‘… when survival is at stake, set ideology aside.’
A Scientific Inquiry into Europe and the ‘Refugee Crisis’.

verfasst von / submitted by
Bernhard Begemann, B.A.

angestrebter akademischer Grad / in partial fulfilment of the requirements for the degree of
Master of Arts (MA)

Wien, 2016 / Vienna 2016

Studienkennzahl lt. Studienblatt /
degree programme code as it appears on
the student record sheet:
A 066 656

Studienrichtung lt. Studienblatt /
degree programme as it appears on
the student record sheet:
Masterstudium DDP CREOLE –
Cultural Differences and Transnational Processes

Betreut von / Supervisor: 
Univ.-Doz. Dr. Helmut Lukas
“Men make their own history, but they do not make it as they please; they do not make it under self-selected circumstances, but under circumstances existing already, given and transmitted from the past.”

Karl Marx
(1852)
CONTENTS

1. INTRODUCTION........................................................................................................................................... 7

2. EMICS AND ETICS......................................................................................................................................... 14
   2.1. What Are Emics and Etics and Where Do They Come From? – A History of Science
   .................................................................................................................................................................... 14
   2.2. What Do Emics and Etics Mean? – A Philosophy of Science.............................................................. 18
   2.3. What Paradigm Are Emics and Etics Anchored In?............................................................................. 32
   2.4. How Do Emics and Etics Work? – An Application to Complex Sociocultural Systems............................ 41
   2.5. Why (Not) to Use It? – A Critique of the Emic/Etic Distinction......................................................... 46

3. THE EMICS AND ETICS OF EUROPE........................................................................................................... 49
   3.1. What Is Europe?........................................................................................................................................ 49
   3.2. How May Emics and Etics Be Applied to Europe?............................................................................... 54
   3.3. The Emics of Europe.............................................................................................................................. 57
      3.3.1. Europe on Its Own: An Emic Account of ‘Europeanness’ ................................................................. 58
      3.3.2. Europe and the Others: An Emic Demarcation of Europe.............................................................. 66
      3.3.3. Europe? – No! A Sceptic Perspective on ‘Europeanness’ ................................................................. 72
   3.4. The Etics of Europe................................................................................................................................. 75
      3.4.1. Infrastructure, Structure and Superstructure................................................................................... 77
      3.4.2. The Formation of an Identerest Group............................................................................................ 86

4. THE ‘REFUGEE CRISIS’............................................................................................................................... 94
   4.1. A Short Historical Outline..................................................................................................................... 95
   4.2. How and Why Does Europe React to the ‘Refugee Crisis’?................................................................. 101

5. MACRO-SOCIOLOGY IN PRACTICE: CONCLUSION................................................................................. 119
LITERATURE.............................................................................................................. 129
LIST OF ILLUSTRATIONS........................................................................................ 143
LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS........................................................................................ 144
ABSTRACTS............................................................................................................... 145
1. INTRODUCTION

“How we know what we know is the only thing that distinguishes us, as anthropologists, from the many other students of the human condition, who include philosophers, poets, novelists, theologists, astrologers, and psychics, as well as sociologists, psychologists, economists, and political scientists. We anthropologists distinguish ourselves from the first group by our commitment to the epistemological principles of the scientific method, but we also need an epistemological means of distinguishing ourselves from the culture-bound second group – and for that we need the emic/etic distinction.”

James Lett (1990: 141, emphasis in original)

Anthropology is the science of the human condition\(^1\). Although the word *science* might be challenged by quite a lot of anthropologists, James Lett underlines the crucial matter of this epistemological grounding in anthropology: the question of *how* we know about things and *what kind* of knowledge we achieve through research. So, if we want to answer the question *why* the human condition evolved in the way it did, the research for cause-and-effect connections and as corollary the commitment to the scientific method will be inevitable (see illustration No. 1). Moreover, if, by this “systematic way of trying to find out about the world” (Lett 1997: 81), one wants to find out about the *whole* world, the *entire* human condition, one needs a second distinction to avoid knowledge, bound to only certain cultures or societies. And that is why – to paraphrase Lett’s statement once again – the distinction between emic and etic knowledge is of such importance.\(^2\)

The emic/etic distinction, i.e. the distinction between culture-bound and universal categories of knowledge, is particularly salient in macro-anthropological/-sociological in-

---

1. The achieve a general understanding of the human condition is, to quote Frank Elwell, “the primary function of the social sciences within the university and within the broader sociocultural system” (Elwell 2006: 150). The human condition is to be understood hereinafter as the general conditions for the human existence and its evolution in sociological terms. For a sophisticated elaboration on the evolution of culture, see White 1959b.
2. Both, emics and etics will be fittingly elaborated in chapter 2 of this paper. For the moment the distinction between insider’s (emic) and outsider’s (etic) knowledge shall serve as a place holder.
queries. As cross-cultural, or macro-topics almost per definition strive for the explanation and illustration of correlations, they demand etic knowledge (see illustration No. 1). Eric Wolf in his well-known book *Europe and the People Without History* emphasises this argument in underlining the necessity of understanding the world as a “totality developed over time, […] the global interconnectedness of human aggregates” (Wolf 1982: 385). In order to understand and further, explain these global connections, Wolf asks for research of their economic and political groundings. Gingrich (2002: 228) follows these arguments in calling for a focus on macro-anthropological analysis responding to the increasing global interconnectedness. “Globalization thus is bringing about a renewed interest in two kinds of macro-comparative questions: a general one about the human condition, and a more specific one about human interactions in a globalizing world” (Gingrich 2002: 228f.). So, the need and legitimation of macro-research is obvious, especially when asking for the causes and effects in the evolution of humankind.

*Illustration No. 1: The Epistemological Distinctions in the Study of the Human Condition.*
The research topic of this Master’s thesis is Europe and the refugee crisis. In other words, it is research about a sociocultural system and its reaction to external impacts. Hence, the topic aspires to find out what is the sociocultural system about and how does it perform in the face of an encounter with almost two million people crossing its borders. This undertaking shall be conducted by means of two approaches. It shall reveal the emics and etics of Europe. Europe is a quite complex topic and hence requires a certain approach of research. I attempt to find out both, the insider’s culture-bound, as well as the outsider’s non-culture-bound perspective. So, how can this analysis be conducted?

Nowadays it is hardly possible to open a newspaper without reading about ‘Europe’ and the ‘refugee crisis’. What will the continent do about this crisis? Is Europe’s cohesion at stake? Will Europe survive the hardest crisis since World War II (Schlitz 2015)? Headlines of European newspapers come thick and fast and the so-called refugee crisis is a topic of high concern in public and political discourse. Therefore the guiding research question of this Master’s thesis is: How and why does an entity, a conglomerate of nation-states like Europe, (re-)act facing an asylum surge? The emic/etic distinction will be key to those inquiries, as it allows to compare the insider’s and the outsider’s perspective.

Which methods and which kind of knowledge are necessary tools to achieve answers to this research question? Throughout the discipline of anthropology a great deal of discussion was held about whether anthropology was a science or not (Peregrine et al. 2012; Wiessner 2016). Although a lot of anthropologists disclaim the worth of the respective other epistemological paradigm, the worth of research well depends on the kind of knowledge one wants to achieve.

Science and the scientific method is a particular way of looking at existential phenomena to make sense of it. […] The lens of the humanities is also a way of taking those patterns and exploring what they mean on the ground in more nuanced culturally textured contexts (Moses 2012: 593f.).

However, the analytical need of culture-bound knowledge on a micro level is not limited to the humanities. Both, etic and emic data, are key to scientific research. On re-
flection, one is forced to conclude that it is the interpretation of data that is of crucial importance and that – for systematic and reliable knowledge – has to remain scientific.

“Today […] it is much easier to integrate emic and etic data systematically in research. […] The stakes of gaining fuller understandings to tackle the problems of today are high. So why not work to close this gap in anthropology?” (Wiessner 2016: 164).

To properly understand humankind, one needs both: insider’s and outsider’s knowledge. That’s why the emic/etic distinction closes the gap and aims to provide understandings of most complex and global problems. Therefore this thesis’s inquiry is based on the emic/etic distinction. An important remark to make is that the need and use of the emic/etic distinction is not a new one; but the more complex a society is, the more the difference of both, and thus the differentiation between the two becomes obvious. Thus, to explore a complex ‘thing’ like Europe and its global interconnectedness, a macro-perspective is necessary. Therefore the distinction between emic and etic knowledge is inevitable; the distinction itself implies a scientific grounding as it is committed to a systematic and falsifiable handling of data. “Anthropologists, because of their broad cross-cultural perspective, take little in the way of human behavior for granted. For most generalizations about the way people live, anthropologists can cite exceptions to the rule” (Margolis 2000: 1). Hence, anthropology has to be cautious about fast generalisations. In stead of falling into a formalist\(^3\) trap, the emic/etic distinction is distinctly committed to a holistic and functional approach. Simple generalising about the human condition at base of particular phenomena will not withstand scientific and non-culture-bound criteria and therefore is to be refuted. General laws according to the scientific method are more sophisticated and cannot do without well-grounded argumentation. This is particularly important in a macro-anthropological/sociological inquiry like in this thesis.

\(^3\) “The formalist principle consists of two elements. First, the separation of elements, like the detachment of economy from a social system. Second, the transfer of a particular element to a new context, for example a different social system” (Ringhofer 2016: 23). The formalist principle thus rates criteria of form higher than criteria of function. This form of generalising about humankind is dangerous and vulgo known as ethnocentric.
Chapter 2 will outline the theoretical fundaments of the emic/etic distinction in more detail. It will include a paradigmatic embedding as well as guideline to the application of emics and etics. As the Master’s thesis’s approach is one of philosophy of science, the elaboration of the paradigmatic surroundings is key to it. The positioning of the paper’s standpoint within the discipline of anthropology will be addressed as well.

Chapter 3 will consist mainly of an application of emics and etics to Europe. Therefore it will start with a demarcation of Europe or rather with clarifying the questions: What is this Europe? What does it bind together? Some readers may assume that a research proposal focusing on Europe is a bit of a stretch. Chapter 3 will counter these possibly raised fears in clearly demarcating the research focus. Moreover, as will get more and more clear throughout the reading of the paper, this analysis’s aim is the qualitative exemplification of how to research into macro-anthropological/-sociological topics. Therefore it is not important of grasping each detail from every place in Europe. Rather, it is important to account for similarities and differences in the evolvement of social organisms and thereby giving explanations on a qualitative, macro-level.

Whereas chapter 3 provided an application of emics and etics to Europe, chapter 4 is concerned with the consequences of an external impact to this sociocultural system called Europe. Consequently it will refer to the emics and etics of Europe stated in chapter 3 and analyse what mechanism come into play in the face of an encounter with almost two million people crossing its borders. It puts the rule to the test.

Chapter 5, as the concluding part, will raise the findings and explanations gained throughout the paper to an even higher macro-level. It will underpin essential rules of macro-anthropological/-sociological inquiry and bring about a research guideline to other research desiderata.

A common problem of scientific research, thence of this paper as well, is the use of terms and notions to denominate certain systems, relations or phenomena. As Leslie White puts it:

Going [...] to such social systems as are labeled ‘democracy,’ ‘fascism,’ ‘communism,’ and ‘socialism,’ in contemporary thought, one finds himself almost wholly outside the viewpoint and habits of thought of science.
We shall attempt to treat human societies in the same attitude with which a physicist regards nebulae, star, or atoms: as natural phenomena. In each case instance material systems are involved, systems which may be studied and interpreted from the standpoint of structure and function (White 1959b: 207f.).

Hence, it is sometimes difficult to point to some things’ meaning and function, when naming them in an emic way. The terms ‘communism’ or ‘socialism’ may indicate a political, ideological orientation. However, they have little explanatory value in scientific social analysis, i.e. explaining the infrastructural, structural and as corollary superstructural differences. Many terms, like ‘Europe’, ‘Europeanness’ or ‘refugee crisis’ are emic notions with particular connotations, but they inclose little etic inference or enable valuable, scientific analysis. However, if I would go on in talking about respective social organisms completely avoiding emic denominations, it would possibly be hard to follow my arguments. That is particularly why, for instance, chapter 4 is called ‘The Refugee Crisis’ rather than ‘The External Impact on a Sociocultural System’. This is done, albeit I am well aware of the problematic connotation, e.g. the term of ‘refugee crisis’ has.

To avoid misleading conclusions, I will therefore clarify some central notions right here in the beginning. Other problematic or ambiguous terms will be footnoted at their first appearance in the course of the paper.

Europe and ‘Europeanness’

The most obvious terms are already part of the paper’s title. What exactly is Europe or ‘Europeanness’? Concerning the former, I shall refer the reader to chapter 3. This chapter is all about demarcating Europe in analytical terms, and further on defining it in emic and etic terms. When using the notion I usually refer to the conglomerate of nation-states situated on the peninsula geographically called Europe. As the nimbus of this paper is a macro-analysis, single nation-states represent only subsystems to the whole system of Europe. Thence, there cannot be an analysis of every single one. Rather the emergent whole and effects being subsequent to it are under scrutiny here. It is clear that Europe cannot refer to an essentialist, homogeneous, unified block of na-
tion-states or population. However, an emic use of it sometimes points to this direction. This is particularly correlated with the notion of ‘Europeanness’ indicating a very concise set of characteristics and markers of Europe. In this paper this term is exclusively used to paraphrase or describe emic standpoints. I personally and academically shall quite bluntly disclaim of any unconscious or incautious use of it.

‘Refugee Crisis’

The migration movement taking place in the last years, especially in 2015 from the Southern borders toward Europe is denominated in diverse ways. Emic terms vary from “refugee crisis” (The Guardian 2016), “refugee’s crisis” (European External Action Service 2016) to migrant crisis (BBC News 2016) or asylum surge (BBC News 2014). Hannah Arendt quite some years ago coined the term “newcomer” (Arendt 2016 [1943]: 9). All those notions have special connotations. Some use refugee in order to emphasise the emergency reason for migration, others call it migrant crisis in order to deny, or at least relativise this reason. Some call it crisis to emphasise the tough conditions, suggesting that Europe is in trouble, others use the possessive form and locate the crisis at the migrating people. Once again I would like to underline that I am well aware of this connotations and the respective normative use. However, as this paper is committed to science, I would not like to attach value to one of those connotations, but just focus on the – compared to recent years – unusual high number of people crossing European borders in 2015 illegally to European understanding. Therefore I will use a more or less neutral notion of migrant movement or use the most spread term ‘refugee crisis’. Nevertheless this is not intended to carry any connotation. As mentioned above, the task is to show and explain macro-relationships, wherein the migration movement represents an external impact to a social organism.
2. EMICS AND ETICS

“[…] the proper study of humankind is both emics and etics, and both thought and behavior.”
Marvin Harris (1976: 67)

So, emics and etics are essential to this thesis as an inquiry into macro-anthropology/sociology. They express simultaneously both, approach to and method of the research proposal. They express the approach to it, because they embody two perspectives, two distinguishable categories of knowledge, which approach the topic from two ways. Where those two ways come from, or rather how they evolved is subject to the subsequent paragraphs. Emics and etics, furthermore, adhere to the method of this thesis, because this approach is inseparably interwoven with the scientific method of acquiring knowledge and thus, clearly states a commitment to certain rules and methodologies of research.

A clarification of the terms emic and etic, their origin, their meaning and their application shall be object of this chapter.

2.1. What Are Emics and Etics and Where Do They Come From? – A History of Science

Emics and Etics represent two distinct ways to approach every topic. Although they well may overlap or even merge completely, the epistemological status of them is distinct. So what is this distinction between them? As will be elaborated in detail below, emics are the insider’s view, knowledge and explanations, where as etics are a kind of matter-of-fact, scientifically measurable knowledge, usually stated by outsider’s, but independently from personal interpretation. This distinction between subjectively or socially shaped knowledge and objectively, scientifically evaluated one is not new. Malinowski, renowned as one of the founding fathers of ethnology, states a very similar
phenomenon according to the Kula ring. It appears to be a complex organisation, but not a single participant knows about the whole mechanism.

They have no knowledge of the total outline of any of their social structure. They know their own motives, know the purpose of individual actions and the rules which apply to them, but how, out of these, the whole collective institution shapes, this is beyond their mental range. Not even the most intelligent native has any clear idea […] (Malinowski 1978: 83, emphasis in original).

Malinowski assigns the task of assembling all pieces and participants, classifying and analysing all parts in an organic whole to the ethnographer. He even postulates, that isolated facts are not of real worth for science as long as they are not integrated in a larger organic puzzle. This integration, however, is possible only with information validated on base of single, all encompassing grid of knowledge outside the insider’s position. A distinction between insider’s and outsider’s points of view thus has been made already at very early stages of ethnology.

But this kind of distinction may be dated back even further in other disciplines concerned with philosophy of science. The Scottish philosopher David Hume brought it up in the 18th century with his “intention of separating knowledge gained by the interplay of reason and controlled observation from knowledge gained by undisciplined experience, inspiration, or revelation” (Hume, paraphrased in: Harris 2001: 11). These distinctions, long before the terms emic and etic were introduced, show that already in very early years of science of humankind a need to classify knowledge, data and operations was caught. Although the set of problems was thus recognized long time ago, it got particular rise in the 1950s along with the upcoming “New Ethnography” (Harris 1968: 568ff.).

The terms emics and etics have their origin in 20th century linguistics. Kenneth Pike (1954) introduced them as neologisms derived from the linguistic terms phonemics and phonetics respectively. A phoneme is then the smallest meaning-bearing phonetic unit in a particular language, whereas phonetic refers to universal sounds in all languages, independently of their particular meaning. Marvin Harris picked up Pike’s work and re-interpreted, or rather adapted the terms’ concept in order to use it in a broader way in anthropology. While a great deal of discussion entwined around specific details, goals
and use of the terms, a certain consensus of what the terms express evolved, mainly along the touched on dichotomy of Hume’s and Malinowski’s times. One of the most convincing definitions is made in the highly detailed omnibus *Emics and Etics. The Insider/Outsider Debate* (Headland et al. 1990) by James Lett. According to him,

> emic constructs are accounts, descriptions, and analyses expressed in terms of the conceptual schemes and categories regarded as meaningful and appropriate by the native members of the culture whose beliefs and behaviors are being studied […]. Etic constructs are accounts, descriptions, and analyses expressed in terms of the conceptual schemes and categories regarded as meaningful and appropriate by the community of scientific observers (Lett 1990: 130f.).

In other words, the distinction between emic and etic knowledge is a distinction between culture-bound, actor orientated knowledge and scientific, observation orientated knowledge, which is thus testable, falsifiable and applicable to phenomena independently from any particular context.

![Illustration No. 2: Basic Research Domains in the Sociocultural Field of Inquiry.](image)

*An Everyday Example: The Rising Sun*

A small and probably banal appearing example may illustrate the dichotomy. ‘The sun rises every morning’ may be lot of people’s emic view on the day/night-scheme on earth, because that is what it looks like every morning and thus seams appropriate,
meaningful and real to ‘participants’, i.e. inhabitants of the earth. Only through observation of stars’ movements, changing day/night schemes and acquainting testable information – later on of course through travels into space and satellites –, it was found out, that it is not the sun which changes its position in a relationship with its planets, but the earth does; it rotates about itself and about the sun. So the etic view on the day/night-scheme on earth is that ‘the earth rotates around itself completely within exactly 24 hours and thus turns different areas toward the sun in different times’. This etic and obviously nomothetic explanation, however, may not at all change the ‘earthling’s’ perception. Because the phenomenon everybody sees every morning is a light, round disk rising up the sky. So this ‘anthropocentric illusion’ might seem quite logical to insiders. But anybody, living on earth can join the ‘community of observers’ by applying their methods to the phenomena under scrutiny and drawing logical conclusions.

The appropriate paradigmatic and theoretical-scientific filing of the emic/etic distinction will be part of the next subsection (chapter 2.2.). It just shall be remarked, that there is no hierarchy supposed to categorise emic and etic knowledge in useful and senseless. To study humankind and to gain full understanding of the human condition, the study of both emics and etics is necessary. But to explain cause and effect of phenomena, scientific and thus etic knowledge is inevitable. The above example of the sun shows this manifestly. To study humankind one has to know what is real and meaningful to people, but one has to know as well what are efficacious reasons behind that. Marvin Harris underlines this notion in committing that “everything that we human beings experience or do is real. But everything we experience or do is not equally effective for explaining why we experience what we experience and do what we do“ (Harris 1976: 331).

This evidentially becomes more obvious for complex phenomena or societies although it is true for all. As Carneiro (2000: 241) states, complexity is a function of size. That is, the bigger a society is, the higher is the number of organisational features it possesses. And therefore the individual conceptual schemes of the respective organisational groupings and features differ from that of the whole social entity. Therefore the
emic/etic distinction is of special importance for a macro-anthropological/-sociological proposal like the focus on Europe in this Master’s thesis.

As may be seen by the so far quoted predecessor models and the short inquiry into Pike’s, Harris’s and Headland’s discourse, the emic/etic debate is quite complex and the terms’ use and interpretation far from unambiguous. But at the core of the debate a distinction between particular context knowledge and nomothetic universal knowledge is at stake – in all anthropological inquiries. This separation seems quite obvious, but in great parts of research about human beings and societies it does not seem to be that apparent. In relation to Europe and the refugee crisis, however, this distinction becomes crucial, as particular contextual and normative knowledge is quite spread around in several discourses. Therefore the need for a science of a universal, organic whole, to arrange discrete parts to one sensible complex is strong. The old and – most likely – obvious distinction in the knowledge about humankind has not lost its importance. In contrast, in times of globalisation the scrutiny on highly complex contexts from a macro-perspective is more topical and necessary than ever.

Before, however, the main topic is under scrutiny, the next chapters will precisely clarify in which way emic and etic are used as notions and what kind of dichotomy they represent.

2.2. What Do Emics and Etics Mean? – A Philosophy of Science

A distinction between culture-contexted and non-culture-bound knowledge is now obvious. But a lot of binary oppositional notion pairs were drawn on this distinction: idealism-materialism, subjective-objective, emotional-rational, etc. This section shall clearly define emic and etic and circumvent these from the other pairs in pointing out the special value and hence, their analytical productivity for anthropological inquiry.

This analytical shape is done by reviewing some researchers’ position on the emic/etic debate and discussing its value for this proposal’s task. Among them, Marvin Harris has brought one of the most elaborate contributions.
Emic constructs refer to an insider perspective, to the relative and particular, whereas etic constructs refer to the outsider, i.e. the absolute and universal. Knowledge is emic, if it is regarded as valid by natives and validated through consensus between natives. Emic knowledge is a more or less natural, acculturated way of studying oneself. A result thereof is the belief, that one’s “world view is isomorphic with existential reality” (Lett 1990: 141). At first sight this vulgo called ethnocentric perspective is quite natural, as the norms and values one learns are those which guide through life (Ferguson 2006: 46). That this, one’s own way of life is intrinsically valued more than others is a product of culture-bound socialisation. This insight is old and can be rooted back to first anthropological inquiries thousands of years ago.

Denn wenn man an alle Völker der Erde die Aufforderung ergehen ließe, sich unter all den verschiedenen Sitten die vorzüglichsten auszuwählen, so würde jedes, nachdem es alle geprüft, die seinigen allen anderen vorziehen. So sehr ist jedes Volk überzeugt, dass seine Lebensformen die besten sind (Herodot 1955: 198).

However, this does approach is not limited to people not being acquainted with academia. “Researchers – often implicitly – assume that either there is little variation across human populations, or that these ‘standard [WEIRD⁴] subjects’ are as representative of the species as any other population” (Henrich 2010: 61). This lack of etic knowledge is problematic when it comes to more generalising statements about cross-culturally significant phenomena. Harris points out that this emic kind of knowledge leads to a closed hermeneutic circle (Harris 1990b: 83), which helps to understand the particular, individual rationalising⁵ of the around world, but not to understand the deeper reasons for their condition. As Kant indicated, “we can attain to a knowledge of appearances only, never to that of the things in themselves” (Kant, in: Pike 1990: 34). Lévi-Strauss follows this affirmation, in saying the nature of all things around us is emic (Lévi-Strauss, in: Harris 1990a: 49). So, its emic knowledge what, at first sight, seems natural and logical. It is emic what we obtain by getting information according to the epistemological principles of the respective culture.

That is why emics contribute a lot to account for the diversity of humanity in all its

---

⁴ For a further elaboration of the ‘WEIRD’-concept, see footnote No. 7.
⁵ Concerning ‘rationalising’ see a more detailed elaboration later on in this chapter.
variety. Its coherent aim is to reach all meaningful, appropriate and real accounts judged by natives. It does not necessarily seek to find features for cross-cultural comparison as it does not refer to a similar grid of common rules, but a single and unique to each culture. As often, Marvin Harris puts it to the point:

In carrying out research in the emic mode, the observer attempts to acquire a knowledge of the categories and rules one must know in order to think and act as a native […] whereas] the test of the adequacy of etic accounts is simply their ability to generate scientifically productive theories about the causes of sociocultural differences and similarities (Harris 2001: 32).

Hence, valid explanations require a systematic grounding, consequently “etic outputs require etic inputs” (Harris 1974: 242); that is why emic knowledge cannot lead to any further comparable explanations, but only to inside interpretation. For instance, the elicitation, the amount of differentiated colours in a particular society, or the motivation in religious endeavours are fine examples to the need and use of emics. One needs emics to understand particular inside views. But one needs etics to understand, e.g. what colours consist of, what chart of colour range generally is possible. The computer based index of RGB, indicating the relative of strength of red, green and blue as a basis of every colour human eye may possibly perceive, is an etic grid. To get back to the rising sun example of the previous chapter: to find out how people organise their day and how they see their position in the universe, one has to ask them and get emic insights. In contrast, however, if one needs to know reasons and correlations for this experience, one has to apply etic methods.

Hence, to find cross-culturally valid explanations, etic knowledge is required. Knowledge is etic, if it is validated by the scientific method, i.e. the methods of falsification, logics, systematics and replication. These methods infer to the epistemological basis of science, which big advantage is, that it is self-correcting through its own rules and provides therefore more reliable knowledge in terms of laws and predictions than any other epistemology. In other words: it has to be validated independently of any specific community – just according to logical principles. The goal of etic knowledge is to draw cross-culturally valid inference. For instance, doing a census or a statistic about homicide is an etic operation.
Once again, this brings us down to the fundamental assumptions of anthropology discussed in the introduction of this thesis. If anthropology seeks for universal principles of causes for similarities and differences in humankind, we need scientific and non-culture-bound knowledge. To understand the complexity and diversity of humankind as much and entirely as possible, one of course needs both, particular insider’s knowledge and a scientific, universal one.

**Limits of Emics and Etics**

It should be emphasised that both categories are necessary and limited in their range. There is a certain danger in overdrawing either of them in order to dismiss the other one. On the one hand, one has to beware here, that the etics will not turn out just in the emics of the observer and/or get an educational, instructive character toward emics. “Clearly anthropologists should use the etic approach to mental life sparingly and should not attempt to override every emic explanation with and etic alternative” (Harris 2001: 40). Not every emic, especially mental emic view can be found invalid in etic criteria or is subject to etic validation. One should be cautious about taking etics for the one and only argument, e.g. trying to elicit hidden motives or mental diseases according to whether somesone’s behaviour is deviant to respective norms. For instance, as Lett (1990: 139ff.) shows, alcoholism is no disease in etic terms. However, “we are well positioned to appreciate the emic dimensions of the claim that alcoholism is a disease” (ibid.: 140) and we are well positioned to be aware of the function this emic label has in the respective socio-cultural system. Pure etic accounts may lack of this functional component ignoring the motives in total and thus do not lead to an understanding of humankind.

On the other hand, one should also handle emic points of view with care, as they may be lacking consistency and “the openness and irreducible ambiguity of the conditions for rules [in emic systems] and for the rules for breaking rules can lead to only one conclusion: people have a rule for everything they do” (Harris 1974: 245). Moreover, this possibility for reinterpretation of judgements points as well to an absence of rules for
things, that may happen unconsciously or apart from a maintained moral consensus.

Unless alternative acts are observed, it is unlikely that alternative rules will be elicited [especially for homicide, cow slaughter; …]. The conclusion to be drawn from the abundance of emic rules is not that people behave to conform rules, but rather that people select rules to conform to behaviour (Harris 1974: 246).

Emic rules may be thus used to cover etic correlation and nexuses in order not to disturb own conceivabilities. The “[…] ideological-moral consensus is neither the precondition nor the normal mode of human social existence. Rather, such consensus is always an illusion fostered by those who are authorities or who work for them” (ibid.: 247). As authorities are more likely to be obeyed as solely rules themselves. This “cover-function” of emic rules may hide some relationships. It is often connected with a rationalisation process, which Frank Elwell describes as a “practical application of knowledge to achieve a desired end. It is a social extension of the industrial mode of production itself” (Elwell 1991: 18). So the rationalising may seem appropriate and real from an emic point of view as it brings alleged evidence into an order which is in line with one’s own world outlook; but it is not necessarily logical from an etic point of view – although it of course may be. A return to the example of alcoholism may illustrate this. The declaration of alcoholism as a disease is an emic rationalisation of deviant behaviour; however, it lacks an etic evidence or explanation for the cause of alcoholism, i.e. etically cannot be considered a disease, but solely as normatively deviant behaviour. Alcoholism is thus rationalised as a disease; emics cover a deeper etic reasoning why this self-destructive behaviour occurs.

A special form of this emic overstatement is the formalist approach, falling into a WEIRD\(^6\) trap, collecting evidence in a particular – mostly Western\(^7\) – context and “try[ing] to pass them off as generalizations about all humanity” (Lett 1990: 131; see as well chapter 1). Unfortunately academic research was not always very conscious about that and quite a lot of instances of this generalizations can be found; this is especially

---

6 WEIRD is used here as an abbreviation for ‘Western’, ‘Educated’, ‘Industrialised’, ‘Rich’ and ‘Democratic’. For more information about this concept, see Henrich et al. 2010. It is a notion indicating the danger of so-called ethnocentric tendencies in Western academic research.

7 A general trend in academia is to rather distinguish between the ‘Global South’ and the ‘Global North’. However, following the WEIRD concept, it makes sense to continue talking about ‘Western’ context.
true regarding alleged human universals, like e.g. the concept of ‘homo economicus’. It, like many psychological studies, refers to testing persons from a well educated, western and well secured background socialised in a capitalist society, assuming that the results are valid for all humanity. In this example it assumes that humans are consistently ‘rational’ and maximising own value by nature – and not only e.g. by capitalist socialisation. As this assumption is based in a psychological, thus individual universal it has to be proven in the biological record. But it is not and therefore failing in petitio principii; the explanandum – that people tend to maximise utility –, cannot be proven separately from the explanans – the ‘homo economicus’, i.e. an assumption about the biological or minded nature of human beings.

If you are sufficiently determined, you can always identify something that people try to maximize. But if all maximizing models are really arguing is that ‘people will always seek to maximize something’, then they obviously can’t predict anything, which means employing them can hardly be said to make anthropology more scientific. All they really add to analysis is a set of assumptions about human nature (Graeber 2001: 8).

So, that all humans act ‘rational’ and clearly self-interested because its is an – alleged – universal part of human’s character is not a sound argument. Furthermore, the ethno- graphic record does show alternatives.8

Thus, every researcher should beware about own biases and not use them as analytical tools without challenging and validating them according to scientific principles. The latter ones, the scientific tools of self-correction should be helpful and must be applied consequently. This should be an especially emphasised guideline for this Master’s thesis. The distinction between emics and etics shall be made with enormous care and not be used normatively in order to dismiss any side or anyone. It shall be a scientific analysis rather than a policy advice paper.

In order to achieve a proper understand of humankind, the relationships between etic data and emic ‘covering’ have to be dug out and uncovered. Nonetheless emic rules remain emic rules and have to be accepted as such. This can be exemplified at the precedent of alcoholism above; moreover, it will be elucidated in the following, when it

8 For an elaborate unmasking of the ‘homo economicus’-concept, see Ringhofer 2016.
comes to research categories and guidelines for analysis. So emics remain emics and etics remain etics; both are doubtlessly mutually interwoven and coexisting. But no one of them may be used to explain the respective other. Whether the sun rises, or the earth rotates may be two accounts for the same phenomenon. The task of this thesis is to distinguish and point to both – emics and etics in Europe. But in the first instance I shall try to demarcate the emic/etic distinction from some of the main blurring other dichotomies, allegedly accounting for similar correlations.

*Emic/Etic Is Not Thought/Behaviour*

One of the main disputes within the emic/etic debate is about the handling of thought and behaviour. While no big disparity is drawn on the fact that a distinction of achievable knowledge is necessary, the biggest divergence in academic discourse is made up about the level of analysis on which to make this distinction. As Harris distinguishes clearly epistemologically between thought and behaviour, he eventually creates four categories in his theoretical work: emics of mental life, emics of behaviour stream, etics of mental life and etics of behaviour stream (Harris 1976; Harris 1994; Harris 2001). Lett (1990: 137), however, argues that this differentiation is incorrect as thought and behaviour could not be known independently. Therefore he argues, that the distinction between thought and behaviour has well to be made, but as an ontological – and not as an epistemological – one. Harris well acknowledges this in admitting the ontological character of the distinction, but anyway claims the need for a practical distinction (Harris 2001: 30). I follow Lett in his argumentation, albeit I follow Harris in his implementation. Therefore, I will distinguish epistemologically only between the two categories of ‘emics of experience’ and ‘etics of experience’. But to acquire information about those categories one has to distinguish between thought and behaviour as well. And eventually,

the inability to decide whether a datum is an idea in an actor's head or an event in the behaviour stream is epistemologically intolerable. This does not mean that systematic relationships between ideas and behavior stream events cannot be found, but rather that it is unlikely that they will be found if they (emic and etic events) are not first distinguished (Harris 1976: 338).
So, the need of a classification of emic and etic as well as of behaviour and thought is urgent. Thence, four research categories are created. They may be epitomised as follows: the ‘emics of thought’ (hereinafter referred to as I, see as well illustration No. 3) may be easily acquired through literally asking people about their opinions, as natives are the ultimate judges of emics. In a macro-context this eventually flows into a discourse analysis. The ‘emics of behaviour stream’ (hereinafter referred to as II) is rather the native’s interpretation of his/her behaviour and thus has as well to be accentuated in an own category. Whether emics are deviant from etics in behavioural terms is, according to Harris, an indicator “of the degree to which people are mystified about events taking place around them. Only if people were totally mystified could one claim that their behavioural descriptions referred exclusively to mental phenomena” (Harris 2001: 39). Mystification is a kind of the above named rationalisation, making sense of alleged evidence according to own emics. To uncover those mystifications can as well come to light in the mental etics (see below).

The ‘etics of behaviour stream’ (hereinafter referred to as III) can be obtained by scientific observation and test, whereas the ‘etics of thought’ (hereinafter referred to as IV) turns out – e.g. in Harris examples – more in a logical, etic conclusion of the observer; but it has little to do with the native’s thoughts. Anyway, etics of thought can epitomise a logical conclusion, helping natives to recognise unconscious beliefs or rules (ibid.).

The adapted example from Harris’s Cultural Materialism (2001) may clarify those four categories. It is about the Hindu prohibition against the slaughter of domestic bovines. The emic mental status (I) is thus: No calves shall be killed, because of religious motivation. The emic behavioural status (II) is consequently that no calves are killed (e.g. starved to death). So far, this may seem coherent, but the ethnographic record in terms of behavioural observation – the etic behavioural status (III) – shows that some male calves are indeed starved to dead. The logical conclusion – the etic mental account (IV) – taking into account ethnographic data, was then, that under the condition of food scarcity male calves are starved to death. The farmers were probably unconsciously

---

9 For the detailed source of the example, see Harris 2001: 32-40.
aware of this etic mental account, seeing that male calves are ill more often than female – although for no aware reason.

Hence, thought and behaviour are not emics and etics and have to be distinguished, summing up in four categories. This implementation in the distinct, epistemological way Harris claims, may be too far, due to the ontological argument brought forward above. But anyway four categories are clearly identified, although named or approached slightly differently. The separation between emic thoughts and emic interpretation of behaviour evolves in two categories; etic behaviour is then another distinct category, followed by a fourth one: a logical, scientific conclusion with an etic evaluation of all categories. Therefore, the source of knowledge is a different one in each of the four categories. But the nature of knowledge, its epistemological value, is different only between emics and etics. Lett’s critique is a helpful indicator for the need of precise distinctions in the analysis of the human condition. “Matter is neither more nor less real than thoughts” (ibid.: 30), and both of them deserve careful attention. In order to make a proper analyses of the emics and etics, the separation between thought and behaviour is crucial. All those four categories together cover “all operationally definable domains in the sociocultural field of inquiry” (ibid.: 38). In other words all sociocultural phenomena, all features of humankind can be studied in the four categories all-encompassingly (see illustration No. 3).

Detailed methodological inputs to the four categories will follow in chapter 2.4 and 3.2. As for now, this should be sufficiently clarified, the following paragraphs shall clear out the separation of subjective/objective, emotional/rational, conscious/unconscious, infra-/superstructure, and idealism/materialism toward the emic/etic distinction. As stated above, those categories, or rather dichotomies, are often blurred with the emic/etic dichotomy. Although they not contribute to a further ‘field of inquiry’ like the thought/behaviour distinction did, it is necessary to detach them properly for the sake of a sound argumentation.
Emic/Etic is not Subjective/Objective

Emics and etics are often equalised to subjective and objective respectively. The struggle for this confusion has most probably its roots in a fallacy of equivocation regarding the term ‘objective’. On the one hand it is used to describe personal, individual approaches in terms of an unbiased or neutral handling of a topic by a single person. On the other hand it applies to the meaning of science in terms of verifiability and replicability. In this paper the meaning is obviously the latter one. Whereas it is almost impossible to be unbiased as a single researcher, the scientific method seeks for independent self-correcting mechanisms, not relying on a single, untestable datum. Subjective and objective, hence, refer to scientific procedure and principles of the operation; in

10 For more information concerning fallacies, see Lett 1997: 64ff.
contrast emics and etics refer to the kind of operation. All research should well be conducted objectively in order to draw reliable inference, but “it is clearly possible to be objective – i.e., scientific – about either emic or etic phenomena. Similarly, it is equally possible to be subjective about either emic or etic phenomena” (Harris 2001: 35). For instance, doing a census is an etic operation, but can be conducted subjectively – i.e. done in unfair practices or under tampered circumstances. As mentioned before, eliciting colour terms is an emic operation, as it refers to native’s opinions. It may as well be conducted subjectively or objectively (Harris 1990a: 50). Therefore, emic and etic cannot be equalised to subjective and objective. To put it in a nutshell, emic means significant in terms of native and etic means significance in terms of scientific observation, i.e. in the ability to generate productive, scientific theories. Subjective means not according to scientific criteria, whereas objective is according to scientific criteria. So, in practice, objective and etic may be used in a quite similar context. leading to confusion. However, this is not precise and is therefore to be refuted.

_Emic/Etic Is Not Emotional/Rational_

The emotional/rational distinction is a false friend as well. Emic explanations may seem entirely rational to natives, e.g. that the sun rises every morning or alcoholism is a disease. It suggests a similar meaning as objective in terms of personally neutral or unbiased. In contrast emotional would probably refer to biased or personally jaundiced. Let me bring another example: it may be argued that the ability to emotions is universal and therefore an etically perceivable datum. That is a sound argument, albeit one has to be cautious about the implementation. The ability to cry is indeed universal, but the modus of use, or rather the context of its appearance, is far from the same or due to the same reasons in various sociocultural systems. Apparently, emotional and rational are rather paraphrasing subjective and objective in their use and meaning. Thus, they have little to do with emic and etic. They, moreover, clearly refer to individual foci, whereas the unit of analysis in this thesis as a sociocultural scientific undertaking is the social organism as a whole (see below, chapter 2.3.).
Emic/Etic Is Not Consciousness/Unconsciousness

Another example can clarify the difference between emics and etics, and conscious and unconscious respectively. Emics can be conscious as well as unconscious. Albeit every native speaker may consciously judge whether a spoken sentence is sound and meaningful according to grammar – i.e. emic – rules. However, quite a few – namely linguists or people acquainted with philology – may consciously name the rules for building meaningful structures in their language (Harris 2001: 37). Not many Germans would probably know, that there is a rule prohibiting a double dative ending on adjectives in a syntactic order. Nonetheless, most probably all native speakers would recognise a sentence as incorrect, using double dative endings.\(^\text{11}\)

Similar evidence will be found at the example of the starved to death calves in Hindu India. “The emics of the situation are that no one knowingly or willingly would shorten the life of calf […]. Emically, the systemic relationship between Kerala’s cattle sex ratios and local ecological and economic conditions simply does not exist” (ibid.: 33).

So, emic components may be conscious or unconscious to natives; similarly, etic components may be either conscious or unconscious. To the scientific observer, though, it is important to find out all of them, uncover all components and separate them into emic and etic categories – no matter whether they are conscious to anybody or not.

Emic/Etic Is Not Super-/Infrastructure

This dichotomy anticipates the theoretical grounding of this thesis’ paradigmatic filing following in the next subsection. All three, infrastructure, structure and superstructure refer to behavioural etic components of sociocultural systems. They are all etic categories and determined by the respective former and eventually by environment. This is, if one may call it that way, the universal and determining grid of any society. The mental components are then subsumed in the emic superstructure. Unfortunately, this double use of the word superstructure may cause confusion and I would rather use another

\(^{11}\) An example therefore is: “Ich gebe dem alten, großen Mann einen Apfel.” The only dative ending is at the article “dem”. The subsequent endings turn to an accusative form: “alten, großen”.

29
term referring to the emic superstructure and “meaning the conscious and unconscious cognitive goals, categories, rules, plans, values, philosophies, and beliefs about behavior elicited from the participants or inferred by the observer” (Harris 2001: 54). The important matter however is that four major categories of necessary components of a social system may be found: “Four major universal components of sociocultural systems are now before us: the etic behavioural infrastructure, structure, and superstructure, and the mental and emic superstructure” (ibid.: 54). To be clear about it, I would like to emphasise here that superstructure in terms of etic and behavioural components are a result of precedent etic groundings. Etic superstructure, in materialistic terms, is a function of the sociocultural system and determined by infrastructure or rather structural features. The emic mental “bubble”, however, is not at all necessarily grounded and determined by a specific constellation but may – as mentioned above – be a result of mystification. (ibid.: Ch. 2)

Another illustration will settle this distinction more precisely. The etic superstructural functions may be opposed to emic motives.12 Whereas the former is a response to structural features and has a function within the whole social organism, the latter is merely a motive or ad hoc incentive to do something. Rituals for example, usually have a particular motive, e.g. a rain-dance to attract rain, or a christian service to worship God. However, the function of those rituals often differs, as the rain is not a response to dance and whether God exists or not is likewise doubtful. The function of those rituals is often a social one, like gathering in a group or social integration.

This theoretical paradigmatic excursus brings us to the question of idealistic and materialistic justification.

*Emic/Etic Is Not Idealism/Materialism*

Emics – due to the validation by natives – is usually identified with idealism. Etics – due to the primacy of infrastructure and its determinism – is then a materialistic ap-

---

12 The function/motive dichotomy will be elaborated in detail in chapter 3.4., attended by a detailed examination of superstructure.
approach. But this is only part of the truth. Emics can be very materialistic, if, for instance, one thinks of hunter-gatherer societies. So, albeit etic inference can hardly be idealistic, emics can be both. Why etics always refer to materialism will become more clear in the paradigmatic chapter.

So, Emic and Etic Is...

The separation of emic and etic knowledge is a fundamental distinction in scientific anthropology. Both are of the same fundamental importance in order to understand humankind; however, both follow different goals. This may be exemplified once again, at an example in studying economic anthropology. In emic economics, “one studies the potlatch as it appears to the potlatchers; in the latter instance [etic economics], one studies potlatch as it appears within the frame of cross-culturally valid analytical and quantitative categories, such as calories, man-hour input, redistribution, stratification with respect to access to resources, and so forth” (Harris 1968: 316). An etic definition of economy refers to all processes of production, redistribution and consumption, whereas an emic one, e.g. for capitalism refers to a specific kind of economic systems including specific rules like the maximisation of utility.  

That again means, that some research fields, as motivation, and webs of meanings in particular culture remain unapproachable to etic studies. But it is and never has been a goal of an etic researcher to describe hermeneutically the meaning and motivation in a very particular context. Etic research is focused on reliable, universal quest for similarities and differences in sociocultural systems – in all times and all places. In contrast, though, in academic history “a conscious and overt commitment to the study of inner meaning and psychic complexities has usually been associated with a considerable amount of indifference toward the quest for the scientific explanation of sociocultural differences and similarities” (ibid.: 579).

This does not imply any greater or lesser worth of knowledge, but different knowledge for different goals. That is why the importance lies on the acceptance and study of both,

13 For a detailed elaboration on economic anthropology, see Polanyi 2014 [1944].
emics and etics. One cannot explain the Grimm’s law germanic sound shift by etic re-
search modi, and one cannot find evidence for general evolution by emic modi. This is
the epistemological difference between them, to which this chapter was dedicated.
Thus, as shall have become clear by the argumentation, one has to distinguish between
emics, etics, thought and behaviour in principle. Moreover, the separation of the other
dichotomies is necessary in favour for a sound and well research design, but not for an
epistemological or ontological fundament. The epistemological distinction on the
grounds of science is between emic and etic. And a distinction between sources of
knowledge, respectively what people do and what is in their minds, is inevitable in
terms of data acquisition. That is why the four ‘ethnographic modi’ of emic thought (I),
emic behaviour (II), etic behaviour (III) and etic thought (IV) will guide this research
paper (see illustration No. 3). The four modi encompass all domains of possible so-
ciocultural inquiry.

In order to better understand this academic research programme and get to know the
paradigmatic embedment, the other paradigmatic principles shall be introduced in the
next chapter. This serves, firstly, an embedding of this paper in the wider landscape of
anthropological academic research. Secondly, it provides a needed set of tools for a fur-
ther productive scientific analysis.

2.3. What Paradigm Are Emics and Etics Anchored In?

“After all there is no value in isolated facts for science, however striking and novel
they might seem in themselves.”
Bronislaw Malinowski (1978: 509)

“But above all, the social scientist is trying to see the several major trends together —
structurally, rather than as happening in a scatter of milieux, adding up to nothing
new, in fact not adding up at all. This is the aim that lends to the study of trends its re-
evance to the understanding of a period, and which demands full and adroit use of the
materials of history.”
C. Wright Mills, in: Elwell (2013b: vii)
Paradigms as Research Guidelines

In the beginning of chapter two I wrote that the emic/etic distinction is both, approach to and method of this thesis. Concerning the epistemological status the approach should be clear now. In this subsection I shall shed light on the rest of the paradigmatic approach of the emic/etic distinction. The methodological details will then be subject to the next chapter.

What is a paradigm? A paradigm consists of several groups of principles, each of which indicates a certain set of rules for academic research. Thomas S. Kuhn coined the notion of paradigm in his *Structure of Scientific Revolutions* and refers to them as “universally recognized scientific achievements that for a time provide model problems and solutions to a community of practitioners” (Kuhn 1970: viii). That means that some researchers of high renown achieved some convincing results following a certain guideline of principles and assumptions. These very principles are – often implicitly – guidelines to generation(s) of following researchers, as they are both, sufficiently unprecedented and sufficiently open-ended to give work and challenge to a community of practitioners (ibid.: 10).

A paradigm, however, is an abstract guideline for research only. It produces theories about any kind of issues which remain to be confirmed or refused on an empirical level. That is exactly why anthropology is an empirical science seeking for empirical verification. In this chapter the principles guiding this thesis shall be made explicit, whereas in the following chapters 3, and especially 4 the empirical evidence to the theories derived from the very paradigms presented here, shall be attested.

Whereas some authors refer to three groups of paradigmatic principles (Guba / Lincoln 1994), others refer to more. A reasonable distinction seems to be between epistemological, theoretical, methodological and ontological principles. As will be clear by now, epistemological principles refer to the question of how we know about things. Theoretical principles refer to relations of cause and effect concerning components of each sociocultural system. Ontological principles refer to qualitative definitions of research objects that have to be made, e.g. how a human being is defined so that according sci-
Entific methods can be applied. Eventually, methodological principles refer to the unit of analysis which is relevant for research on societies or human groups, i.e. as a rule this is usually either the individual or the whole group.

**Epistemological Principles**

Chapter 2.2. already cleared a lot concerning the emic/etic distinction as the key epistemological principle of this thesis, though a short summary shall be given. At first sight, the emic/etic distinction refers to two epistemological principles: one of the emic system and one of the etic system. The emic system is variable as it depends on each certain culture-specific case of research; it may be scientific, humanistic or post-modern, i.e. highly relativistic. The etic system, in contrast, is not variable, but clearly committed to the epistemological principle of science. The emic/etic distinction is thus necessarily situated in the scientific branch of epistemology, although it recognizes an emic approach to wholly understand (*not explain*) the human condition. Hence, other ways of knowing are well accepted, though not for scientific goals. In order to draw inference, draw etic conclusions and find laws on cause-and-effect relationships, however, etic input is inevitable. That particularly is the main goal of scientific research, in contrast to the other ways of knowing. Once again, if anthropology seeks for explanations of similarities and differences, and thus for conditions of human social evolution, it is thereupon axiomatically committed to science. It is “the overall aim of science is to discover the maximum amount of order inherent in the universe or in any field of inquiry. Maxwell calls this ‘aim-oriented empiricism’” (Harris 2001: 25). As it is the goal of this research undertaking to find out how and thereupon why a conglomerate of nation-states reacts to an external impact like the migration movement, the positioning of this paper in a scientific principle will not come as a surprise.

**Theoretical Principles**

In theoretical terms the decisive factor is again the etic one. As etic seeks for scientific explanations of cause and effect a reasonable assumption is a materialist determinism.
If universal principles of the human social and cultural condition shall be explained, one has to find determinates. The main alternative, i.e. philosophic idealism, will quickly lead to the assumption that it is the free will of every single person to take decisions and thus shape sociocultural systems. But this free will is usually understood as a total free will, thus free of any determination. This stands in contrast to any possibility of drawing inference or making conclusions about social groups. This phenomenon will be re-considered in the section about methodological principles. This thesis, however, is “based on the simple premise that human social life is a response to the practical problems of earthly existence” (Harris 2001: xv). It was thus preformed by Marxist theory:

The mode of production in material life determines the general character of the social, political, and spiritual processes of life. It is not the consciousness of men that determines their existence, but on the contrary, their social existence determines their consciousness (Marx 1859: 21).

In other words, it

[…] asserts the strategic priority of etic and behavioural conditions and processes; but it does not deny the possibility that emic, mental, superstructural, and structural components may achieve a degree of autonomy from etic behavioural infrastructure. Rather, it merely postpones and delays that possibility in order to guarantee the fullest exploration of the determining influences exerted by the etic behavioural infrastructure (Harris 2001: 56).

The theoretical embedding of this paper acts on the assumption of the primacy of etic behavioural components, determining structure and superstructure. This, in nuce, implies that the infrastructural components, i.e. the mode of production (the mechanism of subsistence, or today rather economy) and reproduction (the mechanism of population control) are determined by environmental factors. Infrastructure in turn, gives huge influence on the structure of a society, i.e. the political and economic organisation within and toward other societies. The superstructural components, as social values, norms are then a response to the structure. As referred to in the quote, the superstructural elements are not necessarily totally, i.e. in detail, determined. Moreover, as discussed in the preceding chapter, the emic mental components may even be independent from any base; etic superstructural features, however, are functions to the respective structural – and eventually infrastructural – fundament. It may therefore convey the impression as if it
influenced existential conditions. Howbeit, superstructure cannot influence the subsequent components of the sociocultural system, apart from feedback loops (Harris 2001: 46ff.). An example on the level of infrastructure and structure may illustrate this. Whereas the societal system of capitalism is a response to intensified production and the intense growth of population, capitalism itself, as a system aiming at perpetual growth, even more supports an intensification of production and reproduction. It supports indeed; it does not cause, though.

Illustration No. 4: Structure and Dynamics of Sociocultural Systems (Based on Elwell 1991: 25).

The materialistic determinism is well accompanied with science. In other words: science as an epistemological principle makes sense the most combined with the theoretical principle of materialistic determinism. With idealist principles, i.e. mostly psycho-

14 For more details concerning this theoretical groundings, see Harris 2001 and Elwell 1991.
15 A detailed elaboration of this principle according to Europe will be part of chapter 3.4.
logism and other individualisms, it mostly leads to contradicting statements. The question of individualistic principles will be addressed in the subsequent paragraphs about methodological principles.

*Methodological Principles*

Along with science, materialism determinism is affirmatively attended by a methodological holism. Although this is no absolute entanglement, chapters 3 and 4 will bring evidence enough to affirm the productive character of this paradigmatic interference. If humans allegedly possess a free will, decisions would exclusively be circumscribed by mindful factors. This idealistic principle, is in contrast rooted in a methodological individualism, which calls for the individual human being as crucial unit of analysis in order to explain human behaviour and thought in sociocultural terms. According to that a society was nothing more than the sum of its parts. But it is more. It is the parts plus relations and connections between the parts. This is called the phenomenon of emergence. Friedrich Engels suggests fine evidence to this using the example of military battle evolvement. According to Engels, Napoleon, when fighting the Mamelucks in Egypt with his army, said:

> 2 Mamelucken wären 3 Franzosen entschieden überlegen; 100 Franzosen wären 100 Mamelucken gleichwertig; 300 Franzosen würden im allgemeinen [sic] 300 Mamelucken besiegen, und 1.000 Franzosen würden in jedem Fall 1.500 Mamelucken schlagen (Marx / Engels 1972: 308f.).

Thus, his french army is not a compilation of loose soldiers, but a tactical, structured and functional by division of task formation, whereas the Mamelucks are described as perfect lone warriors. This – coming back to sociocultural systems – speaks clearly in favour of a methodological holism. The stratification of social organisms, infrastructural and structural features form the participants consciousness. The large majority raised in a capitalist system thinks capitalistic, strives for private property and acts according to capitalist rules. It is not the capitalist thinkers who form the system, but the other way round. It is by rationalisation, that people endorse the infrastructural premises and act to conform and survive. Thus, people socialised in a capitalist, en-
lightened society are most probably convinced that it is the individual that is in a crucial position. However, this a superstructural function strengthening the needs of capitalist societal organisation. Even, disadvantaged parts of the society fill out their functional part, as for instance, lower castes in India. Affiliated to a lower cast people cannot easily get out their caste and change the system, “[…] the victims of the caste system cannot base their behavior on long-term abstract calculations. Access […] depends on caste identity validated by obedience to caste rules” (Harris 2001: 62). The superstructure of a sociocultural system thus determines and forms the participants mind and behaviour. This holistic mechanism is strongly affiliated with the materialistic determinism. It may also be a called a cultural determinism, meaning that socialisation and all structural features forming the conditions for individual life. Social science is not a psychological inquiry, striving for individual demarcation.

Marshall Sahlins points to the core of methodological holism in stating, that “there is no such pre-social individual, no such thing as a human being existing before or apart from society” (Sahlins 2008: 109). Similar to the Mamelucks, the organisational features of a group, conglomerate or any other assembly is different to those of loosely affiliated individuals. A shoal is more than than many fish. As the accumulation of fish increases in number, it increases in stratification. The position of each single fish becomes more and more determined. It is thus with society. “A society is an organism […] It is also a character of social bodies, as of living bodies, that while they increase in size they increase in structure. […] It is thus with a society” (Spencer 1898: 449). Furthermore, the organism is not necessarily dependent on every single individual any more. It is an entity of its own.

The relation between the lives of the units and the life of the aggregate has a further character […]. By a catastrophe the life of the aggregate may be destroyed without immediately destroying the lives of all its units, while on the other hand, if no catastrophe abridges it, the life of the aggregate is far longer than the lives of its units (Spencer 1898: 455).

Again, although neoliberal superstructure indicates something different, due to capitalist constraints – to paraphrase Margaret Thatcher (The Guardian 2013) – there is such a thing as society. “By their very nature social facts tend to form outside the conscious-
ness of individuals, since they dominate them. To perceive them in their capacity as things it is therefore not necessary to engage in an ingenious distortion” (Durkheim / Lukes 1982: 72). What does this mean for the domains of sociocultural inquiry?

The group thinks, feels and acts differently […]. If therefore we begin by studying these members separately, we will understand nothing about what is taking place in the group. In a word, there is between psychology and sociology the same break in continuity as there is between biology and the physical and chemical sciences. Consequently every time a social phenomenon is directly explained by a psychological phenomenon, we may rest assured that the explanation is false (Durkheim / Lukes 1982: 129).

Thus there is a difference in how individuals act to how groups do. As organic (biological) organisms refer to different laws as inorganic (physical), they also refer to different laws as superorganic (cultural) ones. Therefore societies and other accumulations of related human beings cannot be analysed in the same categories; nor can individual faculties like emotions, abilities, etc. hold good for whole societies. If, furthermore, the human condition would depend on individual faculties, based e.g. on biological universals, those must be proven in the ethnographic record. But no biological universal concerning human interaction is proven cross-culturally; the example of the ‘homo economicus’ quoted above points to this as well.16 Phenomena of human interaction thus cannot be explained in terms of individual, biological groundings. They must be explained in methodological holistic terms. This denies the relevant influence of ‘mind’, ‘free will’ or other individual, idealistic factors. Furthermore this cultural determinism is strongly interwoven with the ontological principle of punctualism. This will be addressed in the subsequent subsection.

**Ontological Principles**

The cultural determinism is itself closely connected to the ontological principles of punctualism. This concept implies, that human species is not gradually superior to animals, e.g. by means of just larger or more, thus quantitative capacities. In contrast, there is a qualitative distinction, which makes humankind unique and separates them from animals. This is exactly the difference of superorganic organisation to organic or 16 For a detailed elaboration of human social universals and the problematic impact, see Ringhofer 2016.
**inorganic one.** What makes humankind unique is the

*fundamental* difference between the mind of man and the mind of non-man. This difference is one of kind, not one of degree. And the gap between the two types is of the greatest importance – at least to the science of comparative behaviour. Man uses symbols; no other creatures does. An organism has the ability to symbol or it does not; there are no intermediate stages (White 1949: 25, emphasis in original).

This ability to symbols – or the cultural faculty – is the fundament of the behavioural superstructure. It is the cultural faculty enabling the superorganic level, not determining it. The ability to culture, which is exclusively inherent to humankind, is the very reason why a distinction between (in-)organic and superorganic has to be made. So, the ontological bases of punctualism is in fact one of the most important justifications for a science of culture. If not that, one could argue for simple biological and zoological studies sufficiently explaining humankind. But that is quite too reductionist. Similar to the genes as an informational system, humans employ culture as an information system. And similar to genes, the information system of culture determines human being. That is why it is so closely interwoven with the paradigmatic principle of methodological holism. Furthermore, the ontologically qualitative distinction of humankind is the reason why there is an analytical need for an emic/etic distinction. It is culture as an information system of social organism which requires a special approach, different to the research of biological or physical objects. No animals and no atoms have an emic life. The ontological principle thus brings the paradigmatic embedding of the emic/etic distinction down to a round figure.

*A Post-Positivist Paradigm*

The emic/etic concept is hence situated in a paradigm, most probably called “postpositivist” (Guba / Lincoln 1994: 105), i.e. a group of guideline categories sharing scientific, holistic, punctualistic and materialistic principles. It might be used with different combinations of paradigmatic principles; this combination, however, is the most coherent, logical and productive for scientific inquiry, as hopefully may be inferred by the argumentation. As indicated, it is mostly the etic – as universal and nomothetic – side who states the rules. That is a complete necessity for the quest for causes of difference
and similarity in sociocultural systems. Between the paradigmatic principles a lot of ties are drawn, some of irrefutable logic, some of less absolutism. However, only in the end they all together make up one paradigm. As mentioned, the affirmation of paradigmatic principles can only be provided through empirical testing. Therefore, the above described conglomerate of principles is most probably the most convincing one, as will be manifest through the analysis drawn in chapter 3 and 4.

The emic/etic distinction is an epistemological principle. However, as shown in the paradigmatic discussion, it is a consequence of an ontological fundament as well. The paradigmatic embedding is of particular importance for the research design of the respective inquiry. Although, the approval and empirical testing on a level of theories is subject to the last chapter, it will not do without reference to the paradigms, where the respective theories are derived from. This is the case for every inquiry into sociocultural systems, although many of them draw their conclusions on implicit paradigmatic orientation. However, to gain a full understanding of any research proposal it is necessary to know the paradigmatic embedding, i.e. the fundaments of philosophy of science. That is why this chapter was dedicated to the positioning of this thesis’s research design.

2.4. How Do Emics and Etics Work? – An Application to Complex Sociocultural Systems

The quoted examples of holy cows and the rising sun have a great value in exemplifying the difference between emics and etics. Anyhow they bear a manageable amount of complexity. Nonetheless this does not mean, that the emic/etic dichotomy is applicable only to simple micro analysis. Quite on the contrary, the more complex societies are, the more the necessity for the emic/etic distinction becomes obvious. As Spencer describes in his article about political integration, huge aggregates like nation-states “at once make possible high organization, and require high organization” (Spencer 1967: 74). The necessity for the emic/etic distinction appears not only in nation-states, but in any complex sociocultural system, e.g. in the Kula ring. As Malinowski describes, no
participating entity of this trading circle knows the circle in its totality and entirety of relations; every participant knows only the respective direct exchange partners and acts according to these connections (Malinowski 2001: 116). Complexity appears to be, thus, a key trigger in the application of emics and etics. As a rule, the named mystification as a degree of deviance between emic and etic accounts is a result of this complexity. As a mechanism to cope with this complexity Elwell (1991: 25) names bureaucratisation on a structural and rationalisation on a superstructural level; both are functions of infrastructure and structure respectively. The more complex a sociocultural system gets, the more the various units within the system become specialised. Division of labour is an example for that. The rationalisation process is hence a way of making sense of things around oneself, though not necessarily of the whole system. In small sociocultural systems like those of hunter-gatherer, participants usually know all other participants. Therefore emics and etics in non-complex social organisms are often isomorphic. Regarding complex and industrial states, Frank Elwell precisely names key features of their evolution:

There are five characteristics of the sociocultural system that promote the growth of bureaucracy. Two of these characteristics are of the infrastructure: industrialism and population growth. Two are structural characteristics: the decline of primary groups and the ‘organizational imperative.’ And finally, one is a superstructural characteristic: the rationalization process (Elwell 1991: 16).

Those key features, especially the superstructural rationalisation process, indicate reasons for the necessity of the application of the emic/etic distinction. Europe as a complex sociocultural system doubtlessly demands a macro-perspective; moreover, due to its complexity it gives especially rise to the use of the emic/etic distinction.

Four categories of knowledge have been located in the epistemological groundings of the emics and etics. So how to do research with those categories? The needed methodological inputs for the distinction, especially in complex sociocultural systems shall be presented now (see illustration No. 5).
Illustration No. 5: The Research Domains in the Sociocultural Field of Inquiry Adapted to Complex Sociocultural Systems.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>THOUGHT</th>
<th>BEHAVIOUR</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>I</strong> INSIDER’S CONSENSUS,</td>
<td><strong>II</strong> INSIDER’S CONSENSUS,</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DISCOURSE ANALYSIS</td>
<td>INTERPRETATION OF OWN BEHAVIOUR</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>IV</strong> OUTSIDER’S/SCIENTIFIC</td>
<td><strong>III</strong> OUTSIDER’S/SCIENTIFIC</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ALIGNMENT,</td>
<td>OBSERVATION OF INFRASTRUCTURE,</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EVALUATION AND EXPLANATION</td>
<td>STRUCTURE AND SUPERSTRUCTURE</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OF I-III</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

To find out about the emic mental scheme (I) in complex social organisms, one has to look at public discourse. One has to find native consensus, as it is the decisive factor for emics validation. Native consensus can most easily be found, as Harris (1974: 246ff.) names it, in statements of authorities, since people are more likely to primarily obey authorities than rules. These information may be found in media discourses, state contracts, constitutions or “prescriptive literature” (Margolis 2000: 7), i.e. historical and popular manuals and writings. This does not mean, that people think exactly what is written there, but it contains a lot of information about trendy ideology and current themes in public discourse, which is not to be denied in its influence.\(^{17}\) Margolis’s monograph is a fine example to such an analysis regarding the changing advice to wo-

\(^{17}\) For the detailed discussion of the (dis-)advantages of the analysis of prescriptive literature, see Margolis 2000: 6ff.
men’s role model in American society.

The emic behavioural stream (II) is quite related to the emic mental stream. It is just the own native’s behaviour which is brought into focus of discourse. The task of the research project is to get a sophisticated interpretation of natives’ behaviour, often including an opinion or justification about own or the group’s behaviour. This interpretation may then be concerning the complex whole (‘why the world is like what it is like’) as well as to one’s standing point in it (‘why I am what I am’). The bigger and more complex a sociocultural system, the more likely several emic versions may be circulating. That will not come as a surprise. Due to division of labor and the specialisation within the social organism, there are many subsystems quite possibly in differing conditions. Hence, their rationalisation as superstructural function about their respective subsystems may differ, not to mention emics. The behavioural emics may express themselves in political currents, parties or extremist factions, as well as in other movements, NGOs, etc. and their respective positions.

The etic behaviour stream (III) is to find in scientific observation. It can be reached by the acquisition of etic data and its systematic arrangement. Whereas in the example of ‘bovicide’ in India it was made by the collection of live and sex ratio data of calves, Harris analysis of the collapse of the Soviet Union scrutinises infrastructural data like the amount of industrial production. This, albeit conducted in a very general way is a fine example to an etic analysis in a macro-context. Regarding Europe, as will be clear very soon, will be inevitably preceded by surveying the dominant mode of production. Eric Wolf’s book (1982) is a great indicator for this need of analytical Marxist analysis. Indeed, “all of these issues demand an understanding of the origins of capitalism” (Harris 2001: 111). For complex societies this analysis may sometimes be tricky.

The global is more than local writ large. […] Rather, the problem is how to create an ethnographic account of empirical processes that cannot be fully apprehended through empiricist methods, or through direct sensory contact with the processes in question (Feldman 2012: 187, emphasis in original).

The main aim of etics is to find out how processes are organised, to dig out (non-tangible) relations that may outweigh (tangible) connections. That is why concepts as
Feldman’s non-local ethnography, focusing on etic data in complex contexts, as well as Marxist methodological inputs, grasping for infrastructural evidence are of absolute necessity. Notwithstanding, it is all about the analytical Marxism, researching into economic fundaments and relations, linking people through mediating agents. According to today’s – widely capitalist – world, Feldman states, that “‘nonlocal ethnography’ […] addresses how people are specifically related when they are not connected in a global configuration of power […]. It responds to […] a global, neoliberal capitalism […]” (Feldman 2011: 380). This can hardly be reached by ordinary participant observation or multi-sited ethnography. To keep in mind relations within the social organism, that cannot be seen, Feldman provides with the concept of non-local ethnography. However, this, in my judgement, is to a greater or lesser extent a quite apposite adaptation of Marxist methods to the 21st century.

The etic mental dimension (IV) is then alike to a systematic and logical alignment and evaluation of the three preceding modi. This is well described by Lett with Roy D’Andrade’s steps: making observations, check their reliability, develop a general model, double check this model with new observations and compare other models to the one developed (Lett 1997: 81). The White’ian notion of “sciencing” (White 1949: 3) is a well fitting term for this procedure. To make reliable observations, however, it is not enough to solely follow the object of study; one has to account for more, than is visible or tangible maybe at first sight. The etic analyses necessarily “pay their way to the extent that they link up with theories which explain diachronic and synchronic differences and similarities” (Harris 1968: 580). That is, it seeks for the very causes of changes.

Although this last modus – the emic mental scheme (IV) – may be revealing common untrue predictions, often emically mystified and transported ones, it has to be conducted in a very sober and neutral way. It will oppose etic data to emic data and draw conclusions thereof. In complex societies, this may often lead to the unmasking of emic world outlooks. In contrast to the possibility of several emic versions, only one etic explanation may exist. This is rooted in the parsimonious constitution of science, prohibiting two conflicting accounts of the same reality. In these circumstances the self-correct
ing character of science brings its most valuable part to light. Whereas emics do not rely on testable information, etic accounts will be abolished as soon as proven wrong.

This general instruction of research in complex societies in the four ethnographic modi will soon be filled with concrete action, as it comes to their application to Europe in chapter three. Moreover, the use of the four modi will be specified in the beginning of chapter three according to the research focus of Europe. Although the emic/etic distinction may appear to be of absolute and inevitable necessity for sociocultural research, quite some critiques are circulating. Those will be discussed in the next section.

2.5. Why (Not) to Use It? – A Critique of the Emic/Etic Distinction

The emic/etic distinction – albeit well and broadly known in anthropology – faces quite some critical and refusing drifts. An overview over the main pro as well as counter arguments and legitimations for the emic/etic distinction shall be provided here. This partly has been done already in chapter 2.2. as regards form and content of the distinction. To achieve the best and most productive research guideline, the critiques were either approved and incorporated into it or disproven by argumentation. Anyhow a lot of researchers deny or refuse the emic/etic distinction – mostly due reasons discussed in the following.

One of the main counter arguments of the emic/etic distinction is the alleged neglecting of idealistic components due to the primacy of infrastructural ones. Once again I shall emphasise that the proper study of humankind is both emics and etics. These two categories of knowledge are distinct in the operations as well as in the goals they seek to achieve. There is no hierarchy between emics and etics. To understand their di- and convergence it is necessary to know both of them. This knowledge will help to understand the human condition better. To understand motivations and intrinsic reasons and ascribed meanings one has to collect emic data – and they may well be idealistic and individualistic in their paradigmatic orientation. But to explain, why certain things evolve and detect cause and consequences of some processes, etic knowledge is required. “[E]tic analysis is not a stepping stone to the discovery of emic structures, but
to the discovery of etic structures. The intent is neither to convert etics to emics nor emics to etics, but rather to account for the divergence and convergence of both etic and emic structures” (Harris 1976: 333). So to deny the emic/etic distinction’s validity for a lack of idealistic components is just unsound. That a materialistic approach from a WEIRDly socialised point of view seems to be generally erroneous is most probably part of emic mystification (concerning the ‘anthropocentric illusion’, see chapter 4.2.). This, however has little to do with the scientific value of the distinction and therefore cannot be considered a valuable argument.

But both categories of knowledge, by definition, are separate and may exclude the respective other’s value. This may be true for emic approaches, holding on an exclusiveness for themselves. The emic/etic approach, instead, insists on both approaches’ validity – for the respective goals. Nonetheless,

the answer to these questions is entirely dependent on whether one accepts the scientific way of knowing as having some special advantages over other ways of knowing. To deny the validity of etic descriptions is in effect to deny the possibility of a social science capable of explaining sociocultural similarities and differences. To urge that the etics of scientific observers is merely one among an infinity of emics […] is to urge the surrender of our intellects to the supreme mystification of total relativism (Harris 2001: 45).

So, the denial of the emic/etic distinction by mostly researchers of the humanistic or post-modern tradition is rooted in a paradigmatic refusal. “The proponents of competing paradigms are always at least slightly at cross-purposes. Neither side will grant all the non-empirical assumptions that the other needs in order to make its case” (Kuhn 1970: 148). That may then be ‘acceptable’ although not by profound argumentation, but in principle.

The denial of scientific applicability to humankind is interwoven with the denial of any determinism in favour of the presumption of a free will (see chapter 2.3.). This, however, is a reason for the normative impact non-scientific – humanistic – research usually has. In this study of humankind, instead, science is not primarily or necessarily in for changing anything, nor it is up for a commitment to certain values. To be honest, an explanation can only be valid if we free it from any prejudgments or normative assumptions. Normative studies doubtlessly have their value, regarding to philosophers, eco-
nomists or political scientists. But they usually have a clear ideological backpack and goal, they are fighting for. This may definitely have its eligibility, but one has to be clear about that and make those premises explicit. “Wallerstein also challenges mainstream social scientists to become committed to social justice” (Elwell 2006: 77). This may be an honourable goal – but an emic one. Therefore it should not disturb a scientific research undertaking. Scientific knowledge will not enable anybody to get control over human civilization. However, it will explain its conditions.

The named characteristics already described the main advantages of the scientific and non-culture-bound method: it looks for value-free and universal explanation and detection of cause-and-effect relationships. And the only aim for science is reliable knowledge. “It is true that knowledge is always contested, and it is true that by itself, as so many anthropologists have recently maintained, knowledge does not guarantee freedom; but there can be no freedom without it” (Harris 1992: 302). So, science is the first step to free oneself of mystification about the world we live in. Therefore, the emic/etic distinction is imperative to the anthropological study of humankind.

The following chapters will collect evidence and analyse it according to the described paradigmatic principles, particularly the emic/etic distinction with its four ethnographic modi. Chapter 5, as the conclusive part, will bring this evidence to a macro-level and will allow to operationalise the research guideline.
3. THE EMICS AND ETICS OF EUROPE

“We thus need to uncover the history of ‘the people without history’—
the active history of ‘primitives’, peasantry, laborers, immigrants, and besieged minorities […] and to abrogate
the boundaries between Western and non-Western history.”
Eric Wolf (1982: x)

3.1. What Is Europe?

Why Europe of all things? The question of why this thesis is concerned with the emics and etics of Europe instead of any other sociocultural system will be addressed here.

The initial idea of this paper was to research the huge refugee movement, which has reached a preliminary peak in 2015. Starting from an emic origin, following most media and official news, it was to understand that this movement headed directly toward Europe, which was therefore facing a “refugee crisis” (The Guardian 2016; European Commission 2016). Hence, for the research design it soon became obvious that the focus of analysis had to be on this very Europe. Whereas the fourth chapter has a focus on the so-called refugee crisis, the clarification of the notion of Europe is addressed here. Therefore, to begin with, this chapter is dedicated to Europe.

As the notion of Europe is used quite often, it demands a definition or demarcation to work with. But what makes this “small peninsula off the landmass of Asia” (Wolf 1982: 385) a distinct entity – if anything does? Is Europe to be comprehended as a sociocultural system and what binds it together? What kind of definition can be an adequate one and what are decisive criteria for it?

If we remind ourselves of the guiding research question of this Master’s thesis – how and why does an entity, a conglomerate of nation-states like Europe, (re-)act in the face of an asylum surge? – it is clear that the focus lies on the conglomerate of nation-states. It is also clear that this should not be an analysis of all the single nation-states’ posi-
tions, but rather an exemplifying analysis of how the conglomerate itself reacts – in em- ics as well as in etics. As chapter 2 has shown, the emic/etic separation is key to the un- derstanding of humankind and therefore should not be let down when it comes to ap- plication. Hence, the answers to the definition of Europe are double sided: they are emic and etic. Similar to the paradigmatic part, neither of them is more or less signifi- cant; however, the etic column is the decisive one in order to explain things, as it re- mains to the scientific method. So, the starting point for a scientific approach to the question ‘what is Europe?’ has to be an etic one.

How can a research of an entity of nation-states look like? Well, the

starting point of all sociocultural analysis for cultural materialists is simply the existence of an etic human population located in etic time and space (Harris 2001: 47).

Neither do members of a particular human population think of themselves as a ‘people’ or a group in order to identify them as a social group. Nor does the interaction among the members of such a group have to be primarily supportive and cooperative in order for it to be considered social (ibid.).

This denial of emic impacts is quite consequent for an etic starting point. Whether people see themselves as Europeans or not is irrelevant for etic knowledge. It is neces- sary to know, that people live in the same time and space. This geographical component is thus not necessarily isomorph with political – and thus normative – maps. An ex- ample right out of Europe will illustrate this: in early 2016 a group of refugees were waiting in Idomeni, a small town in Northern Greece on EU-territory in order to quit the EU toward Macedonia, a non-EU-member state, again, in order to eventually reenter the EU-border in Hungary and onward toward Austria, Germany, Sweden or other countries. The borders of the EU as a political union are blurred, as people were actually hindered to quit EU-territory, although their intention was probably to get on it. Thus, however, Europe cannot be determined along politically defined borders.

In contrast, there are many examples of people struggling with crossing an EU-border facing major dangers like an overseas trip in a small boat. By all means, this example shows that it is along other than simply politically defined borders etic space is defined. This is not at all a denial of the impact of borders as etic constitutive grids for nation- states. But in a macro-context, i.e. regarding a conglomerate of nation-states, borders
become an omnipresent integral component within, as well as outside the conglomerate. The notion of a state border thus is analytically drained as it epitomises a segregation between all nation-states. The crucial lever to define the etic space of Europe in a more macro-context has thus to be found in other criteria than simply in nation-state borders.

These criteria cannot be found in borders. Consequently they must be found in the relations people and nation-states are linked with. Of course these relations are also surrounded, or rather confined by borders. However then, the decisive question in order to constitute the subject of this thesis is not ‘what is Europe?’, but rather ‘what are the relations linking nation-states in Europe?’. To find those relations is thus the important guideline in this analysis.

Another example may illustrate the priority of relations over – formally – drawn borders. The common currency Euro in some of the member states of the EU does not necessarily infer the assumed strong relations between themselves. As several crisis of the past years have shown, it is strong economic relations and infrastructural similarities that exceed the boundaries of the monetary union in strength and effect. The nation-states like Germany, France or Austria were in clear opposition to Greece facing the difficulties of the financial crisis following 2008.

Reacting to pressure from the global stock markets, the EU imposed strict austerity measures on struggling southern European economies, bringing penury to large sections of their populations, with the inevitable accompaniment of social unrest and the diversion of this unrest into a strident anti-immigrant racism, fuelled by the nationalist rhetoric of both far right and mainstream politicians. The EU, as a regional alliance, appears as riven by conflicts as are its component states (Cetti 2013: 122).

Therefore, I shall argue that the analysis of etic relations and as corollary the cause for similarities and differences is crucial to the understanding of a sociocultural system. As becomes apparent by means of the example, those relations are most probably of structural and infrastructural character.18

What Eric Wolf did in his book *Europe and the people without history* is exactly to reveal those relations and look “at the world as a whole, a totality, a system, instead of as

18 For a definition and detailed discussion of those, see chapter 3.4.
a sum of self-contained societies and cultures […] As we unraveled the chains of causes and effects at work in the lives of particular populations, we saw them extend beyond any one population to embrace the trajectories of others – all others” (Wolf 1982: 385). This means, that e.g. European evolution cannot be seen isolated from African or American. Zooming on a smaller level this means, that the condition and evolution of one nation-state in Europe hardly can be understood without regarding the other nation-states. And these roots for similar or different evolution are the essential keys to the understanding of what is an etic group.

And these relations have to be of an infra- and structural level, as the fundament of any etic analysis is the primacy of those. This theoretical principle as a part of the discussed paradigm does not change, neither do the principles of etic anthropological research – no matter whether the focus is on small village in Papua New-Guinea or on a continent as a whole. The methodological tools remain the same – to understand globalism, modern state power blocks or “the politico-economic consequences of new centralized industrial modes of production. All of these issues demand an understanding of the origins of capitalism” (Harris 2001: 111), as they demand an understanding of the infrastructural criteria the latter responds to. So to demarcate an etic space, one has to bring infrastructural circumstances to light. A nation-state, as well as a distinct group of nation-states is an expression of such circumstances. In how far Europe itself – or a certain part of it – can be seen as such an etic group or not will be at the core of this paper’s analysis. Beyond that, as will not come as a surprise, what makes Europe – or a certain part of it – an emic group will be considered as well. This will account for insider’s perception, however, not necessarily for scientific explanations.

Europe as a Social Organism

The analysis of Europe is the analysis of a sociocultural system on a macro-level. It is to understand like an organism composed of parts “[…] each of which is related to all the others, the relationship of part to part being determined by the relationship of part to whole” (White 1959b: 205). It is the aim to account for interdependencies and deter-
inations of the social organisation of Europe. And the social organisation of nation-states is, similar to a society for human beings, an “[…] aspect of the behaviour of living material bodies […]. Social organization is not merely a means of sustaining life; it is a form of life: of the life process itself” (White 1959b: 208, emphasis in original).

Similar to all social organisation one may distinguish between different kind of groupings. A social organism consists of segments – Europe consists of nation-states. Segments are all alike in structural, compositional and functional terms. For instance families are segments of a society, having all the same structure, composition and function. All segments constitute a whole. Segments are thus unlike classes, which are also parts of a society, but are not alike or equal, but differ in structure, composition and function. E.g. men and women, or natives and migrants constitute social classes. Classes are cleavages dividing the whole society in different, unlike parts. Whereas classes are thus crucial for a differentiation of structure and function in a social system, segments are liable for mechanisms of integration and social cohesion, especially in processes of enlargement.

According to these two concepts of analysing social systems as networks or sets of relationships, I shall refer to corporative and descriptive groups. Whereas corporative, or analytical groups are organised within themselves and, like segments, are equal in their structure, descriptive groups are not necessarily related by a common organisation, but defined by an emically specified criterion. For instance, the social class of women has a biological sex and mostly social gender in common, but it does not imperatively share a common network of relations, which makes them united.

Accordingly, the segments of Europe, the analytically related groups of Europe are its nation-states. In order to analyse Europe on a macro-level, the unit of analysis have to be its subsystems, i.e. its nation-states.

This points to the core of this chapter’s aim. To research a sociocultural system means to research relations between analytical groups and how those develop in the light of changes or impacts from outside. It is the aim of this paper to research the reaction of a

---

For a detailed elaboration of the terms ‘segments’, as well as social ‘classes’, see White 1959b: 142ff.
conglomerate of nation-states to an asylum surge. It is thus the goal to find out in how far Europe is linked through interrelations and what are the consequences of those links.

To this question – unsurprisingly – there are two kind of answers: emics and etics. Hence, the task of this chapter is to map both answers, scrutiny on the relations they quote and evaluate them regarding their analytical value. Although, the nation-states are the units of analysis, I shall clearly disclaim of any methodological individualism, indicating that the whole is simply the sum of its parts. To understand and explain the relations between the units of analysis, one has to understand and explain the evolvement of the whole with all its interrelations and consequences. We will soon come to a further clarification of this argument, when digging out the etics of Europe in chapter 3.4.

Hence, what is Europe? This section scrutinised on how to demarcate Europe for a scientific analysis. Therefore it referred to etic criteria. What soon became obvious is that – no matter whether in emic oder etic terms – the demarcation is not literally a demarcating border, but rather ties and relations linking the single segments. Hence, to find out what makes Europe ‘Europe’ means to find out about European relations. To get a proper understanding of these relations, it is necessary to find out what these relations are like for insiders as well as for outsiders. That is why one has to apply the emic/etic distinction. How to apply this distinction to Europe is thus subject to the next chapter.

3.2. How May Emics and Etics Be Applied to Europe?
Having well developed a mode to use emics and etics for complex phenomena (see chapter 2.4.) and having defined a mode to circumvent Europe (see chapter 3.1.), it is necessary to combine both modes to start the analysis. Therefore, the four ethnographic modi have to be applied to the question posed in the paragraphs above: what does relate the segments of Europe (see illustration No. 6)?
What is an emic mental account (I) for Europe? What was denied in chapter 3.1. to be of valid importance is exactly what comes into play now: whether members of the group consider themselves as such and under what circumstances. The emic mental account will mirror main drifts in European discourse about Europe.\(^20\) What visions do European Union constitutive contracts shape? What media, prescriptive literature, politicians and other authoritative impact givers think and say about Europe? This will conclude in an answer to the question of which relations do unite Europe. Exemplifying statements will help to evaluate major streams of discourse. As has been mentioned, in a highly complex sociocultural system a high diversity of emics may exist. Therefore it is impossible to account for every single emic drift. However, major discursive ideolo-

---

\(^{20}\) I shall subsume this hereinafter as ‘European discourse’ or emic understandings of ‘Europeanness’. I am well aware of any possible essentialist tendency and shall therefore disclaim of a use of it in etic contexts. But as a notion, summarising public and political discourse to describe the core of a ‘European Identity’, it is quite useful – as an emic term.
gical trends shall be identified.

Strongly interwoven with this first step is the second: the account for emic behaviour (II). This account may be achieved as well through analysing major discourses; however, the focus is not on general statements about perceptions and visions, but rather about own behaviour. This emic behavioural account may concern the political unifying in the European Union or recommendations for actions that should be taken in order to justify and defeat it. Both – emic mind and behaviour stream will be analysed in an entangled way in chapter 3.3.

The etic behavioural account (III) will refer to infrastructural and structural frames. This is necessarily also done in a macro-context. To define Europe in etic criteria cannot be done without pointing to its relations to the rest of the World. Furthermore, one of course has to focus on internal relations between the segments, i.e. nation-states as well. This synchronic approach will be accompanied by a diachronic one, referring to impacts and changes in history. In chapter 4, the etic behavioural account will refer to very concrete actions in 2015, the year with the most people coming to Europe.

The final part – the etic mental account (IV) – will evaluate the findings of the further three. The research question of how Europe reacts to the asylum surge comes into play again and will lead over from a general understanding of Europe to the investigation of a very concrete case in the fourth chapter. The analytical groups and etic ties of Europe will be dug out and thus allow reliable inference on why Europe can or must react as it does. An example may illustrate the task of the fourth ethnographic modus. Islam as a religion is an emically defined group about values, religious belief and identity. It cannot be made responsible for any action. ISIS, however, is an organised group, related through a common economic organisation and political, i.e. structural interest. Although a probably ticklish or even pejorative appearing but strictly scientifically intended comparison, the aim of the fourth ethnographic modus, and consequently of the emic/etic distinction in general and eventually of this thesis, is to reveal what ‘Europe’ is to Europe, quite as what ISIS is to Islam.

These final results will pave the way for the fourth chapter and help to find explana-
tions concerning the refugee crisis and why Europe does react as it reacts. The four ethnographic modi are key to this inquiry. Illustrations No. 6 shows an overview of them.

3.3. The Emics of Europe
As this chapter is concerned with the emics of Europe, it tries to account for the main public discourses in Europe – and concerning Europe. This allows to grasp for both the emic mental (I) as well as the emic behavioural scheme (II), inasmuch both are strongly interwoven. The main principles “that represent and account for the way in which that domain is organized or structured in the mental life of that informant” (Harris 1976: 331), is followed by an account for the emic behavioural scheme, which is mostly an emic conclusion how to act, justified on base of the emic mental stream. The analysis of the emic categories will be conducted along three major topoi: Europe on its own, i.e. a self-referred outline of ‘Europeanness’ (chapter 3.3.1.); Europe in relation to others, i.e. a demarcation to non-Europe (chapter 3.3.2.); and eventually an outline of eurosceptic positions (chapter 3.3.3.).

This is mostly done on base of sources of the last months and years. Nonetheless, when considered emically necessary it will reach out to a diachronic approach as well. The aim of the chapter is to dig out, what in emic terms is Europe, what keeps Europe together and what relations are responsible for this linked sociocultural system.

As Maxine Margolis pointed out, the cited ‘prescriptive’ literature should not be taken literally for what most people in Europe think everyday, but it reflects major “ideological trends” (Margolis 2000: 7) which doubtlessly give a representation of what may find wide consensus in society. It shall be emphasised that chapter 3.3. in its entirety is an outline of emic accounts. Therefore the used wording and argumentation refer solely to emic patterns.

I shall remark here, that not being willed to exceed this Master’s thesis’s formal limits, I cannot account for a quantitative and all encompassing data analysis concerning Europe in a complete syn- and diachronic perspective. This would definitely be sufficient assignment for several dissertations, as the focus of the analysis is a macro-level
with the nation-states only as respective subsystems – which again consist of many sub-
systems. Nevertheless, I shall well point out the major qualitative strands and thereupon
draw a scientific argument. I shall show how such an analysis could be conducted in
detail, by exemplifying it on a well grounded base and by formulating sound arguments
on a reasonable qualitative fundament. Consequently this analysis does not refer to all
emic accounts in Europe. This would be impossible even in a detailed, quantitative ana-
lysis. The emics referred to in the following, however, account for a diverse record of
all across Europe. Notwithstanding, the emics are of course exemplified illustrations on
base of singular cases. This ensures a sound argumentation and brings the analysis
down to a round figure.

The introduced roman numerals shall hereby refer to the four research categories as
they do in the graphics above: emic mental stream (I), emic behavioural stream (II), –
etic behavioural stream (III), etic mental stream (IV).

3.3.1. Europe on Its Own: An Emic Account of ‘Europeanness’

I – Europe’s Heritage: A Common History and Source of Civilization

One of the main strands in European discourse is the reference to a common history
and thus a common inheritance. Despite a claimed pluralistic society today, “the idea of
Europe as an essentially Christian civilization” (Stevenson 2013: 24), often in opposi-
tion to non-christian barbarism (see chapter 3.3.2.), is central to this historic argument.
Especially in the medieval times the common idea of Europe becomes wide-spread, as
christianity takes over in Europe’s empires. The process of christianisation is triggered
by a widely common feudalistic system following the ‘cuius regio, eius religio’ rule,
i.e. a mandatory compliance of people to the religion of their political leader (Steven-
son 2013: 24; Soeffner 2014: 208). Christianity in it the shape of mission supports then
the common European experience of uncovering and colonising other parts of the
world; it underlines the assumed superiority of the own, legitimising the evangelising
of others. Christianity alongside with colonialism made “[t]his noble continent, com-
prising on the whole the fairest and the most cultivated regions of the earth, enjoying a
temperate and equable climate, […] the home of all the great parent races of the western world” (Churchill 1946). So, christianity as an emic concept is at the core of emphasising a Eurocentric perspective.

Of special importance in the notion of a common European history is the phase of Enlightenment in Europe. It carries back to the inheritance of the two big ‘civilizations’ of Rome and Athens and gives rise to the philosophic blossom of the a common European genius, seeking truth, progress and reflection in individualism (Bohrer 2014: 1; Soeffner 2014: 217). This philosophic movement takes on all a long 19th and 20th century (Lützeler 2014: 3) and became a trigger and main branch of humanism; it advances the metaphor of a common journey of Europe, suggesting common origin, movement and purposeful common goal (Bischof 2011: 112). This common journey of Enlightenment is assumed to bring Europe forward, i.e. in the very sense of the word: bring light to Europe. The plenty of common historical heritage is referred to as making Europe unique in the world:

To put it in a nutshell, Europe is meant to be an evolvement of common history, relaying its heritage to every next generation and carrying its evolved amalgam of values onward together. What makes emic Europe ‘Europe’ are thus common historic relations, linking and unifying the continent to a common ground of values and world view. The tying relations of Europe in this context are thus of superstructural character. As mentioned, the common historical journey is taken as the basis for the today often emphas-
ised canon of common ‘European values’. Those will be discussed in the next subsec-
tion.

I – Europe’s Soul: A Common Canon of Values

This might be explanations of Europe as a community of ‘shared values, culture and psy-
chological identity’ […]. Advocates of this kind of ‘cultural approach’ point to Europe’s
heritage of classical Graeco-Roman civilization, Christianity, the ideas of the Enlight-
ment, and the triumph of Science, Reason, Progress and Democracy as the key markers of
this shared European legacy. Significantly, these are all features which European Com-


These quoted features are often subsumed to a ‘European soul’ being an idol for others,
e.g. most recently by the Pope of the Roman catholic church (Franziskus 2016). Em-
phasising the cultural commonalities of Europe, it is often – e.g. by the German Presid-
ent Joachim Gauck – referred to a common ‘identity-generating source of Europe’
(Gauck 2013): its canon of values. As Europe lacked a story of origin like a big won
fight, Europeans would not have common memorials or materiality to generate their
identity of, but rather a non-material, ideal idol to live on: democracy, human rights,
equality, solidarity, etc. (Gauck 2013). This argument infers to two aspects. The notion
of ‘we – Europeans’ transports a certain assumed homogeneity of the collective popula-
tion; furthermore, this idealistic ‘Europeanness’ implies the primacy of those values
over other (material) aspects of life. “[Europa] wird nur dann überleben, wenn es das
notwendige System moralischer und ästhetischer Werte einführt” (Drndić 2014).Similar
claims were made already a hundred years ago, stating the importance of intellectual or
spiritual homogeneity:

wer [...] zum inneren Wesen Europas vordringt, wer die Leidenschaft und
Handlungsweisen der europäischen Seele selbst erforscht, der wird bald dazu gelangen, die
geistige Kontinuität und Homogenität dieser beiden Zustände Europas wiederherzustellen
[...] (Bohrer 2014: 3).

These spiritual continuity shall promote the intellectual and moral greatness of Europe
(Ernest Renan, in: Bohrer 2014: 3), achieved through its history and especially Enlight-
enment. Europe is thus said to have a strong and attracting character, a common ‘soul’
unique and superior to others. This already a few times mentioned superiority will be
under special scrutiny a few paragraphs below.

Another feature, added to European discourse after World War II, is Europe’s ability to promote a life in peace, in safety and in freedom (Churchill 1946; Franziskus 2016). It is often emphasised through metaphors, promoting, legitimising and eventually naturalising social and hierarchical structures in Europe (Bischof 2011: 16). Hierarchical structures may be seen as the manifestation of the values promoted. The today biggest European hierarchical structure is of course the European Union.

I – Europe’s Manifestation of Values in the European Union: United in Diversity

In this context Europe and the EU – e.g. in Austrian media – are often used similarly with no distinction (Bischof 2011: 88). This is definitely a consequence of the dominant presence of the latter in Europe, presenting itself as the manifestation at representation of Europe and its values – at least inside the European Union.

At an early stage of European political integration after World War II the back then nine member states introduced the concept von European Identity, in order to preserve their national cultures, the principles of representative democracy, the rule of law, social justice and human rights, all perceived as fundamental elements of European identity: ‘The diversity of cultures within the framework of a common European civilisation, the attachment to common values and principles, the increasing convergence of attitudes to life, the awareness of having specific interests in common and the determination to take part in the construction of a United Europe, all give the European identity its originality and its own dynamism’ […] (European Communities, in: Radeljić 2013: 4f.).

Jacques Delors, former president of the European Commission, later on emphasised this concept as an addition to the economic integration, defining Europe as a grouping that is unique in the density and quantity of its commercial exchanges, a comparative oasis of monetary order and even of financial equilibrium, and a considerable reserve of internal growth. It possesses a demographic, historical and cultural wealth, homogeneous even in its extreme diversity, which, doubtless, no other region of the world can claim (Delors 1992: 17).

Underlining the economic grounding of the post-World War II integration, the European Union intensely picks up the historic heritage and claims to be the major – if not only – representation of European values. This is anchored then in the Treaty on the
European Union,

DRAWING INSPIRATION from the cultural, religious and humanist inheritance of Europe, from which have developed the universal values of the inviolable and inalienable rights of the human person, freedom, democracy, equality and the rule of law,

RECALLING the historic importance of the ending of the division of the European continent and the need to create firm bases for the construction of the future Europe […]” (European Union 2012: Preamble, emphasis in original),

[t]he Union is founded on the values of respect for human dignity, freedom, democracy, equality, the rule of law and respect for human rights, including the rights of persons belonging to minorities. These values are common to the Member States in a society in which pluralism, non-discrimination, tolerance, justice, solidarity and equality between women and men prevail (European Union 2012, Article 2).

The assumption of an isomorphism between Europe’s values and the European Union laps over with an assumed isomorphism of the European population and its territory. The introduced by the Treaty on the European Union concept of ‘European Citizenship’ is evidence to that. ‘European Citizenship’ was created as an additional to the national, i.e. supranational concept observing the principle of equality of all EU-citizens throughout the territory of the EU. 21 Thus, it calls for a homogenisation of rights the EU; it strives for a transnational tendency within the borders of the EU and thereupon toward a unionisation of the population. This emphasises the claim of the manifestation of ‘Europeanness’ in the shape of the EU. 22

The common values and their representation in the Union is often merged in the metaphor of the “Europe as a Common Home” (Gorbachev 1989) built by common effort and including secondary associations like defined borders, economic wealth and security a home/house provides (Bischof 2011: 105). The economic component of Europe is as well part of the emic definition of Europe and will be analysed in the next paragraphs.

21 EU will be used hereinafter as abbreviation for European Union.
22 For a detailed elaboration of the in- and exclusive features of the European Citizenship, see Begemann 2016.
I – The European Dream: Economic Growth and Wealth

This very economic stability is part of the attraction, called by some authors the ‘European Dream’ “emphasising welfare provision, well-being and quality of life.” (Stevenson 2013: 33). It is supposed to oppose the American Dream representing a rather anarchic capitalism. Albeit this project may have been grazed since the financial/economic/debt crisis in 2008 it is nevertheless a central column in European emic representation so far. As the economic representation including living standards, wealth and economic organisation, can be fully understood only in a global perspective. Therefore it will be elaborated in the section about Europe as a Global Player (see chapter 3.3.2.).

I – Europe’s Emic Essence: Moral Leadership and Supra-Identity

What do these factors lead to? They represent an idea, appropriate and meaningful to many Europeans, especially EU officials as they per definitionem work for an organisation claiming a special role in the representation of this idea. But not all Europeans are Europeans first and foremost. The German President as other commentators emphasise that a European identity does not erase national, regional or other collective identities (Gauck 2013; Lützeler 2014: 2). A ‘European identity’ is thus most probably not yet experienced a post-national, replacing idea, but rather a supranational, collective identity, additional to other splints forming personal identities. The concept of European citizenship, touched in an example above (and further below), is evidence to that.

A collective identity, however, is always a projection or a symbolic representation. It is an “imagined community” (Anderson 1991), not based on personal knowledge of all other members, but on imagination.

With reference to identity, Europe is connected to an idea and normative centre rather than a precisely formed territory. Europe is a discourse which is translated into a political and ideological project (Stråth 2013: 6).

23 As so many other notions, this is a typical normative, emic term often referred to in political speeches. Once again I shall emphasise the particularly emic use of these terms without any tie or even claim to use them in an analytically valid, etic argument.
Such an ideological project is emic by definition and depends on narratives, symbols, self-representation, etc. A great story – a master-narrative – of Europe has to be passed on from generation to generation, as e.g. the will for peace and a “re-creation of a European Family” (Churchill 1946) after World War II.

As we have seen, the European master-narrative depends a lot on common history, heritage and values. Enlightenment and central ideas of humanism are hereby of particular importance. This movements brought up the commitment to values as human, individual rights, referred to as universal, “inviolable and inalienable” (European Union 2012: Preamble). This claimed universality is at the core of European self-conception. It claims those values – a a pure product of European evolution and discourse – to be a universal, global guideline, superior to any other. It claims a “moral and cultural leadership of Europe” (Churchill 1946). It makes this leadership absolute and unchallengeable and concludes in the triad of humanism, universalism and ergo superiority. Humanism is hereby of particular importance, as it is the leading ideology since hundreds of years of succeeded the religious fundamentalism of the Middle Ages. This emic mental account is thus a springboard for the emic behavioural account.

II – Protecting and Promoting Europe’s Values and Wealth

“And politics, as we know well, is first and foremost the ability to protect one's own territory and its system of values.”
Donald Tusk (2015: 4)

These words of Donald Tusk, speaking as President of the European Council, put the major appropriate guideline for the emic behaviour stream in a nutshell. As the emic mental account – common and universal values – is accepted as right and meaningful, the following emic behavioural account is a logical consequence of that. The Treaty on the European Union prescribes

to promote peace, its values and the well-being of its peoples. […] establish an internal market […] work for the sustainable development of Europe based on balanced economic growth. […] It shall promote economic, social and territorial cohesion, and solidarity
among Member States (European Union 2012: Article 3).

So, in addition to the promotion of the values, the economic wealth shall be enhanced. So far, these behavioural interpretations or recommendations concern the internal order among the member states. The normative commitment to the values of Enlightenment and capitalistic organisation infer a sustainment of competitiveness and the upholding of moral leadership. Without any doubt the economic wealth, higher than in many – or most – other regions in the world support the considered wealth of values. The claimed superiority and the universalism of European values, hence, gain credibility as Europe is a generally attractive place to live in terms of economic and living standards. So,

> Europe takes itself to be a promontory, an advance – the avant-garde of geography and history. It advances and promotes itself as an advance, and it will have never ceased to make advances on the other: to induce, seduce, produce, and conduce, to spread out, to cultivate, to love or to violate, to love to violate, to colonize, and to colonize itself (Derrida 1992: 49).

This avant-garde role is quite important for an internal self-conception of Europe. But it is a lot more important for its external mission and demarcation, as the following paragraphs shall remark.

Nevertheless, regarding internal affairs, Europe’s main emic luting ties are its values, evolved in the common experience of historical instances. Underlining this notion, the Austrian chancellor, quoting Jacques Delors, states that nobody would fall in love with an internal market (Bundeskanzleramt Österreich 2016). Hence, values and the common sense of ‘Europeanness’ are supposed to be of prior importance. So, the economic ties are definitely part of the emic self-conception; the decisive role, however, is seen in universal values. What Europe’s emic perception is like regarding its external affairs shall be under scrutiny now.
3.3.2. Europe and the Others: An Emic Demarcation of Europe

“Man braucht Europa nur zu verlassen, gleich in welcher Richtung, um die Realität unserer Kultureinheit zu spüren.“
Denis de Rougemont, in: Gauck (2013)

I – Europe’s Culture: United in Similarity

These words point to the importance of a tertium comparationis for a definition of Europe. One may well define something just by describing inherent features. But in a situation, probably even competition with others it appears necessary to distinguish oneself in relation to the outside. Once again, this may be exemplified at the example of European citizenship. Whereas it was intended to create a supranational additional identity concept to equalise Europeans all over European Union territory (see above), it created a new, higher border to non-European citizens, as well.

Hereby, two classes of immigrants are created. EU-migrants – even after three months of residence in another EU country – may participate in municipal elections, whereas non EU-citizens after unlimited time of residence are still excluded. […] No ‘rational’ arguments like shared history, being born in the country or cultural assimilation may counter this inequality. The former citizen-alien-dichotomy is now turned in a citizen–EU-citizen–alien ‘trichotomy’ […]. wherein the position of the latter has worsened in comparison to the former duality (Begemann 2016: 53).

It shall not be denied that the concept of European citizenship has an inclusive character. But it does clearly demarcate Europe toward its exterior, or rather its ex-territorials.

Europe’s emic distinction toward others shall be under scrutiny in this chapter. Notions like the ‘fortress of Europe’ come into play. Binary logics of ‘we’ and ‘others’, other forms of ethnocentric – or rather Eurocentric – tendencies enforce a demarcation. As the values of Enlightenment and their universalism are of central importance to an emic notion of Europe, it is their claimed and promoted superiority that helps situating Europe along other parts of the world.

Equal only to itself, Europe as universal consciousness therefore transcends its specificity or, rather, posits the power of transcendence as its distinctive characteristic and universalism as its particularity (Braidotti 2010: 127f.).

How Europe is emically positioned toward other parts of the world will be subject to the next paragraphs.
A common notion for defining the own in relation to others is *othering*. This is a mechanism of defining in- and exclusion. It is often supported by metaphors as “boundary drawing, boundary maintaining, ordering and othering ‘mini-narratives’ that contribute to the discursive mechanisms of inclusion and exclusion” (Mottier 2008: 192). As Bischof’s analysis of Austrian newspaper discourse concerning the probable EU accession of Turkey shows, almost all reasoning and argumentation is concerned with the differentness of Turkey. The readiness of the country to meet all requirements in order join the “Christian Club” (Bischof 2011: 114) is questioned due to altered history, ‘culture’ or ‘mentality’. This example points to the roots of discussions and the development of ‘Europeanness’, of the ‘West and the Rest’.

This othering, striving through the above mentioned steps of commonly experienced history, accumulated to Samuel P. Huntington’s notion of the “Clash of Civilisations” (Huntington 1993). In his article Huntington proposes that the great divisions among humankind and the dominating source of conflict will be cultural. Nation states will remain the most powerful actors in world affairs, but the principal conflicts of global politics will occur between nations and groups of different civilizations. The clash of civilizations will dominate global politics. The fault lines between civilisations will be the battle lines of the future (ibid.: 22).

Europe, along with ‘the West’ as a ‘civilisation’ is therefore opposed to other ‘civilisations’. This assumption seems just like a logical consequence of defining Europe in relation to non-Europe.
There are also definitions of Europe which involve a subtext of racial and cultural chauvinism, particularly when confronted with Islam. For some therefore the definition and meaning of ‘Europe’ acquires saliency only when pitted against that which is ‘non-European’ (Goddard et al. 1994: 27).

So, the common traits of Europe, throughout history, culture, religion, etc. are opposed to those, who are not part of this community. As the evolved values and consideration are classified as universal and inalienable, they consequently are perceived as superior to others. Colonialism, for instance, will most probably not have caused a huge subtraction of this feeling of superiority. Europe is often understood or determined by binary oppositions, itself representing the good, civilised and universal, being opposed to the bad and un-civilised. “The binary logic of identity and otherness is core to the universal claim of reason, inherent to the philosophy of enlightenment” (Begemann 2016: 54).

This Eurocentrism is fundamental to the self-understanding and will be addressed again in the coming up behavioural scheme. So-called ethnocentrism is of course not an exclusively European phenomenon, but a rather wide-spread emic one. Nonetheless, it is of crucial importance for an understanding of the self-concepted ‘Europeanness’.

I – Europe as a Global Player: Market Economy and Global Partnership

“Europa indessen ist selbstbewußt und eigenständig genug geworden, um sich als gleichberechtigter Partner in diesem [transatlantischen] Verhältnis zu empfinden, und als gleichberechtigter Partner muß es anerkannt werden.”

Willy Brandt (1973)

This distinct positioning of Europe in the world is crucial not only in political relations. Albeit times have changed and official colonialism is overcome, Europe does claim a, or even the leading position in the world. However, not anymore on a ‘colonial master’ base. It is rather expressed in the notion of a leading ‘global player’. Derived from economic language, it is nowadays often and commonly used to describe claim and entitlement to the leadership of Europe (Bischof 2011: 230). That Europe should stand at a globally distinguished position was emphasised primarily in a political way, back in Cold war times (see e.g. above quoted Brandt 1973). Although Europe then clearly is a
synonym for mostly Western Europe, it was meant to strive for an own, strong position between the two powerful political blocks: the United States of America and the Soviet Union. In times of modern economic globalisation, the notion of a ‘global player’ is primarily one concerning a demanded competitiveness within a market economy. The aim and ideal of a strong Europe, being economically strong, superior and more competitive than others, seems to be unchallenged in European discourse, e.g. according to Austrian print media analysis (Bischof 2011: 231ff.). This both, infer and legitimises a commitment to neoliberal market economy as the ruling economic system of the world. It infer to capitalist rules of a competitive world, making the primacy of economic strength unconditional. In return, this strength legitimises a priority of economic growth to e.g. social factors, as the powerful global position stands synonymic for the fundament of wealth and European standards. Politicians all over Europe are concerned about making Europe the most competitive continent in the world, e.g. German chancellor Angela Merkel in Die Welt (2016). This goal seems to be of high consensus and priority, as it is supposed to be the lifeline of Europe.

Hence, the relations, tying and binding Europe together, are perceived of being economic as well. Progress, growth and economic advancement are main features of emic ‘Europeanness’.

I – Reflective Europe and the Post-Colonial Turn

So far, all elements of so-called ‘Europeanness’ were rather self-orientied, be they concerning inner or outer relations. This is in fact true for most features. As has been made clear, the binary understanding of identity and otherness is key to the logic of Enlightenment. This, however, has been challenged in movements like the post-colonial turn in social science. As Soeffner (2014: 215) argues, both, ethnocentrism and colonialism on the one side, and management of consciousness of guilt and active repentance are ‘Western’ products. So the reflection-orientated movements in anthropology, history, etc. starting in the 1960s and 1970s are mostly Western responses to own history. The trial to change perspectives and a guiltily reflection of one’s one behaviour has come to
great importance. So, Braidotti argues, that today’s European Union is like an answer to the own past, as it
stands for the ethical obligation to be accountable for its past history and the long shadow it casts on its present politics. In this respect, the political project of the European Union marks a radical redefinition of Europe's relationship to its outside, or its constitutive others (Braidotti 2010: 130).

This is definitely a constituting emic reason for the set up of development cooperation and its rising importance in policy programmes and public discourse. For instance, all ‘Western’ nation-states committed themselves to development aid to the amount of 0,7% of their GDP.

This commitment to help emphasis the humanistic orientation, mentioned in the above elaboration. It represents one pillar of emic ‘Europeanness’, epitomising a reflection of its own role and an act toward justice along other ‘players’ and parts of the world. The Enlightenment with its core values of humanity point to this reflective role as well. How, however, those features of emic mental self-interpretation lead to emic behavioural accounts, is subject to the next subsection.

II – Protecting Borders and Capitalist Organisation

This emic mental account for Europe’s relation toward its outsiders states again the fundamental guidelines for the emic behavioural account, i.e. the insider’s interpretation for own appropriate and necessary action. As Europe’s cultural unity and homogeneity is ascertained and adjudged to be meaningful, good and superior to others, it seems quite appropriate to protect and promote it. The superiority of the own qua reasonable, ‘enlightened’ thinking legitimises the promotion and enforcement of its values – ‘here’ and ‘there’, i.e. in an own welfare system and in development aid. The economic strength and global dominance of Europe even more legitimises the promotion and enforcement of market economy organisation and rules, as it is promising to a successful further evolvement.

This core principles of ‘Europeanness’ must be protected according to own compelling argumentation; and to quote Donald Tusk once again, this protection is quite normal
and inherent to a political system (Tusk 2015: 4). As Europe distinguishes itself from others, the notion of borders becomes virulent. To let Europe and its values survive, it has to be protected and defended against impacts, possibly destroying its integrity. The pan-European identity of the ‘occident’ itself is intensified when it is clearly demarcated in relation to others. Europe and all nation-states, especially within the EU “should take care of European borders bravely and without any historical complexes” (ibid.: 10).

At this border protection, the reflexive turn of Europe comes into play once again. Humanitarian aspects and development aid shed their light on European action. So, just building a wall as a demarcation without taking notice of worse conditions on or outside the border would be too simplistic. It would deny the enlightened and absolute humanitarian account. Therefore, EU officials like Donald Tusk avoid to call or consider borders hermetically sealed.

External borders do not necessarily mean walls. It is a combination of infrastructure and complex policy that requires a wise use of soft, economic and hard power, for example against smugglers, and in order to enforce our rules and laws. It is a policy of protecting Europe not against refugees, because they are only victims who need our help, but against those, who have caused this exodus and want to make use of it for their own interests (Tusk 2015: 7f.).

Thus, border protection, as the “maritime surveillance system is justified as a humanitarian measure to protect, rather patronizingly, individuals from themselves […]” (Feldman 2011: 387). In doing so, the EU is committed to endorse “such familiar values as freedom, dignity, happiness, and opportunity for all” (ibid.: 286). However, this is supposed to be reached only by the rule of the own law. FRONTEX as border managing agency is the empowered commissioner to do so, aiming at the prevention of illegal border crossing. Thereby, refugees are emically not seen as the main target of this policy; rather smugglers and criminal organisations are the objective. Strong borders are thus emically in accord with humanistic values.

At the same time, the market economical principle of individual competition is held up, as it infers the deserved wealth through own and allegedly well-earned achievements.

24 For a detailed elaboration on FRONTEX, see chapter 4.1 and 4.2.
For instance, the German chancellor Merkel argues for the return to own core values in order to persevere in times of globalisation, i.e. market economical competition at its best.

Deutschland ist wirtschaftlich stark und stabil. Deutschland hat trotz aller Probleme einen großen sozialen Zusammenhalt, und dieser soziale Zusammenhalt ist unser größtes Pfund. Meine Antwort auf die von mir gestellte Frage lautet: Wir dienen unserem Land in diesen Zeiten der Globalisierung am besten, wenn wir uns an unseren Werten orientieren, die uns zu dem gemacht haben, was wir heute sind – das ist Freiheit, das ist Sicherheit, das ist Gerechtigkeit und das ist Solidarität –, wenn wir den Menschen eine gute wirtschaftliche und soziale Perspektive geben, wenn wir die wirtschaftliche und soziale Stärke unseres Landes weiter ausbauen (Merkel 2016).

Europe’s emic behavioural account is thus a programme, clearly legitimated by own values and the own economic system. That is why, by the way, all development aid and all external action are guided by those two strands. That is why global organisations, like the IMF or the World Bank at one side, and the UN Human Rights Movement and other organisations at the other are well supported by Europe.

In nuce, the network of Europe, hence, is emically defined by a strong economic system and a superior, humanistic canon of values.

3.3.3. Europe? – No! A Sceptic Perspective on ‘Europeanness’

I – Euroscepticism: Breaking Up Europe?

Along all those emic accounts which are quite affirmative to Europe, one should not forget about Euroscepticism. Especially in times of crisis, when commonplace things begin to totter, formerly apparent, fundamental consensus is often questioned – not only by radicals. The described consensus on emic ‘Europeanness’ and supposed emic behaviour was/is supported by mainly all political actors, forming a kind of ‘no alternative’-coalition. Thus, through the jerk of crisis, populist movements crying out, e.g. for a dropping out of the EU, or other anti-European movements in general keep on growing (Theisen 2015).

The jerks triggering the main anti-European tendencies in recent times started mostly in the 2008 financial crisis, getting ascent in the migration and asylum surge of the last
years. Although, there were a lot of – mostly right-wing – movements before, those crisis gave rise to them all around Europe. Immigration movements within – and partic-
ularly from without – Europe had two effects: strengthening European against non-
European identity, but, moreover, national even more than European identity (Weber
2012: 168).
Hence, migration movements, or a volatile balance of the mutual solidary community in Europe as in the financial crisis, enforce the strengthening of and the return to na-
tionalistic policies. This may articulate in a total refusal of the European Union, e.g. in the ‘Brexit’ referendum, i.e. the poll in the United Kingdom to make the country leave the EU. Other strands claim for a dissolution of the Euro-zone, like the early AfD party in Germany. Another feature of Euroscepticism is the general indifference and decreas-
ing interest toward Europe, articulating in a very low voter turnout in European elec-
tions (Bohrer 2014: 4).
Notwithstanding, those movements do not necessarily deny all or the majority of the emic features of ‘Europeanness’ as elaborated above. However, they deny Europe as an entity to be entitled to administrate those values and features. Some, furthermore, claim that only few nation-states were ‘real’ European or claim a formation of a ‘core Europe’. Market Economy and the values of Enlightenment may well be supported, but it is the own nation-state only which should take care of their promotion and protection. A common European responsibility and unifying relations should not exist according to those Eurosceptic movements.

II – Re-Enforcing the Nation-State: Replacing Europe?
So, the emic mental account of Euroscepticism is rather diverse – similar of course to the pro-European movements. Those strands reach from the support of European emic features to the refusal of humanitarian features, like arresting or stopping people in front of borders or claiming the use of guns in case of illegal border crossing (Spiegel Online 2016).
What most of them have in common is the refusal of the delegation of any political
power or action to Europe. Albeit some do not disagree with a protection of European
borders, the protection of the own nation-state’s borders is of absolute priority.

Während in Spanien die Grenzen Europas weitgehend gehalten werden, ist Griechenland
auch hierbei die Achillesferse Europas. Wenn der Nationalstaat die Staatsaufgabe der
Grenzsicherung an die EU delegiert und diese dabei scheitert, geraten beide Ebenen in eine
Legitimationskrise (Theisen 2015).

Economic weakness – or even felt economic inferiority – of some nation-states under-
line this claim for a return to national instruments, mostly in other states which are sup-
posed to show solidarity. Assuming that “nationalism is not the awakening of nations to
self-consciousness[, as] it invents nations where they do not exist” (Anderson 1991: 6,
emphasis in original), eurosceptic movements claim for a reinvention of national re-
sponsibility and a total authority over all national borders, resources and means. The
emic behavioural scheme of Euroscepticism thus is an outline of movements which,
particularly in the light of crisis, demand a total backup – or even replacement – of
European structures through national ones. This is especially the case in the event of
weakness or the non-fulfilment of the mechanisms Europe was/is in charge of. This is
based on the emic mental account of a re-invention of the nation-state. The relations,
tying Europe together seen by eurosceptics thus barely exist on a practical level. The
prevalent goal or assumption is to re-enforce the nation-state.

Summary: Emic Relations

What do all those emics of Europe have in common? As argued before, the diversity in
emics may be quite large. However, the nimbus of humanity runs like a common thread
through most emic accounts. Even eurosceptic movements which advocate an anti-
European standpoint are mostly committed to humanistic values, albeit qua the particu-
lar evolvement of the respective nation-state and its solidary community. This human-
ism is triggered a lot through Enlightenment, being a succeeding ideology to religious
fundamentalism in the Middle Ages. By means of reasoning and the emergence of im-
maturity the humanistic values are seen as reasonably right, promoting the agency of
human beings and therefore axiomatically seen as universally valid. Being universal,
humanism cannot invalid for any human being or society as a normative guideline. Thereupon it has to be considered superior to any other; therefore it is just reasonable to promote and protect it. Due to the emphasis on the agency of every single human being, humanism is distinctly committed to an individualist approach. This can also be seen in the competitive system of market economy which calls for the reward of individualist performance. Humanism and market economy are of key importance to any emic account of Europe.

One of the major impacts for Europe at the moment is without any doubt the refugee surge, particularly of 2015. Hence, no matter whether regarding eurosceptics or pro-Europeans defining Europe in terms of inner or outer relations – all emic accounts are concerned with the current situation. Moreover, the refugee surge as a perceived crisis accentuates articulately the core of the respective positions. Through this external impact, the refugee surge sheds light on the key principles of the respectively appropriate networking ties, binding Europe together. That is why the refugee crisis is an extremely interesting research topic, concerning Europe and its condition. But in order to accurately analyse all effects, a proper analysis of both emics and etics has to be conducted. As the emics have been widely addressed, I will now turn to etics.

Whereas most emics were concerned with superstructural elements – only economic arguments, i.e. the role of a global player supporting economic wealth, touched structural elements – the etic analysis will be concerned with all three, infrastructural, structural and superstructural elements. After the etic analysis of Europe, the results of both, emics and etics will be applied precisely to the case of the 2015 refugee surge in Europe and thereby exemplify major strands of European network relations.

3.4. The Etics of Europe

Etic knowledge is validated by scientific rules, carving out the „principles of organization or structure that exist outside of the minds of the actors“ (Harris 1976: 331). So the etic analysis of Europe is conducted by etic – observer validated – criteria. The universal etic elements of each society are infrastructure, structure and superstructure (Harris
According to the theoretical principle of materialism we discussed in chapter 2.3., superstructural elements are probabilistically determined by structural, which respectively are constrained by infrastructural elements.

Whereas the second part of this chapter will consist of the etic mental analysis (IV), i.e. an evaluation of all emic and etic results to a systematic map, the first part of the etic analysis – the etic behavioural stream (III) – will consist of an analysis of the above named three levels: infrastructure, structure and superstructure. A diachronic perspective will be quite helpful to explain qualitative changes here, whereas chapter 4 will mostly stick to a synchronic perspective. Eric Wolf’s (1982) analysis of *Europe and the People Without History* is a salient hint to etic diachronic research and will therefore serve as one of the main sources. Chapter 3.1. already pointed to that. As Frank Ewell puts it, historic data is often fundamental to macro-analysis: “Macro theorists’ data consist of the archaeology of prehistoric societies, the ethnographies of preliterate societies, and the histories of all human societies” (Elwell 2013b: 35).

Accordingly, the analysis of Europe is set in a macro-anthropological/-sociological context. This is necessary almost by definition, as all parts, all societies in the world have to be seen as interrelated. Europe thus cannot be understood without taking reference to non-European issues as well. Whereas each society has to be understood like an organism (Spencer 1898, see chapter 2.3. as well), this is no less valid for the world as a whole. Elwell formulated the basic principle of sociological theory according to societies: “[…]the various parts of society are interrelated; when one part of society changes, other parts must also change” (Elwell 2013a). This interdependence is of absolute importance. Each sociocultural system shall be seen metaphorically as an organism. First and foremost, it “is focused upon stability and meeting the physical and psychological needs of its population” (Elwell 2013b: 12). Thereby the holistic perspective (see chapter 2.3.) comes to light, showing the systemic approach. To start with it, I shall begin with infrastructure.
3.4.1. Infrastructure, Structure and Superstructure

III – Infrastructure

“More precisely, it is the etic behavioral aspect of the demo-techno-econo-environmental conjunction that is salient, and hence it would be more precise (but too cumbersome) to define the causal center as the etic behavioral infrastructure (or the etic behavioral mode of production and reproduction).“

Marvin Harris (1994: 68, emphasis in original)

Infrastructure consists of the mode of production and the mode of reproduction, i.e.

the technology and social practices used to draw energy and raw materials from the environment and fashion them for human use […] and] the demographic factors of human populations such as the size and density of the population, its growth, decline or stability, and its age and sex composition [as they] are important in determining the amount and type of resources needed from the environment (Elwell 2013a).

Both components of infrastructure interdepend each other. So, the question is, which infrastructural relations tie Europe together? Once again I shall disclaim here of any attempt of a full or overly detailed historical outline of European evolvement. Nonetheless, I will point to important steps and thereby show qualitative changes throughout the history of the continent. In his great and detailed historical outline of Europe and its global history, Eric Wolf states: “An observer looking at the world in A.D. 800 would barely have taken note of the European peninsula” (Wolf 1982: 101). Hence, something must have happened which makes this peninsula of such vital importance in today’s world. Wolf then sees a major shift already by the year of 1500, excelling even more in the following years. The shift is traced back to “long-distance trade which changed the position of Europe from that of a dependent fringe of Asia into a key area of commercial development” (ibid.). This central position in global trade as an infrastructural, functional response in order to sustain livelihood is at the core of European ascent. But who is this Europe at that time? It is mostly some cities in sea-affine states like the today’s Netherlands, England, Portugal and Spain. The horticultural rural areas were hardly included in this process, but nevertheless, they were within the same – later evolving – states. The advancing global trade with slaves and natural resources, together with a “depletion of the resources upon which Europe’s feudal mode of produc-
tion has been based” (Harris 2001: 111), then built the fundament of the change from feudal or horticultural to another mode of production in Europe: the industrial production.

The ‘mode of production’ is hereby rather different from the similar written Marxian notion, as the former mainly refers to the above defined infrastructural response to nature (see above quoted Elwell 2013a). The Marxian notion, in contrast, refers more to the structural organisation of economy and society, which will be subject to the next subsection.

The industrial mode of production demands huge amounts of labor, which – although still being subject to elaborate research – probabilistically unleashed the population explosion, especially in the last two hundred years (Harris 2001: 112). Conversely, the population growth before this time of the last two hundred years lead to the change in infrastructural organisation, as the feudalist mode simply could not cope with, i.e. not meet the population’s physical needs any more. That today’s commencing change to a service and information based mode of production will interact with reaching a population peak would be topic enough for a good deal of further research. For the need of this paper the focus on the industrial mode of production will be enough.

The beginning of this mode of production of course did not take over over night. For some hundred years both modes existed almost symbiotically. However, the first country in which the mode switched was England. So how did the starting movement in England, for instance, influence other parts of Europe, probably less integrated in global trade?

[…] England, in making the first breakthrough into the capitalist mode, was also able to capitalize on the commercial network created by British traders, gaining strategic advantages in access to markets and raw materials and denying such advantages to later competitors, such as France and Germany. […] The hegemonic expansion of England and its capitalist class evoked the consolidation of national states among all her rivals. Such consolidation sought to improve each capitalist society’s control over its own ‘conditions of production’ by strengthening the power of the state (Wolf 1982: 309).

Although Wolf already goes one step further, striving for structural changes, he very well argues for the interdependent actions of nation-states. So, a common infrastruc-
Tural response is probably not provoked by exactly the same catalyst, but, although responding in slight temporal delay, is definitely a response to similar constraints, found in the circumventing nature. Other countries in Europe thus were influenced by the rising British Empire, but by means of protecting mechanism managed to oppose this influence.

In contrast, the other side of those mechanisms can be found on the other side of the mode of production as well. Where as European states found similar conditions and were triggered by colonial exploitation, the protecting mechanisms kept other states down as they were in inferior power positions.

To protect their own textile industries, for example, the British crushed the industrial revolution in India […]; the Dutch used Indonesia for plantation crops and destroyed the indigenous merchant classes […]; and Portugal’s ‘development’ investment contributed to the steady underdevelopment of Africa […] (Harris 2001: 112).

And the more this infrastructural responses evolve, the more these mechanisms evolve to a systemic character, as for instance,

[…] there is an international system of political and economic relationships that subordinates Mexico’s economy to the material interests of the developed industrial nations (ibid.: 300).

As each system acts conservatively and strives for its proliferation and promotion, the infrastructural features strive for certain structural consequences, i.e. each mode of production infers to certain social formations: “As Marx said, men make their own history but not under conditions of their own choosing. They do so under the constraint of relationships and forces that direct their will and their desires” (Wolf 1982: 386). So the changing dynamics of sociocultural systems have their roots in infrastructural causes. Of course, this infrastructural responses are attended by further evolutions and structural feedback loops. For instance, the technological standards and the military juggernaut rendered the outcome inevitable.

The prime material factors considered […] to be behind the vast social changes that were transforming their societies from agrarian to industrial, from monarchies to democracies, were changes in population, technology, division of labour, and the environment.” One can see this with Marx focusing on the production and reproduction of life; with Spencer and Durkheim emphasizing population growth, density, technological development, and an increasing division of labour […] (Elwell 2013b: 37).
So the change of Europe from a not-to-mention position in terms of economic importance to a global player is rooted in the rapid population growth, going aside with a response to decreasing own resource capacities: global trade through shipping routes and the intensification of production as a consequence. These infrastructural changes, as may be clear by now, form the fundament for social organisation – within nation-states themselves as well as in the very formation of the latter and their international relationship. The segments of Europe come into play at this very point. Therefore, part of the network of Europe – if I may call it with this notion – in etic infrastructural terms, can be considered only nation-states based on industrial production. As history shows us, by the 19th and especially by the 20th century the number of those nation-states increased considerably. The reasons for that are the indicated interdependencies, responding to – nevertheless – similar groundings. Europe’s fundament is thus a common infrastructure. Whereas some might call for a similarity, for instance, to the United States of America as well, this is true only to a certain point. The United States definitely share the same mode of production, although they do not share the same environment. The ‘American Dream’, the American state and society system was much more a result of the exploitation of the sheer unlimited access to resources and land, defeating widely without mercy any indigenous resistance. This was quite different in Europe, as resources and land were limited, population density therefore rose faster and resources, but no living land, were imported from colonial territory.

The rise of capitalism in Europe is thus far from incidental. “Material conditions cause certain structures to arise and endure; material conditions allow particular ideas and not others to gain widespread acceptance” (ibid.: 38). Therefore, the next step is to analyse the structural elements of Europe.

III – Structure

The second feature, universally inherent to every sociocultural system, is the structure. The structure of a society consists of domestic and political systems, i.e. primary and secondary groups (Harris 1994: 69; Elwell 2013b; Harris 2001). Whereas the first is
primarily kin-based, the latter is the social organisation on a larger scale.

As “the dynamics of this universal system begin with the intensification of the infra-
structure [..., i.e.] intensification, or growth in population and production” (Elwell 2013b: 261), the consequence thereof is a change in structural features. The feudal or tributary mode of production came to an end along the decreasing occurrence of local resources. Along with the upcoming trade the new mercantilism paved the grounding for capitalism,

 […] a world-system that had its origins in about 1500 in Western Europe and by the late nineteenth century covered the globe. This system is based on the economic exploitation of much of the world to benefit the core countries of Europe, North America, and increasingly the Asian rim. Within this core, there exists a hegemon, a nation-state that dominates by the sheer weight of its economic and military power (ibid.: 30).

This analysis points to two effects of the capitalistic social system: The first is the impact on the world’s organisation as a whole. The second infers to the evolving and enforcement of the dominant players in this world’s system: nation-states.

The latter is a product due to the growing importance of secondary groups. As complexity is a function of size (Carneiro 2000, see as well chapter 2), the bigger a sociocultural system, the higher its stratification. The social system of capitalism does not depend on any kin base any more and the growing size of the population favours a more complex organisation of society. Thus, the growth of secondary organisation is promoted. In turn, primary groups and social kin-based bonds weaken (Elwell 2013b: 261f.). “What the family, community, ethnic groups, friendship network, and church once did, private corporations and government now attempt to do” (Elwell 1991: 17). As a result and as those secondary organisations are dependent on, the bureaucratization rises to an ever higher level: “It is obvious that technically the great modern state is absolutely dependent upon a bureaucratic basis. The larger the state, and the more it is or the more it becomes a great power state, the more unconditionally is this the case” (Weber / Gerth 1946: 211). Major epiphenomena of the capitalist system are thus secularization and a more and more rule of law state. This particularly concerns the more or less unhindered and competitive trade, as it is one of the supporting pillars of capitalism. The more complex a society, the more division of labour is occurrent, which espes-
cially in capitalism is promoted even more. These phenomena are fundament for the superstructural function of individualism.

So, “why […] did the nation become so popular? […] A] strong case can be made for the primacy of capitalism” (Anderson 1991: 37). The evolvement of nation-states throughout the 19th and 20th century is a result of the increasing prevalence of capitalism. As has been argued above, the intensification of secondary groups on a ‘national’ level and the accumulation of capital on an ‘international’ level fostered the protection of exactly these mechanisms. Nation-states became political institutions in the global competitive system. “It was the expansion of capitalism that fostered the growth of the interstate system, the sovereignty of nations, and the rise of nationalism” (Elwell 2006: 79). With its features like welfare systems and democratic participation, the nation-states more and more became solidary groups. Solidary groups, then, depend on boundaries and demarcations, who is entitled to be part of it – and who is not. The structural form of a ‘liberal nation-state’ was born.

Main characteristics of capitalism in terms of economic organisation are the control of means of production, thus technologies, by a class of so-called capitalists. To get production going, labour is needed in high amounts and, to guarantee the labour supply, independent access to means of production by labourers has to be denied. The fostering of capital accumulation and, as a consequence, the maximisation of surplus is the main goal of capitalist mode of production. (Wolf 1982: 78)

These main principles apply as well to the international organisation of states. As capitalist nation-states evolve in a similar manner, the world’s organisation grows upon them as competitive, individual players, constituting its segments. But to keep the system going profitably, some have to control the means of production and deny access to others. Europe is, as mentioned by Elwell (2013b: 30) above, clearly profiting of the capitalist system, as it is controlling most means of production. The formation of capitalised ‘core-groups’ and peripheral supplying states in the world system gained increasingly momentum.

Europe, in this context again, is to be considered only the capitalistically organised
parts of it. This — to be clear — does not disclaim other parts of Europe of their affiliation or membership to Europe. It rather constitutes the etic ties of a common group, which, as times evolve, gets bigger and bigger. I shall once again abdicate any normative entitlement. This analysis is all about etic ties and causes for similar and different evolvement of parts of the world.

Anyway, what unites those European players is a similar infrastructural response to environmental constraints, followed by similar structural evolvement, namely in global terms: the control of major means of production. This is the fundament of an eventual common organisation of European states. As Elwell (ibid.) proceeds, hegemons rise and fall, but it is the capitalist world-system — and thus its rules —, which define and decide today’s struggles in the world. The structural means of control are central to the sustaining of the system — like of any system. As Harris puts it to the point:

> Without that control [of means of production by the ruling class in form of the police-military apparatus], the rules governing money exchange and money value, contracts, wages, interests, rates, profits — the whole emic and mental structure of the capitalist enterprise — would disappear over night. Like all mistaken ideas, the emic and mental categories of capitalism enjoy a power guaranteed not by the fraility of the human intellect but by the fraility of the human body (Harris 2001: 227).

The common organisation of European nation-states as an integration toward an internal market can only be explained in a global, structural perspective. This will be of special interest to chapter 4.1. As structure determines superstructure, it also feedbacks to infrastructural features. As capitalism is a system of perpetual growth it feedbacks a continuing intensification of population and production, i.e. infrastructural components. The etic superstructure, anyway, as a consequence of etic structure is under scrutiny in the following subsection.

**III — Superstructure**

Superstructure among social scientists is denoted as “the realm of values, aesthetics, rules, beliefs, symbols, rituals, religions, philosophies, and other forms of knowledge including science itself” (Harris 1994: 69). Here, once again (see as well chapter 2.3.) we have to distinguish precisely between emics and etic superstructure. Whereas the
former is all about the insider’s view and their *motives* of doing something, it is not necessarily rooted in any causal adaption or constraint. In contrast, etic superstructure refers to a logical deduction of infra- and structural constraints, mirroring *functions* of the respective sociocultural system.

Functions are the ways in which a sociocultural trait contributes toward the maintenance or adaptation of the socio-cultural system; dysfunction refers to a trait’s impact on the system that lessens adaptation. Motives are the subjective orientations of the individuals engaged in behaviour. Functions and motives are often (though not always) very different (Elwell 2013b: 15).

This will get clearer with an illustration using the example of the rain-dance of the Hopi people (ibid.: 17f.). The Hopi people use to gather and all together dance the rain-dance in order to attract water from the sky. Their emic motive is clear: the attraction of rain. As one may assume, this mechanism lacks a strict cause-and-effect relationship; and, this is probably clear to a lot of people among the Hopi. Nevertheless, the Hopi continue to gather for the rain-dance. The reason for this lies in the sociocultural function of it, as the rain-dance fulfils “the latent function of reinforcing the group identity by providing occasion on which the scattered members of a group assemble to engage in common activity” (ibid.: 17). Similar assumptions may be made about other religious beliefs and organisation. Thus, the emic analysis (see chapter 3.3.) is concerned with the motives, whereas the etics (this chapter) are all about functions. They might be similar, but as a rule, the more complex a society, the larger the difference between both.

Furthermore, the etic superstructural features of a society are referred to as “the (mostly) shared sense of reality that members of a sociocultural system have about the world and their role in it. The basics of this symbolic map of reality that each of us carries in our head are developed in our early socialization and are continually refined and shaped throughout our lives in interaction with others” (ibid.: 13). The more complex and various a society is – in structural terms: the more labour division exists – the more heterogeneous and different such a superstructure may appear, albeit this is to be considered relatively. Notwithstanding, all members of a sociocultural system live in the same system.

*Individual members of a society internalize the broader cultural superstructure in varying*
degrees, largely depending upon the extent of the division of labour and the resulting het-
erogeneity of the system. […] The division of labour has been responsible for some vastly
different human experiences, which have in turn generated ideas and ideologies that must
be encompassed by the cultural superstructure. In modern hyperindustrial societies, the
sheer size and heterogeneity of the knowledge base makes it impossible for either indi-
viduals or subcultures to internalize all the elements of the cultural superstructure. In addi-
tion, some individuals and groups have actively developed countercultural images that op-
pose the dominant superstructural framework by providing an alternative map of reality—
of the natural world, the social world, or both (ibid.: 261ff.).

This explains the occurrence of several superstructural strands. Generally speaking the
superstructure reflects the given structural constraints and is sometimes denoted as a
“rationalization process” (Elwell 1991), where members of a society rationalise about
their lives, thus try to justify it on a logical to them base.

So, what about European etic superstructure? As may be clear be now, the prominent
structural system in Europe is capitalism, evolving from the 16th century up to today in
an ever stronger manner. One of the core consequences of this social system, as already
indicated, is the perceived individualism, i.e. high specialisation. As Durkheim (1982)
argues, the more specialised roles people get, as a result of complexity and labour divi-
sion, the less they have in common with other members of their society. In contrast,
they become more dependent on them through the mechanism of labour division. Indi-
vidualism, in terms of specialisation, is thus an unavoidable, or even mandatory result
of a more complex society. To say it again, with Herbert Spencer:

As […] the social organism grows, its parts become unlike: it exhibits increase of struc-
ture. The unlike parts simultaneously assume activities of unlike kinds. […] The reciprocal
aid thus given causes mutual dependence of the parts (Spencer 1898: 462).

The competitive character of capitalism enforces this individualist trend. As has been
stated in chapter 3.3., the humanistic ideology does so, too.

The core principles of both, individualism and therefore competition, is key to both,
Enlightenment and capitalism. That is why, human rights are attached to the individual,
rather then to social groups. That is why individual responsibility is crucial to jurisdic-
tion. That is why the principle of individual efficiency is at the core of the European
canon of values. The declaration of pluralism of values, political drifts, etc. is another
expression for an individualist imperative (Soeffner 2014).
The maintenance of this values – and their functional task – is directly interwoven with the maintenance of capitalism, which itself is determined by the mode of industrial production. This causal chain underlines the importance of each very level.

It is not that social structures and cultural ideas do not matter in the analyses of these materialists; they are, in fact, critical in both affecting and motivating human behaviour. Rather, for the materialist, it is a matter of first principles: material conditions cause certain structures to arise and endure; material conditions allow particular ideas and not others to gain widespread acceptance (Elwell 2013b: 38).

“Nobody falls in love with an internal market” (Bundeskanzleramt Österreich 2016), as the Austrian chancellor Christian Kern recently quoted Jacques Delors (see as well chapter 3.1.). Hence, to sustain a sociocultural system, to make it function, it is of key importance to promote its core principles, translated into values, beliefs – in other words: into functional etic superstructure.

Thus, to give a short outline, European values and beliefs are functional features of its whole sociocultural system. Democratisation, pluralism and competition, secularization, individualism and bureaucratization are all results of – or responses to – materialistic fundaments. The etic superstructural ties are thus based on structural and infrastructural interrelations. How those can be systematically set in order will be part of the next chapter, the etic mental analysis. The evaluation of the so far gained explanations will be subject to the fourth chapter of this paper.

3.4.2. The Formation of an Identerest Group

So what to do with these results of emic and etic analysis so far? This part shall provide a logical conclusion of the etic analysis – the etic mental scheme (III) – taking into account the emic findings. Hence, it consists of an evaluation of emic assumptions and summarises the mentioned emic and etic evidence. By systematising the results, a logical argumentation, leading to an explanation of Europe’s status and behaviour will be the outcome.
IV – European Identity and Interest: The Formation of an Identerest Group

Most emic features (I, II) of Europe were concerned with the importance of common history, common values and the EU as its manifestations. Those values are, as arisen from Enlightenment and reason, seen as superior and universal. Therefore Europe’s moral leadership is claimed, which is also expressed in an othering process marking others as inferior or underdeveloped. Economic wealth and Europe’s role as a global player is thus mostly seen as own achievement. The emic behaviour scheme is a recommendation to the promotion and protection of own values. Another feature of humanistic ideology, additional to the human individual and universal rights, is the post-colonial or reflexive turn in the 20th century. Humanitarian projects and management of the past became part of official policies, enforcing development aid and democracy programmes.

The etic analysis (III) supports these findings in quite some part. Common history – as infrastructural fundament – and therefore a similar superstructural evolvement may well be etically supported. But there is quite a difference in the reasoning; and a difference in the findings as well.

The emic argumentation mostly lacks of an interdependence of European wealth, growth and e.g. African poverty. Moral or humanitarian, emic imperatives lead well to development aid and support in forms of financial or project resources, etc. However, structural inequalities are harshly denied and therefore little is done to overcome them.

As Feldman observes, EU officials e.g. are all about to

moral justification the traumatic effects of Europe’s narrowly defined legal migration channels. […]

EC official[s], must avoid two things: (1) portraying the migrant as an evil doer which would invite pushback; and (2) acknowledging the structural inequalities at work, because these could lead to a moral justification for illegal migration (Feldman 2011: 387).

Illegal migration is thus nothing, that can be accepted. So to say, the reflexive and post-colonial turn – I tend to speak of policies here, not of any academic research programme – is an emic ‘mystification’ process. Emics are used to cover ‘bad, immoral’ etics (Harris 1976) and to rationalise own existence and action. That most stories about the European Union start as a result of the prevention of war after World War II is also
evidence to a shortened emic perspective, blanking out hundreds of years of economic ties (Schmid 2016). The interrelation of European wealth and the exploitation of other parts of the world during centuries, however, is striking.

Moreover, development aid may be seen as a superstructural function of the structural system. It supports of course the humanistic ideology which itself is a functional part of capitalism. Besides that, however, it does not thwart capitalist structures or hierarchy. That means it does help on a small level, probably contributing to a minimum standard of livelihood. But it does not tear down borders, soften competition or try to dissolve structural inequalities between different parts of the world.

At the same time, the current system of capitalism and nation-states is emically presented as the famous ‘moral success story’, leading to the ‘best of all possible worlds’ (drawn on famous Voltaire’s (1913 [1759]) Candide), ‘we Europeans’ live in. This notion infers, that it is a teleological process in which everyone has to reach this, highest level. It is strongly interwoven with the assumption of the competitive human nature of individuals, only tamed by the state.

Hobbes’ narrative of the development from the natural to the political state in Leviathan is at the same time an origin myth of capitalist mentality. From the premise of each man’s endless desires to secure his own good, there inevitably follows a general scarcity of means, hence mutual incursions in which, the power of one man resisteth and hindereth the effects of the power of another (Sahlins 2008: 12).

This grounding impression of human nature, a ‘homo economicus’ nature, paves the way for a naturalisation of capitalistic values, of “culturally contingent, emic, euro-centric understandings of human behaviour” (Ringhofer 2016: 47). Thus, as Europeans live in the best of all possible (world-)systems, everyone else has to to that as well. Humanistically inferred and enlightened superiority sends its regards.

Some normatively leftist or liberal intellectuals recognise the very problem, e.g. the Italian academic Franco Berardi, denotes a future solution for Europe in three points: the fair allocation of wealth and capital, the opening of European borders toward Africa and Asia and the reduction of western consumption (Berardi, in: Drndić 2014). But, in etic terms, this would be the end of Europe’s fundament as we know it today, as it would deny the core principles of capitalism: limited access to means of production and
individual competition.

What is this Europe then? Is it a homogenous continent? Of course it is not. It is all about the digging out of etic ties, i.e. the systematic analysis of sociocultural evolution. As this evolvement was mainly based on global trade, industrial production and capitalism, it has its roots mainly in Western European states. Through interdependent relations of the world system as well as to responses to similar infrastructure, other states joined the former core group of France, England, the today BeNeLux and Iberian states.

This clear etic base in capitalist structural elements could be seen, for instance, in the financial crisis of 2008. The economic strength and clear commitment to neoliberal rules were of absolute priority when it came to the guidelines ‘Europeanness’. So, countries who were weak or demanding solidarity would not get it without complying to clear competitive rules of capitalism. The European unity of values, the emic mystification of solidarity values was highly questioned. The short emic motivation of solidarity was quickly overtaken by superstructural functional features aiming at the sustainment of the structural system.

The main actors of Euroscepticism thus follow this very neoliberal guideline of their superstructure.

Many are now proclaiming the future heralds the break-up of the European Union and the return to nationalist politics and more aggressive free-market capitalism. […] Europe currently seems to have little sense of an ‘alternative’ to the dominant policies of neoliberalism (Stevenson 2013: 23f.).

The core values of ‘Europeanness’ as superstructural functions are thus well supported – just as by eurosceptic movements. But, these values are emphasised in a nationalist way, re-orientating those to the segments, the main actor: the nation-state. This is mostly occurrent as response to a crisis threatening Europe to meet its structural obligations.

An etically defined Europe is to see as a conglomerate of segments, subsystems, i.e. nation-states. Emically a bound of ‘European identity’ ties them up to a close formation. Etically (and for some intents and purposes emically) those ties are well existing, how-
ever based in a common economic system. A dissolution of those economic ties would 
dissolve the superstructural ones. Similar to the segments of a society, the nation-states 
are the analytical groups in the organism of today’s world. Particularly in times of crisis 
this primacy of analytical groups toward descriptive ones becomes obvious. 
The bureaucratisation process in the evolvement of nation-states, however, is a strong 
indicator for the further structural integration of Europe, as “the creation of bureaucra-
cies themselves has often required the creation of other bureaucracies to supervise, con-
trol, or deal with them” (Elwell 1991: 17f.). So, the bureaucratic apparatus of the 
European Union might be a first step toward the further rise of complex evolution and 
the constitution of tied up and unified nation-states. But at the moment this cannot be 
stated, as the nation-state is still the main responsible regulator of power. 
So what is Europe then? Identity is a very diverse feature and refers to so many factors 
as origin, sex, tribe, region, ethnicity, culture, etc. What Ferguson states according to 
wars may be used as a metaphor for any organised group. The “highly variable basis of 
identity makes the frequently used catchall – “ethnic conflict”– inappropriate. [...] To 
focus on ethnicity makes it [only] seem that cultural difference is itself the cause of 
conflict” (Ferguson 2006: 53, emphasis added). Thus, a cultural, i.e. emic description or 
explanation is not enough. A common interest of economic dominance and similar 
structural constraints are inevitable elements of a common corporate group. To bring it 
down to a simple notion: the important notion of Europe is not a simple identical or 
simple political, or simple border-defined one; without infrastructural and as corollary 
structural similarities, no superstructural union can be established. Therefore, the notion 
of Europe can only be an “identerest” (ibid.) one, combining commonalities in identity 
with those of political consequences and material interests. This does not at all infer, 
that the identerest group is or becomes more and more similar or necessarily united. 
There is “no one group to lead” (ibid.), but a conglomerate of interests. In terms of 
global economic dominance, facing a common ‘enemy’, Europe, however, can be seen 
as an identerest group. Highly diverse and complex sociocultural groups become united 
through a common goal of dominance in the world-system. Again, Ferguson illustrates
this using an example of war, particularly the Iraq war in the 2000s. “Iraq and the United States are certainly not identerest groups [respectively], but the broader theory of practical interests shaping perceptions and being reinforced by identities and values of those who start wars – at least arguably – fits” (ibid.: 61). Thus, by means of common goals, diverse and heterogeneous groups may be united. The identerest concept does not at all deny emic factors as irrelevant or even abdicable. However, it denies their primary and decisive agency. Rather, they may appear only on the base of materialist constraints fulfilling a certain function to those.

In the light of the denial of structural inequalities and the promotion of own economic dominance, the European positioning in the global world may thoroughly be described as imperialist (Arendt 1986). “If imperial and totalitarian rule could be justified by refusing to recognize the humanity of the other then the honour code can be found alive and well in imperial and totalitarian Europe” (Stevenson 2013: 26).

**Summary: The Emics and Etics of Europe**

Thus, what is achieved by the analysis of the emics and etics of Europe? The etic mental stream (IV) of Europe tries to explain Europe’s current position in the world (a ‘core’ zone of economic wealth and trade) on an etic behavioural base (III; industrial production and capitalism). Simultaneously emic features (I, II; humanistic values, ‘European identity’ and the commitment to market economy) are compared to and interpreted in relation to those explanations. With all that being said, a quite sophisticated explanation of Europe’s evolving to its current situation can be achieved, taking into account all domains of sociocultural inquiry (see illustration No. 7).
About 500 years ago, the feudal system of production began to reach its limits. Step by step it switched to the industrial mode of production, triggered by a global trade system, where Europe had a key position in. This switch was a response to environmental constraints, such as the depletion of resources facing a constant population growth. Consequently to that infrastructural intensification, a change in structural features took place as well. The feudalist organisation was replaced by capitalist one. Obviously, the previous infrastructural and structural components reached their limits in meeting the social organism’s need. Kin-based feudalism literally could not feed the growing population anymore, so another structural system took over. Eventually, as a consequence of those changes in structure and infrastructure, a superstructural shift occurred. Religion as a superstructural function – I shall call it ideology here –, in short, telling people that the promising part of life will be the afterlife, did not fulfil an appropriate function any -

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>THOUGHT</th>
<th>BEHAVIOUR</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>I</strong> COMMITMENT TO HUMANISM AND MARKET ECONOMY</td>
<td><strong>II</strong> PROMOTION AND PROTECTION OF HUMANISM AND MARKET ECONOMY</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>IV</strong> EUROPE AS IDENTEST GROUP</td>
<td><strong>III</strong> INDUSTRIAL MODE OF PRODUCTION, CAPITALISM, INDIVIDUALISM</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Illustration No. 7: The Research Domains in the Sociocultural Field of Inquiry According to the Results of the Provided Research.*
more. Capitalism, a system of perpetual growth and sheer unsatisfiable need of labour force, is in need of a different superstructure than one promoting collectivist, unproductive values. The superstructural shift from religious fundamentalism to humanism is thus the equivalent to the shift of feudalism to capitalism. The ideology – i.e. the functional superstructure – of capitalism is humanism promoting values of individualism, the ‘emergence of the self-incurred immaturity’ (Kant 2016 [1784]: 1) and superiority. Religion, as well as humanism are adaptive ideological systems responding to the respective structural system. Of course, these ideologies pick up steam on their own and evolve probably even dysfunctional, emic features. However, in the long-term as well as particularly in critical circumstances, superstructural functions come out on top. The ‘moral success stories’, advocated by every ideology, represent a form of functional eclecticism and distortion. To dig out all – infrastructural, structural and superstructural – features of the sociocultural system of Europe, was the aim of this chapter.

Nevertheless, the respective features will become even more salient in exemplifying them. The last years’ refugee crisis shall serve as an illustration. Chapter 4 of this paper will apply the gained understanding of Europe to the refugee surge. This operation promises to be particularly fruitful, as the migration movement represents an external impact to the social organism of Europe. Consequently it will put the rules of emics and etics to the test and therefore illustrating the latter in particular distinctness.
4. THE ‘REFUGEE CRISIS’

“Africa has always been Europe’s problem”
Gregory Feldman (2012: 150)

“Most of what matters in our lives takes place in our absence.”

‘Europe and the refugee crisis’. At an early stage of the thesis, this was a working title. As mentioned in the beginning of chapter 3, the initial interest of this research project was to examine the huge migration movement of the last years toward Europe. I dedicated the preceding parts of the paper to the clarification of emics and etics as well as to the notion of Europe. So, eventually this chapter has the incidence of the asylum surge as its subject.

The so-called ‘refugee crisis’ is not a simple process. Furthermore, it is not limited to a small, homogeneous and circumvented region. On the contrary: as its extent got bigger and bigger over the last years, it became clear that it is a highly complex and transnational issue. As being discussed in chapter 2, the emic/etic distinction is of special importance and obviousness to complex issues. Moreover, as the research question points to the cause of a reaction, the scientific approach – home to the emic/etic distinction – is an inevitable instrument. The necessity and value of this approach to the research topic has already been elaborately discussed in chapter 2.

What is Europe more than the “small peninsula off the landmass of Asia” (Wolf 1982: 385)? This was the guiding topic for chapter 3. Applying the emic/etic distinction to Europe brought light to the emic understanding and the etic formation of this continent. Digging out the relations which bind the nation-states together was key to the analysis. Presumably, emic definitions differed from etic ones. The inquiry was deliberately

25 For a clarification of the notion’s use hereinafter, see chapter 1.
made on a non-specific level seeking for a general understanding and explanation of Europe. Etic explanations were compared to emic rationalisation. What do people think, say and interpret in their behaviour? What may scientifically be considered a valid explanatory note? These questions guided chapter 3.

Both, the elaboration of the emic/etic distinction and its application to Europe on a general level, pave the way for the upcoming inquiry: the analysis of the refugee crisis along the research question: How and why does an entity, a conglomerate of nation-states like Europe, (re-)act facing an asylum surge like the one of the past years? In other, more scientifically used words: how does a social organism react to an external impact like the refugee surge?

What do we need for this undertaking? First and foremost, we need to gather etic data about what has happened on this concern in the past years. Hence, the first subsection will consist of an historic overview. This chronographic outline as the etic behavioural account (III) will serve as a decisive base for a scientific analysis.

However, in order to gain a full understanding of humankind, an emic perspective is inevitable; therefore it will be the second step in this chapter. Similar to chapter 3.4.2. (IV), the emic argumentation (I, II) will be embedded in an etic context and, whenever possible, explained in superstructural and functional terms. The aim of this chapter is thus to give an answer to the research question, accounting for a scientific argumentation and providing an explanation using the concrete incidence. A macro-anthropological/-sociological embedding will follow in chapter 5.

4.1. A Short Historical Outline

This subsection is about Europe and refugees coming to the continent in the past up until today. It shall reveal in short the relationship between Europe and the refugees of the last years in etic terms, as human societies’ history is the base for macro-anthropological/-sociological theoretical inquiries (Elwell 2013b: 35). The chapter is about to bring empirical evidence and – later on – correlate them with the conclusions of chapter 3.4. In other words, the presented paradigm (chapter 2) as base for a general theory
building according to Europe (chapter 3) shall now be empirically put to the test on a concrete example. An important thing to mention here is, that this research proposal is not about explaining crises and wars neither in Europe, nor all around the globe. It is about the behaviour of a conglomerate of nation-states, more or less tightly unified in an entity called Europe, reacting to a – so-called or perceived – ‘crisis’. This very ‘crisis’ means a huge number of people coming from outside the conglomerate, crossing its borders and looking for support – for an undefined amount of time. The analysis focuses the external impact which affects external as well as internal reactions. The question to analyse is: who is affected by what and how the reaction – if there is one – may be characterised. In other words: how does the entity called Europe react in the face of external impacts – in emic and etic terms?

At the outset the inquiry will strive for the origins of the common Schengen territory abolishing border controls between some European countries. This is necessary as it comes along with a common organisation of migration and ‘border management’ (FRONTEX 2016). The EU-Turkey Treaty of 2016 can be taken as a final marking point of the analysis. As current and frequent changes of the situation are about to happen, an up to date analysis cannot be provided. This is though not necessary as the goal of this paper is to point to a qualitative evolvement, embedded in a macro-anthropological/-sociological inquiry. The goal of this subsection here, is then to state ‘what was actually happening’, i.e. provide an etic behavioural account (III).

**European Migration Policy and the Schengen Agreement**

To understand what happened in the refugee surge, it is necessary to understand what has happened in Europe before that. The integration of a common internal market across some European nation-states was a process triggered by the growing capitalist globalisation, especially in the second half of the 20th century. But the realisation of the internal market, i.e. the free movement of goods, was soon assumed to be inevitably interwoven with the implementation of free movement of people (Seehase 2013: 143). At the beginning of these attempts during the 1970s and 1980s, these precedents of the
Schengen Agreement (European Union 2009 [1990]) were focused rather on citizens of the EU than on everybody. However, with the implementation of the Schengen area the abolishment of internal borders, i.e. the free movement of every person within this area, came into force. The hereby important detail for this paper is that the abolishment of internal borders goes hand in hand with a common concern of external borders and hence with asylum and migration management, which as corollary was part of the Schengen Treaty. Although this sounds simple and logic, it was not. Problems like the multiple application for asylum in several countries (also known as ‘asylum shopping’) or the probable unjustified shift of applications to other countries (also known as ‘refugee in orbit’) appeared. (Seehase 2013: 146)

This finally concluded in the Dublin Convention which inter alia stated the responsibility of the very nation-state to examine the asylum application which has been entered first by the refugee coming from a non-member state of the Schengen area (European Union 1997: Art. 6, 7). Hence, the main task of dealing with refugees was delegated to the nation-states in Southern Europe bordering on the Mediterranean Sea as this was the way most of the refugees entered the EU (FRONTEX 2010; FRONTEX 2016). So, along with the abolishment of internal borders, the external borders of the Schengen area gained greater and greater importance. Accordingly, the nation-state as the evolved player in the world’s system of capitalism (see chapter 3.4.1.) delegated some of its responsibility of border protection to other nation-states. Eventually this lead to the establishment of an apparatus supporting those nation-states dealing most with the respective external borders: the establishment of FRONTEX (European Union 2004).

**FRONTEX as Facilitator of Border Management**

Although the “integrated border management”\(^{26}\), i.e. the totality of border and migration concerns and the deal with them on a multi-layered legal and administrative pillar (Hobbing 2005: 10), is clearly in the responsibility of the respective nation-states, FRONTEX is in command of support and facilitation. It

---

\(^{26}\) For a detailed elaboration on EU ‘integrated border management’, see Hobbing 2005.
should carry out risk analyses in order to provide the Community and the Member States with adequate information to allow for appropriate measures to be taken or to tackle identified threats and risks with a view to improving the integrated management of external borders (European Union 2004: Art. 6).

Thereby FRONTEX became, if I may call it that way, the ‘brain’ of Schengen border management. It is an agency which main task, adjacent to border protection or deportations, is to collect, compile and assess data in order to identify risks at all external borders of the EU, thereby phasing interests of trade and economy with interests of security. (Seehase 2013: 155, 193)

The information is compiled through various channels. For instance, all member states collect DNA profiles, fingerprints and biometrical data and provide all other member states with their respective database (ibid.: 149). Another example is I-MAP, an intergovernmental database in order to identify and track migration routes (I-MAP 2016; Feldman 2011: 382f.). The integrative migration map is co-initiated by FRONTEX and serves as a base for intergovernmental agreements and policy formation. To support this information gathering, a huge surveillance apparatus is held in place, e.g. including old Cold War satellite infrastructure, readapted by the EU with a budget of €50 million only in 2010 (Feldman 2011: 383). In general, the rising budget of FRONTEX from €19.2 million in 2006 to €92.8 million in 2010 is clear evidence to the huge and growing importance of the agency for the European Union (Seehase 2013: 210).

So, what can be inferred by this short abstract of FRONTEX and Migration Politics? The mentioned importance of protecting mechanisms for capitalist nation-states (see chapter 3.4.1.) is revealed in Europe as well. As in favour of an economic integration, the external borders are enforced, supported by a huge “migration apparatus” (Feldman 2012), trying to identify and consequently fight risks of (illegal) migration movements. The non-acceptance of free movement throughout the external EU-borders is of high priority, admittedly according to capitalist rules of competition, as the ‘liberal nation-state’ of capitalised societies demands a sharp separation of who is part of the solidarity group of welfare and participation, and who is not (see chapter 3.4.1. and 5.).
Migration Movements

This task was fulfilled by FRONTEX coping with a number of not more than 100,000 refugees per year from 2008 to 2013 coming over the Mediterranean Sea (UNHCR 2016). In 2014, however, the number of people crossing the European border illegally to the understanding of FRONTEX rose to more than 200,000 (IOM 2016), or even 280,000 (FRONTEX 2016); in 2015 it tremendously increased, exceeding 1,000,000 people (IOM 2016), or even 1,800,000 people according to FRONTEX (2016). The reasons for this might be found in the ongoing civil/international war in Syria and uneasy concerns in other areas in Asia and Africa. However, the aim of this paper is not to detect the direct reasons, but rather to focus on the reaction of Europe. For the sake of this argument, it is important to mention the extraordinary incline in arriving people. Those people mainly came over the so-called “Eastern Mediterranean Route” and further on over the “Western Balkan Route” (FRONTEX 2016: 9f.).

The Opening and Closing of the ‘Western Balkan Route’

This huge movement of people could cross the Balkans in the beginning rather unhindered of border barriers, although this is by far not to comprehend as an easy non-stop ticket. Rather, people were not directly hindered in crossing borders – sometimes deliberately, sometimes looked on helplessly by the border forces. In the following, three decisive incidences happened. Firstly, in September 2015,

in the face of tens of thousands of stranded refugees at the Hungarian border Chancellor Merkel decided ad hoc to suspend European asylum rules and allowing thousands of refugees stranded in Europe to enter Germany via Austria (Krumm 2016: 21).

In part, the ‘Western Balkan Route’ was enlarged to Germany. This, to make a constrain, can of course only be stated if the route was not intended to lead to Germany even before this; furthermore, albeit a German politician’s decision, it affected other countries like Austria or Sweden as well. In public discourse this act is known as the factual suspension of the Dublin Convention.

Secondly, after Hungary has closed its borders to the South yet in 2015, Slovenia and as
a consequence, the other countries on the ‘Western Balkan Route’ closed their south-bound borders in spring 2016 (Geinitz 2016). This literally meant the closing of the ‘Western Balkan Route’ as a transit way to Central and Western Europe for a mass, and thus the majority of people.

*The EU-Turkey Treaty*

Thirdly, in March 2016 the European Union made a pact with the Republic of Turkey aimed at the closure of the EU-Turkey border for illegal migrants (Council of the European Union 2016). With the German chancellor taking a leading role in the negotiations, all 28 EU member states agreed to the deal. This international Treaty includes commitments from both sides. In exchange for payments of €3 billion and the acceleration of the Turkish accession to the EU, Turkey committed to return all further migrants illegally crossing its borders toward EU member states; moreover, “Turkey will take any necessary measures to prevent new sea or land routes for illegal migration opening from Turkey to the EU” (ibid.). In exchange for every migrant returned to Turkey according to this Treaty, the EU is supposed to resettle a Syrian national to the EU according to the UN Vulnerability criteria. The goal of the agreement is that “irregular crossings between Turkey and the EU are ending or at least have been substantially and sustainably reduced” (ibid.). According to UNHCR (2016) numbers, until the beginning of October 2016 about 316,000 crossed to the border toward EU, albeit on many routes including the ‘Eastern Mediterranean Route’. Thus a considerable reduction of illegal border crossings from Turkey to the EU may be stated.

So, what may be picked from this timeline of events? To put it in a nutshell, this subsection is supposed to provide a basic etic behavioural account (III) for what happened in Europe during the last years in terms of refugee movements and how the EU dealt with it. FRONTEX symbolises the EU’s security mechanism in order to prevent illegal border crossing. This mechanism was built up and managed to cope well with a number of less than 100,000 refugees per year coming to Europe on illegal paths. In 2015 this
number took tremendous rise and obviously crashed the thitherto functioning border protection mechanisms. As a consequence, on one side this movement was accelerated at a latter level from Hungary onwards to Germany through the factual suspending of the Dublin Convention. On the other side, taking some time, many nation-states on the major migrant route closed their borders in order to prevent illegal migrants from crossing it. Eventually the EU made a pact with the Republic of Turkey aiming at the substantial and sustainable reduction of the number of migrants coming to the EU, which according to official data takes effect.

These macro-perspective etic data shall now serve as a guideline in the further evaluation and interpretation in the ongoing analysis. The next subsection will therefore embed this findings with emic data (I, II) and an etic mental conclusion (IV).

4.2. How and Why Does Europe React to the ‘Refugee Crisis’?

“... when survival is at stake, set ideology aside.”
Robert Carneiro (1992: 129)

Using the example of the refugees, it is an auspicious project to interweave the emic justifications of acts with etic analysis of the selfsame. This is the purpose of this subsection. The etic findings of the preceding parts shall serve as a backup for the emic accounts presented here. Along the paradigmatic guidelines all lines of argumentation shall be evaluated and situated in the respective category. On this base, chapter 4.2. includes the answer to the main research question. The four ethnographic modi will be, albeit in a slightly different manner, applied to the object of research. As the etic behavioural account (III) has been already presented, the emic accounts (I, II) will follow, consequently attended by some conclusions (IV).

The Fortress of Europe – an (Un-)Conscious Compartmentalisation Process

According to the etic behavioural account, Europe has built an external border around
itself or rather enforced it by an agency called FRONTEX. This was a consequence of the building of a common internal market area abolishing borders within Europe and in return enforcing external ones. We shall come back to FRONTEX in a moment, but to begin with, the compartmentalisation shall be provided with an explanation in etic mental terms (IV). So, how can this process be accounted for? As we have seen in chapter 3.4.1., capitalism is the key determinant for the evolvement of nation-states, as

there is a fundamental connection between nationalism and the global capitalist system (even in its neoliberal form). Capitalism generates nationalism as the condition of its continued existence as a system based in the global network of interlinked, but competing and often antagonistic, nation states that serve as its local conduits (Cetti 2013: 116).27

The merging of European markets to a single and common one is a subsequent process of the ‘nationalistic’ global capitalism forming larger units of competition as a function of growing complexity and economic size. As mentioned above as well, at the core of nation-states – as products of capitalism – is the safeguard of its ‘content’ and the protection of its borders. This is a main fundament of the competitive organisation of the world system. On a superstructural level this leads to the “naturaliz[ation of] a state-oriented imagination of the world” (ibid.). Corresponding to the principle of methodological holism, it is the wider socio-cultural context determining the individuals perception and not, in contrast, the individual itself as the decisive actor for any social phenomena. Hence, those national narratives, albeit probably below the awareness of the individual, influence the individual’s perception of reality. The structural process of capitalism and compartmentalisation forms “an essentialized understanding of national belonging formed in opposition to the essentialized characteristics of those who fall outside the national frame” (ibid.: 117), i.e. ‘stateless’ people like illegal migrants. People coming as illegal migrants or refugees are per definition the odd ones out, as they do not fit in the state-centric classifications and organisations of European – and other Western states’ – understanding of the world. This binary logic of associated and non-associated, of ‘us’ and the ‘others’ is, as we have seen in chapter 3, key to the humanistic Enlightenment perspective. This emic mental account (IV) rather elucidates a

27 For a general overview of the effects of illegal migration to Europe on a superstructural level, see Cetti 2016.
superstructural function of capitalism, promoting its fundamental principles (of competition) and thus re-enforcing it in form of feedback loops.

So, “[…] how is it that […] asylum-seekers have come to be seen as threats to national security? Why are people, who allegedly intend no harm [to a state they come to] categorised as security threats” (Devetak 2004: 101)? Regardless of the intention of the coming persons, they are emically considered alien and are often denied a legal identity. And by their uncontrollable way of entering e.g. the EU, they are considered a danger. This danger is key to the European understanding as it in emic terms justifies the necessity of protection of the own, good and superior system of values, whereof the nation-state is a crucial and coherent part. A ‘pan-European identity’, by reason and universal claim is enforced by means of the marginalisation of illegal migrants who do not respect the rules and foreseen mechanisms of European nation-states (Cetti 2013: 120). The (I) emic mental – vulgo denominated as ethnocentric – assumption of Europe as a whole being superior to others, leads to the emic behavioural account (II) of protecting this superiority by various mechanisms, prioritising border protection. The etic behavioural account (III) approves this protection, albeit due to different reasons. It may be concluded (IV), that the constraints of the capitalist system as a consequence of productive and reproductive intensification, determine the sociocultural system to enforce its borders in order to ensure competition, e.g. a difference in costs of production, and thereupon a perpetual growth.

The justification of the upholding of a protection mechanism is – of course – far from this etic conclusion. It is emically mystified and bound to superstructural functions, as superstructure accounts for the values and mental environment. To repeat Kant’s statement quoted in chapter 2, the nature of all things is emic to people as insiders. Hence, protecting borders is rooted in the alleged superiority of European values.

The insistence on universality, however, lends the legal and administrative application of ‘global migration control’ the appearance of an instrument that, while responding to the everyday concerns of national citizens, exists in a realm guided solely by abstract principles, above and beyond the taint of everyday, nationally specific political demands. The forced migrant can therefore be dehumanized and reduced to an ideological abstraction through the imposition of a universally applicable ‘alien’ identity (Cetti 2013: 139).
Surveillance of emically illegal migrants is justified by the maintenance of own, superior universality. That is why FRONTEX was established and cheerfully justified, as ensuring a uniform and high level of control and surveillance, which is a necessary corollary to the free movement of persons within the European Union and a fundamental component of an area of freedom, security and justice (European Union 2004: Art 1).

Thus, the protection of Europe and, according to the emblem of FRONTEX, of liberty, security and justice (‘libertas – securitas – justitia’) is a logical consequence of the emically claimed superior universalism. The maintenance of liberty as a value of unmatched importance justifies its protection per emic definition (cf. chapter 3.3.). FRONTEX fulfils the preservation of this right with the help of the highly equipped instruments of surveillance of migrant movements, even on non-European territory. However, this surveillance is not a mere reaction anymore but a quite sophisticated, foresightful engagement.

The European Union’s (EU) external borders themselves have become increasingly securitized […] and detached from their territorial remit, guarded by the technologies of surveillance and interception and extended far beyond the region into the high seas and deep into other continents. As a consequence, the forced migrant is regarded, pre-emptively, as harbouring the intention to cross into Europe illegally long before they reach the actual geopolitical borders (Cetti 2013: 115).

Furthermore, as the stick to those values, including rules of rule of law and the maintenance of the nation-state are of highest priority, they represent the guideline everything has to be subordinated to. Structural inequalities are denied by EU officials (Feldman 2012, see as well chapter 3.3.), illegal migration is tried to be undermined by all means, whereas the respective mechanisms, like maritime surveillance is interpreted as a helping mechanism for the migrants (Feldman 2012: 387).

These emic accounts (I, II) are a clear superstructural function of the etic constraints (III) they are circumvented by, i.e. capitalist world organisation; this underlines the etic mental account (IV) of chapter 3: Europe’s formation as an identerest group.

The above described features provide almost per excellence the definition of an identerest, or “ethnopolitical group” (Ferguson 2006: 53), as a “group[…], whose ethnicity has also political consequences resulting either in differential treatment of group members or in political action on behalf of group interests” (ibid.). Thereby identity is vari-
ous in merging selective features, but usually broken down to common history, culture and myths of common ancestry. All those features are important parts of the described emics of Europe (I). In addition to those emic features, etic elements force the building of identerest groups. By means of global capitalism, Europe is bound by the common interest of controlling means of production (IV). The emic perspective accounts for common values, emphasising them as universal – and thus superior to any other. This nimbus of superiority welds the nation-states together; however, it is only the super-structural expression of infra- and structural commonalities. Thus, both emics and etics are decisive, albeit the further is influenced by the latter. The humanistic values and principles are a functional, superstructural feature of the sociocultural system of Europe, promoting themselves the very fundamental etic mechanisms they depend on. This, however, may be exercised in a mystified manner, transfiguring the etic reasons to emic elements.

On this general base of explanations the subsequent paragraphs shall scrutinise the events of the 2015 migrant movement.

*The Crash of the Fortress? – The ‘Crisis’ Coming Up the Way to Europe*

As may be clear due to the precedent analysis, the protection mechanism is of high importance to the conglomerate of nation-states referred to as Europe. It is ensuring the maintenance of ‘universal values’ (I, II) and of the capitalist system (III, IV). What happened to this very protection mechanism during the refugee crisis and before is subject to this subsection.

For a long time, up to 2013, the protection mechanism was working orderly as not more than 100,000 people managed to enter the EU illegally. FRONTEX may not be the cause of these numbers but rather a facilitator in order to get the border under control. Starting in 2014 and hitting its peak in 2015, the migration movement’s numbers exploded to more than ten, referring to FRONTEX numbers, more than 20 times its previous volume. As might be assumed, this sheer number overstrained the protection mechanisms installed before. FRONTEX could probably track the migrant movements but
could not stop them, as the information system with its surveillance apparatus works irrespective of the intercepted amount; the implementation units, however, were overwhelmed. Moreover, direct use of force in order to stop a person is strictly prohibited due to the own rules of humanistic values. The number of migrants could not be stopped by the so far established means. Thus, regardless of the source or reason for the increased migrant movement, the installed protection mechanism ceased to work, or rather to succeed.

As often mentioned in the course of this thesis, the application of humanistic values and rules are key according to the emic ‘Europeanness’. This is based mainly in the individualism triggered by the capitalist evolvement of specialisation. Due to this individualism, all socially entitled values are fixed to the individual, i.e. individual rights are made to human rights. Those rights are emically supposed to be of top priority. And this as corollary was the motivation for the German chancellor Angela Merkel to suspend the Dublin Convention and let Syrian migrants, stopped in Hungary and staying there in conditions assumed to be far from humanistic, proceed on to Germany. In Germany as well as in a lot of other Western countries this act was “initially praised as an act of humanity and moral leadership” (Krumm 2016: 21). However, what followed was the closing of the ‘Western Balkan Route’ and eventually the EU-Turkey Pact.

Admittedly, there were reactions in clear contrast to those welcoming actions, as the growing extent of right-wing movements show. As we have seen, the existence of several emics in complex societies is quite usual. Albeit we cannot account for all of them, we will get back to the right-wing movement in chapter 4.3. Nevertheless, what seems to be a wide consensus, even in those circles is that one has to help refugees fleeing from war. This, however, should not be done in Europe, but rather outside its borders.

So, even perfectly justified in emic mental terms (I), the act (II) of suspending the Dublin Convention was not of perdurability. It was succeeded by harshly contrary action, which is strong evidence for the primacy of infrastructure and structure over superstructure and emics (III). The superstructural component of individualism is a functional feature of capitalism, ensuring or rather promoting competition and specialisa-
tion. The correspondent values including human rights are rather to be considered an epiphenomena, albeit of high superstructural importance. Nonetheless, especially outside the own scope and outside own interest they play a minor role. One could also argue, that in this case – facing a crisis – they are dysfunctional features, having lost their superstructural function. Examples to this are working conditions of sewers in Asian countries sewing clothes for European markets in conditions which would not be accepted in European factories. But as long as they are not visible or omnipresent to Europeans, they are endured. The upheld nimbus of human rights is merely a sign for emic mystification of etic reason.

The etic approach – like Feldman’s (2012) non-local ethnography – is thence a rather durable approach, outlining consequences in the long-term. Thus, to put it simple, the (short-term) values of humanity are in the long-term contradicting the function of competition. The emic and emotional reaction of people, e.g. Angela Merkel’s act, may then be pushed for a start. But in the long run, it is highly unlikely for a dysfunctional emic position to enforce oneself. The nation-state as an etic expression is based on the mode of production and the social and political organisation. This argument points to the distinction between an emic motive and a superstructural function. Whereas some humanist features as the protection of people’s dignity are a motive here, the enforcement of upholding fundamentals of competition, i.e. legal rules and border maintenance, is an operating function to structural and infrastructural fundamentals. The nation-state and the conditions it provides are a back coupling to material conditions, a feedback to capitalist and industrial production. The decision of suspending the Dublin Convention was most probably an emic one, albeit it might have been a reaction to realities recognising the hardly feasible implementation of the treaty by the overwhelmed police authorities. Notwithstanding, it had to give way to deeper based constraints. The emics are thus always a direct and short-term reaction. Using the example of the opening (or not closing) of a route to Germany, the upholding of humanistic values was a motive (I) and used as a justification for the open transfer of refugees from Hungary to Germany (II). However, in holistic and materialist perspectives the counter-action of closing borders
and forming a treaty about closing external European borders (III) are to be seen as im-
parts corresponding to structural groundings (IV). In emic terms (II) this, however, is
justified as an action against smugglers and for the safeguard of migrants. In etic men-
tal terms, a short deviation of emics was possible; nevertheless this cannot endure for a
very long time, as any superstructure is determined by structural and infrastructural
components. The primacy of intensified reproduction and production and as corollary
the system of capitalism will not allow free movement of people through borders of
capitalist competition.

The argument of the cease of humanism due to material constraints will probably sound
unsound for quite a lot of Western readers, as the basic principle of Western, European
emic consciousness is an idealistic individualism, i.e. the self-determined conduction of
life or even history. The “anthropocentric illusion” (White 1949: 330) of man’s control
over civilisation is common and widespread, as it is then argued,

that it is people, not culture, that do this or that mistake a description of what they see for
an explanation of these events. Seated in the Senate gallery they see men making laws; in
the shipyards men are building freighters; in the laboratory human beings are isolating en-
zymes; in the fields they are planting corn, and so on. And, for them, a description of these
events, as they observe them, is a simple explanation of them: it is people who pass laws,
build freighters, plant corn, and isolate enzymes. This is a simple and naive form of anthrop-
ocentrism.

A scientific explanation is more sophisticated. If a person speaks Chinese, or avoids his
mother-in-law, loathes milk, observes matrilocal residence, places the bodies of the dead
on scaffolds, writes symphonies, or isolates enzymes, it is because he has been born into,
or at least reared within, an extrasomatic tradition that we call culture which contains these
elements. A people's behavior is a response to, a function of, their culture. The culture is
the independent, the behavior the dependent, variable; as the culture varies so will the be-
havior (White 1959a: 241).

So, it is the culture that is determining the individual’s action and thought, i.e. rooted in
a methodological holism, argued by Durkheim (1982), White (1949), Marx (1859) and
many others. Culture as a superstructural element, in turn is determined by economic
and political organisation and eventually by natural constraints. Culture itself, however,
is a mechanism, a web of information of the social organism, like genes are to biolo-
gical organisms (see chapter 2.3.). The desired control over man’s civilisation is thus
indeed an emic illusion.
The closing of the ‘Western Balkan Route’ by the respective nation-states, and eventually the EU-Turkey Treaty are thus ethically constrained, as they fulfil the function of promoting their structural base (IV). The fundamentally important mechanism of protection of Europe was crashed through the unexpected high number of people coming across its borders (III). Apart from some emic welcoming reactions – as well as hostile ones (II), the etic back coupling came eventually into force: closing borders and trying to build up the protecting mechanism once again. Eventually, the EU-Turkey Treaty is an act trying to recapture migrant movements in pre-2015 channels – beyond the borders of Europe. To put it in a nutshell: Humanism is important, but in times of crisis, it loses its previous priority and function, or rather: “when survival is at stake, set ideology aside” (Carneiro 1992: 129).

The Preliminary Avoidance of the ‘Crisis’? – The EU-Turkey Treaty

The main goal of the EU by making a pact with Turkey was the ending of illegal border crossing toward the EU (I, II). So, tying in with the precedent chapter, the goal was to re-establish a protection mechanism preventing people from getting into the EU. The pact does neither target any causes of migration nor point toward a fight with the reasons and sources for migration. Emically this seems to be rooted in the avoidance of recognising structural inequalities (I), i.e. poverty as a result of the economic relations of the world system as justification for migration (Feldman 2011: 387). This seems to be key to the European self-conception, as it supports the own position achieved through competitive evolvement and allegedly through own strength. In addition to the denial of this reasons for migration, any illegal way of migration is seen as unacceptable, referring stranded people to the official legal migration channels provided by the EU. Any border management concerning illegal border crossing is thereby justified as a help and support for people who go astray.

The state – in the form of cooperation among EU member states – innocently strives to save lives of people who have made ‘bad choices’, in a neoliberal register, or who are passive victims of invisible evil-doers such as smugglers travelling incognito (ibid.).

Hence, in emic behavioural terms (II), the EU-Turkey Pact is just a mean to help mi-
grants not to drown in the Mediterranean. This, however, masks the fact that according to current circumstances, the application for asylum is de facto only possible once one has reached a EU country. An etic explanation has already been given in the preceding paragraphs: the maintenance of the capitalist organisation of society and the world, i.e. nation-states, and the maintenance of competition and thus clearly defined and protected borders (IV).

However, another emic – mainly non-governmental – argumentation condemns the pact, calling it a “‘pact of shame’ [making] the repressive Turkish government of Recep Tayyip Erdogan the main cop controlling the flow of refugees towards Europe” (Nichols 2016). This ascribes a moral guilt to the EU, accusing the missing humanitarian aspects in the Treaty, as the condition of the migrants are delegated to a country which is accordingly doubted to guarantee the same humanitarian standards like the EU. These quotes offer another emic perspective (I) seeing the pact as a sellout of European values (II). This arguments, however, are rarely uttered by people incorporated in the analytical system, i.e. people in charge of decisions on a state level. Although those people may well think like that, they are determined by the constraints of their political organisation and eventually by the interests of their sociocultural system. The argument will reappear in chapter 4.3. concerning national emic discourse. For the moment I shall give a short summary of the analysis conducted so far.

**Preliminary Summary: What Happened in Europe?**

What we have seen so far is that Europe is embedded in a compartmentalisation process toward states which are on a far different level of wealth and with different infrastructural fundaments. The capitalist evolvement as a consequence of industrial infrastructure of a mass society sends its regards. The logical conclusion is thus the ever stricter protection and the maintenance of a competitive order in the world (IV). In emic terms those basic or hard consequences are denied (II); however, the own economic wealth is underlined but rooted in own achievements, values, etc. Compassion with migrants is expressed, help is offered, albeit not in structural terms, but rather in a
charity manner or through surveillance forces actually aiming on border protection.

Having shed light on those correlations, the analysis aimed to provide an understanding of how Europe in general reacts to the migrants, especially a huge number of them. Along the etic behavioural account (III) the analysis was conducted and conclusions were drawn with an etic mental account (IV), interweaving the emic side (I, II). Due to the capitalist organisation of Europe and large parts of the world, borders on the edge of the social organism which responds to similar materialist constraints, are built and maintained. Emic compassion cannot cozen etic constraints, albeit they do well in emic life.

Apart from this conclusion on a macro-level of the organism, two things are still ahead: firstly, how does the conglomerate react within itself, i.e. between the nation-states themselves? Secondly, how does emic discourse evolve concerning the refugee crisis?

*The Conglomerate of Nation-States*

The analysis so far always focused on Europe as a whole. This is perfectly fine as it concerned the whole conglomerate of nation-states which it was supposed to. The EU-Turkey Treaty was signed by all 28 EU member-states, the closure of the ‘Western Balkan Route’ includes EU as well as non-EU member-states. Nevertheless, the reaction of the respective nation-states differs. The variation in degree of affection among the several nation-states brings down the problem to another level. A lacking relation in analytical terms comes to light, which brings the segments, i.e. nation-states of Europe to the front. E.g. a pan-European distribution of 160,000 refugees faces strong opposition, especially from Eastern European countries like Hungary, Romania, Slovakia and Czech Republic (Krumm 2016: 30). Those states totally denied any responsibility and as corollary refused to take care of any refugees. Their emic position (I) was mainly a rejection of European ties in exchange for a reenforcement of the nation-states. In etic mental terms (IV), this action is most probably rooted in the own position of the countries in the capitalist system. As “[…] competitive international pressures generated by the global economic system have helped forge a hierarchy of nation states within the re-
gional bloc” (Cetti 2013: 121), those countries are at the minor side of “[…] uneven capital and labour flows between the nation states [which] accentuate uneven development“ (ibid.).

Thus, their ‘Euroscepticism’ concerning the refugee movement is most probably due to the breakdown of capitalist involvement to the nation-states. The external impact of 1.8 million refugees coming to Europe is nothing directly related to their economic involvement in the capitalist system. Although most migrants worldwide stay in their country or a neighbour country, the goal of the migrant movements toward Europe does apparently not aim at semi-peripheral countries. The crash of the European protection mechanism lead then to the consequence of the building of a national one: a fence at the nation-state’s border. As soon as the global capitalist system ceased to guarantee its benefits, it is a national protection mechanism of avoiding any potential risk for the own force which takes effect. In contrast to states like Greece, Italy or Spain who are limited to their geographical constraints as first-entry countries, other states like Hungary are in a position to build protection mechanisms in order to deny access. Greece is at the border of the European protection mechanisms, the famous external European border, which ceased to succeed in ending illegal migration. Countries like Germany, Austria or Sweden, where most refugees went to in the beginning, welcomed refugees. Later on, through the closing of the ‘Western Balkan Route’ the numbers decreased a lot and e.g. Austria or Sweden limited the numbers of official refugee reception as well. Emically, “the struggle between the two Europes — the one that wants people to see refugees as a threat and the one that sees them as fellow human beings — gets sharper with every passing week” (Nichols 2016). In etic terms however, there is only a Europe interested in an ending of (illegal) migration. Emic reactions may be pushed in either direction, but notwithstanding, they are all backed up in etic structure. As can be stated at the reactions of some nation-states, it varies according to the respective degree of affection, the environmental constraints and the respective position in the global world system. The important argument for this thesis, however, is that as Europe is tied together through capital flows, it acts like a social organism in face of outside dangers.
Regarding the conglomerate, however, it becomes clear that Europe is not one thing, but rather consists of segments, i.e. subsystems that are all expressions of the respective interests. That is why Europe will speak with one voice only if this voice is determined by a common interest. In the long-term this is the case; short-term reaction, however, may either hinder or accelerate this process. This paper is concerned with a macro-analysis of Europe and seeks to point to qualitative reasoning. An analysis of every single state’s position therefore lies outside the scope of the present discussion. However, it may serve as an eligible research desideratum.

Exceptions to Etic Protectionism

This non-acceptance of refugees is, however, just a response to own economic constraints, as the social security system is limited to a certain amount of people. Nevertheless, the economic labour force of cheap workers, probably without any social costs for society is no problem for etic integration. The structural system of capitalism is based on several fundaments. Industrial production, growth and competition are some. The unequal distribution of control over means of production is of key importance, a result whereof is the competing supply and price of labour force. Through illegality orderly mechanisms of control over this competing supply are disabled. That means illegal migrants often are in forced positions offering their labour at a far lower price than the respective national standards would allow, i.e.

[...] many so-called ‘illegal migrants’ continue to be employed in key economic sectors. The agricultural and food-processing, catering, service and construction industries in many European countries rely heavily on their labour [...] They are policed as ‘outsiders’ even as they are economically incorporated through the informal labour markets (Cetti 2013: 136).

Thus, the global structural forces deny equal access to means of production, i.e. they deny an uncontrolled or even free movement of people from nation-states with lower access. The example of the sewers in Asian factories points to the same argument. The global visa regulation suggests evidence for this regulation as well. Whereas citizens of the leading economic, capitalist states are able to more or less freely move within that most countries often without a visa, access for citizens from other, so-called ‘peri-
pheral’ states, mostly in the ‘Global South’, are denied easy – or total – access. In contrast, the unequal prices for labour function as a trigger for capitalist organisation, as many products are produced in countries with low costs. So, the economic integration on shadow markets of migrants with no legal documents is highly endorsed. A full, official integration, however, is denied, as an open legal inequality within the competing segments of capitalism is impossible.

*Emic Discourse: Europe, What to Do Now?*

As far as the analysis is concerned, it scrutinises the incidence of mostly last years asylum surge. This section’s aim is to go further and try to focus on the present, or rather future. Of course, due to effects of emergence and the complexity of determinants, a prediction never can be made with high precision. If at all, we usually can extrapolate some phenomena ceteris paribus. Not to mention emic accounts, as it is impossible to predict emic rules (Harris 1974: 248f.). So, what is at the core of this chapter then? It is merely an evaluation of emic predictions on base of the so far conducted analysis; thereupon it will provide reasons for the approval or refusal of those emic arguments.

So, what should Europe to do now? We have given explanations for the core lines of reaction of the conglomerate of the nation-states: EU official statements about what happened, their claims for Europe’s actions as well as the etic backup they all are constrained by. Now, we shall turn to an outline toward the future. What to do now and how to go on?

This is done in the following manner: According to three ‘What to do now’-statements of British and German ministers (Gabriel / Miliband 2015), Amnesty International (2015) and two German journalists (Munzinger / Schulte von Drach 2015) the different (or similar?) emic mental and behavioural account is given. On base of the etic account in chapter 4.1. and 3.4. those accounts will be embedded in an etic mental account, i.e. a scientific conclusion.

Besides some far-reaching positions of Amnesty like the “guarantee [of] full funding to
alleviate refugee crisis worldwide” (Amnesty International 2015), the resettling of all refugees in need or the possible border crossing without passports, all three statements are quite fairly similar. All emic behavioural accounts (II) state the necessity of a maritime salvage programme hindering people from losing their lives on the Mediterranean flight routes. Secondly, a common claim is to “investigate and prosecute trafficking gangs” (Amnesty International 2015). Thirdly, safe and legal ways for refugees to Europe should be established according to the three articles. Those may include reception camps for refugees outside the territory of EU, e.g. in Northern Africa (Munzinger / Schulte von Drach 2015), a solidary European distribution and standard system to allocate the refugees (Gabriel / Miliband 2015) or even a global refugee system available everywhere and every time (Amnesty International 2015).

Of course, there are other emic voices as well, arguing for a sealing wall at Europe’s borders ever since (Ritter 1990) or increasing deportations as for deterrence of future migrants (David Cameron, in: Kingsley 2015).

The above quoted claims, however, are almost classical expressions of humanistic superstructure. Illegal ways as well as anything supporting illegality is to be denied. The emic mental stream of humanistic values leads to an emic behavioural account (II) of helping in time of need. Furthermore, there is an emic call for legal ways for refugees to come to Europe. However, the etic behavioural stream (III) backs up only a part of those claims. As we have seen, any border crossing is aimed to be significantly reduced. E.g. the EU-Turkey Treaty is evidence to that. Albeit it entails a condition of resettling a Syrian refugee legally to the EU for every illegal Syrian refugee deported from the EU back to Turkey, this condition seems to be a farce. The main aim – and apparently the working impact – of the pact is to end border crossing. Consequently it also should end the legal resettlement of refugees in exchange for deported illegally migrated refugees. As in former situations,

the EU’s solidarity was expressed through financial and other support to the humanitarian effort. However, a chance was missed to demonstrate visibly its political commitment to sharing responsibility for refugee protection through relocation and a substantial resettlement effort (Garlick / Selm 2012: 22).
So, in etic mental terms (IV), there is a structural opposition to opening borders in a substantial manner. There is a superstructural need for humanitarian acts like rescuing drowning refugees or establishing a development aid. The latter, however, is not aiming for structural equality, but rather as a charity action for own humanistic standards, or even as means to keep standards of livelihood at a minimum standard in order to prevent people from migrating. But there is an infrastructural and as corollary structural need for protecting competitive segments. Therefore Europe will not open its borders.

With increasing international refugee movements coming up, the above named European interest in a minimum living standard guarantee in ‘peripheral’ countries rises, so people will rather stay than try to come to Europe. Notwithstanding, there is a higher demand for the keeping of European living standard. The predictions to the future may thus simply be extrapolations of the capitalist system. Capitalism is based on competition and unequal costs of production. The migrant movements, albeit only in a relatively low number and possibly unconsciously, strive for a crashing of the borders of competition – at least for themselves. This cannot be admitted by a capitalist Europe. However, the structural integration of cheap labour force will likely strengthen the economy.

**Emic Mystification or How to Live in an Ideological Society**

A general trend in European societies which can be identified over the period of the last years is a political shift to the right, i.e. the strengthening of right-wing parties. Those, as concerned in chapter 3.3.3. are often eurosceptic movements; nevertheless, main topics are the anti-migration policy as well as the accumulation of protest voters acting against established structures or parties. Having little influence in many countries back in 2014, they rose significantly with the ongoing migrant movement in 2015. (Krumm 2016: 30)

A further feature of this political movement is the decreasing popularity of political leaders who are in favour of a liberal approach to refugees, e.g. of chancellor Angela Merkel in Germany. This may be recognised also in general public media, calling the
coming refugees a “national catastrophe” (ibid.: 21). This emic reaction, often influ-
enced by discourse rather than by practical experience or contact with refugees, is a su-
perstructural function of established structural features. As has been seen in many im-
migration movements, the first emic reaction is often a hostile one. In the long-term, as
soon as immigrants are structurally integrated and often lead to an economic upswing –
e.g. in Israel after many immigrants came from the former Soviet Union – those anti-
immigrant movements decrease in size and popularity.

It seems to be that little can be done against the uprising of those right wing movements
unless time goes by and the structural integration can make an impact on superstruc-
tural features. Albeit the Merkel may act on behalf of Europe, she is elected by the Ger-
man people only and thus relies on German politics. Nevertheless, the long-term policy
can only be determined by etic factors, and those, as we have seen in chapter 3.4.
through the capitalist advancement of the European internal market, are already deeper
than national speculations may let assume.

As Margolis (2000) points out in her analysis concerning motherhood in the United
States, “such changes [...] are not isolated cultural artifacts resulting from random
ideological fashions” (Margolis 2000: 10). Rather the changes respond to external im-
pacts on the environment and are thus adaptations in infrastructure, structure and even-
tually in superstructure. Those adaptations are long-term, whereas pure emic actions are
not necessarily rooted in a deeper systematic framework and thus appearances at short
notice.

Thus, like in every society, there is a superstructure determined by structural, infra-
structural and eventually environmental constraints. This superstructure is a functional
ideology which feedbacks its fundaments. In Europe this adaptive ideology switched
from religious fundamentalism in feudalist times to enlightened humanism in capitalist
ones. This humanism supports the agency of human beings on an idealistic and indi-
nual base. Besides these alleged universal humanistic values, ‘European identity’ and
the commitment to market economy are ideologically supported. However, when it
comes to crisis, those universal values reach their limit of application: the European
border. As long as capitalist organisation with all its features of production, nation-states, etc. is at stake, dysfunctional ideology, i.e. humanistic values for everyone, will be set aside. The emic upholding of those values attended by the etic dominance of structural processes which contradict those values is what Marvin Harris called ‘mystification’. As long as the structural organisation of capitalism will exist and be backed up by the respective infrastructural determinants a long-term switch in ideology is not going to happen. But at the moment, capitalism is alive and well and most probabilistically will go on to do so.
“My advice [to policymakers] is obvious as well: ‘Level out global economic inequality so people can lead dignified lives wherever they are.’”

Gregory Feldman (2012: 199)

„Der Strom der Zeit läuft seinen Weg doch, wie er soll, und wenn ich meine Hand hineinstecke, so tue ich das, weil ich es für meine Pflicht halte, aber nicht, weil ich seine Richtung damit zu ändern meine.“


The concluding part of the thesis shall summarise the results of the conducted analysis. Although it may be tempting, no idealistic policy advise can be given at the end. As Feldman states in the quote above, the solution is more than obvious, but the way to get there is probably not reachable by some simple policy implementation. This is one of the results of this Master’s thesis.

Anthropology is the science of the human condition. As stated in the very beginning of this inquiry, the aim of the latter is to find out about the human condition, i.e. how and why it is like it is today. Europe is a quite complex topic requiring a macro-perspective. These assumptions or rather indications tell a lot about the needed research design. That is why the paper is situated in a paradigm, relying on the scientific method (i.e. detect cause-and-effect relations), on a materialist perspective (material circumstances determine cultural and social features) and on a holistic perspective (social facts determining individuals), and eventually on punctualism (human behaviour has to be understood on base of humans as cultural beings, not simply as biological ones). The general or macro-approach of the topic specifies the scientific grounding of the work even more. There is an analytical need for non-culture-bound knowledge and therefore we need the emic/etic distinction, i.e. the distinction between particular insider’s knowledge and universal, scientific one.
So, let us then come to the core of the inquiry: how does humankind evolve, why do we live in a the world we live in? To find out about the causes and determinations we have to start in the fundament of each sociocultural system. As has been discussed in chapter 2, the universal components of each sociocultural system are infrastructure, structure and superstructure (Harris 2001: 54). As we are all ‘emic beings’ – if I may adapt a famous notion – all analysis usually starts with superstructural, and especially emic evidence. It is an obvious and frequent starting point for any research project, as it is taken from the mouths of participants. The examples of the holy cattle in India, the ‘rising’ sun or the Hoqi rain-dance may illustrate this. Chapter three, then started with the emics of Europe (I, II). However, following a materialist paradigm, a proper analysis of sociocultural systems will then immediately proceed to research the infrastructural components: How does the respective system reproduce itself and how does it draw energy from environment to satisfy needs of subsistence? A point where these features become particularly apparent is of course when those mechanisms change and as corollary the structural organisation of the sociocultural system changes as well. So, in the case of this thesis, one might ask: why did capitalism arise?

*Infrastructural Changes*

The key to this question is probably in the capacity limit of a mode of production for a certain size of population (Harris 1995: 314). All sociocultural systems are constrained by their environment. Through the enormous intensification of population and production at the end of European Middle Ages, the feudal system came to an end. It could not satisfy the needs of the population any more. “It is in the attempts of capitalists to overcome environmental constraints of depletion that the Industrial Revolution is born” (Elwell 2006: 54). This revolution, however, did not take place over night. There was a symbiotic relationship between the to for some 500 years (Harris 1995: 227). The rising global trade has done its share to counteract depletion of resources. However, no system can grow forever. At some point effects of emergence come into force, when the systemic limit is reached. Feudalism, as a mainly kin-based system of production obvi -
ously reached its limit of capacity. Capitalism, as “a system committed to perpetual growth in production and in the name of profit” (ibid.) hence replaced feudalism (Elwell 2006: 140ff.; Wallerstein 1974: 18; Harris 1990: 221ff.; Polanyi 2014 [1944]).

The kin- and dues-based system was replaced by the industrial mode of production. This is attended by the intense growth of population demanding means of subsistence. These infrastructural changes – themselves being a response to depletion of resources, i.e. environmental constraints – determined a change in structural parts of the system, i.e. the economic and political organisation. Capitalism is hereby to be understood not only as an economic, but as a societal system. As a feedback loop to infrastructure, capitalism is committed to perpetual growth and thus enhances populations growth and the intensification of production. The structural change to capitalism has two main consequences: it enforces an economic world-system (Wallerstein 1974) and triggers the development of secondary groups within society at the expense of primary groups. To understand, thus, the evolution of nation-states and any other structural organisation, one has to understand the changes in environmental constraints and consequently in infrastructure.

The Structural System

Following the materialist outline of the paradigm, attended by a methodological holism, it is not the idea of individual people who created nation-states and then an economic world-system after their fancy.

Rather, the world-economy was created first by establishing long-distance trade in bulk goods and linking production processes worldwide. 'Raw materials, food, fuel, and later manufactured goods all became a part of these 'commodity chains' allowing the accumulation of significant profit to European capitalists [...]'. With the establishment of capitalism, the modern nation state was created to foster and protect capitalist development, first in Europe and then throughout the world. It was the expansion of capitalism that fostered the growth of the interstate system, the sovereignty of nations, and the rise of nationalism. [...] The modern world-system has developed from one in which these 'nationalisms' were weak or nonexistent to one in which they were salient, well-ensconced, and pervasive [...]'. Other social groups were also fostered by the growth of the capitalist world-system, including social classes and household structures (Elwell 2006: 79).

So, it is the infrastructural constraints, enforcing global trade, which constitute a struc-
tural system of capitalism. The political organisation of nation-states was a consequence of this established economic system. Within the evolved nation-states, capitalism formed society: kin-based relations paled in comparison to property-based ones. Primary social groups lost their total function of subsistence for the benefit of the importance of secondary groups. The growing complexity requires a mode of organisation which took form in public institutions and growing bureaucracy. The accumulated capital fostered the establishment of social classes, i.e. the owner of means of production (capital) and the labourers offering their labour force at a competing price. On an international level, similar processes took place. This world system consists, according to Wallerstein (1974: 349) of ‘core’ states, ‘semi-peripheral’, and ‘peripheral’ areas, which is a property-based classification as well; nota bene of capital property. This classification is of course enforced through military power and technological innovation, fostering the division or ‘specialisation’ within the world system.

The structural evolvement of a social organism is indicated at the form of economic and political organisation. The latter will be under scrutiny in the following paragraphs in relation to superstructural features. The former was discussed above. The infrastructural adaption to environmental constraints fostered an accumulation of capital, initially by means of trade. Along this world-system, political units were formed as protection mechanisms for the capital. Hence, to understand a social organism, an understanding of economic processes as a repercussion of infrastructural features is inevitable.

Superstructure in Form and Function

[...] the entire etic conjunction is functionally dependent on ideological commitments to values and goals that enhance cooperation and/or minimize the costs of maintaining order and an efficient level of productive and reproductive inputs. It follows from this that ideologies and political movements which lessen the resistance to an infrastructural change increase the likelihood that a new infrastructure will be propagated and amplified instead of dampened and extinguished. Furthermore, the more direct and emphatic the structural and superstructural support of the infrastructural changes, the swifter and the more pervasive the transformation of the whole system (Harris 2001: 72).

Hence, the superstructure is not only a repercussion of structural and infrastructural components, but a functional support as well. By means of feedback loops, the super-
structural component of a sociocultural system underpins the infrastructural and structural base. Thus, to come back to the European case, capitalism is likely to be supported ideologically. As capitalism – within the nation-state, as well as in the world-system – entails a majority of people being rather deprived or even exploited, one could easily tend to challenge this assumption of superstructural, ideological support for structure. Elwell (2006: 84f.), however, lists several reasons why this does not happen. First of all, especially in global relations, there is no central institution responsible for the upholding of unequal relationships. The capitalist world-system is rather hard to grasp, “an entity that is extremely difficult to identify, blame, communicate with, or to march against” (Elwell 2006: 84). Secondly, the system is very dynamic. Capital flows are highly agile and thus the situation is ever changing. A buffer zone of semi-peripheral states which is up-and-coming absorbs a formation of clear opposition. As there is a – theoretical – chance for every state to grow, emerge and finally become one of the core states, it is likewise hard for an opposition to grow.28 Furthermore, the non-formation of global resistance (in a considerable degree) is ‘supported’ by a quite huge military juggernaut of the core states.

Those reasons, however, still have little to do with ideological or superstructural commitments. Elwell (2006) and Wallerstein (2000) mention a third and crucial reason though: an ideology committing people of the capitalist world-system to their system. It is an ideological commitment, a faith in economic progress and development giving rise to the toleration of “inequality, poverty, and political powerlessness because it was widely believed that tomorrow would be a better day, that our children would live richer and freer” (Elwell 2006: 85). But how does this faith become manifest in people’s lives? The ‘instrument’, if I may call it that way, to this manifestation is the liberal and democratic welfare nation-state, which developed in capitalised Europe of

28 Superstructural parts usually spread further and faster than technological ones, as Sahlins / Service (1960: 89) state: “We refer to the fact that in the spread of more advanced culture types very often the ideological component will tend to spread farther and faster than its technological component.” This is just to remind the reader that the nation-state is well a product of capitalism, but the ideological promotion of capitalism can also be a superstructural spread of the global system. Thus even, different infrastructural premises in several nation-states may support a global system, which they are part of. The next paragraphs about the ideological fostering of capitalism will explain this in a more elaborate way.
the 19th and 20th century. This state absorbs the worst shocks of capitalism by introducing a welfare state. The established safety net protected people from total poverty and thereby protected human dignity at least to a minimum standard. A second tool of the nation-state became its democratisation. People – and by the beginning of the 20th century literally all people – were allowed to vote for their government and thus legitimated the representation of the system. The third tool mentioned by Elwell (ibid.) is the enforcement of nationalism. Through the establishment of the former two mechanism this becomes evident. The democratic legitimation as well as the welfare system are based on a limited group of people paying/electing for it. Consequently, only a limited group is legitimated or supposed to profit from national services. After a long symbiotic period of overlapping with feudalism, by the beginning of the 20th century all capitalised sociocultural systems established this above mentioned mechanisms, spearheaded by England/the United Kingdom. Whereas the ‘instrument’ is the nation-state, the respective ‘ideology’29 to those tools is humanism.

At the core of humanism is the individual human being. Dignity of man and participation in society are key to Enlightenment as man’s ‘emergence from their self-incurred immaturity’ (Kant 2016 [1784]: 1). The individual and idealist emics mentioned above (see chapter 4.2.) are thus not surprising. They are epiphenomena of humanist ideology. The ideological shift from religious fundamentalism in the feudalist Middle Ages to enlightened humanism in modern capitalism is nothing but the consistent shift in superstructure, following a structural and infrastructural shift. Religion just as humanism are adaptive ideological, superstructural features.

This evidence points to the research design of this and many other scientific papers using the epistemological concept of emics and etics. As we are all ‘emic beings’, it is quite natural to ask people and check their understanding of life. The upholding of human rights, the importance of saving every single life, common, universal values of human dignity and the commitment to the nation-state are then not coincidental findings.

29 ‘Ideology’, set in quotation marks here, is to be understand as a superstructural feature. I am well aware of the fact, that in WEIRD emics it is often used in a pejorative connotation. I, however, clearly disclaim of this connotation here and shall use it in a scientific, functional connotation.
They are the starting point – as an emic mental account (I) – for anthropological research as they point to the core of the respective sociocultural system. Emics often reveal a lot, when embedded in functional superstructure. That is why the proper study of humankind is necessarily both, emics and etics. As the emics often serve as initial point to scientific research about humankind, they often serve as punch line as well. The more emics differ from etics, the more the emics are exposed in the course of research as a mystifying cover for superstructural functions. So does it in the context of this analysis. Europe's reaction to the asylum surge is – etically based – the attempt to reenforce borders and stop illegal migration. Emically, however, this is justified as an act of humanity, preventing migrants from drowning in the Mediterranean.

**How to Research Sociocultural Systems on a Macro-Level**

So, how to research into complex sociocultural systems? As mentioned above, emics often serve as starting points for a research idea. However, to analyse social organisms on a fundamental macro-level, one has to analyse all four universal components of social systems, i.e. etic infrastructure, structure, superstructure and emic superstructure. Starting from an emic perspective (I, II), things may find easy explanations. However, etics are necessarily subject to a holistic perspective. This, indeed, is crucial to macro-anthropological/-sociological inquiry (Durkheim 1982). A holistic perspective points to systemic interrelations and its consequences. “To demonstrate the global interconnections of human aggregates is one task; to explain the development and nature of these connections, however, is another” (Wolf 1982: 385). Therefore, one needs to get to the core of macro-anthropological/-sociological inquiry: science.

In the light of the conducted analysis, materialist determinism is quite a reasonable paradigm to research sociocultural systems. The evolution of humankind is not about the individual – it is about society. There *is* – to rephrase Margaret Thatcher’s famous quote (The Guardian 2013) – such a thing as society; and literally that’s all one needs to understand. This Master’s thesis was conducted using the example of Europe. Nonetheless the research design may easily be transformed to any sociocultural system, be that
the emergence of China, the formation of the United States of America or the collapse of the Soviet Union. There is no limit to science, and there is no self-imposed limit to scientific inquiry.

Every possible avenue of knowledge must be explored, every door tried to see if it is open. No kind of evidence need be left untouched on the score of remoteness or complexity, of minuteness or triviality. The tendency of modern enquiry [sic] is more and more towards the conclusion that if law is anywhere, it is everywhere (Tylor 1924: 24).

A clear research focus notwithstanding, all research about humankind, especially on a macro-level, has in common that it draws

heavily from history, anthropology, sociology, economics, and political science, as well as current world affairs. Like the founders of the social sciences themselves, each has attempted to contribute to a general understanding of the human condition (Elwell 2006: 149f.).

The study of humankind is therefore not subject to the constraints of any academic discipline. Rather, it is solely subject to the epistemological principle of emics and etics, i.e. the scientific way of knowledge.

Science is doubtlessly an auspicious undertaking. Especially materialist explanations, intuitively contradicting Western emics, may not seldom cause displeasure of many Western readers (Harris 1990: 10). This, however, does not mean that all scientists are ‘un-human’ beings or devaluing human action.

Recognition of the primacy of infrastructure does not diminish the importance of conscious human agency. Rather, it merely increases the importance of having robust theories of history that can guide conscious human choice (Harris 1992: 302).

One merely has to be cautious about affection in academia, especially the commitment of mainstream social science to social justice. “Such commitment need not jeopardize our obligation to objectivity” (Elwell 2006: 77). Or as Richard Dawkins once put it referring to catastrophes, he indeed does feel sorry as a human being, but not as a scientist (Süddeutsche Zeitung 2016).
LITERATURE


LIST OF ILLUSTRATIONS

ILLUSTRATION NO. 1: The Epistemological Distinctions in the Study of the Human Condition ......................................................................................................................... 8

ILLUSTRATION NO. 2: Basic Research Domains in the Sociocultural Field of Inquiry .......... 16

ILLUSTRATION NO. 3: All Operationally Definable Research Domains in the Sociocultural Field of Inquiry (Based on Harris 2001: 38) ........................................ 27

ILLUSTRATION NO. 4: Structure and Dynamics of Sociocultural Systems (Based on Elwell 1991: 25) ........................................................................................................... 36

ILLUSTRATION NO. 5: The Research Domains in the Sociocultural Field of Inquiry Adapted to Complex Sociocultural Systems ......................................................... 43

ILLUSTRATION NO. 6: The Research Domains in the Sociocultural Field of Inquiry Adapted to the Research Focus on Europe ......................................................... 55

ILLUSTRATION NO. 7: The Research Domains in the Sociocultural Field of Inquiry According to the Results of the Provided Research .............................................. 92
LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS

EU  European Union
GDP  Gross Domestic Product
IMF  International Monetary Fund
ISIS Islamic State of Iraq and Syria
RGB  Red-Green-Blue Colour Model
UN  United Nations
USA  United States of America
ABSTRACTS

English Abstract

Nowadays it is hardly possible to open a newspaper without reading about ‘Europe’ and the ‘refugee crisis’. What will the continent do about this crisis? Headlines of European newspapers come thick and fast; the so-called ‘refugee crisis’ is a topic of high concern in European public and political discourse. Therefore, this Master’s thesis’s aim is to find answers to questions concerning the fundaments of living together in Europe and as corollary possible courses of (re-)action. Hence, the guiding research question of the thesis is: How and why does an entity, a conglomerate of nation-states like Europe, (re-)act in the face of a so-called ‘refugee crisis’?

This project, as well as an increasing number of articles in anthropology, calls for a new focus on macro-anthropological/-sociological research responding to the increasing global interconnectedness. A consequence of macro-anthropological/-sociological research is the need of and commitment to scientific, and non-culture-bound methods. Particularly in complex sociocultural systems like Europe the need for a distinction between insider’s and outsider’s knowledge becomes obvious. The corresponding epistemological principle is the emic/etic (insider/outsider) distinction.

After an in-depth elaboration of the emic/etic concept, the thesis will apply this distinction to Europe, starting with an analytical demarcation of Europe. On the basis of the achieved fundamental understanding, the thesis will scrutinise the consequences of an external impact, i.e. the ‘refugee crisis’, to the sociocultural system called Europe. Hence, it will be analysed as to what mechanisms come into play in the face of an encounter with almost two million people crossing its borders. The Master’s thesis will put the rule to the test and typify the fundaments of Europe using the example of the ‘refugee crisis’. From this one must conclude that Europe – in emic terms – upholds the nimbus of humanism; however, – in etic terms – Europe is about to encapsulate itself as a result of capitalist constraints. For instance, the EU-Turkey Treaty is clear evidence to an emic commitment to humanistic intercourse with refugees in Europe; however, the etic aim is to stop (illegal) migration to Europe. Nonetheless, framed in a paradigm of science, methodological holism, theoretical materialism and ontological punctualism, the humanistic ideology, promoting the agency and dignity of human beings, is a superstructural function of the capitalist structure and the infrastructural mode of industrial production respectively. The concluding part will raise the findings gained throughout the paper to an even higher macro-level and thereby bring about a research guideline to further research desiderata.
Deutsches Abstract


Angesichts der zunehmenden Globalisierung unterstreicht die vorliegende Masterarbeit die Notwendigkeit makro-anthropologischer/-soziologischer Forschung. Makroperspektivische Ansätze erfordern wissenschaftliche (scientific) und nicht kulturbedingte Methoden. Besonders in komplexen, transnationalen Zusammenhängen, wie in Europa, wird die Erforderlichkeit einer Unterscheidung zwischen kulturspezifischen und universellen Wissenskategorien deutlich. Das zugehörige erkenntnistheoretische Prinzip auf welchem diese Unterscheidung beruht, ist die Unterscheidung zwischen emischem (emic, insider’s) und etischem (etic, outsider’s) Wissen.