Critical discourse analysis of press coverage on Islamist terrorist attacks in the USA, France, and Denmark

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1. INTRODUCTION

The core thematic of this paper is the analysis of norms and values embedded in press reports on terrorist attacks. How are words used to affect readers' political behavior and their behavior as citizens and towards other people? What kinds of power constructions are behind the discourses?

Many scholars claim that the Al-Qaida attacks in New York on 11 September 2001 marked the beginning of a new era in world politics. As Nacos (2002:14) puts it, it is the era of “mass-mediated terrorism”. After September 11, 2001 there have been numerous studies on terrorism and its communicative dimensions (Rubin, 2009). Perhaps unsurprisingly, much of the academic research on terrorism, emotions and politics related to it has its origin in the United States. Terrorist attacks spread fear and anxiety among populations. Some crises can be avoided; however there are still crises that are inevitable. Natural disasters fall into that category, but also human-caused crises. Some scholars even suggest that crises are occurring with greater frequency and causing more harm than they used to (Perrow, Seeger, Sellnow, & Ulmer, as cited in Sellnow & Seeger, 2013).

Falkheimer (2014) points out that the worldwide threat of terrorist attacks has increased since 2003. However, most of the attacks don’t occur in the West. Moreover, the main course of terrorism in the West was not militant Islam, most of the attacks were caused by right-wing extremists and other extremist movements (Institute for Economics & Peace, 2015). Therefore it is overwhelmingly interesting to look into the foundations of public fear and political “fear-mongering”.

Media coverage of terrorism has exponentially increased since 9/11 (Miller & Mills, 2010:14). The rise of sensationalism and thus emotion-laden rhetoric in news reporting (Nacos, Bloch-Elkon, & Shapiro, 2007) has an impact on audience’s minds. This, coupled with the rise of right-wing nationalist movements in several Western countries, and the heavily accelerated migration from the war-torn Middle-East is bringing up tensions and confrontation between people with different sociopolitical stances. Therefore it is crucial to thoroughly analyze the root causes and motivations of juxtapositions and create awareness of the effects that “innocent” news texts can have. Whether or not a publication is more or less steered by the government and officials of the country it operates in, the
question of so called objectivity is always relevant. According to Friedman (2011) most of the information on terrorism that U.S. citizens receive comes from politicians and government organizations that might even have an interest in reinforcing excessive fears (Friedman, 2011).

Hoffmann (2004) claims that humanity is in a universe of fears which is pervasive and global. Globalization and technological advancements spread information which can also make us fear more. Also epidemics, narcotics and weapons travel the world, and so do terrorists. Hoffmann argues that the civil society has entered the field of warfare that previously was the assigned to states and their armies. In the past, drivers for terrorist acts were local, for example in West Germany in the 1970s. Hoffmann further cites Hobbes concluding that we are now in a state of war against one another.

The dependence of terrorist groups on propaganda and media propagation of their activities and power raises ethical concerns for the media industry and how to manage the coverage of terrorist attacks (Slone, 2006). The news media is like a double-edged sword; on the one side the traditional purpose of news media is to inform people, but the extensive reporting on terrorist attacks promotes terrorists’ goals by giving them visibility, building their image and making them heard all over the world (Norris as cited in Falkheimer, 2014). Olsson, Nord and Falkheimer (2014) point out to the increased coverage of terrorist attacks and “hype” around terror, fear, and risks, which can be described as crisis exploitation. Indeed, the interface between media and terrorism has challenging ethical questions. These two parties have almost a symbiotic “win-win” relationship, as terrorists want their cause to be known, and the media is hungry for massive and dramatic stories with high news values, and it tends to focus on negative news (Mythen & Walklate, 2006).

All in all, it is obvious that terrorists are not the only ones dictating and using power, the coin has another side and it needs to be scrutinized carefully. The tool used is fear, a very strong and fundamental emotion that all humans share. Because fear of crime has a number of undesirable effects of its own, it is important to monitor its causes (Nellis & Savege, 2012). The inner feelings of a person cannot easily be known or even communicated authentically. Anxiety needs to be understood if we want to understand why people do the things they do (Pyszczynski, 2004). The same is the case with emotions that are shared by communities. They cannot be assessed in the same manner as more tangible phenomena, such as patterns of conflict, trade volumes or peace agreements (Bleiker & Hutchison, 2008).
After introducing the research problem and context, the following chapters will present interrelated academic studies on fear and terrorism. An overview of fear and how it affects humans will be given, and what kinds of conflict areas are coupled with fear and anxiety and the political sphere. The methodology part explains how embedded, yet powerful, signals effecting our perceptions can be figured out from news texts with the help of critical discourse analysis (CDA). The remaining part of this work deals with the discoveries of the analysis, and sets those findings in an academic, and also in a broader political context.
2. LITERATURE REVIEW

2.1. Islamist terrorism

Jihadism, Al-Qa’ida, and the Islamic State (ISIL) are the three movements under which Institute for Economics & Peace (2015) groups terrorist attacks that are executed "in the name of Allah". Schmid and Jongman (as cited in Bakker & de Graaf, 2014:2) constructed an overarching definition based on more than a hundred definitions. The definition starts off as “Terrorism is an anxiety-inspired method of repeated violent action, employed by (semi-) clandestine individual, group, or state actors, for idiosyncratic, criminal, or political reasons”. Terrorism can also be divided in three subgroups: state terrorism, referring to political violence, domestic terrorism, and global terrorism (Tuman, as cited in Falkheimer, 2014).

Terrorist attacks have, almost without exception, a very high news value. Spreading fear is a fundamental goal of terrorism, and as Jenkins argued in 1975 (as cited in Bekker & de Graaf, 2014:2), terrorism is a lot like theatre, it is desperately seeking attention. Also Laqueur (as cited in Falkheimer, 2014:54) said that publicity is what terrorists are after. Other communication goals that terrorists may have is to impact the public discussion, attracting new supporters, engaging in psychological warfare by tricking and misleading the opponent, and building a certain image, a form of public relations (Falkheimer, 2014). Louw (as cited in Falkheimer, 2014) concludes that Al Qaeda’s attacks in 2001 reached many of its goals; the perpetrators managed to create fear, anger, and convey a political message. The strikes were valuable adverts for supporters and potential new followers, and thus helped to build extremist Muslim identities. From another point of view, terrorism is an example of a primitive model of one-directional public relations, with just one aim that is exposure (Grunig and Hunt, as cited in Falkheimer, 2014).

Violent acts which one can call terrorism have occurred throughout history. However, terrorism experts claim that modern terrorism started 1968. In the 1960s Palestinian groups hijacked airplanes as a way to protest against the state of Israel and its politics. (Nacos, Bloch-Elkon, & Shapiro, 2007). The advent of terrorist group’s media relations was in the 1970s when the violent leftwing German Red Army Faction (RAF) even evaluated the generated press coverage of their actions (Rothenberger, as cited in Falkheimer, 2014:56).

2.2. “New” terrorism

David Rapoport (2001) is convinced that the 9/11 attacks started a new era of terrorism. The sheer destructiveness of 9/11 with the use of planes, and the resulted global state of
shock and impact on international relations were something new. According to Mueller (2010) there are two signals that back up Rapoport’s claim: the frequency of suicide bombings increased after the American presence in Afghanistan. On top of that, the number of beheadings has risen since the early 21st century. These two indicators thus can indeed be regarded as a qualitative difference compared to earlier decades. Jäckle and Baumann (2015) point out that brutalization based on the two previously mentioned indicators is very much geographically limited: in the 1970s, North America and West Europe were the main foci of terrorists, and in the following decade Central and South America were targeted. Middle East, South Asia, and Sub-Saharan Africa are increasingly victims since the beginning of the 1990s (Jäckle & Baumann, 2015). One can make a distinction between soft (human) and hard (military) targets. Mueller added, that the brutalization, i.e. number of casualties declined between 2008 and 2011. Further, Mueller (2010) says for all the attention it evokes, terrorism actually causes rather little damage, and the likelihood to become a victim of a terrorist attack is extremely low. What, on the other hand, is clear is the increased focus on publicity and attention. Mueller (2010) brings up another way to measure the brutality of terrorist attacks.

David Rapoport’s (2001) concept of Four Waves of terrorism is one of the most influential thoughts within terrorism studies. Moreover, Jackson (2007) says the notion of Islamist terrorism was first introduced by David Rapoport in 1984. Rapoport divided terrorism in four eras, starting with anarchist terrorism in the late 19th century, through Nationalist and Marxist phases to the current stage known as the religious wave. Parker and Sitter (2016) challenge the approach by conceptualizing different types of terrorism as strains, not as waves. Parker and Sitter argue that terrorists learn from other terrorists, and historical learnings and ideas are adapted into new attacks. Recent studies have interestingly questioned the notion of “new terrorism”. “Old” and “new” terrorism have more in common than alleged. One can also contest the allegation that “new terrorism” is motivated by extremist interpretation of religion (Jackson, 2007).

Furedi (2007) describes today’s focus on terrorism as a sort of obsession, which is part of a general fixation on negative and detrimental nature of the contemporary times. Furedi refers to a “culture of fear” that is prevalent in the Western world. Additionally, Mythen and Walklate (2006) argue that authorities, national institutions, and journalists promote the fear. According to Furedi, the narrative of fear is expanding, and the significance of fear and risks is disproportionate when considering the decrease of actual threats in the West during the 20th century. Widely spread anxiety leads to a feeling of powerlessness, and at the same time may enforce the idea that powerful displays of dominance are necessary to
fight back against the threat. Furedi says even that the Western countries are inviting terrorists to terrorize. Featherstone, Holohan, and Poole (2010) pose a similar question of why the tragic terrorist attacks in the past, such as the events of 1972 in Munich and actions by IRA, did not dramatically shake feelings of security. For one, the world was not yet globalized and networked as it is now. The attention and media impact of today’s terrorist attacks is incomparable with the strikes some decades ago. The toolkit for spreading messages is nowadays vast, and the technological progress enables broadcasting in real-time, not to mention the role of the Internet (Nacos, 2003).

2.3. Terrorism discourse

Jackson (2007) names aforementioned David Rapoport as the initiator of the subject, terrorism studies, in the mid-1980s. Terrorism experts continuing Rapoport’s work have connections to policymakers and thus the experts have the possibility to steer the public discussions, also via media. Narratives on Islamic terrorism often rely on the juxtaposition “we” against “them”, comparisons of black and white: West versus Muslim world, brutal versus human, violent versus peaceful, medieval versus modern, and so on. Often the labeling is mitigated by beginning the discourse with statements such as “most Muslims prefer a peaceful version of their faith”, and then continuing with material arguing the opposite.

The Islamic terrorism discourse is fueled by the orientalist scholarship, where many of the narratives and assumptions come from. The orientalist academia discussed the dramatic events that took place in the Middle East in the 1970s and 1980s. The narrative was again ignited by the 9/11 attacks and the following war on terror. Jackson also mentions Samuel Huntington’s essay “The Clash of the Civilizations” from 1993 that greatly influenced the Islamic terrorism discourse. The discourse is additionally inspired by the Islamic “other” that is framed either as violent, extreme, and animalist or exotic and exciting. These narratives can be seen as a mirror picture of the fears and prejudice stemming from the imperial era. Just like anti-terrorism legislations are backed up by protecting common good and values (Featherstone, Holohan, & Poole, 2010). This is the same as the war on terror narrated as a virtuous war, being on the good side, as during the Second World War and the Cold War (Jackson, 2007).

As contemporary terrorism is very often deemed as extremely bloody and destructive, Jackson (2007) postulates that the possibility of negotiation is categorically excluded. Islamic terrorism is deemed irrational and savage. Instead of trying to see the bigger picture and roots of the problem, aggressive counterstrikes, counter-terrorism, are
considered as the only way to response. Instead, eradication and forceful counter-terrorism are the only reasonable responses. The logic of this language implies that extermination is the only way of bringing terrorists “to justice”. Halliday (as cited in Jackson, 2007) argues that Islamist discourse, although often expressed in religious terms, is a form of secular or nationalist protest at external and internal domination and forms of exclusion.

Second statement is that Islamic terrorists’ operate in decentralized, flexible network structures, and take advantage of all the possibilities that the 21\textsuperscript{st} century high-tech can offer. This kind of narrative enforces the horrendous image of Islamic terrorism and makes citizens even more fearful. Discourse of terrorism with the prefix “Muslim” and “Islamist” has inevitably an impact on the myriad of Muslims all over the world who have nothing in common with terrorists. Jackson (2007) points out that a narrative that is rather prominent in today’s media is the pressure put on peaceful Muslims to take responsibility of the evil deeds of other Muslims and to somehow mend the problem among the so called Muslim community, without Western countries having to take part. Nacos and Torres-Reyna (as cited in Papacharissi & De Fatima Oliveira, 2008) demonstrated that the news media’s portrayal of Muslims and their religion grew more negative, unfair and stereotypical two years after 9/11 (following a remarkable short-lived increase in more thematic and reflective reporting during the immediate post 9/11 months). Terrorist attacks thus do not only contribute to fear in society at the time of the incident, they also – via the media – succeed in changing public attitudes for a longer period of time.

2.4. Logic of public fear

As previously described, discourse of terrorism seems to be confronting audiences everywhere. Yet it is difficult to say whether today’s people fear more than before because the meaning of fear itself is constantly changing (Furedi, 2007). Still, it is obvious that terrorist incidents have impacts on citizens.

Featherstone, Holohan, & Poole (2010) connect the rise of terrorist acts and the media coverage related to it with neo-liberal politics. Neo-liberalism has paved the way for a politics of fear that legitimates pressing legislative changes. The authors call The United States and the United Kingdom the forerunners of neo-liberalism, and those countries have examples of new legislations. Patriot Act was introduced in the United States after 9/11, and the UK Terrorism Bill was revised after the London bombings in 2015 (Featherstone, Holohan, & Poole, 2010).
What do fear and anxiety trigger in us? It worsens cognitive abilities, steers attention to threat and makes it more difficult to absorb information. Moreover, fear encourages risk-taking. (Eysenck as cited in Huddy, 2004). Mueller (2010) confirms the increase of risk-taking, also in the economic sense. In addition, fear is harmful for health. Fear and a heated political environment may even push political leaders farther away from moderate policies, not to mention citizens whose sociopolitical attitudes may be effected by anxiety (Huddy, Feldman, Taber, and Lahav 2005). As a matter of fact, Nacos, Bloch-Elkon, and Shapiro (2007) have observed that there’s a positive correlation between the frequency of terrorism news and the perception of terrorism being a big national issue. Group polarization impacts people’s judgment since “processes of social deliberation typically lead like-minded people to accept a more extreme version of the views with which they began (Sunstein, 2004:975). In groups, people spread and strengthen their fears and doubts.

Rubin introduces two narratives, the rage narrative and the fear narrative. According to the rage narrative people become angry, and revengeful, hate crimes and hate speeches are common. On the political level, military responses are commonplace. Huddy, Feldman, Taber, and Lahav (2005:606) confirm this, as the 9/11 attack resulted aggression over anxiety which “enforced Americans’ ‘basic desire’ to strike back instead of contemplation”. Fear narrative refers to post-crisis situation in which public fear rises to extreme levels. In addition, stressed citizens may be willing to give up some of their liberties and have them limited. For politicians a high level of public fear is an opportunity to gather people to support a specific political agenda (Rubin, 2009). Both narratives share the risk of intolerance towards “others”. Fear and anger are also key building blocks of Islamophobia (Rubin, 2009).

Back, Kufner, and Egloff (as cited in Rubin, 2009) proved that anger levels rose after the 9/11 attacks as the mass media catered for details, and peaks of aggression were detected right after President Bush’s speech and later after additional news reports. Nacos, Bloch-Elkon, and Shapiro (2007) made similar observations in Israel, where public fear increased after significant terror alerts. Another study from Israel showed that the audience displayed much higher post-test levels of anxiety, aggression, and stereotypes of enemies, compared to people who saw a neutral news coverage (Shoshani & Slone, 2008). The psychological agony was also proven in the United States, where surveys after 9/11 pointed out the substantial role media exposure played in triggering a post-traumatic stress disorder (Schuster et al. as cited in Gadarian, 2010).
2.5. Communicating fear

Sirin and Geva (2011) summarized the common reasons behind deploying emotional overtures: “Regarding political discourse and communication, several studies indicate that emotion-laden appeals, particularly on the issue of terrorism, are selectively deployed by political leaders, firstly, in order to re-boost their public approval ratings while suppressing criticism and dissent, secondly, to justify and garner support for their policy agenda (including counter-terrorism policies), and thirdly, to divert the attention of the public in times of domestic turmoil (Sirin & Geva, 2013:723).”

Authorities use emotional rhetoric when the support from their people is declining (De Castella & McGarty, 2011). Thus, engaging in emotional appeals is a chance to build up both personal and institutional credibility and liking. According to Boin (2009) skillful leaders know how to take advantage of emotional cues, and improve their own positions despite the challenging times. Nevertheless, Sirin and Geva (2013) remind of the risk of over-emotionality, as it can aggravate the psychological effect of terrorism and thus make it even more challenging for the State to manage the crisis. Also, manipulating a nation with dark scenarios and fear is a question of ethics (De Castella & McGarty, 2011:197).

Gadarian and her Threat Model (2010) demonstrate the media has an impact on public opinion when it communicates messages from political leaders and covers crises in graphic ways. Mass media has an impact on the psychological wellbeing of viewers (Slone 2006). However, the extent in which media coverage on terrorism creates anxiety and fear is disputed. Glassner (2004) argues that media and politicians are together in the process of creating fear, “fear mongering”. Sometimes the media extensively covers an incident as being part of a bigger trend, and then it “commercializes” the phenomenon, which in real life might not be as spectacular as it is presented. Emotionally appealing and salient events stand out easily (Sunstein, 2004). This is also a way of shifting attention away from issues and situations that really do matter. In referring to the situation in the US and the UK, Furedi (2007) claims the West is paralyzed by fear, fear that is communicated by the media. Another force driving anxiety is the individualization and privatization of fear. Furedi argues that fear used to be a more collective feeling, whereas now fears are fragmented.

News outlets tend to communicate messages and frames as the government wishes to during and after terrorist attacks due to the abnormal circumstances. This leads to a one-sided coverage, unbalanced reporting and highly descriptive news (Olsson, Söderlund, & Falkheimer, 2015). Nacos, Bloch-Elkon, and Shapiro (2007) even claim that the majority of the press was in alignment with the government and in favor of George W. Bush’s
military actions after 9/11. Most of the few reported anti-war statements came outside of the United States (Gadarian, 2010). Journalists, even when they are aware of what is going on, sometimes willingly hold back unpleasant truths in the name of “national security”. First, authorities may be unwilling to give out strategic information about terror plots in order to protect the citizens from terrorists and from public fear. In matters of foreign policy, the executive branch of government often controls access to information, and it can sometimes conceal or misrepresent reality without being challenged. The political opposition is often intimidated or co-opted. Second, journalists might publish fear-generating reports due to the credo that journalists are in the business of informing, no matter what the consequences might be (Bakker & de Graaf, 2014).

2.6. Rally-‘round-the-flag effect
A renowned theory related to military crisis situations and politics is the rally-‘round-the-flag effect, describing the sudden, steep spikes in the presidential approval ratings. In the past, the approval ratings of presidents increased – often significantly – during and after terrorist incidents and in the wake of military responses to terrorism (Nacos, Bloch-Elkon & Shapiro, 2007). A study of this effect is concentrated in the United States, and often refers to the US-American context. The rally effect after the 9/11 terrorist attack is, however, one of the relatively few strong examples of the syndrome, some others being Pearl Harbor in 1941 and the US participation in the Gulf War in 1991. The US invasion of Iraq in 2003 is an example of the rally-‘round-the-flag effect. As De Castella and McGarty (2011) argue, the fear content of both George W. Bush’s and Tony Blair’s messages kept increasing as the due date of the invasion approached. This phenomenon was most likely part of the communications strategy and aimed to preserve the public support.

Lambert, Schott, and Scherer (2011) disagree with the social psychological models that highlight the anxiety and desire for security as the drivers for rally-‘round-the-flag effect. The authors remind us of the fact that presidential approvals do not always go up when people are anxious, they go up only in case of a hostile and military crisis. The scholars see aggression as the prominent factor. People seek for retaliation and stand with their leader. This approach is backed up by Huddy, Feldman, Taber, and Lahav (2005). They conducted a telephone survey in the United States and observed a difference between the effects of anxiety versus threat. High levels of anxiety meant less support for military actions against terrorists, and equally less support for George W. Bush. The “anxious cluster” also preferred the country to isolate from others. Most of the respondents felt threatened instead of anxious, and vouched for Bush and his politics. Many citizens accept, sometimes reluctantly, the limitation of citizen rights because of fear. The
insecurity of everyday life contributes to the general discomfort and fear. Advocates of new anti-terror legislation say that only criminals are affected, and one has to stand up for the shared values and way of life. Politics of fear creates an atmosphere, where many citizens consent to almost any measures in order to feel secure (Featherstone, Holohan, & Poole, 2010).

During the aftermath of 9/11, Osama bin Laden and George W. Bush took advantage of the mass media to propagate fear messages. Media was contributing to the creation of hysteria (Kellner as cited in Nacos, Bloch-Elkon, & Shapiro, 2007). Official announcements and public statements emphasizing the risks of terrorism boosted public approval of Bush’s counter-terrorism measures, as well as his overall rating in general (Nacos, Bloch-Elkon, & Shapiro, 2007; Pyszczynski, 2004).

2.7. Terror Management Theory (TMT)

The theory of Terror Management (TMT) is a theory that helps to understand rally-round-the-flag effect (Lamber, Schott, & Scherer, 2011). The fundamental idea of TMT is that all human beings are afraid of their mortality, and aim to manage their fear of death. Therefore people try to sustain faith in specific understandings of the world and the universe. The faith provides a feeling of belonging and reason, and differs people from animals (Greenberg & Arndt, 2011). TMT was spelled out in the 1970 by combining insights from various subjects, such as evolutionary biology, psychoanalysis, and sociology. TMT has helped to discover how the awareness of the inevitable end affects our attitudes towards terrorism, among other things (Greenberg & Arndt, 2011).

Terror Management Theory’s first concept is of self-esteem. It states that people need to build faith in a worldview ensuring that they are vital contributors of the world order. Self-esteem serves as a critical anxiety-buffering function. The mortality salience hypothesis refers to the degree to which an individual is aware of his mortality, and the reaction of defense, when one’s own worldview is threatened (McBride, 2011). For example, if a devoted Christian is confronted with an act of violence, afterwards he will cling more tightly to his faith and have negative feelings towards the perpetrator and his incentives. A further aspect of TMT, in the context of terrorism, is the understanding that people afraid of death are drawn towards leaders and worldviews who can offer the most soothing answers and the feeling of belonging. Participating in a battle against “evil” gives the greatest feeling of escaping death (McBride, 2011). Seen from the perspective of terror management theory, fear is boosting increased nationalism, patriotism, intolerance for
dissent, hostility towards out-groups, and a desire for vengeance (Pyszczynski, 2004:840).

2.8. Fear Management
Bakker and de Graaf (2014:1) define fear management as “the efforts, undertaken by governmental institutions, prior, during and after situations of emergency and recovery, relating to a terrorist threat or attack, to manipulate the human capital in society in order to improve the positive, collective coping mechanisms of that society (Bakker & de Graaf, 2014).”

There are several factors that political leaders ought to think about, in regards to how to best manage citizens’ fears, alternatively how not to intensify public fear. As previously explained, terrorism encourages people to elect hardline governments and the support for heavy counter-terrorism policies grows (Huddy, Feldman, Taber, & Lahav, 2010). Terrorism-related research has linked the experience of anger and fear with increased authoritarianism (Hastings & Shaffer, as cited in De Castella & McGarty, 2011), ethnocentrism (Skitka, Bauman, & Mullen, as cited in Huddy, Feldman, Taber, & Lahav, 2005), close-mindedness (Huddy, Feldman, Capelos, & Provost, as cited in De Castella & McGarty, 2011), reliance on social stereotypes (Huddy, Feldman, Taber, & Lahav, 2005), and support for defensive actions towards an out-group (Eidelson & Eidelson; Lake & Rothchild, as cited in Huddy, Feldman, Taber, & Lahav, 2005). It should be obvious that the focus should be moved from fear management to emergency relief and protection, if the public fear is justified and serious risks exist (Warr, as cited in Nellis & Savage, 2012).

Counter-terrorism strategies are designed with the aim of preventing terrorist attacks from occurring, and limiting the physical impact. Fear management should be an integral part of counter-terrorism policies as well. Bakker and de Graaf (2014) made clear that recently organizations are taking crisis communications increasingly seriously.

According to Bakker and de Graaf, the notion of resilience, which is discussed in more detail below, is the key; fear management approaches need to be improved and formed, so that the construction of public resilience can be supported, and the attempts to control by fear wouldn’t be that successful. Bean, Keränen, and Durfy (2011) recall British and American administrations managing fear and apathy related to “existential threat” for some 70 years. Cold War united these countries in downplaying the nuclear threat of Soviets, whereas in the 21st century officials characterize terrorism as an unavoidable effect of globalization (Bean, Keränen, & Durfy, 2011).
Leaders may be unaware of exactly what is happening, since terrorist attacks are mostly unexpected and, in many countries, infrequent. First of all, terror attacks are communicative events. The supposedly trivial task of explaining what has happened, who the suspects are, what is the best response and reaction, is truly challenging. By “giving meaning”, is a way to frame the crisis and explain it to the citizens. Leaders have to create an image of being in control, and comfort the public even if they did not know what exactly has happened (Christense, Lægreid, & Rykkja, 2013). An additional challenge is communicating in an extremely mediated environment (Olsson, Söderlund & Falkheimer, 2015). In the early stages, the acquisition of reliable information and an overall picture of the incident is the highest priority. At the same time, an anxious audience has to be informed and kept up-to-date. There is also a real risk of the messages being misinterpreted or modified. Political leadership is not the only instance framing incidents (’t Hart, as cited in Bakker & de Graaf, 2014). Other players may channel alternative interpretations of higher or lesser value, and actions to be taken. Boin (2009) argues that this challenges leaders’ ability to lead and make decisions. Olsson, Söderlund, and Falkheimer (2015) stated, however, that authorities are in charge of framing the situation since media communicates messages coming from the leadership. Nacos, Bloch-Elkon, and Shapiro (2007).

The first official response is vital. The response has to be delivered as soon as possible in order not to severely threaten the first impression in the public’s eye. In the worst case, fear may cause epidemic problems and reduce the government’s ability to lead. Responses should be quick in order to ensure successful communication in the future (Sen & Egelhoff 1991, as cited in Coombs & Holladay, 2010). Something that is also crucial is to communicate with one credible voice instead of several (uncoordinated) representatives.

One approach to counter-terrorism, specifically fear management, comes from the Netherlands. Netherlands General Intelligence and Security Service initiated a research project to help manage fear after terrorist incidents. The study analyzed the communication strategies of all stakeholders. Eventually, five aspects that contribute to the social significance of the events were discovered:

- “Is the issue being politicized?”
- Is it framed as a national security or even a national identity issue?
- Is the threat extended to a broader circle of perpetrators and sympathizers?
- Is the threat linked to existing fears or historical experiences?
- Does the discourse contain inflammatory or securitizing aspects?"

If these questions are answered with a “yes”, “the degree to which these strategies serve to mobilize and capture public and political attention and thus provide for conditions that affect the state of national anxiety and fear about the issue (Bakker & de Graaf, 2014:13)."

The study includes three areas of best practices: 1) communication – authorities have to give the first statement to the public during the first hour (e.g. “golden hour”) after an event; 2) content – fear and emotion-laden rhetoric should be avoided; 3) organization – government should be prepared for complex crisis situations with spokespeople of different minorities (Bakker & de Graaf, 2014:13). Crelinsten (as cited in Bakker & de Graaf, 2014) is another expert highlighting the importance of communication in counter-terrorism. He clustered counter-terrorism communications strategies into five models that are coercive, proactive, persuasive, defensive, and the long-term approaches.

Fear, as with all emotions, pertains to an individual feeling, to a socio-cultural tendency in the society, and to political discourse. This makes it almost impossible to estimate or claim success. Is fear management successful if the majority of society does not feel afraid anymore? Is eliminating fear in society the end goal? Fear in itself is an evolutionary tool to deal with imminent threat and danger, and therefore not a bad thing as such. The “fight or flight” impulse, induced by fear, helps us to survive.

In general, it is rather difficult to measure the outcome of counter-terrorism policies, in particular, quantitative results are hard to obtain. Instead, de Graaf and de Graaff (2010) introduced the concept of “performativity”. The emphasis of this approach is in “the looks” of the counter-terrorism policies instead of the tangible results, such as arrests being made. The government can set the tone for the counter-terrorism discourse by promoting its representations of events, its solutions to the problem. This way the audience can be activated and made sensitive towards the problematic.

In recent times, “resilience” has been one of the most popular concepts in the counter-terrorism discussion. Resilience refers to people’s capacity to resist abrupt changes and stressful situations, and the capability to recover and return to the initial state (Bakker & de Graaf, 2014). Resilience plays an important role prior, during, and after crisis situations. Resilience is mental, and thus links to the notion of psychological coping mechanisms that need to be improved in order to improve resilience. Resistance and resilience help to deal with the negative impact of fear, and a resilient community finds it
easier to bounce back after tragic events. Attacking a resilient society won’t hurt and shake the target as badly as striking a less-resilient society.

Resilience can be seen as empowering citizens and fighting back criminals peacefully. Others say it is an attempt to command society, and a method to teach people to get along on their own without governmental support, which again spares resources. The recent advancement of resilience as a policy discourse can be seen as the government’s obligation to foster civil defence and prepare people for disasters (Bean, Keränen, & Durfy, 2011). Bakker and de Graaf (2014) saw resilience as the most important component of counter-terrorism policies and thus strengthening resilience is the biggest task of governments preparing themselves for crisis situations.

In the context of national security resilience is deemed contributing to ongoing fears about terrorist attacks (Hardy, 2015). Additionally, resilience-based policies can generate anxiety in populations. In the context of emergency response procedures, they may contribute to ongoing civil anxiety about terrorist attacks (Hardy, 2015).
3. RESEARCH QUESTIONS

This paper makes an enquiry into the press coverage on some of the recent Islamist terrorist incidents that took place in Denmark, France, and in the United States in 2015. Three research questions were formulated based on the literature and theories.

Q1: To what extent does the press coverage on terrorist attacks and politicians’ comments contribute to managing citizens’ fear and anxiety?

In times of crisis, citizens turn to the government and their leaders for answers and protection. Leaders cannot necessarily provide the comfort that is requested, and mass media strengthens anxiety (Gadarian, 2010). Therefore it is important to study and question the means with which press, and media in general, approach and affect the audience. This is especially the case with television and its vivid pictures and real-time broadcasting, as it has a very strong, emotional impact on the audience (Rubin, 2009). The impacts that news texts have, excluding images, is subtler but also definitely existing. However, the part that emotions play has not always been taken seriously and requires attention. Robert Jervis, who has played a key role in examining the role of perception and misperception in world politics, admitted that his early neglect of emotion was a “major blunder” (Bleiker & Hutchison, 2014:116). Richard Ned Lebow, another leading American scholar, recognises that the notion of an autonomous and rational individual is “a fiction of the Enlightenment”, arguing, instead, that emotions are “absolutely central” to world politics. Across the Atlantic the situation is no different. Christopher Hill and Andrew Linklater, two senior scholars in the UK, acknowledge the crucial role of “feeling and intuition” in decision-making and deplore that the study of emotions in world politics is still “in its infancy” (Bleiker & Hutchison, 2008:116). The role of governments in promoting their counter-terrorism policies, in diminishing the negative impact of terrorism and supporting the construction of national resilience should receive far more attention. Communication has a crucial importance in the so called “psychological warfare”, where political terrorists aim to demolish the public morale, and leaders try, or they should, to preserve resilience and regenerative strengths (Bakker & de Graaf, 2014).

Q2: To what extent does the discursive practice reproduce or, instead, restructure the existing order of terrorism discourse? What consequences does this have for the broader social and political practice?
Fear and stress resulting from terrorist attacks lead to increased aggression toward outgroup, groups that are deemed different and threatening. These emotions can be exploited. The so-called rally-round-the-flag effect describes the mechanisms of how the public can be abused in terms of taking advantage of their weakness to drive political agenda.

There’s a body of literature on the consequences of terrorist attacks, and how they impact on the citizen rights and freedoms after crisis and terrorist situations. However, the micro level discourse that enforces the cycle of fear has not been widely studied. Investigating the role that emotions play in shaping people’s responses to international terrorism also helps provide greater insights into the policy choices of political leaders who take public opinion into account when making decisions (Sirin & Geva, 2013). Thus it is very interesting to analyze if, and how, news show signs of emotional manipulation.

**Q3: Is the quantity or form of emotional content similar between different countries? If not, what differences are there?**

Comparative studies of terrorism have found key cross-national similarities in reactions to international terrorism. For instance, Friedland and Merari (as cited in Sirin & Geva, 2013:726) find an association between terrorist threats and support for aggressive military action among Israelis, which parallels the findings of most studies on the perceived threat of terrorism and U.S. public opinion (Sirin & Geva 2013). Gerhards and Schäfer (2014) made a quantitative-qualitative analysis on the television reporting around terrorist attacks on selected German (ARD), Arabic (Al Jazeera), US-American (CNN), and British (BBC) television channels. The study is interesting from the perspective of this paper, as Gerhards and Schäfer detect differences between the channels and how they report on terrorism. BBC and ARD frame terrorist acts as “crimes against humanity”, whereas CNN and Al Jazeera use the frame “war on terror”.

The following chapter aims to explain the literature and fundamental findings on the thematic that were presented in the introductory chapter. The focus lies on contemporary Islamic terrorism, and whether it can be seen as public relations. The second part analyzes the political dimension of terrorism; what is the impact on the general public, how do people manage their fear and anxiety, and to what extent authorities utilize fear as means to control masses.
4. METHODOLOGY

4.1. Critical Discourse Analysis

The research questions the management of the audience’s fear and the discursive practices embedded in news texts, strongly guiding the selection of method. With critical discourse analysis (CDA) this paper looks into the deep level of text products and how they are produced and consumed. Critical discourse analysis is not a single theory; it is more like a set of different approaches to analyze discursive products and their embedded meanings and messages (Richardson, 2007). CDA takes a critical stance on journalism and, unlike in content analysis, aims to “examine the role that journalism plays in maintaining and/or transforming social inequalities (Richardson, 2007:38).” Two basic questions for CDA research are “how do (more) powerful groups control public discourse, how does such discourse control mind and action of (less) powerful groups, and what are the social consequences of such control, such as social inequality (van Dijk, 2001:355)?”

CDA looks into the text, what has the author written? Importantly, CDA also digs deeper and questions what could have been said but is not. According to Fowler (1991), fundamental to CDA is the belief that language creates reality; anything that is communicated comes from a particular ideological position. Thus it is important to critically examine language used in newspapers, and the hidden meanings can be very subtle (e.g. choice of words) (Fowler, as cited in Shojaei, Youssefi, & Hosseini, 2013).

CDA takes a very broad and comprehensive approach and moves from and between the micro level (linguistic analysis), the meta level of discursive practices (e.g. consumption and processes), and the macro level of social practices (Richardson, 2007). These three spheres are tightly interrelated and will be further elaborated in the coming chapters. CDA analysis should not and cannot be conducted as a plain step-by-step study analyzing three levels separately since all dimensions are very much overlapping (Janks, 1997).

One of the foremost principles of academic publications is objectivity. CDA takes a slightly different perspective; CDA studies use of power in communicative products and openly picks up inequalities and addresses and critiques them. A central notion in most critical work on discourse is that of power, and more specifically the social power of groups or institutions. Those groups who control the most influential discourse also have a greater chance to control the minds and actions of others (van Dijk, 2001).

The explicit take on social inequalities and phenomena is what separates CDA from other methods of social sciences. All analyzed discourses are, at the same time, bodies of
ethical and political evaluation. The aim of the analysis should always be the generation of discussion, and eventually giving voice to people who are not heard, and raising awareness of power abuse (Blommaert & Bulcaen 2002). Awareness of this responsibility is crucial when doing CDA (van Dijk, 2002).

Such diverse areas as pragmatics, conversation analysis, narrative analysis, rhetoric, stylistics, sociolinguistics, ethnography, and media analysis use critical discourse analysis. Yet political science is one of the few social sciences that has hardly applied CDA (van Dijk, 2001).

In political communications, the theory of “framing” is rather close to critical discourse analysis (Nimmo & Sanders, as cited in van Dijk, 2001). Social science has various methods to choose from, yet they are very limited in their comprehension of emotions and how they work in societies (Bleiker & Hutchinson, 2008). This thought links CDA with the questions posed in this paper.

This paper orientates after the critical discourse analysis approach of Norman Fairclough, which has been called as the most developed theory and method for research within CDA (Jorgensen & Phillips, 2002). In the early 1990s, Fairclough’s objective was to develop an approach that will be useful when investigating changes in language, and could be used in studies of social and cultural change (Fairclough, 1992). Common examples of change are changes in relations between women and men in workplaces and society, and doctors and patients (Fairclough, 1992).

Before Fairclough, discourse analysis was mainly a linguistic field. However, Fairclough combined textual analysis with social sciences. He says there was a “traditional lack of interest in language on the part of other social sciences, and a tendency to see language as transparent” (Fairclough, 1992:2). He pointed out that it is impossible to decrypt social meanings from linguistic data without paying attention to the language itself.

Fairclough’s approach aims to combine the following three approaches (Fairclough, as cited in Jorgensen & Phillips, 2002:66):

- Detailed textual analysis within the field of linguistics (including Michael Halliday’s functional grammar)
- Macro-sociological analysis of social practice (power relations that people are not always aware of)
- The micro-sociological, interpretative social tradition (i.e. how people are tying themselves to rules via daily practices)
In other words, all discursive occurrences are text pieces, instances of discursive practice, and part of social practice (Fairclough, 1992). The “text” dimension refers to language analysis of texts. The dimension of discursive practice defines how a text is interpreted. It is referring to who is reading the text, and who or what has created the text. The third dimension of social practice is then a broader social analysis looking into the institutional, social, and political circumstances displayed in the event and how that plays out in the discursive practice (Fairclough, 1992).

Fairclough’s approach to CDA is useful as it provides multiple points of analytic entry. It does not matter which kind of analysis one begins with, as long as they are all included and are shown to be mutually explanatory. It is in the interconnections that the analyst finds interesting patterns and disjunctions that need to be described, interpreted and explained. The strength of CDA is that the different dimensions of analysis that it offers provide the means both for producing research questions and for analyzing data. As such, it is an extremely important research tool (Janks, 1997).

Before proceeding to the analytical level, the focal notion of discourse needs to be clarified. “‘Discourse’ is used abstractly (as an abstract noun) for ‘the domain of statements’, and concretely for groups of statements or for the ‘regulated practice’ (the rules), which govern such a group of statements (Fairclough, 2004:124)”. Fairclough, himself, sees discourses as “ways of representing aspects of the world – the processes, relations and structures of the material world, the ‘mental world’ of thoughts, feelings, beliefs and so forth, and the social world. Particular aspects of the world may be represented differently, so we are generally in the position of having to consider the relationship between different discourses (Fairclough, 2004:124).” He also uses the term where linguistics have written about “language use”, “parole”, or “performance” (Fairclough, 1992). The social context is important to Fairclough. For him language use creates reality, as already mentioned, and it is part of social practice, as opposed to purely individual activity.

Richardson (2007) groups the academic discussion on discourse in two. According to Richardson, discourse can be defined as an object that is larger than a sentence. Functionalisists say that language is active, and thus critical discourse analysis aims to discover what people do with their language. Functionalist approach ignores the role which people’s social knowledge has in the process of decrypting messages. The second formalist definition considers the social aspect and argues that discourse should be studied as “language in use”.
One of the main lessons of CDA is that language is always active (Richardson, 2007). Language is in the core of humanity, and everything one communicates is a reflection of our gender, social class, values, and life experiences. First of all, language mirrors the society we live in. People use language as a tool to achieve something they want, and they also adapt language to fit different contexts and audiences. Another significant property of language is power. Language use has power, and this power is usually not evenly distributed. Some individual's saying has more weight than another. Journalistic products reach out to big masses, and therefore journalism plays a critical role as a user of power or as an institution distributing power. Journalistic language has the power to affect people and represent social power in specific ways. It shapes agendas and effects people’s opinions. “It can help shape social reality by shaping our views of social reality (Richardson, 2007:13)”. Richardson adds that language use is political as it is never objective or transparent like natural sciences.

In the following the three dimensional levels of CDA as introduced by Fairclough are presented in more detail. Each discursive event has three facets: it is a spoken or written language text, it is an instance of discourse practice involving the production and interpretation of text and it is a piece of social practice (Fairclough, 1993). This analytic approach is the starting point for the analysis in this paper.

The first dimension is text analysis i.e. the linguistic features and organization of concrete instances of discourse. This refers to choices and patterns in vocabulary (e.g. wording, metaphor), grammar (e.g. transitivity, modality), cohesion (e.g. conjunction, schemata), and text structure (e.g. episodes, turn-taking system) (Blommaert & Bulcaen, 2002).

Text analysis can be organized under four main areas: vocabulary, grammar, cohesion, and text structure. Vocabulary deals mainly with individual words, grammar deals with words combined into clauses and sentences, cohesion deals with how clauses and sentences are linked together, and text structure deals with large-scale organizational properties of texts. In addition, Fairclough (1992:75) distinguishes further three main headings which can be used in analysis of discursive practice but not so much in text analysis: utterances, such as promises, requests, and threats, have power. The coherence of texts and their intertextuality can be analyzed as well. These seven areas make a framework for analyzing the aspects of formal properties (i.e. text analysis), production, and interpretation of texts. It is vital to recognize the overlapping natures of text analysis and discourse analysis, they cannot be explicitly separated.
At this stage, analysis moves from textual analysis into discourse analysis. The second dimension is discursive practices, something that is produced, circulated, distributed, and consumed in society (Blommaert & Bulcaen, 2002). Discursive practice involves processes of text production, distribution, and consumption (Fairclough, 1992). Analysis of discursive practice focuses on how authors of texts draw on already existing discourses and genres to create a text, and how the receivers apply available discourses and genres in their consumption and decoding of the texts (Jorgensen & Phillips, 2002:69). Simply put, discursive practice is about encoding and decoding; meaning sent by the producer and decoding at the intersection of the text and its context. The notion of interdiscursivity points out that texts are combinations of various discourses and genres. Intertextuality is very much related to interdiscursivity, and they both show how texts from the past are being used as inspiration to current textual products (Fairclough, 1993).

The aspect of discursive practice remains the most under-developed step of CDA (Richardson, 2007). Research on analyzing texts as products of discourse processes is lacking. According to Richardson, there are different professional practices and techniques that influence the impact of texts on people. The entire discursive chain is like a two-way street, both between producer and text, and between consumer and text. To elaborate this further, the producer and the mode of production give a meaning to a text, and simultaneously the text acts on the producer since it shapes the way in which the producer collects and presents information, based on the rules of the genre. At the consumer’s end, the messages of the text attempt to shape the understandings of the reader. As readers “do” reading, they decode texts by reflecting them on their background (knowledge) and agendas. Hence, the reader may resist, counter or understand the encoded meanings. Additionally, discursive meaning is not just a result of the process of encoding and decoding text; readers also assess meanings based on their judgment of the producer. The producer obviously customizes its contents and genres in regard to the preferences of the audience (Richardson 2007).

As mentioned earlier, the analysis of the discursive practice inevitably involves analysis of the linguistic features, and vice versa. The discursive dimension serves as a link between textual dimension and social practice; on the one hand, processes of text production and interpretation are shaped by, and help shape, the nature of the social practice, and on the other hand, the production process affects the text (Jorgensen & Phillips, 2002:69).
The third dimension is social practice. Structures and values impact journalism and its agenda and output. When analyzing the social practices of discourse, one needs to consider economic practices, political practices and ideological practices (Richardson, 2007). The study of the social practices of news discourse assumes a dialectical relationship between society and journalism. That is, both the society and journalism affect each other, both acting on each other.

Fairclough (1992) discussed discourse in relation to ideology and power, and saw power as hegemony, and viewed the evolution of power relations as a hegemonic struggle. Hegemony concerns power that is achieved through constructing alliances and integrating classes and groups through consent, so that “the articulation and rearticulation of orders of discourse is correspondingly one stake in hegemonic struggle” (Fairclough, as cited in Blommaert & Bulcaen, 2002:449).

Critical discourse analysis is a very non-monolithic approach and the procedure to conduct analysis is rather flexible. The research design can be tailored to fit the needs and objectives of the respective research. Since the three levels of CDA, text, discourse, and socio-cultural practice, are interrelated and cannot be separated, the research cannot progress in linear manner (Jorgensen & Phillips, 2002). Due to the flexibility, critical discourse analysis is a challenging method and requires planning and evaluation of the ongoing process. Fairclough presents the overlapping of different steps with a CDA box. (Table 1, Fairclough, as cited in Janks, 1997).

Boxes are embedded in order to visualize the interdependencies within the practices, and the back-and-forth movement between them. The areas have to remain connected, and due to this coherence, an analysis cannot and should not be a strictly linear process with separate phases (Janks, 1997).
4.2. Sample and data acquisition

This paper delves into the national press coverage of three Islamist terrorist attacks, all of which occurred in 2015:

14 – 15 February 2015 Copenhagen
Two separate shootings took place in Copenhagen, Denmark. The first victim was shot during the event "Art, Blasphemy and Freedom of Expression" at the Krudttønden culture center. The Swedish artist Lars Vilks, who is known for his controversial drawings of the Prophet Muhammad, was speaking at the event. The second victim was attacked after midnight, outside the walls of the Great Synagogue. The shooter killed a Jewish man. In total, five police officers were injured.

13 November 2015 Paris
A chain of attacks occurred in Paris, France. Three suicide bombers struck near a football stadium, where a friendly game between France and Germany was taking place. After that, the terrorists bombed and shot people at cafés, restaurants, and at a music venue. The death toll reached 130 people, and 368 people were injured. Seven terrorists died.

2 December 2015 San Bernardino
14 people were killed and 22 were injured after a couple stormed an employee event at the Inland Regional Center in San Bernardino, USA. One of the perpetrators worked as a health department employee in the very same center.
The sample consists of press coverage from Denmark, France and the United States. Two of the highest-circulation daily newspapers are chosen from each country, and five articles from each publication that report the incident that took place in the respective country. The text analysis will be based on texts only, excluding possible press images in order to manage the scope of this paper. All articles stem from the two first days after the terrorist incident. For example, all French articles were published between November 14 and 15, 2015.

Details on the year of establishment, circulation, ownership, and political stance are presented on the table 2. Each country is represented by a conservative publication, another being more in the left.

Articles from the Danish Jyllands-Posten were retrieved from the research of the Copenhagen Business School. Articles from Politiken, The New York Times, Le Monde, and Le Figaro stem from LexisNexis. News from The Wall Street Journal were fetched from the website of The Wall Street Journal and from ProQuest. Tables 2, 3, and 4 show the articles clustered per country and publication. Findings of the analysis are later on reflected with the theories and notions presented earlier: Terrorism discourse, Terror Management Theory (TMT), Fear Management, and rally-round-the-flag effect.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Publication</th>
<th>Founded</th>
<th>Circulation, weekdays (2014)</th>
<th>Ownership</th>
<th>Editorial stance</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Jyllands-Posten</td>
<td>1871</td>
<td>84,000</td>
<td>Jyllands-Postens Fond</td>
<td>Liberal-conservative</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Politiken</td>
<td>1884</td>
<td>90,000</td>
<td>Politiken Fonden (88.4%) Ellen Hørups Fond (4.4%) Others (7.3%)</td>
<td>Social-liberal</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Le Figaro</td>
<td>1826</td>
<td>325,459</td>
<td>Dassault Group</td>
<td>Right</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Le Monde</td>
<td>1944</td>
<td>298,529</td>
<td>La Vie-Le Monde Group</td>
<td>Center-left</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The Wall Street Journal</td>
<td>1889</td>
<td>2,276,207</td>
<td>News Corp (via Dow Jones &amp; Company)</td>
<td>Conservative</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 2. Overview of the sample newspapers

Table 2 shows the even distribution of “polarities” in each of the countries; both left and right editorial alignments are represented from each country.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Publication</th>
<th>Headline</th>
<th>Day/ month (2015)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Jyllands-Posten</td>
<td>Tidligere PET-chef: Politiet slår jernring om København / Former head of Danish Security and Intelligence Service: police closes iron ring around Copenhagen</td>
<td>14/2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jyllands-Posten</td>
<td>Thorning efter skudattentat: Vores sammenhold testes / Thorning after the shooting: our unity is being tested</td>
<td>14/2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jyllands-Posten</td>
<td>DFeR: De Radikale har et ansvar / Danish People's Party member: Danish Social Liberal Party is responsible</td>
<td>16/2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jyllands-Posten</td>
<td>Politifolk ønsker patruljebiler op i gear efter terror / Police wishes geared up patrol cars after terror</td>
<td>17/2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jyllands-Posten</td>
<td>Vi skal handle mod terrenen / We must act against terrorism</td>
<td>18/2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Politiken</td>
<td>Han narrede politiet ved at spille fuld / He fooled the police by pretending to be drunk</td>
<td>16/2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Politiken</td>
<td>Offer: På vakt ved synagogen / Victim: guarding the synagogue</td>
<td>16/2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Politiken</td>
<td>PET kan ikke overvåge alle potentielle terrorister / PET cannot surveil all potential terrorists</td>
<td>16/2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Politiken</td>
<td>Det Danmark, vi ikke kendte / Denmark we didn't know before</td>
<td>16/2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Politiken</td>
<td>Stop de hadefulde / Stop the haters</td>
<td>16/2</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 3. Articles from Danish newspapers

Articles from Politiken are from the same date, February 16, whereas the samples from Jyllands-Posten were published on February 14, 16, 17, and 18.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Publication</th>
<th>Headline</th>
<th>Day/month (2015)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Le Figaro</td>
<td>Attaques terroristes sans précédent en plein Paris; Des raids coordonnés par des islamistes, utilisant des armes à feu et des explosifs, ont fait plusieurs dizaines de morts et de blesses dans la nuit. / Unparalleled terrorist attacks in downtown Paris; Islamist raids using firearms and explosives, dozens were killed and injured in the night</td>
<td>14/11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Le Figaro</td>
<td>L'état d'urgence, une mesure rarissime / State of emergency, a rare measure</td>
<td>14/11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Le Figaro</td>
<td>François Hollande décrète l'état d'urgence; Le president de la République a convoqué un Conseil des ministers extraordinaire dans la nuit. / François Hollande declares state of emergency; The President of the Republic convened an extraordinary Council of Ministers in the night</td>
<td>14/11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Le Figaro</td>
<td>Solidarité immédiate exprimée par les Alliés / Immediate solidarity among the allies</td>
<td>14/11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Le Figaro</td>
<td>Scènes d'horreur au Bataclan / Scenes of horror at Bataclan</td>
<td>14/11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Le Monde</td>
<td>Un attentat “complex” inédit sur le sol Français / “Complex” attack took place on the French soil</td>
<td>15/11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Le Monde</td>
<td>“Cette nuit, la ville aussi, ils l’ont tuée” / Tonight, they killed the city as well</td>
<td>15/11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Le Monde</td>
<td>La France, cible privilégiée / France, the chosen target</td>
<td>15/11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Le Monde</td>
<td>Au Bataclan, “du sang partout, des cadavres” / “Blood everywhere, dead bodies” at Bataclan</td>
<td>15/11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Le Monde</td>
<td>Six attaques simultanées au coeur de Paris / Six simultaneous attacks in the heart of Paris</td>
<td>15/11</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Table 4. Articles from French newspapers*

Coverage from Le Figaro is dated on November 14, reports from Le Monde are all from November 15.
Table 5. Articles from US newspapers

All articles (except for one) from The Wall Street Journal stem from December 3, The New York Times coverage is spread out to December 3, 4, and 6.
5. FINDINGS

5.1. Mass fear

All of the observed news outlets used very graphic lexicon and tended to describe the crime scenes in a ruthless way. This was the case especially for the Wall Street Journal and The New York Times. Vocabulary such as “slaughter”, “bloodshed”, “massacre”, “carnage”, “nightmare”, “horror”, “worst-case scenario”, “trail of bloodied bodies”, in Paris “witnesses flocked traumatized” like a flock of sheep, and the almost classical “apocalypse” recreate the tragic scene in the reader's mind and give a feeling of hopelessness. As an example, The New York Times assigns an entire paragraph of its article to picture the incident in San Bernardino:

“Amid the chaos were the horrifying and familiar aspects of a mass assault by the latest ‘active shooter’: bodies on gurneys, innocents weeping under desks at the rattle of gunfire, desperate emails for survival, SWAT teams massed at a war zone of civilian casualties. All the familiar terror was back, as a father received a text from his daughter: ‘People shot. In the office waiting for cops. Pray for us.’”

The paragraph is a disturbing introduction to the article. Narratives like this clearly create an unpleasant feeling in most of its readers. First, horrifying and familiar aspects of a mass assault could be observed, which refers to the sad frequency of similar tragic attacks. A heart-breaking listing follows: “bodies”, “innocent weeping”, “rattle of gunfire”, “desperate emails”. It is like in a war, as the editor wrote, it refers to a war zone and civilian casualties. The message is clear by now; the American nation is at war.

The headlines, of course, aim to capture the reader’s interest. In The New York Times articles, it is often the intangible, such as fear or horror, or the act of terror itself, that is the actor and acts instead of humans or perpetrators: Fear in the air, “as bullets flew”. The Wall Street Journal takes a more neutral approach by using active sentences “shooting suspects had bombs”, “Barack Obama says - -“. The Danish headlines focus on active sentences “He fooled the police - -“, Police wishes – Le Monde goes reveals the horror right from the first row, “at Bataclan, ‘blood everywhere, dead bodies’”. This punchy survivor statement is then recycled in another article as well.

Reports on the witness’ statements and their interviews significantly stand out from the articles, especially in the American and French texts. Questioning survivors and their family members immediately after the attacks, sometimes without them knowing if their
companions are safe, caters undoubtedly for very impactful content. However, detailing how the families prayed, what kind of text messages were sent during the assault, and how shocked survivors had human flesh and blood on their face, certainly creates fear and anxiety in the readership. One could say that the journalistic objective is to report on the attacks without hiding any unpleasant facts.

On the contrary, turning to the general audience for content has its implications. The New York Times builds one article solely on the comments that they asked their readers to submit online. Without having seen all the messages that came in, it seems as if the most shocked and anxious comments were published. Among them people who avoid leaving their apartments, and “army veterans who confined that they felt safer in war zones”. The overwhelming text is spiced up with brief comments from psychologists (how to manage fear) and uneasy questions stressing the serious nature of the situation – “could it happen to me?” Fear is fortified in the same article by mentioning that the target in San Bernardino wasn’t “an iconic symbol”. This leads to the thought that, indeed, every one of us can be a target. Ironically, the article recognizes the much bigger likelihood of being a victim in a traffic accident than in a terrorist attack, but this message will most likely become lost.

War morphology is prevalent, in particular in the French and American press: “bristling arsenal of guns and bombs”, “sustainable mobilization” (of the police special forces in France) "Iron ring around Copenhagen" which is reminiscent of the siege of Leningrad during the Second World War. The French reports focus on the strategic implementation of the attacks in Paris, “asymmetric warfare”. Le Monde bluntly states without any further contemplation that “now it is war.” A scene from a Middle-Eastern fast-food restaurant in Paris: a Syrian cook comments on Arabic boys following the news broadcasting on the terrorist attacks: “they are not used to it [terrorism]”. It appears almost like a cynical heads-up on what is yet to come, or it marks the beginning of a new era.

Terror attacks and attackers are portrayed almost like a natural force sweeping across the country, something uncontrollable. Le Monde writes about “massive waves of jihadists” and “Syria that imports on French soil a form of unprecedented violence.” “Violent criminals will keep terrorizing communities and the nation, inflicting mass death and damage across the land.” The choice of modality, adjectives and adverbs, highlight the chaos: “unprecedented terrorist attacks”, “worst tragedy ever endured by the country since World War II”. An anaphora as if borrowed from the news reporting of the World War II “many made it, many did not”. Again, adverbs punctuate the national state of chaos: “- - truly beyond the power of the government”, “the nation is left numbly to anticipate being
“---randomly victimized by mass shootings”. An article on one of the Danish victims mentions twice the large physical size of the victim. Message: even strong people become casualties, no one is safe. The senselessness of the attacks are made very clear: “man that protected children and youth - - It doesn’t make any sense”.

The conditional sentence from the head of the Jewish congregation in Copenhagen is an example of probability modalization, which urges to imagine the worst possible outcome: “If the shooter had been able to access the celebration, the result would have been disastrous”.

All the sample articles are from the time right after incidents took place, so clearly the focus is often on the description of what happened. Still there are preliminary reflections on the causes of the events, further than the plain motives of the shooters. Danish outlets take the first steps to discuss the socially troubled background of the assaulter, whereas the American reports focus on the gun legislation. An article of The New York Times does, however, refer to the White House speaker Paul Ryan, who supports the expansion of mental health services so that “violent people might theoretically be intercepted”. Both the adverb theoretically and the modal verb in this indirect citation emphasizing the careful stance that The New York Times is taking. Republican Representative Tim Murphy is cited directly as he said that important is “treating the mental illness instead of responding to the crime.”

When it comes to the narrative form of the sample articles, especially the American and French coverage eagerly employing bellettristic tools such as staccato sentences that build tension, curiosity and even anxiety, a horror story framing device with which the editor leads the reader throughout the story until the grim end “ - - he [a colleague of the San Bernardino shooter]” realized why his co-worker’s [the shooter] chair had been empty that morning.” The advantage of contrasts, beautiful day, Sunny California, suddenly blood is its shock value. This was taken advantage of by The New York Times and The Wall Street Journal. In addition, the aforementioned publications use Aristotelian periphery when first labeling the employee event at the San Bernardino County Department of Public Health as prosaic, dreary, and their daily work as banal, and then switching the tone by explicitly describing the horrendous scene of the following mass shooting. Another stylistic tool, less familiar to the news genre, is personification. As Le Monde puts it, “tonight, they killed the city as well”, and “six simultaneous attacks in the heart of Paris.” Both Le Figaro and Le Monde impose the “new terrorism thesis” which argues that “driven by hatred, fanaticism and extremism rather than by political ideology. Today’s religiously
inspired terrorists are determined to cause mass casualties among civilians, they are
driven to sacrifice themselves in murderous suicide attacks (Jackson, 2007:408)”. An
article of Le Monde: “[the shooters] did not even wear hoods. A very bad sign. Without a
doubt, it is a sign that they have no fear of death.” The editor goes to a categorical
extreme when claiming the perpetrators have no fear. This idea places the terrorists in the
group of “others”.

France believed to be protected from the asymmetric warfare as the Paris attacks are
described by Le Monde and Le Figaro. President Hollande’s belligerent rhetoric is
stressed by the overview of concrete actions that will be taken: “defense council
meetings”, “all special police forces mobilized”, and so on. Actions taken by the French
President Francois Hollande after the attacks were drastic. He declared a state of
emergency, which authorized searches at any time in the entire French territory, and enables media control measures. Le Monde lays out the basic principles of the
emergency state and special laws, yet it doesn’t express any concern over the possible
misuse of power, and stays completely factual at this point.

Le Monde: “France remains a favored target after its strikes in Syria.” “Launched more
than two years in the Islamic anti-government coalition, France has stepped up its strikes
in Iraq and decided to deploy in the Gulf in December its aircraft carrier, Charles de
Gaulle. A declaration of war.” It is a clear admittance of a state of war, overseas.

In the case of San Bernardino, authorities and press didn’t confirm whether the assault
was a terrorist attack or, at least, not before further information was available.
Nevertheless, the presupposition was that a terrorist attack would be the right diagnosis. It
seemed “hard to fathom” that the massacre of 14 people might stem from a “more prosaic
pathology”.

Similar to the French press, the Danish Politiken quotes the head of the Danish Security
and Intelligence Service (PET) who says that the attack in Copenhagen is of a new type, a
so-called serial attack. However, the notion of asymmetric warfare is not used.

There is an obligation modulation already the lead paragraph of Politiken article,
demanding “strict prioritization” when it comes to the Danish Security Service and their
intelligence work. Several questions follow on how to manage the resources and evaluate the risks some of
the suspects pose. Also, the editor asks “what can the society do to prevent this from
happening again?” The question, if the legislation should be tightened is replied by a
determined no: “legislation alone cannot solve the problem.” “PET already has the means and necessary mandate to work against potential terrorists.

Critique on PET is deductible from the articles (“PET has underestimated the risk”). There is a soft start: “it is easy to criticize afterwards but one has to learn for the future”, it is an “extremely tense situation for the police”, and “everything indicates that the police and PET acted professionally during the first shooting episode.” The latter comment excludes the second attack at the synagogue, and so “one wonders how the perpetrator was able to go to the synagogue”. It is said that PET has not been vigilant enough, to which it is added that PET doesn't have enough resources to monitor all suspects day and night. Harder critique is embedded in Politiken’s headline “He fooled the police by pretending to be drunk” refers to the shooter who was able to approach the civil guard and two police officers standing in front of the synagogue by floundering as if he was drunk. The civil guard was the second casualty of the serial attack in Copenhagen. Politiken refers to a vague actor of “many observers” who wondered why the security measures were not more prominent.

Politiken retrieves comment from the terror expert Magnus Ranstorp, who is one of the staple terrorism experts in the media. According to Jackson (2007), Ranstorp has some very disputed opinions on “the traditionally violent” Middle East. Ranstorp wondered immediately how the perpetrator could move so close to the Jewish guard in the first place. He has statements on hand as “It would have been better to create a security zone”. After the remark the editor added his second, less judgmental point “I believe they [the two police officers watching over the synagogue] did their best, but four guards would have been the right decision”. According to Miller and Miller (2010:24), Ranstorp is employed by a private Security/intelligence firm, which is questionable in terms of journalistic objectivity.

5.2. United we stand
The personal pronoun, “we”, and the word, “nation”, are frequently repeated in all newspapers. In Le Figaro, “France plunges into horror”, and the New York Times even applies a third-person subjective narrator when referring to the US people “nation wonders when - -, The New York Times conveys ideological expressions as American freedom, the fundamental value of the nation, and American muscle, signaling raw power. Gov. John W. Hickenlooper called the killings at the Planned Parenthood center in Colorado a week prior to the San Bernardino attack as ”a form of terrorism.” Terrorism aims to
brutally influence the politics of a country, among other things. Are not militant contra-abortio
people terrorists too, or is the stigma reserved for Islamist terrorists?

The New York Times used the framing device, so does Politiken. The article “Det Danmark, vi ikke kendte”, translates into Country/Denmark we didn’t know, det being a definite article for Denmark (“the Denmark”). It is like a moment of awakening, a completely new side of one’s home country is being revealed. One question arises, who are we? Is there a homogenous Danish we, one nation that doesn’t know anything about social hardship, maybe someone else, faces in the suburbs. The red thread or theme of the article is the traditional children’s game katten af tønden played in Denmark during the carnival season, before Ash Wednesday. The game and its established rules that have existed for centuries are part of the “Denmark we know”. At the end of the report, the focus shifts on the costumes the playing children wore: “They were dressed up as police officers, Arabs, and tigers. I believe it was the oil sheikh that won”. It is rather interesting that the journalist chooses to disclose the hints on kids’ attires in this sensitive context. Arabs are “the other”; exotic characters one can dress up as in the carnival season. Filthy rich oil sheikh or terrorist?

The articles are ostensibly neutral when describing the terrorists. Nevertheless, some common labels that are often associated with Islam do exist: “militant Islamist shooters”, “coldblooded”, “militant Islamism ideology”, “indomitable hate”, “parallel society”. When the Danish sources call for families, schools, mosques and other networks to keep an eye on their offspring, the objective is that “hateful young men have to be discovered at an early stage”. The value discourse is reflected in Jyllands-Posten editorial signed off by four heads of political parties after the shootings in Copenhagen: “there are people who do not share our values but are eager to use our democratic rights to fight against our way of life”. In the Danish society and context this is a rather explicit utterance. Five ideas on how to prevent terrorism and tackle the existing problem are listed by the leaders. One proposal, however without much precision, is the utilization of technology in terms of monitoring people. Again, the risks of this approach are not mentioned.

The appearance of two often polarized groups, Jews and Muslims is contrasted in a Politiken article: the “shooter wore a Palestinian scarf” whereas a Jewish man interviewed is “a lawyer and wears a royal blue kippah with silver embroidery”.

Jackson (2006:7) introduced the idea of “rhetorical pre-emption against charges of Islamophobia and anti-Muslimism”. This trope is deployed by Politiken in its depiction of visiting an imam in Copenhagen; follows a lengthy report on how the imam condemns
terrorism but at the same time reminds us that Prophet Mohammad is holy, and that provocative caricatures are unacceptable. Another interpreter is brought in, and the supposed misunderstanding is gone – “it is clear that a drawing cannot justify the killings that took place”. The awkward story casts a shadow over the imam, a seed of suspicion. The same article quoted a young man saying that many of his friends are Muslims and part of the Danish society.

The first shooting that occurred at the cultural center Krudttønden had one victim, the film director Finn Nørgaard. The analyzed articles only mentioned him, often without a name. The victim of the second shooting at the synagogue was a Jewish man, Dan Uzan, who used to voluntarily guard the synagogue when events were held. Politiken printed one article focusing solely on the murder of Dan Uzan and him as a person. The article portrays a man of dignity and kindness, who “paid with his life” for the safety of the Jewish community celebrating a bat mitzvah on the evening of the attack. It is comparable to an obituary, a homage for the brave man standing up for an Islamist. Another article states Dan Uzan “sacrificed his life to protect a Jewish celebration”.

The article on Dan Uzan tells us that he was accompanied by two police officers on the evening of the attack. The article doesn’t tell us whether the officers were injured. Other articles state that they were wounded. Clearly these are editorial decisions to highlight one person, and keep others in the background.

These considerations bridge over to some more discourses on various societal segments.

5.3. People on the margin
San Bernardino is characterized as a “working-class community”. The town is financially struggling and working class is a certain label to the community.

San Bernardino ought to have “affordable housing” and it is a “solace for immigrants”. A New York Times article has an entire paragraph on the city and its struggles and how “the population has swelled”, how San Bernardino is “sprawling with immigrants from Latin America, Asia and the Middle East”. The questionable characterizations paint a neglected and underprivileged picture of the town, and hardly have anything to do with the terrorist attack. On top of that, The Wall Street Journal deems relevant to point out that an interviewee speaks in “broken English”. The newspaper brands the community as a “middle-class neighborhood”, whereas The New York Times finds “working class” more appropriate.
Also the Danish Politiken attributes statuses to people: striking reporting after the first incident in Copenhagen: “Vilks and the French ambassador remained unharmed, on the other hand [conjunction adverb] a man was shot, and three police officers injured”. The academic title of the second victim Dan Uzan is mentioned without any obvious reason.

A headline of Le Monde shouts dramatically “Tonight, also the city was killed.” The statement valued as a headline material comes from a homeless man that the journalist encounters in the city, seemingly deserted by the terrorist attacks. “His colleagues have gone to sleep to the suburbs”. It is as if the state of emergency, even for a short moment, gives a voice to the people in marginal. Labeling homeless people light-heartedly as “colleagues” is mind-boggling. Being homeless is not a profession, and very seldom one’s own choice.

Reference to gender discourse, specifically related to female politicians, can be found on Le Monde. The mayor of Paris Anne Hidalgo is the first political character to access the crime scene. Her physical traits oozing fragility seem to be more central than anything she might have to say: “the closed face”; misty eyes”. Surprising or not, Obama and his male colleagues avoid this sort of analysis.

5.4. Addressing the nation

Danish prime minister Helle Thorning-Schmidt tries to build conciliate more than anyone. Almost her every sentence has “we”; “we as a nation”; “we have tasted fear and helplessness”; “we will answer those who want to hurt us by thinking and speaking what we want”, “we don’t want Denmark to be like this”, “we need to stick together”, “speech for the nation”; the entire nation “who wants to grow with the tragedy”, “we will stand together as a nation and will not let us be divided.” She wants to Muslims in her inner Danish group as well, when she emphasizes “we - all Danes – take distance from the incident”. Her aim is clearly to gather people together and encourage their unity. The wish for a peaceful society is evident as she reassures Danish Jews that they are an important part of the society, and the state wants to protect them. Politiken’s choice of words alters the tone drastically when the prime minister addresses Danish Muslims: “to the Muslims in ghettos and in the multiethnic Nørrebro, this is not a religious war, and you will not be hated”. The utterance carries a heavy burden of meanings in it. The article implies that Muslims live in ghettos, underprivileged neighborhoods. Nørrebro is the area where Copenhagen’s shooter came from. Repeating Nørrebro and the adjective “multiethnic” in a negative context, even when the name was not vocalized in the speech, is harmful. Picking the notion of “religious war” enforces the general idea that a religious war (between Muslims
and non-Muslims) exists. “You will not be hated” – it sounds like forgiving an ill-mannered child. Why would one hate “you”, the entire Muslim population, when a troubled individual commits a crime? The baffling surprise is that what the prime minister actually did say in her speech is: “this is not a war between Muslims and non-Muslims. This is a fight between individual freedom and a dark ideology.” In all three countries high-level police and state security authorities are frequently heard. In Denmark, the former operative chief of the Danish Intelligence Service Hans Jørgen Bonnichsen has maintained his status and is the main informant of one article. Similarly, in France the former head of General Directorate for Internal Security: “Intelligence services have, in theory, considered such a scenario: ‘When I was at the head of the Central Directorate of Internal Intelligence, we envisioned this type of attack against train stations, stadiums or theaters,’ reports Bernard Squarcini.

In the United States, President Barack Obama calls for unity and we, but he addresses the political field, not citizens: “we should come together in a bipartisan basis”. / not to eliminate every shooting, but to improve the odds that they don’t happen as frequently”. In his first speech after the San Bernardino attack, Obama lists several unanswered questions at the time, such as the terrorists’ motives and connections to radical Islamic groups overseas. As a concluding remark after the uncertainties, the American leader is obliged to “assure the American people - - we’re going to get to the bottom of this.” California Governor Jerry Brown promised, “California will spare no effort in bringing these killers to justice”. The same fixation with justice is visible in Obama’s promise to France after the Paris attacks, he promised to help France “to bring terrorists to justice.”

San Bernardino’s mayor Carey Davis reminded, “this [terrorist attack] could happen at any community in the country. Unfortunately, San Bernardino was the target.” He is perfectly right, however San Bernardino is one of the least affluent communities of the country, and the homicide rate is extremely high.

Head of the Copenhagen Police Union demands more trainings for the police force and investments in new equipment and special patrol vehicles: “If the police is to answer terrorism in the future, are investments obligatory”. He is quoted saying, “in my world there is no doubt [on the need for increased budget]”. Danish Minister of Justice questions the demands and estimates of the Police Union leader, as if the appeals were new information to her, “it is new for me, that there is a need related to patrol cars”, and adds that “if there is a concrete problem with the vehicles, we will look into it.” Interestingly, the
former heads of national intelligence services have their say in the French and Danish publications.

Jyllands-Posten brings up two members of the populist right-wing party of Danks Folkeparti. One parliamentary candidate of Danks Folkeparti had published a tweet giving part of the blame to “the leftists and other people who have welcomed Islam to the country. Another candidate from the same party was interviewed: “De Radikale (Danish Social Liberal Party) has enabled development where extremists have been let into our midst”, referring to legislation that was introduced in 1983. “My thoughts are with the survivors. It seems that the left and others who have supported Islam's entry into Denmark should be made accomplices. By reacting to and reporting populist utterances the mainstream media does a favor to the right-wing agenda (Wodak, 2015).

French President Hollande took a vigorous approach in his crisis communications strategy: “faced with terror, France must be great; it must be strong”. He envisions France as a fearless unified power. Hollande is very determined in his rhetoric. By using a passive voice, he alienates the real-life effects of a state of emergency from the citizens and the authorities behind the decision: “the state of emergency will be declared, which means that some places will be closed, traffic will be prohibited and there will also searches that may be decided throughout Ile-de-France”. Hollande strives to be a strong leader, focusing on himself: “the second decision that I made, is to close borders, we must ensure that no one will go to commit any act whatsoever. And along with those who may have committed crimes that are unfortunately recorded can also be apprehended if they were to leave the country.” Nonetheless, the borders weren’t in fact really closed, more border checks were conducted but the radical move of impeding free movement was never realized. The one-man-show goes on: “we, with my decision, mobilized all forces possible in order to neutralize terrorists”. Hollande seems to be ready for a war, “we will lead the fight, and it will be ruthless against terrorists”. With an anaphoric scheme Hollande impedes terrorists, “this nation facing terror knows how to defend, knows how to mobilize its forces, and will defeat the terrorists”. Le Monde recalls that United States as the “oldest ally” of France. To highlight the bond between these two countries Obama condemned the Paris attacks against the country of “freedom and brotherhood”. Obama completed the French national motto with Égalité, for Le Figaro the third leg was apparently redundant. Le Monde publishes an article on the reactions of some of its allies, the United States, Germany, and the United Kingdom; “Immediate solidarity among the allies”. Condolences from Arab countries are absent, which in a subtle way highlight the divide into two fronts.
5.5. Post-crisis reflections

Common to all newspapers is the appeal to emotions. The New York Times and The Wall Street Journal make the most of the piercing stories that survivors and their family members tell. Le Figaro and Le Monde cover the tragedies in a similar way. Politiken and Jyllands-Posten don’t dig as deep as the other newspapers; this might be partially due to the much smaller number of victims than in Paris and San Bernardino, thus a smaller “shock value”.

The notion of news value is relevant when asking why a certain piece of new was published, or a certain perspective chosen (Galtung & Ruge, 1965). Terrorist attacks, like the ones discussed in this paper, are of course essentially negative occurrences. One can argue that terrorist attacks on the Danish, French, or US-American soil carry more meaning to Western people than equally destructive attacks in culturally and geographically distant regions, such as Iraq and Pakistan. In a similar way, reference to elite nations, global powers like the USA and France attract more attention than nations with smaller global significance. Incidents and news texts reporting on them that are scrutinized in this work all refer to earlier attacks of a similar nature. Thus, continuity is one of news’ values.

Co-optation is a story that’s hardly significant but it is reported when linked to major news. An example of this is the Le Monde article named “Supporters of the Islamic State celebrated on social media”. An article merely focusing on unexpected reactions to a human tragedy does not contribute to common good; on the contrary, it is more likely to cause tension. At the end of the day, terrorist attacks with extremist religious motives build on conflicts between groups of people are very interesting to the public.

News coverage on terrorist attacks makes high-level politicians heard. Interviews and comments from people surviving attacks, and also families and friends of the survivors and victims are extremely common. Journalists are keen to approach the victims, and the industry is eager to print statements full of despair and uttermost fear. The shock value is guaranteed. The bold disclosure of intimate stories, sensationalism, might be a reflection of the tabloidization of news media, and the general trend of individualism, and the resulting “unique” stories that are exploited by the media industry to attract consumers, and eventually advertisers. The prominence of so-called terrorism experts is not completely unproblematic. The most cited scholars in the academic literature are not the ones cited in the media. Media thus focuses on few experts with lesser academic credibility. In addition, the terror experts favored by the media are often linked to state institutions and private security firms. These facts of course affect press coverage and
enforce governmental agendas (Miller & Mills, 2010).

Striking is also near non-existence from the Muslim perspective in the news. They may be present in political speeches, yet absent, alien, and classified as something “other” that is not quite part of “our society”. For example, the (possible) restrictions of civil freedoms and discussion on societal challenges are avoided. Sociologist Loic Wacquant (as cited in Downing, 2016) says Europe’s largest gap between “insiders” and “outsiders” is in France. Downing adds that long-term investment in labor and housing policies and attitudes are truly needed to unify the nation. The unpopular president Hollande struggles to appear credible and strong, which doesn’t contribute to intelligent long-term solutions. Indeed, the state of emergency has been extended ever since the attacks in November 2013, and Amnesty International reports on inhuman actions of the police forces (Safdar, 2016).

Eriksen and Vetlesen (2016) discuss in their article the root causes of Islamist terrorist attacks, and how the answer to the problem is not violence. Sociologist Pierre Bourdieu manifested that neo-liberalism is a political discourse, and its goal is to destroy all forms of collectivism since they hinder the implementation of the free market ideology. “Individual freedom” and “increased flexibility” are terms used to describe the institutionalization in working conditions. Social insecurity becomes the foundation of social dominance. Angry young men with the migration background rioted in the Parisian suburbs some 10 years ago. That time the response from the French government was harsh. The symptoms were liquidated but the roots of the outburst were ignored. Islamism promises the final liberation from the colonial era. Islamism offers what the individual Western society cannot; recognition on its own terms, and the followers are not second-class citizens anymore. Eriksen and Vetlesen (2016) point out that François Hollande’s declaration of war is exactly what IS leaders want. Especially the United States and France carry a historical burden of their ventures outside their own territories. Extremist religious movement in its essence is more politics than religion itself, faith being just a tool and a common denominator.

Also the Danish government is acting against terrorism and plans to establish a blacklist for “hate preachers”, meaning Muslim speakers arriving in Denmark and possibly agitating people. The scheme raises the question of freedom of speech that has had a high value in Denmark (Chadwick, 2016). The issue that is also prevalent in the analyzed articles is downplaying history: an article from Le Monde formulated referring to historical terrorist attacks during the Algerian civil war, “this terrorism remained however limited to known networks of intelligence and ended when their decommissioning was possible.” The past is not processed, even though data from the Global Terrorism Index (2015:68) underline
that “since F, 88 per cent of all terrorist attacks occurred in countries that were experiencing or involved in violent conflicts.”

After the San Bernardino shooting President Barack Obama said that it has to be “made harder, not impossible, but harder for individuals to get access to weapons.” The formulation shows that Obama is trying to balance between the relentless pro-gun movement and voices demanding more regulation. In France, according to Downing (2016), police are either completely absent or heavily armed in French suburbs. Many of the criminals have access to military grade weapons, as the state has failed to address the structural problems.

5.6. Conclusion

Let us look back on the research questions that were posed earlier in this paper, and summarize the findings.

Q1: To what extent does the press coverage on terrorist attacks and politicians’ comments contribute to managing citizens' fear and anxiety?

The language used is very graphic and heavy on emotions, and the coverage is frequent including survivors’ stories. The narrative form as known from novels adds up to the anxiety; first everything is fine, and suddenly the storm arrives. The choice of the news’ angle and how the events are framed steer the readers’ thinking as well. Newspaper reporting on a single victim and how unjustified his death was, or a narration of supporters of ISIL praising the attacks in the social media all have impact on the readers’ evaluation, in a broader sense.

French newspapers refer to President Hollande who explicitly says France is at war with terrorists. The word war obviously has a very negative connotation and, when repeated, sinks in citizens’ minds. Terrorists are alienated as they are referred to as “waves of jihadists” who “have no fear”. These descriptions create fear, and make the situation seem hopeless, and war is the only way out.

Seen from the perspective of resilience, the Danish prime minister Thorning-Schmidt is the only one aiming to address the nation as a whole and building unity. She addresses Muslim citizens, and emphasizes us facing the challenge together. This is quite the
opposite of President Hollande, who tells what he has decided, and demands France to stay strong, as a leader at war would.

Presidents Obama and Hollande are “in charge” in their rhetoric, by emphasizing that everything will be done to find out what happened (Obama), and actions will be taken, such as closing the borders (Hollande). Denmark’s Thorning-Schmidt repeatedly appeals to “us”. All leaders can be seen as building resilience; however, Thorning-Schmidt’s approach can be seen as the most sustainable in its attempt to build bridges. In total, there is much to do in the area of fear management and its execution, and the understanding of human fear.

Q2: To what extent does the discursive practice reproduce or, instead, restructure the existing order of terrorism discourse? What consequences does this have for the broader social and political practice?

The sample texts contribute to the idea of the Muslim “other”. The texts don’t explicitly blame Muslims or highlight the religion of the perpetrators, yet they employ subtle cues, and the choice of perspective is a strong statement. Bakker and de Graaf (2014) pointed out the benefits for building resilience that a media spokesperson coming from a minority background can have. Currently the focus lies on high-level politicians and other authorities that present the non-Muslim mainstream.

The common patterns of terrorism discourse are enforced by the juxtaposition of us versus them; “our way of living”, and the lack of self-critique when it comes to the past and the current declaration of war (president Hollande), versus faceless Islamist terrorists. Our own actions are seen as virtuous (Jackson, 2007), and terrorism is sometimes seen as an incurable disease (Bean, Keränen, & Durfy, 2011), and long-term solutions are not discussed enough. To a great extent, the media outlets echo what leaders say (Nacos, Bloch-Elkon, & Shapiro, 2007).

The scenes of terror are harmful from the point of view of Terror Management Theory (TMT). Political leaders should understand what the theory says about fear of death. Terrorist attacks can easily lead to anger and frustration, which again leads to what we know as rally-'round-the-flag phenomenon. Even if politicians understood the linkage, it is up to them whether they wish to comfort the public or use the public fear to back up their political goals.
Q3: Is the quantity or form of emotional content similar between different countries? If not, what differences are there?

It is, of course, impossible to draw conclusions or make generalizations of a publication’s general discursive style based on a limited sample as in this paper. However, the American and French newspapers are very dramatic in their narratives and often focus on an individual's experiences and thus underline the dramatic events. Danish sources play with readers' feeling as well, but do it in a more subtle way. American and French press focus more strongly on the physical actions taken and to be taken after the attacks, whereas Danish press coverage tends to be more analytical and looking forward, asking what can we do to prevent terrorist attacks in the future.
6. DISCUSSION

6.1. Limitations
The method of this paper, critical discourse analysis is fascinating and at the same time challenging research design. More comprehensive research design with a larger sample could bring added value and more credibility. Critical discourse analysis is a useful method on its own, but enriching the approach with other methods and a cross-disciplinary approach is advisable. As ex put it, analysis conducted by the human mind is helplessly selective; we see what we want to see, and ask questions we want to ask. One practical issue is the languages per se. Certain risks have to be recognized, when exploring original texts without possessing the language commands of a native speaker.

Studying the impact on people would be the next logical step. In other words, interviews and group discussions could provide valuable insights to the perceptions of fear and how media consumers feel about discourses on terrorism. When it comes to the first research question on anxiety and fear, it would be very interesting to confront people with this question, and combine the sensations with findings of a discourse analysis.

Critical discourse analysis has a lot to offer when shifting focus to other channels, such as television and Internet.

6.2. Scientific and societal significance
So far scholars of political science have been less keen to adopt this approach (van Dijk, 2001), therefore this study contributes to the deficiency.

Mass media has the responsibility of reporting acts of terrorism, just like it covers natural catastrophes, politics, and other significant topics. Many scholars warn about the devious cycle of terrorist attacks and media resonance. Media attention is fueling terrorist attacks by presenting horrendous acts and thus creating public fear (Mythen & Walklate, 2006). The question is whether media should continue reporting terrorist incidents as it is doing so at the moment, without sparing us from any bloody details, or if it should consider the open policy? Jetter (2014) even claims that media attention of a terror attack predicts the likelihood of another atrocity in the affected country within seven days' time and a shorter interval until the next incident.

Regardless of one’s political stance, maintaining a peaceful and resilient society should be in the interest of all citizens. The recent drastic increase of refugees coming to Europe, as
caused by the Syrian civil war has led to harder, polarized tones in the discourses in the political, as well as private fields, including social media (Wodak, 2015). Many see this polarization as extremely harmful, and the words having an effect on the actual atmosphere in the society. In addition, many right-wing parties and politicians see their chance in the situation; in the United States the Republican presidential candidate Donald Trump and several populist parties across Europe (Wodak, 2015). It is vital to recognize the power and meanings that simple words carry (Richardson, 2007). Social media and the globalized media landscape offer the perfect means for terrorists to spread their message. The technological possibilities are one reason to take the communicative power of terrorism very seriously (Nacos, 2003). From the recent history one can see how political leaders have taken advantage of the public fear and anxiety in order to gain support for their oversea actions, which again have led to increasing anti-American and anti-West feelings (De Castella & McGarty, 2011). Understanding and being aware of this mechanism is vital for keeping democracy strong.

A news text on terrorist attacks is one way in which the mass media affect our minds. Texts are not as flashy and loud as television broadcasts and videos available on the Internet, yet their impact should not be underestimated. Moreover, the academic world is bound to continue discovering linkages between discourse, emotions, and power.
REFERENCES

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APPENDICES
Appendix A: Abstract (English)

Terrorist attacks cause mixed feelings of fear, anxiety, and anger. Terrorist attacks have a high news value, and information and visual material are spread around the globe with the advances of modern technology. Media’s role in transmitting and filtering information is significant. At the same time, politicians are looked up to, and with their mode of communication they may steer the public discourse on terrorism and manage the public fear.

This Master's thesis asks whether the press coverage of terrorist attacks, including statements from political leaders, contributes to fear management, and what can be said about the discourse on Islamist terrorism. In addition, it is of interest to see if there is international variation in the form of emotion-laden content.

The literature review provides an understanding of terrorism discourse and what implications it has on the society, and the sense of fear and anxiety. Terror Management Theory explains how one may try to overcome the fear of mortality by signifying one’s worldview. This may also lead to clashes with the out-groups. According to Rally-'Round-the-Flag effect politicians can take advantage of the public fear and anxiety in hostile crisis situations. On the other hand public fear can be managed and psychological defense mechanisms strengthened.

The methodological approach taken in this paper is Critical Discourse Analysis (CDA) by Norman Fairclough in scrutinizing the signals embedded in news reports on three terrorist attacks from 2015. The cases are from Denmark, France, and the United States. What all these attacks have in common is the category of “Islamist terrorist attacks”. Two newspapers with the highest circulation were selected from each country. Analyzing the interrelated layers of text analysis, discourse practice, and sociocultural practice gives an understanding of how news texts are constructed and how they carry a myriad of values and meanings in them.
Appendix B: Abstract (Deutsch)


Die vorliegende Masterarbeit beschäftigt sich mit den Fragen in wie fern die Berichterstattung von Terroranschlägen und die politischen Äußerungen zum Fear-Management beitragen und wie der Diskurs von Islamistischen Terrorismus geprägt ist. Weiters werden die emotionellen Diskurse von verschiedenen Ländern unter Vergleich gesetzt.
