“With Liberty and Justice for Some: Democratic Rights as a Casualty of the Global War on Terror”

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Abstract

This thesis seeks to address the relationship between States of Exception and the Quality of Democracy in Liberal Democratic States. The central argument is that States of Exception, embodied by counter-terror legislation, have an inverse causal effect on the Quality of Democracy, as operationalized through democracy indices. A linear regression is used to test 14 sub-hypothesis that eventually provide evidence supporting the main argument. Although the study cannot prove causality, it does show a significant correlation between counter-terror legislation and the quality of democracy in nearly all test countries. This thesis contributes a novel methodological approach to the theory of States of Exception and provides new theoretical backing to the extant literature on democratic backsliding.

Pledge of honesty

On my honour as a student of the Diplomatic Academy of Vienna, I submit this work in good faith and pledge that I have neither given nor received unauthorized assistance on it.

Scott Patterson
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1: Introduction

States of exception have been vital tools of democratic governance since the early days of Enlightenment. While monarchies crumbled before popular revolutions and colonial revolt, rising democrats devised legal instruments to preempt the Machiavellian impulses of state leaders. Amid the revolutionary euphoria, early Liberals also recognized that deliberative paralysis may leave democratic governments defenseless in times of crisis. These scholars recognized that during acute situations, executives may need to exceed their legally prescribed limits (Fatovic 2009, 2). This recognition lead to the development of emergency executive powers.

During emergencies, democratic governments concentrate authority in the executive to streamline decision-making and allow for decisive action (Cameron 2013, 183). Under emergency rule, executives suspend the constitution to defend the state against from existential threats (Cameron 2013, 182). On one hand, states that move slowly during emergencies are vulnerable to overthrow (Cameron 2013, 183). On the other hand, emergency powers provide ambitious executives with opportunities to swell their power to the detriment of rule of law and civil rights (Cameron 2013, 181).

Since the onset of the “War on Terror”, a body of literature has emerged asserting that states of exception are a definitive exercise of sovereign power rather than a momentary departure from democratic norms (Agamben 2005). In a democracy, all individuals are supposed to enjoy fundamental human rights and equal legal standing (Yamaguchi 2012, 248). However, during a state of exception the executive selectively defines the constituency to which the rule of law extends (Yamaguchi 2012, 244). With the “War on Terror”, many democratic governments determined that the threat of terrorism justified depriving individuals suspected to be affiliated with terrorist organizations of their legal standing (Yamaguchi 2012, 244). Given the conceptual and legal ambiguity of the term terrorism, states enjoy considerable discretion in defining the “legitimate” targets of state violence (Wright 2009, 795). In this “parallel legal universe”, terrorism is any act perceived as a threat by those waging war, the battlefield spans the planet, the war may continue in perpetuity (Hoffman 2004, 940).
Recent years have also seen growing concern over the quality of democracy around the world. Among the concerned are top democracy research institutes, including Varieties of Democracy, Freedom House, and The Economist Intelligence Unit. In their 2017 annual report, the Varieties of Democracy Institute (V-DEM) highlighted moderate, but worrisome, global democratic backsliding, including many countries in Western Europe and North America (Varieties of Democracy Institute 2017, 8). According to the 2018 “Freedom in the World” report from Freedom House, a major democracy index, “democracy faced its most serious crisis in decades in 2017” (Abramowitz 2018). Pointing to “an accelerating decline in American political rights and civil liberties”, and the growing popularity of far-right parties in Western Europe, the Freedom House report asserted that 2017 was the “12th consecutive year of decline in global freedom” (Abramowitz 2018). The Economist Intelligence Unit’s (EIU) “Democracy Index” also fell in 2017, exhibiting the worst performance in recent years (The Economist Intelligence Unit 2018, 2). The EIU expressed particular concern regarding threats to freedom of expression posed by certain counter-terror laws and distrust in public institutions (The Economist Intelligence Unit 2018, 12). In aggregate, the outlook offered by democracy scholars provides reason for concern.

This thesis seeks to investigate the link between States of Exception and the Quality of Democracy. The hypothesis for this study is that States of Exception have a negative impact on the quality of democracy. As the independent variable, States of Exception is operationalized as the volume of counter-terror legislation in effect in each of the sample countries. As the dependent variable, the Quality of Democracy is operationalized through V-DEM democracy indices. This study extends to 20 countries and the results are intended to be generalized across this sample set.

The thesis will proceed in the following order. First, I will overview the development of Giorgio Agamben’s States of Exception theory. Second, I will engage with counter-terror literature, discuss the link between democratic rights and security, and detail key concepts from the democratic backsliding literature. Third, I will outline the methodological framework used to conduct regression analysis. Fourth, I will present the results of the regression analysis. I will conclude with discussion of the results and a summary of the main points.
2: Theoretical Framework

This study primarily builds on Giorgio Agamben’s *states of exception* theory. Agamben’s theory developed through critique of two other paradigms in the scholarship of exceptional governance. The first paradigm conceives of *states of exception* as enumerated powers *within* a state’s legal order. The second paradigm views *states of exception* as extra-judicial mechanisms *outside of* a state’s legal order. While Agamben drew from both paradigms, his theory situates *states of exception* in a liminal space that is neither fully within nor external to the legal order. After discussing this liminal space, Agamben then describes how states increasingly use the ambiguity of *states of exception* to take coercive action that may otherwise be unconstitutional. Finally, Agamben describes how this propensity for exceptional measures is creating a permanent *state of exception*, with foreboding consequences for democratic governance. To establish the theoretical framework, this thesis will first discuss the enumerated powers paradigm. Second, this thesis will overview the extra-judicial powers paradigm, primarily through engagement with Carl Schmitt. Finally, this thesis will discuss Agamben’s liminal space theory of *states of exception*.

**Enumerated Powers Paradigm**

The enumerated powers paradigm can be understood as an attempt to reconcile two vital but contradictory democratic imperatives: the need for a rule-bound government and the need for executive prerogative in responding to crises. On one hand, early Constitutional Liberals sought to legally constrain the leaders of governments to prevent a return to tyranny and arbitrary rule (Fatovic 2009, 40). On the other hand, these scholars also acknowledged that a strong executive would be necessary to defend the aims of a constitution during times of existential crisis, thus safeguarding a return to the state of nature (Fatovic 2009, 40). Enumerated emergency powers can be understood as a negotiated settlement between these competing democratic imperatives.

This paradigm conflates the concept of *state of exception* with *state of emergency*. A *state of emergency* refers to the enumerated constitutional power to suspend a constitution in defence against an existential threat to the state (Cameron 2013, 182). States of emergency streamline decision-making procedures and concentrate authority with the executive, allowing them to circumvent constitutional barriers when taking coercive action (Cameron 2013, 183). When a state of emergency is enacted, citizens temporarily forfeit any constitutional protections that may prolong the executive’s efforts to resolve the crisis (Humphreys 2006, 678). Proponents of this paradigm treat emergency conditions as
autonomous sources of law, thereby legally grounding any otherwise illegitimate actions undertaken in a crisis (Agamben 2005, 23).

Early Constitutional Liberals asserted that one key function of government is to prevent and resolve disputes through the codification of impartial laws (Fatovic 2009, 46). Averse to arbitrary authority, these scholars sought to safeguard individual rights from arbitrary authority through deference to the rule of law (Fatovic 2009, 40). Rule of law refers to democratic structures designed to limit the abuse of state power (Munck 2009, 124). When the rule of law functions, the state acts with respect for its constitution, commits to self-binding measures, monopolizes the legitimate use of force, and abides by a hierarchy of laws (Linz and Stepan 1996, 10). The rule of law elevates the institutions that are vital for democratic self-reproduction, including civil rights and equality before the law, out of reach for ambitious executives (Munck 2009, 125). As a bulwark against tyranny, the rule of law was a key commitment for early Constitutional Liberals (Fatovic 2009, 67).

The same liberal constitutionalists that pressed for the rule of law also recognized the necessity of an agile executive in responding to emergencies. This argument recognizes that the law provides little formal guidance for specific crisis situations (Fatovic 2009, 2). To compensate, liberal constitutionalists vested discretionary power in the executive to preserve the collective good through emergencies (Fatovic 2009, 40). While expected to uphold the law in normal times, the executive may exceed the law to prevent regression to the chaotic state of nature (Fatovic 2009, 2). Liberal constitutionalists asserted that individuals were entitled to the natural rights of life, liberty, and property (Fatovic 2009, 46). One goal of liberal democracy is to mitigate the unpredictability of the natural world and safeguard these natural rights (Fatovic 2009, 46). Given that the law cannot foresee future crises, it is imperative for the executive to protect the ends of democracy from existential threat, even if doing so temporarily compromises lesser democratic principles (Fatovic 2009, 51). One advocate for executive discretion, Alexander Hamilton, argued that “the circumstances that endanger the safety of nations are infinite; and for this reason no constitutional shackles can wisely be imposed on the power to which the care of it is committed” (Humphreys 2006, 678). Another liberal constitutionalist, John Locke, also conceded a high degree of executive authority during crises, despite his affinity for formal rules (Fatovic 2009, 40).

Enumerated emergency powers emerged as a compromise between these two imperatives. To prevent regression into the state of nature, states of emergency grant the executive unique discretionary powers during crises (Fatovic 2009, 48). However, constitutional liberals also recognized that states of emergency may provide executives with a
unique opportunity to expand their power at the expense of the population (Fatovic 2009, 2). For example, during an emergency, the executive may find short-term advantage in limiting the function of the judiciary and other self-corrective institutions of democracy (Cameron 2013, 192). When the rule of law is not enforced, even temporarily, the executive is uniquely able to define their own powers and damage other institutions, with potentially lasting consequences (Cameron 2013, 192). Therefore, to bolster the rule of law from executive abuse, constitutional liberals devised countervailing forces to limit the scope and duration of emergency powers (Fatovic 2009, 38).

**Extra-judicial Powers Paradigm**

Carl Schmitt was a controversial critic of liberal democracy who was marginalized from academia for his affiliation with the Nazi party (Vinx 2016). Schmitt’s work on sovereignty and exceptional powers provides a conservative rationale for a strong executive with wide ranging powers (Vinx 2016). In many regards, Schmitt’s marginalization is justified, especially considering his anti-Semitism and Nazi apologism (Vinx 2016). However, when stripped of its normative content, Schmitt’s work highlights certain institutional weaknesses that leave liberal democracies vulnerable to executive abuse. Furthermore, Schmitt’s conception of *sovereignty* influenced Agamben’s theory of *states of exception*, albeit with a normative inflection.

Schmitt opens his critique by claiming that liberal democracies lay vulnerable during crises because of the interdependence of popular legitimacy and executive deference to legal norms (Vinx 2016). During a crisis, one of the primary goals of an executive is to return the situation to normality (Vinx 2016). While the executive has recourse to numerous legal instruments, functional administration cannot be assumed during an emergency (Vinx 2016). Under these circumstances, the executive may need to act with prerogative and resort to extra-legal means to protect the integrity of the state (Fatovic 2009, 4). In doing so, the executive may contravene the rule of law, separation of powers, protection of civil liberties, and other norms critical to liberal democracies (Fatovic 2009, 3). However, the executive cannot depart from these legal norms while maintaining legitimacy, even if extra-legal measures are necessary to end a crisis (Fatovic 2009, 4).

According to Schmitt, the executive in a liberal democracy derives popular legitimacy through adherence to legal norms (Fatovic 2009, 3). State actions are considered legitimate when the state abides by established legal principles (Vinx 2016). In contrast, policies that smack of arbitrary authority cost the state legitimacy and popular support (Vinx 2016). By
this logic, when confronting problems that have an established legal precedent, executives can maintain their legitimacy by deferring to past legal interpretations, thereby minimizing their own interpretation of the law (Vinx 2016). However, when faced with crises that lack legal precedent, executives must interpret and extend legal norms on their own accord (Vinx 2016). Without the fortification of legal precedent, executive legitimacy, and further, state functioning, are vulnerable to contestation (Vinx 2016). Essentially, Schmitt outlines a paradox where liberal democracies can only maintain legitimacy through a crisis if they have previously divined and enacted legal norms to then defer to during that crisis (Fatovic 2009, 3). Schmitt advocated for strong executive powers – expressed through his conception of sovereignty - to overcome this paradox.

Schmitt defines the sovereign as “he who decides on the exception” (Schmitt 2006, 5). The sovereign is an individual with the de facto power to decide “what constitutes the public interest or interest of the state” (Schmitt 2006, 6). Arguing that “no norm is applicable to chaos”, Schmitt asserts that for a state’s legal norms to function they must be grounded in a shared conception of the normal order (Schmitt 2006, 13). During a crisis, government ministers may disagree over which policies to pursue, though all generally can be assumed to pursue what they feel is best for the state (Schmitt 2006, 9). The sovereign resolves the antagonism between these advisors, thereby defining what constitutes public order and resolving to bring it about (Schmitt 2006, 9). However, this individual decides not only on how to respond to a crisis, but also on what constitutes a crisis in general (Schmitt 2006, 7). In defining a crisis, the sovereign also defines what constitutes the normal order of a state (Schmitt 2006, 10).

In defining sovereignty, Schmitt breaks from certain rationalist understandings of executive powers, reviving instead the concept of natural law (Schmitt 2006, 14). In one of these breaks, Schmitt outlines why sovereignty refers to the de facto ability to invoke a state of exception, rather than to the rationalist enumerated exceptional powers approach (Schmitt 2006, 12). According to Schmitt, enumerated powers will always be insufficient to address severe crises, as the “precise details of an emergency cannot be anticipated” (Schmitt 2006, 6). In such an event, the sovereign would assume the unforeseen and unenumerated competencies deemed necessary to resolve the crisis (Schmitt 2006, 10). The sovereign assumes these rights on behalf of the state as an expression of the natural right to self-defence (Schmitt 2006, 12). Furthermore, Schmitt asserts that a legal order itself is contingent on the sovereign distinction between norm and exception (Schmitt 2006, 10). If order depends on who defines it, and the sovereign commands the power to define order, then suspending
normal laws is the “actual mark of sovereignty” (Schmitt 2006, 9). In this sense, the sovereign stands outside the legal order, as only the sovereign can suspend or reinstate the force of a constitution (Schmitt 2006, 7).

Schmitt advocated for a sovereign executive to uphold legal norms during normal times and to interpret or suspend the law during exceptional times. Although Schmitt contests rationalist attempts to “regulate the exception as precisely as possible”, he does offer a democratic rationale for a sovereign executive through his discussion of the sovereign dictator (Schmitt 2006, 14). Harkening to the French Revolution, Schmitt argues that the revolutionary government wielded dictatorial control to instate a new constitution (Vinx 2016). Although the revolutionary government’s practices in bringing about the new government were non-democratic, their aims reflected an expression of popular will (Vinx 2016). Essentially, the French Revolution could not have taken place had the people not willed an exception (Vinx 2016). Emblematic of a sovereign dictatorship, the revolutionary government claimed power to enact an exception in the name of the French people while ruling them as dictators (Vinx 2016). Therefore, this sovereign dictatorship was an eminently democratic expression of popular will, although it wielded unlimited executive power (Vinx 2016).

As an active Nazi party member, and it has been argued that Schmitt’s theory was pragmatically oriented to legitimize Hitler’s seizure of power (Vinx 2016). Schmitt normatively advocated for the authoritarian wrestling of power in liberal democracies, arguing that such a seizure is not only justified but also democratic (Vinx 2016). When interpreted as a policy imperative, Schmitt’s theory can be read as a populist manifesto which has been justly marginalized. However, when normatively inflected, Schmitt’s theory highlights chronic weaknesses that leave liberal democracies vulnerable to executive overreach. After all, Schmitt both identified the weaknesses of the Weimar Republic as a scholar and exploited these weaknesses as a Nazi party activist. Schmitt argued that during crises, executives should disregard any legal constraints that inhibit their response, even if in doing so they exceed their enumerated powers (Schmitt 2006, 12).

However, Schmitt’s work has staying value when interpreted as a warning of how liberal democracies can be exploited by ambitious executives. For example, Schmitt argues that the sovereign, in defining an exception, effectively wields “unlimited power” and that enumerating these powers does not necessarily constrain them (Schmitt 2006, 12). Schmitt conceived of enumerated powers as shackles inhibiting the guardian of the state. However, when inflected, this same statement questions the effectiveness of institutional checks on
executive power, a cornerstone tenant of democracy. Furthermore, if an executive wields the unlimited power to define enemies of the state, and these enemies are subjectively defined, then what is to stop the executive from rendering their rivals as enemies of the state? Agamben draws on Schmitt’s definition of sovereignty while addressing these other concerns.

**Agamben’s Theory of States of Exception**

One key point of contention between Schmitt and Agamben regards Schmitt’s stance on the legality of sovereign violence during a *state of exception*. In the aftermath of a revolution, where an existing order is overthrown, the law is suspended, leaving the sovereign to dictate the scope and contents of the law (Humphreys 2006, 680). Schmitt argued that during this type of exception, sovereign violence is justified and legal, since in effect, the sovereign’s word is law (Humphreys 2006, 681). Agamben contests this point, claiming that Schmitt sought only to legally justify sovereign violence on behalf of the Nazi regime (Humphreys 2006, 681). *States of exception*, Agamben claims, cannot be contained within the law, as they exist in a liminal space in which the law formally exists but is not applied (Humphreys 2006, 681). While the narrative of exception – advanced through metaphors of war – extols the sanctity of the law, the exception itself is a “*fictio juris*” (Agamben 2005, 59). Furthermore, the violence produced by the *state of exception* cannot be legally constrained (Agamben 2005, 59). After contesting Schmitt on this point, Agamben then outlines an alternative theory of *states of exception*.

Agamben’s theory rejects the two dominant paradigms in the study of *states of exception*: the exception as grounded in positive law and the exception as extrajudicial. Proponents of the extrajudicial paradigm of *states of exception* argue for an executive that is prior to or other than the law, who can interpret and execute the law (Agamben 2005, 23). This paradigm anticipates the eventuality of unforeseen crises and affords the executive sweeping prerogative to respond in the face of an existential threat (Humphreys 2006, 678). Essentially, the executive has a responsibility to abandon constitutional practices that hamstring their ability to protect democratic institutions, or further, the mission of a constitution.

Agamben rejects both paradigms, insisting that the ‘*state of exception is neither internal nor external to the juridical order*” (Agamben 2005, 27). Attempts to situate *states of exception* within a juridical order parallel the natural right to self-defence (Agamben 2005, 43). According to this rationale, the emergency is treated as an autonomous source of law.
The emergency, which is subjectively defined as an existential threat to the state, activates a state’s natural right to self-preservation (Agamben 2005, 23). The legal authority of necessity justifies the specific actions undertaken during an exception that are deemed imperative for the self-preservation of the state (Agamben 2005, 24). Therefore, events which transpire under an exception, regardless of their legal standing during normal times, are legal, thereby situating states of exception within the juridical order.

Agamben contests this point, arguing that necessity itself is not an autonomous source of law (Agamben 2005, 23). Rather, necessity frees an individual case from the direct application of legal norms (Agamben 2005, 25). During a state of exception, the sovereign determines if legal norms inhibit them from protecting the state (Agamben 2005, 25). This sovereign holds the de facto power to both produce and suspend the law (Agamben 2005, 12). Whether legal norms continue to apply depends on sovereign judgement (Agamben 2005, 25). Although the prevailing legal order continues to exist, it does not apply to the emergency case, and the exception, thus, cannot be completely contained within the juridical order (Agamben 2005, 25). Furthermore, to subsume the state of exception under the law is to encompass the non-legal within the law, an implicit assumption which denies the existence of reality outside of the law (Humphreys 2006, 682). When extrapolated, this assumption necessitates a totalizing juridical order under which every facet of human existence is regulated (Humphreys 2006, 682).

Attempts to situate states of exception outside of the juridical order assert that states of exception temporarily blur the authority of the legislative, judicial, and executive branches, rendering the juridical order itself de facto powerless (Agamben 2005, 7). Emphasizing the authoritarian character, this argument seeks to compare states of exception to dictatorship. However, Agamben contests this narrative by tracing the genealogical evolution of states of exception. In their contemporary form, states of exception developed as a technique of governance in the democratic-revolutionary tradition (Agamben 2005, 5). Although the exception departs from legal norms, the legal order of a country remains mostly intact through its duration (Humphreys 2006, 681). Furthermore, new laws are generally not enacted through non-democratic channels during a state of exception, as may be the case in a dictatorship (Humphreys 2006, 681). Overall, most of a state’s laws still apply, just not those affected by the emergency situation, thereby maintaining at least minimal contact between the state of exception and juridical order.

Rejecting both paradigms, Agamben asserts that states of exception exist in the liminal space both within and external to a state’s juridical order (Agamben 2005, 27). States
of exception simultaneously recognize democratic legal limits while trying to legally incorporate these very limits (Humphreys 2006, 680). To define states of exception is to define a “zone of indifference, where inside and outside do not exclude each other but rather blur with one another” (Agamben 2005, 27). This definitional ambiguity is problematic not only in theory, but also in assessing the political significance of states of exception as an increasingly relevant governmental practice.

Agamben’s genealogy of exception concludes with certain practices in the Global War on Terror which exemplify the concept of a permanent state of exception. By the end of the 20th century, states of exception were a common practice adopted by most democratic governments around the world (Humphreys 2006, 678). Though originally conceived as an instrument of war, states of exception have increasingly been invoked in the context of socioeconomic crises (Humphreys 2006, 679). This tendency has accelerated since the onset of the Global War on Terror (Humphreys 2006, 684). Government officials in the Global North increasingly invoke open-ended emergency provisions in response to the terrorist threats (Humphreys 2006, 684). Through rhetoric of existential threat, officials justify recourse to increasingly intrusive levels of government intervention (Humphreys 2006, 679). This military rhetoric sustains an open-ended, or permanent state of exception (Humphreys 2006, 680). At the heart of the permanent exception lies the sovereign right to define enemies of the state (Aradau and van Munster 2009, 693). As the definition of enemies expands and turns inwards, many states have effectively embarked on legalized civil wars which “allow for the physical elimination not only of political adversaries but of entire categories of citizens who for some reason cannot be integrated into the political system” (Agamben 2005, 2). Myriad political issues have emerged in the countries which have embarked on the path of permanent exception.

Agamben uses the concept of homo sacer to illustrate the terminus of the permanent state of exception. In a state of emergency, states define the groups to which the rule of law applies (Humphreys 2006, 686). The individuals who are excluded from the in-group are subject to a parallel justice system that does not extend normal constitutional protections (Humphreys 2006, 686). These individuals, termed homo sacer, hold no political rights or legal standing (Humphreys 2006, 687). Agamben argues that states produce homo sacer through states of exception; homo sacer is the enemy who exists external to politically qualified life (Perezalonso 2010, 152). When a state kills these individuals, it is not considered murder, but rather as confirmation of the boundaries of a sovereign community (Perezalonso 2010, 152). Homo sacer is life that can be taken with impunity, outside of the
influence of the global human rights regime (Aradau and van Munster 2009, 693). In a sense, this killing is intended to reinforce the life of the dominant political community operative within a state (Perezalonso 2010, 152). Agamben uses Guantanamo Bay as a case study to illustrate the concept of *homo sacer*.

**Literature Review**

**Democratic Rights and Security**

Implicit in the justifications of *states of exception* is an assumption regarding the trade-off between democratic rights and security. This trade-off is inscribed in both domestic and international law. At the domestic level, acceptance of this trade-off is apparent in the widespread presence of emergency provisions in democratic constitutions around the world. Most of the world’s democratic governments have adopted temporary emergency provisions, justified as a means for self-defense in the face of existential threats (Svensson-McCarthy 1998, 2). These emergency provisions tend to swell executive authority at the expense of the legislature and the judiciary (Svensson-McCarthy 1998, 41). According to Svensson-McCarthy (1998), “Legal protection may also be fragile when the civil law concept of state of siege is applied, if the limits of the authorised powers are not carefully defined in the domestic law” (44). In some cases, emergency provisions have been noted to hobble the legislative branch and remove the power to censure the president (Svensson-McCarthy 1998, 41). Essentially, when an emergency is declared vital democratic structures can be reduced to forums for debate (Svensson-McCarthy 1998, 41). Every country differs in their tolerance for emergency authority. However, the prevalence of emergency provisions in democratic constitutions contributes to the assumption that normal democratic procedures cannot be afforded during crisis situations.

The contemporary treatment of this assumption in international law can be traced through the development of derogation clauses in cases of public emergency (Svensson-McCarthy 1998, 200). The concept of a derogation clause for public emergencies was introduced into a draft of article 4 of the International Bill of Rights in 1947 (Svensson-McCarthy 1998, 200). While the United States and France initially contested this measure as a non-enforcement-loophole, both countries eventually accepted the concept (Svensson-McCarthy 1998, 201). Eventually, derogation provisions for public emergencies were included into the American Convention on Human Rights, following a legal harmonization procedure outlined by the Organization of American states (Svensson-McCarthy 1998, 284).
Additionally, article 15 of the European Convention on Human Rights permits derogation for public emergencies (Svensson-McCarthy 1998, 324). In particular, France was granted certain derogation privileges when it ratified the European Convention on Human Rights and the International Convention on Civil and Political Rights (Svensson-McCarthy 1998, 42). By seeking these derogation clauses, France claimed a right to remain within the law in the event of an emergency which lead to the abuse of human rights. France is not alone in seeking these exemptions. Furthermore, states enjoy significant flexibility in defining emergencies, a term which has been “suited to fit wellnigh any situation of crisis which the government or military has – rightly or wrongly – perceived as a threat to the security of the state, nation or simply to its own survival and influence in political affairs” (Svensson-McCarthy 1998, 147). Overall, the prevalence of domestic emergency provisions and derogations for international treaties suggests a degree of institutional consensus that human rights may be legally sacrificed during emergencies.

The trade-off between democratic rights and security is also inscribed in the decision-making calculus of authorities in democratic governments. After a terrorist attack, democratic governments must act to maintain support (Ackerman 2004, 1030). To reassure citizens, politicians make promises for greater security (Ackerman 2004, 1029). Emergency provisions are useful as a short-term reassurance measure (Ackerman 2004, 1044). When sustained over time, emergency provisions can even help majority parties invoke patriotism as an electoral tactic (Ackerman 2004, 1048). Civil liberties tend to be a quick casualty when they are deemed an impediment to the security effort (Ackerman 2004, 1030). While these security means may be repressive, citizens may accept the curtailing of civil liberties, especially the civil liberties of different social groups, in pursuit of security from terror (Hardin 2004, 83). This reassurance factor is evident in the pronounced preference among citizens for observable counter-terror actions, as opposed for clandestine activity (Bueno de Mesquita 2007, 11).

Since the onset of the War on Terror, scholars have noted a shift in the willingness of democratic leaders to depart from normal democratic principles in their counter-terror policies (Miller 2005, 270). In the aftermath of the 9/11 terror attacks, many governments expanded their coercive capacity to fight terrorism (Dragu 2011, 64). This moment represented a paradigm shift from the deterrence model to the preventive model of Counter-terrorism (Dragu 2011, 65). This prevention model was built on greater surveillance capacity, an emphasis on pre-emptive measures, and lower barriers for intrusive intelligence activity (Dragu 2011, 65-66). The lowered threshold for intelligence activity created a more
threatening environment for both active terrorists and potential affiliates (Dragu 2011, 66). Further, the costs to civil liberties were argued as justifiable against the cataclysmic potential for future attacks (Dragu 2011, 65). However, problems in this paradigm emerge when extended to the logical extreme. In the face of an infinitely catastrophic terror attack, is the government entitled to unlimited coercive capacity? Nevertheless, Dragu (2011) noted that the inverse relationship of democratic rights and security is rarely challenged, lending further support to this assumption.

The trade-off between democratic rights and security is also inscribed in the minds of citizens in democratic countries. In 2011, a psychological study was conducted to assess the relationship between attitudes towards democratic rights and security from terrorism (Kossowska, et al. 2011). The results of this study provided evidence that the level of terrorist threat is a significant predictor for tolerance of civil liberties restrictions throughout Europe (Kossowska, et al. 2011, 255). According to this study, when “under threat, supposedly in an effort to increase personal security, people more readily accept restrictions on democratic procedures” (Kossowska, et al. 2011, 248). Although there were differences in attitudes across countries and demographics, the fear of terror remains indicative of tolerance for authoritarian policies. Even if this effect is not universal, considerable segments of many European countries have internalized the trade-off between democratic rights and security.

The trade-off between democratic rights and security is assumed in the emergency provisions of democratic governments, the decision-making processes of democratic leaders, and the minds of citizens in democratic countries. As a widely taken-for-granted belief, it could be argued that this assumption previously held doxic status in the rhetorical field of counter-terror discourse among leaders of many democratic governments. Kornprobst and Senn (2016) describe a rhetorical field as an “autonomous social space in which actors contest, de-contest, and reproduce background ideas (doxa) through their foreground communication (debate)” (303). This theory describes discursive interactions in which contested ideas are debated, while uncontested doxic issues structure the terms of debate (Kornprobst and Senn 2016, 303). The widespread adoption of repressive counter-terror measures in the aftermath of the 9/11 terror attacks suggests a high degree of consensus among policy-makers around the world. Many critics of the War on Terror have contested the doxic status of this assumption. By challenging its foundations, these scholars bring counter-terror discourse back into debate.
Critique of the Doxic Assumption

The following section critiques the doxic assumptions about the relationship between democratic rights and security. Dragu (2011) uses a game theoretic model to contest the assumed inverse relationship between privacy protections and security. As the dominant counter-terror paradigm has shifted from deterrence to prevention, security agencies assumed greater authority to conduct intrusive and coercive operations, thereby weakening privacy protections for citizens in democratic countries (Dragu 2011, 65). Governments weaken these privacy protections to minimize legal impediments to their missions and to create a more hostile environment for terrorist groups and their sympathizers (Dragu 2011, 65). This study employs a game theoretic model which accounts for the strategic actions of terrorist and counter-terrorist organizations (Dragu 2011, 66). In doing so, Dragu (2011) asserts that decreasing privacy protection does not necessarily improve security, as doing so may have lasting anti-democratic consequences in the future (Dragu 2011, 75). However, regardless of the security effectiveness, reducing privacy protections will always be in the interest of counter-terror agencies (Dragu 2011, 75). This argument contests the security component of the assumed relationship between democratic rights and security. If reducing democratic protections always increases security, then this trade-off can be more easily justified. However, by contesting the security effectiveness of this assumption, Dragu (2011) destabilizes the validity of the trade-off in general.

Bueno de Mesquita (2007) challenges the security justification for decreased democratic rights by drawing attention to the divergence in politically-optimal and security-optimal counter-terror strategies. From a tactical perspective, counter-terror strategy can be divided into observable and unobservable tactics (Bueno de Mesquita 2007, 10). Observable tactics, which can be seen by the public and by terrorists, include airport security, police presence in public places, and other measures (Bueno de Mesquita 2007, 10). Unobservable tactics, which include asset freezing and surveillance, remain invisible to the public and to terrorists (Bueno de Mesquita 2007, 10). A security-optimal counter-terror strategy employs a mix of both observable and unobservable tactics (Bueno de Mesquita 2007, 14). However, a politically-optimal counter-terror strategy relies on an abundance of observable tactics (Bueno de Mesquita 2007, 13). This tendency is a factor of electoral incentives, which push officials to favor tactics which can be seen by the public (Bueno de Mesquita 2007, 12). In doing so, officials protect themselves from being seen as weak or unconcerned with public safety. Through tracing this divergence, Bueno de Mesquita (2007) argues that increased
counter-terror activity may be a factor of political posturing, thereby challenging the assumed relationship between security and democratic rights.

Dragu and Polborn (2014) also contest the security rationale that underpins assumptions about the trade-off. As mentioned before, emergency measures tend to concentrate authority in the executive branch. Using a game theoretic model, Dragu and Polborn (2014) demonstrate how security from terror attacks decreases when the executive faces electoral incentives to provide security and has the legal authority to expand their power without constraint (Dragu and Polborn 2014, 511). This study employs a similar logic on the divergence of politically-optimal and security-optimal counter-terror strategies. Essentially, legal constraints prevent an executive from engaging in overly repressive counter-terror policies in response to electoral pressure. In fact, overly repressive counter-terror policies play a distinctly negative role in exacerbating the risk of future terrorism.

Bueno de Mesquita and Dickson (2007) describe how numerous terrorist organizations have goaded governments into adopting repressive tactics to damage government credibility. Drawing on examples from Ireland, Spain, and Palestine, this study outlines how terror groups provoked repressive government tactics, leading to costly occupations and unpopular policing campaigns (Bueno de Mesquita and Dickson 2007, 364). Furthermore, the attendant repression of each campaign effectively strengthened support for each of the local terror organizations (Bueno de Mesquita and Dickson 2007, 364).

Dragu (2017) also discusses the link between repression and community support for terror campaigns. Terrorist campaigns depend on both material and ideational support from the communities that the terrorist organizations claim to support. After an attack, many democratic electorates demand forceful, visible counter-terror measures (Dragu 2017, 2). Elected officials who are responsive to these demands tend to respond with coercive action that is localized in the communities that are perceived to house terrorist sympathizers (Dragu 2017, 1). In the short term, such repressive measures quell the electorate and shield the official from appearing weak on terrorism (Dragu 2017, 2). However, such repressive measures are damaging in the long run. While repressive, localized counter-terror measures may temporarily decrease the direct risk of a terror attack, these same measures may undermine the legitimacy of the broader counter-terror effort (Dragu 2017, 3). In these cases, the collateral damage and loss of legitimacy will hobble a governments long term efforts to combat terrorism.
Democratic Backsliding

Counter-terror strategies that involve significant collateral damage are unlikely to be successful. However, the deleterious effects this collateral damage affect more than just the counter-terror strategy. In fact, this collateral damage may be partially responsible for a general trend of democratic backsliding that is currently underway in many democratic governments. This section will overview the concept of democratic backsliding, discuss how it can be measured, and highlight the vectors that are currently under strain from counter-terror policies.

Democratic backsliding refers to the “state-led debilitation or elimination of any of the political institutions that sustain an existing democracy” (Bermeo 2016, 5). Democratic backsliding is a contextually-bound concept which varies across different countries. During the Cold War, democratic backsliding was often blatant, involving staged coups or open election fraud (Bermeo 2016, 7). Today, the obvious subversion of democratic norms has given way to more subtle and incremental backsliding, making detection and countermeasures more difficult (Bermeo 2016, 8). Executive aggrandizement is one common form of democratic backsliding that is particularly relevant in the context of counter-terrorism.

Executive aggrandizement is a form of democratic backsliding through which an executive systematically dismantles the institutions of government and civil society which may other exert a countervailing influence (Bermeo 2016, 10). Aggrandizement can occur through both legal and illegal measures. For example, when an executive uses parliamentary influence to pass legislation that upsets the separation of powers in a democratic government, these measures are technically legal (Bermeo 2016, 11). Parliamentary support for such measures many even lend legitimacy to the executive, although the consequences of such actions may have negative consequences in the future (Bermeo 2016, 11). When aggrandizement holds some form of legal legitimacy, countervailing forces may be acutely limited.

Democratic backsliding through executive aggrandizement is characterized by the incremental erosion of the countervailing democratic institutions (Bermeo 2016, 10). One of these institutions, the rule of law, is particularly vulnerable in the face of an ambitious executive. Rule of law refers to the democratic structures designed to limit the abuse of state power (Munck 2009, 124). By elevating certain democratic rights above democratic deliberation, rule of law serves as an important bulwark against the potentially Machiavellian impulses of the executive branch (Munck 2009, 125). As previously discussed, during a
crisis, executives in democratic government often have recourse to suspend the rule of law through a *state of emergency* or through provisions stipulated in counter-terror legislation. In theory, when such a suspension abides by legal constraints and respects temporal limits, the rule of law can be reinstated as before without altering the democratic order. However, the habitual suspension or piecemeal legislative erosion of the rule of law is harkens to Agamben’s theory of the *permanent state of exception*. Under these circumstances, certain democratic rights lay vulnerable to backsliding. Intrusive counter-terror legislation, indicative of a trend towards the *permanent state of emergency*, threatens to damage the countervailing institutions which restrain the executive, provide civil protections from executive abuse, and protect minority rights in democratic states.

**Democracy Indices**

The research organization Varieties of Democracy (V-DEM) provides numerous indices to measure the quality of democratic constraints on the executive. The Executive Oversight Index (v2lgotovst) assesses to what extent branches of government other than the legislature investigate or publically critique the executive in response to unethical activity (Varieties of Democracy Institute 2017, 185). This index is scaled on a 0-4 point scale with 0 being the worst score. (Varieties of Democracy Institute 2017, 185). The High Court Independence Index (v2juhcind) seeks to “identify autonomous judicial decision-making and its absence” (Varieties of Democracy Institute 2017, 214). This index is scaled on a 0-4 point scale with 0 being the worst score (Varieties of Democracy Institute 2017, 214). The Legislative Investigation of the Executive Index (v2lginvstp) assesses whether the legislature is likely to challenge the executive in response to illegal or unethical behavior (Varieties of Democracy Institute 2017, 185). This index is scaled on a 0-4 point scale with 0 being the worst score (Varieties of Democracy Institute 2017, 185).

Protection from executive abuse is another area of democracy which is threatened by counter-terror policies. The following V-DEM indices are relevant to protection from Executive Abuse. The Freedom from Torture Index (v2cltort) assesses the extent to which a country uses torture as a state practice. This index is scaled on a 0-4 point scale with 0 being the worst (Varieties of Democracy Institute 2017, 221). The Equality before the Law Index (v2xcl rol) assess the extent to which laws are transparently and impartially enforced by the government (Varieties of Democracy Institute 2017, 60). This index is scaled on a 0-4 point scale with 0 being the worst (Varieties of Democracy Institute 2017, 60). The Equal Protection Index (v2xeg_eqprotec) assess the degree of equality in the protection of rights
across different social groups in a state (Varieties of Democracy Institute 2017, 65). This index is scaled on a 0-4 point scale with 0 being the worst (Varieties of Democracy Institute 2017, 60).

Additionally, V-DEM details numerous democracy indices when assess the protection of minority rights in democratic governments. The Freedom of Religion (v2clrelig) assesses the quality of religious freedom in a state (Varieties of Democracy Institute 2017, 220). The Egalitarian Component Index (v2x_egal) assess the extent to which the egalitarian principle is achieved in a state (Varieties of Democracy Institute 2017, 275). The Equal Access index (v2xeg_eqaccess) assesses the quality of equal access to power in a state (Varieties of Democracy Institute 2017, 65). The Egalitarian Democracy Index (v2x_egaldem) assess the extent to which egalitarian democracy is achieved in a state (Varieties of Democracy Institute 2017, 275). The Social class equality in respect for civil liberty index (v2clacjust) assesses the degree to which civil liberties are equally enjoyed by poor and rich people in a state (Varieties of Democracy Institute 2017, 235). The equal distribution of resources index (v2xeg_eqdr) assesses how equally resources are distributed in a country (Varieties of Democracy Institute 2017, 66). The Alternative Sources of Information Index (v2xme_altinf) assesses the quality of un-biased media coverage in a state (Varieties of Democracy Institute 2017, 57). The freedom of discussion index assesses the extent to which citizens may discuss political issues in public places (Varieties of Democracy Institute 2017, 228). Each of these indices are scaled on a 0-4 point scale with 0 being the worst.

**Methodology**

**Experimental Design**

This thesis seeks to address why Counter-terror Legislation has a negative impact on the quality of democracy in Liberal Democratic governments. The quality of democracy is a nebulous and contested concept. To test the hypothesis, 14 sub-hypotheses will be tested using linear regression analysis. These sub-hypotheses have been drawn from a list of democracy indices that are relevant to states of exception and for which sufficient country data is available. The selection process for these indices is listed below.

The following 14 sub-hypotheses will be tested through linear regression analysis:
H1: The volume of Counter-terror Legislation has a negative effect on Freedom from Torture.

H2: The volume of Counter-terror Legislation has a negative effect on Equality before the Law.

H3: The volume of Counter-terror Legislation has a negative effect on Equal Protection.

H4: The volume of Counter-terror Legislation has a negative effect on Freedom of Religion.

H5: The volume of Counter-terror Legislation has a negative effect on Executive Oversight.

H6: The volume of Counter-terror Legislation has a negative effect on the Egalitarian Principle.

H7: The volume of Counter-terror Legislation has a negative effect on Equal Access to Government.

H8: The volume of Counter-terror Legislation has a negative effect on Egalitarian Democracy.

H9: The volume of Counter-terror Legislation has a negative effect on Social Class Equality.

H10: The volume of Counter-terror Legislation has a negative effect on Equal Distribution of Resources.

H11: The volume of Counter-terror Legislation has a negative effect on High Court Independence.

H12: The volume of Counter-terror Legislation has a negative effect on Legislative Investigation.

H13: The volume of Counter-terror Legislation has a negative effect on Alternative Access to Information.

H14: The volume of Counter-terror Legislation has a negative effect on Freedom of Discussion.

**Variables and Data Content**

This thesis uses Volume of Counter-terror Legislation as an independent variable. This data has been taken from the “Legislative Responses to Terrorism” (LeRIT) dataset developed by Epifanio (2011). This data includes new laws that regulate counter-terror policy and amendments to existing laws (Epifanio 2011, 401). This data includes legal instruments explicitly designed to regulate counter-terror policy and measures which influence counter-terror but that do not reference terrorism in their title (Epifanio 2011, 401). Epifanio (2011)
disaggregates legislative responses to terrorism into three categories: privacy laws, procedural laws, and immigration laws (402-403). However, this thesis will only use the sum-total of these categories for analysis.

This thesis uses democracy indices taken from the “Varieties of Democracy v. 7.1” (V-DEM) dataset (Varieties of Democracy Project 2017). The base V-DEM dataset contains over 3,000 indices to assess the quality of democracy around the world. At the onset of analysis, I compiled a list of indices relevant to civil rights protections and potentially indicative of a *state of exception*. The following indices were included in the list:

| Freedom of academic and cultural expression | Freedom from forced labor | Freedom from forced labor for men |
| Transparent laws with predictable enforcement | Freedom from forced labor for women | Property rights |
| Freedom of domestic movement | Social class equality in respect for civil liberty |
| Freedom of domestic movement for men | Egalitarian democracy index |
| Freedom of domestic movement for women | Legislative constraints on the executive |
| Freedom of discussion | Equal protection index |
| Access to justice | Women political empowerment index |
| Weaker civil liberties population | Electoral regime index |
| Expanded freedom of expression index | Private civil liberties index |
| Freedom of expression index | Vertical accountability index |
| Judicial constraints on the executive index | Legislature investigates in practice |
| Regional government index | Particularistic or public goods |
| Core civil society index | Lower court independence |
| Women political participation index | Freedom from torture |
| Civil liberties index | Freedom of foreign movement |
| Accountability index | Freedom of discussion |
| Executive respects constitution | Freedom of discussion for men |
| Common good index | Freedom of discussion for women |
| High court independence | Social group equality in respect for civil liberties |
| Freedom of religion | Egalitarian Democracy Index |
| Rigorous and impartial public administration | Alternative sources of information index |
Civil society participation index  
Equal access index  
Women civil liberties index  
Executive electoral regime index  
Political civil liberties index  
Horizontal accountability index  
Executive Oversight index  
Government attacks on judiciary index  
Freedom from political killing  
Subnational civil liberties unevenness  
Freedom of association  

Equality before the law and individual liberty index  
Local government index  
Equal distribution of resources index  
Women civil society participation index  
Legislative electoral regime index  
Physical violence index  
Diagonal accountability index  
Legislature declares war by law  
Judicial accountability index

Only indices later deemed significant through Pearson analysis were fully subjected to regression analysis. However, this paper intended to cast a wide net in assessing the potential indicators of a state of exception.

**Sample Size and Time Frame**

The sample size and time frame are restricted by the LeRIT dataset. The sample countries include Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Portugal, Sweden, Spain, Switzerland, United Kingdom, and United States (Epifanio 2011).

There are several advantages to using this sample of countries. According to Epifanio (2011), each of these countries altered their counter-terror laws in the aftermath of the terror attacks on 11 September 2001 (400). However, each country also varied in the degree to which they adapted their battery of counter-terror legislation, bringing descriptive diversity to the dataset (Epifanio 2011, 404). Additionally, using this sample of relatively similar “Western liberal democracies” reduces governmental heterogeneity and thus, the pool of potential confounding variables (Epifanio 2011, 400). As in Epifanio’s (2011) study, the results of this study cannot be generalized to incorporate autocratic countries or non-Western democracies (400). However, these results can be generalized among the group of included countries.

The LeRIT dataset spans from 2000 to 2008. Data has been taken from V-DEM to accommodate the country and timeframe constraints of the LeRIT dataset. However, the V-DEM index values have been lagged one year to allow time for legislation to take effect,
thereby reducing the potential for tautology. Therefore, the LeRIT counter-terror value for the year 2000 corresponds to the V-DEM value for 2001.

Data Compilation

First, I compiled a data frame using the statistical software R Studio and the general programming language Python. The components of the data frame are a subset version of the “Varieties of Democracy v. 7.1” data set and a subset version of the “Legislative Responses to Terrorism” dataset from Epifanio (2011). The subset version of V-DEM included the indices listed above for each of the listed countries from 2001 through 2009. The subset version of LeRIT included the sum-total of counter-terror legislation for each of the listed countries from 2000 through 2008. The following section details how I compiled this data set, entitled “master-data”. The R code for this process can be found in annex 1 and the Python code for this process can be found in annex 2.

1) First, a working directory was established to store and organize each of the necessary R files. Then, each of the R Packages that are necessary for analysis were read into the local R library.1

2) Second, the “Varieties of Democracy v. 7.1” dataset was saved as an Excel table, read into R, and saved as the object “V_Dem.”2

3) Third, the “V_Dem” was subset to include only the indices found between 2001-2009. This data frame was saved as “V_Dem_yearlag.”3

4) Fourth, “V_Dem_yearlag” was further subset to include only the sample countries: Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Portugal, Sweden, Spain, Switzerland, United Kingdom, and United States. This object was saved as “V_Dem_countries.” Then, “V_Dem_countries” was alphabetically ordered and saved as the object “V_Dem_countries_ordered.” Finally, the objects

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1 Annex A
2 Ibid.  
3 Ibid.
“V_Dem_countries” and “V_Dem_yearlag” were cleared from the library to reduce clutter.4

5) Fifth, the “Legislative Responses to Terrorism” dataset used in Epifanio (2011) was read into the R library and saved as the object “jpr_replication.” Next, “jpr_replication” was subset to include only data that appears after the year 2000. This object was saved as “LeRIT.” Then, “LeRIT” was alphabetized and saved as “LeRIT_order.” The objects “LeRIT” and “jpr_replication” were then cleared from the library to reduce clutter. Having alphabetized the data, a vector which included only the sum-total value of “Counter-terror Legislation” was saved as a data frame as “LeRIT_counter_terror.”5

6) Sixth, a new data frame entitled “V_Dem_indices” was created. Then, the country names and years from “V_Dem_countries_ordered” were added to this data frame. Next, the Counter-terror Legislation data were added to “V_Dem_indices.” Then, each of the following 66 V-Dem indices were added to “V_Dem_indices” from “V_Dem_countries_ordered”:

- ‘v2clacfree’
- ‘v2clrelig’
- ‘v2cltort’
- ‘v2clkill’
- ‘v2cltnslw’
- ‘v2clrspect’
- ‘v2clmove’
- ‘v2clmovem’
- ‘v2clmovew’
- ‘v2xcl_dmove’
- ‘v2cldiscm’
- ‘v2cldiscw’
- ‘v2xcl_disc’
- ‘v2clslavem’
- ‘v2clslavef’
- ‘v2clprptyym’
- ‘v2clprptw’
- ‘v2xcl_prpty’
- ‘v2clacjstkm’
- ‘v2clacjstw’
- ‘v2xcl_acjst’
- ‘v2clacjust’
- ‘v2clocgrp’
- ‘v2clrgunev’
- ‘v2clsnlpet’
- ‘v2x_egaldem’
- ‘v2x_egal’
- ‘v2x_frassoc_thick’
- ‘v2x_freeexp_thick’
- ‘v2x_freeexp’
- ‘v2xme_altinf’
- ‘v2xcl_rol’
- ‘v2x_jacon’
- ‘v2xlg_legcon’
- ‘v2x_cspart’
- ‘v2xel_locelec’
- ‘v2xel_regelec’
- ‘v2xeg_eqprotec’
- ‘v2xeg_eqaccess’
- ‘v2xeg_eqdr’
- ‘v2xcs_ccsi’
- ‘v2x_gender’
- ‘v2x_genc’
- ‘v2x_gencc’
- ‘v2x_genpp’
- ‘v2x_elecreg’
- ‘v2xel_elecreg’
- ‘v2xlg_elecreg’
- ‘v2x_civilib’
- ‘v2x_elpriv’
- ‘v2x_clpol’
- ‘v2x_clphy’

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4 Annex A
5 Ibid.
![Image](image.png)

After adding these indices, the objects “LeRIT_counter_terror”, “LeRIT_order”, “V_Dem_countries_ordered”, and “year_vector” were removed from the library to reduce clutter.  

7) Seventh, the first three columns of “V_Dem_Indices” were renamed for a cleaner appearance. The cleaned data frame was saved as “V_Dem_clean.”

8) Eighth, columns 4:69 were renamed to include only the name of the corresponding index. The command lines for this process can be found in *Python Annex 2.*

9) Ninth, “V_Dem_clean” was renamed to “master_data” and written to a .csv file as a shortcut for future access. Having completed the data preparation phase, the objects “V_Dem_clean” and “V_Dem_indices” were removed from the library.

**Isolating Usable Data**

After compiling “master_data”, it became apparent that not all the indices changed over the course of the time frame. While it is possible for indices to remain static, the precision of the indices lead me to assume that these indices had not been updated through the time frame. To remove indices that had not been updated, I subset “master_data” into each constituent country, then subtracted the 2000 index value from the 2008 index value. I then excluded data for which 0 was the resulting difference. Next, I then subset “master_data” into individual objects which included only data that had changed through the time frame. The following section details how I isolated usable data. The R code for this process can be found in Annex 1 and the Python code can be found in Annex 2.

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6 Annex A-B
1) First, I subset “master_data” into 20 separate objects to include only individual country data. The objects were created in the following format: “master_Country.”

2) Second, each country subset was tested across each index to find usable data. To do so, the index value corresponding to 2000 was subtracted from the index value for 2008. Country-Indices that showed no change over this period were discarded. The remaining Country-Indices were saved for analysis.

3) Third, new objects were created to group indices by usable countries. This step maximizes the dynamic data used for empirical analysis while limiting data that did not change over the selected time frame.

The objects were created in the following format: “index_sub.”

**Statistical Analysis**

After isolating usable data, I determined the Pearson Correlation Coefficient to assess the linear relation between Counter-terrorism Legislation and Democracy Indices. The Pearson Correlation Coefficient test describes the strength of the linear relationship between two variables (Laerd Statistics 2018). After calculating these coefficients, I ordered the indices based on the strength of the correlation. Coefficients that were less than or equal to -0.7 were coded as *strong negative*. Coefficients that were greater than -0.7 and less than or equal to -0.5 were coded as *moderate negative*. Coefficients that were greater than -0.5 and less than or equal to -0.3 were coded as *weak negative*. Coefficients that fell between the value -0.3 and 0.3 were coded as NULL. Additional categories were also created to accommodate a potential positive correlation. At this point, each of the NULL coded variables was excluded from further analysis.

After culling the NULL coded variables, I began linear regression analysis on the remaining 14 indices. To do so, I created linear object models with Democracy Indices as the regressand and Counter-terrorism Legislation as the regressor. Each regression drew from a subset data frame except for “v2x_egaldem”.

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7 Annex A  
8 Annex A-B
Using the linear object models, I then plotted the data on a Cartesian plane, calculated the best fit line, and derived the equation for each best fit line. Finally, I added each model’s $R^2$ value, coefficient estimates, standard error, T-value, and P-value to a table. The linear object models were saved in the following format: “lm_index.” In R, the formula for linear regressions is as follows: “lm(formula = index ~ `Counter-terror Legislation`, data = index_sub.”

**Python Methodology**

Given the size of the master_data set, this thesis makes use of the *Python for loop* technique to generate command lines for use in *R*. Throughout this thesis, *for loops* are useful to insert lists of countries, democracy indices, or both into otherwise standard command lines. The following section overviews the use of *Python* to generate command lines in *R*.

1) py1 used a *for loop* to iterate a command line used to bind each democracy index to the “V_Dem_indices” data frame.

2) py2 used a *for loop* to iterate a command line that changed the column names of “V_Dem_clean” to match each index.

3) py3 used a *for loop* to iterate a command line that created individual country data frames from the master_data set.

4) py4 used a *double for loop* to generate command lines that subtract the 2000 democracy index value from the 2008 democracy index value. When run, this script displayed “TRUE” if the index was usable for corresponding country, and “FALSE” if unusable.

5) py5 used a *for loop* to iterate command lines that tested the Pearson Correlation Coefficient for each democracy index.
6) py6 used a *for loop* to generate commands which plotted the linear models for high performing indices. py6 also iterated the command lines to calculate the coordinates for each linear model’s best fit line.
Results

Isolating Usable Data

Isolating the dynamic indices of “master_data” significantly reduced the pool of usable data. The final pool of potential indices was as follows:

v2cltort    v2x_egaldem    v2x_freeexp_thick
v2xcl_rol   v2clacjust    v2x_jucon
v2xeg_eqprotec v2xeg_eqdr    v2x_freeexp
v2clrelig    v2juheind    v2x_gender
v2clgotovst  v2lginvstp    v2dlencmps
v2x_egal     v2xme_altinf  v2jupoatck
v2xeg_eqaccess   v2xcl_disc  v2x_frassoc_thick

Pearson Correlation Coefficient

A Pearson Correlation Coefficient test was performed to restrict the analysis to variables which display at least a weak correlation. Table 1 displays the ordered results of the Pearson Correlation Coefficient test.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Index</th>
<th>Index Name</th>
<th>N</th>
<th>Pearson Correlation</th>
<th>Correlation Class</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>v2cltort</td>
<td>Freedom from Torture</td>
<td>45</td>
<td>-0.8565038</td>
<td>Strong Negative</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>v2xcl_rol</td>
<td>Equality before the Law</td>
<td>99</td>
<td>-0.5986138</td>
<td>Moderate Negative</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>v2xeg_eqprotec</td>
<td>Equal Protection Index</td>
<td>36</td>
<td>-0.5942917</td>
<td>Moderate Negative</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>v2clrelig</td>
<td>Freedom of Religion Index</td>
<td>36</td>
<td>-0.4865791</td>
<td>Weak Negative</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>v2clgotovst</td>
<td>Executive Oversight Index</td>
<td>54</td>
<td>-0.45814</td>
<td>Weak Negative</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>v2x_egal</td>
<td>Egalitarian Component Index</td>
<td>144</td>
<td>-0.4300427</td>
<td>Weak Negative</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>v2xeg_eqaccess</td>
<td>Equal Access Index</td>
<td>108</td>
<td>-0.4192182</td>
<td>Weak Negative</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>v2x_egaldem</td>
<td>Egalitarian Democracy Index</td>
<td>180</td>
<td>-0.3745672</td>
<td>Weak Negative</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>v2clacjust</td>
<td>Social Class Equality Index</td>
<td>45</td>
<td>-0.3533304</td>
<td>Weak Negative</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>v2xeg_eqdr</td>
<td>Equal Distribution of Resources Index</td>
<td>108</td>
<td>-0.3524451</td>
<td>Weak Negative</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>v2juhcind</td>
<td>High Court Independence Index</td>
<td>54</td>
<td>-0.3373022</td>
<td>Weak Negative</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>v2lginvstp</td>
<td>Legislative Investigation of Executive Index</td>
<td>90</td>
<td>-0.3169916</td>
<td>Weak Negative</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>v2xme_altinf</td>
<td>Alternative Sources of Information Index</td>
<td>90</td>
<td>-0.3084458</td>
<td>Weak Negative</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>v2xcl_disc</td>
<td>Freedom of Discussion Index</td>
<td>45</td>
<td>0.5920441</td>
<td>Moderate Positive</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>v2x_freexp_thick</td>
<td>Freedom of Expression (Thick)</td>
<td>117</td>
<td>-0.2940444</td>
<td>NULL</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>v2x_jucon</td>
<td>Judicial Constraints on the Executive</td>
<td>63</td>
<td>-0.2884216</td>
<td>NULL</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>v2x_freexp</td>
<td>Freedom of Expression</td>
<td>108</td>
<td>-0.2840531</td>
<td>NULL</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>v2x_gender</td>
<td>Women Political Empowerment Index</td>
<td>180</td>
<td>-0.2502198</td>
<td>NULL</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>v2dlencmps</td>
<td>Particularistic or Public Goods</td>
<td>63</td>
<td>-0.1234318</td>
<td>NULL</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>v2jupoatck</td>
<td>Government Attacks on Judiciary</td>
<td>90</td>
<td>0.07519124</td>
<td>NULL</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>v2x_rassoc_thick</td>
<td>Freedom of Association (Thick)</td>
<td>180</td>
<td>0.2346807</td>
<td>NULL</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
The Pearson Correlation Test displayed a strong negative correlation for the “Freedom from Torture” index (v2cltort) and moderate negative correlations from the “Equality before the Law” index (v2xcl_rol) and the “Equal Protection” index (v2xeg_eqprotec). Additionally, the “Freedom of Discussion” index displayed a moderate positive correlation. The indices which scored a “Weak Negative” in the Pearson Correlation Test remained in the viable indices pool, albeit with a lower degree of certainty. Finally, the values which scored “NULL” were discarded from further analysis.

**Linear Models**

Linear regression analyses were conducted for all of the above indices except for those coded “NULL” in the Pearson Correlation Coefficient Test. The results of these analyses are displayed in the following section.
Results: Hypothesis 1

H₁: The volume of *Counter-terror Legislation* has a negative effect on *Freedom from Torture*.

Sample Size: 45  
Dependent Variable: *Freedom from Torture Index (v2cltort)*

Pearson Correlation Coefficient: **-0.8565038**  
*Strong Negative Correlation*

R² = 0.73  
Best Fit: \( y = 3.969 - 0.108x + u \)

**Table 2:**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Estimate</th>
<th>Standard Error</th>
<th>T value</th>
<th>p</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Intercept</td>
<td>3.969</td>
<td>0.128</td>
<td>30.90</td>
<td>0.000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Counter-Terror Legislation</td>
<td>-0.108</td>
<td>0.009</td>
<td>-10.88</td>
<td>0.000</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Figure 1:**

**Statistical Interpretation:**

Null Hypothesis 1 states that *Counter-terror Legislation* has no effect on *Freedom from Torture*. The T-values for the intercepts are \( <= -2 \) or \( >= 2 \). The p-values for the intercepts are < 0.05. When subtracting the Standard Error from the intercepts, the value does not change signs. The R² value is close to 1. Therefore, this study rejects the null hypothesis that *Counter-terror Legislation* has no effect on *Freedom from Torture*. Given these results, as well as the strong Pearson Correlation Coefficient, the alternative hypothesis that *Counter-terror Legislation* has a negative effect on *Freedom from Torture* can be accepted with a relatively low uncertainty.
Results: Hypothesis 2

H$_2$: The volume of Counter-terror Legislation has a negative effect on Equality Before the Law.

Sample Size: 99
Dependent Variable: Equality Before the Law and Individual Liberty Index (v2xcl_rol)

Pearson Correlation Coefficient: **-0.5986138**
*Moderate Negative Correlation*

R$^2$ = 0.36
Best Fit: y = 0.996 – 0.001x + u

Table 3:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Estimate</th>
<th>Standard Error</th>
<th>T value</th>
<th>p</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>(Intercept)</td>
<td>0.996</td>
<td>0.002</td>
<td>483.450</td>
<td>0.000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Counter-Terror Legislation</td>
<td>-0.001</td>
<td>0.000</td>
<td>-7.360</td>
<td>0.000</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Figure 2:

![Counter-terror Legislation v. Equality before the Law Index](image)

**Statistical Interpretation:**

Null Hypothesis 2 states that Counter-terror Legislation has no effect on Equality before the Law. The T-values for the intercepts are &lt;= -2 or &gt;= 2. The p-values for the intercepts are &lt; 0.05. When subtracting the Standard Error from the intercepts, the value does not change signs. The R$^2$ value is closer to 0 than 1. Therefore, this study rejects the null hypothesis that Counter-terror Legislation has no effect on Equality before the Law. Given these results, as well as the moderate Pearson Correlation Coefficient the alternative hypothesis that Counter-terror Legislation has a negative effect on Freedom from Torture can be accepted with moderate uncertainty.
Results: Hypothesis 3

H₃: The volume of Counter-terror Legislation has a negative effect on Equal Protection Index.

Sample Size: 36
Dependent Variable: Equal Protection Index (v2xeg_eqprotec)

Pearson Correlation Coefficient: -0.5942917
Moderate Negative Correlation

R² = 0.35
Best Fit: y = 0.979 – 0.004x + u

Table 4:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Estimate</th>
<th>Standard Error</th>
<th>T value</th>
<th>p</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>(Intercept)</td>
<td>0.979</td>
<td>0.017</td>
<td>62.576</td>
<td>0.000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Counter-Terror Legislation</td>
<td>-0.004</td>
<td>0.001</td>
<td>-4.309</td>
<td>0.000</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Figure 3:

Statistical Interpretation:
Null Hypothesis 3 states that Counter-terror Legislation has no effect on Equal Protection. The T-values for the intercepts are <= -2 or >= 2. The p-values for the intercepts are < 0.05. When subtracting the Standard Error from the intercepts, the value does not change signs. The R² value is closer to 0 than 1. Therefore, this study rejects the null hypothesis that Counter-terror Legislation has no effect on Equal Protection. Given these results, as well as the moderate Pearson Correlation Coefficient, the alternative hypothesis that Counter-terror Legislation has a negative effect on Equal Protection can be accepted with moderate uncertainty.
Results: Hypothesis 4

Sample Size: 36
Dependent Variable: Freedom of Religion Index (v2clrelig)

Pearson Correlation Coefficient: \(-0.4865791\)
Weak Negative Correlation

\[ R^2 = 0.24 \]
Best Fit: \[ y = 2.341 - 0.017x + u \]

Table 5:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
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<th>Estimate</th>
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<th>T value</th>
<th>p</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>(Intercept)</td>
<td>2.341</td>
<td>0.866</td>
<td>27.031</td>
<td>0.000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Counter-Terror Legislation</td>
<td>-0.017</td>
<td>0.005</td>
<td>-3.248</td>
<td>0.003</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Figure 4:

Statistical Interpretation:
Null Hypothesis 4 states that Counter-terror Legislation has no effect on Freedom of Religion. The T-values for the intercepts are \(\leq -2\) or \(\geq 2\). The p-values for the intercepts are < 0.05. When subtracting the Standard Error from the intercepts, the value does not change signs. The \(R^2\) value is closer to 0 than 1. Therefore, this study rejects the null hypothesis that Counter-terror Legislation has no effect on Freedom of Religion. Given these results, as well as the weak Pearson Correlation Coefficient, the alternative hypothesis that Counter-terror Legislation has a negative effect on Freedom of Religion can be accepted with high uncertainty.
Results: Hypothesis 5

Sample Size: 54
Dependent Variable: Executive Oversight Index (v2clgotovst)

Pearson Correlation Coefficient: -0.45814
Weak Negative Correlation

R² = 0.21
Best Fit: y = 2.610 – 0.035x + u

Table 6:

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<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Estimate</th>
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<th>T value</th>
<th>p</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>(Intercept)</td>
<td>2.610</td>
<td>0.168</td>
<td>15.507</td>
<td>0.000</td>
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<tr>
<td>Counter-Terror Legislation</td>
<td>-0.035</td>
<td>0.009</td>
<td>-3.717</td>
<td>0.000</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Figure 5:

Counter-terror Legislation v. Executive Oversight Index

Statistical Interpretation:
Null Hypothesis 5 states that Counter-terror Legislation has no effect on Executive Oversight. The T-values for the intercepts are <= -2 or >= 2. The p-values for the intercepts are < 0.05. When subtracting the Standard Error from the intercepts, the value does not change signs. The R² value is closer to 0 than 1. Therefore, this study rejects the null hypothesis that Counter-terror Legislation has no effect on Executive Oversight. Given these results, as well as the weak Pearson Correlation Coefficient, the alternative hypothesis that Counter-terror Legislation has a negative effect on Executive Oversight can be accepted with high uncertainty.
Results: Hypothesis 6

Sample Size: 144
Dependent Variable: *Egalitarian Component Index (v2x egal)*

Pearson Correlation Coefficient: \(-0.4300427\)
*Weak Negative Correlation*

\[ R^2 = 0.18 \]
Best Fit: \[ y = 0.942 - 0.003x + u \]

Table 7:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Estimate</th>
<th>Standard Error</th>
<th>T value</th>
<th>p</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Intercept</td>
<td>0.942</td>
<td>0.008</td>
<td>118.209</td>
<td>0.000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Counter-Terror Legislation</td>
<td>-0.003</td>
<td>0.001</td>
<td>-5.676</td>
<td>0.000</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Figure 6:

*Counter-terror Legislation v. Egalitarian Component Index*

Statistical Interpretation:
Null Hypothesis 6 states that *Counter-terror Legislation* has no effect on *Egalitarian Principle*. The T-values for the intercepts are \(\leq 2\) or \(\geq 2\). The p-values for the intercepts are \(< 0.05\). When subtracting the Standard Error from the intercepts, the value does not change signs. The \(R^2\) value is closer to 0 than 1. Therefore, this study rejects the null hypothesis that *Counter-terror Legislation* has no effect on *Egalitarian Principle*. Given these results, as well as the weak Pearson Correlation Coefficient, the alternative hypothesis that *Counter-terror Legislation* has a negative effect on *Egalitarian Principle* can be accepted with high uncertainty.
Results: Hypothesis 7

Sample Size: 108
Dependent Variable: Equal Access Index (v2xeg_eqaccess)

Pearson Correlation Coefficient: -0.4192182
Weak Negative Correlation

R² = 0.18
Best Fit: y = 0.947 − 0.003x + u

Table 8:

<table>
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<tr>
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<th>Estimate</th>
<th>Standard Error</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>(Intercept)</td>
<td>0.947</td>
<td>0.011</td>
<td>79.822</td>
<td>0.000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Counter-Terror Legislation</td>
<td>-0.003</td>
<td>0.001</td>
<td>-4.754</td>
<td>0.000</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Figure 7:

Counter-terror Legislation v. Equal Access Index

Statistical Interpretation:
Null Hypothesis 7 states that Counter-terror Legislation has no effect on Equal Access. The T-values for the intercepts are <= -2 or >= 2. The p-values for the intercepts are < 0.05. When subtracting the Standard Error from the intercepts, the value does not change signs. The R² value is closer to 0 than 1. Therefore, this study rejects the null hypothesis that Counter-terror Legislation has no effect on Executive Oversight. Given these results, as well as the weak Pearson Correlation Coefficient, the alternative hypothesis that Counter-terror Legislation has a negative effect on Equal Access can be accepted with high uncertainty.
**Results: Hypothesis 8**

Sample Size: 180
Dependent Variable: *Egalitarian Democracy Index* (v2x_egaldem)

Pearson Correlation Coefficient: **-0.3745672**
*Weak Negative Correlation*

\[ R^2 = 0.14 \]
Best Fit: \( y = 0.839 - 0.002x + u \)

**Table 9:**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
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<th>Estimate</th>
<th>Standard Error</th>
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</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>(Intercept)</td>
<td>0.839</td>
<td>0.006</td>
<td>135.21</td>
<td>0.000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Counter-Terror Legislation</td>
<td>-0.002</td>
<td>0.000</td>
<td>-5.39</td>
<td>0.000</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Figure 8:**

![Graph showing Counter-terror Legislation v. Egalitarian Democracy Index](image)

**Statistical Interpretation:**
Null Hypothesis 8 states that *Counter-terror Legislation* has no effect on *Egalitarian Democracy*. The T-values for the intercepts are \( < -2 \) or \( >= 2 \). The p-values for the intercepts are \( < 0.05 \). When subtracting the Standard Error from the intercepts, the value does not change signs. The \( R^2 \) value is closer to 0 than 1. Therefore, this study rejects the null hypothesis that *Counter-terror Legislation* has no effect on *Egalitarian Principle*. Given these results, as well as the weak Pearson Correlation Coefficient, the alternative hypothesis that *Counter-terror Legislation* has a negative effect on *Egalitarian Principle* can be accepted with high uncertainty.
Results: Hypothesis 9

Sample Size: 45
Dependent Variable: Social Class Equality Index (v2clacjust)

Pearson Correlation Coefficient: -0.3533304
Weak Negative Correlation

R² = 0.12
Best Fit: y = 2.617 – 0.028x + u

Table 10:

<table>
<thead>
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<th>T value</th>
<th>p</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>(Intercept)</td>
<td>2.617</td>
<td>0.194</td>
<td>13.483</td>
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<tr>
<td>Counter-Terror Legislation</td>
<td>-0.028</td>
<td>0.011</td>
<td>-2.477</td>
<td>0.017</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Figure 9:

Counter-terror Legislation v. Social Class Equality Index

Statistical Interpretation:
Null Hypothesis 9 states that Counter-terror Legislation has no effect on Social Class Equality. The T-values for the intercepts are <= -2 or >= 2. The p-values for the intercepts are < 0.05. When subtracting the Standard Error from the intercepts, the value does not change signs. The R² value is closer to 0 than 1. Therefore, this study rejects the null hypothesis that Counter-terror Legislation has no effect on Social Class Equality. Given these results, as well as the weak Pearson Correlation Coefficient, the alternative hypothesis that Counter-terror Legislation has a negative effect on Social Class Equality can be accepted with high uncertainty.
Results: Hypothesis 10

Sample Size: 108
Dependent Variable: Equal Distribution of Resources Index (v2xeg_eqdr)

Pearson Correlation Coefficient: -0.3524451
Weak Negative Correlation

R² = 0.12
Best Fit: y = 0.976 – 0.004x + u

Table 11:

<table>
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<th>p</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>(Intercept)</td>
<td>0.976</td>
<td>0.015</td>
<td>63.320</td>
<td>0.000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Counter-Terror Legislation</td>
<td>-0.004</td>
<td>0.001</td>
<td>-3.877</td>
<td>0.017</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

Figure 10:

Counter-terror Legislation v. Equal Distribution of Resources Index

Statistical Interpretation:
Null Hypothesis 10 states that Counter-terror Legislation has no effect on Equal Distribution of Resources Index. The T-values for the intercepts are <= -2 or >= 2. The p-values for the intercepts are < 0.05. When subtracting the Standard Error from the intercepts, the value does not change signs. The R² value is closer to 0 than 1. Therefore, this study rejects the null hypothesis that Counter-terror Legislation has no effect on Equal Distribution of Resources Index. Given these results, as well as the weak Pearson Correlation Coefficient, the alternative hypothesis that Counter-terror Legislation has a negative effect on Equal Distribution of Resources Index can be accepted with high uncertainty.
Results: Hypothesis 11

Sample Size: 54
Dependent Variable: High Court Independence Index (v2juhcind)

Pearson Correlation Coefficient: -0.3373022
Weak Negative Correlation

R² = 0.11
Best Fit: y = 2.287 – 0.018x + u

Table 12:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
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<th>Estimate</th>
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<th>T value</th>
<th>p</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>(Intercept)</td>
<td>2.287</td>
<td>0.109</td>
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<td>0.000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Counter-Terror Legislation</td>
<td>-0.018</td>
<td>0.007</td>
<td>-2.584</td>
<td>0.012</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Figure 11:

Counter-terror Legislation v. High Court Independence Index

Statistical Interpretation:
Null Hypothesis 11 states that Counter-terror Legislation has no effect on High Court Independence. The T-values for the intercepts are <= -2 or >= 2. The p-values for the intercepts are < 0.05. When subtracting the Standard Error from the intercepts, the value does not change signs. The R² value is closer to 0 than 1. Therefore, this study rejects the null hypothesis that Counter-terror Legislation has no effect on High Court Independence. Given these results, as well as the weak Pearson Correlation Coefficient, the alternative hypothesis that Counter-terror Legislation has a negative effect on High Court Independence can be accepted with high uncertainty.
**Results: Hypothesis 12**

*Sample Size: 90
Dependent Variable: Legislative Investigation of Executive Index (v2lginvstp)*

*Pearson Correlation Coefficient: \(-0.316916\)*

*Weak Negative Correlation*

\(R^2 = 0.10\)

Best Fit: \(y = 2.747 - 0.027x + u\)

**Table 13:**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
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<th>Estimate</th>
<th>Standard Error</th>
<th>T value</th>
<th>p</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>(Intercept)</td>
<td>2.747</td>
<td>0.139</td>
<td>19.787</td>
<td>0.000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Counter-Terror Legislation</td>
<td>-0.027</td>
<td>0.009</td>
<td>-3.135</td>
<td>0.002</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Figure 12:**

*Counter-terror Legislation v. Legislature Investigating Index*

**Statistical Interpretation:**

Null Hypothesis 12 states that *Counter-terror Legislation* has no effect on *Legislative Investigation*. The T-values for the intercepts are \(<-2\) or \(>=2\). The p-values for the intercepts are \(<0.05\). When subtracting the Standard Error from the intercepts, the value does not change signs. The \(R^2\) value is closer to 0 than 1. Therefore, this study rejects the null hypothesis that *Counter-terror Legislation* has no effect on *Legislative Investigation*. Given these results, as well as the weak Pearson Correlation Coefficient, the alternative hypothesis that *Counter-terror Legislation* has a negative effect on *Legislative Investigation* can be accepted with high uncertainty.
Results: Hypothesis 13

Sample Size: 90
Dependent Variable: Alternative Sources of Information Index (v2xme_altinf)

Pearson Correlation Coefficient: -0.3084458
Weak Negative Correlation

$R^2 = 0.10$
Best Fit: $y = 0.941 - 0.001x + u$

Table 14:

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<thead>
<tr>
<th>Estimate</th>
<th>Standard Error</th>
<th>T value</th>
<th>p</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>(Intercept)</td>
<td>0.941</td>
<td>0.005</td>
<td>174.889</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Counter-Terror Legislation</td>
<td>-0.001</td>
<td>0.000</td>
<td>-3.042</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Figure 13:

Counter-terror Legislation v. Alternative Information Index

Statistical Interpretation:
Null Hypothesis 13 states that Counter-terror Legislation has no effect on Alternative Access to Information. The T-values for the intercepts are $<-2$ or $>=2$. The p-values for the intercepts are $<0.05$. When subtracting the Standard Error from the intercepts, the value does not change signs. The $R^2$ value is closer to 0 than 1. Therefore, this study rejects the null hypothesis that Counter-terror Legislation has no effect on Alternative Access to Information. Given these results, as well as the weak Pearson Correlation Coefficient, the alternative hypothesis that Counter-terror Legislation has a negative effect on Alternative Access to Information can be accepted with high uncertainty.
Results: Hypothesis 14

Sample Size: 45
Dependent Variable: Freedom of Discussion Index (v2xcl_disc)

Pearson Correlation Coefficient: 0.5920441
Moderate Positive Correlation

R² = 0.35
Best Fit: y = 0.933 + 0.002x + u

Table 15:

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<thead>
<tr>
<th>Estimate</th>
<th>Standard Error</th>
<th>T value</th>
<th>p</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>(Intercept)</td>
<td>0.933</td>
<td>0.006</td>
<td>167.185</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Counter-Terror Legislation</td>
<td>0.002</td>
<td>0.000</td>
<td>4.817</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Figure 14:

Counter-terror Legislation v. Freedom of Discussion Index

Statistical Interpretation:
Null Hypothesis 14 states that Counter-terror Legislation has no effect on Freedom of Discussion. The T-values for the intercepts are >= 2. The p-values for the intercepts are < 0.05. When subtracting the Standard Error from the intercepts, the value does not change signs. The R² value is closer to 0 than 1. Therefore, this study rejects the null hypothesis that Counter-terror Legislation has no effect on Freedom of Discussion. Given these results, as well as the moderate Pearson Correlation Coefficient, the alternative hypothesis that Counter-terror Legislation has a positive effect on Alternative Access to Information can be accepted with moderate uncertainty.
Discussion

In every case except for *Freedom of Discussion* there was statistically significant evidence to reject the null hypotheses, albeit with varying degrees of ambiguity. This correlation suggests that increases in the volume of counter-terror legislation are likely to have negative consequences on the quality of democracy in general. This correlation was particularly significant for the *Freedom from Torture, Equality before the Law*, and the *Equal Protection* indices. Taken together, it is likely that Counter-terror legislation has a strong effect on these areas of democracy. The regression analyses for hypotheses 4-13 also suggest a negative linear relationship. Still, these correlations are much weaker and contain greater degrees of standard error. Although it remains likely that counter-terror legislation has some influence on these indices, the extent of this influence is much less certain. The case of *Freedom of Discussion* appears to directly contradict the general hypothesis that counter-terror legislation has a negative impact on the quality of democracy. However, a single anomaly is not sufficient to disprove the entire thesis.

The most compelling results of this study regard the *Freedom from Torture* index. Agamban described the *homo sacer* produced in Guantanamo Bay as emblematic of the contemporary *state of exception* (Agamben 2005). The results of this study show the strongest correlation between instances of torture and counter-terror legislation. Overall, this bodes well for the accuracy of counter-terror legislation as an accurate operationalization of *states of exception*.

This study has numerous weaknesses. For example, using the volume of counter-terror legislation as an independent variable essentially treats all counter-terror legislation as equal. This methodology does not account for qualitative differences in types of counter-terror legislation. However, to date there is no dataset which includes both qualitative and quantitative data on counter-terror legislation. Such a database could be very useful for further study. Another weakness of this study is the lack of operative variables. While counter-terror legislation is likely to have some influence on democracy indices, this study lacks sufficient evidence to prove causality. Other variables are almost certainly operative, and the imprecise metric of counter-terror legislation may be capturing these effects. If other quantifiable variables were identified, a multiple-regression study could provide more insight into the relationship between counter-terrorism and democracy.

This thesis contributes to the *States of Exception* literature in two important ways. For one, this study represents the first attempt to analyze the spread of Agamben’s theory with quantitative literature. Although these results cannot definitively prove causality, this model
does provide a jumping off point for further investigation. Additionally, this study bridges the literature on *States of Exception* with the *Democratic Backsliding* literature, which is more firmly planted in Political Science. On one hand, the *States of Exception* literature stands to benefit from the empirical rigor and analytical tools of Political Science. On the other hand, the *States of Exception* literature adds theoretical and philosophical depth to the *Democratic Backsliding* literature. As a final note, this study also opens the potential for conducting a rhetorical field analysis on counter-terror discourse. Such a study could provide greater depth to the brief rhetorical field overview provided during the literature review of this thesis.

**Conclusion**

As the quality of democracy continues to regress around the world, the literature on *States of Exception* will grow in relevance. At the moment, this literature is primarily situated in philosophy and post-colonial studies, despite its relevance to International Relations. This theory is complementary to the democratic backsliding literature in many ways. In particular, the *States of Exception* literature expands on the theoretical depth of the democratic backsliding literature. At the same time, the methodologies used in democratic backsliding analysis, particularly regarding democracy indices, has potential to push Agamben’s theory into the mainstream. This thesis is an exploratory effort to unite these fields. No single factor can explain as nebulous a concept as democracy. There are limits to the analytical utility of regression analyses. However, as a preliminary quantitative investigation, the parameters used in this study show promise. Whatever the case, both scholars and policymakers stand to benefit from using every available tool in understanding these phenomena.
Bibliography


Wright, Katie. 2009. “Redefining development for national security: implications for civil society.”

Appendix A

Appendix A contains the verbatim command lines from the R Programming language.

#########Thesis Script################

### (1) Set Working Directory; Library Necessary Packages

setwd("~/Documents/Diplomatic Academy of Vienna/Thesis/Data")

library(readr)
library(dplyr)
library(jtools)
library(huxtable)

### (2) Read Base V-DEM from .csv

V_Dem <- read.table("V-DEM-DS-CY-v7.1.csv", sep="", header=T)

### (3) Subset V-DEM for YEAR 2001-2009

V_Dem_yearlag <- subset(V_Dem, year >=2001 & year <=2009)

### (4) Subset V_Dem_yearlag for COUNTRIES:

V_Dem_countries <- subset(V_Dem_yearlag, country_id == 144 | country_id == 148 |
country_id == 66 | country_id == 158 | country_id == 91 | country_id == 186 | country_id == 21 | country_id == 76| country_id ==163 | country_id == 77| country_id == 67 | country_id == 164| country_id == 81 | country_id == 82 | country_id == 185 | country_id == 96|
country_id == 5| country_id == 6 | country_id == 101 | country_id == 20)

V_Dem_countries_ordered <- V_Dem_countries[order(V_Dem_countries$country_name),]
rm(V_Dem_countries,V_Dem_yearlag)
### (5) Read LeRIT from .csv

```r
library(haven)
jpr_replication <- read_dta("Epifanio_replication/jpr_replication.dta")
LeRIT <- subset(jpr_replication, year >= 2000)
LeRIT_order <- LeRIT[order(LeRIT$country),]
rm(LeRIT,jpr_replication)
LeRIT_counter_terror <- data.frame(LeRIT_order$sumtot)
```

### (6) Subset V_Dem_countries for INDICES; Compile data.frame with LeRIT:

```r
***Python 1***
V_Dem_indices <- data.frame(V_Dem_countries_ordered$country_name)
year_vector <- data.frame((V_Dem_countries_ordered$year)-1)
V_Dem_indices <- cbind(V_Dem_indices, year_vector)
V_Dem_indices <- cbind(V_Dem_indices, LeRIT_counter_terror)
V_Dem_indices <- cbind(V_Dem_indices, data.frame(V_Dem_countries_ordered$v2clacfree))
V_Dem_indices <- cbind(V_Dem_indices, data.frame(V_Dem_countries_ordered$v2clrelig))
V_Dem_indices <- cbind(V_Dem_indices, data.frame(V_Dem_countries_ordered$v2cltort))
V_Dem_indices <- cbind(V_Dem_indices, data.frame(V_Dem_countries_ordered$v2clkill))
V_Dem_indices <- cbind(V_Dem_indices, data.frame(V_Dem_countries_ordered$v2cltrnslw))
V_Dem_indices <- cbind(V_Dem_indices, data.frame(V_Dem_countries_ordered$v2clrspct))
V_Dem_indices <- cbind(V_Dem_indices, data.frame(V_Dem_countries_ordered$v2clfmove))
V_Dem_indices <- cbind(V_Dem_indices, data.frame(V_Dem_countries_ordered$v2cldmovem))
V_Dem_indices <- cbind(V_Dem_indices, data.frame(V_Dem_countries_ordered$v2cldmovew))
V_Dem_indices <- cbind(V_Dem_indices, data.frame(V_Dem_countries_ordered$v2xcl_dmove))
V_Dem_indices <- cbind(V_Dem_indices, data.frame(V_Dem_countries_ordered$v2cldiscm))
```
V_Dem_indices <- cbind(V_Dem_indices, 
data.frame(V_Dem_countries_ordered$v2cldiscw))
V_Dem_indices <- cbind(V_Dem_indices, 
data.frame(V_Dem_countries_ordered$v2xcl_disc))
V_Dem_indices <- cbind(V_Dem_indices, 
data.frame(V_Dem_countries_ordered$v2clslavem))
V_Dem_indices <- cbind(V_Dem_indices, 
data.frame(V_Dem_countries_ordered$v2clslavef))
V_Dem_indices <- cbind(V_Dem_indices, 
data.frame(V_Dem_countries_ordered$v2clprptym))
V_Dem_indices <- cbind(V_Dem_indices, 
data.frame(V_Dem_countries_ordered$v2clprptyw))
V_Dem_indices <- cbind(V_Dem_indices, 
data.frame(V_Dem_countries_ordered$v2xcl_prpty))
V_Dem_indices <- cbind(V_Dem_indices, 
data.frame(V_Dem_countries_ordered$v2clacjstm))
V_Dem_indices <- cbind(V_Dem_indices, 
data.frame(V_Dem_countries_ordered$v2clacjstw))
V_Dem_indices <- cbind(V_Dem_indices, 
data.frame(V_Dem_countries_ordered$v2xcl_acjst))
V_Dem_indices <- cbind(V_Dem_indices, 
data.frame(V_Dem_countries_ordered$v2clacjust))
V_Dem_indices <- cbind(V_Dem_indices, 
data.frame(V_Dem_countries_ordered$v2clsocgrp))
V_Dem_indices <- cbind(V_Dem_indices, 
data.frame(V_Dem_countries_ordered$v2clrgunev))
V_Dem_indices <- cbind(V_Dem_indices, 
data.frame(V_Dem_countries_ordered$v2clsnlpct))
V_Dem_indices <- cbind(V_Dem_indices, 
data.frame(V_Dem_countries_ordered$v2x_egaldem))
V_Dem_indices <- cbind(V_Dem_indices, 
data.frame(V_Dem_countries_ordered$v2x_egaldem))
V_Dem_indices <- cbind(V_Dem_indices, 
data.frame(V_Dem_countries_ordered$v2x_frassoc_thick))
V_Dem_indices <- cbind(V_Dem_indices, data.frame(V_Dem_countries_ordered$v2x_freexp_thick))
V_Dem_indices <- cbind(V_Dem_indices, data.frame(V_Dem_countries_ordered$v2x_freexp))
V_Dem_indices <- cbind(V_Dem_indices, data.frame(V_Dem_countries_ordered$v2xme_altinf))
V_Dem_indices <- cbind(V_Dem_indices, data.frame(V_Dem_countries_ordered$v2xcl_rol))
V_Dem_indices <- cbind(V_Dem_indices, data.frame(V_Dem_countries_ordered$v2x_jucon))
V_Dem_indices <- cbind(V_Dem_indices, data.frame(V_Dem_countries_ordered$v2xlg_legcon))
V_Dem_indices <- cbind(V_Dem_indices, data.frame(V_Dem_countries_ordered$v2x_cspart))
V_Dem_indices <- cbind(V_Dem_indices, data.frame(V_Dem_countries_ordered$v2xel_locelec))
V_Dem_indices <- cbind(V_Dem_indices, data.frame(V_Dem_countries_ordered$v2xel_regelec))
V_Dem_indices <- cbind(V_Dem_indices, data.frame(V_Dem_countries_ordered$v2xeg_eqprotec))
V_Dem_indices <- cbind(V_Dem_indices, data.frame(V_Dem_countries_ordered$v2xeg_eqaccess))
V_Dem_indices <- cbind(V_Dem_indices, data.frame(V_Dem_countries_ordered$v2xeg_eqdr))
V_Dem_indices <- cbind(V_Dem_indices, data.frame(V_Dem_countries_ordered$v2xcs_ccsi))
V_Dem_indices <- cbind(V_Dem_indices, data.frame(V_Dem_countries_ordered$v2x_gender))
V_Dem_indices <- cbind(V_Dem_indices, data.frame(V_Dem_countries_ordered$v2x_gencl))
V_Dem_indices <- cbind(V_Dem_indices, data.frame(V_Dem_countries_ordered$v2x_gencc))
V_Dem_indices <- cbind(V_Dem_indices, data.frame(V_Dem_countries_ordered$v2x_genpp))
V_Dem_indices <- cbind(V_Dem_indices,
data.frame(V_Dem_countries_ordered$v2x_elecreg))
V_Dem_indices <- cbind(V_Dem_indices,
data.frame(V_Dem_countries_ordered$v2xex_elecreg))
V_Dem_indices <- cbind(V_Dem_indices,
data.frame(V_Dem_countries_ordered$v2xlg_elecreg))
V_Dem_indices <- cbind(V_Dem_indices,
data.frame(V_Dem_countries_ordered$v2x_civlib))
V_Dem_indices <- cbind(V_Dem_indices,
data.frame(V_Dem_countries_ordered$v2x_clpriv))
V_Dem_indices <- cbind(V_Dem_indices,
data.frame(V_Dem_countries_ordered$v2x_clpol))
V_Dem_indices <- cbind(V_Dem_indices,
data.frame(V_Dem_countries_ordered$v2x_clphy))
V_Dem_indices <- cbind(V_Dem_indices,
data.frame(V_Dem_countries_ordered$v2x_accountability))
V_Dem_indices <- cbind(V_Dem_indices,
data.frame(V_Dem_countries_ordered$v2x_veracc))
V_Dem_indices <- cbind(V_Dem_indices,
data.frame(V_Dem_countries_ordered$v2x_horacc))
V_Dem_indices <- cbind(V_Dem_indices,
data.frame(V_Dem_countries_ordered$v2x_diagacc))
V_Dem_indices <- cbind(V_Dem_indices,
data.frame(V_Dem_countries_ordered$v2exrescon))
V_Dem_indices <- cbind(V_Dem_indices,
data.frame(V_Dem_countries_ordered$v2lginvstp))
V_Dem_indices <- cbind(V_Dem_indices,
data.frame(V_Dem_countries_ordered$v2lgotovst))
V_Dem_indices <- cbind(V_Dem_indices,
data.frame(V_Dem_countries_ordered$v2lgwarlaw))
V_Dem_indices <- cbind(V_Dem_indices,
data.frame(V_Dem_countries_ordered$v2dlcommon))
V_Dem_indices <- cbind(V_Dem_indices,
data.frame(V_Dem_countries_ordered$v2dlencmps))
V_Dem_indices <- cbind(V_Dem_indices,
data.frame(V_Dem_countries_ordered$v2jupoatck))
V_Dem_indices <- cbind(V_Dem_indices,
data.frame(V_Dem_countries_ordered$v2juacent))
V_Dem_indices <- cbind(V_Dem_indices,
data.frame(V_Dem_countries_ordered$v2juhcind))
V_Dem_indices <- cbind(V_Dem_indices,
data.frame(V_Dem_countries_ordered$v2juncind))
rm(LeRIT_counter_terror,LeRIT_order,V_Dem_countries_ordered,year_vector)

### (7) Clean V_Dem_indices; rename columns 1:3

V_Dem_clean <- V_Dem_indices
colnames(V_Dem_clean)[1] <- "Country"
colnames(V_Dem_clean)[2] <- "Year"
colnames(V_Dem_clean)[3] <- "Counter-terror Legislation"

### (8) Clean V_Dem_clean; rename columns 4:69 ***Python 2***

colnames(V_Dem_clean)[4] <- 'v2clacfree'
colnames(V_Dem_clean)[5] <- 'v2clrelig'
colnames(V_Dem_clean)[6] <- 'v2cltort'
colnames(V_Dem_clean)[7] <- 'v2clkill'
colnames(V_Dem_clean)[8] <- 'v2cltrnslw'
colnames(V_Dem_clean)[9] <- 'v2clrspect'
colnames(V_Dem_clean)[10] <- 'v2clfmove'
colnames(V_Dem_clean)[11] <- 'v2cldmovem'
colnames(V_Dem_clean)[12] <- 'v2cldmovew'
colnames(V_Dem_clean)[13] <- 'v2xcl_dmove'
colnames(V_Dem_clean)[14] <- 'v2cldiscm'
colnames(V_Dem_clean)[15] <- 'v2cldiscw'
colnames(V_Dem_clean)[16] <- 'v2xcl_disc'
colnames(V_Dem_clean)[17] <- 'v2clslavem'
colnames(V_Dem_clean)[18] <- 'v2clslavef'
colnames(V_Dem_clean)[19] <- 'v2clprptym'
colnames(V_Dem_clean)[20] <- 'v2clprptyw'
colnames(V_Dem_clean)[21] <- 'v2xcl_prpty'
colnames(V_Dem_clean)[22] <- 'v2clacjstm'
colnames(V_Dem_clean)[23] <- 'v2clacjstw'
colnames(V_Dem_clean)[24] <- 'v2xcl_acjst'
colnames(V_Dem_clean)[25] <- 'v2clacjust'
colnames(V_Dem_clean)[26] <- 'v2csocgrp'
colnames(V_Dem_clean)[27] <- 'v2clrgunev'
colnames(V_Dem_clean)[28] <- 'v2clsnlpcet'
colnames(V_Dem_clean)[29] <- 'v2x_egaldem'
colnames(V_Dem_clean)[30] <- 'v2x_egal'
colnames(V_Dem_clean)[31] <- 'v2x_frasassoc_thick'
colnames(V_Dem_clean)[32] <- 'v2x_freeexp_thick'
colnames(V_Dem_clean)[33] <- 'v2x_freeexp'
colnames(V_Dem_clean)[34] <- 'v2xme_altinf'
colnames(V_Dem_clean)[35] <- 'v2xcl_rol'
colnames(V_Dem_clean)[36] <- 'v2x_jucon'
colnames(V_Dem_clean)[37] <- 'v2xlg_legcon'
colnames(V_Dem_clean)[38] <- 'v2x_cspart'
colnames(V_Dem_clean)[39] <- 'v2xel_locelec'
colnames(V_Dem_clean)[40] <- 'v2xel_regelec'
colnames(V_Dem_clean)[41] <- 'v2xeg_eqprotec'
colnames(V_Dem_clean)[42] <- 'v2xeg_eqaccess'
colnames(V_Dem_clean)[43] <- 'v2xeg_eqdr'
colnames(V_Dem_clean)[44] <- 'v2xcs_ccsi'
colnames(V_Dem_clean)[45] <- 'v2x_gender'
colnames(V_Dem_clean)[46] <- 'v2x_gencl'
colnames(V_Dem_clean)[47] <- 'v2x_gencs'
colnames(V_Dem_clean)[48] <- 'v2x_genppp'
colnames(V_Dem_clean)[49] <- 'v2x_elecreg'
colnames(V_Dem_clean)[50] <- 'v2xex_elecreg'
colnames(V_Dem_clean)[51] <- 'v2xlg_elecreg'
colnames(V_Dem_clean)[52] <- 'v2x_civilib'
colnames(V_Dem_clean)[53] <- 'v2x_clpriv'
colnames(V_Dem_clean)[54] <- 'v2x_clpol'
colnames(V_Dem_clean)[55] <- 'v2x_clphy'
colnames(V_Dem_clean)[56] <- 'v2x_accountability'
colnames(V_Dem_clean)[57] <- 'v2x_verace'
colnames(V_Dem_clean)[58] <- 'v2x_horace'
colnames(V_Dem_clean)[59] <- 'v2x_diagacc'
colnames(V_Dem_clean)[60] <- 'v2xrescon'
colnames(V_Dem_clean)[61] <- 'v2lginvstp'
colnames(V_Dem_clean)[62] <- 'v2lgotovst'
colnames(V_Dem_clean)[63] <- 'v2lgwarlaw'
colnames(V_Dem_clean)[64] <- 'v2dlcommon'
colnames(V_Dem_clean)[65] <- 'v2dlencmps'
colnames(V_Dem_clean)[66] <- 'v2jupoatck'
colnames(V_Dem_clean)[67] <- 'v2juacctn'
colnames(V_Dem_clean)[68] <- 'v2juhcind'
colnames(V_Dem_clean)[69] <- 'v2juncind'

### (9) Save data.frame as .csv for easy access

master_data <- V_Dem_clean
rm(V_Dem_clean, V_Dem_indices)
write.csv(master_data, file = "master_data.csv")

### (10) Subset master_data by country ***Python 3***

master_Australia <- subset(master_data, master_data$Country == 'Australia')
master_Austria <- subset(master_data, master_data$Country == 'Austria')
master_Belgium <- subset(master_data, master_data$Country == 'Belgium')
master_Canada <- subset(master_data, master_data$Country == 'Canada')
master_Denmark <- subset(master_data, master_data$Country == 'Denmark')
master_Finland <- subset(master_data, master_data$Country == 'Finland')
master_France <- subset(master_data, master_data$Country == 'France')
master_Germany <- subset(master_data, master_data$Country == 'Germany')
master_Greece <- subset(master_data, master_data$Country == 'Greece')
master_Ireland <- subset(master_data, master_data$Country == 'Ireland')
master_Italy <- subset(master_data, master_data$Country == 'Italy')
master_Netherlands <- subset(master_data, master_data$Country == 'Netherlands')
master_NewZealand <- subset(master_data, master_data$Country == 'New Zealand')
master_Norway <- subset(master_data, master_data$Country == 'Norway')
master_Portugal <- subset(master_data, master_data$Country == 'Portugal')
master_Sweden <- subset(master_data, master_data$Country == 'Sweden')
master_Spain <- subset(master_data, master_data$Country == 'Spain')
master_Switzerland <- subset(master_data, master_data$Country == 'Switzerland')
master_UK <- subset(master_data, master_data$Country == 'United Kingdom')
master_US <- subset(master_data, master_data$Country == 'United States')

### (11) Test for Usable Data ***Python 4***

##Usable data when !=0 -- TRUE

#Australia
(master_Australia$v2clacfree[9] - master_Australia$v2clacfree[1]) != 0
(master_Australia$v2clrelig[9] - master_Australia$v2clrelig[1]) != 0
(master_Australia$v2cltort[9] - master_Australia$v2cltort[1]) != 0
(master_Australia$v2clkill[9] - master_Australia$v2clkill[1]) != 0
(master_Australia$v2cltrnslw[9] - master_Australia$v2cltrnslw[1]) != 0
(master_Australia$v2clrspct[9] - master_Australia$v2clrspct[1]) != 0
(master_Australia$v2clfmove[9] - master_Australia$v2clfmove[1]) != 0
(master_Australia$v2cldmovem[9] - master_Australia$v2cldmovem[1]) != 0
(master_Australia$v2cldmovew[9] - master_Australia$v2cldmovew[1]) != 0
(master_Australia$v2xcl_dmove[9] - master_Australia$v2xcl_dmove[1]) != 0
(master_Australia$v2cldiscm[9] - master_Australia$v2cldiscm[1]) != 0
(master_Australia$v2cldiscw[9] - master_Australia$v2cldiscw[1]) != 0
(master_Australia$v2xcl_disc[9] - master_Australia$v2xcl_disc[1]) != 0
(master_Australia$v2clslavem[9] - master_Australia$v2clslavem[1]) != 0
(master_Australia$v2clslavef[9] - master_Australia$v2clslavef[1]) != 0
(master_Australia$v2clprptym[9] - master_Australia$v2clprptym[1]) != 0
(master_Australia$v2clprptyw[9] - master_Australia$v2clprptyw[1]) != 0
#Master_Australia$
(master_Australia$v2x_clphy[9] - master_Australia$v2x_clphy[1]) != 0
(master_Australia$v2x_accountability[9] - master_Australia$v2x_accountability[1]) != 0
(master_Australia$v2x_veracc[9] - master_Australia$v2x_veracc[1]) != 0
(master_Australia$v2x_horacc[9] - master_Australia$v2x_horacc[1]) != 0
(master_Australia$v2x_diagacc[9] - master_Australia$v2x_diagacc[1]) != 0
(master_Australia$v2exrescon[9] - master_Australia$v2exrescon[1]) != 0
(master_Australia$v2lginvst[9] - master_Australia$v2lginvst[1]) != 0
(master_Australia$v2lgwarlaw[9] - master_Australia$v2lgwarlaw[1]) != 0
(master_Australia$v2dlcommon[9] - master_Australia$v2dlcommon[1]) != 0
(master_Australia$v2dlencmps[9] - master_Australia$v2dlencmps[1]) != 0
(master_Australia$v2jupoatck[9] - master_Australia$v2jupoatck[1]) != 0
(master_Austria$v2clacfree[9] - master_Austria$v2clacfree[1]) != 0
(master_Austria$v2clrelig[9] - master_Austria$v2clrelig[1]) != 0
(master_Austria$v2cltort[9] - master_Austria$v2cltort[1]) != 0
(master_Austria$v2clkill[9] - master_Austria$v2clkill[1]) != 0
(master_Austria$v2cltrnslw[9] - master_Austria$v2cltrnslw[1]) != 0
(master_Austria$v2clrspct[9] - master_Austria$v2clrspct[1]) != 0
(master_Austria$v2clfmove[9] - master_Austria$v2clfmove[1]) != 0
(master_Austria$v2cldmovem[9] - master_Austria$v2cldmovem[1]) != 0
(master_Austria$v2cldmovew[9] - master_Austria$v2cldmovew[1]) != 0
(master_Austria$v2xcl_dmove[9] - master_Austria$v2xcl_dmove[1]) != 0
(master_Austria$v2cldiscm[9] - master_Austria$v2cldiscm[1]) != 0
(master_Austria$v2cldiscw[9] - master_Austria$v2cldiscw[1]) != 0
(master_Austria$v2xcl_disc[9] - master_Austria$v2xcl_disc[1]) != 0
(master_Austria$v2clslavem[9] - master_Austria$v2clslavem[1]) != 0
(master_Austria$v2clslavef[9] - master_Austria$v2clslavef[1]) != 0
(master_Austria$v2clprptym[9] - master_Austria$v2clprptym[1]) != 0
(master_Austria$v2clprptyw[9] - master_Austria$v2clprptyw[1]) != 0

#Austria
(master_Austria$v2clacfree[9] - master_Austria$v2clacfree[1]) != 0
(master_Austria$v2clrelig[9] - master_Austria$v2clrelig[1]) != 0
(master_Austria$v2cltort[9] - master_Austria$v2cltort[1]) != 0
(master_Austria$v2clkill[9] - master_Austria$v2clkill[1]) != 0
(master_Austria$v2cltrnslw[9] - master_Austria$v2cltrnslw[1]) != 0
(master_Austria$v2clrspct[9] - master_Austria$v2clrspct[1]) != 0
(master_Austria$v2clfmove[9] - master_Austria$v2clfmove[1]) != 0
(master_Austria$v2cldmovem[9] - master_Austria$v2cldmovem[1]) != 0
(master_Austria$v2cldmovew[9] - master_Austria$v2cldmovew[1]) != 0
(master_Austria$v2xcl_dmove[9] - master_Austria$v2xcl_dmove[1]) != 0
(master_Austria$v2cldiscm[9] - master_Austria$v2cldiscm[1]) != 0
(master_Austria$v2cldiscw[9] - master_Austria$v2cldiscw[1]) != 0
(master_Austria$v2xcl_disc[9] - master_Austria$v2xcl_disc[1]) != 0
(master_Austria$v2clslavem[9] - master_Austria$v2clslavem[1]) != 0
(master_Austria$v2clslavef[9] - master_Austria$v2clslavef[1]) != 0
(master_Austria$v2clprptym[9] - master_Austria$v2clprptym[1]) != 0
(master_Austria$v2clprptyw[9] - master_Austria$v2clprptyw[1]) != 0
(master_Austria$v2xcl_prpty[9] - master_Austria$v2xcl_prpty[1]) != 0
(master_Austria$v2clacjstm[9] - master_Austria$v2clacjstm[1]) != 0
(master_Austria$v2clacjstw[9] - master_Austria$v2clacjstw[1]) != 0
(master_Austria$v2c_acjst[9] - master_Austria$v2c_acjst[1]) != 0
(master_Austria$v2clacjust[9] - master_Austria$v2clacjust[1]) != 0
(master_Austria$v2clacgpr[9] - master_Austria$v2clacgpr[1]) != 0
(master_Austria$v2clrgunev[9] - master_Austria$v2clrgunev[1]) != 0
(master_Austria$v2clsnlpct[9] - master_Austria$v2clsnlpct[1]) != 0
(master_Austria$v2_x egal[9] - master_Austria$v2_x egal[1]) != 0
(master_Austria$v2x_eal[9] - master_Austria$v2x_eal[1]) != 0
(master_Austria$v2x_frasoec_thick[9] - master_Austria$v2x_frasoec_thick[1]) != 0
(master_Austria$v2x_freeexp_thick[9] - master_Austria$v2x_freeexp_thick[1]) != 0
(master_Austria$v2x_freeexp[9] - master_Austria$v2x_freeexp[1]) != 0
(master_Austria$v2xme_altinf[9] - master_Austria$v2xme_altinf[1]) != 0
(master_Austria$v2xcl_rol[9] - master_Austria$v2xcl_rol[1]) != 0
(master_Austria$v2x_jucon[9] - master_Austria$v2x_jucon[1]) != 0
(master_Austria$v2xlg_legcon[9] - master_Austria$v2xlg_legcon[1]) != 0
(master_Austria$v2x_cspart[9] - master_Austria$v2x_cspart[1]) != 0
(master_Austria$v2x_locelec[9] - master_Austria$v2x_locelec[1]) != 0
(master_Austria$v2x_regelec[9] - master_Austria$v2x_regelec[1]) != 0
(master_Austria$v2xeg_eqprotec[9] - master_Austria$v2xeg_eqprotec[1]) != 0
(master_Austria$v2xeg_eqaccess[9] - master_Austria$v2xeg_eqaccess[1]) != 0
(master_Austria$v2xeg_eqdr[9] - master_Austria$v2xeg_eqdr[1]) != 0
(master_Austria$v2xcs_csi[9] - master_Austria$v2xcs_csi[1]) != 0
(master_Austria$v2x_gender[9] - master_Austria$v2x_gender[1]) != 0
(master_Austria$v2x_gencl[9] - master_Austria$v2x_gencl[1]) != 0
(master_Austria$v2x_genes[9] - master_Austria$v2x_genes[1]) != 0
(master_Austria$v2x_genpp[9] - master_Austria$v2x_genpp[1]) != 0
(master_Austria$v2xelecreg[9] - master_Austria$v2xelecreg[1]) != 0
(master_Austria$v2ex_elecreg[9] - master_Austria$v2ex_elecreg[1]) != 0
(master_Austria$v2xls_elecreg[9] - master_Austria$v2xls_elecreg[1]) != 0
(master_Austria$v2xcivlib[9] - master_Austria$v2xcivlib[1]) != 0
(master_Austria$v2x_clpriv[9] - master_Austria$v2x_clpriv[1]) != 0
(master_Austria$v2x_clpol[9] - master_Austria$v2x_clpol[1]) != 0
(master_Austria$v2x_clphy[9] - master_Austria$v2x_clphy[1]) != 0
(master_Austria$v2x_accountability[9] - master_Austria$v2x_accountability[1]) != 0
(master_Austria$v2x_veracc[9] - master_Austria$v2x_veracc[1]) != 0
(master_Austria$v2x_horacc[9] - master_Austria$v2x_horacc[1]) != 0
(master_Austria$v2x_diagacc[9] - master_Austria$v2x_diagacc[1]) != 0
(master_Austria$v2exrescon[9] - master_Austria$v2exrescon[1]) != 0
(master_Austria$v2lginvstp[9] - master_Austria$v2lginvstp[1]) != 0
(master_Austria$v2lgotovst[9] - master_Austria$v2lgotovst[1]) != 0
(master_Austria$v2lgwarlaw[9] - master_Austria$v2lgwarlaw[1]) != 0
(master_Austria$v2dlcommon[9] - master_Austria$v2dlcommon[1]) != 0
(master_Austria$v2dlencmps[9] - master_Austria$v2dlencmps[1]) != 0
(master_Austria$v2jupoatck[9] - master_Austria$v2jupoatck[1]) != 0
(master_Austria$v2juaccnt[9] - master_Austria$v2juaccnt[1]) != 0
(master_Austria$v2juhcind[9] - master_Austria$v2juhcind[1]) != 0
(master_Austria$v2juncind[9] - master_Austria$v2juncind[1]) != 0

#Belgium
(maстер_Belgium$v2clacfree[9] - master_Belgium$v2clacfree[1]) != 0
(master_Belgium$v2clrelig[9] - master_Belgium$v2clrelig[1]) != 0
(master_Belgium$v2cltort[9] - master_Belgium$v2cltort[1]) != 0
(master_Belgium$v2clkill[9] - master_Belgium$v2clkill[1]) != 0
(master_Belgium$v2cltnslw[9] - master_Belgium$v2cltnslw[1]) != 0
(master_Belgium$v2clrspct[9] - master_Belgium$v2clrspct[1]) != 0
(master_Belgium$v2clfmove[9] - master_Belgium$v2clfmove[1]) != 0
(master_Belgium$v2cldmovem[9] - master_Belgium$v2cldmovem[1]) != 0
(master_Belgium$v2cldmovew[9] - master_Belgium$v2cldmovew[1]) != 0
(master_Belgium$v2xcldmove[9] - master_Belgium$v2xcldmove[1]) != 0
(master_Belgium$v2cldiscm[9] - master_Belgium$v2cldiscm[1]) != 0
(master_Belgium$v2cldiscw[9] - master_Belgium$v2cldiscw[1]) != 0
(master_Belgium$v2xcl_disc[9] - master_Belgium$v2xcl_disc[1]) != 0
(master_Belgium$v2clslavem[9] - master_Belgium$v2clslavem[1]) != 0
(master_Belgium$v2clslavef[9] - master_Belgium$v2clslavef[1]) != 0
(master_Belgium$v2clprptym[9] - master_Belgium$v2clprptym[1]) != 0
(master_Belgium$v2clprptyw[9] - master_Belgium$v2clprptyw[1]) != 0

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(master_Belgium$v2xcl_prpty[9] - master_Belgium$v2xcl_prpty[1]) != 0
(master_Belgium$v2clacjstm[9] - master_Belgium$v2clacjstm[1]) != 0
(master_Belgium$v2clacjstw[9] - master_Belgium$v2clacjstw[1]) != 0
(master_Belgium$v2cl_acjst[9] - master_Belgium$v2cl_acjst[1]) != 0
(master_Belgium$v2clacjust[9] - master_Belgium$v2clacjust[1]) != 0
(master_Belgium$v2clsocgrp[9] - master_Belgium$v2clsocgrp[1]) != 0
(master_Belgium$v2clrgunev[9] - master_Belgium$v2clrgunev[1]) != 0
(master_Belgium$v2clsnlpct[9] - master_Belgium$v2clsnlpct[1]) != 0
(master_Belgium$v2x_egaldem[9] - master_Belgium$v2x_egaldem[1]) != 0
(master_Belgium$v2x_egal[9] - master_Belgium$v2x_egal[1]) != 0
(master_Belgium$v2x_frassoc_thick[9] - master_Belgium$v2x_frassoc_thick[1]) != 0
(master_Belgium$v2x_freexp_thick[9] - master_Belgium$v2x_freexp_thick[1]) != 0
(master_Belgium$v2x_freexp[9] - master_Belgium$v2x_freexp[1]) != 0
(master_Belgium$v2xme_altinf[9] - master_Belgium$v2xme_altinf[1]) != 0
(master_Belgium$v2xcl_rol[9] - master_Belgium$v2xcl_rol[1]) != 0
(master_Belgium$v2x_jucon[9] - master_Belgium$v2x_jucon[1]) != 0
(master_Belgium$v2xlg_legcon[9] - master_Belgium$v2xlg_legcon[1]) != 0
(master_Belgium$v2x_cspart[9] - master_Belgium$v2x_cspart[1]) != 0
(master_Belgium$v2xlo_locelec[9] - master_Belgium$v2xlo_locelec[1]) != 0
(master_Belgium$v2xlg_regelec[9] - master_Belgium$v2xlg_regelec[1]) != 0
(master_Belgium$v2xeg_eqprotec[9] - master_Belgium$v2xeg_eqprotec[1]) != 0
(master_Belgium$v2xeg_eqaccess[9] - master_Belgium$v2xeg_eqaccess[1]) != 0
(master_Belgium$v2xeg_eqdr[9] - master_Belgium$v2xeg_eqdr[1]) != 0
(master_Belgium$v2xcs_ccsi[9] - master_Belgium$v2xcs_ccsi[1]) != 0
(master_Belgium$v2x_gender[9] - master_Belgium$v2x_gender[1]) != 0
(master_Belgium$v2x_gencl[9] - master_Belgium$v2x_gencl[1]) != 0
(master_Belgium$v2x_gencs[9] - master_Belgium$v2x_gencs[1]) != 0
(master_Belgium$v2x_genpp[9] - master_Belgium$v2x_genpp[1]) != 0
(master_Belgium$v2xelecreg[9] - master_Belgium$v2xelecreg[1]) != 0
(master_Belgium$v2xex_elecreg[9] - master_Belgium$v2xex_elecreg[1]) != 0
(master_Belgium$v2xlg_elecreg[9] - master_Belgium$v2xlg_elecreg[1]) != 0
(master_Belgium$v2x_v2xclpriv[9] - master_Belgium$v2x_v2xclpriv[1]) != 0
(master_Belgium$v2x_v2clpol[9] - master_Belgium$v2x_v2clpol[1]) != 0
(master_Canada$v2xcl_prpty[9] - master_Canada$v2xcl_prpty[1]) != 0
(master_Canada$v2clacjstm[9] - master_Canada$v2clacjstm[1]) != 0
(master_Canada$v2clacjstw[9] - master_Canada$v2clacjstw[1]) != 0
(master_Canada$v2xcl_acjst[9] - master_Canada$v2xcl_acjst[1]) != 0
(master_Canada$v2clacgr[9] - master_Canada$v2clacgr[1]) != 0
(master_Canada$v2clrgunev[9] - master_Canada$v2clrgunev[1]) != 0
(master_Canada$v2cslnlpc[9] - master_Canada$v2cslnlpc[1]) != 0
(master_Canada$v2x_egaldem[9] - master_Canada$v2x_egaldem[1]) != 0
(master_Canada$v2x_egal[9] - master_Canada$v2x_egal[1]) != 0
(master_Canada$v2x_frassoc_thick[9] - master_Canada$v2x_frassoc_thick[1]) != 0
(master_Canada$v2x_freeexp_thick[9] - master_Canada$v2x_freeexp_thick[1]) != 0
(master_Canada$v2x_freeexp[9] - master_Canada$v2x_freeexp[1]) != 0
(master_Canada$v2xme_altinf[9] - master_Canada$v2xme_altinf[1]) != 0
(master_Canada$v2xcl_rol[9] - master_Canada$v2xcl_rol[1]) != 0
(master_Canada$v2x_jucon[9] - master_Canada$v2x_jucon[1]) != 0
(master_Canada$v2xlg_legcon[9] - master_Canada$v2xlg_legcon[1]) != 0
(master_Canada$v2x_cspart[9] - master_Canada$v2x_cspart[1]) != 0
(master_Canada$v2xel_locelec[9] - master_Canada$v2xel_locelec[1]) != 0
(master_Canada$v2xel_regelec[9] - master_Canada$v2xel_regelec[1]) != 0
(master_Canada$v2xeg_eqprotec[9] - master_Canada$v2xeg_eqprotec[1]) != 0
(master_Canada$v2xeg_eqaccess[9] - master_Canada$v2xeg_eqaccess[1]) != 0
(master_Canada$v2xeg_eqdr[9] - master_Canada$v2xeg_eqdr[1]) != 0
(master_Canada$v2xcss_ccsi[9] - master_Canada$v2xcss_ccsi[1]) != 0
(master_Canada$v2x_gender[9] - master_Canada$v2x_gender[1]) != 0
(master_Canada$v2x_genel[9] - master_Canada$v2x_genel[1]) != 0
(master_Canada$v2x_genecs[9] - master_Canada$v2x_genecs[1]) != 0
(master_Canada$v2x_genpp[9] - master_Canada$v2x_genpp[1]) != 0
(master_Canada$v2x_elcreg[9] - master_Canada$v2x_elcreg[1]) != 0
(master_Canada$v2xex_elcreg[9] - master_Canada$v2xex_elcreg[1]) != 0
(master_Canada$v2xlg_elcreg[9] - master_Canada$v2xlg_elcreg[1]) != 0
(master_Canada$v2xcivlib[9] - master_Canada$v2xcivlib[1]) != 0
(master_Canada$v2x_elpriv[9] - master_Canada$v2x_elpriv[1]) != 0
(master_Canada$v2xclpol[9] - master_Canada$v2xclpol[1]) != 0

(master_Canada$v2x_clphy[9] - master_Canada$v2x_clphy[1]) != 0
(master_Canada$v2x_accountability[9] - master_Canada$v2x_accountability[1]) != 0
(master_Canada$v2x_veracc[9] - master_Canada$v2x_veracc[1]) != 0
(master_Canada$v2x_horacc[9] - master_Canada$v2x_horacc[1]) != 0
(master_Canada$v2x_diagacc[9] - master_Canada$v2x_diagacc[1]) != 0
(master_Canada$v2exrescon[9] - master_Canada$v2exrescon[1]) != 0
(master_Canada$v2lginvstp[9] - master_Canada$v2lginvstp[1]) != 0
(master_Canada$v2lgotovst[9] - master_Canada$v2lgotovst[1]) != 0
(master_Canada$v2lgwarlaw[9] - master_Canada$v2lgwarlaw[1]) != 0
(master_Canada$v2dlcommon[9] - master_Canada$v2dlcommon[1]) != 0
(master_Canada$v2dlencmps[9] - master_Canada$v2dlencmps[1]) != 0
(master_Canada$v2jupoatck[9] - master_Canada$v2jupoatck[1]) != 0
(master_Canada$v2juaccnt[9] - master_Canada$v2juaccnt[1]) != 0
(master_Canada$v2juhcind[9] - master_Canada$v2juhcind[1]) != 0
(master_Canada$v2juncind[9] - master_Canada$v2juncind[1]) != 0

#Denmark
(master_Denmark$v2clcfree[9] - master_Denmark$v2clcfree[1]) != 0
(master_Denmark$v2clrelig[9] - master_Denmark$v2clrelig[1]) != 0
(master_Denmark$v2cltort[9] - master_Denmark$v2cltort[1]) != 0
(master_Denmark$v2clkill[9] - master_Denmark$v2clkill[1]) != 0
(master_Denmark$v2cltrnslw[9] - master_Denmark$v2cltrnslw[1]) != 0
(master_Denmark$v2clrspct[9] - master_Denmark$v2clrspct[1]) != 0
(master_Denmark$v2clfmove[9] - master_Denmark$v2clfmove[1]) != 0
(master_Denmark$v2cldmovem[9] - master_Denmark$v2cldmovem[1]) != 0
(master_Denmark$v2cldmovew[9] - master_Denmark$v2cldmovew[1]) != 0
(master_Denmark$v2xcl_dmove[9] - master_Denmark$v2xcl_dmove[1]) != 0
(master_Denmark$v2cldiscm[9] - master_Denmark$v2cldiscm[1]) != 0
(master_Denmark$v2cldiscw[9] - master_Denmark$v2cldiscw[1]) != 0
(master_Denmark$v2xcl_disc[9] - master_Denmark$v2xcl_disc[1]) != 0
(master_Denmark$v2cslavem[9] - master_Denmark$v2cslavem[1]) != 0
(master_Denmark$v2clsclavef[9] - master_Denmark$v2clsclavef[1]) != 0
(master_Denmark$v2clprptym[9] - master_Denmark$v2clprptym[1]) != 0
(master_Denmark$v2clprptwy[9] - master_Denmark$v2clprptwy[1]) != 0
(master_Denmark$v2xcl_prpty[9] - master_Denmark$v2xcl_prpty[1]) != 0
(master_Denmark$v2clacjstm[9] - master_Denmark$v2clacjstm[1]) != 0
(master_Denmark$v2clacjstw[9] - master_Denmark$v2clacjstw[1]) != 0
(master_Denmark$v2xcl_acjst[9] - master_Denmark$v2xcl_acjst[1]) != 0
(master_Denmark$v2clacjust[9] - master_Denmark$v2clacjust[1]) != 0
(master_Denmark$v2clsocgrp[9] - master_Denmark$v2clsocgrp[1]) != 0
(master_Denmark$v2clrgunev[9] - master_Denmark$v2clrgunev[1]) != 0
(master_Denmark$v2clsnlpct[9] - master_Denmark$v2clsnlpct[1]) != 0
(master_Denmark$v2x_clrgaldem[9] - master_Denmark$v2x_clrgaldem[1]) != 0
(master_Denmark$v2x_egal[9] - master_Denmark$v2x_egal[1]) != 0
(master_Denmark$v2x_frassoc_thick[9] - master_Denmark$v2x_frassoc_thick[1]) != 0
(master_Denmark$v2_freqexp_thick[9] - master_Denmark$v2_freqexp_thick[1]) != 0
(master_Denmark$v2_freqexp[9] - master_Denmark$v2_freqexp[1]) != 0
(master_Denmark$v2xme_altinf[9] - master_Denmark$v2xme_altinf[1]) != 0
(master_Denmark$v2xcl_rol[9] - master_Denmark$v2xcl_rol[1]) != 0
(master_Denmark$v2x_jucon[9] - master_Denmark$v2x_jucon[1]) != 0
(master_Denmark$v2xlg_legcon[9] - master_Denmark$v2xlg_legcon[1]) != 0
(master_Denmark$v2x_cspart[9] - master_Denmark$v2x_cspart[1]) != 0
(master_Denmark$v2xel_locelec[9] - master_Denmark$v2xel_locelec[1]) != 0
(master_Denmark$v2xel_regelec[9] - master_Denmark$v2xel_regelec[1]) != 0
(master_Denmark$v2xeg_eqprotec[9] - master_Denmark$v2xeg_eqprotec[1]) != 0
(master_Denmark$v2xeg_eqaccess[9] - master_Denmark$v2xeg_eqaccess[1]) != 0
(master_Denmark$v2xeg_eqdr[9] - master_Denmark$v2xeg_eqdr[1]) != 0
(master_Denmark$v2xcscsccsi[9] - master_Denmark$v2xcscsccsi[1]) != 0
(master_Denmark$v2x_gender[9] - master_Denmark$v2x_gender[1]) != 0
(master_Denmark$v2x_gencl[9] - master_Denmark$v2x_gencl[1]) != 0
(master_Denmark$v2x_gencs[9] - master_Denmark$v2x_gencs[1]) != 0
(master_Denmark$v2x_genpp[9] - master_Denmark$v2x_genpp[1]) != 0
(master_Denmark$v2x_elecreg[9] - master_Denmark$v2x_elecreg[1]) != 0
(master_Denmark$v2xex_elecreg[9] - master_Denmark$v2xex_elecreg[1]) != 0
(master_Denmark$v2xlg_elecreg[9] - master_Denmark$v2xlg_elecreg[1]) != 0
(master_Denmark$v2x_civilib[9] - master_Denmark$v2x_civilib[1]) != 0
(master_Denmark$v2x_clpriv[9] - master_Denmark$v2x_clpriv[1]) != 0
(master_Denmark$v2x_clpol[9] - master_Denmark$v2x_clpol[1]) != 0
(master_Denmark$v2x_clphy[9] - master_Denmark$v2x_clphy[1]) != 0
(master_Denmark$v2x_accountability[9] - master_Denmark$v2x_accountability[1]) != 0
(master_Denmark$v2x_veracc[9] - master_Denmark$v2x_veracc[1]) != 0
(master_Denmark$v2x_horacc[9] - master_Denmark$v2x_horacc[1]) != 0
(master_Denmark$v2x_diagacc[9] - master_Denmark$v2x_diagacc[1]) != 0
(master_Denmark$v2exrescon[9] - master_Denmark$v2exrescon[1]) != 0
(master_Denmark$v2lginvstp[9] - master_Denmark$v2lginvstp[1]) != 0
(master_Denmark$v2lgotovst[9] - master_Denmark$v2lgotovst[1]) != 0
(master_Denmark$v2lgwarlaw[9] - master_Denmark$v2lgwarlaw[1]) != 0
(master_Denmark$v2dcommon[9] - master_Denmark$v2dcommon[1]) != 0
(master_Denmark$v2dlencmps[9] - master_Denmark$v2dlencmps[1]) != 0
(master_Denmark$v2jupoatck[9] - master_Denmark$v2jupoatck[1]) != 0
(master_Denmark$v2juacct[9] - master_Denmark$v2juacct[1]) != 0
(master_Denmark$v2juhcind[9] - master_Denmark$v2juhcind[1]) != 0
(master_Denmark$v2juncind[9] - master_Denmark$v2juncind[1]) != 0

#Finland
(master_Finland$v2clacfree[9] - master_Finland$v2clacfree[1]) != 0
(master_Finland$v2clrelig[9] - master_Finland$v2clrelig[1]) != 0
(master_Finland$v2cltort[9] - master_Finland$v2cltort[1]) != 0
(master_Finland$v2clkill[9] - master_Finland$v2clkill[1]) != 0
(master_Finland$v2cltranslw[9] - master_Finland$v2cltranslw[1]) != 0
(master_Finland$v2clrspect[9] - master_Finland$v2clrspect[1]) != 0
(master_Finland$v2clfmove[9] - master_Finland$v2clfmove[1]) != 0
(master_Finland$v2clmovem[9] - master_Finland$v2clmovem[1]) != 0
(master_Finland$v2xeg_eqdr[9] - master_Finland$v2xeg_eqdr[1]) != 0
(master_Finland$v2xcs_ccsi[9] - master_Finland$v2xcs_ccsi[1]) != 0
(master_Finland$v2x_gender[9] - master_Finland$v2x_gender[1]) != 0
(master_Finland$v2x_gencl[9] - master_Finland$v2x_gencl[1]) != 0
(master_Finland$v2x_genecs[9] - master_Finland$v2x_genecs[1]) != 0
(master_Finland$v2x_genpp[9] - master_Finland$v2x_genpp[1]) != 0
(master_Finland$v2x_elecreg[9] - master_Finland$v2x_elecreg[1]) != 0
(master_Finland$v2xex_elecreg[9] - master_Finland$v2xex_elecreg[1]) != 0
(master_Finland$v2xlg_elecreg[9] - master_Finland$v2xlg_elecreg[1]) != 0
(master_Finland$v2x_civlib[9] - master_Finland$v2x_civlib[1]) != 0
(master_Finland$v2x_clpriv[9] - master_Finland$v2x_clpriv[1]) != 0
(master_Finland$v2x_clpol[9] - master_Finland$v2x_clpol[1]) != 0
(master_Finland$v2x_clphy[9] - master_Finland$v2x_clphy[1]) != 0
(master_Finland$v2x_accountability[9] - master_Finland$v2x_accountability[1]) != 0
(master_Finland$v2x_veracc[9] - master_Finland$v2x_veracc[1]) != 0
(master_Finland$v2x_horacc[9] - master_Finland$v2x_horacc[1]) != 0
(master_Finland$v2x_diagacc[9] - master_Finland$v2x_diagacc[1]) != 0
(master_Finland$v2exrescon[9] - master_Finland$v2exrescon[1]) != 0
(master_Finland$v2lginvst[9] - master_Finland$v2lginvst[1]) != 0
(master_Finland$v2lgotovst[9] - master_Finland$v2lgotovst[1]) != 0
(master_Finland$v2lgwarlaw[9] - master_Finland$v2lgwarlaw[1]) != 0
(master_Finland$v2dlcommon[9] - master_Finland$v2dlcommon[1]) != 0
(master_Finland$v2dlencmps[9] - master_Finland$v2dlencmps[1]) != 0
(master_Finland$v2jupoatck[9] - master_Finland$v2jupoatck[1]) != 0
(master_Finland$v2juaccent[9] - master_Finland$v2juaccent[1]) != 0
(master_Finland$v2juhcind[9] - master_Finland$v2juhcind[1]) != 0
(master_Finland$v2juncind[9] - master_Finland$v2juncind[1]) != 0

#France
(master_France$v2clacfree[9] - master_France$v2clacfree[1]) != 0
(master_France$v2clrelig[9] - master_France$v2clrelig[1]) != 0
(master_France$v2cltort[9] - master_France$v2cltort[1]) != 0
(master_France$v2clkill[9] - master_France$v2clkill[1]) != 0
(master_France$v2cltrnslw[9] - master_France$v2cltrnslw[1]) != 0
(master_France$v2xeg_eqdr[9] - master_France$v2xeg_eqdr[1]) != 0
(master_France$v2xcs_ccsi[9] - master_France$v2xcs_ccsi[1]) != 0
(master_France$v2x_gender[9] - master_France$v2x_gender[1]) != 0
(master_France$v2x_gencl[9] - master_France$v2x_gencl[1]) != 0
(master_France$v2x_gencl[9] - master_France$v2x_gencl[1]) != 0
(master_France$v2x_genpp[9] - master_France$v2x_genpp[1]) != 0
(master_France$v2x_elecreg[9] - master_France$v2x_elecreg[1]) != 0
(master_France$v2xex_elecreg[9] - master_France$v2xex_elecreg[1]) != 0
(master_France$v2xlg_elecreg[9] - master_France$v2xlg_elecreg[1]) != 0
(master_France$v2x_civlib[9] - master_France$v2x_civlib[1]) != 0
(master_France$v2x_clpriv[9] - master_France$v2x_clpriv[1]) != 0
(master_France$v2x_clpol[9] - master_France$v2x_clpol[1]) != 0
(master_France$v2x_clphy[9] - master_France$v2x_clphy[1]) != 0
(master_France$v2x_accountability[9] - master_France$v2x_accountability[1]) != 0
(master_France$v2x_veracc[9] - master_France$v2x_veracc[1]) != 0
(master_France$v2x_horacc[9] - master_France$v2x_horacc[1]) != 0
(master_France$v2x_diagacc[9] - master_France$v2x_diagacc[1]) != 0
(master_France$v2xexrescon[9] - master_France$v2xexrescon[1]) != 0
(master_France$v2lg_invstp[9] - master_France$v2lg_invstp[1]) != 0
(master_France$v2lg_invovst[9] - master_France$v2lg_invovst[1]) != 0
(master_France$v2lgwarlaw[9] - master_France$v2lgwarlaw[1]) != 0
(master_France$v2dl_common[9] - master_France$v2dl_common[1]) != 0
(master_France$v2dl_common[9] - master_France$v2dl_common[1]) != 0
(master_France$v2jupoatck[9] - master_France$v2jupoatck[1]) != 0
(master_France$v2juaaccnt[9] - master_France$v2juaaccnt[1]) != 0
(master_France$v2juncind[9] - master_France$v2juncind[1]) != 0
(master_France$v2juncind[9] - master_France$v2juncind[1]) != 0

#Germany
(master_Germany$v2clacfree[9] - master_Germany$v2clacfree[1]) != 0
(master_Germany$v2clrelig[9] - master_Germany$v2clrelig[1]) != 0
(master_Germany$v2cltort[9] - master_Germany$v2cltort[1]) != 0
(master_Germany$v2clkill[9] - master_Germany$v2clkill[1]) != 0
(master_Germany$v2cltrnslw[9] - master_Germany$v2cltrnslw[1]) != 0
(master_Germany$v2xeg_eqdr[9] - master_Germany$v2xeg_eqdr[1]) != 0
(master_Germany$v2xcs_ccsi[9] - master_Germany$v2xcs_ccsi[1]) != 0
(master_Germany$v2x_gender[9] - master_Germany$v2x_gender[1]) != 0
(master_Germany$v2x_gencl[9] - master_Germany$v2x_gencl[1]) != 0
(master_Germany$v2x_genccs[9] - master_Germany$v2x_genccs[1]) != 0
(master_Germany$v2x_genpp[9] - master_Germany$v2x_genpp[1]) != 0
(master_Germany$v2x_elecreg[9] - master_Germany$v2x_elecreg[1]) != 0
(master_Germany$v2xex_elecreg[9] - master_Germany$v2xex_elecreg[1]) != 0
(master_Germany$v2xlgelecreg[9] - master_Germany$v2xlgelecreg[1]) != 0
(master_Germany$v2x_civlib[9] - master_Germany$v2x_civlib[1]) != 0
(master_Germany$v2x_clpriv[9] - master_Germany$v2x_clpriv[1]) != 0
(master_Germany$v2x_clpol[9] - master_Germany$v2x_clpol[1]) != 0
(master_Germany$v2x_clphy[9] - master_Germany$v2x_clphy[1]) != 0
(master_Germany$v2x_accountability[9] - master_Germany$v2x_accountability[1]) != 0
(master_Germany$v2x_veracc[9] - master_Germany$v2x_veracc[1]) != 0
(master_Germany$v2x_horace[9] - master_Germany$v2x_horace[1]) != 0
(master_Germany$v2x_diagacc[9] - master_Germany$v2x_diagacc[1]) != 0
(master_Germany$v2exrescon[9] - master_Germany$v2exrescon[1]) != 0
(master_Germany$v2lginvstp[9] - master_Germany$v2lginvstp[1]) != 0
(master_Germany$v2lgotovst[9] - master_Germany$v2lgotovst[1]) != 0
(master_Germany$v2lgwarlaw[9] - master_Germany$v2lgwarlaw[1]) != 0
(master_Germany$v2dlcommon[9] - master_Germany$v2dlcommon[1]) != 0
(master_Germany$v2dlencmps[9] - master_Germany$v2dlencmps[1]) != 0
(master_Germany$v2jupoatck[9] - master_Germany$v2jupoatck[1]) != 0
(master_Germany$v2juaccnt[9] - master_Germany$v2juaccnt[1]) != 0
(master_Germany$v2juhcind[9] - master_Germany$v2juhcind[1]) != 0
(master_Germany$v2juncind[9] - master_Germany$v2juncind[1]) != 0

#Greece
(master_Greece$v2clacfree[9] - master_Greece$v2clacfree[1]) != 0
(master_Greece$v2clrelig[9] - master_Greece$v2clrelig[1]) != 0
(master_Greece$v2cltort[9] - master_Greece$v2cltort[1]) != 0
(master_Greece$v2clkill[9] - master_Greece$v2clkill[1]) != 0
(master_Greece$v2cltretranslw[9] - master_Greece$v2cltretranslw[1]) != 0
(master_Greece$v2clrspct[9] - master_Greece$v2clrspct[1]) != 0
(master_Greece$v2clfmove[9] - master_Greece$v2clfmove[1]) != 0
(master_Greece$v2clldmovem[9] - master_Greece$v2clldmovem[1]) != 0
(master_Greece$v2clldmovew[9] - master_Greece$v2clldmovew[1]) != 0
(master_Greece$v2xcl_dmove[9] - master_Greece$v2xcl_dmove[1]) != 0
(master_Greece$v2cldiscm[9] - master_Greece$v2cldiscm[1]) != 0
(master_Greece$v2cldiscw[9] - master_Greece$v2cldiscw[1]) != 0
(master_Greece$v2xclDisc[9] - master_Greece$v2xclDisc[1]) != 0
(master_Greece$v2clslavem[9] - master_Greece$v2clslavem[1]) != 0
(master_Greece$v2clslavef[9] - master_Greece$v2clslavef[1]) != 0
(master_Greece$v2clprptym[9] - master_Greece$v2clprptym[1]) != 0
(master_Greece$v2clprptyw[9] - master_Greece$v2clprptyw[1]) != 0
(master_Greece$v2xcl_prpty[9] - master_Greece$v2xcl_prpty[1]) != 0
(master_Greece$v2clacjstm[9] - master_Greece$v2clacjstm[1]) != 0
(master_Greece$v2clacjstw[9] - master_Greece$v2clacjstw[1]) != 0
(master_Greece$v2xcl_acjt[9] - master_Greece$v2xcl_acjt[1]) != 0
(master_Greece$v2clacjust[9] - master_Greece$v2clacjust[1]) != 0
(master_Greece$v2clsocgrp[9] - master_Greece$v2clsocgrp[1]) != 0
(master_Greece$v2clrgunev[9] - master_Greece$v2clrgunev[1]) != 0
(master_Greece$v2cslnlpt[9] - master_Greece$v2cslnlpt[1]) != 0
(master_Greece$v2_xegaldem[9] - master_Greece$v2_xegaldem[1]) != 0
(master_Greece$v2x_eegal[9] - master_Greece$v2x_eegal[1]) != 0
(master_Greece$v2x_frasassoc_thick[9] - master_Greece$v2x_frasassoc_thick[1]) != 0
(master_Greece$v2x_freexp_thick[9] - master_Greece$v2x_freexp_thick[1]) != 0
(master_Greece$v2x_freexp[9] - master_Greece$v2x_freexp[1]) != 0
(master_Greece$v2xme_altinf[9] - master_Greece$v2xme_altinf[1]) != 0
(master_Greece$v2xcl_rol[9] - master_Greece$v2xcl_rol[1]) != 0
(master_Greece$v2x_jucon[9] - master_Greece$v2x_jucon[1]) != 0
/master_Greece$v2xlg_legcon[9] - master_Greece$v2xlg_legcon[1]) != 0
(master_Greece$v2x_elocelec[9] - master_Greece$v2x_elocelec[1]) != 0
(master_Greece$v2xel_regelec[9] - master_Greece$v2xel_regelec[1]) != 0
(master_Greece$v2xeg_eqprotec[9] - master_Greece$v2xeg_eqprotec[1]) != 0
(master_Greece$v2xeg_eqaccess[9] - master_Greece$v2xeg_eqaccess[1]) != 0
(master_Greece$v2xeg_eqdr[9] - master_Greece$v2xeg_eqdr[1]) != 0
(master_Greece$v2xcs_ccsi[9] - master_Greece$v2xcs_ccsi[1]) != 0
(master_Greece$v2x_gender[9] - master_Greece$v2x_gender[1]) != 0
(master_Greece$v2x_gencl[9] - master_Greece$v2x_gencl[1]) != 0
(master_Greece$v2x_gencs[9] - master_Greece$v2x_gencs[1]) != 0
(master_Greece$v2x_genpp[9] - master_Greece$v2x_genpp[1]) != 0
(master_Greece$v2x_elecreg[9] - master_Greece$v2x_elecreg[1]) != 0
(master_Greece$v2xex_elecreg[9] - master_Greece$v2xex_elecreg[1]) != 0
(master_Greece$v2xcivlib[9] - master_Greece$v2xcivlib[1]) != 0
(master_Greece$v2xclpriv[9] - master_Greece$v2xclpriv[1]) != 0
(master_Greece$v2xclpol[9] - master_Greece$v2xclpol[1]) != 0
(master_Greece$v2xclphy[9] - master_Greece$v2xclphy[1]) != 0
(master_Greece$v2x_accountability[9] - master_Greece$v2x_accountability[1]) != 0
(master_Greece$v2x_veracc[9] - master_Greece$v2x_veracc[1]) != 0
(master_Greece$v2x_horace[9] - master_Greece$v2x_horace[1]) != 0
(master_Greece$v2x_diagacc[9] - master_Greece$v2x_diagacc[1]) != 0
(master_Greece$v2xrescon[9] - master_Greece$v2xrescon[1]) != 0
(master_Greece$v2lginvstp[9] - master_Greece$v2lginvstp[1]) != 0
(master_Greece$v2lgotovst[9] - master_Greece$v2lgotovst[1]) != 0
(master_Greece$v2lgwarlaw[9] - master_Greece$v2lgwarlaw[1]) != 0
(master_Greece$v2dlcommon[9] - master_Greece$v2dlcommon[1]) != 0
(master_Greece$v2dlencmps[9] - master_Greece$v2dlencmps[1]) != 0
(master_Greece$v2jupoatck[9] - master_Greece$v2jupoatck[1]) != 0
(master_Greece$v2juaccnt[9] - master_Greece$v2juaccnt[1]) != 0
(master_Greece$v2juhcind[9] - master_Greece$v2juhcind[1]) != 0

#Ireland
(master_Ireland$v2clacfree[9] - master_Ireland$v2clacfree[1]) != 0
(master_Ireland$v2clrelig[9] - master_Ireland$v2clrelig[1]) != 0
(master_Ireland$v2cltort[9] - master_Ireland$v2cltort[1]) != 0
(master_Ireland$v2clkill[9] - master_Ireland$v2clkill[1]) != 0
(master_Ireland$v2cltrnslw[9] - master_Ireland$v2cltrnslw[1]) != 0
(master_Ireland$v2xeg_eqdr[9] - master_Ireland$v2xeg_eqdr[1]) != 0
(master_Ireland$v2xcss_ccsi[9] - master_Ireland$v2xcss_ccsi[1]) != 0
(master_Ireland$v2x_gender[9] - master_Ireland$v2x_gender[1]) != 0
(master_Ireland$v2x_gencl[9] - master_Ireland$v2x_gencl[1]) != 0
(master_Ireland$v2x_gencs[9] - master_Ireland$v2x_gencs[1]) != 0
(master_Ireland$v2x_genpp[9] - master_Ireland$v2x_genpp[1]) != 0
(master_Ireland$v2x_elecreg[9] - master_Ireland$v2x_elecreg[1]) != 0
(master_Ireland$v2x_ex_elecreg[9] - master_Ireland$v2x_ex_elecreg[1]) != 0
(master_Ireland$v2xlg_elecreg[9] - master_Ireland$v2xlg_elecreg[1]) != 0
(master_Ireland$v2xcivil[9] - master_Ireland$v2xcivil[1]) != 0
(master_Ireland$v2x_clpriv[9] - master_Ireland$v2x_clpriv[1]) != 0
(master_Ireland$v2x_clpol[9] - master_Ireland$v2x_clpol[1]) != 0
(master_Ireland$v2x_clphy[9] - master_Ireland$v2x_clphy[1]) != 0
(master_Ireland$v2x_accountability[9] - master_Ireland$v2x_accountability[1]) != 0
(master_Ireland$v2x_veracc[9] - master_Ireland$v2x_veracc[1]) != 0
(master_Ireland$v2x_horace[9] - master_Ireland$v2x_horace[1]) != 0
(master_Ireland$v2x_diaggacc[9] - master_Ireland$v2x_diaggacc[1]) != 0
(master_Ireland$v2x_exrescon[9] - master_Ireland$v2x_exrescon[1]) != 0
(master_Ireland$v2lginvst[9] - master_Ireland$v2lginvst[1]) != 0
(master_Ireland$v2lgotvst[9] - master_Ireland$v2lgotvst[1]) != 0
(master_Ireland$v2lgwarlaw[9] - master_Ireland$v2lgwarlaw[1]) != 0
(master_Ireland$v2dlcommon[9] - master_Ireland$v2dlcommon[1]) != 0
(master_Ireland$v2dlencmps[9] - master_Ireland$v2dlencmps[1]) != 0
(master_Ireland$v2juapatch[9] - master_Ireland$v2juapatch[1]) != 0
(master_Ireland$v2juaccnt[9] - master_Ireland$v2juaccnt[1]) != 0
(master_Ireland$v2juhcin[9] - master_Ireland$v2juhcin[1]) != 0
(master_Ireland$v2juncind[9] - master_Ireland$v2juncind[1]) != 0

#Italy
(master_Ireland$v2clacfree[9] - master_Ireland$v2clacfree[1]) != 0
#Netherlands
(master_Netherlands$v2clacfree[9] - master_Netherlands$v2clacfree[1]) != 0
(master_Netherlands$v2crlrelig[9] - master_Netherlands$v2crlrelig[1]) != 0
(master_Netherlands$v2cltort[9] - master_Netherlands$v2cltort[1]) != 0
(master_Netherlands$v2clkill[9] - master_Netherlands$v2clkill[1]) != 0
(master_Netherlands$v2cltrnslw[9] - master_Netherlands$v2cltrnslw[1]) != 0
(master_Netherlands$v2clrspect[9] - master_Netherlands$v2clrspect[1]) != 0
(master_Netherlands$v2clfmove[9] - master_Netherlands$v2clfmove[1]) != 0
(master_Netherlands$v2cldmovem[9] - master_Netherlands$v2cldmovem[1]) != 0
(master_Netherlands$v2cldmovew[9] - master_Netherlands$v2cldmovew[1]) != 0
(master_Netherlands$v2xcl_dmove[9] - master_Netherlands$v2xcl_dmove[1]) != 0
(master_Netherlands$v2cldiscm[9] - master_Netherlands$v2cldiscm[1]) != 0
(master_Netherlands$v2cldiscw[9] - master_Netherlands$v2cldiscw[1]) != 0
(master_Netherlands$v2xcl_disc[9] - master_Netherlands$v2xcl_disc[1]) != 0
(master_Netherlands$v2cslavem[9] - master_Netherlands$v2cslavem[1]) != 0
(master_Netherlands$v2cslavef[9] - master_Netherlands$v2cslavef[1]) != 0
(master_Netherlands$v2clprptym[9] - master_Netherlands$v2clprptym[1]) != 0
(master_Netherlands$v2clprptyw[9] - master_Netherlands$v2clprptyw[1]) != 0
(master_Netherlands$v2xcl_prpty[9] - master_Netherlands$v2xcl_prpty[1]) != 0
(master_Netherlands$v2clacjstm[9] - master_Netherlands$v2clacjstm[1]) != 0
(master_Netherlands$v2clacjstw[9] - master_Netherlands$v2clacjstw[1]) != 0
(master_Netherlands$v2xcl_acjst[9] - master_Netherlands$v2xcl_acjst[1]) != 0
(master_Netherlands$v2clacjust[9] - master_Netherlands$v2clacjust[1]) != 0
(master_Netherlands$v2clsocgrp[9] - master_Netherlands$v2clsocgrp[1]) != 0
(master_Netherlands$v2cslrgunev[9] - master_Netherlands$v2cslrgunev[1]) != 0
(master_Netherlands$v2clsnlpc[9] - master_Netherlands$v2clsnlpc[1]) != 0
(master_Netherlands$v2x_egaldem[9] - master_Netherlands$v2x_egaldem[1]) != 0
(master_Netherlands$v2xme_altinf[9] - master_Netherlands$v2xme_altinf[1]) != 0
(master_Netherlands$v2x_frasoec_thick[9] - master_Netherlands$v2x_frasoec_thick[1]) != 0
(master_Netherlands$v2x_freeexp_thick[9] - master_Netherlands$v2x_freeexp_thick[1]) != 0
(master_Netherlands$v2x_freeexp[9] - master_Netherlands$v2x_freeexp[1]) != 0
(master_Netherlands$v2xme_altinf[9] - master_Netherlands$v2xme_altinf[1]) != 0
(master_Netherlands$v2juhcind[9] - master_Netherlands$v2juhcind[1]) != 0
(master_Netherlands$v2juncind[9] - master_Netherlands$v2juncind[1]) != 0

#New Zealand
(master_NewZealand$v2clacfree[9] - master_NewZealand$v2clacfree[1]) != 0
(master_NewZealand$v2clrelig[9] - master_NewZealand$v2clrelig[1]) != 0
(master_NewZealand$v2cltort[9] - master_NewZealand$v2cltort[1]) != 0
(master_NewZealand$v2clkill[9] - master_NewZealand$v2clkill[1]) != 0
(master_NewZealand$v2cltrnslw[9] - master_NewZealand$v2cltrnslw[1]) != 0
(master_NewZealand$v2clrspect[9] - master_NewZealand$v2clrspect[1]) != 0
(master_NewZealand$v2clfmove[9] - master_NewZealand$v2clfmove[1]) != 0
(master_NewZealand$v2clmovem[9] - master_NewZealand$v2clmovem[1]) != 0
(master_NewZealand$v2clmovew[9] - master_NewZealand$v2clmovew[1]) != 0
(master_NewZealand$v2xcl_dmove[9] - master_NewZealand$v2xcl_dmove[1]) != 0
(master_NewZealand$v2cldiscm[9] - master_NewZealand$v2cldiscm[1]) != 0
(master_NewZealand$v2cldiscw[9] - master_NewZealand$v2cldiscw[1]) != 0
(master_NewZealand$v2xcl_disc[9] - master_NewZealand$v2xcl_disc[1]) != 0
(master_NewZealand$v2clslavem[9] - master_NewZealand$v2clslavem[1]) != 0
(master_NewZealand$v2clslavef[9] - master_NewZealand$v2clslavef[1]) != 0
(master_NewZealand$v2clprptym[9] - master_NewZealand$v2clprptym[1]) != 0
(master_NewZealand$v2clprptyw[9] - master_NewZealand$v2clprptyw[1]) != 0
(master_NewZealand$v2xcl_prpty[9] - master_NewZealand$v2xcl_prpty[1]) != 0
(master_NewZealand$v2clacjstm[9] - master_NewZealand$v2clacjstm[1]) != 0
(master_NewZealand$v2clacjstw[9] - master_NewZealand$v2clacjstw[1]) != 0
(master_NewZealand$v2xcl_acjst[9] - master_NewZealand$v2xcl_acjst[1]) != 0
(master_NewZealand$v2clacjust[9] - master_NewZealand$v2clacjust[1]) != 0
(master_NewZealand$v2clsocgrp[9] - master_NewZealand$v2clsocgrp[1]) != 0
(master_NewZealand$v2elrgunev[9] - master_NewZealand$v2elrgunev[1]) != 0
(master_NewZealand$v2clsnlpct[9] - master_NewZealand$v2clsnlpct[1]) != 0
(master_NewZealand$v2x_egaldem[9] - master_NewZealand$v2x_egaldem[1]) != 0
(master_NewZealand$v2x_egal[9] - master_NewZealand$v2x_egal[1]) != 0
(master_NewZealand$v2x_frassoc_thick[9] - master_NewZealand$v2x_frassoc_thick[1]) != 0
(master_NewZealand$v2x_freeexp_thick[9] - master_NewZealand$v2x_freeexp_thick[1]) != 0
(master_NewZealand$v2x_freeexp[9] - master_NewZealand$v2x_freeexp[1]) != 0
(master_NewZealand$v2xme_altinf[9] - master_NewZealand$v2xme_altinf[1]) != 0
(master_NewZealand$v2x_freexp_thick[9] - master_NewZealand$v2x_freexp_thick[1]) != 0
(master_NewZealand$v2xcl_rol[9] - master_NewZealand$v2xcl_rol[1]) != 0
(master_NewZealand$v2x_jucon[9] - master_NewZealand$v2x_jucon[1]) != 0
(master_NewZealand$v2xlg_legcon[9] - master_NewZealand$v2xlg_legcon[1]) != 0
(master_NewZealand$v2x_csart[9] - master_NewZealand$v2x_csart[1]) != 0
(master_NewZealand$v2xel_locelec[9] - master_NewZealand$v2xel_locelec[1]) != 0
(master_NewZealand$v2xel_regelec[9] - master_NewZealand$v2xel_regelec[1]) != 0
(master_NewZealand$v2xeg_eqprotec[9] - master_NewZealand$v2xeg_eqprotec[1]) != 0
(master_NewZealand$v2xeg_eqaccess[9] - master_NewZealand$v2xeg_eqaccess[1]) != 0
(master_NewZealand$v2xeg_eqdr[9] - master_NewZealand$v2xeg_eqdr[1]) != 0
(master_NewZealand$v2xcs_csci[9] - master_NewZealand$v2xcs_csci[1]) != 0
(master_NewZealand$v2x_gender[9] - master_NewZealand$v2x_gender[1]) != 0
(master_NewZealand$v2x_gencl[9] - master_NewZealand$v2x_gencl[1]) != 0
(master_NewZealand$v2x_gencs[9] - master_NewZealand$v2x_gencs[1]) != 0
(master_NewZealand$v2x_genpp[9] - master_NewZealand$v2x_genpp[1]) != 0
(master_NewZealand$v2x_elcreg[9] - master_NewZealand$v2x_elcreg[1]) != 0
(master_NewZealand$v2x_elcreg[9] - master_NewZealand$v2x_elcreg[1]) != 0
(master_NewZealand$v2xlg_elcreg[9] - master_NewZealand$v2xlg_elcreg[1]) != 0
(master_NewZealand$v2x_civlib[9] - master_NewZealand$v2x_civlib[1]) != 0
(master_NewZealand$v2x_clpriv[9] - master_NewZealand$v2x_clpriv[1]) != 0
(master_NewZealand$v2x_clpol[9] - master_NewZealand$v2x_clpol[1]) != 0
(master_NewZealand$v2x_clphy[9] - master_NewZealand$v2x_clphy[1]) != 0
(master_NewZealand$v2x_accountability[9] - master_NewZealand$v2x_accountability[1]) != 0
(master_NewZealand$v2x_veracc[9] - master_NewZealand$v2x_veracc[1]) != 0
(master_NewZealand$v2x_horacc[9] - master_NewZealand$v2x_horacc[1]) != 0
(master_NewZealand$v2x_diagacc[9] - master_NewZealand$v2x_diagacc[1]) != 0
(master_NewZealand$v2exrescon[9] - master_NewZealand$v2exrescon[1]) != 0
(master_NewZealand$v2lginvstp[9] - master_NewZealand$v2lginvstp[1]) != 0
(master_NewZealand$v2lgotovst[9] - master_NewZealand$v2lgotovst[1]) != 0
(master_NewZealand$v2lgwarlaw[9] - master_NewZealand$v2lgwarlaw[1]) != 0
(master_NewZealand$v2dlcommon[9] - master_NewZealand$v2dlcommon[1]) != 0
(master_NewZealand$v2dlencmps[9] - master_NewZealand$v2dlencmps[1]) != 0
(master_NewZealand$v2jupoatck[9] - master_NewZealand$v2jupoatck[1]) != 0
(master_NewZealand$v2juacnt[9] - master_NewZealand$v2juacnt[1]) != 0
(master_NewZealand$v2juhcind[9] - master_NewZealand$v2juhcind[1]) != 0
(master_NewZealand$v2juncind[9] - master_NewZealand$v2juncind[1]) != 0
#Norway
(master_Norway$v2clacfree[9] - master_Norway$v2clacfree[1]) != 0
(master_Norway$v2clrelig[9] - master_Norway$v2clrelig[1]) != 0
(master_Norway$v2cltort[9] - master_Norway$v2cltort[1]) != 0
(master_Norway$v2clkill[9] - master_Norway$v2clkill[1]) != 0
(master_Norway$v2cltranslw[9] - master_Norway$v2cltranslw[1]) != 0
(master_Norway$v2clrsptc[9] - master_Norway$v2clrsptc[1]) != 0
(master_Norway$v2clfmmove[9] - master_Norway$v2clfmmove[1]) != 0
(master_Norway$v2cldmovem[9] - master_Norway$v2cldmovem[1]) != 0
(master_Norway$v2cldmovew[9] - master_Norway$v2cldmovew[1]) != 0
(master_Norway$v2xcl_dmove[9] - master_Norway$v2xcl_dmove[1]) != 0
(master_Norway$v2cldiscm[9] - master_Norway$v2cldiscm[1]) != 0
(master_Norway$v2cldiscw[9] - master_Norway$v2cldiscw[1]) != 0
(master_Norway$v2xcl_disc[9] - master_Norway$v2xcl_disc[1]) != 0
(master_Norway$v2cslslavem[9] - master_Norway$v2cslslavem[1]) != 0
(master_Norway$v2cslslavef[9] - master_Norway$v2cslslavef[1]) != 0
(master_Norway$v2clprptym[9] - master_Norway$v2clprptym[1]) != 0
(master_Norway$v2clprptyw[9] - master_Norway$v2clprptyw[1]) != 0
(master_Norway$v2xcl_prpty[9] - master_Norway$v2xcl_prpty[1]) != 0
(master_Norway$v2clacjstm[9] - master_Norway$v2clacjstm[1]) != 0
(master_Norway$v2clacjstw[9] - master_Norway$v2clacjstw[1]) != 0
(master_Norway$v2xcl_acjst[9] - master_Norway$v2xcl_acjst[1]) != 0
(master_Norway$v2clajst[9] - master_Norway$v2clajst[1]) != 0
(master_Norway$v2clsocgrp[9] - master_Norway$v2clsocgrp[1]) != 0
(master_Norway$v2clrgunev[9] - master_Norway$v2clrgunev[1]) != 0
(master_Norway$v2xcl_acjstw[9] - master_Norway$v2xcl_acjstw[1]) != 0
(master_Norway$v2xcl_acjst[9] - master_Norway$v2xcl_acjst[1]) != 0
(master_Norway$v2xcl_rol[9] - master_Norway$v2xcl_rol[1]) != 0
(master_Norway$v2xlg_legcon[9] - master_Norway$v2xlg_legcon[1]) != 0
(master_Norway$v2x_cspart[9] - master_Norway$v2x_cspart[1]) != 0
(master_Norway$v2xel_locelec[9] - master_Norway$v2xel_locelec[1]) != 0
(master_Norway$v2xcl_rol[9] - master_Norway$v2xcl_rol[1]) != 0
(master_Norway$v2x_egal[9] - master_Norway$v2x_egal[1]) != 0
(master_Norway$v2x_frassoc_thick[9] - master_Norway$v2x_frassoc_thick[1]) != 0
(master_Norway$v2_xqprot[9] - master_Norway$v2_xqprot[1]) != 0
(master_Norway$v2_freexp[9] - master_Norway$v2_freexp[1]) != 0
(master_Norway$v2_freexp_thick[9] - master_Norway$v2_freexp_thick[1]) != 0
(master_Norway$v2_freexp[9] - master_Norway$v2_freexp[1]) != 0
(master_Norway$v2xme_altinf[9] - master_Norway$v2xme_altinf[1]) != 0
(master_Norway$v2x_mealtinf[9] - master_Norway$v2x_mealtinf[1]) != 0
(master_Norway$v2xel_regelec[9] - master_Norway$v2xel_regelec[1]) != 0
(master_Norway$v2xel_regelec[9] - master_Norway$v2xel_regelec[1]) != 0
(master_Norway$v2xeg_eqprotec[9] - master_Norway$v2xeg_eqprotec[1]) != 0
(master_Norway$v2x_egaldem[9] - master_Norway$v2x_egaldem[1]) != 0
(master_Norway$v2x_gender[9] - master_Norway$v2x_gender[1]) != 0
(master_Norway$v2x_gencl[9] - master_Norway$v2x_gencl[1]) != 0
(master_Norway$v2x_gencl[9] - master_Norway$v2x_gencl[1]) != 0
(master_Norway$v2x_genpp[9] - master_Norway$v2x_genpp[1]) != 0
(master_Norway$v2x_exclpriv[9] - master_Norway$v2x_exclpriv[1]) != 0
(master_Norway$v2x_clpriv[9] - master_Norway$v2x_clpriv[1]) != 0
(master_Norway$v2x_clpol[9] - master_Norway$v2x_clpol[1]) != 0
(master_Norway$v2x_clphy[9] - master_Norway$v2x_clphy[1]) != 0
(master_Norway$v2x_civlib[9] - master_Norway$v2x_civlib[1]) != 0
(master_Norway$v2x_exclpriv[9] - master_Norway$v2x_exclpriv[1]) != 0
(master_Norway$v2x_clpol[9] - master_Norway$v2x_clpol[1]) != 0
(master_Norway$v2x_clphy[9] - master_Norway$v2x_clphy[1]) != 0
(master_Norway$v2x_accountability[9] - master_Norway$v2x_accountability[1]) != 0
(master_Norway$v2x_veracc[9] - master_Norway$v2x_veracc[1]) != 0
(master_Norway$v2x_horacc[9] - master_Norway$v2x_horacc[1]) != 0
(master_Norway$v2x_diagacc[9] - master_Norway$v2x_diagacc[1]) != 0
(master_Norway$v2exrescon[9] - master_Norway$v2exrescon[1]) != 0
(master_Norway$v2lginvstp[9] - master_Norway$v2lginvstp[1]) != 0
(master_Norway$v2lgotovst[9] - master_Norway$v2lgotovst[1]) != 0
(master_Norway$v2lgwarlaw[9] - master_Norway$v2lgwarlaw[1]) != 0
(master_Norway$v2dlcommon[9] - master_Norway$v2dlcommon[1]) != 0
(master_Norway$v2dlencmps[9] - master_Norway$v2dlencmps[1]) != 0
(master_Norway$v2jupoatck[9] - master_Norway$v2jupoatck[1]) != 0
(master_Norway$v2juaccnt[9] - master_Norway$v2juaccnt[1]) != 0
(master_Norway$v2juhcind[9] - master_Norway$v2juhcind[1]) != 0
(master_Norway$v2juncind[9] - master_Norway$v2juncind[1]) != 0

#Portugal
(master_Portugal$v2clacfree[9] - master_Portugal$v2clacfree[1]) != 0
(master_Portugal$v2clrelig[9] - master_Portugal$v2clrelig[1]) != 0
(master_Portugal$v2cltort[9] - master_Portugal$v2cltort[1]) != 0
(master_Portugal$v2clkill[9] - master_PORTugal$v2clkill[1]) != 0
(master_Portugal$v2cltmsslw[9] - master_Portugal$v2cltmsslw[1]) != 0
(master_Portugal$v2clrspct[9] - master_PORTugal$v2clrspct[1]) != 0
(master_Portugal$v2clfmove[9] - master_PORTugal$v2clfmove[1]) != 0
(master_Portugal$v2cldmovem[9] - master_PORTugal$v2cldmovem[1]) != 0
(master_Portugal$v2cldmovew[9] - master_PORTugal$v2cldmovew[1]) != 0
(master_Portugal$v2xcl_dmove[9] - master_PORTugal$v2xcl_dmove[1]) != 0
(master_Portugal$v2cldiscm[9] - master_PORTugal$v2cldiscm[1]) != 0
(master_Portugal$v2cldiscw[9] - master_PORTugal$v2cldiscw[1]) != 0
(master_Portugal$v2xcl_disc[9] - master_PORTugal$v2xcl_disc[1]) != 0
(master_Portugal$v2cslavem[9] - master_PORTugal$v2cslavem[1]) != 0
(master_Portugal$v2cslavef[9] - master_Portugal$v2cslavef[1]) != 0
(master_Portugal$v2clprptym[9] - master_Portugal$v2clprptym[1]) != 0
(master_Portugal$v2clprptyw[9] - master_Portugal$v2clprptyw[1]) != 0
(master_Portugal$v2xcl_prpty[9] - master_Portugal$v2xcl_prpty[1]) != 0
(master_Portugal$v2clacjstm[9] - master_Portugal$v2clacjstm[1]) != 0
(master_Portugal$v2clacjstw[9] - master_Portugal$v2clacjstw[1]) != 0
(master_Portugal$v2xcl_acjst[9] - master_Portugal$v2xcl_acjst[1]) != 0
(master_Portugal$v2clacjust[9] - master_Portugal$v2clacjust[1]) != 0
(master_Portugal$v2clsocgrp[9] - master_Portugal$v2clsocgrp[1]) != 0
(master_Portugal$v2clrgunev[9] - master_Portugal$v2clrgunev[1]) != 0
(master_Portugal$v2clsnlpct[9] - master_Portugal$v2clsnlpct[1]) != 0
(master_Portugal$v2x_egaldem[9] - master_Portugal$v2x_egaldem[1]) != 0
(master_Portugal$v2x_egal[9] - master_Portugal$v2x_egal[1]) != 0
(master_Portugal$v2x_frassoc_thick[9] - master_Portugal$v2x_frassoc_thick[1]) != 0
(master_Portugal$v2x_freexp_thick[9] - master_Portugal$v2x_freexp_thick[1]) != 0
(master_Portugal$v2x_freexp[9] - master_Portugal$v2x_freexp[1]) != 0
(master_Portugal$v2xme_altinf[9] - master_Portugal$v2xme_altinf[1]) != 0
(master_Portugal$v2xcl_rol[9] - master_Portugal$v2xcl_rol[1]) != 0
(master_Portugal$v2x_jucon[9] - master_Portugal$v2x_jucon[1]) != 0
(master_Portugal$v2xlg_legcon[9] - master_Portugal$v2xlg_legcon[1]) != 0
(master_Portugal$v2x_cspar[9] - master_Portugal$v2x_cspar[1]) != 0
(master_Portugal$v2xel_locelec[9] - master_Portugal$v2xel_locelec[1]) != 0
(master_Portugal$v2xel_regelec[9] - master_Portugal$v2xel_regelec[1]) != 0
(master_Portugal$v2xeg_eqprotec[9] - master_Portugal$v2xeg_eqprotec[1]) != 0
(master_Portugal$v2xeg_eqaccess[9] - master_Portugal$v2xeg_eqaccess[1]) != 0
(master_Portugal$v2xeg_eqdr[9] - master_Portugal$v2xeg_eqdr[1]) != 0
(master_Portugal$v2xcs_ccsi[9] - master_Portugal$v2xcs_ccsi[1]) != 0
(master_Portugal$v2x_gender[9] - master_Portugal$v2x_gender[1]) != 0
(master_Portugal$v2x_gencl[9] - master_Portugal$v2x_gencl[1]) != 0
(master_Portugal$v2x_genccs[9] - master_Portugal$v2x_genccs[1]) != 0
(master_Portugal$v2x_genpp[9] - master_Portugal$v2x_genpp[1]) != 0
(master_Portugal$v2xelecreg[9] - master_Portugal$v2xelecreg[1]) != 0
(master_Portugal$v2xex_elecreg[9] - master_Portugal$v2xex_elecreg[1]) != 0
(master_Portugal$v2xlg_elecreg[9] - master_Portugal$v2xlg_elecreg[1]) != 0
(master_Portugal$v2x_civilib[9] - master_Portugal$v2x_civilib[1]) != 0
(master_Portugal$v2x_clpriv[9] - master_Portugal$v2x_clpriv[1]) != 0
(master_Portugal$v2x_clpol[9] - master_Portugal$v2x_clpol[1]) != 0
(master_Portugal$v2x_clphy[9] - master_Portugal$v2x_clphy[1]) != 0
(master_Portugal$v2x_accountability[9] - master_Portugal$v2x_accountability[1]) != 0
(master_Portugal$v2x_veracc[9] - master_Portugal$v2x_veracc[1]) != 0
(master_Portugal$v2x_diagacc[9] - master_Portugal$v2x_diagacc[1]) != 0
(master_Portugal$v2x_exrescon[9] - master_Portugal$v2x_exrescon[1]) != 0
(master_Portugal$v2x_lginvstp[9] - master_Portugal$v2x_lginvstp[1]) != 0
(master_Portugal$v2x_lgotovst[9] - master_Portugal$v2x_lgotovst[1]) != 0
(master_Portugal$v2x_gwarlaw[9] - master_Portugal$v2x_gwarlaw[1]) != 0
(master_Portugal$v2x_diagacc[9] - master_Portugal$v2x_diagacc[1]) != 0
(master_Portugal$v2x_exrescon[9] - master_Portugal$v2x_exrescon[1]) != 0
(master_Portugal$v2x_lgotovst[9] - master_Portugal$v2x_lgotovst[1]) != 0
(master_Sweden$v2cl_acfree[9] - master_Sweden$v2cl_acfree[1]) != 0
(master_Sweden$v2cl_relig[9] - master_Sweden$v2cl_relig[1]) != 0
(master_Sweden$v2cl_tort[9] - master_Sweden$v2cl_tort[1]) != 0
(master_Sweden$v2cl_kill[9] - master_Sweden$v2cl_kill[1]) != 0
(master_Sweden$v2cl_trnslw[9] - master_Sweden$v2cl_trnslw[1]) != 0
(master_Sweden$v2cl_respc[9] - master_Sweden$v2cl_respc[1]) != 0
(master_Sweden$v2cl_fmove[9] - master_Sweden$v2cl_fmove[1]) != 0
(master_Sweden$v2cl_dmovem[9] - master_Sweden$v2cl_dmovem[1]) != 0
(master_Sweden$v2cl_dmovew[9] - master_Sweden$v2cl_dmovew[1]) != 0
(master_Sweden$v2cl_discm[9] - master_Sweden$v2cl_discm[1]) != 0
(master_Sweden$v2cl_discw[9] - master_Sweden$v2cl_discw[1]) != 0
(master_Sweden$v2cl_slavem[9] - master_Sweden$v2cl_slavem[1]) != 0

#Sweden
(master_Sweden$v2cl_acfree[9] - master_Sweden$v2cl_acfree[1]) != 0
(master_Sweden$v2cl_relig[9] - master_Sweden$v2cl_relig[1]) != 0
(master_Sweden$v2cl_tort[9] - master_Sweden$v2cl_tort[1]) != 0
(master_Sweden$v2cl_kill[9] - master_Sweden$v2cl_kill[1]) != 0
(master_Sweden$v2cl_trnslw[9] - master_Sweden$v2cl_trnslw[1]) != 0
(master_Sweden$v2cl_respc[9] - master_Sweden$v2cl_respc[1]) != 0
(master_Sweden$v2cl_fmove[9] - master_Sweden$v2cl_fmove[1]) != 0
(master_Sweden$v2cl_dmovem[9] - master_Sweden$v2cl_dmovem[1]) != 0
(master_Sweden$v2cl_dmovew[9] - master_Sweden$v2cl_dmovew[1]) != 0
(master_Sweden$v2cl_discm[9] - master_Sweden$v2cl_discm[1]) != 0
(master_Sweden$v2cl_discw[9] - master_Sweden$v2cl_discw[1]) != 0
(master_Sweden$v2cl_slavem[9] - master_Sweden$v2cl_slavem[1]) != 0
(master_Sweden$v2clslavef[9] - master_Sweden$v2clslavef[1]) != 0
(master_Sweden$v2clprptym[9] - master_Sweden$v2clprptym[1]) != 0
(master_Sweden$v2clprptyw[9] - master_Sweden$v2clprptyw[1]) != 0
(master_Sweden$v2xcl_prpty[9] - master_Sweden$v2xcl_prpty[1]) != 0
(master_Sweden$v2clacjstm[9] - master_Sweden$v2clacjstm[1]) != 0
(master_Sweden$v2clacjstw[9] - master_Sweden$v2clacjstw[1]) != 0
(master_Sweden$v2xcl_acjst[9] - master_Sweden$v2xcl_acjst[1]) != 0
(master_Sweden$v2clacjust[9] - master_Sweden$v2clacjust[1]) != 0
(master_Sweden$v2clsocgrp[9] - master_Sweden$v2clsocgrp[1]) != 0
(master_Sweden$v2clrgunev[9] - master_Sweden$v2clrgunev[1]) != 0
(master_Sweden$v2clsnlpct[9] - master_Sweden$v2clsnlpct[1]) != 0
(master_Sweden$v2x_egaldem[9] - master_Sweden$v2x_egaldem[1]) != 0
(master_Sweden$v2x_freexp[9] - master_Sweden$v2x_freexp[1]) != 0
(master_Sweden$v2x_freexp_thick[9] - master_Sweden$v2x_freexp_thick[1]) != 0
(master_Sweden$v2xcl_rol[9] - master_Sweden$v2xcl_rol[1]) != 0
(master_Sweden$v2xlg_legcon[9] - master_Sweden$v2xlg_legcon[1]) != 0
(master_Sweden$v2x_cspart[9] - master_Sweden$v2x_cspart[1]) != 0
(master_Sweden$v2xel_locelec[9] - master_Sweden$v2xel_locelec[1]) != 0
(master_Sweden$v2xel_regelec[9] - master_Sweden$v2xel_regelec[1]) != 0
(master_Sweden$v2xeg_eqprotec[9] - master_Sweden$v2xeg_eqprotec[1]) != 0
(master_Sweden$v2x_maltinf[9] - master_Sweden$v2x_maltinf[1]) != 0
(master_Sweden$v2x_gender[9] - master_Sweden$v2x_gender[1]) != 0
(master_Sweden$v2x_gencl[9] - master_Sweden$v2x_gencl[1]) != 0
(master_Sweden$v2x_genps[9] - master_Sweden$v2x_genps[1]) != 0
(master_Sweden$v2x_elecreg[9] - master_Sweden$v2x_elecreg[1]) != 0
(master_Sweden$v2xex_elecreg[9] - master_Sweden$v2xex_elecreg[1]) != 0
(master_Sweden$v2xlg_elecreg[9] - master_Sweden$v2xlg_elecreg[1]) != 0
(master_Sweden$v2x_civilib[9] - master_Sweden$v2x_civilib[1]) != 0
(master_Sweden$v2x_clpriv[9] - master_Sweden$v2x_clpriv[1]) != 0
(master_Sweden$v2x_clpol[9] - master_Sweden$v2x_clpol[1]) != 0
(master_Sweden$v2x_clphy[9] - master_Sweden$v2x_clphy[1]) != 0
(master_Sweden$v2x_accountability[9] - master_Sweden$v2x_accountability[1]) != 0
(master_Sweden$v2x_veracc[9] - master_Sweden$v2x_veracc[1]) != 0
(master_Sweden$v2x_horacc[9] - master_Sweden$v2x_horacc[1]) != 0
(master_Sweden$v2x_diagacc[9] - master_Sweden$v2x_diagacc[1]) != 0
(master_Sweden$v2exrescon[9] - master_Sweden$v2exrescon[1]) != 0
(master_Sweden$v2lginvstp[9] - master_Sweden$v2lginvstp[1]) != 0
(master_Sweden$v2lgotovst[9] - master_Sweden$v2lgotovst[1]) != 0
(master_Sweden$v2lgwarlaw[9] - master_Sweden$v2lgwarlaw[1]) != 0
(master_Sweden$v2dlcommon[9] - master_Sweden$v2dlcommon[1]) != 0
(master_Sweden$v2dlencmps[9] - master_Sweden$v2dlencmps[1]) != 0
(master_Sweden$v2jupoatck[9] - master_Sweden$v2jupoatck[1]) != 0
(master_Sweden$v2juacnt[9] - master_Sweden$v2juacnt[1]) != 0
(master_Sweden$v2juhcind[9] - master_Sweden$v2juhcind[1]) != 0
(master_Sweden$v2juncind[9] - master_Sweden$v2juncind[1]) != 0

#Spain
(master_Spain$v2clacfree[9] - master_Spain$v2clacfree[1]) != 0
(master_Spain$v2clrelig[9] - master_Spain$v2clrelig[1]) != 0
(master_Spain$v2cltort[9] - master_Spain$v2cltort[1]) != 0
(master_Spain$v2clkill[9] - master_Spain$v2clkill[1]) != 0
(master_Spain$v2cltrnslw[9] - master_Spain$v2cltrnslw[1]) != 0
(master_Spain$v2clrspect[9] - master_Spain$v2clrspect[1]) != 0
(master_Spain$v2clfmove[9] - master_Spain$v2clfmove[1]) != 0
(master_Spain$v2clmovem[9] - master_Spain$v2clmovem[1]) != 0
(master_Spain$v2clmovew[9] - master_Spain$v2clmovew[1]) != 0
(master_Spain$v2xcl_dmmove[9] - master_Spain$v2xcl_dmmove[1]) != 0
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(master_Spain$v2clprptyw[9] - master_Spain$v2clprptyw[1]) != 0
(master_Spain$v2xcl_prpty[9] - master_Spain$v2xcl_prpty[1]) != 0
(master_Spain$v2clacjstm[9] - master_Spain$v2clacjstm[1]) != 0
(master_Spain$v2clacjstw[9] - master_Spain$v2clacjstw[1]) != 0
(master_Spain$v2xcl_acjst[9] - master_Spain$v2xcl_acjst[1]) != 0
(master_Spain$v2clacjust[9] - master_Spain$v2clacjust[1]) != 0
(master_Spain$v2clacgr[9] - master_Spain$v2clacgr[1]) != 0
(master_Spain$v2clrgunev[9] - master_Spain$v2clrgunev[1]) != 0
(master_Spain$v2clsnlpct[9] - master_Spain$v2clsnlpct[1]) != 0
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(master_Spain$v2x_egal[9] - master_Spain$v2x_egal[1]) != 0
(master_Spain$v2x_frassoc_thick[9] - master_Spain$v2x_frassoc_thick[1]) != 0
(master_Spain$v2x_freexp_thick[9] - master_Spain$v2x_freexp_thick[1]) != 0
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(master_Spain$v2xel_locelec[9] - master_Spain$v2xel_locelec[1]) != 0
(master_Spain$v2xel_regelec[9] - master_Spain$v2xel_regelec[1]) != 0
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(master_Spain$v2xeg_eqdr[9] - master_Spain$v2xeg_eqdr[1]) != 0
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(master_Spain$v2x_gencs[9] - master_Spain$v2x_gencs[1]) != 0
(master_Spain$v2x_genpp[9] - master_Spain$v2x_genpp[1]) != 0
(master_Spain$v2x_exlecreg[9] - master_Spain$v2x_exlecreg[1]) != 0
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(master_Spain$v2xlg_elecreg[9] - master_Spain$v2xlg_elecreg[1]) != 0
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(master_Spain$v2x_clpol[9] - master_Spain$v2x_clpol[1]) != 0
(master_Spain$v2x_clphy[9] - master_Spain$v2x_clphy[1]) != 0
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(master_Spain$v2x_horacc[9] - master_Spain$v2x_horacc[1]) != 0
(master_Spain$v2x_diagacc[9] - master_Spain$v2x_diagacc[1]) != 0
(master_Spain$v2exrescon[9] - master_Spain$v2exrescon[1]) != 0
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(master_Spain$v2lgotovst[9] - master_Spain$v2lgotovst[1]) != 0
(master_Spain$v2lgwarlaw[9] - master_Spain$v2lgwarlaw[1]) != 0
(master_Spain$v2dlcommon[9] - master_Spain$v2dlcommon[1]) != 0
(master_Spain$v2dlencmps[9] - master_Spain$v2dlencmps[1]) != 0
(master_Spain$v2jupoatck[9] - master_Spain$v2jupoatck[1]) != 0
(master_Spain$v2juaacnt[9] - master_Spain$v2juaacnt[1]) != 0
(master_Spain$v2juhcind[9] - master_Spain$v2juhcind[1]) != 0
(master_Spain$v2juncind[9] - master_Spain$v2juncind[1]) != 0

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(master_Switzerland$v2clreli[9] - master_Switzerland$v2clreli[1]) != 0
(master_Switzerland$v2cltort[9] - master_Switzerland$v2cltort[1]) != 0
(master_Switzerland$v2clkill[9] - master_Switzerland$v2clkill[1]) != 0
(master_Switzerland$v2cltm[9] - master_Switzerland$v2cltm[1]) != 0
(master_Switzerland$v2clrspt[9] - master_Switzerland$v2clrspt[1]) != 0
(master_Switzerland$v2clfmove[9] - master_Switzerland$v2clfmove[1]) != 0
(master_Switzerland$v2cdmovem[9] - master_Switzerland$v2cdmovem[1]) != 0
(master_Switzerland$v2cdmovew[9] - master_Switzerland$v2cdmovew[1]) != 0
(master_Switzerland$v2xcl_dmove[9] - master_Switzerland$v2xcl_dmove[1]) != 0
(master_Switzerland$v2cdiscm[9] - master_Switzerland$v2cdiscm[1]) != 0
(master_Switzerland$v2cdiscw[9] - master_Switzerland$v2cdiscw[1]) != 0
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(master_Switzerland$v2clslavem[9] - master_Switzerland$v2clslavem[1]) != 0
(master_Switzerland$v2clslavef[9] - master_Switzerland$v2clslavef[1]) != 0
(master_Switzerland$v2clprptym[9] - master_Switzerland$v2clprptym[1]) != 0
(master_Switzerland$v2clprptyw[9] - master_Switzerland$v2clprptyw[1]) != 0
(master_Switzerland$v2ctl_prpty[9] - master_Switzerland$v2ctl_prpty[1]) != 0
(master_Switzerland$v2clacjstm[9] - master_Switzerland$v2clacjstm[1]) != 0
(master_Switzerland$v2clacjstw[9] - master_Switzerland$v2clacjstw[1]) != 0
(master_Switzerland$v2xcl_acjst[9] - master_Switzerland$v2xcl_acjst[1]) != 0
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(master_Switzerland$v2clsocgrp[9] - master_Switzerland$v2clsocgrp[1]) != 0
(master_Switzerland$v2clrgunev[9] - master_Switzerland$v2clrgunev[1]) != 0
(master_Switzerland$v2clsnlptc[9] - master_Switzerland$v2clsnlptc[1]) != 0
(master_Switzerland$v2x_egaldem[9] - master_Switzerland$v2x_egaldem[1]) != 0
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(master_Switzerland$v2xlg_legcon[9] - master_Switzerland$v2xlg_legcon[1]) != 0
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(master_Switzerland$v2x_el_locelec[9] - master_Switzerland$v2x_el_locelec[1]) != 0
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(master_Switzerland$v2xeg_eqprotec[9] - master_Switzerland$v2xeg_eqprotec[1]) != 0
(master_Switzerland$v2x_gencl[9] - master_Switzerland$v2x_gencl[1]) != 0
(master_Switzerland$v2_genpp[9] - master_Switzerland$v2_genpp[1]) != 0
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(master_Switzerland$v2xlg_elecreg[9] - master_Switzerland$v2xlg_elecreg[1]) != 0
(master_Switzerland$v2x_civilib[9] - master_Switzerland$v2x_civilib[1]) != 0
(master_Switzerland$v2x_clpriv[9] - master_Switzerland$v2x_clpriv[1]) != 0
(master_Switzerland$v2x_clpol[9] - master_Switzerland$v2x_clpol[1]) != 0
(master_Switzerland$v2x_clphy[9] - master_Switzerland$v2x_clphy[1]) != 0
(master_Switzerland$v2x_accountability[9] - master_Switzerland$v2x_accountability[1]) != 0
(master_Switzerland$v2x_veracc[9] - master_Switzerland$v2x_veracc[1]) != 0
(master_Switzerland$v2x_horacc[9] - master_Switzerland$v2x_horacc[1]) != 0
(master_Switzerland$v2x_diagacc[9] - master_Switzerland$v2x_diagacc[1]) != 0
(master_Switzerland$v2x_exrescon[9] - master_Switzerland$v2x_exrescon[1]) != 0
(master_Switzerland$v2lginvstp[9] - master_Switzerland$v2lginvstp[1]) != 0
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(master_Switzerland$v2dlcommon[9] - master_Switzerland$v2dlcommon[1]) != 0
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(master_Switzerland$v2jupoatck[9] - master_Switzerland$v2jupoatck[1]) != 0
(master_Switzerland$v2juacnt[9] - master_Switzerland$v2juacnt[1]) != 0
(master_Switzerland$v2juncind[9] - master_Switzerland$v2juncind[1]) != 0

#UK
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(master_UK$v2clrrelig[9] - master_UK$v2clrrelig[1]) != 0
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(master_UK$v2cldmovew[9] - master_UK$v2cldmovew[1]) != 0
(master_UK$v2xcl_dmove[9] - master_UK$v2xcl_dmove[1]) != 0
(master_UK$v2cldiscm[9] - master_UK$v2cldiscm[1]) != 0
(master_UK$v2cldiscw[9] - master_UK$v2cldiscw[1]) != 0
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(master_UK$v2cslavef[9] - master_UK$v2cslavef[1]) != 0
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(master_UK$v2clprptyw[9] - master_UK$v2clprptyw[1]) != 0
(master_UK$v2xcl_prpty[9] - master_UK$v2xcl_prpty[1]) != 0
(master_UK$v2clacjstm[9] - master_UK$v2clacjstm[1]) != 0
(master_UK$v2clacjstw[9] - master_UK$v2clacjstw[1]) != 0
(master_UK$v2xcl_acjst[9] - master_UK$v2xcl_acjst[1]) != 0
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(master_UK$v2clsocgrp[9] - master_UK$v2clsocgrp[1]) != 0
(master_UK$v2clrgunev[9] - master_UK$v2clrgunev[1]) != 0
(master_UK$v2clsnlpct[9] - master_UK$v2clsnlpct[1]) != 0
(master_UK$v2x_egaldem[9] - master_UK$v2x_egaldem[1]) != 0
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(master_UK$v2xme_altinf[9] - master_UK$v2xme_altinf[1]) != 0
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(master_UK$v2x_jucon[9] - master_UK$v2x_jucon[1]) != 0
(master_UK$v2xlg_legcon[9] - master_UK$v2xlg_legcon[1]) != 0
(master_UK$v2x_cspart[9] - master_UK$v2x_cspart[1]) != 0
(master_UK$v2x_el_locelec[9] - master_UK$v2x_el_locelec[1]) != 0
(master_UK$v2x_el_regelec[9] - master_UK$v2x_el_regelec[1]) != 0
(master_UK$v2xeg_eqprotec[9] - master_UK$v2xeg_eqprotec[1]) != 0
(master_UK$v2xeg_eqaccess[9] - master_UK$v2xeg_eqaccess[1]) != 0
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(master_UK$v2xcs_csi[9] - master_UK$v2xcs_csi[1]) != 0
(master_UK$v2x_gender[9] - master_UK$v2x_gender[1]) != 0
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(master_UK$v2x_gencs[9] - master_UK$v2x_gencs[1]) != 0
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(master_UK$v2x_elcreg[9] - master_UK$v2x_elcreg[1]) != 0
(master_UK$v2xex_elcreg[9] - master_UK$v2xex_elcreg[1]) != 0
(master_UK$v2xlg_elecreg[9] - master_UK$v2xlg_elecreg[1]) != 0
(master_UK$v2x_civilib[9] - master_UK$v2x_civilib[1]) != 0
(master_UK$v2x_clpriv[9] - master_UK$v2x_clpriv[1]) != 0
(master_UK$v2x_clpol[9] - master_UK$v2x_clpol[1]) != 0
(master_UK$v2x_clphy[9] - master_UK$v2x_clphy[1]) != 0
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(master_UK$v2x_veracc[9] - master_UK$v2x_veracc[1]) != 0
(master_UK$v2x_horacc[9] - master_UK$v2x_horacc[1]) != 0
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(master_UK$v2lginvstp[9] - master_UK$v2lginvstp[1]) != 0
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(master_US$v2cldiscw[9] - master_US$v2cldiscw[1]) != 0
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#US
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(master_US$v2clrelig[9] - master_US$v2clrelig[1]) != 0
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(master_US$v2cldiscw[9] - master_US$v2cldiscw[1]) != 0
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(master_US$v2cslavem[9] - master_US$v2cslavem[1]) != 0
(master_US$v2cslavef[9] - master_US$v2cslavef[1]) != 0
(master_US$v2clprptym[9] - master_US$v2clprptym[1]) != 0
(master_US$v2clprptyw[9] - master_US$v2clprptyw[1]) != 0
(master_US$v2xcl_prpty[9] - master_US$v2xcl_prpty[1]) != 0
(master_US$v2clacjstm[9] - master_US$v2clacjstm[1]) != 0
(master_US$v2clacjstw[9] - master_US$v2clacjstw[1]) != 0
(master_US$v2xcl_acjst[9] - master_US$v2xcl_acjst[1]) != 0
(master_US$v2clacjust[9] - master_US$v2clacjust[1]) != 0
(master_US$v2closcgrp[9] - master_US$v2closcgrp[1]) != 0
(master_US$v2yclrgunev[9] - master_US$v2yclrgunev[1]) != 0
(master_US$v2cslnlptc[9] - master_US$v2cslnlptc[1]) != 0
(master_US$v2x_egal[9] - master_US$v2x_egal[1]) != 0
(master_US$v2x_frexp[9] - master_US$v2x_frexp[1]) != 0
(master_US$v2x_freexp[9] - master_US$v2x_freexp[1]) != 0
(master_US$v2xme_altnf[9] - master_US$v2xme_altnf[1]) != 0
(master_US$v2x_jucon[9] - master_US$v2x_jucon[1]) != 0
(master_US$v2xlg_legcon[9] - master_US$v2xlg_legcon[1]) != 0
(master_US$v2x_cspart[9] - master_US$v2x_cspart[1]) != 0
(master_US$v2xel_locelec[9] - master_US$v2xel_locelec[1]) != 0
(master_US$v2xel_regelec[9] - master_US$v2xel_regelec[1]) != 0
(master_US$v2xeg_eqprotec[9] - master_US$v2xeg_eqprotec[1]) != 0
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(master_US$v2xeg_eqdr[9] - master_US$v2xeg_eqdr[1]) != 0
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(master_US$v2x_gender[9] - master_US$v2x_gender[1]) != 0
(master_US$v2x_gencl[9] - master_US$v2x_gencl[1]) != 0
(master_US$v2x_gencs[9] - master_US$v2x_gencs[1]) != 0
(master_US$v2x_genpp[9] - master_US$v2x_genpp[1]) != 0
(master_US$v2x_elecreg[9] - master_US$v2x_elecreg[1]) != 0
(master_US$v2xex_elecreg[9] - master_US$v2xex_elecreg[1]) != 0
(master_US$v2x_civil[9] - master_US$v2x_civil[1]) != 0
(master_US$v2x_clpriv[9] - master_US$v2x_clpriv[1]) != 0
(master_US$v2x_clpol[9] - master_US$v2x_clpol[1]) != 0
(master_US$v2x_clphy[9] - master_US$v2x_clphy[1]) != 0
(master_US$v2x_accountability[9] - master_US$v2x_accountability[1]) != 0
(master_US$v2x_veracc[9] - master_US$v2x_veracc[1]) != 0
(master_US$v2x_horacc[9] - master_US$v2x_horacc[1]) != 0
(master_US$v2x_diagacc[9] - master_US$v2x_diagacc[1]) != 0
(master_US$v2x_exrescon[9] - master_US$v2x_exrescon[1]) != 0
(master_US$v2lginvst[9] - master_US$v2lginvst[1]) != 0
(master_US$v2lgotovst[9] - master_US$v2lgotovst[1]) != 0
(master_US$v2lgwarlaw[9] - master_US$v2lgwarlaw[1]) != 0
(master_US$v2dlcommon[9] - master_US$v2dlcommon[1]) != 0
(master_US$v2dlencmps[9] - master_US$v2dlencmps[1]) != 0
(master_US$v2jupoatck[9] - master_US$v2jupoatck[1]) != 0
(master_US$v2juaccnt[9] - master_US$v2juaccnt[1]) != 0
(master_US$v2juhcind[9] - master_US$v2juhcind[1]) != 0
(master_US$v2juncind[9] - master_US$v2juncind[1]) != 0

### (12) STATISTICAL ANALYSIS:

## Group usable data by INDEX and COUNTRY; subset country list for usable indices

#V2xcl_disc

v2xcl_disc_sub <- subset(master_data, master_data$Country == 'Australia' | master_data$Country == 'Belgium' | master_data$Country == 'Germany' | master_data$Country == 'Sweden' | master_data$Country == 'United States')

#V2clrelig

v2clrelig_sub <- subset(master_data, master_data$Country == 'Norway' | master_data$Country == 'Spain' | master_data$Country == 'Switzerland' | master_data$Country == "United States")
#V2x_egaldem - No Subset

#V2x_egal


#v2x_frassoc_thick - No Subset

#V2xcl_rol

v2xcl_rol_sub <- subset(master_data, master_data$Country == 'Denmark' | master_data$Country == 'Finland' | master_data$Country == 'Germany' | master_data$Country == 'Greece' | master_data$Country == 'Norway' | master_data$Country == 'Portugal' | master_data$Country == 'Spain' | master_data$Country == 'Sweden' | master_data$Country == 'Switzerland' | master_data$Country == 'United Kingdom' | master_data$Country == 'United States')

#V2cltort

v2cltort_sub <- subset(master_data, master_data$Country == 'Denmark' | master_data$Country == 'Finland' | master_data$Country == 'Portugal' | master_data$Country == 'Sweden' | master_data$Country == 'United States')

#V2clacjust
v2clacjust_sub <- subset(master_data, master_data$Country == 'Australia' | master_data$Country == 'Denmark'| master_data$Country == 'Greece'| master_data$Country == 'United Kingdom'| master_data$Country == 'United States')

#V2x_freexp_thick

v2x_freexp_thick_sub <- subset(master_data, master_data$Country == 'Australia' | master_data$Country == 'Belgium'| master_data$Country == 'Canada' | master_data$Country == 'Finland' | master_data$Country == 'France' | master_data$Country == 'Germany' | master_data$Country == 'Greece' | master_data$Country == 'Italy' | master_data$Country == 'Netherlands' | master_data$Country == 'NewZealand' | master_data$Country == 'Norway' | master_data$Country == 'Sweden' | master_data$Country == 'United Kingdom' | master_data$Country == 'United States')

#V2x_freexp

v2x_freexp_sub <- subset(master_data, master_data$Country == 'Australia' | master_data$Country == 'Belgium'| master_data$Country == 'Canada' | master_data$Country == 'Finland' | master_data$Country == 'Germany'| master_data$Country == 'Greece'| master_data$Country == 'Italy'| master_data$Country == 'Netherlands'| master_data$Country == 'Norway'| master_data$Country == 'Sweden'| master_data$Country == 'United Kingdom'| master_data$Country == 'United States')

#V2x_jucon

v2x_jucon_sub <- subset(master_data, master_data$Country == 'Canada'| master_data$Country == 'Finland'| master_data$Country == 'Greece'| master_data$Country == 'Italy'| master_data$Country == 'Norway'| master_data$Country == 'Portugal'| master_data$Country == 'United States')

#V2xme_altinf
v2xme_altinf_sub <- subset(master_data, master_data$Country == 'Belgium' | master_data$Country == 'Canada' | master_data$Country == 'Finland' | master_data$Country == 'France' | master_data$Country == 'Greece' | master_data$Country == 'Italy' | master_data$Country == 'Netherlands' | master_data$Country == 'New Zealand' | master_data$Country == 'Sweden' | master_data$Country == 'United States')

#V2xeg_eqaccess

v2xeg_eqaccess_sub <- subset(master_data, master_data$Country == 'Belgium' | master_data$Country == 'Canada' | master_data$Country == 'Germany' | master_data$Country == 'Greece' | master_data$Country == 'Italy' | master_data$Country == 'Netherlands' | master_data$Country == 'New Zealand' | master_data$Country == 'Portugal' | master_data$Country == 'Spain' | master_data$Country == 'United Kingdom' | master_data$Country == 'United States')

#V2xeg_eqprotec

v2xeg_eqprotec_sub <- subset(master_data, master_data$Country == 'Australia' | master_data$Country == 'Denmark' | master_data$Country == 'United Kingdom' | master_data$Country == 'United States')

#V2xeg_eqdr

v2xeg_eqdr_sub <- subset(master_data, master_data$Country == 'Australia' | master_data$Country == 'Canada' | master_data$Country == 'France' | master_data$Country == 'Germany' | master_data$Country == 'Ireland' | master_data$Country == 'Italy' | master_data$Country == 'Netherlands' | master_data$Country == 'New Zealand' | master_data$Country == 'Portugal' | master_data$Country == 'Spain' | master_data$Country == 'Switzerland' | master_data$Country == 'United States')
#V2x_gender - No Sub

#V2lginvstp

v2lginvstp_sub <- subset(master_data, master_data$Country == 'Belgium'|
master_data$Country == 'Canada' | master_data$Country == 'France' | master_data$Country
== 'Germany' | master_data$Country == 'Norway' | master_data$Country == 'Sweden' |
master_data$Country == 'Spain' | master_data$Country == 'Switzerland' |
master_data$Country == 'United Kingdom' | master_data$Country == 'United States')

#V2dlencmps

v2dlencmps_sub <- subset(master_data, master_data$Country == 'Australia' |
master_data$Country == 'Canada' | master_data$Country == 'France' | master_data$Country
== 'Ireland' | master_data$Country == 'Italy' | master_data$Country == 'NewZealand' |
master_data$Country == 'Portugal' | master_data$Country == 'United States')

#V2jupoatck

v2jupoatck_sub <- subset(master_data, master_data$Country == 'Australia' |
master_data$Country == 'Austria' | master_data$Country == 'Canada' | master_data$Country
== 'France' | master_data$Country == 'Greece' | master_data$Country == 'Italy' |
master_data$Country == 'Netherlands' | master_data$Country == 'New Zealand' |
master_data$Country == 'Portugal' | master_data$Country == 'United States')

#V2clgotovst

v2clgotovst_sub <- subset(master_data, master_data$Country == 'Austria' |
master_data$Country == 'Canada' | master_data$Country == 'France' | master_data$Country
== 'Germany' | master_data$Country == 'Norway' | master_data$Country == 'Sweden' |
master_data$Country == 'Spain' | master_data$Country == 'Switzerland' |
master_data$Country == 'United Kingdom' | master_data$Country == 'United States')
== 'Norway'| master_data$Country == 'United Kingdom'| master_data$Country == 'United States')

#V2juhcind

v2juhcind_sub <- subset(master_data, master_data$Country == 'Canada'| master_data$Country == 'Greece'| master_data$Country == 'Italy'| master_data$Country == 'Norway'| master_data$Country == 'Portugal'| master_data$Country == 'United States')

### (13) STATISTICAL ANALYSIS: ***Python 5 ***
## Run Pearson Correlation Coefficient Script; Select for strongest correlation

cor(v2xcl_disc_sub$`Counter-terror Legislation`, v2xcl_disc_sub$v2xcl_disc, use = 'p')
cor(v2clrelig_sub$`Counter-terror Legislation`, v2clrelig_sub$v2clrelig, use = 'p')
cor(v2x egal_sub$`Counter-terror Legislation`, v2x egal_sub$v2x egal, use = 'p')
cor(v2xcl rol_sub$`Counter-terror Legislation`, v2xcl rol_sub$v2xcl rol, use = 'p')
cor(v2cltort_sub$`Counter-terror Legislation`, v2cltort_sub$v2cltort, use = 'p')
cor(v2clacjust_sub$`Counter-terror Legislation`, v2clacjust_sub$v2clacjust, use = 'p')
cor(v2x freeexp thick_sub$`Counter-terror Legislation`, v2x freeexp thick_sub$v2x_freeexp_thick, use = 'p')
cor(v2x freeexp_sub$`Counter-terror Legislation`, v2x freeexp_sub$v2x_freeexp, use = 'p')
cor(v2x jucon_sub$`Counter-terror Legislation`, v2x jucon_sub$v2x jucon, use = 'p')
cor(v2xme altinf_sub$`Counter-terror Legislation`, v2xme altinf_sub$v2xme_altinf, use = 'p')
cor(v2xeg eqaccess_sub$`Counter-terror Legislation`, v2xeg eqaccess_sub$v2xeg_eqaccess, use = 'p')
cor(v2xeg eqprotec_sub$`Counter-terror Legislation`, v2xeg eqprotec_sub$v2xeg_eqprotec, use = 'p')
cor(v2xeg eqdr_sub$`Counter-terror Legislation`, v2xeg eqdr_sub$v2xeg_eqdr, use = 'p')
cor(v2lginvstp_sub$`Counter-terror Legislation`, v2lginvstp_sub$v2lginvstp, use = 'p')
cor(v2dlencmps_sub$`Counter-terror Legislation`, v2dlencmps_sub$v2dlencmps, use = 'p')
cor(v2jupoatck_sub$`Counter-terror Legislation`, v2jupoatck_sub$v2jupoatck, use = 'p')
cor(v2lgotovst_sub$`Counter-terror Legislation`, v2lgotovst_sub$v2lgotovst, use = 'p')
cor(v2juhcind_sub$`Counter-terror Legislation`, v2juhcind_sub$v2juhcind, use = 'p')

cor(master_data$`Counter-terror Legislation`, master_data$v2x_egaldem, use = 'p')
cor(master_data$`Counter-terror Legislation`, master_data$v2x_frassoc_thick, use = 'p')
cor(master_data$`Counter-terror Legislation`, master_data$v2x_gender)

### (14) STATISTICAL ANALYSIS: Linear Models for high performing indices ; Plot, Calculate regression line, add line to plot ; ***Python 6***

## *Strong Negative* <= -0.7

#v2cltort
lm_v2cltort <- lm(formula = v2cltort ~ `Counter-terror Legislation` , data=v2cltort_sub)
summary(lm_v2cltort)

confint(lm_v2cltort,level = 0.95)

t.test(lm_v2cltort$coefficients)

plot(x = v2cltort_sub$`Counter-terror Legislation` , y = v2cltort_sub$v2cltort, main = 'Counter-terror Legislation v. Freedom from Torture Index', xlab = 'Volume of Counter-terror Legislation', ylab = 'v2cltort Index', pch=20 )

line(x = v2cltort_sub$`Counter-terror Legislation` , y = v2cltort_sub$v2cltort)

abline(lm_v2cltort, lwd = 1)

summ(lm_v2cltort)

export_summs(lm_v2cltort)

## *Moderate Negative* > -0.7 & <= -0.5
#v2xcl_rol

lm_v2xcl_rol <- lm(formula = v2xcl_rol ~ `Counter-terror Legislation` , data = v2xcl_rol_sub)

summary(lm_v2xcl_rol)

plot(x = v2xcl_rol_sub$`Counter-terror Legislation`, y = v2xcl_rol_sub$v2xcl_rol, main = 'Counter-terror Legislation v. Equality before the Law Index', xlab = 'Volume of Counter-terror Legislation', ylab = 'v2xcl_rol Index', pch=20)

line(x = v2xcl_rol_sub$`Counter-terror Legislation`, y = v2xcl_rol_sub$v2xcl_rol)

abline(lm_v2xcl_rol, lwd = 1)

summ(lm_v2xcl_rol)

#v2xeg_eqprotec

lm_v2xeg_eqprotec <- lm(formula = v2xeg_eqprotec ~ `Counter-terror Legislation` , data = v2xeg_eqprotec_sub)

summary(lm_v2xeg_eqprotec)

plot(x = v2xeg_eqprotec_sub$`Counter-terror Legislation`, y = v2xeg_eqprotec_sub$v2xeg_eqprotec, main = 'Counter-terror Legislation v. Equal Protection Index', xlab = 'Volume of Counter-terror Legislation', ylab = 'v2xeg_eqprotec Index', pch=20)

line(x = v2xeg_eqprotec_sub$`Counter-terror Legislation`, y = v2xeg_eqprotec_sub$v2xeg_eqprotec)

abline(lm_v2xeg_eqprotec,lwd=1)

summ(lm_v2xeg_eqprotec)

## *Weak Negative* > -0.5 & < -0.3
#v2clrelig
lm_v2clrelig <- lm(formula = v2clrelig ~ `Counter-terror Legislation`, data = v2clrelig_sub)
summary(lm_v2clrelig)

plot(x = v2clrelig_sub$`Counter-terror Legislation`, y = v2clrelig_sub$v2clrelig, main = 'Counter-terror Legislation v. Freedom of Religion Index', xlab = 'Volume of Counter-terror Legislation', ylab = 'v2clrelig Index', pch=20)

line(x = v2clrelig_sub$`Counter-terror Legislation`, y = v2clrelig_sub$v2clrelig)
abline(lm_v2clrelig, lwd=1)
summ(lm_v2clrelig)

#v2x_egal
lm_v2x_egal <- lm(formula = v2x_egal ~ `Counter-terror Legislation`, data = v2x_egal_sub)
summary(lm_v2x_egal)

plot(x = v2x_egal_sub$`Counter-terror Legislation`, y = v2x_egal_sub$v2x_egal, main = 'Counter-terror Legislation v. Egalitarian Component Index', xlab = 'Volume of Counter-terror Legislation', ylab = 'v2x_egal Index', pch=20)

line(x = v2x_egal_sub$`Counter-terror Legislation`, y = v2x_egal_sub$v2x_egal)
abline(lm_v2x_egal, lwd = 1)
summ(lm_v2x_egal)

#v2clacjust
lm_v2clacjust <- lm(formula = v2clacjust ~ `Counter-terror Legislation`, data = v2clacjust_sub)
summary(lm_v2clacjust)
plot(x = v2clacjust_sub$`Counter-terror Legislation` , y = v2clacjust_sub$v2clacjust , main = 'Counter-terror Legislation v. Social Class Equality Index', xlab = 'Volume of Counter-terror Legislation', ylab = 'v2clacjust Index', pch=20)

line(x = v2clacjust_sub$`Counter-terror Legislation` , y = v2clacjust_sub$v2clacjust)

abline(lm_v2clacjust, lwd = 1)

summ(lm_v2clacjust)

#v2xme_altinf
lm_v2xme_altinf <- lm(formula = v2xme_altinf ~ `Counter-terror Legislation`, data = v2xme_altinf_sub)
summary(lm_v2xme_altinf)

plot(x = v2xme_altinf_sub$`Counter-terror Legislation`, y = v2xme_altinf_sub$v2xme_altinf , main = 'Counter-terror Legislation v. Alternative Information Index', xlab = 'Volume of Counter-terror Legislation', ylab = 'v2xme_altinf Index', pch=20 )

line(x = v2xme_altinf_sub$`Counter-terror Legislation` , y = v2xme_altinf_sub$v2xme_altinf)

abline(lm_v2xme_altinf, lwd = 1)

summ(lm_v2xme_altinf)

#v2xeg_eqaccess
lm_v2xeg_eqaccess <- lm(formula = v2xeg_eqaccess ~ `Counter-terror Legislation`, data = v2xeg_eqaccess_sub)
summary(lm_v2xeg_eqaccess)

plot(x =v2xeg_eqaccess_sub$`Counter-terror Legislation` , y = v2xeg_eqaccess_sub$v2xeg_eqaccess , main = 'Counter-terror Legislation v. Equal Access')
Index', xlab = 'Volume of Counter-terror Legislation', ylab = 'v2xeg_eqaccess Index', pch=20)

line(x = v2xeg_eqaccess_sub$`Counter-terror Legislation`, y = v2xeg_eqaccess_sub$v2xeg_eqaccess)

abline(lm_v2xeg_eqaccess, lwd = 1)

summ(lm_v2xeg_eqaccess, lwd = 1)

#v2xeg_eqdr
lm_v2xeg_eqdr <- lm(formula = v2xeg_eqdr ~ `Counter-terror Legislation`, data = v2xeg_eqdr_sub)
summary(lm_v2xeg_eqdr)

plot(x = v2xeg_eqdr_sub$`Counter-terror Legislation`, y = v2xeg_eqdr_sub$v2xeg_eqdr, main = 'Counter-terror Legislation v. Equal Distribution of Resources Index', xlab = 'Volume of Counter-terror Legislation', ylab = 'v2xeg_eqdr Index', pch=20)

line(x = v2xeg_eqdr_sub$`Counter-terror Legislation`, y = v2xeg_eqdr_sub$v2xeg_eqdr)

abline(lm_v2xeg_eqdr, lwd = 1)

summ(lm_v2xeg_eqdr)

#v2lginvstp
lm_v2lginvstp <- lm(formula = v2lginvstp ~ `Counter-terror Legislation`, data = v2lginvstp_sub)
summary(lm_v2lginvstp)
plot(x = v2lginvstp_sub$`Counter-terror Legislation`, y = v2lginvstp_sub$v2lginvstp, main = 'Counter-terror Legislation v. Legislature Investigating Index', xlab = 'Volume of Counter-terror Legislation', ylab = 'v2lginvstp Index', pch=20)

line(x = v2lginvstp_sub$`Counter-terror Legislation`, y = v2lginvstp_sub$v2lginvstp)

abline(lm_v2lginvstp, lwd =1)

summ(lm_v2lginvstp)

#v2gotovst
lm_v2gotovst <- lm(formula = v2gotovst ~ `Counter-terror Legislation`, data = v2gotovst_sub)
summary(lm_v2gotovst)

plot(x = v2gotovst_sub$`Counter-terror Legislation`, y = v2gotovst_sub$v2gotovst , main = 'Counter-terror Legislation v.Executive Oversight Index', xlab = 'Volume of Counter-terror Legislation', ylab = 'v2gotovst Index', pch=20)

line(x = v2gotovst_sub$`Counter-terror Legislation`, y = v2gotovst_sub$v2gotovst)

abline(lm_v2gotovst, lwd = 1)

summ(lm_v2gotovst)

#v2juhcind
lm_v2juhcind <- lm(formula = v2juhcind ~`Counter-terror Legislation`, data = v2juhcind_sub)
summary(lm_v2juhcind)
plot(x = v2juhcind_sub$`Counter-terror Legislation`, y = v2juhcind_sub$v2juhcind, main = 'Counter-terror Legislation v. High Court Independence Index', xlab = 'Volume of Counter-terror Legislation', ylab = 'v2juhcind Index', pch=20 )

line(x = v2juhcind_sub$`Counter-terror Legislation`, y = v2juhcind_sub$v2juhcind)

abline(lm_v2juhcind, lwd = 1)

summ(lm_v2juhcind)

#v2x_egaldem
lm_v2x_egaldem <- lm(formula = v2x_egaldem ~ `Counter-terror Legislation`, data = master_data)
summary(lm_v2x_egaldem)

plot(x = master_data$`Counter-terror Legislation`, y = master_data$v2x_egaldem, main = 'Counter-terror Legislation v. Egalitarian Democracy Index', xlab = 'Volume of Counter-terror Legislation', ylab = 'v2x_egaldem Index', pch=20 )

line(x = master_data$`Counter-terror Legislation`, y = master_data$v2x_egaldem)

abline(lm_v2x_egaldem, lwd = 1)

summ(lm_v2x_egaldem)

## *Moderate Positive* >= 0.5 & < 0.7

#v2xcl_disc
lm_v2xcl_disc <- lm(formula = v2xcl_disc ~ `Counter-terror Legislation`, data = v2xcl_disc_sub)
summary(lm_v2xcl_disc)
plot(x = v2xcl_disc_sub$`Counter-terror Legislation`, y = v2xcl_disc_sub$v2xcl_disc, main = 'Counter-terror Legislation v. Freedom of Discussion Index', xlab = 'Volume of Counter-terror Legislation', ylab = 'v2xcl_disc Index', pch=20)

line(x = v2xcl_disc_sub$`Counter-terror Legislation`, y = v2xcl_disc_sub$v2xcl_disc)

abline(lm_v2xcl_disc, lwd = 1)

summ(lm_v2xcl_disc)

## NULL

# v2x_freexp_thick
#v2x_freexp
#v2x_jucon
#v2dlencmps
#v2jupoatck
#v2x_frassoc_thick
#v2x_gender

knitr::stitch('Thesis_final.R')

---

**Appendix B**

Appendix B contains the verbatim Python commands used in this thesis.

```r
### 1 ###
# Target: V_Dem_indices <- cbind(V_Dem_indices,
data.frame(V_Dem_countries$v2clacfree))

#index_list =
('v2clacfree','v2clrelig','v2cltort','v2clkill','v2cltrnslw','v2clrspct','v2clmove
','v2clmovem','v2clmovew','v2xcl_dmove','v2cldiscm','v2cldiscw','v2xcl_disc','v2c
lslavem','v2clslavef','v2clprptym','v2clprptyw','v2xcl_prpty','v2clacjstm','v2clacj
stw','v2xcl_acjst','v2clacjust','v2clscogr','v2clrgunev','v2clslntct','v2x egaldem
','v2x egalth','v2x frassoc thick','v2x freeexp thick','v2x freeexp','v2xme_altinf','v2
xclRol
','v2x_jucon','v2xlg_legcon','v2x_cspart','v2xel_locelec','v2xel_regelec','v2xeg eqp
rotec','v2xeg_eqaccess','v2xeg_eqdr','v2xcs_ccsi','v2x_gender','v2x_gencl','v2x_gen
```

---
for index in index_list:
    py1 = "V_Dem_indices <- cbind(V_Dem_indices, data.frame(V_Dem_countries_ordered$" + index + ")"
    print py1

### 2 ###
for index in index_list:
    py2 = "colnames(V_Dem_clean)[x] <- " + index + ""
    print py2

### 3 ###
country_list = ('Australia', 'Austria', 'Belgium', 'Canada', 'Denmark', 'Finland', 'France', 'Germany', 'Greece', 'Ireland', 'Italy',
    'Netherlands', 'New Zealand', 'Norway', 'Portugal', 'Sweden', 'Spain', 'Switzerland', 'UK', 'US')
country_list_2 = ('Australia', 'Austria', 'Belgium', 'Canada', 'Denmark', 'Finland', 'France', 'Germany', 'Greece', 'Ireland', 'Italy',
    'Netherlands', 'New Zealand', 'Norway', 'Portugal', 'Sweden', 'Spain', 'Switzerland', 'United Kingdom', 'United States')

for country in country_list_2:
    py3 = "master_" + country + " <- subset(master_data, master_data$Country == " + country + ")"
    print py3

### 4 ###
(master_Country$index[9] - master_Country$index[1]) != 0
for country in country_list:
    for index in index_list:
        py4 = "(master_" + country + "$" + index + "[9] - master_" + country + "$" + index + ")[1] != 0"
        print py4

### 5 ###
index_short = ('v2xcl_disc', 'v2clrelig', 'v2x egal', 'v2xcl rol', 'v2cltort', 'v2clacjust', 'v2x freeexp thick'
    '#', 'v2x freeexp', 'v2x jucon', 'v2xme altinf', 'v2xeg eqaccess', 'v2xeg eqprotec', 'v2xeg eqdr', '2lginvstp', 'v2lgotovst', 'v2dlencmps', 'v2jupoatck', '#v2lgotovst', 'v2juhcind', 'v2juncind')
#cor(v2xcl_disc_sub$`Counter-terror Legislation`, v2xcl_disc_sub$v2xcl_disc, use = 'p')

# for index in index_short:
#    py5 = "cor(" + index + ",_sub$`Counter-terror Legislation`, " + index + ",_sub$" + index + ", use = 'p')"
#    print py5

### 6 ###

#index_shorter = ('v2cltort', 'v2xcl_rol', 'v2xeg_eqprotec', 'v2clrelig', 'v2x egal', 'v2clacjust', 'v2xme_altinf', 'v2xeg_eqaccess', 'v2xeg_eqdr', 'v2lginvstp', 'v2lgotovst', 'v2juhcind', 'v2x_egaldem', 'v2xcl_disc')

#plot(x = v2xeg_eqaccess_sub$v2xeg_eqaccess, y = v2xeg_eqaccess_sub$`Counter-terror Legislation`, main = 'v2xeg_eqaccess v. Counter-terror Legislation', xlab = 'v2xeg_eqaccess Index', ylab = 'Volume of Counter-terror Legislation')
#line(x = v2xeg_eqaccess_sub$v2xeg_eqaccess, y = v2xeg_eqaccess_sub$`Counter-terror Legislation`)  

#for index in index_shorter:
#    py6_1 = "plot(x = " + index + ",_sub$" + index + ", y = " + index + ",_sub$`Counter-terror Legislation`, main = "" + index + ", v. Counter-terror Legislation", xlab = "" + index + ", Index", ylab = 'Volume of Counter-terror Legislation")"
#    py6_2 = "line(x = " + index + ",_sub$" + index + ", y = " + index + ",_sub$`Counter-terror Legislation")"
#    print py6_1
#    print py6_2
#    print ""