The Representation of Chechens in Austrian Print Media
A comparison between the quality newspaper “Die Presse” and the tabloid newspaper “Die Krone” in 2006 and 2012

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This verse comes from the “Cossacks Lullaby” (Kazač'ja Kolybel'naja Pesnja) written in 1840 by the Russian writer and poet Michail Jurevič Lermontov. The lyrical subject is a Cossack mother, singing a lullaby to her little son. The little child is confronted with the figure of the “evil Chechen”, sharpening his dagger after crawling to the shore of the river Terek. The river Terek was a natural borderline separating the Russian Empire from the territories of the North Caucasus. In the course of the Russian Conquest of the North Caucasus, which resulted in the Caucasian War (1817-1864), settlements for Cossacks armies were created along the river shore. The river was known in the Russian Empire as the borderline to “wild” mountaineers, such as the Chechens, living in the North Caucasus. (cf. Meyer-Fraatz 2005: 54f, Kelly 1977: 28) The conquest of the North Caucasus, with its mainly Muslim population, coincides with the emergence of romanticism in Russian literature (cf. Zacharov 2007: 28). Many authors who had to serve in the army, wrote about their experiences and memories in their books. Lermontov, who wrote the verse quoted above, was also among them. The Caucasus found its place in Russian Literature of the early 19th century as an exotic, mythic and oriental place. (cf. Kappeler 1993: 154) The resistance of the people of the North Caucasus, especially in Chechnya, was unique, as the mountaineers managed to keep up the fight for nearly half a century during the Caucasian war. Historical myths about the conquest of the North Caucasus are a point of reference for forming identities on the Russian as well as on the Chechen side. Chechens still relate to their ancestors, who managed to resist the Russian army for such a long time. On the Russian side the perception of the Caucasus as the “Achilles heel” of the Empire plays a certain role. (cf. Strasser-Camagni 2009: 74)

Two stereotypes established themselves for the mountaineers of the Caucasus. On the one hand the noble, freedom-loving savage living in harmony with nature, and on
the other hand the unreliable bandit and Muslim fanatic. Especially the latter prevails in the perception many Russians until today. (cf. Kappeler 1993: 1, 54)

In a newspaper-analysis of the Rossijskaja Gazeta in the context of the first Chechen war (1994-1996) Anna Strasser-Camagni found out that Chechnya was constantly compared to a “cancerous ulcer of criminality” forming metastases all over the Russian Federation. Chechens in general were not only described as criminals, but metaphorically referred to as a disease which has to be cut out in an operation – the military intervention in 1994 which marked the start of the first Chechen war. (cf. Strasser-Camagni 2009: 67-75) Another popular stereotype in russian society is marking Chechens in general as terrorists. (cf. Koževnikova 2005)

In the course of the second Chechen war, which started in 1999, the greatest exodus of Chechens to European countries began. Target countries were mainly Austria, Poland, France, Germany and Belgium. According to an information from 2009, around 23,000 Chechens live in Austria, which is one of the biggest communities in the European Union. (cf. European Center for Constitutional and Human Rights 2011: 2-4; Langthaler 2009:165) As a consequence the Chechens, an ethnic group with no significant historical connections to Austria, who were known prior to the Austrian public mainly due to reports of the Chechen Wars, started to appear as a topic of local news and became an object of public attention and discussion.

1.1 State of Research

Regarding the scientific discussion of the topic “Chechens in Austria” there have been publications in the field of oral history, where interviews on integration topics where conducted with Chechens (Trojer, Philipp 2014: Lebenswelten tschetschenischer Flüchtlinge in Österreich; Krampl, Petra 2010: Transnationale Aktivitäten von (anerkannten) Flüchtlingen am Beispiel der TschetschenInnen in Wien; Karla, Valerie (2012): "Heimat"-(Re-)Konstruktionen anerkannter Flüchtlinge in Wien.), an analysis focussing on the problems between Chechen asylum seekers and the Austrian asylum authorities (Roschger, Verena 2009: Gekommen auf der Suche nach Schutz: interkulturelle Begegnung zwischen tschetschenischen AsylwerberInnen und den österreichischen Asylbehörden), an essay presenting the results on surveys conducted on Chechens in Austria regarding religious identity (Heinrich, Hans-Georg; Lobova, Ludmilla 2011: Religious Identity in an Open Society: The Case of Chechen Refugees
in Austria) and an anthology gathering various essays covering Chechen life in Austria as well as background information on Chechen history and their situation within the Russian Federation (Schinnerl, Herwig; Schmidinger, Thomas [Ed.] 2009: Dem Krieg entkommen? Tschetschenien und TschetschenInnen in Österreich.).

1.2 Central Issue of the Study (Research Questions)

Despite the importance of these publications, they don’t directly target the topic of the present study. The topic of investigation of this paper is the image of Chechens in the Austrian press. Though there are some publications dealing with the image of asylum seekers and various minorities in the Austrian media landscape, a study researching the representation of Chechens specifically is yet missing. Using the example of the Chechens, as a relatively new ethnic group in Austria, I want to make a contribution to the research of stereotypes and how they emerge in history.

Ideally a study analysing the content of the press would focus on three questions: First on which information the press gives on Chechens and how that information is presented, second on how these pieces of information are received by the autochthonous population and third how the Chechens themselves react to the press publications about Chechens. Questions number two and three are undeniably interesting, but would require extensive empirical work which I cannot cope with at the moment. (cf. Delgado 1972: 13f) Hence this scientific research will centre on the following questions:

a) Which information do the two sample newspapers (“Kronen Zeitung” and “Die Presse”) provide about Chechens, and how is this information presented? Where are the differences between the news coverage about Chechens in the two sample newspapers?

b) Does the image of Chechens, conveyed by the two sample newspapers change in between the investigation years 2006 and 2012?

The aim of the present study is to capture the qualitative range of the discourse about Chechens in the two sample newspapers and to analyse if this discourse changes during the two sample years.
While this research is certainly inspired by the representation of Chechens in Russian culture this is not a comparative analysis. In order to do that a similar research in Russian newspapers would be required, which is beyond the scope of this study.

1.3 Choice of Investigation Period

The sample I will analyse in this paper consist of all the articles published in the newspapers „Kronen Zeitung“ and „Die Presse“ in the years 2006 and 2012, which contain one or more of the following keywords: „Tschetschene“, „Tschetschenin“, „Tschetschenen“, „Tschetscheninnen“ and „TschetschenInnen“. The year 2006 has been chosen because by that time the Austrian Chechen community was still young but already quite big and had started to establish its own organisations in Austria. (cf Langenthaler 2009: 174) The year 2012 was selected as a reference year to 2006. By 2006, the refugee waves of Chechens to Austria had settled. Therefore there will be a time interval of six years in between the reference years.

Stereotypes are often used for gaining or stabilizing political power, for example during conflicts between nations or election campaigns. They address people on an emotional level, making it easier to mobilize them. (cf. Hahn 1995: 194) I expect to find an increased amount of stereotypes in articles about Chechens in relation to political events. Due to that, an increased amount of political debates about Chechens have been a reason for choosing these investigatory years:

2006 has partly been chosen because Jörg Haider, from the right wing party Alliance for the Future of Austria (BZÖ), who was state governor of Carinthia at that time, started to call for a Chechen-free Carinthia in that very year. The key event that lead to this demand was a brawl on a playground in Klagenfurt between Austrian and Chechen teenagers. One of the Chechens phoned his family members, after they arrived a brawl involving around 20 people started, resulting in some minor injuries. Without awaiting the results of police investigation, Haider first started to call for the expulsion of the Chechens involved in the brawl and later for the expulsion of all Chechens from the Federal state of Carinthia. This lead to an anti-Chechen racist discourse peaking in the illegal deportation of 18 Chechens to the refugee camp Traiskirchen after a brawl in Villach on New Year’s Eve 2007/8. Following the principle of kin liability, not only the three suspected perpetrators, but also their families, including elderly people and children were expelled. Investigations afterwards
revealed that 17 of the 18 expelled Chechens were not involved in the brawl. Furthermore the one Chechen, who was put on trial was acquitted. Nevertheless the Carinthia state government refused to take the deported Chechens back, ignoring the judgement of the Independent Administrative Board (Unabhängiger Verwaltungssenat). Jörg Haider was sued for abuse of authority but died in a car accident in 2008 before the end of the trial. The call for a Chechen-free-Carinthia puts Chechens under general suspicion. It reminds of Chechen stereotypes (e.g. Bandit, criminal, terrorist), which are frequently reproduced by Russian media and politicians. (cf. Machreich 2009: 326-338)

Also 2012 a Chechen-related political event took place. Among other members of the right-wing Freedom Party of Austria (FPÖ) the politician Johann Gudenus visited President Ramsan Kadyrov in Chechnya. After his return he proclaimed that the refugees return to Chechnya is free of risk. (cf. Die Presse 08.02.2008: 2) Anny Knapp, from Asylkoordination Österreich, remarked the lack of objectivity in obtaining information from Kadyrov, who is suspected of having violated human rights himself, in order to assess the human rights situation in a country. (cf. Knapp 2012) I will also analyse if and how the political discourses described are represented in the sample newspapers.

1.4 Choice of Sample Newspapers

I chose the tabloid newspaper “Kronen Zeitung” (which will be referred to as “Krone”) and the quality newspaper “Die Presse” (wich will be referred to as “Presse”) to compare in my analysis. It is quite expectable that there will be a difference in the reports about Chechens in these two types of newspapers. The goal of this comparison is not to state that there is a difference between how a tabloid and a quality newspaper write about Chechens, but to make visible were exactly these differences lie.

Among other reasons, which I will state below, the newspapers have been selected because they are being distributed throughout Austria and because they are daily newspapers. In the next few paragraphs I will provide a short overview of the Austrian newspaper environment and describe relevant information about the two sample newspapers, such as the editorial policy, the readers and the circulation.

The Austrian Circulation Survey from 2012 shows the following numbers for the most popular Austrian newspapers:
Table 1: Austrian Circulation Survey 2012 (Own table; data source: Österreichische Auflagenkontrolle 2012: 10-12, 32-34)

It can be seen on the graph that the circulation of the Krone exceeds all the other newspapers by far. According to a media analysis of the year 2012 it had a range of 37.4% and an even higher one for the Sunday edition with 44.8%. The “Neue Kronen Zeitung” has been chosen as the tabloid paper for the analysis because of its big readership and its distribution throughout Austria. (cf. Verein ARGE Media-Analysen 2012a) Other tabloid papers like “Heute” or “Österreich” do also have high circulation rates, but were not included in the sample because they focus on big cities, especially Vienna. “Der Kurier” was being ruled out because this newspaper is considered to be a mixture between quality and tabloid paper. (cf. Cihak 2007: 40) Compared to the “Neue Kronen Zeitung” the circulation of Austrian quality newspapers is very low. (cf. Österreichische Auflagenkontrolle 2012: 10-12, 32-34)
Table 2: Media Analysis 2012 (Verein ARGE Media-Analysen 2012b)

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<td>Vienna</td>
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<td>145</td>
<td>120</td>
<td>617</td>
<td>477</td>
<td>256</td>
<td>31</td>
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<td>69</td>
<td>52</td>
<td>231</td>
<td>569</td>
<td>213</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>2</td>
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<td>9</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>132</td>
<td>44</td>
<td>21</td>
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<td>Styria</td>
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<td>32</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>415</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>37</td>
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<td>518</td>
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<tr>
<td>Carinthia</td>
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<td>15</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>221</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>12</td>
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<td>235</td>
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<td>453</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>88</td>
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<td>8</td>
<td>287</td>
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<td>Salzburg</td>
<td>450</td>
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<td>10</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>164</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>15</td>
<td></td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
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<tr>
<td>Tyrol</td>
<td>604</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>241</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>9</td>
<td></td>
<td>18</td>
<td>0</td>
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<tr>
<td>Vorarlberg</td>
<td>310</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>3</td>
<td></td>
<td>2</td>
<td>0</td>
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<tr>
<td>Carinthia (with East Tyrol)</td>
<td>523</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>231</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>248</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>3</td>
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<tr>
<td>Tyrol (North)</td>
<td>562</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>231</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>8</td>
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From the numbers of the Austrian Media Analysis of 2012 it can be seen that the majority of readers of the “Oberösterreichische Nachrichten” live in Upper Austria. The focus on certain federal provinces also applies to the readers of the “Salzburger Nachrichten” which mainly come from Salzburg and to the “Kleine Zeitung” which solely has strong numbers in Carinthia, East Tyrol and Styria. Those three Newspapers were ruled out due to their strong focus on certain regions and their weakness in other federal provinces. Also the newspaper “Der Falter” hasn’t been considered because it is a weekly magazine and not a daily newspaper. That leaves us with the two quality newspapers “Der Standard” and “Die Presse”. With 3.7% the range of the Presse was lower than that of the Standard, with 5%. Both attract a wider readership in Vienna and
Lower Austria than in the other federal provinces. (Verein ARGE Media-Analysen 2012a)

In its editorial policy the Presse describes itself as a newspaper, which is independent from any political parties, holding civic-liberal (bürglich-liberale) views on a high quality level. Furthermore the newspaper considers informing the readers fully and objectively as its journalistic professional duty. (cf. Die Presse n.d.) The main focus of their reports is on politics, economics and culture. The Presse is one of Austria’s eldest newspapers. Published for the first time in 1848, it was continuously circulating until today, except for a break during the Second World War. It has never been a mass-circulation newspaper. Among the readers of the Presse are many academics and students. Overall the Presse has the reputation for being more conservative than the Standard, which considers itself as a liberal paper. (cf. Cihak 2007: 38f) Due to that fact I chose “Die Presse” over “Der Standard” for the analysis. I expect to find a higher amount of stereotypes in a conservative paper than in a liberal one.

The ”Neue Kronen Zeitung” was issued for the first time under the name “Illustrierte Kronen Zeitung” in 1900. 1944 it was published under the name “Kleine Wiener Kriegszeitung”. In 1971 it became the „Neue Kronen Zeitung“, which it has kept until now, except for a short period of time between 1971 and 1976 where it was called „Unabhängige Kronen Zeitung“. Since the late 1960s it has been Austria’s biggest newspaper and is therefore considered a very influential organ of the countries mass media landscape. (cf. Cihak 2007: 41) The “Neue Kronen Zeitung” wants to reflect the diversity of opinions of its publisher and editors. (cf. Kronen Zeitung 2015)

1.5 Discourse and Public Opinion

What is written about Chechens in the news can reveal a lot about the self-perception of the respective journalists (e.g. Chechens are x -> we are not x) and about the discourse about Chechens in Austria. In the Archaeology of knowledge Michel Foucault describes discursive practice as follows:

[Discursive Practice] must not be confused with the expressive operation by which an individual formulates an idea, a desire, an image; nor with the rational activity that may operate in a system of inference; nor with the ‘competence’ of a speaking subject when he constructs grammatical sentences; it is a body of anonymous, historical rules, always determined in the time and space that have defined a given period, and for a given social, economic, geographical, or linguistic area, the conditions of operation of the enunciative function. (Foucault 1972: 117)
Pursuant to this theory the journalists from the two sample newspapers who write about Chechens operate within the borders of the discourse about Chechens. (cf. Foucault 1972: 117) According to Baberowski a discourse includes everything that is sayable about a certain topic as well as a set of rules on what and how something can be said. (Baberowski 2005: 196f) While for example the sentence “Chechens are terrorists” might be widely accepted (or sayable) in the discourse on Chechens in Russia, it might not be accepted in the Austrian one. One goal of analysing a discourse is to explore the possibilities or the range of what is, can or should be said as well as what can’t or shouldn’t be said about a certain field of knowledge at a certain time in a certain environment. As discourses are not steady but change over time another goal can be to research in what way they change. (cf. Baberowski 2005: 196f; Foucault 1972: 117) These two goals also inspired the research questions for the present study, as well as Hypothesis 4 in the next section.

Like discourses, stereotypes are perceptions of the world and don’t necessarily correspond with the world or the “reality”. Nevertheless, the way people perceive the world has an impact on history. On these grounds the analysis of such perceptions are a relevant field of study. Stereotypes are communicated in the public and the political sphere. (cf. Hahn 1995: 191)

Van Dijk uses the term “symbolic elites” for groups (e.g. politicians, writers, journalist, scholars, teachers, writers) which, according to him, play an important role in controlling and reproducing public discourse (e.g. dominant knowledge and ideologies). People are not born with stereotypical perceptions of different ethnic groups, they acquire them mainly through discourse. Such perceptions can be fueled by private discourses (e.g. conversations with friends and family) as well as by personal experiences with members of an ethnic group. However, compared to public discourses (e.g. news, textbooks, movies, parliamentary discussions), private discourses have a far lesser range and are thereby less influential in reproducing discourses. (cf. Van Dijk 2009: 16f) Van Dijk concludes that the symbolic elites “at least preformulate, legitimate or condone popular racism” (Van Dijk 2009: 17)

Though this study is restricted to analyzing texts and can thereby not provide findings on the influence of the two sample newspapers on their readers attitudes towards Chechens, research in the field of communication and media studies suggests that media has an effect on public opinion. A Study on the reproduction of racism of the University of Amsterdam and the University of California, San Diego between 1980
and 1985 provides some insight in that respect. As a part of the research 180 informal interviews were conducted in Amsterdam and California on people’s experiences and opinions regarding the ethnic minority groups. (cf. Van Dijk 1987: 13-15)

In the interviews with Dutch respondents, reports about “Ethnic crime” are either criticized and/or resented or used “as an evidence for their fear of or prejudice against foreigners” (Van Dijk 1987: 163). Some people specifically mention media as a source of information when it comes to topics like crime, cultural differences or favorable treatment of ethnic groups. The interviewed rarely talked about positive reports or programs and the few who did, viewed them with skepticism (-> criticizing “favorable treatment” of ethnic groups). Racist propaganda was decisively opposed by many respondents. However it was also often moderated or not perceived as such. (cf. Van Dijk 1987: 153-155, 163f)

Even if some media users are conscious of the negative picture and impact of ethnic reporting in the media, it may be assumed that the more subtle forms of discrimination especially may be unwillingly adopted as an acceptable opinion by many people. Whether received positively or critically, media messages on many ethnic issues influence the topical agenda of everyday talk. This is especially the case for those people who have no daily contacts with ethnic groups and for those topics that cannot be based on personal observation or communication alone: crime and crime statistics, immigration, official policies, national politics and the role of racist parties, and discrimination. (Van Dijk 1987: 163)

Van Dijk highlights the problem that especially in low-contact areas people rely on media information about ethnic groups. As they cannot derive their knowledge from personal experience they inform themselves mainly through media. This doesn’t mean that this information is consumed uncritically. (cf. Van Dijk 1987: 163f)

One of the basic functions of journalism for the society is the Agenda-Setting-theory. Setting the Agenda elucidates the ability of media and journalism to influence which issues are considered important by the users. If certain topics appear frequently in the news and are saliently placed (e.g. on the front page of a newspaper) the audience will regard them as significant. The Agenda-Setting function is crucial in political processes, where politicians try to get certain issues into the news in order to increase public attention towards them. Newspapers which are close to a political party might for example report more frequently about issues considered important by that favoured party. A high amount of editorial independence therefore lowers the risk of deliberately exploiting the Agenda-Setting function. (cf. Hasebrik 2009: 5,7f)

Due to formal characteristics of the material (see 4.1), the placement of the reports can’t be considered in this study. I will however pay attention to which political
discourses, involving Chechens, appear in the news, as well as to which politicians appear those discourses.

According to Van Dijk the process of news gathering is biased. Thereby he means that sources which are classified as trustworthy, were usually produced by what he calls the “white elites” (government, politicians, the police, lawyers, NGOs, or professors). Sources include texts as well as quotations. (cf. Van Dijk 2009: 26f) The “white” in “white elites” is connected with Van Dijk’s definition of racism, which applies to “European dominated countries” (cf. Van Dijk 2012: 15f):

Racism is here defined as a system of ethnic or “racial” dominance, that is, of systematic power abuse of a dominant (European, “white”) group against various kinds of non-European groups– such as ethnic minorities, immigrants and refugees– in Europe, the Americas, and other European-dominated countries. [...] The system of ethnic domination has two major dimensions, namely, social and cognitive dimensions. The first, social dimension consists of the everyday social practices of discrimination against ethnically different groups, for example, through the exclusion from, or unequal distribution of social resources or human rights. The second, cognitive dimension consists of the ethnic beliefs, stereotypes, prejudices, and ideologies that function as the motivation and legitimation of such discriminatory practices. In very general terms, this means that out-groups are represented negatively (as different, deviant, or a threat) compared to the European in-group, which represents itself as superior in all relevant attributes. (Van Dijk 2012: 15f)

Thus racism consist of the belief in a hierarchical classification into superior and inferior ethnic groups legitimizing dominance of the former over the latter. The last part of the definition emphasizes the meaning of positive self- and negative external ascriptions in the concept of racism. These negative ascriptions range from marking the “Out-group” as different to describing them as threatening. Stereotypes and prejudices play an important role in that context. (cf. Van Dijk 2012: 15-17)

Van Dijk argues that even in reports about ethnic events, those who are cited usually belong to the “white elites” - they are the ones who can describe the event and thereby define it. Members and leading figures of the concerned ethnic groups are rarely quoted, and if so their statements don’t appear alone, but in the context of quotes of the “white elites”. Applying this theoretic background to the present study lead to hypothesis 7, that Chechens are rarely quoted in both sample newspapers. (cf. Van Dijk 2009: 26f)

For the purposes of this study I will use the terms “Austrian elites” and “Chechen elites” or just “elites”, which are adapted versions of van Dijk’s “symbolic elites” to describe politicians, the police, lawyers, representatives of NGOs and professors. (Van Dijk 2009: 17)
1.6 Hypotheses

The following hypotheses are partly based on theory and partly derived from a first overview of the sample data:

H1: In both newspapers, the quantity of news coverage about Chechens increases between 2006 and 2012.

H2: In the tabloid newspaper, Chechens appear more often in local contexts (Sensational and Crime Reports), while in the quality newspaper their appearance in international contexts prevails (Long-term reports about the situation in Chechnya).

H3: In the quality newspaper “Die Presse” the amount of articles where Chechens appear in local contexts increases between 2006 and 2012.

H4: The topics in the discourse about Chechens differ in 2012 compared to 2006.

H5: Contexts in which Chechens appear in an active role, are mainly violence- or crime-related (as perpetrators). Positive attitudes towards Chechens in an active role are rare. In passive roles, they appear as refugees, (war) victims and politically persecuted persons.

H6: The news coverage about Chechens concerns primarily (young) Chechen men. Reports involving Chechen women are rare. Therefore, stereotypical attributions in the press concern primarily Chechen men.

H7: Chechens are rarely quoted in both sample newspapers.

H10: Stereotypes about Chechens will be mostly negative. In 2012 the usage of stereotypes increases compared to 2006.

H9: Stereotypes about Chechens are used in argumentation schemes (e.g. political discourses about Chechens)
Hypothesis 1, 3 and 4 are linked to a popular murder case, which took place on the 13th of January 2009 in the district Floridsdorf in Vienna. The Chechen refugee Umar Israilov was shot in the middle of the street in broad daylight. Later the Public Prosecution Office announced that the victim had unsuccessfully applied for personal protection at the Federal Office for the Protection of the Constitution and the Suppression of Terrorism before he died. Israilov stated that before his flight he was forced to work in Kadyrov’s life guard the “Kadyrovcy”. (cf. Klenk, Florian 2009: 1) After the murder Ali Israilov, the father of Umar released a public statement, saying that his son was being threatened from Russia because he had filed a complaint against the President of Chechnya Ramzan Kadyrov at the Russian Public Prosecution office, as well as at the European Court of Human Rights. (cf. Israilov 2009) The European Center for Constitutional and Human Rights (ECCHR) confirmed that Israilov should have testified as the principal witness in a lawsuit against Kadyrov. (cf. European Center for Constitutional and Human Rights 2011a: 1) In its final report the Federal Office for the Protection of the Constitution and the Suppression of Terrorism indicates that Ramsan Kadyrov has ordered the murder of Israilov. (cf. European Center for Constitutional and Human Rights 2012) Kadyrov himself rejected those accusations. (cf. Steiner 2009) The police managed to capture three suspects. One of them was given a life sentence, the other two were sentenced to 19 and 16 years. The principal suspect who shot Israilov hasn’t been found yet. (cf. APA 2012) Dick Marty, who was summoned as an expert in the trial, stated that exiled dissidents as well as their family members, who are still living in Chechnya, were systematically intimidated. The report puts the Israilov case into a broader, international context, indicating that the so-called “Kadyrov-network” operates also in other countries like in France, Norway, Poland and Belgium. (cf. European Center for Constitutional and Human Rights 2011b: 3,4) Both the murder case in 2009 and the trial that took place between 2010 and 2011 received a huge media resonance. A Wiso-Search (wiso-net.de) with the keywords “Umar Israilov, Israilov, Umar I.” found 93 articles in the Krone and 54 articles in the Presse in the period between 2009 and 2011. Those years haven’t been considered as investigation years because Chechen-related reporting in that period focusses too much on the specific case of Israilov, while the present study deals with the image of Chechens in general. However given that background I expect that the increased attention the Chechen community got because of the Israilov-case, effected the
reporting about Chechens in both newspapers on a longer term (that is at least until 2012) and lead to a quantitative increase on Chechen-related articles (H1).

As an after-effect of the Israilov-case I also presume a qualitative shift concerning the topics in which Chechens appear in local context (e.g. Chechen refugees being threatened) and in international contexts (e.g. increased reporting about the situation within Chechnya) (H4). I expect that the majority of Chechen-related reports in the Presse in both sample years will focus on international contexts (H2). However I also hypothesise that the number of articles about Chechens in Austria increases in 2012 compared to 2006 (H3) because of the increased attention the Chechen community in Austria got due to the Israilov case. As the Krone mostly addresses local contexts, I presume that in both sample years only a few reports will target Chechen-related topics on an international dimension (H2).

1.7 Proceedings and Structure of the Study

In the first part of this term study I will provide some general data about Chechens and an overview about Chechen history in Russia and in Austria. I will focus on cultural specifics, persons and events that occur in the sample data.

In the second part I will specify the methodology used to analyse the sample. The articles will be coded performing a theme analysis (content structuring). This is a mixed approach of quantitative and qualitative content analysis using inductive and deductive category application. (Mayring 2014: 104f)

In a third step the sample will be approached from three different angles in order to verify or falsify the hypothesis:

1 Contexts and roles in which Chechens appear
2 Chechen stereotypes
3 Structures of argumentation in the discourse about Chechens in exemplary reports

Additional theoretical and methodical background for this three-step analysis will be explained more precisely in the second part and is provided by similar studies about the depiction of ethnic groups in media by Jésus Manuel Delgado and the Dutch philologist Teun van Dijk, a linguistic study on group-specific stereotypes by Magda Telus and the frame theory after Robert Entman.
2 Specifics and Cultural Aspects of Chechen Society

Chechnya is a region in the Caucasus in the south of the European part of the Russian Federation. It consists of two geographically different regions – the Caucasian highlands in the south and the lowlands in the north. Grozny is the capital of the Chechen Republic. (cf. Schmidinger, Schinnerl 2009: 13)

The ethnonym “Chechens” is a Russian term. Chechens refer to themselves as “Nach” (Singular) or “Wainach” (Plural). The self-designation also includes the Ingush people from the neighboring Republic of Ingushetia. The distinction between the terms “Ingush” and “Chechen” goes back to the time of Russian colonization, where those who subordinated themselves were described as “Ingush” and those who didn’t as “Chechen”. (Schmidinger, Schinnerl 2009: 14)

The Chechens are a good example for a segmented society, because they never founded their own state or some sort of centralized power. Tribal organizations play an important role until today. The extended family, called “Ts’a” (=men of the house) plays a central role in Chechen society. Traditionally only men are equal members of the family. Women deserve the respect of men, but are not allowed to participate in important decision-making processes. One of the next bigger society units after the Ts’a is the Teip, or clan. A union of Teips is called Tukhum. As Chechen society is patriarchal, the membership in a Teip (=clan) is inherited through patrilineal succession. Due to that, virginity before marriage among women is seen as highly important. The Chechen society is not a closed one. Outsiders can be adopted into the Teip or found a Teip themselves. Among the 150 Teips, there are also Georgian, Russian, Dagestani Teips and one Jewish Teip. Chechens never had a gentry or a class society. Only during the conquest of the Russian Empire a rudimental kind of central power was established. (cf. Schmidinger, Schinnerl 2009: 14-16; Jaimoukha 2005: 90f)

2.1 Customs

The Adat is a set of about two dozen rules and taboos on how a Chechen should behave in society. It’s a form of customary law. The main features of the Adat are hospitality, the blood feud, loyalty to the Teip and the death cult. (cf. Schmidinger, Schinnerl 2009: 16f; Jaimoukha 2005: 130)
Various ethnic groups throughout the North Caucasus use different designations referring to the Adat. Circassians for instance call it “Xabze”, while Chechens use the word “Nokhchalla”. Due to the similarity of these customs and traditions, Amjad Jaimoukha speaks of a “common ‘mountaineer’ culture and identity” (Jaimoukha 2005: 7), connecting the different ethnic groups of the North Caucasus. Until recently the Adat has always been more important than the Shariat. Although especially in times of war, there were attempts to introduce it to Chechen society, for instance by Imam Šamil in the context of Russian colonisation in the 19th century. Especially in the last two decades the opposition between Shariat and Adat became the topic of dispute in Chechen society. (cf. Jaimoukha 2005: 7, 130)

The Adat also includes a set of rules that regulates the patriarchal order of society, which is characterized by a strict separation of the sexes. Like in many other Islamic peasant societies, women play an important role in agricultural production processes. Because of that they have more rights than in traditional Islamic city cultures, where due to the wealth of the people, women where often locked away as a “decoration of the house”. (Schmidinger, Schinnerl 2009: 17) Chechen women traditionally never wore a veil and partly participated in combats as respected fighters, for example in the first Chechen war. (cf. Schmidinger, Schinnerl 2009: 14-17)

Traditional Chechen gender roles define women as „guardians of traditions and culture“, and men as upholders of the “honour of womenfolk”. However the main task of women remains giving birth to children. As already mentioned above the Adat always played a more important role than the Sharia in Chechen society. In some cases, like the inheritance law, that is to the detriment of the women. Furthermore there are some avoidance taboos. For instance men and women never shake hands and it’s customary that they eat separately. Also traveling women have to be chaperoned by a male member of the family. (cf. Schmidinger, Schinnerl 2009: 14-17; Jaimoukha 2005: 95f)

Marriages are not only arranged but partly a result from the custom of “bride stealing” – often without the consent of the bride. (cf. Schmidinger, Schinnerl 2009: 14-17)

From the 15th until the 18th century bride theft was the most common form of entering into marriage among the mountaineers of the Caucasus. The groom afterwards discussed the amount of the dowry (Kalym) with the family of the bride. Kalym and Kanly (blood feud) are regulated in the Adat. Jurisdiction in the Adat is based on the principle of either vengeance (Kanly) or compensation. Thereby a violation of the Adat
can be settled either through blood revenge or payment. (cf. Babič 2005: 256-258; Quiring 2009: 27f; 110f)

The tradition of bride stealing was widely spread throughout the Caucasus and is still a current topic. Generally one has to distinguish between bride theft with or without mutual consent. The number of the latter has increased in the past decades. It is explained with the deterioration of women’s rights. (Babič 2005: 49; Brooks, Umarova 2015) In a report about the human rights situation in Georgia of 2006, the Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights and Labour, gives account of cases of women and girls who were kidnapped without consent and then raped. In case those women manage to escape, their families often reject them. (cf. Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor 2006: Internet) Also the Russian historical and civil rights society “Memorial” reports of women being discriminated, humiliated, been beaten and even killed. Such crimes are committed under the cloak of tradition. The situation in Chechnya reached especially tragic proportions, where honour killings are not uncommon anymore. Usually those murders are committed by relatives of the victim, as a punishment for bringing “dishonour” to the family. Dishonour can already be caused by something called “silly behaviour” of woman, which can be any kind of attention of women towards men. (cf. Memorial 2012)

To counter the practice of bride theft the penalty for that crime was raised to 1 million Rubles. (cf. Brooks, Umarova 2015) However, Memorial reports that the police rarely takes effort to solve such cases. Officials would not only tolerate those crimes, but commit them as well themselves. (cf. Memorial 2012)

Bride stealing practices and honour killings as described above are against Chechen traditions and against the rules of Adat. Adat rules exclude women, children and elderly people from becoming the subject of vengeance. (Jaimoukha 2005: 130) Customary bride abductions are agreed upon with the family of the bride and also the bride herself. There were however rare cases, where a bride was stolen without her consent, which is seen as an offense towards the family of the bride. In that case the two families start negotiating with each other. Results can be the return of the woman to her home, a harsh dispute between the families (e.g. blood revenge) or forced marriage. (cf. Memorial 2012)

Also the contemporary bride stealing without consent often end with a marriage:

*The social stigma attached to spending the night in a man’s house -- or even just a few hours before being rescued -- is enough in deeply traditional societies like...*
Irena Brežná writes about recent developments, that if no marriage took place, families often find it easier to ban the concerned woman instead of seeking the traditionally required blood revenge on the abductor. In order to protect the family honour, such incidents are often not reported to the police. (Brežná 2010)

Bride stealing is forbidden in the Russian Federation. Also in the Soviet Union it was against the law. The law on “Crimes Constituting the Relics of the Tribal order” prohibited for instance bride theft, Kalym (dowry) and polygamy. Compared to the current situation bride stealings rarely happened in the Soviet Union. (Mack 2015: 24)

2.2 Religion

Until the 12th-13th century Chechens worshipped natural gods, like the sun god “Molex”. Chechens were christianized from Georgia in the 12th century and later islamized from Dagestan. The majority of Chechen Teips are Sunni Muslim. There is a strong influence by Sufi-brotherhoods, mainly the Naqshbandi and the Qadiriyya. In the middle of the 19th century the syncretic Chechens were acquainted for the first time with an orthodox form of Islam through the military leader Imam Šamil from Dagestan. He played a major role in the Caucasian war and established a short-term Islamic state where he introduced Sharia law. More radical Islamic currencies were able to spread in Chechen society only since the Chechen Wars the 1990s. Jaimoukha writes in that context of an opposition between Adat and Shariat in Chechen society which plays a role until today, despite the fact that Russian jurisdiction has been reinstated in 2002. (cf. Schmidinger, Schinnerl 2009: 17-19; Jaimoukha 2005: 41, 87f, 145)
3 Chechen History

3.1 In Russia

3.1.1 Conquest of the North Caucasus

The Caucasus is divided into the mountainous North Caucasus and the southern Transcaucasia. Today's republics of Chechnya, Dagestan and Ingushetia belong to the North Caucasus. (cf. Reisner 2009: 288) For Russia, Caucasus region has always been of strategic importance. While Transcaucasia has already been conquered at the beginning of the 19th century, the conquest of the North Caucasus lasted until 1864. (cf Kappeler 1993: 149; Quiring 2009: 15)

Due to the fact that the mountaineers managed to resist the Russian army for nearly 50 years, during the Caucasian War, the fight for freedom by the people of the Caucasus received much attention and stirred lots of discussions within the Russian Empire and abroad and became a myth. Also after the war ended, the situation in the Caucasus never fully calmed down. Among the bigger events was a rebellion in 1877. (cf. Schmidinger, Schinnerl 2009: 20f, Kappeler 1993: 149)

3.1.2 Soviet Times

In 1917 the Mountainous Republic of the Northern Caucasus (Sojuz Ob"edinennych Gorcev Severnogo Kavkaza i Dagestana) was founded as an independent state, recognized by Germany, the Ottoman Empire, Georgia and Azerbaijan. However after the Russian Civil war in 1921, the Mountain Republic was incorporated into the Soviet Union. There it was part of the Mountain Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic (Gorskaja ASSR) which was split into smaller republics like the Chechen-Ingush Soviet Republic in 1936. (cf. Schmidinger, Schinnerl 2009: 20f)

During World War II some Chechens, among them members of other minorities, hoped to regain their independence with the help of Nazi-Germany. That is why several Chechens fought on the side of the armed forces of Nazi-Germany, however relatively more Chechens fought in the Red Army. According to the principle of kin liability, 480 000 Chechens and Ingushs were deported to Siberia for collaboration with the Nazis. Chechens who fought in the Red Army came back after the war to find their villages empty and their families gone. There are no exact numbers, but data suggests
that around a third of the deported died during the process of the deportation. Russians and other Soviet Citizens began to settle in Chechnya. Under Chruščev the Chechens were allowed back to their territories, but their return caused tensions between them and the people who had moved there. There was a constant shortage of labor and living space. Ten thousands of Chechens had to look for work outside their republic. (cf. Schmidinger, Schinnerl 2009: 22-23)

With the Breakdown of the Soviet Union ethnic conflicts in the Caucasus began to escalate (e.g. in Abchasia, South Ossetia, Nagorny Karabach). The same happened in Chechnya. A leading institution in the Chechen national movement was the All-National Congress of the Chechen People (NCChP). During the August Putsch in 1991 the local leadership of the party sided with the State Committee on the State of Emergency, who attempted a coup against Michail Gorbačev, whilst the NCChP allied with Boris El'cin, who lead the resistance campaign against the putschists. The NCChP also organized demonstrations in Grosny against the pro-putschist local government. On the 6th of September the National Guard of the NCChP took over the Supreme Soviet in Grosny. An important figure in that context is the soviet air forces General Džochar Dudaev, who became president of Chechnya in 1991. In November he proclaimed the independence of the Chechen Republic of Ichkeria. In March a new constitution was created and the Russian Federation removed its troops from Chechnya. (cf. Schmidinger, Schinnerl 2009: 24-26)

Chechnya wasn’t the only Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic to declare sovereignty from the Russian Federation. Many autonomous areal units, including the Russian Soviet Federative Socialist Republic, did that between 1990 and 1992 in a process referred to as the “parade of sovereignties”. Chechnya, however, was next to Tatarstan, the only autonomous republic, who didn’t sign the new Federation treaty with the Russian Federation in March 1992. (cf. Götz, Halbach 1994: 315, 316; Treisman 1997: 226, 227) Both republics acted as if they were independent states. Neither did they hold the Duma election, nor the constitutional referendum of 1993. Tatarstan however negotiated a treaty with the Russian Federation, signed in 1994, where it was granted exceptional powers compared to other areal units. (Hughes 2001: 17f)

While the leaderships of Tatarstan and Moscow found a peaceful resolution, the situation in Chechnya started to turn into the most violent of all post-Soviet conflicts. An economic and financial blockade was implemented by the Russian government.
Because of the economic breakdown, Dudaev became willing to compromise. However negotiations on that account were not successful. A draft treaty which would have defined Chechnya as a Sovereign Democratic Constitutional State within the Russian Federation was rejected by the leadership in Chechnya. Dudaev thereafter demanded to negotiate only with the Minister of foreign affairs or President El'cin himself, which was rejected by Moscow. Dudaev's government didn't take efforts to secure the protection of the ethnic Russian people within Chechnya and failed to establish a functioning constitutional state. There were several clans within Chechnya, that didn't support Dudaev. They sided with him only after a Russian propaganda-campaign against Chechnya was implemented in July 1994. In the second half of that year, there were only two fractions (Vybor Rossi, Jabloko) in the Russian Duma left, which urged a peaceful resolution of the conflict. (cf. Schmidinger, Schinnerl 2009: 24-26; Hughes 2001: 28f)

3.1.3 First Chechen War

In December 1994 the Russian government authorized a military intervention in order to overthrow Dudaev. This military intervention was the start of the first Chechen War with a death toll of around 80.000 people. (cf. Wagner 1999: 22) The armed forces in Chechnya were grossly underestimated on the Russian side. On December 11th, the Russian army not only failed to take Grozny, but lost over 1000 soldiers in combat. After this crushing defeat Grozny was bombed and taken by the Russian troops in February 1995. Chechen chief of staff Aslan Mašadov announced a Guerilla-war after that. During the first Chechen war there were two bigger hostage-takings by Chechens – one in 1995 in the city Budennovsk, led by the radical Islamist Šamil Bassaev and the other one in 1996 in the city of Kizlyar, led by Salman Raduev, who is a relative of Dudaev. Dudaev himself died in 1996 in a Russian missile attack. Huge losses on the Russian side in Grosny and other cities led to the peace agreement on the 31st August 1996, which was concluded by Aleksandr Lebed', secretary of the National Security Council and Aslan Mašadov. The question about the status of Chechnya was postponed until 2001. In 1997 Aslan Mašadov won the presidential elections in Chechnya, which were monitored by the OSCE. (cf. Schmidinger, Schinnerl 2009: 26-29)
The first Chechen war left the republic devastated. The economy had collapsed and the people were left in social isolation. The region then got financial support from the Gulf region, wherefrom also Islamic fundamentalism in Chechnya was fostered and spread. (cf. Bonin 1999: 16f) Before the first Chechen war, Chechen society could be described as secular. The emergence of “Islamic warriors” in Chechnya was not only caused as a reaction to the conflict with the Russian Federation, but also the presence of Wahhabi volunteers in the region. The radicals openly propagated that their goal was to found an Islamic state in the North Caucasus. (cf. Hughes 2001: 35) After the peace agreement, the leadership in Moscow didn’t take much effort to resolve the conflict with Chechnya, also because President Mašadov still insisted on the independence of the republic. (cf. Bonin 1999: 16f) Of the financial aid of 143 million dollars promised by the leadership in Moscow, only 22 million dollars arrived. The rest of the money vanished and thereby couldn’t be used for the stabilisation of the country. (cf. Schmidinger, Schinnerl 2009: 32)

3.1.4 Second Chechen War

In summer 1999, a group of 1200 fighters, led by Šamil Bassaev and the Jordanian Ibn al-Chattab, invaded Dagestan and declared a Chechen-Dagestani Islamic state. The Russian army was able to fight them back within 4 weeks. (cf. Schmidinger, Schinnerl 2009: 32) Several bombing attacks on apartment buildings in Moscow and other cities ensured public support for a second war in Chechnya. Hughes emphasizes that the leadership in Moscow used the second Chechen war in order to consolidate state power and recentralize the country. The war also helped to boost Putin’s popularity before the presidential elections. Before the war he only held 2% in polls. This low percentage increased to 60% in the beginning of 2000. Similar to the first Chechen war, a media campaign against Chechens was launched which is illustrated in the following quotation. (cf. Hughes 2001: 36f; Schmidinger, Schinnerl 2009: 33)

"[...] Putin took the conflict with Chechnya to a new low level of dehumanization, using gangster language to publicly remark how Chechens would be ‘wasted in the shithouse. The question is closed once and for all. And we have to do this today, quickly, decisively, with clenched teeth, strangle the vermin at the root’" (Hughes 2001: 37)
Comments like that helped to stir hate against the ethnic group of Chechens as a whole and legitimise the war. Hughes also calls this strategy “demonization”. (cf. Hughes 2001: 37, 39)

The second Chechen war was characterized by massive human rights violations by the Russian army which evoked critique from Western governments and international organizations. (cf Hughes 2001: 37f) In 2000, already 260,000 refugees from Chechnya were registered in Ingushetia. Putin started with a policy of “chechenizing” the conflict, which means to transform it to a conflict within Chechen society. Important in that respect is Achmad Kadyrov who was introduced by Putin as head of an interim administration in 2000. Under him Chechen refugees in Ingushetia were returned to their country by force. Achmad created a private army called “Kadyrovcy”, which was led by his son Ramzan Kadyrow. Among the bigger terrorist acts outside Chechnya were the Moscow theatre hostage crises in 2002 and the Beslan school siege in 2004. Šamil Bassaev, who was killed in an explosion in 2006, played major role in both incidents. In 2007 Ramzan Kadyrow became president of Chechnya. Through brutal repression he managed to gain control over the situation in Chechnya. Kadyrov and his private army are accused of numerous human rights violations. Attacks by rebels continued in neighboring republics, like Ingushetia. Still most refugees from the North Caucasus are Chechens, with 15,000 leaving their country only in 2007. (cf. Schmidinger, Schinnerl 2009: 33-40)

3.1.5 Flight

Since the beginning of the war, and especially during the “Anti-Terror Operations” in 2000/2001, many Chechens fled to neighbouring republics like Ingushetia and Dagestan and from there also to Western European countries. Even in 2007 still 15,000 Chechens fled their country. Starting in 2002 Austria became one of the main host countries for Chechen refugees in the European Union. As Chechens are Russian citizens, they appear in the statistics as refugees from the Russian Federation. From 2001 to 2002 the number of refugees from the Russian Federation increased by 276%. At that time many still used Austria as a Transit country to get to France, Germany or Belgium. The acceptance rate for Chechen refugees in Austria rose from 28% in 2002, to 94% in 2004. Due to the EU-Expansion in Mai 2004 Austria’s northern, eastern, and southern neighbouring countries (Slovenia, Hungary, Slovakia, and Czech Republic)
became members of the EU. Hereupon Austria didn’t have EU-external borders. After that Austria was theoretically only responsible for refugees who would find a way to go directly (without crossing other EU-countries) to Austria from the countries were they are persecuted. This led to a temporary rise of refugees from the Russian Federation in the first half of the year. According to the Dublin Convention, refugees have to apply for asylum in the first EU-country they enter. Since 2003 the Dublin convention includes exceptions if medical proof can be found that the refugee was tortured or/and has been traumatized. Langthaler suspects that the psychological state of Chechen refugees due to experiences with torture and terror, led to that exception clause. That also means that a confirmation of post-traumatic stress disorder could decide whether a refugee was allowed to stay in Austria or to be sent back to the first EU-country they set foot on, which was mainly Poland and Slovakia. The acceptance rate for refugees from the Russian Federation in Poland was in 2002 only at 4%. (cf. Langthaler 2009: 165-174)

Austria had a high acceptance rate for Chechen refugees (over 90% in 2004 and 2005) compared to other EU-countries (on average 20-30%). In Austria threat of persecution, which is the main reason for receiving the asylum status, was granted not only if the threat was coming from the government (e.g. Russian army) but also by third parties (e.g. Islamist rebels). Statements of Chechen refugees reveal that they felt threatened from radical Chechens as well as from the Russian army. Also in most cases in Austria, the Russian Federation as a flight alternative is assessed negatively. In addition, if interpreted as a political act, refugees can be granted asylum status even though they participated in armed conflicts against government troops. In 2008 acceptance rates for refugees from the Russian Federation decreased to 50%. In the same year refugee aid workers in Upper Austria and Carinthia report, that the amount of Chechens who return to their country voluntarily increased. (cf. Langthaler 2009: 172-175) The voluntary return is often used as an alternative to deportation after the application of asylum has been rejected. The International Organisation of Migration (IOM) launched a project from 2010 to 2015 to support Chechen returnees financially with a one-time payment of 2000 Euro per family for reintegration measures (e.g. training, starting a new business) and 500 Euros per Person in the first months. (cf. IOM n.d.)

According to an information of the Austrian Federal Ministry of the interior of 2009, the local Chechen community consisted of 23.000 people. (cf. Bundesministerium für Inneres 2009: 16)
3.2 In Austria

3.2.1 Organisations

Since around 2005, Chechen or Chechen-Austrian organisations appeared in Austria, like the European-Chechen society in Vienna, Salzburg and Klagenfurt and the Chechen cultural centre in Vienna and the Chechen-Austrian Cultural association “Daymochhk” in Linz. (cf. Langthaler 2009: 174f; Schmidinger 2009: 252f) Compared to other migrant communities in Austria, like the Turkish, Kurdish or Ex-Yugoslavian, Chechen organisations have a low number of members. A reason for that is that parts of the Chechen diaspora in Austria avoid the contact to other Chechens because they are afraid of rivalling groups, the Russian secret service or/and members of the Kadyrov-network in Austria (see 3.2.2). Due to that the internet, granting anonymity, became one of the most important devices for communication with other Chechens, and for establishing contact with Chechnya. (cf. Schmidinger 2009: 252f)

The Chechen cultural centre in the 20th district of Vienna includes the only Chechen Mosque in the city and the Association of Democratic Chechens in Austria. The head of the centre and the association is Wisita Ibragimov, who is also the diplomatic representative of the Chechen exile government under Achmed Zakaev.

The former actor Achmed Zakaev fought in the first Chechen war as a field commander under Dudaev. He played an important role in the peace negotiations in Khasav-Yurt in 1996. In 1997 he lost the presidential elections against Aslan Maşadov, who made him his deputy prime minister. Since 2001 he lives in Great Britain with his family. Zakaev represents the moderate wing of Chechen separatists, opposing the Russian state as well as the radical rebels such as Doku Umarov: (cf. BBC 2010; Politkovskaya 2002)

*In 2007, new rebel commander Doku Umarov declared himself head of a proposed Islamist state spanning the Russian North Caucasus and described Western countries as enemies of all Muslims. Mr Zakayev resisted the development, appointing himself prime minister of the Chechen government-in-exile. He called the radicalisation of the rebel movement a "tragedy". (BBC 2010)*

The separatist movement thereby officially split into Islamists and Democrats. (cf. Wainakh 2014) The cultural centre in Vienna is characterized by the latter. (cf. Schmidinger 2009: 252f)
3.2.2 Kadyrov-Network

According to a report by the European Center for Constitutional and Human Rights from 2011, president Kadyrov manages to threaten Chechens within the Chechen republic as well as abroad. His agents, or “security forces” had been spotted in Europe and the Middle East. The threat they pose keeps Chechens from openly addressing critical issues in the Chechen republic. This corresponds with information provided by the Austrian Office for the Protection of the Constitution, where Kadyrov-close Chechens are described to threaten other Chechens in Austria, with the goal to make them return to Chechnya. (cf. Bundesministerium für Inneres 2011: 70) The police in countries of the European Union often doesn’t offer adequate protection because they wouldn’t take reports of threat serious enough. Furthermore the report states that in Austria some Chechens close to Kadyrov received the status of political refugees but manage to occasionally travel to Chechnya despite that. They are suspected to compile information about Chechens in Austria for Kadyrov. (cf. European Center for Constitutional and Human Rights 2011b: 2-4).

3.2.3 Importance of Religion and Ethnic Heritage

In the essay “Religious identity in an Open Society: The case of Chechens in Austria” by Hans-Georg Heinrich, a survey was conducted with 153 Chechen participants from Styria and Vienna. Lobova and Heinrich state that many Chechen migrants are traumatized and “share a deep distrust towards the authorities and against out-group members”. (Heinrich, Lobova 2011: 228) People they trust are usually people with whom they share some kind of connection or similarity, such as family members and members of the same Teip or Sufi-brotherhood. When asked if they wanted to stay in Austria or return to Chechnya, 10% chose the latter option. However only around 20% stated that they were willing to fully integrate in Austria. The essay doesn’t specify what “full integration” includes. A majority of 36,6% answered that they want to stay in Austria and raise their children in Chechen tradition. In the religiousness index which contains 32 points to measure the “dedication to religious principles and traditions” (e.g. mosque visits, marriage ceremony, Ramadan etc.), the respondents on average scored just 14 points. Women and professionals had the lowest level of religiousness, while pensioners had the highest. The fact that a third of the interviewed stated to
believe in superstitions (e.g. magic, omens, astrology, etc.) suggests a syncretism of Islamic and non-Islamic beliefs and attitudes. In a 7 point Bogardus scale to measure social distance between the Chechen respondents and Austrians, the interviewed had an average indicator of 3.03. Though being in the upper half of the Bogardus scale, this value is quite high. (Heinrich, Lobova 2011: 227-237)

The authors of the essay didn’t give information on the exact scale anchors they used. However a Bogardus scale typically consists of 7 anchors which range between “would have to live outside of my country (7)” and “would marry (1)”. 1 (“would marry”) suggests no social distance, while 7 would indicate maximal social distance. (cf. Wark, Galliher 2007: 393)

Co-running the results of the Bogardus scale with the factor “religiousness” (weak-medium-strong) revealed that religion is not the main reason for the social distance the respondents felt towards Austrians. People with weak religious beliefs scored quite similar to those with strong beliefs. The authors suspect that the social distance is caused by a strong we-they scheme, coming still from Soviet times. When asked what they liked and what they didn’t like about Austria, many criticized the lack of respect towards elderly people and parents. Among the most stated aspects they like, were the “rule of law”, “orderliness” and the “social security system”. Similar evaluations can be found among other migrants with a (post-) Soviet background and are hardly influenced by religious beliefs. Moreover many respondents emphasized the fact that culture and tradition, which are perceived as unique, played an important role for their identity. The authors write that “certain social values and liberation attitudes [...] are more explicitly rejected by Muslims from the Caucasus. In their desire to preserve their own value system and their identity, they assume the moral high ground.” (Heinrich, Lobova 2011: 243) They state that the integration process can be impeded by those parameters.

The respondents often perceived their religious identity through their national and ethnic heritage. Thus, the national identity with its rules and standards, shapes the approach to religious practices. Lobova and Heinrich suggest that the topic religion (here: Islam) as a factor to create social distance might be overstressed in debates about integration. Furthermore they criticise that differences between Muslim communities often remain unrecognized or are overshadowed by discussions about an “Islamic threat”. (cf. Heinrich, Lobova 2011: 237-243)
Inspired by that I will also analyse which cultural specifics of Chechens are mentioned in the present study. Thereby I want to find out whether they are primarily described through their religious identity, or if other characteristics are more dominant in the two sample years.
4 Materials and Methods

4.1 Sample Material (Determination – Formal Characteristics)

The source material for this study consists of 225 reports published in the Krone and the Presse in 2006 and 2012. Articles have been gathered on the online data base wiso-net.de and are available in pdf-format. For compiling a representative sample a search using the keywords “Tschetschene, Tschetschenin, Tschetschenen, Tschetscheninnen, Tschetschenien, tschetschenisch” was performed. The articles are provided in full length with the page number and the date of publication. The material doesn’t include pictures and other illustrations. That is why the analysis is entirely based on textual sources. The departments of the newspaper in which the reports were published couldn’t be considered because in the Krone 2006 sample they weren’t specified. In addition, the Krone appears in all federal states in slightly differing versions. In particular, this concerns articles printed in the local section. Wiso-net treats the Krone as a single newspaper and provides all the articles without information in which federal country an article was published. That is one reason why the Krone-sample turned out to be bigger than the Presse-sample. Due to that a comparison between the amounts of articles published in the two sample newspapers wouldn’t lead to sound results. Therefore, only percentage proportions of different categories in the Presse can be compared with those in the Krone.

In most cases the authors of the reports are not mentioned. Due to that articles will uniformly be cited with the name of the newspaper, the date of publication (DD.MM.YYYY) and the page number.

4.2 Direction of the Analysis – Theme Analysis (Content Structuring)

To describe how Chechens are portrayed in the two sample newspapers, the articles were coded performing a theme analysis (content structuring). This is a mixed approach of quantitative and qualitative content analysis using inductive and deductive category application. (cf. Mayring 2014: 104f) The categories in the present analysis cover dimensions, already in the introduction (Contexts and roles in which Chechens appear, Chechen stereotypes, Structures of argumentation in the discourse about Chechens).
At first, deductive categories fitting the research questions and the hypotheses were formed based on “theory and previous studies” according to Mayrings rules of deductive category assignment. Deductive category application is useful in order to structure the sample-material and extract certain aspects from it that are relevant for the study. This approach economizes the procedure of the content analysis. Also, in the present study, only sections which are relevant for the research were considered. Categories were defined in advance. Anchor examples representing each category were created. The deductive categories were then tested on a part of the sample and adapted accordingly. The number of categories hasn’t been determined in advance. Inductive categories and subcategories derived directly from the text, data has been added during the coding-process. (cf. Mayring 2014: 93-95, 100)

The software ATLAS.ti was used to detect the category’s frequency counts as well as co-occurring codes. Codes were developed and assigned only by the author of this paper. Mayring suggests double-checking the category system with a second coder, which would assign the categories to the sample material, with the rules provided by the first coder in order to avoid subjectivity. Due to restrictions of the study, double checking of the category system with a second coder was not possible. (cf. Mayring 2014: 109f)

4.3 Types of Categories used

This chapter should give an overview of the types of categories used and explain the theoretical background behind them.

4.3.1 Contexts and Roles

4.3.1.1 Main Topic of Report

1. Sensational and crime reports
2. Good-will reports
3. Factual reports
4. (Labour market reports)
5. Reports about Chechens in international contexts
Categories one to four have been developed in a content analysis about guest workers in the German press by Manuel Delgado. (cf. Delgado 1972: 20) However, criteria formulating which kind of articles each of these categories include, have been adapted to the material of the present study. After applying these categories to a part of the sample articles, the category “Labour market reports” seems to be redundant. Furthermore the category “Reports about Chechens in international contexts” has been added. The coding unit for these categories is a whole article.

4.3.1.1.1 Sensational and Crime Reports

In the present study the category “sensational and crime reports” includes the articles in which Chechens were involved as perpetrators, victims and/or witnesses and those in which Chechens are punished by the law (Court reports). The category comprises detailed descriptions of concrete crimes as well as general considerations about crime in which Chechens are mentioned. (cf. Delgado 1972: 20) Reports about Chechen refugees (illegally) crossing the border to Austria were classified in that category, as well as reports portraying inappropriate behaviour of Chechens, like in the following anchor example:

Flüchtlings-Demo: "Wir wollen weg!"
In Deutsch Tschantschendorf demonstrierten drei Flüchtlingsfamilien für ihre Verlegung nach Niederösterreich. Sie wollten zu Bekannten in Amstetten. Drei Tage vor der geplanten Überstellung reisten die Tschetschenen mit elf Kindern auf eigene Faust per Linienbus ab. In der burgenländischen Gemeinde herrscht darüber Unverständnis. (Kronen Zeitung 10.01.2006: 18)

Subcategories were formed to code different criminal offences (e.g. theft, murder, threat etc.) and court reports.

4.3.1.1.2 Good-Will Reports

Reports that should evoke understanding for the special situation of Chechens in Austria belong to this category. Articles in this category show a good willing attitude towards Chechens and a readiness to understand and solve problems concerning Chechens like in the anchor example. (cf. Delgado 1972: 20f)

"Tschetschenische Teestunde"
Plattform für ehrenamtliche Flüchtlingshilfe im Entstehen:
Für Flüchtlinge da sein und unbürokratisch helfen: Das liegt vielen Kärntnern, die sich nun regelmäßig zu Gesprächen treffen, am Herzen. Ins Leben gerufen wurde die Initiative von Schwester Andreas
vom Wernberger Kloster und Hedi Torschanoff aus Villach. Auch eine gemeinsame Plattform soll gegründet werden.
"Unser Ziel ist, die Flüchtlinge, die meisten kommen aus Tschetschenien, unbürokratisch zu unterstützen und zu integrieren", so Schwester Andreas. 24 ehrenamtliche Helfer für Flüchtlinge (Uni Klagenfurt, Interkulturelle Küche Villach, Katholische Frauenbewegung- und Bildungswerk usw.) waren beim ersten Treffen dabei. (Kronen Zeitung 24.06.2006: 18)

4.3.1.1.3 Factual Reports

The category “factual reports” includes articles concerning the life of Chechens in Austria, like reports about free time activities, festivities, cultural and sporting events concerning, involving or organized by Chechens. Articles about accidents and sickness of Chechens belong to this category as well as reports about political activities of Chechens. (cf. Delgado 1972: 21):

_Gefährliche Lungenerkrankung in Flüchtlingsheim ausgebrochen_

This category also includes reports giving background-information on Chechen-related topics, like reports about migration in general and statistics.

4.3.1.1.4 Reports about Chechens in International Contexts

This category contains all articles concerning Chechens outside Austria. These are mainly reports about the situation in Chechnya, Chechen refugees in countries other than Austria, but also (political) contacts between Austria and the Chechen Republic like in the following anchor example:

_Gudenus traf Kadyrow: Geheime FPÖ-Mission nach Tschetschenien FPÖ._
Tschetscheniens gefürchteter Präsident empfing blaue Delegation. Man verständigte sich über gemeinsame Vorhaben in der Flüchtlingsfrage. (Die Presse 08.02.2012: 2)
4.3.1.2 Cultural Specifics

This code was assigned when cultural specifics such as religious beliefs or traditions of Chechens were mentioned. Subcodes like “religious beliefs” and “traditions” (e.g. bride theft) were derived inductively from the sample-material. Additionally a key-word search with variations of the terms blood feud (Blutfehde), honour killing (Ehrenmord), Clan-system and Adat were conducted. Coding units were relevant sections. The following section serves as an anchor example:


4.3.1.3 Role of Chechens

Chechen actors were coded as active or passive in a positive or negative role. The code “positive” was assigned when the author expressed sympathy for the actor (e.g. by emphasizing his/her good behaviour or by showing empathy towards a victim). Sections were coded as “negative” when antipathy towards the actor was expressed. That was usually the case for perpetrators committing a crime or showing inappropriate behaviour. Some sections couldn’t clearly be affiliated to the categories positive or negative and were thereby only coded as neutral.

The categories active and passive are based on a semantic and not a syntactic definition. Syntactically speaking, in the sentences “Mary hates John” and “John is hated by Mary”, the first sentence is an active and the second a passive construction. Looking at the example from a semantic point of view Mary would be active (because she does something) and John passive (because something is done to him) in both sentences. Groups were coded as one actor if they could be assigned to the same categories. If they couldn’t (e.g. in a brawl situation, where a group as a whole appears as perpetrators but one or more members are hurt) they were treated as more than one actor. Additionally categories for the most frequent roles (e.g. perpetrator, victim, refugee, political actor etc.) were created. In addition, the code female Chechen actors was created to verify or falsify hypothesis 6. Only persons in concrete situations were coded. Chechens appearing in the framework of generalisations (e.g. Chechens are X) were excluded, firstly due to the difficulty of assigning them to the categories active
or passive and secondly these sections will be analysed in chapter 5.2 (Chechen Stereotypes).

4.3.1.4 Direct Quote

For the analysis of Hypothesis 7, all direct quotes were gathered and grouped together in job categories (e.g. police, politicians, jurists, etc.). The category “Chechen” and “Other citizens” were added. One of the main objectives of counting quotes was to find out how many Chechens were cited in the sample. That is why members of “Chechen Elites”, such as politicians, have been classified as “Chechens” and not as “politicians”.

4.3.1.5 Other Categories

Sections that were found relevant for the study have been coded in this category.

Reappearing topics formed the following subcategories.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Category</th>
<th>Definition</th>
<th>Anchor example</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Overreaction</td>
<td>One or more Chechens are (violently) overreacting either due to implausible reasons or without any reason</td>
<td>Ein Streit um gestohlene Wäscheklammern artete Dienstag in der Bessarabierstraße in Salzburg aus. Eine Iranerin und eine Tschetschenin holten ihre Angehörigen zu Hilfe. Fünf Personen raften. (Kronen Zeitung 28.06.2012: 16)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Different concept of law of Chechens</td>
<td>Criminal behaviour of Chechens is interpreted or implied as “normal for them”.</td>
<td>Ein &quot;Einkauf&quot; der anderen Art wurde gestern einem Tschetschenen (34) in Hall zum Verhängnis. Polizisten beobachteten den vierfachen Familienvater, als er in einem Diskont-Geschäft Babybekleidung einsteckte und nicht bezahlte. (Kronen Zeitung 23.08.2006: 14)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
4.3.2 Chechen Stereotypes

Stereotypes are a necessity without which communication cannot function. They economize speech by simplifying and generalizing certain concepts. The use of stereotypes becomes problematic if stereotypes are used imprudently. If for example the reason for validating a message in a discourse is a stereotype, it gets difficult to verify or to falsify the content of a statement. The discourse becomes formulized and lost in generalizations. Although stereotypes can be racist, they are not restricted to ethnicity, nationality or religion but can be established for all kinds of groups (e.g. lorry drivers, law students, women, etc.). (cf. Jost 2007: 199-201) Nearly all social sciences, including sociology, political sciences, psychology and history dealt with the analysis of stereotypes. The research on historical stereotypes is a branch of history of mentality, concentrating on collective self-perception on the one hand and the perception of others on the other hand. In other words the research on historical stereotypes analyses a specific form of communication (=stereotyping) used in a society to differentiate so-called in- from out-group(s). In that respect stereotyping is a way of differentiating and forming an identity. (cf. Hahn 1995: 190f)

For the category “stereotype” in the analysis, I chose to use a concise definition. The objects of study of the present research are texts. That is why I chose a linguistic approach, as offered by the philologist Magda Telus in her essay “Gruppenspezifisches Stereotyp: Ein textlinguistisches Model”. Therein Telus presents the model of embedding group-specific stereotypes in the textual production. Firstly there are many generalizing statements that correspond with a certain stereotype. Secondly people in a society might not share those generalizing statements at all, or only to a certain extent. The question Telus poses, is how come that, although there are so many different ways of speaking about a certain content, the people in a society still develop similar ideas about this content. The focus of a linguistic approach is on the spoken word, meaning the entirety of textual production. (cf. Telus 2002: 93)

When working with the model of embedding group-specific stereotypes in the textual production, only text passages, where a quality or some description of behavior is associated with a group name, are relevant for the linguistic research. The group name can also appear in singular, as an adjective or in the context of the text, as long as it refers to the group as a whole. Telus differentiates the terms group-specific and social stereotype. The group-specific stereotype is limited to the field of linguistics. However
the social stereotype also includes other aspects, like the image of a social group or personal experiences of individuals with members of that group, which can’t be approached solely with linguistic methods. (cf. Telus 2002: 94f)

Telus thereby defines the group-specific stereotype as an implemented attributional relation between the term for a social group and one or more contingent characteristics or qualities. (Telus 2002: 115) Contingent means that not every member of the group has to possess every quality at all or at the same extent. (cf. Telus 2002: 109) An anchor example would be the following section:

*Es gibt Dolmetscher, die sich nicht mehr trauen, zu arbeiten - weil Tschetschenen so gewaltbereit sind.* (Kronen Zeitung 12.04.2012: 18)

The example classifies as a stereotype according to Telus, due to the attributional relation between the terms „Chechens“, „ready to use violence“ and the use of the ethnonym for the group in general.

### 4.3.3 Structures of Argumentation

Telus states that the goal of conducting a research with this model is to explain how social topoi emerge. (cf. Telus 2002: 93) As the terms “topos” and “stereotype” are often used as synonyms, it is important to be precise in their definitions. Aristotle describes the goal of topoi as a “line of inquiry whereby we shall be able to reason from opinions that are generally accepted about every problem propounded to us, and also shall ourselves, when standing up to an argument, avoid saying anything that will obstruct us.” (Aristotle n.d.) According to that a topos is an arguing-structure that can be applied to any kind of topic based on prevailing opinions. Topoi deal with practical and logical questions of everyday life. They are argumentation schemes and in order to function they need premises which are accepted by the audience, like in the following example: (cf. Jost 2007: 173-179,183.)


In this example a stereotype (X are Y: Chechens are aggressive) was used as an argument in a topical argumentation. This kind of argumentation matches the “crime-topos”, formulated by Martin Wengeler in the framework of his book “Topos und
Diskurs. Begründung einer argumentationsanalytischen Methode und ihre Anwendung auf den Migrationsdiskurs (1960-1985)“:

[Remark of the author: translation by author] Because people (don’t) commit crimes and thereby (don’t) threaten the inner security of a region/country, there measures that lead to the refrain of such actions or make the stay of the respective person / group of people impossible should (shouldn’t) be taken. (Wengeler 2003: 311)

However, for the analysis of some exemplary argumentation patterns in the present study, I will use a similar but slightly more flexible concept than a topos analysis. Framing elements formulated by Robert Entman will be adapted and used as categories for analyzing argumentation patterns:

Framing essentially involves selection and salience. To frame is to select some aspects of a perceived reality and make them more salient in a communicating text, in such a way as to promote a particular problem definition, causal interpretation, moral evaluation, and/or treatment recommendation for the item described. (Entman 1993: 52)

Thereafter framing involves choosing certain aspects of a topic and highlighting them while neglecting others. The Framing function deals with the perspective from which a topic is observed. It is the task of journalists to put issues in a context. However this entails the risk of interest based and one-sided reporting. Which frames are emphasized, provides information on the editorial line of a medium. According to the framing-function, frequent reporting about certain issues increases the chance that users take on the perspective of the consumed media, especially when they don’t use different sources of information. (cf. Hasebrik 2009: 5, 8; Entman 1993: 52)

In another essay of Entmann from 2003, some alterations of the four frames defined in 1993 are suggested. “Moral evaluation” is changed to “evaluation” and “treatment recommendation” to “solution”. (Entman 2003: 417) I chose to use these altered frames as categories for the analysis, as their definition is a little bit wider than the one from 1993.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Category</th>
<th>Definition</th>
<th>Anchor Example</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>(1) Problem definition</td>
<td>Defined discourse/conflict</td>
<td>Diese Menschen mit einem derart hohen</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(2) Causal interpretation</td>
<td>Cause of (1); Context information</td>
<td>Aggressionspotenzial (2) stören</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

40
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>(3) Solution</th>
<th>Prognosis for and/or treatment recommendation of (1)</th>
<th>unseren sozialen Frieden (1). Damit muss Schluss sein, wir werden für ein tschetschenenfreies Kärnten eintreten. (3) (Kronen Zeitung 22.08.2006: 12)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>(4) Evaluation</td>
<td>Evaluation of (1), (2) and (3) by the author of the report: - Approval - Partial Approval - Disapproval</td>
<td>The anchor example contains three categories. As it is a quote it can't contain an evaluation by the author. The categories will be applied to exemplary articles. Only articles with 3 of the 4 framing elements will be considered.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
5 Results

5.1 Contexts and Roles

5.1.1 Hypothesis 1

H1 In both newspapers the quantity of news coverage about Chechens increases between 2006 and 2012.

Table 3: Articles (Total, amount of short news items and reports where Chechens are not the main topic) and Ethnonyms (Headline, total, average)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Articles Total</strong></td>
<td>81</td>
<td>79</td>
<td>33</td>
<td>32</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Short news items</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Not main topic of report</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>43</td>
<td>43</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>18</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ethnonym in headline</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ethnonym total</td>
<td>154</td>
<td>127</td>
<td>69</td>
<td>91</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Average ethnonyms per article</td>
<td>1,9</td>
<td>1,6</td>
<td>2,1</td>
<td>2,8</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

From the figures in table 3 it is apparent that neither the Krone nor the Presse shows a significant in- or decrease in articles about Chechens between the two sample years. In fact the numbers stay quite constant.

Short news items (= one-paragraph-articles) and reports where Chechens are not the main topic were counted in order to see if there is a quantitative difference regarding the articles which focus on Chechens. However, also after having removed those reports, the numbers between 2006 and 2012 in each newspaper remains almost the same.

Another quantitative indicator that can suggest that the discourse about Chechens has intensified, is the frequency of the ethnonym “Chechen”\(^1\) used in both sample years. The figures in the table reveal that in the Krone the frequency of ethnonyms has

---

\(^1\) Counted were the ethnonym “Tschetschene/Tschetschenin” (in all variations) as well as the adjective “tschetschenisch” and the noun “Tschetschenien” if refered to a person/a group of people (e.g. der tschetschenische Dissident; X ist aus Tschetschenien)
dropped by 18% to an average count of 1.6 ethnonyms per report. Whereas in the Presse in 2012, 32% more ethnonyms were used in comparison to 2006. The average count of ethnonyms per article in 2012 is with 2.8 in the Presse nearly twice as high as in the Krone of the same year. The difference between the average count of ethnonyms in the two sample newspapers could be explained by the fact that the articles in the Presse are generally longer than in the Krone. Thereby they provide more space for the use of ethnonyms in a report focussing on Chechen-related topics. However, against that background, hypothesis 1 has been proven wrong. The amount of reports published in 2006 didn’t substantially change compared to 2012. Nonetheless there has been a significant increase of used ethnonyms in the Presse in 2012. In the same year the ethnonym “Chechen” has been used 6 times in a headline. These numbers indicate a more intense discourse in the respective newspaper in the seconds sample year, which might be uncovered when examining the articles more closely in the next sections.

5.1.2 Hypothesis 2 and 3

H2: In the tabloid newspaper Chechens appear more often in local contexts (Chechens in Austria), while in the quality newspaper their appearance in international contexts prevails (Long-term reports about the situation in Chechnya)

H3: In the quality newspaper “Die Presse” the amount of articles where Chechens appear in local contexts, increases between 2006 and 2012.

After assigning the articles of the two sample years in both newspapers according to their main topic, certain tendencies become apparent: In the Krone the vast majority of the sample in both years appears in the category “Sensational and crime reports”, which is only second highest category in the Presse. Prima facie the different focuses of each newspaper (local contexts in the Krone and international contexts in the Presse), suggested in hypothesis 2, can be spotted easily. However, when examining the Presse-sample more closely this finding has to be partly revised. International reports in the Presse have halved from 23 articles in 2006, to 12 in 2012. Of these 12 articles, 9 are borderline cases concerning their categorization, because they partly deal with Chechens in Austria: 6 reports were published about a trip where members of the right wing freedom party visited President Ramzan Kadyrov
in Chechnya in order to discuss the repatriation of Chechen refugees in Austria (See 5.3.2). The other 3 borderline cases deal with Chechen refugees who went back from Austria to Chechnya. The international reports in the Presse-sample of 2006 don’t show this tendency of relating to Austrian contexts. From the 23 international reports in the first sample year, only one merely broaches an Austria-related topic – a short news item reporting that an Austrian journalist has been arrested in Chechnya. A shift towards topics concerning Chechens in Austria in the Presse-sample of 2012, as anticipated in hypothesis 3 is not only visible in the category “international”, but also by an increase in the categories factual, good-will and other reports.

Table 4: Main Topic of Report (Percentage and Absolute Frequencies)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Type of Report</th>
<th>Krone 2006</th>
<th>Krone 2012</th>
<th>Presse 2006</th>
<th>Presse 2012</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Sensational and Crime</td>
<td>60</td>
<td>60</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Good-Will</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Factual</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>International</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Others</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>81</strong></td>
<td><strong>79</strong></td>
<td><strong>33</strong></td>
<td><strong>32</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Regarding each newspaper separately, the amount of sensational and crime reports remains quite steady in both sample years. In the Krone more than a third of the
sensational and crime reports are short-news items (24 in 2006 as well as in 2012). International reports generally remain on a low level. In the Krone, good-will reports decreased while factual reports increased in the second sample year. In the majority of the factual reports (3 in 2006 and 6 in 2012) Chechens are the main topic. In contrast to the Presse, wherein most of the factual reports Chechens are only mentioned shortly (1 in 2006, 5 in 2012). All in all factual reports increased in the Presse in 2012, while good-will reports remain low in both sample years. Of the international reports of 2006, 9 were short news items and in 5 Chechens were not the main topic. In 2012 the two international reports were short news items and in one article Chechens were only shortly mentioned, leaving 9 international reports focussing on Chechens for each sample year.

The majority of factual reports in the Krone concern Chechens primarily (3 of 5 in 2006; 6 of 9 in 2012). In the Presse only one factual report had Chechens as a main topic, in all the other cases they were only mentioned. Of the four categories the factual reports unite the broadest spectrum of topics. In the Krone they range from sport (3) and sickness of Chechens (1) in 2006, to accidents of Chechens (4), charity events (1), and asylum statistics (2) in 2012. In factual reports of the Presse, Chechens were mentioned in the description of a cabaret programme (“zum traditionellen, gewohnt virtuosen Jugo-Türke-Dialog ist ein Tschetschene dazugekommen, der natürlich von beiden Altimmigranten scheel angesehen wird.” In: Die Presse 08.03.2012: 25), in a report about the journalist Jutta Sommerbauer, being awarded a prize for her reporting on Chechnya (“Ausgezeichnete ‘Presse’-Journalistinnen. In: Die Presse 10.11.2012: 30), in a report on illegal immigration, smuggling and trafficking of human beings and in an asylum statistic. The broad thematic scope makes comparisons within this category difficult.

In good-will reports Chechens are not merely positively depicted. Some of the articles are inherently good-will reports, evoking an understanding for the special situation of asylum seekers and refugees in general. However in some of these cases Chechens are described as negative examples for integration or problem cases (e.g. “Probleme gibts mit Tschetschenen: Ihnen fehlt das Integrationsinteresse. In: Kronen Zeitung 13.12.2006: 14). That was true for 3 Krone reports of 2006, the one good-will report of 2012 and a Presse article of 2006. Against this background it doesn’t come as a surprise that in the Krone good-will reports are, after the sensational and crime reports, those with the highest number of stereotypes.
5.1.3 Hypothesis 4

H4: The topics in the discourse about Chechens differ in 2012 compared to 2006

5.1.3.1 Crime (103 articles)

In this section, reports about concrete criminal offences of Chechens are dealt with. Articles interpreting statistical data about criminality in general were coded as “factual reports”. Table 5 includes the most frequent criminal offenses that were reported in the two sample years. Apart from certain court reports (see 5.1.3.3) the articles usually don’t reveal whether the respective Chechens were convicted of the described crime. If Austrians were involved in any way, usually no ethnonym was used. Sometimes more than one criminal-offence code was assigned per article if more than one criminal offence was mentioned in the report. Due to the number of articles the topic occupies 55% (45 articles) in the Krone of 2006 and 66% (52 articles) in 2012. The percentages in the Presse are remarkably lower with 5% (5 articles) in 2006 and 1% (1 article) in 2012. Reports about criminal offences, affecting the image on Chechens in a negative way, takes lots of space especially in the tabloid-sample.

Table 5: Criminal Offences mentioned in the Sample (Absolute frequency)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Type of criminal offence</th>
<th>Krone 06</th>
<th>Krone 12</th>
<th>Presse 06</th>
<th>Presse 12</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Brawl with injury</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Brawl with injury and murder</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Injury</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Murder</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Theft (attempted or committed)</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>35</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Threat</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Violence against women</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Resistance against the police</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Flight</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>46</strong></td>
<td><strong>59</strong></td>
<td><strong>5</strong></td>
<td><strong>6</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Crimes were counted per report. If one criminal incident was the topic of two (or more) articles it was counted as two (or more) and not as one. Criminal offences receiving lots of media attention were concerned by that. An example for that is the high number in the category “Brawl with injury and murder”, in 2006. All of the articles in both sample years concern a brawl between Chechen and Dagestani people in Hallein (Salzburg), in the course of which a Chechen had been shot. (cf. Die Presse 19.08.2006: 11)

Reports about theft increased in the Krone sample of 2012. Overall theft reports range from minor cases of theft (Q1, Q2) to organized criminality, as in Q3:

Q1 Flüchtender mit Schuss gestoppt

Q2 Passanten überwältigten in Schügelmühl (NÖ) einen 24-jährigen Asylanten, der zuvor ein Rad gestohlen hatte. Sie wurden durch Schläge verletzt, konnten den Tschetschenen aber der Polizei übergeben. (Kronen Zeitung 11.10.2006: 12)

Q3 Bande überfiel acht Tankstellen (Kronen Zeitung 07.06.2012: 16)

Minor cases of theft as described in Q1 and Q2, appear quite often in 2006. In Q1 a Chechen father steals baby clothes and flees after being confronted with it. The whole incident from the crime to the pursuit of the perpetrator by the police is described in much detail. In Q2 a Chechen steals a bike and is overpowered by other people, who handed him over to the police. As both crimes are not severe, it is interesting why they appear in the news at all. They certainly help to paint a negative picture of Chechens in Austria, who apparently (like in Q1 and Q2) don’t observe the law. Overall the severity of theft cases reported about increases in 2012, like in Q3 where a gang robs a petrol station.

The category “flight” appears only in the Krone and was applied in cases where Chechens crossed the border to Austria and were picked up by the police. In all cases the illegality of these acts is stressed:

Q4 Gleich zu acht schwammen Illegale aus dem Osten nach Österreich! Dort wurden die Tschetschenen und Moldawier aber von heimischen Grenzpolizisten erwartet und abgefangen. (Kronen Zeitung 12.10.2006: 16)

Q5 Mehr Illegale zu Weihnachten! (Kronen Zeitung 08.12.2006: 14)
5.1.3.2 Overreaction (21 Articles)

Only the Krone contained sections which were coded in the category “overreaction”. 10 articles from 2006 and 9 from 2012 could be spotted. Included were sections where Chechens overreacted primarily through acts of physical violence. The headline “Chechen goes completely berserk”, quoted in Q1 is characteristic for this category. The concerned incidents are most of the time brawls and sometimes cases of threat or violence against the police.

Q2. Bei blutigen Bandenkriegen wurden 17 Asylanten verletzt

Q3 Um die Aufteilung der Hausarbeit ging es Donnerstagvormittag bei einem Familienstreit in einer Wohnung im Bezirk Jakomini: Ein 18-Jähriger nahm plötzlich ein Küchenmesser und drohte seinem Bruder (22), ihn zu kastrieren. Ein Zeugin alarmierte die Polizei, die den Tschetschenen wegwies und auch anzeigte. (Kronen Zeitung 27.01.2012: 18)

Q4 Massenschlägerei unter Asylwerbern
Ihre Kinder hatten zuerst (wegen eines an die Mauer geschossenen Fußballs) gestritten. Dann legten die erwachsenen Asylwerber los. Insgesamt prügten im steirischen Kapfenberg mehr als zehn Tschetschenen bzw. Kosovaren und ein Serbe aufeinander ein. Auf dem zweifelhaften Feld der Ehre blieben der Serbe (22) sowie eben auch ein Kosovare schwer verletzt liegen. (Kronen Zeitung 03.02.2012: 18)


Reasons for the overreaction (highlighted in the quotes by the author) are usually described as minor or not apparent at all. The behaviour of the Chechens in the section seems unreasonable. Due to stolen clothes pegs (Q4), someone jumping the cue (Q2) or quarrelling children (Q4) they lose their temper and behave overly aggressive, by e.g. beating each other bloody with iron bars (Q2). Incidents in that category are usually confrontations between Chechens and Chechens, Chechens and other ethnic groups or Chechens and the police. In many cases the excessive effort the police had to make in order to gain control of the situation are emphasised, like in the following case were the massive presence of the police, who even brought a police dog is stressed:

Q7 "Nach 23 Uhr war eine Massenrauferei im Gange, wobei eine Hacke und ein Butterfly-Messer als Waffen verwendet wurden", berichtet ein Uniformierter: "Sechs Streifen mussten ausrücken, zudem ein Kollege mit seinem Diensthund. Es war mehr als mühsam, diese Schlacht zu beenden. (Kronen Zeitung 03.02.2012: 22)

Not only the reports themselves, also their headlines often indicate that the situation is difficult to control or beyond control of the authorities.


Q9 Erleichtertes Aufatmen bei Polizei und Sicherheitsdirektion: In Klagenfurt ist es scheint's gelungen, den Ausbruch eines Bandenkriegs im Keim zu ersticken (Kronen Zeitung 27.05.2006: 18)

Q11 Messerwurf auf Dolmetscherin: Polizisten unterließen Kontrolle (Kronen Zeitung 12.04.2012: 18)

In Q9 the struggling of the police in the process of preventing the “outbreak of a gang war”. Q11 indicates the inability of the police to protect an interpreter from an assault. The term “gang wars” is also used as an exaggeration in Q8 in order to describe an increased amount of brawl situations in the refugee camp Traiskirchen. Again the helplessness of the police facing such incidents is stressed (“Wenn sich etliche Dutzend Asylanten die Köpfe einschlagen, dann können auch mehrere Polizisten nur wenig ausrichten.” In: Kronen-Zeitung 16.02.2006: 14). In addition the content of headline doesn’t entirely correspond with the content of the article. While the headline mentions drunks in plural, the report itself speaks of one single drunk Chechen. Also the term “rampant crime” isn’t specified in the article and can thereby only apply to the already mentioned brawl situations and the drunk Chechen.
In trial situation, Chechens are described either extremely incooperative (e.g. Richter Peter Friedrich hatte Mühe, aus dem Angeklagten irgendetwas heraus zu bringen, das über "Ich kann mich nicht erinnern", hinausging. In: Kronen Zeitung 21.06.2006: 16) or telling boundless lies. Their implausibility or their lacking sense of guilt is underlined.

Q1 "Das ist unmöglich!", behauptete er. "Sie mögen es für unmöglich halten, es ist aber so!", betonte die Richterin. Auch die Aussage der Kellnerin, die ihn zu hundert Prozent wieder erkannte, ist ihm egal. "Sie wurde instruiert, so auszusagen."
(Kronen Zeitung 21.01.2012: 18)

In Q1 the good will of the judge, who even with the best will didn't find any mitigating factors for the defendant, is emphasised. The Chechen doesn't show any signs of remorse neither after being identified by a witness nor after being fined. He denies everything and lodges an appeal against the judgement.

Quotes of Chechens are frequent in court report. Usually they are short and undescriptive like in Q1, however there are also some quotes in court reports with more content:

(Kronen Zeitung 20.09.2012: 22)

(Kronen Zeitung 12.10.2012: 27)

Q4 13-Jährige hatte Sex: Geld weg
Sabine bekommt davon nicht viel mit. Im Schlafzimmer hat sie Sex mit Aslambek U. Dass genau das mit Unmündigen strafbar ist, will der 19-Jährige nicht gewusst haben. Im Verhör sagt er: "In Russland darf man mit allen Mädchen schlafen, wenn sie es freiwillig tun." Dann habe ich auch meine Hose ausgezogen. Sabine sagte mir, dass sie Sex mit mir haben will, blieb am Rücken liegen und spreizte die Beine (...) Sie wehrte sich auch nicht dagegen (...) In Russland darf man, glaube ich, mit allen Mädchen schlafen, wenn sie es freiwillig machen. [...] (Kronen Zeitung 07.03.2012: 18)

In Q2 and Q3 the defendants indicate that they are „unproductive members of society“, by stating to sit all day in the park smoking marijuana and to never having worked. In addition Q2 shows the same pattern of the Chechen making implausible testimonies, denying everything and the judge expressing his doubt, that has already been described in Q1 ("Das macht ja keinen Sinn", wundert sich der Richter. Genauso wenig, wie die Tatsache, dass Freunde des Angeklagten schon im Vorfeld verschiedenste Alibis auftischten. Doch der 21-Jährige bleibt dabei: "Ich hab das nicht getan!" – vertagt. In: Kronen Zeitung 20.09.2012: 22). Furthermore in Q3 the author calls the dialog between the judge and the defendant exemplary. Thereby he uses the testimony of a single Chechen as the basis for the generalizing argument that Chechens or/and refugees don’t work.

As already mentioned the reports about crime in the Krone often stress the crime by giving a detailed description of it. Q4 is a section from a court report about a 19-year old Chechen who had coitus with a 13-year old girl at a party, while his friends committed theft. The quote emphasises the criminal act by offering a long quote of the defendant, describing the scene. The part where he justifies his acts by stating, that he thought that in Russia, one can have coitus with every girl who is willing to, appears twice in the report. The author writes that the defendant was not aware that he was committing a crime, indicating that he has a different concept of law. Favourable treatment of foreigners, though sometimes indicated, was only once directly criticised by Johann Gudenus, a member of the right-wing freedom party. The article about the Chechen who had coitus with a minor (Q4) gives information that the proceedings against the defendant were dropped. Thereafter Gudenus was quoted, stating that foreigners are treated milder by the law compared to Austrians ("Junge Kriminelle darf man nicht mit Samtsporthandschuhen anfassen. Für Ausländer müssen die gleichen Regeln und Gesetze gelten wie für Inländer!"). In: Kronen Zeitung 07.03.2012: 18).

Overall Court reports increase from 2 in 2006 to 7 in 2012. Like the category “overreaction”, court reports could only be found in the Krone.
Apart from Q4 there were some other sections in the Krone-sample that suggest that Chechens had a particular understanding of the law which is different from the Austrian standard. The most descriptive section is this one, where a Chechen attacks an interpreter, because he, according to the author doesn’t respect the Austrian law:

Q5 Trotz dieser Unterstützung zeigte der Tschetschene bei der Besprechung mit der Dolmetscherin, was er von österreichischen Rechtsnormen hält. "Mit dem Kampfmesser verletzte er sich selbst, dann schleuderte er das Messer gegen die Dolmetscherin." (Kronen Zeitung 11.04.2012: 1)

Sections where the different concept of law was interpreted a motivation for crime were rarely declared as openly as in Q5. Some articles however implied this different perception of law and order, by emphasising the criminal behaviour was a normal act of everyday life for the perpetrator(s). (“Für sie war es normal, in ein Geschäft zu gehen und dort irgendetwas mitgehen zu lassen.” In: Kronen Zeitung 25.01.2012: 18)

5.1.3.4 Cultural specifics

The code cultural specifics had overall very low results. It was searched for sections mentioning customs, traditions, traditional food and music, language and religion of Chechens. Words referring to a special concept of honour were found only in the Krone sample of 2006. Among them were the terms blood revenge (2), honour killing (1) and feud (4):

Q1 Eine anonyme Androhung von "Blutrache" und "Ehrenmord" aus Tschetschenen-Kreisen hatte dafür gesorgt, dass Kobra-Beamte das Gericht überwachten. (Kronen Zeitung 21.06.2006: 16)

In Q1 those designations are just mentioned on the side and not discussed further. The term „feud“ was only used in connection with the murder in Hallein in the Krone. Vengeance in general as a motive for crime was only mentioned 5 times in the Krone (3 in 2006 and 2 in 2012). One case of failed bride theft, where the bride was returned to her family could also be spotted in the 2006 Krone-sample (for more details see 5.1.6.1). Sections dealing with the topic religion of Chechens were generally rare. Articles mentioning that issue could be found in the Krone sample of 2006 (4), as well as in the Presse of 2006 (4) and 2012 (3). Religious beliefs of Chechens were not mentioned in the Krone of 2012.
In all cases the issue Chechens and religion, appears in negative contexts, connected either with Islamist terrorism in international reports (Q4) or religious extremism (Q2, Q3). Q3 belongs to a report about Chechen returnees, where a Chechen woman criticises the Islamisation in Chechnya. Q4 is the only report in the sample about radical Islamist Chechens fighting in Syria. A discussion about Austrian Chechens joining the Jihad in Syria started a few months later. A search on Wiso.net revealed that the first article on that topic was published in April 2013 in the Presse ("60 Männer aus Österreich im syrischen Jihad" In: Die Presse 25.04.2013: 1) and in August 2013 in the Krone ("Mehr als 200 Kämpfer in Syrien haben österreichische Wurzeln" In: Kronen Zeitung 28.08.2013: 2). Q2 is also the only report connecting Chechens in Austria with fundamentalist Islam. Religion was mentioned in a Krone report as well as in the corresponding article of the Presse (cf. Die Presse 19.08.2006: 11) as a possible motif for a brawl with weapons in Hallein, ending with a murdered Chechen:

In the Presse report the possibility of a religious motif is only shortly mentioned. (cf. Die Presse 19.08.2006: 11) Q5 describes the religious motive in detail. Hurt religious feelings due to a drunk Dagestani, who has been seen by Chechens, are presented as a reason for the criminal action. However in the end the police is quoted suspecting drug dealings to be the more likely motive of crime.
One incident appearing in both sample newspapers in 2006 concerned a school where “Muslim-fathers” (2 Bosnians and 1 Chechen) complained about female teachers not wearing headscarfs:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>German</th>
<th>English</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>

Core contents in both reports are very similar. However the argumentation structures around those quotes are differing. In the first section of the Presse article reactions of politicians are cited while in the last section the President of the Education Board Upper Austria was quoted, saying that integration was not a one-way street and that he expected a reaction from Muslim organisations on this incident. The Krone report starts by stating in a good-willing manner, that the attempts to integrate by foreigners are “torpedoed” by a few fanatics and ends by concluding that the foreigners are a problem which is getting more severe.
5.1.3.5 Chechens threatened/persecuted

This category hardly appeared in 2006. One article was published in the Krone in the aftermath of the murder of the Russian Journalist Anna Politkovskaja in October 2006. ("Wer in Russland sagt, was er denkt, kann sterben …" In: Kronen Zeitung 12.10.2006: 34) A similar article exists in the Presse, were overall 5 reports contained the code of Chechens being threatened or persecuted. All sections of 2006 were found in international reports relating to the situation in Chechnya. In both newspapers this tendency changes in 2012, where the code appears more often in Austrian contexts. In the Krone sample of that year 5 sections were coded. Four of those sections appear in articles related to the FPÖ-trip to Chechnya and the discussion about whether Chechens are safe in Chechnya (see 5.3.2; 5.3.3).

In 2012 Chechens being threatened becomes a constant topic in the Presse. All in all 12 sections could be spotted. There are several reports where Chechens being threatened or persecuted is the main topic of the report, like in the following example:

\[Q1 \text{ Heute befinden sich nach Erkenntnissen des Inlandsnachrichtendienstes etwa} 300 \text{ Agenten Kadyrows im Land. Ihre Aufgabe: dessen Gegner so weit unter Druck zu setzen, dass sie nicht wagen, von den vermuteten Folterungen und Kriegsverbrechen zu erzählen. Wolfgang F., alias Suliman E., der den Kampfnamen "Karamasow" trägt, war der Anführer der Agenten. (Die Presse 04.02.2012: 13)}\]

Q1 deals with the case of Wolfgang F. also known as Suliman E. who is according to the Presse the leader of the Kadyrov-network in Austria. (cf. Die Presse 2012-02-04: 13) Four articles were published about that topic in the Presse in 2012. The Kadyrov-agents don’t appear in the Krone-sample at all. Some references to the Israilov-murder case could be spotted in both newspapers.

5.1.4 Hypothesis 5

H5 Contexts in which Chechens appear in an active role are mainly violence- or crime-related (as perpetrators). Positive attitudes towards Chechens in an active role are rare. In passive roles they appear as refugees, (war) victims and politically persecuted persons.
5.1.4.1 Krone

Table 6: Roles of Chechens in the Krone in 2006 and 2012 (Absolute frequency)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Active 06</th>
<th>Passive 06</th>
<th>Active 12</th>
<th>Passive 12</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Positive</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Negative</td>
<td>70</td>
<td>60</td>
<td>65</td>
<td>60</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Neutral</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>20</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Corresponding to the amount of sensational and crime reports described in 5.1.2 the majority of Chechens were coded as “active negative”. In the vast majority of those cases this active negative role is the one of the perpetrator (60 of 63 in 2006; 53 of 58 in 2012). In 2006 Chechens appear 13 times in positive active roles, mainly as athletes (3) and as persons who show morally right behaviour in conflict situations (4) like in the following case:

Q1 Der 17-Jährige wollte sich rächen, zückte einen Dolch mit elf Zentimeter langer Klinge und stieß Morddrohungen aus. Mehrere Tschetschenen und der Erzieher konnten den Russen zurückhalten, der sich eine Hand brach. (Kronen Zeitung 20.08.2006: 12)

In 2012 only three sections with Chechens in positive active roles could be spotted. Passive positive roles in 2006 contain 8 cases of Chechens who became victims of physical violence, 5 of which are women (see 5.1.5.1). Chechens in victim roles were coded as passive neutral, if no or not much sympathy is expressed for them. Usually that was the case when they appear in the report as perpetrators as well as victims like in the brawl situation in Q2.

Q2 Drei Streithähne mussten ins Spital. Ein Kosovare (40) erlitt schwere Kopfverletzungen, ein Landsmann (23) und ein 21-jähriger Tschetschene wurden ambulant behandelt. (Kronen Zeitung: 03.02.2012: 22)
In Q2, Chechens are called “wranglers” (Streithähne), their own fault for being injured is stressed. Whereas in Q3 (coded as positive passive) sympathy for the victim is expressed by describing the incident "dramatic" and emphasising the innocence of the victim by stating that he was molested without any reason. In 2012 three references were made to the politically motivated murder of Umar Israilov, who was also coded as positive passive.

In 2006 Refugees appeared in passive neutral roles twice and 4 times in active roles, of which one was positive and three were negative. In the 2012-sample they were also mentioned three times in active negative roles, and thrice in passive roles (2 positive, 1 negative). The negative active roles involve violations against the asylum law and flight situations, like in Q4:


Actors were coded as “refugee/asylum seeker” only if it was their main role in the report. However Chechens are often referred to as refugees or asylum seekers (Asylwerber, Asylant, Flüchtling) in other contexts. Counting those references lead to a score of 82 in 2006 (61 times in the context of sensational and crime reports and 18 times in good-will reports) and 34 in 2012 (21 in the context of sensational and crime reports). The vast majority of cases the terms appear in sensational and crime reports and are used to describe perpetrators. That means that the words “asylum seeker” and “refugee” are mostly used negatively.
5.1.4.2 Presse

Table 7: Roles of Chechens in the Presse of 2006 and 2012 (Absolute Frequency)

Similar to the Krone the category “active negative” shows the highest scores, apart from that the distribution to the respective categories varies a lot compared to the tabloid-sample. Of 14 in 2006 only 5 perpetrators in local contexts (sensational and crime reports) and 8 to actors in international reports could be found. Among the latter are Ramzan Kadyrov (1) and Šamil Bassaev (2). The 2012 sample included 5 active negative actors in the international-category. In 2012 5 of the 7 sections with negative actives actors in the sensational and crime reports concern Wolfgang F., the leader of the Kadyrov network, who was already discussed in 5.1.3.5. (cf. Die Presse 04.02.2012: 13)

While active positive active roles are rare in 2006, they increase to 8 n 2012. However 5 of the 6 in international contexts appear in the same article - a background report about Chechen returnees to Chechnya. Passive positive roles also increased in 2012, the category corresponds to a large degree with the category “victim”. There is a co-occurrence between the codes “Chechen woman” and “positive active and passive roles” which will be examined more closely in the next chapter. The category negative active was assigned if a passive actor was described as an absolute negative figure, such as a terrorist or a murderer, who was either captured, trailed, injured or killed. (e.g. Sohn von Tschetschenen-Rebellenchef in Syrien getötet. Schwere Gefechte. Der kaukasische “Gotteskrieger” Gelajew soll von Regimetruppen erschossen worden sein
This was twice the case in 2012 and 4 times in 2006.

The category “refugees” was only assigned trice in the Presse sample (2 neutral active, 1 negative active). The Negative active role was within a quote of a Chechen political actor who is close to Kadyrov:

Q6 Schwierig vor allem deshalb, weil die tschetschenischen Flüchtlinge in Europa so viel “Falschinformationen” über die kleine Republik verbreiteten: “Das ist für sie ja die einzige Möglichkeit, damit ihr sie aufnimmt.” (Die Presse vom 01.07.2012: 4,5)

The code “asylum seeker/refugee” had 17 hits in 2006 (0,52/article) and 40 hits in 2012 (1,21/per article). In the Krone of 2006 the average was 1,01/article, which is nearly twice as high as in the Presse of the same year. In 2012 a reverse trend of this tendency can be spotted. The average value of hits per article is in the 2012-Presse-sample significantly higher than in the Krone, where the figure is 0,43 per article. Then increased hits in the Presse can be seen as an indicator for the topical shift towards Chechens in Austria, which has already been mentioned before. The average hits per article in the category sensational and crime reports are in the Presse with 1,29 in both years higher than in the Krone (1,02/article in 2006 and 0,35/article in 2012)

Counting how often Chechens were referred to as asylum seekers or refugees lead to a score of 17 in 2006 and 40 in 2012. Unlike in the Krone, the number increases in the second sample year. In 2006 most of these terms appear in sensational and crime reports. This changes in 2012, where the majority (19) appears in international reports.

5.1.5 Hypothesis 6

H6: The news coverage about Chechens concerns primarily (young) Chechen men. Reports involving Chechen women are rare. Therefore stereotypical attributions in the press concern primarily Chechen men.

5.1.5.1 Krone 2006

While the Presse-sample of 2006 no section with a female Chechen actor could be found, in the Krone of the same year 9 Chechen women were mentioned. Thereof they appeared 5 times in passive roles as victims, three times in positive active roles.
(reporting a crime, helping in an accident-situation and participating in an integration project) and once in an active negative role, committing a minor crime (theft).

Having a closer look at the sections where Chechen women appear as victims reveals that in 4 cases the perpetrators are Chechen men. Chechen husbands beating their wives were the main topic in two short news items (Q1, Q2) and a side topic in one longer article illustrating the character of a Chechen who was brought to court for stabbing another Chechen (Q3):

Q1 Geohrfeigt hat ein Tschetschene (31) seine Frau (36) in Moosburg. Er muss jetzt in ein anderes Asylantenheim. Anzeigel (Kronen Zeitung 30.04.2006: 14)


Q3 Im Oktober 2005 hatte der Mann im Flüchtlingsheim oft seine Frau geschlagen. (Kronen-Zeitung 21.06.2006: 16)

Q1 is a news item realized in three sentences. The reader gets a message consisting of two pieces of information. The first one is that a Chechen husband had beaten his wife. The fact that no further background information is provided might indicate that a Chechen being violent is perceived as nothing out of the ordinary by the author (and in the discourse about Chechens in the Krone) and therefore doesn’t need any further explanation. The second information deals with the consequences (being moved to another asylum camp and being reported to the police) the perpetrator has to face.

Q2 is a little more descriptive. The cultural background of the perpetrator is described as the motive of the crime: He beats and threatens his wife because he wants her salary “as is the custom in the homeland” (Kronen Zeitung 06.07.2006: 16) Not only is he violent and has backwards views rooted in his culture, he is also lazy - he doesn’t work due to a backache, which is set in quotation marks to indicate that the information is not to be trusted. (cf. Kronen Zeitung 06.07.2006: 16) The woman, on the other hand, appears positive in passive (as the victim) and active (as a worker) roles. Unlike her husband she works and is therefore described as diligent. Also in this case the perpetrator is punished by the authorities.
The topic of Q4 is a case of bride theft were four Chechen men abducted a Chechen woman with the goal to marry her to another Chechen.

Q4 Junge Tschetschenin als Entführungsopfer! Vier Landsmänner wollten sie verheiraten. [...] Die Mutter der jungen Frau hatte inzwischen die Polizei verständigt. (Kronen Zeitung 26.08.2006: 18)

The abduction was described as spontaneous and not agreed on with the family who should have functioned as matchmakers. That is why the woman had been allowed to phone her father and was returned to her family. Meanwhile her mother, appearing in a positive active role, had phoned the police. The abducted woman is presented as a victim of the behaviour of Chechen men rooted in their cultural background.

In one case a Chechen woman was murdered with a Samurai sword by an Albanian perpetrator. The indicated reason was that she was the member of an opposing family and by killing her, the Albanian took revenge for something a member of her family did to a member of his. (cf. Kronen-Zeitung 02.02.2006: 28)

In these cases above the cultural background of the perpetrators is partly used as an explanation for their behaviour, also, them being violent is not being questioned, hinting that it is normal. The discourse about violence against woman with a migrant background is often emotionally charged and moralizing in a biased way and rarely based on empirical data (which doesn't always exist on that topic). In the discussion about that issue there are two major dangers. First, such topics are often used to stir stereotypical concepts of migrants. One-sidedly emphasizing that violence against women and gender equality issues concern certain ethnic groups (Out-groups) can overshadow those problems in the majority society (In-Group). Also it can lead to generalizations, marking migrant men as perpetrators and migrant woman as victims of domestic violence. Furthermore there is the risk that the issue becomes a differentiating factor, marking an out-group as being and the in-group as not being violent against woman. However the second danger is that trying to prevent stereotyping can trivialize an increased risk of victims of (domestic) violence that women with a migrant background might be exposed to. Ideally there should be an objective discussions based on empirical data, making it possible to work out solutions in order to prevent women and girls from becoming victims of violence. (cf. Schröttle 2010: 283, 284)
5.1.5.2 Krone and Presse 2012

News about Chechen women as victims of Chechen men decrease in 2012 to one short news item about domestic violence in the Krone. The Presse-sample didn’t include corresponding reports.

In the 2012 sample of the Krone, 10 females could be spotted. For instance woman appear in active roles in a dispute that caused a brawl (2). Another woman attempted to commit suicide because of her forthcoming deportation. The woman appears again in a passive role when being deported. In neutral roles they appear as family members who are mentioned shortly in the respective report. (5)

In the Presse (2012) they appear in positive active roles as interview partners in a report about Chechen returnees (3) and as a woman fighting against the deportation of her husband (2). In a passive role a woman appears as a war victim in a conversational situation:

[...] doch als vor drei Wochen bei einem interkulturellen Workshop eine 17-jährige Berliner Schülerin zu einer gleichaltrigen Tschetschenin sagte, ihre größte Angst sei, einmal nicht erfolgreich zu sein, da zog sich mir doch das Herz zusammen – vor allem angesichts des ratlosen Gesichts der Tschetschenin, die andere Kriegserfahrungen mitbrachte als die Berlinerin, was dieser zu entgehen schien. (Die Presse 23.06.2012: 38)

The differing backgrounds of a German and a Chechen teenager are contrasted in this section. The role of the woman is absolutely positive.

In opposition to their male counterparts Chechen women are primarily depicted as positive figures in the Presse and mostly positive figures in the Krone, in active as well as in passive roles. In the Krone reports they act reasonable (e.g. The mother calling the police in Q4), courageous (“Die Tschetschenin Termalieva Dezchi (37) - am Bild links mit Sohn Magomed (9) - half dem verletzten Welser Anschlagsopfer. Mutter und Sohn erlitten Rauchgasvergiftungen." In: Kronen Zeitung 14.09.2006: 12) or willing to „integrate“ (e.g. by working, like in Q2). In most of the reports were men and women appear together there is a big contrast between the positive figure of the woman and the negative figure of the man. However there are far too few sections with female Chechen actors (19 in the Krone and 7 in the Presse within a sample of 225 reports) to draw conclusions that exceed the sample.
However, the hypothesis that the news coverage about Chechens concerns primarily Chechen men can thereby be verified. Only 9.3% of the reports involved women, moreover in some of those reports woman were just mentioned and not the main topic. Due to that and also because the depiction of Chechen women differs from their male counterparts, stereotypical attributions in the press concern primarily Chechen men.

5.1.6 Hypothesis 7
H6: Chechens are rarely quoted in both sample newspapers

5.1.6.1 Kronen Zeitung

Table 8: Direct quotes in the Krone in 2006 and 2012

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Categories</th>
<th>2006</th>
<th>2012</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Police</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Politicians</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other citizens</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jurists</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chechens</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Representatives of refugee aid organisations</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>School staff</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sport trainers</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Others</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>53</strong></td>
<td><strong>39</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Overall the number of quotes slightly decreased between 2006 and 2012. The findings on the tables above are only partly consistent with Van Dijks's contention that members of ethnic groups are hardly ever quoted in media. However having a closer look at the category “Chechens” in the “Neue Kronen Zeitung” reveals that the purpose of most of the quotes is rather to shock than to describe a situation:

Q1: "Sie sind selbst verantwortlich, was mit Ihnen jetzt passiert! Ich werde nach der Tat ins Ausland flüchten, damit mich die Polizei nicht erwischt!“ (Kronen-Zeitung 13.01.2006: 16)

Q2: "Ich schneide dir die Kehle durch!“ (Kronen Zeitung 06.07.2006: 16)

Q3: "Salam aleikum" rufen die Eindringlinge […] (Kronen Zeitung 19.08.2006: 8)
Chechens were mainly cited in crime or court situations, making short aggressive and/or shocking statements. Longer quotes, of Chechen perpetrators describing a situation could only be found twice in court reports. The opinions of members of the Chechen community on a Chechen perpetrator was quoted once:

Q4: Das Umfeld kennt ihn kaum; innerhalb der tschetschenischen Gemeinde war der Bursche nie beliebt: "Weil er spielt; das ist nicht in Ordnung", sagen Landsleute, die hier in Kärnten ein anständiges Leben führen. (Kronen Zeitung 13.10.2012: 22)

Members of „Chechen Elites“ have not been quoted at all. The majority (10 of 12) of Chechen quotes is accompanied by quotes of other people. Given the circumstances that most of the articles in the Krone-sample are part of the category “sensational and crime reports”, it doesn’t come as a surprise that the most cited group in both sample years is the police. In addition lawyers, judges and politicians are cited frequently.


Q6 "Das sind Zustände wie auf dem Balkan!", so ein Klagenfurter Polizist. (Kronen Zeitung 10.07.2006: 17)

Q7 "Die Mentalität dieser Leute ist nicht nachzuvollziehen", urteilt ein erhebender Beamter über die Vorgänge in der Gustav Kramer-Straße. (Kronen Zeitung 03.02.2012: 22)


In their quotes members of the elites describe (Q5) and evaluate situations (Q6). They give their opinions on the Chechen community (Q7) and recommend which actions should be taken (Q8).

Apart from the quotes made by members of the elites, the category “Other citizens” has a remarkably high number in the Krone:


The quotes range from eye-witnesses (Q9) or victims describing events to random people’s opinions and concerns regarding crimes which happened close to them. In Q10 for instance the Krone quotes a woman in a report about a murder case. She is neither a witness, nor does she stand in any relation to the crime. The woman appears as a random concerned citizen, verbalizing her fear in the aftermath of the crime and forecasting undefined problems in the future. Similar passages appeared occasionally in the Krone.

5.1.6.2 Die Presse

Table 9: Direct quotes in the Presse in 2006 and 2012

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Categories</th>
<th>2006</th>
<th>2012</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Politicians</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chechens</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Experts on Chechnya</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>School staff</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Police</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Representatives of refugee organisations</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jurists</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Others</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>19</strong></td>
<td><strong>33</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The figures reveal that the number of quotes doubled between 2006 and 2012. For the “Presse” quotes, the categories “other citizens” and “Sport trainers” were redundant. Unlike the Krone-articles, a large part of the Presse-sample consists of reports on Chechens in international situations. This might explain why the category “police”, being one of the largest in the Krone is one of the smallest in the Presse.

Table 8 depicts that there was a rise in the category “Chechens” in 2012 compared to 2006. This difference was caused by a detailed report where former asylum seekers who returned to Chechnya were interviewed. (cf. Die Presse vom 2012-07-01, 4,5) 6 of the 10 Chechen quotes were counted in that report:

Q2 "Die tschetschenischen Behörden beschuldigten meinen Ehemann, mit den Rebellen unter einer Decke zu stecken. Das stimmt aber nicht. In Wirklichkeit ist das Leben hier gefährlich. [...] Man weiß nie, was die Behörden mit uns vorhaben. Korruption ist überall, Gesetze zählen nichts." (Die Presse 01.07.2012: 4,5)

Compared to the same category in the Krone these quotes are longer and more descriptive. Among the six quoted Chechens in this report are also a lawyer, defending a Chechen returnee and the head of Chechnya’s Department of Foreign Relations who is close to president Kadyrov:

Q3 Eine schwierige Aufgabe, nicht weil sein Boss in vielen Ländern eine Persona non grata sei, so Chadschimuradow, der Kadyrow als "unkonventionellen" Politiker preist. Schwierig vor allem deshalb, weil die tschetschenischen Flüchtlinge in Europa so viel "Falschinformationen" über die kleine Republik verbreiteten: "Das ist für sie ja die einzige Möglichkeit, damit ihr sie aufnehmen." Auf die Frage, wie viele der Flüchtlinge in Europa ihre Geschichten denn erfunden hätten, antwortet er: "Gibt es 101 Prozent?" (Die Presse 01.07.2012: 4,5)

Also in the rest of the quotes, members of Chechen elites are cited, like Kadyrov (1) and Prime Minister of Chechnya exile government Achmed Zakaev (3). Rebel leader and terrorist Šamil Bassaev was also cited twice. Among the reports of the 2006 sample is an interview with Zakaev, which was coded as one quote. Chechens living in Austria, which dominate the Chechen quotes in the Krone, were only quoted thrice. One example is the following section from a good-will report, where a Chechen boy talks about his flight to Austria:


Apart from the sections where statements of Kadyrov, Karimov and Bassaev were cited, Chechen quotes in the Presse-sample are descriptive and help to define events. In two cases (Zakaev-Interview: "Wladimir Putin will uns auslöschen" in: Die Presse 2006-07-12: 5; "Heimkehr nach Tschetschenien - ins Gefängnis" in: Die Presse 2012-07-01: 4,5) Chechens quotes were the main sources on which reports were based on. As can be seen from the table, politicians were also quoted in reports on Chechens:
Similar to the Krone citations, these quotes are evaluative, descriptive or/and serve as a source of information. Like in Q4 among the quoted are politicians from the right wing parties FPÖ (4) and BZÖ (2), but also local politicians and representatives of ministries. Interviews were made with the Ukrainian author Andrej Kurkov on the poisoning of Aleksandr Litvinenko in 2006, who commented on Chechens thrice (“Putin will ein demokratischer Stalin sein” in: Die Presse vom 11.12.2006: 4) and FPÖ-politician Johann Gudenus about his trip to Chechnya in 2012. (“Asyl ist ein Recht auf Zeit” In: Die Presse 18.02.2012: 5)

5.2 Chechen Stereotypes

H10: Stereotypes about Chechens will be mostly negative. In 2012 the usage of stereotypes increases compared to 2006.

The following attributional relations have not been counted among the stereotypes, because they are not relevant for the study: “Chechens are from Chechnya”; “Chechens are from the Russian Federation”, “Chechens speak Chechen/Russian” “Chechens are refugees/asylum seekers in Austria”.

Table 10: Stereotypes in the Krone and the Presse in 2006 and 2012

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Stereotypes</th>
<th>Krone 06</th>
<th>Presse 06</th>
<th>Krone 12</th>
<th>Presse 12</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>total</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Articles containing Stereotypes</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 9 shows the number of stereotypes mentioned in the sample and the amount of articles containing stereotypes. Some reports contained more than one stereotype. The highest number of stereotypes per article (6) was found in an interview with right-wing politician Johann Gudenus of the freedom party in the Presse of 2012. The amount of stereotypes used in the Krone significantly decreased from 2006 to 2012.
The most frequent attributes used to describe Chechens in general were the semantically related terms aggressive, pugnacious and violent. The stereotype that every Chechen men carries a knife with him, formulated in Q6, also belongs here. In the Krone of 2006 this stereotype was spotted 8 times in 4 articles, thereof once in a headline (Q1). The Krone of 2012 contained one such statement and the Presse of 2012 contained 5.

Q1 Hohes Aggressionspotenzial: Tschetschenen im BZÖ-Visier (Kronen Zeitung 22.08.2006: 12)

Q2 Kärntens Flüchtlingsbeauftragter Gernot Steiner hat in einem Radiointerview auch eingeräumt, dass "von der tschetschenischen Volksgruppe ein aggressives Verhalten ausgeht." [...] Doch was machen sie im friedlichen Gastland? Sie benehmen sich kriegerisch. . . (Kronen Zeitung 22.08.2006: 12)

Q3 Es gibt Dolmetscher, die sich nicht mehr trauen, zu arbeiten - weil Tschetschenen so gewaltbereit sind. (Kronen Zeitung 12.04.2012: 18)

Q4 Seither herrscht Angst nicht nur in Fischl sondern in ganz Klagenfurt. Asylanten vornehmlich aus Tschechien könnten weitere Gewaltakte setzen, lautet die Befürchtung. (Die Presse 24.08.2006: 13)

Q5 "Kärnten soll gewaltfrei bleiben!", betont Steiner. Asylwerber würden selbstverständlich in Kärnten weiter im Sinne der Genfer Konvention Schutz erhalten, allerdings müssten sie sich hier ordnungsgemäß verhalten. Tschetschenen allerdings will man keine mehr aufnehmen - zur Sicherheit für die einheimische Bevölkerung. (Kronen Zeitung 23.08.2006: 12)

In in Q1 to Q4 the stereotype is used explicitly. In the last part of Q2 the personal pronoun “they” was used instead of “Chechens”. Such sections were counted if they contained generalizations about Chechens. In Q4 the stereotype is used implicitly. Gernot Steiner, Commissioner for refugees, was quoted, demanding that Carinthia should stay free of violence. Nevertheless they would still accept refugees. However in order to keep the local population safe they wouldn’t accept Chechens anymore. By stating this, he implies that the local population wouldn’t be safe with Chechen refugees present and hints that “free of violence” in this case means “free of Chechens”.

In three cases Chechens appeared in connection with stereotypic statements about foreigners. Despite being interesting, they haven’t been counted in table 10, because they didn’t concern Chechens primarily. One section has already been described in the section court reports (Der Dialog zwischen Richterin Margit Kreuzer und einem Angeklagten war beispielhaft: "Was machen Sie beruflich?" "Nichts." "Seit wann?"
"Immer schon." In: Kronen Zeitung 12.10.2012: 27), another one was found in the Krone-sample of 2006:


A single Chechen perpetrator is presented as an example for the generalisation, that asylum seekers are aggressive towards refugee aid workers in Tirol.

In the Presse interview with Johann Gudenus the stereotype of Chechens being violent appears three times (highlighted by the author):


Das stimmt ja auch.

Dann gilt das auch für den tschetschenischen Präsidenten, Herrn Kadyrow, den Sie getroffen haben.

Nein. Von den Tschetschenen, die in Österreich Asylwerber sind, geht vergleichsweise die größte Gewalttätigkeit aus. Das hat uns Ramsan Kadyrow bestätigt. (Die Presse 18.02.2012: 5)

Interesting is that Gudenus perceives Chechens in Austria as more violent compared to Chechens in Chechnya. The interviewer in Q6 approaches stereotypes in a critical way. The same can be said about most stereotypes in the Presse (apart from Q4). In the Krone only one example for a critical approach towards a stereotype has been found in a letter to the editor:

Q7 Der Kreml hat es mittlerweile beinahe vollends geschafft, die Formel Tschetsche =Terrorist im russischen Vokabular zu verankern. (Kronen Zeitung 29.05.2006: 26)

The author criticises the establishment of the stereotype “Chechens are terrorists” in Russia. Apart from Q7 this stereotype hasn’t been found in the sample.

The stereotype of Chechens being violent appeared once in a slightly more positive meaning as “Chechens are strong/good at fighting”, in the following quote of a boxing-teacher:


Sections mentioning that „Chechens have a different kind of mentality/ are not willing to integrate“, could be found three times - thereof once in the Presse. There the “not
willing to integrate" is seen as an effect of Chechens being Muslim in combination with them coming from an extremely patriarchal society:


Different formulations of “Chechens cause troubles” could be spotted three times in the Krone. Variations of “Chechens are economic refugees" appeared 5 times, two of which in the Presse Interview with Johann Gudenus. After “Chechens are violent”, “Chechens are Economic refugees" is the second leading stereotype in the sample. Despite having stated that “Chechens are refugees/asylum seekers in Austria”, “Chechens are economic refugees” has been categorized as a stereotype. The reason for counting it is that the term “economic refugee” has a pejorative meaning. It is frequently used in debates about asylum and implies asylum abuse as well as the accusation of exploiting the welfare system in Austria. Also it implies that Chechens are not persecuted in Chechnya and the republic is safe for return. (cf. Stötzel, Wengeler 1995: 738; Münch 1993:105)

A significant number of stereotypes (18) co-occurs with quotations. In the Krone for instance, 10 out of the 14 stereotypes were formulated in direct quotations, five of them by politicians.

5.3 Structures of Argumentation

H9: Stereotypes about Chechens are used in argumentation schemes (e.g. political discourses about Chechens)

The most dominant discourses about Chechens, analysed in this chapter were initiated by right wing parties (The BZÖ in 2006 and the FPÖ in 2012). They were chosen because they focus solely on Chechens and appeared in both sample newspapers.
5.3.1 Chechen-Free Carinthia 2006

In the sample year 2006 I chose articles connected to the demand about a Chechen-free Carinthia that was raised by the right-wing party “Alliance for the Future of Austria” in the course of the Federal elections of that year. This political issue has been preceded by two incidents, which played a major role in that discussion. Both happened in August 2006:

- A murder case in Hallein: Some Chechens entered the apartment of Dagestani people. In the course of a brawl with weapons (knives and guns) a Chechen was shot. According to both newspapers motives for the crime remained unclear. (cf. Die Presse 19.08.2006)
- Brawl in Fischl-Park in the city of Klagenfurt:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Klagenfurt: Wild brawl with Chechen gang</th>
<th>Klagenfurt fights against violence of foreingers</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>There was a scuffle in Klagenfurt were Chechen teenagers beat up local children.</td>
<td>There was a scuffle between local and Chechen teenagers in Klagenfurt.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>It turned into a bigger brawl after the Chechen teenagers, according to witnesses, fetched a “hit squad” (Schlägertrupp). These hit squads were armed with baseball rackets and fence posts and started hitting also children.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Many people were injured.</td>
<td>Those involved had bruises (blaue Flecken) and other injuries (Blessuren)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Core contents differ slightly in the aspects described above (age of the Children, who beat up whom, “weapons”). The Krone report contains also information that isn’t essentially necessary for the course of actions, for example that the Chechens arrived by a BMW-car. Furthermore a woman is quoted criticising that the police had arrived far too late. (cf. Kronen Zeitung 19.08.2006: 14)
After this incident a political discourse about Chechens in Carinthia started, which was discussed in both sample newspapers.

5.3.1.1 Krone

5.3.1.1.1 Krieg im Gastland

Krieg im Gastland

Wer sich im Gastland nicht wie ein Gast benimmt, der hat hier nichts zu suchen!" Damit hat Landeshauptmann Jörg Haider Recht. Vor allem im Fall jener tschetschenischen Asylwerber, die bei uns in den vergangenen Tagen für skandalöse Szenen gesorgt haben. Kärntens Flüchtlingsbeauftragter Gernot Steiner hat in einem Radiointerview auch eingeräumt, dass "von der tschetschenischen Volksgruppe ein aggressives Verhalten ausgeht."

Nun handelt es sich bei Asylwerbern gemeinhin um Flüchtlinge; um Menschen also, die zu Hause verfolgt und bedroht werden; um Leute, die alles zurückgelassen haben und davongelaufen sind, weil sie keinen Krieg mehr wollen, weil sie Frieden suchen. Müsste man annehmen. Doch was machen sie im friedlichen Gastland? Sie benehmen sich kriegerisch... Die Szenen vom Klagenfurter Fischl-Park waren erschreckend; da wurde geprügelt, und als es endlich gelang, die Gewalttäter in die Flucht zu schlagen, holten diese "Verstärkung". Im Nu rückte diese an. Das sind Methoden wie im Krieg. Nicht vergessen darf man auch, dass die Polizei nur durch rechtzeitige Informationen und massive Präsenz heuer schon einen Bandenkrieg, den Tschetschenen anzetteln wollten, hatte verhindern können. Und dass in Salzburg so eine aufgebrachte Menge jetzt sogar einen Mord verübt hat. Wer Gewalt will und gewaltbereit ist, der sollte sein Recht auf Asyl eigentlich verwirkt haben. Es gibt genug Menschen, die wirklich Frieden suchen und glücklich wären, bei uns hier leben zu dürfen.

(Kronen Zeitung 22.08.2006: 1)

In the Krone-sample, there are five articles that deal with the incident at Fischl-Park and the call for a Chechen-free Carinthia by the BZÖ. The first one has been described above. With its catchy headline and the detailed description of the crime itself, it doesn’t particularly differ from other sensational and crime reports in the sample. However a few days later a report referring to the same incident, with the headline “war in the host country” (“Krieg im Gastland” in: Kronen Zeitung 22.08.2006: 12) was published. The author of the article compared the acts of the Chechens in Fischl Park with methods used in war ("[...] als es endlich gelang, die Gewalttäter in die Flucht zu schlagen, holten diese "Verstärkung". Im Nu rückte diese an. Das sind Methoden wie im Krieg." In: Kronen Zeitung 22.08.2006: 12) and connected it to other recent events, like the murder of Hallein and the prevented “gang-war” in Klagenfurt. These incidents were the basis of the article (2) for the following problem definitions:
Problem B is premised on a quote by Jörg Haider, stating that those who don't behave as guests in their host country have no business being there. This also indicates the solution (3) offered in the article, that violent refugees should be deprived of their refugee status. Problem C is partly based on a stereotype formulated in a quote of Carinthia’s Commissioner on Migration Matters. He was cited, saying that Chechen people behave aggressively (... "von der tschetschenischen Volksgruppe [geht] ein aggressives Verhalten aus [...][In: Kronen Zeitung 22.08.2006: 1]). The author underpinned this quote in the following section, repeating the stereotype with a different wording:

Q1 Nun handelt es sich bei Asylwerbern gemeinhin um Flüchtlinge; um Menschen also, die zu Hause verfolgt und bedroht werden; um Leute, die alles zurückgelassen haben und davongelaufen sind, weil sie keinen Krieg mehr wollen, weil sie Frieden suchen. Müsste man annehmen. Doch was machen sie im friedlichen Gastland? Sie benehmen sich kriegerisch… (Kronen Zeitung 22.08.2006: 1)

The first part of the citation shows apparent empathy with asylum seekers and refugees, who had to flee because of war to a peaceful country. The author then disclaims this statement by writing that against his/her good-will and understanding concept of refugees, they (-> stereotype) behave “warlike” in their host country. Together with the headline “war in the host country” this is the basis for problem A, that Chechens imported conflicts from their homeland to Austria. This argument was already spotted once before in an article about the Hallein murder-case. A member of the police was quoted saying “We won’t permit (3) that asylum seekers burden us with their conflicts (1)” (“Wir werden es nicht zulassen, dass uns Asylwerber mit ihren Konflikten belasten.” In: Kronen Zeitung 23.08.2006: 10). The argument consists of a problem definition (1) and a rather unspecified solution.
Overall the author of “Krieg in Gastland” seems to agree (4) with the problem definitions, which he/she partly reproduces himself in Q1 and the headline. Quotes are used to underpin them and not questioned. The stereotype of violent Chechens, which is used twice in this article, posed difficulties in the coding process, as it oscillates between being a problem definition and one of its causes. On the one hand the stereotype is a conclusion drawn from exemplary incidents, like the brawl in Fischl. On the other hand the article implies that the “violent nature of Chechens” (underlined by quotes and interpretations of the author himself) causes such incidents.

5.3.1.1.2 Hohes Aggressionspotential: Tschetschenen im BZÖ-Visier

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Problem definition(s)</th>
<th>Cause(s)</th>
<th>Solution(s)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>A) Chechens are violent</td>
<td>Incidents in Fischl-Park and Hallein; violence of Chechens in refugee camps; Chechens are violent</td>
<td>Chechen-free Carinthia (BZÖ)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The incidents in Fischl and Hallein and violent behaviour of Chechens in refugee camps in Carinthia are listed as causes (2) for the following problem definitions (1) in this articles:
Again, the stereotype is part of the problem definition (A) and its cause (2). Already the headline inclines the stereotype is the cause for the BZÖ reacting. The argument in this report can be surmised in the following quote by Jörg Haider:

\[Q1\] "Diese Menschen mit einem derart hohen Aggressionspotenzial stören unseren sozialen Frieden. Damit muss Schluss sein, wir werden für ein tschetschenenfreies Kärnten eintreten." (Kronen Zeitung 22.08.2006: 12)

Due to their high aggression potential (1,2) Chechens threaten the social peace in Austria (2). On these grounds Carinthia should be free of Chechens (3). The solution offered here is much more radical than in the previous article, which demanded that violent Chechens should be deprived of their refugee status. Apart from calling for a Chechen-free Carinthia, a member of the BZÖ urges the mayor of Klagenfurt to intensify police control in the city.

The author seems to agree (4) with the problem definitions and the solutions by not questioning them. He/she however criticises the reaction of the BZÖ as being late, by using the word “finally” ("Für das BZÖ ein Alarmsignal, endlich zu handeln." In: Kronen Zeitung 22.08.2006: 12).

5.3.1.1.3 Haider wirft Tschetschenen raus

|   | Problem definition(s) | A. Chechens pose a threat to the local population in Carinthia  
B. Chechens are violent |
<table>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>Cause(s)</td>
<td>Incident in Fischl-Park; Chechens are violent</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
| 3 | Solution(s)           | • Sending back Chechen perpetrators and families to the refugee camp Traiskirchen  
• Refusal to take on further Chechen asylum seekers  
• seeking out other criminal asylum seekers who can be sent a way |
| 4 | Evaluation            | Agreement                                                        |

Causes (2) are again the brawl in Fischl Park and the implication that Chechens are violent. In this article the solution (3) for the problem is the topic of the headline: 6 Chechen perpetrators and their families are deported to the refugee camp Traiskirchen. Other solutions suggested in the article are the refusal to take on any further Chechen asylum seekers, suggested by Carinthia’s Commissioner on Migration Matters, and seeking out other criminal asylum seekers that can be sent away. („Nach weiteren straffälligen Asylwerbern und Wiederholungstätern wird gesucht, um auch sie wieder dem Innenministerium zuzuschieben.“ In: Kronen Zeitung 23.08.2006: 12) Again the author agrees with 1, 2 and 3. He/she does not question that not only perpetrators but along with them, according to the principle of kin liability, their whole families should be sent back to Traiskirchen:

Q1 Zunächst hat Kärntens Flüchtlingsbeauftragter Gernot Steiner sechs Tschetschenen "verschickt": Ein 20-Jähriger, der bisher im Pirkerhof in Krumpendorf untergebracht war, gilt als Rädelsführer in der Szene. Auch eine dreiköpfige Familie, die in Feldkirchen lebt, und ein in Klagenfurt wohnender Jugendlicher mit seiner Mutter müssen raus aus dem Land. (Kronen Zeitung 23.08.2006: 12)

The affected Chechens are described in detail and without indications of compassion. The verb “verschicken”, which is used here to describe Chechens being sent to Traiskirchen, is usually not used for persons but for inanimate objects such as letters or packages. The peculiar word choice suggests that the author wanted to present this piece of information as being something humorous.
Klagenfurt kämpft gegen Gewalt von Ausländern


Der Anlass war marginal: Auf einem Spielplatz im Klagenfurter Stadtteil Fischl waren Ende letzter Woche ein paar Jugendliche wegen eines Milchpackls in Streit geraten. Es kam zur Rauferei, die Asylantenkinder riefen nach Zeugenaussagen einen "Schlägertrupp" zu Hilfe, der mit Stangen und Ästen auf die Einheimischen Kontrahenten einschlug.

An der Rauferei waren rund 20 Personen beteiligt, die blaue Flecken und andere Blessuren davon trugen. Seither herrscht Angst nicht nur in Fischl sondern in ganz Klagenfurt. Asylanten vornehmlich aus Tschetschenien könnten weitere Gewaltakte setzen, lautet die Befürchtung.


"Anpassung an Lebenskultur"


Er verweist auf das Beispiel Paduas, wo sich der Bürgermeister gezwungen sah, um eine Siedlung gewaltbereiter Immigranten eine Mauer errichten zu lassen. "So weit dürfen wir es erst gar nicht kommen lassen", sagt Scheucher im Gespräch mit der "Presse".


In Fischl sind jetzt, besonders bei Nacht, verstärkt Polizeistreifen unterwegs. "Die meisten der Kollegen sind in Zivil," berichtet der Oberst, "weil sie auf diese Art leichter mit der Bevölkerung ins Gespräch kommen." Denn die Exekutive will herausfinden, ob die Auseinandersetzung am Fischer Spielplatz wirklich ein Einzelfall war oder "ob sich etwas zusammenbraut". Der Bürgermeister hat die zuständige Abteilung beauftragt, das Streetworking in Randgruppen der Gesellschaft zu verstärken. Denn er ist überzeugt davon, dass man im Gespräch so mancher Gewalt vorbeugen kann.

Sprachkurse verstärken

Im Gegensatz zum Landeshauptmann glaubt er, dass sich die Asylantenfrage nicht als Wahlkampf-Thema eignet. Aber auch Scheucher warnt: "Wenn jemand in Österreich Asyl sucht, was man etwa Tschetschenen aufgrund der Situation in ihrer Heimat zugestehen muss, hat er sich den hiesigen Rahmenbedingungen anzupassen." Die Stadt will den Asylanten in Zukunft verstärkt Sprachkurse anbieten, um damit den wichtigsten Integrationsfaktor zu verstärken, denn: "Wenn man miteinander reden kann, ist vieles leichter." (Die Presse 24.08.2006: 13)
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Problem definition(s)</th>
<th>Cause(s)</th>
<th>Solution(s)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>A. Foreigners (mainly Chechen refugees) pose a threat to the local population in Carinthia</td>
<td>Brawl in Fischl-Park</td>
<td>- Chechen-free Carinthia (State Governor Jörg Haider)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>B. the BZÖ reacts</td>
<td></td>
<td>- Take measures in order to be able to deport criminal refugees quickly; Increased amount of language courses for refugees, because language is an important integration factor; Increased amount of street workers for marginal groups of society, in order to prevent violence with dialogue (Mayor of Klagenfurt Harald Scheucher)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
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<td></td>
<td>- Increased presence of the police, especially in plain clothes, who should find out if the incident in Fischl was an isolated incident (Commander of the city police Eugen Schluga)</td>
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<td>2</td>
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<tr>
<td>3</td>
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<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>Evaluation</td>
<td>Partial disagreement</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The first sentence addresses problem definition A. After describing the events in Fischl-Park, the fear that refugees, mainly from Chechnya could commit further acts of violence. Unlike the Krone-articles A is described as a fear and not a fact. Q1 then deals with the reaction of the BZÖ with their claim for a “Chechen-free Carinthia” by stating that Jörg Haider instrumentalizes the incident in Fischl as a topic for the forthcoming legislative elections. The word „Fressen“, in the phrase „ein gefundenes
Fressen für Landeshauptmann Jörg Haider”, is usually used to describe food for animals. The phrase contains the picture of an animal greedily devouring some food it found. In that context it is used to ridicule the following statement of State Governor Jörg Haider about freeing Carinthia from Chechens. Irony can also be detected in the phrase “Law-and-Order-philosophy of the party”, where the English pendant is used instead of the German “Recht und Ordnung”. Thereby the author ridicules the topos of “law and order” which is frequently used in argumentation patterns of right-wing populists², and is later in Q1 used by Haider himself. (cf. Woschitz 2011: 32f)

In Q2 the author indicates that the State Governor overreacted, comparing his quote to the one of the mayor, who evaluates the incident “slightly more relaxed”. Furthermore a member of the police is quoted, stating that the number of brawls in Klagenfurt of that year had decreased at 70% and suggests that the recent acts of violence are isolated incidents.

Overall the author questions problem definitions as well as solutions. As described above Jörg Haider is criticized for using asylum seekers as a topic for the legislative elections. The choice of words around the quotes of the other people is rather neutral.

5.3.2 FPÖ-Trip to Chechnya 2012

5.3.2.1 Krone

FPO-Fleißaufgabe gänzlich unnötig


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² Law and order topos: If a law stipulates or prohibits certain acts, they have to be observed or refrained. As soon as the populists are in power they will establish law and order. (Eismann 2002:191f)
The news coverage in the Krone concerning the FPÖ-mission to Chechnya was quite moderate, with the following short news item and a letter to the editor referring to that. The topic of the report is a discussion about asylum right for Chechens, initiated by a mission to visit President Ramzan Kadyrov in Chechnya. Already in the headline the trip is criticized as redundant. Kadyrov is described as a mass murderer, by dealing with him the Austrian politicians would give him a “clean bill of health” (Persilschein). Despite that asylum rights of Chechens in Austria are called into question. In the argumentation that follows that critique geographical background knowledge is demonstrated. As Chechnya is a part of Russia, Chechens can live in Russia outside Chechnya and thereby don’t have to seek asylum in Austria. Furthermore the author uses the Israilov-murder in Vienna to form the argument that Chechens are just as much in danger in Austria as they would be in Russia. The same argumentation pattern (Chechens can live in Russia) reappears a few months later in a short news item with almost the same choice of words. (cf. Kronen Zeitung 20.04.2012: 4)

| 1 | Problem definition(s) | A. Asylum right for Chechens; Repatriation  
B. Redundancy of FPÖ-mission to Chechnya  
C. Chechens threatened from Chechnya |
<table>
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<tr>
<th></th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>Cause(s)</td>
<td>FPÖ-mission to Chechnya; Chechens are Russian citizens; contract killing of Umar Israilov</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>Solution(s)</td>
<td>Chechens can live in Russia</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>Evaluation</td>
<td>Partial Disapproval</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

5.3.2.2 Die Presse

5.3.2.2.1 Gudenus traf Kadyrow: Geheime FPÖ-Mission nach Tschetschenien.

Die Rede ist von einer Plattform in Österreich, die die Rückkehr der Flüchtlinge unterstützt, und von einem tschetschenischen Kulturzentrum, das Traditionspflege und Integration in Österreich forciern sollte. Man habe weitere Gespräche vereinbart. "Vermittlung russischer Freunde"


Like in the Krone the FPÖ-Mission to Chechnya, in order to discuss the repatriation of refugees, was called into question by the Presse. Main critique points are that the trip was secretive, because the Austrian embassy has not been informed and controversial, due to the human right abuses Kadyrov is accused of.

| 1 | Problem definition(s) | A. Asylum right for Chechens; Repatriation  
           B. Chechens threatened from Chechnya  
           C. Chechens are economic refugees  
           D. Chechens are dangerous |
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>Cause(s)</td>
<td>FPÖ-Mission to Chechnya; Kadyrov-agents in Austria</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>Solution(s)</td>
<td>Cooperation with Chechnya in dealing with refugees; Chechen cultural centre in Austria to enforce integration (FPÖ)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>Evaluation</td>
<td>Partial Disapproval</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

According to the Office for the Protection of the Constitution he maintains a network of 300 agents in Austria in order to threaten Chechen refugees. As already mentioned in 5.1.3.5 the issue of Kadyrov-agents in Austria appears several times in the Presse of
2012. The FPÖ is criticized for not addressing this problem on their trip. In Q1 stereotypic statements of FPÖ members are cited:


The argument in the Presse (due to the Kadyrov-network in Austria Chechen refugees are threatened even in Austria) calls the argument of the FPÖ in Q1 (Kadyrov doesn’t pose a threat to Chechens, that is why most Chechens in Austria are economic refugees) into question. When citing the stereotype that Chechens are violent, the word violent is set under quotation marks, indicating that the authors disapproval with the statement.

5.3.2.2.2 “Asyl ist ein Recht auf Zeit”

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Problem definition(s)</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
<td>A. Asylum right for Chechens; Repatriation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>B. Chechens threatened from Chechnya; Safety of Chechnya</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>C. Chechens are economic refugees</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>D. Chechens are dangerous</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>Cause(s)</td>
<td>FPÖ-Mission to Chechnya; Kadyrov-agents in Austria;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>FPÖ-press release “Chechens are dangerous” (Tschetschenen sind gefährlich);</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>Solution(s)</td>
<td>Repatriation of Chechens to Chechnya</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Chechen cultural centre in Austria to enforce integration (FPÖ)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>Evaluation</td>
<td>Disapproval</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The interview touches a big variety of issues around the FPÖ-mission itself, starting with Chechen stereotypes formulated in a FPÖ-press release with the title „Chechens are dangerous“ over the discussion about the on FPÖ-side criticised right for asylum for Chechens to solutions the FPÖ would offer for their problem definition. Stereotypes,
which are questioned by the interviewer, are used in argumentation schemes of the politician. How the interview questions are composed implies the critical attitude of the interviewer towards Gudenus and generally disagrees with what he is saying (Questions highlighted by the author):

**Sie wollen anerkannte Flüchtlinge nach Tschetschenien abschieben?**
*Sicher. Man muss fragen: Liegt der Verfolgungsgrund noch vor? Kadyrow sagt, dass er viele Leute, die er früher vielleicht verfolgt hat, nicht mehr verfolgt.*

**Das glauben Sie ihm?**
*Der Herr Kadyrow ist nun einmal der legitime Herrscher Tschetscheniens. Ich werde ihm diese Aussagen glauben müssen.*
(Die Presse 18.02.2012: 5)

The disapproval seems to be mutual as the right-wing politician also questions facts presented in the questions (Questions highlighted by the author):

**Wenn es kaum politische Verfolgung gibt, warum sind laut Verfassungsschutz 300 Kadyrow-Agenten in Österreich?**
*Stimmt das?*

**Sie selbst haben die Abschiebung der Agenten gefordert.**
*Wenn es sie gibt, sind sie als Erste abzuschieben.*
(Die Presse 18.02.2012: 5)

Another article with similar content and argumentation patterns as in XX was published in March 2013 with the title “The FPÖ wants to withhold the right to asylum from Chechens”. (“Die FPÖ will Tschetschenen Asyl entziehen”. In: Die Presse 24.03.2012: 4)

5.3.3 Illegal Holidays in Chechnya 2006

5.3.3.1 Krone

Sind Tschetschenenflüchtlinge auf illegalem Heimaturlaub?

Ungereimtheiten insofern, als von Flüchtling keine Rede sein kann, wenn ein Tschetschen jetzt Urlaub in seiner Heimat macht und dann als "Flüchtling" nach Österreich zurückkehrt.


This short news item was published asking in its headline whether Chechens refugees in Austria are illegally traveling to Chechnya for holidays. The question was answered in the affirmative. The author refers to a statement of a spokesman of the Austrian Ministry of the Interior, who according to the report confirmed that several hundred refugees went to Chechnya and back to Austria during their asylum procedures. The
article explains that this is possible because they provide incorrect names when applying for asylum in Austria and use their real names when they visit Chechnya. No solutions for the problem definitions are offered. 1 and 2 are not questioned by the author, suggesting that he approves of both.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>1</th>
<th>Problem definition(s)</th>
<th>A. Violation of the asylum law by Chechen refugees in Austria (“Holidays” in Chechnya)</th>
<th>B. Chechens use incorrect names when applying for asylum in Austria</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>Cause(s)</td>
<td>Statement from the Austrian Ministry of the Interior</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>Solution(s)</td>
<td>-</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>Evaluation</td>
<td>Approval</td>
<td></td>
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</tbody>
</table>

5.3.3.2 Presse

Die Presse 27.07.2012: 10

The main difference to the corresponding Krone-report is that here the source for the problem definition is not the Austrian Ministry of the interior, but a FPÖ-politician Gudenus, who claims to have verified information that thousands of refugees go back to their countries for summer holidays. The information is rebutted by the Austrian Ministry of the Interior, who didn’t confirm the suspicions raised by the FPÖ.
<table>
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<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Problem definition(s)</th>
<th>A. Violation of the asylum law by Chechen refugees in Austria (“Holidays” in Chechnya)</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>Cause(s)</td>
<td>Statement of the FPÖ; Austrian Ministry of the Interior</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>Solution(s)</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>Evaluation</td>
<td>Disapproval</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
6 Discussion

I opened this paper with two questions. The first one was about how Chechens were depicted in each of the two sample newspapers. The second one was about possible differences of the image of Chechens in between 2006 and 2012.

After having tested the hypotheses by applying qualitative and quantitative methods I hereby present the following findings:

- There was no relevant quantitative de- or increase of the amount of articles between the two sample years in each of the sample newspapers. The findings suggest that the Israilov-Case, that received massive media coverage (see 1.6) between 2009 and 2011, didn’t lead to an increase of reports about Chechens in 2012. Hypothesis number 1 is thereby falsified. The fact that both sample newspapers published the same number of articles (around 80 in the Krone and around 30 in the Presse) in 2006 and 2012 could be purely coincidental. In order to find out more about the quantity of articles about Chechens per year, additional sample years would have to be considered.

- As suggested in hypothesis 2, in the tabloid paper Chechens appear mostly in local contexts. In other words, the news coverage about Chechens in the Krone concerns mainly Chechens in Austria. Against that background hypothesis 2 can be verified for the Krone.

- Within the five topical categories most of the reports in the Krone sample are sensational and crime reports. Subtracting the sensational reports and having a closer look at the types of criminal reports (table 5) reveals a slight increase of reported incidents in 2012. Articles about theft cases tripled in that year. International reports are generally low. Also the number of good will-reports, which was already below 10 in 2006, further decreases in 2012. Cases of minor theft, which are quite popular in 2006 nearly vanish from the agenda in 2012 in favour of reports about organized crime.

- On a quantitative level the majority of articles in the Presse in both sample years were categorized as international reports, though a significant decrease in that category for the benefit of the others, is clearly visible in the second sample year. Examining these international reports on a qualitative level in 5.1.2 revealed that most of them were related to Austrian contexts in one way or another. That indicates a thematic shift in the Presse towards topics
concerning Chechens in Austria. This has been further underpinned in 5.1.3.5 where an increased amount of articles mentioning or focussing on the persecution of Chechens has been depicted. Those articles mainly cover the presence of the Kadyrov network in Austria and the situation of Chechen returnees in Chechnya/the Russian Federation. Quantitative indicators also speak for that tendency. On the one hand the increased use of ethnonyms (+32% in 2012) assessed in 5.1.1. suggests an intensification of the discourse about Chechens in the second sample year. On the other hand the high amount of times where Chechens have been referred to as “asylum seekers” or “refugees” in 2012 (40 in 2012 compared to 17 in 2006), hint towards a shift regarding Chechens in the refugee context. (see 5.1.4.2). Against that background hypothesis 4, that Presse articles focus on international context, can only partly be verified. Hypothesis 3, however, can be fully verified because articles about Chechens in Austria do increase.

- The categories “court reports” and “overreaction” only appeared in the Krone. This doesn’t come as a surprise given the high amount of sensational and crime reports. Chechens overreacting appear most of the time in brawl situation. Reasons for the overreaction are presented as minor. Due to that Chechens appear as some kind of uncontrollable threat, reacting violently without any understandable indication. In court reports Chechen are presented either as uncooperative defendants or/and liars who don’t show any sense of guilt. In some rare sections a different concept of law of Chechens is implied either explicitly or implicitly.

- The code “cultural specifics” had overall very low results. Religious beliefs of Chechens were hardly ever mentioned, and if so only in connection with religious extremism or Islamist terrorism. The latter was only found in International reports. As already mentioned in 5.1.3.4 since 2013 Chechens from Austria start to appear more often in the sample newspapers as Jihadists in Syria. That is why a further study of the depiction of Chechens from 2013 onwards might provide interesting findings regarding the discourse about Chechens in Austria.

- Corresponding to hypothesis 4 most Chechens in the Krone appeared in negative active roles, as perpetrators. Male Chechens hardly ever appear in positive roles (e.g. as sportsmen). Some male victims of violence were not
coded as positive, for instance if the injuries were self-afflicted and/or if low sympathy was expressed for them (e.g. in a brawl). Chechen refugees in flight situations were, unlike what was expected in hypothesis 4, often depicted negatively. Due to that they were coded as negative or neutral. Against that background hypothesis 4 can only be partly verified.

- An interesting finding is that of the few positive roles most apply to women, who appear for instance as victims of domestic violence (mainly in 2006), or show morally right behaviour (active). Also in the Presse sample women were rarely spotted (only a few in 2012). Overall women seldom appear in the whole sample, which is why Hypothesis 6 can be verified here.

- The Presse hypothesis 4 cannot be fully verified. Like in the Krone the majority of Chechens appear as perpetrators (active negative). Positive active and passive roles increase in the second sample year, where the focus of reports shifted from international reports to topics that concern Chechens in Austria.

- Chechens are quoted in both newspapers, but overall quotes of what Van Dijk calls “white elites”, predominate. Many politicians and - especially in the Krone - many members of the police are cited. The nature of Chechen-quotes significantly differs in both newspapers. In the Krone most of those quotes are short shocking comments, which didn’t help to define the situation. In the Presse, however, Chechen quotes are longer and more descriptive. Also members of Chechen elites were cited (e.g. Achmed Zakaev). On a quantitative level, Van Dijk’s thesis that members of ethnic groups are rarely cited, is also true for the present sample. However in the Presse not only “white elites” but also Chechens help to define and describe events. (cf. Van Dijk 2009: 26f)

- As suspected in hypothesis 8 most stereotypes about Chechens are negative. In fact there was only one stereotype (“Chechens are strong/good at fighting”) which didn’t have a totally negative meaning. Variations of “Chechens are violent” were throughout the most dominant ones. In 2012 the stereotype “Chechens are economic refugees” started to appear, connected to the discourses analysed in 5.3.2 and 5.3.3. A high number of stereotypes appears in quotes of members of the elites (e.g. politicians, refugee aid workers, police, etc.). The authors of the articles hardly ever use stereotypes without a reference to a member of those elites. Similar stereotypes appear in both
newspapers, but their usage differs significantly. In the Presse stereotypes are most of the times thematised and approached critically, like in the interview with Gudenus (see 5.3.2.). In the Krone the stereotype often function as the cause for an incident (see 5.3.2) in an argumentation scheme. Generally they are not questioned.

- Overall stereotyping is rare in the sample. The findings above which concern the Krone sample suggest that quantity of negative contexts in which Chechens appear provides an environment where stereotypes are likely to arise because they fit in the dominant discourse.

The findings above which concern the Krone sample suggest that the high amount of sensational and crime reports provide reference points which back stereotypes like “Chechens are violent” with numerous stories about Chechens behaving violent. Thus I hypothesise that tabloid papers such as the Krone provide an environment where stereotypes are more likely to be accepted than for instance in the Presse. Austrian criminal statistics only provide limited information on the nationality of perpetrators, not on Chechens specifically anyway (cf. Pilgram, Fuchs, Leonhardmair 2012: 4). Due to that I found no empirical data on the criminality of Chechens or migrants from the Russian Federation. While I suspect that Chechens are overrepresented in the crime reports in the Krone, I don’t have proof to back that assumption.

Despite the fact, that I can’t jump to conclusions concerning the effect of sensational and crime reporting based solely on a textual analysis, I want to utter some final thoughts on that topic. As already mentioned in the introduction, Van Dijk stated that especially in low contact areas between migrants and the local population, the local population gets their information about those groups primarily from media. (cf) A report about the kind of information criminal statistics in Vienna can provide in terms of migrants and foreigners goes even further. The authors state that even in cities people avoid contact with areas or persons which they perceive as foreign or strange. The reason for that would be that this contact with the “unknown” often comes with a feeling of anxiety and insecurity. A person in such a stressful condition might misinterpret situations and overreact (e.g. call the police) more easily than in a calm state. The authors expect that by tackling the fear of foreigners and encouraging cross cultural-understanding more, such conflicts (e.g. caused by a lack of communication) could be
solved without the aid of the police (cf. Pilgram, Fuchs, Leonhardmair 2012: 39). Negative stereotypes and prejudices about certain groups of people work against that goal.
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9 Abstract

As a consequence of the flight waves in the course of the Second Chechen War to the European Union, a big Chechen community settled down in Austria. Chechens started to appear frequently in Austrian news and became an object of public discourse. There are many negative stereotypes connected to Chechens in Russian society. Due to that I wanted to find out how Chechens are depicted in Austria. I chose a tabloid (Kronen Zeitung) and a quality newspaper (Die Presse) to compare in this master thesis. The sample consists of 225 reports about Chechens which were analyzed using mixed approach of quantitative and qualitative content analysis after Philipp Mayring. The aim of the study is to capture the range of the discourse (e.g. contexts and roles in which Chechens appear; Chechen stereotypes) about Chechens in the sample newspapers and to see if this discourse changes between the sample years 2006 and 2012. One of the results was that Chechen stereotypes were generally rare in the sample, but often coincided with political debates about Chechens, which were described in the reports. Several differences between the sample years and the sample newspapers could also be spotted.