DISSERTATION

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„Strangers in a Familiar Land: Culture and Commitment Factors for Foreign Service Nationals in the U.S. State Department“

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Chapter 1

ONCE UPON A TIME when the world was young there was a Martian named Smith. Valentine Michael Smith was as real as taxes but he was a race of one.

Thus begins Robert Heinlein’s 1961 award winning science fiction classic *Stranger in a Strange Land*. The story is of a human raised by Martians on a far away planet and his eventual return to Earth. Neither fully human nor fully Martian in his orientation to the universe, Smith’s return to Earth serves as the genesis for the transformation of both cultures. Heinlein’s title is an allusion to the Biblical story of *Exodus* and speaks to the longings of those who exist at the tense intersection between two worlds. The gap between Earth and Mars is no wider than a gap of modern-day Smiths operating in the world of international relations. Specifically, the State Department of the United States employs foreign nationals at its diplomatic and consular posts throughout the world. And like Smith, they exist as both members of their home culture but work in an environment that is ostensibly American. Undoubtedly the cultural orientation of some makes the transition relatively painless. For others, the peculiarities of American cultural generally and the State Department specifically will likely produce palpable dissonance. But for all, the experience of being a foreigner in the space of home and interacting with foreigners who have constructed that space as their own will create an awkward sense of strangeness that is familiar and familiarity that becomes strange. As Heinlein’s text argues, the dialogue between cultures has enormous transformative power. The purpose of this research is to better understand this intersection of culture and institution and to consider how the management of this dialectic is acting for or against the interests of both.
1.1 Research Synopsis

Foreign Service Nationals (FSN’s) are typically non-American, locally hired employees at American diplomatic and consular posts. It should be noted that American family members of State Department Officers sometimes hold positions nominally designated as being “FSN.” The functional use of the term and organizational perception is that FSN’s are non-American (Dorman, 2005) and this research will be focused on that population. FSN’s occupy a unique organizational position as liaisons between American staff and host nations; they are invaluable in ensuring that American diplomatic posts are functional. “America's Foreign Service Nationals comprise the bulk of the 42,000 locally employed staff members working at more than 250 U.S. embassies and consulates worldwide[...] America's Foreign Service Nationals are the glue that holds our embassies together” (Foreign Service Nationals: America's Bridge, 2007). Foreign Service Nationals account for 32% of the positions at U.S. State Department international posts (U.S. Department of State, 2005). As the “glue” of the State Department, FSN’s provide logistical bridges between the embassy and the host country as many officers lack the cultural and linguistic skills to function in the country in which they are posted (Asthana, 2006, August 11). The effectiveness of FSN’s in providing this support, consequently, accounts for the ability of the U.S. State Department to conduct foreign policy and operations through diplomatic and consular posts. An important measure that can forecast the effectiveness of employees is their level of commitment (Cohen, 2007). Commitment levels of employees to the organizations for which they work have been linked to a range of performance related variables (Cohen, 2003) including the rate of turnover, withdrawal, absenteeism, tardiness, and success in completing and managing tasks (Randall/Cote, 1991; Blau, 1986). Cultural variables have been found to significantly affect commitment levels in the workplace (Randall, 1993) with further documentation and exploration of this theme to be found in the second chapter of this research. Structurally, the State Department precludes FSN input in many important decisions and the performance evaluation and primarily Americans conduct
supervision of FSN’s. This structure is consistent with a high power distance organization (Wanek, 2005), where a group has power based on status or affiliation that is unavailable to other groups within the organization with structural barriers inhibiting advancement and empowerment. Hofstede (2001) identifies cultures as varying according to their acceptance of high power distance, with some cultures comfortable with top-down hierarchies and others preferring participatory and egalitarian leadership structures. As cultural orientation affects organizational commitment, this research investigates the extent to which the high-power distance structure of the State Department is accepted by FSN’s emerging from varying cultural backgrounds and the corresponding effect this has on commitment which has profound implications for the efficacy of U.S. diplomatic and consular posts. Public diplomacy (detailed in subsequent chapters) is particularly affected by FSN input as it attempts to bring attractive aspects of American culture to worldwide populations. Necessarily, the attitudes of this important population (FSN’s) will profoundly impact any attempt to speak to the community in which a U.S. diplomatic post operates (especially considering the gaps in cultural and linguistic ability on the part of many officers). Considering that worldwide sentiment towards the United States has become increasingly acrimonious, the engagement of FSN’s can be in important part of international outreach, thus further validating the need for this study in the context of international relations.

1.2 Locally Employed Staff and the U.S. State Department

The designation of FSN is still used in many State Department documents and by Foreign Service Officers. Throughout the late 90’s and early 2000’s, different names have been given to the FSN position to minimize the “foreign” aspect of their job title. Some changes have included calling people in this position “Locally Engaged Staff,” “LES” (producing an unfortunate acronym that phonetically sounds like “less”), and “LE Staff.” As of 2007, the State Department itself used a variety of terms such as these (along with the FSN moniker) ubiquitously in their documentation (Foreign
Service Nationals: America's Bridge, 2007). Despite these changes, the FSN designation is still operationally used by State Department officers and locally hired employees themselves (Dorman, 2005). For purposes of clarity and to be consistent with the language generally used by the State Department, “FSN” will be the term that is operationally used in this research.

The role of Foreign Service Nationals is that of support for organizational decisions made almost exclusively by Americans (General Accounting Office, 1996). Due to heightened fears related to terrorism, the State Department has also increased oversight of FSN work activity (Office of Inspector General: U.S. Department of Homeland Security, 2004). For instance, the monitoring of work has been increased along with a reduction in the decision making power of FSN’s. The access to “sensitive information” has been more intensively scrutinized and entry/exit of U.S. Posts by FSN’s is more thoroughly screened (decreasing the work flexibility and office access for FSN’s). Cumulatively, the role of the FSN is clearly differentiated from the role of Foreign Service Officers, in terms of their operational and security status. The recruitment website emphasizes the importance of FSN roles but furthers this differentiation (U.S. Department of State: Careers Representing America, 2007):

(FSN’s) provide unique services in support of foreign policy at nearly 265 posts worldwide. (They) are an integral part of the team dedicated to representing America's interests to other countries (Retrieved October 26, 2009 from http://careers.state.gov/local-employment/index.html).

Furthering this “important but other” status, the website goes on to indicate the following:

(FSN’s) are the continuity staff of our Missions abroad. Our Locally Employed Staff (FSN’s) abroad provide the institutional knowledge and professional contacts that are so important to the embassy. LE Staff perform vital mission program and support functions. All USG agencies under Chief of Mission authority depend heavily on their continuity staff, frequently delegating to them significant management roles and program functions (Retrieved October 26, 2009 from http://careers.state.gov/local-employment/index.html).
The status of Foreign Service Nationals in the U.S. State Department clearly identifies their foundational role. Correspondingly, the structure of the State Department precludes advancement of FSN’s to the level of State Department Officers. The role of FSN’s is to implement initiatives created by Americans within the State Department, not create the policy of the U.S. State Department (Dorman, 2005).

Despite their separate status, FSN’s receive consideration and work protection that is consistent with the protection available for U.S. workers in terms of diversity protection (U.S. Department of State: Careers Representing America, 2007):

It is the policy of the Department of State to provide equal opportunity and equitable treatment in employment to all persons without regard to race, color, religion, sex, national origin, age, handicap, political affiliation, marital status, or sexual orientation (Retrieved October 26, 2009 from http://careers.state.gov/local-employment/index.html).

Salary and benefits, however, are derived from the prevailing practices of the host country (U.S. Department of State: Careers Representing America, 2007):

Section 408 of the Foreign Service Act of 1980 prescribes the basis for setting Locally Employed Staff compensation and benefits. To the extent that it is consistent with the U.S. public interest, U.S. missions compensate Locally Employed Staff based upon prevailing practice in country. This means that total compensation (salary and benefits such as health insurance, life insurance, and allowances) is based upon what local comparable employers are providing to their employees in jobs that have similar levels of complexity and responsibility. As a result, Locally Employed Staff should normally receive a package of pay and benefits competitive with that paid by other employers. Locally Employed Staff are paid in host country currency unless local prevailing practice is to compensate all LE Staff in US dollar (Retrieved October 26, 2009 from http://careers.state.gov/local-employment/index.html).

The physical space of an embassy or consulate is also in a unique territory. While present in the host nation, they are, in principle, not governed by the legal rules and prevailing practices of that nation (Congressional Quarterly, 2000). Additionally, the stated mission of the U.S. State Department is that its diplomatic and consular posts should reflect American values, standards, and practices (U.S. Department of State:
Careers Representing America, 2007). Within the space of a U.S. post, English is the dominant language. Communication with those visiting or receiving services is expected to be consistent with American practices. According to the State Department, the relationship between supervisors and employees (in many cases, FSN’s) should meet American standards of collegiality and professionalism; regardless of the standards of the host country, the policies and procedures inside an American diplomatic or consular post operate independently from the territory and should (in theory) be based on the values, standards, and regulations derived from the United States as it relates to employment and legal rules. The space of the embassy or consulate is U.S. space regardless of the country it is operating in (Retrieved June 8, 2009 from http://travel.state.gov/law/info/judicial/judicial_678.htmlextraterritoriality). When an FSN arrives for work at a State Department post, they are (at least in theory) working in America (Convention on the Service Abroad of Judicial and Extrajudicial Documents in Civil or Commercial Matters, 1965). In sum, FSN’s serve an important position in serving U.S. Foreign policy. They also, however, exist in a divergent position where the State Department both depends on their status as non-Americans, and requires that their work practices reflect those of an American institution.

1.3 Power Distance Perceptions and State Department Structure

Power distance refers to the extent to which power and prestige are evenly or unevenly distributed in a culture. Hofstede (1980) created the Power Distance Index (PDI) based survey analysis of employees in a number of countries where power had different implications for organizational structures. High PDI cultures tend accept inequality as inevitable or the natural human condition and tend to have power concentrated in the hands of a few. In high power distance cultures, employees do not expect supervisors to negotiate work assignments or solicit input from employees on the advisable course of action (Tosi & Greckhamer, 2004). People who are culturally oriented towards high power distance were found to accept a hierarchical distribution of power in an organization and as a result perform their obligations without
questioning them (Cohen, 2007). In recent years, serious criticism of Hofstede’s work has emerged, including methodological and application questions. Specifically, Clark (2003) cites a growing body of scholarship that finds fault with his research including the fact that Hofstede’s analyses focused on face-to-face interactions in organizational contexts in the attempt to appeal to the notion of a presumably homogenous national culture. This could represent a simplification in explaining problems in organizational communication through such relatively simple dichotomies (high/low power distance, for example). Such essentializing may be too simple for dealing with the real-world complexities of culture (Ess and Sudweeks, 2005). These criticisms, however, do not mitigate the clear insights and advantages his work offers (for more extensive details regarding these advantages, please refer to chapter 2 of this research). Despite concerns about utilizing Hofstede for a macro analysis of generalized cultural epistemologies, his work has been shown to be the most effective and practical instrument available when applied to cultural variables as they specifically relate the problems of intercultural institutions (Dorfman and Howell, 1988; Cohen, 2007). To mitigate concerns about generalizing heterogeneous cultures into discrete categories, researchers have revised Hofstede’s work for application at the individual (rather than national) level (Dorfman and Howell, 1988) and have found it to be a valid and reliable method in looking at cultural orientation, specifically at an individual’s acceptance of power distance.

Relating to the concept of power distance, U.S. Foreign Missions have a built-in structural inequality between foreign local staff and American officers. FSN’s are accountable to and evaluated by American staff. They are responsible for the implementation of American policies. Although they may have autonomy in the method of carrying out these policies, at the larger policy-making level of the State Department, they are excluded from setting institutional goals by the structure of the organization (Dorman, 2005). Individuals culturally oriented towards high power distance find work-related power disparity more acceptable than those with a low power distance orientation (Tosi & Greckhamer, 2004). In high power distance
cultures, the concept of someone holding a position of power without ascension from a lower position tends to be viewed as normal with stratification accepted. Conversely, individuals culturally oriented towards reduced power distance view the power granted based on status with concern, trepidation, and a generalized dissatisfaction with the structure of the institution (Cohen, 2007). This structural dissatisfaction could be negatively correlated to the ‘Organizational Commitment’ of Foreign Service Nationals.

1.4 Organizational Commitment

Commitment is defined as a psychological attachment to social or nonsocial foci and to courses of action relevant to those foci (Meyer, Becker, & Vandenberghe, 2004) and is a crucial part of the role FSN’s play in preserving the continuity of Embassy work at U.S. international posts (U.S. Department of State: Careers Representing America, 2007). U.S. Foreign Service Officers are rotated regularly between international postings to prevent clientism— the excessive identification with the country in which officers reside rather than with the United States (Perle, 1999). With regular and fixed management turnover, officers are profoundly dependent on the work of FSN’s to maintain U.S. post operations. Considering the significant role FSN’s play in the institution of the State Department, the factors contributing to or limiting their organizational commitment merit significant consideration. As the structure of the State Department is hierarchical, power distance provides a compelling factor in understanding the acceptance or rejection of that structure by individuals with varying cultural orientations.

1.5 General Hypotheses Discussion

Full, descriptive and predictive hypotheses are more fully outlined in chapter two of this research. In this overview, however, several expectations of this research emerge. Given the structure of State Department posts, it is expected that individuals who are
culturally comfortable with defined and (principally) non-negotiable hierarchies will be more comfortable working for an institution in which their position requires accountability to a specific group. This comfort level will, in turn, lead to acceptance of the power distance intrinsic for FSN’s working for the U.S. State Department. From this, organizational commitment will be higher as there will be greater acceptance of an institution that structurally limits their authority and empowerment. Additionally, those individuals reporting lower levels of power distance in their cultural orientation are expected to be less likely to accept institutionally created authority as a basis for hierarchy. FSN’s oriented towards more collaborative and less hierarchical organizations should be less inclined to offer full organizational commitment. Previous research dealing with culture and its relationship to organizational commitment demonstrates that a similar relationship exists in other multi-cultural organizations (Cohen, 2003; Cohen, 2007; etc.). This exploration has direct implications on U.S. foreign policy as the effectiveness with which FSN’s do their jobs affects the perception local populations have on the U.S. as a whole (see subsequent content in this research related to “public diplomacy”). Embassies serve the logistical needs of individuals traveling and doing business in the U.S., but they serve a public diplomacy function, as well. The engagement and investment that FSN’s have in making America accessible and telling the American “story” has played and continues to play a significant role in local populations perceptions of the U.S. At a larger level, the ability of the U.S. effectively manage cultural issues in its international missions could speak to a more generalized ability (or inability) to consider culture as a part of its international decision-making calculus.

1.6 Method Overview

Through web-based survey collection and anonymous survey distribution to posts throughout the State Department, FSN’s will have the chance to complete the survey honestly, with the fear of consequence greatly reduced. The survey itself consists of items from Dorfman and Howell (1988) that deal with an individual’s cultural
tendencies (specifically the conception of power). Porter et al. (1974) items will be used to identify organizational commitment with the Meyer and Allen (1984) survey identifying affective commitment. Several questions that may influence the results of the rest of the survey (employment tenure, contact with Americans, etc.) will be included for further clarification of the results, along with an open narrative question that allows free response regarding perception of the State Department as a whole. The sum of these results should offer insight into the relationship between power conception and commitment to the State Department (with mitigating factors and explanatory questions offering further insight). To see the full survey, please refer to Appendix 1. A more detailed description of the methodological considerations follows in chapter two.

1.7 Research Structure

This research is divided into six chapters. The first chapter serves as an introductory overview to outline the project and provides background information regarding relevant issues (note that all items mentioned are covered in detail in subsequent chapters). This section includes information about the structure of the State Department as it relates to the relationship between FSN’s and American officers. It also outlines the relationship of power distance to culture and its implications for attitudes resulting from organizational structure. Finally, this chapter looks at the general results of previous research on organizational commitment as it relates to both power distance and the distribution of power in an organization. Using these elements as a basis, an overview of the hypotheses are developed and justified as being grounded in previous scholarship in this area.

Chapter 2
The section reviews the relevant literature related to cultural orientation and commitment. This section gives insight into the construction and meaning of the survey questions. Competing theoretical views, the evolution of culture and
commitment, as conceptual frameworks, and the utility of the survey construction are all explored. The sum result of this review is that a more meaningful understanding of the instruments and their theoretical basis emerges. With an eye to this theoretical model, State Department structures and the role of FSN’s are also considered and reviewed. The conclusion of this chapter articulates a) what answers can emerge from this exploration and b) the larger meaning of the results of this research.

Chapter 3
This chapter analyzes the results of the survey responses. Standard tests for reliability and validity of the relationships between variables are applied. Emerging relationships between the variables of power distance orientation, organizational commitment, role negotiation, and role acceptance are identified. A narrative content analysis further clarifies the “stories” coming from the responses to the open-ended question included at the conclusion of the survey. Hypotheses are applied to these results and tested for their accuracy.

Chapter 4
This chapter will summarize the research results and offer analysis based on the data in relation to both research questions and hypotheses. Specifically, the results are considered in terms of their context for policy at State Department posts. For example, the misunderstanding that could result from the dissent that comes from low power distance cultures and the agreeability that comes from high power distance cultures is discussed as a possible cause for misinterpretation in the context of research results. The various factors of commitment (maintenance, investment, etc.) are evaluated in light of this unique and important population for U.S. public diplomacy. Considering this research inherently evaluates the harmony between two distinct groups (FSN’s and American Officers), the potential for the creation of what Allen and Pilnik (1973) called a “shadow institution” (where subordinates create a separate, largely non-scrutinized organization) certainly exists. As the State Department ostensibly seeks to build an institution that tells a coherent and consistent story relating to U.S. interests,
such an “off the radar” set of decision-making and organizational culture would certainly give pause. This chapter affords an opportunity to look at the results in the context of their relation to U.S. foreign policy.

Chapter 5
This chapter identifies the possible consequences and effects suggested by the results of this research. The orientation of the American relationship to the world and perceptions of the United States are considered in the context of the attitudes and values of FSN’s. While the extent and meaningfulness of the relationship between FSN and international attitudes is not considered (this would be quite hard to measure and would not likely produce any direct relationship with world attitudes), the results appear to be both informative and instructive.

Chapter 6
This application chapter utilizes the results and analysis of chapters three and four to make recommendations for changes in the State Department that could improve the organizational structure and culture, with a particular eye how these changes could offer a window to a more fully realized public diplomacy that better leverages the unique expertise of the FSN population. As people who both directly promote U.S. interests (often to skeptical populations) and serve unofficially as “citizen diplomats” for the U.S. to their home community, improving the organizational climate has implications towards world perception of the U.S. Considering the current uncertainty much of the world has about U.S. leadership (despite a spike in optimism created by the 2008 elections), the need for effective utilization of 30,000+ potential foreign advocates cannot be dismissed. These changes could also prove instructive for American foreign policy overall, as the lack of understanding of cultural nuance and the valuation of world opinion has plagued a number of U.S. decisions after the Cold War. Additionally, the Foreign Services of many states and numerous international organizations regularly rely on the efforts of foreign nationals at diplomatic posts in many different countries and in a variety of cultural settings. Clearer insight into the
structure and potential drawbacks of the American system for utilizing FSN’s creates a useful framework for comparison and provides a foundation for improved utilization of multi-national workforces. Finally, recent events have provided the U.S. with a stark demonstration of the dangers of forcing institutions and structures on countries without consideration of the cultural environment present within those countries. The results of the research are considered in each of these contexts.
Chapter 2

Here, by the grace of God and an inside straight, we have a personality untouched by the psychotic taboos of our tribe — and you want to turn him into a carbon copy of every fourth-rate conformist in this frightened land!

Raised by Martians prior to his return to Earth, Smith’s identity is fully unique from human culture. His status of being both “with us” and “separated from us” is greeted with both interest and suspicion by his fellow humans upon his “homecoming.” For FSN’s, this dichotomy between union and separation is just as much a part of their experience. As the Martian-Human Smith attempted to make sense of how to navigate both parts of his cultural self, FSN’s must consider their cultural orientation as it relates to the State Department. In an institution that is structured by power, the conception of power on the part of an FSN will undoubtedly affect the conception of the organization. For Smith, sacred trust was earned through the Martian ritual of simply sharing water with another person. His discovery of the duplicitous and deceitful nature of human relationships served to further alienate him from humans who were both “same” and “other.” The potential gap in understanding between FSN’s and the State Department has profound implications for the United States as it seeks to directly address the world community through public diplomacy. Smith’s honest and open articulation of Martian culture fundamentally transformed the arrogance of the human race. For the United States to shed world perception of aloofness and arrogance, more meaningful dialogue with the world must begin. That is not to say that agreement and understanding will be the result (it rarely is between Martians and Earthlings). The world may not agree with the U.S., but they should be able to understand, assess, and reasonably predict the decisions of the U.S. This can only begin with dialogue. That dialogue can begin with a more complete understanding of Foreign Service Nationals and it can continue when that understanding creates opportunities for engagement with host countries.
2.1 Cultural Dimensions

Any discussion of cultural dimensions typically begins with the work of Geerht Hofstede. For nearly 30 years, his investigation into the values and work attitudes of varying cultural groups has been a foundational element to cultural research. Specifically, Hofstede’s (1980) study is regularly one of the most referenced pieces of research on the relationship between culture and that attitudes and actions of employees in an organization (Bhagat & McQuaid, 1982). His research has been instrumental in furthering an understanding of cross-cultural management theory and practice, revealing that members of different societies hold divergent values concerning the nature of organizations and interpersonal relationships within them (Fernandez et al., 1997). In his seminal work beginning with 116,000 questionnaires completed by IBM employees from 50 countries (Bing, 2004), Hofstede researched how cultures differ across nations. IBM was selected based on the assumption that rigid corporate structure would ensure worldwide workplace homogeneity in all areas except culture. He outlined key cross-cultural dimensions capable of affecting the conception and epistemological underpinnings of work orientation (Friedman, 2007).

Follow-up research in the U.S. and internationally has established value and belief components of organizational culture/cultural systems (Cavenaugh, 1990; Chatman, 1989; Conner & Becker, 1975; Louis, 1983). Comparative values relating to management have been studied in a variety of international contexts (Carlson, Fernandez, & Stepina, 1996; Dorfman & Howell, 1988; England, 1978; Hofstede, 1980; Ronen & Kraut, 1977; Ronen & Shenkar, 1985).

Values are regularly operationalized as the central tenets of a society's culture. According to Fernandez, et al. (1997):

Values are believed to influence the interpretation of response outcomes of work, causing some outcomes to be positive reinforcements and others negative. Understanding variations in multiple cultures and the differences in work-related values that MNEs deal with across the globe is a necessary… Inadequate
awareness of international variations in cultural systems, including values, can exacerbate expatriate failure (p. 44).

The key values examined initially by Hofstede included power distance, uncertainty avoidance, individualism, and masculinity. His research on fifty-three national cultures argues that a culture can be ranked according to its corresponding score in each area (Nielsen and Gannon, 2006). Each element in his initial research produced a sort of continuum along which the basic problem-solving mechanisms of a culture could be revealed. A culture with a high power distance, for example, might be inclined to defer to authority for guidance and direction. A culture with a low power distance may seek multi-level discussion and consensus. Such distinctions between cultures have enormous implications for the values, attitudes, procedures, and policies of the workplace. In fact, variance in cultures may moderate the relationship between managerial practices and organizational effectiveness; that is, cultural differences may enhance or diminish the impact of managerial practices as they bear on job attitudes (Hofstede, 1991). Research into these value dimensions has produced some of the most extensive and significant implications into the study of culture in the workplace (Triandis, 2004). On the significance of his research, Hofstede (2006) writes:

My 1980 book introduced the 'dimensions' paradigm, showing that cultural differences between modern nations could be meaningfully measured and ordered along a discrete set of dimensions, representing different answers to universal problems of human societies. I had empirically derived four such dimensions: Power Distance (related to the problem of inequality), Uncertainty Avoidance (related to the problem of dealing with the unknown and unfamiliar), Individualism-Collectivism (related to the problem of interpersonal ties) and Masculinity-Femininity (related to emotional gender roles)... the dimensions paradigm since the 1990s has become the 'normal science' approach to cross-cultural business studies (p. 884).

Bing (2004) recounts a number of anecdotal examples in which the validity of Hofstede’s work was shown in a real-world context. On a trip to Austria, Bing observed that farmers kept their woodpiles in precise and orderly stacks (Austria scores low on uncertainty avoidance). On the subway in Austria, people are expected to purchase and hold tickets on their own (Austria scores low on power distance).
Contrast this to the American train system in which large gates and officials police passenger traffic. The easy application and empirical validation of Hofstede has continued to give his work traction. Writing on the profound influence of Hofstede on both practice and scholarship, Bing (2004) contends:

Hofstede's study was groundbreaking in other ways as well. Survey research had been used before, in fields such as sociology, political science, and business studies, but had not been significantly employed in cross-cultural comparisons, certainly not across a large number of countries. It is no exaggeration to say that Hofstede helped to create the field of comparative intercultural research. From its original publication date in 1980, Culture's Consequences sold steadily over a twenty-year period. In 1988, citations referencing Culture's Consequences jumped. From that time, Hofstede's influence has grown steadily (p. 86).

An understanding of the value dimensions has been shown to be a necessary component of the effective adaptation of organizational policy for multi-national organizations (Friedman, 2007). The dual nature of institutions require organizations to balance creating standard practices that are globally effective with the need to localize workplace policy to the practices of the community in which the organization operates (Kostova and Roth 2002). Empirical application has shown that there will consistently be a gap between the efficacy of standardized policy and their application to divergent cultural contexts. There will consistently be a tension between local practices and standardized institutional policy (Poutsma et al. 2006). As organizations expand globally, the number of variables that must align for new organizational initiatives increases exponentially, and that makes mastery of change management more challenging (Friedman, 2007). Increasing the challenging aspects of this sort of change management is the ethereal nature of Hofstede’s value dimensions. Hofstede (2006) argues:

The (value dimensions) do not 'exist' in a tangible sense. They are constructs, not directly accessible to observation but inferable from verbal statements and other behaviors and useful in predicting still other observable and measurable verbal and nonverbal behavior. If they exist, it is in our minds - we have defined them into existence. They should help us in understanding and handling the complex reality of our social world (p. 885).
An example of the intangible nature of Hofstede’s value dimensions can be found in how each area cannot be essentialized to stable a hypothesis about interacting with a culture. High power distance in a culture, for example, can be expected to mean that people adhere to leadership with fewer questions or criticism. There will also be fewer visible indications of dissent between subordinates and superiors. It would seem to follow that people from a high power distance culture would be less inclined towards revolt, revolution, or subterfuge; however the opposite was found (Peterson, 2003). Perhaps the lack of critical dialogue between follower and leader creates a climate in which the mitigating effects of argument (Infante, 1987) are not present, because in low power distance cultures there is much more upward vertical criticism yet a higher degree of adherence to agreed upon policy (Peterson, 2003).

Another challenge is the fact that culture is best studied in terms of values (what people believe) when looking at the national level, yet culture is best studied in terms of practice (what people do) at the organizational level (Muijen and Koopman, 1994). These challenges have led to a number of serious critiques of Hofstede’s methodology, application, and practical applicability of value dimensions in terms of academic research and as a basis for policy in multi-cultural organizations.

### 2.2 Criticism and Response: Hofstede’s Cultural Dimensions

Hofstede’s framework for understanding national differences has been among the most influential works in intercultural communication, however (in recent decades) it has also been one of the most highly criticized (Clark, 2003). One of the most debated aspects of Hofstede’s research is the extent to which it can be applied in a specific context. When countries share similar attributes according to Hofstede’s dimensions, internal consistency would suggest that management styles could easily be transplanted- though validation of this is lacking. His typology has been applied to cross-cultural reward management (Chiang, 2005) and to issues of motivation in an organization (Hofstede, 1980). Most of these application studies have not been
empirical (Chiang, 2005) and the focus of the orientation of the research has predominantly been filtered through a distinctly Western lens (Gerhart and Milkovich, 1990).

Concerns also exist regarding the generalizability of Hofstede’s research based on the fact that his initial pool was uniformly drawn from IBM employees. Given that management and hiring standards explicitly and implicitly draw upon individuals with specific characteristics, a range of research suggests that generalizing to groups outside of this population may be problematic (Sondergaard, 1994; McSweeney 2003). Peterson (2003) voices concern based on personal experience about Hofstede’s characterization of Japan having a “low power distance.” Unless IBM systematically attracts Japanese employees who would have been misfits in other Japanese companies, Peterson would argue that the Japanese workplace (by experience and research) actually has a substantial power distance. A strong organizational culture is believed to dilute the scores on the dimensions (Smircich, 1983). Bias is also suspected in the samples’ gender (mostly male respondents) (Merker, 1982) and orientation to career/professional life (Kidd, 1982). Similarly, Hofstede’s identification of cultural dimensions based on nationality has proven potentially problematic. Regional differences within countries and increasing globalization may limit the utility of suggesting a person’s country of birth or residence has predictive power on her/his organizational behavior. It is also crucial to consider the issue of sub-cultures within a larger cultural frame. Looking at culture as a national aggregate may obfuscate distinctions across subcultures. Internal differences between groups in a national culture may flourish (Martin, 1992). Summation of these objections is further articulated by McSweeney (2003) who states that other than a priori belief, we have little evidence that national borders have any influence on defining a discrete cultural group.

The dichotomized representation of cultural values has led to criticism that the framework leads to unjustifiable and incoherent perceptions of specific cultures.
(Clark, 2003). Nielson and Gannon (2006) offer a brief example to show placing culture on a linear continuum (as Hofstede does) ignores the nuances that shape the dimensions of a culture. Hofstede’s perspective (according to Nielson and Gannon) holds that Sweden cannot be both feminine and masculine; that is, the country’s culture can only be defined in terms of a continuum trending (with varying intensity, depending on the study) towards masculinity OR femininity. However, close observation of Swedish values and behaviors indicates that the Swedes are simultaneously masculine and feminine. Viewing a culture in terms of its linear place on Hofstede’s dimensions increases the probability of inaccurate stereotyping. Also, evidence suggests that cultures frequently manifest seemingly paradoxical values and behaviors. Iran, for example, trends towards fiercely masculine values while, at the same time, Tehran has a number of women serving in significant political positions. Smesler (1992) argues that other such contradictions exist in every culture and gives the examples of the Anglo proverbs of "look before you leap" existing alongside the competing proverb "he who hesitates is lost." Additionally, U.S. negotiators frequently complain that Chinese negotiators are both sincere and deceptive (Fang 1999). For a richer and more complete conception of a culture, it may be necessary to look at frameworks beyond Hofstede’s value dimensions.

A deeper epistemological question related to the very concept of culture has increasingly been put to Hofstede’s work. Hofstede (1980, 1991) has contended that cultural dimensions represent deeply rooted “software of the mind” and are principally fixed. While not contending that culture is fully static, Hofstede’s work suggests that there are root orientations that are unlikely to dramatically change over time. Contending scholarship suggests that culture may, in fact, be far more malleable than Hofstede suggests (Sondergaard, 1994). International migration, globalization, historical events, economic changes, as well as a range of other occurrences have undoubtedly had an effect on many cultures. For example, Hofstede’s work explores the religious tendency of a country like Spain and the irreligiosity of the Russians. Historically, however, in the post-Franco era, church attendance has dwindled in Spain.
and swelled in post-Communist Russia. This is to say nothing of the dividing and re-unification of nations. Hofstede’s research treats Hong Kong as separate from China and Yugoslavia as holistic group, leaving contemporary researchers to wonder which value dimensions remain valid and how to interpret the new national borders. To state that the value dimensions of culture X are Y should, perhaps, not be viewed as an axiomatic statement. Rather, such statements could alternatively be seen as a snapshot from a specific historical, economic, and social period rather than something that provides an enduring heuristic into the expected behavior of a national group.

Wallerstein (1990) states that he is “skeptical that we can operationalize the concept of culture [...] in any way that enables us to use it for statements that are more than trivial (p. 34).” It is agreed that culture exists, but like putting an ocean in a teacup, defining culture into a convenient category may be futile. Similarly, there is concern that Hofstede overstates his framework’s role in shaping historical, economic, and social periods. McSweeney (2003) argues that Hofstede discounts and discards non-cultural explanations for the actions of nations, groups, and individuals. Clark (2004) writes:

Hofstede cites archaeological evidence that 4000 years ago there were centralized governments in the Middle East and democracies in Scandinavia to support the view that the power distance variable has been at work for millennia. It would appear that Hofstede subscribes to the view that all historical, political, economic, and social (or any other) events that have ever happened throughout history, in the present or in the future, are related to and can be explained by his national culture dimensions. Although his framework may be appropriate for accounting for certain observable behaviors (i.e., the differences in rates of eating out in various countries), most business and cultural researchers would hardly buy into the argument that his framework of values can account for all world occurrences (p. 69).

Chiang (2005) tested the concerns regarding Hofstede’s work by studying the work reward preferences of a diverse group of countries. These countries represented (in some cases) polar opposites in Hofstede’s framework. Several countries in the study were, for example, strongly masculine while others were strongly feminine. Hofstede’s dimensions would suggest that individuals in masculine countries should elicit a stronger preference for financial rewards and individual-based performance
reward systems than those in feminine cultures. The results showed strong validity for Hofstede’s thesis, but also suggested that many of the previously cited limitations have merit. Chiang writes:

Cultural differences clearly offer insight into reward preferences, although the findings are not straightforward. This study demonstrated that reward preferences might not be conditioned solely by cultural influences (cultural determinism), but also by a multiplicity of other contextual factors (e.g. economic conditions) (p. 1561).

The transmission of culture adds to its complication as a construct along with the challenge of defining divergent dimensions of it. Sharing cultural meanings (for instance, from parents to children) within a society may be imperfect, so that over time the cultural definitions evolve. Earley (2006) contends that cultural meanings are typically not shared uniformly by an entire society, and they are not shared precisely. Any two individuals from a given culture may hold slightly different meanings for the same event or construct, and these two individuals may have shared meanings with other parties in the society but not with one another (Rohner, 1984). Earley (2006) sums up the challenges faced by Hofstede by describing the “trap” his research falls into and stating “(Hofstede’s) trap is inevitable if one uses values measured by individual perception as an indicant of collective culture (p. 928).”

In addition to global concerns about Hofstede’s research orientation, methodological concerns have also emerged. Dorfman, Howell, and Bautista (1986) examined the uncertainty avoidance value dimension and found significant inconsistency. Cumulatively, they build a strong case that the questions Hofstede selected for this portion of the survey reflect the researcher’s own perceptions of measuring the concept- rather than being based on questions that establish valid responses. A single (presumably unique) item was also shown to have been used on different scales creating further validity questions. Additional evidence of the “stacked deck” criticisms of Hofstede’s framework can be found in the fact that his literature reviews (in his initial and subsequent work on the value dimensions of cultures) tends to be
drawn from authors agreeing with his thesis and (in some cases) close associates (Clark, 2004). Further methodological concerns are articulated by McSweeney (2003) who points out that Great Britain is composed of at least three nations (England, Scotland and Wales), yet Hofstede treats it as a single entity with a single “national” culture. Such methodological problems could very well point to substantial weaknesses at the foundation of Hofstede’s thesis.

Validation of these concerns is shown in the work of Fernandez et al (1997). Duplicating Hofstede’s research in 1997 (albeit in a more limited sample size and less homogenous corporate population), they found significant shifts from the previous rankings of countries based on earlier studies of their value dimensions. This may reflect the sorts of previously noted trends that cause shifts in the values of a country. These results may also point to the difficulties of establishing a reliable scale for a culture based on national borders. Further reliability issues may be based on the fact that Hofstede’s research may only be duplicatable in homogenous systems based on a uniform corporate culture (with differing national cultures), thus greatly limiting its explanatory power in an increasing diverse and evolving world. If Fernandez et al’s research suggests any or all of these factors, treating national origin/habitation as a reliable indicator of an individual’s values would prove folly. Hofstede himself has said that a litany of misapplication has plagued the perceived reliability of his theory (Bing, 2004). Specifically, Hofstede has stated that the most common misapplication of his theory is that individual cultural preferences can be inferred from the score of that individual’s country. Referred to as the “ecological fallacy,” this occurs when data collected at a countrywide level is used to predict individual behavior (Clark, 2004). If a normal curve is assumed, individuals will fall into a range of areas outlying their country’s score. The goal of Hofstede’s research was never intended to account for the behavior and values of individuals, but, rather, to offer global insight into the behavior and values of a national group (Bing, 2004). Similarly, the so-called “reverse ecological fallacy” occurs when the behavior of an individual is used to explain the values and actions of a nation (in terms of Hofstede’s data). This occurs less
frequently than the former, though it represents, again, a strong misuse of Hofstede’s thesis (Clark, 2004). Stated in a polemic fashion by Slater (1970):

An individual, like a group, is a motley collection of ambivalent feelings, contradictory needs and values, and antithetical ideas. He is not, and cannot be, a monolithic totality, and the modern effort to bring this myth to life is[…] delusional and ridiculous (p. 27).

Having established several key methodological concerns about Hofstede’s work, it is important to carefully consider the response to these charges from Hofstede and advocates for the validity of his research. On the issue of the reliability of Hofstede’s value dimensions over time, Smith (1996) presents a range of studies to show that the fundamental country scores remain principally valid. In duplicating Hofstede’s research, Chiang (2005) used data collected from four countries, representing over 120 companies with over 1,000 respondents from diverse backgrounds, using both qualitative and quantitative methods. Despite these potential “improvements” on Hofstede’s research methodology, Chiang found that Hofstede’s framework still provides a cogent explanation for variations in national culture. In attempting to overcome potential limitations in the framework, the research found that the proposition of that culture influences values in predictable and measurable ways holds true.

Other researchers have suggested that there are cultural values that merit study that were overlooked by Hofstede. For example, Hunt (1981) suggests there should be a value dimension related to “shame and guilt.” Dorfman and Howell (1988) contend that paternalism should be part of an expanded Hofstede methodology. Others have suggested entirely new typologies of cultural values (Hampden-Turner and Trompenaars, 1993). While these works have (to varying degrees) criticized Hofstede’s framework, they implicitly validate his methodology (Adler, 1997). Hofstede (2006) himself notes that proposed revisions to his work have tended to validate the fundamental principles of his framework. GLOBE (Global Leadership and Organizational Behavior Effectiveness) attempted to create a more comprehensive and exhaustive exploration of culture and its implications. Seen by many in the field
as a rebuttal to Hofstede’s work, he viewed it as a rejoinder noting “GLOBE not only adopted the dimensions paradigm, they also started from my choice of five” (p. 883). Such research begs for modification of the value dimensions, but validates the principle concept of value dimensions being a foundational element of culture.

Certain critics of Hofstede have made quasi-Marxist arguments that imply wealth/power distribution provides a better framework for understanding the attitudes and values of a culture (House et al, 2004). Hofstede counters this by stating that identifying the causation of cultural values is beyond the scope of his work. Hofstede (2006) writes:

> I have argued that differences in values that can be accounted for by economic factors do not need to be explained by cultural factors. Therefore, in all my validations of the culture dimensions against external data, wealth has been controlled for, often by analyzing separately data from poor and from wealthy countries. From the original four IBM dimensions, Individualism and Power Distance were both strongly correlated with national wealth, and therefore (negatively) with each other, but after controlling for wealth their intercorrelation all but disappeared. Uncertainty Avoidance was weakly correlated with wealth; only Masculinity was entirely unrelated to wealth and therefore purely cultural (p. 888).

As an anecdote, Hofstede routinely used to begin the courses he taught by writing the provocative statement on the blackboard that “CULTURE DOES NOT EXIST.” Upon clarification, he explained to the class that culture (like values, ethics, morals, etc.) are constructs. Once they no longer have utility in explaining or predicting behavior, they need to be discarded. Culture, according to Hofstede, should never be the summative explanation of an event. Culture can play a role both in cause and effect. While important for study, culture should never be construed as a “divining rod” capable of showing the truths of a society and the actions of an individual (Hofstede, 2006). Russia may have re-discovered religious tradition because of the economic uncertainty caused in a post-Communist society. Russia may also have had a strong, but dormant religious tradition that remained hidden during the pre-Glasnost era of Communism. Hofstede’s work doesn’t attempt to enter into the chicken/egg aspect of this debate. It only seeks to answer the is portion of the cultural question (Hofstede, 2006).
Peterson (2003) summarizes the criticism against Hofstede and offers a succinct reply-instead of claiming that Hofstede’s dimensions are in any way sufficient to explain individuals or cultures, future researchers need to view them as an initial orientation to divergent cultural values. Other forms of research (ethnography, open-ended surveys, etc.) need to be used as a balance against making unsupported assumptions. Developing future cultural research can employ Hofstede’s work as a framework, but an open exploration of the beliefs and values of individuals must also be a part of any exploration.

In sum, Hofstede’s value dimensions represent a significant part of the foundation of modern cultural research. These dimensions offer a clear perspective on the epistemology of various cultural groups. However, significant concerns about his methodology, assertions, and the generalizability of his research give pause to anyone looking to use Hofstede’s work as the exclusive method for understanding the orientation of individuals. This is especially true when looking at a population where people have been selected and self-selected to work for the interests of another (perhaps radically different) culture. To simply state that a Foreign Service National comes from X country and will likely have Y values is such a gross oversimplification that the results of any such study would be utterly baseless. To ignore the role of value dimensions in people working for an organization like the U.S. State Department would also overlook important aspects of culture that may play a role in productivity, job engagement, organizational identification, and commitment. Thus, there is a need for a middle ground that incorporates the most relevant aspects of Hofstede’s work, while acknowledging the reality that individuals are unique from their culture.

FSN’s working for the State Department have made a conscious choice to work in an environment that will assuredly be distinct from their own cultural experience. In countries hostile to the U.S. (for varying reasons), this decision may even point to a job applicant being an outlier from the local culture. As U.S. diplomatic posts are, in
principle, American workplaces, the impact of organizational culture (as noted previously) will be profound. It is simply not possible to work for a U.S. government institution abroad and expect it to function in a way consistent with the national culture. Even the issue of language cannot be overlooked as English is both the operational and relational method of communication on the job. Over time, it can be expected that all of this will influence the work values and behaviors of FSN employees. It is also likely that many FSN’s have been educated in the English language and may have even studied at American institutions. Such individuals would likely be more attractive candidates for positions at diplomatic posts, as they would more easily integrate into the linguistic and cultural environment. The State Department also has a policy of providing employee training, which is exclusively presented in English and often from American contractors. The Foreign Service Institute (FSI) in Washington provides training programs for FSN’s as well as American officers. It is beyond the scope of this research to suggest the extent to which any or all of these areas will affect the value dimensions of individuals. Fortunately, the scales used by Hofstede to study national culture have been operationalized to the individual level.

Dorfman and Howell’s (1988) work utilizes Hofstede’s value dimensions for a scale that would be applicable at the individual level. Utilizing Hofstede’s four value dimensions, Dorfman and Howell created a 22 question survey to measure an individual’s value orientation. The scale was empirically tested at international firms from countries with divergent scores in terms of value dimensions. After performing a confirmatory factor analysis, correlation analyses, ANOVA procedures, and tests for moderation, the scale was found to be valid and reliable (Hoffman and Robertson, 2000). That is to say, individuals tended to score in line with the value dimensions for their country based on Hofstede’s (1980) initial studies. Further research validates this as Smith et al., (1996) showed that individual reports about their personal power distance preferences tended to strongly correlate with the self-identified nationality of the individual. In reference to Dorfman and Howell’s instrument’s ability to measure
individual value dimensions without pigeon-holing people into fixed cultural groups, “the most notable trend was that while scores on Dorfman and Howell’s scale were consistent with Hofstede’s dimension scores, there was extensive variation within each national group” (Hoffman and Robertson, 2000, p. 36). The implication of this work is that the scale can be used to measure an individual’s value dimensions. The strong correlation with national culture shows the influence of culture on individual epistemology, but the survey allows individuals to demonstrate their personal variation from their culture. In a population such as Foreign Service Nationals, this distinction is ideal. It allows for culture to be studied at the individual level. It also allows for variations stemming from exposure to U.S. culture and individual values to be accounted for in the research. Used in conjunction with specifically chosen, open-ended questions, this method allows for exploring the differences in the FSN population without assuming that national origin or residence are the exclusive cause of those differences.

2.3 Power Distance

Given the stratified structure of the U.S. State Department in terms of FSN roles, the most compelling value dimension for study is that of Power Distance. As this research posits the idea that a cultural acceptance of stark hierarchy will lead to greater acceptance of State Department structure, understanding this value dimension is an ideal starting point for this research.

Power distance refers to the extent to which there is unequal power distribution in a society. This is organizational, social, and societal. High power distance societies see this unequal distribution of power as natural and acceptable. The unequal distribution of power, according to many in such societies, creates a defined and predictable hierarchy. High power distance implies a sharp distinction between superiors whose role is to 'think' and subordinates whose role is to 'do' (Miles, 1975). From this there is order and accountability at each stratum that ensures protection of the whole (De Jong,
et al. 2006). Low power distance societies work to reduce inequality and see the uneven distribution of power as indicative of injustice. Despite this cultural preference, hierarchy persists in low power distance cultures, however those in power attempt to conceal or redistribute their status i.e. “without all the team’s hard work, I could have never won this award” (Hofstede, 2001). This is part of a general discomfort found in low power distance cultures with status and power (Hofstede, 1980; Singelis, et al. 1995; Triandis, 1995). Beyond status differences, a generalized sense of “otherness” between power levels has been found in high power distance cultures. Differences between superiors and subordinates are viewed as distinct. That is to say, those with power view those without power as being “not like us” (Friedman, 2007). In low power distance cultures, there is a view that people are essentially the same (at least in terms of rights and responsibilities) at all levels of an organization. This notion of shared responsibility in low power distance cultures creates an interesting relationship. It is possible in high power distance cultures that people will ostensibly support the leadership role of those with power, but have little investment in the policies advocated by the powerful (outside of respecting their status). Thus, it would be a mistake to construe the acceptance of hierarchy as an engagement in policies emerging from that hierarchy (Peterson, 2003). The old joke from workers in the Soviet Union was that “we pretend to work and they pretend to pay us.” The result should not be seen as subterfuge from the underlings with low power distance societies and efficient implementation of ‘the plan’ in high power distance societies. Alvez et al. (2006) found that in high power distance cultures, ‘the leader’ makes most overt decisions but ‘the followers’ routinely make covert decisions on their own. The orientation suggests a far more complex relationship in the very conception of power across cultures.

Equally important is the conception of the meaning of power across different cultures. In many high power distance countries, power is viewed through a familial metaphor. A leader or supervisor is expected to give guidance, protection, nurturance, and care to the employees, while subordinates are expected to give trust, loyalty, deference, and appreciation (Aycan et al., 2000). Far from the more brutal connotations associated
with “autocratic” power that many low power distance countries would ascribe to such a relationship, high power distance countries tend to view power as a protective (rather than coercive) force (Sagie and Aycan, 2003). In a “father/child” view of organizational power, it is expected that the “father” knows what’s best for his “family” and trust in “his” decisions is at the heart of the organizational structure. The exploitive character many Western societies ascribe to the “power hungry” tends to be absent in this view of power. If it is to be accepted, this familial view of power also explains Peterson’s (2003) concept of rebellion and subterfuge in high power distance structures- the most brutal fights in families are often those that occur when a child believes s/he knows better than the parent. Also telling in this metaphor is the affection many high power distance countries have shown to “autocratic” leaders who loudly profess to only being interested in taking care of “their people.” In contrast, a Swedish (low power distance culture) proverb holds “be but do not be seen!” (Huberman and Loch, 2004).

From a leadership perspective, Hofstede (1984; 2001) identified connections between power distance and the process of an organization making a decision. Not surprisingly, low power distance decision-making tended to be more democratic and participatory with leaders serving as facilitators for a group buy-in. High power distance cultures expected unilateral (perhaps paternalistic) decisions to come from superiors. Delegation is shown to be avoided high power distance cultures (Sagie & Koslowsky, 2000). Hackman and Johnson (1996) identified that autocratic leadership is more common in high power distance cultures. Wu and Stewart (2005) create a clear delineation based on decision making between low and high power distance cultures. Decisions coming from high power distance cultures are defined as “directive decisions” whereas decisions coming from low power distance cultures are defined as “participative decisions.” Their survey analysis comparing university employees in Taiwan vs. the United States showed that power distance and democratic leadership style were significantly correlated with each other. Perhaps not coincidentally, tasks coming from places of authority in the Department of State are
typically referred to as “directives.” Sagie and Aycan (2003) sum up the decision-making differences between low and high power distance cultures by stating:

By contrast, in low power distant cultures, everyone is perceived to have the potential to contribute to the decision-making process; in fact, interdependence between the superior and the subordinate(s) is valued. Second, in high power distant cultures, decision-making is perceived as a privilege of management, and participation is considered as an infringement to management prerogatives. In contrast, in low power distant cultures, everyone is assumed to have equal rights. As such, employees consider it their right to participate in decisions that concern them. Finally, in high power distant cultures, the 'inequality' belief creates not only dependency of subordinates in their superiors, but also fear of punishment if employees question, challenge, or disagree with their management's decisions. This fear is much smaller in the low power distant cultures; in fact, participation here is frequently encouraged and may even be rewarded (p. 453).

In a culture with high power distance, employment is often based on strict status relationships (Hoon Nam and Wie Han, 2005). Supervisors tell employees both what and how a task should be accomplished. The role of the employee is to act on the initiatives put forth by management, not to question them. If this is consistent with cultural values, this arrangement serves both the superior and the subordinate in the hierarchy. Leaders validate their position by being the (almost wholly) responsible and accountable agent of action. Employees don’t face questions of accountability for organizational decisions. The outcome of this model is that supervisors have tight control over employees, while employees are free from burdens of responsibility. However, when there is a multi-cultural organization where co-workers have different perceptions of the appropriate power distance, there will be unique challenges. In an organization with both low power distance cultures and high power distance cultures present, Gouttefarde (1996) interviewed a number of employees about their perceptions. An individual in the low power distance camp comments about his high power distance organization by stating "the decision-making process is so hierarchical[…] Here everything is so boxed I can just do a few things[…] carry out my defined responsibility and then pass the project on. No one is individually responsible. Your project could die in the next person's hands” (p. 62). Another low power distance employee “enthusiastically described the efforts of his home office's
CEO (who has a low power distance view of hierarchy), such as lunching with people much lower on the corporate totem pole, in order to communicate better with his staff... in contrast, (his new high power distance manager) had lost visibility since becoming a member of the upper echelons” (p. 62). Huberman and Loch (2004) found the value of status in a culture to be strongly correlated to power distance. Thus, not surprisingly, high power distance has been correlated to a reduction in openness (De Jong, et al. 2006). The basis for this issue of “openness” can be seen in the work of Hartzing (1999) who found that people in low power distance cultures tended to be more comfortable providing information to people in an organization regardless of status or rank. High power distance cultures tended to place rank as a determinant for whom should receive information in an organization.

Kirkman et al. (2001) identified examples of this phenomenon during investigations of several organizations operating in high power distance countries. In each country surveyed, new positions were created that called for creative, self-governing employee teams without a “leader” as defined by custom and tradition. Employees in these organizations “recalled feeling baffled when it was first explained to them that they would be making decisions more autonomously in a new work system” (p. 19). Even after the teams were created and implemented, team members expressed discomfort with self-governance items such as giving performance feedback to peers and assessing work processes. Not surprisingly, a greater comfort was expressed towards an organizational structure in which a defined leader oversees such items. Kirkman et al. (2001) go on to suggest a relationship between power distance and a culture’s acceptance of determinism. In high power distance cultures, a belief persists that a larger authority, entity, or force controls both human and organizational outcomes. An example of this can be found in the (largely high power distance) worldview of many Muslim countries. Instead of making a statement about what will happen, the caveat of “Inshallah” (God-willing) is given. This suggests a belief that human action is not intrinsically autonomous and that outside (and more powerful) forces will ultimately
bear on any plan. Thus, autonomous, egalitarian organizational structures are not only at odds with tradition; they may be viewed as an affront to it.

An example of the challenge of disparate cultural values in terms of power distance is explored in Hoon Nam and Wie Han’s (2005) analysis of an international corporate merger over cultural lines. Specifically, their work explored a merger between a Canadian and Korean firm. One of the sharpest distinctions between the two companies was the orientation to power distance. Their research extensively analyzed the challenges faced by Canadian expatriate managers (characterized by their emphasis on low power distance) and their Korean employees (characterized by expecting high power distance from supervisors). The new organizational vision was to transition from “control and command” to “lead and support,” transparently showing the move of the organization to the Canadian low power distance structure. The results, not surprisingly, were mixed. One Canadian manager stated "the Korean employees could not 'get out of their boxes,' because they were so used to being told how to do things from their managers" (p. 42). Many senior level employees in Korea could not adapt to a new organizational orientation that held “leadership” as a reciprocal process between people rather than a hierarchical structure of power and responsibility. Younger employees expressed some enthusiasm for the opportunity afforded by a less hierarchical structure, but there was still a lack of trust in the new concept of reducing power distance. This lack of trust is based on what Kirkman et al. (2001) described as the fear of self-management found in many high power distance cultures. They elaborate that people from high power distance cultures tend to behave submissively in the presence of managers, avoid disagreements, and believe that bypassing their bosses is insubordination. Not surprisingly, the discomfort created by a change in power distance can be profound. Ultimately, positive outcomes in organizational communication followed the merger, however the growing pains created by changing the value of hierarchy in an organization show the importance of the concept of power distance in workplace culture.
Similar research was conducted to identify the extent to which employees accepted or rejected leadership based on an alternative perception of power (i.e. low/high power distance relationships). Robert and Prost (2000) studied cultures with different dimensions of power distance and the effect supervisors with competing views of hierarchy had on organizational effectiveness, job commitment, and communication. Their results showed that Mexican workers (lower power distance) may tolerate strong hierarchy but would prefer a less autocratic system (consistent with Page and Wiseman, 1993). Poland (a high power distance country in Hofstede’s initial research) was found to now reject high power distance leadership. Nasierowski and Mikula (1998) contend that Poles may now see hierarchy with suspicion due to its possible connection to the failed Soviet regime. This research cumulatively suggests the challenge an organization faces when its perception of power distance is out of step with the culture in which it operates. It also suggests the ancillary challenges of adapting to rapidly changing and evolving cultures. Summing up the dangers associated with inverted value dimensions between organizational and national culture, Robert and Prost (2000) argue, “(our) results go beyond providing support for the contention that some practices may be ineffectual in some cultures. Indeed, our results suggest that some practices may in fact be harmful (in relation to power distance)” (p. 655).

Shipper et al. (2003) go on to argue that the basis of many of these outcomes is the fact that an entirely different skill set is needed for management in low vs. high power distance cultures. Based on survey research from firms operating in cultures with varying levels of power distance, they contend “self-awareness of interactive skills” that foster discussion, group ownership of policy, and steady feedback/dialogue are crucial to managing in countries with a low power distance. In high power distance cultures, “self-awareness of controlling skills” is the foundation of success. That is to say, managers should be more adept at giving directives and keeping employees in line with organizational policy. As job satisfaction on the part of employees is part of the foundation for effective management, Lam et al. (2002) examine the importance of
“organizational justice” as viewed by employees. They found the perception of “just” organizational policies and management to be crucial in creating a climate where employees are committed to their tasks. Procedural justice (a belief in fixed and fair policies that should be adhered to) was valued by many high power distance cultures, while distributive justice (a belief in fair outcomes based on action) was found to be emphasized in many lower power distance cultures.

Contributing to the challenges of management across cultures is the fact that power distance levels tend to also relate to employee preferences regarding reward structures (Chiang, 2005). Hierarchy in culture and in organizations indicates a willingness to accept reward differentials/inequalities derived from ‘predetermined’ non-performance criteria, such as status, positions, age and seniority, more so than individual effort and contribution (Lincoln and Kalleberg, 1990). As authority and loyalty are valued higher than performance in high power distance cultures, it follows that employees will accept reward inequality based on status over performance (Chiang, 2005). A reward system based on performance that aims to narrow the reward gap/opportunity gap between superiors and subordinates will be treated with suspicion in high power distance cultures. Chiang (2005) went on to suggest that since in high power distance countries, rewards are linked more to employee position and seniority than contribution and performance, “individuals in high power distance countries should elicit a stronger preference for group- and non-performance based rewards than those in low power distance countries” (p. 1550). The distribution of rewards (financial, status, etc.) is an important component of most jobs. An institution where the mobility of one group (e.g. FSN’s) is checked tightly by the group’s status is likely to be linked to the local culture’s acceptance of reward inequality based on power distance. In sum, a person from a culture where advancement is not a core value will be more satisfied in a strictly stratified institution.

Identifying the U.S. State Department as a high power distance institution would seem to be at odds with the fact that American culture was shown to score low on
Hofstede’s measure of power distance (Hofstede, 1980). American supervisors tend to reduce the perception that they have authority and hide any of the privileges that power may entitle (Gouttefarde, 1996). From U.S. Presidents trying to play up their working class roots to politicians showing their families are just “normal folks” to celebrities helping with volunteers at homeless shelters during Christmas, there is a near universal emphasis on creating a non-hierarchical appearance as part of American culture. In the State Department, this is exemplified in Colin Powell’s initiative “One Team-One Mission” in 2004. This initiative de-emphasized traditional State Department hierarchies and focused on increasing training and development at all levels (Pearson, 2004). Despite the clear structural hierarchy that precludes FSN’s from many positions of organizational leadership, the initiative focused on the opportunities and contributions made from people at all levels of the State Department. This dichotomy of presenting an egalitarian structure while maintaining hierarchy is a systemic part of many American institutions, despite the simplistic notion that America is a “low power distance country.” The need for a more complete exploration of American power conception is shown in Westwood and Everett (1987) who argue that power distance can be an unreliable indicator of status structure. Gouttefarde (1996), for example, identified differences in leadership styles between American and French managers in a multinational organization. While the French (high power distance culture) displayed their status overtly in terms office décor and setup, the Americans tended to have more modest and open offices. However, Gouttefarde found the Americans to engage in displays and performances suggesting status attained. American organizations, with their litany of Vice Presidents and Senior Executives, celebrate individual success less in terms of “position held” and more in terms of “position earned.” Huberman and Loch (2004) describe this view of power as being the pursuit of a symbolic validation rather than the pursuit of resources.

A cultural metaphor for this can historically be found in the work of Horatio Alger. Writing in late 19th century, his novels emphasized the idea that a person from a low status level can attain anything with hard work, dedication, and ingenuity. The phrase
“Horatio Alger story” is an understood element of the American cultural lexicon. A sample of the titles of his works suggest this clear message:

- *Abraham Lincoln: the Backwoods Boy; or, How A Young Rail-Splitter Became President* (1883)
- *Adrift in the City; or, Oliver Conrad's Plucky Fight* (1902)
- *Ben's Nugget; or, A Boy's Search for Fortune* (1882)
- *A Debt of Honor. The Story of Gerald Lane's Success in the Far West* (1900)
- *Frank's Campaign; or, What Boys can do on the Farm for the Camp* (1864)
- *Mark Mason's Victory; or, The Trials and Triumphs of a Telegraph Boy* (1899)

While intended as popular works for a young audience, the enduring legacy of these books has become part of the American identity (Ziewacz, 2001). Successful American films such as “Good Will Hunting,” “Pretty Woman,” “Rocky,” “Star Wars,” and “The Pursuit of Happyness” (though the list could go on *ad nauseum*) all suggest that those in destitute circumstances can ascend hierarchies through dedication, application, and talent. Thus, the American in a position of power (SIC) doesn’t get respect because s/he is *in that position*. Rather, s/he demands respect because of the fact that the position was *earned*. The reality of advancement opportunities provides stark argument against this cultural mythos, however the perception remains. And the concept of hierarchy remains legitimated. As such, while America scores low on power distance and presents power gaps as surmountable, the want for status and power remains fully present and powerful in American culture. Although there is an overt emphasis on teamwork put forward by the State Department, a core job motivation of American Foreign Service Officers has been to improve career status by obtaining an important title, good assignments, frequent promotions, and annual bonuses (Krizay, 1988). Understanding this duality of the American view of power (that it must be both completely subdued AND desperately earned) provides a basis for understanding a power structure such as the State Department’s. While its expression may be subdued, there is a paradoxical sense of earned entitlement that frames the American perception of power. For individuals not familiar with this duality (i.e. FSN’s with limited exposure to American culture and
intercultural communication perspectives), American appearance of deference while maintaining authority can seem, at best, inconsistent and, at worst, duplicitous.

In summation, the concept of power distance initially refers to the extent a culture accepts stratification of power. The concept should not be confused with the idea that a high power distance means the blind acceptance of mandates coming from the powerful. Power distance, nevertheless, has profound implications for leadership and management. Cultures with low power distance expect democratic, two-way communication as it relates to organizational decision-making. Cultures with a high power distance accept directive communication, but expect protection and support from leaders. In multi-cultural organizations, power distance can create tension if there are diverse conceptions of it within the organization. The U.S., while considered a low power distance country, values and fosters power-seeking behaviour in ways that are not readily apparent to those from an outside culture. The State Department, as a micro chasm of this tendency, re-enforces the notion of earned status and power with its rigorous and competitive system of promotion. Understanding the conception of power distance of FSN’s should, according to many of the previously documented sources, provide deeper insight into the satisfaction and commitment levels of foreign State Department employees as power distance strongly shapes the internal perception of an organization. Utilizing Dorfman and Howell’s (1988) survey, specifically the section on power distance, can offer insights into FSN reaction to the obtuse and challenging power structure of the State Department specifically and the United States, as a whole.

2.4 Organizational Commitment

Like Hofstede’s work on culture, the concept of organizational commitment has become a touchstone for many investigations into organizational effectiveness (Griffin and Bateman, 1986). The basis for this interest is due in no small part to the perceived outcomes of organizational commitment in terms of teamwork, performance, loyalty,
job satisfaction, etc. Despite the conceptual interest organizational commitment has generated, definitions for the concept itself are decidedly varied (Cohen, 2003). The definitions are closely linked to two key theoretical approaches to the concept: the calculative vs. moral/emotional approach to organizational commitment (McGee and Ford, 1987; Griffin and Bateman, 1986). The calculative approach views organizational commitment in investment terms, that is to say what investments (personal, social, economic, opportunity cost, etc) would an individual lose if s/he were to leave an organization? If the costs are too high to leave or if comparably valued investment opportunities in other organizations don’t exist, then the individual will remain committed to an organization. The moral/emotional approach deals with the concept of organizational identification. The distinction between these approaches can be blurred, as identification can be viewed as an investment. In principle, the moral/emotional approach deals with psychological aspects of commitment. Porter’s work (e.g., Porter et al., 1974; Mowday et al. 1982) has been foundational to this view of commitment and has been termed “affective and value commitment” (Cohen, 2003).

Porter’s work has been called “the most visible measure of affective commitment and has enjoyed widespread acceptance and use” (Griffin and Bateman, 1986, p. 170). Consisting of 15 items and utilized for the survey in this research, it reflects Porter’s three dimensions of commitment. These include:

- Want to continue membership within an organization
- Acceptance of and belief in the values of an organization
- Willingness to invest effort and energy into an organization

Subsequent research testing and re-testing Porter’s seminal 1974 survey demonstrated its reliability and validity as well as the quality of the survey’s psychometric properties (Morrow, 1983; Blau, 1985; Commeiras and Fournier, 2001). Further validating the wide-spread usage of the Porter’s work, Cohen (2003) argues that from the 1970’s
onward, much of the scholarship on organizational commitment has been based on results generated from Porter’s 1974 survey (or variations thereof). Recently, scholarship has become more critical of this measure. Most criticisms deal with the fact that the survey does not draw clear distinctions between the values and outcomes of an individual. Specifically, “willingness to invest effort in an organization” is functionally useless without a measure of outcome based on performance.

Meyer and Allen (1984, 2001) voice this need for a multidimensional conception of organizational commitment. Working with a combination of the calculative approach and Porter’s work on attitude, their resulting measure(s) (also included in this study) examines “affective commitment” (positive feelings, identification, attachment, etc.), “continuance commitment” (the extent to which the cost of leaving an organization keeps an individual in place in an organization), and “normative commitment” (the feeling of obligation to an organization). Subsequent follow-up on Meyer and Allen’s work has shown acceptable levels of validity in their instrument (Cohen, 2003; Ko et al. 1997).

Of particular interest to this research project is the resulting of outcomes of the various forms of organizational commitment. Commitment is distinguishable from other motivations based on the exchange of resources in that extrinsic motivation is noticeably less relevant (Meyer & Herscovitch, 2001). During periods of pay freezes and budget cuts, commitment could prove to be a factor in motivation that is independent from the fiscal realities of funding gaps. Mowday et al., (1982) echo this by demonstrating that the core basis for productivity in an organization is the quality of commitment in that organization. Validating this is the work of Sommers (1995) who examined commitment as it relates job withdrawal intentions, turnover and absenteeism. In his work, commitment emerged as the most consistent predictor of these outcome variables thus further validating the importance of commitment as a factor in measuring organizational effectiveness. Beyond performance, the quality of commitment in an organization also has implications for the well-being of employees.
Particularly relevant for the State Department is the fact that organizational commitment has been linked to the adaptability of an organization in times of flux and change (Meyer & Herscovitch, 2001). Given the inherent culture of change in State Department (officer rotation, new ambassadors, new administrations, changing political realities, etc.), the link between worker identification with an institution and resiliency during periods of turbulence has far-reaching consequences. Commitment has also been linked to cooperation between employees and acceptance of organizational rules/priorities (Morrow, 1993). In an organization where policies ranging from security protocols to bargaining positions in negotiations require both adherence and discretion, this outcome (as it relates to commitment) is crucial for organizational success, longevity, and perhaps even safety.

While the important outcomes of commitment are obvious, there are increasingly voices of dissent that suggest that the practicality and relevance of organizational commitment are waning. In a fluid international economy, people are increasingly looking at jobs as temporary endeavours that lead to subsequent employment elsewhere (Cohen, 2003). The concept of the “employee as self-employed” has emerged suggesting that people view work as primarily self-directed with long-term commitment to a single institution as being out of favour in a an increasingly flexible economy. Despite concerns about the applicability of commitment as a relevant measure for effective employment, there are key distinctions between FSN’s (and all State Department employees) that indicate relevant differences from the private sector move towards employee free agency. Initially, many cultures represented in the State Department still put a premium on long-term employment at a single institution (Hoon Nam and Wie Han, 2005). The State Department’s hiring and contractual practices also seek candidates who intend to work for an extended period (U.S. Department of State: Careers Representing America, 2007). At a macro-level, concerns about brand image and product quality also make committed employees crucial for overall competitiveness. In the case of the State Department, the U.S.’s emphasis on public diplomacy to improve its standing in the world (Public Diplomacy Alumni
Association: What is Public Diplomacy, 2008), the need for engaged, enthusiastic, and committed staff is vital for realization of departmental goals. When considered in the context of declining budgets and (thus) fewer personnel acting in strictly supervisory positions, the need for engaged, self-directed employees grows even stronger (Cohen, 2003). This will likely become even more pronounced as the available labor market declines in the coming decades. In sum, for any organization (especially one that requires engagement as much as the State Department) understanding and improving commitment levels on the part of employees remains a pivotal priority.

2.5 State Department: Overview and Goals

To better understand the importance of an engaged FSN workforce within the State Department, it is crucial to examine a brief structural overview of the organization, its priorities, current challenges, its culture, and how it is perceived. As part of the Executive Branch, the State Department provides the President with the primary input for the conduct of foreign affairs (at least theoretically). In practice, the State Department is tasked with implementation of Presidential foreign policy goals. A good deal of State Department infrastructure, however, is committed to logistical and bureaucratic endeavors such as serving the needs of Americans abroad in a given country, dealing with visa and permit requests from residents of a country, providing basic consular services, and organizing visits from American officials to a country or region. As the instant availability of international information has become both more pervasive and accessible, many agencies can now work internationally without the State Department acting as an intermediary in the process. The Executive Branch itself has increasingly begun to conduct its agenda with State largely absent from (and in some cases, in opposition to) the President’s agenda (Gingrich, 2003). Criticism of the State Department by the Executive Branch is hardly a new phenomenon (Rubin, 1985). John F. Kennedy remarked “If the State Department drives you crazy you might calm yourself by contemplating its effect on me. The other night I woke with a blissful feeling and discovered I had been dreaming that the whole Goddam place
(Foggy Bottom) had burned down. I dozed off again hoping for a headline saying no survivors” (Krizay, 1988; retrieved October 26, 2009 from http://www.heritage.org/research/governmentreform/bg673.cfm). The tension has increased in recent years with the rise of the National Security Council and the increasing power of teams of foreign policy advisors who work directly with the President. Rubin (1985) suggests that Kissinger spawned a revolution in Presidential foreign policy with the conceptual creation of “the President as self-directed (rather than State Department directed) foreign policy agent.” Subsequent administrations have continued this legacy with State increasingly providing a service function rather than a policy-making function. This decline continues leaving a demoralized and unenthusiastic class of diplomats who no longer feel that the State Department is relevant to American foreign policy (Cornwell, 2001).

This decline of State Department influence comes at time when State could serve an important function in fostering improved attitudes about the United States through improved public diplomacy. Lord (2006) contends that the greatest threat to security and stability in many regions of the world is the attitude of many populations towards the United States. Public diplomacy with a focus on improving the American image through communication, aid, media, events, and economic engagement with a regional population is as important a military intervention and alliances (Mead, 2007). Creative activities designed to build meaningful direct linkages between the U.S. and international populations should be a driving engine for American foreign policy (Lord, 2006). Many have argued that the importance of this engagement cannot be overstated- in an age where war is increasingly asymmetrical and attacks emanate from non-state actors, the attitudes of the people in the international community carry more weight now than they ever have before (Telhami, 2004). Telhami goes on to argue that focusing primarily on military and economic responses could further entrench attitudes of anti-Americanism and create a situation (unlike during the Cold War) where demonstration of force compromises (rather than enhances) a position of
safety. Thus, the need to reflect on the importance of building bridges internationally (and what assets the State Department can use in that promotion) becomes paramount.

While many elements of the State Department’s mission will inherently fall under the control of U.S. Officers, elected officials, and policymakers in Washington (i.e. defense strategies, political and economic stances on changing international situations, etc.), public diplomacy and engaging with the local population is one area in which the expertise and experience of FSN’s will be paramount to success. Thus, the item of public diplomacy begs a deeper analysis in terms of its definition, goals, and significance.

2.6 Public Diplomacy and Local Engagement

Foreign policy was previously the space of Diplomats engaging in Important Activities Behind Closed Doors. Batora (2005) argues that citizen activists, NGOs, domestic ministries, private enterprises, academics and other actors participate directly in foreign policy and frame public debates about foreign policy issues. This engagement of local communities in international affairs creates a dialogue that exists in value-based terms (Nye, 1990; Nye, 2002; Nye, 2004; Leonard, et al., 2002). Batora goes on to suggest a change in thinking from the traditional concept of state actors and state power towards a postmodern orientation of images and influence. “Power,” he states, “no longer stems solely from persuasion or coercion, but increasingly from information sharing and attraction, which are essential for the development of soft power” (p. 1). Promotion of this soft power, where feelings about a country shape the political values of a population and, in turn, the policies of a state, is the focus of public diplomacy. Traditionally, there has always been a public component of diplomacy. In the Middle Ages, public ceremonies that involved an ambassador served as the most direct line of communication between a state and populations abroad (Jones, 1984). Though not termed “public diplomacy,” Langhorne (2008)
notes that elements of the concept have been at play in international relations for centuries. He notes the extraordinarily sharp press wars between Britain and Imperial Germany before the First World War and between the German and Russian Empires about tariffs. Additionally, during the Reformation period, competing versions of Christianity and the rulers representing them certainly employed what we would now call public diplomacy. Campaigns in the nineteenth century in support the Geneva Conventions and post-war support for the League of Nations also show that the concept, while conceived differently, has existed for some time (Langhorne, 2008).

In the modern sense, the soft power that serves as the basis for public diplomacy is “activities of multiple actors and organizations with impacts on foreign publics – artists, art galleries and music channels; civic activists and NGOs; politicians, political parties and political philosophers; writers and literary associations; journalists and media groups; business people, enterprises and products; academics and universities; religious leaders and religious groups, etc.” (Batora, 2005, p. 2). Based on this broad list, one could suggest that any activity that a population engages in where an international audience is present is a form of public diplomacy. In this way of thinking, Germans lollygagging on the beaches of Mallorca or Japanese tourists photographing everything that moves in New York would serve the representative function of the term. However this view would be both dismissive and inaccurate. Utilizing Batora’s definition, public diplomacy comprises all activities by state and non-state actors that contribute to the maintenance and promotion of a country’s soft power. Thus, Germans drinking on the beach on Mallorca are not part of this definition. A German DJ performing as part of an arts exchange for a mixed cultural audience on Mallorca (if such a thing exists) does.

One of the key challenges of public diplomacy is the competition for the attention of international audiences. Described as the challenge of “occupying the mind space” (Smith & Sutherland, 2002) of a constituency, religious institutions, political ideologies, and media messages can create barriers and/or competition for engagement. A key component for success in the face of such challenge is access to
elements of a home culture that is/would be attractive to external populations. For the full fruition of public diplomacy, network relationships between international populations and foreign ministries must develop that are driven by attraction. This necessarily requires an understanding and developed relationship with those external populations to more fully understand what elements of a culture might be attractive to such a group. In Germany, for example, the State Department recently hosted a festival and lecture series related to hip-hop music (retrieved August 12, 2009 from http://germany.usembassy.gov/hiphop.html). Hip-hop (at least perceptually) is an American musical form that has been adopted by many populations throughout the world. One such population is Turkish youth, a country (perhaps not coincidentally) with increasing friction towards the U.S. and a large youth population in Germany. In a model of effective public diplomacy, such events will (at some level) open the minds of participants towards a more positive view of the country hosting the event. Perhaps some participants might visit or study in the U.S. They could serve as “citizen diplomats” generating increased goodwill for the U.S. in their communities. Voting behavior and political decisions could be influenced. With sustained and wide-spread activities such as these, an increased level of political and economic opportunities between the countries involved could emerge. Diplomacy is often defined as the art of achieving state objectives by other means than force. Public diplomacy should not be viewed as antithetical or separate from this definition, but rather as a conception of power based on attraction and engagement. While Diplomacy is typically (though not always) thought of in terms of state leaders negotiating specific policy through official (but sometimes confidential) channels, Public Diplomacy typically has less specific policy goals and tends to focus on promoting attractive aspects of a culture to populations. Diplomats can ultimately leverage the goodwill created by public diplomacy; these are not separate entities. As marketers attempt to work with both suppliers and consumers, diplomacy can work through official channels with more public presentations of attractive cultural elements creating a climate that influences the decisions of leaders.
It is this emphasis on attraction that has proved troubling to some analysts. Langhorne (2008) notes that the seductive and apparently mind-altering nature of public diplomacy may “for some, sit far too near the less acceptable idea of propaganda; for others it is merely a newish form of cultural diplomacy, formerly the preserve of distinct organizations such as the Alliance Française or the British Council” (p. 58). Undoubtedly, questions such as method, intent, and integrity need to be applied in considering the ethicality of public diplomacy and Cull (2008) recounts the constant struggle the U.S. Information Agency faced with politicians regularly pushing propagandized views over honest engagement. Beyond questions of ethics, public diplomacy presents a powerful challenge to many traditional conceptions of foreign relations. This challenge, of shifting from governing elites to general populations, has been shown to have unsettling effects on more traditionally minded foreign ministries and diplomatic corps that may be both unskilled and unmotivated to articulate a country’s message or narrative to foreign populations (Langhorne, 2008). Melissen (2007) argues:

Traditional diplomacy and public diplomacy run at different speeds: public diplomacy is a long-term affair and if it is connected too closely with the daily grind of foreign affairs, it will not flourish and will come to be seen and dismissed as mere propaganda. If public diplomacy is used as an immediate foreign policy tool, it exposes public diplomacy to the contradictions, discontinuities, fads and fancies of foreign policy. If it is too closely tied to foreign policy objectives, it runs the risk of becoming ... a failure when a foreign policy itself is perceived to be a failure (p. 15).

Since World War II (and increasingly after the terrorist attacks of 2001), the concept of public diplomacy has gained traction in the U.S. as direct, 2-way engagement with the people (instead of only the leaders) of the international community is viewed as crucial to economic and political stability between the U.S. and the world (Tuch, 1990). As previously noted, the idea is that a general attraction towards the U.S. in a population will ultimately affect the decisions of leaders of that population; a population that consumes and enjoys U.S. culture might be less inclined to accept a leadership that favors hostility and isolation towards the United States. Far from being separate from diplomacy, advocates of public diplomacy argue that its purpose is to
improve the effectiveness of diplomacy. The term “public diplomacy” was first used in the U.S. by broadcaster Edward R. Morrow (the subject of the George Clooney film “Good Night and Good Luck”) in 1963 during his time as director of the U.S. Information Agency during the Kennedy administration (Sun, 2007). While Morrow focused on the role of the media, educational programs, culture exchanges, open libraries, collaboration between U.S. missions and local press, TV/Radio/Online productions, and other areas of direct engagement with local populations can assist in decreasing hostility towards the U.S., reducing justification for militant action, and improve a climate favorable to doing economic and political business with the U.S. The history of American public diplomacy offers a level of instruction regarding its scope and power, along with the key role that local populations (i.e. FSN’s) must play in its effective implementation. Present challenges regarding the state of public diplomacy (with the positive presentation of the U.S. image) derive in part from the communication vacuum created after the fall of the Soviet Union (Barron, 2007). According to Barron, throughout the Cold War, the United States operated a robust network of communication and propaganda campaigns, all “attempting to displace Communist-implanted anti-Americanism and install a pro-Western worldview” (p. 30). These campaigns included broadcast productions, educational and cultural programming, speaker programs, and creation of news sources designed specifically to counter the image of America presented by hostile regimes (Bellamy & Weinberg, 2008). The efficacy of these programs is often rightfully questioned. In the case of the Cold War, U.S. “success” clearly was a result of economic and military advantages beyond providing a positive image of American values. Despite the implication that soft power is rarely decisive in global conflict, Nye (2009) argues that the U.S. military deterred Soviet aggression, but that “when the Berlin Wall finally collapsed, it was destroyed not by an artillery barrage but by hammers and bulldozers wielded by those who had lost faith in communism” (p. 163). Again, the role of the presentation of the U.S. story in shaking that “faith” is difficult to estimate, but also unwise to ignore. What is also important to note is that this engagement with populations through a competing U.S. sanctioned message relied heavily on understanding
cultures, adapting the message to appeal to those populations, and utilizing knowledgeable local contacts as conduits for presenting the message. Historical anecdotes abound relating to this local orientation including the promotion of baseball in Reconstruction Japan (a sport they had historically played prior to the World War II and one in which they have now surpassed the U.S. in winning the last two World Baseball Championships) and the revival of interest in Karl May's "Winnetou" novels in post-War Germany. Additionally, the Fulbright Program provides an excellent example of educational exchange where members of the local population are turned into quasi-Ambassadors for the U.S. Research on international Fulbright participants found that 99 percent reported better understanding of the United States and its culture, 96 percent shared their experiences through media or cultural activities when returning to their home country, and 89 percent reported that their experience allowed them to assume leadership positions after returning home (Bellamy & Weinberg, 2008). The message here is clear- it is not enough to share the American worldview; it must be shared in a context that effectively connects to the values and culture of the community engaged.

After the Cold War, interest in this sort of engagement waned and funding for U.S. public diplomacy was reduced by some 40%, with a sharp reduction in cultural exchange programs and information centers (Barron, 2007). The structure of public diplomacy was also dismantled, leaving only “poorly organized bureaucratic structures within the State Department” (p. 31). Hughes (2007) notes that it was only after the September 11 attacks (and the perception of support for the attacks in the Arab world) that the U.S. became fully aware of the folly of disengaging from public diplomacy. Hughes states that the current focus and funding for public diplomacy “shrinks into insignificance against the vast sums spent on military operations in Iraq” (p. 9). Not only has economic and political investment in public diplomacy declined, attitudinal barriers in understanding the values and concerns of “average folks” in other countries have also emerged (in contrast to the Cold War “street level” engagement of U.S. public diplomacy). In the Middle East, for example, this disengagement with local
populations has been fully rationalized as “the opinions and views of non-elites living in Muslim countries have been of minimal concern to U.S. policymakers. Because of the autocratic nature of many Muslim governments (most are either traditional monarchies or single-party states) and the lack of democratic institutions, many U.S. policymakers and Middle East strategists have dismissed mass opinion as unimportant and instead have focused only on the opinions and policies of national governing elites” (p. 14). The decline in investment and the decline of the want (or aptitude?) to create programming for local communities instead of governing elites indicates a sharp shift in the kind of engagement the U.S. has utilized in positioning itself in world affairs. Zayani (2008) argues that recent attempts to revitalize a coherent and locally focused public diplomacy has been nominal in scope and primitive in its understanding of diverse communities, going on to suggest that it remains to be seen if recent steps will have any measurable effect on world opinion of the United States.

The necessity of this sort of engagement, however, is fully transparent. In their succinctly titled book Why Do People Hate America?, Sardar and Davies (2002) argue for wide-spread world animosity towards the political and economic policies of the United States. In fact, they state “there are hardly any universals left in our post modern times, but loathing for America is about as close as we can get for a universal sentiment: it is the one dynamic that unites fundamentalists and liberals, Arabs and Latin Americans, Asians and Europeans, and even the overshadowed Canadians with the rest of the world” (p. 195). A U.S. Government initiated report confirms many aspects of this statement with the following statistical validation:

The bottom has indeed fallen out of support for the United States. In Indonesia, the country with the largest Muslim population in the world, only 15 percent view the United States favorably, compared with 61 percent in early 2002. In Saudi Arabia, according to a Gallup poll, only 7 percent had a “very favorable” view of the U.S. while 49 percent had a “very unfavorable” view. In Turkey, a secular Muslim, non-Arab democracy that is a stalwart member of NATO and a longtime supporter of America, favorable opinion toward the U.S. dropped from 52 percent three years ago to 15 percent in the spring of 2003, according to the Pew Research Center. The problem is not limited to the Arab and Muslim world. In Spain, an early ally in the war in Iraq, 3 percent had a very favorable view of the
Further analysis of the worldwide trends related to this sentiment shows that over the last five years, the percentage of people with a favorable image of the United States has decreased 11 percent in Japan, 18 percent in Argentina, 30 percent in Germany, and currently stands at only 51 percent in the U.K. (Bellamy & Weinberg, 2008).

Interestingly, despite this animosity, there remains wide-spread affection towards many cultural aspects of the U.S. and respect for many institutions and individuals of American origin. Sardar and Davies even found admiration for many U.S. institutions and cultural contributions in the most fervently anti-American regions. Writing on the metaphor of the U.S. as “the Federation” in the popular entertainment *Star Trek*, Neumann (2001) sums this view up by stating America (“the Federation”) “should be loved when known, and it is only just a question of time before everybody knows it” (p. 619). Public diplomacy has the potential to return American foreign affairs to its most basic liberal engagement of “seeking out new life and new civilizations” with a Prime Directive that offers instead of demands.

Like “the Federation,” however, true engagement requires a prevailing interest and developed understanding for partnership with local populations. Former Ambassador and current professor Cynthia Schneider (2007) notes a specific subset of public diplomacy that requires cultural engagement. She terms it “cultural diplomacy” and identifies several standards for its effective realization:

- Cultural diplomacy is a two-way street.
- Cultural diplomacy operates in the long term.
- Cultural diplomacy can increase understanding between different peoples and cultures.
- Cultural diplomacy can open doors between U.S. diplomats and their host countries, even when relations are strained.
• Cultural diplomacy cannot be effectively measured; it makes a qualitative, not quantitative, difference in relations between nations and peoples.
• Cultural diplomacy works best when it caters to the interests of a host country or region.

When culture and understanding are ignored and public diplomacy is done with political intent and owned primarily by the U.S., there is a risk that it will be viewed as disingenuous. Bellamy & Weinberg (2008) argue more directly that public diplomacy must be local and authentic in its orientation and must not come from sources that are obviously American. Schneider (2007) recounts an example of this sort of duplicitousness:

Discussions of the United States' declining image inevitably turn to public diplomacy. However, the expectation that public diplomacy can somehow repair the damage caused by unpopular policies is unreasonable and at odds with the fundamental long-term goals of increasing understanding and building relationships and trust. Experience has shown that using public diplomacy as a rapid response tactic tends only to alienate foreign publics even further. For example, a Southeast Asian diplomat told of a U.S. library that had opened six times during the 1960s, always in response to crisis. Each time the crisis abated, the library was shut down. According to one Egyptian diplomat, "Cultural diplomacy emerges at times of crisis. But this should be a process of building bridges, not a one way street. Developing respect for others and their way of thinking—this is what cultural diplomacy does" (p. 192).

The success of public diplomacy (particularly in the form of culture) during the Cold War, Schneider argues, was that the “Ambassadors” of public diplomacy were framed (figuratively or literally) as non-Americans. Jazz musicians, rock bands, and writers were perceived by the publics they engaged with as fully independent from and (in some cases) “other” than the U.S. Government. They were separated and potentially disenfranchised in the case of black musicians like Louis Armstrong. They were “the bad boys” such as the rock bands who played music that many in conservative America defined as “coming from the Devil.” They were writers whose work was brandished as being “un-American,” “pornographic,” or “dangerous,” as was the case with Norman Cousins on a trip to the Soviet Union. Despite their status, they still
were viewed as being a part of an American system (unlike that of the Soviet Union) that generally allowed dissent. Schneider notes that a key part of this cultural diplomacy was the fact that these people typically held workshops and concerts with local artists where different perspectives were shared and appreciated (with interesting fusions between local folk music and American Jazz emerging in places like Armenia). It is this authentic, two-way engagement that makes public diplomacy viable. Messages clearly owned and sanctioned by the U.S. delivered in a culturally unengaged and monologue fashion appear destined for failure.

An example of the sort of dialogue that can occur when local communities are viewed as equal partners and authors in creating a relationship with the United States can be found in the so-called “Sister Cities” program initiated by Eisenhower in 1956. At a speech inaugurating the program, Eisenhower stated “if we are going to take advantage of the assumption that all people want peace, then the problem is for people to get together and to leap governments[…] to work out not one method but thousands of methods by which people can gradually learn a little bit more of each other” (Eisenhower, 1956). Bellamy & Weinberg (2008) describe the program as being “highly decentralized” with local communities working with one another on a case by case basis creating programs for exchange that are locally appropriate and grounded in the cultural priorities of the communities involved. Two rural Sister Cities might engage in exchanges about agriculture. Youth from two urban Sister Cities might visit one another during times of cultural festivals. The key element is that local priorities and sustained partnerships are the foundation of the process. Like most other public diplomacy programs initiated during the Cold War, however, funding has made the sustainability and efficacy of the program questionable (Bellamy & Weinberg, 2008).

Despite funding challenges, public diplomacy programs, which promote engagement through local channels, appear to be the most viable option with growing international consensus that the U.S. Government is not an attractive agency. In the period immediately after the September 11 attacks, the Council on Foreign Relations
convened a task force to critically examine both the potential and current shortcomings of U.S. public diplomacy. The most important finding, according to the task force, is that foreign populations will consider interlocutors coming from that population as far more credible and effective than messages coming directly from the U.S. Government (Improving U.S. Public Diplomacy, 2002). In the context of this research, the separate, non-American status of FSN’s could play a vital role in allowing the U.S. to direct its message while ensuring that it is constructed and delivered in a culturally appropriate way from an agent who better relates to the population (detailed further in subsequent sections of this research). Ironically, despite the clear statement from the task force that culture matters, they go on to argue for using “the most sophisticated tools that modern marketing and political campaigns have developed in pursuit of this critical objective (of promoting America to the world)” (p. 76). Such statements suggest an American-centric approach where focus groups drive the marketing of American culture in much the same fashion that they sell soft drinks and luxury automobiles. There is, however, a basis for this conception of “public diplomacy as advertising” that comes from the concept of “International Political Marketing” (Sun, 2008). IPM seeks to build “profitable” relationships with international partners by the employment of a “campaign” style model of marketing that mirrors U.S. electoral advertising. To gain support through public diplomacy, a country must create the appropriate “mix of product, place, polling and promotion” (Sun, 2008; p. 6). Not only does such a vision for public diplomacy ignore both the need for meaningful local involvement in the construction of messages/programs and the importance of dialogue and two-way engagement, it would be wholly unrealizable in many parts of the world. Responding to the task force, Middle East Quarterly (2002) states that this transactional view of marketing simply won’t work in Arab populations where sustained relationships with “kinsmen” are so important. They add that considering the number of dictatorial regimes in the region (many supported by the U.S.), polls and opinion groups (the foundation of modern marketing) will be either inaccurate or impossible. The most important area that was found to be lacking was the absence of officials who could articulate the American position in a clear way that makes sense to
the local population—again, the very function FSN engagement and increased cultural understanding on the part of State Department Officers could provide. An almost comically naïve suggestion offered by the Council was that American diplomats should go on a “listening tour” to better understand the concerns of populations throughout the world. Critics found this concept to be both patronizing and hopelessly infeasible, given the need for a listener to first be able to understand (Improving U.S. Public Diplomacy, 2002). Peterson (2002) suggested that before any such undertaking can happen, a fundamental re-thinking of U.S. Foreign policy as it relates to public diplomacy needs to be undertaken:

The purpose is not to increase U.S. popularity abroad for its own sake, but because it is in America’s national interest to do so. This requires a deeper understanding of foreign attitudes and more effective communication of U.S. policies. It also means fully integrating public diplomacy needs into the very foundation of American foreign policies in the first place. Particularly in a period when the United States is fighting a war on terrorism, the country must come to understand and accept the basic notion that “image problems” and “foreign policy” are not things apart. They are both part of an integrated whole (p. 74).

Public diplomacy and the importance of cultural engagement can, however, certainly be overstated; Saddam Hussein was an enormous Frank Sinatra fan, Kim Jong Il is probably the world’s foremost collector of American pornography, and Fidel Castro played baseball for the St. Louis Cardinals (all with little measurable effect on their policies). However, to fully reject the importance of sharing the American worldview and perspective with the world seems dangerous. Unfortunately, numerous inefficiencies of the Department make realization of a coherent public diplomacy at best difficult and at worst unrealizable. The conservative American politician Newt Gingrich is hardly the first name that comes to mind when thinking about concepts such as pluralism and public engagement with hostile populations, however his criticisms of the State Department seem to point to such necessities. Gingrich (2003) states:

One of the areas most urgently in need of reform is the State Department’s global communication strategy. To lead the world, the United States needs to communicate effectively[…] the State Department must learn
to fulfill this role. As the world’s only superpower, largest economy, and most aggressive culture, the United States inevitably infringes on the attention and interests of other peoples and nations. A country this large and powerful must work every day to communicate what it is doing (to international populations)... Today, the United States does not have a strategy, structure, or resource allocation capable of dealing with this sort of (anti-Americanism). That must change if the United States is to gain sufficient popular appeal with ordinary people around the world, such that their governments will in turn support U.S. policies... The state-to-state diplomatic system of the past simply will not survive... Such an information strategy must be implemented on a nonstop, worldwide basis, with some variations by region and country. The new systems and structures that this strategy requires will transform diplomacy permanently (retrieved October 26, 2009 from http://www.foreignpolicy.com/story/cms.php?story_id=94).

Due to the cultural and linguistic shortcomings of many Foreign Service Officers (Asthana, 2006, August 11), arguing for such a transformation could be untenable. Holt (2004) goes on to argue that the language and cultural deficiency of the State Department is so great, that it may be compromising American foreign policy initiatives and threatening the viability of many U.S. installations. The most startling statistic in a time where engagement in the Middle East is of the utmost importance is that a government initiated report by former Syrian and Israeli Ambassador Edward Djerejian showed that in the entire Foreign Service, there are only 54 fluent speakers of Arabic, to say nothing of the cultural knowledge necessary for engagement Arab populations (Committee on Appropriations: U.S. House of Representatives, 2003). The solution of “just hire more translators” has not produced the results necessary for true connection and increased understanding (Holt, 2004).

These inefficiencies in the inability to culturally or linguistically engage with “the other” are compounded with an organizational structure and culture resistant connecting with the host culture. The report of an independent task force cosponsored by the Council on Foreign Relations and the Center for Strategic and International Studies (2001) states that “the department’s professional culture is predisposed against public outreach and engagement, thus undercutting its effectiveness at public diplomacy” (p. 2). Inadequacies, such as a lack of professional development and training (often as it relates to culture), have created a situation in which the knowledge necessary for cultural engagement has not been realized. Furthermore, a climate of
information policing rather than information providing pervades both the internal and external policies of the institution (Council on Foreign Relations, 2001). A relic of Cold War structures, this element of organizational culture has proven to be an inhibition towards communication that fosters a greater sense of understanding. This has implications for both public diplomacy and the ability of the State Department to perform bureaucratic, consular, developmental, regulatory, and economic functions. Some suggest that current organizational barriers, such as those indicated, have contributed to an attrition rate of 38% for State Department staff (Eagleburger, 2000). In sum, many have pointed to a new mission for the State Department- one where engagement and communication with other cultures (potentially suspect ones) serves the foundation of U.S. foreign policy goals. To meet this challenge and create the sort of organizational effectiveness necessary to meet existing demands, demonstrate relevance, and create the organizational success necessary to retain the best employees, an improvement in cultural understanding is fundamentally necessary.

In the Report of the Advisory Group on Public Diplomacy for the Arab and Muslim World (2003), it states:

We must underscore the common ground in both our values and policies. We have failed to listen and failed to persuade. We have not taken the time to understand our audience, and we have not bothered to help them understand us. We cannot afford such shortcomings (p. 24).

What could serve as the basis for this improvement? The answer is so transparently obvious that it almost seems unnecessary to articulate: better utilization of FSN networks, cultural expertise, and knowledge of the national culture in which the State Department operates.
2.7 FSN Role in State Department Goals

As members of the community in which U.S. diplomatic posts are located, FSN’s have unique access to the local population. A small sample of the potential door-opening function offered by FSN’s include:

- Access to the local media
- Links to educational programs in the community
- Understanding of how the FSN workforce will interpret U.S. directives
- Knowledge of the idiosyncrasies of local and regional governmental institutions
- Understanding the meaning and nuance of the local language
- Ability to articulate and explain local culture, cultural institutions, and cultural expectations to an American audience

This is by no means exhaustive, as there are so many potential linkages that they cannot reasonably be articulated in one location. Even internal State Department documentation suggests that the value potentially added by FSN’s is not unknown. In a statement from the State Department, the functions of FSN’s are described as “performing vital foreign policy program and support functions, and providing the unique knowledge and understanding of local culture and conditions that are so important to America’s transformational diplomacy (Bureau of Human Resources of the U.S. State Department, p. 21).” State Department H.R. goes on to state:

The FSN community is integral to America’s transformational diplomacy across the globe. Over the years, in many parts of the world, U.S. Embassy FSNs have helped advance the ideals and strengthen the institutions of democracy on every continent. Libraries and cultural centers in closed countries, for example, provide a refuge where readers gain free and open access to a diversity of thought and opinion. Local national staff of these centers regularly host democracy study groups and book debates, teach English and Internet-searching skills, and facilitate advanced research. FSNs work closely with clients ranging from university students to Supreme Court judges. As Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice has stated: “There is no higher calling than to help other people fulfill their aspirations for a better life, a more democratic future, and a more peaceful world.” (p. 21)
The potential is clear—FSN’s can assist the State Department in fulfilling its operational functions and be the foundation of a public diplomacy that seeks to engage with international populations. The viability of this asset, however, is contingent upon the State Department effectively harnessing it. If an FSN population rejects the sort of entrepreneurial autonomy required by empowering FSN’s to assist this important foreign policy mission, steps must be taken to alleviate this tension. If an FSN population feels that the stratified nature of the State department precludes the full valuation of their ability to assist in reaching out the community, steps must be taken to overcome this perceived barrier. In sum, the relationship between the functional power that exists for American officers and the latent power that exists in the FSN workforce is crucial to the efficacy of the State Department and its emerging mission of public engagement. If the research suggesting the power of public diplomacy is viewed as credible, it will be of utmost importance for the U.S. to effectively utilize a population that provides its greatest opportunity for success in public diplomacy.

Echoing this institutional identity challenge, Batora (2005) writes:

What does represent a substantial challenge for foreign ministries in relation to public diplomacy, though, is the fact that diplomats have traditionally not been used to engaging domestic actors in the conduct of diplomatic affairs. The need to do so constitutes an institutional crisis undermining the very institutional identity of foreign ministries as the exclusive agencies dealing with foreign affairs. Public diplomacy challenges basic notions of who is a diplomat, and indeed what is and what is not diplomacy (p. 15).

For the State Department to succeed in this mission, the expertise of those who are a part of the local population (the FSN’s) will be crucial for success. Thus, a study that explores this relationship is crucial to understanding the opportunities and pratfalls that exist in the State Department’s role in American foreign policy.
2.8 Theoretical Model and Hypotheses

Based on the outlined literature, this research would suggest that the State Department is a hierarchical organization. Foreign Service Nationals have a status below American Officers within the organizational structure. With this status, the gap between the power of Americans and the power of Foreign Service Nationals is pronounced. The power distance orientation of an individual is an important part of her/his workplace attitude. Individuals who accept power distance have been shown to have higher levels of commitment to high power distance organizations. Correspondingly, individuals oriented to low power distance have lower levels of commitment in high power distance organizations. Thus, the following hypothesis emerges:

*Hypothesis I: Power distance scores of FSN’s will be positively correlated with organizational commitment to the U.S. State Department.*

Two measures of commitment are included in this research (Porter et al., 1974; Meyer & Allen, 1984). The first focuses on attitudinal commitment while the second focuses on affective commitment, continuance commitment, and normative commitment. Existing literature notes the distinctions between each commitment type. This research presents an opportunity to observe differences between both approaches in a relatively large sample. The possible differences in an individual’s response to the various types of commitment produces a compelling research question:

*Research Question I: Is there a significant distinction in responses to these various commitment types?*

The research argues that the State Department has failed to sufficiently incentivize long-term employment. Organizational problems and threats to the department’s relevancy have created (for many) what seems to be an unrewarding work
environment. Specific barriers to advancement for FSN’s have also been detailed. As this research pool consists of some 600 respondents from varied cultural and employment circumstances, the trend away from long term employment should be visible within this group. The culmination of these factors forms the basis for the following hypothesis:

**Hypothesis II: Duration of employment will not be significantly correlated to power distance.**

Related to this hypothesis, the negative climate of the State Department and its high turnover rate suggests substantial dissatisfaction on the part of employees as their tenure increases. As previously noted, the experience of FSN’s compounds many of the organizational challenges of the State Department and the “glass ceiling” that prevents large-scale promotion for FSN’s would also negatively impact motivation. While these factors could clearly inhibit long-term employment on the part of employees coming from a low power distance orientation, there are expectations from power that are present in high power distance cultures. Those in power are accountable for offering protection to those in subordinate positions (De Jong, et al. 2006). The expectation is for leadership to provide guidance, protection, nurturance, and care to the employees, while subordinates are expected to give trust, loyalty, deference, and appreciation (Aycan et al., 2000). The portrait of the State Department offered by the research suggests an institution that may not be able to provide this as it would require engagement with a foreign population (Gingrich, 2003; Asthana, 2006, August 11; Holt, 2004; Committee on Appropriations: U.S. House of Representatives, 2003; Council on Foreign Relations and the Center for Strategic and International Studies, 2001). Thus, despite the expected higher levels of commitment offered by high power distance FSN’s, this commitment may not necessarily translate into extended employment duration. These factors suggest another hypothesis:
Hypothesis III: Duration of employment by FSN’s working for the State Department will be negatively correlated to organizational commitment.

Experience with another culture has been found to change the cultural perceptions of an individual (Storti, 1990). As a person spends significant time with a person from another culture, her/his cultural perceptions will start to mirror certain aspects of the “other” culture (i.e. an American living in France will develop a French perspective over time). The literature on the inaccessibility of the State Department to other cultures indicates substantial barriers for the “other” to connection to American culture. Correspondingly, regardless of the amount of time FSN’s spend with their American colleagues, this would suggest that the cultural transference observed in other contexts will not be present in this environment (i.e. the core values of an FSN will not be affected by regular contact with American Officers). As the State Department’s stratified structure could reify conception of power distance, FSN’s with an existing orientation towards high power distance will be unaffected by contact with Americans. From this, the following hypothesis emerges:

Hypothesis IV: FSN scores on the measure of power distance will not be significantly impacted by the frequency of contact with Americans.

The open question on the survey allows for a narrative response from FSN’s. The culmination of these narrative responses should produce several emergent stories regarding the FSN experience in the State Department. As this question is at the conclusion of the survey, concepts such as organizational commitment, power, culture, and structure will likely feature prominently in such responses. For purposes of better interpreting the survey results and better understanding the direct perceptions of FSN’s regarding their status, the following research question is begged:

Research Question II: What emerging themes are present in FSN narrative responses to the open question in the survey?
2.9 Operational Research Method

The population of the study compromises 595 Foreign Service National respondents from multiple countries and cultures. The survey questions are written in English, a language that FSN’s are fluent in as a condition of employment. 123 hard copies of the survey were distributed at FSN training events held in the following locations during the years of 2007-2008:

- Rome, Italy
- Sofia, Bulgaria
- Kigali, Rwanda
- Ankara, Turkey
- Kiev, Ukraine
- FSN Training Center, Vienna, Austria (NOTE: two training events at this location brought in FSN’s from dozens of countries ranging from the Dominican Republic to Madagascar to Pakistan)

Online distribution of the survey was handled through a State Department FSN training and support network. This network informed FSN employees worldwide of the online survey and provided instructions on how to access it. The announcement also made clear that the survey conclusions could be shared with State, but the survey and its results were not initiated by the Department nor would State have access to individual responses. Responders from this online appeal account for the remaining 472 responses. Copies of both the paper and online version of the survey are included in the appendix section. To maintain full anonymity and because of methodological concerns about presuming a cultural orientation based on nationality, respondents were not required to identify where they are from in the survey.
The survey itself is composed of five sections: power distance measures (Dorfman and Howell, 1988), organizational commitment measures (Porter et al. 1974), affective organizational commitment measures (Meyer and Allen, 1991), informational questions (how long they have been employed by the State Department and the regularity of contact with American officers), and an open ended question that allows for a narrative response about their perceptions of State Department. Economic concerns about salary impacting survey results (i.e. a well-paid person accepts all aspects of her/his position, a poorly paid person rejects all aspects of her/his position) are largely mitigated by the fact that State Department salaries for FSN’s are (theoretically) fixed to be equal to or higher than comparable positions elsewhere in the host country (“U.S. Department of State: Careers Representing America,” 2007).

Dorfman and Howell’s (1988) scale identifies Hofstede’s (1980) cultural dimensions at the individual level. Specifically, the six items related to power distance were included in the survey. This approach has been shown to be valid in measuring an individual’s cultural orientation (Clugston et al. 2000; Cohen, 2007) and has significant advantages over assuming individual cultural orientations based on cultural membership. Samovar and Porter (2003) argue that individuals are unique from their culture for a variety of reasons including familial communication, individual personality, exposure to other cultures, personal experience, status in a culture, and membership in subcultures. Cultural membership certainly shapes individual values, but cannot be assumed to be the summation of an individual’s values. In the case of FSN’s in the State Department, many have lived, worked, and/or studied in the United States. Some have worked extensively for U.S. institutions and acculturated to State Department and/or American structures. These factors, coupled with Samovar and Porter’s (2003) identified variables affecting cultural orientations, make classifying an individual’s cultural dimensions based on her/his cultural membership unreliable. Dorfman and Howell’s (1988) scale has shown strong correlation between cultural membership and cultural values, but this approach (allowing for an individual’s
Commitment factors are measured by the inclusion of several different items related to aspects of organizational commitment. Porter et al. (1974) is “the most visible measure of affective commitment and has enjoyed widespread acceptance and use,” (Griffin and Bateman, 1986, p. 170). It reflects on three definitions of commitment including (a) desire to maintain membership in the organization (b) belief in and acceptance of the values and goals of the organization and (c) willingness to exert effort on behalf of the organization. Given that all of these definitions of commitment in FSN’s are crucial for the efficacy and sustainability of State Department activities and given the widespread validation of the soundness of this instrument (Morrow, 1983; Blau, 1985; Commeiras and Fournier, 2001), its inclusion is highly appropriate for this research. Meyer and Allen (1991) deal with the “positive feelings of identification with, attachment to, and involvement in the work organization” (Meyer and Allen, 1984, p. 375). These areas have been linked to employment continuance and organizational investment. Given the regular rotation of American officers, the necessity of defining the extent to which FSN’s see themselves as the embodiment of the organization is of clear importance. Cumulatively, the combination of these measures offers insight into how people internalize, operationalize, and enact commitment to their jobs.

An additional open question was included in the survey to allow respondents to clarify their perceptions and give additional feedback related to their perception of the organization. The question is as follows:

Please write any follow-up information regarding your views on management/supervision, your employment with the U.S. State Department or other U.S. Government organization, or your opinions in relation to any question in this survey.
To make these responses more salient and defined, a basic conceptual analysis is employed. Identifying emerging themes and the frequency of their occurrence offers more coherent insights into the texts generated by FSN’s. The goal of this analysis is not the creation statistical or scientific proof and it is (per definition) highly subjective. Given that the survey preceding the open-ended question dealt with power distance and organizational commitment, the narrative responses were probably shaped, influenced, accentuated, or perhaps even altered by the question’s proximity to these other concepts. Rather, the intent is to create several defined categories and examples of responses that may better frame the research results and more fully inform the discussion/recommendation sections of this project.
Chapter 3

*Human bipolarity was both the binding force and the driving energy for all human behavior, from sonnets to nuclear equations.*

For the Martian-Human Smith, human culture was seen in terms of its hyper-duality. People were left hungry while others gorged themselves. People lusted after power while simultaneously being dominated. People actively attempted to secure peace while developing the instruments of war. The duality of FSN’s as representatives of both their home culture and their American workplace produces a similar cleavage. In the case of the results of this research, this schism readily presents itself in the data results. Those coming from a culture where power is definitional show higher levels of commitment to an organization where power and status are clearly defined. Those coming from cultures where power is deemphasized indicate lower levels of commitment to a hierarchical institution. At a superficial level, this points to a sort of predicted rationality. But as Smith learned in his Terran experiences, humans are rarely rational. The stated support of an institution can mask less genuine impulses. The stated rejection of an institution can hide a high level of commitment. Further interpretation of data suggests a reality that is far less orderly and far less understood by Americans working in the State Department. In examining the language of the FSN’s in their narrative responses, a very different reality is suggested than the orderly vision of a unified team described in State Department literature. And as Smith discovered “language itself shapes a man's basic ideas.”
3.1 Overview of Survey Results
The survey produced 595 responses. There are several survey results worth noting prior to analysis of the data according to the hypotheses and research questions. Specifically, on the first six items of the survey (see APPENDIX 1 for full survey text) some trends related to power distance are suggested:

**Figure 1: Power Usage Acceptance Results**

**Figure 2: Opinion-seeking Behavior Results**
SURVEY TEXT: “Managers should avoid off-the-job social contacts with employees.”

![Figure 3: Social Contact Results](image)

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<tr>
<td>Disagree</td>
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<td>Neither Agree nor Disagree</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
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SURVEY TEXT: “Employees should not disagree with management decisions.”

![Figure 4: Employee Dissent Results](image)

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<td>Agree</td>
<td>59</td>
<td>10.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Strongly Agree</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>3.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>591</td>
<td>100.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Missing</td>
<td>System</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>595</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

SURVEY TEXT: “Managers should not delegate important tasks to employees.”

![Figure 5: Delegation Results](image)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Frequency</th>
<th>Valid Percent</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Valid</td>
<td>204</td>
<td>34.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Disagree</td>
<td>300</td>
<td>50.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Neither Agree nor Disagree</td>
<td>41</td>
<td>6.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Agree</td>
<td>35</td>
<td>5.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Strongly Agree</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>2.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
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<td>100.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Missing</td>
<td>System</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>595</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

On all but two of these items, at least two thirds of respondents indicated a disagreement or strong disagreement with the high power distance viewpoint. In the context of a hierarchical institution, this point of view would seem to be at odds with the organization’s policies.
Yet the commitment level results could show a contrast to this expectation as on 15 items, half or more of the respondents indicated agreement or strong agreement with organizational commitment.

**SURVEY TEXT:** “I am willing to put in a great deal of effort beyond that normally expected in order to help this organization be successful.”

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Response</th>
<th>Frequency</th>
<th>Valid Percent</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Strongly Disagree</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Disagree</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>2.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Neither Agree nor Disagree</td>
<td>35</td>
<td>5.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Agree</td>
<td>229</td>
<td>38.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Strongly Agree</td>
<td>311</td>
<td>52.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>595</td>
<td>100.0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Figure 6: Effort Beyond Expectation Results**

**SURVEY TEXT:** “I talk favorably about this organization to my friends as a great organization to work for.”

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Response</th>
<th>Frequency</th>
<th>Valid Percent</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Strongly Disagree</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Disagree</td>
<td>33</td>
<td>5.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Neither Agree nor Disagree</td>
<td>112</td>
<td>18.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Agree</td>
<td>243</td>
<td>40.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Strongly Agree</td>
<td>202</td>
<td>33.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>595</td>
<td>100.0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Figure 7: "Talk Favorably" Results**

**SURVEY TEXT:** “I feel very little loyalty to this organization.” (R)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Score</th>
<th>Frequency</th>
<th>Valid Percent</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>3.2</td>
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<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>4.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>59</td>
<td>10.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>229</td>
<td>38.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>257</td>
<td>43.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>592</td>
<td>100.0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Figure 8: Loyalty Results**
Figure 9: "Familial Connection" Results

(It is important to note on the above item that the familial connection could refer to the link to other FSN’s rather than to the American Officers or the State Department as a whole. Attempting to create a question that differentiated these areas proved problematic for clarity and it was not possible for the survey to include every eventuality of interpretation in such a diverse organization.)

Figure 10: Value Similarity Results
**SURVEY TEXT:** “I am proud to tell others that I am part of this organization.”

**Figure 11: Organizational Pride Results**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Response</th>
<th>Frequency</th>
<th>Valid Percent</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Strongly Disagree</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Disagree</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>3.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Neither Agree nor Disagree</td>
<td>124</td>
<td>20.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Agree</td>
<td>248</td>
<td>41.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Strongly Agree</td>
<td>197</td>
<td>33.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
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<td>100.0</td>
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<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>595</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**SURVEY TEXT:** “This organization really inspires the very best in me in the way of job performance.”

**Figure 12: Organizational Inspiration Results**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Response</th>
<th>Frequency</th>
<th>Valid Percent</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
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<td>18</td>
<td>3.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Disagree</td>
<td>84</td>
<td>14.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Neither Agree nor Disagree</td>
<td>153</td>
<td>25.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Agree</td>
<td>250</td>
<td>42.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Strongly Agree</td>
<td>90</td>
<td>15.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>595</td>
<td>100.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Missing</td>
<td>System</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>595</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**SURVEY TEXT:** “It would take very little change in my present circumstances to cause me to leave.” (R)

**Figure 13: Continuation Intention Results**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Scale</th>
<th>Frequency</th>
<th>Valid Percent</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
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<td>20</td>
<td>3.4</td>
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<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>74</td>
<td>12.6</td>
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<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>160</td>
<td>27.3</td>
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<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>255</td>
<td>43.5</td>
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<td>5</td>
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<td>13.1</td>
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<td>100.0</td>
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<tr>
<td>Missing</td>
<td>System</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>595</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
SURVEY ITEM: “I am extremely glad that I chose this organization to work for over other organizations.”

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Response</th>
<th>Frequency</th>
<th>Percent</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Valid Strongly Disagree</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>1,0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Disagree</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Neither Agree nor Disagree</td>
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<td>21,2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Agree</td>
<td>277</td>
<td>46,6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Strongly Agree</td>
<td>161</td>
<td>27,1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
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<td>100,0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Missing</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>595</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Figure 14: Preferred Organization Results

SURVEY TEXT: “There’s not too much to be gained by staying with this organization over time.” (R)

5 = BELIEF IN LONG TERM BENEFITS (REVERSE SCALE ITEM)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Response</th>
<th>Frequency</th>
<th>Valid Percent</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
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<td>43</td>
<td>7,3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>115</td>
<td>19,5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>136</td>
<td>23,1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>235</td>
<td>39,8</td>
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<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>61</td>
<td>10,3</td>
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<td>Total</td>
<td>590</td>
<td>100,0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Missing</td>
<td>5</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>595</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Figure 15: Long Term Benefit Results

SURVEY TEXT: “I really care about the fate of this organization.”

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Response</th>
<th>Frequency</th>
<th>Percent</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
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<td>8</td>
<td>1,4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Disagree</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>4,6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Neither Agree nor Disagree</td>
<td>83</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Disagree</td>
<td>280</td>
<td>47,5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Agree</td>
<td>192</td>
<td>32,5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Strongly Agree</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>590</td>
<td>100,0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Missing</td>
<td>5</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>595</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Figure 16: Organizational Concern Results
SURVEY TEXT: “Deciding to work for this organization was a definite mistake on my part.” (R)

```
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>5 = ORGANIZATIONAL DECISION NOT MISTAKE (REVERSE SCALE ITEM)</th>
<th>Frequency</th>
<th>Valid Percent</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Valid</td>
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<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>.8</td>
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<td>2</td>
<td>.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>48</td>
<td>8.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>239</td>
<td>40.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>301</td>
<td>50.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>595</td>
<td>100.0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
```

Figure 17: Organizational Decision Results

SURVEY TEXT: “I do not feel 'emotionally attached' to this organization.” (R)

```
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>5 = HIGH EMOTIONAL ATTACHMENT (REVERSE SCALE ITEM)</th>
<th>Frequency</th>
<th>Valid Percent</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Valid</td>
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<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>3.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>94</td>
<td>16.0</td>
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<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>120</td>
<td>20.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>263</td>
<td>44.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>92</td>
<td>15.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>587</td>
<td>100.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Missing System</td>
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<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>595</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
```

Figure 18: Organizational Attachment Results

SURVEY TEXT: “This organization has a great deal of personal meaning for me.”

```
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Strongly Disagree</th>
<th>Disagree</th>
<th>Neither Agree nor Disagree</th>
<th>Agree</th>
<th>Strongly Agree</th>
<th>Total</th>
<th>Frequency</th>
<th>Valid Percent</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Valid</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>61</td>
<td>153</td>
<td>257</td>
<td>103</td>
<td>589</td>
<td>2.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Disagree</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>10.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Neither Agree nor Disagree</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>26.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Agree</td>
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<td>43.6</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>589</td>
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<tr>
<td>Missing System</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>595</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
```

Figure 19: Organizational Meaning Results
On several other items related to commitment, however, fewer than half of the FSN respondents indicated agreement or strong agreement with commitment. Related to employment duration, several items indicated that a substantial number of FSN’s may be amenable to working for institutions other than the State Department and that their attachment to the institution is not unique. This lack of a unique connection to an organization can often foreshadow departure (Mobley, 1977; Moble, Griffeth, Hand, and Meglino, 1979).
**SURVEY TEXT:** “For me, this is the best of all possible organizations to work for.”

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Frequency</th>
<th>Valid Percent</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Valid</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>3.7</td>
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<tr>
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<td>110</td>
<td>18.5</td>
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<tr>
<td>Disagree</td>
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<td>34.7</td>
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<tr>
<td>Neither Agree nor Disagree</td>
<td>180</td>
<td>30.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Agree</td>
<td>75</td>
<td>12.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Strongly Agree</td>
<td>75</td>
<td>12.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>593</td>
<td>100.0</td>
</tr>
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<td>Missing</td>
<td>System</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>595</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Figure 22: "Best Organization" Results**

**SURVEY TEXT:** “I think that I could easily become as attached to another organization as I am to this one.” (R)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Frequency</th>
<th>Valid Percent</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Valid</td>
<td>35</td>
<td>6.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Strongly Disagree</td>
<td>164</td>
<td>27.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Disagree</td>
<td>222</td>
<td>37.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Neither Agree nor Disagree</td>
<td>135</td>
<td>23.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Agree</td>
<td>32</td>
<td>5.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Strongly Agree</td>
<td>76</td>
<td>12.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>588</td>
<td>100.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Missing</td>
<td>System</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>595</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Figure 23: Unique Attachment Results**

**SURVEY TEXT:** “This organization has a great deal of personal meaning for me.”

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Frequency</th>
<th>Valid Percent</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Valid</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>4.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Strongly Disagree</td>
<td>111</td>
<td>18.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Disagree</td>
<td>162</td>
<td>27.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Neither Agree nor Disagree</td>
<td>219</td>
<td>36.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Agree</td>
<td>76</td>
<td>12.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Strongly Agree</td>
<td>76</td>
<td>12.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>593</td>
<td>100.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Missing</td>
<td>System</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>595</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Figure 24: Personal Meaning Results**
Perhaps related to these items is the fact that over two thirds of the respondents indicated a neutrality, disagreement or strong disagreement with the organization’s employment policies:

**SURVEY TEXT:** “Often, I find it difficult to agree with this organization’s policies on important matters relating to its employees.” (R)

![Figure 25: Employment Policy Agreement Results](image)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>5 = HIGH LEVEL OF AGREEMENT WITH EMPLOYMENT POLICIES (REVERSE SCALE ITEM)</th>
<th>Frequency</th>
<th>Valid Percent</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Valid</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
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<td>55</td>
<td>9.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>174</td>
<td>29.3</td>
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<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>163</td>
<td>27.5</td>
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<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>171</td>
<td>28.8</td>
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<td>5.1</td>
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<td>Missing</td>
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<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>595</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Two other commitment items also produced responses indicating lower commitment levels (“enjoy discussing organization to people outside” and “would accept any job type in the organization”). Several unique elements of the State Department, however, might explain these outcomes (see section 4.2 for additional details).

### 3.2 Results Relating to Hypothesis I

_Hypothesis I: Power distance scores of FSN’s will be positively correlated with organizational commitment to the U.S. State Department._

For purposes of measuring the power distance orientation of a respondent, items 1-6 of the survey were put into a single category. Internal consistency of the items is accessed by a reliability analysis. Cronbach’s Alpha is 0.62, which is rather low (with 0.7 considered “satisfactory”). However, there was no substantial improvement by discarding any one item in the scale and correlation with commitment items from these six questions was very high (see subsequent sections). For purposes of measuring commitment, items 7-29 of the survey were put into a single category (to measure this...
hypothesis). Cronbach’s Alpha in this case was 0.87 (highly satisfactory) with deletion of any one item only providing a nominal increase in the consistency and validity of viewing these items as a single instrument. Thus, changes were deemed not to be worthwhile.

To test for correlation between power distance and commitment, the means of each respondent’s score in each area were measured against the means of the scores in the other area. The result of \( r = .12 \) for the Pearson Correlation Coefficient demonstrates a high degree of correlation (correlation is significant at the 0.01 level):

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Table 1: PD/Commitment Correlation</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MeanQ1toQ6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>---</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Power Distance</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sig. (1-tailed)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>N</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Commitment</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sig. (1-tailed)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>N</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*If \( p < 0.5 \) **If \( p < 0.01 \)

Several items related to this hypothesis had levels of correlation worth noting:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Table 2: Autocratic Decisions/Commitment Correlations</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>“Managers should make most decisions without consulting subordinates.”</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-----------------------------------------------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Effort beyond expectation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Accept any job type</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Organization inspires me</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Best organization to work for</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Personal meaning high</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*If \( p < 0.5 \) **If \( p < 0.01 \)

These strong correlations suggest that an FSN who accepts top-down decisions may have a deeper personal connection and appreciation for the organization. It also could indicate that a willingness to accept directives would allow a change in job type, if
requested by the institution. While a weaker correlation, the negative correlation between effort and top-down decisions could indicate that this mentality not only indicates that an employee should do as s/he is told, but also that s/he should do no more than what they are told.

Similar correlations where found for the item “it is frequently necessary for a manager to use authority and power when dealing with subordinates.” While the item “managers should seldom ask for the opinions of employees” had similar correlations as the other power distance items, one area appears to be exceptional:

Table 3: Opinion Seeking/Commitment Correlations

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>“Managers should seldom ask for the opinions of employees.”</th>
<th>Pearson Correlation</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Accept any job type</td>
<td>.179**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Proud of organization</td>
<td>.141**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Organization inspires me</td>
<td>.146**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Best organization to work for</td>
<td>.132**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Personalize organization</td>
<td>.179**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Agree with this organization’s employment policies</td>
<td>.147**</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*If p < 0.5   **If p < 0.01

While items related to pride in the organization, personal meaning, and a willingness to follow directives in terms of job type were consistent with other power distance items; the agreement with the organization’s employment policies was unique. This relationship suggests that a view on management that doesn’t solicit feedback corresponds to agreement with State Department employment policies (something sharply criticized by respondents in a number of ways; see section 3.7).

Interestingly, the item “managers should avoid off-the-job social contacts with employees” (while consistent generally with other power distance items) did not strongly correlate with any other items (only some correlation with “happy to spend
career here” \( r = 0.091 \) and “uniquely attached to this organization” \( r = 1 \). Possible areas of explanation include the cultural and organizational divisions that cloud this issue with respect to socializing with American Officers. The other power distance items, however, produced more of the expected correlations including:

There appears to be a great deal of consistency in the responses related to commitment indicated by the extent to which one believes dissent from management opinion is appropriate. An acceptance of management without disagreement seems to indicate a strong correlation to a number of other commitment factors in State Department employment. The item “managers should not delegate important tasks to employees” produced responses consistent with the rest of the power distance items.

The cumulative effect of these results is to clearly see that attitudes about power have a clear relationship with attitudes about commitment when it comes to working for the

---

Table 4: Dissent/Commitment Correlations

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Employees should not disagree with management decisions.</th>
<th>Pearson Correlation</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Accept any job type</td>
<td>.209**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Organization inspires me</td>
<td>.205**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Glad I chose this organization</td>
<td>.180**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Agree with this organization’s employment policies</td>
<td>.149**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Best organization to work for</td>
<td>.121**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Decision to work for organization not a mistake</td>
<td>.115**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Happy to spend career here</td>
<td>.145**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Personalize organization</td>
<td>.111**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Personal meaning of organization high for me</td>
<td>.193**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Feel a sense of belonging</td>
<td>.125**</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*If \( p < 0.5 \) **If \( p < 0.01 \)
State Department. As such, this research would seem to validate the extensive literature that suggests the State Department is an institution of hierarchy.

3.3 Results Relating to Research Question I

*Research Question I: Is there a significant distinction in responses to these various commitment types?*

The Cronbach’s Alpha score of .87 indicates a satisfactory correlation between all of the commitment items to consider them as a single instrument. Dividing the items into two factors in a five-component analysis, 17 of 22 items can be placed into a single component. Component matrix analysis of the data shows the following:
Table 5: Component Matrix/Commitment Types

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Component</th>
<th>Component</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Effort beyond expectation</td>
<td>0.411</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Talk favorably on organization</td>
<td>-0.570</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Loyalty to organization</td>
<td>-0.223</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Accept any job type</td>
<td>-0.110</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Similar values to organization</td>
<td>0.215</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Proud of organization</td>
<td>0.640</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Prefer this organization to a similar job at another organization</td>
<td>0.420</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Organization inspires me</td>
<td>0.093</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unlikely to leave</td>
<td>0.092</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Glad I chose this organization</td>
<td>0.043</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Advantage to staying in organization</td>
<td>-0.136</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Agree with employment policies</td>
<td>0.564</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Care about organization's fate</td>
<td>-0.247</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Best organization to work for</td>
<td>-0.210</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Decision to work for organization not a mistake</td>
<td>0.034</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Happy to spend career here</td>
<td>0.815</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Enjoy discussing organization outside</td>
<td>0.031</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Personalize organization</td>
<td>-0.239</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Uniquely attached to organization</td>
<td>0.041</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Familial connection</td>
<td>0.302</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Emotionally attached</td>
<td>-0.144</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Personal meaning high</td>
<td>0.151</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sense of belonging</td>
<td>-0.078</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Extraction Method: Principal Component Analysis.
5 components extracted.

Two of the remaining five items fall into a single component including the items:

- I feel very little loyalty to this organization.
- I would accept almost any type of job assignment in order to keep working for this organization.
The first item is a negative, reversed scale item which (in some research) has compromised its reliability. The second item has some unique implications in relation to State Department structure that may have affected responses (see section 4.2 for additional details).

The remaining three items each fall into unique components in this analysis:

- It would take very little change in my present circumstances to cause me to leave.
- I am willing to put in a great deal of effort beyond that normally expected in order to help this organization be successful.
- I enjoy discussing my organization with people outside it.

The negative, reverse scale aspect of the first item above (along with its wording) has also been a source of criticism in other research (Cohen, 2003). The second item appears more suited to the private sector in contrast to the State Department where deviating from job structures and requirements (even with good intentions) can be discouraged or (in some cases) prohibited (see section 4.2 for additional details). Similarly, discussion of State Department policies and procedures with outsiders is (in many cases) not allowed for security reasons.

None of these items sufficiently impacted the reliability of the scale to justify exclusion nor would their exclusion have a substantial impact on the overall results of this study. To preserve the integrity of the previously validated work of Meyer and Allen (1984, 2001) and Porter (1974) and to prevent any impression of “cherry picking” the data to validate hypotheses, both commitment measures are included in the results. The results, in this case, indicate that FSN’s commitment levels are, in principle, similarly measured across all items.
Despite the generally uniform nature of commitment across all items in this survey population, there were a number of interesting correlations in the commitment items that merit additional scrutiny:

Table 6: Intra Commitment Item Correlations

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Commitment Item</th>
<th>Commitment Item</th>
<th>Pearson Correlation</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Effort beyond expectation</td>
<td>Talk favorably about the organization</td>
<td>.421**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Talk favorably on organization</td>
<td>Similar values to organization</td>
<td>.429**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Talk favorably on organization</td>
<td>Proud of organization</td>
<td>.555**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Talk favorably on organization</td>
<td>Glad I chose this organization</td>
<td>.443**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Talk favorably on organization</td>
<td>Best organization to work for</td>
<td>.432**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Accept any job type</td>
<td>Best organization to work for</td>
<td>.416**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Similar values to organization</td>
<td>Proud of organization</td>
<td>.456**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Similar values to organization</td>
<td>Glad I chose this organization</td>
<td>.437**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Proud of organization</td>
<td>Best organization to work for</td>
<td>.457**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Organization inspires me</td>
<td>Talk favorably on organization</td>
<td>.404**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Organization inspires me</td>
<td>Proud of organization</td>
<td>.436**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Organization inspires me</td>
<td>Glad I chose this organization</td>
<td>.481**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Advantage to staying in organization</td>
<td>Proud of organization</td>
<td>.346**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Advantage to staying in organization</td>
<td>Organization inspires me</td>
<td>.399**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Advantage to staying in organization</td>
<td>Happy to spend career here</td>
<td>.483**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Advantage to staying in organization</td>
<td>Sense of belonging</td>
<td>.475**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Agree with employment policies</td>
<td>Similar values to organization</td>
<td>.364**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Agree with employment policies</td>
<td>Organization inspires me</td>
<td>.423**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Agree with employment policies</td>
<td>Sense of belonging</td>
<td>.416**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Care about the organization’s future</td>
<td>Emotionally attached</td>
<td>.420**</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*If p < 0.5  **If p < 0.01
There was (predictably) an excellent level of correlation between the various commitment items; however these specific correlations are of interest for this research. The picture painted in these results is of an organization where personal and professional pride is linked to having similar values to the organization. The belief in an opportunity for professional advancement tended to be linked to greater intent for a longer tenure and a feeling of inspiration and belonging to the institution. Agreement with employment policies tended to correlate with a number of commitment areas including a sense of belonging and inspiration about the organization’s goals. Concern about the future of the organization trended towards strong correlation with emotional attachment. These relationships suggest an FSN workforce where factors of commitment such as personal and professional satisfaction with the organization were linked to items related to retention and organizational investment.

### 3.4 Results Relating to Hypothesis II

**Hypothesis II: Power distance scores of FSN’s will not significantly impact duration of employment.**

Power distance scores of FSN’s were not significantly impacted by duration of employment. Pearson Correlation only reached the level of .010 with no significant relationship indicated. Analysis of the results on each item of the power distance scale showed no significant relationships between any item and tenure. Thus, this result suggests that duration of employment and orientation to power do not strongly correlate in the FSN population.

### 3.5 Results Relating to Hypothesis III

**Hypothesis III: Duration of employment by FSN’s working for the State Department will be negatively correlated to organizational commitment.**

Employment tenure was measured by the following question item:

“How long have you been employed by the State Department or other U.S. Government organization?

- 0-3 years
- 4-6 years
- 7-9 years
- More than 9 years”
Duration of employment was negatively correlated to commitment items at a Pearson Correlation of -.097 (correlation is significant at the 0.01 level). This suggests a strong likelihood that the longer a person works for the State Department, the greater the chance there will be a corresponding decline in commitment level. This decline in commitment based on tenure was seen in 19 of the 22 areas:

Table 7: Tenure/Commitment Correlations

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Commitment Item</th>
<th>Pearson Correlation</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Effort beyond expectation</td>
<td>-.029</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Loyalty to organization</td>
<td>-.058</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Accept any job type</td>
<td>-.032</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Similar values to organization</td>
<td>-.012</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Prefer this organization to a similar job at another organization</td>
<td>-.068</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Organization inspires me</td>
<td>-.036</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unlikely to leave</td>
<td>-.044</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Glad I chose this organization</td>
<td>-.061</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Advantage to staying in organization</td>
<td>-.044</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Care about organization's fate</td>
<td>-.063</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Best organization to work for</strong></td>
<td>-.082*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Decision to work for organization not a mistake</td>
<td>-.022</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Happy to spend career here</strong></td>
<td>-.194**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Enjoy discussing organization outside</td>
<td>-.040</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Personalize organization</td>
<td>-.075</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Uniquely attached to organization</strong></td>
<td>-.134**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Emotionally attached</strong></td>
<td>-.101*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Personal meaning high</strong></td>
<td>-.149**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Sense of belonging</strong></td>
<td>-.136**</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*If p < 0.5  **If p < 0.01
Significant correlations were found in the areas noted. Of the three areas that did not trend negative in correlation, there was no statistically significant level of positive correlation. Thus, a very specific picture emerges about long-term employment duration with the State Department. Commitment generally declines over time with employment retention commitment less likely (“best organization to work for” and “happy to spend career here”). The personal, emotional, and community aspects of commitment also tend to be less felt the longer one is with the institution. In sum, these items suggest a working environment that may become less attractive the longer one is employed.

3.6 Results Relating to Hypothesis IV

Hypothesis IV: FSN scores on the measure of power distance will not be significantly impacted by the frequency of contact with Americans.

Frequency of a respondents contact with American Officers was measured in the item:

“How often do you have contact with American Officers in the course of your duties?
Very Infrequently 1 2 3 4 5 Very Frequently”

Checking correlations to items of power distance and commitment, the results were as follows:

Table 8: Officer Contact Level Correlations

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Commitment Items</th>
<th>Power Distance Items</th>
<th>Contact with Americans</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Commitment Items</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pearson Correlation</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>,120**</td>
<td>,097**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sig. (1-tailed)</td>
<td>.</td>
<td>,002</td>
<td>,009</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>N</td>
<td>595</td>
<td>595</td>
<td>595</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Power Distance Items</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pearson Correlation</td>
<td>,120**</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>-.057</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sig. (1-tailed)</td>
<td>,002</td>
<td>.</td>
<td>,084</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>N</td>
<td>595</td>
<td>595</td>
<td>595</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Contact with Americans</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pearson Correlation</td>
<td>.097**</td>
<td>-.057</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sig. (1-tailed)</td>
<td>,009</td>
<td>,084</td>
<td>.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>N</td>
<td>595</td>
<td>595</td>
<td>595</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**. Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (1-tailed).
The positive correlation between commitment and contact with Americans was shown to a Pearson Correlation of .097 with high significance. In relation to this hypothesis, however, there was no significant correlation between power distance orientation and contact with Americans. This could suggest that the culture of the individual is largely unaffected by the contact with American Officers. The implications of such a possible relationship, where cultural shifts are not part of cultural interaction, are discussed in further detail in section 4.5.

Interestingly, despite the significant relationship with the commitment items generally, the frequency of contact with Americans appears to only significantly correlate to 3 items in the entire survey:

Table 9: Significant Correlations/Contact with Americans

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Frequency of contact with Americans</th>
<th>Pearson Correlation</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Similar values to organization</td>
<td>.092*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Proud of organization</td>
<td>.094*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sense of belonging</td>
<td>.172**</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*If p < 0.5  **If p < 0.01

The result of “similar values” being correlated to “frequency of contact” is hardly surprising as similarity is typically the basis for most meaningful relationships (DeVito, 2009). Correspondingly, belonging and pride in an institution are obviously linked to having better organizational relationships- relationships that require contact to be fully realized. Still, the extent to which American contact had little observable impact on the survey results suggests a possible gap between the two groups that can perhaps be better understood through the narrative responses to this survey.

3.7 Results Research Question II

From the 260 responses to the open questions at the conclusion of the survey, several dominant narratives emerge from FSN’s. These include:
An overview of each area along with a series of excerpts from survey respondents offers an opportunity for a more detailed exploration. Please note, for purposes of clarity and coherence, FSN responses in this section were edited for grammar, spelling, and content (eliminating much of the bureaucratic “Alphabet Soup” that makes up the different departments of the organization and making the language more consistent with the rest of this research). Additionally, this section extensively utilizes quotations from responses given as they bear a more eloquent and direct witness to the experience of being an FSN than a summation or supposition that could be offered by this researcher. The full and unedited version of all respondents’ answers can be found in Appendix II. This is included as this research by no means wishes to suggest that the voices and feelings of FSN’s can only be understood or interpreted by an American researcher; especially important given several of the statements issued in response to the open narrative question.

The State Department as a structurally flawed organization

Many responses indicate deeply rooted concerns about the structure and policies of the State Department. As noted previously, in an attempt to minimize clientism (the over-identification by Officers with the host country), officers typically on a fixed 2-3 year rotation. This has created a situation in which FSN’s are continually adapting to new American supervisors who typically bring in a new set of policies (often independent of the efficacy of the existing policies). It also prevents continuity and reduces
incentives to invest in any one Officer’s policies (especially in the period immediately before that Officer’s transfer to a new post and arrival of the next Officer). The responses suggest that there are often gaps in long term planning that make the work of FSN’s less meaningful. Related to this is the notion that some officers focus on personal advancement often at the expense of good policy, given that their time at a specific post will be relatively condensed. There were also concerns about consistency as the work/communication style of one Officer could be dramatically different than the style of the next one, creating a position of dependence on an unpredictable working relationship. This unpredictability in the actions/attitudes of the next Officer posted makes long-term organizational investment unrealistic. Additionally, as creating positive change seems to be rewarded over maintaining working programs, several respondents felt that functioning processes are discarded when a new Officer arrives. Some sample responses speaking to this concern include:

There is very little long term planning. The longest period is 1.5 years. No views, no long term decisions. No American officer cares what happens after his or her 3-year tour.

The problem areas are the local US staff that most of the time focuses on empire building, lifestyle management and advancement of the individual career and not the US Government long-term interests!

The relationship with our American supervisors relies heavily on the personality and work style of our supervisors and is therefore subject to change every three years. Some of them do involve the FSNs and some of them don't. Each of them has a personal work style. Accordingly, the flow of communication is at times really good, but there are periods when it is not. These are the results of having watched American officers come and go over many years.
Sometimes it's really hard to work with many types of bosses, since they just come and go every 2 or 3-4 years. We have to start everything all over again. Everyone (new managers) wants to show their power, their skills, but sometimes it just does not make any sense.

The downfall of working as an FSN in this organization is the continuous change of officers every one or two years. FSN’s have a difficult time in transition periods.

The fact that supervisors and managers change frequently makes it difficult to be attached to the organization.

I strongly believe that there should be a continuity line when officers are transferred. I mean that many times when a new officer is assigned at post, all the work done by his/her predecessor is suddenly wrong (upon arrival) and everything starts over again every two or three years. I understand that changes are good when they mean improvement, not just for the sake of changing or doing things your own way. This is many times the cause of frustration to FSN employees -together with the saying "in my previous post"- and why organizations can't grow on a solid base.

It is sometimes frustrating to get new boss every 2 years, especially since your knowledge base is really huge and (my) bosses are often Junior Officers.

The span of the American Officers’ attention is limited[…] they do not really care what will happen in the Embassy after their time. I just do my job the best way I can under the circumstances hoping for a retirement at 55.

We have gotten used to the fact that every 2-3 years officers change, and the new supervisors arrive with their own vision and management styles. Quite often, however, they tend to ignore the best practices established at post and force the changes.
Sometimes personnel/managing problems tend to be postponed indefinitely as the American officer in charge knows s/he will be leaving soon and is not willing to take on the burden of difficult decisions.

Management changes every 2-3 years and it’s a pure luck (or misfortune) who will you get next, because the atmosphere and everything in the office strongly depends almost exclusively on the State Department Officer's skills.

The 2-year-tour basis at State is the very weakness of the system. By the time you establish a good work relationship, your supervisor is leaving. You cannot build up that expertise with your American partner. A good example of that is with Americans who stay four years. Performance is far better than with people who stay two years. In other words the big loser is the organization.

These responses suggest that commitment and performance are negatively impacted by the near constant rotation of American Officers. Another weakness identified was with the salary structure at many posts. While the websites promoting FSN job opportunities boast that salaries are comparable (or better) than private sector jobs in the host country, these responses paint a different picture:

FSNs have become increasingly displeased with the poor salary adjustments that we have been given.

In general, I enjoy my work, I am happy to work for the Embassy, but I think that the salary system is not fair.

My opinions that are of a negative quality reflect my dissatisfaction with my compensation […] not my dissatisfaction with my job itself.
No wage increase is also creating a problem for the local staff and they have started to seek employment in other organizations that pay more and have more benefits.

It is an honor working for the State however, but truth be told, our salaries and benefits quite frankly do not match what our local market is paying for similar positions[...] we do not have a retirement plan or pension plan and our low salaries make it difficult to cope with rising inflation. Most of us have sent their families back to their home country to cut down on expenses.

There is no motivation for work- due to the high inflation that happened in our country during the past 4 years the current salary is not enough for the normal life. However we are always reminded that we work for the Department of State and should be proud of this fact! Salary is not that good as it was 4 years back- and there is constant pressing from the Management that really brings stress to the local staff. I like my job and enjoy working for this Embassy, however I have started thinking about finding some other - well-paid job. (Just FYI- about 25 staff members left jobs here in the last year- one of the main reasons for their departures was the salary issue).

Many FSNs have put in years of work, and their salaries have reached the max. And they have another 8 to 12 years more to go. There should be some form of incentives for these employees.

Related to compensation, FSN’s have indicated serious concern about the structural barriers that preclude promotion and the distribution of service awards. There is a feeling from many such responses that vertical movement is not possible and, thus, the incentive to work hard or invest in the organization is minimal. As such, many view a long-term commitment to the State Department as professionally untenable. Several responses in this area include:
Once you are in, you realize that there really isn't much room for growth - or at least, that is the case at our Post. I think that finding the motivation to outdo yourself in your job depends a lot on your supervisors. We can't really look at it as an opportunity for promotion because there really aren't promotions here.

There are very limited opportunities for the career development. The longer you work, the less they are.

There should be more opportunities for promotions and recognition. Officers often lose sight of the consistent high quality output of the FSNs. Awards, incentives should be offered generously to deserving FSNs. Otherwise it will generate work fatigue and frustration among FSNs.

I have heard of how a technician rose to the rank of CEO in some private U.S. firms. This is something that can never happen in the State Department (for FSN’s) as these high level posts are reserved for Americans.

The nature of FSN employment is such that long-term career opportunities are not readily available and as such, employees should be encouraged to grow and develop to both benefit State but also in order to have skilled workers that move to new careers after a few years. For most FSN's, working for the State means doing one position for life or leaving. When I leave, it will not be from lack of loyalty, but because at some point, the work has been accomplished and it is time to move on.

The upward mobility is also very much limited which is also a great dissatisfaction factor.

I think the Department of State is a good organization to work for, but no one should spend his or her whole career only in this organization.
Retention will continue to be a problem at this post and other posts like it if something is not done to make it more attractive to stay [in terms of advancement].

It is very difficult to project your stay when there is very little room for growth. Good supervisors come and go and so does their recognition of your job. There should be some plan for professional advancement for FSN's.

I still wouldn't recommend to anyone new staying here for more than 3-4 years but I don't regret my experience nor working with colleagues. But I'm still looking to quit as there is no useful training, no salary incentives, no promotion opportunities and our technology roadmap appears dissociated from any needs by technical professionals such as me.

The result of these perceived structural flaws are that many FSN’s feel undervalued, with little opportunity for advancement, with a seemingly endless and continuous rotation of supervisors who may or may not be invested (or competent) in the organization’s goals. This suggests problems for both power distance and commitment concerns. For those with high power distance orientations, the needs of continuity, loyalty, certainty, and provision of resources from authority are not being met. For those with low power distance orientations, the opportunity for advancement and the need for equity in compensation appear to be a concern for some. Likewise, these structural elements can negatively impact commitment levels. Issues such as pride in work, the feeling of being valued and organizational relevancy are all put at risk. Cumulatively, the basis for the short tenure of FSN’s can likely be found in many of the sentiments.
Americans separate from FSN’s and lack culturally knowledge of the host country

Another narrative theme of the responses is that of separation; separation of American Officers from their FSN colleagues and separation of American Officers from the host country in which they are posted. The workplace separation has, according to survey responses, had a devastating impact on workplace morale. Basic collegiality and communication necessary to ensure that goals requiring the full participation of all employees at a post are, according to some respondents, noticeably absent. This division has in some cases has created a climate where FSN’s feel that they lack the respect necessary to do the job. Additionally, the social and emotional needs of employees extend beyond paychecks, checklists, and hours worked. The absence of social contact (ranging from simple friendliness to an emotional investment in the lives of colleagues) can create problems for fully committing to an organization (as noted by respondents). This separation between Officers and FSN’s extends to a cultural separation, as well. Lacking the cultural knowledge of the host country and failing to adequately communicate with FSN’s has fostered a situation in which American Officers are dangerously distant from the culture with which they are supposed to be engaging. The results (as noted in surveys) are that many Americans make visible mistakes in dealing the local culture, fail to engage entirely, and show little interest in using the most obvious resource (the FSN’s) that could remedy this situation. Some responses include:

I have always felt like there are "us" (FSN’s) and "them" (American officers).

Americans don't really associate much with FSN’s, and we have also learned to keep our distance. Truth be told, FSNs are like third class citizens among the community. First priority is the American Officers, then the Officers’ family members, and then the FSN’s.
What works in one country will not necessarily work in another. Cultural sensitivity is very important. Bad Officers result in the Ugly American image.

Supervisors sometimes make a big difference between FSN’s and Officers while they should treat them equally. Most of the (Officers) do not have knowledge of the language and culture of the host country which makes it difficult to deal with FSN’s and the mission contacts.

In relation to the question (about social contact off the job), 99 percent of American Officers/managers at the post where I belong avoid off-the-job social contact with (FSN) employees which makes for an incomplete experience.

I haven’t had many Officers who care about FSN’s.

When Officers say "We Americans, and you FSNs", it is really hard to work.

The communication/understanding between American and local employees has become very distant. Communication, understanding and mutual benefit are keys to building the bridges and I hope that management becomes more aware of this. Although my values are similar to those of Americans and I take proud in the work that I do and how I do it, management decisions "sometimes" lead me to think "what am I doing here?"

The breach between U.S. direct hire employees and FSN’s is very wide and I do not see a serious effort on the part of management to improve the situation. FSN’s seem to be an after-thought or a necessary evil to most American managers who pay lip service to the idea of employee integration.
Sometimes lack of communication is a real barrier between supervisors and subordinates… Cultural understanding is important and respecting differences.

More and more (American Officers) often lack a European cultural understanding of European situations -- and that makes the relationship more difficult.

American Officers should also develop a greater sense for the local culture because American culture is not paramount.

Sometimes, I feel that the (American Officers) do not have the necessary training before coming to post and they often have no clue about the culture of the country. I personally think that managers should be more aware of the country's culture and give opportunities to subordinates to see what they can do.

One of the issues that I have taken up with several other FSN colleagues is the lack of social skills of American officers towards foreign employees in the sense that there is no inclusion within their circles. An example, during social gatherings it is very obvious that American officers will mingle and socialize with their own and leave FSN's off to their own too, there is no effort to socialize and socially a lack of acknowledgment on a daily basis starting from the basic response to a "Good morning". There is a strong sense among the consulate, this is we and this is you, we're not the same.

I would also recommend that (American Officers) familiarize themselves with the host county's labor laws and labor culture, which might differ greatly from that of the U.S.

I have come to dislike the "them" and "us" attitude that exists between FSN and (American Officers)[…] There doesn't seem to be much trust anymore. I used to socialize a lot with the American community but have completely stopped when it became obvious that new staff arriving at Post were no longer interested.
I am not part of the family. I am just an employee.

The organization does a poor job of making me feel like a part of the team. It's almost like a caste system with the Americans on one side and the FSN’s on the other.

FSN staff gets the same kind of treatment as the general public. There is no distinction between a local employee and an outsider. The organization does not own its locally engaged employees and they work with a sense of insecurity. The level of trust and respect (from the American staff) between the two communities; the FSN and the American staff is diminishing.

Managers should know (in detail) about the culture, attitudes and other factors of people of the assigned country.

Over the years, I have found that the American officers have become increasingly distant in their interaction with FSN’s.

It is my personal opinion that we suffer from an "us and them" mentality between the American staff and FSN’s staff at post, I personally feel that this is terrible for morale when American staff cannot even say "hello" in the corridors within the office. It is also my personal feeling that this mentality of "us and them" starts and the very top and works its way down.

I don't feel as a member of the Embassy "family" as I used to before (there is greater feeling of "Americans" and "FSN" as separate entities while we work for the same goals and aspirations[...]) There is less mingling of American and Malaysian employees today compared with what we had enjoyed several years ago. It could be because of the 9-11 aftermath and Americans have become more "careful" (and they should not be blamed for that "carefulness") but more inter-mingling events sponsored
by the Embassy is probably the way to move forward… We forget that the most
important element in any organization is human capital and human capital is founded
upon human interdependence and relationship building.

It is somehow frustrating when people do not trust FSN’s enough just because they are
not American.

The American officers need to learn the basic culture in country they work in order to
understand the employee. We work as a team not as a boss/underling. Be humble but
firm on decision making, but please listen when the FSN’s inform you first. Minor
mistakes can cause a lot of dissatisfaction on FSN.

Since India is so different from the U.S., there is often an adjustment time needed when
a new American Officer comes in, as the Officer comes in with perceptions based on
what he/she are used to in the U.S. and finds that those might not work in local
conditions.

Generally one is very aware of the strong dividing line between the 2 cultures and that
an FSN will always be considered an inferior… which is reflected in the way that
requests are given. One point though is that from time to time a genuinely caring
American Officer comes along who isn't pretending to purport the "FSNs are
important to us" directive… that is when local staff actually gives their best.

The "Them & US" attitude of American Officers and Locally Employed Staff is nothing
short of discrimination.

The sum total of these responses suggests that many FSN’s perceive a two-tiered
culture in American diplomatic and consular posts. While this is certainly a function
of the fact that these posts are “U.S. space,” one senses in these responses that the
delineation of the two roles (Officer and FSN) extends beyond the fact that these are
American institutions. The unavoidable hierarchy of this institution does not correspondingly mandate that the local staff should not be engaged. These responses suggest that a basic level of respect and communication is lacking in the relationship between Officers and FSN’s. Many responses also show the link between this lack of personal and professional engagement with FSN’s and the lack of cultural understanding of the Officers. This lack of cultural understanding both hurts the ability to effectively utilize the skill set of the FSN’s and the ability to engage with host country where the Officer is posted.

**FSN’s deserve empowerment, but are denied or ignored**

As the cleavage between FSN’s and American Officers is noted by respondents, so too is the lack of authority that many FSN’s feel in offering their own expertise and experience on the job. This can contribute to a lack of perceived value by the State Department for FSN’s existing and potential contributions. Many note that they have a high level of expertise that is underutilized and undervalued by the State Department. Others note that their skills would be enhanced by additional training. The dominant theme of these types of responses is that the FSN’s have a valuable skill set and substantial human capital that could prove beneficial if fully realized by the State Department.

The ignoring of the knowledge offered by FSN’s is identified in several responses:

*Newly appointed American Officers do not value the long experience of the FSN’s; they ignore the knowledge provided to them and treat them with superiority.*

*I'd wish to have more responsibilities as a Senior FSN who worked 20 years for the American Embassy.*

*I don't think any of my views/opinions matter or are considered.*
Because, an American supervisor is always right; it is her/his way, or NO way. There is no control mechanism for American Officers[...] Empowering FSN’s in many aspects will be helpful not only to create more productive workplace but also to reduce personnel budget.

Officers must bear in mind that without FSN’s; they would be able to perform their work in a timely and efficient way. They must be able to trust FSN work.

Sometimes we have to deal with new Supervisors that do not recognize and/or have respect for the loyal service we have always given to the organization, as well as the vast experience and knowledge most of us have (in my case 26 years of service).

I believe that FSN’s should be delegated with additional duties in order to enable Officers to dedicate more time to other issues.

FSN’s -who do most of the work- opinions, are seldom taken into consideration.

In recent years, unfortunately, despite what we are told at training, there is a dangerous - I would say suicidal - move to disempower FSN’s who are the backbone and the continuity of the Mission.

Officers can learn from FSN’s with experience, but most of the time, they refuse to learn thinking that they know everything. I have seen it a lot!!

The FSN’s are the ones who best know the country and the day to day running of Post, so it would be best to communicate with them.
FSN’s generally accept American management’s authority when they make decisions without consulting with FSN’s, but if they consult beforehand, that would be very appreciated.

I would also recommend mainly young diplomats to not hesitate in using local FSN’s experience and to be more helpful to FSN’s in their everyday activities. It should really be teamwork in order to reach better cooperation and achievement.

Management should include FSN’s in decision-making process.

Also, since India was (until recently) regarded as a “third-world developing” country rather than a “developed” one (images from the West tend to show India more as a land of snake charmers and Rajahs, rather than one with an IT revolution, etc.), many American Officers tend to be more cautious in the beginning when delegating responsibility to FSN’s.

We (FSN’s) meet and exceed the standards at our Post. Nevertheless, time and again we are having meetings resembling “school lessons”; where our boss is a “teacher.” Our boss recently arrived at Post and he does not understand a lot of things related to the job performance.

On many occasion American Officers do not take into consideration the opinion of the employees, and FSN’s just have to accept the decisions. Over the years, the employees will argue or discuss a decision being made that will impact their work environment. It is like they become submissive.

FSNs are the backbone of the organization and they always try to give their best during their association. But problems erupt when American Officers (during their usually short tenure) try to show off, or are guided by their whims and egos, that often result in disruption in harmony in an otherwise smooth teamwork.
The opinions of FSN’s, who know the target audiences better, are not considered when planning/evaluating (Public Diplomacy) activities [...].

It would be nice that FSNs be treated with more consideration. Americans should realize it is a strong possibility that other nationalities also have valuable individuals. I have heard on so many occasions that FSNs are the most important link in the Embassy. It would be nice if behind those words would be some facts to sustain these claims.

I find it to be a serious mistake that many FSN’s have much to contribute to professional events and relationships in their area of expertise, but are often ignored.

My embassy is structured in such a way that it appears the hierarchy is more important than any good idea or project because it gets lost in the many layers it has to go through to reach a decision-making level. American officers appear to be too reluctant to be proactive or to recommend ideas from FSN’s to management. Too often, they see FSN's as mere tools for realizing their ideas and executing their orders. That can be tiring!

American Officers should understand that in order to produce worthwhile results they must partner with their FSN's.

FSN's usually know their local circumstances and programs better, but for the Americans this is often difficult to admit.

The best management practice of the State Department would be to a) listen to their FSN employees and b) often do what these employees suggest!

As a non-U.S. citizen there is no room to make decisions or to work independently.
In my perception, the FSN’s are underestimated and very often ignored specifically because of their qualifications and high level of professionalism. Many FSN’s are overqualified and their abilities are lost or misused – the organization is focused mostly on the happiness of American Officers. Other international organizations in my country treat their local staff as the institutional memory and backbone of the organization. At the embassy this concept is unheard of.

People are the organization and if the management doesn’t appreciate and value what FSN’s can contribute, it is only normal for them to become detached, lose morale and finally leave the organization.

Beyond wanting appreciation, authority, and a voice for their ability to contribute, FSN’s also indicate an interest in training that could develop these skills even further. In both cases, the underlying concept is the idea that FSN’s need to be valued as creative capital that contribute to realization of State Department goals and energize the organization as it develops new ones. Some responses related to this developmental theme include:

There should be more training opportunities both for FSNs and Supervisors.

Training remains the problem area. I have done this job for over four years now, and am still waiting for the specific training to increase my productivity. The same thing happened with a job in State (I was there for 17 years) where after 13 years of service, I finally got to go see how I should do my work!! Not investing in training is like going backwards.

FSN’s need more training on how to do their jobs.
There is a need to provide training opportunities to every FSN, especially when it is outside the country. It will encourage better knowledge, confidence, skill evaluation, and understanding across Posts. The essence of training is for empowerment...

The want of some respondents for training, coupled with the lack of valuation of the unique competencies of FSN’s (which may be sorely needed by some Officers), indicates that a core need for many FSN’s is the want to be valued by the institution and the want to contribute to the realization and development of institutional goals. The respondents also indicate that the organizational structure and culture of the State Department precludes this kind of organizational investment.

**Damaging policies and personalities hurt the working environment**

Concerns about empowerment also coincide with examples of policies and personalities that hurt morale and limit the commitment tendencies of FSN’s. In an environment where the “two-tier system” is so prevalently seen by many employees, coupled with the perception that American supervisors are not engaged with the FSN population, it is not surprising that several profoundly disturbing examples of damaging behavior were identified. Collegiality and respect tended to be issues that many such responses point towards. Institutional policy, according to some employees, does little to curb this tension and in many ways, exacerbates the problem. These responses also pointed out that there is no defined system for airing FSN grievances and the systems that may exist are under the domain of Americans (thus limiting the perception that these systems could provide honest mediation in a dispute involving an American and an FSN). Coupled with the previously noted issue of frequent Officer rotation, the perception here is that it may be preferable to endure the abuse and hope the next Officer offers a better working environment. As noted in some of the responses, this attitude of “just accepting organizational injustice” creates the sort of negative climate that Masterson, et al. (2000) showed to be predictive of a
range of negative organizational outcomes. Some examples of such policies and behaviors include:

American officers do not seek guidance from FSN supervisors or employees; they tend to believe that by being who they are, they do not have to request information from a local national. They act rude to their fellow FSN’s and sometime discriminatory behavior is perceived. The statement "if it comes from an FSN employee, it does not count" is very common in this atmosphere.

FSN’s are treated as staff more often than as colleagues.

Most of the American Officers that come to post do not regard the FSN’s; they see us as sub-standard.

Americans usually talk down to locally employed staff and have an arrogant view towards the host country.

There are some Officers who like to terrorize employees by saying, "you will be fired if X happens." This makes the employee feel insecure. This is especially true in an African country like ours; they believe that they can get new employees easily.

The one downside with working at the State Department is that some officers believe that they are superior to FSNs, or at least treat us in a condescending way that makes us feel that.

But the one thing I dislike is that FSN’s are sometimes considered as second-class citizens with second-class opinions.

The locally employed staff in my post has been so distressed by the humiliation and discrimination from management and American Officers.
The Americans are unfriendly and uncomfortable with communicating - sometimes to point of being insulting.

FSN’s no longer park inside the Embassy proper but in a separate lot. We are not entitled to sick leave when "family members" are sick. We are not entitled to R&R when environmental situations are deteriorating (example when the Air Pollutant Index is considered seriously unhealthy--but American officers get such privileges). We are not entitled to purchase Commissary goods. FSN’s are not respected the way American supervisors are respected […]

Officers sometimes take credit for projects initiated by FSN’s or work carried out by FSN’s. More credit should be given to employees.

The Department of State has no feeling in dealing with FSNs and the main policy is "WE DO NOT CARE."

We (even as FSN’s) are not encouraged to discuss too much about this organization and our job.

As employees of this organization we feel that we are discriminated and humiliated by some of our supervisors and managers and not treated well.

The "kiss up and kick down" culture (of the State Department towards FSN’s) just doesn’t work.

It says a lot that the Ambassador can call me by my nickname even if I never gave her permission for that but I have to call her by her title and stand up for her every time she enters a room, everyday for three years. I believe you earn respect but nobody, not even the Ambassador, gets it for having people stand up for her.
I was very attached to the organization and I loved being a member of the US Embassy team until my former boss allowed and even encouraged a colleague to take over a program that I had created and developed; that’s when I no longer felt part of the family, although I did not complain. Since then, I have felt that I don’t want a lifetime career as an Embassy employee.

It is a shame that sometimes various negative characteristic traits of various American employees have such a negative influence and portray the institution in a completely obstructive light.

American Officers should treat their subordinates with respect, and seek other outlets for their bad tempers rather than taking pleasure in being mean and nasty.

American Officers often do everything to make us not feel like a "part of the family"[...] There is no efficient system that would protect an FSN or control an American Officer. There is no "punishment" for being a bad Foreign Service Officer. There is no institution behind the Embassy, there is only a supervisor [...] working in the U.S Embassy and being proud is a myth.

I was sexually touched in a humiliating and public way by a supervisor. Two American Officers were there when this happened. They said nothing and only joked about it when I brought it up later. I think they know this totally, completely is harassment but they want no involvement. If there is an investigation, it could go against their records and hurt their chance for a promotion or better post. They think “the stupid FSN will keep her mouth shut and make no problems…” This happens A LOT on many issues. They don’t care about us- only their careers. I have an advanced university diploma- do they ever treat me like I have something to offer? NO! The day I leave this place with my pride will be one of the best days of my life.
Those who listen cannot do anything; those who can do not listen. So what's the point?

Cumulatively, many respondents seem to view the State Department as an institution that accepts and obfuscates (perhaps encourages?) abusive, discriminatory, and shortsighted behavior on the part of American Officers towards their FSN colleagues. Policies do little to curb what some respondents see as a climate of organizational injustice. Beyond FSN concerns about compensation, development, and empowerment, respondents seem to be indicating that there are more basic concerns about the respect afforded fellow human beings. For those oriented towards high power distance, this is a basic affront to the protection that those with power should be affording their subordinates. For those oriented towards low power distance, such behavior contradicts standards of openness, fairness, and equality. Taken together, such attitudes can threaten the commitment level of all employees, if such behavior is present.

The State Department provides a high degree of job satisfaction

While many of the respondents indicate serious concerns about the culture of the State Department and the behavior of American Officers, a number of responses tend to indicate many positive aspects of being an FSN. Some of these responses indicated that there is a greater degree of respect that comes from working for Americans than they would receive in a comparable position in their home country. Others noted that many aspects of the American work environment are more collegial, transparent, and consistent than what one would find in other countries. Certain areas and programs were singled out where FSN’s were allowed to innovative and demonstrate a higher level of creativity. Some others also showed a general admiration/interest in American culture and working for the State Department provides a chance to engage and experience some elements of the United States. A sample of these responses include:

I get the respect I am looking for, happy with salary, emotionally stable in my job.
I've really enjoyed doing the public affairs work for the U.S. Government for the past 16 years, and I hope to continue working at the current post during the rest of my career until the mandatory retirement age.

I like working at this institution because they give us a space to be creative, and be supportive to any innovative ideas to enhance the quality of the "product" we are manufacturing.

In my 8-year career with 3 organizations, the State Department is the only organization that rewards innovation, and hard work through various incentives. I value competition and this is the most ideal work environment for me. The organizational values are also ideal for my country and supervisors appreciate any kind of interventions that reflect these values.

I think this organization provides a good example of the U.S. democracy and, above all, of what 'you can do for your country'. I share many points of view in way it is managed.

In my view, working in Public Affairs for the Department of State offers a wide range of professional and personal opportunities which one needs to seize and not to allow some of the administrative, management, ideological and hierarchical constraints to limit one's possibilities of what, in my experience, has been an extraordinarily interesting and varied job.

I worked for a French Embassy for about 3 years. When I compare the two systems, I prefer the American way of doing things: employees are given the trust and opportunity to perform their duties the best way they think it should be done.
I have worked for 27+ years with the Department of State, 22+ years in a supervisory position. I’m dealing with the public day-by-day representing the Department of State - I’m proud to be a member and know that my work and how I perform has a little influence on the overall Austrian/U.S. relations.

I feel that teamwork is a strong method of work it has been practiced within this organization over the years. Likewise, leadership shown by the current and former Officers has strongly created a sense of belonging to this organization as a family.

I feel a great gratitude for the US Embassy in Bogota. My work performance in these 31 years has been outstanding and I have been very lucky with the American Supervisors I have worked with.

This is the best organization.

Here are what I think to be key factors for good management: effective communication; continually seeking to improve work methods; showing interest in training subordinates and listening to them. Most managers I have worked with in the State Department have demonstrated these skills.

With U.S. supervisors I feel like I can give more than 100% of myself because they really support you- not only as a worker but also as a person. I work much better under U.S. supervision because I really feel like I’m working for the State Department. I always wanted to live to the U.S. so I'm glad I’m working at the Embassy- it's a must for me!

The job might be very challenging and stressful at times, but our good and positive work environment keeps me motivated and makes me want to try harder everyday and achieve higher goals for the mission. Having lived in the United States for 5 years, I have been able to accommodate to the mission's values pretty quickly. For me, serving
this mission, gives me a sense of belonging to this great nation and its culture that I really love, even if I am not a U.S. citizen! I think that's what makes America unique: diversity and equal opportunities for all!

I feel lucky and blessed to work for U.S. Embassy in my country. It was a dream since childhood to become an interpreter and work for an international organization, but never could I imagine that I would be more than just an interpreter, I have worked as assistant and now as coordinator. And not in a simple international organization but the U.S. EMBASSY! I am very proud of it and very thankful to those people who trusted me and chose me for a vacant position at the Embassy over 6 years ago.

It has been pleasure working for State. My supervisors both here and in Washington are professionals and very good people. I appreciate the attitude with which they treat subordinates: I never felt I was one.

I feel grateful for the chance to work with the American community. I don't spend a great deal of time with them but they are always gracious and thankful for my work.

I gave been working with the State Department as an FSN for more than 25 years. The fact that I am able to work so many years in an organization speaks volume about my workplace. I like two-way communication. We are able to solve an issue together and also agreed to disagree to keep the peace with our officers. Of course there are times I when I have met with difficult bosses but I tell myself they come and go, but I can stay as long as I am needed and I enjoy the working environment of office.

Responses such as these indicate that beyond the challenges and difficulties posed by employment as an FSN, there are many who still take a great deal of pride in their work and view the State Department in a favorable light. Such energy, however, could be threatened if the perceptions voiced in other responses become fully systemic. Cultural factors, such as the distribution of power, have been shown to have a
significant effect on commitment. Given the crucial role of FSN’s in realizing State Department goals, the need for more experiences such as these and structures to deal with the alienation and disempowerment experienced by others need to be more fully explored. Thus, the narrative responses to the open question suggest that the State Department is at a precipice with full engagement of the FSN population as one possibility and a dangerous shortage of people capable of fulfilling the organizational mission as the other.
Chapter 4

My failures are so much more numerous than my successes that I am beginning to wonder if full grokking will show that I am on the wrong track entirely — that this race must be split up, hating each other, fighting each other, constantly unhappy and at war even with their own individual selves...

In trying to create an enlightened and peaceful worldview to better humanity, Smith found many of his fellow humans less than receptive his ideas. For the United States to reach out to the world, it will need to create a dialogue that can only come from understanding the world. FSN’s can assist in that process of dialogue, however the results of this research may indicate that a cleavage between the institution and the locals who frequently serve it may represent a significant barrier in building that connection. From misunderstanding the cultural values of “the other” to creating an institution that (at least for some) prevents their full participation, understanding these results is crucial to understanding some fundamental challenges for the U.S. Foreign Service. Smith’s view was that such misunderstanding was often willful and contrived with impugnity, leading him to believe that the ability to relate was fleeting and hopeless. Ultimately, dialogue and communion opened the door for a new way of thinking. Similarly, for the State Department to reach out to the world, it must begin by discovering a new way of thinking- and learning how the old ways have contributed to the cultural cacophony that has hampered the institution. That can only happen by examining the profound differences in attitude this research has discovered.
4.1 Discussion of Results Relating to Hypothesis I

Validation of the initial hypothesis that power distance is positively correlated to organizational commitment has significant implications to both the State Department and to this research. However the result could be misleading and misread if not placed into a clear context. Specifically, a superficial reading would suggest that the State Department’s culture works fine in contexts where the FSN population accepts a high degree of power distance. This view would be shortsighted, however. The higher levels of commitment in a high power distance population could actually mask existing problems and invite substantial challenge if FSN’s are required to engage in more creative and self-directed work for future State Department outreach.

Peterson (2003) noted that a covert culture that operates independently from the existing institution is common in high power distance cultural settings. In the case of the State Department, the possibility of FSN’s “going rogue” and re-interpreting directives and policies (while ostensibly “being committed to leadership”) would have disastrous consequences for any sort of institutional coherence. With many American Officers lacking the cultural awareness, linguistic ability, and personal relationships to get a sense of what the FSN’s are thinking or doing outside the defined employment context (Asthana, 2006; Committee on Appropriations: U.S. House of Representatives, 2003; Holt, 2004), it is possible that such non-sanctioned decisions and attitudes could exist with virtual impunity with the American Officers unable to identify or diagnose this delineation. Alvez et al. (2006) validates this danger by showing that in a high power distance context, ‘the leader’ makes most overt decisions but ‘the followers’ routinely make covert decisions on their own. As one FSN states, “American Officers/managers at the post where I belong avoid off-the-job social contact with FSN’s” meaning that Officers may lack any real sense of the attitudes that FSN’s have beyond the public face they share in the work setting. Another noted that the management style and priorities of FSN’s working in a supervisory position could be dramatically different (and potentially detrimental) when compared to the style and priorities of an American Officer. The result is clear- although FSN’s oriented
towards high power distance may “fall in line” with many policies and express a
commitment to the organization, the secretive nature of those “without” compared to
those “within” in a high power distance context can have damaging effects for any
attempt at a unified or consistent organizational position. When leadership lacks the
tools and aptitude to “scratch beneath the surfaces” in such a situation, the danger
becomes even more pronounced.

Beyond concerns about the public/private dichotomy of subordinates with a high
power distance orientation, there are also concerns about the initiative of followers to
engage in self-directed leadership and creative organizational processes. Existing
priorities with which the State Department is tasked (VIP visits, consular tasks,
immigration and visas, trade rules, etc.) inherently require some creativity and
initiative, as existing U.S. policies may not match the situation on the ground in
specific countries (as one respondent stated, “a host country's labor laws and labor
culture, (may) differ greatly from that of the U.S.”). Additionally, the concept of U.S.
representation and public diplomacy (if intended to be effective) will require
substantial guidance and leadership on the part of FSN’s who know the local culture
far better than their American counterparts. As Miles (1975) argues, the tension
between those who “think” versus those who “do” will be problematic if FSN’s with a
high power distance orientation are expected to show initiative and create
programming. Concerns also exist about the perception of delegation as “weak
management” and a threat to the established “leader/follower” roles (Sagie &
Koslowsky, 2000). Sagie and Aycan’s argument (2003) that the culture of dependency
of subordinates to their superiors in high power distance contexts can stifle questions,
comments, suggestions, and initiatives emanating from those at the top of the
hierarchy. Kirkman et al. (2001) and Hoon Nam and Wie Han’s (2005) suggest that
serious confusion can result when subordinates in such a situation are required to
suddenly participate in decision-making and engage with management. Suggesting the
dangers of this relationship, one respondent states “FSN's often don't feel responsible
for anything nor do they have initiative.”
leadership, the need for responsibility and initiative become paramount. In FSN’s oriented to high power distance who correspondingly show higher levels of commitment, this research would suggest that empowerment could be problematic and the self-identified commitment offered by the FSN’s could be misinterpreted by a management structure that is not fully engaged.

Although this research has suggested a positive correlation between high power distance and commitment to the State Department, this correlation should not be viewed as fixed or certain in a context in which expectations of a “leader” in a high power distance context are not fully embraced by some American Officers. As Aycan et al. (2000) argue, a leader or supervisor is expected to give guidance, protection, nurturance, and care to the employees, while subordinates are expected to give trust, loyalty, deference, and appreciation. Respondents indicating that American Officers can be a source of hostility, humiliation, and threats coupled with concern about basic job elements such as compensation and benefits demonstrate that the institution may not meet the expectation of “protection” and “care”. Statements from respondents such as “no American Officer cares what happens after his 3 year tour” and “many times when a new officer is assigned at post, all the work done by his/her predecessor was wrong and everything starts over again every two or three years” suggest that the guidance from management can lack consistency and clarity. Cumulatively, the danger is that FSN’s oriented towards a high power distance may feel that the management, although hierarchical, has not embraced its role as “provider” that is expected in stratified cultural settings. Thus, the visible face of commitment may hide a covert and undetected culture that undermines or rebels against the goals of the organization (Peterson, 2003).

While the dangers of misinterpreting the higher levels of commitment from those oriented to high power distance are serious, perhaps a greater danger exists in the finding that FSN’s favoring low power distance correspondingly have lower levels of commitment. In many cases, these FSN’s may feel stifled by a State Department
culture that doesn’t allow them to demonstrate their skills or contribute to decisions made about projects. A low power orientation suggests a perception that everyone should be part of the decision making process, with an emphasis on equality and interdependence between leader and subordinate (Sagie and Aycan, 2003). Respondents making statements such as “I don't think any of my views/opinions matter or are considered,” “we are not part of the decision-making process,” and “my views are ignored” indicate a tension that exists in the hierarchical structure of the institution. With many FSN’s taking pride in their knowledge, experience, and credentials, failure to empower such individuals to participate fully in the organization suggests a possible explanation for the reduction in commitment and retention.

Beyond participation in decision-making, the sharing of information is also an expectation of a person with a low power distance orientation. Drawing on Hartzing’s (1999) work, a low power distance typically corresponds to a freer flow of information. Decisions are more transparent and communication is less obtuse. The need for an individual to be “in the loop” is stronger and the communication chain is more inclusive. In the case of the State Department, however, it seems that many feel shut out from the process. A possible defense on the part of the State Department might be that the need for secrecy and separation in information flow is based on security and confidentiality reasons. However, previous investigations into the Department’s modus operandi of information policing instead of information sharing suggests that the motivations are, at best, antiquated (Cold War relics) or, at worst, an attempt to hold onto power through controlling the flow of communication rather than opening up dialogue (Council on Foreign Relations, 2001). It should also be noted that FSN’s have shown understanding and appreciation for the need for some aspects of communication to be controlled for security reasons (sample statements from some FSN’s include “we can't discuss much out of the office about the organization due to operational security reasons” and “we are not encouraged to discuss too much about this organization and our job with people outside due to security concerns”). FSN’s not only respect this control- they are expected to engage in it, as well. One could
argue that it is possible for an organization to communicate transparently without overexposing what clearly needs to be private, secure, or confidential (private sector companies navigate this issue all the time). More dangerously, the act of withholding information affords the informed with “the power of privilege.” For those oriented to low power distance, who expect to be legitimate and contributing members of an organization, the act of not sharing communication can alienate the individual from the institution (De Jong, et al. 2006).

The issue of organizational justice and some concerns raised by FSN’s also points to some of the reasons why those with a low power distance may be less inclined to fully commit to the organization. Distributive justice (a belief in fair outcomes based on action) was found to be emphasized in many lower power distance cultures (Lam et al., 2002). The idea that the actions of the individual ought to be positively connected to that individual’s outcome is another area in which respondents suggest there are shortcomings in the State Department structure. The concerns consistently voiced about salary inadequacy, the lack of performance incentives, the inability to advance regardless of work quality, and the perception that American Officers actions are not effectively checked by the institution (one respondent writes “there is no "punishment" for being a bad Foreign Service Officer”), suggests a belief that there is no strong relationship between action and outcome in the State Department. For those less rooted in hierarchy, this gap makes full organizational investment unrealizable as the connection between “what I do” and “what I get” is a foundational element to a low power distance view of the world (Lam et al., 2002).

Individuals with a low power distance orientation may tolerate hierarchical systems, but this tolerance doesn’t necessarily indicate organizational investment (Robert and Prost, 2000; Page and Wiseman, 1993). A number of responses indicate dissatisfaction with the lack of respect, autonomy, and power they feel in the organization and, perhaps not surprisingly, a suggestion that their employment duration will not be extended (e.g. “when I leave, it will not be from lack of loyalty,
but because at some point, the work has been accomplished and it is time to move on,”
“no one should spend his or her whole career only in this organization,” and “I still
wouldn’t recommend to anyone new staying here for more than 3-4 years”). This
could be part of the general discomfort found in low power distance orientations with
an organization based on hierarchy and status (Hofstede, 1980; Singelis, et al. 1995;
Triandis, 1995). With the State Department clearly rooted in hierarchy and status
(Krizay, 1988), the disconnect between those who have different conceptions of power
can create the kinds of barriers that make organizational investment unlikely. All of
these results are remarkably consistent with Gouttefarde’s (1996) study of a mixed
power distance organization. As was the case there, the closed information channels,
the lack distributive justice, and the barriers created by those in the upper echelons all
combined to stifle communication and hinder effective organizational relationships.
As one FSN stated, “we feel like ‘neither fish nor fowl.’”

Neither of these challenges (recognizing the pratfalls of high power distance and
understanding the commitment gap of those with a low power distance orientation)
would necessarily be insurmountable. Two-way communication, respectful discussion
of roles, honest negotiation, and an understanding of cultural variables could all be
employed to build a mutually agreeable set of values and policies that the entire team
buys into. Unfortunately, the suggestions of respondents and the existing literature all
point to substantial weaknesses in the State Department that may preclude the full
embrace of any or all of these solutions. Statements such as “Americans don't really
associate much with FSN’s, and we have also learned to keep our distance,” “I have
come to dislike the ‘them’ and ‘us’ attitude that exists,” and “over the years, I have
found that the American officers have become increasingly distant in their interaction
with FSN’s” suggest that the communication gap will make the dialogue necessary for
cultural understanding difficult in many cases. Fernandez, et al. (1997) suggest that
inadequate awareness of international variations in cultural systems, including values,
can exacerbate expatriate failure. When there are barriers to effective cultural
communication in many State Department personnel (Committee on Appropriations:
U.S. House of Representatives, 2003; Holt, 2004), the chance to discuss the nature of the supervisory relationship and power structure of the organization in the context of local culture can be lost. As there is a friction between local practices and standardized institutional policy (Poutsma et al. 2006), many potentially competing and contradictory policies must be explained by both supervisors and subordinates making mastery of change management more challenging (Friedman, 2007). Shipper et al. (2003) argue that empowerment, discussion, shared ownership of policy, and mutual feedback are all part of a low power distance context. In high power distance contexts, managers should be more adept at giving directives and keeping employees in line with organizational policy. Finding the nuance necessary to understand the intersection between culture and work relationship requires consistent and authentic engagement. In cases where this engagement and dialogue is not present, it can be expected that there will be significant challenges. In the case of power distance, uninformed managers might give orders in a way that suggests self-importance to an audience that wants openness. Similarly, in another situation, the same manager might delegate important tasks in a way that is seen inappropriate in a high power distance context. The result of all these areas could compromise organizational effectiveness and the commitment level of the team members. Without consistent, two-way communication, these results (while unfortunate) should not be unexpected.

In summation, the results related to the first hypothesis show that those more inclined towards hierarchy are also more inclined to be committed to the hierarchical institution of the State Department. This result indicates that the challenges posed by a high power distance orientation may be masked or ignored without active dialogue and follow-up. These results also suggest that a decreased commitment from those oriented to a low power distance may be cause for concern. Narrative comments from participants show that in some cases, the dialogue necessary to overcome both sets of challenges may not be taking place. Coupled with the lack of cultural background by some Officers, validation of this hypothesis suggests potential cultural/structural areas of concern for the Department.
4.2 Discussion of Results Relating to Research Question 1

The results showed remarkable consistency between the various types of commitment included in the survey. Porter et al. (1974) identified commitment types including the want to continue membership within an organization, acceptance of and belief in the values of an organization, and the willingness to invest effort and energy into an organization. The included items from Meyer and Allen (1984) investigate commitment in terms of “affective commitment” (positive feelings, identification, attachment, etc.), “continuance commitment” (the extent to which the cost of leaving an organization keeps an individual in place in an organization), and “normative commitment” (the feeling of obligation to an organization). The results (as indicated in the previous chapter) are similar across commitment types and from both instruments.

The factor analysis shows that all but five of the results from commitment items could be bundled into a single group. The five items that produced unique results in comparison to the other items in the survey include:

- I am willing to put in a great deal of effort beyond that normally expected in order to help this organization be successful.
- I feel very little loyalty to this organization.
- I would accept almost any type of job assignment in order to keep working for this organization.
- It would take very little change in my present circumstances to cause me to leave.
- I enjoy discussing my organization with people outside it.

The analysis on these items does not change the fact that commitment was largely a discrete category for FSN’s. Even in these cases, there are external factors that
provide compelling explanation for these items. On the “effort beyond expectation” item, compelling evidence seems to suggest that many FSN’s really want the institution to succeed. Recalling Sardar and Davies’ (2002) work, if Anti-Americanism is truly so widespread, the decision to work for the American Government could represent a decision antithetical to the values and mores of a local culture. Combining this with the repeated concerns about the State Department being unable to match salary increases in other positions in a host country, it would seem that deciding to work at a U.S. Embassy or Consulate could be connected to some sort of deeper want to support American efforts in a country or region. The intensity of willingness to go beyond what is expected is identified in the chart below (see results section for a more detailed statistical analysis):

![Effort beyond expectation chart]

Despite factors limiting commitment and concerns about short FSN employment tenure, it would seem that engaging in activities that support U.S. interests (even those beyond expectation) is within the scope of what FSN’s are willing to do. This item
could give some pause, as it shows that the motivation and potential of the FSN workforce may, in its latent form, be stronger than the State Department currently supports.

The “accept any job type” item could also be a result of some of the unique elements of State Department structure. Unlike a company where the focus is typically on a unified set of products or services with items like security, record keeping, or healthcare outsourced to external contractors, an embassy (for example) provides all of those services internally. It could be expected that a person working in public diplomacy would not accept a job in motor vehicles services. A physician’s assistant in the healthcare center would be an unlikely candidate to deal with visas in the consular section. A security coordinator would likely be uncomfortable working with the translation group. While speculative, it could well be the diversity of jobs in an embassy inhibited respondents from suggesting they would accept “almost any job” to stay employed by the State Department.

The “enjoy discussing organization with outsiders” question could be misinterpreted, as the State Department expressly requires employees NOT to discuss the specific goings on of the organization with outsiders (as noted by responses to the open-ended question). Commitment is obviously less of a measure in this case as the lack of external contact about the State Department may actually point to a higher level of commitment rather than a lower level (as suggested by the survey). If interpreted differently, however, the question could be applied to the extent to which a person talks about her/his workplace (though obviously not security details or confidential information) with friends and family. It might also be seen differently by those working in public diplomacy and outreach where discussing the organization with outsiders is directly written into the job description. In which case commitment level may impact the results based on this interpretation. These differences are clearly reflected in the survey results (see results section for a more detailed statistical analysis), which tend to group around “neither agree nor disagree.” It appears likely
that in the context of the State Department, those working in different contexts will likely read this item differently.

Both the “very little loyalty” and “very little change to cause me to leave” items are “reverse scale” items in which the phrasing is negated. The reader is required to affirm an item they disagree with to indicate their disagreement. With a large population of non-native speakers of English, such a process could have potentially been confusing (with perhaps even native speakers of English not immediately comprehending “It would take very little change in my present circumstances to cause me to leave” at first glance!). Previous research has indicated reliability problems with the reversed scale items in the commitment survey (Cohen, 2003). Curiously, Principle Component Analysis placed seven other reverse scale items in the same factor bundle.
Ultimately, none of these factor results adequately justify excluding any of these items from the survey nor do they undermine the articulated result that commitment types were not reported as distinct by this study. Given the size, diversity, and consistency of the research population, this result is quite interesting. It indicates that commitment, despite the variety of forms of commitment, may be more uniformly understood and enacted than the literature would suggest.

4.3 Discussion of Results Relating to Hypothesis II

Those with an orientation to high power distance tended to have employment tenures consistent with their low power distance colleagues. Keeping in mind the work of Sagie and Aycan (2003), a high power distance view of hierarchy tends to see power as a protective (rather than coercive) force with connotations of paternal “protection of the family” ascribed to the powerful. It could be that salary concerns, divisive attitudes, and a lack of appreciation may point to a structure in the State Department that embraces the hierarchical aspects of high power distance while failing to fully realize the protective/providing functions expected of those with power. Thus, the very concept of commitment in a high power distance culture may be illusory- “I cede power and offer commitment to you so long as it protects and provides for me.” In low power distance cultures (e.g. the “West”), a commitment takes on the character of law suggesting that a fully informed and autonomous agent has made a public decision that s/he (by her/his acceptance) is bound by (Fang, 1999). As Peterson (2003) suggests, high power distance cultures may have a covert structure where grievances about those in power remain equally sharp but the presence of these grievances is masked by the face of overt, public commitment. This result indicates that although those with high power distance orientation may indicate a higher level of commitment to a hierarchical organization (i.e. the State Department), there may be grievances that compromise this; with respondents stating that “there is no efficient system that would protect an FSN or control an American Officer,” “the ‘kiss up and kick down’ culture (of the State Department towards FSN’s) just doesn't work,” and “the Department of
State has no feeling in dealing with FSNs and the main policy is ‘WE DO NOT CARE.’” While employment duration cannot be seen as the full measure of commitment, we should expect that a committed employee would remain on the job longer. That is not the case here, further validating the point that the State Department should proceed cautiously in high power distance cultures that express a high level of adherence and investment in the organization; it could well be that this commitment (on the part of such FSN’s) is illusory, especially when the actions of State could be seen as a violation of the “leader/follower” arrangement endorsed in that cultural setting. Especially dangerous would be for Officers to wrongly assume that oppressive, autocratic power (without nurturance and protection) works in high power distance cultures (Aycan et al., 2000). Future research should also investigate the extent to which commitment in high power distance cultures refers to a commitment to power generally, rather than a commitment to those with power specifically.

Beyond the results related to this hypothesis, it is important to note that 57.3% of the total study population had tenure of employment of 0-3 years. While the population of new employees may have had (for whatever reason) greater inclination to complete this survey, this percentage is essentially consistent with overall State Department attrition rate of 38%. By comparison, the turnover rate for the U.S. job market is 23.4%, with an overall rate of 8.2% for government positions (Bureau of Labor Statistics, 2006). There are other factors that could explain elements of the disparity (recategorization of positions to new departments, ad hoc/temporary projects, etc.), but considering all firms and organizations face these elements the attrition rate is still relatively high in comparison to the U.S. Government and economy overall. The findings of this study show that a significant number of FSN’s have not been and do not expect an extended duration of employment in the State Department. This is echoed in their narrative responses, including “once you are in, you realize that there really isn't much room for growth,” “there are very limited opportunities for the career development,” “The nature of FSN employment is such that long-term career opportunities are not readily available,” “the upward mobility is also very much
limited which is also a great dissatisfaction factor,” “retention will continue to be a
problem at this post and other posts like it if something is not done to make it more
attractive to stay,” and “I still wouldn't recommend to anyone new staying here for
more than 3-4 years.” These attitudes would suggest the stratification of State
Department power and decision-making make the organization unattractive for long-
term employment for many FSN’s.

Regardless of motivation, the short duration of employment of many FSN’s creates
operational, relational, and cultural barriers to many elements of State Department
success. Operationally, the replacement of employees is costly and fosters
inefficiency. For example, the training and orientation time alone for a new employee
has been estimated at 153 hours (Ehrenberg R.T. and Smith, E.G. 2003). More
importantly, the service level and communication quality that comes from frequent
employee turnover can create serious setbacks for an organization (Hinkin T.R. and
Tracey J.B., 2000). For an organization that overtly expresses a mission of improving
the American image abroad and providing excellent service, such discontinuity could
prove disastrous in presenting a coherent message and managing the specific details
associated with the work of a post. The issue of cost cannot be overlooked as when an
FSN leaves; s/he takes the skills and knowledge acquired in her/his time in the State
Department. This knowledge was developed at great time and expense. Employment
modeling has indicated that replacing an employee (in the private sector) can cost
more than three times the employee's annual salary (Del Monte, 2009). Clearly, if an
employee engages in ethical misconduct, lacks relevant skills, or has a job that no
longer serves an organizational function, change is necessary. But the frequency and
extent of State Department turnover suggests greater systemic problems. With a
ballooning budget deficit coupled with a new President who expects engagement to be
a priority of the Department (January 22, 2009 transcript of Obama’s address to State
Department employees), the need for efficiency and cost-effectiveness should be a
paramount concern. Longer tenured FSN’s are more likely to grasp the policies and
programs of the post. Their institutional memory can be informative when new
initiatives emerge. There is a greater understanding of the formal and informal policies and procedures of the host country in terms of their relation to State Department policies. In sum, the State Department requires FSN’s who are capable and experienced. Policy initiatives and diplomatic posts’ operation would benefit from longer and more sustained commitment from FSN’s. This research suggests that the State Department may be at a disadvantage.

While the operational implications of higher turnover are important, there are relational aspects that should be considered, as well. There are a number of instances where the relationships built by FSN’s could be damaged with frequent turnover. As employment law differs from country to country, it is critical that FSN’s in a supervisory position have connections to the host countries labor bodies, the fluctuating employment rules, and the implications these might have on how jobs are constructed by the State Department. As cases requiring consular action can extend over many months, change of employees could compromise the decision-making process. Visits from officials and representatives from the U.S. require coordination of security, press, venues, etc. and the connections FSN’s have with institutions working in these areas are damaged if there are frequently new employees. Perhaps most damaging is the fact that public diplomacy depends on the quality of relationships the local population and institutions (i.e. businesses, schools, universities, etc.) and those relationships risk non-sustainability when there are frequently new FSN voices initiating contact. If building bridges is one of the State Department’s goals, those bridges are at risk when turnover doesn’t allow sustained engagement.

This is particularly dangerous in cultures valuing continuity of contact. Hofstede’s work notes that the meaning of a relationship is often different in more collectively oriented culture. Continuity, trust, mutuality, shared values, and tradition are often emphasized in more collective cultures. Business decisions that the West may view as merely transactional take on a relational character (Hofstede, 1980). In such contexts, the contact base of an FSN is in many ways the relationship base of the State
Department in that country (as American Officers rotate frequently and lack the skills for communicating locally). A disruption of such relationships with a new staff member tasked with maintaining organizational outreach and connection could create an initial period of uncertainty on the part of external contacts with another extended period of relationship re-building. Additional disruption could severely damage the institution’s reputation, as consistency, loyalty, and certainty are perceived as compromised in cultures valuing long-term collaborations and connections. Clearly, the turnover rate of the State Department is cause for concern if the Department expects to effectively carry out an agenda.

An interesting result was uncovered in analysis of the data related to “frequency of contact with Americans” and “commitment level” that could point to a basis for remediating many of the above items related to long-term commitment. Specifically, the finding that “frequency of contact with American Officers” was positively correlated to organizational commitment. While this would initially seem to be in conflict with the narrative responses that indicate concern about perceived disengagement on the part of American Officers, it would appear that the opposite is true. When Americans communicate frequently with FSN’s, it seems to mitigate the concerns that inhibit organizational commitment. That is to say, when dialogue is the basis of a work assignment, the level of commitment on the part of the FSN is higher. Commitment encompasses a wide range of topics including loyalty, job focus, personal meaning of work, emotional connection, and mutuality of outcome (Porter et al., 1974; Meyer and Allen, 1991). When a position involves frequent contact with Officers, it can be assumed that this contact will include discussion of organizational goals, challenges, policies, and procedures. Thus, the work of an FSN in this context is more directly linked to the larger organizational mission. The frequency of communication between FSN’s and officers was identified as problem for many of the respondents (“sometimes lack of communication is a real barrier between supervisors and subordinates,” “there is no effort to socialize and socially a lack of acknowledgment on a daily basis starting from the basic response to a ‘Good
morning,” “there should be more (combined) training opportunities both for FSNs and Supervisors”). In this context, the relationship of the contact frequency measure to organizational commitment should not be so surprising.

4.4 Discussion of Results Relating to Hypothesis III

The need for consideration of items related to employment tenure become substantially more important when considering the results related to this item. In the State Department, commitment was negatively correlated to length of employment. Basically, the longer you work for the State Department as an FSN, the less committed you are. In an ideal organization, employment commitment should increase with employment duration. A wealth of literature suggests employment duration should be positively correlated to commitment (Mowday et al., 1982; Mathieu and Zajac, 1990). Moreover, this commitment should supercede potential problems the employee has with the organization and the work itself (Mueller et al. 1992). That is to say, the commitment that should come with employment duration is stronger than the problems that inevitably come up in a job. The more alarming prospect for the State Department is that disengaged employees remaining on a job are more inclined to engage in the “progressive withdrawal process” (Mobley, 1977; Moble, Griffeth, Hand, and Meglino, 1979). In this process, declining attitudes towards a job typically precede temporary withdrawal (i.e. absenteeism, extending inadequate or merely adequate effort, etc.). These often foreshadow permanent withdrawal (i.e. quitting; see previous results discussion). In the case of an employee who remains in the position, the result can be the continuance in a position with limited energy being expended into to performance. The narrative examples related to this item can offer a near perfect manifestation of such a process with responses including “I work for the Embassy for 31 years I am 53 years old and although I tried very hard to change this mentality around I have finally become cynical and I just do my job the best way I can” and “Despite the fact that I am very willing to put in a great deal of effort beyond normally expected to make this organization more successful, there is no motivation.”
Such employees may, perhaps, pose an even greater danger to the accomplishment of organizational goals than employees who quit early on in their tenure. Such unmotivated employees can infect the workplace with cynicism and decrease the motivation of their colleagues. In some instances, disengaged employees remaining with an organization can create a “shadow institution” that actively undermines the overall goals and priorities of the whole. Some of the first significant research on shadow organizations was done by Allen and Pilnik (1973). In describing the possible negative outcomes of shadow organizations, they state:

What lies beneath is another organization, frequently invisible to outsiders, rarely committed to writing, but usually more powerful than the first. Of what does it consist? It consists of the informal day-to-day behavior carried on in the name of tradition, habit, and expectation; it consists of what people actually do rather than what they say... As such, (shadow organizations) often subvert rather than support an organization’s priorities. Whatever the company does is likely to be less successful than it might otherwise be. (p. 3)

The negative manifestation of these “shadow institutions” typically comes from long-time employees who have, through experience and attitude, developed a number of negative norms that spread through the organization as a whole. Working on an extended research project that lasted over ten years, Allen and Pilnik utilized analysis of workplace discourse at over 100 companies. Some of the emerging narratives of negative shadow organizations show startling similarity to many of the negative responses articulated in the narrative portion of this study. Some examples from their work include:

- **Norms of autonomy and empowerment.** These include the development of an “us/them” mentality concerning management and leadership. (“They are always trying to take advantage of us around here”).

- **Norms of performance.** These represent acceptance of a “good enough” standard of achievement. (“There’s no point in trying around here… mediocre results are satisfactory”).
- **Norms of leadership and supervision.** These norms tend to be negative for the organization when managers view policing and supervision as their role rather than development and empowerment. (“Managers tend to overlook their training… it’s best to hide your problems and avoid your supervisor”)

- **Norms of employee relations.** When employees view their goals as separate or antithetical to the goals of the organization, the outcome tends to negatively impact organizational effectiveness. (“Our organization doesn’t care about the welfare of its associates… many of us are treated merely as an extra pair of hands.”)

- **Norms of innovation and change.** These encompass an overarching rejection of change and a suspicion for new ideas. (“Around here, we hang onto to old ideas long after they have outlived their usefulness… you better not have an idea your boss didn’t come up with first.”)

FSN’s (especially long serving ones) are viewed by the State Department itself as being the “glue” and “institutional memory” of the organization. In many ways, with frequent American Officer rotation, the long serving FSN is empowered to shape the organizational culture of a post in ways that an officer on a temporary assignment cannot. In terms of their influence in a “shadow institution” of other FSN’s, they have both the credibility of seniority and the status of being a part of the host culture. Thus, their attitude will shape the attitudes of those around them in ways that may or may not be detected during an American’s time at a post (especially true considering the difficulties Americans may face in understanding the local language and culture).

Based on the results of this study, the decline in commitment correlated to employment duration coupled with many responses that echo those identified in Allen and Pilnik’s (1973) work suggest another potential barrier for organizational effectiveness in the State Department. The decline of commitment over time by some FSN’s could lead to an overall decline in commitment for FSN’s as a whole.
This also suggests that FSN’s may not have fully realized their own role in the “us/them” paradigm many have observed on the part of American Officers. If senior FSN’s with declining engagement suggest that the institution favors an “us/them” mentality (as previous research would suggest), the result could be that other FSN’s accept the validity of this view. Basic principles of perception accentuation and self-fulfilling prophecies would then make it likely that the suggestion of the division between Americans and local staff make the reality of that division more likely. This is not to suggest that the cultural aptitude or work attitudes of American Officers is optimal; both the research on State Department cultural ability and numerous items presented by the FSN’s themselves beg otherwise. However, when employees become disengaged during long-term employment and their attitudes about the institution are shared, the possibility of meaningful and productive dialogue and mutual work between FSN’s and Americans becomes more remote.

4.5 Discussion of Results Relating to Hypothesis IV

The intersection of multiple cultures typically functions dialectically. There are syntheses and transformations that occur via contact with the “other” (Carbaugh, 1990). With the frequency of contact that occurs between non-Americans and Americans within U.S. posts, it would be expected that there would be some cultural shifts that occur on both sides (Kim, 1988). In the case of the State Department, however, it appears that exposure to contact with Americans has no significant relationship on the perception of power on the part FSN’s. It could be attributed to the idea that the cultural values of FSN’s are so set, that contact with Americans will not be sufficient to shift their values. This view, however, the fact that virtually all intercultural contact moderates the views of both sides. One might also suggest that the values of State Department Officers are so wildly disparate, that a consistent and singular influence never reaches FSN’s at an American Post. Yet, it would be expected that there should be at least some level of uniformity of values and attitudes for a population (American Officers) who received the same kinds of training, selected
the same sort of career, and operated in the same fixed structure. While speculative, elements of both presumptions lack a satisfying explanation for the following question. This result begs- why are FSN’s so uninfluenced culturally (at least in terms of power) by their American counterparts? Why, when contact with Americans correlates to commitment, would we not see stronger results on this item?

The answer could be (at least according to several narrative responses) that the interaction lacks the sort of cultural engagement that creates the chance for reflection about one’s cultural values. Statements that point to this include “communication, understanding and mutual benefit are keys to building the bridges and I hope that management becomes more aware of this,” “lack of communication is a real barrier,” “this is we and this is you, we're not the same,” and “American officers have become increasingly distant.” The suggestion here is that work communication lacks the sort of personal quality that is a part of most significantly influential relationships (DeVito, 2009).

Some might suggest that this is not only acceptable, it is appropriate. After all, encouraging the FSN’s at a post to adopt a different value set smacks of the sort of imperialism the U.S. is regularly saddled with. Yet there are still questions about the lack of cultural influence that may point potential problems the U.S. has reaching populations abroad. If U.S. embassies and consulates are supposed to be run in the same style and to the same standard as Stateside offices (U.S. Department of State: Careers Representing America, 2007), it would follow that a complete orientation to American standards and values must (or at least should) be occurring. This result would suggest FSN’s face problems orienting to American values, because such orientation inevitably should lead to the sort of dialogue and reflection that shapes values in some way. In this case, however, it appears that the values people have towards institutional power are unaffected by the powerful institution (the State Department) they work for. In cases of public diplomacy and representing American values to the community, this may point to other problems (Committee on
Appropriations: U.S. House of Representatives, 2003). If the people working directly with the Americans fail to have their values influenced by this contact, how likely is it that external communities will reconsider their perceptions of America? Again, this research is not suggesting this as the only explanation for this phenomena (the lack of cultural influence that comes with frequent contact with Americans), nor should the State Department be challenging officers to go out and “proselytize foreigners” to accept American values. Rather, this is merely a result that should give pause as the shift in values that typically comes through intercultural contact is not happening in this context. That alone is enough to reflect on why and seek out other areas of diplomatic and consular operations that may be further reflected in this tendency.

4.6 Discussion of Results Relating to Research Question II

The emerging narratives from the open question in the survey suggest a range of issues within the Department that demand additional reflection, discussion, and possible future research. These narratives appear closely linked to the concept of organizational justice; that is to say, the first four reflect concerns about an unresponsive, unfair institution that limits the ability and control on the part of FSN employees. Organizational justice refers to people’s subjective perceptions of fairness in organizations (Colquitt, et al., 2001). The perceptions of justice have strongly been linked to organizational commitment and job satisfaction, with many FSN concerns echoing the concerns of employees in organizations they perceive as unjust (Masterson, Goldman, & Taylor, 2000; Lam et al., 2002; Moorman, 1991). This commitment based on the perception of organizational justice was also strongly linked to turnover and intention to exit a job. Moorman, et al. (1993) indicated that perceptions of justice were significantly related to turnover intentions and the perception of harmony/conflict in the organization. Loi et al. (2009) identified the four types of justice most often indicated by the literature: distributive, procedural, interpersonal, and informational (Ambrose, Hess, & Ganesan, 2007; Colquitt, 2001).
As each narrative was seen in a broad cross-section of responses, it is important to reflect on each:

**The State Department as a structurally flawed organization**

The primary concerns about organizational structures included the frequency of Officer rotation, the lack of competitive compensation, and a structure that does not permit advancement for FSN’s beyond a certain level. The frequency of Officer rotation creates problems of consistency. A basis of organizational justice is consistency in the organization’s message, policies, and procedures (Colquitt, et al. 2001). Many respondents in this area noted that there is little incentive to invest in the job when a new Officer will likely re-do or radically alter any programs previously initiated. Thus, the feeling of having work valued over time is lost along with the sense of ownership in organizational outcomes, compromising the sense of meaning that employees expect in an organization perceived as just (Mossholder et al., 1998). Moreover, the feeling of appreciation and fairness in compensation could also be compromised with the need to prove one’s self again to a newly rotated supervisor (also noted by respondents). The concerns about compensation are crucial as Greenberg (1990) found this to be one of the most stable and overarching measurements of perceived organizational justice on the part of employees. With many respondents voicing concern about the fact that fair FSN salary adjustments may not be an institutional priority, the narrative of an organization that is inconsistent in its valuation of employees could prove counterproductive for long-term organizational commitment. In connection with salary concerns, the lack of advancement beyond a certain level or position also may serve as a disincentive for full organizational commitment (Loi et al., 2009). A strong belief among people participating in an organization perceived as just is that exemplary and effective work should lead to promotion, greater opportunities, more responsibility in the organization’s decision-making, etc. An organization that systemically and (virtually) categorically denies that opportunity for a substantial portion of its workforce faces serious challenges in
creating a climate that suggests fairness or provides sufficient incentive for significant employee commitment.

**Americans separate from FSN’s and lack culturally knowledge of the host country.**

This group of responses indicates a disconnect between American Officers and FSN’s, as well as a disconnect between American Officers and the culture of the host country. Colquitt et al. (2001) argue that interpersonal respect and sensitivity is important when organizational procedures are executed. They further note that informational justice, referring to the accuracy and quality of explanations individuals receive about organizational procedures, correlated to employment satisfaction and organizational commitment. As interpersonal communication requires mutuality and sharing between interdependent people (Devito, 2009), authentic dialogue has to allow an equality of voice and full recognition of the “other” as a respected part of the discourse. Lindblom (2001) argues that information sharing is part of the relational “principle of cooperation” where providing information (rather than hording or obfuscating information) is an interactional goal. With status often serving as a justification for the disconnect, the organizational tensions created by this power gap will only be compounded (Gouttefarde, 1996). With many respondents noting a lack of meaningful dialogue between FSN’s and American staff, the perception of being fully valued by the institution is compromised. This kind of disconnect is only exacerbated when there is a culture gap on the part of American Officers. As Hoon Nam and Wie Han’s (2005) and Helfrich’s (1999), work indicates, a lack of cultural understanding between an organization’s leaders and employees can create misunderstandings about what is fair and just in the organization’s members. In the case of the State Department, FSN’s must clearly accept that the values of the institution need to remain American. However, the consistent theme of responses was that there was a lack of understanding of the local culture on the part of the Americans. As noted, this can lead to confusion on the part of FSN’s in terms of policy and frustration for Americans
who feel that the local staff are ineffective or insubordinate. For an organization to be perceived as just by its employees, understanding and respect both need to be part of the interaction (Colquitt et al., 2001). The culture gap of Officers has been clearly shown in popular press investigations, academic research, government inquiry committees, and the FSN’s themselves. As noted, this gap continues to have negative implications for voicing the American viewpoint abroad, but it also has internal implications in terms of the perception of organizational justice. This set of responses, in turn, creates concerns about the magnitude and duration FSN commitment to the organization.

**FSN’s deserve empowerment, but are denied or ignored**

FSN’s repeatedly indicated that their experience and knowledge of the local culture could benefit the work of the State Department. Unfortunately, many also felt that their role was largely subordinated and their expertise largely ignored by American Officers. This was also reflected in the responses that indicated a lack of training opportunities demonstrated a lack of interest in maximizing the capabilities of FSN employees. Franz’s (2004) analysis of workplace attitudes in Australia, Belgium, Brazil, Canada, France, Germany, Mexico, Spain, Taiwan, Thailand, United Kingdom, and United States identified a number of findings relevant to this set of responses including that higher organizational empowerment consistently resulted in a stronger perception of justice in an organization, regardless of what country that organization is operating in. While empowerment had a more direct effect on job satisfaction in more individualistic cultures, the perception of “empowerment as indication of a just and fair organization” appears to be universal. Considering the effects of organizational justice perceptions on commitment and long-term employment (Colquitt, et al., 2001), the perception of a lack of empowerment appears to point to substantial organizational challenges in terms of retention and job engagement. Crabtree (1998) furthers this point by suggesting that in cross-cultural organizations, empowerment is an essential part of effective communication. Furthermore, she notes (in contrast to the perception
of many in the State Department) that empowerment must be mutual and two-way; that is to say, it cannot feel as though power is a gift that comes from the powerful and those “with authority” should willingly seek ideas from the communities they are engaging with. For many FSN’s, it’s not just that structural barriers precluding advancement are the source of their dissatisfaction- it’s the fact that many compelling and locally relevant ideas have been ignored or never allowed to be presented in the first place.

Additionally, the value of training based on the perceptions of employees and the return for the organization is not in dispute. Baron and Armstrong (2007) established a rubric based on the positive outcomes training and learning opportunities produce for organizations, not the least of which should be the perception of value training offers to those who participate in it. By sending people to training, it suggests that their skill sets are important and their competence is such that they are capable of doing even more for the organization. The repeated suggestion that training is not available and/or fairly distributed could be interpreted as a perception that the State Department does not view the performance of FSN’s as being worth investment. What’s more, if a lack of training is hindering performance and performance evaluation is the basis for compensation/promotion, one might reasonably conclude that the system is unjust, furthering the perceived fairness gap that can erode FSN loyalty, commitment and focus.

**Damaging policies and personalities hurt the working environment**

The recurring themes in this area included a feeling that some American Officers not only put up barriers to FSN’s, there are some that actively engage in behavior that hurts morale, undermines the credibility of employees, and lacks the level of respect that is expected in a fair working environment within an institution that may overtly or covertly accept (perhaps even endorse) such behavior. When enough employees institutionalize these views, the expectation is that there will be a reduction in justice
perception and an overall reduction in commitment and effort to doing a job effectively. The type of communication identified fits with the theory of disconfirmation in negative communication relationships (Pearson, 1993; Galvin, et al., 2004). Disconfirmation negates, ignores, or minimizes the existence of “the other” in the communication process. Examples of this type of communication include ignoring the presence and expertise of others, avoiding contact, engaging in monologue style communication (rather than dialogue), giving orders instead of requests, engaging in meticulous evaluation of others, ignoring ideas presented by others, and focusing interactions towards the self instead of listening to the viewpoints of others. This type of communication is typically linked to discrimination and is often institutionalized (DeVito, 2009). The lack of institutional oversight on this issue and the belief that there is not a neutral and open location where such grievances can be aired is also a cause for concern in terms of justice perceptions. As one respondent stated, “those who know, don’t care and those who care, don’t act… so what’s the point?”

Beyond implications for FSN’s in the workplace, if such attitudes and behaviors are prevalent they call into question the efficacy of such Officers in presenting the views of the United States to an international audience. Take for example the respondent who felt that it was culturally inappropriate for a State Department official to use his nickname when speaking to him in public. Perhaps this official has an acute sense of the local culture and instantly utilizes that sense when dealing outside audiences in the host country. A more likely outcome, however, is that the same communication pattern of disconfirmation experienced by the FSN’s is still (at least partially) in place when dealing with the local culture. Consistently, the literature has suggested an arrogance and an ignorance that leads to ineffectiveness for State Department outreach. If the narrative of inappropriate attitudes and behaviors on the part of American Officers is accepted as valid (and the prevalence of this in the written responses seems to indicate that the issue should be considered), perhaps this needs to be reflected on when making an evaluation of the institution as a whole. A common adage in the world of client service suggests that a satisfied client typically only nets
one to two more additional satisfied clients, while a dissatisfied client typically yields
ten more dissatisfied clients. If the attitudes of a few officers (perhaps more) outlined
in this research are reflected in the public face presented by the Department, the idea
of State serving as a remedy to the misinformation and misunderstanding that is the
basis for much of the distrust of America could be unrealistic.

**The State Department provides a high degree of job satisfaction**

While the narratives of dissatisfaction demand attention, it is also important to note the
frequency of responses that indicated that the State Department provides a high degree
of job satisfaction. While some of these responses were glowing about the
organizational culture, the values of the U.S., and the institutional structure, many
seemed to be responding to concerns that they may have heard from colleagues. As an
elementary example, one states “I think that in organization supervision it is important to involve
subordinates in the decision making process. At the same time there are cases when
decisions should be made in authoritative manner.” Another follows by stating “I still
believe that basic decisions have to be made by (American Officers)” despite the
expertise of the local staff. This would suggest that the perceived lack of voice
expressed by many FSN’s should be reconsidered as both fair and necessary for
effective departmental action. Another example of this sort of rebuttal to the views of
many in the organization is that FSN’s should “not to allow some of the
administrative, management, ideological and hierarchical constraints to limit one's
possibilities” indicating that the complaints of others are not well founded. Still others
suggest that their particular area/department is the source of their happiness. These
responses appear to make a delineation between the quality of the State Department
generally and the quality of their area specifically. Others seem to indicate that in
comparison to the working conditions at local institutions, suggesting that the State
Department is superior and could serve as a benchmark that is needed for economic
progress. As one response states, “this organization rewards hard work and
innovation… it would be ideal if other workplaces in my country did the same.”
Another continues on this theme arguing that in terms of corruption in the country he
is from, the “strict control over the way money is spent (in the State Department)” has been enlightening. Relating to this theme, others expressed that American supervision is generally more transparent and reliable than the subterfuge engaged in by the local staff. This “State Department is good in comparison to X” theme is also found in the statement “I worked for a French embassy for about 3 years. When I compare the two systems, I prefer the American way of doing things: employees are given the trust and opportunity to perform their duties the best way they think it should be done.”

Another element of many of these responses was that their specific, personal experience with American Officers has been excellent. While certainly a positive indicator for their employment, the caveat in these responses is clearly that others have not had a similarly uniform series of good experiences with American Officers.

While it’s tempting to label all of these responses with the broad brush of “happy employees,” doing so ignores the impetus that justification was needed to explain their positive experiences. Basic theories of group interaction and cognitive dissonance hold that when an individual’s perception is different from the group’s perception, there is a need to rationalize this disconnect (Festinger, 1957; Cooper, 2007). In the case of these “positive” responses, a careful reading suggests that these FSN’s may NOT be arguing for the organizational justice of the State Department. They may merely be arguing that the State Department, a specific area, or supervisor is just in comparison to others. Moreover, such positions may point to a situation in which these individuals are the minority view, as minority viewpoints tend to require greater rationalization to achieve consonance (Read, et al., 1997). This is not to minimize the satisfaction these individuals have with their employment. Rather, it is merely to suggest that a possible level of defensiveness in these responses indicates that the negative narratives previously documented could have attained sufficient organizational traction to require those having positive experiences to justify those perceptions.
On the whole, the emerging narratives that come from the responses to the open question seem to indicate the perception of a lack of organizational justice in many areas. With justice perceptions linked to organizational commitment, the basis for many of the institutional problems FSN’s have in the State Department is clearly identified. It is important to note that several responses indicated that things in these areas have gotten worse. Qualifiers such as “in recent years,” “over the last eight years or so,” “in the past, things were different,” etc. seem to indicate a perception that a change in the attitude of the Department as a whole has been responsible for declining standards across a range of issues. Perhaps the Bush Administration set a unilateral tone for the Department to generally disregard the worth of non-Americans. Perhaps increased security measures served as a basis for increasing disengagement with local populations, including FSN’s. Perhaps the values of a new administration emphasizing multilateral partnerships will trickle down to increasing access and empowerment for FSN’s. Or perhaps the view that things were better in the past is simply a manifestation of the Historical Fallacy where previous events are selectively remembered as being better than they actually were. Answering these questions is beyond the scope of this research. Further research would do well to follow up on this study in the future to see if the perceptions of FSN’s have significantly changed over time. As the current responses represent the only opportunity available for analysis, the only inference possible at present is that there is a justice gap in terms of how the State Department is viewed as an institution.
Chapter 5

I do know that the slickest way to lie is to tell the right amount of truth at the right time — and then shut up.

As Smith discovered, the gap between human values and human behavior is often canyonous. Humans can proclaim justice while attempting to crush it; they can proclaim tolerance while seeking to destroy those who are different. If “humanity” can viewed as a proxy for what Heinlein saw in post-war America, the current attitudes of the world appear to mirror his dim view of the United States. In a world increasingly weary of an America that seems to engage in policies that undermine the values that it promotes, the work of U.S. foreign relations must consider the anger of a world that, like it or not, it must engage with. FSN’s are in the employ of the U.S. government, but they are also citizens of that world. Their feelings towards America as they relate to culture and world attitudes represent both a window to the world and a suggestion of the institutional strength of the State Department. As Smith ultimately found humans willing to embrace a new way of thinking, this research suggests that an important audience for American aspirations may be in the very FSN’s working for it. Unlike Stranger in a Strange Land, there may be no singular leader to change the world’s understanding of the United States. Change, if possible, will need to be won in the understanding and respect afforded to individuals—perhaps individuals like the FSN’s.


5.1 Overview of the Impacts of Research Results

While much of these results have been considered in terms of their organizational context, there is a broader context in terms of the effect on international relations. As this research has outlined the specific cultural reactions that individuals have to State Department employment, the general perceptions the world has towards the United States also should be examined in terms of relationship to culture. The findings in this chapter note that high power distance in a country is generally negatively correlated to perceptions of the United States. While apparently running counter to the results of this research, this chapter argues that the distinction points to a possibly serious miscalculation that overt support for U.S. institutions in high power distance cultures may mask serious misgivings. Through the prism of the State Department, consideration is given to the idea that a general misreading of what overt support means in relation to culture may be a source of ongoing missteps in overall U.S. foreign policy. Considering the extent of many of the negative stereotypes the world has towards the United States, the origin of FSN dissatisfaction with the State Department is also considered. Do negative stereotypes frame FSN dissatisfaction or do negative behaviors match existing stereotypes? While a fully salient answer is probably unattainable, what is clear is the damage that this dissatisfaction can do on world perception of the United States. With FSN’s in a unique position to speak either for or against the United States in their home communities, the public diplomacy role of FSN’s is reflected upon. Given the extent to which FSN dissatisfaction appeared to be correlated with objections to the Bush administration, consideration is given to evaluating the extent to which “Obamamania” may positively shape the institution. For a number of institutional and political reasons, this analysis suggests that meaningful change both in the world and the State Department created by the new administration will be either fleeting or nominal in scope. Thus, the foundation of change in world attitudes towards the U.S. is best realized by meaningful and ethical utilization of resources such as Foreign Service Nationals.
5.2 Anti-Americanism, Culture, and Power Distance

Research into the phenomena of Anti-Americanism is far-reaching and varied. For purposes of focus and clarity, this portion of the research will focus on examining recent literature that suggests Anti-American attitudes that could be informed by the results of this study. As Sardar and Davies (2002) argue, the resentment held by the world towards the United States is salient in most populations. Noting how widely held this attitude is, Katzenstien and Keohane (2006) summarize the world’s position by stating:

When its Belgrade embassy is bombed, Chinese people believe it was a deliberate act of the United States government; terror plots by native British subjects are viewed as reflecting British support for American policy; when AIDS devastates much of Africa, the United States is faulted for not doing enough to stop it (p. 25).

While unsurprisingly more intense in some locations, the attitude that the policies of the United States are not good for the world is held in places that would seem to be pro-American or at least benign to U.S. interests. Many Middle Eastern populations find the U.S. to be untrustworthy as expressions of support for democratic reforms are seemingly contradicted by policies that include tolerance for autocratic regimes in the region (Peterson, 2002). Of course, Muslims do not live only in Arab nations: the majority of the world's Muslims, diverse in religious and social attitudes, is spread around the globe, with heavy concentrations in Central, South, and Southeast Asia. As Peterson (2002) notes, their views of America have a different mix of pros and cons, as do attitudes in Western Europe, Latin America, East Asia, and elsewhere. Concerns regarding trade law, subsidized agriculture, environmental standards, and the perception of a unilateral superpower contribute to a disparaging worldview for many. Even the tone of “stalwart” allies has grown increasingly acrimonious, with many European populations and governments openly suggesting that the U.S. is not only inappropriately using its power, but it is doing so in a way that invites dangerous outcomes for the world. The promise of independence from U.S. influence was a
primary voter motivation on the part of the electorate in 2009 parliamentary elections in Japan (The Economist, Sept. 5, 2009). Given the vital role of such partners in international cooperation on issues such as the global economic decline, the prevention of terrorism, and the creation of a climate favorable for improved environmental policies, this rift has profound implications (Peterson, 2002). Scholarship in this area suggests that the opportunity to improve this climate is unlikely to come about so long as globalization is seen as a soft-pedaled attempt at Americanization (Katzenstein & Keohane 2006).

While the literature suggests a widely varying historical basis for Anti-Americanism, contemporary analysis of these attitudes suggests an emerging manifestation of this attitude composed of the following elements: the discussion of America in terms of crude stereotypes; the causal attribution of malign intent and implausible (sometimes conspiratorial) omnipotence to the U.S. government; and the desire to narrow one’s own society’s contact with corrupting American influence (Cox, 2008). While there are certainly zealots who literally see the United States as an instrument of some sort of supernatural evil, Cox suggests that, in the main, Anti-Americanism operates from a quasi-rational (if circular) set of logical principles. Moreover, these attitudes should not be misconstrued as authentic criticism of U.S. policy. Instead, the rejection of policies emerging from the U.S. is not discussed on its own terms, but, rather, as an indication of a deeper and more profound cultural, intellectual, attitudinal, ethical, and spiritual poverty that has infected (perhaps chronically?) American society. The crude stereotypes ascribed to Americans include items such as cultural illiteracy, laziness, a lack of foresight/planning, willful ignorance, dishonesty, selfishness, arrogance, self-indulgence, hypocrisy, inattentiveness, and an unwillingness or inability to engage in dialogue with those outside of its borders (Peterson, 2002). Furthering this typology of Anti-Americanism, Katzenstein and Keohane’s 2007 book Anti-Americanisms in World Politics suggest that these stereotypes are manifested in global politics via one or more foundational worldviews including liberal objections (the U.S. does not live up to its ideals); social objections (lack of social welfare, the death penalty,
unilateralist policies, spotty adherence to international treaties); sovereign nationalist objections (desire to reinforce sovereignty and power of one's state); and radical anti-Americanisms (calls for the destruction or transformation of U.S. institutions). Thus, the cultural perception of Americans as “ignorant” or “selfish” becomes political “liberal objection” as the U.S. is cast as a country that willfully or stupidly ignores the human rights violations that its policies foster while continuing to proclaim the mantra of “Land of the Free.” Indeed, the case can clearly be made that objections to the United States in terms of base stereotypes cannot be separated from political implications in which the U.S. is viewed as an unreliable or unworthy political partner (Arnoff, 2008). As Katzenstein and Keohane (2006) note, Anti-Americanism is more than simply opposition to what the United States does, but extends to opposition to what the United States is.

It should be noted that despite the virulence of rhetoric expressed against the United States, the interest and appreciation that many have towards American culture cannot be separated from this animosity. As Diven (2007) recalls at a protest in the Philippines, one protester carried a sign stating ‘Yankee Go Home—and Take Me with You!’ This perhaps exemplifies the ambivalent attitudes of some critics of the United States. It is this attitude, of simultaneous aversion and attraction that could best characterize the attitude that much of the world has towards the United States. One could vocally criticize foundational aspects of American culture while, at the same time, pine for a Harley Davidson or Harvard professorship (or both). This could represent a unique space of personal political worldview. If someone finds a region or country repugnant, it is almost certain that avoidance will be part of that attitude (Storti, 2002). Yet in the case of Anti-Americanism, fascination and consumption appear to exist in parallel and not exclusive to animosity and hatred. This is central to Katzenstein and Keohane’s (2006; 2007) thesis that the polyvalence of American culture and policy is the foundation for world resentment. They offer numerous examples of the polyvalence of United States. Clerics in the Middle East decry the lack of morality in a sexual explicit and hedonistic culture, while the United States has
the most robust church attendance of any industrialized country. Liberals criticize the U.S. for a repressive society, while the U.S. leads much of the world in policies favoring women’s emancipation and gay rights. Human rights advocates decry U.S. military and security policies, while America has played a crucial role in genocide intervention and aid to the world’s poor and disenfranchised. In sum, Katzenstein and Keohane argue that the United States simultaneously creates arguments for Anti-Americanisms while engaging in actions that seemingly should mitigate them. Ironically, as noted in the previous chapter, U.S. public diplomacy in recent years has failed to utilize the attractive aspects of American culture as a narrative antidote to those aspects that many in the world find objectionable. This failure, coupled with the fact that American humanitarian and developmental contributions have been poorly lighted to the world (especially in cases such as Kosovo and in the aftermath of the recent Pakistani earthquake where large Muslim populations were the beneficiaries) has contributed to a climate where programs such as the State Department’s efforts at public diplomacy have had difficulty in creating measurable changes in these attitudes (Peterson, 2002).

As the focus of this research is primarily on the role of FSN’s in the State Department, the intersection of their cultural values with organizational values, and the impacts of this relationship on the institution in its representative function, it is important to consider world attitudes towards the U.S. in relation to the cultural contexts that inform them. Specifically, what are the unique opinions of specific countries and how might those opinions relate to this research? Fortunately, Glick et. al’s 2006 study provides an ideal framework for the exploration of such questions.

5.2 Anti-Americanism, Culture, and Power Distance

One of the most comprehensive studies of recent sentiment towards the United States was conducted by Glick et al. (2006). The population of their study was composed of some 5000 respondents in 11 nations. Participants indicated their perceptions of the
personality traits of, intentions of, and emotional reactions to the United States. A central thesis justifying the importance of this research progress is their suggestion that “perceptions of America as a powerful but malevolent nation decrease its security” (p. 363). Several compelling results relating to this research include the following items:

Table 10: World Perception of U.S. (Glick, et al., 2006)

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<td>3.58</td>
<td>2.21***</td>
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<td>−4.64***</td>
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<td>−3.00***</td>
<td>3.83</td>
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<td>1.46</td>
<td>3.97</td>
<td>3.83</td>
<td>1.96**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chile</td>
<td>2.43</td>
<td>2.54</td>
<td>−2.96***</td>
<td>3.77</td>
<td>3.77</td>
<td>−.01</td>
<td>3.68</td>
<td>3.49</td>
<td>4.41***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>England</td>
<td>2.69</td>
<td>3.37</td>
<td>−8.98***</td>
<td>3.54</td>
<td>3.56</td>
<td>−.42</td>
<td>3.90</td>
<td>3.46</td>
<td>5.71***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Italy</td>
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<td>2.74</td>
<td>−2.92***</td>
<td>3.72</td>
<td>3.55</td>
<td>1.85*</td>
<td>3.60</td>
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<td>2.65***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Japan</td>
<td>2.48</td>
<td>3.03</td>
<td>−7.20***</td>
<td>3.69</td>
<td>3.48</td>
<td>2.83***</td>
<td>3.96</td>
<td>3.72</td>
<td>2.84***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jewish Israeli</td>
<td>2.94</td>
<td>3.20</td>
<td>−3.89***</td>
<td>3.60</td>
<td>3.24</td>
<td>5.10***</td>
<td>3.73</td>
<td>3.12</td>
<td>9.07***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Korea</td>
<td>2.07</td>
<td>2.09</td>
<td>−.14</td>
<td>3.65</td>
<td>3.56</td>
<td>.64</td>
<td>4.20</td>
<td>4.13</td>
<td>.70</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Polandamiento Israel</td>
<td>1.06</td>
<td>2.10</td>
<td>−5.57***</td>
<td>3.45</td>
<td>3.45</td>
<td>.02</td>
<td>4.36</td>
<td>3.97</td>
<td>4.84***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Taiwan</td>
<td>3.09</td>
<td>3.28</td>
<td>−2.18***</td>
<td>3.98</td>
<td>3.74</td>
<td>3.60***</td>
<td>3.78</td>
<td>3.53</td>
<td>3.07***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Turkey</td>
<td>1.96</td>
<td>2.53</td>
<td>−8.61***</td>
<td>3.91</td>
<td>3.39</td>
<td>9.43***</td>
<td>4.06</td>
<td>3.54</td>
<td>8.00***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>M</td>
<td>2.41</td>
<td>2.75</td>
<td></td>
<td>3.64</td>
<td>3.51</td>
<td></td>
<td>3.92</td>
<td>3.61</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Note. All ratings were made on a scale ranging from 1 (not at all) to 5 (extremely).

*p < .10. **p < .05. ***p < .01.

Glick et al.’s findings confirm the stereotype of the United States as a competent, arrogant nation that lacks “warmth.” It’s also important to note that the argument that the world makes a sophisticated distinction between the attitudes and actions of U.S. citizens and the U.S. government is not born out through these researchers’ findings. Only moderate and inconsistent levels of relationship were identified in which respondents indicated a measurably distinct opinion between the Americans and their government. Noting the research that Cold War public diplomacy focused on the use of non-state actors to make the case for a pluralistic and open society coupled with the argument that the U.S. has minimized public diplomacy to focus on military and governmental channels, this measure could be seen as a possible outcome of this prioritization. Of relevance to this research is the fact several FSN narrative responses drew a distinction between perceptions of the State Department and perceptions of the U.S. as a whole. As noted, these responses were exceptional. For many, “the Americans” was used synonymously with Foreign Service Officers, Supervisors, and
the State Department. In the context of Glick et al.’s findings, it would seem that the
general sense is that perception of American institutions should be viewed as generally
consistent with the perception of America as a whole.

Glick et al. found a similar consistency in attitudes regarding perceptions of the U.S.
government mirroring perceptions of U.S. citizens in measuring the emotional opinion
of the 11 nations:

Table 11: World Emotions towards U.S. (Glick, et al., 2006)
Mean Values for Emotions Toward the Government and Citizens of the United States

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Nation</th>
<th>Government</th>
<th>Citizens</th>
<th>t</th>
<th>Government</th>
<th>Citizens</th>
<th>t</th>
<th>Government</th>
<th>Citizens</th>
<th>t</th>
</tr>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Australia</td>
<td>2.54</td>
<td>2.68</td>
<td>-1.09</td>
<td>2.29</td>
<td>2.04</td>
<td>1.91*</td>
<td>1.75</td>
<td>1.75</td>
<td>.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Belgium</td>
<td>2.23</td>
<td>2.33</td>
<td>-97</td>
<td>2.27</td>
<td>1.97</td>
<td>2.84***</td>
<td>1.90</td>
<td>1.73</td>
<td>1.38</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Brazil</td>
<td>2.52</td>
<td>2.37</td>
<td>-74</td>
<td>2.37</td>
<td>2.06</td>
<td>3.82***</td>
<td>1.68</td>
<td>1.56</td>
<td>1.35</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chile</td>
<td>2.05</td>
<td>2.02</td>
<td>-78</td>
<td>1.97</td>
<td>1.75</td>
<td>4.76***</td>
<td>1.76</td>
<td>1.68</td>
<td>1.60</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>England</td>
<td>2.19</td>
<td>2.61</td>
<td>-4.68***</td>
<td>2.48</td>
<td>2.01</td>
<td>4.70***</td>
<td>1.60</td>
<td>1.78</td>
<td>-1.79*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Italy</td>
<td>2.30</td>
<td>2.42</td>
<td>-2.94***</td>
<td>2.10</td>
<td>1.79</td>
<td>4.17***</td>
<td>1.46</td>
<td>1.50</td>
<td>-1.81</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Japan</td>
<td>2.58</td>
<td>2.78</td>
<td>-2.20***</td>
<td>2.43</td>
<td>2.24</td>
<td>1.93*</td>
<td>2.32</td>
<td>2.60</td>
<td>-2.34**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jewish Israeli</td>
<td>2.46</td>
<td>2.48</td>
<td>-20</td>
<td>2.52</td>
<td>2.68</td>
<td>5.16***</td>
<td>2.11</td>
<td>1.98</td>
<td>1.44</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Korea</td>
<td>2.15</td>
<td>2.14</td>
<td>-17</td>
<td>3.01</td>
<td>3.07</td>
<td>-45</td>
<td>2.88</td>
<td>2.92</td>
<td>-2.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Palestinian Israeli</td>
<td>1.70</td>
<td>1.98</td>
<td>-4.02***</td>
<td>3.77</td>
<td>3.03</td>
<td>7.46***</td>
<td>2.38</td>
<td>2.18</td>
<td>1.60</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Taiwan</td>
<td>3.26</td>
<td>3.28</td>
<td>-.19</td>
<td>2.38</td>
<td>2.41</td>
<td>-.32</td>
<td>2.98</td>
<td>2.96</td>
<td>.18</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Turkey</td>
<td>2.50</td>
<td>2.38</td>
<td>-1.12</td>
<td>2.70</td>
<td>2.23</td>
<td>6.31***</td>
<td>2.64</td>
<td>2.51</td>
<td>1.35</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>M</td>
<td>2.53</td>
<td>2.44</td>
<td></td>
<td>2.50</td>
<td>2.22</td>
<td></td>
<td>2.12</td>
<td>2.11</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note. All ratings were made on a scale 1 (not at all) to 5 (extremely).
*p < .10, **p < .05, ***p < .01.

While envy (generally regarded as a socially undesirable trait) scored lower than the
other two emotional measures utilized, the cumulative evaluation of these measures
suggests what Glick et al. refer to as an “ambivalent” emotional attitude towards both
the citizens and government of the United States, with similar levels admiration and
contempt shown in most countries. As many countries in the survey are considered
“staunch” allies of the United States with similar political goals and challenges, this
symmetry for positive and negative emotional reaction towards the U.S. should be
disconcerting as it may indicate only soft support or non-support for American
international objectives. At the micro-level of diplomacy examined in this research (a
single post, consulate, or embassy), there is similarly inconsistent support for
American Officers. While some respondents indicated much admiration for the
institution, many narrative responses, survey totals, and retention levels, all indicated a similar sort of “ambivalence” towards long tenure and organizational investment. In the case of public diplomacy, this lack of personal investment corresponds to a lack of institutional investment in reaching out to constituencies with hostile or negative attitudes towards the United States. Three states in Glick et al.’s research (or two and Palestine, depending on one’s predilection) specifically are facing challenges in which American intervention is far more salient: Palestine, Korea, and Turkey. Of interest to this research is the fact that in each of these three examples, the level of admiration was far lower than the level of contempt (both for citizens and the government). This would seem to suggest that the previous level of Cold War public diplomacy in which U.S. efforts focused on creating support in opposition countries has dwindled in much the way current research argues (Bellamy & Weinberg, 2008; Barron, 2007; Schneider, 2006).

When combining the emotional perception of and the traits ascribed to the United States and its citizens, a final relevant category emerges: the perceived goals of the U.S.

Table 12: Goal Perception of U.S. (Glick, et al., 2006)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Nation</th>
<th>Government</th>
<th>Citizens</th>
<th>t</th>
<th>Government</th>
<th>Citizens</th>
<th>t</th>
<th>Government</th>
<th>Citizens</th>
<th>t</th>
</tr>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Australia</td>
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<td>3.10</td>
<td>.47</td>
<td>3.28</td>
<td>3.18</td>
<td>.75</td>
<td>3.81</td>
<td>3.85</td>
<td>−.23</td>
</tr>
<tr>
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<td>3.52</td>
<td>3.11</td>
<td>4.00***</td>
<td>2.43</td>
<td>2.69</td>
<td>−2.26**</td>
<td>3.73</td>
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<td>.51</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Brazil</td>
<td>3.85</td>
<td>3.69</td>
<td>2.03***</td>
<td>2.31</td>
<td>2.55</td>
<td>−3.21***</td>
<td>4.07</td>
<td>4.10</td>
<td>−.23</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chile</td>
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<td>2.68</td>
<td>2.76</td>
<td>−1.77*</td>
<td>4.05</td>
<td>4.00</td>
<td>−.58</td>
</tr>
<tr>
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<td>3.42</td>
<td>2.90</td>
<td>5.47***</td>
<td>2.77</td>
<td>3.05</td>
<td>−3.29***</td>
<td>3.94</td>
<td>3.77</td>
<td>1.55</td>
</tr>
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<td>2.95</td>
<td>3.13***</td>
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<td>2.59</td>
<td>−2.61***</td>
<td>3.28</td>
<td>3.39</td>
<td>−1.32</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Japan</td>
<td>3.57</td>
<td>3.29</td>
<td>3.13***</td>
<td>2.84</td>
<td>2.90</td>
<td>−.77</td>
<td>3.79</td>
<td>3.56</td>
<td>1.71*</td>
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<tr>
<td>Jewish Israeli</td>
<td>3.48</td>
<td>3.07</td>
<td>5.49***</td>
<td>2.99</td>
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<td>.46</td>
<td>3.82</td>
<td>3.83</td>
<td>−.16</td>
</tr>
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<td>Korea</td>
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<td>3.87</td>
<td>−.06</td>
<td>2.25</td>
<td>2.32</td>
<td>−.65</td>
<td>4.12</td>
<td>3.93</td>
<td>1.34</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Palestinian Israeli</td>
<td>4.30</td>
<td>3.90</td>
<td>5.21***</td>
<td>1.89</td>
<td>2.31</td>
<td>−4.77***</td>
<td>4.09</td>
<td>4.05</td>
<td>.45</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Taiwan</td>
<td>3.54</td>
<td>3.46</td>
<td>.97</td>
<td>3.30</td>
<td>3.39</td>
<td>−1.00</td>
<td>3.94</td>
<td>3.94</td>
<td>−.07</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Turkey</td>
<td>4.26</td>
<td>3.75</td>
<td>7.94***</td>
<td>2.10</td>
<td>2.41</td>
<td>−4.57***</td>
<td>4.23</td>
<td>4.18</td>
<td>.61</td>
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<td>3.38</td>
<td></td>
<td>2.61</td>
<td>2.75</td>
<td></td>
<td>3.91</td>
<td>3.86</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note. All ratings were made on a scale ranging from 1 (not at all) to 5 (extremely).
*p < .10, **p < .05, ***p < .01.

With near unanimity, the perception is that the U.S. is primarily concerned with domination and maintenance of its position of superiority, with a greatly reduced
interest/respect for human rights. While the gap between “domination/superiority” and “human rights” is lower in several U.S. allies (Israel and Australia) and wider in countries that perceive American intervention in their regions to be a threat (Palestine, Korea, and Turkey), the generalized international perception of a self-absorbed, uncaring superpower consistent with Katzenstein and Keohane’s (2006; 2007) thesis emerges. And as Katzenstein and Keohane argue, the distinction between the government and its citizens is not clearly defined, again re-enforcing that the message of America (in terms of public diplomacy) is primarily viewed as being the message of the American government.

In reference to this research, orientation to power distance in each of the cultures studied bears scrutiny. Hofstede (1980) identified the scores of numerous countries on the scale of power distance. For purposes of a general comparison, the 11 nations studied in Glick et al.’s work are identified below:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Power Distance</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Australia</td>
<td>36</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Belgium</td>
<td>65</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Brazil</td>
<td>69</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chile</td>
<td>63</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>England</td>
<td>35</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Israel</td>
<td>13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Italy</td>
<td>50</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Japan</td>
<td>54</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Korea</td>
<td>60</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Palestine</td>
<td>80</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(Arab Countries)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Taiwan</td>
<td>58</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Turkey</td>
<td>66</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

While virtually impossible to fully bifurcate culture from international events, this comparison suggests an interesting tension with the results of this study: high power distance seems to negatively correlate to a variety of perceptions of the United States, while high power distance also seems to positively correlate to organizational commitment to the United States State Department by FSN’s. In the case of
comparison to Glick et al.’s work, countries such as Australia, Italy, and Japan (with relatively lower levels of power distance) tended to have a more favorable view of the United States across a range of emotional and image-related measures. Hofstede’s research focused on Israel as a singular country, with Palestinian results linked to a more generalized “Arab” identity. This is obviously problematic if attempting to build an argument that approaches a level of social scientific fact (to say nothing of the political events that have shaped the perceptions of both groups), however for the purpose of acquiring a general understanding of culture and its implications on attitude, this distinction has proven valid (Cohen, 2003). The results, nonetheless, further the argument that power distance is in some way related to a country’s view of the United States with Israel’s score of 13 corresponding to a generally favorable view and Palestine’s score of 80 corresponding to a range of negative views towards the U.S. and its people. Again, a conclusive statement that X level of power distance corresponds to Y level of support for the U.S. is not the goal of this research (and, frankly, probably a proposition that cannot be realized). What is suggested by previous research, however, is that there is some level of relationship between these two measures.

In contrast to these research results, high power distance was positively correlated to organizational commitment to the U.S. State Department by FSN’s. There are several arguments that could be made in attempting to explain this schism. Initially, one might argue that in countries with high power distance (typically less supportive of the U.S.), the FSN workforce might be composed of cultural outliers who support America despite the likely negative views from the local community. While potentially explanatory, this ignores the fact that FSN’s who choose to work for the U.S. government in low power distance countries would also likely have a more favorable orientation to the United States in selecting the State Department as an employer. Another argument might be that employees in high power distance countries (regardless of workplace) will report higher levels of organizational commitment out of a sense of loyalty to hierarchy or a need to retain a job for financial
reasons (assuming a lack of opportunities in a potentially underdeveloped country). However, this research has shown that employment retention intention and tenure were unaffected by the power distance orientation of FSN’s. Thus, the most compelling justification for this tension is that overt indications of support in high power distance countries may cover up more covert doubts and even rebellion against the institution (Peterson, 2003; Alvez et al., 2006). This is especially damaging for any attempt by the State Department to depend on the support of FSN’s in such cultural settings, as Officers may take the spoken “yes” of local staff to be a more meaningful indication of commitment than what is actually inferred. This danger of misappropriation of cultural meaning is not hypothetical- as Hofstede (1980) identified the U.S. as a low context culture in which written and spoken statements are viewed as the definitive promise of commitment. As such, the institution of the State Department may wrongly be assuming that an argumentative FSN community has a lower level of commitment while a compliant FSN community is more reliable. While highly speculative, this could point to a more global problem for the United States in international relations. If U.S. foreign policy operates from a perspective that assumes overt support from members of the international community indicates reliability and partnership, it is possible that this may lead to agreements and alliances that don’t serve U.S. interests over time. The list of leaders who enjoyed U.S. support only to wreak havoc in the wake of that support is considerable (Osama bin Laden, Sadam Hussein, Manuel Noriega, ad nauseam). The corollary of snapping back at those who share similar policies and values with the U.S. when they criticize American action was fully in evidence in the run up to the second Gulf War. While this research only covers the case of FSN’s working for the State Department, it is worth considering and reflecting in future research to see if this tendency to accept overt statements of support (when culture, history, and intention suggest otherwise) has compromised the ability of the United States to conduct its foreign affairs.
5.3 Results as a Reflection of Anti-American Attitudes

While the gap between stated commitment and power distance is an area of concern highlighted by these research results, the narrative responses produce data that suggests that many of the prevailing attitudes of Anti-Americanism are present in the worldwide FSN population. Specifically, looking at the work of Katzenstein and Keohane’s (2006; 2007) and Glick et al. (2006), several categories of Anti-Americanism could be identified in the 260 written statements from FSN respondents. Specifically, the following themes related to stereotypes of the United States and its citizens could be identified in the description of the State Department and its personnel:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Attitude Linked to Anti-Americanism</th>
<th>Frequency</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Arrogance</td>
<td>102 instances</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cultural Insensitivity</td>
<td>88 instances</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Laziness</td>
<td>37 instances</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lack of Future Focus</td>
<td>47 instances</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Coldness</td>
<td>29 instances</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

In the case of arrogance, a number of respondents noted that the attitude of the State Department minimized the importance of FSN contributions and reflected an “us first” perspective towards the organization. While several noted that focusing on the U.S. mission was important, the perceived incompetence of FSN’s made the work unsatisfying and results more inefficient as the important local perspective was not included as part of the decision-making process. Cultural insensitivity was also indicated as being a primary problem as Officers were viewed as uninformed and (at best) disinterested in the local situation. The perception of laziness along with a lack of future focus were typically seen as foundational issues to perceived organizational weakness, with American staff focusing on short duration postings with little effort extended towards sustainability of policies and programs. Like cultural insensitivity and arrogance, the perception of many FSN’s appears to be that the American Officers...
put up barriers to access for “outsiders” to the extent that their attitude is one of
coldness instead of collegiality and friendliness. In sum, many of the stereotypes
outlined in recent research dealing with Anti-Americanism are present in the
observations of FSN’s regarding the institution. And while difficult to link causally,
one could argue these attitudes affect related items in the study such as duration of
employment, organizational investment, and job commitment.

Having identified the presence of these attitudes in the FSN population, the
challenging question emerges of considering the extent to which these attitudes were
created by employment experiences at the State Department versus the extent to which
these attitudes existed prior to employment with experience serving as validation of an
existing viewpoint. The relevance of this distinction cannot be overstated. If the
opinions reached by many FSN’s regarding Americans emerged organically through
their employment at the State Department, it suggests that the existing stereotypes of
Americans as arrogant, insensitive, lazy, and disengaged from reality could be based in
reality; that is to say, the stereotypes reflect existing and observed American behavior
on the part of FSN’s. If, on the other hand, the stereotype existed for FSN’s prior to
being employed by the State Department and served as a frame for observed behavior
of Americans, it could suggest that the negative images held by many in the world
towards Americans is so pervasive that neutral and open interaction may now prove to
be difficult. Devito (2009) speaks to this issue in describing the human perception
tendencies regarding the attribution of control and overattribution. These tendencies
suggest that in an attempt to ascribe motive to human behavior, human tendency is to
identify a finite number of characteristics to an individual or group and utilize these
characteristics as a sort of heuristic to explain that person’s or group’s behavior. In the
case of negative FSN perception of Americans, it could be that the stereotypes of the
United States have so permeated the world that close contact with Americans will only
serve to re-enforce these stereotypes. If FSN’s, a group that has willingly chosen a
close personal and professional association with the U.S. government, are so shaped
by these negative preconceptions, it is quite foreboding for any attempt the United
States may make at world engagement with populations even less receptive to the American viewpoint. Alternatively, if an open/positive perspective on the part of many FSN’s was negatively impacted by frequent interaction with American Officers, it suggests that many of the world’s worst perceptions of Americans may exist openly in the culture of the State Department. Additionally, given that the relationship between Officers and FSN’s has the character of both personal interaction and professional contact with the U.S. Government, Glick et al.’s results that show strong overlap between perceptions of the government and the American people is very much realized in this relationship. In sum, the world’s perceptions of the American people and the American government would seem to be manifested in the attitudes of the FSN’s.

5.4 Results as a Contributor to Anti-American Attitudes

It is difficult to quantify the extent to which the tensions and contradictions faced by FSN’s may contribute to worldwide Anti-American sentiment. While there are only several thousand FSN’s worldwide, it could be argued that a number of characteristics regarding their position may produce substantial impacts on world opinion. A good analogy could be the work of the Fulbright program. In the case of this program, direct and sustained engagement with the U.S. and its institutions has produced numerous “citizen diplomats” who articulate and explain American attitudes and values to their country of residence (Bellamy & Weinberg, 2008). While not specifically identified as such, FSN’s (designed or de facto) serve a similar role. It is not difficult to imagine FSN’s returning home after a day of working at a U.S. post only to be asked questions by their friends and families about what Americans are “really like.” It could also be expected that the people of their community will give the answers given by FSN’s a greater level of merit. Thus, the opinions of 30,000+ people worldwide will be crucially in shaping the opinions of an exponentially higher number of constituents. If the suggestion given by FSN’s is that Americans are honest, fair, open, and engaged, it could go a long way in changing the perceptions of
many. If, alternatively, these FSN’s answer such questions with answers that mirror much of the world’s opinions about Americans, one could similarly expect that the negative stereotypes will be validated and perhaps made more intense considering that FSN’s are seen to be in a position of greater knowledge about America and its values. The attitudes of FSN’s could then be viewed as extension of American public diplomacy and a manifestation of soft power. Currently, no literature or publications coming from the State Department suggests an understanding of this role in FSN employment. Given the responses to this survey that local staff are uncomfortable or unable to discuss even basic elements of their job/experience, it would seem that this is another opportunity for world engagement that is being lost.

Beyond the representational function FSN’s could serve in their community, the impact of compromising the morale of local staff could also contribute to negative perceptions on the part of the international community. While FSN staff indicated a willingness to go beyond expected performance levels, the reduced commitment with employment duration, the interest in entertaining other professional opportunities, along with a number of items outlined in narrative responses seems to indicate that turnover and fluctuating commitment levels may compromise State Department performance in a number of ways. This compromised performance could play a role in decreased effectiveness in interaction with the host country. For example, if the FSN’s in a visa section are all recent hires or feel dissatisfied with their supervisor/position, they may be less helpful in dealing with visa applications. This, in turn, may cause applicants to view the institution as being obstinate, disengaged, or arrogant. Another possibility is that FSN’s tasked with public diplomacy projects may be tasked with programs initiated by an Officer that are locally unfeasible. With energy and resources committed to project that fails to produce a positive outcome in terms of connecting with a host country’s population, the result may do little to change perspectives. In short, as U.S. posts serve as functional windows to the United States, failures caused by misuse or mistreatment of FSN’s could exacerbate negative views of America held by the residents of a host country.
Again, as noted in the previous research, the basis for Anti-Americanism is complicated and multi-faceted. No one instance can be seen as causing worldwide resentment or limiting the effectiveness of American foreign policy. The attitudes that FSN’s develop in their employment cannot be directly linked to global negative attitudes towards the United States in any directly measurable way. It is important to note, however, their role and their performance has a direct impact in the attitudes of many individuals towards the United States. Reflecting on Batora’s and Nye’s views on public diplomacy, the multiplicity of individual attitudes can deeply affect global attitudes. While this research shows widespread interest in job engagement on the part of FSN’s, the cultural misunderstandings and the declining levels of commitment also deserve consideration. If FSN’s are seen as a crucial instrument in international engagement, failures to effectively utilize this resource must also be considered when world opinion suggest that a lack of engagement is a serious shortcoming of the United States.

5.5 Barack Hussein Obama: The Pink Elephant in the Room

In both recent world opinion and in the statements given by FSN’s in this research, there is a largely unspoken but palpable influence of the presidency of George W. Bush. Fairly or unfairly, Bush became the physical embodiment of what was seen as the worst elements of the United States and its government. Jingoistic, self-centered, imperialist, and grossly ignorant, the perceptions of Bush became synonymous with perceptions of the inherent “dark character” of the United States. So extensive was world hatred of Bush that Blackburn (2008) noted in response to the Project on International Policy Attitudes 20 nation survey:

"Around the world, Hu Jintao and Vladimir Putin beat President Bush in the trustworthiness polls. Not that they do so splendidly among the men and women in the streets, rues and avenidas. It's just that Mr. Bush does worse. He usually does worse than Mahmoud Ahmadinejad as well… Mr. Bush was unpopular most places pretty early. He became unpopular at home comparatively recently. He staked
his foreign policy on the belief that everybody yearns for freedom. Now, the leader of the Free World is beaten in polls worldwide by undemocratic rulers of China and Russia (p 3).

Such reactions are validated by a number of studies including a 20-country poll coordinated by the Project on International Policy Attitudes at the University of Maryland in 2008 where Vladimir Putin was found to be more trustworthy and democratic in every nation with the exception of Spain, Nigeria, and Thailand (Blackburn, 2008). In the period immediately after Bush’s second election, negative reaction was felt even more sharply, with a poll of over 20,000 people in 21 countries, in late 2004/early 2005 showing that a solid majority (58%) viewed Bush's re-election as negative for world peace and security, with only about a quarter of those polled (26%) calling the re-election a positive step (Public Diplomacy Alumni Association, 2005). The reasons for this negative perception are both well documented and as varied as the negative perceptions of America. Perhaps the most intriguing aspect of the world’s hatred of Bush is the closeness with which such hatred mirrors the stereotypes that much of the world holds about the United States as a whole. Virtually every aspect of Anti-Americanism identified in this research was present in the world’s conception of Bush’s failures and shortcomings- ranging from cultural insensitivity (calling for a “crusade” in the Middle East) to a lack of intellectual proficiency (“You've also got to measure in order to begin to effect change that's just more - when there's more than talk, there's just actual - a paradigm shift”) to poor planning (appearing in front of a “Mission Accomplished” banner in Iraq in 2003) to apparent indifference to basic human rights standards. For diverse world populations with diverse grievances towards the United States, Bush stood as a salient and tangible embodiment of virtually every criticism against the U.S. one could construct (Sweig, 2006).

While not overtly mentioned in the narrative responses of FSN’s, the suggestion of a more sinister organizational tone in roughly the timeframe of Bush’s election was present in many of the responses:
- In the recent years, at our Post, FSNs have become increasingly displeased… I have heard it over and over again from the FSNs who have been here for more than 15 years - things are very different now, and not for the better.

- Some of the answers are related to my feelings towards the current Administration. The answers would have been different if you had asked the questions 8 years ago.

- If you would have given me this survey just a couple of years ago, I would have answered the questions very differently: I used to really feel part of this organization, even emotionally attached… I remember the time when everybody, American officers and FSNs alike, were one big family. These days, the American officers really show that you are inferior to them.

- In past, we had more chance to help, support and give ideas. Now for FSN’s it is harder and more difficult to communicate with American supervisors. In past I felt as a part of family and now I am just employee.

- The new officers coming in ... are just soooo different and distant from then the 'old guard'.

- When I first came to work in this organization, I was proud of it. But now, after 10 years, I feel disappointed.

- In the beginning of my 10+ years at the State Dept. the atmosphere was fairly good, however within 2 years that deteriorated sharply. Generally one is very aware of the strong dividing line between the 2 cultures and that an FSN will always be considered an inferior...

In these and similar responses, the impression is a decline in the attitude of the organization towards FSN’s that approximately coincides with Bush’s ascendancy. In social science survey research, there is a bias in which people recall higher levels of satisfaction with previous instances over current ones. The responses of FSN’s could merely be a reflection of that bias (“things were better in the ‘good old days’”) or they could point to a more significant manifestation of world perception on the operation of the State Department. Referring to section 5.4 of this research, similar questions emerge about the correlation/causation of the Bush administration on the decline of FSN morale in the State Department. Did administration policies and attitudes fundamentally change the actions of Foreign Service Officers or was the specter of Bush-as-Boogeyman so great that the negative behaviors on the part of Officers were attributed to an imagined realignment of fundamental State Department values? A fully satisfying answer is not tenable, but it is clear that a number of FSN’s ascribed the period of the Bush administration as being the foundation for unsatisfying changes
in the institution. Whether real or imagined, however, the perception has acquired the feeling of truth for many respondents.

Perhaps such intense animosity directed towards a single individual created vacuum from which only a newly knighted “hero” could emerge. For both the United States and the world, that hero was constructed as Barack Hussein Obama. As both the world and much of the FSN community cast George W. Bush the “villain,” it is necessary to explore the extent to which America’s redemptive “champion” could change such perceptions. Obama created an unprecedented euphoria in world reaction to a U.S. presidential election. As a person of African heritage, as a child of an immigrant, and as a product of a single mother with working class roots, the mythos of Obama was framed as a validation of the American values of tolerance, opportunity, and equality. His Harvard education and editorial position on The Harvard Law Review spoke against perceptions of the United States as a nation that embraces an anti-intellectual view of its leaders and policies. His election was also framed as a vehement response to the liberal, social, and sovereign objections to the United States. In terms of liberal objections, the world press quickly noted Obama’s intent to dismantle the Guantanamo prison camp and change surveillance/detention policies as an indication that the U.S. was going to focus on a foreign policy that lived up to its ideals. The Spanish national daily El País proclaimed that Obama’s victory is a chance to turn the page after a presidency characterized by “eight years of incompetence and abuses.” Germany’s Bild-Zeitung stated “Barack Obama has won more than just the U.S. Presidential election: he has won the hearts of the (world).” The Syrian daily Ath Thawra suggested that a historic change could allow America to re-engage on policies related to social justice throughout the world. The state-owned Egyptian Gazette ran the headline “World hopes for a ‘less arrogant’ America.” In answering many social objections to the United States, Obama promised healthcare reform, government investment in job creation, and an increased focus on environmental policy. In the days immediately after his election, the Austrian national newspaper Die Kronen Zeitung proclaimed that Obama would end American wars in
the Middle East, help solve the world economic downturn, provide national healthcare for all Americans, increase environmental standards, provide aid and support to developing countries, and heal America’s racial divide. The feeling that sovereign concerns about the United States could be remedied through an Obama presidency has been frequently articulated throughout the world. For example, in Obama’s June 3, 2009 speech in Cairo, his suggestion for a state solution in Palestine and a more generalized respect for institutions in the region and in the world created an immediate positive response from those who identified themselves as skeptics of U.S. foreign policy actions and motives (Childress, et al., 2009). One Egyptian observer suggested "just one of him is worth 10 George Bushes (Childress, et al., 2009)." In sum, the consistent message of much of the world was that Obama was some sort of transformational remedy to the American identity created under George W. Bush.

While the survey distributed for this research project was done prior to Obama’s election, given the perception that Bush’s tenure had (in some way) negatively affected the organizational attitude of the State Department, it logically follows that an Obama administration would be viewed with optimism in its ability to re-establish the more open relationships (real or imagined) previous administrations fostered. The tone of openness and engagement suggested in the honeymoon period of Obama’s ascension would certainly speak to such a change; however there is reason to doubt that the cultural shift FSN’s presumably hope for (and perhaps expect) will come about. There are three key reasons that such optimism is likely misplaced.

1. Presidential administrations have long-lamented the lack of effect their programs, goals, and initiatives have had on the State Department.
2. There are structural dimensions to the State Department that make the organization change resistant.
3. Sentiment appears to be growing that the general promise of change Obama spoke for in his election may be unrealizable or seriously mitigated by political reality.
Initially, the effect of Presidential administrations on the State Department has historically been nominal in scope (Krizay, 1988; Rubin, 1985; Gingrich, 2003). While administrations come and go based on the political choices of constituents, the position of Foreign Service Officers is a sort of constant. Given their position of entrenchment, considering the problems a mass exodus of career officers would create, and keeping in mind the fact that much of the State Department’s work is no longer overtly political, the ability to operate in a fashion largely independent from Washington ensures that the day to day operations of the organization are (for the most part) not affected by the climate emanating from the White House. This, coupled with the fact that the work of foreign policy is now largely done in structures independent from the State Department (Rubin, 1985), means that Presidential goals and values do not necessarily affect the attitudes and actions of individual posts on a range of issues.

Additionally, structural dimensions to the State Department ensure that the policies of a President carry little weight in the operations embassies and consulates. While the President has the power to make political appointments, Obama has appointed only about a third of ambassadors, which is in line with historical trends (“Obama admits some ambassador picks political”; January 9, 2009). The remaining two-thirds of all ambassadors are career State Department employees who (ostensibly) are supposed to represent an administration’s values and policies, but who, nonetheless, are a product of the existing State Department culture. For those who are political appointees, the expectation of competence, consistency, and availability is often not well founded. In describing the training process that these political appointees go through, Kushlis (2008) states:

> If anyone thinks a two-week how-to-be-an-Ambassador course at the State Department’s Foreign Service Institute is adequate preparation for becoming a US Ambassador, he (or she) must be smoking something far stronger than tobacco. But that – according to the August American Academy of Diplomacy (AAD), which counts all former Secretaries of State and various other American foreign policy luminaries as members – is what newly appointed ambassadors get. I could add whether they need it or not – but that seems unnecessarily gratuitous[…] Professional staff runs the Embassy. They do so because 1) there are months between the time an individual is nominated for an Ambassadorsial position and actually arrives at
post; and 2) most political Ambassadors haven’t a clue as to what being an Ambassador is all about anyway. Frankly, they never really run much more than their secretary and those individuals in the administrative office who tend to their personal needs. Then it’s time for them to leave – wearing the honorific title on their lapel pins to the grave. As a consequence, the highest ranking professional staffer – the Deputy Chief of Mission – is tasked not only with ensuring that the Embassy functions smoothly, that US interests are represented as well and as appropriately as possible and that the Ambassador and his or her spouse (or other kin who may have come along for the spare bedroom) cause as little damage as possible while in the country – and ideally are turned into public relations assets - rather than liabilities (retrieved on October 26, 2009 from http://whirledview.typepad.com/whirledview/2008/07/how-not-to-appo.html).

While Kushlis’ tone is frank to the point of being pithy, her career as an FSO along with a litany of anecdotal and compiled evidence suggests that politically appointed ambassadors typically serve for relatively short periods with varying degrees of effectiveness in their position. Diaz (2009) notes that while political appointments to sensitive posts such as Ambassador to the United Nations or to strategically important regions or states serve as an extension of administration policy, the vast majority of political appointees are large-scale campaign donors (with some cynically suggesting that the desirability of an ambassadorship comes with a correspondingly high price tag). Obama’s administration (despite campaign promises) has continued this practice with many appointees lacking diplomatic experience, knowledge of the host country, political experience, or even a modest understanding of the language of the country they are appointed to (Lee, 2009). In most of these cases, the primary work of setting the policies and standards in posts with politically appointed ambassadors will be done by the so-called DCM (the Deputy Chief of Mission). DCM’s are uniformly Foreign Service Officers coming from the training, culture, and climate of the State Department (Dorman, 2005). In sum, the perceived change in organizational climate that could come from a new administration will be greatly mitigated. The vast majority of posts will be staffed by career Foreign Service Officers and those where the president has made a direct appointment will likely receive their de facto leadership from an FSO, as well. These barriers for change, coupled with the fact that State in many ways operates independently from Washington would suggest that
differences FSN’s might expect from an administration promising openness and engagement may be far less consequential than previously thought.

Finally, there is the sentiment that the more generalized global shift of U.S. priorities that Obama is perceived as embodying may produce far less consequential results than previous rhetoric would suggest. For FSN’s tasked with attempting to justify their employment at an institution that is (theoretically) an extension of the Bush administration, the shift to Obama would obviously be a cause for optimism. From the tiresome task of attempting to explain Gitmo, Abu Ghraib, and “aggressive interrogation” to friends, relatives, and embassy visitors, FSN’s likely experienced a great deal of personal, interpersonal, and community-based stress in their jobs. Obama, with his promises of moving U.S. adventures towards an ethical resolution and creating international policy that is both multi-lateral and respectful of state’s rights, seemed to offer a kind of non-specific, but palpable sense of international hope and (more to the point for many FSN’s) a relief from feeling as though they work for an institution the world sees as (at best) unsavory. As the administration has progressed, however, the initial optimism that Obama could serve as remedy to the stereotypes and objections many have towards the United States has proven to be a slippery proposition. The World Public Opinion organization conducted a multi-national survey utilizing respected opinion polling institutions in each state. Asked whether they have confidence in Barack Obama to "do the right thing regarding world affairs," for all nations (excluding the US) an average of 61 percent say they have some or a lot of confidence (“Though Obama Viewed Positively, Still Much Criticism of US Foreign Policy: Global Poll,” 2009). Despite these positive perceptions of Obama’s integrity, the overall perceptions of the United States fluctuated little from previous perceptions during the Bush administration. The U.S. continues to receive sharp criticism for coercing other nations with its superior power (15 of 19 nations), failing to abide by international law (17 of 19 nations), and for how it is dealing with climate change (11 of 18 nations). Overall, views are mixed on whether the US is playing a mainly positive or mainly negative role in the world, however when asked
about the U.S. treatment of individual countries a consistent trend emerges suggesting that optimism about Obama has not translated into an overall optimism regarding the United States:

**Table 15: Perceived U.S. Relations (WorldPublicOpinion.org)**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Treats us fairly</th>
<th>Abuses its greater power</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Mexico</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>87</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Germany</td>
<td>48</td>
<td>42</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Great Britain</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>68</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>France</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>68</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Poland</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>65</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ukraine</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>66</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Russia</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>75</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Egypt</td>
<td>34</td>
<td>62</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Azerbaijan</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>61</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Iraq</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>69</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Turkey</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>86</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Palest. ter.</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>87</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kenya</td>
<td>72</td>
<td>26</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nigeria</td>
<td>68</td>
<td>28</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>India</td>
<td>45</td>
<td>47</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Macau*</td>
<td>31</td>
<td>52</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Indonesia</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>63</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hong Kong*</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>73</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Taiwan*</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>72</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>South Korea</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>81</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>China</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>76</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pakistan</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>90</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Average</strong></td>
<td><strong>26</strong></td>
<td><strong>66</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Initial programs initiated by Obama at home have faced political hurdles and have produced results inconsistent with the stratospheric level of expectation his election seemed to promise (Krauthammer, 2009, September 4). In terms of Obama’s worldwide reputation, it appears that the promise of immediate closure of the Guantanamo facility is unfeasible in the near term due to a lack of alternative facilities, the questionable legal status of detainees, and security concerns about mass amnesty (Ephron, 2009). On matters from healthcare to environmental policy to defense to finding a feasible withdrawal strategy in two wars to dealing with a global economic
downturn, it would seem that the administration is discovering that producing the sort of (unrealistic?) change supporters around the world expected will prove a far more difficult challenge than knocking down the caricatured straw man of George W. Bush. As these political realities become more salient, the initial redemptive power of Obama for improving world perception of the United States could wane. In conjunction with the deeply rooted stereotypes and fears the world has towards America, along with the recent poor record of public diplomacy, it would seem that the initial goodwill that FSN’s may experience towards the institution of the State Department is not likely to be long-lived.

All this analysis should be taken with the enormous caveat of uncertainty. The administration may prove capable of meeting much of the world’s standards in rejuvenating international perception of the United States and creating the climate of openness, respect, tolerance, and justice voiced during the campaign. This is merely to suggest an initial analysis of the results of the administration measured against international hopes has produced a calculus that suggests world opinion towards the administration may have peaked and residual concerns about America and its institutions may again come to the fore. Taken into consideration with structural barriers to change in the State Department, the change hoped for by many (including FSN’s) may simply not come to pass.

5.6 Results as a Basis for Organizational Change

These results suggest a number of items of concern that beg for meaningful and engaged solutions. In terms of culture, the effect on the attitudes of both states and FSN’s towards the policies and institutions of the United States can no longer be overlooked. Its effect is pronounced and simply dismissing this aspect of the organization and leaving leadership in the hands of the often willfully uniformed can no longer be the basis for a stable future for the institution. Like the cultural perceptions of the FSN’s, the perceptions the world has of the United States are
inextricably linked to what America and its institutions both say and do. The mirroring of FSN’s objections to the State Department and world objections to the United States should be the basis for some serious introspection and change. Whether a cause or a correlation, the perception of arrogance, intolerance, incompetence, and unilateralism in both the State Department and the U.S. demands remedies. Just as Martin Luther King proclaimed “injustice anywhere is injustice everywhere” the State Department must consider the treatment and meaningful utilization of FSN’s as matter of its public diplomacy. This research has shown a number of areas of dissatisfaction on the part Foreign Service Nationals. What cannot be calculated, however, is the extent to which perceived misuse or mistreatment has had on their community’s image of the United States. For America to reach out, it must rely (as it historically did) on the expertise and knowledge of its supporters in communities across the globe. In many cases, one of the strongest and most culturally viable constituencies in making the case for America can be found in the work of FSN’s. While it is tempting to imagine that a single leader, slogan, or image can be the basis for shifting world attitudes towards the United States, much important work can come by effective leveraging of international partners at the ground level. In doing so, the State Department can improve both its operational success and achieve more in getting the American message across the globe. The lessons of change this research suggests could be similarly applied to a number of international organizations.
Chapter 6

There comes a time in the life of every human when he or she must decide to risk his life, his fortune, and his sacred honor on an outcome dubious. Those who fail the challenge are merely overgrown children who can never be anything else.

As the world increasingly embraced Smith’s view of a better humanity, unsurprisingly he was attacked by those seeking to maintain the status quo. Charged as a heretic by the governments of the world, he was branded a terrorist and enemy to civilization. Besieged by forces seeking to bring him and his followers to justice, Smith ultimately teleports his supporters far away from those seeking to destroy them- at the exact moment of impending doom. Despite those who rejected his message, he felt a higher calling to a better existence. Leaders of international organizations (especially the State Department) face a similar moment of decision. The efforts of people like the Foreign Service Nationals can be a centerpiece of a renewed call for international engagement or they can continue to be ignored, misunderstood, and marginalized. As this research has suggested a gap in cultural understanding that has had dire implications on organizational commitment, the time for change is now. The remedies for this misunderstanding are implicitly found in many of the research results. When institutions begin valuing the work of all people and seeking the input of citizens of the world in addressing the communities of the world, the change can be profound. As the Martian-Human Smith offered a new reality based on inclusion, integrity, and openness, so too can international institutions become internationally aware of the audiences they address. There will always be strangers and there will always be strange lands, but perhaps through engagement the strangeness no longer has define us.
6.1 Overview of Recommendations

While exploratory in nature, this research can serve as a basis for recommendations for the U.S. State Department. As other international organizations and diplomatic institutions face similar dilemmas in terms of officer rotation, utilizing local staff, and public outreach across a broad spectrum of cultures, these recommendations also merit consideration for contexts beyond the State Department. Given that culture is at the heart of many of these findings, the need for increased cultural training on the part of officers is absolutely essential. Many of the expectations of local staff related to issues like power distance as well as other cultural values could be better met with greater understanding and a more open perspective. This cultural engagement could then be the sort of interpersonal engagement that allows for better working relationships overall. In terms of public outreach, it’s clear that the substance of the message still needs to originate from the State Department or relevant institution leading the international organization. However, a change in metaphor needs to occur in how local staff are viewed in making sure that message reaches the local target audience. Viewing local staff as a bridge and seeing their work as high-level consultation on the needs of the community would be a powerful change from a culture that too often seems to view local staff as merely the conduit for programs largely initiated and owned by the institution. A key step in both directions could begin with longer postings for officers ensuring that they acquire local expertise while providing an incentive to use it, as their time at a given post will be longer. With frequent rotation, there is little incentive to understand the local conditions as another post is just years (or months) away. To facilitate the needed interaction and to improve training outcomes requested by local staff, there should be more combined trainings on the part of staff and officers. This would simultaneously create a better link between the two groups, improve the skill sets of both audiences, demonstrate a perceived equality between local staff and officers, and provide a feeling of worth to participating local
staff. With these enhanced organizational positions for local staff, the next step would logically be to better create incentives for long-term organizational commitment by providing empowerment, advancement opportunities, and rewards. Again, no one would argue that local staff should control the position of an institution operating in foreign country. However, an alternative organizational structure creating access to new challenges, responsibilities, and achievement for local staff could go a long ways towards answering questions about the viability of a career with the organization. Going hand in hand with this increased responsibility for local staff would be increased accountability for officers. A system of upward evaluation would allow local staff to assess the quality of the work being done by their superiors. For such a system to be effective there would also need to be a system of protection that allows for the airing of grievances on the part of local staff (to ensure that high evaluations are not coerced). Yet such a system is in wide-use in the private sector with favorable results. Additionally, this research has identified certain areas of the organization where employment satisfaction may be higher. Identifying the climate and policies of such areas could also offer insight for improving the institution as a whole. Such a comprehensive implementation of programs could lead to fewer cultural misunderstandings, better integration of staff to departmental goals, improved outreach to local communities, and a power structure that changes the view of hierarchy from “power over” to “power from.”

6.2 Increased Cultural Training for Officers

An overview of the training available for Officers at the American Foreign Service Institute (FSI) shows that there are a limited number of programs directly related to cultural interaction, outside of language courses (Peterson, 2002). Given the deficiencies in language outlined in the literature and this research, it would appear that even the language courses are being underutilized. Understanding the concept of culture as a something that shapes the epistemology of a group has profound implications for effective diplomacy. Knowing that power distance shapes a group’s
perspective on leadership might better inform an Officer about what to expect when meeting a country’s delegation. Understanding the collective/individual nuances of a country can provide information about what sorts of development programs might be successful for a region. Exploring a culture’s perception of time might allow for more realistic expectations about the speed of the negotiation process. Perhaps most importantly, this epistemological view of culture removes the perception of cultural difference from the “they shake hands this way and slurp raw fish heads at dinner” Star Wars Cantina view of culture that permeates the popular imagination. This view of culture as a way of knowing would obviously improve engagement with the local staff. This engagement would allow improved organizational processes and better understanding. For example, on the issue of power distance, Bing (2004) offers examples related to change management effectiveness:

**CHANGE—how do you handle those with a preference for Power Distance/Hierarchical Style?**

Use senior staff to make announcements/to communicate change
Use legitimate power to exercise authority
Tell subordinates what to do differently (do not leave it to them to figure out "how" to do thing differently)

**CHANGE—how do you handle those with a preference for Low Power Distance/Participative Style?**

Use influencing skills
Include them in a discussion; explain your (or the company's) position
Allow for questions and challenges
Provide a forum where they can be involved in discussion/framing "how" things will be different (work processes during the interim) after you provide the "what” (p. 85).

For Officers in an international organization to explore issues such as this one would be an excellent exercise in reflection about culture and communication. Although no such seminar could adequately explain all aspects of culture (nor should it), moving officers beyond the “they are so lazy” or “they are so forceful” mentality towards a broader understanding of cultural motivation would be beneficial in the communication process both with staff and the community. And there must be
meaningful consequences for Officers who fail to take the “culture question” seriously. Peterson (2002) argues that Officers in the State Department must utilize all training available as it relates to culture and supplement this with knowledge gained through experience with host countries (presumably with FSN’s serving as an excellent entry point to increased cultural understanding). He goes on to suggest that this cannot be yet another aspirational goal that is celebrated and ignored. Officers demonstrating cultural competence as it relates to their diplomatic and consular work should be rewarded and Officers failing to connect their work with the culture in which they operate should receive punishment or demotion. Only when policy requires that cultural understanding is a basis for modern diplomatic engagement will institutions change their practice of willful ignorance.

For example, the findings of this research show that cultures with a high power distance have a higher degree of organizational commitment to hierarchical institution such as the State Department. As hierarchy is inherently a part of international organizations tasked with enacting a mission typically derived at a central location, it is expected that similar results would occur in other international organizations (though obviously additional research could more adequately answer this question). This research also showed that the stated commitment of high power distance cultures does not necessarily translate into increased employment tenure. This is wholly consistent with the existing literature that suggests that the public commitment voiced to authority in high power distance cultures may actually mask feelings of dissatisfaction. For an Officer not versed in the often dichotomous expressions of a culture, this inconsistency could lead to them to wrongly believe that high power distance cultures are more loyal. Likewise, the stated lower levels of commitment in low power distance cultures may be misread as insubordination when the reality is that the people of such cultures merely expect more transparency and a greater voice in the decision-making processes. Training that increases the sensitivity and awareness of these different views could offer new officers insight into the cultures in which they operate. There will always be a tension between representing the culture of the
institution and adapting to the environment of the host country and there should not be an expectation of cultural pandering as a part of this training. Cull (2008) expresses this tension in examining U.S. public diplomacy efforts during the Cold war by stating “cultural (understanding) needed to be far enough from the great diplomatic machine to maintain integrity [. . .] but still close enough to retain relevance to the broadest goals of foreign policy” (p. 343). Mediating this tension is understanding that awareness can be the starting point for dialogue that allows issues related to culture to be better understood on both sides.

6.3 Local Staff as Bridge for Public Diplomacy

As centralization of diplomacy has been documented as a trend for the last several decades (i.e. in the U.S., the President largely controls foreign policy independently from the State Department), a key function of diplomatic posts has increasingly been to engage in outreach to the local community (in addition to the day to day bureaucratic functions). As Officers in an international organization can never be expected to fully build up networks and connections in the host country, it becomes incumbent for the local staff to play an active role in organizing and directing this outreach. Peterson (2002) identifies a number of elements in State Department public diplomacy specifically that could be remedied by FSN’s playing a greater role in the conception and deliver of outreach programs:

(The State Department ) must adopt an "engagement" approach that involves listening, dialogue, and relationship building… Traditionally, U.S. public policy has been communicated via a push-down method, which suffers from limited reach and inadequate explanation to foreign media. Policy is created, speeches given, press releases written, and press conferences held -- all with a primary focus on addressing American news media. Messages are typically delivered by a limited number of officials to foreign audiences, composed primarily of representatives of governments and international organizations. Foreign publics get short shrift. This push-down approach affords little open discussion of the basis for policy decisions. Communications, geared toward a domestic audience, assume a keen understanding of the American system of government -- knowledge that is often deficient among foreign publics. Often absent is the linkage of policies to the values of others, indeed to our own values of freedom and democracy (p. 92).
While the essential message and story of this outreach still will come from the organization, the process, structure, and style of this outreach best emanates from local sources. Folk narratives of the business world abound with disasters that occurred when companies pushed forward marketing plans without considering the needs of the community they operate in. One such example was that of Parker Pens’ old slogan of “Use a Parker and you won’t get embarrassed” (that the pen would not leak on you). When translated into Spanish without regard for local slang, the slogan was read as “Use a Parker and you won’t get pregnant.” Diplomatic missteps have repeatedly been linked to such a lack of understanding of the local culture (Bush’s famous use of “crusade” to stop terrorism, for example). Similarly, public outreach carries with it many dangers for Officers not fully integrated into a culture. An Officer might suggest that due to facebook’s popularity as a social network, it is an ideal platform to reach the youth of the country. However, in many countries (Russia in particular) there are similar but locally unique social networking tools. Public outreach might include cultural programs such as presentation of artwork that necessarily needs to be considered in relation to the values and interests of a community. To make such programs effective, the input of members of the host culture are absolutely crucial to program effectiveness.

With that in mind, this research proposes that local staff should be treated as independent agents in conducting much of the public outreach and public diplomacy of a post. An appropriate analogy from the private sector would be that of an advertising or marketing agency- they don’t create the product and they are accountable for how the message is presented, but (in most cases) they are given a great deal of autonomy in creating messages that will generate the desired results. Cotton (1996) identified numerous areas of success in such self-managed teams. Despite concerns that self-managed teams would ignore leadership directives, results indicate that such groups are actually more engaged in the policies of the leadership (with increased job satisfaction, productivity, and reduced absenteeism as important additional benefits).
Moreover, self-managed teams tended to function (albeit with different structures) in a variety of different cultural settings (Sagie & Aycan, 2003). This view needs to take hold when considering public diplomacy. As the literature suggests, the biggest gap for the United States in getting its message out is a lack of cultural understanding for the communities it is trying to reach. For an international institution to effectively communicate with diverse populations, the messages need to be constructed by members of those diverse populations. This may represent a radical departure from the hierarchical and territorial perception that public diplomacy is the domain of Officers in the institution. Such a cultural shift in an organization would not come easily, but the potential success of empowering local staff to speak to local communities should not be underestimated.

6.4 Longer Postings for Officers

A consistent theme of the narrative responses was that short duration postings hurt accountability, integration, and consistency for the State Department (and one would expect other international organizations, as well). The primary argument against longer postings is that of clientism; that an officer would “go native” and begin to see world events from the perspective of the country they are posted in rather than the perspective of the country they represent. The reality is this- there is no documented study on the point at which a posted Officer is at risk for engaging in clientism. One could argue that in the age of the internet, inexpensive international telephone calls, satellite television, and easy air travel to and from the home country, the risks of clientism are minimal in comparison to what they were in the past. In a bygone era when a diplomat was sent to a foreign land for years with limited communication to her/his home country, the risk of beginning to identify with the local culture was far more acute. This is clearly no longer the case. Coupled with the fact that, according to the narrative portion of the survey, Officers tend to primarily associate with one another, it could be argued that the risk is almost non-existent. In cases where an Officer does seem overly focused on the needs of the country s/he is operating in,
reviews of her/his performance should reflect this. Staying focused on the needs of the organization is always a condition employment and guarding against clientism should not be viewed any differently from other aspects of job performance. Clientism, however, has been given the metaphoric quality of communicable disease. The very term used to describe the condition is “clientitis,” which seems to sound similar to tonsillitis or appendicitis. While the extent and duration of contact that causes this “country as client” view has yet to be adequately measured (or clearly defined), “clientitis” as the threat that legitimates short postings remains fully in tact. The basis for this concern is three-fold: the accusation of clientitis remains a pariah, the “fear” of clientitis allows Officers to refrain from the difficult and often messy process of cultural interaction, and short duration postings allow for faster career advancement for Officers.

Initially, the appearance of clientitis represents one of the more damaging accusations an Officer can face (Krizay, 1988; Armacost, 1996; Shaffer, 2006; Tucker, 2001). The perception that an Officer is no longer representing the interests of her/his country or institution compromises both the competence and integrity of the Officer in lasting and damaging ways that will seriously impact her/his career. Schaffer (2006) and Tucker (2001) identify incidents in which simply acclimating or working with the local community brought charges of clientitis from other diplomats and officers. The term, it seems, has the power of fact whereby the mere accusation that an Officer has “gone native” erodes that Officer’s credibility to such an extent that lasting damage may be incurred to her or his positions, regardless of merit. One might suspect that personal grudges and resentment of those with the ability to more effectively operate in a foreign culture could also be a motivating factor in the accusation. The process of engagement with local populations can also lead to recommendations of restraint from Officers posted in the “enemy” country when conflicts emerge. In arguing about the dangers of clientism, the conservative American policy institute The Heritage Foundation called into question the actions of the British Foreign Service during the Falklands conflict (Krizay, 1988). They stated that British FSO’s in Argentina
recommended that Thatcher pursue diplomacy before considering military action and argue “the proclivity to accommodation shown in that instance by the British Foreign Office is an institutional characteristic of most foreign services” (p. 2). The cumulative message here is that Officers engaged with the local population risk being branded as disloyal, unreliable, weak, and perhaps even unpatriotic. This alone makes the idea of short postings and a lack of engagement with local populations and local staff a preferable organizational standard. But beyond prevention of accusations of parochialism, the fear of clientism serves other practical functions, as well.

Using clientism as a justification, Officers are allowed and potentially encouraged not to become meaningfully involved in the culture of the host country. The stress created by meaningful and sustained interaction with another culture is not trivial. Storti (1990) found that meaningful intercultural interaction (beyond superficial or tourist-level interaction) can actually produce the symptoms of physical illness on the part of those involved in the interaction. There also tends to be something he describes as an “expatriate sub-culture” where those expats from a country or region tend to band together in isolation when placed into a new cultural environment. Given that most foreign services and international organizations can provide ready access to people of a similar background, such sub-cultures could easily permeate. While Storti’s work analyzes how such sub-cultures typically hurt the personal satisfaction of those involved by preventing full integration into their new environment, clientism can moderate this concern. Isolation from the community can be justified as the appropriate action to ensure that the mentality of Officers is never unduly influenced by the country in which they reside. Such a justification provides a remedy against the enormously taxing work of intercultural interaction, which has been found to be among the most stressful forms of communication by a number of exemplary studies (Ward, et al., 2001; Wan, 2004). Additionally, the most stressful period of intercultural interaction typically occurs later in the process (DeVito, 2009) as differences at the beginning of intercultural relationships are typically minimized, seen as trivial, perhaps charming, or even only as a minor irritation/inconvenience. It is
only as time goes on that such differences are seen in terms of their greater implications in terms of meaning and understanding, producing what is called the “crisis period” of intercultural interaction (Oberg, 1960). Short-duration postings, justified by the fear of clientism, create a situation in which Officers in a mission can avoid a great many of the challenges (and miss many of the rewards) of intercultural interaction.

Beyond reducing the intercultural stresses of international work, short duration postings have another compelling advantage for many Officers: they create more advancement opportunities and reduce accountability for programs initiated during a posting. At the conclusion of one posting, Officers (at least in the State Department) have the opportunity to “bid” on where they will be posted next. Each new bid can bring a move to a more attractive location, a job with higher levels of responsibility, or the chance to affect policies at a post in a diplomatically important country or region. By increasing the number of postings, there are (necessarily), more chances for advancement. To justify this ascension, Officers are then compelled to create meaningful new initiatives at their current post in a relatively short period of time (promotion does not come from “maintaining something that is already good”). This, coupled with a lack of understanding of the cultural environment they are in, creates a situation in which potentially unworkable programs are developed in short order with long-term outcomes not really considered as a part of the decision-making calculus. This was validated in many of the narrative responses in this research with statements such as:

- There is very little long term planning... the longest period is 1.5 years.
- The problem areas are the local US staff that most of the time focuses on empire building, lifestyle management and advancement of the individual career and not the US Government long-term interests.
- We have to start everything all over again. Everyone (new managers) wants to show their power, their skills, but sometimes it just does not make any sense.
- The downfall of working as an FSN in this organization is the continuous change of officers every one or two years.
• The span of the American Officers’ attention is limited... they do not really care what will happen in the Embassy after their time.

• The 2-year-tour basis at State is the very weakness of the system.

As senior level Officer positions are also rotated regularly, the long-term implications of programs initiated during a posting cannot be considered. It may be multiple “generations” of Officers before the full ramifications of previous policies are understood; a long enough period of time that creating accountability is unrealizable. Ironically, the one group of people who serve as the organization’s “institutional memory” are the FSN’s (Foreign Service Nationals: America's Bridge, 2007). However, without an institutional position with legitimate power, their perceptions related to the long-term implications of the actions and policies initiated have little traction. Thus, international organizations and foreign services should consider longer duration postings for Officers with a system of accountability for their work that extends beyond their period at a post.

Several respondents suggested that Officers posted for four years tended to have a greater understanding of local conditions, a better working relationship with the local staff, and an interest in creating more sustained and developed programs at the post. The current norm (depending on area) for a posting is approximately 1-3 years. By shifting this to a 3-5 year system of tours, meaningful interaction with the community would likely increase. Cultural differences would be brought to the fore and real dialogue would be harder to avoid. Programs such as public diplomacy, which often are built on long-term relationships and planning, would benefit by Officers who can now take a longer view on the development and results. Bellamy & Weinberg (2008) argue that the biggest barrier faced in public diplomacy is that knowledge gained is typically taken away when a practitioner accepts a new appointment. The diffusion of local experience related to public diplomacy and the lack of sustained relationships could be remedied by Officers working in one location (with greater FSN input) over a longer period of time. Beyond public diplomacy benefits, local staff tasked with working for a chronically unproductive or hostile supervisor would now have an
incentive to speak out against him or her (rather than merely waiting for the year or two to end and hoping for better luck on the next Officer). In sum, a system of longer tours could create an environment where decisions are better grounded in the local reality and more sustainable over time. In the context of longer postings, the issue of clientism needs to be considered in a meaningful (rather than subjective) way. Internal research and the evaluation of Officer performance should examine the extent to which country identification affects the integrity of the organization’s work (if at all). While there is potential risk in such a program if local culture is found to unduly influence an Officer’s decision-making, the dangers of culturally unengaged Officers making decisions with nominal regard for the future are not theoretical.

There are obviously logistical items that need to be considered before such a shift could be realized in the State Department or other international institution. Posts in hostile locations often require officers to live and stay on a highly secured compound on the grounds of the office. Family members are often forbidden to travel with or visit Officers posted in such locations. Naturally, a 3-5 year posting in such a location would be problematic for organizational morale and may limit the pool of future applicants. Additionally, while blind ambition in FSO’s should be kept in check, it is beneficial to an organization to have Officers looking for advancement. The system of promotion would need to be reconsidered in the context of Officers staying at one location for a greater period of time. There is also the fact that global situations are always in flux and more officers may be needed in a country or region that suddenly becomes strategically important. Clearly, maintaining an Officer’s posting at a location that is less strategically important may not be in the organization’s best interest. These concerns, however, can be remedied through creative solutions on the part of an organization. What this research suggests is that the need for engagement with local populations and the need for a long-term strategic vision should be a central feature of an organization’s decision-making. This can only be met through a system of tours that is long enough to allow such consideration.
6.5 Local Staff Evaluation of Officers

An important piece in the role of local staff is the function of providing an institutional memory for the organization. Officers come and go, there are always new leaders, and new administrations, but the local staff can be the continuity for the organization that extends beyond these changes. The only way that continuity can have meaning, however, is if the local staff can provide their input into the quality of work being done by a supervisor and comment on the long-term results of policies and procedures initiated by previous Officers. Such an arrangement could offer the organization a better understanding of the conditions at a post over time and provide context for evaluating the work of Officers. Reciprocal evaluations would also have the benefit of ensuring that local staff have the opportunity to voice concerns about the attitudes and actions of Officers which are problematic while giving the chance to express appreciation for the exemplary efforts of many supervisors. Numerous such scales exist for public institutions (McEvoy, 1990) and could be adapted to meet the needs of local staff in their evaluation of Officers. The results of such reciprocal evaluations have shown great potential in governmental work as evidenced in the findings of Daley (1997) who states:

Organizations and supervisors need to pay particular attention to those factors that employees expect them to provide (and, hence, hold them accountable). Fairness and trust are salient. Yet, the preservation of fairness and trust are indeed found in the details of administration. Fairness and the trust it engenders are not the result of subscribing to general principles, but are earned from adhering to those principles in carrying out day-to-day activities. The performance appraisal process and the duties of protecting merit are a crucial aspect of this day-to-day struggle (p. 311).

Additionally, Bernardin (1986) contends that employee evaluations of supervisors must be an important piece in any organization that wants accountability for the quality of its leadership. In an organization like the State Department, such a change in thinking would require a number of steps to ensure effectiveness. Marques (2008) notes that there are some common mistakes made in creating supervisory evaluation programs. Some of the shortfalls include:
• Putting employees in a position of vulnerability for honest assessment
• Organizational complicity in minimizing negative supervisory evaluations
• Ignoring or discarding reciprocal evaluations
• Viewing any one evaluation in isolation

In the case of the State Department, the relative position of FSN’s makes each one of these areas a concern for any such program. If local staff believe that honesty will lead to retribution without the possibility of redress, the accuracy of reciprocal evaluations will obviously be compromised. Concerns about the State Department “protecting its own” and minimizing or discarding negative evaluations would also prove to be a disincentive for investing much effort in a reciprocal evaluation program. After all, why risk honesty when the outcome produced will be nominal at best? The reciprocal evaluation process also carries with it a risk that the personality clashes that can always occur in an institution will be exacerbated by a litany of “he said/she said” dueling evaluations. McEvoy (1990) recognizes a number of practical and methodological concerns endemic to creating such supervisory evaluations. A strong recommendation is that such evaluations must be given worth, employees must be protected, and consequences based on performance must follow, but these evaluations need to be part of a multi-faceted evaluation system in which the perceptions of those who work for, with, and above a person are all taken into account in the evaluation process. Doing so creates a substantial incentive for people (especially Officers) to view each level of the organization with a perspective of collegiality, respect, and teamwork—something that many respondents indicated was desperately needed.

6.6 Empowerment and Advancement for Local Staff

An important part of any of the previously stated recommendations is a greater opportunity for advancement and promotion in local staff. For local staff to feel invested in organizational decisions, they need to me more fully included in the
discussion process. Again, this is not a recommendation that local hires need to direct organizational decisions. There might be some matters related to confidentiality and security that they are necessarily excluded from. It is important to note, however, that many organizational day-to-day procedures and new programs could benefit from the insight and expertise offered by local staff who reside in the host country. The organizational culture must also work hard to solicit this input from a population that may have felt excluded from participation in organizational processes. In the case of the State Department, American Officers must create a space for dialogue when FSN’s are part of decision discussions. Merely allowing ornamental “participation” on the part of local staff is not sufficient. Officers must build functioning relationships with the local staff and facilitate a real chance for the staff to offer their ideas during discussions. Officers must also ensure that the local staff who dissent on ideas and proposals are not overwhelmed. Their purpose in decision-making must be more than to rubber stamp proposals already agreed upon by Officers. The result of such participation should be policies that are more in line with the local reality of both the post and the host country. This would also have the ancillary benefit of making the local staff feel more involved in the organization’s priorities, improving commitment levels and possibly increasing the likelihood of employment duration. Such participation would also effectively close the door on the common critique of “we just don’t matter around here” here that was common in the narrative responses in this research.

Such a shift in focus will present challenges in terms of cultural perceptions of empowerment noted in this research. The role of local staff in decision-making needs to be clearly defined and understood. In the case of those with a high power distance, such responsibility may not be fully internalized. Hoon Nam and Wie Han’s (2005) analysis of such a situation shows that some staff members might be nervous in participating in a process that could require creative thinking that extends outside of their fixed employment position. Changing from a “command and control” to a “lead and support” model may make high power distance cultures uncomfortable in a
position that calls for leadership from multiple organizational levels. A management strategy of empowerment emphasizing participative decision-making may also be seen as weak and ineffectual in vertical cultures (Mendonca & Kanungo, 1994). Correspondingly, those with a low power distance might embrace the empowerment but require clear role definition about the point at which a level of institutional hierarchy needs to be maintained. Navigating these two areas can only come from the extended dialogue that should be initiated in the other program recommendations. There is precedent for improved management based on cultural understanding. In studies of organizations where the construction of participative power and decision-making was different among members, Shipper et al. (2003) found:

The results indicate that the relationship between self-awareness and effectiveness needs to be explored controlling for culture. It appears that in low power distance (PD) cultures such as the United States and United Kingdom, self-awareness of interactive skills may be crucial relative to effectiveness whereas in high PD cultures such Malaysia, self-awareness of controlling skills may be crucial relative to effectiveness. These findings follow from Hofstede's (2001) suggestion that different cultures value different managerial behaviors. Thus, the need for self-awareness of different managerial skills varies by culture (p. 189).

Kirkman, et al. (2001) argue that this awareness is manifested in the foci of management when new programs are introduced. In terms of power distance, for example, responsive and aware managers understand that in low power distance cultures, management must clarify the outcomes expected and rationale for the new program. In high power distance cultures, a greater focus needs to be placed on making the expected performance clear and any item requiring self-direction needs to be articulated by a source with legitimate power. Such challenges in terms of empowerment can have significant benefits. Franz (2004) found that empowerment improved workplace morale regardless of power distance. What is important, however, is that an organization must invest effort in understanding the local staff in conjunction with providing more opportunities to shape the direction of the organization.
Understandably, when local staff engage in more organizational decision-making, it will follow that additional promotion and advancement positions need to come with the increased responsibility. This presents a potentially systemic challenge to maintaining sustained organizational commitment on the part of local staff. Policy in a Foreign Service or international organization will typically come from a centralized location. In the case of the State Department, it will come (at least principally) from Washington with an expectation that American Officers are accountable for enacting programs related to that policy and producing results. Thus, there will always be an institutional hierarchy, regardless of the level of empowerment that is given to local staff in carrying out policy. As such, while Junior Officers can work to the level of an Ambassador, Regional Security Officer, or Deputy Chief of Mission at an important post (regardless of whether such a position is ever attained), there will be a clear and visible ceiling for FSN’s at their specific post with most key positions of power still squarely held by Americans. For those who are ambitious, this barrier could ultimately be what prevents long tenure with the organization. Similar situations exist in other international organizations. In each context, the situation will be different based on a number of factors (type of work, size of post, local culture, etc.). With that in mind, this research can only recommend that international organizations generally and the State Department in particular must make finding meaningful advancement structures a priority for local staff. This will obviously be different based on the various situations encountered. However it would be folly to ignore this situation and not expect change. This process begins when the organization considers responses like the one encountered in this research:

*The nature of local employment is such that long-term career opportunities are not readily available[…] For most FSN’s, working for the State means doing one position for life or leaving. When I leave, it will not be from lack of loyalty, but because at some point, the work has been accomplished and it is time to move on.*
If a valuable and contributing member of the team has such a viewpoint, how can the organizational structure for local staff be adapted to ensure that such a person is motivated to extend her/his career with the organization? Without providing advancement opportunities, years of experience and the investment in extensive training will walk out the door every few years and the organization will be forced to re-invest the same (or more) resources to have an employee of (hopefully) equal competence. The entire process is costly, inefficient, and damaging to the organizational mission. The basis for long-term commitment comes from answering the argument above.

6.7 Combined Trainings for Officers and Local Staff

A consistent call by respondents was an increase in the amount of training for local staff. Training serves numerous valuable functions for an organization beyond improving efficiency and skills. Training has been found to improve organizational commitment, build up internal networks, increase knowledge sharing, and develop a climate of team building and shared organizational ownership (Smith, 2004). Obviously, all of these functions are incredibly important and could benefit both the local staff and the organization as a whole. The State Department has a developed training infrastructure with the Foreign Service Institute in Washington serving a (primarily) American audience of Officers with a network of training centers, online courses, and onsite courses delivered to FSN’s throughout the world. While the segmentation between Americans and FSN’s in training is not official policy, it is (in many ways) the de facto reality. Creating courses that incorporate both American Officers and FSN’s would allow the knowledge sharing and team-building functions of training to stretch across the divide between each group. It could also develop greater opportunities for discussion of work-related issues in a safe and appropriate context.
There would be some challenges that such combined trainings would intrinsically face in the current conditions of the State Department. Specifically, facilitating the participation of FSN’s in discussion would involve a level of local understanding of the culture considerations regarding interaction. Officers could certainly contribute, but if the feeling on the part of participating FSN’s is that a dominating Officer is seeking validation and not really inviting discussion, this could result in non-participation. In short, the focus of such courses needs to be explicit in the call for equal participation from all sides. This is important in addition to making sure the level of course content enhances the skills of both FSN’s and Officers. For the course to be successful, the opportunity for mutual development must be understood by both sides. The end result for the State Department and other international organizations would be that training serves not only to improve the attitude, skills, and effort of the workforce- it could be the basis for building bridges across the organizational divide experienced by local staff. This important function can only be realized, however, if both sides go into the training with a level of enthusiasm and a willingness to develop (i.e. elimination of the “I don’t have time to go to a stupid training” response).

6.8 Employee Satisfaction Surveys by Area

Some base measures for progress created by all of these areas need to be established by systematic and regular evaluations of local staff satisfaction. Such an evaluation would offer insight into the overall effectiveness of new initiatives in increasing the organizational commitment of local staff and the cultural/relationship competence of the institution, as a whole. As this research has shown, this can vary by area. In the case of the narrative responses in this survey, certain sections of the State Department were identified as being more conducive to empowering local staff and having a respectful dialogue with colleagues. Public affairs/public diplomacy, for example, produced:

- I've had some rough experience with a very few Americans and that was mainly personality issues of the individuals. Generally speaking, I enjoy my work in the Public Affairs Section.
• Working for the Public Affairs section of the Department of State is unlike working for most other organizations. Only employment in the diplomatic service of one’s own country or in a multi-national organization like the UN would be comparable. In my view, working in PA offers a wide range of professional and personal opportunities which one needs to seize and not to allow some of the administrative, management, ideological and hierarchical constraints to limit one’s possibilities of what in my experience has been an extraordinarily interesting and varied job.

• I’m dealing with the public day-by-day representing the Department of State - I’m proud to be a member and know that my work and how I perform has a little influence on the overall Austrian/U.S. relations.

A comprehensive study that investigates each area of an organization specifically could allow an even more detailed view of the structures of each section and their relation to the overall satisfaction the local staff. Thus, regular evaluation of employment satisfaction should seek to identify departmental areas and locations that are yielding higher levels of engagement on the part of local employees. Upon identifying exceptionally high areas of satisfaction, an investigation into the work-style and programs of that area could yield several examples of best practices that could be employed throughout the organization as a whole. For example, if some location offered a high degree of autonomy for local staff doing public diplomacy and this produced higher levels of satisfaction/commitment, that area should be investigated to determine if these kinds of autonomy giving structures might benefit other local in other areas/locations. Due to the need for anonymity and discretion required for respondents to the survey in this research, there were no questions about location or area included in the study (I was advised by the State Department that this would probably decrease the authenticity of responses; tracing “who said what” would be relatively easy if I knew the post/area of the respondents). An organizationally implemented survey in the context of an organization that is more open and engaged with local staff could yield the kind of honest results that could help the institution make productive choices in employment policy.

In sum, these program recommendations would not remedy all of the challenges noted by FSN’s in this research. But if an international organization is able to offer a stake
for local staff to contribute in the organization and is willing to provide respectful
dialogue that seeks clarity and understanding (rather than snap judgments and
hierarchy), the result could very well be an institution that fully realizes the resources
brought to the table by all team members.
Concluding Summation

In evaluating the overall results of this research, there are clear and potentially instructive answers to many of the questions raised. The State Department’s publications highlight the importance of FSN’s while suggesting (in a typically genteel fashion) the “other” status of its foreign employees. Both aspects of the role of an FSN were keenly understood by this research population— that they are crucial to meeting missions objectives in the context of transient American Officers and ambassadors and that despite (or perhaps because of) their important status, their role is not fully valued. This research also demonstrated that an individual’s cultural orientation matters in the context of such an organizational structure. Not surprisingly, acceptance of hierarchy played a role in the perceived acceptance of institutional norms and policies that limit the organizational voice of FSN’s. Based on existing research, this result is unsurprising and unremarkable (outside of the fact that this was the first such investigation into the perceptions of FSN’s). What is important to note, however, is that this perceived acceptance on the part of FSN’s accepting hierarchy may mask hidden feelings that are at best ambivalent towards the State Department. Both narrative responses and analysis of employment patterns shows that the those who give a generally unquestioning “yes” to State Department policies may actually hide a vehement “no” in their personal and private interactions. When coupled with many American Officers demonstrated lack of skill at reading cultural cues (or even functionally speaking a foreign language), this relationship creates a recipe for potential missteps.

Literature explored in this research suggests that public diplomacy has power in shaping world perception towards a state. The extent of this power is certainly debatable, but history has shown that world perception and political action are, at least at some level, related. The Cold War may have been won with doctrines of mutually assured destruction, a massive military industrial complex, rocket ships and space planes, and the threat of tanks in eyesight at contested borders. But it would be naïve
to believe that these displays of hard power alone were completely decisive in the conflict. The West, with its (perhaps constructed?) allure of fast cars, good times, rock music, political autonomy, and freedom from want, undoubtedly shook the faith of a portion of the population that was joyously complicit in rebellion against Party elders. As the U.S. is currently engaged in yet another military/ideological battle, the woeful state of its public diplomacy is fully outlined in this research. If the current conflicts of the U.S. are as much about “the hearts and minds of the world” as many argue, the demonstrated inability to speak to the world can no longer be overlooked. Given the power that FSN’s could wield as advocates for American interests in both their communities and countries, it is striking how underutilized and undervalued many of these potential “citizen diplomats” feel, as outlined in this research. For the State Department, or an international institution, to bring its message to foreign populations, that message must be constructed with (and in some cases by) members of those populations. This research, along with the work of others referenced herein, makes a strong case that the level of cultural understanding on the part of institutional leaders is inadequate for meeting this mandate.

Perhaps, as some argue, this research points to a deeper truth about the duality of the American character that has profound implications for its foreign relations. America proclaims itself as a land of immigrants, ignoring the sizeable population that was displaced by its founding. Through the metaphor of a “melting pot,” America has long argued that the unique ethnic character that each culture brings when it arrives in the country shapes the flavor of the whole. Through the years and over generations, the old identity is generally lost, leaving only the label of the previous tradition. There are self-identified Italian Americans who speak not one word of the language. Many Americans celebrate their Polish heritage, while remaining completely ignorant of the goings on in “the old country.” Students on a short excursion to Europe or Asia may come back with what they project as a meaningful understanding of the cultures they visited. Perhaps this “culture as costume” and “culture as custom” view has created an overly optimistic perception that “They” are not so different than “Us” and that
understanding is easy. Perhaps in this context, it’s easy to understand why the State Department broadcasts a policy of engagement with the world and appreciation for its local workforce- the concept of difference has not fully been internalized by much of American culture. This could speak to a number of questionable decisions made by American policy-makers- specifically that other states want their economies and institutions to mirror those of the United States. This core belief, that cultural difference is not significant enough to be a priority, could be at the foundation of a government that seems to regularly behave as though the world wants and should want to be American. Within the microcosm of the State Department, the duality of the American conception of difference comes to the fore- the FSN’s are not like us but we can assume that they are exactly like us. Culture pulls people in different directions. It twists and turns people. It can make a decision seem completely rational, while being catastrophically stupid, based entirely on one’s cultural orientation. It shapes time. It alters the perception of space. It creates problems that one group tries to solve, while another group simply tries to manage. It is ugly and beautiful. It can inspire the basest instincts and uplift human impulses. In short, how we see the world affects how the world will see us. Until culture is viewed as a fundamental part of the epistemology of states, communities, and individuals, the full understanding of decisions and the motivation for those decisions will be impossible- leaving those ignorant to believe that planetary gaps are merely at arms length.
References


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Peterson, P. (2002, September). Public Diplomacy and the War on Terrorism: A


APPENDIX 1: Survey Copy

This paper version of the survey was distributed at the described training sites. It was a paper copy completed by the FSN’s present.

Survey instructions: The following survey relates to your GENERAL views on the relationship between supervisors and employees. Several questions are related SPECIFICALLY to your employment with the U.S. State Department or other U.S. Government organization. Please circle the correct response for each item.

Questions about your general views on management/supervision

1. Managers should make most decisions without consulting subordinates.
   Strongly Disagree 1 2 3 4 5 Strongly Agree

2. It is frequently necessary for a manager to use authority and power when dealing with subordinates.
   Strongly Disagree 1 2 3 4 5 Strongly Agree

3. Managers should seldom ask for the opinions of employees.
   Strongly Disagree 1 2 3 4 5 Strongly Agree

4. Managers should avoid off-the-job social contacts with employees.
   Strongly Disagree 1 2 3 4 5 Strongly Agree

5. Employees should not disagree with management decisions.
   Strongly Disagree 1 2 3 4 5 Strongly Agree

6. Managers should not delegate important tasks to employees.
   Strongly Disagree 1 2 3 4 5 Strongly Agree

Questions about your employment with the U.S. State Department or other U.S. Government organization

7. I am willing to put in a great deal of effort beyond that normally expected in order to help this organization be successful.
   Strongly Disagree 1 2 3 4 5 Strongly Agree

8. I talk favorably about this organization to my friends as a great organization to work for.
   Strongly Disagree 1 2 3 4 5 Strongly Agree

9. I feel very little loyalty to this organization.
   Strongly Disagree 1 2 3 4 5 Strongly Agree
10. I would accept almost any type of job assignment in order to keep working for this organization.

Strongly Disagree 1 2 3 4 5 Strongly Agree

11. I find that my values and the organization's values are very similar.

Strongly Disagree 1 2 3 4 5 Strongly Agree

12. I am proud to tell others that I am part of this organization.

Strongly Disagree 1 2 3 4 5 Strongly Agree

13. I would be just as happy working for a different organization as long as the type of work was similar.

Strongly Disagree 1 2 3 4 5 Strongly Agree

14. This organization really inspires the very best in me in the way of job performance.

Strongly Disagree 1 2 3 4 5 Strongly Agree

15. It would take very little change in my present circumstances to cause me to leave.

Strongly Disagree 1 2 3 4 5 Strongly Agree

16. I am extremely glad that I chose this organization to work for over other organizations.

Strongly Disagree 1 2 3 4 5 Strongly Agree

17. There's not too much to be gained by staying with this organization over time.

Strongly Disagree 1 2 3 4 5 Strongly Agree

18. Often, I find it difficult to agree with this organization's policies on important matters relating to its employees.

Strongly Disagree 1 2 3 4 5 Strongly Agree

19. I really care about the fate of this organization.

Strongly Disagree 1 2 3 4 5 Strongly Agree

20. For me, this is the best of all possible organizations to work for.

Strongly Disagree 1 2 3 4 5 Strongly Agree

21. Deciding to work for this organization was a definite mistake on my part.

Strongly Disagree 1 2 3 4 5 Strongly Agree

22. I would be very happy to spend the rest of my career with this organization.

Strongly Disagree 1 2 3 4 5 Strongly Agree

23. I enjoy discussing my organization with people outside it.

Strongly Disagree 1 2 3 4 5 Strongly Agree

24. I really feel as if this organization's problems are my own.
25. I think that I could easily become as attached to another organization as I am to this one.

26. I do not feel like ‘part of the family’ in my organization.

27. I do not feel ‘emotionally attached’ to this organization.

28. This organization has a great deal of personal meaning for me.

29. I do not feel a strong sense of belonging to my organization.

General Questions

30. How long have you been employed by the State Department or other U.S. Government organization?
0-3 years 4-6 years 7-9 years More than 9 years

31. How often do you have contact with American officers in the course of your duties?
Almost Never 1 2 3 4 5 Very Frequently

32. Please write any follow-up information regarding your views on management/supervision, your employment with the U.S. State Department or other U.S. Government organization, or your opinions in relation to any question in this survey:

As noted, the survey (identical in content) was also distributed electronically via the State Department’s online service for FSN training and support. Due to the formatting of the survey online and the need to inform online responders (who necessarily cannot ask clarification questions), minor (non-significant) changes were made to design and instructions. The company Zip Survey (www.zipsurvey.com) logged and stored each individual’s survey responses, while ensuring the anonymity of the responder. No statistically significant differences were found between responses to the paper survey and the online version.
**APPENDIX 2: Narrative Responses**

Full text of survey of all responses given to the open survey question. Please note that the grammar, style, and punctuation of respondents were generally maintained to fully preserve the authenticity of survey responses. Copy editing and editorial changes to clarify statements were made in quotations from this material in previous sections of the research.

Please write any follow-up information regarding your views on management/supervision, your employment with the U.S. State Department or other U.S. Government organization, or your opinions in relation to any question in this survey:

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<td>1.</td>
<td>I get the respect I am looking for, happy with salary, emotionally stable in my job</td>
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<td>2.</td>
<td>I have always felt like there are &quot;us&quot; (LES) and &quot;them&quot; (American officers)</td>
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<td>3.</td>
<td>Given that I work in the public affairs, most of the management (or mismanagement) issues stem from the reality that the USIA was folded in to the State Department ushering in a variety of changes to the way the U.S. conducts public affairs outreach abroad.</td>
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<td>4.</td>
<td>Would recommend that ALL U.S. supervisors be more attentive to problems regarding ALL their LES employees and be more fair in the treatment reserved to them in matter of evaluation, consideration and respect.</td>
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<td>5.</td>
<td>American supervision is very poor. The Department of state has no feeling to deal with FSNs and the main policy is &quot;WE DO NOT CARE&quot;. There is very less long term planning. The longest period is 11/2 years. No views, no long term decisions. No American officer cares what happens after his 3 year tour.</td>
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<td>6.</td>
<td>The survey confuses the organization and local US managers. The organization</td>
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has excellent goals and is an excellent one. The problem areas are the local US staff who are most of the time focus on, empire building, lifestyle management and advancement of the individual career and not the US Government long term interests!

| 7. | I started working for the U.S. Mission right after I finished my education 29 years ago. I just don't have an idea what it might be like to have a different employer. The relationship with our American supervisors relies heavily on the personality and work style of our supervisors and is therefore subject to change every three years. Some of them do involve the FSNs and some of them don't. Each of them has a personal work style. Accordingly, the flow of communication is at times really good sometimes there are periods when it is not. These are the results of having watched American officers come and go over many years. |

| 8. | I like the fact that team spirit is encouraged in our organization. I think that in organization supervision it is important to involve subordinates in the decision making process. At the same time there are cases when decisions should be made in authoritative manner. |

| 9. | My time with the State Department has generally been positive. But in recent years there have been incidents of dishonesty (skimming funds for personal use), turning a blind eye to bad practices (such as putting mail of departed officers in the garbage instead of taking time to forward), and the policy has been to ignore these practices. One appalling incident was giving a high-calibre award to a very bad officer to help (him/her) get a new posting when (he/she) has had no responses to new-post applications. This person hardly shows up at work. That made everyone in the local organization feel extremely disillusioned and cynical. Fortunately the OIG visited post and semi-addressed some of these issues. I see the value of the OIG after witnessing events in the past few years. At least it offers SOME safeguards but if management policy is to ignore wrongdoings the attitude among FSNs is that FSOs will do anything, ignore everything, to protect their own. This does not foster a good workplace. |
It is very difficult to project your stay where there is very little room for growth. Good supervisors come and go and so do their recognition of your job. There should be some plan for professional advancement for FSN's.

Since I have been with the Embassy (a little less than 5 years), I have noticed the huge gap between Americans and Foreign Service Nationals. FSNs tend to serve in the missions for many years, so there is a lot of loyalty, and in the past, there was a greater prestige to working with the Mission. In the recent years, at our Post, FSNs have become increasingly displeased with the poor salary adjustments that we have been given. They have not reached to half of the annual inflation rates. Morale among the FSN population is very low. And Management can't seem to do much to improve it. I have heard it over and over again from the FSNs who have been here for more than 15 years - things are very different now, and not for the better. Management is always telling the FSNs that we are the glue that hold things together for the Missions abroad, and that we are the ones that keep things running. I don't think FSNs at our Post feel that we are being appreciated as such. I am involved in the local FSN association. I have noticed how different management styles can make a difference in employee relations. In dealing with upper Management, the management style of the Joint Management Officer is a key factor. We are very fortunate to have an exceptional JMO currently at our Post. But at the same time, we are also very aware that he is exceptional - he is not the "rule". Within the Mission, the people that work with USAID are, in general, more motivated than those of us working for the Department of State. On a personal note, I am a US citizen hired as an FSN. Of places to work (after many years of managing my own business), the Embassy was my first choice, and I was fortunate enough to get a job offer after my third attempt. I was overqualified for the job I got, but I chose to place a foot in the door, knowing that you can make a career out of working for the Embassy. Once you are in, you realize that there really isn't much room for growth - or at least, that is the case at our Post. I think that finding the motivation to outdo yourself in
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<td>2.</td>
<td>your job depends a lot on your supervisors. We can't really look at it as an opportunity for promotion because there really aren't promotions here. You can compete for a job opening with everybody within and outside the Mission. There is no sense of community at our Post. Americans don't really associate much with FSNs, and we have also learned to keep our distance. Truth be told, FSNs are like third class citizens among the community. First the American officers, then the officer family members and then the FSNs.</td>
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<td>12.</td>
<td>State Department is a huge bureaucratic organization. Being at post we do sometimes feel like part of the family but when certain regulations come from DC this feeling is usually gone. This happens due to the different realities in DC and at posts.</td>
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<td>13.</td>
<td>Some of the answers are related to my feelings towards the current Administration. The answers would have been different if you had asked the questions 8 years ago. Pls also appreciate the fact that we (even as FSNs) are not encouraged to discuss too much about this organization and our job with people outside due to security concern. This actually has a subtle impact on how emotionally/personally attached we can be to this organization.</td>
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<td>14.</td>
<td>as an FSN /w more than 9 years working for DoS, sometimes it's really hard to work with many types of bosses, since they just come and go every 2 or 3-4 years. We have to start everything all over again. Everyone (new managers) wants to show their power, their skills, but sometimes it just does not make any sense.</td>
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<td>15.</td>
<td>I like this survey because I send my views.</td>
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<td>16.</td>
<td>I've really enjoyed doing the public affairs work for the U.S. Government for the past 16 years, and I hope to continue working at the current post during the rest of my career until the mandatory retirement age.</td>
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<td>17.</td>
<td>Despite the congenial environment the organization offers, there should be more scopes for promotions and recognition. FSO often lose sight of the consistent</td>
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<td><strong>18.</strong></td>
<td>As we know two persons can never be of the same disposition or mentality, or of the same caliber, so it's natural that the relation between the supervisor and the employee can never be the same. Every supervisor does have his own style of works. We the employees have to act accordingly. Sometimes we enjoy such change of taste, but sometimes it hurts us. Close friendly relationship with supervisors engenders enthusiasm to perform better and job satisfaction in employees’ hearts leading to better atmosphere of works. But it does not always happen.</td>
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<td><strong>19.</strong></td>
<td>My answers to some of the questions depends. For instance, when asked if I feel like family to this organization, sometimes I do and other times I don't. I've had some rough experience with a very few Americans and that was mainly personality issue of the individuals. Generally speaking, I enjoy my work in the Public Affairs Section.</td>
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<td><strong>20.</strong></td>
<td>In most of the questions I marked neither agree or disagree because it depends on the administration at the time. Here I mean the Exo - what the Ambassador wants is what PAO will tell us to do and also it will depend if PAO is not strong enough to challenge and guide the Ambassador we end up doing things we shouldn't be doing. Aslo age of PAO/supervisors matters - young officers care for their promotions - whereas old supervisors guide the ambo and care for the welfare of their staff.</td>
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<td><strong>21.</strong></td>
<td>I like working at this institution because they give us a space to be creative, and be supportive to any innovative ideas to enhance the quality of the &quot;product&quot; we are manufacturing within the regulations and laws spectrum and to achieve mission objectives.</td>
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<td><strong>22.</strong></td>
<td>Management/Supervision style change every three years with the change of</td>
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officers in the Embassy. Local employees have to adapt to these changes. Not many DOS officers are really good managers as many of them aspire for promotion during their three-year assignments and will do only things which they think will help them get promoted. All managers should undergo a people skills course, especially those who supervise local employees, such as those in General Services and Public Diplomacy. Cultural Diplomacy begins at the workplace such as an Embassy. What works in one country will not necessarily work in another. Cultural sensitivity is very important. Bad managers result in the Ugly American image.

In my 8-year career with 3 organisations, the State Department is the only organisation that rewards innovation, and hard work through various incentives. I value competition and this is the most ideal work environment for me. The organisational values are also ideal for my country and supervisors appreciate any kind of interventions that reflect these values.

The nature of FSN employment is such that long-term career opportunities are not readily available and as such, employees should be encouraged to grow and develop to both benefit DoS but also in order to have skilled workers that move to new careers after a few years. I have had the opportunity to do both as I have been fortunate to have great management that has also given me the opportunity to train and develop and then supported me when I wanted to serve in Iraq, where I was given even greater opportunities. When I came home, that was recognized and I have been able to move into a much more senior position. For most FSN's, working for the DoS means doing one position for life or leaving. When I leave, it will not be from lack of loyalty, but because at some point, the work has been accomplished and it is time to move on. Realizing that FSNs like FSOs want career development and the ability to develop and move on, is an integral part in recruiting and maintaining the very best, while keeping the organization vibrant, creative and flexible to changing needs and world developments. I saw this particularly in Iraq were 'long-serving' means that you
have been there for more than a year, and that is not always a bad thing. I am critical of the CAJE as it emphasizes the abstract work and not the individual performing it which means that a mediocre-performing staff may, possibly, receive a greater reward simply by reason of that position description than someone who performs outstanding. Places were labor is cheap will have higher-ranked FSNs than places were skill, independence and responsibility are key individual requirements. Overall, the DoS is an excellent employer, often paying more than market-comparative salaries and with many benefits, it is rewarding and challenging and for me, it is an opportunity do something no private company could do or offer. I believe that, without change or growth, an ideal time to stay in a position is no more than 3-5 years depending on the skill required to perform it, similar to a posting. In some countries, the DoS may be a life-long service and some people will stay all life, but for most of today's workforce, the ideal is to come in, do a great job and move on when the maximum has been reached, and I am very thankful for having this opportunity to hopefully do so for something I believe in. Also, thank you for the opportunity to submit some of my views on this matter.

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<td>25.</td>
<td>I think this organization provides a good example of the US democracy and, above all, of what 'you can do for your country'. I share many points of view in way it is managed (strict control over the way money is spent, for example). Obviously, there are also things that after 25 years I have learned and which are not completely positive. Sometimes personnel/managing problems tend to be postponed indefinitely as the American officer in charge knows s/he will be leaving soon and is not willing to take on the burden of difficult decisions.</td>
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<td>26.</td>
<td>A lot depends on a particular supervisor and/or higher management of the mission. The overall feeling is that at present general interest in keeping good employees is going down as compared with the situation a decade ago.</td>
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<td>27.</td>
<td>Most of the time supervisors do not care about CAJE. Either they don't have time to review/work on it, or they just ignore it. Supervisors sometimes make a big</td>
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difference between FSNs while they should treat them equally. Most of the supervisors do not have knowledge of the language and culture of the host country which make it difficult to deal with FSNs and the mission contacts.

| 28. | It is kind of tricky to give realistic views on management as everything depends on the american officers. Some are effective and have good management skills whereas some are completely out of the scheme and would not integrated their environment. So the morale or the loyalty of a local employee depends on who is in control. There are also situations where officers are too weak to manage a deficient employee. This lack of authority is seen by hard working FSNs as a sign of mismanagement. |
| 29. | In general the management/supervision is fine. But sometimes, a "strong/wrong character" can make the difference. It is great if a boss is a normal person, with challenging requests, but if the boss is not sure of what he wants, then it is a completely different situation. And what bothers me most is micro-management, and moody bosses. We know our job, contacts, and we are loyal. My basic motto is to present America in the best possible light whenever, wherever, and I am proud to be able to do this in normal circumstances. |
| 30. | This survey reflects views from the FSN point of view. Some equestions seemed even irrelevant to me, due to way hierarchy organized within the embassy system. |
| 31. | US diplomats come here and have very limited managerial skills, and even more, they lack the willingness to take decisions that might have a negative impact on FSNs. But this "all and each of you are the best" does damage morale of high performers. |
| 32. | 1. The first 6 questions are especially interesting. 2. Questions 7-29 focused on employee loyalty/attachment to the organization is little too much. 3. Working with the State department in the Field is very interesting and exiting but FSNs some time encounter huge challenges due to working with American Officers |
who lack some managerial skills in handling work/people or sometimes not
culturally sensitive/informed or misinformed. 4. In relation to question 4, 99
percent of American Officers/managers at the post where I belong avoid off-the-
job social contact with employees which make is incomplete experience.

| 33. | Working for the PA section of the DoS is unlike working for most other
organizations. Only employment in the diplomatic service of one's own country
or in a multi-national organization like the UN would be comparable. In my view
working in PA for the DoS offers a wide range of professional and personal
opportunities which one needs to seize and not to allow some of the
administrative, management, ideological and hierarchical constraints to limit
one's possibilities of what in my experience has been an extraordinarily
interesting and varied job. |
| 34. | The down fall of working as LES in this organization is the continuous change of
officers every one or two years. LES have difficult time in transition periods.
However, good officers/managers keep their marks and lasting memories, and
memories of not so good ones are often forgotten. |
| 35. | In Embassies, American officers stay generally for 2 to three years. This means
that management styles change every 2 or three years. Management involves
science (objective aspects) and personality (subjective aspects) and the challenge
for the LES is to have the intelligence to adapt to every management style. This
is like human life. It is not easy all the time. |
| 36. | There should be more training opportunities both for FSNs and Supervisors. As
much as possible, FSNs and Supervisors should jointly participate in training
sessions on critical issues relating to their job. |
| 37. | I haven’t had many officers who cares about FSN. I am under a FSN supervision
and I do feel annoyed by it. My supervisor does not care about the job I do. |
| 38. | The locally employed staff in my post has been so distressed by the humiliation
and discrimination from management and American Officers. Newly appointed |
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<td><strong>39.</strong></td>
<td>American Officers do not value the long experience of the local staff; they ignore the knowledge provided to them and treat them with superiority. As for the questions, the answers should have included other options.</td>
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<td><strong>40.</strong></td>
<td>As employees of this organization we feel that we are discriminated and humiliated by some of our supervisors and managers and not treated well. I'd like to take this opportunity to suggest that officers before they join the organization should receive an intensive management course on how to treat and work with their staff in human way and try to learn from them not to attack them and benefit from their experience, also to ask their opinion and share with them their thoughts and plans. We are working here for the benefit of the U.S. government, therefore, we need our performance to be appreciated and rewarded. Not to be humiliated.</td>
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<td><strong>41.</strong></td>
<td>My management and supervision views depend on the managers and the supervisors themselves....I am cannot talk in terms of organization but in terms of human relations, the relation to the organization depends on your relation to the people you work with. Moreover, the fact that supervisors and managers change frequently makes it difficult to be attached to the organization. In addition other businesses mainly oil companies offer much better job opportunities in my area, the fact that makes me think about leaving the embassy for another better salary, in an international environment and training opportunities.</td>
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<td><strong>42.</strong></td>
<td>There are very very limited opportunities for the career development. The longer you work, the less they are. Loyalty is not appreciated here.</td>
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<td><strong>43.</strong></td>
<td>I worked for a French embassy for about 3 years. When I compare the two systems, I prefer the American way of doing things: employees are given the trust and opportunity to perform their duties the best way they think it should be done.</td>
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<td><strong>44.</strong></td>
<td>American officers do not seek guidance from FSN supervisors or employees,</td>
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they tend to believe that by being who they are they do not have to request information from a local national. They act rude to their fellow FSNs and sometime discriminatory behavior is perceived. The statement "if it comes from an FSN employee does not count" is very common in this atmosphere.

44. FSN's should become more training. FSN's should be able to take the FSI online language courses.

45. Most of them really do not care about you. if it is in there best interest or to keep other people happy they can and will either make or break you Often they do not follow up promises and do not do anything about situations among fsn,s

46. Supervisors often lack good management/people skills. Local hires are treated as staff more often than as colleagues. Sometimes FSO supervisors try too hard to be "friends" with subordinates. Credit is too often claimed for work completed by or initiated by a subordinate.

47. While FSOs have superb analytical and drafting skills, management and leadership can be a challenge for some. The State Department should do more to assist senior FSOs to grow in their managerial capabilities and move up from being team members to becoming team leaders.

48. Local practise is not always adhered to.

49. State should remove the word "management" from its org chart and telephone book until it implements basic principles. The "kiss up and kick down" culture just doesn't work, and our almost complete failure to prioritize goals and objectives, coupled with a failure to pursue the necessary resources to accomplish even basic tasks, is stifling.

50. I have currently served 12 years with the State dept and they have all been enjoyable in the most part. However, I feel that the lack of money at certain posts to enhance employees capabilities to perform in their roles is now becoming increasingly obvious. I travel frequently as part of my employment and seeing other regions and their spending capabilities due to more funding from State than
what is received in EUR is extremely frustrating. Training budgets should be more uniform across the globe. We have not had any money in our Embassy training budget for two years now - this is really unacceptable for any organisation, if they expect to get the best from their employees - extremely short sighted!

51. all good - happy Christmas and a happy new Year R

52. I work for 27+ years with the Department of State, 22+ years in a supervisory position, I'm dealing with the public day by day representing the Department of State - I'm proud to be a member and know that my work and how I perform has a little influence on the overall Austrian/U.S. relations.

53. The one downside with working at the State Department is that some officers believe that they are superior than FSNs, or at least treat us in a condescending way that makes us feel that.

54. I feel that it is extremely important that American officers talk to their employees to check not only how but also why they perform their duties in a certain way. Empathy is really important as

55. I was sexually touched in a humiliating and public way by a supervisor. Two American Officers were there when this happened. They said nothing and only joked about it when I brought it up later. I think they know this totally, completely is harassment but they want no involvement. If there is an investigation, it could go against their records and hurt their chance for a promotion or better post. They think “the stupid FSN will keep her mouth shut and make no problems…” This happens A LOT on many issues. They don’t care about us- only their careers. I have an advanced university diploma- do they ever treat me like I have something to offer? NO! The day I leave this place with my pride will be one of the best days of my life.

56. Thank you for the survey.

57. If to compare with previous years now the embassy has lost its "good public
image”.

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<td>233</td>
<td>Although it is widely known that many issues depend on personalities, their management style and behavior in public, current supervisors neither have skills nor wish to better know the country. In such situation when there are &quot;We Americans, and you FSNs&quot;, it is really hard to work and compete with EU funding and their programs.</td>
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<td>58.</td>
<td>Americans usually talk down to locally employed staff and have an arrogant view towards the host country. The Ambassador is very distant at my post and has old values and ways of managing. It says a lot that she can call me by my nickname even if I never gave her permission for that but I have to call her by her title and stand up for her every time she enters a room, everyday for three years. I believe you earn respect but nobody not even the Ambassador gets it for having people stand up for her.</td>
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<td>59.</td>
<td>I personally feel that over the years our embassy has been miss managed. Due to management decision the communication/understanding between American and local employees has become very distant. Communication, understanding and mutual benefit is key to building the bridges and I hope that management becomes more aware of this. Although my values are equal to those of Americans and I take proud in the work that I do and how I do it, management decision &quot;sometimes&quot; lead me to thing &quot;what am I doing here&quot;. Thank you for your efforts and I wish you all the success.</td>
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<td>60.</td>
<td>It is very difficult to work with Ambassadors who are political appointees. In some cases they do not realise what position they carry and that they did not come for touring a beautiful country only but to represent the United States of America. The staff sees very clearly who is who.</td>
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<td>61.</td>
<td>I strongly believe that there should be a continuity line when officers are transferred. I mean that many times when a new officer is assigned at post, all the work done by his/her predecessor was wrong and everything starts over again every two or three years. I understand that changes are good when they mean improvement, not just for the sake of changing or doing things your own way.</td>
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This is many times the cause of frustration to LES employees (together with the saying "in my previous post") and why organizations can't grow on a solid base. Thank you for valuing our opinion.

I feel that Teamwork is a strong method of work it has been practiced within this organization along these years. Likewise, leadership shown by the current and former American Direct Hired Staff has strongly joined the sense of belonging to this organization as a family. Congrats on this initiative of providing more training in professional development skills to the U.S. Government employees that will certainly improve the U.S. Mission towards to a high performance organization.

I am happy to work with U.S. State Department and hope to continue so. Still there is a family after the working hours to enjoy.

Supervisors and their management styles change in the course of the years. But lately, communication and being informed of what is going on has become more of a problem despite all information and communication technologies in place.

The breach between U.S. direct hire employees and LES is very wide and I do not see a serious effort on the part of management to improve the situation. LES seem to be an after-thought or a necessary evil to most American managers who pay lip service to the idea of employee integration. As an AMCIT LES, I feel the situation is even more difficult as I am considered "neither here nor there". In addition, the fact that, as an American citizen working for the State Department, I am subject to full U.S. taxes, but my status as LES also requires me to pay full local taxes means that my net income after taxes is around 40% of my gross—a situation that I was NOT apprised of when I was offered the position. I feel that I am somehow being punished for working for my own government. My direct supervisor and the MO at mission are sympathetic to my situation, but are unable to really help. When I presented the issue to the Director General's office, the response I eventually got was less than satisfying (yes, you are liable for both taxes and, as the country you reside doesn't have a tax treaty with the U.S.,
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<td><strong>nothing can be done. Needless to say, the situation doesn't make my current position my &quot;dream job&quot;. That being said, while I'm here, I try to do the best job I can.</strong></td>
<td><strong>The management situation varies extremely with turnover. Characters, styles and opinions can be very different, which sometimes makes it hard, since the direction the mission/department was heading is changing along - sometimes with extreme consequence.</strong></td>
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<td><strong>66.</strong></td>
<td><strong>67.</strong></td>
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<td>After 9 year working for the Embassy, I know, that our supervisors do not know in detail, what the people are doing. To get a higher salary, &quot;is important to sell my self&quot;, instead to work as best as I know. In general, I enjoy my work, I am happy to work for the Embassy, but I think that the salary system is not fair.</td>
<td>It is sometimes frustrating to get new boss every 2 years, especially since your knowledge base is really huge and bosses are juniors. However it is great when your boss is not the best one and when he/she is due to leave. Also micromanagement in this organization is difficult to deal with since normally micromangers do not know much about process and they slow it down..</td>
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<td><strong>68.</strong></td>
<td><strong>69.</strong></td>
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<td>I feel a great gratitude with the US Embassy in Bogota. My work performance in these 31 years has been outstanding and I have been very lucky with the American Supervisors I have worked with. Unfortunately my grade was frozen around 15 years ago and I have not had an step increase during all these years and the salary increase has been very low in the last 3 years, so my salary has become lower in terms of the annual salary necessary for living in Colombia. I hope my next supervisor will help me next year.</td>
<td><strong>70.</strong></td>
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<td>I don't agree with the actual management/supervision in my Section. Unfortunately I don't feel respected and much appreciated, it hurts and it's very disappointing. This affects my morale and my view of the Embassy which I've always idealized.</td>
<td>Being a part of the consular section staff for over 13 years, having started with</td>
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<td><strong>one American officer and 2 LES I have enjoyed my employment basically due to the management/supervision attitudes. Now there are 3 American officers and 3 LES (plus one frozen position) at the consular section which adds to the management issue and provides a different perspective. We have been blessed by the consular officers during all this time and I have always valued the respect, trust and friendly working relationships we have been and are in. I still believe that basic decisions have to be made by the supervisors but different opinions might help to make the right decision. Most of the job requirements cannot be questioned and are set very clearly but there are many things which can be decided inside the section with everybody involved.</strong></td>
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<td><strong>72.</strong></td>
<td><strong>I am working about 24 years for my Embassy and I had bad/regular opinion about the attitude of two direct supervisors, they made my working life very unhappy.</strong></td>
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<td><strong>73.</strong></td>
<td><strong>All in all I'm very satisfied with DOS organization and employer/employee relations, however, there's always an issue of personalities - good or bad - as in any other organization. At times DOS policies do not &quot;protect&quot; subordinates from bad managers. Yet I have been lucky thus far with mostly good managers. In my 17-year career I only once had a bad manager. Also, to my opinion, DOS would benefit more if junior officers instead of supervising senior FSN's were peers to them.</strong></td>
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<td><strong>74.</strong></td>
<td><strong>I'd wish to have more responsibilities as a Senior FSN who worked 20 years for the American Embassy</strong></td>
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<td><strong>75.</strong></td>
<td><strong>I used to be a happy, full of energy and devoted to work employee. Some people need &quot;a carrot&quot; some people need a &quot;stick&quot; to work well. I only expected a &quot;thank you&quot; sometimes, but even this frequently seemed too much. Within almost 16 years of working for US Dept of State I went to training twice, once to a conference and once I received an individual award. So my energy kind of diminished. I still work as perfectly as I can, but the energy is different. Sad, what else can I say...</strong></td>
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<td>76.</td>
<td>Officers have their own agenda to pursue on how they can please their managers in order to get good EERs for their onward assignment or carrier. Every three years in a way we reinvent the wheel although in the absence of officers (elapsing time between two supervisors) the work continues efficiently and flawlessly. The span of the American officers attention is limited to the three years they spend in a post and they do no really care what will happen in the Embassy after their time. I work for the Embassy for 31 years I am 53 years old and although I tried very hard to change this mentality around I have finally become cynical and I just do my job the best way I can under the circumstances hoping for a retirement at 55.</td>
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<td>77.</td>
<td>Sometimes lack of communication is a real barrier between supervisor and subordinates. Training as a key tool should be always available for FSNs. Cultural understanding is important and respect to those differences. I will gladly share working and relationship experience of 21 years with the USG.</td>
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<td>78.</td>
<td>This is the best organization.</td>
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<td>79.</td>
<td>Below are what I think to be key factors for good management: effective communication; continually seeking to improve work method; show interest in training subordinates and listening to them. Most managers I have worked with in the State Department have demonstrated these skills.</td>
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<td>80.</td>
<td>If you would have given me this survey just a couple of years ago, I would have answered the questions very differently: I used to really feel part of this organization, even emotionally attached. Unfortunately, over the last couple of years, I am afraid the American officers we have in our office have shown poor judgment and poor management, especially when it comes to their relationships with other employees. I sincerely regret that. I remember the time when everybody, American officers and FSN's alike, were one big family. These days, the American officers really show that you are inferior to them. I have been working for this organization for almost 14 years and a half, 7 years of which in my current office. This is the 2nd office I work in.</td>
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<td><strong>81.</strong></td>
<td>I don't think any of my views/opinions matter or are considered.</td>
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<td><strong>82.</strong></td>
<td>I believe that if Management officers were given an extra 3 years of responsibility after they have left post for things done during their time, they would think twice about many of their decisions. Many decisions are made with their carriers in mind not the mission. It is very easy to write up a report to Washington about how great the idea is and getting a reward, but at Post we see the bad effects of these decisions and are left to deal with the bad outcome of these decisions. I have been with the Embassy for 11 years now and I must admit it is getting worse.</td>
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<td><strong>83.</strong></td>
<td>Working with U.S. Government would be better if they implement a retirement plan for FSNs, or do like U.N is doing for their employees. Due to inflation FSN are loosing because they are paid in local currency while the local (African) government is lowering intentionally the inflation rate.</td>
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<td><strong>84.</strong></td>
<td>Even though I like working with the USG, security issues I don't feel comfortable to talk to much about my employer outside of the compound.</td>
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<td><strong>85.</strong></td>
<td>Management is totally subjective. A new boss can have a 180 degree difference in his / her vision of how the job should be done, compared to their predecessor. And we have to obey regardless of their competence level, knowledge or experience. On the other hand the rotation of FSOs is the oxygen needed to stop FSNs becoming too deeply rooted in old practices.</td>
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<td><strong>86.</strong></td>
<td>Some questions are difficult to answer as your link to your supervisor might completely change the perception of the organization. Supervisors move frequently and you can have up and downs and extremely different styles of management. I am a senior FSN at Public Affairs. What I am doing depend on my supervisor as well as U.S. policies. So there might be many reasons why you feel very comfortable and proud of your organization or not willing to tell others for whom you work. I think the quality of our supervisors is going down - more and more often lack of European culture and understanding of European</td>
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specifities -- and that makes the relationship more difficult; moreover, they have never been good managers, even if we enjoyed working with some of them. Why I like very much my job: it's very interesting and multifaceted; I have a lot of autonomy (which is possible due the work I do) and we are a good team of FSN colleagues

| 87. | The fact that employees are assessed based on what they do and not on what they are is already a great asset. |
| 88. | I'm working for the US government for more than twenty years. Of course it is very boring to work for the same organization for so many years, but I couldn't find any other better organization in Alexandria. We are over-populated and it's not easy to find a good work environment. On my part I always ask the new supervisor every three years to look at my job description, to change it by adding new duties that would be useful to my career or to move duties that can be performed by other colleagues. I think that the supervisor should work on making his staff happy with their duties. I really have one thing that annoys me and my colleagues as well, when the supervisor shows his/her surprise to hear that most of the FSNs are working for the organization for more than ten years - the supervisor may not understand the reasons that cause our long stay in the organization. Anyway, I happy to work for the US government at the American Center or Consulate in Alexandria.

<p>| 89. | Despite the fact that I am very willing to put in a great deal of effort beyond normally expected to make this organization more successful, there is no motivation. The performance criteria solely depends on the number of years worked. They can't differentiate between good or bad employees in terms of efficiency and even if they do, they do not do anything to look bad as they only stay for a limited number of years and they do not want to look bad. There is no management and or performance tool that is being used to turn inefficient employees to efficient ones. The upward mobility is also very much limited as the turnover rates are very low which is also a great dissatisfaction factor. |</p>
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<td>90.</td>
<td>I have been working with the mission for over 28 years. During this period, I notice changes in the way managers are working. They have less confidence in employees and with the computer age, they tend to work alone, not involving subordinates. Sometimes, I feel that the managers do not have the necessary training before coming to post and they often have no clue about the culture of the country. I personally think that managers should be more aware of the country's culture and give their chance to subordinates to see what they can do.</td>
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<td>91.</td>
<td>If an American supervisor exhibits abusive behavior and creates a hostile workplace, it doesn’t work to report this and discuss it with the HR manager. Because, an American supervisor is always right; it is her/his way, or NO way. There is no control mechanism for FSOs if they are eligible to supervise. There is also no room to go if an FSN having difficulties with his/her supervisor or in case favoritism, workplace harassment, mobbing, and discrimination. On the other hand, as we heard from the Embassy management both personally and at the town hall meetings many times; don’t even try to complain or discuss on anything because there are a lot of unemployed people waiting for a job in front of the Embassy!... Empowering LES in many aspects will be helpful not only to create more productive workplace but also to reduce personnel budget</td>
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<td>92.</td>
<td>working for the government is a great duty.</td>
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<td>93.</td>
<td>Dealing with US Officers is the best part, the worse part is dealing with FSN supervisors.. They just acting as &quot;super chief&quot; sometimes with no consideration of your job and this is why i strongly prefer to work under a direct supervisory of an US officer and that i wish I could stay in this organization as long as I can. Local supervisors considers only how if you are fake with them and I'm not like that.. With US supervisors i feel like i can give more than 100% of myself cause they really supports you not only as a worker but also as a person. So I use to work much better under a US supervision because then I really feel like i'm working for the State department. I always wanted to live to the US so I'm glad i'm working at the Embassy, it's the must for me!</td>
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<td>94.</td>
<td>It varies from office to office. But the one thing i dislike is that fsn's are sometimes considered as second class citizens with second class opinions. Also, the lack of continuity and consistency in officers attitudes is a little depressing, more so when you are trusted and asked to deal with responsibility and then suddenly you are PNGd because personalities changed. Also, I was disappointed to find that in my office it is not a meritocracy but rather we are all equal, regardless of the effort we put into things. Equality is great when you are born. The moment you build yourself up and prove yourself, merit is importance. Otherwise, why should i make more effort if i get the same treatment as one who doesn't?</td>
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<td>95.</td>
<td>Training remains the problem area. I do this job (FMC) for over 4 years now, and am still waiting for the specific training to increase my productivity. Same happened with GSO (I was there for 17 years) where after 13 years of service, I finally got to go see how I should do my work!! Not investing in training is like going backwards...</td>
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<td>96.</td>
<td>Personally I feel very grateful for having worked in this institution for over 30 years. However, there are good and bad things as in all the places. One of the most important things: Officers must bear in mind that without LES they would be able to perform their work in a timely and efficient way and be able to trust LES ' work.</td>
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<td>97.</td>
<td>Question 5: You can disagree with a supervisor's decision but still accept it and work with it.</td>
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<td>98.</td>
<td>For all the questions that I've chosen &quot;Neither Agree nor Disagree&quot; - this answer doesn't reflect my indecision in making a statement. It rather refers to the management decisions and work style of the Management Counsellor/Officer present at post within a certain time frame. I've been employed for 13 years now and I've seen many Management Counsellor succeeding one another, and it was proven a lot that the decisions of the current one were not a progress but a regress of the previous one.</td>
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<td>The survey will not show accuracy in results because leadership in FSO changes so often (every 2/3 years, FSO at times are not on the same sheet of music and personalities and billets are in conflict....State needs to define leadership, management and implement people skills in their initial training seminars and followed up often.</td>
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<td>99.</td>
<td>Comment: I feel as a negative fact of the system of this organization is that due to the fact that our American Supervisors change every 2 or 3 years, sometimes we have to deal with new Supervisors that do not recognize and/or have respect for the loyal service we have always given to the organization, as well as the vast experience and knowledge most of us have (in my case 26 years of service). We have to prove almost every time that we perform our jobs with all our best efforts and we are always willing/trying to improve the image of the US Government and to try to make our Section and our jobs more efficient and effective and, open to help them in every way we can.</td>
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<td>100.</td>
<td>I bet that if FSNs and Supervisors were all aware of the importance of the subject of this survey, their relationships will improve drastically, since they all will agree that they are part of the same team.</td>
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<td>101.</td>
<td>Newly assigned FSOs should read the position descriptions of their staff in order to know with accuracy what to request and to expect from each employee. I would also recommend that they familiarize themselves with the host county's labour laws and labour culture, which might differ greatly from that in the U.S.</td>
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<td>102.</td>
<td>For question number 2: &quot;It is frequently necessary for a manager to use authority and power when dealing with subordinates.&quot; The answer is that a manager must control and verify employees work. It is not an issue of frequency, but of consistency and quality. Management sometimes takes credit for projects initiated by LES or work carried out by LES. More credit should be given to employees. LES supervisors are superfluous, sometimes jealous and do not always provide the best supervision or guidance for LES employees. All LES should be supervised by FSOs. The CAJE should be totally revised. Jobs should be given</td>
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based on competence and past experience, not on a job description. We are people not numbers. Salaries should follow this rule as well. Some LES have very high salaries and are not at all competent for the position. For HR: An American LES or FSO should always interview a potential candidate before any testing is done. Some LES HR personnel are not apt in the decision making process for hiring Embassy staff. Watch out for nepotism and insider references. LES should receive more training on America's system of government and History and learn how to write business letters in English.

104. I am happy with everything about my employer except the for the criteria for the awards program.

105. I am an Amcit local hire rather than a classic FSN, and my opinions that are of a negative quality reflect my dissatisfaction with my compensation and being double-taxed, not my dissatisfaction with my job itself.

106. More communication and training programme for FSN in order to have a very good performance and help to develop the all the type of work.

107. I have come to dislike the "them" and "us" attitude that exists between FSN and USDH personnel and which only developed over the last 6 or 7 years. There doesn't seem to be much trust anymore. I used to socialise a lot with the American community but have completely stopped when it became obvious that new USDH staff arriving at Post were no longer interested. It's a shame as it used to be so good.

108. I BELIEVE THAT AMERICAN LOCAL ENGAGED STAFF SHOULD BE DELEGATED WITH ADDITIONAL DUTIES IN ORDER TO ENABLE OFFICERS TO DEDICATE MORE TIME TO IMPORTANT ISSUES. OFFICERS SHOULD ALWAYS BE PROFESSIONAL, ESPECIALLY WHEN DEALING WITH THE PUBLIC AND REMEMBER THAT THEY REPRESENT THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA.

109. in past we have more chance to help, support and give ideas. now for fsn's is
| 110.  | not a clear position descriptions written to cover all major tasks/responsibilities. |
| 111.  | I think US diplomats are not prepared to be managers. Strategies are never designed and evaluation of results never takes place. Local personnel, who do most of the work, is seldom taken into consideration and there are no career plans for them. When I enter the U.S. Government, i never expected to remain in the same category for the rest of my life. |
| 112.  | I am very proud to work for the US government. My family and I always had strong ties to the US culture. Working for the Dept State has been a true pleasure but lately also a true frustration. The new officers coming in ... are just sooo different and distant and then the 'old guard'. Often some have no manners. How about a good morning and not a good morning fsn's! Hellooo...what's this for an attitude. Supervisors need to remember that they are only as good as their staff. That said, I am a supervisor and strongly believe in that saying. |
| 113.  | i realize that as an FSN, I am in a difficult position working for a foreign government whose policies I may not agree with but who offers a good salary, honest work and certain securities. I have chosen to focus on the charitable work that this government offers to my country and accept the rest as a means to that end. Additionally, I have learned new skills from good managers and I have learned patience from bad ones. |
| 114.  | Most of the American Officers that come to post do not regard the locals; they see us as sub-standards. Awards are presently selectively to Americans. Only Americans get high honors, and FSNs get trivial honor. This attitude doesn't reflect the American Government philosophy of equality. |
| 115.  | I have been working with the U.S. Embassy Nouakchott for a little over 2 years. I joined the mission as a telephone operator, then got promoted last year after 16 months, as consular assistant, and it's been a wonderful experience so far. i have |
| 116. | I enjoy my work and my colleagues, but because of recent management structural changes I feel that the organization does a poor job of making me feel like a part of the team. It's almost like a caste system with the Direct Hires on one side and the LESs on the other. |
| 117. | I have been working with the US Embassy Ouagadougou for 24 years and I am proud of the management tools and concepts that DOS has given me throughout my career. As a result, I feel confident with this knowledge I acquired, given this opportunity I did take advantage, I can be relocated anywhere and to serve with professionalism in any company with ease. I have been highly trainable in expendable and non-expendable stocks managing using the updated automated software what make me so confident. Thank you DOS. |
| 118. | In addition to all the questions, I would like to emphize that every post has different problems and should not be treated the same. Most of the time post do what Embassy proposes and probably will not fit in post needs. Officers can learn from FNS with experience but most of the times they refuse to learn thinking that they know everything. I have seen it a lot!! |
| 119. | It would help if less micro managing is done. |
| 120. | Perhaps it would be useful for the LES to evaluate their American officers. It would even help the State Department to assign them to other Posts in accordance with their evaluations. Thank you. |
| 121. | Due to the fact that this is a very small post if the FSNs are not kept in the loop, Post will be to a disadvantage. The FSNs are the ones who best know the country and the day to day running of Post so it would be best to communicate with them. |
| 122. | - I am at PA. Based on 10 years of experience after consolidation, working with American officers who are not belonging to PA cone is much difficult making them understand PA operations. Sometimes lack of understanding causes problems on daily public diplomacy work, especially relationship with host country contacts. FSNs often obey their orders and instructions, but not quite accept their authority in mind. - I hope to see as many PA senior officers become the head of the mission. It seems POL officers got greater chances to move up to COM or DCM than PA officers. Good PA senior officers will do really well on the Ambassador job, because they had greater chances to understand more thoroughly about public opinion, public attitude, public relations of the host country. - FSNs generally accept American management's authority when they made decision without consulting with FSNs, but if they consult beforehand, that would be very appreciative. - I feel lucky working for State Department, but I also feel old USIS days were happier than post-1999 consolidation) |
| 123. | Greetings and congratulations on an excellent survey you have organized to inquire the sentiments in the field. The US Embassy is a first rate employer but there are many flaws nonetheless. I am very attached to this organization and have input more than 30 years already. I am now attached to the organization because of the important values it upholds or tries to uphold, and mostly because of the principal goal: to bolster bilateral relationships. Plus, there are many good management factors that attract me to stay within the employ of the U.S. |
Embassy here and they include but are not limited to: -participative decision-making, -the somewhat flat organization in terms of "power-distance" between ranking officials and LES employees (compared with Malaysian society and organizations outside the US Embassy) -the "informality" with which we may work internally (for example, we don't need to dress formally except if we are receiving visitors or representing the Embassy at events off-site, -the excellent drive to achieve Mission goals via top management's periodic reminder's about this and including LES in the process, -the first rate tools provided by the Embassy to get our jobs done, for example: vehicles to get to off-site events and programs, travel and perdiem out-of-town for TDY, GSO support, etc -comfortable and functional offices (not just pretty!) and conducive physical environment (airconditioning, etc) -access into the chancery for the physically disabled (parking, ramps, elevators, etc). But now for some disquieting trends which is presented with very good intentions and not to criticize without charity: -I don't feel as a member of the Embassy "family" as I used to before (there is greater feeling of "Americans" and "LES" as separate entities while we work for the same goals and aspirations (but it was excellent many years ago) -The vocabulary LES is itself not appropriate. We tend to feel "LESSER" now than before when we were referred to as "FSNs". -LES no longer park inside the Embassy proper but in a separate lot -We are not entitled to sick leave when "family members" are sick -We are not entitled to R&R when environmental situations are deteriorating (example when the Air Pollutant Index is considered seriously unhealthy--but American officers get such privileges) -We are not entitled to purchase Commissary goods -LES supervisors are not respected the way American supervisors are respected -The compensation package for senior LES are not comparable to similar positions outside the Embassy -The rewards for long-term service for LES are mere tokenisms -There is less mingling of American and Malaysian employees today compared with what we had enjoyed several years ago. It could be because of the 9-11 aftermath and Americans have become more "careful" (and they should not be blamed for that "carefulness")
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<td>124.</td>
<td>but more inter-mingling events sponsored by the Embassy is probably the way to move forward. It could also be because we are doing more with less resources today and have less time to do other social events--but then we forget that the most important element in any organization is human capital and human capital is founded upon human interdependence and relationship building. Thank you for the opportunity you have given me to share my candid, sincere opinions. I wish you every success in your good work because it affects America, Malaysia, and all participants in our global village. God bless America and the world.</td>
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<td>125.</td>
<td>When I first came to work in this organization, I was proud of it. But now, after 10 years, I feel disappointed. I am not proud to tell my friends about my employer anymore. The most essential reason is the payment, especially in my country, Vietnam. I don't know what the U.S. State Department salary scales is based on, the annual salary for the ordinarily resident is much much lower than it is for the not-ordinarily resident (who is holding diplomatic passport). For example, the annual salary of FSN-6 position grade for ordinarily resident is US$5,672 which is equivalent to US$29,379 of the FP-8 position grade for not-ordinarily resident. This is obviously unfair. Additionally, the salary the U.S. Government pays us, the local employees, is much much lower (and becomes lower and lower) than other organizations pay for their local employees. Finally, if there is a chance I (and many of my colleagues) will take a job in another organization to get more decent earnings.</td>
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<td>126.</td>
<td>The American Officers with whom I have worked have been extremely good and always gave me a sense of belonging to this organization.</td>
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<td>127.</td>
<td>I strongly feel about the review of the present salary structure, which allows minimal increase after step 14. Once an employee reaches the last steps he/she after some years starts feeling stagnated and demoralized.</td>
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<tr>
<td>127.</td>
<td>No comments</td>
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<tr>
<td>128.</td>
<td>Something serious needs to be done about the DoS' high/idealistic goals. They</td>
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seized to exist, being replaced by the practical modern objectives. In the field of diplomacy idealism is something that motivates, gives sense to one's work and keeps the team together.

129. Since I'm the FSNI with the RSO's office and here we discuss everything with subordinates as no one is 100% perfect, one can get better ideas from subordinates too. We earn respect for what we do for the organization in order to keep everyone safe. Managers should be open to their subordinates so that the sense of being "part of the family" remain intact. Being in the security we can't discuss much out of the office about the organization due to operational security reasons. I really love my job and enjoy working with the organization.

130. I would make changes on question #23 so it sounds differently. I try NOT discussing my organization issues with people outside for the SECURITY reasons, but always keep informed people on various opportunities the U.S. Government provides to local citizens in my country. Diplomats whom I used to work with had good management skills, were really good supervisors, nice and kind people, fair at work, and friendly colleagues. I would also recommend mainly young diplomats to not hesitate using local FSN's experience and be more helpful to FSNs in their everyday activity. It should be really team work in order to reach better cooperation and achievements.

131. Management should include LE Staff in decision making process.

132. having worked here for a long time, I can say that I am among the luckiest people. My job and what it entails as services are what I love. But it makes one feel frustrated when the work one does is not recognized or ignored in some way. There are instances when credit for work done is given to someone who has just put 10% of all the efforts to carry out successfully one project. But when you just love the job, you just say maybe the next US boss will be fairer than this one, and this happens, until another one takes over and treats you like nothing. Fortunately, one person does not represent the whole community. It also happen that US boss will give more attention to some section's projects and will make
nothing of other section's project - how important the subject or audience might be.

133. The rules and regulations are quite fair when it comes to management and supervision. Two very strong points of the Department of State: 1) Access to information on policies and regulations, including on management/supervision issues is being made easily available to LES. 2) The Department's ongoing concern to improve its handling of LES employees is commendable.

134. Management doesn't care about locally employed stuff. They listen to FSN problems but do nothing to help.

135. Majority of the decisions are based on personal likeness or dislikeness. FSN staff gets the same kind of treatment as the general public. There is no distinction between a local employee and an outsider. The organization does not own its locally engaged employees and they work with a sense of insecurity. The level of trust and respect (from the American staff) between the two communities; the FSN and the American staff is diminishing. No wage increase is also creating a problem for the local staff and they have started to seek employment in other organizations which pay more and have more benefits.

136. Since India is so different from the U.S., there is often an adjustment time needed when a new FSO comes, in as the FSO who comes in with perceptions based on what he/she are used to in the U.S., finds that those might not work in local conditions. Also, since India was till recently was regarded as a "third-world developing" country rather than a "developed" one (imagines in the West tend to show India more as a land of snake charmers and Rajahs, rather than one with an IT revolution, etc.), many FSOs, tend to be more cautious in the beginning when delegating responsibility to LES.

137. The biggest career challenges these days are perceptual...psychological. Not technical. Not even skills-based. The major adjustments we need to make are mental.
Managers' style is very important - working together equals success to the manager to the FSN and to the organization. Not that many American officers are capable of following that style but whoever does, enjoys the respect and support of the FSNs.

Management quality strongly depends on the personality and education level of supervisor. During 12 years of my employment with the Embassy, I have seen both superb and very poor supervision. I got an impression that supervisors are designated by the State Department without proper consideration.

It is an honor working for the US Government however, truth be told, our salaries and benefits quite frankly do not match what our local market is paying for similar positions. Although we do not pay taxes in Kuwait, as expatriates we do not enroll in social security; we do not have a retirement plan or pension plan and our low salaries make it difficult to cope with rising inflation. Most of us have sent their families back to their home country to cut down on expenses.

It has been pleasure working for my program, (I work for INL office in Tbilisi), my supervisors both here and in Washington are professionals and very good persons. I appreciate the attitude they treat subordinates. I never felt I was one :)

G.S.

The present Management seams not to know it's duties well. We have endless meetings about Service standards, process mapping and CMI, which seams to be too much. Our Chief stated that we(our section in particular) meet and exceed the standards at our Post, never the less time and again we are having meetings in the shape of "school lessons"- where our boss is a teacher- which really takes a lot work time off- and since our boss recently arrived to Post he does not understand a lot of things related to the job performance. Also there is no motivation for work- due to the high inflation that happened in our country during the past 4 years the current salary is not enough for the normal life. However we are always reminded that we work for the Department of State and should be proud of this fact! How can we be proud if due to the security regulations we are NOT
| 143. | I was very attached to the organization and I loved being a member of the US Embassy team until my former boss allowed and even encouraged a colleague to take over a program that I had created and developed; that's when I no longer felt part of the family, although I did not complain. Since then, I have felt that I don't want a lifetime career as an Embassy employee. |
| 144. | I used to be very happy working for this organization... I've been working for over almost 13 years, I have a daily contact with the American officers and I have come to the conclusion that the lower quality of the human resources (in terms of instruction, experience, etc) is very well reflected by the employees' performance. |
| 145. | In many occasion managers do not take into consideration the opinion of the employees, and they just have to accept the decisions, over the years the employees will do not argue or will want to have a discussion regarding a decision being made that will impact their work environment, is like they become submissive. |
| 146. | The thing that irks me most is that FSNs are treated like second class citizens. We are just numbers, expendable and anonymous and have no rights or avenues |
of redress. We are told that we are valued employees but actions speak louder than words.

Within years of employment we have got used to the fact that every 2-3 years officers change, and the new supervisors arrive with their own vision and management styles. Quite often they tend to ignore the best practices established at post and force the changes. In spite of competitiveness of our current salaries in the labor market people tend to stay, since they realize that the benefits they get are valuable. I am pleased to have been working for the State Department overseas and find my job interesting and enjoyable.

The management style seems to be crisis management. In other words, let's deal with this crisis and then move to the next crisis. They seem to be eager to change things for the sake of change and when change does actually seem warranted, no action is taken. Each mission is different but the overall way in which the organization is run leaves much to be desired. The greatest complaint I have as an FSN is that there is no incentive to improve yourself. We have a retention problem at this post. We live in an economy that despite the crisis that is doing well and jobs are easy enough to get if you have the right qualifications. Most companies here have programs through which employees can further their education. I am not talking about online courses which only the State Department recognizes, but university education - recognized degrees which the company pays and which, in the long run, benefit the company. I already have a BA but very much would like my MA, but can't afford the fees. Would the "company" benefit from me receiving my MA? Of course, they would. FSI courses do not provide you with skills that translate beyond the embassy environment. Retention will continue to be a problem at this post and other posts like it if something is not done to make it more attractive to stay. Increasing salaries is not the answer either. In a country where most people can pay 61% of their salary taxes, any raise we get goes straight to the tax man.

In my work it is extremely important what kind of personality will be my next
boss. People (management) change every 2-3 years and it's a pure luck (or unfortunate) who will you get next, because the atmosphere and everything in the office strongly depends almost only to the State Department Officer's skills (personality). I was lucky in my career so far and I had good managers, and even when one crazy person came and made horrible atmosphere in the office by yelling, throwing office supplies from the desk, I was on maternity leave. But right now salaries are no more attractive as they were before and if I get some nasty person for my next boss, I may be ready to leave my job and find better paid one. So, we have very little contact, or no contact at all with any other American but our own Section Chief and if he is O.K. person, everything works fine. If he is grumpy, nasty, nervous, unhappy - the whole section will suffer for the next few years.

150. It seems that the U.S. Dept. of State doesn't put much emphasis on employees' experiences these days. New hires from outside get higher grades immediately. It's getting more and more difficult to find respectful managers among American officers.

151. The questions are very ambiguous. The answers would have been different if the Management would show some interest in changing an obsolete system of evaluation and promotion of personnel.

152. Overall Embassy management doesn't do much to improve FSN's employment. They're coming to post for a year or two so no need to worry what will happened after departure. The same situation for 16 years here.

153. Management style is very open and allows employees to talk freely with their supervisors. However, the management style is largely dependent on the FSOs, as different officers use different styles.

154. In general, LES that are employed by USG do feel strongly attached to the organization and feel proud to be a member of such an organization. However, some views expressed above are not directed at the organization itself but at the
people that comprise management in the organization. People are the organization and if the management doesn’t appreciate and value LES, it is only normal for them to become detached, lose morale and finally leave the organization.

155. Nothing to add but what is there...

156. Based on my length of service, I would really recommend having senior FSN's to join the "training team" (FSN CORE) to give some trainings to other colleagues in other posts so we feel like we are also committed to make a positive change in this organization and that we are also a real team players who can reach the same goal ...on time.

157. When "neither agree nor disagree" is marked this means that the answer depends on situations and circumstances

158. I feel lucky and blessed to work for US Embassy at my country. It was a dream since childhood to become an interpreter and work for international organization, but never could imagine that i will be little bit more then just interpreter, i worked as assistant and now as coordinator. And not in a simple internat. organization but US EMBASSY! I am very proud of it and very thankful to those people who trusted me and chose me to vacant position at the Embassy over 6 years ago.

159. Officers rotate every 2-3 years. Each time FSN needs to prove him/herself before the new officers. This is healthy somehow to do our best, but in some cases officers would not recognize FSN exerted efforts. FSN needs to resign once SIV is granted. Would not be better should FSN stays serving the Embassy?

160. We see various types of managerial styles since Americans tour posts every two years or so. Generally, most of them are good managers but sometimes we see bad managers to extent that local staff resign or leave after working so many years at the state department. Managers should be know in detail cultures, attitudes and other factors of people of the assigned country.
<p>| 161. | Being a Foreign Service National, American supervisors who come and go every two or three years have to consult with me regarding any local issue. FSNs usually have the institutional knowledge that the Americans lack. However, sometimes American officers feel lax about duties that they have to do, or learn to do, rather than relying on us all the time. In addition, although we support our offices so vigorously and rigorously, we are often frustrated by the lack of support from our supervisors. |
| 162. | There should be a total review of policies pertaining to American FSNs/American direct hire. We have no rights or privileges. No APO mail, No access to commissary, no parking on the compound etc. We fee like &quot;nor fish nor fowl&quot;. Why? |
| 163. | In my perception, the local staff is underestimated and very often ignored specifically because of their qualifications and high level of professionalism. Many FSNs are overqualified and their abilities are lost or misused - the organization is focused mostly on the happiness of FSOs and EFMs. Other international organizations in the country treat their local staff as the institutional memory and back bone of the organization. At the embassy this concept is unheard of. |
| 164. | I really feel proud for being working for American Embassy in Cairo for almost 20 years. I think I've learnt a lot from the way my American supervisors manage the work. I love American style especially when I visited U.S couple of times for training purposes. I have great respect for America because when I was there I felt real freedom, respect law, supervisory training that I took was really productive and changed my way in many ways I supervise my team. One thing I told my colleagues and my friends from my last visit to America for FACT training before I go to Baghdad that if you didn't visit America so you did not see the world, America is the world that I love. Thanks for giving me the chance to express my thoughts and feeling in here. Ahmed |
| 165. | It is somehow frustrating when people do not trust FSNs enough just because |</p>
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<td>166.</td>
<td>To achieve good management requires time. The 2-year-tour basis at state is the very weakness of the system. By the time you establish a good work relationship your partner, supervisor, is leaving. You cannot build up that expertise with your American partner. A good example of that is with Americans who stay four years. Performance is far better than with people who stay 2 years. In other words the big looser is the organization.</td>
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<td>167.</td>
<td>All right with this organization and with supervisors of it</td>
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<td>168.</td>
<td>Nothing to add to your information...</td>
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<td>169.</td>
<td>If some of my replies seem inconsistent, it is because I have seen vastly varying situations here - it all depends on the American officer on top. In recent years, unfortunately, despite what we are told at FSI, there is a dangerous - I would say suicidal - move to disempower FSNs who are the backbone, the continuity of the Mission.</td>
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<td>170.</td>
<td>American Officers especially the JOs are not so friendly to LES. Separate treatment for American verses LES Employees.</td>
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<td>171.</td>
<td>No comment.</td>
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<tr>
<td>172.</td>
<td>as a non us citizen there is no room to make decisions or to work independently. carrier is not possible. if this is clear from the start, this is a great organization to work for, especially as a working mother.</td>
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<td>173.</td>
<td>&quot;13. I would be just as happy working for a different organization as long as the type of work was similar&quot; and may be rewards are similar or even better... &quot;23. I enjoy discussing my organization with people outside it&quot; - I do not discuss my organization with people outside it - this is security...</td>
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<tr>
<td>174.</td>
<td>Thank you for taking the time to consider our views and all the best in 2009!</td>
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<td>175.</td>
<td>Thank you for this opportunity.</td>
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176. In the beginning of my 10+ years at the State Dept. the atmosphere was fairly good, however within 2 years, that deteriorated sharply. Generally one is very aware of the strong dividing line between the 2 cultures and that an FSN/LES will always be considered an inferior... which is reflected in the way that requests are given. One point though is that from time to time a genuinely caring Officer comes along who isn't pretending to purport the "FSNs are important to us" directive... that is when local staff actually give their best.

177. I think most of USG organizations should give management training to all managers quite often, either on site or abroad to reinforce their capacities. Most flaws derive from poor magt qualifications from supervisors. This will help give a better profile to USG organizations outside the US. Hope to see changes occur; thanks a lot.

178. Thank you for this opportunity. One of the issues that I have taken up with several other FSN colleagues is the lack of social skills of American officers towards foreign employees in the sense that there is no inclusion within their circles. An example, during social gatherings it is very obvious that American officers will mingle and socialize with their own and leave FSN's off to their own too, there is no effort to socialize and socially a lack of acknowledgment on a daily basis starting from the basic response to a "Good morning". There is a strong sense among the consulate, this is we and this is you, we're not the same.

179. Training programs are not very often equally distributed. Certain sections are given much priority over others. Funds are almost always available for certain section whiles to others there is always the same music; "There is no money".

180. I have been with this consular office for 45 years, and obviously enjoy the work and in most cases, the people! Sometimes the handling of LES matters, such as salaries, leaves a little to be desired, but obviously is controlled from far above!

181. The morale of the department can be boosted or destroyed by one American with a bad attitude towards FSNs
| My views on management/supervision : Trainings for Managers / Supervisors : I believe that the SAME training should be mandatory for USDH Managers, for Senior LES and for relevant HR staff. This will enable the HR to understand how you (the employer) require the managers/senior staff to perform in this organization. In cases where a problem exists and HR exclusively supports the employee, thus leaving the supervisor unprotected, then it is the supervisor who has to bear the future consequences of a ‘problematic relationship’ between the supervisor/subordinate. I can understand that HR office is a ‘shelter’ for the employees who need guidance to their problems, but do not forget that the supervisor needs this guidance and protection, too. My employment with the U.S. State Department : When the organization is clear with the guidance as to the values to be considered by ALL employees, then the promotion of these, by the Management/Supervisors/Employees would be successful, therefore advancing the level of job satisfaction. My opinion in relation to questions in this survey : questions are very good – survey could be done more frequently. | 182. For me, management is a team work.  
The best management practice that the State Dept people in London do is a) listen to their FSN employees and b) often do what these employees suggest! The ability to take on-board criticisms is a very useful one and indicative, in my personal opinion, of the liberal views of the State Dept. I still wouldn't recommend to anyone new staying here for more than 3-4 years but I don't regret my USIS or IM experience nor working with colleagues. But I'm still looking to quit as there is no useful training, no salary incentives, no promotion opportunities and our technology roadmap appears dissociated from any needs by technical professionals such as myself :-) | 183. | 184. | 185. local Cultural reality should be taken into account in Management's decision regarding benefits. | 186. Thank you. |
| 187. | There is need to spread equal training opportunities to every staffs especially when it is outside the country because it will encourage better knowledge impastation, exposure, confidence and skill evaluation/understanding across posts. The essence of training is for empowerment so it should not be done out of favouritism. Some have spent more than five years without any training opportunity outside the country even when training courses have been submitted over and over which is relevant to the person's job. |
| 188. | I believe the Department needs to put more effort and resources into bettering the working conditions and benefits of its LES. |
| 189. | Management's EER should include a review by FSNs as well. |
| 190. | When a manager, such as an ISO or IMO, when sent to post should be interviewed by IT people in Washington and only be assigned the job upon their knowledge, skills and experience. Must be Microsoft certified in order to run a Computer Center. It is impossible to run an office of that nature only by "pushing rank" and have absolutely no idea of what a Network is. |
| 191. | I am willing to put in a great deal of effort beyond that normally expected in order to help this organization be successful - also depending on the way the supervisors management of the office treat us employees, manage to motivate the team, appreciate the efforts. |
| 192. | #8, 12 We are told not to discuss our employment with outsiders for security reasons. #14 This is dependent on who is in charge at the time you ask it. I have personal experience with those who use LES as stepping stones without regard for our input; those who believe they can be rude and inconsiderate to subordinates; and I have worked for those who show their appreciation for us in ways that do not cost the USG money or loss of productivity -- all dependent upon the person at the top at the time on the national and local level. My productivity and job satisfaction are dependent on the whims of management -- I do my best work when I know what I do matters to management, and not just |
what makes them look good to their superiors or guests or inspectors. Interpersonal skills are as important as knowledge of the work required for managers and supervisors at all levels.

The American officer need to learn a basic culture in country they work in order to understand the they employee. Work as a team not as a boss. Humble but firm on decision making but please listen what the FSN need inform you first. Minor mistake can cause a lot of dissatisfaction on FSN.

Managers should not simply make most decisions without consulting subordinates. Managers should not verbally over use authority and power when dealing with subordinates.

Most FSNS have put in many years of work, like 25, 30 years and their salaries have reached the max. And they have another 8 to 12 years more to go. There should be some form of incentives for these employees. Also FSN supervisors sometimes face difficulty handling FSN employees. The American should listen to FSN Supervisors grievances and help them to resolve such issues. Thank you.

I am happy to work with US Government.

Locally employed staff or FSNs are the backbone of the organization and they always try to give out their best during their association. But problems erupt when American officers during their usually short tenures try to show off, or are guided by their whims and egos, that often results in disruption in harmony in an otherwise smooth teamwork. Some of the officers, being vindictive in character, will even like to go to their extremes but that spells disaster. If the vindictiveness is coupled with very strong personal likes and dislikes, the consequences become dangerous. In present day's globalized management style, egotists are never welcome and they should be trained to win over their traits of throwing personal tantrums such as thinking I am the best before they assume new positions. The stint is short. So why not work with FSNs with a smiling face and judicious and impartial dealings! After all, only the memory of one's own behavior lingers.
There are, of course, always exceptions. Thanks for giving us the opportunity to share our feelings.

I think the Department of State is a good organization to work for, but no-one should spend his or hers whole career only in one organization. American colleagues have a huge impact on FSN's opinion about their jobs and organization itself. As Americans change after a certain period, then the job satisfaction is also a subject for change.

LES salaries should be raised. Stop enforcement of EFT system for FSNs salaries due to the low credibility to local banks.

The work load is lopsided at times due to seasonal occurrence: one person may have a whole lot, and other FSN colleagues aren't too busy. When you complain nothing happens. All managers have a different style, but it is often repetitive and everything changes back to what it once was after a few years. In general, all American supervisors are very friendly. The word passes from top to bottom well. I don't think careers for FSN's get developed for individuals, but if you are lucky you get put into a higher paid position. I think they should not have the awards program.

For my position at this organization accessibility for outside publics is very important. I think that the closing-down of the American Centers, where much of our programming was done and where we could interact with our publics on a regular basis, was not a forward-looking or very wise decision overall.

The state department system is unique because the management staff is on a permanent rotational basis. Most Supervisors spend only two to three years at post. There are therefore only a few who really get attached to their workers to the point of wanting to see their personal development over time. career options are limited by the very nature of the mission of the Embassies. I have heard of how a technician rose to the rank of General manager in some private US firms which is something that can never happen in the Missions as this high level posts
are reserved. Coupled with the fact that personal achievement in the form of learning and experience over the years in a post does not alter your grade, the only option for some very hard working LES is to look for work outside. On the job Training in your field of work at state department facilities does not guarantee a grade or step increase. Even the proposed Meritorious Increase does not seem to address this problem. What are the motivating factors at work in a mission? Would realisation of the self be a consideration? yes I believe it should. According to Marslow, this is very high level is his pyramidal scale and the state department should consider this as more and more LES take self development courses.

| 203. | I have to say that I am lucky my supervisor and the supervisor of the section are very good people, with very good manner and very supportive to the staff. Thank you |
| 204. | Public diplomacy is sometimes conducted non-diplomatically, when supervisers are "occasional diplomats", in other words, have great dedication, but are not experienced or without natural diplomatic talent and flexibility. Achievement of the mission goal may turn into disaster when local conditions are not considered and the mission goals are blindly cherished - particularly, opinions of local employees who know the target audiences better, are not considered when planning/evaluating activities; needs of target audiences are not considered either. Results: damage of what was existing (and trust as well), without replacement; conducting activities for the sake of activities (and reports); target audience does not understand and value the activities; level of distrust in general public grows; most qualified local staff resigns. It is needless to speak about staff morale at such conditions. |
| 205. | It is a shame that sometimes various negative characteristic traits of various american employees have such a negative influence and portray the institution in a completely obstructive light. |
| 206. | Would be nice that FSNs be treated with more consideration. It is a strong |
possibility that other nations have also valuable individuals. Have heard so many occasions that FSNs are the most important link in the Embassy. Would be nice that behind those words be some facts to sustain these claims. It would also be nice for the American staff to recall that they represent the American nation and make this goal prevail over their personal issues. At the end of the day it is an interesting experience, from many points of view. I for example, despite many challenges I was put through, still maintain a solid dedication for the organisation, hoping that better times and persons will come.

The Management here treats local FSNs fairly well. We get some say how projects should be run. Good work is appreciated. Recently, upon request by a senior FSN (myself) for the first time FSNs in my PA department can have meetings every week same time as the US officers to discuss issues and improve the workflow esp great for team spirit.

The above opinions are in relation to the current management. As the management changes after a few years, my opinions might also change.

In 27. I do not feel ‘emotionally attached’ to this organization. (Answer: I have not answered this question, as I believe in any professional capacity or role, one has to be emotionally unattached to perform objectively your role. I am attached but would like to have a detached attachment to act objectively. This helps us manage well.)

Thanks for this survey!

those who listen cannot do anything; those who can do not listen. so what's the point?

Management not respecting LES. LES not treated equally. Performance of LES are often ignored. American’s most often less experienced and work-knowledge than the LES ill-treat LES by taking advantage of the economical condition of the host country.

Like many around the world, I have had some difficult times relating to the
current administration but I really feel that "I belong" to the state department and American supervisors are usually making LES feel "part of the team". The recent elections in the U.S. made me very proud again to work for the best example of a great democracy and a great country. The recent freeze on LES salaries however, I felt unjust as it was not applied to everyone.

It would be a great welcome if the LES are treated as the GS. For eg. the GS has an increase every year plus the COLA whereas the LES in Paris do no even have a GSI when compared to the LES in Belgium, Luxembourg or Holland. Even if we have an increase of 3% (few years Back) it was cut down to 1.5%. Also we do not have any bonus salary (as in Belgium where they have a months salary as a bonus) or vacation pay or bonus salary as in Holland or in Luxembourg. Also when comparing the salary between Luxembourg and Paris the Grade 3 in Luxembourg is equivalent to Grade 6 in Paris. Plus in Luxembourg they get paid for other bonus. I this we need to have a set rule also for the LES that we get a GSI every year.

I am glad to be a part of the OSC Algeria and help the Algerian Military to be more professional, and also help people through the Humanitarian Assistance Program. I can sign for the rest of my career with this organization if I have a decent pay raise every year.

In the course of the years that I have been in this employment it seems to me that the loyalty to the employer and personal devotion to the job have been losing appreciation. No one views it as a value anymore. It is very demotivating. On the contrary, some managers indicated on several occasions that it is "trendy" to change employment often. For some people who do not prefer changing relationships often it also is demotivating. I appreciate this survey as it seems that this issue is being given some attention now.

Things have changed tremendously regarding the quality of officers employed by the U.S. government. Years ago there were more care from the administration to the foreign nationals and considered them part of their own family. Now we can
see the difference and that we are only LES, which for many of us translated it as (Less) We seldom achieve anything with management which is less responsive than before. FSNs who spent more than 25 years serving the US feel more caring about the future than the Americans themselves, but now you here the word "we need new blood" disregarding the expertise factor. Good Luck

I have always felt as part of this organization/team. Manager(s) I have been working for (2/3) have being supportive and assisted in a professional manner during my 7 yrs of employment, they had a great communication, organizational and leadership skills. Having one exception only, I'd give the highest grade for communication style, level of support, organizational level, as well as for delegating to people style.

The only serious morale issue for FSNs at our post is our compensation plan which is not adequate at all (Kyiv, Ukraine). Most people that quit are those who find better jobs elsewhere. If I quit, that would be only for a better job offer in terms of salary. Other than that, we do not really have any management related issues.

In the Embassy I am working we have had great management officers. I know not all Embassies are so lucky. I am convinced that managers should consult with their subordinates before making decisions, but they need to make decisions themselves and sometimes use their power if needed.

Theory wise, the policies or disciplines are good, but most of the time they get away with it, bending the rules to accommodate them. Many a times too, their decisions are penny wise and pound foolish (no different from other countries attitude). 'Government mentality'. And to be fair, they certainly are good managers but sad to say they are overpowered.

i gave been working with the State Department as FSN for more then 25 yrs, the fact that i able to work so many years in an organizations speaks volume about my working place. I like two ways communication we are able to solve an issue
together, and also agreed to disagreed to keep the peace with our officers. Of course there are times i when i met with difficult bosses but i tell myself they come and go, but i can stay as long as i am needed and i enjoy the working environment of office. They new group of young FSOs are not so diplomatic when it comes to deal with people, i have a junior officer who asked me to do something i should not do but when i pointed it out, still insist that there is nothing wrong but quietly make no changes on the issue.

| 223. | i enjoy to work with this organization, thanks very much |
| 225. | Advantage for officers to know the local customary practices and be people friendly. When dealing with employees, best to use a soft approach before sending a strong message. Despite the number of sick leave allowed, the pattern should be monitored to cut abuse. Employees should be trained to handle the job and customer oriented. |
| 226. | I am completely happy to work with this organization as it full fill my dream of becoming a better and well organize man. |
| 227. | Managers should treat their subordinates with respect, and seek other outlets for their bad tempers rather than taking pleasure in being mean and nasty. |
| 228. | Because I had a good local supervisor, I learned a lot from the organization. So, it's not the organization that inspired me, it's my former supervisor. If you really mean the organization, the organization doesn't have a personal meaning for me or emotionally attached, it's more about my colleagues and how a good team work we are. However, American officers sometimes ruin that. Some of them don't understand that good relationships are important in order to get work done smoothly. And about the discussion about the organization with contacts, if you mean discussion with friends, I'd say that I don't because most of local people don't like one section in my organization, which is visa section. Visa section has |
a bad reputation here. So, I avoid to tell others that I work for the US Embassy. But, if you mean whether I talk to my contacts proudly about my section, which is Information Resource Center, I'm proud to tell others that I'm part of the section and I feel like I'm part of my section in the organization, but not the whole organization.

At times the management/supervisor should understand the local culture and qualification level of a employee, before he be given another persons task(s) which the employee may feel he is over worked for less pay.

More local culture understanding!

LES need more training on job.

Managers and supervisors must keep an open mind and keep abreast with the latest development and trends in their own field in order to embrace changing needs and trends without fear plus to be able to manage thier department effectively.

Thank you for pushing me to work on this survey.

Management and supervisory practices could be strengthened in USAID. Often, supervisors raise to their positions based on professional merit, lacking the requisite skills and practices to motivate people and reward good performance not to mention creating team cohesion. Supervisors in some cases are not strong enough in providing prompt feedback. This particularly applies to my field, Contracting in the Office of Acquisition and Assistance.

It is my personal opinion that we suffer from an "us and them" mentality between the American direct hire staff and FSN staff at post, I personally feel that this is terrible for morale when American staff cannot even say "hello" in the corridors within the office. It is also my personal feeling that this mentality of "us and them" starts and the very top and works its way down. I also feel that the management and supervision styles by my current management team are far from professional. One instance that comes to mind, was when a member of staff
received a pay increase after gaining a promotion and the management officer decided to tell the whole GSO office of the salary increase before informing the member of staff who was to receive the increase. I also find that my current direct American supervisor (GSO) is far too emotional and loses composure far too easily when members of staff disagree with certain situations or have an opinion on situations and decisions, screaming and shouting at staff is not going to make FSN members of staff change their opinion and any respect she may have had will only decrease. At the time of writing I am yet to see her behave in this manner in front of a fellow American member of staff. Her style of management is not one I am familiar with. I also have a feeling that if some members of the FSN staff are under performing, some, not all, American supervisor staff seem have a "oh well I'm out of here in a few years, I'll let the next person deal with it' kind of attitude and do not seem to want the hassle of having to discipline the staff members who are underperforming. I feel this is not good for staff morale, especially for the members of staff who have to work alongside the underperforming member of staff. It is a feeling of total mismanagement by direct American supervisors. All of this is of course my own perception and is not a representation of all of my direct American colleagues or my fellow FSN colleagues. I will also point out that we work in a first world English speaking country and city.

| 236. | New officers, entry level or senior, should be trained about local culture and sensitiveness. Do not assign someone without any supervisory skill or any other job experience unless s/he knows how to respect people. |

| 237. | Over the years, I have found that the American officers have become increasingly distant in their interaction with LES. Unfriendly and uncomfortable with communicating - sometimes to point of being insulting. I find that to be a serious mistake as many LES have much to contribute to professional events and relationships in their area of expertise. At the same time, there is a failure to understand that LES are citizens of that country and such insensitive behavior |
| 238. | I am proud to be part of an organization that defends freedom and respects self determination. |
| 239. | I hope this organization improves for the better. |
| 240. | it all depends on the type of officer at post. But most of the officers are always kind, gentle, friendly and in short its a pleasure to work with Americans! |
| 241. | Overall, the management in our organization has been very good. I have worked with several MOs, DCMs, and GSOs and can attest to their high leadership skills, ability to motivate employees, and involve them effectively in the working process. |
| 242. | FSN's Supervisors should be better trained and make them understating the importance of team work! Culture differences often play a key role on this..however, during training emphasize the importance of sharing information, treating all the subordinates equally and rewarding even with a thank you the good work that the subordinates do. In my short experience working for this organization I found not many FSN’s managers understanding this part of their duty. FNS’s Supervisors often are chosen as a reward for their loyalty of working for so many years for the organization but this DOES not always mean that they are capable to handle that role. i.e. an employee who has very good technical skills does not mean he also has management or customer service skills... even if he has been working for 25 years in the same section … |
| 243. | Working with the American Officers is always challenging, specially as they change between 2/3 years, some officers bring a wealth of knowledge, others don't. Overall it is very interesting. |
| 244. | FSOs are often doing everything to make us not feel as a "part of the family". Your reference to the organization or to the system doesn't mean a lot for FSNs. Unfortunately, for an FSN organization is his/her supervisor. There is no efficient system that would protect an FSN or control an FSO. There is no |
"punishment" for being a bad FSO. There is no institution behind the Embassy, there is only a supervisor. If he/she is good manager you adore the place you work and vice versa. Working in the U.S Embassy and being proud is a myth. In 21st century it is all about how much you are paid, how much things can you learn and how much your supervisor respects you and assists you in your development. I doubt that the FSOs know what the notion of emotional relation to their work is, unless in the contexts of promotion, salary and respect. And why it would be different for an FSN?

Since 2001, the working climate has changed, presumably due to the fear of terrorists, this is especially noticed by the locally employed NON-American staff. Most American officers keep more distance to the non Americans, as if the LES's are not to be trusted anymore. The decreased funding is also showing effects, since various needs, ea. training, new equipment, pay raises, etc. is being denied.

I feel grateful for the chance to work with the American community. I don't spend a great deal of time with them but they are always gracious and thankful for my work.

There's a big difference between Americans and LES Staff. A bad example is the medical benefits available to local staff. The U.S. Government can improve how LES Staff are treated in terms of medical care.

The State Department should better look at the RESULTS of FSN work.

The relationship is good in terms of management and supervision.

I have the impression that there are policies that are not flexible. They are dictated on U.S. Missions overseas with no room for discussion. This is a big organization that should take the lead in all matters related to the welfare its employees. Sometimes the organization does not respond to the needs of employees in a timely manner and this is probably caused by too much "centralization" in Washington offices who are not aware of the realities in the
State Department has great amount of supervisory skills training. I wish every new officer coming to post would take one of these courses and follow its recommendations (concerning communication, feedback, conflict resolution and delegation) while dealing with subordinates.

There are some officer's who would like to terrorize the employee by saying, "you will be fired" this makes the employee feel insecure. Especially in African country like us, they believe that they can get employees easily. the good things is that he/she will be replaced by others every two or three years.

I like working with the Americans since the treat me very friendly. I sometimes tell my compatriots they are kinder than my own compatriots.

My embassy is structured in such a way that it appears teh hierarchy is more important than any good idea or project because it gets lost in the many layers it has to go through to reach a decision-making level. American officers appear to be too reluctant to be pro-active or to recommend ideas from FSN's to management. Too often, they see FSN's as mere tools for realizing their ideas and executing their orders. That can be tiring!

FSO's should understand that in order to produce worthwhile results they must partner with their FSN's. There has been a strong change against this in recent years.

Our last manager/Consul General and the CAO in the Embassy micro-manage a lot, causing great frustration. I don't have any issue with supervision, this is okay. On many occasions, when it comes to advising I don't offer my opinion because I know the managers have already made up their minds. Although I like my organization and love Americans, I can't speak highly of my job because there are many policy issues that are considered to be hostile for my country and the general new population is very anti-american when it comes to involvement in the area.
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<td><strong>257.</strong></td>
<td>The relationship between the American officers and the FSN's is often quite difficult. FSN's usually know their local circumstances and programs better, but for the Americans (supervisor) this often difficult to admit. On the other hand, without the strong leadership qualities of the American supervisors, FSN's often don't feel responsible for anything nor do they have initiative, and the team spirit suffers. I my opinion this is due to the hierarchical structure of the State Department. FSN's are not getting the feeling that they are seen as equally important and are not given major responsibilities. For FSN's there is no possibility in the system to gain higher positions and advance their careers. After 10 years they have reached the max. pay level. That is why many really good people leave after a couple of years. Most American officer's top priority on the job is their own profession, their next evaluation and to achieve the next grade. Therefore, sometimes the programs suffer from the reluctance to really fight for something because it could harm their career.</td>
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<td><strong>258.</strong></td>
<td>FSO should be smarter and better trained. In addition, they should also develop a greater sense for the local culture because American culture is not paramount.</td>
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<td><strong>259.</strong></td>
<td>I want it to be known that I care as much as the Americans about the fate of this organization, if not more since I am the institutional memory of the organization-not them. I wish the State department would read the outcome of this research and improve the human relationship at posts.</td>
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<td><strong>260.</strong></td>
<td>I have noted a sharp decline in morale post-wide in the last five years that affects performance and motivation.</td>
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Curriculum Vitae
Bond H. Benton

Education
Doctorate: Political Science
2010 (University of Vienna – Vienna, Austria)
Master of Arts: Speech Communication/Rhetoric
1998 (Kansas State University – Manhattan, Kansas)
Bachelor Degree: Speech Communication/Philosophy
1996 (Wichita State University – Wichita, Kansas)

University Teaching
Instructor– Webster University Vienna
2003-2009
Instructor – Miami University (Oxford, Ohio)
1998-2003

International Consulting
Trainer –U.S. State Department
2004-Current

Publications and Research
➢ “Forensics Participation as Predictor of Teaching Success” (paper presented at the 2001 National Communication Association Conference; Atlanta, Georgia)
➢ “I Have a Dream of Better Oratorical Persuasion” (paper presented at the 2001 Central States Speech Association Conference; Cincinnati, Ohio)