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NATO-RUSSIA SECURITY COUNCIL
and
NATO SUMMIT 2009

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ABSTRACT

(In English)

Master thesis entitled “NATO-Russia Council and NATO Summit 2009” is aimed at analyzing the American-Russian relations in the framework of North Atlantic Treaty Organization. The main focus is on the transformation of approach in bilateral relations that occurred during NATO Summit 2009. The balance of threat theory is theoretical basis of the paper. In order to come to the final conclusions analysis of threats perceived by the USA and Russia will be conducted, along with the evolution of NATO-Russia relations, conflicts of interest between Washington and Moscow within NATO, “reset” of American-Russian relations and the possible platforms for the fruitful bilateral relations.

(Auf Deutsch)

INTRODUCTION

The North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) as a military alliance, which was created from the very beginning as the resist to the Soviet military bloc in Easter Europe, had to revise its aims and ideals after the collapse of the Soviet Union. Up till now by many politicians it is seen as the tool of American influence on the European continent. That vision is highly supported by the fact that the main successor of the Soviet Union, Russia, is not the member of the Alliance and latest actions of NATO do not always meet the agreement with the Russian authorities.

There was a hard time in the U.S.-Russia relations during the Bush presidency. Nevertheless both sides realize that current global problems would be easier solved in the cooperation with each other. “Reset button” that was pressed during NATO Summit 2009 proves the change in the perception of one another from both sides.

The financial crisis and global turndown as well as the change of the personalities in American and Russian policies caused the change of the dialogue between two countries. One should not expect big friendship out of it after a long period of the contradictions, but what is really possible is the development of a new type of dialogue on the national and international levels. One of the biggest achievements of the ‘reset’ period is the setback from the Cold War ideology and consideration of another side as a partner for cooperation.

Current financial and economic crises put on the top new issues, which need to be solved. Both Washington and Moscow are interested in the economic growth of their countries and overcoming of the current economic situation. As well the countries clearly understand the necessity to cooperate with each other on the issues of the global security and main international threats. That is why war against terrorism, disarmament, nonproliferation of the weapons of the mass-destruction, narco-business, and Afghan problem became the issues for the mutual cooperation between Washington and Moscow.

The main focus of the paper is to analyze the change of priorities within North-Atlantic Treaty Organization at the time of Obama administration. It will lead to the comparison of the previous particularities of American-Russian relations in NATO, main challenges, latest developments after NATO Summit 2009 and the main changes in the bilateral relations of the two countries.

We would question the possibility for Russian to become American ally, but we are convinced that they will start more closely cooperate on the issues of global importance or national security. Obama administration defined the new national threat – Afghanistan. From the beginning of the election campaign Obama’s team did not perceive continuation of the war in Iraq as a possible strategy for the foreign affairs of the U.S. On the controversy to McCain, who was highly
supporting War with terrorism through the war in Iraq, Obama saw the necessity to withdraw the troop from Iraq and stabilize Afghanistan as his main goal.

With Obama coming into power, Afghanistan became the main threat for the U.S. After unsuccessful experience in Iraq, Washington understood the necessity to involve as many partners and allies in their actions in Afghanistan as possible. In addition similarly to Iraq Afghanistan is a pretty complicated country to be in war with. From historical background one should remember Soviet campaign in Afghanistan and its failure. There are also many geographic, social and number of other issues that make the fight in Afghanistan not so easy. It became obvious that without participation of an ally that possesses experience of military campaign in this country, the new administration might face the same failure as it was in Iraq.

With this in mind Russia was the most possible ally in the war with Afghanistan. Moscow is dissatisfied with its border with Afghanistan and the narco-problems that it is receiving from that region. Clearly none of the sided is able to solve mentioned above problems on its own and the success will definitely depend on the cooperation with one another.

The research will focus on answering the questions ‘What were the changes in American-Russian relations after NATO Summit 2009?’, ‘How NATO Summit 2009 was different from NATO Summit 2008?’. In order to answer these main questions we will need to answer related questions: ‘Is NATO Summit 2009 the beginning of the reset in the U.S.-Russia relations?’, ‘Are there still hidden confrontations between Washington and Moscow and what are they?’, ‘What are the threats for the U.S.-Russia cooperation within NATO?’, ‘What are the aspects of cooperation between Obama-Medvedev-Putin?’, ‘Can NATO become a platform for U.S.-Russia fruitful cooperation?’, ‘What are the other options for American-Russian dialogue?’.

Analyzing the time period from 1991 till October 2009, we will try to prove the hypothesis that NATO Summit 2009 signalized the will for the positive changes in American-Russian relations. New threat – Afghanistan – leaded to the change in the perception of Russia as a possible ally. As well the change of the personalities in both Washington and Moscow made it possible to reset the bilateral relations. There was a tremendous switch in the decisions and results achieved on the NATO Summit 2009 in comparison to the Summit of 2008. From confrontation NATO transferred to cooperation and involvement of Russia.

We would claim that there will be still many disagreements between the USA and Russia, but they will not bring by no chance to the military confrontation or even war. The U.S. will probably keep on involving NATO into the solution of the issues of its national value and interests. As Russia is not satisfied with its position in NATO and at the same time is not able to guarantee successful organization analogue to NATO, it will keep on standing on the position of promoting reformation of UN Security Council and OSCE along with their involvement into the solution of the main international problems.
In order to achieve the goal of the research we intend to use the balance of threat theory as a theoretical background. This theory was for the first time proposed by Stephen M. Walt in his article “Alliance Formation and the Balance of World Power”, published in the journal International Security in 1985. The balance of threat theory modified the balance of power theory in the neorealist school of international relations.

According to balance of threat theory, states' alliance behavior is determined by the threat they perceive from other states. Stephen M. Walt contends that states will generally balance by allying against a perceived threat. He gives the example of the alliance patterns of European states before and during World War I and World War II, when nations with a significantly greater combined power allied against the recognized threat of German expansionism.

Among the main criteria Stephen M. Walt identifies four of them that the states use to evaluate the threat posed by another state. They are the following: the county’s aggregate strength (size, population, and economic capabilities), its geographical proximity, its offensive capabilities, and its offensive intentions. He argues that the more other states view a rising state as possessing these qualities, the more likely they are to view it as a threat and balance against it.

On the sample of Afghanistan and its perception by Obama administration we may see that this country is seen as a threat due to its geographic proximity, offensive capabilities and the most important its offensive intentions. Neither size of the country, nor population play any role in constructing the image of the threat country to Washington.

For Moscow there are fewer factors applicable. It does not consider Afghanistan to have offensive intentions nor offensive capabilities. The only important aspect here for Russia is its geographical position. If the U.S. is situated on the other continent from Afghanistan and considers its geographic position only with the respect to the stabilization of the region, Russia is in a different situation. The most unstable Russian border is in the South and Afghanistan is the biggest producer of drugs that are transported through Russian territory. In addition one should not forget here Russian internal problem with the Muslim radicalism that is supported by Afghanistan.

Balance of threat theory modified realism as well as the neorealism of Kenneth Waltz\(^1\) by separating power from the threat. In balance of power theory, which had previously dominated realist analyses, states balance against others whose power was rising – greater power was assumed to reflect offensive intentions. Stephen M. Walt argues that this is not borne out by empirical evidence, and that balance of threat theory – in which states will not balance against those who are rising in power but do not display offensive intentions – is a better account of the evidence. For instance, the United States rose in power during the Cold War, but many other states (e.g., the NATO member-states) allied with it because it did not display aggressive intentions toward them.

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\(^1\) Waltz 1979.
Many scholars advocate that the current international system is characterized by growing interdependence. It is a mutual responsibility and dependency on others. Interdependence is one of the aspects of growing globalization. Due to the interdependency the threats could be not just nation-states but the phenomenon, such as terrorism, and in order to win the war with the phenomenon the states need to work in cooperation with the other states. International organizations are the shining sample how many of the international problems are solved on the international level, which unites different countries facing similar threats or problems. If previously international relations were characterized by interaction between either nation-states or alliances, nowadays we observe interdependence of all the parts – nation-states and alliances.

Inclusion is another peculiarity of the current international relations. If previously agreements were made mostly between two or more equal parts in order to solve one problem. Nowadays we can observe the phenomenon of inclusion, which is characterized by including cooperation not between two organizations, but their elements. For example OSCE is cooperating with NATO on the issues of Afghanistan. Afghanistan can not be the mutual threat for both organizations, as it is not a member of OSCE (what forbids OSCE to be involved in the actions in this country). But these two organizations agreed to cooperate having in mind stabilization of the region. OSCE is stabilizing its member-states surrounding Afghanistan, NATO is acting directly in Afghanistan. So, we experience the cooperation of some elements or units of two international organizations.

Previously realism, the dominant theoretical approach of international relations that was widely used, argued that alliances are merely tools for power aggregation, reflecting either the need to face some threat or the opportunity of achieving some gain. Since its inception in the aftermath of World War II and throughout the Cold War, NATO was not an exception to that argument. With the availability of a triangular international context, (while actor A can ally with actor B to face actor C) NATO succeeded in balancing and deterring the Soviet Union and its Warsaw Pact.

However, the post Cold War years have witnessed an important debate over what is called “the rationale of NATO’s survival”. Some Realist scholars have considered that the transatlantic relationship has gone about as far as it can, paradoxically, other realist practitioners have insisted that the dissolution of Warsaw Pact and the collapse of the Soviet Union does not mean that NATO is a mission accomplished organization, simply because there are lots of potential enemies already existing (terrorism, Islamic fundamentalism, rogue states, weapons of mass destruction, etc).

Realism always explains international relations using mainly two analytical concepts: “confrontation” as the dominant feature of what Morgenthau called “politics among nations” and

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2 Robert Keohan, Joseph Nye, Richard N. Cooper.
“balancing” as a behavior and as an outcome to these politics among states. Obviously, talking about confrontation and balancing means implicitly dealing with terms like “enemy”, “threat”, “increasing state power” and “aggregation of powers”.

Realist thought attaches great importance to the “balance of power”. The root idea of this term is that only force can counteract the effect of force, and that in an anarchical world, stability, predictability and regularity can only occur when the forces that states are able to exert to get their way in the world are in some kind of equilibrium. Usually, the balance of power appears in the image of a chandelier. The chandelier remains balanced if the weights which are attached to it are distributed beneath it in such a way that the forces they exert are in equilibrium.

The question remaining here is with whom should states ally in order to protect themselves and serve their interests. Actually, only two options are available. First, to ally with those who can not readily dominate their allies, in order to avoid being dominated by those who can. That means to get closer to the less strong powers. The second option is to ally with the dominant power. The logic behind this latest option is either defensive, or offensive.

Although, the regular and frequent practice is that states respond to threats through balancing or bandwagoning, there is a third way for the only super power that followed the dissolution of the Soviet Union in 1991. The United States, as “hyper-puissance”, has neither an equivalent power to seek to balance nor a more powerful state to tend to bandwagon. Accordingly, “hegemony” in all its forms became a key factor in understanding both American foreign policy and the external policy of a military alliance led by the United States like NATO.

Despite the fact, that etymologically the word “hegemony” is derived from the Greek word “hegeisthai” which means “to lead”, Gramsci conceptualizes at least two meanings of hegemony: domination and leadership:

a) hegemony as a sort of domination or imperialism means to put one state or more under direct or indirect political control of a powerful country aiming to exert commanding and seeking obedience;

b) hegemony as a kind of leadership or influence means to transform the behavior of other states towards predetermined, self-chosen goals. This transformation is not based on the use of force or coercion but on the systemic spread of the values and views of the hegemonic power.

Accordingly, hegemony could be seen as a coercive relation between a sufficiently powerful actor using material forces or soft political influence on one side, and a weaker partner lacking any credible allies and tend to bandwagon the hegemonic power on the other side.

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5 Ibid.
6 Stephen M. Walt, International relations: one world, many theories, Foreign Policy, spring 1998, pp 38–41
In order to analyze cooperation between the U.S. and Russian within NATO in order to find the solution for the threat coming from Afghanistan, we will use the following methodology: compare/contrast, historical analysis, case study, field research, interviews, official documents, policy reports, discourse analysis. Firstly the comparison of the decisions and results of NATO Summit 2008 and 2009 will allow us to see the main issues that were urgent along with the threats that were perceived in a different time period. Inclusion of interviews, field research with the analysis of the official documents, will allow us to see whether there is a difference in perception by politicians and those expressed in official documents that are used by both countries. We will analyze security and military doctrines and other relevant documents to find whether in the official documents these countries are still seen as an enemy and what their main threats are. We clearly understand the difficulties that might occur while dealing with such a contemporary topic, but will do our best to make it as objective as possible.

In the first part of the thesis we intend to analyze the new challenges and threats from American and Russian perspective. In this part we will address the main security and military documents and look for the contradictions or mutual threats states in them from both sides. As a rule the information which we consider to be true is mainly formed by global media or media policy of some countries, and does not always reflect the real state policy of the country. With this in mind, we intend to analyze military and security doctrines of the USA and Russia and see whether these countries are perceived as adversaries or threats to each other.

The next chapter of our work will be based on the NATO-Russia Council, in particular, the preconditions for its creation, analysis of the founding documents and the most important the conflicts, which occurred between Moscow and Washington. Among the key touching issues in U.S.-NATO-Russia relations we will discuss American missile defense in Eastern Europe, NATO enlargement (Georgia and Ukraine), Abkhazia and South Ossetia. We will analyze why mentioned above issues became the core problem in U.S.-Russia relations and how their further development might influence the possibility of fruitful cooperation between Washington and Moscow. We consider that not all the questions are of equal importance for Russia and the U.S. and would try to prove which issues are of vital importance for both sides and which could be used as a platform for negotiations.

Further on the thesis will be dealing with the NATO Summit 2009, its main topics for the discussion, particularities, achievements and the claim of “Reset relations” in its framework. We will argue that although Washington highly perceives NATO as a platform for the development of cooperation with Moscow, but the opposite feelings are in Kremlin. We believe that Russia would not agree for NATO to become the basis for the cooperation with the U.S., what is claimed in a number of official documents. With this in mind we will develop the idea that OSCE might become more visible as this type of platform. The shining sample of this could be the construction of
cooperation between OSCE and NATO over the issue of Afghanistan. We are positive that the USA and Russia will be more willing to cooperate with each other as they will see more common spheres of interests and in the future OSCE-NATO formula might be used for solving further global threats that are sensitive for both the USA and Russia.
1. NEW CHALLENGES and THREATS from RUSSIAN and AMERICAN PERSPECTIVE

Threats and challenges perceived by different countries are reflected in the military and security doctrines. In both the USA and Russia presidents decide on these issues. American foreign policy has a long history of doctrines issued by its presidents. Russia on the controversy should be analyzed starting from the collapse of the Soviet Union, when Russian Federation as a state was establishes. In order to see the main latest threats perceived by Washington and Moscow, we will analyze adopted Bush Doctrine along with the tendencies in the formation of Obama Doctrine, as well as Russian military, security doctrines and relevant documents adopted by former President Putin and current President Medvedev.

After 9/11 Bush Doctrine and following documents formulated challenges and threats of the United States of America. Due to the fact that Obama Doctrine as such has not been yet documented, we will make the main focus on the documents adopted by Bush administration. The United States of America determined security priorities in the following documents: National Strategy for Information Sharing\(^\text{10}\), National Strategy on Combating Terrorism\(^\text{11}\), the National Security Strategy of the United States of America (2002)\(^\text{12}\), the National Security Strategy of the United States of America (2006)\(^\text{13}\), National Strategy for Homeland Security\(^\text{14}\), and 9/11 Five Years Later\(^\text{15}\).

Bush administration adopted two Security Strategies with the difference in four years. Security Strategy of 2002 defends the peace “by fighting terrorists and tyrants”. Terrorism is sees as the main threat. It is explained by the fact that this document was developed after terrorist attack on 9/11. As the solution to this threat the Strategy proposes “to make use of every tool in arsenal – military power, better homeland defenses, law enforcement, intelligence, and vigorous efforts to cut off terrorist financing.”\(^\text{16}\)

Threat of terrorism is closely connected in American view to the issue of the American missile defense system in Eastern Europe. With this in mind defence against ballistic missiles was planned to be built. Bush Doctrine states that in order to predict terrorist actions the USA should act preventively.

The world great powers are according to Washington united by the same threats. Among these world powers are also mentioned Russia, India and China. In particular Russia “is in the midst

\(^{10}\) National Strategy for Information sharing: Successes and Challenges in Improving Terrorist-related Information Sharing, October 2007.

\(^{11}\) National Strategy on Combating Terrorism, September 2006.


\(^{13}\) The National Security Strategy of the United States of America, March 2006.


\(^{15}\) 9/11 Five Years Later: Successes and Challenges, September 2006.

of a hopeful transition, reaching for its democratic future and a partner in the war on terror.\footnote{Ibid.} Security Strategy (2002) claims that Russia and the United States “are no longer strategic adversaries”. “The Moscow Treaty on Strategic Reductions is emblematic of this new reality and reflects a critical change in Russian thinking that promises to lead to productive, long-term relations with the Euro-Atlantic community and the United States”. The White House claimed its will to facilitate Russia’s entry into the World Trade Organization, creation of NATO-Russia Council, and at the same time bolstering the independence of the states of the former Soviet Union. U.S. policy towards Russia’s neighbors is definitely contradicting with the Russian priorities and Russian policy. There are also other issues that openly are claimed as problematic for U.S.-Russia relations. Among such are: underdeveloped free-market democracy and dubious record in combating the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. In general through out the Strategy Russia is described as a “weak state”.

“The United States is committed to lasting institutions like the United Nations, the World Trade Organization, the Organization of American States, and NATO as well as other long-standing alliances”\footnote{The National Security Strategy of the USA, 2002.}

American perception of the alliances is that both alliances and multilateral institutions can multiply the strength of the nations and only in cooperation with the other nations, terrorism can be fought. Though the White House declared mutual cooperation as the most important factor in the war on terror, but “the United States welcomes (its) responsibility to lead in this great mission”. By this formulation the dominant American role in the world affairs was stated.

To achieve its goal, the United States will:
- Champion aspirations for human dignity;
- Strengthen alliances to defeat global terrorism and work to prevent attacks against itself and its friends;
- Work with others to defuse regional conflicts;
- Prevent its enemies from threatening itself, its allies, and its friends, with weapons of mass destruction;
- Ignite a new era of global economic growth through free markets and free trade;
- Expand the circle of development by opening societies and building the infrastructure of democracy;
- Develop agendas for cooperative action with other main centers of global power; and
- Transform America’s national security institutions to meet the challenges and opportunities of the twenty-first century.\footnote{The National Security Strategy of the USA, 2002.}
As weapons of mass destruction and means of its transportation are seen as inseparable component of the war on terror, the special strategy for its combat was developed. Comprehensive strategy to combat weapons of mass destruction (WMD) includes:

- Proactive counter-proliferation efforts;

“We must deter and defend against the threat before it is unleashed. We must ensure that key capabilities – detection, active and passive defenses, and counterforce capabilities – are integrated into our defense transformation and our homeland security systems. Counter-proliferation must also be integrated into the doctrine, training, and equipping of our forces and those of our allies to ensure that we can prevail in any conflict with WMD-armed adversaries”20.

- Strengthened nonproliferation efforts to prevent rogue states and terrorists from acquiring the materials, technologies, and expertise necessary for weapons of mass destruction;

“We will enhance diplomacy, arms control, multilateral export controls, and threat reduction assistance that impede states and terrorists seeking WMD, and when necessary, interdict enabling technologies and materials. We will continue to build coalitions to support these efforts, encouraging their increased political and financial support for nonproliferation and threat reduction programs. The recent G-8 agreement to commit up to $20 billion to a global partnership against proliferation marks a major step forward”21.

- Effective consequence management to respond to the effects of WMD use, whether by terrorists or hostile states.

“Minimizing the effects of WMD use against our people will help deter those who possess such weapons and dissuade those who seek to acquire them by persuading enemies that they cannot attain their desired ends. The United States must also be prepared to respond to the effects of WMD use against our forces abroad and to help friends and allies if they are attacked”22.

Among the other goals of Bush administration were: economic growth through free markets and free trade, opening societies and building the infrastructure of democracies, transformation of America’s national security institutions, developing agendas for cooperative action with the other main centers of global power. The last one touched the question of coalition organization by the states willing to promote the balance of power. The Strategy mentions such allies as: NATO, Canada and EU. NATO took a special place. The document underlines the necessity to develop new structures and capabilities by North Atlantic Treaty Organization, along with building a capability to field, at short notice, highly mobile and specially trained forces. NATO is supposed to be also ready to create coalitions under its own mandate.

In order to achieve this goal, the following solutions were proposed: to expand NATO’s membership to those democratic nations willing and able to share the burden of defending and advancing American common interests; to ensure that the military forces of NATO nations have appropriate combat contributions to make in coalition warfare; to develop planning processes to enable those contributions to become effective multinational fighting forces; to take advantage of the technological opportunities and economies of scale in defense spending to transform NATO military forces so that they dominate potential aggressors and diminish vulnerabilities; to streamline

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21 Ibid.
22 Ibid.
and increase the flexibility of command structures to meet new operational demands and the
associated requirements of training, integrating, and experimenting with new force configurations;
and to maintain the ability to work and fight together as allies even as we take the necessary steps to
transform and modernize the forces\textsuperscript{23}.

In 2006 the new National Security Strategy\textsuperscript{24} of the United States of America was adopted
and was called a war time security strategy. The structure of the new Security Strategy is identical
to the previous one. But its main focus is the War on Terror. The War on Terror is compared to the
Cold War with the difference that nowadays the core problem is the perversion of religion, but not a
philosophy. The new Strategy added new aspects. Among them are: solving of the regional
conflicts, strengthening alliance and challenges of globalization.

The Security Strategy (2006) is as well a preliminary report of achieved results of previously
adopted Security Strategy (2002) and some of the future goals. In general results seem to be very
optimistic. But the achievements of war in Iraq and actions in Afghanistan are definitely
exaggerated. Among the achievements of American policy was mentioned the loss of its positions
by al-Qaida in Afghanistan and construction of the democratic rule in Iraq and Afghanistan. This
achievement now can contradict with the new policy of Obama administration towards Afghanistan.

\begin{quote}
“A few years ago, Afghanistan was condemned to a pre-modern nightmare. Now it has held two successful
free elections and is a staunch ally in the war on terror. Much work remains, however, and the Afghan people deserve
the support of the United States and the entire international community”\textsuperscript{25}.
\end{quote}

NATO’s activities were positively characterized in the Security Strategy of 2006. It was
perceived as a transforming organization that meets current threats and is playing a leading role in
stabilizing the Balkans and Afghanistan, as well as training the Iraqi military leadership to address
its security challenges.

Russia got a separate abstract in the analysis of the possible allies and current situation of
the new Strategy. One should stress here that in comparison with the perception of Russia in
previous Strategy\textsuperscript{26}, it is shown as the country with the great influence in Europe and among its
neighbors, but not as just a “weak state”. Nevertheless the analysis raises the issue of diminishing
commitment to democratic freedoms and institutions in Russia. The main accent is made on the
necessity to persuade Moscow in the benefits of democratic governance.

The summarizing part of the Security Strategy (2006) points out that “the challenges
America faces are great, yet we have enormous power and influence to address those challenges”,
stating its vision of the unipolar world with the dominating role of the United States in it.

\textsuperscript{23} The National Security Strategy of the USA 2002.
\textsuperscript{24} The National Security Strategy of the United States of America 2006.
\textsuperscript{25} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{26} The National Security Strategy of the United States of America 2002.
In addition to the National Security Strategy of the United States of America (2006), the National Strategy on Combating Terrorism\textsuperscript{27} was adopted the same year. The strategy in the War on Terror was stated as “destroying the larger al-Qaida network and also confronting the radical ideology that inspired others to join or support the terrorist movement”. Among the methods are mentioned similar to those indicated in the National Security Strategy (2002, 2006). Fight with the spread of the weapon of mass destruction and existence of the phenomenon of the rogue states are among the actions that Washington is planning to take in this war.

The Strategy on Combating Terrorism clarified the understanding of the new enemy in the War in Terror. In this particular document “the principal terrorist enemy confronting the United States is a transnational movement of extremist organizations, networks, and individuals – and their state and non-state supporters – which have in common that they exploit Islam and use terrorism for ideological ends”\textsuperscript{28}. On September 2006 “9/11 Five Years Later: Successes and Challenges” was developed as a document analyzing achievements and further threats in the War on Terror. It repeats the same threats mentioned in the previous documents.

The National Strategy for Homeland Security was adopted in 2007 after events of the Hurricane Katrina, when the state was still in War on Terror. To the previous threats, such as the proliferation of the weapon of mass destruction and terrorism, this document added threats of pandemic diseases and natural disasters. The Strategy for Homeland Security recognizes that while the country continues to focus on the terrorist threat, it should also address the full range of potential catastrophic events, including man-made and natural disasters, due to their implications on the homeland security. The main goals of the Homeland Security Strategy were determined as following: prevention of the terrorist attacks, protection of key resources and infrastructure, respond to incidents that occur, and strengthening the foundation of the long-term success\textsuperscript{29}.

The last document dealing with the issues of national and international threats and their prevention is the National Strategy for Information Sharing\textsuperscript{30}. It is a critical component of American approach for combating terrorism. As such, it takes its lead from the President’s National Security Strategy, which provides the broad vision and goals for confronting the national security challenges of the 21st century. In addition, it is closely aligned with the National Strategy for Combating Terrorism and the National Strategy for Homeland Security. It is mainly dealing with the questions of information sharing improvement on all the levels for more productive fight with terrorism.

If George W. Bush considered Iraq to be the main target in the War on Terror, President Obama changed the focus from Iraq for Afghanistan. He declared that “the United States has a vital national security interest in addressing the current and potential security threats posed by extremists

\textsuperscript{27} The National Strategy on Combating Terrorism 2006.
\textsuperscript{28} The National Strategy on Combating Terrorism 2006.
\textsuperscript{30} Ibid.
in Afghanistan and Pakistan\textsuperscript{31}. The following steps for Afghanistan and Pakistan are mentioned: executing and resourcing an integrated civilian-military counterinsurgency strategy in Afghanistan, resourcing and prioritizing civilian assistance in Afghanistan, expanding the Afghan National Security Forces (army and police), engaging the Afghan government and bolstering its legitimacy, encouraging Afghan government efforts to integrate reconcilable insurgents, breaking the link between narcotics and the insurgency, etc. Terrorism remains the main threat for Obama Administration, but with the changed perception of the guilty state.

Obama's foreign-policy advisers come from diverse backgrounds. They are former aides to Democratic mandarins like Tom Daschle and Lee Hamilton (Denis McDonough and Ben Rhodes, respectively); veterans of the Clinton administration's left flank (Tony Lake and Susan Rice); a human-rights advocate who helped write the Army's and Marine Corps' much-lauded counterinsurgency field manual (Sarah Sewall); a retired general who helped run the air war during the invasion of Iraq (Scott Gration); and a former journalist who revolutionized the study of U.S. foreign policy (Samantha Power). Yet they form a committed, intellectually coherent, and united foreign-affairs team. But each opposed the Iraq War. Each did so because they understood that the invasion and occupation ran counter to the goal of destroying al-Qaeda. Obama's advisers argue that national security depends in large part on dignity promotion. Without it, the U.S. will never be able to destroy al-Qaeda.

The Obama Doctrine maintains that all societies and cultures are morally equal. More important, promoting democracy and human rights has been abandoned in favor of improving America's standing in the world.

The main tool of Obama Administration in foreign policy became the policy of diplomatic engagement. Russia and China are seen as a partners rather than enemies. On China, President Obama and Secretary of State Hillary Rodham Clinton have put human rights and Tibet on the back burner, refusing to raise these issues for fear of angering Beijing. Instead, Mrs. Clinton insists that the global financial crisis, the climate-change and the security crisis are more important. Regarding Russia President Obama has publicly declared the will to reset bilateral relations. He perceives Moscow as a partner in the war in Afghanistan. This policy is realized despite Moscow's war of aggression against the Republic of Georgia and declaration of independence of Abkhazia and South Ossetia.

President Obama rejected Bush’s definition of ‘Global War on Terror’, but he is willing to confront Al Qaeda aggressively wherever it exists. He has pledged more forces for Afghanistan and expanded the size of the U.S. Army; he has listened to his commanders to slow the drawdown of forces in Iraq so as not to undermine security gains; and he has continued the drone attacks that have apparently killed the Taliban leader of Pakistan, Baitullah Mehsud.

At the same time, President Obama has sought to set himself apart from former President Bush. He has promised to close the U.S. detention camp at Guantánamo Bay in Cuba, discontinued interrogation practices, and vowed to approach troublesome countries such as Iran and North Korea with more diplomatic nuance.

National goals in its foreign policy and definition of the main threats of Russian Federation are described in the following documents: the Foreign Policy Concept, the National Security Concept, the National Security Strategy till 2020, and the Military Doctrine.

The Foreign Policy Concept of the Russian Federation\textsuperscript{32} circulated at UN underlines the reassessment of the overall situation around Russia in the world and international developments in the field of international relations. Similarly to the Obama Doctrine according to the Concept Moscow is seeking collective actions of the international community for the solution of the conflicts. Here one should mention that this aspect is contradicting the actual acts taken by Russian administration in the latest war in Georgia.

Russia exerts a substantial influence upon the development of a new architecture of international relations. It blames Bush’s multilateral approach for destabilization of international situation. At the same time Moscow claims its responsibility for maintenance of security both globally and regionally and is ready to take joint actions with all other states at finding solutions for common problems. In this respect cooperation with the CIS Member States constitutes a priority area of Russia's foreign policy.

“The Russian Federation possesses real capacity to play a well deserved role globally. In this respect, of fundamental importance are the following factors: strengthened Russian statehood, stable economic growth, further political and economic reforms, resolution of social problems, overcoming of the resource-based economy and its transition to innovations, as well as improved demographic situation. Other important factors include the strengthened civil society institutes and governmental support to national nongovernmental organizations interested in promoting Russia's foreign policy interests.”\textsuperscript{33}

Russian Federation considers that the present fundamental development trends, including the emerging multipolarity and diversification of risks and threats lead to the conclusion that the strategic stability issue cannot anymore be addressed exclusively within the framework of Russia-U.S. relations.

The Foreign Policy Concept puts next to each other the Russian perception of NATO and the USA. Regarding NATO it states:

“Russia will build its relationship with NATO taking into consideration the degree of the alliance's readiness for equal partnership, answering compliance with the principles and standards of international law, the implementation by all its members of the obligations, assumed within the framework of the NATO-Russia Council, not to ensure one's security at the expense of security of the Russian Federation, as well as the obligation to display military restraint. Russia maintains its negative attitude towards the expansion of NATO, notably to the plans of admitting Ukraine and Georgia to the membership in the alliance, as well as to bringing the NATO military infrastructure closer to the Russian borders on the whole, which violates the principle of equal security, leads to new dividing lines in Europe and runs

\textsuperscript{32} Foreign Policy Concept of the Russian Federation.

\textsuperscript{33} Ibid.
counter to the tasks of increasing the effectiveness of joint work in search for responses to real challenges of our time.”

The Russia-U.S. relations are perceived as following:

“...it is necessary to transform the Russian-U.S. relations into strategic partnership, overcome the barriers of strategic principles of the past and focus on real threats, while working for the resolution of differences between Russia and the USA in the spirit of mutual respects in the areas where they persist...”;

“Russia has been consistently favoring new agreements with the United States on disarmament and arms control in the interests of preserving continuity of this process, strengthening confidence building and transparency measures in space activity and anti-missile defense, as well as on issues of nonproliferation of weapons of mass destruction, secure development of peaceful nuclear energy, broadening cooperation in countering terrorism and other challenges and threats as well as settlement of regional conflicts”; “favors...predictability in the Russia-U.S. relations” and “...is interested in U.S. actions in the world stage be based on the principles and norms of international law, first of all the UN Charter”.

Another important document along with the Foreign Policy Concept is the National Security Concept of the Russian Federation. This document regulates relations in the sphere of security and defense of the state. The document formulates the most important trends in the state policy of the Russian Federation defining content and forms of the corresponding activity of state power and administrative bodies. On one hand it makes the Russian Federation security policy comprehensible and predictable. The document states that the importance of military power remains considerable and the level and scale of threats in the military sphere increases when efforts of particular countries to weaken Russian positions are stirred up. The Concept positively rejects the prevalence of the Soviet orientation to force in the past and stresses new methods for the conflict prevention such as political, diplomatic, economic and other non-military methods.

Another document – National Security Concept of the Russian Federation – was published on 14 January 2000 and was signed by President Putin on 10 January. It represents an edited version of the Draft Concept adopted by the Russian Security Council (Russia's analogue to the U.S. National Security Council) on 5 October 1999. The Concept also replaced the National Security Concept signed by Boris Yeltsin on 17 December 1997.

National Security Concept is of much bigger interest to the research as it directly analysis the world system, role of the USA and the position of Russian Federation towards American foreign policy. It states clearly that Russia is going to support the development of the multipolar world. Security Concept divides all countries of the world into two groups:

- the countries that are working on the creation of the new world system and integration of their political and economic systems;

- the countries that support the construction of the world system with the American domination.

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34 Ibid.
37 Ibid.
Throughout the Security Concept, Russia’s national interests in the international sphere consist in “maintaining sovereignty and consolidation of Russia’s position as a great power – one of the influential centers of the multipolar world”\(^\text{39}\). It states the priority of cooperation with the countries of the Commonwealth of the Independent States and “traditional partners of Russia”. The document does not specify which countries are perceived as Russia’s “traditional partners”. We may assume that under this term are meant the countries with which the Soviet Union had stable relations and after its collapse continue support Russian policy. In the Foreign Policy Concept some of these countries are mentioned. Among them are Cuba, Iran, Venezuela, India, etc.

The basic threats in the international sphere perceived by Russia in the Security Concept are seen in the following way:

- desire of the particular states and interstate unions to neglect the role of current providers of the international security, such as OSCE and UN;
- danger of the decrease of the political, economic and military Russia’s influences in the world;
- strengthening of military-political blocs and union, especially NATO and its enlargement to the East;
- deployment of the military bases and contingents close to the Russian border;
- distribution of the weapons of mass destruction and means of its delivery;
- weakening of the integrating processes in Commonwealth of the Independent States (CIS);
- escalation of the conflicts close to the Russian border or CIS member-states;
- claim on the territory of Russian Federation.

From analysis of the main international threats perceived by Russia in Security Concept, we can come to the conclusion that Russia claims CIS countries to be the zone of its influence and NATO (guided by the USA) as one of the main problems. This document can also question Russia’s dissatisfaction with role of security institutions with the dominating role of Washington in them (such as NATO) and the will either to improve another alternative international institutions responsible for security issues (such as UN, OSCE) or create the new one, where Russia will be fully represented. Russian officials often express their interest in reforming UN Security Council in order to increase its military capability and ability to solve international conflicts. As well many Russian scholars were discussing the possibility to create the new organization, where Russian security interests would be better represented than they are now in NATO. Security Concept criticizes NATO military approach to the solution of some conflicts, acting without UN Security Council sanctions.

Dr. Nikolai Sokov, Senior Research Associate at James Martin Centre for Nonproliferation Studies, saw current Security Concept of Russia from an interesting angle, with which we do not actually agree. He perceived it as a declaration of the new nuclear age and made following conclusions regarding Russia’s new defense policy: (1) the perception that NATO uses force freely and will not hesitate to use it against Russia over political disagreements, and (2) a realistic appreciation of how Russia's weakened conventional forces are unable to resist a large-scale conventional attack by NATO. He suggests that nuclear weapons are seen by Russia as the only reliable means to dissuade NATO from using force against Russia, and the harsh language of the recent official documents is clearly intended to ward off this perceived threat \(^{40}\).

We agree with Sokov that the National Security Concept of the Russian Federation contains some really strong statements, especially regarding the USA and NATO. Nevertheless we did not get the impression from the text that the use of nuclear weapon as a respond to NATO attacks is seen as very realistic. To our mind the nuclear weapon was used in the text along with the other military means of protection and was mentioned as the most reliable mean of defense. The Security Concept contains critical analysis of the other military complex means and along the document one may find the mentioning of their poor conditions and necessity to be modernized (what is obviously true). Next to these types of weapon, Russian nuclear arsenal is just seen as the one, which is in a relevantly good condition.

On the controversy to the conclusions made by Dr. Sokov, we saw the Security Concept more as a statement of the zones of Russian influence, particularly regarding CIS countries, and the analysis of the current international system especially concerning security issues and Moscow’s disagreement with them.

Confirming our thesis that Russia does not see the possibility of the nuclear conflict development, we should address the other important document – Military Doctrine of the Russian Federation, which was adopted by the same President on April 21, 2000. Military Doctrine is a transition time document for the period of “the democracy formation” and “dynamic transformation of the international world system”\(^{41}\). It aims at specifying the implementation of the Security Concept. The Doctrine from the very beginning in the part about military-political situation underlines “the decrease of the threat of the nuclear war”\(^{42}\).

If Security Concept was oriented on both national and international issues, by contrast to it Military Doctrine makes the main accent on the increase of the global threats, such as “national and religious extremism”, the “spread of the local military conflicts and wars”, “strengthening of the regional arms race”, the “activity of the terrorist organizations”, “strengthening of organized

\(^{40}\) Sokov 2000.
\(^{41}\) Military Doctrine of Russian Federation 2000.
\(^{42}\) Ibid.
criminal groups”, the “illegal trade of weapons and drugs”. The Doctrine as well as the Security Concept stresses the disagreement with the dissolution of the role of OSCE and UN Security Council on the world arena and much more influential role of NATO.

There were some changes made to the Foreign Policy Concept of Russian Federation. These are the “system of views on the content and main areas in the foreign policy activities of Russia”, after the war with Georgia in August 2008. Among the most interesting aspects added to the new document is determination of the "privileged interests" meaning the region around Russia. It was perceived as an introduction of the new kind of hegemony or claiming of the zone of interests by Russia.

On May 12, 2009, President Medvedev signed the new National Security Strategy of Russian Federation till 2020. It states that Russia “has restored its possibilities for the escalation of the competitiveness” based on the national interests of the “multipolar international system formation”. In the chapter about current international situation, the Strategy underscores the existence of the globalized world and the necessity to face its threats in cooperation with the other countries. NATO is shown in the document as a security structure that is not able to maintain international security any more.

Moscow is not accepting any attempts of deployment military means of NATO or its allies at the Russian border. “Russia is ready to the development of its relations with NATO on the basis of equality and strengthening of general security in Euro-Atlantic region, only if legitimate interests of Russian Federation are considered.”

In the new Security Strategy Russia will “support the formation of the equal strategic partnership with the United States of America on the basis of conterminous interests and with regard to their influence on the international situation as a whole.” Among the priorities are the achievements of the new arrangements in disarmament and arms control sphere, actions on the nonproliferation of the weapons of mass destruction, the escalation of the antiterrorist cooperation, and the settlement of the regional conflicts.

“In order to maintain strategic stability and multilateral interaction equal in rights on international arena, Russia will undertake all necessary efforts to preserve the parity of cooperation with the United States of America in the field of strategic offensive arms during the American plans of deployment missile defense system in Europe.”

Economic threats have the leading position in the new Security Strategy of the Russian Federation. The reason of it might be current financial crisis and economic turndown that cause Russia big economic problems. Both Moscow and Washington are now more concerned about the development of the world financial crisis and its solutions than in the confrontation with each other.

43 Ibid.
44 The Foreign Policy Concept of the Russian Federation, approved by the President V. Putin.
46 Ibid.
47 Ibid.
48 Ibid.
No one should underestimate the meaning of security issues for Russian politicians, but at the moment economic threats are placed on the first place, what are very clear from the new Security Strategy. For realization of its main international goals Russia needs a strong economic basis. Without economic achievements all the Strategy concepts would be just empty worlds.

For analysis of U.S.-Russia relations we should address the Sochi Declaration. Lately relations between Moscow and Washington has been not very productive and seemed to be more contradicting than cooperative. Current Russian President Medvedev sees the solution for occurred situation in realization of the Strategic Framework Declaration49, signed in Sochi in 200850. This Declaration was signed by George W. Bush Jr. and Vladimir Putin. The document was supposed to create the framework for the cooperation between future U.S. and Russian presidents. It analyses the achievements in U.S.-Russia partnership as well as its disagreements (MDS deployment in Eastern Europe, NATO enlargement). Regarding policy towards NATO the document contains the room for further maneuvers. Sochi Declaration states the readiness of both sides to collaborate on the issues of CFE Treaty, the distribution of the nuclear technologies, struggle against international terrorism, broadening of economic cooperation, development of the mutual development projects, Russia’s joining of WTO, repeal of the Jackson-Vanik Amendment51, fight with the global warming.

According to Sergei Oznobischev, director of the Institute for Strategic Estimations, Russia the Russian-American cooperation has prime value not only from the point of view of the security, but also because of its internal problems. Russian internal problems were repeatedly declared by Medvedev and Putin, and were even written down in the Foreign Policy Concept. And they lie, first of all, in the support of innovative development of Russian Federation and increase of its competitiveness. This is impossible without scientific and technical exchange with the most innovative-developed countries among which is the USA, Japan, South Korea and the number of European countries.52

On the meeting with the representatives of NGO in September 19, 2008, in the Kremlin President Medvedev made an accent that “Russia is surrounded by enemies”.53 Whom did he mean as the enemies of Russia? The statement was made after events in South Ossetia and Abkhazia and one might assume that enemies are the countries that did not support Russian policy in Georgian conflict.

49 U.S.—Russia Strategic Framework Declaration.
50 Medvedev 2009.
51 Amendment to the Trade Act of the United States of America (1974) restricting immigration rights of the nations from the to certain countries with non-market economies. President Gerald Ford signed the amendment into law on January 3, 1975. Jackson–Vanik Amendment still applies to Russia. Critics of the amendment argue that with the end of the Cold War, Jackson–Vanik is a now merely counterproductive trade discrimination, but some still see it as instrumental in helping democracy take hold in Eastern Europe
52 Oznobischev 2009.
53 Dmitriy Medvedev intends to modernize Russia 2008.
So, we may summarize the following. Although we might still here from politicians in both Washington and Moscow the term “enemy”, but it is not reflecting the actual state of relations between two countries. Cold War is over both countries are transferring from former adversaries to the potential allies. There is an understanding of the necessity to involve other side for the solution of the global issues on both sides of the Atlantic Ocean.

If in the first documents of Russian Federation we were able to see some negative perception of Washington, this formulation changed for positive in the latest one, adopted by President Medvedev. From Russian official documents is obvious understanding of NATO as the tool of American foreign policy and that is a very serious aspect in American plans to involve Moscow more actively into the work of North Atlantic Treaty Organization. We consider Russian authority would not agree with NATO as the only active and productive player on the world arena, but would support the UN, OSCE or another means of cooperation and involvement between international organizations.

Regarding Washington, all security and military documents prove its orientation on the war with terrorism. Although the United States of America is going through a very difficult economic period, but in its foreign policy terrorism is still the main target. From analysis of the American documents, Russia changes from a “weak state” to an influential state in the region that has some problems with the democracy. At the same time Obama Administration tries to act differently from Bush Administration facing the same goals. The new president is seen as a representative of liberal institutionalism, believing in the dominating role of the international organization in the solution of the international problems.

One of the problematic fields visible from the documents of Washington is the statement to support the development and democratic development of the former Soviet States. Russia considers these countries to be its zone of interest. As we have seen from the events of August 2008, Moscow is ready to defend its interests in the Post-Soviet region. Another problematic issue is the perception of its role in the world affairs. Bush Administration was claiming through its documents unipolar world. Moscow would be willing only to agree on the multipolar world. With the change of American administration, this issue has been overcome.

The main American threats mentioned in the official documents are: terrorism and terrorist organizations, distribution of weapons of mass destruction, unstable Afghanistan and Pakistan, pandemic diseases and natural disasters. Russia considers its main threats to be NATO enlargement, distribution of the weapons of mass destruction, weakening of the integration process in CIS, extremism and terrorism, spear of local military conflicts, military bases close to Russia’s border, irreverence of the UN and OSCE role.

The USA praises Russia as a potential partner in the War on Terror. Russia is also willing more closely to cooperate with the U.S. Both countries are seeking collective actions of the
international community for the solution of the conflicts. They have following mutual interest: disarmament and arms control, space activity and missile defence, nonproliferation of weapons of mass destruction, secure development of peaceful nuclear energy, cooperation in countering terrorism, fight with the organized criminal groups as well as illegal trade of weapons and drugs.
2. THE EVOLUTION of NATO-RUSSIA RELATIONS
2.1. FOUNDING ACT and NATO-RUSSIA PERMANENT JOINT COUNCIL

North Atlantic Treaty Organization was created from the very beginning as the result of the Soviet blockade of Berlin and intended to become the controversy to the Soviet Union. Nowadays we are talking about existence of the NATO-Russia Council and mention previous body for NATO-Russia cooperation – NATO-Russia Joint Permanent Council.

Since the end of the Cold War era the European security environment has undergone fundamental changes. Confrontation is gone, but a common security framework embracing the whole continent is still absent. Moreover, tensions abound, feeding upon and strengthening old suspicions. After the end of the Cold War, NATO has established itself as the most influential politico-military actor on the continent.

In order to see the complete picture of the NATO-Russia cooperation and its evolution we should address the approach of phase division. Paul Fritch, the Head of Section on Russia and Ukraine Relations in NATO's Political Affairs and Security Policy Division, divided NATO-Russia cooperation on several phases: post Cold War period and the creation of NATO-Russia Council54.

We decided to develop more detailed phase partition for the analysis of NATO-Russia partnership. According to our own methodology cooperation between NATO and Russia can be divided into following phases:

- Phase 1: December 1991 to late 1993 – the initial phase during which Boris Yeltsin made progress in achieving positive relations with NATO and stated it as his major foreign policy goal. That is the period of the crucial letter to NATO members declaring that “today we are raising the questions of Russia’s membership in NATO as a long-term political aim”55 and an apparent endorsement of possible Polish membership in the Alliance.

- Phase 2: 1994 to early 1997 – Russian attitude towards NATO became more guarded during this phase and the main reasons for that were there growing concerns regarding NATO enlargement policy, the use of NATO airpower against Serbian forces in Bosnia, and a growing belief that Russia had been duped about the true nature and aims of the Partnership for Peace program56. Despite concerns Russia continued to cooperate with NATO. Close partnership between them was shown by participation of the Russian troops in the NATO-led Implementation Force and further on in the Stabilization Force.

54 Fritch 2007.
56 Vladislav Chernov highlighted some of the major Russian concerns regarding PfP in the article in Nezavisimaya Gazeta on February 23, 1994. He argued that PfP was primarily a repository for “the anti-Russia sentiments of our former friends”.

in Bosnia and Herzegovina. Remarkable aspect was as well the signing of the Partnership for Peace Framework Document.

- Phase 3: Spring 1997 – to spring 1999 – NATO and Russia signed the Founding Act on Mutual Relations, Cooperation, and Security (May 27, 1997). That Act assured that the Alliance sought to include in its Euro-Atlantic security community Russian Federation. With this document both sides agreed that they do not see each other as adversaries and they pledge “to build together a lasting and inclusive peace in the Euro-Atlantic area on the principles of democracy and cooperative security” (see Appendix 2).

- Phase 4: Spring 1999 to summer 1999 – the low point in NATO-Russia relations due to the Kosovo crisis. Moscow’s response to NATO’s air campaign against the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia was to reduce its structural links with the Alliance. Nevertheless Russia remained to have fruitful relations with Washington. The Kosovo crisis proved the survival of NATO-Russia partnership after the development of the contradictions.

- Phase 5: Summer 1999 to fall 2001 – the new Russian President Vladimir Putin expressed the will to get back to more fruitful cooperation with NATO. When asked by a British journalist if Russia might possibly join NATO, he replied, “Why not?”57.

- Phase 6: Fall 2001 to 2004 – after terrorist attack on New York and Washington, President Putin joined international coalition against terrorism and with this persuaded Alliance members to respond more dynamically to his motion toward enhanced NATO-Russia cooperation. In May 2002 the heads of the state of Russia and the alliance nations established NATO-Russia Council.

- Phase 7: 2004 to August 2008 – NATO went through a massive enlargement process. Its new members became seven new member states: Estonia, Lithuania, Latvia, Slovakia, Slovenia, Bulgaria, and Romania. In 2006 NATO Summit for the first time was held in the former Soviet state – Latvia.

- Phase 8: August 2008 till 2009 – escalation of the confrontation between NATO and Russia over the Georgian crisis.

- Phase 9: 2009 till present – reset of relations with Russia. Moscow became a NATO’s partner in the campaign against Al Qaeda in Afghanistan. According to Paul Fritch, head of the Russia and Ukraine relations section in the NATO international staff,

“The need to engage Russia in the struggle against terrorism was obvious – intelligence capabilities, political influence in relevant regions of the world, heightened sensitivity to the threat, even simple geography made Russia an indispensable partner in the campaign against Al Qaeda and its Taliban sponsors in Afghanistan. But the immediate crisis also unearthed a deeper truth. Even the most cursory look at the list of NATO’s most pressing “contemporary security challenges” – terrorism, proliferation, regional instability, trafficking in drugs, arms, and human beings – made clear that in most areas, any solution that did not include Russia as a cooperative partner was no solution at all. “Going it alone” was not likely to ensure Allied security”58.

57 Smith 2006, 72.
58 Flitch 2003, 12-14.
Let us begin with the starting point of NATO-Russia relations. From a military security point of view, Russia and NATO are the two main, albeit asymmetrical players in the Euro-Atlantic area. Toward the end of the Cold War Moscow and Brussels understood the necessity of establishing direct contacts between them. The end of the bipolar confrontation and Russia’s internal transformation provided a new and propitious environment for such contacts, leading eventually to partnership. Since 1991 NATO and Russia had been cooperating within the North Atlantic Cooperation Council. Partnership for Peace was another framework within which Russia and NATO cooperated since 1994. In 1997, North Atlantic Cooperation Council and Partnership for Peace were consolidated within the Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council. The most important example of long-lasting and successful cooperation on a practical issue between NATO and Russia has been within Implementation/Stability Force (IFOR/SFOR) in Bosnia (since 1995), and in Kosovo (KFOR, since mid-1999). On the problem side, Russia has been especially concerned about NATO's enlargement, its use of force without a UN Security Council mandate in the Balkans (1999), and the alliance’s new strategic concept stressing out-of-area interventionism.

One reason behind NATO enlargement was to hedge against a potential resurgence of Russian power. European security, however, can not be fully achieved simply through NATO's enlargement or even its internal transformation. There is a need for a mutually satisfying arrangement which would include Russia as a full participant. Thus, involving Russia in partnership security relations with the West is an important issue.

The official beginning of the NATO-Russia cooperation should be considered May 27, 1997, with the signing NATO-Russia Founding Act. President Clinton and the leaders of the other NATO nations, joined by President Yeltsin, sign the “Founding Act on Mutual Relations, Cooperation, and Security between NATO and the Russian Federation” (see Appendix 2). The NATO-Russia Founding Act, a politically binding agreement (i.e., not a treaty) calls for creation of a NATO-Russia Joint Council that is intended to “provide a mechanism for consultations, coordination, and, to the maximum extent possible, where appropriate, for joint decisions and joint action with respect to security issues of common concern” (see Appendix 2). The Founding Act does not give Russia any veto power over NATO decision-making or action. In the document, NATO reiterates that it has "no intention, no plan and no reason to deploy nuclear weapons on the territory of new members, nor any need to change any aspects of NATO's nuclear posture or nuclear policy," (see Appendix 2) nor any plans to deploy substantial numbers of NATO combat forces on the territory of new members.

The NATO-Russia Founding Act reflects the changing security environment in Europe, an environment in which the confrontation of the Cold War has been replaced by the promise of closer cooperation among former adversaries. It highlights the profound transformation that the Alliance has undergone since the end of the Cold War, through reductions of conventional and nuclear
forces, through a revision of its strategic concept, through its new missions such as peacekeeping, and through its support for security cooperation throughout Europe, in particular within the framework of Partnership for Peace. It also refers to the transformation Russia is undergoing, its force reductions – which will continue –, the withdrawal of Russian forces from Central and Eastern Europe, the revision of Russia's military doctrine, and its participation in the multinational operation in Bosnia and Herzegovina.

In order to achieve the aims of the Founding Act on Mutual Relations, Cooperation and Security NATO and Russia agreed to base their relations on the following principles:

* development, on the basis of transparency, of a strong, stable, enduring and equal partnership and of cooperation to strengthen security and stability in the Euro-Atlantic area;
* acknowledgement of the vital role that democracy, political pluralism, the rule of law, and respect for human rights and civil liberties and the development of free market economies play in the development of common prosperity and comprehensive security;
* refraining from the threat or use of force against each other as well as against any other state, its sovereignty, territorial integrity or political independence in any manner inconsistent with the United Nations Charter and with the Declaration of Principles Guiding Relations Between Participating States contained in the Helsinki Final Act;
* respect for sovereignty, independence and territorial integrity of all states and their inherent right to choose the means to ensure their own security, the inviolability of borders and peoples' right of self-determination as enshrined in the Helsinki Final Act and other OSCE documents;
* mutual transparency in creating and implementing defence policy and military doctrines;
* prevention of conflicts and settlement of disputes by peaceful means in accordance with UN and OSCE principles;
* support, on a case-by-case basis, of peacekeeping operations carried out under the authority of the UN Security Council or the responsibility of the OSCE (see Appendix 2).

To carry out the mutual activities NATO and Russia created the NATO-Russia Permanent Joint Council, what was stated in the Founding Act. The central objective of this Permanent Joint Council is “to build increasing levels of trust, unity of purpose and habits of consultation and cooperation between NATO and Russia” (see Appendix 2).

The Permanent Joint Council was engaged in three distinct activities: consulting on the topics in Section III of this Act and on any other political or security issue determined by mutual consent; on the basis of these consultations, developing joint initiatives on which NATO and Russia would agree to speak or act in parallel; once consensus has been reached in the course of consultation, making joint decisions and taking joint action on a case-by-case basis, including
participation, on an equitable basis, in the planning and preparation of joint operations, including peacekeeping operations under the authority of the UN Security Council or the responsibility of the OSCE\textsuperscript{59}.

Under the Founding Act, the NATO-Russia Permanent Joint Council was created as a forum for regular consultation on security issues of common concern. Its aim was to build mutual confidence and help overcome misperceptions through dialogue and the development of a substantial program of security and defence-related cooperation.

In the five years of its existence, the Permanent Joint Council addressed a wide range of topics of direct interest to both sides. Among them were: the situation in the Balkans; military matters discussed in meetings of Military Representatives under the auspices of the Permanent Joint Council; measures to promote cooperation, transparency and confidence between NATO and Russia; the contribution by NATO and Russia and the role of the Permanent Joint Council to the security architecture of the Euro-Atlantic region; political and defence efforts against the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction; nuclear weapons issues; strategies and doctrines of NATO and Russia; peacekeeping; disarmament and arms control; search and rescue at sea; retraining of military officers; combating terrorism; defence-related scientific cooperation; defence-related environmental issues; civil emergency planning and disaster relief.

NATO and Russia have positive experience of interaction. One of the samples is the participation of the Russian navy in the Mediterranean operation of an alliance "Active Efforts". In March Russian patrol ship "Ladnyi", the second structure of the Black Sea fleet, successfully patrolled together with NATO east part of the sea region.

There is an adjust cooperation under the control over air space within the limits of joint counterterrorist actions. Experts say that today it is the most successful project of Russia and the NATO. There are also absolutely new directions of interaction in particular connected with psychological adaptation of soldiers and the officers participating in confrontations. Russia has many years of fruitful cooperation with the EU-members of NATO in the framework of the program on continental antimissile defense. However American plans on MDS deployment close to the Russian borders challenge the fruitful cooperation between NATO and Russia.\textsuperscript{60}

The Founding Act and the Permanent Joint Council which it established have registered some tactical success, but they clearly failed to prevent a serious crisis between Moscow and the Alliance over Kosovo, which reached its peak in the spring of 1999.

The Permanent Joint Council, however, was thought to be the heart of the Founding Act and more generally of the NATO-Russia relations. The sides, however, failed to agree on what the Permanent Joint Council would do and – as a result – they got a “disabled child”. The council lacked a “home” and a permanent secretariat. It was also hugely asymmetrical in operation – Russia

\textsuperscript{59} Appendix 2.

\textsuperscript{60} Gavrilov 2009.
was presented with a joint position of the NATO members, and could deal with NATO only in bloc. If the Russians made a bid, its NATO partners needed to go in retreat to discuss it and then present Russia with their joint reply. This was cumbersome, but “safe”, from the NATO point of view. The Russians, for their part, soon discovered that dealing with individual NATO member states outside the Permanent Joint Council was more effective and satisfying. The Permanent Joint Council quickly turned itself into a talking shop for rather stale dialogue. As a result, the Permanent Joint Council was becoming less, rather than more relevant over time.

The Permanent Joint Council was never created as a decision making body. As said in the Founding Act, “Provisions of this document do not provide NATO or Russia at any stage with a right of veto over the actions of the other nor do they infringe upon or restrict the rights of NATO or Russia to independent decision making and action. They cannot be used as a means to disadvantage the interests of other states”. In reality, that meant that NATO was not to be formally prevented by Russia from intervening in the Balkans. By the same token, NATO could not veto a Russian action in the Caucasus.

In conflict management, which was the subject most frequently discussed within the Council, the role of the Permanent Joint Council was relatively low-key. Cooperation in Bosnia was a result of earlier agreements; the political issues were taken up by the Contact Group, and the military cooperation was exercised on the basis of U.S.-Russian arrangements which placed the Russian brigade in the zone of the U.S. division. The Permanent Joint Council was routinely used for exchange of information and views on the developments in Bosnia. Similarly, the issue of Kosovo was being dealt with mainly by the Contact Group.

Kosovo was first discussed by the Permanent Joint Council in May 1998, but it was agreed that the conflict belonged under the OSCE authority. It was underscored at the time that Russia’s participation in the Cooperative Jaguar exercise was of high importance. In later deliberations, the role of the United Nations resolutions was stressed. As time went on, the gap between the two sides grew wider. Mutual frustration was the result. By October 1998 it became clear that the Permanent Joint Council reached an impasse on Kosovo. In December 1998 the Foreign Ministers could do nothing beyond calling for a political settlement of the Kosovo crisis. The last meeting of the Permanent Joint Council was held a week before the launching of air strikes against Yugoslavia.

The Permanent Joint Council was an ideal organ for discussing NATO-Russia bilateral programs. It reviewed work programs, Russia’s Individual Partnership Program, and Western programs of assistance in retraining retired military officers. Another genuine achievement of the Permanent Joint Council was creation of a Russia-NATO working group of experts on peacekeeping.
The main transformation in the perception of Russia by NATO occurred in 1999 during the Washington Summit, when Strategic Concept61 was adopted. The Strategic Concept marked a significant point and the latest stage in the evolution of the Alliance’s approach to security, which began at the end of the Cold War. Hitherto, NATO strategy was focused on the military elements of security. It sets out the Alliance’s essential and enduring purpose – to safeguard the freedom and liberty of its members by political and military means. It affirms the values of democracy, human rights, and the rule of law which the Allies share, and their determination not only to defend one another but to contribute to the peace and stability of the wider Euro-Atlantic area. NATO Strategy Concept also states clearly the necessity of mutual work with European security structures.

The new fundamental tasks are now listed as: “security”, “consultation”, “deterrence and defence”; and in order to preserve the security of the Euro-Atlantic area, “crisis management” and “partnership”. According to Colonel Kirkland, UK AR Chief Strategic Policy and Concepts Branch HQ NATO, “Russia is treated in the section dealing with partnership and cooperation – and not in the section concerned with risks and challenges”62.

For many members, in particular new East European recruits, there are still concerns about partnership with Moscow as well as territorial defence which have been extended by Russian military action in Georgia through air and naval deployments, and its vision of its ‘near abroad’. As underlined by Michael Codner, Director of the Military Sciences Department, Royal United Service Institute, “However a NATO strategy that refocused on Russia would be self-defeating in that it would reinforce polarity when cooperative security is more important than ever vis-à-vis nuclear arms reduction and nonproliferation, countering terrorism, coping with Iran and other common security concerns”63.

Three main developments shaped the relationship between Russia and NATO during the 1990s: Bosnia and Herzegovina (1995), NATO’s invitation to Czech Republic, Hungary and Poland to join Alliance (1997), and Kosovo crisis (1999). In Bosnia and Herzegovina’s case NATO/U.S. used the force for stabilizing the situation. Later on it led to the Dayton Peace Agreement. Peacekeeping operation was significant in this respect due to participation of Russian troops in it under NATO command. NATO's enlargement invitation to the Czech Republic, Hungary and Poland, and their accession in 1999 was barely balanced for Moscow by the creation of the Permanent Joint Council. Kosovo’s crisis culminated in NATO's 78-day air campaign against the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia. It was implemented despite Russia’s most vigor protests.

Despite these serious issues, Russia continued to participate in Stabilization Force operations in Bosnia and Herzegovina and indeed requested to join the Kosovo Force, again under

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61 The Alliance's Strategic Concept, approved by the Heads of State and Government participating in the meeting of the North Atlantic Council in Washington D.C. on 23rd and 24th April 1999.
63 Codner 2009.
NATO command. Nevertheless, by the end of President Yeltsin's time at the Kremlin, Russia-NATO relations were in a deep freeze.

At the beginning of President Vladimir Putin's first term, there were expectations for a better development of relations with Russia. Some believed that, if Russia was to accede to NATO, this would serve for getting away from past and contribute to the development of truly friendly relations. But it was not to be. Relations were restored and membership was probed anew, but again without success.

Couple of weeks after 9/11, a U.S.-led military campaign removed the most serious post-Cold War external threat to Russia's security, the Taliban regime in Afghanistan. Soon thereafter, NATO forces took on the mission of helping to stabilize Afghanistan – the Alliance's first major out-of-area military campaign. From Moscow's perspective, an alliance, which for decades had been facing the Soviet Union in Central Europe, had turned into a coalition that was helping to secure the approaches to Central Asia, Russia's most vulnerable flank.

From the analysis of foregoing period of the NATO-Russian Council, we saw variety of the very sensitive issues, but what is more important the intension for much closer cooperation between former adversaries. For NATO, new relations with Russia were to be part of its internal transformation; for Russia, relations with NATO were a logical part of the military reform effort. With the changes in the perception of Russia by NATO member states alongside took the transformation within NATO itself and its main approaches. If it used to be mainly military oriented, later on this vision was changed to the peace and stability development in Euro-Atlantic region. In such a way a new preventive approach appeared and the organization was changing together with the modification of relations between NATO and Russia.

The development of mutual work between Brussels and Moscow began right after the collapse of the Soviet Union. The first document conducted between two sides was the Founding Act that leaded to the creation of the NATO-Russia Permanent Joint Council. Initial period was mostly focused on the military elements of security and constructed forum for regular consultations on security issues of common value. There were registered some successes but was failed the prevention of the crisis over Kosovo.

The main transformation both within NATO and in the perception of Russia happened with the adoption of the Strategic Concept. It formulated the new orientation on the mutual work with European security structures and Russia is one of them. From now on Russia is dealt as a partner for cooperation. In addition this stage was of great success as it was marked by the first coalition between the USA and Russia. Joint actions in Afghanistan became the tool that showed the possibility for the fruitful cooperation between former adversaries.
2.2. NATO-RUSSIA COUNCIL: AIMS, GOALS, ACHIEVEMENTS

On May 28, 2002, meeting of the NATO member countries and the Russian Federation has "launched a new era in NATO-Russia cooperation". They signed the Rome Declaration (see Appendix 3) that has formally established the NATO-Russia Council. It was supposed to serve as the principle structure and venue for advancing the relationship between NATO and Russia. In contrast to the Permanent Joint Council which was essentially a bilateral structure, the new NATO-Russia Council meets with all member state and on an equal footing with the others.

The NATO-Russia Council was intended to become a more decisive step away from the stereotypes of the past, and toward more effective cooperation in facing the challenges of the future. Important precondition for the beginning of the new phase were the events of September 11, 2001, in NYC. Therefore it was agreed to focus on the threats of the 21st century, more independent approach to security and much deeper involvement of Russia to the activities of organization.

The general idea behind the NATO-Russia Council was to create a coordinating body where NATO member states and Russia could meet as equal partners to discuss and make decisions about topics of common interest, while also assuming the same rights and responsibilities for the implementation of NATO-Russia Council decisions. As President George W. Bush mentioned in his remarks at the ceremony inaugurating the council on May 28, 2002, the NATO-Russia Council offers “a way to strengthen our common security… [and give] the world a prospect of a more hopeful century.” Bush further described this new organization as an opportunity for NATO and Russia to take joint action in counter-terrorism and other areas, “such as missile defense and airspace control.”

NATO-Russia Council realizes its activities through the following components: executive steering committee on the “NATO-Russia Council Pilot Project on Counter narcotics training of Afghan and Central Asian Personnel”, constituent bodies, working groups, ad hoc working groups and experts under the auspices of the NATO-Russia Council. Constituent bodies are respectfully working in the field of theater missile defence, intelligence, exercise and training team on concept. Working groups are focusing on the cooperation in the fields of peacekeeping, cooperative airspace initiative, defence reform and cooperation. Ad Hoc working groups are conducting projects on proliferation issues, terrorist threats to the Euro-Atlantic Area, Theater Missile Defence, and civil emergencies. NATO-Russia Council attracts the specialists to the work at the issues of nuclear and conventional arm control (see Appendix 1).

The biggest achievements of the NATO-Russia Council are in the field of combating terrorism. In its framework the joint NATO-Russia assessments of specific terrorist threats in the Euro-Atlantic area have been developed. In addition in 2004 NATO-Russia Council adopted Action

64 Bush says NATO-Russia Council will strengthen security 2002.
65 Ibid.
Plan on Terrorism. It is specifying actions on preventing terrorism, combating terrorist activities, and managing the consequences of the terrorist attacks. Considerable progress has been achieved in the implementation of the NATO-Russia Council Pilot Project on Counter-Narcotics Training of Afghan and Central Asian personnel, which was made an on-going initiative, at the Summit in Bucharest. Another important milestone was the arrangements of the land transit through the Russian Federation for commercial transport of International Security Assistance Force cargo. Currently the NATO-Russia Council Science for Peace Committee is developing projects and prototypes with a particular focus on oil spill response and ecological terrorism, and the Council’s Ad Hoc Working Group on Civil Emergencies is considering modalities for the Rapid Deployment Capability and an Emergency Transportation Fund.

In the field of nonproliferation of the weapons of mass destruction NATO and Russia are preparing a joint assessment of global trends. This assessment comes in the wake of an NATO-Russia Council related workshop that took place at Norton Manor, United Kingdom, on 10-12 September 2004. The participants of the workshop developed recommendations on this topic. According to Russian Defense Minister Ivanov, “an even more specific area of mutual concern is Pakistan’s role in the proliferation of nuclear materials and weapons components. NATO and Russia need to work together to bring Pakistan into the fold of the nonproliferation movement”66.

NATO-Russia Council achieved results also in the sphere of arms control and confidence building measures. In the wake of the 1997 Founding Act on Mutual Relations, Cooperation, and Security, as well as the 2002 Rome Declaration (see Appendix 3), NATO and Russia have continued to work closely towards the implementation of the final act of the 1999 Conference of the States Parties to the Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe (CFE). They also continue to work towards the entry into force of the agreement of adaptation of the CFE treaty, which would permit its accession by non-CFE states. Finally, both parties have taken practical steps to further implement the NATO-Russia Nuclear Expert Consultation Work Plan, with a particular emphasis on nuclear weapons safety and security.

The cooperation in the area of theater missile defense (TMD) has included: exploring the potential interoperability of anti-missile defense systems held by Russia and NATO member states; developing a common terminology and conceptual basis for TMD deployments; agreeing in principle to reform a detailed interoperability study on the technical requirements and possibilities associated with joint, combined TMD operations; and a TMD command post exercise held in March 2004 in Colorado Springs, Colorado, where NATO and Russian staffs used a computer simulation to exercise, examine and test a jointly developed TMD concept of operations.

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The Cooperative Airspace initiative was one of the first major cooperation programs launched within the NATO-Russia Council framework. The fundamental objective of the initiative remains to foster cooperation on air-traffic management and air surveillance.

A key objective of NATO-Russia military cooperation remains improved interoperability, especially since modern militaries must be able to operate within multi-national structures. Within this context, Defense Minister Sergey Ivanov has stated that he would like to especially focus upon a renewed dialogue between NATO and Russia on the SOFA (Status of Forces Agreement). “We believe that such agreement will lend an additional impetus to further cooperation in joint training and exercises, [and] to command-staff and troop field exercise to be held at training centers located upon national territories”. Ivanov would also like to build upon what the Russians see as an extremely important document, “The Political Aspect of Basic Concept for NATO-Russia Joint Peace Support Operations,” which fixes the principles of joint peacekeeping activity on the basis of equal rights.

NATO and Russia are using their cooperative peacekeeping activities in the Balkans to conduct procedural exercise and build a generic concept for joint peacekeeping operations. As well they have focused on developing mutual understanding in logistics, primarily by sharing information on doctrine, politics, structure, and lessons learned.

Since Russia and NATO both need armed forces that are appropriately seized, trained and equipped to deal with the current threats, mutual cooperation has begun on specific aspects of defense reform, including the management of human and financial resources; macroeconomic, financial, and social issues; and force planning.

NATO and Russia are developing cooperation in the field of scientific researches. As a result more scientists from Russia have benefited from NATO science fellowship and grants than from any other partner country. This level of cooperation began with signing of a memorandum of understanding on scientific and technological cooperation in 1998. The key focus areas were terrorism, forecasting and preventing catastrophes, examining the social and psychological impact of terrorism, protecting against chemical, biological, radiological or nuclear attacks, cyber security and transport security capabilities.

NATO-Russia Council is also addressing the challenges of the modern society and environmental protection is a prominent part of it. It includes the development of joint action plan that focuses on the prevention and elimination of eco-system level pollution by oil products, the environmentally friendly reclamation of former military lands, and advanced training courses for military and civilian environmentalists on ecological protection and safety.

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All mentioned above results achieves in the framework of NATO-Russia Council has been realized along with the following activities. They will give us time and space understanding of the achieved results.

In July 2002 in Moscow was opened a joint NATO-Russia centre for helping discharged Russian military personnel return to civilian life. The centre intends to provide personnel leaving the military with information on training and employment opportunities as well as their rights and privileges.

On 23rd of July 2003 in a statement issued after the ambassadorial meeting of the NATO-Russia Council, Russia and NATO member countries have jointly called on the Bosnian authorities to take responsibility for their own affairs and, in particular, to strengthen efforts to reform the armed forces and to create an effective state-level, democratic, civilian command and control structure. In the framework of developing cooperation between NATO and Russia was discussed the topic of tackling the social costs of downsizing in the Russian military.

After the meeting of the NATO-Russia Council at the level of Foreign Ministers in Brussels on December 4, 2003, NATO Secretary General Lord Robertson said: “Once more the new spirit of NATO-Russia cooperation is crystal clear. This is one of the biggest changes NATO has brought over the past four years of my term. As I prepare myself to step down, it is one of my biggest sources of satisfaction.”

During a visit to Moscow on April 7-8, 2004, NATO Secretary General Jaap de Hoop Scheffer signed agreements establishing Russian military liaison offices at NATO’s top military headquarters. Later on this year the NATO-Russia Council met in extraordinary session to discuss the recent wave of terrorist attacks in the Russian Federation.

As the result of the meeting of the NATO-Russia Council at the level of Foreign Ministers on December 9, 2004, the NATO-Russia Council agreed on an action plan against terrorism that will guide future efforts in all aspects of this common struggle. In addition, an agreement on Russian support to NATO’s Operation Active Endeavour in the Mediterranean, aimed at helping deter, disrupt and protect against terrorism.

On the 8th of December 2006 at the meeting of the NATO-Russia Council Foreign Ministers agreed to launch a pilot project on counter-narcotics training of Afghan and Central Asian personnel. The pilot project is meant to support international efforts to promote security and stability in and around Afghanistan, and particularly those aimed at addressing the threats posed by the trafficking in narcotics, including its links to the financing of terrorism. Later that year during an informal meeting of the Council was achieved an agreement on documenting priorities for NATO-Russia cooperation, including political dialogue, the fight against terrorism and interoperability.

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68 Official NATO-Russia Council web-site. Checked on 20.06.09
On September 15, 2006, the historic event of coming together of two partners – NATO and Russia – took place. The Russian Federation Ship "Pytlivy" participates in NATO’s Operation Active Endeavour. It proved a tendency of growing ties in an operational engagement at sea countering the common threat of maritime terrorism. The same day, the first training courses for Afghan law-enforcement officers, under the NATO-Russia Council pilot project on “Counter-Narcotics Training of Afghan and Central Asian Personnel” began at training centers in Turkey (Tadoc) and Russia (Domodedovo).

So, we may notice that most of the activities realized in the framework of the NATO-Russia Council were either aimed at countering terrorism or related to it. Among such are the development of the action plan against terrorism, which includes the operation in the Mediterranean and the fight with the maritime terrorism; stability promotion in and around Afghanistan with the counter-narcotic trainings in Kabul and Central Asian countries. With this in mind further involvement of Russia in the framework of NATO-Russia Council to the War with Terrorism in Afghanistan seems pretty logical.

Igor Tarasenko in his paper made a big accent on the opportunity to strengthen cooperation within NATO-Russia Council in the field of naval cooperation. As there is a possibility that terrorist organizations might start using already available maritime sources, it could lead to the interest from both sides – Russia and NATO – to mutually work on that issue. To our mind naval cooperation increases its potential to develop at NATO-Russia Council as the world is facing bigger and bigger sea piracy phenomenon. NATO already started Counter Piracy Operation Allied Protector and NATO Shipping Centre. Dmitri Rogozin, Russian representative in NATO, already declared the possibility for Russia to cooperate with NATO on the issues of sea piracy. So far officially NATO-Russia Council is not supposed to deal with the sea piracy issues, but as Moscow claims there is the possibility for the development of the mutual work on this issue.

The idea of building common security space in Eurasia is highly supported by Tarasenko. However according to him this space will not be possible to achieve without NATO-Russia cooperation in coping with the variety of common threats and challenges. Among such threats are:

- international terrorism;
- the proliferation of the weapon of mass destruction and their delivery vehicles;
- growing demographic problems and ethnic instability;
- the illicit activities of radical religious groups and communities;
- illegal drug trafficking;
- organized crime;
- the “centrifugal disorder” associated with failed states (i.e. political oppression, economic distress, and absent institutions);

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69 Russia offers NATO to fight together against sea piracy 2008.
70 Tarasenko 2005.
- the transnational migration of thousands of violent and well-trained religious-political militants who have refused to adapt to the conditions of peaceful life.\textsuperscript{71}

As it is obvious from the activities of the NATO-Russia Council, NATO fully understands the value of the partnership with Russia that is why new type of the Council was created. Preconditions of 9/11 influenced its aim, goals ad structure. The main focus of the NATO-Russia Council became the fight against terrorism. Prominent results have been achieved in this field. In addition NATO-Russia Council showed results in nonproliferation of the weapons of mass destruction, arms control, theater missile defence, peacekeeping, military cooperation, science, challenges of modern society, etc.

Progress has already occurred in twelve working areas, but a meeting of minds needs to occur in four others if the NATO-Russia Council is to achieve a higher level of strategic cooperation. These lingering stress points cluster around the unilateral use of force, NATO activities in geographical zones which Russia considers vitally important to its national interests, an ambivalent policy on the part of some NATO states towards Russia’s fight against Chechen separatists and terrorists, and bilaterally agreed upon transit rights through Lithuania to and from Kaliningrad.

\textsuperscript{71} Tarasenko 2005.
3. CONFLICT of INTERESTS WITHIN NATO BETWEEN the USA and RUSSIA
3.1. AMERICAN MISSILE DEFENCE SYSTEM in EASTERN EUROPE

In the 2008 defense budget the Bush Administration requested about $310 million to begin design, construction, and deployment of a ground-based midcourse defense element of the Ballistic Missile Defense System in Europe\textsuperscript{72}. Successive U.S. governments have urged the creation of an anti-missile system to protect against long-range ballistic missile threats from adversary states. The Bush Administration believed that North Korea and Iran represented strategic threats. The Bush Administration’s position on this issue remained unchanged, even after the intelligence community assessed that the Iranian nuclear weapons program halted in 2003. The Bush Administration built long-range missile defense bases in Alaska and California to protect against missile threats, especially from North Korea. Additionally, the Bush Administration proposed deploying a ground-based mid-course defense element of the larger Ballistic Missile Defense System (BMDS) in Europe to defend against an Iranian missile threat. The system would include 10 interceptors in Poland, radar in the Czech Republic, and another radar deployed in a country closer to Iran, all to be completed by 2013.

The proposed American system has encountered resistance in some European countries and beyond. Critics in Poland and the Czech Republic assert that neither country faces a notable threat from Iran, but that if American ground-based mid-course defense facilities were installed, both countries might be targeted by missiles from rogue states – and possibly from Russia. The Bush Administration signed agreements with both countries permitting ground-based mid-course defense facilities to be stationed on their territory; however, the two countries’ parliaments continue to wait on ratifying the accords, in part, until after the Obama Administration clarifies its intentions on missile defense policy. NATO has deliberated long-range missile defense, and has taken actions that some interpret as an endorsement of the U.S. ground-based mid-course defense system.

The ground-based mid-course defense plan has also affected U.S.-Russia relations. Former President Putin and his successor, Vladimir Medvedev, have argued that the proposal would reignite the arms race and upset American-Russian-European security relations. U.S. officials dispute Russia’s objections, noting that the interceptors are intended to take out Iranian missiles aimed at Europe or the United States and could not possibly act as a deterrent against Russia. Some argue that Russia has been attempting to foment discord among NATO allies\textsuperscript{73}. In mid-2007, Russia offered to cooperate on missile defense, proposing the use of a Russian-leased radar in

\textsuperscript{72} Some were calling for such an effort in Europe before the Administration formally requested funding in early 2007. For instance, in October 2006, Sen. Sessions noted NATO steps in developing an Alliance-wide theater missile defense capability, and encouraged the deployment of a U.S. long-range missile defense system in Europe. See “U.S. Missile Defense Site in Europe Needed to Support Alliance Strategy,” Space News, October 9, 2006, p. 19.

Azerbaijan, but urging that U.S. facilities not be built in Eastern Europe. President Bush welcomed the idea in principle, but insisted upon the need for the European sites. Despite ongoing discussions over the issue, sharp Russian criticism of the program has continued.

In respond to American will to place its missile defense system in Europe Russia answered with its flying patrols. In August 2007, the Russian Air Force began flying long-range patrols through neutral international waters in the Atlantic Ocean. These were the first long-range Tupolev Tu-95 and Tu-160 bomber patrols since the end of the Cold War. Though taken in the international airspace, these patrols caused considerable media anxiety within NATO member states, and U.S. Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice commented the Bush administration was "unhappy" with the sorties. U.S. fighters scrambled several times to follow Russian planes coming near the U.S. territorial waters. The Russian bomber has also buzzed the U.S. Nimitz super carrier on February 11, 2008. Four F/A-18A fighter jets scrambled to follow the bomber. Overall, the U.S. NORAD crews had to scramble U.S. fighter jets 46 times in 2007.

In August 2007 President of Russia Vladimir Putin said that 15-years halt in long-range bombers’ patrols had affected Russia’s security as “other nations” had continued strategic aircraft missions. Vladimir Putin was presumably referring to the U.S. air patrols. Flights by strategic bombers were resumed by Russia, with many other close encounters and airspace disputes resulting near Alaska and Northern England.

In Washington, State Department spokesman Sean McCormack played down the significance of Russia's move, saying: “We certainly are not in the kind of posture we were with what used to be the Soviet Union”. “If Russia feels as though they want to take some of these old aircraft out of mothballs and get them flying again, that is their decision,”74 he told reporters. One of the reasons Russia halted its flights 15 years ago was that it could no longer afford the fuel.

During the 2008 presidential campaign, Senator Obama said he supported the deployment of ballistic missile defenses that were operationally effective. In January 2009 nomination hearings for Undersecretary of Defense for Policy, Michele Flournoy said the Obama Administration would review plans to deploy elements of a missile defense system in Europe75. Flournoy said the plans should be reviewed as part of the QDR (Quadrennial Defense Review) and “in the broader security context of Europe, including our relations with Russia,” noting that any final policy decision should consider it in the interest of the United States if Washington and Moscow could agree to cooperate on missile defense. Flournoy also said the final contours of any decision would require close consultations between the Administration and Congress. At his nomination hearing before the Senate Armed Services Committee for Deputy Secretary of Defense, William Lynn responded to a question suggesting he would support making the MDA’s budgetary, acquisition, testing, and policy processes more open and similar to the military services. “I think that all our military programs

74 Russia restarts Cold War patrols 2007.
75 Gray 2009.
should be managed through those regular processes,” he said, and “that would include missile defense. I would think any exceptions should be rare and fully justified.” Representative Ellen Tauscher, head of the House Armed Services Strategic Forces subcommittee, reportedly predicted such changes would be made in the new administration. On the White House website, the Obama administration says it “will support missile defense, but ensure that it is developed in a way that is pragmatic and cost-effective; and, most importantly, does not divert resources from other national security priorities until we are positive the technology will protect the American public.”

The President Obama’s Budget was released in May 2009. It includes $50.5 million for the European 3rd site. Additionally, there is about $618 million from fiscal year 2009 appropriated funds for the European 3rd site pending Polish and Czech ratification of the missile defense agreements signed in 2008. The Obama Administration is in the midst of a major BMD Review and the Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR). Hence, the Administration’s commitment to the specifics of the European 3rd site as proposed by the Bush Administration has not been made, although it has made clear there is sufficient funding available to proceed with the site should both Poland and the Czech Republic ratify the missile defense agreements.

U.S. proponents of the missile defense program note that the bases being planned would be part of a limited defensive system, not an offensive one. The missiles would not have explosive payloads, and would be launched only in the event that the United States or its friends or allies were under actual attack. Critics respond that Europe does not currently face a significant threat from Iran or its potential surrogates, but that Polish and Czech participation in the European ground-based mid-course defense element would create such a threat. If American ground-based mid-course defense facilities were installed, they argue, both countries would likely be targeted by terrorists, as well as by missiles from rogue states – and possibly from Russia – in the event of a future confrontation.

Some proponents of the proposed ground-based mid-course defense European capability system assert that cooperation would help consolidate bilateral relations with the United States. In Poland in particular there is a sense, based in part on historical experience, that the United States is the only major ally that can be relied upon. Therefore, some Poles argue, it would be beneficial to strengthen the relationship by becoming an important U.S. partner through joining the missile defense system. In addition, some Czechs and Poles believe that the missile defense sites would become a prestigious symbol of the two countries’ enhanced role in defending Europe. Some would argue that the Czechs and the Poles see this formal U.S. military presence as an ultimate security guarantee against Russia; when asked shortly before Poland’s October 21, 2007, parliamentary

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77 Ibid.
78 http://www.whitehouse.gov/agenda/defense.
elections about the missile defense issue, former Prime Minister Kaczyński singled out Russia as a threat.

Opponents, however, contend that this is not a valid reason for accepting missile defense facilities because the two countries, which joined NATO in 1999, already enjoy a security guarantee through the alliance’s mutual defense clause. Polish missile defense skeptics also maintain that their country does not need to improve its bilateral security relationship with the United States because it has already shown its loyalty through its significant contributions to the military operations in Iraq and Afghanistan and the War on Terrorism. Some Polish and Czech political leaders reason that the United States may proceed with missile defense with or without them, so they may as well be on board. However, the missile bases are unpopular among the Czech and Polish public, and any government that agreed to host such facilities might lose political support. In addition, some Czechs and Poles may be speculating whether it would be worthwhile to expend political capital on the ground-based mid-course defense bases, as the issue may become moot. One Polish observer asserted that if the project is discontinued, “Poland will become an international laughingstock.” A Czech member of parliament noted that, if the U.S. Congress determines not to fund a European arm of missile defense, “[t]he USA will thus solve the problem for us.”

NATO also has been deliberating strategic missile defenses. A feasibility study of such a program called for in the 2002 Prague Summit was completed in 2005. In the final communiqué of their 2006 Riga Summit, NATO leaders stated that the alliance study had concluded that long-range BMD is “technically feasible within the limitations and assumptions of the study,” and called for “continued work on the political and military implications of missile defence for the Alliance including an update on missile threat developments.” Supporters contend that the U.S. facilities intended for placement in Eastern Europe would be a good fit with any future NATO missile defense. However, other policymakers have recommended that the establishment of any anti-missile system in Europe should proceed solely under NATO auspices rather than on a bilateral basis with just two NATO partners. A Bush Administration official declared that “the more NATO is involved in [ground-based mid-course defense], the better.”

Some observers have suggested that the Bush Administration chose not to work primarily through NATO because consensus agreement on the system was unlikely. However, in mid-June 2007, alliance defense ministers did agree to conduct a study of a complementary “bolt-on” anti-missile capability that would protect the southeastern part of alliance territory that would not be

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82 This program should be distinguished from the theater missile defense system intended to protect deployed forces, which the alliance has already approved. See Riga Summit Declaration. NATO web page. http://www.nato.int/docu/pr/2006/p06-150e.htm Missile Defense and Europe. Foreign Press Briefing. U.S. Department of State. March 28, 2007.
covered by the planned U.S. interceptors. Bush Administration officials interpreted the move as an implied endorsement of the U.S. ground-based mid-course defense plan and an adaptation of NATO plans to fit the proposed U.S. system. In addition, NATO Secretary General Jaap de Hoop Scheffer stated “The roadmap on missile defense is now clear... It’s practical, and it’s agreed by all.”

The statements by Russian officials are evidence that deployment of the American system would damage U.S. relations with Russia. At a February 2007 security conference in Munich, former President Putin strongly criticized ground-based mid-course defense, maintaining that it would lead to “an inevitable arms race.” Russia has threatened to abrogate the 1987 Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty, which eliminated this class of U.S. and then-Soviet missiles that were stationed in Europe. Putin also announced that Russia had suspended compliance with the Conventional Forces in Europe (CFE) Treaty, and on another occasion indicated Russia might now target Poland and the Czech Republic and transfer medium-range ballistic missiles to the Russian exclave of Kaliningrad. Some U.S. officials dismissed Russia’s alleged concerns and have noted that Moscow has known of this plan for years and has even been invited to participate. Ground-based mid-course defense proponents maintain that the interceptors are intended to take out launched Iranian missiles aimed at European or American targets and could not possibly act as a deterrent against Russia, which has hundreds of missiles and thousands of warheads. The chief of the Czech general staff has noted that “by simple arithmetic, Russian generals can see that U.S. missile defenses cannot imperil Moscow’s arsenal.” Some Russians contend, however, that the modest ground-based mid-course defense facilities planned for Eastern Europe are likely just the harbinger of a more ambitious program.

Russian officials have also argued that North Korean or Iranian missiles would not likely enter European airspace, and that the real reason for ground-based mid-course defense is to replace U.S. radar in Eastern Europe to monitor Russian missile sites and naval operations. A Czech military officer dismissed the charge of electronic espionage as “absolute nonsense,” arguing that “the radar monitors the already launched missiles, and it cannot monitor what is going on the ground” – a task that is already being performed by U.S. surveillance satellites.

Some argue that Russia has other motives for raising alarms about the U.S. missile defense system: to foment discord among NATO member states, and to draw attention away from Russia’s suppression of domestic dissent, its aggressive foreign policy actions, and its nuclear technology cooperation with Iran. Observers note that Russia blustered about NATO expansion, too, and argue

that Russia’s veiled threats may actually stiffen resolve in Prague and Warsaw. Some observers note, however, that Russian acceptance of NATO expansion was conditioned on a tacit understanding that NATO or U.S. military expansion into the new member states would not occur. The European ground-based mid-course defense in this regard is seen as unacceptable to Russia.

On June 7, 2007, during the G-8 meeting in Germany, Putin offered to partner with the United States on missile defense, and suggested that a Soviet-era radar facility in Azerbaijan be used to help track and target hostile missiles that might be launched from the Middle East. President Bush responded by calling the proposal an “interesting suggestion,” and welcomed the apparent policy shift. The following day, Putin suggested that ground-based mid-course defense interceptors be “placed in the south, in U.S. NATO allies such as Turkey, or even Iraq ... [or] on sea platforms.” Military and political representatives from both countries have met to discuss the proposal, but some experts point out that Azerbaijan is technically not the ideal place to locate the radar because it would be too close to potential Iranian launch sites; they also argue that the radar is outmoded.

Putin urged the United States not to deploy elements of ground-based mid-course defense until his offer had been examined. One week later, however, U.S. Defense Secretary Robert Gates stated that even if the United States were to accept Russia’s offer to share use of the Azeri radar, that facility would be regarded as “an additional capability” to complement the proposed ground-based mid-course defense sites planned for Europe. In late July 2007, MDA Director Obering said the United States was looking at the proposal very seriously. He said the Azeri radar could be useful for early detection of missile launches, but that it does not have the tracking ability to guide an interceptor missile to a target – which the proposed Czech radar would be able to do.

At a July 1-2, 2007, meeting in Kennebunkport, ME, Putin expanded on his counterproposal by recommending that missile defense be coordinated through offices in Brussels and Moscow. He also suggested the possible use of radar in south Russia and said that cooperation could be expanded to other European countries through the use of the NATO-Russia council – eliminating, he added, the need for facilities in Poland and the Czech Republic. President Bush reportedly responded positively to Putin’s new proposal, but insisted on the need for the Eastern European sites.

Despite ongoing discussions over the issue, Russian criticism of the program has continued, edged, at times, with sarcasm. During an October 2007 visit to Moscow by Secretaries Gates and Rice, President Putin remarked “of course we can sometime in the future decide that some antimissile defense system should be established somewhere on the moon.” Putin later likened the U.S. placement of the missile defense facilities in central Europe to the 1962 Cuban missile crisis – a comparison disputed by U.S. officials. In late November 2007, Russia rejected a written U.S.

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proposal on the project, arguing that it failed to include the points Secretary Gates had discussed a month earlier, including “joint assessment of threats, ... Russian experts’ presence at missile shield’s sites, [and] readiness to keep the system non-operational if there is no actual missile threat....”89 In December, the chief of Russia’s army suggested that the launching of U.S. missile defense interceptors against Iranian missiles might inadvertently provoke a counter launch of Russian ICBMs aimed at the United States. However, critics assert that a Russian counter strike could not be prompted so easily and mistakenly. In February 2008, Putin reiterated earlier warnings that, if construction commenced on the missile defense facilities, Russia would re-target ICBMs toward the missile sites90.

The day after the U.S. elections, in his State of the Federation speech, President Medvedev said that Russia would deploy short-range Iskander missiles to the Russian exclave of Kaliningrad, which borders Poland and Lithuania, if the U.S. ground-based mid-course defense system is built. However, Medvedev later told a French newspaper that if the United States does not deploy the system, Russia would not transfer its missiles to Kaliningrad. Prime Minister Putin later reiterated that Russia would scrap its plans for the Iskanders if the United States cancelled its European ground-based mid-course defense project91. Some observers believe that the announcement created more concern in central than in Western Europe. Shortly thereafter, however, European Commission President Jose Manuel Barroso stated that “Cold War rhetoric” was “stupid,” and U.S. Defense Secretary Gates states that “such provocative remarks are unnecessary and misguided.”92

American missile defence system caused criticism in Europe and especially had negative impact on American-Russian relations. Moscow considers deployment of American missile system close to its borders as a threat to its security and national interests. It was stated in numerous official documents of Russian Federation. Nevertheless Bush administration did not perceive it as a big problem. Taking into account that Russian side offered changes to American plan, that were later on rejected, the situation was getting to the critical point. Area around Russia’s territory is a zone of Russian vital interest and we do not believe that any negotiations on this topic were possible from the Russian side. This topic could have been a core problem in further American-Russian relations. Luckily new American President changed his opinion on the missile defence system in Europe and reviewed the initial plan.

3.2. NATO ENLARGEMENT (UKRAINE and GEORGIA)

After U.S. ground-based mid-course defense in Europe, NATO enlargement another sensitive question in American-NATO-Russian relations. NATO’s “open door policy” is based on Article 10 of its founding treaty. Any decision to invite a country to join the Alliance is taken by the North Atlantic Council on the basis of consensus among all Allies.

NATO had several waves of enlargement after the collapse of the Soviet Union. The biggest on that occurred in 2004 added the biggest number of the new member-states never experienced before. NATO enlargement policy is realized through admission of the countries of the former Soviet bloc or Balkan states. NATO enlargement became problematic issue for U.S.-NATO-Russia relations after Ukraine and Georgia appeared on agenda of possible membership. Here one should mention that NATO already included former Soviet states, such as Lithuania, Latvia, and Estonia. There was no big opposition towards their membership in NATO as they declared NATO membership policy right after their independence. Russian Federation was suffering from economic ad internal destabilization and was not as influential as it is now. That is why these two countries, former Soviet republics, managed to get NATO membership. Concerning Georgia and Ukraine the understanding of the necessity of NATO membership was developed later and happened in the time of Russia’s raising and Putin’s imperialistic policy. Former President Yeltsin either to his poor situation with health or his political ideas did not keep strong control over former Soviet republics. The other case was his successor Putin.

Georgia and Ukraine due to their geographic situation (close to Russian border) and mutual with Moscow history, are perceived as the zones of Russian influence. In Chapter I we showed that Russian military and security documents declare countries of the former Soviet Union to be its zone of the particular interest. NATO membership is directly threatening Russian influence in these countries and according to Moscow’s point of view supports American impact on the internal and foreign policy in the region. Washington on the other hand declared its support of independence of the CIS countries. It implemented the policy in the region in promotion of reduction Russia’s role and power in the foreign and internal policy of the countries. But we should stress out that this vector of American policy is not among the most vital and important. It is seen more as supplementary.

Russian Foreign Minister mention that when the Soviet Union was leaving Easter Europe it was promised that there won’t be any NATO enlargement through the Soviet states. Nevertheless it was not realized and after this event appeared the idea of establishing American bases on the Black Sea in Romania and Bulgaria, what was also promised never to happen. In the scope of this comment we could see the vision of the inherited rights from the Soviet Union highly concerned in Moscow. One should just remember that the promises given to the leaders of the Soviet Union,
when they were deploying the military and political influence from East European countries were caused by that time situation. Currently the countries mentioned by Sergei Lavrov are sovereign and they have their own right to agree or disagree with the deployment of military troops or bases on their territory. If the countries of the post-Socialist bloc could still expect to have some freedom in their foreign policy, the countries that were part of the Soviet Union don’t have such opportunity. After latest successful economic development of Russia one could observe realization of their strategy on the returning the control over ex-Soviet states.

Russia’s fundamental objection to NATO’s enlargement is:

“...Our European neighbors will be increasingly dependent, both politically and militarily, on NATO’s decision-making mechanism. In practice, the dependence will be in force on a much broader range of issues then defense against outside aggression, as recorded in the 1949 Washington Treaty.”

In other words, NATO expansion really does not threaten invasion but rather the further enlargement of the sphere of Eurasian democracy which Russian leaders regard as an intrinsic threat to their security, stability, sovereignty, and status. This confirms the observations of many Western scholars that what is at stake in NATO enlargement is not a military or political threat to Russian security. Instead, “the fundamental issues involve status and perception, rather than structure and power.”

Zbignev Brzezinski suggested one of the solutions in dealing with Russia to create the zone of Russian isolation in the region surrounding it. But we support the idea that this strategic policy of isolating Russia by expanding NATO to former Warsaw Pact nations is not in the best interest of the United States. Such a policy is potentially dangerous for Washington because an expanded NATO could cause Russia to contemplate or form a military alliance with China for self-defense or to carry out a strategic nuclear first strike against the United States. The way to deal with Russia is to engage it economically, culturally and geopolitically in an effort to attain mutually acceptable goals, just as we have engaged China so that the Chinese understand that they have more to lose by not working with the U.S. Isolating and threatening Russia with an expanded NATO and with missile bases on Russia's border will only push that country dangerously into a corner.

In addition to discussing position of the U.S. and Russia on NATO enlargement, we should mention as well the vision of this policy in both Ukraine and Georgia. Both countries decided to become democratic states and this will was expressed by the majority of the population in the Rose Revolution (Georgia) and Orange Revolution (Ukraine). By this they declared their will to become more independent from Moscow.

Georgia has moved quickly following the Rose Revolution in 2003 to seek closer ties and eventual membership with NATO. Russia has been opposing closer ties, including those expressed

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93 Kelin 2004, 17.
94 Driscoll and MacFarlane 2003, 253.
95 Traynham 2009.
the Bucharest Summit of 2008 when NATO members promised that Georgia will eventually join organization. Complications in the relationship between NATO and Georgia includes presence of Russian forces in Georgian territory as a result of multiple recent conflicts, like the 2008 South Ossetia war, over the territories of Abkhazia and South Ossetia, both of which are home to a large number of citizens of the Russian Federation. A nonbinding referendum in 2008 resulted in 77 per cent of voters supporting NATO accession. Ukraine is facing other from Georgia difficulties in the membership to NATO. At the beginning of 2008, the Ukrainian President, Prime Minister and head of the Parliament sent an official letter to apply for the Membership Action Plan. The idea of Ukrainian membership in NATO has gained support from a number of NATO leaders. The biggest supporters of Ukraine’s membership were the U.S. and Poland. The latest highly supported Ukraine in the Orange Revolution and perceived Russian threat to its independence in case if Ukraine is under Russia’s control. At the 2008 Bucharest Summit, NATO Secretary General Jaap de Hoop Scheffer declared in a press conference that Georgia and Ukraine will join NATO. Within the NATO-Ukraine working commission, NATO officials reassured Ukrainian officials that they are willing to invite their country to join the Alliance. The Deputy Foreign Minister of Russia, Alexander Grushko, announced however that NATO membership for Ukraine was not in Russia's best interests and wouldn't help the relations of the two countries.

According to numerous independent polls conducted since 2002, Ukrainian public opinion on NATO membership is split, with the majority of those polled against joining the military alliance and many identifying it as a threat. According to the FOM-Ukraine pollster, as of April 2009, 57% of Ukrainians polled were against joining the alliance, while 21% were in favor. A Gallup poll conducted in October 2008 showed that 45% associated NATO as a threat to their country, while only 15% associated it with protection.

Protests, such as the Crimean anti-NATO protests of 2006, have taken place by opposition blocs against the idea, and petitions signed urging the end of relations with NATO. Influential Ukrainian politician like Yulia Tymoshenko, who is currently Prime Minister of Ukraine and one of the most possible future Presidents, have stated Ukraine will not join NATO as long as the public continues opposing the move. This was also confirmed by a March 6, 2008 agreement between the parliamentary coalition and opposition parties which says that any international agreements regarding Ukraine’s entry to NATO must be decided by referendum. Recently the Ukrainian

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96 Some 77% Georgians vote to join NATO // People's Daily Online. 19.01.2008.
97 Ąuriánová 2006.
98 News of Ukraine / Interfax.
99 Khrestin 2008; Razumkov Centre poll retrieved on August 26, 2009.
101 Ukrainians May Oppose President’s Pro-Western Goals 2009.
102 Ukraine will not join NATO without referendum // Global Security. 20.09.2008.
Government started an information campaign, aimed at informing the Ukrainian people about the consequences of membership\textsuperscript{103}.

If the question of NATO enlargement over Ukraine will start to be discussed more actively it can divide the country itself and in addition cause additional problems with Russia. Due to its geographical position, enlargement policy will question the stability in the region and the necessity of Russian intervention. \textsuperscript{104}

Georgian and Ukrainian membership in NATO is possible only in the agreement with Russia. So far Moscow would not agree with Ukraine’s membership. Georgia’s membership is under big question after military campaign over Abkhazia and South Ossetia in August 2008. NATO as an organization is different from the one it used to either during the Cold War or after it. It perceives different goals and uses new means of security. We consider that the change for better between Russia and NATO is possible to occur in the future, but it will definitely take some time. Regarding the sensitive issues of Ukraine’s and Georgia’s membership in the North Atlantic Alliance, it is still very problematic one for U.S.-Russia relations. Nowadays Moscow will not give up its restrictions on Ukraine’s and Georgia’s membership. If NATO and the U.S. would like to cooperate more fruitfully with Russia, they would have to change the priorities and put on the first place cooperation with Russia and on the second Ukraine’s and Georgia’s membership.

\textsuperscript{103} Khrestin 2008.
\textsuperscript{104} Kremenyuk 2009.
3.3. ABKHAZIA and SOUTH OSSETIA

The North Atlantic Council met in special Ministerial session on 19 August 2008\textsuperscript{105}, expressed its grave concern over the situation in Georgia and discussed its wider implications for Euro-Atlantic stability and security. A peaceful and lasting solution to the conflict in Georgia must be based on full respect for the principles of Georgia’s independence, sovereignty and territorial integrity recognized by international law and UN Security Council resolutions.

Military action must cease definitively and military forces must return to their positions held prior to the outbreak of hostilities. Fully international discussions must begin on the modalities for security and stability in Abkhazia and South Ossetia. Economic activity in Georgia, including international aviation and shipping, must not be hindered. This position is fully reflecting American perspective at the Georgian conflict.

NATO has also agreed today to support Georgia, upon its request, in a number of areas. In addition, we have agreed to task the North Atlantic Council in Permanent Session to develop with Georgia rapidly the modalities for a NATO-Georgia Commission.

In official statement NATO expressed concerns by Russia’s actions during this crisis and reminded Russia of its responsibility for maintaining security and order in the areas where it exercises control, especially in light of continuing reports of Russia’s deliberate destruction of civilian infrastructure. Russian military action has been disproportionate and inconsistent with its peacekeeping role, as well as incompatible with the principles of peaceful conflict resolution set out in the Helsinki Final Act, the NATO-Russia Founding Act (see Appendix 2) and the Rome Declaration (see Appendix 3). We call on Russia to take immediate action to withdraw its troops from the areas it is supposed to leave under the six-principle agreement signed by President Saakashvili and President Medvedev\textsuperscript{106}. The Alliance is considering seriously the implications of Russia’s actions for the NATO-Russia relationship.

In the conflict over South Ossetia and Abkhazia both Russia and Georgia acted insufficiently. Georgia started military actions against its population. Russia intervened, stating the protection of Russian citizens that populate struggling territory of Georgia and afterwards supported independence of Abkhazia and South Ossetia. Nowadays Russia is the only state that recognized the formation of the two independent states on the territory of Georgia. Uruguay was the other country that recognized their independence, but it withdrew its recognition after couple of months. In May 2009 Russian Federation announced that due to the incapability of the new independent states, the new government empowered Russia to provide its security and allowed presence of the Russian military troops on the territory of Abkhazia and South Ossetia. Some of the analysis saw the mutual

\textsuperscript{105} http://www.nato.int/docu/pr/2008/p08–104e.html
\textsuperscript{106} As complemented by President Sarkozy’s letter dated 16 August 2008 and subsequent correspondence on this issue.
features between American recognition of Kosovo’s independence and Russian recognition of Abkhazia and South Ossetia’s independence.

Russia-Georgia War over Abkhazia and South Ossetia was blamed by the international community. Russia is treated as aggressor. Similar attitude was expressed by the majority of the Western media. Later on some of the BBC journalists agreed that there was an act of aggression from both sides. Nevertheless unilateral proclamation of the independence of Abkhazia and South Ossetia by Moscow leaded to the freeze of relations between NATO and Russia. Russia ended up in the situation of being the only state that recognized independence of two new states and we do not see the possibility of Moscow to give it up. That was more of a disable act – trying to prove its role and influence Russia overestimated its possibilities and role. This situation proves once again that Russia considers post-Soviet countries the zone of its primary interest and it would be difficult to negotiate on these issues with Moscow.
4. “RESET” of the U.S.-RUSSIA RELATIONS in the FRAMEWORK of NATO SUMMIT 2009
4.1. RESULTS of NATO SUMMIT in BUCHAREST in 2008

In order to meet the challenges of the XXI century it was requested for the Council in Permanent Session to prepare a Declaration on Alliance Security\(^{107}\) for adoption at the Summit in 2009. Through a broader partnership with the international community such as United Nations, EU and other international organization NATO realizes a comprehensive approach of solving current challenges. For the first time another international organizations were participating in the Summit. NATO developed operational cooperation in peacekeeping through the UN-mandated NATO-led operations in the Balkans and Afghanistan.

During Bucharest Summit in 2008 the NATO members agreed on invitation of Albania and Croatia to begin accession talks to join the Alliance. The Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia was mentioned as a possible member of the Alliance. Nevertheless the polemic around the name of the country was specified.

Under review were kept the relations with Serbia, Bosnia and Herzegovina, and Montenegro. Both Montenegro together with Bosnia and Herzegovina were welcomed to develop an Individual Partnership Action Plan with NATO. They were invited to begin an Intensified Dialogue on the full range of political, military, financial, and security issues relating to their aspirations to membership, without prejudice to any eventual Alliance decision.

NATO welcomed officially Ukraine’s and Georgia’s Euro-Atlantic aspirations for membership in Alliance. Membership Action Plan was stated as the next step for both countries. It was made clear that Alliance supports Ukraine’s and Georgia’s application for Membership Action Plan and was underlined the will to begin the period of intensive engagement with both at a high political level to address the questions still outstanding pertaining to their membership applications.

Euro-Atlantic and wider international security is closely tied to Afghanistan’s future as a peaceful, democratic state, respectful of human rights and free from the threat of terrorism. With the UN-mandated International Security Assistance Force partners, and with the engagement of President Karzai, NATO stated the tension to issue a statement on Afghanistan. This statement sets out a clear vision guided by four principles: a firm and shared long-term commitment; support for enhanced Afghan leadership and responsibility; a comprehensive approach by the international community, bringing together civilian and military efforts; and increased cooperation and engagement with Afghanistan’s neighbors, especially Pakistan. Alliance welcomed the significant contribution by Australia, Japan, New Zealand, Republic of Korea and Singapore to NATO-led efforts in Afghanistan.

\(^{107}\) http://www.nato.int/docu/pr/2008/p08–049e.html
Regional security and stability throughout Balkans was pointed out as another important issue. It was agreed that KFOR will remain in Kosovo on the basis of United Nations Security Council Resolution 1244 to ensure a safe and secure environment, including freedom of movement, for all people in Kosovo unless the Security Council decides otherwise.

NATO stated readiness to support their peacekeeping efforts in African region. At the request of the African Union, NATO has agreed to provide support to the AU Mission in Somalia and expressed desire to consider further requests for support to this mission. Summit also brought attention to the problem of Darfur, support to the AU Mission in Sudan and ongoing support to the African Standby Force. NATO welcomed the European Union’s EUFOR Chad / Central African Republic operation and the EU’s contribution to stability and security in the region.

The Alliance committed to support the Government of Iraq and to assist with the development of Iraqi Security Forces. NATO has also approved proposals for a structured cooperation framework to develop NATO’s long-term relationship with Iraq.

While NATO was concerned by Russian statements and actions on key security issues of mutual concern, such as the Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe, NATO stood ready to continue working with Russia as equal partners in areas of common concern, as envisaged by the Rome Declaration and the Founding Act. Russia was addressed to continue its common efforts with NATO in the fight against terrorism and in the area of non-proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and their means of delivery. It was reaffirmed to Russia that NATO’s Open Door policy and NATO Missile Defence efforts are intended to better address the security challenges they both face, and reiterate that, far from posing a threat to their relationship, but to offer opportunities to deepen levels of cooperation and stability. NATO Summit Declaration (2008) also commended the work to strengthen NATO-Russia missile defence cooperation and encouraged the Russian Federation to take advantage of United States missile defence cooperation proposals and mentioned readiness to explore the potential for linking United States, NATO and Russian missile defence systems at an appropriate time.

Reduction and concerns regarding nuclear weapon were among the next goals of NATO Summit in Bucharest 2008. Alliance remained deeply concerned about the proliferation risks of the Iranian nuclear and ballistic missile programs as well as by the proliferation of activities of the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea.

Among further threats Declaration mentioned strengthening key Alliance information systems against cyber attacks, NATO’s Role in Energy Security, reform of NATO Headquarters’ structures, support the territorial integrity, independence and sovereignty of Armenia, Azerbaijan, Georgia and the Republic of Moldova.

In general Bucharest Summit (2008) brought up the following issues: broader partnership with international community; membership of Albania, Croatia, and Macedonia; development of
 Individual Partnership Action Plan for Serbia, Bosnia and Herzegovina, and Montenegro; supported Membership Action Plan for Ukraine and Georgia; peacekeeping efforts in African region; discussed the threat of nuclear weapon use; paid attention to the issues of Iraq, Kosovo, Afghanistan, and lack of structural integrity of Armenia, Azerbaijan, Georgia and Moldova.

On the meeting of the NATO-Russia Council at the level of Heads of State and Government held in Bucharest such topics were brought up: NATO's transformation including enlargement; missile defence; the Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe (CFE) and Kosovo 108.

Joint action against terrorism has been identified as a priority at the NATO-Russia Council Summit in Bucharest in 2008. Although NATO’s new strategic concept referred to terrorism as one of the new challenges facing the Alliance, the events of September 2001 changed terrorism from what was essentially a domestic into an international security problem that requires a broad spectrum of political, economic, and law-enforcement measures, as well as military engagement. NATO's new military concept for defense against terrorism sets out four categories of possible military activity by NATO. These are anti-terrorism; consequence management; counterterrorism; and military cooperation 109.

NATO-Russia Council Summit in Bucharest achieved the most productive results in the field of the fight against terrorism. It was agreed to continue its work in implementing Action Plan on Terrorism, in particular efforts to deny terrorists access to weapons of mass destruction. The new task was formulated for NATO-Russia Council members – to expedite work on the joint projects to counter terrorism threats to civil aviation, the Cooperative Airspace Initiative.

In the framework of war against terrorism Afghanistan was highly discussed. The NATO-Russia Council agreed that the success of international efforts in support of the Afghan Government in promoting peace and stability in and around Afghanistan is of utmost importance. Towards that end, a mechanism has been defined to facilitate land transit through Russian territory of goods to International Security Assistance Force in accordance with UNSCR 1386. Recognizing the threat of narcotics trafficking in the region, the NATO-Russia Council also decided to make the Pilot Project for Counter-Narcotics Training of Afghan and Central Asian Personnel an ongoing initiative.

Fewer results have been achieved on the issues of CFE Treaty, Kosovo, proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and means of its delivery, and missile defence system. Bucharest Summit became the starting point of fruitful cooperation over the issues of terrorism and Afghanistan as inside NATO and in the framework of NATO-Russia Council.

108 Official NATO-Russia Council web-site (20.06.09).
109 Bennett 2003.
4.2. RESULTS and ACHIEVEMENTS of NATO SUMMIT 2009

Vice President Biden announced Washington’s intention to “reset” relations with Russia during his Munich speech in February 2009. Underlying the Obama administration’s policy toward Russia is recognition that, by the end of 2008, U.S.-Russian relations had fallen to their lowest point since 1991. The administration believes a more positive relationship is in the U.S. interest, including by creating the possibility to secure Russia’s help on key international challenges.

Biden ticked off a list of security headaches that the Kremlin has the potential to help or hinder, including the faltering war in Afghanistan and fruitless efforts to persuade North Korea and Iran to forsake nuclear weapons. But Biden also served notice that the Obama Administration would take a harder line on other issues with Russia. The United States, he said, would not tolerate Russian attempts to impose a "sphere of influence" over its neighbors. Nor would it recognize Abkhazia and South Ossetia, two breakaway territories in Georgia where Russia has stationed military forces.

“This is an important move forward, because Mr. Biden was here, speaking about the need to listen to partners,” said Konstantin Kosachev, head of the Foreign Relations Committee in the Russian Parliament. “This is the major difference between Mr. Obama and Mr. Bush, because Mr. Bush was absolutely sure there was no need of listening to anybody.” The will to listen to Russia’s position was also expressed by President Obama in the preparation to his visit to Moscow in July, 2009.

The NATO Summit 2009 concentrated on a restricted number of issues, which are supposed to have a profound and durable impact on NATO: the progress of NATO’s strategy for Afghanistan and the results of the strategy review undertaken by the new U.S. Administration, relations with Russia, France’s closer involvement in the Alliance and its impact on NATO-EU relations, and finally initiating work on a new strategic concept for the Alliance.

Allies endorsed President Obama’s strategy for Afghanistan, reaffirming and building on the strategic consensus achieved at the March 31 International Conference on Afghanistan in The Netherlands. NATO announced that it will:

- establish a NATO Training Mission-Afghanistan, drawing on NATO’s successful experience training in Iraq, to oversee higher level training for the Afghan National Army while training and mentoring the Afghan National Police;
- support this Afghan National Police training, including through the contributions of several allies who have committed over 300 new para-military trainers and mentors;

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110 Whitlock, Craig. 'Reset' sought on relations with Russia, Biden says // Washington Post. Posted on 8.02.09.
fully resource the remaining requirements identified for the Election Support Force by deploying additional forces to assist the Afghan authorities in safeguarding the upcoming elections, which involves the deployment of over 3,000 new manoeuvre forces and required equipment from both allied and partner nations;
provide over 70 NATO embedded training teams required for 2009 to support the progressive enlargement of the Afghan National Army to a size of 134,000;
expand the NATO Afghan National Army Trust Fund to include sustainment costs for an expanded Afghan National Army;
build a broader political and practical relationship with Pakistan;
increase ongoing civilian reconstruction commitments through substantially enhanced support for civilian efforts and reconstruction.  

The summit showcased a renewed U.S. commitment to Europe and to restoring a sense of cohesion, community, and shared purpose in transatlantic relations. As a result NATO Summit 2009 brought up the questions of new threats such as terrorism, proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, cyber-attacks, environmental degradation and energy disruption, fallout from failed states and economic crisis. Summit of 2009 continued the topic of terrorism as the core one, but at the same time put it on a much serious level. It proved that the new American Administration is more willing to fight terrorism with the international community rather than on its own. Absolutely new form of threats were mentioned for the first time on the sessions of NATO, among such are environmental degradation, energy disruption, economic crisis, fallout from failed states. These issues became the new topics of Obama Administration.

Last Summit draw attention by accepting new member states Albania and Croatia; selecting new Secretary General (Prime Minister Anders Fogh Rasmussen); and by issuing a “Declaration of Alliance Security” in order to address new threats through the subsequent preparation of a new “Strategic Concept”.

New members – Albania and Croatia – joined NATO during 60-anniversary Summit in April 2009. If for Albania, the post-communist country, this event was perceived as a big achievement. Croatia took it for granted and considered the fact of joining EU of much bigger value. Since Albania applied to join NATO in 1992, support for membership has steadily risen to 96 per cent after NATO's U.S.-led campaign halted the Serbian police and army offensive against ethnic Albanians in Kosovo in 1999. Half a million Kosovo Albanians who fled to Albania were able to return home under NATO's protection and NATO troops remained in Kosovo for years to maintain security and the province's U.N. administration. By contrast, NATO stayed on the

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sidelines during fighting between Croatia and Serbia in the 1990s as Yugoslavia collapsed. Both countries already have troops on NATO-led missions abroad, including Afghanistan and Iraq.

The main motivation for Albania to join NATO is seen by many experts as the step forward to the EU membership, what is of the first priority. Actually NATO membership had little effect on the process of being accepted to EU, but it is perceived as a guarantee in the Balkan region from the future conflicts. Neither Croatia nor Albania is of geopolitical importance for NATO. They are also not in the Russian zone of influence, what played a positive role in their membership. Though both new NATO members are working closely with the U.S. on many issues, they are not perceived by Washington as geopolitical partners.

NATO Summit 2009 marked new approach to cooperation with Russia. Moscow and war on terrorism are perceived as inseparable aspects. Due to the switch of focus from Iraq to Afghanistan by U.S. Administration, the inclusion of Russia became extremely necessary. New cooperation is supposed to be implemented in the areas of the common interest, such as Afghanistan, counter piracy, arms control and counterterrorism. The most important is that NATO Summit 2009 symbolized the ‘reset’ of relations with Russian Federation.

Prior to NATO Summit 2009 Presidents of the USA and Russian Federations made a joint statement\(^{114}\). Both presidents recognized many common interests and established agenda for Moscow and Washington to be developed over the year. Among discussed issues were following: global economic crisis, nuclear arms control and reduction, mutual international cooperation in the field of missile defence, non-proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and means of their delivery, approaches to resolving regional conflicts, Afghanistan and Pakistan as a common threat, denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula, started dialogue on security and stability in Europe, Iranian nuclear program, and strengthening Euro-Atlantic and European security. The last one implemented proposal by President Medvedev on making OSCE as one of the key multilateral venues for this dialogue, as is the NATO-Russia Council. Two sides also agreed on the future meetings include discussion of transnational threats such as terrorism, organized crime, narcotics and corruption.

On the NATO Summit that took place on 3-4 April in Strasbourg, Kehl, and Baden-Baden the main topics were the development of the mutual strategy towards Afghanistan and widening of NATO-Russian cooperation through NATO-Russian Council. Charles A. Kupchan, Senior Fellow for Europe Studies at Council on Foreign Relations, and Jeffrey Mankoff, Adjunct Fellow for Russia Studies at CFR, stress that for the first time after latest developments in NATO, it enlargement through Ukraine and Georgia will not be discussed.\(^{115}\) These are the issues of the biggest disagreement between NATO and Russia.

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\(^{115}\) Personal conversation.
Charles Kupchan also underlines that the threat coming from Afghanistan is not so urgent from European perspective. As well the latest NATO policy towards Russia can only worsen European security. Obama administration in comparison with its predecessors is much more cautious concerning acceptance of Ukraine and Georgia into NATO. This is probably aimed at diffusion of tensions in the relations with Russia. Although the perception of the NATO enlargement seems to change, but the doors for Ukraine and Georgia still remain open.¹¹⁶

One of the questions discussed at the summit was the role of Russia in the international efforts on stabilization of the situation in Afghanistan. Jeffery Mankoff considers that Moscow pursues two mutually exclusive aims. On one hand Moscow is concerned about the distribution of Islamic fundamentalism at its southern boundaries and on the other hand it is interested in the preservation of its influence in Central Asia. “It seems quite obvious that Russia has played an important role in the decision of Kyrgyzstan on the rent termination of the air base “Manas” for Americans,” according to the expert. After that however Moscow declared permission for the USA and NATO to use its air space for delivery to Afghanistan non-military cargoes. These steps specify the desire of Moscow to make Russia irreplaceable partner of the NATO in Afghanistan. There is still no single opinion in the North Atlantic Alliance how to react to such type of actions. The United States and its allies are interested in cooperation with Russia in Afghanistan as their mutual aim is to win the fight with Taliban. The problem here is that Russia pursues its additional own interests in the region.

The war in Afghanistan should not be seen as the war of the West. That is why the support of Russia, China, Pakistan and Iran is highly needed here. There are different motivations and opinion among NATO member-states on the war in Afghanistan. But there are points on which all the sides agree. Firstly, there is no military solution to the situation in Afghanistan. Secondly, more troops are needed for stabilization of the situation in the region.

Mankoff specifies that a long-term goal of Russia is to lower NATO’s influence in Europe and outside of it. The invitation of America delegation to the meeting of the Shanghai Organization of Cooperation in Moscow testified the desire of Russian management to create if not alternative than parallel structure for struggle against Talibs in Afghanistan. Russia as well is one of the initiators of the revision of the European security architecture. While France and Germany are ready for such discussion, many East European NATO-members are negative about it. So far those countries consider only the USA to be able to guarantee their security. Charles Kupchan paid attention that Obama administration has suspended the steps on the deployment of MDS in Eastern Europe.

Unexpected way out from the dilemma with Russia in NATO was offered by the chairman of the Left Party Oscar Fontaine. He advised to invite Russia to join the North Atlantic Alliance. At

¹¹⁶ Personal conversation.
the same time he does not believe himself in the future of NATO. According to him: “NATO is not a defensive alliance, but rather offensive. It is involved into wars, violating norm of international law. It is more and more become involved in the war for oil and gas deposits in the Middle East.”

“The most important is for the relations between Russia and NATO to get back to its fruitful development. They were spoiled at the time of the Georgian attack on South Ossetia. These relations need to be repaired and we are ready for this,” said Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov.

At the same time American mass-media attentively followed the discussion of the statement made by President Dmitri Medvedev and Minister of Defense Anatoly Serdyukov. They announced that NATO is approaching towards Russian border and the necessity to improve Russian military capability. Within Russian border since 2011 will begin the scale re-equipment of army and fleet. The press has regarded these worlds as the demand for the rigid conclusions for the first meeting with U.S. President Barack Obama. It was also aimed to send Obama a message that Russia is not going to be an easy partner. Medvedev’s statement shows that the Kremlin does not want to rung negotiations with the U.S. being in the position of the weak, according to the New York Times. Forbes has written that from political point of view that military ambitions of Russia and the statement of the Kremlin should be considered as “trump” in the forthcoming negotiations between presidents of the USA and Russia. At the same time statement of American officials prove that no one sees a threat in the Russian statements and plans. “For a long time we conduct fruitful dialogue and it’s good that both parties to develop military potential,” declared the Press Secretary of the Pentagon, Jeff Morell.

Tarak Barkawi, of Cambridge University's Center of International Studies, called NATO's Afghan mission “a mess”. “Things don't portend well for the future at all. People are under the illusion that somehow Afghanistan is a less difficult country to fight in than Iraq and that's simply not the case.”

U.S.-Russia relations are becoming more pragmatic and business-like, reflecting the personalities of Presidents Obama and Medvedev. Missile defense in Europe, rapid NATO expansion, and the previous administration’s vocal disagreements with Russia over the August 2008 Georgia war, challenged Russia’s security and must be addressed as the relationship moves forward.

Victor Kremenyuk, the deputy of the Institute of the USA and Canada (Russia), expressed his opinion on the construction of the new U.S.-Russia relations in the following:

“In order to improve the cooperation between Russia and the U.S., first of all should be changed the vector of these relations and their tone, meaning many questions on which Russia does not have consensus with Washington

118 Lavrov, Sergei. NATO is back to the Cold War // Versii. Posted on 22.04.09.
120 Brunstrom, David. 60 years on, NATO in crisis over Afghan war // Washington Post. Posted on 1.04.09.
should be at least taken into consideration. Among those issues are: the NATO enlargement, deployment of a missile defense system in Europe, Kosovo, etc. Friendly relations are possible only if mentioned above issues would be considered by American side. Among the mutually urgent questions for both Russia and the U.S. are following: proliferation of the weapons of mass destruction and its means, Iran. The will to reset the relations with Russia was expressed by Obama administration before the Summit. Henry Kissinger and James Baker, two former U.S. secretaries of state, went to Moscow in March for talks with Russian officials after President Barack Obama pledged to ‘reset’ relations with Russia. “These guys are building the bridge from the real diplomacy of the Bush Sr. administration to Obama,” said Nina Khrushcheva, an international affairs professor at the New School in New York. “Diplomatically inclined Republicans can make a better opening line because they come from successful relations in the past.”

Obama is seeking strengthening of ties with Russia and win the support for his policies on Afghanistan, Iran and nuclear arms reduction. Vice President Joe Biden said in February it was time to ‘reset’ relations after they reached a post-Cold War low under former President George W. Bush. Priority spheres for new U.S.-Russia cooperation (Obama-Medvedev):

- disarmament;
- collective solutions to the problems facing Afghanistan, with the involvement of all influential players;
- the sustainability of the global financial system only by making its architecture mutually complementary and reliant on a diversified system of regional reserve currencies and financial centers…introduction of a world supranational reserve currency, potentially under the aegis of the International Monetary Fund;
- more successful investment projects, joint research and development by companies, and increased trade in high-tech products.

Former senators Gary Hart and Chuck Hagel led in March 2009 a bipartisan commission to Moscow meeting with Medvedev and Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov. In a report published afterwards, the commission recommended the U.S. “significantly improve our understanding of Russian interests as Russians themselves define them.”

Russian expert Victor Kremenyuk explained the visits of such a big amount of American experts to Russia as a sigh that Washington is highly interested in the transformation of the relationship with Russia. At the same time according to him, it should not mean that Russians will forget about their priorities and would give up some of its interests. Washington realized the limits of its power and is searching for the new allies outside of NATO and Russia is on the top of the list here.

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122 Kremenyuk 2009.
123 Kim, Lucian. Kissinger, Baker Visit Moscow as Obama Resets Ties // Bloomberg. Published on 18.03.09.
125 Kim, Lucian. Kissinger, Baker Visit Moscow as Obama Resets Ties // Bloomberg. Published on 18.03.09.
126 Kremenyuk 2009.
Anatoliy Serdyukov, Russian Minister of Defense, announced after NATO Summit (April 2009) that there are still disagreements between Russia and NATO. The most problematic questions remain disagreement on Treaty on Conventional Forces in Europe, NATO enlargement, development of the military infrastructure on the territory of the new NATO-members, as well as the plans to deploy MDS in Europe. During NATO-Russia Council Anatoliy Serdyukov brought up the questions of war against international terrorism, spoke about the destiny of the Agreement on usual armed forces in Europe, and expansion of the American MDS at Russian borders.127

Anne Applebaum128 expressed doubts regarding success of the “reset” of relations with Russia. She stresses the remarks Russian Minister of Foreign Affairs Lavrov himself made next weekend after the first meeting of Obama and Medvedev. He presented a vision of the world utterly unchanged by the events of January 20. Lavrov offered his own version of those developments, as well as of some more current. Among other things, he implied that the West lied to Russia; that NATO remains a threat to Russia; that the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe should replace NATO as the primary Western security organization; and that Russia has plenty of potential clients for its gas in the Middle East should its Western clients ever become problematic. As for Russia helping to prevent Iran from developing nuclear weapons – an Obama Administration suggestion – Lavrov's only comment was that “there is no proof that Iran even has decided to make a nuclear bomb.”

Konstantin Remchukov, the editor and publisher of Nezavisimaya Gazeta in Moscow expressed similar ideas by saying: “We can never be strategic partners; we have too many differences and goals and aims. We could be partners on strategically important issues – and that is the principle difference –never a strategic partnership between us and you because so many stakeholders inside our country have so many vested interests which will not allow delegating any of the powers as strategic partners very often do”129. He also mentioned that “…a serious problem in Russian-American relations is determined by the lack of stakeholders on both sides who are fundamentally, materially and pragmatically interested in good relations. It is always in the sphere of security, threat, or personal good relations of the top two leaders”130.

The main topics of the NATO Summit 2009 continued to be discussed on the Corfu meeting of NATO-Russia Council. NATO and Russia renew cooperation after the crisis over Georgia, what was the main result of the NATO-Russia Council meeting in Corfu on June 27, 2009. The joining issue for both sides was Afghanistan. Russia agreed to assist in the solution of Afghan problem.

127 Serdyukov, Anatoly. There are still misunderstandings between Russia and NATO on MDS and CFE Treaty // Russian Weapon. Checked on 4.05.09.
128 Applebaum, Anne. For Russia, more than a 'reset' // The Washington Post. Posted on 24.03.09.
130 Ibid.
Moscow will not only be able to restart its relations with Washington and NATO, but at the same time get interest out of the transit of the military cargo to Afghanistan through Russian territory.

Although Georgia seemed to be of big interest to the USA, but Afghan issue belittled its importance. After Russia’s consent to join the USA in its policy towards Afghanistan, situation in Georgia came to the stage of just being discussed but not planned to be solved in a closest time. Jaap de Hoop Scheffer, NATO former General Secretary, acknowledged the switch of NATO interests from Georgia to Afghanistan. On the press-conference after NATO-Russia Council meeting at ministerial level in Corfu, he said that: “The NATO-Russia Council which has been in the neutral stand for almost a year, is now back in gear”131. Describing the achievements on Georgian questions he mentioned: “No one tried to paper over our differences in the meeting, on Georgia for example. But we agreed [...] not to let those disagreements bring the whole NATO-Russia Council train to a halt132.”

In the framework of the meeting was agreed on the strategic importance of the NATO-Russia Council for security promotion in the Euro-Atlantic area. Among the common security interest were identified, such as the stabilization of Afghanistan, arms control, the nonproliferation of weapons of mass destruction and their means of delivery, crisis management, counter-terrorism, counter-narcotics, and counter-piracy. Georgia, CFE, the future of the Conventional Forces in Europe Treaty, were mentioned as issues with the fundamental differences between the members of NATO-Russian Council133.

Obama pledged to support Moscow's World Trade Organization membership bid, which could help end what Russia sees as the embarrassment of being the largest economy outside the WTO. Obama also said he would seek U.S. ratification of the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty, something Russia has long wanted from Washington134. And in a nod to the Kremlin's self-image as a chief guardian of global security, Obama also acknowledged Russia's proposal for a new trans-Atlantic security arrangement – a key Medvedev initiative that former President George W. Bush's administration pointedly ignored. For his part, Medvedev pleaded Obama by joining the U.S. in calling for clarity from Iran on its nuclear program and warning North Korea against a planned rocket launch. In the past, Russia has cast the U.S. as part of the problem on the Korean peninsula, and backed Iranian denials that it is seeking nuclear weapons. But at least publicly, Medvedev made no commitment to increase pressure on Iran. He did not promise to support harsher sanctions in the U.N. Security Council over Iran's nuclear activities or rule out further weapons sales to Tehran. His signal of support for the U.S. effort in Afghanistan was also short on detail. He

131 NATO-Russia Council foreign ministers meet in Corfu // NATO's official web-site. NATO News. Posted on 27.06.09.  
132 Ibid.  
133 Press conference by NATO Secretary General Jaap de Hoop Scheffer after the NATO-Russia Council meeting in Corfu (Greece, 27.06.09) // NATO’s official web-site.  
did not say Moscow would press Kyrgyzstan to call off its eviction of American forces from an important air base, for instance, or help the U.S. find a new Central Asian staging area for Afghan operations.

There was no sign of a Russian retreat on the divisive disputes that dragged ties to a post-Cold War low last year. Moscow remains adamantly opposed to the potential deployment of a missile shield in Eastern Europe, and is likely to use the issue as leverage in the talks the presidents agreed to set in motion on a replacement for the START I nuclear arms treaty. Russia opposes any further eastward expansion of NATO, and remains starkly at odds with the U.S. on Georgia following its war with the ex-Soviet republic last August. The Kremlin has made clear it will not consider U.S. calls to retract its recognition of South Ossetia and Abkhazia or withdraw forces from the separatist regions at the heart of the war.

Construction of new type of relations went also through the Russian provocations for President Obama. Among such were following:

(a) Pressuring Kyrgyzstan to shut down the U.S. air base in Manas, an absolutely crucial NATO conduit into Afghanistan;

(b) Announcing the formation of a “rapid reaction force” with six former Soviet republics, a regional Russian-led strike force meant to reassert Russian hegemony in the Muslim belt north of Afghanistan;

(c) Planning to establish a Black Sea naval base in Georgia's breakaway province of Abkhazia, conquered by Moscow last summer;

(d) Declaring its intention to deploy offensive Iskander missiles in Kaliningrad if Poland and the Czech Republic go ahead with plans to station an American (anti-Iranian) missile defense system.

New American President has been tested on his respond to the mentioned above issues. For example former President Bush's response to the Kaliningrad deployment was firm. He refused to back down because giving in to Russian threats would leave Poles and Czechs exposed and show the world that, contrary to post-Cold War assumptions, the United States could not be trusted to protect Eastern Europe from Russian bullying.

The Obama response was different. "Biden Signals U.S. is Open to Russia Missile Deal," as the New York Times headlined Biden's Munich speech on February 7, 2009, to a major international gathering. This followed strong messages from the Obama transition team even before the inauguration that Obama was not committed to the missile shield. And just to make sure everyone understood that the Bush policy no longer held, Biden said in Munich that the United States wanted to "press the reset button" on NATO-Russian relations.

NATO Summit 2009 reaffirmed the values, objectives and obligations of the Washington Treaty, which united Europe with the USA and Canada. It stressed new global threats among which is terrorism, the proliferation of the weapons of mass destruction, their means of delivery and cyber attacks, energy security, climate change, instability emanating from fragile and failed states. The focus of the new threats is similar to the new objectives of American Administration. For the first time such topic as climate change was discussed in the framework of NATO. As well NATO member states realized the necessity to develop a new Strategic Concept, reform NATO, and strengthen cooperation with other international actors, including UN, EU, OSCE and African Union.

The main topic of the Summit was Afghanistan and construction of cooperative partnership between NATO and Russia. On the controversy to the Bucharest Summit (2008) issue of NATO enlargement through Ukraine and Georgia was not discussed. Russian attack on Georgia was not mentioned. Iraq was replaced by Afghanistan – issues of the mutual interest for the U.S. and Russia. To the mutual NATO-Russia threats, such as terrorism, weapons of mass destruction, missile defence, in 2009 were added stabilization of Afghanistan, counter-piracy, and arms control. In general, NATO Summit 2009 created fruitful conditions for the ‘reset’ of American-NATO-Russian relations.
4.3. NEW EUROPEAN SECURITY PROPOSED by RUSSIA and ITS IMPLICATIONS

After Georgian war in August 2008, Russia began actively promote the new model of the European Security Treaty. It strengthens the weak point and incompatibility of the current security institutions to provide peace and security. Bearing that in mind President Medvedev developed new European security system. Afterwards it was introduced and promoted on all international security events, including joint U.S.-Russia meetings between President Obama and President Medvedev. On April 1, 2009, both sides already agreed the necessity to discuss this questions and empowerment of OSCE in the solution of the issues of security character.

The European Security Treaty\textsuperscript{137} intends to create a collective security system in the Euro-Atlantic area on the basis of polycentrism, rule of international law and leading role of the United Nations. The system will create single security zone without different levels of security. In addition it should not include only “hard security”, that is provided by NATO, but as well the “soft security”.

The Treaty is planned to reaffirm that not a single state or international organization could have “exclusive rights to maintaining peace and stability in the Euro-Atlantic area”. It expects to create new quality of cooperation, procedures and mechanisms of interaction in such areas as non-proliferation of weapon of mass destruction, terrorism, drug trafficking and other types of transnational crimes. As there are numerous international and regional organizations dealing with the security issues, the treaty suggest harmonization of their activities in the field of security.

During a speech, made in Berlin on June 5, 2008, before an audience of five hundred politicians and business leaders, Russian President Dmitry Medvedev proposed a new security treaty for Europe. “Our predecessors during the Cold War years,” said Medvedev, “managed to draw up the Helsinki Final Act (…), and so why should we not be able to take the next step today? Namely, drafting and signing a legally binding treaty on European security in which the organizations currently working in the Euro-Atlantic area could become parties.” This new pact would be, according to him, “a regional pact based, naturally, on the principles of the UN Charter and clearly defining the importance of force as factor in relations within the Euro-Atlantic community.”\textsuperscript{138} Although Medvedev provided some more details in a speech on October 8, 2008 at the World Policy Conference in the French city of Evian(2), his proposal remains rather vague.\textsuperscript{139}

An invitation for China to participate at a conference on Euro-Atlantic security may seem, at first sight, rather strange. The Russians could argue, however, that also OSCE countries, such as Uzbekistan, Tajikistan, Kyrgyzstan and Turkmenistan are also fully fledged Asian countries and

\textsuperscript{137} Elements of European Security Treaty (developed version) // Contribution to the OSCE Annual Security Review Conference (Vienna, 23-24.06.09). Prepared by Permanent Mission of the Russian Federation to the OSCE.

\textsuperscript{138} President of Russia Dmitry Medvedev’s speech at meeting with German political, parliamentary and civic leaders (Berlin, 5.06.2008) // Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation. Information and Press Department.

\textsuperscript{139} Herpen, Marcel H. Van. Medvedev’s proposal for a pan-European security pact: its hidden objectives and how the west should respond // Cicero Foundation. Posted on October, 2008.
that this does not exclude them from participating in the OSCE, an organization that deals with security and cooperation in Europe.

Some see it as an attempt by Moscow to give the Shanghai Cooperation Organization, a security organization in which Russia, China, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan and Uzbekistan are members, an equal say in European affairs with NATO. The American presence in Europe would be balanced by another extra-European power: China. But, at the same time, Russia would not want to grant China too much importance, because the Russian-Chinese partnership possesses a number of ambiguities.

Another objective of Russia could be to raise the profile of the Collective Security Treaty Organization, which has its roots in the Commonwealth of Independent States. This ‘Mini- Warsaw Pact’ in which Russia – in contrast to the Shanghai Cooperation Organization – is the uncontested leader and in which seven former Soviet states\(^{140}\) are members, is not only militarily more integrated than the Shanghai Cooperation Organization, but it also has an equivalent of NATO’s Article 5, defining a mutual defense obligation\(^{141}\).

Russia rightly fears that the role of the UN Security Council will diminish in the years to come – a tendency due, not in the last place, to its own obstruction policies and the return to its former Cold War position in the UN of Moscow. Therefore it wants to build an additional international legal structure for the Euro-Atlantic area in order to bind NATO’s hands. It is clear that a humanitarian intervention in order to prevent ethnic cleansing, such as was conducted in 1999 by NATO in Kosovo, would be forbidden under the new treaty.

Moscow considers the OSCE to be obsolete. In his Berlin speech Medvedev said: “An organization such as the OSCE could, it would seem, embody European civilization’s newfound unity, but it is prevented from doing so, prevented from becoming a full-fledged general regional organization. The problem is not just in the organization’s own incomplete institutional development but also in the obstruction created by other groups intent on continuing the old line of bloc politics.”\(^{142}\)

Apart from these proposals, meant to emasculate the OSCE, a gradual hollowing out of the election monitoring process of the OSCE had already begun as soon as 2002, when Russia started to set up parallel election monitoring organizations within the Shanghai Cooperation Organization, the Collective Security Treaty Organization and the Commonwealth of Independent States, three Russia dominated organizations. The new motto became: let non-democratic countries monitor each other’s elections. The Commonwealth of Independent States sent about 100 observers to the December 2007 Duma elections in Russia. These monitors saw no irregularities and gave their

\(^{140}\) The members of the CSTO are Russia, Armenia, Belarus, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, and Uzbekistan.

\(^{141}\) The collective defense provision is specified in Article 3 of the CSTO Treaty. The text of the treaty is available at <http://untreaty.un.org/unts/144078_158780/5/9/13289.pdf>.

\(^{142}\) President of Russia Dmitry Medvedev’s speech at meeting with German political, parliamentary and civic leaders (Berlin, 5.06.08) // Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation. Information and Press Department.
blessing even when these elections were judged unfair by the OSCE\textsuperscript{143}. The same happened again with the parliamentary elections in Belarus on September 28, 2008.

A second premise of Medvedev’s peace conference is that, equally, the CFE Treaty is obsolete. The Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe that was signed on November 19, 1990, is one of the most important treaties for the security and stability in Europe. It has limited conventional military equipment in the region between the Atlantic Ocean to the Urals and has implemented confidence building measures, such as prior notification of troop movements and military maneuvers, and surprise inspections. The Treaty established ‘central zone limits’ and regional ‘flank limits’ in order to prevent destabilizing force concentrations. The Russian flank ceilings were revised in the Flank Agreement of 1996 in order to take into account the new situation after the demise of the Soviet Union. This gave Russia higher ceilings in the North Caucasus.

On 19 November 1999 the 30 CFE State Parties signed in Istanbul the Adaptation Agreement to amend the CFE Treaty in order to take into account the new geostrategic situation in Europe. In the Final Act of this agreement Russia committed itself to withdraw its troops from Georgia and Moldova. Because Russia did not fulfill this commitment the NATO countries did not ratify the new treaty. Russia thereupon ‘suspended’ the existing CFE Treaty on July, 13, 2007, a suspension that came into force 150 days later, which meant a unilateral breach of the treaty. Russia considers itself no longer bound by the Northern and Southern Flank ceilings of the Treaty, which makes it possible to concentrate troops near the frontiers of the three Baltic States, as well as near Georgia and Ukraine. Russia equally withdrew from the systems of mutual monitoring and exchange of information, and no longer accepted inspection teams on Russian territory or the pre-announcement of movements of Russian troops.\textsuperscript{144}

This strategy has, so far, met with success. On a visit to Moscow on July 16, 2008, the Italian President, Giorgio Napolitano, already expressed his support for Medvedev’s security plan.\textsuperscript{145} Moscow’s project can equally count on the sympathy of the German Foreign Minister and SPD chancellor candidate Frank-Walter Steinmeier. On October 1, 2008, the Spanish Prime Minister José Zapatero, who was invited to Moscow, on a press conference openly, supported the idea to create in Europe new security architecture. “It has to take into account the interests of Russia, Europe, as well as the whole world”, he said.\textsuperscript{146} But the most important political support Medvedev has received up until now from French – and EU – President Nicolas Sarkozy at October 8, 2008 in Evian. Sarkozy not only wholeheartedly supported Medvedev’s proposal, but he went so far as to propose a special summit meeting of the OSCE to be held at the end of 2009 “to discuss

\textsuperscript{143} Weitz, Richard. OSCE maintains role in Central Asia despite conflict with Russia // Central Asia-Caucasus Institute Analyst. Posted on 28.11.07.

\textsuperscript{144} Socor, Vladimir. Kremlin would re-write or kill CFE Treaty // Eurasia Daily Monitor. Posted on 18.07.07.

\textsuperscript{145} Napolitano backs New Security Pact // The St. Petersburg Times. Published 18.07.08.

\textsuperscript{146} Prem’er Ispanii priival ES i RF zaklyuchit’ novyi dogovor bezopasnosti // Russian Daily Internet Paper Brjansk, Published 1.10.08.
(Russian) proposals and those of the European Union for new concepts of a pan-European defence.”

Suggested by Medvedev agreement predicts the equal status of all the participating states, impossibility of the military attack between the signatures of agreement. Moscow stresses that NATO is not able to solve international problems and face international threats on its own. At that time when EU leaders discussed security from both aspects of soft and military security, Russia was oriented on the second one.

The Medvedev initiative is a significant departure from the normal course of post-Soviet foreign policy in at least three respects. First, Moscow has put forward a set of ideas that go beyond the purely reactive. While the original proposals in June 2008 were prompted by Russia’s negative perceptions of security trends in Europe, they were more than simply a gut reaction to NATO enlargement, missile defence and American unilateralism. Instead of the ad hoc approach that had characterized much of Russian foreign policy under Boris Yeltsin and Vladimir Putin, the Medvedev project was an attempt to introduce Russia’s own vision of European – and Euro-Atlantic – security.

Second, and consequently, the notion of new security architecture challenges the assumption that Russia’s international influence is almost entirely preventative, far better suited to obstructing the interests of others than to advancing a positive agenda of its own. It is as if the leadership has realized that Russia cannot live on ‘anti-policy’ alone, but must offer an alternative, no matter how nascent and ill-defined. In a very real sense, it reflects Russia’s desire to play a leading role in regional and global affairs.

Third, when Medvedev first introduced the idea of revised European security architecture, it indicated a new self-belief. For much of the Yeltsin (1991-99) and Putin presidencies (2000-08), Russian foreign policy was a hotchpotch of allergic reactions, grudging compliance and mounting frustration. At times, Russia appeared on the verge of reassuming a major role in world affairs, but these moments were short-lived. For example, initial hopes of equal partnership with the US post-September 11th soon gave way to bitter disillusionment. The Iraq war, the ‘color’ revolutions in Georgia and Ukraine, and the development of US missile defence plans in Europe highlighted a Russia whose importance was given little more than lip-service. It remained at best a secondary player in Europe and a largely disregarded voice on global issues.

It is difficult to pinpoint when exactly the Russian mood changed. For this was a gradual process, given impetus by a number of domestic and external factors: the unpopularity of the George W. Bush administration; booming energy and commodity prices; divisions among the Europeans; Putin’s consolidation of power; and the disorganized response of NATO member-states to the question of alliance enlargement. What is clear that the timing of Medvedev’s proposed new

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147 Sarkozy and Medvedev call for new European security pact // Deutsche Presse Agentur. Published on 8.10.08.
148 Medvedev’s speech to German political, parliamentary and civic leaders, Berlin, June 5th 2008.
European security architecture was not accidental. It revealed a confidence that Russia was finally able to assume a more active role in international affairs, and others – great powers and small states alike – must respect its interests.

The general rationale behind the Medvedev security concept is to redefine Europe in ways that are more inclusive of Russia and its interests. Since the end of the Cold War, Russia has felt excluded from the continental mainstream. In the 1990s during the Yeltsin presidency, the combination of political instability, socio-economic crisis and sharply reduced influence abroad ensured that it would be regarded as a junior partner at best. Later, as Russia’s domestic and foreign policy fortunes improved under Putin, it would be seen as more influential, but also as increasingly awkward and sometimes confrontational. The brief Georgia war in August 2008 marked, simultaneously, the climax of a much-trumpeted resurgence and Russia’s alienation from Europe.

All this has occurred against a backdrop in which the EU and NATO have become almost wholly identified with post-Cold War Europe. The EU has assumed a normative, as well as political and economic, monopoly of what it means to be European, while NATO has achieved much the same in the military and security spheres. As a member of neither body, Russia has struggled to assert a modern European identity. Its so-called ‘strategic partnership’ with the EU and participation in the NATO-Russia Council offer a measure of formalistic recognition, but they have scarcely made Russia any more European, at least in the postmodern sense.

The original iteration of the Medvedev initiative in June 2008 predated the Georgia conflict, indicating that Moscow was already looking to reshape European security in ways more congenial to Russian interests. It was intended, in the first instance, to limit American influence on the continent. It emphasized that the existing European architecture bore “the stamp of an ideology inherited from the past”; and declared that NATO had “failed so far to give new purpose to its existence”. Crucially, Moscow called for a European summit to start work on drafting a new Helsinki-type charter\(^\text{149}\) and, in case anyone should miss its meaning, noted that “absolutely all European countries should take part in this summit, but as individual countries, leaving aside any allegiances to blocs or other groups”\(^\text{150}\).

Moscow seeks a framework that would legitimize its indirect control over the former Soviet states. The notion of a “privileged sphere of interests” has acquired fresh currency in Russian thinking.\(^\text{151}\) While policy-makers understand that restoring the Soviet Union is neither practical nor even desirable, they are keen to reassert Russia’s hegemonic role in its neighborhood. The existing Euro-Atlantic security system, dominated by the US and NATO, is a major hindrance to this. For all its imperfections, it has been instrumental in promoting western interests and values throughout

\(^{149}\) The 1975 Helsinki Act centered on three baskets of issues: political and military (including de facto recognition of WWII territorial changes); economic, trade and scientific cooperation; and human rights, freedom of emigration and cultural exchanges.

\(^{150}\) Medvedev’s Berlin speech, June 5, 2008.

\(^{151}\) Medvedev’s TV interview with Channel 1, Rossiya and NTV, August 31, 2008.
much of the former Soviet states. It is unsurprising, then, that Moscow should challenge its legitimacy.

The ultimate prize is not so much a more effective European security architecture as an environment that would facilitate (or at least tolerate) the projection of Russian influence. Moscow aspires to an arrangement that would consolidate its position as the ‘regional superpower’ in the former Soviet space; bring it into the European strategic mainstream; and recognize, formally and practically, its status as a great power on a par with the U.S. and the totality of European states.

The first iteration of Medvedev’s proposals in Berlin elicited little response in Europe. It was only when the Russian president presented a more developed version at the World Policy Forum in Evian in October 2008 that his project began to attract some attention. By this time, Russia’s relations with the West – and particularly the US – had reached a 20-year low following the Georgia war two months earlier.

The biggest difference between Medvedev’s Evian statement and his Berlin address was the shift in geographic focus from European to Euro-Atlantic. Although he condemned Washington’s alleged complicity in the Georgia war and American unipolarity in general, there was now an implicit understanding that the U.S. could not be excluded from any revised security architecture. The Russian initiative metamorphosed from a purely regional to a more global undertaking. In addition to the frequent use of the term, ‘Euro-Atlantic’, Medvedev highlighted issues that extended beyond Europe such as the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and international terrorism. Importantly, too, he invited “all key Euro-Atlantic organizations” to take part in a European security conference – a significant departure from Berlin, when he had called for countries to attend as individual nations only152.

With the emergence of an American president who enjoys unprecedented popularity in Europe, the Russian proposals have become increasingly conciliatory and inclusive. The extent of the journey travelled is illustrated by Medvedev’s address at the London School of Economics in April 2009, immediately after the G-20 summit. Eschewing the aggressive rhetoric of Berlin and Evian, he stressed that NATO, as the “strongest military-political organization in the world” had a “deserved place” in any European or global security system. In effect, he shifted to the position taken by Sarkozy at Evian, noting that “we should not see the conclusion of a new treaty as leading to the replacement of existing organizations with new ones. The organizations that already exist … should take part in drafting the new treaty.153”

Moscow is now clearly at pains to smooth out the rough edges in its security initiative. At a time when relations with the U.S. and NATO are improving, there is little will in the Kremlin to upset things. The latest Russian position, articulated by Medvedev in an address at Helsinki University in April 2009, is that a new security architecture should involve “all Euro-Atlantic states,

152 Medvedev address at the World Policy Forum, Evian, France, October 8, 2008.
153 Medvedev address to LSE students and staff, London, April 2, 2009.
international organizations … regional organizations and … all the countries that belong to these organizations”. The question of a new ‘Helsinki-type’ treaty has been left deliberately vague (and confusing): “a confirmation, continuation and effective implementation of the principles and instruments born out of the Helsinki process, but adapted to the end of ideological confrontation and the emergence of new subjects of international law in the 21st century”\textsuperscript{154}.

The vagueness of Medvedev’s initiative has been much criticized, in Russia as well as the West. One commentator recently observed that “this grand vision remains no more than just an idea that Russian officials periodically allude to without bothering to describe in detail how it is supposed to work”\textsuperscript{155}.

The Obama administration has not only talked of “pressing the reset button” in U.S.-Russia relations\textsuperscript{156}, but has re-engaged with Moscow in areas where it believes Russia can make a difference: strategic arms control, the Iranian nuclear question, and Afghanistan. At the same time, it has downplayed to near-anonymity issues that have previously caused major ructions, such as NATO enlargement and missile defence\textsuperscript{157}. The administration’s moves have altered the psychological climate and led Moscow to embrace, albeit cautiously, the opportunity to engage Washington on issues where it has both a vital interest and a genuine role. The prospect of a renewed co-operative security relationship with the US has made grand systemic approaches to international security less relevant and certainly less urgent.

More generally, Washington’s renewed interest has encouraged a return to the America-centric tradition in Russian strategic thinking. The EU may account for over half of Russia’s external trade as well as most of its foreign investment, while senior political figures often speak about a common European civilization. But for Russia’s leadership, the U.S. remains the main game because it is by far the most powerful country in the world, even if its authority is under greater challenge than at any time in the past two decades. Brutally put, in the Russian mind raw power trumps geographical proximity, economic interaction and cultural affinity.

All this means that the evolution of proposals for new security architecture are to a large extent hostage to trends in the Russia-U.S. relationship. As long as the latter remains centered on concrete priorities, there will be scant policy space for more conceptual schemes, particularly if Washington shows little interest in them. But should the bilateral relationship sour, with deadlocked arms control negotiations or a worsening of tensions in the former Soviet space, then the notion of a European/Euro-Atlantic security treaty could gain new impetus.

The main challenge for European policy-makers in responding to the Medvedev project is that there is very little to ‘bite’ on. It was easy to reject some of the early ideas, such as the

\textsuperscript{154} Medvedev speech at Helsinki University, April 20, 2009.
\textsuperscript{155} Frolov, Vladimir. Medvedev’s “vision thing” in foreign policy // Russia Profile Weekly Experts Panel. Published on 6.06.09.
\textsuperscript{156} Vice-President Joe Biden’s speech at the 45th Munich Conference on Security Policy, February 7, 2009.
\textsuperscript{157} Valasek, Tomas. Obama, Russia and Europe // CER policy brief, June 2009.
exclusion of NATO and the US. But, beyond that, getting to grips with what the Russians really want has proved elusive.

What is interesting, given past divisions on Russia policy, is the degree of European unity so far. Some NATO member-states, mainly in Central and Eastern Europe, have viewed the Medvedev proposals as pure mischief-making, motivated by a desire to undermine NATO and consolidate a Russian sphere of influence. Others, such as Germany and France, have been more receptive, identifying an opportunity to realize the long-term vision of a common European security space. Yet even their reaction has been guarded, and fallen well short of what Moscow had hoped or expected. Far from fracturing along familiar ‘old Europe’ versus ‘new Europe’ lines as they did over NATO enlargement, the Europeans have foiled Moscow’s attempts to divide them from the US and from each other. They have refused to legitimize the notion of a Russian sphere of privileged interests. They have underlined NATO’s primacy in European security, as well as preserving a central role for the OSCE. And they have left the onus on Moscow to deliver on the detail of its security proposals.

Despite recent improvements in Russia-EU and Russia-NATO relations, Georgia, Ukraine, the three Baltic States and most Central and Eastern European countries – all states that view NATO as the main pillar of Europe's security – remain either openly hostile to, or extremely wary of the Russian security proposal. By contrast, Azerbaijan and members of the Collective Security Treaty Organization – a Russian-led regional body that brings together Armenia, Belarus, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan and Uzbekistan – support Medvedev's plan. While neither rejecting, nor adhering entirely to Russia's views, Western European nations say the Russian proposal deserves consideration, despite the fact that it contains “more questions than answers”.

In a joint editorial published in France's Le Monde daily on February 3, French President Nicolas Sarkozy and German Chancellor Angela Merkel said they were “ready to debate” Medvedev's proposal “with [their] allies and with [their] European partners, and to consider everyone's point of view.” At the same time, they implicitly cautioned against undermining existing international security agreements and structures. “We shall reiterate our confidence and commitment to the EU, NATO, and the OSCE, to the tried and tested European standards underpinning our security, to the arms control and disarmament regime, and to trans-Atlantic cooperation,” the two European leaders said.

Critics of Medvedev's proposal say they fear it seeks to weaken the OSCE and the EU, and to eliminate the CFE Treaty. While dismissing those claims, Russia makes no secret that it wants to put an end to what it calls NATO's supremacy over European security. “NATO's eastward expansion plans are reproducing the outdated logics according to which one can achieve one's own security without taking the security of others into account and thus, instead of helping solve the

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158 In the aftermath of the Georgia war, there was much talk among NATO member states about the need to reinforce mutual defence (Article 5) commitments in the face of external military challenges.
problem, they [NATO members] become part of it,"159" Russia's Deputy Foreign Minister Aleksandr Grushko told the annual Vienna winter meeting of the OSCE Parliamentary Assembly on February 20, 2009.

While Western participants to the OSCE PA meeting said they viewed the OSCE as “the most appropriate” forum to discuss Europe's security, Grushko made it clear that Moscow views the Vienna-headquartered organization as just one possible forum. He added that discussions at the OSCE should focus on arms control issues and other aspects of political-military security. Despite persisting reservations in Central Europe, there seems to be a general understanding that discussions with Russia should be continued. However, there is still no consensus on the format for future consultations.

So, the concept of a pan-European defence system – a new approach in Russian foreign policy – introduced a new Russia’s vision on Euro-Atlantic security. The practical idea behind it is to make Moscow more inclusive into the European and world affairs. Though the proposal is still very vague and managed to shift its focus from European to Euro-Atlantic, but it already has supporters among European states, such as France, Germany, Italy and Spain. Although this concept is still on the level of discussion, but Russia will keep on promoting its idea and insist on creating additional binding mechanism for NATO.

159 Peuch, Jean-Christophe. 4.03.09. Russian proposal for new European security pact encounters scepticism. OSCE Parliamentary Assembly.
Though positive personal relations between former President George W. Bush, Jn., and former President Putin has been established, during their time in power contacts between the states came almost into the stage of the Cold War. Role of the personal contact in the international relations should not be underestimated. Lately the U.S. and Russian Federation has gone through the stage of changing leading personalities in their countries. Republican Bush was replaced by democrat Obama in Washington. Former KGB leader Putin was de jure replaced by his more liberal and reform oriented protégé Medvedev. First meeting of the new leaders of both countries occurred on April 1, 2009, but indirect communication was observed way before.

Right before the personal meeting with the President Obama on the pages of The Washington Post Medvedev specified the possible vectors of the mutual cooperation with Washington. President Medvedev mentioned disarmament process, collective solution for Afghanistan, establishment of the mutual rules for the global economy, introduction of a world supranational reserve currency (under the aegis of International Monetary Fund), nuclear security, and strategic stability\textsuperscript{160}.

Russian President stressed out that some of the international problems can be solved only in cooperation with Washington. Among such he mentioned international security, extremism, proliferation of the weapon of a mass destruction, counter-terrorism, counter-narcotics \textsuperscript{161}.

After fruitful NATO Summit (2009) President Obama declared its will to pay official visit to Russian Federation in July the same year and to continue the development of ‘reset’ relations between the U.S. and Russia. Russian President Medvedev, analyzing the history and perspectives of U.S.-Russia relations before official visit of his colleague, with enjoyment mentioned the desire of new American President Obama and his Administration to change the situation and build the new type of relations between two states\textsuperscript{162}. Dmitry Medvedev as well expressed his main dissatisfaction with the American foreign policy realized by the former Administration. Among the most critical issue he mentioned following: deployment of the U.S. missile defence system in Eastern Europe, NATO enlargement initiative to the East, refusal to ratify the Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe\textsuperscript{163}.

Michael A. McFaul, special assistant to the president for National Security Affairs and senior director of Russian and Eurasian affairs at the United States National Security Council, approved the interest from American side to construct the new type of relations with Russia. In the preparation to the Obama’s visit to Russia, he specified the main questions for the discussion.

\textsuperscript{160} Medvedev, Dmitry. Building Russian-US bonds // Washington Post. Posted on 31.03.09.

\textsuperscript{161} About the history and perspective of Russian-American relations // Official blog of the Russian President Medvedev. Posted on 2.07.09.

\textsuperscript{162} Ibid.

Among them were mentioned the resigning of ‘START-2’ agreement, the problem of Iranian and South Korean nuclear programs, the issues of the non-proliferation of the nuclear weapon, diversification of the energy sources. At the same time McFaul underlined that the construction of the new type of relations with Russia should not go against American interests in the regions and Washington will keep on supporting Ukraine and Georgia in their will to join NATO.

Previous year McFaul analyzed the transit in the Russia political system. He characterized Russia’s political regime as the one “between dictatorship and democracy.” He elaborated on what he sees as three possible reasons that the Russian leadership decided to construct the system that exists today: (1) Putin has decided that this system is necessary for the modernization project he wishes to undertake; (2) in order to allow for theft by the elites, for which McFaul noted a controlled national media was crucial; and (3) to manage the transition. Now that Putin's plan for the transition has been fulfilled, it is an open question whether the regime can become a system for governance. McFaul’s colleagues Petrov and Lipman made clear that they did not believe Medvedev's liberal rhetoric should be treated seriously.

McFaul supported the idea of Russia’s involvement into the solving of the international problems even at that time, when he was an adviser of Senator Obama. He stressed the necessity to have a “soft-pedal” what Washington says about Georgia. In 2008 McFaul came with the 12 steps how to build the new type of relations with Russia. Among the main aspects was the behavior towards Georgia’s integration, the development of democracy in Russia, support of free media in Eastern Europe, reduction of Europe’s dependency on Russian energy resources, etc. Finally he underlined that democratic Russia should be allowed to apply for the membership in NATO, but not the current one.

Visit of American President to Russia was organized in the framework of American-Russian Summit. Obama had planned meetings with Russian President Medvedev, Prime Minister (de facto ruling person in Russia) Putin, Russian businessmen and students of the New Economic School. Before arrival Obama gave an interview stating the difference between the approaches and qualities of Putin and Medvedev and giving the last much more positive analysis. He called Putin “person who stand with one foot in the past and the other in the future”. On the other hand he called Medvedev more democracy oriented leader with the new way of thinking. Nevertheless even these controversial statements did not spoil the preparation of the visit of American President to Russia.

Indeed, analysts said one of the main summit agenda items was establishing a better atmosphere between the two countries. “It's far more important to clean up the atmosphere, to get

164 The White House: the USA will not give up its interests for Russia // Korrespondent. Posted on 2.07.09.
165 Petrov, Nikolai; Lipman, Masha; McFaul, Michael A. Russia’s over-managed democracy: does Medvedev make a difference? // Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. Posted on 05.05.08.
166 Ibid.
168 Obama, Putin Hold Private Talks in Russia // Huffinton Post. Posted on 07.07.09.
rid of all those sticky fumes of anti-Americanism,”169 said Pavel K. Baev, a research associate at the International Peace Research Institute in Oslo. Arms control may be an area where Russia-U.S. agreements are both necessary and possible, but this agenda generally belongs to the Cold War era.

A key element of the economic package that had been prepared for the summit by U.S. experts was the final arrangements for Russia’s accession to the World Trade Organization (WTO), but this question suddenly disappeared as Moscow opted for a collective entry with Belarus and Kazakhstan (members of the yet-to-be-operationalized custom union), which in essence means a postponement of the claim into indefinite future. One of the promising topics for cooperation might be energy efficiency, which Medvedev has recently prioritized as a key direction of modernization, but it cannot qualify for a ‘strategic’ breakthrough170.

The meaning of ‘reset’ for the Russian political establishment boils down to getting rid of pointless discussions of values and human rights and focusing on really important matters of pragmatically defined interests. The liberal camp, divided and marginalized as it is, to the contrary expects that Obama would re-launch the campaign for promoting democracy that had been seriously compromised by George W. Bush171. Russian policy-makers assume that Washington is facing risks of two unwinnable wars at the time of protracted recession, which is mostly of its own making, and so has to concentrate on tangible issues like transit to Afghanistan or military-to-military contacts. They may have little understanding of the political phenomenon of Obama’s leadership but still suspect that there is more to this U.S. president than horse-trading in the best tradition of Realpolitik and so are bracing for surprises172.

What has already shaken Russian elites is that Obama has resolutely dismissed all the peculiar balances that underpin the division of authority between Medvedev and Putin in the so-called ‘tandem’ arrangement. He acknowledged that the Prime Minister ‘still has a lot of sway’ in Russian politics and so scheduled a 90 minutes-long working breakfast with him and his aids. That however is merely an episode comparing with 8-9 hours of talks with Medvedev, a good part of which was planned in one-on-one format173.

Personal chemistry certainly matters in international relations, and with Putin it matters a lot, but Obama is aiming at more than just exploiting the differences in the odd duumvirate that currently rules Russia’s enormous bureaucratic pyramid. He understands perfectly well that anti-Americanism is an essential part of Putin’s policy and not just style, while Medvedev’s priority on innovation and modernization requires a functioning partnership with the U.S.174. Unlike most European leaders, Obama will hardly have difficulties pronouncing the name ‘Khodorkovsky’, and

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169 Baev, Pavel K. Expectations about the Obama's visit to Moscow // PRIO news. Posted on 3.07.09.
171 Nezavisimaya gazeta, June 3, 2009.
that leaves Medvedev with a question more serious than finding a perfect number for warheads – how to bring to a closure the embarrassing trial that holds him hostage of Putin’s autarchy.

Russia remains deeply hostile toward Georgia after the two nations went to war – a conflict that has affected U.S.-Russia relations since Georgia is a key U.S. ally as a transit route for a giant oil pipeline connecting the Caspian Sea and Mediterranean. The U.S. seeks to deepen its ties with the Caspian Sea countries, while Moscow wants the U.S. to limit such engagement, viewing the region as a Russian preserve.

Some analysts had thought that the impact of the global financial crisis would cause Russia to moderate some of its foreign policy objectives, especially when those objectives include Moscow's plans to use its oil and gas as a way to extend Russian influence abroad. But there is no sign that either Russia or the U.S. will retreat on their positions concerning energy. “If anything, the crisis gives Russia more leverage in its region. It hasn't in any way changed Russia's attitude toward the outside world,” said Angela Stent, a Russia expert at Georgetown University.

The White House understands that, in order to change the substance and tone of the relationship, the United States has to get to some issues of interest of Moscow. It thus has offered to negotiate a legally-binding successor to the Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (START) that will reduce missiles and bombers as well as warheads, a major shift from the Bush Administration’s approach. It has indicated flexibility on missile defense, another major departure from the previous administration.

More broadly, the Obama administration’s embrace of multilateral approaches to tackle key transnational threats, such as nuclear proliferation, pandemic disease and climate change, opens new areas for U.S.-Russian cooperation. By cutting their strategic arms, the United States and Russia can lead in strengthening the nuclear nonproliferation regime. Likewise, the countries share an interest in combating pandemic disease, which does not respect international borders, and in dealing with climate change, which threatens dire consequences on a global scale.

The White House also said that the two countries have agreed to cooperate in the fields of public health and medical research, an arrangement intended to range across public health issues from infectious diseases to promotion of healthy lifestyles to improving global health. Yet, the two sides remain in a stalemate over the U.S. pursuit of a missile-defense system in Europe. Obama's administration is reviewing the efficacy of plan, which Bush had pushed hard. U.S. leaders have expressed hope of getting Russian cooperation on missile defense. But both sides have also shown signs of hardening their positions ahead of the summit.

The progress reflected an effort to re-establish ties a year after Russia’s war with Georgia left the relationship more strained than at any time since the fall of the Soviet Union. The two sides agreed to resume military contacts suspended after the Georgia war and sealed a deal allowing the

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United States to send thousands of flights of troops and weapons to Afghanistan through Russian airspace each year.

But after hours of meetings at the Kremlin, the Presidents agreed to conduct a joint assessment of any Iranian threat and presented a united front against the spread of nuclear weapons. Mr. Obama hailed the arms agreement as an example for the world as he pursued a broader agenda aimed at countering the spread of nuclear weapons, a goal he hopes to make a defining legacy of his presidency.

While the United States and Russia together have 95 per cent of the world’s nuclear weapons, Obama also views Russia as an influential player in deterring nuclear programs in Iran and North Korea. “This is an urgent issue, and one in which the United States and Russia have to take leadership,” Mr. Obama said. “It is very difficult for us to exert that leadership unless we are showing ourselves willing to deal with our own nuclear stockpiles in a more rational way.” Medvedev expressed willingness to help fight the proliferation of nuclear weapons in places like Iran and North Korea. “It’s our common, joint responsibility, and we should do our utmost to prevent any negative trends there, and we are ready to do that,” he said.\(^\text{176}\)

The United States of America and the Russian Federation confirm their commitment to strengthening their cooperation to prevent the proliferation of nuclear weapons and stop acts of nuclear terrorism. Additional efforts will be focused on development of prospective and innovative nuclear energy systems; research into methods and mechanisms for the provision of reliable nuclear fuel cycle services; research into international approaches for the establishment of nuclear fuel cycle services to secure the nuclear weapons nonproliferation regime; improvement of the international safeguards system.\(^\text{177}\)

The arms agreement drew starkly contrasting reactions in the United States. Daryl G. Kimball, executive director of the Arms Control Association, called the agreement “an overdue if very modest step toward ridding each side of obsolete and expensive Cold War legacy weapons.” But John R. Bolton, who was ambassador to the United Nations under President George W. Bush, said Mr. Obama was going too far. “The number they are proposing for a delivery vehicle is shockingly low,” he said.

Sergey Karaganov, the chair of the Foreign and Security Policy Council, expressed concern regarding the focus of the discussion between the USA and Russia in July 2009 on the military issues. Although agreement on reduction of the warheads was achieved between the sides, it can have an opposite effect and cause distrust towards each other. Russia is not willing to become a part of the Western world. In addition the confrontation towards West is often perceived as a unifying idea for the Russian population and national revival.

\(^\text{176}\) Citation from the joint press conference of President Medvedev and President Obama in the Kremlin on July 6, 2009.
Though Obama called for the complete disarmament, but during the July meeting the agreement was achieved up till 1/3 of the current nuclear weapon potential. Here one should mention an international initiative “Global zero”, which was proclaimed in 2008 in Paris and aims at achieving total nuclear disarmament till 2030. Although from Russian side there were such officials supporting the idea as Mikhail Gorbachev (the last head of state of the USSR), Igor Ivanov (Secretary of the Security Council of the Russian Federation till 2007), Konstantin Kosachev (Chairman of the International Affairs Committee, State Duma of the Russian Federation), Mikhail Margelov (Chairman of the Foreign Affairs Committee of the Federation Council of Russia), that does not prove about the seriousness of the afford taken by Moscow.

Russia was interested in signing the agreement on START 2. Firstly, as it will preserve the extension of the warheads by Americans. Secondly, Russia is not able to renew its potential and won’t be able to participate in the arms race. Thirdly, the agreement as such proves that Russia is the only country that Washington has to agree with on this issue.

Under new agreement, the Start successor treaty would reduce the ceiling on strategic warheads to somewhere between 1,500 and 1,675 warheads within seven years, down from the current ceiling of 2,200 warheads by 2012. The limit on delivery vehicles — land-based intercontinental missiles, submarines-based missiles and bombers — would be somewhere from 500 to 1,100, down from the 1,600 currently allowed.

The Russians are pushing for deeper cuts in delivery vehicles because their missiles generally fit more warheads than American missiles. American officials said this treaty would not address warheads stored in reserve, an issue something the Russians have wanted to include in the past.

The two Presidents agreed to create Bilateral Presidential Commission. Its areas of work are supposed to be following: development, economy, energy and environment, nuclear energy and security, arms control and international security, defense, foreign policy and counterterrorism, preventing and handling emergencies, civil society, science and technology, space, health, education and culture.

The problem could occur due to the linking American Radar System in Easter Europe. As the result of the American-Russian meeting in July 2009, Mr. Berman showed the will of Washington to negotiate on this sensitive issue. “Regarding our radar system in Eastern Europe, we made couple of mistakes, and the position of Russia was omitted. …now this question will be discussed again. ” he stated at the press-briefing in Kremlin.

In an exchange of diplomatic notes on July 6, the United States and the Russian Federation reached a common understanding on a framework for the U.S.-Russia Joint Commission on

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Prisoners of War and Missing in Action (POW/MIAs)\textsuperscript{180}. The Commission serves as a forum through which both nations seek to determine the fates of their missing servicemen. The Commission will pursue its goals through four working groups, which seek to account for personnel from World War II; the Korean War; the Vietnam War, and the Cold War, including Soviet military personnel unaccounted for in Afghanistan.

Most of the one-on-one talks between the Presidents were consumed by Iran and missile defense, Obama later told reporters that it was “entirely legitimate for our discussions to talk not only about offensive weapon systems, but also defensive weapon systems,” a statement that pleased the Russians, who have sought to link missile defense to arms cuts. But Obama aides later said he still refused to link the new arms control treaty to any compromise on the missile defense project, begun by President Bush, which is under review by the new administration.

Sergei A. Karaganov, a Russian political scientist, said more collaboration on nuclear non-proliferation could increase pressure on Iran, which he said benefited from the schism caused by the war in Georgia. “If you take the Georgia war, who was the winner?” he asked. “Russia, Georgia, the United States? No, it was Iran.”

President Obama has vowed to ratify the long-stalled Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty, secure vulnerable nuclear materials around the world within four years and hold a non-proliferation summit meeting in Washington next year. Critics say Obama’s ambition of eliminating nuclear weapons is naïve and dangerous, given that countries like Iran and North Korea presumably would not go along.

President Obama’s official visit to Russia following the agreements of NATO Summit 2009 testified the continuation of the dialogue between Washington and Moscow started in April. This visit made clearly positive impact on American-Russian relations. Russia saw that Washington is willing to listen to its concerns; the U.S. got the results it was expecting. The visit touched only military and security issues, what proves security is in the core of the problem. Two presidents discussed the process of the Middle East settlement, development of links in humanitarian field and science.

As well as on the April Summit Afghanistan was the main issue for the discussion. Obama and Medvedev agreed upon the need to combat the threat of violent extremism (particularly from al-Qaeda), made a special statement and deeply discussed problems of Afghanistan. There was a substantial contribution made by Russia to American international effort. In order to solve Afghan issues more productive, the Presidential Commission was created and military-to-military cooperation between the U.S. and Russia was restored. In addition Washington succeeded in getting permission for military transit to Afghanistan.

\textsuperscript{180} U.S. – Russia Joint Commission on POW/MIAs // The White House. Office of the Press Secretary, July 6, 2009.
Among other achievements of Obama Administration from the visit to Russia was lifting of restrictions by Russian Duma on imports of livestock, agreement on a joint nuclear cooperation towards Iran and North Korea. In addition Russia agreed to join the U.S. in passing a U.N. Security Council resolution that calls for strong steps to block North Korea’s nuclear and ballistic missile program.

At the end of Obama’s visit there were still questions of disagreement between two sides. Among such were Georgian sovereignty and territorial integrity, as well as deployment of the U.S. missile defence shield in Europe. The last one was agreed to be analyzed once again by Washington. In September 2009 the U.S. decided to compromise with Russia on this question. President Obama declined missile-defence agreement the Bush Administration negotiated with Poland and Czech Republic. The White House justified its decision by claiming to have new intelligence showing that Iran’s long-range missile capabilities are not as advanced as previously believed.
Washington and Moscow realized their incapability to deal with the global threats on their own. Russia is lacking power and facilities to solve even regional problems all alone. New American Administration realized the necessity to involve other participants of the world order for the solution of the problems that should be solved in cooperation. International relations long ago turned to the model of including international or regional organization for the joint operations among countries of the world. After Cold war international security depended on the UN Security Council, that proved to be not very productive, and NATO. By the majority of the countries NATO was perceived as the most reliable security organization. This aspect was contradicting with the Russia’s ideas. Moscow being not a true member of the organization criticized it and proposed an inclusion of UN and OSCE to the solution of the security issues.

In order to satisfy the demands of different world actors new type of cooperation began to be practiced. International organizations began to include subdivisions of other international or regional organizations in realization of one joint project. Relevant to our topic is cooperation between NATO and OSCE. It is realized in the following spheres: early warning, conflict prevention and conflict recurrence prevention; confidence building; post conflict rehabilitation; support to democratic development; civilian aspects of crises management; small arms and light weapons.

In order to discuss and mutually solve global threats NATO-OSCE cooperation was established. Idea of NATO engagement with OSCE belongs to Washington. At the very beginning Moscow was not so much willing to support it and bargained with the U.S. regarding issues of OSCE-NATO cooperation. After President Obama came into power, Russian officials start seeing this cooperation as a perfect platform for the development of fruitful partnership. Mutual projects between OSCE and NATO can allow Russia to stay on its positions and at the same time work together with the U.S. on the solution of the global challenges.

One of the main issues of cooperation between NATO and OSCE is Afghanistan. The OSCE decision to get engaged in the work with NATO over Afghanistan was approved on November 30, 2007 (see Appendix 4). OSCE provides the assistance to Afghanistan in the areas of border security, police training and combating drug trafficking. This document makes an access on the cooperation of OSCE with such international organizations, as NATO, EU, and CSTO.

OSCE Engagement with Afghanistan allowed including organizations of different spectrums, from U.S.-led NATO to Russia-led CSTO. CSTO\(^{181}\) – Collective Security Treaty Organization – was created on October 7, 2002, and consists exclusively out of former Soviet state, such as Armenia, Belarus, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Russia, Uzbekistan and Tajikistan. From the

\(^{181}\) CSTO official web–site.
very beginning it was created in order to claim Russian influence over the countries of the former Soviet Union and it was aimed to be the analogue to NATO in the transatlantic region. According to official documents CSTO is engaged exclusively in security issues, organizing mutual work of the CSTO member states on the issues of the military cooperation, as well as the questions connected to the fight against terrorism, narco trafficking, illegal migration, information security, interactions in political sphere, including the problems of global and regional security.

The Charter of CSTO reaffirmed the desire of all participating states to abstain from the use or threat of force. Signatories would not be able to join other military alliances or other groups of states, while aggression against one signatory would be perceived as an aggression against all. Because of the orientation on joining NATO Georgia left predecessor of CSTO and refused to be its member. On the contrary many other CIS see CSTO as the platform for much closer cooperation with Russian Federation. OSCE cooperates with CSTO in the field of contra-terrorist activities, fight against the narco trafficking and strengthening of the Afghanistan’s borders.

There is also laid foundation for the cooperation between CSTO and NATO. So far NATO is not cooperating with CSTO officially, but there have been official meetings between their General Secretaries. From the statements of CSTO General Secretary Nikolai Bordyuzha the organization is very interested in establishing such contacts. It seems NATO does not consider direct cooperation with its Russian prototype and OSCE to be the mediator in their cooperation on the questions of the mutual interest.

OSCE on the Afghanistan issues was working on the preparation and planning of the Presidential and Provincial Council elections scheduled for August 20, 2009. Similar support was provided in 2005. This year OSCE ODHIR is going to work in cooperation with NATO in order to protect observers and members of the mission from International Security Assistance Force.

Although NATO, OSCE and CSTO all are working on the issues of Afghanistan, but to my mind their activities are very complementary. If NATO considers military deployment to be of big importance as well as the free access to Afghanistan from inside, CSTO and OSCE are more interested in influencing the situation from outside of the target country. NATO is oriented on direct participation in the military operations in Afghanistan. OSCE are mainly interested in border security, police training, combating narco trafficking and terrorism. And CSTO is offering its help in the process of stabilisation, in particular assistance in formation of the strong government, creation of the legal basis, etc.

OSCE engagement with Afghanistan of 2007 symbolized the new type of cooperation between international organizations. This document brought together interests of Washington and...

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183 General Secretaries of CSTO and OSCE discussed the questions of cooperation // Official CSTO Portal. Posted on 26.03.09.
Moscow. The U.S. satisfied its idea of involvement Russia and other international actors to the stabilization of Afghanistan through stabilizing surrounding countries. Russia managed to have its protégée – CSTO – to be included into the security system along with the well-known actors. This document in addition proved the will of American Administration to negotiate with Russian Kremlin on its vital issue. On the other hand Kremlin realized benefits for Russia from being involved in this plan and understood the possibility to become more active on the world arena.

We consider the OSCE engagement Afghanistan to be the shining sample of one of the most fruitful forms of cooperation between Russia and the USA. Russia would prefer to have OSCE the platform for the construction of this type of cooperation. In this organization both the U.S. and Russia are equal players. Involvement of NATO and CSTO on the basis of OSCE in order to solve mutual problems will be to our mind the most productive. Nowadays Afghanistan became joining link for bringing together two former adversaries. It was successful as met the interest of both sides. That is why this basis might be successful for the further development of partnership between the U.S. and Russia and construction of the fruitful cooperation.
CONCLUSIONS

After the collapse of the Soviet Union, Russia has been gradually involved into NATO operations. Firstly, the term ‘adversary’ has been changed to the term ‘partner’. Secondly, understanding of the need to include Russia more deeply and actively into the solution of the global threats has been developed among NATO-members. All these changes occurred along with the transformation of bilateral relations between Washington and Moscow.

Nevertheless up till now on both sides of the Atlantic one might hear from time to time polemic of the Cold War, but on official level and in security and military documents the character of communication has been changed. If from the Russian side these transformation has been observed gradually and in the first documents one could find some negative aspects regarding the USA, from American side this feature was absent.

The events of 9/11 changed American threats. Since that time terrorism became the main issue in American security. As a result the new American security doctrine has been developed by President Bush. Although terrorism could have been a uniting factor for American-Russian policy, but due to the unilateral approach of George W. Bush, this opportunity has not been used. Bush administration solved its national security problems mostly on its own, with the exception of stable allies like Great Britain, Australia, etc.

With the change of leadership in Washington the new approach towards Moscow has been announced. Instead of contradictions the threat of terrorism in Afghanistan became a unifying factor for the U.S. and Russia. The main tool of President Obama in foreign policy became the policy of diplomatic engagement. Bearing in mind that the new focus of current American administration is Afghanistan, the most necessary partner for engagement is Russia. Unsuccessful experience in Iraq leaded Obama to agree on engagement with Russia in the war in Afghanistan despite Moscow's war of aggression against the Republic of Georgia and declaration of independence of Abkhazia and South Ossetia.

Terrorism and Afghanistan are sensitive issues as well for Russia. Nevertheless they are less important next to the diminishing role of Moscow in the world and regional affairs. After the Cold War, Moscow was mostly excluded from the world politics. Engagement with the U.S. will give Russia a change to be more actively involved into the international politics. At the same time support of Americans in Afghanistan will help Russia to stabilize region close to its borders.

NATO proved to be productive platform for the fight against terrorism and Russia engagement. In addition U.S. and Russia has been already successfully cooperating on the issues of disarmament and arms control, space activity and missile defence, nonproliferation of the weapons of mass destruction, secure development of peaceful nuclear energy, etc. To the mutual interest could be names as well fight with the organized criminal groups, illegal trade of weapon and drugs.
NATO-Russia cooperation development showed the transformation of the security environment in Europe. The polemic of confrontation gradually has been replaced by cooperation and dialogue between former adversaries. Evolution influenced not only attitude towards some states, but as well approach to Alliance’s security. For NATO, new relations with Russia were to be part of its internal transformation; for Russia, relations with NATO were a logical part of the military reform effort.

NATO-Russia Council, as a joint body for cooperation on the multilateral level, made substantial progress in its activities. The biggest achievements of the NATO-Russia Council are in the field of combating terrorism, nonproliferation of the weapons of mass destruction, arms control, theater missile defence, peacekeeping, military cooperation, science, challenges of modern society, etc.

Nevertheless there were problematic issues along with the achievements in NATO-Russia dialogue. Among such we should mention NATO enlargement through Ukraine and Georgia, American missile defence system in Eastern Europe, independence of Abkhazia and South Ossetia. All of these issues Russia considers to be of vital importance for its national security and influence in the region. President Obama clearly understood that and made some changes to the approaches used by the previous administration. Missile defence system in Eastern Europe was reviewed. NATO enlargement through Ukraine and Georgia and independence of Abkhazia and South Ossetia has not been mentioned during NATO Summit 2009.

Former NATO Summit (2008) discussed the issues of CFE Treaty, Kosovo, proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and means of its delivery, and missile defence system. But what is the most valuable it became the starting point of a fruitful cooperation over the issues of terrorism and Afghanistan as inside NATO as well in the framework of NATO-Russia Council.

Terrorism and Afghanistan were further developed on the NATO Summit 2009. At the same time it stressed new global threats and goals, and apparently NATO enlargement through Ukraine and Georgia, which were named as one of the priorities on the Bucharest Summit, has been silently forgotten. We do not claim that there were realistic chances for Ukraine and Georgia to become NATO members on NATO Summit in 2009, but the dialogue has changed from active to passive.

The new threats announced on the NATO Summit 2009 are very much alike with the new objectives of Obama administration. Among them is terrorism, the proliferation of the weapons of mass destruction, their means of delivery and cyber attacks, energy security, climate change, instability emanating from fragile and failed states.

The core topic of the NATO Summit 2009 was Afghanistan and construction of cooperative partnership between NATO and Russia. In general, it created fruitful conditions for the ‘reset’ of American-NATO-Russian relations. The Summit did not make tremendous change in U.S.-Russia
relations, but it changed the dialogue between two states. As well it proved Washington’s will to listen to the other actors of the world affairs and engage them into the solution of the global issues.

Although Obama administration agreed to compromise on the missile defence system in Europe, but there are still number of issues that might be troublesome. Here one should name the problem with Georgian sovereignty and territorial integrity as well as proposed by Russia new pan-European defence system. The latest is aimed at creating binding mechanism for NATO. As well pan-European security system is additional proof that Russia finds it not acceptable to give NATO the leading role in international security. Many times Moscow stressed the necessity to make OSCE, UN Security Council and other regional organizations more active than NATO.

With this in mind we consider that OSCE has the potential for becoming fruitful platform for American-Russian cooperation. OSCE engagement in Afghanistan is a shining sample of it. Involvement of NATO and other regional organizations on the basis of OSCE in order to solve mutual problems will be to our mind the most productive for constructive dialogue between the U.S. and Russia.
Appendix 1. NATO-Russia Council Structure
Appendix 2. Founding Act on Mutual Relations, Cooperation and Security between NATO and the Russian Federation

(Paris, 27 May 1997)

The North Atlantic Treaty Organization and its member States, on the one hand, and the Russian Federation, on the other hand, hereinafter referred to as NATO and Russia, based on an enduring political commitment undertaken at the highest political level, will build together a lasting and inclusive peace in the Euro-Atlantic area on the principles of democracy and cooperative security.

NATO and Russia do not consider each other as adversaries. They share the goal of overcoming the vestiges of earlier confrontation and competition and of strengthening mutual trust and cooperation. The present Act reaffirms the determination of NATO and Russia to give concrete substance to their shared commitment to build a stable, peaceful and undivided Europe, whole and free, to the benefit of all its peoples. Making this commitment at the highest political level marks the beginning of a fundamentally new relationship between NATO and Russia. They intend to develop, on the basis of common interest, reciprocity and transparency a strong, stable and enduring partnership.

This Act defines the goals and mechanism of consultation, cooperation, joint decision-making and joint action that will constitute the core of the mutual relations between NATO and Russia. NATO has undertaken a historic transformation - a process that will continue. In 1991 the Alliance revised its strategic doctrine to take account of the new security environment in Europe. Accordingly, NATO has radically reduced and continues the adaptation of its conventional and nuclear forces. While preserving the capability to meet the commitments undertaken in the Washington Treaty, NATO has expanded and will continue to expand its political functions, and taken on new missions of peacekeeping and crisis management in support of the United Nations (UN) and the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE), such as in Bosnia and Herzegovina, to address new security challenges in close association with other countries and international organizations. NATO is in the process of developing the European Security and Defence Identity (ESDI) within the Alliance. It will continue to develop a broad and dynamic pattern of cooperation with OSCE participating States in particular through the Partnership for Peace and is working with Partner countries on the initiative to establish a Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council. NATO member States have decided to examine NATO's Strategic Concept to ensure that it is fully consistent with Europe's new security situation and challenges.

Russia is continuing the building of a democratic society and the realization of its political and economic transformation. It is developing the concept of its national security and revising its military doctrine to ensure that they are fully consistent with new security realities. Russia has carried out deep reductions in its armed forces, has withdrawn its forces on an unprecedented scale.
from the countries of Central and Eastern Europe and the Baltic countries and withdrawn all its nuclear weapons back to its own national territory. Russia is committed to further reducing its conventional and nuclear forces. It is actively participating in peacekeeping operations in support of the UN and the OSCE, as well as in crisis management in different areas of the world. Russia is contributing to the multinational forces in Bosnia and Herzegovina.

I. Principles

Proceeding from the principle that the security of all states in the Euro-Atlantic community is indivisible, NATO and Russia will work together to contribute to the establishment in Europe of common and comprehensive security based on the allegiance to shared values, commitments and norms of behavior in the interests of all states.

NATO and Russia will help to strengthen the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe, including developing further its role as a primary instrument in preventive diplomacy, conflict prevention, crisis management, post-conflict rehabilitation and regional security cooperation, as well as in enhancing its operational capabilities to carry out these tasks. The OSCE, as the only pan-European security organization, has a key role in European peace and stability. In strengthening the OSCE, NATO and Russia will cooperate to prevent any possibility of returning to a Europe of division and confrontation, or the isolation of any state.

Consistent with the OSCE's work on a Common and Comprehensive Security Model for Europe for the Twenty-First Century, and taking into account the decisions of the Lisbon Summit concerning a Charter on European security, NATO and Russia will seek the widest possible cooperation among participating States of the OSCE with the aim of creating in Europe a common space of security and stability, without dividing lines or spheres of influence limiting the sovereignty of any state.

NATO and Russia start from the premise that the shared objective of strengthening security and stability in the Euro-Atlantic area for the benefit of all countries requires a response to new risks and challenges, such as aggressive nationalism, proliferation of nuclear, biological and chemical weapons, terrorism, persistent abuse of human rights and of the rights of persons belonging to national minorities and unresolved territorial disputes, which pose a threat to common peace, prosperity and stability.

This Act does not affect, and cannot be regarded as affecting, the primary responsibility of the UN Security Council for maintaining international peace and security, or the role of the OSCE as the inclusive and comprehensive organization for consultation, decision-making and cooperation in its area and as a regional arrangement under Chapter VIII of the United Nations Charter.

In implementing the provisions in this Act, NATO and Russia will observe in good faith their obligations under international law and international instruments, including the obligations of the United Nations Charter and the provisions of the Universal Declaration on Human Rights as
well as their commitments under the Helsinki Final Act and subsequent OSCE documents, including the Charter of Paris and the documents adopted at the Lisbon OSCE Summit.

To achieve the aims of this Act, NATO and Russia will base their relations on a shared commitment to the following principles:

- development, on the basis of transparency, of a strong, stable, enduring and equal partnership and of cooperation to strengthen security and stability in the Euro-Atlantic area;
- acknowledgement of the vital role that democracy, political pluralism, the rule of law, and respect for human rights and civil liberties and the development of free market economies play in the development of common prosperity and comprehensive security; refraining from the threat or use of force against each other as well as against any other state, its sovereignty, territorial integrity or political independence in any manner inconsistent with the United Nations Charter and with the Declaration of Principles Guiding Relations Between Participating States contained in the Helsinki Final Act;
- respect for sovereignty, independence and territorial integrity of all states and their inherent right to choose the means to ensure their own security, the inviolability of borders and peoples' right of self-determination as enshrined in the Helsinki Final Act and other OSCE documents;
- mutual transparency in creating and implementing defence policy and military doctrines;
- prevention of conflicts and settlement of disputes by peaceful means in accordance with UN and OSCE principles;
- support, on a case-by-case basis, of peacekeeping operations carried out under the authority of the UN Security Council or the responsibility of the OSCE.

II. Mechanism for Consultation and Cooperation, the NATO-Russia Permanent Joint Council

To carry out the activities and aims provided for by this Act and to develop common approaches to European security and to political problems, NATO and Russia will create the NATO-Russia Permanent Joint Council. The central objective of this Permanent Joint Council will be to build increasing levels of trust, unity of purpose and habits of consultation and cooperation between NATO and Russia, in order to enhance each other's security and that of all nations in the Euro-Atlantic area and diminish the security of none. If disagreements arise, NATO and Russia will endeavor to settle them on the basis of goodwill and mutual respect within the framework of political consultations.

The Permanent Joint Council will provide a mechanism for consultations, coordination and, to the maximum extent possible, where appropriate, for joint decisions and joint action with respect to security issues of common concern. The consultations will not extend to internal matters of NATO, NATO member States or Russia.
The shared objective of NATO and Russia is to identify and pursue as many opportunities for joint action as possible. As the relationship develops, they expect that additional opportunities for joint action will emerge.

The Permanent Joint Council will be the principal venue of consultation between NATO and Russia in times of crisis or for any other situation affecting peace and stability. Extraordinary meetings of the Council will take place in addition to its regular meetings to allow for prompt consultations in case of emergencies. In this context, NATO and Russia will promptly consult within the Permanent Joint Council in case one of the Council members perceives a threat to its territorial integrity, political independence or security.

The activities of the Permanent Joint Council will be built upon the principles of reciprocity and transparency. In the course of their consultations and cooperation, NATO and Russia will inform each other regarding the respective security-related challenges they face and the measures that each intends to take to address them.

Provisions of this Act do not provide NATO or Russia, in any way, with a right of veto over the actions of the other nor do they infringe upon or restrict the rights of NATO or Russia to independent decision-making and action. They cannot be used as a means to disadvantage the interests of other states.

The Permanent Joint Council will meet at various levels and in different forms, according to the subject matter and the wishes of NATO and Russia. The Permanent Joint Council will meet at the level of Foreign Ministers and at the level of Defence Ministers twice annually, and also monthly at the level of ambassadors/permanent representatives to the North Atlantic Council.

The Permanent Joint Council may also meet, as appropriate, at the level of Heads of State and Government. The Permanent Joint Council may establish committees or working groups for individual subjects or areas of cooperation on an ad hoc or permanent basis, as appropriate.

Under the auspices of the Permanent Joint Council, military representatives and Chiefs of Staff will also meet; meetings of Chiefs of Staff will take place no less than twice a year, and also monthly at military representatives level. Meetings of military experts may be convened, as appropriate.

The Permanent Joint Council will be chaired jointly by the Secretary General of NATO, a representative of one of the NATO member States on a rotation basis, and a representative of Russia.

To support the work of the Permanent Joint Council, NATO and Russia will establish the necessary administrative structures.

Russia will establish a Mission to NATO headed by a representative at the rank of Ambassador. A senior military representative and his staff will be part of this Mission for the
purposes of the military cooperation. NATO retains the possibility of establishing an appropriate presence in Moscow, the modalities of which remain to be determined.

The agenda for regular sessions will be established jointly. Organizational arrangements and rules of procedure for the Permanent Joint Council will be worked out. These arrangements will be in place for the inaugural meeting of the Permanent Joint Council which will be held no later than four months after the signature of this Act.

The Permanent Joint Council will engage in three distinct activities:

- consulting on the topics in Section III of this Act and on any other political or security issue determined by mutual consent;
- on the basis of these consultations, developing joint initiatives on which NATO and Russia would agree to speak or act in parallel;
- once consensus has been reached in the course of consultation, making joint decisions and taking joint action on a case-by-case basis, including participation, on an equitable basis, in the planning and preparation of joint operations, including peacekeeping operations under the authority of the UN Security Council or the responsibility of the OSCE. Any actions undertaken by NATO or Russia, together or separately, must be consistent with the United Nations Charter and the OSCE's governing principles.

Recognizing the importance of deepening contacts between the legislative bodies of the participating States to this Act, NATO and Russia will also encourage expanded dialogue and cooperation between the North Atlantic Assembly and the Federal Assembly of the Russian Federation.

**III. Areas for Consultation and Cooperation**

In building their relationship, NATO and Russia will focus on specific areas of mutual interest. They will consult and strive to cooperate to the broadest possible degree in the following areas:

- issues of common interest related to security and stability in the Euro-Atlantic area or to concrete crises, including the contribution of NATO and Russia to security and stability in this area;
- conflict prevention, including preventive diplomacy, crisis management and conflict resolution taking into account the role and responsibility of the UN and the OSCE and the work of these organizations in these fields;
- joint operations, including peacekeeping operations, on a case-by-case basis, under the authority of the UN Security Council or the responsibility of the OSCE, and if Combined Joint Task Forces (CJTF) are used in such cases, participation in them at an early stage;
- participation of Russia in the Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council and the Partnership for Peace;
• exchange of information and consultation on strategy, defence policy, the military doctrines of NATO and Russia, and budgets and infrastructure development programmes;
• arms control issues;
• nuclear safety issues, across their full spectrum;
• preventing the proliferation of nuclear, biological and chemical weapons, and their delivery means, combating nuclear trafficking and strengthening cooperation in specific arms control areas, including political and defence aspects of proliferation;
• possible cooperation in Theatre Missile Defence;
• enhanced regional air traffic safety, increased air traffic capacity and reciprocal exchanges, as appropriate, to promote confidence through increased measures of transparency and exchanges of information in relation to air defence and related aspects of airspace management/control. This will include exploring possible cooperation on appropriate air defence related matters;
• increasing transparency, predictability and mutual confidence regarding the size and roles of the conventional forces of member States of NATO and Russia;
• reciprocal exchanges, as appropriate, on nuclear weapons issues, including doctrines and strategy of NATO and Russia;
• coordinating a programme of expanded cooperation between respective military establishments, as further detailed below; pursuing possible armaments-related cooperation through association of Russia with NATO's Conference of National Armaments Directors;
• conversion of defence industries;
• developing mutually agreed cooperative projects in defence-related economic, environmental and scientific fields;
• conducting joint initiatives and exercises in civil emergency preparedness and disaster relief;
• combating terrorism and drug trafficking;
• improving public understanding of evolving relations between NATO and Russia, including the establishment of a NATO documentation centre or information office in Moscow.

Other areas can be added by mutual agreement.

**IV. Political-military matters**

NATO and Russia affirm their shared desire to achieve greater stability and security in the Euro-Atlantic area. The member States of NATO reiterate that they have no intention, no plan and no reason to deploy nuclear weapons on the territory of new members, nor any need to change any aspect of NATO's nuclear posture or nuclear policy - and do not foresee any future need to do so. This subsumes the fact that NATO has decided that it has no intention, no plan, and no reason to establish nuclear weapon storage sites on the territory of those members, whether through the construction of new nuclear storage facilities or the adaptation of old nuclear storage facilities.
Nuclear storage sites are understood to be facilities specifically designed for the stationing of nuclear weapons, and include all types of hardened above or below ground facilities (storage bunkers or vaults) designed for storing nuclear weapons.

Recognizing the importance of the adaptation of the Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe (CFE) for the broader context of security in the OSCE area and the work on a Common and Comprehensive Security Model for Europe for the Twenty-First Century, the member States of NATO and Russia will work together in Vienna with the other States Parties to adapt the CFE Treaty to enhance its viability and effectiveness, taking into account Europe's changing security environment and the legitimate security interests of all OSCE participating States. They share the objective of concluding an adaptation agreement as expeditiously as possible and, as a first step in this process, they will, together with other States Parties to the CFE Treaty, seek to conclude as soon as possible a framework agreement setting forth the basic elements of an adapted CFE Treaty, consistent with the objectives and principles of the Document on Scope and Parameters agreed at Lisbon in December 1996.

NATO and Russia believe that an important goal of CFE Treaty adaptation should be a significant lowering in the total amount of Treaty-Limited Equipment permitted in the Treaty's area of application compatible with the legitimate defence requirements of each State Party.

NATO and Russia encourage all States Parties to the CFE Treaty to consider reductions in their CFE equipment entitlements, as part of an overall effort to achieve lower equipment levels that are consistent with the transformation of Europe's security environment.

The member States of NATO and Russia commit themselves to exercise restraint during the period of negotiations, as foreseen in the Document on Scope and Parameters, in relation to the current postures and capabilities of their conventional armed forces - in particular with respect to their levels of forces and deployments - in the Treaty's area of application, in order to avoid developments in the security situation in Europe diminishing the security of any State Party. This commitment is without prejudice to possible voluntary decisions by the individual States Parties to reduce their force levels or deployments, or to their legitimate security interests.

The member States of NATO and Russia proceed on the basis that adaptation of the CFE Treaty should help to ensure equal security for all States Parties irrespective of their membership of a politico-military alliance, both to preserve and strengthen stability and continue to prevent any destabilizing increase of forces in various regions of Europe and in Europe as a whole. An adapted CFE Treaty should also further enhance military transparency by extended information exchange and verification, and permit the possible accession by new States Parties.

The member States of NATO and Russia propose to other CFE States Parties to carry out such adaptation of the CFE Treaty so as to enable States Parties to reach, through a transparent and cooperative process, conclusions regarding reductions they might be prepared to take and resulting
national Treaty-Limited Equipment ceilings. These will then be codified as binding limits in the adapted Treaty to be agreed by consensus of all States Parties, and reviewed in 2001 and at five-year intervals thereafter. In doing so, the States Parties will take into account all the levels of Treaty-Limited Equipment established for the Atlántico-the-Urals area by the original CFE Treaty, the substantial reductions that have been carried out since then, the changes to the situation in Europe and the need to ensure that the security of no state is diminished.

The member States of NATO and Russia reaffirm that States Parties to the CFE Treaty should maintain only such military capabilities, individually or in conjunction with others, as are commensurate with individual or collective legitimate security needs, taking into account their international obligations, including the CFE Treaty.

Each State-Party will base its agreement to the provisions of the adapted Treaty on all national ceilings of the States Parties, on its projections of the current and future security situation in Europe. In addition, in the negotiations on the adaptation of the CFE Treaty, the member States of NATO and Russia will, together with other States Parties, seek to strengthen stability by further developing measures to prevent any potentially threatening build-up of conventional forces in agreed regions of Europe, to include Central and Eastern Europe.

NATO and Russia have clarified their intentions with regard to their conventional force postures in Europe's new security environment and are prepared to consult on the evolution of these postures in the framework of the Permanent Joint Council.

NATO reiterates that in the current and foreseeable security environment, the Alliance will carry out its collective defence and other missions by ensuring the necessary interoperability, integration, and capability for reinforcement rather than by additional permanent stationing of substantial combat forces. Accordingly, it will have to rely on adequate infrastructure commensurate with the above tasks. In this context, reinforcement may take place, when necessary, in the event of defence against a threat of aggression and missions in support of peace consistent with the United Nations Charter and the OSCE governing principles, as well as for exercises consistent with the adapted CFE Treaty, the provisions of the Vienna Document 1994 and mutually agreed transparency measures. Russia will exercise similar restraint in its conventional force deployments in Europe.

The member States of NATO and Russia will strive for greater transparency, predictability and mutual confidence with regard to their armed forces. They will comply fully with their obligations under the Vienna Document 1994 and develop cooperation with the other OSCE participating States, including negotiations in the appropriate format, inter alia within the OSCE to promote confidence and security. The member States of NATO and Russia will use and improve existing arms control regimes and confidence-building measures to create security relations based on peaceful cooperation.
NATO and Russia, in order to develop cooperation between their military establishments, will expand political-military consultations and cooperation through the Permanent Joint Council with an enhanced dialogue between the senior military authorities of NATO and its member States and of Russia. They will implement a programme of significantly expanded military activities and practical cooperation between NATO and Russia at all levels. Consistent with the tenets of the Permanent Joint Council, this enhanced military-to-military dialogue will be built upon the principle that neither party views the other as a threat nor seeks to disadvantage the other's security. This enhanced military-to-military dialogue will include regularly-scheduled reciprocal briefings on NATO and Russian military doctrine, strategy and resultant force posture and will include the broad possibilities for joint exercises and training.

To support this enhanced dialogue and the military components of the Permanent Joint Council, NATO and Russia will establish military liaison missions at various levels on the basis of reciprocity and further mutual arrangements.

To enhance their partnership and ensure this partnership is grounded to the greatest extent possible in practical activities and direct cooperation, NATO's and Russia's respective military authorities will explore the further development of a concept for joint NATO-Russia peacekeeping operations. This initiative should build upon the positive experience of working together in Bosnia and Herzegovina, and the lessons learned there will be used in the establishment of Combined Joint Task Forces The present Act takes effect upon the date of its signature. NATO and Russia will take the proper steps to ensure its implementation in accordance with their procedures.

The present Act is established in two originals in the French, English and Russian language.

The Secretary General of NATO and the Government of the Russian Federation will provide the Secretary General of the United Nations and the Secretary General of the OSCE with the text of this Act with the request to circulate it to all members of their Organizations.
Appendix 3. Rome Declaration (founding document of NATO-Russia Council)

NATO-RUSSIA RELATIONS: A NEW QUALITY

Declaration by the Heads of the States and Governments
Rome, Italy
May 28, 2002

At the start of the 21st century we live in a new, closely interrelated world, in which unprecedented new threats and challenges demand increasingly united responses. Consequently, we, the member states of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization and the Russian Federation are today opening a new page in our relations, aimed at enhancing our ability to work together in areas of common interest and to stand together against common threats and risks to our security. As participants of Founding Act on Mutual Relations, Cooperation and Security, we reaffirm the goals, principles and commitments set forth therein, in particular our determination to build together a lasting and inclusive peace in the Euro-Atlantic area on the principles of democracy and cooperative security and the principle that the security of all states in the Euro-Atlantic community is indivisible. We are convinced that a qualitative new relationship between NATO and the Russian Federation will constitute an essential contribution in achieving this goal. In this context, we will observe in good faith our obligations under international law, including the UN Charter, provisions and principles contained in the Helsinki Final Act and the OSCE Charter for European Security.

Building on the Founding Act and taking into account the initiative taken by our Foreign Ministers, as reflected in their statement of 7 December 2001, to bring together NATO member states and Russia to indentify and pursue opportunities for joint actions at twenty, we hereby establish the NATO-Russia Council. In the framework of the NATO-Russia Council, NATO member states and Russia will work as equal partners in areas of common interest. The NATO-Russia Council will provide the mechanism for consultation, consensus-building, cooperation, joint decision, and joint action for the member states of NATO and Russia on a wide spectrum of security issues in the Euro-Atlantic region.

The NATO-Russia Council will serve as the principle structure and venue for advancing the relationship between NATO and Russia. It will operate of the principle of consensus. It will work on the basis of continuous political dialogue on security issues among its members with a view to early identification of emerging problems, determination of optimal common approaches and the conduct of joint actions, as appropriate. The members of the NATO-Russia Council, acting in their national capacities and in a manner consistent with their respective collective commitment and obligations, will take joint decisions and will bear equal responsibility, individually and jointly, for their implementation. Each member may rise in the NATO-Russia Council issues related to the implementation of joint decisions.
The NATO-Russia Council will be chaired by the Secretary General of NATO. It will meet at the level of the Foreign Ministers and at the level of Defence Ministers twice annually, and at the level of Heads of the State and Government as appropriate. Meetings of the Council at Ambassadorial level will be held at least once a month, with the possibility of more frequent meetings as needed, including extraordinary meetings, which will take place at the request of any Member or the NATO Secretary General.

To support and prepare the meetings of the Council a Preparatory Committee is established, at the level of the NATO Political Committee, with Russian representation at the appropriate level. The Preparatory Committee will meet twice monthly, or more often if necessary. The NATO-Russia Council may also establish Committee or working groups for individual subjects of areas of cooperation in an ad hoc or permanent basis, as appropriate. Such committees and working groups will draw upon the resources of existing NATO committees.

Under the auspices of the Council, military representatives and Chiefs of Staff will also meet. Meetings of Chief of Staff will take place no less than twice a year, meetings at military representatives’ level at least once a month, with the possibility of more frequent meetings as needed. Meetings of military experts may be convened as appropriate.

The NATO-Russia Council, replacing NATO-Russia Permanent Joint Council, will focus on all areas of mutual interest identified in Section III of the Founding Act, including the provision to add other areas by mutual agreement. The work programs for 2002 agreed in December 2001 for the PJC and its subordinate bodies will be continued to be implemented under the auspices and rule of the NATO-Russia Council. NATO member states and Russia will continue to intensify their cooperation in areas including struggle against terrorism, crisis management, non-proliferation, arms control and confidence-building measures, theater missile defence, search and rescue at sea, military-to-military cooperation, and civil emergencies. This cooperation may complement cooperation in other fora. As initial steps in this regard, we have today agreed to pursue the following cooperative efforts:

- Struggle against Terrorism: strengthen cooperation through a multi-faced approach, including joint assessments of the terrorist threat to the Euro-Atlantic area, focused on specific threats, for example, to Russia and NATO forces, to civilian aircrafts, or to critical infrastructure; and initial step will be a joint assessment of the terrorist threat to NATO, Russia and Partner peacekeeping forces in Balkans.

- Crisis Management: strengthen cooperation, including through: regular exchanges of views and information on peacekeeping operations, including continuing operations and consultations on the situation in the Balkans; promoting interoperability between national peacekeeping continents, including through joint or coordinated training
initiatives; and further development of a generic concept for joint NATO-Russia peacekeeping operations.

- Non-Proliferation: broaden and strengthen cooperation against the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (WMD) and the means of their delivery, and contribute to strengthening existing non-proliferation arrangements through: a structured exchange of views, leading to a joint assessment of global trends in proliferation of nuclear, biological and chemical agents; and exchange of experience with the goal of exploring opportunities for intensified practical cooperation on protection from nuclear, biological and chemical agents.

- Arms Control and Confidence-Building Measures: recalling the contributions of arms control and confidence- and security-building measures (CSBM) to stability in Euro-Atlantic area reaffirming adherence to the Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe (CFE) as a cornerstone of European security, work cooperatively toward ratification by all the State Parties and entry into force of the Agreement on Adaptation of the CFE Treaty, which would permit accession by non-CFE states; continue consultations on the CFE and Open Skies Treaties; and continue the NATO-Russia nuclear consultations.

- Theater Missile Defence: enhance consultations on theater missile defence (TMD), in particular on TMD concept, terminology, system and system capabilities, to analyze and evaluate possible levels of interoperability of among respective TMD systems, and explore opportunities intensified practical cooperation, including joint training and exercises.

- Search and Rescue at Sea: monitor the implementation of the NATO-Russia Framework Documentation on Submarine Crew Rescue, and continue to promote cooperation, transparency and confidence between NATO and Russia in the areas of search and rescue at the sea.

- Military-to-Military Cooperation and Defence Reform: pursue enhanced military-to-military cooperation and interoperability through enhanced joint training and exercises and the conduct of joint demonstrations and tests; explore the possibility of establishing an integrated NATO-Russia military training centre for missions to address the challenges of the 21st century; enhanced cooperation on defence reform and its economic aspects, including conversion.

- Civil Emergencies: pursue enhanced mechanisms for future NATO-Russia cooperation in responding to civil emergencies. Initial steps will include the exchange of information on recent disasters and the exchange of WMD consequence management information.
- New Threats and Challenges: In addition to the areas enumerated above, explore possibilities for confronting new challenges and threats to the Euro-Atlantic area in the framework of the activities of the NATO Committee on Challenges to Modern Societies (CCMS); initiate cooperation in the field of civil and military airspace controls; and pursue enhances scientific cooperation.

The members of the NATO-Russia Council will work with the view to identifying further areas of cooperation.
Appendix 4. OSCE engagement with Afghanistan

DECISION No. 4/07
OSCE ENGAGEMENT WITH AFGHANISTAN

The Ministerial Council,

Taking note of the request by Afghanistan (PC.DEL/922/07 from 21 September 2007) that the OSCE provide assistance to the country in the fields of border security, police training and combating drug trafficking,

Seriously concerned that the situation in Afghanistan is having an impact on security in the OSCE area,

Recognizing the primary role of the United Nations Security Council in maintaining global security and stability, and with a view to supporting the goals set forth in the Afghanistan Compact, agreed to at the London Conference on Afghanistan in 2006,

Acknowledging the contribution of the United Nations as well as of regional arrangements under Chapter VIII of the United Nations Charter and of other international organizations, such as, inter alia, NATO, EU, CSTO and other relevant international actors as well as participating States actively engaged in Afghanistan and desirous of complementing their efforts also in order to avoid unnecessary duplication,

Recalling the 1975 Helsinki Final Act, which states the close link between peace and security in Europe and in the world as a whole,

Also recalling the 1999 Charter for European Security, which states that “the OSCE is the inclusive and comprehensive organization for consultation, decision-making and co-operation in its region”,

Taking into consideration the status of Afghanistan as a Partner for Co-operation of the OSCE, and recalling the OSCE Strategy to Address Threats to Security and Stability in the Twenty-First Century, adopted in 2003 at the Eleventh Meeting of the Ministerial Council, in Maastricht, which states that “the OSCE will intensify its co-operation with its Mediterranean and Asian Partners for Co-operation, by early identification of areas of common interest and concern and possibilities for further co-ordinated action”,

Recalling Permanent Council Decision No. 571 of 2 December 2003 on further dialogue and co-operation with the Partners for Co-operation and exploring the scope for wider sharing of OSCE norms, principles and commitments with others, and Ministerial Council Decision No. 17/04 of 7 December 2004,

Recalling Ministerial Council Decision No. 5/05, encouraging the Partners for Co-operation to implement voluntarily the OSCE commitments to combat the threat of illicit drugs,

Recalling the OSCE Border Security and Management Concept, adopted in 2005 at the Thirteenth Meeting of the Ministerial Council, in Ljubljana, which states that the provisions of the Concept will be shared by the Partners for Co-operation, on a voluntary basis,

Taking note of the OSCE project to train Afghanistan’s anti-drug police officers in Domodedovo, launched on 12 November 2007,

Convinced that long-term security and stability in Afghanistan is of the utmost importance for the OSCE region, in particular for Central Asia,
Stressing the particular responsibility of the Government of Afghanistan for security and stability in the country and the important role of the International Security Assistance Forces in assisting Afghan authorities on these matters,

Underscoring the importance of contributing to international efforts to combat terrorism and trafficking in small arms and light weapons, illegal drugs, and human beings,

1. Within available resources, tasks the Secretary General with examining the prospects for intensifying OSCE action to support measures for securing the borders between the Central Asian participating States and Afghanistan in line with the objectives and principles set forth in the OSCE Border Security and Management Concept;

2. Further tasks the Secretary General with exploring all possible co-operation options, in co-ordination with the United Nations and other relevant regional and international organizations and other actors, and making proposals, as appropriate, for further actions by the Permanent Council;

3. Encourages the OSCE field operations in Central Asia, in consultation with their host governments, to intensify the involvement of Afghan counterparts in their relevant activities;

4. Tasks the Secretary General with providing support for intensifying the involvement of Afghan counterparts in OSCE activities, such as those related to the fields of border security and management, policing and the fight against drug trafficking, and those at the educational and training facilities in Central Asia and in the rest of the OSCE area, and with developing specific projects and programmes for Afghan counterparts in the OSCE area, as necessary and without unnecessary duplication of existing efforts, including those of international actors such as the UN Office on Drugs and Crime;

5. Encourages the Secretary General and OSCE field operations in Central Asia to co-ordinate with relevant regional organizations with a view to avoiding unnecessary duplication and reinforce mutual efforts;

6. Endorses the Permanent Council Decision on combating the threat of illicit drugs inter alia tasking the Secretary General with conducting in 2008 a follow-up training project for Afghanistan’s anti-drug police officers in Domodedovo;

7. Encourages the participating States and Partners for Co-operation to contribute to activities in the above-mentioned fields;

8. Tasks the Permanent Council with remaining seized of the matter and with researching and evaluating options for future engagement with Afghanistan upon its request.
LITERATURE

7. Babakin, Alexander; Myasnikov, Viktor. *The creation of an anti-Warsaw Bloc: the generals have set their sights on yet another base* // Rossiiyskaya Gazeta. Published on 1.03.2006.


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120. Vershbow, Alexander. The future of NATO-Russia relations // Remarks to the participants in the NATO Operational Course at the General Staff Academy (Moscow, 10.06.2005). <moscow.usembassy.gov/links/statement.php?record_id=143>.


**Curriculum vitae**

**TETYANA PODOBINSKA**

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E-mail: podobinska@yahoo.com

**EDUCATION**

| October 2007 – July 2009 | **Vienna University**, Vienna, Austria  
**Leipzig University**, Leipzig, Germany  
Joint **Master of Arts** Degree in Global Studies. |
Department of International Relations.  
**Master of Arts** Degree in International Relations.  
Major: Countries Study; Minor: Foreign Languages (English, German, Polish). |

**WORK EXPERIENCE**

| December 2008 – July 2009 | **Ukrainian Permanent Mission to International Organizations/ OSCE, Vienna, Austria**, Assistant:  
• conducting the reports for the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Ukraine based on the Sessions of OSCE PC;  
• preparation of the analytical materials for the Sessions at OSCE;  
• drafting the analysis of the current events. |
| February-March 2009 | **Embassy of Ukraine to the United States of America, Washington, DC, USA**, Assistant:  
• analyzing the political events in the U.S. and their implications for Ukrainian foreign and internal policy;  
• conducting the reports of the main political events in Washington, DC;  
• attending the meetings of the Think Tanks on the topics relevant to Ukraine and reporting on them;  
• updating and developing of the Embassy’s website. |
| September 2006 – Sept. 2007 | **CFC Consulting Company, Kyiv, Ukraine** (www.cfc.com.ua), Project Manager:  
• managing government and public relations;  
• assisting in ‘Save Darfur’ project with the involvement of ‘World Music Awards’ nominees;  
• coordinating the preparation of the Interregional Economic Forum ‘Eastern Europe – Gulf Cooperation Council’ (strategy and proposal development, establishing the contact, logistics, preparing the presentation);  
• preparing analytical reports/documents of |
economic and political character, in particular on economic and investment situation in Ukraine;
- maintaining and developing websites;
- conducting public presentations.

February – May 2006
**European Network of Election Monitoring Organizations (ENEMO) Mission in Ukraine for Parliamentary Elections in 2006, Kyiv**, Assistant to Core Team:
- analyzing pre-election political situation in Ukraine, pre-election campaign of political parties, election programs;
- participating in the official meetings with the representatives of Central Election Committee of Ukraine and Ukrainian Parliament;
- assisting in training on Ukrainian election legislation and relevant amendments;
- conducting simultaneous and consecutive interpreting.

October 2005 – May 2006
**British Council in Ukraine, ‘Strengthening Regional Social Services’ TACIS Project, Lutsk-Kyiv, Ukraine**, Interpreter/Free-lance Interpreter:
- conducting simultaneous and consecutive interpretation;
- assisting in project execution;
- assist in developing and participation in the trainings, meetings with the representatives of local authorities, heads of the target institutions.

September 2004 – May 2006
**Volyn’ Public Youth Organizations’ Center ‘NASHA SPRAVA’ (NGO), Lutsk, Ukraine**, Project Manager:
- developing and implementing the projects in the fields of civil society, human rights, democracy development, Euro-Atlantic integration, media freedom, gender issues;
- developing good working relations with potential donors;
- analyzing international donors activities in Ukraine;
- developing international network of European NGOs working in the field of media;
- conducting intermediate and final reports on the projects.

January 2004 – May 2004
**Mohawk Valley Resource Center for Refugees, Utica, NY, USA**, Assistant/Intern:
- assisting in preparation of cultural, legal and social trainings for refugees;
- assisting in the project on the development of the booklet for refugees;
- conducting simultaneous and consecutive interpreting.
**EXTRA-CURRICULAR ACTIVITIES**

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<thead>
<tr>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Description</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>August 2007 – At present</td>
<td>Open World Program financed by the U.S. Government, <em>Facilitator</em>.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>April 2005 – At present</td>
<td>European Association “Youth4Media Network”, founded in Munster, Germany, <em>Member of the Board</em>.</td>
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**AWARDS AND PROGRAMS PARTICIPATION**

<table>
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<th>Date</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>October 2007 – August 2009</td>
<td>Erasmus Mundus Scholarship Holder.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>August 2007</td>
<td>Certificate for the Completion of the Open World Program.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>July 2005</td>
<td>Participant of UN Youth Summit, member of Mass-Media Committee, organized by UNDP, Kharkiv, Ukraine.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Languages Spoken** | Ukrainian (native), English (fluent), Russian (native), German (advanced), Polish (spoken), Spanish (basic). |

**Computer Skills** | Advanced user. MS Office (Word, Excel, Access, PowerPoint, etc); Internet, Bat, Lotus. |