Master Thesis

One World?
The Importance of World History
in Modern Geopolitical Discourse.

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1. Introduction

1.1 A debate of global significance

The impact of geopolitical manoeuvrings, even those on a massive scale, was until recently relatively limited by the natural firewall of global geography. It was just not possible for an event resulting from such machinations to impact every person in every corner of the globe. The phenomenon of modern globalisation, however, has shattered that containment field. Geopolitical debates now have the potential to hold true global significance. When such debates emanate from a country with a seemingly unlimited economic, military and cultural global reach, with the purpose of influencing foreign policy with respect to the entire world, the realisation of this potential is inevitable. A perfect example of such a debate commenced in the United States after the end of the Cold War; a discourse ostensibly concerning what the U.S. should do with its newfound status of sole superpower, in turn what world order would result and where the UN should stand within that world order. Mostly missing from these debates was the direct involvement of practitioners of an academic discipline that had experienced a growth spurt coinciding with the growth of modern globalisation—world history. This is somewhat surprising, as there is a natural harmony between world history—which investigates arenas of global significance—and geopolitics, which in the case of the American debates on the role of the U.S. and the UN in the modern world order, is an arena of global significance. It raises the question of whether world history, both through its visions of the world and the histories behind them, is helpful to the understanding of geopolitical debates, and the motivations and influences of the actors behind them. Is knowledge of world history important when considering geopolitical debates of global significance?

The backdrop to these debates is globalisation. It is the nature of the world shaped by this phenomenon that extends their already huge political and social significance to a global scale. The scope and reach of modern globalisation has never been witnessed before, a phenomenon that has become accepted knowledge—a rare global consensus that traverses national borders and all segments of society and in itself is an example of globalisation at work. The world has reached a point in time where, metaphorically at least, borders between nations and civilisations appear to have been breached at a number of levels, including economics, culture and the transmission of ideas, thus creating new dynamics affecting the entire world. A side effect of this metaphoric debordering has been an increased emphasis on difference,
manifest in a general rise in national, ethnic, religious and cultural parochiality. When the fact that many elements of globalisation have occurred within the guidelines and often under the auspices of nation states is considered, a paradox becomes clear. The global village is bound to exist within a nation state paradigm.

It is in this environment that geopolitics, with its long and chequered history, continues to play a role in the shaping the world. One of the most important issues in this arena today is the role of the U.S. and the related role of the rest of the world. After the end of the Cold War, the U.S. found itself with a disproportionate geopolitical and military power balance in its favour, which when combined with economic power and cultural reach that had been developing since the end of the Second World War, gave it a unique place in world history. Never before had such a country held such perceived power, effectively over the entire world, and by association, the world’s people, inspiring calls of ‘global hegemon’ that can be heard to the present day.

There was and remains much debate as to what America should do with this new post-Cold War world dominance, primarily how to ensure the continuance of this position. Within the context of these debates, there stood on the horizon only one body that could be argued to represent the people of the entire globe—the UN. As the only truly global body representing sovereign state units that has the power to authorise—in certain circumstances—military intervention, peacekeeping and economic sanction, as well as being at the forefront of global initiatives in education, health and human rights, to name but a few examples—the UN was bound to be in their sights. As such, the UN and its relationship with the U.S. in this new post-Cold War world stands front and centre in debates concerning America’s rightful role in the world. What makes these debates globally significant is that even though they are outwardly trying to forge American public and political opinion behind the implementation of foreign policy, such policy would, because of the combination of American power and unlimited scope of globalisation, resonate throughout the world in a manner that previous so-called ‘global hegemons’, from the Pax Romana to Pax Britannia, could never hope to achieve. Which in itself creates another paradox. A debordering planet seemingly moving away from the primacy of the nation state creates the condition where an understanding of geopolitics of global significance becomes more important for understanding the nature of that debordering planet.
Concurrent to, although not necessarily as result of this wave of globalisation was the rise of the historical discipline of world history, although in its modern form it predates the post-Cold War era, in many ways addressing some of the same questions that the *morbūs philosophus-historicus*—in the words of Frank Manuel¹—had been attempting to answer for centuries. If ever there was a time when world history and writers of world history should have something to contribute to geopolitical debates of a global significance, it should be now. Not only may world history make it possible to uncover all relevant and causal antecedent and related actions that frame the geopolitical debates such as those on American foreign policy, as well as cultural and economic connexions, but individual world historical treatises that include a vision of the contemporary globe are talking about the very world arena that the debates are operating within.

Modern world historical writing has for the most part steered clear of syntheses based upon geopolitics and the political sciences in general. This is partly understandable from an academic standpoint if one considers the long-held phobia in the history academy for involvement in debates with a future—and somewhat teleological—focus.² As part of long overdue efforts at addressing the overemphasis on politics and the nation state in traditional history writing, world history as a historical discipline has literally widened the net, utilising a far larger selection of foundational cores, including trade, migration, gender, ethnicity and identity. The connections that made the respective region or human subject group as it was at the time of the phenomenon studied, charting sometimes multiple courses of that transition or progression, has rendered world history based upon geopolitics a somewhat endangered species. This is not to suggest politics no longer plays a role in world history writing, in its institutionalised form it remains involved, as an actor or by merely providing the environment and the boundaries of the particular world historical narrative.

There are still writings produced based upon the traditional and now out-of-fashion paradigms of nation state and politics. Two such works are *The End of History and the Last Man*, by Francis Fukuyama, and *The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of the World Order*, by Samuel Huntington. It was into the relative vacuum of the post-Cold War world order that these two highly contentious works first appeared, striving to map out a global vision for the future. Though vastly different treatises, both works, through their presentation of patterns of global change supported by historical development, were founded upon and are reliant on world history. Their emergence, influence and
success made them difficult to ignore, with a resonance that echoes even today. What appears to have been ignored is the world historical foundations supporting their theses. How do the ideas of Huntington and Fukuyama relate to the debates in question? As both works purport to map out world order scenarios, something the debates strive to influence, can understanding the world history behind these works be beneficial?

It is probable that people influenced by *The Clash of Civilizations* and *The End of History* did not consider their world history foundations and focussed rather on their universal history-like future premonitions. Notwithstanding, the world history supporting their respective treatises remains vital, and is inseparable from their overall syntheses. Conversely, even if practitioners of world history spurn these works, as they did with the preceding high profile attempts at a future global vision, such as those by Arnold J. Toynbee, H.G. Wells and Oswald Spengler, they are still founded upon world history, and regardless of their academic palatability are representative of world history as a practice. Therefore, it remains to be argued that understanding world history, in this case via the bridge built between world history and geopolitics by Fukuyama and Huntington, is important in forming a deeper understanding of geopolitical debates of global significance; debates where the ideas of the two men can be seen at almost every turn.

1.2 Tackling the problem. A multifaceted approach

There is no single approach to such a synthesis as this, as it involves several distinct and multidimensional segments. Whereas the analysis of the American debates requires a fairly standard debate analysis, with a supplemental comparative analysis in order to establish debate positions, the world history component needs a historiographical analysis, in order—in effect—to establish itself. Add to that a review of *The End of History* and *The Clash of Civilizations*, necessary to attach them to discipline of world history and to geopolitical debates of global significance, and a degree of empirical research throughout for substantiation, and the result is an epistemological smorgasbord. Each component of this study also has different temporal scales, leaving but one area of consistency throughout—the spatial. This is a study of debates concerning the relationship between the U.S., as a sovereign state; the UN, an international organisation currently comprising 192 sovereign states; and planet Earth, covering all peoples, administrative units, collectives and cultures. Although such debates are not confined to the U.S., this work is focussed entirely on the American domestic debate. The
The essence of this study is encompassed by the following paradigm; how the U.S. and the UN fit together at the figurative summit of planet Earth. Overlaying all of this is a non-geographic space, the academic field of world history writing.

The temporal scales of this study need to be broken down by segment. The American debates concerning the UN date back to the very establishment of the organisation. A dramatic upsurge in this discourse commenced with the end of the Cold War, and the momentum continues unabated. Therefore the temporal focus of this part of this study is the debates concerning this relationship from 1991 to 2007; the first significant blow was Charles Krauthammer’s article, “The Unipolar Moment”, which appeared in *Foreign Affairs* in 1991. Fukuyama and Huntington’s contributions came in book form in 1992 and 1996 respectively; although they were both monographs developed from previously published articles. A historical scale has been chosen to run concurrently with this, namely 1991-2007, as a study of this size could not hope to cover the relevant antecedent causal history. The temporal scale of the historiographical world history component is longer. In order to establish world history as a discipline, the nascent modern works from the 1950s and 1960s need to be considered. Finally, as both *The End of History* and *The Clash of Civilizations* cite many philosophers with a world historical vision, if not modern world historians per se, it is necessary to extend this temporal scale back centuries.

Analysing the American debates is a relatively straightforward task. There are so many competing voices from the political arena, academia, policy institutes and think tanks that the most difficult task here was to choose which ones to include. In turn the vehicles used to communicate their beliefs range from academic journals through to cable news television. Hence this section is perfectly handled by a simple debate analysis, which involves sourcing, analysing and categorising what has been said or written with regards to the subject at hand. Added to this is an even simpler form of comparative analysis, which establishes distinct categories within the debates. Here the discourse is analysed against both other discourses and academic commentary on those discourses.

Establishing what world history actually is, in order to give it context within these debates, requires a historiographical analysis. Two types of writings are considered, world histories themselves, and historiographical commentary on world history writings. This is also important when establishing the world historical foundations behind *The End of History* and *The Clash of Civilizations*; for which a basic review of both is sufficient. This will enable them to be connected to world history writing, and will set the scene for them to be placed within
the context of the geopolitical debates that are the focus of this work. The actual underlying history is studied through empirical research, to locate the actions that frame the situation within which the debates occur. Empirical research is also used to substantiate the similarity of ideas, most importantly to link Fukuyama and Huntington to key players and positions within these debates. This is the only true way to establish these concrete connections, short of interviewing both Fukuyama and Huntington and the actual players in the debate, which falls outside the scope of this work.

This work contains elements of history, world history, historiography, political science, international relations, as well as a smattering of both political philosophy and philosophy of history. A broader study of this topic would ideally consider international law, economics and sociology, and perhaps philology. All of which is consistent with both works of global nature and to world history writing, as such questions of global significance are inherently difficult when confined to one discipline. One final note, as English is the primary language of the debates themselves, as well as the majority language of the U.S., all sources used here were originally delivered in written or spoken English.

1.3 State of play. Literature review

The multifaceted nature of this thesis posed a challenge when establishing a state of the art for literature. As it is clear that no specialised academic journal could possibly cover such a broad arena, there can be no state of the art literature review for this overall thesis topic. As this work has individually delineated sub-sections, it was imperative to establish the state of the art for each of the individual sub topics that make up this treatise, and the only way to do this is by a cross-discipline analysis. In this case, that meant seeking out articles concerning Huntington and Fukuyama, and world history in general, in the leading relevant political science, foreign policy and international relations journals. Conversely, the major world history journals have been reviewed to establish whether there are any arguments regarding geopolitical debates within world history, or specifically Fukuyama and Huntington in this context. If there are arguments with a common thread, then it can be deduced that this problem, in a general sense if not specifically, has been previously recognised and addressed.

This thesis is restricted by scale, therefore it was necessary to limit the number of journals consulted. Only the leading English language journals in each field have been researched. It can be argued that if the themes at the core of this thesis are not visible here, they are not
being debated at the pinnacle of these disciplines. Three world history journals were reviewed, the *Journal of World History*, the *Journal of Global History* and the online journal *World History Connected*. To establish whether this argument has been raised in the more general academic history community, *The American Historical Review*, has also been analysed. Finally, *History and Theory* has been investigated, due to the theoretical and sometimes philosophical nature of both Fukuyama and Huntington’s work. On the foreign policy side two journals have been studied in depth, *Foreign Affairs* and *International Affairs*. To complete this analysis *Political Science Quarterly* and *The Journal of Politics* were chosen from the political science arena.

The end result of this initial research is that this particular synthesis has never been attempted—there is no real corpus of writings specific to this topic. However, when combined with the more specific research on the individual elements that make up this thesis, enough articles have been written that indicate that this is a viable topic for study. An example of a pertinent article is one by John Gray, entitled “Global utopias and clashing civilizations: misunderstanding the present”, which appeared in *International Affairs* (Jan 1998).3 His argument considers the world historical foundations of both Fukuyama and Huntington with respect to the global political system of the 1990s, displaying an excellent if rare application of world historical models to geopolitical situations. In a similar vein was “World History in a Global Age”, by Michael Geyer and Charles Bright, from *The American Historical Review* (Oct 1995).4 This offers both an overarching state of the art of world history writing at the time, and an establishment of the relationship of power and international politics to the historical notions of nationalism, state borders, and histories written for a national purpose. From the United Kingdom, thereby not technically within the scope of the U.S. debate, are many works from Paul Kennedy; the most notable being his 2006 work *The Parliament of Man. The Past, Present and Future of the United Nations*.5 Some world historical works on empires take contemporary geopolitical considerations into account. One recent example is Yale law Professor, Amy Chua’s *Day of Empire: How Hyperpowers Rise to Global Dominance – and Why They Fall*. Chua, who equates ‘empire’ to the dominant power in the world at that time, comparing the U.S. to ten such ‘empires’ stretching as far back as the Persians and Romans.6 For the most part, however, all matters political and nation state have generally taken a back seat with regards to being the primary focus of modern world historical writings.

In terms of analysing and categorising world history as a historiographical concept, in order to help establish the link between the works of Fukuyama and Huntington and world historians, there is a multitude of resources available. Like all academic disciplines, world history is both
introspective and self-critical. For background here, the 2005 edition of Palgrave advances in world history, edited by Marnie Hughes-Warrington, is invaluable, offering multiple perspectives on world history that make hazarding a definition an easier task. Patrick Manning’s 2003 work, Navigating World History. Historians Create a Global Past, and the 1998 collected work World History. Ideologies, Structures, and Identities, edited by Philip Pomper, Richard Elphick and Richard Vann, also provide detailed conceptual maps of world history writings. Volume 34, Number 2, of History and Theory, a special theme issue entitled “World History and its Critics”, is notable for a vigorous defence of The End of History by the author himself—a rare excursion by either Fukuyama or Huntington outside the world of foreign policy and political science journals. Both men have felt compelled to defend themselves in print and in interviews, a notable example being Huntington’s “If Not Civilizations, What? Samuel Huntington Responds to His Critics”, a bold challenge to his critics to come up with a viable alternative to his ‘clash of civilisations’ thesis.

In the American debates concerning the UN and its role in the modern world relative to the U.S., there is an embarrassment of sources, so much so that the largest challenge here was deciding at what point critical mass was reached. To prioritise the participants in these debates and the nature of their messages, it was necessary to step back and establish whether any clear and consistent positions on American foreign policy, or ideological groupings, could be ascertained, and to what degree these positions related to their opinions concerning the UN. Here John van Oudenaren’s article, “Unipolar versus Unilateral”, Policy Review (April & May 2004) was invaluable, providing the categorisation typology for the analysis of the debates, breaking them down into four different groupings, which we will later return to in greater detail. Van Oudenaren also provides a related list of influential actors, primarily from the academic side. Investigation of these cited authors uncovered a wealth of work concerning where the chosen author believed America should stand with regards to the modern world, as well as the role of the UN in that world. From these four general positions on U.S. foreign policy, two positions specifically concerning the UN can be distilled.

It appears that when it comes to the UN almost everybody in this arena had something to say. Political figures contribute heavily to this discourse, for example candidates in the 2008 Presidential elections such as Hillary Clinton and John McCain. Foreign policy officials (current and former) are heavily involved, including Clinton-era Secretary of State, Madeleine Albright, not to mention recent U.S Ambassador to the UN, John Bolton, a notable critic of the UN, infamous for a 1994 speech where he suggested that if ten stories of the United
Nations headquarters were destroyed, it would not make one bit of difference. Media pundits have also been heavily involved in these debates, as have numerous academics. In addition, Ian Hurd, from Northwestern University—a leading specialist on the history of the UN from an international law standpoint—weighs in often to these debates from the historical perspective of the relationship between the U.S. and the UN and the actual role of the UN as specified by its charter.

The journal *Foreign Affairs* is an indispensable resource for works on the issue of world power polarity as well as lateralism, and has seen many future geopolitical visions grace its pages. Standing out from amongst a bank of relevant materials is Niall Ferguson’s, “The Next War of the World”, essentially a Huntington-style prediction of how the twenty-first century world will manifest. *Foreign Affairs* has also featured many articles specifically relating the core writings of Fukuyama and Huntington to foreign policy as it happened. Actual links between Fukuyama and Huntington and the actors in these debates can be ascertained by analysing personal and professional relationships the two writers had with these actors. There are ample and easily accessible references to these connections.
2. Terms & definitions, debate positions, actors

2.1 Terms and definitions

As the subject matter of this work is term-heavy, it is important at this juncture to clarify some of the terms used throughout. Definitions for bodies such as the UN or sovereign states such as the U.S. need not be rehashed here. However, there is much terminology specific to the debates in question, as well as terms connected to the works of Fukuyama and Huntington and others relevant to the fields of world history and geopolitics that require clarification. As this study is reliant on the detailed formulation for common characteristics for world history writing, the term ‘world history’, in reference to the academic sub-discipline of professional history, will be detailed separately in Chapter 3. The expansive nomenclature displayed by the world history profession will also be addressed in this section; most importantly the distinct yet related world history sub-groups of global history and speculative philosophy of history.

In modern and more common parlance geopolitics refers to the relationship and influence of political power, history and social sciences to the politics and policy agendas of international relations. The ‘geo’ refers to geography; specifically geographic boundaries such as national borders, the impact of natural resources, land geography and human geography on politics. The spatial aspect of this work is the entire globe, hence we speak of geopolitical debates of global significance—in this work the debates concern global power relations between international political administrative units, primarily sovereign states but also international organisations such as the UN. In its highest academic form geopolitics is focussed more on pure geographic indicators such as resource availability; however it could be argued that this makes no difference to the definition offered here. In a globalised world it would be naïve to think that geopolitics of any level is not driven to a large degree by geography, provable by one salient example—the importance of oil to the interventions in Iraq in 1991-1992 and from 2003 to the present.

With regards to the American debates in question, there are several important terms used throughout this work. The first two are based upon polarity, which refers to how power is distributed in a global system. Unipolar refers to global dominance by one sovereign nation, bipolar by two, and multipolar by more than two. The normal facets of polar power are the subject of debate, but can generally be considered as unsurpassed military and economic
capabilities, resources strength (people, land, commodities), and a high level of competence in managing the above fields of power. Some commentators include strong soft power as a mandatory condition. Soft power is subtle—for example cultural transfer, back-room diplomacy, leading by example, even sometimes agreeing to a global consensus not in line with standing national policy. Contrasting soft power is hard power, which is plainly visible, working by inducement and threat, utilising such tools as standing armies or trade sanctions. How a polar power, indeed any sovereign nation, practices international co-operative politics at the collective level of nation states is called lateralism. In it’s most simple form, unilateralism reflects a country going it alone on an international issue, whereas multilateralism refers to countries working together by consensus, often through umbrella organisations such as the UN, the World Trade Organisation or the International Monetary Fund. Lateralism becomes problematic where international law and treaties are concerned. To give a hypothetical example, if five countries were to sign a free trade agreement with a particular state in defiance of UN sanctions, their action as a collective body of five against the UN can be seen to be unilateral, whereas their cooperation as a body of five is multilateral.

The best manner in which to illustrate how polarity works is by outlining a brief history of international power politics at the global level since the Second World War. Until 1945 the world power system was multipolar, with the strongest nations striving to counterbalance the power of like countries, in some instances these competitors were also considered threats. After the Second World War two great power blocks emerged, centred upon the U.S. and the Soviet Union. This was the bipolar world system, where other traditional world powers fell far behind in terms of hard power indicators. Although these countries could still challenge their respective hegemon in certain circumstances; such challenges never came close to threatening the world power system or the dynamic within the respective hegemonic orbits. It also became difficult for a second-level power to operate independently within the hegemon’s sphere of interest—as Britain and France found when they attempted to intervene during the Suez Crisis in 1956. This bipolar system lasted until the sudden collapse of the Soviet Empire, an event that caught most foreign policy experts and policy makers by surprise.

2.2 Where four goes into two. Categorising the American debates

As previously noted, the debates concerning the role and place of the U.S. in the world with regards to the UN are a central component of the larger debate of what the U.S. should do to preserve its place in the world, painting a picture of how the world is viewed by different
stratas of American society. As previously noted, John van Oudenaren devised an unwieldy yet highly descriptive classification system, segmenting the debate into four general groups: *unipolar unilateralists*, who insist that unilateralism is the only way to protect American interests, which are in turn beneficial for the world; *unipolar multilateralists*, who believe the continuance of American primacy is best served by restraint and judicious use of the international system; *multipolar unilateralists*, notable for a combination of isolationists and those that believe that unipolarity as a concept is impossible; and *multipolar multilateralists*, who believe in a return to a traditional great power system where existing and emerging great powers will be best served by working together.

It is necessary to outline the differences between the unipolar unilateralists and the unipolar multilateralists in this section, because these differences have shaped the recent trajectory of U.S. foreign policy. The unipolar unilateralists believe that American power has passed a tipping point, which no other country—for the foreseeable future—can counterbalance. Without fear of competition at a global level, active maintenance of American global hegemony will result in an extended *Pax Americana*. Their primary tool is military supremacy.

The unipolar multilateralists, on the other hand, believe that if the U.S. is considerate of the needs of other nations (whilst never being subservient), it will ward off potential challengers to American global primacy by the very good of the example set by its approach. Both camps ascribe to Hegemonic Stability Theory, which postulates that the world is best served by a single dominant nation which can keep the world stable by its very hegemony, such as by maintaining a reserve currency. For both groups, this theory supposes willing co-operation by states.

These positions drive all debate on geopolitical issues of a global scale in the U.S., as they cover all the possible permutations when working within a nation state based world system. Whilst the actors representing these positions are not always in complete agreement on every single issue and sometimes in conflict, displaying the multiple personality of these debates, they are very much their ideological nerve centre. In the case of discourse concerning the UN, these four positions can be distilled into two; *Antagonists*, notable for their agitation for radical reform of the UN, with some tending towards abolition; and *Protagonists*, who although supportive of the UN, still counsel moderate reform. Whilst these two groupings form the typology for the analysis of the discourse, they are inexorably connected to the four overall positions on American foreign policy outlined above.

The following table displays this dynamic, and highlights why both the four-position typology of Van Oudenaren and the Antagonist/Protagonist model need to be referred to throughout
this work, for actors sharing the same position on the UN may have formulated that stance from entirely different perspectives of U.S. foreign policy.

Table 1.1: Segmentation of American debates on foreign policy and the UN

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<th>Unipolar unilateralist</th>
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<tr>
<td>Position with regards to U.S. foreign policy</td>
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<tr>
<td>Position with regards to the UN</td>
<td>Antagonist</td>
<td>Protagonist</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Actors</td>
<td>• Primarily Republicans • Foreign policy experts and pundits with Republican leanings • Selected political science, international relations and international law academics</td>
<td>• Primarily Democrats • Foreign policy experts and pundits with Democrat leanings • Selected political science, international relations and international law academics</td>
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These debates also showcase how interdependent the UN is to questions of the role of the U.S. in the world. Even when the UN is not mentioned by direct address in a particular discourse, the very nature of the debates means that whatever is said or written must have a connection to a position on the UN. There can be no debate on a new world order without the UN as a constituent element, as the machinations leading to the 2003 Iraq conflict displayed in abundance. On matters of global management in the post-Cold War world, the UN and the U.S. are inexorably linked. For example, if one is proposing a new international body of democratic states, like-minded to the U.S., a ‘League of Democracies’ per se, its motivation must have as a foundation an opinion of the worth of the UN.

2.3 Where do they stand? Segmenting the actors

The range of actors in these debates is as diverse as the mediums in which this discourse can be found. They range from politicians, policy advisors and government bureaucrats, to academics and what can be loosely termed pundits. As this is a debate considering the relative strength and influence of the U.S. with relation to the UN in the contemporary world, it is an almost essential policy consideration for American politicians, especially those with foreign policy responsibilities or designs on the highest office in the land. The three most prominent candidates in the 2008 U.S. presidential election primaries,
Senators John McCain, Hillary Clinton and Barack Obama, have all stated their positions on the role of the UN. Their policy decisions should they become President put them on an inevitable collision course with this issue; the successful candidate will have to face the issue of the UN to perform the functions of the office of United States President, just as current President George W. Bush and his predecessor Bill Clinton (indeed all their post-Second World War predecessors) have done. In short, McCain is an Antagonist and the two Democratic candidates Protagonists. Joining them on the national stage are members of the various Congressional bodies that oversee different levels of foreign policy, such as the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations. These members are either active in these debates through Committee business or independent initiative.

Serving elected officials are tied to policy not only though resolutions of the House of Representatives and the Senate, but through the work of the un-elected (though confirmed by Congress) foreign policy community, primarily the State Department, but also increasingly in modern times the Department of Defence. Again, the job of these people, from the respective Secretaries down, is two-fold. They are the departments responsible for enacting laws passed by Congress on the approval of the President, at the same time they are developing policy on behalf of the executive branch of the government for debate in Congress at the behest of the President. Their very jobs are welded to the issue of the UN. As they are the departmental face of the national government, they are not only contributing to these debates by word but also by action. Notable vocal administrators in this discourse include former Secretary of State, Madeleine Albright, as well as former Defence Department officials such as Paul Wolfowitz and John Bolton.

For the most part the academics at the head of these debates are from schools of political science, government and international relations, such as Joseph Nye from Harvard, John Ikenberry from Princeton, and Charles Kupchan from Georgetown. Notable exceptions include the historian Niall Ferguson from Harvard, who is also a member of the American Enterprise Institute; a major player in these debates taking what is commonly known as the neo-conservative position, and Jan Nederveen Pieterse, global sociologist from the University of Illinois. Of course Fukuyama and Huntington can be added to this list. The demarcation between this group and policy officials is also muddied, as many academics active in this discourse have worked in federal government institutions. For the most part, it can be stated that these contributions to the overall body of discourse have been academically sound and balanced.
There are also many overlaps between the final grouping of actors in these debates—the pundits—and policy formulators and academics, with one major distinguishing characteristic; this group is specifically pushing an agenda in order to influence opinion; impartiality is not a concern here. Often this agenda belongs to the policy institute or think tank to which the respective actor belongs. These actors can be found espousing their views across various mediums ranging from selected academic journals through to mass circulation newspaper and magazine articles. In addition, pundits have become experts-on-tap for the emerging and influential world of cable news channels in the U.S., which include Fox News, MSNBC and CNN, being called upon for authoritative comment in pursuit of an opinion, often in preference to academics or working policy personnel. Although these particular actors wear their agenda on their sleeves, this is not to suggest that they are without qualifications to support their positions. Many of them, whilst not practicing academics, have doctoral qualifications, such as William Kristol; have worked as journalists covering areas of significance to these debates, like Jonah Goldberg; or have had working experience in politics and international relations. Exemplifying the latter are Patrick Buchanan, former White House Chief of Staff to Richard M Nixon and advisor to Ronald Reagan, and Charles Hill, former U.S. special envoy to the UN.

These debates are noteworthy for the absence of practicing historians, specifically practitioners of world history. The most notable exception to this trend, apart from Niall Ferguson, is Paul Kennedy, author of several world historical monographs specific to international relations. Kennedy’s contributions to this discourse can be traced to his thesis of American imperial overstretch first proposed in 1987 in *The Rise and Fall of the Great Powers*. As for world history itself, the most important debates from a historiographical standing have been introspective, focussed on what exactly makes world history distinct from traditional academic history. In turn, such self-defining debate has spread into questions of terminology, and demarcation between supposedly different forms of world history. This discourse is ongoing and far from settled, typical of a relatively new sub-discipline trying to establish itself in the academic community, especially one trying to differentiate itself from its parent discipline and employing such a varied multidisciplinary approach. Indeed, opinions on what world history actually is vary to such a degree that one could form the impression the world history community is reticent to nail down a common definition. It is because of this lack of an agreed common definition that a chapter constructing one is required for this study.
3. Global vision. The discipline of World History

Any consideration of the discipline of world history must start with this question: Is world history important? Events of the past two decades would seem to indicate that it is. The founding of the World Historical Association in 1982 and journals dedicated to the cause, starting with the *Journal of World History* in 1990, coincided with a steady growth in teaching world history. There has been, admittedly, somewhat of a regression of late, especially in American universities. However, with continued steady growth of the global history form of world history, it appears to not be just a flash-in-the-pan. So, what exactly constitutes world history? This question is especially pertinent considering the varied definitions and terminologies world historians themselves assign to their endeavour. For a start, what is its relationship with both history and the world, its two constituent elements? If the answer were as simple as the history of the world, or at least the world known to those writers in earlier periods of history, there would be little conjecture or need for debate. There are four pitfalls to this explanation. The first is a simple matter of scale, for it would be impossible for any world historian, or indeed teams of such, to write a history of everything that has ever happened, much to the chagrin of the likes of Leopold von Ranke. Such work would be unreadable due to its length not to mention its unfathomable minutiae. The second is the availability of that knowledge, for it is impossible for every event, regardless of consequence, to have been recorded, or recorded with a consistency anywhere near necessary for study. These lead to another pitfall—a history of everything approach leaves behind all facts and no narrative, recording everything and telling nothing. It threatens to level everything out to a meaningless parity, where no event has significance over any other, which despite postmodern protestations to the contrary, is impossible. The fourth pitfall, in the words of Michael Geyer and Charles Bright, is that such an approach,   

misses the nature break that constitutes world history in a global age... World history in a global age proceeds differently. The recovery of the multiplicity of the world’s pasts matters now more than ever ... because, in a global age, the world’s pasts are all simultaneously present, colliding, interacting, intermixing producing a collage of present histories that is surely not the history of a homogenous global civilisation.

In effect, the global age has revealed the complexities and heterogeneity of global civilisation, distinctions which would be missed in a history constructed without prioritisation or investigation into strands of difference.
This chapter will endeavour to formulate a definition of world history. It must be noted, however, that this will be a particular author’s definition. Many practicing world historians might take issue with some of its elements. However, as this definition will be constructed by reviewing the declarations of world history practitioners, some standing at the pinnacle of the field, the overall conclusion should be fairly palatable, especially when considering the reticence of many of them to offer comprehensive definitions of their own. This chapter, therefore, will build towards a constructed formulation for world history writing that will enable it to be related to *The End of History* and *The Clash of Civilizations* as well as geopolitical debates of global significance.

It would be wise to first consider the beliefs of William McNeill, recognised by many in the world history fraternity as the forefather of the discipline in its current form. McNeill states that, “histories of the portion of the earth known to the writer are properly classed as world histories inasmuch as they seek to record the whole significant and knowable past.” There are two very important qualifying elements that stand out in McNeill’s comment. The first is “the earth known to the writer” and the second “significant”, emphases shared by Marnie Hughes-Warrington, who contended that “the ‘world’ in world history … refers not to the earth in its entirety—both including and apart from human experience—but to the known and meaningful world of an individual or group.” The scale beyond the town, state, and nation state is already clear here, as well as a search for the significant—a characteristic shared by all who write world history. These distinctions mean that there is the potential to construct either a single or a number of meta-narratives but what purpose would be served? Marshall Hodgson sees these world history meta-narratives as setting “a framework to all our historical experience,” in effect giving humanity a platform from which to consider their existence, a point again shared by Hughes-Warrington: “The purpose of world histories and creation myths is to construct a world of meaning and order that is not so much right or wrong as useful.”

The construction of world historical narratives should liberate patterns and sequences from the morass of recorded history, much in the same way that the more philosophical universal histories of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries aspired to achieve. Patrick Manning comments on patterns when stating that world history addresses, “patterns at a larger scale that may not be observable or explicable at more localised levels, and it addresses the linkages among localised and broader scales.” Another significant term that stands out here is “linkages”. Linkages are prominent throughout much of the discourse on world history, bringing to the fore its foundational element—people—which again broadens the scale,
without necessarily superseding many institutional or regional groupings which dominate traditional history writing. Jerry Bentley outlines simply the centrality of people to world history; stating that “‘interactions between peoples participating in large-scale historical processes’ are ‘one of the central concerns of world history’”.

Indeed, people are central to a definition of world history offered by Patrick Manning, who boldly opens his 2003 monograph *Navigating World History* with the statement, “To put it simply, world history is the story of connections within the human community.” People drive the interactions that form the cultures and civilisations to which they belong, and the change and growth in those units that results from external contact.

At the forefront here is McNeill, who has based his entire vanguard of world history writing upon “the reality and historical importance of trans-civilizational encounters”. Such patterns and linkages would obviously take on a global significance when the known world is considered; in this age of modern globalisation that would entail the entire planet. C.A. Bayly interprets world history in relation to globalisation, in a definition where some of the aforementioned pieces come together,

> It shows how historical trends and sequences of events, which have been treated separately in regional or national histories, can be brought together. This reveals the interconnectedness and interdependence of political and social changes across the world well before the supposed onset of the contemporary phase of “globalization” after 1945.

What Bayly is stating is that although modern globalisation has magnified the interconnectedness and interdependence of political and social change across the world, this is not a new phenomenon.

The review to this point of what practitioners have been saying about world history appears to make an underlying definition—without having analysed its methodological framework—fairly rudimentary. Unfortunately, there are two fundamentals that must be addressed before reviewing the methodology of world history, namely the confusing mass of terms and sub-genres that are used to define world history, and its relationship to previous endeavours at writing world history that stretch back millennia.

World historians are notable for employing a multitude of often confusing self-defining terms, such as ‘global history’, ‘new global history’, ‘world systems history’, or ‘universal history’, to offer but four examples. This point bears closer inspection. Scholars seem to be
divided on whether these are one-and-the-same, related or completely different. This may explain why finding a common world history definition remains for the most part elusive, and why the single-term definition to be offered in this chapter might raise a few eyebrows. Patrick O’Brien, who coincidentally uses the term global, is essentially stating they are the same, with differences of scope and scale. He explains this well when considering the terms world, global and universal, “hairs may be split in dealing with possible ambiguities, the confusion of conflation, or with potentially illuminating distinctions embodied in all three adjectives”. Other world historians make a point of separating these terms into different genre positions, such as Bruce Mazlish. Although acknowledging their similarities, Mazlish defines world history and global history as two different endeavours, noting that, “whereas world history may take all of the past for its subject, global history restricts its attention to the theme of globalisation”. He sees global history as a means to capture a vision in time of the subject part of the earth with relation to globalisation, stating that “Global thus points in the direction of space; its sense permits the notion of standing outside our planet and seeing ‘Spaceship Earth’”. The confusion over terms might be logical; in the rush to legitimise a relatively new (or reborn) academic endeavour it is possible that justifying importance by differentiation and qualities of uniqueness have played a role in this. Related to the discourse concerning self-defining terminology are differences in opinion as to what belongs in world history and what doesn’t, and whether world history is actually a new endeavour that began with the likes of McNeill, Hodgson and Leftos Stavrinos in the 1950s and 1960s, or an evolution of past attempts to find meaning through the history of the world, such as speculative philosophies of history.

Speculative philosophy of history is one of a number of terms used to describe a style of philosophical history that builds in most cases a single metanarrative of world history—“History with a capital H”, in the words of Immanuel Wallerstein—in order to uncover either a passage to the end point of a historical procession—the telos—or the existence of a cyclical pattern in world history. It shares with some world histories the unit of study—generally though not exclusively the world, although this is a world whose parameters are determined by the writer. All peoples and cultures that contribute to or play a part in the narrative, including the inactive or insignificant ‘others’, are accounted for in this unit, even if in the latter case this is by omission. The term universal history, common throughout Fukuyama’s *The End of History*, is probably the best known of the speculative philosophies of history. They also share with world history a desire to account for human progression and
the development of a historical narrative to a point in time. Where speculative philosophy of history differs is in its philosophical underpinnings, more specifically its methodological foundation based upon determinism, teleology and *a priori* constructions, as well as the tendency of some speculative philosophies of history to offer constructed portends into the future course of history.

Speculative philosophy of history is not the focus of this work, although engagement with it is somewhat unavoidable because a convincing case can be made for both Fukuyama and Huntington being writers of both world history and speculative philosophy of history. It is sufficient to state briefly that speculative philosophy of history became discredited inexorably and progressively from the mid-nineteenth century, for various reasons including its aforementioned methodological foundation, connection to nationalism and totalitarianism, and stark eurocentric triumphalism. This helps explain why many who write world histories today pass over the connection, whilst others have taken a more realistic, and must be stated, world historical approach to the problem. McNeill—inspired by Arnold J. Toynbee—is one who acknowledges the connection, gaining inspiration from the questions posed by speculative philosophy of history whilst acknowledging its fundamental flaws. Another is O’Brien, who dates what he terms global history writing to Herodotus (495-425BCE), making world history for him a modern, professional, and less philosophical and version of those previous endeavours.

Most world historians share a disdain for philosophical and eurocentric world histories of the past, a feeling best summed up by Michael Geyer and Charles Bright, who stated that the old style of world history “was an illegitimate, unprofessional, and therefore foolish enterprise. It was for dilettantes”. Regardless of the feelings concerning speculative philosophies of history within the world history fraternity, there is more than enough evidence to link speculative philosophies of history to current world history as an antecedent practice, an important point when considering what world history actually is. The world history writing of today may be different, but it is definitely related. This is important when relating world history to issues of global significance, especially as the writers being used here to build a bridge between world history and geopolitical debate are Fukuyama and Huntington.

If one were to accept O’Brien’s contention that the myriad terms outlining world history are essentially—with a few specific variations—describing one and the same practice, and that world history has a pedigree stretching back almost 2,500 years, what distinguishes
the world histories of today from all others? In this area there is a modicum of agreement among world historians that there are two different streams of modern world history writing. One is based upon connexions, the other, on comparison. ‘Connexion’ was first used in history by McNeill as a descriptor for a methodology to which he remains adhered. In the words of the man himself: “It follows that world history ought to be constructed around this reality (connexions), the largest and most inclusive framework of human experience, and the lineal ancestor of the old world in which we find ourselves so confusingly immersed today.” Connexions describe the phenomenon where contacts between different units previously unbeknownst to each other have a lasting impact on both parties—in short, best summed up by a four word process: contact, connection, exchange and change. O’Brien adds that, “McNeill’s assumption is that ‘encounters’, ‘contacts’ and above all ‘connexions’ with ‘outsiders’ can be represented as the origins and engine of most economic, social, political, military, cultural, religious, technological and other conceivable types of change studied by historians.” This theme, according to David Christian, has “inspired an entire generation of scholarship in world history”, including his own.

The second approach, as seen by O’Brien, “extends geographical catchment areas (from the local to the more encompassing units) for comparative histories of topics that might be the subject of a study across parish, regional and national boundaries as well as continents, oceans and separable cultures”. This is the comparative approach noted above, the origins of which Michael Geyer and Charles Bright trace to the quest for “the history of discovery, maritime empires, and nomadic formations … It is a history of mobility and mobilization, or trade and merchants, of migrants and diasporas, or travellers and communication”. This approach is more commonly labelled global history, and although resting upon the moniker ‘global’, does not necessarily take in the entire world. However, this is based upon the same dynamic of contact, connection, exchange and change, sharing methodology and mindset, differing only from world history as highlighted previously by its scale and, in some cases, boundaries of study. It is these two streams that make up world history: world history by connexion; and world history by comparison.

World history differs from traditional history as influenced by Ranke in that it has returned to using generalisation as a synthesis tool, a practice more prevalent in world history writings of previous eras. Traditional historians do not necessarily understand or appreciate this development; in the words of Hughes-Warrington, “World histories … are considered derivative: they are viewed as an amalgam of smaller national histories and thus as dependent
on the historiographical presuppositions and methodologies of them”. Beyond that, the penchant for generalisation is bound by two principles: scale and necessity of formulating a narrative. In addition, secondary sources are relied upon more than primary sources, although the latter remains indispensable. Marshall Hodgson summarises this well, “Here the complexity of the enquiry, the breadth of the questions it asks, is such that it can no longer be a question of marshalling all evidence bearing upon a single occasion, but of selecting and arranging all evidence bearing on the wider questions at issue”. Patrick O’Brien adds the spatial aspect to this, stating that “in order to emphasize and communicate major differences as well as resemblances global historians will tend to aggregate and average contrasts across more extended spaces and larger populations (continents, oceans, cultures and civilizations) than their colleagues who have the time and sources to engage in exercises in comparative history for more confined geographies and time scales”.

World histories, regardless of whether their spatial dimension is the entire globe or the phenomenon of globalisation, are able to focus on a subject specific core. According to O’Brien, it “has already generated a bibliography of global histories concerned with: economic development, gender, the family, youth, marriage, diet, housing, health, military organization, government, slavery, human rights, parliaments, nationalism, religions, fundamentalism, revolutions, and so forth”. As such, world history need not stand isolated from other disciplines; indeed to attempt to write such histories without employing other disciplines, due to the breadth of enquiry required, renders this task difficult. In addition, it brings academic world history writing closer to works of amateur world history and also world historical works from academics specialising in other disciplines. The type and number of disciplines utilised varies according to the needs of the topic; with a broad scope, ranging from disciplines often employed by traditional historians, such as political science and international relations; through to newer cross-overs like biology and geology.

World historians, with their professional tool kit covering multiple disciplines, are able—if the history in question so dictates—to write from a present perspective. The manner of this differs considerably from traditional historians who wrote present-centred Whiggish histories to explain and solidify national triumph and superiority, none the least because they are not welded to the perspectives of a single nation state. In the words of Michael Geyer and Charles Bright, “Narrating world history in our global age means taking seriously (rather than fleeing from) the present. And it means recovering the spirit and intent of historical inquiry,
as practiced in archival research, and adapting this to the task of writing contemporary history.”37 The relation to world history and the nation is an interesting one. As world history can “help to uncover a variety of hidden meta-narratives”,38 many have argued that a world historical approach actually enhances and makes previously confined national and regional spatial histories more thorough due to the placing of that unit in a global context.39 It can reveal local and national differences, which enriches the histories of the locals or nations in question.40 Indeed, as Thomas Bender argues with respect to the U.S., “American history cannot be adequately understood unless it is incorporated into that global context.”41 He continues, “whatever the distinctive position of the United States today, it remains nonetheless only one global province interconnected with and interdependent with every other one. The history of the United States is but one history amongst histories.”42

Another often stated quest of world historians is to transcend and invalidate eurocentric, indeed all centric, viewpoints that were core features of both previous efforts at world history and nation state based traditional histories.43 World history should neither present a national perspective of the world nor ignore or downplay the contributions of cultures other than that of the writer to the relevant narrative, because, as Marnie Hughes-Warrington put it, “there is no single culture, method or purpose that has shaped the making of world history.”44 Geyer and Bright add that, “world history at the end of the twentieth century must therefore begin with new imaginings. It cannot continue to announce principles of universality, as if the process shaping the globe into a materially integrated totality have yet to happen.”45 The nation state is still an important component part of world history, in a few cases the core unit of study, although it must be remembered that the modern nation state, and the political world in which we live, is a Western invention. Although Hodgson stated that, “to make use of current political boundaries in our discussion of historical materials turns out, with remarkable frequency, to be another means of reinforcing Westernist biases”,46 it is impractical to remove the nation state from world history writing, as long as there are nation state elements involved in the lives of the people in the narrative. One of the Western biases is the principle of universality, which reinforces the “condescension of cultures”;47 a point specifically pertinent to Fukuyama.

There is an interesting side conflict in play here, whether world history writing has over-corrected the centric mistakes of the past. Whilst it may be “important to consider the resources and strategies, and mutual collisions of dominant groups and their supporters,
at a world-historical level, as well as to chart the experience of people without history,” it should not do so at the expense of acknowledgement of the achievement of what has been historically termed ‘the West’. To remove this achievement from world history would threaten a return to the scenario posed at the beginning of this chapter—writing a history where everything has equal significance. Ricardo Duchense gives a good warning when commenting on the backlash against Western civilisation prevalent in some world history writing; “it is an ideology that encourages all students to place the level of intellectual achievements of all cultures on the same moral and rational level, and discourages the so-called ‘triumphalist’ ideas that Western civilisation has made the major contributions to the ideals of freedom, democracy and reason’.” The danger in this is two fold: it removes prioritisation or segmentation from historical achievement, and it opens the door for a new centrist viewpoint taking the place of the old eurocentrism by stealth.

Having now reviewed what world history practitioners have been writing about their discipline, it is now time to attempt a definition, or a set of defining characteristics, for world history, in order to both qualify the works of Fukuyama and Huntington as such, and also to support the contention that an understanding of world history is an important asset when considering significant global debates, such as those in the geopolitical arena.

World history is a field of historical study encompassing either an overall view of the entire world known to the writer at the time, or a subject specific view of that subject’s world. It investigates matters of global significance—overcoming the epistemological pitfall of scale by employing a degree of generalisation—in order to help establish a framework and useful meaning for world history from a non-centric point of view. Although founded in history, it utilises other disciplines when required. World histories are constructed by the examination of connexions, linkages, transfer and diffusion in order to uncover patterns and sequences of historical change.

As for the alternative terms used for world history, as noted above, the following can be added. Variants such as global history—which tend to subject specificity and comparative foundations—are merely a different spatial manifestation of world history, often focussed upon globalisation, that apply the same overall principles, standards of professionalism, and search for desirable outcomes that stand up to academic scrutiny.

Now that we have a definition with which to consider world history when relating it to geopolitical discourse, all that remains is to reinforce what world historians believe to be the overall benefits of their endeavour. Many comments outlined here seem to place world
history writing as a vital endeavour in the service of the present, a point which bears remembering when the absence of world historians from the geopolitical debates of global significance is considered.

Michael Geyer and Charles Bright offer a pointer as to what world history can achieve in the current global environment,

It is precisely the rupture between the present condition of globality and its many possible pasts that gives the new world history its distinctive ground and poses the familiar historical questions, which do not, as yet, have clear answers: when and how was the history of our world, with its characteristic condition of accelerating integration and proliferating difference, torn off from the many histories of the world’s pasts and set upon its separate course?

It is evident here that many of the questions posed by Geyer and Bright are similar to those raised by writers of earlier attempts at world history. To both men, world history can reveal purpose at a global level that traditional history could only provide for confined units, leading them to proclaim that, “this should be an exhilarating moment for historians … to account for the world as it is.”

Similar thoughts are offered by O’Brien, who, apart from seeing an ability for global history to “broaden our education”, believes it can help people “comprehend the environmental, human and cultural diversities of their times”, whilst raising the “awareness of the lives, achievements and sufferings of humanity as a whole”. Hughes-Warrington, who acknowledges the connection of contemporary world history and its predecessors, agrees: “world histories, I believe, share the feature of being a construction of and thus a guide to a meaningful world”. Hodgson claims all of history itself is “in virtue of the questions it studies possessing a permanent public interest”, due to the fact that people’s, “image of the physical and temporal pattern of the human world as a whole, is fundamental to our sense of who we are. No one is without some image of the sort, however crude”. Paul Kennedy, in referring to David Landes, states that Landes was right: there will always be a place for world history writings, as they fulfill a basic human instinct to impose some order on the past. This can be applied from above when constructing national histories, as per the examples given by Thomas Bender, who writes that if that image can “imbue our national history and civic discourse with appropriate humility, accepting the country’s condition of being one among many in an interdependent world”. These comments indicate that world history, by uncovering some order on the past, creates some order for the present.
McNeill projects this belief onto the future wellbeing of human society. He states that, “historians can play a modest but useful part in facilitating a tolerable future for humanity as a whole and for all its different parts”.

World historians have been for the most part reticent to offer “considerations of the future”, a hold over from speculative philosophies of history, as they “disdainfully view such attempts as amateurish and even embarrassing”.

Craig Benjamin contends ruefully that this “seems extraordinary given that there is actually a great deal we can say about the future with a fair degree of certainty”.

Part of the tolerable future is a world with less conflict and aggression, actions that are connected to, if not dictated by, geopolitical debates of global significance. As with all written study, the effect of world history is directly related to how it is received, by whom, and what expectations are placed on them, which leads Hughes-Warrington to comment, “exploring what is expected of world histories, when, and by whom, may help to cast critical light on contemporary geopolitical discourses such as that on the health and clash of civilisations”.

Jerry Bentley adds that, “to the extent that visions of world history shape the values of voters and policy makers, the stakes include intellectual influence with potentially enormous implications for global governance, peace and security—or lack therefore”.

Which is where we now turn. To geopolitical discourses with implications for global governance, peace and security, to look at a particular bridge between world history and geopolitical discourse, *The End of History and the Last Man* by Francis Fukuyama and *The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of the World Order* by Samuel Huntington.
4. A clash of civilisations or the end of history? 
Samuel Huntington and Francis Fukuyama

Now that we have established a constructed definition of world history, supported by commentary of its practitioners, we are now able to look at two works with world historical foundations that could effectively build a bridge between world history and geopolitical debate. The first book appeared in 1992—Francis Fukuyama’s The End of History and the Last Man. Fukuyama, a political economist and philosopher who wrote his thesis on Soviet foreign policy in the Middle East, had worked in policy planning for the Reagan era State Department, under Paul Wolfowitz, a very important player in the debates in question. At the time of writing he was a full-time employee of the conservative think tank, the Rand Corporation. The End of History, a follow up to an article penned for The National Interest in 1989, was Fukuyama’s attempt to map out future development of global politics and society. It was based upon one very simple premise—the failure of totalitarianism as exemplified by the Communist ‘second world’ and previous twentieth-century socio-political movements such as fascism and nazism, left only one socio-political system as a viable alternative—liberal democracy, which for him represented the end point of the historical progress of humanity—its telos—as only liberal democracy could guarantee human freedom.

This relatively simple claim is overwhelmed, however, by the means by which Fukuyama reaches this synthesis. It is the make-up and foundation of his argument for which Fukuyama became at once so criticised and so successful. Fukuyama approached proving his thesis from two angles, based upon selective world historical constructions and the writings of historical philosophy. The first is what he calls the “mechanism of desire”. This mechanism supports a mostly economic argument, based upon the power of liberal democracy and the economic system that underpins it, modern capitalism, to satisfy man’s desires. Liberal democracy is the natural outcome of full economic modernity, and capitalism is the only viable path toward that modernity, as proven by the disintegration of historical competition to modern capitalist systems.

This mechanism is driven by the irresistible progress of technological development, the economic and material outcome of what he terms modern natural science. Fukuyama states that he “selected modern natural science as a possible underlying ‘mechanism’ of directional historical change, because it is the only large-scale social activity that is by consensus cumulative and therefore directional”. The evolution of modern natural science has been powered by two fundamental human requirements; the need to fight wars to satisfy material
needs (including labour), which he calls military competition, which when ultimately successful leads to technology being utilised to greater effect to satisfy human consumption desires, or material wants. This is the modernisation that Fukuyama contends is in every person’s sights. The eventual political, economic and material homogenisation of humankind will render all humans both equal and satisfied, therefore helping eliminate the need to resort to conflict. The only true environment in which such a process can be realised is liberal democracy.

There is one facet of desire that Fukuyama states is unable to be satisfied by this mechanism—that of recognition. The mechanism of desire may explain why liberal democracy will end up as the only viable system, but not why it must be the only natural system. In addition, the mechanism of desire only accounts “for the last four hundred years or so of human history”, therefore rendering progress up to that point unexplainable. In order to complete his thesis, Fukuyama introduces the “mechanism of recognition”. This part of his argument is purely philosophical, and it is here that his interpretations of past treatises of speculative philosophy of history come to the fore. Although he evokes and utilises a wide range of thinkers—notably all from classical Euro-American schools of philosophy—his core argument is based almost entirely on Franco-Russian philosopher Alexandre Kojève’s interpretation of German philosopher Georg W. F. Hegel. “Hegel-Kojève” provides the missing link, enabling Fukuyama to create a monocausal metanarrative spanning from ‘the first man’ to ‘the last man’. Hegel’s universal history is far too elaborate to outline in great detail here, however like Fukuyama it is centred upon the realisation of recognition and freedom. In the words of Hegel, “Universal history is exclusively occupied with showing how Spirit comes to a recognition and adoption of the truth: the dawn of knowledge appears; it begins to discover salient principles, and at last it arrives at full consciousness.”

This need for recognition can be traced to Hegel’s original and foundational dialectic of man, whereby ‘the first men’s’ fear of death determined the dualist order of humanity that remained unchallenged for millennia. The man willing to forgo natural survival instincts and challenge death would become the master, the man unwilling to risk death the slave. The slaves slow struggle for recognition as a human being was driven by the need to satisfy, from Plato’s term, a thymos—in essence, the inner spirit. Man’s thymos sought isothymia, “the desire to be recognised as the equal of other people”, in opposition to the megalothymia of the master. Megalothymia is described by Fukuyama as “manifest both in the tyrant who invades and enslaves a neighbouring people so that they will recognize his authority, as well as in the concert pianist who wants to be recognized as the foremost interpreter of Beethoven”.

A clash of civilisations or the end of history? Samuel Huntington and Francis Fukuyama
Fukuyama sees in liberal democracy a controlled, sanitised version of megalothymia, in such fields as sport, the arts and business, in which is it acceptable to a degree so long as it plays a part in satisfying one's thymos. There is danger in this form of megalothymia; the Nazis for example used it to great effect to satisfy the isothymia of its racially German subjects.

According to Kojève's interpretation of Hegel, this freedom was first manifest in the American and French revolutions and reached its apex—its telos—after the conclusion of the Battle of Jena in 1806, when Napoleon's forces routed the King of Prussia, an event that proved a stimulus for reforms that ended the feudal era in Prussia. This brings up an interesting and often debated point about Fukuyama's epistemology. The 'end of history' does not indicate the end of historical events, per se, nor that there can't be deviations from the monocausal line of historical progress, but the satisfaction of the telos. His mechanism of desire and the mechanism of recognition converge at the end of history, leaving humanity free and recognised as such, when the satisfaction of desire through liberal democracy and its catalyst, modern capitalism, intersects with the political and therefore individual freedom of the spirit manifest in liberal democratic political systems.

Fukuyama employs an empirical approach with the mechanism of desire, formulating a world historical narrative arguing that governments have become more democratic over time, proven by the weakness of dictatorships, as he shows in two hundred plus years of recorded history leading up to the writing of the book. The mechanism of recognition, by contrast, is entirely philosophical, leaning heavily on universal history. Fukuyama concludes that the homogeneity of the human race is a bi-product of these mechanisms being determined by the political system that guarantees freedom. In his own words, “The universal and homogenous state that appears at the end of history can thus be seen as resting on the twin pillars of economics and recognition.” As with all large monocausal philosophies of history, Fukuyama’s process can be used in reverse to explain many contributing historical phenomena, such as imperialism and nationalism.

Fukuyama does not claim the end of history has been reached, rather that the conditions for it were locked into place by the dissolution of the Soviet Union. After this event, it would become inevitable. When the end of history is finally reached, it is a rather dispassionate existence for Fukuyama. Here he invokes Friedrich Nietzsche and his “Men without Chests”, not certain that the removal of struggle for both political recognition and material gain will result in eternal happiness. It is a somewhat miserable existence, as expressed by Roger
Kimball, “the satisfactions of living at the end of history will leave mankind so dull and complacent that his spiritual life will atrophy and he will find himself transformed into that flaccid creature, Nietzsche’s ‘last man’.”

Four years after the *End of History and the Last Man* came American political scientist Samuel Huntington’s *The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of the World Order*. Huntington has been, excepting a few years, a member of the Harvard Department of Government since 1950, where he was a teacher of Fukuyama. He too, worked in government, as Co-ordinator of Security Planning for the Carter-era National Security council. *The Clash of Civilizations* is much less identifiable, on first glance, as either a world history or speculative philosophy of history than *The End of History*. Huntington’s work is another attempt to outline a vision of the world’s future in the wake of the end of the Cold War, an uncertain time in geopolitics that Huntington calls “bloomin’ buzzin’ confusion”. Huntington’s work is far less openly philosophical than Fukuyama’s, and regardless of his emphasis on the term ‘civilisations’, resembles more a standard geopolitical balance of power study, one where civilisations act like and are treated as larger versions of traditional nation states.

Huntington’s thesis can be summed up as follows: The world is divided into units called civilisations as it has been throughout recorded world history. Currently, there are seven, possibly eight major civilisations, and as they are homogenous entities with unique cultural identities and differing expectations and desires, they are always prone to conflict with one another. Civilisations determine the path of geopolitical relations and will continue to do so in the future. He states that “the central theme of this book is that culture and cultural identities, which at the broadest level are civilization identities, are shaping the patterns of cohesion, disintegration, and conflict in the post Cold-War world”. He identifies the sources of intercivilisational conflict either along their boundaries, or fault lines, as he calls them, or driven by core state antagonism. He sees this threat as rising in the modern world due to a combination of reasons. The fall of the Soviet Empire left the world without an established and settled system of international relations, which had in the past been a safeguard of sorts against the fact that the most important and powerful countries are almost always from, and representative of, different civilisations. He hopes intercivilisational war can be averted by the formation of a new international order based upon civilisations, which accept each other’s differences and learn to stay apart, although he does not appear overly hopeful this will occur. In short, Huntington replaces the redundant superpower rivalry with an order centred upon “a clash of civilizations”.

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Huntington defines civilisations together with culture; they are different scales of the same entity, and are ubiquitous. He states that, “civilizations and culture both refer to the overall way of life of a people, and a civilization is a culture writ large”\textsuperscript{35} Further to this, Huntington adds that civilisations are imprecise and malleable, contending that, “civilizations have no clear-cut boundaries and no precise beginnings and endings. People can and do redefine their identities and, as a result, the composition and shapes of civilizations change over time”\textsuperscript{36} He believes people seek identity, although not necessarily their primary identity, through their respective civilisations\textsuperscript{37} which is why fault line conflict can turn intercivilisational, as he concludes that this bond is strong enough that countries will come to the aid of their cultural kin in the event that they are threatened by such a conflict\textsuperscript{38} The central civilisations in this new world order are: the ‘western’, representing North America, most of Europe, partially Latin America, possibly Israel and the settler colonies of Australia and New Zealand; the ‘Sinic’, consisting of China, the Chinese Diaspora and related countries such as the Koreas, and ‘Islamic’, which represents to differing degrees all Islamic countries\textsuperscript{39}

Huntington fears that the relative power of the western civilisation is in decline\textsuperscript{40} leaving an iron curtain of sorts, with the peoples of Western Christianity on one side, and Muslim and Orthodox peoples on the other\textsuperscript{41} The multipolar and multicivilisational order left in the wake of the Cold War also renders the possibilities of a universal modernisation \textit{(à la} Fukuyama) impossible; this can be seen in the shifting global balance of power. Huntington adds that the pretensions of the west in imposing their universal world order will likely backfire\textsuperscript{42} The only way to stop this is by “Americans reaffirming their Western identity and Westerners accepting their civilization as unique not universal … Avoidance of a global war of civilizations depends on world leaders accepting and cooperating to maintain the (new) multicivilizational character of global politics”\textsuperscript{43} To this point, Huntington outlines a model, so as to be able to: 1. order and generalize about reality; 2. understand causal relationships among phenomena; 3. anticipate and, if we are lucky, predict future developments; 4. distinguish what is important from what is unimportant; (and) 5. show us what paths we should take in order to achieve our goals\textsuperscript{44} There are only two true possible outcomes to Huntington’s thesis, global peace or global war, and these outcomes are path dependent.

The most notable difference between the two works is that Fukuyama’s is entirely based on a universalist assumption; that an end of history is achievable through the adoption of a universal liberal democracy movement which satisfies the need for human recognition;
whereas *The Clash of Civilizations*, by basing itself on the uniqueness of civilisations, offers a complete repudiation of such internationalist tendencies, on the surface at least. He states, “the one harmonious world paradigm is clearly too far divorced from reality to be a useful guide to the post-Cold War world,” because it is clear in the time since the fall of the Soviet Empire that such harmony was non-existent.\(^{45}\) Fukuyama counters in a 2003 article that there is no such thing as a united Europe let alone a Western civilisation.\(^{46}\) With a universal focus, Huntington’s thesis would be untenable, without one, Fukuyama’s would suffer the same fate. Huntington in particular is vocal about this difference; however, it is arguable that the way in which he constructs civilisations is in itself universalist—as he uses the western social science model for identifying and categorising civilisations and imposes it globally.\(^{47}\) It is clear that at ‘the end of history’ Fukuyama sees ‘one world’, whereas Huntington uses world history to try to prove that there can only be ‘multiple worlds’. The other differences of note concern epistemology, particularly noticeable in Fukuyama’s mechanism of recognition. Huntington’s vision is also discernibly more sceptical than Fukuyama’s.

As for similarities, both seem to be stressing Western values as superior (although, in Huntington’s case, excepting the imposition of those values on non-Western cultures) and the peaceful nature of relations between liberal democracies. Both are based on a political view specific to the time and spatial dimension of their argument, but take this present centred foundation and project it into the future. Both also use world history as a platform from which to dive into their respective theses. The epistemological similarities between the two works help to qualify them as speculative philosophies of history, although this is much more obvious in Fukuyama’s work, which is essentially a universal history. For example, both works produce visions of the future contingent on their particular reading of the world historical record. With Fukuyama this is clear, whilst Huntington uses history to construct civilisations and to outline their past and future growth and development. They share not just historical pattern, a staple of modern world history study, but also motion. Whereas Fukuyama’s theory is monocausal, Huntington’s is path dependent, meaning that the future can unfold in two ways, dependent on the decisions of individuals and nation states. *The End of History* is inherently world historical and philosophical, *The Clash of Civilizations*, with its path dependent passage to the future, can qualify as this as well.

Huntington can be connected to the twentieth century cyclical philosophers of history such as Oswald Spengler, with whom he displays more comfort than most academics in claiming that his *Decline of the West* “has been a central theme in twentieth-century history,”\(^{48}\)
and Arnold J. Toynbee, who is partly responsible for his definition of civilisations as well as the state of a civilisation at its end point of decline, which is arguably its telos. Huntington states that, “as the civilization’s universal state emerges, its peoples become blinded by what Toynbee called ‘the mirage of immorality’ and convinced that theirs is the final form of human society.” He differs on the repetitive cycle of universal history proposed by Toynbee and Spengler, although he does not discount it; here he is more in line with the less philosophical approach of William McNeill.

This review of the theses of Fukuyama and Huntington shows their works to be motivated by politics; in Fukuyama’s case a political philosophy, and in Huntington’s case international relations. However, their entire treatises rest upon a construction and vision of world history, which corresponds with the definition of world history outlined in the previous chapter. It is important to qualify this further, which is the subject of the next chapter. Once Fukuyama and Huntington are established as employers of world history, even if, in the case of Huntington, it was never his primary intention to write a world history, an analysis of geopolitical debates covering the same arena—the entire globe—which they are hypothesising about, will further bridge the gap between world history and geopolitical debates of global significance.

In order to establish the world historical credentials of Fukuyama and Huntington, it is necessary to return to our core definition of world history established previously.

World history is a field of historical study encompassing either an overall view of the entire world known to the writer at the time, or a subject specific view of that subject’s world. It investigates matters of global significance—overcoming the epistemological pitfall of scale by employing a degree of generalisation—in order to help establish a framework and useful meaning for world history from a non-centric point of view. Although founded in history, it utilises other disciplines when required. World histories are constructed by the studying of connexions, linkages, transfer and diffusion in order to uncovering patterns and sequences of historical change.

This needs to be broken down into its constituent elements to enable us to establish whether *The End of History* and *The Clash of Civilizations* are world histories, or are reliant on world history in order to make their arguments viable.

The first, and most important component, is that world history is a historical study. Both *The End of History* and *The Clash of Civilizations* are not presented as histories, although Fukuyama writes a universal history, an antecedent form of world history. However, both treatises are reliant upon a world historical base, without which they would be untenable. For example, Fukuyama’s thesis is dependent on his world historical construction of the causes of the failure of non-liberal democratic modes of governance, the causal phenomenon leading to the eventual universal uptake of liberal democracy, which in turn results in complete human recognition. To achieve this he analyses the slow death of the Soviet system—a historical narrative of weakness—and compares this to similar weaknesses in totalitarian dictatorships such as Nazi Germany, military dictatorships such as Greece and Argentina and the apartheid regime in South Africa. The comparative element here is a feature of modern world history writing. From this synthesis, Fukuyama attributes the failure of all non-liberal democratic systems to a loss of legitimacy, something liberal democracy ably provides humanity. He supports this with a controversial table outlining the historical progression of democracy since the eighteenth century; contentious because of both the specific years selected to make the comparison, and his bundling together of all democratic regimes as being equally capable of providing freedom as the form of liberal democracy.
he based his work upon. Further examples used by Fukuyama include his linking through historical narrative the development of education and industrialisation to the inevitability of democracy.

Huntington’s thesis is also reliant upon a historical base. Like Fukuyama, he offers a political map of the contemporary world with a historical narrative describing how it got to that point. His concept, as well as segmentation, of civilisations, is produced in the same manner, as are his arguments refuting competing world order theses, including the ‘one world’ paradigm of *The End of History*. Two examples where Huntington employs historical study in *The Clash of Civilizations* are how he establishes of the types of civilisations and nature of relations among and within them; and how he charts the rise, dominance and decline of Western civilisation. Without history here, Huntington has no thesis, as his civilisational paradigm would be rendered moot. Huntington also uses a world history construction to ascertain that the West has a problem with Islam, and has had so for over a thousand years, in turn using this to contradict the politically expedient line (at the time paraded by Bill Clinton and Francis Fukuyama, among others) that the only problem the West has with Islam is Islamic extremists. He constructs a history beginning in the early seventh century CE with the Islamic expansion, and taking in the crusades, and the Ottoman expansion into Europe. Here he cites Bernard Lewis, historian of the Middle East from whom he borrowed the term “clash of civilizations”, and a close personal friend and advisor to Dick Cheney, another influential actor in the debates. He frames this conflict as a dichotomy, sweeping throughout the centuries on ‘the product of difference’ and yet fuelled by their similarities. Another area where he uses world history is to build up a ‘west versus the rest’ paradigm, through summarising how the rest of the world dealt with the West and modernisation, leading to his formulation of the categories of rejectionism, based upon Japan from the 16th-19th century and China in the 17th and 18th centuries, Kemalism, and Reformism, citing among many instances the later stages of the Chinese Ch’ing dynasty and the failed modernisation efforts of Muhammad Ali in 1830s Egypt.

Establishing Fukuyama and Huntington’s qualifications as employers of world history against the other constituent elements of our definition is relatively straightforward. Both works purport to offer a view of the entire world, even though they make reference to world regions peripheral to their main theses only in passing. In Huntington’s case in particular, it seems enough to establish certain civilisations, such as the African and Latin American, and then
jettison them for the remainder of his work. However, it is his opinion that they still belong to his world order paradigm, as either peripheral contributors or as not in a position to have direct relevance to his overall thesis. Indeed, in the Latin American example it could be argued that its absence from *The Clash of Civilizations* is merely an accident of geography, for it has no true fault lines, no true dominant core state, and its civilisational barriers are oceans. In the case of *The End of History*, the tide of liberal democracy means that all regions will share the same form of governance, making his incomplete view of the world merely an indicator that the end of history has not yet been reached. It is also clear that both works concern matters of global significance; indeed it would be impossible to believe that the writers weren’t considering this when putting together their treatises. For Fukuyama, this is the current and future history of humanity, and a vision of a future world order of liberal democracy and a victory of the *thymos*. Huntington’s work is a study of the current and future world orders where path dependency will ensure the conditions for global war or worldwide peace.

As for methodology, both works employ a great deal of generalisation to form world historical syntheses; unfortunately, some of their generalisations appear to veer somewhat into the realm of convenience. The most striking example is the civilisational paradigm of Huntington, formulated by combining a world historical viewpoint of elements such as language and religion, as well as economics, politics and a good deal of statistics. For example, by using statistics of religious adherents in the twentieth century that showed a dramatic growth in Islam and combining this with demographic data and Islam’s penchant for growth by conversion, he concludes that Islam will supersede Christianity as the most predominant religion in the world in the early twenty-first century. In formulating his civilisational paradigm, Huntington has considered and then utilised the needed components to formulate an argument, with a degree of generalisation consistent with world history writing. He segments the seven (possibly eight) civilisations by placing countries with others that he considers share a common culture. He states that “a civilization is thus the highest cultural grouping of people and the broadest level of cultural identity people have short of what distinguishes humans from other species”. Yet, in doing so, he makes value judgements, such as that the Vietnamese or Korean cultures identify with the Sinic civilisation, and the Greek and Russian with the Orthodox. The same can be said for Fukuyama. It is bold yet hazardous for Fukuyama to make all liberal democracy one and the same, both throughout history and into the future in order to form a single position for his main argument, whilst qualifying that there are great differences between them, such as the Reagan/Thatcher free
market model through to social democracies such those in Scandinavia. At the same time, Fukuyama devotes little space explaining the failings of the Soviet Union or other non-democratic entities in history. In essence the progression of competing political philosophies whose failure enabled the triumph of liberal democracy are generalised to provide a contrasting ‘other’. It is arguable that the failings of these systems are far more complex than Fukuyama makes out.

Both *The End of History* and *The Clash of Civilizations* offer a framework and meaning for and of history. In Fukuyama’s more philosophical case, all of history, indeed all of human existence, has meaning because it is the driver of the process towards the *telos*—freedom. For Huntington, establishing a meaning of or for history is less clear, although if one was to look at his thesis in reverse it becomes clear that civilizations have always framed world history, and vice versa. In contemporary and future times, Huntington’s civilisational model, as determined by world history, determines whether civilisations can coexist peacefully as homogenous units, or succumb to a clash of civilisations, in effect determining world history. This is directly related to whether these two works uncover patterns of change. Fukuyama’s is entirely based upon a pattern of change, a single monocausal metanarrative determining the progress of humankind towards a liberal democratic utopia of freedom; world history in an albeit philosophical fashion. Huntington discovers a cyclical pattern of historical change, with the previous cycle being the ‘Cold War model’ and the current civilisational paradigm that will run its course and evolve into something new at an indeterminate point in the future.

There are differing degrees of connexions, linkages, transfer and diffusion apparent in both works. Fukuyama’s thesis is that liberal democracy has and will continue to diffuse from the West outwards, through linkages; this movement is for the most part a one-way street. Thus his world history is not supported by connexions, as there is little evidence presented that the Western model of liberal democracy is evolving due to both internal influences and those from outside the West. However, the model of liberal democracy itself is the product of transfer and diffusion, albeit in that same limited geographical and cultural sphere—the West. Fukuyama’s contention (well supported by the historical record) that the American Founding Fathers took many of their ideas from Hobbes and Locke, as well as how the likes of Fergusson, Hume and Montesquieu influenced the development of the democratic ideals on which liberal democracy rests, is a perfect example of this.
Huntington’s thesis, by parading the homogeneity of its civilisations, appears an anathema to the characteristics noted above. However, he outlines that threats to Western civilisation have developed due to how non-Western cultures have added to or enhanced their own civilisations, and/or appropriated the necessary means, to compete, for example on world markets, through military build up, or even through terror, without becoming westernised.\(^1\) Such responses by countries around the world, to the growth in power of the West, offer an example of linkages and diffusion. In Huntington’s words, “the expansion of the west has promoted both the modernisation and the Westernisation of non-western societies. The political and intellectual leaders of these societies have responded to the western impact in one or more of three ways: rejecting both modernisation and Westernisation; embracing both; embracing the first and rejecting the second”\(^1\). It is Huntington’s contention from review of the world historical record that, “in the early phases of change, Westernization thus promotes modernization. In the later phases, modernization promotes de-Westernization and the resurgence of indigenous culture”.\(^2\) Huntington details this as a pragmatic response to modernisation that differs in its manner from civilisation to civilisation.\(^3\) This too is an example of linkage and diffusion, again a mostly one-way street. Look deeper, however, and his core state/periphery state paradigm is underlined by evidence of connexions and transfer, best exemplified by the East Asian cultural framework and its centrality with Confucianism.\(^4\)

Both *The End of History* and *The Clash of Civilizations* are multidisciplinary works, based primarily in political science and economics. In addition Fukuyama’s work utilises political and historical philosophy, whereas Huntington’s is naturally focussed on international relations. It is also arguable that both rely on sociology by stealth; Fukuyama through theory and Huntington by his use of cultures. There is one area, however, where these books fall out of the definition outlined here for world history—and that is the goal of presenting a non-centric perspective. They are clearly written from a Western perspective. Fukuyama’s employment of the universal value of liberal democracy—and his belief that the rest of the world will share his viewpoint—is eurocentric, indeed, amerocentric.\(^5\) Huntington’s underlying theme of the protection of Western civilisation, not to mention some backwater opinions about the Islamic civilisation in particular,\(^6\) also renders his work eurocentric. It is in this area alone that these two books seem to fail the test of world history. Yet, as previously defined, the removal of centrism is an ideal. The challenge for world historians is to keep this to a minimum, and to acknowledge it—here it is clear both writers are not shying away
from it. *The End of History* and *The Clash of Civilizations* are works completely dependent on world history, and apart from displaying unabashed euro-amerocentrism, and perhaps in Fukuyama’s case an over-reliance on philosophy, they belong in the corpus of world history writing. Now it is time to turn to a geopolitical debate of global significance, a living and breathing example with implications for the entire globe, where an understanding of world history should enable a better understanding of their dynamics. A debate sharing the same global, spatial dimension as *The End of History* and *The Clash of Civilizations*—the American debates concerning the role of the U.S. in relation to the UN in the post-Cold War world.
6. Is this town big enough for the two of us?
American debates concerning the role of the UN

Having now established a workable definition of world history, reviewed the magnum opuses of Francis Fukuyama and Samuel Huntington, and confirmed that both are founded upon world historical constructions, as well as a universal history and a geopolitical model respectively, it is time to examine an illustrative case study of a contemporary geopolitical debate. The robust debate in question is ostensibly a domestic American endeavour. What role should the UN play in relation to the U.S. in the ever shrinking post-Cold War world, a living and breathing discourse with immense significance to the entire globe? At times of international uncertainty, debates concerning both America's rightful place in the world and the design and purpose of the modern multilateral global system increase in frequency and intensity. They are fuelled by an enormous reservoir of American politicians and pundits who by nature stake their position on any issue with significance to the U.S., not to mention political science and international law academics who would be in dereliction of their profession if they remained aloof.

Debates concerning the role of the UN, whilst simmering since it’s foundation in 1945, intensified with the end of the Cold War and went into overdrive during the machinations that led to the U.S. invasion of Iraq in March 2003. Within these debates, numerous opinions on that role have been espoused across the American political spectrum, some sympathetic to the UN, some brutal in its condemnation. Although there are two general positions within these debates, distilled from the four sides of overall debates on U.S. foreign policy, a single consistent attitude toward the UN can be ascertained—that the UN as a multilateral institution should be working towards, or being used to further the foreign policy objectives of the U.S.—an attitude that shows a degree of disconnect with the actual foundational philosophy of the UN.

The UN came into existence in 1945, during the final stages of the Second World War. American President, Franklin D. Roosevelt was a driving force behind the formation of an international order of nations that would right the wrongs of the previous experiment in global multilateral order, the League of Nations. The UN was designed as a great-power driven world system; to ensure such a catastrophe as the Second World War would never be repeated, whilst ensuring the reintegration of “the defeated Axis states and the beleaguered
Allied states into a unified international system.” The most powerful illustration of the inspiration behind the UN is to be found at the very introduction to the Charter of the United Nations,

We the peoples of the United Nations determined to save succeeding generations from the scourge of war, which twice in our lifetime has brought untold sorrow to mankind, and to reaffirm faith in fundamental human rights, in the dignity and worth of the human person, in the equal rights of men and women and of nations large and small, and to establish conditions under which justice and respect for the obligations arising from treaties and other sources of international law can be maintained, and to promote social progress and better standards of life in larger freedom.

The great power signatories to the UN Charter believed that they needed to manage the new international system on behalf of the world, and that as long as they could avoid conflict amongst themselves—which was perceived as the major threat on a global scale—peace and security could be protected. Hence the UN Security Council (UNSC) veto provisions, without which, it is likely the entire concept would have been stillborn. It was never the intention that the UN would be for the “benefit of the weak, but rather to avoid the strong stepping on each other’s toes”, in effect to head off the threat of world war. The UN was a prime example of Realpolitik, a practical attempt to ensure great powers never clashed again, whilst ensuring that they could act outside the UN in matters where such a UN-brokered outcome would be impossible. To give one example of this Realpolitik, former U.S. Senator and isolationist Arthur Vandenberg stated that, “this is anything but a wide-eyed internationalist dream of a world state … It is based virtually on a four-power alliance”.

It was the multilateral institutions such as the UN that, in the words of diplomatic historian Norman A. Graebner, “underwrote much of the postwar American-led international order.” He contended that, “these institutions, with the restraints they imposed, created a stable, agreeable environment which promoted the interests of all. At the same time, the rule-based structure of international cooperation minimized the possibilities of American hegemonic dictation”. From the multitude of standpoints taken on the UN by the sources cited in this research, two general sides can be established. The first are the Antagonists, notable for their agitation for radical reform of the UN, with some tending towards abolition. The second are the Protagonists, who although supportive of the UN, still counsel moderate reform. This study is not deep enough to investigate whether every cited source agrees with each of the outlined
issues relevant to their side. However, there are enough evident similarities to enable the formation of the two categories.

The positions of Francis Fukuyama and Samuel Huntington are relatively simple to ascertain. Although their respective treatises forecast the development of a future world order in spite of the UN, it is still possible to ascertain their stand on the UN through their works. *The Clash of Civilizations* is littered with references to UN failures, a feature that falls completely in line with Huntington’s thesis that different civilisations are only able to co-exist completely independently within their own spheres. To Huntington, the UN is rather toothless when it comes to intercivilisational rivalry; best exemplified by his comment that “The United Nations is no alternative to regional power, and regional power becomes responsible and legitimate when exercised by core states in relation to other members of their civilization”.

For Huntington, universalist assumptions are “far too divorced from reality”; the world cannot now and can never be harmonious if civilisations become interdependent. Huntington also uses the 1993 Vienna UN World Conference on Human Rights as an example of how civilisations are just too different to work as one. Therefore, at the global level Huntington appears to be multipolar, and casting civilisations as homogenous units displays unilateralist tendencies.

However, although he concedes that the U.S. is “the sole state with preeminence in every domain of power”, Huntington defines unipolarity as a system with one superpower, no other major powers of significance, and many minor powers. As he sees other major powers on the world stage, he defines the world system as “a strange hybrid, a uni-multipolar system.”

Within civilisations however, his positions are different. His belief that civilisations rely entirely on a core state is a unipolar assumption, whilst his belief in internal civilisational kinship displays multipolarity. Indeed, this is his preferred model for keeping the peace. He states, “the appropriate replacement for a global sheriff is community policing, with the major regional powers assuming primary responsibility for order in their regions.” This is intra-civilisational unipolar multilateralism. On a global scale, he does see a possible role for organisations like the UN, so long as it takes into account and works within his civilisational paradigm, stating, “the United States needs the cooperation of at least some major powers. Unilateral sanctions and interventions are recipes for foreign policy disasters”. In effect, this is the global response to core state and fault line conflicts. It must be concluded that Huntington is an Antagonist, although if the UN were to evolve into a body that could manage his world system, he could easily become a Protagonist.
Fukuyama’s *The End of History* barely makes mention of the UN at all, the only real comment of consequence being his belief that a successful UN would resemble NATO, as “a league of truly free states brought together by their common commitment to liberal principles”, a Kantian dream.17 Since the publication of *The End of History*, Fukuyama has been vocal in his disgust that “dictatorial and human rights abusing” regimes have a say in UN matters. To him, this denies the body true legitimacy.18 This places Fukuyama squarely in the Antagonist camp, a categorisation made easier by his alignment (which according to him has lapsed in recent years) with the neo-conservative movement. Unlike Huntington, Fukuyama is an unswerving universalist, envisaging a multilateral world of liberal democracies where polarity rests with a political philosophy, more than with a particular nation state. However, as he portrays the U.S. as the beacon of this inevitable movement of history, he can be said to be a unipolar unilateralist dreaming of a future of nonpolar multilateralism. Here we can leave these two men until the next chapter and continue the analysis of the debates in question.

The Antagonists share a general disdain for the UN, manifest in the multiple viewpoints, which will be summarised here: The UN is failing at its perceived objective, ostensibly to maintain global peace and security, in reality to push the U.S. foreign policy agenda, because this is what is believed will secure global peace and prosperity. If the UN were to adopt a more pro-U.S. position, it would still need to ensure it does not impinge on American national sovereignty or challenge in any way American global hegemony. The UN model is outdated, tainted by non-democratic member states whose voting and lobbying contributes to laws and treaties the U.S. may need to abide by, and by the structural empowering of ‘weaker’ members grossly disproportionate to their actual geopolitical balance of power. Depending on the commentator, the inept and corrupt UN is in need of serious reforms, including defunding or downsizing, with abolition a real alternative, although it is generally accepted that the domestic and international legitimacy the UN adds to U.S. international manoeuvres is valuable. A bellicose UN can be sidelined, only used when it can be guaranteed to agree with the U.S., by employing separate multilateral channels more in tune with U.S. interests, or by turning to unilateralism or bilateralism.

By contrast, the Protagonist argument appears less vehement. They believe a strong UN is imperative, both to sure up American interests in the world and to ensure the continued health of the modern international world system which the U.S. was so instrumental in creating. A healthy world system can help the U.S. to deal with the challenges of the twenty-first century, such as enhancing America’s ability to fight terrorism, through both direct action and the
softer approach of humanitarian initiatives such as education and health.\textsuperscript{19} Reform is on the Protagonist agenda, but with far less vitriol, mostly concerning accountability and structural efficiency. To them a stronger UN would create a world system more palatable to member states whilst legitimising the U.S. interests that are promoted and debated within it.

The assertion that the UN is failing at its mission, which includes the promotion of the U.S. foreign policy agenda, is pervasive amongst Antagonists. The machinations surrounding the Iraq War exemplified this; the hesitancy of some members of the UNSC to support the invasion came to be seen as a confirmation that their priorities lay elsewhere.\textsuperscript{20} This feeling is best emphasised by Dick Cheney, in reference to the lead up to the Iraq War in 2002-2003:

\begin{quote}
I think the United Nations up until now has proven incapable of dealing with the threat that Saddam Hussein represents, incapable of enforcing its own resolutions, incapable of meeting the challenge we face in the 21st century of rogue states armed with deadly weapons, possibly sharing them with terrorists?\textsuperscript{21}
\end{quote}

It was in this environment, combined with the belief that institutions like the UN couldn’t be assured of supporting U.S. interests, that one highly public spectacle and one mundane congressional act, showcased the Antagonist belief that the UN should never stand in America’s way. The first was the U.S. National Security Strategy 2002 (NSS 2002), an audacious statement of a new global intent with enormous significance to the UN, as would be shown with the Iraq War. The NSS—in reality a more audacious update of the so-called Wolfowitz Doctrine formulated by Cheney under the guidance of Wolfowitz in the wake of the liberation of Kuwait in 1991\textsuperscript{22}—advocated pre-emptive power strikes and bluntly forbade that any nation “surpassing, or even equaling, the power of the United States”,\textsuperscript{23} whilst officially embracing ‘democracy’ as the key to the spread of American values and practices, which would in turn promote U.S. interests.\textsuperscript{24} Nothing would stand in their way, and if the UN could not provide support for American endeavours, the U.S. would have to take matters into their own hands.

This sentiment was repeated in the brazenly entitled but never-ratified \textit{United States International Leadership Act (2003)}, co-sponsored by Congressmen Lantros and Dreier.\textsuperscript{25} The targets of this bipartisan legislation were multilateral institutions and the UN was placed squarely at the top of the list.\textsuperscript{26} Dreier commented, “this legislation will provide the State Department with the tools it needs to aggressively pursue American interests and security at these multilateral institutions”.\textsuperscript{27} Both manoeuvres displayed strong exceptionalist tendencies; evoking the

\textit{Is this town big enough for the two of us? American debates concerning the role of the UN}
sentiment that what’s good for America is good for the world. Most sources cited here display some of these traits, although few spell it out. It seems that Antagonists believe that America’s status as sole remaining superpower combined with expansive and unchallenged power growth was a confirmation of America’s exceptionalism. Such a power expression can be seen in the following sombre assessment by Robert Kagan when he stated that America, “must refuse to abide by certain international conventions that may constrain its ability to fight effectively & it must support arms control, but not always for itself. It must live by a double standard”, which determines a role for organisations like the UN, out of the way of the U.S.

Antagonists openly believe the UN should be helping the U.S. when it comes to foreign policy. The question of whether that UN support is really necessary is often answered in the negative. During the 2000 U.S. Presidential Campaign, the then advisor to George W. Bush, Condolezza Rice derided the idea, which she attributed to the Clinton administration, “that the support of many states—or even better, of institutions like the United Nations—is essential to legitimate exercise of power”. To involve institutions like the UN would hinder that exercise, as the former Secretary of Defence, Donald Rumsfeld said, “the worst thing you could do is to allow a coalition to determine what your mission is”. Even if the UN did a better job of furthering American interests, the Antagonists contend that such action better not come at a cost to American sovereignty or damage in any way the American global hegemonic position. An illustrative example of one of numerous UN initiatives strongly attacked by Antagonists, concerns UN institutions with international judicial powers, namely the International Criminal Court (ICC) and the International Court of Justice (ICJ). When the ICJ intervened on behalf of Mexican citizens on death row in Texas in 2007, there was outrage amongst the Antagonists (indeed, outrage directed towards President Bush for assenting to the court’s decision). This was clearly regarded as an impingement on U.S. sovereignty by a potential global competitor, and could not be tolerated. It was framed as an ‘all of the world vs. us’ scenario. This incredulity was mirrored during the debates about the ICC, a body seen as a clear threat to both sovereignty and hegemony, as noted by David Davenport from the Hoover Institute, “A criminal court of universal jurisdiction created by one-third of the nations of the world, representing one-sixth of its population, constitutes a major power play”. To Antagonists, that American sovereignty is sacred is taken for granted.
A “United Nations that seeks to impose its presumed authority on the American people, without their consent, begs for confrontation and—I want to be candid with you—eventual withdrawal”. So pled Republican Senator, Jesse Helms in January 2000. It has been claimed by Jan Nederveen Pieterse that a stronger UN, especially one aided in that task by the US, “would imply stepping down from its pedestal of world leadership”. Which raises a great fear held by some Antagonists—that of a world government, in the form of a more-powerful UN, dictating terms to the U.S. that they would be obliged to follow. From the Protagonist ‘side’, Hillary Clinton rejects the fear of the UN as a world government out of hand,

It was precisely to address this fear that Presidents Truman and Roosevelt and Prime Minister Winston Churchill created the Security Council veto for the “P-5” … Without that veto power, it would have been as weak as the old League of Nations; without that veto the U.S. Senate would have rejected the UN Charter as it had the League.

The Antagonists’ unease about the UN and its potential power to dictate to the U.S. is compounded by the fact that non-democratic member states wield a degree of UN influence, including those considered to be flagrant abusers of human rights, such as Syria and Libya. Some Antagonists are infuriated that such member states can chair committees, influence or even vote on laws and treaties that have the potential to affect the U.S. One idealist proposal often floated is a form of a “United Nations of democracies”, a cause taken up by John McCain, who hopes for the bringing together of “democratic peoples and nations from around the world in one common organization: a worldwide League of Democracies. This would be … like-minded nations working together in the cause of peace, (which) could act where the UN fails to act”. Noted harsh UN critic Charles Krauthammer expands this ideal to add that such a League should only be made up of ‘friendly’ democracies, a point entirely in line with The End of History. The Bush Administration position is to coerce the UN into taking up the U.S. goal of the worldwide spread of democratic governments. Indeed, they even made an effort to do this through the UN—at the UN General Assembly in 2004—by proposing the creation of a “UN Fund for Democracy”, which would have put “democracy on the same institutional footing as world hunger, children’s rights, and economic development”. There is no dispute that the UN has many non-democratic members and a number of less-than-salubrious ones. It is notable, however, that within the confines of these debates, democracy is equated with freedom, and that being democratic makes a nation more inclined to support the U.S. This latter opinion does take into account that vigorous resistance to the U.S. attempts to gain UN legitimacy for the Iraq War came from other democracies, such as France and Germany.
Not only is the UN regarded by the Antagonists as being burdened by undemocratic members, its very structure empowers weaker member states to ‘fight above their weight’, where “decision making authority … no longer corresponds to the distribution of power”.45 To Antagonists, the UN is no longer reflective of the actual geopolitical balance of power (a complaint shared by Huntington in *A Clash of Civilizations*);46 resulting in impingements on American sovereignty by nations that should never be in a position to do so. In the words of Krauthammer,

From the dawn of history to the invention of the U.N., it made not an ounce of difference what a small, powerless, peripheral country thought about a conflict thousands of miles away. It still doesn’t, except at the Alice-in-Wonderland United Nations, where Guinea and Cameroon and Angola count … It is only slightly less absurd that we should require the assent of France.47

Donald Rumsfeld has also criticised the UN regarding the non-democratic regimes and their ascension to chairs and committees, citing the example of the Libya to head the Commission on Human Rights.48 The case of John Bolton provides the perfect insight into the Bush Administration’s line on this issue. Bolton has been publicly scathing about the UN for a number of years. During a speech at the Global Structures Convocation in New York in 1994, Bolton famously said, “There is no United Nations. There is an international community that occasionally can be led by the only real power left in the world, and that’s the United States, when it suits our interests, and when we can get others to go along”.49 In 2000, he further commented, “If I were redoing the Security Council today, I’d have one permanent member because that’s the real reflection of the distribution of power in the world”.50 In 2005, he was made a recess-appointed U.S. Ambassador to the UN.

Bolton did not reserve his scorn for the balance of power within the UN. Out of the mass of commentators who chide the UN for being hopelessly inept and corrupt, Bolton is one of the most colourful,

If you lost ten stories today, it wouldn’t make a bit of difference. The United Nations is one of the most inefficient, intergovernmental organizations going. UNESCO is even worse, and others go downhill from there. The fact of the matter is that the international system that has grown up…has been put into a position of hiring ineffective people who do ineffective things, that have no real world impact.51

The call for UN reform has ‘become a mantra’ for those who are interested in the future of the UN, regardless of the side of the debate.52 It is a “top priority” of the Bush Administration.53
Working against the perceived interests of the U.S. whilst being structurally broken and corrupt has led to many calls for the extension of the practice of defunding (where UN dues were withheld by the U.S., often as a negotiating tactic) to complete defunding. That the lowest paying 130 countries together contribute less than one percent of the budget at $19,000 annual dues per country is cited as justification. When this is combined with the fact that the U.S. pays approximately 22% of the UN budget (proportionately more for UN peacekeeping operations), many Antagonists are driven to argue along the lines of ‘what does the U.S. get in return?’ One of the leading critics of UN funding is Pat Buchanan, who complained that the money does not buy influence but in fact encourages competition to the U.S., “The U.S. funded superstate has succeeded only in draining our coffers, belittling our values, and diminishing our international standing.”

Some Antagonists hope that the UN, as a result of its ‘failures’, will be diminished or fall apart, with the only surviving UN bodies the one’s inoffensive to American foreign policy or public sensibilities. This was outlined by Richard Perle, then Chairman of the White House Defence Policy Board, when commenting on the Iraq War in an article gleefully entitled, “Thank God for the death of the UN”: He stated that Hussein, will go quickly, but not alone: in a parting irony, he will take the UN down with him. Well, not the whole UN. The “good works” part will survive, the low-risk peacekeeping bureaucracies will remain, the chatterbox on the Hudson will continue to bleat. What will die is the fantasy of the UN as the foundation of a new world order. As we sift through the debris, it will be important to preserve, the better to understand, the intellectual wreckage of the liberal conceit of safety through international law administered by international institutions.

Many on the Antagonist ‘side’ grant the UN a single positive characteristic, that it confers a much-needed domestic (and to a lesser extent international) political legitimacy on American action; something Fukuyama pushed for after it became clear that the current Iraq intervention was not doing well. Indeed, during the lead up to the Iraq war some members of the Bush Administration (publicly at least, and notably not Dick Cheney) were keen to promote the UN as the answer to the crisis, displaying a brash degree of political pragmatism considering their overall viewpoints towards the organisation. Although some commentators claim that many Americans find it odd that American defence—as the Iraq crisis was presented by the Bush Administration—requires UN approval, polls consistently showed during the run up to the Iraq War that UN approval was sought by the majority of the American public. For example,
in a February 2003 poll conducted by CBS News, 64% of respondents agreed that the “US needs to wait for the approval of the United Nations before taking action against Iraq”, and “62% said the United States, should wait and give the United Nations inspectors more time.” The findings are consistent with other studies taken at the time. The difference might be explained by the public perception of a ‘defence effort’. The legitimacy of UN cooperation is not just to satisfy domestic opinion, as claimed by Krauthammer, many UN members take UNSC decisions seriously, especially the smaller ones, and some formulate their foreign policy positions only after waiting for UNSC decisions.

Most Antagonists analysed here believed that employing or encouraging separate multilateral channels more in tune with US interests could sideline the UNSC. The U.S. has been doing this for some time now anyway; Jan Nederveen Pieterse notes how the U.S. prefers to deal with certain issues through the World Bank and IMF, where its vote is stronger due to financial voting rules. The policy of the Bush Administration is to work with the most favourable institution depending on the circumstance, and if none exists, to modify an existing one or create a new one, as noted in NSS 2006. The argument that the “UN is one tool of many” indicates that the influence of the UN (especially the UNSC) can be minimized by skirting around it, a position consistent with a belief in a “League of Democracies”. In other words, whichever organisation is chosen, it should be a veritable rubber-stamp when needed for U.S. foreign policy. Other calls are frequently made along similar lines, be they for “pragmatic partnerships”, or “regional concerts” with ‘other great powers’.

Two general criticisms of these arguments of the Antagonists need to be raised before moving on to analyse the much less complicated Protagonist argument. It is impossible to escape the conclusion that the Antagonists believe that the UN has been detrimental to the U.S. and that the U.S. wields little power in the UN. A brief look at the historical record suggests otherwise. The U.S. has often found great success in the UN by ‘throwing their weight around’. They have been very successful at lobbying, and use funding as a tool for getting the UN reforms they want—at one point in 1999 they were in arrears by $1.5 billion. Secretary General Kofi Annan felt compelled to report on Middle East progress directly to the U.S. Congress, a gross transgression of protocol. They have used retribution as a coercion tool, for example when the Yemenis voted against the first Gulf War resolution.

No sooner had the Yemeni ambassador put down his hand after voting against the resolution, the U.S. Ambassador was at his side saying, “that will be the most expensive ‘no’ vote you ever cast”. The remark was picked up on an open U.N. radio microphone,
and broadcast throughout the building and ultimately around the world. So three days later, when the U.S. cut its entire aid budget to Yemen, the world took notice.\(^7\)

The preceding cases are only a few of countless examples of the U.S. wielding its power in the UN. When considered in light of what U.S. foreign policy action has occurred, it is not as if the UN has actually stopped the U.S. from doing something it would otherwise have done. Examples include how the U.S. has continually ignored strong UN majority opinion on Israel, Vietnam, Grenada and Panama, among others;\(^7\) opinion that made no difference to American positions on these issues. Cuba offers another example. In the 1990s, the General Assembly condemned the crusade against Castro by 138-3,\(^7\) yet to this day only minor policy changes have taken place, and only on the fringes. Even operating within the UN orbit, the U.S. can get what it wants much of the time and knows it, as notably conceded by Krauthammer, when referring to the first Gulf War,

> The United Nations is guarantor of nothing. Except in the formal sense, it can hardly be said to exist. Collective security? In the gulf, without the United States leading and prodding, bribing and blackmailing, no one would have stirred.\(^8\)

The same comment can be made with regards to the pressure to stop UN weapons inspections in Iraq in 2003,\(^8\) the implementation of the Iraq ‘no-fly zone’ or the probe into the ‘Oil-for-food’ program.\(^8\) Krauthammer best outlines the leverage of the U.S. in this comment made during the lead up to the Iraq War in 2003.

> The United Nations is on the verge of demonstrating finally and fatally its moral bankruptcy and its strategic irrelevance: moral bankruptcy, because it will have made a mockery of the very resolution on whose sanctity it insists; strategic irrelevance, because the United States is going to disarm Saddam anyway.\(^8\)

An analysis of the Protagonist position is infinitely more straightforward, which stands to reason as they are in the position of wanting to strengthen or improve an existing system that, philosophically if not necessarily operationally, they are satisfied with. On the whole they have much less to complain about. The primary argument amongst this group is that a strong UN is imperative, both to shore up American global interests and to maintain the health of the modern world system, (coincidentally mostly designed and influenced by the U.S.). This group still calls for reform, but with a different intensity to the Antagonists, and shares their view that engaging with the UN can proffer legitimacy to U.S. actions both domestically and abroad, but from an entirely less cynical perspective. Much of their argument can be traced to a position defined by John Van Oudenaren as ‘unipolar multilateralists’,\(^8\) who believe that a
strong international focus and respect for other nations’ opinions, combined with the pull of soft power, is a much more effective way to both maintain the western world power system of which the UN is such an integral part and also to ensure the continued U.S. dominance of world affairs.\(^\text{85}\)

The leading intellectual proponents of this position are Professors Joseph Nye and John Ikenberry. Nye is the originator of the term soft power, which is a vital component of the Protagonist position,\(^\text{86}\) and an approach he believes will ensure continued American leadership at a much lower financial expense.\(^\text{87}\) Ikenberry is of the same ilk, with a stronger focus on expansive multilateral diplomacy.\(^\text{88}\) On the political side Hillary Clinton and General Wesley Clark are strong Protagonists. Clinton, in particular, believes the US global position requires a strong UN,\(^\text{89}\) and is passionate in her condemnation of the anti-UN rhetoric that surrounded the Iraq War debate, notably for the comment “to blame the U.N. was like to blame a building on what happens inside it.”\(^\text{90}\) She was of the opinion that the UN worked as it was meant to during that diplomatic crisis. She is in the minority who still see the UN as an organisation whose decisions are the overall responsibility of its members.\(^\text{91}\) General Clark has a slightly different take on the UN. On the current issue of Iranian nuclear proliferation, he argued that the U.S. should be leading the world community through the UN because U.S. power gives it the legitimacy to do so.\(^\text{92}\) To him the U.S. might as well try leading from the front at the UN for a change.\(^\text{93}\)

Linda Jamieson from the Centre for Strategic & International Studies adds perhaps the most reasoned comment in all of the debates, stating that the proof is there that the original goals of the UN are best achieved “when the world stands together, even when the outcome is insufficient or the problem goes unsolved.”\(^\text{94}\) Regardless of this, Protagonists still want to see reform of the UN, including Hillary Clinton, who sees the value in overcoming the UN’s “flaws and inefficiencies.”\(^\text{95}\) and Ikenberry, who comments that such reform will be difficult due to the nature of the UN but worthy of the effort.\(^\text{96}\) Barack Obama is more subdued about the UN but displays both strong multilateral tendencies and a clear understanding of a need for UN reform.\(^\text{97}\) This group also understands the legitimacy of U.S. action that is conferred by UN approval. In the words of Ian Hurd, “When the United States mobilises the legitimacy of the Council behind its interests, it becomes easier to win support of third-parties … This in reality may be an illusion … but if it is an illusion that works, then it is worth investing in.”\(^\text{98}\) Sharia Tharoor from the UN explains further from a non-U.S. perspective, with reference to the Iraq War debate, “the Councils refusal to serve as a rubber stamp for Washington will
give any future support it lends to the United States greater credibility. She adds that had, “the Security Council been able to agree that force was warranted, it would have provided unique (and incontestable) legitimacy for U.S. military action.”

Protagonists disagree with the Antagonist notion that the UN is a threat to U.S. sovereignty, most eloquently put by Madeleine Albright, who famously stated in a 2003 *Foreign Policy* article that such notions were,

Balderdash. The United Nations’ authority flows from its members; it is servant, not master. The United Nations has no armed forces of its own, no power of arrest, no authority to tax, no right to confiscate, no ability to regulate, no capacity to override treaties, and—despite the paranoia of some—no black helicopters poised to swoop down upon innocent homes in the middle of the night and steal lawn furniture.

Albright, in the same article refers to the relatively low fiscal investment the U.S. makes with the UN every year, stating the Protagonist position that such investment is more than worth it, especially when compared to what the U.S. spends every week on defence. The Protagonists believe that such investment is worthwhile, showing they consider that the UN, although designed for a 1945 world, can still be highly effective in the twenty-first century.

Whether one wants to see the UN prosper, or “wither of its own irrelevance”, the common belief of both Antagonists and Protagonists is that the UN should be either promoting U.S. foreign policy interests or working with the U.S. to further those interests. This deviates somewhat from the original philosophy behind the formation of the UN as stated in Chapter 1, Article 1 of the UN Charter, which outlines as objectives the maintenance of “international peace and security”, “collective measures for the prevention and removal of threats to the peace”, “conformity with the principles of justice and international law”, the development of “friendly relations among nations based on respect for the principle of equal rights and self-determination of peoples”, the achievement of “international co-operation in solving international problems” and “promoting and encouraging respect for human rights and for fundamental freedoms for all”. It would be naïve to think that the signatories to the UN Charter did not have national interests in mind, nor that these are absent from their day-to-day dealings with the UN to this day. However, the effectiveness of the UN starts from the top. The U.S. is by far the major source of funding of the UN and the dominant global power regardless of what measurement is used, yet their management of the UN is notable for self-interest; they have in recent years strayed from the soft power approach. If the U.S. is prepared to use the UN to further it’s own foreign policy goals, it can hardly be surprising
that other nations have followed suit. It is no wonder the original aims of the UN have become somewhat muddied. It carries a huge global significance when the U.S. tries to use the UN for furthering its own aims.

Another significance of this is the movement to promote the spread of democracy throughout the world, a stated goal of the current U.S. Administration, in fact of almost all people cited in this study. Behind the aforementioned push to encourage the UN to foster the spread of democracy amongst its members, many commentators have cited the special place of ‘peace’, ‘security’ and ‘freedom’ in the UN. On analysis, here it can be concluded that the cited commentators see promoting democracy as the only formula to achieve such noble goals. Yet, ‘peace’, ‘security’ and ‘freedom’ does not necessarily equate to democracy, in fact, history suggests that such terms are in conflict as much as they are interlinked. Both the UN Charter and the UN International Declaration of Human Rights do not make one single reference to ‘democracy’, yet it seems to be accepted across the spectrum of this American debate that the UN was always meant to promote democracy. Any treaty agreed to by the likes of Joseph Stalin and Chiang Kai-Shek was hardly likely to be promoting the formation of democracies. The inspiration behind the foundation of the UN may have been to avoid another large-scale global conflict, but the politically ideological means to do so were noticeably absent, unless one considers striving for peace and harmony a political ideology. This too suggests a disconnect with the original intention of the UN.

Another disconnect with the original intent of the UN is more typical of the Antagonist side. The belief that to secure peace may require war is alluded to (quite obtusely) in Articles 43 to 51, Chapter 5 of the UN Charter; however, these are clearly in response to extreme provocation and are intended as tools of last resort. The UN recognised the contradiction inherent in the concept of waging war to secure the peace. U.S. foreign policy, especially after September 11, 2001, does not recognise this difference; in fact, it promotes the very opposite as a viable strategy. This was a strong point of contention during the diplomatic manoeuvrings at the UN over Iraq in 2002-2003. A telling comment by Jeremy Rabkin succinctly sums up this whole change in attitude, showing just how far some in the U.S. have left the original ideals of the UN behind.

In practice, awaiting approval from the Security Council would mean leaving Iraqis under the murderous regime of Saddam Hussein. Europeans certainly deplored mass murder—at least in 2003. But as in the past, most Europeans held that peace must take priority over freedom {author’s emphasis}. 
The debates in America about what part the UN should play in the ‘new world order’, have been intensifying since the end of the Cold War. The participants, ranging from politicians and academics to media pundits, have formed two general positions—the Antagonists and the Protagonists. The differences between the two groups appear stark, and are much more complex than their respective anointed categorisations suggest. However, what both sides share is a belief that the UN should either be actively promoting U.S. foreign policy interests, or be encouraged to help the U.S. in those endeavours. This highlights that there is no room in the debates for the espousal of a position on the UN in line with the original UN objectives. The Realpolitik sentiments that drove the U.S. to form the UN have taken a back seat in American discourse, overwhelmed by a belief that the UN should be at the forefront working for its global interests, as opposed to the U.S. working at the forefront in concert with other great powers in order to ensure a conflict the likes of the Second World War will never be visited upon the world again. Top of a long U.S. foreign policy wish list for the UN is the promulgation of democracy. Seen by many in the U.S. as the panacea of the world’s ills, democracy is considered the only true path to an objective that was intended to be the product of negotiation and collective diplomacy.

These debates concerning the role of the UN with respect to the U.S in the post-Cold War world have global repercussions, due to one simple characteristic. The intention of the actors involved is to influence the formation of U.S. foreign policy with regards to the maintenance of a world favourable to America’s perceived global interests. Often, as has been proven through the implementation of policy by the U.S. Federal Government, they have been successful, an example being the NSS 2002. What is noticeable from the overview of the debates outlined here is an almost complete absence of contributions from professional historians, more specifically practitioners of world history. Yet, if ever there was a discourse relevant to the practice of world history, this is it. Due to globalisation, American foreign policy debates—as they frame actual policy affecting the entire world—raise the question whether an comprehension of world history as a subject is beneficial in broadening the understanding of both the motives behind American action and the reaction of the rest of the world.

Not only may world history make it possible to uncover all relevant and causal antecedent and related actions that frame the American foreign policy debates, as well as cultural and economic connexions, but individual world historical treatises that include a vision of the contemporary globe are talking about the very world arena that the debates are operating in.
within, led by *The Clash of Civilizations* and *The End of History*. Fukuyama and Huntington envisage a world order, one they have formed on the back of world history. The actors in this geopolitical discourse also envisage a world order. Is it possible for them to have formed their positions in spite of their world historical viewpoints? It is to this that we now turn. World history discusses arenas of global significance, with global reach and effects. Contemporary American debate on the role of the U.S. with regards to the UN in the post-Cold War world is an arena of global significance, with global reach and effect. The stars for world history and geopolitical debate are in alignment, thus there should be benefit in bringing them closer together.
7. A place for world history. Fukuyama, Huntington, world history and geopolitical discourse

All that remains is to analyse the American debates concerning the UN whilst considering world history writing, specifically via the bridge provided by Francis Fukuyama and Samuel Huntington with their respective master works. To ascertain the absolute degree of influence *The End of History* and *The Clash of Civilizations* had upon the actors in these debates would require research of forensic detail beyond the scope of this study. However, in analysing the positions of the Antagonists and Protagonists, we should be able compare them to those of Huntington and Fukuyama. In addition, the connections of the two men to the actors in the debates—be they people or organisations—whilst not proving absolute influence, per se, indicates a level of personal or professional connection strong enough to enable the drawing of preliminary conclusions. What this will reveal is that works reliant on a world historical foundation offer a vision of the current and future world, which in turn geopolitical debates are trying to shape, and that there is enough commonality to indicate that an active application of world history is beneficial when considering geopolitical debates of global significance. In addition, if it can be shown that world histories such as *The End of History* and *The Clash of Civilizations* offer varying relevant interpretations, with some of their concepts resonating in different streams of the debates, it shows that there is more than one world history narrative worthy of consideration. Indeed, the existence of multiple viewpoints can encourage the search for a third or a fourth opinion from another world history, or another work founded upon such.

A consideration of the Antagonist world-view shows a world whereby maintaining American’s position of power is thought to be in everybody’s best interests, regardless of whether that antagonism is shaped through a belief in global engagement or selective isolationism. Already the similarities to Fukuyama and Huntington’s theses are emerging. To Antagonists the UN in its current form impedes this; an undemocratic, multilateral body that takes into consideration far too many opinions of other sovereign states, the UN endangers American hegemony, or at the very least American power. As such, and in the world of modern globalisation, the UN has become an outdated body—set up to deal with the international challenges of the mid-twentieth century, hence unable to manage the complexities of the twenty-first. The Protagonists also want American interests safeguarded, but are willing to, or are of the belief that, this is best achieved in a degree of harmony with the rest of the
A world; a harmony that is achievable through bodies such as the UN. This is best described as a ‘one world, two world’ dichotomy: the Antagonist ‘one world’ preferring to see the rest of the world as either a partner in delivering national benefit or a harmless and inconsequential players on the sidelines of international affairs; the Protagonist ‘two world’ willing to genuinely embrace to a degree the outside world, although remaining true to national interest.

Short of conducting personal interviews, which falls outside the scope of this work, establishing the actual world historical viewpoint of the actors representing both positions can only be assumed from analysis of their arguments and those of Huntington and Fukuyama. Even if the actors were interviewed to ascertain this, it is possible they don’t understand what world history is, let alone be willing to offer their take on it. However, there are many clues that can be found in their arguments. There are a few areas that stand out on the Antagonist side, the most interesting being their adherence to an exceptionalist agenda. American exceptionalism can best be described as the belief that the U.S. holds a special place in the world, granted to them by the unique circumstances of the historical narrative of their formation and growth, such as the development of their system of government with its enshrinement of freedom and liberty. Exceptionalism has a long history, since the Second World War it was driven by the desire to find not only a different place in world history for the U.S. but a unique one, fuelled by a need to explain and contrast American success in light of Soviet oppression and European self-destruction. In effect, this helped explain why ‘blessed’ America had escaped the horrors visited upon the rest of the world, a viewpoint that tended to group the rest of the world (although almost always Europe and Russia) as a single ‘other’ in exceptionalist writings. An earlier characteristic supporting exceptionalism was the conquering spirit that enables the U.S. to overcome adversity, a spirit displayed from Pilgrims through to frontiersmen, a theme popularised by Fredrick Jackson Turner, who claimed that America’s unique place was due to the expansion westwards, through the “gate of escape from the bondage of the past”.

There are strong religious undertones to American exceptionalism, not surprising since to exceptionalists it seemed as though history had indeed chosen them. These include the oft-repeated “City upon a Hill” remark by Puritan leader John Winthrop, which implied that the seventeenth century Puritan community should serve as a model for the rest of the world, notably rehashed by Ronald Reagan in his farewell address on leaving the Presidency in 1989, and John O’Sullivan’s introduction of “manifest destiny” in 1839, which indicated a divine mission for the U.S. expansion westwards to spread democracy throughout the land, a
form of democracy that was delivered by Providence. Examples of associated characteristics that believers feel make America exceptional and virtuous include free enterprise, *laissez-faire* ideology, powerful private sector and small government, democracy, and American social values. Which, contended Fukuyama, was behind the move towards a more neo-conservative American foreign policy in the new millennium, a move “premised on American exceptionalism, the idea that America could use its power in instances where others could not because it was more virtuous than other countries”? Standing behind all of this is the American form of liberal democracy and the belief that what makes America great is also right for the rest of the world. Liberal democracy made America great, it will make the world great, or at the very least it will make the world great for America.

So far there is much in common with Fukuyama’s argument in *The End of History*, however, not to be left out is Huntington. His thesis of the incompatibility of civilisations creates a series of ‘others’, which could be combined as a single ‘other’ against the West along exceptionalist lines noted above (it must be said that this would be the case for any combination of civilisations in his model). Specifically, since Huntington focuses on the future health of the West, civilisations that may appear equal in his thesis are actually contrasted to the West, which puts the West on a pedestal worth defending. Many antagonists also believe in the metaphoric clash of civilisations, if the machinations concerning the 2003 invasion of Iraq—where the UN played a central role—as well as American dealings in general with non-Western cultures such as the Chinese and the Islamic, are considered. Krauthammer, for one, sees the U.S. in the “midst of a bitter and remorseless war with an implacable enemy that is out to destroy Western civilization”? Another notable voice is Bernard Lewis, whose connection to both Huntington and the neo-conservative movement (particularly Dick Cheney, his close personal friend) will be expanded upon later in this chapter. The ‘clash of civilisations’ theme was taken up by the media as a simplistic explanation for the chaos surrounding the events of September 11 an opportunity they took with both hands. Although an opinion on Islamic civilisation doesn’t automatically raise the debates about the UN, it is important to remember that any action proposed in response to such opinions must take into account actions within the UN. The UN is inseparable from such machinations.

Where they differ is that for the most part Huntington urges separation; the management of international affairs should be limited, focussing on ensuring fault line serenity and conflict resolution between core states only when required. Protagonists such as Stanley Hoffman
dispute the effectiveness of this, stating that wars within states are becoming more common, especially where there are no fault lines that equate to Huntington’s civilisational paradigm, such as in Iraq, Sri Lanka and between Croats and Serbs. John Gray shares this view, pointing out that whether or not wars, “are waged by the agents of sovereign states, the old, familiar logic of territories and alliances often impels members of the ‘same’ civilisation into enmity and members of different ‘civilizations’ into making common cause”. The Bush Administration went to great lengths as well, publicly and most likely through political expediency, to disavow the *Clash of Civilizations* thesis, with the exception of Fukuyama’s friend and former employer, Paul Wolfowitz. It is notable that the Protagonists share many of the same viewpoints as the Antagonists, although with their willingness to deal with and accept the UN as a genuine body with competing viewpoints lessens their exceptionalist tendencies. Both sides in the debate take into account the history behind the foundation of the UN foundation, and also consider the League of Nations. Indeed, to the Antagonist side, the League of Nations is often cited in conjunction with the UN as to why any global multilateral institution that accepts membership on the basis of sovereignty alone is bound to fail. Donald Rumsfeld made this very comparison when complaining about the UN in the lead up to the Iraq War, stating that it “appeared to be following the League of Nations in choosing bluff over action”.

Further light can be cast upon the connection of the debates to the two works or their supporting world history constructions by analysing characteristics where there is complete harmony or contradiction. *The End of History* and *The Clash of Civilizations* both contend that the UN is failing, a viewpoint shared almost unanimously on the Antagonist side, and to a lesser extent by the Protagonists. Fukuyama actually groups the UN and the League of Nations together for failing to provide collective security against the likes of Mussolini, the Japanese, Hitler and the Soviets, due to both bodies having no real power of enforcement or sanction. *The Clash of Civilizations* even has a “United Nations, failures of” entry in the index, with six page references. Huntington’s belief that the UN, or a similar global organisation, could have a role in managing world peace along civilisation fault lines, fits in well with the Protagonist position. He states, “Avoidance of a global war of Civilizations depends on world leaders accepting and cooperating to maintain the multicivilisational character of global politics.” The actors in the debate, to differing degrees, believe the UN should be working to support U.S. foreign policy. This is not implicit in either book, but it is easy to find similarities and differences to this position. Fukuyama contended that the UN would be better served if a
so-called League of Democracies, a common call among Antagonists and a stated goal of U.S. foreign policy, replaced it. This is a case of Fukuyama and the Antagonists sharing the belief that what’s good for the US is good for the entire world.

On the other hand, Huntington would be opposed to both the unilateral streak in current American foreign policy as well as, to a degree, the global inclusionism of the Protagonists, as both go against his beliefs that homogeneous civilisations should be kept apart to ensure peace and that world order management should be based upon the notion of separation. Both men advocate the use of separate channels other than the UN in international relations when the UN proves itself unable to fulfil its mission. For example, Huntington warns that if no changes are made in the membership of the UNSC to make it more reflective of the civilisational balance of the globe, “other less formal procedures are likely to develop to deal with security issues”. This is an Antagonist position and official U.S. foreign policy as stated in NSS 2003, best exemplified by the formation of a coalition to invade Iraq in 2003 outside the auspices of the UN.

Both Antagonists and Protagonists argue from the position that the U.S. should remain at the pinnacle of the world system and the UN, to be effective, should be a platform from which this can be achieved. *The End of History*, by tying the realisation of man’s thymos and ultimate freedom to liberal democracy, does this by stealth, as does Huntington, by ending his treatise with a guide to protecting the health of Western civilisation. Another theme that is consistent, this time between the Antagonists and Huntington, is that the UN might be of some use if it was, by circumstance or design, reduced to undertaking relatively safe, simple tasks such as the promotion of health and education and peacekeeping. This was the position of Richard Perle when lauding what he saw as the death of the UN over the issue of the Iraq War, and on the peacekeeping side at least Huntington agrees, seeing the correct role for the UN as peacekeeping and international peace management, along the boundaries of civilisations and between the core states representing those civilisations. This, in effect, is an example of the Protagonist position, the use of diplomacy without imposition—an example of soft power—to ensure peace with (in particular for Huntington) the Sinic and Islamic civilisations.

It is clear that there are many similar characteristics between what people are communicating within the debates concerning the UN and what Fukuyama and Huntington are communicating through their respective books, which is natural as they are both concerned with a new world order. It must be remembered that both men formed their position after
constructing world history narratives that, in effect, supported their theses. In order to see whether the participants in the debates hold the similar world historical viewpoints as the two men, indeed any world historical viewpoints at all, it is important to see if there are any connections, both professional or personal, and also to see if actors in the debates are citing ‘world history’ or ‘history’ in their pronouncements on the UN, or U.S. foreign policy in general. Neither of these will offer conclusive empirical proof that these two books were directly influential to the debates, however, there is enough evidence to suggest this was highly likely, and enough to justify a further and deeper investigation into the problem.

The first of the two writers to analyse is Francis Fukuyama, and the smoking gun here is neo-conservatism. Neo-conservatism, originally a movement of mostly Jewish intellectuals from City College, New York, who strove to limit socialist or communist tendencies in government, or what Fukuyama calls “social engineering”. In the 1970s they became harsh critics of the then Secretary of State, Henry Kissinger’s geopolitical realism, as they believed dealing with non-democratic regimes like the Soviet Union legitimised them. After the end of the Cold War they pushed for an interventionist foreign policy reliant on American might to fix current and future world problems that impacted on U.S. power. This was caused by the belief that “all totalitarian regimes were hollow at the core and would crumble with a small push from outside”, inspired by the demise of the Soviet Empire, and a contention that the actions of the Reagan Administration ‘won’ the Cold War. Fukuyama worked with Paul Wolfowitz, a noted neo-conservative intellectual, in the Reagan Administration, a relationship that would have a lasting impact on Fukuyama’s later reputation. He was also a member of the RAND Corporation at the same time as the likes of Donald Rumsfeld and Condoleeza Rice, and more importantly, the Project for a New American Century (PNAC). The PNAC became notorious in 1998 when it sent a letter to the then President, Bill Clinton, advocating the invasion of Iraq, with objectives that seem to have been fulfilled during the administration of George W. Bush. The letter included the following call,

We believe the U.S. has the authority under existing UN resolutions to take the necessary steps, including military steps, to protect our vital interests in the Gulf. In any case, American policy cannot continue to be crippled by a misguided insistence on unanimity in the UN Security Council.

This section of the letter alone shows willingness, indeed a desire, to deal with problems outside of the UN orbit, for that institution could no longer serve America’s best interests, placing it squarely within the debates discussed in this work. The letter is notable for the list
of signatories, including John Bolton, Paul Wolfowitz, Robert Kagan, William Kristol, Richard Perle, Donald Rumsfeld—all actors in the debates analysed here—and, most importantly, Francis Fukuyama.27

The signatories and associated members of the PNAC were well rewarded when the Bush Administration came to power in 2001; eleven of the eighteen signatories, plus further PNAC associates, were appointed to senior positions in the Administration, including Positions 1, 2 and 3 at the Defence Department and Position 2 at the State Department.28 Notable again was the appointment of Fukuyama to the President’s Council on Bioethics, followed in 2002 by his commissioned work for Wolfowitz at the Defence Department on a long-term strategy for the Global War on Terror.29 It is noticeable that since it became apparent the adventure in Iraq was not going to be the unqualified success it was advertised to be, Fukuyama has broken quite publicly with PNAC and the neo-conservative movement. He has even gone so far as to downplay entirely the significance of PNAC, regardless of their obvious influence within the Bush Administration, stating in 2006 that: “Everybody points to these letters I signed, the Project for a New American Century, which is basically just Bill Kristol and a fax machine.”30 Still, he still strongly defends his position as stated throughout The End of History on liberal democracy and forgives Wolfowitz to a degree, calling him an idealist and separating him from others in the movement interested in “the cynical pursuit of American advantage”.31 These connections of Fukuyama to players in the debates, as well as similarities in arguments that impact those debates on the UN, indicate that Fukuyama had a degree of direct influence over some actors in the debates.

The same is true of Huntington, although his connections may not be as personal as those of Fukuyama, his ideas and one of his academic mentors also place him squarely within debates concerning the Iraq War, which are integrated with debates concerning the UN. He has been a member of the Brookings Institute and the Council of Foreign Relations (indeed, he was a founder of Foreign Affairs), where he too had dealings with many actors in the debates. He also served on the board of the National Interest, with, amongst others, Irving and William Kristol, Paul Wolfowitz and Charles Krauthammer.32 The most important connection however, is with Orientalist scholar Bernard Lewis, and the related connection to three important Antagonists, Dick Cheney, Charles Krauthammer and Paul Wolfowitz.

Huntington borrowed the term “Clash of Civilizations” directly from Lewis’ 1990 article entitled “The Roots of Muslim Rage”,33 and it has been claimed the framework for his treatise
as well. Lewis believes that the West, a successor to what had been known as Christendom, is “in the last stages of a centuries old struggle for dominance and prestige with Islamic civilization”. The pathway to victory in this struggle is to convert Islamic countries to liberal democracy, ironically an end result that would satisfy Fukuyama, although he has disagreed vehemently with the means advocated to achieve this. Lewis is of the belief that the Islamic world would accept democracy with open arms, basing this assumption on his experiences in Kemalist Turkey in 1950. Lewis also happens to be a great friend of Dick Cheney; he provided the Vice President with numerous historical lectures in 2002 and 2003 to verify the contention that Iraq would gladly accept liberal democracy American-style, again using Turkey as an example. Indeed, Lewis has been cited as perhaps the most significant intellectual behind the push to invade Iraq in 2003.

Huntington noticeably spends much more space on Turkey in *A Clash of Civilizations* than say Africa or Latin America, although in contrast to Lewis he qualifies it as a torn country, however, he also offers it as an example of viable response to westernisation and modernisation through the imposition of liberal democracy. It is through liberal democracy that Krauthammer and Wolfowitz join this picture. Krauthammer, one of the most vitriolic Antagonist voices against the UN, is a strong devotee of both Huntington’s *A Clash of Civilizations*, calling it “scandalously brilliant”, and Lewis’ paradigm that Arabs are capable of democracy. Wolfowitz is another who follows Lewis’ line, preaching that a democratic Turkey is a “useful model for others in the Muslim world”. Their version of a successful liberal democracy also comes from Lewis, who in turn took it directly from Huntington. Lewis states, when referring to Huntington, “you can call a country a democracy when it has made two consecutive, peaceful changes of government via free elections.”

The evidence of Huntington’s influence is not conclusive beyond reasonable doubt. Trial by association is a dangerous path, however with Huntington as with Fukuyama there is again more than enough evidence to justify further investigation and to draw preliminary conclusions. As for the relevance of the aforementioned connections to the debates concerning the UN, there was and could never have been debate on the Iraq War without the UN being a part of them. Indeed, each of the positions noted above contains an attitude toward the UN. It can be argued, for example, that because of Antagonist beliefs about the UN it was decided by U.S. policy makers that the best way to achieve their goals in the Middle East was to first try to garner international legitimacy through UN support, and then bypass the UN when it became apparent that would be impossible. The UN is inseparable from the
debate on Iraq. With regards to world history, it is clear that both Fukuyama and Huntington share many characteristics with those involved in the debate, a position that developed from constructing a world historical foundation upon which their respective treatises relied. The following illustration is an attempt to chart the connections between the two men and the actors in the debates, and will show that there is enough to draw a preliminary conclusion that *The End of History* and *The Clash of Civilizations*, based as they are upon world history, were influential in U.S. debates concerning their place in the new world order and the role of the UN within that new environment.

**Illustration 1.1: Ties between Fukuyama/Huntington and actors in the debates**
There is one final area to investigate. Do the actors in geopolitical debate invoke history when presenting the reasoning behind their actions or proscriptions? If so, this would indicate that an understanding of history might be of benefit to the recipient of these messages. There is no better place to start than at the top, with George W. Bush. The President frequently invokes history in speeches on foreign policy, most often regarding the current struggle in Iraq and the war on terror. In his first speech to the UN General Assembly after the events of September 11, 2001, Bush evoked history in a manner startling in its End of History-like connotations: “We face enemies that hate not our policies but our existence, the tolerance of openness and creative culture that defines us. But the outcome of this conflict is certain. There is a current in history, and it runs toward freedom.”

Another with similar undertones was a speech to the Council for Foreign Relations in 2005, where he stated that, “One of the great lessons of history is that free societies are peaceful societies, and free nations give their citizens a path to resolve their differences peacefully through the democratic process. Democracy can be difficult and complicated, and even chaotic.”

History is actually used by Bush as a justification for American foreign policy, as exemplified by the following excerpt to a 2005 speech which displays a brash application of manifest destiny: “We will meet the challenge of our time. We will answer history’s call with confidence – because we know that freedom is the destiny of every man, woman and child on this earth.” Dick Cheney is also one to invoke history, whilst pushing the capitalism/democracy agenda, this time in a speech honoring Margaret Thatcher,

> When the 20th century is seen years hence through the long lens of history, two defining themes will surely stand out: the clashes between socialism and capitalism, and between totalitarianism and democracy. When future generations learn how capitalism triumphed over socialism, you will figure prominently in the story as a central hero.

In fact, history is invoked in a great deal of American discourse on foreign policy. An example already outlined in this work is the comparison made by Antagonists of the UN to the League of Nations. History is often raised in other foreign policy discourses, such as those concerning the war on terror, where efforts to set guidelines for an eventual U.S. withdrawal from Iraq, or even to talk with regimes or organisations deemed to be terrorists, are met by cries of appeasement and comparisons to Neville Chamberlain’s actions at Munich in 1938. Donald Rumsfeld, for one, has commented that critics of George W. Bush critics had not “learned history’s lessons”, asking whether Americans can “truly afford to believe that somehow, some way, vicious extremists can be appeased?”
It is clear that the Antagonists and Protagonists share many positions on the makeup of the current and future world order with Huntington and Fukuyama, and that both men are connected to actors in the debates analysed in this work. Whilst not proving beyond absolute doubt that *The End of History* and *The Clash of Civilizations* have either influenced these actors or that they appreciated the respective world historical foundations, there is enough evidence to warrant a deeper study. This is especially true when those world historical foundations are taken into consideration, and the fact that history is evident in geopolitical discourse of global significance. Fukuyama and Huntington have written world history-based treatises concerning the current and future world order, and the actors in the debates are striving to influence policy concerning that same current and future world order. There are so many common indicators between world history and geopolitical debate that it is safe to form a conclusion that knowledge of world history and world history writing is vital when considering geopolitical debates of global significance.
Conclusion

It was into the relative geopolitical vacuum following the end of the Cold War that Francis Fukuyama and Samuel Huntington wrote *The End of History* and *The Clash of Civilizations* respectively, in order to establish their vision of the future world order. Fukuyama foresaw the coming of worldwide liberal democracy—the metaphoric end of history, as people’s universal desire to share in the benefits of modernisation, which he argued, can only be satisfied by universal adoption of liberal democracy. Huntington outlined the dangers of inter-civilisational dispute and offered some potential prophylactics against global conflict. Many of the ideas contained within these two books can be located within the U.S. debates concerning its role in the world, and the relationship of the UN to that position, and to more specific debates that by their very nature involve the UN as a component consideration, such as debates over the Iraq War or the war on terror. The ideas in *The End of History* and *The Clash of Civilizations* that corresponded to debate positions were founded upon world historical constructions—a viewpoint of how a world history narrative has proceeded to a point in time where the conditions outlined have come into play, or will do so in the future. Which is not surprising, as world history writing creates narratives of understanding, outlining all of the events and peoples that have contributed to that history up to a point in time. The point in time for the American debates is now and extends into the future, a temporal match for Huntington’s thesis and, to a lesser degree, that of Fukuyama.

In a globalised world, geopolitical debates such as the one outlined in this study have an impact in all four corners of the world. Yet, there have been few connections made between such globally significant machinations and the world history that lies behind them, which is surprising considering global geopolitics and world history share the same arena—planet earth. This raises many questions, not the least of which is what are the viewpoints of world history held by the actors in these debates, people influencing or making policy that impacts on all of the worlds people? It is almost impossible to believe that actors in such debates do not have a personal view of world history, regardless of whether they connect it to the discipline of world history or just reach it by osmosis. If we could unlock these visions, it should be possible to form a better understanding of their motivations. At the same time, would a general comprehension of world history better empower people to judge what they see, read or hear from actors in these debates? For example, when the U.S. was engaged in what turned out to be futile efforts to garner a UNSC resolution authorising the invasion of Iraq in 2003, events that dominated American newspaper, radio and television coverage
for several months, would the public have reacted differently? Would France, which was
singled out as an irrational barrier to American interests, have been lumped together with old
foes Russia and China, as U.S. enemies? Would Americans have for the most part accepted
without question the demonisation of a fellow liberal democracy that shared with the U.S.
an eighteenth century revolutionary ideal?—a demonisation that included such timeless
spectacles as the renaming of French fries to “freedom fries”? A more thorough consideration
of world history should result in a more comprehensive understanding of what is happening
in the world, and how and why things have reached that point.

This study offers a preliminary look into the connection between world history and
geopolitical debates of global significance. There is enough evidence of a reliance on world
history by actors in the debates to warrant further and deeper study. Such study would ideally
involve personal interviews with the relevant participants in the debate—politicians, pundits,
academics and policy advisors—to ascertain their thoughts on world history. Although it
is entirely likely that many will have no opinion on world history as an academic endeavor,
per se, it is difficult to believe these actors are without opinion on the world history or that
they have formulated their geopolitical ideas and positions in a historical-free bubble. Such
interviews would strive to uncover what they have read, what has influenced them, and from
where they have acquired their historical knowledge, even to discover what they might have
been told—especially relevant in the case of representative politicians, where much of what is
espoused is the product of backroom speechwriters and advisors. In this case it would also be
of benefit to investigate the people behind the people involved in the discourses.

In addition, the base of world history writers considered needs to be opened up well beyond
Fukuyama and Huntington, to include any world historian, anyone writing from a world
historical perspective, or works by those loosely termed traditional historians, who have had
an impact on these actors. It is already clear from this study that the historical notion of
American exceptionalism has had a significant impact on many of the participants, and whilst
not technically a trait of world history, has massive implications for world history as a whole.
Further study would also need to consider antecedent versions of modern world history,
such as universal history. To give an illustrative example, if a politician such as John McCain
is promoting a League of Democracies, it is important to uncover whether this opinion
has come from Kant, from Fukuyama, a combination of the two, or from another source
altogether. Such a study should complete the reconnection of the globally significant study
of world history and the globally significant debates on geopolitics, and alert the world that
knowledge of world history is important when considering global geopolitical debates.
The debates analysed here are merely a case study, generated to prove the point that world history has an impact on geopolitical debate (and vice versa). It is important to extend this exercise to other contemporary geopolitical debates of global significance, such as those surrounding the rise of China and India, and the global tactics of the European Union, to take but a few examples. Such debates, by the very nature of the modern world system, must take the role of the UN into account. Which is why the UN was chosen as the case study to represent geopolitical debate in this study. There can be no such discourse in the era of modern globalised world without the UN as a constituent element, for the same reasons as the most powerful country on earth—the U.S.—must always be a consideration; the reach of the UN and the U.S. in global affairs is metaphorically infinite.

There is one final caveat to the success of such a study; the academic world history profession must be prepared to re-acquaint itself with geopolitics as a subject of equal worthiness to all the non-state world and global histories. Part of this reconciliation involves a willingness not to run from world histories or works founded upon world history that may be methodologically contentious, or reminiscent of the ‘bad old days’. It must be remembered that both Fukuyama and Huntington are not professional historians, nor is Amy Chua. However, if works such as *The End of History* and *The Clash of Civilizations* are being widely read and discussed and are having an influence in debates that affect how the world is run, they are worthy of consideration by world historians, because of their use of world history to support their theses and their relation to it. Although the world may be metaphorically debordering, the nation state still exists and shows no sign of disappearing any time soon. We all still live under its auspices, from paying taxes to holding the passports that enable the world travel so instrumental in the mechanism of globalisation. Many of the professional world historians analysed in this work see a very humanistic purpose for the writing and study of world history, in helping people comprehend the contemporary world and how and why it evolved. A reconnection of world history and geopolitics might actually broaden interest in world history and enhance its chances of surviving as a viable discipline in its own right. Consideration of visions of the world system, be they the ‘one world’ vision like that of Fukuyama and the Antagonists, the ‘two worlds’ of the Protagonists, or ‘multiple worlds’, such as that of Huntington and his disciples of his ‘clash of civilization thesis’, are all viable concepts with points in their favour and points against. Perhaps such a reconnection will increase the appeal of world history to both the general public and to universities around the world, upon whom its very survival as a viable academic discipline is reliant, as a worthwhile exercise in understanding the world as it is today.
Abstract

After the end of the Cold War, the United States was arguably left as the sole remaining superpower, however, the form the new world order would take in this environment remained unclear. In light of this, there has been much debate within the U.S. since 1991 considering the role of the U.S. in the modern—and globalised—world; and its relationship to the United Nations, the only true global representative institution which could conceivably compete with the U.S., has been centre stage in this discourse. It was in this arena of uncertainty that two works having world historical foundations appeared: *The End of History and the Last Man*, by Francis Fukuyama; and *The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of the World Order*, by Samuel Huntington. Ostensibly treatises based upon political philosophy and international relations respectively, both works were founded on, and entirely reliant upon, their readings of world history. They offered a vision of the contemporary and future world order in line with that of many of the actors in the aforementioned debates—indeed, many of their ideas still resonate within this living and breathing discourse. All indications are that world history and geopolitical debate should be a natural fit, as can be seen from the reception and influence of both treatises, yet this connection seems to have been sidelined and the world history on which both writers base their respective works overlooked, none the least by practitioners of world history themselves. An understanding of the world historical foundations behind *The End of History* and *The Clash of Civilizations* should result in a more comprehensive understanding of these specific debates. This leads to the question: In this global age how vital is engagement with world history, both its writing and the historical narratives themselves, in understanding the motivations of and inspiration behind the positions of actors in geopolitical debates of global significance?
Abstract

Endnotes

1. Introduction

1.1 A debate of global significance


1.3 State of Play. Literature Review

6 Paul Kennedy, in reviewing her book, notes that one of the most interesting conclusions drawn by Chua is that for a country with such global power and reach, the U.S. stands alone in history because of its firm refusal “to take formal juridical control of distant lands, as seemed so natural to the Romans, the Ottomans, the Spanish, and the British”. Paul Kennedy, “The Distant Horizon”, *Foreign Affairs*, May/June 2008, http://www.foreignaffairs.org/20080501fareviewessay87309/paul-kennedy/the-distant-horizon.html, accessed June 30, 2008. Last accessed July 4, 2008.
12 Van Oudenaren also provides whom he considers to be the loudest or most influential voices from within them: Unipolar unilateralists—Robert Kagan and Charles Krauthammer; Unipolar multilateralists—Joseph S. Nye and G. John Ikenberry; Multipolar unilateralists—Pat Buchanan, John Mearsheimer and Jeremy Rabkin; and Multipolar multilateralists—Michael Lind, Charles Kupchan and David Calleo.


2. Terms & definitions, debate positions, actors

2.1 Terms & Definitions


2 Ibid.

3 Nye, op.cit., p. 552-554, also see Harries, op.cit., p. 4.

4 Nye, op.cit., p. 552.

5 Van Oudenaren, op.cit., p. 1.


2.2 Where four goes into two. Categorising the American Debates

7 Van Oudenaren, op.cit., p. 2. Political Scientist, Christopher Layne devised a slightly more colloquial set of designations for the unipolar side of the debates—less descriptive but easier-on-the-eye—which essentially match those of Van Oudenaren, providing support for his thesis. His term for unipolar unilateralists is unipolar optimists, and for unipolar multilateralists it is unipolar agnostics. Layne, op.cit., pp. 134-140.

8 Van Oudenaren, op.cit., p. 2.

9 Ibid.

10 Ibid.

11 Layne, op.cit., p.135.

12 Ibid.

13 Ibid., p. 136, also see Nye, op.cit., pp. 552-555.

13 Layne, op.cit., p. 136.

15 Ibid.
2.3 Where do they stand? Segmenting the Actors


17 There is much overlap between the academy and professional foreign policy practitioners, for example, Rice has in her resume an Assistant Professorship of Political Science at Stanford University; Albright a Professorship of International Affairs at Georgetown University; and Wolfowitz a Professorship of International Relations at John Hopkins University.

18 PhD in Government from Harvard University (1979).

19 Writing for many magazines and newspapers, currently on the editorial board of the Los Angeles Times.

20 Some have a foot in all of these areas, for example Kristol is also a journalist and was Chief of Staff to former Vice President Dan Quayle.

21 To illustrate this disconnect, we need look no further than the prolific historian of the Victorian era, Gertrude Himmelfarb. A vocal conservative commentator, member of the American Enterprise Institute, wife of Irving Kristol—considered by many to be the godfather of the neo-conservative movement—and mother of the aforementioned William, Himmelfarb has never weighed into the debates in question here, even though her historical monographs strongly display her ideological convictions.

3. Global vision. The discipline of World History


2 Ranke, who admittedly realised this task was impossible, thought it still worth the effort. He stated that, “I have often discussed the question whether it would be possible to write a Universal History on such principles as these (through critical enquiry). We came to the conclusion that perfection was not attainable but that it was nonetheless necessary to make the attempt.” Ranke, Leopold von., “Preface to ‘Universal History’”, in G. Iggers and K. von Moltke (eds.), The Theory and Practice of History (New York, 1973), p. 163.

3 Geyer & Bright, op.cit., p. 143.

4 For example Paul Costello described McNeill as “perhaps the most powerful voice in the promotion of the idea of world history as a means to a global consciousness”? Benjamin, op.cit., p. 99.


8 Hughes-Warrington, world histories, op.cit., p. 8.

9 Manning, methods and materials op.cit., p. 44.

10 Jerry Bentley, quoted in Mazlish, terms, op.cit., p. 27.


12 McNeill, op.cit.


Mazlish, terms, op.cit., p. 37.


McNeill, op.cit.


Geyer and Bright, op.cit., p. 1034.


Ibid., p. 4.

McNeill, op.cit.

O’Brien, op.cit., p. 4.


O’Brien, op.cit., p. 5.

Geyer and Bright, op.cit., pp. 1039-1040.

Hughes-Warrington, world histories, op.cit., p.3.

Mazlish, terms, op.cit., p. 19.

Manning, methods and materials, op.cit., p. 49.

Hodgson, op.cit., p. 260.


Ibid.

Geyer and Bright, op.cit., p. 1038.

Manning, Methods and Materials, op.cit., p. 52.

Geyer and Bright, op.cit., p. 1053.

Bayly, op.cit., p. 8.


Bender, op.cit., p. 296. Geyer and Bright state that world history “deploys questions and frameworks in which ‘local’ history can flourish while becoming more aware of its global historicity” Geyer and Bright, op. cit., p. 1041.

Bender, op.cit., p. 6.

Ibid., p. 8.

Mazlish, terms, op.cit., p. 24.

Hughes-Warrington, World History, and World Histories, op.cit.

Geyer and Bright, op.cit., p. 1037.

Hodgson, op.cit., p. 94.

O’Brien, op.cit., p. 4.

Bayly, op.cit., p. 9.


Geyer and Bright, op.cit., p. 1043.

Ibid., p. 1053.

O’Brien, op.cit., p. 5.

Ibid., p. 38.

Ibid.
4. A clash of civilisations or the end of history. Samuel Huntington and Francis Fukuyama

1 Marnie Hughes-Warrington, Fifty Key Thinkers on History (London, 2000), p. 108. Also see Rentoul, op.cit.
2 Hughes-Warrington, Fifty Key Thinkers, op.cit., p. 108.
4 Ibid., p. 97.
5 Ibid., p. 80.
6 Ibid., p. 73.
7 Ibid., p. 76.
8 Ibid., p. 139.
9 Ibid., p. 135.
10 Ibid., p. 144.
11 Peter Fenves makes note of this reliance, stating that, “the ancient world may be incapable of satisfying desire, but it is at least capable of satisfying the desire for a satisfactory vocabulary of desire” Peter Fenves, “The Tower of Babel Rebuilt. Some Remarks on ‘The End of History’”, in T. Burns (ed.), After History? Francis Fukuyama and His Critics (London, 1994), p. 227.
12 Hughes-Warrington, 50 Key Thinkers, op.cit., p. 109.
14 Ibid.
16 Ibid., pp. 163-165.
17 Ibid., p. 182.
18 Ibid.
19 Ibid., pp. 313-321.
20 Ibid., p. 66. See also Hughes-Warrington, 50 Key Thinkers, op.cit., p. 109.
23 Fukuyama, The End of History, op.cit., p. 204.
24 Ibid., pp. 214-215 & 259-270.
25 Ibid., pp. 300-312.
Ibid.

Huntington, If not Civilizations, What?, op.cit.


Ibid., p. 20.

Ibid., p. 29.

Ibid., p. 321.

Ibid., p. 28.

Ibid., p. 41.

Ibid., p. 43.

Ibid., p. 21.

Ibid., pp. 272-291.

Ibid., pp. 45-47.

Ibid., p. 29.

Ibid., p. 28.

Ibid., p. 20.

Ibid., pp. 20-21.

Ibid., p. 30.

Ibid., p. 32.


In the words of Paul Costello, “As much as any other single historian of the twentieth century, Toynbee contributed to the modern view of cultural relativism and to our conception of civilizations as independent historical entities living out their own valid cultural experience rather than as people to be enlightened in civilization by the modern West.” Paul Costello, World Historians and Their Goals. Twentieth Century Answers to Modernism (DeKalb, ILL, 1993), p. 70.

Huntington, Clash of Civilizations, op.cit., p. 301.

Ibid., p. 37.

5. New era. New world. Fukuyama, Huntington and world history


Ibid., pp. 49-50. For example, he chooses 1848, the year of European revolutions, when many of the nation states on his list do not yet exist; 1919, after many new states were born from the ashes of the First World War; and most contentiously, 1940, when many democracies on his list had been conquered by the Germans.


Ibid., p. 52.


Huntington, Clash of Civilizations, *op.cit.*, pp. 72-73.

Ibid., p. 74.

Ibid., p. 65.

Ibid., p. 43.

Ibid.

Ibid., pp. 45-46.

Fukuyama, End of History, *op.cit.*, p. 44. Indeed, John Gray points out that the fall of the Soviet Empire and the rise of China created a new source for global competition, a “rivalry among capitalisms”. Gray, *op.cit.*, p. 153.


Huntington, Clash of Civilizations, *op.cit.*, pp. 91-95.

Ibid., p. 72.

Ibid., p. 76.

Ibid., p. 72.

Ibid., p. 168.


For example, his equating of Islamic fundamentalism with mainstream Islam, as well as almost entirely skirting over divisions within the Islamic world itself, he (perhaps unconsciously) makes Islam a common enemy—the ‘bogey-man’ for Western civilisation. Huntington, *op.cit.*, pp. 209-218 & 254-258.

6. Is this town big enough for the two of us? American debates concerning the role of the UN


2 Ikenberry, *op.cit*.


4 Hurd, *op.cit.*, p. 70.

5 Ibid.

6 Ibid., p. 71.


8 Graebner, *op.cit*.

9 Ibid.

10 Huntington, Clash of Civilizations, *op.cit.* p. 156.

11 Ibid., p. 32.

12 Ibid., pp. 195-96.


14 Ibid.

15 Ibid.

16 Ibid.


23 Layne, op.cit. p. 135.


25 Lantros is a Democrat and Dreier a Republican.

26 H.R. 1590 [108th], op.cit.


29 Conservative commentator Pat Buchanan believes there is no need to even bother with a double standard, when claiming that nobody could ensure the peace like the U.S.—“what reason is there to believe a world government can bring better peace on earth than a world where America is the lone superpower”. Patrick J. Buchanan, The Trojan Horse of Global Tyranny, op.cit.


32 Donald Rumsfeld, quoted in Harries, op.cit. Jonah Goldberg adds that to do so would fly in the face of the ‘exceptional American agenda’, for “the more intellectually consistent and pro-U.N. you are, the less patriotic you are likely to be”. Goldberg, op.cit.


To such a degree that Cornell Professor Jeremy Rabkin dryly observed, “Was it really to be expected that a government of the United States should submit itself to the judgements of such a court?” Rabkin, op.cit.


Jesse Helms, quoted in Graebner, op.cit.

Again, this sentiment is best illustrated by Pat Buchanan, who criticised the General Assembly as “made up of regimes that range from the democratic to the dictatorial and the criminal”. Buchanan, The Trojan Horse of Global Tyranny, op.cit.

Clinton, op.cit.

Holmes, op.cit.

McClain, op.cit.


John Bolton, Speech to Global Structures Convocation, op.cit.

Bolton, Speech to Global Structures Convocation, op.cit. Heritage Foundation president Edwin Feulner also complains that the UN “it is riddled with scandal and corruption, its bureaucracies and decision-making processes are inefficient, ineffective and often incoherent, Feulner, op.cit.

53 United States Policy Toward the United Nations, *op.cit*. This was exemplified by the NSS 2006, which stated, “Where existing institutions can be reformed to meet new challenges, we, along with our partners, must reform them,” Drezner, *op.cit.*, p.39.

54 Feulner, *op.cit.*


56 Holmes, *op.cit.*


59 Fukuyama, ABC The World Today, *op.cit.*

60 In a 2002 interview, Secretary of Defence, Donald Rumsfeld, was willing to hide behind the façade of using the UN resolutions against Iraq whilst making the following point “at some point an institution has to ask how does it feel about that—does it want relevance or is it willing to simply keep making resolutions and having a dictator like Iraq tell the world community not to worry you’re irrelevant” Interview with Donald Rumsfeld, PBS NewsHour with Jim Lehrer, September 18, 2002 {television broadcast}, http://www.pbs.org/newshour/bb/middle_east/july-dec02/rumsfeld_9-18.html, accessed 21 June, 2008. Last accessed July 4, 2008.

61 Rabkin, *op.cit.*


64 The power of legitimacy was subtly acknowledged by conservative commentators Bill Kristol and Lawrence Kaplan, who stated that “the longer the kabuki at the U.N. has gone on, the weaker support for action has become in Europe and here at home.” Lopez, *op.cit.* At the same time, Robert Kagan noted that the eventual attempt to engage the UN was a counter to that weakening support, stating that “Americans support the UN enough that President Bush decided it was wise, at least for the sake of appearances, first to seek the Security Council’s approval for invading Iraq and then to return to the body repeatedly to generate international support -- and international legitimacy -- for U.S. reconstruction activities.” Robert Kagan, America’s crisis of Legitimacy, *op.cit.*


69 Feulner, *op.cit.*

70 Feulner states, “We must wisely discern when it is best to work through the United Nations, or alongside the United Nations, or apart from the United Nations in other international arrangements among freedom-loving countries that choose to support each other in their decisions.” *Ibid.*

71 Kupchan and Trubowitz, *op.cit.*

72 Lind, *op.cit.*


74 Feulner, *op.cit.*

75 Jamieson, *op.cit.*

76 Halliday, *op.cit.*

77 Bennis, *op.cit.*


79 Graebner, *op.cit.*

80 Krauthammer, The Unipolar Moment, p. 25.

81 Albright, Bridges, Bombs, or Bluster, *op.cit.*

Endnotes
84 Van Oudenaren, op.cit.
85 Ibid.
86 Nye explains that ‘soft power’ rests on “the ability to set the political agenda in a way that shapes the preferences of others”, which for the U.S. should work as long as they represent “values that others want to follow.” Nye, op.cit., p. 552.
87 Ibid.
88 He contends that, “if the Western system offers rules and institutions that benefit the full range of states—rising and falling, weak and strong, emerging and mature—its dominance as an international order is all but certain”. Ikenberry, op.cit.
89 Clinton, op.cit.
90 Ibid.
91 Ibid.
92 He states that, “We’re the big power; we’re the big dog on the block … We are the leading power in the United Nations and we should take this step and move forward.” Interview with Wesley Clark, op.cit.
93 Ibid. Michael Lind, who is almost alone in this study in having a foot in each camp, displays Protagonist sympathies in this comment, “Working together with the other great powers of the world would cost less in terms of American taxes, American lives and American liberty than a misguided retreat into isolation or the doomed attempt to establish solitary United States world domination”. Lind, op.cit.
94 Jamieson, op.cit.
95 Clinton, op.cit.
96 He notes that the UNSC “is perhaps the hardest to deal with, but its reforms would also bring the greatest returns”. Ikenberry, op.cit. Stanley Hoffman also sees the value in making the UN more powerful in the modern globalised world. Hoffman, op.cit.
98 Hurd, op.cit., p. 74.
99 Tharooor, op.cit.
100 Ibid.
102 She states, “So why was the United Nations the first place the Bush administration went for approval after winning the war? Because for $1.25 billion a year—roughly what the Pentagon spends every 32 hours—the United Nations is still the best investment that the world can make in stopping AIDS and SARS, feeding the poor, helping refugees, and fighting global crime and the spread of nuclear weapons.” Ibid.
103 Joseph Biden states that the UN “can help set the rules of the road for the 21st century. It can establish norms for the conduct of nations”. Both Albright and Biden in these respective articles laud the UN for its response to humanitarian challenges. Biden, op.cit.
105 Charter of the United Nations, op.cit.
106 such as Kim Holmes. Holmes, op.cit.
110 Rabkin, op.cit.
7. A place for world history. Fukuyama, Huntington, world history and geopolitical discourse

2 Ibid., p. 27.
3 Ibid., p. 29.
4 Rodgers, op.cit., p. 25. See also Hughes-Warrington, 50 Key Thinkers, op.cit.
7 Pieterse, op.cit., p. 125.
10 Indeed, Lewis noted that, “I have no doubt that September 11 was the opening salvo of the final battle”. Hirsh, op.cit.
12 Hoffman, op.cit.
13 Gray goes on to give numerous supporting examples, including how Iran supported Christian Armenia in its conflict with Islamic Azerbaijan. Gray, op.cit., p. 157. Niall Ferguson also shares this view—in 2006 he presented evidence that out of thirty major post-Cold War conflicts, only nine could be regarded as civilisational Ferguson, Next War of the World, op. cit.
15 Shanker, op.cit.
17 Ibid., p. 249.
18 Huntington, Clash of Civilizations, op.cit., p. 365.
19 Ibid., p. 21.
20 He states that the “promotion of democracy through all of the available tools at our disposal should remain high on the agenda, particularly with regard to the Middle East … If the United States does not like the fact that the UN is dominated by non-democratic regimes, then it should invest in an effort to build up other institutions … that are based on the norms and values we share”. Fukuyama, Neoconservative Moment, op.cit.
21 Huntington, Clash of Civilizations, op.cit., p. 317.
22 Francis Fukuyama, After Neoconservatism, op.cit.


Rentoul, op.cit.

Gove, op.cit.

Fukuyama, Neoconservative Moment, op.cit.


Hirsh, op.cit.

Hirsh, op.cit.


Huntington, Clash of Civilizations, op.cit., p. 149-150.

Ibid., p. 73-74.


Fukuyama, Neoconservative Moment, op.cit.

Hirsh, op.cit.


As the following example from Donald Rumsfeld testifies: “That these acts of irresponsibility could happen now, at this moment in history, is breathtaking,” Mr. Rumsfeld said. “Those acts will be marked in the history of the U.N. as either the low point of that institution in retreat, or the turning point when the U.N. woke up, took hold of itself, and moved away from a path of ridicule to a path of responsibility. Shanker, op.cit.


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Appendix

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