Kosovar Identity in the Making? Discourses on the formation of a civic identity in Kosovo/a

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Abstract

Content-wise this study has two main thematic blocks: a) the analysis of the process of state and nation building in Kosovo as a post-conflict society; and b) the description and elaboration of the public discourse on Kosovo national identity. In this context relevant collected data have been reviewed.

This thesis attaches to the already existing research on these topics with the aim to complement them. The scientific objective was to contribute to ongoing debates, enrich the body of knowledge and develop proposals how to better understand particular processes. This has been done by elaborating the available literature sources and reflecting on the recent surveys’ results.

In practical expressions, the role of various factors were investigated in the creation of identities and their interaction, the extent of their acceptance by local communities in Kosovo and the degree of political consensus for the concept of common (national) identity. Correspondingly, the complexity of the discussion on the emerging of a new “Kosovar” identity has been evaluated. In more concrete terms, I have tried to enquire whether there is an idea of a joint identity shared by all ethnic groups in Kosovo.

For the thesis I have adopted the case study method using the approach of nation building theories. The methodology employed to assess the hypothesis and research question has been of literature based nature.

This study attempts to demonstrate that individuals join in groups because the group symbolizes a set of values. In the theoretical part it can be observed that collective identities link, but only to a limited level, individuals with diverse backgrounds and create a sense of community around shared principles reducing other distinguished variation.

The key findings of the conducted research consist on the gained overall conclusion that the debate about a common Kosovar identity has triggered a taboo subject and is slowly increasing. The main supporters of this idea are mostly representatives of the civil society. The Ahtisaari Plan was only an additional impetus element in these developments. In future this process might be facilitated by the course of the integration into European structures.

Another significant outcome is that the process of state- and nation-building in Kosovo has not yet finished, and that the question whether there is a strong sense of a Kosovar identity remains debatable for the foreseeable future.
Abstrakt (Deutsch)

Inhaltlich hat diese Studie zwei Hauptthemenblöcke: a) die Analyse des Prozesses der Staats- und Nationsbildung im Kosovo als Post-Konflikt-Gesellschaft; b) die Beschreibung und Erläuterung des öffentlichen Diskurses über die nationale Identität des Kosovo. In diesem Zusammenhang wurden die relevanten gesammelten Daten überprüft.

Die hier vertretene These knüpft an die bereits bestehende Forschung zu diesen Themen an und möchte sie ergänzen. Das wissenschaftliche Ziel bestand darin, einen Beitrag zu den laufenden Debatten zu leisten, den Wissensstand zu erweitern und Vorschläge zu machen, wie man bestimmte Prozesse besser verstehen kann. Es sollte erreicht werden durch das Studium der zur Verfügung gestandenen Literatur und Quellen sowie durch die Analyse der Resultate der jüngsten Umfragen.

In den praktischen Ausdrucksformen wurde die Rolle von verschiedenen Faktoren bei der Schaffung von Identitäten und deren Interaktion, das Ausmaß von deren Akzeptanz durch die lokalen Gemeinschaften im Kosovo und der Grad des politischen Konsens bezüglich des Konzepts der gemeinsamen (nationalen) Identität untersucht.


In dieser Arbeit wurde die Fallstudie-Methode zurückgegriffen, wobei der Ansatz der Nationsbildungstheorien zur Anwendung kam. Um die zur Lösung der Forschungsfrage aufgestellte Hypothese zu verifizieren, wurde eine auf Literatur basierende Methodik angewandt.

Die vorliegende Studie versucht zu zeigen, dass sich Individuen in Gruppen zusammenschließen, weil die Gruppe eine Reihe von Werten symbolisiert. Im theoretischen Teil kann man nachvollziehen, wie kollektive Identitäten – jedoch nur bis zu einem bestimmten Grad – Menschen unterschiedlichster Herkunft verbinden und einen Sinn von Gemeinschaft rund um miteinander geteilte Prinzipien schaffen, indem die Unterschiede nivelliert werden.


Ein weiteres wichtiges Ergebnis dieser Arbeit ist, dass der Prozess der Staats- und Nationsbildung in Kosovo noch nicht zu Ende ist, und dass die Frage, ob es ein starkes Gefühl einer Kosovarischen Identität gibt, für die absehbare Zukunft offen bleibt.
1. INTRODUCTION

1.1 Background

The escalation of violence in Kosovo in 1998 drew the attention of the international community, leading to NATO intervention on Serbian military targets in an eleven-week bombardment in the spring of 1999. In June that year Kosovo was placed under UN administration.

At the end 2005, the UN SC appointed Martti Ahtisaari, former President of Finland, as his Special Envoy for the future status process for Kosovo. The document named “The Comprehensive Proposal for a Kosovo Status Settlement” was delivered to SC of UN in March 2007, and accepted by Kosovo Albanian representatives but not by Belgrade and UN SC. Based on the Ahtisaari Plan, which offers prerequisites for the creation of a multi-ethnic state, the political elite of the country declared independence on 17th February, 2008.

Nation- and state-building in Kosovo have been motivated by the desire to reconstruct and reconfirm the Kosovar Albanian national identity as a modern, Western and European one. Yet, the transformation process in Kosovo proved to be especially difficult. Ethnic diverging developments led to a profound ethnic and social segregation. The society of the country is deeply divided in the K-Albanian majority and K-Serbian minority separated by language, religion and strong identification with their respective national identities.\(^1\) Tension among them has been a defining factor of the Kosovo new history.

On the other hand, Kosovo statehood is still contested. For some it is an independent state, for others a Serbian province. Both, K-Albanians and K-Serbs define their national identity through myths of permanent struggles for freedom and territorial continuity. This enabled them to, in recent time, draw communication boundaries between themselves. The divergence of these two communities in the field remains visible and the fragmentation of Kosovo's political landscape across ethnic lines is evident, being directed to Euro-Atlantic integration as the only matching point.

Kosovo is, in particular in previous 25 years, still a society which mainly communicates with each other through events and incidents. The K-Albanians and K-Serbs have different views and all feel threatened. The only effective interaction bridge is currently the EU and Brussels. Conversely, decentralization of the country is based on ethnic separation rather than on the integration of

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\(^1\) I will use the term K-Albanians for Albanian inhabitants of Kosovo, and K-Serbs for Serb inhabitants of Kosovo.
different communities. The north of Kosovo is de facto under international protectorate since the central government in Pristina has no effective role in this part of its territory.

The international community\(^2\) believes that, despite latest armed conflict, K-Serbs and K-Albanians can live together peacefully in Kosovo. However, this assumption will only appear as a realistic and achievable one if there is something that unites the people in this country and holds them together. This element could be a “Kosovar” identity.\(^3\)

The discourse on the Kosovar identity was triggered in the wake of the great political changes and in the process of determining the political future of Kosovo. The debate refers to a number of factors such as common territory, common history and new gained statehood. The exponents of these ideas are convinced of the existence of a unique Kosovar identity based on contemporary concepts of citizenship and state.

Kosovo inherited a diverse ethnic, religious, linguistic and cultural composition. Any move towards “ethnic-based mono-definitions” will presumably grow the distance between communities and weaken the multiple social ties that had helped frequently in the past to preserve local equilibrium.

This Master Thesis will try to analyze the ongoing process and to examine the current debate about possible emergence of a national identity in Kosovo.

\(^2\) There is no any unique definition on “The international community”. In Kosovo contexts this is a phrase used to refer to a broad group of states or international organizations like UN, EU, NATO, OSCE, Contact Group, ICO, etc.

\(^3\) This identity could possibly compliment but not replace the existing ethnic identities of different ethnic groups in Kosovo.
1.2 Review of research literature

There is a remarkable increase of the body of literature on trends and processes in post-conflict societies. The growing writings on the democratization of post-conflict domains focus on the “state”- rather than the “society”-level, not always centring on the emerging of new individual and collective identities. Numerous researchers have conducted large number of studies on the phenomenon of the “re-birth” of the Balkan nations and “re-approaching” of this region to the West, in particular after the fall of communism.4

In the case of Kosovo, due to the short time that has passed since the proclamation of independence, the literature sources are relatively few and mostly focussed on exploring the conflict and war, whereas with regard to the question of identity building there is little research done.

The discourse about identity in Kosovo is very new. To bring this topic further, in Kosovo started to be published, after the last war in 1999, a weekly magazine “Java” (“The Week”) that run this discourse to a different level debating a possible emergence of a new identity. In 2005 a book titled “Who is Kosovar? Kosovar Identity” was published by Migjen Kelmendi and Arlinda Desku. Alternatively, Forum 20155 and the Open Society Institute6 organized in Prishtina in July 26-28, 2007a symposium on European Identity of Kosovo, subsequently followed by editing of presented papers.

In elaborating the selected topic the method of empirical qualitative analysis of various sources was used. Methodologically, the study is based on primary sources (the Ahtisaari Plan, Kosovo constitution, EU Documents such as agreements, reports, official speeches and many other documents). The secondary literature (books, anthologies, scientific journal articles, scientific papers and other publications) has served to a better understanding and analysis of primary sources.

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5 See: http://www.kfos.org (06.11.2013)

6 See: http://www.opensocietyfoundations.org (06.11.2013)
In the contexts of so far elaborated literature, in particular the one published by Vienna University, Baliqi (2008) evaluated the role of international actors (communities) in the nation building process, whereas Daka and Ismajli (2010) made a research on the establishment of Kosovo institutions and its prospect of integration into the EU. On the other side, Ante (2008) approached this phenomenon mainly from an economic point of view. However, the following research will analyse and elaborate a spectrum of authors, with local or western background.

1.3 Summary of objectives

Initially I will make effort to argue what composes identity. Consequently, I will try to answer the question if there is a distinctive “Kosovar” identity, if yes who are “Kosovars”, and if there exists in Kosovo a rational sense of collective community. In this regard it is important to describe the positions of ethnic Albanians and Serbs on this topic. Another issue to deal with will be to investigate how a Kosovar identity in the current state of affairs could look like and if it will expand as a regional part of identity within the Albanian national identity or might result in contrast to the other Albanian-speaking populated areas into an independent sense of belonging to the Kosovo state.

The area of research has been little explored; especially the issue of how the process of identity change has affected, apart from the elite, the broader masses of the Kosovo population. This research will try to fill this gap taking into consideration that operating in a local setting requires knowledge about the context, the transition of the country, its history, languages and social conditions that are crucial for a successful compilation of this work. Yet, it should be made understandable that the results of quoted survey’s are not to be generalised, but can be taken as indicators of a present trend.

In some parts of this paper the relations between Kosovo ethnic Albanians and Serbs will be recalled, without pretending to neglect other minorities. However, there is no intention to list all of the possible differences between the two major ethnic groups in Kosovo, since this is the subject of another debate and beyond the scope of this thesis.
1.4 Research methodology, questions and hypothesis

The methodology employed to analyse and test the scientific question and hypothesis will be the literature based research supported by generated knowledge out of theoretical concepts and empirical evidences.

This thesis adopts the case study method, which aims to explain “how” and/or “why” questions about a set of contemporary actions, over which the researcher doesn’t have any control, and focuses on the analysis of “up-to-date information” collected from contemporary documentation and observing. Other used methods consist in the analyses of selected surveys and opinion pools. A part of these writings was not in English and a free translation has been provided by the author who takes all the responsibility for it. Following main elements are involved:

- Literature review
- Qualitative and statistical analysis

The empirical research will be followed by a comprehensive review of selected studies which have been carried out on pre- and post-war Kosovo, as well as of a variety of analytical texts.

The guiding research questions are formulated like the following:

- How far has the debate on Kosovo national identity triggered a taboo subject?
- What impact does the Ahtisaari Plan have in the process of building of a new/joint identity of Kosovo citizens?
- Is the emerging of a new Kosovo identity an issue in process or simply a “utopian” idea?

In order to be able to answer and back up the research question, the following hypotheses, based on literature survey, have been put forward:

- In post-conflict and divided societies inter-ethnic tensions continue to occur as the result of a lack of mutually agreed and accepted political solutions in form of peaceful settlement;
- Due to the lack of constitutional, civic, and institutional loyalty, Kosovo national identity is still a contested construct distant from being consensual;
- Post-conflict societies are confronted with a complex process of transition in the search of redefining of collective identities.

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1.5 Theoretical framework

Theories explain phenomena. Initially, when studying identities there is a need for following a theory, since by doing so we gain a better understanding of issues under study. The function of theory is that it provides tools for the perception and conceptualization as well as for the case description and depth analysis.

By a theory is mainly meant a system of conditional statements with regard to the relation between specific variables. In this respect I will proceed on some key assumptions. In the course of the paper I evaluate the claims against the collected evidences.

This study will analyze the processes of creation of the national identity. In this context, relevant definitions will be presented. In regard to the question of (national) identity, the two theoretical dichotomies to be elaborated in this paper are:

- I -

1) Essentialism: (Calhoun, 1994, 1997, Jenkins, 2008, etc): approaches identity as essentials or attributes, which are naturally endowed or structurally determined8

2) Constructivism: (Smith, 1986; Gellner, 1997): approaches identity as socially constructed reality, which are negotiable and maneuverable9

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3) Primordialism: tends to attribute the basis of identity to some essences that are in-born, inherited from past, or accumulated through cultural tradition within a given social entity10

4) Instrumentalism or Modernism: approaches identity as psycho-social phenomena grown out of functional requisite or instrumental necessity of a given social system11

Essentialism is an orientation toward reality, knowledge, truth, and the identity of things in the world. Its essence is an internal property that defines its being.12 Essentialism approaches identity as attributes, which are naturally endowed or structurally determined. Essentialist explanations look ethnicity in endogamous groups of homogeneous cultures of biology and the geographical conditions according to which the measures provided for the creation of beings play a timeless, essential existence.

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9 Ibid, p. 2.

10 Ibid, p. 2.

11 Ibid, p. 2.

Constructivism approaches identity as a socially constructed reality, which is negotiable and, on the one hand, collectively constituted in a social process or even social movement, and, on the other hand, individually constructed in conscious presentations and articulations. Constructivism rests on the inter-subjective dimension of human action.

Primordialism tends to attribute the basis of identity to some essences that are in-born, inherited from ancestral past, or accumulated through cultural tradition within a given social entity. These “primordial ties may include kinship and homeland ties and connections to some traditional mythomoteur (myth-symbol complex)”\(^\text{13}\). Under the primordial bonds are to be understood those inherited loyalties that arise from the basic conditions of social existence. These are, for example, from early childhood mediated feelings of belonging to the group of a particular religion, a particular language and customs that are limited to a certain location or territory. For adherents of this concept nationalism is, at least partly, a manifestation of a primordial sense of belonging and a nostalgic longing for the replacement of individual through collective responsibility.

Instrumentalism or Modernism approaches identity as psycho-social phenomena grown out of functional requisite or instrumental necessity of a given social system, like for instance, sentiment of solidarity or sense of cooperation among members of society.\(^\text{14}\)

The most relevant theory while dealing with Kosovo appears to be constructivism. The next step will be to evaluate this selected theory in wider contexts. The interest lies primarily in collecting evidences that support our assumptions.

\(^{13}\) Compare: Smith, 1986, Pp. 57-68.
1.6 Discourse analysis

The problem formulation implies that the focus of this thesis will be on the discourse on national identity construction and its implication for the likelihood of creation of such uniqueness in Kosovo.

In this paper I will take the approach in line with Phillips and Jørgensen who define discourse as a specific way to talk about and understand the world. They elaborate this definition by stating that “language is structured in different patterns which our expressions follow when we act in different social spheres”. A discourse analysis is then the analysis of these patterns.

Ernesto Laclau and Chantal Mouffe define discourse in the following quotation “we call articulation any practice establishing a relation among elements such that their identity is modified as a result of articulatory practise. The structured totality resulting from the articulatory practise, we will call discourse. The differential positions, insofar as they appear articulated within a discourse, we will call moments. By contrast, we will call element any difference that is not discursively articulated”.

Elements are the signs with not yet fixed meanings which are to be defined by their differences to the other elements. On the other hand, moments are symbols whose meanings are defined by their positions and difference between each other. Articulation is the linking of elements that gives them meaning.

The scientific questions will thus be answered through a discourse analytical approach based on a discourse theory and method which is rooted in the social constructivist perspective and covers a variety of different theories on culture and society. According to the social scientist Vivian Burr, there are four general philosophical assumptions that characterize social constructivism and on which most discourse theories are based:

- There is no objective truth about the world. Our knowledge is not a reflection of the world as we see it, but is gained through the way we categorize it. This view involves a critical approach to knowledge;
- Human beings are historical and cultural creatures without fixed internal essence. Our knowledge is influenced by the historical and cultural context and is thus specific and

16 Laclau and Mouffe, 1985, p. 105.
contingent. It could be different in another context and is changeable over time. The social world (knowledge, identities, social relations, etc.) is also anti-essentialist: It is not given in advance but constructed by social action and discursive action;

- In the social processes, where the social world is constructed by social and discursive interaction, there are struggles over truth and falsehood and if possible common knowledge and identities are created;

- Different social constructions of knowledge lead to different kinds of social actions which have consequences for social life.
1.7 Outline

The purpose of this research will be to investigate, from political science perspective, the most significant aspects of the concepts of identity building process in Kosovo as the youngest state in Europe. The paper will take the Ahtisaari Plan and country’s declaration of Independence as point of departure. I will also examine the question which chances and opportunities exist for the construction of collective characteristics by communities of Kosovo as well as which are the challenges and obstacles this process could be confronted within the future. At the same time, I will analyze the results achieved so far.

Another issue to be explored will be the position and expansion of the claims of neighbouring countries, first of all of Albania and Serbia, and their impact, interference and influence on present and future developments of Kosovo.

One of the core-spotlight will be put on the ongoing discourse on “Kosovar” identity. In this part involved actors will be described, the forums they use will be named and their motives will be analysed. Correspondently the contradictions and the arising question when the topic of identity is addressed will be made visible. In this context, various arguments and perspectives will be faced and elaborated.

The proposal adopts case study method. The period covered by this thesis will be primarily focused on developments after the end of war in Kosovo until the first half of this year (1999-2014) and will be split into six chapters.
1.8 Rationale

One of the objectives of this research will be to explore, from social and political science perspective, the most important aspects of the process of identity-building by looking at Kosovo as a case study. Furthermore, the purpose of this thesis is to analyse the phenomenon of identity and to elaborate on the discourse. In that outlook I will present some of most used definitions of identities and also deal with most significant elements of theoretical approach on individual and collective identity-building. I will examine the question of what opportunities exist for emerging and eventual consolidation of a unique identity by the communities of Kosovo.

The topic chosen for this research is of considerable personal interest to me, since I am a Kosovo national. I believe that the University of Vienna in general and the Program of Balkan Studies in particular will benefit from this compilation due to the fact that it will serve for further analysis, academic comparison and opinion building in other similar cases. I do hope to be in a position to provide an independent view which enables readers of this study to receive a meaningful and scientific insight into the elaborated topic.

Structurally the paper is organized in six chapters. The first part provides an introduction of the research topic, including the theoretical framework. The second component describes relevant theories and definitions. The third division focuses on short historical background of Kosovo issue and presents the role of the international community, while the fourth fraction explores the process of the settlement of political status. The fifth section analyses the discourse on the national identity question in Kosovo, whereas the final chapter provides the conclusions on the summarized research outcomes, supported by generated data.
2. DEFINITIONS AND THEORIES

In this part of the study some definitions and theories which are relevant for the analyzed subjects will be introduced and put in Kosovo context. In the forthcoming sections will be presented some different and opposing views related to these approaches.

2.1 Identity

Identity is mainly defined by how we see ourselves and how other people see us. Identity is always plural since we have many of them. In diverse circumstances we decide which identity is the most relevant. Identities are beliefs, feelings of belonging, similarities and emotional relationships. Identity formation means a distinction from others.

The most common approaches when dealing with identities (group related or social), are universalistic conceptions of identity, such as the theory of Habermas (1976), sociological theory of identity (Giddens, 1991), conception of social psychology (Tajfel, 1981), etc. Sociological approaches tell us whether, how and to what extent identity markers emerge in social processes that are situated in time and space (Eder, 2008). In the following part will be briefly introduced some of the theories relevant to the selected case study.

The rational theory of collective identity argues that in complex societies strong collective identities will emerge and that the narratives people share to live in this complex world will remain the basic building stone of identities.

Scholars agree that the conception of an “other” creates identity. Identity should not be conceived as static, but as dynamic. Individual and collective identity as a social phenomenon is a process and not a state. For Eder “identity emerges by linking past social relations with those in the present. In some case even future social relations are included; in this case identity is linked to ideas of salvation or fate that include future social relations in our present existence”.

To quote Balibar who says that

“... it is not a question of setting a collective identity against individual identities. All identity is individual, but there is no individual identity that is not historical or, in other words, constructed within a field of social values, norms of behaviour and collective symbols. The real question is how

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19 Ibid, p. 2.
the dominant reference points of individual identity change over time and with the changing institutional environment”.

Collective identities for Eder are “social constructions which make use of psychological needs and motives for providing an answer to the question ‘whom do I belong to?’ or to the question ‘whom do we belong to?’ In this sense collective identities make use of such psychic references in specific social constellations”.

In this fraction an attempt was made to display various theoretical approaches that explain identity and the core dimensions of this construct and describe its content. However, due to restricted volume of this study, only a superficial overview has been provided.

2.1.1 Ethnicity (ethnic group)

Under an ethnic group usually is defined a number of people who perceive themselves, due to one or more common characteristics, connected to each other. For a number of researchers, ethnicity is fundamentally based on blood, language, religion and common history. To quote John Nagle and Mary-Alice C. Clany: “although it is clear that ethnicity can be constructed (within a limited window), this is not to say that ethnic identity can just be reconstructed readily. Notably, ethnic identities, while constructed, are hard to reconstruct once they form … the conditions needed for reconstruction are quite rare, especially in modern times, and especially among ethnic groups in conflicts”.

According to Aziri, “democracy as a societal order can be successfully built by both ethnically homogenous and ethnically heterogeneous countries. The practice of development of countries in Europe so far clearly shows that ethnically homogenous countries are better suited by the democratic rule by majority, whereas ethnically heterogeneous countries are better suited by consensual democracy. As a matter of fact, it is difficult to precisely define multi-ethnic and homogenous countries by a well-defined criterion. There is no widely accepted criterion about the share of an ethnic community in the population in order for the country to be characterized as homogenous or heterogeneous”.

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20 Balibar, 1991, p. 94.
In the analysis of the events before and after the proclamation of Kosovo’s independence a division between “we”- (K-Albanians and other minority groups) and “them”- (K-Serbs) approaches is observed with the clear ethnic attitude behind it. Ethnicity has been used as a normative category to promote the inclusion of ethnic groups and to bridge the differences and segregation especially between K-Albanians and K-Serbs for a unitary citizenship in the Kosovo state. Yet, neither the endorsement of the Ahtisaari plan nor the constitution of the republic of Kosovo has brought about the full participation of all ethnic groups, in particular the K-Serbs in public and political life of the country. Due to divisions along ethnic lines strengthened by socioeconomic imbalance between the various communities and the lack of shared values and mutual empathy, the Kosovo society is still not capable to develop a satisfactory social cohesion and continues to live in a constant state of tensions, social disorder and political instability. Summing up the above mentioned observations, Kosovo will probably continue to be an ethnically divided society based on “consensual” separation and inequalities between majority population and other communities.
2.2 Multiethnic societies and states

“Multi-ethnic” is a term for a collection of many different ethnic groups and minorities. In a country several such groups live together in a politically consolidated place (a state or region).

In the article 3 of the Kosovo constitution is stated that “the Republic of Kosovo is a multi-ethnic society consisting of Albanian and other Communities, governed democratically with full respect for the rule of law through its legislative, executive and judicial institutions”.

Acknowledging the fact that multi-ethnicity is not only about figures, but also about the position of minorities in the society, the international community and its interim administration has invested much effort in promoting the multi-ethnic character of Kosovo. However, a combination of exclusion and self-exclusion has kept minorities from being sufficiently involved into the public life of the new Kosovo.

In Kosovo context, the ipSoS Survey 2011 shows that discourses on multiculturalism have been internalized to a large extent among K-Albanians, the overwhelming majority of whom respond that they perceive Kosovo as a multi-ethnic and multi-cultural country. This perception is shared to some extent by members of other ethnic groups, but stands in sharp contrast to the opinion of the K-Serb respondents, 91 per cent of whom say that they do not perceive Kosovo as being multi-ethnic and multi-cultural.

24 See: http://www.kushtetutakosoves.info/?cid=2,247 (25.06.2014)
25 Krasniqi, 2013, p. 146.
2.3 Nationalism

An interrelated issue that will partly come into sight in this study is nationalism and its influence on identity building. There are various debates which impact the study of nationalism. First among these is the question of how to define its term. Scholars dispute also about when nations first appeared. Many authors argue that the growth of the middle classes, their desire for political power, and the consequent development of democratic political theory were closely connected with the emergence of modern nationalism which became a widespread and powerful force in the 19th century.

For Billig, “...nationalism is to be seen as an ideology, which deeply affects contemporary consciousness – our consciousness, as much as ‘theirs’ ”. Nationalism is considered the state of having an attachment to one’s nation and can also be defined as love toward the country and willingness to sacrifice for it.

The research on nationalism which deals with phenomena such as nation-building and national identity has developed only in the late 1970s and early 1980s and is split into different schools of thoughts. While more traditionalistic approaches assume that nations have always existed, the modernists consider that nations are new concepts. Furthermore, there are scientists who hold that the roots of nations would mostly be based on ethnicity. Others believe that the state and citizenship are important triggers for formation of a nation. The almost simultaneously published works of Benedict Anderson and Eric Hobsbawm pointing particularly the constructive character of the imagined or invented communities, back up the view that not only nations but also other social phenomena could be constructed.

To answer the questions of how and why national thinking prevailed as an important organizing principle the researches on nationalism provide, among others, the concept of “national identity”. This is, similar to the concept of nation, very complex and is closely associated with him. Thus, the definition of the concept of identity depends of the respective definition of the concept of nation. Through understanding of nations as structures national identity is understood as a constructed sense of belonging, which is subject to change and is a sub-product of nation-building.

26 Billig, 1995, p. 15.
2.3.1 Nation

There are various definitions of nations. The widely held thesis describes the nation as a sovereign group of population, or as a linguistic and cultural unity. On the other hand, Benedict Anderson defines the term “nation” as “an imagined political community – limited and sovereign”.

Nations are large groups that have emerged since the early 18th century as part of construction processes and are, since their formation, subject to processes of change. This paper will place constructivist approaches to the concept of nation which are to be understood as constructs.

In the scientific literature, there are usually described two types of nation: the state-nation (France) and cultural-nation (Germany, Italy). The difference is that the state-nation presents a community of people who live in a state, a political entity. The cultural-nation is a community of people who feel connected to each other by language, traditions, culture and religion that is by belonging to a culture and by descent. This type of nation can therefore go beyond national borders.

In this regard, historians Hans Kohn, Liah Greenfeld, Philip White and other classify countries such as Germany or Italy where cultural harmony has come into existence before territorial unification of areas, as ethnic nations or ethnic nationalities. On the other hand, “state-driven” national units (France, England or China) are more likely to turn in multi-ethnic societies. Brubaker examines the difference between the territorial basis of the French citizenry and the German emphasis on blood descent and shows why the French citizenship is territorially inclusive and the German citizenship ethnically exclusive.

Nations are politicized ethnic groups that go beyond political representation and allied rights and relate more to certain areas, such as statehood, political will and civic identity. The thesis of the invention (or construction) of nations is widely used in the West. In Eastern Europe, however, this theory finds little support. In the Balkans, where the definition of the nation is more associated with ethnicity than with the state, the formation of national states began in the late 19th century and obviously it has not ended yet.

2.3.2 Titular nation

As titular nation of a state is considered a nation from which the name of the State derives. The term was first used in the Soviet Union. To become an “ethnos” titular nation, a core dominant community had to meet certain criteria in terms of the numbers of the population and the compactness of the settlement.

Despite the fact that Kosovo is not defined as a nation state of a titular nation, but as a multi-ethnic state of all its citizens, it cannot be neglected that ethnic Albanians set up the overwhelming majority of the population of Kosovo. As such, the Albanian community in Kosovo takes a central place within the new state as well as within the central political institutions of the country, so that it presents the core society. On the other hand, the Serbs in Kosovo have the position as the core non-dominant community.

For Halil Matoshi “the nation-state of Kosovo was created by ethnic Albanians, but nation-building processes have helped also others, as Turks, Gorani, Bosnians and Roma, while most hesitant to integrate into the nation-state remain the Serbs, precisely because they still regard themselves as a nation of language, culture and the church. So the nation-state of Kosovo is already done, it would be preferable if all (including the Serbs) will be integrated in a unique national culture. But even if this does not happen (it is believed that in two to three generations may occur) Kosovar nation-state will continue to live”. In regard to the “ownership” over the nation, the same author assumes that „Kosovo state will necessarily create the Kosovar nation as the owner of this state. The nation has no institutions and no president, but rather evocation and emotional force that create a nation to give love and loyalty to the state in front of other nations, not always benevolent”.

The analyst Nexhmedin Spahiu brings a different perspective by stressing that “the owner of the state of Kosovo is certainly the Kosovar nation that is K-Albanians, who comprise the titular nation”. Asked whether he defends the idea that the creation of states leads to creation of nations, Spahiu underlined that “it is quite the opposite. Nations create states. Since Kosovo state was created then there should be a nation that has created it”.

30 See: http://www.koha.net/?page=1,9,169982 (02.08.2014)
31 Ibid
32 See: http://www.rrokum.tv/?page=1,3,4118 (02.08.2014)
2.4 State-Building

State- and nation-building processes have to be analysed separately and sometimes treated as contrasting developments. The first has to deal with power monopole, control over a territory and its administration by national institutions. The latter is more associated with the people as bearers of the sovereignty. In a sense state, nation and democracy “grow” together.

To quote Sahin, “in post-conflict situations there are two separate but interacting processes involved: re-building the state, including creating bureaucratic and political institutions and stabilizing the economy; and rebuilding the nation, including easing inter-ethnic or inter-groups tensions and beginning to create a coherent and inclusive collective identity that can unite the people who may have been in conflict with each other”.

The roots of Kosovo’s first elements of “statehood“ go back to the year 1945 when Kosovo gained the status of an Autonomous Region within the Republic of Serbia. According to Predrag Simić, “the Yugoslav constitution of 1963 provided the possibility for the creation of autonomous provinces within the federal republics, leaving it to the republics to decide on these themselves”. In 1968 K-Albanians demonstrated on the streets to express their demands for turning into a republic of YU. One year later they were allowed to use their national flag.

In Simić’s view, “this development reached a climax with the federal constitution of 1974 which practically evened Serbia with its two provinces (the provinces were given the right of veto to any changes in the republic or federal constitution). Under its own constitutional law, the competencies of the Province of Kosovo were extended even further, so far as to include the right to ratify international agreements”. In practical terms, Kosovo was granted its own constitution and as one of the eight units of the YU received the right of representation in all federal bodies of the joint state and the right of veto, but without the prerogative to the proclamation of the Republic. This period of time until 1981 was marked by positive developments in Kosovo that enabled the province to develop in terms of economic, political, education, health, social and cultural issues in the sense that, among others, bilingualism (Albanian-Serbian) became a condition for employment in public service and national quotas were introduced by nominations for public functions.

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35 The country was formed in 1918 immediately after World War -I- as the Kingdom of Serbs, Croats and Slovenes (SCS). Later, the government renamed the country leading to the first official use of Yugoslavia in 1929.
36 Ibid, p. 11.
On 23rd of March 1989 under state of emergency and the threat of arms, the Kosovo Assembly approved amendments to change the Constitution of 1974, which meant de jure abolishment of Kosovo's autonomy. On 28th of March 1989, Yugoslavia Federal Assembly ratified this decision which opened the way for Serbia to dismiss the Kosovo government in July 1990 and to take over the whole administrative power.

In September 1991, in an unofficial referendum, the overwhelming majority of K-Albanians took the decision to declare independence and sovereignty of Kosovo. In 1998, the KLA\(^37\) was transformed into a powerful military and political factor in Kosovo reaching to take control of a smaller part of its territory. Marking the end of a NATO intervention in Kosovo, in order to provide an interim administration in accordance with the SC resolution 1244\(^38\) in June 1999, in Kosovo was established an international civil presence – UNMIK. As far as the international dimension is concerned, to date, Kosovo’s statehood has been recognized by more than 100 countries worldwide, including the US and the majority of EU Member States.

In the light of above elaborated events, it can be summarized that the most significant phases in the process of Kosovo state-building include:

1. Granting of the status of an Autonomous Region within the Republic of Serbia (1945);
2. Constitutional upgrading of the Kosovo’ position under YU (1974);
3. ‘‘Passive’’ resistance led by Ibrahim Rugova\(^39\) as the key mastermind political leader (1989-98);
4. Active confrontation against Serbian repressive regime in form of armed conflict directed by KLA\(^40\) (1998-99));
5. International protectorate (1999-2008);
6. Proclamation of independence and establishment of state apparatus (2008);
7. Consolidation of statehood followed by seeking of international recognition (2008-up to date).

\(^{37}\)The Kosovo Liberation Army or KLA (Albanian: Ushtria Çlirimtare e Kosovës or UÇK) was a Kosovar Albanian guerrilla organization which sought the separation of Kosovo from Federal Republic of Yugoslavia in the late 1990s. After the war in Kosovo the KLA was officially disbanded. (source: https://www.princeton.edu/~achaney/tmve/wiki100k/docs/Kosovo_Liberation_Army.html last accessed on 28.07.2014)


\(^{39}\)Ibrahim Rugova (1944-2006) was a Kosovar writer and politician who devoted his public life to peaceful attempts to gain independence for ethnic Albanians in Kosovo.
2.4.1 State

The classical theory defines the state in principle by monopoly of power, territory and nation. In these terms, the state is a political entity, which consists of three essential elements: permanently determined territory, population living in that area and political institutions capable to implement binding decisions.

According to Lumnije Kadriu, “force and power were unfairly used, particularly when borders of nation-state were designated, given that, the nation-state and its territory did not always coincide with the common culture and language of the population living within that territory”. In the post-socialist Balkan the new emerging states were often considered as an instrument to suppress mostly ethnic minorities, and affirming of a new (national) identity accomplished through repression and denial of “others”, restricting the freedoms of individuals with other ethnic or cultural identity.

Ibrahim Rugova is considered as the architect of the Kosovo state identity. He viewed himself as a follower of Mahatma Gandhi and was often called the “Albanian or Balkan Gandhi”. He had many followers who were deeply convinced of the value of non-violent methods. Rugova also introduced the flag of Dardania or the flag of the President of Kosovo and a national anthem as proposals for official symbols of emerging Kosovo state.

While the nationalist ideologies are re-oriented towards the “shared past” of the nation, state-building is predominantly oriented to the future. Given the history of Albanian and Serb ethnic relations in Kosovo and the experience of the 1998-1999 conflict, orientation to the future and the search for unifying symbols for the Kosovo nation has become one of the objectives of its official state-building politics. Kosovo statehood is based on the „Comprehensive Proposal for Kosovo Status”, also known as the “Ahtisaari Plan” which sets the general conditions for granting Kosovo sovereignty under the supervision of the international community that calls for a project on civic terms and citizenship rights. The constitution of the republic of Kosovo is another document which emphasizes minority rights and ethnic reconciliation.

Kadriu, 2013, p. 106.

After completing his education in Prishtina and Paris, Rugova taught literature at the Institute for Albanian Studies in Prishtina and wrote books. In 1988 he became president of the Kosovo Writers’ Union. When Slobodan Milosevic revoked Kosovo’s autonomy the next year and placed the province under Serbian control, a group of academics formed the Democratic League of Kosovo (LDK), with Rugova at its head. As the Serbian government grew increasingly oppressive, the LDK declared the self-proclaimed Republic of Kosovo, and in 1992 Rugova was elected president. International recognition was not forthcoming. Rugova was elected president in an unofficial vote in 1998 and reelected president of Kosovo in 2002 and 2004. In 1998 he was awarded the Sakharov Prize for Freedom of Thought (source: http://www.britannica.com/EBchecked/topic/1112766/Ibrahim-Rugova last accessed on 28.07.2014).
2.5 National state

The national state based on the German model ("jus sanguinis") is frequently described as ethnic, mostly with a negative association since it relays on genealogy, that is on the ethnic descent of its citizens and is defined in ethicizing terms on descent and origin which become the two essential criteria to define who belonged to the nation and who was excluded.

Billig argues that “… in the modern era of globalization, or the postmodern era, there will be a weakening of nation-states and, perhaps, even their extinction”. On the other hand, many scholars have the opposite stance. Controversially, Orvar Lofgren underlines that “globalization is not succeeding to erase the already established identities, especially cultural once”. This argument can be noticed also in pre- and post-war multi-ethnic areas in the Balkans. In addition, in many parts of the world new national identities are created, while the existing ones are becoming stronger.

The non-ethnic concept of nation ("jus soli") stemmed from the French Revolution. The French model of national state is based on the idea of political nation as an outcome of a political agreement in form of a contract between its citizens. According to Giordano “the 1791 and 1793 constitutions, any foreigner living in France could be granted citizenship without having to prove that he had acquired a French identity. In this manner obtaining citizenship came before obtaining nationality. The French type of national State is associated with the concept of a more open society than other models of political-administrative organization”.

In Sahin’s words “the difference between civic and ethnic models of national identity, in other words, is about its inclusiveness or exclusiveness. The construction of collective identities in inclusive or exclusive terms, in this context, affects the prospect of building enduring peace through ‘nationness’ and ‘stateness’ in post-conflict societies”. Evidently, a separated society faces various challenges in reaching consent on fundamentals of democracy and human rights.

As Giordano observes “the war and the independence of Kosovo have notoriously led to a double ethnic cleansing in Kosovo. At first, the Serbs tried to annihilate or expel the ethnic Albanian population from the region. Then, when Slobodan Milošević lost the war declared on him by NATO, a Kosovar State with a vast Albanian majority was created. At the same time, most of the

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45 Giordano, 2013, p. 3.
46 Sahin, 2007, p. 79
ethnic Serb population was expelled. The entire process of the double ethnic cleansing was once again in accordance with the founding principle of European Nation-States: the ethnic homogeneity”. This observation can be understood as an indicator that both models strive for ethnic homogeneity.

Yet in Kosovo context, the two larger communities are territorially and socially separated. On the other hand, the South of Kosovo makes its practically autonomous political life. The problematic stance towards minorities is evident, since to them the Kosovo state does not offer a meaningful alternative between integration in form of the route from one identity to another (as in the French model), but forces them to marginalization within the civic and political community (as in the German model). In the future it cannot be excluded that, although their diversity is formally acknowledged, minorities in Kosovo may intensively demand more political rights and even voice claims to territorial autonomy.

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47 Giordano, 2013, p. 63.
2.5.1 Nation-building

The debate among scholars on interpretation of nation and ethnicity as primordial, essential, constructed or modernist continues. They use various approaches to treat the question, if nations existed before states have been established or constructed after national state formation. Among others, Eric Hobsbawm has pointed out that the state makes the nation not the nation the state.48

As Armanda Hysa puts it, “Albanians in Kosovo have started the process of nation-building at the same period as when they started the process of state-building, especially when they acquired autonomy from Serbia. It was the state-building process that guaranteed the massive spread of Albanian nationalism in Kosovo, and not the other way around. Furthermore, the Serbian state never integrated both processes: it let them happen, or it abolished them, a policy that resulted in the formation of parallel state structures”.49

Currently, the process of state- and nation-building in Kosovo is essentially determined by external factors (international community), while in local context it is marked by elite driven course (from above). However, these developments are seriously contested. Their narratives and practices are strongly opposed, among others, by the “Vetevendosje”50-movement and by the resistance of the Serbs in North Kosovo, even though their antagonism is fundamentally different.51 This fact constitutes a constant source of tensions and conflicts.

50 Lëvizja VETEVENDOSJE! (Movement for Self-Determination!) is a community of people that refuse to submit and intend to achieve and realize self-determination for the people of Kosovo. The origin of Vetevendosje is in the activities and many actions of KAN (Kosova Action Network) that had as its goal the creation of active citizens in Kosovo, dedicated to the promotion of universal values in the field of human rights and freedoms, equality and social justice. (source: http://www.vetevendosje.org/wp-content/uploads/2013/09/index3.pdf last accessed on 01.08.2014)
51 “Vetevendosje” emerged from the national elections in 2010 as the third largest political entity, winning nearly 13 per cent of the votes (source: http://www.kipred.org/advCms/documents/28022_Kosovo_Electoral_System_Review.pdf last accessed on 28.07.2014)

3.1 Short historic background of Kosovo

“Dardania” is the old name for Kosovo. The term was mentioned for the first time in the 4th century before Christ. In ancient times Kosovo was inhabited by the Illyrians. The region came first under Roman rule. After the division of the Roman Empire, Kosovo was put under Byzantine rule. With the migration of the Avars, Slavs settled in the 7th century in the Balkans.

“The word ‘Kosovo’ enters fully the European history in the 14th century after the major battle in 1389 at Kosovo Polje just outside today’s capital city of Prishtina. This was one of a series of battles between the advancing Turks and the retreating Europeans”. The Balkan army was defeated and Kosovo was placed under Ottoman Empire.

In the 19th century, in particular after having been introduced as one of four territorial provinces in the region under the Ottoman Empire, Kosovo gained for the first time a special level of self-administration, but without prerogatives of self-determination. After the disintegration of the Ottoman Empire (1912) Kosovo was put under Serbia before the First World War, as from 1929 under the Kingdom of Serbs, Croats and Slovenes (SCS) and YU just after the Second World War.

By the establishment of the Second Yugoslavia (YU) began the phase of a half century long free period in the region. Self management was intended to constitute a third path between American capitalism and Soviet socialism. Nevertheless, structural and cultural divisions within the Yugoslav society proved later as a cause of decay, tensions, clashes and wars. The collapse of real socialism showed, among others, that it did not satisfactory solved national conflicts.

In the third conference of AVNOJ, held on August 1945 Kosovo and Vojvodina were established as autonomous provinces within Serbia. In this manner, Kosovo became a constitutive unit within YU and enjoyed a certain degree of autonomy from 1974-89. During this period of time K-Albanian intellectuals engaged in a campaign requiring greater political autonomy for the province and

52 Although there are not many evidences of continuation of Illyrian culture and tradition, ethnic Albanians living in Kosovo believe very strong on this story and pose great meaning in trying to convince the world about the “old roots”.
55 The present Kosovo was part of the Vilayet of Kosovo which was an area much larger that today’ Kosovo.
56 For more about the factors of the disintegration of YU see: Jović, 2008.
57 The former highest communist political body in Yugoslavia.
introduction of bilingual education system at all levels. With its university and high degree of autonomy Prishtina became the centre of all Albanians in YU. During the phase of limited liberalization under Tito’s regime, social life in Kosovo developed positively, involving cultural exchange with surrounding countries, like Albania until the end of the 1970s.

Many factors, such as social isolation, slow political development, limited economic progress and lack of trustworthy relations with other ethnic groups within a common state shaped the creation of a specific Kosovo political identity. On the other hand, it should be noted that this period of time marks the highest investment of YU central state authorities in improvement of Kosovo’s infrastructure, by among others, building up of number of large socially owned companies and advancement of self-government rights as an autonomous unit within YU.

In Kosovo, like in many other parts of Europe, 1989 is considered as “the year of change” with a specific connotation due to the fact that its autonomy was abolished, civic riots were violently crashed down and Serbian President Slobodan Milošević held a very nationalistic speech in the celebration ceremony in occasion of the 600th anniversary of the “Kosovo Battle”. This year results also with the internationalization of the Kosovo-question and the endorsement of a resolution by the European Parliament (13th of April) followed by the USA Congress (18th of July).

3.2 After the dissolution of YU

The contradiction of YU lays in the fact that on the one hand it promoted internationalism and “brotherhood and unity” and on the other hand it was organized as a federal state based on ethnic principle. YU was a state of nations and not a national state. While the other communist countries aimed to strengthen and develop the state apparatus itself, in addition to that YU had the objective, under certain conditions and a narrow framework, to empower the society.

After the downfall of YU, its constitutive nations have showed the tendency to re-nationalise and the “soil question” turned into one of the most frequent referring point in regard to ethnic-conflicts. In this relation attempts to redraw borders in the region have led to wars.

58 On 23rd of March, 1989, Serbian President Milosevic abrogated the autonomy granted to Kosovo 15 years earlier and incorporated the province within Serbia. Albanian deputies of Kosovo Assembly reacted by approving the constitution of “Republic of Kosovo” on 7th of September, 1990.

59 Clark, 2000, p. 90.


61 For more see: http://archive.unu.edu/unupress/unupbooks/uu12ee/uu12ee0h.htm (02.10.2014)
Serbian regime after 1990s considered that its goal to create a “Greater Serbia” could not be achieved in a democratic way. Therefore, it used violence and run wars. For Serbian politicians of that time this option was a rational solution. Due to repression over K-Albanians, Milošević managed to mobilize for the service of his national-hegemonic policy the Serbian Academy for Science and Arts – SANU\(^\text{62}\), Serbian Orthodox Church and the security structures, namely the policy and army. However, Slobodan Milošević’s project “all Serbs in one state” failed.

3.3 Pacifist resistance

In the early beginning of the last decade of the previous century the YU was transformed into the most instable region in the old continent. As regarding to non-governmental international actors\(^\text{63}\), the more systematic involvement of the international community in the Kosovo conflict dates back to the 1980s and to the early 1990s as regards to governmental organizations. The latter began by the engagement in a different political and diplomatic relations, especially after the violent suppression of its political self-rule made by the Serbian side.

In relation to Kosovo the nationalist populism became the legitimizing principle of post-communist Serbian regime. After the rise of Milošević to power in the early 1990s the Albanian majority in Kosovo set up parallel (shadow) institutions\(^\text{64}\) in Kosovo which were characterized by a pacifist resistance and the government in exile.\(^\text{65}\) The leader of this movement, Ibrahim Rugova, who is considered as the initiator of the Kosovo state identity, was aware that the use of violence and escalation of the situation in Kosovo would produce a fierce reaction from the Serbian regime.

The Albanian movement in Kosovo in the 1990s arose as a reaction to Serbian domination. The main goal of the K-Albanian movement was the postponement of the conflict and the independence

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\(^{62}\) The “Memorandum of the Serbian Academy of Sciences and Arts” (often referred to as the “SANU Memorandum”) was a draft document produced by a 16 members-committee of the SANU from 1985 to 1986. The memo immediately captured the public's attention in YU as it gave voice to controversial views on the state of the nation and argued for a fundamental reorganization of the state. The main theme was decentralization leading to the disintegration of Yugoslavia and that the Serbs were discriminated by the Yugoslavia's constitutional structure. (Source: [http://shelf3d.com/i/Memorandum%20of%20the%20Serbian%20Academy%20of%20Sciences%20and%20Arts](http://shelf3d.com/i/Memorandum%20of%20the%20Serbian%20Academy%20of%20Sciences%20and%20Arts) last accessed on 30.07.2014). For more information see: [http://www.sanu.ac.rs/](http://www.sanu.ac.rs/) (02.08.2014)

\(^{63}\) Amnesty International and other human rights organizations have monitored the situation in Kosovo for many years.

\(^{64}\) K-Albanians declared independence in 1990 and began setting up parallel structures of government, health care and education. Ibrahim Rugova was elected president in semi-underground elections, while a “government-in-exile” functioned mostly in Germany. For more see: [http://balkanwitness.glypx.com/civil-resistance-in-kosovo.pdf](http://balkanwitness.glypx.com/civil-resistance-in-kosovo.pdf) (14.09.2014)

\(^{65}\) For more on civil resistance in Kosovo see, Clark, 2000.
of Kosovo. Rugova accepted the strategy based on the principles of non-violent political struggle for achieving the objectives. In this framework the methods were carefully selected in line with seeking of support from the international community.

Kosovar “parallel society” functioned successfully until the Dayton Conference in 1995, which caused huge disappointment among K-Albanians because it ignored the question of Kosovo. According to political analyst from Prishtina, Shkelzen Maliqi “Being aware that they are militarily inferior, they decided to save resources and potentials and to make transparent Serbia’s violent behaviour and aggression”.

3.4 Military resistance

“Dayton Accord” (1995) was concluded without taking any stance in relation to Kosovo issue which was left aside. This resulted in radicalization of K-Albanian illegal groups. The appearance of the Kosovo Liberation Army (KLA) in 1997 and its battles against YU and Serbian authorities had an immense influence and served as a catalyst for the separation of Kosovo from Serbia. As a reaction the Serbian regime decided for a so-called “final solution” of the Kosovo question and began employing a strategy of reprisals against the civilian population.

The fierce fighting made Kosovo to turn to the main topic of talks and to the international authorities in 1998. The U.S. envoy Richard Holbrooke met many times with the President of Serbia Slobodan Milošević and the commanders of the KLA in Kosovo to facilitate the cessation of hostilities. In November 1998 the International Community took the decision to send an OSCE-Delegation in a fact-finding mission in Kosovo. On 16th of January 1999 in the village of Racak (Shtimje municipality in Kosovo) were discovered 45 bodies of Albanians massacred a day earlier by Serbian forces. This act the head of the OSCE mission to Kosovo, Ambassador Walker, called “a crime against humanity”. However, a forensic report made in aftermath under the mandate of the EU throws doubt on the claims of Racak “massacre”.

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68 The Dayton Accord is a peace agreement reached on 21st of November 1995, by the presidents of Bosnia, Croatia and Serbia, ending the war in Bosnia and outlining a General Framework Agreement for Peace in Bosnia and Herzegovina. It preserved Bosnia as a single state made up of two parts, the Bosniak-Croat federation and the Bosnian Serb Republic, with Sarajevo remaining as the undivided capital city.
71 For more see: http://emperors-clothes.com/docs/fsi.pdf (05.10.2014)
3.5 Escalation of conflict and NATO intervention

The international community, which had learned from mistakes made from its late response in armed conflict in other parts of YU, acted quickly and more decisively in Kosovo to prevent a new genocide. The event in the village Racak shocked the democratic world and under the pressure of the international community, on 6th of February 1999 in Rambouillet (France) under the auspices of the Contact Group, were launched peace talks between Serbs and Albanians. The core principles of the international community explicitly envisaged: the sovereignty and territorial integrity of FRY will remain intact; Kosovo should receive higher political autonomy with a legislative, executive and judicial branch of its own. FRY was required to accept international involvement and to provide full support in the implementation of the agreement. After three years of the transitional phase the final status of Kosovo was to be determined. The discussions continued in Paris, where on 19th of March 1999 the K-Albanians delegation signed the agreement proposal, while the Serbs rejected it.

There are many reasons why the Serbian representatives refused to accept the final document of Rambouillet. For Hosmert, “the agreement would have severely restricted Serbia’s military and police presence in the province and empowered NATO to constitute and lead a military force to help keep the peace. Serbs also believed the Rambouillet terms would have jeopardized Serbia’s ultimate sovereignty over Kosovo by permitting the province’s future to be determined by a referendum – a vote they knew the Kosovo Albanians seeking independence surely would have won. Although the Belgrade leaders did not cite them at the time as reasons for their refusal to sign the agreement, other provisions of the Rambouillet Agreement also seriously infringed on their nation’s sovereignty by NATO forces access, billeting, and utilization rights throughout the entirety of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (FRY)”.

Five days later, on 24th of March, NATO military alliance led by the U.S. made a decision to begin campaign of airstrikes against Serbian targets, which lasted 79 days. During this time as bombing continued NATO Serbian forces in revenge throw out of their homes to neighbouring countries about 1 million K-Albanians. The war in Kosovo had a deep impact on the lives of the civilian

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72 This informal grouping of countries included the U.S., U.K., France, Germany, Italy, and Russia. For more see: http://2001-2009.state.gov/p/eur/ci/kv/c13102.htm (13.09.2014)
73 Federal Republic of Yugoslavia was formed from two of six republics that made up Yugoslavia until 1992; Serbia and Montenegro were known as the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia until 2003 when they adopted the name of the Union of Serbia and Montenegro. (source: http://www.thefreedictionary.com/Federal+Republic+of+Yugoslavia (14.09.2014)
population and was a major cause of material destruction. The number of killings is estimated to over 10,000 with the majority of the victims being K-Albanian but also thousands of members of other communities.

3.6 Post-war developments

After the end of the armed conflict in 1999, despite the considerable presence of international police and military forces ethnic relations between K-Albanian and K-Serb populations increasingly worsened. According to UNHCR sources “as a consequence, many Serbs and other minorities left Kosovo after the war rather than languishing in a precarious situation. In total, approximately 230,000 Serbs, Roma and other minorities fled their homes, and most have never returned”. However, these figures are contested. Since segregation remained a prevailing feature, opposing the central government in Pristina K-Serbs introduced a parallel system which was perceived as a necessity due to fears associated to their safety and freedom of movement.

When analysing the events in the eve of proclamation of independence of Kosovo, it can be observed a strong division between “us”- (Albanians) and “them”- (Serbs) approach with the clear ethnic attitude behind it. In this relation, the former Serbian President Boris Tadić urged for partition of Kosovo and wanted to retrieve to the Motherland the territories inhabited by K-Serbs. On the other hand, the former President of Albania Alfred Moisiu stated that Kosovo is a province of Albania. Therefore, political stability and the improvement of interethnic relations, including confidence building and mutual trust among the K-Albanian and the K-Serb community, have been major challenges for the international community and Kosovar society.

55 See: http://reliefweb.int/sites/reliefweb.int/files/resources/F62789D9FCC56FB3C1256C1700303E3B-thekosovoreport.htm (14.09.2014)

56 According to the information of the Humanitarian Law Center (HLC), 13,421 persons died, were killed or went missing during the armed conflict in Kosovo in the period from January 1st 1998 until June 14th 1999 and after the deployment of international troops in Kosovo until December 2000. In the total number of victims, 10,533 were Albanians, 2,238 were Serbs, 126 Roma, 100 Bosniaks, 40 Montenegrins, 25 Ashkalia, 18 Egyptians, 13 Turks, 10 Hungarians, eights (8) Goranis, four (4) Macedonians, two (2) Bulgarians, two (2) Czechs, two (2) Croats, two (2) Russians, two (2) Slovenians, one (1) Ruthene, one (1) Slovak, and 294 victims whose nationality has not yet been ascertained. See: http://www.rferl.org/content/New_Kosovo_War_Victims_Report_Released/1845593.html (25.09.2014).


58 Kosovo authorities speak of about 100 000-150 000 Serbs who left Kosovo after June 1999. Other organizations quote larger figures, like Human Right Watch report which estimates that more than 210, 000 Serbs fled from Kosovo during and after the war. See: http://www.hrw.org/reports/2001/kosovo/undword.htm (25.09.2014), while according to other sources the FRY Red Cross had registered 247,391 mostly Serbian refugees by November 1999. For more see: Aertsen Ivo, Arsovska Jana, Rohne Holger-C, Marta, V aliñas, V anspauwen Kris, 2008, p. 85.

Conflicts, in particular military ones, usually create widespread social trauma. Based on scientific studies, as a result of the recent war in Kosovo, about a quarter of its population is suffering from post-traumatic stress. On the other hand, in a conflict between two ethnic groups, there is always a one sided approach on the past and present. In the case of Kosovo a narrow perspective has been advocated by both its major communities. On this issue, according to a study conducted by KIPRED, “Kosovo is not an exception of post conflict societies when it comes to interpretation of history and expressing of traditions by certain communities. In many instances design and use of symbols can be directed at annoying other communities rather than truly enjoying the symbols for themselves”.

The armed conflict also had profound demographic consequences: Kosovo was now a much more homogeneous country. According to the census held of 2011, the Republic of Kosovo had about 1.8 million residents. In average its population is the youngest within Europe. According to the census results Kosovo today is inhabited by a large majority of Albanians 88%, Serbs 7% and 5% other ethnic groups (Turks, Bosnians, Torbeshen, Gorans, REA, etc.).

Nevertheless, certain contradictions and conflicting lines not only by ethnic divisions are to be observed. This has also to do with the fact that since the early 1990s K-Albanians and K-Serbs had limited contacts and were socially and politically divided. This segregation lead to maintenance of prejudices in both communities and continued after the armed conflict, during the UN administration and in the aftermath of the proclamation of the country’s independence. In this context, other separation lines are to be observed: K-Albanians inhabit mainly urban while K-Serbs rural areas marked by poverty, migration and dependence on agriculture. Consequently, the

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80 See: http://www.evropaelire.org/content/article/1009907.html (31.07.2014)
81 Kosovar Institute for Policy Research and Development: http://www.kipred.org/ (02.08.2014)
82 See: http://www.kipred.org/advCms/documents/10447_Integration_of_minority_communities_in_the_post_status_Kosovo.pdf (01.08.2014)
83 See: http://unstats.un.org/unsd/censuskb20/Attachment488.aspx (25.06.2014)
84 Roma, Egyptian and Ashkali.
85 In April 2011, the Kosovo Agency of Statistics (KAS) conducted the “first internationally recognized census” in Kosovo since 1981. The official results of the census, monitored by the International Monitoring Operation (IMO), were published in September 2012. The IMO concluded that the census had been conducted in a “relatively successful manner” and resulted in “figures that can be relied on”, highlighting however that the results did not cover northern Kosovo. Indeed, while the census makes a wealth of vital information available, its data have also raised a series of questions, particularly regarding their validity and accuracy for minority communities. The exclusion of the largely Serb-inhabited northern Kosovo was the most notable problem with the census. It meant that roughly half of Kosovo’s total Serb population – estimated at around 140,000 – was not represented at all in final census data, which estimates the Serb population at 25,532. This has also affected the census figures of other minority communities living in that area, including Bosniaks and Roma. (source: http://www.ecmikosovo.org/wp-content/Publications/Policy_briefs/2012_12_ECMI_Kosovo_Policy_Brief_Minority_Communities_in_the_2011_Kosovo_Census_Results_Analysis_and_Recommendations/eng.pdf last accessed on 15.09.2014)
unemployment rate, in particular by youth, is much higher in the minority community.\textsuperscript{86}

For Skilas and Roukanas, “the solution based on economic and social questions is seen more as an individual issue rather than a field of collective action. Additionally, the fact, that a large number of refugees and IDPs are still living in Serbia, further exacerbates the social and economic conditions of the country, which does not contribute to stability in the region. Additionally, this group of people is always a source of pressure on the Serbian government to adopt a non flexible position in respect of the future status of Kosovo”\textsuperscript{87}

Despite various attempts to improve the communication among communities in Kosovo this process has faced many challenges. As Dragana Dulić observes, “state-building and peace-building are potentially contradictory processes – the former requiring the consolidation of governmental authority, the latter involving its moderation through compromise and consensus. The challenge for both national and international peacemakers is to situate reconciliation firmly within the context of state building, while employing state-building as a platform for the development of mutual trust and lasting reconciliation. In the Kosovo case, it goes without saying that neither of these processes can be possible without the broad and inclusive engagement of the Kosovo people, although facing a range of constraints which limit their ability to participate”\textsuperscript{88}

\textsuperscript{87} Skilas and Roukanas, 2007, p. 272.
\textsuperscript{88} Dulić 2007, p. 4.
4. THE PROCESS OF STATUS SETTLEMENT

4.1 The Ahtisaari Plan

Marti Ahtisaari\(^9\), former president of Finland who was “a trusted figure”, since he successfully negotiated the withdrawal of Serbian troops from Kosovo in exchange for the end of the NATO bombardment of Serbia in 1999\(^{90}\), was appointed a Special Envoy of the United Nations Secretary General (UNSG) to head the mediating Kosovo/Serbia status negotiations held in Vienna (June 2005-February 2007).

The position of the international community was expressed in the so-called three “no”: no partition of Kosovo, no annexation to other states and no return to the situation prior to March 1999. The positions of the Serbs and K-Albanians were diametrically opposed. While the K-Albanians requested immediately full independence, the Serbs were ready to offer only “more than autonomy, but less than independence”. The Ahtisaari negotiation strategy in this status talks was not to start over from the fundamental question of the status, but how the new state should look like. However, the negotiating parties could not agree on basic principles of Kosovo’s future.

In the end of the process, Ahtisaari presented “The Comprehensive Proposal for the Kosovo Status Settlement” (dated of 27\(^{th}\) of March, 2007). The Settlement Proposal projected a 120-day transition period, during which Kosovo Assembly would adopt all the legislation necessary to implement the settlement.

This outcome is also known as “The Ahtisaari Plan” which was accepted by Kosovo and backed by the US and partly the EU, but strongly opposed by Serbia and Russia. While not yet mentioning the word “independence”, the draft arrangement incorporated several provisions that were extensively interpreted as implying statehood for Kosovo. The Ahtisaari Plan envisaged that Kosovo would obtain an internationally supervised sovereignty under the oversight of an international envoy and that Kosovar Serb municipalities would be granted an extensive autonomy. The plan was expected to provide incentives for an inclusive society and anchor of multi-ethnicity in the former province. Based on this document on 17\(^{th}\) of February, 2008, Kosovo proclaimed its independence. For K-Albanian political representatives the Ahtisaari package is a compromise in relation to national

\(^9\) Ahtisaari, 2008 laureate of Nobel Price for Peace for his role as mediator in Namibia, Indonesia and Kosovo.
\(^{90}\) Ertel, Manfred/ Flottau Renate and Kraske Marion: Final Status for Kosovo: Negotiations Lean Towards Independence. In Spiegel: [http://www.spiegel.de/international/spiegel/0,1518,402188,00.html](http://www.spiegel.de/international/spiegel/0,1518,402188,00.html) (23.10.2013)
unification. On the other hand, the movement “Vetvendosje” was and is of the opinion that the Ahisaari Plan opens the possibility of partition of Kosovo along ethnic lines.91

Some of the key constitutional provisions are that:

1) Kosovo is a multi-ethnic society based upon the equality of all its citizens;

2) Kosovo has no official religion and is neutral on question of religious beliefs;

3) Kosovo will have its own, distinct, flag, seal and anthem, which must reflect the multi-ethnic character of Kosovo;

4) The official languages of Kosovo will be Albanian and Serbian;

5) Non-majority communities will be represented in the Assembly through a system of guaranteed/reserved seats.92

91 “Vetvendosje’s” viewpoint on decentralization is that it is in essence destabilization which creates additional boundaries and municipalities that are ethnically dominated. In the political program of Movement “Vetvendosje” it is stated that “decentralization should be based on the needs and interests of the citizens, and not according to ethnic principles. Decentralization up to today, based on ethnic principles, has been in the service of daily and disintegrating politics for the territory and society. It is very dangerous also for the future of the state of Kosova. We will totally review the current process of decentralization. Kosova needs decentralization regardless of ethnic difference, but with the citizen of Kosova at its focus and not Ahtisaari”. (source: http://www.vetevendosje.org/wp-content/uploads/2013/09/Programi_i_shkurte_anglisht.pdf last accessed on 14.09.2014)

4.2 Declaration of Independence

On 17th February 2008, the Kosovo assembly passed a resolution, which proclaims Kosovo to be independent. The Declaration of Independence stipulates: “We invite and welcome an international civilian presence to supervise our implementation of the Ahtisaari Plan, and a European Union-led rule of law mission”. 93

A group of countries consisting mainly by Western powers recognized Kosovo within a few days. The EU’s policy towards Kosovo was spelled out in the Council Conclusions on 18th of February: “The Member states will decide, in accordance with national practice and international law, on relations with Kosovo.” In February 2008, the General Affairs and External Relations Council agreed to a Joint Action to establish an ESDP rule of law mission, known as “EULEX“, in Kosovo. 94

After the proclamation of independence, on the invitation of Kosovo institutions a group of states, so called “International Steering Group” 95, was established with the goal to supervise the implementation of the Ahtisaari Plan. To the head of its mechanism in the field, International Civilian Office (ICO) 96 Peter Faith was delivered extensive competences in the form of the highest executive authority. This mission ended in September 2012.

In Macshane’s view “Kosovo enters the second decade of the 21st century in both a better and a worse state than its founding fathers would have thought. Better because the country is free and, in contrast to the northern Mitrovica triangle, at peace. Worse because the continued Moscow-Belgrade blockage on Kosovo’s acceptance as a normal European nation-state leaves the country unable to fulfil many of the roles of statehood”. 97 To quote Sahin “the reconstruction of post-conflict societies as peaceful, democratic entities therefore requires not only building loyalty to the newly established government institutions, seen as inclusive, representative and capable of responding to local needs, but also creating a sense of solidarity and cohesion within the population”. 98

93 Declaration of Independence: http://www.assembly-kosova.org/?cid=2,128,1635 (25.06.2014)
95 The Member States of the ISG were: Austria, Belgium, Bulgaria, Croatia, the Czech Republic, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, France, Germany, Hungary, Ireland, Italy, Latvia, Lithuania, Luxembourgh, the Netherlands, Norway, Poland, Slovenia, Switzerland, Sweden, Turkey, the United Kingdom and the United States of America.
96 See: http://www.ico-kos.org (25.01.2014)
97 Macshane, 2011, p. 86.
4.3 The EU involvement in Kosovo

In the last decade of the previous century Kosovo became one of the main discussed topics by the international community. The EU has been an integral part of the international effort to build a new future for Kosovo since 1999. The Kosovo crises and in particular the negotiations in Rambouillet introduced the lunching of the EU Common Foreign and Defence Policy (CFDP). These relations began to materialize especially after the war by opening of liaison offices in Kosovo. On the other hand according to Augustin Palokaj “controversially, the EU has benefited from its involvement in Kosovo too. Either when acting jointly with other international actors or when acting on its own, the EU has tested a number of its new policies, especially the role of law policy”\(^99\).

The EU, both its Member States and its institutions, notably the EC\(^100\), plays a prominent role in the reconstruction and development of Kosovo. The EU is by far the single largest donor providing assistance to Kosovo and is at the forefront of the reconstruction effort. The majority of EU Member States maintain a representative office in Kosovo and numerous non-governmental organizations from EU member states are active in Kosovo. The EU had been closely involved in Kosovo’s affairs from the outset of transition. To date, the EU in Kosovo is represented by EULEX, EUSR and the EU Member State representations in form of Embassies and Liaison Offices. There are many other entities in Kosovo, which promote the idea of “Europe”. They are engaged in various fields, including the areas of politics, economics, culture, social issues, human rights and the environment.\(^101\)

EULEX is the largest civilian mission ever launched under the ESDP. The core objective is to assist and support the Kosovo authorities in the rule of law area, specifically in the police, judiciary and customs areas. The mission works under the general framework of UNSC Resolution 1244 and has a unified chain of command to Brussels. The issue of the Kosovo’s place in Europe is outstanding in the public and political discourse associated with the question of EU membership. These debates have accompanied the post-war processes installing hopes among Kosovars for a European future.

\(^99\) Palokaj, 2013, p. 5.
\(^100\) Since 2005 EC issues progress reports for Kosovo as a particular entity.
\(^101\) Among others also Kosovar Civil Society Foundation (KCSF) gives attention to the process of European integration, by raising awareness about the EU within Kosovo society and providing information and analytical tools to professionals that deal with these issues (http://www.kcssfoundation.org); Kosovo Foundation for Open Society (KFOS) implements a range of initiatives to advance justice, education, public health, and independent media (http://kfos.org); The European Centre for Minority Issues (ECMI) Kosovo is engaged with the protection and promotion of the rights and interests of all minority communities in Kosovo (http://www.ecmikosovo.org); Civil Rights Program Kosovo (CRPK) conducts its activities as non-governmental human rights based organization (http://www.crpkosovo.org); NGO EKOVISONI deals with environmental issues (http://www.ekovizioni.com), etc.

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for their country, even though Kosovo is not a candidate for EU accession. Moreover, Kosovo is
today the only country in the region not granted visa-free travel in the European travel zone.\footnote{Its citizens can travel without a visa to only four European countries: Albania, Macedonia, Montenegro and Turkey.} On the other hand, the EU integration perspective represents a significant potential in promoting an inclusive society due to the fact that the accommodation between the minorities is one of the core conditions towards the EU membership.

4.4 The Kosovo-Serbia agreement on the normalization of their relations (19\textsuperscript{th} of April 2013)

In spite of all enormous international engagement in Kosovo certain contradictions and conflicting lines not only by ethnic divisions are still to be observed. This has also to do with the fact that since the early 1990s K-Albanians and K-Serbs had limited contacts and were socially and politically divided. This segregation lead to maintenance of prejudices in both communities and continued after the armed conflict, during the UN administration and in the aftermath of proclamation of the country’s independence.

Kosovo has still not sufficiently moved beyond post-war transition paradigm. The segregation of the two major communities in the area remains visible and the fragmentation of Kosovo's political landscape, across ethnic lines is obvious. The Euro-Atlantic integration remains currently the only matching point.

K-Albanians and K-Serbs declared themselves to be in favour of dialogue and accord between them but not much for coexistence with each other. In the past 15 years, no negotiation process, starting from Rambouillet until the Ahtisaari Plan and the technical dialogue has ended with the endorsement of an agreement signed by both parties. This was made possible only on 19\textsuperscript{th} of April, 2013\footnote{See: http://www.rts.rs/upload/storyBoxFileData/2013/04/20/3224318/Originalni\%20tekst\%20Predloga\%20sporazuma.pdf (02.08.2014)} as a result of discussions led by the EU in Brussels. Nowadays, Kosovo politicians speak about a deal in the form of a peace treaty. In this context, Kosovo Deputy Prime Minister Hajredin Kuci said “a peace treaty would indicate a completion of all preliminary issues, which would conclude a chapter of conflict and open up co-operation. Kosovo could do it, but maintain national identity, territorial integrity, and the position it holds”\footnote{See: http://www.setimes.com/coconut/setimes/xhtml/en_GB/features/setimes/features/2011/10/12/feature-01 (15.09.2014)}\footnote{Ibid}. According to him “not only Kosovo wants a treaty, but also Serbia, the region and the entire democratic world”\footnote{Ibid}.
However, referring to the recent statements made by Kosovo's officials about the possibility of signing a peace agreement, Serbia's recognition of independence and Kosovo's accession to various international organizations, Serbia's Deputy Premier and Foreign Minister Ivica Dačić spoke of "attempt to abuse of Belgrade's good willingness".  

Kosovo institutions should negotiate with the local Serbs to peacefully integrate themselves into the country with guarantees of rights and political autonomy. This option became increasingly feasible after countrywide municipal elections in autumn 2013 and early parliamentary elections in summer 2014 which were prised by both international and local observers.


107 For the first time, the Kosovo local elections (on 3rd November and 1st December 2013) were organized in the whole territory of Kosovo, including Leposavić/Leposaviq, Mitrovica North, Zubin Potok, and Zvečan/Zveçan. This represents a new phase in Kosovo’s development after its declaration of independence in 2008. Generally, the elections were held in free and fair conditions, and the parties did not contest the results, as was the case with the last elections of 2009. None of the candidates and parties that participated in the elections has contested the 2013 results. (source: [http://www.infoecmi.eu/index.php/analysis-lessons-learned-kosovo-local-elections/](http://www.infoecmi.eu/index.php/analysis-lessons-learned-kosovo-local-elections/) last accessed on 15.09.2014)

108 The analyst from Prishtina Kranar Gashi is of opinion that "the June 8 2014 elections met the highest international standards, making it one of the best elections organized in the region. From the Central Election Commission, police, state prosecutors, to political parties, media and civil society observers, the whole society was mobilized to make sure every incident would be reported and analyzed. Even verbal tensions between voters were televised. Secondly, they were the first election with a solid participation of Kosovo Serbs living in the north of the country, who traditionally boycotted Kosovo institutions. Thus, Sunday elections mark an important turn when it comes to representation of the Serbs in the institutions, boosting in this way the legitimacy of the parliament". (source: [http://blogs.lse.ac.uk/lsee/2014/06/10/kosovo-elections-what-we-know-so-far/](http://blogs.lse.ac.uk/lsee/2014/06/10/kosovo-elections-what-we-know-so-far/) last accessed on 15.09.2014)
5. THE DISCOURSE ON KOSOVO IDENTITY

5.1 The debate

This chapter explores the dynamics of national identity construction under the international protectorate. In relationship to the state-building project it examines the inter-linkages between ethnicity and the politics of identity formation and explores the ambivalence and resistance to dominant public discourses on nation-building concept.

Because of their close ties with the Ottoman Empire national identity among the Albanians in Kosovo evolved later than among other ethnic groups in the region of the Balkans. According to Kadriu “identification as Kosovar Albanian was viewed in the past mainly as a regional identification, connected to administrative positioning and borders of the province, which have changed over the course of history. Nevertheless, this provincial identification as Kosovars was used also by the Serbians in form of “Kosovari”, and by the Turks in form of “Kosovali”.  

For the first time the term “Kosovar” appeared in the early 20th century. The initial “real” creation of Kosovo’s political identity has been manifested in 1912, when the area was abandoned by the European powers109 and left in the hands of Serbia. As a self-designation the term “Kosovar” first appeared in the subtitle of one partisan’s weekly magazine published in 1942.111 This concept of identity developed further during Kosovo’s integration in Socialist Yugoslavia, where K-Albanians had the status of a recognized “nationality”.

According to the “Historical Dictionary of Kosovo” by Robert Elsie, “Kosmet is abrogation of the term Kosovo and Metohija which was in official usage during the communist time. It was replaced in December 1968 by the term Kosovo. The version Kosova112 is more liking to the Albanian population”.113 Geographically the term Kosmet comprises the territory of Kosovo and in the wider sense, also includes the smaller region of Metohija which is located in the southwest of Kosovo and means “Monastic Estates” in English.114 In Albanian language equivalent of Metohija is “Rrafshi i Dukagjinit” (the Dukagjini Plateau).115

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110 Great Britain, France, Germany, Austria-Hungary, Russia and Italy assembled in the London Conference of 1912–1913, also known as the London Peace Conference or the Conference of the Ambassadors.
112 In Albanian language the name is spelled like “Kosova”.
113 Elsie, 2012, p. 95.
114 See: http://www.kosovo.net/hist.html (15.09.2014)
115 Elsie, 2012, p. 119
Professor at the Faculty of Philosophy, Belgrade University, Dušan Bataković presents the view that "the very word ‘Kosovo’ has opposing meanings in different ethnic communities in this part of southwest Balkans. For Serbs, the very meaning of Kosovo signifies above all a genuine Serbian land, the sacred territory of the ‘Serbian Jerusalem’ whose glorious cultural and economic rise in the middle ages was brutally cut off from its European and Christian background by the Ottoman conquests. Kosovo is by all means symbolically the most important word in Serbian historical dictionary that, after the name of Savior, and Saint Sava (the founder of the Serbian Orthodox Church in the early thirteenth century), denotes simultaneously both the national and cultural identity of the whole Serbian people. For ethnic Albanians the word ‘Kosovo’ (or ‘Kosova’ in the Albanian pronunciation) is considered as a symbol of ‘ancient Albanian land’ which directly connects the ancient Illyrian and modern Albanian ethnic community in this territory".116 On the other side, Enver Rexha, the director of the Archaeological Institute of Kosovo is of opinion that “the country name “Kosovo” in historical terms, is taken as the successor to the old name of a place called “Dardania”. The first data historic-graphical about the name “Kosovo” (in the strict sense of the word “Kosovo Field”) appear relatively late in the history, although geographically the name is mentioned since the 15th century. The country's historical name “Kosovo” is known from the second half of 19th century when the Vilayet of Kosovo was created as a territorial administrative unit of the Ottoman Empire, which included a wider territory than it has today”.117 However, it is difficult to establish correlations on this issue which is very much politicized among Albanian and Serbian academicians.118

In relation to national identity formation in Kosovo Oliver Jens Schmitt is of the opinion that to the majority of the Albanian-speaking population in Kosovo the transition from a Muslim to a national-Albanian identity began after 1945, consolidated in the 1980s, and continued to be shaped.119

With the intensification of the Serb-Albanian conflict in the 1990s, the term “Kosovar”120 came in the international public and was often used as a synonym for “Kosovo Albanian". The U.S. State Department is the first among international agencies which used this term to refer to the people of Kosovo.121

118 For more on this topic see also Schmitt and Frantz (2009)
120 The term derives from Albanian and means “person from Kosovo”, as well as “gjakovar” means “person from Gjakova” (a city in western Kosovo) or “shqiptar” means “person from Albania”.
According to Petritsch and Pichler “in Western vocabulary an attempt has been made to differentiate the term ‘Kosovars’ referring to ‘all inhabitants of Kosovo’ from the ethnically differentiated terms ‘Kosovo-Albanians’ and ‘Kosovo-Serbs’.” 122

In contrast, the term “Kosovar” is also among the K-Albanians controversial. Some intellectuals think that over the decades of separation from Albania a specific “Kosovar identity” has emerged. Others, however, reject the designation of “Kosovar”, because, according to them, this term would deepen the division of the Albanian nation.

The issue of Kosovo’s identity is controversial and complicated. To the question of whether there is a Kosovar identity, one obtains in Kosovo entirely different answers.

In the following section an attempt will be made to answer the fundamental question: Is a new identity in Kosovo being developed, and if so, is that a kind of national feeling or not? In this part the most important involved actors will be named and described. Correspondently, the contradictions and arising questions when the topic of identity is addressed will be made visible. In this context, various arguments and perspectives will be faced and elaborated.

The debate on Kosovo identity was raised in the course of major political changes: after the war ended in June 1999, the process of determining Kosovo’s political future began. It first appeared in public through a weekly journal “Java” (“The Week”), published in Prishtina, which carried out this discourse to another level and enabled a platform for discussion on the topic of possible emergence of a new (national) identity. Since that time a group of intellectuals in Kosovo are openly debating whether “they”123 posses or not, different to Albanian or Serbian, a common identity with the other co-nationals disregarding the ethnic background. In the beginning this discourse got about in internet platforms, and has later entered the mainstream media. The advocates of this initiative believe the constituent attributes for a genuine Kosovar identity are there.

The idea to create a the new “Kosovar” identity based on pragmatism and rationality represents a specific element closely related to recent history of Kosovo as a precondition for receiving further recognitions of its statehood by the international community and is considered by its proponents as one of the imperatives to further promotion of the new state.124

123 By “they” are meant all Kosovo nationals, but the debate has in focus especially K-Albanians and K-Serbs.
124 See Matoshi in Newspaper “Koha Ditore” http://www.koha.net/?page=1,9.169962 (02.10.2014)
In order to decrease identification in ethnic terms the suggestion is to focus on individual features by introducing a new social indicator, namely a civic identity. According to its adherents, this process may lead to the creation of a community in-group identity that will promote the approach of more inclusive “we” instead of “us”- and “them”-divisions and should be based on a social contract which has no room for ethnicity as the main identification feature.\textsuperscript{125}

The core identity markers put forward are the name of the new state, the flag, the anthem, the coat of arms, the constitution, the institutions, the frontiers (although with disputed territory and people), official holidays and administrative features like passport, number plates, etc.

“Kosovo is a country suffering from ethnic divisions,” said the analyst Kelmendi, and that “this is the reason I have asked for [a] reaching beyond this reality through a new identity.” He, too, sees the new identity as intimately linked to the new state. But, for him the key question is: Will an independent Kosovo be a multi-ethnic or a mono-ethnic state? His proposal is to graduate from an ethnic identity to a political one, an idea that is very close to the wishes of the international community. “For me, the problem of Kosovo identity is the same, on a smaller scale, as the problem of European identity”, Kelmendi said.\textsuperscript{126} He is the chef-editor of “The Week” magazine in Prishtina, whose editorial policy is clearly tailored towards affirmation of Kosovo identity. However, in general terms, the European identity should complement and not replace the national identity by creating a field of identification that reaches beyond dividing lines and includes all the nationals of Kosovo.

Andersen adds that the term “Kosovar” arose as “a reference to the whole population of Kosovo as a supra-ethnic category that disregards ethnicity. It is a territorial form of identity”.\textsuperscript{127} The same author underlines that “the rising notion of ‘the Kosovar’ is an expression of how state institutions are trying to promote a concept of a collective shared high culture, representing the values of its citizens. If the Kosovar state is successful, and provides a solid framework where its citizens can look forward to realizing their dreams and aspirations, the identity of the state and its citizens, the ‘Kosovars’, will continue to be strengthened, and may eventually over time be considered a national identity”.\textsuperscript{128}
In this relation the question can be put what are the distinctive features of a Kosovar identity, which could differ from an Albanian and Serbian national identity. Among others, according to its advocates, these are:

- History: Kosovo has always been inhabited by Albanians, Serbs and other ethnic groups. Multi-ethnicity and cultural diversity was always present;

- Geography: For the first time, from 1877 until 1912 under Ottoman rule Kosovo was granted prerogatives of an administrative unit. In this regard, the Vilayet of Kosovo as an organizational division of the Ottoman Empire in the Balkan Peninsula comprised mainly the present territory of Kosovo and the western part of the Republic of Macedonia;

- Statehood and institution-building: The state has its own official symbols that are not similar either to Albania or to Serbia. On the other hand, Kosovo has managed to establish a number of institutions which cover a range of sectors like security, education, health and culture, which tend to deliver services to all citizens;

- Common future: the EU integration of Kosovo as the final objective of all its inhabitants and state policy.

In contrast, the initiatives to discuss and develop an inclusive state and territorially based identity and symbols that may be acceptable for all the people in Kosovo did not find remarkable support neither by the K-Albanian nor K-Serbian political leadership. For illustration, the current Kosovo’s Prime Minister, head of the Democratic Party of Kosovo (PDK) and former political leader of the guerrilla army (KLA), Hashim Thaçi, immediately reacted to these debates by saying that “a Kosovo identity does not exist ... I do not give the flag for a state ... I want both, the state and the flag ... ”. Thaçi was referring to the Albanian national flag under which KLA fought against Serbian forces. This statement was made at a time when he was in the opposition and no public discussions about the design of symbols of the emerging state were officially launched. Years later, he declared Kosovo's independence and agreed with the state flag which is different from that of Albania. Jakup Krasniqi, a former spokesman of the Kosovo Liberation Army (KLA), asked rhetorically: “did not the people who today are asking for the substitution of national identity, yesterday ask us to adopt the Yugoslav identity?” Similarly, the analyst Merxhan Avdyli does not consider that a Kosovar identity can be established in the time to come.

130 Ibid, p. 2.

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The more neutral assumptions are presented by a few local politicians. In this regard, as Kelmendi quotes, Nexhat Daci, former President of the Parliament of Kosovo who replied on this issue as follows: “there is a Kosovar identity. It was created over a long period of time. Unfortunately, there was never someone who could represent it. Perhaps this was simply due to the lack of the intellectual, scientific and personal courage. Meanwhile, however, the conditions have been met that the Kosovars defend strongly their identity. Kosova is no amorphous thing without its own identity and will have to prove its specific ethnic, geopolitical and geo-social characteristics.” 132

On the other hand, Ramush Haradinaj, the leader of the Alliance for the Future of Kosovo (AAK) and former Prime Minister, said the following on this issue: “we are in the middle in the efforts to build our state Kosovo whose citizens are Kosovars. We are Albanians, but we are also Kosovars. The Serbs are Serbs, but also Kosovars.” 133 Additionally, Bajram Rexhepi of the Democratic Party of Kosovo (PDK), also former Prime Minister, acknowledged that “Kosovo's identity is something that needs to be discussed about. Kosova is a geographic term and the term ‘Kosovar’ is to be accepted also for practical reasons”. 134

Nexhmedin Spahiu, an adviser to former Prime Minister Ramush Haradinaj who has been developing and defending the idea of a Kosovo nation, chiefly in the pages of the Tirana daily “Shekulli”, assumed that “this process started years ago.” Spahiu sees the main justification for the existence of a distinct Kosovar nation in modern concepts of the nation, state, and ethnicity. “‘Nation,’ in the modern and Western conception, is very closely linked to ‘state,’ and very little to ethnicity, so, in that context, I think that Kosovo’s people are going through a nation-building process”, he said. 135

One of the major opposing forces to the nation-building from the major ethnic community in Kosovo is the “Vetevendosje”-movement which populist and nationalist agenda served to intensify the debate over the limits of the Kosovo state and national identity, bringing issues like “albanianness”, nation-building and identity politics to the focus of public life. This movement protested continuously against the Ahtisaari plan and decentralization, privatization of socially owned enterprises, international pressure and the presence of UNMIK and EULEX in Kosovo. “Vetevendosje” also argues for a referendum for Kosovo to join Albania, a political concept that is,

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to a certain degree, popular within K-Albanians but not an option amongst the international community.

Some of the core issues promoted by the movement “Vetevendosje” political program are: “The people are the source of sovereignty. The right to the self-determination of people is the justice of the people’s will; in order to complete the independent statehood of Kosova, it is necessary for various international and supranational organizations to end their rule of Kosova and for Kosova to become part of these organisms on an equal basis with other states; the movement “Vetevendosje” is committed to the constitutional definition of Kosova as a state of Albanians and all citizens of Kosova. The movement “Vetevendosje”, in addition is committed to returning the national Albanian symbols to the state of Kosova.”136

Involving himself to the debate about Kosovar nation, the leader of “Vetevendosje”, Albin Kurti said “I am first of all an Albanian and then I am Kosovar Albanian. Kosovo is a geographic idea. It doesn’t have national connotations. There is a distinction between ethnicity and nation. Ethnicity is very much in post-modernity, the nation is a modernist concept. The nation is a socio-historical creation of modernity. Ethnicity is a post-modern euphemism for a tribe. And I think the international community, by relying on ethnicity for this region, has de-politicized people. But the reality is that a nation can be not only a tool but also a defence of the society against neo-liberalism because neo-liberalism destroys societies and communities. And it atomizes people. I think it’s progressive in this respect, but you shouldn’t overdo it because it becomes very dangerous”. However, this can be considered a confusing statement due to the fact that Albin Kurti is the main advocate of the unification of all ethnic Albanians in the Balkans into one national state.

Also Serbs reacted to this debate. In this context, Rada Trajković, local K-Serb politician is against the possibility of creation of a Kosovar nation. “the imposition of Kosovar sovereignty and an attempt to create a surrogate nation is something that is really difficult discrimination. Some want to say that it is linguistic discrimination or language problem, but I think it is profoundly political because the Serbs as a people do not accept”, said Trajković. Previous year, (2013) the deputy Prime Minister of the Serbian government, Aleksandar Vučić, stated that Serbs will never be Kosovars and that he never regarded the Serbs of Kosovo differently from the Serbs of Serbia.139

137 See: http://www.vice.com/read/kosovos-vetevendosje-movement-doesnt-like-foreign-intervention (01.08.2014)
138 See: http://www.radiokim.net/vesti/trajkovic-termin-Kosovar-politicki-problem.html (02.08.2014)
139 See: http://www.balkaneu.comserbian-deputy-pm-serbs-Kosovars/ (11.06.2013)
In Kosovo context the debate on the nation is closely linked to newly gained statehood. Since K-Albanians comprise the majority of inhabitants in Kosovo they consider it as their state. On the other hand, taking into account that they represent only a minority community K-Serbs, as from the very beginning of the proclamation of the new state have been unwilling to accept it, among others due to the fear that in the political processes of decision-making they will be overruled by the K-Albanian majority and as a consequence their ties with Serbia will be weakened. In this perception can be observed also their hesitance to take part more actively in the discourse on the issue of a “Kosovar” nation.

For Dušan Bataković, “there is neither a single Kosovo people nor a Kosovo nation (as distinct from the one in Albania or in parts of Macedonia populated by ethnic Albanians). That the meaning of the word “Kosovar” means nothing but an Albanian is clearly proved by the fact that the only flag that the alleged Kosovo nation is using, is exclusively the state flag of Albania, and that the concept of a „Kosovar” has always denoted only an ethnic Albanian from this region. Serbs use the word “Kosovac” for Serbs from this region. Even Bernard Kouchner, the civil administrator of the United Nations in Kosovo and Metohija, had used the term “Kosovar Serb” on a few occasions, which could mean something like Albanian Serb, until the bishop Artemije warned him of the crucial difference. The whole terminological confusion, with the Albanian propaganda behind it, had one single political aim: to separate the Kosovo question in the eyes of the Western opinion from global Albanian aims.”.140

In this context it will be important to examine the question of the opinion of K-Serbs and other minorities concerning to their relation to the majority community and their position in the Kosovo state. In this regard in June 2007 the non-governmental Humanitarian Law Centre (HLC) released a survey on position and inclusion of ethnic minorities in Kosovo conducted during 2006. Whilst it found progress in majority Albanian acceptance of Turkish, Bosniak, Ashkali and Egyptian minorities, including their improved freedom of movement, there was little improvement for Serbs and Roma.141 In addition, according to a study conducted by World Directory of Minorities and Indigenous Peoples in 2011, “the minority situation in Kosovo is complex. Several years after the conflict, minority return to pre-war homes has barely occurred. Those who did return faced not only physical threats, but widespread economic exclusion, including through discrimination in employment and provision of social benefits.”142

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140 Bataković, 2007, p. 5.
141 See: [http://www.minorityrights.org/?lid=6379&tmpl](http://www.minorityrights.org/?lid=6379&tmpl) (02.08.2014)
142 See: [http://www.minorityrights.org/?lid=2458](http://www.minorityrights.org/?lid=2458) (02.08.2014)
In this manner, based on evidences that focus on history, territorial integrity and minority rights, Serbia continues its claims on Kosovo. Permanent opposition of Serbian “shadow” structures\textsuperscript{143} in north of the country, creation of parallel societies, differences in language, segregation of schools and education curricula between Kosovo ethnic Albanians and Serbs make the process of the creation of a unified identity very difficult.

Although its main proponents consider that the Kosovar identity could help consolidate the citizenship in the new state of Kosovo, to the question whether a Kosovar nation can function if ethnic minorities refuse to be part of it, Nexhmedin Spahiu offers this answer, “yes, it can. It is not necessary that all citizens feel or be considered part of the nation that owns the state in question. Kosovar nation comprise only those citizens who have at heart the state of Kosovo. It is not necessary that the minority members be part of a Kosovar nation. There is nothing wrong even if they are, but it is not necessary to be. Multi-ethnicity of the nation finds its expression in more advanced stages of the development of the nation.”\textsuperscript{144} However, this statement is confusing due to the fact that, as it is formulated, is presupposes that it suffices that the major community accepts the state whereas minority groups does not need to recognize it.

The arguments in favour of, to a certain extent, the integration of the Serbs into the Kosovo society incorporate an increasing number of Serbs applying for personal documents issued by Kosovo authorities, participation in local and central election, in particular in the central and southern part of the country, the creation of new municipalities in Serb inhabited areas, the opening of a Serbian speaking TV public broadcaster channel and the political representation in towns’ administration and central Government. Moreover, local analyst Krenar Gashi assumes that “the process of decentralization marks the biggest success in the consolidation of the coexistence between the Albanians and Serbs in an independent Kosovo. Decentralization is proving to be the most successful tool for preserving and developing the multi-ethnic character of the country”.\textsuperscript{145}

Furthermore, in practical terms, challenging is also the issue of how to find a term that will make a distinction between being a citizen of a state and belonging to an ethnic group. This problem exists

\textsuperscript{143} After the end of the NATO bombing campaign in 1999, the Kosovo Serbs who remained in Kosovo did not immediately recognize the newly established UNMIK administration. In the predominantly Kosovo Serb municipalities in the north and some enclaves in the south of the country the Serbian administration – courts, schools, hospitals, etc. directly answering to Belgrade – has been maintained. UNMIK has never accepted these Serbia-controlled structures, which operated in parallel to the UNMIK administration. These structures were all abolished by the Brussels Agreement of 2013 reached by Serbia and Kosovo under facilitation of the EU. (source: http://www.osce.org/kosovo/42584?download=true last accessed on 28.07.2014)

\textsuperscript{144} See: http://time.ikub.al/0d5e8cfe56/4b64e15415a688af6704bbf65e6f3fe/Lajm_Kosova-shteti-imponuar-apo-shtet-per-zemer-Nexhmedin-Spahiu.aspx (02.08.2014)

\textsuperscript{145} Gashi, 2010, p. 12.
also in other countries and languages. In the case of Kosovo, the term “Kosovar” is problematic. The opponents of this expression raise the question of how should the Albanians, living in other surrounding countries, for example in Montenegro, be named: Albanians living in Montenegro, ethnic Albanians of Montenegro nationality, Albanian speaking citizens of Montenegro or Montenegrins?

As noted earlier, despite the ongoing debate, a number of scholars and politicians in Kosovo, both of Albanian and Serbian ethnic origin, oppose the active discourse on a common identity. Apart from a few intellectuals, there is no any massive social movement in favour of building up a “Kosovar” nation that will merge the ethnic features in a new collective identity.

The concept of a new particular Kosovar identity is not sufficiently endorsed by ordinary citizens, Albanians and Serbs, who still consider themselves more as constituent elements of their respective nations. Due to deficiency of implementation strategies for the benchmarks, the international community in Kosovo did not succeed to satisfactorily promote and generate a sense of cohesion across diversity. The accomplishment of this goal seems remote and may be approached only by initiating reconciliation programs, adopting sustainable channels of communication and platform for dialogue and cooperation at community level, and by creating of a joint forum for addressing sensitive issues regarding the definition of the statehood and shared future.

European integration is a long and challenging process that tries to reform societies and add democratic values. Nevertheless, despite all efforts, after more than 15 years of international presence Kosovo, still remains the most divided and isolated country in the region.

Despite the “multi-ethnic” rhetoric stipulated in the Ahtisaari Plan and Kosovo constitution Kosovo's statehood is disputed by both, inside and outside. In these terms Kosovo is still in a “making”. At present, internally, it seems that there is a consensus in terms of European identity, but not of Kosovo’s one, and apparently there is not suitable climate for accepting a common identity.

The notion of Kosovo state is conditioned more by ethnic principle than by that of citizen identity of its population. The term “Kosovar” still represents more a notion of territoriality rather than national belonging.

Evidently, the process of state building in Kosovo has not yet come to an end, and the question of whether there is a distinct sense of a Kosovar identity remains discussable for the predictable future.
5.2 Stakeholders of the public debate

The main exponents involved in this debate are civil society activists, few foreign scholars and representatives of the international community who are considered advocates of a new Kosovar nation. The opponents of such ideas are mainly former KLA leaders, the movement “Vetvendosje” and both K-Albanian and K-Serb local politicians. As neutral or not actively involved in the discussions of this topic are religious leaders, academics and representatives of numerically smaller ethnic groups.

The four most prominent promoters of a Kosovo nation are Migjen Kelmendi, Halil Matoshi, Nexhmedin Spahiu and Enver Robeli.

Migjen Kelmendi was born in 1959. He is a singer, author and publisher from Kosovo. He studied law at the University of Prishtina followed by postgraduate studies in the field of media management at the Concordia University of Montreal (Canada). Since 2001 he is the author and publisher of the weekly newspaper “Java” (“The Week”) and of the private broadcaster TV Rrokum in Prishtina.146

Halil Matoshi was born in 1961. Journalist by profession he studied philosophy and sociology. Matoshi writes poems, stories and essays. He is the author of many books and has also published literary and philosophical studies. During the Kosovo war he was captured by Serbian security forces and has served a prison sentence in Serbia for about a year. Matoshi currently writes weekly columns for the newspaper “Koha Ditore” in Prishtina.147

Nexhmedin Spahiu was born in 1965. He graduated in the field of Southeast European Studies at the Central European University in Budapest. In the previous years he was a political adviser of the Prime Minister of Kosovo (2005), professor at the University of Tirana and Tetovo and a visiting professor at the University of Hamburg. Spahiu is a well-known political analyst and currently managing director of the Radio and Television of Mitrovica and professor at the University of Prishtina.148

Enver Robeli was born on 1973. He is a regional expert who has been analyzing the processes which the Balkans, particularly the countries formed from the breakup of the former Yugoslavia,

have undergone, and he is a correspondent of the German newspaper “Süddeutsche Zeitung” and the Swiss “Tagesanzeiger” of the Balkans. He is a regular commentator for the Kosovo daily “Koha Ditore”.

The followers of this idea point out that the ethnicity is more due to the group, origin, language and culture, while the nation has to do essentially with the political will. According to them, the nation is an inspiration and the national identity is a very concrete political support with the goal to underline the national policy. Moreover, they argue that nations have created states, but likewise states have created nations. For them nations are not historic categories, but modern constructs of recent times. In this sense, Kosovo should create a national state aiming to harmonize differences among ethnic groups that would enable peaceful coexistence of various cultures. More details about the dynamic of this process will be provided in the scheme below:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Timing</th>
<th>Motives</th>
<th>Goals</th>
<th>Stakeholders</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>After end of armed conflicts (1999)</td>
<td>- Easing of inter-ethnic tensions and reconciliation</td>
<td>- Moral</td>
<td>- International community</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>- Acceptance of diversity</td>
<td>- Human</td>
<td>- Civil society</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>- Promotion of political identity oriented towards Western values of</td>
<td>- Pragmatic</td>
<td>- Former KLA members</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Western democracy</td>
<td></td>
<td>- K-Serbian elite</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>In the eve of proclamation of independence</td>
<td>- Introduction of civic society concepts</td>
<td>- Social</td>
<td>- Moderate non-political elite</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(2005-2008)</td>
<td>- Endorsement of “modernization” and “Europeanization” of Kosovo</td>
<td>- Political</td>
<td>- Foreign opinion-makers and historians</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>- Movement “Vetvendosje”</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>After declaration of Kosovo state (2008-up</td>
<td>- Acceleration of international recognition of the new state</td>
<td>- Rational</td>
<td>- International community</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>to date)</td>
<td>- Strengthening of civic consciousness</td>
<td>- Liberal</td>
<td>- Civil society</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>- Modern</td>
<td>- Local politicians</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>- Serbian politicians</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Figure 1: The dynamic of identity discourse in Kosovo (source: the author’s own scheme)

The debate over the Kosovo identity had a rapid velocity. Just as shown in the table above, at its very beginning the main goal has been to open new channels of communication, primarily within the K-Albanian population and to be followed afterwards by, however limited, involvement of the minority communities. This pace would enable the Kosovo post-conflict society to start an interaction and to identify on human and moral bases the common elements that different peoples in Kosovo share. The initiators of this debate, primarily the international community and the civil society of Kosovo, were challenged by former KLA fighters and some of the Serbian political leaders who at this point found a common interest; none of them was willing to accept the possibility of the creation of a civic identity beyond ethnic frames.

In the second stage of the debate, civil society gained greater public space and began to openly introduce various concepts associated with the new Kosovar identity. In this period of time a number of international conferences on the issue were held and several articles, studies and books by groups of authors published. Likewise, some TV debates took place which awakened the interest of the public. As a new component in this phase can be noted the inclusion in this debate of some western intellectuals, who through academic writings, brought new arguments and their perspective into public. This was made possible partly thanks to the added commitment of the international community, while waiting for the resolution of Kosovo's political status and an economic and social consolidation of the Kosovar society at this time. An additional segment in the process became the involvement in the political life of the “Vetvendosje”-movement with its promotion of political alternatives that were inconsistent with the possibility that Kosovo develops in the near future an inclusive identity.

The third phase, which still continues, was initially dominated by the event of the declaration of independence of Kosovo state, after which a massive exodus of local Serbs, as a part of the


international opinion was foreseeing, did not occur. Moreover, the declaration of the state was an additional impetus for the intellectual elites which now started to make calls for political rationality and endorsement of liberal ideals in the regulation of the new relations between the citizens. The core goals of this course were the support for the state institutions, promotion of civic loyalty to the constitution and laws and orientation towards the common future of all communities in Kosovo. The supporters of a unique Kosovo identity consider that all this will help to strengthen the international position of Kosovo and decrease expansionist ambitions of neighbouring countries, especially Serbia and Albania.

The proponents of this conception argue that the national state is a political association of citizens and regard the multicultural model as an alternative to the ideal of the mono-ethnic national state. In their opinion, the state should promote the political community with equal rights without drawing a distinction between (eventual) titular nation and minorities.

The advocates of this idea try to answer the question of how can Kosovo create national unity based on equality. To them, this must be an identity, which all its citizens will be able to identify with. Otherwise the aim of creating national unity will probably not be reached. The identity should thus be common for all ethnic groups. In this context, they assume that this new identity should be closely connected with the principle of equity. They believe that the state constitution is the framework where both a common national identity of Kosovo could be constructed and the minority rights could be settled. This document is therefore often seen as a fundamental for uniting politically the people of Kosovo.

In this sense a group of more moderate Albanian elites try to confirm its commitment to the unity of the state, whilst demanding measures to grant the K-Serbian community more autonomy in political sphere. Their objective is to transform Kosovo from an ethnic nation-state into a civic/multi-ethnic state.

Serbs have their reservations against Kosovo institutions dominated by ethnic Albanians. They often see democratization of Kosovo society as a dictatorship of majority over minority. A sound fear exist that, if Kosovo will define itself as only Albanian state, then the non-Albanian population would not be, or will not accept to be, part of it. Notably, a deep social, economic and cultural gap

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152 The main proponents of a “Kosovar” nation are considered to represent constitutionalist thoughts. For more see Sulstarova, 2011, Pp, 10-14.
153 Ibid
exists between the two major ethnic groups. The uncertain political future in the form of a slow international recognition and a lack of membership in international organizations can also be a source of instability.

The debate is perceived with reservation and sometimes with empathy. In the cultural and political aspect there can be observed trends for a unified Albanian identification on the one hand and for a particular identification of Kosovo as a single entity on the other. In some cases this is welcomed, while in others it is considered harmful and intolerable.
5.3 Dimensions of the ongoing discussions

The history shows clearly that questions regarding national identity arise in these countries which are in a complex situation, divided along ethnic lines or in the transformation phase from one to another system. The statehood of Kosovo, beside the rhetoric of “multi-ethnicity” was and is driven mainly by the Albanian majority population.

In order to answer the question why the national identity is actually important and what purpose does it serve, it must be clarified what the construct of national identities concretely means, which are the circumstances that encourage its creation and what can hinder its shape.

The optimal conditions for a successful formation of a national identity have to arise from “bottom” and cannot be imposed from “above”. In this expansion process the decisive role play culture, education, arts, literature, media, etc. A special source of identity construction is tradition, folklore, folkdances, etc. However, it must be noted that in the case of Kosovo, this process has taken the opposite “top-down” trajectory, since the discourse is still designed and limited within the circle of the intellectual elite.

The construct of national identity has a highly theoretical and abstract meaning. To seek after the issue of the existence of a Kosovar identity, it should first be made its operationalization and identification of concrete elements and criterions which enable precise answers to this question.

5.4 Hindering elements of the process of national identity formation

Based on available and elaborated literature sources there are a number of elements which make the formation of a Kosovar identity more difficult or even impossible such as: memories, ethnicity, religion, language, culture and common symbols.

Myths and legends are highly suitable for identity formation. In Kosovo there are many myths and legends, but they lack consensus on their explanation. Their different interpretation by Serbs and Albanians complicates the formation of a Kosovar identity and leads to a strengthening of exclusive national identities of Albanians and Serbs, respectively. K-Albanians and K-Serbs share joint historic memories rather than a common history. Moreover, identity formation always requires a
A reference object. This can be a person or perception of certain values. There is a lack of such personality in Kosovo who could represent it and be acceptable for all its citizens.

The population of Kosovo is not homogeneous, but it does comprise predominantly a large part of Albanians and to a lesser extent of Serbs and members of other population groups. Identity impeding affects mainly the problem of minorities, especially the Serbian residents.

An identity building barrier can be regarded the fact that the religious affiliation of the population of Kosovo is not uniform. Besides Muslims, there are also Catholics and Serbian Orthodox. Albanians define their ethnicity by language, not by belonging to a particular religion. This cannot be said for the Slav people, including Serbs. However, it should be noted that Kosovo is defined by its constitution as a secular state, thus it promotes a culture of secularism on various levels.

In Kosovo, there is no common language, but a plurality of languages. Approximately 88% of the population speaks Albanian, 7% speak Serbian, the rest Bosnian, Roman und Turkish. However, there is also multilingualism, people who speak more than one language, predominantly in ethnically mixed areas.

From a cultural point of view, “in order to create a particular identity, K-Albanians use different archaeological settlements and findings called Illyrian or Dardanian; different monuments (churches, mosques, masjids); prominent personalities from history (Isa Boletini, Hasan Prishtina, etc); art and literature (Ali Podrimja); actors (Bekim Fehmiu), singers (Rita Ora), sports (Luan Krasniqi, Majlinda Kelmendi) and humanist, such as Mother Theresa, monuments marking the day of Kosovo independence (obelisk NEWBORN), etc”. For K-Serbs, Kosovo personifies authentic Serbian land and they lay their cultural heritage in Kosovo mainly on orthodox monasteries from medieval age and myths about the famous battle of 1389 against the Ottomans. On the other hand Serbian politicians do not agree with re-designation of Serbian heritage as “Kosovo's heritage”. To quote the former Foreign Minister of Serbia, Vuk Jeremić, who in 2011 stressed, that “the Serbian Orthodox monasteries are not and cannot be cultural monuments of Kosovo”.

An overwhelming majority of Albanians, Muslim Slavs (Bosnians and Gorani) and the members of the Turkish minority belong to the Muslim faith. The Catholics are almost all Albanians and a few members of the Croatian minority. The Serbs belong to the Serbian Orthodox Church.

“Multilingualism” is a term used to discuss situations in which a person has communicative abilities in more than one language. (source: http://www.wisegeek.com/what-is-plurilingualism.htm last accessed on 01.08.2014)

Kadriu, 2013, p. 108.

As a symbol can be considered almost everything what is perceivable or imaginable: natural, artificial and immaterial elements, such as words, music or real and historical figures. Symbols within groups or societies have the function to arrange believes about reality. According to Antony Cohen, “symbols of a community are mental constructs. They offer people means to form the meaning. By doing so, they also offer them means to express certain meanings that community has for them”. For K-Albanian nationalists the Kosovo flag, although future and goal oriented, poses a risk for de-albanization of the new state and weakening or even loss of Albanian national identity. The same flag is boycotted by major part of K-Serbs (especially in northern part of the state). In sum, there is a lack of a suitable personality and of an identification with an object or event that will be acceptable to all the communities in Kosovo.

In these circumstances it appears less realistic to expect the setting up of a national feeling or a sense of collective solidarity. Thus, the combination of multi-ethnic and multi-religious composition of Kosovo represents clearly a hindrance for a common identity. Based on generated arguments, as a result, it can be stated that due to the lack of suitable Identification objects and core subjects, a Kosovar identity still does not exist and it has hardly existed ever before. Instead of a common Kosovar identity, a split in a Serbian and an Albanian national identity has occurred. Currently in Kosovo there is no consensus between the two major ethnic groups about the country’s statehood. The understanding of the recent past remains highly contested. The politicization and deepening of differences with ethno-national connotations and exclusive interpretation of history is still used at all levels.

As George Schöpflin argues, “democratic nationhood is composed of three key, interdependent elements: civil society, the state and the ethnicity” When, like in Kosovo, civil society and the state are week, then ethnicity obviously come to dominate. In this relation it is very questionable whether a European perspective of Kosovo can be used as a matching point to help, although this prospect has so far been a significant tool. Beside the fact that a European perspective cannot replace formation of a national identity, in Kosovo the process could benefit by strengthening the willingness of its citizens to identify with it, which presents for all an acceptable goal. As Billig writes, “it is misleading to think that nationalist and internationalist habits of thought are necessarily in opposition to each other. They can be, and frequently are, intermixed”.

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159 One of the demands of the Ahitsaari package was the state symbols should represent all communities living in Kosovo, so they can identify with.
160 Schöpflin, 2008, p. 35.
5.5 The Kosovo identity in relation to the Albanians, Serbians and minorities

The identity of Albanians in the Balkans includes their place in the historical and geographical culture between Orient and Occident. The conflict between Serbs and Albanians over Kosovo began with the collapse of the Ottoman Empire and the subsequent emergence of new nation-states, whereas the Albanian national idea arose relatively late in the 19th century. In this regard, according to Iris Herscht the Albanian worldview is shaped by the trauma of a “divided” nation.\textsuperscript{162}

When Serbia forcefully occupied Kosovo during the First Balkan War, its territory was strongly inhabited by ethnic Albanians. The separation of Albanians happened violently in 1913. Although Albania has never been internationally recognized within its ethnic borders, since that time emerged the idea for the “reunification” of Albanians in a common state, but at a suitable time. However, currently the Kosovo leadership is more focused toward strengthening of the position of the new state in the international arena. The Albanian government’s stance over the past decade has been that “the unification of Albanians can come about only through the broader process of regional integration into the European Union”\textsuperscript{163}. Albania’s Prime Minister, Edi Rama, has stayed clear off the idea of national unification, arguing that such nationalist ideas “could destabilize the region”.\textsuperscript{164}

Ideas of possible national unification are usually led by governing elites which apparently today are not ready for this, even though they are intensely put forward in the Kosovo parliament, especially by the movement “Vetvendosje”. These ideas are more idealistic, not in favour of the current moment and might challenge the Kosovars ability to manage their state.

The use of nationalistic rhetoric from both sides of the border, especially during festivities in occasion of the 100\textsuperscript{th} anniversary of the independence of Albania, two years ago, leads to the impression that these requests are made in order to shift the current problem in these two countries. On the celebrations held in Skopje on 25\textsuperscript{th} November 2014, Sali Berisha, the former Prime Minister of Albania, promised a de facto Greater Albania in the framework of the process of European integration, while Hashim Thaci, the Prime Minister of Kosovo, stressed that Kosovo will be the guarantor of the rights of Albanians in Macedonia and Serbia.\textsuperscript{165}

In addition, Albanian journalist Hana Marku assumes that former Prime Minister Sali Berisha made references to a united nation of Albanians while attending the Munich Security Conference on the

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{162} Herscht, 2007, p. 7.
\item \textsuperscript{163} See: \url{http://www.balkaninsight.com/en/article/petition-creates-fresh-hype-on-greater-albania} (01.08.2014)
\item \textsuperscript{164} Ibid, p. 1.
\item \textsuperscript{165} See: \url{http://www.nationalia.info/en/news/1269} (02.08.2014)
\end{itemize}
100th anniversary of Albania’s independence. This, in turn, caused an ostensible “wave of nationalism” - even a “nationalistic delirium”. Late last year, Edi Rama was heavily criticized for stating the following: “national unification cannot be achieved through the old methods of destructive rancour. There is no room for phantoms of the turbo-folk nationalism in our region. Let’s achieve national unification through the new road of Europe. Albanians are free today because of American support and European understanding. We cannot encroach upon this with the devastating old politics.”

Beside many touching points (such as the common written language), there are also some slight differences between K-Albanians and Albanians from Albania. Moreover, the Albanians in their motherland were cut off, through the isolation in the communist era, from the intellectual and scientific developments outside the country, while the K-Albanians of the older generation, due to decades of labour migration to Western Europe, are much more “cosmopolitan”. On the other hand, after the Second World War, cultural, patriarchal and religious traditions played in Kosovo an important role, while their fellow nationals led by communist leaders underwent a process of “imposed modernization”. Gradual rapprochement between the K-Albanians and those from Albania took place in the past few years manly through tourisms, joint economic and cultural activities.

Among the most essential questions that are to be answered in this relation, are the followings: what is the content which illustrates the Albanian national identity in Kosovo since 1980s? Are there, by the developments in the 1990s, crushes with the essential aspects of the Albanian national identity which were constructed in the early 20th century or do these developments reinforce its substance? Other puzzles to deal with are the issues of how the Albanian identity building does react to the Declaration of Independence in 2008. Can a tendency toward the formation of a regional sub-identity within the Albanian national identity be recognized? Are we observing the establishment of an independent Kosovar identity or the identity of the K-Albanians will completely be fused into the Albanian national identity?

The decades-long separation of the Albanian-speaking population in Southeast Europe through the isolation policy of the Albanian state under Enver Hoxha and the affiliation of the Albanian

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populated areas in Kosovo to the Yugoslav States have contributed to different identity formation processes, but have so far not resulted in decomposition of the Albanian national identity.

On the other hand, no other name than Kosovo calls on Serbs for such emotions. According to Serbian nationalists, in that place are the roots and origin of Serbian culture and Serbian nation. The Kosovo myth is sometimes also used to construct the implicit national character of the Serbs. The main argument used by Serbia to back up its claim over this territory is based on the affiliation of Kosovo to the Kingdom of Serbia (12th to 14th century) and in the modern era (1912-1999). Nowadays, Serbian politicians declare Kosovo, this “heart” of Serbia, as indispensable. The Serbian constitution 169 continues to consider Kosovo as its integral part and rejects its independence.

Riedel has the opinion that “according to the understanding of the ethnic nation-state, the non-Albanian-speaking population has no place in future’s Kosovo nation and decentralization of Kosovo will not lead to solution of the Albanian-Serb conflict”. 170 The division of the Albanian and Serb areas has solidified and the prospect of a multi-ethnic shared state is currently difficult to predict. The danger of a de facto partition of the country still exists.

Although the Ahtisaari plan represents the basis for building of a multi-ethnic and democratic state, the interests of other minorities in Kosovo tend to be neglected. According to a survey of Austrian Social Funds “… it is true that in the Kosovo Parliament are sitting also the representatives of the smaller minorities, but in the predominately Kosovo-Albanians and Serbs political process they could hardly come in appearance as relevant actors and assert their own interests”. 171 In this sense, inclusion of minorities in Kosovo still proves as difficult.

The international community has taken the complex task of bringing closer a peaceful solution to the one century old conflict between Serbs and Albanians over Kosovo. Kosovo is in the process of development of the state infrastructure and is slowly moving from the Ahtisaari Plan towards Brussels. Nevertheless, within its boundaries there are still visible defects in inter-ethnic harmony. Without UN membership, the full statehood remains controversial and the question of the internal and external sovereignty continues to stay open. To cite Andersen, “essential to the ‘Kosovar

169 See: https://www.constituteproject.org/constitution/Serbia_2006.pdf (01.08.2014)
171 See: http://www.integrationsfonds.at/laenderinformation/minderheiten_im_kosovo_die_kosovo_serben/ (25.06.2014)
identity’ is the success of the international administration in establishing institutions that provide good governance to its population, in a way that its people can identify with”.

Kosovo was conquered by Romans and Byzantium, ruled by Ottomans and taken by Serbs. In these terms, Kosovo represents an ancient society, but is a young state, squeezed between Albania and Serbia. In this regard a justified question can be put forward: what is the relation between the trends for the construction of a Kosovar identity and the aspirations for the unification of Kosovo with Albania or its partition from Serbian side? The return of Kosovo to Serbia as its integral part is unlikely to happen. Alternatively the option of Kosovo’s partition between Albania and Serbia is a more pragmatic preference, but only in a long term. Plausibly that development could anticipate the beginning of the process of a “national unification” of the two nationalities, Albanians and Serbs.

Despite the promotion of a power-sharing concept and the inclusion of Serbs in the government, the result was more an attempt at co-opting of the Serbian political elite. The two major communities do not pay much attention to the interest of other ethnic groups in the country which have mostly been left out of political equations. Despite many efforts, in general, a multi-ethnic society in Kosovo in which there are no differences and discrimination on ethnic or other grounds, has hardly arisen. However, the multi-ethnic character of the Kosovo society actually receives a new opportunity, and the dialogue between Serbia and Kosovo, which started three years ago, occupies a central position.

\footnote{Andersen, 2000, p. 10.}
6. CONCLUSIONS

6.1 Summary

The present research deals with Kosovo national identity and the public discourse on this topic. Therefore initially it was essential to define the terms of identity and nation since these have been taken up frequently. I have also explored whether a common identity in Kosovo is possible, if so, how this is formed out and which politically relevant discourses are important, etc. With the help of literature review of selected books, studies, media reports and scientific articles, I have tried to answer the above mentioned questions.

This paper does not claim to provide a comprehensive analysis of collective identity building as a contemporary phenomenon. Consequently, a demarcation of the topic was necessary. Identities are constructions created in action and process rather than unchangeable state. By collective identity we refer to social groups. This paper demonstrates hypothetically that individuals join in groups because the group symbolizes a set of values.

The theoretical part of the study can be summarized that collective identities link individuals with diverse backgrounds and the creation of a sense of community around shared principles reduces other divergences. Additionally it tends to harmonise differences among various ethnic groups that would enable coexistence of various cultures.

Referring to accumulated data in previous parts of this thesis, in regard to the research question and hypothesis introduced in the beginning of this paper, the following conclusion can be drawn:

Proclamation of Independence is an important development, but by no means sufficient to end the process that will set Kosovo among the democratic countries of the united Europe. There are historical reasons that make Kosovo a separate society and cause major obstacles in the integration processes. Here explicitly we deal with the relationship between the Albanian majority and the Serb minority. An unsuccessful process of state and nation-building could lead to instability, conflicts and social crisis.

The debate about a common Kosovar identity has triggered a taboo subject and is slowly increasing. The main supporters of this idea are mostly representatives of the civil society. The Ahtisaari Plan was only an additional impetus element in these developments. In the coming time, this process can be facilitated by the course of integration into European structures.
The notion of the “Kosovar” identity should be understood as a dimension promoted predominantly by few local intellectuals, foreign scholars and the international community. As a result of it, state nationality in form of citizenship may, but not in the near future, become the unifying factor of the common Kosovar identity.

Kosovo has not yet sufficiently moved from post-transition paradigm. Therefore, it can be considered that the term of the Kosovo state is defined on the ethnic principle rather than the citizenship attitude. Kosovo remains a fragile country with a divided society into mainly two “parallel worlds“.

Evidently, the nation-building process is seriously contested. Its narratives and practices are strongly opposed, among others, by the “Vetevendosje”-movement and by the resistance of the Serbs in North Kosovo, even though their antagonism is fundamentally different. This fact constitutes a constant source of tensions and conflicts.

Eventual making of the new Kosovar identity would represent a specific element related mainly to the context of the recent history. In the forthcoming period of time, this process can be facilitated by the course of integration into European structures. However, there is some scepticism stressing that it is unlikely that the route of closing up to the EU will have any substantial impact on the ability of K-Albanians and K-Serbs to enhance their interaction and strengthen mutual trust in the short-term.

Although the creation of a multi-ethnic society and common institutions of government in Kosovo is one of the proclaimed main aims of the international community, it is jeopardized by the ethnic based decentralization which simply separates public life. The international community has managed to reconcile K-Albanian politicians and few K-Serb local politicians, but not also these two respective ethnic groups.

Kosovo is the youngest country in Europe and represents a quite divisive case in the international arena. Despite recognition by 106 countries, without UN membership the Kosovo statehood is still contested. This fact proves that the state-building process has not ended yet, while nation-building is in the very early phase of discussion. The relations between two larger ethnic groups, K-Albanians and K-Serbs, remain uneasy and delicate due to hostility legacy and lack of trust.

173 The majority of kosovars have welcomed the new flag in EU colors with six white stars which represents its communities, and the yellow outline figuring under them to indicate territorial uniqueness. On the other hand Kosovo institutions adopted the new national anthem called “Europe”, without lyrics.
Apparently, the question of whether a sense of a Kosovar identity can be developed remains debatable for the foreseeable future. Therefore, the project that would bring together all communities of Kosovo to new gained sovereignty and territorial designation, defined in terms of the recognition of diversity and inclusion, is still a delusive target and remains utopian – at least for the coming years. In sum, the creation of a Kosovar civic identity is presently just a theoretical inspiration and distant from his making.

Based on generated arguments, the thesis sought to analyse the nation building process in Kosovo in the light of pragmatic parameters. From a general point of view, it can be concluded that the selected theoretical framework, represented primarily in the theory of constructivism, provides a solid and better understanding about the elaborated topic.

By concluding this study, I want to express the opinion that the obtained results match the hypothesis presented in the introduction. By this master thesis I do sincerely hope to have provided an independent view which enables readers of this research to receive a meaningful and scientific insight into the elaborated topics. If I managed to do so, I would consider myself fulfilled.
### Glossary of abbreviations and acronyms

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Abbreviation</th>
<th>Full Form</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>AEI</td>
<td>Agency for European Integration</td>
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<td>CFSP</td>
<td>Common Foreign and Security Policy</td>
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<td>CoC</td>
<td>Council of Europe</td>
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<td>CRPK</td>
<td>Civil Rights Program Kosovo</td>
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<td>EAR</td>
<td>European Agency for Reconstruction</td>
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<td>EC</td>
<td>European Commission</td>
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<td>ECMI</td>
<td>European Centre for Minority Issues</td>
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<td>EP</td>
<td>European Partnership</td>
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<td>ESDP</td>
<td>European Security and Defence Policy</td>
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<td>EU</td>
<td>European Union</td>
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<tr>
<td>EULEX</td>
<td>EU rule of law mission</td>
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<tr>
<td>EUSR EU</td>
<td>Special Representative</td>
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<tr>
<td>FRY</td>
<td>Federal Republic of Yugoslavia</td>
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<td>FYROM</td>
<td>Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia</td>
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<td>HLC</td>
<td>Humanitarian Law Centre</td>
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<td>ICG</td>
<td>International Crisis Group</td>
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<td>ICO</td>
<td>International Civilian Office</td>
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<td>KAS</td>
<td>Kosovo Agency of Statistics</td>
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<td>KCSF</td>
<td>Kosovo Civil Society Foundation</td>
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<tr>
<td>KFOR</td>
<td>Kosovo Force (military structure lead by NATO)</td>
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<td>KFOS</td>
<td>Kosovo Foundation for Open Society</td>
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<td>KIPRED</td>
<td>Kosovar Institute for Policy Research and Development</td>
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<td>KLA</td>
<td>Kosovo Liberation Army</td>
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<tr>
<td>NATO</td>
<td>North Atlantic Treaty Organization</td>
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<tr>
<td>OEI</td>
<td>Office for European Integration</td>
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<tr>
<td>OSCE</td>
<td>Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe</td>
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<tr>
<td>PISG</td>
<td>Provisional Institutions of Self-Government</td>
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<tr>
<td>REA</td>
<td>Roma, Egyptian and Ashkali</td>
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<tr>
<td>SAA</td>
<td>Stabilisation and Association Agreement</td>
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<tr>
<td>SANU</td>
<td>Serbian Academy of Science and Arts</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SAP</td>
<td>Stabilization and Association Process</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SEE</td>
<td>South East Europe</td>
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<tr>
<td>SG</td>
<td>Secretary General</td>
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<tr>
<td>SRSG</td>
<td>Special Representative of the UN Secretary General</td>
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<tr>
<td>UN</td>
<td>United Nations</td>
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<td>UNHCR</td>
<td>United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees</td>
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<td>UNMIK</td>
<td>United Nations Mission in Kosovo</td>
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<td>UNOSEK</td>
<td>United Nations Office of the Special Envoy for Kosovo</td>
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<td>UNSC</td>
<td>United Nations Security Council</td>
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<td>WB</td>
<td>Western Balkans</td>
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<td>YU</td>
<td>Yugoslavia</td>
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### List of figures

Figure 1: Dynamics of identity discourse in Kosovo

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