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Dignāga’s Philosophy of Language
Dignāga on anyāpoha

Pramāṇasamuccaya V
Texts, Translation, and Annotation

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Ole Holten Pind
Introduction

1 Purpose and scope

1.1 This dissertation is centred on presenting an annotated English translation of chapter five of the seventh century A.D. Buddhist philosopher Dignāga’s *Pramāṇasamuccayavṛtti* (hence PSV V). In this important chapter Dignāga expounds his philosophy of language known as the *apoha* theory or thesis of *anyāpoha* “exclusion of other referents,”¹ which affected post-Dignāga philosophical debate in India for centuries. The original Sanskrit version of *Pramāṇasamuccayavṛtti* (hence PSV) is no longer extant. Except for a few Sanskrit fragments traced to post-Dignāga philosophical literature, the only comprehensive sources available for the study of Dignāga’s *apoha* doctrine are two mediocre Tibetan translations of PSV included in the Tibetan *bsTan ’gyur* and a small number of Sanskrit fragments traced to post-Dignāga philosophical literature. Thus, the English translation of PSV V is based upon its two Tibetan versions and Sanskrit fragments published in *Hattori* 1982, including Sanskrit fragments I have traced to other sources. The translation is accompanied and supported by a critical edition² of the bulk of the corresponding fifth chapter of the single Sanskrit manuscript of *Viśālāmalavatī tīkā* (hence PST V). This unique *tīkā* attributed to Jinendrabuddhi, a central eighth century A.D. Indian grammarian and philosopher, is the only extant commentary on PSV and thus an important source of information on the philosophical context in which Dignāga propagated his work, and the Sanskrit text of PSV as known to Jinendrabuddhi.

¹ Essential means for studying Dignāga’s *apoha* theory were published in 1976 by Muni Jambuvijayaji in the second volume of his monumental edition of Simhasūri’s commentary on Mallavādi’s *Dvādaśāraṃ Nayacakram*. This volume includes Sanskrit restorations of crucial passages of PSV V based upon the evidence presented in Simhasūri’s work and the Tibetan translations of PSV V, as well as the Tibetan translation of Jinendrabuddhi’s PST V included in the bStan gyur. These brilliant reconstructions have served many scholars as the only trustworthy introduction to essential aspects of the *apoha* theory as presented in PSV V. An annotated English translation of selected passages of the fifth chapter based upon its Tibetan translations and Sanskrit fragments is published in *Hayes* 1988.

² The critical edition leaves out a few insignificant passages and Jinendrabuddhi’s erudite comment on *upacāra*; independent paragraphs are edited separately; see 4. below.
1.2 The purpose of the translation is to present a faithful English version of the Tibetan and Sanskrit sources. All crucial paragraphs of PST V and other chapters of Jinendrabuddhi’sṭīkā are translated in the annotations, as well as citations of Sanskrit or Tibetan sources if they are important for understanding Dignāga’s *apoha* doctrine. Sanskrit or Tibetan quotations are rendered into English with the background of current knowledge of the vocabulary and technical terms of classical Indian grammatical and philosophical literature. Sanskrit terms inserted in round brackets reflect the vocabulary of the Sanskrit sources. Those marked with an asterisk are hypothetical restorations suggested by the Tibetan translations and the context as presented in the Sanskrit vocabulary reflected in PST. In order to avoid ambiguity a limited number of exegetical additions are added in square brackets if suggested by the context and Jinendrabuddhi’s exegesis. The annotations are intended to explain in exacting detail the philological evidence contained in Hattori 1982, PST V, and other relevant Sanskrit or Tibetan sources.

1.3 The difficulties of construing the Tibetan translations of PSV are well known and in some cases almost insuperable. I have therefore taken advantage of the Sanskrit evidence embodied in PST V and restored into Sanskrit many paragraphs of the presumably original version of PSV V if the Sanskrit evidence of PST V is matched by the Tibetan translations of PSV V. Crucial passages from other chapters of PSV are also restored if they shed light on the philosophical issues addressed in PSV V. The restorations are primarily established on the basis of pratikas quoted in PST and Jinendrabuddhi’s paraphrases of Dignāga’s presentation of his philosophy in PSV. Independent Sanskrit sources that corroborate the restorations are quoted too. The method applied to restore the Sanskrit text of PSV V and other relevant sections of PSV is outlined below (see 5.1-9). The Sanskrit restorations are presented in separate annotations that lay out their sources in a straightforward and comprehensive way.

1.4 Dignāga’s *“apoha theory”* is an essential complement to his theory of knowledge and logic. Since it generated an incessant debate among contemporary and subsequent generations of Buddhist and non-Buddhist Indian philosophers, and continues to elicit questions among Dignāga’s modern Western interpreters about the meaning and

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purpose of anyāpoha, this work includes a fresh study of its basic presuppositions as presented in PSV V. The objective is to clarify fundamental theoretical issues in the light of the Sanskrit evidence of Jinendrabuddhi’s PST V, as it is no longer necessary to address the inherent ambiguities of the opaque Tibetan sources.


2 Pramāṇasamuccayavṛtti V

The Purpose of PSV V

2.1 The fifth chapter on exclusion follows the crucial chapter on the role of the example (drṣṭānta) in inference, succeeded by the final chapter six on the jātis “sophistical reasons.” Its place in Dignāga’s treatise is undoubtedly motivated by the frequent reference to “exclusion” (vyavaccheda, apoha) or “preclusion” (nivṛtti) in the preceding chapters. Thus the aim of PSV V, which presents the essentials of the apoha thesis, is to supplement previous statements about exclusion or preclusion with an exposition of the apoha doctrine itself.

2.2 As the title Pramāṇasamuccaya indicates, Dignāga composed PSV as a compendium (samuccaya) of his works on epistemology and logic, the intention being to provide scholars and students with a summary of his philosophy on the assumption that if needed they would refer to the detailed expositions of his other works. Thus, PSV is marked by extreme economy of presentation and tantalizing ellipsis. Given the limited number of extant works by Dignāga it is not possible to place PSV in the context of Dignāga’s philosophical oeuvre, as all of his works on logic and epistemology except PSV and the Chinese versions of Nyāyamukha (hence NM) are no longer extant. Dignāga must have regarded NM as a current exposition of his philosophy of inference when he composed PSV because he always mentions this work first when referring to his works on epistemology and logic. Indeed, there is not a single quotable instance in all of PSV where it is not mentioned first. In the final chapter six of PSV Dignāga mentions Nyāyaparīkṣā, Vaishēśikaparīkṣā, and Sāmkhyāparīkṣā; and Nyāyamukha refers once to Sāmkhyāparīkṣā. This makes it possible to conclude that most if not all of the Parīkṣās including Sāmānyaparīkṣāvyāsa (hence SPVy)—apparently the main source of PSV V (see 2.3)—were written before Dignāga composed PSV to summarize his works on epistemology and logic.

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6 A Sanskrit manuscript of Nyāyamukha is found among the Sanskrit manuscripts stored in Potala; see Steinkellner-Much 1995 p. xix.
7 The references are usually presented as Nyāyamukha and so on.
8 He refers to Nyāyaparīkṣā in PSV VI; cf. Hattori 1968: Introduction no. 51; Pind 2001 p. 157 no. 30; v. next.
9 Cf. Hattori 1968 no. 53.
2.3 It is commonly assumed that PSV records the final stage of development of Dignāga’s thought. However, we cannot \textit{a priori} exclude the possibility that Dignāga composed other works after PSV, which presupposes and presumably to a large extent is based upon earlier works. He exploited the SPVy for the crucial fifth chapter. Jinendrabuddhi quotes two passages from this work, and he refers to it once (see 5.13). It is thus certain that PSV V is based upon the earlier work. It is doubtless SPVy to which Yijin refers in \textit{Nan hai ji gui hei fa zhuan} (T 2125: 230a6) under the title \textit{Guan zong xiang lun *Sāmānaya(lakṣana)parīkṣā}\(^{10}\) of which only a fragment of eleven verses are included in the Chinese Buddhist canon (T 1623) under the same title.\(^{11}\) As the qualification \textit{vyāsa} added to the original Sanskrit title indicates, it must have been a comprehensive treatise. Uddyotakara is no doubt addressing statements from this work in his criticism of the \textit{apoha} theory. For instance, he closes his presentation of Dignāga’s arguments by quoting an important prose fragment which cannot be traced to PSV V. It seems, however, to belong in the same context as PSV V: 11d that ends the first section of PSV V\(^{12}\).

2.4 Thus, it is reasonable to assume that the scope of the philosophical issues which Dignāga addresses in PSV V to a large extent reflects the philosophical discourse of SPVy, although the treatment of the subjects in SPVy undoubtedly would mirror the qualification \textit{vyāsa} appended to the title of the treatise: it must have been a full and comprehensive treatment of its subject matter. Although the evidence shows that Uddyotakara addresses issues identical with those presented in PSV V: 1-11, there are nonetheless conspicuous differences. As mentioned above, he quotes a prose fragment that would seem to belong in the context of the final statement of PS V: 11d,\(^ {13}\) but there is nothing comparable in PSV V: 11d, which one would expect. Moreover, there is a particular quotation that Uddyotakara attributes to Dignāga and rejects as untenable in his \textit{apoha} critique, which has no parallel in PSV V, cf. \textit{Nyāyavārttika} (hence NV) 325,14-15: \textit{yac cedam ucyate tvayā: parikalpitāḥ sattāśabdā iti tad api na}. He also

\(^{10}\) Cf. \textit{Pind} 1999 no.3. The Chinese translation would indicate that the term \textit{lakṣaṇa} was part of the original title, which is unlikely. Simhasūri refers to Dignāga as \textit{Sāmānyaparīkṣākāra} at NCV 628, 8 and indicates that Mallavādi was using this work in his presentation of Dignāga’s arguments, which are also presented in PSV V although in an abbreviated form.

\(^{11}\) The title also occurs in verse two of the Chinese fragment.

\(^{12}\) See \textit{Translation} no. 182.

\(^{13}\) See \textit{Translation} no. 182.
quotes a slightly edited version of Bhartrhari’s Vākyapadiya (hence VP) III 14:8,\(^{14}\) which belongs in the context of an argument similar to the one presented at PSV V: 3, where Dignāga cites the original version to substantiate his criticism.

2.5 Dignāga apparently wrote similar extensive studies like, for instance, Nyāyaparīkṣā, which is referred to in later philosophical literature as mahatt,\(^{15}\) “comprehensive.” It is uncertain if the Dvādaśa-śatikā which presupposes the apoha theory belongs among Dignāga’s pre-PSV works like the SPVy. It must have been considered an important Dignāga oeuvre because Dharmakīrti quotes a short prose passage from it in PVSV.\(^{16}\) The significance of the title “The twelve Hundred” is uncertain. It may refer to the number of verses (kārikās) of the work. As only a prose passage is quoted, it may have been a work of considerable size, consisting of kārikās embedded in a prose commentary like other Indian philosophical literature. It is regrettable that Dignāga’s works on epistemology and logic are no longer extant, as the somewhat truncated discourse of PSV contains very little information on contemporary scholars, whose works and philosophical doctrines Dignāga addresses in PSV.

2.6 Fortunately PSV has survived the ravages of time albeit in two mediocre Tibetan versions and a few Sanskrit fragments. Indeed, there is reason to believe that the main reason why PSV is still extant although in Tibetan translation is because its relative brevity made it an ideal work to comment on for generations of post-Dignāga buddhist philosophers, who could use it as a pretext for introducing views of later philosophers as if they were Dignāga’s own, while not addressing views that had become controversial or out of date in the context of post-Dignāga philosophy. For instance, Jinendrabuddhi refrains deliberately from addressing the implications of Dignāga’s use of the term arthāntaranivṛttiśiṣṭa,\(^{17}\) “qualified by the preclusion of other referents,” which according to Dignāgan epistemology distinguishes the referents (bhāva) of any word from the referents of other words. However, the evidence indicates that Dignāga introduced this term, since he conceived anyāpoha as a substitute for real universals, as opposed to his non-Buddhist contemporaries, who

\[^{14}\text{Cf. 2.28 below.}\]
\[^{15}\text{Cf. Vādanyāyaṭikā 142,13-15: mahatyāṃ Nyāyaparīkṣāyāṃcārya-Dignāgapada-h.}\]
\[^{16}\text{Cf. Pind 1991 p. 269 no. 1.}\]
\[^{17}\text{See Translation no. 466.}\]
regarded real universals as qualifiers of things and thus as pravṛtti-nimitta of denotation.

2.7 Whatever may have been the cause, a substantial part of Dignāga’s work is irretrievably lost, and PSV V is the only extant exposition of his philosophy of language. Since Jinendrabuddhi does not identify the scholars whose views Dignāga rejects in this chapter, it is difficult to place PSV V in a well-defined historical context. Dignāga’s apoha theory was known among contemporary thinkers before he wrote the fifth chapter of PSV V because he addresses the sāṅkhyanāśaka\textsuperscript{18} philosopher Mādhava’s criticism of the apoha doctrine in a fairly long and difficult section of PSV V: 39ff.\textsuperscript{19} Dignāga’s answer includes slightly edited quotations of Mādhava’s critical remarks.\textsuperscript{20} Fortunately Jinendrabuddhi provides the Sanskrit original of Dignāga’s source, although he does not mention its title. Mādhava evidently criticized the apoha theory as presented in another work by Dignāga, presumably the no longer extant SPVy, and Dignāga answers his criticism in PSV V. In the same context Dignāga also answers a Jaina philosopher’s critical remarks about his apoha thesis at PSV V: 41. Jinendrabuddhi quotes the relevant passage from his work, but he does not mention its title or the name of its author, who is styled vaibhāgika “distinctionist.” This section is especially crucial for understanding Dignāga’s apoha thesis as it shows unambiguously that his theory of exclusion pivots on non-existence (abhāva) of other things in the locus of any referent, namely their mutual non-existence, which Dignāga appears to regard as a general qualifier like real general properties.

Dignāga’s presentation of the apoha doctrine in PSV V

2.8 Dignāga’s presentation in PSV V of the fundamental tenets of his philosophy of language is marked by tantalizing ellipsis and appears to be remarkably lax, which affects understanding the philosophy of anyāpoha. Important theoretical statements are restricted to a few highly condensed paragraphs of the entire chapter, which is primarily concerned with refuting contemporary theories of meaning.

\textsuperscript{18}See Steinkellner 2005 p. 17: sāṅkhyanāśako mādhavas tv āha.
\textsuperscript{19}Dignāga mentions Mādhava’s views on pratyakṣa in the Śāmkhya section of PSV I; cf. PSV I 28, Steinkellner 2005 p. 17; Hattori 1968, Translation p. 57f.
\textsuperscript{20}Mādhava’s knowledge of the apoha theory necessitates re-thinking his and Dignāga’s dates.
based on the assumption that the semantic condition of the application of words are real universals inherent in things. In contrast to other chapters of PSV, Dignāga does not attempt to present or justify in any detail his own view on the subject of *apoha* in the first part of the chapter, which is primarily devoted to criticizing doctrines that Dignāga rejects as untenable. In fact, crucial statements about *anyāpoha* are only presented at PSV V: 34-50, the final third of PSV V. The fifth chapter starts by presenting the thesis that verbal knowledge does not differ from inference, as any word like “existing” (*sat*) denotes its referent by excluding other referents in the same way as the logical indicator “being produced” (*krtakatva*), which presupposes that there be invariable connection (*avinābhāvasambandha*) between the word and its referent similar to that of the inferential indicator (*liṅga, hetu*) and the indicated. Dignāga continues immediately thereafter by criticizing in some detail views he rejects as untenable. The identities of most of the philosophers whose theses Dignāga analyses and confounds remain unknown, as Jīnendrabuddhi rarely identifies any of Dignāga’s protagonists.

2.9 Thus the exact philosophical context of the relentless criticism which Dignāga levels at the philosophy of language of contemporary philosophers remains obscure, except when he answers the criticism of the *apoha* doctrine formulated by the Sāṅkhya philosopher Mādhava (see 2.7). In general the order of presentation of the philosophical issues discussed in the chapter does not appear to be well organized as many of the subjects under discussion appear to be addressed haphazardly. This no doubt reflects Dignāga’s attempt to summarize, in the fifth chapter, the content of the more comprehensive work, SPVv, and possibly to address reactions to his major work. Important concepts are sometimes introduced abruptly without explaining their connection to the context in which they are introduced. This has left a noticeable mark of lack of coherence on the discourse of this crucial chapter. For instance, it is not clear why Dignāga addresses the semantics of compounds in the light of the general *apoha* thesis immediately after the first central section PSV V: 1-13, although the analysis of the relation between the terms of a compound like *nilotpala* is no doubt motivated by the attempt to analyse the semantic relation between general and particular terms in the context of the *apoha* theory, which in a way mirrors the relation between the terms of a sentence (vākya).
2.10  The first part of PSV V:1-11 (+12-13), however, is a well-defined and independent section of the chapter. In this section Dignāga analyses and rejects four theories of denotation: that a general term denotes (1) individuals (*bheda), (2) general properties (*jāti), (3) the connection between general properties and the thing in which they inhere (*tadyoga), and (4) the general property possessor (*tadvat). It ends with the claim that the thesis that a word excludes other referents is settled (*sthitam), although no formal proof has been presented to substantiate the claim. It would thus seem that the untenability of the rejected views serves as a means of bolstering the *apoha doctrine through *via negationis. Although Dignāga presents a fairly detailed analysis of the last mentioned theory, he never addresses this thesis again, except in the important paragraphs at PSV V: 34-36 which present a brief account of why the problems of the four theses analysed at PSV V 2-4a do not obtain according to the *apoha thesis. For instance, the main problem of the *tadvat thesis, namely the impossibility of direct (*sākṣāt) reference, is briefly mentioned at PSV V: 36c, where Dignāga claims that the *apoha thesis does not entail this problem, since exclusion of other referents applies directly (*sākṣāt arthāntarapatirātānta).

2.11  However, the immediately following kārikās at PSV V: 12-13 introduce subjects that have not been addressed previously in the chapter and in one case only once in the entire treatise. For instance, the implication of the concept of *svasambandhānurūpya introduced at PS V: 12 is explained in a theoretically charged passage at PSV II: 13, which is the only passage of the entire PSV where it occurs. It is obvious that the two verses must have been copied from another of Dignāga’s works—perhaps the SPVy—in which the implication of the term was treated in detail and its denotation explained. There are also noticeable inconsistencies in the chapter that are difficult to understand. For instance, the fairly long exposition at PSV: 25-30 explains that exclusion of other referents is caused by conflict or opposition (*virodha) between properties occurring in a tree of categories and the terms that denote them. The tree presupposes a logically ordered hierarchy of properties, which ultimately is derived from Vaiśeṣika taxonomy.

2.12  But Dignāga apparently invalidates *virodha as cause of exclusion at PSV V: 31a by introducing non-observation (*adrṣṭa) as a justifiable substitute, and explains at PSV V: 34 that mere non-observation (*adarśanamātra) of any given word’s application to
things other than its own referent establishes exclusion and verbal knowledge as inference. This discussion together with the following paragraphs at PSV V: 35-36 are the only passages specifically devoted to presenting the philosophy of *apoha*. Dignāga apparently did not attempt to integrate the two mutually incompatible causes of exclusion into a logically coherent theory, and the crucial paragraphs PSV V: 34-36 only presents the bare essentials of his *apoha* theory leaving a number of important philosophical issues unanswered.

2.13 Other information that is essential to our understanding of the rationale of the *apoha* doctrine is mentioned incidentally, for instance, the crucial information that the general property of any given referent or word that is defined as exclusion of other referents or words is located *in* the referent (*arthe*) or *in* the word (*śabde*). Since the evidence shows that anyāpoha pivots on exclusion interpreted as non-existence or negation (*abhāva*) of other referents (*artha*) or other words (*śabda*) in any given referent or word, it raises a number of intriguing questions about what justifies exclusion: *apoha* is evidently not related to negation in its well-established Western sense because ultimately the *apoha* theory is not centred on the notion of negation as the act of denying a word or statement, but rather on the notion of non-existence of other things in the locus of the referent of any word (see 6.1 ff). Dignāga conceived anyāpoha as a qualifier of the referent of the word, evidently imitating contemporary usage among Sanskrit grammarians and non-buddhist philosophers. The introduction of the locative to denote the referents of the word as loci of anyāpoha would otherwise be incomprehensible: anyāpoha is presented as qualifying the referent as if it were a real general property, which is corroborated by Dignāga’s use of the locative to designate the referent as locus of anyāpoha, which is understandable with the background of Dignāga’s statement at PSV V: 36d that exclusion of other referents has all the acknowledged properties of a general property (*jāti*).

**The title of PSV V**

2.14 The Tibetan translation of PSV V attributed to Vasudharakṣita and Seṅrgyal (hence V), 21 reproduces the title of the fifth chapter as *tshad ma kun las btus pa las gžan sel ba brtag pa’i le’u ste lṅa pa ’o*. This would indicate that the original Sanskrit title of the chapter was

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21 K appears to have been completed in the 11th or by the beginning of the 12th century A.D. and V towards the end of the 11th century A.D. See Mejor 1991: 179.
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*anyāpohaparīkṣā. The question is whether it is rightly so named. In fact, the Tibetan version attributed to Kanakavarman and Dad pa’i šes rab (hence K) does not record any title, but merely refers to the chapter as “the fifth chapter” (le ’u lha pa ’o). Unfortunately the Sanskrit colophon of the fifth chapter of PST is missing. Its Tibetan translation, however, corroborates K by reading le’u lha pa ’o (= *pañcamah paricchedaḥ). As Ms B of PST V omits the colophon we are forced to restore its title by extrapolating from the colophon of chapters like that of the first one, which reads prathamaḥ paricchedaḥ (samāptah).22

2.15 PSV V is, of course, a parīkṣā in the sense that it analyses and refutes views which Dignāga considers untenable, but it is certainly not a critical examination of anyāpoha. This would contradict the purpose of the chapter, which is to justify why exclusion of other words and speech units or other referents does not entail the problems that follow from the assumption that real general properties inherent in words and speech units or things constitute the semantic condition of denotation. Originally individual chapters of PSV did not bear any title, as indicated by the translation of PSV attributed to Kanakavarman and his collaborator. Their translation of PSV merely enumerates the number of the individual chapters, in contrast to the version attributed to Vasudharakṣita and his assistant, which adds information about the number and subject matter of the first three chapters, namely PSV I *pratyakṣa (mñon sum gyi le ’u ste dañ po ’o),23 PSV II *svārthānumāna (rañ gi don gyi rjes su dpag pa ste le ’u gnis pa ’o),24 and PSV III *parārthānumāna (gzan gyi don rjes su dpag pa’i le ’u), adding the term *parīkṣā (brtag pa) after the title of the remaining three chapters like those of PSV IV: *dṛṣṭāntadṛṣṭāntābhas apariksā (dpe dañ dpe ltar snañ ba brtag pa’i le ’u ste bzi pa ’o),25 PSV V: *anyāpohaparīkṣā (gzan sel ba brtag pa’i le ’u ste lña pa ’o), and PSV VI: *jātiparīkṣā (lhag gcod brtag pa’i le ’u ste drug pa ’o).26 Since the title *anyāpohaparīkṣā is only recorded in V, it is reasonable to conclude that the Sanskrit title *anyāpohaparīkṣā is spurious, and in all likelihood so are the titles of PSV IV and VI. It is

22 The Tibetan version of PST V does not corroborate the reading samāptah which may be an interpolation. It is occasionally found in contemporary colophons, but it is evidently redundant.
24 Cf. P 42b7.
25 Cf. P 70a8.
26 Cf. P 93a8.
impossible to decide why the term parīkṣā was added to the colophons of the last three chapters.

The format of PSV V

2.16 The format of the two Tibetan translations of PSV V reflects well established classical Indian literary standards. It consists formally of 49½ kārikās embedded in a prose commentary. Oddly, in both K and V verse 43 only consists of two pādas as opposed to the well-established pattern of four pādas to a śloka, which Tibetan translators reproduce as four times seven syllables. The reason for this anomaly is unknown as the Tibetan versions of PSV V and the separate version of the verses included in the bsTan ’gyur27 do not imply that originally verse 43 consisted of just two pādas as one would expect, nor that the identification or numbering of the verses of PSV V is wrong if compared to the order and number of the verses of PSV in general.

2.17 As Jinendrabuddhi’s explanation indicates the two pādas of verse 43 are introduced by slightly edited quotations from the source Dignāga criticizes; and there is nothing that indicates that K and V in this particular instance misinterpreted two pādas as prose, which otherwise might explain the apparent irregularity. In view of this peculiar problem it is noticeable that the translators of V interpreted the sentence that closes PSV V:3 as two śloka pādas: l’di yi riṣṣ kyis ggra yis ni // brjod par bya ba ŋid mi ’thad /, which reads in the Sanskrit phrase that closes the paragraph: naïvāṣya jātiśabdena< / >vācyatvam upapadyate. If this interpretation is correct, and it is certainly metrically possible, it would solve the riddle of the two missing pādas of PSV V: 43.28 The distribution of the two hundred pādas among the fifty kārikās merely has to be adjusted accordingly,29 that is, pādas 4ab are to be converted to 4bc, and so on, and pādas 43ab to 43bc.

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27 The separate version of the verses is extracted from K and is therefore without independent value.
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The Tibetan translations of PSV V

2.18 The two Tibetan translations of Dignāga’s Pramāṇasamuccaya-vṛtti are maddeningly difficult as they are peppered with textual problems of every kind conceivable. Many sentences are extremely difficult to construe, and so far scholars have been forced to study PSV V supported by the generally excellent Tibetan version of Jinendrabuddhi’s PST V included in the bsTan ’gyur and published in Hattori 1982. Thus the problem of construing the two Tibetan renderings of PSV V is a major obstacle to understanding Dignāga’s thought.

2.19 Although K as a rule appears to be more reliable than V, there are nonetheless passages that make better sense in the version recorded in V, whose translation occasionally is corroborated by the Sanskrit sources as opposed to that of K. Indeed, at the present juncture of Dignāga studies there appears to be no justification for preferring one version to the other. Only when the two Tibetan versions of PSV have been studied carefully in the light of the information of the presumably original Sanskrit version of PSV that can be restored on the basis of PST will it be possible to decide which of the two versions is more trustworthy than the other, and, last but not least, to determine to what extent the occasional differences between the two Tibetan translations of Dignāga’s work are attributable to different versions of it or just illegible Sanskrit manuscripts (see 2.21-32), rather than to translation mistakes or mere differences of interpretation of the syntax and vocabulary of the Sanskrit original.

2.20 The erratic and occasionally nonsensical character of K or V would indicate that the two translator teams may not have had sufficient expertise in Indian or Dignāgan philosophy of logic and language. It is hard to believe, however, that insufficient knowledge of Dignāga’s philosophy would explain the tantalizing difficulties of reading the translators’ efforts as not all passages of K and V present similar obstacles. This makes one wonder if there may have been other reasons for the inferior quality of their translations than mere incompetence.

2.21 Vasudharakṣita is only credited with the translation of PSV, so it is impossible to ascertain whether he was a poorly educated scholar in the field of Indian philosophy. Kanakavarman, on the other hand, is credited with the excellent revision of the Tibetan translation of
Candrakīrti’s Madhyamakāvatāra,\textsuperscript{30} which is a demanding treatise to translate into Tibetan; in addition he also produced a superb Tibetan translation of Candrakīrti’s Prasannapada.\textsuperscript{31} He can hardly be considered incompetent. Even if the two translators were not specialists of classical Indian epistemology and logic, we must assume that they would be able to construe Dignāga’s Sanskrit kārikās and prose, which in general is comparatively simple and devoid of syntactical complexities of the kind we encounter in, for instance, the contemporary grammarian Bhartṛhari’s prose, which Dignāga knew and in a few cases exploited.\textsuperscript{32}

2.22 It is impossible to explain the poor quality of the Tibetan translations unless one assumes that somehow it reflects the two translator team’s inability correctly to interpret the readings of their Sanskrit manuscripts. It is therefore noteworthy that Kanakavarman or Vasudharakṣita misinterpreted words and phrases, which should not present any difficulty of interpretation to scholars with traditional Indian background, provided that the Sanskrit manuscripts were readable. Indeed, the evidence supports the conclusion that the difficulties of construing the Tibetan translations are at least to some extent due to the translators’ attempt to render Sanskrit corruptions into Tibetan, even if the readings were meaningless and the Tibetan translations in consequence incomprehensible.

2.23 For instance, the reading at PSV II 4d: śugs kyis K : don yod pa’i V\textsuperscript{33} is utterly incomprehensible. śugs kyis sometimes reproduces Sanskrit arthāpattyā, which regularly is translated as don gyi śugs kyis. However, the translator team responsible for V could not identify the last word of the compound, which they may have interpreted as a form of Sanskrit sattā as the Tibetan term yod would indicate. However, the Tibetan term don which is commonly used to translate Sanskrit artha shows that the first word of the compound was easy for them to identify, which thus corroborates the suggested Sanskrit restoration *arthāpattyā.

2.24 Kanakavarman and his assistant must have read the noun phrase tadvān artho at PS V 9c as if the reading were *tadvad artho.

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{30} Cf. Louis de la Vallée Poussin’s Preface to his edition of Madhyamakāvatāra, Bibliotheca Indica IX (Reprint 1970).
\item \textsuperscript{31} Cf. Mejor 1991: 178.
\item \textsuperscript{32} Cf. e.g. PSV V: 46; Pind 2003.
\item \textsuperscript{33} Cf. Translation no. 2.
\end{itemize}
because they reproduce it as de ltar don. The Tibetan translation de ltar presupposes a regular sandhi form of the Sanskrit adverb *tadvat before vowel. The Tibetan translation is, of course, incomprehensible in the context, and one can only conclude from examples like this, of which unfortunately there are several instances, that indigenous Tibetan scholars and students of Indian logic and epistemology were ill served by the Tibetan translations of PSV that eventually were included in the Tibetan bsTan ’gyur.

2.25 Fortunately, the Sanskrit manuscript of Jinendrabuddhi’s tīkā makes it possible to identify the causes of some of the translation mistakes. The Sanskrit evidence indicates that one of them was the not uncommon problem of disjoining morphemes in the process of copying, another that of scriptura continua, of which there are several examples in the Sanskrit manuscript of Jinendrabuddhi’s tīkā, which occasionally made the competent Tibetan translator suggest implausible translations because he did not notice that he was translating an instance of scriptura continua. However, without the original Sanskrit sources the causes of such errors are difficult to detect.

2.26 A characteristic example of a translation based upon Sanskrit text with disjoined morphemes is Vasudharakṣita and his collaborator’s reproduction of the term ĥrdvatāvat at PSV V 31d. The Tibetan translation re ĥig ĥreṅ bā la presupposes apparently a reading like *ĥrdvat ĥe ĥat, which is totally meaningless in the context. Although Tibetan translators are not known to make conjectures, one cannot, of course, exclude the possibility that the translation ĥreṅ bā la which would seem to presuppose Sanskrit *ĥrdhe, is, in fact, an emendation intended to correct the false reading ĥrdha tāvat, which any translator with knowledge of Sanskrit would consider dubious and perhaps attempt to “correct.”

2.27 In any case, one should not overlook the fact that Tibetan translators tend to translate what they read in their Sanskrit manuscripts and do not attempt to make conjectures or emendations. Thus some of the apparent absurdities of the Tibetan translations of V and K stem in the final analysis from PSV manuscripts that were carelessly or badly copied and therefore difficult to interpret. The vagaries of the transmission of the original Sanskrit version of PSV are in places evident. For instance, K and V concur in not translating into Tibetan the crucial apodosis required by the context at PSV V
32d: \textit{tadā pārthiva iti kevalasya prayogah sambhavati}. This clause, however, was evidently part of Dignāga’s original text, as Jinendrabuddhi incorporated it into his paraphrase of the paragraph he was commenting on.\footnote{Cf. Ms B 225a2 quoted ad loc.} This indicates that the otherwise divergent manuscripts used by the two translator teams descend from an archetype in which this particular sentence was missing. There is no doubt, however, that the phrase was an integral part of the original version of PSV V: 32d as Dignāga’s exposition would be incomprehensible without it. In addition, there are no quotable examples in PSV V of phrases beginning with \textit{yadā} that are not syntactically apodized by the corresponding apodosis of \textit{tadā}.

2.28 Some passages appear to reproduce corruptions like PSV V: 33d, which is impossible to construe in the versions presented in K and V. The readings *\textit{yod pa la sogs par} K: \textit{sogs par} V translate in all likelihood *\textit{śatrantādau} as Jinendrabuddhi’s \textit{ṭīkā} indicates. The translator team responsible for K, however, could not identify the first term of the compound correctly, but apparently read it as \textit{sattā + ādau}, the translation not leaving any trace whatsoever of the term \textit{anta}. The scholars credited with V apparently could not even identify the word \textit{śatranta}, although they correctly identified the last word of the compound as the locative of \textit{ādi}. With this background the student of the Tibetan version of PSṬ V: 33d, which correctly reproduces and comments upon the passage, will find it impossible to identify the context of the discussion, much less understand the argument presented at PSV V: 33d. The few examples cited above—they are not isolated instances—show the type of philological problems that students of the Tibetan translations of PSV have to resolve in order to make sense of Dignāga’s text.

2.29 There are sometimes considerable differences between the Tibetan translations and the Sanskrit evidence of PST, which shows that the manuscript transmission of PSV is not uniform. In contrast to minor differences between K and V with regard to translation of individual verses of PSV V, their versions of PSV V: 2c-d differ in several respects. For instance, only V reproduces Dignāga’s quotation of Bhartṛhari’s VP III 14:8. This citation, however, is essential to Dignāga’s argument and crucial for understanding it; and it is not clear why it is not found in K. Jinendrabuddhi does not explain its implications, which is remarkable as he usually addresses grammatical
issues. This would indicate that he did not find it in his copy of PSV V, assuming that he would check the original source when writing his śīkā. Dignāga, however, quotes the Bhartrhari verse in support of his argument, and we have no reason to assume that it was interpolated because parallels in works by Dignāga’s opponents show that the verse belongs in the context of this particular argument. Uddyotakara cites an edited version of the same verse addressing a similar argument in his criticism of Dignāga’s apoha theory. It stems in all likelihood from Dignāga’s no longer extant SPVy.

2.30 In a few instances the difference between K and V is inexplicable, unless we assume that the Tibetan versions presuppose different readings and not just corrupt text or misinterpretations. For instance, the Tibetan conversions of the paragraph that follows immediately after PSV V: 3 are mutually divergent and incompatible with the Sanskrit evidence of PST Ms B 195a1ff. Thus the term āśāṃkitam at Ms B 195a6 and the phrase idam tad iti recorded at Ms B 195b1 have no identifiable translations in K or V, although Jinendrabuddhi’s exegesis indicates that he quotes the source he is explaining. I have therefore adopted the Sanskrit readings of PST as I think that they are preferable to the confused translations of K and V, although neither K nor V corroborate the readings presented in PST.

2.31 In other cases the translators appear to have rendered glosses interpolated into the verses, as it is sometimes impossible to fit the terms reproduced in the Tibetan translation of a particular verse into the metrical constraints of a Sanskrit śloka of thirty two syllables. For instance, the Tibetan translation of PSV V: 48a-d contains the compound īṅgi don V : īṅg don K, evidently rendering Sanskrit *vākyārtha. However, it is impossible to fit *vākyārtha into the Sanskrit restoration with the background of the readings of the verse recorded in PST V. *vākyārtha is probably a marginal gloss introduced as a synonym of pratibhā (f.) in order to explain the reference of the demonstrative pronoun sā (f.) at 48a. As the Tibetan equivalent of Sanskrit vākyārtha is found in both K and V, which represent different manuscript transmissions of PSV, it is possible to conclude that the term was interpolated into the verse of the Sanskrit original or perhaps earlier Tibetan attempts to translate Dignāga’s work before the translations recorded in K and V were executed.

2.32 There are noteworthy divergences between K and V with regard to which ślokas are saṃgrahaślokas. In PSV saṃgrahaślokas
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occur sparingly and they invariably summarize issues treated in the preceding paragraphs. However, in Vasudharaksita’s translation of PSV V 12-13 the two verses are designated as *saṃgrahaślokas, despite the fact that they do not summarize the preceding exposition, but quite unexpectedly introduce entirely new topics. In K, on the other hand, they are rendered as ordinary ślokas. Similarly, the two verses at PSV V 26-27 are saṃgrahaślokas according to V, although they do not summarize the content of the preceding paragraphs, but rather add some general remarks about the logico-semantic relation between general terms. K does not identify the verses as saṃgrahaślokas, nor does Jinendrabuddhi in any way suggest that they are inserted in order to summarize the content of the preceding discussion. The conclusion is inevitable: these stylistic qualifications were added at a later time. They were inserted for no obvious reason as the nature of Dignāga’s exposition does not per se qualify them as saṃgrahaślokas.

2.33 Thus the evidence indicates that corruptions of the Sanskrit manuscripts of PSV no doubt are one of the main causes of the difficulties of understanding Dignāga’s thought through the Tibetan translations of PSV. When all the linguistic information contained in PST has been studied with the background of the Tibetan translations of K and V we shall be in a much better position to ascertain whether or not the many philological problems of the two versions, which force any scholar into hairsplitting arguments pro et contra regarding possible solutions to almost insoluble philological problems, are caused by textual corruptions of the original Sanskrit manuscripts, which the translators attempted to render into Tibetan, or just random instances of incompetence on their part. Even the highly competent Tibetan translator of PST, dPañ lotsāva Blo gros brtan pa, occasionally produced passages that are entirely incomprehensible in the context of the subject matter because he faithfully translated a string of corruptions exactly as he read and interpreted them. In one case he even appears to have made a conjecture, although it is meaningless in the context. Finally, it is necessary to investigate whether the

35 Cf. e.g. Translation no. 188.
36 For instance, the Tibetan translation of PST Ms B 211a1 which quotes PS V: 46, is incomprehensible because Blo gros brtan pa reproduced text that is full of corruptions and in principle untranslatable. For instance PST loc. cit. reads apodvāre for apoddhāre, which Blo gros brtan pa translated as sel ba’i sgo la as if the reading of the Sanskrit Ms was apohadvāre. He apparently conjectured that apo was a mistake for apoha. See Translation no. 221.
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Occasional textual divergences between the Tibetan translations of PSV and the readings quoted in the Sanskrit manuscript of PST reflect actual differences of transmission of Dignāga’s work and not chance corruptions or interpolations.
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3 Viśālamālavatī tīkā V and the commentator Jinendrabuddhi

3.1 The Viśālamālavatī tīkā attributed to Jinendrabuddhi is the only extant commentary on Dignāga’s PSV. As I shall show below, PSṬ is not the only commentary devoted to commenting upon PSV. The evidence indicates that it is dependent upon other sources, some of which were known to Dignāga’s critics Mallavādi and Simhasūri (see 4.13), who quote them in their criticism of Dignāga’s logic and apoha thesis. This makes Jinendrabuddhi’s work an important source of information not only on the Sanskrit text of Dignāga’s work, as it makes it possible to restore substantial sections of PSV V, but also to some extent on the nature of the earlier commentaries devoted to explaining PSV and the philosophical issues Dignāga discusses throughout his work.

3.2 Jinendrabuddhi is in all likelihood identical with Nyāsakāra, the author of Nyāsa, an important commentary on the Kāśikā known as the Kāśikāvīvaraṇapañjikā. The date of the Nyāsakāra has been the subject of continuous debate. Consensus is that the reference to Nyāsa in Māgha’s Śīśupālavadha is indeed to Jinendrabuddhi’s commentary on the Kāśikā; and therefore it is likely that Jinendrabuddhi was active as a scholar around 700 A.D. Since he quotes Tattvasaṅgraha verses 1241, 1263, and 2811 in PSṬ I pp. 43 and 54, Jinendrabuddhi and Śāntarakṣita (ca. 725-788 A.D) must have been contemporaries. Since Śāntarakṣita and his commentator Kamalaśīla refer to Jinendrabuddhi’s view of pratyakṣa as shown by Funayama, he may therefore have been an older contemporary of this eminent Buddhist scholar. Thus it is reasonable to assume that he was active as a writer in the first half of 8th century A.D. Apparently Jinendrabuddhi does not quote Tattvasaṅgrahapañjikā (hence TSP). This would indicate that copies of Kamalaśīla’s TSP may not yet have been in circulation among Buddhist philosophers before Jinendrabuddhi composed PSṬ.

3.3 Jinendrabuddhi was evidently conversant with the sources addressed by Śāntarakṣita and Kamalaśīla, as appears from the discussion in TSP and PŚṬ V of Kumārila’s criticism of the Dignāga’s view that verbal communication is subject to the constraints of the

logical canon of trairūpya. However, the treatment recorded in PST V differs from that of TSP, which therefore may not have been known to Jinendrabuddhi. The source that Kamalaśīlā and Jinendrabuddhi address criticizes the theory that the inferential nature of verbal communication consists in its indicating the intention of the speaker. This view was presented by Dharmakīrti, and the unknown source specifically subjects Dharmakīrti’s view to criticism. Śāntarakṣita and Kamalaśīlā address the criticism of Dharmakīrti’s view in the context of Kumārila’s critique of the assumption that verbal communication is subject to the constraints of the trairūpya. It is therefore reasonable to assume that the source which Jinendrabuddhi, Śāntarakṣita, and Kamalaśīlā address may be Kumārila’s Bṛhaṭṭīkā, which unfortunately has never been recovered.

3.4 The colophons of PST and Nyāsa refer to Jinendrabuddhi as Bodhisattvadeśīya. As the copyist of PST supports this attribution by honouring Jinendrabuddhi as an erudite grammarian, there is no cogent reason for doubting that the colophons refer to the same author. On the other hand, it is difficult to corroborate the attribution of PST and Nyāsa to the same person on the basis of internal evidence. It is evident, though, that the author of PST was an expert in Sanskrit grammatical literature, as appears from his concise explanation of Dignāga’s quotation at PSV V 9ab of a well-known grammatical definition—allegedly from Bhartrhari’s Mahābhāṣyaṭīkā—of the semantic conditions for introducing the abstract affixes tā and tva, which are claimed to denote either the relation (sambandha) or general property (jāti). One would therefore assume that Jinendrabuddhi’s exegesis of A V 1:119 defining the semantics of the abstract affixes would quote and comment upon the same crucial definition of their usage, as does Kaiyaṭa, who quotes and explains it in his Pradīpa on A V 1:119.

3.5 The Nyāsakāra evidently knew the above-mentioned definition as he quotes it elsewhere in the Nyāsa. However, he limits himself to

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39 Cf. Appendix III.
40 For the sources of this discussion, cf. Appendix II
42 See, for instance, Prabhat Chandra Chrkavarti, The Philosophy of Sanskrit Grammar. University of Calcutta, 1930, p. 207ff (with note 3.).
43 Cf. Nyāsa Vol. I: 610, 28-29; Translation no. [40].
the barest essentials when commenting on A V 1:119, although he mentions the view of some who claim that the cause of application of speech units denoting an action is the relation (sambandha) between the action and the agent of that action (kecīt tu kriyākārakasambandhanāṃ kriyāśabdānāṃ pravṛttinimittam icchanti). The thesis that speech units denote sambandha is mentioned by Dignāga at PSV I: 3d. The example of such kriyāśabdās is pācakatva, which illustrates the rule that the introduction of the abstract affix after pācaka serves the purpose of denoting the relation. Jinendrabuddhi presents a concise exegesis of Dignāga’s quotation of the grammatical definition that in essence is similar to the one found in Kaiyāta’s Pradīpa on Mahābhāṣya explaining A V.1:119, although Jinendrabuddhi mentions additional instances of compounds (samāsa), and kṛt and taddhita derivatives. The only instance that would corroborate the alleged identity of the Nyāsakāra and Jinendrabuddhi is the remarkable similarity between Jinendrabuddhi’s exegesis of A II.1:57 and his exegesis of PSV V: 14 and 27.44

3.6 The writer Bhāmaha, author of Kāvyālaṅkāra, a well-known treatise on poetics, refers to some Nyāsakāra at Kāvyālaṅkāra VI 36 where Bhāmaha rejects the Nyāsakāra’s description of a particular type of compound formation as contradicting Pāṇini’s grammar. The question is whether the Nyāsakāra, whose view Bhāmaha rejects, is identical with Jinendrabuddhi, the author of Nyāsa. Bhāmaha mentions the word vṛtrahantr as an example of a term accepted by the Nyāsakāra, although it is excluded by the relevant Pāṇinian rules. In this connection Bhāmaha refers to A III 1.133, which introduces the affix trc to denote the agent of an action, and A II 2.15, which disallows the introduction of this affix to form a genitive tātpuruṣa (sāsthītātpuruṣa) compound like vṛtrahantr. This compound, however, is recorded in the Mahābhārata;45 and post-Pāṇinian grammarians tried to accommodate the Pāṇinian rules to recorded usage. But nowhere does Nyāsa mention vṛtrahantr together with other non-Pāṇinian compounds as examples of legitimate derivations under the Sanskrit grammarians’ attempt at accommodating the linguistic evidence to the relevant Pāṇinian rules.46 We are evidently faced with another Nyāsakāra, several of whom are mentioned in Sanskrit

44 Cf. Translation, notes 203 and 357.
45 Cf. PW s.v.
grammatical literature, among others by Bhartṛhari in his Mahābhāṣyaṭīkā.\textsuperscript{47}

3.7 The date of Bhāmaha has been the subject of a never-ending debate. G. Tucci, for instance, concluded on the basis of references to Dignāga’s philosophy in Kāvyālaṅkāra, that Bhāmaha must have been a pre-Dharmakīrti scholar because he does not mention Dharmakīrti’s philosophy anywhere.\textsuperscript{48} This is certainly true. The question is whether the absence of references to Dharmakīrti’s works corroborates the conclusion as it is based upon an argument \textit{e silentio}. The evidence, however, supports Tucci’s conclusion. Indeed, Bhāmaha must have been either a pre-Dharmakīrti writer or one of Dharmakīrti’s contemporaries as Dharmakīrti addresses his criticism of Dignāga’s \textit{apoha} theory at PVSV 63,12ff. This conclusion is corroborated by Jine ndrabuddhi’s presentation of Dharmakīrti’s views on \textit{anyāpoha} in an excursus inserted immediately after his comment on PSV V: 13.\textsuperscript{49} In this excursus Jine ndrabuddhi quotes a slightly edited version of Bhāmaha’s objection to Dignāga’s \textit{apoha} theory at Kāvyālaṅkāra VI 17, which states that according to the \textit{apoha} theory a word must have two separate functions, namely that of affirmation and that of exclusion.

3.8 In Jine ndrabuddhi’s exposition this objection is followed by a quotation of Dharmakīrti’s PVSV 63,12ff, which he interprets as Dharmakīrti’s answer to Bhāmaha’s objection. Otherwise it would be difficult to understand why Jine ndrabuddhi would quote a slightly edited version of Kāvyālaṅkāra VI 17 in this particular context. The above-mentioned passage of PVSV addresses among other issues Dharmakīrti’s statement at PV I 127ab: \textit{na cāpi śabdo dvayakṛd anyonyābhāva ity asau} that a word does not effect two things viz. affirmation and exclusion—which reproduces Bhamaha’s objection to Dignāga’s \textit{apoha} thesis, since the connection between the referent posited by the word and the thing excluded is one of mutual non-existence; and affirmation implies \textit{per se} negation which merely reflects non-existence of one of the elements of the relation of mutual non-existence.

\textsuperscript{47} Cf. Cardona 1997 no. 453.
\textsuperscript{48} Cf. Guiseppe Tucci, ”Bhāmaha and Dīnāga” in The Indian Antiquary LIX (1930) pp. 142-47.
\textsuperscript{49} Cf. Appendix 2.
3.9 Jinendrabuddhi’s identification of the target of Dharmakīrti’s argument with Bhāmaha is not an isolated instance in post-Dharmakīrti philosophical literature. Other contemporary scholars like Śāntarakṣita, who quotes Bhāmaha’s objection at TS 911, shows a marked dependence on Dharmakīrti’s rejection of Bhāmaha’s criticism when presenting at TS 1019 his own refutation of Bhāmaha’s arguments. This corroborates Jinendrabuddhi’s identification of the target of Dharmakīrti’s criticism with Bhāmaha. Moreover, Karnakagomin quotes in PVST 250,19-22 the relevant verses from Kāvyālaṅkāra followed by the observation that Bhāmaha’s claim is rejected by Dharmakīrti’s argument at PVSV 63,12ff, which both Śāntarakṣita and Kamalāśīla at TSP 395,18 take to address Bhāmaha’s objection to the *apoḥa* theory.50 With this observation I think we can safely put the debate about Bhāmaha’s date to rest.

The sources of Viśālamālavatī V

3.10 The impression one gets from reading Jinendrabuddhi’s *ṭīkā* is that he rewrote older material with the intention of making his own *ṭīkā* au courant with the latest development in epistemology, logic and philosophy of language. Jinendrabuddhi’s dependence on Dharmakīrti’s *Pramāṇavadotttikasvavṛtti*, which contains an important section devoted to the philosophy of *anyāpohā*, is evident throughout his commentary on PSV V. Thus, PST V reflects Dharmakīrti’s position in the process of explaining Dignāga’s *apoḥa* thesis. Consequently Jinendrabuddhi is not a reliable exegete of Dignāga’s thought in every respect. His main objective is evidently to show that Dignāga’s views are compatible with Dharmakīrti’s philosophy. This attempt makes him gloss over controversial aspects of Dignāga’s philosophy.

3.11 For instance, Dharmakīrti attempt to re-interpret the rationale of Dignāga’s claim that words denote things (*bhāva*) or entities (*vastu*) qualified by exclusion or absence of other things from the referent in the light of his own philosophy;51 and he re-interprets Dignāga’s claim that verbal cognition does not differ from inference; according to Dharmakīrti’s interpretation, the inferential nature of verbal cognition means that the thing inferred is not the referent of the verbal expression, as Dignāga claims, but the *vivakṣā* of the speaker, whose

50 Cf. the evidence traced in Appendix 2.
intention is inferable through the speaker’s words. Jinendrabuddhi follows this re-interpretation as appears from his gloss on the term nivṛttiviśiṣṭa “qualified by exclusion,” which he maintains qualifies the person speaking. This understanding departs completely from the rationale of the original apoha theory, which aims at substituting exclusion of other referents for the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika universal as a real entity inherent in things and the justification for the application of words to things. As already mentioned, according to Dignāga exclusion of other referents comes with all the attributes of the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika universal as resident in things and words. Thus Jinendrabuddhi’s explanation is not true to the rationale of Dignāga’s apoha thesis.

3.12 Although Dharmakīrti’s philosophy is the main source of Jinendrabuddhi’s interpretation of Dignāga’s apoha theory, it is, on the other hand, evident that Jinendrabuddhi had access to and made use of already existing commentaries on PSV. For instance, he must have used the same source as the Jain philosopher Simhasūri, who wrote a detailed commentary of Mallavādi’s criticism of Dignāga’s apoha thesis, because there are several cases where Jinendrabuddhi’s glosses and explanations are almost identical with those found in Simhasūri’s commentary on Mallavādi’s work. Indeed, there is every reason to believe that Simhasūri’s explanations of theoretically crucial passages of PSV V are more reliable reproductions of Dignāga’s original view than those found in PST. This remarkable similarity is difficult to explain unless we assume that Jinendrabuddhi had access to and copied or slightly rephrased explanations found in an older commentary on PSV.

3.13 It is not possible to identify the source with absolute certainty, because Simhasūri merely identify certain explanations occurring in Mallavādi’s work as presented by the tīkākāraḥ. Given the authority of the source, as indicated by the fact that Mallavādi in several cases conflates Dignāga’s text with that of the tīkā, and further indicated by Jinendrabuddhi’s use of the same source as a valid explanation of Dignāga’s view on a particular issue, it is not unreasonable to assume that the work may be identical with the tīkā, which Devendrabuddhi composed according to the Tibetan Buddhist scholar Bu sTon. Thus it is not unlikely that it is this work to which Simhasūri refers and quotes as one of Mallavādi’s sources. Mallavādi probably made extensive use

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52 Cf. NCV 621, 25. The plural tīkākāraḥ is in all likelihood to be interpreted as respect language. Cf. Renou, Grammaire § 207.
of the ṭīkā even without indicating that he was quoting or slightly rephrasing it. Otherwise it is difficult to explain why the phrase: tato naiva prakāśakaṁ syat that occurs in Mallavādi’s work as quoted at NCV 708,13-14, surfaces in Jinendrabuddhi’s ṭīkā Ms B 71a7 as tataś ca naiva prakāśayeta. The sentence belongs in the context of explaining PSV II: 15. The similarity of phrasing and syntax is striking and undeniable. In any case, Jinendrabuddhi must have considered the unknown commentary a valid source of information on Dignāga’s philosophy, as appears from the fact that he, Mallavādi and Simhasūri used it and apparently made no attempt to distinguish between Dignāga’s own statements and the explanations attributed to the ṭīkā.

3.14 I quote below selected passages from Simhasūri’s Nayacakravṛtti juxtaposed with those of PSṬ V; they illustrate Jinendrabuddhi’s dependence on the source used by Mallavādi and Simhasūri: he apparently either quotes or edits it slightly to fit it into his own exposition. The quotations—often verbatim—are such that there can be no doubt that both authors rely on the same source, in all likelihood an old and authoritative ṭīkā, although it remains an open question whose work it is. As already mentioned it may be identical with the ṭīkā attributed to Devendrabuddhi. The following examples show beyond doubt that we are not presented with chance similarities: in spite of minor differences of expression, Jinendrabuddhi evidently utilized the same source as Mallavādi and Simhasūri. The collection of examples is not exhaustive:

1. PSṬ Ms B 193b1: ānanyād ity upapattih. kasyānanyāt? prakṛtatvād bhedānām eva; cf. NCV 627, 14-15: ānanyād iti hetuḥ. kasyānanyāt? bhedānām, yasmāt te pūrvam prakṛtā na cānayaḥ śṛyāye.

2. PSṬ Ms B 193, 2: ākhyātum; karoter anekārthatvāt; cf. NCV 627, 17: kartum ākhyātum; karoter anekārthatvāt.


6. Ms B 208a7: tathā hi te vināpi vṛkṣārthena rasādiṣu drṣṭāḥ, na vṛkṣāsabdatvādikam sāmānyam, cf. NCV
Apart from PSV and other works by Dignāga, Mallavādi and Simhasūri had access to Dignāga’s SPVy from which they presumably quote the lakṣaṇavākya on apoha, cf. NCV 611,5ff,53 as well as works by titkākārās, cf. NCV 621,25ff. It is obvious that Jinendrabuddhi too had access to other works by Dignāga or his commentators when he wrote PST. For instance, he either quotes or refers to Dignāga’s SPVy three times.54 Judging from the parallel passages found in PSV V the passages from SPVy represent a more discursive treatment of the same subject, although the vocabulary is basically the same. The fragmentary Chinese translation of a few of the introductory verses of this treatise makes it impossible to infer its scope.

4 The Critical Edition of PST V

4.1 The Sanskrit manuscript of PST V comprises Ms B 191a7-242b7. The objective of the critical edition of PST V presented in the apparatus as an integral part of the annotation is to establish a readable version of the unique manuscript of Jinendrabuddhi’s PST V. The edition occasionally leaves out brief sentences that are not important for understanding Dignāga’s thought or restoring PSV V into Sanskrit. Jinendrabuddhi’s erudite remarks on upacāra (transference) recorded at Ms B 198a-198b have been left out too, as they add nothing

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53 Cf. Translation no.182.
54 Cf. PST Ms B 229b1-2, Translation no. 465; PST Ms B 239a1-2, Translation no. [301]; PST Ms B 238b7-239a2, Translation no. 608.
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theoretically important to the grammatical and philosophical issues of *upacāra*. His excursus on central philosophical issues of the *apoha* theory are edited separately and included in the four Appendixes. In all, well over 90 percent of PST V is edited and included in the annotation and Appendixes. The main purpose of the edition is to e-

4.2 I have punctuated the critical edition without regard for the occasionally meaningful punctuation of Ms B as I consider the use of comma, semicolon, and full stop to be more helpful for the reader of an occasionally complicated text than traditional indigenous punctuation. The punctuation marks reflect my interpretation of the syntax of the Sanskrit original and are primarily intended to present a version of Jinendrabuddhi’s work that is syntactically understandable to a modern reader. Sandhi has been adjusted accordingly. The manuscript has proved to be an invaluable source of information on the Sanskrit version of PSV which Jinendrabuddhi commented upon. Apart from the substantial number of *pratīkās* quoted from the original source or the sources Jinendrabuddhi consulted for his *ṭīkā*, his paraphrases of the Sanskrit text of PSV V have proved to be an excellent means for
restoring a substantial number of paragraphs of PSV V into Sanskrit, as they contain important information on the syntax of phrases of PSV V. In one instance Jinendrabuddhi’s paraphrase includes a crucial phrase that for unknown reasons was missing in the manuscripts used by the two Tibetan translator teams (see 2.8 and 2.6).

The Tibetan translation of PST

4.3 The Tibetan translation of PST (hence T) attributed to lotsāva Blo gros brtan pa is generally of a high standard and an important source of information on the readings of the Sanskrit manuscript of PST used by the translator. It is therefore of considerable value for text critical purposes. It contains nonetheless a number of passages that are impossible to construe and understand. In most cases they are either due to misinterpretations of the original Sanskrit ms caused by scriptura continua or due to wrong readings found in the manuscript upon which the translator relied. Although the Tibetan sources indicate that the translation is based upon another Sanskrit manuscript than Ms B, it is evident that it must have been based upon a manuscript with similar readings, because T reflects wrong readings which also occur in Ms B.

4.4 For instance, Jinendrabuddhi quotes PS V 46ab at PST Ms B 211a1-2 in this form: apodvāre yad anyās?am vāksād arthe vikalpita iti. This clause is reproduced in T 177, 36-37 as: ’di ni sel ba’i sgo la gañ ’di’i ’di dag las don du brtags pa ’o źes ’chad par ’gyur ro. The translation is meaningless. It is evidently based upon a corrupt text like the one found in Ms B. One wonders if the translator himself could make sense of it. There is no reason to assume, however, that the reading of the translator’s manuscript differed essentially from that of Ms B on this particular point. The most likely explanation is that originally the corruption was introduced because of a misreading or misreproduction of the ligature /ddh/ that at some point in the transmission of the manuscript was read as /dv/, which would yield apodvāre as we find in Ms B. It is therefore likely that the translator attempted to emend the reading of his manuscript because apodvāre is reproduced as sel ba’i sgo la corresponding to Sanskrit *apohadvāre, which has no support in Ms B. The translator may have conjectured that the meaningless apodvāre was to be emended to read apohadvāre and inserted an extra syllable /hal/ in a desperate attempt to make sense of the compound.
4.5 In one case the translator misinterpreted the phrase cādyupādānaḥ < cdī < ca + ādī + upā° as derived from vādin + upā°. This appears from the translation rgol pas Ṉe bar len pa T 155,15, which is utterly meaningless. The reading sāmānyaviśeṣāvastavacchedahetutvāt recorded at Ms B 215a2 is translated in T as spyi dān khyad par gyi dōos po ma yīn pa gcod pa'i rgyu śīd kyi phyir. The otherwise meticulous translator evidently read sāmānyaviśeṣāvastavacchedahetutvāt as a compound and translated it accordingly in spite of the fact that it is incomprehensible. He assumed that lā/ of viśeṣavastū° was due to sandhi: the result of sāmānyaviśeṣa- + avastu (= dōos po ma yīn pa). Apparently he did not reflect upon whether his understanding of the compound made sense in the context of the argument: he merely translated the text as he read it. Fortunately it is easy to emend the reading by inserting the space that was deleted by the copyist: the correct reading is, of course, sāmānyaviśeṣā vastavacchedahetutvāt which is easy to construe with the rest of the clause. The reading of Ms B illustrates once again the common error introduced by scriptura continua, forgetting to mark syntactical word boundaries in the process of copying a manuscript; and without the Sanskrit text it is virtually impossible to identify the cause of a meaningless Tibetan translation because of the structural difference of the two languages. The example illustrates once again that Tibetan translators tend to render what they read in their Sanskrit manuscripts, in spite of the fact that it makes no sense in the context; and without the original Sanskrit source it is difficult to infer what the cause of similar philological problems might be.

4.6 Although the number of translation mistakes appears to be limited—most of them are due to scribal errors introduced into the Sanskrit manuscript on which T is based—the translation is sometimes difficult to understand and invariably leads to wrong conclusions about the context of a particular argument. For instance, at Ms B 242b5 we find the reading nirdiśṭapravartakam. The same reading was evidently found in the manuscript used by Blo gros brtan pa, because he reproduces the term as ṇes par bstan pa 'jug par byed pa. The translation, however, makes no sense in the context, and any reader, who is unaware of the fact that Jinendrabuddhi quotes a passage from Vātsyāyana’s Nyāyabhāṣya (hence NBh), is left with the impression that he has missed the point. Jinendrabuddhi is merely

55 Cf. Translation no. 44.
quoting Vātsyāyana’s use of the term *nirdiṣṭapravakṭra* in NBh on NS II.2:1: *anirdiṣṭapravakṭram pravādapāramparyamaitihyam*. The error is presumably an old one, but without tracing the correct Sanskrit reading to the original source, it would have been difficult to identify the error and emend the text.

4.7 It is difficult to explain why Blo gros brtan pa would translate the term *samākhyāsambandhapratīti* (Ms B 241a6) as *mtshuṅs pa ŋnid ces bya ba’i ’brel pa rtogs pa* unless we assume that his manuscript erroneously left a space between *samākhyā* and the rest of the compound, which is likely to be true. Consequently he must have interpreted *samākhyā* as a qualifier of *sambandhapratīti* (f.). Moreover, he appears to have read *samākhyā* as a derivative of *samāna*, or he may have conjectured that the correct reading should be *samānyya*. It is not clear why Blo gros brtan pa, employs the speech units ŋnid and ces bya ba. No matter what motivated the translation, it is utterly incomprehensible in the context. The term *samākhyā-sambandhapratīti*, however, is found in Vātsyāyana’s commentary on the same sūtra, namely NS II.2:1. These examples illustrate the nature of the philological problems involved in studying the Sanskrit and Tibetan versions of PST. In spite of the fact that the Tibetan translation of PST is excellent it is clear that without having recourse to the original Sanskrit version it is difficult to understand why certain Tibetan passages are meaningless, unless one is in a position to identify the cause of the philological problem as being based upon a faulty Sanskrit manuscript or misinterpretation of its readings.

4.8 In spite of its occasional faults the Sanskrit manuscript shows that the Tibetan version of PST V reflects a Sanskrit version that in general appears to have been similar to the one recorded by the scribe who copied Ms B. In a few places there are minor gaps in PSV V. Since they also occur in T, which for this reason is impossible to construe, it is obvious that the Sanskrit source on which T is based descends from a similar Ms. Apart from minor gaps in Ms B as reflected in T, it is possible to infer from the Tibetan translation that there is one of approximately seven lines between Ms B 237a7 and 238a1. The missing passage is part of Jinendrabuddhi’s comment upon PSV V 46. The commentary of the entire paragraph is reproduced in T, which contains several *pratīkas*; and there is no reason to assume that in the process of the manuscript transmission seven lines

56 Cf. Appendix 3 where the Sanskrit phrase is edited.
of text were suddenly deleted. As the folios contain seven lines recto and verso the conclusion seems inevitable: the otherwise conscientious scribe who copied his manuscript as far as Ms B 237a7 forgot to turn the folio and copy 237b1f; instead he continued copying 238a1f.

4.9 This paragraph is particularly important as it presents Dignāga’s view on pratibhā, which is influenced by Bhartṛhari’s philosophy of language. The Sanskrit restoration of this crucial paragraph is therefore not fully supported by Sanskrit pratīkas, which is a minor problem as it is written with the background of Bhartṛhari’s vocabulary and philosophy of language. It has not been possible to trace the Sanskrit equivalent to the Tibetan term lcags kyu med pa to any of Bhartṛhari’s extant works or his commentators’ explanations. The Tibetan translations lcags kyu med pa yin pa’i phyir ro V : lcags kyu med pa’i phyir ro K reproduce in all likelihood the expression *niraṅkuśatvāt. Surprisingly, I have succeeded in tracing the term to Śaṅkara’s Brahmaśūtrabhāṣya on Brahmaśūtra II.1.3:11. Addressing the nature of utprekṣā Śaṅkara describes it as unfettered, like Dignāga. There is no reason to assume that Śaṅkara’s use of the expression niraṅkuśa stems from Dignāga’s work. On the contrary, it mirrors undoubtedly Bhartṛhari’s vocabulary and an aspect of his philosophy of language about which we are not well informed.57

5 The Sanskrit Restoration of PSV V

5.1 Jinendrabuddhi’s ṭīkā is a valuable source of information on the original Sanskrit version of PSV. With the background of the Sanskrit evidence it is possible to solve many of the nearly inextricable philological difficulties that beset the study of the Tibetan translations of PSV, assuming that Jinendrabuddhi quotes and comments upon the original Sanskrit version of the treatise. This, however, is not absolutely certain as he relied upon information contained in at least one earlier ṭīkā on PSV as I have shown (see 3.14), and he may therefore not always quote from the original Sanskrit version of PSV, but rather from whatever material he found included in the sources that he was using when writing his ṭīkā.

5.2 PST contains a considerable number of pratīkas, which are of inestimable importance for interpreting the vocabulary and syntax of

57 Cf. Translation no.s 574-75.
the Tibetan translations of PSV V: the Sanskrit evidence indicates that Jinendrabuddhi in many cases chose to paraphrase Dignāga’s original Sanskrit exposition in order to present his views in his own words, adding glosses in the well-established manner of Indian commentators, as a means of explaining his terse statements. Thus they are helpful in restoring the Sanskrit text underlying its Tibetan conversions. Jinendrabuddhi also quotes passages from works written by Dignāga’s contemporary opponents like the Sāṅkhya philosopher Mādhava and an unknown Jaina vaibhāgika “distinctionist”, who criticised the *apoha* theory. These examples would indicate that Dignāga in general incorporated into his own presentation, although in slightly edited form, quotations from works written by authors, whose views he addressed. For instance, when writing the important paragraph on *pratibhā* at PSV V: 46, which reflects Dignāga’s intimate knowledge of Bhartṭhari’s philosophy of language, he quotes a slightly edited version of one of Bhartṛhari’s own statements on the topic of *pratibhā* recorded in Vākyapadiyasvārttī I; Dignāga even incorporates into the *pratibhā* section of PSV V pādas lifted from Vākyapadiya. Thus, PSV V: 47 quotes pāda *d* and *c* of VP II 134-35, respectively. And in the passage at PSV V: 50a where Dignāga quotes two verses from VP II: 155-56 he incorporates edited extracts from Bhartṛhari’s *svavṛtti* on these verses.

5.3 Under these circumstances, I have attempted *exempli gratia* to restore as much as possible of PSV V into Sanskrit. I think it is necessary to emphasize, though, that the proposed restorations reflect the nature of their primary sources viz. PŚT and the limited number of quotations of PSV V recorded in independent Sanskrit sources. From a strictly philological point of view all of these are secondary sources. As the occasional differences between the text upon which Jinendrabuddhi comments and the versions recorded in K and V would indicate, the transmission of PSV may not have been uniform, and the fifth chapter is no exception, as the evidence from other chapters of PSV would indicate. This divergence is difficult to understand, unless we assume that the Sanskrit manuscripts of PSV that were in circulation at the time when the two translator teams completed their efforts had been subject to textual changes and interpolations. The difference of readings is reflected, for instance, in the Tibetan versions of the *vṛtti* on PSV V: 3 upon which

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58 See *Translation* no.s 580-81.
59 See *Pind* 2003.
60 The first chapter of PSV is restored by Ernst Steinkellner and published online.
Jinendrabuddhi comments (see 2.14). This paragraph differs markedly from the Tibetan translations of K and V, which, moreover, exhibit individual differences that cannot merely be attributed to incorrect renderings of the Sanskrit manuscripts that Kanakavarman and Vasudharakṣita were translating into Tibetan. In cases like this I have adopted the readings suggested by PST, except when K and V support each other against the readings of PST.

5.4 The Sanskrit restoration is one strictu sensu: the restored paragraphs only comprise those parts of PSV V which PST V and independent sources make it possible to reconstruct with reasonable certainty. I have only attempted to fill in the lacunae in a limited number of cases, where the context and parallels make it possible to suggest a hypothetical restoration that is beyond doubt. These passages are enclosed in < >. As part of the annotations I have also restored passages from other chapters of Dignāga’s PSV based upon critically edited versions of the corresponding paragraphs of Jinendrabuddhi’s PST, when they shed light on issues which Dignāga addresses in PSV V. The text of the restored Sanskrit passages is presented in separate annotations, indicated by square brackets in bold, numbered 1 through 320. For each note, the relevant pratīkās and paraphrases found in PST as well as quotations traced to independent Sanskrit philosophical literature are quoted. In the apparatus I have underlined all words and passages of Jinendrabuddhi’s paraphrases that match the Tibetan versions of K or V. It is thus possible to follow how I interpret the Sanskrit evidence of PST in the light of the Tibetan evidence of K and V, and linguistically justify the proposed Sanskrit restorations. All of the restored kārikās and prose passages of PSV V are combined in a separate Appendix to make it possible to read the restoration without the philological apparatus and text critical remarks. In all, it has been possible to restore approximately eighty percent of the fifty kārikās of PS V and approximately seventy five percent of PSV V.

5.5 The Sanskrit restoration is based upon the following sources:

1. The Tibetan translations recorded in K and V as mentioned above.
2. Sanskrit verse and prose fragments of PS and PSV V quoted as pratīkas in Ms B of PST V.
3. Sanskrit paraphrases of PSV V traced to Ms B of PST V.
4. Sanskrit verse and prose fragments of PSV V quoted in Sanskrit philosophical literature.

Sanskrit quotations or *pratīkas* embedded in PST V do not constitute a philological problem *per se* unless they are contradicted by other sources. If more than one source contradicts a particular reading there is reason to assume that it is dubious. For instance, the reading *vivecitaḥ* that occur in the quotation of PS V 46b at TSP 363,15-16 is contradicted by three sources viz. PST V which reads *vikalpitaḥ* for *vivecitaḥ*, and KV which read *rnam par brtags*, thus corroborating PST V. Whatever the source of this reading might have been, it is clearly secondary and should be rejected as spurious.\(^{61}\) In a similar case Ms B reads *iṣṭā* at PS V 27d as opposed to *tulyā*, the reading recorded at NCV 649,11, which both K and V corroborate. The reading *tulyā* is therefore preferable, especially as the reading *iṣṭā* necessitates a forced and dubious interpretation of the verse in which it occurs.

5.6 In the case of *pratīkas* or Sanskrit quotations from other sources the principle has been to identify the Tibetan words or phrases of K and V that match the Sanskrit quotations. It is sometimes difficult to identify Sanskrit matches, as the syntax of Dignāga’s original Sanskrit writing and relevant terms are not always correctly reproduced in K and V, since the translators were having difficulties interpreting the Sanskrit manuscripts they were translating (see 2.1-15). For instance, the term *kṛtam*, which is syntactically important for understanding the argument at PSV V: 28c-d, is only translated in K.\(^{62}\) It occurs, however, in the paraphrase recorded in Jinendrabuddhi’s *ṭīkā*.\(^{63}\) In a few instances PST V makes it possible to identify a clause that is missing in both K and V, although it is crucial for understanding Dignāga’s thought (see 2.8).

5.7 If the Sanskrit restoration is based exclusively upon Jinendrabuddhi’s paraphrases of Dignāga’s Sanskrit original, the problem of identifying suitable Sanskrit matches is sometimes considerable, especially when the Tibetan readings of K and V are problematic. In such cases the proposed Sanskrit restoration reflects

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\(^{61}\) Abhayadevasūri, who relied on TSP, quotes the verse with the reading *vivecitaḥ* in his commentary on Saṃmatītārkaprakāraṇam Vol. I: 188, 9. Thus, it is not a recent corruption.

\(^{62}\) Cf. *Translation* no.s [189] and 368.

\(^{63}\) Cf PST Ms B 221a3-7 quoted ad loc.
the principle followed by Indian commentators when quoting and commenting on a passage that needs to be elucidated: the terms of the quotation are followed by their glosses. For example, the paraphrase of PSV V: 36ab at PST Ms B 227b5ff reads sāmānyāśabdasya yat kṛtyaṃ pratyāyāyam. tat punaḥ kīḍṛṣam? arthāntaravyudāsaḥ sa svabhedāpratikṣepena. The Tibetan translations show that this paraphrase is basically a verbatim reproduction of the first sentence of Dignāga’s prose commentary on PS V: 36ab including an explanatory gloss pratyāyāyam followed by the rhetorical question tat punaḥ kīḍṛṣam? In the present case K and V do not contain identifiable matches for kṛtyam, which Jinendrabuddhi’s paraphrase would seem to presuppose. Instead of the expected Tibetan reading bya ba both K and V read byas pa (= kṛtam), and one cannot exclude the possibility that this translation reflects the Sanskrit reading of their manuscripts, although it is incomprehensible in the context, unless kṛtam is interpreted as a neuter ta-participle which is well established as an action noun similar to kṛtyam in terms of its semantics.

5.8 Fortunately the reading kṛtyam is quoted by Simhasūri at NCV 730,1ff followed by the gloss vyāpārah: sāmānyāśabdasya hi sadāder yo ’rthāntaravyudāso “asan na bhavati” iti kṛtyaṃ vyāpārah sa tvayetham avadhāritaḥ svabhedāpratikṣepetī. In this case the gloss vyāpārah “function” covers as a matter of fact the denotation of kṛtyam much better than Jinendrabuddhi’s gloss pratyāyāyam. Simhasūri’s quotation contains the crucial particle hi, which is to be construed with iti. But Jinendrabuddhi’s paraphrase omits hi. As kṛtyam occurs in an identical context in PST and NCV the reading is beyond doubt and we can safely adopt it for the purpose of restoring the original Sanskrit phrase. If Jinendrabuddhi’s paraphrases do not contain any identifiable glosses and his exposition matches the Tibetan translations of V or K, it is reasonable to assume that he reproduces the Sanskrit version of PSV V in the form that was known to him with minor syntactical adjustments to his own presentation, like the omission of the particle hi.

5.9 Sometimes Jinendrabuddhi resorts to the use of analytical strings (vigraha) as commentators often do in order to explain the scope of technical terms. For instance, the term naimittika that occurs in the restored phrase naimittikeṣu śabdeṣu at PSV V: 50a is explained

65 The semantics of kṛtyam encountered in Buddhist Sanskrit literature imitates MI kiccam.
at MS B 238b2-3 as follows: *naimittikeṣu śabdeṣu, which Jinendrabuddhi’s explanation corroborates. The original loc. pl. of the Sanskrit phrase is reproduced in the following explanation which introduces the loc. pl. teṣu. This pronominal locative merely has the function of imitating the original locative pl. of the definition of *naimittikeṣu śabdāḥ, from which we only have to extract the term śabdāḥ in order to restore the original Sanskrit phrase. Thus the grammatical structure of Dignāga’s text is carefully reflected in Jinendrabuddhi’s explanation, which makes it possible to restore the original sentence complement in the locative: *naimittikeṣu śabdeṣu. This restoration matches the syntax of the Tibetan translations of K and V and is mirrored in the subsequent noun phrase yāḍrcchikeṣu tu katham, which Jinendrabuddhi subsequently quotes.
6 Dignāga’s philosophy of anyāpoha

6.1 The objective of this study is to present an analysis of the essential features of Dignāga’s *apoha* thesis as expounded in PSV V, which is a crucial complement to Dignāga’s philosophy of inference as it presents the only definite exposition of his theory of induction. Dignāga develops in this central chapter the idea that joint absence (*vyatiraka*) of word and referent in contrast to their joint presence (*anvaya*) defines exclusion of other referents and simultaneously justifies the invariable concomitance of word or speech element and the thing denoted. Thus, by extension, joint absence establishes the invariable connection between the logical indicator (*liṅga*) and the thing indicated (*liṅgin*) because Dignāga claims that verbal cognition is subject to the same constraints as those that characterize knowledge obtained through inference.

6.2 All sources indicate that anyāpoha was conceived as a substitute for real general properties. Kumārila claims, for instance, in the first *śloka* of his *apoha* critique, that exclusion of non-cows as *sāmānyya* in principle does not differ from the general property cowhood (*gotva*) as real entity (*vastu*), and Dignāga rejects the assumption that real general properties are real entities. Kamalaśīla explains that Kumārila’s use of the term *sāmānyya* in his presentation of the *apoha* doctrine presupposes Dignāga’s thesis that the general property (*sāmānyya*) as denotable object is characterized by exclusion (*apohalakṣaṇāṃ*). The question is, however, in what way *apoha* could be presented as a general property like *sāmānyya*, which contemporary Sanskrit grammarians and non-Buddhist philosophers assumed is the semantic condition for the application of words (*pravṛttinimitta*). As the Buddhists reject as untenable the idea that extramental real general properties inherent in the object of denotation are grounds of application of words, they were somehow forced to present a theoretically consistent explanation of the cause of denotation, which dispenses with real general properties like existence.

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66 The analysis draws on the explanations of crucial paragraphs of PSV V presented in the annotations to the translation.

67 Cf. the frequently quoted statement, which Buddhist writers attribute to Dignāga: *apohah śabdalingāḥkhyām eva pratipādyate*. See PVSV 25,27f; TSP 367, 17 commenting on Kumārila’s statement at ŚV Apohāvāda 73ab: *na cānyavyāvṛtti-muktā pravṛttih śabdalingayoh*.

68 Cf. TSP p. 360, 15: *apohalakṣaṇāṃ sāmānyam vācyatvenābhidhiyamānam*. 
(sattā) and substanteness (dravyatva) or the like. The *apoha* theory is thus very much part of the contemporary Indian philosophical scene at the time when Dignāga propounded his *apoha* doctrine. He addresses the inherent ontological difficulties that attach to the thesis of real general properties in the second chapter of PSV II:16 and substitutes *anyāpoha* for real general properties, claiming at PSV V: 36d that *anyāpoha* has the same properties as real general properties without being subject to the same absurd consequences as the thesis that real general properties constitute the semantic condition for denotation.

6.3 In PSV V Dignāga also claims that words denote things (*bhāva*) as qualified by preclusion (*nivṛtti*) of other referents (*arthanivṛttivisista*). In a theoretically related fragment—presumably from the SPVṣy—we find a similar phrase which substitutes *vastu* for *bhāva*, claiming that the referent is a real object qualified by preclusion: *nivṛttivisistaṃ vastu śabdārthaḥ*. It is thus clear that the śabdārtha qualified by *nivṛtti* is conceived as a real object (*vastu*) or entity (*bhāva*). These definitions of denotation and the concomitant function of *nivṛtti* raise the obvious question of what a term like *nivṛtti* denotes in this particular context. Neither *nivṛtti* nor its synonyms have verbal implications *per se*. In grammatical contexts *nivṛtti* is recorded in the sense of cessation or removal and is thus semantically related to *apoha* in the sense of exclusion. It is difficult, however, to relate these terms and their well attested denotations to verbal knowledge and inference as described by Dignāga in PSV V.

6.4 Dignāga’s *apoha* doctrine and its basic presuppositions as presented in PSV V were never adopted by post-Dignāga Buddhist scholars without modifications. Their views on *anyāpoha* were inevitably influenced by the works of the central Buddhist philosopher Dharmakīrti, and post-Dharmakīrti thinkers. In fact, the theory of knowledge underlying the original version of the *apoha* doctrine as expounded in PSV V is incompatible with its subsequent elaboration by Dharmakīrti. In spite of an undeniable family likeness between Dignāga’s original theory and Dharmakīrti’s version of it, there are substantial differences between them, and we must differentiate between Dignāga’s views and those of Dharmakīrti and later generations of Buddhist thinkers. Thus it is obvious that the

69 Cf. PSV II: 16 restored and translated no. 504.
70 Cf. the crucial paragraph PSV V: 36d.
71 Cf. Translation no. 182.
expression “apoha theory” does not designate a uniform theory with an invariable set of theoretical presuppositions. This study therefore aims at shedding light on the theoretical obscurities of the *apoha* theory by focusing on some of Dignāga’s statements in PSV V, which are crucial to our understanding of its basic presuppositions, and hopefully thereby paving the way for an in-depth study of what suggested to Dharmakīrti to reformulate, in his remarkable œuvre, some of the basic presuppositions of the *apoha* doctrine in the light of the criticism it met with.

**Verbal knowledge as inference**

6.5 There is one assumption whose importance far outweighs all other elements of the *apoha* theory: Dignāga’s claim that verbal knowledge (śābda) and inference (anumāna) share the same properties. He rejects the commonly acknowledged doctrine that verbal knowledge presupposes the existence of real general properties inherent in things. In PSV II:16\(^{72}\) he addresses its absurd consequences and substitutes *anyāpoha* for real general properties, claiming that exclusion has the same properties as real general properties without being subject to the same consequences. Thus Dignāga presents the *apoha* theory as a theoretical achievement superior to the doctrine of real general properties.\(^{73}\) The question is in what way it is possible for Dignāga to maintain that there is a functional homology of exclusion or preclusion of other referents and real general properties without generating an ontological *aporia* similar to the one he has shown pertains to the thesis of real general properties. In the first paragraph of PSV V:1 Dignāga propounds the fundamental hypothesis of the *apoha* theory, that verbal knowledge (śābda) does not differ from inference (anumāna)\(^{74}\) since a word denotes its referent (artha) by means of exclusion of other referents (*anyāpoha*) in the same way as indicators like “being produced” (*kṛtakatva*). And Dignāga continues explaining that when a word is

\(^{72}\) Cf. *Translation* no. 504 where PSV II: 16 is restored and translated.

\(^{73}\) Cf. PSV V: 36d where its superior merits (*guṇotkarṣa*) are mentioned; cf. *Translation*.

\(^{74}\) This assumption, however, was re-interpreted by Dignāga’s influential commentator, Dharmakīrti, whose work was to dominate Buddhist epistemology and logic for centuries. Dharmakīrti’s work shows that the inferential nature of verbal cognition was no longer of any theoretical concern because he re-interprets Dignāga’s original statement about the inferential nature of verbal cognition in such a way that the inference is presented as one of the speaker’s intention (*vivaksā*) and not the referent (artha) as Dignāga originally assumed. Cf. *Translation* no. 9.
applied to an object (viṣaya) it denotes any given part or attribute (āmsa) of it by exclusion of other referents (artha), like the general property “being produced”, which excludes things that are not produced (akṛtaka).

6.5 The reason why Dignāga introduces the abstract term kṛtakatva in the context of explaining that verbal cognition is inferential, is to show that exclusion of other referents (anyāpoha) is in fact equivalent to a general property (sāmānya). This is shown by an important passage at PSV V:33ab in which Dignāga explains that:

In the exact same way as the general property (sāmānyam) ‘being produced’ (kṛtakatvam) is [explained] to indicate ‘impermanence’ (anītyatvagamakam) through its exclusion of what is not a product (akṛtakavyudāseṇa), the general property in a word (śabde) is explained [to be] due to its exclusion of other words (śabdāntarvyavacchedena); and only through this (tenaiva ca) does it indicate its referent (arthapratyāyakaḥ).

Although this explanation is intended to describe what constitutes the general property in a word (śabde) the explanation is evidently presented on the analogy of the general property in a referent (arthe), which by definition is characterized as sāmānyalakṣaṇa. Thus, Dignāga’s explanation makes it possible to conclude that the general property “being produced” (kṛtakatva) qualifies produced things (kṛtaka) by excluding them from things that are not produced (akṛtaka). Dignāga rejects the view that general properties are ontologically singular entities inherent in things, but he does not reject the idea that there are general properties, although of a different order. In fact, he defines general properties as exclusion of other, which leads to the question of how he justifies establishing an invariable connection between indicator and indicated and word and referent with the background of preclusion or exclusion of other.

6.7 Dignāga’s theory of knowledge is characterised by a well-known set of dichotomies. The object of immediate sensation (pratyakṣa) is the svalakṣaṇa, i.e. the individual character of things, which by definition is beyond linguistic representation. The object of the indicator or the word and the thing indicated or the referent is the sāmānyalakṣaṇa, i.e. the general character of things, and the

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75 Cf. Translation PSV V: 33ab.
76 For the implications of Dignāga’s introduction of the abstract affix tva after kṛtaka, cf. Translation no. 14.
śāṁśaṇa is according to Dignāgan epistemology the domain of inference and language. The term śāṁśaṇa is rarely used in PSV and Dignāga never defines its exact scope, but limits himself to state without any qualifications that it is the object of inference and verbal communication. However, the explanation at PSV I 2c2-d1 is in a way an implicit definition of the content of the term:

śvasāṁśaṇābhyaḥ hy avyapadesyavarnatvabhyaḥ varṇaṁ grhitvā nityatayā cāṇityaṁ varṇaṁī tamāḥ saṁdhatte.

“For having perceived a colour or the like through its individual and general characters, i.e., through what is not denotable and colourless, [respectively], as well as through [the general property] impermanence, one combines [the two] at the thought: “Colour, etc., is impermanent.”

In this phrase we notice the distinction Dignāga makes between the general property varṇatva, i.e. colourness and the term varṇa denoting a particular colour. He also introduces the abstract term anityatā in order to explain the judgement “colour or the like (varṇādi) is impermanent (anityam).” Although Dignāga never defines śāṁśaṇa and the implications of this term in the context of Dignāga’s ontology and theory of knowledge have never been answered, it is clear as shown by PSV V:33ab quoted above that śāṁṇya is defined in terms of exclusion of other referents.

6.8 Exclusion of other referents presupposes that the relation (sambandha) between the word and the thing it denotes is subject to the constraints of invariable concomitance (avinābhāva): they are supposed to be in invariably concomitant (avinābhāvīn) in the same way as the logical indicator and the indicated. Dignāga assumes that the relation (sambandha) between the word and its referent is comparable to that of the inferential sign (hetu or linga) and the thing it indicates, which shows that Dignāga established his philosophy of language on the basis of his logical theory. This is confirmed by a passage in the chapter on the role of exemplification (drṣṭānta) presented at PSV IV.578 in which he explains the connection between the word and its referent in terms of the rules that must be observed for establishing the connection between the indicator and the thing indicated. In other words, they are subject to the triple constraints of the trairūpya.79 The

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77 For a translation and analysis of this phrase, cf. Translation no. 1.
78 Cf. Translation no. 9.
79 Cf. Translation no. 9.
severe criticism which Kumārila, for instance, levelled at Dignāga’s view of śabda as similar to the logical reason of an inference takes this assumption for granted, and PSV V and contemporary sources indicate beyond doubt that Dignāga established the apoha theory on the analogy of his philosophy of logic.

6.9 Thus the postulated similarity of the logical indicator and the word are fundamental to the apoha theory. The question is how Dignāga avoids the absurd implication that the word occurs at the thing it indicates in the same way, for instance, as the logical indicator smoke, which could justifiably be said to occur at the thing it indicates viz. fire. His presentation and vocabulary makes constant use of the locative to denote the referent, which any word denotes. However, words do not occur at their referents like logical indicators. The word ‘smoke,’ for instance, does not occur at smoke, nor at fire. The theory would thus seem to be based upon patently absurd assumptions. Dignāga’s critic, Kumārila, subjected this apparent absurdity to a thorough examination in the Śabdapariccheda chapter of his Śloka-vārttika. The problem relates to the semantics of the locative and the ambiguities entailed by the application of the trairūpya to the presuppositions of verbal knowledge without adjusting the expressions of the theory of logic to a different although comparable context, that of verbal knowledge.

6.10 Since Dignāga elaborated the apoha thesis on the basis of his philosophy of logic, it is essential to understand how the connection (sambandha) between a term and the thing it denotes is established as invariably connected (avinaḥbhāvin). In PSV V: 50b towards the very end of the chapter, Dignāga describes how the connection between the word “panasa”, breadfruit tree, and a prototypical instance of a breadfruit tree is taught. The discussion centres on the question of whether or not verbal cognition is comparable to inference in the situation where someone is taught the denotation of words. Dignāga answers that learning the denotation of a word is not inference because learning the denotation of a word is the condition of apoha and thus of verbal cognition as inference. This paragraph addresses the process of

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80 See Kumārila’s criticism at ŚV Śabdapariccheda 68-98. Cf. 6.9 below.
81 Dignāga’s statements are ambiguous as their interpretation depends upon the meaning of his use of the locative. See PSV V: 34 and Translation nos 416, 419 where I suggest that it is possible to interpret the use of the locative in terms that are compatible with its use in Sanskrit grammatical literature and lexicography.
vyutpatti: teaching the denotation of a word by ostentation (hastasamjñā).

6.11 Dignāga’s description of vyutpatti assumes that someone points to a prototypical example of a breadfruit tree, and explains “this is a breadfruit tree” (ayam panasa). Thereby the learner understands the connection between the term “panasa” and the thing it denotes. Dignāga puts weight on the deitic function of the demonstrative pronoun “this” (ayam) which accompanies the ostentation because the syntactical agreement between the pronoun and the term “panasa,” the name of the object, secures the grammatical validity of the reference. In PSV V: 50c Dignāga continues explaining that the connection (sambandha) between the word and its referent is mentally constructed at the thought “this is the word for that thing.” Vyutpatti thus implicates two separate moments: first, the moment of learning how a term is used by observing its application to its referent, and second, the subsequent moment of constructing the connection in the mind (manas). Dignāga closes the paragraph by pointing out that the connection between any term and the thing it denotes is similar to the connection between inference and inferred (anumānānumeya-sambandha).

6.12 However, the mentally constructed connection needs to be reified. That is, the person who is learning the denotation of a name like the word “panasa” or any other term through vyutpatti must ascertain that it refers to all instances of the breadfruit tree and not only to the prototype, which his teacher is showing him. However, it is impossible to justify the invariable connection of the term panasa and its referent, the breadfruit tree, by showing how it applies to every single instance as instances are infinite. Dignāga addresses the problem at PSV V:2b that a general term like “existent” does not denote all particulars (bheda) because

it is impossible (aśakyah) to tell (kartum) the connection (sambandhaḥ) of particulars [with a general term like ‘existent’] when they are infinite; and as the connection of the word [with particulars] is not told (akrtasambandhe śābde), it is not justified that it denotes its referent because merely its own form is cognized (svarūpamātrapratiṭeḥ).

82 In a different context Dignāga explains that vyutpatti relates to observed instances of referents (drṣṭārtha), in other instances to those that are not observed (adṛṣṭārtha). Cf. Translation no. 631.
Denotation thus presupposes that the connection of a term like “existent” and its referent is established, which is not possible on the assumption that its connection with every particular instance is ascertained by enumeration showing every single referent, as particulars are infinite. In addition the use of the word “existent” is ambiguous as it denotes many different things like substances or qualities and so on. As mentioned above Dignāga addresses the problem of infinity of particulars at PSV V:2ab and presents at PSV V: 34 a solution to this classical problem of induction.

6.13 He explains at that

the word’s connection is feasible (sambandhasaukaryam) and there is no ambiguity (vyabhicāritā) as it is not observed (adrṣṭēḥ) [to apply] to the referent of other words and is also (api) observed (darśanāt) [to apply] to a member (aṃśe) of its own referent.

The explanation pivots on the implication of “observation” (darśana) and “non-observation” (adrṣṭi) because Dignāga claims that the feasibility of the connection (sambandhasaukarya) depends upon the application of e.g. the term “existent” to an example of its referent and non-observation of its application to the referent of other words. The question is what the two terms imply in terms of theory of cognition. The following explanation gives the answer: Dignāga assumes that non-observation is the fundamental element of the process of reification. In fact, he equates non-observation to joint absence of word and referent and observation to their joint presence:

For (hi) joint presence and joint absence (anvayavyatirekau) are a means (dvāram) to the word’s denoting its referent. And these two are its application to what is similar and its non-application to what is dissimilar. In this case, however (tu), application to all that is similar is by necessity not statable with regard to any [referent] whatsoever (kva cit) because stating it is impossible (ākhyānāsambhavāt) as the referent is infinite (arthasyānāntye).

On the other hand, stating its non-application to what is dissimilar is possible, even though it is infinite (atulye saty apy ānāntye), through mere non-observation (adarśanāmātrena); and just therefore (ata eva ca) it has been explained that [the word’s] denoting its own referent (svārthaḥbhidhānam) is an inference from [its own referent’s] exclusion from these [other referents] (tadvyavacchedānāntye), from its not being observed [to apply] to other [referents] than its own relata (svasambandhibhhyo ‘nyatraadarsanāt).

6.14 Dignāga thus claims that it is easy to justify the connection by means of joint presence (anvaya) and absence (vyatireka) but he omits
addressing the implications of the term \( (saukarya) \). We must therefore assume that the meaning of the term was evident to contemporary philosophers and that there was no need for explaining its implications. Dignāga’s presentation shows that the feasibility of the connection \( (sambandhasaukaryam) \) depends on the fact that the word is observed to apply to an instance of its referent and not observed to apply to the referents of other words. Non-observation, however, is of a different order than that of temporarily not observing a referent that is not where it would be expected to be, because it has been removed from its locus. It is noteworthy that Dignāga’s use of non-observation does not address non-observation of things that have been temporarily removed from their expected place, but rather the universal non-existence in time and space of other things in the locus of the thing to which the indicator refers, and the same goes for the word and its denotation. Thus non-observation ascertains the non-occurrence of other words or indicators in a context where the observer is able to perceive that e.g. the word “tree” denotes a tree and not any other thing with which it is incompatible in terms of its nature and the word used to denote it, and on the basis of this observation to generalize the non-existence of other things in the locus of the referent, and thereby to ascertain the invariable concomitance of word and referent.

6.15 Dignāga’s use of the term “feasibility” becomes clear from the writings of non-buddhist philosophers, who address the implications of \( sambandhasaukaryam \). Dignāga presupposes that a person who is being taught the connection of word and referent \( (vyutpti) \) by ostentation \( (hastasamjñā) \) is standing in some place \( (ekadesastha) \) next to a prototypical instance of the referent \( (artha) \), i.e., a member \( (aṃśa) \) of the domain of similar referents. A knowledgeable person points to the referent explaining that “this \( x \) is \( y \)”. As the referent thus defined occurs in a particular locus and no special conditions apply to it and its locus, the \( ekadesastha \) may reify the application of \( y \) to any given \( x \) through the means of their joint presence \( (anvaya) \) and absence \( (vyatireka) \), their joint absence being ascertained merely through not observing \( (adarśanamātra) \) the application of \( y \) to any other thing but the referent \( x \), inferring that \( y \) denotes all instances of similar things to the exclusion of all things occurring in the domain of dissimilar things.

6.16 As mere non-observation of other things in the locus of the prototypical \( aṃśa \) is easily performed, Dignāga assumes that the reification of the connection between \( y \) and \( x \) is feasible on the basis of
mere non-observation, emphasizing the role of vyatireka, joint absence, as the primary means of establishing the connection, the object of non-observation being the non-existence (abhāva) of other referents in the locus of the prototypical example. It is therefore understandable that vyatireka was interpreted as the primary cause of exclusion being supported by mere non-observation of the word’s application to the referents of other words. It is obvious that non-observation in this case does not refer to temporary non-observation of referents that might have been observed to occur in the locus of the taught referent on other occasions. The absense of other referents is substantial: no non-tree (avrkṣa) is ever observed where a tree (vṛkṣa) is found. It is therefore possible to conclude from the use of any given term that the referents of other words are not found in the locus of the referent of a particular word which therefore excludes them from its scope. It is thus obvious that verbal knowledge as inference is based upon joint absence of word and referent, which presupposes the non-existence (abhāva) of other things in the locus of the thing inferred.

6.17 Only on this assumption is it possible to avoid the paradox of uncertainty and the ensuing doubt about the nature of the referent. As Dignāga explains:

If, however, the inference were by means of joint presence (anvayadvārena), the word ‘tree’ should not give rise to doubt (saṃśayah) appearing as śimśapā, etc. (śimśapādyābhāṣah), about one and the same entity (ekasmiṃ vastunī). Yet, in the same way as there is doubt about it, there will also be doubt appearing as earthenness and substanteness, etc. However, since the word ‘tree’ is not observed to denote what is non-earthen, etc., the inference is only by means of joint absence (vyatirekamukhenatīva).

In this explanation Dignāga addresses the implications of verbal knowledge as inference. The explanation addresses the extension of individual terms. The term “tree,” for instance, denotes different kinds of trees such as the śimśapā or the like. The argument addresses the logical implications of basic predication: a śimśapā is a tree, and a tree is an earthen object, and a substance, and so on. As there are more trees than śimśapās, and more earthen things than trees, and more substances than earthen things, the individual terms are related in a logical hierarchy according to their individual extension, which makes it possible to infer from the application of the term śimśapā that it is a tree (vṛkṣa), earthen (pārthīva), and a substance (dravya), and existent (san) and knowable (jñeya). Consequently the inference is based upon joint absence as it presupposes the exclusion of all non-trees from any
tree, which is the function of the word “tree,” and only exclusion of non-trees ascertains the validity of the inference. This raises the question of the purpose of a term like “non-tree.”

6.18 Dignāga addresses this question in the commentary on PSV V:43b, which is a crucial paragraph of the apoha chapter:

For the [word] does not exclude a different general property (anyām jātim) for each individual substance (pratidravyam), but rather (kiṃ tarhi) with the intention of denoting the things to be excluded (vyavacchedyavivakṣayā) by means of a single general property (ekena sāmānyadharmanena). And on this point it has been explained (uktām cātra) that the inference [of the referent] is from mere non-observation [of the word’s application] to what belongs to the class of dissimilar things (vijātiye ’darśanamātreṇānumnam).

Any word or speech element is thus seen to denote a prototypical observed instance of the referent but not to denote things that fall outside the scope of denotation of the word whose connection is being taught, i.e. anything that is dissimilar to the referent. Thus observation is context bound, as learning the denotation of any term relates to observation of individual instances of the referent and individual instances of the word applied to denote the referent. However, an inferential rule has to be established which makes it possible to infer that the word “tree” denotes the referent tree irrespective of its individual character. Whatever is dissimilar to the prototypical object is characterized by a single property (ekadharman) which is its being non-x. In order to express the absence of the property of being non-x in things that are x Dignāga coined the negative term non-x, which has the purpose to denote the single property (dharma) of things that are non-x. Thus the term non-x is derived from the positive term x by means of vivakṣā as a convenient means for denoting things that are dissimilar to any x. The terms “tree” and “non-tree” mirror a privative relation that concerns the non-existence of non-x in the locus of any x. Although Dignāga does not attribute reality to things that are aggregates of atoms, which are the only ultimate things that are ontologically real, it is obvious nonetheless that objects have a derived secondary reality, in spite of which it is still possible to maintain that cows or trees are discernible entities to which one may refer by the word “cow” or “tree”.

6.19 This leads inevitably to the conclusion that the inferential status of verbal cognition is based upon the fact that any instance of a thing is dually marked: by its individual character which is only
accessible through perception and as such inexpressible and by its
general character which is defined by exclusion, as the identity of any
given cow as the referent of the word “cow” is due to the fact that it
excludes non-cows. It is not possible to construe non-existence of non-
cows in the locus of any cow as an instance of double negation on
which many discussions about apoha pivot. However, double negation
does not exist. The word non-cow for instance is merely a secondary
derivative of the word cow. It has been coined to denote anything that
is not a cow: a typical apoha inference therefore reads “it is a cow as it
is not a non-cow.” Non-cow, however, is only a generalized referent
denoting the single property (ekadharma) that defines the negated
referent of the word cow.

6.20 Dignāga equates verbal cognition to inference by means of
joint absence (vyatirekamukha), which explains why commentators
compare apoha to vyatireka and unanimously refer to Dignāga’s
apoha theory as “having joint absence as the chief thing”
(vyatirekapradhāna). Classical Indian scholars interpret vyatireka as
characterized by non-existence (abhāvalaṅkāra), and Dignāga
assumes that joint absence of word (śabda) and referent (artha) is
equivalent to mutual non-existence of any speech unit and non-speech
unit and any referent and non-referent, which is implied by his claim
that existence of the nature of one thing presupposes the non-existence
of the nature of other things. Jayamiśra, Kumārila’s commentator,
interprets apoha in terms of itaretarābhāva “mutual non-existence,”
which mirrors Dignāga’s basic assumption that apoha presupposes
mutual non-existence of excluded and not excluded. With this
background this study will address Dignāga’s attribution of all the
commonly acknowledged features of real general properties to
exclusion.

6.21 Dignāga evidently conceived apoha as a substitute for real
general properties. As mentioned above (5.2) the remarkable mīmaṃ-
saka philosopher Kumārila attributes the view to Dignāga that
exclusion of non-cows (agonivṛtti) is equivalent to a general property

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83 Cf. PSV V: 34: vyatirekamukhenai vānumānam.
84 Cf. Translation no 188; Pind 1999: § 8. Kumārila’s commentator Jayamiśra refers
to followers of Dignāga’s apoha theory as vyatirekavādins. cf. ŚVT 46, 18.
85 Cf. Translation no 425.
86 Cf. Translation PSV V: 45 and the statement: ātmāntarābhāva ātmāntaram iti.
87 Cf. e.g. Translation no.s 466, 517, 523.
Śāntarakṣita quotes the verse at TS 914 and his commentator Kamalaśīla explains that exclusion of non-cows as general property means general property as qualified by exclusion (apohalakṣaṇāṃ sāmānyam), and elsewhere he expressly equates apoha to non-existence (abhāva). This interpretation of the underlying purpose of the apoha theory is, for instance, confirmed by Kumārila, who states loc. cit. that “it is obvious that those who imagine that exclusion of non-cows (agonivṛtti) is the denotable general property (sāmānyya) have designated by the term “exclusion of non-cows” (agopohagir) nothing else but [the general property] cowhood (gotva) which is a real object (vastu).” Kumārila’s conclusion is clear: apoha is just another name for sāmānyya, general property. Thus he indirectly corroborates the assumption that apoha is a substitute for general properties. However, the role of apoha as semantic justification for denotation similar to that of real general properties leaves many questions unanswered.

6.22 Kumārila continues his criticism asking Dignāga to explain "what the entities (bhāva) [viz. cows] are, whose nature consists in exclusion of horses or the like (aśvādinivṛttyātma), as it has been explained [viz. by me, Kumārila] that a non-entity (abhāva) is equivalent to another entity (bhāvāntaram).” Thus, Kumārila, on the one hand, equates preclusion or exclusion, nivṛtti or apoha, with the category of general property (sāmānyya), on the other hand, he interprets Dignāga’s view of exclusion as involving nothing but the privative opposition between different entities (bhāva), one being the negation of the other and thus a non-entity (abhāva), which Kumārila interprets as just a different entity (bhāvāntaram). Kumārila’s observation is not invented ad hoc. Indeed, there are statements in the fifth chapter of PSV that corroborate Kumārila’s introductory remarks of the apohavāda chapter of Ślokavārttika; and Dharmakīrti, for instance, addresses the question of how the general property is exclusion of other referents (katham idānīm anyāpohah sāmānyam) at PVSV 39,1ff in an important and theoretically charged paragraph of the

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88 Cf. ŚV Apohavāda 1: agonivṛttiḥ sāmānyam vācyam yaiḥ parikalpitam / gotvam vastv eva tair uktam apogohagirā sphutam.
89 Cf. Dharmakīrti’s definition of the general property of referents as qualified by exclusion: arthānām yac ca sāmānyam anyavyāvṛttilakṣaṇam, yanniṣṭhās ta ime śabdā, na rūpaṃ tasya kiñcana, PV II 30ab.
90 Cf. TSP p. 960,15.
91 Cf. ŚV Apohavāda 1-2. Kumārila connects elsewhere in ŚV apoha as sāmānyya to abhāva; cf. the important discussion in Śūnyavāda 135ff.
apoha section of PVSV. 92 And the assumption that anyāpoha is equivalent to sāmānya is mentioned by Jinendrabuddhi too in an interesting discussion recorded in PSV II:4c. 93 However, the question is, in what way apoha could be presented as a general property in contrast to real general properties as semantic condition for the application of words (pravṛttinimitta). Since the Buddhists rejected as untenable the idea that extramental real general properties inherent in things are grounds of application of words, they were somehow forced to present a theoretically consistent explanation of the cause of denotation, which dispenses with real general properties like existence (sattā) and substanteness (dravyatva) or the like.

6.23 The apoha thesis is centred on exclusion as qualifier of the referent of any word. In a central passage Dignāga claims that words denote things (bhāva) as qualified by preclusion (nivṛtti) of other referents (arthāntaranivṛtti viśiṣṭa). 94 In a theoretically related fragment—presumably from the SPVy—we find a similar phrase which substitutes vastu for bhāva, claiming that the referent is a real

92 I made the following observation in Pind 1991 p. 271-72: “One thing is clear: the apoha theory represents Dignāga’s solution to the epistemological problem raised by his denial of the existence of universals (jāti or sāmānya). As is well-known, they were conceived by the Nyāyavaiśeṣika tradition as ubiquitous entities inherent in substances (dravya), thereby differentiating them (viśiṣṭa) as belonging to a certain class of things having certain definable features. In fact, Dignāga’s apoha theory only becomes fully understandable when we realize that he used it as a substitute for universals, in contexts where the Nyāyavaiśeṣika school of philosophy would formulate its theories with reference to the existence of universals. Thus, for instance, the Dignāgan expression arthāntaranivṛtti viśiṣṭa is the exact equivalent of the Nyāyavaiśeṣika jātivisīṣṭa. Moreover, in the important section of the vṛtti on PS V 36d [q.v.], he explicitly attributes the properties of the Nyāyavaiśeṣika universal (jāti) to the apoha ... It appears from a revealing passage in the vṛtti ad PS II 16, in which Dignāga shows the consequences of the assumption that universals are real entities, that certain philosophers attempted to solve the problem of how to justify the existence of universally valid connections between properties [e.g., between smoke and fire], by claiming that knowing the universal in a single substratum is equivalent to knowing it in all. This claim is understandable since it was tacitly assumed that universals would always instantiate in the same way. Hence they could serve as a means of establishing universally valid connections of the kind that was required by the development of contemporary logical theory. However, if one rejects the idea of the universal as untenable, one is left with the problem of accounting for the possibility of universally valid connections. Dignāga evidently solved this fundamental epistemological problem with reference to the apoha theory.”

93 Cf. Translation no. 2.2 (1) where Jinendrabuddhi’s explanation is quoted and translated.

94 Cf. the crucial paragraph PSV V: 36d.
object qualified by preclusion: nivṛttiṁ śabdārthaṁ vastu śabdārthah.\textsuperscript{95} It is thus clear that the śabdārtha is conceived as a real object (vastu) or entity (bhāva) qualified by nivṛtti. These definitions of denotation and the concomitant function of nivṛtti raise the obvious question of what a term like nivṛtti denotes in this particular context. Neither nivṛtti nor its synonyms have verbal implications per se. In grammatical contexts nivṛtti is recorded in the sense of cessation or removal, which implies preclusion and is thus semantically related to apoha in the sense of exclusion. It is difficult, however, to relate these terms and their well attested denotations to verbal knowledge and inference as described by Dignāga in PSV V. In order to understand the implications of Dignāga’s statements it is necessary to review each of his claims. In the first place it is necessary to address the claim that verbal knowledge is inferential, because it presupposes invariable connection, i.e. concomitance between the word and its referent.

6.24 The evidence recorded in PSV V clarifies the issue. It shows unexpectedly that the apoha theory pivots on the concept of non-existence (abhāva) and describes non-existence of other referents or words in the referent (arthe) or in the word (śabde) as the foundation of preclusion of things and words, thus seemingly imitating well-established philosophical usage among Sanskrit grammarians and non-Buddhist philosophers: it is not inherent real general properties in things or words that are the causes of application of words and identity of words, but rather non-existence or preclusion of other, whether things or words. Thus Dignāga attributes the properties of real general properties to exclusion of other referents. A crucial passage at PSV V: 45 explains that the statement that “the nature of one thing is the non-existence of the nature of other things” (ātmāntarābhāva ātmāntaram iti), has been formulated with regard to (prati) the denotable [object].” Thus the sāmānyalakṣaṇa lies outside the domain of perception and must be considered an abstract entity comparable to a type.

6.25 The main question is in what way it is possible for Dignāga to maintain that non-existence of other things understood as exclusion or preclusion of other referents and real general properties are homologous without generating an aporia similar to the one that pertains to the thesis that each general property inherent in every single object of denotation is the cause of application of words (pravṛttinimitta). Dignāga’s claim at PSV V: 36d that properties

\textsuperscript{95} Cf. Translation no. 182.
(dharma) of exclusion like “being one, eternity, and extension to each single particular” (ekatvanityatvapratyekapariparimāpti) are similar to those of real general properties (jāti)\(^{96}\) is difficult to understand with the background of apoha as characterized by joint absence (vyatireka) or non-existence (abhāva). Dignāga’s justification for this claim is particularly illuminating.

6.26 He explains that these properties are confined to exclusion because (1) [exclusion of other referents] is not a particular (abhedā), because (2) its substratum is not discontinued (āśrayasyāvicchedāt), and because (3) its referent is cognized completely (kṛtārthapratītā).

The explanation first addresses the question of the distribution of apoha among the particulars like a real general property whose postulated oneness (ekatva) is transformed into a particular because of its distribution among the particulars. This argument is only understandable with the background of the postulate that “exclusion of other referents,” anyāpoha is qualified by non-existence (abhāva) of other referents in the referent. And non-existence is not, like real general properties, divisible because mere non-existence as qualifier of things implies absence of other things from their substrata. It is noteworthy that Dignāga introduces the term āśraya, substratum, to justify that anyāpoha is eternal like general properties, because this term was commonly used among contemporary grammarians and philosophers to denote the substratum of real general properties. The argument seems obscure, but Dignāga intends to explain that since apoha has substrates and as substrates of non-existence are not discontinued, anyāpoha is eternal. The substratum of anyāpoha thus mirrors the objects (vastu) or things (bhāva) which according to Dignāga are qualified by preclusion of other referents (anyārtha-nivrūttivīśaṭa). As all substrata of the same kind are qualified by non-existence of other referents Dignāga concludes that their knowledge is comprised by exclusion of other referents. It is noteworthy that Dignāga takes care to emphasize that exclusion is not just another type of general property (bhāva)\(^{97}\). However, non-existence per se is an

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\(^{96}\) Cf. PSV V: 36d.

\(^{97}\) Cf. PSV V: 36c; 38d; cf. Simhasūri’s critique at NCV 735.17-18: abhāvāntarātvād arthāntarāpohasyāpohavān arthāḥ śabdavācyo na bhavati, ato nāpohaviśeṣanām nāpohavān so ‘rtha iti yadi tvayēṣam: “If you claim that since the exclusion of other referents is not a different [kind of] entity, exclusion is not a qualifier and the referent is not exclusion possessing.” NCV 734.20: atha svamatena brūṣe na sāmānyaṁ na vyāvyrttimad iti kutus tadviśiṣṭavastvabhidhānam. khaṇḍapā-
indivisible absence, and the universal non-existence of other referents in any particular referent, e.g. a tree, is the object of inference which qualifies verbal knowledge (śābda) as not different from inference.

6.27 As shown in PSV V: 34 Dignāga claims that the inference is based upon joint absence which he qualifies as inference from exclusion of what is other than the referent. Dignāga never presents an apoha inference, but Mallavādi’s commentator Śiṃhasūri gives an example of such inference at NCV 732,10-13:

\[
\text{arthāntarāpohāh sad ity asan na bhavatīti nāsadbhāvamātram evocyate,}
\text{kīṃ tarhi, arthāntarāpohena viśiṣṭaṃ vast eva sad ity ucyate, yasmin}
\text{vāstuni so 'pohāh kriyate, tac ca ċravāyāṃ śabdārthaḥ, nāpohamātram. sa}
\text{cāpohaviśiṣṭo 'ṛtho dravyādiḥ sacchabdena vyāpto 'parityāgāt, na tu}
\text{sāksād uktah:}
\]

“Exclusion of other referents as in the statement “it is existent as it is not non-existent” does not merely express its being non-existent, but rather, that the entity for whose sake the exclusion is effected, is indeed an entity which, being qualified by exclusion of other referents, is said to be “existent.” And this substance is the referent of the word, not mere exclusion. And the referent that is qualified by exclusion viz. a substance, etc., is encompassed by the word “existent” because it is not rejected by it, but it is not denoted directly.”

At 752,21-22 he presents a similar example of an apoha inference\(^98\):

\[
yatraivādārśanam uktam vrksābhāve 'vrkṣe, tato vyavchedānumānam
\text{'avrksa na bhavati' iti. evam ca kṛtvā vrksaśabdād dravyatvādyanu-
\text{mānam upapannam bhavati:}
\]

“Only with regard to the thing about which non-observation is stated, i.e. with regard to the non-existence of a tree which is a non-tree, the inference is from its exclusion from this [non-tree] at the thought “it is not a non-tree”; and on such grounds the inference of substanceness, etc., from the word “tree” is justified.”

Verbal cognition as inference is thus based upon what the inferred thing is not e.g. a tree which is not a non-tree. The latter term is as

\(^98\) Cf. Translation no. 427.
mentioned above an instance of what Dignāga designates as *vyavachedyavivaksā* intention to denote the excluded objects, “non-tree” denoting things as qualified by the single property (*ekadharma*), non-existence of trees, and the term “tree” as excluding these. As appears from Simhasūri’s presentation of an *apoha* inference the negation “is not” (*na bhavati*) merely conveys the notion of negation of non-existence (*abhāva*), and in the present context the notion of negation of non-existence of non-trees. An *apoha* inference would thus seem to be an instance of the type of inference known as *kevalavyatirekin* which is a purely negative type.\footnote{Cf. \textit{Randle} 1930, 241ff.}
Conclusion

6.28 Dignāga attempted to show that observation of a prototype of the referent of a word teaches the relation of the word to its referent, which is reified by mere non-observation, i.e. by not observing that the word denotes other things. Thus the apoha doctrine pivots on non-existence (abhāva) of other things in the referent. Exclusion is thus in the final analysis a matter of ontology. The theory, so it seems, presupposes an extreme ontological parsimony: things are aggregates of atoms which by definition are beyond perception. Dignāga quotes a sāmkhya verse to the effect that atoms are not perceptible. Thus words denote things as aggregates of atoms, and the aggregates are the things that exclude other things in accordance with their nature. What Dignāga’s critics found unacceptable was the idea that an absence may qualify things like a general property. The qualifying function however, is constructed on an absence of other things from the referent. It is in the nature of the referent to exclude from its locus any other referent. The absence is thus basically inscribed in the nature of the referent as a defining property. The idea appears to have been that the absence of other things from any particular referent is equivalent to a general property and as absence is indivisible, the apoha theory avoids the ontological problems of the view that denotation presupposes real general properties inherent in things.

6.29 Dignāga established the apoha theory on the analogy of real general properties. As he rejects the assumption that denotation presupposes that real general properties inherent in the objects of denotation define the identity of verbal denotation and cognition, he must have realised that a possible way of accounting for the identity and difference of things as referents, i.e. as denotable objects, would be to start from the principle of the mutual absence of any given x from the loci of all non-x. This could be formalised by means of joint presence and absence (anvayavyatireka) as a qualifier-qualified relation in which the predominant joint absence of all non-x from any given locus of x qualifies the latter as x. Induction presupposes, of course, vyutpatti, teaching the connection of any given word to the thing it denotes, which involves identification of the referent by ostentation accompanied by the use of the demonstrative pronoun “this,” as Dignāga explains at PSV V 50b-c.

6.30 Dignāga conceived exclusion or preclusion as a generalized absence of all non-x from all x. Thus the inferential component of the
theory is based on the principle that since no non-\(x\) is found in the locus of any \(x\) it is safe to conclude that the term used to denote \(x\) accomplishes this through joint absence (\(vyatireka\)). The connection established presupposes observing a knowledgable person who teaches the denotation by pointing at the referent (if the referent is an observable entity) saying this is \(x\), the use of the demonstrative pronoun ascertaining through co-reference (\(sāmānādhikaraṇya\)) the linguistic validity of the reference. Since non-existence of other things in the referent is indivisible, non-existence does not entail the usual problems that attach to the theory of real universals. If they are singular real entities they become particulars when divided among the infinite number of individual referents. This problem, however, does not affect non-existence which being indivisible is adduced by Dignā-ga for defining the identity of things. If any \(x\) is not non-\(x\), and non-\(x\) as already mentioned is not to be understood as anything but a term derived from the positive term for the purpose of denoting things that are not \(x\), it becomes easy to understand why Dignā-ga thought it would be possible to interpret any statement like the referent (\(artha\)) of the word ’tree’ as not a ’non-tree’ to one implicating the non-existence of non-trees at any tree.

6.31 It is not clear how Dignā-ga understood the qualifying function of non-existence as it is nothing but an absence. However, it is an absence of something from something else: non-trees are absent from trees. Dignā-ga apparently thought that this would define trees in general and that this universally applicable observation would qualify as a substitute for real general properties and thus constitute the ground of application of words. Thus, in the final analysis the inferential component of the theory concerns the possibility of establishing an inferential canon that involves non-existence as a premise: the use of the word tree leads to the inference: it is a tree because it is not a non-tree. The inference, however, is about things and exclusion is exclusion of other referents or other speech units, not denotations or representations.
Abbreviations and References


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Kāśikā. Kāśikā of Vāmana and Jayāditya. See Nyāsa.


NCV. *Nyāyāgamāṇusāriṇī nayacakrālavṛtti of Siṁhasūri*. See NC.


NM. *Nyāyamukha of Dignāga*. Taishō XXXII,1628; 1629.

NR. *Nyāyaratnākara of Śrī Pārthasārathi Miśra*. See ŠV.
Abbreviations and References


NSBh. Nyāyasūtrabhāṣya of Vātsyāyana. See NS.


Padamañjarī of Haradattamiśra. See Nyāsa.

Paddhati. Paddhati of Vṛṣabhadeva on Bhartṛhari’s Vākyapadiya I. See VP I.


PBh. Praśastapādabhāsyam of Praśastapāda. See Kiraṇāvalī.


PS. Pramāṇasamuccaya of Dignāga.

PSV. Pramāṇasamuccayavṛttī of Dignāga.
Abbreviations and References

PST. The Sanskrit codex unicus of Jinendrabuddhi’s Pramāṇasamuccayaṭīkā Viśālāmalavatī.


Raja 1963. K. Kunjunni Raja, Indian Theories of Meaning. The Adyar Library and Research Centre.


ŚBh. Śabarasaṁvīmin’s Bhāṣyam zu den Mīmāṃsāsūtres I,1,1-5. See Erich Frauwallner 1968,


Abbreviations and References


Śarkarikā. See ŚVT.


*Steinkellner* 2005. Dignāga’s PSV I. Published online.


TSP. Tattvasaṅgrahapañjika of Kamalaśīla. See TS.


Abbreviations and References


VPV I. Bhartṛhārī’s svavṛtti on VP I. See VP I.

VPV II. Bhartṛhārī’s svavṛtti on VP II. See VP II.


VPṬ. Puṇyāraja’s ṭīkā on Bhartṛhari’s Vākyapadiya II. See VP II.

VSV. *Candrānanda*’s *värtti* on VS. See VS.


YS. *Yogasūtra of Patañjali.* See YSBh

YSBh. *Yogasūtrabhāṣya of Vyāsa.* In Pātañjalayogasūtrāni, Ānandāśramasaṃskṛtagranthāvaliḥ 47, 1904.

WZKS. *Wiener Zeitschrift für die Kunde Süd- und Ostasiens.*
Translation
§ 1. [1] It has been explained that there are two means of cognition (pramāṇadavyam). But some think that verbal cognition (śābdam) is a separate means of cognition (pramāṇāntaram) too. Now (*tatra) verbal cognition is not a means of cognition separate from inference (anumāṇānt). That is, a [word] denotes (bhāṣate) its own referent (svārtham) by exclusion of other [referents] (anyāpohena) like [the general property] ‘being produced,’ and the like. [1]

[2] Since (hi) a word (śabdaḥ) indicates (dyotayati) through exclusion of other referents (arthaśantaravyavaccheda) that part (aṃśa) of the object (viṣayaḥ) to which (yatra) it is applied (prayojyate), being connected [to it] as invariably concomitant (avinābhāvitvasambandhaḥ), [verbal cognition] does not differ from inference.

§ 2. [4] On the other hand, some claim that a general term (jātiśabdaḥ) denotes all its own particulars (svabhedaḥ sarvān evaḥ). But when they are denoted a particular term serves the purpose of restriction (niyamārtham viśeṣaśrutih).

[5] To this it is replied that

a general term (jātiśabdaḥ) does not (na)

‘denote’ (vācaka iti), as [2c1] will state (vakṣyate),

particulars (bhedānām). [2a]

[6] In the first place, a general term like ‘existent’ (jātiśabdas tāvat sadādiḥ) does not denote substances, etc.

[7] because they are infinite (ānantyāt). [2b1]

For (hi) it is impossible (aśakyāḥ) to tell (kartum) the connection (sambandhaḥ) of particulars [with a general term like ‘existent’] when they are infinite; and as the connection of the word [with particulars] is not told (akrtasambandhe śabde), it is not justified that it denote its referent because merely its own form is cognized (svarūpamātrapratītēḥ).
§ 3. [8] Moreover, [a general term like ‘existent’ does not denote particulars]

because of ambiguity (vyabhicārataḥ). [2b2]

For just as (yathā hi) the word ‘existent’ applies to substance (dravye), so it also [applies] to quality, and so on (guṇādiṣv api); consequently (iti) there will be doubt (saṃśayāḥ syāt) because of ambiguity (vyabhicārāt), but there will be no denotation (nābhidhānam).²⁹

§ 4. [9] Someone believes (yo ’pi manyate) that the general term [‘existent’], on the other hand, is used to denote the mere general property (*jātimātre) or its mere inherence relation (*tadyogamātre vā)³⁰ because the connection is feasible and because there is no ambiguity (sambandhasaukaryād avyabhicāraḥ ceti).³¹

This is not justified³² (tad ayuktam); for [the general term ‘existent’] does not [denote] these two either (*na hi tayor api),³³³⁴ (vācakaḥ) neither the general property nor the inherence relation, because it is not “heard apart” (apṛthakṣruteḥ) from [words] whose referents (bhedārthaiḥ) are particular [general properties]. [2cd]

[10] That is (tathā hi), there would be no co-reference (sāmāṇādhihikaranyam na syāt) with words like ‘substance’ (*dravyādiṣadaiḥ) whose referents are particular [general properties] (*bhedārthaiḥ), like, for instance, ‘existent substance’ (*saḥ dravyam), ‘existent quality’ (*san guṇāḥ), and ‘existent action’ (*sat karma): but this is observed (tac ca dṛṣṭam).³⁶ [12] For existence (sattā) or its inherence relation (tadyogah) is neither a substance (dravyam) nor a quality (guṇāḥ),³⁷ but is rather (kim tārīḥ) of a substance (dravyasya) or of a quality (guṇasya).³⁸ [13] It is, moreover, explained that (āha ca)³⁹ [a word] denoting a quality and one denoting the bearer of that quality (guṇagunyabhidhāyinoh) have different case affixes (vibhaktibhedāḥ) because of a restrictive rule. However, for two words that denote a substance (dravyaśadāyoh) co-reference is acknowledged (sāmāṇyādhikaranyasya prasiddhiḥ).⁴⁰ (VP III 14:8)
And in this context it is explained that the connection is denotable through the property of the relatum (sambandhidharmena vācya ucyate). That is, it [viz. the connection] is denoted on the assumption that it is a state of action (bhāvaḥ kṛtvoktaḥ), and a state of action is connected with the other [relatum] (bhāvaś cānyena yuyate).

For connection means ‘state of connecting’: it [namely the state of connecting] is connected to the other [relatum] in the same way as the state of colouring (rāgādivat), etc. Therefore, assuming (iti kṛtvā) that the connection is denotable through the property of the relatum, doubt about (prati) the claim (idan tat) that a word, on the other hand, does not denote the connection by its own property (svadharmena) is meaningless (nāsti). Consequently (ataḥ) its [viz. the connection’s] denotability (vācyatvam) by a general term is not at all (naiva) justified (upapadyate).

Some claim (*ye tv aḥuḥ), on the other hand, that [the general term ‘existent’ denotes] the mere general property possessor as intended object (jātimadmatram *vivaksitam) because it is co-referential with particular terms (viśeṣaśabdād *sāmānādhihikaranīyāt), because the connection is feasible (*sambändhāsaukāryāt), and because there is no ambiguity (*avyabhicārāc ca).

Now (*tatra) it does not (na) [denote] the general property possessor (tadvatal) because it is not self-dependent (asvatantarvāt).

For even in these circumstances (evam api hi) the word ‘existent’ (sacchabdaḥ) denotes (āha) a substance whose general property and the word’s own form are merely subordinate (jātisvarūpamātropasarjanam), but [it does] not [denote the substance] directly (na sākṣāt). Consequently (iti) there is no co-reference (sāmānādhihikaranīyābhāvaḥ) as it is without particulars (atadbhedaḥ) because it does not imply particulars like pots that are included in it [namely existence] (tadgataghaṭādibhedānākṣepāt); for when there is no pervasion (na hy asatyāṃ vyāptau) [of particulars by the word ‘existent’], there is no co-reference. For instance, since the word ‘white’ denotes a substance as merely qualified by its own referent, namely the quality [whiteness], it does not imply the sweet quality, and so on, even if it exists in the substance. And therefore it is without particulars (atadbhedatvām). The [absurd]
consequence is the same in the present case too (evam atrāpy prasaṅgah).\textsuperscript{62}

§ 6. Moreover, [the general term ‘existent’ does not denote the general property possessor]

\textsuperscript{[20]} because of transfer (upacārāt).\textsuperscript{63} [4b\textsubscript{1}]

\textsuperscript{[21]} For (hi) the word ‘existent’ denotes (āha) in terms of a real referent (bhūṭārthena) either its own form (svarūpaṃ vā) or the general property (jātim vā).\textsuperscript{64} As it is applied to these [two] (tatra prayṛttāḥ), it is transferred (upacaryate) to the general property possessor (tadvati).\textsuperscript{65} For a [word] that is transferred [to its referent] does not denote this referent (artham) as its primary referent\textsuperscript{66} (paramārthenaḥ).

§ 7. \textsuperscript{[22]} And [the general term ‘existent’ does not denote the general property possessor] because resemblance (*sārūpyasya) is impossible (asambhavāt).\textsuperscript{67} [4b\textsubscript{2}]

\textsuperscript{[23]} And resemblance with the property (guṇasārūpyam) in the general property possessor (tadvati ca) is neither possible through transfer of notion (pratyayasaṅkrāntītaḥ) nor through influence of the property\textsuperscript{68} (guṇopakārāt).

§ 8. \textsuperscript{[24]} Why is it not [possible] through transfer of notion? Because when there is transfer (upacāre sati),

[such] idea’s form is different\textsuperscript{69} (buddhirūpasya bhinnatvāt), like, for instance, the transfer of [the notion] ‘king’ to the servant (rājno bhṛtyopacāravat).\textsuperscript{70} [4cd]

\textsuperscript{[25]} For instance (tadyathā), when\textsuperscript{71} the word ‘master’ is used of the servant at the thought\textsuperscript{72} ‘the servant is master’ (*yo bhṛtyah, sa svāmī),\textsuperscript{73} an identical notion of king and servant does not arise.\textsuperscript{74} [26] And the general term is transferred to the general property possessor.\textsuperscript{75}

§ 9. \textsuperscript{[27]} And\textsuperscript{76} because [the general property and general property possessor] are not denoted successively (kramena)\textsuperscript{77} like [in the statement] “jasmine, conch shell, and so on, are white.” [5ab]
For (*hi)*\textsuperscript{78} things about which (*yat\textit{ra}) the cognition is the same, (*tatra) are observed (*dr\textit{ṣ}tam) to be denoted in succession (*kramaṇābhidhānam)*\textsuperscript{79} like, for instance, [in the statement] “the jasmine, the nightlotus and the conch shell are white” (*śuklam kundam kumudam śaṅkham iti)*.\textsuperscript{80} And the word is applied simultaneously (sak\textit{ra}) to the general property and the general property possessor. Consequently (*iti) similarity due to transfer of notion does not exist.\textsuperscript{81}

§ 10. [29] If\textsuperscript{82} [the general property possessor] were similar to [the property] because of the influence of the property (guṇopakārāt tādṛṣpye) [on a substance], there would be [perception of] degree of intensity\textsuperscript{83} [of a quality] without its perception (prakarasāḥ syād vinā dhiyā).\textsuperscript{84} [5cd]

[30] If the general property possessor were to have the nature of the property as a consequence of the influence of the property (guṇopakārāt) [on the substance], like, for instance, [the influence of the red colour on] a crystal (sphaṭikavat), in that case there would be a perception of degree of intensity [of the red colour] (prakarasabuddhiḥ) that is not dependent upon the perception of degree of intensity of the quality\textsuperscript{85} (guṇaprakarasabuddhyanapekṣā)\textsuperscript{86} in the substance (dravye). [31] For (hi) the perception of the red colour (raktabuddhiḥ) in a crystal does not occur as dependent upon the perception of the proximate substrate\textsuperscript{87} (upadhānabuddhyapekṣā) because someone who has not been taught [about it] (avyutpannasya) does not perceive the difference\textsuperscript{88} [between the crystal and the proximate substrate] (*bhedbuddhyabhāvāt)*.

§ 11. Moreover,

[32] due to the form of the merged property (saṃsarɣiruṇāt),\textsuperscript{89} it follows [absurdly] that there would be false knowledge about all [referents]\textsuperscript{90} (sarvatra mithyājñānam prasajyate). [6ab]

[33] Since (hi) every verbal cognition is separated from its referent (arthe) by the form of the merged property (saṃsarɣiruṇapavyavahitāḥ), (tataḥ) it will be false (ayathārthāḥ) in the same way as [the cognition of the red] crystal.\textsuperscript{92}

§ 12. Furthermore,
[34] if the general properties, and so on, are many (sāmānyādibahutve) and the listeners apprehend (grāhakesu) them simultaneously (yugapat), the influence (upakāraḥ) [of the properties] will be in conflict (virudhyeta). [6c-7a]

[35] And when (yadā ca) the possessor of the properties (gunavatas śuklädeḥ) that is white, and so on, has many apprehending listeners (grahitāraḥ) because of qualifiers like ‘pot’, ‘earthen’, ‘substance’, ‘existent,’ ‘white’, ‘sweet’, ‘odorous,’ (tadā) the influence of the properties is in conflict. For then it would not be possible to define a substance in the form of a single property (ekagunarūpena) because of absence of difference (aviśeṣāt). Nor would it be possible partially (ekadeśena) to obtain knowledge (anubhāvitum) about the form of its properties (gunarūpam) because the [substance] as a whole (kṛtsnasya) is apprehended in the form of ‘pot’, and so on. (ghaṭādirūpapratiṣṭh).

[36] Or if [the influence] is through all [the properties], there will be a confused perception (mecakekṣanam). [7b]

[37] If, on the other hand, all [the general properties] like potness simultaneously exert their influence on the [substance as a] whole (upakāro yugapat kṛtsnasya kriyate), (tataḥ) there will be a confused perception (mecakadarśanam) because it is impossible to apprehend them one by one (pratyekam) in the form of ‘pot’, and so on, (ghaṭādirūpagranaṇābhāvār) and because [the substance] simultaneously assumes the form of all [of its general properties] (yugapat sarvarūpapatteḥ).

§ 13. [38] As regards the particulars, the general property, and its connection the fault is the same, because also with respect to these the [form of the] general property (*jātiḥ), the own form [of the word] (*svarūpam), or [the form of the general property as] connected with the latter are not justified. For even though they are denoted in the form of particulars (*bhedarūpena), the particulars are necessarily (avaśyam) to be denoted in the form of the general property (*jātirūpena) on the grounds that [the word] primarily denotes the general property and is transferred to the particulars (jātāu mukhyo bhedesīpacaṛita iti). Thus all the problems (*doṣāḥ) like those that were asserted with regard to the general property possessor, are to be asserted
because of the possibility (sambhavataḥ)\(^{114}\) that (iti)\(^{115}\) [the word] denotes the general property (*jāter vācakaḥ)\(^{116}\) having superimposed (*adhyāropya) the word’s own form (*śabdasvarūpam) upon the general property (*jātau) as its denotable object (*abhidheyāyām),\(^{117}\) the relation of the general property (*jātiyogah) is to be denoted in the form of the general property, namely [in the form of] existence (*sattā), etc. Thus also in this case (*atrāpi) the problem is to be asserted respectively (*yathāsambhavam).

§ 14. \(^{[42]}\) The general property possessor, moreover, (tadvāṃś ca) is claimed to be a particular only (bheda eva iṣṭaḥ), and this has already been repudiated previously (sa ca pūrvaṃ nirākṛtaḥ). \(^{[8cd]}\)

For concerning a general term (*jātiśabde) it\(^{118}\) has already been refuted above (*prāg niṣiddhaḥ)\(^{119}\) stating that

“a general term does not denote particulars.”\(^{120}\) \(^{[2a]}\)

And this is also said of the general property possessor (*jātivataḥ).\(^{121}\)

§ 15. \(^{[43]}\) It has certainly been explained (nanu coktam) that the general term (jātiśabdaḥ)\(^{122}\) denotes the mere general property possessor\(^{123}\) (*jātimanmātrasya vācakaḥ), but not (na tu) in the form of a particular (*bhedarūpena).\(^{124}\)

[44] If this is the case (yady evaṃ),\(^{125}\)

\(^{[45]}\) the mere general property possessor (tadvadmātran tu), nevertheless, has already been considered (vicāritam) as it is either the relation or the [general property] existence (sambandhaḥ sattā veti) [that is denoted]. \(^{[9ab]}\)

For (*hi)\(^{127}\) ‘mere general property possessor’ (*tadvadmātram) means ‘the property of being a general property possessor’ (*tadvattvam);\(^{128}\) and (*ca), the bhāva affix (*bhāvapratyayaḥ) is used to denote a connection or a property (*sambandhe guṇe vā).\(^{129}\) Thus, for instance, it is said (*yathāha).\(^{130}\)

\(^{[46]}\) “[The bhāva affixes tva and tā] denote a connection\(^{131}\) (sambandhābhidhānam) when [introduced] after compounds, [words] ending in kṛt and taddhita affixes (samāsa[kṛttaddhiteṣu),
except (anyatra) when [introduced] after idiomatic expressions, [words] whose form is not distinct, and [words] whose connection is invariable (rūḍhyabhinnarūpāvyabhicāritasambandhebhyaḥ).”[132]

And in this context (*tatra) it has already been explained133 that “[a general term] does not (*na)

denote (vācakah) either the general property or [its] relation (yogajātyoh) [with the general property] because it is not “heard apart” (aprthaksruteh) from [words] whose referents are particular [general properties] (bhedārthaiḥ).” [2cd]

§ 16. [47] If the referent that is the property possessor (tadvān), namely a [single] pot and so on, (ghaṭādiḥ) does not reside in cloth and so on, (na paṭādiṣu vartate), how can this referent be a general property ?!134  [9cd-10a]

[48] For (hi) a general property is resident in many135 [objects] (anekavṛttī); [49] and if136 (tac ca) this [general property] is a [single] general property possessor (*sāmānyavān) like a pot, how [50] (katham) can it be justified to claim, when this [namely the pot] does not reside in cloth,137 and so on, that it is their general property?138

§ 17. [51] It certainly (nanu ca) denotes the general property possessor, [52] so what purpose does it serve (kimartham) to attribute to this (*tatra) [namely the general property possessor] the property of a general property (*sāmānyatādhyāropena)?139

Since (yasmāt) the word ‘existent’ does not denote the general property possessor (*tadvato na vācakah),140 as it has been asserted that it denotes the general property,141 [53] and [the general property] existence, and so on, does not exist at [general properties] such as existence,142 [54] (tasmāt) it is necessarily (*avaśyam) to be assumed, that it is the referent143 that has the property of a general property (arthasya *sāmānyatā).144 [55] And the referent is not a [general property] because (yasmāt)

with regard to it (*atra)145 the word alone (*kevalaḥ)146 is the same (*samaḥ).147 [10b]

For (*hi) general property possessors like pots are the same148 because they are denotable (*vācyah) by the word ‘existent,’ [56] but not because of some general property possessor (kenacit tadvatā);149
and [the general property] existence and its relation (sattāyogau ca) have been rejected previously.\textsuperscript{150}

§ 18. [58] And it [namely a word] is not thought to be without a cause of application (animittāḥ). [10c]

And a word (*śabdaḥ) is not observed (*drṣṭaḥ)\textsuperscript{151} to be the same (*abhinnaḥ)\textsuperscript{152} with respect to different things (*bhinneṣu) without a cause of application.\textsuperscript{153} Therefore it is not justified that it [namely the word] be [their] general property\textsuperscript{154} (*śāmānyam);\textsuperscript{155} [59] and therefore there is no qualifier-qualified relation\textsuperscript{156} (*viśeṣaṇaviśeṣyatā).

§ 19. [60] Suppose, on the other hand,\textsuperscript{157} that [a thing like a pot] possessing the general property existence (sadguṇam) is resident in the same (ananyasmim) substance,\textsuperscript{158} there will be a qualifier-qualified relation as the word ‘existent’ causes the expectation of a complement like ‘pot,’ in the same way as [the complement] ‘bluer,’ and so on, (nīlatarādīvat).\textsuperscript{159}

[61] If [the the general property existence is resident] in one and the same (ekatra) [property possessor] in the same way as, ‘blue,’ and so on,\textsuperscript{160} [10d],

it will be used to denote the connection or the property (*sambandhe guṇe vā syāt),\textsuperscript{161}

[62] and this is not the case. [11a1]

[63] For the word ‘blue’ (nīlaśabdo hi) <denotes a substance that has the property blueness>. Since it [namely the substance] does not exist in another [substance] that is bluer, and so on, (*nīlatarādāv anyatrāsati) it is not justified (*na yujyate) that [the substance] is a general property possessor (*tadvat).\textsuperscript{162} For it has already been explained\textsuperscript{163} that blueness and its connection (*nīlatvatatsambandhau) are not the referents of the word (*śabdārthau).\textsuperscript{164}

§ 20. Moreover (*kiṃ ca),

[64] even if\textsuperscript{165} it were assumed (upetyāpi)\textsuperscript{166} [to be the case], it is not so (naitad)\textsuperscript{167} because a general property is without general properties\textsuperscript{168} (jāter ajātītaḥ). [11a2-b]\textsuperscript{169}
Even though it were assumed that the general property blueness (*nīlasāmāṇyam) is [resident] in [substances] that are bluer, and so on, (*nīlayārsālu) nevertheless (*tathāpi) the general property existence is not found to be possessed of the general property potness, and so on. [65] (naivam sattājātir ghaṭatvādiṣṭatātātāt) in the same way as the quality blue (*nīlagunah) which is divided into three kinds [is possessed of the general property blueness], [66] so that, when it resides in a substance, having appropriated these particular [general properties] (yatas ān viśeṣāṇ upādāya dravye <vrītau>), one would expect a particular [term] like ‘pot’ as a complement. [670] Therefore this [example] is not to be considered either.

§ 21. [67] In these circumstances it is then (evam tarhi) said that although [particulars] are not expressly denotable (aśābdavācyā), there will nevertheless be the expectation of a particular [term] (bhedākāṅkṣā) as ‘pot’, and so on, are implied [671] (ghaṭādiṣy arthākṣipteṣu). For the referent possessing the general property [existence] (tadvān hy arthaḥ) is necessarily (avaśyam) connected to some general property (kenacit śāmānyanānubaddhaḥ) from among potness, etc. [673] (ghaṭatvādīnām).

[68] Even in the case of implication (arthākṣepaḥ ‘pī), there is uncertainty (anekāntaḥ). [675] [11c]

[69] For implication (arthākṣepaḥ) means obtainment of certainty according to the state of the case [676] (*yasminn arthād niścayotpattiḥ), [670] like, for instance, the certainty that NN is eating at night (rātrī- bhojane) on the basis of [the statement] that he does not eat during the day (dvā na bhunṭka iti). [677] In the present context, however, [71] (iha punah), when one says ‘existent’ (sad ity ukte) there is no certainty about ‘pot’, etc. Therefore (iti) there is no implication (nāsty arthākṣepaḥ) as there is doubt.

§ 22. Since [678] (*yasmār) it is not justified under any circumstances (*na katham api) [679] that a general term (*jātiśabdaḥ) denotes particulars, a general property, the connection [with a general property], or the general property possessor [680] (*bhedaśāmānyanasambandhajātīmadvācakaḥ),

[72] (tena) a word (śrutiḥ) excludes other (anyāpohakṛt) [referents]. [681] [11d]
Therefore, what was stated previously namely that it, [i.e a word] denotes its own referent through exclusion of other [referents] like [the inferential indicator] ‘being a product,’ etc. [1cd],
is settled\(^{182}\) (**tad eva sthitam**).\(^{183}\)

§ 23. \(^{74}\) It is, moreover, explained\(^{184}\) that

a word does not indicate [its referent] in toto, although it is denotable in many ways.\(^{185}\) On the contrary (tu), it performs its purpose which is exclusion\(^{186}\) in accordance with its own connection (**svasambandhānurūpyāt**).\(^{187}\) [12]

\(^{75}\) Even though a word has many properties\(^{188}\) it only indicates by means of that [property] by virtue of which it does not deviate\(^{189}\) from its referent,\(^{190}\) but not by virtue of the word’s being a quality [of ether], etc.\(^{191}\) (**śabdagunanatādibhiḥ**).\(^{192}\) [13]\(^{193}\)

§ 24. \(^{76}\) If the word’s referent (**śabdārthaḥ**) is merely exclusion of other (**anyāpohamātram**) [referents], how then (**katham**) could words like ‘blue’ and ‘lotus’ (**nīlotpalādiśadānām**) be co-referential (**sāmānādhiḥkaparyam**) and related as qualifier and qualified (**viśeṣaṇaviśeṣyabhāvah**)?

And why would that not be the case?

Because (**yasmāt**) the excluded object (**apohyam**) of general and particular terms (**sāmānyaviśeṣaśabdānām**) is different (**bhinnam**).\(^{194}\)

This problem does not exist. For even though they (te ’pi hi)

\(^{78}\) have separate referents (**bhinnārthaḥ**) because of difference of excluded [objects] (**apohyabhedāt**), they are [each]\(^{195}\) incapable (**jaḍāḥ**) of indicating the particulars of their own referent (**svārthabhedagatau**).\(^{196}\) But they are [each] qualifier and qualified because together their effects are not separate (**ekatrābhinnakār-yatvāt**). [14]

\(^{79}\) For words like ‘blue’ and ‘lotus’ (**nīlotpalādiśabdā hi**), although their excluded objects are different, become co-referential (**samānādhiḥkaparānāh**) by combining\(^{197}\) (**upasamharantah**) their own apoha referent\(^{198}\) (**svam apohārtham**) into one (**ekatra**) [referent] for the sake of disclosing the particulars of their own referent\(^{199}\) (**svārthabheda-**)
vyāñjanārtham), in the same way as ‘uprightness’ and ‘crow’s nest’ (ūrdhvatākākanilayavat).\textsuperscript{200} That is (tathā hi), they are each (pratyekam) a cause of doubt as to the particulars of their own referent.\textsuperscript{201} And since a referent that is to be manifested as associated with another word is impossible\textsuperscript{202} (śabdāntarasahitavyānṛthāsambhavāc ca), they are [each] like qualifier and qualified\textsuperscript{203} (viśeṣanaviśeṣyabhūtāḥ).

§ 25.\textsuperscript{[80]} Then, why is it that this [namely the term ‘blue lotus’] has one and the same object (ekādhikaraṇam) as ‘blue lotus’ means that it is neither [just] blue nor [just] lotus, but it is both blue and lotus (*nīlam ca tad upalāṃ ceti nīlotpalam iti).\textsuperscript{204}

\textsuperscript{[81]}It [namely the object] is neither blue alone (kevalam nīlam) nor lotus alone (kevalam upalām)\textsuperscript{205} because the denotable [object] is [their] aggregate (samudāyābhidheyatvāt).\textsuperscript{206} [15a-c]

\textsuperscript{[82]}For (*hi) it\textsuperscript{207} [namely the referent blue lotus] is indicated by the words ‘blue’ and ‘lotus’ (nīlotpalasabdābhīyām) when combined (sahitābhīyām), but not alone (na kevalābhīyām).\textsuperscript{[83]} For alone (*kevalau hi),\textsuperscript{208} they are as meaningless\textsuperscript{209} as the phonemes. [15d]

\textsuperscript{[84]}For just as (yathaiva hi) the speech unit nī and the speech unit la, even though they exist, are meaningless with regard to the articulation ‘nīla’ [‘blue’],\textsuperscript{210} so also in this case (*evam atrāpi).\textsuperscript{211}

§ 26.\textsuperscript{[85]}This is an inadequate illustration (viṣama upanyāsa). For no (na hi) referent whatsoever is indicated, when the [individual] phonemes are articulated.\textsuperscript{212} It is indicated, however, when they are combined as ‘nīla’ [‘blue’].

\textsuperscript{[86]}If no referent is understood on the basis of the phoneme (varṇe) whereas [it is understood] on the basis of the two syntactical words (padadvaye), the [referent] is still on this [assumption] (tatrāpi) indicated alone (kevalam) since it is its denotable [object] (tadvācya iti).\textsuperscript{213} [16]

\textsuperscript{[87]}For just as\textsuperscript{214} (yathaiva hi) the speech units nī and la (*nīlāśabdau) are empty of the referent blue (*nīlārthāśūnyau), so the words ‘lotus’ and ‘blue’ are empty of an aggregate referent (*samudāyārthā-
śūnyau); and with regard to the claim that the speech units nī and la do not indicate any referent whatsoever, the denotable object (*vācyāḥ) of the word 'blue' is the general property [blueness]. Consequently (*iti) it is indicated alone (*kevalam); and since it is not justified that its denotable object be [the general property blueness] as connected to the quality [blue] as connected to the substance [lotus], it is indicated by aggregates that are empty of referents (*aṁśaśūnyair samudayair) in the manner of the phonemes. Because [their] referent is denotable by separate words (*bhinnāśabdavācyenārthena), they are said to have separate referents (*bhinnārthāḥ). Therefore it is justified that there be co-referentiality and a qualifier-qualified relation, if the referent of a word is exclusion of other [referents] (*anyāpohe śabdārthe).

§ 27. For (*hi) it is not justified that the word’s referent (*śabdārthaḥ) is another referent (arthaṁtarah). On what grounds?

Because (*hi), the object of the two component referents (āvayārthayor adhihikaranam) may either be different or not different from these (tato bhinnam syād abhinnaṁ vā). Now (*tatra), in the first place (*tāvat), it is not different because (*yasmāt)

there is no singularity of the aggregate (samudāyaikatā) since mutual non-difference follows [absurdly] (mitho *bhedaprasaṅgataḥ). [17ab]

For if (yadi hi) the aggregate is one, the two referents, namely lotus and blue are not different. And therefore it follows [absurdly] that they are mutually (*parasparam) non-different because they are not different from the one [aggregate]. Moreover,

because plurality of the aggregate follows [absurdly] (samāhānekatāsakteḥ). [17c]

Because the aggregate is not different from the many [parts], the [absurd] consequence is that it is plural (anekatāpraśaṅgāḥ), and therefore it does not exist. Even if it is assumed that the aggregate exist, there is no co-reference of the [two words] whose referents are the blue [quality] and [the object] lotus (nīlotpalārthayoh) because when they occur in one [word] (ekatāpi vartamānau), the two words do not reject their own referent. [17d]
The referents of the words ‘blue’ and ‘lotus’ in isolation are their own general properties, and these [referents] are the same [even when the two words] are combined (samuditayor api). Therefore (*iti), [100] how could there be co-reference (kutaḥ sāmānādhikaranyam)?! [101] This problem does not exist. Both of them (dvāv api) have particulars as their referent (*viśeṣārthau) because particulars are included in the general property (sāmānye viśeṣāntarbhāvāt). They have a form that is identical with having the general property as their referent (tulyarūpaṃ sāmānyārthena). [102] The application of the second word is for the purpose of making known the fact that they have a particular as their referent (*viśeṣārthavattvajñāpanartham dvītiyaśābdaprayogah). In these circumstances the two [words] (*dvāv api) are co-referential because they have the aggregate as referent. [103] Here, in the first place (atra tāvat), the word ‘blue’ (nīlaśabdena) denotes [the general property blueness or the blue quality] without distinction (*abhedena),

but not the general property [substanceness] (na jātih). [18a1]

[104] For (*hi) the word ‘blue’ does not denote in a general way (sāmānyenāha) the general property substanceness (dravyajātim), so how (*kutah) could the particular be imagined to be included in the general property substanceness (*dravyajātai)? [105] It certainly (nanu ca) denotes in a general way the substance which possesses [the] blue [quality], and its particulars such as cranes (balākādayah) and lotuses are included in it. [106] It is not justified that this is the case (ayuktam evam bhavitum). [107] Why (*kasmāt)?

Because it already has been explained above. [18a2]

[108] For (*hi) the denotation of the general property possessor (*tadvadabhidhānam) has already been rejected above (pūrvam eva niṣiddham) by [the statement]

“[a general term does] not [denote] the general property possessor because it is not self-dependent” [4a], etc.
The claim that it is because a particular is included in the general property (*sāmānye viśeṣasyāntarbhūtatvāt), [109] is not justified (tad ayuktam).

[110] Why?

Because of doubt (samśayāt). [18b1]

[111] For it is observed that a general term causes (*sāmānyasaabdāt) doubt about the particulars; [112] and it is not justified that [a term] which causes doubt denote. [113] By implication, however (syāt tv arthataḥ), the particular term would cause (*viśeṣasaabdāt) a cognition of the general property (*sāmānyapratītih) because it does not deviate from [it] (*avyabhicārāt).

[114] In that case (tarhi), the claim that particulars are included in the general property is not set forth because [particulars] are denotable objects, but rather (*kiṃ tarhi),

[115] because of not being excluded (*anapohanāt). [18b2]

Since (*yasmāt) the word ‘blue’ does not exclude sesamum, and so on, (*tilādim) in the same way as [it excludes] jasmine (*kundādivat), and so on, (*tasmāt) [sesamum, and so on,] is said to be included in it. And on this assumption they are included among the denotable objects [of the word ‘blue’].

If both [words, namely ‘blue’ and ‘lotus’] have particulars as their referents (*bhedārthau), the two words would become synonyms. And it is observed that

[116] with regard to a synonym, [the referent] is understood from a single one. [18c]

[117] For (hi) the addition of another synonym to a synonym whose referent is not understood or whose referents are many (anirjñātānekārthe) serves the purpose of making known the same referent as the first-mentioned. [118] For this surely is the raison d’être of synonyms: [119] They denote their referents successively, not simultaneously; and thus no qualifier-qualified relation (viśeṣanaviśeṣyatvābhāvah) exists because the word ‘blue’ alone indicates the referent lotus. Therefore, in the first place, there is a
problem with regard to [the aggregate’s] not being different [from its parts].

§ 28. And just as [there is a problem] if it [namely the aggregate] is not different [from its parts] (*yathābhede), so also if it is different [from its parts] (tathā bhede 'pi): The difference of the aggregate from the members of the aggregate (samudāyibhyah) is to be proved. For it is not possible that it [namely the aggregate] resides in these (teṣu) [namely the members], or these in it (tatra), whether completely (kārtsnyena) or partially (ekadeśena); and even if it were assumed

that [the aggregate] is different [from its parts], both [co-reference and the qualifier-qualified relation] are non-existent. [18d]

Also in this case co-reference and the qualifier-qualified relation are impossible. For this will either be of the two referents or of the two words; and it has already been examined that with regard to the two referents it [namely co-reference and the qualifier-qualified relation] will either be of the quality and the general property, or of the general property possessor; and similarly with regard to the two words, it [namely co-reference and the qualifier-qualified relation] will either be of the two words denoting the quality and the general property, or of the two words denoting the general property possessor. Now (*tatra),

[123] even if the two referents, namely the general property and the quality were to reside in one and the same referent (ekārthavṛttitā), there is no general-particular property relationship between them (sāmānyaviśeṣatvam). [19a-c]

[124] For even if the quality blue and the general property lotus were co-referential because they reside in one and the same substance (ekattra dravye vṛtteh), they are not related as qualifier and qualified. The quality blue (*nilagunasya) has no relation to the general property lotusness (*utpalajātiyogāḥ), nor has the general property lotusness (*utpalajāteḥ) any relation to the quality blue (*nilagunayogāḥ).

[126] And both [co-reference and the qualifier-qualified relation] do not exist with regard to the two general property possessors (*tadvatoḥ). [19d]
When (*yadā) the quality blue (*nīlagunah) and the general property lotusness (*utpalajātih) reside in the referent (*arthe) that is the property possessor (*tadvati), (*tadā) they are not co-referential because the two substances do not reside elsewhere (*dravyayor anyatāvṛtteḥ). Nor can they be related as qualifier-and qualified because of the impossibility that both or one of them possess the general and the particular property (*dvayor ekasya vā sāmānyaviśeṣavattvāyogāḥ). Thus, in the first place, both [co-reference and qualifier-qualified relation] are impossible with regard to the two referents. And just as they are [impossible] with regard to the two referents, so also with respect to the two words that denote the mere general property and the mere quality. [20ab]

Since (*hi) the two words that denote the general property and the quality (*jātigunābhidhāyakau) are entirely different (*ayantabhīnna), (*tasmā) they are not co-referential (*tayoh sāmānādhi-karanyābhāvah); and since the two [properties] are not connected [with one another], there is no qualifier-qualified relation between the two words denoting them (*tacchabdayoḥ). Thus, in the first place, these two [namely co-reference and qualifier-qualified relation] do not to exist when [the two words] denote the mere general property and the mere quality (*jātigunamātrābhidhāyakatve). And if they denote the general property possessor, the consequence is that [the substratum] is similar and dissimilar (tulyātulyam). [20cd]

Since (*yasmāt) the two words denote one and the same substance (ekāṃ dravyaṃ) as qualified by a general property [namely lotusness] and a quality [namely blueness] (*jātigunaviśiṣtam), (*tasmā) the referent (*adhikaraṇam) is similar (*tulyam); and since they denote a substance while denoting two different qualifiers, it is dissimilar (*atulyam). Therefore it is not ascertained that they are co-referential.

§ 29. [131] If [it is objected that] there is no intention to express the dissimilarity (atulyātvaṇvivakṣā) [of substratum]. [21a]
Suppose you think: “Since the difference that is caused by the relata is not intended to be denoted (*sambandhikṛtahedā-vivakṣāyām) there will be co-reference on the basis of such similarity [of substratum] (tulyātvam tāvad upādāya).”

For also in the case where (yatrāpi hi) [‘blue’ and ‘lotus’] are said to be co-referential because they are causes of a cognition having the same form (tulyākārabuddhihetuvāt), (*tatra) the other differences like the lotus buds are not intended to be denoted, although they do in fact exist.”

This is an inadequate illustration (*viṣama upanyāsah). The function of the expression [‘blue lotus’] is to denote the (tatra) [referent of the expression ‘blue lotus’] to the extent that it is apprehended when supported by the exclusions of both [terms] (ubhayavyudāsānugṛhitē). Thus the intention to denote this much is justified (tadmātrasya vivakṣā prayujyate).

But if the difference that is caused by the relata (sambandhikṛte) is not intended to be denoted, how could this entity (vastu) be the denotable object?

In addition,

there would be similarity of cow and horse, etc. [21b]

And if the difference between a cow and a horse, and so on, that is caused by the relata [the general properties] cowhood and horsehood, and so on, is not intended to be denoted, there is similarity of the entity because of its not being the denotable object (anabhidheya-tvena). Therefore the [absurd] consequence is that ‘cow’ and ‘horse’ become co-referential in the same way as ‘lotus’ and ‘blue.’

§ 30. Suppose [you think that] there is a difference of [generic] form in these (tatrākṛtyiviśeṣāya cet). [21c]

Suppose you think (*yadi manyate). “Since the difference of material shape (*samsthānaviśeṣa) in a cow and a horse is explained to be [their generic] form (*ākṛti), this [generic form] exists. Since (hi) the two denotations of these two [namely as ‘cow’ and ‘horse,’ respectively] are caused in this way by the [generic form], which is the cause of the manifestation of their own general properties, why would there be no intention to denote this difference [of generic form], but not [no intention to denote a difference of generic form] of a referent (arthasya) that has the properties blueness and lotusness (nīlotpalatvavataḥ)? Therefore (*iti)
[the words ‘cow’ and ‘horse’] are not co-referential in the same way [as the words ‘blue’ and ‘lotus’].”296

In that case,

[143] the many [generic] forms become commingled (anekākṛtisanākaraḥ). [21d]

[144] Many material shapes would co-occur (anekasaṃsthānasamāyeṣah) in one entity because it manifests many general properties; [145] and this is not observed.297

§ 31. [146] In addition (api ca),

[their substance would be] similar (*tulyam). [22a1]

[147] Moreover, [the words] ‘cow’ and ‘horse’ and so on would have a similar or dissimilar referent (adhikaraṇam) because it is not denotable, and because it manifests [the general properties] existence, and so on, and cowhood, etc.298 [148] Also in this case co-reference obtains [absurdly], as the dissimilarity is not intended to be expressed.

§ 32. [149] And even if it is claimed, it is not the case. [22a2]

[150] Even in the case where (yatṛāpi) ‘existent’, ‘lotus’, and ‘substance’, and so on, are claimed to be co-referential, (*tatra) [co-reference] does not obtain. [151] For if (yadi) ‘cow’ and ‘horse’ are not co-referential [152] because [a cow and a horse] manifest different general properties, [153] in the same way also a lotus is observed to manifest [the general properties] existence (sattā) and substanteness (dravyatva), etc.

§ 33. Moreover,

[154] Quality (guna) and action (karma) do not manifest [general properties].299 [22b]

[155] For the [absurd] consequence is that quality and action, since they do not possess material shape (asamsthanavattvāt), do not manifest the general properties contained in them (tadgatasaṃmāṇyānabhipvyaktiprasaṅgah). If it is claimed that [156] the difference between substance, and so on, is due to the fact that they manifest their own
general properties because of difference of power (śaktibhedena), but
not because of difference of material shape, this [claim] is not justified because it is assumed that the powers are different, even though an entity is devoid of difference, like, for instance, the entity lotus. And as regards the statement that it is because [the powers] are the causes of manifestation of different general properties, it is to be explained whereby the difference between [the general properties] cowhood and horsehood is established.

§ 34. Here we shall explain how: In the first place, for the grammarians (śābdānām) [the difference between the general properties] is caused by the words that denote [them] (abhidhāyaka-śabdakṛtaḥ). For their difference is the one between arbitrary terms (yaḍrechaśabdeoṣu) because they [namely the general properties] are their objects of denotation.

Now (*tatra),

[159] if the difference is due to the difference of [the words that]
denote [the general properties], the difference does not exist per se (svataḥ*).

For (*hī) in those circumstances the mere verbal difference (*śabda-mātrabhedaḥ) of the different general properties (*viśiṣṭasāmānyānām) is not intrinsic (*svābhāvikāḥ). For one should not say as a consequence of transfer in terms of identity [of the general property] with the word that denotes [it] to the non-different [general] entity (aviṣiṣṭe ... vastuni), that cows, and so on, are different because they are causes of manifestation of different general properties (viśiṣṭa-sāṃāṇyābhivyaktihetutvād gavādayo viśiṣṭāḥ). Suppose [it is objected that] difference is also observed because of difference of denotation, like [the proper name] Caitra, etc. This [objection], however, is not justified (na) because exactly this is subject to [the above-mentioned] criticism, and because one and the same [referent] is the denotable object of several synonyms. Just as it [applies] to this, so the [proposition] “the difference does not exist per se (svataḥ)” applies to the word (*śabde). Also in a word (*śabde) like ‘cow’ there is no difference that is cognized per se, but rather (kim tarhī), with regard to it [viz. the word] the analysis is like that concerning the referent (arthe), namely that the difference (*bhedaḥ) is caused by the general property (*sāmānyakṛtaḥ) in the word. Certainly, (*nanu ca) a word-particular (*śabdaviśeṣaḥ) such as ‘cow’ is perceptible (pratyakṣaḥ)!
Even though a particular is perceptible (*pratyakṣe saty api viśeṣe), it does not, however, denote (sa tu nābhīḍhāyakāḥ) because it is not observed together with the referent (*arthena sahāḍrṣṭavāt), and because a [word] like [i.e., ‘carter’] denotes the same referent when it is used by children, etc. Therefore the difference between words is caused by the general property.

§ 35. The Vaiśeṣikas, however (*tu), claim that the general properties (*sāmānyānām) that are manifested by the material shapes of their own substrata (*svāśrayasaṃsthitēbhir abhivyāṅgyānām) also have an intrinsic difference (*svābhāvikō bhedaḥ) because it is, for instance, said [at VS X.11] that “[the cognition] ‘head’, ‘back’, ‘stomach’, and ‘hand’ is due to their particular [general properties].” As far as they are concerned, however,

[164] circularity follows [absurdly], if the difference is due to the manifestation [effected] by the manifesting [substance] (vyaṇjaka-vyaktito bhede).

For on their explanation circularity obtains: [165] What is the intrinsic nature of a substance (dravyasvabhāvah)? The fact that it manifests its own general property (svasāmānyābhivyāṅjakatvam). And what is the intrinsic nature of the general property (sāmānyasvabhāvah)? The fact that it is manifested by its own substance (svadravyābhivyāṅyatvam). Thus (*iti) it has no force (*asāmarthyam).

§ 36. Moreover (kiṃ ca),

[166] a single (ekasya) [substance and general property] would have a multitude of intrinsic natures (svabhāvānakatā) because of mutual ‘multi-manifestation’ (bhuvvyakteḥ parasparam).

It is called ‘multi-manifestation’ because of the manifestation of many as well as the manifestation by many. [167] For (hi) many general properties such as existence (sattādeḥ) are manifested by a substance (dravyāḥ). Thus (*iti) a single substance (*ekasya dravyasya) would have many intrinsic natures (*anekasvabhāvah syāt); and because existence is manifested by many substances (*anekadravyāḥ) that are earthen, etc. (pārthivādeḥ), existence would have many intrinsic natures; [168] and if the difference altogether (sarvathā) is assumed to be due to difference of relation to a [general]
property\textsuperscript{323} (\textit{guṇasambandhabhedāt}), difference of power\textsuperscript{324} (\textit{śaktibhedāt}), and difference of denotation\textsuperscript{325} (\textit{abhidhānabhedāt}), the [absurd] consequence is that a single (*ekasyāpi) [substance or general property] would have a multitude (\textit{anekatvaprasaṅgaḥ}) [of intrinsic natures].\textsuperscript{326} An inserted verse (*\textit{antaraślokaḥ}) states:

If one imagines that the difference is due to difference of [general] property, power, and denotation, the [absurd] consequence is that a single [substance or general property] will have a multitude [of intrinsic natures] because it possesses many [intrinsic natures]. [24]

Thus, in the first place, there is no co-reference (\textit{evam tāvat sāmānādhikaraṇyābhūvah}).\textsuperscript{327}

§ 37. \textsuperscript{[169]}The qualifier-qualified relation (\textit{viśeṣaṇaviśeṣyatvam}) has already been explained above on the grounds that it is not self-dependent (\textit{asvātantryāt}).\textsuperscript{328} [25ab]

For the impossibility of the qualifier-qualified relation (*\textit{viśeṣaṇaviśeṣyatvāsambhavah}) has already been explained if the general property possessor is denoted (\textit{tadvadabhidhāne}). Thus co-reference and qualifier-qualified relation are only justified when exclusion of other referents is the referent of the word, but not otherwise.

§ 38. Now (\textit{tatra})

\textsuperscript{[170]}the denotable objects of general terms, particular [general] terms, and synonyms are not excluded (\textit{na sāmānyabhedaparyāyāvācyanu}), although they are different.\textsuperscript{329} [25cd]

\textsuperscript{[171]}For even though [the referents’] being different is the same (\textit{tulye ’pi hi anyatve}), the word does not exclude the referents of general terms, particular [general] terms, and synonyms. How can this be?

\textsuperscript{[172]}Because they are not in conflict (\textit{avirodhāt}).\textsuperscript{330} In the first place (\textit{tāvat}), the excluded object (\textit{apohyam}) of a synonym is the same because [synonyms] are not applied simultaneously (\textit{yugapad apra-yogāt}).\textsuperscript{331} And it is not justified that it rejects its own referent (\textit{na ca svārthapratikṣapo yuktaḥ}).\textsuperscript{332} [173]A particular [general] term,\textsuperscript{333} moreover, approves (\textit{anumodate}) that the general term\textsuperscript{334} has excluded another referent\textsuperscript{335} (\textit{arthāntaram vyudastam}) for the sake of its own particulars\textsuperscript{336} (\textit{svabhedeṣu}) because they are in need of it (\textit{arthi-}
tvāt).\(^{337}\) For just as (yathā hi) a śimśapā [tree] is not a palāśa [tree], and so on,\(^{338}\) it is not a pot, and so on, either.\(^{339}\) Thereby (etena) it is also explained why it does not reject the referent of a general term’s general term (sāmānasāmānayaśabdārthāpratikṣepa uktah).\(^{340}\) Similarly, why would a general term (sāmānyaśabdaḥ) not tolerate that its own referent\(^{341}\) is being restricted to the intended referent\(^{342}\) (abhīprete viśaye vyavasthāpyamānam) by a particular [general] term or a particular [general] term’s particular [general] term?\(^{343}\) Thus, since they are not in conflict (*avirodhāt), the exclusion of the referent of a general term, and so on, is not justified (*na sāmānyādiśabdārthāpoḥo yuktāḥ).\(^{344}\) And an aggregate\(^{345}\) (samūhaḥ) denotes a separate referent (arthāntaravācakāḥ) in the same way.\(^{346}\) And thus it is justified, in the manner explained previously (yathoktam prāk)\(^{347}\) that a general term and a particular [general] term, whether they are two\(^{348}\) or many\(^{349}\) (dvayaḥ bāhūnāṃ vā), denote a separate referent that is qualified by these (tadviśiṣṭārthaṃ arthāntaravācakatvam), while being applied to the general property which is their own referent.

§ 39.\(^{179}\) It is, moreover, explained that

a\(^{350}\) particular [term] is not rejected (nojjhitaḥ) by its own general [term] because that alone is expected as a complement (tādmātrā-kāṅksaṇāt)\(^{351}\) nor is it included (nopāttaḥ) [by it] because doubt arises (saṃśayotpatteḥ). But in case of identity [of referent] (sāmye), they have the same reference (ekārthatā).\(^{352}\) \(^{26}\)

\(^{180}\) A\(^{353}\) general property, even if there are several (anekam api), is included by a particular general [term]\(^{354}\) because it does not deviate [from the general property],\(^{355}\) but their qualifier and qualified relation is not symmetrical (itulyā).\(^{356}\) \(^{27}\)

§ 40.\(^{181}\) In this context, moreover, what is the reason\(^{357}\) why a particular [general] term (*bhedaśabdaḥ) excludes the referent of other particular [general] terms (*bhedāntaraśabdārtham apohate)?

\(^{182}\) A particular (bhedaḥ) [general term] certainly excludes the referent of other particular [general terms] because they are in conflict [with one another]\(^{358}\) (virodhītvāt). \(^{28ab}\)
For words whose referents are particulars are in conflict with one another (parasparavirodhino) because they are appropriating [their] common property (sāmānyārthāpahāritvād), in the same way as the sons of a king [are appropriating their common property]; and therefore they do not tolerate (kṣamante) one another’s property.

For instance, when the word ‘śimsapā’ is used together with (*saha) the word ‘tree’ in [the statement] “this tree is a śimsapā” (*vrksō ’yaṃ śimsapā), it confines (*vyavasthāpayati) treeness (*vrksatvam) to its own object (*svavisaye) by excluding (*vyavacchidya) it from khadira, etc.; and likewise with regard to the remaining [particular terms]. Thus, in the first place (*tāvat), it is justified that a particular term excludes the referents of other particular terms because they are appropriating one and the same property (ekadravyāpahāritvā).

§ 41. But why does the [word ‘śimsapā’] exclude a referent that is the particular of a different general property (sāmānyāntarabhedartham), namely a pot, and so on, (ghatādim) which is without connection (asambaddham) [to the word ‘śimsapā’]? Because referents that are particulars of other general properties (sāmānyāntarabhedarthāḥ) are in conflict about its [i.e., śimsapā’s] own general property (svasāmānyavirodhīḥ).

For there is conflict (virodhaḥ) between the word ‘tree’ and ‘pot’, etc. because they are appropriating earthenness, etc. (*pārthivatvād-yapahāritvāt). For the [word ‘śimsapā’] approves (abhyanumodate) that [pot, etc.] is being excluded (nirākriyamānam) by the [word ‘tree’], in the same way as [one approves that] the enemy of a friend [is being excluded] (*mitraśatruvāt), and it is understood by implication (arthāt) that it [namely pot, etc.] is excluded by the (word ‘śimsapā’). Thereby [etena] one is to understand that the exclusion (nirākaraṇam) and the toleration (upekṣaṇam) of the particulars of another general property such as quality and of their particulars such as colour is caused by a connection series (sambandhsambandhataḥ kṛtam), in the same way as [the exclusion of] the enemy of a friend’s friend (mitramitraśatruvāt) and [the toleration of] the friend of the enemy of a friend (mitraśatrumitravāt).

§ 42. In this context, however,
they are not its excluded [referents] directly (sākṣāt). [29a]

[191]For the word ‘śīṃśapā’ does not exclude pot, and so on, directly. Why?

There must be no identity [of referent] with [that of] the general [term] (sāmānyatulyatā). [29b]

[192]For if it were to exclude directly, it would have a referent (tulyārthah) identical with [that of] the word ‘tree.’

[193]In those circumstances there would be no exclusion of other particulars [by the word ‘śīṃśapā’], just as [there is no exclusion of the particulars] by this (tenēva) [namely the word ‘tree’].369 [29cd]

[194]For in the exact same way as (yathaiva hi) the word ‘tree’ would not exclude palāśa, and so on,370 the word ‘śīṃśapā’ would not exclude (palāśa, etc.) either because of identity [of referent]. [195]If it is [objected] that this problem does not exist because [the word ‘tree’ and the word ‘śīṃśapā’] are different as they exclude few and more referents,371 such [an objection] is not justified (ayuktam). [196]For just as the words ‘tree’ and ‘śīṃśapā,’ when denoting an entity (vastu) as qualified by treeness and śīṃśapāness (*vṛksatvaśīṃśapātvaviśiṣṭam), [in your system] denote an entirely different referent (*atyanthabhin-nārtham), in the same way the referent must not be confused (asānkīrnenaṁarthena) in our system (iha) either.372 However, by implication (arthāt) there will be exclusion of few and more [referents].373

§ 43. [197]If a particular [term] excludes the referents of other particular [terms], how then could there be co-reference of a quality with other qualities like in [the statement]: “The sweet taste is sticky, cool, and heavy (madhuro rasaḥ snigdhaḥ śīto guruś ceti)?374 There is no conflict (*virodhah) in this case because [198]the co-reference (sāmānādhikaranyam) of [one] quality with other qualities consists in their not being in conflict with its substratum (*āśrayenāvirodhitvam) because they are resident in the same substance (*ekadravya-vṛttītvāt).375 [30]

Because they inhere in the same referent (*ekārthasamavāyāt), a quality like stickiness (*snigdhatvādīgūṇaḥ) is transferred to the
sweet taste (*madhure rase) that is found in the substance.\footnote{376} Thus (iti)\footnote{377} there is no problem.

\textbf{§ 44. [199]} Or rather,\footnote{378} the exclusion is due to not being observed (adṛṣṭatvāt). [31a]

Or rather, a particular term excludes because it is not observed to denote the referent of another particular term (bhedāntarārthe). But why [do you say] ‘not observed’ (na drṣṭa iti)?\footnote{379} Because being in conflict (*virodhitvāt) with some (*kaiścit),\footnote{380} although the referent [of the word] is natural (svabhāvike 'py arthe), is understood as boasting of one’s manliness (āhopurusīkā pratipanna).\footnote{381}

\textbf{§ 45. [202]} In these circumstances (evaṃ tarhi)

a general [term] would exclude its own particulars\footnote{382} (svabhēdanut). [31b]

If [a particular term] excludes [the referents of other particular terms] because of not being observed (adarśanena) [to denote these], [their] exclusion would follow [absurdly] since also a general term (*sāmānyaśabdasya) is not observed to denote its own particulars (*svabhēdesu).\footnote{383}

This is not the case (na) because [a general term] is observed [to denote its own particulars] when it is connected with other [factors]\footnote{384} (anyayuktasya). [31c]

For a general term indicates a particular, when it is observed together with motive and context, etc.\footnote{385} (arthaprakaraṇādibhiḥ)\footnote{386}.

Thus doubt (saṃśayah) reflects these (*tadābhāḥ). [31d]

In these circumstances it is justified that doubt caused by a general term\footnote{387} reflects its particulars (*sāmānyaśabdād bhedābhāsah\footnote{388} sam- śayo yuktāḥ), even though it has previously been observed to denote these\footnote{389} [particulars], in the same way as uprightness\footnote{390} (teṣv api drṣṭapūrvah, ārdhvatāvah\footnote{391}).\footnote{392}

If [it is claimed that] it is not justified that there be doubt. [32a]
The following is meant: If the idea is that the [general term] is perceived [as denoting its own particulars] only as accompanied by motive and context, and so on, (arthaprakaraṇādisahita eva), then how could there be doubt?*

If [the particular] is ascertained (niścīte), the [doubt] is caused by [the general term] alone. [32b]

It is not claimed that the doubt is caused by [the general term] as accompanied by motive, etc. (arthādisahitā), but rather that if [the particular] is ascertained [by the general term] as accompanied by motive, and so on, there is subsequently doubt caused by the [general term] alone (*kevalāt).

If [it is objected that a general term] alone (kevalai) is not found to denote a particular (bhide). [32c]

Suppose it is objected: In your system (*iha) a general term (*yatoktam) that

a general term does not denote particulars. [2a]

It is observed with regard to the listener (śrotṛvyapekṣayā). [32d]

For when (yadā hi) the listener asks for the exclusion of other general properties, like, for instance, when he asks: "Is a tree earthen (pārthivah) or does it consist of the five principal elements (pañcama-hābhautikah)," (tadā) the application of the [word] ‘earthen’ alone is possible.

How then could he be in doubt because of the application of the word ‘earthen’ when the tree has been ascertained?

When [the tree] has been ascertained, he is in doubt about the other [word] due to [the general term] alone. He hears the word ‘earthen’ alone; and so (*iti), in the first place (*tāvat), there is an application [of a general term] alone. Consequently (*iti) there is no problem (*doṣāḥ).

§ 46. And just as (yatā ca) the general property (*sāmānyam) in the referent (arthe) is its exclusion of other referents, in the same way (*tathā)
[215] the general property in a word (\textasteriskcentered{sabde sāmānyam}) is explained (\textasteriskcentered{ucyate}) as its exclusion of other words. [33ab]

[216] In the exact same way as the general property (sāmānyam) \textquoteleft being produced\textquoteright{} (kr̥takatvam) is \textquoteleft{}said\textquoteright{} to indicate \textquoteleft{}impermanence\textquoteright{} (anityatvagamakam) by exclusion of what is not a product (akṛtakavyudāsena),\textsuperscript{400} the general property in a word (sabde) is said to be its exclusion of other words (sabdāntaravyavacchedena); and only through this (tenaiva ca) does it indicate its referent (arthapratvāyakah).\textsuperscript{3}\textsuperscript{01} With regard to this [viz. the speech unit],\textsuperscript{402} moreover,\textsuperscript{403} [217](tatrāpi) there is identity when there is doubt about the referent. [33c]

[218] When (yatra) a word like \textquoteleft{}akṣa\textquoteright{}\textsuperscript{404} causes doubt about its referent, namely a part of a cart, etc.\textsuperscript{405} (sakajāṅgādau), (yatra) there is identity of speech unit\textsuperscript{406} (sabdasyaikyam).

[219] However, when there is doubt about it, there is difference (anekatā) [of speech unit]. [33d]

[220] When (*yatra) there is doubt about whether a speech unit like \textquoteleft{}bhavati,\textquoteright{} (*bhavatiśabdādau) is ending in [the taddhita affix] śatṛ, and so on,\textsuperscript{407} (*yattra) it is to be regarded as difference of speech unit (śabdabhedaḥ), in spite of the identity of sound\textsuperscript{408} (śrutisāmye \textquoteright{}pi), like, for instance, \textquoteleft{}kā iha.\textquoteright\textsuperscript{409}

§ 47. [221] Again, why does the first-mentioned problem\textsuperscript{410} not follow [absurdly] if the word\textquoteleft{}s denoting its own referent is through exclusion of other referents?
Because (*yasmāt)\textsuperscript{411}

[222] the word\textquoteleft{}s connection is feasible\textsuperscript{412} (sambandhasaukaryam) and there is no ambiguity\textsuperscript{413} (vyabhicāritā) as it is not observed (adṛṣṭeh) [to apply] to the referent of other words\textsuperscript{414} and is also (api) observed (dārśanāt) [to apply] to a member\textsuperscript{415} (aṃśe) of its own referent.\textsuperscript{416} [34]

[223] For (hi) joint presence and joint absence (anvayavyatirekau) are a means (dvāram) to the word\textquoteleft{}s denoting its referent.\textsuperscript{417} And these two are its application\textsuperscript{418} to what is similar and its non-application to what is dissimilar.\textsuperscript{419} [224] In this case, however (tī), application to all that is
similar is by necessity not statable with regard to any [referent] whatever \(^{320}\) (kva cit) because stating it is impossible (ākhyānāsam-bhavāt) as the referent is infinite (arthasyānanye). \(^{421}\) On the other hand, \(^{322}\) stating its non-application to what is dissimilar is possible, even though it is infinite \(^{423}\) (ātulye saty apy ānanye), through mere non-observation \(^{424}\) (adarsanamātreṇa); and just therefore \(^{425}\) (ata eva ca) it has been explained that [the word’s] denoting its own referent (svārthaḥbhidhānam) is an inference from [its own referent’s] exclusion from these \(^{426}\) [other referents] (tadvayavacchedānumānam), from its not being observed [to apply] to other [referents] than its own relata \(^{427}\) (svasambandhibhyo ‘nyatrādarśanāt). \(^{225}\) If, however, \(^{428}\) the inference were by means of joint presence (anvayadvērena), the word ‘tree’ should not give rise to doubt (saṃśayah) appearing as śiṃśapā, etc. (śiṃśapādyābhāsaḥ), about one and the same entity (ekasmiṃ vastuni). Yet, in the same way as there is doubt about it, there will also be doubt appearing as earthenness and substanceness, etc. However, since the word ‘tree’ is not observed to denote what is non-earthen, and so on, the inference is only by means of joint absence (vyatirekamukhenaiva).

\[^{226}\]Moreover it is explained that (*āha ca)

‘treeness’, ‘earthen’, ‘substance’, ‘existent’, and ‘knowable’ are [each] a cause of doubt, in reverse order (pratilomyataḥ), about four, three, two, and one [properties]. In opposite order (anyathā) they serve the purpose of ascertainment (niścaye). \(^{429}\) [35]

This is an inserted verse \(^{430}\) (*ity antaraślokah).

§ 48. \(^{227}\) And without the means of connection \(^{431}\) (sambandhadvāraṃ muktvā) the word (śabdasya) or \(^{432}\) the inferential indicator (liṅgasya vā) is incapable of indicating its own referent (svārthakhyāpānāśaktīr asti), \(^{228}\) because it is impossible to indicate it in toto (sarvathā) as it has a multitude of properties (dharmabahutve). \(^{433}\) And because it does not denote particulars \(^{434}\) (bhedānabhidhānāt) there is no ambiguity about its own referent. \(^{229}\) Thus, in the first place (evam tāvat), the first mentioned problem does not exist \(^{435}\) (*pūrvoktadoṣābhaḥvāh).

§ 49. \(^{230}\) Nor does the immediately following [problem] exist. \(^{436}\)

Why?

Because (*yasmād)
there is agreement (abhinnatā) [of the general term ‘existent’] with [words] whose referents are its particulars (tadbhedārthaiḥ) as the rejection of other referents (vyāpter anyaniṣedhasya) pervades [the particulars]. [36ab]

Since (hi) the function (kṛtyam) of the general term (sāmāṇyaśabdasya) ['existent'], namely exclusion of other referents (arthāntaravyudāsah), is through not rejecting its own particulars (svabhedāpratikṣeṇa), (iti) co-reference with a particular term is justified (bhedaśrutiyā saha sāmāṇādhiyakaranam upapannam).

Therefore the problem of being “heard apart” from [words] whose referents are its own particulars does not exist (*svabhedārthaiḥ prthakśrutido nāsti). For it is co-referential [with the particular term] as regards the other referent that is denotable by both terms.

That is (rathā hi), there is no ambiguity with regard to its own referent (svārthāvyabhicārah) because alone it does not denote the other (*kevalasyānityatraśṛtyte).

§ 50. Nor does the last mentioned problem exist. Why?

Because [exclusion of other referents] applies directly (sākṣād vyṛtṛte), and because [exclusion of other referents] it is not a particular (abhedāc ca). [36c]

For (hi) a word does not apply to its own particulars (*svabhedeṣu) while being dependent upon another referent (arthāntaram upādāya). Therefore the problem of not implying its own particulars (*svabhedānākṣepadosaḥ) because of its dependence (pāratantryena) does not exist, nor does the problem of transfer of denotation (bhāktadosaḥ) exist, nor the problem of not denoting because the particulars are infinite (nāpi bhedaṇavasthānād anabhidhānadoṣaḥ), nor the problem of not being a general property because of not pervading [the particulars] (āvyāpakatvāc cāsāmāṇyadoṣaḥ), because the mere exclusion of other referents is without division (arthāntarāphamātrasyābhinnatvāt) and because it is not a substance (adṛavyātvāc ca). Precisely therefore (ata eva) one does not have to pursue its relation to other particular general properties (*sāmāṇyaviśeṣāntarayogānusaranam) because it excludes other referents directly (sākṣād arthāntarapratiṣedhāt). Thus, since the above-mentioned problems do not exist, only exclusion of other referents is the proper (sādhuḥ) referent of the word.
§ 51. [239] And [the last-mentioned problem does not exist] because the attributes of a general property are confined (*atrāḥ) [36d]

to it (*atrāḥ).

[240] Moreover, the attributes of a general property (*jātiddharmāś ca), which are characterized by being one, permanence, and extension to each single [particular] (*ekatvanityatvapratyekaparismāptilaksanaḥ), are confined to it only (*atraiva vyavatishthante) because [exclusion of other] is not a particular (*abhediḥ) because its substratum is not discontinued (*āśayasyāvicchedāḥ), and because its referent is cognized completely (*kṛtstnārthapratīṭeḥ). [241] Thus, since the said problems do not exist and the merits [of exclusion of other referents] are superior (*guṇotkarṣāt), a word denotes (*āhā) things (*bhāvān) exclusively (eva) as qualified by preclusion of other referents (*arthāntaranīvrttivīśāṣṭān).

§ 52. If so,

[242] whereby (*āphohaniyamāḥ kasmāt) [37a]

[243] If some asserts: “The word ‘colour’ excludes taste, and so on, but not the rest of the colours when it denotes either colour (*anyatama-varnābhidhāne) even though they are completely different (*atyantabhinnāpi). Whereby is this [restriction] effected (kimkṛtāḥ)? On the other hand, such a problem does not exist for some who claims that [the general property] colourness is the same (*abhinnam) only in [the colour] blue, and so on, but not in taste, etc.*[244] This problem does not exist because

[what is] current in the world (*lokarūḍhāḥ) is not adhered (na mṛśyate) to. [245] [246]

[245] For Bhagavat has said: “One should not become attached to a regional expression, nor should one disregard a name (*saṅjñām) of the world.” [247] Therefore we too do not adhere to expressions current in the world (*lokavyāvahāraḥ) whether they have a cause of
application (*naimittikāḥ) or are technical designations (pāribhāṣī-
āḥ) as having real referents (bhūtārthatvena), but observe them
(anugamyante) exactly as the world does (lokavad eva). And in the
world (loke) the word ‘colour’ is only acknowledged (siddhāḥ) to
denote [the colour] blue, and so on, but not to denote taste, etc.475

§ 53. [246] And with respect to [the general property] colourness
(rūpatve) this [questioning] is the same.476 [37c]

[247] And what is the reason why colourlessness does not reside in taste,
and so on, according some who is of the opinion that it resides in
entirely different [colours like] blue, etc.477 Or, just as it does not
reside in taste, and so on, it does not reside in yellow, etc.
[248] There is a reason for this.478 In that the essential nature [of blue,
etc.] is different,479 visibility (*cākṣuṣatvam) is only the same in blue,
and so on, but not in taste, etc.

[249] If visibility [is the cause of restriction], [the application of the
word ‘colour’] is caused by an action (kriyākṛtaḥ).480 [37d]

[250] For visibility means perceptible by the eye (cakṣuṣā *grāhyam).
And thus the word ‘colour’ would be used to denote blue, and so on,
having an action as its cause of application (kriyānimittah), but not
having a general property as its cause of application (jātinimittah).482
[251] For what purpose does [the general property] colourlessness serve, if
visibility is the same [in the blue colour, and so on, but not in taste,
etc.]?483 [252] If, on the other hand (atha), the cause of the connection
of colourlessness is said to be visibility,484 [253] even so (evam api) it
follows [absurdly] with respect to visibility that the inherence (sama-
vāyah) [of colourlessness] is caused by an action (kriyākṛtaḥ), or that
the manifestation of colourless (rūpatvābhivyaktir vā) [is caused
by an action].486 [254] Or again, whereby (kasmā) is the restriction
(niyamaḥ) [effected] with respect to visibility?488 [255] Therefore one
must by necessity rely upon [visibility’s] being essential [to the blue
colour, etc.].489

[256] And [colourlessness] follows [absurdly] in substance, etc.490 [38a]

[257] And because substance (dravya-), number (saṅkhyā-), and size
(parimāṇa-), and so on, are visible (cākṣuṣatvāti), colourlessness in these
would follow [absurdly].491 Moreover,
there would be no difference between white, etc.\textsuperscript{492} [38b]

As visibility is uniform there will be no difference between blue and yellow, and bluer and bluest.\textsuperscript{493} Therefore, without visibility the word ‘colour’ is necessarily\textsuperscript{494} to be observed (anugantavyah) as denoting blue and yellow, and so on, even though they are entirely different because it is current usage\textsuperscript{495} in the world (loke rūḍheḥ), but not to denote taste, etc. Therefore, what is to be determined, namely the exclusion of other [referents] is restricted.

\section*{§ 54.} And if\textsuperscript{496} the word denotes its referent without dependence upon preclusion of other referents, then (*tarhi)

its validity (siddhiḥ) [for denoting its referent] would only be by means of joint presence (anvayād eva), [38c]

but the word’s [validity]\textsuperscript{497} for denoting its referent (arthābhidhāne) would not be by means of joint presence and joint absence (anvayavyatirekābhhyām), and this is maintained.\textsuperscript{498} [263] Yet, since the denotation fulfills its purpose\textsuperscript{499} by means of restriction of either [term] or both [terms of a statement],\textsuperscript{500} the denotation of the referent is also by means of joint absence, like, for instance, “[the technical term] karman denotes what the agent (kartuḥ) most wants to obtain (ipsitatamam) [by his action]”\textsuperscript{501} [A I.4.49].

\section*{§ 55.} It is certainly the case (nanu ca) that if the word’s referent is merely exclusion of other [referents], it would only (eva) denote its referent by means of joint absence (vyatirekāt).

Such would be the case (syād etad evam) if joint presence were not maintained.\textsuperscript{265} However,

the word’s] concomitance (*vyāpti) is not claimed to be with a principal (mukhyena) [38d]

entity\textsuperscript{502} (bhāvena).\textsuperscript{266} For (hi) it has been stated that “it is impossible that a general property (jātiḥ) occur in entities, whether it be separate (*vyatiriktā) or not separate (*avyatiriktā) [from its substrata].”\textsuperscript{503} But if the referent is qualified by the exclusion of other referents\textsuperscript{504} (arthāntarāpohāvisiṣṭe ‘ṛthe) without the general property,\textsuperscript{505} the word’s joint presence and joint absence do not have different referents in accordance with the [statement at PS V 34a:] “since it is not observed [to apply] to the referent of other words.”
§ 56. [267] Someone, however, objects that if everything manifest like a cow is a modification that is due to something non-existent (gavāḍi vyaktam sarvam asato vikāraḥ), it follows [absurdly] that everything manifest has an existent nature (prayuktam asataḥ sadātmakatvam) that is due to something non-existent because of the [absurd] consequence of its being the nature of everything (sārvatmyaprasaṅgāt).508 Regarding this (*tatra) [we ask you],

[268] wherewith is existence (sattvam) connected, according to [you] who assume (abhyupagacchātaḥ) that everything is continuously connected with what is non-existent (asatsamanvitaṃ sarvam) because [existence] is the nature of many things? [39]

[269] If it is assumed that everything is continuously connected with something non-existent, in that case, what other non-existent things such as cows will be the objects of attribution of existence on account of which nature? For while [you] assume that all cows, and so on, are continuously connected with something non-existent, the rejoinder (uttaram) that their having an existent nature follows [absurdly] from what is non-existent (asataḥ sadātmakatvam prāptam), is not justified. [270] Moreover, as regards [the] claim that there would be no difference of notion (pratyayābhedaḥ) with regard to something existent and something non-existent, for the notion of primordial materiality (prakṛtipratiyayā) is observed with regard to a modification, like, for instance, the notion of clay with regard to a plate, and so on, (*tatra) [we ask you],

[271] how is the cognition of difference established, although there is no difference of what is non-existent, if you maintain that there is a cognition of the difference of plate, and so on, although they are not different from clay? [40]

[272] For just as the difference of cognition of a plate, and so on, is assumed to be due to some means or other (kenāpi vidhinā) although [plates, etc.] are not different from clay (*mṛdbhyo 'bhinnatve 'pi)–when the [absurd] consequence is that there is only a ['clay'] cognition, (tathā) in the same way, why is it not maintained that the difference of cognition of what is existent and what is non-existent is due to the residual traces of verbal difference (sabdabheda-bhāvānāvaśāt)? For in your opinion too (tavāpi hi),
the ultimate form of the constituents is beyond the reach of vision. What has come within the reach of vision, however, is void like an illusion (māyā).\textsuperscript{515}

\textbf{§ 57.} \textsuperscript{[273]}The example\textsuperscript{516} \textsuperscript{[you have]} adduced, namely that the cognition of a cow is due to the observation of dewlap, and so on, is in conflict with your own theory.\textsuperscript{517} On the contrary, they have mutually different excluded referents.\textsuperscript{518} [41]

\textsuperscript{[274]}For how could someone,\textsuperscript{519} \textsuperscript{[to whom]} the cognition of a cow (*go-pratyayaḥ) as precluded from non-cows (*agonivṛttah), assert that it is caused by the observation of dewlap, etc. (*sāsnādidarśanānimittaḥ)? \textsuperscript{[275]}Having assumed \textsuperscript{[this]},\textsuperscript{520} the example is in conflict even with your own theory (svamataviruddhah).\textsuperscript{521} For the excluded \textsuperscript{[object]} is different with regard to a cow and a dewlap because of verbal difference\textsuperscript{522} (śabdabhēdāt).

\textsuperscript{[276]}The idea, however, that this \textsuperscript{[namely the cognition of one thing (ātmāntara)]} is not dependent \textsuperscript{[upon the observation of non-existence of other things]},\textsuperscript{523} is created out of your own imagination,\textsuperscript{524} for the word does not denote any individual form (*svārūpam) whatsoever that is exempt from exclusion (nirapoham) \textsuperscript{[of other referents]}. [42]

\textsuperscript{[277]}For it has previously been demonstrated that the general form in a dewlap, etc. (sāsnādisu), does not exist without dependence upon the non-existence of other referents (*sāmānyarūpam arthāntarābhāvānirapekṣam na bhavati).\textsuperscript{525} The\textsuperscript{526} \textsuperscript{individual} form,\textsuperscript{527} however, (svārūpam tu) is not denotable (*vyāvahārikam) in this (tena) \textsuperscript{[form]} because it is inexpressible (anabhīlāpyatvāt).

\textbf{§ 58.} \textsuperscript{[278]}And as to the objection that there is no first cognition (ādyapratyayah),\textsuperscript{528}

\textsuperscript{[279]}our view is established because there is no beginning.\textsuperscript{529} [43a]

For (*hi) there is no first cognition since the transmission of the cause and effect of discourse is without beginning (*vyavahārakāryakāranāpāramparyānāditvā).\textsuperscript{530} \textsuperscript{[280]}However, the following two problems concern someone who recognizes first cognition,\textsuperscript{531} namely that \textsuperscript{[281]}neither is it \textsuperscript{[namely the word]} capable of universally pervading the general property possessors,\textsuperscript{532} nor\textsuperscript{533} is the general property
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(*jātīḥ) capable [of pervading the general property possessors]\textsuperscript{534} as resident in a single or in all [general property possessors] (*ekasamastavṛtīḥ) whether it is separate (*vyatirikta vā) or not separate (*avyatirikta vā) from the general property possessors.\textsuperscript{535}

§ 59. \textsuperscript{282}Nor is the claim justified that no cognition occurs at all (pratyayāvyṛttir eva nāsti).\textsuperscript{536}

because exclusion is [in the form of a single] common [property]\textsuperscript{537} (sāmānyena nirākrteḥ). [43b]

\textsuperscript{283}For the [word] (saḥ) does not exclude a different general property (anyāṁ jātīṁ) for each individual substance\textsuperscript{538} (pratidravyam), but rather (kim tarhi) with the intention of denoting the things to be excluded\textsuperscript{539} (vyavacchedyāvivaksayā) by means of a single common property (ekena sāmānyadharmena).\textsuperscript{540} And on this point it has been explained (uktam cātra) that the inference [of the referent] is from mere non-observation [of the word’s application] to what belongs to the class of dissimilar things (vijātīye ḍarśanamātreṇānumānam).\textsuperscript{541} However, this problem\textsuperscript{542} concerns only you (tavaivā): if [the word] were to apply by universally pervading [the referents] pertaining to its own class of similar things (svajātīvyāptyāvarteta), the pervaded\textsuperscript{543} would be infinite (*vyāpyasyānacyāntyam). Therefore, like in the statement “It is a non-horse because it is horned” (*viṣāṇītvaḥ anaśva iti), the inference is from its exclusion from this [namely a horse] (tadvayavacchedānumānam)\textsuperscript{544} because of not observing the general property of being horned in a horse (aśve viṣāṇītyādārsanena), but the white horses, etc. (*karkādīn) are not excluded each separately (pratyekam), nor is every single cow, etc. (*ekaikagavādin)\textsuperscript{545} apprehended.\textsuperscript{546} Also you maintain the theory that cognitions are based upon exclusion and continuous application\textsuperscript{547} (*vyāvyrttyanuvṛtti-buddhimatam); and the principle (nyāyāḥ) in this treatise (atra) is the same (tathā).

§ 60. \textsuperscript{284}The notion of identity and difference (ekānekatvākalaṃpā) is not justified on the assumption (upetya) of non-existence of the nature of other things since (hi) it is concerned with an entity.\textsuperscript{548}

\textsuperscript{285}For (hi) it is justified to conceive of the identity and difference of a thing whose nature is existent (*sadātma), but not on the assump-
tion of non-existence of the nature of other things (*ātmāntarābhāv- 
am abhyupetya). 549

[286] The consequence is the same for you too, as regards the powers in the unmanifest. [44d]

[287] For if (*hi) the powers of the modifications are identical (vikāra-
śaktīnām aikye) in the unmanifest, there would be no difference 
between the modifications. If, on the other hand, they are different, 
that would be in conflict with the unity of primordial materiality 
(pradhānasya) because it is not different from the powers.

[288] This theory (cintā), moreover, concerns the denotable object of 
the word, not the domain of the senses (*indriyagocare). Since it 
[namely the denotable object] is not included (*prakṣiptaḥ) 550 in 
[what is perceptible such as] words, and so on, it does not have 
different sensefaculties [for cognizing it] (*bhinnendriyaḥ). 551 [45]

[289] For the object of sensation is not denotable 552 (anirdeśyah). The 
statement “the nature of one thing is the non-existence of the nature of 
other things” (ātmāntarābhāva ātmāntaram iti), 553 has been formu-
lated with regard to (prati) the denotable [object]. Therefore it [namely 
the denotable object] is not included in what is perceptible (pratyakṣe 
prakṣepaḥ).

§ 61. In this context, moreover (*atra ca),

[290] the referent 554 of the syntactical word (padasya) is imagined 555 
(vikalpitaḥ) when abstracted (apoddhāre) 556 from the sentence 
(vākyāt). Yet the referent of the sentence which is called intuition 
(pratibhā) is in the beginning (ādau) produced by that [namely the 
syntactical word]. 557 [46]

[291] Even though the syntactical word is unreal (asat) 558 as abstracted 
from the sentence, its referent is determined by invention 559 
(utpreksaṇā) 560 according to the [grammatical] tradition, 561 because it 
is not used in isolation 562 (kevalasyāprayogāt) in the same way as a 
stem and an affix (prakṛtipratyayavat) [are not used in isolation]. 563 
And this invention apprehends a referent that is not justified 
(ayuktārthagrahānti) 564 in other traditions. 565 Therefore this different 
referent 566 (arthāntaram) has been brought forward (utkṣiptam);
because for those who have not repeatedly experienced the connection between the word and its referent (*anabhyastaśabdārtha-sambandhānām) the intuition of the referent of the sentence (*vākyārthapratibhā) has in the beginning (*ādau) the syntactical word568 as a means of apprehension of the referent (*padārthagrahaḥanopāya). [292] Yet only (eva) the sentence and its referent are the principal speech unit and the principal referent569 (mukhyau śabdārthaḥ) because they are indivisible (tayor abhinnatvā).570 The other belief in apprehending speech units and [their] referents (*śabdārthagrahaṇānām) in the interval between them571 (∗tadantarāle) is due to invention572 (*utprekṣayā), for [invention] is unfettered573 (*nirāṅkuṣatvā).

§ 62. [293] Those who reject intuition of the referents (*artheṣu ... pratibhāṃ hitvā) and imagine that the referent of the sentence (vākyārtham) is something different, namely an external referent575 (bāhyam artham) or their connection576 (tatsambandham vā), their [view] is also (teśām api) mere imagination (kalpanāmātram).577 Why?

[294] Because (hi) even without an external referent, according to repeated practice578 (yathābhyāsam) a cognition (pratipatti) is produced in various ways (anekadhā)579 by sentences in imitation of one’s own ideas580 (svapratyayānukāreṇa). [47]

[295] Although the external referent does not exist,581 a cognition about purposeful action (arthakriyāpratipattiḥ) that has various forms (nānārūpā) arises from a sentence, as well as representations by imitation of one’s own ideas583 (svapratyayānurūpyena) dependent upon latent impressions from repeated practice584 [in a former existence] with regard to the referents585 [of a sentence] (arthābhya-savāsanāpekṣā),586 like hearing [the sentence] “The tiger [is near by],” or the like (vyāghrādiśrutīvat).587 Or, even if its [referent] is the same588 (tadaviśeṣe vā), nevertheless, in those who are impassioned (rāgiṇām) a cognition (pratītiḥ) arises from hearing a love poem589 (śṛṇgārakāvyasya śravanāt) that reflects their passion (rāgānurūpā), but in those who are devoid of passion (vītarāgānām) it reflects their aversion (saṃvegānurūpā).

§ 63. [296] Moreover, the [intuition] of some who knows the connection (sambandhābhijñāsya) [between the word and its referent]590 is claimed to be [intuition] of a referent (arthe) as
excluded (vyavacchinnē) from the referents of other sentences (vākyāntarārthebhyaḥ). Therefore it [namely intuition] does not differ from inference. Therefore it [namely intuition] does not differ from inference.

Moreover, the intuition of someone who knows the connection [between the word and its referent] is different for each sentence (*pratyekam vākye) in the same way as for [each referent of] the syntactical words (*padārthavat). Therefore it [namely intuition] does not differ from inference.

However, the cognition (pratipattih), entailing different representations, that arise due to a sentence (*nātivartate) [the domain of] sensation (*pratyakṣam) either, as it is self-awareness.

Intuition (*pratibhā), however, is sensation (*pratyakṣam) as it is self-awareness (*svasamvedanam). Consequently it does not transgress [the domain of] this [namely sensation].

§ 64. If, in the first place, it is justified, in the case of words having a cause of application (naimittikeṣu), that they denote their referents (arthaḥbhidhānam) through exclusion of other referents (anyāpohena), how then [is it justified] in the case of those that are arbitrary (yādṛccikeṣu)?

[it is] also [justified] in the case of arbitrary terms because their referents are without distinction (*arthābhedāt). [50a]

For (hi) an arbitrary term like the word ‘dittha’, which denotes an aggregate (samudāyavācī), denotes the members of the aggregate (*samudāyinaḥ) without distinction (abhedenāha).

What then is the difference between a general term and an aggregate term?

[There is] none whatsoever! According to acknowledged usage (prasiddhivaśāt) a general term in some cases (kvacī) is transferred to each single (pratyekam) part (avayavesu), as, for instance, in the statement: “one should not eat the village swine” (abhakṣyo grāmyasākara iti). In other cases (kvacī) it [applies] directly (mukhyāḥ) [to the parts]. [302] It is, for example, said that
without reference to number, quantity, and material shape the denoting [word] (vācakah) applies to water, or the like,\(^{609}\) whether a [single] drop or a multitude [of drops].\(^ {610}\) (VP II 156)

In certain cases (*kvacit*) it does not refer to a part (*avayave*)\(^ {611}\) [of a referent]. For instance,

303] the word which applies to [a referent] that is qualified by material shape, colour, and parts, is not recognized to apply to [each single] component [of these]. (VP II 155)

When [applied] to [a referent] that is qualified by material shape (*samsthānaviśīṣṭa*) [the terms] 'circular' (*vṛttas*), 'spherical' (parimāndala), 'oblong' (dīrgha), and quadrangular (caturaśra), and in the same way 'fist' (musti), 'knot' (granthi), 'wreath' (*mālā*), and 'ear-ring' (kundalaka) do not denote the parts.\(^ {612}\) [304] When [applied] to [a referent] that is qualified by colour (varnnaviśiṣṭe): [the terms] 'speckled' (citram) and 'variegated' (kalmāṣa), and so on,\(^ {613}\) [do not denote the parts].\(^ {605}\) When [applied] to [a referent] that is qualified by parts (avayavaviśiṣte): [the terms] 'hundred' (śatam), 'thousand' (sahasram), 'prastha',\(^ {614}\) 'drona',\(^ {615}\) 'month' (māsa), 'year' (saṃvat-sara), and 'weight' (tulā) do not apply to the parts.\(^ {616}\) [306] And in some cases an aggregate term (samudāyaśabdaḥ) comprises each single [part]\(^ {617}\) (pratyekam parisamāpyate), as, for instance, [in the statement]: “The village came back” (grāmā āgataḥ).\(^ {618}\) [307] In some cases it is transferred (upacaritāḥ) [to each single part], like [VS V.2:18]: “The action of the ātman is explained by the action of the body” (kāyakarmanā 'tmakārma vyākhyātama).\(^ {619}\) In some cases it does not refer to the parts [of the aggregate], as for instance, [the words] 'troop' (yūtham), and forest\(^ {620}\) (vanam).

§ 65. [308] Now how could the cognition of a referent (arthapratītiḥ) from a word whose connection has not been told (*akṛtasambandhaśabdāt*)\(^ {622}\) be an inference about it like, for instance, from [the statement] ‘this is a Jack-fruit tree’ (ayam panasa iti)\(^ {623}\) [309] In that case there is no cognition of the referent from the word 'Jack-fruit tree.'

Why?

310] Because [it’s] referent is shown (*arthadarśanāt*) (?) by someone to whom [its connection] is known (pratītena).\(^ {624}\) [50b]
Since the [word’s] referent is established\(^625\) (*\textit{arthasiddhatvā}*) by an acknowledged authority (*\textit{vṛddhena}*) to whom the connection is known (*\textit{pratītasambandhena}*)\(^626\) [311] by means of the demonstrative pronoun ‘this’\(^627\) (\textit{ayaṃśabdena}) and ostentation\(^628\) (*\textit{hastasamjñayā}*)\(^629\), there is no cognition of the referent (*\textit{arthapratītiḥ}*) due to the word ‘Jack-fruit tree,’\(^312\) but rather, it is the name [of the referent] that is taught (\textit{saṃjñāvyutpattiḥ}).\(^630\) [313] The co-reference (\textit{sāmānādhikaranyam}) of this [namely the word ‘Jack-fruit tree’], whose purpose is that of teaching a name,\(^314\) with the demonstrative pronoun ‘this’ is just\(^632\) for the purpose of showing the connection (\textit{sambandhpradarśanārthaṃ tu}),\(^633\) [314] on the assumption (\textit{iti kṛtvā}) that [the connection] is the denotable object of both [terms].\(^634\) [315] And since the word ‘Jack-fruit tree’ does not have this [namely the Jack-fruit tree] as its referent, its purpose is that of teaching a name.\(^635\)

§ 66.\(^316\) Then (\textit{tarhi}) only the connection will be the word’s object of cognition (*\textit{prameyam}*)\(^636\).

The connection is not (*\textit{na}) [the word’s object of cognition] because it is imagined.\(^637\) [50c]

[317] Since (\textit{hi}) the connection is created in the mind (\textit{manasā kalpyate}), after having perceived the referent Jack-fruit tree and the word ‘Jack-fruit tree’ by the other means of cognition [namely sensation],\(^638\) at the thought: “This [word] is [the denotation] of that [referent]” (*\textit{asyāyah īti})*, in the same way as the inference-inferendum connection (\textit{anumānānumeyasambandhavat}),\(^639\) (*\textit{tataḥ}) verbal cognition (\textit{śābdam}) is not a separate means of cognition.

§ 67.\(^318\) Now why is it that the remaining [means of cognition] namely comparison (\textit{upamāndi}), and so on,\(^640\) are not separate means of cognition?

[319] The remaining [means of cognition] are explained in the [previously prescribed] manner.\(^641\) [50d]

[320] Firstly, comparison has the purpose of cognizing the similarity\(^642\) in a cow and a gayal, and so on. In this context (\textit{tatra}) the cognition that results from listening to another\(^643\) (\textit{parata upaśrutyā}) is verbal cognition (\textit{śābdam}). And when (\textit{yadā}) one imagines (\textit{kalpayati})\(^644\) the similarity in the mind (\textit{manasā}) after having apprehended the two
referents by means of the other means of cognition (*pramāṇāntareṇa*) [namely, sensation], (*tadā*) it is not a separate means of cognition either.\(^{645}\) Nor is similarity when apprehended in this way an object of cognition (*prameyam*).\(^{646}\) In the same way also the other [means of cognition] are to be rejected (*parikṣiptavyāni*) since they are not separate from inferential representation (*anumānavikalpāvyatirikta-tvāt*).\(^{647}\)

[End of] Chapter Five\(^{648}\)
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(1) Cf. tshad ma giñis su bbrjod pa la V : tshad ma giñis bṣad pa yin no K. This nominal sentence is syntactically ambiguous and open to interpretation. V translates: “the means of cognition are explained as [i.e. to be] two;” K: “The two means of cognition are [already] explained.”

1 Jinendrabuddhi explains this statement with reference to Dignāga’s definition of the means of cognition at PSV I:2ab. The purpose is to present the greater merit of Dignāga’s theory of the actual means of cognition and to refute the views presented by other philosophers, cf. PST Ms B 191a7-191b1: yat prāk pratijñātam “pratyakṣam anumāṇam ca pramāṇe dve eva” iti tat uktam pramāṇadavyam iti svapramāṇaṇugṛhbovānavatāt parapramāṇaṇapratiṣedhataś ca. See Hattori 1968: 24, 76 no. 1.11.

In the first chapter of PSV Dignāga sets forth his theory of sensation (pratyakṣa) introducing the crucial distinction between svalakṣaṇa and sāmānyalakṣaṇa. Svalakṣaṇa denotes the individual character of any given thing as observable through sensation, which Dignāga claims is beyond linguistic representation, whereas sāmānyalakṣaṇa designates the general character of things as known either by means of an inferential indicator (liṅga) or communicated through language. Although Dignāga never explicitly defines sāmānyalakṣaṇa, it appears indirectly from a passage recorded at PSV I 2c2-d1 that sāmānyalakṣaṇa is comparable to general properties like colorness (varṇatva) and impermanence (anityatā): svasāmānyalakṣaṇābhyām hy avyapadeśyavaraṇatvābhavyām varṇādi gṛhītvānityatayā cānītyam varṇāditī manasā saṃdhatte: “For having apprehended a color and so on through its individual and general characters, i.e., through what is not denotable and colorless, [respectively], as well as through [the general property] impermanence, one combines [the two] at the thought: “Color, and so on, is impermanent.”

This passage shows unequivocally that sāmānyalakṣaṇa is equivalent to sāmānya “general property,” which contemporary grammarians and philosophers claimed to be a real singular property inherent in things and the cause of application of words (pravṛttiṇimitta). Dignāga, however, rejects the theory of real universals and substitutes anyāpoha “exclusion of other [referents]” for real general properties. He defines apoha as equivalent to preclusion (nivṛtti) or non-existence (abhāva) of all instances of non-x in all instances of x, thereby qualifying any instance of x as x(excluded from non-x). See PSV V 34ff, and cf. no. 9 below on Dignāga’s introduction of the abstract affixes tvā or tā to denote anyāpoha as the general property of things and as cause of application of words.

2 Jinendrabuddhi does not identify any of the contemporary scholars whose philosophy of verbal cognition Dignāga addresses in this paragraph, but merely identifies his protagonists as Sāṅkhya, and so on, cf. PST Ms B 191b1: Kapilādayaḥ. It is noteworthy, however, that Dignāga, in the crucial paragraph at PSV II:4c, mentions the views of contemporary philosophers who claim that there is a difference between sābda and anumāna as
1. No example is mentioned because any given example is already well known to the listener \((\text{prasiddhiva} \text{śena})\).

2. The word and its referent are identified in verbal cognition in terms of \(\text{abhedopacāra}\). That is, the cognition of the word \((\hat{\text{śabda}}jñāna)\) and that of the referent \((\text{artha}jñāna)\) become fused. This, on the other hand, is not the case with the relation that holds between the logical indicator and the thing it indicates. Consequently it is impossible to assert that the word and the inferential indicator are similar;

3. Only the sentence \((\text{vākyā})\) has status as an independent speech unit, and a sentence cannot be an inferential indicator (cf., however, PS V:48-49 § 63 below).

The two Tibetan versions of PSV II:4c diverge semantically and syntactically from each other, and the limited number of \(\text{pratīkas}\) quoted by Jinendrabuddhi at PTS Ms B 60b4-61a1 are not in every case sufficient for restoring the Sanskrit original of this important paragraph. It is obvious that the translator of V was uncertain about some of the readings of his manuscript. For instance, \(\text{śugs kyis} \text{K} : \text{don yod pa' i} \text{V}\) of the following passage must translate \(\text{arthāpattī}\) because K in general renders Sanskrit \(\text{arthāpatti}\) by Tibetan \(\text{śugs}\). The noun phrase \(\text{don yod pa' i}\), however, shows that the translators of V identified the first lexeme of this compound as Sanskrit \(\text{artha}\), but could not correctly identify the second term on the basis of their manuscript and presumably interpreted it as a form of \(\text{sattā} (?)\) to be construed with the following word, otherwise the Tibetan reading of V: \(\text{don yod pa' i}\) is inexplicable. Whatever the reading of the Sanskrit manuscript may have been, the incomprehensible translation of V shows that the first word of the compound must have been equivalent to Sanskrit \(\text{artha}\), and in this way V corroborates, although indirectly, the suggested interpretation of \(\text{śugs kyis} \text{K}\) as equivalent to Sanskrit \(\text{arthāpattī}\).

1. Dignāga addresses the first view in the following passage:

\[
\text{K} \text{ (Kitagawa 1973 453b2-10 = P 110b2-5): grags pa' i dba' gi rjes su dpag pa las sgra las byun ba tha dad par yan grub bo } \| \text{kha cig dpe ma bstan pa las khjad par yod do žes zer ro } \| \text{de lta na yan gan du rtogs pa' i phyir dpe gcig gam gnis ma bstan pa der sgra las byun ba ni dper na du ba la mes me byun ba' i rjes su dpag pa lta bur sugs kyi rjes su dpag par thal bar 'gyur ro} \\
\text{V} \text{ (Kitagawa 1973 453a2-9 = P 29a6-8): rab tu grags pa' i dba' gi sde ni bstan par mi bya'o žes kha cig gis rjes su dpag pa las sgra tha dad du 'byed par byed do } \| \text{de lta grags pa' i phyir dpe bstan par mi bya ba yin na ni dper na dud pa las me rjes su dpag pa lta bu der don yod pa' i rjes su dpog pa yan sgrar thal bar 'gyur ro} \
\]

“Some assert that verbal cognition is different from inference as no example is stated \((\text{drṣṭāntānabhidhānam})\) because [the word’s application to similar instances and non-application to dissimilar instances] is well known \((\text{prasiddhiva} \text{śena})\) [to the listener]. Even so \((\text{evam api})\), in which case one \((\text{drṣṭāntasyaikasya})\) or two examples \((\text{dvayor vā})\) are not stated because [the positive and negative examples] are well-known [to the listener], it follows by implication \((\text{*arthāpattī})\) that inference like, for instance, inference of fire from smoke \((*\text{dhūmād agnyanumānavat})\), is [absurdly] verbal cognition \((\text{sābdaprāsaṅgah})\).”(1)

(1) For the Sanskrit fragments of this paragraph, cf. PST Ms B 60b3-60a1: \(\text{prasiddhiva} \text{śeneti ... drṣṭāntānabhidhānam ... evam apīti ... drṣṭāntasyaikasyetī ...} \)
dvayar veti ... śābdaprasaṅga iti. Jinendrabuddhi explains at PST Ms B 60b3-4 that the reason why śāda is not inferential is that [the word’s] existence to denote similar things and its non-existence to denote dissimilar things is an established fact to the listener, for which reason examples are not stated: sapakṣāvipakṣayoh sadasattve śrotuḥ siddhe iti drṣṭāntānabhidhānām. The remaining part of his explanation, however, sheds no further light on the topic.

Kumārila presents this view in similar terms at ŚV Śabda° 33: drṣṭāntānabhidhānām ca dhūmādau vyabhicāritam, prasiddhavād dihi tatrāpi na drṣṭānto 'bhidhiyate: “The not stating an example, moreover, is ambiguous in the case of smoke, and so on, for also in that case an example is not stated since it is well known.”

Cf. also Śabda° 35cd: śabdentumānyavar aikyam dhūmād agnyānumānavat: “language and inference become identical just as the inference of fire from smoke;”

The writer Bhāmaha, who composed Kāvyālankāra, a treatise on poetics, was evidently familiar with an argument similar to the one Dignāga is addressing. This appears from his exposition at Kāvyālankāra VI.7: pratīṭi artheṣu yatas tām śabdaṃ bruvate apare, dhūmabhāsor api prāptā bhādatāgnyanumāṃ pratī: “Other [scholars] claim that a word is that due to which there is a cognition of objects; but it follows [absurdly] that also smoke and light [from fire] have status as words.”

2. Dignāga mentions the second view in the following paragraph:

K (Kitagawa 1973 453b2-10 = P 110b2-5):
   g[z]aṇ ni sṛga las byuṃ ba la sṛga daṇ dan tho ma di dad par ne bar btags pa yin te |
   de ltar don las rjes su dpag pa las ni ma yin no žes bya ba ni khyad par yin no žes zer ro || sṛga daṇ tho ma di dad pa ne bar btags pa de lta na yān ji ltar don la rjes su dpag pa yin žes brjod par bya ste |

V (Kitagawa 1973 453a2-9 = P 29a6-8):
   g[z]aṇ dag ni don gye sṛga la tho ma di dad kyi || sṛgas ne bar btags pa ste don de ŋid rjes su dpog pa ni ma yin no žes bya ba ni khyad par ro žes zer ro || de lta na yān sgras tho ma di dad du ne bar btags pa las don rjes su dpog go žes ji lta brjod par bya |

“Other [scholars], however, argue (anye tv āhuh) that the difference (*viṣeṣāḥ) [between inference and verbal cognition] is that in verbal cognition (*śābde) the word is transferred to the referent in terms of non-difference (*sabdenārthābhedopacāraḥ) [of the referent] from the word. Thus, there is no inference of the referent (*evam nārthe 'numānam). Consequently (*iti) there is a difference. As this is the case, it is to be explained (*vaktavyam) how it is inference of the referent (katham arthe 'numānam), since the word is transferred [to it] in terms of non-difference [from it]?r(1)

(1) For the Sanskrit fragments of this paragraph, cf. PST Ms B 61a1-2: anye tv āhur ityādi ... katham arthe 'numānam iti; cf. loc. cit. below.

In this short passage Dignāga presumably addresses Bhartṛhari’s view that in verbal cognition any given word and its referent become fused in terms of abhedopacāra; cf. Bhartṛhari’s use of the phrase so 'yam to illustrate abhedopacāra (cf. Iyer 1969: 206), e.g., at VPV I 101,3: so 'yam iti vyapadeśena sambandhopa-yogasya sākyatvāti; VPV 105,3-4; VPV I 126,4-5: so 'yam iti sañjñīnā śākyavac-chedalaksanāḥ sambandho niyamya; VP II:128. Kumārila addresses the implica-

Jinendrabuddhi explains the view Dignāga is criticizing in an interesting passage at PST Ms B 61a1: śabdo hi svarūpābhinnarūpam evārthām pratīyāpayati. na tv evaṃ dhūmādayaḥ. na hi dhūmād āgnīṃ pratīyāyati pratīyāpayati vā. kathām arthe ’numānam ity arthasyānekarūpratvāt. tatra hi kim svarūpena so ’ṛtho gamyate uta sāmānyarūpena? sarvatahāvānupapattim manyate. tathā hi yadi vrśādayaḥ śabdāḥ sattvādibhiḥ sāmānyākārair vrśādikam arthāṃ pratīpādayeyuḥ sarvasaabdānāṃ ekārthatā prasajyeta sāmānyākārānāṃ ānekārthasādharānāvāt. atha viśeṣārūpeṇa tad ayuktam, asādhārānāsya rūpasya pratīpādayitum asākyatvāt iti sarvathā śabdārthatvābhāvah: “For a word makes its referent known only in a form that is identical with its own form, but smoke and so on does not. For [in verbal cognition] fire is not known or made known from smoke. So how is there inference of the referent? Because the referent has numerous forms. Is the referent in that case understood in its own form or in the form of [its] general properties? In every single case there is thought to be no justification. That is, if a word like ‘tree’ were to indicate a referent like a tree by means of the forms of its general properties such as existence, the [absurd] consequence would be that all words have one and the same existence, the [absurd] consequence would be that all words have one and the same

Before addressing the third view Dignāga answers a question his opponent is asking about how the referent is inferred, when the word is transferred to it in terms of non-difference. This passage is important for understanding the rationale of the apoha theory:

K (Kitagawa 1973 453b13-454b4 = P 110b5-8): śiṃ gi sgras’i brjod par bya ba ni don gzan ma yin no || gal te yon rdzas kyi sgras ni don de ni gdo bar byed pa yin la || ran bzin gzan gyis ni rdzas ma yin pa las ldog pas so || on te sīn gi sgras kyan rdzas ma yin pa las ldog pa go bar byed do ze na || gal te go bar byed kyan don gyis yin gyis || sgras ni ma yin pas nes pa med do ze na || gal te sīn la sogs pa’i sīn tshig kha no la tshad ma brjod na ni nes pa med par ‘gyur na || a khya ta la sogs pa’i sgra rnamds de’i ran bzin ma yin pas kyan don go bar byed pa yin no.||

V (Kitagawa 1973 453a11-454a1 = P 29b1-3): ēdi sīn gi sgras’i brjod bya’i don gzan ma yin pas rdzas kyi sgras don de ni gdo go ru zin kyan tsul gzan gyi sgo nas rdzas gzan ma yin pa las bdog pa go ba yin no || gal te sīn gi sgras rdzas ma yin pa las log pa go bar byed du zin mod kyi kyan don las yin gyi sgras las ni ma yin no || de’ phyir skyon med de ze na || skyon du ni mi ’gyur la rag la || sīn la sogs pa’i tshig las gzan pa’i sgra ni gdo tshad mar brjod par bya ste || bya ba brjod pa’i sgras kyan don gyi tshul de ni gdo bar byed do.||

“The referent that is the denotable object of the word ‘tree’ is not a different [referent from a substance] (vrkṣaśabādhibhīhṛno ’ṛtho na bhavati). Even though the word ‘substance’ denotes the same referent (as the word ‘tree’), it
indicates a different form [of it] (*rūpāntaram) by excluding it from non-substances (adravyanivṛtyā).

Surely (nanu ca) also the word ‘tree’ (vrkṣaśabdenāpi) indicates its exclusion from non-substances.

Even so, it does so by implication, not explicitly (arthāt, na śabdāt), therefore there is no problem.

If only syntactical words like ‘tree’ were claimed to be a means of cognition (yadi vrkṣādīpādāny eva pramāṇam ucṣeryan), there would be no problem (na syāda doṣaḥ), but also verbs (ākhīyātaśabdārī aiḥ) that do not have their form (*atadrūpaḥ) [i.e. they end in a tiṅ affix in contrast to nouns that end in a sup affix] indicate the object.”

(1) The inserted Sanskrit fragments stem from PST Ms B 61a4ff, q.v. below. The theoretical implications of this paragraph are difficult to assess because Dignāga’s exposition is concise and difficult to contextualise as he never explains in detail how he understands the denotation of verbs and verbal inflectional affixes with the background of the apoha thesis. I assume that Dignāga would analyse any finite or non-finite verbal form on the analogy of the apoha thesis–like his analysis of the function of nominal affixes (cf. no. 349 below)–as consisting of a verbal root denoting the action itself and a tiṅ affix denoting person, temporal, and modal aspects of the action, each form excluding its complement. Such verbal forms are considered to denote a not finished action (aparītiśpanna) in contrast to nouns that denote finished referents (parītispanna). In view of the importance of this paragraph I reproduce Jinendrabuddhi’s interesting exegesis of it at PST Ms B 61a4-62a3, omitting a few insignificant phrases indicated by ... . The historical context of this debate is obscure, but the claim that general property (sāmānyaya) is exclusion of other referents (śabdārthānyāpoha), which is Dignāga’s assumption too, appears to mirror the view of his opponent, whereas Jinendrabuddhi’s exegesis aims at explaining the difference between the two versions of the apoha doctrine: yathāiva tava śabdārthānyāpoham sāmānyam tathā mamāpi. etāvam tu viśeṣa mayayā tac chabdākāroparaktam pratiyata iti abhyupagatam iti darsayate. vrkṣaśabdamitiḥheyo na ’rthah so ’nyo ghaṭādir na bhavati, anyaśabdārthābhāvānātra vrkṣaśabdaḥbhidheyo bhāgo laksyate. etad uktam bhavati: “arthāntaravāyṛtyupalakṣito yo vastuno bhāgāḥ sa eva vrkṣaśabdasāyṛtha” iti. tenaiva tasya sārūpyāt, na tu sattvādibhiḥ sādhanaṁ añkāraṁ asādhdhārenāna vā rūpeṇeti manyate.

nanu ca dravyasabdenāpi sākṣadīmnārthaḥ prayāpyate. na cāsau tādṛśaḥ. tataś cāsārūpye ’py abhidheyaḥvadāraṇāt, na śabdāsārūpyaḥpyenaḥpratāpyāyanam iti.

ata āhā: yady apītyādi, apīṣabdēna dravyaśabdo dravyaśabdenāṁ vyābhicārāṁ na vācikaḥ, abhyupetottaram ucyatā ity arthāṃ āvīṣkaroṭi, rūpāntaram ākāran- taram. “tasyaiva vastunāḥ kaścid bhāgāḥ.”

(a) tena ca saha dravyaśabdaḥ sārūpyaḥ āsty evety abhiprāyāḥ. tat punā rūpāntaram adravyanivṛtyupalakṣitavastuno rūpāntaram dravyanivṛtyupalakṣyata iti drāśayīṃ idam uktam: adravyanivṛtyetī. nanu cetyādi, na kevalaṃ dravyaśabdenādadravyanivṛtyupalakṣitavastuno rūpānta- raṃ dravyaśabdasārūpyapratyāpyogyam gamyate, api tu vrkṣaśabdenāpi. tathā hi sāmānādhikaranyam drṣyate: dravyaṃ vrkṣa iti, na hi bhinnārthayos tad upapadyate, na ca tena saha tasya sārūpyam iṣyate. tatas sa eva doṣo ’sārūpye ’pi śabdārthavadāraṇāt, nābhīdhānvasārūpye nārthābhīhānām ity abhiprāyāḥ, arthāt, na śabdādī. iti vrkṣaśabdaḥ evādravyanivṛtyitr avinābāhīvināḥ sā pratiyate. mūḍhas tu śabdāḥ eva gamyata iti manyate. sāmānādhikaranyam tu viśeṣasahitasasya viśeṣe vartamāṇāt, na tu vrkṣaśabdenādadravyanivṛtyitr abhidhīyate. yadi vrkṣādipādā-
ny evetyādi. subantāny eva padāni. vadi śabdani bandhane pramāṇam ucyeran, na syād dosah. tathaḥ hi īsēṃ parinispannarūpa 'ṛtha “idam tad” iti pratyavamarsa-yogyo buddhau sammīṣata iti. tena sahābheda pacārah sambhavati śabdasya, na tu nāmapadāny eva parinispannārthaḥbhidhāyiny ucyante, kim tarhi tīnantāny api. yad āha: ākhyaśābadhair apiyāṭādi. ākhyaśābdaḥ pacaṭi pāthati evamādibhiḥ, aśīngā asaṃkhyaśārvapārisbhūtvayavāparinispannasvarūpā kriyocythe. na ca tathāvi-dhāsay idam tad ity agrhītasya buddhyā ṣakyo 'bhedopacārah kartum. nāpi parinis-pannarūpāḥ śabdātmā sādhyanākāraśām pratipadya(n)te:

“Just as general property according to you is exclusion of other referents so it is according to me too. However, the difference is of such kind that I assume that the [general property] is understood as ‘coloured’ by the form of its word. This is what he illustrates. The referent that is the denotable object of the word ‘tree’ is not a different one like a pot. The part that is the denotable object of the word ‘tree’ is in this case implied by its not being the referent of other words. That is, only that part of the object that is indirectly indicated through negation of other referents is the referent of the word ‘tree’ because it agrees with that only, but not with common forms like existence or a not common shape. Such is the idea ...

The word ‘substance’ certainly also indicates a referent on which there are branches, and so on, and this [word] does not agree with that [referent]; and therefore there is no indication of the referent due to the word’s being in agreement because it is observed to be denotable, even though there is no agreement.

Therefore he says ‘even though’ and so forth. By the word ‘though’ he makes the issue clear, namely that the word ‘substance’ does not denote particular substances because of uncertainty. Having assumed [that it does], a rejoinder is formulated. A different form means a different aspect namely a certain part of the same object, and the word ‘substance’ is only in agreement with this [aspect]. Such is the underlying opinion. In order to show that this different form is indirectly indicated by negation of non-substance, the following is stated: “by negation of non-substance.”

“Certainly,” and so on. Not only does the word ‘substance’ imply another form of the object through negation of non-substance, which is capable of being in agreement with the word ‘substance’, but the word ‘tree’ does so too. That is, one observes that they are coreferential as in the statement: “a tree is a substance,” for this is not justified of two different referents. And it is not claimed that one is in agreement with the other. Therefore the problem is precisely this, that since one observes that [a tree] is a referent [of the word ‘substance’], even though there is no agreement [of the word ‘substance’ with the referent tree], there is no denotation of the referent when there is no proper agreement with the denotation. Such is the underlying intention.

“By implication, not explicitly.” Due to the word ‘tree’ alone one understands the negation of non-substance because a tree is invariably connected to [substrance]. A fool, however, believes that it is understood explicitly. However, there is coreference of [the word ‘substance’] when combined with the particular [term ‘tree’] because it applies to a particular [namely a tree], but the word ‘tree’ does not express the negation of non-substance.

“If only syntactical words like ‘tree,’ etc.” Syntactical words that are nouns terminate exclusively in the affixes denoted sup. If they were said to be a means of verbal construction, there would be no problem. That is, their referent, whose form is finished, is absorbed into the mind as capable of the identification “this is such and such [a thing].” The word’s transfer in terms of non-difference from that is
possible, but not only syntactical words that denote a finished referent are said [to be a means of verbal cognition], also syntactical words that end in the affixes denoted tin. As he explains: “also by means of verbs, etc.” i.e. by verbs such as “he is cooking;” “he is reading.” An action is said to be without gender and number, and to have a form that is not finished in terms of anterior and posterior parts, and [a syntactical word] like this is not capable of being transferred in terms of non-difference from [the action], as it is not perceived by the mind as “this is such and such [an action].” Nor does the nature of a speech unit whose form is finished indicate the appearance of [the action] that is in the process of being realised.”

The last paragraph is particularly interesting because Dignāga does not address in PSV V the question of how the thesis of anyāpoha applies to denotation of verbal action (kriyā) like pacati “he is cooking.” Kumārila addresses the question in a few kārikās at ŚV Apoha° 139f qu. TS 973f; cf. the discussion at TS 1143f with TSP ad loc.

(a) Jinendrabuddhi alludes to a statement found in Dignāga’s lost Dvādaśaśatikā: tasya vastunah kaścid bhāgo ’rthāntararvāvyṛtyā loke ganyate; cf. Pind 1991 no. 1. For the term “part,” cf. no. 15 below.

3. After this discussion Dignāga continues addressing the third view according to which only a sentence (vākyā) is the principal speech unit. He has Bhartrhari’s position in mind, cf. PS V:46-47 §§ 61-62. Both Tibetan translations of this passage diverge considerably from each other. In general K appears to be more reliable than V, but not in every case. Thus, for instance, the crucial term tshig ‘syntactical word’ (= Sanskrit padam, cf. A I.4:14) is missing in K.

K (Kitagawa 1973 454b4-8 = P 110b8-111a1]) gaṅ ṭig ṇag kho na sgra yin la de rtogs pa’i thabs ni ’dod pa de dag gi sgra daṅ mthun par don rtogs pa yod pa ma yin te | de ltar khyad par gyi cha ṇe bar bzuṅ nas rjes su dpag pa las sgra las byun ba tha dad do ŋes brjod do |;

V (Kitagawa 1973 454a1-5 = P 29b3-4): gaṅ dag ṇag kho na sgra yin te | tshig ni de rtog par byed pa’i rgyu ma (sic) yin la | sgra de’i ṇo bo tsam las don rtogs pa’i phyir ro ŋes khyad par can ḍzan tsam ṇe bar blanis nas rjes su dpag pa las sgra tha dad du brjod ces brjod do |:

“According to those who claim that only the sentence is the speech unit (yeṣām ca vākyam eva śabdah), and that the syntactical word (*padam) is a means of understanding it (tadadhigamopāyaś ca), there is no (teṣām nāsti) cognition of the referent in agreement with the words (*śabdānurūpeṇa). Thus, having assumed a slight difference (viśeṣalesaḥ) they assert that verbal cognition is different from inference.”(1)

(1) For the Sanskrit fragments of this paragraph, cf. PST Ms B 62a3-5: yeṣām ca vākyam eva śabda iti ... tadadhigamopāyaś cetyādi ... teṣām nāstityādi ... iti viśeṣalesa iti. (loṣa em. [cf. Ms 62a7: viśeṣalesaḥ] : veṣaṇam Ms).

Dignāga is addressing Bhartrhari’s view. This is underlined by Jinendrabuddhi who introduces Bhartrhari’s concept of sādhanaśakti (for which cf. Vākyapadiya III.7:2), cf. PST Ms B 62a5-6: vākyārtho hi bāhya vā syāt <śādhyā> sādhanaśambandhātām, (a) sādhanaśaktinivesānuḥṛtā niravayavā kriyā vā, āntaro vā pratibhā-lakṣāṇaḥ, trayam api caittat asattvabhūtam “idam tad” iti pratyanamarṣāṭkṛtāntam, na ca tathābhūtenārthena “so ’yam” ity abhedopacārahā śkyāḥ kartum: “For whether the reference of the sentence is external, being of the nature of a connection
between the means of accomplishment [of an action, i.e., any given kāraka] and [the action] to be accomplished, or whether it is the partless action assisted by the residence of the powers in the means of accomplishment [of the action], or whether it is internal characterized by intuition, these three things, however, are unreal, transcending the identification judgement (pratyavamarṣa) “this is such and such a thing;” and it is impossible to state a transfer in terms of identity like “this is such and such a thing” with a referent of this kind.”

(3) sādhya° conj. (cf. bsgrub par bya ba T): om. Ms

3 Cf. the definition of sābdam at PST Ms B 191b1: sābdād upajātām asamnikṛṣṭe 'ṛthe jñāṇām sābdam: “Verbal cognition is an awareness, which follows from a word, about a referent with which one is not in [direct] sense contact.” ŚBh 32,3: sāstraṃ sābdaviṃśānād asamnikṛṣṭe 'ṛthe vijñānam; ŚV Śabda° 3; TSP 530,22ff.

4 That is, not only implication (arthāpatti) and the rest are separate means of cognition, but also sābdam, cf. PST Ms B 191b1: na kevalam arthāpattādīnity āpy arthāḥ. For the nature and number of pramāṇas admitted by the various Indian schools of philosophy, cf. Hattori 1968: 78 no. 1.12.

5 Cf. de la V : om. K.


(1) saḥ Ms B 191b2 and v.l. at TSP : tat TSP, cf. PST Ms B 191b2, claiming that saḥ by force of implication is to be construed with an implicit sābdah: sa iti sāmartṛhyaprāptaḥ sābde sambadhyate. The variant tat, referring to sābdam, is meaningless in the context because verbal cognition does not function as an indicator according to Dignāga epistemology. The reading tat is not recent, however, since Mallavādi’s rephrasing of PS V:1 reads tat for saḥ, cf. NCV 674,17-18.

6 For Dignāga’s explanation of what constitutes the inferential nature of verbal cognition, cf. the theoretically important passage at PSV V:34 and no. 9 below. Kumārila contrasts at ŚV Śabda° 15 the views of Sāṅkhya and other schools on sābda with those of the Buddhists and the Vaiśeṣikas who include verbal cognition in inference: tatrānumāṇam evadām bhaudhiḥ vaiśeṣikaiḥ śrītām bhedaḥ sāṅkhya-dibhīṣ tv īṣō na tuktaṃ bheda-kāraṇam. For the Vaiśeṣika definition, cf. Candrānanda ad VS IX:19: yathā kāryādīśrītya-pāpekṣām anumāṇaṃ trikālaviśयaṃ atīndriyārtham ca tathaiva sābdam saṃkētasmiṃtya-pāpekṣām trikālaviśयaṃ atīndriyārtham ca. ato ‘numāṇenaatayahyagaksemavād anumāṇām evety uktam bhavati. In contrast to this explanation, the statement at PBh § 256 shows that Praśastapāda regards the word as an indicator like the inferential indicator (linga) and thus subject to the constraints of the triple format of inference (for which, cf. PBh § 247: sābdādāhinām āpy anumāṇe ‘nītarbhāvah, samānāvihitvāt, yathā prasiddhasama-yasya lingadarśasaṃprasiddhyanusmarṇābhyām atīndriye ‘ṛthe bhavaty anumāṇam, evaṃ sābdādibhyo ‘pūtī). For the relation between the trairāpya and sābda, cf. no. 9 below. The Vaiśeṣika view that verbal cognition is inference (anumāṇa) because a
word (śabda) functions in the same way as an inferential indicator (liṅga), is also propounded at NS II.1:50-52; cf., e.g., NSBh ad NS 50: yathānupalabhyamāno liṅgī mitena liṅgena pasčāṃ miyata iti anumāṇam. evam mitena śabdena pasčāṃ miyate ‘rtho ’nupalabhyamāna ity anumāṇam sabdhāḥ. See Biardeau 1964: 127; 205.

7 According to Kamalaśīla, Dignāga is using bhāṣate with the same value as dyotayati (for which, see no. 12 below), cf. TSP 540,7f, equating bhāṣanam with dyotanam, i.e., the act of indicating, making known: tatra bhāṣanam = dyotanam, jñāpanam iti yāvat; Ms B 191b5-6: bhāṣaṇasya śabdadharmatvena rūḍhatvād drṣṭāntadṛṣṭāntika+yāt疮yam mā bhūd iti dyotatyāti āha.

8 Throughout PSV V Dignāga uses the term artha of the thing or referent denoted by the following classes of speech units: 1. affixes (pratyaya), to which Pāṇinian grammar attributes distinct denotations, 2. words (śabda) [usually common nouns or adjectives in the nominative, cf. the Pāṇinian definition of the nominative as denoting the mere referent of the nominal stem (prātipadiśārthamātra, cf. A II 3:46); this class also includes the referents of proper nouns], 3. compounds (samāśa), and 4. sentences (vākya), utterances or judgments. The referents (artha) of words are infinite, cf. PSV V:2b above and the expression arthasyaṇantye at PSV V:34 below. Dignāga does not address the artha of verbs in PSV V, but mentions ākyātāśābda at PSV II:4c; cf. no. 2. above and the passages quoted at paragraph 2., especially Jindrabuddhi’s interesting explanation of Dignāga’s introduction of the denotation of verbs in the context of the apoha thesis.

9 Cf. PST Ms B 191b2: yathā kṛtakatvādi liṅgam trairūpyayogāt svārtham prakāśayati, tathā śabdo ’pity arthaḥ. anena drṣṭāntena śabdasya liṅgatvan paridīpayan śabdasyanumāṇatvalakaṇṣanam udbhāvayati: “The meaning is as follows: just as the indicator [the general property] ‘being produced’, and so on, indicates its own referent because of being connected with the triple form [of the indicator], so also the word. While illustrating the word’s being an indicator by means of this example he explains the definition of verbal cognition as being one of inference.”

For Dignāga’s description of the logical property of kṛtakatva in inference, cf. PSV II:23, q.v. infra no. 14.

Dignāga’s mention of the logical indicator kṛtakatva to illustrate his claim about the inferential nature of sābda would indicate that verbal cognition is assumed to be subjeckt to the constraints of the trairūpya as defined at PSV II.5cd: anumeye hi dharmaviśiṣṭo dharmi, tatra dārṣaṇaṁ prayāṣato ’numāṇato vā. uttarakālam dharmasya śāmānyarupeṇa tajjātiye ca sarvatraikadeśe <vā> sadbhāvāḥ <śiddhāḥ>, kuta etad iti? tattulya eva sadbhāvā <ity> avadhāraṇāt, na tariḥ vaktavyam: <atattulye nāstītaitvete>, etat punar niyam<ārtham>: asaty eva nāstītā, nānyatra, na viruddha iti. Restored, cf. PST Ms B 64b1-66b6: anumeye ‘tha tattulya iti ... nāstītāśatiti ... anumeye hitīdāi ... dharmaviśiṣṭo dharmi, tatra dārṣaṇam iti ... prayāṣata iti ... anumāṇato veti ... uttarakāla iti ... dharmasya śāmānyarūpeneti ... tajjātiye ceti ... kuta etad iti ... sarvatra sadbhāvo ’nyatraikadeśe ’piti ... vyavacchadhaphalatvād vākyānām. isjataś cāvadhāraṇād etad labhyata ity āha: tattulya evetyādi ... na tariḥ vaktavyam iti ... etat punar ityādi ... niyamaḥ, asaty eva nāstīteti ... nānyatreti ... na viruddha iti.
The Tibetan versions of this crucial passage diverge from each other and the Sanskrit evidence:

K (Kitagawa 1973 455b9ff = P 111a6-111b1): rjes dpag bya dan de mtshuns la || yod dan med la med pa ’o || (PS II:5cd) rjes su dpag pa ni chos khyad par can gyi chos can yin te || de la dus phyis chos kyi spyi’i tshul gyis mgon sum nam rjes su dpag pas mthon ba ’o || de'i rigs la yan mtha’ dag gam phyogs cig yod pa ’n?id do || de gan las ze na || de dan mtshuns pa kho na la yod ves nes par gzun ba’i phyir yin gyi yod pa kho na’o ves ma yin no || de ltar na med pa lam med do ves brjod pas mi byo ’o ze na || ’di ni med pa ’n?id la med pa yin gyi || gzan pa la ’an ma yin ’gal ba la ma yin no ves nes pa’i don du ’gyur ro ||.

V (Kitagawa 1973 455a9ff = P 30a1-4): rjes dpag bya dan de mthon la || yod dan med ’n?id la med pa ’o || (PS II:5cd) rjes su dpag par bya ba ni chos kyi khyad par du byas pa’i chos can no || de la mgon sum mam rjes su dpag pas mthon gi rjes la de’i rigs dan mthun pa la yin spyi’i tshul gyis phyogs thams cad dam phyogs geig la yod par grub pa ’o || ci’i phyir ze na || de dan mthun pa kho na la yod ves nes par gzun ba’i phyir ro || de dan mthun pa la yod pa kho na’o ves ni brjod par mi bya ba’i phyir ro || med pa ’n?id las med pa ves pas ni slar yan de ’n?id nes par bya ba’i don du ste || med pa ’n?id la med pa ’n?id yin gyi gzan la yan ma yin la ’gal ba la yan ma yin no ves pa’i don to ||.

As PSV V:1 shows, Dignāga primarily mentions kr̥takatva in order to emphasise the logical indicator and the word share the function of indicating through exclusion of other referents. He defines at PSV V:34 (for which, see below § 46) the inferential nature of verbal cognition as tadvyavacchedānuṃāna svārthābhiddhānam without any reference to the canonical format of the traśūrūpya. There is, however, a passage in PSV IV where Dignāga explicitly draws a parallel between the role of traśūrūpya in inference (anumāna) and verbal cognition (śādha). Commenting at PSV IV:5 on the role of the explicit formulation, in parārthānūmaṇa, of the second and third criteria of the traśūrūpya, Dignāga compares their role in svārthānūmaṇa to that of verbal cognition (śādha). As Jinendrabuddhi observes in his comment at Ms B 178a4-7 (see below), the ascertainment obtained through svārthānūmaṇa presupposes recollection of the two states of affair as defined by the second and third criteria of the traśūrūpya, without being dependent upon their explicit formulation (arthadvayaparamārśāparvako hy abhidhānānapakṣah svārthānūmaṇanīścayaḥ). Dignāga continues asserting that after one has apprehended a word through immediate sensation (pratyakṣa), the mere fact that one recollects the second and third criteria of the traśūrūpya is sufficient for knowing the referent denoted by it (tathā hi śabdām pratyakṣatā upalabhya tasya “anyatra sajātiye sattāṃ smarati, asati cāsaśātmān.” tāvataivyā cābhidheyaṃ pratipadyate).

The Tibetan versions of PSV IV:5 diverge from each other, and, moreover, interpret the crucial phrase śādha iva as if the actual reading were śādha (loc.) eva K : śādha (nom. sic) iva V.

K (Kitagawa 1973 521b4-8 = P 150b4-7): gan ūg la cuñ zad rab tu grub pa yin pa’i phyir gan yan run ba brjod pa yan sgrub byed yin no || sgra kho na la don gnis rtogs pa’i phyir ram gan yan run bas žugs kyi gni ga bstan pa’i phyir gni ga brjod par mi bya ’o || rjes su dpag pa la yan tshul ’di yin par mthon ste || gal te rtags ’di rjes su dpag par bya ba la nes par bzun na gzan du de dañh rigs mthun pa la yod pa ’n?id dan || med pa la med pa ’n?id dran par byed pa de’i phyir ’di’i nes pa bskyed par yin no ||.
V (Kitagawa 1973 521a4-10 = P 65b2-4): 'ba’ zig tu cuñ zad grub pa ŋid du ‘gyur ba yin no || gan yan rũn ba gcig brjod pas kyaŋ sgrub byed du ‘gyur te | sgra bžin du don gnis rtogs pa‘i phyir gan yan rũn ba gcig gis gnis ka bstan pa‘i phyir don gyi sugs kyi gnis brjod pa yin no || don rjes su dpog pa la yan rigs pa de ŋid bta‘o || gan rjes su dpag par bya ba la rtags ‘di ŋes pa guñ bar byas nas gžan la de‘i rigs yod pa dran par byas te | med pa la med pa ŋid kyi bdag ŋid kyi ŋes par skyed par byed do |:

“Since some [example] is well-known (*prasiddhatvā) to someone (kasyacit) the formulation of one or the other [example] is also a means of proof (anyatarokir api sādhanaṃ); Since the two states of affair are already known (*artha vyaparāpratītavā) in the same way as in verbal cognition (sāda ṛva) or since they both are shown implicitly (*arthāpattyā) by one or the other (*anyatarena), both of them are not stated (ubhāyānabhidhānam). This is also observed to be the method in the case of inference: If the logical indicator is ascertained at the object of inference (anumeyeye), one recalls [its] existence elsewhere at what is similar and [its] non-existence where [what is similar] is absent (anyatra sajātīye sattām smarati, asati cāsattām). Therefore one realises oneself its ascertainment (*niścayāh).”

The inserted Sanskrit equivalents and phrases have been extracted from Jīnendrabuddhi’s explanation at Ms B 178a4-7: kasyacit ityādi. Parāvabodhanārthaṃ parārtham anumānaṃ. parasya ced anyataradṛṣṭāntapratipaḍyo ’rthā prasiddhāḥ, ’nyatāroktir api sādhanaṃ prasiddhokter anarthakatvā. apiśabdō ’vadhāranārthaḥ, sādā ivetyādi. pratiṭatvatmātraṃ sādharmyam upādāya sābdā iveti ṅṛṣṭānto veditavyaḥ, nānabhidhānaṃ. anyathā sābdASYA svārthaḥumānāntavād ayuktam etad nidārśanaṃ syāt, prasaṅgabhāvāt. na hi svārthaḥumāne ḍṛṣṭaṇa-prasango ’sti, arthāmakaṭvatvā. arthāvyaparāmaśaṃpaṇvako hy abhidhānanapekṣaḥ svārthaḥumānānāścayaḥ. tathā hi śābdasya pratyakṣata upalabhya tasya “anyatra sajātīye sattām smarati, asati cāsattām,” tāvataiva cābhidheyaṃ pratipadyate. tasmāt pratiṭatvatmātraṃ upā<dā>ya ṅṛṣṭaṇaḥ kṛta iti. ubhāyānabhidhānaṃ iti.

Dignāga’s claim about the inferential nature of verbal cognition was interpreted by his contemporaries as well as later writers as a statement about the word’s being subject to the constraints of the trairūpya. The view that the word indicates its referent in accordance with the canon of the trairūpya was addressed and severely criticized by Kumārila in ŚV Śabda’ 68-98, who asks whether it makes sense to apply the canon of the trairūpya to describe verbal cognition as the second and third member of the logical canon are presented in terms of existence of the logical indicator at some instance of the indicated and its non-existence at all dissimilar instances. The criticism evidently centres on whether it makes sense that the locative denotes a word’s existence or non-existence at something. However, there is no reason to assume that Dignāga’s use of the locative indicates that he believed that the denotation of words or utterances is dependent on their being observable at the objects or state of affairs they denote like any inferential indicator, but rather that they are observed to denote their referents at the time of vyāpatī (cf. PSV V:50c below), the locative being used to introduce their denotation like in traditional Sanskrit and lexicographical literature. The use of the locative at PSV V:34 is to be interpreted with this background. An extract of Kumārila’s criticism is quoted at TS 1490-97.
Related discussions about *trilakṣaṇa śabda* are found in Mallavādi’s NC, cf. NCV 666,12ff (*kritakavādīlingavac chabdāś trilakṣaṇo ‘anāpohe śvartham gamayatitī*), and in YD 101,8ff. Jinendrabuddhi summarises some of Kumārila’s critical observations, namely that it is incorrect to talk about the referent of the word as a property possessor because the fact of being a property possessor does not fit the referent of the word since it is the thing to be indicated, like impermanence, and, moreover, one does not observe the *pakṣa* of the word at the referent, but rather at the speaker as he speaks, which goes to show that *śabda* is a separate means of cognition, cf. PST Ms B 192a2-4: *kathaṃ punah śabdasya tairūpyam? kathaṃ ca na syāt? dharmino ‘yogāt. tathaḥ hi śabdārthasa na dharmitvam upapadyate pratīyavatvād anityavatvāt, na cārthe śabdāsya paksādārṣāna vaktār sthitavat tatraivopalabdheḥ. tasmāt pramāṇāntaram evedam yathāsamyayam arthapratipatti- hetuttvāt.*

Jinendrabuddhi’s answer to this critique is influenced by Dharmakīrtan and post-Dharmakīrtan philosophy, in which the question of whether or not the alleged inferential nature of verbal cognition reflects the canon of the *tairūpya* is answered by claiming that verbal cognition is subject to the constraints of the *tairūpya* because words indicate the intention (*vivakṣā*) of the speaker. Thus the speaker is the *dharma*, any given word is the *pakṣadharma*, the *pakṣa* is any previously perceived possessor of *vivakṣā* (*vivakṣāvān pūrvānubhūtaḥ*), and *vipakṣa* its exclusion (*tadvyatirekaḥ*).

Cf. the discussion Ms B 192a4-6: *tad etac chabdasya prāmāṇyaviśayāparijñānād evam ucyate, na ti haśā bhāyhe ‘ṛthe prāmāṇyaṃ ... kva tarhi? vivakṣāyām. tatra cāṣty(3) eva śabdāsya tairūpyam. tathaḥ hi vivakṣāvān pūrṇaḥ dharmaḥ, vivakṣā sadhyadharmah. vivakṣāvaty evopalambhanāc chabdāsya pakṣadharmatvam. vivakṣāvān pūrvānubhūtaḥ sapakṣaḥ. tadvyatireko vipakṣa iti kathaṃ tairūpyam na sambhavati?* For the unabridged text of this discussion, cf. Appendix 2.

The view that a speaker’s words make it possible to infer his underlying intention (*vivakṣā*) can be traced to Bhartrhari, cf. VP III.14:197cd: *anumānaḥ vivakṣāvāḥ śabdād anyam na vidyate; TS 906, TSP 357,8ff; cf. Kamalaśīla’s answer to Kumārila’s criticism at TS 1514-24, and the related statement at PVSV 107,22-24: na hi śabdā yathābhāvaṃ vartante yatas te bhṛtyo ‘ṛthaprakṛti niścīryeta. te hi vaktur vivakṣāvyātaya iti tannārītyakāh. tām eva gamayeyuḥ.*

(2)tatra ... vā qu. ŚVT (Ūmyeke) 142,8; PVin II Vol. I: 30,4-5.
(3)cāṣty em. : cājjhy Ms

[3] śabdo hi yatra viṣaye prayaūyate tasya yenaṃśenāviniśhāhāvītvāsambandhaḥ tam kṛtakatvādīvad arthāntaravayavacchedena dyotayati(1), <tasmād anumānān> na bhidyate(2). Restored, cf. PST Ms B 191b3-6: śabdo hi yatra viṣaye prayaūyata iti ... tasya yenaṃśeneti ... vrksādīśabdasyāviniśhāhāvītvāsambandhaḥ(3), yena tu sambandhaḥ tam kṛtakatvādīvad arthāntaravayavacchedena dyotayati ... na tat tato bhid-yate.

(1) Cf. TSP 540,3-4: *tat (sic) kṛtakatvādīvad arthāntaravayavacchedena dyotayati.*
(2) Cf. PST Ms B 192a1-2: *tasmād eva viśeṣāc chabdām anumānaḥ bhidyāta iti.*
(3) *vāsambandhaḥ em. : tvam sambandho Ms*

The particle *hi* (cf. *ni* VT : *yajñ K) is syntactically equivalent to Sanskrit *yasmāt*. It is to be construed with the restored *tasmād < T de’i phyir VK; cf. the
The term śabda is somewhat ambiguous: It denotes any given speech unit posited by the Sanskrit grammarians through grammatical analysis, from phonemes through syllables to affixes and finished words. Most of the examples mentioned by Dignāga belongs to the last-mentioned category, but he evidently regards phonemes and affixes to be definable within the theoretical framework of the apoha theory, cf. Pīnd 1991 and no. 349 below. Like Bharthari Dignāga considers any given speech unit posited apart from a sentence as a useful grammatical fiction, the sentence being the principal speech unit, cf. § 61 below.

Dignāga uses dyotayati with the same value as prakāśayati or prakāśaka, the function of the logical indicator (hetu, liṅga) and the word (śabda) being structurally similar; cf. the use of the cpd. dyotakadyotya at PS II:33a-c: liṅgasāyānyena sāmānyam viśeṣā ca liṅgino na dyotakadyotyam, qu. Ms B 81b5. This is the only instance where Dignāga uses the verb dyotayati of the action of denoting. Cf. the similar use at YSBh 139,2-3 (ad YS III.17): sarvābhidhānasaktiparihṛtā gakārau-kāravisarjanīyāḥ sāsnādimantam artham dyotayantītī.

For the use of dyotana, dyotaka, dyotya in Sanskrit grammar, cf. DSG s.vv. dyotaka; Renou, Terminologie s.v. dyut.

For a contemporary definition of apoha, cf. Bhāmaha’s Kāvyālaṅkāra VI.16: anyāpohena śabdo ‘ṛtham āḥety anye pracaksate, anyāpohaś ca nāmānyapaddārthāpākyṛtīḥ kila: “Other [scholars] explain that a word denotes its referent through exclusion of other referents; and the name “exclusion of other referents” means, as it is reported (kila), the removal (apākṛti) of other referents (padārtha).”

Exclusion or negation, i.e., apoha, nirākaraṇa, nivṛtti, pratiṣepta, pratiśedha, vyāvṛtti, vyavaccheda, vyuddāśa—Dignāga uses these terms indiscriminately—which presupposes the predominance of joint absence (vyatireka) over joint presence (anvaya), contrasts with vidhi, i.e., an affirmative statement, which presupposes joint presence of the word and an observed instance of its referent, cf. NCV 668,17: anyāpohohi vyatirekamātram: “For exclusion of other referents is nothing but joint absence”; PSṬ Ms B 191b3: anyāpohetey arthāntaravāvṛtya, na drṣṭavad vidhirūpena: “Through exclusion of other [referents], that is, by means of exclusion of other referents, not in an affirmative form like the way in which it is observed.”

The term drṣṭavat denotes, as Jīnendrabuddhi explains in his comment on PS II:15 (cf. below) the referent as observed at the time when the connection (sambandhakāla) is being taught. He is referring to the process of vyutpatti, namely teaching someone the connection (sambandha) between word and referent by hastasaṃjña and ayaṃsabda. This implies that someone is confronting a particular object or state of affairs/action through direct sensation (pratyakṣa) while being taught the connection, which implies an affirmative statement like “this x is y.” Thus, it constitutes an instance of joint presence (anvaya) as opposed to joint absence (vyatireka). For Dignāga’s view of vyutpatti, cf. §§ 65-66 below.

Dignāga will address the fundamental asymmetry of anvaya and vyatireka at PSV V:34-35, q.v. below with no.s 185, 421, 423-425. For his view of what
constitutes the difference between affirmation and exclusion or negation, cf. the exposition at PS II:15: *drṣṭavad viḍhīrīpēṇa yadi lingaṃ prakāśayet, sarvatrādar-śanāṇa na syāt sarvathā vā gatir bhavete*. (1)

For the Tibetan versions of PS II:15 and PSV ad loc., cf. K (Kitagawa 1973 463b6-464a4 = P 113a4-8): mthoṅ bzin bsgrub pa’i raṅ bzin gyis | gal te rtags ni gsal byed na || thams cad rtogs par mi ’gyur ba ’am || yān na thams cad rtogs par ’gyur || (PS II:15) gal te ji ltar me la du ba mthoṅ de ltar dus phyis gsal bar byed na ’gar yāṅ gsal bar byed pa niṅ du mi ’gyur te  | ci ltar me med thams cad la ma mthoṅ ba de bzin du de me thams cad la mthoṅ ba ma yin no || gal te yāṅ ci ltar mthoṅ ba de ltar gsal bar byed pa yin na | ’bar ba dan rno ba la sogs pa’i khyad par daṅ ldan par yāṅ gsal bar byed pa’i ’gyur ro || gaṅ gi phyir spyi’i rani bzin ēd kyi me ma yin pa bkag nas gsal bar byed pa de’i phyir | bsgrub pas kyaṅ ’di’i raṅ bzin de niṅ mthoṅ no žes rtogs pa yin gyi khyad par gyi raṅ bzin ni ma yin no ||

V (Kitagawa 1973 463a8-464a3 = P 31b7-32a3): gal te mthoṅ ba bzin tshigs | sgrub pa’i sgo nas ’jug pa ni || thams cad rtogs par mi ’gyur ram || yāṅ na thams cad rtogs par ’gyur || (PS II:15) gal te yāṅ dper na me la du pa mthoṅ ba bzin du phyis kyi tshe yāṅ ’jug par byed na ni nam yāṅ rtogs par mi ’gyur te | dper na me mtha’ dag la ma mthoṅ ba bzin du de mi ’di yāṅ mi rtogs par ’gyur ro || gal te ji ltar mthoṅ ba bzin du rtogs par byed na ni gsal ba daṅ rno ba la sogs pa’i bye brag rnams kyan rtogs par ’gyur ro || gal te ma yin pa rnam pa bkag ste spyi’i tshul gyis ’jug par byed na ni de’i phyir sgrub pa’i sgo nas ’jug pa la yāṅ tshul de niṅ bta’o žes sès par bya’o || |

“If the indicator were to indicate in an affirmative form in the way in which it was observed [previously], there would be no [indication] because of [the indicator’s] not being observed at all [instances of the indicated], or there would be a cognition [of the indicated] in toto (PS II:15).

For (hi) if smoke (*dhūmaḥ) subsequently (*paścāti) were to indicate in the way in which it was [previously] observed at fire (yādi hi yathāagnau drṣṭah) (2) it would never indicate. For just as it has not been observed at all (*sarvatra) [instances of] absence of fire (*agnyabhāve), so also it has not been observed at all (*sarvatra) [instances of] fire (*agnau). And if (yadi ca) (3) it were to indicate in the way in which it was observed [previously], it should also indicate its [namely the fire’s] particular features such as its flames and temperature, etc. (4) However, since (yatas tu) it only indicates in a general form (sāmānyaratupenaiva) by excluding non-fire, (*tatas) it is understood that it is only this form of it that is observed, although in an affirmative form, not the form of the particular features (vidhināpi tad evāsya rūpam drṣṭam iti gamyate, na viśeṣarūpaṃ).”

(1)pādas abc have been restored on the basis of Ms B 71a5-6: drṣṭena tulyaṃ drṣṭavat, yathā sambandhakāle lingaṃ upalabdham tathā yadi prakāśayev ity āriḥaḥ, vidhimukhāgniṇā rata bhavātī, na vyāvyuttimukhāgniṇā evātra nānagnān evam sarvatrādarśanān na syāt prakāśānaviddhir iti prakāśayev iti prakrāntavāt; pāda d is restored on the basis of the parallel at NCV 707,12: agatir vā sarvathā bhavet.

For the use of drṣṭavat in a similar context, cf. PS III:44 quoted at NVC 727,9-10: drṣṭavad yadi Siddhiḥ syac chaulkyarāpāgūṭiṣrītāt, kramavat prāttīmyme ’pi dvityeykārthagatir bhavet, and the untraced quotation (from Dignāga?) at NCV 678,13-14: sarvatra līnigy adarśanāt, na drṣṭavat pratipattiḥ.

(2)Qu. Ms B 71a6.
As Jinendrabuddhi points out in his commentary, cf. note(1) above, the difference between *vīdhi* and *vyāvṛtti* is that a statement affirming the presence of fire would be 'here is fire' (agnir *atra bhavati*), as opposed to a statement having the canonical exclusion form 'here is fire only, not non-fire' (agnir evātra, nānagnih).

Śantaraksita quotes a fragment on *vīdhi* from Dignāga’s *Hetumukha* at TS 1096a: “asambhavo *vidher*” uktah sāmānyāder asambhavat. śabdānām ca vikalpānāṁ ca vastuno ’viśayatvataḥ(1): “Affirmation is impossible,” as it has been stated, since general properties, and so on, are impossible because words and representations do not have an entity (vastu = general property) as object.”

For Dharmakīrti’s related view of *vidhi*, cf. his statements at PVSV 27,8-12: vastugrave anumāṇāc ca dharmasya ekasya niścaye, sarvadharmagraho ‘pohe na ayam doṣah prasajyaite. (PV I 46), na kevalam pratyakṣadṛṣṭe pramāṇāntarāvṛttīḥ kvacit. yadānumāṇām api vastu vīdhinā pratyāyayati na vyavacchedakṛt, tada ekadharmaniścaye tadavatīrakāt sarvadharmaniścaya itī pramāṇāntarāvṛttīḥ. PVSV 65,19-22: yadi hi vīdhirūpaṇa vasty eva śabdair vikalpaṁ vāpi viśayīkriyeta so ‘yam sarvārthhasarvakāraṇapratisargaḥ sāmānādhiḥkaraṇyādayaḥ ceti manya-mānaḥ pranetā nyāyasāstrasānyāpōha viśayāvata evācāṣyati.

(1) aviśayatvataḥ conji: viśayatvataḥ TS. The conji is corroborated by TSP ad loc. TSP however, presupposes the reading vastutāḥ = paramārthataḥ (sic), for vastumāḥ. Cf. TSP 417,8: yady vīdhirūpaḥ śabdārtho ‘bhuyapagamyaṁ, kathāṁ tarhi Hetumukhe lañkānākāraṇena “asambhavo vīdheḥ” ity uktam ... sāmānyaalakṣāṅāder vācyasya vācakasya ca paramārtato ‘sambhavāc chadbānām vikalpānām ca vastutaḥ paramārtato viśayāsambhavāt paramārtham āśritya “vīdher asambhava” ukta ācāryeṇa.

Jinendrabuddhi continues addressing at Ms B 191b6-192a2 an objector’s question regarding the statement ‘anyāpohena bhāṣate kṛtatvādīvat’ and the contrast between *vīdhi* and *apoha*: athānāpohena bhāṣata ity etat kimartham? yāvatā kṛtatvādīvad bhāṣata ity anenaiva anumāṇāc chābdasyābhēdhaḥ pratipāditaḥ. asti prayojanam. kṛtatvādikam hi liṅgām arthāntaravavacchedena svārtham pratipādayatiḥ prāg etad upapāditaṁ. tato yad anyāpoheney etan noicyeta, tadā pramāṇāntarāvīdānām iyaṁ kalpanā syāt: kṛtatvādīalingam arthāntaravyāvṛtyā svārtham prayāyayati, śabdās tu vīdhīmukhaṁ, tasmād eva viśeṣāc chābdam anumāṇād bhidyata iti. atas tannirāśartham etad uktam: “Suppose someone asks: ‘What purpose does the statement ‘it [namely a word] denotes (bhāṣate) its own referent (svārtham) through exclusion of other [referents]’ serve insofar as a word’s non-difference from inference already is indicated by the statement “in the same way as the [inferential indicator, the general property] ’being produced, etc.’”? There is a purpose. For it has already been justified previously that the logical indicator ’being produced,’ and so on, indicates its referent through exclusion of other referents. Consequently, if he did not say ‘through exclusion of other [referents],’ the adherents of the theory that [verbal cognition] is a means of cognition separate [from inference] might imagine that an inferential indicator like
‘being produced’ indicates its own referent through exclusion of other referents, whereas a word does so through affirmation (vidhimukhena). Because of this difference, verbal cognition differs from inference.” Therefore, in order to rebut this [view] this is stated.”

The technical term amśa ‘part’ or attribute denotes any given general property as defined by exclusion of other referents. Things are qualified by a multitude of properties constituting a logical hierarchy, whose characteristics are defined by their position in the hierarchy. These properties, however, are not real general properties that are resident in the things they qualify, but are, according to Dignāgan epistemology, defined by exclusion of other things; cf. PST Ms B 191b4-5: bahavo hy abhidheyasyārthasyāṁśāḥ sattvajñeyatvādayo na ca ātih sarvair vrksādiśab-
dasyāvinābḥāvitvasambandhah: “For the denotable object has a multitude of parts such as ‘existence’, ‘knowability’, and so on, and the word ‘tree’ is not connected with all of these as invariably concomitant.” Cf. PS V:12-13, 34 with PSV V ad loc.

A similar use of amśa to denote any given part of the referent occurs in the alleged fragment from Dignāga’s Hetumukha: grāhyadharman tadamsena vyāpto hetus tridhaiva sah, Frauwallner 1982: 840; for the Dignāgan use of grāhya, cf. Dharmakīrti’s PV I 89 with Manorathānandin’s PVV ad loc.

Dignāga uses the synonymous term bhāga ‘part’ in the Sanskrit fragment from Dignāga’s Dwādaśāsatikā quoted in Siddhasenagan’s Tattvārthabhāṣyavākyāṅkha V 24: yathāha Dwādaśāsatikāyāṃ: yady apy uktaṃ aprasaktasya kimartham prati-
śedhah? iti naivaitat pratisedhamātram ucyate, kim tu tasya vastunāḥ kaścid bhāgo ’rthāntaravṛttyā lokē gamyate yathā viśāntvād anāśva iti: “As he claims in the Dwādaśāsatikā: Even though it is objected: What purpose does the negation of what is not applicable [e.g. the term anāśva] serve? [We answer that] it is not mere negation that is expressed, but rather a certain part of the object is inferred in ordinary language (loke) through exclusion of other referents like, for instance, in the inference: it is a non-horse because it is horned.” Cf. Pīṇḍ 1991: 269 no. 1.

Dharmakīrti quotes a slightly edited version of it at PVSV 62.26: arthāntara-
vṛttyā tasya vastunāḥ kaścid bhāgo gamyate; cf. PST Ms B 205a3: tasya vastunāḥ kaścit bhāgo ’rthāntaravṛttyā gamyate. Jinnendrabuddhi seems to quote a similar passage from Dignāga at PTS Ms B 61a6: etad uktaṃ bhavati: arthāntara-
vṛttyupalakṣito yo vastuno bhāgah sa eva vrksaśabdasyārthā iti: “Only that part of the object that is implied by exclusion of other referents is the referent of the word ‘tree’.”

Cf. PST Ms B 191b3-4: yasyārthasya prayāyanārtham(1) uccāryate, sa tasya viśayaḥ prayāyyatvā(2), yathā(3) liṅgasya liṅgī: “the referent for the sake of indicating which [the word] is articulated, is its object (viśaya) because it is the thing to be indicated, in the same way as the bearer of the inferential indicator (liṅgī) is [the object] of the inferential indicator (liṅga).

(1)em. (cf. go bar byed pa T) : prayatvāyāyanārtham Ms
(2)em. (cf. go bar bya T) : ṣāpya Ms
(3)em. : ayamā? Ms

aviniḥbhaṅvitva “the being invariably concomitant” defines the sambandha “connection” between any given word (śabda) or logical indicator (liṅga, etc.) and
the thing indicated viz. the referent (artha) or the thing inferred. Dignāga addresses the fundamental asymmetry that holds between the two relata of the indicator-indicated connection in a crucial passage at PS II 19-20 that fortunately is extant in Sanskrit:

nanu dvigatavāt sambandhasya saṃyogivad liṅgīdharmanā liṅgena bhavitavyam. naitad astī.

sambandho yady api dvīṣṭhaḥ sahabhāvyāṅgaliṅginoḥ
ādhārādheyavad vṛttes tasya saṃyogivad na tu. [19]

yathā hi saty api dvigatave sambandhasya, na kadācid ādhāra ādheyadharmā
bhavati nāpy ādheya ādhiāradharmā, tathā na kadācil liṅgaṃ liṅgi bhavati liṅgi vā
dlīṅgamsaṃyogī yathāikas tathā dvitiya iti na tadvad iha. tathā hi

liṅge liṅgi bhavaty eva linginy evetarat punaḥ
niyamasya viparyase ’sambandho liṅgaliṅginoḥ. [20]

yasmāl liṅge liṅgi bhavati eva, tasmād yuktam yad aṅgivad dhūmo dravyatvā-
dinām api prakāśakaḥ, na taikṣṇyādinaṁ. yasmāc ca lingīna eva liṅgaṃ bhavati,
nānyatra, tasmād yuktam yad dhūmo dhūmatveneva pāṇḍvatvādibhir api prakāśa-
yati, na dravyatvādibhir iti. evaḥ hi avadhāraṇaśaipaṛītyena sambandho liṅgaliṅ-
ginoḥ:(1)

“Certainly the indicator (liṅga) will have the property of the indicated (liṅgīdharman) because the connection (sambandha) relates to both [the indicator and the indicated] in the same way as [a conjunction relates to its two] conjuncts (saṃyogivat)! This is not the case.

Even though the relation between the together connected indicator and indicated resides in both, [nevertheless] its mode of existence is like [that of] a container and the contained, but not like [that of] conjuncts. [19]

Because, just as the contained never has the property of the container or the container never has the property of the contained, even though the relation is found to be resident in both, so also the indicator is never the indicated, nor is the indicated ever the indicator. In the case of a conjunct, however, one is just like the other. Therefore the case is not the same in this context.

That is,

The indicated only exists at the indicator; and the latter, in turn, exists only at the indicated. If the restriction is inverted, there is no connection of indicator to indicated. [20]

Since the indicated necessarily exists at the indicator, it is correct that smoke, in the same way as [it indicates] fire, also indicates substanceness, and so on, but [it is] not [correct] that it indicates [fire’s] temperature, etc.; and since the indicator exists only at the indicated, and not elsewhere, it is correct that smoke, in the same way as
it [indicates] through smokeness, also indicates through the property of being smoke-coloured, and so on, but [it is] not [correct] that it indicates] through substanceness. Therefore, if the restriction is transposed there is no relation of indicator to indicated.”

Dignāga apparently never defines sambandha in terms of avinābhāvitva in PS or PSV, but Simhasūri takes it for granted at NCV 627,21-22, q.v. below no. 26. Jīnendrabuddhi’s gloss at PS II Ms B 72b6 avinābhāvitvan sambandhāḥ explains Dignāga’s use of the term sambandha at PS II 20a: sambandho yady api dvīśṭhah; cf. the definition of sambandha at Ms B 183a7: avinābhāvitvan hi sambandha iti.


4 ye tv āhur: jātiśabdaḥ svabhedaṁ sarvān evāha, ukteṣu tu niyamārthaṁ viśeṣaṣṭrūtir <iti>. Restored, cf. PS T Ms B 193a4-7: ye tv āhur jātiśabda ityādi … jātiśabda iti. svabhedaṁ iti … sarvān evāheti … ukteṣu tu niyamārthaṁ viśeṣaṣṭrūtir iti.

17 Here as elsewhere Dignāga seems to quote the work he is addressing. It is not possible to ascertain the identity of the work and its author. It is noteworthy, however, that the term niyama is used by Bhartṛhari in a similar context, cf. no. 21 below.

18 The theory of denotation to which Dignāga refers is based upon the assumption that a general term denotes all particulars through transfer of the general property to every individual substance in the form of non-difference (abheda-pācāra). That is, the general property and the thing in which it is claimed to be instantiated become identified through co-reference, in the same way as when one transfers the properties of a lion to a brāhmaṇa boy like in the statement “the brāhmaṇa boy is a lion.”

Cf. Simhasūri’s lucid exposition of the view Dignāga is addressing at NCV 627,11-13: yasmāt saccabdo jātisambandhino jātim upādāyāmārūpāna dravyādīn abhedopacārād āha, tasmād abhedopacārāhetunā vyapādiṣṭyate jātiśabda iti. yathā simho māṇavaka iti simhasābdo māṇavakagunān upādāyabhedopacārāpravṛttter abhedopacārāhetunā vyapādiṣṭyate guṇasābda iti: “Since the word ‘existent,’ while being based upon the general property, in its own form denotes substances, and so on, that are the relata of the general property due to transfer in the form of non-difference, it is designated as ‘general term’ on account of transfer in the form of non-difference. Just as the word ‘lion’ in the statement ‘the young brāhmaṇa is a lion’, while being based upon the qualities of the young brāhmaṇa is designated as ‘quality word’ on account of transfer in the form of non-difference because it applies by transfer in the form of non-difference.”

Jīnendrabuddhi’s explanation of the view at Ms B 193a2-3 is similar: kathāṃ punar anabhidheyaḥ satī jātiḥ vyapadesāhetuḥ? abhedopacārāhetuvād guṇavat. yathā “simho māṇavaka” iti śauryāđigunaviśeṣah simhamāṇavakayor abhedopacārāhetur bhavan vyapadesāhetur bhavati, guṇasābda iti, tathā jātiḥ api śabdasya bhedair abhedopacārāhetur iti sādhayavypadesāhetuḥ: “How, moreover, is the general property the cause of designation (vyapadesāheto), when it is not denotable? Because it is the cause of transfer in the form of non-difference in the same way as a
quality (गुनवत). For instance, in the statement ‘the young brāhmaṇa is a lion,’ a particular quality like bravery, being the cause of transfer in the form of non-difference of the lion with the young brahmīn, is the cause of designation; in the same way the general property is the cause of transfer of the term [denoting it] in the form of non-difference of [the general property] with the particulars. Thus it is the cause of designation of that which is to be indicated.”

The subsequent explanation at NCV and PST would indicate that Dignāga addresses views views comparable to those traditionally ascribed to Vyājapāyāna by Kātyāyana at vārt 35-44 on A I.2:64, namely that a term denotes a class property as resident in individual substances; cf. no. 21 below.

Dignāga’s well-known definition of pratyakṣa at NM (T 1628 3b15-17; T 1629 8c9-11) is terminologically indebted to this view, although this does not imply that he considers qualifications to be real entities rather than products of kalpanā, cf. TSP 456,15-19 quoting and explaining the passage: “yay jñānam arthe rūpādau (so read) viśeṣanābhidhiyakābhedopacāreyaṃvikalpakaṃ tad aksaṃ aksaṃ prati varāta iti pratyakṣaṃ” iti. viśeṣānam jātyādi, abhidhiyakaṃ nāma, tāyor abhedopacāro jātyādimadābhiḥ saṃjñānaḥ ca. abhedopacāragrahaṇam upalākaṃyaṃ yatraṃ bhedena grahaṇam: asya gotvav asyedam nāmeti, tatrāpi kalpanesyata eva.

Notice that throughout PSV V Dignāga uses the terms jāti and sāmāṇya interchangeably to denote any given general property.

19 Cf. PST Ms B 193a4-5: svasyā jāter bhedān(1). yā jātir āsya śabdasya vyapadesāhetuḥ, sā tasya svam bhavati. bhidyante parasparato viśiṣyanta iti bhedāḥ, yathā jāter dravyagunākarmāṇi.

(1) em. : ॐām Ms

20 Jīnendrabuddhi addresses the implications of the expression sarvān eva at PST Ms B 193a: sarvān evāha, na kiñcidd eva. tathā hi brāhmaṇa na hantavya ity ukte sarve brāhmaṇajātiḥbheda Mātharādayo na hanyanti. yadi jātiśabdo niravaśeṣaṃ svabhedān āha, kimartham tarhi brāhmaṇah Kaṇḍinyaḥ ānīyatām iti viśeṣaṃśrutāḥ? yāvātā brāhmaṇasaṃbdeina va Kaṇḍinyaḥ 'bhīhita iti: denotes all, i.e., not just some. That is, when it is said that one should not kill a brāhmaṇa, all individuals of the brāhmaṇa class like the son of Mathara are not to be killed. If a general term denotes all its particulars without exception, then what purpose does a particular term serve, like when it is said ‘bring the brāhmaṇa, son of Kaṇḍina’ inasmuch as the son of Kaṇḍina is denoted by the word ‘brāhmaṇa?’

The example brāhmaṇa na hantavya is taken from Patañjali’s comment at Mahābh I 242,24f on vārttika 39: dharmaśāstraṃ ca tathā, whose implications Patañjali explains in the following way: evaṃ ca kṛtvā dharmaśāstrāṃ pravrītāṃ: Brāhmaṇa na hantavyaḥ ... brāhmaṇamātṛtaṃ na hanyate ... yadi dravyaṃ padārthah svad ekam brāhmaṇam ahatvā ... anyatra kāmācāraḥ svatō: “And on this assumption [viz. that a term denotes a class property] the dharmaśāstra proceeds: [The injunction] ‘one should not kill a brāhmaṇa’ means ‘one does not kill any brāhmaṇa at all’ ... If an individual substance were the referent denoted by the word one could do as one pleased by abstaining from killing one brāhmaṇa;” cf. Scharff 1996: 118-19.

Mallavādi alludes to the view that the application of a term denoting particulars merely has the purpose of restricting the scope of the general term; he presents his view at in a kārikā based upon PS V 2: na jātiśabdo bhedānāṃ ānantyād vyabhicārataḥ, vācako niyārthokoṭer jātimadvad apohavān; cf. NCV 606,21-22
and the passage op. cit. 606,10-13 in which Simhasuri explains that every new term that is added to the preceding general term, like for instance ‘brâhmaṇa,’ has the purpose of restricting the scope of the general term in accordance with the intended meaning. Thus any term that is articulated subsequently to the general term with the function of restricting its scope is a particular term. Consequently restriction is the establishing of its own referent, i.e., it is a restriction with respect to the referent: niyamârtha punahpunahsrutir vivaksitârthâ, kasmât? tadadhatvâd viâsenaârthatvâd viâsenaârthatvâd pûrvârtheh sâmânyaâruter brâhmaânâdeh. tasmâc chrâvanâkaâkârama punahsrutir iti viâsenaäsabda ucyate. ko ’saun niyamo nâm? ity ucyate: niyamah svârthaâvasthâpanam vivâksite ’rthe vadhârânam.

Cf. also Bharâthari’s discussion of the restrictive function of punahsrutih at VP II:64ff (cf. the expression niyamârtha punahsrutih, 64b).

Jinendrabuddhi comments briefly on the subject of restriction at Ms B 193a7 by introducing the delimitative/restrictive particle (avadhârana) eva, which Simhasuri’s explanation presupposes: Kauñçânya eva na Mâthara iti yathâ kriyâ hi dravyam ninayâttî ukte punar nádravyam iti niyamârtham ucyate yathâ gamyeta dravyam eveti: “Only (eva) Kauñçânya, not Mâthara. Just as when it is said “for an action moves a substance (towards something),” and, in addition, it is said for the sake of restriction, “not a non-substance,” so that one understands “only a substance.”

For Dignâga’s use of eva as semantically equivalent to vyâtiyika “joint absence” or exclusion, cf. PSV V 38c § 54 below.


(1) Cf. rjod par byed pa Žes brjod par bya ’o V : brjod par byed pa ma yin no K.

21 Dignâga refers to the occurrence of vâcakah in pâda 2c, which is to be construed with 2a; Cf. PST Ms B 193b: sâkânsatvâd aparismâptam vaksyam iti vaksyamanâna padenâkânsâvicchedam darśayati: “Thinking that the clause is incomplete because it entails expectation of a sentence complement (sâkânsatvâ) he excludes the expectation of a sentence complement by means of the syntactical word that is going to be used (i.e., vâcakah).”

The problems which PS V 2a-c caused its Tibetan translators are basically due to the fact that in Sanskrit the negation does not cliticise on the verb like in classical Tibetan. This excludes the possibility of using it as a morpheme syntactically independent of the verb unlike the negation na in Sanskrit. In the present case the negation na of 2a has to be construed twice with vâcakah. Since the translators of K and V have followed the common practice of translating 2a as a syntactically independent clause, they were unable to construct the negation with rjod par byed pa = vâcakah twice. Although V loc. cit. reproduces correctly the sentence complement vâcaka iti vakṣyati as rjod par byed pa Žes brjod par bya’o, the introduction of med before the complement is syntactically and semantically impossible, whereas the use of mi would have been syntactically correct. K, on the other hand, uses min, and, moreover, correctly adds, as if to compensate for the syntactical ambiguity of min, another negation after the sentence complement, so that K reads brjod par byed pa ma yin no, although it occurs in the wrong place after
2b₁ mtha’ yas phyir daṅ (= ānantyāt) without any syntactical connection with 2a. V introduces correctly the negation min in 2d, cf. no. 34 below.


[7] ānantyāt. ānantye hi bhedānām asakyaḥ sambandhaḥ kartum. na cārkṛtasambandhe śabde ‘ṛthābhidhānām yuktām svarūpaṁtrapraṣṭīteh. Restored, cf. PST Ms B 193b1: ānantyāt; NCV 627,14: ānantyād iti hetuḥ; TSP 342,13; NCV 606,21-22; Ms B 193b1-3: ānantye hi bhedānām ityādi. asakyaḥ sambandhaḥ kartum iti ... na cārkṛtasambandhe śabde ‘ṛthābhidhānām yuktām iti; 193b6: svarūpāmātrapraṣṭīte iti; NCV 627,14-16;21;23. NCV 706,21: ānantye hi bhedānām ityādi granthavyākhyānanyāyavat.

22 Cf. PST Ms B 193b1: ānantyād ity upapattih. kasyānantyāt? prakṛtatvād bhedānām eva; cf. the similar explanation at NCV 627,14-15, indicating that it is based upon the same source as Jinendrabuddhi’s tikā: ānantyād iti hetuḥ. kasyānantyāt? bhedānām, yasmāt te pūrvaṁ prakṛtā na cānyaḥ śrīyate; TSP 342,12-14: ayam eva ca akṛtasamayatvād iti hetur acāryadīnāgena “na jātiśabdo bhedānākāvakā, ānantyād” ity anena nirādiṣṭah. tathā hi “ānantyād” ity anena samayāsambhava eva nirādiṣṭah. Uddyotakara presents the argument at NV 324,3-4 as follows: sacchabādha pindānām vācako bhavisyatītī na yuktām pindānām ānantyāt; cf. no. 29 below for Uddyotakara’s reproduction of Dignāga’s argument.

23 Cf. Jinendrabuddhi’s gloss at PST Ms B 193,2: ākhyātum: karoter anekārthatvāt; cf. the identical gloss at NCV 627,17: kartum ākhyātum; karoter anekārthatvāt.

24 Simhasūri interprets ānantya as denoting: 1. spatial remoteness, cf. NCV 627,16: na hi pātaliputraśūndhā dravyādaya iḥaṣṭhena sacchabādena sahākhyātum śakyāḥ: “For it is not possible for one who is situated here simultaneously to denote substances, and so on, that are situated in Pātaliputra, and so on, by means of the word ’existent’;” cf. Jinendrabuddhi’s similar explanation at Ms B 193b3-4: ye vidīrdeśavartino na ta iḥaṣṭhānām svasya praviṣṭaḥ sambandhitvenaḥkhyātum śakyāḥ; 2. infinity in terms of the variety of particulars, cf. NCV 627,16: ānantyād vā dravyādīnām, tathā hi te ghatapataraṇthādibhūtāṃ anantāḥ. evaṃ tāvat sambandhibhedād bhedam abhyupagamyedam ucyate, na tu tasya vastunaḥ svagato bhedo ’sti. tatredam eva kāraṇaṃ yat sambandhāntaraṇaviṣṭābhīdhāyī śabdāḥ sambandhāntaraṇaviṣṭaḥsabdhavācyāṃ asamārthato vaktum, gavāśvādivat. tasmād bhedānām avācākaḥ: “Or because substances, and so on, are infinite. That is, they are infinite because of the difference between pot, cloth, wagon, etc. Thus, in the first place, this is said on the assumption that the difference is due to difference of the relata. The difference of the entity [from other entities], however, is not understood per se. This then is the reason why a denoting word which is qualified by one connection is incapable of denoting the [entity] that is the denotable object of a word that is qualified by another connection, like [the words] ‘cow’ and ‘horse,’ etc. Therefore it does not denote the particulars.”
Simhasūri’s use of the term sambandhibheda would seem to allude to VP III.1:33: sambandhibhedā sattaiva bhidyamanā gavādiṣu jātīr ity ucyate. tasyāṁ sarve śabdā vyavasthītāḥ. One cannot therefore exclude the possibility that Dignāga has Bhārtṛhari’s view of sattā in mind.

25 Cf. PST Ms B 193b6: yo bhedair anākhyaṭasambandho na sa teṣāṁ vācako mlecchaśabdavat.

Simhasūri explains sambandha in terms of āvinābhāvita, cf. NCV 627,21-22: akṛtasambandha ity anākhyaṭasambandhe śabdā iti dvīṣhatve ’pi sambandhasya śabdasyaivāvinābhāvita arthapratyayakatvam darśayati: “By the statement ‘as the connection [of the word] has not been told’ viz. as the connection of the word has not been stated, he shows that although the connection is resident in two things [viz. the word and the thing it denotes] the word exclusively indicates its referent because of being invariably concomitant with it.”

For the technical term āvinābhāvita as defining the scope of sambandha, cf. Dignāga’s use above of the term āvinabhāvitasambandha for defining the nature of the relation between a word and its denotation at PSV V §1 with no. 17. The term akṛtasambandha refers to the situation before the denotation of any given word has been taught by pointing at its referent (vyutpatti). Dignāga addresses the theoretical implications of vyutpatti below at PSV V 50bc (§ 65). The term akṛtasambandha occurs once in Bhārtṛhari’s VP III 166c.

26 Cf. PST Ms B 193b 2: tad etad dhetudvayam uktam: ānantyam sambandhāśakyatve(1) hetuḥ, anākhyaṭasambandhatvam punar anabhidhānena(2): “The following two reasons are formulated: infinity is the reason for the impossibility of connection; the reason, moreover, for not denoting is the fact that the connection is not told.”

A similar explanation is found at NCV 627,22: atra cānantyaṁ pāramparyeṇānabhidhānahaḥetuḥ: tato hi sambandhāśakyatā, sambandhāvyutpattār anabhidhānam: “And in this case infinity is indirectly the reason for not denoting. For because of this [infinity] the connection is impossible, and as a consequence of not teaching the connection there is no denotation.”

Dharmakīrti argues in the same way at PVSV 47,7-10: syād etad ānantyaṁ vyaktīṇāṁ aṣākyaḥ śabdena sambandhaḥ kartum. evam satīdām ānantyam tadvaty api samānāṃ. jātyāpihi viśiṣṭa vyaktya eva vaktavyā ity akṛtasambandhasyaṇābhidhānād avasyaṁ tatra sambandhaḥ karaṇīyaḥ. sa ca na śakvate.

(1)°tvē hetuḥ em. : °tvahetuḥ Ms
(2)°āne em. : °āno Ms

27 The technical term svarūpa denotes the phonetic form of any linguistic item without reference to its denotation. It is used by Pāṇini at A I.1:68: svam rūpaṃ śabdasya śabdasaṃjñāḥ to indicate that the own form of a linguistic item refers to that element itself, and not to the thing it denotes. The term was interpreted differently in the grammatical tradition. Some considered the svarūpa to be any particular instance of any given linguistic item, whereas others considered it to be identical with the word type, cf. Bhārtṛhari’s exposition at VP I:68-69, 83; Pind 1991. See DSG, Renou, Terminologie s.v.
In the present case Dignāga is using the term in the original sense, cf. NCV 627,23-68,7: yatra śabdasārthena sambandho vyutpanno yathā mlecchasabdollāṃ tatra śabdamātram pratīyate nārtha ityāti: “When the connection of the word with [its] referent has not been taught as in the case of the words of non-Aryans, only the speech unit is understood, not the referent.” A similar explanation, presumably based on the same source, in all likelihood SPVy, is given at Ms B 193b6: mlecchasabde hi śabdasvarūpamātram eva pratīyate, nārīhaḥ.

28 Uddyotakara reproduces almost verbatim the content of this paragraph at NV 324,4-6: sacchabdo pindānāṃ vācako bhaviṣyatīti na yuktam pindānāṃ ānāntyāt, na hy ekasya śabadsayēn kidnārargyaṇunaprāṇena sambandha ākyātum sakyāḥ, na cānākhyāte sābārthasambāndhe śabdād arthaṃ pratipattitār vyātā, svarūpamātratpratītāḥ: “It is not justified to claim that the word ‘existent’ will denote the particulars because they are infinitive. For it is impossible to tell the connection of a single word with a multitude of many substances and qualities. And in that the connection of the word with its referent is not told it is not justified that the cognition of the referent follows from the word because it is merely the own form of the word that is cognized.”

Uddyotakara may have used the infinitive ākyātum because he found it in the source he was quoting, which in all likelihood is Sāmānyaaparīkṣayāśa cf. no. 30 below.

8 kim ca, vyabhicārataḥ, yathā hi sacchabdo dravye vartate tathā guṇādīsv(1) apīti. vyabhicārāt samśayaḥ svāt, nābhidhānām. Restored, cf. PST Ms B 193b7: kiṇceti; 194a1-2: vyabhicārata iti, NCV 661,13: yat tūktan tvayā: vyabhicārata iti; Ms B 193b7: yathā hityādi; NCV 661,14: sacchabdo hi yathā dravye vartate(1) tathā guṇādīsv(2) apīti. Vyabhicārāt samśayaḥ svāt, nābhidhānām(3); Ms B 194a1: dravyābhāve ’pi guṇe darśanāt, tadabhāve ’pi ca dravyakarmanoḥ iti; sarvatra vyabhicārataḥ(4) samśayaḥ svāt, nābhidhānām.

(1) Cf. ’jug pa V : yin pa K.
(2) guṇaṃ em. : ghaṭādīsu NCV.
(3) Cf. ’khrul pa’i phiyer the tshom du ’gyur gyi, rjod par byed pa ni ma yin no V : brjod par byed pa ni ma yin gyi ’khrul pa’i phiyer the tshom za bar ’gyur ro K.
(4) cātāraḥ em. : cāraḥ Ms.

29 Uddyotakara reproduces Dignāga’s argument in a more elaborate form at NV 324,6-9, presumably on the basis of Dignāga’s lost Sāmānyaaparīkṣayāśa: vyabhicārāca ca. sacchabdaśravanāc ca dravyagunakarmāṇīti pariplavamāṇā buddhir avatiṣṭhate; na ca yasmād abhidhānāt pariplavate buddhās tad abhidhānām iti yuktam vaktum. tasmāt sacchabdo bhedānāṃ na vācaka iti: “Moreover, [the general term ‘existent’ does not denote the particulars] because of ambiguity. Moreover, from hearing the word ‘existent’ the mind remains in a state of confusion as to substance, quality, or action; and it is not justified to claim that the denotation due to which the mind is confused is denotation. Therefore the word ‘existent’ does not denote the particulars.”

Dignāga’s arguments for the impossibility that general terms denote the particulars are mentioned by Kumārila at Tantravārttikam on MS III 1:12 p. 39,16ff: nanu vyaktinām ānantavyabhicārābhyaṃ anabhidhānāṃ utkam.
Jinendra-buddhi closes his exegesis of this paragraph with the following discussion at Ms B 194a2-5, which presupposes Dharmakīrti’s philosophy: nānu ca jñātāsabdat sarvasvabhedapratīttih. na hi sarveṣu samśaya upajāyate, na ca sarvasvabhedābhāvē kadacī jñātāsabdasya kvaḍid arthāntaravṛttir upalabdhh; tath kuto vyabhicārāḥ? naisa doṣaḥ, na hi jñātāsbadena bhedābhedārūpasamsprāsena pratvāvyaate. na ca samastabhedarūpaṃ nāma teṣām sāmāyam asti yac chabdenābhidhihyetā, bhedarūpaparitvyagte teṣām eva jñātīvaprastāṅgat. na ca bhedarūpena vyāptir asti, parasparaya-vṛttavatāt[(1)] bhedābhupasyeti, nāsty asiddhiḥ.

(1) Cf. PV I 40-42 and PVSV 24,24 ad loc.

[9] yo ‘pi manyate <jñātāsabdas[(1)] tu jñātimatre[(2)] tadyogamatre[(3)] vā> sambandhasaṅkaryād avyabhicārāc ceti, tad ayuktam[(4)], <tayoṣ ca na>.[(5)] Restored, cf. PST Ms B 194a5-7: yo ‘pi manyata iti ... sambandhasaṅkaryād avyabhicārāc ceti ... tad ayuktam iti.

(1) Cf. rīγs kyi sgra tsam V: sgra de K.

(2) rīγs tsam K: om. V.

(3) de daṅ ldan pa tsam la ni V: de daṅ ldan paʻi K. Ms B does not make it possible to resolve the question of which version is preferable. From the point of view of syntax and content V is better than K. I assume that the affix la V is used to reproduce the Sanskrit locative. The reading ‘brel pa can yin te | sla baʻi phyir K is, I assume, a mistake for ‘brel pa sla baʻi phyir based on a faulty manuscript reading.

(4) This clause is not reproduced in VK. Assuming that it is an integral part of the original Sanskrit version of this paragraph, it presumably belongs here.

(5) For this restoration, cf. no. 34 below.

The two locatives are used to express “in the sense of” or “to denote,” a usage that is well known in Sanskrit grammatical literature. For tadyoga = tayā = jñātā yogah = sambandhaḥ, cf. TSP 340,23; NSBh ad NS II 2:62: yasya jñātā yogas tād atra jñātivisistam abhidhiyate gaur iti; cf. the reference to tadyoga at PV III 173: tasmād jñātādityadogā nārthe teṣa ca na śrutih.

The relation to which Dignāga’s opponent is referring is samavāya ‘inherence,’ which is defined at PBh §§ 373 as follows: ayutasiddhānām adhārādhārabhyātām yah sambandhaḥ ihaprātvyahetūḥ sa samavāyaḥ; cf. TSP 313,15: samavāyalaksanaḥ sambandhaḥ (quoting an unidentified work by Uddyotakara).

PBh § 384 uses the expression sattāyogah to denote the inherence of the general property existence in substances, qualities, and actions: yathā dravyagunakarmanāṃ sadātmakasya bhāvasya nānyāḥ sattāyogaḥ ‘sti, evam avibbhāgino vṛttyātmakasya samavāyasya nānyā vyṛttir asti.

Bhartṛhari mentions the view at VP II 126 that a general term denotes the inherence relation (samsarga). The underlying assumption is that since the inherence relation is not perceived apart from its relata i.e. the general property and the thing in which it inheres through the inherence relation, it is unreal (asaṭya) as the denotatum of any given general term as only the object as related to the general property (samsṛṣṭa) through the inherence relation is real. Since Bhartṛhari’s svavytti on VP II 126 is no longer extant, I quote Puṇyārāja’s tīkā ad loc.: atha jñātigunakriyātmakasyārthasyāsamvyabhūtah samsarga eva ṣabdārtha iti paṃcamaṃ paksam darśayitum āha: asatyo vāpi samsṛṣghaḥ ṣabdārthaḥ kaiścid iṣyate (VP II 126), ghaṭāḍibhiḥ ṣabdār ghaṭādīnaṃ jñātīdīsaṃsarga ucyate. sa cātra
The expression yo 'pi no doubt refers to a particular philosopher, whose view Dignāga briefly mentions. Although it is not possible to identify him, he must have been a Vaiśeṣika because the doctrine Dignāga addresses in this paragraph is characteristic of Vaiśeṣika philosophy: the claim that a general term like sat denotes either the mere general property or the mere inherence relation of the general property is only understandable with the background of Vaiśeṣika ontology. When Dignāga’s opponent claims that the connection is easy to establish with the general property existence, it is because it is conceived as one and indivisible. The same is true of the connection of the general property to the thing in which it resides because the connection or inherence is one and indivisible like the general property itself, it follows that the problems of the characteristic of Vaiśeṣika philosophy in each individual instance, and the connection which connects by way of existence. Since general properties instantiate identically giving rise to the same general property because it pervades every single entity completely, although the substrates. Nor is there ambiguity with regard to the relation, i.e., its inherence in its own substrate. For it is correct that there is ambiguity with regard to the particulars because they are many, and, moreover because they occur as mutually non-existent, but not with regard to the general property or the relation because they are not particular and because the word would not apply if they did not exist.”

Cf. PST Ms B 194a7-194b1: yuktā na sambandhyata ity arthah. kā punar atra yuktiḥ? āgamātkhyam pramāṇam. kathaṃ tayā na sambhāhyate: ‘bhedārthaḥ aprthakśruteḥ.’ “The meaning is that it is not in agreement with reasoning. What, moreover, is reasoning in this case? It is the means of knowledge called āgama (received doctrine). In what way is it not in agreement with this [reasoning]? “Because it is not “heard apart” from [words] having particular [general properties] as referents [2cd].”
Jinendrabuddhi’s explanation connects the phrase *tad ayuktam* with PS V 2d, as if the latter followed immediately after it. It is not possible to decide if his explanation reflects the readings of the Ms he was using for his *ṭīkā.*

33 The negation *na* of PS V 2a has to be construed with *vācakaḥ* of 2c, cf. NMañjGBh 137,15-16: *atra na jātiśabdo yogajātyor vā bhedārthair aprthakśrutair (sic) ity ato vācaka iti sambadhyaite.

V 106,29-30 has placed the negation *min* after *rjod byed.* This is correct from the point of view of Tibetan syntax in that the negation in Tibetan necessarily cliticizes on the verb, although strictly speaking it is not part of the original Sanskrit version of 2cd. The negation necessarily carries over from 2a to 2c, and Dignāga therefore had to incorporate it as part of the *vṛtti* on 2cd. K, on the other hand, reproduces the negation *ma yin te* immediately before *rjod byed* that translates *vācakaḥ,* evidently imitating the syntax of the underlying Sanskrit at the cost of producing a syntactically and semantically misleading Tibetan translation. However, the negation preceding *vācakaḥ* is correctly reproduced in K § 15, where 2cd is quoted in the following form without consideration for the usual metrical constraints: *ldan pa dan rigs rjod par byed pa ma yin te | khyad par gyi don dan tha mi dad pas thos pa’i phyir ro.*

The demonstrative pronouns *de dag gi K : de dag V* probably render Sanskrit *tayoḥ* in agreement with *yogajātyoh* of 2c. There is no reason to assume that *de dag* and *de dag gi* reproduce the correlative *tasya* of yo ’pi because both K and V usually distinguish between singular and plural/dual. For such constructions, cf., e.g., PVSV 29,7: yo ’pi manyate ... tasyāpi (+ PV 152); 66,7: yo ’pi ... āha tasyāpi; 67,1-6: yo ’pi manyate ... iti, tasyāpi. 78,24-26: yo ’pi ... tasyāpi.

[10] *vācako yogajātyor vā bhedārthair aprthakśrutēḥ.* Qu. Ms B 194b1; ŚVṬ 49,25; NR 422,8; NMañjGBh 137,16.

34 Dignāga is using the technical term *apṛthakśruti* as a synonym of co-reference (*sāmāṇādhiśārya*), which entails inflectional identity of case affixes. It refers to the fact that there is no audible perception of difference of case affix (*vibhakti*) between that of the term *sāt* and the term it qualifies, e.g., *dravya (n.) or guṇa (m.);* cf. the mention of *apṛthakśrutiloṣṭa* at PSV V:36ab. Kumārila uses the term *prthak* ‘apart’ (= *vaiyadhikārya*) as opposed to *abhinna* ‘one with’ (= *sāmāṇadhikārya*) at ŚV Anumāṇa*: 25b (cf. Randle 1930: 270). The somewhat odd term *(a)prthakśruti* is known from indigenous Sanskrit phonology, cf. Renou, *Terminologie s.vv. prthak-, and śruti.* Uddyotakara reproduces Dignāga’s argument at NV 323,17-18 (cf. op. cit 325,19-20) as follows: *bhedārthair abhinnavibhaktikatvāt,* cf. no. 37 below.

35 Cf. PST Ms B 194b1: *bheda arthaḥ veyañ iti bhedaṛthā viśeṣaśabdās; tair aprthakśrutih sāmāṇādhiśāryam. aprthag ekasmin adhikaraṇe śrutir iti kṛtvā: “‘Having particular [general properties]’ as referents’ means ‘whose referents are particular [general properties],’ namely particular terms. ‘Not hearing apart’ from these means ‘co-reference’ in that the hearing is not separate with regard to one and the same referent (adhikaraṇa).”*
36 The opponent assumes that the word ‘sat’ exclusively denotes sattā or the relation of sattā to the thing it qualifies as distinct from the substance, quality, or action in which it inhere. Dignāga therefore concludes that observable instances of co-reference like the phrase “sad dravyam” are in conflict with the theory of denotation to which the opponent is subscribing. The phrases sad dravyam, and so on, are syntactically similar to compounds and Dignāga and his commentators therefore interpret them as if they were compounds. This appears from his statements at PSV V:35ab addressing the above-mentioned problems.

The content of this paragraph presupposes Viśeṣika philosophy, cf. PST Ms B 194b1: drṣṭā hy āptebhyo ‘prthakṣruṭiḥ sad dravyam ityādi tad na syāt: “For co-reference as in sad dravyam, and so on, that is observed from trustworthy authorities would not occur,” and ibid. 194b2: jātisambandhābhidhānapratijñā sāstradrṣṭena sāmāṇāḥdikaranyena bādhya ity arthāḥ: “The thesis that it denotes the connection of the general property is in conflict with the co-reference that is observed in sāsttra;” cf. Candrānanda ad VS I.1:7: sad dravyam san guṇah sat karma iti sattā trayāṇām aviśesah, and ad VS I.2:7: “sad iti yato dravya-guṇakarmasu.” bhinneṣu dravyādiṣu triṣu yato jāyate ‘sat sat’ iti buddhiḥ sā sattā.

Uddyotakara reproduces Dignāga’s argument as pūrvapakṣa at NV 223,17-21: tatra na tāvaj jātir abhidhiyate bhedārthair abhinnavibhaktikatvāt. yady ayaṃ jātivācaakah sacchabdo bhavati sad dravyam iti bhedāvacinā dravyaśabdēna saha sāmāṇāḥdikaranyam na prāpnoti, na hi bhinnārthavācaakahām sāmāṇāḥdikaranyam paśyāmah, na hi gavāsvam iti sāmāṇāḥdikaranyam drṣṭam: “In the first place, [the word ‘existent’] does not denote the general property because it has case affix in common with [words] whose referents are particular [general properties]. If the word ‘existent’ denotes the general property, co-reference with the word ‘substance’ that denotes a particular [general property] as in [the statement] ‘a substance is existent’ does not obtain. For we do not observe that [words] denoting different referents are co-referential, for co-reference is not observed like [it is not observed] in [the dvandva compound] ‘cows and horses’ (cf. A II 4:11).”

37 According to Jinendrabuddhi, Dignāga alludes to the definition of sattā at VS I 1:8-10: dravyagunakarmabhyo ‘rthāntaraṃ sattā. ekadravyavavattvān na dravyam. guṇakarmasu ca bhāvān na karma na guṇah: “Existence is a different thing from substance, quality, and action. It is not a substance because it is possessed by a substance. Because [existence] is resident in qualities and actions, it is neither a quality nor an action;” and samavāya at VS VII 2:31:
dravyatvagunatvakarmatvapratisedho bhāvena vyākhyaṭaḥ: “The negation of being a substance, a quality, and an action is explained in accordance with [the general property] existence;” cf. PSṬ Ms B 194b4: yasmād dravyagunatvakarmedhyo ‘ṛthāntaram sattety uktam. sambandhasya ca dravyādipratisedho(1) bhāvena(2) vyā-
khyaṭaḥ: “Since it is explained that “existence is a different thing from substance, quality, and action,” and that the negation of the inherence relation’s being a substance, etc. (dravyatvādi), is explained in accordance with existence.”

Candrānanda explains at VSV 61,18: yathākadravyavattvān na dravyam bhāvo guṇakarmasu ca bhāvān na karma na guṇa evam samavāyo ’pi: “Just as existence is not a substance because it is possessed by a substance, and it is not a quality or an action because it is resident in qualities and actions, so also inherence.”

(1) Although T corroborates the reading dravyādi° the correct reading must be dravyatvādi°.

(2) bhāvena conj : bhāve tu Ms. The reading bhāve tu is meticulously reproduced at T 154.35 as dhos po la ni bśad pa ’o, although it is meaningless in the context. In spite of that the Tibetan translator evidently preferred to translate what he read in his Ms, and made no attempt to “correct” it.

38 Jinendrabuddhi limits himself to explaining at Ms B 194b4-5 that the meaning is that a sixth triplet, whose charactereristic is to indicate a relation should be introduced: sambandhalakṣaṇāya(1) saṣṭhyā bhavitavyam ity arthah. The Sanskrit grammarians attribute to the sixth triplet the semantic function of indicating a relation (sambandha); cf. CV II.1:95: saṣṭhi sambandhe. VP III.7:143: sambandhaḥ kārakebhya ‘nyāḥ kriyākārakarpūrvakāḥ śṛutāyām aśrutāyām vā kriyāyām so ‘bhidhiyate. DSG s.v. saṣṭhī. Jinendrabuddhi’s remark, although basically correct, does not bring out all the grammatical implications of Dignāga’s concise statement. As the following quotation of VP III.14:8 indicates, Dignāga wants to point out that co-reference (sāmāṇādhikaranya) is impossible if it is assumed that the word ‘sat’ denotes the relation of the general property existence (sattā) to any given substance, quality or action. For in such a case the grammarians prescribe the introduction of the sixth triplet after the term that denotes the item with which it is connected, that is, one would expect a phrase like sad dravyasya showing the difference (bheda) as opposed to the phrase sad dravyam where the two relata coalesce through abhedopacāra. Dignāga addresses the grammatical implications of the concept of relation at PS I:22ab (v. Hattori 1968: 43-44, 138 4.17), cf. PS II:10b, where he objects to those who consider sambandha to be anumeyya that one would expect that the sixth triplet is introduced after the term denoting the item that possesses the relation: saṣṭhī sṛṣyeta tadvati; cf. PSṬ Ms B 68b2-3: sambandhavivakṣāyām hy agniśabdaḥ saṣṭhyantaḥ syāt: “For if the relation were intended to be expressed the word ‘fire’ should end in the sixth triplet.”

Uddyotakara reproduces a more explicit version of Dignāga’s argument as pūrvapakṣa at NV 323,21-324,3: atha dravyādīvṛttīvat sattāyā eva dravyādīsabdaḥ saha sāmāṇādhikaranayaḥ tathāpi pāratantrīt sarvāt vā gunatvam, gunagunabhidhāyinoṣ ca śabdayoḥ sāmāṇādhikaranām na drṣṭam iti yathā śāṅkhasya śāuktīyam iti. etena sambandho vyākhyaṭaḥ: “If, on the other hand, existence is co-referential with words like ‘substance’ because existence is resident in substances, and so on, nevertheless because of its dependence [upon the general property existence] existence has status as a property (gunatvam) and two words that denote a property and a bearer of that property, [respectively], are not observed to be
co-referential, like, for instance, [the statement]: ‘Whiteness of conch-shell’. Hereby the relation is explained.”

(1)em. (cf. ‘brel pa’i mtshad ñid T) : svasam° Ms


39 The Vākyapādiya quotation is missing in K. Moreover, Jinendrabuddhi does not comment upon it, which might indicate that it was not included in the material he used for his ōkā. There is no reason to believe, however, that it has been interpolated because Mallavādi quotes a similar verse in the same context as appears from Śiṃhasūri’s quotation at NCV 631,9-10, q.v. above no. [13]. An edited version of the verse, presumably by Dignāga, was known to Uddyotakara, cf. no. 41 below.

40 As mentioned above Dignāga quotes this verse with the intention of corroborating his analysis, namely that the introduction of the sixth triplet after the word denoting a substance as connected with the property existence is required by a grammatical rule. The verse constitutes part of Bhartrhari’s reflections on the problems discussed by Patañjali at Mahā-bh I 399,4ff. (ad A II 1:57), which Helarāja explains thus at VPP Vol. II 154,1-5: pātasya śūkla iti dravyagunābhādyapadprayoge sābdo guṇaprāadalāhāḥ. tathā hy atropasārjanam pradhānopakāraparinatam svārtham ācāṣta iti guṇavibhāktaṁ śaṣṭīṁ upādatte. pradhānaṁ tu svāmāny avasthitam aparopakāriti prathamayā yuyata iti niyato vibhaktibheda vyadhikarane viṣaye. viṣāḥ puruṣa ityādau tu sāmānādhikarane viṣaye dvāv api dravyasābdauv svanīṣṭham svārthām ācāṣate. tathā ca prathanāvā: “When syntactical nominals denoting a substance and a quality are used, like in the expression ‘white colour of cloth,’ the relation between the secondary and the principal item (pradhāna) is verbal. That is, in the present case the subordinate item denotes its own referent as brought into the service of the principal item. Thus it assumes the sixth triplet which is the affix of the subordinate item. The principal item, however, being confined to itself is not subsidiary to the other. Therefore it is constructed with the first triplet. Thus the difference of nominal affix is restricted to the domain where there is no co-reference. However, in the domain where there is co-reference, as in an expression like ‘the man that is a hero’ even two words that [each] denote a substance denote their own referent as self-contained. And thus only the first triplet [is used].”

Uddyotakara quotes at NV 326,5-6 a similar but slightly revised version of VP III.14:8. Dignāga must have edited it with the intention of adapting Bhartrhari’s analysis to his own treatment of the question of sambandhaḥ. It is quoted towards the end of Uddyotakara’s rebuttal of Dignāga’s argument. Since Uddyotakara apparently used the Sāmānyaparikṣāvāsa for his criticism of the apoha theory, the verse no doubt stems from this work: tasmāt sāmānādhikaranyānapapattir adoṣaḥ: “vibhaktibheda(1) niyamād guṇagyuyabhidhāyinoḥ, sāmānādhikaranyāsiddhiḥ sadravyasābdayoḥ” iti etad anena pratvyaktaṁ: “Therefore it is not a problem that there is no justification for co-reference. Hereby [the verse claiming that] “[A word] denoting a quality and one denoting the bearer of that quality have different case affixes because of a restrictive rule. For the two words ‘existent’ and ‘substance’ co-reference is not established,” is answered.”
Jinendrabuddhi closes his exegesis of this paragraph with a brief discussion of the problem of the denotation of general terms like "dravya" in relation to expressions showing "vaiyadhika" like "sad dravyasya," in which one general property seemingly is connected with another, which contradicts the assumption that general properties are not connected with one another, cf. PSṬ Ms B 194b5-7: nunu ca dravyādiśabdair api jātimātram dravyatvādy ucyata iti. tatra kaḥ sambandho jāter jātyantareṇa yataḥ saṣṭhy ucyeta? naśa daśaḥ. dravyatvāvad dravyam iha matvarthālaṃ kṛtvā darśitam vaiyadhikaranyapradarśanārtham. yady evam sacchabdē 'pi matvarthālaṃpāt sāmāṇādhiṇārṇāyam bhavīṣyati. yadā tarhi matvarthīno notpadavya sattāmāttravivakṣitavitvā, tadā na prāṃnoti; na ca tadā sad dravyasyetīṣyate: "It is certainly the case that terms like 'substance' also denotes the mere general property such as substanceness. In that case what kind of connection to another general property does the general property have so that one would use the sixth triplet? There is no problem. In this case the general property possessor of substanceness is referred to as 'substance' by eliding the affix denoting possession in order to illustrate absence of co-reference. If that is the case, there will be co-reference even in the case of the word 'existent' as a consequence of the elision of the affix denoting possession. When in that case the affix denoting possession is not introduced because the mere general property existence is intended to be denoted, it does not obtain; and then the clause "sad dravyasya" is not called for."

(1)ṇo ni"con.: "ani".
(2)em.: "ata Ms


41 A Connection is basically dviṣṭha, that is, it involves two terms namely the state of connecting and the thing that is being connected to something else. Thereby it only becomes denotable through the introduction of the sixth triplet after the word denoting the other relatum.

Dignāga addresses the question of the denotability of sambandha in his criticism at PS II.110cd of the view that the object of inference (anumeyya) is the connection; cf. PS II:10c1:

K (Kitagawa 1973 459b16-460b3 = P 112a7-8): gaṅ gi phyir yan 'brel pa ni | brjod min | (10c1) raṅ gi chos dan 'brel pa ni gzan la brjod par bya yin la | de lta bu la rjes su dpag par bya ma yin gyi |

V (Kitagawa 1973 459a18-460a3 = P 31a3-4): raṅ gi chos kyi<s> 'brel par ni || brjod par mi bya'o || gzan ma brjod pa ni de lta rjes su dpag par bya ba ma yin te:

"For the connection *(sambandho hi)* is not denotable by virtue of its own property (avācyah svadharmena),"(1) but is denotable with respect to something else [viz. its relatum], and thus it [i.e. the relation] is not the inferendum (na caivam anumeyyah)."(2)

[3] Jinendrabuddhi comments upon the phrase avācyah svadharmena in a way that is reminiscent of Dignāga's explanation at PSV V:3, cf. PSṬ Ms B 68b7: sambandhanām hi sambandha iti bhāvarūpena sambandhaśabdenābhādhiṇāt. bhāvaś cānyena sambandhinā yujyata iti. sambandhyantarākāṅkṣā(3) jāyate: kasya
bhartū, buddh||; cf. Dharmakṣaṃbāntvena gamyate when denoted it becomes present to the mind as having relata.” KarṇāGa a thing. Its form is not apprehended. The relation is in no way whatsoever denoted in its most likely source would be the Śāṅkara’s lost works. If so, the connection is only a relatum. Thus the connection is not denoted in its own form.”

The idea that sambandha is only understood as an entity that connects relata is formulated by Bhartṛhari in his description of samavāya at VP II 435: sambandhidharmā samyogāsvaśabdenābhidhīyate | sambandhaḥ samavāyas tu sambandhitvena gamyate ||; cf. Dharmakīrti’s explanation at PVSV 92,4–8: sambandhasya tu svarūpāna anabhidhānam uktam. abhidhāne sambandhitvam buddhāv upasthānāt: “The relation is said not to be denoted in its own form because when denoted it becomes present to the mind as having relata.” Karṇakagomin explains at PVSVṬ 345,19 the crucial last clause as follows: tatra rājapurūṣayoh sambandha ity ucyamāne rajñāḥ puruṣa(4) ity asya vyatirekasya hetuḥ sambandhaḥ, tadā sa sambandhaḥ sambandhirūpēṇa pratiṣyāyate: “When in this case it is said that there is a relation between the king and the servant the relation is the cause of the difference [of case affix] as in the expression ‘king’s man.’ Then this relation is understood in the form of its relata;” Karṇakagomin mentions, at PVSVṬ 345,16, Dignāga as Dharmakīrti’s authority for claiming that sambandha is not denotable: kathaṃ tarhy aśāryadīnāgena tasyāvācayatvat uktam. To support the analysis he quotes the following verse 348,31–346,2: asattvabhūtas sambandho rūpam tasya na grhyate. nābhidhānam svarūpāna sambandhasya kathaṅcaneti: “The relation is not a thing. Its form is not apprehended. The relation is in no way whatsoever denoted in its own form.” This verse may stem from one of Dignāga’s lost works. If so, the most likely source would be the Śāṃkara’s authority for claiming that sambandha is not denotable: kathaṃ tarhy aśāryadīnāgena tasyāvācayatvat uktam. To support the analysis he quotes the following verse 348,31–346,2: asattvabhūtas sambandho rūpam tasya na grhyate. nābhidhānam svarūpāna sambandhasya kathaṅcaneti: “The relation is not a thing. Its form is not apprehended. The relation is in no way whatsoever denoted in its own form.”

42 Cf. PST Ms B 195a5: bhāva ity abhiprāyenoktaḥ. The techical term bhāva denotes the state of action expressed by action nouns like pāka or sambandha; cf. Rocher 1966; 1968: 23 § 13; Renou, Terminologie s.v.

43 Connection means that of any given x to any given y. The two terms of the relation constitute its relata (sambandhin). Cf. PST Ms B 195a1–3: iha kaśic chadbārthaḥ, kaśeṣti ākāṅksāṃ upajanayā(1) kasetyā ākāṅksāṃ upajanayā(2), bhāvaś ca bhāvasādhanena sābdenābhidhiyamāno nityam anyaviṣayām ākāṅksām janayati: “In this case when a certain word referent is being denoted by a certain word it is the cause of generating expectation [of the complementation of] the other relatum. Like, for instance, an accumulation is
the cause of generating expectation [of the complementation] of the correlate when being denoted by a word denoting accumulation. The [word denoting accumulation] comprising [the word] 'and', and so on, with certainty generates expectation [of complementation] at the thought [accumulation] of what'? (3) And a state that is denoted by a word having a state [of action] as its means of realisation necessarily generates expectation concerning the other relatum.’

After this explanation Jinendrabuddhi addresses the additional question of whether or not the analysis of the relation applies to the general property, like when one talks about the general property of a horse, cf. PST Ms B 195a3-5: nanu ca jātvī apy evam yuktam abhidhātum. jātīr hi jātiśābdenābhābhidhiyamānā sambandhirupenābhābhidhiyate: jātīr aśvasyā gor veti. naitad asti. saty api sambhandhite jātīrūpam nāvahīyate. sambandhasya punah sambandhitve rūpaḥanīr eva, asati sambandhāntare sambandhītvānupapatteḥ. tāthā cānavasthāprasāṅgah.

(1)The translator of T has misunderstood the cpd. cādyupādāna < cādi < ca + ādi + upā as vādin + upā, cf. the translation rgol pas ne bar len pa 155,16. (2)em.: "ām nopaja" Ms (3)Cf. Patañjali’s illustration of the concept of accumulation at Mahā-bh I 434,10: samuccayah: plakṣas ceti ukte gamyate etan nyagrodha ceti. (4)For the concept of bhāvasādhana, cf. Renou, Terminologie s.v. bhāva.

[15] sambandhanam hi sambandhah(1): <so 'nyena yujyate> rāgā<di>vat. tasmāt sambandhiḥdamenaḥ sambandho vācyā iti krtvāsāṅkitaṁ(2) svadharmena tu nāsti sambandhasya vācakāḥ śābda ity idan āt(3) prati nāsti. ato naivāsya jātiśābdena vācyatvam upapadyate(4). Restored, cf. PST Ms B 195a5-195b1: sambandhanaṁ hi sambandha iti ... rāgavat ... tasmāt sambandhiḥdamenaḥ sambandho vācyā iti krtvāsāṅkitaṁ iti ... svadharmena tv iti. svarūpena nāsti sambandhasya vācakāḥ śābda iti. idam āt iti pratyavamarśāyogayogavileṣa vācyatvam upapadyate iti. (1)Cf. 'brel par byed pas 'brel pa ste K : brel pa ni V, after which V adds gdon mi za bar 'brel par 'gyur ba'i nes pa med de: “For the connection is necessarily without certainty as to what is to be connected.” This phrase has no counterpart in K except perhaps the final de that may correspond to the demonstrative de (= sah) of K. PST is of no help in settling the problem. (2)The word āśāṅkitaṁ has no identifiable counterpart in VK; the immediately preceding absolute krtvā is perhaps reproduced by pHyir, which could be justified semantically considering the usage of Sanskrit kṛtvā, cf. V 108,9, K 109,9. (3)VK do not reproduce the expression idam āt prati that is to be construed with āśāṅkitaṁ. In view of the uncertainty of the readings of KV and the apparent discrepancy between PST and the text reflected in the Tibetan translations of KV, the suggested Sanskrit restoration of this paragraph, although it is corroborated by Jinendrabuddhi’s rīkā, may not in every detail reflect the original version. (4)The phrase naivāsya jātiśābdena vācyatvam upapadyata iti introduced by ataḥ is reproduced as two śloka pādas in V: ‘di yi rigs kyi sgra yis ni // brjod par bya ba ŋid mi ’thad / K translates as prose omitting the negation ma before yin no. If indeed the phrase consists of two pādas, which one cannot reject offhand because Jinendrabuddhi’s use of iti indicates that the phrase is part of a quotation and the phrase seemingly does not deviate from the śloka metrics of PS, their existence would solve the riddle of the missing two pādas of verse 43.
11: The term applies to any given noun that is not subject to the grammatical operation of introducing the sixth triplet that denotes the relation (na
nu
sha
šthī sambandhasya 
āryam, Helarāja introducing loc.cit., cf. VPP Vol. I 128,10-11: tatra svena asādharaṇena 
ārgha svabhāvenopalaksita 
vācakaṁ pratyāyakam abhidhānanaṃ 
āṣṭhiyativoitiktaṃ nāstī, idantayā svarūpānavadhāraṇāt.  

16 For Dignāga’s use of the technical term svadharma, cf. VP III.3:4 na
bhidhānaṃ svadharmena sambandhāyi 
vācakaṁ 
ātyantaparantaravād 
rupam nāsāpadiśyate. The term applies to any given noun that is not subject to the previous faults: Particular general terms are ‘substance,’ etc. Since they refer to the same substance as the word ‘substance’ whose cause of application is substanceness. Based upon its cause of application viz. the general property existence, applies to the same referent (previous faults: Therefore co-reference like in the statement ‘existent substance’ is justified if it denotes the possessor of the general properties. Nor is there any impossibility of possession the general property (jātimadātra). And as this is one the relation is feasible and there is no ambiguity because without this [viz. the relation] the word does not apply.”  

Cf. the similar explanation at NMaṅjGBh 137,9-11: sacchabdaḥ 
sattam pravṛttinimittam āṣṭrya tadvatī dravye pravṛttāḥ śūklaśabdaḥ ca 
ghanam pravṛttinimittam āṣṭrya tatraśīvem mukhyayā vṛttyā sāmāṇadhikaranyāṃ bhavati: “The word
'existent,' by being based upon existence as its cause of application, is applied to a substance as possessed of this [viz. existence], and the word 'white,' by being based upon a quality as its cause of application, is applied to the same thing (tatraiva). Thus there is co-reference by virtue of direct application.'

50 I assume that la la dag ni ... zer ro V : gan yañ zer baʼi K is equivalent to gan la la dag ni of V 106,10 = ye tv āhuh.

51 Cf. de la V : om. K.

[17] tadvato nāsvatantratvāt. Qu. NCV 623,17; ŚVT 60,3; NR 423,10; PVSVT 200,11-12; NMañj 296,6; NMañjGBhg 137,13 and 138,8-9, cf. PST Ms B 195b5: asvatantratvād iti.

52 The re-occurrence of vācakaḥ follows from 2c, cf. TSP 382,8: tadvato na vācakaḥ śado svatantratvāt.

53 The term tadvat is used as a technical term for jātimat, cf. PST Ms B 195b5: tadvad iti jātimad ity arthaḥ; NMañj 295,31: nanu ko 'yam tadvān nāma: tad asyāṣṭiti tadvān iti: "Now what is this thing called tadvān: tadvān means that 'x has y;'" cf. A V 2:94: tad asyāsty asminn iti matup.

54 Cf. PST Ms B 195b5: asvatantratvād iti parāpekyatvād iti. Simhasūri quotes a verse from another chapter, possibly from Dignāga’s Sāmānyaparikṣāvāyāsa, in which the same argument occurs, cf. NCV 735,24: asvāntraṇyād, bhedāj, jāter ajātitaḥ (cf. PS V:11b).

[18] evam api hi sacchabdo jātisvarūpamātropasarjanam(1) dravyam āha, na sāksād iti tadgataghatādibhedānākṣepād atadbhedatvāt sāmānādhikaranyābhāvah. na ṣya atasyāṃ vyaṣṭītī na māṃkāṃ vāpyātta <sāmānādhikaranyābhāvah>. Restored, cf. PST Ms B 195b6: evam api hiṣṭīdī; TSP 382,8-11: sacchabdo jātisvarūpopasarjanam dravyam āha, na sāksād iti tadgataghatādibhedānākṣepād atadbhedatvāt sāmānādhikaranyābhāvah. na ṣya atasyāṃ vyaṣṭītī na māṃkāṃ vāpyātta. cf. Ms B 196a2: na sāksād iti ... tadgataghatādibhedānākṣepād iti; Ms 196a6: sa evatadbhedatvāt sāmānādhikaranyābhāvah, cf. NCV 616,24: atadbhedatvāt sāmānādhikaranyābhāvah; NCV 618,16: atra bhāṣyena para evottaram āha: na ṣya atasyāṃ vyaṣṭītī ityādi, cf. PST Ms B 196a7: na ṣya atasyāṃ ityādi.

(1) ‘mātra’ em. (cf. tsam KV; Ms B 195b6: mātragrahaṇam) : om. TSP.

55 Cf. PST Ms B 195b6-7: jātis ca svarūpam ceti dvandvaḥ(1), svarūpasrūtyā śabdavariṣam uktam. te upasarjanam apradhānam(2) yasya tat tathoktām. Mātragrahaṇam dravyagatadharmāntaraviṣeṣapratīṣedhārtham. katham punah svarūpaṃ dravyasyopasarjanam. yavata jātīr eva tadupasarjanam, śabdo hi svarūpaviṣṭām jātīm abhidhatte taduttarakālām śabdavarūpaviṣṭajātivīṣṭam dravyam. naśa doṣāḥ, upakārakopakāriṇo ’pi hi bhavantri upakārināḥ sva-viṣeṣanāpekṣasva viṣeṣanāsyā pradhānopakāre mahāti vartamānaṇātāvāt: ‘‘General property’ and ‘own form’ is a dvandva compound. By the word ‘own form’ is meant the word’s own form. That of which these two are subsidiary members (upasarjanam), i.e., not primary members (apradhānam) is named thus. The use of the word ‘mere’
has the purpose of negating particulars viz. the other properties that occur in a substance.

But how can the [word’s] own form be a subsidiary member of the substance insofar as only the general property is its [viz. the substance’s] subsidiary member? For the word denotes the general property as qualified by its own form, and thereafter it denotes the substance as qualified by the general property as qualified by the word’s own form.

This is not a fault. For they are also assisting and assisted because the assisted that is dependent upon the qualifier, being dependent upon its own qualified, is of great service to the primary thing [viz. the qualified].

The view which Dignāga addresses and Jīnendrabuddhi explains is related to a view which Bhartṛhari expounds at VP III.1:6: svā jātīḥ prathamaṁ śabdaiḥ sarvair evābhidhiyate, tato ‘ṛṭajāṭirūpeṣu tadadhyāropakalpaṁ.

1)em.: ta dvanṭaḥ Ms

(2)For upasarjana = apradhāna, cf. Renou, Terminologie s.v.

56 Cf. PST Ms B 196a2-3: na sāksat = nāyavyadhānena. jātisvarūpagrahaṇam ubhayavayadhānenādhipāratantrayopadarsanārtham: “Not directly, i.e., indirectly. The use of ‘general property’ and ‘own form’ is for the purpose of showing that the dependence is excessive because of the intervention of both.”

(1)For the Ms B 196a2-3: nāyavyadhānena. tadgatahaṭādhībhedānāksepād itī. yat tajjaṭimat tadgata ye viśeṣa ghaṭādayas teṣām anāksepād ity arthaḥ. Jātisvarūpagrahaṇam ubhayavayadhānenādhipāratantrayopadarsanārtham read: nāyavyadhānena. jātisvarūpagrahaṇam ubhayavayadhānenādhipāratantrayopadarsanārtham.

57 Cf. Uddyotakara’s reproduction of Dignāga’s argument at NV 324,9-12: jātīmatmātrābhidhiyako ‘pi sacchabdo na bhavati. kasmāt? asvantratvāt, na hi sacchabdāt tadbhēdā ghaṭādaya gamyanta iti tadvadhāṭādhībhedānāksepāt sāmānādhikaranyādbhāvah: “Nor does the word ‘existent’ denote the mere general property possessor. Why? Because it is not self-dependent. For one does not get to know its particulars such as ‘pot,’ etc. Thus there is no co-reference as it does not imply the particulars of the general property possessor such as ‘pot.’” The analogous exposition of Dignāga’s argument at ŠVT 60,7ff appears to be a verbatim quotation from another Dignāgan text: atra bhikṣur āha: jātīśabdāḥ sadādi tadviśiṣṭam eva dravyam abhidadhām na tadgatam eva ghaṭādhiviśeṣarūpam ākṣipati. paratāntra hy asau sattāṁ nimittikṛtya dravye pravartate, na tu svatantrah. sarvaviśeṣanāviśiṣṭam dravyam vakti. tataḥ ca gaṭødēs tena sacchabdenānākeṣpān nāsti tadvācinā sāmānādhikaranyā. na hy ekopādhiviśiṣte dravye ‘bhīhite paropadāhinā sāmānādhikaranyām bhavati: “Here the monk objects: The general term ‘existent’, and so on, while denoting a substance as qualified by this [viz. existence] only, does not imply the form of the particulars like pots that are included in it. For it [viz. the general term ‘existent’] is dependent since it applies to the substance by making the general property ‘existence’ its cause of application, but it is not self-dependent. It denotes the substance as not qualified by all its properties, and therefore there is no
co-reference with the word denoting it [viz. ‘pot’] since the word ‘existent’ does not imply ‘pot,’ etc. For when a substance that is qualified by one attribute is denoted, there is no co-reference with another attribute.”

Cf. the succinct paraphrase of Dignāga’s objection at NCV 648,7-8: yad uktam tvayā: ghatādibhedānākṣepitvāt sacchabdaya jātisvarūpānunadāvacchitvānābhidhānāt pāratantryād ghatādibhedābhedatvāt taiti nāma sāmāṇādhikaranyābhāvah. “As you have objected: Since it does not imply particulars like pot because the word ‘existent’ only denotes substances having as subordinate members the general property and the (word’s) own form because it is dependent, and because particulars like pot are not its particulars, there is no co-reference with these” (this quotation may stem from Sāmānāparikṣāvāsya). PVSVṬ 153,21 (ad PVSV 34,19: tadvatpaksoditaiḥ): yathā kila sāmānyam abhidhāya tadvati vartānānāh śabdo ’svatantrāḥ syāt tataś ca śabdapravṛtyinimittabhūtena sāmānyena vasūkṛtasya śabdasya vyaktigataparasparahādānākṣepat taiti sāmānādhikarananyam na syāt.

58 Cf. PST Ms B 196a2-3: yat tajjātimat tadgatā ye viśeṣa ghaṭādayas teṣām anākṣeṣād ity arthāḥ. Jinendrabuddhi continues addressing the meaning of ākṣepa at 196b3-6: atha ko ’yam ākṣepo nāma: atyāgāh. naṃ ca ghaṭādayo ’py atyāktā eva sattāśrayatvāt vādābhidhānāt. na, ghātavādinām anākṣeṣāt. sacchabdo hi sattāpātanaśruti tato bhinnaṁpurān ghaṭavādānānākṣipati, ghaṭavādirāpasanniveṣāc ca tad vastu ghatāḥ paṭo(1) vā bhavati, na svato vastumātrasya viśeṣābhāvāt. tasmād yathāva paṭāsabdeṇa(2) ghaṭavādyasamsargād ghaṭādayo nākṣipyante, tathā sacchabdeṇāpi. tatah kim? tatah sa evātadbhedatave sāmāṇādhikaranyābhāvah, katham kṛtvā? yad iha sacchabdena ghaṭādayo nākṣipyante, tato na tasya te bhedāḥ, na hy anākṣiptā bheda dhṛṣṭāḥ: “Now what is this so-called implication? It is the not leaving out. Certainly also pots, and so on, are not left out because they are the substrata of existence, and because [the word ‘existent’] denotes its substrate. No, because potness, and so on, is not implied. For the word ‘existent’ since it is dependent upon existence does not imply potness, and so on, whose nature is different from it [viz. existence]. A thing may be either a pot or a piece of cloth because the nature of general properties like potness are resident in it, but is is not [a pot or a piece of cloth] per se(3) because a mere thing is without distinction. Therefore, just as a pot, and so on, is not implied by the word ‘cloth’ because the general properties like potness are not connected [with cloth], it is not implied by the word ‘existent’ either. What follows from that? Therefore there is no co-reference in that it is without its particulars. On what grounds? If pot, and so on, are not implied by the word ‘existent,’ then these are not its particulars insofar as particulars that are not implied are not observed. And because they are not its particulars it cannot be co-referential with the words denoting these.”

59 Cf. PST Ms B 196a7-196b1: vyāptir ākṣeṣaḥ. yathā rūpāṣabdenānākṣepe madhurādānām atadbhedatvād na tacchabdaḥ sāmāṇādhikaranyam bhavati. na hi bhavati rūpam amlam iti. vyāptau tu bhavati rūpaṁ nilam iti: “Implication means pervasion. For instance, in that the word ‘colour’ does not imply things that are
sweet, etc. because they are not its particulars, there is no co-reference with words denoting these. For the expression ‘sour colour’ is impossible. But when there is pervasion the expression ‘blue colour’ is possible.”

The two examples mentioned by Jinendrabuddhi were also used by Mallavādi who appears to have copied them from a tikā, cf. NCV 618,14ff. Mallavādi incorporates part of Dignāga’s formulation into his own exposition, cf. NCV 618,16: na hy asatyāṃ vyāptau, and apparently also part of the tikā, of which Śimhasūri has preserved a fragment addressing the question of the impossibility of co-reference due to lack of pervasion (vyāpti), cf. NCV 618,14-15: tikāyāṃ coditam “anākṣiptair avyāptair api sāmāṇādhikaranyam bhavisyat vivakṣāvaśād ‘idam viśeṣyam idam viśeṣaṇam’ iti: “In the tikā it is objected: there will be co-reference with [words] that are not implied, i.e., not pervaded [e.g., by the word ‘existent’] by virtue of the intention to state ‘this is the thing to be qualified, this is the qualifier’.”

[19] tadyathā <śuklaśabdhaḥ> svābhidheya guṇamātraviśiṣṭadrvavyābhidhānāt saty api dravye madhurādīnā nāksipati. tataḥ cāttadbhedatvam. evam atrāpi prasangaḥ. Restored, cf. PSṬ Ms B 196b1-3: tad yathetyādi ... śuklaśabdasya svābhīdheyo guṇāḥ pravṛttinimittatvāc chuklatvam, sa tannātaviśiṣṭadrvavyābhidhānāt saty api[1] tasmin dravyātmanī madhurādīnā nāksipati ... tataḥ cāttadbhedatvam iti ... evam atrāpi prasangaḥ iti. cf. NCV 619,18-19: tataḥ cāttadbhedatvam ... evam iḥāpi. (api em. (cf. yod kyan T) : tat(au?) pī Ms

60 Cf. ŚVT 60,7-14: yathā madhuraśabdena mādhurypaṭhāviśiṣṭam khaṇḍadravyam abhidhānāt tadgatāparasuklādānākṣepat tena na sāmāṇādhikaranyam yathaitan madhuraṃ svetam iti tathaitenāpi na bhāvyāṃ san gṛha iti: “Just as there is no co-reference with the word ‘sweet’ denoting the substance sugar as qualified by the attribute sweetness because of not implying other [qualities] like [the quality] white that is included in it. Like, for instance, the [co-reference] ‘this [substance] is sweet and white’ will not be possible, so also the [co-reference] ‘existent pot.’”

61 Cf. PSṬ Ms B 196b2-3: na hi tasya śuklatvavad madhuratvādayaḥ pravrtiliṣṭeṇaṃ: “For the general property sweetness is not the cause of application of the [word ‘white’] as is the general property whiteness.”

62 Cf. PSṬ Ms B 196b4: sacchabdena[1] ghaṭādiṁ am anākṣepah, anākṣepāc cāttadbhedatvam ity arthah: “The meaning is this: The word ‘existent’ does not imply pots, etc.; and since it does not imply (pots, etc.), it has no particulars.” The idea that the denotation of one term does not imply the denotation of other terms has a parallel in Bhartṛhari’s claim at VP III.3-4, in the context of a discussion of prakāraṇa, that the different distinguishing properties that are found in substances are not denoted by any given particular term that denotes its referent as excluded from other referents and thus does not imply the denotation of other terms: vidyāmānaḥ pradhānesaḥ na sarve bhedahetavah, viśeṣaśabdair ucyante vyāvrittīrthābhiddhiṣyati-bhiḥ. Mallavādi appears to quote this verse (or a version of it) in his rebuttal of Dignāga’s argument (it may, in fact, have made up part of Dignāga’s own argument), cf. the explanation at NCV 622,23-27: pradhānesaḥ viśeṣyevaḥ vidyāmānaḥ api bhedahetavādharmaḥ sarve no cyante, kaścid eva viśiṣṭo vivakṣitaḥ kenacid viśeṣaṇena tadvacinā viśeṣaśabdenocayate ‘rtho viśeṣaṇtaravīyāpi –, tatrāva
caritārthatvāt tasya guṇabhūtatvāt. ata eva ca te višeṣaṣabādā ity ucyante vyārtrān-

(1)sac’ āṃ. (cf. yod pa’i T) : tac’ Ms

(20) upacārāt. Qu. Ms B 197a2; NMañjGBh 137,13.

63 Jinendrabuddhi explains that Dignāga introduces this argument in order to show that in the case of abhedopacāra it is impossible that the general property possessor be the denotable object because the word only denotes the form of the general property existence upon which it is imposed, cf. PST Ms B 196b7-197a1-2: thehdam uktaṁ jātiśabdena tadvaty ‘bhidhānam iti. tadvati ca śabdasya matulpopād abhedopacārād vā vyṛthī. tatra matuppakṣe śukładīvad abhidhānaṃ sambhavātiti sati vācyatve doṣa uktaḥ. abhedopacāre tu tasyaiva samāropitasya saitārūpasyābh-

(1)hi conj. (cf. yod pa’i sgra ni K : sgra ni V) : ‘pi ŚVṬ (’pi is probably w.r. for hi)

(2)So read with NCV (cf. ni KV) and NMañjGBh 138,6, q.v. no. 67 below : tu Ms

64 Jinendrabuddhi explains that Dignāga mentions svarūpa in accordance with the view that those who claim that the own form of a word (śabdasaṃsvarūpa) is denotable, cf. PST Ms B 197a2: ye śābdasaṃsvarūpaṃ vācyam icchanti, tannatena. The reason why Dignāga alludes to this view is undoubtedly because Bhārtṛhari claims that the word denotes its svarūpa before its connection with the referent, cf. VP I:66: prāk saṃjñinābhīsambandhāt saṃjñā rūpapadārthikā, cf. VPV 125,5-6 ad loc.: vāvat saṃjñinā tu saṃjñā na sambaddhā tāvan na saṃjñīpadārthiketī; VP III.1.6ab svā jātiḥ prathamāṃ śabdair sarvair evābhidhīyate; Helarāja Vol. I 17,8 ad loc. quotes VP I:66ab. For the alternative view that the word denotes the general property, cf. PST Ms B 197a2: ye jātiṁ, na tu svarūpam (scil. icchanti).

65 Cf. PST Ms B 197a3: jātimati. svarūpābhidheyaāvādīnāṃ tu jātāv apy upacārāt.

66 Jinendrabuddhi illustrates this statement by quoting the example of the transfer of the word ‘king’ to the servant, cf. PST Ms B 197:4: tadvathā rājaśabadāḥ puruṣa upacārāt ca jātiśabdam tadvatītī. Other paraphrases of Dignāga’s argument do not
include svarūpa among the principal denotata of the word ‘existent,’ cf. NMañjGBh 138.3-6: sacchabdlena jātih khyāpyate sattālakaśaṇaḥ. tatra pravṛttas tadvaty utpacyate ’sau. na ca yah śābdo yatropacaryate sa tasya vācakaḥ. na hi yo yatropacārāt vartate sa tam artham paramārthaḥ bravīti yathā simhaśabdo maṇavaṃ. NV 324,12-14: atha vā, avatantratvād iti sacchabdaḥ prādhēṇyena sattaśaṃ vartate. tatra vartamānas tadvaty utpacyate, yac ca yatra vartamāṇam anyatropacaryate na tat tasyābhidhāvakaṃ maṇicasabdavād iti: “Alternatively, ‘because of not being self-dependent’: The word ‘existent’ applies principally to [the general property] existence. While being applied to this it is transferred to the possessor of the general property, and that which, while being applied to one thing, is transferred to some other thing does not denote this [other thing], like the word ‘seats’ [which stands metonymically for the persons sitting on them]”(1)

As an illustration of the view which Dignāga criticizes Jinendrabuddhi quotes VP III.14:347 at Ms B 197a5: maṇicasābdyo yathādheyaṃ maṇices eva vyavasthitāḥ tatvēnāḥa tathā jātīśaḥdo dravyeṣu vartate: “A general term applies to substances in the same way as the word ‘seats’ which being restricted to the seats only denotes what is supported [by the seats] as identical [with them],” and he continues at 197a5ff: so rājety(2) upacaryamāṇo rājaśaḥbdḥ bhūtārthena <na> bhṛtyam abhidhatte ... sa eva tu rājārtha bhinnādhikaranā ucyate. Helarāja explains loc.cit at VPP Vol. II 310,27f: maṇīcāḥ krośantīti khyāśambhandhāṣādhye maṇicaṣthe prāṇīny upapatter ādhārārtapābhēdenāḍhāravacano ‘pi maṇīcasābdas taddhēye vacana iti niścīyate’; cf. NCV 624,14-15: maṇīcasābdoby maṇicaṣthān maṇicasavarūpaṃpannā eva brūte na puruṣatvāpānān iti. Dignāga may therefore have had Bhartṛhari’s position in mind. Since Mallavādi quotes VP III.14:347 in the same context (cf. NCV 624,13), it is highly likely that Dignāga either quoted it or alluded to in the Sāmānyaparikṣāvyāsa, the work that Mallavādi together with other Dignāgan works relied upon for his criticism. Dignāga’s critique of the theory of transfer of the general term to the general property possessor is alluded to at PVSVṬ 153,23-24 (ad PVSV 34,19: tadvatpakṣodidāḥ): upacāritā ca tadvati śabdapravṛttit ityādikā dasa iti.

(1)For this example, cf. NSBh ad NS II 2:62: sthānāt: maṇīcāḥ krośantīti iti maṇicaṣthāḥ puruṣāḥ abhidhīyante: “Due to placement like [the statement] “the stages are shouting,” by which the people located on the stages are denoted;” see also Kānnakagomin’s PVSVṬ 153,17–20 and Manorāthanandin’s PVV 280,4–10 ad PV I 64, respectively.

(2)So rājety conj: (s)a jeyarājyety Ms


67 Cf. NMañjGBh 138.8-13: atha sattoparaktatatsvariṣe dravye sārūpyāc chabdasya vṛttir bhaviṣyatīti ced āha – “asambhavād” iti tatsārūpyāṣāsmabhavād ity arthah. na hi sattaya sārūpyam dravyasya nilena yathā sphaṭihātasya nirūpatvāt tasyāḥ. atha yathā ākṛtau pratyaśasankrāntyā ‘gavayo ’yam’ ityādau tathā ghaṭādu satpratyaśasankrāntyā ‘san ghaṭāḥ’ iti bhaviṣyati. tad api na. kutaḥ? Asambhavāt. katham asambhavāḥ? dravyasya sattākṛtyasambhavād dravye satpratyaśasankrāntyabhāvah: “If is is claimed that the word will apply by virtue of resemblance [of the substance with the general property] to a substance whose own form is influenced by (the general property) existence, he refersents “because it is
impossible,” that is, the resemblance [of the substance with the general property] is impossible. For a substance does not resemble [the general property] existence in the same way as a crystal [resembles] the blue colour because [the general property existence] is colourless. If, on the other hand, the expression ‘a pot is existent’ will be due to transfer of the notion ‘existent’ to the pot in the same way as in the expression ‘this is a gavaya’ by way of transfer of notion to the form, that too is not justified. How can that be? Because it is impossible. Why is it not possible? There is no transfer of the notion ‘existent’ because it is impossible that a substance has the form of existence”

The view which Dignāga criticizes is related to Bhartrhari’s description of sattaupacārikā at VP III.3:40: sphaṭikādi yathā dravyam bhinnair upāśrayaih, svasaktiyogat sambandham tadṛṣṭyeṇopagacchati; cf. no. 88 below.


(1) Cf. ldan pa las K, for which read ldan pa la.

68 Simhasūri explains at NCV 622,25ff that there are two types of transfer, one based upon similarity (sārūpya) and one based upon influence of the attribute (guṇopakāra): dvayī hi upacārasa gatiḥ: sārūpyāt: yathā yamalayor anyatarasmin ‘sa evāyam’ iti pratayasaṅkrāntetah, rājñā bhṛtye ‘mātyāda’ rājā iti vā pratayayaḥ. guṇopakārād vā, upadhānānurāgād iva sphaṭike raktatvādibuddhīḥ: “There are two ways of transfer: 1. through similarity, like, for instance, from transfer of notion to either one of two twins thinking ‘one is just like the other’, or the notion ‘king’ to the kings servant viz. the minister, and so on, or 2. due to the influence of a quality like, for instance the perception of redness, and so on, in a crystal due to the influence of [the red colour of] a proximate substrate.” Dignāga addresses both types in the following paragraphs.


69 Cf. NMañjGBh 138,18-20: nanūpacārād anyavishayāḥ pratayo ’nyatra saṅkrāman drṣyata ity āha: “vṛttirūpasya bhinnatvād” bhedenopalabhyaṃāvatvād iti: “It is certainly the case that due to transfer a cognition that is concerned with one thing is observed in the sense of something else by being transferred. With this [objection] in mind he says: “Because the form of the application is different,” i.e. because it is observed to be different.”

70 The parallel version quoted at NMañjGBh 137,14 (q.v. above no. [24])—it probably stems from the Sāmāṇyaparīkṣāvāsa—expresses the opposite idea, the transfer of the notion ‘servant’ to the king; Bhartrhari makes use of the same simile at VP III.7:121: rājñī bhṛtyatvām āpanne yathā. Jinendrabuddhi does not comment.
on the simile as such, cf. PST Ms B 197b6: jātau vṛttah śabdas tadvat upacaryate. na copacāre sati tulyākāro buddhir bhavati. etad dṛṣṭāntena pratipādayati: “While being applied to the general property, the word is transferred to the general property possessor. And in the case of transfer the cognition does not have the same form. This he shows by means of an example.” In Uddyotakara’s exposition of the argument at NV the relation between the two terms is not inverted, cf. NV 324,15-16: tadvat na ca guṇasārūpyāt pratrayasakrāntiḥ, yathā svāmīsaabdasya bhṛtye: “And there is no transfer of cognition to the general property possessor due to similarity of property, like [the transfer] of the word ‘master’ to the servant.”


71 źes bya ba la K, would indicate the presence of a Sanskrit locative.

72 Cf. bran la rai gi sgrar brjod pa ni V : om. K.

73 Cf. gaṅ mi de ni rāṇ no V : nā(1) gaṅ yin pa de ni bran yin no K. In contrast to KV supports the statement of pāda d. (1)nā em. : nāg K.

74 Cf. blo mtshuis par skye ba ni ma yin no V : blo mtshuis par ‘gyur ba ma yin no K. Although the translation of this paragraph is tentative as neither KV nor Ms makes it possible to form a clear idea of its syntax and vocabulary, the gist of it seems clear enough: Dignāga wants to point out that the assumption that the alleged transfer of the idea of the general property existence to its possessor (tadvat) due to similarity is impossible because in secondary usage the transfer of one term to something else, like when a king refers to his minister as ‘master’ or ‘king’, does not entail that the cognitions of the two things to which the term is applied directly and secondarily coalesce: they are still separate, like the notions of ‘king’ and ‘servant,’ cf. NCV 624,24-25: tatra na tāvat pratrayasakrāntiḥ sārūpyād upacārah sambhavati sārūpyāsambhave pratrayasakrāntyabhāvāt svāmībhṛtyayor bhinnatvāt: “In this case, in the first place, transfer is impossible through transfer of notion due to resemblance because there is no transfer of notion in that there is no resemblance because the master and the servant are different.” NMānḍGBh 138,13-17 explains the parallel as an illustration of the transfer of the word ‘king’ to the servant: upacāre hi ‘yo ‘ham sa evāyam’, ‘rājā bhṛtyah’ ity upacārād lokasya rājā-dau pravṛttih pratrayabhṛdenopalabhyata iti tad iha bhākta(h) “vṛttirūpasya bhinnatvād rājñi bhṛtyopacāravad” iti: “For in the case of transfer like “he is what I am: the servant is king,” it is observed that people’s usage with regard to the king, and so on, is accompanied by difference of notion.”


75 Cf. PST Ms B 197b7-198a1: tad evam tadvaty upacāravacanāj jātau mukhya ity uktam bhavati. tad etena yau mukhyopacaritaśabdābhidheyau, na tayoh sārūpyam: tadyathā rājabhṛtyayoh: “Thus, on account of the statement about transfer to the general property possessor it is [eo ipso] stated that [the general term] applies directly to the general property. Therefore, on this account there is no
similarity of the two denotable objects of a word that applies directly and in a transferred sense, like for instance [the lack of similarity] of a king and his servant.”

(27) kramenānabhidhānāc ca kundaśankhādiśuklavat. Restored, cf. PST Ms B 199a2-3: kramenānabhidhānāc ceti ... kundaśankhādiśuklavat iti(1).

(1)em.: ṣṭhyā Ms

76 Jinendrabuddhi introduces this paragraph by clarifying the concept of similarity, cf. PST Ms B 198b6-199a2: sārūpyam indriyapratyayasanākrāntyā vā paricchidyeta sābdaprayayasankrāntyā vā. tatendriyapratyayasanākrāntyā jātītadvatoḥ sārūpyam nāvāśiyata iti pratipādītaḥ prāyam etat sāmānyasyādārśanām pratipādayat “sāmānyam yady api syāt tu tatrānyat tasya darśanam āśra-yādarśanān na syād” (PS II:16abc) ityādinā, na hy adṛṣṭena saha kasyacit sārūpyaṃ sākyate pratyetum. sābdaprayayasankrāntyāpi nāvāśiyata iti darśayam āhā: “Similarity may either be defined through transfer of sense cognition or through transfer of verbal cognition. Now, it has already been shown in outline by PS II:16abc(1), showing that the general property cannot be observed, that the similarity of the general property and the general property possessor is not to be determined through transfer of sense cognition. For it is impossible to cognize the similarity of something with something that is not observable. Showing that it is not ascertained by transfer of verbal cognition either, he formulates (PS V:5a).”

(1) For a translation of PSV II:16, cf. no. 500 on PSV V:38d.

77 Cf. Jinendrabuddhi’s explanation at Ms B 199a2-3: jātītadvatoḥ kramaṇa śabdaprayogasyābhāvād ity arthaḥ. yadi jātāu tadvati ca kramaṇa śabdaprayogah syat, tato yādṛṣṭaḥ śabhā(1) jātāu prayayo bhavati tādṛṣṭa eva tadvātii syat prayayasanākrāntiḥ, na ca kramaṇa śabdaprayogah, kim tarhi sakṛd eva. tataś caika eva prayaya iti. kutaḥ prayayasanākrāntir iti: “The meaning is this: Because there is no application of the word to the general property and the general property possessor in succession. If the word were to be applied successively to the general property and the general property possessor, the notion about the general property that is due to the word would be exactly like the notion about the general property possessor. Thus there would be transfer of notion. Yet, the word is not applied in succession, but rather, it is applied simultaneously. And therefore there is only one notion. So how could there be transfer of notion?,” Uddyotakara and Mallavādi appear to quote Dignāga’s argument from another source, probably the Sāmānyaparīkṣāvyāsā, cf. NV 324,17 = NCV 625,10: kramaṇaṃtītābha vā: “because [the general term] does not apply in succession.” Although Mallavādi applies the argument to Dignāga’s own theory, the subsequent explanation loc. cit. no doubt imitates the original Dignāgan formulation: na hi kramaṇaṃ sakṛd uccaritaḥ śabdaḥ ... tadvati vartate. Uddyotakara, however, does not explain the argument.

(1)ōāj em.: oā Ms

78 For the semantics of the topicalisation particle ni VK, cf. no. 10 above.

79 Cf. rim gyis brjod par mthoṅ ste V : rim pa yin par brjod pa de mthoṅ ste K.

80 Cf. kun da daṅ ku mu ta daṅ duṅ dkar po K : me tog kun da daṅ me tog ku mu ta daṅ du duṅ gi(1) dkar po ’o V.
(1) The use of the morpheme *gi* after *duṅ* would indicate the presence of the sixth triplet after each of the terms (in the manner of expressions like *pātasya śuklaḥ*); it is not corroborated, however, by *K* and the parallel at *Ms B 235b6-7*: *yathā śuklataviśeṣayābhinnatvāt kumudādayo ‘bhinnākāreṇa pratyayena pratiyante: “śuklaṃ kumudaṃ kundam śanḵham”* iti, which is adopted here.

(28) *sakṛc ca jātitaadvatōḥ śabdā<prayoga iti>*(1) *nāsti pratyayasaṅkrāntitāḥ sārūpyam*. Restored, cf. *PT* *Ms B 199a4,6*: *sakṛc ca jātitaadvatōḥ sabda<prayogas>*(1) *iti ... nāsti pratyayasaṅkrāntitāḥ sārūpyam.*

(1) *<prayoga iti> conj., cf. sbyor ba’i phyir K : om. VT; cf. the use of sabdaprayoga at Ms B 199a2-3, q.v. above.

81 Cf. *PT* *Ms B 199a6*: *pratyayasaṅkrāntito yad avasīyate, nisargasiddham sārūpyaṃ tan nāsīty arthaḥ.*

82 *Jinendrabuddhi introduces the argument at Ms B 199a6-7as follows: mā bhūt svatāḥ sārūpyaṃ, jātyuparāgāt tu tad dravyaṃ svayam atadrūpyaṃ api tathā prakāṣate. yathā spatikā upadhanāvasāt svayam atadrūpo ‘pi tadrūputāya: “Let there not be similarity per se. However, because of the influence of the general property a substance appears in this way, even though it is not identical with the general property per se, in the same way as a clear crystal by dint of a proximate substrate appears as if it were similar to it, even though it is not similar to it;” cf. NCV 625,12-14: *syān matam: guṇopakārād iti. tan nāpi guṇopakārāt spatikāvanized viṣeṣaṇapraḳaraṇam agrḥhitā viṣeṣye pratyayaprasāṅgāt: “Suppose the idea is that it is due to influence of the property. However, it is not due to influence of the property in the same way as a crystal because the [absurd] consequence is that there would be a notion of the qualified without having perceived the degree of the qualifier.” Uddyotakara relates briefly the argument at NV 324,17: guṇoparāgāt. yathā nilaḥ spatikā iti.*

83 Cf. *PT* *Ms B 199b1*: *prakṛṣaṇa iti viśayena viśayinyāḥ prakṛṣaṇabuddhier nirdeśaḥ. prakṛṣaṇabuddhiḥ syād ity arthaḥ. kasmāt punar ayaṃ doṣa upanyasyati? yāvad drṣṭāiva dravye prakṛṣaṇabuddhiḥ.*

84 Cf. *PT* *Ms B 199b1-2*: *guṇapraṇaṣaṅkhuddhyā vinety arthaḥ.*

85 *yadi spatikāvad guṇoparāgāt tadvān guṇasvarūpo bhaved, evaṃ sati dravye <guna>prakṛṣaṇabuddhyanapeksā(1) prakṛṣaṇabuddhiḥ svāt. Restored, cf. *PT* *Ms B 199b2*: *yadi spatikāvad guṇoparāgāt tadvān guṇasvarūpo bhaved, evaṃ sati tītaraḥ pāta iti dravye viṣeṣaṇapraṇaṣaṅkuddhyanapeksā prakṛṣaṇabuddhiḥ svāt.*

(1) *Cf. yon tan ‘phel ba’i blo K.*

86 The argument that the perception of prakṛṣaṇa presupposes perception of prakṛṣaṇa of the quality is remarkable in that prakṛṣaṇa, at least in the grammatical tradition represented by Bhartṛhari, whose work, for all we know, was well-known.
to Dignāga, is said to rely on other properties that inhere in the substance, such as luminousity (bhāsvaratva), whereas prakarṣa is not supposed to be a property of the general property as such; cf. VP I 122.5ff with Paddhati ad loc.; Iyer 1969: 271f; Helarēja on VP III.3:3ff. However, as Jīnendrabuddhi explains at Ms B 199b2-4, in this context the term guṇa denotes the quality as merged with the substrate (samsargiguna)\(^\text{(1)}\), but not the quality as such, e.g., whiteness; cf. no. 87 below. Jīnendrabuddhi’s discourse on the use of the term prakarṣa at Ms B 199b7-200a4 addresses the apparent ambiguity of its use in the context of Dignāga’s argument. For, as the fictitious opponent observes, general properties do not possess prakarṣa: prakarsagrahanam guṇāpeksapratyayasyasamarthanārtham anyathāvasīyamāṇāpi jātīr jātimato ‘rthasyopakārīnī\(^\text{(2)}\) vartate. tatas tadupakārāḥ tathā bhāṣata iti kaścit pratayavatistheta, prakarṣās tu nivogataś tadavasāyāpeksapratyayaparicchedya eva, dravyasya svataḥ prakarṣābhāvāt. na hi dravyaṁ svato dravyāntarām atiśayitum alam svarūpaṃśreṇa vakṣūm bodhūm viśākyatvāt. nanu ca jāteḥ prakarṣābhāvāt tadānaṃsaṃviśeṣapratyayāḥ, naśaj doṣaḥ. viśeṣapratyayo nilādau viśeṣanāpekṣaḥ. tat sadādeviśeṣaṃpekṣa\(^\text{(3)}\) viśeṣaḥ sadityādipratyayo nilādipratyayaavadi ity uk-tam bhavati. anyathā yady agraḥīti vāsāraye gotvādikā jātīr gavādiyapratyayām kuryeta. yadā kim api etad dravyam iti dravyāntropatralabhau gotvādayo na ghr-yante tadāpi gavādiniścayaḥ svān, na ca bhavatī. tasmān na jātinirapekṣas tadvāti pratvayāḥ.

\(^\text{(1)}\) For the term samsargin, cf. no. 90 below.
\(^\text{(2)}\) em. : ‘kāri Ms
\(^\text{(3)}\) em. : ‘au Ms

86 Cf. NCV 625.13-15: yathā sphaṭike raktavādipratyaya upadhānaprakarṣam agraḥītā bhavati tathā viśeṣanaprakarṣam agraḥītā viśeṣye pratyayāḥ svānt. na tu svānt: “Just as the cognition of redness in the crystal exists without having apprehended the degree (of redness) of the proximate substrate, there would be a notion of the qualified without having perceived the degree of the qualifier. This, however, would not happen.”

PST Ms B 199b2-4: na ca viśeṣanaprakarṣe grhīte viśeṣye prakarṣabuddhir bhavati, dravyasya svataḥ prakarṣāpaprarbābhāvāt. na hi svata eva paṭaḥ paṭāntarāt krayate, api tu nilātvāder aśīrītād guṇāt, nirupaḥānasya vasturūpasya jñānāsambhavāt. guṇaśrūtiḥ ceha samsargigunābhādhyāṇi, na tu sullatvādayas tayā guṇā vivakṣitāḥ: “And there is no cognition of degree with respect to the qualified, when the degree of the qualifier has not been apprehended because increase and decrease [of the property] of a substance does not exist per se. For one piece of cloth is not per se set off from another piece of cloth, but rather because of the property that is resident in it viz. blueness, for it is impossible to get to know the form of a referent that is without an property. And in this case the word ‘property’ denotes the property as merged [with the substance], whereas [the general property] whiteness, and so on, are not intended to be denoted by it [viz. the term ‘property’] as properties.”

The example of a crystal(1) reflecting the colour of a proximate substrate is also mentioned by Bharṭṛhari in a similar context at VP III.3:40, describing the apparent tādṛṣṭya of a crystal with variously coloured proximate substrates: sphaṭikādi yathā dravyaṃ bhinnarūpair upāśrayaih, svasaṅkyogat sambandham tādṛṣṭyeṇeva(2) gacchati: “Just as a substance like a crystal comes into connection as if by way of similarity, with variously coloured proximate substrates due to the fitness of its own powers;” cf. the similar use of iva at VPV I 147,3-4 relating various views about the relation between śabda and dhvani: śabdena saṃsṛṣṭo dhvanir upāśrayānurāga iva sphaṭikādinām avibhakta upalabhya; in his comment Vṛṣabhadeva substitutes upadhāna for upāśraya, cf. Paddhati 147,11-13: yathopadhānoparaktā raktasphaṭikā na tato vivekenāvadhārayitum śakyaḥ tathā sphotena saṃsṛṣṭo dhvanir na vivekenāvadhāryata ity apare.

One cannot exclude the possibility that Dignāga in rejecting this view has Bharṭṛhari’s position in mind.


Cf. PST Ms B 199b6-7: na hy avyutpannasya sphaṭikopadhānayor bhedabuddhir bhavati, sa hi sphaṭikā evāyam etadākāra iti vyavasyati. vyutpannasya tu rakto ’yam sphaṭika iti nīscayānupapattir eva: “For someone who has not been taught [about it] has no idea of the difference between the crystal and the proximate substrate. For he will ascertain: ‘It is the crystal alone that has such an appearance’. But for someone who has been taught [about it] there is no justification for: ‘This crystal is read’.”

A similar argument is mentioned by Kumārila at ŚV Pratyakṣā 143: sphaṭikādau tu lāksādisvarūpā yā matir bhavet, avyutpannasya sā mithyā vyutpannānām hi bhedadhīḥ.

saṃsargirūpāt sarvatra mithyājñānāṃ prasajyate. Qu. Ms B 200a5.

Dignāga is using the term saṃsargin to denote a property (guna) as merged with its substrate, cf. its use by Bharṭṛhari, e.g., at VPV I 123,3, and VP III.5:1, with Helarāja’s explanation VP Vol. I 192,5: saṃsargi ādhārena saṃsṛṣṭam rūpasaṃbhedena vartamānām, na sambandhamātrām; Iyer 1969: 270. According to Jinendrabuddhi saṃsargin = viśeṣaṇa or guṇa, cf. PST Ms B 200a6: saṃsargi viśeṣaṇaṃ guṇa ity eko ’rthāḥ.

That is, if one assumes that similarity is due to influence of the property on the substance, cf. PST Ms B 200a5f: guṇopakārā tādṛṣṭyābhāyupagane.

sarvo hi śabdāḥ pratayav ’rthe(1) saṃsargirūpavyavahitas, tatoḥ <śphaṭikāvad> ayathārthāḥ syāt. Restored, cf. PST Ms B 200a6-7: sarvo hityādi ... sarvo hi śabdāḥ pratayav ’rtheṣu(2) saṃsargirūpavyavahitaḥ, tato ... yathā nilaḥ sphaṭika iti gṛhnato ’yathārthāḥ pratayavah ... tathā ... ayathārthāḥ syāt.

(1)Cf. don la K : don dān V.

(2)em. : pratayārth° Ms

The cognition is separated from its referent (arthe vyavahitaḥ) insofar as the real referent of the word is the property, not its reflected form.
Uddyotakara and Mallavādi apparently use the same source, presumably the Sāmānyaparīkṣāvāya, for their exposition of the pūrṇapakṣa, cf. NV 324,18: ayathārthajñānottiprasāṅgac ca: “And because it follows (absurdly) that false knowledge would arise; NCV 625,14ff ayathārthajñānottipatātāḥ, yatā śpāṭiṁ raktatvādipratayāya mityāpratayatāḥ tathā viśeṣaṇasarūparupatrayayo viśeṣya syāt: “Because false knowledge originates. Just as the notion of redness, and so on, in the crystal is a false notion, the notion about the qualified that is similar to the qualifier ‘Because false knowledge originates. Just as the notion of redness, and so on, in the crystal is a false notion, the notion about the qualified that is similar to the qualifier ‘Because false knowledge originates. Just as the notion of redness, and so on, in the crystal is a false notion, the notion about the qualified that is similar to the qualifier ‘Because false knowledge originates. Just as the notion of redness, and so on, in the crystal is a false notion, the notion about the qualified that is similar to the qualifier per se, any verb not in its proper syntactic relation to the other elements of the phrase will be [a false notion] about the qualified.” Jñinendrabuddhi explains the argument at Ms B 200a6-200b1: yadi gunopakārād guṇini tāḍrūpyyaṃ syāt, evam sati yathā nilaḥ śpāṭikā iti gṛhṇato ‘yathārthah pratyayaḥ, śpāṭikāṣya svato ‘nīlāvat, tathā sarva eva ghatāḥ pata ityādiḥ(1) śābdāḥ pratyayaḥ ‘yathārthāḥ syāt, dravyasya svato ghaṭādīrūpābhāvāt; na cēṣyate: “If there be similarity in the qualified because of the influence of the property, this being the case, just as the notion of the one who apprehends that ‘the crystal is blue’ is false because the crystal is not blue per se, every verbal notion like ‘pot’ and ‘cloth’ will be false because the substance does not per se have the form of a pot, and so on, nor is it claimed [to be the case].”

(1)em. : ओऽदिसां ̃ऽ.

92 Uddyotakara and Mallavādi apparently use the same source, presumably the Sāmānyaparīkṣāvāya, for their exposition of the pūrṇapakṣa, cf. NV 324,18: ayathārthajñānottiprasāṅgac ca: “And because it follows (absurdly) that false knowledge would arise; NCV 625,14ff ayathārthajñānottipatātāḥ, yatā śpāṭiṁ raktatvādipratayāya mityāpratayatāḥ tathā viśeṣaṇasarūparupatrayayo viśeṣya syāt: “Because false knowledge originates. Just as the notion of redness, and so on, in the crystal is a false notion, the notion about the qualified that is similar to the qualifier

93 According to Jñinendrabuddhi ādi implies quality (guṇa), and action (kriyā), cf. PST Ms B 200b2: ādigrahaṇād(1) guṇakriyāgraḥaṇam.

(1) ādi° em. : ǎ° Ms

94 Dignāga uses the term grāhaka with the same value as grahīṭr = pratipattṛ, for which, cf. VP I:53c with VPV ad loc.

95 For this argument, cf. NV 325,17-18: yugapadasambhāvāc ca, and NCV 625,16: yugapadasambhāvāc ca. Once again Uddyotakara and Mallavādi seem to quote from the Sāmānyaparīkṣāvāya.

96 Cf. PST Ms B 200b2: yadaikakālaṁ bahavah pratipattāro bhinnair viśeṣaṇair ekam artham pratipadyante tadopakāro virudhyeta guṇakṛtaḥ: “When many listeners at the same time understand the same referent by means of different qualifiers, the influence [on the general property possessor] that is effectuated by the properties will be in conflict.” Cf. Dharmakīrti’s related criticism at PV I:54-55 and PVSV p.30 ad loc.

97 For this argument, cf. NV 325,17-18: yugapadasambhāvāc ca, and NCV 625,16: yugapadasambhāvāc ca. Once again Uddyotakara and Mallavādi seem to quote from the Sāmānyaparīkṣāvāya.

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anubhāvitum śākyam, kṛtstāsya ghaṭādirūpaṃpratīteḥ; Ms B 200b3-5: tadyatheti...na hi śākyam ityādi. ... avīśeṣāḥ ... nāpy ekādeśeṇa gunarūpaṃ anubhāvitum...kṛtstāsyetyādiā. 

1 Cf. khyad par med pa’i phyir ro V 110,28: khyad par med pa’i phyir K 111,28.

97 Since any given referent has a multitude of properties, it would require a multitude of speakers to convey them at the same time and therefore, by implication, a multitude of listeners for decoding what the speakers say. This is inconsistent with the way in which verbal knowledge is conveyed; cf. NCV 633,11ff where Simhasūri explains Dignāga’s argument with reference to the speaker (vaktr) as opposed to the graḥitṛ decoding what the speaker says: ekasmin arte ghaṭādaughaṭatvapṛthivītvadṛavyatvasattvādibhinnesu vaktṛṣu kaścid ghaṭa iti brūte kaścit prthivīyādi yāvat san iti. tatra ghaṭābhidhānāḥ so ’rtho ghaṭārūpeṇa kṛtsno vābhidhiyate ekādeśeṇa vā? na tāvat kṛtsnah, tasmān eva kāle vakrāntarasasya pāṛthivatvenābhiḥādināsambhavapasangāt: “When someone among the speakers that are divided between potness, earthiness, substanceness, existence, and so on, says ‘pot’, about the same referent viz a pot, and so on, and some says ‘earth’, and so on, up ‘existent’, in that case, is this referent denoted in toto in the form of ‘pot’ or is it denoted partially? In the first place it is not denoted in toto because the [absurd] consequence is that it would be impossible for another speaker at the same time to denote is as ‘earthen’;” cf. NCV 634,5-6: yathā param pratti tvaduddārta-ghaṭāpṛthivatvoktāu “yadi ghaṭatvena samastam vastu viśiṣṭam tataḥ pāṛthivatvas-yāvakāśābhāvān na yuḥyate” iti iṣṭo doṣaḥ: “Like the mistake you have pointed out, in opposition to the opponent, in your statement about potness and earthiness which you have quoted as examples, namely that if the entity as a whole is qualified by means of potness it is not justified because there is no room for eartheness.”

98 There are three ways (trayī gatiḥ) in which one might cognize a thing as Jinendrabuddhi explains: 1. cognition of the form of any property among the many that define an entity; 2. cognition of the form of all (its qualities) partially, i.e., one by one; 3. cognition of the form of all qualities in toto, cf. PST Ms B 200b3-4: atra trayī gatiḥ, anyatarasyaiva vā gūṇasya rūpaṃ pratipadyeta, sarveṣāṃ api vā ekādeśāḥ, sarvātmanāḥ sarveṣāṃ eveti.

99 Cf. PST Ms B 200b4-5: tatra na tāvad ekaikasyaiva, avīśeṣāḥ. na hi sattādināṃ kaścid viśeṣo ’sti, yata ekasyaiva rūpaṃ pratipadyeta, nānyasya: “In the first place, there is no [cognition] of each single [property] because of absence of difference. For there is no difference whatever between the [general property] existence, and so on, so that the form of only one would be cognized, but not that of another.”

100 Cf. PST Ms B 200b5-6: yadi hy ekādeśeṇa viśeṣaṇarūpaṃ pratipadyeta, tadaikadeśo ’syā ghaṭa iti pratīyeta, tathā pāṛthivo dravyam ityādi: “For if one were to cognize the form of the qualifiers partially, one would cognize one part of its as ‘pot’, similarly one part as ‘earthen’, ‘substance’, and so on.”

101 V 110,29 adds lan cig tu (= yugapat) : om. K. The reading of V is doubtful as it does not occur in the corresponding passage at NCV 625,19, q.v. no. [35] above.

102 Cf. PST Ms B 200b6-201a1: sarvair ghaṭatvapārthivatvādibhir viśeṣaṇaiḥ samastasya vastuno yogapad upakāre tadrūpāpattau ghaṭādirūpasya vibhāgena grahaṇābhāvād vibhāgenānyonyam abhinānekarūpagrahaṇam syāt, na vibhāgena ghaṭo 'yam pārthivā vetyādikām: “If such qualifiers as potness and earthenness, and so on, at the same time were to exert their influence on the entity as a whole, then, in that it assumes [all] their forms because there is no apprehension of it by way of distinction between the form of ‘pot’, and so on, there will be an undifferentiated apprehension of their various forms because they are not mutually differentiated due to lack of distinction [between them], but there would not be [an apprehension of it] by means of distinction [into] ‘this is a pot’, or ‘this is earthen,’ etc.”


104 Cf. PST Ms B 201a1-2: yatās tad dhravyam sarveṣam rūpaṃ yogapat āpadyate. tad evam upakāraṇaḥ ghaṭaṇānum grahaṇam na syāt. asti ca tat: “Because the substance at the same time assumes the form of all [of its general properties]. Thus there would be no apprehension in the form of ‘pot’, etc. because the influence [of the general properties] is in conflict [with linguistic experience]. And yet this [apprehension] exists.”

105 For this paragraph, cf. the quotation at NCV 625,19-20 (cf. no. [37] above): “If, on the other hand, all [of the general properties] such as potness, and so on, simultaneously assist the [substance as a] whole, there would be a confused perception due to the mixing together of all the properties in it because [the substance] simultaneously assumes the form of all [of the general properties] and because the listeners do not apprehend them all, one by one, in the form of ‘pot’, etc.”
bhedeṣu jātau tadyoge tulyo doṣaḥ ca teṣv api. Restored, cf. PST Ms B 201a2-3: bhedeṣv ityādīnā; Ms B 202b5-6: bhedeṣu jātau tadyoge tulyo doṣaḥ ca teṣv apītyādīnā prāg eva nīrākṛtām.

106 According to Jinendrabuddhi, Dignāga extends the problems of the theory of the general property possessor to the other theses mentioned in the first half of the verse, formulating the corresponding reasons in the second half, cf. PST Ms B 201a2-3: bhedeṣv ityādīnā tadvatpākṣoditaṁ doṣaṁ pakṣāntaresv atidiśati. uttarārdhana tv atraivopapattiḥ āha.

107 Cf. Jinendrabuddhi’s explanation at Ms B 201a3: jāturūpam bhedeṣu na(1) yujyate, śabdasvarūpaṁ(2) jātau, śabdasvarūpayuktajāturūpaṁ sambandhe: “The form of the general property is not justified with regard to the particulars, the own form of the word is not justified with regard to the general property, and the form of the general property as connected with the own form of the word is not justified with respect to the relation.”

(1) esu na yujʊ em.: oesv ayam ayujʊ Ms
(2) svarūpʊ em.: ṛūpʊ Ms

108 Cf. tha dad pa’i(1) no bos K: tha dad pa’i no bo la V.
(1) tha da pa’i em.: tha da pa’i ran gī K.

109 Cf. PST Ms B 201a4: sambandhirūpaviviktasyārthātmano vācā viṣayikartum aṣakyaṃ vād avaśyaṃ ity āha: “Since it is impossible for an expression to take as its referent the nature of a thing as dissociated from the form of its relatum, he says ‘necessarily.’”

110 That is, general properties like substanteness, cf. PST Ms B 201a5: dravyatvādiṣu.

111 For Jinendrabuddhi’s remarks on what distinguishes the bhedapakṣa from the tadvapakṣa, cf. no. 113 below.

112 These problems comprise 1. direct and transferred application, 2. no denotation in succession, and 3. incompatibilty of the influence of the general properties [with verbal distinctions], cf. PST Ms B 201a4-6: kas tarhi tadvatpaksād bhedapaksasya viśeṣah? tadvatpaksē sajñāturūpaṇa sacchabdo ‘bhidhāyakaḥ, bhedapakṣe tu dravyānārūpaṇa. evam hi bhedarupenaḥbhīhūtā bhavanitya esa viśeṣaḥ. tatrāpi dravyatvādiṣu mukhya bhedeṣpācārita iti pūrvavad eva doṣā vācyāḥ: mukhyopācāritavīrtītvam, kramenānabhidhānam, guṇopākāvirodhaḥ ca: “Then what is the difference of the thesis about the particulars [being the denotable objects] from the thesis about the general property possessors [being the denotable objects]?
On the thesis about the general property possessors [being the denotable objects] the word ‘existent’ denotes in the form of the general property existence, but on the thesis about the particulars [being the denotable objects] it denotes in the form of substances, etc. For in this way they are denoted in the form of particulars. Such is the difference. And also in that case the problems are to be stated exactly as before, on the grounds that (iii) it denotes substanteness, and so on, directly and is transferred to the particulars, namely, direct and transferred application, no denotation in succession, and incompatibility with the influence of the general properties.”

113 Cf. de dan ldan pa la brjod pa bzin du skyon thams cad brjod par bya ’o (1) V : de dan ldan pa bzin du thams cad la nes pa brjod par bya ’o K.
(1) Cf. PŚ Ms B 201a5: pūrvavad doṣā vācyāḥ.

[41] sambhavataḥ(1), Qu. Ms B 201a6.
(1) Cf. srid pas V : srid pa yin no (sic) K.

114 Cf. Jinendraabuddhi’s explanation of Dignāga’s use of the word ‘possibility’ at Ms B 201a6: jātyabhidhāne “prakāśāḥ syād vinā dhiyāḥ” (PS V 5d) ity asyāsambhavāt, sambandhābhidhāne ’py, ata eva sambhavagrahaṇam: “Since it is impossible that ‘there would be [perception of] degree of intensity [of the degree of intensity of the property]’ (PS V:5d) if the general property as well as the relation are denoted, precisely therefore he uses [the word] ‘possibility.’” After this explanation he continues addressing questions regarding the problems of the denotation of the relation, cf. PŚ Ms B 201a7-201b3: nanu ca pūrvam sambhandhasyānabhidheyataiva’vokta(1). tat katham idānīṃ sadrūpeṇābhidhānāṃ āśriyate? katham cātābhedopacāraḥ sambandhābhicāreṇa sa ucyate, katham sadyogaśabdayoḥ sāmānādhihikaranyuṇapattih? naiṣa doṣaḥ, abhyupetya sambandhābhicāraṇāṃ asya doṣasyābhidhānat. yady api sambandho ’bhidhiyate, tathāpi tadvatpakṣaśoṣānatipattīr āśrtyaśākṣatvāḥ(3) iti pradarśanārtham idam uktam.
(1) em. : ‘dhasyābhi’ Ms
(2) em. : ‘pi vā satva’ Ms
(3) em. : ‘tālya’ Ms

115 For Sanskrit iti, cf. ātes srid pas(1) V : phyir srid pa yin no (sic) K.
(1) Cf. PŚ Ms B 201a6: ity asambhavāt, q.v. above no. 114.

116 Cf. rigs brjod pa’i (phyir) K : rdzas su brjod pa V.

117 Cf. rigs kyaṅ mñon par brjod par bya ba la K : brjod par bya ba’i rigs dag la V. For the assumption that the own form (svarūpa) of the word is superimposed upon the jāti as its referent (artha), cf. no. 304 below.
tadvāṁs ca bheda evaṣṭaḥ sa ca pūrvaṁ nirākṛtaḥ. Qu. ŚVT 62,11; NR 425,8; Cf. PST Ms B 201b3: tadvāṁs cetyādinā paksāntaravām evāśya nirākaroti.  
118 Cf. rigs kyi sgra ru 'o V : om. K.  
119 Cf. śīnar spaṇs pa yin no K : bsal žes pa ni śīnar V (this translation is akward).  
120 Unlike the previous translation of 2a K is not syntactically confused this time. V repeats the syntactically impossible first translation adding par (DC om. in accordance with the previous translation) after med. The qu. of 2a involves the reasons given at 2b viz. ānantyaḥ vyabhicārataḥ as indicated by ŚVT 62,8f on ŚV Apoha° 128, introducing Dignāga’s argument as follows: yat punar etasmīna eva pakṣe bhikṣunoktaṃ: jātiviśiṣṭeṣu abhidhīyamāneṣu svalaṃkāraṇā evābhidyāṇī prāpaṇvantu, teṣām ānantavyavyabhicāraḥ bhāvyam avācyatvam uktam iti: “With regard to this thesis the monk has explained: ‘When they are denoted as qualified by the general property, it follows [absurdly] that only the individual entities are denotable, and they are explained not to be denotable because they are infinite and because of ambiguity’.”  
121 Cf. de yaṅ(1) rigs daṅ Ḵaṇ pa ḵa yaṅ ḵrjod pa yin no V : de yaṅ rigs daṅ Ḵaṇ pa yin no K.  
122 Cf. rigs kyi sgra K : om. V (PN so; D conj. rigs ni ).  
123 Cf. rigs daṅ Ḵaṇ pa tsam Ḵrjod par byed pa K : rigs daṅ Ḵaṇ pa tsam gyi(1) Ḵrjod par byed pa V.  
124 Cf. PST Ms B 201b4-5: na ḵa ḵy atra bhedābhedarūpeṇābhidhīyante, kim tarhi teṣām jātīmaṃḥ yad aviṣṣṭam rūpaṃ sattānaṃāropitaṃ tad eva bhedarūpāsmaparṣenābhidhīyate. tathaḥ ca bhedapakṣat paksāntaram evaṃ iti manyaṃ: “For in this case it is neither denotable in the form of various kinds of particulars,(1) but rather, it is only the undifferentiated form of the general property possessors as transposed to the general property existence that is being denoted without touching on the form of the particulars. And thus this is a different thesis from the thesis about the particulars. This is what is meant.”  
125 I regard bhedābheda as an instance of a reduplicated cpd. from < bheda + bheda with rythmical lengthening, denoting “various kinds of particulars.” Cf. AiGr II.1 p. 148; Nachträge zu II.1 p. 44.
125 Dignāga is going to show that the opponent’s theory does not differ in substance from the views that the denotation of the word is the general property or the relation of the general property; the mere general property possessor will either be the general property as such or its relation, cf. PST Ms B 201b5-6: yady evam ityādīnā jātiyogapāksayor asyantarbhāvāt pakśantaravām pratikṣedhayati. kathāṃ punas tadvannātaram sattā sambandho vā syād ity āha: tadvannātaram tv ityādi: “By the words “if this is the case, and so on,” he denies that it is a different thesis since it is included in the theses of the general property and its relation. To the question “in what way then would the mere property possessor be [the general property] existence or its relation,” he answers “the mere property possessor, nevertheless, etc.”

ŚVT 62,18-19: yac cātra bhikṣunā jātimattvamāttram vācyam bhavisyatītā āśaṅkya vikalpitam: atha jātimattvam, kim jātiadvatos sambandhaḥ kim vā sāmānyarūpam iti. evaṃ ca vikalpya pūrvoktajātisambandhābhidhānadoṣo yojanīyāḥ ity uktvoktāṃ: “Moreover, the monk supposes that the denotable object will be the mere property of being a general property possessor and conjectures: “Suppose [the denotable object] is the property of being a property possessor, is it the relation of the general property as such or its relation, cf. PS Ṭ the relation of the general property: the mere general property possessor will either substance from the views that the denotation of the word is the general property or existence or its relation,” he answers “the mere property possessor, nevertheless, etc.”

126 Cf. PST Ms B 201b6-7: mātraśabdena bhedanirākarane sāmānyam sarvāṅgataṁ rūpaṁ sabdārtha ity uktam bhavati. tacy ca pravṛttinimittavād bhāvapratyayenābhidheyam. na sattām sambandhām vā muktvyayad upalabhya bhāvapratyayasya tatratva vidhānāti: “The word ‘mere’ is for the sake of excluding the particulars, and it means that the referent of the word is the general property, which is the form that is continuously present in everything. And since this is the cause of application, it is to be denoted by means of the bhāva affix. Apart from the general property existence or the relation [of the general property existence] no other [cause of application] is found because the bhāva affix is prescribed for denoting this only.”

127 Cf. ni K : yañ V.

128 Cf. de ldan niḥ K : de daṇ̃ ladan pa V; cf. ŚVT 63,9ff: matubantād ayam bhāvapratyayasyā kṛtaḥ, sa ca sambandhavāc api smaryate: “This bhāva affix is introduced after a word ending in a matup affix, and it is also traditionally thought to denote the relation.”

129 This clause is syntactically confused in KV: ’brel pa ’am yon tan la ’gyur K probably translates sambandhe guṇe vā bhavaiti; nam ’brel pa ’i yon tan du ’gyur ro V is comparable to brel pa’i yon tan du ’gyur ro V (114,9), which, as indicated by
the context, must be interpreted in the same way. The term 'property' (guṇa) denotes any given general property (jāti, sāmānya).

130 Dignāga supports his analysis with a well-known grammatical quotation whose source Jinendraubdhi omits identifying, cf. PSṬ Ms B 201b7: etad āgamena darśayitum āha: samāsakṛttaddhīteṣu ityādi. sambandhābhidheyatāyām āgamaḥ. The Sanskrit gramman Bhaṭṭoṭto Diśkaśī claims that the quotation stems from Bhartṛhari’s Mahābhāṣyaṭīkā, cf. Vaiyākaraṇaiddhāntakārikā 49: kṛttaddhītasamās- sebhya matabhedānibandhanam, tvatalor arthakathanam tīkāyām Harinā kṛtam. Kaunda Bhaṭṭa explains in Vaiyākaraṇabhusanāsāra ad loc. that the mention of Hari and tīkā serves to rebut the erroneous view current among Mumāsakas and other scholars (= Naityyikas) that this definition of the function of tvatal is a vārttika and thus by implication to be attributed to Kātyāyana(1); kṛttaddhītasamāsēbhyaḥ (sic) sambandhābhūthiḥānām bhāvapratayaenyānātātā rūdhyaḥbhinnarūpāvayabhicaritasamb- bandhhebhya iti vārtikavacacā iti mimāṃsakādānām bhramam āpākuvvānā aha tīkā- yām, Bhartṛharinā Mahābhāṣyaṭīkāyām ity aṛtahā. It is, of course, an open question if the attribution to Bhartṛhari is trustworthy because the attribution of the quote to Bhartṛhari is very late. On the other hand, the claim that the abstract affixes tva and tā denote the general property (jāti), when introduced after idiomatic expressions and words whose connection (to existence) is invariable, is only known from Bhartṛhari’s Vākyapadiya; cf. Jātisamuddeśa VP III 1:48: asvaśabdābhūdhānās tu narasimhādījātayaḥ saritāpaṇaṇayā nā tu śrutir avasthitā; and VP III 14 39cd where Bhartṛhari explains that in the case of terms like gaurakharā the jāti is not expressed prior to the formation of the compound (prāg vṛttṛ jātitvayam na gaurakharādiṣu). The view that the abstract affixes denote existence (sattā) is essential to Bhartṛhari’s metaphysics, cf., e.g., Jātisamuddeśa 34: sā nityā śa mahān ātmā, tām āhūn tvatālādayaḥ.

The idea of the invariability of connection (avayabhicaritasambandha) of existence to things ultimately derive from Mahābhāṣya, cf. no. 133(1) below, but Bhartṛhari has elaborated the idea with the background of his metaphysics of existence (sattā).

(1) Cf., e.g., NVṬ 52,4: iti Kātyāyanīyavacacānāt; Nyāyaanikā: 20,19: iti vārtīkakāravacacānāt.

131 Dignāga mentions at PSV I:3d the view that words like dāndin and viṣānīn that terminate in taddhīta affixes denote their referents as qualified by a connection (sambandhaviśiṣṭa). This view is characteristic of Bhartṛhari’s analysis of taddhīta forms and compounds in general, cf. VP III 912, 920, 922; 933ff; no.s 132 and 596 below.
For a concise explanation of the grammatical implications of the statement, cf. PST Ms B 201b7-202a3: rājapuruṣatvam pācakatvam aupagavatvam iti teṣu samāsādiṣu svasvāmilākāraṇātpatyaśīpatavatsambandhā ucyante yathākramam.

tad atrāpi sacchadeśaya kṛdantavāti sambandhābhīdhanām syāt. anye tv āsyaivā-pavādām āhūḥ: anyatreyādi. eṣa guṇābhīdhiyātīyām āgamaḥ. rūdhāt samāsāt: gaurakharatvam srmaratvam, taddhitāt: hastītvam. atra jātimātram ucyate, na sambandhāḥ. taddhitād abhināritātāt: śūklatvam. śūklaśabdasya matvarthāyāntasyāpi prakṛtyā tulyarpatvāt. atrāpi guṇa evābhīdhiyate. avyabhicaritasambandhāt kutaḥ sattvam. na tu sattām padārtho vyabhicaratiḥ (1). atra saiva sattābhīdhiyate na sambandhāḥ: “When [the bhāva affixes] are introduced after these viz. rājapuruṣatvam pācakatvam aupagavatvam, then, beginning with the compound, a master servant relation, an agent action relation, and a descendant originator relation are denoted, respectively. In this context therefore also the word ‘sat’ would denote a relation because it ends in a kṛt affix. Others formulate an exception to this viz.: Apart from, etc. This is the received tradition about denoting a property: [apart from] when it is introduced after a conventional term, viz. a compound: gaurakharatvam, after a [conventional term] ending in a kṛt affix: srmaratvam, and after a [conventional term] ending in a taddhitā affix: hastītvam. In these [instances] (atra) the mere jāti is denoted, not the relation. When introduced after [a word] ending in a taddhitā affix whose form is not distinct (2): śūklatvam because the word śūkla has the same form although in its original state it ends in the (taddhitā) affix denoting possession [i.e., matup]. In this case too, it is only the property that is denoted. [Apart from] when it is introduced after [a term] whose relation is invariable. Why is it existence? “Certainly, a thing does not deviate from existence. In this case it is only existence that is denoted.”

Cf. PST I 38,12-17 on PSV I:3d: kriyādṛavyāobyāṃ tadvatām yah sambandhaḥ sa śabdapravṛttinīmittaṃ. tathā hi kārakatvaṃ (3) daṇḍitvaṃ iti bhāvapratyayāḥ kriyākārakādisambandhe bhavati. yathoktaṃ: samāṣaṃkṛittadhiṣu sambandhābhīdhānāṃ iti. śabdapravṛttimitte ca bhāvapratyayo bhavati. tathā cāhur: “yasya guṇasya hi bhāvād dravye śabdaniyeśaḥ, tadabhīdhāne tvatalavā” (vārtt 5 on A V 1:119) iti. pācako daṇḍīti ca kṛttaddhitau. tasmād atra sambandhe bhāvapratyayāḥ.


(2) For the grammatical implications of the term abhināraūpa, cf., e.g., Helarāja on VP III.14,136c: vrter abhināraūpatvāt. Kaiyāta’s lucid remarks on Mahābhāṣya ad A V 2:94, vārtt 3: “gunavacanebhyo matupō luk.” śūklaśaya evābhīnaṛūpā gune tadvati ca dravye vartamāṇā grhyante; and on A V 2:94, vārtika 4: avyatirekād iti guṇaṃtinoḥ so ‘yam ity abhisambandhād abhedādhyavasāyād utpattir eva matupō nāṣīty arthaḥ.

(3) The reading kārakatvaṃ is odd. One would expect pācakatvaṃ followed by daṇḍitvaṃ as examples of the rule that the abstract affixes tā and rvam denote the relation, when introduced after kṛt and taddhitā derivatives like pācaka and dandi, mentioned a few lines below. Cf. Padamaṇjarī Vol. IV 106,8 (ad A V 1:119): pācakatvam iti kriyākārakasambandhāh.

Cf. žes brjod zin to V : om. K.
tadvān artho ghatādiś cen(1) na paṭādiśu(2) vartate, sāmāṇyam arthah sa katham? Qu. ŚVT 63,17-18; NR 426,8-9; Cf. PST Ms B 202a3-4: tadvān ’ṛtho ghatādiś cetyādiṇāḥ ... sāmāṇyam arthah sa katham iti.

(1)cen na ŚVT 63,17-18; NR 426,8-9 : ca Ms
(2)em. : ghaṭādiśu NR, cf. snam bu sogs pa (sic) V : bum pa la sogs rnams la K.

NVC 735,19 quotes a couple of similar pādas that probably stem from the Sāmāṇyarāparīksāvāyaḥ: satvān artho ghaṭādir na paṭādiśu na vartate: “Suppose the referent that is the possessor of the [general property] existence is a [single] pot, etc. That is not the case, for it [viz. the pot] does not reside in cloth, etc.”

Dignāga addresses in this paragraph the assumption that the denotation of the word ’existential’ is a single instantiation of existence such as a pot. As Dignāga points out this contradicts the assumption that the general property existence is present in every single of its instantiations. For if the instantiation is restricted to a single referent like a pot in which the general property is resident to the exclusion of other referents, the idea of the general property residing in each single instantiation becomes untenable, if the pot does not reside in other things like cloth.

Jinendrabuddhi explains that tadvān artho ghatādiḥ, and so on, states the reason why a single possessor of the general property existence does not reside in the many instantiations of existence. sāmāṇyam arthah sa katham is the prāmāṇyaphala, i.e., the result of the proof: that which does not reside in cloth, etc.

Kumārila applies Dignāga’s argument to a hypothetical exclusion possessor at ŚV Apoha(1) 131ab: na caikāpohavān artho vartate ’ṛthāntare kvacit; cf. also NCV 635,10: yady api tadvad ghaṭādi paṭādiśu na vartate.

ŚVT on ŚV Apoha(5) 131 introduces Dignāga’s argument in this way: yadā gotvaviśiṣṭah sābaleyo gośabdasya vācyatvam āṅgikṛtam tadāsaū bāhuuleye nāṣṭī tatra gośabdapravṛttaḥ na syād iti: “When it is agreed that the object of denotation of the word ‘cow’ is the brindled cow as qualified by the general property cowhood, this [brindled cow] does not exist in the speckled cow. Consequently the word ‘cow’ would not refer to this.”

K and V differ in their interpretation of the syntax of pādas 9c-10a. If we disregard the syntactical problems of V 112,21-23 the Tibetan reproduction of the verse runs: “If the property possessor viz. a [single] referent like a pot does not reside in cloth, and so on, how could this referent be the general property,” whereas K (quite apart from its many inaccuracies: such as interpreting tadvān as if it were the particle tadvat = de bžin) construes sāmāṇyam with vartate. On this interpretation the verse says: “If a [single] referent like a pot is the property possessor and the general property does not reside in cloth, and so on, how could this be the referent.”

anekavrṭī(1) hi sāmāṇyam. Qu. Ms B 202a4.
(1)ṭi em. : ṛṭi Ms

For the qualification of the general property as anekavrṭī, cf. the definition of sāmāṇya at PBh § 361: svavīṣayasarvagatam abhedātmakam anekavrṭī.

136 Cf. gal te K : gañ{(1)} V.
(1) The reading gañ is presumably based upon a misreading of yadi as yad.


137 Cf. snam bu la sogs pa la yin nam (sic) V : bum pa la sogs pa rnams la jug pa ma yin na K.

138 Cf. the phrase at 10a: sāmānyam arthāḥ sa katham.
[51] nanu ca{(1)}. Qu. Ms B 202a.
(1) Cf. ‘on te yañ K : spyi ste V (for which read ci ste).

(1) Cf. ci’i don du K : don spyi yin V (for which read don ci yin).

139 The opponent objects to Dignāga’s attributing the form of the general property to the general property possessor, cf. PST Ms B 202a5-6: nanu cetvādinā siddhasādhyatām āha tadvataḥ sāmānyarūpataparāniṣṭatvāt. tad anīṣṭām sāmānyarūpādyopena sācayannāhā: kimartham ityādi. In the light of this explanation the reading de la ci’i don du spyi med par sgro ’dogs par byed že na K must be corrected to read de la ci’i don du spyi ńid du sgro ’dogs par byed že na, cf. de spyi ńid du sgro btags pa’i don ci{(1)} yin V.
(1) So read, cf. no. [52].

140 Cf. de dañ ldan par brjod pa ma yin te K : de la ‘jug pas ni brjod par mi bya’o V.

141 Jinendrabuddhi points out that Dignāga presupposes that the opponent assumes that the word ‘existent’ denotes a real general property, when he talks about the feasibility of the connection and lack of ambiguity. In addition he assumes that (a general term) is co-referential with particular terms, which presupposes a relation between general and particular properties, which would be impossible if general properties did not exist, cf. PST Ms B 202a6-202b1: evam manyate: sambandhasaukaryam avyabhicāram ca bruvātā sacchabdasaya sāmānyabhidhāyitvam āśrītam ... viśeṣaśabdaḥ sāmānādhibhāgyapagamāc ca.{(1)} na hy asati sāmānyaviśeṣabhāve sāmānādhibhāgyam upapadyate, tathā hī sāmānyāsbādād avēśeṇa pravartamānā buddhir viśeṣaśabdair viśeṣāntarebhyo vyavacchidyā viśiṣte viśaye vyavasthāyate, tad asati sāmānye noapapadyate: “The idea is as follows: someone who claims that the connection is feasible and that there is no ambiguity relies on the fact that the word ‘existent’ denotes the general property [existence] ... and because of the assumption that [the word ‘existent’] is co-referential with words denoting particular [general properties].{(1)} For co-reference is not justified when there is no general-particular relation. That is, an idea that arises without differentiation because of a general term is restricted to a distinct object by terms
denoting particular [general properties] by being excluded from other particular [general properties]. This is not justified when there is no general property."

(1) It is difficult to construe this clause with the preceding and following; some part of the argument appears to be missing. T corroborates the reading of Ms

\[53\] *sattādiṣu ca <sattādir nāstī>.* Restored, cf. PST Ms B 202b2: *sattādiṣu cetyādi.*

\[142\] Cf. PST Ms B 202b1-3: *atra ca sāmānyatā tadvad ity abhyupagame dvīdhā vikalpah. sāmānyasya vā sattādeḥ tattvāt syāt, tadvato vā ghaṭādeḥ sāmānate\[\textsuperscript{(1)}\]ti.* tatra pūrvaṃ na sambhavatī tārasayann āha: sattādiṣu cetyādi. na hi sattādiṣu jātyantaram asti niḥsāmānyatvāt sāmānyānām. tad avaśyam dvitiyo vikalpo ‘bhuypeya iti: “And if, in this case, a general property and a general property possessor are assumed [to exist], there are two options: either the general property existence, and so on, will be the general property possessor, or the possessor of the general property like a pot will be the general property. Now, in the present case the first [option] is impossible. This he shows explaining: “And at existence, etc.” For there are not other general properties at existence, etc. because general properties are without general properties\[\textsuperscript{(2)}\]. Therefore one is forced to adopt the second option.”

(1) The reading *sāmānataḥ* (cf. *mīshūṃs paṇḍā T*) is undoubtedly an error for *sāmānyataḥ*, cf. the remark attributed to the opponent about the attribution of *sāmānyataḥ* to the general property possessor.

(2) Cf. the statement *jāter ajātitah*, PS V:11b, q.v.; v. no. 166.

\[54\] *tasmād <avaśyam>\[\textsuperscript{(1)}\] arthasya <sāmānyatābhuypeyā>\[\textsuperscript{(1)}\]. Restored, cf. PST Ms B 202b3: *tasmād ityādi. arthasyeti.*

(1) Cf. PST Ms B 202b2: *tad avaśyam dvitiyo vikalpo ‘bhuypeya iti.*

\[143\] That is, a single general property possessor like a pot, cf. PST Ms B 202b3: *arthasyeti: prakṛtatvāt tadvato ghaṭādeḥ.*

\[144\] In spite of the reading *spyi khas blaṅ bar bya ‘o K: spyi’i don khas blaṅ bar bya V* the reading must have been *sāmānyataḥ* as indicated by the pronoun *sā* quoted in *pratika* at Ms B 202b3, cf. the objection that Dignāga superimposes the property of being a general property upon the general property possessor.

\[55\] *sā ca <nāsty arthasya>\[\textsuperscript{(1)}\] yasmād\[\textsuperscript{(2)}\]. Restored, cf. PST Ms B 202b3: *sā cetyādi; Ms B 202b3: yasmād ityādi.*

(1) Cf. *de yāṅ don la yod pa ma yin pa K: de yāṅ don la yod pa la* (sic om. DC) ma yin pa V.

(2) *de’i phyir KV.*

\[145\] ‘dir K: om. V probably reproduces Sanskrit *atra*, which I interpret as an anaphor referring back to *arthasya.*

\[146\] Cf. PST Ms B 202b3-4: *kevalagrahanena vācyasya tulyasya nirāsaṃ karoti. śabda eva vācaka esāṃ tulyo, na tu vācyam kiṃcit tadvad ity arthah: “By using [the word] alone he denies that the denotable object is the same. The meaning is this:
Only the term that denotes them is the same, but no general property possessor whatsoever is the denotable object.”

147 Cf. 'dir ni sgra mtshuṅs 'baʻ(1) ʑig go K : sgra don 'ba' ʑig pa daṅ mtshuṅs V.
(1)em. : pa K. PS V:10b may be restored as šabdō 'tra kevalaḥ samaḥ.

148 Cf. 'dra ba yin gyi K : om. V.


149 Cf. PST Ms B 202b4-5: vācakatulyatayaivaśām tulyatvam, na tu vācyena tadvatā kenacid vasturūpenety arthaḥ: “The meaning is that they are only the same because the word denoting them is the same, but not because of any denotable general property possessor whatsoever having the form of a real entity.”

[57] sattāyogau ca <prāg nirākṛtau>(1). Restored, cf. PST Ms B 202b5: sattāyogau cetyādi.
(1) Cf. snar bkag pa yin no K (Ms B 202b5: prāg eva nirākṛtaṃ) : snar cuṅ zad kyaṅ grub pa med do V.

150 That is above at 7cd, cf. PST Ms B 202b5-6: na sattā śabdasvarūpaṇa tadvatā vācyā, sambandho 'pi sattārūpaṇa. ataḥ sattvena sambandhena vā vācyena tadvatā tulyā bhaviṣyantīty āha: sattāyogau cetyādi. “bhedēsu jātāu tadyoge tulyo doṣaś, ca teṣy api’” iyādinā prāg eva nirākṛtaṃ jātiyogayos taitvattayābhidhānam.

(1) Ca em. (cf. de yaṅ rgyu mtshan meṇi 'dod K : de yaṅ rgyu mtshan meṇi par 'dod V : rgyu mtshan meṇi min’ de yaṅ dod T).

That is, in the opponent’s śāstra. cf. no. 37.

152 Cf. tha mi dad par K : gzan V (read gzan ma yin par?).

153 Cf. rgyu mtshan med par K : tha mi dad kyi rgyu mtshan V.

154 Cf. Jinendrabuddhi’s explanation at Ms B 202b6-203a1: yadi ghaṭādiṣu śabdaḥ samaḥ sa eva tarhi śabdaḥ śabdātvena tadvāṃs teṣaṃ sāmānyam bhaviṣyatī ti. āha: “nānimitta” (10c) ityādi. śabdō hi teṣām vācakatāyā sambandhi, tad eva tu sambandhitvam ekānimittam antaṇeṇa nopapādyate yasya naimittiko jātiśabda ity abhyupagamah, etena naimittikasya yasya śabdasya yatra nimmattāṃ nāṣtī na sa tatra prayogam arhati. tadyathā daṇḍisābdo daṇḍaraḥite puṃṣi. nāṣtī ca naimittasya jātiśabdasva ghaṭādiṣu nimmittām iti: “If the word is the same with regard to pot, and so on, then the word as such, which is a general property possessor due to [its] property of being a word, will be their general property. With this in mind he says “not without a cause of application, etc.” For the word is their relatum because of its denoting them. This very property of being a relatum, however, is not justified without a cause of application for someone whose assumption it is that a general
term has a cause of application. Therefore the word that has a cause of application is not capable of being applied to the thing in which there is no cause of application, just like [the application of] the expression 'possessing a staff' to a man who has no staff. And the general term that has a cause of application does not have a cause of application in the pot, etc."

155 Cf. de’i phyir de yaṅ spyi ru sbyar bar mi bya’o V : de’i phyir yaṅ ci(1) rigs pa ma yin no K.
(1)ci is a misspelling for spyi(r).

59† tataś ca. Qu. Ms B 203a1.

156 Cf. PST Ms B 203a1-2: yadi hi sacchabdāna sāmānyam ucyeta, tatas tadviśeṣānārthaṃ ghaṭa iti ucyeteti syāt sāmāṇādhihkaranyam. asati tu sāmānyābhidhāne kim kena viśisyate. tataś cābhhyupetāhānam: ‘For if the general property were to be denoted by the word 'existent', then one could say 'pot' for the sake of qualifying it. Thus there would be co-reference. But when there is no denotation of a general property, what then is qualified by what? And therefore the assumption is given up.’

60† atha punar ananyasmin dravye vartate sadguṇam,(1) sacchabdād ghaṭādīyāṅkāṅksāyām viśeṣānviśeṣabhāvāh syāt, nilatārādīvat. Restored, cf. PST Ms B 203a2-4: atha punar iti ... ananyasmin(2) dravye vartata iti ... sacchabdād ghaṭādīyāṅkāṅksāyām viśeṣānviśeṣabhāvāh syāt, nilatārādīvat.
(1) Cf. the reading sadguṇam of paraphrase at Ms B 203a3 below no. 159 indicating that syntactically the term belongs after vartate.
(2) em., cf. gzan ma yin pa’i rdzas la V : nānyasmin Ms, cf. rdzas gzan la ’jug pa ma yin pa T, corroborated by rdzas gzan la ’jug pa ma yin la K; cf. the reading ananyatra no. 159 below.

157 Cf. PST Ms B 203a3: saty api sāmānyaviśeṣabhāvī 'nyathā viśeṣānviśeṣayatvān samarthayate.

158 Cf. PST Ms B 203a3: ananyatra dravye vartti(1) sadguṇam ghaṭādīdravīyam. sadguṇa iti sattāgūna ity arthāth. sattāgūno ’sveti kṛtvā: “The [thing] possessing the general property existence viz. a substance like a pot residing in the same substance. The expression 'sadguna' means 'having the general property existence' on the ground that is has the general property existence.”
(1) em., cf. gzan ma yin pa’i rdzas la ’jug pa’i T : anyatra dravyavartī Ms

159 Cf. PST Ms B 203a4-7: yathā nilagunanānārthaṃ ananyatra nilatārādau dravye ’tadgūne ca na vartata iti, na tat sāmānyam. tathāpi nilam ity ukte nilāsabdād bhedaṅkāṅkṣā bhavati: yad etan nilam ity uktam, tat kim nilataram atha nilatamam iti. tato bhedaṅkāṅkṣārī viśeṣaih nilatāro nilatamo vetti. evam sann ity ukte sattāyā anekāṅhavṛttitvād ghaṭādīyāṅkāṅkṣā bhavati: yo ’yam sa sa kim ghaṭo ’tha paṭa iti. tatas taddhādaṅkāṅkṣāviśeṣayyānam: ghaṭās paṭa vetti: “For instance, the substance that possesses the quality blue does not reside in another substance that is bluer, and so on, and in one that does not possess this quality. Thus it is not a general property. Nevertheless, when it is said 'blue', the word 'blue' causes the
expectation of a complement: That thing called blue is it bluer or bluest? Therefore it is qualified by particular terms viz. 'bluer' or 'bluest'. In the same way, when one says 'existent' there is the expectation of a complement like 'pot' because existence resides in many referents: that existent thing is it a pot or cloth? Therefore we shall qualify them by means of the terms denoting them viz. 'pot' or 'cloth.' "

ŚVT 64.4-8: yad api bhikṣunā śāṅkitam: mā bhūt piṇḍāntareṇa viṣeṣaṇaviśeṣya-bhāvāḥ. tasminn eva piṇḍe sattādviśiṣte 'bhihite paratadgataviśeṣākāṅksāyām viṣeṣaṇādīvyavahāro bhaviṣyati san ghaṭāḥ iti. yathā niḷaśabdena niḷagune 'bhihite tadbhaviṣeṣāpekṣayā tarabādviśeṣānām bhavati niḷatara niḷatamaḥ iti: "the monk [viz. Dignāga] subjects the following argument to criticism: let there be no qualifier-qualified relation without a particular substance (piṇḍa). When the same (tasminn eva) particular substance that is qualified by the general property existence, and so on, has been denoted, qualifiers, and so on, will be used because of the expectation of complementation of further distinctions that pertain to it, such as 'a pot is existent.' In the same way, when the blue quality has been denoted by the word 'blue', a qualifier like 'tara' is used with regard to the differences that pertain to it, such as 'bluer,' 'bluest.'"

Annotations

[61] yady ekatrāṣītādivat. Qu. Ms B 203a7, ŚVT 64.9; NR 426.14.

160 Cf. PST Ms B 203a7-203b1: yady ekatrāṣādhāraṇarūpe jātimatī dravye sādhāraṇī sattā varīta iti, tatra sann ity ukte ghaṭādyākāṅksā bhavati. yathā niḷa ity ukte niḷatarādyākāṅksā. tataś ca viṣeṣaṇaviśeṣyabhāva īṣyate: "If existence that is common to many things resides in one general property possessing substance having a singular form, in that case there is the expectation of a complement like 'pot,' when it is said 'existent'. In the same way as the expectation of the complement 'bluer,' when it is said 'blue'; and therefore there is claimed to be a qualifier-qualified relation."

161 Cf. 'brel pa'i yon tan du 'gyur ro(1) V : om. K.
(1) Cf. the related expression 'brel pa' am yon tan la 'gyur te K 113,15-16; I assume that V is based upon a misreading of the original Sanskrit, which, I believe, constitutes an exact parallel to the above-mentioned quotation from K, and thus probably reproduces *sambandhe gune vā syāt; this suggestion fits in with the syntax, and, moreover, is supported by PSV on 11a1 and Ms B 203b2-3, q.v. below no. 163.

<etac ca nāsti>(1). Restored, cf. PST Ms B 203b1: tan naitad(2)apy asti.
(1) Cf. 'di yan yod min K : de līa la 'aṅ min V.
(2) em : na etad Ms

[63] niḷaśabdo hi(1) <niḷaṅguram dravyam abhidhatte. niḷatarādāv anyatrasati(2) tadvan na yuṣyate(3)> (4). Restored, cf. PṬS Ms B 203b1: niḷaśabdo hītyādi; Ms B 203b1-3, q.v. below no. 163.
(1) Cf. sōn po'i sgra ni V : sōn po'i sgra la (sic) ni K.
(2) Cf. śīn tu śīo ba la sogs pa rnam sā gčan (sic) med na K : śīn tu śīo ba la sogs pa med par gčan gyis V.
(3) Cf. de daṅ ldan par 'thad pa ma yin no V : de daṅ ldan pa rigs pa ma yin te K.
(4) For the suggested restoration, cf. no. 163 below.

162 It is quite impossible to construe this paragraph as it has been transmitted in KV, and Jinendrabuddhi’s paraphrase suggests that a crucial part of the original text is missing in both versions. I have inserted the missing part on the basis of the paraphrase, which no doubt reflects Dignāga’s original text fairly accurately, cf. PST Ms B 203b1-3: nīlaśabdo hi nīlagunam dravyam abhidhatte, tac cānayaṛa nīlātarādau (1) dravye na vartate. yac ca vartate nīlātvam tatsambandho vā sa śabdārtha eva na bhavati. “For the word ‘blue’ denotes a substance possessing the quality blue. And this [substance] does not reside in another substance that is bluer, etc. And that which resides in it viz. the quality blueness or its relation is not the referent of the word. Therefore also in this case [the statement] is the same viz. “it is, moreover, not considered to be without a cause of application” (PS V:10c).”

163 That is, at PSV V:10c.

164 Cf. sṇon po ŋid daṅ ldan pa(1) ’brel pa dag ni K : sṇon po ŋid daṅ ’brel(1) pa ni sgra’i don ma yin no V.


166 Cf. upetyāpi tu: NCV 636,10.

167 Cf. PST Ms B 203b3: yady api drṣṭānte siddhiḥ syāt tathāpi <satvataḥ?>tena sāmāṇyaṃ nāsti: “Even though it were assumed [to be the case], i.e., even if it were taken for granted with respect to the example, nevertheless there is no similarity between it with regard to the general property existence.”

168 Cf. PST Ms B 203b3-4: nāsyāṃ sajjātau ghaṭatvādijātir astiṣṭi ajāṭih: “Without general property means that there is no general property like potness in the general property existence.” NCV 636,11-12: jāter ajāṭītaḥ, nāsyāṃ jāter vidyata iti ajāṭīr iti vīgrahāti sāmāṇyāṇām asāmāṇyādhārātām darśayati: “Because a general property is without general properties”. In accordance with the analytical string ‘without general property’ = ‘a general property does not reside in it’ [viz. in
existence], he shows that general properties are not containers of general properties.” Cf. the well-known nyāya “niḥsāmānāni sāmānāni,” e.g., at TSP 728,13.

169 Cf. PST Ms B 203b4-6: sattāyāṁ ghaṭatvādayo na santi jātivīśeṣa yathā nilagunasya nilatārādayo viṣeṣāḥ, yatas tān viṣeṣāṁ upādāya dravye varteta. tadanupādāne ca tadvastusampramukhārpatam na ghaṭo na pataḥ. tasmān na sacchabaddā ghaṭādiviśeṣākāṅkṣā yuktā. nilagunaḥ ēva anekabhedaḥ. sa ekaṭrāpi dravye vartamānāḥ svabhādān upādāya yathābhīṣambhavaṃ vartata iti yuyjate. tadabhidhāyino nilāśabdān nilatārādāyākāṅkṣetīi darśayati: “That is, there are no particular general properties like potness in the general property existence in the same way as the quality blue has particulars such as bluer, and so on, so that it would reside in a substance together with these particular [general properties]. And in that it does not appropriate these the chief form of their referent is neither a pot nor cloth. Therefore it is not justified that one expects the complement of a particular like ‘pot’ from the word ‘existent’. For the quality blue is divided into many kinds. When it is resident in one substance it resides in it after having appropriated, according to circumstances, its own kinds. He illustrates the blue words that denote these [different kinds] by means of “expectation of the complement ‘bluer’, etc.” A related explanation is found at ŚVT 64,10-13: yuktām nile tatra nīlo gunāḥ prakaraṇāprakaraṇādīkṣetīnaṃ tarabādhibhī vidiṣyate. sattājātis tu ghaṭādiśiṁyānā śvāmaviśiṣṭānām pavārthāṃ pratipādayanti naiva ghaṭatvādānākāṅkṣātiiti na tatra viśeṣānābhīṣηdānānām bhavatī.


[66] yatas tān viṣeṣāṁ upādāya dravye <vṛttau ghaṭādiviśeṣākāṅkṣā syāt>. Restored, cf. PST Ms B 203b4-5: sattāyāṁ ghaṭatvādayo na santi jātivīśeṣa ... yatas tān viṣeṣāṁ upādāya dravye varteta. (1) Cf. NCV 636,15 levels Dignāga’s apoha theory with a similar argument: yato ’satsatvato vastunāḥ aghāṭābhāvaghaṭatvādān upādāya pravartetātātātātātāt. (1) Cf. gaṅ las khyad par de ŋe bar blaṅs nas rdzas la ’jug pa na K.

170 I assume that the reading bum pa ŋid la sos pa’i khyad par ’doṇ pe yan no V, is preferable to bum pa la sos pa’i khyad par la ’jug par dogs par ’gyur pe K, provided that bum pa ŋid is corrected to read bum pa. The technical term ākāṅkṣā is never used in PS V in connection with the residence of general properties in their loci, but always in the context of expecting the introduction of a complement to another term. In fact, Ms uses the term ghaṭādiviśeṣākāṅkṣā (cf. no. 167) in this particular context, which corroborates the readings of V.

[67] evam tarhi <ucyate> yady apee aśābhāvācayā, tathāpi ghaṭādiśv arthākṣipteṣu bhedākāṅkṣā bhaviṣyatī, tadvān ēva artho ’vaśyaṁ ghaṭatvādīnām kenacit śāmān-yānēnubaddha <iti>. Restored, cf. PST Ms B 203b7-204a2: evam tarhiṭī ... yady apee ghaṭatvādīayaḥ sacchabaddavācyā na bhavanti tathāpi satāvatārthena ghaṭādiśv ākṣipteṣu bhedākāṅkṣā bhaviṣyatī, ... tadvān ŋya artho ’vaśyaṁ ityādi ... ghaṭatvādīnām kenacit śāmān-yānēnubaddhaḥ; cf. ŚVT 64,20-21 ad ŚV Apoha’s 132: aśābhāvācyār eva ghaṭādibhīṣ sajjiṭākṣiptaḥ (read sajjiṭāsabdāḥ?) viśeṣānādivavahāro bhaviṣyatī: “On account of ‘pot’, and so on, being implied by
the general term ‘existent’ without at all being expressly denotable by it, a qualifier, and so on, is going to be used.”

171 Cf. PST Ms B 203b6-204a1: śabdo hi paratantra guṇāpeksapraṇārthitvāt tadāṅkṣepāsamarthahaḥ. <arthas> tu prayojanatvāḥ(1) pradhānaḥ, tena jātīmān artha eva sarvabhedān ākṣipya varate tataḥ ca yady api ghaṭatvādayaḥ saccabdaivaśya na bhavanī tathāpi sattātārthena ghaṭādviṣu ākṣiptesu bhedākāṅkṣā bhaviṣyatī, tato nāstī viśeṣanaviśeṣyatābāhāvah: “For the word is dependent (paratantra), and because it applies in dependence upon a property it is not capable of implying these. The referent, however, is primary because of being the purpose [of the word]. Therefore the very referent that is the general property possessor occurs by implying all the particulars. And therefore, although potness, and so on, are not denotable by the word ‘existent’, there will, nevertheless, be the expectation of a particular in that ‘pot’, and so on, are implied by the referent possessing the general property existence. Therefore it is not the case that there is no qualifier-qualified relationship.”

(1) <arthas> tu prayojanatvāḥ conj.: avastu prayojanatvāt Ms, cf. T don ni dgos (so read with CD, ed. dogs so) pa ṇīd kyi phyir gtso bo ‘o.

172 Cf. de (red P 73a1) dañ ldan pa’i don V : yod pa dañ ldan pa’i don K (= sattāvān). Cf. Ms B 204a2: jātīmān arthaḥ śabdenopaḍiyate. sa ca niyogataḥ eva ghaṭatvādīnāṃ kenacit sāmānyanānubaddhaḥ. tataḥ ca tatsāmānyabhedākṣepa ghaṭādibhedākṣepa iti.

173 Cf. bum pa ṇīd(1) la sogs pa’i V : bum pa ṇīd la sogs pa K.

(1)ṅīd em. : om. V.

174 Cf. PST Ms B 204a2: jātīmān arthaḥ śabdenopaḍiyate. sa ca niyogataḥ eva ghaṭatvādīnāṃ kenacit sāmānyanānubaddhaḥ. tataḥ ca tatsāmānyabhedākṣepa ghaṭādibhedākṣepa iti: “The referent that is the possessor of the general property is assumed by the word, and this [referent] is by necessity connected to some general property from among potness, etc. And therefore it implies a particular like a pot in that it implies a particular general property.”

[68] arthākṣepa ’py anekāntah. Qu Ms B 204a3, cf. NCV 637,6: naitad asti, arthākṣepa ’py anekāntah. NR 426,26 arthākṣepa ’py anikāntah. ŚVT 64,24: arthākṣepo ’py anikāntah, cf. ŚV Apoha8 133ab: arthākṣepo ’pi nāsy eva.

175 This statement introduces the rebuttal of the preceding argument, cf. PST Ms B 204a2-3: imāṃ api kalpaṇāṃ nirūkaryann āha.

[69] arthākṣepo hi. Qu. Ms B 204a3.

176 Cf. gañ la don gyi śugs kyis V : don gañ la K. Since the traditional understanding of arthāpatti is that it is something that obtains according to the state of the case (cf., e.g., NBh 573,3: arthād āpattir arthāpatti), it is reasonable to assume that V has recorded a word that is missing in K.
[70] tadyathā divā na bhunkta iti rātribhojane(1) <niścayah>. Restored, cf. PST Mś B 204a3-4: tadyathā divā na bhunkta iti ... tadyathā divā na bhunkta ity atra rātribhojane.

(1) Cf. nub mo za bar V : mtshan mo K.

177 This example belongs to the category of śrutārthāpatti, i.e., implication of an oral statement, cf. ŠBh 32,6: arthāpattir api drṣṭah śruto vā 'ṛtho 'nyathā nopapadyata ity arthakalpanā; cf. the discussion at ŠV Arthāpatti95 in the context of the criticism of Dignāga’s attempt to include arthāpatti in anumāna: pīno divā na bhunkte cety evamādivacah śrutrau rātribhojanavijñānāṃ śrutārthāpatti ucyate: “When hearing a statement like 'NN' is fat, and yet he does not eat during the day time’, the knowledge that he is eating at night is what is called implication of an oral statement.”

[71] iha punaḥ sad ity ukte na ghatādiṣu niścayāḥ. <iti(1) samśaye sati> näṣty <arthi>ākṣepah(2). Restored, cf. PST Mś B 204a3-5: iha punar ityādi ... näṣty ākṣepa iti pramāṇapahālam ... na ca sad ity ukte ghatādiṣu niścayāḥ. kiṃ tarhi samśaya iti(1).

(1) V seems to presuppose a reading like ... niścaya iti samśaye sati, cf. ma nes pa’i phyir the tshom za ba yin pas V : ma nes pa’i phyir (sic) K. In the present context samśayāḥ that is missing in K would correspond to anekāntah of PS V:11c. The reading kiṃ tarhi of Jinendrabuddhi’s paraphrase is not corroborated by the readings of KV which usually render this adverbial complement as 'on kyaṃ. It is therefore reasonable to conclude that kiṃ tarhi was not part of the original Sanskrit text.

(2) em., cf. don gyes phaṇs pa (= arthākṣepah) KV : ākṣepah (cf. ‘phaṇs pa T) Ms

178 Cf. gāṇ gi phyir K : de’i phyir V. gāṇ gi phyir = yasmāt correlates with tena of PS V:11d; the readings of K suggest the following restoration: yasmāt sa jātiśabdo na katham api bhedasāmānyasambandhajātimadvacako yuyyate, cf. no.s 181-82 below.

179 The reading ji ṭtar yaṇ ... rigs pa ma yin no K would translate Sanskrit na katham api ... yuyyate. V is entirely confused. In addition to misconstruing the dvanda compound khyad par daṇ spīy daṇ daṅ ‘brel pa daṅ rigs daṅ ldan pa K for which V reads tha dad ‘brel pa’i spīy (NP ci) rigs daṅ ldan pa, the translators misunderstood the expression na katham api, construing katham as acc. of katha in dependence on the verb. Thus the adverbial complement katham api is reproduced as the noun phrase lan ‘ga’ yaṇ.

180 Cf. NCV 609,19f: tatha ca jātisambandhajātimadabhidhānāṃ asambhavād ‘anyāpohakṛc chruṭiḥ’.


181 Simhasūri regards the śloka pāda PS V:11d as anyāpohalaksanavākyam, cf. NCV 611,20 and explains it ibid. line 21ff: tasya vyākhyā: sabdāntarārthāpohāṃ hi
The first line of the explanation is the beginning of a well-known prose fragment defining *apoha*, which evidently belongs in a similar context. The same fragment is also addressed by Mallavādi, cf. NCV 612,5ff, just as Uddyotakara in his critique of Dignāga's *apoha* theory quotes the sūla pāda followed by the first line of its explanation as the conclusion of the *pūrvapakṣa*, cf. NV 324,20f. The prose fragment, which was known to all contemporary scholars, stems in all likelihood from Dignāga's sources of this fragment, which I quote here in extenso, cf. NCV loc.cit., and *Pīnd* 1999: 318-19: *āthya ca jātisambandhajātimadabhidhānānām asambhavā "tenānya- pohakr chrutih, " śabdāntarārthāpoham* (1) *hi svārthe kurvatī śrutir abhidhātta ity ucayate; hiśabdo yasmadartho. yasmād vrkṣāsabdo 'vrkṣantyṛtīm* (2) svārthe kurvan svārtham vrkṣalaksanām pratyāyayaiti ucayate, evaṃ nivṛttivivistam vastu śabdārthaḥ, 'dravyādī san', na nivruttimatram, alaksanāya eva ca syān nivruttimatram, avastutvā, kharavīsānakunthiḥkṣatādīvaryānāvatā: "And since the denotations of the general property, of the relation, and of the general property possessor are impossible, the word excludes other [referents]. For (hi) it is claimed that the word 'denotes' in that it excludes the referents of other words for the sake of its own referent. The word hi is used in the sense of 'because'; Because it is claimed that the word 'tree' while precluding the word 'non-tree' (2) for the sake of its own referent indicates its own referent as having the character of a tree. Thus the word’s referent is a thing (*vastu*) as qualified by preclusion, [i.e.] an existent thing like a substance, but not mere preclusion; for (ca) mere preclusion would indeed be indefinable because it is an unreal thing, like [the unreal referents of] descriptions like bluntness or sharpness of hare’s horns."

For the referent as an entity (*vastu*) qualified by the non-existence or exclusion of other things from its locus, cf. PSV V:34-36.

(1) Cf. the reading at NCV 640,7: śabdāntarārthāpoham svārthe kurvatī, which in all likelihood imitates Dignāga’s original formulation; The definition was well-known, cf. e.g. TS 1015 and TSP 394,8ff.

(2) According to the *apoha* thesis words exclude other words as well as referents of other words. Exclusion defines the general property in words and referents. Cf. e.g. Translation of PSV V:33ab.


(1) Cf. gaṇ ṣΙν pa K : om. V.
(2) Cf. snar brjod pa ltar V : om. K.
(3) Cf. de ŋīd K : om. V.

[182] This paragraph marks the end of the first section of PSV V. Dignāga concludes that the validity of his own thesis is established because there is no other theoretically justifiable solution to the problem of the denotation of words. The two verses that follow PS V:11 introduce topics that are unrelated to those introduced in the previous paragraphs, cf. no. 194 below. Uddyotakara closes his exposition of Dignāga's view in a similar way at NV 324,20-21: *anyatra pratyayābhāvapra- sanāc ca, na ca anyā gatir asti, tasmād anyāpohakr chrutir iti: “And because it follows [absurdly] that there is no cognition otherwise, and there is no other way, the word excludes other [referents].” As it appears from Jinendrabuddhi’s remarks
on this page, other Indian scholars did not fail to notice that Dignāga seems to corroborate the validity of the *apoha* theory merely by debunking the opponents’ theories without corroborating in detail its epistemological framework, cf. PST Ms B 204b6-205a2: 'yathokta-jātyāya-abhidhāna-pratisedhānapasamāhāna svavay eva sthirakarotani, nanu ca “parapaksapraṭisaṣṭhena svapakṣasiddhir alabhya” (1) yathok-tam āvīṣapraṭisaṣṭhā. naiva dosah, pūrvam evaṭa “kṛtakatvādavat svārtham anyāpohena bhiṣata” (PS V:1cd) iti pratipāditaṁ śabdasyānumāṇād abhimantavam. tatra kevalaṁ pramāṇāntararavādibhir vidhimukhena jātyādaya ucyante ity uktam. taśmin pratiṣhiddhe sa evārtho vyavatīṣhate. vakṣyamānām ca svapakṣasādhanāṁ hṛdi kṛtvaivam uktam: “He corroborates his own theory by means of summarizing debunking [the views] that the word denotes the general property, etc. But is it not so that “establishing one’s own thesis by means of debunking the opponent’s thesis is inadmissible” as it has been formulated in the [chapter on the] rejection of the āvīta inference? There is no fault at all. The fact that verbal cognition is not different from inference has previously been explained in the [statement]: “It [i.e., a word] denotes its own referent through exclusion of other referents in the same way as ‘the word’ (verbal cognition) is a separate means of cognition that general properties, and so on, are denoted in an affirmative form. In that this has been debunked only this referent is settled. And he has formulated it in this way while keeping in mind the proof of his own thesis that is going to be explained.”

After this comment Jinendrabuddhi inserts an excursus on the *apoha* doctrine. It reflects Dharmakīrti’s *apoha* theory and includes many quotations from Dharmakīrti’s Pramāṇavārtikasavavytti. For the Sanskrit text of the excursus, see Appendix 2.

(1) Jinendrabuddhi appears to quote a passage from PSV III where Dignāga debunks the Sāṃkhya opponents view of indirect proof (āvīta) as that of the action of establishing one’s own thesis through negation of the thesis of the opponent, cf. Ms B 122a5: parapaksapraṭisaṣṭhena svapakṣasthāpanakriyā āvītaḥ.

(1) de śidd = tad eva, cf. the phrase sa evārtho vyavatīṣhate at Ms B 205a1, which probably imitates the original Dignāgan formulation.

(74) āha ca: bahudhāpy abhidheyaśa na śabdāt sarvābhāt gatiḥ svasambandhānurūpyāḥ (1) tu vyavacchedārthākkārya (2) asau. restored, cf. PST Ms B 208a1 āha ceti = NCV 653,15; verse qu. SVT 46,7-8, cf. PST Ms B 208a2-3: bahudheti ... abhidheyaṣyati ... svasambandhānurūpyād ityādi; NCV 653,15-16: bahudhāpyabhidheyaṣyati ... svasambandhānurūpyāt tv iti. āha ca would indicate that Dignāga quotes from another work, possibly the Sāmānyaparikṣāvyāsa.

(1) anurūpeṇa ŚVT.

(2) don la rnam bcod byed K : don rnam gcod nang gi 'bras bu yin V, for which, cf. vyavacchedaphalam vākyam, PV IV 192a.

(184) According to Jinendrabuddhi this verse settles that only exclusion of other (referents) is the word’s referent by showing that it constitutes a part of the referent to be indicated, cf Ms B 208a1-2: āha cety arthasya pratyāyasyāṅgah (1) saṃdarśanenāpyāpoham eva śabdārtham samarthyate.

(1) pratyāyasyāṅga (2)conj. (cf. rtogs par bya ba'i cha T) : pratyāyasyaṁgi (2) Ms
Cf. PST Ms B 208a2-3: śimśapādibhedena puṣphitaphalātibhedena ca bahuprakārāvate 'pi arthah. abhidheasyeti vrksāder arthasya. tasyaivaṃ aneka- prakārāvate 'pi sābdat sarvaprakārenā pratitir nāsti: “The meaning is as follows: even though it has many modes because of particulars like śimśapā and particulars such as having flowers and fruits. The denotable object means a referent like a tree. Thus, although it has many modes, there is no cognition of it from the word in all its modes.” Simhasūri explains 12a with the theoretical background of PSV V:34 (q.v.), cf. NCV 653,15ff: bahudhāpy abhidheasyeti śimśapādibhedā atrabhīpṛetā na dravyādayaḥ; tathā hi vrksavad bhedeṣu sansāyo drṣṭo 'rthatas tu dravyādiṣu niṣcayayā: “In the present context a particular like śimśapā is intended, not [particulars] like substance. That is, there is observed to be doubt about the particulars in the same way as there is doubt about [the particulars of] tree, whereas, by implication, there is certainty about substance, etc.”

This verse has a close parallel at PS II:13: <anekadharmabādibhi sarvathā gatiḥ>, anubaddhasya vicchedaṃ tasyānyato gamayati. (1)

K (Kitagawa 1973 462b2-5 = P 112b 7-8): don gyi chos rnams du ma ni thams cad rtags las rtogs ma yin no. gaṅ ḥi rjes 'brel gzan la ni ldog pa rtogs par byed pa yin no.

V (Kitagawa 1973 462a3-6 = P 31b 3): chos don du ma gtan tshigs kyis rnam pa thams cad du rtogs min no. gaṅ ñaṅ 'brel pa yoṅs bcad nas chos gzan daṅ bral thob par byed;

“The indicator does not indicate in toto the referent with its many properties. It indicates, however, the exclusion from other [properties], of that [property] that is concomitant with it.”

(1)For the restored pādas ab, cf. PSV V:12b and the parallel formulation at PS I:5ab: dharmino ’nekarūpasya nendriyāt sarvathā gatiḥ, on which, v. Hattori 1968: 27, 91 no. I.43; pādas cd are restored on the basis of pratika and paraphrase at Ms B 70a4: anubaddhasya vicchedam itī ... tasyānyato vivakṣād vicchedam vyāvṛtti gamayati; PS II:13 also occurs in NM as verse 17, cf. T 1628 3c10-1113, T 1629 8a4-5; Frauwallner 1982: 778.

The technical term svasambandha denotes the invariable connection between any given word or indicator and the thing it denotes or indicates. Such connection is, according to Dignāgan epistemology, based upon the word’s or indicator’s application to, or presence at some similar instances of the referent and indicated, respectively, and their absolute non-application to or absence from all instances of the absence of the referent and indicated, respectively. Dignāga’s concept of svasambandha is thus a function of the epistemological considerations underlying the second and third member of the trilaksana hetu. This is evident from his use of the expression svasambandhānūrūpyāt at PSV II:13:

K (Kitagawa 1973 462b6-14 = P 112b7-113a2): me’i ’bar ba daṅ rno ba’i khyad par ci lta ba de rnams ni du ma las rtogs pa ma yin te ’khrul ba’i phyir ro. gaṅ yan ’brel ba ni gaṅ med par me med pa’ rdzas ma yin dan yon tan ņid la sosgs pa’i rdzas de dag rdzas ma yin la sosgs pa las ldog pa ņid rtogs pa yin te, dper na me’i me ma yin pa las ldog pa tsam raṅ daṅ ’brel ba’i rjes su mthun pa rtogs de bţin du ’di yin te, thams cad du me med pa la ma mthoṅ ba’i gzan la yaṅ mthoṅ ba yin no.
V (Kitagawa 1973 462a7-15 = P 31b3-5): dper na me la ’bar ba dañ rno ba la sogs pa du ma yod kyan dwu pas bye brag de go bar mi byed de ’khrul ba ’i phyir ro. gañ dañ rjes su ’brel pa de las gzan pa ni ma yin te, rdzas nïd dan yon tan nïd la sogs pa de dag gis rdzas ma yin pa la sogs pa las log pa tsam ’ba’ zip thob par byed pa ste, dper na mes me yin pa las log pa ’i rañ dañ ’brel pa tsam thob par byed pa de bzin du ’di yân me ma yin pa thams cad la mthon ba nïd gzan la ni mthon ba yin no:

“Smoke does not indicate the many particular features that are found in fire such as its flames, temperature, and so on, even though they exist in it because of ambiguity (*vyabhicārāti). It indicates, however, the mere exclusion of those (particular properties) that are concomitant [with fire] (ye tv anubaddhā), without which fire does not exist (yān antarenāgnir na bhavati), such as substanceness, qualityness, and so on, from non-substanceness, and so on, in the same way as it merely [indicates] fire’s preclusion of non-fires (yathāgner anagnivyrttimātram) in accordance with its own connection (svasambhandhānurūpyāt), namely, that ‘it is not observed at all non-fires, and observed elsewhere” (tathā hy asau sarvatrānagnau na drṣṭaḥ, anyatrāpi ca drṣṭaḥ).(1)"

Jinendrabuddhi explains at Ms B 70b1-3 that Dignāga’s concluding statement emphasizes the predominance (prādhānya) of vyatireka over anvaya for ascertaining the relation (sambandha). Joint absence (vyatireka) presupposes non-observation of the probandum at all of the vipakṣa, whereas anvaya only has a subsidiary role (aprādhānyam): sarvatrānagnau na drṣṭa ity anena vyatirekasya prādhānyam vipakṣe sarvatrādarsaṇena khyāpayati, anyatrāpi ca drṣṭa iti. apiśabdena kvac na drṣṭo ‘pītī dyotayann anvayasyāprādhānyam. After these introductory remarks Jinendrabuddhi continues: tad evam: yasnād anvayopasarjano vyatirekapradhānau sambhandhah, sa ca sāmānyenaiva sambhavati, na viśeṣena, tasmāt tadānurūpyād vyatirekamukhenāgnir evaṭrānagnir na bhavatity anagnivṛttimātram pratipādayati, na viśesam: “It is as follows: since the relation has joint presence as its subsidiary feature and joint absence as its chief feature, and this [namely the relation] only is possible in a general form, not in a particular form, [smoke] indicates, in conformity with this, by means of joint absence, the mere preclusion of non-fire, at the thought: “only fire is here, not non-fire,” but [it does] not [indicate] a particular.”

These remarks merely expound what Dignāga states at PSV V:34 (q.v. below with no.s 421, 423, and 425), namely that it is only possible to ground the invariable connection on joint absence (vyatireka) of word and referent based upon non-observation of its application to dissimilar instances, which is generalized to apply to all dissimilar instances as opposed to joint presence (anvaya) which is based upon observation of its application to some similar instances. Thus anvaya and vyatireka are not equipollent, which is essential for understanding Dignāga’s apoha doctrine.

Jinendrabuddhi and Simhasūri explains the term svasambhandhānurūpyād at PS V:12 accordingly:

1. PST Ms B 208a3-4: svasambhandhānurūpyād ityādi. svasambhandho ’vinābhāvitvam anvayavyatirekalakaśanam tac ca tasya sāmānyāpekṣayā, na viśeṣāpekṣayā. ato yādṛśo ’syā sambhandhāḥ, gamakatvam api tādṛśam eva yuktam. etad uktam bhavati: sāmānyāpekṣayāsyā sambhandhaḥ. sāmānyaṁ ca vyavaccherūpam
The term svasambandha also occurs in a related passage at PSV III:45:

K (Kitagawa 1973 508b11-13 = P 136a4): rañ dan ’brel pa med par gzan du rtags can rtogs par nus pa ma yin pa’i phyir ro ||.

V (Kitagawa 1973 508b12-14 = P 53a2): gtan tshigs la ni rañ dan ’brel pa bor nas gzan du rtags can gyi šes pa bskyed pa’i nus pa yañ yod pa ma yin no ||:

“For without its own connection the indicator is incapable of indicating the indicated elsewhere (*anyatra).”

(1) Sanskrit fragments inserted on the basis of pratikas quoted at Ms B 70a5-7: yāna antareṅgir na bhavatī. ... ye tv anubaddhā iti ... yathāgner anagnīnīrtytī mātram iti; 70b1-2: svasambāndhānurūpyād ityādi ... tathā hy asāv iti ... sarvātrā-nagnau na drṣṭa iti.

(2) em.: kāro Ms

[75] anekadharmā śabdo ’pi yenaṁtham nātiṃvartate, pratyāyayati tenaiva, na śabdaguṇatādibhiḥ. Restored, cf. PST Ms B 208a5-6: anekadharmā śabdo ’pīyādi ... yenaṁtham nātiṃvartata iti ... pratyāyayati tenaiveti ... na śabdaguṇatādibhir iti; cf. NCV 653:18: anekadharmā śabdo ’pi.

[188] Cf. NCV 653,18ff.: sāmānyadharmaḥ khagunatvādibhir vrksārtham tasmin vastunī nabhīdhante, tathā hi te vināpy vrksārthena rasaḍīṣu drṣṭāḥ, na tu vrksaśabdo ’nyatra drṣṭāḥ, tasmād vrksaśaśabdenāiva pratyāyaṃ upapannam: “It does not, for the sake of this object, denote the referent tree by means of general properties like being an attribute of space, etc. For they are, for instance, observed at taste, and so on, even in the absence of the referent tree. The word ‘tree’, however, is not observed to apply to other things (anyatra). Therefore it is justified that only the word ‘tree’ indicates.” Ms B 208a4-5: atha śabdasya ko ’mā gamakā ity āha. anekadharmā śabdo pīyādi. svasāmānyadharmā anekadharmā; cf. the phrase at VP II:253: śabdasya anekadharmānaḥ.”
Like Bharṭhrāri Dignāga uses *ativartate* as a synonym of *vyabhicarati*; cf. VP III.3:51: *etāṃ sattāṃ padārtho hi na kaścid ativartate. sā ca sampratisattayāḥ prthag bhāṣye nirūḍhitā, alluding to Mahā-bh Vol. II 391,7 (ad A V 2:94): *na sattāṃ padārtho vyabhicarati*; cf. the use of *ativartate* at PS II:17, q.v. no. 193.

The property to which Dignāga alludes is the general property of the word, e.g., treewordness, which is defined by exclusion of other words, in the same way as the referent of the word. Dignāga addresses this aspect of the general *apoha* theory at PS V:22c § 35, 33ab § 47, q.q.v; Cf. PST Ms B 208a5-6: *sāmānyadharmaṇa vrkṣaśabdavādāṇā yena na vyabhicarati pratvayāyati tenaiveti. sa evāṣya dharma gamaka ity arthah. evaśabdena yad vyavachinchām tad dārsayati: “The meaning is this: It only indicates by means of that (property) due to which it does not deviate viz. the general property treewordness, etc. Only that property of it indicates. The word ‘only’ indicates that which is excluded.” As will become clear later in the chapter, the general property of the word, namely exclusion of other words, is intrinsic to the word (*sābde*) in the same way as it is intrinsic to the referent (*arthet*). Consequently exclusion is an inherent property of words or referents. Cf. the crucial statements of PSV V 22cd above and 33ab below.

Cf. PST Ms B 208a: *ādiśabdenā sābdajñeyatvādāṇām grahanam. apratyaṇyakatvaṃ punas teṣām vyabhicārīdvāt. tathā hi te vināpī vrkṣārthena rasādiṣu drṣṭāḥ, na vrkṣaśabdavādikāṃ sāmānyam: “By the expression ‘etc.’ is included the word’s being knowable, etc. These, however, do not indicate because they are ambiguous. That is, even without the referent tree these are also observed to denote taste, and so on, but the general property treewordness is not” (cf. the similar explanation at NCV 653,18ff, q.v. no. 189 above).

Dignāga’s statement is similar to the view which Bharṭhrāri propounds at VPV I 53.2-3: *yathā hi ghate dravyatvapṛthvīvṛtvaḥatvādāṇām aviruddhāḥ samavāyāḥ, tathā vrkṣaśabde ‘pi guṇavasābdatvavṛkṣaśabdavādāṇām ṣāṃkṣipteṣeṣāṃ nam aviruddhāḥ samavāyāh: “Just as the inherence in a pot of general properties such as substanteness, earthness, potness, and so on, not in conflict, so also the inherence in the word ‘tree’ of such particular universals as qualityness, wordness, treewordness, and so on, is not in conflict.”*

Dignāga’s point is that the word’s being a quality (*guṇatāḥ*) of ether (cf. VS II 1:5; PBh § 61) is irrelevant to its semantic properties. This is also emphasised by Bharṭhrāri’s commentator Vṛṣabhadeva at VPT 52.23: *guṇatvāṃ tv anabhidhāyakam pratītīm eva rūpādīṣv api samavāyāt: “But qualityness is understood not to denote because it also inheres in colour, etc.”

PS V:13 has a close parallel at PS II:17: *tathānāṃ yena rūpeṇa liṅgīnāṃ nātiṃ vartate| tenaivāṇekadharmāpi | āgamayati netaraś tuḥs(a).*

K (Kitagawa 1973 465b1-8 = P 113b3) de litar yan lag gan no bos rtags can las ni mi ’da’ ba de niid kyi chos du ma yan rtogs par byed kyi gzan gyi min (PS II:17) ||

du ba yan du ba niid dañ skya ba niid la sogs pa’i cha nas gan gis me la mi ’khrul ba de niid niid kyi rtogs par byed pa yin gyis rdzas niid la sogs pa ni ma yin te ’khrul ba’i phyir ro (PSV II:17).

V (Kitagawa 1973 465a1-8 = P 32a6): cha šas ’di lta bu’i tshul nas | rtags can la ni mi ’gyur žin ||de niid kyi chos du ma na ’an | cig šos thob par byed pa yin (PS

189 190 191
NCV 674,23ff is considerably more explicit than Jinendrabuddhi as to the implications of PS II:17: liṅgam anāgam dhūmakrtakatvādi liṅginam agnyanitva-

tvādiviśiṣṭam deśasābādādim artham nātikramya vārtate yena rūpeṇa. kena ca nāti-
vartate? “dhūma ity adhūma na bhavati, kṛtaka ity akṛtaka na bhavati” ity adhūmā-
krtakarnivṛtytāmanā nātikrāmati, tenaiva ca rūpeṇānyaya vyāvṛttyātmakeṇa gama-
yati, sattvadraṇyādekaṇḍaharmāpi sans tais tu vyābhīcārān na gamayati sattvādi-
sāmānyāyadharmair iti. eṣa tāvad gamakanyamah:

“In which form the anāgam, i.e., the indicator (liṅgam) namely smoke or being produced does not occur by transgressing the indicated (liṅginam) that is qualified by fire or impermanence, etc. namely the referent (artham) which is place or sound (deśasābādādim) and so on. And in which [form] does it not transgress? It does not transgress having the nature of preclusion of non-smoke and not being produced (adhūmākṛtakarnivṛtyāmanā) like [the statements] “it is smoke (dhūma) thus (iti) it is not non-smoke (adhūma),” “it is a product (kṛtaka) thus (iti) it is not a non-
product (akṛtaka).” And it only indicates in that very form whose nature is exclusion from other [things]. Even though it [viz. the indicator] has many properties such as existence or substanceness it does not, however, indicate by means of these, that is, general properties like existence because of ambiguity. This is the restriction with regard to the indicator.”

(1) pādas abc are quoted in the original Sanskrit at NCV 674,23ff (yat tvayoktam), cf. PST Ms B 72a5-6: tathetyādinā ... nātvartata iti na vyabhicarāty arthāḥ. PS
II:17 also occurs in NM as verse 18, cf. T 1628 3c12-13, T 1629 8a6-7; Frauwalnner 1982: 778.

(2) That is, general and particular properties, cf. PST Ms B 72a6: sāmānyavīśeṣa-
dharmāḥ.

(3) Sanskrit equivalents inserted according to Ms B 72a6, 72b1.

The reading žes bya ba bsdu ba’i tshigs su bcad pa ’o V 116,3 indicating that PS V 12-13 are saṇghraḥaślokas is dubious because these verses introduce topics that have not been dealt with in any of the preceding paragraphs. The purpose of a

saṇghraḥaśloka is to summarize the discussion of topics that have been addressed previously, and this is, to the best of my knowledge, how they are used by Dignāga in other sections of PSV. The introduction of the term in V therefore contradicts its use in PSV in general, and thus corroborates its omission in K, which I have decided to follow. In addition, Mallavādi quotes the verses immediately after citing PSV
V:34-35 §§ 47-48 (cf. NCV 652-53), and Simhasūri merely restricts himself to explaining that Dignāga indicates the purpose of the preceding exposition in two ślokas (cf. NCV 653,15: āha cety etam artham ślokadvaṣyena dasaṃvaḥ), thus connecting them to PSV V:34-35, without even hinting at their being saṇghraḥa-
ślokas. The introductory āha ca seems to indicate that Dignāga quotes them from another treatise (presumably the Śāmānyapariśāvyāsa) to corroborate his conclusion at PS V:11d because, as indicated above, they presuppose some of the fundamental theoretical issues of the apoha theory, which he will address at PSV V:34f.

[76] yady anyāpohamātram <śabdārthaḥ>, katham <niłotpaladīśabdānāṁ>(1) sāmāṇādhikaranyaṃ syād višeṣānāvīśeṣyabhāvaḥ ca, katham ca na syāt? yasmād bhinnam <apohyaṃ sāmāṇāvīśeṣaśabdānāṁ>. Restored, cf. PST Ms B 208a7: yady anyāpohamātram ityādī; 208b1: katham iti ... katham ca na syāt.

(1)sgra ēams la ḵ : sgra la V.

194 Cf. PST Ms B 208b1-2: apohyabhedena sāhacaryād arthabhedam darśayati, eṣa hetuḥ: ye bhinnārthā na te samāṇādhikaranā nāpi višeṣānāvīśeṣyabhūtāḥ, ghataapaṭādiśabdavat. tathā ca niłotpalādāyāḥ śabdāḥ: “He shows that difference of referent is due to its concomitance with difference of excluded referent. The reason is as follows: [Words] whose referents are different are neither co-referential nor referent is due to its concomitance with difference of excluded referent. The reason is as follows: [Words] whose referents are different are neither co-referential nor related as qualifier and qualified, like words such as ‘pot’ or ‘cloth’. And expressions like ‘blue lotus’ are the same.”

Uddyotakara’s criticism of Dignāga’s view at NV 334,6-12 sheds more light on the assumptions that may have motivated the opponent’s criticism: niłotpalasābdayoh ca pradhānattvād višeṣānāvīśeṣyabhāvaḥānapapattāv višeṣānāsaya pūrvanipāta ity ubhayoh pradhānattvād na pṛāpṭiḥ. ... samāṇādhikaraṇāriṣaḥ ca anyāpohavādīnā vācyah, yasya ca anyāpohah śabdārthas tena anilānupalavyudāsaḥ katham samāṇādhikaranau iti vaktavyah: “And in that the qualifier-qualified relation of the words ‘blue’ and ‘lotus’ is not justified because they are [both] primary, it does not follow that the qualifier is placed first in the compound(1) because both are primary ... And the upholder of the theory of exclusion should explain what co-referential means. For one who claims that the referent of a word is exclusion of other [referents] should explain how the two exclusions of non-blue and non-lotus are co-referential.” And Uddyotakara continues explaining that it only makes sense to talk about co-reference on the assumption that the two words denote a substance as qualified by a general property and a quality because a general property and a quality are resident in it, whereas this is not the case with the two exclusions of non-blue and non-lotus. Consequently there is no referent with regard to which the two exclusions are co-referential, cf. op. cit. 334,10-12: yasya punar vidhiyaṁmaṇaḥ śabdārthas tasya jātaṇuvāśiṣṭam niłotpalasābdayāḥ dravyam abhidhāyate jātigunau ca dravye vartete na punar anilānupalavyudāsaḥ, tasmāt samāṇādhikaranaṁ nārtho nāsti. It is thus clear that Uddyotakara assumes that Dignāga considers the relation between niła and upala to be symmetrical, both terms being primary, cf. vāṛṭ 1 ad A II 1:57 according to which each term is qualified as well as qualified (on this view, v. below no. 203). Thus the distinction between primary and secondary terms in a compound is obliterated, and thus pūrvanipāta of the qualifier does not entail(2). A similar view is expressed by Kumārila, who objects that the qualifier-qualified relation is impossible because the exclusion of non-lotus is not implicit in the negation of non-blue and vice versa, and because the two words that function as qualifier and qualified are without denotable object. Moreover, co-reference is impossible because of the difference of the exclusions, and co-reference presupposes identity of the referent to which the two terms refer. If it is claimed that there is co-reference it is necessary to answer the question of the nature of the substrate of the
two exclusions because it is assumed that only sāmānyalakṣaṇa is denotive; cf. ŚV Apoha° 115cd-18ab: nilotpalādiśabdēṣu śabālārthābhīdhāyīṣyī viśesānvisāvyatva-sāmānādhihkaranyayoḥ na Siddhiḥ, na hy anilatavyudāse 'nutpalacyuthī. nāpi tatretaras tasmān na viśesāvīśeṣeṇa śabdāyor nāpi te svātām abhidheyaṇaṃekṣayaḥ sāmānādhihkaranyam ca na bhinnatvād apohayoḥ. Kārnākagomin expounds Kumārila’s objections in a prose version at PVVṬ 188,8ff. For this criticism, cf. PV I 131-133; TS 966-970; TS 1097.

(1) For the technical term pūrvanipāta, cf. DSG s.v., Renou, Terminologie s.v. pūrva.

(2) Kārnākagomin quotes Uddyotakara’s objection at PVVṬ 261,27ff on PVSV 65,10ff.

[77] <esa doṣo nāṣṭi>(1)te ‘pi hi. Restored, cf. PST Ms B 208b2: te pi hīyādi.

(1) Cf. Šes pa ’di ni med de de dag kyan K : Šes pa de dag ni yod pa ma yin te V, conflating two separate clauses.

[78] apohyabhedādh bhinnārthāḥ svārthabhedagatau jādāḥ, ekatrabhimakārya-
vād viśesānaviśesyaśakāh(1). Qu. NCV 732,21-22, TSP 397,5-6, cf. PST Ms B 208b2-3: yady apy apohyabhedābh bhinnārthās tathāpi viśeṣo ’sti, yasmāt svārthabheda-
gatau jādāḥ ... āt ekatraṃ apohyabhedābh bhinnādhihkaranyam.

(1)viśeṣyaśakāh NCV : viśeṣyatāḥ TSP.

195 Cf. PST Ms B 208b3: prayekam iti śeṣaḥ.

196 Cf. T 174,19-13 (om. Ms B 208b3f): ‘‘Own referent’ means the general property (sāmānyam). For the referent of the word ‘lotus’ is the mere lotus (uṭpalāmātram). Its particulars are the red lotuses (*raktotpala), etc. And the referent of the word ‘blue’ is only a blue thing (*nīlamātram), and its particulars are bees (*bhramara), etc. ‘Incapsible of’ (jādāḥ), means that they are causes of doubt (*samśayahetavāḥ).

[79] <nilotpalādiśabdā hi> saty apy apohyabhede svārthavisāvyaṇjanārtham ārdhavatākārakaniyalavat svam apohārtham ekatropasamharantāḥ <sāmānādhhi-
karanā bhavantī>. tathā hi te prayekam svārthavisāṣe samśayahetavāḥ, śabdān-
tarasahitavyangyārthāsambhavāc ca viśeṣānaviśeṣyaṃ bhūtāḥ(2). Restored, cf. PST Ms B 209a5-209b: saty api apohyabheda ity atrāpi pūrvaḥ apohyabhede-
denārdhabheda darśayati. svārthavisāvyaṇjārtham ... ārdhavatākārakaniyalavat svam apohārtham iti ... ektropasamharanta iti ... tathā hi te(1) iti ... prayekam ... svārthavisāṣe samśayahetavāḥ ... śabdāntarasahitavyangyārthāsambhavāc cetyādi.

(1) ta em. : tam Ms
(2) For bhūtāḥ, cf. no. 204 below.

197 Cf. PST Ms B 209a6-209b1: nilotpalādāv arthatvisēṣe viśeṣanatvena khyāpayantāḥ nilotpalādāya hi śadbāḥ saha pravayumānaḥ nilotpalādāpratiḥbhāṣaṃ vijnāne ‘rpayanto nilotpalādāv arthe svārthāsmānāya nilotpalādāviśeṣanatvenop-
 pasamharantaḥ pratiṣṭhṛbhīḥ pratiṣṭhante, tatas tatpratītiśād evam uktam. Kumārila and Dharmaκūṭi use the term upasamhāra in similar contexts at ŚV Pratyakṣā° 195cd: ekatra copasamāhāro na buddhyor nirvikalpake, and at PVSV
44,2-5, respectively: tadabhinnam ekākāravisayikarane apy anisicitāyarām ākārāntarasākānyaśabuddhigrāhyaṃ bhinnasabdarthopasamanāre apy abhinnaṃ buddhau pratibhāti iti sāmānyaviśeṣanaviśeṣyabhāva sāmānādhikaranāyāni yathā-pratīti na virudhyante.

Cf. the related discussion at Prāṇaśabdena svārthaviśeṣasamāyayatana svārthhasamānye buddhāvīropite, so ‘ṛtho paricchinmānyākāratvād ākārāntarasākānṣayā buddhāvī paricchidyate: yad etad upalām kim etad nilam uta raktam iti? āta ākāṃśāvikchēdaṃvī nilaśabdaḥ prayuyāmanāṃ tatra svārtham upasamaharaṇaṃ upalārtham viśiṣitaḥ: yad etad upalām nilam etat, na raktaṃ iti bhavati viśeṣanaviśeṣyabhāvaḥ, ayam atrārthah: sābdānam yad abhidheyaṃ buddhāpratibhāsātamakam apy adhyavasitābhāyārthasvabhāvam. tad bhinnasabdarthopasamanāre ‘py anekadharmānuyatan abhinnaṃ iva pratibhāsate tataḥ ca nilotpālādayaḥ sābdās tathāvidham artha-pratibimbakam buddhāvī arpayanta evam eva vastu nilotpālatvādyanekadharmakah prakteṣayantī bhūrāntair vyavahartrbhīḥ pratītyante. tato yathā-pratīti teṣām sāmānādhikaranyam na virudhyate. evam ca buddhāḥ sābdārtho nilayekataraśabdarpyogād avasaītankalāyākāro ‘py anisicitāparaviśeṣatvād viśeṣāntarasākānṣayā buddhāvī paricchidyate: yad etan nilam kim idam upalām utānyad bhramarādukam ity evamādiyayā. āta ākāṃśāvikchēdaṃvī nilaśabdēna sahotpalādayaḥ sābdāḥ prayuyāmanāṃ nilotpālādiprathītyenaḥjanayanto nilādyākārāṃ vasty anupālāder arthaṁārātār vyavachchindānity adhyavasyānte. tataḥ pratītyanurodhena viśeṣanaviśeṣyabhāvō ‘py upapadyata iti.

198 That is, the general properties blueness and lotushood, cf. Prāṇaśabdena B 209a6: nilasamānyam upalāsāmānyam ca.

199 Cf. Prāṇaśabdena B 209a5-6: svārthaviśeṣo nilotpālādiśabānāṃ nilotpālādiḥ. tadabhīvyāngyārtham anenābhinnākāryatvam āha.

200 Dignāga mentions this example to explain how the two terms ‘nila’ and ‘upalā’ whose scope each separately differ completely, generates certainty about the referent, when they are combined as nilotpala. The general property uprightness in itself does not generate certainty about which referent is qualified. Without context it is a cause of doubt because uprightness applies to different referents like humans or trunks. If, however, it is combined with the term ‘crow’s nest’ the applicability of ‘uprightness’ is by implication limited to trunks; Cf. Prāṇaśabdena B 209b1-3: ārūḍhvatānārūḍhavyavacchedenordvhasāmānyam pratipādayantī sthāṇupuruṣādyārdhva<śa> bhede sāmānyahetvā̄, kākāntilayanam apy akākāspadayogāvastuvacchedena kākāvasthānayo vyavastumātraṃ prat三亚vayayat tadaviśeṣṣva sthānusthāndilādīsa sandehahetvā niścayahetvātāṃ sāmānādhikaranāṃ, yathā tathā nilotpālādiśabānāṃ ekāmmān arthe pūrvoktena vidhinā tad bhavati: “‘Uprightness’ which communicates knowledge about the general property of being upright by excluding [things that are] not upright is a cause of doubt with respect to the difference of the uprightness of a trunk or a human being, etc. ‘Crow’s nest’ which only imparts knowledge about a referent that is suitable as the habitat of a crow by excluding such referents that are not suitable as the abode of a crow is also a cause of doubt as to its particulars like a trunk or a landmark, but the two are co-referential when combined because they are
a cause of ascertainment with regard to the particular of uprightness that has the form of something non-human. It is the same in every case with regard to a single object of expressions like ‘blue lotus’ in accordance with the abovementioned rule.”

Dignāga mentions the same example at PSV III 44ff:

K (Kitagawa 1973 505,16f = P 135a6): dper na mtho yor la ’gren ba dañ bya rog la gnas pa dag bsdoms pa ltu bu ’o.

V (Kitagawa 1973 505,17f = P 49a7): dper na bslaṅ ba’i rnam pa dañ bya babs pa gnis gcig tu ‘dus pa las mtho yor du šes pa lta bu ’o?

K (Kitagawa 1973 505,7-8 = P 136b2): de ltar yan ’gren ba yin la bya rog gnas pa’i phyir mtho yor du rtogs (P gtogs) pa mthoṅ gi, ’ba’ (P ’ga’) žig pa la mi nus pa’i phyir ro.

V (Kitagawa 1973 509,8-9 = P 53a5-6): ‘di ltar ’gren ba dañ bya ba babs pa las mtho yor du rtogs pa mthoṅ ba ni kha yar ba las ſes par mi nus pa’i phyir ro.

Cf. NCV 722,25-26: yathā ārdhvatvaṃ sāmānyam “sthāṇuḥ syāt, puruṣaḥ syāt” iti sāmāyayetuḥ, sākunanilayanam “sthāṇu eva” iti niṣcayahetur viśiṣṭavāt, vastraśaṃyamanaṃ vā “puruṣa eva” iti: For instance, the general property uprightness is a cause of doubt “maybe it is a trunk or a human being”!

‘Bird’s nest’ is a cause of ascertainment “it is definitely a human being” because of being qualified, or ‘clothing’ [is a cause of ascertainment]: “It is definitely a human being”! Cf. also NCV 605,15; 677,29-678,10-17; PSṬ Ms B 142a7: kākanilayanam hi pūrasādibhyo vyavacchidyā sthānusthāṇidhiḥ kevalaṃ sāmāyayetuḥ. Ārdhvatāsaḥitam tu sthāṇau <so read : “o Ms> niṣcayahet<ur> ḍṛṣṭām (so read : “udṛṣṭā” Ms). sāhāgraṇam cāṭrāp<ru>sasyordhvātā sāmānyasopalaṃsārtham; ŚV Anumāna° 94cd-95ab: kvacit sāmāyaḥetuḥ yauprayatvena laḵṣitaḥ, saṃghāte niṁnayas tābhyaḥ ārdhvatākākavatvatvavat. ŚVT (Umveka) 328,18-19 (ad loc.): sāhān ayaṃ ārdhvatve sati kākanilayanat. ŚV Vākyā° 363: paḍārthā gamayanty etam prayekam sāṃṣaye sati. sāmāyste niṁnayotpādat sthānumūrddhasthakākavat.

201 Cf. PST Ms B 209b3: pratye kam(1) svārthaviśeṣe sāmāyayetutvam arthāpattyā ca sahitānāṃ niṣcayayetutvam āḥa.

(1)caṃ em. : “a Ms

202 Cf. PST Ms B 209b5-7: śabdāntaraṇa niśāśabdena sahitāsotpalāśabdasya vyāṅgyo yo viśiṣṭo ‘ṛthāḥ, sa kevalasotpalāśabdasya na sambhavati. evaṃ niśāśabdasyāpy utpalāśabdasahitasya yo vyāṅgyah, sa kevalasya na sambhavatīti. śabdāntarasanidhānena viśiṣṭārthavṛtteḥ parasparam viśeṣanaviśeṣayabhāvah yathārdhvatākākanilayanayoh sahitayor eva viśiṣṭārthapratyayane: “The specific referent of the word ‘lotus’ that is to be manifested when [the word ‘lotus’] is associated with another word such as the word ‘blue’ is not possible for the word ‘lotus’ in isolation. In the same way [the particular referent] of the word ‘blue’ that is to be manifested in association with the word ‘lotus’ is not possible for it in isolation either. Thus, since they refer to a distinct referent because of being juxtaposed with another word they are mutually related as qualifier and qualified in the same way as ‘uprightness’ and ‘crow’s nest’ only indicate a distinct referent when they are associated.”

Dignāga’s view that each term in a compound like nilotpala is related to the other as qualifier and qualified is historically related to the view Patañjali expounds at Mahā-bh I 399,4ff on væṛt 1 ad A II.1:57, according to which both terms in a compound like kṣṇatila are related as qualifier and qualified: viśeṣaṇaviśeṣayor
ubhayaviṣeṣanatvād ubhayoṣ ca viṣeṣyatvād upasarjanasyāprasisiddhiḥ. kṛṣṇatilā iti. kṛṣṇaśabdō 'yaṃ tilaśabdēnābhishambhadhyāmāno viṣeṣyavacanaḥ sampadyate. tathā tilaśabdāḥ kṛṣṇaśaṃbhadhyāmāno viṣeṣyavacanaḥ sampadyate. tad ubhayam viṣeṣanaḥ bhavaty ubhayam ca viṣeṣyam. Jñendra-buddhi’s explanation at Nyāsa Vol. 2: 76,19-22 reflects the Buddhist Dignāga’s point of view: atra nilārtho bhramarādibhyo vyāvartayotpalārthenotpale vyavsthāpyate. utpalārtho ’pi raktotpala-dibhyo vyāvardiya nilārthena nilē vyavsthāpyata ity asti pratyekeṃ viṣeṣana-viṣeṣyabhāvah. sa yatra nāstī tatra tu na samāsah. yathā vrksah śiṃśapeti: “In this case the referent of ‘blue’ is restricted to lotus together with the referent of ‘lotus’, having been excluded from bees, etc. The referent of ‘lotus’ too is restricted to blue together with the referent of ‘blue,’ having been excluded from red lotus, etc. Thus each is related [to the other] as qualifier and qualified. Where this is not the case, there is no compound, like śiṃśapā is a tree.” Dignāga’s view that each of the terms generates doubt as to the referent it denotes and that only their combined exclusions manifest the referent is related to a similar discussion at VP III.14:10-11 which addresses the problems discussed at Mahā-bhūloc. cit.: sāmānāṇām asambandhātu tava viṣeṣeṣe vyavsthātāu, rūpābhedād viṣeṣaṃ tam abhiyāktum na śaksnaṭāh. tāv evaṃ sannipatitau bhedena pratipādane, avacchedam ivādhāya sāṃśayaṃ vyapakāryātaḥ.

203 Cf. PSṬ Ms B 209b7: arthānām eva parasparam viṣeṣyabhāvo lokē pratiṣṭāḥ, na śabdānām. tat katham sa teṣām teṣām vyavsthāpyate, ity āsaṃkhyāmānasya bhūtagrahaṇam. bhūtaśabdā upamānavācī.

204 The opponent addresses Dignāga’s assumption that the two terms ‘blue’ and ‘lotus’ together manifest the denoted referent blue lotus, by pointing out that this claim is in conflict with the well-known use of analytical strings (vigraha) in grammatical literature to explain the meaning of compounds like nilōtpalam as nilaṃ ca tad utpalam ca, which isolates the two terms as well as their denotations showing their syntactical agreement, cf. PSṬ Ms B 210a2-3: vigrahakāle nilaṃ ca tad utpalam ceti kriyate. atāḥ prāsānah. etena yaṃ uktam “śabdāntarasahitenaiva śabdena viṣiṣṭo ‘rtho ‘bhivyāngya” ity(1) atrābhivyupetābādhām āhā. The term adhikarāṇa is used in this context and throughout in the following discussion to denote a concrete object (dravya) like in Mahā-bhū, cf. Renou, Terminologie, s.v.

205 Cf. PSṬ Ms B 210a4: tathā hi nilāśabdāna kevalotpalasābdāna ca kevalena yad abhidhyātate, tad loke kevalaṃ nilaṃ ca kevalaṃ(1) utpalam iti ca pratiṣṭām.
(1)nīlaṃ ca kevalam conj. (cf. snoṅ po 'ba' žig pa daṅ u tpal la 'ba' žig pa T) : om. Ms

206 Cf. PST Ms B 210a5-6: yasmāt sahitābhyaṃ eva nīloṭpalaśabdābhyaṃ so 'ṛtha 'bhidheyo na kevalābhyaṃ. anyathaikasya tadarthābhidhāiyitve paryayaśabda- vat dvayoh sahaprayogo nopapadyeta. tad etena vigrahakāle 'pi sahitābhyaṃ eva nīloṭpalaśabdābhyaṃ tadvācyam ity abhyupagamān nābhdyupetabādheti darśayati.

[82] nīloṭpalaśabdābhyaṃ <hi> sahitābhyaṃ sa <pratīyate>(1), na kevalābhyaṃ.(2) Restored, cf. PST Ms B 210a5, q.v. above no 207.

(1)Cf. de ... rtogs pa yin gyi K : sbyar bar bya ba'i V.
(2)K and V are syntactically confused, cf. bsdus pa dag K : mtha' dag la V. In any case, it is clear from the paraphrase at Ms B 210a5 that either expression qualifies snoṅ po daṅ u tpala la'i sgra dag las V : u tpala daṅ snoṅ po'i sgra dag las K.

207 Cf. de K : om. V (PN so; DC conjecture de, presumably on the basis of K).


(1)varṇavat tau conj. (cf. yi ge bzin du TK, kha dog bzin du V) : varṇāvarṇaṃ Ms

208 Cf. kha yar ba ni V : 'ba' žig pa dag la K.

209 Cf. the discussion at Mahā-bh I 31,11-12 on vārtt 14 ad Śivasūtra 5: anarthakās tu pratīvarṇam arthānupalabdheḥ. anarthakās tu varṇāḥ. kutaḥ? pratīvarṇam arthānupalabdheḥ. na hi pratīvarṇam arthā upalabhyanīte. kim idaṃ pratīvarṇaṃ? varṇam varṇaṃ prati pratīvarṇam.


210 Cf. ni la brjod pa la V : sion pa brjod (so read with P; ed. yod) pa K.

211 Cf. de bzin du 'di la yan no V : de bzin du 'dir yin no K.


(1)Cf. mi mtshuns pa bkod pa yin te K : om. V.

212 Cf. PST Ms B 210a7-210b1: drṣṭāntavaiśanyam āha. kathāṃ visama iti? āha: na hityādi. etenābhhyupetahānim āha. nīlaśabdasya kevalasyāpy arthavattvenābhhyupagāt.

[86] varṇe na kaścid arthaś ced gamyate tu padadvaye, tadvācyā iti tatrāpi kevalaṃ sa pratīyate. Restored, cf. PST Ms B 210b1-2: varṇe na kaścid arthaś ced gamyate tu padadvaye, nāisa doṣaḥ. yasmāt tadvācyā iti tatrāpi kevalaṃ sa pratīyate.
213 Cf. PST Ms B 210b2: tatrāpi niśāsabde yo ’ṛtho gamyate sa niśāsabdavācyā iti kevalaṃ pratīṣṭate, na tu samudāyāṛtho niśāsabdavācyatvenā pratiṣṭhata ity arthaḥ:


214 Cf. PST Ms B 210b2-3: ata eva samudāyārthaśāvyatāṃ kevalayor darśayann āha: yathaiva hityādi.

[88] yat tūktam ... tatrāpi. Qu. Ms B 210b3: yat tūktam ityādīna ... tatrāpītyādīna.

215 Since Jinendrabuddhi explains that the sentence beginning with yat tūktam repeats the pūrvapakṣa, it is obvious that the readings ji skad du ni dan la’i sgra cuṅ zad kyaṅ don gyi rtogs (so read) pa mi bskyed do ḃes pa bzin no ḃe na V are preferable to snon po’i sgras don ’ga ḃig rtogs pa yin no K; cf. PST Ms B 210b3-5: yat tūktam ityādīna pūrvapakṣaṃ pratīṣṭhāya tatrāpīṭhāyādīna tadvācya ityāder uttarārdhāyārtham acaṣṭe.

216 Cf. de la yan rigs snon po’i (so read : V po ni) sgras’i brjod bya’o ḃes yan gar ba rtogs par bya ste V : de la yan rigs ’ba’ ḃig snon po’i sgras brjod pa’i phyir ’ba’ ḃig rtogs pa yin no K.

217 Cf. PST Ms B 210b3-4: jātīr niṣaṅgasamāvāyinī niṣatvam. kevalagrahaṇena samudāyārthaśāvyatāṃ āha: “The general property inherent in the blue quality is blueness. By using the [word] ’alone’ he explains that it is empty of the referent of the aggregate.”

218 The Tibetan translations of this clause in KV are syntactically ambiguous, cf. de’i yon tan dan ldan pa dan rdzas dan ldan par brjod par bya ba yin par rigs pa’i phyir K : yon tan de’i brjod bya dan ldan pa yin na ni rdzas ldan pa’i ldan pa yan yin pas V. Jinendrabuddhi’s explanation, however, leaves no doubt about the nature of the argument, cf. PST Ms B 210b4-5: niṣaṅgasadavācyayā jātīya yukto guṇo vā yatra sā samavetā, jātiyuktena guṇena yuktam dravyam vā yatra niṣaṅgaḥ samavetāḥ: sarvam cedam na samudāyasyārthah: “The quality as connected to the general property [blueness] that is denotable by the word ’blue’ or [the quality] in which [the general property blueness] is inherent, the substance as connected to the quality as connected to the general property [blueness] or [the substance] in which the blue quality is inherent: all of this is not the referent of the aggregate.”

Dignāga evidently wants to point out that the denotation of the word ’niḷa’ is neither the blue quality as connected to the general property blueness nor the substance as connected to the blue quality. On this interpretation it seems reasonable to assume that a negation is missing in KV. The suggested translation is based on the conj. mi rigs pa’i phyir : rigs pa’i phyir K.

[89] arthaśānyaiḥ samudayair. Restored, cf. PST Ms B 210b6: arthaśānyair iti ... samudayair iti.

[90] bhinnāsabdavācyenārthena(1) bhinnārthā ity ucyclante. Restored, cf. PST Ms B 210b6-7: katham tarhy “apohyabhedāt bhinnārthā” (14a) ity ucyclanta ity āha: bhinnāsabdavācyenetyādī ... etad uktam bhavati:
kevalanīdiśabdarthavācyenārthaṃ bhinnārthā ity ucyante. na tu samudāyārtheneti.

(1) V misinterprets arthena as don gyi śugs kyis, i.e., "by implication."

219 Cf. PSṬ Ms B 210b6-7: bhinnāḥ prthagbhūtaḥ kevala iti yāvat.

220 Jinendrabuddhi closes his comment on this paragraph with a brief discussion of the implications of Dignāga’s view of co-reference and the qualifier-qualified relation, cf. PSṬ Ms B 210b7-211a2: yadi tarhi samudāyavācyya eva viśiṣṭo ’ṛthāḥ, tat katham sāmānādhikaranyam viśesa<na>viśesyabhāvo vā yavatā bhedādhi-ṃṣṭhānam. ubhayam apiḍaṃ(1) bhinnāśrayaṃ(2) samudāyas caikāḥ? Parikalpasamā-ropitāvavasadbhāvāḥ ubhayam vyavasthāpyate. vakṣyate ca itād “apoddhāre padasyāyaṃ artho vikalpita”(2) (= PS V 46ab) iti. pratipattrabhiprāyasena vā. pratipattāro hy ubhayaviśeṣanaviśeṣasthāṣṭrasāṃadhikarana yād bhinnāśrayamāṃ aide māṃ bhedādhikaranaṃ apiḍaṃ cakāvāḥ iti manyante. tatas tathāvyavasthāpyate.(2)

(1) Ms so, but ‘di giis ka ni T would suggest reading hīdaṃ as Tib. ni generally translates Sanskrit hi.

(2) bhinnāśrayaṃ conj (cf. tha dad pa’i rten can T) : om. Ms

221 That is, something different from ‘exclusion of other (referents)’ like a general property, cf. PSṬ Ms B 211a3: yad anyāpohād anyaj jātyādikam abhidheyam ityate.

222 Namely the aggregate as object, cf. PSṬ Ms B 211a3: samudāyābhidheyo yo ’ṛthas.

223 That is, the denotable objects of the separate terms ’nīla’, and so on, cf. PSṬ Ms B 211a3: kevalanīdiśabdarthavācyayoh.

224 That is, because there is no third option with regard to a substantially existent general property, cf. PSṬ Ms B 211a4: dravyasatas trīṭīyavikalpābhāvāt.
Namely, from the two component referents consisting of the two general properties, cf. PST Ms B 211a4: जात्याम अवयावर्थाब्ध्याम. According to the translations of KV—both equally confused—it is the general properties as referents that may or may not be different from the referent (adhirukana).

Restored, cf. PSṬ Ms B 211a4: जात्याम अवयावर्थाब्ध्याम. According to the translations of KV—both equally confused—it is the general properties as referents that may or may not be different from the referent (adhirukana).

Cf. gaṅ gi phyir K: 'di litar V.

Cf. PST Ms B 211a5: samudāyinoḥ parasparam abhedaprasaṅga ity arthah.

yadi hi. Qu. Ms B 211a5.

Cf. PST Ms B 211b1: yad anekasamudāyo na sa vastutaḥ, kalpita eva tu sannagarīvat(1).

Cf. gcig las K: don gcig las V.

samūhānekaṭasakṭha(1). Qu. Ms B 211a7.

Cf. 'gyur (sic.; read thal) phyir K: thal bar 'gyur V.

samūhasya <cā>(1)nekasmād abhedād anekatvaprasaṅgah. <tataś ca nāsti>. Restored, cf. PST Ms B 211a7-211b1: samūhasya jātiguṇasamudāyasyānekasmād avayavād abhedād anekatvaprasaṅgah.

samūlotpalārthayoh. Qu. Ms B 211a7.

Cf. PST Ms B 211b1: nilotpalārthayor iti baḥuvrīhiḥ. nilotpalābhidhāyinoḥ śabdavār ity arthaḥ.

ekatrāpi vartamānau <śabdau svārthaṃ na tyajataḥ>(1). Restored, cf. PST Ms B 211b1: ekatrāpi vartamānāv iti.

That is, in the compound 'nilotpala,' cf. PST Ms B 211b1-2: ekaminn api śabdāsamudāye 'vayavabhāvena vartamānāv ity arthaḥ.

samuditayor api. Restored, cf. PST Ms B 211b2: nilotpalaśabadayoḥ samuditayor apiṭi.

kutaḥ sāmānādhikaranyam. Qu. Ms B 211b2.
bhinnārthatvāt. yathā ghaṭapaṭaśabdayoh sāmānādhikaraṇyaṁ nāsti, tathā nilotpalaśabdayoh samuditayor apiṭī.

<esa doṣo nāsti>. dvāv api <viśeṣārthau> sāmānye viśeṣāntarbhāvāt. tulyārupāu <sāmānyārthena>. Restored, cf. PST Ms B 211b3: sāmānye viśeṣāntarbhāvād iti; 211b4: dvāv api nilotpalaśabdau; Ms B 211b5: tulyārupāv (1)ītyādi.

They have a form that is identical with,

a particular as its referent.

Thus,

'blue' also denotes the blue lotus in the same form in which it denotes blueness.

[question] he answers: "They have a form that is identical with,"

the second word is applied since the partic ular is understood from this? To this

a particular as its referent even though it is a general term, what is the reason why

the particulars are included in the general; for they too are the referents of the words 'blue' and 'lotus'. In those circumstances both of them viz. the words 'blue' and 'lotus' have as their referent the blue lotus. And therefore there is no problem even if they give up their own referent."

(1)ānantae em. : āmṛ̣tāms Ms
(2)ānyābhi em. : ām abhi°.
(3)palārthavantau em. (cf.u tpal la sion po don daṅ ldan pa dag go T) : palenāvyavatmaus

viśeṣārthavattvajñāpanārtham(1) dvitiyaśabdapravyogah. Restored, cf. PST Ms B 211b6, q.v. no. 236.

(Cf. don gyi bye brag daṅ ldan pa sērs par bya ba’ i phyir V : khyad par gyi don sērs par bya ba’i don du K.

yenaiva rūpāṇa nilaśabdo nilatvam āhā, tenaiva nilotpalam ity api. atas tasya 
<tylua>rūpavān(1) na jñāyate: kim ayaṁ sāmānyārtha eva atha(2) viśeṣārttha 
'piṇī(3); viśeṣārthavattvajñāpanārtham dvitiyaśabdapravyogah: "In that case, if it has a particular as its referent even though it is a general term, what is the reason why the second word is applied since the particular is understood from this? To this [question] he answers: “They have a form that is identical with,” etc. The word

'blue' also denotes the blue lotus in the same form in which it denotes blueness. Therefore one does not know whether it only has the general property as its referent or whether it also has a particular as its referent because its form is the same. Thus the application of the second word is for the purpose of making known the fact that they have a particular as their referent."

(1)tulya° conj. (cf. no bo mtshuṁs pa T) : om. Ms
(2)atha em. : hata Ms
(3)ṭiti em. : ṭhi Ms

atra tāvad nilaśabden<ābheden>ābhidhiyate, na jātiḥ. Restored, cf. PST Ms B 211b6-7: atra tāvad ityādi; Ms B 211b7f, q.v. no. 237 below.
Cf. PST Ms B 211b7-212a1: niśaśabdena hi niḷajāṭir abhidhīyate tadyukto vā 
gunaḥ, na tūtpalāḍḍhravajāṭiḥ. tasyāś(1) ca viśeṣā rakotpalādayaḥ, na niḷaguṇasya 
tatsamavāyino vā niḷatvasya, tataḥ katham niśaśabdārthe niḷotpalādīnām antar-
bhāvaḥ syāt: “For the word ‘blue’ denotes the general property blueness or the 
quality connected to it, but not the general property substanceness of a lotus and so 
on; and the red lotus, and so on, are its [viz. the general property substanceness], 
[they are] not [particulars] of the blue quality or the blueness inherent in it. 
Therefore, how could the blue lotus, and so on, be included in the referent of the 
word ‘blue’?”

(1) T reproduces tasyās as de las sic.

<na hi niśaśabdo dravyajāṭiṃ> sāmānyenāha, <kuto viśeṣasya dravyajāṭāv 
antarbhūtah kalpyeta(1)>]. Restored, cf. PST Ms B 212a1: sāmānyenāhety; 211b7-
212a1, q.v. no. 237 above.

brtag V : brtags pa K.

Cf. PST Ms B 212a1: abhinnaśabdasyārtham ācaṣṭe, tad etena ye niḷa-
śabdārthasya bhedā na bhavanti, na te tatrāntarbhavanti, tadyathā balākādayaḥ. 
tathā ca niḷotpalādayo dravyajāṭiviśeṣā iti.

nanu ca niḷavad dravyaṃ sāmānyen<āha>. Restored, cf. PST Ms B 212a2, 
q.v. no. 241 below.

The reading balāka is supported by Ms, cf. no. 238 above. K and V are utterly 
confused, cf. ha li daṅ la ba la sogs pa K : là ba daṅ u tpa la dag kyaṅ V.

Cf. u tpa la dag kyaṅ V : om. K.

Cf. PST Ms B 212a2: naiva hi niśaśabdena nilo guṇas tajjāṭir vābhidhīyate, 
kim tarhi niḷagunavat sāmānyena dravyam; tadbhedāś ca niḷotpalādaya ity 
anavadyam: “For the word ‘blue’ does not denote the blue quality or its general 
property, but rather [it denotes] in a general way the substance that possesses the 
blue quality; and the blue lotus, and so on, are its particulars. Thus it is 
unobjectionable.”

ayuktam evaṃ bhavitum. Qu. Ms B 212a3.

<kasmāt?> pūrvar vuktavāt. Restored, cf. PST Ms B 212a3-4: pūrvar 
uktavād ityādi.

Cf. ci’i phyir V : gaṅ gi phyir K.

Cf. PST Ms B 212a3-4: tadvapatkṣadasarasanaṃ hīdam upanyakṣam. tac ca 
purvar eva nisiddhan iti kṛtvā tad eva pūrvaniṣiddhatvaṃ darsāyann āha: purvar 
uktavād ityādi.
of the general property tree, which is caused by the word sāṃśayaḥ. The use of the expression 'by implication' is due to the fact that it is believed that it are included [in the general property] as denotable objects. And it is not possible that the particulars are the denotable objects of the general term."

"The statement made by the opponent. Cf. PSṬ Ms B 214a4: abhidheyaḥva hy antarbhāva itṣṭaḥ, na ca viśeṣāṁ kṣāṇāṁ sāmānyāśabdābhidheyaḥvāṃ sambhavati: “For it is claimed that [the particulars] are included [in the general property] as denotable objects. And it is not possible that the particulars are the denotable objects of the general term.”"

"K and V are syntactically confused, cf. de daṅ laṅ pa brjod pa la (sic) ni V : de daṅ laṅ pa ni K, and, subsequently de daṅ laṅ pa brjod pa ni."

"Cf. snār ṅid du bkag pa yin no K : snār ṅid du ... ma grub pa brjod do V."

"The use of the expression ‘by implication’ is due to the fact that it is believed that it denotes directly.”

"Since the referent of the word 'śimśapā’ does not deviate from the general property tree, there is a cognition of the general property tree, which is caused by the word 'śimśapā’ by implication.”


"<anapohanā>. Restored.
Mahā words whose referents have already been denoted,’ which Patañjali explains at Dign. does not apply a second term in addition to one whose meaning is understood. If two synonyms are synonyms, and thus the addition of one to the other is meaningless because one is a single synonym causes the cognition of the intended referent. And therefore the application of a second [synonym] is not met with. So how could there be coreference or a qualifier-qualified relation. This is how he is thinking.”

Thus the use of a second term in addition to the one already mentioned is only justified if the meaning is not clearly understood. Otherwise it is not. And in the present case it must be assumed that if nīla and utpala denote the same referent they are synonyms, and thus the addition of one to the other is meaningless because one does not apply a second term in addition to one whose meaning is understood. Dignāga apparently alludes in this paragraph to the principle that ‘one does not use words whose referents have already been denoted,’ which Patañjali explains at Mahā-bh I 105,2-3: arthagatyarthas śabdapravogah, arthaṃ sampratyāyayiṣyāmīti śabdāḥ prayuyate. tatraikenaṃ tasyārthasya dvitiyasya pravogena na bhavi-
tavyam uktiārthaṃ aprayoga iti: “The use of words is for the purpose of comprehending their referents. A word is used at the thought “I shall make [its] referent understood.” In that case one should not use a second word because the referent has already been denoted by a single one, for ‘one does not use [words] whose referents have already been denoted’;” cf. Mahā-bh I 240,24-25.

246 Cf. til la sogs pa K : snon po la sogs pa la V.

247 Cf. PST Ms B 212b1-2: paryāyāsabdeṣu hi ekasmād eva paryāyāsabdād vivakṣārthapratītir bhavati. tataḥ cā dvitiyasya pravogabhāva eveti kathāṃ sāmā-nādhikaranyāṃ viśeṣanaviśeṣyabhāvo vetai manyate: “For in the case of synonyms a single synonym causes the cognition of the intended referent. And therefore the application of a second [synonym] is not met with. So how could there be co-reference or a qualifier-qualified relation. This is how he is thinking.”

248 Cf. PST Ms B 212b3-4: tatrānirjñātārthe(1) paryāyāntarasya(2) prayogas tat<pūrvā>ṛthapratītaye. Restored, cf. PST Ms B 212b3: paryāyāsabde hītyādi; B 213b3-4, q.v. below no. 249.

(1) Cf. don du ma ma rtogs pa la K : ma rtogs pa dañ don du ma la ma (sic; ma om. DC) yin gyi V.

(2) Cf. rnam grañs gžan gyi (so read; ed. gyiṣ) sbyor ba K : rnam grañs gžan sbyor ba V.
etad eva hi <paryāyaśabdānām> paryāyatvam\(^{1}\). Restored, cf. PST Ms B 212b4-5: kasmāt punar ekasya paryāṣyasya prayoge dvitiyasya tatrāprayoga ity āha: etad eva hiṣṭādi. 212b6: paryāyatvam iti.
\(^{1}\)rnam grans pa’i sgra ŋid K : sgra ŋid V.

249 Cf. PST Ms B 212b5: paryāyenārtham abhidadhatīti paryāyaḥ. na so ’sti\(^{2}\) yogapatprayoge svanimitābhāvāt.
\(^{1}\)yāh. em. : yā Ms
\(^{2}\) na so ’sti conj. (cf. de cig sbyor ba la med de T) : na sā Ms

250 Cf. PST Ms B 212b5: anvarthasamijñā hiṣṭām.

251 Cf. Bhartṛhari’s VP II:251: yaugapadyam atikramyā paryāye vyavatīṣṭhate.

252 Cf. PST Ms B 212b6-7: yataḥ paryāyaśabda eka evābhidhānāyālam, ata utpalasābadasahitavyaṃgyāyārthasya nilasābdenaiva kevalenaiva vyavacchedyatvat eva nāstīti viśeṣanvisēṣatvābhāvah. “Since only a single synonym is sufficient for denoting, the referent that is manifested together with the word ‘lotus’ does not have an excluded referent because it is understood from the word ‘blue’ alone. Thus there is no qualiﬁer-qualiﬁed relation.”

253 Cf. Jinendrabuddhi’s lengthy elaboration of Dignāga’s argument at PST Ms B 213a2-213b1: yadi hy avayavy avayavesv ekadeśena vartetāvayaṅvānavasthā syāt. tathā hi yair avayavair avayavī samavāyikārane avayavesv vartate, teṣy api tenāvayaṅvabhedenaiva vārātīvāyam. punas teṣy apy evam ity anavasthā. na ca tadvṛttāv avayavino vṛttir asti teṣām avayavavīrtvāt. atha kārṣṭyena vartate tādāvayavoḥ bhuhum aprasāndno ’vayavānāṃ bahuvāt teṣu ca priyakām sarvātmānān paripāntavāt. abhhinnadesatvāc cayayavīnā sarve ’vavāvāḥ sanyogyideśenābhinnadesāḥ syāh. atha naḥbhhinnadesā śyānte, evam tarhy ekadāravyo ’vavāvī syād ity evamādhayaḥ kārṣṭyena vyavatt deṣās teṣām api tatra yad sarvātmānān vṛttir avayavānāṃ vāpāya tatas tasya niravayavatvār sarveṣām ekadeśātā. tataḥ ca yatra pāṇīḥ, tatra pāḍādayo ’pūti. mecakeśaṇaprasamgo vibhāgena grahanāsambhavāt. athakeṇa vṛttih saivavayo ’navasthā. yesu hy avayavā ekadeśeṣu vartante,
tair apya apareṣu vartitavyam, tair apya evam ity anavasthā. yac ca niḷam tan notpalaṃ syāt, yad apya utpalaṃ tan na niḷam ityādi. yad evam kārṣṭyenaikadesēna vā vṛttir na sambhavi, tasmān nāvavavyatiriktaḥ samudāyāḥ sidhyāti.


[255] I assume that the syntax of this clause has to be interpreted in the light of the previous sentence.

[123] yady apya ekārthavṛttitā <jātigunayos cārthayor> na sāmānyaviśeṣatvam. Restored, cf. PST Ms B 213b1-2: yady apya ekārthavyṛttitety etat ... na sāmānyaviśeṣatvam iti.

[256] That is, there is no qualifier-qualified relation between them. In this context the term is equivalent to viśeṣaṇaviśeṣyabhāvaḥ.


[257] Cf. PST Ms B 213b1-2: ekatra dravye dvayor api samavāyād upapadyste sāmānādhihkaranyam, jātigunayor na viśeṣaṇaviśeṣyabhāvah: “Even if co-reference is justified because they both inhere in the same substance, a general property and an quality are not related as qualifier and qualified.”


[258] Cf. PST Ms B 213b2: etena parasparaṃ sambandhābhāvam āha. etac ca “na sāmānyaviśeṣatvam” (PS V:19b) ity asya vivaraṇam. yeṣām parasparaṃ sambandho nāsti na teṣāṃ viśeṣaṇaviśeṣyabhāvah, ghātaṇādивat. nāsti ca jāti-gunayoh parasparam sambandhah: “Thereby he explains the absence of a mutual relation; and this is the explication of the statement “there is no general-particular property relation between them” (PS V:19b). [General and particular properties] that have no mutual relation are not related as qualifier and qualified like a pot and cloth [are not related as qualifier and qualified]; and a general property and a quality do not have a mutual relation.”


[259] Cf. PST Ms B 213b4-5: katham punaḥ tadvato ity ucyate. yāvataikam eva tad dravyam ubhayaviśeṣaṇaviśeṣṣam. ekasyāpi guṇabhēdād bhedam āśkītvaivam uktam ity adosah: “However, why is the expression “of the two property possessors” used, in so far as this substance is one only, being qualified by both qualifiers? It is used in this way with reference to the difference [of the qualifiers] because although it [viz. the substance] is one, it has different properties.”
Cf. 'jug pa V (DC conj. ldan pa sic) : om. K.

The translation of the prodosis is conjectural as K and V are confused, diverging in terms of syntax and vocabulary, cf. de\(^{(1)}\) dañ ldan pa’i don K (cf. tadvatoḥ 19d) : spyi’i (sic) don la V.

\(^{(1)}\)de conj. : om. K.

drayyayor anyatrāvṛtteḥ\(^{(1)}\). Qu. Ms B 213b3.

\(^{(1)}\)Cf. gzan la ‘jug pa’i rdzas dag la V : rdzas dañ yon tan dag gzan du mi ‘jug pa’i phyir K.

That is, they do not have any other locus than the one in which they are already resident, cf. PST Ms B 213b3-4: yasmāj jāṭīgūṇaviśiṣṭayor dravyayor nāparam adhikaraṇam asti yatra bhedena\(^{(1)}\) varteyātām. āta ekatra vyrttyabhāvād digākāsaya iva nāsti sāmāṇādhikarāynām iti: “Because two substances that are qualified by a general property and a quality do not have another locus, in which they might reside separately.” Therefore, since they do not reside in one and the same [thing] they are not co-referential in the same way as a quarter of the sky and the sky.”

\(^{(1)}\)ena conj. : bhede Ms : om. T.

dAVOR ekasya vā sāmāṇāviśeṣavattvāyogāt. Qu. Ms B 213b5-6.

Cf. PST Ms B 213b6: na hi nīladravyasya bhrāmarāder utpaladravyasya ca sāmāṇāviśeṣavattvam asti. āto nānayor viśeṣanaviśeṣyatā, jāṭīdvavat. ekasya yatra jāṭīgūna saha vartete, na hi tad eva tasya sāmāṇyam viṣeṣo vā bhavati. āto ‘trāpi nāsti viśeṣanaviśeṣyabhāvo yathāikasya ghaṭasya: “For an indigo-blue substance like a bee and the substance lotus do not possess the general property [lotusness] and the particular property [blueness]. Therefore the two are not related as qualifier and qualified, like a couple of general properties. The same [substance] in which the general property and the quality reside together is not the general property or the quality of one of them. Therefore there is no qualifier-qualified relation in this case either, like [there is no qualifier-qualified relation] of one pot.”

Cf. de ltar na re žig don la gñis srid pa ma yin no V : de ltar re žig sic K (text corresponding to don la gñis srid pa ma yin no V is missing).

atyantabhinnau\(^{(1)}\) hi <sabdau jāṭīgūnābhīdhāya, tasmāt tayoḥ sāmāṇādhikarānābhāvo>. Restored, cf. PST Ms B 213b7: atyantabhinnau hiti.

\(^{(1)}\)Cf. śin tu tha da pa ni V : gzan la (sic) tha dad pa K.

The syntactic function of the particle hi is in this case equivalent to yasmāt.

Cf. PST Ms B 213b7-214a1: sāmāṇāviśeṣayor bhedo ’sti tadaradvīṣayatayā, nātyantam. atas tadvyavacchedāyātyantagrahaṇām.

Cf. de’i phyir\(^{(1)}\) gži mthun pa yod pa ma yin no K : de yañ yod pa ma yin no. de dag gi gži mthun pa la yā V.
Read de’i phyir de dag gi.

Cf. de’i sgra dag la yaṅ V : de’i sgra dag kyaṅ K.

Cf. PST Ms B 214a1-2: viśeṣāṇavīśeṣyabhāvo ’pi jātiṣunavācinoḥ śabdavay nopapadyate. arthadhāraṇaḥ hi tayor viśeṣāṇavīśeṣyabhāvah. taḍarthaḥ ca jātiṣunavayor na kaścānāḥbhāsambandhasaḥ: “A qualifier-qualified relation between two words that denote a general property and a quality is not justified. For the qualifier-qualified relation of the two [words] is caused by [their] referents. And there is no relation between their two referents viz. the general property and the quality.”

Cf. de dag med do K : om. V.

Cf. rigs V : rdzas K.

Cf. rigs (em. : K rdzas) daṅ yon tan tsam rjod par byed pa ŋid la K : rigs daṅ yon tan tsam brjod pa ŋid yin no V.

[(130) tulyātulyaṃ prasajyate. Qu. Ms B 214a2.]

[(131) atulyatvāvivakṣā cet. Qu. Ms B 214a3.]

[(132) <yadi manyate: sambhikṛtabhedāvivakṣāyāṃ> tulyatvam tāvad upādāya sāmāṇādhirakaranyam bhavisyatī. Restored, cf. PST Ms 214a4-5: tulyatvam tāvad upādāya sāmāṇādhirakaranyam bhavisyatī.]

The opponent objects that what defines the similarity (tulyatvam) of the substance to which the words ‘blue’ and ‘lotus’ refer is the fact that the speaker does not intend to refer to the difference that is caused by the relata viz. the general properties blueness and lotusness, cf. PST Ms B 214a3-5: samāṇāsamāṇādhirakarana-sambhave samānām adhikaranaṃ āśritya sāmāṇādhirakaranyam ucye door vidhiṇā sāmāṇādhirākaryavacanat. na hi bhinnam adhikaranaṃ prātiṣidhyate, kim tarhy abhinnaṃ vidhiyate. tena tāvannātraṇaḥvāsayaḥ tulyatvam tāvad(1)upādāya sāmāṇādhirakaranyam bhavisyatī. Yas tu vastunāḥ sambhikṛto bhedah, sa vivakṣāya-nupasthāpitavād na bhinnādhirakarantuḥāya kalpata ity aparasyābhiquyam āvīṣ-
karoti: “If there is the possibility that the substance is either the same or not the same one speaks about co-reference with reference to the same substance because co-reference is expressed in an affirmative form. For it is not denied that the substance is different, but rather it is prescribed that it is not different. Therefore since only that much is intended to be expressed, there will be co-reference based upon such similarity. But the difference of referent that is caused by the relatum [i.e., the general property] does not effect that the substance is different because it is not presented according to the intention [of the speaker]. In this way he shows the opponent’s opinion.”

(1) Notice the wrong punctuation ‘dra ba ŋid de, de srid la brten nas T.


277 The opponent continues arguing that the same principle holds even on the apoha theory, cf. PST Ms B 214a6: apohapakṣe ‘py eṣa nyāya āśrayaniya iti darśayati.

278 Cf. T 182,26ff: “The meaning is ‘because they are the causes of a cognition that appear as having the same reference (*sāmāṇādhikaranābhāsabuddhihetutvāt)’. There is a minor gap in Ms corresponding to T 182,26-28, after which Ms continues at B 214a6-7: … śabdopajanitā darśayati. tannātram āśriya tvayāpi sāmāṇādhi-karanyavyavasthā kriyata iti.


(1) tvāt conj. (cf. blo mtshun s pa’i rgyu yin pa’i <physir(2) K : blo mtshun s pa’i rgyu yod pa ŋid [sic] V) : tulyākārabuddhi Ms (some lines are missing, cf. blo mam pa mtshun s pa’i rgyu ŋid kyi phyir ŋes pa T). For the reading tulyākārabuddhihetu which is not corroborated by K and V, cf. expressions like bhinnākārā buddhi and abhinnākārā buddhih in Dharmaṅkīrti’s PVV: 65,25f: tad ekam anamśaṃ vastu katham bhinnākārābhīr buddhihīr viṣayikriyate; 39,15: kevalam abhinnākārā buddhi utpadyate; 55,7: katham tāṣv abhinnākārā buddhir iti. One cannot therefore exclude the possibility that ākāra has been interpolated in the light of Dharmaṅkīrti’s usage.

(2) phyir conj. (cf. rgyu ŋid kyi phyir T) : om. KV.

279 Cf. yod du zin kyaṅ V : med pa ŋid ma yin gyi K.

280 Cf. mi tshun s bkod pa ste K : ‘di ni mi zad par brgal ba ste V.


281 Cf. PST Ms B 214a7-214b1: ubhayavyudāso ‘nilotupalavavyāvrttiḥ. sā ca vyāvṛttimataḥ paramārthato nānyeti. tad evānīlāntulalavavyāvṛttam nilotpalākhyam vastu tathocyate. tenānugṛḥitaḥ, (1) anugrahaḥ(2) punas tasya buddhasya śabdār-

(1)T punctuates wrongly: des rjes su bzuṅ žiṅ phan btags pa ni.
(2)STRU em. : jānu° Ms

That is to the exclusion of particular distinctive properties like mukulatva, cf. PST Ms B 214b1-2: nānyeṣāṃ mukulatvādīnām.

The apprehension of the meaning of the expression ‘blue lotus’ only presupposes the combined exclusions of the neganda of ‘blue’ and ‘lotus’ viz. ‘non-blue’, and ‘non-lotus’, it is not assisted by other exclusions like the exclusion of the neganda of ‘lotus bud’, and so on, cf. PST Ms B 214b1: tatraiva nilotpālaśabdayāparo, na mukulādivyudānugṛhitā iti. PST Ms B 214b2-3, q.v. below no. 285.

[137] sambandhirte tv 'viśeṣe 'vivaksite >, tad vastu katham vācyam. Restored, cf. PST Ms B 214b2: sambandhirte tv iti; Ms B 214b2-3, q.v. below no. 285.


[139] <tasya vastumo> 'nabhidheyatvena <samānāteti gavāśva iti> nilotpālaśabdissvabhāvatā bhavaity asaṃvyavahāryam eva syāti: “If the difference is not intended to be expressed although it is made the object of the word, there would be similarity even in the case of [the entities called] ‘cow’ and ‘horse’.”

yod pa V : rta ŋid K would indicate that the translators of V read astitva for aśvatva.

[140]°eye° em. : °e° Ms
prasa tam all. because the word takes them as its objects. Otherwise they could not be denoted correctly that cowhood and horsehood in a cow and a horse are intended to be denoted. Therefore it is on, the difference between a horse and a cow exists. difference effected by the difference of the relata cowhood and horsehood, and so anyatathā: “The idea is as follows: Also in the case of [the word] ‘blue lotus’ there is not a single denotable object because a blue lotus does not have another form apart from the particular form that manifests it, and to which its occurrence is restricted, is briefly mentioned by Helarāja Prakāṇaprakāśa Vol I 94: 8-11 (on VP III.1:93-94); he attributes it to the Vaiśeṣikas (loc.cit. line one): nanu ca sāpi (scil. jāti) katham anavyayena vyaktim nānuyayat. tathā ca gavāsvadau sāṅkarya-prasāṅgaḥ. naitad evam, pratiniyatāśrayavṛttitvāt sāmānyānām. kim atra nimittam
Cf. dbyibs kyi khyad par (= samsthānaviśeṣa) rnam par (= ākṛti) brjod pas K: dbyibs kyi bye brag tu byas te V, which is difficult to construe and must be based upon a flawed reading, cf. 21c der bye brag tu ma (sic) byas te V.


292 Cf. Ms B 215a1-2: anena tadastitvāvagatere(1) nibandhanam āhā. kāryaviśeṣāt samsthānam avayavasannītakam anumāyata ity arthaḥ. nanu caśīrīdharmabhedā evāyam, yathāva hi gotvāśvatvādayah sāmānyaviśeṣā vastvavacchedahetutvād(2) anātmabhūtār vastunāh(2) tathā samsthānam api. tathā ca tadupamarde vastvātmavāvāśiṣyat. satyam etat. dosāntarābhidhītasyā tv etad avyapekṣitam(4): “Hereby he formulates the cause for ascertaining its existence. The meaning is that due to a particular effect the [difference of material] shape whose nature consists in a collocation of parts is inferred. But surely this is only a difference of dependent properties. For in the exact same way as particular general properties such as cowhood and horsehood do not have status as essential natures of material objects (vastu) because they are causes of delimiting objects, so also the material shape; and thus, when it is destroyed nothing but the nature of a material object is left. This is true. However, this is not taken into consideration with a wish to present other problems.”

Annotations

(1) ñāya<ga>ter em.: ñāyjavater Ms
(2) T translates in accordance with Ms sāmānyaviśeṣāvastvavacchedahetutvāt as spyi dañ khyad par gya dnos po ma yin pa gcod pa ‘i rgyu ñid kyi phyir which is meaningless in the context. T reflects a common translation error caused by scriptura continua.
(3) T 183,33 interprets gen. sg. vastunāh as nom. pl., cf. loc.cit. dnos po rnam.s
(4) ’di la bltos par byas pa T 183,35 for etad avyapekṣitam.

295 Cf. Ms 215a3-4: samsthānaviśeṣakṛte gaur aśva ity evam abhidhāne sati katham bhedasyāvivakṣā. athavā tatkrte hi tayos tathābhidhāne(1) iti dvivacanam evaitat. abhidhānam sābdo ’bhidiyate neneśī kṛtvā: “When there is a denotation like ‘cow’ or ‘horse’ which is caused by difference of material shape, why would there be no intention to express the difference [of material shape]? Or rather, [in the phrase] “since the two denotations of these two in this way [viz. as ‘cow’ and ‘horse’, respectively] is caused by this [difference of material shape] [the expression abhidhāne] is definitely a dual form. A word is a ‘denotation’ (abhidhānam) on the grounds that it denotes.”

(1) Cf. no. [141] above.
Although it is crucial for understanding the argument.

(1) U tpa la dan snon po bzin no V would indicate that the translators read o\textsuperscript{vat} and interpreted it accordingly instead of vato. U tpa la snon po la sog pa’i don la K shows no trace of the possessive suffix vato. Neither version reproduces the affix \textit{tvā}, although it is crucial for understanding the argument.

(2) Cf. \textit{phyir} K and the syntactically analogous use of \textit{tato} in the paraphrase of the argument at Ms B 215a5 below no. 297.

296 Cf. PST Ms B 215a5: \textit{nilagunotpalajātīviśesamato} \textsuperscript{(1)} ’rthasya na gavāśvavat samsthānabhedaḥ tato na tadvad nilotpalādiśabdavatā sāmāṇādhikaranavat gavāśvādiśabdānām: “The referent that is possessed of the quality blueness and the particular general property lotusness has no difference of material shape like a cow and a horse. Therefore words like ‘cow’ and ‘horse’ are not co-referential in the particular general property lotusness has no difference of material shape like a cow and a horse. Therefore words like ‘cow’ and ‘horse’ are not co-referential in the same way as these viz. words like ‘blue’ and ‘lotus’.”

\textsuperscript{(1)} \textit{viśesamato} em. : \textit{viśemato Ms

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297 Cf. PST Ms B 215a7-215b1: na hi dirghaparimanaṇḍalādīnī ekatra samāvīṣṭāni. etena tadabhāvavāvahārasiddhyai svabhāvānupalāmbham āha. caśabdo na ceṣṭam bhavato ‘pīty arthadyotanāvā\textsuperscript{(1)}’. ghaṭatvasattvadravyatvādyabhiyātiker anekasamsthānasaṃvedais prasaṣṭaye: “If different general properties are manifested because of difference of material shape, it follows [absurdly] that many material shapes would co-occur in one entity because it manifests such general properties as potness, existence, and substanceness.”

\textsuperscript{(1)} arthadyotanāvā em. : arthaḥ | dyotanāvā Ms

298 Annotations
<gavaśvādīnāṃ punah> tulyātulyam adhikaraṇam <syād> anabhidheyatvāt sattādivyaṇjakatvāc ca gotvādivyaṇjakatvāt. Restored, cf. PST Ms B 215b2-3: idānim tv anabhidheyatvāt sattādravyatvādivyaṇjakatvāc ca tulyam gotvāsvatvav- 
yāṇjakatvāc cātulyam iti tulyātulyam adhikaraṇam.

298 Cf. PST Ms B 215b1-3: pūrvaṃ gotvāsvatvābhyaṃ(1) viśeṣo 'nabhidheyatvāc cāviṃsa iti tulyātulyam adhikaraṇam uktam. idānim tv anabhidheyatvāt sattādravyatvādivyaṇjakatvāc ca tulyam gotvāsvatvavāṇjakatvāc cātulyam iti tulyātulyam adhikaraṇam: “Previously the substance was said to be similar and dissimilar on the assumption that the difference is due to cowhood and horsehood, and the non-difference is due to not being the denotable object. Now, on the other hand, the substance is similar and dissimilar on the assumption (iti) that it is similar because of not being denotable, and because of manifesting existence and substancess, and so on, and dissimilar because of manifesting cowhood and horsehood.”

(1) gotvāsvatvā em. (cf. rta ŋid T) : gotvāo Ms

299 Cf. PST Ms B 215b5: yadi samsthānam eva sāmānyasyābhivyājakam abhyupeyate, gunatvakarmatvādīnām anabhivyaktripasaṅgaḥ, teśām asamsthāna- 
vattvāt: “If it is assumed that the material shape alone manifests the general property, it has the [absurd] consequence that there is no manifestation of qualityness and actionness because they do not possess material shape.”


300 Cf. PST Ms B 215b6-7: samsthānapakṣasya duṣṭatvāt tam utsriya pakṣāntaram avalambate: dravyaṅgakārmasu dravyatvādīvyākṣiṣetraḥ śaktiviśeṣo 'sti. tato na guṇakarmagatasāmānyānām abhivyaktidoṣāḥ: “Since the theory of material is faulty he gives it up and clings to another theory, namely that there is a particular power in substances, qualities, and actions, which is the cause of manifestation of substanteness, etc. Therefore there is no problem concerning the manifestation of general properties included in quality and action.” For the Vaiśeṣika concept of śaktibheda, cf. PBh § 381: yathā kuṇḍadadhaṁ saṃyogaikatve bhavyatī aśrayāśrayībhāvaniyamah, tathā dravyatvādinām api samavāyīkate ‘pi vyāṅgavāyāṅjaśaktibhedād ādhārādheṇyaniyamah. Mallavādī discusses this view at NC, cf. NCV 533,9ff. For the concept of śakti, cf. Halbfass 1992: 72f, and passim.

301 Cf. PST Ms B 215b7-216a1: naitad evam anekāntā. tathā hi ghaṭasyānekasāmānyavattvāt tadyavatāu śaktibheda bhuyapagantavyah. tatas caikasyāpi śaktibhedadarśanāt, nālam śaktibheda bhedapratipādanāya: “This is not the case because of uncertainty. That is, since a pot possesses many general properties difference of power is to be assumed with respect to their manifestation. And therefore difference of power is not sufficient for explaining difference [of substance and the rest] because even a single [substance] is observed to have different powers.”


302 Cf. PST Ms B 216a1-2: bhinnam hi višeṣanām višeṣasyasya bhedapratipādantālam iti tayor eva bhedaṁ paryanuyuktē: “For a distinct qualifier is sufficient for explaining the difference of the qualified. With this in mind he enquires about the difference between the two.”


(1) Cf. brjod par bya ba śid las (cf. the syntactical parallel gavādiśābda-vācyatayaiva, q.v. below no. 304) K : raṇ raṇ gi sgras (sic) brjod par bya ba de dag V.
(2) Cf. PST Ms B 216a2-3, q.v. no. 304 below.

303 Cf. PST Ms B 216a2-3: sarvāpamātranimitapraṇāyay yadṛcchāśābdayaḥ gavādiśābdaś ca gotvādiṣu bāhyapraṇāyinīnimitābhāvād yadṛcchāśābdayaḥ. tadbhidheyaṁ eva(1) tesām viśeṣah. gotvādāya hi yadṛcchāśābda-viśayā gavādiśābda-vācyatayaiva vastvantarād viśiṣyanta iti śābdā manyante: “Words like ‘dīthha’ are arbitrary terms whose cause of application is their mere own form. And words like ‘cow’ are arbitrary terms with regard to cowhood, etc. because they are without external cause of application. Their difference is the mere fact that they are their denotable objects. For [general properties] like cowhood that are the objects of arbitrary terms are differentiated from other [general] entities (vastvantarā) merely by being the denotable objects of words like ‘cow’. This is what the grammarians think.”
The only property that characterizes general properties is that they are entities (vastutva) devoid of any other distinguishing property. Since general properties as entities per definition are devoid of other general properties (nihsāṁanyānī sāmānyānī), their denotation is without cause of application. Consequently the semantic condition for their denotation is similar to that of arbitrary terms whose cause of application is their own form (svārūpa).

It has not been possible to trace an explicit statement of the view which Dignāga’s opponent mentions, to Sanskrit grammatical literature, although related views of the function of svārūpa as cause of application, when denoting a general property, are taken for granted by Bhartṛhari, cf., e.g., VP III.1:6f; Kaiyata at Mahā-bh-Pr IV p. 341,11-13: gavādayo yadā jātmātravācīnas tadā tebyāyaḥ śabdasyaivāpe pratyayaḥ, tathā hi arthe jātatuḥ śabdasyaivāputam adhyaste, yo gosabdaḥ sa evārtha iti, tatāh śabdasyaivāputam eva tatra pravṛttinīmūttam, nānyat: “When [words] like “cow” denote the mere general property, the (bhāva) affix [cf. A V.1:119] serves to denote the own form of the words when introduced after these. That is, the own form of the word is superimposed upon the general property in the referent at the thought “the word ‘cow’ is the same as the referent.” Therefore only the own form of the word is the cause of application to it, nothing else.”

For Dignāga’s treatment of the semantic conditions of arbitrary terms, cf. § 64 and no. 597.

After explaining the view of the grammarians, Jinendrabuddhi addresses the objection that the difference between ‘dittha,’ etc. exists per se, cf. PST Ms B 216a3-5: nanu ca ditthādīnām svato ‘py asti viśeṣaḥ. śabdāmātrāhite hi viśeṣe ‘nāhitasamjñāyos tadaharājatayor viśeṣo nopapadyeta. naiṣa doṣaḥ, śabdavyāpāre bheda ‘yam cintyate, na tu ārthasane(3) na ca śabdavyāpāre ditthāder viśeṣaṇam apiṇam asti: “Certainly the difference between ‘dittha,’ etc. also exists per se. For if the difference were merely effected by the word, it would not be justified that there is difference between two [persons] born at the same day, who have not yet been given a name. This is not a problem. The difference is conceived with regard to the function of the word, not with regard to observation. And with regard to the function of the word its qualification is not other than that of [proper names like] ‘dittha,’ etc.”

(1)ōtvam eva em.: ov(ōtvam e?)va Ms
(2)Cf. the use of the term arthajāti in Bhartṛhari’s VP I 15a, III.1:6c, 8c, 11a which denotes the “general property inherent in a referent upon which the general property inherent in a word is superimposed as its cause of application;” cf. Ṣhelarāja VPPr Vol. I p. 8,1-3 ad VP III.1: 8cd): nihsāmānyānī sāmānyānity arthajātānī svato jātmātrihitvaatkāram chabdapravayānurvyrttilaśaṇaḥ śabdārthayoh so ‘yam ity abhedena sambhandhac chabdasiṣamvāyinī jātir arthenādhyaśāropitēbhādē samapādayantī tādātmānaḥ sampadyatī ity upacaryate.
(3)na tu ārthasane conj. (ma mtho ba la ni ma yin no (?)) T : na upaladārštāne Ms T would seem to presuppose the reading adārštane which makes no sense in the present context.

[159] bheda vācakabhedāc cet(1). Cf. PST Ms B 216a5: cetyādi.
(1)cet conj (cf. Že na K : Žes na V) : ca Ms (ces T).

[304] Cf. PST Ms B 216a5: śabdasyaivāntar bheda nārthasyeti yāvat.
avishiṣte hi vastuni abhidhāyakena śabdenābhedopacārāṇa

viśīṣtasāmānyābhīvyaṅjakatvam iti.

abhidhānabhedād api dṛṣṭo bhedaś caitrādīvīd <iti ceto.

na, tasyaiva parikṣayatvād, ekasāpya <cā>(1)nekaparyāyaśabdenābhidheyatvāti. Restored, cf. PST Ms B 216a5-6: avishiṣte hi vastuni abhidhāyakena śabdenābhedopacārāṇa(2) tataś ca na vaktavyam viśīṣtasthāvyaṅjakatvam gavādayo viśīṣṭāḥ. abhidhānabhedād api dṛṣṭo bhedaś caitrādīvīd iti; 216b3-4: abhidhānabhedād api dṛṣṭo bhedaś caitrādīvīd iti; 216a6: na tasyaiva parikṣayatvād iti; 216a7: ekasāpyi pītyaati; 216b3: ekasāpyi anekaparyāyaśabdenābhidheyatvād iti.

(1)ca conj.
(2)abhedem. (cf. thā mi dad pa né bar btags pa’i phyir T): “ena bhed” Ms

305 Cf. PST Ms B 216b6: tasyaivaḥabhidhānakrtasya bhedasya caitrādiśv api gotvādiśv iva parikṣayatvāt: kiṃ caitrāmaitrayoḥ svato bhedaḥ, āhosvid abhidhānabhedād iti: “Because the difference that is made by the denotation is subject to criticism also in the case of Caitra, like in the case of cowhood, etc.: Is the difference due to their manifesting their own general property or speech unit (abda) or speech unit (śabda), its sāmānyalakṣaṇa, is constituted by exclusion of other referents or speech units, the referent or speech unit being the substrate of exclusion of other referents or speech units, cf. PSV V 36d with note 460.

306 Cf. PST Ms B 216b7: paryāyaśabdādair anekāntād iti tato bhedaḥ prātiyate ity arthāḥ.

307 Cf. ‘on kyaṅ spyi las bye brag tu byas par zad na V: spyi daṅ khyad par gyis byas pas yin no K.

The general property of any given referent (artha) or speech unit (śabda), its sāmānyalakṣaṇa, is constituted by exclusion of other referents or speech units, the referent or speech unit being the substrate of exclusion of other referents or speech units, cf. PSV V 36d with note 460.

308 Cf. PST Ms B 216b1-4: gośābdāśvāśabdāyaḥ kimkṛta viṣēṣā ity ukte ‘vaśyāṃ’(1) vaktavyam svasāmānyābhīvyaṅjakatvena viṣēṣā iti. tathā hi gośābdaco gośābdatvaśya vyāñjako vyāśabdaco tv aśvāśabdaco.<tvaušṣyati. evaṃ yadi bhinnasāmānyābhīvyaṅjakatvād gavādīśvāśabdābheda īsyaie, svato bhedaṛaśaṅgah. tathā hi sāmānyaviṣēṣena gośābdatvaśīnā sāhābhāpocārāḥ, upacārāto bhedaḥ, na tu vāstavāḥ, ekasāpya ca gośābdasya sābdatvaśvāśabdavagunatvaśīnām vyāñjakaṭvād anekāparāśaṅgah. athābhiddhānakṛta viṣěṣāḥ, tad ayuktaṃ “ekasāpya anekaparyāyaśābdabhidheyatvād” ity eso ‘ṛtho(2) iva vićāraḥ: athāvā tatrārtha iva vićāra iti śābdasāmānaye: kimkṛto ‘sya bheda iti pāvīva vac ca vićāra kartavyaḥ: “When it is asked how the difference between the word ‘cow’ and the word ‘horse’ is caused, it is necessarily to be answered that the difference is due to their manifesting their own general properties. That is, the word ‘cow’ manifests [the general property] cow-wordness, the word ‘horse’, on the other hand, manifests [the general property] horse-wordness. Thus, if it is claimed that words like ‘cow’ are different because they manifest different general properties it follows [absurdly] that the difference is not per se. That is, on account of transfer [of the word ‘cow’ to cow-wordness] in the form of identity with the particular general property cow-wordness, the difference is due to transfer, but it is not a substantial one. And because a single word ‘cow’ manifests [the general properties] wordness, cow-wordness, qualityness,
and so on, it follows [absurdly] that it is many. If, on the other hand, the difference
is caused by the denotation, this is not justified because one [referent] is denoted
by many synonyms. Thus the analysis is like that of the referent. Or [alternatively],
in this case the statement “the analysis is like that of the referent” means like that of
the general property of the word: the analysis is to be performed like before [asking]
’whereby is the difference caused’”?

(1) ‘vaśyaṃ em. : ‘vaśya° Ms
(2) em. : arthaḥ | iva Ms


309 Cf. PST Ms B 216b4-5: svalaṅkṣanam prayākṣyasya viśayah. tac cāsādha-
ranatvād nārthena saha prāg dṛṣṭam. na ca pūrvam agrhūtasambandhasya vācaka-
tvam samasti: “The object of immediate sensation is the individual [word]. And this
has not been observed previously together with its referent because it is not
common. And a word whose connection with [its referent] has not been appre-
hended does not denote.” For the implications of this discussion, cf. no. 401 below.

311 Dignāga points out that even the perceptible difference between the usage of
educated people and that of children and uneducated ones does not involve any
difference of referent. His argument no doubt reflects similar discussions in
Bhartṛhari’s VP; cf., e.g., VPV I 228,7ff where Bhartrhari addresses the question of
the denotation of so-called corrupted speech forms (apabhraṃśa), among which he
mentions gāvī and gonī that are used to denote the object to which educated (śiṣṭa)
people refer as ’gauḥ’. Since Dignāga claims that only the general speech form
(sāmānya), i.e., the word type, denotes, the question arises as to how he understands
the difference between forms like gonī and gauḥ in terms of the alleged denotative
function of the general property. Jīnendrabuddhi explains Dignāga’s statement at Ms
B 216b5-7: yam evārtham śiṣṭaprayuktah śabda āha, tam evāśiṣṭaprayukto ’pi. yadi
cā svalaṅkṣanabhedena bhidyamānāḥ śabdaś tasya tasyārthasya vācakaḥ syuḥ, tato
gonyādiśabdaiḥ sa evārtho na gamyeta, gamyate ca. tasmād viśeṣo na vācakaḥ,
sāmānyam eva vācakam. evam aśiṣṭaprayuktād api śabdā tasyaivārthasyāvagatir
bhavati sāmānyasyābhinnatvād, nānyathā: “The word that is used by an uneducated
person denotes the same referent even when it is used by an educated one. If the
words that differ because of difference of the individual [words] were to denote this
or that referent, the same referent would not be understood from words like gonī,
etc. Yet it is understood. Therefore the particular does not denote, only the general property denotes. Thus a view, even when it is used by an uneducated person, causes understanding of the same referent because the general property [of the word] is the same, but not otherwise."

As it appears Jinendrabuddhi’s commentary is not particularly clear on the question of how the sāmāṇya is involved in the denotation of the word gone, but since forms like gone are described as particulars (svalaksana), it seems natural to conclude that he assumes that the denotation of the so-called apabhramśa forms is mediated through the general property of the alleged correct form viz. gauḥ. This view apparently presupposes that apabhramśa forms are ultimately based upon so-called correct (sādhau) forms (cf. VPV I 229,1f), incorrect forms denoting by means of inference of the correct underlying form, cf. VP I:141ab: te (scil. apabhramśāḥ) sādhasya anumāṇena pratyayotpatihetavah; VP III:3:30: asādhur anumāṇena vācakaḥ kaiścid iṣyate, vācakatvāviśeṣe vā niyamah pumapāpāyoh. Cf. Helarāja ad loc. VP P. Vol I 143,12ff (quoting on p. 144,5 the relevant passage from Mahā-bhūta prābyoktavye babhyaḥ; cf. Candrāṇañcāṇa IV 82ff. etc. manifested by the of its own substrate, the cognition 'head' is due to that [viz. due to the differences of of the parts. That is, when the property headhood is

anumāṇaḥ tu sambhandhād aksīmkocātivad apabhramśāḥ pratyayaviśeṣaḥ anugabhavam upagac-chanti; cf. Paddhati ad loc. sādhusabdād abdavyavadhāḥ anumāṇapakṣena dvītyaḥ: yathā lingam svajñānavyavahānena linginam anumāpayati. yathā va anumeyajñānam sāmāṇyākārvavayavadhānena svalaksanam. apabhrāṃśāḥ iti: tathā gonyādayaḥ sābdā gośabdavyavahānena. yatra srotut evam buddhir bhavati gośabdāḥ ‘svabhidhītoṣṭaḥ śābdasaṃsād saśaktē vēnīdē yāṇām jñānam janayantīt iti aviśeṣam āha pratyakṣapakṣena iti: yathā pratyakṣam avyavahitam jñā-nañtareṇa svaviṣayaṃ bodhayati tathā sādhusabdasaṃbandhāḥ sābdāntarāvya-vahitāḥ, anumāṇapakṣena dvītyaḥ: yathā lingam svajñānavyavahānena linginam anumāpayati. yathā va anumeyajñānam sāmāṇyākārvavayavadhānena svalaksanam. apabhrāṃśāḥ iti: tathā gonyādayaḥ sābdā gośabdavyavahānena. yatra srotut evam buddhir bhavati gośabdāḥ ‘svabhidhītoṣṭaḥ śābdasaṃsād asaṃktaḥ va gonyādayam ucca-rayati; VP P. Vol I 233,1-4; VP III:3:55: rūpaṇavyapadesābhyam āyukte vartmanī sthitau, jñānam praty abhilāpam ca sadṛśau bālapanditau. This verse is the third in Dignāga’s Traikālyaparikṣā; cf. Helarāja VP P. Vol I: 163: 9-10: yathā bālo vikal-pavaty atham abhidhatte ca, evam paramārthhadārśanāḥ vidvāmso ’pi. The problem of the relation between correct and incorrect forms is addressed by Dharmakīrti at VN I 44,12ff, cf. VN II 82ff.

312 Children’s usage involves morpho-phonetic distortion, cf. ambāmbā iti prayoktave bāla ambakete prabhāṣate, Paddhati 232,13 ad VP I:179.

313 Cf. bye brag de dag las V : om. K.

314 Dignāga quotes VS X.11: sīrā prṣṭham udaram pānir iti tadvīśeṣehyyah, for which, cf. Čandrāṇanda ad loc.: svasāmāṃvīśeṣeṣehyyah śrīrāṅvādibhiyoh yēṣu jñā-nam jāyate (te) śrīrāddayo ‘vayāvā ity arthah; Ms B 216b7- 217a1: śrā iti jñānam yāvat pānir iti yaj jñānam tad avayavasamsthānaviśeṣehyya ity arthah, tathā hi yadā śrīrāṅvāṃ svāṣravasamsthān在全国に普及している

bhāvati: “The meaning is this: The cognition 'head' up to the cognition 'hand' is due to the differences of of the parts. That is, when the property headhood is manifested by the of its own substrate, the cognition 'head' is due to that [viz. headhood].”
Cf. de dag gi ltar na yaṅ V : de yi khyad par de dag kyaṅ K.

vyāṇjakavyaktito bhede <prāptam anyonyasāṃśrayaṃ>(1). Restored, cf. PST Ms B 217a1: vyāṇjakavyaktito bheda ityādi.

(1) For 23b, cf. ŚV Ākṛti° 50b: prāptam anyonyasaṃśrayam, no. 317 below.

vyāṇjakadrayavakṛtā vyaktih svasāṁśānasvarūpaprakāśanam. tato bhede(1) sāmānyasyesamāna itaretarāśrayam vyākhyānam prāpnoti, anyatārasāyāpy apraśṭatvatā. tataś ca na parasparahadapratipādanāyālam(2): “The manifestation that is effected by the manifesting substance means the act of bringing to light the own form of its own general property. If the difference of the general property is claimed to be due to that, the explanation becomes necessarily circular because [the difference] of the other is not cognized. And therefore it is not capable of explaining their mutual difference.”

Dignāga’s argument is reproduced in similar terms by Kumārila in ŚV Ākṛti° 49b-50b, although with a different intention: vyāṇjakasya tu kīṃkṛtaḥ | bheda hastyādipādhyāyaḥ? svataś cet, iha tatsamam || vyāṅgajātīvīśeṣāc cet, prāptam anyonyasaṃśrayam.

(1)°e em.: °a Ms
(2) na ... ¯āyālam em. (for alam ‘capable of’, ‘able to’ constructed with the dative, cf. A II.3 [13+]: 16, cf. nus pa ma yin T): ¯āyāṃ Ms


Cf. PST Ms B 217a4: dravyasya sattādeś canekasvabhāvāvatvam syāt: “The substance and [the property] existence, and so on, would have many intrinsic natures.”

Cf. PST Ms B 217a5 on 23cd: bahūnāṃ vyaktar bahubhiś ca vyakter iti.

Cf. manṭ po gsal bar byed pa’i phyir daṅ maṅ po rnams kyis gsal ba’i phyir maṅ po gsal ba yin no K : gsal ba maṅ po žes bya ba ni maṅ po rnams ky i gsal ba daṅ maṅ po rnams ky i gsal ba ste V.

Dravyād dhi <bahusāmānyasya> sattāder <vyaktih>. Restored, cf. PST Ms B 217a5: dravyād dhitī ... sattāder iti.

Cf. PST Ms B 217a5-6: ādiśabdena ghāṭatvapārthivatvādīni grhyante.

Cf. PST Ms B 217a5: ghāṭādikāt.

Cf. PST on the use of ādi no. 321 above.
323 The term *guna* is here as elsewhere used of the general properties that are supposed to inhere in substances, cf. PST Ms B 217b2: *gunaḥ sāmānyaviśeṣaḥ* īhāhipretaḥ. tena sambandhah. tadbhedāt. Jinendrabuddhi refers to PS V:22a2 at Ms 217b2: yathoktaṃ: sāmānyabhedābhivyāṉjatvāt.

324 Jinendrabuddhi refers to PSV V:22b, cf. PST Ms B 217b3: yathoktaṃ: śaktibhedaṃ svasāmānyabhivyāṉjatvād dravyādiśu bheda iti.


326 Cf. Jinendrabuddhi’s paraphrase of Dignāga’s argument Ms B 217a6-217b1: tad evam ekaṃ ghaṭādidravyam anekeśām pārthivatvādināṃ vyāņjakam iti tasyānekasvabhāvatvaprasaṅgaḥ. yadi vyāņgasāmānyabhedād dravyabhedāḥ, tathā sattādīsamānyam anekena pārthivatvādinām dravyena vyāfyata iti tasyāpy anekeśavabhāvata prasajyate. yadi vyāņjakadravyabhedāt sāmānyabheda 'bhuyepyate. tasmān na vyāņjakadravyabhedāt sāmānyabheda nāpi vyāņgasāmānyabhedād dravyabheda 'nekāntād iti.

327 Cf. PST Ms B 217b4: evaṃ tadvadabhidhānapaṃśe sāmānādhiṣṭhakaṃ sāṃānyabhavāḥ.

328 Cf. PS V:4a above with PSV ad loc.; PST Ms B 217b4-5: “tadvato nāsvatanaṃtavād” (4a) ity atra hy etadbhedatvam uktam. atadbhedatve ca yathā sāmānādhiṣṭhakaṃ na sambhavati, tathā viśeṣaṇaviśeṣyabhāvo ‘pi. bhedaḥ hi śaṃānyāṃ viśeṣyante, nābhedena.

329 According to Jinendrabuddhi, Dignāga is now introducing an exception to the general rule of exclusion formulated at the beginning of the *apoha* chapter, so as to avoid the conclusion that the general rule also applies to the referents of general terms, particular terms, and synonyms, cf. PST Ms B 217b6-7: śaṃāṣya pravṛttinivrtytathavāt anavyāvyatirekacakodanaṃ vyahāraṃtāt, na(1) tv anyathā iti darsāyitum pūrvaṃ kṛtakatvādīvā svārtham anyāpohena śabdo bhāṣata (cf. PS V:1cd above) ity uktam. tasyedānāṃ anyatve ‘pītyādīnāpavādāṃ āha. yaḥ utṣṛṣṭam “anyāpohena bhāṣata” (PS V:1d above) iti tat sāmānyaviśeṣaparyāyasyaśabdārtha-parihāreṇeti.

(1)na conj. (cf. ma yin T) : om. Ms
Characterization of non-exclusion in conflict, i.e., not being in conflict, and synonyms are not in conflict, although they are different because terms like 'earth,' 'śimśapā,' and 'taru' (tree) are not in conflict; it excludes cloth, etc. because of conflict.

ŚVT 69,27-70,1 on ŚV Apoha° 148: atra bhikṣuṇā vrksaḥ śimśapeti sāmāṇḍhi-karanyam darsayatoktam: vrksas tarur iti paryāyaṇām ca parasparam anapahytam. anyatve 'pi na sāmāṇḍhahaparyāyavācīnām avirodhāt, virodhāc ca paṭaṇām apohitā iti: “The word ‘tree’ does not exclude the referent of a general terms, a particular term, and a synonym although they are different because terms like 'earth,' ‘śimśapā,’ and ‘taru’ are not in conflict; and it excludes cloth, etc. because of conflict.”

Cf. NR 429,32: yad api sāmāṇḍhyaviśeṣaśabdhām śimśapāvṛksādīnām paryāyaṇām ca taruāvṛksādānām avirodhānānapahākavatnām uktam: anyatve 'pi na sāmāṇḍhahaparyāyavācīnām <m avirodhād> (1) iti.

(1) yā em. : yo Ms
(1) So probably read: om. NR.

330 Since the property of being other is the cause of exclusion, not being in conflict, i.e., not being other, explains why the referents of general terms, particular terms, and synonyms are not excluded, cf. PST Ms B 217b7-218a1: anyatvaṃ cāpohe nimittam, avirodhā iti anapahytāyām hetuh. (1) yā aviruddhā na ite parasparebhyo druhyantī nāpohanti, yathā rūpādaya dravye. NCV 637,15-16: anyatve sāmāṇḍaḥaparyāyaśabdhānām arthāṃ vrksaṃśrutīr nāpohate prthiviśim-śā-pāvṛksādīsabdhānām avirodhāt, virodhāc ca paṭaṇām apohitā iti: “Since the referent is dealt with by a single [synonym] a second one is not applied as they have the same capability, the two of them have the same reference, like [the synonyms] ‘taru’ and ‘vrksa.’”

(1) yathā taruvṛksā° conj. : yasthā [prasth?] ayoh Ms (dper na bye brag dag bzin no T, which is incomprehensible in the context; the the translator may have had difficulties interpreting the Sanskrit Ms; the proposed conj. is based on the examples mentioned at NR 429,32 q.v. no. 331 above).

332 Another reason for non-exclusion according to Jīnendrabuddhi, cf. PST Ms B 218a4: anapahytāyām hetvantaram āha.


[172] avirodhāt. paryāyaśabdasya <tāvat>(1) tulyam apohyam yugapad aprayogāt, na ca svārtha-prapacepako yuktah. Restored, cf. PST Ms B 218a1-2, 4: avirodhā iti ... paryāyāvasadyetādī, tulyam apohyam iti ... yugapad aprayogād iti ... na ca svārtha-prapacepekpo yuktā itī.

(1) Cf. re zig KV.

330 Since the property of being other is the cause of exclusion, not being in conflict, i.e., not being other, explains why the referents of general terms, particular terms, and synonyms are not excluded, cf. PST Ms B 217b7-218a1: anyatvaṃ cāpohe nimittam, avirodhā iti anapahytāyām hetuh. (1) yā aviruddhā na ite parasparebhyo druhyantī nāpohanti, yathā rūpādaya dravye. NCV 637,15-16: anyatve sāmāṇḍaḥaparyāyaśabdhānām arthāṃ vrksaṃśrutīr nāpohate prthiviśim-śā-pāvṛksādīsabdhānām avirodhāt, virodhāc ca paṭaṇām apohitā iti: “Since the referent is dealt with by a single [synonym] a second one is not applied as they have the same capability, the two of them have the same reference, like [the synonyms] ‘taru’ and ‘vrksa.’”

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332 Another reason for non-exclusion according to Jīnendrabuddhi, cf. PST Ms B 218a4: anapahytāyām hetvantaram āha.

[173] sāmāṇḍyasaṃsabdenāpi svabhedaḥ arthāntaram vyudastam bhedaśabdo ‘numodato, (1) arthāvī. Restored, cf. PST Ms B 218a5-6: sāmāṇḍyasaṃsabdenāpityādi ... svabhedaḥ śimśapādāyah tesa arthāntaram ghaṭādi vyudastam vrksaśabdena bhedaśabdhā śimśapāsābdo ‘numodato evārthīvī. 

Annotations
have the form of pot, etc. Thus its excluded referents are also pot, etc. And these are

general term. That is, the referent of the word ‘tree’ is not in conflict with a general term. The word ‘tree’ does not have the form of pot, etc. In the same way it does not have the form of pot, etc. Thus its excluded referents are also pot, etc. And these are excluded by the word ‘tree.’"

333 For instance the word ‘śimśapā’.

334 That is, the term ‘tree’ (vrkṣa).

335 Such as pot, etc. (ghaṭādi).

336 That is śimśapā and the rest, cf. PST Ms B 218a5-6: sāmānyāsābdasya vrkṣaśābdasya yat svavrksatvasāmānyaṃ tasyā bhedāḥ svabhedāḥ śimśapādayah.

337 Cf. PST Ms B 218a6: arthāḥ hi śimśapāśabdo ghaṭādiyuddāsena: “For the word ‘śimśapā’ is in need of the exclusion of pot, etc.”

338 Cf. PST Ms B 218a5-6: sāmānyāsābdasya vrkṣaśābdasya yat svavrksatvasāmānyaṃ tasyā bhedāḥ svabhedāḥ śimśapādayah.

339 Cf. PST Ms B 218a6-218b1: etena ghaṭādyapohenārthitvā ekārthakārītām udbhāvayaḥ bhedaśabdaḥ sāmānyāsabdena na virudhyata iti darśayati. tathā hi pāḷāśādirūpaḥ śimśapāśabdasārtho na bhavatiṣṭī. tasya pāḷāśadayo ‘pohyāḥ. tathā ghaṭādirūpo ‘pi na bhavatiṣṭi. ghaṭādayo ‘pohyāḥ. te ca vrksyaśabdenāpohyante: “Thereby, arguing that they have the same purpose because they are in need of the exclusion of pot, and so on, he shows that a particular term is not in conflict with a general term. That is, the referent of the word ‘śimśapā’ does not have the form of pāḷāśa, etc. Thus its excluded referents are pāḷāśa, etc. In the same way it does not have the form of pot, etc. Thus its excluded referents are also pot, etc. And these are excluded by the word ‘tree.’"

340 Cf. PST Ms B 218b1-3: svasya sāmānyasya vrksatvasya yat sāmānyam pāṛthivatvam tacchabdaḥ pāṛthivaśabdaḥ sāmānyasāmānyasabdaḥ. tena yaḥ vyavāsyaṃ apāṛthivādi tac chimsapāśabdo ‘numanyate ‘ṛthivāt. yathā hi śimśapā na pāḷāṣaḥ. evam(2) nāpāṛthivādy(3) api. evam āvṛttīyā adravyasyāsataḥ ca dravyaśacchabdaḥbhyaṃ nirākṛtyamānāsyārthitvād abhyanumodanaṃ yojyaṃ: “The word ‘earthen’ denoting the general property earthenness that is the general property of its own general property, is a general term’s general term. The word ‘śimśapā’ approves that non-earthen things, and so on, are to be excluded by it because it is in need of it. For just as a śimśapā [tree] is not a pāḷāṣa [tree], so it is not not
[something] earthen, and so on, either. Thus the approval is to be applied by recursion because it needs that non-substances and non-existent things are excluded by the words ‘substance’ and ‘existent.’

(2)opalāsāh, ev° conj. : “palāśasya cey° Ms

(3)nāpārthivādy conj. : nāpādīvādy Ms (cf. chu la s gyur pa ni`id la sogs T = āpādītvādi; the translator of T evidently read āpādītvādi as translated. However, it makes no sense in the context).

[176] tathā sāmānyaśabdaḥ svārtham abhiprete viśaye vyavasthāpyamānam viśesāśabdena viśesaviṣeṣaśabdena vā katham nopeksate. Āven avirodhāt sāmānyādīśabdārthāpohō na yuyate>. Restored, cf. PSṬ Ms B 218b3-5: tathā sāmānyaśabda ityādi ... svārtham(1) sattādikam abhiprete viśaye vyavasthāpyamānam iti ... viśesāśabdena ... viśesaviṣeṣaśabdena vā ... katham nopeksate.

(1)‘am sat° em. : "asat° Ms

341 That is, for instance, the word ‘existent’ and its own referent existence, cf. PSṬ Ms B 218b3: sāmānyaśabdo ‘pi sadādiḥ. svārtham sattādikam.

342 That is, e.g., a substance as defined by a property, and so on, cf. PSṬ Ms B 218b4: guṇādīvavyacchinne(1) dravyādau.

(1)vyacchinne em. (cf. rnam pa bcad pa’i T) : vyavasthinne Ms

343 A particular term is a term like ‘substance’, and a particular term’s particular term comprises in descending order terms like ‘earthen,’ ‘tree,’ ‘śimśapā’, and so on, cf. PSṬ Ms B 218b5: viśesāśabdena dravyādīnā, viśesaviṣeṣaśabdena vā pārthivavrksaśimśapāśabādīnā.

344 Cf. PSṬ Ms B 218b5-6: arthī hi svaviṣayāvasthānena(1) nirviṣayasya svārthasyānupapatteḥ. anenābhīṣṭārayasaṃpādānāt viśesāśabdaḥ sāmānyaśabdasāyopakārī, tataḥ ca sāmānyaśabdās tena na virudhyata iti darsāyati: “For [the general term] is in need of being confined to its proper domain since it is not justified if its proper referent is without domain. Since the intended referent is realised by means of it [viz. the general term], the particular term is assisting the general term; and therefore he points out that the general term is not in conflict with it.”

(1)savviṣayāva° em. (cf. rañ gi yul la gnas pas T) : sasvaviṣayāva° Ms


345 Although Dignāga does not explain the linguistic implications of the term samūha, it is clear from Jinendrabuddhi and Simhasūri’s explanations in PSṬ and NCV, respectively, that samūha in the present context denotes any given string consisting of 1, two speech units such as stem (prakṛti) and affix (pratyaya), 2, two speech units constituting a compound (sāmāśa), 3, two speech units (i.e., syntactical words) constituting a sentence (vākya); and 4, a sentence consisting of more than two syntactical words. According to Dignāgan theory, the sentence is the principal speech unit, cf. PSV V:46 § 61.
Cf. PST Ms B 218b6-7: avirodhād apratikṣepe guṇotkārāṃ darśayati. athavā parasparārthāpratikṣepe hetvantaram āhā. parasparārthāpratikṣepe hi svārtha-viśistāsāmyasa vācakatvam upapadyate, nānyathā.

[178] evaṃ ca sāmānyaviśeṣaśabdayor svārthe sāmānye <vartamānayor> dvayer bahūnām va <tād>vīśistārthaśarasya vācakatvam <upapadyate> yathoktam prāk. Restored, cf. PST Ms B 219a1-2: evaṃ cetī ... dvayer iti ... svārthe vrksasāmānye vārtamaṇam; 219a6-7: bahūnām va ... sarveṣāṃ svārthasāmānye vartamaṇānām ... vācakatvam ... arthaśarasya cābhidhānām; parallel at NCV 647,14-15: evaṃ ca ... sāmānyaviśeṣaśabdayor ityādi yāvad vāyārthavācakatvam: Ms B 218b6-7, q.v. no. 347 above; 219b1: yathoktam prāg iti.

Jinendrabuddhi quotes PS V:15ac explaining that while it shows that the words ‘nila’ and ‘upala’ each separately are without referent in terms of the referent of their aggregate, it also explains that the aggregate denotes a separate referent (arthāntara), cf. PST Ms B 219b1: samudāyārthena pratyekam ānarthakyaṃ nilotpalasabdayor darśayatam samudāyāsvaṁ arthāntarabhādhīyitam uktam.

Jinendrabuddhi quotes as an example of a string consisting of stem and affix the syntactical word vrksam (PST Ms B 219a1: dvayer iti yathā vrksam iti prakṛtipratayayoḥ), which he analyses at PST Ms B 219a1-3 as a combination of the denotation of the nominal stem vrksa and the affix am denoting the direct object (karma): atra hi prātipadikāṃ svārthe vrksasāmānye vartamaṇam karmādivibhātyarthānānām vrksasamānye am ity api pratayayaḥ karmāsāmānye vāsthitayoḥ prātipadikārthānāpohate. evaṃ parasparārtha-pratikṣepe tayer yah samūho vrksam iti so ‘vayavārthaviśīṣṭāsāmyasya’ vācaka upapannah: “For in this case the nominal stem(a) does not reject the referent of the direct object case affix, and so on, while being applied to the general property treeness. And the affix am which is restricted to the general property of being a direct object does not exclude the referents of nominal stems like ‘tree’, etc.; thus, in that there is no mutual rejection of their referents, it is justified that the aggregate of the two viz. vrksa + am denotes a referent that is qualified by the referents of the [two] constituents.”

Jinendrabuddhi continues extending the analysis to the compound nilotpalā at 219a3-6: tathā nilotpalā(2) iti nilotpalasabdayoḥ samāsapatdayoḥ samāsaṛtha-vācakatvam anyonyārthāvyūdāte sati yaJuṣṭā iti yoṣyam. tathā hi nilāsabdayoḥ nilāviśeṣaṃ anupalādaṇaṃ(3) apratikṣipata(4) upalāmutpalavāyitār arthāḥ. utpalāśasya yāpy upalāviśeṣaṃ anilādīnaṃ(5) apratikṣipata(6) nilānīlayavāyitī. samudāyās(7) tv avayavārthābhyaṃ viśīṣṭaḥ: “It is to be construed thus: In the same way as it is justified that the words ‘blue’ and ‘lotus’ viz. the two compounded words of the expression ‘blue lotus’ express a compounded referent in that they do not exclude one another’s referent. That is, although the word ‘blue’ is not rejecting particulars of blue such as non-lotuses, and so on, it has a referent that occurs among lotuses as well as non-lotuses. And although the word ‘lotus’ too is not rejecting particulars of lotus such as [those that are] non-blue, it [has a referent that] occurs among blue as well as non-blue things. The compound, however, is qualified by the referents of the two constitutive parts.”

(a) For the definition of prātipadikā, cf. A I 2:45: arthavādaḥ adhātur apratayayaḥ prātipadikā. The first triplet (prathamaḥ) serves the purpose of denoting the referent of a mere nominal stem (prātipadikārtha[mātra]), cf. A II 2:46.
The commentator mentions as an example of the combination of more than two terms the example: rājapurūsa abhirūpamān āgaccheti: (1) “let the handsome prince come.” (PST Ms B 219a7), cf. NCV 647,18-20 which develops more fully the implications of Dignāga’s concise statement: devadatta tisthati, devadatto gehe tisthati, devadatta gām abhyāja suklām ityādīvitricatuḥpaśicādipadasamūhānāṁ vākyārthavācakatvam.

(1) āgaccheti conj (< āgaccha + iti, cf. śog ces pa T) : apeti Ms

(179) <āha ca> (1) tanmātrākāṅkṣanād bhedāḥ svasāmānyena nojhitah, nopātaḥ smāsāyotpatteḥ, sāmye caikārthaṁ tayoḥ. Qu. TSP 379,7-8; Ms B 219b2–6: tanmātrākāṅkṣanād iti ... nopātta ityādi ... sāmye caikārthaṁ tayor iti; NCV 648,18 (PS V:27cd).

(1) Cf. yan brjod pa V : om. K.

350 Jinendrabuddhi explains that since general and particular terms are not in conflict, Dignāga formulates this verse with reference to the fact that a general term and any of its particulars, e.g., the term, only concerns complements. That is, due to the word ‘tree’ the expectation of a complement that only is for the sake of excluding the expectation of other particulars as exclusion made by somebody, who is in doubt about these particulars. The word ‘only’ is the request for a complement. Moreover, the expectation of a complement, moreover, is the request for a complement. ‘Only’ is for the sake of excluding the expectation of other particulars as complements. That is, due to the word ‘tree’ the expectation of a complement that only concerns palāśa, and so on, arises, but not one that concerns pot, etc. And if palāśa, and so on, were rejected in the same way as pot, and so on, there would be no expectation of a complement with regard to these in the same way as [there would be no expectation of a complement with regard to] pot, etc. And this is the case. Therefore they are not excluded.”

(1) na conj : om. Ms

352 The identity to which Dignāga refers is the identity of the referent of the general term ‘tree’ and any of its particulars, e.g., the term, ‘palāśa,’ which is the presupposition of their being co-referential. Mallavādi substitutes the term tattva for sāmya in his edited version of PS V:27, cf. NCV 648,15. Jinendrabuddhi does not expressly comment upon the concept of sāmya, but limits himself to explaining that
the co-reference of the general and particular term consists in their not excluding and not including, cf. PST Ms B 219b6: yatraitayoh sāmānyaviśeṣaśābdayar atyāgo 'nupādānam ca, tatraikārthata sāmānyādhikarāṇyam ity arthah: “The meaning is this: When the general and the particular term neither exclude nor include, they have the same reference, i.e., they are co-referential.”

[180] anekam api sāmānyam bhedāvābhācārinā, upāttaṃ na tayos tulyā(1) viśeṣaṇaviśeṣyatā. (2) Restored, Ms 219b7-220a2: anekam apītyādi ... avyabhicārineti(3) ... na tayor īstā viśeṣaṇaviśeṣyateti; cf. parallel at NCV 648,24-25: anekam ca sāmānyam ... upāttaṃ avyabhicārinā bhedā; NCV 649,11: yathocate tvayā: na tayos tulyā viśeṣaṇaviśeṣyatā.

(1) tulyā (cf. mtshuṅs KV): īstā Ms 220a2.

(2) In V this verse is followed by the phrase īes bya ba bsdu ba’i tshigs su bcad pa dag go : om. K. However, the subject matter of the verses as well as PST do not corroborate that formally they are samgrahāślokas; for a similar example of a non-standard use of the term, cf. the verses at PS V 12-13 that V also identifies as samgrahāślokas in contrast to K.

(3) ēti em. (cf. NCV 648,24: avyabhicārinā): ēhi Ms

353 The preceding verse addresses the relationship between a general term and its particulars, which is defined by the general term’s neither excluding nor including the particulars. In the immediately following one Dignāga answers the question of whether the relation between a particular general term and its general property is the same as that between a general terms and its particulars; cf. the introduction to the verse at Ms B 219b7: yathā sāmānyāśabdena(1) svabhedānām na tyāgo nopādānam, kim tathā viśeṣaśabdānāpi sāmānyasyeti? prāśnaprasargam(2) āha.

(1)sāmānyā” em. : sāmānyādhihikara o Ms

(2) prāśnaprasargam conj (cf. dri ba spon bar byed pa T): prannaprasaṅgā Ms

354 Cf. the paraphrase at PST Ms B 219b7-220a1: yady apy anekam sāmānyam tathāpi tad bhedaśabdenopāttau pratyayitaṃ ity arthah; prayāpanavātyatrekenopādānāsambhavāt. yathā śimśāpśābdenārthata(1) vrksapārthihvadravyasatsāmānyam upāttaṃ, na kevalam atyaktaṃ eva. “Even though there are several general properties, nevertheless they are included by the particular [general] term, that is, they are indicated by it because inclusion is impossible without the action of indicating, like the inclusion by implication through the word ‘śimśāpā’ of the general property of a tree, an earthen thing, a substance, and something existent, not merely of [the general property] as not excluded.

(1) oto em.: oḥ Ms

355 Cf. PST Ms B 220a1-2: kasmāt punah sāmānyāṃ upādānam bhedaśabde
netyādi? “avyabhicārinīti,” yasmād bhedaḥ sāmānyāvyabhicārī sāmānyābhāve bhedaḥbhāvāt, tasmāt tena tadupāddānam: “Why is it, moreover, that general properties are included by a particular [general] term, etc.? [The answer is:] “Because it does not deviate.” Since the particular [general property] does not deviate from the general property in that the particular [general property] would not exist if the general property did not exist, the [general property] is included by the [particular general property].”
The point is that the relation between the terms ‘vrksa’ and ‘simsapā’ is not symmetrical as neither one is related to the other as qualifier and qualified because every simsapā is a tree, whereas every tree is not necessarily a simsapā. Thus the term ‘simsapā’ may qualify the term ‘tree’ but not vice versa as ‘simsapā’ does not deviate from the general property treeness and the hierarchy of other general properties that together define the entity ‘tree;’ cf. the succinct explanation at PSṬ Ms B 220a2-5: vrksa hi simsapādin vyabhicaraṇa vyavacchedaṁ apeiṣṣata ity asti viśeṣaṇaviśeṣyaḥbhāvāḥ. simsapā tu vrksasāmāṇyaṁ avyabhicaraṇī nāpeṣṣata ity nāsti. vyabhicarinos tu bheda-yor viśeṣaṇaviśeṣyaḥbhāvāḥ tulyaḥ. tadyathā nīlotpalayoh: “For ‘tree’, not being restricted to ‘simsapā’, and so on, depends upon exclusion. Thus there is a qualifier-qualified relation. ‘simsapā’, on the other hand, being restricted to the general property treeness, does not depend upon it. Thus there is none. Two particulars, however, that are not restricted have a symmetrical qualifier-qualified relation, like, for instance, ‘blue’ and ‘lotus.”’

The problem Dignāga discusses is ultimately derived from a discussion at Mahābh in which Patañjali addresses the question of how two words that each denote a substance (dravya) and therefore are principal (pradhāna) relate to one another, cf. Mahā-bh I 399,25-26 (ad A II 1:57 várt 2): katham tarhīmau dvau pradhānaśabādv ekasmin arthe yugapad avarundhyete: vrksah simsapeti. naitayar avasyakaḥ samāvesaḥ, na hy avrksah simsapāsti: vrksah simsapāḥ: “How then are these two principal words simultaneously confined to the same referent like [in the statement]: “The simsapā is a tree.” The conjunction of these two is not necessary because the simsapā is not a non-tree.” This statement is explained as follows by Jinendrabuddhi in Nyāsa ad A II:1:57: vrksa hi simsapātvam vyabhicaraṇi, simsapāḥ tu na vrksatvam. atas tatprakārāntarebhīhyah palāśādibhyah tāṃ vyavacchintattī simsapāḥ tasya viśeṣaṇam bhavati, na tu viśeṣyam. vrksas tu viśeṣyah. simsapārthas tu vrksatvam na vyabhicaraṇī na tasyāsau viśeṣaṇam bhavati: “For ‘tree’ deviates from simsapānness, whereas ‘simsapā’ does not deviate from treeness. Therefore, as it excludes this from palāśa (trees), and so on, whose attributes differ from those of the former, ‘simsapā’ is its qualifier, but not the qualified. ‘Tree,’ (vrksa) on the other hand, is the qualified. The referent of ‘simsapā,’ however, does not deviate from treeness. Thus the latter is not its qualifier.”


356 Cf. Jinendrabuddhi’s introductory remark at PST Ms B 220a4-5: sāmānvasāvēṣāsadvadyōḥ paravarārthaprakāřapratipādasyedhe[1] dvayoḥ sāmānvasāsvadyōḥ dvayoś ca bhedaśabdadyōḥ paravarārthaprakāřapratipādasyaḥ siddhā iti etad aprati-pādyam eva, kāraṇam eva tu pratipādyam iti. atas tad eva prcchati “kim punar atreyādi” tāyāḥ. sāmānyayoḥ tu svasāmānyāpekṣāya bheda-vāna prthuḥ apādānām. (1) Cf. the use of the term paravarārthaprakāṛṣa no. 347 above.

357 Cf. Jinendrabuddhi’s introductory remark at PST Ms B 220a4-5: sāmānvasāvēṣāsadvadyōḥ paravarārthaprakāřapratipādasyedhe[1] dvayoḥ sāmānvasāsvadyōḥ dvayoś ca bhedaśabdadyōḥ paravarārthaprakāṛṣaḥ siddha iti etad aprati-pādyam eva, kāraṇam eva tu pratipādyam iti. atas tad eva prcchati “kim punar atreyādi” tāyāḥ. sāmānyayoḥ tu svasāmānyāpekṣāya bheda-vāna prthuḥ apādānām. (1) Cf. the use of the term paravarārthaprakāṛṣa no. 347 above.

358 Cf. PST Ms B 220a6-7: vrksatvasya simsapādir bhedaḥ parasararo bhidyata iti kṛtvā sa eva khadirādyapekṣayanyo bhedaś ceti bhedāntaram. iha tu viṣayasya(1)
viṣayino nirdeśāc chabdo bhedo bhedāntaram ceti vijñeyam. bhedāsabdo bhedān-
taraśabdārtham ity arthaḥ. virodhītvā (PS V:28b1) iti hetuḥ: “śimśapā, and so on, 
is a particular of treeness in that [śimśapā, etc.] differ mutually. ‘Different 
particular’ means that the same thing is different with regard to khadīra, and so on, 
as well as [being] a particular. In this case, however, one has to understand that the 
word is the particular as well as a different particular since that which has reference 
to a given thing is specified as the thing [in question]. The meaning is: A particular 
term [excluding] the referent of different particular terms. The reason is ‘because they 
are in conflict [with one another’;” Cf. ŚVT 69,3 introducing 28ab: atra bhikṣunā 
palāśāḥ śimśapetī sāmānādhikaranyam na bhavattī darśayatokam. Kumārila 
addresses the content of 28ab at Apoḥā° 147: virodhitvena bhedānām apoho yadi 
kalpyate, virodho ‘pohatas tatra, virodhāc cápy apohanam. Pārthasārathimisīra ad 
loc. explains apoha as mutual non-existence (itaretarābhāvaś cāpohāḥ, NR 429,16), 
which is an undeniable aspect of Dignāga’s apoha thesis, cf. PS V: 45 below.

(1)yesya em. : yeśā Ms

[183] bhedārthā hi śabdāḥ sāmānyārthāpaharitvād rājaputravat parasparaviro-
dhīnāḥ, tataś ca na parasparārtham kṣamante(1). Restored, cf. PST Ms B 223a7: 
bhedārthā hi śabdāḥ sāmānyārthāpaharitvād rājaputravat parasparavirodhīnāḥ iti 
etad eva tāvad ayuktām; 220a7: sāmānyārthāpaharitvād iti ... rājaputravad iti; 
220b1: tataś ca na parasparārtham kṣamante; cf. the paraphrase at ŚVT 69,3ff: 
bhedāsabdaḥ hi palāśaśimśapādaya ekam vrksatvasāmānyam anyonyam apahṛtya 
rāyam iva rājaputrāḥ svaviṣaye sūpāyantah parasparavirodhīnāh vartante.

(1)bzod (so read, ed. brjod) pa ma yin te K : bzod par mi nus te V.

359 Cf. Kumārila’s use of the same expression at ŚV Apoḥā° 148: na sāmānyāpa-
haritvam vidhirūpeṇa tatra te, palāśādīnī apohāyāto vrksaṃ harati śimśapā.

360 Cf. PST Ms B 220a7-220b1: rājaputrānām hi pitary uparate sāmānyārtho 
rāyam, tasya te sarve yathābalaṃ apaharitvād virodhīnāḥ: “For when their father 
is deceased, the kingdom is the common property of the king’s sons. They are all of 
them in conflict [with each other] because they are appropriating it with all their 

[184] tadyathā <’ayam vrksaṃ śimśape’iti(1) śimśapāśabdo vrksaśabdena sara pra-
vyajamānāḥ khadīrādivibhyo vyavacchidyā(2) vrksatvam svaviṣaye vyavasthāpayati. 
ṭhetaratrāpi(3). evam tāvad bhedāsabdasyayai>kaḍrayāpaharitvād(4) <bhedāntara-
śabdārthāpoḥo yukiḥ(5)>. Restored, cf. PST Ms B 220b2: tadyatheteti ... 
kaḍrayāpaharitvād iti.

(1)śīn ’di śiṇ śa pa yin no ṭes em. : śīṇ ’di dis (NP so; ’di śiṇ ed.) śa pa yin no V : 
śiṇ śa pa ṭes bya ba la K.

(2)Cf. rnam par bcad nas V : bṣad nas K.

(3)Cf. cig sōs la V : gzan la K.

(4)rdzas gcig btaŋ sños su byed pa’i phyir ro V : rdzas gcig la ’jug pa’i phyir 
K.

(5)Cf. rigs pa yin no V : rigs pa ma yin no K.

361 Cf. PST Ms B 220b2: tadyatheti sāmānyāpaharitvam darśayati.
According to Jinendrabuddhi the reason ekadravyāpahārītvāt is just a repetition of the reason sāmānyarthāpahārītvāt, cf. Ms 220b2: ekadravyāpahārītvād iti sāmānyāpahārītvasyaīvānuvādāḥ.

atha <sāmānyāntarabhedārthāḥ> kasmād apohata <iti. yasmārtha>. Restored, cf. PST Ms B 220b5: athetyādi; 220b5-6, q.v. no. 364 below.

362 Cf. spyi gzan V : phyir (sic) gzan K.

363 Cf. Jinendrabuddhi sets forth the assumptions underlying the opponents objection at PST Ms B 220b3-6: nanu caitaḍa virodhitvasya hetuḥ, na bhedāntarārthāpohasya. tat kimiti tataḥ sa prayukto ucyate. tad api tasya pāramparyena hetur ity adoṣaḥ. virodhāḥ pratikṣepahetur uktāḥ. sa ca sāmānyārthāpahārītvāt. na ca sāmānyāntarasya pārthivatvāder ye bhedā ghaṭādayas tadvācibhō saha śīṃśapāśabdasyaikārthāpahārītvām, kim tarhi vrksaśabdānena. atah(1) pratikṣepakārāntabhāvād nāpohā iti manyamāṇa āha: athetyādi. śīṃśapāyāḥ sāmāṇyaṃ vrksatvam. tato ‘nyāvāt pārthivatvam sāmāṇyaṃtaram. tadbheda ghaṭādiḥ. so ‘sambhandhaḥ śīṃśapāśabdānena virodhābhāvāt, na hi taccabdena śīṃśapāśabdasyaikādravyāpahārītvam. atas tām kasmād apohate virodhābhāvāt. naivāsāv apohyata ity arthaḥ: ‘Certainly this [viz. appropriating the common property] is the reason for being in conflict, but not for the exclusion of the referent of other particulars [terms]. So how is it justified thereby? This too is indirectly the reason for it. Thus there is no problem. Being in conflict is said to be the reason for negation. And this [viz. being in conflict] is due to appropriating the common property. And the word ‘śīṃśapā’ does not appropriate the one property together with words denoting particulars like pots that are particulars of other general properties like earthenness, but rather [it does so] together with the word ‘tree’. Therefore there is no exclusion since the reason for the negation does not exist. With this in mind he says: ‘But’, etc. Earthenness is the general property of śīṃśapā. Earthenness is a different general property because it is different from that [viz. treelessness]. Its particular such as a pot is without connection with the word ‘śīṃśapā’ because there is no conflict. For the word denoting it does not appropriate the same property as that of the word ‘śīṃśapā’. So why does it exclude this since there is no conflict? The meaning is: It does not exclude at all.”

364 Cf. PST Ms B 220b7: tad evaḥ virodhāḥ apohanibandhanam darśayati. virodhāsāmāṇyaṃ apohahetūḥ. iha ca yady api sākṣād virodho nāsti pāramparyena tv asty eva: “In this way he shows that hostility is the cause of exclusion. The cause of exclusion is the general property hostility. And even though the hostility does not exist directly, it exists, however, indirectly.”

365 sāmānyāntarabhedārthāḥ svasāmānyavirodhīnaḥ. Qu. NCV 613,27, 649,15; cf. PST Ms B 220b6-7: sāmānyāntarabhedārthā iti.

366 Cf. PST Ms B 220b7: tad evaḥ virodhāḥ apohanibandhanam darśayati. virodhāsāmāṇyaṃ apohahetūḥ. iha ca yady api sākṣād virodho nāsti pāramparyena tv asty eva: “In this way he shows that hostility is the cause of exclusion. The cause of exclusion is the general property hostility. And even though the hostility does not exist directly, it exists, however, indirectly.”

367 Cf. PST Ms B 220b7: vrksaśabdānena hi <ghaṭādinnām pārthivādyapahārītvād virodhāḥ>. tena hi nirākriyamāṇām abhyanumodate(1) mitrāsātravat. Restored, cf. PST Ms B 220b7: vrksaśabdānena hiṣyādi; Ms B 221a1: tena hiṣyādi; 221a1-2, q.v., no. 366 below.

(1) Cf. rjes su yi rañ bar byed VK.
The word ‘tree’ is the friend of the word ‘pot’ because it denotes the general property of its referent. Its enemies are words like ‘pot’ because they are appropriating earthenness. Therefore the word ‘tree’ approves that pot, and so on, is being excluded by the word ‘tree’ in the same way as [one approves that] the enemy of a friend [is being excluded].”

Cf. PST Ms B 221a1-2:

“... arthāḥ ca tena sa nirasta iti pṛatīyate. Restored, cf. PST Ms B 221a2-3:

Cf. PST Ms B 221a2-3: the general property of a word is understood by implication.

Cf. PST Ms B 221a3-7 q.v. no. 368 below.

Cf. PST Ms B 221a3-7: anyat sāmānyam... sattvam. tasya bhedā... mitramitravat. ... mitramitrāsatravat, mitraśatrumitravat. Restored, cf. PST Ms B 221a3-7 q.v. no. 368 below.

Cf. PST Ms B 221a3-7: anena nyāyena pārthivasāmānyād anyat sāmānyam... sattvam. tasya bhedā... mitramitrāsatravad abhyanumodate. gunaviśeṣān... rūpādin karmaviśeṣān colitkeśapatīnaṃ sīṃsāpāsābdo mitraśatrumitravat dravyasabdena rūpādutkṣeṇaṃ disabdānāṃ cānyatarena nirākriyamānānṣa upeksate: “In accordance with this principle substanteness is another general property than the general property earthen. The general property of this [viz. substanteness] is existence. The
particulars of this [viz. existence] are qualities and actions, and their particulars, moreover, are colour, and so on, and the action of throwing upward, and so on, respectively. And the exclusion by a term with which itself is hostile and the toleration by a particular term should be understood as caused by a connection series. In what way? Like the enemy of a friend’s friend, etc. In this case the repetition ‘friend’s friend’ is to be understood as having the objective of indicating a friend in a series, otherwise the friend would be understood as completely separated from one friend. In this context the word ‘śimsāpā’ approves that quality and action is being excluded by the word ‘substance’ like the enemy of a friend’s friend. And the word ‘śimsāpā’ tolerates like the friend of the enemy’s friend that particular qualities like colour and particular actions such as throwing upward, and so on, is being excluded by the word ‘substance’ as well as by one or other among the words ‘colour’, and so on, and ‘throwing upward’, etc.”

1 upksanaṃ em. : utkṣepanañ Ms
2 sambandhasaṃ em. : sambandhaḥ kṛtaṃ samā Ms
3 kṛtaṃ is not translated in T.
4āśō em. : āśd Ms

1de la yaḥ V : de la yaḥ de ni K.
2āśaḥ em. : āśa(rth) Ms

368 Cf. PST Ms B 221a7-221b1: nanu ca śimsāpāsabdenaiva ghaṭādināmaṁ nirākaraṇam. tathā śimsāpāsabdād evoccaritā tadapohāḥ pratiyāte: “Is it not so that pot, and so on, is only excluded by the word ‘śimsāpā’? Thus its exclusion is understood from the word ‘śimsāpā’ alone as soon as it is articulated.”


[192] yadi hi(1) sākṣād apoheta, vrksaśabdena tulyārthaḥ(2) syāt. Restored, cf. PST Ms B 221b1-2: yadi hi sākṣād apoheta rūpaśabdāvat,(3) vrksaśabdena tulyārthaḥ syāt; 223b6-7: yadi hi sākṣād apoheta(4) vrksaśabdenāviśiṣṭaḥ syād ityādi.
1Cf. ni V : om. K.
2Cf. śiṅ gi sgra dañ mthuñs pa’i don can du ’gyur K : śiṅ gi sgra dañ don mthuñs pa ’gyur V. Thus KV do not corroborate the reading vrksaśabdenāviśiṣṭaḥ at 223b6-7.
3rūpaḥ em. : rūpo śo Ms : sñon po’i sgra T.
4śeta em. : śe tu Ms

1The particle iva, which is crucial for understanding the argument, is found in the paraphrase of the argument at Ms 221b2, q.v. below no. 370. It is not reproduced in KV, cf. des ni K : de yis V.
369 Cf. PST Ms B 221b2: tathā sati palāsaḥdīnāṃ vrksaśabdena śimśapāśabdena na syād apohah: “In those circumstances palasa, and so on, would not be excluded by the word ’śimśapā’ just as it is not excluded by the word ‘tree’.”

370 That is, because ’palāśa’, and so on, include ‘tree’ because the latter negates pot, and so on, cf. PST Ms B 221b3: ghaṭādipratikṣepena vrksopādānāt.

371 Cf. Jinendrabuddhi’s exposition of the opponent’s view at PST Ms B 221b4-7: śimśapāśabdsya bahutaram apohyam palāśaṃdipratikṣepaḥ alpataram vrksaśabdsya palāśaḥyānapohāḥ. ataś cātulyāpohyatvān na vrksaśabdena tulyārthaḥ śimśapāśabdaḥ. tathā hi vrksaśabdsya vrksatvaṃ arthaḥ. śimśapāśabdsya tu tace ’śimśapātvam. ato ’lpaḥabhatvāpohyatvān’ bhinnatvān naiva dosah. etad uktam bhavat: yady api śimśaṃpāśabdsya vrksaśabdsya ca vrksatvaṃ arthaḥ, tathāpi śimśaṃpāśabdsya śimśaṃpārthavatvalakṣaṇo ’sti viṣeṣaḥ. tena saty api vrksārthopaḍāne na bhavati palāśaṭādyanapohaprasaṅga itī: “The word ’śimśapā’ has more excluded referents because it excludes palāśa, and so on, the word “tree” has fewer because it does not exclude palāśa, etc. And therefore the word ’śimśapā’ does not have a referent in common with the word ‘tree’ as its excluded referents are not the same. That is, the referent of the word ‘tree’ is the property treeness. That of the word ’śimśapā’, however, is the same as well as śimśapānās. Therefore, since they are different as their excluded referents are few and many there is no problem. What is meant is this: even though the referent of the word ’śimśapā’ and the word ‘tree’ is the property treeness, nevertheless the difference of the word ’śimśapā’ is that it is characterized by the fact of having the śimśapā as its referent. Therefore, even though it includes the referent tree the [absurd] consequence of not excluding the palāśa, and so on, does not exist.”

372 yathaiva hi vrksaśimśapāśabdaḥ(1) <vrksatvāśimśapātvaviśiṣṭam vastu bruvāṅv atyantahhinārtham> brūṭāḥ, tathēḥapy asaṅkīrṇārthenaḥ bhavitaṃ. arthāḥ tu syād alpaḥabhutarāpohāḥ. Restored, cf. PST Ms B 221b7-222a1: yathaiva hi parasya vrksaśimśapāśabdāv asaṅkīrṇam(2) artham brūṭāḥ, tathēḥāpi bhavitaṃ iti samāṅārthah; 222a2-3: arthāḥ tu syād ityādi, cf. 224a1: yad āpidadam “arthāḥ tu syād(3) alpaḥabhutarāpohā” ity etad anyāyam eva.

394 yathaiva hi vrksaśabdaḥ palāśaḥ(1) <tena tulyatvāḥ>(2). Restored, cf. PST Ms B 221b2-3: yathaiva hi vrksaśabdaḥ palāśaḥ(3) ... tathā śimśapāśabdo ’pi nāpoheta.

(1)Cf. pa la śa la sogos pa V : śin śa pa la sogos pa mams K.
(2)Cf. de dan mtsun pa’i phyir K : des mtsunis par bya ba’i phyir V.
(3) apoheta em. : apohate Ms

395 <yadi nāsti sa doṣo>’lpabahvarthāpohatvena bhinnatvād <ity evam>, ayuktam. Restored, cf. PST Ms B 221b4: alpabahvarthāpohayavena bhinnatvād iti; Ms B 221b7: ayuktam iti.

(1) azi ’lpaḥabhatvā° conj (cf. de’i phyir bsal bar bya ba ŋu ŋu dañ mañ po ŋid kyis ni T) : cātolyabahutvā° Ms (cf. ataś cātulyāpohyatvāt above, de’i phyir yan etc. T).

(1) Cf. ’sin dañ śin śa pa’i sgra dag ni V : śin dañ śin śa pa’i sgra dag gis K.
(2) a° em. : o’c ca° Ms
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(3) tu syād em.: tasmāt Ms

372 Dignāga points out that he basically follows the same principle as the opponent who, while accepting conventional usage, differentiates between the referents of the words ‘śīṃsāpā’ and ‘tree’ as the referents of general terms and particular general terms are not confused in common usage, cf. PST Ms B 222a1-2: <kutah>[1] punar ayam niyamo yat parasyaiva bhavitavyam iti? na[2] kutaścītu. yathaiva tu pariṇa laukikī[3] pratiṇum anuraksatā loke sāmānyaviśeṣasabdāyor asanāṅrārthatvāc chīṃsāpāvṛksaśabdāyor arthāh hedo vyavasthāyate, tathāsma-bhir apiṇy etāvad ucyate.

(1) kutah conj. (cf. ci las T): om. Ms
(2) na kha(lu?) Ms
(3) lau° em.: lo° Ms

373 Cf. PST Ms B 222a2-4: kathām tarhi śīṃsāpāsabdād bahutarāpohah pratyaye yadi’ sa tena na kriyata ity āha: arthāt tu syād ityādi. śīṃsāpāsabdāna hi śīṃsāpārthe pratyāyite śīṃsāpāy[1] vṛksaṇevānābhāvītvāt sāmārthāyāt vṛksa-
vāvakatiḥ, atas tenārthena nirākriyānam[2] ghatādikam mūḍhah sābdkrtam manyate: “How then is the exclusion of more understood from the word ‘śīṃsāpā’ if it is not effected by this? With this in mind he says: “Yet, by implication there will be,” etc. For when the word ‘śīṃsāpā’ has indicated the referent śīṃsāpā, teeness is understood by implication because a śīṃsāpā is invariably connected with teeness. Therefore a fool believes that when a pot, and so on, is implicitly excluded by it [viz. the word ‘śīṃsāpā’], it is done explicitly.”

In the immediately following excursus Jinendrabuddhi addresses the question of why the word ‘śīṃsāpā’ only indicates śīṃsāpānēs directly, whereas it indicates by implication all the other properties that define the śīṃsāpā. For Dignāga has claimed in a sangrahaśloka at PS II:18ab that the logical indicator indicates the concomitant properties (the so-called anubandhīnāh) of the indicated. And the logical property of the word ‘śīṃsāpā’ would constitute a parallel instance, cf. PST Ms B 222a4-222b2: katham punas tulye liṅgatvē dhūmādi sākṣād evānalādau dravyatvādī avagamayati, yad āha: “gamyante liṅgatas te ‘pi liṅgino ye ‘nubandhīnāh’” (PS II:18ab) iti. śīṃsāpāsabdāna hi śīṃsāpāvṛksaṇa sākṣāc chīṃsāpātvaṃ eva pratyāyayati, sāmānyantarāni tu sāmārthāyāt, api cānvasayatyarekalaksanasambandhāpeksayā sābdah svārthavāga-
hetur isyate. tathā kathām na dravyasatītvādī gamayeta? na hi tādhābhē śabdā
upalabhītye. naīsa doṣah. tatra na ha arthāsya puruṣakṛtaḥ sambandho, ‘pi tu svabhāvataḥ, sa yena yenāvinābhūtah svabhāvataḥ, tām tām eva pratyāyayati, śabdasya tu puruṣakṛtaṇaṇekotopanītah sambandhāh, na ca dravyatvādau vrksa-
graheṇe[5] vyabhicārān neseṣay. dhūmādāv api liṅga etad tulyam eva. na hi tad api diptatvādīsāmānyaviśeṣam anālādau gamayitum alam. tatra ko ‘yaṃ śabdā eva codyānurāgah: “How then, as its being an indicator is similar, does smoke, and so on, directly indicate substanteness, and so on, in the case of fire, etc. For as (Dignāga) says: “The concomitants of the indicated are also indicated by the indicator.” (PS II:18ab). The word ‘śīṃsāpā’, however, indicates śīṃsāpānēs directly, but [indicates] the other general properties by implication. In addition, it is claimed that a word is the cause of the cognition of its own referent by virtue of its
dependence upon its connection, which is characterized by joint presence and joint absence (cf. PSV V:34). Therefore, why would it not indicate substanceness, etc.? For the word is not apprehended in the absence of these. This is not a problem. For in this case the connection of the referent is not manmade, but rather, it is due to the essential nature [of the referent]. Whatever [referent] with which it is invariably connected, that alone it indicates. The word’s connection, however, is brought about by a convention that is manmade. And the word ‘tree’ is not agreed to denote substanceness. Therefore, how could there be joint presence and joint absence with respect to this [viz. the word ‘tree’ as denoting substanceness]? Consequently, it does not indicate substanceness, etc.

Certainly, even the word’s connection for the sake of denoting the intension [of the speaker] (vivakṣa) is by no means due to human agents. In the present context it is claimed that it [viz. the word ‘tree’] is a cause of the cognition of other general properties, when the particular [general properties] that are occasioned by it are apprehended, but it is not claimed, when the particular [general properties] are not apprehended because of uncertainty. (6)

The case is the exact same with regard to the logical indicator smoke, etc. For the word is not apprehended in the absence of these. This is not a problem. For the speaker [viz. the word ‘tree’ as denoting substanceness]? Consequently, it does not indicate substanceness, etc.

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The case is the exact same with regard to the logical indicator smoke, etc. For the word is not apprehended in the absence of these. This is not a problem. For the speaker [viz. the word ‘tree’ as denoting substanceness]? Consequently, it does not indicate substanceness, etc.

The technical term anubandhin also occurs in PS II:18-19. It is possible to restore both verses on the basis of quotations and paraphrases at NCV 675,11-16, YD 86,20 (PS II:19cd), and PSṬ Ms B 72b1-3: gamyante lingatas te ’pi līṅgino ye nubandhinaḥ, vīśeṣā na tu gamyante tasyaiva, vyabhicārīnaḥ, (PS II:18) līṅgānubandhinās tv arthā gamayanti na līṅginam vyaḥicārād, vīśeṣās tu pratiṭāh pratipādakāh. (PS II:19): “The concomitants of the indicated are also indicated by the indicator, but its particulars are not indicated at all as they are deviating. (18) The referents that are the concomitants of the indicator, however, do not indicate the indicated on account of deviation. The particulars, however, are indicating insofar as they are cognized” (19).

The commentary on these verses at NCV loc. cit. is far more explicit than Ms B ad loc., and is therefore worthwhile quoting in full: vīśeṣās tauşakāriṣādayo na gamyante tasyaiva, vyabhicāriyitād līṅgasya vīśeṣāḥ sahādyāstvatāt. evam līṅgasyānyāvāyvṛtām sāmānyam gamakaṁ, nāvāyātma anyataḥ sattvādī. līṅgināḥ sāmānyam gamyam nivṛttam anagnyaḍībhī y'gniyaṁ sattvādī cāṅṅīvaḥnubaddham avyabhicārīyitād iti. līṅge tv ayam punaḥ vīśeṣah: līṅgānubandhinās tv arthā ityādiślokaḥ, pūrvodāṛṭaḥ sāmānyadharmāḥ sattvādayo līṅgasya dhūmasya na gamayanti, uktakāraṇatvāt. vīśeṣās tu kecid līṅgyavināḥbhāvināḥ pratiṭāh pratiṭādakāh pāṇḍutvabahūlataṇḍaya iti. For the pratikas at Ms B loc.cit., cf.: gamyante lingatas te ’pīti ... vyabhicarīṇa iti ... līṅgānubandhinās tv arthā iti ... viśiṣṭāḥ (sic) tv iti.

(1) T translates erroneously śīṅ śa pa’i don rto gs par byas pa na śīṅ śa pa’i nyid kyang no.

(2) "ena nirākri° conj. : "enākri° Ms
(3) "yatvā° conj. : "yā° Ms
(4) "ane sām° em. : "anāsām° Ms
(5) "eva, avi° em. : evāvi° Ms

(6) The opponent appears to object that even in the case of vivakṣā, which is claimed to be indicated by any given word [see note 9 above and Appendix I below], the logical connection is not conventional and manmade, but rather
transcends human agency (*apaurusṛṣeya*). The rest of the argument takes for granted that general properties are real things that presuppose appearance. Even though the word ‘tree’ denotes an object which is a substance, the inference of substantiveness is only valid if backed by observation of the particular general properties that the object includes.

[197] yadi bheda bhedāntarārtham <apoheta, madhuro rasaḥ snigdhaḥ śīto gurus(1)> ceti yad etad guṇasya guṇāntaraṁ sāmāṇādhikaranyam,> tat katham? Restored, cf. PST Ms B 222b-3: yadi bheda bhedāntarārtham iti ... tat katham iti.

(1) The same example is quoted at TSP 312,25: tadyathā: madhuro rasaḥ snigdhaḥ śīto gurus ceti, cf. ro mīraḥ po snam pa graṅ ba lci ba ās bya ba’i yon tan ’di yon tan gān daṅ gū mah pun pa ās bya ba gān yin pa der ci īr ‘gyur āe na K : gān ’di yon tan daṅ yon tan gān gyis gū mah pun pa ste, ro mīraḥ pa la snam pa daṅ bsil ba daṅ lci ba niid do ās pa de ji īr āe na ∫.

374 Cf. PST Ms B 222b-3: gunabheda hi madhurasnigdhatvādayaḥ. tatrāisāṁ parasparāpohē sāmāṇādhikaranyena na bhavītayam. astī ca tat(1). tathā hi madhurārasasya(1) guṇāntāraṁ snigdhavādibhiḥ sāmāṇādhikaranyam upalabhyahe: “For sweetness and stickiness, and so on, are different qualities. Under these circumstances there is no co-reference as they exclude one another. And [co-reference] does exist. For instance one observes the co-reference with other qualities such as stickiness.” And Jindebruddhi continues commenting upon the phrase tat katham at Ms B 222b3-4: na kathaṁcid yuyata iti manyate. anena sāmāṇādhikaranyam madhurādīnāṁ kṛṣṇāntalakavad anapoham anumāya virodhasya hetor anekāntikatvam udbhāvayati, apohābhāve ’pi bhāvāt. Madhurasnigdhaśātyādāv(2) akāraṇatvam vāpoham prati virodhasya, saty api īsamīn avikālpye(3) tadabhāvīd iti.

(1) tat em.: tataḥ Ms
(2) madhurārasasya conj.: carakārasasya Ms
(3) mtshaṅ na (sic) T.


375 Cf. PST Ms B 222b5–223a1: yaḥ etat sāmāṇādhi karanyam gunabhedaṁ tadāśrayena virodhāḥ. madhurādīnāṁ yaḥ āśrayabhiṁ dravyam tenn teśāṁ avi-rodhāḥ, na hi guṇāḥ svāśrayena virudhyantenaḥ(1) dravyam eva ca madhurāgūnaṁ, tasyaiva śītasnigdhasaya guṇāḥ, na rasasya guṇasya. atas tatra dravye vrūṭṭa rasa upacaryante. upacāranibandhanam punar ekārihasāmāvaiyah. upacārāphalaṁ tu madhuryasya snehādibhiḥ sāhacaryaκhyāpiṇam. tās tu yatāḥ teśāṁ mukhya āśrayo dravyaṁ madhurādīgūnasya “madhurām dravyaṁ śītam guruḥ” cety ucyate, tathopacarito ’py āśrayo madhurākhyo rasaḥ snigdhavādgūnasya “madhuro rasaḥ snidhalo gurus” cety ucyate. tad evam guṇaṁ atra sāmāṇādhi karanyam kāliphitam ity uktam bhavati. na ca kalipīthavāsaṁ vastunāḥ tādātmyaṁ sidhyatīti. nāsti yathoktadoṣāḥ: “The co-reference of the various qualities is due to their not being in contradiction with their substrate. That is, the [quality] sweet [taste] and the rest, are not in contradiction with the substance that is their substrate. For qualities are not in contradiction with their own substrate. And only the substance has the quality sweet [taste], and only this [viz. the substance] has such qualities as cold and sticky, but the quality taste does not. Therefore they are
transferred to [the sweet] taste as resident in the substance. The cause of transfer, moreover, is [their] inherence in one and the same referent. The effect of transfer, however, is the enunciation of the concomitance of sweetness with stickiness and the rest. And therefore, just as their primary substrate viz. the substance is said to be a substance that is sweet, cool, and heavy because it is connected with the quality sweet, and so on, in the same way the taste called sweet, although it is substrate in a transferred sense, is said to be a sweet sticky and heavy taste because of the connection with the quality stickiness, etc. Thus the co-reference which in this case is secondary is said to be imaginary;” cf. TSP (ad TS 781) 312,26ff: yatraiva hi dravye mādhuryam samavetam tatraiva śītavādayo ‘pīty ekārthasamavāyabalād atra bhavati sāmānādhikaranyam.

(1)vi° em. : ni° Ms

376 I assume that rdzas yod la ni V : rdzas K translates Sanskrit *dravye sati.

377 Cf. žes pa’i V : phyir K.

[199] adṛṣṭatvād vyudāso vā. Qu. Ms B 223a1; ŚVT 71,6, NR 431,1.

378 In PSV V:25cd Dignāga introduces conflict (virodha) as the cause of exclusion and makes use of this term throughout the following paragraphs to describe the action of exclusion of other referents. However, Dignāga’s use of the disjunction vā at this juncture serves the purpose of introducing an epistemologically valid alternative to virodhitva as the cause of exclusion. Dignāga’s statement at PŚ V:31a invalidates the previous discussion, and makes it look problematic, if not entirely superfluous.

Bhaṭṭaputra Jayamisra correctly interpreted the introduction of non-observation (adṛṣṭatva, adarśana) as another cause of exclusion than conflict (virodha) or being in conflict (virodhitva), which Dignāga introduces at PS V:25a above. Cf. his introduction to the quotation of PŚ V:31a at ŚVT 71,5: bhikṣunāparam kāraṇam uktam, and the explanation at NR 431,1-2: adṛṣṭatvād vyudāso vā ’bhedānām itaretaram iti śimsapāsabdaḥ palāśādāv adṛṣṭaḥ tasyāpohām karoṭi.

Jinendrabuddhi interprets vā in the sense of eva, which excludes virodha and virodhitva as the cause of apoha, cf. Ms B 223a2: vāśabdo ‘vadhāraṇārthah, adṛṣṭatvād eva vyudāsah, na virodhitvād ity arthah. yathā kṛtaktvam nityesv adarśanāt(1) tadapohām karoti, tathā bhedaśabdo bhedāntaresy adarśanāti tadapohām karoti: “The word vā has a restrictive meaning. The meaning is this: exclusion is only due to not being observed, not due to being hostile. Just as the general property being produced excludes permanent [things] because of not being observed in these, a particular term excludes other particulars because of not being observed to denote these.” Although the interpretation of vā as avadhāraṇa is supported by the indigenous Sanskrit lexicographers, cf., e.g., Amarakośa IV.16cd: vai vety avadhāraṇavācakah, Jinendrabuddhi’s interpretation is formally correct in the context of Dignāga’s exposition at PSV V:34 below. However, vā which is repeated in the vṛtti where evidently it has no restrictive function merely serves the purpose of introducing the only valid reason of exclusion. It marks the introduction of the siddhānta as is generally the case in Indian śāstra literature, and leaves the impression that Dignāga depends on earlier sources, which explained exclusion in
terms of virodha, and now introduces non-observation as the real cause of exclusion of other referents, which ultimately reflects his own epistemology and logic.

(1) ʻeṣv adarśaʻem. : ʻeṣu darśaʻMs

380 Cf. kha cig gis ‘gal ba’i phyir K : kho bo cag gis ... bkag pa’i phyir ro V.

381 The extant Sanskrit fragments of this sentence do not, unfortunately, clarify the divergent translations of K and V. Although Jinendrabuddhi comments on Dignāga’s statement with the background of Dhammakīrtian and post-Dhammakīrtian philosophy, the introductory part of his explanation presumably reflects Dignāga’s own view. I have therefore adopted the readings of K that seem to fit Jinendrabuddhi’s explanation. According to Jinendrabuddhi Dignāga introduces non-observation (adarśana) as the cause of exclusion because being in conflict (virodhitva) is merely an implied feature (upalaksanamātram), cf. PS Ms B 223a3: svābhāvike ‘py arthe ... āhopuruṣikā pratipannā; cf. PST Ms B 223a3: svābhāvike ‘py artha iti. 223a7: āhopuruṣikā pratipanneti. Cf. 224a4: kim punaḥ kāraṇam ācāryenāhopuruṣikā pratipannā.

379 Cf. PST Ms B 223a3: śimśapāśabdasāya palāśādāv adarśanasya kāraṇam préchati: “He asks for the reason why the word ‘śimśapā’ is not observed to denote a palāśa, etc.”

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should also know the other cause transcending this, which has been set forth. The person who thinks, ‘Ah! What a person I am,’ is a conceited person (ahopuruṣa); as an essential state (tadbhāva) [cf. A V 1:119] āhopuruṣikā is ‘personal conceitedness.’ Moreover, it is haughtiness (abhimāna), for this prompts the application of the word ahopuruṣa.’”


(1) etasmin svā° em.: tasmin asvā° Ms
(2) °e em.: °am Ms
(3) yo em.: yo na Ms
(4) hetutve° em.: hetve° Ms
(5) °ánto em.: °ānte Ms
(7) samha° conj. (cf. ‘dus nas T): ha° Ms
(8) °eta em.: °e tu Ms
(9) tu syāt em.: tasmād Ms
(10) ‘nu° em.: vamityate Ms
(11) °lamby em.: °lampi° Ms
(12) abhisandhāya conj. (cf. dgon las T) : (unn?)aṃ (gh?)ya Ms


[382] Cf. PST Ms B 224a5-6: evam tarhītyādinā sāmanyaśabdasya viśeṣasya adarśane saty apy apohasyābhāvad(1) apohasyātaddhetukatvam.

(1)apy apo° em. : avy ahopuruṣik(ā)? apo° Ms


(1)phyr K. : ēs V. 

(2)sel bar K : gžan sel bar V. 

[383] Cf. the parallel objection reproduced as pūrvapakṣa at ŚVT 71,12-14: yady adarśanēna bhedaśabdo bhedāntarārtham apohate. atha kasmāt sāmanyaśabdo ’pi bhedārtham nāpohate, so ’pi hi na tatra drṣṭa eveti: “If a particular term excludes the referent of other particular terms, then why does a general term not exclude the referent of a particular term too? For this [viz. the general term] too is not observed to denote these.”

[204] nānyayuktasya drṣṭatvāt. Qu. Ms B 224a6; ŚVT 71,22; NR 431,11.

[384] That is, contextual factors like motive and context. One cannot exclude the possibility that anya = anyaśābda, cf. the parallel at VP II:264: arthapraṇāpeksa yo vā śabdāntarasaiḥ saha yuktaḥ, pratyāyat arthaḥ taṃ gaṇaṃ apare vidūḥ; VP II:251cd, q.v. below no. 386.

[205] drṣṭa hy arthapraṇāṇādibhiḥ sāmanyaśabdo viśeṣam pratipādayati. Restored, cf. PST Ms B 224a6-7: drṣṭa hy arthapraṇāṇādibhiḥ(1) iti ... sāmānyasyabdo viśeṣam pratipādayati; cf. ŚVT 71,19-20: yāḥ punar asyam paricodanyām bhikṣuṇā pariḥāro dattāḥ: arthapraṇāṇādibhiḥ sāmanyaśabdo viśeṣasya drṣṭaye. ato nāstī adarśanāma iti.

(1)ādibho em. : ābh? Ms

[385] Cf. VP II:251cd: arthapraṇāṇābhyāṃ vā yogāc chabdāntareṇa vā; VPV II 255,9-12 ad loc.: arthapraṇāṇaśabdāntaraśambandhāṇi pravibhāge nimittāni. artheṇa aṅjaliṇā juhoti ... prakārana tu bhohanādīnāṁ ānindhavādānāṁ śabdānāṁ arthaviśeṣāvacchedāḥ kriyante. śabdāntaraśambhandhaṇāṁ māṇavako gaur vāhika iti; see also VP II:314-316 with VPV ad loc. Ms B 224a6-224b1: ādiśabdena samsargadayo grhyante. tatra sāṃsthyena sāmānyābhād viśeṣam pratipādayati. tadyathābhīrūpāya kanyā deyeti. antareṇāpi vacanam abhirūpāyaiva kanyādānām siddham eva. vacanasāmarthyād abhirūpātmatāyāt(1) gamyate(2). prakāranaṇa bhohanam golpaṃhārapraṇāreṇe saindhavam āṇayety ukte lavana eva pratayaya bhavati(3). samsargena savatsā dhenuḥ ānīyatām ity ukte godhenur eva pratīyate(4). 

arthya
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qualifying
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particulars. For the word
vam
deye ti na cānabhirūpe pravruttir asti tatrābhirūpātāmāyeti gamyate. VPV II 275,23f
(ad 315-16): abhirūpāya kanyā diyatām ... na cānabhirūpe pravruttir asti. Tatrābhi-
řuপরাতায়েতi viññāyate.
(3) Cf. VPV II 274,13f (ad loc. cit.): arthāḥ prakaranād vā loke viṣeṣagatir iti ...
saindhavam ānaya mrgayām ca karisyāmītī ... tadyathāntarena śabadam bhujyange
samhriyamāne saindhavam ānāyetī nāsve sampratayo bhavati.
(4) Cf. VPV II 273,18f (ad loc. cit.): samsargād dhenur ānīyatām ... vyavasthi-
tasya viṣeṣasyāsamarṇāyāḥ ... savatseti.

386 Cf. Mahā-bh I 220,5-6 : sāmīnayaśabdāś ca nāntareṇa viṣeṣam prakaranam
vā viṣeṣasy avatiśhante. VP II:214; VNṬ 7,24-25: yad āha: na hi viṣeṣa-
śabdasannidhir eva śabdānām viṣeṣāvāsthithihetāḥ, api tu prakaraṇasām-
arthāyādikām api.

239 Annotations

386 Cf. Mahā-bh I 220,5-6 : sāmīnayaśabdāś ca nāntareṇa viṣeṣam prakaranam
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śabdasannidhir eva śabdānām viṣeṣāvāsthithihetāḥ, api tu prakaraṇasām-
arthāyādikām api.

387 Cf. spyī’ī sgra <las>(1) V : spyī’ī las K.
(1)las conj. cf. K above : om. V.

388 T snañ ba translates in this case Sanskrit ābhāṣa. For a similar use of ābhāṣa
qualifying samśaya, cf. PSV V:34 below.

389 Cf. de rnams la yañ V : de yod pa rnams kyañ K.

390 That is, even though the general term previously has been observed to denote
its particulars, the use of it without the necessary restriction of its scope is similar to
the use of the term uprightness whose scope is restricted to denote the uprightness of
a tree by the addition of the term ‘crows nest’, cf. PSV V:14 above.

391 Cf. the absurd translation re źig ’greñ ba la V (= ārdhvē [?] tāvat sic).

392 Although KV are syntactically confused and the readings diverge, the
svabhāvahetuo formulated by Jinendrabuddhi gives a sufficiently clear indication of
its context, so that it is possible to eliminate the errors, cf. ṢṬ Ms B 224b2-3:
sāmīnayaśabdasaya viṣeṣu darśane hetvantaram āha. na hi caiteṣabdasaya madhu-
rādiṣy adṛṣṭapūrvasya tadākārasanśāyāhetutvam. etena yah svabhedaṅkārasanśāya-
hetuḥ sa svabhedaṅs drṣṭapūrvaḥ, ārdhvāvat, tathā ca sāmīnayaśabda iti svabhā-
vaṃ āha: “He formulates another reason for the observation of a general term at the
particulars. For the word caiteṣ(1) is not a cause of doubt about its mental picture
when it has not previously been observed to denote sweet things (madhura), etc.
Therefore, that which is a cause of doubt about the mental picture of its own
particulars has been observed previously to denote its own particulars, in the same
way as ‘uprightness’. And a general term is like that.” After this explanation
Jinendrabuddhi adds a brief discussion with reference to the general term
śraṇaṭatva, cf. 224b3-5: nanu ca śraṇaṭatvenānekāntaḥ, tad dhi na kvacit drṣyate
samśayāhetuṣ ca. naitad asti. śraṇaṭatvasya hi śraṇaṭaviṣeṣātmakā eva svabhedāḥ.
tatra ca tat drṣṭam eva, na tu punar nityādayah padārthāḥ. tasya bhedā yeṣu tan na
drṣṭam ity acodyam etat. sāmānyatve vā saṭṭhī viññēṣaṇam atra draṣṭavyam. tac ca
sāmānyasabdādhikārād labhyate.

(1) Cf. Amarakośa III.15.

[207] samśayo ’yukta iti cet. <idaṃ> manyate: yady arthapra Karanādīsaheeta
<ev(1)opalabdhaḥ> syāt, tataḥ <katham samśaya> iti. Restored, cf. PST Ms B
224b5: samśayo ’yukta iti cet iti; B 224b5-6: yady arthapra Karanādīsaheetaḥ(2)
svāt, samśaya hetur na syāt, kākanilayanasahtordhvatātavyat. asti ca samśayah. tato yathā
svabhedasūpalabdhpūrvaśa tathārthādisahitavābhāvo ’pīti virudhāḥ hetur iti
manyate.

(1) Cf. kho na K : om. V.
(2) ośayo em. : ośaye Ms

[208] niścere kevalāt tu saḥ. naiva arthaśaahitāc chaṃśaya ity ucyate(1), kim tarhy
arthādisaahitā. niścita uttarakālam kevalāt samśayaḥ. Restored, cf. Ms 224b6:
niścere kevalāt tu sa ityādī; B 224b6-7: naiva viññēsaahitāt samśaya ucyate, kim
tarhy arthapra Karanādīsaheetaḥ sāmānyasabdāc chiṃśapādau viññē niścita uttara-
kālam kevalād viñeṣeṇu samśayah.

(1) brjod par ma bya ste V : brjod pa K.

393 Cf. PST Ms B 224b7-225a1: etenārthādisaahito palabdhiāke samśayahetute
vāsiddheḥ, yadā ca samśayahetutvaṃ tadārthādisahitavāpāratiṇānād nāsti virud-
dhateṣu darṣayati.


(1) Ms so, but T reproduces 32c in toto.

394 Cf. PST Ms B 225a1: kevalasya bhedeṣu prayoga eva nāsti tadanabhi-
dhyāyitvāca(1) chabāntaravat, na vāprayuktiṣa samśaya hetutvaṃ upapadyate iti.
evam apy asiddham svabhedākārasaṃśayahetutvaṃ.

(1) anabhi° em. : abhi°.

395 Cf. ’dir K : om. V.

396 Cf. spyi’i sgra V : ci’i sgra K.

[210] drṣṭah śrotvyaapekṣayā. Qu Ms B 225a2.

[211] yadā hi śrotayāsvāmānyavvīdāraḥ tathābhavati, <tadyathā> kim vrksah
pārthiva uta pañcamahābhautikā ity <akte>, tadda pārthiva iti kevalasya prayogyah
sambhavati. Restored, cf. PST Ms B 225a2: yadā hiyyādi(1), yadā hi śrotā ... 
tadāvāśvāmānyavvīdāraḥ tathābhavati, tadā pārthiva iti kevalasya pārthivāsab-
dasya prayogyah sambhavati. Ms B 225a4: kim vrksah pārthiva uta pañcamahā-
hautika iti.

The translations of this clause in KV deviate considerably in terms of syntax and
meaning from the paraphrase at Ms B 225a2-3 and appear to have been based upon
a corrupt text. K and V state: For when (yadā hi) the listener, after having excluded
another general property, is in need of [a word] alone, like, for instance, the answer
'earthen,' when he asks "is a tree earthen (pārthiva) or does it consist of the five principal elements (pāncamahābhautika):" Cf. Ms loc. cit.: yadā hi śrotā vrkṣasvabhāvam prati samśayitaḥ, pārthivatvadīnām sāmānyānāṁ anyatamasvabhāvapratipattarthaṃ tadanyasāmānyavyūdāsenārthihbhavati, tadā pārthiva iti kevalasya pārthivāsabdasya prayogaḥ sambhavati: "For when (yadā) the listener who is in doubt about the essential nature of a tree in order to get to know either nature of [its] general properties such as earthenness, and so on, asks for the exclusion of its other general, (tadā) it is possible to apply 'earthen' alone saying 'earthen' (pārthiva iti)."

When juxtaposing the two Tibetan translations and Jinendrabuddhi’s paraphrase it is obvious that neither K nor V reproduce the expected apodosis, which is introduced by tadā in the paraphrase. K, on the one hand, reproduces Sanskrit yadā by gan gi tshe: om. V, but neither K nor V translate tadā. In addition, they both seem to have misunderstood the syntax of Sanskrit arthībhavati = don du gñer bar 'gyur te K : don du gñer ba yin te V, which is constructed with instr. of the thing requested/asked for. It is highly likely that Jinendrabuddhi’s paraphrase: tadā pārthiva iti kevalasya pārthivāsabdasya prayogaḥ sambhavati incorporates the original apodosis because it contains a gloss pārthivāsabdasya on pārthiva iti kevalasya that otherwise would seem unnecessary. KV may have preserved part of the apodosis in the clause sa las gyur pa 'o zes smras pa la bur' o K : sa la byun ba' o zes brjod pa bzin no V, which, however, was interpreted as part of the sentence illustrating the use of the word pārthiva alone. A trace of the word kevala is probably found in yañ gar ba don du gñer ba V : 'ba' zig kho na don du gñer bar 'gyur te K.

(1) hi em. : pi Ms

397 Cf. Bhartrhari’s use of the term arthītām at VPV II 323,16-17: yathaiva prayoktur abhidhānam arthāvacchedanimitam tathaiva pratipattur apy arthītām ... tathā “kimvarnaḥ,” “kutah krānta” iti praśne “śveto dhāvati, atikrānta” ityevamādy api sambhavati: “Just as the intention of the speaker is a cause of determining the meaning, so also the request of the listener ... For instance, at the question “of what colour,” “from where did he run away” [answers like 'the white horse is galloping away (śveto dhāvati)/the dog ran away from here’(1) (<śvā + itāḥ + dhāvati) are also possible.”

(1)This example is recorded at Mahā-bh I 14,14.

212 niścīte tarhi <tasya> vrkṣe(1)kutah pārthivāsabdapravogā(2) samśaya iti <cet>. Restored, cf. PST Ms B 225a3-4: niścīte tariḥtyādinā samśayānupapattि�ṇi darśayati ... niścīte prāṣṭur vrkṣe kutah kevalāt sāmānyāsabdat samsayāh.

(1)Cf. gal te de’i sīn nes pa la K : de nes pa’i itar na ni de’i sīn la V.

(2)Cf. sa las gyur pa’i sgra sbyor ba’i phyir K : sa las byun ba’i sgra sbyor ro žes pa’i V.


and the referents of other words in the same way as its own referent inherently negation of other (referents). In other words, any given word excludes other words being an inherent property of the excluding word and thing. This explains why absence of other things from the locus of the referent of any given word, exclusion is equivalent to the non-existence of other referents or other words. As will become clear in the crucial paragraphs of this chapter, exclusion is equivalent to the function of real general properties as maintained e.g. by Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika philosophers. Exclusion of other is like the opponents’ real general properties as a real entities resident in any given referent (arthe) or word (sabde). They were considered as constituting the semantic justification for the application of words. Dignāga, however, rejects that there are general properties in things or words, and he maintains that exclusion of other referents or other words is equivalent to the function of real general properties as maintained e.g. by Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika philosophers. Exclusion of other is like the opponents’ real general properties assumed to be the inherent property of things and words, which means that Dignāga regarded exclusion as an inherent natural property of things and words: they exclude other things by their very nature. Exclusion thus defines in a general way their difference from other things and words, in spite of the fact that the individual differences of things and words (their svalaksana) is beyond linguistic representation. This explains why Dignāga introduces the concept of substrate (āśraya) of exclusion in § 51 below. This term only makes sense if one interprets it as referring to an actual substrate. As will become clear in the crucial paragraphs starting with PSV V:34, exclusion is equivalent to the non-existence (abhāva) or absence of other things to the locus of the referent of any given word, exclusion being an inherent property of the excluding word and thing. This explains why Dignāga claims that a word denotes its referent as qualified by preclusion or negation of other (referents). In other words, any given word excludes other words and the referents of other words in the same way as its own referent inherently

(1) Cf. ītār don la don gzan gsal ba spyi yin pa de bzin du K : ji ītār don gzan sel ba de bzin du spyi yan V. K would seem to translate a text like *arthaṁtarāpohom ‘rthe sāmānyam: “The general property in the referent is exclusion of other referents.” This translation reflects the content of § 46 which is to show that the sāmānyam in sabda is similar to that in artha namely exclusion of other speech units and other referents. The locative evidently imitates contemporary usage, which is based upon the assumption that that general properties are inherent in the objects they qualify.

(2) This paragraph is important for understanding the rationale of the apoha theory. Dignāga’s use of the locative imitates contemporary philosophical usage. The schools of thought, whose views Dignāga analyses and rejects as untenable, considered general properties as a real entities resident in any given referent (arthe) or word (sabde). They were considered as constituting the semantic justification for the application of words. Dignāga, however, rejects that there are general properties in things or words, and he maintains that exclusion of other referents or other words is equivalent to the function of real general properties as maintained e.g. by Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika philosophers. Exclusion of other is like the opponents’ real general properties assumed to be the inherent property of things and words, which means that Dignāga regarded exclusion as an inherent natural property of things and words: they exclude other things by their very nature. Exclusion thus defines in a general way their difference from other things and words, in spite of the fact that the individual differences of things and words (their svalaksana) is beyond linguistic representation. This explains why Dignāga introduces the concept of substrate (āśraya) of exclusion in § 51 below. This term only makes sense if one interprets it as referring to an actual substrate. As will become clear in the crucial paragraphs starting with PSV V:34, exclusion is equivalent to the non-existence (abhāva) or absence of other things to the locus of the referent of any given word, exclusion being an inherent property of the excluding word and thing. This explains why Dignāga claims that a word denotes its referent as qualified by preclusion or negation of other (referents). In other words, any given word excludes other words and the referents of other words in the same way as its own referent inherently

398 In this paragraph Dignāga introduces the concept of general word property sābdasāmānya, which he defines as exclusion of other words, analogous to the definition of the general property of the referent viz. arthasāmānya, which is exclusion of other referents cf. PST Ms B 225a5-6: evam arthasāmānyāṃ vyutpādyā sābdasāmānyāṃ vyutpādayītum āha: yathā cetyādi; cf. Pīṇā 1991. The subsequent exposition at Ms B 225a6-225b1 is strongly influenced by Dharmakīrti’s philosophy (cf., e.g., the discussion at PVSV 38,17f), although the concept of sābdasāmānya never occurs in Dharmakīrti’s works: yathārthasya ekārthakriyākāriyavakhyābhedāḥ bhūtāḥ bhāvanāvādyāt buddhau viparītatamāḥ sāmānyakāra vyavahārānuyatibhir bāhyarūpatayā vyavasāyamāno ’rthāntaravvyūdāśākhyaṃ(1) sāmānyam gamakaṃ, tathā sābdasya atatākāravyāvyārtasābdasvalaksanānu-bhāvāhītavibhramavāsanopanitajñamā(2) bauddhau sāmānyakāra vyavahārānuyatibhir bāhiḥ sābdamātrām upāyitvenāvyavasitaḥ ’sādāntaravvyavacchedākhyāṇam(1) sāmānyam vyavasthāpyate.

(1) em.: śaḥ Ms
(2) vibhrama° em.: vidrama° Ms
excludes other things. The referent is supposed to be a real entity (vastu) qualified by preclusion as appears from the important fragment from Sāmānyapariksāvyāsa quoted no. 182 above, which states that the referent is an object (vastu) qualified by preclusion (nivṛtti visiṣṭam vastu śabdārthaḥ) i.e. non-existence of other things in the locus of the referent.

\[\text{215} \text{<śabdāntaravyavacchedah> śabde sāmānyam ucyate}(1).\text{ Restored, cf. PST Ms B 225b-3, q.v. below no. [216].}\]

(1) Cf. sgra gzan rnam par gcod pa ni sgra la spyir ni brjod pa yin K: sgra gzan rnam par bcad nas ni sgra'i spyi rjod par byed pa yin V. K presupposes the reading #śabdāntaravyavacchedah. V is impossible to construe.

\[\text{216} \text{yathaiva akṛtakavyudāsena}(1) \text{ yat kṛtakatvam}(2) \text{ tat sāmānyam anityatvādi-}\]

\[\text{gamakam, tathā śabdāntaravyavacchedena śabde sāmānyam ucyate. tenaiva cārtha-}\]

\[\text{pratīyakakah. Restored, cf. PST Ms B 225b-3:} \text{ yathaivetyādānā kārikārtham ācāse ... akṛtakavyudāsena hetunā yat kṛtakatvam}{(2)} \text{ buddhpratibhāsāvīsesah, yathaiva tat sāmānyam kṛtakavyaktisādhaṛanātvād anityatvādīgamakam tathā śabdāntara-}\]

\[\text{vyavacchedena}{(3)} \text{ hetunā viṣṇuākāra viṣeṣārūpam śabde svāsāmānyam}{(4)} \text{ ucyate.}\]

\[\text{tenaiva cāṛthapratīyakakah śabdah.}\]

(1) Cf. ma byas pa rnam par bsal ba'i spyi yis mi rtog pa la sogs pa go bar byed pa (sic) V: ma byas pa bsal ba'i phyir mi rtog pa niñd la sogs pa go bar byed pa K. 

(2) okaṭvam em. (cf. byas pa niñd T, byas pa niñd K: byas pas V): okaṃ Ms

(3) Cf. sgra gzan rnam par gcod pa'i sgra la spyir brjod pa K: sgra gzan rnam par bcad pa'i sgra'i spyis brod par byed do V. KV do not corroborate oṣvyavacchedena Ms.

(4) śabde sāmānyam conj (cf. sgra la rañ gi spyi T): śabdesu sāmānyam Ms. In contrast to T, Ms and KV V do not corroborate svāsāmānyam.

\[\text{400} \text{ Cf. PST Ms B 225b-2:} \text{ hetau tritiya, akṛtakavyudāsah kṛtakam vastūcyate,}\]

\[\text{na hi vyāvṛtti vyāvṛttimato (cf. PVSV 32,15ff) 'nyety uktam, vyāvṛtti vyuḍāso vyavaccheda iti hi paryāyāḥ: the third triplet is to denote the cause. The exclusion of not-produced [things] is explained to be an object (vastu) that is produced; cf. Dignāga’s exposition of what constitutes the indicative function of kṛtakatva at PSV II:22, v. above no.s 13 and 400. Jinendrabuddhi’s paraphrase of the argument at Ms B 225b-3 (cf. no. [216] above) explains that the general property in a word is its exclusion of other words, the general property itself having the appearance of a particular form in consciousness. It is remarkable, though, that it is impossible to trace a single passage in PSV V, in which Dignāga makes clear that general properties are mental constructs located in consciousness.}\]

\[\text{401} \text{That is, only the word type, which is qualified by exclusion of other words denotes, in contrast to its individual instantiations, the svalakṣaṇas because they have not been observed before; cf. Jinendrabuddhi’s explanation at Ms B 225b4, quoting a ślokapāda: na tu svalakṣaṇaṇa “tasya pūrvaṃ adṛṣṭatvād” iti that stems from a well-known verse in which Dignāga explains that the relation between signifier and signified can only be established in terms of their types, the underlying supposition being that these two types are each defined by exclusion of other: nārthasābdavīśeṣasya vācyavācakatesyate | tasya pūrvaṃ adṛṣṭatvāt; sāmānyam tūpadekṣyate: “It is not claimed that there is a signifier-signified relationship} \]
between an individual referent and an individual word (*arthasaabdaviiśesa*) because they have not previously been observed (together); their general property, however, will be taught.” Cf. Kūmārila’s statement at ŚV Apoha 102: bhavadbhīh śabdabheda ’pi tannimitto na labhyate, na hy asādhāranah śabdo vācakah prāg adṛṣṭītah: “Nor do you assume that the difference between words is caused by the (vāsanās), for [according to your theory] an individual (asādhāranah) word does not denote because of not being previously observed [together with its referent].” ŚV Apoha 104 equating śabdāntarāpoha with śabdāsāmānaya corroborates the assumption that the verse is from one of Dignāga’s works. Kamalaśīla quotes it explaining at TSP 377,18 that the general property of the word that denotes (śabdāsāmān-way vācakam) is exclusion of other words (śabdāntarāpoha), which he compares to the general property of the referent (arthasaṃyam), defined as exclusion of other referents (arthāntarāpoha). The verse is inter alia quoted at NCV p. 615,12–13 with the introductory remark: arthāviśesaś ca tāvāvācya eva; Śiṅhasūri quotes at NCV 616,10-11 a short prose passage from the same work (presumably the Sāmānyaparīkṣāvāsya) stating that the word denotes the general feature (sāmānaya): yad api uktam; pūrvadṛṣṭasāmānaya dhūmenāṅgyanumānavad abhidhānām sāmānasya śabdena na viśeṣasya pūrvam adṛṣṭavād iti: “Just as fire is inferred by means of smoke whose general property [viz. exclusion of other] has been observed previously, the general property is denoted by the word, but not the individual because it has not previously been observed. Jinendrabuddhi also quotes the slokāpāda at Ms B 62b5-6 in the context of discussing how the relation between the word and its referent is established with reference to a perceptible particular (svalakṣaṇa) at the time of sanketa (i.e., the time when the relation between the word and the thing it denotes is taught) when the word by definition does not denote individuals, but only their general property: sāṅketaṁ śabdārthasambandhāḥhīnā hi sāṅketaṇāntudhibhūrthasāmānaya eva pratipādyate śabdān, na svalakṣaṇam, “tasya pūrvam adṛṣṭavāt.” prayogakāle viśeṣavīṣayatvāvāsānkā na bhavaty eva. sāṅketaṁ tu pratyakṣam svalakṣaṇam iti.

Vṛṣabhadeva’s statement at Paddhati 52,13-15 is closely related to Dignāga’s view: śabdavālakaṇāṇi pariḥcchidyaṁnodhayavayāṇi katham nityāni syuh, svalakṣaṇāṇi ca na vācakāni, sāmānaya eva vācakam iti jātih śabdaḥ; “How could the individual words that originate and vanish in the process of being delimited be eternal. The individuals do not denote. Only the general property denotes. Thus (iti) the word [as conveyor of meaning] is the general property.” Cf. Pind 1991.

Interestingly, Dignāga’s reason for denying word-particulars’ capability of denotation re-surfaces unexpectedly in Vinītadeva’s Santānāntarāsiddhiṭṭhā 3,13-16: ‘di ltar saṁs rgyas pa thams cad ni brjod par byed pa’i sgra’i rnam pa can gyi šes pa yin par ‘dod kyi, sgra’i khyad par ni yod kyi ma yin te, de ni sion ma mthon ba’i phyir ŋes bya ba la sogs pa’i gtan tshigs kyi khyad par brjod par byed pa yin pa bkag pa’i phyir ro: That is, all Buddhas maintain that a cognition (*jñāna*) has the form of the word that denotes (*vācaka*), but it does not have that of a word-particular (*viśeṣasabda*) because it has been refuted that a [word] particular denotes, the reason being “because it has not been observed previously (*pūrvam adṛṣṭavāt*),” and so on.

402 Namely the word as type, cf. PST Ms B 225b4: tatrāpi śabde idam aparāṇa veditavyam.
In this paragraph Dignāga discusses, although very briefly, a problem to which the Sanskrit grammarians usually refer as ekaśabdadarśana and anekaśab-
dadarśana, cf. Punyārāja’s VPṬ 103,21 (ad VP II:250): atraikāśabdadarśanam
anekaśabdadarśanam ceti dvau pakṣau; Ms B 225b3-4: ekānekatvaṃ śabdasya
vyutpādayitum āha: tratāpītyādī. According to the first theory the same speech unit
has various meanings depending on whether the usage is primary or secondary. The
second theory stresses the fact that some speech units are identical in terms of the
string of phonemes that constitute them, but different in terms of their derivation, the
ambiguity of denotation being resolved by contextual factors. Thus the first theory
focuses primarily on ambiguities of reference (artha), whereas the second is
concerned with ambiguities of single speech units like words or sentences. Both of
them are mentioned by Bhartrhari, cf. e.g. VPV I 139,8-9: srutyabhedād anekār-
thatve ’py ekaśabdavatvam, arthābhedād ekaśrūtītve ’py anekaśabdavatvam. tatra caie-
śāṃ aupacārīko bheda mukhyam ekatvam. anyeśāṃ tu prthaktvaṃ mukhyam vyāva-
hrīkaṃ ekatvam iti; VP II:257; VP II:314-17; 405, 407; VPV I 206,2-5: vākyānām
hi tulyaṇātītve ’pi sati nimitāntarāc chakti bhidyate. tatra yo rūpād eva kevalād
vākyārthaṃ pratipadyate prakaraṇasāmarthīyādi nāpekṣate sa vivakṣitāvivakṣitayoh
saṃmoham āpādyate.


[218] yatraṅkaśādiśabdād(1) arthe śakātaṅgādaud(2) samśaya <utpadyate>, tatra śab-
dasyaikyam. Restored, cf. PST Ms B 225b4-5: yatraṅkaśādiśabdāśravaṇād abhidheye
śakātaṅgādaud ... samśayo bhavati, tatra śabdasyaikyam.

(1) For yatra, cf. gaṇ du V : om. K.
(2) Cf. don śīṅ rta’i gsol mda’ la sogs pa la V : śīṅ rta’i yan lag la sogs pa’i don
K.

The word aksa is a well-known example of a homonym in Sanskrit gram-
matical literature, cf. Mahā-bh I 220,2: bhavō śabdā ekārthā bhavanti, tadyathā
indraḥ śakrāḥ + ... ekaḥ ca śabdo bahvarthas tadyathā aksah pādā māṣaḥ iti. VPV
II 255,2-3 (ad VP II:250): yathaiva śabdabhede ’pi hastāḥ karah pānīr ity
arthasaśvatvaṃ na nivartate, tathaivārthabhahi ’py aksah pādā māṣa ity ekatvaṃ
(so read; ed. vā) śabdasya na nivartate: “Just as hasta, kara, pāni do not abandon
their identity of reference although the words are different, so aksa pāda māṣa do
not abandon their [phonetic] identity of word although their [individual] referents are
different.”

Cf. PST Ms B 225b4-5: ādigrahaṇād vibhītakādaud.

Cf. PST Ms B 225b5: ekasya hy anekārthasambandhiṣu samśayakāraṇatvam
prasiddham ataḥ prameyatvavad anekasambandhisamśayahetutvād eka iti prati-
yate: “For it is acknowledged that a single [word] is a cause of doubt about relata
that are different referents. Therefore it is understood that it is one because it is a
cause of doubt about different relata in the same way as ’being an object of
 cognition’.”

<yatras> bhavatisabdādau <satrantādau> (1) samśayāḥ(2), <yatras> śrutisāmye(3) ‘pi sābdabheda draṣṭavyaḥ, tadyathā ka iheti. Restored, cf. PST Ms B 225b6-7: śrutisāmye ‘pi sābdabheda draṣṭavyaḥ ... tadyathā(4) ka iheti.

(1)satrantādau conj. (Cf. PST Ms B 225b6: kim idam satrantasya saptamyevakacane sati). The two Tibetan translations of this paragraph are utterly confused. bhavatisabdādau is translated (partly in translitterated form) in K as bhābate ‘i sgra la sogs par, but V contains no trace of this term. yod pa la sogs par K : sogs par V are incomprehensible. Perhaps Kanakavarman read the first term of the compound as sattā(2); the crucial lexeme anta, however, is not reproduced. Vasudharakṣita may not even have been able to identify in his exemplar the first two terms of this compound. DC add absurdly sgra la before sogs par V.

(2)Cf. PST Ms B 225b5f: bhavatisabdādau sādrśyāt samśayāḥ.
(3)Cf. sgra spyi K : ñāṇ pa pos (sic) spyi la V.
(4) yathā em. “yatha Ms

407 Cf. PST Ms B 225b6: yathā bhavatisabdādau sādrśyāt samśayāḥ: kim idam satrantasya saptamyevakacane sati rūpam āhosvit tiṇantam utāmantraṇam, evam asyety ukte sandehāḥ: kim idam saṣṭhyantam padam uta lotmaḍhyanamapuruṣaikavācanāntam? “Like the doubt about the word ‘bhavati’, etc. because of similarity: “Is this the form of a word ending in the affix satr [i.e., the affix of the present participle] ending in the seventh triplet in the singular, or is it a word ending in a tin affix [i.e., pr. 3 sg. < ṛbhīr], or is it a vocative [< bhavatī]? In the same way, when one says asya, there is doubt about whether it is a syntactical word ending in the sixth triplet [i.e., gen. mn. < idam] or whether it is ending in second person singular of the affix lof [i.e., imp. < ṛ as “throw”].”

Kumāraśīla mentions the same example at ŚV Pratyakṣa° 191: bhavatyādau ca bhinne ‘pi nāmākhyātatvasaṃjñāyā, rūpaikatvena cādhyāye tulyārthatvam prasajyate.


409 The clause ka iha is ambiguous: due to sandhi it may be interpreted either as a combination of the syntactical words kah + iha > ka iha: “Who is here” or ke [locative of kam (m. or n.)) + iha > ka iha: “Here at Ka [i.e., Prajāpati], or “Here in ka [i.e., water],” Cf. PST Ms B 225b7-226a1: atra hi saṃhitāyāṃ sābdarūpapagataḥ samśayāḥ. kim ayam pratham uta saptamāntya ity anekatvaṃ ca prasiddham. evaṃ lokasyārthe śabde ca saṃdehād abhedo bhedaḥ ca veditavyāḥ: “For in this case the doubt relates to the form of the word in connected speech: Does it end in the first triplet or does it end in the seventh triplet? And thus its manifoldness is acknowledged. In this way identity and difference are to be viewed since people are in doubt about the referent and the word, respectively.” Examples of such ambiguities are mentioned at VPV I 135,6-7: vākyeṣu vā pravivekī nirjñātārtha-bhedaṃ vā vāvat tulyaṛūpam padoṃ gaur aksaḥ iti sarvaṃ tad ekam. nāmākhyāta-bhede ‘pi caikam evākṣṣyaśva ityevamprakāraṃ padam. VPV II 259,16-17 (ad VP II:268): tathā vāyur vāyuḥ, aśvo ‘svah, tena tena, iti nāmākhyātānāṃ tulyarūpavte visayāntarasāyāmsparśān na gauṇamukhyavyavahāro ’sti; cf. VPV II 304,12 (ad VP II:405).
[221] katham punah śabdasyārthāntarāpohena svārthābhidhāne pūrvaḍosāprasānaṅgaḥ. Restored, cf. NCV 650,9: katham punah śabdasyārthातaretyādi; Ms B 226a1: katham punar ityādi; NCV 658,15: arthāntarāpohena svārthābhidhānā; NCV 651,3: pūrvaḍosāprasānās ca katham arthāntarāpohena svārthābhidhānā; NCV 658,10: pūrvaḍosāprasānaṅga iti.

410 Dignāga’s opponent asks why the consequences–anabhidhāna and vyabhicāra—that follow from the first theory, the so-called bhedaṇa introduced and explained at PSV V:2ab do not apply to the katha that Dign refersent (vyutpatti) observed to apply to the referents of other words. It is clear from the writings of word’s being observed to apply to an instance of its referent and its not being c i.e., a member (and no special conditions apply to it and its locus, the x is easily ascertained, the object of the prototypical example (cf. no. 428 below), Dignāga assumes that reification of the connection between y and x is feasible on the basis of mere non-observation, emphasizing the predominance of vyatireka over joint presence as the means of establishing the invariable concomitance of y and x, the foundation of any valid connection. Dignāga’s view was well known to Kumārila, who addresses it at ŚV Anumāna’ 131cd–132:

\[ aśesāpekṣitavāc ca saukaryāc cāpy adarśanāt \]
\[ sādhane yady apiṣṭo 'tra vyatireko 'numāṃ prati \]

411 Cf. gaṅ gi phyir K : ’di ltar V.

[222] adṛṣṭaḥ anyaśabdārthe svārthasyāṁśe ’pi darśanāt, īrteh sambhandhāsaukaryam na cásti vyabhicārītam. Qu. TSP 378,17-18; Ms B 226a2: 34ab, 226a4-5: 34cd; NCV 652,8: 34ab: 660,25: 34cd; 661,10: 34abc; 728,20: 34a.

412 The feasibility of the connection (sambhandhāsaukaryam) depends on the word’s being observed to apply to an instance of its referent and its not being observed to apply to the referents of other words. It is clear from the writings of non-buddhist philosophers who address the implications of sambhandhāsaukaryam that Dignāga presupposes that the person who is taught the connection of word and referent (vyutpatti) is standing in some place (ekadēśaṣṭha) next to the referent (artha). A knowledgeable person points to a prototypical instance of the referent, i.e., a member (amśa) of the domain of similar referents, explaining that “this (thing) x is y” (cf. §§ 65-66 below). As the referent thus defined occurs in a particular locus and no special conditions apply to it and its locus, the ekadēśaṣṭha may reify the application of y to any given x through the means of their joint presence (anāvaya) and absence (vyatireka), their joint absence being ascertained merely through not observing (adārśanāmātra) the application of y to any other thing but the referent x, inferring that y denotes all instances of similar things to the exclusion of all things occurring in other loci than that of the referent. As non-observation of the absence of other things in the locus of the prototypical amśa is easily ascertained, the object of non-observation being the non-existence (abhāva) of some other referent in the locus of the prototypical example (cf. no. 428 below), Dignāga assumes that reification of the connection between y and x is feasible on the basis of mere non-observation, emphasizing the predominance of vyatireka over joint presence as the means of establishing the invariable concomitance of y and x, the foundation of any valid connection.
tāvatā na hy anāṅgatvam yuḥtikāṃ śābdē hi vākṣyate [132]

“Although joint absence (vyatireka) is claimed to establish [universal concomitance] because it is dependent upon [joint absence] of all [of the dissimilar instances] and because [the connection] is easy [to establish] since [the indicator or the word] is not observed [to apply to dissimilar instances], it is by no means the case that joint presence (vyatireka) is not a factor when it comes to inference, as will be explained in the chapter on verbal knowledge (śābda).”

Umveka introduces Kumārila’s succinct statement of the rationale of Dignāga’s theory of the feasibility of the connection as follows:

sādhyaṇa vyāptisiddhyai ca vyatireko ‘tra kathyate [ŚV Anumāṇa’ 128c-d] ity uktam, tad anupapannam ity āsāṅkyate: aśeṣāvipakṣāpekṣitvenādarsanāmārāvāvetyena ca sukhagrāhyatvād anvayani apekṣasya vyatirekasyavāṅgatvāt; anvayas tu āraṇād avaseyah; na ca tat sarvatra sapakṣe sambhavati sakalasapakṣaṃgraḥa-

“It is said: “In order to establish the universal concomitance with the probandum joint absence (vyatireka) is stated for that purpose” [ŚV Anumāṇa’ 128c-d]. This is unjustified he thinks and argues: Because only joint absence without dependence upon joint presence is a factor because it is easy to apprehend as dependent on the vipakṣa as a whole and as ascertainable through mere non-observation; joint presence on the other hand, is ascertainable through observation; and that is not possible for all of the sapakṣa because there is no apprehension of all of the sapakṣa.”

Sucaritāmiśra’s Kaśikā ad ŚV loc. cit. supports Umveka’s interpretation:

atra bauddhā varanti kim idaṁ “vyāptiḥ sādharmyam ukte ca na vaidharmyam apeksyaḥ” [ŚV anumāṇa’ 118ab] ity ucyate ? na hi śatāṃsāṇāpi hetor vipakṣād vyatirekaṃ sāṅkyyamāne gamakatvam asāty āsāvapakṣo ’numātār vyatirekāṃ grahitum apekṣitāḥ, na cāsau durādhyāgānaṃ, ekādēṣāsthāsāpyāpi sarvādārānasākāryāt. āraṇām hi sarvāvipakṣāṃ duṣkaram, tadabhāvas tu sakāryaṇaṃ vṛtta eva:

“In this context the Buddhists argue: what is meant by saying that “when the positive example has been formulated in connection with the [formulation of the] universal concomitance (vyāpti) there is no need for the negative example” [ŚV anumāṇa’ 118ab]? For the reason is not probative if there is even the least bit of doubt about its difference from the dissimilar instances (vipakṣa). Consequently the person who is inferring has to depend on all of the dissimilar instances for discerning the joint absence [of the hetu] from the dissimilar instances. This, however, is not difficult to realise because it is feasible even for someone who is standing in one place (ekastha) to not observe [the application of the hetu] to all [of the dissimilar instances]. For the observation of all the things that are dissimilar is not feasible, whereas their absence is easily obtained (sakāryaṇaṃ vṛtta).”

Pārthasārathīśra corroborates the analysis in Nyāyaratnakā ad loc.:

śākyā tu vaidharmyavacanasya pāsikatvam asahamāṇā vaidharmyam eva sarvadā vaktavyaṃ na sādharmyam ity āhuḥ ... te kila manyate: yasyāpi sādhyaṃvayo lingasyānumāṇāṅgaṃ yasya vā vipakṣāvyatirekāṃ tayor ubhayaś api tāvad aśeṣāpekṣitavam avivādam. tatra yady anvayo ’ngam iṣyate, tato ’vaśyaṃ sarvesāṃ attānāgatānām api dhūmānām agrihīhi sarvāḥ samanvayo ghrītvavahāḥ. na cāsāv īśvareṇāpi grahitum śākyate; na ca keṣāṃcīda anvayē ghrīte ’nyāir agrīhitānyavayār maṇānaṃ sambhavati. vahmāntvasāmāṇyaḥ dhūmātvāsāmāṇyaṃvayo ghrīta iti cet? na, sāmānyasya svalakṣaṇavyatirekavikalpasahānaṃsambhavāt. astu vā
sāmānyam, tathāpi tātīyāśādeśakālānīvayo 'gner durgra-ha eva. vipākṣavyati-rekaś tu sujjhānaḥ, sa hy adarśanamātragramyaḥ, sukram ca sarvadhūmānam apy eka

dēsāsthenaivānāgniṣv adarśanam. tasmāt anagnibhyo vyatecčeyāna dhūmo 'nagānyāvṛttimukhenāgniṃ gamayati. ata evātadvayāvṛttivāyatvam līṅgāsābdāyoh. tasmād vipākṣavyāvṛttipradarśanārthaṃ vaidharmyaṃ eva vaktavyam, na sādharm-

yam iti:

“The Buddhists, however, being unable to accept that the formulation of the negative example [only] has status as a corollary [to the positive example] claim that only the negative example should always be formulated, not the positive one; they are reported (ki-la) to argue as follows: whoever is of the opinion that the indicator’s agreement with the probandum is a factor in inference or whoever is of the opinion that [its] difference from the heterologous [is a factor in inference] they necessarily have to agree on its being dependent on the exhaustion [of all of the homologous and the heterologous]. If, in the present case, agreement is taken to be a factor, it will be necessary to perceive the agreement of all past and future [instances of] smoke with all [past and future instances of] fire, but not even the Lord is capable of doing that! And inference is not possible when joint presence of some has been apprehended because of other joint presences that have not been perceived. Suppose it is objected that what is perceived is the agreement of the property of being smoky with the property of being fiery. Such objection, however, is impossible because the universal cannot stand [the criticism] of the alternatives of its being [identical or] different from the particular [in which it inheres]. On the other hand, let us assume that the universal exists. But even so fire’s agreement with such a thing [as a universal] at all places and modes of time is certainly difficult to perceive. However, its difference from the dissimilar [instances] is easy to know, for this can be known merely through [the reason] not being observed [at the dissimilar (instances)]. Indeed, it is feasible even for someone who is standing in a some place (ekadeśa-stha) not to observe all [instances of] smoke at non-fires. Therefore when smoke is differentiated from non-fires it makes fire known by means of excluding it from non-fires. Consequently the scope of the indicator or the word is to exclude what is other (atad). Therefore only the dissimilar example is to be formulated for the sake of exemplifying the exclusion [of the hetu] from dissimilar [instances], but not from the similar ones.”

413 Cf. the related formulation of Kumārila’s solution to the problems of infinity and ambiguity at Tantravārttikam ad III 1:12 where he rejects Dignāga’s two arguments against the possibility of denoting the particulars by claiming that although entities are infinite, the relation of the word to the thing it denotes is feasible and that there will be no ambiguity if one takes a single among them as indicative [of the residence in it of the general property],(1) cf. loc.cit. p. 39,16ff: nanu vyaktīnām ānantyavābhidhārābhāyām anabhidhānam uktam. naiśa dosaḥ: ānantye 'pi hi bhāvānām ekaṃ kṛtvopalaṃkṣaṇam. śadhaḥ sukarasambandhaḥ na ca vyabhicariṣyati.

(1)Kumārila assumes by implication that the universal resides identically in each particular and therefore justifies the application of a general term to each instance.

414 Cf. PSṬ Ms B 226a2: śabdārthagrahaṇaṃ vipākṣopalaksanam. vipāke 'darśanād ity arthaḥ: “The use of ‘referent of the word’ is an implicit indication of
the vipakṣa. The meaning is this: because of not being observed to apply to the vipakṣa;” cf. no. s [224] and 420 below.

415 The locative is used to introduce the reference of any given term as in Sanskrit grammatical literature in which x(loc.) generally means “to denote x” or “applies to x,” cf. no. 419 below on the use of ārtī.

416 Cf. NCV 652,8-9: atrocyate tvayā: adṛṣṭer anyaśabdārthe svārthasyāṁśe ’pi darśanāt, anyāpohenārthābhidhānasiddhir iti vākyaśeṣah; op.cit. 728,20-21: ’adṛṣṭer anyaśabdārthe” ityādīnāpy āparīḥrātvāt.

Jinendrabuddhi deviates completely from the theoretical framework of Dignāga’s apoha theory by claiming that the svārtha is the aggregate of persons as possessed of intention vivakṣāvatpuruṣasamāḥ, the term ‘part’ (aṁśa) denoting a single such person, cf. PST Ms B 226a2-4: svo ‘ṛtho ’sminn iti svārthaḥ. kah punar asau? vivakṣāvatpuruṣasamāḥah. tasyāṁśo ‘vayavah vivakṣāvān puruṣaḥ, aṁśe ’pīti ca vivakṣavata ityam sankhyāḥ. This interpretation is indebted to Dharmakīrtin and post-Dharmakīrtin philosophy according to which one infers a speaker’s vivakṣa from the words he is using, cf. no. 9 above. In spite of this deviation from Dignāgan doctrine the subsequent presentation reproduces fairly accurately the underlying rationale of Dignāga’s theory of induction: Jinendrabuddhi states that although the members of the own referent of the word as explained above are infinite, nevertheless the word indicates its referent because it is observed to denote a single instance; to which Jinendrabuddhi adds that the use of api indicates that it is observed to denote several instances as well(1); and he concludes his exposition by explaining that Dignāga uses the word ‘member’ because the pervasion of the sapakṣa [i.e., everything similar to the indicated referent] is without [all] the members in the case of the act of indicating; for the word indicates even though it does not pervade (the sapakṣa), cf. PST Ms B 226a3-4 : etad uktam bhavati: yady api yathoktasya svārthasyaṅgānam ānāntyam, tathāpi tatraitaktrāpi darśanād iti. apiśaabd ‘nekatrāpiti dyotayati. sapakṣavyāpteḥ pratīyānanāyām anamśatvād aṁśagrahanam. avyāpake ’pi hi gamakāh.

(1)Jinendrabuddhi alludes to the well-known use of api after numerals to indicate the notion of totality, cf. Renou, Grammaire Sanscrite § 382 p. 517.

[223] anvayavyatirekau hi śabdasāyṛārthābhidhāne(1) dvāram, tau ca tulyātulyayor vṛttyavṛtti. Qu. NCV 660,21, cf. PST Ms B 226a5-6: anvayavyatirekau hi ... dvāram ... tau ca.

(1)śabdamārthāṃ em. : śabdamārsya NCV; cf. NCV loc. cit. no. 8; NCV 652,10-11: śabdasāyānvyayavyatirekau arthābhidhāne dvāram. tau ca tulyatulyayor vṛttyavṛtti; NCV 664,10-11: śabdasāyānvyayavyatirekau arthābhidhāne dvāram.

417 Joint presence and joint absence are a means (dvāram) in the sense that the word has the property of an indicator and as such it indicates by virtue of its connection, which is established through joint presence and joint absence, cf. PST Ms B 226a5-6: dvāram upāyah. śabdasya liṅgatvāt tasya śāntanvyvyatirekalaksana- sambandhabalena gamakatvāt. Dignāga’s view of joint presence and absence differs from the traditional view of the Sanskrit grammarians by its emphasis on the impossibility of anvaya for every single item to which a term refers as opposed to joint absence vyatireka.

418 For the implications of the use of (a)drṣṭi/(a)darśana and vr̥tti in the context of Sanskrit grammatical literature, cf. the references in Renou, Terminologie s.vv. drṣ- and vr̥-. Dignāga’s use of these terms is ambiguous because it is open to a localistic interpretation as in the case of the canon of the trairūpya, which is concerned with the occurrence of the indicator at the indicated and the sapakṣa and its absolute non-occurrence at the vipakṣa. Although Dignāga undoubtedly assumes that the logical indicator and the verbal indicator are homologous in the sense that they are subject to identical constraints, it is hard to believe that he would have described verbal usage in terms of the occurrence of the verbal sign at the referent(s) it denotes and its absolute non-occurrence at dissimilar referents. The use of vr̥tti with the locative like that of (a)drṣṭi/(a)darśana rather reflects the common usage in traditional Indian semantics of introducing the locative in order to indicate the denotation of any given term, and this is in perfect agreement with Dignāga’s description in §66 below of teaching the denotation by pointing at the referent. However, Dignāga’s critics evidently interpreted his formulation in a localistic sense as appears from Kumārila’s criticism at ŚV Śābda° 86, where he addresses the second member of the trairūpya, namely the sapaksānvaya: yatra dhūmo ‘stī tatrāgner astitvenānvayaḥ sphuṭah. na tv evāṁ yatra śābdō ‘sīi tatārtho ‘sīi niśca-yah: “It is obvious that wherever there is smoke, there it is continually accompanied by the existence of fire. However, an ascertainment like "the referent is wherever the word is" is not in the same way obvious. Some buddhists apparently attempted to reinterpret joint presence in terms of joint presence of verbal cognition (śabdajñāna) and cognition of the referent (arthajñāna), cf. Umveka’s introductory remarks to ŚV Śābda° 89 p. 368,21-22: kaścid āha: vināpy śābdasvarūpasayārthaśavariṇānvayaṃ śabdajñānasayārthajñānenānvayo bhaviṣyatī. yatra yatra gośabdajñānaṃ tatra tatra gojñānam īti.”

419 Cf. Simhasūri’s exegesis at NCV 652,9-11 explaining the homology between the logical and verbal indicator: anumānānumeysasambandho hy abhidhānābhidhe- yasambandhaḥ. tatra yathā dhūmasya ekadeśe darśanād agneḥ anagnau cādārśa- nād anagnivṛddāsenāgnipratītis tatha anvayavyatikāv arthābhidhāne dvāram: “For the connection between signifier and signified is an inference-inferendum connection. Just as fire in this case is cognized through exclusion of non-fire because smoke is observed at some place where there is fire and because it is not observed at non-fire, joint presence and joint absence are a means to denoting the referent.”

Jinendrabuddhi also connects induction by means of joint presence and joint absence to Dignāga’s view of the purpose of the second and third member of the canon of trairūpya, cf. PST Ms B 226a6: anvayavyatikārāpavavaranam: tattulya eva vr̥tīs tatadute ‘vr̥tīs eva līṅgasyeti. etat svarūpam anvayavyatikayoḥ: “The description of the form of joint presence and joint absence is [as follows]: the indicator’s occurrence at what is similar exclusively, and its absolute non-occurrence at what is dissimilar. This is the essential nature of joint presence and joint absence;” cf. Dignāga’s definition at PSV II:5cd (q.v. no. 9 above) of the three criteria any valid indicator must fulfil.
YD alludes to Dignāga’s description of induction by means of joint presence and joint absence at 100,13-16: na, anvyavatirekābhyām adhiśamahetutvāt. yathā kṛtakatvādīr dharmo ‘nityādu (1) viśaye dṛṣṭaḥ tadābhāve cādṛṣṭa ity anītye ārthe niścayam ādādhāty evam śābdo ‘pi svārthe dṛṣṭo ‘nyatra cātājātīye (2) na dṛṣṭāḥ pratipattiḥetur bhavati. tasmād anumāṇād abhīnna evāyam iti: “No, [āgama, i.e., verbal communication, is not something different] because it is a cause of cognition through joint presence and joint absence. Just as a general property like being produced is observed at an object that is imperfect, but not observed at its absence, and thus instills certainty about the referent as impermanent, the word too becomes a cause of cognition, when it has been observed to apply to its own referent and not observed to apply to something else that is not of the same kind. Therefore it is not at all distinct from inference.”

(1) anītyādu conj. : ed. anītyatvādu; however, according to Dignāgan epistemology general properties do not occur at other general properties as in Vaiśeṣika ontology, but only as mediated through the objects/referents in which they occur.

(2) so read with A; ed. anyatra tajjātīye.

(224) tatra tu (1) tulye (2) nāvaśyam sarvatva vrṭtir ākhyeyā kva cid, ānante ‘ṛthasyākhyānāsamabhāvat. atule tu saty āpy ānante śākyam adarśanamātrenāvṛttir (3) ākhyānam. ata eva ca svasambandhibhyo ‘nayatradarsanāt tadyavacchedānumānaṃ svārthābhādhānam (4) ity ucayate. Restored, cf. NCV 652,11-21: tatra tule nāvaśyam sarvatva vrṭtir ākhyeyā kva cid, ānante ‘ṛthasyākhyānāsamabhāvat . . . atule tu saty āpy ānante śākyam adarśanamātrenādarsane ‘pravṛttir ākhyānam . . . ata eva ceti . . . sambandhibhya iti . . . anyatradarsanād iti . . . tadyavacchedānumānaṃ; NCV 718,14: ata eva cedam ityādī etapatśasamśrayadarśanārtham bhāṣyagrantham āha: svasambandhibhyo ‘nyatradarsanād ityādī; Ms B 226a6-7: tatra tu tattule nāvaśyam iti. nāyaṃ niyamo yat sarvasmin sajātīye vrṭtir ākhyeyā . . . kvacid ityādī; 226b1-5: atule tu saty āpy ānantiya iti . . . ata eveti . . . svasambandhibhyah sajātīyebhyo ‘nyatra vīpakṣe adarśanāt tadyavacchedānumānaṃ (5) iti. yatradarsanāṃ svārthābhāvā tadyavacchedānumānaṃ anumānaṃ anumītiḥ svārthe bhīdhānam ity ucayate (6).

(1) tu Ms (cf. de la “ . . . ni V : de la ‘ . . . ni K : om. NCV.
(2) tule (cf. dra ba la V : dra ba K) NCV : tattule Ms
(3) mātrenāvṛttir conj. : mātrenā ‘pravṛttir NCV.
(4) abhi° em. (cf. rāni gi don rjod par byed pa V : ‘e ‘bhi° (cf. rāni gi don la . . . brjod pa KT = svārthe ‘bhīdhānam).
(5) tad° em. (cf. de T) : tatra vya° Ms
(6) Cf. žes brjod par bya ’o V : bśad pa yin no K.

420 The adverbial complement kvacid is here syntactically equivalent to kasmiṃścit. There is no doubt that kvacid is to be construed with the preceding negation na. Jinentrabuddhi, however, interprets kvacid as if it constitute a separate clause, syntactically independent of the preceding clause, cf. PST Ms B 226a7f: yadṛcchāśabdānām sambhavati sarvatva darśanām tadviśayaśayākavād iti. atah “kvacid” ity āha: “It is possible to observe arbitrary terms [denoting] every [referent] because their referent is singular. Therefore he says ‘to any [referent] whatever.”

This interpretation is evidently motivated by the view that arbitrary terms (= proper nouns) denote a single referent and that the problem of the particulars being
infinite therefore does not apply to the referents of proper nouns. It may have been motivated by the exposition of an (old?) ūkā on PS which both Mallavādi and Simhasūri quote, cf. below no.s 422-23.

Elsewhere Simhasūri cites a passage (from the ūkā) in which it is argued that it is impossible to state the joint presence (anvaya) of parts like being one-eyed and dwarffish, and so on, with respect to the aggregate of attributes that constitute the object denoted by the proper name dīthha, consequently one might draw the conclusion that joint absence (vyatirekā) like joint presence is impossible too, cf. NCV 706,13-15: tvayā anvayavyatirekā arthānumāne dvāram ity uktvā guna-
samudāye dīthākhya "rthe kānakuṇṭādyavayānayānabhidhānād anvayāsambhāvam niruṭkṛtya anvayāsambhāvād vyatirekāsambhāvam āśankyoctaṁ syād etad vyatirekāsambhāvāt iti. NCV 652,12-15, q.v. below no. 422.

For Dignāga’s analysis of proper nouns with the background of the apoha theory, cf. PS V 50a.

421 Cf. NCV 652,12-15: na hi sambhavo 'sti vrksāsabdasya sarvavrksesu dar-
sane, nāpi sarvatra lingini sarvalingasya sambhavo ‘gnidhtamādi, yady api kva
cid asti dīthādiṣu sambhavas tathāpi na taddvārāṇānām, sarvvānāpratit-
teḥ. gunasamudāyo hi dīthākhya 'rthāḥ, na ca sarve kānakuṇṭādyav dīthāsabdād
gamyate. evam anvayādāvānānānumānāsambhāvat: “For it is not possible to observe
that the word ‘tree’ denotes all trees, nor is it possible to observe every indicator at
every indicated, in the same way as it is not possible to observe every smoke at
every fire. Even though it is possible at some such as dīthha, nevertheless there is no
inference by means of that because it is not cognized in toto. For the referent that is
termed dīthha is an aggregate of attributes, and they, e.g., his being one-eyed,
dwarffish, and so on, are not all of them understood from the word ‘dīthha’. Thus
inference by means of joint presence is impossible;” NCV 657,20-21: yat svar-
thasyāmsē ‘pi darśanād gamakatvām samarthyatoktām: na sarvatra lingini lingam
sambhavati; cf. NCV 678,13-14: bhrāntavacanam etad: “sarvatra linginy adar-
sānān na dṛṣṭavat pratipattiḥ;” for the epistemological implications of the term
dṛṣṭavat, cf. PS II:15 with PSV ad loc. no. 13 above.

Simhasūri’s explanation at NCV 652,12-15 appears to be an almost verbatim
reproduction of the passage of the (old?) ūkā on PSV, cf. NCV 662,11,14: vrksāsab-
dasyavrksetyādi yāvad darśane nāsti sambhavah, nāpi sarvatra linginītyādi ... yady
api kva
cid ityādi sa eva ūkāgrantho yāvad anumānāsambhava itī; cf. NCV 716,18-
19: guṇasamudāyamātraṇa kānakuṇṭāder darśanāsambhavah, saty api darśane
sarvathānumānāsambhavah sarvaprākārenādṛṣṭatvāti: “It is impossible to observe
the mere aggregate of attributes such as being one-eyed, dwarffish, etc.; even though
they are observed, it is impossible to infer them in toto because [the aggregate] has
not been observed in every possible way.”

422 Since Simhasūri introduces his exegesis of this phrase at NCV 652,16 by
stating syād etad vyatirekāsāpy asambhavah, it is highly likely that this sentence
and the following exegesis of the ūkā he was using is indebted to the ūkā as applied to any referent
of proper nouns, cf. above no. 421. It is obvious that Jinendra buddhi made use of the
same source because his introductory remark is similar, cf. PST Ms B 226b1: syād etad atulyānāṃ ānantyād vyatirekākhyānasyāpi sarvatrāsambhava iti.

423 Cf. Simhasūri’s lucid exposition of Dignāga’s standpoint at NCV 707,8-10: anvayagatadosabhyāvam(1) vyatirekaṅgatam guṇam ca dārsāyati granthah: “atulye saty āpī ānantyeyo”(2) ityādi. tato anavayābhāvamātraṃ sāmānyato vyatirecanyāti. tadbhedarūpyāti asamprṣṭātā sābdāna līṅgāna vā. tasmād adodo iti parihāraḥ: “The text (granthah) shows that the joint presence is problematic and joint absence preferable, namely ‘non-occurrence at what is dissimilar, even though it is infinite’, and so forth. Therefore the mere non-existence of other [referents] is to be excluded in a general way (sāmānyato) by the word or the logical indicator without [its] being in contact(3) with the forms of its particulars [i.e., the particulars constituting the excluded other referents](4). Therefore there is no problem. Such is [Dignāga’s] rebuttal.”

(1) So read: ed. ści bhāvam.
(2) For this citation, cf. no. [224].
(3) No speech unit is in direct touch with its referent beyond the fact that it denotes it as excluded from its non-referents, irrespective of the individual features of the non-referents; the idea that speech is not in direct touch with reality but transcends it due of its generalising representation of things, is also expressed in a well-known verse ascribed to Dignāga viz. vikalpayonayāḥ śabdāḥ, etc., for which cf. no. 531 below.
(4) For this, cf. the exposition of the theoretically crucial § 60.


Jinendrabuddhi explains vyatireka as characterized by non-existence, cf. PST Ms B 226b2-4: teṣām ānantyeyo saty api svārthābhāve śruter abhāvālaṅk posto vyatirekāḥ śakyaṃ dārsāyitum adarśanasyābhāvamātraṃ. śabdārthayor hi kāryakāraṇabhāvāve śiddhe kāraṇasyārthābhāve tatkāryaṃ śabdō na bhavatī. etāvaṃ adarśaṃ pratyāyitaṃ bhavati. tatrāśrayaśrāṃṣam(1) aprayojanam, vināpi tena vyatireka-niścayāt. na hi kāraṇāvahā kāraṇasyambhava iti. ato vyatirekasyāpi sukrām ākhyānaṃ. “Even though there is an infinity of these [referents] it is possible to show joint absence, which is characterized by non-existence when the word’s own referent does not exist because non-observation is nothing but non-existence. For in that it is recognized that word and referent are related as cause and effect, the effect of the referent namely the word does not exist when its cause viz. the referent does not exist. That much explains non-observation. In this context non-observation of the substrate has no purpose because joint absence is ascertained even without it. For there is no possibility of an effect when there is no cause. Therefore it is also feasible to tell the joint absence [of the word and its referent].”

On the subject of adarśanamātra, Simhasūri limits himself to explaining that non-observation is nothing but absence of observation, cf. NCV 652,17: adarśanam hi darśanābhāvamātraṃ. Kumārila mentions, ŚV Anumāna° 131cd-132ab,
Dignāga’s view that it is feasible to establish the connection through non-observation as it relates to the dissimilar without expection and connects non-observation and joint absence vyatireka: ašeṣāpaksatvatvāc ca saukāryāc cāpy adarsanāt, sadhane yady apiṣṭo ’tra vyatireko ’numām prati; cf. the criticism of adarsanāmātra Apoha’s 75: na cādarsanāmātrens tāḥyām prayāyanaḥ bhavet | sarvatraiva hy adṛṣṭatvāt prayāyāyaṃ navaśisyate ].

Dignāga’s view that mere non-observation of the word’s application to dissimilar instances establishes the connection between the word and its referent is reflected in his alleged pupil Īśvarasena’s theory of upalambhābhāvatam, cf. E. Steinkellner: “Bemerkungen zu Īśvarasenas Lehre vom Grund,” WZKS 10 pp. 73-85; cf. HB II p. 154 foll.. Dharmakīrti’s theory of anupalabdhi breaks with the Dignāgan tradition.

Cf. Dharmakīrti’s implicit criticism of Dignāga’s view of adarsanāmātra as the principal means of establishing apoha at PV III Pratyakṣapariccheda 172a-e: anyatrādṛṣṭyaapekṣaṭvāt kvacit taddṛṣṭyaapekṣaṇāt śrutau sambhadhyaye ’pohō. This criticism, which treats observation and non-observation as equipollent, is implicit in the clause anyatrādṛṣṭyaapekṣaṭvāt, for which Dignāga would have sarvatra for anyatra, i.e., in the atulya in toto; v. PV Bh p. 264,30 foll. ad loc. cit.: śabdasya hy anyatra vijayīye ’dṛṣṭatvāt(2), kvacit tu tajjātiye darśanād apoha eva sankēta iti jñāyate; note especially the following reference to Dignāga’s view loc. op. cit. p. 265,23: anye tu punah sarvato vijayīyād vyāvṛtīṃ, kvacid vidhīye vṛttīṃ apekṣaṇa ātī vyatirekā tātparyām(3) anvaye tu neti, vyatireka eva prādhānyena prayāyate: “Others, on the other hand, claim that [a word] depends on exclusion from all dissimilar instances, and on its application to some thing to be shown. Thus the reference is to joint absence, but not to joint presence. Therefore (itti) joint absence is understood as the primary thing.” A similar statement is quoted in Īśaṇasrīmitrā’s Apohaprakaraṇa 207,10-11: tathā hi vijayīye sarvatrādṛṣṭyaapekṣaṭvāt, kvacit tu apekṣaṇātmajātiye śrutau sambhadhyaye ’pohā iti śāstraṃ. The śāstra to which Īśaṇasrīmitrā refers is as one can see the above-mentioned passage from Dharmakīrti’s PV III 172. However—and this is remarkable—it breaks completely with Dharmakīrti’s view by substituting sarvatra for anyatra, thus apparently returning to Dignāga’s original justification of apoha by stating that apoha depends on non-observation of the referent in all (sarvatra) of the domain of the dissimilar and dependence on some instance (kvacit) of the referent in the domain of the referent. Cf. Dignāga’s use of sarvatra at PSV II:13 quoted no. 188 above, q.v.


(1)ōadarśanaṃ conj. : ṣadarsanām Ms (cf. mthon ba T). The conj. is required by the context as the argument otherwise would seem incomprehensible.

(2) ’dṛṣṭatvāt em. : dṛṣṭatvāt PV Bh
(3) vyatireke tātparyām conj. : vyatirekātātparyām PV Bh

425 Cf. NCV 652,17-18: yasmād darśanasya sarvatrāsambhavaḥ, saty api darśane sarvathānumāṇāsambhavaḥ: “Because observation to denote all [that is similar to it] is impossible. Even if it were observed [to denote all that is similar to it], inference in toto is impossible.” Jinendrabuddhi must have used the same source as Simhasūri, as appears from the parallel explanation at Ms B 226b4: yasmād darśanasya tattulye sarvatrāsambhavo ’tattulye tu sambhavo ’darśanasya: “because observation to denote all that is similar to it is impossible, whereas non-observation
to denote all that is dissimilar to it is possible.” Dignāga also mentions at PSV III:45 the impossibility of observing the indicated at all that is similar. Both versions deviate from each other, cf. K (Kitagawa 1973 508b7-11): ‘di rigs pa yan yin te | gaṅ rigs mi mthun pa thams cad las ldog pa’i phyir dan | de’i sgo nas bsgrub bya thams cad la rtogs par byed pa’i phyir ro | ‘di ni bsgrub bya daṅ rigs mthun pa | thams cad la gedon mi za bar yod pa ma yin la | thams cad la ’dzin pa srid pa ma yin žin. — V (Kitagawa 1973 508a7-12): gaṅ rigs mi mthun mtha’ dag las log pa de’i sgo nas bsgrub bya la ’ses pa ’jug par byed pa de dag ni rig s kyī | ‘dir gor ma chags par mthun phyogs mtha’ dag la yod pa’o žes pa ni ma yin žin | thams cad la yod par ’dzin pa yan mi srid do ||: “And this is justified because [the indicator] is excluded from all that is dissimilar and because it indicates every probandum by means of that (*taddvārena). For it is necessarily not the case that it is found at all that is similar to the probandum, it being impossible to apprehend its existence at all [that is similar to the probandum].”

426 The compound tadyavacchedānumāna is syntactically equivalent to tato vyavacchedānumāna, cf. NCV paraphrasing the (old?) tīkā (cf. no.s 421-23 above) 752,21-22: yatraivādāsanam uktam vṛksābhāve ’vṛksē, tato vyavacchedānumānam ’avrksō na bhavati’ iti. evam ca kṛivā vṛksāsabdād dravyatvādyanumānam upapan- nam bhavati: “Only with regard to which non-observation is stated i.e. with regard to the absence of a tree which is a non-tree, the inference from its exclusion from this [non-tree] is ’it is not a non-tree’; and on such grounds the inference of substanteness, and so on, from the word ‘tree’ is justified.” Thus, the inferential component of Dignāga’s apoha theory presupposes that it is possible to draw valid inferences from negative evidence based upon non-observation.

Jinendrabuddhi’s gloss at Ms B 226b1-5 is syntactically ambiguous: yatrādārśa- nam svārthābhāve tadyavacchedānam anumānam: “The inference is of exclusions of/from that to which it is not observed to apply when its own referent is absent.”

It is evident that the inference to which Dignāga refers amounts to the judgement that e.g. the referent of the word “tree” is not a non-tree, which means that no entity that is not a tree occurs in the locus of the referent tree. From this follows that the relation between the referents of the words “tree” and “non-tree” is one of privative opposition between any given tree and any given non-tree, the latter qualifying the former by its absence from its locus. This constitutes Dignāga’s solution to the problem of the universal: the reference of a word does not depend upon the presence of a universal inhering in the referent as its cause of application, but rather upon the fact that any given tree is not primarily qualified by its individual characteristics, but rather, it is universally qualified by the non-existence in its locus of things that are not trees, the relation between the referents being one of privative opposition between two types of objects, namely trees and non-trees. This is the reason why Dignāga emphasises the predominant role of joint absence (vyatireka) i the process of exclusion. For Dignāga’s view of terms like ‘non-tree,’ whose purpose is to denote as non-existing the single (eka) general property (sāmānyadharma) that distinguishes non-trees from trees, cf. the important paragraph PSV V:43b below.

For the qualifying role of negation or exclusion as equivalent to the non-existence or absence (abhāva) of other things from the locus of the referent, cf. no. 466 below, and Jinendrabuddhi’s remarks on the predominance (prādhānya) of vyatireka (cf. no.s 13, 188, and 426 above, no. 428 below) over anvaya at Ms B 226b5-6: etena yady apy anvayavatirekayor ubhayor apy anumittāv aṅgatvam,
tathāpi vyātirekasya prādhānyāt tadvāreṇaiva gamakatvam iti darśayati: “Thereby he shows that even though both joint presence as well as joint absence are factors with regard to inference, nevertheless, since joint absence is predominant, it is only by means of that [the word] indicates.”

427 The technical term svasambandhin denotes any of the general properties that together define an entity. Thus the referent tree is defined by the general properties treeness, substanteness, earthenness, etc. Not all of these properties are connected to the word ‘tree’ in terms of being invariably connected with it. The word ‘tree’ is only invariably connected to the general property treeness. The other relata, however, are inferable from the word ‘tree’ because they form a hierarchy of properties, whose logical characteristics are determined by their position in the hierarchy, which is defined in terms of the extension of the terms that constitute it; cf. the explanation at NCV 652,18-20: svasambandhibhy ātī. yatra ṛṣṭaḥ so ‘tra sambandhi abhipretaḥ, na tu avinābhāvitvasambandhena. anyatrādarśanāḥ iti abhi-
dheyābhāve ‘darśanāt, anyathā hi vrksāsabdasya tasmin vastuni prthividravyādya-
bhāve ‘pi darśanaṃ vaktavyam syāt: “Than its own relata: The thing to which it is observed to apply is in this context considered a relatum, but not due to a connection in terms of being invariably concomitant. Because of not being observed to apply to other [referents]: Because of not being observed to apply when the denoted is not present. For otherwise observation of the word ‘tree’ to apply to this object (vastu) would have to be stated even in the absence of earth and substance, etc.”

In his exegesis Simhasūrya appears to reproduce more or less verbatim an old tiṣṭkā on PSV on the concept of svasambandhi, which Mallavādi evidently combined with extracts from Dīṇaga’s PSV, cf. NCV 718,15-16: “ata eva cedam” ityādi etapatkāsasamśrayadarśanārtham bhāṣyagrantham āhā “svasambandhibhyo nyāt-
trādarśanāḥ” ityādi. asya vyākyāḥ tiṣṭkāgranthe “yatra ṛṣṭa ityādi yāvad ‘avṛkṣo ‘nagir vā na bhavaḥ’ti gatārthaḥ, evam ca kṛtvyādyāh yāvad upapannam bhavati; the explanation at NCV 718,16-22 is probably a paraphrase, if not a verbatim reproduction, of the corresponding exposition of the tiṣṭkā: anekāvīnābhinām prthividravyatvādīnām vrksaśabdād dhūmāc cānubandhīnām anumānām yujyate taddarśasparśanena, vrksāyatvāḥ prthiśvī dravyāṃ sac ca dhūmatvāc ca vrksav adam aghin vac ceti. itarathā tv ityādi. ayantavyātirekē sambandhitvābhāve ‘nubandhīnām dravyādīnām aṣṭ vyākyā adhyātmyāt vyākyā eva vrṛṭe apakṣadharmaṁvānaikāntikāvatvānvānvānāḥ ābhāvādōsāḥ syuḥ. Anubandhīnām dravyādīnām tāge taddaṁbhāvino vrksasya svārthasāmbhava eveti ca doṣāḥ. tataḥ pratyāyya-
pratyānyayoryor anupapaptih. tasmāt svasambandhitvābhāvyadī yuktasāmbhāraḥ, sambandhīno 'ṛtheśtarasya bhāve darśanāt sambandhīnā eva bhāvābhāve ‘darśā-
nae cānūmānāsyaḥhīnpretasya siddhir iti: “The inference of the invariable concomi-
tants such as earthenness, substanteness, and so on, from the word ‘tree’ and the concomitants(1) from smoke is justified due to their observation or touch: from treeness, earth, substance, and ‘existent’, and from smokeness in the same way as tree and fire. Otherwise, however, etc.: if they were completely disconnected, i.e., if they did not have the property of being a relatum, then, because of the occurrence of the adjuncts viz. substance, and so on, in what is dissimilar viz. the vipakṣa, as also they are different, there would be the faults of not being inference viz. not being a property of the probandum, being ambiguous, and being contradictory; and if the concomitants viz. substance, and so on, are taken away, there would be the problem that its own referent tree that has these as its concomitants were impossible.
Therefore indicated and indication are not justified. This is recapitulated in the words beginning: *therefore, if the relata do not exist: because of observing a relatum viz. another thing at an entity and because of not observing the same relatum when the entity does not exist the meant inference is realised.*

(1) For the term *anubandhin*, cf. PS II:18-19, q.v. no. 374 above.

(225) *anvayadväreṇa cānumāṇe vrksaśabdād ekasmin vastuni śimśapādyābhāsah samaṣayo na sāt. tataṃśayavatā(1) pārthivatvadrvatvādyābhāsos 'pi(2) samaṣayah sāt. yatas tu(3) <vrksaśabdo 'pārthivādīsu na drṣṭah>, ato vyātirekamukhenaivānumāṇam. Restored, cf. PST Ms B 226b6-227a2: anvayadväreṇa cetyādi ... yady anvayadväreṇaivābhidhānām iṣyate, evam sati vrksaśabdasvāryāḥdāśahitaśya śimśapādiśy anvayo 'sti kevalāt vrksaśabdād ekasmin vastuni śimśapādyābhāsah samaṣayo na sāt, api tu niścaya eva sāt. athānekatra darśanaḥ samaṣayah. evam tarhi tataṃśayavat pārthivatvadrvatvādyābhāsos 'pi samaṣayah sāt pārthivatvādyanekadarsanāt. niścayas tu drṣṭo. yato nekatrāpi vartamāṇo yasyābhāvē na bhavati tad gamayati, netaram(4), ato vyātirekamukhenaivānumāṇam. etad eva darśayann āha: yatas tv ityādi.

(1) Cf. the tshom de bzhin du V : the tshom za ba bzhin du K.

(2) Cf. snān ba V : snān la yaṅ K.

(3) Cf. gan gi phyir K : gan du V (Sanskrit tu is not translated).

(4) netaram em. (cf. cig šos T) : netarata Ms

(228) Cf. PST Ms B 226b6-227a2: caśabdo 'vadhāranārthah. Simhasūri’s explanation of the passage beginning *anvayadväreṇa cānumāṇe* is related to the corresponding passage of Jinendrabuddhi’s explanation at Ms B 226b6-227a1-2 quoted above no. [225], cf. NCV 652,23–653,12 anvayadväreṇa cānumāṇe ‘yam dosāh; yasmād anugama ‘sti vrksaśabdasvāryāḥdāśahitaśya śimśapādiśu, tasmāt kevalenāpy anumāṇam prāṇaḥ. atha bahuṣu palāsādiśy api drṣṭa iti samaṣayo bha-vati. evam sati vrksārthe pārthivatvadrvatvādyāsattārthāḥ(1) santi tesu vrksaśab-dasya samāṇatvāt samaṣayah sāt, niścayas tu drṣṭaḥ śabdāt: “If, however, the inference were by means of joint presence the problem is as follows: since there is joint presence of the word ‘tree’ accompanied by the referent, and so on, with śimśapā, and so on, it follows [absurdly] that the inference is through that alone. But it is also observed to denote the palāśa, etc. Thus there is doubt. In those circumstances there would be doubt about the referent of earthenness, substance[-ness?], and existence that are found in the referent tree because the word ‘tree’ is the same with regards to these. However, it is observed that the word causes ascertainment explicitly.”

(1) One would expect the reading *dravyatvārtha* instead of *dravyārtha*.

(226) <āha ca> vrksatvapārthivadrvyasajjaṇeyāḥ prātiломyataḥ catustridvyeka- sandehe nimittam, niścaye(1) ‘nyathā. Qu. ŚVṬ 72,1-2; Ms B 227a3 (pāda d); NR 432,8-9. Cf. ŚV Apoha° 158.

(1) niścaye NR Ms : niścayo ŚVṬ.

(249) This verse is related to PS II 14, which Simhasūri quotes at NCV 724,22-24 to illustrate the predominance of joint absence (*vyārttiprādhāṇya*) over joint presence: *gunatvagandhasaurabhayatadviseṣair anukramāt, adrvyādiyavaçcheda ekvṛddhyotpalādivat.* (PS II:14)
gunatvenādṛavyād gandhatvenāpārthivād adṛavyāc ca surabhyenāsuraṃṭaḥ sādhāraṇaḥ surabhiviṣeṣaṇa cōṭpaladīṣu vyavaccheda ekaikaṃvyrdhyā kriyate (PSV II:14): (1)

“Like with respect to a lotus, and so on, the possessing a quality, aroma, sweet fragrance, and its particular [i.e., a particular sweet fragrance], excludes [it] in due order from being a non-substance, and so on, by augmentation [of the exclusions] one by one. (PS II:14)

The possessing a quality effects with respect to a lotus, and so on, its exclusion from being a non-substance, the possessing aroma from its being non-earthen as well as being a non-substance, sweet fragrance from what does not possess the common property of sweet fragrance [namely aroma (gandhatvam)], as well as a particular sweet fragrance, and so on, by augument-ing [the exclusions] one by one.” (PSV II:14).

(1) It is possible to restore PSV II:14 from the pratikas and Jinendrabuddhi’s paraphrase at PST Ms B 70b6-71a3: gunatvenādṛavyāt vā ity uktam. ata eva gunatvasyāpya ekāvyṛddhyā vyavaccheda karanaṃ prayāmānāṃ sūtraḥ ‘sti. yadi hi tenādṛavyavaccheda vidhiyata evam gandhe ‘naikavṛddhyā vyavacchedaḥ kriyate ... gandhatvenāpārthivād adṛavyāc cēti pārthivam idam dravyaṃ ca gandhavatvād ity apārthivād adṛavyāc ca vyavacchedaḥ kriyate. surabhyenā- surabhīsādharanād iti gandhavat etat surabhīyenā pūrvakābhyaṃ asurabhīsādharanād ca vyavacchedaḥ kriyate surabhe gandhaviṣeṣasya sādharanaṃ sāmāryam surabhīsādharanah gandhatvamātraṁ iha vivakṣitam. Avidyamānaḥ surabhīsādharanah yasya tat tathoktaḥ nīṣṛṣṭam ity arthaḥ.

Jinendrabuddhi’s concluding remark at PTS Ms B 71a4, addressing the opponents question why the logical reason indicates through joint absence only, is a precise characterization of the rationale of the Dignāga argument: surabhyeṣa utpaladīgandhaviṣeṣah. tad evam adṛavyādvivaṃvyaccheda ekaikavṛddhyotpalaṇādīṣu gunatvādibhiḥ kriyamāṇo dṛṣṭah, sa katham yujyate yadi vipakṣavyāvṛttitimukhena hetuḥ prayāpayati, nānyathā? dṛṣṭavad vidhimukhena hi sarveṣu sarvesaṃ darsānasyāviśiṣṭatvā tūḷā pratiṭhī syāt. tasmād vyāvṛttidvārenaiva hetur gamayatīty abhyupeyam: “A particular sweet fragrance is a particular aroma of a lotus. Therefore, when in this way the property of being a quality etc. is observed to effect the exclusion from non-substances etc. with regard to a lotus etc. by augmentation [of the exclusions] one by one, how could that be justified if the logical indicator indicates through exclusion from what is dissimilar, but not otherwise? Because (hi) through affirmation in the way it has been observed [previously] the cognition of all [properties] would be the same since the observation of all [properties] is not differentiated. Therefore it is to be accepted that the logical reason indicates exclusively by means of exclusion.”

Simhasūri quotes PS III:44 at NCV 727,9-10 as yet another example of the predominance of exclusion over joint presence, which presupposes affirmation of the presence of the indicator at some indicated or observation of the word’s application to its referent: anyathā hi drṣṭavad yadi siddhiḥ syāc chaukhyarūpaṃgurṣāritāḥ, kramaḥ prayātiṣome ‘pi dvipreyākārthagatī bhavet (1).

(1) Cf. PST Ms B 139b4-140a1: yasmād vyacchedadvāraṇa hetur gamakah. tasmād ekasāmāt surabhīyad dhetor utpalasya gandhādīni siddhyanti. surabhīyasya yatra gandhatvādīm tatra bhāvāt, tadabhāve vābhāvāt. nanu ca surabhīyasya
The word 'tree' has a single referent by means of preclusion of non-trees also applies to its own referent through exclusion of non-earthien things. That is, the indication is only through joint absence. That is, it is observed where trees are absent. That is, the word 'tree' is a cause of doubt about three viz. substanceness, earthenness, and treeness since it is also observed where these are absent. The same is to be formulated with regard to those that follow: the word 'existent' [is a cause of doubt] about three viz. substanceness, earthenness, and treeness, the word 'substance' about two viz. earthenness and treeness, and the word 'earthen' about one viz. treeness. In the statement otherwise [they are a cause] of the word 'cause' is to be supplied from what precedes. Otherwise, i.e., the word 'substance' is a cause of about four viz. earthenness, substanceness, existence, and knowability. That is, it is, on the one hand, observed when they are present, and, on the other hand, not observed when they are absent. The same is to be formulated with regard to those that follow: also the words 'earthen', and so on, are in the same way to be considered causes of about substanceness, and so on, by deducting one after another. But if the indication were in an affirmative form in the way [the referent] has been observed [previously] there would be about four, three, two, and one referent in direct order. This would also be the case in reverse order because the words 'knowable', and so on, are observed to apply when existence, etc. is present. Since there is doubt because they are also observed where these are absent, the property of indicating is only through joint absence.”

Cf. also NCV 653,12-14: vrksasabdo 'vrksanivrttyaikarthako 'pahrthivavvyrttyapi svartthe vartate, tathaa hi vrksaparthivadvrasacchabda anulomyna tridvyekarthaniscayetavah. evam arthanatarayudasenaarthantarabhidhnanam upapannam: ‘The word ‘tree’ which has a single referent by means of preclusion of non-trees also applies to its own referent through exclusion of non-earthien things. That is, the
words ‘tree,’ ‘earthen,’ ‘substance,’ and ‘existent,’ are in direct order causes of ascertainment of three, two and one referent, [respectively]. Thus, the denotation of some referents (arthāntara) is by means of exclusion of other referents (arthāntara).”

Similarly ŚVT 72,20-25 who interprets the verse in the light of Dignāga’s rejection of vidhi as it necessarily is a cause of doubt: yat punah parakapṣe vidhimukhena śabde pravartamāne sarvāmakārthagrahanaṁ prāpnoti, tataḥ ca yathānulonyena yṛksapārthivadrvyasajjñeyasyāsabdebhyaś catuṣtridvayekaniscayo bhavati, tathā prāti-lomyenāpi niścayena bhavitavyam. na ca tathā drṣyate. jñeyaśabdāc caturṣu sattā-ḍīṣu sandehāt, sacchabādṛiḥ triṣu dravyādīṣu, dravyaśabdāt dvayoḥ pārthiavṛkṣa-tvayoḥ, pārthiav śabdādē ekatra vyksate. tasmān na vidhimukhena pravṛttāḥ śabdāḥ.

(1) evam em. (cf. de bžin du T): etam Ms
(2) drṣṭah em.: drsta Ms
(3) ekaikā em.: ekeka Ms
(4) As opposed to adding them, cf. PSV II:14, q.v. no. 430 above.

[227] na ca sambhandhāvāraṁ muktā śabdasya liṅgasya vā(1) svārthahyā-panaśaktārī ti. Qu. NCV 663,9-10 (iti tvayivokto ‘yam nyāya iti darśayati); cf. PST Ms B 227a6: na ca sambhandhāvāram muktētyādy. sambhandho ‘vinābhāvaḥ sa eva dvāram nimittam anumṛteḥ, tatra prarūtyaśa liṅgasya svārthagraha (sic) nāstī svārthapratīyanaśaktēśānti; cf. Ms 227a7-227b1, q.v. no. 432 below.

(1) Cf. PST Ms B 227a7: vāsabda aupamīye, which explains the reading liṅgasyeva of the paraphrase.

431 The necessary means of connection is vyaṭireka whose predominance over anyyaya for establishing the avinābhāvasambhandha was explained at PSV V:34, cf. Ms B 227a7-227b1: yathārthātmakāṁ liṅgam avinābhāvasambhandhāvāreṇa pratyayayat svārthām vyātrikādyavāreṇa pratyayayati, tathā śabdoro ‘pīti pratiśādanāya ‘liṅgasya ve’ti vacanam: “Just as a logical indicator indicates its proper object that has the nature of a referent through joint absence by indicating it through the relation which is constituted by the irreplaceable relation [between indicator and indicated], so also a word. Therefore, in order to make that clear he uses the expression “or the inferential indicator.”

Dignāga’s view that the irreplaceable relation of the word (śabdā) or the logical indicator (liṅga) to the referent or the indicated is grounded on exclusion underlies Kumārila’s statement at ŚV Apoha° 92: yady apy apohanirnukte na vṛtti śabdāliṅgavyakta, tathāpi buddhiḥ tu jñātur vastv avalambate; cf. also ŚV Apoha° 73 qu. TS 933, commenting on which Kamalaśīla quotes a Sanskrit fragment at TSP 367,11: apohāḥ śabdaliṅgābhāyām eva pratiśādanāye, which probably stems from one of Dignāga’s lost works; cf. Manorathandrand at PVV 299,14-15 ad PV I 134cd-135ab: sāmānya-gocarīś śabdā buddhayah kalpika anyāpohāvīṣayāc ācāryenā prakāḥ: apohāḥ śabdaliṅgābhāyām pratiśādanāye; Dharmakīrti would seem to incorporate more of this fragment in the following statement: at PVSV 25,27-28: katham punar etad ganyate: “vyavacchedhaḥ śabdaliṅgābhāyām pratiśādaye vidhinā na vasturyaṁ eve’ti. Hemacandra on Syādvādamaṇḍarī 14 p. 94:248 quotes the following two ślokāpādas: apohāḥ śabdaliṅgābhāyām na vastu vidhinocayate; cf. also PV I 47: apohāvīṣayam iti liṅgam prakāṛitam, ascribed to ācārya, i.e., Dignāga by Manorathandrand ad loc. For the implications of vidhi, cf. no 13 above.
Jinendrabuddhi interprets vā in the sense of iva(1), cf. Ms 227a7: vāsabda aupamyē.

(1) Cf. Amarakoṣa III.4:9: va vā ... sāmye. However, vā in the sense of iva is only recorded in verse. Dignāga evidently does not distinguish between the function of the logical indicator and the word in terms of their connection and indicative function.

228 tasyānekkadharmatve sarvāthā pratāyānaśambhavāt, <svārthāvyabhicāraś ca>(1) bhedānabhidhānāt. Restored, cf. PST Ms B 227b1-3: tasyānekkadharmatva iti śimśapādibhedena puṣpitahalitavādibhedena ca vrksāder arthāyakekkadharmatve sarvāthā pratāyānaśambhavād iti ... bhedānabhidhānād iti; cf. the quotation at NCV 663,11-12: yad uktam tvayā. “na cāsti vyabhicārītaḥ, bhedānabhidhānād” iti, which may stem from a different source, presumably the Sāmānyaparīkṣā-vyāsā.

(1) Cf. the use of svārthāvyabhicāraḥ at § 49, cf. no. [234] below.


(1) Cf. sār bād paʾi skyon K : ŋes pa sna ma V.

230 That is, the problem of not denoting as explained at PSV V:2ab. Simhasūri quotes a similar argument interspersed with his own glosses at NCV 653,20-22 pūrvadoṣābhāvaś ca yasmāc chruteh sambandhasaukaryam bahutev ‘pi tulyatulya-yor vṛtyavṛtt, sambandhasaukaryād na cāpi vyabhicārītaḥ bhedānabhidhānāt. evaṃ tāvat bhedābhidhāne ye doṣā uktās te pariḥrtā iti anyāpohāvādpaksah: “And the previous faults do not exist since the word’s connection is feasible, i.e., [its]
occurrence and non-occurrence at the similar and dissimilar, [respectively], although [the particulars] are many. Because of the feasibility [of the connection] there is no ambiguity either since the particulars are not denoted. Thus in the first place the faults that have been mentioned with regard to the denotation of the particulars are avoided. This is the thesis of the upholder of the *apoha* theory.”


(1) Cf. *gaṇi phir K*: ‘di ltar V.


[232] *sāmānyāsabdasya hi yat kṛtyam* (1) arthāntarayudāsah sa svabhādāpratikṣeṇeti bhedaśrutyā saha(2) sāmānyādhikaranyam upapannam. Restored, cf. PST Ms B 227b5–228a1: sāmānyāsabdasya hi yadā hihi kṛtayam pratyāyam, tat punah kidṛṣam? arthāntarayudāsah sa svabhādāpratikṣeṇaḥ. NCV 730,14-15: *sāmānyāsabdasya hi sadādṛ yo rthāntarayudāsās “asan na bhavati” iti kṛtyam vyāpārāh sa tvayettham avadhārītaḥ svabhādāpratikṣeṇeti;
NCV 730,20: tataś ca bhedaśrutyaḥ dravyagunādikāya ghaṭapatādikāya saḥa sāmāṇādhiṣṭhānyām anupapannam.

The Tibetan translations are syntactically confused and, moreover, reproduce kṛtyam as byas pa, cf. spyī’i sgras gaṅ don gžan rnam par gsal bar byas pa V : don gžan bsal ba byas pa ‘spyī’i sgra K.

[233] <tasmāt svabhedārthair(1) prthakṣrutidoso(2) nāsti>. Restored, cf. the parallel at NCV 730,24: tasmād aprthakṣrutidoso ‘sty eva, which undoubtedly reflects Dignāga’s own formulation. The Tibetan translations of this clause are problematic.

(1) Cf. rāṇ gi khyad par gyi don K : ‘di’i tha dad pa’i don V (= tadbhedārthair).
(2) Cf. sgra tha dad pa’i ŋes pa V : tha dad pa’i rgyur gyur pa’i ŋes pa K.

(2) Cf. khyad par gyi sgra daṅ lhan cīg K : tha dad pa’i sgra daṅ gzi mthun pa daṅ lhan cīg pa (sic) V.

439 Cf. PV IV 178: sa ca bhedo ‘pratikṣepitā sāmāṇyānām na vidyate, vrkṣo na sīṃsāpaiveti yathā prakaraṇe kvacit; see Manorathandin’s commentary PVV 422,10-15 ad loc.

440 Cf. PST Ms B 227b6-228a1: anena vyāpakatvam āha, na hi yathā jātyabhidhāne jātyantarānām parityāgas tathārthāntarāpohābhidhāne dravyatvādīnām bhedānām, abhināsya vastunāḥ sacchabād apratikṣiptadravyatvādīkārasya buddhau pratibhāsanāt. hiśābo yasmādārthath. itiśābdas tasmādārthath. yata evaṃ, tasmāt bhedārthair dravyādiśabādātī sacchbrute sāmāṇādhiṣṭhānyām upapannam: ‘Hereby he explains that [the negation of other referents] pervades [the particulars]. For particular [general properties] like substanteness, and so on, are not omitted, when the exclusion of other referents is denoted, in the same way as the other general properties are omitted when the general property is denoted because due to the word ‘existent’ a non-different entity, from whose form substanteness, and so on, is not omitted, is reflected in the mind. The word ‘for’ has the meaning of ‘since’. The word ‘thus’ has the meaning of ‘therefore’. Since this is the case, it is justified that the word ‘existent’ is co-referential with words like ‘substance’ whose referents are particulars.’

Jinendrabuddhi’s explanation is influenced by Dharmakīrtinian philosophy and the subsequent discourse at Ms B 228a1-4 is an adaptation of Dharmakīrtin’s PVSV 42,13ff applied to the question of the co-reference of the two terms ‘sad’ and ‘dravya’: kathāṃ kṛtvā? yad etaj jñānaṃ vastusvabhāvagrāhiṇānubhāvenāhitāṃ vāsanām āśrityotpadyate abāhyārthaviśayam api tadvivayam ivābhinnakārya-pādārthakprasūtavyāvadh abhinnārthagṛhiṇā vikalpakaḥ. tatra yo ‘ṛthākāraḥ pratibhāsate vyavahartr bhāyāvastutvenādhyavasitasu(1) tatra sāmāṇādhiṣṭhānyām vyavasthāpyate, na svalaṣaṇe, buddhāv apratibhāsanāt. sa hy asadvāyṛtyena rūpeṇa pratibhāsamanāḥ ‘bhinnasadākārānugataḥ pratibhāsate. sa evāsato vyāvṛtyaḥ, punar adravyatvāder api vyāvṛtya dvitīyena dravyatvādīkāreṇānugato ‘bhinnā ca pratibhāti. ata ekam vastutvena dravyatvena ca prakās曼ānām saddravyam iti saddravyāsadbhāyām abhidhīyata iti sāmāṇādhiṣṭhānyavavyavasthā kriyate.

(1)em. (cf. phyi rol gyi don ŋid du lhag par žen pa T) : bāhāvavākṣavastutvenādhyavasitas Ms
For the implications of this explanation, cf. the exposition at PS V:2cd-3 above § 4.

The translation of this clause is tentative, as the Tibetan translations differ considerably from one another, cf. don gan giṅi gaʾi sgras brjod par byed pa yan don gzan la giṅ mthun pa yin no K: de ni mthun paʾi sgra daṅ don gzan sel baʾi don giṅis ka sgraʾi brjod byaʾ o V. Only the phrases don gan giṅi gaʾi sgras brjod par byed pa K: don giṅis ka sgraʾi brjod byaʾ o V are comparable to one another. It is clear, however, that the content of the clause must be related to the explanation at PST Ms 228a4-5 and NCV 732,14ff (for which, cf. no. 445 below), which is concerned with explaining that the [absurd] consequence that general and particular terms are not co-referential does not arise on the apoha theory. When the two terms ‘existent’ and ‘substance’ are combined in the phrase ‘existent substance’ they form an aggregate that is syntactically similar to a compound and thus subject to the same interpretation. As it appears from Simhasūri’s exposition, Dignāga’s statement is parallel to the apoha theory of compound formation, for which, cf. PSV V:15 § 25 above.

That is, there is no ambiguity as regards the denotation of the general term ‘sat’ when it is accompanied by the particular term ‘dravya’; cf. the exposition at NCV 732,14ff, q.v. no. 445 below.

Cf. PST Ms B 228a4-5: samudāyārtho hi viśiṣṭas. tasya yadi padam vācakaṃ syāt, tada tadabhāve ’pi padasya viṛte na taʿd gesture. yatas tu samudāyaḥ šabdāntaram eva tasya vācakaṃ, ato na vyahicāraḥ: “For the referent of an aggregate is distinct [from the referents of the individual components]. If the syntactical word were to denote it, it would not indicate because the syntactical word applies even in its [viz. the referent of the aggregate’s] absence. But since the aggregate, i.e., a different expression, denotes it, there is no ambiguity.”

The exposition of the pūrpapakṣa at NCV 732,14ff is far more explicit as to the question Dignāga addresses: kasmād anabhidhānam iti cet, samāyotpattē, <an>upātattave[1] sati anabhihite samāyāḥ syāt, tasmāt sāmānādhikaranyam višeṣārthair dravyādiṣabdaḥi sacchabdasya vākyārthe yuktam, na padārthe. tad

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441 Dignāga refers to the problem mentioned at PS V 2d: bhedarthair aprthaksrūteḥ; cf. Simhasūri’s explanation at NCV 731,11-732,10: sattāsambandhādhīnānapakṣayor aprthaksrūtidoṣo ’sti, nāpohapakte višeṣahetussadbhāvād iti. tasya višeṣahetoh pratipādanārtham uktam – tatra hīyādī. sattāsambandhādhīnānapakṣayor guṇauḥ sattāsambandhaḥ višeṣanatvāti, tadvastu guṇity atāh sāmānādhikaraṇyābhāvo yuktō: “The problem of not being “heard apart” [from words whose referents are particular general properties] [that attaches] to the theses of the denotation of existence or its connection, does not [attach] to the theory of exclusion because there is a special reason [for it]. In order to explain this special reason it is said: For on these two, etc. On the two theses of the denotation of existence or its connection existence and the connection are properties because they are qualifiers. Their object is the property bearer. Therefore it is justified that there is no co-reference.”

443 That is, there is no ambiguity as regards the denotation of the general term ‘sat’ when it is accompanied by the particular term ‘dravya’; cf. the exposition at PS V:2cd-3 above § 4.

444 The translation of this clause is tentative, as the Tibetan translations differ considerably from one another, cf. don gan giṅi gaʾi sgras brjod par byed pa yan don gzan la giṅ mthun pa yin no K: de ni mthun paʾi sgra daṅ don gzan sel baʾi don giṅis ka sgraʾi brjod byaʾ o V. Only the phrases don gan giṅi gaʾi sgras brjod par byed pa K: don giṅis ka sgraʾi brjod byaʾ o V are comparable to one another. It is clear, however, that the content of the clause must be related to the explanation at PST Ms 228a4-5 and NCV 732,14ff (for which, cf. no. 445 below), which is concerned with explaining that the [absurd] consequence that general and particular terms are not co-referential does not arise on the apoha theory. When the two terms ‘existent’ and ‘substance’ are combined in the phrase ‘existent substance’ they form an aggregate that is syntactically similar to a compound and thus subject to the same interpretation. As it appears from Simhasūri’s exposition, Dignāga’s statement is parallel to the apoha theory of compound formation, for which, cf. PSV V:15 § 25 above.

234 tathā hi svārthāvyabhicāraḥ <kevalasyānyatāvyrtteḥ>. Restored, cf. PST Ms B 228a4: tathā hi svārthāvyabhicāra iti; NCV 732,16: tathā hi svārthāvyabhicāro višeṣasahitas yeti.

445 Cf. PST Ms B 228a4-5: samudāyārtho hi viśiṣṭas. tasya yadi padam vācakaṃ syāt, tada taddabhāve ’pi padasya viṛte na taʿd gesture. yatas tu samudāyaḥ šabdāntaram eva tasya vācakaṃ, ato na vyahicāraḥ: “For the referent of an aggregate is distinct [from the referents of the individual components]. If the syntactical word were to denote it, it would not indicate because the syntactical word applies even in its [viz. the referent of the aggregate’s] absence. But since the aggregate, i.e., a different expression, denotes it, there is no ambiguity.”

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darsayati – sad dravyam san guṇa ityādi. tathā hi svārthāvyabhicāro viśeṣasahitas-yeti viśeṣasabdapravayogah, ko ’sau vākyārtha ity ata āha – yasmād avayavaśab-dārthābhāyam anyāḥ samudāyārthah, saddravyaśabdārthāv avayavāv asadadravya-nivṛttyupalaksitau, tābhāyam anya ubhayāsabdavyudāśānugṛhitāḥ samudāyārthah, tasya ca vācakau tau samuditau na vipāritārthau, tad darsayati – na tu sacchabdo dravyārtham āha, na dravyaśabdah sadartham: “If it is asked: “Why is there no denotation [of its own particulars by the general term]”? [Answer:] Because doubt arises. There will be doubt in that it is not included [by the general term](3), i.e., in denotation [of its own particulars by the general term]”?

Because doubt dravya. Thus the word ‘substance.’ Thus the word ‘existent’, it is said to be so, but not because the referent that is existent is denoted by words like ‘substance,’ whose referents are particulars, with regard to the referent of a sentence, but not with regard to the referent of the syntactical word. He shows that in the examples: ‘existent substance’, ’ existent quality’, etc. That is, there is no ambiguity as regards the denotation of the general term, when it is accompanied by a particular. Thus a particular term is applied. What is this referent of the sentence? Therefore he says: Because the referent of the aggregate is other than the referents of the two words that constitute the parts; the two parts viz. the referents of the words ’existent’ and ’substance’ are characterized by negation of what is non-existent and what is a non-substance; the aggregate referent that is other than the referents of the two words that constitute the parts; the two parts viz. the exclusions [effected by] both words is other than these two; and the what is non-existent and what is a non-substance; the aggregate referent that is other than the referents of the two words that constitute the parts; the two parts viz.,…

At this point Simhasuri quotes PS V:15, after which he continues: atra codyam – katham tarhiti ‘yat sat tad dravyam, yad dravyam yat sat’ iti bhinnārthatve na(2) yuktam? iti. atra tenaivocyate – ubhayaśabdavyudāśānugṛhitasya asadadravyanivr¯tyanugṛhitasya samhataśabdadvayābhidheyasya samudāyārthasyaikatvāt tathocyate, na tu sadarthasya dravyaśabdendāh bhidhānād iti pūrvapakṣaḥ: “Here the following question is to be raised: In this case, how is not correct to say ‘whatever is existent is a substance’ and ‘whatever is a substance is existent’ as the referents are different? Here he says: since the referent of the aggregate that is denotable by the two words together assisted by negation of non-existent things and non-substances is a unity, it is said to be so, but not because the referent that is existent is denoted by the word ‘substance.’ Thus the pūrvapakṣa.”

(1)em., cf. NCV 732 no. 8.
(2)‘ve na conj.: ’tena NCV, cf. op.cit. 732 no. 10.
(3)cf. PS V 26 § 40.


That is, the problem explained at PSV V 4a, cf. PST Ms B 228a5-6: tadvato nāsvatantratvād ity asya. Simhasuri quotes a similar verse, presumably from the Sāmānyapārikāsyāsya, as an introduction to his exposition of Dignāga’s argument, cf. NCV 733,13: yad uktam jātimatpakṣe “tadvato nāsvatantratvād bhedāj jāter ajātītāḥ” ityādi doṣajātam. The phrase sākṣād vṛtyeh of PS V 36c is related to Dignāga’s observation at PSV V 4a: sacchabdo jātisvarūpamātropasarjanāṃ dravyam āha, na sākṣād itī.
The word applies directly to its referent through exclusion of other referents without its denotation being mediated by the word’s dependence upon a real general property, cf. PST Ms B 228a6: na hi tadvatpakṣa īva\(^1\) gunarūpapakṛtāṃ vastu śabdenābhidhīyaṃ. tatra hi guṇāntaropakārasya virodhāḥ tyāgāḥ. iha tu sattvādi-kāṃ guṇāntaram anapekyāsadvvyudaste vastuni śādeo vartate: “For it is not, like in the case of the thesis of the general property possessor, a referent under the influence of the form of a general property (guṇa) that is denoted by the word. For on this [theory viz. the apoha theory] there is omission of the influence of other general properties because it is in conflict\(^2\). However, on this [theory viz. the apoha theory] the word applies to an object (vastu) from which what is non-existent is excluded without being dependent upon a different general property like existence.”

For Siṃhasūrī’s explanation of the statement sākṣād vrṭteḥ, cf. no.s 450, 456 below.

\(^{227}\) na hy arthāntaram upādāya <śabdah svabhedeṣu varate>. tasmāt pāratan-tryeṇa <svabhed>ānākṣepadoṣo nāstī\(^1\), bhāktadoṣo ’pi nāstī\(^2\), nāpi bhedānava-sthānād anabhidhānadoṣah\(^3\), avyāpakatvāc cāsāmānyadoṣo ’pi nāstī arthāntarāpohamātrasyābhinnatvād adrvatyavāc ca. ata eva <śāmānvyavisesāntaraśāntaryogānusaranāṃ na kartavyāṃ> sākṣād arthāntarapratiśedhāt. Restored, cf. PST Ms B 228a7, na hy arthāntaram upādīyeti. tasmāt pāratantryeneti; 228b1-7 ata eva bhāktadoṣo ’pi nāstī ... nāpītyādi. bhedānava-sthānām ānanyam. na tasmād anabhidhānadoṣah ... avyāpakatvāc cāsāmānyadoṣo ’pi nāstī ... arthāntarāpohamātrasyābhinnatvād iti ... adrvatyāvād ceti ...ata eveti; 229a2: sākṣād arthāntarapratiśedhād iti.

\(^{236}\) sākṣād vrṛter abhṛdac ca. Restored, cf. PST Ms B 228a6: sākṣād vrṛter iti; NCV 733,14: sākṣād vrṛteḥ; Ms B 228b3: anenābhidhāc cety etat vivṛtam.

\(^{246}\) The word applies directly to its referent through exclusion of other referents without its denotation being mediated by the word’s dependence upon a real general property, cf. PST Ms B 228a6: na hi tadvatpakṣa īva\(^1\) gunarūpapakṛtāṃ vastu śabdenābhidhīyaṃ. tatra hi guṇāntaropakārasya virodhāḥ tyāgāḥ. iha tu sattvādi-kāṃ guṇāntaram anapekyāsadvvyudaste vastuni śādeo vartate: “For it is not, like in the case of the thesis of the general property possessor, a referent under the influence of the form of a general property (guṇa) that is denoted by the word. For on this [theory viz. the apoha theory] there is omission of the influence of other general properties because it is in conflict\(^2\). However, on this [theory viz. the apoha theory] the word applies to an object (vastu) from which what is non-existent is excluded without being dependent upon a different general property like existence.”

For Siṃhasūrī’s explanation of the statement sākṣād vrṭteḥ, cf. no.s 450, 456 below.

\(^{247}\) For the implications of this argument, cf. no.s 452, 462 below.

\(^{237}\) na hy arthāntaram upādāya <śabdah svabhedeṣu varate>. tasmāt pāratan-tryeṇa <svabhed>ānākṣepadoṣo nāstī\(^1\), bhāktadoṣo ’pi nāstī\(^2\), nāpi bhedānava-sthānād anabhidhānadoṣah\(^3\), avyāpakatvāc cāsāmānyadoṣo ’pi nāstī arthāntarāpohamātrasyābhinnatvād adrvatyavāc ca. ata eva <śāmānvyavisesāntaraśāntaryogānusaranāṃ na kartavyāṃ> sākṣād arthāntarapratiśedhāt. Restored, cf. PST Ms B 228a7, na hy arthāntaram upādīyeti. tasmāt pāratantryeneti; 228b1-7 ata eva bhāktadoṣo ’pi nāstī ... nāpītyādi. bhedānava-sthānām ānanyam. na tasmād anabhidhānadoṣah ... avyāpakatvāc cāsāmānyadoṣo ’pi nāstī ... arthāntarāpohamātrasyābhinnatvād iti ... adrvatyāvād ceti ...ata eveti; 229a2: sākṣād arthāntarapratiśedhād iti.

\(^{1}\) Cf. NCV 733,16: anākṣepadoṣo nāstī.

\(^{2}\) Cf. NCV 733,16: bhāktadoṣo ’py atya eva nāstī.

\(^{3}\) Cf. NCV 733,17: nāpi bhedānava-sthānād anabhidhānadoṣaḥ.

\(^{448}\) Mallavādi applies the term bhāvāntara in a similar context, cf. NCV 734,16 and 735,7,16-17. Dharmakīrti alludes to Dignāga’s formulation at PVSV 34,21-23: tatra hy arthāntaram upādāya anyatra vartamāṇo dvhanir avśāntantryādi dosaṁ upādīyate, na ca arthāntaram anyasmād vyāvṛṛtī vyāvṛṛtādvayor ekabhīdhanād ity uktaṃ: “For in this case (viz. in case exclusion of other is considered a property like a general property) the word, while being applied to one thing in dependence upon another referent, is afflicted with such problems as not being independent. And it has already been explained (at PVSV 34,15-20) that the exclusion from other is not a referent that is different from the excluded because both (viz. the term denoting the property exclusion of other and the term denoting the property possessor as qualified by exclusion of other) denote the same thing.”

Cf. PVSV 62,26ff; Pīnd 1999.
Cf. Simhasūri’s lucid exposition at NCV 733,14: tasyābhāvo ’nyāpohapakṣe sāksād vṛtteḥ. tatra hi sacchadāhāṃ sattāṃ upādāya dravye vartamānas tadbhedaṃ ghatādīn ākṣeptum asamarthāḥ. atra punar asatpratīṣṭhena sāksād vartata iti tasya ye viśeṣās tān na pratikṣepti. tasmād ihānākṣepadoso nāsti: “This (kind of problem, cf. the verse quoted at NCV 733,13, q.v. no. 30 above) does not exist here (viz. on the apoha theory). For on this (theory) the word 'existent,' while applying to a substance in dependence upon (the general property) existence, is incapable of implicitly referring to its particulars such as pots. But here (viz. on the apoha theory), on the other hand, it applies directly by negation of the non-existent. Thus it does not negate its particulars. Therefore the problem of not implicitly referring (to the particulars) does not exist here (viz. on the apoha theory).”

Jinendrabuddhi explains Dignāga’s argument in similar terms at PST Ms B 228a7-B 228b1: na hy apoḥo nāma jātyādivat kiṃcid arthāntaraṃ yad upādāya sābdo dravye vartetā. tato vyavādhānābhāvāt kutaḥ pāratañtryam. tad eva tu vastv asadyāvīttam sāksād abhiddhyate. tatas tasya ye viśeṣās te tadavatyātrekkād na pratikṣipyante: “For the so-called exclusion is not some different sort of referent like a general property, and so on, in dependence on which the word applies to a substance. Therefore, since no intermediary entity exists how could there be dependence? This very object, however, is denoted directly as excluded from the substance. Therefore, since no intermediary entity exists how could there be dependence?”

Precisely therefore the problem of transfer of denotation does not exist either. For (the word’s) primary application to something else is not transferred to substances, etc.” Cf. the almost identical explanation at PST Ms B 228b1-2: ata eva bhāktadoso ’pi nāsti. na hy anyatratvāḥ mukhyavṛttīḥ sābdo dravyādiśūpacaryate: “Precisely therefore the problem of transfer of denotation does not exist either. For a word that primarily applies to something else is not transferred to substances, etc.”

(1) na hy an° conj. : na nyatra Ms

Simhasūri’s explanation at NCV 733,16-17 sheds more light on the issue than Jinendrabuddhi’s exegesis (on which see below): nāpi’ bhedānavasthānād anabhidhānadoṣāḥ. kasmāṭ? abhedāt. na hy arthāntarāpoḥo bhedeṣu bhidyate, abhāvāt. tanmātraṃ ca śabdenucyate, na bhedāḥ: “Nor does the problem of not denoting exist, which is due to the particulars being infinite. Why? Because [exclusion] is not a particular (abheda). For exclusion of other referents (arthāntarāpoḥa) is not divided among the particulars because it is non-existence (abhava).”

Jinendrabuddhi identifies this problem with the argument at PS V:8cd, cf. PST Ms B 228b2: bhedānavasthānam ānāntyam, na tasmād anabhidhānadoṣāḥ. “tadvāṁ ca bheda evoktaḥ, sa ca pūrvaṃ nirākṛta” (PS V:8cd) ity anena ‘ya uktam(2).

(1) Exclusion of other referents is equivalent to non-existence of other referents in the locus of the referent of any given word. Non-existence is eo ipso indivisible and therefore not subject to the absurd consequences that the theory of real universals entails. Cf. Translation § 51.

(2)em. : ściḥ Ms
Jinendrabuddhi identifies this problem with the discussion at PS V:9c, cf. PST Ms B 228b2-3: avyāpakatvāc cāsāmānyadoṣo ’pi nāsti. yad uktam “tadvān aritho ghaṭāḍiś ce” (PS V:9c) tyādinā. This is indirectly confirmed by Simhasūri who deals with Mallavādi’s criticism of Dignāga’s argument at NCV 733,19, quoting a similar verse, presumably from the Sāmānyaparīksāvāyāsa. According to Simhasūri Dignāga’s claim that a problem similar to the one of assuming that general properties are real entities does not exist on the āpoha theory, presupposes that it denotes the exclusion of other referents directly, cf. NCV 733,20: sākṣād ghatapatādiśv asatpratikṣepād iti: “Because it negates directly non-existent [things] with respect to pot or cloth, etc.;” NCV 735,15 (yad apy uktam): arthāntarāpgho ’sadaghatanivrttiḥ san ghaṭa iti, tasmāt sāmānyadoṣo ’pohapakṣe nāsti: “Exclusion of other referents is the preclusion of non-existent things and non-pots such as ’existent pot’. Therefore the problem of the general property does not exist on the āpoha theory.”


As Jinendrabuddhi notices at PST Ms B 228b3, this explains 36c2 anenābhedaḥ ce (36c2) ty etad vivṛtām, and he continues explaining the argument at 228b3-4: bhedo hi saty ānāntyadoso bhavaty asāmānyadosaḥ ca, anyasyānyatratrāyrtiḥ. (1) arthāntarāpohamātṛam tv abhinnam. tatra kuto ’sya dosasyāvakāsah: “If [exclusion of other] were a particular there would be the problem of infinity and the problem of not being a general property because one thing does not reside in the other [as mentioned at PS V 9c-10a]. The mere exclusion of other referents, however, is not divided [among the referents]. So how could there be an opportunity for [introducing] this problem;” cf. Dharmakīrti’s statement at PVSV 48,14, q.v. no. 459 below.

(1) em.: anyasyānyatratre vṛtter Ms

The argument that the sāmānyadosa does not exist because exclusion of other is not a substance (adravyatvā) elaborates the point that it is not a different sort of referent (arthāntara) like the general property existence, and that it is without division. The reason is that exclusion of other things anyāpoha is equivalent to non-existence of other things in the locus of the referent, and non-existence which is the mere absence of something from something else, does not have status as a thing, which by implication excludes that it is qualified by the kind of properties that define things. Dharmakīrti formulates a similar view at PV I 169ab and PVSV 85,21-23 ad loc.: nivṛttį niḥsvabhāvatvān na sthānāṭhānakaṇpanā. na hy anyāpohena nāma kincit tasya ca svabhāvāṇusānginyah svabhāvasīhitaparṣyanītyukkapānā na kalpante: “Since negation is without essential nature the idea of permanence or non-permanence does not (fit). For negation of other is nothing whatsoever, so the notions of the duration and disappearance of the essential nature that are the concomitants of an essential nature do not fit it.”

As indicated by Simhasūri’s exegesis at NCV 734,13-16 Mallavādi quotes two ślokapādas to the same effect, presumably from the Sāmānyaparīksāvāyāsa. Unfortunately NCV does not quote Mallavādi’s exposition of Dignāga’s view in full, cf. NCV loc. cit.: adravyatvāc ca bhedāc ceti kārikāyām (so read) caśabdā(ā)}
that the general property is a mental category, not a thing: cf. the parallel at Madhyamakahrdayakārikā V 64 [for which, cf. no. 458 below] where Bhavya explains, in his criticism of Dignāga’s apoha theory, that the reason why a general property is resident in many things is that it is not a substance, cf. Tarkajvālā ad loc.: rdzas thams kyi khyoṅs su gtogs pas rdzas su med pa’i phyir du mar ’jug pa yin no: “Since [the general property] does not exist as a substance (dravya) in that it is inherent in all substances (*sarvadrvyāntargata) it is resident in many (*anekavṛtti).” Jindeyabuddhi explains the argument at Ms B 228b4–7 with reference to Dharmaśtri’s view, as it is expounded at PV I 70–72 and PVSV ad loc., that the general property is a mental category, not a thing: nanu ca jñānasya yah sāmānyākāraḥ sāmānyavyavasthāpitam, sa ca jñānaḥ avyatiriktavād (cf. PV I 71c) anyatraśvaratmānāḥ kathāṃ sāmānyam ity āha. avadhyāvāc cetyādī. vijñānakāryāpi sāmānyarūpaṇāpi nirjñānavāt sāmānyam avadhyasad eva naiva anīṣṭam. etad utkama bhavati “mithyāvikalpa evāyam arthasya ekatmatāgrahah” (PV I 72ab). vastutaḥ sāmānyan nāma nāsty eva. bhrāntajānābhāvipravāsāḥ (2) kevalam tvaṃ sāmānyavyavasthā kriyāte. bhrāntāḥ hi vyavahārāraḥ svajñānāpratibhāṣa-viśeṣam eva bahir vyaktībhedānuyātām eva sāmānyam manyanta iti kṛteh(3).

(1)āgrahah em. : “nāgraho Ms
(2)bhrāntajānāḥ em. : bhrāntjānāḥ Ms
(3)Jindeyabuddhi’s exposition is an epitome of Dharmaśtri’s discourse on the problem at PVSV 38,17ff.

455 Cf. PST Ms B 228b7–229a2: sākṣād vrteḥ (PS V 36c). tatra hi sattāviṣeṣaṇarūpaṇābhādhānād vastunāḥ svarūpaṃ vyavādhiyate. tatsambandhinaś ca ghaṭatvādayo na sattāsambandhino “jäter ajātitaḥ” (PS V 11b2). tato na tadākhiṇēnāṅkārthākāṅkṣāhetuḥ. iha tu sākṣād asatpratīṣṭhena sābdehṛṝvārytvi pravartate. tatas taddbhādākāṅkṣāhṭetutvam upapadyate vināpi jñāntarayogena: “That is, “because it applies directly.” For in this context (i.e., the context of the existence of general properties) the own form of an entity is defined by a word denoting it in the form of the qualifier “existence.” And its relata viz. pottness, and so on, are not the relata of existence “because a general property is without (other) general properties” (PS V 11b2). Therefore it is not on that account a cause of the expectation of many referents. Whereas here [viz. on the apoha theory], on the other hand, the word [‘existent’] applies directly to its own referent through negation of which is non-existent. Therefore it is justified that it is a cause of expectation of its particulars even without the connection to other general properties.”

456 Cf. PST Ms B 229a2–4: arthāntarapratīṣṭedhopāyālakhayam svarūṭhābhādhaṇam evam uktam. sākṣāt svārūṭhābhādhānād ity arthaḥ. etenāta evety asyārtho darsītah, atra ca vastuṣājāyantarayogapratiṣṭedho vyāvaktso, na tu kalpiṭajāytantaravyo ’pi. tathā hi yat sad ity ucyaṭe, tad eva tatas tato vyāvṛttam ākārāntareṇa pratibhāsāmāṇaḥ kalpitasāmānyāntaravogena tathā tathā vibhaṭjaye: “The (word’s) denoting its own referent is is to be understood by means of negation of other referents, as it has been explained. The meaning is: Because it denotes its own referent directly. Thereby the meaning of “precisely therefore” is shown. And in this context the negation of connection to other real general properties is intended, but not the connection to other imagined general properties too. That is, the same thing
that is said to be ‘existent’, being reflected in the mind in a different form as
excluded from this or that is differentiated in this or that way by being connected to
other imagined general properties.”

This exegesis is strongly influenced by Dharmakīrtīan philosophy, cf., e.g.,
PVSV 54,18ff.

[238] <evam pūrvadosābhāvād> arthāntarāpoha eva śabdārthah śādhuḥ. Restored,
 cf. TSP 389,11-12: tasmād guṇotkarsād apy arthāntarāpoha eva śabdārthah śādhuḥ; cf. no. [241] below.

[239] <atra ca>(1) jātiadharmavavasthiteḥ. Qu. ŚVT 74,8; NR 433,4; TSP 728,16, 776,8. ścih NR, TSP : ścih ŚVT.
(1)'di las (read 'di lā = Śanskrit atra) kyaṁ K (cf. the PSV ad loc. atraiva vyavatīṣṭhante) : guṇaṁ las se na V (this translation is incomprehensible in the context and presupposes a different reading).

457 It is interesting that Bhavya, in his criticism of the apoha theory at
Madhyamakārdayakārikā V:64 describes the general property, which he defines at
V:62 as a property that is absent from dissimilar things (vijātīyena śūnyatam ... śāmāṇyaṃ iti niścitam) in terms that are related to Dhignāga’s exposition at PSV V:36cd, cf. loc. cit.: abhedādravyavasattvabhyaṁ ekam anekavṛty api, tadvināše 'vināśca ca nāṇyasmin tanmatir na ca: “Since by nature it is not a particular and not
a substance, it is one as well as resident in many; and in that it is not annihilated
when its [substrate] is annihilated, it is not the case that the cognition of it does not
[apply] to another [instantiation of it].”

458 Exclusion of other referents that is equivalent to non-existence (abhāva) of other
referents in the locus of the referent, is not a particular (abheda) and is
therefore characterized by property of being one (ekatva) like real general properties
postulated by other schools of thought. For Dharmakīrtī’s interpretation at PVSV
48,14-16: cf. no. 462 below.

459 Dharmakīrtī rejects these properties commonly attributed to real general
properties (jāti) at PVSV 39,13-15: vyaktivatiriktīvayatiriktaiakantīvyayāpiśāyā-
kāraṁ api naiva pratipattiḥ, kevalam abhimākārā buddhir(1) utpadyate. According
to Karnakagomin the argument at PVSV 48,18: yathākalpanam asyāyogāt: “because
it [viz. the general property] is not connected [with attributes such as eternity and
Different from those (that are the same;) cf. PVSV [exclusion of other referents] is identical with respect to those (effects) that are.

Pratibhāvāvasthā Ms B 229a4-5: āpy asti:

šāntī as opposed to the view of its being the bearer of real general properties is related to similar views on the permanence of the general property formulated by Bhartṛhari; cf. VP III.1:41cd: anucchināśrayāḥ jātīr anite ye 'py āśraye sthitā:

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pervasiveness] the way they are imagined,” alludes to Dignāga’s exposition in this paragraph(2).

(1) Cf. no. 463 below on the notion of substrate (āśraya) of buddhi.


460 Cf. PST Ms B 229a4: yujyanta ity arthāḥ(1). Jayamiṣra quotes Dignāga’s enumeration of properties with the following observation on Kumarila’s ŚV Apoha 163 at ŚVT 74:7-9: atra bhikṣuṇāpohapakṣe jātipakṣatulyatvat atidiṣṭam (quoting first paragraph of PSV:36d) ... te ime vastudharmā avastuny atidiṣyamānā asūra-patakārtvam sūcayantīty arthāḥ. In short, transferring properties of real things to an unreal thing like exclusion is like making yarnless cloth.

(1) Cf. rigs śīṅ (sic) ldan no žes pa’i don to T; rigs śīṅ translates yujyante, although not in the sense of “being connected to” as required by the context; ldan no = yuktāḥ (?) has no equivalent in Ms. One cannot, however, exclude the possibility that the translator attempted to convey the idea of the properties of exclusion being logically justified (yujyante) as well as connected to exclusion.

461 Exclusion’s property of being one (ekatva) follows from its not being a particular (bheda), cf. PSV V: 36c with no. 452 above. The scope of the term bheda appears from its use in Dignāga’s analysis of the view current among contemporary non-Buddhist philosophers that general properties are real single entities that inhere in their substrates. See PSV II:16 q.v. no. 504 below.

Jinendrabuddhi’s explanation reflects Dharmakīrti’s view on the issue, cf. PST Ms B 229a4-5: abhedād ekatvam. arthāntaravayuddāso hi buddhāv abhinnarūpatayā pratibhāsamāno vyavahāranyutibhir ekatvena vyavāśyate ity ekatvam tasya vyavasthāpyate: “Its being one follows from its not being a particular(1). For the exclusion of other referents, when appearing in the mind in identical form, is determined as being one and the same by those who are engaged in verbal exchange(2). Thus its being one is defined.”

(1) For the implications of this argument, cf. PS V 36c no. [236] above with no. 448.

(2) This explanation is evidently dependent upon Dharmakīrtian philosophy; cf. Dharmakīrti’s reference to the unity of exclusion at PVSV 48,14-16: tasmād avaśyaṃ śadbena vyavachedaḥ codanīyāḥ. sa ca abhinnaḥ tadanyeṣv iti jātīdharmo apy asti: “Therefore exclusion is necessarily to be enjoined by the word. And this [exclusion of other referents] is identical with respect to those (effects) that are different from those (that are the same;” cf. PVSVT 202,17-19 explaining that being identical (abhinnā) relates to things that have the same effect and those that differ from them in terms of effect. Thus the jātīdharma is the property of excluding many referents (anekārthavyāvṛttīva): sa cety anyavyavachedah. tadanyeṣv iti tasmād atatākāryād anyeṣv ekakāryeṣv abhinnaḥ. Sarveṣaṃ vyāvṛttatvāt. iti kṛtvānekaṛtha-vyāvṛttivaṃ jātīdharmo ’py asti).

462 Dignāga’s introduction of the concept of āśraya as denoting the substrate of anyāpoha as opposed to the view of its being the bearer of real general properties is related to similar views on the permanence of the general property formulated by Bhartṛhari; cf. VP III.1:41cd: anucchināśrayāḥ jātīr anitye ’py āśraye sthitā:
“Since [its] substrate is not discontinued the general property remains, although [its] substrate is impermanent.”

Cf. Candrananda’s remarks ad VS I.2:8 on the notion (buddhi) ‘existent’ (sat) as not being annihilated because the general property existence is separate from substances, and so on, whose destruction does not affect its being permanent: āśrayavināśād asyā (scil. buddher) vināśa iti cet, na yataḥ “dravyaganakarmabhyo ‘rthāntaraṃ satāḥ (= VS I.2:8).” yasmād drvyādibhyo vyātrikātā satāḥ tasmān na dravyādivināśe satā vinaśayīti.

Jinendrabuddhi’s explanation of this term is indebted to Dharmakīrti’s philosophy, cf. PST Ms B 229a5-7: āśrayavicchedāṃ nityatvam. āśrayās tadartha-kriyākāritavātakāribhyo vyāvṛttā bhedāḥ, te hi svānubhavadvāreṇa śabdārthasya nimittam bhavanti yathoktam prāk; teśām cāṇantyāt ucchedo nāsti. ato yāvat te tāvat sa iti nityatvam api kalpitam upapadyate: “The property of being eternal follows from the substratas’ not being discontinued. The substrata are the particulars that are excluded due to their effecting a [specific] purposeful action, from those that do not effect it, for (hi) they are the cause of the word’s reference based upon one’s own experience, as explained previously(1); and since they are infinite there is no discontinuation. Therefore, as long as they exist, this exists. Thus, (iti) also an imagined (kalpitam) infinity (nityatvam) is justified.”

Interestingly, Jinendrabuddhi does not explain the introduction of the concept of substrate (āśraya) in the light of its use at the crucial passage PVSV 39,13ff; cf. e.g. the statement concerning the substrate of buddhi loc.cit. lines 15-17 in which Dharmakīrti explains that the substrate of buddhi is exclusion of other referents (anyāpoha) because it exists in the entities (sic) (vastusu bhāvāt): tasyāḥ ka āśraya ity anyāpoha ucyate. tasya vastusu bhāvāt, avirodham(2) vyavahārasya, ca śabdāśrayasya tathādarsanāt. na punar vastubhūtaṃ kimcīt sāmānyam nāmaśī yathēyaṃ buddhiḥ pratibhāti.

(1)Jinendrabuddhi is referring to his excursus at PST Ms B 206b2, for which, cf. Appendix II. The introduction of the notion of arthakriyākāritā is, of course, an anachronism that is indebted to Dharmakīrtian philosophy.

(2) Cf. Karnakagomin’s exegesis at PVSVT 171,22ff, which clarifies in what way anyāpoha is resident in things (vastusu) thereby causing a mental representation that has the same appearance (ekākārā buddhhiḥ): tasya vijātavyāvirahalaksanasyān- yāpahasya bhinneṣy apy sarvatra vastusu bhāvāt tathābhūtasya cāṇyaapahasya sāmānyabuddhiḥ itutvam praty avirodhāt. tathā hi yathāikam vyakṣam avyā-vṛttām paśyate evam anyam apy atas tatraikākārā buddhir upapadyate. Dharmakīrti’s statements as explained by Karnakagomin evidently presupposes Dignāga’s view that the general property (sāmānya) in any given referent [artihe, cf. PSV V §34, §46 above] or speech unit [sabde, cf. PSV V §34, §46 above] is defined by exclusion of other referents or speech units. Dignāga, on the other hand, does not address the question of the mental representation of anyāpoha, but restricts himself to explaining that exclusion of other referents or speech units is a function of the referents or speech units belonging to the same class, which we regard as tokens of the same type.

Cf. PST Ms B 229a7-229b1: pratyekaparīṣamāptiḥ kṛṣṭarāthapratīteḥ. arthāntaravyudāśo hi palāśādau pratyekam buddhiparīvatīti(1) vyavahāravāsa-rūhī pratiṣṭhītāḥ sarvottamāṇaḥ pratiṣṭhāta iti tatpratītiyanurvedēna vyavasthāpyamānāḥ kṛṣṭarāthaparīṣamāptīra na(2) virudhyate: “Extension to each single follows from cognizing the referent completely. For the exclusion of other referents is cognized completely by the listeners who are engaged in discourse with regard to each single [tree] such as a paḷāśa, and so on, that revolve in the mind. Thus, when it is defined in accordance with this cognition the extension to the complete referent is not in conflict.”

(1) Dharmakīrti uses this term in a related passage of PVSV, cf. op. cit. 38,24ff: tad eśām buddhipratīhāsāṃ anurūdhānair buddhiparīvatīnāṃ eva bhāvānām ākāraviśeṣaparīgrahād bahir iva pariṣphuratāṃ sāmāṇyam ity ucyate.

(2) na conj (cf. mī ’gal T) : om. Ms

464 It appears from Jinendrabuddhi’s concluding remark that Dignāga must have contrasted, in the SPVy, his own view of the general properties that attach to the exclusion of other with those of the upholders of real general properties, cf. PST Ms B 229b1-2: jāṭidharmavavasthyā āatraiva yuktavāt. vastusajjātipakṣe tu yathā sā nopapadavyate, tathā Sāmāṇyaparīkṣāvyāse(1) veditavyam: “That is, because the definition of the attributes of a general property is only connected to this [viz. exclusion of other referents]. However, the way in which it [namely the definition of the properties of a general property] is not justified on the theory of objectively real general properties, should be known from the SPVy.”

(1) Translated erroneously as spyī brtags pa’i skabs su T; elsewhere SPVy is correctly translated as spyī brtags pa rgyas par.

465 Jinendrabuddhi seems consciously to avoid commenting upon the idea of referents being qualified by exclusion of other referents because of the controversies attached to it. Elsewhere, however, he interprets the term arthāntarāpohaviṣṭatya as vivakṣāvati puruṣa (cf. no. 505 below), which is a complete departure from the rationale of Dignāga’s use of the term, being based upon Dharmakīrtian and post-Dharmakīrtian philosophy (cf. no. 9 above).

Mallavādi and Simhasūri allude to Dignāga’s claim that the word denotes things (vasu) as if qualified by exclusion of other referents at NCV 732,10-13: arthāntarāpohah sad ity asan na bhavatītī nāsadbhāvamātram evocayate, kim tarhi, arthāntarāpohena viśiṣṭam vastv eva sad ity ucyate, yasmin vastuni so ‘pohah kriyate, tac ca dravyam śabdārthah, nāpohamātram. sa cāpohaviṣṭo ‘ṛtho dravyādhi sacchab-dena vyāpto ‘parityāgatā, na tu sākṣād uktaḥ: “Exclusion of other referents as in the statement ‘existent means it is not non-existent’ does not merely express its being non-existent, but rather, that the entity for the sake of which the exclusion is effected, is indeed an entity which, being qualified by exclusion of other referents, is said to be ‘existent.’ And this substance is the referent of the word, not mere exclusion. And the referent that is qualified by exclusion viz. a substance, and so on, is encompassed by the word ‘existent’ because it is not rejected by it, but it is not
denoted directly.” Cf. the related Sanskrit fragment, possibly from Dignāga’s SPVy, quoted no. 182 above.

Simhasūri’s remark at NCV 734,20 exposes the difficulties of the notion of exclusion of other referents as qualification of things: aha svamatena brūse na sāmānyam na vyāvyrttimad iti kutas tadviśīṣṭavastavbhidhānam. khapuspaśekhara-
viśiṣṭavandhyāputrābhidhānavat: “Now, if you say in accordance with your own theory that [exclusion of other] is neither a general property, nor is [the referent] exclusion possessing, then how could the [word] denote a thing as qualified by it [viz. exclusion]. It is like denoting the son of a barren woman as qualified by a wreath of sky flowers”!

Simhasūri also attributes to Dignāga the view that in spite of his use of the phrase “qualified by exclusion of other referents,” exclusion of other referents is not to be understood as another kind of qualifier (viśesana) like the general properties posited by Nyāyavāśīśika philosophy, cf. NCV 735,17-18: abhāvāntaratvād arthatārāpohasyāpohavān arthatā śābdavācyo na bhavati. ato nāpohohi viśeṣānām nāpohavān so ’rtha iti yady tvayestyam: “If you claim that since the exclusion of other referents is not a different [kind of] entity, the denotable object of the word is not a referent that is exclusion possessing. Hence exclusion is not a qualifier and the referent is not exclusion possessing.”

The thought underlying Dignāga’s claim that a word denotes things as qualified by negation of other referents becomes clear, I believe, in the light of the debate with the Sāṅkhyaśākta Mādhava recorded at PSV V:39ff. This interesting discussion shows that the idea of exclusion or negation presupposes the notion of mutual absence (itaretarābhāva). Things as denotable objects are defined by the absence in their loci of the nature of other things (ātmāntarābhāva). As Dignāga states at PSV V:45: “The nature of one thing is the non-existence of the nature of other things” (ātmāntarābhāva ātmāntaram iti). He appears to interpret this mutual absence as a qualifier-qualified relation: the absence of all non-x from any given locus of x qualifies x as denotable, the absence of non-x from the locus of x being the qualifier and x the qualified.

The idea that absences are related to the loci from which they are absent as qualifier to qualified can be traced to a short fragment from an unknown work by Uḍḍyotakara which Kamalaśīla quotes in TSP ad TS 782ab; and there is no reason to assume that Uḍḍyotakara does not rely on earlier views about absences as qualifiers of the loci from which they are absent. In the above-mentioned fragment Uḍḍyotakara states that the relation of general properties like potness to things like pots is characterized by inherence, whereas (the relation to them) of negations (i.e., absences) is characterized by a qualifier-qualified relation, cf. TSP 313,15-16: ghaṭatādīnām sāmānyānām ghaṭādibhiḥ samavāyalaṅkānāḥ sambandhaḥ, abhāvā-
ānam tu viśeṣānāviveṣyabhāvalaṅkānāḥ.

Since Dignāga rejects the assumption that pravṛttinimitta is real general properties inherent in things as not tenable, he must have realised that a possible way of accounting for the identity and difference of things as referents i.e. as denotable objects would be to start from the principle of the mutual absence of any x from the loci of all non-x. This could be formalised through joint presence and absence (anvayavyatireka) as a qualifier-qualified relation in which the predominant joint absence of all non-x from any given locus of x qualifies the latter as x. Induction by means of joint absence and presence of any word and referent presupposes, of course, vyutpatti, teaching the connection of any word to the thing it
denotes. This implies identifying the referent by pointing at a prototypical instance of it accompanied by the demonstrative pronoun “this,” as Dignāga explains at PSV V 50b-c; cf. no. 413 above.

(1)apoha° em. (cf. gžan sel T) : apohaniyam Ms

466 Cf. PST Ms B 229b2: na kutaścid api hetor ity arthaḥ.

[243] rūpaśabdena rasādayo apohyante, na punar anyatamavartanvābhidhāne śesā varṇā <atyantabhinnā api. sa kinkṛtāḥ>? yasya tu rūpatvam abhinām nilādisy evaśī(1), na rasādīvī <ity evam ēṣā doṣo nāṣṭītī cet>. Restored, cf. PST Ms B 229b3-5: tatra tulye bhede rūpaśabdena rasādayo apohyante(2) na(3) punar anyatama-vartanvābhidhāne śesāvarṇā ... yasya tv ēṣītāti. yasya tu rūpatvam abhinām(4) dravyasatsāmanvānāmyaṃ tasya tatktro niyamo ... tac ca nilādīvī evānī na rasādīṣu.

(1)eva is reproduced by niūd in V, cf. sīon po la sogs pa niūd V : sīon po la sogs pa nmams K.
(2)apohyante em. : hyante Ms
(3)na em. : na na Ms
(4)abhināṃ em. : ā[ṃ]bhinnan Ms

467 This paragraph introduces a discussion of how the scope of exclusion is restricted. Dignāga’s opponent points out that since a quality (guna) like the blue color differs from other colors as well as from the quality taste (rasa) and the remaining qualities, it is necessary to explain the cause of restriction. As he asserts, this restriction can only be accounted for by assuming that a real general property colourness is found in each particular colour as opposed to taste, and so on, cf. PST Ms B 229b2-3: nilādīnaṃ pararashāparasamayābhabhāvāyān(1) rasādīvate ‘pi bhid-yante. tatra tulye bhede rūpaśabdena rasādayo apohyante, na punar anyatamavartanvābhidhāne śesāvarṇā ity atra na kaścina niyamahetuḥ. anenābhyapagamavirodham āḥa.

(1)‘samanyā” em. : ‘samarthayā”

[244] <esa dośo nāśī, yasmād(1) > lokarūḍho(2) na mṛṣyate(3). Restored, cf. PST Ms B 229b5-6: lokarūḍho na mṛṣyate iti.
(1)Cf. gaṇi gi phir K : ‘di ṣtār V.
(2)This adjective qualifies an implicit vyavahāra.

468 Cf. PST Ms B 229b6: anekārthathvād dhātūnāṃ nābhiviśyata ity arthaḥ.

[245] uktam hi Bhagavatā: “janapadanirūktin nābhiniṇīṣeta saṃjñāṃ ca lokasya nābhīdīvar(1).” tasmād asmābhīr api <lokavyavahārā naimittikā vā> pāribhāṣikā <vā> bhūtārthatvena na mṛṣyante, lokavad evānūgamasyante. siddhāḥ ca rūpaśabdā loke nilādīs eva, na rasādīṣu. Restored, cf. Ms B 229b-230a4: uktam hityādi. janapadanirūkt lokavyavahārah ... pāribhāṣikā ... saṃjñāṃ cetyādi ... tasmād iti ... bhūtārthatveneti ... tena na mṛṣyante nābhiniśvyante ... lokavad evānūgamasyanta
iti ... tathāsmābhīr api anugamyante ... ata āha siddhaṃ cetyādi ... rūpaśabdō loke nīlabāsy eva siddho na rasādīsu.

(1)The Sanskrit version of this Madhyama-āgama quotation is found at Abhidharmakośabhāṣya 31,14-15, cf. Taishō 1,701c6. For the original Pāli version, cf. no. 471 below.

469 Cf. PST Ms B 229b6: janapadaniruttir lokavayavahāraḥ.

470 In the Buddhist tradition this passage is quoted to show that one should not become attached to conventional usage, cf., e.g., Abhidharmakośabhāṣya 31,15: caṅkuḥ paśyati vijnānaṃ vijnātīti nātrābhihinveṣṭavam. Buddhist Sanskrit nirukti translates Pāli niruttī and is not related to Sanskrit nirukti “etymology.” The original Pāli version of the quotation is found at Majjhimanikāya III 230,20-21: janapadaniruttīṃ nābhihinveseyya, samaṇṇam nātiḍhāveyyā ti (Papañcasūdanī V 30,23f: nābhihinveseyyā ti na adhiṭṭhahitvā ādāyā vohareyya. samaṇṇam ti lokasamaṇṇaṃ lokapaṇṇattāti nātiḍhāveyyā ti nātiṅkamayyā). The use in the Pāli canon of atidhāvati (= Buddhist Sanskrit abhidhāvati) is highly restricted; cf. Sāmyuttanikāya IV 230,23-25: yam ca sāmaṃ nātaṃ taṃ ca atidhāvanti. yam ca loke saccasammatāṃ taṃ ca atidhāvanti; in post-canonical Pāli literature it is used in descriptions of how the teaching of the ultimate truth should not disregard conventional usage, cf., e.g., Visuddhimagga 522,15: janapadaniruttīyā anabhihinveso samaṇṇaya anatiḍhāvanā ti ayaṃ nāyo pariṇāpita hoti, and Mohavichchedāṇī 267,7-9: paññattīm anatkamma paramattho paṅkāsto vināyakeṇa so yasmā. tasmā aṅgō pi paṅḍito paramattham paṅkāsento samaṇṇaṃ nātiḍhāvaye.

471 Cf. the canonical formulation at Dīghanikāya I 202,7-9: ittimā kho Citta loka-samaṇṇā lokaniruttīyo lokavohārā lokapaṇṇattīyo yāhi Tathāgato voharati aparāmasan ti.

472 The underlying assumption is that terms denoting things in which any given general property is resident have this general property as their cause of application (naimittika), whereas terms like 'existence' (sattā) do not have a cause of application because any given general property is by definition a not repeatable singularity. They are therefore similar to such items that are denoted by proper nouns or by technical terms like those of Pāṇinī grammar; cf. PST Ms B B 229b6-230a1: samudāyaśabdāḥ sattādikam vastusatsāmānayam pravṛttinimittam upādāya tadvati vartante. sattādau tu dravyasati sāmānye nimittāntarabhāvāt pāriḥbhāṣikāḥ yādṛçchikā ity evam nābhihinvesaṃ kuryāt vastusatāḥ sāmānyasyāyogātī: “Words that denote a collection [of things] in dependence upon a real general property like existence as their cause of application viz., apply to the general property possessor. However, since there is no other cause of application with regard to a general property such as existence as a real object, they are technical designations, i.e., proper nouns. Thus one should not become attached since it is untenable that a general property is a real object.”

For the term pāriḥbhāṣika, v. Renou, Terminologie, DSG s.v.

473 Cf. PST Ms B 230a1-2: bhūto ’ṛtho vastusatsāmānayam pravṛttinimittam viṣayaṃ vā yeṣām te tathocayante. tadbhāvo bhūtārthatvaṃ(1) ... itthambhūtalakṣaṇe tṛtiyā(2).
474 Cf. PST Ms B 230a2: yathā loko ‘nabhiniśyānugacchati. The idea of observing the constraints of conventional usage on the level of samyṛti is also emphasized by Dignāga in Hastavālapraķarana, cf. verse 6ab: ‘jig rten pa yi don rtogs pas | ‘jig rten bzin du sès par bya |. The yṛtti explains this statement as follows: ji ltar ‘jig rten pa dag bum pa la sogs pa’i don la yod pa’i no bor rtogs pas | ‘di ni bum pa ’o || snam bu ’o || šin rta ’o žes tha sūnad ’dogs pa de bzin du jig rten bzin du sñon gyi sgrub pas tha sūnad du bya ’o ||.

475 Cf. PST Ms B 230a: syād etad: vastusata śāmānyena vinā loke ’pi naiva sidhyati, rūpasabdo niḍāsi ṽrasādiṣv iveti. ata āha: śiddhāś cetyādi. vastusata śāmānyam antareṇāpi samyṛtisata eva śāmānyād rūpasabdo loke niḍāsiḥ(1) eva śiddhāḥ, na rasādiṣu, tad dhi niḍāsi ṽeva vartate, na rasādiṣu. tathā hi niḍādaya ṽeva prakṛtyā śvānumhavadvārena tathāvidham vikalpabuddhau śāmānyākāram arpaṇyati.(2) yenā lokas tatraiva rūpavyahāraṃ karoti, netaratra.


477 Cf. PST Ms B 230a7: tathāpi tulyo paryayuṣya ṽita arthaḥ.

478 The opponent rejects that his own questions can be turned against himself, cf. PST Ms B 230a7: tulyaparyayuṣyayogatāṃ pariharati.

479 Cf. PST Ms B 230a7: saty api niḍāṇāṃ svabhāvabheda ṽita arthaḥ.

480 If the use of the word ‘colour’ were restricted by visibility, it would have an action as it cause of application, but not the alleged general property colourness, cf.
PST Ms B 230a: cāksuṣatve niyamahetāv isyamāne kriyānimitto rūpaśabdaḥ syāt, na tu jātinimitta iti.

(250) cāksuṣā <ṛgḥyaṃ hi cāksuṣatvam>. <evam ca niśādiṣu> kriyānimitto rūpaśabdaḥ syāt, na tu jātinimittaḥ{1}. Restored, cf. PST Ms B 230b1: kriyānimittaṃ darśayati cāksuṣetyādi; cf. PST Ms B 230b1: kriyānimitto rūpaśabdaḥ syāt, na tu jātinimitta ity abhyupetabdhatāṃ āha.

{1} Cf. rigs kyi rgyu mtshan nas ni ma yin no V 138,23 : rigs tha mi dad pa’i rgyu mtshan gyis ni ma yin no K.

... 

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481 Cf. the definition of colour as perceptible by the eye at PBh § 117: tatra rūpaṃ cakṣurgrāhyam.

482 Cf. PST Ms B 230b1-2: nanu caivaṃ rūpatvasamavāyaḥ kriyākṛtaḥ syāt. śādsvajātinimitta eva tat kim ucyate kriyākṛta iti?

483 Cf. PST Ms B 230b2-3: cāksuṣatvābhede hi kim punā rūpatvena. Restored, cf. PST Ms B 230b2-3: cāksuṣatvābhede hītyādi ... yadi ca niśādiṣu cāksuṣatvam abhinnam isyate ... kim punā rūpatveneti.

... 

252 aṭha rūpatvasambhandhasya nīmittam{1} cāksuṣatvam <uktam iti cet>. Restored, cf. PST Ms B 230b3-4: aṭhyādi ... rūpatvam abhinnābhidhānasya pravṛttinimittam cāksuṣatvam tu rūpatvasambhandhasyeti.

{1} Cf. bya bar byas pa pas V : byas pa’i K.

484 The term connection (sambandha) denotes the category of inherence (samavāya).

485 Cf. PST Ms B 230b3-4: ayam abhiprāyāḥ: bhinnā hi bhāvaśaktayaḥ, tato rūpatvam abhinnābhidhānasya pravṛttinimittam, cāksuṣatvam tu rūpatvasambhandhasyeti: “The opinion is this: Since the powers of entities are different, colourlessness is imagined to be the same cause. And if it is claimed that visibility is the same in the blue [colour], and so on, then let us concede that the expression ‘colour’ is the same for that reason only, but what purpose, then, does [the general property] colourlessness serve?”

253 evam api <cāksuṣatve samavāyāḥ> kriyākṛtaḥ{1} prāpnoti, rūpatvābhivyaktir vā. Restored, cf. PST Ms B 230b4-5: evam apītyādinā ... ata āha: rūpatvābhivyaktir veta: kriyākṛtā prāpnotiḥi sambhandhaniyam.

{1} Cf. bya bar byas pa pas V : byas pa’i K.
This consequence contradicts the opponent’s assumption that inherence is invariably the same and thus by implication is not subject to action, cf. PST Ms B 230b4: \(\text{evam apityādīnāpy abhyupetabādhām āha, nityatvābhypagamāt samavāyasya.}\)

This [absurd] consequence is the result of the assumption that visibility is not the cause of the inherence of colourlessness in any given colour, but rather that it causes its manifestation as inherent in any given colour. This, however, contradicts the assumption that colourlessness, and so on, is to be manifested by its own substrate, and thus it cannot be caused by an action, cf. PST Ms B 230b4-5: \(\text{syād etat, na brāmaś cākṣūsatvād rūpatvasya samavāyaḥ, 'pi tu samavetasyābhivyaktir iti. ata āha rūpatvābhivyaktir vetī ... anenāpy abhyupetabādhatām āha: svāśrayavyaṅgyatvābhypagamād rūpatvādānām.}\)


\[256\] dravyādīṣu prasaṅgaś ca. Qu. Ms B 230b7.

\[257\] <dravyasaṅkhyaśparimāṇānādānām ca cākṣūsatvāt teṣv api rūpatvapraseṅgaḥ syāt. kim ca>. Restored, cf. PST Ms B 230b7-231a1, q.v. no. 491 above.

\[258\] bhedābhaṅgaḥ(1) sitādiṣu(2). Qu. Ms B 231a1.

(1)\( śamavāyāc\) em. : \( śāmavāc\) Ms

(2) Cf. dkar sogs K : dkar min sogs la V.
Restored, cf. PS Ms B 231a-2: cāksuṣatvasya niyamahetor aviśeṣāt, niyamahe-
tvantarābhāvāc ca rūpaṃ ity abhīdhanapratyayasāmyād nīlapitādibheda(1) na syāt: “Because the cause of restriction viz. visibility is uniform and since the identity of the cognition due to the word ‘colour’ is the same because there is no other cause of restriction, there will be no difference between blue or yellow, etc.”

(1) pāṭādi° em. : pāṭādi° Ms

[259] <cāksuṣatvāviṣeṣe nīlapītānīlātaranilatamādibheda na syāt>. tasmād avaś-
yam cāksuṣatvavyatirekena <nīlapītādibheda bhinnesv api> rūpaśabdo loke(1) rūdher anugantavyo, na rasādīsu. Restored, cf. PST Ms B 231a1-2, q.v. no. 489 above; Ms B 231a4-5: tasmād avaśyam iti ... cāksuṣatvavyatirekena nīyagata nīlādyav eva rūpaśabdo loke rūdher anugantavyo, na rasādīsu.

(1) do lok° em. : dalok° Ms

493 Before commenting upon Dignāga’s conclusion, Jinendra relates the following discussion at PST Ms B 231a2-4: yadi cāksuṣatvān nīlādīnanām rūpavetā-

bheda iṣyate, tatra saty api cāksuṣatvāt tasyāviṣeṣe nīlatvādhibhir yogād viśeṣāh syāt. na, tasyaivāyogāt. na hi nīlādīsu kāraṇām kīmcid asti pratiniyatam, yato nīla-
tvādisamavāvyaniścayah syāt. ādibhedāḥ kāraṇām astīti cat tatrāpi ko hetuḥ, yata
tasya kasmīṃṣcī(1) eva vṛtī na sarvatreti. anuṭṭharam etat: “If it is maintained that
due to visibility there is no difference between blue, and so on, in terms of [their]
colourness, in that case, even though this [colourness] is the same due to visibility,
there will be a difference [between the various colours] because of the connection
with [the general properties] blueness, etc. This is not the case because it is not
connected. For there is no cause whatsoever in blue, and so on, that is restricted to
each single [colour] so that one could ascertain the inherence of blueness, etc. If it is
asserted that the cause is the difference of power (ādibhedāḥ), also in this case [the
question arises]: What is the reason why it only occurs in a certain thing and not in
all. Thus this is not an answer [to our criticism].”

(1) kasmīṃṣcī° em. (cf. ‘ga’ zig kho na la T) : kacid Ms

494 That is, because it is not justified that visibility is the cause with regard to the
connection with colourlessness, cf. PST Ms B 231a4: yasmāc cāksuṣatvasya rūpavet-
yogam prati hetutvam na yuvyate.

495 Current usage is based upon general properties that only exist conventionally,
cf. PST Ms B 231a5: rūdheṣ ca nimittām samvṛtisd eva sāmānya, na tu dravya-
sad ity abhiprāyāḥ: “The opinion is that the cause of current usage is a general
property that only exists conventionally, but not as something that exists substan-
tially.”


496 The purpose of this paragraph is to address once again the thesis that the word
denotes its own referent by means of exclusion of other referents, cf. PST Ms B
231a5-6: punar arthāntaravāvṛttdvāreṇa śabdāḥ svārthaṃ pratīyayatītī etad
darśayitum(1) āha: yadi cetyādi.

(1) darśayitum conj. : dra(?)yi{ti} | tum Ms

[262] na tu <śabdasyārthābhidhāne> (1) ’nvavavyatirekābhhyām syāt, iṣyate ca. Restored, cf. PST Ms B 231a6-7: na tv anvavvyatirekābhhyām sahitābhhyām syād ... iṣyate cetyādi.

(1) Cf. sgra’i don rjod par byed pa’i lta na ni V : sgra’i don brjod pa la K.

It is not possible to construe this sentence unless one assumes that the grammatical subject is siddhiḥ that is to be supplied from 38c.


(1) Cf. gan yan ruṅ ba daṅ gni gar ŋes par bzuṅ ba brjod pa ’bras bu daṅ bcas pa’i phyir K : khyad par gzan gnis ka ŋes par bzuṅ bas rjod par byed pa ’bras bu daṅ bcas pa’i phyir ro V.

Cf. the statement at PV IV 192a = PVin II 11a: vyavacchedaphalam vākyam, which belongs in the context of the logical properties of restriction and thus by implication the semantic function of the restrictive particle eva, cf. Steinkellner 1979 (PVin II Teil II): 33 no. 66, and no.s 497-98 below. Dhammapāla’s statement at Udānaṭṭhakathā 12,23ff (= Itivuttakaṭṭhakathā I 23,22ff): sabbāḥ hi vavyāni evakāraththasaḥhitāni yeva avadhāranaphalattā, evidently belongs in the same context; see Pīnd 1997: 523ff; cf. also the related discussion of restriction as a concomitant property of verbal discourse at PSV V:34 at § 47 above.

Cf. PSV V:34 at § 47 above.

[265] vyavacchedaphalam vākyam, which belongs in the context of the logical properties of restriction and thus by implication the semantic function of the restrictive particle eva, cf. Steinkellner 1979 (PVin II Teil II): 33 no. 66, and no.s 497-98 below. Dhammapāla’s statement at Udānaṭṭhakathā 12,23ff (= Itivuttakaṭṭhakathā I 23,22ff): sabbāḥ hi vavyāni evakāraththasaḥhitāni yeva avadhāranaphalattā, evidently belongs in the same context; see Pīnd 1997: 523ff; cf. also the related discussion of restriction as a concomitant property of verbal discourse at PSV V:34 at § 47 above.

[266] The concept of anyatarobhayāvadhāraṇa belongs in the context of subject-predicate sentences like “x(+ avadhāraṇa) is y(+ avadhāraṇa),” the resultant cognition being said to depend upon whether the scope of the predicate or the subject, or both, is restricted by implicit avadhāraṇas. For the use of the term anyatarobhayāvadhāraṇa, cf. Dignāga’s criticism of the Naiyāyika definition of pratiṣṭhā at NS I.1.33: sādhyanirdeśah pratiṣṭhā as entailing absurdities when interpreted by means of avadhāraṇas. His criticism is addressed at length at NV.

501 Cf. PŚT Ms B 231a7-231b2: kartur eva nākartaḥ. kartṛṣabdo ‘kartāraṁ vyavacchindan īpsitataṁ svārthe na sambadhānti. ēvam īpsitataṁ eva nāṇīp-sitatatam. īpsitataṁōśabdo ‘py anīpsitataṁ (1) vyudasya (2) na kartṛṣabdartham svārthena yojayaṁ. ēvam ubhayāvadhāraṇena viṣiśṭārthaṁścayād abhidhānasāphalyam. anyatarāvadhāraṇena yathā satsva meghaṁ vrśīra bhavatīti. satsva eva nāsatsa, na tu bhavaty eveti: “The agent only, not the non-agent. The word agent does not connect “most wants to obtain” to its own referent while excluding non-agent. In the same way “most wants to obtain” only, not “most wants to obtain.” The expression ‘most wants to obtain’ too does not connect the referent of the word agent with its own referent by excluding “not most wants to obtain.” Thus the denotation fulfills its purpose because of ascertaining its specific referent by means of a restriction of both terms. By means of restriction of either term [means], for instance, “there is rain when clouds are found,” i.e., only when they are found, not when they are not found, but not “there is only [rain]”. Jīnendrabuddhi then continues explaining the implications of lack of restriction at PŚT Ms B 231b2-4: tad arthāntaranivṛttaṁ svadāya na prāṇottāti. yathā hi yady akartur anīpsitatam karma, kartṛṣabdācārenām aparāthakaṁ svat. yathā yady anīpsitataṁ api karma, īpsitataṁ ity abhidhānaṁ nispalāyaṁ svat. tasmād arthāntara-nivṛttnidvārena śabdo rthaṁ gamayati y abhyupeyaṁ: “This does not obtain when the word is not dependent upon negation of other referents. That is, if karman is what a non-agent does not most want to obtain, the articulation of the word karman would be purposeless. Thus, if karman is also what [the agent] does not most want to obtain, the expression ‘most wants to obtain’ would not fulfill its purpose. Therefore the word indicates its referent by means of negation of other referents.”

There is no indication in the grammatical literature that Pāṇini’s definition of the karmaṇaṇa was interpreted by means of avadhāraṇaḥ in the way Dignāga’s formulation suggests, and the quotation as well as the interpretation may well have been motivated by a wish to extend the use of avadhāraṇaḥ to the Pāṇinian sūtra, since the Nāyārika definition of pratijñā as sādhyanirdeśāḥ, involves the introduction of a kṛtya affix which, according to the Pāṇinian derivational system, denotes karma, and thus involves the Pāṇinian definition, cf. Jīnendrabuddhi’s remarks MS B 113b6 ad PSV III:3cd: karmani cāyaṁ kṛtyapratayāyaḥ. tena na karmābhidhāyinā śādhyasabdenāsādhyasyākṣepah: kartur īpsitataṁ hi karma; Uddyotakara quotes A I 4.49 at NV 516,13f in his rebuttal of Dignāga’s objections and explains: karmanirdeśaṁ cāyaṁ sādhyanirdeśaḥ pratijñeti.

(1) nāṇīp-sitatatam. īpsitataṁśabdo em. (śītu thob pār ‘dod pa min pa ni ma yin, śītu thob par ‘dod pa i sgra T) : nāṇīp-sitatatmasabdō Ms

(2) vyudasya em. : (ṛnam par bsal nas T) : vyudasya Ms

[264] nano cā<pohamātre śabdārthe> vyatirekādi evābhidhānāṁ syāt. syād etad evaṁ <yady anvayo nesiṣṭa>. Restored, cf. PŚT Ms B 231b4-6: nano cetyādi ... vyatirekādi evābhidhānāṁ syāt ... syād etad evam ityādi. bhāvena (1) tu mukhyenetī.
bhāvena tu mukhyena\(^{(1)}\) < nesyaṭe vyāptih\(^{(2)}\)>. Restored, cf. PST Ms B 232b6: bhāvena\(^{(1)}\) tu mukhyeneti.

\(^{(1)}\)bhāvena conj. (cf. dīos pos ni K : dīos po’i phyogs nas ni V) : bhāve (cf. dīos po yis [em. yi T] ni gtsos bor T) Ms

\(^{(2)}\)Cf. khyab pa VK. It appears from Jinendrabuddhi’s paraphrase of the verse (cf. no. 496 below) that vyāpti corresponds to anvaya, as Dignāga’s own commentary indicates.

That is, concomitance with a real general property that is assumed to be the principal referent denoted by the word, cf. PST Ms B 232b6: vastusatsāmānyā-kylena\(^{(1)}\) sābdasyānyavayo nesyaṭe: “The word’s joint presence is not claimed to be with a so-called substantially existent general property.”

\(^{(1)}\) vastusat\(^{*}\) em. : vastuṣat\(^{a}\) Ms

na hi bhāveṣu <jātiḥ sambhavati vyatiriktā vā syād avyatiriktā vety\(^{(1)}\)> uktam. jātivatirekena tv <avādīṣt anyaśabdartha “ity etenā>rthāntarapohaviṣṭe ‘ṛthe <sābda-syānayavatirekau na bhinnārthau>. Restored, cf. PST Ms B 232b7-232a1: na hi bhāveṣv ityādinā uktam iti … jātivatirekena tv iti … arthāntarapohaviṣṭe ‘ṛthā iti.

\(^{(1)}\)Cf. tha dad pa ’am tha mi dad par ’gyur ba’i V : gžan daṅ gžan ma yin pa’i K.

According to Jinendrabuddhi Dignāga quotes this statement from another of his treatises (prakaraṇāntare). He continues explaining that in the context of the present treatise (inya) this problem has been dealt with at PS II 16, of which he quotes the first pāda followed by a fragment of an important passage that occur in the Vaiśeṣika section of PSV I:23b (v. Hattori 1968: 205-6), cf. PST Ms B 231b7: na hi bhāveṣv ityādinā uktam iti prakaraṇāntare, iha ca “sāmāṇyam yady api syād” (PS II:16a) ityādinā. “tathā viśeṣyāṃ svair indriyair upalabhī”isyādinā ca. pādas abc of PS II:16 are recorded at Ms B 1991a: sāmāṇyam yady api syāt tu tatrāṇyat, tasya darśanam | aśrayādarśanāṃ na syād; cf. PST Ms B 71b7: sāmāṇyam yady api syāt = Ms B 231b7. The Tibetan renderings of PSV II:16 are incompatible with the Sanskrit evidence presented in PST and appear to render corrupt readings as they are impossible to construe:

K (Kitagawa 1973 464b5-16 = P 113a8-113b2): spyi ni yod pa ma yin na yān  ||

\text{re} \text{zig me la me nīd kyi spyi gžan ni yod pa ma yin no}  ||

\text{yod kya}n de la mthoṅ ba ni mi srid de rtan thams cad ma mthoṅ ba’i phyir ro  ||

\text{gñis ŋid la sogs pa du ma dan}  ||

\text{thun moṅ ba rams kyi rten ma bzūn bar ‘dzin pa ni mthoṅ no}  ||

gañ dag 'dra ba phyir smra ba’i ‘dra ba’ an ma yin no. ci ste spyi gcig la brten par gzūn na yān thams cad gzūn ba yin no že na de la brten bžin du du bar ‘gyur ro}.

V (Kitagawa 1973 464a4-16 = P 32a3-5): gal te spyi las yin graṅ na  ||

\text{de ni de las gžan du ‘gyur}  ||

\text{rten rams ma mthoṅ ba yi phyir}  ||

\text{tha dad min gcig mthoṅ mi ‘gyur}  \quad \text{(PS II:16)}

\text{re zig me la gžan pa’i me nīd ces pa’i spyi ni yod pa ma yin no}  ||

\text{yod du chug na yān de mthoṅ ba ni mi srid do}  ||

\text{rten mtha’ dag ma mthoṅ ba’i phyir du ma rams las gñis ŋid la sogs pa’i thun moṅ ba ni yod pa ma yin no}  ||

gañ dag s pyi mthoṅ žiṅ
“Even if the general property were to exist in this one fire] as different from all its substrates, there would be no observation of it because it is not observed in all its substrates; or [the general property] would be a particular (*bhedaḥ) because it is observed [completely] in a single (*ekatra) substrate (PS II:16).

In the first place, fireness does not exist (na tāvad agnitvamasti) as a general property separate from fire (agner anyat sāmānyam). For even if it were to exist (saty api tasmin) it would be impossible to observe it (*darsanāsambhavaḥ) because all its substrates have not been observed (sakalāśrayādarśanāt). For perception of [the general property] twoness, and so on, (dvitvādinām) that is common to many [substrates] (anekasādhāraṇānām) does not exist, when all its substrates have not been perceived (aghītasa kalāśrayānām).(2) Nor [does observation] of similarity (nāpi sādṛśyasvya) exist on the view of someone (*kasyaṣcid) who claims that similarity is the general property (*sāmānyam sādṛśyam iti vādinaḥ), being the same in substrates that have already been perceived as well as in those that have not yet been perceived (*grhitāghñītāśrayasamam).(3)

The following ādhyātmas are quoted at Ms B 71b7: na tāvad agnitvam astīti; 72a2-4: saty api tasminn ityādī ... nāpi sādṛśyasvetī ... aṭhaivaśrayanagrahane ’pi samantaṁ grhyate ... anekatvaṁ syāt.

Jinendra buddhi introduces his exegesis of PSV II 16 as follows: syād etat: sāmānyavastv ekam eva vyaktisu, tad vyatiriktaḥ aya-vatiriktam vāasti; tasya ca pratipravakti sarvātmanā pariśamāptatvād ekasya <sarv>ātimāgni vyaktau darśanō papatiḥ, tasmāt sarvatrādarśanān na syāt prakāśanam ity ayuktam etad ity āha.

(1) Dīnagā’s analysis, at PS II:16, of the view that real general properties are resident in things, addresses the underlying assumption that the indicator-indicated relation is based upon real general properties that instantiate identically in any particular instance of, e.g., fire and smoke. The discussion presupposes PS II:15, q.v. no. 13 above.

(2) For the inserted Sanskrit terms, cf. the exegesis at PST Ms B 72a2: yad anekāśrayasādhāraṇam agṛhitasa kalāśrayam na tad draśṭam śakyam, yathāgṛhitāsakalāśrayam dvitiyāti. tathā cāgnītvam.

(3) This brief statement apparently alludes to Vindhyavāsin’s claim about the inseparability of the general property similarity from the individuals that instantiate it, cf. the alleged quotation from Vindhyavāsin at Śrīgāraprakāśa Vol. IV 786,12-14: āha ca vindhyavāsī: śabdasya sāmānyam vācyam. tac ca sādṛśyaritam iti. sāmānyam ca pūrvavyaktyavacchinnaṃ apūrvvyaktau pratyāmānaṃ tad uktam sādṛśyam: ‘Vindhyavāsin says: The word’s denotable object is the general property; and this has the form of similarity; and the general property that has been
distinguished in a former individual and is cognized in a new individual is called similarity.”

Cf. Jīnendrabuddhi’s remark, at PST Ms B 72a3, about the claim that similarity (sādṛṣyam) has been put forward separately because it is not distinct from the substrate: aśrayād avyatirekītvāt sādṛṣyam prthag upanyastam. atrāpy ayam eva prayogo vācyah.

Kumārila criticizes Vindhyavāsin’s view at ŚV Ākṛti° 75-76: vyaktītāś cātireko ’ṣya syān na vetti vicārite, sāmānyo eva sādṛṣyam bhaved vā vyaktimātrakam. tena nātyantabhinno ’ṛthāḥ sārūpyam iti varṇitaṃ granthe vindhyāvāsena bhrānteḥ sādṛṣyam ucyate.

Jīnendrabuddhi’s interpretation of this crucial term is indebted to the view that a verbal utterance indicates the speaker’s intention (vivakṣā), and that which is qualified by exclusion of other referents is in fact the person who is qualified by vivakṣā because he is the substrate (aśraya) of the referent of the word, cf. PST Ms B 232a1: vivakṣāvati puruṣe. sa hi śabdārthasyāśraya iti tadviśīṣta ucyate. For the interpretation of śabda as indicating vivakṣā, cf. no. 9. above. For the implications of the expression ‘qualified by exclusion of other referents,’ cf. the remarks under no. 466 above.

That is without a substantially real (vastusatī) general property (jātiḥ), cf. PST Ms B 231b7: vinā hi jātyā vastusatyeti yāvat.

yās tv āhā “yadi gavādi vyaktam sarvam asato vikāraḥ(1), sarvāmyaprasaṅgāt pravuktam(2) asataḥ sadātmakatvam(3)” iti. <tatra>. Restored, cf. PST Ms B 232a1: yās tv āhēyādi ... 232a6: yādi vyaktam sarvam asato vikāraḥ sādhyate. evam sati sārvāmyaprasaṅgāt pravuktam asataḥ sadātmakatvam iti; cf. 232b1: yādi gavādi vyaktam sarvam asato vikāra iti bruvānāh.

(1) asato vikāraḥ : med pa las rnam par ’gyur ba/PA KV
(2) Cf. rab tu thob pa ñid do V : thal lo K.
(3) asataḥ sadātmakatvam : med pa las yod pa ’i bdag ñid can K : yod pa ma yin pa ’i bdag ñid V (= sadātmakatvam < a(sataḥ)sad°).

This paragraph introduces a lengthy discussion, covering § 56 through § 60, with the Sānkhyavaināśika Mādhava(1), who, as it appears, addresses Dignāga’s criticism of his proof of the existence of pradhāna, in connection with his own rebuttal of the apoha theory. Dignāga now answers his criticism. According to Jīnendrabuddhi, Mādhava addresses Dignāga’s objection immediately after dealing with the direct proofs of the continuous connection of the particulars with primordial materiality, cf. PST Ms B 232a1-2: arthāntarābhāvalakṣanam asatsamanvayam ‘bhuyupeta gavādīnām asataḥ sadātmakatvam pratipādayitum ayuktam. Arthāntara-to hy arthāntararayudāsa iti. etāvātyām upanyāsō anvayavīkṣitam leptāntarām vaināśikenoktaḥ(2), so ’sataḥ sūcaka iti vākyāśesāḥ “Having assumed that continuous connection with what is non-existent is characterized by non-existence of other referents, it is not possible to indicate the existent nature of cows, and so on, on account of what is non-existent. For exclusion is of one referent from other referents. In so many words the illustration, which the Vaināśika has set forth immediately after the formulation of the direct proof of the joint presence [of the
particulars with primordial materiality], indicates [that the primordial materiality] is non-existent, such is the sentence complement.”

Mādhava’s argument is related to an objection, evidently put forward by Dignāga in another work (Sāṅkhya-parīkṣā or Sāmānyaparīkṣāvāyaśa ?) in which he appears to argue that what Mādhava considers to be proof of the existence of pradhāna, equally well establishes its non-existence. The argument focuses on the implications of the concept of samanvaya, the main point being that everything manifest is continuously connected with what is non-existent in that manifest things are mutually non-existent, and thus is defined by continuous non-existence of all other things.

Jinendrabuddhi presents Dignāga’s argument as pūrvapakṣa followed by Mādhava’s response at Ms B 232a2–4: yo 5yam bhavatā vyaktasya ekajīta-samanvayāḥ pradhānasiddhyarthanṁ (3) uktaḥ, sa asatsiddhim api sūcayati, kasmāt? Asat-samanvayāt. asatsamanvitaṁ hidaṁ vyaktaṁ. na prthivyādayo na gavādayaḥ paras-paratmasu santi. yac ca yena samanvitaṁ tasyāsau vikāraḥ: tadyathā dadhi kṣīreṇa samanvitaṁ kṣīravikāraḥ. asatsamanvitaṁ cedam vyaktaṁ. tasmād idaṁ vyaktaṁ asato vikāra iti: “The continuous connection of the manifest with a single genus which you have propounded in order to establish primordial materiality (4) also presents the proof of [its being] non-existent. Why? Because of [its] continuous connection with what is non-existent. For the manifest is continuously connected with what is non-existent. Neither the earth, and so on, nor a cow, and so on, exist in one another’s nature. And that with which something is continuously connected is a modification of that. For instance yoghurt which is continuously connected with milk is a modification of milk. And the manifest is continuously connected with what is non-existent. Therefore the manifest is a modification of what is non-existent.”

This argument shows that Dignāga relies on the idea of things being excluded from each other through mutual non-existence, a view he is going to elaborate in the following. Cf., e.g., the classical formulation of the implications of mutual non-existence at ŚV Abhāva (1) 12a-c: svarūpaparūpābhyaṁ nityaṁ sadasadātmake vastuni (5).

(1) Dignāga also refers to and discusses other of Mādhava’s views at PS I section 5; 3d2-7cd, cf. Hattori 1968: 57–59, 155 no. 5.40. See Steinkellner 2005 ad loc.

(2) So probably read: pratipādayitum ayuktaṁ ity etāvādayān upānyāsah. arthāntarataḥ hy arthāntaravvudāsah. anvaya-vitkita-samanantarām vaināśikenoktaṁ Ms and T. I assume that the clause arthāntarataḥ … vyūdāsā originally followed after ayuktaṁ as part of Mādhava’s objection since he interprets exclusion of other referents as an instance of connection of any given thing with what is non-existent, in other words, as an instance of mutual non-existence.

(3) oṁ em.: oṁ a Ms


507 Cf. PST Ms B 232b2: yadiśabdo hy abhyupagamaṁ paridīpayati.

508 As it appears from Jinendrabuddhi’s reproduction of Mādhava’s objection, Dignāga quotes it in a slightly abbreviated form, cf. PST Ms B 232a6: etasmin
pūrwapakṣe sāṅkhyaṇektaṃ “yadi vyaktaṃ sarvam asato vikāraḥ sādhyate, evaṃ sati sārvāṁyaprasaṅgāt prayuktam asataḥ sadātmakatvam.”

Jinendrabuddhi explains the argument at Ms B 232a6-232b1: sarvavikāra-svarūpata sārvāṃyam, vikārasvarūpādarsanāc ca prakṛtes tatvarūpānumānāṃ, tathā hi kṣiravikārā dadhyādayas tadātmakāḥ. tadātmakaprabhāvya eva sarvāṃkā vikārāḥ. tataḥ prakṛter api sarvātmakatvam. sarvātmakatvāc ca sattvaprasaṅgadh. na asat sarvātmakas upapadyate. tatuṣa ca saddhāśadhanam asatpurvavā kheṇā iti.

(1)ānumaṃ em. : ॐāmaḥ Ms
(2)dhv em. : ॐāa Ms

asatamanvitam sarvam <yasya(1) tv> abhyupagacchataḥ(2), sattvaṃ anekātmakatvād iti kim kena yujyate. Restored, cf. PST Ms B 232b1-2: asatamanvitam sarvam iti ... evaṃ tasya sāṅkhyaśābhyupagacchataḥ, sattvaṃ anekātmakatvād iti kim kena yujyate.

(1)Cf. gān zig V : gān yin K.
(2)pāḍa b om. Ms; recorded T, cf. paraphrase above.

The question relates to the fact that the answer to Dignāga’s objection is inconsistent with the opponent’s own assumption, cf. PST Ms B 232b2: nābhṣyapagamenottaram sambadhyaṣa ity arthaḥ.

<śravam asatamanvitam ity abhyupagamyeta>, tatra katame ’nye gavādayo <śsantah kena svabhāvena sattvādhyaropayāḥ sūryaḥ>, sarvān hi gavāḍīn <āsatsamanvītām> abhyupagacchato ’sataḥ sadātmakatvam prāptam ity uttaram na yujyate(1). <tatra>. Restored, cf. PST Ms B 232b2-4: tatra katame ’nye gavādaya iti ... sarvān hityādi ... na hi gavāṇīn sadātmakān abhyupagacchataḥ tadāmyād asataḥ sadātmakatvam prāptam ity uttaram yujyate.

(1)Cf. lān ’di ni sbyar bar mi bya ’o V : lān ’di rigs pa yin nam K.

The question relates to the fact that the answer to Dignāga’s objection is inconsistent with the opponent’s own assumption, cf. PST Ms B 232b2: nābhṣyapagamenottaram sambadhyaṣa ity arthaḥ.

yad apy uktaṃ “pratyayāḥbhedaḥ syād asatsatoḥ, prakṛtipratyayoh hi vikāre dṛṣṭaḥ, tadyathā mṛtraprataḥāḥ sarvāvādāv itī.” Restored, cf. PST Ms B 232b4-5: yad apy uktaṃ iti. ... pratyayāḥbhedaḥ syād asatsatoḥ, kasmāt? prakṛtipratyayoh hi vikāre dṛṣṭaḥ, tadyathā mṛtraprataḥāḥ sarvaḥ” itī.

(1) sarvāvādāv em. (cf. kham por la sog pa la KV) : sarvā (cf. kham por la T) Ms

Dignāga reproduces Mādhava’s objection with some omissions as appears from Jinendrabuddhi’s exposition at Ms B 232b4-5: tatroktam “yadi gavādi vyaktaṃ sarvam asato vikāraḥ, pratyayāḥbhedaḥ syād asatsatoḥ, kasmāt? prakṛtipratyayoh hi vikāre dṛṣṭaḥ, tadyathā mṛtraprataḥāḥ sarvaḥ” iti: “In this context it is objected: If everything manifest like a cow is a modification due to what is non-
existent there will be no difference of cognition relative to what is existent and what is non-existent. Why? Because the cognition of primordial materiality is observed with regard to a modification, like, for instance, the cognition of clay with regard to a plate.” Jinendrabuddhi explains the argument at Ms B 232b5-6: etad uktam bhavati: asatsamanvite tadākāra eva pratayayah syat, na tu gaur āsya iti vastubhedākāro bhavet, bhavati ca. tasmān na vyaktaśrādsamanvayah: “This is what is meant: If the cognition is continuously present with what is non-existent it will only have the form of this, it would not have the form of different referents called ‘cow’ or ‘horse’, and yet this is the case. Therefore the manifest is not continuously present with what is non-existent.”

[271] mṛdabhede śaravādibhedadhīr yadi cesyate(1), asadabhede 'pi bhedadhiḥ kim iti nidhāryate. Restored, cf. PST Ms B 232b7: mṛdabhede śaravādibhedadhīr yadi cesyata iti; 233a1-2: evam saty asadabhede(2) 'pi ... bhedadhiḥ ... kim iti nidhāryate(3).

(1) The readings gzaṇ ŋid min na 'an K : gzaṇ min yan V of the Tibetan versions of PS V 40ab are not corroborated by the Sanskrit evidence of Ms B, and, moreover, do not fit metrically into the restored Sanskrit version of the two pādās. The readings may be due to a gloss based upon the parallel expression of the vṛtti ad loc., cf. gzaṇ ŋid ma yin yan K : gzaṇ ma yin na ni V.

(2) asadabhede conj. (cf. med khyad med KT) : asat bhede Ms

(3) bsal K : dag V : bzlog T would indicate that the translators interpreted nidhāryate as nivāryate (“excluded” sic), which is impossible as the causative of ni + ādhīr is not recorded in the sense “to exclude.” The mistake is incomprehensible as Ms leaves no doubt about the reading.

[512] Cf. PST Ms B 232b7-233a1: mṛdbhyo hi śaravādayo 'bhinnāḥ. tatrābhinnākārāpratayava[p]a.range yadi pratayayabheda iṣyate: mṛdi mṛtpratayayah, śaravādsau śaravādipratayayah, evam saty asadabhede(1) 'py, asataḥ(2) kārnasyabhede(3) 'pi, gavādityakte asatsamanvite(4) 'pi bhedadhiḥ gaur āsya iṣyevamādipratayayabhede-dah kim iti nidhāryate: “For plates, and so on, are not different from clay. If it is claimed that there is difference of cognition: clay cognition with respect to clay, and plate cognition with respect to plate, in that the [absurd] consequence in this case is that the cognitions of these would have the same form, in those circumstances, although there is no difference of what is non-existent, i.e., although there is no difference of a cause that is non-existent, i.e., although a manifested thing like a cow is continuously connected with what is non-existent, then how is the cognition of difference, i.e., the difference of cognitions like ‘cow’ and ‘horse’ established.

(1) asada° em. (cf. med khyad med T) : asat° Ms

(2) asataḥ conj. (cf. med pa’i T) : tāsa[ṭ]aḥ Ms

(3) nasyabhe° em. (cf. tha dad med T) : o[nasya bhe° Ms

(4) asatsamanvite em. (cf. med pa dañ ldan pa la T) : asatsamarthite Ms

[272] <yathā hi mṛdbhyo 'bhinnatve 'pi tadmātraprataybeprasanaige> kenāpi vidhe-na <śaravādipratayabhedo bhyupagamynate, tathā> śabdahedahāvaṇāvasāt <sadasatoḥ pratayayabhedaḥ kim nesyate>-. tavāpi hi guṇānām paramam rūpam na dyātipathath irchati, yat tu dyātipathaprāptaṃ tan māyeva sutucchakam. Restored, cf. Ms 233a1-5: kenāpi vidhineti ... śabdahedahāvaṇāvaśād iti ... tavāpi hityādi;
Ms B 232b7-233a1, q.v. above no. 509 above. The verse stems from Śaṭītantra, cf. YSBh ad YS IV.13; Frauwallner, *Kleine Schriften* 1982: 277-78.

513 Cf. PST Ms B 233a2: *samsthānādibhedaṃ vā puruṣārthavāsaṇaṃ vā.

514 Cf. PST Ms B 233a2-5: anādāu śabdavyavahāraparamparāyāṃ śabdavīśeṣāḥītaṃ(1) tadākārāpratrayotpattaye yā vāsaṇā, sā śabdabhedabhāvanā. tadvāśād bhinnakārāpratrayaprasātīr bhavati. etenā tadātmakatve ‘pi tato bhinnakārāpratrayāväseyatvasya śāravādiṣu darsanād anaikāntikatvam āha. tato nāsatsamanvyāsyāsiddhātā Kateṃ yad sadavyatireke ‘pi vastusattvāt pratyakṣenā paricchinnā gavādayāḥ śabdā bhāvanāvāsat tathā paricchidyante. pratyaksikṛte hi vastuni śabdasaṃketaḥ śākyate kartum nānyathā. asattve tu teśām iṣyamāne katham bhinnakārāpratrayāväseyatvam iti. This is the only context in which Dignāga refers to the residual traces of words (bhāvanā) as causes of verbal difference. He must have dealt more fully with this question elsewhere because Kumārila rejects the view at SV Apoha(2) 100a-c (= TS 959) that the difference between the vāsaṇās explain the difference of the exclusions: na cāpi vāsaṇābhāded bhedah sadrūpātāpi vā, apōhāṃ prakalpyate na hy avastūni vāsaṇā. Kamalaśīla quotes, in TSP 376,12ff ad loc., a passage from a working express views, which he attributes to certain Buddhists (*kecid bauddhāḥ*), who evidently tried to answer Kumārila’s criticism: na khalv apohābhedād ādhārābhāded vāpoḥānāṃ bhedah, api tv anādī-kālapravṛttavivicitravitārthavikalpaśāṇābhādenāvayais tattvato nirviṣayair api bhinnavīśayālambibhir iva pratyayair bhinnasy avibhāṣy am bhīvāḥ bhīnaḥ ivārthātāmāna ivāvabhāvā api apohāḥ samāropyaṇe. te ca tatha ātiṃ samāropitā bhinnāh santaś ca pratibhāsante, tena vāsaṇābhāded bhedah sadrūpātā cāpohānāṃ bhaviṣyati: “The difference of the exclusions is certainly not due to difference of the excluded or difference of the substrate, but rather, the exclusions, although they are without self-dependent nature, are superimposed, as if they were different and of the nature of the referents, upon external referents that are differentiated through notions that seemingly (iva) rely upon different objects, although they are essentially without objects, being accompanied by difference of (karmic) impressions, in circulation in the beginningless time, which are due to various representations of unreal referents.” This text is strikingly reminiscent of Dharmakīrti’s explanation at PVS 38,17ff; cf. the similar “de-realizing” use of iva ibid. 42,12-22.

(1)ōviśeṣā° conj : ōviśeṣanā° Ms

515 Cf. PST Ms B 233a5-7: sāmyāvasthāyāṃ yo ’viparītah svabhāvah, so ’tīndriyatvān na ḍṛṣṭe viśaṃ yavābhāvam anuyāti(1). yat tu rūpaṃ teśām vyaktyāvasthāyām tan “māyeva sutucchakam;” svabhāvāsūnyam ity arthaḥ. tataś ca tvayāpy aavastutatvani‘bhandhanca eva vyavahārō ’bhuyapeya iti: “Their true essential nature in the state of homogeneous equilibrium(2) does not enter the domain of vision because it is beyond the [visual] sense. On the other hand, their form in their manifest state is ‘void like an illusion’, that is, ‘empty of essential nature’. And therefore you too should accept that discourse is conditioned by non-material properties.”

(1)ōʾāṭi em. : ʾāṭi Ms

(2) Jinendrabuddhi’s use of this term shows that the concept of sāmyāvasthā did not originate with Vijnānabhikṣu (ca. 16th c. AD) as claimed in Larson & Bhattacharya 1987: 37.
According to Jinendrabuddhi this paragraph introduces Mādhava’s discussion with an unknown Jain “distinctionist,” a Vaibhāgika, who describes the cognition of certain things as due to the observation of the non-existence of the nature (ātmāna) of other things, cf. PST Ms B 233a7-233b1: tatra hi vaibhāgikenoktaṁ: “yasyāsānōdayāyaḥ bhavati, tad eva tad bhavati, tayathā sāsnādidarśanāyaḥ gopratyayo bhavati. sāsānāyāya eva gaur. ātmāntarābhāvadārsanāc cātmāntare pratyayāyaḥ. tasmād ātmāntarābhāvā evātmāntarāṇīti: “For in this context the Vaibhāgika has stated: “In this world whatever cognition is due to the observation of whatever thing: this is such and such a thing only. For instance, the cognition ‘cow’ is due to the observation of dewlap, etc. A cow is only dewlap, etc.

And the cognition of the nature of one thing is due to the observation of the non-existence of the nature of other things. Therefore the nature of some things are nothing but the non-existence of the nature of other things.” After having summarised the Vaibhāgika’s argument at Ms B 233b1-2: etena yaddarśanāyaḥ yatpratyayo bhavati, tad eva tad bhavati. tadyathā sāsānādidarśanāyaḥ gopratyayo bhavati. sāsānāyāya eva gaur, ātmāntarābhāvadārsanāc cātmāntare pratyayāyaḥ bhavaitī kāryam āha, Jinendrabuddhi continues quoting Mādhava’s answer to his Vaibhāgika opponent at Ms B 233b2-3: atra sānkhyena pratividhāhānam uktānaḥ “yadi sāsānādidarśanāyaḥ gopratyayo bhavati, evaṁ sati yad uktam: “ātmāntarābhāvadārsanāc cātmāntare pratyayāyaḥ bhavaiti”ti tad ayuktam: iti. ātmāntarābhāvā evātmāntarāṇīti. “In this context the Sāṅkhya has formulated the following counter-offensive: “If the cognition of a cow is due to observation of the dewlap, and so on, in that case the claim that the cognition of the nature of one thing is due to observation of the non-existence of the nature of other things, is not justified. If is is assumed that all cognitions are caused by the non-existence of the nature of other things, how then could the cause of the cognition of a cow be the dewlap, etc.? That is, you yourself have formulated the abandonment of what you have admitted since you give up your own thesis for the sake of the example.”

The peculiar term ātmāntaṁ which may be specific to the Vaibhāgika argument; it is also used by Dignāga in the important paragraph PSV V:45, q.v. below.

(1) Cf. ās DC : žūg P.
(2) o̅ād em.; əʾān Ms

According to Jinendrabuddhi, this statement sets forth Mādhava’s own view, cf. PST Ms B 233b4-5: asmanmatena tu bhinṇāpoṣyāś tu te mithāh. “Because your view is that a cow is nothing but dewlap, etc.”

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mutually different, that is, cow and dewlap, and so on, on the ground that with regard to these the excluded referent is different."


That is, the one who subscribes to the theory of exclusion, cf. PST Ms B 233b5: apohavādīnāḥ.

[275] abhyupagamyādṛṣṭāntah svamataviruddho 'py(2). śabdbhedād dhi gosāṇād<īsu> bhīnnaṁ apoḥyaṁ(3). Restored, cf. PST Ms B 233b5: abhyupagamyādṛṣṭāntah svamataviruddho 'py utktaḥ; Ms B 233b6: śabdbhedād dhīyādī.

(1) Cf. khas blaṅs nas V : khas blaṅs kyaṅ K;
(2) Cf. yaṅ KV;
(3) Cf. PST Ms B 233b5, q.v. above no. 519.

520 Namely, that a cow is nothing but an aggregate of dewlap, and so on, cf. PST Ms B 233b5: bhavato hi sāsnādisamūha eva gaur iti.

521 Cf. PST Ms B 233b5-6: etad uktam bhavati: yathā tava sāsnādisamūha-darśanā gorprayayas tatā mamāpy ātmāntarābhāvadarśanād ātmāntareprayayaḥ iti: “What is meant is the following: just as you are of the opinion that the cognition of a cow is due to the observation of the aggregate of dewlap, and so on, I am of the opinion too that the cognition of the nature of one thing is due to the observation of the non-existence of the nature of other things.”

522 Cf. PST Ms B 233b7-234a1: sāsnādisabdasyāsāsnādyapohyaṁ sāsnādiṣu, gośābdsaṅyāpy agaur gavi(1), yata evam bhīnnaṁ apoḥyaṁ, ataḥ sāsnādiṣv asāsnādyapohena sāsnādiprayayaḥ, gavy agoyvavacchdena gorprayayaḥ. evam cātrāpy ātmāntarābhāvadarśanād ātmāntareprayayaḥ(2): “that is, the excluded [referent] non-dewlap, and so on, of the word ‘dewlap’, and so on, with regard to a dewlap, and so on, and non-cow of the word ‘cow’ with regard to a cow. Since the excluded referent is different in this way, the cognition ‘dewlap,’ and so on, with regard to a dewlap, and so on, is due to the exclusion of non-dewlaps, and so on, and the cognition ‘cow’ with regard to a cow is due to the exclusion of non-cows. And thus, in this case too the cognition of the nature of one thing is only due to the observation of the non-existence of the nature of other things.”

(1) a°...°vi em. : agau javi Ms
(2) pratyayaḥ em. : sītyayaḥ Ms

[276] “so ’napekṣa” <ity etat tu> svavikalpavi<nirmitam>(1), nirapoham (...). Restored, cf. PST Ms B 234a1-3: so ’napekṣa ityādi ... svavikalpavinirmitam(1) iti ... nirapoham ityādi.

(1)vinirmitam conj. (cf. sprul K : spros pa zad V) : ṭi[τ]i[t]itam Ms (sprul T), cf. the expression avidyāvinirmitam at Dignāga’s Prajñāpāramitāpiṇḍārthaḥ 42.

523 Jinendrabuddhi quotes the passage from Mādhava’s work which Dignāga addresses in this paragraph, cf. PST Ms B 234a1-2: sāṅkhyaṁ hy ātmāntarābhāvadarśanāc cātmāntareprayayaḥ bhavatīty asiddhatām udbhāvayitum uktāṇ: “so
'napekṣa ātmāntaraprattyayaḥ. kasmāt? na hi naḥ pratayayo bhavaty ātmāntarābhāvadārāṣṭrād ātmāntara, kiṃ tārhi, vidhīriṇīṇīva gaur iti?": “for the Sāṅkhya has asserted in order to explain that the statement “and the cognition of the nature of one thing (ātmāntara) is due to the observation of the non-existence of the nature of other things (ātmāntara),” is unproved, and that the cognition of the nature of one thing is independent. Why is that? Because in our opinion the cognition of the nature of one thing is not due to the observation of the non-existence of the nature other things, but rather, [the cognition] ‘cow’ is exclusively in the form of an affirmation’(1).”

(1)For the implications of the concept of vidhi, cf. no. 13 above.

524 Although the reading of Jinendrabuddhi’s gloss svavikalpapivāhājītām is not beyond doubt, I assume that is was intended as a pun on the term Vaibhāgika, cf. PST Ms B 234a2-3: svavikalpapivāhājītām(1) etat. etat uktam bhavati: svavikalpavasād evam ucyate.

(1)vivāhājītām conj. (cf. dbye bar byas pa T): svavikalpavi(yādhi?)tam Ms

[277] sāsnādiṣu hi <sāmānyarūpaṃ> arthāntarābhāvanirāpeksaṃ na bhavatī pūrvam evopapāditam. svarūpaṃ tv ten<aivyāvahārikaṃ> anabhilāpyatvāt. Restored, cf. PST Ms B 234a3-5: sāsnādiṣu hiḥyādy asyaiva vivaranam ... arthāntarābhāvanirāpeksaṃ na bhavatī pūrvam evopapāditam ... svarūpaṃ tv iṣyādy ... tena nāma tasyānabhilāpyatvāt ... vyāvahārikam ....

525 Cf. Jinendrabuddhi’s paraphrase at Ms B 234a3-4: sāsnādiṣabdo hi sāmānyarūpeṇa svārtham pratīyayati. tac ca sāmānyarūpaprataḥītāv arthāntarābhāvānirāpeksam na bhavatī pūrvam evopapāditam: “for the word ‘dewlap’, and so on, indicates its own referent in the form of its general property, and concerning this it has previously been argued that with regard to the cognition of the general form this [general form] does not exist independently of the non-existence of other referents.” It is not quite clear how to interpret Dignāga’s remark about having demonstrated earlier that the general form i.e. the abstract type, presupposes the non-existence of other referents in the locus of the referent of any given term or indicator because Dignāga only introduces the idea that the denotable general form depends upon non-existence of other referents in the context of his discussion with Mādhava and the unknown Vaibhāgika. It is clear, however, that within the conceptual framework of the apoha theory non-existence of other referents in the locus of the referent is instrumental in establishing the generalized form of invariable connection between indicator and indicated as appears from Dignāga’s theory of induction expounded at PSV V:34, q.v. above. It is thus understandable that he introduces the concept of mutual non-existence of any given x and non-x in the context of apoha. This corresponds to the connection of any indicator—a word or speech unit, or a logical indicator like ‘being produced’—to the indicated through non-observation of the indicator where the indicated is non-existent.

526 Jinendrabuddhi introduces the concluding statement of this paragraph by presenting the opponents view that individuals are denotable in an affirmative form, cf. PST Ms B 234a: nanu ca bhāvasvalaṃkṣaṇādhiḥgatir arthāntarābhāvāpāraṇāyapaṇāḥ. gaur iti vidhīnaiva bhavatī: “certainly the cognition of the individual
character of an entity is independent of the cognition of the non-existence of other referents. It is exclusively found in an affirmative form as 'cow.'"

527 Cf. PST Ms B 234a5-6: svarūpaṃ svalaksanām. tatpratītau yady arthaṃ-tarābhāvo nāpekṣeta nāmāḥ, tasyānabhiḥāpyatāt. abhīāpyaṃ tu vyāvahārikaṃ rūpaṃ gavāṃnām nārthāntaraṇapohānirapekṣam pratiṣṭaye: "the own form is the individual character. If the non-existence of other referents does not depend on the cognition of this [individual character], it is because it is not denotable. However, the form of a cow, and so on, that is denotable, i.e., the one that is subject to designation, is not cognized as exempt from exclusion of other referents."

(1) nāpekṣeta nāma conj (cf. itos par bya ba ma yin mod T): sāpeekṣ(?)na nāma Ms. For the underlying syntax of this clause, cf. the compound arthaṃ-tarābhāva-pratītinirapekṣa, q.v. no.s 526-27.

528 Dignāga addresses in this paragraph an objection made by Mādhava, which Jinendrabuddhi quotes in extenso and explains at Ms B 234a6-234b1: evam hy uktam: "yady ātmāntarābhāvadarsānād ātmāntare pratyayo bhavati, ādyapratyaya-yasamvṛtīr eva nāstī. kasmāt? na hi tadātmāntarābhāvadarsānam asti" ti. atrādyāḥ pratyayo yāḥ sansāre prathama utpadyate, tasyābhāvah. tadānīm aparasyātmāno 'darsānād ātmāntaram cāgṛhitāv tadabhāvopalakṣitam ātmāntaram grahītum asākyam ity abhyupetahānīḥ(1): "for it has been objected as follows: "if the cognition of the nature of one thing is due to observation of the non-existence of the nature of another thing, there is no occurrence of a first cognition. Why? Because then there is no observation of the non-existence of the nature of things that are different from it."

In this context the first cognition, i.e., the one that arises as the first one in the round of transmigration does not exist. And then, not having apprehended the nature of one thing because of not observing the nature of another thing, it becomes impossible to apprehend the nature of the one thing that is implied by its non-existence. Thus you give up what you have assumed.

A related objection is put forward by Uddyotakara who maintains that negation presupposes an act of affirmation defining the content of a first cognition. The assumption underlying Uddyotakara’s argument is that since apoha is nothing but negation without any positive content, there cannot be a first cognition on the basis of which negation becomes meaningful; cf. NV 331,19-332,3: vidhānaśabdartha-sambhave sati ādyā pratipattih. yadi vidhānaśabdārtho bhavati, yasya (so read) vidhīyamānaśabdārthrarahatpratipattāv satyām tasyānyatra pratiṣedha ity upapānnaḥ pratiṣedhah. yasya punar vidhīyamānah padārthah nāstī, tasyādyām pratipattiṃ antareṇa katham pratiṣedhah: “the first cognition is when the referent of the word is present in terms of affirmation. If the referent of the word exists in terms of affirmation, someone who has a cognition of the referent of the word that is being affirmed, can negate it elsewhere. Thus negation is justified. But how could someone, according to whom the thing that is in the process of being affirmed does not exist, negate without a first cognition?”

(1) hānīḥ em. : ṭhānīṃ Ms

529 Cf. PST Ms B 234b1: īṣṭam evaitad ādyapratyayānabhhyapagamāt. ato nābhypetahānir ity arthaḥ.

530 The view that the transmission (pāramparyā) of vyavahāra is beginningless is related to similar formulations by Bhartṛhari, cf. VPV I 58,3-4: aparā āhūḥ; pāramparyāvichchedān nityapravṛttaḥ prayoktrhīr utpatyāv alabadhaprāthāmyā vyavahārānityatayā nityāḥ śabdāḥ; cf. Vṛṣabhadeva’s Paddhati ad loc. VPV I 58,22-23: na śabdavyavahārasya vicchedo ‘sti, anādau samsāre pāramparyena vyavasīhi ‘yam śabdavyavahāra iti na kūtasthānityatāṇ, kiṃ tu prayogavichchedaḥ: “there is no interruption of the use of words. The use of words is confined by way of transmission to the beginningless transmigration, thus there is no invariability in terms of being immutable, but rather, there is no interruption of usage.” The causal relationship to which Dignāga refers is the causal relationship between the word and its mental representation. In this regard he appears to be influenced by Bhartṛhari, cf. VP III.2:32: śabdah kāraṇam arthasya sa hi tenopajanyate, tathā ca buddhihisayād arthāḥ chabdad pratiyate; cf. VPV I 42,12-3: tathā eke kārya-kāraṇabhāvam eva śabdārthayoh sambandham manyante: “Some think that the relation between the word and its referent is a causal relationship whose transmission is invariably uninterrupted.” VPV I 61,1-2: nityam avicchinnapāramparyāḥ kāryakāraṇabhāvāḥ śabdārthayoh sambandhāḥ: “The relation between the word and its referent is a causal relationship whose transmission is invariably uninterrupted.” VPV I 71,4-5 (ad I 25): kāryakāraṇabhāvenārathākāraṇirbhāsamātrānuṃgatasya prayayasyārṣṭuḥ prayastarūpasyaḥ thatvenādhyavasāye tasyarthātmānaḥ śabdo nimittam, tathārthāvagrahadārṣaṇam so ’yam iti śabdārthayoh sambandhaprasiddher nādābhivyaktsaṃyāntāḥkaranaṃśaṃ śabdasya pravṛttau kāraṇam.

For the notion of śabda being the cause of the cognition of artha, cf., e.g., Candrānanda’s vṛtti on VS IX.21: ardhasya pratipattāv ityam hastaceṣṭā kāraṇam pratipattavyā iti vyrttasanketaḥ tām hastaceṣṭāṃ drṣṭvā tataḥ śabdāt kāraṇāt artham pratipadyate evam asyārthasya pratipattāv ayam śabdāḥ kāraṇam.

In the present context it is significant that Helarāja in his comment on VP III.2:54 quotes pādas ab of a verse commonly attributed to Dignāga. Simhasūri quotes the verse at NCV 547,7-8: vikalpayaṇayāḥ śabdāḥ vikalpāḥ śabdavyayaṇayāḥ, teśāṃ atyanatasambhandho nārthāḥ śabdāḥ sprāṣṭant api: “Words have their origin in representations and representations have their origin in words. They are interrelated. Nor are words in direct contact with their referents.” The fact that the term atyanatasambandha is to be interpreted in terms of mutual connection appears from the variant of pādas cd quoted, e.g., at SVT Vol. II 620,2: teśāṃ anyonyasambandho nārthāḥ śabdāḥ sprāṣṭant api. Vacaspatimisīra alludes to this verse at NVTṬ Vol. I 241,10-12: vikalpayaṇayo hi śabdāḥ tādgoça arramah abhinivīśante. yad vikalpā grhnnti yac cādhyaśvacāya tad ubhayam apy anavyāvytrātipam avastu, tasmin na avikalpikām jñānam tādgoça ram vā paramā́rthasad gocarayantī vikalpāḥ śabdaś cety ayam abhisandhīḥ. This explanation presupposes that the object of śabda or vikalpa is not a real object (avastu) although it is interpreted as having the form of exclusion of other
(anyavyārvitteṇapam avastu), which contradicts Dignāgān doctrine as presented in PSV V and the Sanskrit fragment from SPVy, cf. no. 182 above.

[280] <na hy ādyapratyayo ṣty eva vyavahārakāryakaranapāramāryapārapāṇādītvā>.  


531 Cf. daṇḍo po’ī rtogs pa’ ‘dod pa K : daṇḍo po’ī śes pa med na V.

532 Cf. PST Ms B 234b2-3: yadi sarvabhedeṣu śabdo niyoktaṃ śakyeta, evaṃ jātimad vastu śabdena vyāptum śakyeta, na caśaṃ jātimad vyāptum iti; PST Ms B 234,3-6 q.v. no. 536 below.

[281] <tasya> na ca śaṃ jātimad vyāptum, na ca śaṃ jātīr <eka>samastā-vrrtīḥ(1), <jātimadbhyo> vyātītāḥ vāvyātītāḥ ve<śaṃ doṣau stah>(2). Restored, cf. PST Ms B 234b2-3: na ca śaṃ jātimad vyāptum iti; PST Ms B 234,3-6 q.v. no. 536 below.

1 Cf. geçig mtha’ dag la ’jug pa ni ma yin no V, for which read geçig mtha’ dag la ’jug pa ni yin no, cf. cig mtha’ dag la ’jug par K.

2 Cf. ḍeś bya ba’i skyon de dag yod do V : ‘di skyon yin no K.

533 The translation of this clause is, with a minor emendation, based upon V whose readings are supported by Ms, for which, cf. no.s [281] above and 536 below.

534 Cf. PST Ms B 234b3: śaṃ yate vyāptum iti prakṛtena sambandhāḥ.

535 According to Jinendrabuddhi, Dignāgā addresses the assumption that because of the unity (ekatva) of the general property it is capable of pervading its substrates, cf. PST Ms B 234b3: syād etad ekatvā jātiḥ śaṃ yate vyāptum iti. The subsequent exposition at PST Ms B 234b3-6 is indebted to Dignāgā’s analysis, at PSV II:16 (for which, cf. no. 504 above), of the problems that entail from the assumption that general properties are real entities: yadi tāvad āśrayat vyātītāḥ jātiḥ samastā-śrayavṛttīḥ kalpyate, tadaḥ dvitvādīvad āśrayadārṣanaparāḥsaram tasya darśanam(1) syāt. na cāśrayāṇāṁ ānāntyād darśanāṁ sambhavati. atha pratyāśrayaṃ sarvāṃ parisāmāptatvāḥ ekāśrayadārsane ‘pi grahaṃ isyate, tadaḥ bhedaḥ syāt. tataḥ cāśrayāvaḥ ānāntyād sambandhābhāvaḥ. athāśrayād vyātatīktaivaṃ api bhedaḥ doṣaḥ, bhedaḥbhyaḥ vyātītātāḥ(2) tadvad evānāntyād iti. jātivādā evādyapratyayābhāvaprasāṅgāḥ: “If, in the first place, it is imagined that the general property is resident in all its substrata as separate from [any given] substrate, then its observation would presuppose the observation of the substrata in the same way as the [general] property twoness, etc. And the observation is not possible because the substrata are infinite. If, on the other hand, it is maintained that it is apprehended even if a single substrate is observed because it is contained completely in each single substrate, then it would be a particular, and therefore there is no connection because it is infinite in the same way as the substrata. If, moreover,
it is not separate from the substrate, even so the problem is similar to that of the particular because, when it is not separate from the particulars, it is infinite in the exact same way as these. Thus the [absurd] consequence that there is no first cognition only concerns one who upholds the doctrine of general properties.”

(1) 

(2) 

[282] 

The phrase "yad apy uktam pratayavrittir eva nāsti" is not reproduced in T, cf. T 212,25.

(1) 

(2) 

What is meant is this: If the cognition is through exclusion of the nature of all things that are different there is no observation of these because the referents that are non-cows are infinite in the same way as the particular cows. And therefore the cognition ‘cow’ is not due to the exclusion of these infinite particulars, in the exact same way.

This objection re surfaces in the discussion at ŚV Apoha° 58, where Kumārila addresses the question of how to define the excluded (apohya) if it is claimed that it consists of everything that is defined as non-x as opposed to x. For if it consists of each single non-x the problem of the excluded referent’s being infinite arises: sarvāpohya yadisyeta, sa vaktavyah katham punah, yadi pratyekaripeṇa nāpohyānantyata bhavet: “If exclusion of all [non-cows by the word ‘cow’] is asserted, it is to be explained in what way [all non-cows are excluded]. If [they are excluded] in the form of each single [non-cow], there can be no [exclusion of all non-cows] because of the infinity of the excluded.” Kumārila’s discussion ŚV Apoha° 58 through 72 is primarily concerned with the views that Dignāga propounds in PSV V:43d.

(1) 

(2) 

Ms B 235a2: avṛkṣo(1) na bhavati evam sāmānyarūpena nirākaraṇāt: “Because exclusion is in a general form such as, ‘it is not a non-tree’;” cf. ŚV Apoha° 63cd: yadi sāmānyarūpena te ‘pohyante, na vastuā(2): “If [all non-cows] are excluded in a general the form [i.e. in the general form of being non-cows, this general form] is not a real object.”

(1) avṛkṣo em. : avṛhye Ms
...gav

excluded does not, on your theory, have the property of being a real object.

excluded would be due to the form of an unreal object as (the things to be excluded); this being the case, the property of being a thing to be single [thing to be excluded] having the form of non-cow which is common to all explained that [the excluded] is excluded through exclusion of the aggregate of each vastutvaṁ nāstity avastuturūpaṁpohyatvam āṅgikram syāt: "suppose, however, it is explained that [the excluded] is excluded through exclusion of the aggregate of each single [thing to be excluded] having the form of non-cow which is common to all [the things to be excluded]; this being the case, the property of being a thing to be excluded would be due to the form of an unreal object as (ii) the thing to be excluded does not, on your theory, have the property of being a real object."

283 na hi so 'nyām jātīm pratidravyam apohate, kim ṭarhi vyavachedyavivakṣayaikena sāmānyadharmena. uktam cātra viṭātiye 'darśanamārāṇaṁnām. tavaiva tv esa doṣaḥ: yadi svajātiyavāpyatā(1) <varteta, vyāpyasyāṇantyaṁ syā(2)>.
sasmād yathā <viṣāṇitvād anāśa ity ukte 'sve viṣāṇitvādārāṇena tadāvavacheyac- 

dānumānam>, <na tu karkādin> pratyekeṁ apohate, <nāpy ekaṅgavāḍīsy anuvartate.(3)>tavaivāpi vyāvrttibuddhi anuvṛttibuddhiḥ ceṣā. tathā <ca>ītra(4) nyāyah. Restored, cf Ms B 235a2-235b5: na hi so 'nyām ityādi ... jātīm pratidravyam apohate ... kim ṭarhi vyavachedyavivakṣayaikena sāmānyadharmena ... uktam cātreyadi ... viṭātiye adarśanāḥāruṇāṇaṁnām iti ... tavaiva tv esa doṣa iti ... yadi svajātiyavāpyetyādi ... tasmād yathetāyādi ... ye 'pi te 'nasāvā gavādayah, tān api viṣāṇitvam na pratyekeṁ vyānoṭi, ye 'pi tadvijātīya nibhasvān api naiva pratyekeṁ apohate ... gavāḍīsy anuvṛttibuddhīr agavādīṣu ca vyāvṛttibuddhīr bhavati ... tathātra nyāvah.

1(KV erroneously construes this cpd. as a locative syntactically dependent on the verb *varteta, instead of taking it as an instrumental form, cf. raṅ gi rigs khyab par bya ba la 'jug pa yin na K : rigs mthun la khyab pa 'jug pa'i lta na V ; cf. no. 540 below.

2(Cf. khyab pa (read khyab par bya ba) la ni mtha' yod pa ma yin no V : khyab par bya ba mtha' med pa yin no K.

3(Cf. ba laṅ la soṅs pa so so la yan 'jug pa ma yin no V : ba laṅ la soṅs pa re re 'dcin pa ma yin no. V is preferable to K because 'jug pa (presumably corresponding to Sanskrit *anuvartate because V translates anuvṛtti as 'jug pa) anticipates the subsequent introduction of the technical term anuvṛtti. Cf. Jinendrabuddhi's explanation at no. 542 below, which uses vyānoṭi with a similar intention.

4(Cf. 'di la yan V : 'dir yan K.

538 Cf. PST Ms B 235a2-3: na(1) yasmāt so vṛkṣaśābdo 'nyām ghatatvāḍikām(2) jātīm pratidravyam apohate ghaṭo na bhavatīty evam: “Because the word ‘tree’ does not exclude a different general property like potness for each substance such as ‘it is not a pot.’” Dignāga’s statement presupposes an objection according to which the word ‘tree’, for instance, should exclude every single different general property for every single substance, which entails that each thing is qualified by innumerable exclusions corresponding to the innumerable general properties that define it. Not surprisingly one finds the same objection at ŚV Apoha° 59: bhinnatvāc cāpy apohānāṁ bhinno 'pohā prasajyate, tatraikasmin bhavet pinde 'nantajātisaman-vayah: “And because the excluded things are different it follows [absurdly] that the exclusion is different. In that case there would be a continuous connection of innumerable general properties to one particular entity.”

1 The akward position of the negation na is motivated by the paraphrase, yasmāt being intended as a gloss on hi.
An example of vyavacchedavivaksā is found in a Sanskrit fragment from Dignāga’s no longer extant Hetumukham quoted at TSP 385,11-12: \textit{ajiñeyam kalpitam krtvā tadyavacchedena jñeye 'numānam': "By positing what is not knowable as imagined the inference of what is knowable is [performed] by means of exclusion of that."

According to Jinendrabuddhi’s explanation Dignāga must have dealt more fully with the crucial concept of ekadharma in another treatise, cf. PST Ms B 235a3-5: ekena sāmānyadharmena vyavacchedasya vā vivakṣā, tavaḥ hetubhūtayāpohate. kena kāreṇāpohate? prakaraṇāntaraninrdeśāt\footnote{\textit{.equ.: ghaṭatvā} (cf. \textit{bum pa la soṣs pa T}) Ms}\textsuperscript{539} tenaiva sāmānyadharmeneti vijñāyate. etad uktam bhavati: sāmānyadharmena vyavacchedavivaksāyā prāpitābh-adarūpenā\footnote{\textit{.conjug.: sambuddhavijñān°taranirdeśā}; see PSV V:34a, TSP 385,11-12: "The intention of denoting the excluded by a single general property—i.e. with that (intention) as cause. Whereby does it exclude? According to the description in another treatise one understands that it excludes by means of this only namely by means of the [single] general property. This means: by a general property whose identical form is obtained through the intention of denoting the excluded at the thought 'it is not a tree.’ In this way a word excludes objects to be excluded (vyavacchedyān) like pots and so on. Therefore infinity [of the things to be excluded] is not established because the form of the general property of non-trees, and so on, is one and the same.” In other words, a negated term like non-tree (avrksa) presupposes an observation statement like “x is not a tree (= non-tree).” The negated term non-tree denotes in a general way (sāmānyena) all things that are not trees. It is thus clear that the term avrksa is secondary and derived from the primary term vrksa with the sole intention of denoting all objects to be excluded (vyavacchedyāvivaksā) by their shared general property (sāmānyadharmena), the so-called single property (ekadharma), namely that of not being trees whereby they form an aggregate (samudāya) of non-trees that is to be excluded. Kumārila addresses the content of PSV V:43b in ŚV Apoha° 61ff: samudāyānmanā nāpi bhaved esām apohyatā, samudāyo hi naikena vinā dharmena jāyate. He refers twice to the concept of ekadharma “single property” in his criticism of the apoha thesis without connecting it to Dignāga’s concept of apohyavivaksā, which emphasizes the secondary and derivative character of the negated term. Cf. ŚV ibid. 72: apohyān api caśvādin ekadharmāvāyād rte, na nirūpayitäm śaktis tatārpoha na śiddhyāt. TS 932 and TSP 367,11-15; TS 1049-50 and TSP 404,17-21.

\textsuperscript{(1)} \textit{taranirdesāt} em.: \textit{taranirdesās} Ms
\textsuperscript{(2)} \textit{ṛūpena} em.: \textit{ṛūpāna} Ms

\textsuperscript{541} Jinendrabuddhi refers in his explanation at Ms B 235a6-7 to the pivotal justification of exclusion at PSV V:34: \textit{adṛṣṭer anyasābdārtha} (PS V:34a) ity atroktam vijñātīte adarsānamātrenānumānām iti, and continues explaining: yo hi yatra <na>\footnote{\textit{.sentence: 'na'}} driṣṭah, sa tam apohate. vrksaśabdaś ca svārthaḥbhāve vijñātīte na driṣṭah. kāraṇābhāve kāryābhāvāt. atataḥ saty apy ānantye 'numitir upapadâyate: “For [the word] excludes that to which it is not observed to apply. And the word ‘tree’ is not observed to apply to what is dissimilar i.e. where its own referent it not found

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because where the cause is not found, [there] the effect is not found. Therefore the result of inference is justified, even though [that which is dissimilar] is infinite.”

(1)na em., cf. ma mtho ‘ba T : om. Ms

542 That is, the problem that no cognition occurs, cf. PST Ms B 235a7: pratyayasanvṛttyabhāvadosāḥ; cf. the discussion above PSV 43b.

543 Cf. PST Ms B 235a7-235b1: yasya hi vidhinā pratyāyanaṃ tasyānvayaḥ pradhānam iti sakalasvajñātiyavāpyātyā śabdena varitavyam, etac ca na sambhavati, sajñāyānām āntanyāt, tadavatirekāc ca jāter iti: “For joint presence is the primary thing according to someone who is of the opinion that [the word] indicates in an affirmative form. Thus the word is to apply by pervading all the referents that pertain to the kind that is proper to it, and this is not possible because of the infinity of the things belonging to the same class and because the general property is not separated from these.”

544 Cf. the exegesis of the term tadvyavacchdānumāṇa at PSV V:34.

545 Cf. PST Ms B 235b1-3: viṣāṇītvam aśvād vyāvartamānam anaśvatvam gamayati. tac ca vastusatsāmānyavādībhir api na kiṃcid anaśvatvam nāma sāmānyam vastusat pratijñātam, ye ‘pi te ‘nāsyā gavādayah, tān api viṣāṇītvam na pratyekam vyānpmi; ye ‘pi tadvijñātyā aśvās, tān api naiva pratyekam apōhate: “The being horned, as it is excluded from a horse, indicates not being a horse. And concerning this not even those who accept the theory that general properties are real objects claim that not being a horse is a general property that is a real object. Neither does hornedness pervade non-horses such as cows each singly, nor does it exclude horses that are dissimilar from these each singly.”

Dignāga addresses a similar problem in the only surviving Sanskrit fragment from his Dvādaśāsātiyākā: yathāha Dvādaśāsātiyākāyām: yady apy uktam “aprasak-tasya kimartham pratisedhāḥ” iti ? naivaitat pratisedhamām ucayte, kin tu tasya vastunah kaścid bhāgo ’rthāntaranvṛttyā loke gamyate yathā viṣāṇītvād anāśvā na (qu. NCV Vol 2 548.25-25): “As he claims in the Dvādaśāsātiyākā: Even though it is objected: What purpose does the negation of what is not applicable [e.g., the term anāśvā] serve? [we answer that] it is not mere negation that is expressed, but rather a certain part of the referent in question is inferred in ordinary language (loke) through exclusion of other referents like, for instance, in the inference: it is a non-horse because it is horned.”

546 re re ‘dzin pa K : so so la yañ ‘jug pa ma yin no V. Since the passage describes to two types of cognitions, I have concluded that K is preferable to V. ‘jug pa translates Sanskrit *anuvṛtti occurring in the immediately following sentence.

547 Cf. PST Ms B 235b3-4: atha ca tato yathā vipakṣavyāvṛttyabuddhir bhavati sāmānyena viṣāṇīyatāraskārād aśvo na bhavatītī, anuvṛttyabuddhiś çaśvavyāvṛttesu gavādīṣu sāmānyakāreṇānasa iti, tathātra nyāyah(1) śabdā ‘pi hi liṅgam. ato(2) gavādīśabda dapi gavādīsv anuvṛttyabuddhir agavādīsu ca vyāvṛttyabuddhir bhavati: “And therefore: Just as there is a cognition in terms of thevipakṣa because of separating it in a general way from dissimilar things viz. [the cognition] ‘it is not a horse’, as well as a cognition in terms of continuous application in a
general form viz. ‘non-horse’ with regard to cows, and so on, as excluded from horses, so is the principle in this context. For also the word is an indicator. Therefore the word ‘cow’, and so on, causes a cognition in terms of continuous application with regard to cows, and so on, and a cognition in terms of exclusion with regard to non-cows, etc.”

Cf. the use of terms anuvṛtti-pratayaya and vyāvṛtti-pratayaya in Praśastapāda’s PBh §7 and §361ff; the term vyāvṛtti-buddhi occurs op.cit. §369. Simhaśūri quotes a related passage from an unknown Vaiśeṣika treatise at NCV 29,22-23: yathoktam: anuvṛtti-pratayakāraṇaṁ sāmāyaṁ, vyāvṛtti-buddhiḥetur visēṣah iti.

(1) cātra nyāyah conj. (cf. de lior ‘dir rigs pa ste T): “ā dravyādayāḥ Ms
(2) rtags dang ldan pa las T reading liṅgam ato Ms as liṅgamato sic


548 This interesting paragraph continues addressing the question about what constitutes the excluded referents of a negative term like non-cow if the referents of the positive term cow are defined as identically the same because of non-existence of non-cows in cows. Dignāga responds to an argument by Madhava, which Jinendrabuddhi quotes at Ms B 235b5-236a1: “yady atmāntarābhāvadarrṣāṇād atmāntare pratayayo bhavati, ekaś atmāntarābhāvah, tataḥ sarvātmāntareṣy ekapratyayaprāsāṅgāḥ. sarvam ekārupeṇa pratayayena pratiyeta visēṣaṇasyākatvāt. yathā śuklatavivēśaṇasyābhinnatvāt kumudādayo ‘bhinnakāreṇa pratayayena pratiyante, śuklām kumudām kundam śāṅkhām iti. atha naika atmāntarābhaḥ, tataḥ pratvāmmam pratayayanāntavaprāsāṅgāḥ śabdavṛttinimittasya bhinnatvāt, śuklāmadhurasurabhīṣītam kandaṁ iti yathā. na caitad ubhayam īsya tā iḥ abhyupetahānam” iti: “If the cognition of the nature of one thing is due to the observation of the non-existence of the nature of other things and the non-existence of the nature of other things is one, the [absurd] consequence is that there is one cognition about the nature of all the other things. Everything would be cognized by a cognition that has the same form because of the unity of the attribute, just as the white lotus, and so on, is cognized through a notion that has the same form because of the unity of the attribute whiteness as in the statement “the lotus is white, the jasmine is (white), and the mother of pearl is (white).” If, on the other hand, non-existence of the nature of other things is not the same, then the [absurd] consequence is that there is difference of notion for each thing because the cause of application of the word is different as in the statement “sugar is white, sweet, fragrant, and cool.” And both [consequences] are unwanted. Therefore (iti) you give up what you have assumed.”

[285] <vastu> hi <yat sadātma>(1), <tasya> yuktam(2) ekānekatvam kalpayitum, na tu atmāntarābhāvam(3) abhyupetaya>. Restored, cf. PST Ms B 236a1-2, q.v. below no. 550.
(1) Cf. dnos po yod pa’i bdag Ṇid can K : gal te bdag dnos po la yod na ni (sic) V.
(2) Cf. rigs pa yin gyi K : mi rigs so V.
(3) Cf. bdag gzan med pa K : bdag gzan yod par V.

549 Cf. PST Ms B 236a1-2: vāstavam hy ekānekatvam vastuna eva sambhavati, na tv avastunaḥ. tad arthāntarābhāvam abhyupetya na yuktam ekānekatvam kalpayitum: “For a factually existent identity or difference is only possible of an
entity. Thus it is not justified to imagine identity or difference on the assumption of non-existence of other referents.”


550 Cf. ’phais K : ’jug pa V. Both terms presumably render past participles like prakṣipta, cf. the related use of praktepa PSV V:45, q.v. below no. [289].

551 Dignāga addresses an objection by Mādhava, which Jinendrabuddhi quotes at Ms B 236a4-6: yad apy uktam “yady ātmāntarābhāvadarsāṇād ātmāntare pratyayo bhavati, aindriyakaś cātmāntare pratyaya ity abhāvāḥ śabdādīnām anyatamaḥ prāptaḥ srotādigrāhyatvāt, atha śabdādīnām nānyatamāḥ sāṣṭham ēśaya grāhakaṃ indriyam astity etad āpannam, anिष्टम caiva udbhayaḥ” iti. tasyaidam uttaram: “Moreover, it is also claimed that ’if the notion of the nature of one thing is due to the observation of the non-existence of the nature of other things and the notion of the nature of one thing is effected by the [visual] sensefaculty, non-existence of any among words, and so on, follows [absurdly] because they [viz. words, and so on,] are cognizable by the ear, etc. If, on the other hand, non-existence of any among word, and so on, does not [follow absurdly], the [absurd] consequence is that it is the sixth sensefaculty [viz. the mind] that cognizes it. And both of these [consequences] are unwanted.” The following is the answer to that statement.”

[289] anirdeśyo hi pratyaksārthaḥ. “ātmāntarābhāva(1) ātmāntaram” iti nirdeśyam praty uktam. tasmān nāsya pratyakṣe praktepe(2). Restored, cf. PST Ms B 236a6-7: anirdeśyo hi pratyaksārthaḥ iti ... yad etad uktam ātmāntarābhāva ātmāntaram iti tan nirdeśyam abhilāpyaḥ artham praty uktam, nendriyagocaram. tasmān nāsya pratyakṣa indriyagocare praktepaḥ yuktah.

(1) Cf. bdag gzan med pa bdag gzan yin no V : bdag ŋid gzan la (sic; the translator appears to have read ātmāntare instead of ātmāntaram) bdag ŋid med pa K.

(2) Cf. ’jug pa V (= praktepa) : nes pa (sic) K, and no.s 547 and 551 above. bstam par bya ba ni K : bstan du med pa’i lta ba na V probably reproduce the noun phrase nirdeśyam prati.


The object of sensation is the svalakṣaṇa, cf. PSV II.2: atha kasmād anumānam eva dvidhā bhidyate? yasmāt “svalakṣaṇam anirdeśyam, grāhābhedāt” (PS II.2). bhinnam hi pratyakṣānumayoḥ svātmavat grāhym. yadi ca <pratyakṣārtho nirdeśyāḥ syāt,> sa tenaiva śabdānunumeyāḥ syāt. (1)
(1) Restored on the basis of PST Ms B 56a1-56b4.

553 This statement is strikingly similar to the Vaibhāgika’s statement of his own view as related by Jinendrabuddhi viz. ātmāntarābhāva evātmāntarāṇīti, cf. no. 517 above.

290 apoddhāre padasyāyaṃ vākyād artho vikalpitaḥ, (1) vākyārthaḥ pratibhākhyo 'yam tenādāv upajanyate.

Qu. TSP 363,15-16; Ms B 236a7-236b1 (pāda a); cf. 236b2: ata evāha: vikalpita iti; kimkāraṇam vikalpita ityāha: vākyārtha ityādi; 236b4 (pāda c-d).

(1) vikalpitaḥ Ms (cf. rnam par brtags VK) : vivecitāḥ TSP.

554 That is, exclusion of other refersnts, cf. PST Ms B 236b1: ayam ity anyāpohāh.

555 Cf. PST Ms B 236b1-2: katham punar avibhaktāvavād ekasmād vākyād padam apoddhārtum śakyte? utprekṣitāvavāvasārūpyena(2) buddhyā vibhājanāt, ata evāha “vikalpita” iti: “How, moreover, is it possible to abstract the syntactical word from a single sentence from which the [individual] parts are not separated? Because they are separated by the mind in conformity with invented parts precisely therefore he says ‘imagined’.”

As Jinendrabuddhi’s explanation indicates vikalpita is = utprekṣita, This is corroborated by the parallel expression utpreksayā ... vyavasthāpyate at PSV V:46. The reading vivecitāḥ TSP does not make sense in the context since viveka or the verb vi + ṣvic is exclusively used of the process of isolating imagined speech units through grammatical analysis (apoddhāra), cf., e.g., VP II:266ab: vākyasyārthāt padārthānām apoddhāre prakalpīte.

(1) em. : tata prekṣitāvavāvasārūpyena Ms; T translates as if this term qualify buddhyā, cf. T 214,28: yan lag rab tu brtags pa dañ shul mthun pa ‘i blos.

556 Ms B 236b1: apoddhāraḥ prthakkarāṇam. kṛtah punar apoddhāro vākyāt.


Jinendrabuddhi explains the verse at PST Ms B 236b2-3: kimkāraṇaṃ vikalpita ity āha: vākyārthaḥ ityādi. yasmād vākyārthāḥ pratibhāsānjānakāḥ tena padārthānaḥ prathamam avyutpāmnānām utpādāyate. na hy aviditapādārthāḥ pūrvam dhiyā vākyārtham(1) adhirgantum utsahate, ato nirāśvatvāvākyārthāpratipatīpyapāyatyāt prakṛtipratyayavad vācakatvenāsato ’pi padasyārtha <ut>prēśyate.(2) sā punar vākyārthāpratibhā, śrotṣantānabhāvīnī ca yā vākyāc chrotur upapājyate,(3) vakṛ- santānabhāvīnī ca yā vākasya samutthāpikā. tatra pūrvām adhikṛtya “vākyārthāḥ ... upajanyata” [PS V 46d] ity etad uktam. vākyārthaṃ punah tasyāḥ prayo-jakatvāt, vākyārthānām hi vaktā vākyam prayunekte: “apiyyyyMMdd(4) vākyāt parasyā vākṣyārthavisyāt pratibhā śyāt.” iti yā punar vākṣyāya samutthāpikā, tām “vākyam eva tadarthaḥ ca mukhyau śādbāv ity atra vākyati. vākyārthāvam tu tasyāḥ prameyatvāt, sā hi vākṣyena kāryalīnīnānmayītām dhīmenavagnih: “Why is it imagined? He explains: “The referent of the sentence,” etc. Since the referent of the sentence technically called intuition at first is caused to arise in those that have not been informed about it by means of the referent of the syntactical word, in that (hi)
someone who has no knowledge of the referent of the syntactical word is incapable of understanding in his mind right away (pūrvam) the referent of the sentence; therefore, since the syntactical word is a means of understanding the partless sentence referent in the same way as a stem and an affix, its referent is invented, although the syntactical word is unreal (asat) as denoting (vācaka) [its referent].”

This intuition as sentence referent, moreover, is both the one that arises in the listener from the sentence, being attached to the existence continuum of the listener, and the one that causes the sentence to become manifest, being attached to the existence continuum of the speaker. Of these [two] (tatra) it is explained with regard to the first mentioned: “Yet, the referent of the sentence which is called intuition (pratibhā) is in the beginning (ādau) produced by it [namely the syntactical word].” Moreover, [the intuition’s] being the sentence referent is due to the fact that it prompts it [i.e. intuition]. For a speaker applies a sentence to that purpose, thinking: “Hopefully the other will get in his mind an intuition concerning the referent of the sentence.” Moreover, the one [i.e. intuition] that causes the sentence to become manifest he is going to explain in the statement “only (rasa) the sentence referent in the same way as a stem and an affix, its referent is invented, therefore, since the syntactical word is a means of understanding the partless existence continuum of the speaker. Of these [two] (two) (tatra) it is explained with regard to the first mentioned: “Yet, the referent of the sentence which is called intuition (pratibhā) is in the beginning (ādau) produced by it [namely the syntactical word].”

Moreover, [the intuition’s] being the sentence referent is due to the fact that it is an object of cognition, for it is inferred from the sentence as an indicator of its effect, just as fire [is inferred] from smoke.”

(1) em. (cf. blos nag gi don T) : dhīvāksārtham Ms
(2) em. (cf. btags T) : padasyārthavata preksyate Ms
(3) em. : uparśāyte Ms
(4) conj. : dipād Ms (cf. nag gi sgron ma las sic T).

[291] padasyāsato <’pī(1)> vākyād apoddhārjasya yathāgamanā uprksaśayārtho vyavasthaśyasi kevalasyāpravagāt pratipratayayāvat. sā cotpreksāṇeyasya āgamyey auyuktārthagrahānī(2), tasmād idam arthāntaram utkṣiptam, <yasmā(3) ādāv anabhyaśaśabārthhasambandhānām padārthagrahānapāyā(4) vāyāarthapratibhā.> Restored, cf. PST Ms B 236b6-237a7: padasyāsata(5) iti ... tasya padasya vākyāt kāryārtham apoddhārjasya uprksaśayārtho vyavasthaśyati itī ... kevalasyāpravagād itī ... pratipratayayavad itī ... sā cotpreksaśeyādī ... asmād āgamād anvesy āgamyey auyuktārthagrahānī ... tasmād idam arthāntaram yuktimad utksiptam.

(1) Cf. kyaṇī KV, Ms B 236b3: asato ’pi padasya, cf. no. 553 above;
(2) auyuktārthagrahānī qualifies uprksaśa; K translates as if ayukta qualifies uprksaśa, cf. ne bar dpyod pa de yān ... don ’dzin pa mi rigs pa’i phyir; V is syntactically ambiguous as it does not translate artha, cf. luṅ nas b’zag pa de yān ... mi rigs par ’dzin pa’i phyir. Both versions appear to reproduce tasmā by means of phyir, which is incompatible with the syntax of the pratikā quoted in PST ad loc. T reproduces correctly the compound as mi rigs pa’i don ’dzin pa.
(3) Cf. gan gi phyir KT : de’i phyir V.
(4) Cf. tshig gi don ’dzin pa’i thabs can T.
(5) em. : yadasyaśasata Ms

558 Cf. PST Ms B 236b6-237a1 quoting VP I:81: padasyāsata itī vāccakātenāsataḥ. yato vākyām eva mukhyāh sābdāḥ tasyavārthena sambandhād vāccakātvam, na padānām, varānava vyavahārāṅgena vāyūyārthena śūnyatvād. vad āha: “asataś cāntarāle yān sābdān astiti manyate, pratipattur āsaktiḥ sā grahanopāya
evā sa” (VP I:85) iti: “the syntactical word being unreal” means being unreal as denoting [its referent]. Since only the sentence is the principal speech unit, that alone has the property of denoting on account of its relation to the thing meant, but not the syntactical words because like the phonemes they are empty of the meaning of the sentence as a part of discourse. As [Bhartrhari] explains: And [the listener] who thinks of the speech units that are unreal in the interval [between a first element heard and the grasping of an entire sound, word or sentence] as real, (2) this is the listeners incapacity. It is only a means of apprehension (VP I 85).”

(1) Cf. no. 567 below.
(2) Cf. VPV 152,1: astitvenābhimanyante.

559 The introductory clause is particularly interesting because Dignāga introduces the technical term utprekṣā, which plays an important role in Bhartrhari’s VP and VPV. Bhartrhari’s commentator, Vṛṣabhadeva, explains tarka, which is mentioned together with āgama and anumāna at VPV I 10,4, as lingam antareṇa svayam-utprekṣāpratibhānām tarkāḥ, cf. VPV I 10,20. It is thus clear that utprekṣā is used to denote invention as not dependent upon an inferential indicator (linga) like in inference (anumāna). Although Bhartrhari rarely uses it, its importance appears from a central passage at VPV I 65,1-6 (ad VP I:24), which undoubtedly must have been known to Dignāga because his own formulation would seem to imitate it (cf. Pind 2003: tatpradādhārapadārtho nāmāyatvamāṃstah samsargād anumeyena parikalpitaṇa rūpeṇa prakṛtvivekaḥ sann apoddhriyaṇe. praviviktasya hi tasya vastuno vyavahārātitaṁ rūpam. tat tā svapratyayānukārenā yathāgamar bhāvanābhāyanābhāsavaśād utpreksayā prāyena vyavasthāpyate(1), tathaiva cāpravibhāge sadbāmanī kāryārtham anvayavyatirekābhīyām rūpasamanugamakalpanayā samudāyād apoddhṛtānāṁ sadbānāṁ abhidheyaatvenaśrīyate: “Now, what is called the referent of the syntactical word obtained by means of abstraction, is abstracted from its connection [with the other syntactical words] although it is closely connected [with them], its separation [from them] being accomplished in an inferred conceptually constructed form. For the form of this object in its isolated state is beyond common usage. In general, however, it is defined by way of invention in accordance with one’s own ideas, under the influence of residual memory traces due to repeated practice according to this or that āgama. And thus in the segmentless speech unit it is taken as the denotable object of the speech units as isolated from their aggregate through grammatical analysis by way of constructing conceptually the recurrence of their form through joint presence and joint absence for the sake of the grammatical operations.”

It is thus clear that for Bhartrhari invention in this particular context is similar to systematic deliberation, which involves the inductive process of generalisation through joint presence and joint absence. Notice Bhartrhari’s use of the term svapratyaya, which Dignāga introduces in the following kārikā PS V:47:

Another parallel occurs at NCV 549,2-3: vākyārthapratipattiyāvah padārtho ‘san vākyād apoddhṛtya utpreksayā vyākhāyate: “The meaning of the syntactical word that is a means of cognizing the meaning of the sentence is explained by way of deliberation, having abstracted it from the sentence.”

The term utpreksā occurs once at VP III 241c, where it appears to denote the action of imagining (something unreal), cf. Helarāja Vol. I 180,9-10 ad VP III.2:86: evam “angulyagre kariyāthaśatam āśta” ityādi cotpreksayābhādhiyāmanāṁ ṃḍrśyate.
In his criticism of Bhartrhari’s philosophy of language at NC 581,1f, Mallavadi states immediately after quoting VP II:129-31 that according to Bhartrhari the referent of a speech unit is grasped by means of darśana, a particular doctrine or upreksā, deliberation. Simhasuri explains that it is grasped as the denotable object by means of the doctrine about primordial materiality (pradhāna), and so on, or by the deliberation of a person, cf. NCV 581,21ff: darśanotprikeśabhyāṃ ityādi: pradhānādirṣāṃ samucchita parusāsya upreksāyā vārtham abhidheyatvena upagrahaḥ.

Bhartrhari is also using the verb upreksate at VP II:236 in the sense of ‘to think up’ i.e., ‘to deliberate.’ Since PS V 46 describes exclusion of other [referents] as imagined vikalpitaḥ, the parallel statement of the vṛtti that the “referent of the syntactical word is determined by way of deliberation” would indicate that upreksā in this particular context is used of a similar type of conceptualisation of the reference of individual speech units. It would seem from Dignāga’s subsequent rejection of the use of deliberation in other traditions as not founded on justified procedures that he is using it with the background of Bhartrhari’s view of induction through joint presence and absence. Exclusion of other [referents] as a means of positing the referent of any given speech unit is ultimately based upon the inductive procedure of joint presence and joint absence (v. PS V:34 above), which could be described as an instance of tarka as suggested by Vṛṣabhadeva’s gloss. But in contrast to the grammatical tradition represented by Bhartrhari, the Dignāgan version of this procedure emphasises the predominance of joint absence over joint presence. In the passage from VPV quoted above Bhat hari refers expressly to anyavyāvyatireka as the means of positing thought up speech units as referents for the sake of explaining the relevant grammatical operations. It seems therefore clear that he uses upreksā along with kalpanā to describe the nature of this procedure, one he himself endorses elsewhere in VP as a natural extension of its use in Mahābhāṣya, e.g., at VP II:166: ye śabdā nityasambandhā jiñātaśaktayaḥ, anvaya-vyatirekābhyaṃ teṣām artho vibhājyate. This procedure, however, introduces speech units that although valuable in Śāstraic discourse are ultimately thought up, cf. svavṛtti 249,6-8 ad VP II:233: iha sarvesv eva sāstreṣu trayaṇaṁvadino manyante: sarvaśāktim artham upreksayā pravibhajāvyidyāṁ anuvartayanto prāyena prthak tīrtha-pravādāḥ pratīyante. In these circumstances it is understandable why Dignāga introduces the concept of upreksā and at the same time uses the referent of the procedure defined by means of apoddhāra as imagined.


560 Cf. ſe bar dpjad nas K : om. V.

561 As opposed to other traditions according to which the particulars, the general property, the relation, and the general property possessor are the referents of the syntactical word, cf. PST Ms B 237a1-2: yaśva (scil. padasya) ya āgaṁah: keśām cid bhedā vācyāḥ, padasyārtha ity āgaṁah, (1) paresām jātir, anyesām sambandhaḥ, keśām cit tadvad iti.

(1) This phrase appears to be misplaced. T reads gaṇ ē lūn gaṇ yin pa ‘ga’ ūg rṇams kyis (sic) brjod par bya ba tha dad pa’i tshig gi don can no ūes pa lūn ste, which does not reproduce the syntax of the Sanskrit version. It should probably follow the phrase, keśaṁ cit tadvad iti. The passage as a whole would then read:
yasya (scil. padasya) ya āgamaḥ: keśāṃ cid bhedā vācyāḥ, paresāṃ jātīr, anyesāṃ sambandhaḥ, keśāṃ cit tadvaḥ iti padasyārtha ity āgamaḥ.

562 As an example of the impossibility of using a syntactical word in isolation Jinendrabuddhi quotes a version of an often quoted vārttika stating that when no other syntactical verb is heard, 3. sg. pr. of the root vās ‘to be, to exist’ is understood. The quotation is followed by the citation of VP II:271. It is interesting in this particular context that the explanation is related to similar statements in VPV I 65,7ff (ad VP I:24), cf. Ms 237a2-3: laukikāt viprayogāc chaśdānām artho nirdhāryate. na ca loke kevalasya padasya prayogo ‘sti. “yatprāpi hy anyat kriyāpadaṁ na śrīyate vṛkṣāḥ plakṣa iti, tatrāpy astir bhavantīparaḥ prathamaipuruṣo(1) ‘prayuyamāno ‘ṣṭi gamyate(2),” tathā coktaṁ “yac ca ko ’yam iti praśne gaur āśva iti cociyate, praśna eva kriyā tatra prakṛntā darśanādike”(3) (VP II:271) ti: “The referent of speech units is ascertained by departing from common usage; for among people a syntactical word is not used in isolation. For even when a different syntactical word denoting an action is not heard like in the statement “plakṣa is a tree,”(4) even in that case, without the the verb AS being applied in present, first person singular, one understands “is;” and similarly it is said: and when someone answers the question “what is that” by saying “a cow” or “a horse,” an action like observing is resorted to in the question (VP II:271).”

(1) em. : “purūṣe Ms
(2) Cf. the discussion at Mahābhāṣya Vol. I 443,5-8 on vārtt 11 ad A II 3:1 as well as Kaiyā’s statement at Mahābhāṣyapadāpīpa Vol. V 402,6-7: anye tu vārṇayanti: yatra kriyāpadamaḥ na śrīyatet tatrāstir bhavantīparaḥ prathamaipuruṣo ‘prayuyamāno ‘py asti ti gamyata iti.
(3) em. : “ad iti Ms (cf. mitho ba ‘i phyir T).
(4) The discussion evidently centres on the syntactical peculiarity of nominal sentences like “plakṣa (is) a tree,” in which no verb is expressly stated, and addresses the rationale of supplementing copula. Bhartṛhari reinterprets the discussion in the light of his metaphysics of being, cf. VPV I 66,2-3: yāvac cāpavāda-bhūtāḥ kriyāviśeṣāḥ ābdapravṛttikāraṇam astityvam na nivartayanti tāvad astir bhavantīparaḥ prathamaipuruṣo ‘prayuyamāno ‘pi vṛkṣādibhiḥ padair ākṣiptāḥ pratīyate.

563 Cf. PST Ms B 236b4-6: padavādino hi padam avidyāmānaprakṛtyādīvibhāgam arthe prayuyate. prakṛtpayayau tu kevalam padārtham asṛṣyete, na tu kevalau prayuyite. na cāprayuyāmānayoḥ sattvam avadhārayītum śakypam. ato na sta eva tau. tathāpi yathā tayor arthe utprekṣayocate tathā padasya: “For according to some who adheres to the idea of the syntactical word, the syntactical word in which there is no division into stem and affix is applied to the referent. Stem and affix, however, rely merely on the meaning of the syntactical word, they are not applied alone; and it is impossible to decide upon the existence of the two, when they are not applied [alone]. Therefore they do not exist. Nevertheless, their referent is told by means of invention,(1) in the same way as [the referent] of the syntactical word;” cf. the discussion of kevalasyāprayogaḥ at Mahā-bh I 219,10-18 (vārt 7-8); VP II:194ab: prayayo vācakatve ‘pi kevalo na prayuyate (cf. vyapekṣāpadasya kevalasyāprayogaḥ, cf. ad. loc.).

(1) The fact that Jinendrabuddhi is using the term utprekṣā in this context supports the above conclusion (cf. no. 560 above) that it denotes deliberation by means of
anvaya and vyatireka. In fact, Patañjali introduces the description of how to determine the denotation of any given affix by means of joint presence and joint absence immediately after having addressed the question at Mahā-bhāṣya 2a as an illustration of the unjustified views about the referent current in other schools, cf. PSṬ Ms B 237a7: yathā tathoktaṃ “na jātiśabdo bhedānām” ityādāṃ.

564 KV translates this compound differently, v. no. [291] above.

565 That is, in other traditions than the present one, cf. PSṬ Ms B 237a6: asmād āgamād anyeṣv āgāmeṣu. Jinendrabuddhi quotes PS V 2a as an illustration of the unjustified views about the referent current in other schools, cf. PSṬ Ms B 237a7: yathā tathoktaṃ “na jātiśabdo bhedānām” ityādāṃ.

566 That is, exclusion of other referents, which is based upon systematic and logical thinking (yukti), cf. PSṬ Ms B 237a7: yuktimad…anyāprahāryam. As an example of the logical thinking involved in exclusion of other referents Jinendrabuddhi continues quoting PS V:34: yuktimad…anyāprahāryam.

567 This clause explains according to T 216,7 the purpose of the imagined referent of the syntactical word (vi[kalpitapadārthaprayojanam).

568 Cf. T 216,16-20: Those who have not repeatedly experienced the connection between the word and its referent (*anabhyastaśabdarthasambandhāḥ) they cognize the referent of the sentence as having as its means the apprehension of the referent of the syntactical word. But those who happen to be knowledgeable about the meaning of the sentence due to repeated experience of the connection between the word and its referent (*śabdārthasambandhābhhyāsāt), their intuition, which is concerned with a sentence referent without parts, is due to a partless sentence only.”

569 Cf. Kaiyata’s similar explanation of Patañjali’s definition of the meaning of a sentence (cf. Mbh I 218,10: ejāṃ padāṇāṃ sāmānye vartamanānāṃ yadviśeṣe ‘vasthānām sa vākyārthāḥ) at Mahā-bhāṣya-P Vol. II 60,13f: yadviśeṣe pādārthasamsargarūpe vākyārtha ity arthaḥ. ata eva vākyam eva mukhyāḥ śabdāḥ, vākyārtha eva
mukhyah śabdārthaḥ. Dignāga refers briefly at PSV II:4c to those who assert that only the sentence is a speech unit, evidently with Bhartṛhari’s standpoint in mind, cf. no. 2 above.

570 Cf. T 216,24-26: “The syntactical words, and so on, are not like segments (*bhāgabhūtāḥ) in the sentence, nor are the referents of the syntactical words [like segments] in the referent of the sentence because they are invented (*utprekṣitātvaḥ). Their referent is like the referent of a stem and an affix.”

571 That is, “the interval between a first element heard and the grasping of an entire sound, word or sentence,” cf. Cardona 1999: 314 no. 165. Dignāga evidently has VP I:85 in mind, q.v. above no. 559.

572 Cf. T 216,26-28: “The other belief in apprehending a speech unit (*śabdagrahaṇābhīmānaḥ) in the syntactical nominal (*pade) and a referent of the speech unit in the syntactical nominal is mistaken” (*viparītah).

573 That is, utprekṣā is an independent unstoppable mental force capable of conjuring up entities like “a hundred herds of elephants sitting on the tip of a finger,” cf. VP III.2:86 (with Helarāja’s VPP Vol. I p. 180,9 ad loc.): avastusy api notprekṣā kasya cīt pratibadhyate, which Dignāga obviously has in mind. It is remarkable in this context that the Tibetan version of Dignāga’s *Traikalyaparīkṣā, which largely consists of verses lifted from VP III.2, omits this verse. Jinendra-buddhi comments at T 216,29f: “The meaning is ‘because it is self-dependent’ (*svātantryāt); and its selfdependence is due to its not being dependent upon a referent; and for this very reason it is impossible to stop it when it is found to venture beyond real things (*vastu).”

It has not been possible to trace similar statements about the nature of utprekṣā to Bhartṛhari’s VPV I or the fragmentary VPV II, but Śaṅkara’s Brahmāsūtrabhāṣya on Brahmāsūtra II.1.3:11, offers a striking parallel to Dignāga’s description of utprekṣā as unfettered: yasmān nirāgamāḥ purusotprekṣāmātronibandhanās tarkā apratiśhitā bhavanti, utprekṣāyā nirankuśatvāt. The vocabulary and the sceptical attitude towards the validity of tarka is reminiscent of Bhartṛhari; interestingly Vacaspati’s Bhāmati ad loc. quotes Bhartṛhari’s VP I:34, which places Śaṅkara’s vocabulary in the context of the Vedānta tradition to which Bhartṛhari sometimes refers, e.g., in the crucial passage at VPV II 249,6ff in which the concept of utprekṣā occupies a prominent place.

574 Cf. lcags kyu med pa yin pa’i phyir ro V : lcags kyu med pa’i phyir ro K : lcags kyu med pa ŋid kyi phyir T, which translates Sanskrit nirankuśatvāt, cf. Mhvyut 4981 and Śaṅkara’s Brahmāsūtrabhāṣya on Brahmāsūtra II.3:11 q.v. no. 573 above.

573 <ye ’py artheṣu> pratibham hitvā anyam bāhyam artham <tatsambandham>(1) vā vākyārtham kalpayanti, teṣām api tat kalpanāmātram. Restored, cf. PST Ms B 237b1.: pratibham vivakṣām ca hitvety arthah. tato ’nyam bāhyam artham gavādikam, bāhyārthānām sambandham <vā>(2), parasparopārakāralakṣaṇām (vāky)ārtham(3) kalpayanti, teṣām api tat kalpanāmātram.
(1) Cf. de dan ’bre¹ pa V (Ms B 237b3: tato na bāhyo ’ṛthaḥ tatsambandho vā vākyārtha upapadyate) : ’bre¹ pa K.
(2) vā em., cf. ’am T 216,35: om. Ms; cf., however, Ms B 237b3 above.
(3) vākyā° conj. (cf. PST Ms B 237b3 above): śabdā° Ms

Ms B 237b1.: gavādikam; cf. VP II:132: yo vārtha buddhivishayo bāhyavastunibandhanah, sa bāhyavastv iti jñātaḥ śabdārtha iti gamyate.(1)


That is, the connection that is characterized by the mutual assistance of the external referents, cf. PST Ms B 237b 1.: bāhyārthānāṃ sambandham <vā>(1) parasparopakāralakṣaṇam. The emphasis is probably on the co-operation of the external referents as means of realisation (sādhana) of a particular action; cf. Jinendrabuddhi’s remarks at Ms B 62a5-6 on the statement vākyam eva śabdaḥ, q.v. above no. 2. Cf. NMāṇj 300,11: anye vāstavaḥ padārthānāṃ parasparasamsargo bāhya eva vākyārtha ity āhuḥ.

(1) Cf. no. [293] above.

577 Ms B 237b2.: yo yo ’bhūṣo yathābhūṣasam.

578 Cf. PST Ms B 237b2: yo yo ’bhūṣo yathābhūṣasam.

Pāḍa d pratiṣṭhāt anekadhā is lifted from VP II:134: yathendriyasannipatad vaicitryopadarāsakam, tathaiva śabdāḥ arthisa pratiṣṭhāt anekadhā; cf. SV Vākyādhikaraṇa 325cd-326ab: pratibhānekaḍhā puṃsāṃ yady apy artheṣu jñāte, tathāpi bāhya evārthas tasya vākyāsya ceṣyate.

580 PS V 47c svapratyāyanukāreṇa is identical with VP II:135c. Dignāga undoubtedly uses the term in the same sense as Bhartṛhari who applies it in the sense of ‘own idea,’ cf. VP II:135: vaktṛnāyaṁ prakṛnto bhinnesu pratiṣṭhātus, svapratyāyanukāreṇa śabdārthaḥ pravibhajyate: “The denotation to which a speaker has resorted in another way is differentiated among different listeners in accordance with their own ideas.” Punyarāja explains ad loc.: tathā vaiśeṣikeṇāvavinyam pratiṣṭhāyitum ghaṭasabdaḥ prayuktah sāṅkhyaic guṇasamāharamātram abhimanyate, jainasauyaṁtai paramānusāñcayamātram iti: “For instance, the word ‘pot’ that is applied by a Vaiśeṣika to make people understand that it is a whole consisting of parts, is considered by the Sāṅkhya to be a mere aggregate of the guṇas, by the Jains and Buddhists a mere collection of atoms.” This explanation is corroborated by Vṛṣabhadeva’s Paddhati 199,17-8 (on VPV I 199,4: pratiṣṭhāt upapadyate): yathā vaiśeṣikasya ghaṭasrūtvāvayaṇi pratiṣṭhāt prāparaśaṁ saṅghamātre. Vṛṣabhadeva mentions svapratyaya as a factor in the listener’s decoding of a sentence at Paddhati 75,7-8: sa hi pratiṣṭhā kramārtham pratiṣṭhāyamānāḥ svapratyāyanukāreṇa śabdāgatām abhidhāṁ kramavatāṁ vyavasthāpayati: “For the listener who understands the referent progressively in
The term svapratyaya in the sense of ‘own idea’ is also found at Mahāyānasūtraśāla II 20: yathārute 'rthe parikalpyamāne, svapratyayo hānim upaitī buddhēḥ: "When the referent is imagined according to the word that expresses it, one’s own ideas ruins one’s understanding.” Vaiśabhandhu’s gloss svapratyaya iti svayandṛśtiparāmarśakah: “svapratyaya means reflection upon one’s own views,” leaves no doubt about the meaning.

Jinendrabuddhi, on the other hand, interprets svapratyaya in the sense of ‘own cause’ which he understands as a vāsanā, i.e., a ‘latent impression’ whose substrate is vijnāna, explaining that in conformity with this cause a cognition of different aspects arises in conformity with repeated practice [in a former existence] even without an outer referent. Consequently it is not justified to assume that the meaning of a sentence is the outer referent or its relation [with another referent], cf. PS T 581 Cf. the analogous expression at SV Apoha° 40ab: asaty api ca bāhye `rthe vākyārthapratibbha tathā, padārthe `pi tathaiva syāt kim apohaḥ prakalpyate.

The intimate connection between pratibhā and arthakriyā is also stressed by Bhartṛhari, cf. VPV I 75,4: arthakriyāviṣayā pratibhā (ad VP I:24-26): “pratibhā ‘intuition’ has purposeful action as its domain.”
(1) Cf. no. [295] above.

583 Cf. PST Ms B 237b5-6: yasya yāḍrśī vāsanā tasya tadanurūpaiva pratibhopajāyata ity arthāḥ.

584 Repeated practice (abhyāsa) is mentioned by Bhartṛhari as one of the six causes of pratibhā, cf. VP II:152; cf. Iyer 1969: 88ff.

585 Cf. Bhartṛhari’s description, at VPV I (ad VP I:113) 186,5 foll., of how the impulses and dispositions that the use of language leaves in babies in their former lives determine their cognitions relative to this or that purposeful action: samāviṣṭavācām ca svajātisu bālāṇām api pūrvaśābdāyēsvabhāvānāṣmākārdhānāt tāsu āśv arthākriyāsv anākhyaśabdanibandhanā pratipattir upapadyate.

YD 75,8-9: yena hi yo ‘ṛhiho ‘bhyaśatāh sukādityena tasya vināpi tenārthena sābdamātrāt pratipattir upapadyate: “The cognition of someone about a referent he has learnt from repeated practice to be pleasant, and so on, arises from the mere word even without the referent.”

586 Dignāga’s formulation is similar to Bhartṛhari’s statement at VPV I 199,3-4: pratipuruṣaṁ tu bhāvanānuvibhāyini saty asati vārthe svapratyayānukāreṇa bhinnarūpā āśabhāyaś pratipattir upapadyate: “It is rather the case that for each person words give rise to different cognitions of the referent irrespective of whether it exists or not, [cognitions] that reflect his bhāvanā [i.e., the residual traces left by usage in former lives of the said person] (1) in accordance with his own ideas.” See Pind 2003.


587 Cf. PST Ms B 237b6-7: asaty api vyāghre vyāghras tiṣṭhāty ukte vyāghrasādhanaśānakriyāpratibhāsā pratīṭir upapajyate. ādiśabdena nadyastire gudaśakatam paryastam ityādī grahānām: “Although there is no tiger, when it is said ‘a tiger is near by’ a cognition arises that is reflected as the means [of effecting an action] viz. a tiger and the action of standing near by. By the word ‘etc.’ is meant [statements] like ‘a wagon load of molasses lies overturned at the river bank.’”

Cf. NCV 548,2–549,1: śabdābhāyāsāvāsanājanitartheṣu pratibhā vāyubhuyojyate tiraścām manuyāṇām (1) ca yathābhāyasm svajātinivāta svapratyayānukāreṇa (2) śūraṅkātarādānām iṣya vyāghrasādāśābāṣravanāt kopaharābhāvānimittatyādi yathāvad (3) anugantavyam: “In animals and human beings an intuition that is restricted to their own class in accordance with practice and according to their own ideas arises from sentences about referents that are generated by latent impressions due to verbal practice. As for instance, that of heroes or cowards, which because of hearing the expression ‘the tiger [is here]’, and so on, are motivated by anger, excitement, or fear, etc.”

(1) Cf. VP II:117.

(2) Cf. VP 2 57,18-19: tena pratiniyatajātyanuṣāreṇaiva niyataiva kācit pratibhā prabodhīyate.

(3) YD 75,9-11: tadāyathā vyāghro ‘tra prativasatīty ukte vināpi bāhyenārtheṇābhīyāsāvāṣd eva svedāpe-separated bhavant: “For instance, when someone says “a tiger is living here,” such things as sweat and trembling arise merely because
of practice [with regard to the referent of the sentence], even without the outer referent;” cf. ibid. 76,9-10 which appears to paraphrase Dignāga’s statement: arthatābhyāsavadānāpeksāsatva api vyāghrādiṣu pratipattir upadāyata iti: “A cognition about tigers and so on arises, although they are non-existent, dependent upon the latent impressions [that result] from repeated practice [in a former existence].”

The example of the tiger is also mentioned by Jayanta Bhaṭṭa in his criticism of the concept of pratībhā at NMaṇḍ 335,28-30: yo ’pi vyāghra āyāta ity ukte sūrakātaranarādhikarananāṃprakārakāryotpādaḥ sa bāhye ’rthe vyāghṛagamanādau pratipanne vāsanānusāreṇa bhavaṇ, na pratībhāmārathetunobhavati; cf. op.cit. 336,2-3: tathā sābdārthe ’pi vyāghṛagamanevagete sūrāṇāṃ utsahāḥ katarāṇāṃ bhayam ityādi kāryam bhavati.

Kumārila alludes to it at ŚV Vākyā° 329cd-330ab: anekākārata yāpi sūrabhīrudhiyam prati vāsanānugrahāḥ saktā kunapaṇāditermāya iti; cf., although in a different context, VP II:321: vyāghṛādityapadesaṇena yathā nivartaye asato ’pi tathā kaścit pratyaya vyavahārāṇye.

588 That is, the referent of the sentence, cf. PST Ms B 237b7: vākyārtasvāvyāśeṣeṣu. The author of YD explains the determining force of the vāsanās on the way in which individuals interpret the same utterance by alluding to the well-known example of a woman that gives rise to different ideas depending upon whether it is a lover, an ascetic, or a dog that is “thinking” of her, cf. op.cit. 75,1-3: aha yo ’nādau saṃsāre devamanusatyatāścām(1) abhinne ’rthe bāhye stryādāu pratyaye pūrṇabhāsavadānāpeksah kunapaṇākāminibhāṣyādyākārakārhrinna-pratyaya itikartavyatāṃgam utpadyate sā hi pratiḥbāḥ.

Kumārila alludes to the same example in the pūrṇapaṇḍa of ŚV Śūnyā° 58-61cd: nakṣatraṃ tārakā tiṣya dārā ityevamādīṣu | naikatārthe viruddhatvā līṅgānekavatā- sambhavāḥ, parivṛttākāmakṣuṇāḥ kunapaṇāditermāya tathā; cf. the rebuttal introducing the term svapratīyāṇukāra at 215a4-216a4b: kunapaṇāditaśu caiṣam sāvarūpye vyavasthi vāsanāḥ sahaḥkāriṇyo vyavasthhākārārdarṣane. svapratīyāṇukāro hi bahvākāreṣu vastuṣu. It is also mentioned by Dharmākṛti at PVSV 32,6-7: yathā rūpaparāśanāviveṣe ’pi kunapaṇākāminibhāṣyavikalpāḥ, and Jayanta Bhaṭṭa at NMaṇḍ 335,32-336,3: yathāvasthiyam viñitatmanī bāhye ’rthe vāsanānusāreṇa kunapaṇā iti kāminī bhakṣyam iti pratiḥbāḥ bhavanti.

The fixed order of the examples presupposes that they were quoted from a verse text, as the three terms kunapaṇā kāminī bhakṣya constitute a śloka pāda like parivṛttākāmakṣuṇāṃ quoted by Kumārila. This being the case, Bodhicittavivaraṇa 20 seems to be a likely source, as parivṛttākāmakṣuṇāṃ ekasyāṁ premādaṇtanāh kunapaṇā kāminī bhakṣya iti tīsro vikalpanāḥ is meant to illustrate the statement of verse 19 that there are different views about an object in the outer world (*bāhyārtha) that has one and the same appearance (*ekākāra), which is the subject matter of this paragraph.

589 Cf. PST Ms B 237b7-238a1: adharapayodharādiṣamvarṇanāvyākṣyavraṇāt: “From hearing sentences in which lips and breasts, or the like, are eulogized.”

[296] sāpi vākyaantaṃrārthebhyyo vyavacchinnhe ’rtha ṭiṣyate sambandhābhijñasya. <tasmāt sānumāṇāṃ na bhidyate>.(1) Restored, cf. PST Ms B 238a4-5: idānīm
pratibhāyāḥ pratyaksānumāṇayor antarbhāvam darśayitum āha: sāpītyādi; B 238a5-6 q.v. no. 592 below; 238a7: sambandhābhījñayeti.

(1) Pāda d of the Tibetan versions of PS V 48 contain the compound nag gi don V: nag don K = Sanskrit *vākyārthah. However, this term is metrically inconsistent with pāda d of the verse. It is most likely a gloss on pratibhā that was interpolated into the verse to identify the referent of the pronoun sā at pāda a. For *sā, cf. ‘di yañ V: om. K; the reading of PS V 48d gzan min KV is a semantic substitute m.c. for tha dad min = na bhidyate, which occurs in the subsequent vṛtti of PSV V 48 (tha dad pa ma yin no K: gzan ma yin no V).

590 Cf. PST Ms B 238a7: yâḥ śabdārthayoh sambandham jânāti,

591 Cf. PST Ms B 238a5-6: Devadatta gām abhyāja śuklām ityāder vākyād yā śrotuḥ pratibhopajyate sā Yajñadatta Pātaliputraṃ gaccheyādīnām vākyāntarānām ye ’rthās tebbho vyāvṛtē ’rthe pratibhāsāmāṇyaviśeṣa(1) iṣyate: “The intuition that arises in the listener because of a sentence like ‘Devadatta, bring a white cow’(2) is claimed to be of a referent, that is of a particular general type of intuition, as excluded from the referents of other sentences like ‘Yajñadatta, go to Pātaliputra.’”

(1) Cf. Jinendrabuddhi’s explanation at Ms 238a6-7 of the reason for using the term pratibhāsāmāṇyaviśeṣa: tad evam yāvantī vākyāni tāvanty eva pratibhās tadarthaviśayā ity uktam bhavati. etena pratibhānekatvam darśayān pratibhāsāmāṇyam vākyasamutthayāḥ pratīṭer visayao ’sṛti śucayati. anekaviśayādhāraṃ hi sāmāṇyam pratīṭam: “What is meant is as follows: there are just as many intuitions, whose objects are the referents of the [sentences], as there are sentences. Showing thereby that there are many intuitions he indicates that the general property intuition is the object of a cognition that originates from a sentence. For it is understood that the general property is the container of many objects.”

The introduction of the term pratibhāsāmāṇyaviśeṣa reflects the discussion about whether or not verbal communication complies with the canon of the trairūpya, cf. no. 9 above and Appendix 1.


592 Cf. PST Ms B 238a7-238b1: etena vākyam līṅgam(1) iti manyamāno yā sāmāṇyārūpe ’rthe sambandhābhījñasya līṅgat pratīṭir bhavati, sāmāṇyām dhūmāgni pratīṭivat. tathā ca śrotuḥ vaktrpratibhāyāṃ pratīṭiḥ: “Therefore, in that he takes the sentence as an indicator (līṅgam), the cognition that someone who knows the connection (between the word and its referent) gets from the indicator about the referent in a general form, is inference like the inference of fire from smoke; and in the same way the listener has an intuition of the intuition of the speaker.”

(1) līṅgam conj. (cf. rtags T): om. Ms

593 The Tibetan translations of PSV V 48 recorded in K and V differ considerably, and PST contains nothing that would make it possible to infer the readings of the underlying Sanskrit text. The translation is based upon K, which unlike V is not syntactically confused. For nag so so la tha dad (*pratyekam vākye bhidyate) K, V reads nag gzan las tha dad (*vākyāntarād bhidyate); for tsig gi don bzin du (*padārthavat) K, V reads rdzas bzin (dravyavat [sic]).

Cf. gaṅ žig ŋag las rtogs pa ni | sna tshogs rtog pa (so read with PN) skye 'gyur ba K : gaṅ žig ŋag las skyes pa yi | rnam rtog sna tshogs šes pa ni V. The expression sna tshogs rtog pa K : rnam rtog sna tshogs = *nānakalpiṅ. (?) is related to the statement at PSV V:47 (q.v. above) about arthakriyāpratipatītiḥ (rtogs pa K : šes pa V) and viкалпāḥ (rnam rtog V : rtog K) of various forms (nānārupā, sna tshogs KV) that arise due to a sentence.

Cf. 'das ma yin K : gζan ma yin V.

Cf. PST Ms B 238b1-2: yat svasaṃvedyaṁ tat saṃvedane pratyakṣe 'ntarbhavati, rāgādivat. pratibhā belongs to the category of mental perception (mānasam pratyaṅkṣam) as defined by Dignāga at PS I 6ab: mānasam cārtharā-gāḍīśvasaṃvittīr akalpiṅ; cf. PS I 7ab: kalpanāpi svasaṃvittāv īśtā nārthe viкалpanāṭ. Hattori 1968: 92 (I.45), 94 (I.47), 95 (I.51).

Cf. spobs pa K : rtogs pa V.

Cf. ni (= Sanskrit tu, cf. PS V 49a, q.v. above) V : yān K.

Cf. rig pa yin pas K : raṅ rig yin pa ’i phyir V.

yuktaṁ tāvad <naimittikeṣu śabdesv> anyāpoheṇarthaḥbhidhānam, yādṛcchikeseṣu tu katham. Restored, cf. PST Ms B 238b2-3: yuktaṁ tāvad ityādi. naimittikā jātigunakriyādṛvayaśabḍāh. teṣu ... anyāpohena sāmānyarūpenābhidhānam sambhavati. yādṛchikeseṣu tv eva kavastūpanipātiṣu katham.

That is, words denoting a general property, a quality, an action, or a substance, cf. PST Ms B 238b2: naimittikā jātigunakriyādṛvayaśabḍāh. This classification corresponds to the semantic conditions mentioned at PSV I:3d: jāti-śabdeṣu jāyā gaur iti. gunaśabdeṣu gunena śukla iti. kriyāśabdeṣu kriyavā pācaka iti. dravyaśabdeṣu dravyena daṇḍi viśāntī; cf. Hattori 1968: 83 no. 1.27. Prominent Sanskrit grammarians like Bhartṛhari did not accept this classification. Bhartṛhari, for instance, explains terms like pācaka and daṇḍin as kṛt and raddhita derivatives, respectively, whose cause of application (pravṛttinimitta) is a syntactical relation (sambandha) that is expressible by means of the abstract affixes tvatau; this view is mentioned by Dignāga who writes: atra kecid āhuḥ - sambandhaviśista iti. For the idea of sambandha as pravṛttinimitta, cf. PSV V 9ab §15 above with no. 133 ad loc.

Kāśikāvṛtī vol. IV p. 105,30: kecit tu kriyākārakaśambhandhāṃ kriyā-śabdānāṃ pravṛttinimittam icchanti. Like Dignāga, Jinendrabuddhi probably has Bhartṛhari’s view in mind.

According to the theory to which Dignāga’s opponent alludes, arbitrary terms are characterized by being applied to a single (eka) not common (asādharaṇa) entities (vastu) (Cf. PST Ms B 238b3: yādṛcchikeseṣu tv eva kavastūpanipātiṣu katham?). Consequently the semantic conditions of such terms differ from those of words whose causes of application (pravṛttinimitta) are general properties, qualities, or actions that are supposed to reside in their substrata(1). Since Dignāga’s apoha
theory presupposes the existence of general properties, although not as real entities, but as defined by exclusion of other referents-equivalent to the absence from the locus of the referent of its complement—the question arises whether proper nouns are subsumed under the general *apoha* theory, cf. PST Ms B 238b4: *na hi teṣām sāmānyam abhidheyaṃ samasty anekādāhāratvāt sāmānyasya. etena yādṛcchikēṣu sāmānyārthābhādhānād abhyupetahānām:* “For their denotable object is not the general property because the general property has a multitude of substrata. Therefore, since the general property as referent is not denoted in the case of arbitrary terms you abandon your thesis.”

Dignāga describes very briefly at PSV I:3d the characteristic of proper nouns as that of qualifying a referent by means of a name: *yadrčchāśabdeṣu hi nāmā viśiṣṭo ʿṛtha ucyate dītteti:* Jinendrabuddhi explains at PST I 38,4 that proper nouns are not dependent upon such causes of application as general properties, cf. Ms loc. cit.: anapekṣitajātyādipravṛttiṇīṁittā yadrčchāśabdaḥ; NCV 60,5-6: nimittaniṃprakaṃ nāma yādṛcchikam ‘dīttho’, ‘davittha’ ityādi.

Yuktidipīkā is the only non-Buddhist source that alludes to Dignāga’s view of the cause of application of arbitrary terms, cf. YD 100,17-20, q.v. below no. 604 below.

(1) Cf., e.g., Patañjali’s statement at Mahā-bh I: 19,20: *catuṣṭayi śabdānāṃ pravṛttiḥ: jātiśabda guṇasabdaḥ kriyāsabdaḥ yadrčchāśabdaḥ caturthāḥ.* The view that arbitrary terms are without cause of application can be traced to the debate at Mahā-bh II 367,18ff (ad A V.1:119), where Patañjali discusses the problem of what accounts for the introduction of the *bhāvapratyaya tā or tva* after arbitrary terms like ‘dītthā,’ when there is no subsisting property (vartin) dītthaness in persons like *dītthā: dītthādiṣu tarhi vartyabhāvāt vṛttir na prāṇam: dītthavatā, dītthātā:* Kaiyata explains that proper names are not dependent upon a cause of application inherent in the object because they apply according to a persons wish, cf. Mahā-bh-P Vol. V: 348,17-18: *dītthādāyo yadrčchāśabdaḥ arthagaṇaḥ na kuncita pravṛttinimittāṃ apekṣyante, puruṣecchāvāṣena pravartanāt;* cf. PVVT 419,18-19 (ad PVSV 115,19-20): bhāyaṃ nimittam antareṇa śabdapravṛtyottā yadrčchā. tasyām bhāvād yādṛcchikāḥ. iesu devadātādiṣu vyākātiṣu.

(299) *yādṛcchike ʿpy <arthābhēdāt>(1).* Restored, cf. PST Ms B 238b4: *yādṛcchike ʿpītyādīnāḥ.*

(1) *don tha dad phyir K : don bye bas V which translate *arthabhēdāt.* Dignāga’s argument, however, presupposes the suggested emendation ʿpy arthabhēdāt, which is consistent with the metre, cf. e.g. PSV V:7c above. For a related error, cf. the prose commentary at [300] below.

602 Arbitrary terms like *dītthā* denote referents that consist of an aggregate of separate properties. Consequently such referents are plural like the referents of general terms and thus comparable to those of general terms, cf. PST Ms B 238b4: *dītthādiṃnāṃ anekatvaṃ darśayan, tatrāpi sāmānyam astitī pratipādayati.*

(300) *yādṛcchiko hi samudāyavāci dītthādiṣabdaḥ <samudāyino> ʿbhedenāha. Restored, cf. PST Ms B 238b4-6: yādṛcchiko hityādi ... kānaṃkūṭadīgumasonamudāvāvāci yādṛcchiko dītthādiṣabdaḥ, tasya samudāyasya ye ʿvayavāḥ ..., tān abhede- na(1)sāmānyenāḥ.*
A word like 'dittha' denotes an aggregate of qualities like being blind on one eye or being dwarfish, cf. PSṬ Ms B 238b4-6: kānakūntadīgūnasamudāyavācī yādṛcchiko dīthādiśabdaḥ. The same examples are mentioned by Jinendrabuddhi and Śimhsārū in their explanations of PSV V:34, v. above no.s 421-22 where the relevant texts are quoted and translated. YD relates Dignāga’s view at 100,17-20: candrādiśy idānim asādhāraṇavisāyasyā kā pratipattiḥ syād iti. āha: āha: āvaya- pekṣatvāt. Candrasaṃbdho hy anekeśy avayavesu varītate jātīdvayagunakriyāsu ca. tathā dīthādiśabdaḥ. tasmād evamjātīvyakānām api cānumānād abhedāḥ: “Now, what sort of cognition would there be with regard to the [word] ‘moon’, and so on, whose referent is not common”? He explains: because it depends upon parts. For the word ‘moon’ refers to many parts as well as to general property, substance, quality, and action. The same does the word ‘dittha’. Therefore, for [words] belonging to this class there is no difference from inference either.” Jinendrabuddhi mentions the question concerning the semantic conditions of application of terms like ‘sun’ at Ms B 239b4-5: ye tarhy ete sūryādayaḥ śabdā ekavyākyupapātīnāḥ, te kathām sāmāṇyavacanaḥ. tatrāpi sūryādinām avasthābhedena bhedād anekatvam astity adosāḥ: “How then do words like ‘sun’, which apply to a single particular, denote a general property. Also in this case the sun, and so on, is plural because of internal distinction due to difference of state. Consequently (iti) there is no problem;” cf. PVSVT 419,21f (ad PVSV 115,19f): atha devadattasaṃbdho ‘py avasthābhedena jātīvācaka isyate; a similar discussion is related at TSP 453,14-18 (ad TS 1225): ye ‘py ete diṭṭhādayaḥ śabdā yadṛcchāsabdatvena prattītāḥ, te ‘pi janmanah prabhṛtyāmaṇaṁ kṣanād anuvartamānaḥ pratiksanaḥbhedabhinām asādhāraṇabhedena vastu gamayītum asaṅktaḥ kālaprakārasyaṃvdvaciḥcchanavastusamavetāṁ jātīm abhidheyatvenopādātate: “Also words like ‘dittha’ that are known as proper nouns depend upon a general property inherent in the referent delimited by the bounds of timespan as their denotable object, being incapable of making a referent that is differentiated by differences every moment known by means of a non-common difference, as they apply to it continually from birth to the moment of death.”

That is, in a general form without distinguishing between the many parts that constitute the aggregate, which is also the property of the so-called aggregate terms (samudāyasābdaḥ), cf. PSṬ Ms B 238b5-6: taṣya samudāyasya ye ‘vavāh kānakuṭādayaḥ, tān abhedena (so read, Ms bhed”) sāmāṇyāha. tato yathā vṛkṣaśābdaḥ śimśapādān viśeṣān abhenedabhidhādasatāmān sāmāṇyavacī tathā samudāyasābdoḥ ‘pi diṭṭhādiśabdaḥ; “The parts of the aggregate are the [properties of] being blind on one eye and being dwarfish, and so on. It denotes these without distinction, i.e., in a general form. Therefore, just as the word ‘tree,’ while denoting without distinction particulars like śimśaपā, denotes the general property, in the same way also an aggregate term like ‘dittha.’”
kara iti. kvacid mukhyah. Restored, cf. PST Ms B 238b6-7: kas tathityadi ... kas
tarhi jatisamudayaasatabdavri viisesah ... na kaedic iti; 239a1-3: yathoktam Samanyapa-
rikasyaye ... prassiddhivasah(1) jatisabda api samudayishu vartate ...
ata aha prassiddhivaasad ivyadi ... tadyathahi abhaksyo grnymysukara ity ukte ...
kvacid mukhyo 'vayavesu vartate.
(1)em.: prasiddha° Ms

That is, if both terms denote a general property, cf. PST Ms B 238b6: yady
ubhav api samanyavacinau.

Jinendrabuddhi qualifies this statement at PST Ms B 238b7 with the
subsequent exposition in mind: etavata leshena nasty eva viisesa ity abhiriyah, na tu
sarvathah nasty eveti. anyathayaam jatisabdo 'yaan samudayaasabda iti bheda na sya:\n"Thus the opinion is that because it is such a minor point, there really is no
difference, but it is not the case that there is no [difference] at all. Otherwise there
would be no distinction, like when one says 'this is a general term', 'this is an
aggregate term.'"

Jinendrabuddhi explains Digna's statement with reference to a similar
exposition in Samanyapariksyaya, cf. PST Ms B 238b7-239a2: nanu ca vaayavesu
mukhyopacaratavyittvena viiseso bhavati. jatisabdasya hi pratyekam avayavesu
mukhyatviti samudayaasabdasya tuptacirita. yathoktam Samanyapariksyaye:
ayam tu jatisamudayaasabdayor viisesah prassiddhivasah(1) jatisabda pratyekam api
samudayishu vartate, samudayaasabdas tu pratyekam samudayishupacaryata iti:
"Certainly the difference is due to direct and transferred application to the parts. For
the application of a general term to each of the parts is direct, whereas that of an
aggregate term is transferred. As it is explained in Samanyapariksyaya: "This,
however, is the difference between general and aggregate terms: According to
acknowledged usage a general term, on the one hand, applies to each member of the
aggregate, whereas an aggregate term is transferred to each member of the
aggregate."
(1)em.: prasiddha° Ms

Cf. PST Ms B 239a2-3: sukaravyaktyavayavesu api sukaarassabda upacarat
pravartate. tadyathahi hy 'abhaksyo grnymysukara' (1) ity ukte, avayavahi
bhi api bhaksyante: 'The word 'swine' is also applied in a transferred sense to the parts
of the individual swine. For when, for instance, it is said that one should not eat
the village swine, parts of it are not to be eaten either.'

Bharthari mentions the same example at VPV II 224,16-17 with reference to the
parts of a swine: abhaksyo grnymysukara iti. atra bhaksyatikriyathathabhuutam eva
saadhana(bhutam dravyavayavam apekshate) ... avayave ca samudaye ca samudaya-
sabdapravarttir iti.
(1)Cf. Mahabh Vol. I: 5,16-17: abhaksyo grnymysukara ity ukte gamyata etad
aranyo bhaksya iti.

yathaha: sankhayapramanamasthananirapekshah pravartate, bindau ca
samudaye ca vacakah safilladi. (VP II 156). Restored, cf. PST Ms B 239a3:
yathaha bhartrharih.
609 Cf. PST Ms B 239a3-4: ādiśabdena prthivyādiparigrāhaḥ.

610 Cf. PST Ms B 239a4-6: sankhyādyanapekṣatvenāvayaveṣu mukhyavrūttīvaṃ
darśayati. sankhyādiśāpkeṣyate kārsāpanavojana-caturāsrādiśabdavād ekadeśa-
vrūttīvaṃ na syāt. tatra sankhyānapekṣa bindumaśṭikādīsankhyānapekṣatvād(1)
ekamin api hi bindau(2) vartate. anekasmin api salilaśabdaḥ. pramāṇanirapekṣa
nābhyyūrūnāmātratvādyanapeksanāt.

(1) muṣṭikā conj. (cf. T 219,9: khyor pa gaṅ) : mukā(2) Ms
(2) au em. : ā or Ms

611 yan lag la K : yan lag 'ba’ žig la V (“a part alone”).

612 Cf. VPV II 223,5-6: samsthānavaṃśayavair viśiṣte yaḥ prayujyate, śabdō na
tasyāvavaye pravṛttir upalabhya. VP II:155.

613 Cf. VPV II 223,7-8: varṇaśabdānāṃ citraḥ kalmāsah sūraṅga iti tada-
vayeṣv apravṛttih: “Words denoting colour such as ‘speckled’, ‘variegated’, ‘dapled’
do not apply to their parts;” Cf. PST Ms B 239a: nīle rakte vā citrāvavaye na
vartante: “They do not refer to a part of the speckled whether it is blue or red.”

614 The Tibetan translations bre V 148,7 : bre phyed (= ardhaprasthā/droṇa) K
149,7 are ambiguous since bre is used to render both Sanskrit prastha and droṇa, cf.
the dictionary by Che rin dbaṅ rgyal s.v. In view of the fact that Dignāga quotes the
examples in the order of the VPV II 223,7-8 (q.v. no. 614 above), it is reasonable to
assume that he is doing the same in this case too.

615 Cf. bre gaṅ K 149,7 : khal (= khari) V 148,7.

616 Cf. VPV II 223,7-8: avayavaśabdena čatam sahasram prastho droṇo māsaḥ
samvatsarah (itiyādayo grhyante’?). Ms B 239a6-7: niyatavayavaiśiṣṭaṃ samudā-
yam abhidhātaḥ satādiśabda avayave na vartante: “Words like ‘a hundred’ that
denote an aggregate qualified by fixed parts do not apply to a part.”

610 <samudāyaśa♭daśa ca kvacit> pratyekeṃ parisamāpyate. Restored, cf. PST
Ms B 239a7: pratyekeṃ parisamāpyata iti.
between a general term and an aggregate term, namely: the aggregate term denotes
preponderant.” This view is just a hint. This, however, is the obvious difference
said to be that “its application as transferred to the components is observed to be
without distinction the [properties] belonging to similar as well as dissimilar things

Cf. groṇi ’oṅs V : ’gro K; PST Ms B 239b1-2: grāmaśabdo grhakṣetra-
āṭapuruṣādisamudāyavācakas(1) tadekadesēsu puṟuṣēsu vartate: “The word
‘village’ that denotes the collection of houses, fields, enclosure, people, and so on,
refers to parts of these viz. the people;” Mahā-bh I 59,20-22: grāmaśabdo ‘yam
bahvarthāḥ. asty eva sālāsamudāyē vartate, tadyathā: grāmo dagdaḥ iti. asti vātā-
parikṣepe vartate, tadyathā: grāmā praviṣta iti. asti manusyēsu vartate, tadyathā:
grāmo gato, grāma āṅgata iti: “The word ‘village’ has many referents. It happens
that it refers to the collection of houses, for instance: “the village burned down.” It
happens that it refers to the enclosure and surroundings (i.e. the arable land), for
instance: “He entered the village.” It happens that it refers to the people, for
instance: “the village went away, the village came back.””

(1)There is no word in this definition that matches lam T.

Dignāga quotes as an example of this usage VS V.2:18. Jinendrabuddhi
explains it at PST Ms B 239b2 as follows: atra kāyaśabdaḥ karacaraṇādisamudāye
vartamānas tadāvaya eva upacarāya: “In the present case the word body while
applying to the aggregate of hands and feet, and so on, is transferred to a part of it.”
Cf. Candrānanda’s exegesis at VSV 43,3-4 in which kāya stands for hasta: iha
ātmasabdena vāyuḥ, yathātmasanyogaprayatnāḥbhyaṃ haste karma tathātmavāyu-
sanyogāḥ prayāṇāḥ ca prāṇāyāmakāma.

Cf. khyu žes bya ba daṅ nags žes bya ba V : kho bo cag žes bya ba K; Mahā-
bh I 239,24-25: ekārthā samudāyā bhavantī tadyathā yūṭhaṃ śatam vanam iti; ibid.
426,21.

Jinendrabuddhi attempts to clarify the actual difference between words
belonging to the class of general terms and those belonging to the class of aggregate
terms in the following passage at Ms B 239b2-4, quoting a brief definition from
Dignāga’s Sāmāṇyaparikṣāvyāsa: Sāmāṇyaparikṣāvyāsa tu avayavesūpaparicita-
vrītītvam bhūyastvena dṛṣṭam iti jātiśabdāḥ samudāyaśabdasya viśeṣaṇaṭvenoktām.

(1) Cf. Ms B 239b1: uttaratropacarita iti vacanā.
(2) ‘tmakarma em. (cf. bdag gi las T) : om. Ms

(1)There is no word in this definition that matches lam T.

(2) Cf. PST Ms B 239a7-239b1: pratyekam avayave mukhyaḥ prayuṣyātā ity
arthāḥ. mukhya ity etat kutah? uttaratropacarita iti vacanāt: “The meaning is that it
applies directly to each part. What is the reason for [using] the expression ‘directly’.
Because of the expression ‘transferred’ in what follows.”
that reside in a single aggregate, whereas a general term [denotes] aggregates and non-aggregates that are of the same kind.”

(1) "āntovartino conj.: 'āntaḥ (j?)ātino Ms

[308] <āth>ākṛtasambandhasabdād(1) yā<ṛthā>pratītīs,(2) <tadyathā yad uktam 'ayam panasa' iti tatra> katham anumānam iti. Restored, cf. PST Ms B 239b5-6: ākṛtasambandha iti ... katham anumānam iti.

(1)Cf. 'brel par ma byas pa'i sgra las K (translating ākṛtasambandhe śabde at PSV V 2ab1) : 'brel pas ma byas pa sgra'i don V. The paraphrase with 'ja 'originating from' at PST Ms B 239b6: ākṛtasambandhasabdajā yā pratītih (see below no.624) would indicate that the case morpheme las translates a Sanskrit ablative as suggested in the restoration above.

(2)Cf. don rtogs pa K : don ston par byed pa V; paraphrase at PST Ms B 239b6 below no. 624.

622 Jinendrabuddhi interprets the term ākṛtasambandha as referring to a person who does not know the connection of a word to its referent, cf. PST Ms B 239b5: ākṛtasambandha iti sambandhānabhijñāḥ pratipattā. This interpretation is possible, but it makes no sense in the context and may be due to carelessness. Jinendrabuddhi may not always have compared his explanations to the original he commented upon.

623 Cf. Jinendrabuddhi’s explanation at PST Ms B 239b6: ākṛtasambandha-śabdajā yā pratītir na sānumānam, tadyathā yasya mlecchaśabdajāḥ samśayāḥ. tathāviddhā sambandhakāle 'yam panasa ity atrāpi pratī<ti>ḥ. kasmāt?


(1)Cf. rtogs pa'i V : so sos (sic) K.

(2)Cf. don ni bstan phyir ro V : don mthon ba yi phyir K. The reading *ārthadarśanāt suggested by V and K is peculiar and non-standard in this context. The purpose of the 50b is to explain, as the context indicates, that the relation (sambanda) between any given word and its referent is shown to somebody by someone to whom it is known (pratītā). This is the rationale for Dignāga’s use of the expression sambhandrapradarśanārtham which occurs in the vṛtti. I believe that Tib. don corresponding to Sanskrit artha is an interpolation based upon the expression arthasiddhatvāt that occurs in the vṛtti. Consequently I would suggest restoring 50b as pratītena *pradarśanāt. On this assumption we must translate 50b as: “Because [the relation] is shown by someone to whom [it] is known.”

624 Cf. PST Ms B 239b7: pratītasambandhenety arthah. For a different translation of 50b, cf. note [310] note 2. above.

625 Cf. don grub pa'i phyir K : om. V.
It is not possible to decide with absolute certainty what the original Sankrit version of the first sentence of PSV V:50 might have been: KV are syntactically confused and both versions omit crucial words. The term grags pa rñiṅ pa V : om. K, corresponds probably to Sanskrit vyḍḍha. This term is commonly used in descriptions of how children learn the connection between a word and the referent from the discourse of grown ups (vyḍḍhayavahāra, cf. ŚBh 46,7); cf., for instance, the explanation at ŚBh 46,2-4: vyṛdhānaṃ svārthena vyavaharamānam upaśyantu balāh pratyāksam arthaṃ pratipadyamānāḥ drśyaṇte. See also Kumāra's related discussion at ŚV Sambandhāṣepeatiparīhāra 138ff. Raja 1963: 26ff. I assume that 'brel pa bstan pas K : 'brel pas rab tu rtogs pa V correspond to Sanskrit pratitā- sambandhena, cf. the use of pratitena at PS V 50b.


At this point Jinendrabuddhi addresses the question of the denotation of the demonstrative pronoun, cf. PST Ms B 239b7-240a2: nanu cāyaṁśabdo 'py āsannapratyaksavastusāmānyavacanaḥ, kutas(1) tena panasarṭahasiddhiḥ? naśa dosah. yathā pratītasaṃbandhā vyṛṣaśadāḥ sāmānyavacanō 'pi yadā pūrovartini palāṣādu pravuṣyate 'yam vyṛṣaś chidyatām iti, tadā vyṛṣavīśeṣa eva vartate. tathāyaṁśabdo 'pi: “Certainly, also the demonstrative pronoun ‘this’ denotes the general property of a proximate perceptible object, so how can it establish the referent ‘Jack-fruit tree’? This is not a problem! In the same way as the word ‘tree’ whose relation is known: When it is applied, although it denotes the general referent ‘Jack-fruit tree’? This is not a problem! In the same way as the word ‘tree’ to the present palāṣā, and so on, as in [the statement] ‘this tree is to be cut down,’ it is used to denote a particular tree only, so also the demonstrative pronoun ‘this’.

(1) kutas conj. : tatas Ms


I assume that the introduction of the particle ‘am after yan laṅ brda’ V (om. K) reproduces Sankrit ca.

[312] kim tarhi samjñāvyutpatтиḥ(1). Qu. Ms B 240a2.

(1) Cf. 'on kyaṅ mīn (śo read; ed. m) rtogs pa K 149,18 : śiṅ tog pa na sa’i sgra don rtogs pa V 148,19. For rtogs pa = vyutpatti, cf. Mhvyut 7495-96.

630 Cf. PST Ms B 240a2: panasaśabdena tatra samjñāvyutpatimātram kriyata ity arthaḥ. In the case of samjñāvyutpatti the relation between any given word and the thing it denotes is taught by pointing at a prototypical instance of the referent and thus presupposes a visible referent. Consequently there is no inference in the case of samjñāvyutpatti. Dignāga addresses briefly the implications of samjñāvyut- patti at PSV II:5: śābdam api tu <asadhāraṇena viṣayena> sambandhābhāve <dvīdhānumānam parīksyeta> drṣṭārtham adṛṣṭārtham <cca>. <tatra> drṣṭārthe samjñāvyutpattiḥ, adṛṣṭārthe 'ṛṭhavikalpamātram, na viśiṣṭārthprātipatiḥ. Restored, cf. PST Ms B 62b5: śābdam api tv ityādi. sambandhābhāva iti. 62b6-7: drṣṭārtham
... adṛṣṭārthaṃ. 62b7: drṣṭārthe samjñāvyutpatṭiḥ. adṛṣṭārthe ’rthaṃpamātrāṃ (qu. PVSV 37.26); 63b5: na viśiṣṭārthāpratītiḥ.

The two Tibetan versions translate this crucial passage as follows:

K (Kitagawa 1973 454b8f = P 111a1-3): sgra las byaṅ ba yāṅ ’brel pa med par thun moṅ ma yin pa ’i yul mthoṅ ba dan ma mthoṅ ba las rjes su dpag pa rnam pa gniṅ su brtag par bya ’o || de la mthoṅ ba’i don la min bstan pa ’o || ma mthoṅ ba’i don la rnam pa rtog pa tsam yin gyi, don gyi khyad par rtogs pa ma yin no ||.

V (Kitagawa 1973 454a5f = P 29b4-6): sgra yul thun moṅ ma yin pa dan ’brel ba yod pa ma yin pas rnam pa gniṅ ka rjes su dpag pa brtag par bya ste || mthoṅ ba’i don dan ma mthoṅ ba’i don no || de la mthoṅ ba’i don la ni mi gsal bar byed pa ’o || ma mthoṅ ba’i don la ni rnam pa rtog pa tsam ’ba’ zig ste || don gyi bye brag rtogs par byed pa ni ma yin no ||:

“However, when there is no connection [of any given word] with an individual referent, it should also be investigated whether verbal cognition is inference in two ways, namely (1) as having a visible referent and (2) as having an invisible referent. Now, with regard to the one having a visible referent, it is teaching a name [and thus it is not inference]. With regard to the one having an invisible referent, it is nothing but representation of the referent. There is no cognition of a distinct referent [and thus it is not inference either].”(1)

(1)Jinendrabuddhi’s explanation at PST Ms B 62b5-7 is deeply indebted to Dharmakīrti’s PVSV 37.24ff; text lifted from PVSV is printed in roman: “sambandhābhave” samketakāle. sābdārthatasambandhābhijnio hi samketakālānu-bhūtārthanāmāṇyam eva pratipādyate sābdāt, na svalakṣaṇam, tasya pūrvam adṛṣṭatvāt. prayogakāle viśeṣaviśayatvāśaṁkā na bhavaty eva. samketakāle tu pratijasāṃ svalakṣaṇam iti, sambhavati tadviśayatvāśaṁkā. atah “sambandhābhava” ity āha. “drṣṭārtham” yatārthāḥ prayakṣeṇa dṛṣyate. “adṛṣṭārtham” viparyayāt. “drṣṭārthe samjñāvyutpatṭiḥ” iti, yathāyam panasa iti. atra sambandha-vyutpatṭi eva bhavati, nānumānam, arthasa prayakṣavatāt. adṛṣṭārthe svargādāv arthavikalpamātrāṃ iti. na hi svargādīsabdāḥ svargādinām samketakāle ‘nyādaḥ v svalakṣaṇam buddhārtrapanti, anatīndriyatvaprasamgat (cf. PVSV 37,24-25). Kevalam tatpratipādanābhīpiṇyāyaiḥ prayuktaḥ. śrāory apratibhasamānataṃsvaḥvāhāṃ arthebimbam arpayanti (cf. PVSV 37-25-27): asti kaścit surāddhīvasaviśeṣa(1) ity evamādikam. naivam svalakṣaṇam pratipannan bhavati pratipāditam vā: svargād śravane tadanubhāvinām iva pratibhāsahedaprasamgat(2). apratipadhyamāno ’pi ca tatsvabhāvaṃ tathābhūta eva vikalpapratisimhe tadadvayavaśaṁy āṃśaṃṣya, tathābhūtavād eva śabdārthapratisatte (cf. PVSV 37,27-38,5). atra ca sambandhābhava iti etad nāpekyate, kim tu drṣṭārthes eva. tatra hi drṣṭavād viśeṣ<as>ya, tasyaiva vyaciyāsakṣet<sa>. tatas tannivṛtyantarham uktam samjñāvyutpatṭi iti: “When there is no connection” that is, at the time when the language convention is taught (samketakāle). For the one who knows the connection of a word to its referent understands from a word merely the general property of the referent he experienced at the time when the language convention was taught, but not the individual because it has not been observed previously. At the time when the language convention is put into practice doubt about whether a particular is the object does not exist at all. However, because (iti) the individual is visible at the time of teaching the
convention, doubt about whether it is its [i.e. the words] object is possible. Therefore he says “when there is no connection. “Having a visible referent” means “when the referent is observed by sensation.” “Having an invisible referent” means in the diametrically opposite case. “With regard to the one having a visible referent, it is teaching a name,” like, for instance: “this is a Panasa.” In that case it is nothing but teaching the relation, but it is not inference because the referent is visible. “With regard to the one having an invisible referent” like heaven “it is a mere representation of the referent.” For words like heaven do not at the time when the language convention is taught or on other occasions convey the particular to the mind because the [absurd] consequence is that it would not transcend the senses. They are merely used with intentions of teaching about them. They convey to the listener a mental picture of the referent whose essential nature is not clear [to him] in words like “it is a particular kind of dwelling place for gods and so on.” A particular is not understood or explained in this way because the [absurd] consequence is that there would be no difference of mental picture from hearing [words] like “heaven” in those who in a way would experience it directly. Although [the listener] does not understand its essential nature he takes pleasure in a representation picture of exactly this nature, identifying it as that [namely a particular] because the cognition of the referent of a word is precisely of this nature. And in this context the expression “when there is no connection” has no relation to that, but rather to visible referents only. Since a particular among these is observed, one would expect it to be the denotable object. Therefore it is said: “teaching a name” in order to exclude this.”


(1) For this term, cf. PST Ms B 240a2f, q.v. no. 632 below.

(1)em. (cf. 'brel pa rab tu bstan pa'i don T; Ms B 240a3: sambhandhapadarśanārtham) : sambandha om. Ms

631 Cf. PST Ms B 240a2f.: samjñārtho yasya sa tathocyate.

632 Cf. PST Ms B 240a2: tuśabdo 'vadhāraṇārthaḥ.

633 Cf. PST Ms B 240a3: yad etad ayamśabdena panasaśāthena panasaśābdasya sāmānādhikaranṛṇam tat sambhandhapadarśanārtham: “The co-reference of the word ‘panasa’” with the demonstrative pronoun ‘this’ whose referent is the panasa has the purpose of showing the connection.”

Umveka elaborates on the issue at ŚVT (Umveka) 371,12-14 (on Śabda° 102): ayaṃ panasa iti vā prayujyamāne vāca-vācakalākāsahasambhandhāvagatiḥ. na ca sa eva panasaśābdavācyah, ayaṃtiprasiddhārthopadasāmānādhikaranṛṇayāvaseyatvāḥ: “Or, when one makes use of the statement ‘this is a Jack-fruit tree’ one understands the connection that is characterized as one of the denotable object with the denoting term. And it [viz. the connection] is not only denotable by the word ‘Jack-fruit tree’ because it is to be ascertained by the co-reference of the syntactical word whose referent is well known with [the demonstrative pronoun] ‘this’.”(1)

Jinendrabuddhi continues the discussion of the role of co-reference in establishing the connection at PST Ms B 240a 3-5: nanu caikatrabhidheyē śābdayer
vyrtih sāmānādhikaranyam. tadā cānirjñātasambandhatvād eva nāsti panasaśabd
dasyārthahas\(^2\), tat katah sāmānādhikaranyam? sanketayitrā samjñātvena panasār-
thavṛttel\(^3\), tadā ayamśabdasyārthe sa niyuktaḥ, tatas tatra tasya vyrtī ity adośaḥ.
ayam atarthaḥ: samjñāsamjñāsambhandhavyutpattimātṛarthā eva tadā panasaśabd-
dasyāyamśabdavivase panase samjñārthena niyoga iti: “Co-reference is certainly
the application of two words to a single denotable object. And at this point (tadā)
the word ‘panasa’ has no referent because its relation [to the referent it denotes] is
not known, so how could there be co-reference? Because the person who teaches the
conventional denotation applies it [viz. the word ‘panasa’] to the referent panasa as
its name, it is at this point applied to the referent of the demonstrative pronoun
‘this’, therefore its application to this is not a problem. The meaning in the present
case is this: At this point the application of the word ‘panasa’ that has the purpose
of being a name of the panasa that is the referent of the demonstrative pronoun
‘this’ has merely the purpose of teaching the relation between the name and the
thing named.”

For Dharmakīrti’s view of pradarṣaṇa in relation to vyutpatti, cf. the discussion
at PV I 117ff with PVSV ad loc.

(1) Dignāga’s view on the role of the demonstrative pronoun for establishing the
relation between the vocal sign and its referent is closely related to Bhartrhari’s
view, cf. the quotation from the Saṅgraha at VPV I 101,3: so ‘yam iti vyapadesena
sambhandhopayogasya śākyatvāt; VPV 105,3-4; VPV I 126,4-5: so ‘yam iti samjñinā
śaktavacchedalakṣanāḥ sambandho niyaminate; VP II:128.

(2) śabdasyārthah em. (cf. T sgṛa‘i don) : asya Ms

(3) panasārthath em. (cf. pa na sa‘i don T) : palāsārthath Ms

\[^{314}\] ubhayaḥ abhidheya iti kṛtvā\(^1\). Qu. Ms B 240a6.

\(^1\) Cf. gniś ka brjod par bya ba yin no ās ās byas nas V : gni ga‘i brjod par bya ba
yin pa‘i phyir K.

\[^{315}\] atādārthyaḥ\(^1\) ca samjñārthaḥ panasaśabdah\(^2\), Qu. Ms B 240a7.

\(^1\) atādārthyaḥ em. (cf. de‘i don niś ma yin pa‘i phyir T) : atārthaḥ\(^3\) Ms

\(^2\) Cf. de‘i don las ni min gi don pa na sa‘i sgṛa yin no K : de‘i don du brda‘i don
byas pa ni ma yin no V.
Jinendrabuddhi’s explanation is concise to the point of being obscure. The underlying intention is that until the connection between the name (samjñā) ‘panasa’ and its referent is established, the term per se has no referent and only denotes its own form (svārīpa). Its sole purpose is that of being a name whose relation to its referent has to be taught by pointing to a prototypical instance of it, and the use of the demonstrative pronoun “this” as mentioned by Dignāga.

Cf. Bharṭṛhari’s explanation at VPV ad VP I 66a-b: prāk samjñinābhisambandhāt samjñā rūpapādārthikā, sāṣṭhyāś ca prathamāyāś ca nimmattāvaya kalpate. ... yāvat samjñīṇā tu samjñā na sambaddhā tāvan na samjñītpadārthiketī: “Before [its] connection with the thing named, the name has [its own] form as referent and is fit for being the cause [of application] of the sixth triplet or the first triplet.”

Cf. VPṬ (Paddhati) 125,22 ad loc.: samjñāsamjñīsambandhāvyutpattikāle ‘ayam panasaḥ’ iti. na hi samjñāyās tadā so ‘rthah: “Like at the time of teaching the connection between a name and the thing named in the words “this is a Jack-fruit tree.” For this is not the referent of the name at that time.”

The introduction of the term *prameya (Tib. gzół bya) is motivated by the opponent’s view that śābda is a separate mans of cognition (pramāṇa) having as object of cognition (prameya) a connection like that of the word ‘panasa’ with the object it denotes. It is uncertain why Jinendrabuddhi substitutes abhidheya for prameya, cf. PST Ms B 240b1: yo ‘yam śabdārthayaḥ sambandhāḥ sa eva śabdasya vidihrūpenābhidhiheya bhaviṣyati, tataḥ cānenaiva viśeṣena śābdaḥ anumāṇāt pramāṇāntaram bhaviṣyatiti manyate: “The idea is that only the relation between the word and its referent will be the denotable object of the word in an affirmative form, and therefore, i.e., because of this difference, verbal cognition will be a separate means of cognition from inference.”

The kārikā may be restored as: na sambandhāḥ, kalpitavā(1). Cf. Jinendrabuddhi’s paraphrase at Ms B 240b3-5 no. 640 below.

(1) brtaqs pa’i phyir V presupposes the reading *kalpitavā: rnam rtog yin phyir K *vikalpitavā (?), which is unmetrical.

sambandho hi <panasaśabdārthau> pramāṇāntarenopalabhhyāśyāyam’ (1)iti> manasaḥ kalpyate(2), anumāṇānumeyasambandhavat, tato <na> śabdāṃ pramāṇāntaram. Restored, cf. PST Ms B 240b1-5: pramāṇāntarenopalabhhyeti ... manasaḥ kalpyata iti... anumāṇānumeyasambandhavat; cf. Jinendrabuddhi’s paraphrase no.s 637 above and 640 below.
The cause has been transferred to the effect, cf. PS

Knowledge that arises as the immediate result of the other means of cognition

Other referents, respectively, and sensation does not have general properties as its

Referent are defined by their general properties viz. exclusion of other words and

Referent, is established by means of sensation, when the forms of the word and its

The question of how the relation between the two relata, i.e., the word and the

That which is imagined is not capable of being inferred in the same way as the

Objective purposeful action. Thus the relation is not capable of being inferred. For

That which is imagined is under no circumstances

Not exist independently of the relatum. It is merely imagined because of the mutual

Dependency of the two relata. And that which is imagined is under no circumstances

Fit for purposeful action; and every undertaking of intelligent persons has as its

This explanation is evidently influenced by Dharmakīrti’s thought. For the concept

Parasparāpekṣā cf., e.g., Dharmakīrti’s Sambandhaparīksā verse 3. For

The term Arthakriyārtha, cf. e.g. Arthakriyārthin at PVSV 89,19.

326ff.

That is, Sambhava and the rest, cf. PST Ms B 240b6: ādiśabdena ... Sambhavādayo grhyante. For Sambhava and the other means of knowledge, cf. Randle 1930: 326ff.


Cf. PST Ms B 240b6: yathoktayaiva diśopamānādīnāṃ yathāsambhavam apramāṇatvam apramāṇāntaravatvaṃ coktaṃ veditavyam.
upamānaṃ tāvad gogavayādiṣu sārūpyapratipattyartham. tatra parata upaśrutya yā pratitiḥ sā śābdam. svayam tu dvayārthaṃ pramāṇantareṇādhigamyā manasā sārūpyam yadā kalpayati, tadā[1] tad api na pramāṇāntaram. nāpy evam adhiṣṭhānānam sārūpyam prameyam. evam anyāpy api anumānavikalpavyāti-riktavāt parikṣiptavyāni. (2) Restored, cf. PST Ms B 240b7-241a5: upamānaṃ tāvad ityādi. gogavayādiṣv iti visayaṃ darśayati. sārūpyapratipattyartham iti ... tatra parata upaśrutyetī ... yā pratitiḥ sā śābdam. ... svayam tu dvayārtham iti. svayam eva gām gavayāṃ cādhiṣaṃya pratyakṣena manasā sārūpyam yadānayoh kalpayati tadānuḥbhūtarthaviṣayatvā ... pramāṇām eva na bhavati ... anyathā gām mahiṣāṃ ca pratyakṣena drṣṭvā yadā tayor visādṛṣṭvam kalpayati: asmād ayaṃ visadṛṣṭam iti, tadā tad api <na> (3) pramāṇāntaram svād ity abhiprāyah. nāpy evam adhiṣṭhānānam iti ... sārūpyam prameyam; 242b4-5: evam ityādi. anyāpy api yāni pramāṇāni pramāṇāntaratvena kalpiṇāi, tāny api anumānavikalpavyāti-rikitavāt pramāṇāntaratvena parikṣceptavyāni; for the reading pramāṇantareṇa, cf. YD 72,18 q.v. below no. 646.

(1) Cf. bsal bar bya ba ņid yin no V 148,36-37 : gān sel ba'i tshul yin no K 149,35.
(2) Although neither V nor K reproduce yadā, and the apodosis tadā, their presence may be inferred from their occurrence in Jinendrabuddhi’s paraphrase; the use of the case marker la in the phrase yid kyis rtogs par byed pa yin la K 149,33 may be an attempt to translate yadā; cf. the use of yadā and tadā in Uddyotakara’s reproduction of Dignāga’s view of upamāna, for which see no. 647 below.
(3) na conj. (cf. de ni tshad ma gān ma yin no V : tshad ma gān ma yin te K) : Ms and T om.

642 Cf. PST Ms B 240b7: sārūpyapratipattyartham iti sādṛṣyaniścayanimittam ity arthah. Jinendrabuddhi then continues quoting the definition of upamāna at NS I.1:6 prasiddhasādharmyāt sādhvasādhanaṃ upamānaṃ followed by a short explanatory gloss, cf. B 241a1: etat tasya laksanam: prasiddhapaṃāṇaniścito gavādhī; tena sādharmyam samānadharmatvam prasiddhasādharmyam. tasmād gavādyapekṣayā gavyādīsārūpyasya yat sādhanaṃ siddhiḥ, tad upamānaṃ: “The following is its definition: A cow, and so on, is ascertained by means of an acknowledged means of cognition. Acknowledged common property means having properties in common with this, i.e., having the same property [as this]. Therefore the establishing, i.e., siddhi of the similarity of the gayal, and so on, with reference to a cow, and so on, is upamāna.”

643 Cf. PST Ms B 240b1-3: gaur iva gavaya ityādy āptavacanaśravanāṃpūrvikā gavayādīsārūpyasya vivāksārūḍhasya yā pratitiḥ, sā śābdam eva sādvaprabhava-tvāt. śābdasya cāṇumāṃ ‘nārāhāvittavād na pramāṇāntaram. bāhye tv arthe visamvāditvāt tasyāḥ prāmnāyaṃ eva nāstīty abhiprāyah: “The cognition of the similarity of a gayal [to a cow], and so on,—(the similarity) being imposed by (someone’s) intention to speak—which presupposes hearing the words of an authority such as “the gayal is like a cow,” is nothing but verbal cognition in that it stems from words; and since verbal cognition is included in (the category of) inference, it is not a separate means of cognition. However, since there is disagreement about an external referent, this [cognition] has no cognitive validity. Such is [Dignāga’s] opinion.”
644 Cf. Ms B 241a4: tatkalpanaṃ smṛtyādivat. pramāṇaṃ eva na bhavati. kutaḥ punaḥ pramāṇāntaraṃ bhaviṣyati.

645 Yuktidīpika reproduces almost verbatim Dignāga’s view at YD 72,17-18: na tāvat parata <upasrutiya? > upamāṇaṃ pramāṇāntaram. yadā svayam eva gām gavayaṃ copalabhya vikalpayati “yathāyaṃ tathāyaṃ” iti tadā tasyārthasya pramāṇāntareṇādhyagamāt pramāṇaṃ eva tan na bhavatīti.

646 Cf. PST Ms B 241a5: apramāṇenādhyagamyamānaṃ. smṛtyādi adhiṣṭhigamamānaṃ iva na sārūpyam prameyam ity arthaḥ. In the immediately following excursus at Ms B 241a5-242b4 Jinendrabuddhi discusses Vātsyāyaṇa’s interpretation of upamāṇa in his commentary on NS I.1:6, and that of Śabarā on MS I.1:5. For this section, cf. Appendix 3.

The view that similarity is an object of cognition would imply that is is a perceptible general property (vastu). Kumārila addresses Dignāga’s rejection of this view at SV Upamāṇa° 17ff: pratyakṣābhāsaṃ etat tu nirvikalpa vādinām, prameyavastavabhāvāc ca nābhīpretya pramāṇātā.

Apart from Dignāga’s remark at Nyāyamukha 3b.10-11 about the inclusion of upamāṇa in anumāṇa his view of upamāṇa is only known from PS V § 67 and the more explicit passage at NV 60,16-61,1 in which Uddyotakara appears to reproduce Dignāga’s view as pūrvapakṣa. It is evidently not based upon PS V § 67. Uddyotakara is therefore addressing the discussion found in another Dignāga work, presumably the lost Nyāyaparīkṣā: pratyakṣāgamābhāyaṃ nopamāṇaṃ bhidyate, kathāṃ iti. yadā tāv ubhau gogavayaṃ pratyakṣenā paśyati tadā hy ayam anena sarūpa iti pratyakṣataḥ pratipadyate, yadāpi śṛṇotī “yathā gaur evam gavaya” iti tadāyāya śṛṇvata eva buddhir upajāyate kiccid gor dharmā gavaye ’nvayina upalabhyaṃ kiccid vyatirekiṇaṃ iti, anyathā hi yathā tathety eva na syat. bhīyaṃ tū sārūpyaṃ gavā gavayaṣya ity evam pratipadyate. tasmād nopamāṇaṃ pratyakṣāgamābhāyaṃ bhidyate iti: “Comparison is not distinct from sensation and testimony. In what way? Because when a person sees both the cow and the gayal, in that case it is by immediate sensation that he apprehends that one is like the other; and when he is told that the gayal is like the cow, in that case it is just on hearing of this that the knowledge arises in his mind that some of the qualities of the cow are found in the gayal and others are not: as otherwise the word ‘like’ would not have been used by the speaker; and he apprehends a preponderant sameness of the qualities of the gayal with those of the cow. For this reason comparison is not distinct from immediate sensation and testimony;” cf. Randle 1926: 49. As mentioned by Randle op. cit. 50-51, Dignāga’s criticism does not address Vātsyāyaṇa’s interpretation of NS I.1:6, and he may in fact have had another interpretation of the sūtra in mind. Kumārila does not expressly mention Dignāga’s view, but his criticism of the attempt to include upamāṇa in anumāṇa at SV Upamāṇa° 43ff is no doubt directed at Dignāga.

647 Dignāga’s inclusion of arthāpatti, implication, and abhāva, non-existence, in anumāṇa is known from PSV II:51, for which, cf. Frauwallner 1968: 90-91. See also YD 73,1-18; 74,9-16. Jinendrabuddhi mentions, in addition, aitiḥṣaya (tradition) and sambhava (inclusion), and closes his commentary on chapter five by quoting PSV I:2ab like in the beginning of the chapter, cf. Ms B 242b5-7: tatraitihyaṃ(1) iti hocur ity(2) anirdiṣṭapravaktkam(3) paramparāgatam vacanam. yattheha vane(4) yakṣaḥ prativasatīti. etad api vivakṣāyāṃ śābdān na bhidyate. bāhye ’rthe tv asya
prāmāṇyam eva nāsti. sambhavo nāma yatra yasya sambhavaḥ tadgraṇāṇāṃ. yathā dronaggraṇāṇād ādakasya sattā gṛhyate. etad api samudāyavāsthaḥ samudāyaṁ kāraṇam iti dṛṇāt kāryalingād eva grahaṇaṁ. tato 'nūmāṇa antargataḥ arthāpattyādīṇi pūrvam eva kṛitiḥvidhānānīti sthitam etat "pratyakṣam anumāṇaṁ ca pramāṇe dve eva”ti.

Cf. the somewhat different presentation at YD 73,19–74,3 of Dignāga’s (?) interpretation of sambhava as an instance of presumption and therefore by definition included in the category of inference.

The compound anumāṇavikalpa—grammatically a karmadāraya “the representation which is inference”—is not recorded elsewhere in PSV and Jinendrabuddhi does not comment upon it.

(1) em. : tatreti hyam iti Ms
(2) em. : dobu ritya Ms (ės drag ciṅ brjod nas sic T)
(3) em. : nirdiṣṭapravarttakam Ms, cf. T ſes par bstan pa ’jug par byed pa indicating that T presupposes the same wrong reading; Jinendrabuddhi alludes to Vātsyāyana’s formulation, cf. Nyāyabhāṣya on NS II.2:1: iti hocur ity anirdiṣṭapra-vaktraṁ pravādāpāramparyam aitihyam; cf. Kiriṇāvalī on PBh § 263.
(4) conj. (dper na nags ’di na gnod sbyin T) : yahivathehavaṭe Ms
(5) em. : tatagrahaṇāt Ms

648 Cf. le’u lha pa ’o K : tsad ma kun las btu pa las gžan sel ba brtag pa ’i le’u ste lha pa ’o V.
Appendix 1

Restored Sanskrit Text of Pramāṇasamuccayavṛtti V §§1-66

§1. uktam pramāṇadvayam. kecic chābdam api <pramāṇāntaram man-
yante>.

\[\text{na pramāṇāntaram} \text{ śābdam anumānāt. tathā hi saḥ |} \]
\[\text{kṛtakatvādīvat svārtham anyāpohena bhāṣate } \| \{1\}\]

śābdо hi yatra viṣaye prayużyate tasya yenāṃsenāvinābhāvitvasam-
bandhah, taṃ kṛtakatvādīvaṃ arthāntaravyavacchedena dyotayati,
<tasmād anumānān> na bhidyate.

§2. ye tv āhuh: jātiśabdaḥ svabhedān sarvān evāha, ukteṣu tu niya-
mārtham viśaṣāśrutir <iti>. <tatrocyate>

\[\text{na jātiśābdо bhedānāṃ } \{2a\}\]

“vācaka” iti vakṣyate. jātiśabdas tāvat sadādir <dravyādīnāṃ na vāca-
kaḥ>,

ānantyāt. [2b,]

ānantye hi bhedānāṃ asākyah sambandhaḥ kartum. na cākṛtasamban-
dhe śabde ’rthābhidhānaṃ yuktam svarūpamātraprafitēḥ.

§3. kiṃ ca,

vyabhicārataḥ. [2b,]

yathā hi sacchābdо dravye vartate tathā guṇādīṣv apīti vyabhicārāt
saṃśayaḥ syāt, nābhidhānam.

§4. yo ’pi manyate: <jātiśābdо jātimātre tadyogamātre vā> samban-
dhasaukāryād avyabhicārāc ceti. tad ayuktam, <na hi tayor api>

vācako yogajātyor vā bhedārthaḥ apṛthakśruteḥ. [2cd]
tathā hi <sad dravyam, san guṇaḥ, sat karmetī bhedārthair dravyādi-
śabdaiḥ> sāmāṇādhikaranıyam na syāt. tac ca drṣṭam. na hi sattā <tad-
yoyo vā> dravyaṃ guṇo vā bhavati, kim tarhi, dravyasya guṇasya vā.
āha ca:

vibhaktibheda nīyamād gunagunyabhidhāyinoḥ
sāmāṇādhikaranīyaṃsya prasiddhir dravyasabdayoh.

[VP III.14:8]

sambandhaś cātra sambandhīdharmane vācya ucyate:
tathā hi bhāvaḥ kṛtvoktaḥ, bhāvaś cānyena yuyate. [3]

sambandhanām hi sambandhaḥ. <so 'nyena yuyate rāgādivat>. tasmāt
sambandhīdharmane sambandho vācya iti kṛtvāśaṅkitam svadharmena
tu nästi sambandhāsya vācakāḥ śabda ity idaṁ tat prati nästi. ato nai-
vāsya jātiśabdena vācyatvam upapadyate.

§5. <ye tv āhuh>: viśeṣasabdaiḥ <sāmāṇādhikaranīyāt sambandha-
saukāryād avyabhicārāc ca jātīmanmātraṃ vivakṣitam iti. tatra>

tadvato nāsvatantratvāt. [4a]

everam √api hi sacchabdo jātisvarūpamātropasaranam dravyam āha, na
sākṣād iti tadbhagatāḥdibhedānākṣepād atadbhedatve sāmāṇādhika-
ranīyabhāvah. na hy asatyām vyāptau <sāmāṇādhikaranīyabhāvah>.
tadyathā śuklaśabdaiḥ svabhidheyagunamātraviśiṣṭadravyābhidhānāt,
saty āpi dravye madhurādīn nākṣipatī. tataś cātādbhedaṃtvam. evam
atrāpi prasaṅgaḥ.

§6. <kim ca>,

upacārāt. [4b₁]

sacchabdo hi bhūtārthena svarūpaṃ vā jātiṃ vāha. tatra pravṛttas tada-
vaty upacāryate. na tu yo yatropacāryate, sa tam artham bhūtārthe-
nāha.

§7. <sārūpyasya ca>

asambhavāt. [4b₂]
Appendices

$\text{§8. katha\u093f na pratayasa\u093e\u093f\u0928r\u093e\u0924\u093e\u0928ntita\u0924? upac\u0924re sati}$

$buddhir\u0932pasya bhinnatv\u093e d\u092a\u094d bh\u0927tyopac\u0924ravat. [4cd]$  
$tady\u0928[\ldots].$  
$\text{upacaryate ca <j\u092d\u093e\u0935\u0942abdas tadvati>}. $  

$\text{§9. krame\u093f\u093e\u0928nabhidh\u0935\u0942n\u0924c ca kunda\u093e\u0935\u093e\u0928\u093fkh\u092d\u093e\u0928\u093e\u093fuklavat. [5ab]}$

$\text{<yat\u0924 hi sam\u0935naprat\u0927\u093e\u0928sis tat\u0924 krama\u093e\u093e\u0928bhidh\u0935\u0942n\u0924am, tady\u0928> \u0926ukl\u0924m kundam, kumudam, \u0928\u0935\u0942\u093e\u093f iti; sak\u092c ca j\u0921t\u0924dvato\u0924 \u0926\u093f \u0924\u093e\u093f\u0942 <pr\u0935y\u093f \u093e\u0935> n\u093e\u093f pratayasa\u093e\u0928r\u093e\u0924\u0928ntita\u0924 s\u0935r\u0932pyam.}$

$\text{§10. gu\u0920pak\u0924r\u0924t t\u093e\u093e\u0924pye prakar\u093f\u0924 sy\u093e\u0935 v\u093e\u0924 dhiy\u093a. [5cd]}$

$\text{yadi sp\u0924\u0932kikavad gu\u0920par\u0924g\u0924t sadv\u0924n gu\u0920nasvar\u0924p\u0928 bhavet, eva\u092f sati}$  
$\text{dravye gu\u0920prakarsabuddhyanapek\u0924s\u092e <pi> prakar\u093f\u0924uddhi sy\u093e\u0935.}$  
$\text{na hi sp\u0924\u0932kika upadh\u0935\u0924nabuddhyapek\u0924s pravartate raktabuddhi, avyutpan}$  
$n\u093e\u093f nasya bhedabuddhy<abh\u0935\u0942v\u093e>.}$

$\text{§11. <ki\u0927m ca>,}$  
$\text{sa\u0935m\u093e\u093f\u0928r\u0924p\u0924t sarvatra mithy\u093e\u0935\u093f\u0928nam prasajyate. [6ab]}$

$\text{sarvo hi \u0926\u0932d\u093f pratayayo \u0924\u093e\u0935<pr\u0935y\u093f \u093e\u0935> sa\u0935m\u093e\u093f\u0928r\u0924pavyavahita\u0924, tata\u0924 <sp\u0924\u093e\u093f-}$  
$kavavd> ayath\u0928\u093e\u0935 sy\u093e\u0935.}$

$\text{§12. <ki\u0927m ca>}$  

$s\u0935m\u0921ny\u0932dibahutve ca yugapad gr\u0924\u093e\u0935hake\u0924 ca}$  
$\text{upak\u0924ro virudhyeta. [6cd-7a]}$

$\text{yad\u093a ca bahavo grah\u0928t\u0924ro bhavanti gu\u0920nava\u093e\u0942t\u093f \u0926ukl\u0924des tady\u0928 h\u0932a-}$  
$\text{ta\u0924, p\u093e\u0928t\u093f\u0924v, dravyam, san, \u0926ukla\u0924, madhura\u0924, surabhi ityeva\u093e\u0928d-}$  
$\text{vi\u093e\u0935\u0942sai\u0924, tada gu\u0920nopak\u0924ro virudhyate.}$  
$\text{na hi \u0926\u0932yam tad\u0924 dravyena}$  
$\text{ekagun\u0932r\u0924pena st\u0935tum, av\u093e\u0935s\u093e\u0935t, \u0924py ekade\u092f\u0924na gu\u0920nar\u0924pam anubh\u0924-}$  
$\text{vitum \u0926kyam, kr\u0935\u0942\u0928s\u0935\u0928y a\u0935h\u0924d\u0932paprat\u0924t\u0924.}$  
$\text{sarvair v\u0924 me\u093c\u093e\u0935ke\u093a\u093f\u093e\u0935m. [7b]}$
atha punaḥ sarvair ghaṭatvādibhir upakāro yugapat kṛṣṇasya kriyate, tataḥ pratyekam ghaṭādirūpagrahānābhāvād meacakadarśanam yugapat sarvarūpāpatteḥ syāt.

§13. bhedeṣu jātau tadyoge tulyo doṣaś ca teṣv api. [7cd]

 [...] <jātau> mukhyo bhedeṣūpacāritaḥ. [...] avaśyam [...] sambha-vataḥ [...].

§14. tadvāṃs ca bheda eveṣtaḥ sa ca pūrvaṁ nirākṛtah. [8cd] [...]

§15. nanu coktam [...]. yady evaṃ
tadvanmātraṃ tu sambandhaḥ sattā veti vicāritam. [9ab]

 [...] <yathāha:> samāsakṛttaddhīteṣu sambandhābhidhānam anyatra rūḍhyabhinnarūpāvyabhicāritasambandhebhya <iti. tatra ca na>

 vācako yogajātyor vā bhedārthair apṛthakṣruteḥ [2cd]
<ity uktam>.

§16. tadvān artho ghaṭādiś cen na paṭādiśu vartate. sāmānyam arthaḥ sa katham. [9cd-10a]
anekavrītti hi sāmānyam [...] tac ca [...] katham [...].

§17. nanu ca [...]. sattādiśu ca ... tasmāt [...]. sā ca <nāsty arthasya>, yasmāt [...]. [...] na tu kenacit tadvatā; sattāyogau ca <pūrvaṁ nirākṛttau>.

§18. nānimittaḥ sa <ca> mataḥ. [10c]

 [...] tataś ca [...].

§19. atha punar ananyasmiṃ dravye vartate sadgūnam,, sacchabdād ghaṭādyākāṅkṣāyāṁ viśeṣāṇaviśeṣāyabhāvaḥ syāt, nilatarādivat.

 yady ekatrāsitaḥdivat. [10d]
<sambandhe guṇe vā syāt>,

Appendices A5

<naitad apy asti>. [11a₁]
nīlāsabdo hi [...].

§20. <kiṃ ca,>

upetyāpi naitaj jāter ajātītaḥ. [11a₂-b]

[...] naivāṃ sajjātir ghāṭādijātimatī yatas tān viśeṣān upādāya dravye varteta. [...] 

§21. evaṃ tarhy <ucyate> yady apy aśabdavācyā, tathāpi ghāṭādiṣv arthāksiptesu bhedākāṅkṣā bhavisyati. tadvān hy artho ’vaśyaṃ ghāṭa- tvādīnāṃ kenaḥ sāmānyenānubaddha <iti>.

arthākṣepe ’pi anekāntāḥ. [11c]

arthākṣepo hi <yasmin arthe niścayotpattiḥ>, tadyathā divā na bhūṅkta iti rātriḥoḥjane <niścayaḥ>. iha punaḥ sad ity ukte na ghāṭādiṣu niścayaḥ. <iti samśaye sati> näṣty <arthā>kṣepaḥ.

§22. <yasmāj jātiśabdo na katham api bhedasāmānyasambhandha- jātimadvācakaḥ,>

tenānyāpohakṛc chrutiḥ. [11d]

tasmād <yad uktam prāk>:

kṛṭakatvādivat svārtham anyāpohena bhāṣate [1cd]

<iti tad eva sthitam>.

§23. āha ca:

bahudhāpy abhidheyasya na śabdāt sarvathā gatiḥ svasambandhānurūpyāt tu vyavacchedārthakārya asau. [12]

anekadharmā śabdo ’pi yenārthaṃ nāṭivartate pratyāyayati tenaiva na śabdaguṇatādibhiḥ. [13]

§24. yady anyāpohamātraṃ <śabdārthaḥ>, katham <-nilotpalādiśabdā- nāṃ sāmānādhikaranyaṃ syād, viśeṣāṇaviśeṣyabhāvaḥ ca>. kathaṃ ca
na syāt? yasmād bhinnam <apohyaṃ sāmānyaviśeṣaśabdānām. eṣa doṣo nāsti>, te ’pi hi

apohyabhedād bhinnārthāḥ svārthabhedagrausau jaḍāḥ
ekatrābhinnakāryatvād viśeṣānviśeṣyakāḥ. [14]

<nīlotpālādiśabdā hi> saty apy apohyabhede svārthaviśeṣavyaṃjanār-
tham ārdhvaśākanilayavat svam apohārtham ekatropasamharantaḥ
<samānādikaranaḥ bhavanti>. tathā hi te pratyekām svārthaviśeṣe
samāyaḥetavāḥ, śabdāntarasahitavyaṃgyārthāsamhavac ca <viśe-
ṣaṇāvīśeṣya> bhūtāḥ.

§25. yat tarhi tad ekādhikaraṇam [...].

na ca tat kevalam nīlam na ca kevalam utpalam
samudāyābhidheyatvāt. [15a-c]

nīlotpalaśabdābhyāṁ <hi> sahitābhyaṁ sa <pratīyate>, na kevalābh-
yāṁ. <kevalau hi>

varṇa<vat tau> nirarthakau. [15d]
yathaiva hi [...] 

§26. viṣama upanyāsaḥ. na hi [...] 

varne na kaścid arthaś ced gamyate tu padadvaye
tadvācyā iti tatrāpi kevalaṁ sa pratīyate. [16]
yathaiva hi [...]. yat tuktam [...] tatrāpi [...] arthaśūnyaiḥ samudayaiḥ
[...]. bhinnāśabdavācyenārthena bhinnārthā ity ucyante. [...].

§27. [...] <etayor hy> avayavārthayor adhikaraṇaṃ tato bhinnam syād
abhinnaṃ vā. [...]

samudāyaikatā nāsti mitho ’bhedapraśaṅgataḥ. [17ab]
yadi hi [...].

samūhānekatāsakteḥ. [17c]
samūhāṣyānekaśmād abhēdād anekatvaprasaṅgaḥ. [...] nilotpālārthayoḥ [...], ekatrāpi vartamānau

<śabdau svārthaṁ na tyajataḥ>. [17d]

[...] samuditaṭyaor api [...] kutaḥ sāmānādhikaraṇyaṁ? <eṣa doṣo nāsti> dvāv api <viṣeṣārthau>, sāmānye viṣeṣāntarbhāvāt. tulyarūpau <sā- mānyārthena>. viṣeṣārthavattvajñāpanārthaṁ dvitīyaśabdaprayogaḥ. [...].

atra tāvad nīlāsabden<ābhedenā>bhidhīyate,

na jātiḥ. [18a1]

<na hi nīlāsabdo dravyajātīm> sāmānyenāha, <kuto viṣeṣo dravya- jātēv antarbhūtāḥ kalpyeta?>
nanu ca <nīlavad dravyaṁ sāmānyenāha>, [...]. ayuktam evaṁ bhavi- tum. <kasmāt>?

pūrvam uktatvāt. [18a2]

<taḍvadabhidhānamḥ hi “taḍvato nāsvatantratvād” [4a] ityevamādinā> pūrvam eva niśiddham.

[...] tad ayuktam. <kasmāt>?

samśayāt. [18b1]

samśayo hi <sāmānyaśabdād viṣeṣeṣu dṛṣṭaḥ>. na ca yataḥ saṃśayaḥ <tenābhidhānam-yuktam>. syāt tv arthato <viṣeṣaśabdāt sāmānya- pratītir avyabhicārāt>.

yat tarhīdam <uktam “antarbhūtaviṣeṣaṁ sāmānyam” iti>, naitad <uk- tam abhidheyatvāt, kiṁ tarhi,

anapohanāt>. [18b2]

[...] paryāye gatir ekasmāt. [18c].

paryāyaśabde hy anirjñātānekarthe paryāyāntarasya prayogas tat<pür- vā>rthapraṭītaye. etad eva hi <paryāyaśabdānām> paryāyavam: paryā-
yeṇārtham abhidadhati, <na yugapat>. tathā cotpālārthasya nīlaśab-denaivāvagater viṣesaṇaviṣesatvābhāvah. [...] §28. <yathābhede> tathā bhedē ’pi: <samudāyibhyah> samudāyasyā-nyatvam sādhyam. na hi tasya teṣu teṣāṁ vā tatra kārtnyenaikadesena vā vrṛtīḥ sambhavati. [...] [...] tad dhy arthayor vā havec <chabdayor vā>. [...].

yady apy ekārthavṛttitā <jātigunayoś cārthayoh> na sāmānyaviṣeṣatvam. [19a-c]
yady api hi <nīlagunotpalajātyor ekatra dravye vrṛteḥ sāmānādhikaraṇyaḥ syāt, na viṣeṣaṇaviṣeṣyabhāvah>. na hi [...] tadvatoḥ [...] [19d]

[...] dravyayor anyatvārṛteḥ. [...] dvayor ekasya vā sāmānya-viṣeṣavattvāyogāt. [...].

[...] [20ab]

atyantabhinnaḥ hi <śabdau jātiguṇābhidhāyakau, tasmāt tayoḥ sāmā�ādhikaraṇyābhāvah> [...]. [...]

[...] tulyātulyam prasajyate. [20cd] [...] §29. atulyatvāvivakṣā cet. [21a]

<yadi manyate: sambhandhikṛtabhedāvivakṣāyām> tulyatvam tāvad upādāya sāmānādhikaraṇyaḥ bhaviṣyati. yatrapī hi [...] tulyākārabuddhi <hetutvāt>. ubhāvayuvāsānugṛhīte [...] tatra śabdavyāparaḥ. tanmātrasya vivakṣā prayujyate. sambhandhikṛte tv <viṣeṣe ’vivakṣīte >, tad vastu katham vācyam?

<kīṃ ca> gavāśvasamānata. [21b]
[...] <tasya vastuno> ’nabhidheyatvena <samānateti> nīlotpalādivat sāmānādhikaranyaprāsaṅgaḥ.

§30. tatrākṛtiviśeṣaś ca. [21c]

[...] svasāmānābhivyaktiheetor <bhedasya> tatkrte hi tayos tathā-bhidhāne katham avivakṣā, na tu nīlotpalatvavato ’rthasya.

anekākāṛtisaṅkaraḥ. [21d]

ekasmin vastuni <anekasāmānā>bhivyakter anekasamsthaṃnasamā-veṣaḥ <syāt>, na ca drśṭam.

§31. api ca,

<tulyam>. [22a₁]

<gavaśvādināṁ hi> tulyātulyam adhikaraṇam anabhidheyatvāt sattādi-vyaṅjakatvāc ca gotvādivyaṅjakatvāt. tatrāpy atulyatvāvivakṣāyāṁ sāmānādhikaranyaprāsaṅgaḥ.

§32. iṣṭe ’pi cābhāvaḥ. [22a₂]

yatrāpi [...]. yadi [...]. tathā hi [...].

§33. [...]

na vyaktir guṇakarmanoḥ. [22b]

<guṇakarmanoḥ hy> asamsthaṅnavattvāt <tadgatasāmānā>abhivyaktipraśaṅgaḥ. śaktibhedena svasāmānābhivyayaṅjakatvād dravyādiṣu bheda iti [...].

§34. [...]. śābdānāṁ tāvad abhidhāyaakaśabḍakṛṭaḥ. teśaṁ hi yadṛcchā-śabdeṣu tadabhidheyatvāṁ viṣeṣaḥ.

bheda vācakabhedāc ca [...]. [22c]

[...] avisīṣṭe hi vastuny abhidhāyaekaṇa śabdenābheidopacārāṇ na vak-tavyam viṣiṣṭasammyābhivyaktiḥetutvād gavādayo viṣiṣṭāḥ. abhidhānabhedād api drṣṭo bhedaś caitrādivad <iti cet>. na, tasyaiva parīkṣ-yaṃe ca <cai>kasyaipi anekaparyāyaśabdābhidheyatvāc <ca>. [...] tatrā-
rtha iva vicārah. [...] sa tu nābhidhāyakaḥ [...] śākaṭikā<der> <bāla>-prayuktasya ca <ekārthābhidhhyakatvāt>.

§35. [...] <tadyathā> śirah prṣtham udaram pāṇir iti tadviśeṣebhya [VS X.11] <ity uktam>.

vyāṅjakavyaktito bhede <prāptam anyonyasaṃśrayaṃ> [23ab]

[...]. dravyasvabhāvah kaḥ? svasāmānyābhivyāṅjakatvam. sāmānyasvabhāvah kaḥ? svadravyābhivyāṅgyatvam. [...].

§36. <kiṃ ca>

svabhāvānaikataikasya bahuvyakteḥ parasparam. [23cd]

[...]. dravyād dhi <bahuśāmānyasya> sattāder <vyaktih>. [...]. sarvathā ca guṇasambandhabhedāc ca śaktibhedāc cābhidhānabhedāc ca bhedābhupagame <ekāṣāpy> anekatvaprasāṅghaḥ.

[...]

[24]

§37. viśeṣaṇaviśeṣyatvam avsātantrytāt puroditam. [25ab]

[...].

§38. tatra,

anyatve ’pi na sāmānyabhedaparyāyāvācyanu. [25cd]

tulye ’pi hi anyatve <śabdo na sāmānyabhedaparyāyasabdānām artham apohate. kuta iti cet?> avirodhāt. paryāyasabdasya <tāvat> tulyam apohyaṃ yugapad aprayogat, na ca svārthapratikṣepo yuktah. sāmānyasabdenāpī svabhedeṣu arthāntaram vyudastam bhedaśabdo ’numodate, arthivāt. yathā hi śimśapā na palas＜ādi＞, evaṃ na ＜ghāty＞ api. etena ＜sāmānyasāmānyasabdārthāpratikṣepo ’py uktaḥ＞. ta-thā sāmānyasabdah svārtham abhiprete viśaye vyavasthāpyamānam viśeṣaṇabdena viśeṣaviśeṣaṇabdena vā katham nopekṣate? ＜evam avirodhād na sāmānyādiśabdārthāpohohuktaḥ＞. samūhaś ca tathārthāntaravācakah. evaṃ ca sāmānyaviśeṣaṇabdayor svārthasāmānye vartamānāyor dvayor bāhūnāṃ vā tadvīśiṣṭārthāntaravācakatvam upapadyate yathoktam prāk.
§39. <āha ca>

tanmātrākaṅkṣaṇād bhedāḥ svasāmānyena nojhitāḥ
nopātaḥ sanśāyotpatteḥ, sāmye caikārthataḥ tayoḥ [26]

anekam api sāmānyam bhedenāvyabhicārīnā
upāttaṁ na tayor tulyā viśeṣaṇaṃviśeṣyatā [27]

§40. kim punar atra <kāraṇaṁ yena bhedaśabdo bhedāntarāśabdār-
tham apohate?>

bhedo bhedāntarārtham tu virodhitvād apohate [28ab]

bhedārthā hi śabdāḥ sāmānyārthāpaharitvād rājaputravat paraspara-
virodhinaḥ. tataḥ ca na parasararthaṁ kṣamante. tadyathā <'ayaṁ
vrkṣāḥ śimśape’ti śimśapāsabdo vrkṣāsabdena saha prayujyamānaḥ
khādirādibhyo vrkṣatvām vyavacchidyā svaviṣaye vyavasthāpayati.
tathetaratrāpi. evam tāvad bhedaśabdasayai>kadravyāpahāritvād <bhe-
dāntarasabdārthāpohoh yuktāḥ>.

§41. atha sāmānyāntarabhed<ārtham> ghaṭādim asambandhamā
kasmād apohata <iti. yasmād>

sāmānyāntarabhedārthāḥ svasāmānyavirodhinaḥ [28cd]

vrkṣāsabdena hi <ghaṭādayāḥ pārthivādyapahāritvād virodhinaḥ>. tena
hi nirākriyamāṇāṃ abhyanumodate mitrāsastruvat. arthāc ca tena sa
nirasta iti pratīyate. etena <sāmānyāntarabhedānāṃ guṇādīnāṃ tad-
bhedānāṃ ca rūpādīnāṃ> nirākaranam upēksaṇam ca sambandhāsamb-
bandhataḥ kṛtāṁ veditavyāṃ <mitramitraśatruvat, mitrāsastrumitra-
vāt>.

§42. tatra tu

na sākṣāt tasya te ’pohyāḥ. [29a]

[...]

mā bhūt sāmānyatulyatā. [29b]

yadi hi sākṣād apoheta, vrkṣāsabdena tulyārthaḥ syāt.

tathā bhedāntarāṇāṁ <tu teneva> na syād apohaḥ. [29cd]
yathaiva hi vrkṣaśabdaḥ palāśādin nāpoheta, tathā śimśapāśabdo 'pi nāpoheta <tena tulyatvāt>. <yadi nāsti sa doṣo>'lpaharthaṁpoha-tvena bhinnatvād <īty evam> ayuktam. yathaiva hi vrkṣaśimśapāśa-bdau <vrkṣatvaśimśapātaviśiṣṭam vastu bruvaṇāv atyantabhinnārtham> brūtah, tathēhāpy <asaṅkīṝṇārthena> bhāvitavyam. arthāt tu syād alpahutarāpohāḥ.

§43. yadi bheda bhedāntarārtham <apoheta, madhuro rasaḥ snigdhaḥ śīto guruḥ ceti yad etad guṇasya guṇāntaraḥ sāmāṇādhikaranyām,> tat katham? [...]

sāmāṇādhikaranyāṃ tu <guṇasya yad guṇāntaraḥ
tasyaikadravyavīrttatvād āśrayenaḥvirodhatvāt> [30]

[...].

§44. adṛṣṭatvād vyudāso vā. [31a]

<atha vā> yasmād bhedasabdo bhedāntarārthe na drṣṭah, tasmād apohate. kasmāt tu na drṣṭah? svābhāvike ’py arthe [...] āhopuruṣikā prati-pannā [...].

§45. evaṁ tarhi

sāmānyam syāt svabhedaḥ. [31b]

yady adarśanenaḥpohate, <sāmānyasabdyāpi svabhedeṣy adarśanād apohaprasaṅgaḥ syāt>.

nānyayuktasya drṣṭatvāt. [31c]

dṛṣṭo hy arthaprakaraṇādibhiḥ sāmānyasabdo viśeṣam pratipādayati.

ta<dābhaḥ> saṃśayasya tathā. [31d]

<evaṁ tarhi> sāmānyasabdād bhedābhāṣaḥ saṃśayo yuktāḥ,> teṣv api drṣṭapūrvaḥ, ūrdhvatāvat.

saṃśayo ’yukta iti cet. [32a]

<idam> manyate: yady arthaprakaraṇādisahita evopalabdhāḥ syāt, tataḥ <kathaṃ saṃśaya> iti.
niścita kevalāt tu saḥ. [32b]
aiva <arthādi> sahitāt saṃśaya ity ucyate, kiṃ tarḥī arthādisahitād niścita uttaraṅgayanaṃ kevalāt saṃśayaḥ.

bhede cen nāsti kevalaḥ. [32c]
[...]
dṛṣṭaḥ śrotṛvyapekṣayā. [32d]
yadā hi śrotānyāsāmānīṇyāvyūdāsenārthībhavati, <tadyathā> kiṃ vrkṣaḥ pārthiva uta paṇcamahābhautika ity <ukte>, tadā pārthiva iti kevalasya prayoga sambhavati. niścita tarhi <tasya> vrkṣe kutaḥ pārthivaśabdā-prayogāt saṃśaya iti <cet>, tasya niścite ’nyasya <kevalāt saṃśayaḥ>. [...].

§46. yathā cārthāntarāpohenārthe sāmānyam, tathā>

<śabdāntaravyūdāsenā śabde sāmānyam ucyate>. [33ab]
yathaivākṛtakavyūdāsenā yat kṛtakatvam tat sāmānyam anityatvādi-gamakam, tathā śabdāntaravyāvacchedena śabde sāmānyam ucyate. tenaiva cārthāpratīṣayakah. tatrāpi

<aiṇyaṁ yatārthasaṃśayāḥ>. [33c]
yatrāksādiśabdād arthe sakaṭāṅgādau saṃśaya <utpadyate>, tatra śabdasyaikyam.

tatsandehe tv anekatā. [33d]
<yatra> bhavatisabdādau śatrantādau saṃśayaḥ, <tatra> śrutiśāmye ’pi śabdabheda draṣṭavyaḥ, tadyathā ka iheti.

§47. katham punaḥ śabdasyārthāntarāpohenā svārthābhidhāne pūrva-doṣāpasaṅgahḥ? <yasmād>

adrṣṭer anyaśabdārthe svārthasyāmśe ’pi darṣanāt śruteḥ sambandhasaukaryaṃ na cāstī vyabhicāritā. [34]
anvayavyatirekau hi śabdasyārthābhidhāne dvāram, tau ca tulyātulya-yor vṛttvavṛttī. tatra tu tulye nāvaśyaṃ sarvatra vṛttir ākhīeyā kva cid,
ānantye 'ṛthasyākhyānāsambhavāt. atulye tu saty apy ānantye śakyam adarśanamātrenāvṛttar ākhyānam. ata eva ca svasambandhibhyo 'nya-trādarśanāt tadvyavacchēdānumānam svārthābhīdham ātis ucyate. anvayadvāreṇā cānumāne vr̥kṣasābdād ēkasmin vastuni śimśapādyā-bhāsāḥ samśayo na syāt. tatsamśayavat pārthivatvadravyatvādyābhāsō ’pi samśayaḥ syāt. yatas tu <vr̥kṣasābdo ’pārthivādiṣu na drṣṭāḥ>, ato vyātīrekaṃkumhaṇādīnānam. <āha ca>

vr̥kṣatvapr̥thivadravyasajjñeyāḥ prātilomyataḥ catustridvyeka sandehe nimittam, niścaye ’nyathā [35]

<īty antaraślokaḥ>.

§48. na ca sambandhadvāream muktvā śabdasya liṅgasya vā svārtha-khyāpanasaktir asti, tasyānekadharmanvte sarvathā pratyāyanāsambhavāt, <śvārthāvyayabhiśāra ca> bhedanābhīdhamāt. evanā tāvat pūrvok-tadoṣasyābhāvah.

§49. anantarasyāpy abhāvaḥ. <katham? yasmād>

vyāpter anyanisedhasya tadbhedārthair abhinnatā. [36ab]

sāmānṭayaśabdasya hi yat kṛtyam arthāntaravvyudāṣaḥ sa svabhedāprati-kṣepeneti bhedaṃrūtya saha sāmānṃadhikaranyam upapannam. <tasmāt svabhedārthair pṛthakśrutidoṣo nāsti>. [...] tathā hi svārthāvyabhiśāraḥ <kevalasyānyatāvṛtteḥ>.

§50. paścimasyāpi doṣasyābhāvaḥ,

sākṣād vṛttter abhedāc ca. [36c]

na hy arthāntaram upādāya <śabdah svabhedeṣu vartate>, tasmāt pārantantryeṇa <svabhēdāṅkṣepadoṣo nāsti>. bhāktadoṣo ’pi nāsti, nāpī bhedānavasthānād anabhidhānadoṣāh. avyyapakatvāc cāsāmānṅyadoṣo ’pi nāsti, arthāntarāpohamātṛasyābhīnnavād adravyatvāc ca. ata eva <sāmānyavīṣeśāntarayogānusaranāma na kartavyam>, sākṣād arthāntara-pratiśedhāt. <evam pūrvadoṣābhāvāḥ> arthāntarāpohā eva śabdār-thaḥ sādhuḥ.

§51. <atra ca>

jāṭidharmavavyavasthiteḥ. [36d]
jatidharmāś caiketvāntyatvapratyekaparīṣṭilakṣaṇāatraiva vyavatisthante, abhedat, āśrayāvicchedat, krtsnārthapratītēḥ. <evam purvoktadośābhāvād> guṇotkarṣac ca śabdo 'ṛthāntaranīrttiśiṣṭan eva bhāvān āha.

§52. <evam sati>,

apohaniyamaḥ kasmāt? [37a]

rūpāsabdēna rasādaya apohyante, na punar anyatamavarṇābhidhāne seṣā varṇā <atyantabhinnā api. sa kiṅkrṭah>? yasya tu rūpatvam abhinnaṃ nīlādiṣv evāsti, na rasādiṣv <ity evam eṣa doṣo nāstīti cet>. [...]

lokarūḍho na mṛṣyate. [37b]

uktam hi <Bhagavatā>: “janapadaniruktim nābhiniśeta samijnām ca lokasya nābhidhāvet.” tasmād asmābhir api <lokavyavahārā naimittikā vā> pārībhāṣikā <vā> bhūtārthatvena na mṛṣyante, lokavadyavānugamyante. siddhaś ca rūpaśabdō loke nīlādiṣv eva, na rasādiṣu.

§53. rūpatve tulyam etac ca. [37c]

<yasya ca atyantabhinnēsu nīlādiṣu rūpatvavrīttih, tasya kena rasādyavrīttih?> rasādyavrīttivad vā pātādvrīttih?

asti atra <kāraṇam>. sati svabhāvabhede <nīlādiṣv eva cākṣuṣatvam abhinnaṃ, na rasādiṣu>.

cākṣuṣatvē kriyākṛtah. [37d]

cākṣuṣā <hi grāhyam cākṣuṣatvam; <evam ca> kriyānimitto <nīlādiṣu> rūpasabdāḥ syāt, na tu jātinimittāḥ. cākṣuṣatvābhede hi kim punā rūpatvaneva? atha rūpatvasambandhasya nīmittām cākṣuṣatvam <uktam iti cet>, evam api <cākṣuṣatve samavāyah> kriyākṛtāḥ prāpnoti, rūpatvābhivyaktīr vā. cākṣuṣatve ’pi vā <niyamaḥ kasmāt>? tasmād avaśyāṃ svabhāvīkatvam āśrāyaṇīyam.

dravyādiṣu prasaṅgaś ca. [38a]

<dravyasaṅkhyaśaripuṁ śīnē su cākṣuṣatvāt teṣv api rūpatvaprasaṅgaḥ syāt>. <kiṃ ca>
bheda-bhāvaḥ sitādiṣu. [38b]
<caṅkuṣaṭavāviśeṣe niḍapātanālatarāṇīlatamāder bhedo na syāt>. tasmād avaśyām caṅkuṣaṭavatyatikeṇa <niḍapāṭādiṣu bhinnēṣv api> rūpaśabd-do loke ṛudher anugantavyaḥ, na rasādiṣu.

§54. yadi cārthāntaranīrtyanapekṣatāyaṃ <śabdasyārthābhidhānaṃ syāt, tarhy>

anvayād eva siddhiḥ syāt, [38c]
na tu <śabdasyārthābhidhāne> ’nvayavatyarekaḥbhyaṃ syāt; iṣyate ca. anyatatobhayāvadhāraṇenābhidhānasāphalyād vyatirekato ’py arthā-

bhidhānaṃ, <tadyathā> “kartū śpaṭatamaṃ karma.”

§55. nanu cā<phamātre śabdārthe> vyatirekād evābhidhānaṃ syāt.
syād etad evaṃ <yady anvayo neṣyeta>, bhāvena tu

mukhyena <vyāptir neṣyate>. [38d]
na hi bhāvesu <jātiḥ sambhavati vyatirikta vā syād avyatirikta vety>
uktam. jātivyatirekena tv <“adrṣṭe anyaśabdārthā” ity etena>rthā-
tarapohāviśiṣe ’rthe <śabdasyānvayavatyarekau na bhinnārthau>.

§56. yas tv āha “yadi gavādi vyaktam sarvam asato vikāraḥ, sarvā-

myaprasaṅgat prayuktam asataḥ sadātmakatvam” iti.
asatsamanvitam sarvam <yasya tv abhyupagacchataḥ>
sattvam anekātmakatvād iti kiṃ kena yujyate? [39]
<yadi sarvam asatsamanvitam ity abhyupagamyeta>, tatra katame

’yne gavādayo <’santaḥ kena svabhāvena sattvādhyaropyāḥ syuh?>.
sarvān hi gavādin <asatsamanvitān> abhyupagacchato ’sataḥ sadātm-
akatvam prāptam ity uttaram na yujyate. yad apy uktaṃ “pratyaya-

bhedaḥ syād asatsatoḥ, prakṛtiprathyayo hi vikāre dṛṣṭaḥ, tadyathā

mṛṭpratyayaḥ śāravādau,” <tatra>,
mṛdabhede śaravādibhededhī yadi ceṣyate
asadabhede bhedadhiḥ kim iti <sā> nidhāryate? [40]
<yathā hi mṛdbho 'bhinnatve 'pi tadmātra-pratyayaprasaṅge> kenāpi
vidhena <śaravādi-pratyayabheda 'bhyupagamyate, tathā> śabdabhe-
dabhāvanāvaṣāt <sadasatoḥ pratyayabhedaḥ kiṃ nesyaite>. tavāpi hi
guṇānām paramaṃ rūpaṃ na dṛṣṭipatham rcchati
yat tu dṛṣṭipathaprāptaṃ tan māyeva sutucchakam

§57. sāsnādīdarśanād <gopratyayo yo 'yam udāhṛtaḥ
so> viruddho bhavanmatyā. bhinnāpohyās tu te mithāḥ [41]

yasya hi [...] abhyupagamyāyaṃ dṛṣṭāntah svamatavoruddhaḥ. śabda-
bhedād dhi <gosāsnādiṣu bhinnam apohyam>.

“so ’napekṣa” <ity etat tu> svavikalpavi<nirmitam>
nirapoham [...]. [42]

sāsnādiṣu hi <sāmānyarūpam> arthāntarabhāvanirapekṣaṃ na bhavaṭī-
ti pūrvam evopapāditam. svarūpaṃ tv ten<āvyāvahārikami> anabhilāp-
yatvāt.

§58. yac coktam <ādyapratyayo> nāstīti, <tatra>
iṣṭisiddhir anāditvāt. [43a]

[...]. yasya tu [... ] na ca śakyaṃ jātimad vyāptum, na ca [...].

§59. yad apy uktāṃ pratyayavrāttir eva nāsti, tad apy ayuktam.

sāmānyena nīrākṛteḥ. [43b]

na hi so ’nyāṃ jātim pratidravyam apohate, kim tarhi vyavacchedyavi-
vakṣayaikena sāmānyadharmeṇa. uktāṃ cātra vijātiye ’darṣanamātre-
nānumānam. tavaiva tv eṣa doṣaḥ. yadi svajātīyavyāptyā <varteta,
vyāpyasyāṇantyaṃ syāt>. tasmād yathā <viśāntvād anāśva ity vacane
’sve viśāntvādarṣanena tadvya-vacchedānumānam>, na tu <karkādīn>
pratyekam apohate, <nāpy ekaikeṣu gavādiṣu vartate. tavāpi vyār-
tyavṛttibuddhīmamatam>. tathā <cātra nyāyaḥ.

§60. upetyātmāṇarabhavam ekānekatvakalpanā

na yuktaḥ vastuni hy eṣā. [44a-c]
<vastu hi yat sadātma, tasya> yuktam ekānekatvan kalpayitum, na tv ātmāntarābhāvam abhyupetya.

tavāpy avyaktavyaktiṣu. [44d]

tulyāḥ prasaṅgaḥ. <avyakte hi> vikāraṇaṇām aikye vikārabheda na syāt. nānātve tu pradhānasyaikatvavirodhaḥ śaktibhya ’nanyatvāt.

iyam ca śabdavācye ’rthe cintā <nedriyagocare>. [45ab]

[...] anirdeśyo hi prayaksārthaḥ. “ātmāntarābhāva ātmāntaram” iti nirdeśyam praty uktam. tasmā nāsyā pratyakṣe prakṣepaḥ.

§61. atra ca

apoddhāre padasyāyaṃ vākyād artho vikalpitaḥ vākyārthaḥ pratibhākhyo ’yaṃ tenādāv upajanyate. [46]

padasyāsato ’<pi> vākyād apoddhṛtasya yathāgamam utprekṣayārthe vyavasthāpyate kevalasyaprayogāt prakṛtipratyaayavat. sa cotprekṣānyeṣv āgameṣv ayuktārthagrahāni. tasmād idam arthāntaram utkṣiptam, <yasmād adāv anabhyastāsabdārthasambandhānām padārthagrahānopaṃyā vākyārthapratibhā>. vākyam eva tadarthāṣ ca mukhyau śabdarthau, tayor abhinnatvāt. <yo hy anyaḥ tadantarāle śabdārthagrahānābhimānaḥ, sa utprekṣāyā, niraṅkuṣatvāt>.

§62. <ye ’py artheṣu> pratibhāṃ hitvā anyam bāhyam artham <tat-sambandham> vā vākyārthaṃ kalpayanti, teṣām api tat kalpanāmā-tram. <kasmāt?>

yathābhīyāsaṃ hi vākyebhyo vināpy arthena jāyate svapratyayānukāreṇa pratīpattir anekadhā. [47]

<asaty api bāhye ’rthe> svapratyayānurūpyenaṁrthābhīyāsavāsānāpeksā vākyād arthākriyāpratīpattir nānārūpotpadyate vikalpaś ca, vyāghrādisṛutivat. tadaviśeṣe vā śṛṅgārakāvyasya śravanavād rāgiṇāṃ rāgānu- rūpā pratītir bhavati, vītarāgānāṃ tu saṁvegānurūpā.

§63. sāpi vākyāntarārthebhhyo <vyavacchinne> ’rtha iṣyate sambandhābhījñasya. <tasmāt sānumāṇād na bhidyate> [48]
pratipattis tu yā vākyād [...] [49]

§64. yuktaṃ tāvan <naimittikeṣu śabdeṣv> anyāpohenaṛthābhidhānām, yadṛcchikeṣu tu katham?

yadṛcchike ’py <arthābhedāt>. [50a]

sāṃkhyaśāṃśanasamsthānanirapekṣah pravartate bindau ca samudāye ca vācakaḥ saillādiṣu

[VP II 156]

<ity uktam>.

samsthānavarṇāvayavair viśiṣte yaḥ prayuyate śabdo na tasyāvayave pravrītir upalabhya
tyājya vyākhyātām” (VS V.2:18). [...] [50b]

§65. <ath>ākṛtasambandhaśabdād> yā pratītiḥ, <tadyathā> yad uktaṃ ‘ayam panaśa’ iti, tatra katham anumānam? iti. na tatra <panasa-śabdād arthapraṭitiḥ. kasmāt>?

pratīten<ārthadarśanāt>. [50b]

§66. yo ’yaṃ sambandhaḥ sa eva tarhi śabdasya <prameyam> bhaviṣyatī.
<na, sambandho vikalpitāt>. [50c]

sambandho hi <panasaśabdārthau> pramāṇāntareṇopalabhyā ’<asyā-yam’ iti> manasā kalpyate, anumāṇānumeyasambandhavat, <tato na śābdam pramāṇāntaraṃ>.

§67. atha śeṣam upamāṇādi kathāṃ <na pramāṇāntaram>?

śeṣam uktam diśānayā [50d]

upamānaṃ tāvad gogavayādiṣu sārūpyapratipattyartham. tatra parata upaśrutya yā pratītiḥ sā śābdam. svayaṃ tu dvayārtham <pramāṇan-tareṇā>dhigamyā manasā sārūpyam <yadā> kalpayati, <tadā> tad api na pramāṇāntaram. nāpy evaṃ adhigamyamānam sārūpyam prame-yam. evaṃ anyāny apy anumāṇavikalpāvyātiriktatvat parikṣiptavyāni.
Appendix 2

Ms B 192a2-193a1 contains Jinendrabuddhi’s discussion of whether or not the logical canon of the _trairûpya_ applies to the verbal sign (_śabda_), and if so, in what way. The discussion is closely related to a similar debate that follows the quotation of PS V 1 at TSP 539,22-23 on TS 1514. It is obvious that Jinendrabuddhi’s discussion presupposes the same arguments as Śāntarakṣīta and Kamalaśīla, even though his formulation of the _pûrvapakṣa_ in spite of conspicuous similarities differs somewhat in detail from the one presented in TS and TSP. The historically interesting question is whether it is possible to identify the author of the arguments that Jinendrabuddhi attempts to answer. Kumārila criticized Dignāga’s view that the verbal sign—the syntactical word (_pada_) or other speech units—is subject to the constraints of the triple format of the _trairûpya_ in ŚV _Śabdapariccheda_, which contains an essential part of his criticism of the _apoḥa_ thesis. His main arguments are presented by Śāntarakṣīta at TS 1490ff quoting the relevant passages from ŚV _Śabdapariccheda_ verses 56, 83 through 88, and 98. As mentioned in the English translation note 9 above, Dharmakīrti introduced the idea that the inferential nature of the verbal sign consists in its indicating the speaker’s intention (_vivakṣā_)—a view that can be traced to the grammarian-philosopher Bhartṛhari—and Jinendrabuddhi, Śāntarakṣīta, and Kamalaśīla address the criticism levelled at Dharmakīrti’s view. Who was this scholar? It is possible to suggest a plausible identification on the basis of two _ālokas_, which Kamalaśīla quotes in the course of his presentation of the opponent’s view. The first reads: _saṅketāpekṣayā tasya hṛti krtyā prakāśanam, anumānatvam udiśtaṁ na tu tatvavyapekṣayā_. This verse would seem to address a statement at PV I 327: _vivakṣā niyame hetuḥ saṅketas tatprakāśanah_, cf. PVSV ad loc. If we take into consideration that Kamalaśīla in the same context quotes ŚV _Codanāśūtram_ 138\(^1\) which has a close parallel in verses from Kumārila’s _Bṛhaṭṭikā_ quoted at Ratnakīrtinibandhāvali 24,27ff it is highly likely that Jinendrabuddhi and his younger contemporaries, Śāntarakṣīta and Kamalaśīla, address Kumārila’s criticism of Dharmakīrti’s view. The _pûrvapakṣa_ includes as indicated below quotations from Dharmakīrti’s PVin and PVSV. They must have been embedded in the source Jinendrabuddhi used as basis for his rebuttal. If the identification of the work as Kumārila’s _Bṛhaṭṭikā_ is correct we must conclude that this work like his other _ṭīkās_ on the Jaiminīyasūtras formally consisted of

\(^1\) I am indebted to Helmut Krasser for this reference.
verses embedded in a prose commentary, and, moreover, that the anonymous author, who as suggested may be Kumārila, knew Dharmakīrti’s *Pramāṇaviniścaya*. There is no doubt that Kumārila addressed Dharmakīrti’s interpretation of Dignāga’s *apoha* theory because the views mentioned at TS 901-4 are quoted by Karnakagomin (PVSVT 131,16ff) as refuted by Dharmakīrti. Karnakagomin’s claim is, of course, an anachronism because Dharmakīrti never managed to address Kumārila’s criticism of his philosophy. I assume, for instance, that Śāntarakṣita lifted, from the *Bṛhaṭīkā*, the criticism aimed at the *apoha* theory, which he quotes at TS 901-4, since the critique quoted at TS 904cd incorporates a citation of PV I 72c as part of his criticism: itaretarabhedo ‘syā bijam cet pakṣa eṣa naḥ, which is in line with the quotations from Dharmakīrti’s works found in the passage from PST edited below. Quotations from Dharmakīrti’s works are printed in roman as well as those passages that PST and TSP have in common.

kathāṃ punaḥ śabdasya trairūpyam? kathāṃ ca na syāt. dharmiṇo ‘yogāti. tathā hi śabdārthasya na dharmitvam upapadyate, pratyaśyatyāvād anityatvavat. na cārthē śabdasya paksadarsanam, vaktāri sthitātvāt, tatraivopalabdheḥ. tasmāt pramāṇāntaram evedam, yathāsama-yam arthapratipatiḥte tvāt. tad eva chābdasya prāmāṇyaviśayāpari-jñānād evam ucyate. na hi tasya bāhye ‘rthe prāmāṇyam. tathā hi na tad tasya bhāva eva bhavati.

kva tarih?

vivakṣāyām. tatra cāstī eva śabdasya trairūpyam. tathā hi vivakṣāvān puruṣo dharmī, vivakṣā sādhyadharmaḥ, vivakṣāvaty evopalambhānāt, śabdasya paksadharmatvam, vivakṣāvān pūrvānubhūtāḥ sapakṣaḥ, tadvyatireko vipakṣa iti. kathāṃ trairūpyaṃ na sambhavati?
nunu ca vivakṣāyām api naivetasya prāmāṇyam yujyate. tathā hi (cf. TSP 540,13ff) vivakṣāsāmānye vā prāmāṇyam syāt, vivakṣāvīśe se vā. na tāvat sāmānye. tena vyavahārāyogāti. yadi hi vivakṣāsāmānyam śabdasyārthah syāt, gaur ity uktāvānaḥ. dhāritavānavibhūgaḥ kim ayam āha? iti, na paryayuyūṇjīte, śabdōccāraṇamātrād eva vivakṣāsāmānyasya vijñātatvāt. vivakṣāsāmānyārthavātyān <na> <na> śabdāḥ pravṛttihevato bhavēyuh. na hi vivakṣāsāmānyena kaścid arthiḥ; pravṛtyaṅgaḥ <na> pramāṇam. “na hy ābhīyām artham paric-chidya pravartamāno ‘rthakriyāyāṃ visaṃvādyata” (PVin 1.1) ity abhīdhānāt. tad evaṃ na vivakṣāsāmānye prāmāṇyam, nāpi viśeṣe, vyābhicārāt. sa punar... vivakṣāvīśeṣavataḥ śabdāntaropalabdheḥ.²
tathā hi uktāṃ yathā rakto bravīti, tathā virakto ‘pīti (cf. PVSV 9,7-

² This clause is evidently incomplete and impossible to construe.
Appendices

8). śabdavyavahārā hi buddhipūrvam anyathāpi śakyante kartum (cf. PVSV 110,13). tato na śabdebhyo viśeṣaniścayah, viśeṣa eva ca vyavahārāṅgam, tasya cāvadhārayitum āsakyatvāt kutaḥ śābdasya prāmāṇyam.

tatra yad uktam na vivakṣāsāmāṇyam ayyabhicāre ‘pi śabdārthah, tena vyavahārāyogād iti, tad ayuktaṁ. yo hi santānāntaramātrasādh-
yārthakriyārthī, tasya katham na vivakṣāsāmāṇyam vyavahārāṅgam, na hy asau śabdād vivakṣāsāmāṇyam paricchidyā pravartamānāh santānāntaramātrasādhāyāṁ arthakriyāyāṁ visamvādyate. yad apy uktam nāpi viśeṣe prāmāṇyam, vyabhicārād iti, tad apy asat, viśe-
ṣasyaiva hetutvāt. viśeṣasyā viśeṣaiva hetutvāt. viśeṣasyā duranvayatvād ayuktaṁ hetutvām iti cet. dhūmasyāpi tarhi hetutvam na syāt. na hy asāv api māyākāranirmitād dhūmābhāsād <bh>ūtasāṅghātād anyavyāvyrttena rūpeṇa sarveṇa pratipatrāvadhārayitum śaktaḥ. taṁ prati tasyānumāṇāṁgatvam. tad etad itaratrāpi samānāṁ; atha vā, pratipattāvisamvādiyacanāṁ khalv ayam īdrśo yatrabhiniveśa<h>. tadvacanasyāvisamvādiyatāṁ adhyāropyānumāṇāṁ karoti. ataḥ pratipattur abhidhānaprāyo viśeṣa-
vaśād viśeṣeśabdasūryānumāṇatvam uktam, na punaḥ paramārthataḥ.

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3 Cf. Karṇākagomi’s PVSVṬ 397, 19: tathā hi sarāgā api vītarāgavad ātmānan
darśayanti vītarāgāś ca sārāgavat.
Appendix 3

After having addressed the problem that Dignāga has not substantiated the *apoha* theory when making the bold claim at PSV V:11d that his theory stands unchallenged, Jinendrabuddhi continues expounding in an excursus some of the theoretical issues which Dharmakīrti addressed in his own exposition of the *apoha* theory in PVSV. Jinendrabuddhi’s excursus consists to a large extent of quotations or slightly edited quotations from Dharmakīrti’s PVSV interspersed with his own explanations inserted in order to contextualise the topics that he addresses. This section was translated into English by Th. Stcherbatsky from the Tibetan version of PST as “Jinendrabuddhi on the Theory of the Negative Meaning of Names” (cf. *Buddhist logic* I: 461-471) without recognizing that Jinendrabuddhi’s exposition is indebted to Dharmakīrtian philosophy. On account of the historical interest of this excursus it is here reproduced from Ms B 205a2-208a1. The quotations from PVSV are printed in roman and traced to their context. It is historically interesting that Jinendrabuddhi connects Dharmakīrti’s rejection of the view that the *apoha* theory entails that any given word has two functions (*dvau vyāparau*) namely affirmation and negation to Bhāmaha’s criticism of Dignāga’s *apoha* theory at Kāvyālāṅkāra VI.17-18, as do Śāntarakṣita at TS 911-12 (cf. TSP 359,15-17 ad loc.) and TS 1019d. The identification is corroborated by Karnakagomi at PVSVṬ 250,19-22 on PV I 127ab: *na cāpi śābdo dvayakṛd anyonyābhābhāva ity asau*. It is significant that Karṇaka-gomin in his comment on this line quotes Kāvyālāṅkāra VI.17-18 with the remark that this objection is hereby rejected (*iti nirastam*). Śāntarakṣita’s critique of Bhāmaha’s objection at TS 1019d: *nānvayo ‘vyatirekavān* repeats Dharmakīrti’s own argument at PVSV 63,14-15: *na hy anvayo ‘vyatireko ‘nanvayo vā vyatirekah*, which explains the statement *anyonyābhābhāva ity asau* of PV I 127b. This shows that these important writers agreed on the philosophical context of Dharmakīrti’s argument. Their identification of Bhāmaha as the target of Dharmakīrti’s rebuttal solves the much discussed problem of

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4 Śākyamati appears to believe that Dharmakīrti answers objections made by Kumārila and others. As all commentators agree in identifying the addressee of Dharmakīrti’s remarks with Bhāmaha, Śākyamati’s identification is peculiar, in particular as the objection Dharmakīrti addresses is not found in Kumārila’s *Ślokavārttika*. Cf. Śākyamati’s remarks on the relevant passage of PVSV: *gzan bzlog pa ni šugs kyis yin pas sgra la bya ba gñis ni med do, de bas na gZon nu ma len pa la sogs pas* (Kumārila etc.) *sgra gcig giš bya ba gñis mi nus pa’i phyir thams cad du sgra gñis brjod par thal bar ‘gyur ro ŋes smras pa gañ yin pa de spaṅs pa yin no.*
Bhāmaha’s date as there is no reason to believe that the view that PV I 127b addresses Bhāmaha’s objection only originated with Śāntarākṣita, Jinendrabuddhi, and Kāṇakagomin who are fairly close in time to Dharmakīrti and therefore must have been in contact with the tradition of the Dharmakīrti circle of students. Bhāmaha’s views are not mentioned or presumed by Kumārila and Uddyotakara, whose criticism of the *apoha* theory was addressed by Dharmakīrti. Bhāmaha’s Kāvyālaṅkāra may therefore have been in circulation after the composition of Ślokavārttika and Nyāyavārttika. Thus the evidence makes it possible to conclude that Bhāmaha may have been an older contemporary of Dharmakīrti. This conclusion is not contradicted by Bhāmaha’s mention of some Nyāsakāra at Kāvyālaṅkāra VI 36. For even though Jinendrabuddhi is known as the Nyāsakāra par excellence, the examples attributed by Bhāmaha to the Nyāsakāra are not mentioned by Jinendrabuddhi in the Nyāsa under the Pāṇinian rules to which Bhāmaha refers. On the other hand, Sanskrit grammatical literature mention other Nyāsakāras than Jinendrabuddhi. We must therefore conclude that Bhāmaha is referring to one of the unknown Nyāsakāras.  

Quotations from PVSV are printed in Roman and traced to their context in Dharmakīrti’s work.

kim punar atrāpohamātram abhidheytvenābhihitam atha tadviśiṣṭam. kim cātah? yady anyāpohamātraṃ “svārtham anyāpohena bhāṣata” (PS V:1cd) iti granthavirodhaḥ, svārthād bhedenānyāpohasyāśrita-
tvāt. tathā “tasya vastunāḥ kaścid bhāgo ’rthāntaranivṛttyā gamyate (Dvādaśaśatikā),” “śabdo arthāntarnivṛttiśiṣṭān eva bhāvān āhe” tyādayo (PSV V:36d) nirdeśas tadvātpakṣasya sūcākā virudh-
yante. atha tadviśiṣṭan “tenānyāpohakṛc chrutīr” iti (PS V:11d) vyāhanyate. yasmād anyāpoham karotīti, abhyāpayatīty arthah. yathā naṁpratiṣedham karotīty atra. na hi sabdyānapakaraṇam sambha-
vati. tadvatpakṣaś ca syād, na paksāntaram. tataś ca tadvatpakṣodītā
dośā ihāpi prasajyeran. naiśa dosah. anyāpoha eva hi śabdārtho, na ca virodhah. yato yo ’sa’u svārthah sa evānāvahakrd ity atravya-
pahāsabdenoktaḥ. “anyāpohena bhāṣata” (PS V:1d) ity asya tu pra-
yojanam uktam. api caikabhedacodane ’py <anya>vāyārttigater⁶
anvayavatirekacodan<ay>ā vyavahārāṅgatāṁ⁷ sabdānām darśayan
tenaḥ bhāṣate,” “tasya vastunāḥ kaścit bhāgo ’rthāntaranivṛttyā
gamyate” (Dvādaśaśatikā), “śabdo ’rthāntaranivṛttiśiṣṭān eva

⁵Cf. Introduction 5.6-8.
⁶em. (cf. gzan las ldog pa rtogs pa T): avyāvṛttagter Ms.
⁷em. : ți mah matam Ms.
bhāvān āhe” tyādy8(3) (PSV V:36d) āha, na tu viśeṣanaviśeṣyabhāvam (cf. PVSV 62,26-63,1, 63,9). nanu cānvayamātracodanayāiva vyatirekamātracodanayāiva vā śabdasya vyavahārāṅgataḥ bhaviṣyatī. naitad asti. ekānvayasya pariḥāryabhāve nispalacodanatvāt tathaiva pariḥāryasya kvacī sthityabhāve, na cānvayo ’vyatireko nāpi vyatireko ’nanvayah (cf. PVSV 63,10-15). svārthasyaiva hi pratyāyanam anvayah. na cāsa vyatirekam antarena sambhavati. svārthād arthāntarasyaiva vyavacchedo vyatirekah. so ’pi na vinānvayenāvakaipate. ata eva ca śabdasya na dvau vyāpāro tadanyāvyārtaṇam ca svārthābhidhānaṃ ca svārthasya bhedarūpyatvāt, tadabhidhānād eva tadanyāvyārṭtigate (cf. PVSV 63,13-14). yath’ ’āyam asya bhrāte’ ’ty ukte bhāṛitrvasyobhayagatavād ekāvī āpi bhāṛitrvābhidhānāṃ nāntarīyaκtvād ātarsāyātyi bhāṛitrvaṃ gamyate. tathā dvayor bhidyamānyor bhedasobhayagatavatvāt, ekabhedacadane ’pi nāntarīyaκtvat tadanyāvyāvṛttiḥ (cf. PVSV 63,7-8). tatas ca yad ucyate: “yady arthāntarārpohāṃ śrutiḥ karoti tasyāḥ pratiṣedha eva caritaḥrthatvāt svārtha-pratyāyanāya śabdāntaram mṛgyatām”9 iti, tad asaṅgatam. yataḥ śabdaḥ svārtham eva pratyāyayati, tasin tu pratiyamāne nāntarīyaκtvād arthaνtaryāvṛttyir gamyata iti. tad evam apoha eva śabdārthah, na ca kaścit virodha iti. kah punar asau śabdasyārthah? yo ’sau vivakṣāyāḥ sāmāṇyākāraḥ. sa ca vivakṣāyāṃ ananya10 iti vivakṣāyāṃ śabdasya prāmāṇyam uktam. nanu ca sāmāṇyam śabdārthah; tataḥ katham buddhipratiḥbāsah śabdasya viṣaya ucyate. sa eva khalu sāmāṇyam vyavasthāpyaye. katham? ihendriyālokamanaskārā ātmendriyamanceṣṭānākmāṃsāvāṃ svākhyāntaḥ bhinnāpi rūpa-jñānam ekam jananti, tatha śiṃśapādayo ’pi bhedāḥ parasparānvaive ’pi svānubhavadvārena vikalpavāsānāṃ prabodhayantah prakṛtyaiva vikalpakam ekam abhinnapratiḥbāsam jñānam janayanti (cf. PVSV 41,1-4), să caikaśādhyasādhanatayā anyavivekināṃ vikalpavāsānāya api prakṛtir,11 yat tadvaśeṇa tadupdaṃṣyām (cf. PVSV 38,20-22) bhinnam eṣāṃ rūpam tirodhāya pratiḥbāsam vābhinnam ātmīyam eṣv adhyāropya (cf. PVV 38,18-19) bhinnāpi tān abhinnānā iva kacāri kākāraṃ darṣayati. tasya yo bhinnah pratiḥbāso bāhya ivārthakri-yākārīva vyakṛthbhedānuṣyāyī ca bhāṛtaḥ pratiṣṭiḥbhīr bhāyateṃdhyavasthātāḥ. sa bhāvaṃ abhiruparvartīnaṃ eva bahir iva parisphuraṭāṃ pratijajam abhirupāyānurodhena sāmāṇyam vyavasthāpyate (cf.

8 em. : āheyody Ms.
10 ananya Ms (cf. mi ’khrul T).
11 em. : apy aprakṛtir Ms

12em.: "phalāvāvāsaṃ Ma Ms
13em.: praśya Ms
59,18-60,1) ekam pradarśyāyam vrkṣa iti bruvāno (PVSV 60,4) 'vadāhārya vā sañketam kuryād anavadhārāya vā. yady avadhāryāya eva vrkṣo nānya iti prāg vrkṣagrahaṇam antareṇāparijñānan evrḳśān katham tadvyavacchedam pratipadyeta sañkete. athānavadhāryāya api vrkṣo 'nyo pīti. katham vyavahārakāle nyaparīhāreṇa pravar-teta pratipatteti. sa eva dośaḥ. na dośaḥ, drṣṭāviparyāyasya suñjānātvāt. evam hi kimcid dṛṣṭavatō 'nyatra tadvilakṣanākārāṃ buddhim anubhavataḥ, tataḥ sañketakālāgrhaḥtād vastunā tadvīparītākārāṃ idam anyad iti vaidharmyanisācyo bhavatī. sa hy ayam eva vrkṣa iti prada-rśya vyuptādito yatraiva tan na paśyati tad evāvṛkṣam svayam eva pratipadyate. nedaṃ vyavacchedavadāṅdhānaṃ sambhavatī. ekatra dṛṣṭaṃ yonāsya rūpasya kvacid ananvayat pratyaṃśaṇa sañketakālāgrhaḥitasyordhvaṃ apratipattihī satyāṃ api pratipattau sañketakālāgrhaḥtā yā vyaktir vyaktyangante 'pi sa evāyam iti prātiṛtī na syāt (cf. PVSV 60,5-13). tathā hi tato yathā ghato vilakṣanas tathā palāśādibheda 'py anvayino rūpasā-nābhuyapagamāt. evam tarhy apohavādino 'pi tulyam etat. yasmād (cf. PVSV 60,13) ete bhāvā bhedino 'py pratyavamarśānāṇādikam ekam kāryam prakṛtyā kecīt kurvanti nānye (cf. PVSV 60,16-17). tān dṛṣṭvā pratipattā ete taddhetavo nānya iti buddhīya vibhajīya rāśiśva-vam vyavasthāpayatī. tatrāṣyā parasparayā ekā kāryapadārthaprasūteḥ. abhinnārtha grāhiniṃ ca tadanubhavaprabhavapraṃkṛter avyavasita-bhāyāyārthasvarāpe sāmyāṅkāravati pratyavamarśāṇāṃ yajnaṃ ākāryaḥhetu- tvena vibhaktā bāhyā ivārthakriyākārīṇa ivānvayinā kenacid rūpe-ṇāṅugata ita pratyavabhāṣyante. tān avyavasitābāhyāsvabhāvan prati-pādyā pratipādavikalpeśv abhinnapatribhāṣāms taimirikadvayadvicandradArsanavatā. svasvapratibhāṣānubhave 'py ekatvenāvyavasītān dar-śya ete vrkṣā iti kṛte sañkete sa bhṛntah. tatraikam ivānvayāyirupam dṛṣṭvā ataddhetutvena vibhaktan atadvīparītākārān avṛkṣatvena sukh- yam evādhyavasyati. na punar ekam vastu tatrābhinnam dṛṣyaṃ asti yasya darśanādaśānābhīyām bhinnadarśane 'py eva vrksavibhāgām kurvita, tasya vibhāgena daṇḍayat daṇḍinyagrhaṇāṭ. aṃghītasya cāṇu-palakaṃ. ākṛtrə api ekatrā dṛṣṭāya anyatra tu draśtam asākyaṭvat. tadatatadvator vrkṣāvṛkṣatve vyaktir ekaiwa vrkṣah syāt (cf. PVSV 61,3-8). iha cāpohasvarūpavidvadbhir abhāvamātram anyāpōha ity adhyāt-ropya dūṣanābhīdhitāsya yat pariḥ pralapaṁ tam anyāpohasvarū-pasamvartanenaivāpakātyaṃ parākrāntaṃ ca tannirākarāṇāya mahāt-mabhīr ity alam atiprāṣaṅgēna.
Appendix 4

Immediately after his comment on Dignāga’s criticism of the view that upamāṇa is an independent means of cognition, Jinendrabuddhi inserts an excursus at Ms B 241a5-242b4 on the latest developments in Nyāya and Mīmāṃsā philosophy concerning upamāṇa. Jinendrabuddhi’s sources are no longer available and the names of the philosophers whose views are mentioned and criticized are not known. As is obvious from a comparison of PSṬ, TS, and TSP, the sources and presumably also their authors were known to Jinendrabuddhi, Śāntarakṣita, and Kamalaśīla. I have traced parallels to Sanmatītarkaparakaṇa. The quotations are printed in roman.


etad api yadi yathāgamāt pariçchinnaṃ tathāpasyann api paricchinatti. tataḥ smṛtir eva, na pramāṇam. ath’āyam (‘di’i sic T) <asāv>” iti viśeṣapratyavamarśād viśeṣena pratipadyate. tato ‘numānām eva, <na> pramāṇāntaram. tathā hi yo gosadrśaḥ, sa gavaya iti vyavasthāyam sādrśyaḥ lingād viśiṣṭā praṭitiḥ. etad uktaṃ bhavati: dṛṣṭamānaḥ piṇḍo dharmi; “ayaṃ gavaya” iti saṃjñā sādhyaḥdharmaḥ; śabdānu- bhūtaspuravasthitayor yat sāmānyam gogavaya sādrśyam, tat pakṣa-dharmaḥ; āgamānu- bhūtābuddhiyavasthitoh gavayo dṛṣṭānta iti. anantopāyā ca samākhyaśamsambhandhapratipattir iti. ka upamāna evaṇu-rodhaḥ (nor dga’ ba sic T), tadyathā yaḥ tuṃgaṇāsaḥ, sa Caitro; yo ‘śve, sa Maitrā iti; na c’ evaṃ pramāṇaṃ.

Śabarās tv āha: upamānām api sādrśyam asannikṛṣte ‘ṛthe buddhim upādāyati: yathā gavaya dasanāṃ gosimaranasyeti (MS I.1:5).

tasyāpi gṛhitaviṣayatvāt smṛtyādīvat pramāṇatvam anupapannam. syād etat, nānugṛhitamātraśyaiva grahaṇe ‘sty upamānasya pramāṇyam, kim tarhi sādrśyaviśiṣṭasya; na ca tat tatha pūrvaṃ gṛhitam; ato gṛhitaviṣayatvam asiddham iti.

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19 pramāṇatvam anupapannam conj. : pramāṇyam anupa Ms
ayuktam etat, pratyaśkata etadadhiṣṭam. sādṛṣyaviśiṣṭam eva hi tat pūrvaṃ api paricchinnam; avasāyaṃ caitaḥ abhyupagantavyam, anyathā hi pūrvaṃ gāṃ dṛṣṭvā paścād mahiṣaṃ api paśyate, gavi sādṛṣā- buddhiḥ syāt, na ca bhavati. tasmāt sādṛṣyaviśiṣṭam api vastu grihya- māṇaṃ nālaṃ pramāṇāntarakaḥpanāyeti.

athaivam api tasyāpi kāyaicit mātrayā viśiṣṭasya grahaṇaṃ iti pramāṇaṃtaraṃ kalpyate, pratyaśkataḥ paricchinme niḥloṭpaladravyā yad uttarakālabhāviniḥloṭpalaṃ iti grahaṇaṃ, tad api nāma pramāṇāntaraṃ kalpanīyaṃ. atrāpi hi naiva tat pūrvaṃ nīlām utpalam ity anenākāreṇa pratyaśkataḥ paricchinnaṃ avikalpaṃkatavāt. syād etad, indriyajātvāt tasya pratyaśka evāntarbhāvaḥ, indriyajñānam api vyayahārakusālasya savikalpaṃkas bhavati. ato 'yam prasānga iti.

ayuktam etat, samayāpeksatvāt anyathā samayānabhijñō 'pi tathā paricchindyaḥ; na cendriyaṃ samayaṃ apekṣate. mā bhuḍ vastunāḥ svabhāvānavasthitiḥ. tathā hi niḥloṭpalātmanāḥ yad vastu vyavasthitam tatrāveccāchātaḥ pītaśabdasamkete kāścin nīlāṃ ity adhyavasyati, kāścit pītaṃ iti. tato na jñāyeta: “katham tadvastu vyavasthitam”? iti. na hi yathāvastusamayas tasyecchānī ṣt (apy?) avidhānāt, icchāyās cāvastuniyatvatvāt.

kiṃ ca, yadi drṣyamāṇād anyatra parokṣe anena tat sādṛṣaṃ iti sādṛṣyabuddhiḥ pramāṇāntaraṃ kalpyate. drṣyamāṇād anyatra parokṣe anena tat visadṛṣaṃ iti visadṛṣatvadhir api pramāṇāntaram saṇgam kim iti na kalpyate.20 abhāvapramāṇānābhairbhāvād iti cet. na, bhāvaviṣayatvād asyāḥ. syād etad, itaretarābhāvāvarūpatayā visadṛṣā- buddhēr yo viṣayāḥ, so bhāvaviṣayā eva. tataś cātāvāviṣayātvam upapannam iti. yady evam sādṛṣabuddhiḥviṣayē ʿpy esa nyāyo ʿstī sādṛṣabuddhēr api abhāvapramāṇānābhairbhāvaprasaṅgāḥ. atha sādṛṣyaviśeṣaṃkṣam aviṣeṣenāśva drṣyamāṇāpeksa<m> pūrvadrṣe jñānaṃ upamānaṃ iti kalpyate. evam api Caitraṃ paricchidyā tad-uttarākālam ca tatputram avagamyā evam adhyavasyati: “asya sa pite’’ti. tatrāpi sanbhavaty eva: pūrvavṛgṛte Caitre paścād drṣya- māṇaputrapeksaḥ piṭṛtvāyasāyaḥ. tathā sopānāmām ākramataḥ21 prathamaphalaḥkātkrame22 dvitiyaphalakapraṇaptēv abhikrānte phalaḥ bhavati jñānaṃ “tasyās tat pūrvaṃ” iti drṣyamāṇaphalakahāpeksa<m>,

20 Cf. the verse qu. STP Vol II 583,15-16: drṣyāṃ parokṣe sādṛṣyadhiḥ pramāṇāntaraṃ yadi, vaidharmāyam ity eva pramāṇam kim na saṃpānam.
21 Cf. STP Vol II 583, 17-18: tathā sopānāmām ākramataḥ prathamaśakramāntaṃ paścād ākraṇtaḥ dirgham mahad hrasvaṃ cetyādy anekam pramāṇam prasaktam iti; TSP 550,18-19: "asmiḥ pūrvaṃ idaṃ paścād dirgham hrasvaṃ idaṃ mahat, ity evamādīvījñāme pramāṃ niṣṭā prasājaite, " iti vaktavyam.
22 phalakātkrame conj. : phalaka ti krame Ms
tasyāpy upamānatvaṁ syāt, na cābhimatasyāpi. tasmād ayuktam asya prāmāṇyam.
Abstract


Da Dignāgas apoha-Theorie eine andauernde Debatte unter den Zeitgenossen und folgenden Generationen buddhistischer und nicht-buddhistischer indischer Philosophen initiiert hat und weiterhin unter seinen modernen westlichen Interpreten Fragen und Probleme in bezug auf Bedeutung und Zweck seiner zentralen Theorie auslöst, bietet die vorgelegte Arbeit auch eine neuerliche Untersuchung der grundlegenden Voraussetzungen dieser Theorie, wie sie in PSV V dargelegt worden ist.
Abstract

This dissertation is centred on presenting an annotated English translation of chapter five of the seventh century A.D. Buddhist philosopher Dignāga’s Pramāṇasamuccayavṛtti (hence PSV V), in which Dignāga expounds his philosophy of language known as the *apoha* theory, which affected post-Dignāga philosophical debate in India for centuries. The original Sanskrit version of *Pramāṇasamuccayavṛtti* (hence PSV) is no longer extant. Except for a few Sanskrit fragments traced to post-Dignāga philosophical literature, the only comprehensive sources available for the study of Dignāga’s *apoha* doctrine are two mediocre Tibetan translations of PSV included in the Tibetan bsTan ’gyur and a small number of Sanskrit fragments traced to post-Dignāga philosophical literature. Thus, the English translation of PSV V is based upon its two Tibetan versions and Sanskrit fragments published in Hattori 1982, including Sanskrit fragments I have traced to other sources. The translation is accompanied and supported by a critical edition of the bulk of the corresponding fifth chapter of the single Sanskrit manuscript of Viśālāmalavatī tīkā (hence PST V). This unique tīkā attributed to Jinendrabuddhi, a central eighth century A.D. Indian grammarian and philosopher, is the only extant commentary on PSV and thus an important source of information on the philosophical context in which Dignāga propagated his work. As the difficulties of construing the Tibetan translations are almost insuperable, I have taken advantage of the Sanskrit evidence embodied in PST V and restored into Sanskrit many paragraphs PSV V, if the Sanskrit evidence is matched by the Tibetan translations. The restorations are established on the basis of quotations from PSV V presented in PST and Jinendrabuddhi’s paraphrases of Dignāga’s original Sanskrit presentation. Since Dignāga’s “*apoha* theory” generated an incessant debate among contemporary and subsequent generations of Buddhist and non-Buddhist Indian philosophers, and continues to elicit questions among Dignāga’s modern Western interpreters about the meaning and purpose of *anyāpoha*, this work includes a fresh study of its basic presuppositions as presented in PSV V.
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**RESEARCH POSITIONS**

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<tr>
<th>Institution</th>
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<th>Description</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>A Critical Pāli Dictionary</td>
<td>Co-Editor and main contributor of articles; under the auspices of Union Académique Internationale and the Royal Danish Academy of Science and Letters, Copenhagen, Denmark. 1990-2000.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Danish Research Council for the Humanities</td>
<td>Fulltime collaborator and main contributor of articles, Copenhagen, Denmark. 1986 – 1990.</td>
<td></td>
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</table>
### TEACHING POSITIONS

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### LECTURES

- **September 2003**
June 2001  Invited Lecturer, International Seminar “Argument and Reason in Indian Logic”, University of Warsaw, Poland. Presented paper: Did Dignāga and Mallavādin Know the Old Vākyapadīyavṛtti Attributed to Bhartṛhari?

May 2001  Guest Lecturer, Institut für Tibetologie und Buddhismuskunde, University of Vienna, Austria. Presented paper: Sanskrit upaniṣad Pāli upanisā Revisited.

October 1999
Invited Lecturer, Warsaw University, Poland, “The International Conference on Sanskrit and Related Studies to Commemorate the Centenary of the Birth of Stanislaw Schayer (1899-1941).” Presented paper: Remarks on the Complementary Distribution of the Pāli Vocatives bhikkhave/bhikkhavo and its Implication for the Interpretation of The Ordination Formula etha bhikkhavo.

October 1997

July 1996
Guest Lecturer, University of Hamburg, Germany, Institut für Kultur und Geschichte Indiens und Tibets. Topic: The Morphology of the Tibetan Verb

June 1996
Guest Lecturer, University of Vienna, Austria, Institut für Tibetologie und Buddhismuskunde. Presented paper: Dignāga on non-observation.

February 1996
Invited Lecturer, Colloque Strassbourg”, University of Strassbour, France. Presented paper: Pāṇinian Grammar and the Semantics of Canonical Pāli.
August 1992  Guest Lecturer, University of Vienna, Austria, Institut für Tibetologie und Buddhismuskunde. Topic: Adarśanamātra and The Question of Induction in Dignāgan Epistemology.


October 1991  Guest Lecturer, Ryokoku University, Kyoto, Japan. Topic: Dignāga’s Apoha Theory, its Presuppositions and Main Theoretical Implications.


October, 1989  Guest Lecturer, University of Vienna, Austria, Institut für Tibetologie und Buddhismuskunde. Presented paper: Aspects of Dignāga’s Apoha Theory.

June 1982  Guest Lecturer, University of Hamburg, Germany, Institut für Kultur und Geschichte Indiens und Tibet. Lecture series encompassing:


**EDUCATION**

Cand. mag. Degree (equivalent to an M.A. Degree)  

Additional Graduate coursework  
Old Indian Society and Religion/Buddhism, Indian Philosophy. Phenomenology of Religion, Linguistics/Textual analysis/Semiotics.

Language mastery  
LIST OF PUBLICATIONS


“Dharmakīrti’s Interpretation of Pramāṇasamuccayavṛtti V 36: śabdo ’ṛthaṇtaranivṛttiśiṣṭān eva bhāvān āha,” in Dharmakīrti’s Thought and Its Impact on Indian and Tibetan Philosophy, Proceedings of the


