



universität
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MASTER THESIS

Titel der Master Thesis / Title of the Master's Thesis

„A Joint EU Strategy for International Cultural Relations-
the Development Towards a European Cultural
Diplomacy?“

verfasst von / submitted by

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angestrebter akademischer Grad / in partial fulfilment of the requirements for the degree of
Master of Advanced International Studies (M.A.I.S.)

Wien 2017 / Vienna 2017

Studienkennzahl lt. Studienblatt
Postgraduate programme code as it appears
on the student record sheet:

A 992 940

Universitätslehrgang lt. Studienblatt
Postgraduate programme as it appears on
the student record sheet:

Internationale Studien / International Studies

Betreut von / Supervisor:

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diplomatische
akademie wien
Vienna School of International Studies
École des Hautes Études Internationales de Vienne

Table of Contents

List of Abbreviations.....	IV
1. Introduction.....	1
2. Evolution of the Legal Framework of Cultural Policy in the EU and the Evolution of Culture in EU External Relations from 1973 to 2017.....	3
2.1. From the Beginning of Culture in the EU in 1977 to 2006.....	4
2.2. From 2007 to 2017: The Institutionalization of EU International Cultural Relations	6
2.3. Culture and EU External Relations in the EU’s Primary Law	13
2.3.1. Basic principles and objectives of EU external relations.....	13
2.3.2. Culture in the EU’s primary law with a special focus on Culture in external relations	14
3. Theoretical and Methodological Framework.....	17
3.1. Literature Review	17
3.1.1. Works on EU cultural policy.....	17
3.1.2. Institutional theories	18
3.2. Theoretical Framework: A Synthesis of Vivien Schmidt’s Discursive Institutionalism and John L. Campbell’s Blend of Historical and Organizational Institutionalism.....	19
3.2.1. Vivien Schmidt’s Discursive Institutionalism	19
3.2.2. John L. Campbell’s Blend of Historical and Organizational Institutionalism	22
3.2.3. The theoretical synthesis	23
3.3. Methodological Framework	25
3.3.1. Non-standardized expert interviews.....	26
3.3.2. Qualitative content analysis	27
4. The Institutional Context and Conditions	30
4.1. Time and timing and the Influence of Personalities	30
4.2. Inter-Institutional Communication (Coordinative Discourse).....	32
4.3. The Open Method of Coordination (OMC).....	34
4.4. The Role of Non-State Actors	35
5. Ideational frames used.....	39
5.1. The ‘creativity frame’ : Culture as a Catalyst for Economic Growth.....	39
5.2. The ‘identity frame’ – “Europe is a cultural superpower”	42

5.3. The ‘European added value frame’	44
6. Ideational Development – Successful Background Ideas	46
6.1. Philosophy of a European Demos and European Identity	46
6.2. The EU’s Philosophy of Values and Soft Power	48
6.3. The Philosophy of the Double Duality of “Culture”	49
6.4. From Cultural Diplomacy to International Cultural Relations	51
6.5. Arm’s Length Principle.....	54
7. Conclusion.....	56
8. Bibliography	61
8.1. Primary Sources.....	61
8.2. Studies and Conferences.....	65
8.3. Literature	66

List of Abbreviations

CFSP	Common Foreign and Security Policy
CoE	Council of Europe
DG	Directorate General
DG DEVCO	Directorate General for International Cooperation and Development
DG EAC	Directorate General for Education and Culture
EC	European Community
ECF	European Cultural Foundation
EEAS	European External Action Service
EP	European Parliament
EU	European Union
EUNIC	European Union National Institutes for Culture
HR	High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy
IO	international organization
MEP	Member of the European Parliament
MS	Member State(s)
NGO	Non-Governmental Organization
OMC	Open Method of Coordination
TEC	Treaty establishing the European Community
TEU	Treaty on European Union
TFEU	Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union
UK	United Kingdom
UNESCO	United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization

1. Introduction

The European Union (EU) is more and more confronted with multiple challenges and crises at the same time. Internal as well as external developments endanger the integration project itself (e.g. Brexit) or threaten to weaken the EU's role as a global actor since emerging countries become more and more important and thus also increasingly invest in starting to build their soft power capacities. Therefore the EU is challenged more than ever to strengthen its efforts and focus on its strong points: soft power and culture. As a consequence it might not come as a surprise that it was thus in the last decade, in which culture became more and more globalized, and migration, and with it right-wing populism, increased, that the value of cultural policy was reconsidered. It was then, that the idea of a strategic approach for Culture in the Union's external relations appeared.

In 2007, in the "European agenda for culture in a globalizing world" the European Commission for the first time strongly emphasized the importance of culture in external relations and started to express its will to develop a strategic approach to integrate culture into "all external and development policies" and introduced the Open Method of Coordination in the field of Culture. Around the same time, the European Union National Institutes for Culture (EUNIC) was founded. Since then, three work plans for culture (2008-2010, 2011-2014, 2015-2018) were developed and the efforts towards a strategy for international cultural relations increased and were put forward by a report of the Member of the European Parliament (MEP) Marietje Schaake, a Preparatory Action for "Culture in External Relations" and lastly, also by a Joint Communication from the Commission and the European External Action Service (EEAS) to the European Parliament (EP) and the Council "Towards an EU Strategy for international cultural relations" in June 2016.

However, until 1993 the Commission of the European Community (EC) did not even mention the term "cultural policy" since its founding treaty, the Treaty of Rome (1957), did not include express cultural competence. It was only with the Treaty of Maastricht (1992) Art. 128 that the term "culture" was introduced and competence in that field was given to the EC. Nevertheless, a common cultural policy was still not foreseen. This article was also included into the Treaty of Lisbon (2007), as Art. 167, but this time offered the opportunity for cultural action of the Union in the form of "supporting and supplementing" the Member States' (MS) actions and "encouraging cooperation" between them.

Thus, the efforts to enhance common efforts in the field of (also external) cultural policy have increased steadily, however, up until today the cultural policy field is strongly torn between

pursuing common efforts and maintaining the Member States' (sole) national competence in the field. Nevertheless, the EU still tries to strike this balance and has already become highly active in the area of culture. This development was not only possible because of the EU's own motivation but has also been strongly put forward by non-state actors, especially advocacy groups and transnational networks in the field of culture.

In this thesis, I want to analyze the current developments of Culture in EU external relations, especially the making of an EU Strategy for international cultural relations – why and how it develops, which competing ideas shape and serve to legitimize it, as well as what it means for the Union and its Member States. My research question will therefore be: What explains the institutionalisation of EU international cultural relations? Answering this question will allow to understand why and how the EU external cultural policies are developing into a program, the EU strategy for international cultural relations. In this thesis, I will mainly focus on the role of ideas in this process. Furthermore, this research question permits to elaborate on whether we can speak of the development of a cultural diplomacy strategy for the EU, what creates difficulties in such a process, hint at what a final EU strategy for international cultural relations might look like, and by which ideas, processes and actors it is shaped.

The thesis will be structured in the following manner: In the second chapter I will trace the evolution of Culture in external relations in the EU context until today (mid 2017). In this section also the legal framework of the cultural policy field in the EU and its evolution – from the introduction of cultural policy in the EU Treaty of Maastricht, the Treaty of Amsterdam and its enhanced role through the Treaty of Lisbon – will be presented. The third chapter will discuss and explain the theoretical and methodological framework, which I will use in order to answer my research question. The following chapters of this thesis will then consist of my empirical analysis, using my theoretical and methodological framework, and try to offer an explanation for the institutionalization of culture in the EU's external relations. In this part I will present the most important elements allowing for this development – the enabling institutional context and the influencing ideas, whether they served as discursive frames or as philosophical background ideas as defined by Vivien A. Schmidt. In this analysis, the expert interviews will be woven in to supplement the information from written documents. The instrument of analysis will be the inductively developed categories along which I will study the documents.

The concepts and terms (e.g. culture, Cultural Diplomacy, Soft Power, European identity, European values) I will come across during these chapters will be discussed and set into context as they appear.

The last chapter of the thesis will contain a conclusion, presenting and summarizing the results of my research and Furthermore, also discuss the possible future of a EU Strategy for international and cultural relations.

2. Evolution of the Legal Framework of Cultural Policy in the EU and the Evolution of Culture in EU External Relations from 1973 to 2017

This chapter describes the evolution of culture in EU external relations. Knowing and understanding the history of the introduction and development of ‘Culture’ in the EU is important to grasp and explain this rather new phenomenon of the institutionalization of international cultural relations since 2007. I therefore will try to show the roots of the EU’s cultural policies, how they changed and evolved, as well as which ideas appeared over time, presenting the most important documents of the EU’s policy and work in this field from 1973 until mid -2017. The evolution of ideas we can thus trace, will also play a major role in the empirical analysis and explanation of the current development of institutionalization. Since the focus of this thesis lies on the institutionalization of international cultural relations, which has been taking place since 2007, I will also concentrate on the last ten years in this part of the paper.

As I will show in this chapter of the thesis, culture started to be an issue to be treated in the EU in the 1970s. However, while the EU only started to deal with culture then, the Council of Europe (CoE), an intergovernmental organization very close to the EU, founded in 1945, having 47 Member States (thus transgressing the borders of the EU), had had culture at its core since its foundation. The CoE focuses on cooperation rather than integration and with regard to content it concentrates on human rights, cultural and social themes.¹ The CoE proclaimed and promoted one “European culture” and introduced the concept of “unity in diversity”, which it pronounced in different documents on multicultural society, diversity as well as cultural identity, as for example the European Cultural Convention signed in 1954.² In its work the CoE relies on the cooperation of governmental and no-governmental organization and it was thus able to build a special expertise and know-how in the field of culture.³ Hence, the CoE can be considered to be a forerunner, and a think tank for cultural policy in the EU, as Sassatelli argues: “Rationale, strategy, even operational modes: especially in recent years the EU has been drawing its inspiration

¹ Sassatelli 2009, p. 59

² Ibid.

³ Ibid., p. 60

from the CoE's approach (...).⁴ The CoE and the EU work closely together and signed a Memorandum of Understanding in 2007 agreeing to share symbols (e.g. European flag), support each other mutually and to cooperate in all the areas of shared interests.⁵ Furthermore, the two organizations both base their approach to cultural affairs on the "(...) proliferation of more or less formal networks and projects of local cultural operators."⁶

The main two sections of this chapter will now illustrate the evolution of cultural action at Community/Union level as well as the institutionalization of EU international cultural relations having taken place in the last ten years.

2.1. From the Beginning of Culture in the EU in 1977 to 2006

As Sassatelli notes, the cultural action of the European Community started in the late 1970s. However, it was only "marginal and disguised", as she emphasizes. According to Sassatelli the strategy of Commission Communications at the time was to deliver: "(...) public documents that stimulate reflection in the relevant sectors (...)."⁷

As explicitly mentioned in the first Commission Communication on cultural action, "Community action in the cultural sector", action of the Community in the cultural sector "(...) necessarily centered on solving the economic and social problems as in all others [sectors]."⁸ Thus, the communication legitimated cultural policy as a specification of economic or social policies as Staiger argues.⁹ It calls for the "Application of the Treaty to the Cultural Sector", which mainly means economic policy in the cultural sector, as no provision on culture had yet been included in the Treaties.¹⁰ Furthermore, the document considers culture to be a "(...) means of arousing a greater feeling of belonging and solidarity amongst Europeans."¹¹ It thus aims at supporting cultural exchange within the (former) Community and encourages "Cooperation between the cultural institutes of the Member States".¹² Apart from these, no other aspects of external cultural policy were included in this first main document of the European Community in the field of culture.

⁴ Ibid., p. 64

⁵ Ibid.

⁶ Ibid., p. 68; this will be further elaborated for the EU's approach in the chapter of the empirical analysis

⁷ Sassatelli 2007, p. 30

⁸ European Commission 1977, p. 5

⁹ Staiger 2009, p. 2

¹⁰ The integration of a provision on culture only takes place with the adoption of the Treaty of Maastricht. Chapter 2.3 discusses the legal basis for former Community and now Union action in the field of culture.

¹¹ European Commission 1977, p. 5

¹² Ibid., p. 21f

In 1983, the Solemn Declaration on the European Union was signed by the European Council. Sassatelli sees this document as a turning point: “(...) cultural action was finally endorsed in the shape of co-operation in higher education, cultural heritage and dissemination of culture, within the wider programme of building a ‘union’, as a means of fostering a common identity.”¹³ It even includes its own section on internal cultural cooperation. In this context the declaration also calls for “(...) closer coordination of cultural activities in third countries, within the framework of Political Cooperation.”¹⁴ The main objective of the Declaration, though, is building an ever closer union, also through culture “(...) to affirm the awareness of a common cultural heritage as an element in the European identity.”¹⁵ As we will see in this chapter, as well as in the empirical analysis of the institutionalization of EU international cultural relations, these two ideas, culture’s importance in economy as well as for building a Union identity have evolved but have accompanied cultural action in the EU in a different form until today.

However, especially the identity-building objective played a major role in the beginning of cultural action in the 1970s and 80s. To this purpose several cultural actions were introduced in the 1980s like the „European Cities of Culture“.¹⁶ In 1985, the Adonnio Reports on “A people’s Europe” appeared. The core idea of this report is, that the EU’s integration process should more carefully consider the importance of community building by fostering a common European identity.¹⁷ In the Report it is furthermore, emphasized that the fields of culture and communication are essential to a European identity.¹⁸

In 1987, the Commission Communication “A Fresh Boost for Culture in the European Community” proposed a framework program for a 5-year period, until 1992. This program covered five areas: the “Creation of a European cultural area”, “Promotion of the European audiovisual industry”, “Access to cultural resources”, “Training for the cultural sector” and “Dialogue with the rest of the world”.¹⁹ Therefore, also in this Commission Communication the focus lies on the economic aspects of culture, but it also called for “Dialogue with the rest of the world”, pursuing a rather classical cultural diplomacy approach (event based showcasing of European culture) with enhanced cooperation among the MS and the Union institutions. In February 1992, the Treaty on European Union was signed in Maastricht. In this Treaty, for the first time a provi-

¹³ Sassatelli 2009, p. 51

¹⁴ European Council 1983, 3.3

¹⁵ Ibid., 1.4.3.

¹⁶ Littoz-Monnet 2012, p. 509

¹⁷ Adonnio 1985; see also Littoz-Monnet 2012, p. 509

¹⁸ Ibid., 3.1.

¹⁹ European Commission 1987

sion on culture was included (in Art.128) with the objective of protecting and promoting cultural diversity internally as well as bringing the common heritage to the fore. This article provided for supplementary competence for the Union in the sphere of culture, but nevertheless safeguards the MS sole competence in the field.²⁰ This tension between unity and diversity expressed in the Treaty provision became the Union's Motto through a contest in 2000: "United in Diversity."²¹

The first Community programs for the implementation of cultural action were Kaleidoscope, Raphael and Ariane, which started in 1996/1997. However, in 2000, a "single financing and programming instrument", the Culture 2000 program was established.²² The program's objectives were the protection and promotion of cultural diversity and intercultural dialogue (even with third countries). It also emphasizes again the economic and social benefits of culture.²³

As Sassatelli argues, the Community's cultural policy from 1977 until 2006 mainly was a two-fold policy. On the one hand the cultural policy of that time can be considered an extension of less identity-sensitive areas (i.e. the economic sphere; culture as another industry), on the other hand a European cultural identity was aimed at through these policies.²⁴ According to Sassatelli, EU intervention in culture was a "(...) mixture of *dirigiste* support schemes, symbolic initiatives and attempts to harmonize EU law in terms of the Single Market."²⁵ However, Sassatelli insists that the Community's action's "(...) symbolic dimension, which focuse[d] on identity-building, [was] the theoretical rationale of the policy as a whole."²⁶

In the next part of this chapter, I will now address the still ongoing process of institutionalization of EU international cultural relations from 2007 onwards.

2.2. From 2007 to 2017: The Institutionalization of EU International Cultural Relations

As will be shown in this part of the thesis, from 2007 onwards more and more EU policies on culture, and more precisely for the first time on culture in the EU's external relations, have been developed, which have started to become more and more institutionalized, meaning that they are transforming from several policies (1st level foreground ideas) into a fully-fledged policy program (2nd level foreground idea).

²⁰ The legal basis for Union cultural action will be more closely discussed in Chapter 2.3.2.

²¹ The EU Motto, online

²² European Parliament and the Council 2000

²³ Ibid.

²⁴ Sassatelli 2009, p. 56f

²⁵ Ibid., p. 57

²⁶ Ibid.

In December 2006, the EU acceded to the 2005 UNESCO Convention on the Protection and Promotion of the Diversity of Cultural Expressions, which was approved by a Council Decision in May 2006.²⁷ The Convention commits the Parties to it to fostering international cultural cooperation, particularly to strengthening “(...) partnerships with and among civil society [and] non-governmental organizations (...).”²⁸ The Convention pursues a twin-track approach to culture, defining it as a way of life (culture in the broad anthropological sense) as well as artistic expression (narrow definition of culture as ‘art’).²⁹ The Convention especially emphasizes the importance of the protection and promotion of cultural diversity and intercultural dialogue to allow for mutual understanding among peoples and cultures.³⁰ It therefore calls for the incorporation of “(...) culture as a strategic element in national and international development policies.”³¹ As Staiger explains, at the latest since the 2005 UNESCO Convention “cultural diversity” and “intercultural dialogue” have “(...) become catchword[s] in EU cultural policy [reappearing in all the main future policy documents in the field of culture].”³² Furthermore, the Convention underlines the economic benefits culture brings about but also insists on culture’s own value.³³ The document moreover sets out that civil society should participate actively to achieve the goals of the Convention.³⁴

The first main document showing the importance of culture in EU external relations and development policy was the 2007 Commission’s Communication “On a European Agenda on Culture in Globalizing World”. Since then, a strategic framework for action in the cultural field is called for. The Agenda has three main objectives, which are also coherent with the objectives of the 2005 UNESCO Convention, which entered into force only months before the Agenda:

- “The promotion of cultural diversity and intercultural dialogue;”
- “The promotion of culture as a catalyst for creativity in the framework of the Lisbon Strategy for growth and jobs;“
- “The promotion of culture as a vital element in the Union’s international relations.”³⁵

The document refers to agreements like the Cotonou agreement or other agreements with third countries, showing that culture already plays an important role in the EU’s external relations. It

²⁷ Council of the European Union 2006

²⁸ UNESCO Convention 2005, Art.12(c)

²⁹ Ibid. Art.4(1)

³⁰ UNESCO Convention 2005

³¹ Ibid., p. 1

³² Staiger 2009, p. 7f

³³ UNESCO Convention 2005, Art.2(5)

³⁴ Ibid. 2005 Art.11

³⁵ European Commission 2007, p. 8

emphasizes the principle of subsidiarity of action in the field and proposes the Open Method of Coordination (OMC), which had already been used in other domains as well, as an informal possibility for the Member States to coordinate their efforts.³⁶ Furthermore, a flexible dialogue with cultural stakeholders is encouraged. The European Agenda for Culture, like the 2005 UNESCO Convention, uses a dual definition for culture: as fine arts *and* as a symbolic world of meanings (as a way of life), as Sassatelli explains,³⁷ and therefore promotes a “twin-track approach” to culture. On the one hand, it demands the integration of culture in all external policies (mainstreaming of culture) to increase the sustainability of EU action, while on the other hand, it defines culture as a value of its own and asks for support for specific cultural events.³⁸ The Agenda also emphasizes, “(...) unity in diversity, respect for cultural and linguistic diversity and promotion of a common cultural heritage lies at the very heart of the European project.”³⁹ Intercultural dialogue and cultural diversity, however, are also important “for a global order based on peace, mutual understanding and respect for shared values, such as the protection and promotion of human rights and the protection of languages.”⁴⁰ For its implementation triennial (later on quadrennial) work plans for culture (2008-2010, 2011-2014, 2015-2018) were elaborated. The Agenda thus set first multiannual frameworks in the field of culture.

Also in 2007, EUNIC was founded as a rather informal network of the EU’s MS’ national cultural institutes, which are represented in it. Through EUNIC the MS’ cultural institutes can cooperate with each other in “European” Projects. EUNIC works on two levels: EUNIC Global with EUNIC’s director and the general assembly meeting twice a year and its seat in Brussels, and the EUNIC Clusters (local networks in MS and third states).⁴¹ As will be shown in the empirical analysis of this thesis, EUNIC and other Non-Governmental Organizations (NGOs) have played a major role in the institutionalization of EU international cultural relations

In the context of the European Year of Intercultural Dialogue 2008, the coming into force of the 2005 UNESCO Convention and the European Agenda for Culture, as well as EUNIC’s foundation and in order to further enhance the role of culture in EU external relations, the Council approved the ‘Conclusions on the promotion of cultural diversity and intercultural dialogue in the external relations of the Union and its Member States’ in November 2008. Also this document calls upon the Member States and the Commission to develop a European strategy for a

³⁶ Council Resolution 2007 Art.9

³⁷ Sassatelli 2009, p. 57f

³⁸ European Commission 2007, p. 10

³⁹ Ibid., p. 2

⁴⁰ Ibid.

⁴¹ Website EUNIC

consistent integration of culture in the EU's external relations.⁴² As Lisack explains, since the European Agenda for Culture the significance of culture for European external relations has been increasing at the political level.⁴³

Therefore, not only the Council and the Commission are responsible for the momentum Culture in the EU's external relations gained, but also the European Parliament. In May 2011, the EP passed a resolution on the cultural dimensions of the EU's external actions based on a parliamentary report by MEP Marietje Schaake and the Committee on Culture and Education. The parliamentary resolution calls for the adoption of a "Green paper on culture and cultural cooperation in the EU's external actions" by the Commission⁴⁴ as it "Is concerned at the fragmentation of external EU cultural policy and projects, which is hampering the strategic and efficient use of cultural resources and the development of a visible common EU strategy on the cultural aspects of the EU's external relations."⁴⁵ The parliament underlines "(...) the cross-cutting nature and the importance of culture in all aspects of life (...) in line with Article 167(4) of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU);"⁴⁶ and stresses the importance of cooperation with civil society (NGOs, cultural networks like EUNIC)⁴⁷. The EP also decided on a budget of €500,000 for a "Preparatory Action" in the field of Culture in external relations.⁴⁸ The strategic green paper demanded in the EP's resolution, however, is yet to come. However, as I will show, major steps have already been taken in that proposed direction.

Even some organizational changes in the EEAS, which was established in 2010, took place, when in early 2014, "(...) a Senior Advisor on Cultural Matters [Alain Ruche] was appointed to the office of the Secretary General of the EEAS (...)."⁴⁹

One year before, the European Parliament initiated a Preparatory Action on Culture in EU external relations. It was implemented by the European Commission, through a commissioned external consortium (headed by the Goethe Institute), which carried out the Preparatory Action from 2013-2014.⁵⁰ The consortium consisted of some cultural institutes from EU MS (British Council, Danish Cultural Institute, Institut français) as well as some European cultural networks (European Cultural Foundation, Institut für Auslandsbeziehungen) the advisory company KEA,

⁴² Council Conclusions 2008, Art.6(B)

⁴³ Lisack 2014, p. 16

⁴⁴ European Parliament 2011, Art.38

⁴⁵ Ibid., Art.9

⁴⁶ Ibid., Art.1; for Art.167(4) TFEU see Chapter 2.3.1.

⁴⁷ European Parliament 2011, Art.8

⁴⁸ Website Preparatory Action

⁴⁹ Lisack 2014, p. 8

⁵⁰ Ibid.

BOZAR Centre for Fine Arts in Brussels as well as some independent experts like Prof. Yudhishtir Raj Isar, Rod Fisher and Damien Helly. EUNIC global participated as an associated partner. The purpose of the Preparatory Action was to analyze the existing situation as regards culture in the EU's external relations and to carry out a comprehensive inquiry. It was also expected to strengthen ongoing policy developments and to recommend a strategic approach to the deployment of culture in European external relations.⁵¹ “*Dialogue through culture, understanding through culture, empowerment through culture, as well as prosperity through culture: these themes are the common threads that ran through the evidence of this inquiry.*”⁵²

The task of the consortium was to map expectations, existing resources, approaches and strategies regarding culture in external relations in EU Member States and third countries concerned. Then, a consultation process with stakeholders in third countries took place. The results were presented and recommendations given in a final report.⁵³ The inquiry found “(...) that EU action in culture in external relations, once it is strengthened and better coordinated, offers considerable and multi-faceted potential for EU Member States, Europe's civil societies, and the EU itself.”⁵⁴ The purpose of a strategy for culture in EU external relations would be to “(...) optimize the deployment of international cultural relations in a new spirit of dialogue, mutual listening and learning, joint capacity building and global solidarity.”⁵⁵ However, for the new strategy to be successful, “New or adapted mechanisms of governance and implementation will need to be put in place.”⁵⁶

Within the EU institutions the Preparatory Action and its findings attracted a lot of attention and it has become the document of reference for the future development of culture in EU external relations. Thus, in November 2015, the Council Conclusions on culture in the EU's external relations with a focus on culture in development cooperation also refer to it, emphasizing the “(...) need for a better coordination of efforts towards a strategic European approach (...)” for culture in external relation. In this document the Council also underlines the necessity to go beyond showcasing of European cultures and “(...) aim at generating a new spirit of dialogue, mutual listening and learning, joint capacity building and global solidarity (...)”.⁵⁷

⁵¹ Isar et al. 2014, p. 24

⁵² Ibid., p. 22

⁵³ Ibid., p.23f

⁵⁴ Ibid., p. 107

⁵⁵ Ibid.

⁵⁶ Ibid.

⁵⁷ Council Conclusions 2015, Art.7

In 2016, the EEAS issued a roadmap for the initiative “A Strategy on Cultural Diplomacy”. It refers to the 2008 Council Conclusions, the 2011 Parliamentary Resolution, the Preparatory Action as well as the 2015 Council Conclusion as the bases for policy action.⁵⁸ It determines the further steps towards a strategy for EU cultural diplomacy. It sets the date for the set up of a “Cultural Diplomacy platform” in “early 2016” and for a Joint Communication (from the Commission and the High Representative) on such a strategy in May 2016. As three main policy objectives “(...) foster[ing] culture as an engine for social progress and job creation (...)”, “(...) preservation and promotion of cultural heritage”, as well as the promotion of intercultural dialogue are determined. Furthermore, the Commission’s Consultation Approach is described.⁵⁹

As will be discussed in a more detailed manner in Chapter 4.2.2.4., while the roadmap is still called “A Strategy on Cultural Diplomacy”, on 8 June 2016, thus with a slight delay, the foreseen Joint Communication from the Commission and the High Representative (HR) was published, called “Towards an EU strategy for international cultural relations”. Being based on the preceding policies, this joint communication aims at establishing a strategic framework for culture in EU international relations. It calls for a shift from merely projecting the EU’s culture(s) to an approach of mutual listening, learning and understanding. The Communication gives an overview of already existing EU action in the field as well as of the existent financing instruments.⁶⁰

The proposed strategy comprises three strands of objectives: “supporting culture as an engine for sustainable social and economic development”, “promoting culture and intercultural dialogue for peaceful inter-community relations” and “reinforcing cooperation on cultural heritage”. Furthermore, it is based on five guiding principles: to “promote cultural diversity and respect for human rights”, to “foster mutual respect and inter-cultural dialogue”, to “ensure complementarity and subsidiarity”, to “encourage a cross-cutting approach to culture” and to “promote culture through existing frameworks for cooperation”.⁶¹ Like the European Agenda for Culture, it also emphasizes the utility of the OMC, “variable geometry”, and “smart complementarity” among the actors. Thereby the EU delegations should serve as the local mediators for example between national cultural institutes of culture and local cultural actors.

In November 2016, the Council met in Brussels and discussed the Joint Communication, especially the way in which the MS and the EU could cooperate successfully. At the Council

⁵⁸ European Commission 2016, online

⁵⁹ Ibid.

⁶⁰ European Commission and the High Representative 2016

⁶¹ Ibid.

Meeting the ministers agreed “(...) that culture is the cornerstone and the cement of Europe.” Furthermore, planned national actions were outlined and it was decided to also address international cultural relations in the Foreign Affairs Council.⁶²

On the EP’s own initiative a report on the Joint Communication was drafted in the Committee on Foreign Affairs and the Committee on Culture and Education. In this draft report the EP welcomes the Joint Communication and calls for the adoption “(...) of an effective EU strategy for international cultural relations.”⁶³ However, the report is very much concerned with the implementation of the communication and demands the presentation of annual and multiannual action plans.⁶⁴ Moreover the launch of European Houses for Culture and festivals is supported.⁶⁵ The next step ahead now is the vote on the report as well as the negotiation of the amendments to it in the EP.

The Council with its Council Conclusions of May 23, 2017 already endorsed the Communication thus recognizing that culture needs to play a role in “(...) a strategic and cross-cutting approach to the Union’s international relations;).⁶⁶ Furthermore, the Council recommends the creation of a Friends of the Presidency Group as a platform to develop an encompassing approach to international cultural relations.⁶⁷

Concerning the future strategy’s implementation, on May 16, 2017, an administrative agreement between the EEAS and the Commission, and EUNIC was struck “(...) to create a new form of partnership (...)”⁶⁸ between the EEAS, the Commission and EUNIC, as proposed in the 2016 Joint Communication. Its objective is enhanced concertation of the approach to international cultural relations and cooperation on the basis of “variable geometry” (as suggested in the 2014 Preparatory Action and the 2016 Joint Communication), allowing MS’ national cultural institutes to participate in projects according to their needs and interests.⁶⁹

As Figueira rightly argues “The strategy marks a shift in EU policy regarding culture: it sets a vision and aims for a coherent and structured approach, based on a complementarity principle with the Member States.”⁷⁰ However, Figueira underlines, that she sees the strategy “(...)

⁶² Outcome of the Council Meeting 2016

⁶³ Brok and Costa 2017, Art.1

⁶⁴ Ibid., Art.9

⁶⁵ Ibid., Art.30

⁶⁶ Council Conclusions 2017, Art.5

⁶⁷ Ibid., Art7

⁶⁸ European Commission and the High Representative 2016

⁶⁹ European External Action Service, EUNIC and the European Commission 2017.

⁷⁰ Figueira 2017, p. 82

as an envelopment strategy of existing mechanisms and activities – thus, although a huge step for the EU (...)", she does not consider it a policy innovation.⁷¹

I, however, argue that this strategy represents the institutionalization of EU international cultural relations and constitutes a policy program that developed out of single policies. The proposed strategy establishes and embodies a first policy program to Culture in EU external relations, as it offers a definition of the problems to be solved by future policies and sets out the "(...) norms, methods and instruments to be applied (...)" in the problem solution.⁷² However, the preceding documents in the field since the 2007 European Agenda for Culture made major ideational contributions to this policy program and can be considered to make up the institutionalization process of EU international cultural relations.

In the chapters of my empirical analysis and by making use of my theoretical and methodological framework, I will try to explain how this institutionalization, this evolution from policies to program, has become possible. In the next part of this chapter, though, Culture and EU external relations in the EU's primary law will shortly be presented to also offer an overview of the legal background and basis of international cultural relations.

2.3. Culture and EU External Relations in the EU's Primary Law

2.3.1. Basic principles and objectives of EU external relations

The basic principles and objectives of EU external relations are laid down in Title V of the TEU, especially in Art.21 of the Treaty on European Union (TEU) and Art.22 TEU.

Art.21(1) TEU sets out the principles of EU external action: "The Union's action on the international scene *shall be guided by the principles which have inspired its own creation, development and enlargement* [italics mine], and which it seeks to advance in the wider world: *democracy, the rule of law, the universality and indivisibility of human rights and fundamental freedoms, respect for human dignity, the principles of equality and solidarity* [italics mine], and respect for the principles of the United Nations Charter and international law."⁷³ Thus, EU external relations should be based on the Union's values and contribute to their promotion and dissemination.

⁷¹ Ibid.

⁷² Schmidt 2008, p. 306

⁷³ Treaty on European Union, Art.21(1)

Furthermore, according to paragraph two of Art.21(1) TEU, relations and partnerships with third countries as well as international organizations (IOs) shall be built⁷⁴ and an increased degree of international cooperation in all spheres shall be achieved to protect and promote the Union's values and assist developing countries as set out in Art.21(2) TEU.⁷⁵ This is again underlined in Art.205 TFEU where it is stated that EU external action "(...) shall be guided by the principles, pursue the objectives and be conducted in accordance with the general provisions laid down in Chapter 1 Title V of the Treaty on European Union."⁷⁶

As Art.22(1) states, the concrete strategic interests and goals of EU external action shall be determined by the European Council, comprised of heads of states and governments, by the unanimous adoption of decisions based upon recommendations from the Council of the European Union (Council) and with regard to Art.22 TEU.⁷⁷

According to Art.216 TFEU the EU has the capacity to conclude international bi- or multi-lateral agreements with states and IOs "(...) where the Treaties so provide or where the conclusion of an agreement is necessary in order to achieve (...) one of the objectives referred to in the Treaties, or is provided for in a legally binding Union act (...)." Furthermore, Art.216 TFEU underlines that agreements which the EU concludes, bind its institutions as well as its Member States.⁷⁸ Article 37 TEU, moreover, lays down that the EU also has the capacity to conclude international agreements even in its Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP).⁷⁹

2.3.2. Culture in the EU's primary law with a special focus on Culture in external relations

Culture as a field of EU action was introduced into the legal framework of the Union with Art.128 of the Treaty of Maastricht in 1992 and thus "(...) establish[ed] clear competences in the field of culture at the supranational level."⁸⁰ Also Sassatelli underlines that while intergovernmental cultural action in the EU started in the late 1970s "(...) a specific, supranational competence on culture was introduced by the Treaty on the European Union (TEU), signed in Maastricht in 1992 (...) which contains a title on culture."⁸¹ With the adoption of the Treaty of Amsterdam, which entered into force in 1999, culture remained a field for EU action under Art.151

⁷⁴ Ibid.

⁷⁵ Ibid., Art.21(2)

⁷⁶ Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union, Art.205

⁷⁷ Treaty on European Union, Art.22(1), see also Art.24(1)

⁷⁸ Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union, Art.216(1)(2)

⁷⁹ Treaty on European Union, Art.37

⁸⁰ Laşan 2014, p. 5

⁸¹ Sassatelli 2009, p. 52

TEC. Also in the Treaty of Lisbon the article including cultural policy to EU action was incorporated in Art.167 TFEU. Until the article's inclusion into the Lisbon Treaty, the Council had to adopt recommendations *unanimously*, based on a proposal from the Commission. Only with the adoption of the Lisbon Treaty was this unanimity requirement eliminated.⁸²

Paragraphs three and four of Art.167 TFEU lay down what role culture should play in the EU's external relations. Art.167(3) TFEU sets out that the EU and its Member states (MS) "(...) shall foster cooperation with third countries and the competent international organizations in the sphere of culture, in particular the Council of Europe."⁸³ Psychogiopoulou, with regard to this provision (as in the Treaty of Amsterdam), argues that due to "(...) the lack of express reference to the conclusion of international agreements of cultural subject matter, Article 151(3) TEC [now Art.167(3) TFEU] does not seem to confer a general power on the Community to enter into treaties with third countries or international organizations in the field of culture *per se*."⁸⁴ She underlines that paragraph 5 of Art.167 TFEU (formerly Art.151 TEC), with the express exclusion of harmonization of the MS' laws in the field of culture, asserts this argument even more. Though, how should the EU (formerly EC) implement this provision if not by concluding international agreements? Article 167(3) TFEU (formerly Art.151(3) TEC), however, could be interpreted in the context of the doctrine of implied powers, as allowing for international agreements to enable the attainment of the objectives set out in Art.167(2) TFEU (former Art.151(2)TEC), as Psychogiopoulou underlines.⁸⁵ This opinion is supported by the fact, that the Council Decision approving the EC's accession to the 2005 UNESCO Convention, mentions Art.151 TEC as one of its legal bases. This shows, that the EC (and now the EU) have considered that Art.151 TEC (now Art.167 TFEU) supplies the EC (or now the EU) with treaty making power in the field of cultural cooperation.⁸⁶

Maybe even more importantly, Art.167(4) TFEU states: "The Union shall take cultural aspects into account in its action under other provisions of the Treaties, in particular in order to respect and to promote the diversity of its cultures."⁸⁷ This provision leaves plenty of room for the inclusion and mainstreaming of culture in all of the Union's activities. Especially cultural diversity as a crosscutting concern of the EU is emphasized.⁸⁸

⁸² Laşan 2014, p. 11

⁸³ Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union, Art.167(3)

⁸⁴ Psychogiopoulou 2007, p. 35

⁸⁵ Ibid.

⁸⁶ Council Decision 2006; see also Psychogiopoulou 2007, p. 36

⁸⁷ Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union, Art.167(4)

⁸⁸ Laşan 2014, p. 11

However, the Union's actions in the field of culture are strongly limited, since, as Art.6 TFEU shows, in the sphere of culture the EU only has the competence "(...) to carry out actions to support, coordinate or supplement the actions of the Member states."⁸⁹ In Art.167(5) TFEU it is even explicitly mentioned, that any kind of harmonization of the Member states' law shall be excluded from Union action in the field of culture.⁹⁰ These two provisions⁹¹ were introduced into the Treaties in order to protect the Member states' own interests and efforts in cultural policy, which seems to be an especially sensitive issue.⁹² Therefore, MS can conclude agreements with third countries or international organizations in the sphere of cultural cooperation as long as they do not jeopardize the EU's objectives as set out in Art.4(3) Paragraph 3 TEU.⁹³ As Laşan argues, it is the two principles of subsidiarity and preservation of cultural diversity, which are at the core of European cultural policy.⁹⁴

Sassatelli summarizes: The "EU competence in cultural matters is now legitimated, but it is also given clear limits."⁹⁵ This legal framework also made the status of cultural initiatives clearer, which is why new cultural programs have emerged after Maastricht (e.g. Kaleidoscope, Ariane, Culture2000).

Culture is also included in the Union's external relations body of law more directly, in the chapter on Common Commercial Policy, more precisely in Art.207(4) TFEU, which lays down that the Council shall negotiate and conclude agreements in the field of trade in cultural and audiovisual services acting unanimously.⁹⁶

As Avocats, the author of a study requested by the European Parliament's Committee on Culture and Education, explains, "The Treaty of the EU imposes on the European Community and its Member States the promotion of cultural aspects in their international relations as well as in their development and trade-related policies, to contribute to a better world order based on sustainable development, peaceful coexistence and dialogue between cultures."⁹⁷ As we will see in the following chapters, this aiming at sustainable development, peaceful coexistence and dialogue between cultures, appears in all the main EU documents as well as agreements concerning international cultural relations.

⁸⁹ Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union, Art.6

⁹⁰ Ibid., Art.167(5)

⁹¹ Ibid., Art.6 and Art.167(5)

⁹² Laşan 2014, p. 6, 11

⁹³ Treaty on European Union Art.4(3)Paragraph 3

⁹⁴ Laşan 2014, p. 10

⁹⁵ Sassatelli 2009, p. 53

⁹⁶ Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union, Art.207(4)

⁹⁷ Avocats 2010, p. 199

After having set out the historical as well as legal background, now the theoretical and methodological framework used in my analysis of the institutionalization of EU international cultural relations will be presented. In my empirical analysis I will then investigate what explains this development from single policies to a policy program for EU international cultural relations, as set out above.

3. Theoretical and Methodological Framework

3.1. Literature Review

3.1.1. Works on EU cultural policy

Even though it is a quite young policy field for the EU, there is already a great array of literature on EU public diplomacy (Duke 2013), cultural policy or Culture in EU External Relations. Some works especially focus on the ambiguity of the term ‘culture’ and its relation to European identity but leave out other important constituting ideas (Bátora 2011a, 2011b; Mokre 2011; Sassatelli 2002). Also Giacomo Tagiuri (2014) describes the relationship between the creation of a European Identity and a European culture and tracks the “emergence of culture as a policy object”.

Brix (2011) focuses on the ambiguous role of Member States in Culture in the EU’s external relations, arguing that they cooperate and compete in the field.

Claudia Schneider (2016) empirically researches on the cooperation of national cultural institutes within the EUNIC Berlin Cluster and EUNIC Global and analyzes the tendencies of Europeanization of the cultural policy of the Member States, the European public and the collective European identity constructions. Claudia Brückner in her thesis (2010) “Europäisierung der Auswärtigen Kulturpolitik Deutschlands? Eine Analyse der deutschen Auswärtigen Kulturpolitik unter Einfluss der EU-Kulturpolitik” also works with the theory of Europeanization and researches on the effects of a EU cultural policy on the German external cultural policy.

Anna Katharina Obenhuber (2011) in her thesis, “Culture in the European Union’s External Relations: The Anna Lindh Foundation as Cultural Diplomacy at Arm’s Length?”, argues for a Euro-Mediterranean Cultural regime and analyses it with the tools offered by Regime Theory especially focusing on the role of the Anna Lindh Foundation as an arm’s length diplomacy instrument in this regime.

In all these works, the role of ideas in the institutionalization EU international cultural relations has never really been discussed. Also the last and maybe most important step so far in this development was only taken in June 2016 and has not yet been analyzed and dealt with. In order

to examine this evolution, I reviewed institutionalist theories since they study the formation and evolution of institutions. However, in what is following, I will only give a brief description of the institutionalist theories and explain how I came to choose my theoretical framework.

3.1.2. Institutionalist theories

The ‘new’ institutionalist theories can be categorized in Rational Choice Institutionalism, Historical Institutionalism, Sociological or Organizational Institutionalism and Discursive Institutionalism. Within all of these approaches there is great heterogeneity among authors, in the following, I will therefore only present some of them categorically.

Considering actors as focused on their self-interests and their best realization, Rational Choice Institutionalists use economic theories, like the principal-agent or game theory to explain how institutions are formed, developed and solve problems arising between self-interested, rational actors (e.g. Knight 2001; Kiser and Laing 2001). However, in order to analyze the institutionalization of EU international cultural relations this approach does not seem appropriate, as in this process, ideas (as content, as well as tools) play a special role and without them this process cannot be understood properly.

Historical and Organizational Institutionalist theories were the first institutionalist theories to bring ideational factors in, although in the beginning in a very limited way. Historical Institutionalism concentrates on how institutions and normative structures linked to them constrain the policy choices available to actors. Due to their emphasis on structure and its effect, they often seem to leave the agent and his policy making power behind (e.g. Thelen 1999). Organizational Institutionalists on the contrary, argue that institutions and institution building are constituted and legitimized culturally as well as cognitively (e.g. Dobbin 1994).

John Campbell (1998, 2001), however, tries to combine historical and organizational approaches thus offering a toolbox to analyze how ideas are exploited in the policy process and which role they play in institution building and development, which is why Campbell’s theory seems especially appropriate for dealing with my research question.

Discursive Institutionalism as Schmidt (2008) conceptualizes it, tries to explain why certain ideas are successful (influential) in the process of policy development while others are not. She thus considers the importance of ideas in policy making on the level of their contents, not like Campbell as instruments in this process. Therefore, her theory adds another level of analysis to Campbell’s historical and organizational approach.

In my theoretical framework I will thus use those two theories and combine them. In the following theoretical chapter, I will explain and discuss these two theories in more detail and combine them to build my own theoretical framework.

3.2. Theoretical Framework: A Synthesis of Vivien Schmidt's Discursive Institutionalism and John L. Campbell's Blend of Historical and Organizational Institutionalism

In order to answer my research question I will work with Vivien A. Schmidt's theory of discursive institutionalism and Campbell's blend of historical and organizational institutionalism. First in this theoretical chapter, I will describe Schmidt's, then Campbell's theory and then present how the two can be combined.

3.2.1. Vivien Schmidt's Discursive Institutionalism

Vivien A. Schmidt's theory of Discursive Institutionalism, the newest of Institutionalisms⁹⁸, "(...) lends insight into the role of ideas and discourse in politics (...)." Schmidt describes "Ideas (...) [as] the substantive content of discourse." Compared to ideas, discourse can be considered to be a more encompassing concept than ideas as it also denotes "(...) the interactive process of conveying ideas."⁹⁹

Schmidt discerns three levels of ideas, according to their "level of generality": policies, programs, and philosophies. The ideas with the highest level of generality, which often remain unarticulated and in the background are "philosophies". With this concept Schmidt refers to "worldviews", which underpin programs and policies "(...) with organizing ideas, values, and principles of knowledge and society."¹⁰⁰ The term "programs" denotes the next level of ideas that underlie policy ideas in the form of paradigms, which orient policies. Programmatic ideas identify the issues to be resolved by policies, which goals should be achieved and how (with which norms, methods and instruments).¹⁰¹ The interest of research in this field mainly consists

⁹⁸ When speaking of ,new institutionalisms' historical institutionalism, rational choice institutionalism, sociological institutionalism are referred to. Discursive institutionalism can thus be considered to be the newest of institutionalisms.

⁹⁹ Schmidt 2008, p. 309

¹⁰⁰ Ibid., p. 306ff; Schmidt 2016, p.322

¹⁰¹ Schmidt 2008, p. 306ff; Hall 1993, p.279

in discovering why certain ideas from these aforementioned levels are being politically realized while others are not.¹⁰²

Furthermore, Schmidt categorizes ideas with regard to their content into cognitive and normative ideas. Cognitive ideas are also called causal ideas, they offer roadmaps for political action and justify policies and programs. In contrast to this concept, normative ideas link values to political action and thus legitimate policies by arguing that they are appropriate pertaining to second (programs) and third level ideas (philosophies).¹⁰³ Also different forms of ideas, like “narratives, myths, frames, collective memories, stories, scripts, scenarios, images (...)” can be discerned, according to Schmidt.¹⁰⁴

Where in all this does the notion of “background ideas” now fit in? Background ideas, as Schmidt defines them, “(...) consist of the unquestioned assumptions of a polity, the deep philosophical approaches that serve to guide action, the unconscious frames or lenses through which people see the world, and/or the meaning constellations by which people make sense of the world.”¹⁰⁵ Thus, background ideas are usually to be found at the deepest level of ideas (philosophies) but also permeate programs and policies. However, also programmatic ideas themselves can turn into background ideas if they and the goals, instruments, and methods they propagate become unquestioned and taken for granted. Schmidt insists, that in order to discuss background ideas comprehensively, their influence on programs and policies must be explored, too.¹⁰⁶

Besides the interest in persistence and dominance of ideas, also ideational change is a matter of interest here. Hall differentiates between first, second, and third order change. While first and second order changes only “(...) adjust policy without challenging the (...) given policy paradigm (...)”, third order change represents a major shift in the underlying policy paradigm.¹⁰⁷

According to Schmidt, also discourse appears in two forms: coordinative and communicative discourse.¹⁰⁸ Coordinative discourse takes place among policy actors. The term describes their efforts to coordinate consensus between themselves and thus constitutes a process of “poli-

¹⁰² Schmidt 2008, p. 306ff

¹⁰³ Ibid.

¹⁰⁴ Ibid., p. 309

¹⁰⁵ Schmidt 2016, p. 320

¹⁰⁶ Ibid., p. 323

¹⁰⁷ Hall 1993, p. 279

¹⁰⁸ Schmidt 2008, p. 303ff

cy construction”.¹⁰⁹ In contrast to this notion, communicative discourse denotes the communication among policy actors and the public.¹¹⁰

She links interests to ideas by defining them as “(...) subjective ideas, which (...) are neither objective nor material.” Also norms are no “static structures” but “dynamic, intersubjective constructs.”¹¹¹

Also, in the discursive institutionalist understanding, institutions are not structures, which are external to the actors, but rather constructs and structures internal to the actors “(...) whose ‘background ideational abilities’ explain how institutions are created and exist”. However, it is also through the agents’ discursive actions that institutional change or persistence can be explained, Schmidt states.¹¹² Thus, in order to discuss (background) ideas, their evolution and the discursive processes around them, the actors involved in this discourse must be examined. Concerning the consideration of the actors in this process, I especially want to focus on the role of non-state actors and their interaction with and connectedness to policy actors.

Like Schmidt describes it, also in constructivism, agents and structure are seen as mutually constituted.¹¹³ Also Wendt argues that, while “ideas (...) *constitute* social situations and the meaning of material forces (...)” the actors, their identities and interests are also constituted by social structures themselves.¹¹⁴ Wendt explains that a causal relationship can only exist between entities existing independently from each other, however, if entities influence each other, thus, are not independent, their relationship is constitutive.¹¹⁵ As we can see, discursive institutionalism strongly relies on a constructivist understanding, which assumes that not only material factors but also and primarily ideational ones shape human interaction, which institutions are a result of.¹¹⁶ Identity, culture, ideas, norms, knowledge and arguments constitute the focus of constructivism.

¹⁰⁹ Ibid., p. 310

¹¹⁰ Ibid., p. 305

¹¹¹ Ibid., p. 303ff

¹¹² Ibid.

¹¹³ Finnemore and Sikkink 2001, p. 392f

¹¹⁴ Wendt 1999, p. 78

¹¹⁵ Ibid., p. 167

¹¹⁶ Finnemore and Sikkink 2001, p. 391

3.2.2. John L. Campbell's Blend of Historical and Organizational Institutionalism

Also John L. Campbell's blend of Historical and Organizational Institutionalism examines "(...) how ideas affect policy making."¹¹⁷ He supports the historical institutionalist understanding, that institutions might restrict the effect of ideas on policy making, that policy ideas considered acceptable by the policy actors are constrained by deep normative structures, and that the transport of ideas into policy making is mediated by institutions.¹¹⁸ For Campbell, however, ideas do not only serve policy making as guidelines but also by "(...) providing symbols and other discursive schema that actors can use to make these maps appealing, convincing and legitimate."¹¹⁹ And this is where Organizational institutionalism comes in. In Organizational institutionalism, the focus lies on cognitive structures, that can be both enabling and limiting. Nevertheless, in Organizational institutionalism Campbell misses aspects of agency, as actors seem to simply be driven by "(...) institutionalized scripts and cues around them."¹²⁰ Here Campbell brings in the concept of transposition¹²¹ and bricolage¹²². Actors thus "self-consciously" find solutions to upcoming issues by "(...) recombining already available and legitimate concepts, scripts, models, and other cultural artifacts that they find around them in their institutional environment."¹²³ According to Sewell, agency can therefore be defined "(...) as entailing the capacity to transpose or extend the schemas to new contexts."¹²⁴ Transposition thus enables actors to solve new problems, similar to those they have already encountered before.¹²⁵ As Sewell explains, the verb "to transpose" describes the "(...) concrete application of a rule to a new case (...)".¹²⁶

Campbell discerns "(...) four distinct types of ideas depending on whether they operate primarily at a cognitive or normative level and whether they constitute the explicit arguments [foreground ideas] or underlying assumptions [background ideas] of policy debates." Thus Campbell discerns paradigms (cognitive background ideas), public sentiments (normative background ideas), programs (cognitive foreground ideas) and frames (normative foreground ideas).¹²⁷ As for Schmidt, also for Campbell, the foreground ideas rest on the background ideas. These different types of ideas, so Campbell, have special functions in the process of policy mak-

¹¹⁷ Campbell 1998, p. 377; see also Campbell 2002

¹¹⁸ Campbell 1998, p. 378, 380

¹¹⁹ Ibid., p. 381

¹²⁰ Ibid., p. 382

¹²¹ Sewell 1992

¹²² Douglas 1986, p. 66f

¹²³ Campbell 1998, p. 383

¹²⁴ Sewell 1992, p. 18

¹²⁵ Bourdieu 1977, p. 83

¹²⁶ Sewell 1992, p. 17

¹²⁷ Campbell 1998, p. 384f

ing.¹²⁸ Similar to Schmidt, Campbell sees programs as offering “(...) concrete solutions to (...) policy problems”¹²⁹ while “Paradigms constitute broad cognitive constraints on the range of solutions that actors perceive and deem useful for solving problems.”¹³⁰ The public sentiments at the background, so Campbell, limit the normative choice of possible solutions that policy actors consider as politically appropriate.¹³¹ And lastly, frames - the normative foreground ideas – typically appear in the public statements of policy makers and serve to legitimize and encourage “(...) public support for policy purposes.”¹³²

For Campbell, also identities, which he conceptualizes as “(...) historically constructed ideas that individuals or organizations have about who they are vis-à-vis others”, have effects on policy making.¹³³

3.2.3. The theoretical synthesis

I will link Schmidt’s discursive institutionalism to John L. Campbell’s Organizational and Historical institutionalism since he also examines “(...) how ideas affect policy making.”¹³⁴ Furthermore, Campbell and Schmidt use the same definitions of “background ideas”, cognitive and normative ideas. Even though they both examine ideas in politics, their focus is a different one. However, their approaches can be combined easily and fruitfully.

Campbell’s “categorization” of ideas is more detailed compared to Schmidt’s but also concentrates on other aspects. While Schmidt elaborates on why certain ideas are more successful than others because of their surrounding discourse, Campbell offers a toolbox to see how ideas are put to concrete use in the policy making process and how they might be constrained by institutional as well as ideational structures.

Thus, in this thesis, I will use a fruitful combination of both theories in order to answer my research question. Seeing ideas both as contents (Schmidt) and as instruments (Campbell) set in the policy discourse. I created my own categorization of ideas, strongly based on both Campbell’s and Schmidt’s. I discern, like Schmidt, three levels of ideas, depending on whether they are in the discursive foreground or constitute the ideational background. I thus strongly base my

¹²⁸ Ibid., p. 378

¹²⁹ Ibid., p. 386

¹³⁰ Both Campbell’s paradigms and public sentiment can be categorized as Schmidt’s philosophies; Campbell 1998, p. 389

¹³¹ Campbell 1998, p. 392

¹³² Ibid., p. 394

¹³³ Campbell 2002, p. 25

¹³⁴ Campbell 1998, p. 377

categorization on Campbell’s but also include Schmidt’s first level ideas (policies), define programs as 2nd level ideas to differentiate between programs, policies and frames.

I therefore consider programs, like Schmidt, to “(...) operate in the space between worldviews and specific policy ideas.”¹³⁵ As background ideas, or 3rd level ideas, I only enlist philosophies, not like Campbell discerns between normative (public sentiments) and cognitive (paradigms) background ideas. In general I will not discern between normative and cognitive ideas, since this differentiation – as I will show in the empirical analysis in this thesis – is not helpful for my analysis as cognitive and normative ideas are closely connected in the context of this research. The table below will illustrate my categorization:

Foreground Ideas		Background Ideas
(1 st level)	(2 nd level)	(3 rd level)
<u>Policies</u> : concrete policy solutions offered by policy makers ¹³⁶	<u>Programs</u> : offer a definition of the problem to be solved by a policy and set out the “(...) norms, methods and instruments to be applied (...)” ¹³⁷ in the problem solution;	<u>Philosophies</u> : offer the ideational background to foreground ideas. Offer “(...) organizing ideas, values and principles (...)” for the foreground ideas (policies, frames and programs). ¹³⁸
<u>Frames</u> : serve policy makers in legitimizing their policy solutions to other actors and the public ¹³⁹		

However, like Schmidt and Campbell did, not only ideas as such will be analyzed, but also the discourse in which they appear and in which they are incorporated. Furthermore, I will consider the institutional context in which this discourse is set, as it might constrain or enable ideas and discourse. I will also use the concepts of transposition and bricolage, to which Campbell refers, especially with regard to how and why certain frames are used in the discourse for legitimization.

¹³⁵ Schmidt 2008, p. 306

¹³⁶ see Ibid.

¹³⁷ Ibid.

¹³⁸ Ibid.

¹³⁹ see Campbell 1998, p. 385

3.3. Methodological Framework

As described above, this thesis tries to explain the institutionalization of international cultural relations with Vivien A. Schmidt's theory of discursive institutionalism combined with John Campbell's Historical and Organizational Institutionalism.

Using a Discursive Institutionalist and thus also constructivist theoretical framework, qualitative data needs to be collected to understand the ideational and other institutional processes, which should for the first time lead towards the development of a strategic approach in international cultural relations. Schmidt and Radaelli recommend content analysis, semi-structured interviews as well as studies of policy-formulation processes for empirical analysis.¹⁴⁰ Except for working with literature on the topic of cultural diplomacy and EU foreign policy, therefore also other sources were analyzed:

Written Documents

- Official documents issued by the EU institutions (e.g. communications, conclusions) relating to the development of a EU strategy for international cultural relations
- Documents issued by non-state actors dealing with European cultural diplomacy or policy (e.g. conference and advocacy papers)

Interviews

Five interviews were conducted with experts working on multilateral cultural policies on the national level within the Foreign Ministry of a Member State (Amb. Stefan Vavrik), Simon Mraz (Director of the Austrian Cultural Forum in Moscow), Andrew Murray (the Director of the network EUNIC global), an EU official, who wants to stay anonymous, and Walter Zampieri (Head of Unit for Cultural Policy and Intercultural Dialogue in the Directorate General for Education and Culture). The interviews took place between December 2016 and March 2017 in Vienna (Austria), Moscow (Russia), and via Skype with the officials from Brussels. In the preparation, conduct and analysis of the interviews and the documents, I relied on Behnke et al. as well as on Mayring's procedures for document and qualitative content-analysis.

¹⁴⁰ Schmidt and Radaelli 2004, p. 205f

3.3.1. Non-standardized expert interviews

Except for analyzing existing primary sources and documents, I also conducted non-standardized expert interviews based on a guiding questionnaire with open questions.

This guiding questionnaire, however, with its openly formulated questions allows the interviewed expert to answer in any direction and the interviewer to adapt to spontaneously arising situations during the interview - be it to inquire more deeply about an issue raised by the interviewee, to leave out or rearrange questions or even to introduce new questions and issues that were not considered before but raised in the interview.¹⁴¹

As Behnke et al. recommend, the open, non-standardized interview proves useful if:

- 1) The researcher wants to gain an overview of and insight into processes that are highly complex or little known e.g. negotiation processes within the EU
- 2) The researcher is interested in differentiated opinions, analysis and interpretations of causal hips
- 3) The researcher is interested in a specific case¹⁴²

Concerning my choice of the non-standardized expert interview, all these three aspects relate to my research and my research interest. In order to understand the reasons, ideas and processes leading to a new form of cooperation in the field of Culture in EU international relations and the role of convergences and divergences of background ideas in this process, I considered it necessary to inquire policy actors; also on their perceptions, interpretations and opinions.

As experts I interviewed one Director of an Austrian Cultural Forum, currently working on the implementation of a project directly related to the newly developed EU Strategy for international cultural relations and thus a practitioner of cultural diplomacy, one official from the Austrian Federal Ministry for Europe, Integration and Foreign Affairs dealing with and involved in the policy processes in the EU and working on multilateral cultural diplomacy, the Director of EUNIC global, since EUNIC is an important actor in EU Culture in external relations, and two EU officials, who contributed to the development of the new strategy. Thus I was able to interview experts from all levels of EU international cultural relations.

Firstly, I contacted my interviewees by email explaining my research interest and asking for an interview appointment. The interviews were conducted personally or via Skype depending on the location and preferences of the experts to interview.

¹⁴¹ Behnke et al. 2010, p. 244

¹⁴² Ibid., p. 244ff

3.3.2. Qualitative content analysis

As Mayring explains, qualitative content analysis wants to systematically analyze fixed communication by following rules and theoretical guidelines in order to allow conclusions to be drawn about certain aspects of communication.¹⁴³ Qualitative interpretation and analysis of documents is useful when working on historical events and a chronological overview, argues Mayring.¹⁴⁴

In order to explain the creation and form of the Strategy for the Union's international cultural relations, I traced the evolution of Culture in the EU's external relations. I examined the external dimension of cultural policies of the European Union not only by looking at the official documents published by the European Council, the Council of the European Union, by the European Commission, by the European Parliament, but also by analyzing conference and advocacy papers.

Basic principles and guidelines

The material needs to be fitted into a model of communication

The material must be seen in its communicative context thus the text was always understood and interpreted within its context and the material also was examined with regard to its creation and effects.¹⁴⁵ The material can be analyzed in different ways, which is why the interpretation requires a clear idea of what the researcher wants to extract from the text. The basic structure of a model of communication always comprises a source (a communicator) and a text situated and created in a specific context with recipients and audience.¹⁴⁶ The relevance of all of these elements of communication has to be measured.

Concerning my interviews, my interest mostly relied on the content – what the interviewed experts mentioned or emphasized. By considering these expert descriptions or opinions on which and how ideational as well as institutional elements shaped the development of Culture in EU external relations, I aimed to complement the analysis of pre-existing documents.

An analysis following rules and theoretical guidelines

Thus, in a next step, the selected documents of communication and discourse were analyzed, guided by rules defined previously relating to the research interest. The most important point here, Mayring argues, is the definition of a clearly set procedure for analysis. Content analysis is not a standard model but needs to be adapted to the material and constructed with regard to the

¹⁴³ Mayring 2010, p. 13

¹⁴⁴ Mayring 2002, p. 47

¹⁴⁵ Mayring 2010, p. 48

¹⁴⁶ Lagerberg as cited in Mayring 2010, p. 56

research question. Thus, a procedure for analysis is laid out that defines the stages of analysis and their order. The system of content analysis shows itself in the material's dissection into content analytical units and categories.¹⁴⁷

Furthermore, the theoretical state of the art as well as previous research on the discussed subject have to be considered in all decisions concerning the procedures of analysis.

Developing a system of categories that will be in the center of analysis

The system of categories was the central instrument of the qualitative analysis. These units and categories need to be theoretically explained and defined to ensure inter-subjective understanding of the analysis and its steps.¹⁴⁸ As Mayring explains, these categories constitute the link between the theory (the research question) and the concrete material and are defined by rules of construction and affiliation (belonging).¹⁴⁹ They were checked and redefined during the analysis. Also the goals of analysis were concretized in categories.¹⁵⁰

In qualitative research, a circular research process is typical. The different stages of research i.e. data collection, data analysis, and the creation of a theoretical framework, are not clearly demarcated or linear but overlap, influence and change each other in the process.¹⁵¹ The categories were developed inductively based on the concepts of "frames", "background ideas" and the analyzed documents.

As explained in Chapter 2.2., I argue that the endeavor to develop a strategy for international cultural relations constitutes a programmatic idea, defining the issues to be solved, the desired objectives, as well as the methods that are to be applied by respective policies in international cultural relations. This transformation from several policies existing in the field to the development of a fully-fledged policy program, as it has been seen over the past decade (from 2007 onwards and now culminating in the Commission's and HR's Joint Communication), represents the increasing institutionalization of international cultural relations. In the empirical chapters, which follow, I will try to explain and analyze what has led to this process of institutionalization making use of my theoretical and methodological framework.

This empirical analysis consists of three chapters: The first describes the institutional context that allowed for this institutionalization. The second deals with ideational frames used in the

¹⁴⁷ Mayring 2010, p. 49

¹⁴⁸ Ibid.

¹⁴⁹ Ibid., p. 59

¹⁵⁰ Ibid., p. 49

¹⁵¹ Behnke et al. 2010, p. 42

process, which helped convince more actors and served to legitimize it in discourse and the third empirical chapter analyzes the ideational development and the background ideas, which influenced the institutionalization.

The first empirical chapter on the enabling institutional context includes a subchapter on “Time and timing”, another on the inter-institutional (coordinative) discourse, a section on the role the Open Method of Coordination played and lastly the roles and functions of non-state actors in the process are discussed. The second chapter, focusing on ideational frames, is itself comprised of three subchapters: one on the ‘creativity frame’, one on the ‘identity frame’ and another one on the ‘European added value frame’. The last empirical chapter analyzes the successful background ideas and how they evolved in this process and thus contributed to its shaping and facilitation. This chapter consists of five subchapters: firstly, one on “The Philosophy of a European Demos and European Identity”, secondly, one on “The EU’s Philosophy of Values and Soft Power”, thirdly, one describing “The Philosophy of the Double Duality of ‘Culture’”, fourthly a subchapter “From Cultural Diplomacy to International Cultural Relations” and lastly a part on “The Arm’s Length Principle” and its influence.

Discourse will be the red thread running through the whole chapter, which is why there is no subchapter on discourse and its role itself. As Schmidt and Radaelli explain, discourse can serve to shape new institutional structures with new ideas for new values, practices, and rules, as well as to legitimate them through interaction for example with the help of discursive frames.¹⁵² What I try to show and consider in this empirical analysis is that “(...) EU policies are not produced in a vacuum, but in an arena where EU institutions and member states project their interests and discourses.”¹⁵³ Therefore, it is important to explore which interests they have and how they renegotiate them through discourse, trying to convince each other.

Having analyzed the primary documents mentioned in the “historical” chapter of this thesis as well as the expert interviews I conducted, I thus aim to show how in this special case “Discourse helps create an opening to policy change by altering actors’ perceptions of the policy problems, policy legacies and ‘fit’, influencing their preferences, and, thereby, enhancing their political institutional capacity to change.”¹⁵⁴

¹⁵² Schmidt and Radaelli 2004, p. 192

¹⁵³ Ibid., p. 185

¹⁵⁴ Schmidt and Radaelli 2004, p. 188

4. The Institutional Context and Conditions

As Littoz-Monnet argues, the constellation of participants in the policy debate as well as the institutional structure have a strong impact on the programmatic possibilities in the process of policy debate and formation.¹⁵⁵ As I am using an institutionalist theory for my analysis, I will not only analyze the “(...) communication of ideas or ‘text’ but also (...) the institutional context in which and through which ideas are communicated via discourse.”¹⁵⁶

With regard to the EU, especially also with a view to culture, it is highly important to consider which competence the EU and the MS have in a certain policy field in order to understand why certain policy issues seem to be more sensitive than others. As already explained in chapter 2.3.2, culture is an area in which the sole competence is with the MS, as it is considered to be of high national interest and a sensitive policy field. However, the EU has a subsidiary and supportive, coordinative competence. Nevertheless, the possible actions of the EU and its institutions are strongly limited by the legal basis for culture in the treaties and as will be shown throughout this empirical analysis the MS often remain skeptical to an extension of EU policy in a field where it only has supplementary competence.

In this first part of the empirical analysis the institutional factors that allowed for and facilitated the institutionalization of international cultural relations by creating a “(...) receptive environment for new ideas”¹⁵⁷ will be presented. Thus, the influence of personalities in this institutionalization process, the means of cooperation in the field – the Open Method of Coordination, the inter-institutional discourse, as well as the role of non-state actors will be explained.

4.1. Time and Timing and the Influence of Personalities

The development towards a strategy for international cultural relations started in 2007, in the context of the adoption of the Treaty of Lisbon and the creation of a European diplomatic service, the EEAS (and its EU Delegations), it brought about. The process gained momentum when the EEAS was already established. The EEAS is headed by the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy (HR). Officially the EEAS was launched in 2011. However, as one of the EU officials I interviewed argued, it took some time for the EU, the first HR, Catherine Ashton, and the EEAS “(...) to prove, to establish our [i.e. their] credentials domestically” as the EU had newly gained its legal personality in external relations, and a diplomatic

¹⁵⁵ Littoz-Monnet 2012, p. 506

¹⁵⁶ Schmidt 2010, p. 4

¹⁵⁷ Schmidt 2008, p. 308

service, which was a major change.¹⁵⁸ Especially concerning the cultural sphere the MS remained skeptical for quite some time as the EU only has supportive competence in the area and the MS were afraid that they would lose even this competence to the newly established diplomatic service, which might even undermine their national diplomacy efforts.

Besides pointing out that the institutional set up of the EEAS and its delegations took time, two of the experts I interviewed – Walter Zampieri from the Commission’s Directorate General for Education and Culture (DG EAC) and Ambassador Vavrik from the Austrian Foreign Ministry – insisted that there was a veritable shift towards the institutionalization of international cultural relations, when Federica Mogherini succeeded Ashton and became the new HR in 2014. On the one hand, they emphasized that Ashton was still very much occupied with building up a working EEAS, while Mogherini had already found the preexisting structure, “the machinery” to make use of. On the other hand, they made clear that the two HRs have had completely different attitudes towards the EEAS and its role:

The change towards an EU Strategy for international cultural relations was really linked to the change Ashton-Mogherini. (...) Ashton did not want a cultural diplomacy; in fact she was rather skeptical towards an EU diplomatic service herself, even though she headed it. (...) And then Mogherini came, who had a completely different attitude, and a different experience how important public diplomacy is: she asked for it and called for the development of such a paper.¹⁵⁹

Compared to Catherine Ashton, she paid special attention to culture. Her ears were open for DG EAC advocating for culture. Walter Zampieri, from DG EAC, whom I interviewed, stressed, it was only through the support of the HR – Mogherini, who as the HR also is the Vice President of the Commission – that DG EAC could convince other actors of the idea for a strategy for culture in external relations. He explained: “When it comes to that, you know, now the Commission has the system with the Vice Presidency. You need the strong backing of a Vice President. That’s why without Mogherini we would not have been able to do it.”¹⁶⁰ Zampieri therefore concluded that the right person, Mogherini, found the right structures, the already fully operational EEAS, and this time and timing contributed to the success of the institutionalization of EU international cultural relations.¹⁶¹

¹⁵⁸ Walter Zampieri interview by author, via Skype, March 15, 2017.

¹⁵⁹ Ambassador Stephan Vavrik, interview by author, Vienna, January 9, 2017.

¹⁶⁰ Walter Zampieri interview by author, via Skype, March 15, 2017.

¹⁶¹ Ibid.

4.2. Inter-Institutional Communication (Coordinative Discourse)

As Schmidt and Radaelli argue, the EU can be characterized as “(...) a multi-actor systems [sic!] in which trans-European co-ordinative discourses among policy actors overlap with the national ones on policy formulation, while mostly leaving to national political actors the communicative discourse to national publics.” In the EU various actors try to reach an agreement among themselves. Therefore, the EU has a very strong coordinative discourse, which constitutes its process of policy construction, while its communicative discourse is very thin, as reaching national publics and attracting their attention proves to be very challenging due to the lack of a common language, common media, and most importantly a European public itself. Nevertheless, the Commission tries “(...) to increase its legitimacy by building a communicative component into its coordinative pronouncements and texts on new policy initiatives.”¹⁶²

At the beginning and throughout the process of institutionalization of international cultural relations, the Commission’s DG Culture reached out to other Commission services, the cultural sector and civil society trying to gain support for its policy endeavor.¹⁶³ As mentioned in the previous subchapter, Walter Zampieri emphasized the critical role the HR Federica Mogherini (as the Vice President of the Commission) played in this.

Many policy areas include a cultural dimension; the EU’s structural organization of its external cultural action mirrors this. Within the Commission services it is not only DG EAC’s task to support cultural activities. Programs with specific geographical or thematic approaches including cultural action have been created within other DGs. Nevertheless three DGs within the Commission are especially active in culture: DG EAC of course, the DG for International Cooperation and Development (DG DEVCO), which includes cultural relations in its development strategy, and the DG for Neighborhood and Enlargement.¹⁶⁴

As Lisack therefore argues, many DGs would be able to integrate cultural elements in their activities, however, none of them are obliged to do so nor are they responsible for it.¹⁶⁵ All the different DG’s responsible for culture one way or the other established programs according to their own priorities. Therefore a clear strategic approach to culture in external relations has been lacking. This is also why many experts consider the EU’s external cultural action ad hoc and uncoordinated, dependent on the will and motivation of individuals.¹⁶⁶

¹⁶² Schmidt and Radaelli 2004, p. 199

¹⁶³ Littoz-Monnet 2012, p. 515

¹⁶⁴ Lisack 2014, p. 16, 43

¹⁶⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 17

¹⁶⁶ *Ibid.*, p. 46

So at EU level, no single institution responsible for the implementation of internal or external cultural policy exists. As Lisack explains, this seemingly chaotic structure shows, that the EU gained its competence in (external) cultural policy rather late and that the MS's competence is still predominant in the cultural field.¹⁶⁷ Taking account of this problem, DG EAC initiated a bilateral dialogue with other Commission services – in the beginning, however, not very successfully. In order to facilitate the promotion of culture within the Commission, the 2007 European Agenda for Culture postulated the mainstreaming of culture as a key objective. As a result, an inter-service group has been created and beyond the inter-institutional framework, a „Structured Dialogue“ with the cultural sector and civil society has been launched.¹⁶⁸

In the interview, Walter Zampieri explained furthermore, that DG EAC proposed the idea to Mogherini, her cabinet and the EEAS, who took it up and started to work in close partnership with DG EAC. He thus argued, that the forthcoming strategy was really developed between them, DG EAC and the EEAS. However, he underlined that the other services were quite responsive, in particular DG DEVCO. As I would point out, this success is also due to the fact that DG EAC really started to work with the priorities of the European Commission, which were endorsed by the Parliament, by the Council and so some space for culture needed to be found and even made.¹⁶⁹ As I will argue in Chapter 4.2.1., this was mainly achieved by the use of ideational frames in discourse.

Nonetheless even more actors needed to be convinced successfully: the MS, the EP and the Council. So far, however, both the Parliament and the Council supported the institutionalization process. The parliament put forth an initiative in 2011 and agreed on a budget for the Preparatory Action in 2014. Also the Council strongly strengthened the undertaking by its conclusions of 2008 and 2015. Likewise among the MS the development of a strategy did not encounter strong rejection. Already in 2009, the French foreign ministry even presented a communication proving that also the MS are convinced of the key role of culture in the EU's external relations and increasingly started to pay attention to it.¹⁷⁰

As stated previously, some MS however, remained slightly more skeptical. Zampieri from DG EAC emphasized that especially Germany, where an arm's length institute, the Goethe Institute, is responsible for external cultural action, needed to be persuaded that a strategy for the EU's external cultural relations would not compromise the subsidiarity principle and thus also

¹⁶⁷ Ibid., p.17

¹⁶⁸ Littoz-Monnet 2012, p. 515;; see also Walter Zampieri interview by author, via Skype, March 15, 2017.

¹⁶⁹ Walter Zampieri interview by author, via Skype, March 15, 2017.

¹⁷⁰ Communication de la France 2009; see also Portolés 2010, p. 14

not the role of the Goethe Institute. He underlined, though, that Germany and the Goethe Institute only need more clarity about the intentions behind such a strategy. Therefore, the MS reaction to the proposal of a strategy for international cultural relations is also strongly dependent on their relation to their cultural institutes, their national division of roles as well as other national issues.¹⁷¹ To fully gain the trust of the MS as well as the EU institutions, the ideas and ideational frames used in discourse have been essential, as will be explained in chapter 4.2.1.

As Lisack insists, especially for the MS, but also for the EU institutions it was highly important to create a light form of “(...) coordination, not another layer of bureaucracy, no interference with or substitution of MS competences.”¹⁷² The need for such an unbureaucratic method of cooperation was already acknowledged and suggested in the European Agenda on Culture in 2007, with the Open Method of Coordination.

4.3. The Open Method of Coordination (OMC)

The success of a strategy for international cultural relations strongly depends on an appropriate form of cooperation and coordination, which is not perceived as too formalized or bureaucratic. Therefore, in 2007, the OMC was proposed. The OMC constitutes an intergovernmental form of cooperation, in which MS can participate voluntarily. It was developed in the late 1990s to be used in the realm of socio-economic policies. Its establishment was also tightly linked to the EU’s legitimacy crisis at the time.¹⁷³ Being based on the principles of “(...) voluntarism, subsidiarity, flexibility, participation, policy integration, and multi-level integration”¹⁷⁴, the OMC was considered to allow “(...) for a novel way of unfolding the co-ordination of national areas of public action, which does not involve a formal or full-fledged transfer of competences.”¹⁷⁵ The OMC is based upon “(...) mutual learning, benchmarking, best practice and peer pressure.”¹⁷⁶

The quarterly OMC meetings, in which experts from ministries of culture and national cultural institutes exchange good practices and produce policy guidelines and toolkits, are organized by the Commission. Also the regular progress monitoring is a core feature of the method, which enables the MS to compare themselves with others and to learn from them. Since 2008, 14 OMC working groups have existed in the field of culture. The tri- or quadrennial Work Plans set out

¹⁷¹ Walter Zampieri interview by author, via Skype, March 15, 2017.

¹⁷² Lisack 2014, p. 47

¹⁷³ Borrás and Jacobsson 2004, p. 186

¹⁷⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 189

¹⁷⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 187

¹⁷⁶ Hodson and Maher 2001, p. 723

which working groups were established and what they would work on. However, the working group can decide itself on the involvement of other experts.¹⁷⁷ Thus, also non-state actors can be consulted and easily involved in the policy process and thus in decision-making.

The method's importance was emphasized in the 2001 White Paper on European Governance. At the European level, the OMC should add value, where there is little scope for legislative solutions.¹⁷⁸ The OMC facilitates finding "(...) a common understanding of problems and helps to build consensus on solutions and their practical implementation."¹⁷⁹ Therefore, also Bátor and Mokre emphasize, the method could "(...) serve as a vehicle for the gradual establishment of basic standards [in the field of culture]"¹⁸⁰

Without such a flexible and unbureaucratic method of coordination and cooperation policy development in the field of culture, and especially the development of a strategy for culture in EU external relations, where the EU only has supplementary competences, would have been much more difficult if not completely impossible. Through its open and participatory character I argue, the sole competence remains with the MS, but at the same time the OMC allows for the EU to start coordination among them in areas, where this would not be possible otherwise. As Borrás and Jacobsson point out "(...) the OMC is a convenient formula for placing issues high on the EU agenda, whilst preserving national autonomy."¹⁸¹ Thus, the formal division of tasks remains the same between the MS and the EU, but has in fact changed fundamentally.¹⁸²

4.4. The Role of Non-State Actors

Non-state actors greatly contributed to the institutionalization of EU international cultural relations as was intended according to the EU policy documents from 2007 to 2017. What they all have in common is that they have influenced policy by providing and supporting certain ideas. Campbell and Pedersen call such non-state actors "knowledge regimes" and define them as sets of "(...) actors, organizations, and institutions that produce and disseminate policy ideas that affect how policy-making (...) regimes are organized and operate in the first place."¹⁸³

In the development of an EU strategy for international cultural relations, these non-state actors or knowledge regimes, mostly networks or advocacy groups, have played many different

¹⁷⁷ Website Open Method of Coordination

¹⁷⁸ European Commission 2001, p. 21

¹⁷⁹ Website Open Method of Coordination

¹⁸⁰ Bátor and Mokre 2008, p. 91

¹⁸¹ Borrás and Jacobsson 2004, p. 190

¹⁸² Ibid., p. 199

¹⁸³ Campbell and Pedersen, 2011, p.167

roles. Firstly, they consult policy makers through the OMC or are tasked with delivering studies relevant to policy development in the field.

Secondly, they have vigorously advocated for more culture in the EU's external relations as well as for a more strategic approach to this. For example, the European Cultural Foundation (ECF), which has been very active in this process, published three studies on the topic in 2006. In a follow-up study "(...) criteria for the development of a 'framework for action' for a more integrated cultural component in external relations policies" were suggested. As its objectives it stated the reinforcement of mutual understanding through intercultural dialogue, the promotion of the EU's visibility, an enhancement of trade through Europe's cultural and creative industries. Furthermore, it called for the sharing of expertise and exchange of knowledge in the heritage sector.¹⁸⁴ Thus, the ECF has strongly influenced and shaped the EU policy process, as we can see that very similar objectives have been enlisted in EU policy documents in the field. Also "More Europe" has been very active in advocating for external cultural relations. The initiative was "(...) created with the support of a few cultural institutes and third sector partners such as the European Cultural Foundation, and designed to build awareness of the importance of the cultural dimension in the European Union's external relations through debate and research."¹⁸⁵

Thirdly, non-state actors are not only engaged in policy development but also in policy elaboration and implementation, mediating between the EU institutions, the MS' cultural institutes and other stakeholders such as cultural actors.

Furthermore, these networks and knowledge regimes in the cultural sector are supported by EU funds and strengthened by EU policy. Respectively, DG EAC has been able to build a strong support for its policies and actions. As Littoz-Monnet points out, DG EAC was able to promote the strategic role of culture more efficiently by including these advocacy groups, which provided it with discursive frames or supported them, in the policy formulation process.¹⁸⁶ In cultural policy, Sassatelli notes, the EU's institutions and especially the Commission with DG EAC adopted a tactic that is typical for policy areas, "(...) in which the competence is neither exclusive nor clear and touches sensitive domains of national identities and sovereignty."¹⁸⁷ In these policy domains the Commission's strategy is to present "Communications" "(...) to inform and shape the debate. Combined with programmes of direct grants to the sectors themselves, this creates a

¹⁸⁴ Isar 2014, p. 15

¹⁸⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 16

¹⁸⁶ Littoz-Monnet 2012, p. 516

¹⁸⁷ Sassatelli 2009, p. 50

climate of consensus and coalition that eventually legitimated the Commission's proposals."¹⁸⁸ Pollack denotes the EU's indirect ways to expand its competences to new policy areas by creating "(...) demand for EU intervention from below"¹⁸⁹, as "creeping competence".¹⁹⁰ As Shore explains it, EU cultural policy therefore not only serves to support the EU's legitimacy, as I will show later, but also broadens "(...) the scope of EU power and authority, extending its competences into new 'occupied fields' of governance."¹⁹¹

Many of the knowledge regimes, which formed and facilitated this institutionalization, use rhetorics, which are very close to the European institutions', since they depend on their financial support.¹⁹² As Sassatelli describes, they "(...) function as incubators for the solutions and approaches designed at the 'central' level, and are then monitored according to standard procedures."¹⁹³ Therefore, she goes on to explain that, with regard to the EU it is relatively hard to discern bottom-up and top-down programs as the EU and the knowledge regimes or networks influencing its policies are so closely linked: like the ECF which was created in 1954, while the foundation of a similar organization was called for by the EU in the 1970s. It is often entrusted with the implementation of EU projects or supported by the EU's financial means. For example it managed the Erasmus program for the EU institutions.¹⁹⁴

Flood even considers networks, as he calls them, to contribute more "(...) to European cohesion than many of the politically inspired and better funded initiatives of the European Union" and thus sees them as "important carriers of change."¹⁹⁵ Also Sassatelli insists, that bottom-up initiatives constitute the basis for the development of cultural co-operation in Europe, with the networks sharing a "European dimension", however, diverging in their concrete objectives.¹⁹⁶ Especially EUNIC plays an important role in EU cultural action, being a network of the EU's MS' cultural institutes, working as an advocacy network, and being entrusted with project implementation. It is initiatives like EUNIC, which aim at coordinating cultural policies at EU-level that signify change and constitute a first step to a more coordinated approach.¹⁹⁷ In a background paper to a conference on culture in external relations, organized by the Slovenian Presi-

¹⁸⁸ Ibid.

¹⁸⁹ Ibid.

¹⁹⁰ Pollack 2000

¹⁹¹ Shore 2006, p.10

¹⁹² Sassatelli 2009, p. 68ff

¹⁹³ Ibid.

¹⁹⁴ Ibid.

¹⁹⁵ Flood 2001, p. 84

¹⁹⁶ Sassatelli 2009, p. 71f

¹⁹⁷ Bátorá 2011b, p.169

gency in 2008, Bátor and Mokre show, that EUNIC's importance in enhancing European cooperation and coordination in internal as well as external cultural relations is threefold: it serves as a networker creating a "European approach" externally, in liaising MS' cultural institutes, EU institutions and cultural actors, acting as an internal and external "mediator" for European narratives.¹⁹⁸

Simon Mraz, the Director of the Austrian Cultural Forum in Moscow explained that a great advantage of EUNIC is, that it is a very informal group, forming in different countries. He describes the network as "(...) a rather free and unbureaucratic, deregulated club. It is like a voluntary club of directors of cultural institutes, who enjoy developing and working on new projects together." Another benefit EUNIC provides, is that unlike meetings at the Commission, EUNIC meetings include representatives of the operational institutes. EUNIC thus offers a forum through which the operational institutes are connected and can cooperate in European projects.¹⁹⁹ Thus, especially for the MS' representatives particularly EUNIC's flexible form of cooperation is highly attractive, offering them a possibility to cooperate with others, while also being able to pursue their national cultural diplomacies.

Therefore, in the final report on the 2014 Preparatory Action the experts recommended the Commission to entrust a coordinating role in cultural relations to EUNIC, "(...) which could then act as a catalyst for a defined and agreed-upon project period, host other European initiatives and be a conduit for the distribution of EU funds."²⁰⁰ Also Walter Zampieri from DG EAC emphasized the importance of EUNIC as an important partner, who also receives money from the CREATIVE EUROPE program. As he states, "The idea is to help them...in the professionalization and to become more European in their operations. At the end of the day, we want stronger cooperation with EUNIC central, the idea is really to help EUNIC. That's the purpose of the document actually, to establish a partnership to help EUNIC transmit this message to the members, to the clusters that they have in the countries, and that is more useful for EUNIC than it is for us."²⁰¹ Especially in this quotation it becomes quite clear that supporting EUNIC, and other non-state actors, also and mainly means to support EU cultural relations and cultural policy in general by "creating demand from below", as explained above.

¹⁹⁸ Bátor and Mokre 2008, p. 93f

¹⁹⁹ Simon Mraz, interview by author, Moscow, December 13, 2016.

²⁰⁰ Isar et al. 2014, p. 114

²⁰¹ Walter Zampieri interview by author, via Skype, March 15, 2017.

In the following chapters of this empirical analysis, the ideas which influenced and facilitated the institutionalization of EU international cultural relations, will be presented. Since ideas do not only serve policy making as guidelines but also by “(...) providing symbols and other discursive schema that actors can use to make these maps appealing, convincing and legitimate (...)”, frames as well as underlying philosophies will be analyzed.²⁰²

First, the ideational or discursive frames used to convince other actors of the idea or to legitimize it will be analyzed. Then, in the last empirical chapter, influencing philosophies (background ideas as defined by Schmidt 2008) will be investigated.

5. Ideational Frames Used

Campbell defines ideational or discursive frames as the foreground ideas, which typically appear in the public statements of policy makers and serve to legitimize and encourage “(...) support for policy purposes.”²⁰³ Also Littoz-Monnet is convinced that the process of framing is central to “(...) create a convincing link between ‘problem‘ and ‘solution‘(...).”²⁰⁴ According to Douglas and Campbell, this is one way for the policy actors to influence policy processes and even the institutional structure. These authors argue that through transposition and bricolage actors can recombine concepts, which are already accepted and exist within their institutional environment to legitimize new policy ideas.²⁰⁵ Some of the frames used in the discourse accompanying the institutionalization of international cultural relations had already been used long before the institutionalization process began when the EC tried to start expanding its competence to cultural policy, while others were created more recently.

5.1. The ‘creativity frame’²⁰⁶: Culture as a Catalyst for Economic Growth

The ‘creativity frame’ was already used at the very beginning of EU cultural action as described in chapter 2.1., to legitimize first EU action in the field of culture, however it has also been essential in the institutionalization of international cultural relations.

As Littoz-Monnet formulates it, “The ‘creativity frame’ presents culture as an asset, in terms of its potential to promote European growth and competitiveness.”²⁰⁷ It thus legitimizes

²⁰² Campbell 1998, p.381

²⁰³ Ibid., p.394

²⁰⁴ Littoz -Monnet 2012, p. 506

²⁰⁵ Campbell 1998, 383

²⁰⁶ term coined by Littoz-Monnet 2012

cultural policy or action by emphasizing the economic benefits culture brings about. Culture is presented as a solution to economic problems and issues, which were the starting point and have always been at the very core of European integration. Forrest explains, that economic reasons were invoked due to lacking competence in the field of culture itself as well as a lack of will on the side of the MS to change this.²⁰⁸ Therefore, economic arguments were put forward to convince the MS and other actors of the advantages of cultural policy.

DG Culture started the promotion of the 'creativity frame', no longer construing the cultural sector as a special sector, hoping for more budget and trying to justify EU action in the field of culture.²⁰⁹ Littoz-Monnet argues that "(...) DG Culture was successful in articulating a convincing link between economic 'problems' in the EU and culture as a potential 'solution'." This, however, was only possible because the broader discursive framework, looking for solutions to economic problems, already had great power within the EU. Especially the Lisbon strategy, the 2000-2010 EU action plan to enhance its economy and competitiveness, provided the "(...) paradigmatic framework within which programmatic ideas at the EU level were conceived and the instrument through which DG culture's issue redefinition strategy could be institutionalized."²¹⁰

The 'creativity frame' can be considered to be an effective instrument to mobilize formerly opposed interests by mediating between them. In order to achieve this, though, the frame had to be vague enough to reconcile different interests.²¹¹ As becomes clear, looking at the EU's policy documents in the phase of beginning institutionalization up until now, as well as at the expert interviews I conducted, culture and the cultural sector is still considered as a resource for the economy.²¹² Also in the background paper for the Conference "New Paradigms, New Models – Culture in the EU external relations", organized by the Slovenian Presidency and held in 2008, de Vries insists on the intrinsic and the economic importance of culture.²¹³

According to Littoz-Monnet, the 'creativity frame' really took off again in 2006, when KEA prepared a study for DG EAC on "The economy of culture in Europe", which created the scientific and conceptual link between broader economic concerns and the cultural sector.²¹⁴ The study's findings are also cited in the 2007 Commission's Communication on a European Agenda

²⁰⁷ Littoz-Monnet 2012, p. 508

²⁰⁸ Forrest 1994, p.12

²⁰⁹ Littoz-Monnet 2012, p. 506

²¹⁰ Ibid., p. 512

²¹¹ Ibid., p. 508

²¹² An EU official, interviewed by author, via Skype, February 15, 2011

²¹³ De Vries 2008, p. 14

²¹⁴ Littoz-Monnet 2012, p. 510

for Culture in a globalizing world, which emphasizes the importance of culture in strengthening creativity and innovation. Culture is thus considered as a catalyst for economic growth and competitiveness.²¹⁵ In all the major policy documents since the European Agenda, culture as an engine for growth is mentioned and endorsed by the EP as well as the Council.

Furthermore, Littoz-Monnet argues, that after DG EAC was able to spread the 'creativity frame' within the Commission, the Commission itself "(...) promoted it as a workable programmatic solution at the intergovernmental level."²¹⁶

However, the 'creativity frame' was not undisputed. While a group of actors has upheld the frame, considering it essential to gain access to existing resources, other actors are more skeptical, rejecting the merely instrumental use of culture or what Mulcahy defines as cultural utilitarianism.²¹⁷

For example, among the MS, the United Kingdom (UK) was a very active proponent of the creativity frame, while France objected to it trying to defend its "exception culturelle", considering cultural policy as a means to protect and support diverse cultural expressions, which might not be able to survive on the free global market. France, in contrast to the UK, often referred to the particularity of culture, which should therefore not be treated like any other economic sector. Similarly, the 2005 UNESCO Convention conceived of culture as a much broader issue, not just a merely economic one as suggested by DG EAC's creativity frame.²¹⁸

It is important to note, that the 'creativity frame' was not just invented to create more space for EU cultural policy, but has already been used successfully in other policy areas within the EU. The 'creativity frame' was thus transposed from other EU policy areas to cultural policy. The success of the 'creativity frame' in cultural policy and also other fields can be explained by the fact that it fits the EU's political context perfectly. An economic rhetoric has always been more successful within EU policy processes. Littoz-Monnet even concludes that "(...) economic arguments are a quasi must be, when the DGs of the European Commission aim to give a higher profile to formerly marginalized policy issues."²¹⁹ With its vague and economic rhetoric the 'creativity frame' was appealing to many different stakeholders and thus became a "strong tool of mobilization" establishing a connection between economic policy problems and the "potential

²¹⁵ European Commission 2007, p. 9

²¹⁶ Littoz-Monnet 2012, p. 511

²¹⁷ Mulcahy 2006, p. 326

²¹⁸ Littoz-Monnet 2012, p. 513f

²¹⁹ Ibid., p. 519

of culture.²²⁰ Mulcahy describes the reference to the facet of culture as a means to an end (i.e. economic growth) in cultural policy as “Cultural Utilitarianism”. When cultural policy tries to gain more support on the basis of utility, like with the creativity frame, Mulcahy calls this “Cultural Utilitarianism”, as cultural policy then is not legitimized by arguing for the value of culture itself, but rather the other results it yields.²²¹

The ‘creativity frame’ and what I call the ‘identity frame’, described in the next section, mutually reinforce each other. While the ‘creativity frame’ presents culture and cultural or creative industries as a catalyst for economic growth, the ‘identity frame’ construes Europe to be a cultural superpower, as Mogherini puts it²²², with an especially thriving creative industry and a particularly high creation and production of cultural goods.

5.2. The ‘identity frame’ – “Europe is a cultural superpower”

Forrest explains that already from the beginning of EU cultural policy “The Ministers of Culture considered (...) that the richness of European culture lay in its diversity and that the wide range of regional and national cultures should be safeguarded.”²²³ As I will argue in this part of the thesis, this argument is still brought forward in the EU’s policy documents on international cultural relations and Europe is construed to be a cultural superpower, an advantage it should make more and better use of according to current policy documents and EU experts. Even though this frame has been used since the incorporation of cultural policy into the EU’s areas of action, it has evolved and changed over time.

The EU’s motto since 2000 “Unity in diversity” and the European identity it promotes do not provide a clear content, but therefore sustain the “(...) unchallenged and widespread agreement that they are positive values.”²²⁴ As Sassatelli explains, this motto “(...) ,Unity in diversity’ may imply the unity of a supranational framework over differences that are made explicit as mainly national and regional.”²²⁵ Therefore “(...) not only diversity between Member States but also diversity within Member States is seen as both a framing condition and an aim of European cultural policy.”²²⁶ As an EU official I interviewed pointed out, Europe is perceived as a very

²²⁰ Ibid.

²²¹ Mulcahy 2006, p. 326

²²² Federica Mogherini, interview by Eunews, *Eunews*, June 10, 2016, accessed March 10, 2017, <http://www.eunews.it/2016/06/10/mogherini-europe-cultural-superpower-need-use-force/61145>

²²³ Forrest 1994, p. 14

²²⁴ Sassatelli 2009, p. 73

²²⁵ Ibid., p. 74

²²⁶ Bátorá and Mokre 2008, p. 84

powerful example of an international organization, of a peaceful coexistence of cultures²²⁷, which considers cultural diversity to be an asset²²⁸, based on the value of tolerance. Tolerance and thus the respect for cultural diversity are promoted as European values. Mokre argues that in the EU's discourse an "(...) essential concept of cultural identity as given by common ethnic roots is avoided but, (...) political values are essentialized."²²⁹ Values thus serve as a mechanism of inclusion and exclusion.²³⁰ Therefore, Shore notes, in the EU's cultural policy documents a "European civilization", explicitly referred to in the early documents on EU cultural policy, is still implied in the newer documents.²³¹ He uses the term 'civilization' "(...) in the sense of a common universal standard towards which all societies should aspire."²³²

The dialogue between cultures and cultural diversity become important frames in the EU's cultural policy in order to "(...) change others to our [European] model, [the] universal value of European culture is confirmed."²³³ For example, in the 2014 Preparatory Action, Europe is described as a cultural powerhouse.²³⁴ Isar et al., the authors of the Final Report of the 2014 Preparatory Action argue that besides being a 'trading power' the EU is often "(...) perceived as an unprecedented and successful social and cultural project."²³⁵ At the European Cultural Forum in 2016, HR Federica Mogherini even claimed that Europe was a cultural superpower as it was able to give value to its cultural diversity and because it was always open to the world. She argued furthermore, that this was an asset today, a point of strength for Europe, which needs to be preserved.²³⁶ Also in an interview with eunews she insisted: "Our Europe is a cultural superpower, even though sometimes we do not recognise it: our culture is fascinating for the entire world, we are a reference point at global level. This power needs to be used, we need to turn it into a tool of peace and growth."²³⁷

As an EU official I interviewed, underlined, it was this (construed) need for culture, which created a favorable attitude of stakeholders and institutions with regard to a communication and

²²⁷ An EU official, interview by author, via Skype, February 15, 2017.

²²⁸ Sassatelli 2009, p. 74

²²⁹ Mokre 2011, p. 78

²³⁰ Ibid.

²³¹ Shore 2006, p. 20

²³² Batora 2011a, p. 5

²³³ Batora 2011b, p. 90

²³⁴ Isar et al. 2014

²³⁵ Isar 2010, online

²³⁶ Speech by Federica Mogherini at the European Cultural Forum 2016, video online; see also Federica Mogherini, interview by Eunews, *Eunews*, June 10, 2016, accessed March 10, 2017,

<http://www.eunews.it/2016/06/10/mogherini-europe-cultural-superpower-need-use-force/61145>.

²³⁷ Federica Mogherini, interview by Eunews, *Eunews*, June 10, 2016, accessed March 10, 2017,

<http://www.eunews.it/2016/06/10/mogherini-europe-cultural-superpower-need-use-force/61145>

strategy for culture.²³⁸ Ambassador Vavrik from the Austrian Foreign Ministry also emphasized: “(...) there is a domain, in which Austria or the EU are over-proportionally strong and that is culture and cultural diversity.”²³⁹

Moreover, the EU plays an especially strong role in the global production of cultural goods, he stressed. Culture becomes especially important for an EU which loses economic importance and is a military dwarf.²⁴⁰ Culture and cultural products are therefore considered to allow the EU to create more external attractiveness by being perceived as a successful example for peaceful coexistence of different nations and cultures.²⁴¹

By construing Europe as a cultural superpower, no longer by referring to its roots in great Greek and Roman civilizations, but by invoking the importance of cultural diversity and its active creative industries, the need for a strategy for international cultural relations is explained and justified. The ‘identity frame’ argues furthermore, that especially in times, when Europe’s economic power is perceived to be decreasing, culture as its ‘only’ and main strength needs to be supported and promoted.

5.3. The ‘European added value frame’

One other frame often used in the policy documents to justify the strategy for EU international cultural relations is the ‘European added value frame’, as I call it. As for example illustrated by Lisack’s argumentation in the advocacy paper “European external cultural relations: Paving new ways?”, the frame argues that having and pursuing a common vision for EU external cultural relations would allow to save financial resources by coordinating the actions of various EU entities. Furthermore, a common approach could strengthen the image of the EU as a reliable partner, and also recognize the impact of culture in external relations, it is argued.²⁴² Therefore, also in the background papers to the conference “New Paradigms, New Models – Culture in the EU External Relations” organized by the Slovenian Presidency in 2008, De Vries argued: “All would benefit from a European strategy of cultural diplomacy, to complement and support national efforts financially and operationally.”²⁴³ As Ambassador Vavrik explained, the pooling

²³⁸ An EU official, interview by author, via Skype, February 15, 2017.

²³⁹ Ambassador Stephan Vavrik, interview by author, Vienna, January 9, 2017.

²⁴⁰ Ibid.

²⁴¹ Bátorá 2011, p. 89

²⁴² Lisack 2014, p. 46

²⁴³ De Vries 2008, p. 17

and sharing of resources as proposed in the final report of the 2014 Preparatory Action²⁴⁴ and foreseen in the strategy to be developed, allows MS which do not have a representation in a country, to still be active there through their participation in EU projects.²⁴⁵

This main argument for European cooperation in the field of external cultural relations is reinforced by the view that “EU Member States (...) face common challenges.”²⁴⁶ As Simon Mraz, Director of the Austrian Cultural Forum in Moscow, added, especially in third countries, like Russia, the EU MS experience common difficulties and ‘Europe’ and ‘European culture’ is much talked about. That is why he is convinced that MS should refer to a common ‘Europe’ and cooperate to make use of the great attention paid to ‘Europe’ as a whole.²⁴⁷ The final report of the 2014 Preparatory Action explains the need for a European strategy to international cultural relations by referring to the “(...) clearly expressed demand in third countries for stronger and better cultural relations with cultural operators from Europe, with European governments, as well as with the EU itself.”²⁴⁸ Besides, he claims that often, the European institutions are more trusted than “nation-based cultural diplomacy”.²⁴⁹ Moreover, according to Ambassador Vavrik, the increasing number of actors in cultural diplomacy creates more and more competition, which is why ‘European’ and therefore bigger projects could more easily score and attract attention.²⁵⁰ As an EU official I interviewed also emphasized, national diplomacies would be strengthened and multiplied by a common European approach. Furthermore, it would offer more visibility for projects and synergies among the cultural institutes could be developed, he argued.²⁵¹

Another aspect of the ‘European added value frame’ refers to the content of a European external cultural policy. Bátorá and Mokre point out, that the EU’s focus on “narratives of ethnic minorities, narratives of coexistence of national narratives, narratives of regions, and narratives of underprivileged groups” could constitute a “unique European added value”, an “(...) innovative approach based on the cultural and political specifics of European integration.”²⁵² This innovative approach is considered to be capable of tackling the “cultural challenges of a globalising world” and could thus reinforce the EU’s “smart power” as emphasized in the final report of the

²⁴⁴ Isar et al.2014, p. 105

²⁴⁵ Ambassador Stephan Vavrik , interview by author, Vienna, January 9, 2017.

²⁴⁶ De Vries 2008, p. 15

²⁴⁷ Simon Mraz, interview by author, Moscow, December 13, 2016.

²⁴⁸ Isar et al.2014, p. 81

²⁴⁹ Ibid.

²⁵⁰ Ambassador Stephan Vavrik , interview by author, Vienna, January 9, 2017.

²⁵¹ An EU official, interview by author, via Skype, February 15, 2017.

²⁵² Bátorá and Mokre 2008, p. 85

2014 Preparatory Action.²⁵³ This content-related facet of the ‘European added value frame’ also refers to the ‘identity frame’, to Europe as a cultural superpower, as explained in chapter 4.2.1.2. While the ‘identity frame’ existed already since the beginning of EU cultural policy and “only” evolved and changed over time, the ‘European added value frame’ really started to appear and being used in the process of institutionalization of international cultural relations. It is strongly linked to the respective key documents, like the 2007 European Agenda for Culture, the 2014 Preparatory Action and the 2016 Joint Communication.

6. Ideational Development – Successful Background Ideas

6.1. Philosophy of a European Demos and European Identity

There is a deep-rooted belief that a European demos (or people) and a European identity should exist and that they could strengthen the EU’s legitimacy. Therefore, one of the main reasons why cultural policies were incorporated into the EU’s action was to reinforce a common European identity and demos.²⁵⁴ As Mokre explains, it is believed that a democratic entity needs a demos or people and in order to create a demos, a collective identity needs to be construed. She points out that people only engage for a society and accept collective decisions if they feel a sense of belonging to it. As in nation states, also in the former European Community or now in the EU, culture is considered a means to create this people.²⁵⁵ Thus this background idea did not just appear in the last decade, when the institutionalization of international cultural relations started, but rather was at the very beginning of EU cultural policy and action.

For example in the 1977 Commission Communication on cultural action, “Community action in the cultural sector”, the first communication on cultural action within the Community, as well as in the 1983 Solemn Declaration on the European Union, cultural policy and action is seen as a means to reinforce integration by promoting a common European identity.²⁵⁶ However, this background idea still plays a crucial role today and in the institutionalization of EU international cultural relations. As Bátorá and Mokre argue, “Due to the deepening of European integration, the question for a European identity, and consequently, for a European culture and for Eu-

²⁵³ Isar et al.2014, p. 105

²⁵⁴ Staiger 2009, p. 1

²⁵⁵ Mokre 2011, p. 67

²⁵⁶ European Commission 1977, p. 5; European Council 1983

ropean cultural politics has come [even more] to the fore.”²⁵⁷

Bátora explains, that culture plays a dual role in external relations. On the one hand, culture is a means of differentiation. Thus, constructing a European culture and promoting it means to differentiate oneself from ‘others’. On the other hand, transversal cultural relations portray Europe as the open society it aims to be seen as.²⁵⁸ This is also pointed out in the 2014 Preparatory Action. In the report Isar et al. argue: “Nurturing an overarching sense of cultural belonging and purpose across the panoply of Europe’s diversity – a vision of multiple cultural futures – and sharing these visions with the rest of the world are two faces of the same coin.”²⁵⁹ As already mentioned in chapter 4.2.1.2., diversity is construed to be the structural but also distinctive feature of the assumed European unity.²⁶⁰

As an EU official I interviewed emphasized, there is an urgency for a new narrative for Europe internally and in the world. This new narrative could be created and conveyed through culture.²⁶¹ Likewise Bátora argues that coordination of EU external cultural policies “(...) has served as an element in the identity formation of the EU in relation to variously defined others.”²⁶² The common European identity is also referred to in the 2007 European Agenda for Culture, which underlines that “Europeans share a common cultural heritage”.²⁶³ For De Vries especially cultural heritage and its promotion “(...) contributes to a sense of European citizenship.”²⁶⁴ Also according to Bátora, cultural heritage has played a major role in construing “(...) Europe as a historical cultural unit (...).”²⁶⁵

This is why in the strategy currently being developed, the protection and promotion of cultural heritage is one of the main priorities.²⁶⁶ This is also illustrated by the fact that 2018 will be the European Year of Cultural Heritage.

²⁵⁷ Bátora and Mokre 2008, p. 78

²⁵⁸ Bátora 2011b

²⁵⁹ Isar et al. 2014, p. 20

²⁶⁰ Bátora 2011b, p. 85f

²⁶¹ An EU official, interview by author, via Skype, February 15, 2017.

²⁶² Bátora 2011, p. 2

²⁶³ European Commission 2007

²⁶⁴ De Vries 2008, p. 45

²⁶⁵ Bátora 2011b, p. 85f

²⁶⁶ European Commission and the High Representative 2016

6.2. The EU's Philosophy of Values and Soft Power

Article 2 TEU states that the EU “(...) is founded on the values of respect for human dignity, freedom, democracy, equality, the rule of law and respect for human rights (...).”²⁶⁷ The EU thus is a community based on these “universal values” and dedicates itself to their promotion as described in chapter 2.3.1. Therefore, the EU understands itself as a “promoter of universal values”, a notion and idea, which is in the very ideational background, thus remaining unquestioned and unchallenged. This philosophy of the EU as a promoter of universal values has also strongly influenced and facilitated the institutionalization of international cultural relations, which were thus construed as a new way to promote the EU's values through culture and to accumulate more “soft power”, a term coined by Joseph Nye in 1990. Nye discerns two aspects of power: hard and soft power. While hard power, according to the author, consists of a country's military or economic weight used to pay, coerce, threaten or even attack others, he defines “soft power”, or “co-optive power”, as he also calls it, as the “power of attraction” which can “(...) shape others' preferences.”²⁶⁸ For Nye, soft power rests on three resources: culture, political values, and foreign policy. If these resources are attractive to others and are employed effectively, other countries will more likely follow the aspired example.²⁶⁹

As De Vries argues in the background papers to the conference “New paradigms, new models - Culture in the EU external relations”, organized under the Slovenian Council Presidency in 2008, “Foreign policy is about more than the defense of material interests (...). It is also about the promotion of immaterial interests and values, and about *soft power*.”²⁷⁰ As De Vries' argument goes, the EU's values constitute the core of European identity, which is why the promotion of these values needs to be the very essence of European foreign policy.²⁷¹ It is with this background idea that he argues, “(...) cultural diplomacy is not only about creating mutual understanding. It is also, and crucially, about the promotion of fundamental values.”²⁷²

Also the 2014 Preparatory Action links the EU's values as well as their promotion to soft power: “The EU is, and must aspire to become even more, an example of ‘soft power’ founded on norms and values... which, provided they are upheld and promoted, can be of inspiration to

²⁶⁷ Treaty on European Union, Art.2

²⁶⁸ Nye 1990, p. 166

²⁶⁹ Nye 2013

²⁷⁰ De Vries 2008, p. 9

²⁷¹ Ibid., p. 9f

²⁷² Ibid., p. 14

the world.”²⁷³ Here the EU is referred to as a “soft power” due to its norms and values, as other countries are and should be even more inspired by these “intangible assets”²⁷⁴ of the EU and follow its example.

In the 2016 Joint Communication, the background idea on the importance of European values is also pronounced: “The EU is strongly committed to promoting a global order based on peace, the rule of law, freedom of expression, mutual understanding and respect for fundamental rights.”²⁷⁵ As will be discussed in a more detailed way in chapter 4.2.2.4, the Joint Communication also argues that international cultural relations could promote cultural diversity – another of the EU’s core values – better than cultural diplomacy and become essential to the EU as a global actor. Thus, the background idea that the EU is a value-based community, which needs to promote its values, strongly influenced the institutionalization of international cultural relations.

This philosophy also has another implication: Culture is now not only considered to be a value in itself, a catalyst for economic growth or a means to strengthen a European identity, but also to promote political values and achieve foreign policy goals, as will be explained in the next part of this thesis.

6.3. The Philosophy of the Double Duality of “Culture”

The philosophy of the double duality of culture describes the assumed double dual nature of culture as on the one hand, artistic performance (narrow concept of culture) or a complete way of life (broader definition of culture) and on the other hand, culture as an end in itself or as a means to an end, an instrument. As already mentioned in the previous chapter, within the forthcoming EU strategy for international cultural relations, culture is thus seen and conceptualized as both: a means to promote values to prevent and resolve conflicts and to strengthen stability²⁷⁶ as well as an end in itself; in a broad and narrow way.

I argue that this conceptual double duality of culture first appeared in the 2005 UNESCO Convention²⁷⁷ (to which the EU acceded) and then made its way into the EU’s policy with the 2007 European Agenda for Culture. In the 2005 UNESCO Convention’s concept of ‘cultural diversity’, for example, investments in creative industries are seen “(...) as investments in ‘protecting’ or ‘promoting’ cultures understood as entire ways of life in the broader social science

²⁷³ Isar 2010, online

²⁷⁴ Simons 2011, p. 328

²⁷⁵ European Commission and the High Representative 2016, p. 2

²⁷⁶ De Vries 2008

²⁷⁷ see UNESCO Convention 2005 Art.4(2), Art.2(5)

sense of the term culture.”²⁷⁸ Furthermore, the Convention calls for the mainstreaming of culture, its inclusion into other foreign (or development) policy areas.²⁷⁹ All this is taken up in the European Agenda for Culture in a Globalizing World, which suggests a “twin-track” approach to culture and thus mirrors its double dual understanding of culture, as I call it. The “twin-track approach” proposed in the Agenda aims at “the systematic integration of the cultural dimension and different components of culture in all external and development policies (...) as a means of strengthening the quality of its diplomatic efforts (...)” – seeing culture as an instrument, as well as the “support for specific cultural actions and events (...)”, recognizing “(...) Culture as a resource in its own right (...)”.²⁸⁰

Therefore, as Ambassador Vavrik explained: “In the future strategy so far, culture is not yet seen as a mere means to an end, (...). But still it is emphasized that culture has positive effects in the long run on democracy, the rule of law, aiming at peace and security.”²⁸¹ Also in the 2016 Joint Communication, the climax of the institutionalization of EU international cultural relations so far, it is argued that culture and inter-cultural dialogue could be a means of “(...) addressing major global challenges – such as conflict prevention and resolution, integrating refugees, countering violent extremism, and protecting cultural heritage.”²⁸² Mokre, however, explains that culture and cultural diplomacy are considered not to altruistically increase the welfare of other countries, but to also generate “(...) goodwill and understanding for the goals and interests of one’s own society (...)” and thus represent a means to create soft power.²⁸³

As Walter Zampieri from DG EAC explained, currently the Maltese Presidency is trying to create a Group of Friends of the Presidency in order to really consider and look into the transversal aspects of culture, as these cannot be covered by the Cultural Affairs Committee alone, which consists of the Ministries for Culture. If culture should be discussed in development or as a stabilizing element in fragile societies other Council formations would be needed. He therefore pointed out: “One of the problems is that culture is so transversal, that there are so many actors.”²⁸⁴ The creation of such a Friends of the Presidency Group was already called for by the Council in May 2017.

²⁷⁸ Isar 2010, online

²⁷⁹ UNESCO Convention 2005

²⁸⁰ European Commission 2007, p. 10

²⁸¹ Ambassador Stephan Vavrik, interview by author, Vienna, January 9, 2017.

²⁸² European Commission and the High Representative 2016, p. 2

²⁸³ Mokre 2011, p. 79

²⁸⁴ Walter Zampieri interview by author, via Skype, March 15, 2017.

Moreover, an EU official I interviewed, pointed out “Culture is what can be uncontroversial. Many countries work together in culture and they wouldn’t be able to work together in any other field.”²⁸⁵ This quotation shows that culture, in its double dual and thus vague meaning, is conceived to be capable of allowing cooperation, where it would not be possible otherwise.

6.4. From Cultural Diplomacy to International Cultural Relations

In the process of institutionalization of EU external cultural policy, the term ‘international cultural relations’ appeared and was taken up. This major change of concepts – from cultural diplomacy to international cultural relations – was essential for this institutionalization process. Therefore, this part of the thesis will discuss what the two terms denote, why the change from the use of cultural diplomacy to international cultural relations occurred, and why this change is so important for the institutionalization.

The most cited definition of cultural diplomacy is from Milton Cummings. He defines cultural diplomacy as “(...) the exchange of values, education, knowledge, art, music, and other aspects of culture and identity among countries and people to foster understanding and strengthen relationships.”²⁸⁶ However, cultural diplomacy is often considered a controversial term as it is seen to consist of mere showcasing and to include the idea of waging a policy of influence. This is better illustrated by the definition Andrew Murray, the Director of EUNIC Global, gave of cultural diplomacy: Cultural diplomacy is about the state speaking to the citizens of other countries in order to get certain messages across using culture (narrowly defined as the arts). Thus, for him cultural diplomacy is about “(...) the promotion, the projection of messages to try to influence and attract peoples, but it is state driven.”²⁸⁷

As Rivera points out, the concepts of cultural diplomacy and cultural relations can be distinguished with regard to “(...) their means, objectives, and motivations.”²⁸⁸ Also according to him, all the differences between them are linked to the role the government plays.²⁸⁹ The term ‘cultural relations’ developed with the creation of the British Council. The British Council’s definition of cultural or public diplomacy includes that it is a governmental activity, from which it

²⁸⁵ An EU official, interview by author, via Skype, February 15, 2017.

²⁸⁶ Cummings 2003 [2009], p. 1

²⁸⁷ Andrew Murray, interview by author, via Skype, February 6, 2017.

²⁸⁸ Rivera 2015, p. 9

²⁸⁹ Ibid.

has distanced itself, as the British Council is not a governmental body, but an arm's length²⁹⁰ institution mainly financed by and closely cooperating with the British government.²⁹¹

Rivera claims that if the British Council had a closer relationship to the government, it would move "(...) away from the practices of cultural relations towards cultural diplomacy."²⁹² Like Rivera, also I would argue "(...) it is important to define 'diplomacy' and establish it as fundamentally an activity of government." While the targeted audience of cultural diplomacy are citizens, it is "(...) funded, designed, and delivered by government."²⁹³ As the EU official I interviewed noted, cultural diplomacy therefore might be a concept, which is more appropriate for sovereign nation states than for the EU.²⁹⁴

Rivera does not define cultural diplomacy to be neutral but rather as an "advocacy approach" making use of culture to support objectives in foreign policy and more generally the national interest. In contrast to that, cultural relations aim at building mutual understanding and trust outside the direct influence of government.²⁹⁵

Cultural relations describe a long-term endeavor to create long-lasting relationships through mutual exchange, which should lead to understanding and trust. Their goal is to generate goodwill and influence abroad, in the sense of soft power (as defined on page 53f). However, their support of the national interest and foreign policy objectives is rather considered a 'byproduct' of the long-lasting relationships that are being built. Rivera also emphasizes that cultural relations often are perceived as more credible and honest due their "non-governmental voice." Another advantage of cultural relations according to Rivera is that the engagement with individual citizens is much deeper due to the focus on listening and understanding.²⁹⁶ Cultural relations need to be a two-way process and do not consist of mere national showcasing.

In the background papers to the conference, organized by the Slovenian Presidency in 2008, De Vries still used the term cultural diplomacy, but actually advocated for a cultural relations approach, arguing that it was essential for Europe to realize how much it can learn from but also offer to other cultures. He pointed out, that the Union should focus on building enduring relationships through "(...) exchanging ideas, sharing knowledge and [mutual] learning (...)."²⁹⁷

²⁹⁰ See chapter 4.2.2.5.

²⁹¹ Pamment 2012 quoted in Rivera 2015, p. 9

²⁹² Rivera 2015, p. 7

²⁹³ Ibid.

²⁹⁴ An EU official, interview by author, via Skype, February 15, 2017.

²⁹⁵ Rivera 2015, p. 35

²⁹⁶ Rivera 2015, p. 11ff

²⁹⁷ De Vries 2008, p. 48

Isar explains, that cultural relations require more complex processes and person-to-person contacts than classical cultural diplomacy.²⁹⁸ Also De Vries stresses the need for contacts among civil society to render cultural action more credible and effective.²⁹⁹ Cummings and De Vries both use the term ‘cultural diplomacy’ but insist that it needs to be a two-way process, not mere showcasing or representation of one’s own culture.³⁰⁰

The term ‘cultural relations’ therefore, denotes a move “(...) away from traditional cultural diplomacy approaches to more strategically-focused international cultural cooperation (...).”³⁰¹ As Andrew Murray, the Director of EUNIC Global, explained to me, cultural diplomacy is linked to short-term political or commercial advantages, while cultural relations focuses on the long-term objective of mutual understanding among peoples, which actually makes it a more effective form of soft power. However, he noted that cultural relations were much harder for policy makers to understand, as there were no short-term successes. The cultural relations approach is long term, even generational and thus goes beyond election periods, which makes it much more difficult to convince policy makers of their advantages.³⁰²

As Ambassador Vavrik noted, within the context of institutionalization of EU international cultural relations, first the terms cultural or public diplomacy were considered to be used in a future strategy. However, these terms were perceived by some actors involved to be too aggressive. It was argued that a EU ‘cultural diplomacy’ strategy would be seen as propaganda, as a one-way showcasing endeavor, presenting European cultural achievements through public institutions. Therefore, inspired by the British Council and the German Goethe Institute, which were both very active in the consortium carrying out the 2014 Preparatory Action, the decision was made to go for ‘international cultural relations’. Hence, the focus of a future strategy for culture in external relations should consist of people-to-people contacts with the public institutions (EEAS, the Commission, EU-MS) only setting the frame and financially supporting civil society initiatives.³⁰³

Also another EU official I interviewed emphasized, that the future strategy should be implemented with the help of local communities and operators. He stressed, that the new strategy will consist of a new approach (i.e. cultural relations), which will include a more society-linked level, focus on people-to-people contacts and engage directly with cultural actors, moving from

²⁹⁸ Isar 2010, online

²⁹⁹ De Vries 2008, p. 34, 49

³⁰⁰ Cummings 2009, p. 1; see also De Vries 2008

³⁰¹ Bátorá 2011b, p. 169

³⁰² Andrew Murray, interview by author, via Skype, February 6, 2017.

³⁰³ Ambassador Stephan Vavrik, interview by author, Vienna, January 9, 2017.

just showcasing to partnerships; away from showcasing towards real involvement and mutual learning and listening.³⁰⁴ The rather new notion of cultural relations also explains why intercultural and –religious dialogue play such a prominent role in the strategy being developed – real dialogue is exactly what is aimed at.³⁰⁵ Also, cultural relations as compared to cultural diplomacy are no longer based on a narrow definition of culture as the arts, but rather distinguish themselves through the acceptance of the double duality of culture, as explained in the previous subchapter (i.e. 4.2.2.3.).

The major leap towards cultural relations was made with the 2014 Preparatory Action. It found that partner countries often conceive of EU cultural projects as mere “(...) vehicles to promote the EU (...) rather than as reciprocal initiatives that might also meet the needs of local cultural practitioners.”³⁰⁶ However, in the early 2016 Roadmap for a “Strategy for cultural diplomacy” the term ‘cultural relations’ did not yet appear.³⁰⁷ Only with the 2016 Joint Communication came ‘international cultural relations’ to its real prominence.³⁰⁸ Before, since the 2007 European Agenda, Culture in external relations, a term very similar to international cultural relations, was the term used.

As Andrew Murray emphasized, he believes that the new strategy for international cultural relations should and could not do away with cultural diplomacy practiced by national cultural institutes, but rather complement it with EU cultural relations, underlining the potential of cultural relations to promote values and prevent conflicts.³⁰⁹

As already briefly mentioned, the concept of cultural relations is closely linked to the arm’s length principle, another guiding background idea newly explicitly introduced at the EU level in the course of the institutionalization of international cultural relations.

6.5. Arm’s Length Principle

The ‘arm’s length principle’ describes a mode of public support for the arts. It denotes a situation, where the government of a state funds an arm's length arts council “(...) that then makes grants according to professional standards of artistic excellence.”³¹⁰ As was noted in the 2014 Preparatory Action, two thirds of the EU’s MS have decentralized, arm’s length cultural insti-

³⁰⁴ An EU official, interview by author, via Skype, February 15, 2017.

³⁰⁵ Isar 2010, online

³⁰⁶ Isar et al. 2014, p. 104

³⁰⁷ European Commission 2016

³⁰⁸ European Commission and the High Representative 2016

³⁰⁹ Andrew Murray, interview by author, via Skype, February 6, 2017.

³¹⁰ Hillman Chartrand and McCaughey 1989

tutes, meaning that they are not directly linked to the Foreign Ministry or the Ministry for Culture, but only funded by and cooperating with them. The most famous examples of EU MS with a decentralized model for culture in external relations are Germany with the Goethe Institute and the United Kingdom with the British Council.³¹¹ These governments appreciate culture's inherent value as well as "(...) its potential in international relations, but maintain an arm's length approach to avoid the political instrumentalisation of culture."³¹²

Also EU cultural policy mainly consists of giving grants to (mostly local) cultural actors. Thus, as Sassatelli explains, already until now in EU cultural policy „(...) bottom-up initiatives (...) [have] receive[d] most of the budget and dominate the approach.“³¹³ Nevertheless, the institutionalization of EU international cultural relations and in particular the 2014 Preparatory Action emphasized the need for an arm's length approach to EU international cultural relations, as wished for by many third states. An arm's length approach would allow the EU institutions to set the frame and at the same time grant “(...) maximum autonomy for cultural operators on the ground, operating as skilled professionals in their domain.”³¹⁴ Thus, the balance between “(...) public responsibility and the autonomous practice of cultural relations by professionals (...)” could be struck.³¹⁵ Isar et al. furthermore underline, that EUNIC could offer a platform for coordination and cooperation among the EU MS' national cultural institutes as well as local cultural actors. It could therefore serve as the future EU's arm's length council implementing the strategy currently being developed.³¹⁶ Hence, an agreement between the EEAS, the Commission's DG EAC, and EUNIC Global was envisaged³¹⁷ and was put in place in the form of an administrative agreement for the implementation of a future strategy for EU international cultural relations on 16 May 2017³¹⁸. As Andrew Murray, Director of EUNIC Global underlined, one great value of cultural relations done at arm's length is, that it “(...) is more likely to inspire trust and understanding since it is people to people activity rather than the state's government [or in the EU's case the EU institutions].”³¹⁹ Similarly, in the discussion papers to the conference ‘Culture in EU External Relations’, where the results of the Preparatory Action and its implications were dis-

³¹¹ Isar et al.2014, p. 30

³¹² Bound et al. 2007, p. 63

³¹³ Sassatelli 2009, p. 54f

³¹⁴ Isar et al.2014, p. 87

³¹⁵ Ibid., p. 109

³¹⁶ Ibid., p. 88

³¹⁷ European Commission and the High Representative 2016, p. 13; see also Ambassador Stephan Vavrik, interview by author, Vienna, January 9, 2017.

³¹⁸ European External Action Service, EUNIC and the European Commission 2017.

³¹⁹ Andrew Murray, interview by author, via Skype, February 6, 2017.

cussed, it is noted arm's length organizations by cultural actors and civil society organizations are more trusted than for example EU delegations, who officially represent the EU.³²⁰

7. Conclusion

In this thesis, I examined the institutionalization of EU international cultural relations from 2007 onwards and I attempted to explain what has led to this process of institutionalization and why it started in the past decade. My empirical analysis shows, that this development has mainly been made possible by an enabling institutional context as well as ideas – as discursive frames and philosophies, as defined by Schmidt and Campbell.

Cultural policy has always been a rather neglected policy field in the EU, with first policy documents dating back to 1977. In 1977 a first Commission Communication on Cultural Action was published. However, from the 1970s until 2006 cultural action was limited to internal cultural cooperation and action and was mainly justified by its economic and social benefits. Culture was understood as 'the arts' and was seen as a means to strengthen a sense of belonging to a European people and to enhance the aspired European identity, while the cultural sector was considered to be just another economic branch, to which the treaty provisions applied.

This can also be explained by the fact that the legal basis for cultural action at the EU level was only introduced with the Treaty of Maastricht in 1992. Nevertheless, also from then on, the EU's competence in culture – a highly sensitive issue for the EU MS – has remained strictly limited, as it only grants the EU a subsidiary, coordinative and supplementary competence, while the sole competence has stayed with the MS. This is why the EU "(...) has never developed a body of expertise in cultural (foreign) policy."³²¹ Nonetheless, the EU has become active "(...) in the area of European external cultural relations and complements the activities of Member States whenever it is necessary and appropriate."³²²

However, with the signing of the Treaty of Lisbon and the creation of the EEAS – a diplomatic service for the EU – it foresaw, the EU has started to develop a common foreign policy in which it has become more and more active and has thus also made the way for Culture in external relations. It was with the accession to the 2005 UNESCO Convention on the Protection and Promotion of the Diversity of Cultural Expressions, which entered into force in 2007, and

³²⁰ Ouchtati and Madinier 2014, p. 5

³²¹ Kühner 2011, p. 8

³²² Lisack 2014, p. 10

the 2007 European Agenda for Culture in a globalizing world, which for the first time calls for a more strategic approach to Culture in the EU's external relations, that Culture in external relations started to become an issue at EU level. The European Agenda for Culture proposed the OMC – an intergovernmental and voluntary form of cooperation for the MS – for the field of culture.³²³ Through the OMC working groups have been created and due to its unbureaucratic nature, it has enormously facilitated the transformation from policies in the field towards a real policy program.

Furthermore, these two documents – the UNESCO Convention and the European Agenda for Culture – engendered new major background ideas, which were endorsed by future policy documents, have gained increasing prominence until today and have facilitated the institutionalization of EU international cultural relations in the long run. First of all, the idea of the *double duality of culture* – culture as ‘the arts’ *and* as a ‘system of beliefs’ or ‘a way of life’ as well as culture as a value in itself *and* a means to achieve other goals – was acknowledged at EU level and has become a philosophy guiding future EU policy and action in the field. This ‘double duality of culture’, as I call it, led to the endeavor to ‘mainstream’ culture and has thus extended its sphere of influence to many other policy areas. Hence, the need for culture in all areas of foreign policy could be made clear.

The EU understands itself as a promoter of ‘universal’ values, as stated in Art.2, as well as in Art.21 TEU. As I tried to show in my empirical analysis this is a deep-rooted belief among policy makers in the EU. Together with the background idea of the double duality of culture, this philosophy of the EU as a value-based community has facilitated the institutionalization of international cultural relations, as culture was thus construed as a means to promote the EU's values in the world, by which the EU could make use of its value-based soft power assets.

Also the already used discursive frame of ‘culture as a catalyst for economic growth’ – the *creativity frame*, as Littoz-Monnet³²⁴ calls it, was successfully put to use again in the 2005 UNESCO Convention and the European Agenda for Culture, justifying EU Culture in external relations through the economic benefits it brings about.

Besides those two documents, also the 2014 Preparatory Action, more precisely its final report, is one of the key milestones towards a European strategy for international cultural relations and paved the way for the 2016 Joint Communication “Towards an EU strategy for interna-

³²³ European Commission 2007

³²⁴ Littoz-Monnet 2012

tional cultural relations”. It argues, that Europe is a “cultural powerhouse”³²⁵ and shows that the ‘*identity frame*’ – of “Europe as a cultural superpower”, which must make use of its cultural soft power assets³²⁶ – has been used as another discursive frame to legitimize the need for EU international cultural relations. However, I also identified a philosophy on European identity to matter in this process. This background idea does not have to do with Europe’s cultural riches, but rather consists of the belief that there should be some kind of European identity and a European people (or demos), which could legitimize the EU’s integration project. With regard to this background idea, culture is still (like at the very beginning of EU cultural policy) seen as a means to foster such a European identity, as set out for example in the 2014 Preparatory Action.³²⁷ Now, that EU policy makers feel the need to create a new internal narrative for the EU, as an EU official I interviewed pointed out, this endeavor has become more relevant again³²⁸

One more discursive frame I uncovered in my empirical analysis is the *European added value frame*, also put forward by the Preparatory Action for example. This frame argues that a more strategic and common approach to EU international cultural relations would benefit the MS and their national cultural diplomacy efforts by enhancing their visibility as well as by “pooling and sharing” their resources.³²⁹

In conclusion, through using the above-mentioned discursive frames and linking culture to deep-rooted beliefs, the Commission, and especially DG EAC, have once again been able to make the need for culture in the EU’s external relations clear. Referring to the beginning of cultural policy at EU level (when discursive frames were also used) Shore argues, that in this way, EU cultural policy “(...) provides an exemplar of the way European integration (...) works in a more general sense, and how EU institutions have maneuvered to acquire increasing jurisdiction over the hitherto jealously guarded national policy domains of its Member states.”³³⁰

However, a major change, and maybe the most important and unique element in the process of developing a policy program for EU international cultural relations, was the change of concepts from EU ‘cultural diplomacy’ to EU ‘cultural relations’. While ‘cultural diplomacy’ is considered to be a short-term effort consisting of mere showcasing of national culture(s), ‘cultur-

³²⁵ Isar et al. 2014

³²⁶ Speech by Federica Mogherini at the European Cultural Forum 2016, video online; see also Federica Mogherini, interview by Eunews, *Eunews*, June 10, 2016, accessed March 10, 2017, <http://www.eunews.it/2016/06/10/mogherini-europe-cultural-superpower-need-use-force/61145>.

³²⁷ Isar et al. 2014

³²⁸ An EU official, interview by author, via Skype, February 15, 2017.

³²⁹ Ibid.

³³⁰ Shore 2006, p.13

al relations' describes the long-term endeavor to create mutual understanding, trust and long-lasting relationships through people-to-people contacts and arm's length institutions. Therefore, intercultural and interreligious dialogue is a core element of cultural relations, which is why, intercultural and –religious dialogue has become a major trope also in EU policy documents since 2007 and will play a key role in a future strategy.

Many ideas – be it frames or philosophies – that allowed for the institutionalization of EU international cultural relations, were supported and promoted by non-state actors. They thus served as incubators, mediators between the EU institutions and civil society as well as platforms for implementation. I would point out, that particularly three NGOs need to be mentioned here: the ECF, More Europe and EUNIC, which will most likely become an implementing arm's length institution for EU international cultural relations, since all EU MS are already represented and have been cooperating with each other *and* cultural actors within this network.

As Shore concludes, mainly three themes have shaped the development of EU cultural policy in particular: The EU's search for legitimacy and popular consent and therefore the question of a European identity (the EU's philosophy of a European identity and a European demos), as well as EU governance and the EU's will to power (the EU's philosophy of values, the 'identity frame').³³¹ However, during the process of institutionalization of EU international cultural relations these themes have been further developed and I would argue that for example through the change of concepts from cultural diplomacy to cultural international relations, the EU's efforts in this field can no longer be subsumed under Shore's categories only.

On the one hand, the institutionalization process of EU international cultural relations has strongly been influenced by the EU's already existing structures and financial means in the field, as some MS remain skeptical of creating new European structures (like European Houses for Culture, or even cultural focal points within EU delegations). Yet, on the other hand, the Joint Communication – the reference document for a future strategy in this field – through its cultural relations approach is much more innovative than many have expected, as Andrew Murray underlined.³³² However, this is now the main challenge of a future strategy: to make MS and their national cultural institutes understand, what cultural relations and people-to-people contacts are. Furthermore, another main task for EUNIC and the EU institutions will be, to convince policy makers at the national level of the value of this new European long-term approach, as compared to national cultural diplomacy's short-term yield.

³³¹ Shore 2006, p. 10

³³² Andrew Murray, interview by author, via Skype, February 6, 2017.

Therefore, I am convinced that national cultural diplomacies will continue to exist, but at best next to and in accordance with strategic and coordinated European cultural relations.

As Lisack argues in her advocacy paper for More Europe, "European external cultural relations could be strategically defined within a broad range, from an international mosaic partly borne by national cultural institutes (prolongation of cultural diplomacy) to a new model with a real European character, borne primarily by civil society (with a greater orientation towards cultural cooperation)."³³³

³³³ Lisack 2014, p. 48

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Abstract (english)

This thesis analyzes the current development of cultural policies of the European Union (EU) towards a more strategic approach to Culture in EU external relations. Since the adoption of the Lisbon Treaty and the creation of the European External Action Service (EEAS) it brought about, increasing efforts for an enhanced role of culture in external relations have been made. Cultural policy should be more strongly considered in the EU's relation to third countries, no longer only be kept within the EU.

Recently the EU faces hard times – an approaching shift in the international power distribution in favor of the emerging economies and to the detriment of the EU's role, an increasingly unstable neighborhood, the Brexit, populist or even xenophobic tendencies within the Member States of the European Union. However, as I will show, it is exactly in this context, that culture in EU external relations is re-evaluated and enhanced. This development of a European Strategy for international cultural relations has been put forward in several official EU documents: These were the European Agenda for Culture in a Globalizing World, published by the European Commission in May 2007, the 2011 Parliamentary Resolution, the 2014 Preparatory Action for Culture in external relations and the 2016 Joint Communication “Towards an EU strategy for international cultural relations”.

This thesis aims to analyze and explain the institutionalization of EU international cultural relations, its development from single policies into a fully-fledged policy program coordinating EU external cultural policies. It therefore makes use of Vivien A. Schmidt's theory of Discursive Institutionalism and John L. Campbell's synthesis of Historical and Organizational Institutionalism and will mainly focus on the role of ideas and discourse in this process of institutionalization. Using this theoretical synthesis, primary documents as well as non-standardized expert interviews will be qualitatively analyzed. The enabling institutional context, the influencing ideas and the ideational development of successful background ideas, which according to my analysis, explain the institutionalization of EU international cultural relations will be presented.

Abstract (deutsch)

Diese Masterarbeit analysiert die derzeitige Entwicklung der Kulturpolitik der Europäischen Union hin zu einem strategischen Ansatz zu Kultur in den EU Außenbeziehungen und versucht zu erklären, warum und wodurch diese Entwicklung in den letzten zehn Jahren möglich wurde. Seit der Annahme des Vertrags von Lissabon und der darin vorgesehenen Schaffung des Europäischen Auswärtigen Dienstes wurden vermehrt Anstrengungen unternommen, um die Rolle von Kultur in den Außenbeziehungen zu stärken.

In letzter Zeit steht die EU schwierigen Herausforderungen gegenüber: einer bevorstehenden Veränderung der internationalen Machtverhältnisse zugunsten der Schwellenländer und zum Nachteil der EU, eine immer unsicherere Nachbarschaft, dem Brexit und populistischen oder xenophoben Tendenzen innerhalb der Mitgliedsstaaten. Nichtsdestotrotz wird genau vor diesem Hintergrund die Rolle von Kultur in den internationalen Beziehungen der EU neu bewertet und verstärkt. Diese Entwicklung hin zu einer Strategie der EU für internationale Kulturbeziehungen wurde durch mehrere EU-Dokumente unterstützt: die Europäischen Kulturagenda (2007), die EU-Parlamentsresolution (2011), die Vorbereitende Maßnahme „Kultur in den Außenbeziehungen der EU“ (2014), sowie die Gemeinsame Mitteilung „Künftige Strategie der EU für internationale Kulturbeziehungen“ (2016).

Diese Masterarbeit versucht die Institutionalisierung von Kultur in den EU Außenbeziehungen – die Entwicklung einzelner policies hin zu einem policy program – zu erklären. Der theoretische Rahmen hierfür basiert auf Vivien A. Schmidts Theorie des Diskursiven Institutionalismus und John L. Campbells Synthese von Historischem und Soziologischem Institutionalismus. Der Fokus liegt daher auf der Rolle von Ideen und Diskurs in diesem Institutionalisierungsprozess. Unter diesen Aspekten werden ausgewählte Primärdokumente sowie selbst durchgeführte Experteninterviews qualitativ analysiert. Der institutionelle Kontext, die beeinflussenden Ideen sowie die ideellen Entwicklungen, die dieser Analyse zufolge die Institutionalisierung von Kultur in den Außenbeziehungen erklären, werden präsentiert.

Pledge of Honesty

On my honour as a student of the Diplomatic Academy of Vienna, I submit this work in good faith and pledge that I have neither given nor received unauthorized assistance on it.

Sonja Schragen