Titel der Masterarbeit / Title of the Master's Thesis

„THE ART OF DARKNESS. THE IDEOLOGICAL FOUNDATIONS AND PRESENT IMPLICATIONS OF JIHADI COUNTERINTELLIGENCE, COUNTERESPIONAGE, DENIAL AND DECEPTION CULTURE“

verfasst von / submitted by
Ferdinand Jakob HABERL

angestrebter akademischer Grad / in partial fulfilment of the requirements for the degree of
Master of Arts (M.A.)

Wien, 2016 / Vienna, 2016

Studienkennzahl lt. Studienblatt / degree programme code as it appears on the student record sheet:
A 066 674

Studienrichtung lt. Studienblatt / degree programme as it appears on the student record sheet:
Masterstudium Islamwissenschaft

Betreut von / Supervisor:
Univ.-Prof. Mag. Dr. Rüdiger Lohlker
Table of Contents

Curriculum Vitae ................................................................................................................. 3
  Professional Experience .....................................................................................................3
  Academic Experience and Education .............................................................................4
Contact................................................................................................................................. 5
Abstract German .................................................................................................................. 6
Abstract English ................................................................................................................... 7
Introduction ......................................................................................................................... 9
Counterintelligence as a Doctrine .................................................................................... 15
  The Emni ............................................................................................................................16
  A Heritage of Secrecy ........................................................................................................18
Intelligence Apparatuses and Internal Security ............................................................... 23
  Electronic Surveillance ......................................................................................................28
  Spy vs. Spy ..........................................................................................................................30
  Deterrence-Based Counterintelligence ...........................................................................34
  Da’ish and the story of Ka’b ibn al-Ashraf .......................................................................38
Deception and Denial.......................................................................................................... 40
  Deception .............................................................................................................................42
  Taqiyya and Kitman ..........................................................................................................45
  Mutual Inspiration and Cooperation ...............................................................................48
Deceptive Means .................................................................................................................. 50
  Camouflage and Concealment .........................................................................................51
  Demonstration and Diversion ..........................................................................................52
  Disinformation ..................................................................................................................53
  Spoofing and Mimicry ......................................................................................................55
  Dazzling ...............................................................................................................................56
  Conditioning and Exploitation .......................................................................................57
  Display, Decoy and Covers ..............................................................................................58
An End to Itself? .................................................................................................................. 60
Knowing the Enemy ............................................................................................................61
Denial and Secrecy ................................................................. 68
Compartmentalisation ......................................................... 72
Secret Communication ......................................................... 77
Local Networks and Public Support ......................................... 79
Territorial Control .................................................................. 83
Conclusion ............................................................................. 86

Bibliography ......................................................................... 91
Journal Articles ...................................................................... 91
Unpublished Sources ............................................................ 96
Anonymous Sources .............................................................. 97
News Sources ....................................................................... 98
Internet and Online Media ................................................... 103
Think Tanks, Governments and NGOs .................................. 104
Books .................................................................................. 107
Classical Sources ................................................................ 112
The Quran ........................................................................... 116
Curriculum Vitae

Professional Experience

2014 – present, Doctoral / PhD Researcher | University of Vienna
Executing complex research and specialist projects to enhance expertise as part of PhD studies at this university institute.

• Doctoral Thesis: Jihadi Intelligence and Counterintelligence
• Jihadi Counterintelligence (ACIPSS conference presentation)

2013 – present, Tutor | University of Staffordshire
Working remotely on a part-time basis providing advice, guidance and support for international media students.

• Designing and delivering training modules and conducting seminars on open source research techniques and providing ongoing project support

• Mentoring and encouraging degree-course students one to one tutorial sessions, marking academic coursework, providing detailed feedback and working with students on effect project planning

2013, English Teacher | Harrow College
Achieved successful University of Cambridge English teaching certification through Harrow College (CELTA).

• Designing and developing teaching material and lessons, delivering English classes at beginner and advanced levels, combining learning across language, grammar and culture

2009 – 2014, Freelance/Part-time Media Contributor | i.a. Al-Jazeera English, TMZ, Bethnal Productions
Independent war journalist building experience of different languages, cultures, politics and religions.

• Working in Jordan, Israel, Palestinian Territories, Tunisia, Ethiopia, Libya, Somalia, Morocco, Western Sahara, Mindanao (Southern Philippines), Kosovo and Hong Kong, ensuring operational security of a 4-6 people team

• Gaining practical, global experience, remaining focused and resourceful in difficult and critical situations, acting calmly and making rational objective decisions in extremely challenging circumstances
Academic Experience and Education

2014 – on-going, Doctorate in Cultural Science | University of Vienna
Thesis: Jihadi Intelligence and Counterintelligence
Researcher, “Jihadi Intelligence - The Art of Darkness” PhD Dissertation in Cultural Science (Supervisor: Prof Dr Rüdiger Lohlker)

2016, Certification in Arabic | Jordanian/Palestinian Dialect, LGC, Jordan
Arabic Dialect Level A2-B1

2014 – 2016, MA in Islamic Science | University of Vienna
Presentation on Al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb
Author & Conference Speaker, “Ideological Foundations & Present Implications of Jihadi Counterintelligence, Counterespionage & a Denial & Deception Culture” Journal of Intelligence, Propaganda & Security Studies (University of Graz Vol 10/1, 2016)

2014 – 2015, LLM in Law (with distinction) | University of Law School, UK
Master Thesis: Jihadi Cyberterrorism
Robotics and Law in Warfare, IT Law, Law of Climate Change, Digital Evidence and Computer Forensics

An Assessment of the Jihadi Cyberterrorism Threat & Its Legal, Operational & Ideological Challenges (University of Edinburgh, Supervisor: Prof Dr Burkhard Schafer)

2014, Certification in French | Accord Language School, Paris
French Level A2

2013, Certification to Teach | English Language; Cambridge University via Harrow, UK

2013, PTLLS Teaching Qualification | Cambridge University, via Harrow, UK

2012 – 2013, MA in Intelligence & Security Studies (with merit) | Brunel University, UK
Abu Sayyaf Intentions and Capabilities
Intelligence Analysis
Intelligence History
Paramilitary Intelligence
Arctic Security and Confrontation (Brunel Univ. BASE simulation)

2009 – 2012, MA in Media & Television Studies | Royal College of Arts, UK
Contact

Ferdinand J. Haberl
contact@fhaberl.com
0043 (0) 664 1318361
Abstract German


6
Abstract English

Jihadi groups commonly establish their own intelligence agencies and train their members in the realms of counterintelligence. Although one can compare the modus operandi of groups like Al-Qaeda or Da’ish (ISIS) with governmental intelligence agencies, ideological and religious aspects of this phenomenon must be considered as well. Al-Qaeda’s recruitment of informants or Da’ish’s establishment of a surveillance state does not only have practical, military, strategic or tactical reasons; it also has a religious and ideological layer. Intelligence collection, intelligence analysis and most importantly the counterintelligence efforts of a jihadi group, organizational structure, recruitment and espionage deterrence are influenced and justified by the actions and military management of the Prophet Muhammad and other historic Islamic role models. This legitimization constitutes the fundamentals and starting point of a „jihadi counterintelligence culture“ and is of utmost importance in order to holistically study and comprehend this subculture, its intelligence- and counterintelligence strategies and the resulting present implications of the threat. This academic research has been written in order to enhance our understanding of jihadi methodologies, ideologies and strategies. The research results of this MA thesis are consequently intended for an utilisation within the realms of counter-terrorism, terrorism prevention, counter-narrative or for further research and analysis.
THE ART OF DARKNESS

The ideological Foundations and Present Implications of Jihadi Counterintelligence, Counterespionage, Denial and Deception Culture
‘And we have put before them a barrier and behind them a barrier and covered them, so they do not see.’
- Sura Yā-Sīn of the Quran 36:9

Introduction

It is said that when the Prophet Muhammad (peace be upon him)¹ left his house, he recited the ninth verse of the sura Yā-Sīn of the Quran and threw a handful of dust into the direction of the Quraysh besiegers who planned to kill him, causing them to be unable to see him.² Though jihadi organisations have grown to utilize more sophisticated methodologies the core themes of avoiding detection and deceiving the enemy have not changed since the times of the founder of the modern Islamic faith. Counterintelligence itself can be defined as the identification and neutralization of a threat posed by foreign intelligence services, which may also include the manipulation of those services in order to gain a benefit for a jihadi organization. With respect to non-state actors, which jihadi groups in most cases are (with the exception of groups like Hezbollah or the Fatah, which started as non-state actors but eventually became state actors), organizational counterintelligence approaches, typically constitute overlays across the whole of the intelligence enterprise while having focal entities at the same time.³

¹ Peace be upon him (pbuh) is used as a honorific appendage, every time the name of the Prophet finds mentioning and has become an established tradition since the 7th century in academic writing or journalism. To deliberately refrain from using said appendage would illustrate an anticlerical attitude and perhaps disbelief or apostasy. This piece of writing does not wish to make any religious or theological statement whatsoever.
² Ibn Kathir, Stories of the Prophet - From Adam to Muhammad, in: Mansoura: Dar Al-Manarah (Egypt, 2001) pp.: 389
³ Roy Godson, Counterintelligence - An Introduction (in Roy Godson, ed.) Intelligence Requirements for the 1980s: Counterintelligence; (New Brunswick, NJ; Transaction Books, 1980) p.: 1
Deceit and counterintelligence are as old as war itself and had a role to play in most major conflicts. Not only has their critical value been acknowledged by most governments, but also the Prophet Muhammad realised the value of deception, and today jihadi groups gain similar advantages from conducting and adjusting counterintelligence measurements. There is, however, an underlying culture of intelligence that dates back over centuries and features the Prophet Muhammad himself as a ‘master of intelligence in war’. As jihadi groups believe they walk in the footsteps of the Prophet Muhammad, the methods he used have turned into doctrines and tactical and strategic as much as ideological and cultural guidelines for various radical jihadi organisations, such as Al-Qaeda or Da’ish and those that use the concept of jihad for nationalistic purposes, like Fatah or Hezbollah. Hezbollah may be a good example since after it arose during the 1982 invasion of Lebanon by

---

7 The Quran, Sūrah al-‘Aḥzāb (الأحزاب) pp.: 33:21
8 The name ‘Islamic State’ or ‘ISIS’ (Islamic State in Iraq and Syria) is commonly used in the media. However, this paper will refer to the group as ‘Da’ish’. This is because the name ‘Islamic State’ has been highly beneficial to the group’s idea of establishing a new Islamic caliphate, has thus become a powerful acronym and was consequently welcomed by its members. The name Da’ish, on the other hand, appears to irritate the leaders of the so-called ‘Islamic State’ and in fact reduces the grandness and splendour of such a posturing name the group has given to itself. This paper does not legitimise or dignify the group’s claims and expansions by calling it any kind of ‘state’. The name Da’ish is in fact not an Arabic word but only an acronym for ad-Dawlah al-Islāmiyah fi ‘l-‘Irāq wa-sh-Shām.
Israel’s worldview was built on the Iranian jurisprudential doctrine of *velayat-e-faqih* (clerical rule) as their *marja* (source of emulation), whilst the organization was structured based on the *Sepahe al-Quds* element of Iran’s *Pasdaran* (Revolutionary Guard or IRGC). Surely the Shia *Hezbollah* can hardly be compared to the Sunni *Da’ish* or *Al-Qaeda*, but what this example mainly illustrates is that ideological fundamentals are clearly present in the foundation history of a radical jihadi group.

Consequently, understanding the ideological fundamentals of these subcultures is a prerequisite for any effective engagement, particularly since religion has been linked to strategic, tactical and political beliefs. This becomes evident when studying tactical and strategic Jihadi publications, as the Islamic faith is not only used as a justification, guidance and inspiration but also interpreted in order to fit specific goals. In this respect, counterintelligence in the form of denial and deception not only plays a necessary tactical role but has been incorporated into the Jihadi subframe of the Islamic mainframe on an operational as much as cultural level.

The intelligence activities that were practiced by pre-Islamic tribes and later by the Prophet Muhammad himself constitute a cultural heritage that has been redeveloped, re-designed and altered in order to fit the present needs and circumstances. The central role of counterintelligence in the Jihadi subframe

---

9 Carl Anthony Wege, *Hizballah’s Counterintelligence Apparatus* (International Journal of Intelligence and Counterintelligence; Vol.25, No.4; 2012) pp.: 772


12 Rüdiger Lohlker, *IS/Da’ish-Fatwas: Legal Extremism* (Pending for Publication) pp.: 1-8

illustrates this dramatically, as it constitutes the basis upon which all other activities rest. Furthermore, as argued by R. Lohlker, this subculture cannot be regarded purely as a political-military phenomenon, as the central role of religious thought must also be acknowledged.\textsuperscript{14} His argument is particularly relevant for this paper, as he points out that the exposure of future extremists to Jihadi literature, specific Quranic verses and Hadiths allows for an identification with the sub-culture, whilst most military management and fighting experience is considered important as scholarly legitimisation and motivation to participate in radical activities.\textsuperscript{15} Counterintelligence activities are certainly no exception.

The Prophet Muhammad, from the beginning of his mission, had an in-depth understanding of the vital role of counterintelligence and, within the context of his time, he applied a variety of strategies one could also find in most present governmental frameworks. In this sense, this paper aims at illustrating that jihadi groups today are establishing their military doctrines around religious and historic role models who had to utilize counterintelligence not only to survive but also to spread Islam and defend their beliefs and faith.\textsuperscript{16}

According to Abd Al-Aziz Al-Muqrin’s ‘A Practical Course for Guerrilla Warfare’, the ‘…call for a pure Islamic system free from defects and infidel elements, one based on the book (the Quran) and the Sunnah…’ requires ‘…Creating an Islamic intelligence service. This will have the task of oversight over recruitment of individuals and of protecting the organisation from being

\begin{thebibliography}{99}
\bibitem{EspionageOutsideAnglosphere} Espionage Outside the Anglosphere (Washington DC: Georgetown University Press, 2013) pp.: 108
\bibitem{LohlkerISReligionMatters} Rüdiger Lohlker, The „I“ of IS or religion matters (Pending for Publication) pp.: 1-15
\bibitem{LohlkerDschihadismus} Rüdiger Lohlker, Dschihadismus – Eine Religiöse Legitimierte Subkultur der Moderne, in: Religionen Unterwegs 21/1 (March 2015) pp.: 7
\bibitem{AlAsmariOriginsArabIslamicIntelligenceCulture} Abdulaziz A- Al-Asmari, Origins of an Arab and Islamic Intelligence Culture, in: Philip H.J. Davies and Kristian C. Gustafson, Intelligence Elsewhere – Spies and Espionage Outside the Anglosphere (Washington DC: Georgetown University Press, 2013) pp.: 108
\end{thebibliography}
penetrated. It will also set the security plans for individuals, the leadership, and installations.’

Interestingly, although Abd Al-Aziz Al-Muqrin has a clear affiliation to *Al-Qaeda*, his work has also had a significant influence on *Da’ish*, to the extent that it is distributed, shared and read openly within the group and its various publication channels. In fact, some *Da’ish* publications even refer to Al-Qaeda-related publications in order to train the group’s undercover members. Also Abu Bakr Naji, the accepted strategist of *Al-Qaeda* as well as *Da’ish*, also enforces this connection in his study ‘The Management of Savagery’, in which he claims that: ‘The administration of savagery has been established in our Islamic history various times. The first example of it was the beginning of the Islamic state in Medina’. He continues: ‘...we want to clarify the requirements of the management of savagery in the ideal form we desire and which agree with the aims of the Sharia. These requirements are: Spreading internal security... Dissemination of spies and seeking to complete the construction of a minimal intelligence agency’.

If one looks at the stated goals of groups such as *Da’ish* and *Al-Qaeda*, spreading Islam and intelligence doctrines are closely related. Though this

17 Abd Al-Aziz Al-Muqrin, A Practical Course of Guerilla War (Translated by Norman Cigar, published as: Al-Aqidas’s Doctrine for Insurgency (Washington; Potomac Books, 2009) pp.: 94 and 109
19 Anonymous Da’ish Publication, How to Survive in the West – A Mujahid’s Guide (2015), published online (2015) pp.: 27 (No Internet Link will be provided here. The author is in possession of the relevant sources and documents.)
20 Abu Bakr Naji, The Management of Savagery – The Most Critical Stage Through Which the Umma Will Pass (Published Online; Translated by W. McCants; John M. Olin Institute for Strategic Studies; Harvard University; 2006) pp.: 11-12
21 Abu Bakr Naji, The Management of Savagery – The Most Critical Stage Through Which the Umma Will Pass (Published Online; Translated by W. McCants; John M. Olin Institute for Strategic Studies; Harvard University; 2006) pp.: 12
paper does not aim to compare theological elements, similar tactical and strategic themes can, however, be extracted from the life and battles of the Prophet Muhammad. Thus, aside from any theological debate, these themes are a part of Islamic culture and have a significant effect on the doctrines used by jihadi groups today and their interpretations of Islam.\textsuperscript{22}

A contrasting juxtaposition of current Jihadi counterintelligence activities with historic examples will illustrate this argument and effectively show not only that jihadi organisations need counterintelligence to survive as insurgency groups but that their strong defensive positions and doctrines are rooted in the cultural heritage of the Arabian Peninsula. According to R. A. Gabriel, the intelligence activities, tactics and strategies that emerged during the earliest years of Islam have become part of the \textit{Sunnah} and the heritage of Islam.\textsuperscript{23} As such, they can be seen as a body of principles, values, norms and activities that are essential to how Jihadi organisations define themselves and their modus operandi. This, in turn, explains the central role of secrecy, denial and deception, which has a knock-on effect on a variety of other activities, such as the established and followed doctrines, internal security, deceptive means, intelligence networks or territorial control.


\textsuperscript{23} Richard A. Gabriel, Muhammad – Islam’s First Great General, Campaigns and Commanders (Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 2007) pp.: xxx
**Counterintelligence as a Doctrine**

Understanding the legacy of intelligence and the role it played at the birth of Islam is essential to understanding the counterintelligence doctrines of modern Jihadi organisations. Analysing the influence of the Islamic intelligence culture on Jihadi organisation will enhance the identified methodologies, ‘tradecrafts’ and approaches to counterintelligence with a cultural framework that will ultimately allow for a wider and more holistic understanding of the jihadi subculture. This is due to the modelling of counterintelligence doctrines around cultural and religious role models, which not only ensures organisational survival but also links back to the earliest attempts to spread and defend the Islamic faith.\(^{24}\) In order to illustrate the impact intelligence culture has on Jihadi groups, it may be worth considering that Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi might be the official leader of Da’ish and its so-called ‘Islamic State’, but when al-Qaeda tried to establish ties with the self-proclaimed caliphate, it was Haji Bakr, Baghdadi’s spymaster, and not the caliph himself, who was first approached by Ayman al-Zawahiri’s emissary.\(^{25}\)

---


Indeed, also most Da’ish operatives that carried out attacks abroad belonged to an intelligence unit known as the *Emni*, which has emerged to be a blend of an internal security and an external operations branch. This branch is dedicated to executing terror attacks abroad.\(^{26}\) For instance, the *Da’ish* attacks in Paris on the 13\(^{th}\) of November 2016 attracted global attention and shifted to focus on the group’s external terror and intelligence networks.\(^{27}\) The responsible branch *Emni* has been described, as a multilevel secret service, which is under the command of *Da’ish*’s most senior Syrian operative, spokesman and propaganda chief Abu Muhammad al-Adnani. He has emerged to be the outsize figure behind the group’s covert strategies and worldwide ambitions. Born in the town of *Binnish* in northern Syria details about his life, education and background still remain unknown, which may have to do with the fact that all members of Emni are blindfolded when talking to him directly. Even his best-trained fighters have never seen his face or know more about him than they have to for the planned operations. Additionally a vetting procedure has been introduced and once a month a shura meeting, of which Abu Muhammad al-Adnani is the head, debates everything that is important regarding the internal and external security.\(^{28}\) Furthermore, he commands a tier of lieutenants, who have been empowered to plan, organize and execute attacks all around the world by themselves. This hierarchy level also includes a “secret service for European affairs”, a “secret service for Asian affairs” and a “secret service for Arab affairs.” The


unit has the overall power to recruit and reroute operatives from all other branches of Da’ish, which means that it gets some sort of priority access to new arrives, experts and special forces operatives within the group.  

The Emni and its head Abu Muhammad al-Adnani has become crucial in for the groups modus operandi and rivals the importance of Baghdadi’s former spymaster Haji Bakr. Members of the Emni led the Paris attacks or built the bombs used in Brussels, whereas undercover operatives in Europe have started to use new recruits as go-betweens, or as they are called “clean men,” who are in charge of linking up potential suicide attackers with the operatives who can provide the instructions on how to build a bomb to how to credit their terror operation to the so-called Islamic State. This illustrates that within Da’ish there is a parallel command structure in which elite power brokers establish or remove emirs and, decisions are made not necessarily made in Shura councils but mainly by the ‘people who loosen and bind’, which translates to *ahl al-hall wa-l-aqd*. The name *ahl al-hall wa-l-aqd* refers to those who are powerful and influential in a Muslim state; a clandestine circle that has the power to influence the leadership and the masses clandestinely and in secret. Abu Muhammad al-Adnani or Haji Bark are clearly members of this elite circle. A circle, whose name is taken from medieval Islam, whilst similar clandestine circles can be found in most Jihadi organisations, and although they cannot all be compared and measured by the same standards, one re-occurring and uniting element may be their affiliation with secrecy, hidden power broking and clandestine operations even beyond the operational necessities.


In 1996 Osama bin Laden acknowledged the importance of secrecy in a fatwa: ‘Due to the imbalance of power between our armed forces and the enemy forces, a suitable means of fighting must be adopted, i.e. using fast-moving light forces that work under complete secrecy’. Additionally, an Al-Qaeda training manual reminds recruits that in order to become a member of the group, it is necessary to keep secrets and conceal information from even the closest of friends. The group goes even further, as memos indicate that potential future leaders should have at least five years of work experience and the ability to keep a secret. In sum, Jihadi groups have established a doctrine of strong defensive positioning before launching operations or when establishing doctrines of how organisations are to be run.

Similar themes, strategies and tactics can be seen in the military management of the Prophet Muhammad, whilst the regional cultural heritage of secrecy, intelligence and counterintelligence dates back even further. In fact, pre-Islamic approaches to intelligence networks consequently underpinned any further Islamic approach to intelligence and counterintelligence. The Arab concept of counterintelligence originated in the ancient age of Jahiliya (Ignorance) of the Qahtani tribes in the first half of the 7th century and even

---

35 Gaetano Joe Ilardi, Irish Republican Army Counterintelligence, in International Journal of Intelligence and Counterintelligence 23/1 (2009) pp.: 21
before the rise of Islam itself. Those early Arab tribes utilized their own espionage networks during wartime and peace, a notion that was later also utilized and further developed by the Prophet Muhammad. Indeed, early Arab records of espionage show that large portions of an ancient Qahtani army were charged with intelligence-related duties, such as skirmishing, scouting or reconnoitring, whereas nomadic Bedouins were also recruited in order to engage in spying missions. The Prophet and his followers later utilized this same system during the earliest years of Islam, as he considered a sophisticated Human Intelligence network to be a vital concept during this stage of Islamic history. In his book ‘al-Uyun wa l-jawasis’, Al-Barhawi mentions that such human intelligence networks (HUMINT) and informants came from all walks of life and were united through their dedication to the cause and adherence to secrecy.

The same appears to be true today for the so-called Islamic Caliphate established by Da’ish. As one of its ideological beacons, namely Abu Bakr Naji, assesses, ‘If our groups are close to the place of savagery or there is a way to get to it and there are spies and individuals in the region of savagery

[


who will give their allegiance to us, then we must study the situation and the extent of our capacity to settle there for the management of this savagery'.

Indeed, according to documents obtained from its architect, spymaster and former colonel in the intelligence service of Saddam Hussein's air defence force, Haji Bakr, also known as the "Lord of the Shadows" amongst many other aliases, the foundations of the Islamic State mainly rests upon intelligence, surveillance and secrecy.

In fact, Haji Bakr created an Islamic Intelligence State rooted in the gradual infiltration of society through espionage networks. This gets done through opening *Dawah* offices (Islamic missionary centres) and recruiting those who come for the lectures on Islamic life. Thus, religion is connected with intelligence, as those faithful Muslims who visit the *Dawah* are instructed to

---

42 Abu Bakr Naji, The Management of Savagery – The Most Critical Stage Through Which the Umma Will Pass (Published Online; Translated by W. McCants; John M. Olin Institute for Strategic Studies; Harvard University; 2006) pp.: 20

spy on their village.\textsuperscript{44} This effort to create a strong ‘domestic’ intelligence service originates from the notion of establishing a strong defensive position. Thus, agents and human intelligence networks are supposed to function as pre-warning indicators of any impending danger from the inside or outside. According to Abu Bakr Naji, ‘The people will be good eyes and armour for us and protect us from spies’.\textsuperscript{45} Indeed, Da’ish appears to have implemented this doctrine, as the group currently seems to mainly, though not exclusively, be concerned with establishing a domestic espionage network. The curricula that were introduced in the classroom hint at this direction as well, since foreign languages, history and international politics have been banned and replaced with rudimentary maths, Arabic and studying the Quran next to the history of the present ‘Caliphate’.\textsuperscript{46}

This highly complex system of infiltration and surveillance is meticulously maintained through long lists of informants that are installed in various rebel brigades or government militias.\textsuperscript{47} Details on defeated FSA fighters, their weapons, their participation in fire fights and battles, and a variety of other information are collected by Da’ish members,\textsuperscript{48} whilst the recruited informants include former intelligence operatives, regime opponents who have had disagreements with any other rebel group and simply young men who need

\textsuperscript{44} Christoph Reuter, The Terror Strategist: Secret Files Reveal the Structure of Islamic State (Spiegel Online; 18. April 2015, published online at: http://www.spiegel.de/international/world/islamic-state-files-show-structure-of-islamist-terror-group-a-1029274.html accessed on the 31. April 2016)

\textsuperscript{45} Abu Bakr Naji, The Management of Savagery – The Most Critical Stage Through Which the Umma Will Pass (Published Online; Translated by W. McCants; John M. Olin Institute for Strategic Studies; Harvard University; 2006) pp.: 66

\textsuperscript{46} Christoph Reuter, Die Schwarze Macht – Der ‘Islamische Staat’ und die Strategen des Terrors (Spiegel Buchverlag; DVA, 2015) pp.: 263


\textsuperscript{48} Christoph Reuter, Die Schwarze Macht – Der ‘Islamische Staat’ und die Strategen des Terrors (Spiegel Buchverlag; DVA, 2015) pp.: 255
the money or a job.\textsuperscript{49} This concept was not invented by ‘The Lord of the Shadows’ but was already in use by Al-Qaeda and a variety of other Jihadi groups, insurgencies and governments. In fact, the same principle can be found when looking at the Prophet Muhammad’s first call to Islam,\textsuperscript{50} as R. Gabriel argues that he was not only ‘a tactician, military theorist, organizational reformer, strategist, combat commander, political leader and heroic soldier’\textsuperscript{51}, but also the ‘inventor of insurgency warfare and history’s first successful practitioner of said concept’.\textsuperscript{52} Most importantly, however, R. Gabriel concludes that he was also a ‘master of intelligence in war’ and his defensive intelligence networks, denial and deception methodologies and secret service activities eventually came to rival those of Rome and Persia.\textsuperscript{53}


\textsuperscript{52} Richard A. Gabriel, Muhammad – Islam’s First Great General, Campaigns and Commanders (Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 2007) pp.: xviii-xix

Intelligence Apparatuses and Internal Security

Although the Prophet Muhammad can be regarded as the overall commander-in-chief in Medina, Umar bin al-Khattab was responsible for most counterintelligence activities.\(^\text{54}\) In fact, Umar bin al-Khattab led the earliest recognizable intelligence organisation and counterintelligence found more frequent mention particularly after the Prophet’s rule was established in Medina. He was in charge of da-to-day orders and the implementation of security protocols.\(^\text{55}\) One particular case, for instance, is Umar bin al-Khattab’s interrogation of a suspected spy, who confessed in order to avoid execution and eventually led the Muslims to their enemy’s camp. However, the counterintelligence apparatus under Umar bin al-Khattab and the Prophet himself were mainly concerned with protective and operational security, as successive attempts were made at the life of the Prophet.\(^\text{56}\) Thus, the establishment of security services under Umar bin al-Khattab was an inevitable step if the new religion was to survive.

---

\(^{54}\) Rad Mahmud Ahmad al-Barhawi, al-Uyun wa l-jawasis (Irbid; dar Al-Mutannabi, 2002) pp.: 99-102

\(^{55}\) Rad Mahmud Ahmad al-Barhawi, al-Uyun wa l-jawasis (Irbid; dar Al-Mutannabi, 2002) pp.: 99-102

In order to ensure the survival of the Islamic state envisioned by Da'ish, Haji Bakr suggested that two Islamic intelligence services operate in a parallel fashion. In order to achieve this, a general intelligence department has to report to the ‘Security Emir’ of a region, who in turn oversees the deputy emirs.
of individual districts. The head of the secret spy cells and the district’s ‘intelligence service and information manager’ report to each of the deputy emirs, whereas the local spy cells report their findings to the district emir’s deputy. Although this concept of an Islamic intelligence service appears to achieve omnipresence and to have everyone keep an eye on everyone, Haji Bakr’s documents illustrate the connection between culture, religion and intelligence through the envisioned establishment of a sharia judge in the security department on a regional level and on a district level as the head of prisons and interrogations as much as in the district’s security department.57 On the district level he additionally establishes a ‘Head of the Security Base and Trainer of the Sharia Judges in Court and Security Questions Relating to the local secret service’.58

The structure of Haji Bakr’s intelligence service also includes experts on technology, weapons and interrogation specialists, whereas economic and property value cells and secret information cells penetrate areas like finance, schools, day-care, the media and transportation. Consequently, aside from achieving a form of intelligence omnipresence, power and control, this system established by Da’ish further enables the group to detect possible dissidents or enemy spies.


Electronic Surveillance

Although one can hardly compare Hezbollah ideology to the previously discussed Da’ish, the modus operandi of the two groups is fairly similar and whilst Da’ish remains very active on social media channels Hezbollah has managed to introduce electronic surveillance and signals intelligence (SIGINT) to its intelligence repertoire, which in terms of capability were even underestimated by the Israeli Defense Forces. Up until now the organization, which has emerged from a paramilitary group to a state actor, aims to recruit computer scientists for the purpose of electronic surveillance and signals intelligence. Hezbollah’s SIGINT capabilities have originally come to Western attention in the mid-1990s, when the group achieved to successfully download unencrypted video feeds from Israeli drones. Indeed, Israel may unwillingly have pushed Hezbollah towards developing more sophisticated electronic surveillance and SIGINT capabilities. After Israel’s withdrawal from Lebanon in 2000, Israel’s Human Intelligence capabilities in Lebanon diminished, which forced Israeli Intelligence to rely more an remote electronic surveillance and SIGINT devices using burst transmissions to satellites. This inadvertently stimulated Hezbollah’s to start operating across the electromagnetic spectrum in order to counter the hostile intelligence activities. This capability only increased after Hezbollah created a more complex military infrastructure in South Lebanon and it turned out to be more effective than Israeli Intelligence anticipated in mid-2006.

By the summer of 2008, Hezbollah achieved utilizing low-technology counter-surveillance in order to discover Israeli surveillance devices in the Mount

60 Carl Anthony Wege, Hizballah’s Counterintelligence Apparatus (International Journal of Intelligence and Counterintelligence; Vol.25, No.4; 2012) pp.: 771-780
61 Carl Anthony Wege, Hizballah’s Counterintelligence Apparatus (International Journal of Intelligence and Counterintelligence; Vol.25, No.4; 2012) pp.: 771-780
62 Daily Star News, Spy-Gadget War Wages between Hezbollah and Israel (Daily Star; 27th of June 2011)
63 Daily Star News, Speculation Continues over Hezbollah’s Ability to Disable Israeli Drones (Daily Star, 9th of November 2011)
Sannine region. The low-technology approach of the group was also successful in locating more sophisticated listening devices on the fiber optic communications network of the group in 2009. Members of the group literally searched the cable meter by meter and eventually found the surveillance device along with the burst transmitter. Two years later, the Hezbollah was already successfully utilizing technology and SIGINT, paired with a systematic approach to internal investigations. This uncovered several Western penetration operations, whilst the group only used openly available software to analyze cell phone data across the country. The group was effectively scanning for infrequent usage of cell phones that were only active for short periods and always dialed the same numbers. The next step would be to validate of the same subscriber had used the suspicious number alongside a regular number that he/she would use for more frequent phone conversations with a variety of different phone numbers. Once a suspect had been identified by Hezbollah’s internal security apparatus, static surveillance managed to verify if there was an existing connection to foreign powers.

64 Carl Anthony Wege, Hizballah’s Counterintelligence Apparatus (International Journal of Intelligence and Counterintelligence; Vol.25, No.4; 2012) pp.: 771-780
65 The Los Angeles Times, Lebanon’s Spy-busting an Issue for Israel, the West (The Los Angeles Times, 18th of September 2010)
66 Ha’aretz, Report: Dozens of U.S. Spies Captured in Lebanon and Iran (Ha’aretz, 21st of November 2011)
Spy vs. Spy

Counterintelligence in the form of detecting and capturing enemy spies is also something that can be found in the times of the Prophet. In the battles of the Prophet it was of paramount importance to prevent the enemy from gathering intelligence on the strength, capabilities and intentions of the Prophet Muhammad. Consequently, the Prophet selected intelligence patrols for reconnaissance in order to avoid being taken by surprise while at the same time preventing opportunities for enemy spies and saboteurs. In one case his counterintelligence apparatus foiled the plan to spy on the Muslims that was led by the priest Abu Amie Al-Khazraji, who converted to Islam in order to undermine the Muslim community. He further built a mosque within close proximity to the Qiba’s mosque of the Prophet in order to use it as what would today be considered a ‘safe house’ for his agents. However, through the counterintelligence investigator’s task to monitor the developments at this newly built mosque, the Prophet Muhammad eventually uncovered the real purpose and agenda of Abu Amie Al-Khazraji and ordered that the building be destroyed. The battles of Badr, Dumat al-Jundal and Bani al-Mustalaq are also good examples; during the conquest of Mecca a spy of the Hawazin was arrested and in the Battle of Khaybar one of the enemy’s bold spies was detected and captured. Counterintelligence and the fear of losing sensitive information also dominates the structure of Da’ish’s so-called Islamic State, Al-Qaeda, Hezbollah and Fatah amongst other groups, which has led to drastic counterespionage

---

68 Al-Waqidi, Kitab Al-Maghazi, 1:217, 2:602
69 Al-Waqidi, Kitab Al-Maghazi, 1:217, 2:602
70 Al-Waqidi, Kitab Al-Maghazi, 3:1047
71 Al-Waqidi, Kitab Al-Maghazi, 3:1047
72 Al-Waqidi, Kitab Al-Maghazi, 3:1047
73 Al-Waqidi, Kitab Al-Maghazi, 1:404, 2:640, 808; Ibn Hisham 3:268; Harawi, al-Hiyal al Harbiyya: 77
measurements. Fatah’s counterespionage personnel actively engaged in capturing and hunting down Arabs in the refugee camps who were accused of cooperating with Israeli security services.\(^\text{74}\) In fact, the group’s efforts to provide internal security and execute counterespionage operations amounted to a similar number of captures as its attacks on Israelis in the late 1960s.\(^\text{75}\) Those counterespionage units, run by Saleh Khalef, were called ‘\textit{Jihaz al Razd}’. The model of the \textit{Jihaz al-Razd} organization proved to be working and was soon picked up by \textit{Hezbollah’s} first generation security services, which merged it with approaches from the \textit{AMAL} security entity.\(^\text{76}\) \textit{Hezbollah’s} Special Security Apparatus was ultimately created by Hussein al-Khalil in mid-1982,\(^\text{77}\) and it grew rapidly throughout the 1990s when the organization became a major force in Lebanese internal policy making.\(^\text{78}\) However, it’s survival until now depends primarily on its counterintelligence branch, which was significantly influenced by \textit{Pasdaran Quds} and shaped to fit local circumstances.\(^\text{79}\) Consequently, counterintelligence disciplines overlay all \textit{Hezbollah} operations and enterprises and have so far been fairly successful in this very task.\(^\text{80}\) According to Ahmad Hamzeh \textit{Hezbollah’s} counterintelligence directorate is divided into the \textit{Amn al-Muddad} (encounter

---

\(^\text{74}\) Zeev Schiff and Raphael Rothstein, Fedayeen – Guerillas against Israel (New York; David McKay, 1972) pp.: 86

\(^\text{75}\) Christopher Dobson, Black September – Its Short Violent History (New York; Macmillan, 1974) pp.: 39

\(^\text{76}\) Andre Gerolymatos, Castles Made of Sand (New York, Thomas Dunne Books, St. Martin’s Press; 2010), pp.: 173

\(^\text{77}\) Magnus Ranstorp, Hizb’allah in Lebanon - The Politics of the Western Hostage Crisis (New York: St. Martin’s Press; 1997), pp.: 66

\(^\text{78}\) Bryan Early, Larger Than a Party, yet Smaller Than a State - Locating Hezbollah’s Place within Lebanon’s State and Society (World Affairs, No. 168; 2006) pp.: 115–128

\(^\text{79}\) Mark M. Lowenthal, Intelligence - From Secrets to Policy (Washington, CQ Press; 2009) pp.: 151

\(^\text{80}\) Carl Anthony Wege, Hizbullah’s Counterintelligence Apparatus (International Journal of Intelligence and Counterintelligence; Vol.25, No.4; 2012) pp.: 772
security) branch, which are sometimes also referred to as Amn al-Khariji (external security), and the Amn al-Hizb (party security) branch, which protects Hezbollah’s leadership and the integrity of the party itself. Additionally, the Amn al-Hizb branch has worked in cooperation with liaison committees, the Lijan Irtibat, which enforces security among Hezbollah’s leadership in its protective function. Furthermore, the British born Talal Hussein Hamaya is known to have facilitated counterintelligence cooperation and internal security investigations, sanctioned by the Hezbollah leadership. These investigations included liaisons with Lebanese, Syrian, and Iranian intelligence services, as well as with Hezbollah’s own Jihad Council.

The group’s most successful counterintelligence operations may have occurred in 1987. Imad Mugniyah disrupted operations conducted by US Intelligence, which used Lebanese assets who worked for a Lebanese/Cyprus ferry company. Mugniyah also cooperated with Iran to uncover suspect AMAL fighters, which would today be considered the Islamic Jihad faction of Hezbollah at that time. Also in 1994, Hezbollah prevented the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) from kidnapping Hassan Ezzeddine, who was the head of the group’s foreign operations prior to 1995. The failed operation was facilitated by a compromised AMAL official, who fled to Cyprus and was later transferred to the US. Also in 1997 the Hezbollah counterintelligence apparatus managed to manipulate a double agent, which misled the Israeli

81 Ahmad Hamzeh, In the Path of Hizbullah (Syracuse, Syracuse University Press; 2004), pp.: 72–73  
82 Carl Anthony Wege, Hizballah’s Counterintelligence Apparatus (International Journal of Intelligence and Counterintelligence; Vol.25, No.4; 2012) pp.: 773  
83 Carl Anthony Wege, Hizballah’s Counterintelligence Apparatus (International Journal of Intelligence and Counterintelligence; Vol.25, No.4; 2012) pp.: 772  
84 Foreign Report, Iran’s Plans in Lebanon (Foreign Report, 12th of November; 1987) pp.: 3  
85 Foreign Report, Iran’s Plans in Lebanon (Foreign Report, 12th of November; 1987) pp.: 3  
86 Carl Anthony Wege, Hizballah’s Counterintelligence Apparatus (International Journal of Intelligence and Counterintelligence; Vol.25, No.4; 2012) pp.: 771-780
Defense Forces. The diversion ultimately enabled a successful ambush of 13 Israeli commando soldiers. Furthermore, an alleged Mossad operative, Elhanan Tannenbaum, was kidnapped in 2000 after he was accused of having tried to facilitate a “false flag” operation against Hezbollah from Europe and after having claimed to represent a European nation. Colonel Tannenbaum was lured to Beirut, where Hezbollah took him into custody. Based on this arrest the Amn Muddad could identify roughly 20 more people that participated in Israeli espionage operations in Lebanon between 2000 and 2006. Lastly, the group managed to compromise Lieutenant Colonel Omar al-Heib, who was the leader of a ten-man cell. Israeli counterintelligence uncovered his doings in 2006 and accused him of providing surveillance data on Israeli Defense Forces installations to Hezbollah in exchange for large amounts of drugs. The IDF assessed that the information that was handed over to Hezbollah by Colonel al-Heib enabled the group to successfully locate targets at Mt. Meron at the end of the war of 2006.

87 Clive Jones, A Reach Greater than the Grasp - Israeli Intelligence and the Conflict in South Lebanon 1990–2000 (Intelligence and National Security, Vol. 16, No. 1; 2001) pp.: 12
88 Carl Anthony Wege, Hizballah’s Counterintelligence Apparatus (International Journal of Intelligence and Counterintelligence; Vol.25, No.4; 2012) pp.: 771-780
89 Carl Anthony Wege, Hizballah’s Counterintelligence Apparatus (International Journal of Intelligence and Counterintelligence; Vol.25, No.4; 2012) pp.: 771-780
90 Carl Anthony Wege, Hizballah’s Counterintelligence Apparatus (International Journal of Intelligence and Counterintelligence; Vol.25, No.4; 2012) pp.: 771-780
**Deterrence-Based Counterintelligence**

In contrast to the early Shia Hezbollah, the Sunni and of course non-state, Al-Qaeda, has also adapted a very strong counterintelligence doctrine, which constitutes the basis of all operations. The group’s designated counterespionage department was referred to as the ‘Central Section’ and can actually be compared to governmental counterintelligence, as it focuses on uncovering enemy agents, penetrating the enemy’s intelligence apparatuses and conducting open source intelligence and media monitoring operations.91 The ‘Central Section’ was further responsible for securing the operation environment, background checks, operational security and the protection of the group’s leaders.92 Similar responsibilities would also be allocated to most governmental secret services. However, Da’ish’s Islamic State’s bureaucracy takes this comparison to the next level, as each provincial council has been assigned two emirs who are not only in charge of covert operations, assassinations, abductions, communication and encryption but also responsible to supervise the other emirs on a regional or district level. Hence, the cell and commando structure is designed to create an omnipresence of the counterintelligence apparatus, which finds its gruesome climax in the public execution of alleged spies for the purpose of deterrence.93 In a different time and under different circumstances, instilling fear and terror in the hearts of those who allied with the enemies of Islam was also a tactic used by the Prophet Muhammad.94 As such, these brutal executions that are still in use today can indeed be regarded as ‘deterrence-based’ counterintelligence procedures that are still used today. This additionally gets justified through radical interpretations of religious

---

93 Christoph Reuter, Die Schwarze Macht – Der ‘Islamische Staat’ und die Strategen des Terrors (Spiegel Buchverlag; DVA, 2015) pp.: 276
94 Al-Waqidi, Kitab Al-Maghazi, 1:217, 2:602
reference as tactical guidance by Jihadi publications. Executions spark fear and spread terror, which causes deterrence and may frighten potential or active spies, as assessed in ‘The Management of Savagery’.  

According to Abu Bakr Naji, fear is one of the main reasons for conducting executions in the first place: ‘…the hostages should be liquidated in a terrifying manner, which will send fear into the hearts of the enemy and his supporters’. With respect to the captured and executed spies, Da’ish stresses those deterrence-based doctrines even more and appears to follow Abu Bakr Naji’s suggestions of how to deal with captured spies: ‘One who is confirmed as a spy through evidence must be dealt with in a manner that deters others like him. If he flees, he must be followed and not abandoned, even if this takes years. It is necessary to announce that he will receive his punishment, even after long years. This will often make the weak souls hesitate in doing likewise’. The extensive interview below that the Da’ish run DĀBIQ magazine conducted with an accused Israeli spy Murtadd, clearly illustrates the deterrence purpose of the groups counterintelligence strategy:

**DĀBIQ:** What kind of information did they want you to send them about the Islamic State?

**MURTADD:** Firstly, they wanted me to tell them the places where their weapons and missiles were being stored. Secondly, the locations of their bases, and

---


96 Abu Bakr Naji, The Management of Savagery – The Most Critical Stage Through Which the Umma Will Pass (Published Online; Translated by W. McCants; John M. Olin Institute for Strategic Studies; Harvard University; 2006) pp.: 33

97 Abu Bakr Naji, The Management of Savagery – The Most Critical Stage Through Which the Umma Will Pass (Published Online; Translated by W. McCants; John M. Olin Institute for Strategic Studies; Harvard University; 2006) pp.: 66
thirdly, the names of any Pal-estinians who made hijrah to the Islamic State from Palestine. They also made it clear that I shouldn’t start working or contacting them until I’d completed the training camp and shar‘ī seminar, and had been assigned to a detachment and begun to be trusted. They also said that I should contact them once I’d completed the training camp and let them know so that they could send me what I needed.

DĀBIQ: How did you come to the Islamic State?

MURTADD: We got everything in order and I left for Turkey as instructed to do so by the Mos- sad. I had the number for a smuggler. I talked to the smuggler and told him where I was. He showed me the way, and I entered Syria and was in the territory of the Islamic State.

DĀBIQ: How was your cover blown?

MURTADD: Not long after I had arrived I be- gan acting in a manner that wasn’t typical of a muhājir despite the training I had received from the Mossad. I also failed to follow some orders that my amīr had given me, and then became worried that as a result he had be- come suspicious of me. I was afraid I would be punished for not listening and obeying as was required of me and possibly be monitored thereafter. So I went and called my father and told him what had happened, and he told me to come back, but it was too late, as I was being watched. The mujāhidīn put me in prison and moved me from one prison to another. During the interrogations, I confessed that I was a spy working as
an agent for the Israeli Mossad, and confessed to the
things that I had done in my country.

**DĀBIQ:** Do you have a message for other spies sent by
the kuffār?

**MURTADD:** Yes, I say to all those who want to spy on
the Islamic State, don't think that you're so smart and
that you can deceive the Islam- ic State. You won't
succeed at all. In the end, they'll capture you and
implement the hadd on you. Stay away from this path.
Stay away from helping the Jews and the murtaddīn.
Follow the right path.⁹⁸

Such a heavy-handed approach in securing internal security and mounting
counterespionage operations is a common feature of most secretive groups.
When the infamous Black September Organisation (BSO) terrorist Ali Hassan
Salameh joined the ‘Jihaz al Razd’ in 1967 he was assigned the task to hunt
down suspected informants. These informants were dealt with in a brutal
fashion, which led to at least 20 of them being killed by the Jihaz al Razd and
those who thought about collaborating with Israel being terrified by the fierce
reputation of the group’s counterintelligence department under Saleh Khalef.⁹⁹
Moreover, Al-Qaeda’s former chief of security, Jamal al-Fadl, testified that
under his counterespionage regime at least three informants were caught, two
of whom were sent to prison and the third was executed.¹⁰⁰

---

⁹⁸ Anonymous Da’ish Publication, 7th Dabiq Magazine published online, features an
interview with the alleged Israeli spy (2015)
⁹⁹ Blake W. Mobley, Terrorism and Counterintelligence – How Terrorist Groups
Delude Detection (Columbia University Press; 2012) pp.: 74
¹⁰⁰ Trial Transcript, United States v. Usama Bin Laden et. al., US District Court,
Southern District of New York S(7) 98 Cr. 1023 (2001) Day 2
Da‘ish and the story of Ka‘b ibn al-Ashraf

With respect to Da‘ish, the brutal execution of an alleged Peschmerga agent may be a good example, particularly since the group quotes from the Quran in order to justify such acts. The quote reads: ‘The penalty for those who wage war against Allah and His Messenger… is none but that they be killed or crucified or that their hands and feet be cut off from opposite sides or that they be exiled from the land’.  

In another video that features the gruesome execution of an alleged Israeli spy by a 10-year-old boy, the Prophet Muhammad is referred to as the ‘The Prophet of Mercy and the Prophet of Battle’, and the assailant says, ‘Allah has repelled your (the Israelis Secret Service’s) plot’. The spy is accused of ‘spying on the secrets of the Mujahidin and the Muslims’. Finally, the Da‘ish fighter concludes his speech prior to the alleged spy’s execution with the words, ‘O grandsons of Muhammad Ibn Maslamah, we have revealed to you some of the names and pictures of the spies in Jerusalem, so make those who recruited them see their blood flow’.  

Aside from aiming to spread fear through the ranks of the Israeli Security Service, more importantly the reference most likely relates to the assassination of the Jew Ka‘b ibn al-Ashraf, who led a dirty campaign and sinister intrigues against the Prophet that were carried out by Muhammad Ibn Maslamah. It is important to acknowledge that this assassination involved enticing him from his fortress through means of deception. Indeed, the Prophet approved this approach and gave his consent based on the concept that war involves deceit.

---

101 Anonymous Da‘ish Video and Transcript Publication (published online on the 20. June 2015 (No Internet Link will be provided here. The author is in possession of the relevant sources and documents.)
102 Anonymous Da‘ish Publication, 7th Dabiq Magazine published online, features an interview with the alleged Israeli spy (2015); but also a video featuring the execution of the alleged Israeli spy contains these statements (No Internet Link will be provided here. The author is in possession of the relevant sources and documents.)
Hence, in a conversation with Ka’b ibn al-Ashraf, Muhammad Ibn Maslamah claimed to be doubtful of the Prophet, as he could not buy food due to the taxes he had to pay. Consequently, he decided to pretend to be in need of a loan in exchange for his loyalty. As he called Ka’b ibn al-Ashraf out of bed regarding said loan, Ka’b came down believing Muhammad Ibn Maslamah would exchange his weapons as the security for the promised loan. However, he still armed himself and heavily scented his body with perfume before facing the nightly visitors. Asking to smell the pleasant scent, Muhammad ibn Maslamah lured Ka’b into bending over, which gave his companions a chance to strike him down. In fact, Muhammad ibn Maslamah created a distraction and diverted the attention of Ka’b ibn al-Ashraf towards something else in order to benefit from the element of surprise and deception. This use of deception, which enabled ‘the knight of the Prophet’ to assassinate an enemy who could have been a danger to internal security, has become a common counterintelligence tool of various Jihadi groups. Additionally, it is the Quranic reference made by Da’ish, that clearly illustrates the important connection between culture, religion and counterintelligence.
Deception and Denial

Deception and Denial are the backbones of Jihadi counterintelligence and tie in with all other military, ideological and intelligence activities. Although other aspects of a counterintelligence apparatus, such as ‘institutional learning’, ‘vetting’ or ‘intelligence gathering for defensive as much as offensive purposes’ deserve scholarly attention, none of them would be possible without first establishing a strong doctrine of denial and deception. Today, these two concepts of counterintelligence are as beneficial to the Jihadi cause as they were to most battle commanders for the length of recorded history. Without them no (Islamic) intelligence service would be able to operate, at least not secretly. Such a doctrine is a traditional component of conflict, intrinsic to all human interaction and probably as old as warfare itself. Even beyond the experiences of human behaviour, deception can be found throughout the animal kingdom due to the effectiveness of disinformation, camouflage and denial. In sum, the doctrine takes precedence over all other activities as it ensures the secrecy needed in order to operate clandestinely. In fact, without Jihadi counterintelligence, adversary actors could destroy not only a Jihadi organisation, but actually any other clandestine group or military entity.

104 A short review of the available literature on the topic of deception shows scholarly interest in this field starting with Sun Tzu, Vegetius, Machiavelli and Carl von Clausewitz.
106 Joseph W. Caddell, Deception 101 – Primer on Deception (Strategic Studies Institute; 2004) pp.: 1
108 Joseph W. Caddell, Deception 101 – Primer on Deception (Strategic Studies Institute; 2004) pp.: 1
Finally, Jihadi groups not only have managed to adapt their denial and deception strategies to the requirements of the 21st century but have further utilized the two concepts in order to spread their ideology and justify it through linking the means of denial and deception to the military management of the Prophet Muhammad. Indeed, in the sophisticated battle strategies of the Prophet Muhammad, denial and deception played a highly significant role with respect to the survival of the Islamic faith. Today, these two counterintelligence doctrines unite members of the Jihadi sub-culture in their struggle to remain clandestine, secret and in the darkness, which goes far beyond their original purpose of gaining a strategic or tactical advantage.

Deception

“It’s not the money, it’s the deception that’s critical”
- Mohamed Merah, French-Algerian Jihadi responsible for the Toulouse attacks of 2012

Jihadi organisations have thus far proven to achieve an in-depth understanding of deception as a part of their counterintelligence activities. These efforts may be as simple as trying to get an adversary to focus on point A instead of at point B, or as complex as trying to influence the entire military strategy of the enemy over a long period of time.\textsuperscript{111} Deception ultimately aims to deliberately induce misperception in another\textsuperscript{112} or consists of information designed to manipulate the behaviour of other by inducing him to accept a false or distorted presentation of his environment – whether physical, social or political.\textsuperscript{113} Deception can promote friendly intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance activities, thwart the enemy’s capabilities to do the same, protect forces and create opportunities to surprise the enemy.\textsuperscript{114} Thus, deception aims to produce an inaccurate assessment of a Jihadi group’s intentions and capabilities whilst ensuring operational security and tactical advantages at the same time.\textsuperscript{115}

\begin{thebibliography}{99}
\bibitem{113}B. Whaley, Cheating and Deception (New Brunswick; Transaction Publishers, 1991) pp.: 188
\bibitem{114}Joseph W. Caddell, Deception 101 – Primer on Deception (Strategic Studies Institute; 2004) pp.: 20
\bibitem{115}Joseph W. Caddell, Deception 101 – Primer on Deception (Strategic Studies Institute; 2004) pp.: 15
\end{thebibliography}
From the Jihadi’s adversary’s perspective, it needs to be said that all intelligence collection methodologies can fall victim to deception.\textsuperscript{116} Indeed, anywhere information can get gathered from, disinformation can be planted.\textsuperscript{117} Double agents or doctored are only two examples of how false information can get infused into the enemy, whereas the detection of such penetration can turn out to be highly complex.\textsuperscript{118}

Offensive and defensive deception is used to affect an adversary’s decision-making processes, targeting an opponents command and control.\textsuperscript{119} Deception can promote friendly activities of intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance, thwart the enemy’s capabilities to do the same, protect forces and create opportunities to surprise the enemy.\textsuperscript{120} Thus, deception aims to produce an inaccurate assessment of a Jihadi group’s intentions and capabilities whilst ensuring operational security and tactical advantages at the same time.\textsuperscript{121} What follows is the delivery of a ‘story’ that gets told through a variety of media in order to produce and enforce the uncovered misperceptions. This story gets told through the means of perception and can range from classic instruments such as camouflage to disinformation and information operations.\textsuperscript{122} Consequently, deception gets planned ‘backwards’,

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{116} Joseph W. Caddell, Deception 101 – Primer on Deception (Strategic Studies Institute; 2004) pp.: 11
\item \textsuperscript{117} Joseph W. Caddell, Deception 101 – Primer on Deception (Strategic Studies Institute; 2004) pp.: 11
\item \textsuperscript{118} Joseph W. Caddell, Deception 101 – Primer on Deception (Strategic Studies Institute; 2004) pp.: 22
\end{itemize}
beginning with the desired outcome and then determining the ends to dictate the means.\textsuperscript{123}

A fundamental dichotomy that can be found in Jihadi deception is its division into ‘active’ and ‘passive’. ‘Passive’ deception in this case focuses on hiding real intentions and capabilities. ‘Active’ deception engages in providing false information to an adversary, which may as well be associated with mere camouflage but is certainly not limited to this area.\textsuperscript{124}

\textsuperscript{124} Joseph W. Caddell, Deception 101 – Primer on Deception (Strategic Studies Institute; 2004) pp.: 6
Religious and ideological concepts and doctrines are a cornerstone of most Jihadi denial and deception practices. The primary Quranic Sura sanctioning deception with respect to non-Muslims states would, for instance be, "Let believers not take for friends and allies infidels instead of believers. Whoever does this shall have no relationship left with Allah – unless you but guard yourselves against them, taking precautions.", which is found in the Quranic Sura 3:28, whilst similar themes can be extracted from Sura 2:173, 2:185, 4:29, 22:78, 40:28. The concept of taqiyya and kitman, moreover, have gained the greatest public exposure and have consequently found appliance in most Jihadi strategies and military frameworks.

Islamic beliefs and Quranic interpretations are central to the denial and deception of a Jihadi group. The Shi’ā concepts of taqiyya (Muda’rat for Sunnī Muslims) and kitman, which for the most part refer to practices that have become tenets of Shi’a theology, can arguably be seen as the religious soil and justification for the implementation of denial and deception. Taqiyya allows the believer to hide a true agenda under duress, which is a theme that, according to S.M. Qazwini, can primarily be extracted from the Quranic verses 3:28 and 16:106. The main Quranic verse sanctioning deception with respect to non-Muslims states is "Let believers not

---

125 David D. Jessee, Tactical Means, Strategic Ends – Al Qaeda’s Use of Denial and Deception, in: Terrorism and Political Violence 18 (006) pp.: 371
126 Andrew Campbell, Taqiyya: How Islamic Extremists Deceive the West, in: National Observer 65 (Melbourne; Council for the National Interest, 2005) pp.: 11-23
129 The extent of the applicability of Taqiyya for Shi’a Muslims is debatable, but the concept exists regardless and has become a legitimate tenet of Islam.
130 The Quran Sūrah Āl ‘Imrān (ال عمران) 3:28 and Sūrah An-Nahl (النهل) 16:106
take for friends and allies infidels instead of believers. Whoever does this shall have no relationship left with Allah – unless you but guard yourselves against them, taking precautions.”

131 Takiyya can be practiced even when under oath, which for obvious reasons allows much greater flexibility when applying the framework and doctrine. According to Sura 2:225 ‘Allah will not call you to account for thoughtlessness in your oaths, but for the intention in your hearts.’ And according to Sura 5:89 ‘Allah will not call you to account for what is futile in your oaths but He will call you to account for your deliberate oaths.’

Those concepts of Islam have shaped the counterintelligence doctrines of many Jihadi organisations, most prominently by the actually Sunni-affiliated Al-Qaeda.132 With respect to the theological foundations of the concept, Ignaz Goldziher points out that ‘it is accepted as legitimate by other Muslims as well, on the authority of Qur’an 3:28’.133 Yet, although Shi’a practices allow dissimulation under special circumstances, Sunni Muslims discount the doctrines of tāqiyya and kitman.134 It remains unclear whether radical Sunni Jihadi ideologues have implemented this very doctrine or not. If so, they have not done so in an explicit manner.135 However, regardless of the doctrinal foundation, Sunni groups such as Al-Qaeda and Da’ish have still not refrained

131 The Quran, Sūrah Āl ‘Imrān 3:28; see also Sūrah Al-Baqarah 2:173; 2:185; Sūrah An-Nisā’ 4:29; Sūrah Al-Ḥajj 22:78; Sūrah Ghāfir 40:28
133 Robert Spencer, Counterterrorism experts starting to awaken to the reality of tāqiyya (Jihadwatch; published online at: http://www.jihadwatch.org/2013/03/counterterrorism-experts-starting-to-awaken-to-the-reality-of-taqiyya accessed on the 31. April 2016)
134 David D. Jessee, Tactical Means, Strategic Ends – Al Qaeda’s Use of Denial and Deception, in: Terrorism and Political Violence 18 (006) pp.: 371
135 Robert Spencer, Counterterrorism experts starting to awaken to the reality of tāqiyya (Jihadwatch; published online at: http://www.jihadwatch.org/2013/03/counterterrorism-experts-starting-to-awaken-to-the-reality-of-taqiyya accessed on the 31. April 2016)
from teaching the associated practices in order to improve their denial and deception capabilities.\textsuperscript{136} Thus, M. Ranstorp argues that the taqiyya is a central pillar to the operational reality of Al-Qaeda\textsuperscript{137} and is essential to a holistic understanding of the operational and counterintelligence realities of Jihadi organisations.

\textsuperscript{136} David D. Jessee, Tactical Means, Strategic Ends – Al Qaeda’s Use of Denial and Deception, in: Terrorism and Political Violence 18 (006) pp.: 371

Mutual Inspiration and Cooperation

In a similar line it can be observed that jihadi groups have not only been inspired by one another’s workflows, but have also learned from each other and occasionally even cooperated. In fact, religious confessions and group affiliations appear to blur significantly when it comes to gaining a tactical or strategic intelligence or counterintelligence benefit. For instance, Hezbollah did not only manage to increase military capacities through expansion of its recruitment across the Shi’a community, but also recruited from the larger non-Shi’a communities, despite the religious divide. On a side note it also deserved mentioning that the American forces that were station in Somalia in the 1990s used the approach Hezbollah had adopted at a tactical level, which encompassed delegating responsibilities to local commanders when it comes to the aspects of security and counterintelligence. This approach has arguably worked reasonably well and it simply goes to tell that mutual counterintelligence inspiration and cooperation for the sake of organizational survival does not appear to recognize and confessional or ideological divisions and gaps. Also Da’ish was searching specifically for militants who had emerged from Al Qaeda’s network in the region and although not a declared an enemy, AQ can at least be regarded as Da’ish’s fiercest

139 Jihad Council’s mandate can be interpreted as an approach where every commander is required to build up and develop his own counterespionage apparatus. The commander must take care of this duty in in addition to his other responsibilities. However, although such an approach may be fruitful at a tactical level, as the American forces in Somalia of the 1990s learned, on a national level counterintelligence activities may require a more specialized methodology. See John Ehrman, What Are We Talking About When We Talk About Counterintelligence? (Studies in Intelligence; No. 53, 2009) pp.: 5–20 for further details on this specialized approach to counterintelligence
140 Dan Carter, Marine Corps Counterintelligence in Somalia and Beyond (Defense Intelligence Journal, No. 4; 1995) pp.: 83
competitor. However, the experiences and contacts of these AQ veterans were methodologically exploited by the group regardless.\textsuperscript{141}

Deceptive Means

The means, methods, resources and techniques available to achieve deception goals are only as limited as the Jihadi deceiver’s imagination. However, one can group them according to the function they serve.

These are:

1. Camouflage and Concealment
2. Demonstration and Diversion
3. Disinformation
4. Spoofing and Mimicry
5. Dazzling
6. Conditioning and Exploitation
7. Display, Decoy and Covers

---

**Camouflage and Concealment**

Camouflage and concealment are used in order to evade detection and utilisation of terrain to avoid observation.\(^{144}\) They may simply be tactical deception tools that will prevent visual detection but could also be part of a larger and complex deception plan,\(^{145}\) which may go as far as putting poorly done camouflage over a real resource in order to give the impression of a ‘false dummy image’ and mislead the adversary away from that very resource.\(^{146}\) Not as complex but still reasonably effective, underground trenches were dug by Fatah in addition to strictly enforcing the use of camouflage,\(^{147}\) whilst some form of camouflage has also been used in a variety of different forms in the battles of the Prophet Muhammad.\(^{148}\) In fact, today neither conventional armies nor Jihadi organisations can engage in any confrontation without appropriate camouflage. This old but successful deceptive device, which can occur in a large variety of different forms and shapes, is consequently closely tied to means of demonstration and diversion.\(^{149}\)

---

\(^{144}\) Jonathan I. Katz, Deception and Denial in Iraq – The Limits of Secret Intelligence and the Intelligence Adversary Corollary (Washington University; Department of Physics, 2006) pp.: 3

\(^{145}\) Joseph W. Caddell, Deception 101 – Primer on Deception (Strategic Studies Institute; 2004) pp.: 8

\(^{146}\) Joseph W. Caddell, Deception 101 – Primer on Deception (Strategic Studies Institute; 2004) pp.: 8


\(^{148}\) Waqidi 1:53, 2:445; Ibn Hisham 3:69; Kala’l, 1:130; ‘Imad Talas, al-Rasul al-Arabi: 310-311

\(^{149}\) Joseph W. Caddell, Deception 101 – Primer on Deception (Strategic Studies Institute; 2004) pp.: 8
Demonstration and Diversion

Demonstration and Diversion are used in order to divert the attention of an adversary in two basic ways: feints and demonstrations. A feint is an attack by friendly forces to distract the attention of the enemy, whereas a demonstration has the same purpose but does not usually involve enemy contact. With respect to diversions, AQ’s ‘Practical Course of Guerrilla Warfare’ states: ‘On the offensive, one must always be fully alert while taking care to deceive the enemy into thinking, for example, that the attack is in the West, while the main attack is really in the East, so that the enemy is kept busy with a supporting attack from on direction and is surprised from another direction’. The Prophet Muhammad also practice diverting enemies from the target of an attack. He would put the enemies in doubt and misguide them so that they would assume the Prophet would not march against them. He achieved this in the battles of Bani Lihyan and Dumat al-Jundal as well as managed to surprise the leaders and citizens of Mecca since it was not clear whether he was marching towards Najd, Hawazin or any other region.

151 Joseph W. Caddell, Deception 101 – Primer on Deception (Strategic Studies Institute; 2004) pp.: 8
152 Abd Al-Aziz Al-Muqrin, A Practical Course of Guerilla War (Translated by Norman Cigar, published as: Al-Aqidas’s Doctrine for Insurgency (Washington; Potomac Books, 2009) pp.: 117
Disinformation

Disinformation and the spreading of doctored information or media that gets passed on to the target is also very common as a means of deception.\(^{155}\) The Prophet utilized the power of disinformation, for example during the Hamra’ Al-Asad operation, which was intended to shake the morale of the Qurayshi army by disseminating disinformation on the strength, determination and condition of the Prophet’s troops through the spy Ma’bad Al-Khuzai.\(^{156}\) The deception worked, and his adversary Abu Sufyan decided that it was best to ‘fold camp and complete their withdrawal to Mecca’.\(^{157}\) One can observe identical concepts today throughout the Jihadi sub-culture, as most groups aim at portraying themselves in a strong and powerful light and in a manner that is intended to intimidate their adversaries through a variety of different approaches, media outlets and publications. The Black September Organisation (BSO), for example, would only conduct bogus interviews with media outlets in order to plant disinformation, whereas most other clandestine groups would at least issue an occasional statement.\(^{158}\) The group’s leader, Hassan Salameh, furthermore allegedly planted rumours amongst Palestinians in Europe that he would plan to travel to Scandinavia. The rumours were picked up by Israeli security services and ultimately lead to an


\(^{158}\) John K. Colley, Green March Black September – The Story of the Palestinian Arabs (Frank Cass Publishers; 1973) pp.: 124
innocent man getting assassinated by Israeli operatives in Norway.\textsuperscript{159} Along the same lines, the Al-Qaeda manual recommended readers to make fake telephone calls in order to mislead the adversary.\textsuperscript{160} Although there is no evidence that members of the group have actually done that, the manual also recommends that members agree on a matching cover story in order to mislead the enemy even when captured and interrogated.\textsuperscript{161}

\textsuperscript{159} Simon Reeve, One Day in September: The Full Story of the 1972 Munich Olympics Massacre and the Israeli Revenge Operation "Wrath of God" (Arcade Publishing; 2011) pp.: 190
\textsuperscript{160} Sharad S. Chauhan, The Al-Qaeda Threat (Ashish Pub House; 2003) pp.: 60
\textsuperscript{161} Sharad S. Chauhan, The Al-Qaeda Threat (Ashish Pub House; 2003) pp.: 60
Spoofing and Mimicry

Spoofing and Mimicry also allow a Jihadi group to portray an entity of significance to the target. For example, Da’ish does not just march into battle; the group has employed mimicry and spoofing in order to achieve its goals when some of its members dressed like rebels and suddenly began to shoot at other rebels, which caused panic and prompted the other rebel group to flee and abandon their territory. Such a simple masquerade of changing out of black clothes into the jeans and vests that were normally worn by a different rebel group helped Da’ish to gain significant territory.¹⁶² Further, during the Munich Olympics operation of the BSO, the operatives dressed in tracksuits, a simple disguise that was so effective that they were actually helped to climb over the fence by other athletes.¹⁶³

¹⁶² Christoph Reuter, Die Schwarze Macht – Der 'Islamische Staat' und die Strategen des Terrors (Spiegel Buchverlag; DVA, 2015) pp.: 20-41
**Dazzling**

In the same category, one can find means of overloading the sensory processing abilities of an enemy through dazzling, which increases the noise level and drowns out the target signal.\(^{164}\) Al-Qaeda utilised a re-adaptation of this doctrine of deceit prior to 9/11, when US intelligence officers picked up considerable noise in the form of increased telephone conversations regarding an impending terrorist attack on the US. However, they found it impossible to tell what was about to happen or where and when it was planned to occur, which allowed Al-Qaeda to gain the strategic surprise.\(^{165}\) Increased chatter before the attack did in fact alarm the intelligence community but pinpointing the location, time or form of the attack remained an impossible task.\(^{166}\) In another, more historic, example, Kab ibn al-Ashraf knew that something was about to happen when Muhammad Ibn Maslamah paid him a visit. In fact, he was not only warned by his wife but also faced Muhammad ibn Maslamah with his sword drawn.\(^{167}\) However, the ‘noise level’ of the situation and an additional distraction appears to have contributed significantly to the end of Kab ibn al-Ashraf.

---


Conditioning and Exploitation targets biased beliefs and habits through re-enforcing or creating them.\(^{168}\) Conditioning can be seen as the repetition of what may be regarded as preparation for a hostile action. However, such hostile action does not automatically follow, which might lead to a false sense of security.\(^{169}\) Al-Qaeda, for example, encourages its secret members and sympathisers to imitate the behaviour of Westerners. These efforts at deception include inventing cover stories, shaving, dyeing their hair, wearing blue contact lenses, smoking, drinking alcohol and even following guidelines on what underpants or cologne to wear.\(^{170}\) In fact, Al-Qaeda exploits a potentially biased belief of how a Jihadi looks like to ‘Western’ preconceptions. Its guidelines even includes instructions on carrying cologne and cigarettes when traveling in order to distract boarder security. Al-Qaeda did particularly well in anticipating the weaknesses of its enemies. Consequently, the group further aimed at recruiting individuals with American passports, as it was assessed that they would be given less scrutiny at airport security.\(^{171}\) The doctrines and guidelines it provides on ‘occidental’ beliefs, values, patterns, behaviours and cultural and historical developments, illustrate its efforts to evade detection through amplifying its targets’ own perceptions.\(^{172}\)


\(^{169}\) Joseph W. Caddell, Deception 101 – Primer on Deception (Strategic Studies Institute; 2004) pp.: 9


\(^{171}\) Peter Bergen, The Osama Bin Laden I Know – An Oral History of the al Qa’ida Leader (New York; Free Press, 2006) pp.: 78

\(^{172}\) Michael Herman, Intelligence Power in Peace and War (Cambridge University Press; 1996) pp.: 170
Display, Decoy and Covers

Display and Decoy are used as dummies to distract the enemy, whilst also the utilization of covers has also been observed with several Jihadi groups. Through this type of deception, non-threatening activities are supposed to disguise a hostile act or hostile preparation. Arguably, using covers is one of the most common deception techniques of Jihadi groups, and applications of this method ranges from passport and visa counterfeits to 'living a double life'. One Da’ish manual phrases it: ‘His (the Jihadi’s) secret life is totally different, in this life he will look different, and act different because he has to complete missions secretly without exposing his true self to anyone’.  

One example that may illustrate the great emphasis Da’ish has put on its covers and display capabilities may be found when looking towards the group’s recruitment procedure. Although theft is punishable in accordance with Sharia law, meaning amputation, in areas under Islamic State control, a criminal past can become a highly valued asset. A former Da’ish fighter expands on the subject and explains that:

“…especially if they know you have ties to organized crime and they know you can get fake IDs, or they know you have contact men in Europe who can smuggle you into the European Union…”;

one can become a valuable member of the group

174 Joseph W. Caddell, Deception 101 – Primer on Deception (Strategic Studies Institute; 2004) pp.: 9  
175 Anonymous Da’ish Publication, How to Survive in the West – A Mujahid’s Guide (2015), published online (2015) pp.: 7 (No Internet Link will be provided here. The author is in possession of the relevant sources and documents.)  
Also Al-Qaeda established cover businesses and NGOs in Kenya, where the group funded a charity in order to provide operatives with counterfeit documents\(^{177}\) and a fishing company for operational activities.\(^{178}\) Consequently, this technique is closely linked to exploitation and conditioning. However, deception depends on providing an adversary with doctored information and being able to predict how this information will be utilized.\(^{179}\) The latter aspect in particular requires jihadi groups to understand their adversaries thought processes and decision-making methodologies.\(^{180}\) Indeed, as explained by Montagu, the success of deception critically depends on understanding the enemy’s thought process.\(^{181}\)

\(^{177}\) Peter Bergen, The Osama Bin Laden I Know – An Oral History of the al Qa’ida Leader (New York; Free Press, 2006) pp.: 264
\(^{178}\) Peter Bergen, The Osama Bin Laden I Know – An Oral History of the al Qa’ida Leader (New York; Free Press, 2006) pp.: 264
\(^{179}\) Jonathan I. Katz, Deception and Denial in Iraq – The Limits of Secret Intelligence and the Intelligence Adversary Corollary (Washington University; Department of Physics, 2006) pp.: 1-3
\(^{180}\) Jonathan I. Katz, Deception and Denial in Iraq – The Limits of Secret Intelligence and the Intelligence Adversary Corollary (Washington University; Department of Physics, 2006) pp.: 3
\(^{181}\) Jonathan I. Katz, Deception and Denial in Iraq – The Limits of Secret Intelligence and the Intelligence Adversary Corollary (Washington University; Department of Physics, 2006) pp.: 3-14
An End to Itself?

Although the previously mentioned approaches are practiced by most jihadi groups, deception is rarely an end to itself and is most often used in coordination with other methodologies. Listing all the benefits of deception in a conflict may go beyond the scope of this paper but it allows employing ‘surprise’, which is clearly one of the most valuable commodities in a conflict or insurgency.

Yet, denial and deception does not happen automatically and by default. In fact, it is made possible by an organization’s bureaucracy, organizational learning and a constant improvement of intelligence and analytical capabilities. Most jihadi groups have not only demonstrated great capabilities when it comes to organizational learning, some groups like Hezbollah have also engaged in analytical methodologies and in actively trying to understand and analyze its adversaries. 182

Indeed, the entire range of military and counterintelligence related objectives require to ‘know the enemy’ and understand the target of the deception. 183 Thus, if any of the previously mentioned deceptive means are to be successful, the gathering of intelligence on a target becomes paramount to the deception as an adversary’s preconceptions, believes and intentions need to be understood in order for the deception to have the greatest impact on the enemy. In short, deception is constructed around intelligence.

182 Carl Anthony Wege, Hizballah’s Counterintelligence Apparatus (International Journal of Intelligence and Counterintelligence; Vol.25, No.4; 2012) pp.: 771-780
183 Joseph W. Caddell, Deception 101 – Primer on Deception (Strategic Studies Institute; 2004) pp.: 1-20
Knowing the Enemy

‘Knowing the enemy’ and understanding the target of the deception is a core-element in counterintelligence and may tie into active intelligence gathering and espionage.\textsuperscript{184} Thus, active gathering of intelligence\textsuperscript{185} on a target becomes paramount to the deception, as an adversary’s preconceptions, beliefs and intentions need to be understood in order for the deception to be successful. Da’ish, in its pursuit to understand the enemy has even introduced a special section in their Dabiq publication called ‘The Enemy’s Words’, which it does not solely utilise for propagandistic purposes but where one can clearly see what matters to the group based on the selected quotes:

‘Although the intelligence community has not yet detected specific plotting against the US homeland, ISIL has global aspirations. And as President Obama has made clear, ISIL’s leaders have threatened America and our allies. If left unchecked, ISIL will directly threaten our homeland and our allies.’ (Secretary of Defence Chuck Hagel, 2014)\textsuperscript{186}

Indeed, deception is constructed around intelligence but collection efforts are mainly directed towards uncovering the enemy’s perceptions, biases and weaknesses.\textsuperscript{187} This involves creating a misleading impression of the truth. For this purpose it is relevant to understand how an enemy perceives

\textsuperscript{185} Abd Al-Aziz Al-Muqrin, A Practical Course of Guerilla War (Translated by Norman Cigar, published as: Al-Aqidas’s Doctrine for Insurgency (Washington; Potomac Books, 2009) pp.: 113, 131, 143 and 148
\textsuperscript{186} Anonymous Da’ish Publication, 4\textsuperscript{th} Dabiq Magazine (published online; 2014) pp.: 44
\textsuperscript{187} Abram Shulsky, Elements of Strategic Denial and Deception, in: in Godson and Wirtz - Strategic Denial and Deception – The Twenty-First Century Challenge (Transaction Publishers, 2002) pp.: 15
Consequently, deceptive approaches of Jihadi groups contain a combination of intelligence with material and behavioural elements in order to achieve successful deception operations. In fact, active intelligence gathering methodologies, deception and denial have been inevitably linked from the origins of warfare to the advent of Islam and the battles of the Prophet Muhammad. Although those records mainly refer to what would be considered military intelligence today, the concept of ‘knowing the enemy’ has always ensured organisational survival through adaptable denial and deception for the purpose of operational security.

Consequently, the quintessence of Jihadi intelligence doctrines is the allocation of comprehensive information on the operational environment and expectable threats. This requires dual defensive and offensive approach to counterintelligence. In this regard, a significant example of offensive counterintelligence can be illustrated by the 2007 case of Nadia Prouty, who was placed inside the CIA by Hezbollah. Perhaps inspired by strategies already used in the Cold War, the Lebanese Prouty legally entered America via Canada. She than overstayed her non-immigrant visa and gained citizenship through a fake wedding with an American citizen. Afterwards she successfully managed to get employment with the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) and ultimately abused her position to gain a job at the Central Intelligence Agency, from within she effectively managed to spy on the CIA for Hezbollah despite the rigorous counterintelligence efforts of said

---

Jihadi efforts to understand the enemy, its methodologies, tactics and assumptions nonetheless exploit weaknesses, increase the chances of operational accomplishments and allow its planners to draw conclusions for future attacks. Equal to most governmental conceptualisations of intelligence, Al-Qaeda’s doctrine also reinforces the notion of prioritising the ability to think ahead and predict the future.

The Prophet Muhammad made a great effort to establish a highly active and dynamic intelligence collection division. In the Battle of Badr as well as during the Conquest of Mecca, he aimed at acquiring very detailed information on his enemies but also when he launched covert operations, like the Sariya of ibn ‘Abd al-Muttalib. In fact, the Prophet favoured ease of movement in order to spy on the enemy. In addition, the recruitment of spies has been common practice, and it is consequently not surprising that modern Jihadi groups have resorted to the same technique. Although Jihadi groups today employ a number of tactics to understand their enemies, those efforts may have reached their climax in the recruitment of a former French

---

191 Carl Anthony Wege, Hizballah’s Counterintelligence Apparatus (International Journal of Intelligence and Counterintelligence; Vol.25, No.4; 2012) pp.: 771-780
194 Anonymous Al-Qaeda Publication, Terrorist Training Manual (Translated by the Behavioural Analysis Program; Operational Training Unit; Counterintelligence Division; FBI Headquarters; The Manual was found in Manchester, England, in May 2000) pp.: 26-27
195 Waqidi, 1:19; 2:803; Tabari 2:436; Ibn Sayyid al-Nas, 2:167
196 Ibn Hisham 4:160; Kala’i, 1:151
197 Waqidi, 1:11
198 Waqidi, 2:462; Ibn Hisham, 4:85; Tabari 2:568
intelligence officer by Al Qaeda in Iraq. This provides an inside view into the French intelligence tradecraft and further allowed Al-Qaeda in Iraq to avoid detection and enhance its clandestine capabilities.\textsuperscript{199} The Australian radical John Roche, who planned to bomb the Israeli embassy in Canberra, and dark-skinned recruits in Africa who were operating in Somalia\textsuperscript{200} are also alarming indicators of AQ’s offensive counterintelligence and commitment to understanding the enemy. Another and even more shocking example may be the Al-Qaeda double agent Ali Mohammad, who managed to infiltrate the American intelligence community and who worked for both the CIA and Egyptian Islamic Jihad simultaneously but also for AQ on the creation of terrorist cells in Tanzania and Kenya. This represents how well Al-Qaeda must have understood its enemies.\textsuperscript{201} Also the interview that Da’ish conducted with an accused Israeli spy illustrates clearly that the group – based on the assumption that this interview was authentic, that the group indeed managed to capture an Israeli spy and that this interview goes beyond the scope of mere deterrence – has a solid interest in understanding its enemies and in trying to learn from its adversaries methodologies:

\textit{DĀBIQ: Did you receive training?}

\textit{MURTADD:} Yes, they sent me to a training camp in East Jerusalem – ‘Anatawt Training Camp. That’s where I began my training. I went through a training course on self-control and on how to survive an interrogation. I also

did a training course on information extraction – how to get information out of people. They also gave me weapons training. I attended the training camp for one month and completed my training.

DĀBIQ: Were you paid during training?

MURTADD: Yes, I received 5,000 Shekels as payment during training.

DĀBIQ: Were there other Palestinians being trained with you?

MURTADD: There were nine of us being trained, but all of them were Jews; I was the only Arab.

DĀBIQ: What happened when you completed your training?

MURTADD: After I completed my training, I began working as a spy in the people’s midst. I was specifically tasked with turning in weapons dealers, anyone who was wanted, anyone looking to infiltrate Jewish territory, and to report to the intelligence any operation planned to be executed in Jerusalem.

DĀBIQ: How did you eventually wind up spying on the Islamic State?

MURTADD: I came home one day and a guy named Miro was there. This Miro is an officer in the Israeli Mossad. My father and brother were both present. Miro had a folder in his hand and was reading from it. He suddenly started thanking me and expressing gratitude for the work I was doing and the help I was providing. He told me to continue on this path so that I could eventually work with them. My father and my brother also began thanking me and telling me that I would get better and better, and kept encouraging me further. Then he left. The next time he came, he said they wanted me to work with them and come and meet with them. I agreed. He said he would call us. He called me afterwards and said to come and see him at the office. I went to the office and met him. I sat down and he began asking me questions. He
asked me how many languages I knew, what kinds of jobs I used to do in my country, and if I would be able to take care of myself if they planted me in the midst of some people whom I didn’t know, and asked me how I would handle myself in such a situation. Then he said that they wanted me to carry out a big mission. They wanted to send me to Syria. I asked him what I would be doing in Syria. He said they wanted to send me to the Islamic State and have me send back information about them.202

Finally, counter interrogation has also been taught by Al-Qaeda based on the group’s assessment and analysis of CIA interrogations. The group instructs members to prepare answers as to why they are travelling to a certain destination and further describes what a common interrogation looks like and what interrogation techniques are likely to be used. This even includes instructions not to talk to cellmates in prison since they could be enemy agents.203

In a similar line also Da’ish has made an effort to instruct its members on how to avoid detection by its adversaries, which is indeed based on an in depth understanding of how its rivaling intelligence services operate. The group has thus instructed those who were planning to travel to Syria in order to fight with for the so-called Islamic State, to make any trip look like a holiday in southern Turkey. This even included booking a flight back to the North or booking a room in for an all-inclusive beach resort, from where smugglers would arrange transportation into Syria. Consequently fighters only received a few days of basic ‘crash-course’ weapons training, so that French or German intelligence services would be led to assume that they were only on holidays in Turkey. Indeed, the longer fighters stayed in Syria, the more suspicious the secret service in the West would get, which is why the training has do be achieved

202 Anonymous Da’ish Publication, 7th Dabiq Magazine published online, features an interview with the alleged Israeli spy (2015)
as fast as possible. \(^{204}\)

The training manual of AQ titled ‘Declaration of Jihad against the Country’s Tyrants (Military Series), the more recent ISIS publication ‘How to survive in the West’, illustrates this last point on active intelligence gathering in order to ensure denial and deception very well and demonstrates a great understanding of so called ‘western’ biases and prejudices. Al-Qaeda, for instance, prepares operatives for an undercover life in western societies through training them how to avoiding detection\(^{205}\) through blending into any given society. This, amongst instructions on how to organize cells, counterfeit travel documents and currency and clandestine communication, includes information on how the enemy might think and on how the adversary could be bluffed.


\(^{205}\) David D. Jessee, Tactical Means, Strategic Ends – Al Qaeda’s Use of Denial and Deception, in: Terrorism and Political Violence 18 (006) pp.: 371
Denial and Secrecy

Denial basically refers to denying an adversary useful information, which can be achieved through hiding objects, using encryption, avoiding interception and utilizing secure communication channels amongst many more digital and analogue means.\textsuperscript{206} In fact, some groups block all information channels through which relevant information on a group could be learned.\textsuperscript{207} According to J.B. Bell, denial must be structured as a central policy that is essential to all operational efforts.\textsuperscript{208} Indeed, the inherent illicitness of Jihadi groups requires a strong defensive positioning rooted not only in deception but mainly in denial.\textsuperscript{209} ‘The more an organisation is perceived as illicit, the more necessary is denial…What terrorists hide is the dynamics of an illicit movement … Denial must be structured as a central policy; no denial, no operations’.\textsuperscript{210} Furthermore, passive deception may also be regarded as means of denial and include false aliases, secure methods of communication, secure bases or

\textsuperscript{206} Jonathan I. Katz, Deception and Denial in Iraq – The Limits of Secret Intelligence and the Intelligence Adversary Corollary (Washington University; Department of Physics, 2006) pp.: 3

\textsuperscript{207} Abram Shulsky, Elements of Strategic Denial and Deception, in: in Godson and Wirtz - Strategic Denial and Deception – The Twenty-First Century Challenge (Transaction Publishers, 2002) pp.: 15

\textsuperscript{208} J. Bowyer Bell, Conditions Making for Success and Failure of Denial and Deception - Nonstate and Illicit Actors, in: in Godson and Wirtz - Strategic Denial and Deception – The Twenty-First Century Challenge (Transaction Publishers, 2002) pp.: 133

\textsuperscript{209} J. Bowyer Bell, Conditions Making for Success and Failure of Denial and Deception - Nonstate and Illicit Actors, in: in Godson and Wirtz - Strategic Denial and Deception – The Twenty-First Century Challenge (Transaction Publishers, 2002) pp.: 133

\textsuperscript{210} J. Bowyer Bell, Conditions Making for Success and Failure of Denial and Deception - Nonstate and Illicit Actors, in: in Godson and Wirtz - Strategic Denial and Deception – The Twenty-First Century Challenge (Transaction Publishers, 2002) pp.: 133 and 135
encryption or a combination thereof, and various other means that evade
detection and ensure survival.\textsuperscript{211}

The Prophet Muhammad can be regarded as a role model for operational
security and keeping important information secret.\textsuperscript{212} His counterintelligence
activities consequently aimed at negating any intelligence the enemy might
have collected on him.\textsuperscript{213} This can be regarded as a classic denial technique,
and it was of the utmost importance to his cause.\textsuperscript{214} He practiced it through a
variety of manoeuvres: implementing speed and swiftness in movement;\textsuperscript{215}
removing the bells from a camel’s neck in order to avoid detection, as seen in
the Battle of Muta and the Conquest of Mecca;\textsuperscript{216} concealing the mobilisation
of forces and their state of readiness, as seen in a variety of his battles;\textsuperscript{217}
using secret codes,\textsuperscript{218} avoiding detection through ordering his troops to
remain silent;\textsuperscript{219} preventing the shining of weapons in order to avoid
detection;\textsuperscript{220} and issuing commands on the safeguarding of secrets and
information about his battle strategy as seen in the conquest of Mecca or the
Sariya mission of Abdullah ibn Jahash, amongst others.\textsuperscript{221} Whilst the means
of warfare may have changed and the methodologies have been adapted
over the centuries by a variety of Jihadi groups, the main themes are still
present today.

\textsuperscript{211} Joseph W. Caddell, Deception 101 – Primer on Deception (Strategic Studies
Institute; 2004) pp.: 12
\textsuperscript{212} Waqidi 1:11, 2:796; Ibn Hisham, 2:245, 4:39; Ibn Sa’d, 2:5; Kala’i, 1:57; Ibn
Sayyid al-Nas, 1:226; Ibn al-Katheer 2:282
\textsuperscript{213} Waqidi, 2:792; Ibn Atheer, 2:241; Ibn Sayyid al-Nas, 2:167
\textsuperscript{214} Waqidi, 2:792; Ibn Atheer, 2:241; Ibn Sayyid al-Nas, 2:167
\textsuperscript{215} Waqidi, 2:755; Ibn Hisham, 4:39; Kala’i, 1:138; Ibn Katheer, 4:282
\textsuperscript{216} Waqidi, 2:755; Ibn Hisham, 4:39; Kala’i, 1:138; Ibn Katheer, 4:282
\textsuperscript{217} Waqidi, 2:796; Ibn Sa’s 2:33; Tabari, 2:555, 3:38; Ibn Sayyid al-Nas, 2:161
\textsuperscript{218} Waqidi, 1:71, 2:466; Ibn Hisham, 2:287, 3:237, Ibn Sayyid al-Nas, 2:282
\textsuperscript{219} Waqidi, 1:56, 2:636; Ibn Katheer, 3:216
\textsuperscript{220} Waqidi, 1:13; Ibn Sa’d, 2:21; Ibn Sayyd al-Nas, 2:109
\textsuperscript{221} Waqidi, 1:12; 2:796; Ibn Sa’d 2:96
Before 9/11 the doctrines of Al-Qaeda involved even more secrecy than in the organisation's later stages, and members were prohibited from identifying the organisation itself or associating it with attack in order to maintain secrecy.222 Indeed, only in late 2004, three years after 9/11, did Osama bin Laden actually admit to Al-Qaeda’s responsibility in the plot.223 This goes in line with the approach of the Prophet Muhammad, who would keep his plans secret and did not discuss them openly,224 instructing that secrets should be kept secret.225

The Quran itself provides a large number of intelligence- and counterintelligence-related activities, particularly since the Prophet Muhammad appreciated secrecy, trustworthiness and honesty the most when considering prospective converts to Islam. This may explain why some Islamic and Jihadi groups, that aim to achieve a specific aim in the interest of Muslims (i.e. liberating occupied territory) may consider counterintelligence not only a tactical and strategic but even a religious and ideological duty.

For example, even before Fatah was created, Yasser Arafat learned how to live a live in secrecy and evade Arab intelligence services when he compartmented his small and secret student organisation in Kuwait.226 Likewise, Ayman al Zawahiri, the current head of Al-Qaeda, was the leader of a clandestine underground organisation in Egypt before he reached the age of sixteen, which allowed him to gain years of experience in how to evade the

223 David D. Jessee, Tactical Means, Strategic Ends – Al Qaeda’s Use of Denial and Deception, in: Terrorism and Political Violence 18 (006) pp.: 369
224 Waqidi, 1:13, 2:636; ibn Atheer 2:188; Ibn Sayyid al-Nas 2:54
225 Waqidi, 1:195; Ibn Hisham, 3:59; Ibn Atheer, 2:188
Egyptian security services.\textsuperscript{227} This further affected the recruits those leaders brought to their organisations, as many of them were used to operating in secrecy under the cover of darkness.\textsuperscript{228} In sum, although not all Islamic organizations aim at executing the violent jihad and some may as well be secular nationalist organizations, that consider the concept of jihad as a cornerstone and vehicle of their activity, the doctrine of secrecy and counterintelligence appears to have an overreaching impact that is deeply rooted in a culture in which the Prophet Muhammad aimed at conducting his battles and missions in a covert and clandestine manner. Consequently, all preparations for war and his tactics and strategies would remain secret, and aside from a select few who were known for their trustworthiness and ability to keep secrets, no one was aware of the intentions and capabilities of the Holy Prophet.\textsuperscript{229} The Sariya of Abdullah ibn Jahash and the Conquest of Mecca illustrate this and also indicate early approaches to compartmentalisation, which has become common practice amongst Jihadi groups today.

\textsuperscript{227} Montasser al-Zayyat, The Road to al-Qa’ida: The Story of Bin Laden’s Right Hand Man (London; Pluto Press, 2004) pp.: 18

\textsuperscript{228} Lawrence Wright, The Looming Tower: Al-Qaida and the Road to 9/11 (New York; Knopf, 2006) pp.: 127-128

\textsuperscript{229} Waqidi, 1:13, 2:535, 3:1123; Ibn Hisham, 4:15; ibn Sa’d, 2:56
Compartmentalisation

Compartmentalisation or the creation of various cells inside Jihadi groups reflects an approach that was also utilized by the Prophet Muhammad, since his intelligence officers and those charged with surveillance, counterintelligence and actively gathering intelligence were not made aware of his plans to conquer Mecca, as was the case of the Sariya of 'Abdullah bin Jahash. Today, the same holds true for Jihadi groups. For instance, prior to Al-Qaeda’s US embassy operation in 1998, the technical advisor Muhammad Sadiq Odeh was not allowed to meet the AQ cell member who built the bomb and carried out the attack. This doctrine was also used while preparing the 9/11 attacks, in that information on the attacks was divided amongst five different cells with varying access to operational details. Hence, only a very limited number of trusted people were in a position to see AQ’s full strategy, Abd Al-Aziz Al-Muqrin stresses that the number of individuals in a cell must not exceed four to six.

The Black September Organisation also had a cell-based structure and was highly compartmentalized, as the group’s operatives knew only a few details until a mission was in progress. This illustrates that the BSO considered counterintelligence and denial a main priority as well. In fact, Arafat’s denial that the group was a proxy of the Fatah can already be seen as a tactic.

---

230 Waqidi, 2:769; Ibn Hisham, 3:292; Ibn Atheer, 4:81
231 Waqidi, 1:13, 1:14, 1:15
234 Jason Burke, Casting a Shadow of Terror (London; I.B. Taurus, 2003) pp.: 5
235 Abd Al-Aziz Al-Muqrin, A Practical Course of Guerilla War (Translated by Norman Cigar, published as: Al-Aqidas’s Doctrine for Insurgency (Washington; Potomac Books, 2009) pp.: 106
236 Bar-Zohar and Haber, The Quest for the Red Prince (Lyons Press, 2002) pp.: 119
designed to distract security forces. Furthermore only a few members were allowed to see the complete picture of the group’s operations and strategies. In some cases, recruited members did not even know that they were actually participating in a BSO operation until it was initiated and believed they were fighting for the cause of the Fatah.

Da’ish has practiced a similar form of compartmentalisation according to some investigation documents and an assessment of terrorism experts. The documents conclude that Da’ish has assigned managerial roles to French or Belgian citizens and has treated them as more than just operatives. The reason for this operational road map is the achievement of foreign jihadi fighters building up their own counterintelligence cells abroad and run their operational networks. Da’ish has given some fighters autonomy with regards to tactics and strategy, although it must be mentioned that the operation as a whole had to receive a green light from the Da’ish leadership.

Compartmentalization also facilitates counterintelligence and counterespionage operations and internal investigations, as restricting the flow of information renders any list of suspected informants with access to compromised information rather small. However, too much compartmentalization has also proven to be fatal to the Jihadi cause, as illustrated by a mixed Japanese-Palestinian BSO group. When the group

237 Christopher Dobson, Black September – Its Short Violent History (New York; Macmillan, 1974) pp.: 39
239 Christopher Dobson, Black September – Its Short Violent History (New York; Macmillan, 1974) pp.: 43
attempted to hijack an airplane in 1973, the group’s planner was killed during the initial takeover, and because no other member held all the necessary information on the mission, it had to be abandoned.\textsuperscript{242} Da’ish on the other hand has learned from mistakes made by other jihadi groups and in their official publications refers to ù Mus’ab az-Zarqāwī as a role model for compartmentalization and cell management:

‘In the late 90s, Abū Mus’ab az-Zarqāwī and his group of very small numbers had a center in the Afghan city of Herat – a city with a Rāfidī majority – far from the assemblies of the mujāhid muhājir groups. He did so to isolate his group from others at the time and prevent traffic from regular visits and thereby protect his group from intelligence infiltration. He also isolated them because of what he and his group was accused of by members of the other groups. They accused him of being takfīrī, Khārijī, and a person of extremist views.’\textsuperscript{243}

With regards to the international architecture of a Jihadi group, tight organizational structures have proven to have a positive impact on counterintelligence performance. This was true for Fatah, BSO and Al-Qaeda until 2001, when the group had to abandon its safe haven in Afghanistan and remains the case for Da’ish, which exercises command and control over large areas in a very tight organizational manner. This has enabled said groups to implement counterintelligence doctrines and extensive training.

Such secret training facilities have been and always will be a cornerstone of the jihadi internal architecture and internal training. Da’ish has pushed its counterintelligence efforts to a great extend when the group dropped new recruits off in the middle of the desert only for them to find out that what

\textsuperscript{242} Christopher Dobson, Black September – Its Short Violent History (New York; Macmillan, 1974) pp.: 47

\textsuperscript{243} Anonymous Da’ish Publication, 6\textsuperscript{th} Dabiq Magazine (published online; 2015) pp.: 41
looked like the middle of nowhere was actually cave-like dwellings all around group. In fact, everything that was above the ground was covered in order to make the structures invisible to drones.\textsuperscript{244} Additionally, it has been reported that these dwellings in the middle of the desert, where the recruits were prohibited to eat unless food was given to them, to drink water or to shower. The reason for this, however, is not the scarcity of water or food but to apply counterintelligence vetting procedures and to see who really wants to join Da’ish or who might have a different agenda or motivation.\textsuperscript{245} This very strict and tight command structure has so far worked fairly well for the groups counterintelligence performance.

In contrast, when AQ loosened its command structure and organizational composition, the group consequently had to rely on previous training or online training in order to increase its counterintelligence performance.\textsuperscript{246} Similarly, the Egyptian Islamic Group, whilst aware of counterintelligence doctrines, did not manage to institutionalize them due to its loose command structure.\textsuperscript{247} Furthermore, tight structures allow for intensive vetting procedures and counterespionage operations, as conducted by AQ or Da’ish. In the case of Da’ish the new arrivals to the so-called Islamic State were put into a network of dormitories in Syria, close to the Turkish border, where they were interviewed, questioned and inventoried. Additionally, they were fingerprinted and blood samples were taken in order to perform a physical examination. The interview questions were methodologically logged into a notebook and

\begin{flushleft}
\textsuperscript{244} Rukmini Callimachi, How a secretive Branch of ISIS Built a Global Network of Killers (New York Times, Aug. 3, 2016; accessed online Sept. 19, 2016: http://nyti.ms/2az95K5)
\textsuperscript{246} Blake W. Mobley, Terrorism and Counterintelligence – How Terrorist Groups Delude Detection (Columbia University Press; 2012) pp.: 230
\textsuperscript{247} Blake W. Mobley, Terrorism and Counterintelligence – How Terrorist Groups Delude Detection (Columbia University Press; 2012) pp.: 230
\end{flushleft}
although they could be perceived as fairly normal questions, they did indeed have great counterintelligence value and benefit the organization of the internal structures. Some of the questions were described to be along the lines of the following: What’s your name?, What’s your second name?, Who’s your mom?, Where’s your mom originally from?, What did you study?, What degree do you have?, What’s your ambition?, What do you want to become?.248

Indeed, the battle strategies of the Prophet Muhammad indicate that he used a very tight command structure throughout his campaigns and a very structured approach that allowed him to emphasise on training, which culminated in a designated department that was responsible for preparing various units for battle operations.249 The training included but was not limited to reconnaissance,250 covert movement and camouflage.251 Psychological warfare252 or taking advantage of the enemy’s weaknesses253 was taught by the supreme commander on a continuous and institutionalized basis. Yet, the Prophet would transmit his doctrines, guidelines and instructions only by letter or preferably verbally in order to remain operationally secure.254

249 Waqidi, 1:402, 2:535; Ibn Hisham, 2:230; Qurtubi, 4:306
250 Waqidi, 1:207, 2:457; Ibn Hisham, 2:245; Ibn Sa’d, 2:45
251 Waqidi, 1:13, 2:636; Ibn Hisham, 4:265; Ibn Sa’d, 2:96; Ibn Katheer, 3:261
252 Waqidi, 2:562; Tabari, 2:554
253 Waqidi, 1:396; Ibn Sa’d 2:21; Tabari, 2:268; Suhayli, 3:28
254 Waqidi, 1:13; Ibn Sa’d, 2:35; Ibn Sayyid al-Nas, 2:39
Secret Communication

Secret and secure communication is paramount to the success of a Jihadi operation today as well. However, the Prophet Muhammad also used coded messages and encryption. Codes were changed from battle to battle and from missions to mission, as illustrated by the case of the Battle of Badr and Khandaq as well as the Sariya mission of Abu Bakr against the Bani Kilab.\(^{255}\) Today, code words are still used: They are still different in each battle and are changed after having been uncovered by the enemy.\(^{256}\) Most recently Da’ish has used coded language to discuss terror plots, assigning terms such as ‘peanut butter and jelly sandwiches’ or ‘culinary school’ to signify ‘terrorist attacks’ and ‘training camps’.\(^{257}\)

Most recently, when Da’ish aimed at smuggling fighters to the EU, they were given a Turkish cellphone number with the instruction to store it in their telephone book simply as “FF,” in order to avoid using a real name. After the fighters received $2,000 in $100 bills, they were transported to the Turkish border, where a man took their photographs and soon after returned with Syrian passports. Another smuggler later on arranged a boat trip to Leros, Greece with fake passports and under fake names.\(^{258}\)

The allocation of a ‘nom de guerre’ is a reasonably common tactic amongst Jihadi groups. From the beginning of the organisation, Fatah leaders adopted aliases,\(^{259}\) such as ‘Abu Amar’ for Yasser Arafat or ‘al Assifa’ (the storm) for

\(^{255}\) Waqidi, 1:72, 2:466; Ibn Hisham, 2:287; Ibn Sa’d 2:85

\(^{256}\) Waqidi, 1:8


the group itself. With regards to AQ, the group has also utilised codes because insecure communication has proven to be a pitfall to Al-Qaeda operatives due to electronic interceptions. Khalid Sheikh, bin al Shibh, Muhammad, Zubayadah and Isamuddin have all been caught due to this shortcoming. AQ has learned from this lapse and repeatedly warns its followers of the risks of intercepted communication channels offline and online. Thus, AQ used encryption and coded messages that were written in the language of globally operating companies, wherein ‘Jihad’ would be called ‘work’ and weapons would be ‘tools’. Interestingly, based on the code word used for the US and UK intelligence services, AQ appears to have perceived itself as more of an intelligence service rather than a mere guerrilla organization, as the used term was ‘foreign competitors’. Indeed, this comparison of the group’s jihadi cause and modus operandi of being a competitor and not an adversary to the CIA or MI6 may reveal more about its underlying ideological thinking patterns than it revealed at first glance.

261 David D. Jessee, Tactical Means, Strategic Ends – Al Qaeda’s Use of Denial and Deception, in: Terrorism and Political Violence 18 (006) pp.: 378
262 David D. Jessee, Tactical Means, Strategic Ends – Al Qaeda’s Use of Denial and Deception, in: Terrorism and Political Violence 18 (006) pp.: 378
263 Abd Al-Aziz Al-Muqrin, A Practical Course of Guerilla War (Translated by Norman Cigar, published as: Al-Aqidas’s Doctrine for Insurgency (Washington; Potomac Books, 2009) pp.: 123
265 Trial Transcript, United States v. Usama Bin Laden et. al., US District Court, Southern District of New York S(7) 98 Cr. 1023 (2001) pp.: 2
266 Trial Transcript, United States v. Usama Bin Laden et. al., US District Court, Southern District of New York S(7) 98 Cr. 1023 (2001) pp.: 2
Local Networks and Public Support

Early Arab tribes utilised local intelligence networks and public support, which was an espionage system that got further developed by the Prophet Muhammad in war and peace.\textsuperscript{267} It comes as no surprise that the first generation of Hezbollah fighters emerged from the tribal structures of the Musawi and Hamadi clans. Consequently, and due to the utilization of clan structures even the earliest stages of Hezbollah counterintelligence activity were extraordinarily efficient. Once the second generation of Hezbollah leaders emerged as a consequence of the growing organization at the turn of the century their counterintelligence apparatus began to face more intricate counterintelligence problems the further it moved away from the original clan structures and local networks.\textsuperscript{268}

However, exploiting local networks, public support and HUMINT sources does not only have advantages and actually comes with significant trade-offs. The interplay between counterintelligence doctrines and public support can clearly be illustrated by the events surrounding Fatah after the group achieved a propaganda victory following the battle of Karameh in 1968. In order to benefit from its newly gained publicity and recruit new members who could, amongst other positions, be of great importance to the group’s human intelligence networks, Fatah’s leaders had to expose themselves to the media. However, Yasser Arafat decided to abandon the safety of secrecy and embark on a campaign to increase the group’s popularity in the West Bank.\textsuperscript{269} This move resulted in an increased fear that Israeli security services would exploit this


\textsuperscript{268} Carl Anthony Wege, Hizballah’s Counterintelligence Apparatus (International Journal of Intelligence and Counterintelligence; Vol.25, No.4; 2012) pp.: 780

\textsuperscript{269} Ehud Yaari, Strike Terror – The Story of Fatah (New York; Sabra Books, 1970) pp.: 245
openness.\textsuperscript{270} Although not everyone was allowed to capitalize on the publicity and public support, and a certain level of secrecy remained, this situation eventually lead to Arafat almost getting caught by Israeli security forces in the late 1960s. He only managed to evade capture by hiding in a car nearby the Ramallah compound of the group.\textsuperscript{271}

Thus, local support is a double-edged sword that can be a great benefit or perhaps even the downfall of a Jihadi group due to the inherent counterintelligence lapses, like the one that happened to Yasser Arafat. Furthermore, when Jordan increased her measurements against Fatah in 1971, it was too late for the group leaders to advocate to return to its original secrecy.\textsuperscript{272} In fact, this trade-off was to follow Fatah throughout its existence, as its leaders were known to Middle Eastern security services and going back ‘underground’ would prove to be nearly impossible.\textsuperscript{273} Eventually, this operational counterintelligence shortcoming would lead to the formation of the Black September Organisation run by Ali Hassan Salameh as the covert and secretive arm of Fatah.\textsuperscript{274} Unsurprisingly, most of BSO’s key leaders had previously served in Fatah’s Jihaz al Razd counterintelligence organisation or were members of the secretive Muslim Brotherhood like Khalil Ibrahim al-Wazir.\textsuperscript{275}

\textsuperscript{271} Zeev Schiff and Raphael Rothstein, Fedayeen – Guerillas against Israel (New York; David McKay, 1972) pp.: 78
\textsuperscript{274} Riad El-Rayyes and Dunia Nahas, Guerillas for Palestine (London; Portico, 1976) pp.: 24
\textsuperscript{275} Said K. Aburish, Arafat: From Defender to Dictator (New York; Bloomsbury, 1998) pp.: 35
Having learned from the downsides of publicity that almost got Arafat caught by the Israeli security service, the BSO never had an official spokesperson, which is rather unusual even for a clandestine group. However, such extreme secrecy can also decrease popular support, since lowering profiles may eventually lead the popular support base to lose interest in the cause of the organisation. For example, the Abu-Sayyaf Group (ASG), which was previously linked to AQ but is now Da’ish affiliated, aimed to increase its popularity through media outreach. Developing a personal popularity did not always aid the group, however, and in fact its visibility actually provided highly valuable information to its Philippine adversaries.

Publicity moves have thus proven to jeopardize counterintelligence strategies. On the other hand, secrecy and lack of publicity paradoxically limit a group’s intelligence performance as well, because missing daily interactions with the local population significantly decreases the number of volunteers, trust in the group and local sources and therefore also its overall counterintelligence strength. After AQ reached fame through the embassy bombings, it managed to exploit local intelligence sources and networks more frequently, as more members of the public were willing to aid the group in its cause. Indeed, popular support can also lead to increased recruitment due to the fame of a leader and the manoeuvres associated with him. For example, Osama bin Laden’s popularity increased the number of new members.

276 Bar-Zohar and Haber. The Quest for the Red Prince (Lyons Press, 2002) pp.: 110
whilst the same holds true for the equally questionable fame of Abu Bakr al Baghdadi and his so-called Islamic State.
Territorial Control

Controlling territory can have a significant impact on a Jihadi group’s counterintelligence performance. Most recently, particularly Da’ish has managed to conquer (but also depend on) significant territory, control and influence and exploit the local intelligence landscape. Such territorial control is closely linked to public support and ensures secure communication, physical security and vetting of new members and this in sum significantly contributes to a Jihadi group’s counterintelligence performance. Limited or no access to a group’s territory drastically increases superiority over the local intelligence landscape, sources and networks, enabling a group to operate in a reasonably free fashion.

With respect to Jihadi ideology, Al-Qaeda also uses local HUMINT sources and networks under the umbrella of ‘the Ummah having to unite against a foreign enemy’, which the group aims to achieve through its media strategies. The same can be said for Da’ish and its publications, whilst ‘The Management of Savagery’ by Abu Bakr Naji also picks up on this aspect, reminding its readers that: ‘...the people will be good eyes and armour for us and protect us from spies … a fact which makes it possible for us to discover the spies and watch each one of them’.

285 Abd Al-Aziz Al-Muqrin, A Practical Course of Guerilla War (Translated by Norman Cigar, published as: Al-Aqidas’s Doctrine for Insurgency (Washington; Potomac Books, 2009) pp.: 109
However, this counterintelligence advantage has the obvious downside of being able to pinpoint the geographical location of a group, infiltrate it with spies and to conduct mass arrests or military raids. In 1990 AQ used its controlled territory in Afghanistan to increase its counterintelligence procedures, recruitments and vetting methodologies but at the same time enabled the US to define a clear geographical target after the 9/11 attacks. The Abu-Sayyaf Group, al-Shabab and the more nationalist Fatah and Hamas have encountered the same pitfalls and advantages at the same time. Whilst not all Jihadi groups rely on territorial control, Al-Qaeda had to do so throughout its existence and state sponsors such as Sudan or safe havens like Afghanistan, the Southern Philippines, Somalia and most recently northern Mali are doubling as additional layers of security and counterintelligence.

Adversaries will hence encounter some difficulties in recruiting informants inside the controlled territory or will be spotted by local supporters. The Abu-Sayyaf group in the Philippines, for instance, has managed to significantly benefit from this. Although it remains small in numbers, ASG draws a lot of strength from a solid base of local support which includes intelligence collection, shelter and hideouts but also local networks as ‘early warning signals’ during military raids.\textsuperscript{292} In fact, the group manages to blend into the local communities and yet controls isolated territory, which has lead to a very unclear picture of Abu-Sayyaf’s current leadership, membership numbers and internal structure.\textsuperscript{293}

\textsuperscript{291} Blake W. Mobley, Terrorism and Counterintelligence – How Terrorist Groups Delude Detection (Columbia University Press; 2012) pp.: 256
Conclusion

Counterintelligence through denial and deception can be amongst the most rewarding of tactical and strategic investments in a conflict for Jihadi organisations. Further, due to the covert and camouflaged nature of most Jihadi groups, denial and deception are essential not only to operational security and to gaining advantages over an enemy but also to organisational survival, as they conceal certain activities. This is especially true for Jihadi groups, as denial and deception constitute the fundamentals upon which all other activities are conducted. Indeed, also R.H. Schultz, Jr. et. al. argue that the manipulation of information and (counter-)intelligence has become a relatively standard procedure throughout Jihadi groups. In fact, groups like Al-Qaeda or Da’ish have taken on most of the counterintelligence attributes of governmental actors, which are not limited to defensive operations but include offensive counterintelligence measurements. When Al-Qaeda underwent transformation in the 1990’s, some commentators have even suggested a paradigm change of warfare itself, which arguably reached its climax with the 9/11 attacks. This new combat doctrine has even been compared to the

295 Joseph W. Caddell, Deception 101 – Primer on Deception (Strategic Studies Institute; 2004) pp.: 1
4th generation of warfare,\textsuperscript{300} which is amongst other indicators, reliant on masked operations, denial, deception, stealth and intelligence and counterintelligence techniques.\textsuperscript{301}

As such, denial and deception have not only been integrated into the workflows of Jihadi groups on an operational and tactical level but have further reached ideological dimensions. Indeed, one of the most recent publications of Da’ish, ‘How to Survive in the West – A Mujahid Guide (2015)’ teaches basic denial and deception techniques to future Jihadis by connecting each chapter to the group’s own interpretation of ideological references and religious justifications.\textsuperscript{302} The theme appears to be that manoeuvres and acts of the Prophet Muhammad and other ideological role models are interpreted as justifications and guidance of Jihadi counterintelligence:

‘Supporting the Islamic cause is a mentality and ideology more than anything else. You are always looking at everything though your Mujahid eyes, always think how any situation could benefit the Jihad’.\textsuperscript{303}

The connections between the military strategy of the Prophet Muhammad, which is in itself partially exposed to pre-Islamic and indigenous influence and

\textsuperscript{302} Rüdiger Lohlker, The „I“ of IS or religion matters (Pending for Publication) pp.: 1-15
\textsuperscript{303} Anonymous Da’ish Publication, How to Survive in the West – A Mujahid’s Guide (2015), published online (2015) pp.: 68 (No Internet Link will be provided here. The author is in possession of the relevant sources and documents.)
the modern approach of Jihadi groups, demonstrates that there is a Jihadi concept of counterintelligence. This concept dates back to the earliest battles of Islam and even further. The Prophet Muhammad made use of this pre-existing intelligence network and enriched already established methodologies with new notions, strategies and counterintelligence doctrines. Today, Jihadi groups believe in walking in the footsteps of the Prophet Muhammad, aim to re-instate an Islamic Caliphate and are willing to die for their ideologies and interpretations of Islam. Thus, it makes sense to understand how these Jihadi sub-cultures evade detection and deceive their enemies within the framework of a Jihadi counterintelligence concept. Also, Abd Al-Aziz Al-Muqrin frequently refers to the strategies and tactics used by the Prophet Muhammad as interpreted from the Sunnah in order to justify methodologies like assassinations or to ensure internal security.\(^{304}\) He refers to the assassination of Khalid Al-Hudhali by Abd Allah bin Unays\(^{305}\) for planning an attack on Medina and inciting the people of Nakhla or Uranah to fight Muslims.\(^{306}\) Also, the assassination of Ka‘b bin Al-Ashraf is mentioned in order to justify drastic measurements that ensure internal stability.\(^{307}\) The doctrines of Da’ish, AQ or any other armed Islamic organisation that engages in some form of Jihad and struggle indicate this connection, even though the goals, approaches and theological or nationalistic practices and ideas of the mentioned groups are highly different. Though not all Jihadi groups can be compared and measured with the same standards one can still apply the notion that their denial and deception efforts support a variety of organisational and operational factors,

\(^{304}\) Abd Al-Aziz Al-Muqrin, A Practical Course of Guerilla War (Translated by Norman Cigar, published as: Al-Aqidas’s Doctrine for Insurgency (Washington; Potomac Books, 2009) pp.: 141

\(^{305}\) Muhammad Husayn Haykal, The Life of Muhammad (Islamic Book Trust, 1976) pp.: 294


\(^{307}\) Abd Al-Aziz Al-Muqrin, A Practical Course of Guerilla War (Translated by Norman Cigar, published as: Al-Aqidas’s Doctrine for Insurgency (Washington; Potomac Books, 2009) pp.: 141
whereas other factors may be applicable depending on the specifications of each Jihadi group.\textsuperscript{308}

Counterintelligence activities of Jihadi groups not only serve military, strategic and tactical purposes, but they are further based on ideological doctrines and as such shape the organisation, structure and methodologies of Jihadi organisations. Da’ish, and its parallel attempts to establish a worldwide Islamic Caliphate and create an Islamic intelligence culture in order to achieve the former, constitute a good example. One might argue that Da’ish’s lust for power and control made this step inevitable. However, a pre-existing Jihadi intelligence culture made today’s clandestinely and secretly operating Jihadi groups inevitable. Jihadi counterintelligence must consequently be understood in light of ideology and religion. Not all the doctrines created by the Prophet Muhammad fit into a time in which warfare is waged from the air, with drones, GPS systems and satellites. Some may claim that a profound engagement with religion, jihadi ideology and counterintelligence doctrines may be too exuberant and cumbersome and that it would only concern theologians and scholars of Islamic Science; an academic field that cannot yield an instant ‘counter-terrorism effect’ or contribute to baffling the emerging threats looming on the horizon.\textsuperscript{309} Some may believe that Jihadi counterintelligence is a mere military problem. This would be a grave error, however, as this paper finds that the ideological connection to the doctrines already practiced by the Prophet Muhammad and other medieval role models significantly affect present practices, approaches and workflows. In fact, one must turn to ideology for important political clues, in order to, as Sir John Keegan mentioned, ‘find a way into the fundamentalist’s mind-set and to overcome it from within’. The Quran, the Sunnah and the military management of the Prophet Muhammad himself provide guidelines and doctrines for a large number of intelligence-related activities and for a large

\textsuperscript{308} David D. Jessee, Tactical Means, Strategic Ends – Al Qaeda’s Use of Denial and Deception, in: Terrorism and Political Violence 18 (006) pp.: 369

number of radicalised jihadi readers or misguided scholars. Hence, counterintelligence is considered not only a tactical and strategic necessity but even a religious and ideological duty.
Bibliography

Journal Articles


A. Botha: Terrorism in the Maghreb: The Transnationalisation of Domestic Terrorism (2008; ISS Monograph Series, Number 144; Pretoria: Institute of Security Studies)

Adebayo E. Adeyemi & Mahmoud N. Musa: Al-Qaeda in Islamic Maghreb (AQIM): Terrorist Networks Infiltrate Northern Mali; pp.: 11 (2014; Global Journal of Human-Social Science; Volume 14 Issue 5 Version)

Aronson, Samuel: AQIM’s Threat to Western Interests in the Africa’s Sahel (Combating Terrorism Center Sentinel (CTC), West Point)


David D. Jessee, Tactical Means, Strategic Ends – Al Qaeda’s Use of Denial and Deception, in: Terrorism and Political Violence 18 (006) pp.: 371


E. Kohlmann: Two Decades of Jihad in Algeria: the GIA, the GSPC and Al Qaeda (2007; The NEFA Foundation; www.nefaffoundation.orginfo)


Gaetano Joe Ilardi, Irish Republican Army Counterintelligence, in International Journal of Intelligence and Counterintelligence 23/1 (2009) pp.: 21

H. Alvi: The diffusion of Intra-Islamic violence and terrorism - The impact of the proliferation of Salafi/Wahhabi ideologies; pp.: 38-50 (2014; Middle East Review of International Affairs,; Vol 18)


J. Bowyer Bell, Conditions Making for Success and Failure of Denial and Deception – Non State and Illicit Actors (Trends in Organised Crime; 6: 32)


John Ehrman, What Are We Talking About When We Talk About Counterintelligence? (Studies in Intelligence; No. 53, 2009) pp.: 5–20

Jonathan I. Katz, Deception and Denial in Iraq – The Limits of Secret Intelligence and the Intelligence Adversary Corollary (Washington University; Department of Physics, 2006) pp.: 3

Joseph W. Caddell, Deception 101 – Primer on Deception (Strategic Studies Institute; 2004) pp.: 1


Kathryn Haar: GSPC in Italy: The Forward Base of Jihad in Europe (Jamestown Foundation)

Lecocq, Baz; Schrijver, Paul: The War on Terror in a Haze of Dust - Potholes and Pitfalls on the Saharan Front (Journal of Contemporary African Studies 25 (1): 141–166)

Michael I. Handel, Intelligence and Deception, in Journal of Strategic Studies; Vol5 No.1

O. Guitta: Al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb: A Threat for the West; pp 54-55 (2010; Defence Against Terrorism Review; Vol. 3 No 1)

R. Chelin: Unravelling Al Qaeda Terrorism in the Maghreb Region; pp.: 107 (2015; African Renaissance Volume 12, Number 1)


Rüdiger Lohlker, Dschihadismus – Eine Religiös Legitimierte Subkultur der Moderne, in: Religionen Unterwegs 21/1 (March 2015) pp.: 7

Rüdiger Lohlker, IS/Da'ish-Fatwas: Legal Extremism (Pending for Publication) pp.: 1-8

Rüdiger Lohlker, The „I“ of IS or religion matters (Pending for Publication) pp.: 1-15

S. Harmon: From GSPC to AQIM: the Evolution of an Algerian Islamist Terrorist Group into an Al Qai’da Affiliate; pp.: 12-29 (2010; Concerned African Scholars)

Steinberg, Guido, Isabelle Werenfels: Between the ‘Near’ and the ‘Far’ Enemy: Al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (Mediterranean Politics 12 (3): 407–413)

T. Camille: New Strategies in Al-Qaeda’s Battle for Algeria (2009; Terrorism Monitor 7)


Zeev Schiff and Raphael Rothstein, Fedayeen – Guerillas against Israel (New York; David McKay, 1972) pp.: 86
Unpublished Sources

Dario Cristiani, Riccardo Fabiani: Al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) - Implications for Algeria's Regional and International Relations
Anonymous Sources

Anonymous Al-Qaeda Publication, Terrorist Training Manual (Translated by the Behavioural Analysis Program; Operational Training Unit; Counterintelligence Division; FBI Headquarters; The Manual was found in Manchester, England, in May 2000) pp.: 26-27

Anonymous Da’ish Publication, 4th Dabiq Magazine published online (2015); pp.: 45

Anonymous Da’ish Publication, 6th Dabiq Magazine published online (2015); pp.: 41

Anonymous Da’ish Publication, 7th Dabiq Magazine published online, features an interview with the alleged Israeli spy (2015);


Anonymous Da’ish Video and Transcript Publication (published online on the 20. June 2015)
News Sources

Abou Zeid Dead: AQIM Confirms Death Of Al Qaeda Leader (2014; Huffington Post)


Al Arabiya: Al-Qaeda Offshoot Threatens Life of Mauritanian President (2011; http://www.alarabiya.net/articles/2011/02/07/136694.htm)


Al Jazeera: Al-Qaeda branch warns France 19 November 2010


Andrew Campbell, Taqiyya: How Islamic Extremists Deceive the West, in: National Observer 65 (Melbourne; Council for the National Interest, 2005) pp.: 11-23


Bob Watson: Algeria blasts fuel violence fears, BBC News


Corera Gordon: Islamists pose threat to French interests in Africa, BBC

Cruickshank, Paul: Libya: An opportunity for al Qaeda?


La Libération: Un Marocain arrêté en Mauritanie pour terrorisme; Juni 2006

Le Monde Diplomatique: El Para, the Maghreb’s Bin Laden (http://mondediplo.com/2005/02/04algeria)


Le Monde: Combats au Mali, alors qu'AQMI choisit un successeur à Abou Zeïd (http://www.lemonde.fr/afrique/article/2013/03/25/combats-au-mali-alors-qu-aqmi-choisit-un-successeur-a-abou-zeid_1853494_3212.html#xpvfjr26SVRmMeGl.99)

Le Monde: Des djihadistes frappent le Niger et la France (http://www.lemonde.fr/international/article/2013/05/24/des-djihadistes-frappent-le-niger-et-la-france_3416795_3210.html#V1gGIYsuEfycSjs8.99)

Le Monde: La mort du djihadiste Abou Zeid confirmée à Paris (http://www.lemonde.fr/international/article/2013/03/23/la-mort-du-djihadiste-abou-zeid-confirmee-a-paris_1853204_3210.html#Akizmugy8sDW6HBM.99)


Nossiter, Adam; Baume, Maïa de la: Kidnappings Fuel Extremists In West Africa; The New York Times.

Panapress : L'attaque contre la garnison de Lemberghy toujours à la une; Jeune Afrique, Juni 2005


Philippe Leymarie (Le Monde Diplomatique): The Sahel falls Apart (http://mondediplo.com/2012/04/05sahel)

Spiegel Online: Der Westen ignoriert den neuen Tuareg-Staat. (2012; www.spiegel.de)

Süddeutsche Zeitung: Die Tuareg rufen eigenen Staat aus (2012; sueddeutsche.de)


Thiolay, Boris: Le djihad du "Barbu rouge; L'Express; pp. 40–41.

BBC News: Profile of AQIM
Internet and Online Media


Think Tanks, Governments and NGOs


Centre for Strategic and International Studies: Al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb

Council on Foreign Relations: Al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM);

Coup - Record of Analysis presented before the United States House of Representatives Committee on Foreign Affairs (2012; Sub-Committee of Africa, Global Health and Human Rights)

Daniel Skallman: The Conflict in Mali is about Poverty not Terrorism (2013; The Global Poverty Project; http://www.globalpovertyproject.com)

David J. Francis: The Regional Impact of the Armed Conflict and French Intervention in Mali (2013; Norwegian Peace building Resource Centre (NOREF); http://www.peacebuilding.no)


in Brief – Two Years after the Crisis: Returnees from Libya Revisited (March 2013; http://publications.iom.int/bookstore/index.php?)

International Organization for Migration (IOM): Policy
Jemal Oumar: Locals, Unesco Condemn Destruction of Timbuktu Mosque 2012; Magharebia)

Morlen Boas: The International Intervention in Mali - Desert Blues’ or a New Beginning? (2013; Canada’s Journal of Global Policy Analysis; http://www.ijx.sagepub.com/content/early/2013/10/04/0020702013505430.full)

National Counter-terrorist Center: AL-QA’IDA IN THE LANDS OF THE ISLAMIC MAGHREB (AQIM)


Report of the UN Secretary-General on the Situation in Mali (2012; UN Security Council; Document No. S/2012/894)

Robert Spencer, Counterterrorism experts starting to awaken to the reality of taqiyya (Jihadwatch; published online at: http://www.jihadwatch.org/2013/03/counterterrorism-experts-starting-to-awaken-to-the-reality-of-taqiyya; accessed on the 31. April 2016)


Trial Transcript, United States v. Usama Bin Laden et. al., US District Court, Southern District of New York S(7) 98 Cr. 1023 (2001) Day 2


Middle East Media Research Institute: The Al-Qaeda Organization in the Islamic Maghreb: The Evolving Terrorist Presence in North Africa; Inquiry and Analysis

Books


Abd Al-Aziz Al-Muqrin, A Practical Course of Guerilla War (Translated by Norman Cigar, published as: Al-Aqidas’s Doctrine for Insurgency (Washington; Potomac Books, 2009) pp.: 94 and 109


Abu Bakr Naji, The Management of Savagery – The Most Critical Stage Through Which the Umma Will Pass (Published Online; Translated by W. McCants; John M. Olin Institute for Strategic Studies; Harvard University; 2006) pp.: 66


B. Whaley, Cheating and Deception (New Brunswick; Transaction Publishers, 1991) pp.: 188
Bar-Zohar and Haber. The Quest for the Red Prince (Lyons Press, 2002) pp.: 119


Brynjar Lia: Architect of Global Jihad – The Life of Al-Qaida Strategist Abu Mus‘ab al Suri

Christoph Reuter, Die Schwarze Macht – Der ‘Islamische Staat’ und die Strategen des Terrors (Spiegel Buchverlag; DVA, 2015) pp.: 263

Christopher Dobson, Black September – Its Short Violent History (New York; Macmillan, 1974) pp.: 39


Godson and Wirtz - Strategic Denial and Deception – The Twenty-First Century Challenge; Nonstate and Illicit Actors (Transaction Publishers, 2002) pp.: 133

Ibn Kathir, Stories of the Prophet - From Adam to Muhammad, in: Mansoura: Dar Al-Manarah (Egypt, 2001) pp.: 389

Jason Burke, Casting a Shadow of Terror (London; I.B. Taurus, 2003) pp.: 5

Joas Wagemakers: A Quietist Jihadi – The Ideology and Influence of Abu Muhammad al-Maqdisi

John K. Colley, Green March Black September – The Story of the Palestinian Arabs (Frank Cass Publishers; 1973) pp.: 124


Michael Herman, Intelligence Power in Peace and War (Cambridge University Press; 1996) pp.: 170


Muhammad Husayn Haykal, The Life of Muhammad (Islamic Book Trust, 1976) pp.: 294


Peter Bergen: The Osama Bin Laden I know – An Oral History of the Al-Qaeda Leader (Free Press; 2006)

Rad Mahmud Ahmad al-Barhawi, al-Uyun wa l-jawasis (Irbid; dar Al-Mutannabi, 2002) pp.: 99-102

Raymond Ibrahim: The Al-Qaeda Reader - The Essential Texts of Osama Bin Laden's Terrorist Organization (Broadway Books; 2007)

Riad El-Rayyes and Dunia Nahas, Guerillas for Palestine (London; Portico, 1976) pp.: 24


Rohan Gunaratna, Inside Al Qaeda - Global Network of Terror (New York; Berkeley)


Classical Sources

Ibn Atheer 2:188
Ibn Atheer, 2:241
Ibn Atheer, 4:81

Ibn Hisham 3:69
Ibn Hisham 4:160;
Ibn Hisham, 2:230
Ibn Hisham, 2:245
Ibn Hisham, 2:287
Ibn Hisham, 3:237
Ibn Hisham, 3:292
Ibn Hisham, 3:59
Ibn Hisham, 4:15
Ibn Hisham, 4:265
Ibn Hisham, 4:39
Ibn Hisham, 4:39
Ibn Hisham, 4:85

Ibn Katheer 2:282
Ibn Katheer, 3:216
Ibn Katheer, 3:261
Ibn Katheer, 4:282

Ibn Sa'd 2:21
Ibn Sa'd 2:44
Ibn Sa'd 2:85
Ibn Sa'd 2:96
Ibn Sa'd, 2:21
Ibn Sa'd, 2:35
Ibn Sa'd, 2:45
Ibn Sa'd, 2:5
ibn Sa’d, 2:56
Ibn Sa’d, 2:96
Ibn Sa’d 2:33

Ibn Sayyid al-Nas, 2:109
Ibn Sayyid al-Nas 2:54
Ibn Sayyid al-Nas, 1:226
Ibn Sayyid al-Nas, 2:161
Ibn Sayyid al-Nas, 2:167
Ibn Sayyid al-Nas, 2:282
Ibn Sayyid al-Nas, 2:39
Ibn Sayyid al-Nas, 2:54

Kala’i, 1:130
Kala’i, 1:138
Kala’i, 1:151
Kala’i, 1:57

Qurtubi, 4:306

Sahih al-Bukhari, 3:45:687
Sahih al-Bukhari, 4:52:270
Sahih al-Bukhari, 4:52:271
Sahih al-Bukhari, 5:59:369

Sahih Muslim, 19:4436

Suhayli, 3:28

Tabari 2:436
Tabari 2:568
Tabari 3:38
Tabari, 2:268
Tabari, 2:554
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Reference</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Tabari, 2:555</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Waqidi 1:11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Waqidi 1:14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Waqidi 1:15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Waqidi 1:53</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Waqidi 2:445</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Waqidi 2:796</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Waqidi 1:12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Waqidi 1:13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Waqidi 1:13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Waqidi 1:19</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Waqidi 1:195</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Waqidi 1:207</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Waqidi 1:396</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Waqidi 1:402</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Waqidi 1:403</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Waqidi 1:56</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Waqidi 1:71</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Waqidi 1:72</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Waqidi 1:8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Waqidi 2:457</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Waqidi 2:462</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Waqidi 2:466</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Waqidi 2:535</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Waqidi 2:535</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Waqidi 2:536</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Waqidi 2:562</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Waqidi 2:636</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Waqidi 2:755;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Waqidi 2:769</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Waqidi 2:792</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Waqidi 2:796</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Waqidi, 2:799-805
Waqidi, 2:803
Waqidi, 3:1123
The Quran

Sūrah Āl ‘Imrān 3:28

Sūrah al-Ahzāb 33:21

Sūrah Al-Baqarah 2:173
Sūrah Al-Baqarah 2:185;

Sūrah Al-Ḥajj 22:78

Sūrah An-Naḥl 16:106

Sūrah An-Nisā’ 4:29;

Sūrah Ghāfir 40:28