A Love Affair with ELF: linguistic hybridity in ELF couple discourse

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To Maria, Hrygoriy, Sashko and Rupert.
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LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS

cf. – compare
CoP – community of practice
CS – codeswitching
e.g. – for example
EFL – English as a foreign language
EIL – English as an international language
ELF – English as a lingua franca
ELFA – Corpus of English as a Lingua Franca in Academic Settings
ENL – English as a native language
GE – Global English
ibid. – in the same source
i.e. – that is
LFE – Lingua franca English
L1 – first language
L2 – second language
LN – non-native language
NS – native speaker
NNS – non-native speaker
ÖWB – Österreichisches Wörterbuch (Austrian Dictionary)
RQ – research question
SFG – Systemic-Functional Grammar
SLA – Second Language Acquisition
TOOD – The Online Oxford Dictionaries
TOMWED – The Online Meriam Webster English Dictionary
VOICE – Vienna-Oxford International Corpus of English
vs. – versus, as opposed to
WE/es – World English/es
Людей мільярди і мільярди слів,
а ти їх маєш вимовити вперше!
Ліна Костенко, “Страшні слова, коли вони мовчать... ”

(There are milliards of people and milliards of words
and you’ve to utter those words anew!
Lina Kostenko, “Strashni slova, koly vony movchat... ”)
1. **INTRODUCTION: WHEN A CUP OF COFFEE IS NOT YOUR CUP OF TEA**

What would one think are the normal replies to the offer like *Willst du eine Tasse Kaffee* ‘Would you like a cup of coffee’? Would one gratefully accept it with *Ja, bitte* ‘Yes, please’ or neutrally decline it with *Nein, danke* ‘No, thank you’? Or would one say *Ja, sicher* ‘Yes, of course’ or simply answer *Ja* ‘Yes’ or *Nein* ‘No’?

My response *Ja, ich will* to my husband’s offer *Willst du eine Tasse Kaffe* caused the first misunderstanding between us that I could remember. It happened once we were in the process of altering from English into German. English was our private lingua franca for about one year, and German was my husband’s first language. The stumbling block of this misunderstanding was the hybrid\(^1\) form *will*, which in our intimate discourse could be associated both with the English future auxiliary and German first person singular of the verb *wollen* ‘to want’. For me this word primarily was associated with our intimate English as a lingua franca (henceforth ELF) context, whereas for my husband it took a negative indexical value as impolite in connection to his ‘native’ knowledge of the world. In his ‘Austrian’ culture a usual response to such offer would be *Ja, bitte* ‘Yes, please’ or *Nein, danke* ‘No, thank you’. *Ja ich will* ‘Yes, I want’ could be contextually appropriate only as a response to priests’ *Will you have ... to be your wife... at the church wedding ceremony*. The hybrid *will* presupposed an ‘Austrian’ cultural context for my husband, and my lack of connection to this context caused our misunderstanding. That is to say, what could have been an effective linguistic sign in our lingua franca was a problem in my husband’s first language and had a particular culture-bound significance for him.

However, not only the disparity of our contexts, my ‘bad’ grammar, and the words themselves or their meaning matters here. What seems more important is the pretext or communicative effect of the conversation. My husband’s offer can be taken as the pretext of ‘phatic communion’ (Malinowski 1923: 315), which is at a premium in intimate discourse (Tannen 1991, Widdowson 2004: 79). In offering a cup of coffee to me, my husband appeals for sympathy and togetherness. While for me, the conversation first of all is a pretext for producing an intelligible structure by drawing upon two foreign resources available for me -

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\(^1\)Here, by *hybrid* I mean forms that involve two or more different linguistic resources (e.g. German, English and Ukrainian). For a detailed discussion of my understanding of *hybrid forms* and *linguistic hybridity* see Chapter 4-5.
English and German - in order to get a cup of coffee in the context of our intimate lingua franca discourse. This private discourse we have created with, through and in ELF. My husband, in turn, associates my utterance with his native language and connects it to his ‘native’ individual knowledge of the world. *Ja ich will* takes the communicative effect (pretext) of arrogance and haughtiness in his mother tongue. His appeal for intimacy thus fails when I am not affected as intended, but focus on the propositional meaning of his offer and do not ‘pick my words’.

This will-cup-of-coffee example illustrates how the same structure (in our case a hybrid one) can have different meaning potential and takes opposite communicative values in connection with two different – ‘monolingual’ German and English as a lingua franca – contexts, and what pretextual factors it can activate. Our failure to understand each other caused by the hybrid form *will*, then, raises two general questions. The first question has to do with the extent to which a particular linguistic sign is associated with a particular meaning potential and takes a particular communicative value in the actual discourse. In other words, it has to do with the relationship between “communicative capacity of the system” (Widdowson 2009: 179) or systems, and contextual and pretextual conditions involved in its realization in discourse. This question concerns the general pragmatic process of meaning negotiation in any human interaction. The second question has to do with the peculiarities of intimate discourse and a specific English as a lingua franca (couple) discourse. It concerns the ways in which language is used to establish rapport in intimate relationship, how partners with different linguistic and cultural backgrounds accomplish their ‘coupleness’ through the ‘third’ language - English as a lingua franca - and the role of partners’ other languages in such discourse.

What I will attempt to do in this thesis is to examine how language is used to establish and maintain intimate relationship on the example of ELF couples data. I aim at extending the analysis of ELF discourse to the domain of couple interactions. The focus will be on the hybrid forms. The purpose of my analysis and discussion thus is to add to our understanding of the discourse analysis of interaction in general and to the specific understanding of intimate ELF couple discourse. Of course, such an undertaking immediately poses the question: what is ELF couple discourse? In the following brief account, I outline
the scope of the study and provide preliminary definitions for the notions most relevant to this research, specifically discourse, ELF intimate discourse and hybridity.

1.1 SCOPE AND AIM OF THE STUDY

As I have mentioned above, there are two main concerns of this study. First, it has to do with the process of meaning negotiation in human interaction in general. Second, it addresses intimate discourse where partners do not share the same language and use English as a lingua franca as their common language. I undertake this research because ELF couples talk is at the crossroads of my personal and research interests. These include discourse analysis, applied linguistics, the linguistic construction of intimacy and couple identity, and ELF.

The study is a discourse analytic, sociolinguistic and applied linguistic exploration of the linguistic practices of couples who do not share the same language and establish their relationship through ELF. It addresses the following questions: What does it mean for people to live and communicate in ELF with a partner who has a different first language (henceforth L1) and culture? How do the two cultures resolve their difference? How is English as lingua franca used to establish rapport in intimate relationship? How do partners’ languages influence such lingua franca? What forms do these influences take? What contextual and pretextual factors (Widdowson 2004) are involved in producing and interpreting these forms in ELF intimate discourse? In short, the aim of this project is to deal with the ways, in which English as a lingua franca shapes partners’ ‘coupleness’, and is shaped by it. What the study focuses on are the ways whereby ELF couples appropriate the languages at their disposal in the process of doing intimate relationship.

For this purpose, five European couples with different first languages were asked to audio record their ELF private interactions whenever they both were present or felt comfortable doing so. A total of about 25 hours was recorded in this way in 2009-2011. The participants were asked to fill in a questionnaire and participate in the interview on their language background and linguistic practices. They were also asked to comment on the

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3 For the purpose of this study, by L1/s I refer to the languages of partners’ primary socialization, by L2 (a language of secondary socialization) I refer to any language which is not their L1. Where relative in the discussion, I also refer to such L2/s as LN/s (non-native language/s) (see also Section 1.1.2 for the terms native-nonnative).

4 For more detailed account of the couples and the data see Chapter 6.
selected extracts of their recordings in order to see what contextual and pretextual correlates can be relevant to them. Because some couples who participated in this project were not legally married but considered themselves as a couple, I use the term marriage and couplehood interchangeably throughout the thesis.

In extending my analysis of intimate discourse to the domain of ELF couple interaction I primarily draw upon two theoretical frameworks: first, Widdowson’s applied linguistic approach to discourse analysis (Widdowson 1973, 2004), and second, Bakhtin’s approach to linguistic hybridity as polyphony (Bakhtin 1981). In the next sections, I briefly outline the field of study to which this thesis belongs, namely discourse analysis and the framework for it developed by Widdowson, my understanding of ELF couple discourse, and the Bakhtinian notion of polyphony.

1.1.1 WHY DISCOURSE ANALYSIS?

Most researchers emphasise the diversity of the disciplines from which discourse analysis has developed. Because of such heterogeneity of disciplines, the field of discourse analysis is a rather confused one. It naturally implies different theoretical premises that influence, in turn, assumptions, concepts and methods. In linguistics, discourse analysis is also one of the most all-embracing but at the same time least defined areas.

So abundant and vague are the definitions of discourse that many books on the subject open their discussion with the survey of its definitions (cf. Jaworski and Coupland 1999, Schiffrin 1994). These are some of them:

(I)
Discourse is: ‘language above the sentence or above the clause’ (Stubbs 1983: 1)

(II)
Discourse [...] is the way in which units above the rank of clauses are related and patterned [...].
(Sinclare and Coulthard 1975: 8)

(III)
Discourse – language beyond the sentence – is simply language – as it occurs, in any context (including the context of linguistic analysis), in any form (including two made-up sentences in sequences; a tape recorded conversation, meeting or interview; a novel or play). (Tannen 2007: 5)

Despite the extreme vagueness of discourse definitions, a broad distinction between two paradigms can be made, namely formalist and functionalist frameworks. The first paradigm describes discourse as structure, or “a particular unit of language (above the sentence)” (Schiffrin 1994: 20). The latter conceives of discourse as function, or in Schiffrin’s words, “a particular focus on language use” (ibid. 20). Many researchers have searched for the synthesis of formalist and functionalist work. One of such attempts is that
of Schiffrin (1994). The author recognizes that discourse as use has to do not with sentences but with *utterances* that is “units of language production (whether spoken or written) that are inherently contextualized; whether and how they are related to sentences (or, in fact, to other units as proposition, turns or tone units) is an issue that will not be explicitly enter into our discussion” (ibid.: 41).

Accordingly, structural definitions focus upon text, and functional definitions upon context. However, for most researchers the difference between text and discourse is of no conceptual importance: the terms often are defined as “language above sentence” and used in free variation (for a detailed discussion see Widdowson 2004: 1-16). Such approaches, nonetheless, raise a number of questions. It is not clear what language *above/beyond* the sentence is. If there is language above/beyond the sentence, does it mean that there is language *below/within*? Is discourse, defined as language “above sentence” or language in use, an all-inclusive category? If yes, does it say “more or other than the term “linguistics”: the study of language”? (Tannen 2007: 5). If discourse is almost synonymous to *text* and *language* itself, why do we then need a separate name *discourse analysis* for the field?

These issues have been taken up by many linguists. My own intellectual path has led me to the applied linguistic model for discourse analysis developed by Widdowson. In his account *Text, context, pretext* (2004), he formulates at least three points that can be taken as a starting point for my study. First, the author provides a conceptual distinction between text and discourse, which rejects “as unsatisfactory, and misleading, the definition of either of them in terms of language “above the sentence” (Widdowson 2004: 14). The relation between discourse and text is described as that of process and product. Thus, text is a linguistic trace of discourse. Discourse is the pragmatic process of meaning negotiation.

Second, texts need to be connected to discourse and discourse community. According to Widdowson, this connection is indirectly mediated by schematic conventions and pretextual purposes. As Widdowson puts it,

> Unless it is activated by this contextual connection, the text is inert. It is this activation, this acting of context on code, this indexical conversion of the symbol that I refer to discourse. (Widdowson 2004:8)

What is central for my discussion of ELF couple talk is not only Widdowson’s concept of *context* but also the concept of *pretext* as one more factor in the general interpretative process. The notion refers to “an ulterior motive” (Widdowson 2004: 79) in engaging in communication. It is important to note that the application of Widdowson’s proposal for discourse analysis to my analysis of hybrid features in ELF couples talk is partly inspired by
Tannen’s (1986, 2007) work on monolingual\textsuperscript{5} intimate discourse. Tannen also argues that couple communication is a continual balancing act of “juggling the conflicting needs for intimacy and independence” (Tannen 1986: 27) where perlocutionary effect or pretext (in Tannen’s words, \textit{metamessage}) of accomplishing partners’ ‘coupleness’ is generally at a premium. Her understanding of intimate discourse gets close to that of Widdowson who suggests that “the desired effect of mediating comity” (Widdowson 2004: 79), the pretext of domestic intimacy and togetherness, which also inevitably brings contextual factors into play, is the defining feature of such discourse. Following this line of argument, the study takes linguistic hybridity (as well as other resources) in ELF couples talk as a device not only for \textit{contextualization} (cf. Gumperz 1982) but for \textit{pretextualization} as well. From this viewpoint, ELF and hybrid forms within it can be treated as linguistic resources that are used to activate and ratify particular \textit{contexts} (schematic constructs), and at the same time to achieve particular \textit{pretexts} or interactive purposes that manage the relationship between the two parties.

Finally, making the distinction between two sets of concepts, Widdowson argues strongly that text must be associated with analysis, and discourse and its factors (context, and pretext) with interpretation. That is to say, the recognition of the purpose of a text or utterance depends not only on contextual but also on pretextual factors. These pretextual factors regulate not only the parties’ but also the analyst’s focus of attention on the textual features to be analysed and the contextual factors to be considered.

To adopt Widdowson’s model, thus, also means to realize that any sociolinguistic and discourse analytic research is also a contextually and pretextually embedded activity. Each step in the research framework and method is profoundly affected by the values, opinions, biases, beliefs and even political interests of the researcher. Each new truth is partial, incomplete and culture-bound. That is to say, with the thesis at hand I will inevitably present my own view of the world, my model of reality, which of course is open to investigation by other models. As Widdowson surmises:

\begin{quote}
 [...] It seems to me that models of human behaviour in the social sciences are comparable in status and function to the representations of human behaviour in novels and plays or any other art form. Both depend upon idealization procedures which in effect yield archetypes of a kind which we can set into correspondence with actual and non-idealised reality. There is not, and cannot be, any direct empirical link between either of them and the external world. Descriptive models and fictional representations create archetypical norms of human behaviour which we can accept as a plausible pattern against which actuality can be compared. Their function is not to be correct but convincing,
\end{quote}

\textsuperscript{5} For the purpose of this thesis, by \textit{monolingual discourse} I refer to the situations where partners/interlocutors share and communicate in the same first language.
Likewise, my purpose is not to maintain the myths of empiricism but clarify the process of human intimate communication and add to our understanding of intimate discourse where partners do not share the same L1. To be more convincing, however, the study looks at such private discourse from both emic and etic perspectives (Pike 1954). That is to say, the thesis analyses and interprets ELF couple data not only on the basis of the detached perspective of the researcher (etic perspective), but also incorporates the participants’ perspectives and interpretations (voices) of their linguistic practices, behaviour, events and situation (emic perspective). For this purpose, I have conducted interviews and discussed selected extracts from the recordings with each couple. These interviews and participants’ comment have been necessary for several reasons. First, they have helped me to gather additional biographical information; this was not possible to get through the demographic questionnaire and recording. Second, I have got the participants’ introspections and perspectives on their linguistic practices and possible contextual and pretextual factors whose history (pre-text) and meaning were not clear for me as an outsider. Third, I have engaged the participants in reflection on aspects of the research and analysis. Finally, both audio data and comment have enabled to locate mismatches between reported and actual behaviour. Thus, I have tried not to create distance to ensure objectivity and to avoid bias (if it is likely at all) in my research, but to encourage the couples to participate in the analysis and reflection on their own practices as much as possible.

To sum up, the thesis takes discourse as the pragmatic process of meaning negotiation and attempts to inquire into how partners’ contexts and pretexts can act upon the same text to give rise to diverse interpretations with the focus on hybrid forms in ELF couples data. In what follows I touch upon the reasons why I undertake this study and the peculiarities of ELF intimate discourse.

1.1.2 **Why ELF Couples?**

Many years ago, I was married to a man who believed that I did not have the right to criticize and argue with him, because I was a woman and he was a man. He claimed that my ‘woman’ place was in the kitchen and my only right was to be mutely submissive to the husband. This was frustrating, because I knew it was irrationally destructive and unfair. I could not ascribe such disparity in his and my vision of our ‘coupleness’ to the fact that we
had grown up in different countries, or had different linguacultural backgrounds. We spoke the same first language. He was a man of good qualities, and both of us were respected people. Nevertheless, ten years of living with the man (I had in the end separated from) left me exhausted and helpless with the question: Why did not our communication and relationship work out? What and why went wrong? What could I do to resolve conflicts and building healthy relationship? What is such healthy/happy or any relationship all about?

Now I am married to a man who is a partner and a friend. Strange as it might seem, not only are our ways to position ourselves sometimes contradictory. We have grown up in different countries. We do not share the same first language. Our cultural backgrounds are rather diverse. Moreover, at the beginning of our relationship, we spoke English, which was a mother tongue/L1 for neither of us. Even so, it is a continual source of pleasure to speak to my husband, and we both enjoy the process of accomplishing our ‘coupleness’ despite some misunderstandings like one described in the introduction. How is it possible, then, that someone I can tell everything to, someone who understands, does not even share the same L1 with me? Might it be that English as a neutral lingua franca influenced the process of making our relationship? Or do our cultures and relationship shape the linguistic practices in our marriage?

In the process of looking for possible explanations, I have addressed discourse analytic and ELF studies. I have briefly outlined how the applied linguistic approach to discourse analysis can add to our understanding of intimate discourse in the previous section. Let us now consider what bearings ELF research might have for my study. To begin with, the term *ELF couples* must be clarified. I take the term *ELF* to mean “any use of English among speakers of different first languages for whom English is the communicative medium of choice, and often the only option” (Seidlhofer 2011: 7). This definition does not exclude the participation of native speakers of English in such interactions. This present thesis, however, deals with interactions between non-native speakers. Whereas disregarding English native speakers in institutional or business settings would not provide a whole picture of ELF use, such restriction of ELF to nonnative-nonnative interactions seems to be

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6 Here, the term native speaker (NS) is taken to mean somebody for whom a language is her/his L1, or the language of her/his primary socialization. The term non-native speaker (NNS) refers to somebody for whom a language is not her/his L1. All the participants’ ‘non-native’ languages, or languages of their secondary socialization, are referred to as their second language/s (L2/s)
productive and necessary for the investigation of couple discourse. Bilingual couple research provides the following examples of language use in bi/multilingual couples:

1. a receptively bilingual household; each spouse uses only his/her own native language productively;
2. a monolingual household; both spouses exclusively or mainly use the same language, either of their first languages;
3. a productively bilingual household; at least one spouse (possibly both) can use either language;
4. an L3 (third language) household; as a common language both spouses use a third language, which is the native language of neither (Yamamoto 1995: 68)

Couples in which one partner has English and the other language X as a first language can be primarily defined as bilingual couples. Using Yamamoto’s (1995) terminology, if both spouses exclusively or mainly use the same language, the L1 of the native English partner, as their common language they belong to “a monolingual household” (Yamamoto 1995: 68). The reasons how and why the partners arrive at such linguistic choice and status of both partners in such situation seem to be rather different from those in ELF couple interactions where partners use what Yamamoto refers to as an L3 (cf. Gundacker 2010, see also Chapter 5). Therefore, I refer to ELF couples as intimate partners who do not share the same mother tongue and use English as a common language, which is the first language for neither. In line with this definition, I recruited only couples who do not share the same first language and use English as a common language for the purposes of their private interaction.

Since English is not the author’s first language, the present thesis is also an instance of ELF. In this connection, it is important to keep apart the notions of English as a foreign language (EFL) and English as a lingua franca (ELF). EFL presupposes that people learn and use English with the primary purpose to interact with its native speakers (henceforth NSs) and to become a member of a NS community (Seidlhofer 2011:17). If we take English as a foreign language, NSs are a relevant and desirable role model for non-native speakers (henceforth NNSs). However, people all over the world nowadays more often than not use English as a means of international communication for quite different purposes. The main objective here is not to interact with NSs or conform to NS norms but to “make use of the (only) language shared by all interactants, the lingua franca, in order to achieve the fullest communication possible” (Seidlhofer 2011: 17-18). This thesis is not an exception. The study, then, is about and in English as a lingua franca and so is the evidence of how the potential of the global, or what Widdowson (2003: 48) refers to as ‘virtual’ language can be realized and actualized rather than an attempt to adopt and conform to the actual ‘native’ (whatever they might be) encoded conventions. I will discuss the notion of virtual language
in relation to ELF in Chapter 2. At this point, I consider how ELF discourse can facilitate our understanding of the general process of human communication.

As I have mentioned above, in a ‘monolingual’ household my ex-husband and I have found ourselves in communication impasse. Misunderstandings in my present marriage have often been connected to one of our first languages (mostly to our native/non-native German). Strange as it might seem, in ELF our communication has usually gone smoothly. Similarly to my own observation and experience, most ELF research claims that ELF discourse is the consensus-oriented use of the language to create its own “commonsense” criteria [...] of emically perceived communicative efficiency in [the user’s] current situation” (Seidlhofer 2005: 161). On the other hand, some studies (House 2003) report that the only cases of failed communication in international encounters have been observed in the interactions of multilingual speakers with those for whom English is a native or sole (first) language that is in native-nonnative encounters.

One possible explanation for the dissimilarities of the two discourses is the relationship between systemic and schematic knowledge (Widdowson 2009: 343) in language use. The point is that in the pragmatic process of meaning negotiation people do not just use their knowledge of linguistic system, or code, but relate it to the knowledge of the world, or schematic constructs. If we take such interactional perspective on language, miscommunication in N-NN talk is rather easy to explain. It can be assumed that native speakers treat their norms as universally applicable and may fail to negotiate the meaning with nonnatives who can apply rather different norms in the interaction (Canagarajah 2007: 929). Contrary to N-NN interactions, ELF communication entails a lack of one prevailing norm due to the multitude of codes available for application, and such interaction requires negotiation of new mutually developed norms and signs (cf. Meierkord 2002: 120). Therefore, an ungrammatical/’incorrect’ usage or unconventional word choice (as the hybrid form will) are often functional in ELF interactions (cf. Hülmbauer 2006).

To put it another way, effective and successful communication usually relies on the speakers’ sufficient knowledge of the language system and shared knowledge of communication schemata. For native speakers of any language sharing the knowledge of the language usually (but not always) presupposes sharing the knowledge of the world as well. ELF partners often cannot rely on such shared schematic knowledge, and, of course, they might be far from simulating the native speaker behaviour in their private communication. In Widdowson’s (2003: 48-50) terms, they use the “virtual language” English, which is
remote from the cultural associations of its native speakers. ELF partners have and take
advantage of such detachment and relate their foreign language to their own private reality.
In doing so, they mutually create the new schematic conventions in their private discourse.

Given this, ELF couple interaction is a fascinating site for exploring discourse in
general, and intimate discourse in particular. On the one hand, ELF facilitates our recognition
that the use of the same language does not always have the same schematic associations with
it. In other words, a language can be symbolically and indexically dissociated from any
particular cultural affiliation. On the other hand, ELF adds to our understanding of the
processes whereby different contextual and pretextual factors are brought into the same
interaction.

1.1.3 Why Hybridity?

I have argued in the previous section that ELF is in many ways a peculiar use of the
language whose forms often defy native standards and may involve the direct or indirect
interplay of three or even more linguistic and cultural systems. Consequently, variation is
considered as the heart of the nature of ELF. Because of the diversity of this communicative
medium, ELF is interpersonally constructed in each specific complex of interaction (cf.
Since each community negotiates the form of such English for speakers’ purposes (Seidlhofer
2005, 2011); the assumption has been that lingua franca conversation can be best
characterised as a hybrid form of communication, potentially involving both structures that
are results of learning a foreign language, and items that implicitly/explicitly reflect the
speaker’s culture ((Firth 1990, 1996; Jenkins 2003; House 1999, 2003; Hülmbauer 2006,
2014; Meierkord 2000, 2002; Seidlhofer 2004, 2011). As concerns ELF couple discourse, it
can be claimed that it is not completely different from language use in other ELF domains.
Therefore, the hypothesis can be made that linguistic hybridity, governed by partners’ lingua-
cultural backgrounds and by the peculiarities of ELF discourse, is a significant multi-facet
element of ELF talk that forms part of the particular speech style of ELF couples. Thus, the
main argument of this thesis is that the appreciation of ELF couple talk as a unique act of
communication depends on the understanding of its hybridity features.

The concept of hybridity has a long and honourable history within different
disciplines (Young 1995). Most scholars agree that hybridity is a universal aspect of any
conversational discourse and can occur in any speech community that have linguistic
repertoires involving more than one “way of speaking” (Woolard 2007:74). However, in linguistics, hybridity has most often been investigated as code alternation in bilingual and multilingual settings, and the main focus has been on such aspects as code switching and code mixing (Auer 1984, Gumperz 1982, Myers-Scotton 1993, Rampton 1995, Poplack 1980, Pujolar 2001). The assumption has been that the more distinct the varieties between which speakers ‘switch’, the more available for scrutiny and speculation linguistic hybridity might be. According to Woolard, “[w]ork on such salient cases can then facilitate our recognition of related but less apparent phenomena” (Woolard 2007: 74). However, such exclusive connection of hybridity with bi/multilingualism and codeswitching seems counterproductive:

Not only is the extent of the phenomenon overlooked, but also the analysis of codeswitching is often marginalized from broader theoretical enterprise that should both inform and be informed by such work (Woolard 2007: 74).

Moreover, the notions of code-switching/mixing themselves are problematic since they presuppose the existence of separate distinct languages-entities (see Chapter 3). Although it might be convenient for a linguistic analyst to assume that there are separate and distinct languages-codes between/among which (exclusively?) bilinguals/multilinguals ‘switch’ back and forth, in reality there are not.

Therefore, in my view, language alternation can be most profitably clarified by the Bakhtinian notion of hybridity as polyphony. Bakhtin defines polyphony as multiplicity of voices/positions that is mediated by what he refers to as utterance. According to him, polyphony is a dialogic process of negotiating – actualizing and realizing – people’s voices/positions by mediation of their language/s. In other words, the process of human communication or, in Bakhtin’s terms, word-discourse always entails interpersonal positioning (Bakhtin 1997: 34, 2002: 56-114). This he delineates as dialogue between different personal (ideological) positions (voices), as doubleness that fuses and brings together, but also maintains separation. Discussing Dostoevsky’s literary work, the author claims that every utterance is a unique combination of two interrelated dynamics that drive all conversational discourse: on the one hand, uni/co-voicing (relative closeness); on the other hand, vari-voicing (relative distance). In this view, there is no meaningful opposition between bilingual/multilingual discourse and monolingual discourse. There is only discourse that is realized and mediated by what Bakhtin refers to as word-language.

Bakhtin’s (1984) understanding of hybridity as polyphony can have important consequences for the investigation and conceptualization of ELF couples practices. First, his
concept of voicing captures the dynamic nature of meaning making, allowing continuity but also ambiguity and variability in significance for any given linguistic form or element. Second, Bakhtin describes the nature of language as dialogic interpersonal positioning or as both expressing and addressing activity. As I have already mentioned, such understanding encompasses both ‘monolingual’ and ‘multilingual’ forms and allows for a broader basis for theorizing about the nature of linguistic hybridity in ELF couple talk than within the confines of bilingual code switching, or code mixing. Finally, in this view, hybridity as polyphony operates at and fuses two (inseparable indeed) levels – discoursal/positional and textual/formal. Consequently, approaching linguistic hybridity in ELF couple talk as polyphony can be a more useful way to elaborate on different forms it takes and to explore the interplay between ELF couples’ language use and interactional processes in their private space.

In light of the above, the study focuses on linguistic hybridity as polyphony that can be preliminary defined as a mixture of all the available languages within the boundaries of an ELF utterance or interaction, which is produced by partners under particular contextual and pretextual conditions. The study, thus, incorporates some basic ideas of Widdowson’s proposal for text realization as discourse and articulates it with Bakhtin’s (1984) notion of polyphony for the analysis of ELF couples’ conversational data. To put it another way, Widdowson’s context and pretext will help me to catch Bakhtin’s voices/positions in ELF couple talk. More specifically, the study aims to analyse the discursive process that Bakhtin refers to as polyphony and Widdowson as positioning on the basis of ELF couple conversational data.

1.2 RESEARCH QUESTIONS

With the sociolinguistic and discourse-analytic coordinates for my own research in place, it is now possible to formulate the questions guiding it. They are:

1. How can linguistic hybridity be defined and operationalized from the discourse analytic perspective in general and for research on ELF couple discourse in particular? (RQ1)

2. What are the formal/textual characteristics/manifestations of linguistic hybridity in ELF couple talk? (RQ2)
3. How linguistic hybridity in ELF couple talk functions to pragmatic/discoursal effect? How ELF couples realize the meaning potential of hybrid forms and their language/s in general as discourse? (RQ3)

4. What are the characteristic (interactive) features of such (private couple) discourse as interpersonal positioning? (RQ4)

My main argument will be that linguistic hybridity, as any other language use, has to be understood in relation to discourse and its factors. In this respect, it mediates negotiation whereby partners bring individual contextual worlds into convergence and enact their positions by acting upon each other to a particular pretextual/perlocutionary effect.

1.3 OUTLINE

This thesis consists of two broad sections. The first one comprises Chapters 2-5 and lays the theoretical groundwork for this thesis. The second one comprises Chapter 6-9 which document the conduct and engagement of the empirical research this thesis is founded on and describes the findings of the research. Chapter 6 deals with data collection and introduces the participants. Chapters 7-9 analyses how the partners-participants position themselves in their private interaction. Taking a descriptive lexicogrammatical and discourse analytical perspective, the present study proposes that hybridity as polyphony or interpersonal positioning can serve as a central concept for understanding ELF couple discourse.

As a starting point, Chapter 2 introduces the concept of English as a lingua franca. For the purpose of this thesis, I treat ELF as actualized variations (Seidlhofer 2011:94-95) of the same basic virtual resource of Global English that is exploited to meet various communicative needs of its users. Clearly, such actualized variations often involve language alternation or linguistic hybridity. The chapter, therefore, provides a selective review of ELF research into linguistic hybridity. Since most ELF researchers describe linguistic hybridity in ELF interaction by drawing upon the sociolinguistic concepts of codeswitching/mixing/meshing (henceforth CS), bi/multi/translingualism and languaging; Chapter 3 looks at how the notions are understood in the social sciences, and what bearings they have for conceptualizing linguistic hybridity in the present thesis.

Chapter 4 lays the theoretical groundwork for my research by considering Bakhtin and Widdowson’s approaches to discourse. The chapter questions the notions of code-switching/mixing as unsatisfactory for describing linguistic hybridity in ELF couple interaction and argues for its understanding in relation to the general process of discourse as
polyphony/positioning and its factors. It is the purpose of Chapter 5 to present a comprehensive report of research into linguistic practices of ELF couples. Where appropriate, I also refer to the literature on bilingual and monolingual couple communication.

Chapter 6 explains what bearings Bakhtin and Widdowson’s theoretical approaches to discourse have for the interpretation of the couples’ data and how they can be applied to the data itself. It details the process of data collection and analysis, and the challenges I encountered in this process. These challenges include what Widdowson refers to as “a paradox of irreducible subjectivity” (2004:10) of any research and observation. This means that any analysis is a matter of interpretation, which is driven by the researcher pretextual purpose. The reliance upon a ‘triangulated’ three-perspective data is justified by the Bakhtinian polyphonic/dialogic stance adopted in this thesis. Such stance presupposes that I do not provide the position/interpretation on what is going on in ELF couple discourse but rather an alternative model of it that is open for revision by other models. Finally, the chapter introduces the five ELF couples-participants as the research subjects.

Chapters 7-9 provide analysis and interpretation of the couples’ linguistic behaviour and their attitudes to it, and look at how they position themselves in the process of accomplishing their ‘coupleness’ by mediation of hybrid forms. The chapters aim to provide a sense of ‘emerging people’ behind the data. They explore the peculiarities of couples’ hybrid language use and interactive features of couples positioning as mediated by such use within their ELF. In other words, the chapters describe lexicogrammatical features of partners’ hybrid uses and interpret them in relation to discourse and its factors. Chapter 10 summarizes the main findings of the thesis, and considers theoretical implications and directions for future research.
2. HYBRIDITY IN ELF DISCOURSE: SETTING THE SCENE

This thesis is about English as a lingua franca in couple discourse. My purpose is to contribute to ELF research by investigating ELF at the basic level of communication between two individuals in a romantic relationship. This, in turn, has to do with two questions. The first concerns the issues related to global spread of English as an international language. The second regards the expression of those issues in the microcosm of ELF intimate interactions, and prompts us to think again about the general nature of language as expressed at the micro level in ELF romantic interaction.

It is clear that there are at least two kinds of factors related to globalization that make it possible for two people from different parts of the world to meet and make a relationship. On the one hand, there are developments in telecommunications and the internet and increased mobility. On the other, the global spread of English that has come about as a result. This chapter is mostly concerned with the latter factor, namely with globalization of English as a ‘neutral’ lingua franca that has brought ELF couples into being. It seems quite reasonable to begin the discussion with a closer look at ELF research and relevance of its findings to the investigation of ELF nature in intimate interaction. In this chapter, I first consider what one might understand under the term global English and ELF as integration of virtual and plurilingual resources, and what bearings my own understanding of them can have on the analysis of hybrid forms in ELF couple talk (Section 2.1). Since the past years have witnessed an intensively increasing quantity of research that tackles aspects of hybridity in ELF within a rather short period, it is impossible (and inexpedient) to give its complete overview. Therefore, Section 2.2 selectively reviews those ELF studies that mainly reflect on variability in ELF as evidence of speakers’ exploitation of the virtual resource of English. Section 2.3 reviews research that primarily deals with the plurilingual resources within ELF. In Section 2.4, I discuss studies that consider the hybrid nature of ELF as a combination of both virtual and plurilingual resources. Finally, Section 2.5 sums up the findings in ELF research which are most pertinent for this thesis. The chapter also provides preliminary definitions for the notions most relevant to the present research, specifically, ELF, ELF partners, and hybridity in ELF.

2.1 ELF: GLOBAL SPREAD - VIRTUAL LANGUAGE

Most research on global spread of English (Coupland 2010, Crystal 1997) agrees that neither economic globalization nor the exchange of information and cultural influences across continental, national and regional boundaries promoted by it is new in the history of humankind. What is especially remarkable today is the speed and scale at which these processes are developing. The worldwide trends like international mobility and expansion of electronic communication via the internet have furthered the need for a shared global language. It is generally assumed that it is English that has become such a predominant global language for most people all over the world (Graddol 2006, Northrup 2013, Seidlhofer 2011, Schneider 2011). As Jenkins at. al. (2011: 303) claim English has become “at once a globalized and globalizing phenomenon”.

Discussion of the unprecedented spread of English has yielded in a confusing multiplicity of terms. To list few of them: English as a foreign language (EFL), Global English (GE), World Englishes, English as an international language (EIL), and English as a lingua franca (ELF). I have already mentioned the irrelevance of EFL for the description of the language as used on the global scale in the introduction (p. 20). I have argued that EFL presupposes that people learn and use English with the primary purpose to interact with its native speakers and to become a member of a particular NS community by conforming to NS norms. While ELF is a means of intercultural communication and so is used for quite different purposes. In the following, I will substantiate my understanding of GE and my preference for ELF to the other terms for conceptualizing globalized English. To begin with, I suggest considering two general ways of understanding GE in sociolinguistic research (Mufwene 2010, Seidlhofer 2011, Schneider 2011). The first can be traced back to the processes of colonization. The second has to do with English as an international language that “serves a whole range of different communities and their institutional purposes, and this transcends traditional communal and cultural boundaries” (Widdowson 1994: 385). The focus in research into English as a means of global communication has been on two kinds of developments, which, according to Widdowson, can be defined as dialect-like and register-like:

English has spread to become international by the exploitation of the resources of the virtual language, and that this has resulted in two kinds of development. One of them is primary and local and takes the form of varieties which are dialect-like in that they serve the immediate everyday social needs of a particular community. The other is secondary and global and takes the form of registers associated with particular domains of institutional and professional use. (Widdowson 2003: 55).
What Widdowson is saying here is that, on the one hand, there are the *globally scattered varieties* of English, which are brought about by outside intervention and are the consequence of the colonial rule. These varieties (like Nigerian English) normally serve the needs of a particular local community and are endonormative\(^8\) (creating their own norms ‘from within’ for the purposes of this particular community) and independent (cf. Schneider 2011: 35). Such English is adapted by those communities for their local *communicative* and *communal* needs and has resulted in what Kachru\(^9\) (1992) refers to as World Englishes (henceforth WEes) of the Outer Circle where English is typically characterized as a second language. It seems quite obvious that those varieties cannot be treated as a global means of communication by definition. What was globally spread has become subject to local constraint and control. Consequently, the term *World Englishes* can be defined as ‘dialect-like’ varieties which are likely
to take their own natural course and in time evolve into separate species of language, adapted to the needs and expressive of the identity of separate communities, gradually becoming mutually unintelligible. (Widdowson 2003: 53)

To put it another way, *WEes* defines the varieties that have evolved from GE into languages of primary socialization for every-day needs in those communities, and is, therefore, different from globalized English in ELF private interaction. Although the processes of variation and change in the evolution of WEes and in ELF use in couple interaction are in principle similar, partners’ English remains the language of their secondary socialization. The couples’ ELF is not English acquired in the process of upbringing in family and/or primary L1 community. It is normally English that is learned through secondary socialization of education and training to become members of global communities, such as medical, architectural or business communities. It is English that Seidlhofer describes as the ‘imported’ English, or English that millions of people learn and use for a wide range of public and personal purposes:

> [English] has been ‘exported’ to many regions of the world by its ‘native’ speakers, primarily through colonization, and so has invaded these places. It has, however, to an even larger extent been

\(^8\) As Seidlhofer, Breiteneder and Pitzl (2006) point out there are at least two different approaches in ELF research as well. Exonormative approach tends to describe ELF data “more through the lens of familiar ENL forms”. Endonormative approach conceives of ELF as language use in its own right.

\(^9\) The Kachruvian model of World Englishes is based on the distinction of the countries/regions where English is used. The Inner Circle refers to the countries where English is a native/first language (eg, Great Britain, the USA), the Outer Circle refers to the countries where it is used as a second language (eg, India), and the Expanding Circle to the countries where it is taught as a foreign language (eg, Russia). See also Graddol (2006: 110), Seidlhofer (2011), Schneider 2011: 31-11), Widdowson (2003) for the full discussion of the Kachruvian model of WEs.
‘imported’ by people all over the world who decide to learn it as a useful language in addition to their first language(s). (Seidlhofer 2011: 3)

One way of understanding such ‘imported’ international English is to think of it in terms of the ‘register-like’ development (Widdowson 2003) of the language. The ‘register-like’ development serves as a device for communication outside one’s primary social/cultural space and relates not to local but rather to global communities, to domains of use, the areas of knowledge and expertise, which transcend national boundaries and are global of their very nature: registers of medicine, engineering, commerce, technology or politics. This kind of language development can be delineated as language use that is defined not so much by (primary) experience but by (secondary) expertise (Widdowson 2003: 54). To summarize, the notion WEes describes globally scattered “dialect-like” varieties evolved from GE that serve the everyday social needs of a particular ‘local’ primary community. The term English as an international language can be understood as globally scattered “register-like” varieties that are used for global purposes in institutional and professional domains.

But what about all kinds of general uses of English all over the globe that cannot be accounted for by the categories of local community and primary experience (dialect-like development), or global community and secondary expertise (register-like development)? What about all kinds of globally scattered variation of English not only for global but also for private communication that also falls within the rubric of English as an international language? At this point, I suggest considering the concept of the virtual language proposed by Widdowson (2003):

[…]we might think of English as an international language not in terms of the distribution of a stable and unitary set of encoded forms, but as the spread of a virtual language which is exploited in different ways for different purposes. (Widdowson 2003: 50, my italics)

Widdowson distinguishes two ways of understanding GE here. The internationalization of English (or any other language) is often seen in terms of the distribution of conventionally encoded linguistic forms, which are believed to be appropriate on the authority of a particular group of NSs and remain intact when being transmitted. Such understanding is based on the assumption that language is a relatively complete and well defined entity, an invariant code, a state of being “with-the-national-name” (Piller 2011, see also Chapter 5) belonging to some authorized ‘native’ community. This distribution of the actual standardized norms presupposes some kind of outside (‘native’) agency and implies adoption and conformity to those norms.
With language spread, as distinct from distribution, there is also agency, but agency of a different kind. As I have argued above, language can spread only by and through people who use it. The agency in the spread of English on the global scale “resides in non-native speakers just as much as with native speakers in principle, and in practice even more so, due to difference on speaker numbers” (Seidlhofer 2011: 50). What is crucial here is that the agency in language spread is always the agency of using or doing language rather than of having or distributing it. It is the agency of what Alton Becker (1995) refers to as languaging that I discuss in more detail in Sections 3.4. *Language spread* understood as languaging is an ‘orientational’ *open-ended process* “that combines shaping, storing, retrieving, and communicating knowledge” (Becker 1995: 9, my italics) rather than transmitting intact “denotational” products. Since language spreads only through *interpersonal* contact, through and by people, it cannot be transmitted or transplanted unchanged into the human mind. If one conceives of a *language* as the manifestation of an enclosed linguistic code or system, communication is nothing but such transmission of unchanged “denotational” products. However, it is not what one can observe in the actual process of meaning negotiation. People will always use language to textualize their own discourses, or to realize their own discourses through various textualizations (whether they formally conform to the conventionalized norms or not). It follows, then, that the process of hybridization of GL (like any other language) takes place at least at two levels: formal/textual and functional/discoursal. On the one hand, then, in the process of GE spread we have to do with linguistic hybridity that can be observable at the formal textual level and primarily is a matter of linguistic analysis. The example of this can be the transformation of uncount nouns such as *information* into count *informations* in ELF interaction (cf. Hülmbauer 2013, see also Section 2.1.1 for a more detailed discussion of *informations*). On the other hand, in the process of textualizing discourse as mediated by GE we have to do with pragmatic or cultural hybridity, which is a matter of interpretation. For example, one can assume that, by the use of plural –*s* in *informations*, the speaker in-forms it by his national affiliation or signals solidarity with other NNSs who participate in the interaction.

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10 According to many scholars, the number of NNS of English exceeds the number of its NS. Craddol (2006: 98-99), for example, estimated that around two billions of people would learned English in schools in 2010. Crystal (2008: 6) indicates that approximately a third of the world’s population currently speaks English as a non-native language.
In this view, GE necessarily spreads by the textualizations of different discourses of its users. English as a global language, as a global virtual resource, thus, cannot be seen as a reproduction of English as a native language (whatever it might be) at any level (whether it is formal or functional). It will always be influenced by the multiplicity of people’s contexts and pretexts and, by its nature, cannot be transmitted or distributed unchanged into people’s mind. Therefore, following Widdowson, I suggest conceiving of GE as the spread of the virtual language, or “resource for making meaning immanent in the language which simply has not hitherto been encoded and so is not, so to speak, given official recognition” (Widdowson 2003: 48-49). In other words, the global language can be defined as what Seidlhofer refers to as “the virtual capacity for exploitation, inherent in the encoded language itself”, or “the underlying encoding possibilities that speakers make use of” (Seidlhofer 2011: 110-111, italics in the original). This virtual potential, by definition, cannot be used exclusively within the limits of whatever variety – ‘native’, “dialect-like” or “register-like”. It gets realized through variation at the individual level in all kinds of globally scattered interactions. This being so, ELF understood as various realizations of such virtual resource all over the world seems to be the most plausible term for conceptualizing GE in private discourse. Thus, for the purpose of this thesis, I treat ELF as actualized variations of the same basic virtual resource of Global English that is exploited to meet various communicative needs of its users. The question, then, is not how far ELF users conform to the attested/actual/encoded NS norms, but how ELF functions as the exploitation of the virtual linguistic resource for making meaning and achieving communicative purposes (cf. Seidlhofer 2011).

Both questions have been extensively addressed in ELF research from different perspectives. It is important to note that most ELF research has attempted to answer them with the focus on the ‘register-like’ varieties, namely English of global business, politics, science, technology and media discourse. The apparently increasing research activity in such professional domains can be explained by the fact that ELF is mainly used in what House (1999: 74) refers to as ‘influential frameworks’. This includes, for example, global business (Ehrenreich 2009), education (Smit 2010, Weber 2013, forthc.), school and academic settings (Klimpfinger 2005, 2007, 2010; Weber 2013). On the other hand, English as a lingua franca is an established means of communication in non-institutional talk between individuals and has also been the subject of recent ELF research (Hülmbauer 2006, 2013; Kramer 2012, 2014). Despite the different domains of focus, most ELF studies demonstrate that ELF
speakers establish their own particular hybrid conversation style that is distinct from that of native speakers. In this respect, there are at least two approaches to accounting for such peculiar style in ELF. One, as suggested by Seidlhofer, focuses on the exploitation of virtual encoding possibilities of English itself. Another considers a “plurilingual composition [that] clearly exemplifies an intrinsic and key feature of lingua francas: their hybrid nature” (Jenkins 2007: 1) as a specific feature of ELF. The point is that in ELF interaction the majority of its speakers come from different other than English L1 backgrounds, and actively modify ELF by using those L1s. The mentioned above virtual and plurilingual resources that ELF speakers have at their disposal are worth considering in more detail and this I take up in the next section.

2.1.1 ELF AS AN INTEGRATION OF VIRTUAL AND PLURILINGUAL RE/SOURCES.

It is Cornelia Hülmbauer’s (2013a, b) suggestion to explain the hybrid nature of ELF as integration of virtual and plurilingual resources. As I have discussed in section 2.1, the concept of virtuality was first introduced and discussed by Widdowson (1997, 2003). Widdowson compares non-conformity of ELF users to that of NS poets and children. His argument is that the processes of using the virtual potential of English, or non-conformity to established standardized English, are similar in the both NS and NNS contexts. This is also what Cornelia Hülmbauer observes in her exploration of unconventional language use in ELF academic settings on the basis of VOICE (2008)\textsuperscript{11}, DYLAN (2006-2011) and author’s own recorded data. She argues that drawing upon virtuality is neither primary lingua-cultures nor ELF specific. What distinguishes the two contexts is that ELF speakers generally use forms more flexibly for communicative convenience, while in ENL contexts the use of virtual elements is often a process of “disregarding conventions in order to create special linguistic effects” (Hülmbauer 2013a: 53). She argues, however, that the virtual English is not the only resource for variation in ELF. As Hülmbauer puts it:

\begin{quote}
the virtual possibilities given in the English system combine and interact with the situational plurilingual possibilities fed into the framework by individual context and speaker constellations. (Hülmbauer 2013: 54)
\end{quote}

Describing the hybrid nature of ELF, Hülmbauer is rather sceptical about the concept of hybridity itself as not sufficient for characterizing flexibility and adaptability of ELF as well. She proposes to depict the nature of ELF as integrative rather than hybrid (Hülmbauer 2013a,

\textsuperscript{11} Vienna-Oxford International Corpus of English. In the brackets - the date of release.
b). Delineating ELF as an interaction of the *virtual* language English and speakers’ *plurilingual* repertoires, she suggests, thus, that variation in ELF is two-dimensional: “the virtual dimension inbuilt in English combined with integrative dimension provided by lingua franca mode, which is fed by plurilingual elements through its intercultural users” (Hülmbauer 2013: 55). In other words,

there is an intralingual level [virtuality] which allows speakers to exploit possibilities within English, but beyond the encoded. In ELF however there is also an interlingual level [integration] which allows its users to carry these possibilities further, namely beyond English. (ibid.: 55)

As an example of such multi-dimensionality, Hülmbauer considers the expression *informations* that an Austrian ELF speaker produces in one of her data extracts. She surmises that this use can be motivated by a possible analogy both ‘within and beyond’ English. In addition to the virtual possibilities of pluralisation within English with analogy to count nouns (*apple – apples*), this expression can be triggered by the interlingual (English-German) analogies. Contrary to the English *information*, in German (the speaker’s L1) *Information* and in Italian (her interlocutor’s L1) *information* is a count noun with the plural forms *Informationen/informationi* respectively. The suggestion is that both virtual English as well as plurilingual resources are crucial for ELF production and comprehension. In other words, she suggests describing ELF nature as ALAAT (all language at all times), contrary to the traditional principle of OLAAT (one language at a time) (Hülmbauer 2013a: 224). According to the principle of ALAAT, ELF users draw upon whatever available resources in ELF interaction. Hülmbauer’s two-dimensional model of ELF adds to our understanding what can be involved in the process whereby ELF users modify the language and what kind of relationship the two dimensions might have. The point here is that linguistic hybridity can be delineated at least in two ways. The first looks at it as a mixture of two separate discrete codes (e.g. codeswitching theory). The second considers it as a *fusion* of any available resources in the process of meaning negotiation. Despite Hülmbauer’s rejection of the term *hybridity*, her description of the nature of ELF as *integrative* of the two resources is close to the latter (and my own) conceiving of it. Arguing for the term *hybridity* for describing the hybrid nature of ELF, I would claim that such hybridity finds its expression in *fusion* – in Hülmbauer’s terms *integration* - of all the available for speakers virtual resources rather than in a combination of two separate codes. This can be diagrammatically shown as follows:
Most ELF research reports that there are particular features of ELF interaction that contribute to such hybrid nature of ELF. They are situationality (Hülmbauer 2009) and endonormativity (Ehrenreich 2009; Seidlhofer, Breiteneder and Pitzl 2006; Kachru 1992: 356). To these factors I now turn.

### 2.1.2 Situationality and Endonormativity in ELF

Both factors of situationality and endonormativity as peculiar features of ELF undermine the traditionally established notion of speech community or a community of speakers of a particular relatively homogeneous language variety. By definition, ELF users are communicators from different lingua-cultural backgrounds. This being so, the concept of a stable ‘speech community’ cannot be applied to lingua franca contexts. ELF users become members of what Hülmbauer (2009: 325) refers to as “situational speaking communities: They enter into contemporary relationships, with speakers constellations frequently being tied and untied anew for each emerging interaction” (italics in the original). The “situationality factor, which determines every lingua franca [interaction] anew and on its own right” (ibid. 324, italics in the original) relates to the concept of super-diversity (cf. Cogo 2012, see also Section 2.3) that sees flexibility and variability of linguistic forms and patterns in ELF as a result of manifold contexts and speakers constellations in ELF interaction.

Another factor that furthers the processes of hybridization in ELF is endonormativity. The term means ‘norm-developing’ and originally refers to relatively stable norms that are being developed by and characteristic of a relatively stable speech community. It has been introduced by Kachru (1992: 356) in relation to the World Englishes of the ‘Outer Circle’. He describes English in the ‘Outer Circle’ (e.g. English in post-colonial India or Nigeria) as norm-developing and, therefore, endonormative. Accordingly, English of the ‘Expanding Circle’ (e.g. English in Ukraine or Austria) is seen as norm-following or norm-
dependent that is exonormative. In ELF research, the concept is applied to the domain of “communities of practice” (CoPs). The term is another alternative to speech community and was introduced by Wenger (1988). Wenger defines CoPs as focusing on the shared communicative activity rather than such external factors as linguistic or cultural background of interactants. In ELF research, the concept is widely used in conceptualizing business interaction. Ehrenreich (2009), for example, takes CoPs as more appropriate for the description of ELF in two large German multinational corporations. She claims that endonormativity is a characteristic feature of such ELF business interaction. Ehrenreich bases her argument on the observation that the managers of the corporations rarely consult such exonormative reference tools and resources as, for example, dictionaries or NSs (defined by Kachru as norm-providing). Instead, they employ such resources as “a (German) colleague or his (German) assistant, whose English is considered “good” or “better than mine” (ibid. 140). The claim is that the staff members do not only talk endonormatively but also produce written texts such as emails, memos, or letters to customers that are hardly ever rely on exonormative ENL re/sources. Ehrenreich explains such resourcefulness by the “essentially pragmatic attitude towards language and variation” (ibid. 140). In other words, the managers develop their own norms - namely use languages other than English, coin and adapt new forms and patterns, establish as-hoc meaning and enrich “the language by spontaneous translations of mother-tongue metaphors and idiomatic expressions” (ibid. 140) - “simply because it is more efficient” (ibid. 138, italics in the original). Such endonormative force that put pragmatic effectiveness over conformity to NS norms (cf. also Hülmbauer 2010) facilitates production and acceptance of non-attested in ENL forms and linguistic innovations.

By definition, the notions of situationality and endonormativity seem to be mutually exclusive, especially in the description of ad-hoc ELF contexts. On the one hand, situationality of each ELF interaction yields locally coined and adapted linguistic forms that are rather flexible and peculiar in each speaker constellation. On the other hand, ELF is reported to be endonormative or norm developing that is creating relatively stable norms at least in CoPs. One might assume, however, that the two factors co-exist and contribute to each other in any ELF interaction, in ELF couple discourse in particular. That is to say, ‘situationality’ and variability makes endonormativity ‘normal’ in most ELF interaction. One can assume, therefore, that what we observe in ELF is not situationality and endonormativity but ‘situational endonormativity’ or “in-group endonormativity” (Pitzl 2011: 25) that is as
natural as in other (ENL) contexts of language use. The crucial aspect here is that ELF speakers act as creative agents of using/doing their own (often hybrid) language and bring/develop their own norms in any ‘situational’ constellation. Although many ELF researchers claim that ELF functions like any other natural language, the observation is that, due to this factor of ‘situational endonormativity’, its functioning becomes particularly apparent. In the following, I review what ELF research report about forms that such situational endonormativity takes in ELF interaction.

2.2 VARIABILITY IN ELF AS EVIDENCE OF USING VIRTUAL ENGLISH

There are at least three general tendencies in accounting for specific hybrid nature of ELF at the formal level in ELF research. Some scholars focus on how ELF users modify English by exploiting its virtual possibilities. Others look at the plurilingual resources, or language alternation, as an aspect of hybridity in ELF. Finally, some studies explore both virtual and plurilingual resources that might contribute to such hybridity. Often, it is rather difficult to identify what - virtual or plurilingual - resources are involved in particular language uses. As we have seen in the Introduction, such uses, for example, as Ja, ich will that appear to be the exploitation of virtual possibilities of a particular language (in this case, German) can, in fact, involve plurilingual resources (e.g. German, English and Ukrainian) of the speaker as well.

The essential point to be made is that what is formally possible in any language relates to all the levels of encoding (Widdowson 2009). It seems quite natural that ELF research has investigated such formal features at all the levels. The focus of this thesis is on the hybrid lexicogrammatical features of ELF. For this reason, the following sections focus on the studies that explored how ELF speakers exploit lexicogrammatical potential of English. In the present section, I discuss how ELF researchers explore the virtual possibilities of English itself. One of the pioneering studies that has looked at how ELF speakers modify English at lexicogrammatical level is Seidlhofer’s (2004) early state-of-the-art overview of ELF empirical work. The author presents the following list of features:

- ‘dropping’ the third person present -s;
- ‘confusing’ the relative pronouns who and which;
- ‘omitting’ definite and indefinite articles where they are obligatory in ENL, and inserting them where they do not occur in ENL;
- failing to use ‘correct’ forms in tag questions (e.g. isn’t it? or no? instead of shouldn’t they?);
- inserting ‘redundant’ prepositions, as in We have to study about…);
- ‘overusing’ certain verbs of high semantic generality, such as do, have, make, put, take;
- ‘replacing’ infinitive-constructions with that-clauses, as in i want that;
- ‘overdoing’ explicitness (e.g. black color rather than just black). (Seidlhofer 2004: 220)

It is important to note that at the time of the article issue in 2004, the larger corpora - such as the VOICE (2008) and ELFA (2008)\(^\text{12}\) projects - were not completed yet. Since such corpora could be a more reliable source for more thorough quantitative investigations of lexis and grammar, Seidlhofer emphasises the preliminary character of the list and intends it as precursory rather than definitive. The list identifies the features that appear to be rather frequent but not impeding international intelligibility and show how ELF speakers use lexicogrammatical potential of virtual English. These lexicogrammatical ‘deviations’ can be classified as exploitation of the virtual potential of English but also can be taken as evidence of how virtual and plurilingual resources of ELF speakers interact with each other. Seidlhofer’s concern here, however, is not to specify the source of such non-conformist lexicogrammatical variation, but to identify formal linguistic features that contrast with encoded ENL norms. The crucial point to be made about the study is that it characterizes variation within ELF as the result of agency of English lingua franca users who are

agents in the spread and development of English [and] are not just at the receiving end, but contribute to the shaping of the language and functions it fulfils and so, as speech communities, take possession of the language. (Seidlhofer 2004: 214)

Despite the researcher’s focus on the formal ‘surface’ differences between ELF and ENL, this point about agency in fact speaks for the similarity of ELF to any other language use as being done through and by people.

Another early study of how ELF users exploit the virtual potential of English is that of Breiteneder (2005, 2009). The researcher provides an exploratory qualitative account of the use of present simple third person –s drawing on the VOICE data. The data come from two professional-organizational meetings – each about 2 and a half hour long - among 25 representatives of European universities. The participants are a rather close working group that comprises speakers of 18 different L1s. They meet regularly to discuss specialized subject matter, namely the possibility of the joint programs between their universities.

\(^\text{12}\) English as a Lingua Franca in Academic Settings. In the brackets - the date of release.
Breiteneder reports that, in her sample, out of 151 occurrences of the main verbs combined with singular third-person subjects 126 are inflectionally marked, and 25 do not show the third-person –s. Her question, then, is why some ELF speakers use zero marking in these instances. In her view, it happens for a number of reasons. Among them, she lists communicative redundancy of the inflection, and nominal considerations. As regards the first factor, she argues that the present simple third person –s is an idiosyncratic communicatively redundant or “afunctional” (Trudgill 2002: 92) grammatical category since English is a non-pro-drop (non-pronoun-dropping) language. This being so, the ‘third person -s’ often acquires another function in ENL communities than that of a marker of social identity and prestige, or of “in-group membership” (Seidlhofer 2001: 136). Unlike communities where English is used as a native language, ELF speakers who belong to different lingua-cultures often prioritize communicative effectiveness and economy over conformity to prestige norms. Apart from such external factors as language contact and focus on meaning rather than form, Breiteneder also considers virtual properties of English or linguistic environment, namely subject features, as a possible trigger of zero marking. She lists the following nominal considerations that are likely to prompt omission of the third-person –s: indefinite pronoun-subjects that can be interpreted as plurals (e.g. anybody, everybody), and/or subjects that are singular in form but plural in meaning (e.g. ministry, community). Breiteneder suggests that meaning and communicative effectiveness are more important than socially sanctioned forms both at the micro linguistic and macro/extralinguistic level. In her view, ELF in Europe undergoes such processes as simplification and regularization, and is

an entirely natural language development comparable to various world Englishes (WEs), and therefore not a ‘learner language’ but a ‘user language’ like any other. (Breiteneder 2009: 257)

What Breiteneder is saying here is that, as in any natural language use, ELF speakers as language users are agents who adapt the language for their own purposes such as economy and communicative effectiveness. This also means that in these adaptive processes whereby the speakers use the virtual possibilities of English itself are rather natural than deviant.

In sum, by looking at “the shape of things to come” (Seidlhofer 2002: 269), the early studies of ELF lexicogrammar have questioned the conventional linguistic descriptions and suggested that unconventional ELF features at formal level are instances of variation “in their own right” rather than deviation from Standard NS English (whatever it might be). Although the researchers do not categorize those features as hybrid, they report the significant variation of linguistic forms that can also be taken as evidence of how and to what extent ELF speakers’
plurilingual resources are involved in such variation. In this sense, considerations of such features can add to our understanding of the hybrid nature of ELF. Admitting that ELF varies according to particular contextual factors for a range of purposes, the researchers, however, primarily focus on formal ELF features that are described as non-conventional use of the virtual potential of English itself.

2.3 HYBRIDITY AS EVIDENCE OF USING PLURILINGUAL RESOURCES IN ELF

The difference of focus between the early studies discussed in the previous sections and those I discuss in the rest of this chapter is not only in the move from the consideration of the virtual English features to the use of plurilingual resources in ELF, or linguistic hybridity in its traditional sense. There is also a shift from the central concern for the occurrence of forms as such to their functional significance. As Seidlhofer puts it, from the surface description of particular features, however interesting they may be in themselves, to an explanation of the underlying significance of the forms: to ask what work they do, what functions they are symptomatic of. (Seidlhofer 2009: 241)

In other words, the focus shifts from description of the textual features to the explanation of discoursal factors in ELF on a broader empirical basis, where the identification of ELF features is only one aspect of the descriptive enterprise.

2.3.1 PLURILINGUALITY IN ELF AS CODESWITCHING

One direction of such “more processual, communicative view of ELF” (Seidlhofer 2009: 241) is a sociolinguistic enquiry into super-diversity (Canagarajah 2013, Cogo 2012). In relation to ELF, super-diversity is defined as profound social, cultural and linguistic variability of interactants (cf. Cogo 2012) and is seen as promoting and resulting in the hybridity of their linguistic performance. Apart from the already discussed lexicogrammatical features, the most extensively investigated hybrid feature in ELF is language alternation or, in our terms, plurilingual resources that are involved in ELF. These are explained either by such well-established concepts as bi/multilingualism, codeswitching and code-mixing (Klimpfinger 2005, Cogo 2009, Pitzl 2011, Pietikäinen 2014), or by an alternative notion of plurilinguality (Hülmbauer 2014 a, b). I have already discussed what Hülmbauer understands under plurilinguality in ELF in section 2.1.1. The concept describes language alternation in ELF as speakers’ exploitation of any available - other than English -
linguistic resources according to the principle of ‘ALAAT’ (‘all languages at all times’). In the following, I have a closer look at how ELF research describes cross-linguistic influence in terms of codeswitching/bilingualism and what bearing they might have for the description of hybridity in ELF couple talk.

One of the early studies on plurilinguality as codeswitching in ELF is that of Klimpfinger (2005). The researcher provides an analysis of language alternation in ELF plenary and workshop discussions at two conferences. Drawing upon three different approaches from different fields of study, she defines codeswitching (henceforth CS) as “the alternative use of two or more languages within one sentence, utterance, or interaction” (Klimpfinger 2005: 7) and identifies three possible ways of understanding it, namely CS as evidence of bilingualism, CS as evidence of communication strategies, and CS as evidence of culture and identity. Among strategies of bilingualism, she lists:

- accommodation to the addressee (e.g. the use of the university names in L1 of the addressee: *monsieur le recteur* {the rector});
- and emphasis (e.g. repetition of the same phrase in two – ELF:L1/LN languages: *that’s it* <LNde> punkt {full stop} </LNde>.

CS as evidence of communicative strategies in ELF finds its reflection in such functions as:

- appeal to authority (e.g. direct or indirect appeals for help to find the right equivalent in English: *<L1de> was heist den hegemonie? {what is it called hegemony} </LNd">),
- the use of untranslatable terms (e.g. specific concepts concerning food, dress, cultural institutions or activities: *<LNfr> cotutelle {joint supervision} </LNfr>*),
- ‘marked’ and ‘anticipated’ switches (e.g. preceded or followed by meta-linguistic comments: *we call them* <LNde> vereine {societies/associations} </LNde>),
- and switches as last resort to get message across (e.g. producing a longer passages in L1 because of a lack of English words).

‘Switches’ signalling culture and identity include:

- emblematic CS (e.g. tags and exclamations signalling culture and identity: *<L1fr> d’accord {okay} </Lfr>*)
- geographic (mainly city or country) names.

As can be seen, the researcher reports a rather large amount of other than English (both L1s and L2s) language uses and a variety of functions they fulfil. As I have mentioned above, Klimpfinger’s is the early study that can be attributed to the formative years of ELF research and one of the pioneering enquiries into language alternation in ELF. For this reason, it seems quite natural that the investigator draws upon the well-established theoretical frameworks of bilingualism, Second language acquisition (henceforth SLA) and CS to integrate a formal
and functional dimension in her study. It is important to bear in mind, however, that such paradigms – like any other disciplinary paradigms - are only of limited value, since they are what Seidlhofer (2011: 70-73) refers to as convenient fictions, or “representations of reality which are suited to certain purposes, relevant to certain circumstances” (Widdowson 2012: 8). More recent research into ELF questions the relevance of such established constructs as bilingualism and codeswitching for the explanation of other than English languages use in ELF. Nevertheless, Klimpfinger is not alone in resorting to such ‘convenient fictions’.

Cogo (2009) also argues for the term CS and looks at how it functions as a pragmatic strategy of accommodation in small ELF talk among teachers in a higher education institution. She makes at least three observations about how one might account for CS in ELF discourse. First, contrary to the traditional view of CS as speakers/learners linguistic deficiency (in, for example, SLA research); she considers it as a facet of speakers multilingual competence. Second, she argues for “the sociolinguistic approach” that sees code alternation as “more important itself than the symbolic meanings that a language is associate with” (ibid. 264). To put it another way, she takes the speakers’ ‘switches’ between/among languages as more meaningful than the socio-cultural symbolic associations they have with those languages. Following Li (1998), Cogo distinguishes between “brought-along meaning”, or macro approach, and “brought-about meaning”, or micro approach to CS. The former presupposes that “the symbolic references associated with different codes are brought along into the conversation to index the participants’ individual associations” (Cogo 2009: 264). The latter refers to CS as a strategy that creates new “brought-about” meaning, views and values in the process of communication. Gogo’s argument, then, is that besides the importance of the social values associated with certain codes that can help the researcher to make sense of CS, there is no “simple one way link between languages and social values and functions” (ibid.). In this view, the meanings and motivations of code alternation in ELF interaction are brought about in the process of communication. Consequently, the participants’ affiliations, values and identities are not bound up with a particular “code or language” (ibid. 269) but are negotiated by ELF speakers who, in Cogo’s words, “enrich it [ELF] with their own flavour to make it their own” (ibid. 270). Finally, this leads to the suggestion that successful ELF communication draws upon

13 For the discussion of my understanding of symbolic and indexical aspects of pragmatic meaning see Chapter 5.
the flexible use of multilingual resources and “crucial adaptive accommodation skills along with appreciation and acceptance of diversity” (ibid. 270).

There are two points to be made here. One the one hand, Cogo’s discussion and findings raise a crucial issue of the relationship between culture and language in ELF communication (see Section 5.4-5.5 for my own understanding of such relationship). What Cogo is suggesting in her article is that language is not a fixed culturally bound entity but rather a resource that ELF speakers draw upon in the process of meaning negotiation. On the other hand, there is a confusion of terms whereby the concepts of code and language, and/or codeswitching and the employment of multilingual resources are used interchangeably. The question here is how far the creative “flexible use of multilingual resources” can be described in terms of CS. Another related issue is whether the notions of code, resource and language are conceptually different.

2.3.2 **Plurilinguality in ELF as languaging**

It is important to note that in her later publication, Cogo (2012: 289) elaborates on ‘super-diversity’ in ELF business interaction and addresses these questions. As regards ‘multilingual practices’, however, she goes not farther than to broaden the list of terms to languaging, translanguaging, and crossing; and again uses the terms interchangeably. According to Gogo’s line of argument, all these concepts “include codeswitching, but go beyond it” (ibid. my italics). Cogo’s understanding of languaging is of special interest here. In the description of how she organizes the data, Cogo explains that her focus is on CS or the use of languages other than English, namely German and Spanish, in ELF interaction. She interprets CS as evidence of “the salient strategies” (ibid. 303) that the participants use to realize their multilingual repertoire. Among such strategies as including-excluding or translating practices, she also lists languaging. In her view, then, languaging is a strategy of drawing on various available resources “to create a multilingual playful atmosphere, [...] while crossing imagined language boundaries (i.e. the boundaries that make Spanish the language of Pedro and Maria, and German the language of Maria and Helmut)” (ibid. 306). In this definition it remains unclear, however, whether and how languaging, which is claimed to presuppose some kind of process, “include[s] codeswitching, but go[es] beyond it”. Hence, no conceptual distinction between codeswitching/mixing, trans/languaging and/or crossing is provided. The controversy here is that, on the one hand, the study emphasises and demonstrates that “plurality or hybridity [in ELF] are not a sum of different and bounded
linguistic systems, but are of a fluid, variable and shared nature, which rely on use” (ibid. 309). On the other hand (contrary to the argument and findings of the study), * languaging * and other language alternation strategies are equated and said to include * codeswitching/mixing * that presupposes the pre-existence of separate predefined * codes-* entities between/among which speakers switch/mix/cross. I will discuss my own understanding of * codeswitching * and * languaging * and what bearings it has for exploring hybridity in ELF in Chapter 3. Meanwhile, the point is that despite the confusion of terms, Cogo’s is an important contribution to the investigation of sociolinguistic diversity in ELF interaction. The study shows that ELF is indeed a hybrid phenomenon and ELF speakers use “multilingual resources” extensively. The main point about the use of languages other than English is that “domain knowledge [expertise] is preferred over correctness” (ibid. 302). This corresponds to what I have said about the register-like development of Global English and priority of expertise/effectiveness over ‘correctness’ in such developments in section 2.1. On the other hand, Cogo makes a valuable contribution to ELF research in that she raises a range of questions. They concern the notion of language as emergent from dynamic processes and practices rather than a bounded and fixed entity, thereby questioning the tradition that associates a language with particular nation-states/nationalities, cultures and identities. Ironically, these very issues have led ELF researchers to doubt the plausibility of the concepts of * bilingualism * and * CS * for the description of hybrid practices in ELF interaction (see also the discussion of Hülmbauer’s argument in Section 2.1.1).

### 2.4 HYBRIDITY AS COMBINATION OF VIRTUAL ENGLISH AND PLURILINGUAL RESOURCES

In the previous sections, I have discussed the studies that have mainly focused on non-conformist innovation in ELF as use of either the potential of virtual English or languages other than English. In the following, I consider ELF research which concerns itself with both virtual and plurilingual resources. Here the focus is both on formal features that these resources take and on the functions that inform such features in ELF discourse.

#### 2.4.1 TRANSLINGUAL PRACTICES AND CODEMESHING

Super-diversity as a social factor that facilitates multilingual practices has also found its reflection in Canagarajah’s (2013) sociolinguistic LFE (Lingua Franca English) study.
The researcher views super-diversity is layered, overlapping, and ‘meshed’ relationships between communities (cf. Vetrovec 2007) that involves translingual practices. Canagarajah takes an integrated view on language skills and modalities with the focus on literacy in such super-diverse academic and migrant settings. He explores written and oral practices of multilingual undergraduate students in the UK and USA and analyses data from the in-depth interviews with Sub-Saharan African migrants in the USA. The attempt is not only to explain the diversity in form as meaning-making practices but also to question the established ways of describing hybridity in English that Canagarajah refers to as Lingua Franca English. Here, the point has to be made about Canagarajah’s rejection of the term English as a lingua franca. For him the notion is unsatisfactory since it presupposes a pre-given language (English) that is exploited by different speakers. Contrary, in his view, LFE suggests that the language emerges from the context of use: “LFE is not an identifiable code or a systematized variety of English. It is a highly fluid and variable form of language practice” (Canagarajah’s 2013: 70). Following Canagarajah’s line of argument, LFE, or what he also refers to as Translingual English\(^{14}\), evokes the analogy with other WEs such as Nigerian or Indian English. Such analogy suggests that LFE is a variety of the language (see the discussion of such WEs in section 2.1, see also Seidlhofer 2011: 77). This, in turn, presupposes that there are particular linguistic features that make LFE such a variety for a particular group of people with a shared (primary) sociocultural background. This, however, is not how I (or many ELF researchers) understand ELF. As Seidlhofer (2011: 25) puts it, ELF is “functionally and not formally defined: it is not a variety of English but a variable way of using it – English that functions as a lingua franca”. In this respect, this relabelling of ELF to LFE is misleading in fact. I think, to simply rename ELF to LFE does not help to understand the nature of ELF as a global

\(^{14}\) See Jenkins (2015) for the overview of the terms for ELF in ELF research (e.g. Translingua Franca English (Pennycook 2010) or codemeshing (Canagarajah 2013, see also this section). Jenkins herself proposes yet another term - English as a Multilingua Franca (EMF) - to refer to “multilingual communicative settings in which English is known to everyone present, and is therefore always potentially in the mix, regardless of whether or not, and how much, it is actually used”. In her view, it follows from this that “we can talk about ‘ELF-using multilinguals’ and ‘ELF-using monolinguals’, or ‘Multilingual ELF users’ and ‘Monolingual ELF users’ (2015: 73-74). Although her suggestion of EMF is not to change a name for ELF but reconceptualise our understanding of it by moving from ‘multilingualism-within-ELF’ to ‘ELF-within-multilingualism’ framework, it is, in my view, not only confusing (what Jenkins herself points out) but also misleading for the same reasons why such concepts as bitmultilingualism and code-mixing/switching, multilpolylingual languaging (see Chapter 3 for a more detailed discussion) and discussed in this section EFL, Translingual English and codemeshing are questionable. Two of those reasons are: the presupposition of the ‘meaningful opposition’ between mono- and bi-multiphilingualism/s, and possible associations of ‘monolingual ELF users’ not only with native (English L1) speakers but also with users of ELF as dialect-like development/variety (ELF L1) (see Section 2.1).
language. Therefore, despite Canagarajah’s suggestion, I use the term ELF in the rest of the section.

LFE and ELF are not the only terms that Canagarajah seems to be juggling with. In describing the forms that ELF and language alternation within it take in academic interaction, the author argues against the notions of multilingualism and codeswitching/mixing for translingual practices and codemeshing. In his view, the term multilingualism is unsatisfactory since it describes the relationship between languages in an additive ‘static’ manner. This presupposes that multilinguals have separate competences for differently ‘labelled languages’ that they add to their repertoire in the course of acquiring (Canagarajah 2013: 6). Instead, the researcher suggests the term translingual as more plausible for the description of language use and alternation. According to Canagarajah, it implies an integrated proficiency where the languages have a dynamic relationship and “mesh in transformative ways, generating new meanings and grammars” (ibid. 8). In other words, codeswitching entails the assumption that “the codes involved in the mix or switch come from separate and whole languages” (ibid. 10), while codemeshing does not. As Canagarajah’s puts it,

the assumption of separately systematized languages prevents scholars from accommodating the full range of meaning and practices which inform translingual orientation. Though translingual orientation is distinctive from other existing terms then, we can still make a space for using codeswitching and mixing in a qualified way in specific contexts. In cases of clear sedimentation, with certain language varieties identified by appropriate local ideologies, we can distinguish which “language” a word gets borrowed from or phrase gets switched into”. (ibid. 11)

Canagarajah’s point is that codemeshing as a translingual practice denies the traditional view of learning or using a second language as a harmful ‘interference’ into one’s primary language. In a way, he challenges the (perceived) inequalities of languages that are implied in the term multilingual where languages are thought to be sequentially added to each other in the course of people’s lives. Such inequalities, he argues, are based on the traditional assumptions of nativeness/non-nativeness, and of the existence of separate ‘labelled’ languages that are owned by certain communities. According to Canagarajah:

To turn Chomsky (1988) on his head, we all are translinguals, not native speakers of a single language in homogeneous environments. In this sense, the binaries “native/non-native” also distort the translingual competence of all people. These binaries treat certain languages as owned by and natural to certain communities, when languages are in fact open to being adopted by diverse communities for their own purposes. (ibid. 8)

What Canagarajah questions here is the concepts of nativeness and linguistic/grammatical competence as proposed by Chomsky, namely the perfect ‘full’ knowledge of language of “an ideal speaker-listener, in a completely homogeneous speech community” (Chomsky
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Translingual practices or codemeshing as non-conformity to ‘native’ norms, as Canagarajah rather reasonably says, cannot be equated with incompetence. They constitute what he refers to as ‘translingual’ or ‘performative’ competence - a particular procedural knowledge that all translinguals have. Here is the suggested model of it:

- Start with your positionality;
- Negotiate on equal terms;
- Focus on practice not forms;
- Co-construct the rules and terms of engagement;
- Be responsive to joint accomplishment of goals;
- Reconfigure your norms and expand your repertoire. (Canagarajah 2013:175)

Canagarajah, thus, attempts to account for the ‘translingual’ communicative practices – where, as he puts it, there is “no uniformly shared or “advanced” proficiency in grammatical forms” (ibid. 76) - not so much in terms of linguistic but rather translingual performative competence. He describes it as a capacity for practice that can be developed through particular strategies (ibid.173-192). This, quite logically, leads him to the conclusion that “one can adopt language resources from different communities without “full” or “perfect” competence in them (as traditionally defined)” and such “modes of hybridity can [still] be socially and rhetorically significant” (ibid. 10, my italics).

Canagarajah’s notion of performative competence is of special interest here because he sees what he refers to as co-operative disposition as its crucial characteristic. He takes the term over from Tomasello (2008) and defines it as a set of “tastes, values, and skills” (Canagarajah 2013: 179) of the ‘translingual’ participants. His claim is that unlike “those in the USA [ENL speakers]” with “a different kind of disposition that does not help them to negotiate differences but insist on their own norms” (ibid. 179), cooperative disposition enables translingual ELF users to insist on their own difference and to be open to other people’s difference. Together with codemeshing practices - as part of their performative competence, translinguals’ cooperative disposition solves the contradiction between their need of mastering the dominant (native) codes for social and educational success, and the expression of their own voice through the preferred codes and conventions. In other words, Canagarajah does not only claim that ELF functioning is particularly apparent in comparison with any other natural language but also that ELF and ENL users – their (performative) competence and disposition – are somehow different.

There are several points to be made here. First, as I have already argued in Section 2.1, it is unreasonable to describe ELF use in terms of adopting language as a product of distribution. Rather, ELF speakers as agents in language spread adapt it for their own
purposes. Second, it is rather plausible to call for the negotiation of the established norms in relation to the ‘translingual’ repertoires and practices such as ‘codemeshing’ rather than disregarding them. It remains, however, unclear how the terms themselves call for translingualism (as contrary to multilingualism), or as Canagarajah defines it, “a sensitivity to similarity-in-difference” (common practice that generate different texts) and “difference-in-similarity” (mediated and hybrid practices that generate seemingly homogeneous and standardized texts) (ibid. 9). To put it another way, how codemeshing is different from codeswitching, or to what extent codemeshing is more ‘translingual’ that is more “sensitive to the dual claims of voice and norms” (ibid. 109) than, say, codeswitching. The key concept in both notions is code. It seems, then, unreasonable to substitute one term with another since both of them imply the existence of separate distinctive code/s or varieties between/among which people switch, mix or ‘mesh’ in their ‘translingual’ practices.

Third, Canagarajah’s cooperative disposition views cooperation and collaboration as the basic principles of language use and learning. This corresponds to Grice’s proposal that the co-operative principle is basic to communicative practices, which I have an occasion to discuss in Section 4.3.3. The point on cooperative disposition is a very interesting observation and worth reflecting on. However, Canagarajah seems to be claiming that it is the only characteristic feature of all translinguals. In my view, such statement is a simplification and a rather optimistic idealization. I cannot agree more that people have to cooperate not only in order to communicate but also to survive in general. I discuss this and other principles that drive ELF (and, in my view, all human) communication in Chapter 5. The point here is that there is no guarantee that all people who are labelled ‘translinguals’ and are said to use the strategies of codemeshing necessarily demonstrate/intend/strive to such cooperative disposition: that is are open to diversity, have strong ethic of collaboration, oriented to communication and meaning, learn from practice, or show adaptive skills (cf. Canagarajah 2013: 180). In other words, Canagarajah’s claim seems to be that the substitution of the terms - or rather re-labelling all the multilingual speakers to translinguals, and all the practices of language alternation to codemeshing - itself necessarily ensures interactants’ collaboration and cooperative disposition, which in reality does not.

Finally, in my view, it is impossible to account for human behaviour in terms of a particular competence: either linguistic or performative. For competence is knowledge of particular (e.g. linguistic/performative) rules or procedures. The rules, however, are source of reference but not actual practice. Identification/specification of rules for knowledge
whether be it those provided by Canagarajah or by Chomsky, I think, does not guarantee how people would act upon them. In other words, any rules are subject to variation and individual manoeuvre. As we may know (and as my data show), to know rules and to follow or realize them is not the same. There is a crucial distinction here between competence and capability\textsuperscript{15} - one made by Widdowson (1984: 242-251). According to Widdowson competence is the abstract systems of knowledge such as our knowledge of language and its rules. Capability, in turn, is the actuality of behaviour that is “the ability to exploit the resources for making meaning which are available in language whether this has been codified [or given social sanction] or not” (ibid. 246). In other words, capability is realization of “the indexical value of language elements in the communicative process” (ibid. 234). The actual language behaviour and this ability to exploit the available resources, I think, cannot be reduced to particular (linguistic or performative) rules or confined within any kind of competence. Canagarajah’s model, therefore, can give us an insight how ELF speakers might in-form their ELF, or how they read their own voices, identities, contexts, and positions into ELF forms, whereby they make their capability a competence of a particular (in Canagarajah’s terms, performative) kind. However, such competence does not preclude the freedom for individual manoeuvre as any other conventions or rules, and, therefore, cannot explain all language behaviour. In this connection, especially interesting is the first ‘rule’ of Canagarajah’s performative competence, namely ‘Start with your positionality’. If one accepts that positionality is “the contexts [ELF users] are located in and the language resources and values they bring with them” (ibid. 175), then, in my view, language users do not (only) start with positionality. They are engaged in an on-going ceaseless process of positioning (or doing positionality, in Canagarajah’s terms) whenever they communicate. This concept of positionality or rather positioning is central to any human communication and to this thesis in particular. I will discuss it in more detail in Chapter 5. In the next section, I consider how other ELF researchers tackle the aspects of positioning.

2.4.2 ELF: TERRITORIALITY AND POSITIONING

Positioning is not a very busy area of investigation in ELF research. Most scholars, like Canagarajah, only touch upon certain aspects of it. However, for some researchers the

\textsuperscript{15} Widdowson’s original concept here is capacity; later on the scholar refers to the same notion as capability. In the present thesis, I use the later term.
aspects of positioning are of central concern. Pitzl (2009, 2011), for example, discusses the related to it notion of *territoriality* in her exploration of idiomaticity in ELF. The author provides evidence of variation in the VOICE corpus by considering both virtual and plurilingual\(^{16}\) resources involved in ELF idiomaticity. She observes that ELF speakers often coin idiomatic language or re-create idioms, and shows how idioms in ELF can formally and functionally vary from ENL equivalents. Pitzl’s argument is that ELF speakers often re-introduce metaphor into idiomatic language in the process that she refers to as *remetaphorization*. Although the author emphasises that her analysis is necessarily formal, the significant part of her study is devoted to the pragmatic motives and functional meaning of idiomatic language in ELF. To put it another way, her focus is not only on “how idioms are being re-created and re-metaphorized in terms of linguistic forms in ELF interactions but also [...] why they are being used by ELF speakers” (Pitzl 2011: 171), or how they are functional, how they serve various communicative purposes.

Since the conformity to established ‘native’ norms is rarely of primary importance in ELF communication, ELF speakers, in Pitzl’s view, re-create and re-metaphorize idioms at the formal level. At this level, idiomaticity in ELF is said to have at least three different sources. It can be an “entirely novel” metaphorical image being created ad hoc by a speaker. Further, metaphors may re-introduce existing English idioms via formal variation of the expression. Finally, metaphors may be created by transplanting idioms from other languages into English (ibid. 317). That is to say, like does Hülmbauer, Pitzl sees non-conformist innovation as both exploitation of virtual English and reflection of plurilingual (normally ELF speakers’ L1s) resources (see also Section 2.1). Comparing two contexts – ENL and ELF, Pitzl surmises that idioms in ENL are primarily used as the territorial marker of membership or belonging to a particular speech community. Unlike, according to Pitzl, idioms in ELF serve a range of other than territorial communicative purposes:

The territorial imperative and the territorial function of idioms [...] are certainly relevant when English is used as first language among members of one particular speech community. Yet, if we accept that in ELF there is no fixed, culturally defined speech community that ELF speakers can – or would want to – claim membership to, one of the prime functions of idioms among first language speakers, namely their territorial function, is presumably absent in ELF. If idioms are used in ELF, we can thus presuppose that this happens for other communicative purposes than marking one’s cultural territory. (Pitzl 2009: 300)

By giving prominence to what is metaphorical about the use of idioms in ELF, we are uncoupling the question of idioms and idiomaticity from its association with territoriality in ENL usage – [...] and this is also what ELF speakers themselves do” (ibid. 302).

\(^{16}\)Pitzl describes plurilinguality in ELF in terms of codeswitching and code-mixing, and uses the two terms interchangeably.
What Pitzl is stating here is that unconventional use of idioms might serve as a territorial marker of non-membership of the particular ‘native’ speech community in particular ENL contexts. At the same time, ELF speakers inform idiomaticity in ELF by “other communicative purposes than marking one’s cultural territory”: to add a humorous note or create a mitigating effect, to increase explicitness and project stance, to establish rapport, and/or to demonstrate shared none-nativeness and solidarity. This difference in functioning is also said to be a matter of presence or absence of the territorial imperative “as a social force driving communication and thus motivating the use of idioms” (2009: 316). This claim seems to be plausible if we accept that there is no conceptual difference between the territorial perspective, function and imperative under the cover term territoriality. Pitzl seems to use these notions interchangeably and understands them as “‘ENL territorial’ motivations” (2011: 256), or ENL “territorial perspective” that analyses and interprets idiomaticity in ELF “from the point of view of ENL speakers, that is, as a part of ENL territory” (2009: 300). In my view, this is how “a territorial perspective” - but not the notions of function and imperative - can be defined. Moreover, these latter two are also of conceptual difference. Function is a conventionalized pragmatic value that people might or might not read into text. While imperative is a drive of discourse, and, therefore, so to speak, is always there. This being so, it does not matter whether one reads/realizes or do not the territorial function into, say, idioms. People textualize their discourses through idioms, and such discourses are always driven by the territorial imperative. It is what Pitzl herself points out in her study:

The crucial point is that among ELF users there is no pre-conceived common territory, but that shared territory is negotiated and created online in interaction. In this way, idiomaticity as a dynamic process still has a territorial function in ELF, albeit with a different concept of territoriality than in L1 communities. If idioms in ELF are being used territorially, we can thus assume that this happens to co-construct a new and shared intercultural territory rather than marking off an L1 English-speaking cultural and/or linguistic territory. (Pitzl 2011: 89)

From this perspective, the difference between the use of idioms in ELF and ENL communication is not so much about relevance/applicability – absence or presence - of the territorial imperative as a social force in ELF communication. It is rather a matter of the degree of speaker attachment to and identifying with a particular linguistic and cultural (ENL) territory.

Another point here is that the territorial imperative is not the only drive in human communication. As I will argue in Section 4.3.3, there are at least two of them: the territorial and co-operative imperatives – two extremes of one continuum (cf. Widdowson 1984).
Together with the cooperative the territorial imperative regulates what Bakhtin (1984) refers to as *voicing/polyphony*, and Widdowson (2012) as *positioning*, or the way how people act upon each other in the process of communication (see Chapter 4 for a detailed discussion of these concepts). This process is a matter of social survival, and involves the need to protect one’s (cultural, social, physical, or any other) territory (the territorial imperative), on the one hand. On the other hand, it calls an individual for co-operating with other people in order to get particular social benefits (the co-operative imperative). This means that the use of territorial markers (as defined by linguists?) can be (and in fact always are) driven/motivated both by the territorial and co-operative imperative. In ELF research, there is much evidence that supports this line of argument and shows how ELF (like any other) speakers skilfully balance between the two imperatives (Klötzl 2014, Kramer 2014, Seidlhofer 2009, 2011). In this view, the use of idioms is also a matter of balancing between the two imperatives. It is quite disputable, then, whether idioms are exclusively linked with their territorial function in ENL contexts, and are not used “for other communicative purposes than marking one’s cultural territory”, as well as whether “ELF communication lacks [...] a “territorial imperative” (Pitzl 2009: 300). If we accept the latter, it follows that the only drive in ELF interaction is the cooperative principle. This line of argument is similar to Canagarajah’s rather idealizing claim that the only force or principle that people are disposed to in ELF (as opposed to ENL) is cooperation (see Section 2.4.1). My point here is that the question of how idioms (like any other language use) function in ELF is not so much about irrelevance of the territorial imperative or the fact that “the territorial imperative does not apply to ELF speakers as it applies to members of any L1 speech community” (Pitzl 2011: 91). Being detached from a particular (ENL) territory, ELF speakers (as any other language users) are still engaged in what Widdowson (2012) refers to as *positioning*, or balancing between the territorial and cooperative imperatives in the process of meaning negotiation.

In this respect, it is not ‘the absence of the territorial imperative’ what matters in ELF but rather the conceptual distinction between idioms as product and idiomaticity as process – one provided by Pitzl in her study. Following Seidlhofer (2011: Chapter 6), she takes idioms as linguistic products - “a snapshot, the static representation of a continuing process” (ibid. 81) - that is “phrases and expressions with a (more or less accessible and transparent [and fixed]) figurative or metaphoric meaning” (Pitzl 2011: 97). Idiomaticity, in turn, is understood as a continuing process of “creation, re-creation, interactional uptake, functional (re)use and potential conventionalizing or institutionalization of these products”
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Pitzl provides a number of interesting examples of how idiomaticity as a process might work in ELF. One of them describes how members of a business meeting discuss their cultural and national peculiarities, and associated with them stereotypes. At a point when the atmosphere is relaxed, a Dutch participant points out that in Holland they *don’t have savings under the bed* but *have a lot of money in the sock,* and so translates and transplants a Dutch idiom into ELF. Pitzl’s argument is that the correctness (conformity to established ENL idioms) and the accuracy of translation from Dutch into English is irrelevant, “because the expression is effective in creating a metaphorical image” (ibid. 315) and has “the communicative function of bringing your own culture into the discourse [... and] humour into the interaction” (ibid. 316). This, in turn, “underlines the fact that the question of idioms in ELF is not only a question of English idioms” (ibid. 315). In Pitzl’s view, this use of the transplanted idiomatic expression goes against the traditional vision that associates idioms with territoriality in ENL usage, according to which the idiom *have a lot of money in the sock* will be identified as incorrect, inappropriate or unidiomatic, and the producer of it will be rejected as an outsider, or as not belonging to ENL speech community. Following this line of logic, the ‘transplanted’ idiom, however, might also serve as a territorial marker not only of ELF territory, of ‘a shared non-nativeness’ (Hülm Bauer 2009), or of particular professional group and culture (Meierkord 2002: 110; Ehrenreich 2009). It can be a territorial marker of other than English (albeit NL or ELF) L1 linguistic and cultural territory. Thus, this example does not only demonstrate that idiomaticity can be as accessible and effective in ELF as in ENL. It also shows that it is motivated by *both* the co-operative and territorial imperatives. Moreover, the imperatives does not only operate on the level of the shared language, or on the level of the socio-cultural constraints of a particular community or a particular ‘commonality’ (Pitzl 2011: 91). They also are a matter of an individual freedom for (territorial-cooperative) manoeuvre. In other words, as Pitzl herself observes in this example, the Dutch speaker is not only doing ‘ELF’ territoriality by non-conforming to ENL norms and creating a humorous effect, but also is performing his own – individual - Dutch cultural/national territoriality by “brining [his] own culture into the discourse”. I cannot agree more, then, that “‘idiomaticity’ [is] a general process which is characteristic of all natural languages” (ibid. 97), and “can be uncoupled and detached from native speakers conventional codified ‘idiomatic expressions’” (ibid. 97). However, I think, ELF communication cannot not be deprived of territoriality or the territorial imperative in general. By doing idiomaticity, ELF speakers (as any other speakers) do not lack territoriality but, as I mentioned above, are
rather involved in the process of positioning, that is balancing between the two – territorial and cooperative – forces.

This is what Birgit Kramer’s argues for in her study of ELF use in Massively Multiplayer Online Role-playing Games (MMORPGes). The study explores how international communication in ELF is enacted through electronic media. Kramer’s argument is that particular stylistic features of online communication in MMORPGes are evidence of how gamers position themselves with the purpose to achieve a particular effect on other gamers. She defines position as “a place in social space in relation to others” (Kramer 2014: 176) and lists the following stylistic features that are influenced by the medium and its contextual constraints and, so, are particular for positioning in MMORPGes:

- smileys: >(^_^)> “Free huggles! No meanies!”, XD “laughing with closed eyes”;
- acronyms: LFG “look for group”, rofl “rolling on the floor laughing”, lol “laughing out loud”;
- logograms: any1 “anyone”, cu “see you”, m8 “mate”;
- leet – visual representing of letters by numbers: 1337 “leet”, gr33n “green”, c00l “cool”;
- neologisms: nerf “weakening or downgrading of a skill, ability, or whole class”, avatar “gaming character, representation of a gamer in a game”.

As can be seen, the characteristic of most of stylistic features in online role-playing games is shortness or, so to speak, economy of language means. Kramer’s observation is that, on the one hand, this is the consequence of such contextual factors as, for example, high pressure and time constraints in online gaming settings. On the other, the features are often difficult to decipher for an outsider non-gamer, and can be used as an in-group (in Pitzl’s terms territorial) marker. Whatever the reason, according to Kramer, gamers (like any other language users) use all the features to negotiate their positions, or to achieve particular effects on other gamers. As Kramer puts it, “action causes reaction, which in return leads an action. [...] Positions are negotiated, taken, imposed on, challenged, accepted or refused” (Kramer 2014: 307). Kramer’s argument is that any linguistic expression does positional work. Although the domain of MMORPGes is rather special, and features used or purposes achieved in such settings can substantially vary from those used in couple discourse, the crucial point here is that human communication is positioning. People communicate to position themselves that is to act upon each other by mediation of the shared language and informing it by their socio-cultural beliefs, values, conventions, and purposes.

In sum, most studies discussed above contribute to our understanding of the textual and discoursal features of ELF in a range of domains. Most of them explore what can be
involved in the processes of hybridization of English in institutional and business settings. Some of the inquiries have special focus on how ELF is different from ENL at the formal textual level. Others pay more attention to the specificity of discoursal processes in ELF at the macro level of social/cultural factors. What is common about most studies is the claim that ELF functions like any other natural language but that its functioning is particularly apparent in such settings. Likewise, my suggestion is that processes of adaptation in ELF are rather similar to any other language use – ENL use in particular. As Seidlhofer puts it:

Like any other language, English is a dynamic process, and naturally varies and changes as it spreads into different domains of use and communities of users. [...] the extent of the spread of English now is unlike that of any other language, but in principle there is nothing at all unusual about the processes of variation and change that are activated by it. (Seidlhofer 2011: 94, my italics)

2.5 SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION: COUPLES’ ELF - GLOBAL SPREAD VS. LOCAL DISCOURSE

This chapter has introduced the concept of English as a lingua franca as applied to ELF couples, and provided a selected overview of ELF research on hybridity and variation within ELF interaction. I have begun my discussion with the point that English like any other language can only be globally spread through contact on the basic interpersonal level whereby people in various ways textualize their own discourses. One example of such interpersonal contact is what we have to do with in this thesis, namely private relationship. It is intimate discourse that involves the variation across ELF couples – dyads in romantic relationship with different first languages and cultural backgrounds – who use the ‘third’ NN language in the private interactions rather than across local communities or professional domains. I have suggested that ELF users (as well as ELF partners) do not adopt the established NS norms but adapt English for the purposes of their particular intimate discourse. It seems quite natural that such adaptation will be unique, or, in Hülmbauer’s terms, situational, for each and every interaction since the interlocutors have at least two virtual linguistic resources at their disposal (or in traditional terms, are bilinguals) and come from different cultural backgrounds. As we have discussed, there are at least two such resources: the virtual resource of English itself, and the virtual resources of languages other than English (in Hülmbauer’s terms, plurilingual resources) - predominantly but not necessarily ELF speakers’ L1s.

To summarize, the lexicogrammatical features that can be taken as evidence of exploitation of the virtual English (but also can often be interpreted as fusion or what
Hülmbauer (2013) refers to as integration of both – virtual English and plurilingual – resources, and that are reported to be most frequent in ELF interaction are:

- flexible use of third-person –s and zero marking such as *it last*, *the thing function*, *everybody talk, the community ask* (Breiteneder 2005, 2009)
- pluralisation of ENL-uncountable nouns: *informations* (Hülmbauer 2013);
- flexible use of determiners and demonstrative pronouns (Seidlhofer 2011);
- flexible use of prepositions: *we’re just discussing about* (Seidlhofer 2004, 2005);
- creation of online and remetaphorization of the existing collocations and idioms: *endangered fields/programms/study, we should not wake up any dogs* (Pitzl 2009, 2011; Seidlhofer and Widdowson 2007; Seidlhofer 2009, 2011).

The use of plurilingual resources is often described in terms of codeswitching and bilingualism or:

- use of words other than English, or codeswitching/mixing: *sontage* (French survey), *d’accord* (French okay), *aus Lissabon* (German from Lisbon) (Hülmbauer 2013, Klimpfinger 2005).

Finally, some scholars explore how both virtual and plurilingual resources are used in ELF and consider such use as:

- integration of virtual and plurilingual resources: *informations, finaneciated, dictature* (Hülmbauer 2013).

According to ELF researchers, these hybrid features are not only triggered by situationality and super-diversity of ELF constellations and contexts. ELF speakers inform those features as language users, or agents by a range of pragmatic functions. To list few of them:

- appeal to authority (Klimpfinger 2005)
- filling lexical gaps (Klimpfinger 2005, Pietikäinen 2014);
- increasing clarity (Breiteneder 2005, Klimpfinger 2005, Pietikäinen 2014);
- economy of expression (Kramer 2014);
- simplification and regularization (Breiteneder 2005, Canagarajah 2013).

On the other hand, ELF research tackles a number of discoursal/contextual factors involved in the process of in-forming ELF – the process whereby ELF speakers textualize their discourses:

- signaling of culture and identity (Klimpfinger 2005, Pitzl 2011);
- humorous note or mitigation (Pitzl 2011);
- translingual performative competence and disposition to cooperation (Canagarajah 2013);
- establishing rapport and solidarity (Kramer 2014, Pietikäinen 2014, Pitzl 2011);
- balancing between the territorial and cooperative imperatives (Klötzl 2014; Kramer 2014, Seidlhofer 2009, 2011; Widdowson 1984)
As can be seen, hybridity is reported as operating at least at two levels. On the one hand, it can be analysed as particular unconventional non-conformist innovations at the formal textual level. On the other, it can be interpreted as various contextual factors - values, believes, cultural assumptions – that inform ELF at the discoursal level. The relationship between the two levels are mainly described in terms of form-function, product-process (e.g. idom-idiomativity/regularization), or competence-performance dichotomy. The reported peculiarities of ELF – no matter on which of two resources the special focus is - prompt us to think again about two constructs in particular, namely those of discourse and text, and the relationship between them. To put it another way, previous ELF research facilitates our thinking about the nature of discourse in general and ELF discourse in particular, and the processes where people bring and negotiate different alternative perspectives through the shared ‘third’ language in the same interaction. This I take up in Chapters 4-5.

Meanwhile, the point is that there are at least two ways of understanding hybridity or language alternation in ELF interaction. The first considers it as an interaction of the virtual language English and speakers’ plurilingual repertoires (Hülmbauer 2013, 2014). The second looks at it as a mixture of two separate discrete codes (e.g. codeswitching theory). As we have seen, most ELF researchers often take the latter perspective and describe linguistic hybridity in ELF interaction by drawing upon the sociolinguistic concepts of codeswitching/mixing/meshing (henceforth under the cover term CS), bi/multi/translingualism and translanguaging. Such ELF research, however, does not provide any plausible definition of CS/bilingualism and languaging, and uses these terms interchangeably. Therefore, in the following chapter, I consider how linguistic hybridity and associated with it CS, bi/multilingualism and languaging are understood in applied and sociolinguistic frameworks, and what bearings it has for conceptualizing hybridity in the present thesis.
3. LINGUISTIC HYBRIDITY IN THE SOCIAL SCIENCES

One of the main concerns of this thesis is linguistic hybridity in intimate relationship. Such an undertaking immediately poses the question: what is linguistic hybridity? Traditionally linguistic hybridity is ascribed to language’s “fundamental ability to be simultaneously the same but different” (Young 1995: 20). The earliest official definition of hybrid appears in the *Oxford English Dictionary* (1933) and runs as follows: “derived from heterogeneous or incongruous sources; having a mixed character; composed of two diverse elements; mongrel” (quoted in Simpson 1933 5: 480). The *Oxford English Dictionary* associates hybridity with heterogeneity and mixture. Similarly, one of the established ways of employing the construct of hybridity in linguistics is by invoking the concepts of language contact, language switching and mixing and language variation and change.

Sociolinguistic and discourse-analytic studies have long sought to develop a plausible framework to understand the significance of linguistic hybridity, mostly such aspects of it as codeswitching and code-mixing.17 Although most scholars agree that codeswitching can occur in any speech community that have linguistic repertoires involving more than one “way of speaking” (Woolard 2007:74), code alternation has most often been investigated in bilingual and multilingual settings. Indeed, it seems that the more distinct the varieties between which speakers ‘switch’, the more available for scrutiny and speculation linguistic hybridity might be. However, such exclusive connection of linguistic hybridity with codeswitching and bi/multilingualism seems counterproductive. Moreover, the analytic concept of codeswitching itself is problematic. In the chapter, I explore what expression the attempts to understand how bilingual and multilingual communities organize their multiple linguistic resources find in the research of linguistic hybridity, and what bearings they have for ELF couple communication. I emphasize the ambivalence of linguistic hybridity as a theoretical construct, juxtaposing contrasting views on the notion and considering the concerns that these views raise with regard to ELF couple communication.

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17 Although for some scholars the difference between codeswitching and code-mixing has a conceptual significance, I use the terms interchangeably for the purpose of this thesis.
3.1 LINGUISTIC HYBRIDITY AS SOCIO-CULTURAL PRACTICE

Initially, the conceptualisation of linguistic hybridity concentrates on the processes of hybridisation in pidgins and creoles, and applies the biological classification of primary, secondary and tertiary hybridisation to the description of their development (Whinnom 1971). In his chapter Linguistic hybridisation of the 'special case' of pidgins and creoles, Whinnom (1971) admits that all three types of hybridisation can be represented in a language simultaneously, and surmises that each type is central for the certain stage of language development. The author defines primary hybridisation as a phenomenon of linguistic fragmentation that is breaking up of a species-language into dialects. In turn, all language alternation constitutes secondary hybridisation so that, for example, the French language spoken by an English speaker is not to be classified as either French or English. Moreover, the scholar associates secondary hybridisation with formal language learning, bilingualism, and geographical superimposition of languages. To solve the puzzle of pidgins, Whinnom accepts that they are tertiary hybrids linked to the primary languages by secondary languages. Finally, the author regards a creole with its mixed inheritance as a primary language that is as “the hybrid, which has become a new species” (Whinnom 1971: 111). In other words, for Whinnom linguistic processes of hybridisation are closely comparable if not mechanically identical to biological ones. For that reason, the scholar sees the biological terms hybrid, hybridise, and hybridisation as the only wholly satisfactory terms for the phenomenon of language contact, mixing, variation and change. Another important Whinnom’s observation is that the processes of hybridisation are rather the rule than the exception for any language.

Likewise, most linguists agree with the point that linguistic hybridity is a natural process of language development, and stands for heterogeneity and mixture. However, theorizing on the notion has produced at least three opposing views on it. On the one hand, many postcolonial theorists use the term to refer to new cultural forms, practices, spaces, and identities created from a synthesis of diverse elements (cf. Arteaga 1997, Bhabha 1994). Arteaga (1997), for example, discusses the phenomenon of hybridity in relation to Chicanos who live at the juncture between different cultures, classes, and languages. He suggests that linguistic hybridity fosters uniquely fluid identities by allowing for the “active interlaminating of competing discourses” (Arteaga 1997:95, italics in the original). The author views hybrid identities, practices, and languages as affirmations of heterogeneity that is capable of disrupting hegemonic cultural discourses. Discussing the hybridity of Chicano
discourse, Arteaga asserts that “inasmuch as [it] is specifically multilingual and multivoiced, it further undermines the tendency toward single-language and single-voiced monologue [...]” (Arteaga 1997:73).

On the other hand, a number of critics (Young 1995, Joseph 1999, Bailey 2007) have questioned this type of positive theorising on hybridity. They argue that, often exploited to disrupt narrow social and cultural categories, hybridity can reduce all differences to a generic state of mixture. Thus, paradoxically, the notion can obscure the distinctiveness of each specific hybrid phenomenon (Joseph 1999: 19). On the other hand, the relations of power and domination often accompany and structure hybrid practices as they are “always mediated through censoring modes such as religious, political, legal, and psychic regulatory regimes” (Joseph 1999: 20). As Joseph cautions, the elements of hybrid practices and products mix on unequal terms. Therefore, there is a need for a careful consideration of the conditions of mixing.

Finally, some scholars struggle against the term hybridity itself (Bailey 2007, Pennycook 2012, Vetter 2015). As Bailey (2007) reasonably argues, conceiving of identities, spaces, or performances as hybrids may more depend on one’s stance and historical power relationships rather than on the forms and practices themselves. It means that normally there are particular social and political processes behind the studies and discussions that make “monolingual-versus-bilingual speech a meaningful opposition” (ibid. 271). Consequently, “analytic constructs that are based on form, such as codeswitching, or that imply anterior, pure essences, such as hybridity, divert attention from the social [...] nature of language [...]” (ibid. 271-272, my italics). For those reasons, he claims, the use of the notion can “pay lip service to certain types of social difference, while implicitly reinforcing the political and economic boundaries [...]” (ibid. 270). As an alternative, Bailey (2007) declares the Bakhtinian term of heteroglossia (translated as Russian разноречие/raznorechie/vari-speechness) as most appropriate for the analysis of language as social practice and defines it as follows:

(a) the simultaneous use of different kinds of forms or signs, and (b) the tensions and conflicts among those signs, based on the sociohistorical associations they carry with them. (Bailey 2007: 257)

As can be seen, Bailey understands heteroglossial разноречие as operating at two levels. One is formal and consistent with the notions of bilingualism (“as the coexistence of two linguistic systems” (ibid. 257) and codeswitching (“as the alternation of codes within a single speech exchange” (ibid. 257). The other is the pragmatic level, or “inherent political and
sociohistorical associations of any linguistic form, i.e. its indexical meanings (Peirce 1955), or social connotations” (ibid. 258, my italics). The authors’ main argument for the term is the Bakhtinian description of heteroglossia as “intra-language varieties within Russian” (ibid. 258). For this reason, Bailey understands the term as the use of different signs and forms that, contrary to bilingualism and codeswitching, does not refer to the distinct languages and encompasses both monolingual and multilingual forms.

I cannot agree more with Bailey’s argument against the ‘meaningful opposition’ between monolingual and bilingual speech in the research of bi/multilingualism. However, I think, it is questionable whether the substitution of linguistic hybridity with heteroglossia can solve the problem of such opposition, or make it less ‘meaningful’. At least if one uses heteroglossia as “a conceptual entree to social meaning of bilingual [why not heteroglossic?] speech and related identity negotiations” (Bailey 2007: 257, my italics). There are at least three objections, which can be raised to Bailey’s definition of heteroglossia. The first is general and concerns Bakhtin’s original concepts of heteroglosia and разноречие (raznorechie)/vari-speechness. The second regards the “socio-cultural” part of Bailey’s definition and is about ‘the tensions and conflicts among signs’ in heteroglossia. The third concerns its “formal” part and association with bilingualism and codeswitching.

As concerns the first point, for Bakhtin the two notions of heteroglosia and разноречие (raznorechie)/vari-speechness are of conceptual difference. To begin with, Bakhtin’s разноречие (raznorechie) refers to ‘vari-speechness’ or language diversity and variation. Rather misleadingly, the notion has often been rendered in English as ‘heteroglossia’ (Russian разноголосье or разноголосица)18 (cf. Pietikäinen and Dufva 2014). It is worth, then, to look at what the scholar himself has to say about such разноречие (raznorechie)/vari-speechness in more detail. According to Bakhtin, it is

внутренняя расслоенность единого национального языка на социальные дialeкты, групповые манеры, профессиональные жаргонь, жанровые языки, языки поколений и возрастов, языки направлений и партий, языки авторитетов, языки кружков и мимолетных мод, языки социально-политических дней и даже часов (у каждого дня свой лозунг, свой словарь, свои акценты), […]внутренняя расслоенность каждого языка в каждый данный момент его исторического существования […] (intra stratification of the standard national language into social dialects, group manners, professional jargons, genre languages, languages of generations and ages, languages of schools and parties, languages of authorities, languages of hobby groups and transient fashions, languages of socio-political days and even hours (every day has its own motto, own vocabulary, own accents), […] intra stratification of every language at every single/given moment of its historic existence […] ) (Бахтин [1972, 1975]2012: 15)

18 For a discussion of the term heteroglossia see also Blackledge and Creese (2014).
What Bakhtin is describing here is разноречие (raznorechie)/vari-speechness as universal language variation, both diachronic and synchronic. He argues against the view that all speakers of a particular language use the language in a uniform way. What he is speaking about is different individual styles, registers, genres, dialects, languages of different generations within a language, although he does not exclude such variation between/among different ‘national’ languages (ibid. 42-44). In Bakhtin’s view, standard language is also one of the ‘languages’ of разноречие (raznorechie)/vari-speechness. This is consistent with his claim that all language is hybrid/heterogeneous in its nature:

(A common standard language is the system of linguistic norms. But those norms are not an abstract must, but creative forces of language life, which overcome variation/vari-speechness [in Bailey’s terms, heteroglossia] of language, unite and centralize verbal-ideological thinking, create the solid and settled linguistic core of the officially sanctioned literary/standard language; or maintain/preserve this already generated language from the pressure of developing variation/vari-speechness. […]The standard language itself […] is only one of the languages of heteroglossia, and it itself is stratified into languages (genres, schools and so on). […] This stratification and variation/vari-speechness spreads and deepens until language lives and develops, together with the centripetal forces, the centrifugal forces of language continuously work; together with the verbal ideological centralization and unification the processes of decentralization and separation take place. (Бахтин 2012: 24-25, emphasis in the original)

As can be seen here, Bakhtin describes разноречие (raznorechie)/vari-speechness as any possible (social) variation in any language use. Consequently, it would seem self-evident that the study of such разноречие (raznorechie)/vari-speechness will focus on the linguistic system, on the form, on the code or codes available to speakers, on the structure of language. Certainly, discourse (or in Bailey’s terms “the sociohistorical associations” it carries with it) can be studied here as evidence for regularities (which can be incorporated into rules or norms of the standard) (cf. Labov 1978 [1972]). In turn, the analysis of разноречие (raznorechie)/vari-speechness as variation can lead to a revision of language as a well-defined system of rules and, consequently, to a rejection of uniformity and prescription. It is also possible that the study of language variation can attract attention to the social nature of language and demonstrate the diversity of language as social practice. However, разноречие (raznorechie)/vari-speechness (as language variation) is still decontextualised from language
as communicative activity or social practice. Its descriptive limit is still text, linguistic system and its manifestation, form, sentence, or structure rather than discourse or social practice. The focus is on a more exact description of grammatical rules, not on their communicative potential.

Hence разноречие (raznorechie)/vari-speechness, or in Bailey’s terms heteroglossia is seen by Bakhtin as language variation, the use of different forms or signs or, to be more precise, the integration of different ‘languages’/styles/speech manners in the human mind which

не сталкиваются между собой[…], диалогически не соотнесены в языковом сознании [человека]: он переходит из одного [языка] в другой бездумно, автоматически: каждый [язык] бесспорен на своем месте, и место каждого бессильно.

(do not clash against each other[…] are not dialogically correlated in the individual linguistic consciousness: he/an individual turns/changes/go on from one [language] to another adrift/absentmindedly; automatically: each [language] is unquestionable on its place, and the place of each is unquestioned/undoubted.)” (Бахтин 2012: 48)

As an example of such blending of ‘languages’, Bakhtin depicts an illiterate peasant who “lives in different linguistic systems” (ibid. 48) but does not opposes (or read any ‘tensions and conflicts’ into) them. He prays in the Church Slavonic language, sings yet in another language, speaks to the family members in the third one, and dictates a petition (for volost) to a literate person in the official-literate (‘paper’) language. According to Bakhtin, such fusion of those languages-systems does not mean that the peasant, like any other individual (or in Bakhtin’s words “an active socio-ideological linguistic consciousness”), is not able or cannot find his bearings in such heteroglossic language variation and take a position by ‘choosing a language’. However, according to Bakhtin, such positioning is not a matter of разноречие (raznorechie)/vari-speechness as different co-existing language systems but of polyphony as heteroglossic ideologies that an individual connects to those linguistic systems (ibid. 49). In other words, Bakhtin understands heteroglossia as an aspect of polyphony or human positioning, as a factor of discourse rather than an element of linguistic system.

This conceptual distinction made by Bakhtin provides justification to the second objection as regards Bailey’s “tensions and conflicts among signs” in heteroglossia. As we have seen, Bakhtin by no means claims that those heteroglossic ideologies or, in Bakhtin’s terms, “approaches to the world” (ibid. 49) and, in Bailey’s terms, “the tensions and conflicts” are ‘inherent’ (see Bailey’s definition, p. 49) in signs or texts themselves. Perhaps, one can speak about ‘the tensions and conflicts among signs’ on the formal textual level in terms of usual or unusual collocation of those signs. So, one can claim that particular
signs/forms do not fit together or are in conflict with each other for some normative reasons: they belong to different codes or, if they can be ascribed to the same code, they do not constitute a usual/’normal’ collocation in it. However, what Bailey seems to be speaking about in his definition is the pragmatic/’sociohistorical tensions and conflicts’ which are inherent in the signs and forms themselves and, consequently, can be encoded and/or decoded from those signs and forms. However, the tensions and conflicts (as well as solidarity and rapport) do not happen among signs; they are perlocutionary effects, which people achieve by and read into particular signs and forms. These are not “the tensions and conflicts among those signs, based on the sociohistorical associations they carry with them” but the tensions and conflicts among people (or in Bakhtin’s terms “active consciousnesses”) who read these associations into the signs. It is not a form that has an “inherent” indexical (political, sociohistorical, or whatever) meaning, but people who connect a certain ideology or world view to a particular form/text, who convert the form/symbol into index. Therefore, it seems plausible to describe Bailey’s first ‘formal’ level of linguistic hybridity as co-existence of established language varieties in terms of the Bakhtinian notion of разноречие (raznorechie/vari-speechness or language variation). It is more useful, however, to delineate the second ‘social’ (in our terms, pragmatic) level of language variation and hybridization in terms of the Bakhtinian polyphony as positioning (and heteroglossia as its aspect), which is the central concern of Chapter 4.

To recap this section, my point is that one can argue for or against linguistic hybridity as a theoretical concept for describing language use/human communication as social practice. One can argue that hybrid practices have either positive/desirable or negative/undesirable consequences (e.g. to express the relations between power and domination). One can also argue that linguistic hybridity can reduce all differences to a generic state of mixture, or lead to privileging of certain groups of people and discrimination of others. However, these are not arguments for or against linguistic hybridity (and the processes of hybridization) itself but arguments for and against the purposes (pretexts) the concepts are used for by people. As I will discuss in the following chapters (and in line with Widdowson’s discourse and Bakhtin’s polyphony), whatever the discipline of social science is (applied linguistics, discourse analysis, sociolinguistics, anthropology and so on), the researcher will always provide his own discourse that s/he reads into any text. In this sense, linguistic hybridity as a concept is evidence of the researcher’s discourse - a version of reality, which is different from other discourses, and from what linguistic hybridity actually is for
Linguistic hybridity is necessary an abstract construct that gives selective prominence to certain (hybrid) features of the experienced language (and world) to fit a particular set of cultural assumptions. Before I provide my own understanding of linguistic hybridity, let us have a closer look at a tendency that has found its expression in the first part of Bailey’s definition of heteroglossia and currently prevails in sociolinguistic and discourse-analytic studies, namely the tendency to associate linguistic hybridity with bilingualism, and codeswitching or code-mixing.

### 3.2 Linguistic Hybridity and Codeswitching Theory

I have argued in the previous chapter and section that in sociolinguistic and discourse-analytic research linguistic hybridity is often described in terms of CS. Moreover, there is a general assumption that (‘full’) bilingualism is a necessary prerequisite for those aspects of linguistic hybridity. Consequently, code alternation is most often investigated in bilingual settings, although many scholars agree that it can occur in any (monolingual/bilingual/multilingual) “speech” community that have linguistic repertoire comprising “two or more language varieties” (Woolard 2007: 73-74). The attempts to understand how bi/multilingual communities organize their multiple linguistic resources have yielded in at least two general frames. One of them concerns itself with grammatical constrains on codeswitching (Poplack 1987, Myers-Scollon 1993). The second has to do with motivations and functions of it (Auer 1984, Blom and Gumperz 1972, Gumperz 1982). Despite the significant differences among the dominant analytical frameworks, in most of them CS is treated as the alternation of two (or more) separate (encoded) language systems that are sequentially activated in linguistic, cognitive, and/or social senses. That is to say, as soon as a researcher speaks about CS, s/he is implying that there are bilingual/multilingual speakers who neatly ‘switch on and off’ two or more distinct codes, whether within a single clause/grammatical unit or in a conversation. Consider, for example, the following extract. It is taken from (no less an authoritative work than) A glossary of sociolinguistics (Trudgill 2003):

*bilingualism* The ability of an individual to speak two or more languages. In the usage of some writers, bilingualism refers to individuals who have native command of more than one language.

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19 *Monolingual* often refers to the communities that use one national/ethnic variety, *by/multilingual* – to the communities who use two or more such national/ethnic languages. See Section 5.4-5.5 for a more detailed discussion of languages with national/ethnic names.
Other writers use the term to refer to any speaker who has a reasonable degree of competence in a language other than their mother tongue. (Trudgill 2003:15, my italics)

**codeswitching** The process whereby bilingual or bidialectal speakers switch back and forth between one language or dialect and another within the same conversation. This linguistic behaviour is very common in multilingual situations. Sociolinguistic research in this area has concentrated on trying to establish what factors in the social and linguistic context influence switching: it may be that one language is typically associated with one set of **domains**, and the other with another. (ibid. 23, emphasis in the original)

What Trudgill is suggesting here is that **bilingualism** and **codeswitching** are related phenomena. Moreover, he, like many sociolinguists, speaks of (‘full’) **bilingualism** as the prerequisite for **codeswitching**. That is to say, **bilingualism** is treated as an achieved state of having two (or more) languages: someone is bilingual or has two (or more) languages. Bilingual speakers are assumed to be able to speak those languages-codes and to engage in codeswitching or “switch back and forth” between them. They are said to be people who have a ‘reasonable’ degree of competence or native command in two or more languages and are described as proficient/competent speakers who have, know and select strategically the most appropriate language/code from a range of choices.

This view is consistent with another definition of **bilingualism** and **CS** taken from the introduction to the book *Codeswitching in Conversation* (Auer 1998). It seems to be entailed in the title itself - *Bilingual Conversation Revisited* - that **CS** is seen as connected to **bilingualism** here:

From earlier and more recent research we know (a) that codeswitching is related to and indicative of group membership in particular types of **bilingual** speech communities, such that the regularities of the alternating use of two or more languages within one conversation may vary to a considerable degree between speech communities, and (b) that intrasentential codeswitching, where it occurs, is constrained by syntactic and morphosyntactic considerations which may or may not be of a universal kind. Accordingly, the dominant perspectives on codeswitching taken in research have been either sociolinguistic […], or grammatical […]. (Auer 1998:3, my emphasis)

Here again, **codeswitching** is said to be (exclusively) connected to **bilingual speech** and **bilingual speech communities**. The implication is persistently the same: there are two distinct languages-codes, which are available and accessible to the speakers in a particular (bi/multilingual) speech community. Another Auer’s observation is that there are two dominant perspectives on codeswitching taken in research. The first perspective – sociolinguistic – focuses on the ways that codeswitching is used to qualify/identify for membership of a (pre-defined bilingual) speech community. This approach then looks at the possible communicative properties/potential of the involved languages and investigates the use to which (bilingual) speakers put their knowledge of two or more (distinct) codes in actual discourse. The second one – grammatical – deals with the languages as encoded systems which are switched back and forth intrasententially under certain (universal) syntactic or
morphosyntactic constraints. The concern of this approach is variation of languages in actual heterogeneous/bilingual speech communities and analysis of the linguistic manifestations from the actual bilingual speakers’ data. In other words, its descriptive limit is sentence and/or grammatical structure. Auer, further, makes a remark that “neither the sociolinguistic approach (sensu strict) nor the grammatical approach explores the whole range of observed regularities in bilingual speech” (ibid. 3, my emphasis).

My own view here is that despite all the differences between grammatical and sociolinguistic approaches in codeswitching research, they do not only have their limitations - as Auer points out - related to the areas of descriptions. The basic assumption that underlies most of them seems to be misleading: the involved languages, or codes, are seen as separate encoded linguistic systems. Consequently, monolinguals (people who have one language) and bilinguals (people who have two or more languages) are put into ‘meaningful opposition’ (see the discussion of Bailey’s argument in Section 3.1). It seems quite obvious, however, that if one takes bi/multilingualism as an individual’s ability to speak two or more separate languages that is as two or more monolingualisms; one in fact takes monolingualism as her/his primary point of reference. The question then here is how a monolingualism can be ‘a meaningful opposition’ to two or more monolingualisms? In other words, the assumption that still predominates in codeswitching and bilingual research is that bi/multilingual speakers are in possession of two separate distinct languages-entities/varieties. There are, however, objections that can be raised against this line of argument. In the next sections, I will address two of them: the discreteness of codes, and the strategic nature of code alternation, or language choice.

3.3 DISCRETENESS OF CODES AND MONOLECTAL CODESWITCHING

Recently, from several directions (including CS inquiry), researchers have turned towards the question whether different languages involved in codeswitching can still be equated or confined to the limits of codes and be considered as two separate entities which are ‘switched on and off’ in the minds of the speakers (Cogo 2009, 2012; Cardner-Chloros 1991; Woolard 2007; Seidlhofer 2011: 72-73). As I have argued in Chapter 2, the scepticism among researchers leads to the questioning of the very category of codeswitching (Bailey 2007, Gardner-Chloros 1991, Hümlbauer 2013, 2014, Seidlhofer 2011). The suggestion is
that there is greater ambiguity in codeswitching and forms it takes than have so often been attributed. For example, particular linguistic forms are more often seen now not as belonging to either one code or another (Cardner-Chloros 1991, Woolard 1999). In codeswitching literature, this observation has found one of its expressions in “a monolectal view” (Meeuwis and Blommaert 1998). The assumption is that people do not switch between two distinct varieties but use a single code (monolect) of mixed origins:

In this monolectal view, the overall code-switched variant used by speakers is not seen as a product of blending between two or more languages (with its implication of full knowledge of those languages), but as one code in its own right. Instead of a split object, a monolectal view allows us to see code-switched speech as a system that operates very much on its own and with a dynamics of its own. (Meeuwis and Blommaert 1998: 80, italics in the original)

What Meeuwis and Blommaert demonstrate in their ethnographic study is that in some cases codeswitching speakers would not necessarily be able to produce monolingual speech in either languages they ‘switch’ between/among. The authors support this observation by the empirical evidence from Lingala-French and Swahili-French “code-switched speeches” spoken in Zaire. They claim that Lingala-French (as well as Swahili-French) users perceive their ‘mixed’ code as a language in its own right: the Lingala language (the Swahili language, correspondingly). Although this ‘monolectal’ approach is still based on the assumption that speakers can engage in (albeit monolectal) codeswitching, it raises the question whether bilingual speakers are switching between two clearly distinct varieties. As Meeuwis and Blommaert put it:

[...] code-switched speech can be, for all practical purposes, *one variety of its own*, unconnected to and unconditioned by the full knowledge of two separate languages (i.e. unconnected by the full knowledge by conventional notions of bilingualism). (Meeuwis and Blommaert 1998: 80, italics in the original)

Discussing mixed ‘impure’ ‘crossover’ phenomena of such (Lingala-french, Swahili-French, or Lingala-French - Swahili-French) “code-switched speech”, Meeuwis and Blommaert (2004: 82) put an exclusive connection between code alternation and (full) bilingualism and, what is more important, the equation between language and code on shaky ground. They describe the language, which has Lingala and French elements but cannot be ascribed to either the Lingala or French code. For the speakers of this “variety of its own” are not able to speak either Lingala or French as separate languages. That is to say, their main argument is that the ‘code-switched’ – hybrid indeed - Lingala-French or Swahili-French languages cannot be treated as two separate codes because the speakers of those varieties are able to produce a ‘monolingual’ speech neither in Lingala or Swahili nor in French. Another important point is that the speakers themselves do not perceive their mixed languages as
consisting of separate and distinct codes. The question then arises as to whether it is plausible to describe and explain such mixed varieties in terms of *monolectal codeswitching*: Does it mean that speakers still *code-switch* albeit *monolectally*? In other words, if Lingala-French/Swahili-French speakers had been able to produce a ‘monolingual’ speech in the varieties involved, would it have meant that they ‘switch’ between separate, discreet and distinct varieties (at least from speakers’ own perspective)? Is it plausible to describe the process of code alternation in any context (including interactions between/among ‘full’ bilinguals) in terms of *switching* between languages *back and forth*, or *on and off* at all? This question regards the extent to which linguistic hybridity in general and language alternation in ELF intimate interaction can be explained (and perceived) in terms of *codeswitching* and *bilingualism/multilingualism* as a combination of two or more separate *monolingualisms*.

One possible answer is that in the process of communication people do not switch between/among languages but engage in what Alton Becker (1995) refers to as *languaging*. The term *languaging* dates back to 1970s and has been introduced by Becker in connection to the process of translating from one language to another. I have occasion to discuss Alton Becker’s *languaging* as related to Bakhtin’s polyphony in a later chapter. For the moment, let us see what Jørgensen (2008) has to say about it in relation to how people use different languages in the same “linguistic production” (ibid. 161).

### 3.4 **CODESWITCHING VS. LANGUAGING**

Jørgensen argues against the term *bi/multilingual* and *codeswitching* in favour of *polylingualism* and *languaging*. He defines *polylingualism* and *languaging* as “the simultaneous use of features from many different sources” (2008:161) in the same interaction. Describing the process of combining languages among urban Turkish-Danish students, Jørgensen suggests distinguishing between *a language* and *language/languaging*. The former is understood as “an ideological [national/ethnic] construct” and the latter as “observable everyday behaviour”, as the use of “whatever linguistic features [which] are at [language users’] disposal with the intention of achieving their communicative aims” (ibid. 169). The suggestion is to treat languages as different *sets of features* that can be perceived as either belonging or not belonging together, or can be either ascribed to specific languages, or “specific categories that are called languages” (ibid. 166), or not. The point then is that the terms *multilingualism* and *codeswitching* are claimed as unsatisfactory for the description of
code alternation as a discursive practice for they presuppose the existence of clearly bounded separate linguistic systems. Instead, the researcher proposes the term polylingual behaviour that is seen as a particular instance of languaging: polylingual languaging. The basic idea is that polylingual languaging is a combination of features which can either have any national/ethnic values or not, or it may be even difficult to determine where some features employed in polylingual languaging originate from. In turn, features are defined as “linguistic features, words with meanings, morphology, syntactic restrictions and [...] values ascribed to them by speakers” (ibid. 167).

While I cannot agree more with Jørgensen that we all are languagers, and “it makes sense to talk about language, but not necessarily about a language” (ibid. 166), I think that in his concept of (“structural linguistic”) feature (ibid. 167-168) there is a confusion and a lack of theoretical rigour. The term feature seems to be used to refer to both form (that is product or linguistic manifestation) and pragmatic significance (what people mean by a form when they put it to pragmatic use). The assumption is that such pragmatic significance together with the encoded semantic (symbolic, or in Jørgensen’s terms structural) meaning, grammatical form and syntactic restriction is a quality of linguistic features themselves. Consider, for example, the following:

The concept of a language is thus bound in time and space (see also Auer & Wei, 2007: 2), and it is not our part of understanding of the human concept of language. Features are, however. Speakers use features and not languages. Features may be ascribed to specific languages (or specific categories which are called languages). This may be an important quality of a feature, and one which speakers may know and use as they speak. But what the speaker uses is a feature [...] A Turkish-Danish grade school student involved in a group assignment with other Turkish-Danish students may ask (Danish in recte, Turkish in italics):

jeg har ikke nogen saks; hvor er saksen, makas ver
This utterance literally means ‘I have no scissors, where are the scissors, give me a pair of scissors’. The student may on the other hand also say:

makasim, makas nerede,20 giv mig en saks
This utterance would translate into exactly the same English utterance as the first one. However, in the first version, the beginning is Danish, the rest is Turkish. [...] In the second version it is the opposite. Going from Danish to Turkish adds an appeal for togetherness of the students who are minority kids in an unfriendly majority surrounding. Going from Turkish to Danish combines the request with the power and status of the majority. To understand this difference we must know which language is the minority language and which the majority language, and we must know the values ascribed to each of the languages among this particular group. (Jørgensen 2008: 166, my emphasis)

What Jørgensen is saying here is that pragmatic (cultural, national, power-solidarity and so on) values can be directly signalled by the order or sequence of linguistic (Turkish and Danish) forms. In fact, the speakers’ values which they “ascribe” to each of the languages, their intentions and understanding, their contextual and pretextual factors (see Section 1.1.1

20 The phrase makasim, makas nerede is not in italics in the original, although it is in Turkish.
and Chapter 4) are not taken into account at all. Arguing against “the categories called languages” (English, Turkish, Danish languages), Jørgensen proposes the term a set of (English, Turkish, Danish) features instead. The question then arises as to how “the change of language back and forth between English, Danish, and Turkish” (ibid. 172, my emphasis) is different from codeswitching back and forth between the English, Danish and Turkish languages. How polylingual languaging (combination of features) is different from multilingual behaviour (combination of languages)? Jørgensen provides the following answer to this question: “Polylingualism is different from multilingualism, a term which covers (more or less ‘full’) command of several languages” (ibid. 169). Polylingualism is said here not to be connected to ‘full’ command of the involved languages. So like in the monolectal view (discussed in Section 3.3), the assumption is that ‘full’ competence in languages involved is not a prerequisite for language alternation in polylingual languaging either. However, not only the terms polylingual and multilingual mean the same with the only difference that multi (‘much’, ‘many’) originates from Greek, and poly (‘much’, ‘many’) – from Latin. The term itself - polylingual languaging (literary, ‘languaging in many languages’) - contradicts the basic Jørgensen’s idea that we do not speak different languages but use different sets of features, in his terms - polylingual features, features which are taken and belong to many (poly) different languages (linguae). My own view is that Jørgensen’s feature is a typical example of confusion between product and analysis (which have to do with text), and process and interpretation (which have to do with discourse) disguised in the useless juggling with the terms. I see no point in substituting languaging and language by polylingual languaging and a set of linguistic features. There is no such thing as polylingual languaging. There is only languaging. The Jørgensen’s denial of ‘national’ languages (and approving of ‘national’ features) in fact underlies the equation in which the Danish and Turkish language (like any language with the national/ethnic name) match the Danish and Turkish culture (like any culture with the national/ethnic name), which in turn match the Danish and Turkish nation state. I will discuss the relationship between language, culture and nationality/ethnicity as an aspect of culture in Chapter 5. Meanwhile, my suggestion is that it is more plausible to make a distinction between a language as a code (established encoded linguistic system) and language as a human resource (as a common human ability to language), rather than between a ‘national/ethnic’ language and a ‘national/ethnic’ feature or a set of features.
In this relation, consider another Jørgensen’s point: “the choice of linguistic features from which are sometimes considered different sets of features is not arbitrary, it is rational” (ibid. 174). It seems Jørgensen’s “rational” presupposes and privileges a speaker’s intention. The question here is not only whether we use meanings, morphology, or syntactic structures intentionally at all. The question also is whether intention implies conscious control and planning, and how far speaker intentions can be manifested and analysed in linguistic production. As we all may know, whatever the speaker’s intentions are and however (clearly) they are worded, there will always be occasions when such intentions are misunderstood and meanings/positions must be negotiated. As Pitzl, for example, puts it in relation to intentionality in linguistic creativity in ELF, “the best or most creative of intentions, so to speak, do not in fact guarantee that one produces a successful linguistic expression, i.e. an expression that is effective for communication in the context it is uttered” (Pitzl 2011:77). Therefore, like many other scholars, I would question the relevance of the distinction between intentionality and arbitrariness/accident for the description of linguistic variation. Moreover, I think it is not only that the concept of rationality or intention is irrelevant for the analysis of linguistic hybridity in ELF. Jørgensen’s claim that the speakers’ choices are always rational appears to pay lip service to the original Becker’s (1995) concept of languaging itself. If speakers always use different features (from different codes) intentionally, how then is the concept of languaging different from the notion of codeswitching where speakers deliberately switch codes on and off? Paradoxically enough, arguing against the terms of codeswitching and multilingualism, Jørgensen makes the assertion that is typical for codeswitching and bilingual research discussed in the sections above. The assumption behind the concepts of codeswitching and Jørgensen’s (polylingual) languaging seems to be the same: the speakers strategically consciously use different codes or, in Jørgensen terms, the features from different sets; they rationally change languages between/among the available sets of linguistic elements that suit their intentions.

As I have argued, there is no point in substituting the concept of a language by a set of features. In fact to do so means to presuppose that a language, an ideology and a culture with-the-national-name (Piller 2011) are intrinsically bound with each other. According to Jørgensen, if a speaker uses the Danish language, s/he necessary expresses the Danish national/ideological/cultural values. If a speaker (“rationally”) uses the Danish feature, s/he might or might not express the Danish national/ideological/cultural values. The assumption then is that national languages are bounded to particular national values as well as national
values are bounded to particular national languages, and that cultural and conceptual systems can be encoded within and inferred from linguistic evidence alone. My point here is that it is true that languages with the national names are convenient fictions, idealizations that help us to explain, understand and categorize this world. It is also true that national languages are used to express and conform to national (whatever they could be) norms, and that such practices can have undesirable consequences. That they can lead to privileging of certain groups of people (e.g. Jørgensen’s “majority language community”), and to the neglect and discrimination of others (e.g. Jørgensen’s “minority language community”). However, these are not arguments against any national language itself but arguments against the purposes they are put for by people. It does not mean that to speak any specific language with the national name or take it as an independent variable for the research purposes means to take this language and connected to it (national) ideology or culture “as a package deal” (Widdowson 2009: 34).

The crucial point here is that these are not (national) languages who communicate, but people who communicate by using languages as a resource for achieving their purposes/pretexts. These are not names (whether they are national or not) of the languages that matter here, but the purposes the languages are used for. Of course, linguists can treat languages as separate encoded systems consisting of particular linguistic features that encode particular cultural, national, ideological and nation states values. But, whatever the claims, the focus of such investigation will always be only on the


(material/product […], the means of the verbal communication, not on the verbal communication itself […], on the relationship between the elements in the system of language, but not on the relationship between utterances and not the relationship of utterances to reality and to the speaker (author) (Бахтин 1997: 326)

According to Bakhtin, not only will such analysis be disassociated from the actual users’ contexts and pretexts, which motivated text or ‘material’ production. What we shall have is cultural/ideological/national meanings read off from textual features (and names of the languages); the confirmation of analysts’ own cultural/ideological/national prejudice based in the selective use of the linguistic features of the text. That is to say, the distinction between languages (in fact, linguistic systems, features and linguistic elements of those systems) in such analysis will be based entirely “on the demarcations that are imposed by linguistic
description [and linguist’s ideological/cultural assumptions] and do not necessary represent the reality of user experience” (Seidlhofer 2011: 73).

My point here is that there is nothing wrong about languages with the national names if an analyst focuses on them as encoded linguistic systems or codes, because (after all) it is the only approach that allows for any linguistic analysis in general and the analysis of linguistic hybridity as textual manifestation in particular. What I am proposing is that it is more useful to treat those languages as various realizations of the common human ability to language. Those realizations will naturally develop and be exploited to meet the varying needs (also as national markers) of those who use them. The question, then, is not how far those realizations are “a quantitative matter of the cumulative collection of different codes”, but rather how people “use their partial knowledge [of their languages] strategically and appropriately as a composite linguistic resource” (Seidlhofer 2011:72-73, my italics). To put it another way, the question is not how different codes are being mixed/accumulated, but how they function when put into pragmatic use.

3.5 HYBRIDITY AS LANGUAGING

As I have briefly discussed in the Introduction and in Chapter 2, it was Becker (1995) who introduced the notion of languaging in relation to the process of translation. He defines it as an ‘orientational’ (as opposed to denotational) open-ended process of doing language by drawing upon any available linguistic resources (Becker 1995: 9). The notion seems to be so suggestive and on the tip of everyone’s tongue that various scholars from different fields of study claim to develop it independently from each other, and often so without reference to the original Becker’s or each other’s concepts.

Merrill Swain (2006), for example, considers it as fortunate that she did not know anyone else who has used this term before it ‘emerged’ in her investigation of the second language proficiency. This, she claims, helped her to develop and retain her own understanding of the concept. The researcher defines languaging as “an action – a dynamic, never ending process of using language to make meaning” (ibid. 96) and sees it as part of the general process of learning, or shaping knowledge and experience through language. One of her examples of how languaging works in language learning is the students’ discussion of the riddle “Why the dentist and the manicurist divorce?” and the answer to it “Because they fought tooth and nail”. The students’ assignment was to discuss and understand the
riddles/jokes in pairs and then to explain them to the rest of the class. In this way, the undergraduates were faced with the task to solve the problem and use the second language (English) as a tool that mediates their thinking. With this particular riddle, Swain reports that it took the pair of students in charge rather long to get the meaning of the idiom across to the rest of the class. As a reaction, a student that was presenting another joke after discussion of this riddle, made a remark – “I fought tooth and nails to get this joke” – that brought about the entire class laughing. Swain’s argument is that such languaging about language helps students learn through and about the language by mediating language and thought. Her point is that such understanding of languaging as “producing language in attempt to understand – to problem-solve – to make meaning” (ibid. 96) differs from that of the introducers of the concept, for example, in psychology (Lado 1979), and, therefore, can be claimed as an independently developed concept. In fact, what Lado means by languaging, namely a “generic term to refer globally to any use of language” or “full communicative use” (ibid. 3) is very similar to how Swain herself conceptualizes it.

Phipps (2007) also argues for languaging for the description of international tourism communication. Likewise, she claims that she has independently developed the concept together with her colleague Mike Gonzalez\(^{21}\) and defines it as “the process of struggling to find a way of articulating the full, embodied and engaged interaction with the world that comes when we put the languages we are learning into action” (2007: 12). She looks at how people are doing tourism through learning and using destination’s languages. Her study is empirical ethnographic examining of a variety of language (e.g. Portuguese) courses for touristic purposes, where the scholar is engaged as a participant observer. She also uses her field-notes on the educational and language learning experience, and participants’ touristic imaginings such as memories or expectations for future encounters. Instead of focusing on the linguistic elements of such class practices as oral speech or games and establishing a language-teaching framework, the researcher seeks to understand the social aspects of the learning experience. What is specific about this study is that its central question is not why people use global English for touristic purposes but why they do not use it, why they ‘break’ English [and live] as it were no alternative. To put it in Phipps words, “why [they] bother” to learn a destination’s language if the dominant English is available and understood/spoken by their interlocutors. Her argument is that people choose such classes in local languages

\(^{21}\) As I have discussed, the development of the concept languaging is generally ascribed to Lado (1979) in psychology and Becker (1995) in philology.
because they are *languages* who seek for dwelling in a different world, or transforming a travel destination into an ‘inhabited’ place and experiencing the unfamiliar through such *languaging*. Her argument is that tourist language learners are languagers who are not operating according to the dominant (English-speaking) modes suggested by tourism industry. By choosing a destination’s language to “dwell” in a place and environment, they establish the relationship and social bonding with destination people in their L1/s, and, so, interact with the world as mediated through the language they learn. In Phipps view, the tourist language learners are

‘agents’ or ‘language activists’, who engage with the world-in-action, who move in the world in a way that allows the risk of stepping out of one’s habitual ways of speaking and attempt to develop different, more rational ways of interacting with people and phenomena that one encounters in everyday life. (ibid. 2007:12)

Thus, Phipps emphasises the “everydayness” - orientation to everyday needs or practical engagement with the world - of any human action and relationship by challenging the established traditional view of what skills (and languages) count as worth learning/teaching. She shows how acquiring and putting into practice such linguistic skills as ordering a cup of coffee in a language other than English (specifically, Portuguese) are functional in the sense that they are “an act of dwelling” (2007: 12) in an unfamiliar different world/culture and transform languagers’ perception of the Other and of them themselves. As Phipps puts it:

‘Languages’ use the ways in which they perceive the world to develop new dispositions for poetic action in another language and they are engaged in developing these dispositions so that they become habitual, durable. (Phipps 2007:12)

All this resonates with the reflections on the virtual English that we have discussed in relation to ELF in Section 2.1. The essential point of languaging is the agency of language users and the focus on the process and practice as opposed to product and linguistic system. In this respect, however, ELF speakers are rather similar than different from any other ‘languagers’.

In Seidlhofer’s words, ELF (like any other language) speakers are agents who

exploit the potential of the language, they are fully involved in the interactions, whether for work or for play. They are focused on the interactional and transactional purposes of the talk and on the interlocutors as people rather than on linguistic code itself. [...] In many ways, ELF communication works in much the same fashion as communication among speakers of any language in that meaning is negotiated and co-constructed [...]. (Seidlhofer 2011: 98)

Such understanding of ELF speakers’ agency as a *common human ability to use language*, I think, is closer to Becker’s original concept and my own understanding of *languaging*, to which I turn in the rest of the section.

Discussing the notion in the connection to the process of translating from one language (Burmese, Malay, or Javanes) into another (English), Becker (1995) claims that
translation, like any language use, is always an approximate interpretation of what has been said or written. In the process of translating poems from Javanese into English, he claims, “what we are doing, in the words of Ortega (1959), is learning what our exuberances and deficiencies of interpretation are” (Becker 2000: 423, my emphasis). Becker sees such approximation as nothing unusual but as “the ordinary condition of using language, of languaging” (Becker 1995: 232, italics in the original). His argument is that in the process of meaning negotiation, we always ‘add’ something to what we hear or read. On the other hand, our understanding is also deficient in the sense that there is also something that we ‘miss’ in what our interlocutor intends to convey. This is how he puts it in connection to the processes of writing and reading:

[…]The difficulty of writing, like the difficulty of reading, is that across two different minds there is so much exuberance [a text says more than intended] and so much deficiency [a text says less than intended] in the understanding of each. Contemplating the experiences […], you come to see this not as a special problem but as the normal situation of languaging.” (Becker 1995: 291, my italics)

Be it the exuberance or deficiency of my own interpretation of Becker’s text, but what he is saying here is that to have a common language means not only (if at all) to share the systemic knowledge of it (and, of course, not to be able to analyse a language) but to have a common shared knowledge of the world. That is what he calls “the prior texts” or “memories”. As Becker puts it, “we have a common language to the extent we have common prior texts” (ibid. 288). From this point of view, what matters is not a language/languages people speak (whatever it/their names or features are) but the extent to which people's cultures, the knowledge of the world, or in Becker’s terms, their “prior texts” converge. This being so, languaging is an orientational process (as opposed to denotational product) of “taking old texts from the memory and reshaping them into present contexts” (ibid. 9).

[...We] do well to replace the word language, as an accomplished system or structure, with the word languaging as the performance of a repertoire of games or orientations […]. Language in this view is not denotational but orientational; in other words, languaging is one means by which we continually attune ourselves to context. In a distant language, we have to relearn to attune ourselves, which means primarily building new memories” (Becker 1995: 288, my emphasis).

What Becker is surmising here is that a language can be taken as the manifestation of linguistic code, in Becker’s terms as “the code image”, or in our terms as text. While languaging - “for the view that combines shaping, storing, retrieving, and communicating knowledge into one open-ended process” (ibid. 9, my emphasis), or in our terms as discourse. Becker’s understanding of languaging as “an endless social process of orienting and reorienting ourselves and each other to a constantly changing environment” (ibid. 288) is consistent with what Seidhlofer has to say about languaging in ELF contexts:
The focus here is genuinely on communicative function [...] whatever forms are used [in ELF they] are evaluated in terms of their functional effectiveness and not their degree of approximation to NS norms. Essentially, in this view, learners are not learning a language but learning to language. (Seidlhofer 2011: 197, italics in the original)

The focus here is on the process of meaning negotiation, in which individuals refer texts - language they have heard and used in the past (their memories as previously experienced discourse) - to context and realize them pragmatically thereby assigning them significance as discourse, or “building new memories”.

3.6 SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION

In this Chapter, I have looked at different theoretical approaches to linguistic hybridity in sociolinguistic, applied linguistic and discourse analytic research. I have argued that there are at least two ways to understand hybridity. The first one considers it as codeswitching or a mixture of two discrete codes. The second conceive of it as languaging, or using any available resources in the process of doing language that involves variation at both formal and discoursal levels. My own understanding of the hybrid nature of language is very close to Becker’s understanding of languaging. There are two points here. The first is that the concept of languaging implies that linguistic hybridity or any language use cannot be seen as the mere combination of separate linguistic entities with the clear-cut (formal) boundaries. It denies a presupposition that a language is a well-defined entity that is something people have. Instead, it sees language as something that people do, and changes its status to a process: to language, to be involved in the process of languaging, to use linguistic resources (very often of diverse origin) as “prior texts” independent from the notion of fixed distinct language entities. Second, the concept of languaging presupposes, and it is also my suggestion, that ELF in general and couples’ ELF in particular is nothing unique. It is as natural as any other language use and is a matter of the relationship between text and discourse. Most studies I have discussed above primarily are concerned with linguistic hybridity at the textual formal level. Although some of them attempt at tackling its aspects at the discoursal or functional level, there is no conceptual distinction between text and discourse provided. This, in my view, brings about the unnecessary substitution and confusion of terms. Therefore, the central concern of the next chapter is this fundamental distinction between text and discourse and its bearings for conceptualizing linguistic hybridity in the specific ELF couple interaction.
4. IN THE BEGINNING WAS THE WORD: POINTS OF DEPARTURE

In the beginning was the Word…

(the Holy Bible, John 1:1)

For last year's words belong to last year's language And next year's words await another voice.

(T. Eliot, Four Quartets)

In the beginning was the word. The title of one of Bakhtin’s central chapter in Problems of Dostoevsky’s Poetics ([1930]1997) reads Types of the Prosaic Word: Dostoevsky’s Word. It was the word that triggered my interest in discourse analysis in 1987 - 1992 when I was a student at the Precarpathian Teachers’ Training Institute in what was then the Soviet Union and is now Ukraine. In the communist Soviet Union, few students if any were encouraged to do sociolinguistics, and even fewer knew that there was such a field of study as discourse analysis, which was already a rather busy area of investigation in Western Europe. Though, on the contrasting background of the mainstream totalitarian Soviet ideology, it was even more fascinating for us – students of the Philological Department - to discover Bakhtin’s word, utterance, speech, dialogue and polyphony that all relate to the modern notion of discourse.

Discourse analysis in the Soviet and post-Soviet linguistics can be said to date back to Bakhtin’s notion of word and his celebrated books Problems of Dostoevsky’s Poetics23 (1929]1997) and The Problem of Speech Genres ([1930]1997). Initially referring word to Dostoevsky’s literary discourse, Bakhtin uses the concept sometimes to term both word and sentence, sometimes – utterance, sometimes – language itself. His word is rather polysemic. On the one hand, it is an abstract element of a language system (“в строгом лингвистическом смысле” (“in the strict linguistic sense”) (Bakhtin 1997: 176)24. On the other hand, it delineates the pragmatic process of human communication that is discourse in the modern terminological sense. Such all inclusiveness of the Bakhtinian word can be

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23 Russian “Проблемы творчества Достоевского” (1997): direct translation into English “Problems of Dostoevsky literary work”. For readers’ convenience, I will further refer to this title in its English version, namely “Problems of Dostoevsky’s Poetics”.

24 One of the central concepts of this study is Bakhtin’s voice. Therefore, in order to be consistent with the canvas of this thesis I incorporate the Bakhtinian original ‘Russian’ voice into the text. All author’s quotation, then, are in Russian with my direct translation given (in brackets) after the original quotation.
accounted for both by the peculiarities of the Russian conceptual system; by the epoch when
Bakhtin was writing, theorizing and living; and by absence of the more plausible terminology
at that time (the term *discourse* was introduced by Harris only two decades later in 1952)25. Although Bakhtin’s terminology and argument sometimes appear to be obscure, ambiguous and
rather abstract, they set an agenda for modern perspectives on discourse in general, and for my own understanding of the pragmatic process of meaning negotiation in intimate interaction in particular. What is clear from Bakhtin’s work is his strong argument for the
differentiation between *sentence* as a unit of abstract language system and *utterance* as a unit
of verbal communication, which is inevitably tied with its social and historical contexts.
Another explicit Bakhtin’s claim is that the process of human communication or *word-
discourse* always entails **interpersonal positioning**. These I take up in the following
sections.

4.1 THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN SENTENCE AND UTTERANCE

Let us briefly consider one of the central aspects of Bakhtin’s theorizing on language
use, namely his vision of the relationship between sentence and utterance, and look how it
can relate to the modern view on discourse analysis. In *Problems of Speech Genres*, Bakhtin
suggests that there is no direct immediate relationship between sentence as an abstract unit
of language system and utterance as a unit of verbal communication. He argues that in the
process of meaning negotiation we do not exchange sentences, word-combinations or words
(“in a strict linguistic sense”), but we exchange thoughts. In other words, we exchange
utterances, which we construct by means of language units: sentences, word-combinations,
words, or even single linguistic elements. That is not to say, however, that a linguistic unit
alone makes a unit of verbal communication. Bakhtin illustrates his point by inviting the
reader to process the sentence **Солнце взошло (The sun rose):**

Предложение, как и слово, - значащая единица языка. Поэтому каждое отдельно взятое
предложение, например, «Солнце взошло», совершенно понятно, то есть мы понимаем его
языковое значение, его возможную роль в высказывании. Но занять в отношении этого
отдельного предложения ответную позицию никак нельзя, если только мы не знаем, что
говарящий сказал этим предложением все, что хотел сказать [...], тогда это уже не
предложение, а полноценное высказывание, состоящее из одного предложения: оно
обрамлено и отделено сменой речевых субъектов, и оно непосредственно отражает
внесловесную действительность (ситуацию). На такое высказывание можно ответить.

25 For a detailed discussion see Widdowson 2004.
(A sentence, like a word, is a meaningful unit of language. Therefore each sentence taken separately, for example, “The sun rose”, is absolutely comprehensible, that is we understand its codified meaning, its potential role in an utterance. But we cannot take the reciprocal position, if only we do not know that the speaker has said in this sentence everything that he wanted to say [...], then it is not a sentence but an utterance of full value, which consists of one sentence: it is framed and demarcated by the change of speech subjects, and it directly reflects nonverbal reality (situation). One can react/respond to such utterance.) (Бахтин 1997: 186, my italics)

The point is that sentences as abstract units of the language system cannot be equated to, derived from, or underlie utterances as units of communication. Bakhtin admits that a sentence, “like a word”, does have some conventionalized semantic meaning. We can perfectly understand, for example, the codified/conventionalized meaning of the sentence *The sun rose*. Indeed, it is quite comprehensible that the noun phrase *The sun* is an agent in this sentence. In the English translation, the article *the* narrows our attention to what is known to both speaker and hearer as *the star round which the earth orbits*26. This significance is perhaps the most probable in Russian too. Yet, the absence of articles in the Russian grammar decreases the specificity of the lexical meaning of Солнце (*the Sun*). In written language, however, such specificity can be increased by the graphological features. Both in Russian and English, normally, the names of stars and planets are written with the first capital letter: correspondingly, in this particular sentence one can write the word with the capital C in Russian and the capital S in English. However, even in written Russian the value of Солнце (*Sun*) can only be processed by relating it to the context. For example, if Солнце (*Sun*) appears at the beginning of the sentence, we always write it with the capital letter, like any other word in this position. In such a case, in the sentence like Солнце встало (*The sun went up/woke up*) with a very near synonym to the verb взошло (*rose*), one might refer the word to some close or dear person: for example, a son, or a daughter (eg. (*Our sun/The sun got up/woke up*). In Солнце взошло (*The Sun rose*), however, we have two other grammatical/communicative devices for getting features of the context into focus. These are the usual in Russian collocation of Солнце (*the sun*) with the word that signifies the process or action itself: the verb взошло (*rose*); and the markers of tense and aspect. Both in Russian and English marking for tense and aspect is done by alternation (and/or addition). The word входимть (*rise*) is altered to взошло (*rose*) to locate the process in time and to signify the past action. In Russian, the temporal character of взошло is marked by the suffix -л- and the alternation of the verb root входить-взошло, in English by the alternation of *rise* and *rose*.

26 The definition is taken from the online Oxford Dictionaries: http://oxforddictionaries.com/definition/sun;jsessionid=66F73B6A93A2C2AF2BA2573E8AE5736B#m_en_gb0828840.003
Thus, grammar and lexis (in both languages) reduce the range of meaning signalled by the words and provide for sharper definition of what the sentence can mean in relation to the external world. In our case, the semantically encoded meaning of the sentence can be reduced to the following: the star - the Sun – did something – rose.

Precise as the above analysis and the derived semantic meaning might be, however, Bakhtin’s argument is that the sentence is inert so long as we take it in isolation from the actual use by “speech subjects”/people. Because, when we construct an utterance, we by no means take the words or sentences from the system of language in their ‘neutral’ dictionary form. One certainly can produce a sentence like Солнце взошло (The sun rose) as an isolated unit. To such isolated examples of sentences (like a statement of fact The sun rose or The grass is green), Bakhtin refers as to “senseless communications” (“бессмысленные коммуникации”) (Bakhtin 1997: 187). His claim is that utterances do not occur in isolation. It makes no sense to look for the meaning of an utterance unless the context is provided. Thus, depending on the context and participants’ intentions, the sentence Солнце взошло (The sun rose) realized as an utterance can have the force of a command/direction (The sun rose. Get up!); permission (The sun rose, but it is still too early. You can sleep a bit more.); or be part of the reality representation in the literary work (e.g. landscape depiction). That is to say, the same sentence (or word) can invoke quite different interpretations. What interpretation it invokes depends on relating the sentence to something outside itself, to the context, or to the social knowledge – knowledge of the world - of participants of the conversation. In other words (in Bakhtin’s words),

Предложение, как единица языка, подобно слову, не имеет автора. Оно ничье, как и слово, и, только функционируя как целое высказывание, оно становится выражением позиции индивидуального говорящего в конкретной ситуации речевого общения [...] мы имеем дело не с отдельным словом, как единицей языка, и не со значением этого слова, а с завершенным высказыванием и с конкретным смыслом – содержанием данного высказывания; значение слова здесь отнесено к определенной реальной действительности в определенных же реальных условиях речевого общения. Поэтому здесь мы не просто понимаем значение данного слова, как слова языка, а занимаем в отношении к нему ответную активную позицию (сочувствие, согласие или несогласие, стимул к действию).

(A sentence as a unit of language, like a word, has no author. It belongs to nobody, like a word, and, only if it functions as a whole utterance, it becomes an expression of an individual speaker's position in the concrete/real situation of verbal communication [...] we have to do neither with the separate word as a unit of language, nor with the [neutral dictionary] meaning of a word, but with the complete utterance and with the concrete [referential] value/significance – content of the given utterance; the significance of a word here relates to the actual reality under certain real conditions of the verbal communication. Therefore, here we do not only understand the meaning of a word, as a word of language, but take an active responsive position towards it (sympathy, agreement or disagreement, stimulus for the action). (Бахтин 1997:187-189, my italics)
Likewise, “[p]одной язык – его словарный состав и грамматический строй – мы узнаем не из словарей и грамматик [...]” (“mother tongue – its vocabulary and grammar regularities – we learn not from dictionaries and grammar books [...]” (Бахтин 1997: 181). Instead, we usually take them “из конкретных высказываний, которые мы слышим и которые мы воспроизводим в живом речевом общении с окружающими нас людьми” (“from concrete utterances which we hear and reproduce in real verbal communication with people around us”) (ibid. 181). According to Bakhtin, to learn a language means to learn how to construct the utterances, since we speak in utterances and not in separate sentences, and, of course, not in separate words. That is to say, utterances are continuously being developed in social activity, are used to refer and represent individual schematic worlds, or what Bakhtin refers to as voices/positions, and are the central means by which people establish, maintain, and shape their worlds for their own purposes (intentions). Another crucial point is that communication is seen as an open-ended (незавершный/unfinalized) dialogic process of negotiating positions. This point is central for the present study, and I have an occasion to discuss it in Section 4.3 and Chapter 5 in more detail.

What is crucial about Bakhtin’s theorizing here is that utterances cannot be restricted to sentences, and sentences do not underlie utterances. Moreover, linguistic elements do not carry fixed semantically encoded meanings with them into contexts of use as we have seen from the discussion of Bakhtin’s example Солнце взошло (The sun rose). One question that arises in this connection: what are the factors then by which we identify whether or not language use is a complete communicative unit? Another question concerns the nature of discourse and the extent to which we can define it in terms of the category of syntactic sentence. I consider this question more closely in later sections. The point I am making here is that people do not manifest their knowledge of the world in general, and linguistic/systemic knowledge in particular, as sentences. Nor is it the size of the linguistic element that determines whether or not language use is a complete utterance. That is what Bakhtin has to say on this point:

Такое [...] высказывание, как «А!» (реплика диалога), нельзя разделить на предложения, словосочетания, слоги. [...] Дальше делят высказывание (речь) и получают единицы языка. Очень часто затем предложение определяют как простейшее высказывание, следовательно, оно уже не может быть единицей высказывания.

(Such an utterance as „Ah!” (dialogue reply) cannot be divided into sentences, word-combinations, syllables. [...] Furthermore, [some linguists] divide utterance (speech) and get the units of language. Very often then sentence is defined as the simplest utterance, consequently, it [sentence] cannot be a unit of utterance any more). (Бахтин 1997: 172, the footnote)

27cf. the Online Russian-English Dictionary www.linguo.yandex.ru
As discussed above, Bakhtin’s argument is that the semantic or codified meaning of words and sentences is not identical to the value they take on when they occur in utterances. Here the claim is that there are instances of language, which function as complete utterances, but do not consist of separate sentences, phrases and words. These utterances are composed of the linguistic elements without semantically encoded meaning. Russian A /a/ is a functional linguistic element: it does not have a semantic significance. It is a linguistic symbol and a sound, a letter of alphabet and a phoneme, an element of Russian graphology and phonology. However, that is not how one interprets it when it functions as an utterance. As a particle, Russian A can have the force of request of confirmation (English what? eh?), or fulfil the functions of tag-questions (OK?). As an interjection, A can signal surprise or guess (English Ah! Oh!), pain (English ouch), or resoluteness and annoyance (English oh well). We do not read it as a conventional element of code and consider its size as a determinant of its communicative value, but relate it to the context and identify it as an utterance by its social intent. In other words, Bakhtin’s utterance embraces all language use: from a dialogue reply A! (Ah!) to a novel such as Dostoevsky’s The Brothers Karamazov. That means that we cannot conceive of utterances as constructed only from sentences, or sequences of sentences. They may consist of any linguistic element such as a word-combination, a word, or even a single letter or sound. On the other hand, what value an utterance has in the actual discourse depends on how the code and context interact on each other. Bakhtin’s distinction between word-sentence/form and word-utterance/function is crucial for understanding of his polyphony, voicing and dialogism. These are the central concern of the following sections.

4.1.1 DISCOURSE AS POLYPHONY

Before I explain my understanding of Bakhtin polyphony, dialogicality, and related to them notion of voice, there are two consideration about what I refer to as Bakhtin’s polyphonic philosophy in anticipation of my discussion of the relationship between text and discourse, and the processes of analysis and interpretation in Section 4.2. Bakhtin proposes the terms of polyphony and dialogicality for the explanation of the multivoicing nature of Dostoevsky’s literary work:

Полифонический роман [Достоевского] весь сплошь диалогичен. […] Ведь диалогические отношения – явление гораздо более широкое, чем отношения между репликами композиционно выраженного диалога, это почти универсальное явление, пронизывающее всю человеческую речь и все отношения и проявления человеческой жизни, вообще все, что имеет смысл и значение.
(Dostoevsky’s] Polyphonic novel is all-over dialogic. [...] After all, dialogic relationships are a much broader phenomenon than the relationships between replies of the compositionally constructed dialogue [literary dialogue], it is almost a universal phenomenon that penetrates all human speech and all the relationships and aspects of human life, on in general everything, that has sense and significance/meaning). (Бахтин [1963] 2002: 51)

What Bakhtin is discussing here is polyphony as *dialogicality* of human social life. The philosopher is claiming that “dialogic relationships” are characteristic not only for Dostoevsky’s novels - literary works, fictions, which, one might argue, have nothing to do with real life, with actuality. Bakhtin’s crucial point is that this very *polyphony* as multi/vari-voicing and *dialogism*, which we find in Dostoevsky’s literary works, are, in fact, *universal* and penetrate *all* human communication, all human life. Therefore, I wish to make it clear that I treat everything what Bakhtin has to say about *polyphony/voicing/positioning* and *dialogue* in Dostoevsky’s literary works as universal and relevant to all human communication in general rather than exclusively applicable to the literary studies and critique. Bakhtin’s Dostoevsky is a polyphonic writer. Likewise, in my view, Bakhtin is a *polyphonic philosopher* who does not provide ultimate answers but rather stimulates thinking and raises questions, and is open to alternative voices/perspectives. Bakhtin’s philosophy, in this sense, is an open-ended dialogue with his readers, or as he puts it, with the other.

I am making this point because there are numerous attempts to confine the Bakhtinian philosophy to some particular field of study or paradigm. Most scholars (cf. Бочаров 2006, Ильин et al. 1995, Исупов 2001, Кожинов 1993) understand Bakhtin’s theorizing on *polyphony* and *dialogicality* of discourse within the confines of literary studies, namely such aspects of it as literary irony, parody or a “compositionally constructed dialogue” (e.g. drama). Interestingly enough, literary critique is not the only area to which Bakhtin’s thinking is being attributed. The typology of Bakhtin’s philosophy (or dialogic philosophy) is rather broad. Different scholars label it differently – from Marxism and semiotics to structuralism and postmodernism (cf. Emerson 1999, Исупов 2001, Lechte 1994). It is not my purpose to discuss the epistemic/taxonomic labelling of the Bakhtinian philosophy and to advocate or argue against any of them in this thesis. My point here is that it seems quite natural that Bakhtin’s theorizing resulted in such heterogeneity of its interpretations. There are at least two reasons for it. First, Bakhtin himself denied belonging to any scholastic trend and never specified such affiliation. Nor did he claim his being a literary critic in particular. Primarily, he insisted on his being a thinker, a philosopher (cf. Исупов 2001). Second (and more important), Bakhtin’s *polyphony* and *polyphonic philosophy* presupposes and argues for “множественность самостоятельных и
In the Beginning was the word: points of departure

(“multiplicity/plurality of independent and non-merged voices and consciousnesses, the true polyphony of full-value/full-fledged voices”) (Бахтин [1963] 2002: 10) that is mediated by what he refers to as utterance (see previous section). Such Bakhtinian understanding of polyphony and dialogue makes any effort to treat his thinking within particular ‘mono’ professional, scholastic or typological/paradigmatic limits implausible. Bakhtin’s claim is that communication: writing, reading, speaking, listening, any language use (in our terms, any activity that involves interpretation of text) or any ‘voicing’ - is culturally and pretextually embedded process. His polyphony as philosophy does not provide any labels and solutions and is about interpersonal voicing/positioning.

While the vision discussed above primarily interprets Bakhtin’s thinking as belonging to particular fields of study, another one treats it as belonging to a particular epoch (namely to the revolutionary 1920s in the Soviet Russia). The argument of the latter is that Bakhtin’s theorising is irrelevant for modern philology or social sciences in general since it is part of the ‘revolutionary’ philosophic epoch of the end of the 19th – beginning of the 20th century (cf. Gasparov 1999[, 1979] 200228, Орлова 2003). This is what Gasparov has to say about such, so to speak, ‘outdatedness’ of Bakhtin’s philosophy:

Ирония судьбы Бахтина в том, что мыслил он в диалоге с 1920-ми годами, а печататься, читаться и почитаться стал тогда, когда свои собеседники уже сошли со сцены, а вокруг встали чужие. […] Несвоевременные последователи сделали из его программы творчества теорию исследования. А это вещи принципиально противоположные: смысл творчества в том, чтобы преобразовать объект, смысл исследования в том, чтобы не деформировать его. (The irony of Bakhtin’s destiny is that he was thinking in dialogue with 1920s, but was being published, read and honoured when his [contemporary] interlocutors had disappeared from the scene, and strangers surrounded him. […] Untimely followers made a theoretical framework from his artistic [literary?] program. But these are two opposite things in principle: the sense of art is to transform its object; the sense of scientific enquiry29 is not to deform it). (Гаспаров [1979] 2002: 37)

In Gasparov’s view, arts and social/philological studies are different in their nature. According to his claim, in arts, the researcher “transforms” the object of the study; in philology, the researcher’s purpose is “not to deform it”. This is not the place and I am not in a position to discuss the complexities of epistemology and the difference between “artistic program” and “theory of enquiry”. Now I wish to address the question how far an enquirer in social sciences, in philology in particular (according to Gasparov’s claim), can be detached from and is able not to deform the object of inquiry. As we may know, the object of enquiry

29 By scientific enquiry here, Gasparov means philological research.
in philology is primarily a linguistic manifestation of human behaviour, or, to put it another way, some kind of text – written or spoken. A philologist/linguist, then, in a certain way acts upon a text that has been produced by a non-linguist. As I have already argued, such acting-upon a text is rather a matter of interpretation than analysis. To put it another way, in any social enquiry the researcher cannot claim that s/he does not deform ‘the object’ of his investigation, since s/he inevitably presents his own view of the world, his model of reality, and sometimes literally deforms it (e.g. by recording or transcribing data) (See Chapter 6 for a more detailed discussion of such ‘deformations’ and objectivity in research). As I have argued in Chapter 2, in the process of textualizing their discourses, people – whether they are linguists/scholars or non-linguists/scholars - will always transform and inform the linguistic resources they have at their disposal. In other words, any language use – philological enquiry in particular - will always to a certain extent be ‘an artistic program’ that both transforms and informs language by realizing it as a particular discourse. As Widdowson puts it, in a linguistic investigation:

We get a model of behaviour (that of linguist [or philologist, in Gasparov’s terms] used to analyze another model of behaviour (that of the common man), one set of cultural assumptions, which are secondary and superposed, used to interpret another set of cultural assumptions, which are primary and acquired through ordinary socialization. (Widdowson 1984: 24)

In this view, a text itself says us nothing unless it is activated by particular cultural assumptions of an individual. My point here is that any kind of ‘scientific’ analysis in social sciences in general and in philology/linguistics in particular is a matter of interpretation and indeed of *positioning*: enacting a particular discourse by the mediation of text with a particular purpose in mind. And this is what, in my view, Bakhtin means by his *polyphony* and *dialogic relationship* between a producer of a text-utterance and the other – an addressee. According to the scholar, with any individual there will be a shift of culture and perspective, a change of the voice/position, a different interpretation, and a different reality:

(When in languages, jargons and styles **voices** begin to be audible/heard. They cease to be a potential means of expression and become an actual realized expression; *a voice has entered and taken possession of them.*) (Бахтин 1997c: 331, Bakhtin’s emphasis, my italics)

What Bakhtin is saying here is that people actualize/realize/enact their voices/positions by ‘entering’, ‘taking possession’ or reading one’s own voice into a language, jargon, style, or any language use that is by exploiting the potential of those languages and styles and making them their own. The notion of **voice** as *a position* or discourse that can only be realized...
through exploiting language as an adaptable resource for making one’s own (rather than encoded) meaning is central here, and I have occasion to discuss it in the next section. Meanwhile, the point is that (ironically enough), Gasparov’s reaction to Bakhtin’s text is an example of a particular – Gasparov’s - interpretation read into the text, which can be taken as evidence of this very polyphonic dialogic nature of what Bakhtin refers to as word-communication and is now called discourse. In this connection consider one more Gasparov’s point. The claim is that according to Bakhtin

[п]роизведение строится не из слов, а из реакций на слова. Но чьих? Вступая в диалог с вещью, читатель или может подстраиваться к ее контексту, или встраивать ее в свой контекст (диалог—это борьба: кто поддается?).

(a literary work does not consists of words but of reactions to the words. But whose [reactions]? Entering a dialogue with a thing/object, the reader can either square her/himself into its context, or embed/build in it into her/his context (dialogue is a struggle: who will give in?) (Гаспаров 2002: 34)

Here, Gasparov conceives of dialogue and polyphony as a (revolutionary, destroying, deconstructing) battle/struggle between reader and text. As Caryl Emerson (2006:26) puts it, for Gasparov, “жизненное мировоззрение по принципу: «кто - кого» переносится в область филологического исследования, на взаимоотношения с текстом” (“a common-man worldview based on the principle: “who wins whom” is transferred to the realm of philological enquiry, to the relationship with text”). There are two points here. First, there is no (and cannot be) evidence in Bakhtin’s text itself that his polyphony, dialogism and voicing is a battle between reader and text of any kind. Such ‘battle’ can only be read as someone’s discourse/interpretation into the text. Gasparov primarily bases his claim on the analysis of the ‘epoch’ when Bakhtin lived, thought and wrote (in fact, the beginning of Bakhtin’s life – revolutionary 1920s in Russia). The gist of such ‘analysis’, in Gasparov’s view, can be formulated as a revolutionary Soviet slogan: “We’ll build our world, new world! [But, presumably, first destroy the old one]”. Consequently, for Gasparov the main point of Bakhtin’s philosophy is “пафос экзpropriации чужого слова” (“pathos of the expropriation of other people’s words”) and arrogance of mastering other people’s words-texts with one’s own intentions that is building the new by destroying the old (Gasparov [1979] 2002: 33). This Gasparov’s vision of the ‘epoch’ and Bakhtin’s text as an expression of it, in fact, provides evidence for the main argument of the present thesis. Namely, any analysis is a matter of interpretation and “reaction” to one’s text, in this particular case, a matter of reading Gasparov’s own discourse/position/voice into Bakhtin’s text.

Naturally enough and in line with Bakhtin’s polyphony and dialogue, there are objections that can be raised against Gasparov’s interpretation. First, most Bakhtinites and
Bakhtin’s contemporaries viewed Bakhtin as a conservative and deeply spiritual man (cf. Бурлака 2002), far from being revolutionary, deconstructive, or predisposed to any kind of expropriation or arrogance. Not only was Bakhtin “the very antithesis of the revolutionary” (Steinglass 1998) in the memoirs of his colleagues. His’s dialogue and Gasparov’s understanding of it as “win-lose” relationship between an individual and text are in opposition if not mutually exclusive. As I have discussed, the crucial point about Bakhtin’s polyphony and dialogue is that texts themselves say nothing until “в них вошел и ими овладел голос” (“a voice enters and makes them its own” (Бахтин 1997с: 331, Bakhtin’s emphasis, my italics), or, rather, until an individual reads his/her voice/position/discourse into them. In Bakhtin’s polyphony, there is no such thing as ultimate or pre-determined (by epoch, nation or culture) analysis/interpretation, there is always room for alternative voices/positions, alternative ways of interpretation and alternative worldviews, or in our terms, alternative discourses, that can be read into a text. In this respect, Bakhtin is a philosopher of perspectives, philosopher of questioning and philosopher of an open-ended (unfinalized) dialogue with the other.

To sum up, Bakhtin explains polyphony as a dialogic process of negotiating – actualizing and realizing - voices/positions through language (Бахтин [1963] 2002). This makes any judgment of it as ‘expropriation’ or ‘destruction’ of other’s ‘textual’ property³⁰ – languages/texts/words – or, more generally, restriction of it within one particular theory or field of study unwarranted. For language or word cannot be “a property [...] to lease out” (Widdowson 2003: 43), but is a (potential virtual) resource that can be only mastered by making a potential meaning encoded in it one’s own. Unless it is put to actual use as “выражен[е]позиции индивидуального говорящего” (expression of the individual speaker’s position), language like word-text is “ничье” (is nobody’s) (Бахтин 1997: 188). The notions of polyphony, dialogicality and voice/position are closely interconnected in Bakhtin’s theorizing. The crucial characteristics of polyphony that I have discussed in this section are voice and dialogicality. Therefore, it is worth dwelling a moment on the concepts in the next sections.

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³⁰ The question arises here how far word or language can be owned (see, for example, Widdowson 2003)
As we have seen in the previous section, Bakhtin describes human communication as *polyphony* that is multiplicity, plurality or, in musical terms, chorus of various independent voices. Here the question naturally arises as for what this *voice* is. Bakhtin’s early understanding of *voice* is rather broad and ranges from (1997c) literal to figurative characteristics of it:

(It includes both *pitch*, *compass*, *timbre*, and *aesthetic category* (lyric, dramatic, etc.). It also includes worldview and the web of life [individual experience]. An *individual as an integrated voice* enters dialogue [discourse]. Not only his thoughts but also his web of life, all his individuality participate in it. (ibid. 351, my emphasis)

In his plan of revision of the book on Dostoevsky for the second edition (Бахтин 1997а), he provides another definition:

(Neither an individual’s self-awareness/ perception (personality), nor the idea that is embodied in the individual can be voiceless objects of a verdict or conclusion. They remain in an unfinalized dialogue with their word [discourse]. Not only his thoughts but also his web of life, all his individuality participate in it. (ibid. 351, my emphasis)

Finally, this is how Bakhtin explains his understanding of *voice, polyphony* and *dialogue* on the material of Dostoevsky’s literary work. His claim is that in Dostoevsky’s polyphonic world:

(Dostoevsky’s prime interest is a character/hero as a *particular point of view on the world and on him himself*, as individual’s conceptual and evaluating position towards him himself and towards the surrounding reality. For Dostoevsky, it is important not what a character is in this world, but first and foremost, what the world is for the character and what he himself is for himself). (Бахтин 2002: 56, emphasis in the original, my italics)

As can be seen from these definitions and according to Magometova’s (Магометова 2005) analysis of the development of Bakhtin’s *voice*, Bakhtin’s understanding of it ranges from

31 The author’s emphasis – realized/actualized position
32 Bakhtin defines idea as a particular ideology or worldview not as “абстрактное единство и последовательность системы мыслей и положений, а как последнюю позицию в мире в отношении высших ценностей. Мировоззрение, воплощенные в голосах” (“abstract unity and consistency of the system of thoughts and presuppositions [in our terms, ideology or genre], but rather as the current [not final] position in relation to supreme/high values. Worldviews realized/actualized in voices”) (Бахтин [1976]1997: 354, my italics). It is important to note that he uses the adjectives-derivatives of idea, namely ideational and ideological interchangeably. In the sense I provided above idea is as a particular individual worldview.
the notions of self, integrated person, and hero/character to intention, enacted ideological/ideational position, and a conceptual set-up of an individual. Bakhtin does not provide the ‘final’ detailed definition of voice where the entire characteristics are represented (what seems quite reasonable from the point of view of his polyphony). However, in his later works, he primarily associates the notion with polyphony and dialogic positioning, and opposes it to such concepts as subject-matter (in our terms, propositional content), neutral word of language, language as system, (text/word as symbolic) voiceless material, abstract idea and abstract unity and consistency of the system of thoughts and presuppositions (ideology). Hence, both in early and later works, voice presupposes dialogue. Bakhtin differentiates at least two facets of such dialogue. The first is between the “self” and the world (or rather knowledge about the world). Here the claim is that the knowledge of the self and the world is not fixed. A person is in a constant dialogue with her/his worldview, and this dialogue is mediated through language. This being so, the word-language and the socio-cultural constructs (in our terms, textual and contextual factors) are in a continuous process of interaction with each other. The second level is interpersonal and regulates the relationship between the “self” and the “other”. Related to this latter are Bakhtin’s concepts of согласие, несогласие, and разногласие (English ‘co-voicing, non-co/voicing and vari-voicing’ correspondently):34

Согласие как важнейшая диалогическая категория. [...] Несогласие бедно и непродуктивно. Существеннее разногласие: оно, в сущности, тяготеет к согласию, в котором всегда сохраняется разность и неслиянность голосов. [...] Подлинное согласие является идей (регулятивной) и последней целью всякой диалогичности. Co-voicing as an important dialogic category. [...] non/dis-(co)voicing is poor and counterproductive. Vari-voicing is more crucial: it, in essence, is closer to co-voicing, which preserves variation and non-fusion of voices. [...] True co-voicing is a (regulative) idea and the ultimate purpose of any dialogicality. (Бахтин 2002: 302, Bakhtin’s emphasis)

If we look at Bakhtin’s terminology here from the pure symbolic/denotational perspective, глас/ие can be translated as ‘voice/ing’ into English. Согласие, несогласие, and разногласие (English ‘uni-voicing/agreement’, ‘non-voicing/agreement’ or ‘discord’, and ‘vary-voicing/agreement’ or ‘controversy’) are derivatives from the word глас35 (English ‘voice’). All three concepts are polysemic and have at least two denotations: согласие – ‘co-voicing/concord’, and ‘agreement’ or ‘homoglossia’; несогласие – ‘non-co-voicing/discord’, and ‘non/disagreement’ or ‘non/mis/dis/glossia’; and разногласие – ‘vari-

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33 see footnote 32.
34 I directly translated the separate etymologically original morphemes (prefixes and roots) of these concepts.
35 Here, some readers may also recognize the etymological origin of old Slavic глас ‘/glas/ ‘voice’ from Greek γλῶσσα (glōssa, "tongue") (that can still be found in such words as heteroglossia, glossary, or diaglossic).
voicing’, and ‘varience’ or ‘heteroglossia’. One can assume that Bakhtin’s choice of *voice* for delineating interpersonal positioning is non-random. As we can see, the concept neatly fuses two related notions: *voice* in its literary physiological and musical sense; and *voice/position* – the way one manages the relationship (i.e. non/dis/‘vari’/agrees) with the other, the way one acts upon the other, the way one achieves and establishes rapport (согласие) with the other. This understanding of voicing as *dialogical positioning* suggests that all communication is *interpersonal*, since it is always motivated by a perlocutionary purpose of achieving a particular communicative effect upon the other, for example in Bakhtin’s terms, of согласие-uni-voicing/agreement, or разногласие-vari-voicing/agreement. In this view, any discourse is about *voice* and *voicing* and, in turn, is a matter of *position* and *positioning*. The question arises here as to what *position* and *positioning* is. In the next section I discuss how Bakhtin understands these notions in reference to what he refers to as *dialogicality of human interaction*.

### 4.1.3 Bakhtin’s *dialogicality* as *positioning*

The first point I want to make here is that Bakhtin’s ([1929]1997) *dialogicality* refers not only (if at all) to the literal creation of dialogue in interpersonal communication but to the interplay between current and previously experienced instances of language (cf. Becker’s *linguaging*, Section 3.4.):

«Каждое высказывание полно отзвуков и отголосков других высказываний, с которыми оно связано общностью сферы речевого общения. Каждое высказывание нужно рассматривать как ответ на предшествующие высказывания данной сферы […] оно их опровергает, подтверждает, дополняет, опирается на них, предполагает их известными, как-то считается с ними. […] Экспрессия высказывания всегда в большей или меньшей степени отвечает, то есть выражает отношение говорящего к чужим высказываниям, а не только его отношение к предмету своего высказывания. […] Высказывание наполнено диалогическими обертонами […], и это не может не найти своего отражения и в формах словесного выражения нашей мысли».

(Each utterance is filled with echoes and reverberations of other utterances with which it is connected by the commonality of the sphere of speech/verbal communication37. Each utterance should be considered as an *answer* to the previous utterances of this given sphere […] it refutes, affirms, supplements, and relies on the others, presupposes them to be known, and somehow takes them into account. […] Expression of the utterance always to more or less considerable degree *answers*, that is *expresses speaker relationship and attitude to the others’ utterances, and not only his attitude to the subject-matter of his/her utterance*. […] Utterance is filled with dialogic overtones […], and it cannot but find its reflection also in the forms of verbal expression/wording of our thought (Бахтин 1997: 195-197, emphasis in original, my italics).

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36 It is important to note, that Bakhtin’s *expressiveness* or *expression* of the utterance refers to the expression/reflection of speaker personality/individuality/position in it or in dialogue (Bakhtin 1997: 211).

37 This Bakhtin’s point relates to the notion of *intertextuality* that I discuss in Section 7.3.4 as an interactional feature of ELF couple discourse.
What Bakhtin claims here is that an individual always expresses her/himself by making her/his utterance convey what s/he has to say about the subject-matter of her/his utterance. On the other hand, Bakhtin distinguishes one more fundamental feature of utterance, namely its addressee-orientedness or addresivity (Bakhtin 1997: 200). Utterance is not only about its subject matter. Each utterance is also an answer to other utterances and an address or appeal to somebody. In this sense, a current utterance is always in “dialogue” with previous and subsequent utterances. Consequently, communication is an open-ended/“unfinalized” process: all the utterances have an author (in our terms, a textualizer, or what Bakhtin refers to as expresser/expressiveness), and an addressee (the other or addressivity), in that they simultaneously answer a preceding utterance and open up the way for a new one. An individual then does not only express her/himself by mediation of her/his word/text but addresses the other. Moreover, Bakhtin’s claim is that “отбор всех языковых средств производится говорящим под большим или меньшим влиянием адресата и его предвосхищаемого ответа” (“the speaker’s choice of all the linguistic resources is more or less influences by the addressee and her/his anticipated answer/reaction”) (Bakhtin 1997b: 205). For being able to communicate, the parties involved need “некий минимум согласия как необходимое усилсно диалога (общий язык, какой-то минимум взаимопонимания) (a certain minimum of co-voicing/concord as a necessary condition for dialogue (a common language, some minimum of rapport/mutual understanding38)” (Бахтин 1997: 364). As Bakhtin puts it:

Высказывание никогда не является отражением или выражением чего-то вне его уже существующего, данного и готового. Оно всегда создает нечто до него никогда не бывшее, абсолютно новое и неповторимое [...]. Но нечто созданное всегда создается из чего-то данного (язык, наблюденное явление действительности, пережитое чувство, сам говорящий субъект, готовое в его мировоззрении и т.п.). Все данное преображается в созданном. [...] Возможности и перспективы, заложенные в слове; они, в сущности, бесконечны. (Utterance is never a reflection or expression of something that exist outside it, [something] given and ready [to use]. It always creates something new that has never existed before it, [something] absolutely new and unique [...] But this created always is created from something given (language, observed phenomenon of reality, experienced feeling, the speaker himself, the established in his worldview and so on). All given is transformed in the created. [...] Potential/ity/capacity and perspectives that are inherent in word [word-language and word-discourse, respectively]; they, in essence, are infinite. (Бахтин 1997c: 330)

Bakhtin makes at least two crucial points here. First, he emphasises the infinite potential or latent capacity of both encoding or rather textualization possibilities of language (cf. our discussion of virtual language/resource in Section 2.1) and of

38 This can be understood as some shared minimum of (conceptual) world knowledge, attitudes, social beliefs values and the other.
discourses/positions/perspectives that can be read into such textualizations. In this respect, each utterance is always something new. The second point is that such creation of new is based upon conformity to ‘old’ or what has already been done, said, written, thought or established. According to Bakhtin, the old and the new, creativity and conformity are interrelated: you cannot creatively extend without (at least some, in Bakhtin’s terms, minimal) knowledge how to conform. That is to say, people do not only ‘newly’ express themselves to get their messages across in a common shared (but not necessary L1) language, but also must bear in mind that there should be some shared ‘old’ knowledge of the world, attitudes, social beliefs and values, or what Bakhtin refers to as “mutual understanding” and I refer to as to shared contextual factors (see Section 4.2). As Widdowson puts it, “it is not enough to make my text express what I mean to say, I must also bear in mind what it might mean to you” (Widdowson 2012: 1, emphasis in the original).

However, even when there is enough concord, when individual contextual/cultural worlds closely correspond, there will be always occasions when the intentions are misunderstood. As I have argued, people’s purposes for engaging in communication have to do not only (if at all) with transition of information, with getting their messages across, but also with achieving particular communicative effects upon their addressees. In enacting a discourse of any kind, an individual will always address the other and have some intention of acting upon this other in mind. That is what makes utterance “смыслов[ым] цел[ым]” (Bakhtin []1997: 332):

Слово (вообще всякий знак) междивидуально. [...] Отношение к чужим высказываниям нельзя оторвать от отношения к предмету (ведь о нем спорят, о нем согласаются, в нем соприкасаются) и от отношения к самому говорящему. Это – живое триедиство. (Word [in our terms, discourse] (in general any sign) is interpersonal. [...] The relation to the other’s utterances [in our terms, the other’s discourse] cannot be separated from the attitude/relation to the subject matter (after all, they argue about it, agree about it, contact in/through it) and from the attitude/relation to the speaker himself. This is a lively triune). (Бахтин 1997: 332-333)

What Bakhtin is discussing here is what is known as propositional content, and illocutionary and perlocutionary forces in Speech Acts Theory (Austin 1975[1962]). The point here is that propositional content – in Bakhtin’s terms, subject matter, a reference to the actual world, illocutionary forces (utterance as a communicative act) and perlocutionary purposes (intended or achieved effects) are inseparable, merge into one “meaningful whole”. It is important to note that Austin has mainly focused on the illocutionary acts (e.g. promise, advice) that people perform by producing a particular expression. His claim is that people

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39 See also Widdowson 2007 (Chapter 2) for a detailed discussion of three kinds of pragmatic meaning.
achieve perlocutionary effects only in certain cases. Likewise, the main attention in Speech Acts Theory has been on illocutionary acts such as promising, ordering, asking and so on (cf. Searle1969). What is crucial for my discussion is Bakhtin’s claim that everything that an individual talks about is interpersonally (межиндивидуально) motivated. This also means that in the pragmatic use of language there is neither a separable propositional meaning of an utterance, nor it is illocutionary force that can be used without a perlocutionary effect. The production of any text is motivated by such perlocutionary (in our terms, pretextual) purpose (in Bakhtin’s terms, замысел-intention) of achieving an effect upon others, and, therefore, is part of an ongoing interpersonal dialogue even if an individual who makes a text has no particular addressee/audience in mind. According to Bakhtin, therefore, this process must be understood as interpersonal dialogue that involves negotiation of voices/positions.

To conclude, hybridity at the discoursal level can be described as polyphony that is the interpersonal dialogic process of negotiating voices/positions. The point is that communication is always about voicing, or positioning. This being so, the process of human communication is about negotiation of individual voices/positions whereby people bring their code/s into polyphonic concord (Bakhtin’s согласие): to achieve the correspondence between intention and interpretation for the purpose of their interaction through a common language. This idea of voicing/positioning relates to the concepts of unfinalizability, since it is the unfinalizability of individuals’ discourses that creates true polyphony. Bakhtin’s notion of unfinalizability treats language and discourse not as a presupposed entity/system or something people have but as an infinite process/dialogue or something people do and, in this sense, is very close to Becker’s understanding of languaging (see section 3.5) as an open-ended process:

Жизнь по природе своей диалогична. Жить – значит участвовать в диалоге – вопрошать, внимать, отвечать, соглашаться и т.п. В этом диалоге человек участвует весь и всю свою жизнь: глазами, губами, руками, душой, духов, всем телом, поступками. Он вкладывает всего себя в слово, и это слово входит в диалогическую ткань человеческой жизни, в мировой симпозиум. (Life by its nature is dialogic. To live means to participate in dialogue – to ask, to listen, to answer, to agree and so on. In such dialogue a human being participates wholly and with his whole life: with eyes, lips, arms, soul, mind, with whole body, acts. He invests the whole self into word, and this word enters the dialogic substance of human life, the world symposium). (Бахтин [1994]1997: 351)

“Вопрошать, внимать, отвечать, соглашаться” (to ask, to listen, to answer, to agree) means that our main purpose in engaging in communication is to position ourselves: to act upon other people, to make them, in turn, agree, share, accept what we intend to achieve by getting our messages across. According to Bakhtin, people can position themselves –
question, refute or accept any current perception of the self and the other – only through such dialogue.

Bakhtin’s philosophic line is similar to that later developed in Widdowson’s text and discourse (Widdowson 2004). I shall consider the relationship between text and discourse in the next section. Now let me summarize Bakhtin’s points that provide the basis for the present investigation:

1. Bakhtin differentiates between word as a linguistic unit with particular semantic meaning, or signification, and word as expression of particular pragmatic meaning (Widdowson’s value). Word as signification is an encoded conventionalized (‘neutral dictionary’) meaning. Word as expression or significance is the communicative functioning of language in use.

2. He suggests that there is no direct relationship between sentence and utterance: sentence cannot be equated, derived from or underlie utterance. Sentences are abstract units of language system, while utterances are units of verbal communication that is realizations of the author’s position in the actual context. Moreover, it is not the size of linguistic unit that determines language use as a complete communicative unit – utterance – but its social intent.

3. Consequently, Bakhtin speaks of the pragmatic meaning of an utterance as dependent from the actual context and author’s intention. On the other hand, an utterance does not only have an author but also an addressee. It seems that by addressivity of an utterance above all Bakhtin means (in Austin’s terms (1975 [1962]), perlocutionary effect of an utterance as intended by its “author” (or by the speaker) and interpreted by the addressee (reader or listener). In this view, any utterance is an inseparable fusion/trinity of proposition (content of an utterance or reference to the actual reality), illocutionary force (a certain communicative act) and perlocutionary purpose (a particular effect upon an addressee that motivates a production of utterance). Any utterance is an answer to the other’s utterance and at the same time an address or appeal to somebody. Any utterance is ‘in dialogue’ with the previous and subsequent utterances. Any utterance is a new (creative) extension of something old. In this respect, polyphony and related to it dialogism views meaning as resulting from the interaction between current and previously experienced discourse. Word is not fixed. Word as a linguistic element and word as the pragmatic process of meaning negotiation interact with each other.

4. Bakhtin stresses the multi-layered nature of language and differentiates between at least two levels of the pragmatic process of its hybridization. The first is the formal level of language variation or разноречие (raznorechie, ‘vari-speechness’) that is often (misleadingly enough) referred to as heteroglossia by many scholars. The second is the pragmatic/discoursal level of polyphony where such heteroglossia-varivoicing or разногласие (together with co-voicing and non/dis/mis-voicing) is part of voicing: the dialogic process of interpersonal positioning as mediated by word-language.
5. Claiming that any discourse (in Bakhtin’s terms word-communication) is a dynamic and polyphonic interpersonal process; he defines polyphony as “множественность самостоятельных и неслиянных голосов и сознаний, подлинная полифония полноценных голосов […], множественность равноправных сознаний с их мирами […].” (plurality of equal and non-fused/separate voices and consciousnesses, genuine polyphony of fully fledged voices […], plurality of equal consciousnesses with their worlds) (Бахтин 2002: 10). The notion of polyphony presupposes that author and addressee might activate and realize either relatively similar or relatively different discourses into the same utterance. These discourses, in turn, are influences by the voices/positions of others. As plurality of voices/positions, polyphony is an ‘unfinalized’ dialogic process of negotiating positions.

I shall be returning to these Bakhtinian notions of polyphony and dialogism as related to linguistic hybridity in human interaction in later sections and chapters. The point to be made at present is that Bakhtin’s theorizing on the relationship between sentence and utterance and his view on the process of human communication as an ongoing online interpersonal dialogue is consistent with my own conceiving of discourse, positioning and linguistic and cultural hybridity in ELF couple discourse. Although Bakhtin does not use the concept of discourse itself, his argument takes us to the very heart of discourse analysis. Bakhtin’s ideas in many ways anticipate later thinking about discourse analysis and related to it linguistic and cultural hybridity in human communication. In the next sections, I look at what bearing the specified above key concepts of the Bakhtinian thinking have for my own understanding of the field of study to which this thesis belongs, namely discourse analysis.

4.2 DISCOURSE ANALYSIS: TEXT AND DISCOURSE

Sketched by Bakhtin more than eight decades ago, the issue of the relationship between sentence (or rather, any linguistic unit or element), utterance and Bakhtin’s word as language use stubbornly remain problematic to this day. As I have argued in the Introduction, most scholars neither provide a distinction between sentence and utterance and often use the terms interchangeably; nor explain the relationship between text and discourse. These issues I address in the next section.

4.2.1 WIDDOWSON’S TEXT, CONTEXT, PRETEXT

Earlier in the section 4.1, I have said that we cannot define discourse in terms of sentences. It has been also suggested that textuality does not depend on the size of the linguistic unit. Any linguistic element or unit (above and below the sentence) can be textually
In the Beginning was the word: points of departure

As I have discussed, Bakhtin argues against equation between language/word as a linguistic system and language/word as a process of communication. That is to say, in discourse we have to do with utterance not with sentence. In this section, I argue against the equation between text and discourse. The conceptual distinction between them underlies the applied linguistic model for discourse analysis developed by Widdowson (2004), to which I now turn.

In line with Bakhtin’s thought, Widdowson criticizes the common view in modern linguistics to refer to

“utterances being “derived” from sentences, or sentences “underlying” utterances as if the speaker had a set of sentences in his mind which were realized in utterances in a kind of type/token fashion, the token not matching the types because of various kinds of performance interference.” (Widdowson 1973: 118)

Widdowson’s point is that if one adopts such a view one would say that a speaker/ person learns sentences first and afterwards converts them into utterances in the process of language use. Contrary to this view and in line with Bakhtin’s theorizing, Widdowson sees no direct connection between sentences and utterances at all. His suggestion is that sentences are “simply the constructs devised by the linguists to exemplify the rules of the language system […]” (Widdowson 1973: 118), and utterances are direct realizations of these rules. This being so, the speaker has no knowledge of sentences at all. What the speaker has is some knowledge of particular rules of the language system according to which s/he composes her/his utterances by direct reference to these rules rather than by reference to sentences. Therefore, in the context of language acquisition a child/an individual does not learn the sentences, but “learns a system of rules [from others’ utterances] that enables him to form [his own] and understand [others’] utterances” (Widdowson 1973: 119). The point is that an individual has no knowledge of sentences and does not, so to speak, ‘sentence’ her/his discourse or manifests her/his linguistic knowledge as sentences, but rather realize it as utterances (see also the discussion of linguistic competence in Section 2.4.1). Reasonably enough, the question here arises as for how the process of such realization can be accounted for.

Widdowson addresses this question in Text, context, pretext (2004). The scholar provides a conceptual distinction between text and discourse, and rejects “as unsatisfactory, and misleading, the definition of either of them in terms of language “above the sentence” (2004:14). As we have seen from the discussion of the Russian Солнце взошло (The sun rose) and A /a/ (Section 4.1), people do not see linguistic elements or sentences as examples of language usage (‘senseless communications’) and/or analyse them into linguistic
constituents. Rather they experience them as language use. They treat them as something not to be analysed but to be acted upon. This view can be further clarified by Widdowson’s suggestion that people treat different realizations/manifestations of linguistic resources as **text** – *use of language which is “produced with the intention to refer to something for some purpose”* (Widdowson 2007: 6). Discourse, in turn, is the *process of negotiating meaning through its textualizing* – expressing ideas, beliefs, getting a message across and acting upon other people in a certain way through the mediation of text at the producing end (cf. Bakhtin’s *author*). It is also the process of making meaning out of text to make it communicative reality at the receiving end (cf. Bakhtin’s *addressee*). Thus, the relation between *discourse* and *text* is described as that of process and product. In Widdowson’s view, text is a *linguistic trace* of discourse, or actual use of language that is symptomatic of pragmatic intent/communicative purpose and is distinct from sentence or any other abstract unit of linguistic analysis. Discourse is *the pragmatic process* of meaning negotiation that underlies the text and motivates its production and interpretation. Texts, in this view, do not *have* meanings, but are used *by people to mediate* meaning across their discourses and discourse communities. According to Widdowson,

> Communication [...] is not simply a matter of issuing semantic tokens of fixed meaning. It involves also using the resources of the language code indexically, to indicate (point out, invoke) specific aspects of shared schematic knowledge of ideational patterns of conceptualization and interpersonal patterns of communication. That is to say, it involves engaging with the shared assumptions, values, beliefs and conventions of behaviour that define the culture of particular discourse communities. (Widdowson 2003: 68)

As can be seen, the relationship between text and discourse are described as indirectly mediated by schematic knowledge of ideational and interpersonal patterns or contextual/cultural factors. For communication to take place, people do not only need to design their texts in the shared language. They also need to design it so as to make the meaning accessible with regard to what is assumed to be shared in the context of world knowledge, attitudes, social beliefs and values. What is crucial for my discussion of ELF couple discourse, however, is not only this concept of *context* but also Widdowson’s concept of *pretext* as another factor in the general pragmatic process of meaning negotiation. The claim is that all communication, all discourse, is motivated by a particular pretext or perlocutionary purpose. In this view, people produce and design any text for a particular pre-conceived pre-textual purpose of having effect upon others.
At this point, it is worth considering the correspondences between Widdowson’s proposal for discourse analysis and Bakhtin’s (1997) notion of *situation* or *reality, intention* and *voice/position* here. According to Bakhtin:

> Выбирая слова, мы исходим из замыслимого целого нашего высказывания, а это замыслимое и созидаемое нами целое всегда экспрессивно, и оно то и излучает свою экспрессию (точнее, нашу экспрессию) на каждое выбираемое нами слово, так сказать заражает его экспрессией целого. [...] Только контакт языкового значения с конкретной реальностью, только контакт языка с действительностью, который происходит в высказывании, порождает искру экспрессии: ее нет ни в системе языка, ни в объективной, вне нас сущущей действительности.

(When choosing the words, we proceed from the intended whole of our utterance, and this intended and created by us whole is always expressive, it is what radiates its *expression* (to be more precise, *our expression*) on each word chosen by us, so to speak, contaminates it by the expressiveness of the whole. [...] Only the contact of *linguistic meaning* with concrete *reality*, only contact of language with reality that occurs in/through utterance gives a birth to a spark of expression: it [expression] exists neither in language system, nor in the objective reality that exists outside us). (Бахтин 1997: 190-191, my italics)

The concepts of *context* and *intention* (or in Bakhtin’s terms, *замысел*[^40]) as the main factors involved in the pragmatic process of meaning negotiation are compatible with Widdowson’s notions of *context* and *pretext*. In line with Bakhtin’s thought and following Widdowson, I take discourse as “the communicative functioning of language in use” (Widdowson 2009: 162). Consequently, I argue that there are at least two kinds of conditions, under which text is realized as discourse, which relate to *pretextual* as well as *contextual* factors. This distinction between *contexts* as schematic constructs, or “socio-cultural conventions from which the online pragmatic processing of language takes its bearings” (Widdowson 2004: 54), and *pretexts* as perlocutionary purposes in engaging in communication are taken as likely to be more useful for the analysis/interpretation of my data. We can show this relationship between text and discourse diagrammatically as follows (cf. Klötzl 2013: 32):

[^40]: Russian *замысел* can be translated as “aim, idea, plot, intention, plan, design” or “conception” (cf. The Online Dictionary Academic.ru: http://translate.academic.ru/замысел/ru/en/1). Bakhtin most often uses this notion in the meaning of “author’s intention/idea” that can be understood as a pretextual purpose of an individual for designing a particular text/textualizing her/his discourse.
Diagram 2: The relationship between text and discourse

Diagram 2 shows that in discourse we do not only exchange information *contextually* by involving the ideational knowledge of how the situation and communication can be referentially framed, but also by managing the interpersonal relationships *pretextually* and creating desirable communicative effects. That is to say, any discourse is motivated by a perlocutionary purpose to act upon an addressee and to achieve a particular effect upon her/him. In this connection, there is a consideration that is central for the present thesis and that I take up in the next section.

4.2.2 DISCOURSE ANALYSIS: ANALYSIS AND INTERPRETATION

Clearly, if one takes up Widdowson’s view on the relationship between text and discourse as mediated by contextual/pretextual factors, one must also admit that text must be associated with (linguistic) analysis, and discourse and its factors (context, pretext and other factors) with interpretation. The examining of the text and linguistic elements within it involves “a consideration of the textual product as such without regard to the discourse that gave rise to it” (Widdowson 2004: 58). Thus, textual or rather co-textual relation (cf. Widdowson 2004: Chapter 4) is the internal linkage between linguistic elements within a text.

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41 The diagram was published in *Discourse and interaction*, 6 (2), p. 32, 2013.
and is associated with text as product. While contextual/pretextrual relation is associated with discourse as process. In Section 4.1, I have discussed how such co/textual relation can constrain our interpretation to a certain extent in the Bakhtinian example of Солнце взошло (The sun rose). I have pointed out that at such co/textual level one might identify this particular unit as a declarative sentence that consists of two main constituents, namely a noun (in English, a noun phrase) Солнце (The sun) and the past tense form of the verb взошло (rose). However, as we have seen from the example, the identification of such textual patterns says us nothing about how the utterance can be experienced and interpreted in the actual discourse. How one would interpret the co-textual connections in Солнце взошло (The sun rose) – as, for example, a command or permission – depends on relating of the language in the text to the schematic constructs of knowledge (contextual factors) outside the text. Thus, co/text might narrow down the referential possibilities, but one can only achieve discourse by realizing text and co-text within it contextually. For co-textual connections are semantic in character, and identification of the textual patterns and such connections has to do with (linguistic) analysis. Contextual relations are in turn conceptual representations of a state of affairs that people read into texts and have to do with discourse and interpretation. As Widdowson puts it,

Interpretation is the process of deriving a discourse from a text and will always be a function of relationship between text, context, and pretext. Any text has the semantic potential to mean many things, and which meaning gets pragmatically realized depends on how these other factors come into play. No matter how detailed the analysis of a particular text might be, the textual features that are activated in interpretation are only those which are perceived, consciously or not, to be contextually and pretextually relevant. (Widdowson 2004:166)

Here Widdowson speaks about contextual factors that mediate the process of textualizing discourse and reading discourse out of text. However, as I have already mentioned, the recognition of the purpose of a text or utterance depends not only on contextual but also on pretextual factors. These pretextual factors regulate not only the parties’ (in our case, partners’) but also the analyst’s focus of attention on the textual features to be analysed and the contextual factors to be considered. It means that I as a researcher, namely my own values, opinions, biases, and beliefs profoundly affect the research framework and method that I take up in this thesis. Since any sociolinguistic and discourse analytic research is a contextually and pretextually embedded activity, the clarification of the process of intimate discourse in general and couple interaction where partners do not share the same L1 in particular will inevitably be culture-bound and, therefore, partial and incomplete. This study is not an exception. With this thesis at hand, I present my own view of the world, my model of reality,
which of course is open to investigation by other models. Given this, my purpose is not to provide any ‘ultimate’ answers and solution but rather dialogically negotiate my position on ELF couple discourse with the reader. This is what Bakhtin refers to as *polyphony* and *dialogicality* of discourse: multiplicity or plurality of alternative worldviews and positions that can be read into the same text, and multiplicity of discourses that must be negotiated by mediation of text. This process of what Widdowson calls *positioning* and Bakhtin refers to as *polyphonic/dialogic voicing* has not gone unnoticed in the social sciences. It is known, for example, as face work in Politeness Theory, and as involvement-independence interplay in discourse analysis. It is worth looking at how the notions of *polyphony, dialogicality, voice* and *position* correspond to those concepts, and this is what I take up in the next sections.

### 4.3 THE NOTION OF POSITIONING IN THE SOCIAL SCIENCES

*Positioning* is a well-established concept in the social sciences. It was introduced within the confines of *Positioning Theory* in psychology to mean “the discursive process whereby people are located in conversations as observably and subjectively coherent participants in jointly produced storylines” (Davies and Harré, 1999: 37). It is important to note that *Positioning Theory* has developed as an alternative way of understanding the dynamics of human behaviour in contrast to *Role Theory*. In Role Theory, human relationships have been traditionally explained in terms of *roles* that are described as “social typification of recurring and instanctive relationships, such as “mother-son”, “clerk-customer”, and “teacher-student” (Luberda 2000). This notion of *role* has been often criticized as being relatively static, fixed and formally defined (Harré 2006). It has been argued that roles as abstract fixed sets of certain characteristics (e.g. of an ‘average’ mother or son) often do not correspond to people’s actual application, interpretation and experiencing of these general characteristics. Contrary, as James Luberda (2000) puts it, “already the spatial dimension of the term [position] suggests its flexibility: one’s position in space is ever-changing, even if only by degrees”. In line with this argument, Harré and Moghaddam (2003: 5-6) propose the triangulated model of positioning. It consists of positions themselves, speech and other acts, and story lines (or genres). *Position* is defined as “a cluster of rights and duties to perform certain actions” (ibid. 5) within the limits of power relations or hierarchy. Such positions/actions are said to have some social meaning or illocutionary forces, which turn those actions into acts in a particular conventionalized pattern of behaviour.
or story line. That is to say, for the scholars position is a place in hierarchy of rights and duties as mediated through particular actions that are expressive of certain illocutionary forces. For example, in the story line “Doctor – Patient”, a doctor is in position (has a right) to examine a patient and prescribe treatment, whereas a person positioned as a patient has a duty to follow the doctor’s orders. The argument is that role (as a ‘more stable’ concept) is a socially enacted position, which is a matter of power relations. Story line, in turn, is understood here as what sociolinguists refer to as genre (cf. Swales 1985), or particular social conventions according to and within the limits of which people act.

This “positioning triangle” (Harré 2006: 307), thus, takes into account the social conventions of genre that are mapped out in advance and add to our understanding of the interpersonal function of positioning. Positioning is said to be a matter of acting within the constraints of and in conformity with particular story-lines/genres whereby people use particular (appropriate) speech acts that express a certain illocutionary force. In this view, positioning has to do with realizing a particular speech act (illocutionary force/s), getting message across, or making it accessible. I think, however, that this understanding of positioning accounts for its nature only partially. There are two points here. First, it is not that people conform to social conventions of genre only for conformity sake. Nor do they follow genre conventions exclusively to fulfil a condition (right or duty) of story line/genre. As I have already argued, an individual produces a text not only because s/he wants the interlocutor to understand what s/he is getting at. An individual does so primarily with some particular perlocutionary purpose - to act upon others in a certain way and to have a particular effect upon an addressee, for example, in Bakhtin’s terms, effect of согласие-agreement, or разногласие-disagreement. This perlocutionary effect, in my view, is a crucial – central indeed - aspect of positioning. Connected to this is the second point: positioning functions not only on the level of socio-cultural constructs where the conversational purpose is predetermined and roles are assigned. Any human interaction is not only socially constrained or motivated. It is not always a fixed routine. Interpersonal positioning works yet on another – individual – level (Widdowson 2012). At this individual level, there is always room for manoeuvre whereby people are acting upon the established socio-cultural conventions in different individual ways online. This is also what we have to do in this thesis: the basic individual level of human interaction between two people in a romantic relationship. At this level, people do not only act according to but also act upon particular conventions or genres that are already given social sanction. In other words, any conventions, genres or story lines
are subject to an individual manoeuvre, and consequently to variation. I will discuss my own understanding of this individual level of positioning in more detail in later sections. Meanwhile, the point is that the factors of perlocutionary purpose and individual – basic in fact - level in positioning has often been left in the background of the mainstream psychologic literature. Likewise, most sociolinguistic research does not bring it centre stage. Even though most sociolinguists admit that human communication is not only about information exchange, but also about managing interpersonal relations, they often do not go farther than reducing its interactional/interpersonal level to such aspects as, for example, *politeness* and *face*. To these I turn in the next section.

**4.3.1 Positioning as Politeness**

The interpersonal level of human interaction is what Brown and Levinson’s (1987) *Politeness Theory* primarily concerns itself with. The theory is based on the notion of *face* that was introduced by Goffman (1955) to mean self-esteem or image of self. Here is Brown and Levinson’s definition of it:

> the public self-image that every member wants to claim for himself consisting in two related aspects: (a) negative face: the basic claim to territories, personal preserves. rights to not-distraction – i.e. freedom of action and freedom of imposition (b) positive face: the positive consistent self-image or ‘personality’ (crucially including the desire that this self-image be appreciated and approved of) claimed by interactants. (Brown and Levinson 1987: 61)

As can be seen, Brown and Levinson differentiate between two kinds of politeness, namely its *positive* and *negative* aspects. Positive face strategies are said to express concern for others by highlighting friendliness, approval or appreciation. Negative face strategies are claimed to be those that minimize the threat to others’ self-esteem by showing difference and independence. Politeness, in this view, is about how people use language to save and threaten face. Such understanding of *politeness*, however, is not without its critique.

Terkourafi (2008), for example, views Brown and Levinson’s *face* as rather associated with Anglophone (namely, English) culture and common wisdom, and, therefore, often insufficient for application to other cultural settings. Indeed, the term *face* has been used to mean ‘prestige’, ‘reputation’, ‘self-esteem’, or ‘self-image’ in English, but also in some other languages (e.g. in my L1s - Ukrainian or my L2 – Austrian German), in such idiomatic phrases, for example, as ‘saving/losing face’. It is important to note that Brown and Levinson (1987: 61) themselves explicitly acknowledge that their notion of *face* “is derived from that of Goffman (1967) and from an English folk term, which ties face up with notions of being embarrassed or humiliated or ‘losing face’”. Instead of such a ‘socio-cultural’ notion
that is invested with various connotations by various (speech/culture) communities, Terkourafi proposes a ‘universalising’ theoretical construct of *face*, namely a second-order notion of face, or *Face₂* (Terkourafi 2008: 50). She identifies two “defining properties” of it. The first is “the biological grounding of face in the dimension of approach versus withdrawal”. The second is “the intentionality of face, i.e. its directedness, or aboutness” (Terkourafi 2008: 50). What Terkourafi seems to be suggesting, in fact, is extending the notion of *politeness* from a tactic of positioning (Politeness₁) to the more universal *approach-withdrawal principle*. Her point is that the first ‘biologic’ property of *Face₂* is universal and encompasses both positive (approach) and negative (withdrawal) aspects of what she refers to as *politeness*. That is to say, this biological grounding is not uniquely human. Terkourafi’s claim is that it is a fundamental duality that is based on the ability of any organism’s nervous systems (e.g. sea anemone) to differentiate between ‘good’ or ‘bad’ stimuli, such as life and death, pleasure and pain, or benefit and injury. Terkourafi’s crucial point is that what makes *Face₂* uniquely human is its second property, specifically its *intentionality*. As she puts it: “face is intentional inasmuch as it presupposes an Other toward whom it is directed” (ibid. 51). Although the notion of *intentionality* is rather vague, the crucial point in Terkourafi’s theorising on it is that it moves away from Brown and Levinson’s (1987: 61) rather static understanding of face as a pre-existing entity “that all competent adult members or a society have” (my italics) and is internally generated and projected into interaction. Instead, she argues that face is something that people are constantly *doing* or constructing in the interaction with an ‘Other’. According to Terkourafi, what matters in the process of human communication is “settling how Self stands in relation to an ‘Other’ in conversation (i.e. whether Self’s face is being constituted or threatened)” (ibid. 45).

Hence, as I have already said, the concept of *intentionality* is a rather problematic one. First, the question here is how intentionality can be recognized and measured. Second, even if the speaker’s intention is recognized, it does not mean that it, as Terkourafi herself (2008: 58, my italics) puts it, “in and of itself constitute/threaten face, since face constituting/threatening are perlocutionary effects beyond the control of the speaker”. In other words, there may be a gap between the speaker’s ‘polite’ intention and the achieved perlocutionary effect of, for example, coming across as rude. Third, Terkourafi’s understanding of human intentionality in approach/withdrawal duality remains within the limits of Politeness Theory and presupposes that what people intend to in their behaviour is confined within two perlocutionary purposes: ‘to be polite’ or ‘to be impolite/rude’.
Moreover, one can assume that people are polite/impolite/rude just for politeness/impoliteness/rudeness sake. My view is that they are not. People are im/polite to negotiate their positions: that is to act upon an ‘Other’ to achieve particular perlocutionary effects. Politeness, then, is a particular tactic for everything what falls under the rubric of positioning: whether with the purpose of getting some social benefits or protecting one’s private territory. There is one more point to be made about Terkourafi’s theorizing. While arguing against the ‘Anglophone’ notion of face for a ‘universalising second-order’ Face\textsubscript{2} with its intentionality and intention (whether recognized or not), the central concept in her theoretical framework is still face/s. What is crucial is the researcher’s extending the notion to something that people do and negotiate in the interaction with an ‘Other’ to achieve a particular perlocutionary effect. This concept of face is also fundamental in understanding how people position themselves in discourse analytic research and this is what I turn to in the next section.

4.3.2 POSITIONING AS INVOLVEMENT AND INDEPENDENCE

In discourse analysis, Gumperz (1982) has introduced the notion of face as the basis for understanding of not only politeness strategies but all human communication in general:

[U]nderstanding presupposes conversational involvement. A general theory of discourse strategies must therefore begin by specifying the linguistic and socio-cultural knowledge that needs to be shared if conversational involvement is to be maintained, and then go on to deal with what it is about the nature of conversational inference that makes for cultural, subcultural and situational specificity of interpretation. [...] Almost all conversational data derive from verbal interaction in socially and linguistically homogeneous groups. There is a tendency to take for granted that conversational involvement exist, that interlocutors are co-operating and interpretive conventions are shared. (ibid. 2-4, my italics)

For Gumperz, then, involvement is not something that can be taken for granted. The scholar describes it as observable active co-operative participation in conversation.

Scollon and Scollon ‘modify’ Gumperz’s model by arguing that human interaction is driven by at least two universal forces, namely involvement and independence. However, the researchers narrow their theorizing on the drives back to the confines of politeness framework. On the one hand, they view involvement as a central strategy of interactants in what they refer to as politeness (or face) systems. Like does Gumperz, they understand involvement as something that is not given but is an achievement in a conversational contact. Yet, they primarily associate it with face and Politeness Theory. For them involvement is a ‘subordinate’ of a more universal cover-term of face, and can be categorized as positive face or positive politeness. On the other hand, face has at least one more factor, specifically
independence or negative face/negative politeness. What is crucial in Scollon and Scollon’s discussion of face is the argument that these “two sides” cannot be separated, and any interaction is a balancing act between the two facets. Consequently, involvement-independence interplay produce a paradoxical situation, “in that both aspects of face must be projected simultaneously in any communication” (Scollon and Scollon 1995: 36). This is what the researchers have to say about the paradox:

*Face* is really a paradoxical concept. By this we mean that there are two sides to it which appear to be in contrast. On the one hand, in human interaction we have a need to be involved with other participants and to show them our *involvement*. On the other hand, we need to maintain some degree of independence from other participants and to show them that we respect their *independence*. (Scollon and Scollon 1995: 36, my italics)

I cannot agree more here that involvement and independence as two aspects of face are not mutually exclusive but rather inextricably entail each other in any human communication. The question here arises as to the plausibility of conceiving of involvement/independence as aspects of face exclusively within the limits of politeness strategies or systems (ibid. 33-47). The second related question is why there is a need to substitute the notions of positive/negative face/politeness with those of involvement/independence if they are said to have no conceptual difference and are used interchangeably. Scollon and Scollon explain their reluctance to use the former because technical or formal contrast between “positive” and “negative” can easily be forgotten and readers can too easily to think of “positive politeness” as good and “negative politeness” as bad (ibid. 37).

In my view, however, whatever the terms, politeness is only one aspect of discourse, indeed a strategy for achieving the universal effects of involvement or independence. In other words, people are im/polite not for im/politeness sake. As I have already argued, they are polite or impolite to act upon each other in a particular way, to achieve a particular perlocutionary purpose and effect (albeit of involvement or independence, or both). In other words, politeness is a strategy, while involvement/independence is rather an effect that such politeness creates. Moreover, as we may know, politeness is far from being the only strategy in achieving such effects. For example, such tactics as humour or mitigation can be also used for the purposes. What I am suggesting, then, is that this “inescapable opposition between showing a desire to include an individual and showing respect for his privacy” (Goffman 1967: 76) in any discourse can be most profitably explained in terms of the more universal territorial and co-operative imperatives – those proposed by Widdowson (1984: 81-94).
In the previous section, I have argued that what matters in the process of meaning negotiation is not politeness for politeness sake but pragmatic (perlocutionary) purpose (or, in Terkourafi’s words, intention) it serves. I have also suggested that communication is always **interpersonal**, whether within the limits of particular genre or story line, or at the level of individual manoeuvre. That is to say, communication/discourse is always enacted through interpersonal contact between two individuals, according to Bakhtin, on the frontier, threshold of two individual worldviews. In this sense, people contact not (only) with the intention to be polite, constitute/threaten face or to show involvement/independence. As I have already suggested in the previous sections of this chapter, people contact to negotiate their *positions*: to address the other and to act upon that other, to express oneself and achieve a particular perlocutionary effect upon others. In this section, I provide my own understanding of linguistic hybridity as one particular aspect of *positioning* by drawing upon the distinction between the territorial and co-operative imperative – one made by Widdowson (1984: 81-94).

The notion of the co-operative imperative or principle is not new in sociolinguistics. It was Grice (1975) who introduced it as a set of four maxims that represent the basic rules that people follow in communication. Like Gumperz’s *involvement*, the co-operative principle suggests that human communication depends on the assumption that people will co-operate to achieve understanding. To do so they will not say more than necessary (the maxim of quantity); will not give information that is false, or not supported by evidence (the maxim quality); will say things that are pertinent/relative to the discussion (the maxim of relevance); and will avoid obscurity and ambiguity (the maxim of manner). These maxims are relative to the concept of *genre* since they depend on the agreed direction and purpose of interaction. However, as we all may know (and as my data will show), people do not always follow rules or the agreed direction and so might also deny co-operation. The question here arises as to why it happens.

Widdowson (1984, 2012) addresses this question and suggests that communicative behaviour is driven by two universal imperatives: *the co-operative* and *territorial* ones. The argument is again that communication is impossible without co-operation. However, co-operation always involves some territorial crossover thereby endangering the private individual worlds of the interlocutors. From this perspective, discourse is not only about face
protection/threat but rather a dynamic process of negotiating the relationship between the two social forces of *territoriality* and *cooperativeness*. According to Widdowson (1984: 84-86), on every occasion of language use the interest of socio-cultural contact (*the co-operative imperative*) has to be reconciled with the interests of individual security (*the territorial imperative*). To put it another way, on the one hand, the individual uses sociocultural constructs to organize his/her experience and to create and protect his/her own social/cultural territory. On the other hand, a human being cannot live in social isolation and needs to put his/her cultural reality into contact with other people in return for social benefits. As Widdowson’s puts it (1984: 85), “social contact calls for a social contract” (my emphasis). In this view, in discourse people do not only exchange information or get a message across by involving the knowledge of the world, but also by managing the interpersonal relationships and creating desirable communicative effects. According to Widdowson:

Communication is achieved when the speaker formulates particular propositional content and illocutionary intent in such a way as to make them accessible on the one hand and acceptable on the other. **Accessibility** is achieved by an alignment of different states of knowledge so that a common frame of reference is created. **Acceptability** is achieved when the interlocutors locate their interaction on the power and solidarity dimensions and reconcile the conflicting forces of the territorial and co-operative imperatives. (Widdowson, 1984:86, my italics)

As can be seen, **accessibility** is described as a satisfactory convergence of individual contextual/cultural worlds for building up a common ground and achieving understanding. **Acceptability**, in turn, is about individual security to ensure that this connection of different worlds-cultures is achieved without a threatening intrusion into the personal domain. In the process of human communication, people then produce texts or textualize their discourses not only to get the other to understand/access the meaning or to make meaning accessible to the other, but also to get the other to accept – share or ratify – it. In this view, position cannot be delineated simply as an enacted role, a face or a place in the power/solidarity hierarchy. All these terms often presuppose that position is a state of being and confine it to a particular tactic of politeness. What I am suggesting is to describe **position as an act of doing: the way how people manage the relationship between the two – cooperative and territorial – imperatives in the process of interpersonal communication**. In this view, positions are being established partly through the shared linguistic resources (*accessibility*, or in Bakhtin’s terms, *expressiveness*), partly by conformity to the social factors, such as social conventions, genres or story lines (see Section 4.3) (*acceptability*, or in Bakhtin’s terms *addressiveness*), partly are regulated by the individual manoeuvre as an act of non-conformity to what has been conventionally encoded and socially sanctioned. In connection to ELF couple discourse
and linguistic hybridity within it, the question is then not how partners mix or switch among different languages within ELF, but how they textualize their discourses by drawing upon any linguistic resources at their disposal to position themselves, to act upon each other, achieve a particular pretextual purpose, and to reconcile the naturally opposing demands of the territorial and co-operative imperatives.

4.4 SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION

I have begun my discussion in this chapter by considering the difference between Bakhtin’s word as a linguistic form or code and word as an utterance or discourse. I have argued that this distinction underlies the essential for discourse analysis differentiation between language as an encoded system and language as discourse. In this respect, Bakhtin’s theorizing on the nature of language as the process of human communication in many ways related to the modern thinking on the hybrid nature of language and discourse in general, and connected to it issues of analysis and interpretation in particular. I have suggested that Bakhtin’s thinking can be better clarified by Widdowson’s applied linguistic model for discourse analysis. Following Widdowson, I take the relationship between discourse and text as such of process and product, which is mediated by particular contextual and pretextual conditions. My argument has been that any language use is interpersonally motivated by a particular perlocutionary/pretextual purpose and that this process of pretextualization is worth being brought centre stage in discourse analysis. It follows, then, that the process of realizing discourse as mediated through text is always interpersonal (polyphonic) negotiations of voices/positions.

I have also considered how Bakhtin’s understanding of the nature of human communication as interpersonal voicing/positioning relates to the terms of position and positioning in psychology, sociolinguistics and discourse analysis. As we have seen, there are at least two tendencies in conceiving of position. Some studies treat position as a state of being or place predetermined and delimited by particular (right/duties) constraints or genres. Others understand position as a process, or act of doing and connect the notion of position to that of face and politeness. In the latter view, positioning is often about either face-constructing (positive politeness) or face-threatening (negative politeness). Contrary to this general tendency, there are claims that argue for a dynamic model of positioning where every utterance entails both positive/negative facets of face and refer to such facets as involvement
and independence (e.g. Scollon and Scollon 1995). I have argued, however, that the concepts of involvement/independence and positive/negative face/politeness are of different nature. Involvement/independence is a pragmatic effect of politeness, whereas politeness (whether positive or negative) is only a tactic of what Bakhtin refers to as voicing/polyphony and I (following Widdowson) refer to as positioning. If we take up the view that position is primarily a process of managing the interpersonal relations for achieving particular goals, it cannot be explained as a static role, face or a place in a particular hierarchy or schema/genre. Neither can it be confined to the limits of politeness. My suggestion has been that position is the way how an individual acts upon others by managing the relationships between the territorial and co-operative imperatives in the process of meaning negotiation.

To sum up, I have considered the key concepts of this thesis, namely the Bakhtinian word, voice, dialogicality and polyphony with reference to discourse analytic concepts of text/discourse, context/pretext and positioning. I have provided my own understanding of discourse as the interpersonal process of negotiating positions. This understanding suggests that, in discourse, people do not only attempt at getting the message across or ‘make meaning’ - express themselves through various textual realizations. People always have some pre-textual purpose in mind to address others. They will always enact their discourse through the mediation of their text (in whatever language/s) to achieve a particular pretext that is to have a particular effect upon others. My suggestion, then, is that language is used not only for contextualization, or activating particular contextual factors in interaction. It essentially functions as pretextualization, or achieving particular interactive purposes and effects. In this respect, this thesis is about how ELF couples use hybrid forms/linguistic hybridity to key into particular contexts, and to achieve particular pretexts, or purposes that the partners set out to achieve in interaction. In the following, I discuss closer how such process of positioning can be understood in ELF couple discourse.
5. POSITIONING AS INTERACTIONAL DYNAMICS IN ELF COUPLE DISCOURSE

We have begun our discussion in this thesis by consideration of a number of current and controversial issues in describing human communication and hybrid nature of language: issues concerning the nature of discourse and text, the relationship between discourse and text as such of process and product, and connected to it issues of analysis and interpretation in particular. I have been arguing that what matters in the process of meaning negotiation is not linguistic (hybrid) forms as encoded semantic symbols but particular contextual and pretextual conditions under which those forms are realized as discourse. In the discussion of Bakhtin’s polyphony and dialogism (Section 4.1), I have suggested that this process of realizing discourse is always interpersonal, and, therefore, is always about positioning/voicing that involves reconciling the territorial and co-operative imperatives which drive all discourse in general. In this chapter, I discuss my understanding of human discourse with reference to the specific interaction of ELF couples. To begin with, consider yet another Bakhtinian account of the interpersonal nature of human communication:

Я осознаю себя и становлюсь самим собой только раскрывая себя для другого, через другого и с помощью другого. Важнейшие акты, конституирующие самосознание, определяются отношением к другому человеку (к Ты) [...тем], что происходит на границе своего и чужого сознания, на пороге. И все внутреннее не довлеет себе, [а] повернуто вовне, диалогизировано, каждое внутреннее переживание оказывается на границе, встречается с другим, и в этой напряженной встрече – вся его сущность. Это – высшая степень социальности [...]. Само бытие человека (и внешне, и внутренне) есть глубочайшее общение [...]. Я себя не смотрю, я смотрю в глаза другому или глазами другого.

(I realize myself and become myself (per se?) only by opening myself for the other, through the other and with the help of the other. The most important acts that constitute self-consciousness are characterized/determined by the relation towards the second person (to You). [...] by what] is happening on the frontier of my and other consciousness, on the threshold. And the inner/all inner life does not suffice itself, [but] turned towards outside, dialogised, each inner (emotional) experience find itself on the frontier, meet the other, and in this tensed meeting is all its essence. This is the highest degree/level of socialability [...]. The being of human itself (both the outside and inner) is the deepest communication. To be means to communicate. To be means to be for the other and through the other – for myself. A human being does not have his own inner sovereign territory, he, the whole of him, always is on a frontier, looking inside (of himself), he looks into the other’s eyes or with/through the other’s eyes.) (Бахтин 1997: 344, emphasis in the original, my italics)

Where, we might ask, then this frontier, this threshold of one’s territory? What is “inner sovereign territory”? How can an individual exist at the frontier/a threshold without a ‘sovereign’ territory? What happens at this very threshold? And what this all has to do with linguistic hybridity in ELF couple talk? These are the kinds of questions I want to consider.
here with reference to linguistic and cultural hybridity as interpersonal positioning in ELF couple interaction.

5.1 COUPLE DISCOURSE AS NEGOTIATION OF IDENTITIES

The central concern of this thesis is what can be involved in and what is specific about the process of positioning as mediated by hybrid forms in ELF couple discourse. Therefore, it is worth having a look at what the researchers on private interaction have to say about such couple discourse. In the previous chapter, I have suggested that position is a process, or the way how an individual manages the relationships between the territorial and co-operative imperatives in the interpersonal process of meaning negotiation rather than a static role or a place in a particular hierarchical frame. In the literature on couple discourse, the phenomenon that I refer to as positioning has found its reflection in what Piller (2002) describes as discursive negotiation of identity or identity positions. Piller explores the conversational data of 36 bilingual – English/German – couples who live in Belgium, Germany, Great Britain, Netherlands and the USA. The data consist of self-recorded discussion of the researcher’s questions, questionnaires and other communication the author had with the participants (e.g. correspondence). In the discussion of her data, the researcher sees the process of meaning negotiation, or what she refers to as discursive construction of hybridity, and linguistic practices within it as mediated by partners’ identities. She makes three main points about identity as a theoretical construct for describing bilingual couple discourse.

First, Piller claims that identity is multiple (cf. also Woodward 2000: 5-42). Although she argues against the traditional conceiving of identity in terms of labels and categories (such as Black, White, female, male, German, Italian, English, academic, worker and so on); what she means by multiple is that one can be identified by others or identify her/himself as having/doing multiple characteristics (such as White German male worker or Black Italian female student). Piller’s suggestion is that bilingual couplehood where partners do not come from the same national culture and do not share the same national language is a fascinating site for exploring how such ‘multiple’ social identities as native/non-native, natives/foreigners and/or woman/man are being “negotiated, upheld or contested” (Piller 2002: 5). The researcher’s second point is that identity is hybrid. According to her, hybrid means that people often incorporate new identities into their repertoire in the process of
“discursive assimilation” (cf. Pavlenko 2001, 2007) to a new linguistic and cultural community. In other words, Piller primarily regards hybrid identity as people’s assimilating new cultural or rather national identities as mediated through national languages - e.g. German Australian, or Canadian Ukrainian. Finally, Piller conceives of identity as performed. Her argument is that the traditional categories-and-labels approach presupposes that “identity, or rather identities, is something that a person “is” or “has”: some immutable, true and inherent quality” (Piller 2002: 11). Contrary to this view, the author suggests that identities are performed or something that people do, and “most of this ongoing construction of identity is done linguistically” (ibid. 12).

Piller’s exploration of partners’ discursive construction of hybridity as the process of negotiating (hybrid multiple) identities has yielded several findings that resonate throughout her data, and can be taken as a starting point for discussion of ELF couples. Her first point is related to what I have said about positioning and the co-operative/territorial imperatives that drive all human discourse and (ELF) couple discourse in particular (see Chapter 4). The claim is that in the context of private relationships questions of language/code use are rarely just those. They often stand for other relationships issues, namely for emotional distance or involvement. These may include disappointment at the partner’s failure to learn one’s language, or dislike for a particular language and variety. Connected to this is her second point that a bilingual and cross-cultural relationship does not just come about because the partners were born in different countries and have different L1s (in our terms, languages of primary socialization). Both mono-lingual/cultural and bi/multi-lingual/cultural relationships are actively created and performed (cf. also Tannen 1986, 1990; Pavlenko 2001). Therefore, according to Piller (2002: 2), any couplehood as well as their linguistic practices is not a state of being, but a continuous act of doing. Third, she sees the process of negotiating (hybrid multiple) identity positions as enacted through language contact. In turn, she claims that language contact in ‘real life’ is not between abstract standards of different languages, but occurs in a rich linguistic tapestry of interrelated varieties. As I have already mentioned, I am rather sceptical about the term language contact since these are not languages but people who contact. Yet, Piller’s point here is that the linguistic ‘landscape’ of the countries where couples live and its effect on their language use

42 Here, Piller refers to mono-lingual/cultural couplehood where partners use the same national language and come from the same national culture, respectively bilingual/cultural - where partners use different national languages and come from different national cultures.
should also be taken into account. In all, the author argues for a polyphonic sociolinguistics that “accepts the very complexity of multiple and hybrid social identities and intersecting discourses as a central characteristic of its subject matter” (Piller 2002: 265).

Although such polyphonic sociolinguistic approach to couple discourse can be a starting point for exploring linguistic and cultural hybridity as represented in ELF couple talk, there are objections that can be raised against the plausibility of understanding partners’ identities as multiple, and differentiating between hybrid and multiple identities as suggested by Piller. The former delimits partner’s discursive construction of hybridity to assimilation of different national/ethnic identities only. The latter presupposes that a person is a combination or a set of particular identities/entities/characteristics. This contradicts, in fact, Piller’s argument that identity is not something that people have but rather something that people do.

There are at least three considerations here. First, as I have already argued in Chapter 4, any classification, categorization or identification will be a convenient fiction based on the demarcations that are imposed by theoretical - sociolinguistic/discourse-analytic - description and, consequently, by the researcher’s ideological/cultural/theoretical assumptions. Being a matter of the researcher purpose and interpretation, then, such demarcations between/among ‘multiple’ identities do not necessary represent the reality of person’s own experience. *Multiple* suggest that an individual is constructing or living various separate parallel ‘selves’. To put it another way, s/he is either experiencing or choosing a particular single identity (of student, parent, employee, White and so on); or combining/constructing all of these (of student and parent and employee and White and so on) concurrently but parallel in a particular (e.g. ‘parent-child’) interaction or, in Harré’s (2003, 2006) terms, story line. Interestingly enough, Piller sees such multiplicity of individual’s identities as the challenge for the researcher that makes it difficult to specify which identity is being constructed in a particular situation or context. I think, however, that the problem here is not in sorting one relevant identity out of their multiplicity. Rather the question is how far it is possible at all – either for a sociolinguist or an individual her/himself - to separate the individual’s multiple ‘identities’ and, then, to choose and enact the most appropriate one/s for a particular interaction. Thus, understanding *identity* as multiple makes it very similar to the concept of *role* or *face* as a static entity or something that people have, something that can be easily categorized according to the existing socially sanctioned typologies. Contrary to this view, I suggest that an individual is enacting an *integrated hybrid*
position as fusion of identities rather than a combination of many *multiple* individualities. The process of establishing and maintaining private couple relationship is rather about how they are positioning themselves or how they are realizing what Bakhtin (1997c: 351) refers to as an *integrated unfinalized voice* (cf. also Section 4.1). As I have already argued, this process of positioning is not about re/constructing roles, faces, or identities but is about balancing between the two universal forces of cooperativeness and territoriality which, in turn, involves conformity or non-conformity to established and socially sanctioned conventions of particular ‘story lines’ or genres. Thus, I conceive of ELF couple discourse as a matter of positioning “with each [partner-] participant acting upon each other, each protecting the position of self and [...] this necessary involves somehow reconciling the naturally opposing demands of the co-operative and territorial imperative” (Widdowson 2012: 5) rather than a matter of exercising various (separate) multiple identities.

The second consideration relates to the first and is about the levels on which positioning operates. According to Widdowson (2012), there are at least two such levels, namely, the mentioned above social level of genre conventions and the individual level of negotiating positions. To put it another way, on the one hand, there is the level of social conventions and constraints that are imposed on an individual by the society. This is the story line or genre level where the relationship between the two imperatives (cooperativeness and territoriality) and frames for identities-roles are mapped out in advanced. At this level, the process of positioning (or what Piller refers to as constructing identity) can be understood as non/conforming to already existing social norms/conventions of behaviour and/or frames/characteristics for identity/ies that are appropriate and relatively fixed in a particular genre. There is, however, another – individual – level. At this level, interpersonal positioning is unpredictable since it is a matter of negotiating positions online where participants use their right for individual (non/conformist) manoeuvre and can modify or deny the pre/existing ‘prescribed’ (linguistic) frames for an identity or role. In identity research, this view has found its reflection in understanding the nature of identity as unstable and consisting of two interrelated levels. Specifically, the level that is relatively fixed and the level that is constantly changing. According to Barker and Galasinski (2001: 31), for example, “[i]dentities are both unstable and temporarily stabilized by social practice and regular, predictable behaviour”. In this sense, people are not doing a combination of multiple identities but rather a *hybrid integrated position* as fusion of these two levels of positioning. To put it another way, people do not engage in interaction only (if at all) to construct a certain
self out of their multiplicity or to conform to particular socially sanctioned roles or genre conventions. They do so to achieve some particular purposes, to act upon others in a certain way. For these purposes, they can conform to such conventions but also realize them as actual behaviour at the individual level in all kinds of variable ways. According to Widdowson (2012), discourse, in this respect, is always a process that implies both levels of positioning which are interdependent: you can exercise the freedom of individual manoeuvre only against the constraints of social conventions that are already accepted and expected as appropriate to a particular language use by a community of its users. The question here, then, is not what identity – native/non-native, or woman/man - an individual constructs but how s/he positions her/himself and what kind of pretextual/perlocutionary effect upon others s/he attempts to achieve in a particular interaction (see Section 4.2).

Finally, the point has to be made about Piller’s understanding of the hybrid nature of identity as assimilation of new cultural or rather national/ethnic identities as mediated through (partners’) national languages. The question here is what hybrid identity is and how it is different from what Piller refers to as multiple nature of identity. This issue has to do with the concept of culture in general and with the extent to which any couplehood is cross/inter-cultural. As I have mentioned above, Piller primarily connects hybridity to national/ethnic cultural aspects of partners’ identities. Other scholars claim that couple communication – albeit mono-lingual/cultural or bi/multi-lingual/cultural - is always cross/inter-cultural because of different gender identities of partners. There is, for example, Tannen’s celebrated work on couple interaction that defines such (cross)cultural dimensions of private communication on the basis of woman/man identities of interactants (Tannen 1990). The question here, again, is how far partners’ cross-culturalness can be accounted for by the differences of their (gender or whatever) identities and to what extent, in turn, language differences can be explained by the partners’ cross-culturalness. Interestingly enough, Piller addresses this issue in her later work and makes the point that cross-cultural communication cannot be defined on the basis of partners’ identities, but rather on the basis of what it is that interactants orient to: only if they orient to cultural difference and culture as a category is actively constructed, can a communicative event be considered cross-cultural (Piller 2007: 342).

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43 Monolingual refers here to the use of the same first language (L1), or the language of primary socialization. Bi/multilingual, respectively, to the use of two or more different national languages, that can be languages of either primary (L1) or secondary socialization (L2) for speakers.
In this claim, Piller puts greater importance to the pretext of engaging into the conversation. Likewise, my suggestion is that the extent to which couple discourse is cross-cultural cannot be defined on the basis of particular gender, national or any other identities of partners but rather on the basis of their pretexts of engaging into the conversation: only if the partners are motivated by the pretextual purpose of constructing cultural difference (of any kind) can such discourse be considered cross-cultural. Here, the general question arises as to the nature of culture and the relationship between language and culture in ELF couple discourse in particular. I have an occasion to discuss this relationship in later sections. At this point, let us look at the few studies that explore these issues in ELF couple domain.

5.2 ELF COUPLE RESEARCH

The first publication on ELF couple discourse I am aware of is that of Julia Gundacker (2009, 2010). Although Gundacker’s study does not directly address aspects of hybridity in ELF, it provides interesting insights into ELF couple discourse in general. The study contributes to our understanding of discoursal processes in ELF couple language use, and is based on five interviews with ELF couples and explores their perceptions of ELF as their private language. The focus is the question what ELF can do and cannot do in intimate relationship, and how ELF relationship differs from L1 or, in Gundacker’s terms, “mother tongue” relationship. Gundacker’s main observation is that ELF has not only made the partners’ relationship possible as the only shared language but also “can do everything for a couple what a relationship in the mother tongue could do” (2009: 114). She surmises that, in comparison with L1 couples (or couples who use the same L1 in the relationship), ELF partners might face misunderstandings connected to language differences/limitations. Among such limitations, Gundacker lists the frustration about a lack of expression in ELF (especially when it comes to expressing emotions); problems in communication with extended families, friends or colleagues who might not speak English at all, speak not well enough, and/or might not want to. In other words (in Gundacker’s words), “ELF can be the language of couples and the language for their relationship, but it cannot be guaranteed that it will be the language for their social life” (ibid. 117). While connecting ELF as an ‘outside’ issue to such factors as a country where a couple live and/or languages spoken in the country

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44 Gundacker defines ELF couples as “couples with different first languages” (2009: 14) where English is not a mother tongue for neither partner.
and family, Gundacker explains difficulties caused by ELF within a couple to partners’ gender differences. She claims that only female participants reported frustration at the limits of their expression, whereas the men “cared less about what language they speak and why they speak that particular language than the women” (ibid. 117). In other words, the suggestion is that female partners more often tend to see ELF as a problem or disadvantage in the relationship. Moreover, following Tannen (1990), Gundacker surmises that male-female communication is always cross-cultural precisely because the partners have different gender identities. As I have already argued, the question here arises as to how far language differences can be accounted for by partners’ cross-culturalness, and to what extent cross-culturalness, in turn, can be accounted for by the differences of partners’ (gender) identities. I think, it is unreasonable to explain any differences (whether they are linguistic or cultural) by the fact that one part of humankind has male and another female gender or identity. As I argue elsewhere (Klötzl 2014 a, b), any kind of culture or identity as well as language is not what people have, but is what people do. This being so, partners’ communication can be cross-cultural only if they are doing it cross-cultural in the process of meaning negotiation rather than because they have a particular culture/identity/gender. The extension to which any contact or interaction is cross-cultural relates to the problem of the relationship between text and discourse, which I have already discussed in Chapter 4, and language and culture, which I will discuss in the following sections in more detail. Meanwhile, what is essential here is Gundacker’s suggestion that there is something global/common for all couples in general and ELF couples in particular. She makes a crucial point that there is nothing what ELF cannot do that a mother tongue can do in intimate relationship. It means that, on the one hand, ELF couples are unlike other couples, or unique, in the sense that they use ‘the third language’ for establishing and maintaining their relationship – the language, which is a mother tongue for neither partner. On the other hand, they are like other (mono/bi/multilingual) couples in the sense that they are “always cross-cultural” due to their gender differences, or, in my interpretation of Gundacker’s findings, can have the same problems as any other couple whatever language/s they speak. The assumption, then, is that apart from language issues there are some other crucial factors such as partners’ cultures and motives that are involved in couple discourse. This assumption is supported by Gundacker’s observation that her ELF couples do not perceive ELF as a disadvantage. The couples are aware of ELF limitations but are rather happy with the language: first and foremost, because without ELF their relationship has not been possible at all. That is to say, the ELF partners
see ELF as an advantage rather than disadvantage, and the limitations of ELF do not really affect their relationship, even more so with the course of the time: the longer the relationship lasts the more comfortable they get with ELF.

At first glance, Gundacker’s observation that the couples generally perceive their ELF rather as an advantage contradicts that of Kaisa Pietikäinen (2014) who views lingua franca partners as linguistically “equally disadvantaged” (2014: 4). However, Pietikäinen accounts for such ‘equally disadvantaged’ situation from a somewhat different angle. She explains it by the fact that ELF as “the couple tongue is not “owned” by either partner” and, therefore, “the power distribution by language choice is more equal” (ibid.). As does Gundacker, Pietikäinen looks at how ELF couples are different from those with more homogeneous similar linguacultural backgrounds. The researcher bases her analysis not only on the participants’ perceptions but also on linguistic practices. She investigates the interaction of six ELF couple by interviewing them and focusing on what she refers to as ‘automatic’ codeswitching in their talk. Pietikäinen compares her findings with those of Klimpfinger (2007, 2010) and Gumperz (1985) and lists codeswitching as one of the strategies that the couples use for solving communication issues and “building a shared couple culture”. As regards Gumperz’ investigation, it looks at how bi/multilinguals use codeswitching in, so to speak, more traditional static multilingual communities. Pietikäinen’s (2014: 6-7) claim is that, in comparison with Gumperz’ participants from such ‘static multilingual communities, ELF couples use CS more actively and creatively. As concerns Klimpfinger’s study, it explores CS in ELF ad hoc groups interaction (see Section 2.3.1 of this thesis for a more detailed discussion). The researcher identifies the following functions of CS in ELF talk: to introduce ideas; specify addressees; appeal for authority; signal culture; and to exercise “emblematic switches” (2007: 40-41) that do not have any obvious pragmatic function. Compared with Klimpfinger’s findings, Pietikäinen argues that her ELF couples use CS for more various reasons. She states that, in addition to the motivations for language alternation in ELF interaction listed by Klimpfinger, ELF couples code-switch for:

- “demonstrating use of a language”, or giving examples of use;
- “automatic codeswitching”, or switches that pass without speakers’ specific attention;
- “replacing/clarifying unfamilierites”, or replacing unknown or forgotten English words/utterances;
- “replacing nontranslatables”, or using culture-bound words that are difficult to translate into English;
- “specifying addresses”, for example addressing children in L1; and
“emphasising the message”, or using switches for extra stress or explanation (Pietikäinen 2014: 6-7).

As can be seen from the list, Pietikäinen roughly divides CS into two categories, namely those that have some social/cultural or interactive relevance, or “cultural signals” (ibid. 7), and ‘automatic switches’ that is “unmarked by any signs of awareness of switching such as hesitation, hedging, or flagging from the speaker” (ibid. 7). Her suggestion is that automatic CS is not a conscious choice, although the intended message behind such switches and their pragmatic functions could be the same as that of corresponding English words used by the partners. In other words, ‘automatic’ CS is said to be not visibly intentional and, consequently, not signalling culture.

At this point, let us look at one of the examples discussed by Pietikäinen. The example is taken from Finish-Dutch couple - Päivi and Jan - who have been together for seventeen years at the time of data collection. Pietikäinen discussed the beginning of the interview when she asked the couple to sign a consent form. In the extract, Päivi gives Jan a book that Jan uses as a writing pad to sign his form. The book turned out to be in Finnish, and Päivi suggests in Finnish that Jan could learn the language from it, since his Finnish is not fluent enough and this causes some problems in communicating with the couple’s friends. The couple explains the interviewer that Jan has a plenty of such Finish books at his disposal (e.g. on how to build your own house). Some seconds later, Jan jokingly adds that he missed out one of those books on how to build your own jetty and uses the Finish equivalent for “jetty” laituri. Pietikäinen interprets Jan’s ‘switch’ as automatic, since all the interlocutors understand Finish and “there is no hesitation preceding the switch, no hedging or flagging that would highlight the switch” (ibid. 17). There are two points here. First, the question is whether the fact that the ‘switch’ goes smoothly or unnoticed necessarily makes it culture free. Second, from Pietikäinen’s description of this couple, one can assume that the partners have some common pre-history, or, in other words, have already created the shared frame of reference in general and for the word in particular in their private culture. One can assume, then, that laituri is contextualized into the partners’ shared territory and so signal their shared private culture (if not national or ethnic). Although the ‘switch’ is ‘unmarked’ and goes unnoticed, it can have a pragmatic function of achieving the effect of togetherness in the shared partners’ territory. This is what Pietikäinen herself points out in her study. On the one hand, she concludes that CS is an important “malleable tool, and occasionally it lifts itself from the toolbox of languages without the speaker’s intention” (ibid. 21). On the other, her
point is that the ELF couples who participated in her study are resourceful communicators whose purpose is to build the shared couple culture. One can assume, then, that this purpose is also the ELF couples’ motivation for using ‘automatic’ CS as one of such “malleable tool[s]”. Consequently, laituri in this particular exchange can be interpreted as creating and signalling the couple’s shared territory. Hence, it is rather disputable whether any language use in general and ‘automatic codeswitching’ in particular can be culture-free. Neither is it clear how ELF couples use CS more actively and creatively, or for more various purposes than ELF ad hoc groups and static bi/multilingual communities. Connected to this is the question how far activity, creativity, and variability in purposes can be measured in any language use and, in particular, in codeswitching which is a problematic concept itself (see Chapter 3). What Pietikäinen has to do with in her study is different discourses and domains. Accordingly, both ELF ad hoc groups and static multilingual communities may have rather different purposes in engaging into communication from those of ELF couples. As I argue elsewhere (Klötzl 2014 a, b), a crucial feature of couple discourse in general and ELF couple discourse in particular is the motive of achieving the effect of domestic intimacy and togetherness by creating partners’ shared private territory, or in Pietikäinen’s terms, by building “a shared couple culture”. In this respect, the researcher seems to be contradicting herself in stating that ‘automatic’ CS is a consequence of “linguistic relaxedness” (ibid. 20) rather than a signal of culture. This controversy raises a number of questions. The first, as I have stated above, is whether any language use can be culture-free. The second relates to the first and regards the relationship between language and culture, and understanding of culture in general. Finally, it requires a clearer conceptualizing of couple discourse and ELF couples (as a category and as people). Before addressing the first two question, I clarify my own understanding of the category an ELF couple.

5.3 CONCEPTUALIZING ELF COUPLES.

As I have already discussed, both Gundacker and Pietikäinen categorise ELF couples as inter/cross-cultural. At the same time, both do not specify what they understand by culture. Since both researchers classify ELF couples on the basis of the partners’ first (other than English) languages and native (other than English-speaking) countries, I can only assume that culture in both studies is associated with a particular nationality/nation-state or ethnicity. Although such associations are rather questionable, the categorization of ELF
couples on the basis of their first languages and native countries is a necessary abstraction. As I have discussed in the Introduction, Seidlhofer’s (2011) definition of ELF is also based on such convenient fiction as participants’ national affiliation and L1s. ELF is defined as the only choice – the only shared language – for all the interactants with different L1s: English native-speakers are not an exception in this respect. Thus, the definition does not exclude native speakers of English from ELF. This allows for categorizing, for example, “meetings at the United Nations headquarters in New York, tourist cruises around Sydney harbour, or academic conferences in Hyderabad” (Seidlhofer 2011: 7) as ELF interactions. Like in Seidlhofer’s definition, my participants are speakers of different L1s, English is the only shared language, and, consequently, the only possible medium of communication for them. However, despite the appropriateness of such inclusion of NSs for description of ELF ad hoc groups, or institutional and business settings, for the purpose of my study I recruited only NNSs of English. Though my purpose is to show how ELF couple discourse is similar rather than different from any other couple interaction, my argument is that ELF partners as NNS of English find themselves in a unique - more ‘equal’ and ‘detached’ - lingua-cultural situation than couples where partners use English, which is L1 of one of them. I have shortly discussed Yamomoto’s typology of multilingual couples in the Introduction and made the point that couples who use one of the partners’ L1 might have unequal status as for the language choice and language use. The concept of language choice is rather disputable in general (see Chapter 3 for a more detailed discussion). In relation to ELF couples, however, it appears that the motivations for choosing any common language (whether it is English, German, Spanish, French or Japan), which makes any intercultural/international interactions possible at all, are often rather similar and practical: participants choose a language, in which they all/both are more or less proficient. Nevertheless, the status of ELF partners in language use, I think, is somewhat unique at least at the beginning of relationship. According to the mentioned Yamomoto’s (1995) typology, both ELF partners use, so to speak, a ‘third’ language in their relationship, which is a L1 for neither partner. One can, then, assume that the partners are more or less ‘equally’ detached from the (primary) cultural associations that the language can have for its native speakers. This is what Pietikäinen seems to be referring to as partners’ ‘equal disadvantage’ in lingua franca situations. It is not my purpose to discuss how far such detachment can be dis/advantageous for ELF partners. The crucial phrase here is ‘equal’ cultural detachment. My point is that such ‘equal’ detachment might draw partners’ attention to the processes that go unnoticed or are taken for granted in the relationship where
partners use a shared L1 and might associate it with their primary cultures. In other words, ELF can facilitate partners’ recognition of the processes whereby different values, beliefs, interests and cultural assumptions are read into particular linguistic forms and are brought into the same intimate interaction in general. This relationship between language and culture is worth dwelling on a moment on in the next sections.

5.4 “З ТВОЇМ ИМ’ЯМ І В ІМЕНІ ТВОЇМ”:\nCULTURE, TERRITORIALITY AND ELF

While Gundacker (2010) (following Tannen) sees cross-culturalness in private relationship as pre-determined by partners gender-specific identities, the intercultural research treats “culture with the (national) name” as a given. That is what Ingrid Piller points out in her book*Intercultural communication*(2011). She makes the important observation that most intercultural research treats culture as a presupposed entity or being that is “something people have or to which they belong” (ibid. 15, emphasis in the original), and more or less associates culture with nationality and/or ethnicity. That is what she calls “culture with the name” (English, German, or Russian culture): the definite noun phrases that trigger a presupposition of existence. As we have seen in the previous section, in couple communication, this is what one can label as ‘culture with the (gender) name’: male or female specific culture. There is, however, another approach to culture. It also connects culture to the specific ways of life of different national/ethnic or social groups, but treats it as a verb to culture (to do English, German, or Russian; male/female culture) that changes its status to a process or as “something people do or which they perform” (ibid. 15, emphasis in the original). These two understandings of the status of culture can both be found in ELF research literature as well. The disagreement among ELF scholars concerns the role of culture in English as a lingua franca (Meierkord 2002). Some scholars argue for the inseparability of language and culture, and that English as a global lingua franca has inherited much of the

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45 З твоїм ім’ям і в імені твоїм (‘With your name and in your name’) – a line of the poem “Благословенна діньо, ти скінчилася...” written by the Ukrainian poet-dissident Vasyl Stus (1938-1985), who was nominated for the Nobel Prize in Literature in 1985, and published after his death in 1994 (for the full text and more information about the author see Гуманітарний Центр Василя Стуса (http://www.stus.kiev.ua), and Wikipedia (https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Vasyl_Stus).

46 The section is substantially derived from Klötzl 2014: “De Gruyter [“Maybe just things we grew up with”: linguistic and cultural hybridity in ELF couple talk”], Walter De Gruyter GmbH Berlin Boston, [2015]. Copyright and all rights reserved. Material from this publication has been used with the permission of Walter De Gruyter GmbH.”
“internal [Anglo] cultural baggage” and is essentially “Anglo English” (Wierzbicka 2006: 312). Others see ELF as culture-free interaction that provides neutral ground for its speakers (House 2003: 559-560). Yet there is another alternative view that treats ELF neither as inseparably bound to any particular (Anglo) cultural affiliation nor culture-free or neutral but as expressive of ELF speakers’ ‘own cultures’ (e.g. Baker 2012, Ehrenreich 2009, Seidlhofer 2011). The reasons for disagreement seem to be triggered by the different perspectives on culture. Some of the researchers treat culture as a national entity with the national name. Others look at nationality or ethnicity as an aspect of the general process of human communication, in which national culture is only one of the contextual factors made relevant by and to the participants. For the purpose of this thesis, I take up the latter perspective. My suggestion is that what one might find in (private) ELF communication is that (intercultural) discourse is not about national, gender or any other cultural difference or similarity but a dynamic process of negotiating the relationship between two more universal social forces that Widdowson refers to as territoriality and cooperativeness. As I have argued in Section 4.3.3, on every occasion of language use the interest of socio-cultural contact (the co-operative imperative) has to be reconciled with the interests of individual security (the territorial imperative) (Widdowson 1984: 84-86). The argument has been that people do not only seek the agreement about how shared knowledge can be referentially framed. This is what Widdowson refers to as accessibility. People are also individuals who are competing to establish their own positions in the process of managing their interpersonal relationship pretextually, or to make their positions acceptable. In other words, accessibility works towards a satisfactory convergence of individual contextual/cultural worlds for achieving meaning and understanding as required by parties’ purpose in communication. Acceptability, in turn, has to do with individual security to assert one’s own territorial rights and at the same time to ensure that this connection of different worlds-cultures is achieved without threatening the territorial rights of the other.

If we now turn to ELF couple discourse, it can be assumed, that ELF partners need to lower the barriers of their individual cultural spaces to create their own shared English ‘idiomatic territory’ and bring their own schematic assumptions, beliefs, and values into their ELF in order to achieve the pretext of domestic togetherness and closeness (Widdowson 2004: 78-79), which is at a premium in intimate discourse. I will be returning to this pretext in couple discourse in a later section. Meanwhile, the point is that in ELF encounters the lack of shared national contextual territory do not prevent interaction from taking place. As we all
know, cultural knowledge often transcends the national borders: there can be relevant cultural convergence among people who do not have a common language and ‘national territory’ as well as considerable cultural divergence between people who do. What I am suggesting, then, is that it is likely to be more useful to treat **culture not as linguistically bound but as a schematic territory, as a representation “of what counts as customary in states of affairs or modes of thought and behaviour, [or] what people take for granted as normal in the society they live”** (Widdowson 2009: 343, my emphasis). Thus, ELF users bring cultural assumptions to their interactions as default values that are adjusted in the process of discursive cultural co-construction whereby they achieve the desired balance between the cooperative and territorial imperatives. From this perspective, the question is not “who makes culture relevant to whom in which contexts” (Piller 2011: 172), but who makes what culture relevant to whom in which contexts for what purposes. If we turn to ELF private discourse, it is reasonable, then, to ask how far doing culture as intimate territory is achieved through ELF and how specific cultural - national ethnic and/or gender - aspects are involved. It is worth exploring this relationship between language and culture a little bit further and considering what bearings it can have on the use of hybrid forms in ELF couple talk. To this, I turn in the next section.

### 5.5 LANGUAGE AND CULTURE OR ‘MAYBE THE THINGS WE GREW UP WITH’

In her book *Intercultural Communication*, Ingrid Piller speculates about the relationship between language and culture and makes the point that:

*Language forms are relative and different languages encode different world views. [...]Intercultural competence is characterised by the ability and desire to engage with realities other than our own.*

(Piller 2011: 53, my italics)

In a way, such a statement is hard to disagree with. It is rather obvious that different languages will be exploited so as to meet different conceptual and communicative requirements of their users. However, it seems implausible to state that such realities are encoded in the language itself. For to argue that “different languages encode different world views” means to take the symbolic perspective on language and culture, and to some extent equate them. This view

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47 The section is substantially derived from Klötzl 2014: “De Gruyter [“Maybe just things we grew up with”: linguistic and cultural hybridity in ELF couple talk”], Walter De Gruyter GmbH Berlin Boston, [2015]. Copyright and all rights reserved. Material from this publication has been used with the permission of Walter De Gruyter GmbH.”
finds its best known expression in the Sapir-Whorf thesis of linguistic determinism (See Gumperz and Levinson 1996 for a comprehensive overview). The assumption is that a language represents and in some way determines a world view, and cultural and conceptual systems can be encoded within and inferred from linguistic evidence alone. There are, however, objections that can be raised against this line of argument, and these we must now address.

The first is that languages as *codes* do not communicate: they provide the means whereby the discourse can be achieved. It is people who communicate by using languages as a resource for mediating the process of communication. This being so, cultural “realities” cannot be directly signalled by linguistic forms themselves: they are the function of the perceived relationship between the forms and cultural factors. As I have made it clear in Section 4.2, there needs to be the separate set of *contextual* and *pretextual* correlates: symbols as categories of linguistic competence must be converted into indices – categories of communicative competence. Of course, there is a relationship between symbol and index where a lack of common knowledge of encoded semantic meanings can also pose problems in interaction (for a detailed discussion of such relationship see Widdowson 1984: Chapter 3). My point here, however, is that the problem is not that the language X speaker cannot share language Y speaker’s conceiving of reality because of different (whether be it national or gender, or any other) worldviews *symbolically encoded* in their languages. They simply do not share the same schematic knowledge of the world or the things they “grew up with”, as the participants of my study formulate it, and therefore might not know what a particular linguistic form *indexically* refers to. That is to say, “the meaning of a language as semantically encoded [*symbol*] is not at all the same as what people mean by language when they put it to pragmatic use [*index*]” (Widdowson 2003: 62). To put it another way, in *discourse* people relate knowledge of the language/s (*systemic knowledge*), which is culturally independent, to knowledge of the world (*schematic knowledge*), which is definitely culturally dependent (Widdowson 2004, 2009). This, however, does not mean that to share the knowledge of the language always presupposes a sharing of knowledge of the world. Moreover, as I have indicated earlier, schematic knowledge is not a representation of the national values exclusively. This is even more obvious in ELF intimate interaction, where users usually share the systemic knowledge of English to some extent, but often not the knowledge of the ‘native’ conditions of its pragmatic functioning. For this reason, ELF couples establish what Feyerabend (1987) refers to as “special and changeable
manifestations of a common human nature” in ELF, and use the resources of English and other available languages in their private discourse to project their own conceptualization of reality, and to create and express their own ideas, values, norms, and beliefs within which they find their essential intimate security. Such special and changeable realizations are possible if only because the relationship between culture and language is not fixed. At the same time, the flexibility of the indexical meaning brings about language variability or, in Bakhtin’s terms, polyphony. As we have argued in Section 4.1, in polyphony we are also concerned with the ways in which people use language to indexically refer to different cultural factors in the process of meaning negotiation. As does Widdowson, Bakhtin (1984, 1997) views meaning as resulting from the interaction between current and previously experienced discourse, and sees linguistic hybridity as one particular aspect of the polyphony (Bakhtin 1984) of utterances. From Bakhtin’s perspective, polyphony can be delineated as an interpersonal dialogic process of negotiating positions that fuses and brings together, but also maintains separation. This being so, every utterance and interaction further dialogue between diverse worldviews:

 [...] говорящий и понимающий вовсе не остаются каждый в своем собственном мире; напротив они сходятся в новом третьем мире, мире общения, они обращаются друг к другу, вступают в активные диалогические отношения. ([…] a speaker and an understander do not remain in their own worlds at all; on the contrary, they meet in the new third world, the world of communication, they speak/turn to each other, [they] enter into the active dialogic relationship). (Бахтин 1997: 209)

What Bakhtin suggests here is that communication is the dialogic process that neither creates two separate isolated spaces or territories nor one common world (absolutely shared territory) that fuses the differences between speakers. This brings us back to the point that people must often negotiate the convergence of their cultural knowledge by bringing their code into polyphonic concord (Bakhtin’s согласие): to achieve the correspondence between intention and interpretation for the pretext of their interaction (see Section 4.1). If we turn now to the pretextual level of positioning in a close relationship, it is Tannen’s (1986, 1991, 2007) work on the monolingual48 private – family and couple - discourse that can be useful for conceptualizing ELF couple interaction.

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48 Monolingual couple refers here to couples where partners share the same first language, or language of primary socialization.
5.6 POWER AND SOLIDARITY IN PRIVATE DISCOURSE

According to Tannen (1986: 118), in couple communication all that is said revolves on the axis of the perlocutionary effect or *metamessage* (Tannen 1991: 32-33) of accomplishing intimacy. In other words (in Tannen’s words) the context of a close relationship makes all that is said “wobble under the heavy weight of a frame that surrounds everything with the question “Do you love me enough?” (Tannen 1983: 126). In her later work, Tannen (2007) addresses this perlocutionary/pretextual level with reference to family discourse. Since both family and couple domains are private and has to do with close relationship, it is worth looking at what Tannen has to say about such pretextual peculiarities in family relationships, and what bearings it can have for understanding of ELF couple interaction.

Discussing ‘monolingual’ family discourse, Deborah Tannen indicates that there are forces that drive all communication and can be ranged along two intersecting axes, which she represents as a multidimensional grid (see Tannen’s multidimensional model in Tannen 2007: 30). The horizontal dimension of *closeness* and *distance* relates to the degree to which people feel they share the territory with those they are in contact with. This dimension corresponds to what other researchers into discourse (Brown and Gilman 1960) refer to as *solidarity*. The vertical dimension of hierarchy and equality has to do with the extent to which a person displays his/her power or status (or his/her own territorial claim) in the process of co-operation with others. This has to do with what other researchers into (family) interaction refer to as *power* ((Brown and Gilman 1960, Varenne 1992, Watts 1991). It is important to note here that the traditional view of interaction in family as elsewhere is that it is governed either by power or solidarity. Some researchers view interaction in family as primarily struggle for power (Varenne 1992, Watts 1991), where *power* is “the ability of an individual to achieve her/his goals” (Watts 1991:145). According to Varenne (1992:76), such understanding of the notion is comparable with “the power of the catalyst, [that] with a minimal amount of its own energy, gets other entities to spend large amounts of their own”. Likewise, in research tracing back to Brown and Gilman (1960), the relationship between power and solidarity is conceptualized as mutually exclusive where any utterance reflects and creates either power or solidarity.

Contrary to this well-established view, Tannen’s grid represents multidimensionality and what she refers to as *ambiguity* and *polysemy* of power and
solidarity. By *ambiguity*, Tannen means that any utterance can be either a power or solidarity manoeuvre. By polysemy, she means that any solidarity move entails power and vice versa. What Tannen claims, then, is that any utterance, and any relationship, is ambiguous or polysemic in that it is a unique combination of two interrelated dynamics that drive all conversational discourse: on one hand, relative closeness vs. distance, and, on the other, relative hierarchy vs. equality. Tannen (2007: 35) gives an example of it. She describes the couples interchange, where Janet (a female partner) is asking Steve (a male partner) to make a copy of an application, and mail it in time: “Please get that out tomorrow. I’m counting on you, *bubbles*. I’m counting on you, *cuddles*.” Steve protests the way Janet reinforces her request by “bubbles” and “cuddles” as implying the hierarchical nature of parent-child relations. While Steve interprets his partner’s terms of endearment as presupposing that he is unreliable, Janet claims that she is signalling the couple’s closeness and the affection she feels to Steve. Thus, on the one hand, Janet’s request can be intended and interpreted as a power manoeuvre. On the other, it can be intended and perceived as a solidarity manoeuvre. In this sense, as Tannen argues, this language use is ambiguous with regard to power and solidarity. Moreover, it is polysemous in that it is an inextricable combination of both.

The points that Tannen makes about ambiguity and polysemy of power/solidarity in intimate discourse get close and can be related to what I have said about positioning and the territorial and co-operative imperatives as elements in interactional dynamics in Chapter 4. I have argued that discourse is always about positioning in that it is interpersonally motivated by a particular pretextual/perlocutionary purpose. Taking into account what Tannen has said about her multidimensional grid, one can assume that any language use is ambiguous and polysemous in that it is motivated and driven by both imperatives at a time. What I am suggesting is that ELF couple discourse (as any discourse) and language use within it always entails positioning with each partner attempting to have an effect on the other and this process of *positioning* involves partners’ balancing between the two fundamental forces of *cooperativeness* and *territoriality*. In the next section, I outline my understanding of the characteristic features of positioning in ELF couple interaction.
This thesis is about linguistic hybridity in ELF couple discourse. In other words, the focus is on why and how couples use the linguistic resources available for them in their interaction. This has to do with partners’ text as their actualized discourse and hybrid forms within it. Hence, my central concern is not only to identify such hybrid forms at the textual level but rather to look at why and how ELF partners use them. To put it in other words, the crucial question here is what it is that determines and motivates partners’ use of hybrid forms. There are two considerations here. As I have argued in Chapter 4, people use language not only to express themselves but also to address the other. This involves, according to Bakhtin (1997), a certain minimum that people must share not only with regard to the language they communicate in but (more) to the context of their schematic/world knowledge or their ideas, beliefs, values and attitudes. To recall Bakhtin’s quotation in the beginning of this chapter, communication is always about the intersection or “meeting at the threshold” of people’s individual contextual/pretextrual worlds, which can never completely converge. I have argued that the process of communication is not only about bringing the individual contextual worlds into convergence, getting a message across or making a text what Widdowson (1984) refers to as accessible - that is designing your text in such a way that the other understands you. What is central in human communication is the process of negotiating positions that has to do with the extent to which the textualized meaning is acceptable to the other. In this respect, communication is not only about people’s ‘meeting on the frontier’ of their contextual worlds but rather is about the extent to which they manage to bring their voices/positions into convergence. It is always motivated and driven by a particular perlocutionary/pretextrual purpose. The central question here is how positioning operates in ELF couple interaction, and what is specific about the perlocutionary/pretextrual purposes that motivate such positioning.

As we have seen in this chapter, this question has been addressed in discourse analytic and ELF research from a range of angles. What I am proposing is to turn to the beginning of our discussion in this thesis and describe ELF couple discourse as positioning by adopting the view on the relationship between text and discourse as mediated by the contextual and pretextrual factors as represented in the Diagram 2 (Section 4.2.1). The point has been that in discourse, people do not only exchange information contextually to achieve
the correspondence of the ideational/conceptual knowledge of the world, but also position themselves to manage the interpersonal relationships pretextually and to create desirable communicative effects. My suggestion is that couple communication, like any other communication, is a pragmatic process whereby meanings and relationships are negotiated by using available linguistic resources to key into context, and to further a particular pretext. The central feature of such couple is the pretext of domestic intimacy and togetherness, which also inevitably brings other pretextual and contextual factors into play. With reference to Diagram 2, one can visualize the process of meaning negotiating in intimate relationship as follows (Klötzl 2013: 33):

**Diagram 3: Discourse in couple relationship**

What Diagram 3 is meant to show is that ELF partners bring their own contextual assumptions to their interactions as default values that are adjusted in the process of discursive co-construction, and this process is primarily motivated by the desired pretext of domestic togetherness and closeness. As I have argued, usually ELF-using-partners cannot rely on the shared schematic cultural knowledge. Therefore, their use of English will often be detached from the cultural associations that the language takes in ENL contexts. ELF couples have and take advantage of such detachment and relate the language to their own intimate reality by creating their own schematic (contextual/cultural) conventions. One way of so doing is to draw upon the systemic (linguistic) resources, predominantly those of their

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49 The diagram was published in *Discourse and interaction*, 6 (2), 2013.
L1s, which have proved functional in the past. Such realization of available resources results in linguistic hybridity within ELF, which can be seen as a means whereby ELF partners signal their own cultural contextual territories. However, the extent to which partners use hybrid forms to activate and ratify their own socio-cultural constructs also depends on the partners’ pretexts (or interactive purposes) that manage the relationship between them. Thus, the argument is that the process of interpersonal positioning in couple interaction involves partners’ acting upon each other with the primary (but not only) purpose to achieve the effect of *domestic intimacy* and *togetherness*.

From this point of view, linguistic hybridity in ELF couple interaction can be defined as operating at least on two levels, namely textual and discoursal. Consequently, on the one hand, I take it as non-conformist innovation that involves elements of all the (‘national’) linguistic resource within the constraints of a single ELF utterance or interaction. That is to say, this level of description is text/form-oriented and has to do with *analysis* of formal characteristics of linguistic hybridity in ELF. On the other hand, I interpret linguistic hybridity as evidence of how partners textualize their discourses, how they position themselves, how partners realize their (individual) discourses by mediation of hybrid forms, and what contextual and pretextual factors they activate and achieve by using such forms. This level is discourse/function-oriented and has to do with *interpretation* of the process of partners’ positioning as mediated by hybrid forms.

### 5.8 ENGLISH WITH THE ‘MARRIED’ NAME:
#### SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION

In this chapter, I have raised a number of points that concern the nature of ELF couple discourse and hybridity within it. I have argued that language and cultural contact is not between abstract standards of different first (national) languages and cultural assumptions or expectations associated with them. Any social contacts and discourse is enacted through individuals. ELF and ELF couple discourse is not an exception and is as natural as any other language use. What is specific about ELF couple interaction, however, is that ELF partners as NNSs of English find themselves in a unique - more ‘equal’ and ‘detached’ - lingua-cultural situation than couples where partners share one of their Ls. Such uniqueness can be accounted for by the peculiarities of the process of meaning negotiating whereby ELF partners (as any other language users) relate the systemic knowledge of a language to
schematic knowledge of the world. As I have argued, for native speakers of any language sharing the knowledge of the language usually presupposes sharing the knowledge of the ‘native’ cultural assumptions/conventions associated with it. Since partners’ ELF is usually a language of their secondary socialisation acquired through educational practices and media exposure, they cannot rely on such shared ‘native’ (whatever it might be) cultural associations. For them ELF is a ‘free’ language (Seidlhofer 2011: 81) which is “not tied to particular [English ‘native-speaking’] countries and ethnicities” or primary cultures. However, such detachment from ENL cultures does not prevent interaction from taking place. ELF partners take advantage of what Widdowson (2003, 2009: 47) refers to as the “virtual language” English, which is remote from the cultural associations of its native speakers and territorialize their ‘foreign’ language to their own private reality for their communicative purposes. In this respect, ELF does not only make partners relationship possible but also facilitates their (and our) recognition that any language can be symbolically and indexically dissociated from any particular cultural affiliation. In other words, as a ‘free’ language, ELF functions like any other natural language but its functioning to pragmatic effect is particularly apparent in such NN settings.

Finally, ELF couple discourse as the communicative functioning of language in use always entails positioning that, in turn, necessarily involves reconciling two opposing drives of the territorial and co-operative imperatives. On the one hand, each partner will enact her/his discourse with the intention of acting upon the other so that to create the shared private territory and effect of ‘coupleness’. On the other, the process of negotiating positions necessarily involves projecting and protecting partners’ individual positions, which represent partners’ personal take on the nature of such ‘coupleness’. In other words, positioning will always be about getting the other to share one’s own conceptual/pretextual territory. There will always be a kind of intrusion into the other’s position, the other’s conceptual/pretextual world, and the other’s territory of self. Each partner necessarily will express her/his own position on the nature of (couple) discourse and will try to get her/his partner to co-operate by sharing her/his contextual/cultural space. This being so, the process of textualizing discourse (also through language alternation and hybrid forms) always entails positioning, and positioning always involves reconciling the opposing forces of the co-operative and territorial imperatives. The crucial point to be made here is that ELF couple discourse is necessarily driven by both the co-operative and territorial imperatives whereby ELF partners lower the barriers of their individual spaces in order to establish and maintain the shared
intimate contextual/cultural and affective/pretextual territory. My suggestion has been that the process of modification of English by means of hybrid forms in such private discourse will usually be more pretext-dependent than context/culture/form-oriented. The defining feature of intimate ELF discourse is the pretext of domestic intimacy and togetherness, rather than partners’ cultural affiliation, although such a pretext inevitably brings cultural factors into play. Therefore (as I have argued elsewhere), I propose to think of couples’ ELF as the language with the ‘married’ rather than with the ‘national’ name. From this point of view,

[…]English use in ELF private talk undergoes the process of territorialization: a creative pragmatic process of hybridization and ‘acculturation’ of English into the partners’ private space, whereby ELF couples adapt and accommodate the language by drawing upon any available resources, and re-load it with their own cultural values for the pretextual purpose of creating their common affective territory. […] We might think of ELF in private interaction not as the language with the ‘national’ name or the “distribution of a stable and enclosed set of encoded forms” (Widdowson 2003: 47), but as the English with the ‘married’ name or the use of the language potential which is exploited in different ways for the specific purpose to accomplish partners’ coupleness. (Klötzl 2014: 46, my emphasis)

The English with the ‘married’ name shifts the focus from English as inseparably bound with the culture with the ‘national’ name – the English ‘native’ culture – to main characteristics and purposes of couple discourse as mediated and achieved by ELF.

Given this, I am concerned with the hybrids nature of private interactions of ELF couples as a particular case of how language generally functions to pragmatic effect. For the purpose of this thesis, I focus on the textual features of linguistic hybridity in ELF couple talk and define it as non-conformist innovation that involves fusion of all the available virtual linguistic resources within the limits of a single ELF utterance and/or interaction. Furthermore, I interpret examples of linguistic hybridity as evidence of how the partners position themselves by activating and ratifying particular contextual and pretextual functions of their discourse. The definition does not exclude creative innovations that involve a non-conventional ‘mixture’ of formal elements of the same ‘national’ language. However, the focus will be on the cases where elements of two or more languages with the ‘national’ name are fused. Following the definition, I will first consider linguistic hybridity in terms of its formal textual features and then look at its possible cultural/pragmatic values in ELF private discourse. Before illustrating this polyphonic process of positioning in the example from the data provided by five ELF couples-participants, I present the description of the research design, the methodological approach and the process of data collection in the next chapter.
6. THE THESIS IS DEFINITIVE. REALITY IS FREQUENTLY INACCURATE: METHODOLOGICAL ISSUES

The Guide is definitive.
Reality is frequently inaccurate.
(Douglas Adams 1980: 20)

This title is an allusion to Douglas Adams’s “The Hitchhiker’s Guide to the Galaxy” (1979). And it is a good starting point for the chapter on methodological issues of the discourse analytical enquiry into private interaction. In the book, a race of “hyper intelligent” beings posed the ultimate “Question of Life, the Universe, and Everything”. They built a gigantic supercomputer called Deep Thought to answer this question. After seven and half million years of computing and calculating, Deep Thought announced the answer. It was forty-two. Ironically, when the answer was revealed, it turned out that nobody knew what the question initially had been.\(^5\) The main characters of “The Guide” are travelling through the Universe in search of the lost ‘ultimate’ question(s) to prevent the destruction of the Earth. “The Hitchhiker’s Guide to the Galaxy” is the reference book that helps them in their pursuit. Here it is a witty Adams’ gist of “The Guide”:

The Hitch Hiker's Guide to the Galaxy is an indispensable companion to all those who are keen to make sense of life in an infinitely complex and confusing Universe, for though it cannot hope to be useful or informative on all matters, it does at least make the reassuring claim, that where it is inaccurate it is at least definitely inaccurate. In cases of major discrepancy it's always reality that's got it wrong. This was the gist of the notice. It said "The Guide is definitive. Reality is frequently inaccurate." (Adams 1980: 20)

The reason for writing this little guide to private ELF is not so ambitious. Nor is it definitive. Contrary to Adams’s “Guide”, my thesis provides no solutions. Readers looking for clear-cut answers had better turn to Adams’s “Guide” at once and take the answer forty-two. For my purpose is not to maintain the myth of being definitive in the field of discourse analysis, but to critically think how the issues related to discourse find expression in the microcosm of intimate interactions, in which couples from different lingua-cultural backgrounds use English - a mother tongue for neither partner. That is not to say that there is no author’s position in the thesis. Here, I apply Bakhtin’s ideas not only to the couples’ data that is interpreted but also to my own interpretation itself. There are cannot be, as Bakhtin ([1963] 2002: 79) puts it, “завершающих авторских оценок” (author’s final/ultimate

\(^5\) To some readers the situation described by Adams can also have an allusion to the lines of a song of the Soviet group “Crematory”, “I remembered the answer, but I didn’t know the question” (Russian “Я помнил ответ, но не знал, в чем вопрос”).
estimates/evaluations)\textsuperscript{51} in discourse. What I am attempting, thus, is a dialogue-negotiation of my own position on what is going on in ELF couple discourse with the participants themselves and with the reader. The question is how such ‘dialogic’ approach can be made operational for the purpose of this thesis. Let us look at its possible methodological realizations in more detail.

One way of understanding the polyphonic approach is to view it as a combination of emic and etic perspectives (Pike 1954). Pike describes those perspectives as two ways of looking at the same thing. An “etic” account is commonly considered as the outsider or observer view. An “emic” account, on the other hand, is the insider or the participant view on the problem. Since not only participants but also observer can be an ‘insider’ of some discourse practices, I think, the two perspectives presuppose some kind of trinity rather than twain. One can assume that there are at least three different ways to view the same thing; namely insider-participant, insider-observer and outsider-observer perspectives. It is known that in ethnography (which has frequently been used as a synonym for observation) there is such well-established procedure of data collection as “participant observation” where the researcher can be either ‘insider’ or ‘outsider’, or even both, in the observed community (Saville-Troike 1982: 119-121). Some scholars argue that ethnomethodology in general is about “finding a balance between ‘insider’ and ‘outsider’ status and make sure that your participants understand and are comfortable with your [the researcher’s] role” (Levon 2013:74). That is to say, there are two ‘emic’ perspectives, which include the second-person perspective of the research participants and the first-person perspective of the researcher as an ‘insider’ on an investigated phenomenon. The third perspective is ‘etic’ that is the third-person observer ‘outsider’ view on the second-person interaction. At this point, let me consider a distinction among three different levels of positioning as polyphony in general. It is what Bakhtin’s (1997) refers to as “lively trinity” of perspectives (see Section 4.4). According to Bakhtin (1997: 333), any communication is “живое триединство” (“a lively trinity”) that comprises the representation of speaker’s first-person self, the relation with the

\textsuperscript{51} The full Bakhtin’s quotation on the essence of polyphony reads as follows: “Именно в этой свободе самораскрытия чужих точек зрения без завершающих авторских оценок и усматривает Чернышевский главное преимущество новой “объективной” формы романа. Подчеркнем, что Чернышевский не видел в этом никакой измены своим “сильным и твердым убеждениям”. Таким образом, мы можем сказать, что Чернышевский почти вплотную подошел к идее полифонии. (Precisely in such freedom of others’ points of view without the author’s final/ultimate judgements/evaluations sees Tchernyshevsky as the crucial advantage of the new “objective” form of novel. It is worth emphasising that Tchernyshevsky did not see any betrayal to his “strong and firm beliefs”. Thus, we can say that Tchernyshevsky was very close to the idea of polyphony).
second-person other (other “utterances”) and the representation of third-person reality, or in Bakhtin’s terms, speaker’s “relation to the subject matter”. This view is compatible with Widdowson’s (2004: 27) claim that in the process of meaning negotiation, the threefold distinction between the first, second and third-person perspectives is fundamental to human perception. Such three-fold model of positioning can be shown diagrammatically as follows:

**Diagram 4. Polyphonic (triangulated) nature of positioning**

As Diagram 1 shows, the trinity of perspectives includes first-person self-perception, relation to second-person other and the representation of third-person reality ‘out there’. I have discussed above that first-person perspective as representation of ego or first-person self corresponds to Bakhtin’s (1997:333) “отношение[е говорящего] к самому говорящему (the self-perception of the speaker)”. Relation to second-person other can be defined in terms of Bakhtin’s (ibid.) “[о]тношение к чужим высказываниям (the relation to the other’s utterances)”. Respectively, third-person perspective matches Bakhtin’s “отношени[е] к предмету (relation towards the subject matter/object)”. Given this, there is good reason for basing the research design on this three-fold polyphonic model. The point

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52 cf. Widdowson (2004: 17-35) for the discussion of the trinity, which are linguistically encoded in the personal pronoun system, in relation to the ideational and interpersonal functions of language as suggested by Systemic-Functional Grammar.
is that one way of representing the three perspectives in the research is the use of various ‘corresponding’ methods and data sources. Such technique is often referred to as *triangulation* in sociolinguistic and discourse analytic research. In the next section, I discuss triangulation as a means of commensuration of the three perspectives in the researcher’s position in the design of the present research.

## 6.1 RESEARCH DESIGN: TRIANGULATED INQUIRY

The notion of *triangulation* is not new in the sociolinguistic research. Traditionally, triangulation is defined as “the use of two or more methods of data collection in the study of some aspect of human behaviour” (Cohen at al. 2000). The notion is introduced by Denzin (1978), and has been suggested as a way to make research studies more robust and rigorous by verifying results through different methods. Denzin (1978) lists four basic types of triangulation:

- data triangulation – the use of a multiplicity of data sources in a study;
- theory triangulation - drawing upon more than one theory;
- investigator triangulation - the use of more than one observer (and/or participant respectively);
- methodological triangulation – use of more than one methods in one area of study, or the same method in different areas.

Louis Cohen at al. (2000: 113) adds three more types to the list:

- time triangulation – use of cross-sectional (or synchronic) and longitudinal (or diachronic) approaches (cross-sectional approach has to do with different groups at one point in time, longitudinal collects data from the same group at different points in time sequence);
- space triangulation – research of more than one culture or subculture;
- combined levels of triangulation - combination of different levels of analysis (e.g. individual, group, institutional, societal).

As can be seen from these lists, the notion of triangulation directly relates to the problem of research validity. Indeed, the use of multiple methods is often claimed to secure depth to an inquiry, reduce the likelihood of misinterpretation, and clarify a phenomenon by identifying different perspectives on it. At the same time, triangulation is not without its critiques. On the one hand, there are scholars who suggest that triangulation can presume superiority to a single data source or methodological technique (e.g. Silverman 1985). On the other hand, many researchers doubt the appeal of triangulation to ensure that the results are not a function of the research method, to increase validity, to reduce bias or to bring objectivity to research
(e.g. Fielding and Fielding 1986, Patton 1980). Among those scholars is Valerie Janesick (2000) who questions the traditional idea of ‘validity’ in general and triangulation – defined as the trinity of validity, reliability, and generalizability - as its instrument in particular. The scholar points out that objective reality can never be captured and there is no single truth. Her claim is that the notion of triangulation reflects neither reality nor truth, and there are other more appropriate “linguistic representations for questions” (Janesick 2000:393). The key question here is whether triangulation provides different perspectives on the same phenomenon or three different kinds of phenomena. As a solution, Janesick suggests yet another general term for all the types of using several methods to verify the repeatability of an observation and interpretation. She argues for the term crystallization coined by Richardson (1994, 2000) to “replace [the image] of the land surveyor and the triangle” and to “move from plane geometry to the new physics” of crystal (Janesick 2000: 399). At this point, let us consider Richardson’s understanding of triangulation and crystallization in more detail. The former is defined as exclusively the use of different methods to ‘validate’ findings. The idea of the latter is that it allows for departing from deploying different methods as an unsatisfactory technique, which carry the assumptions of the same domain or, in Richardson terms, genre. To put it another way, crystallization is delineated as a mixed-genre approach that reflects how “texts validate themselves”, and, thereby, provides a “deepened, complex, thoroughly partial understanding of the topic” (Richardson 2000: 934).

There are a number of reasons for raising objections to this line of argument. One is the question how crystallization as the use of different ‘genres’ – literary, artistic, or scientific – on the same topic by the same scholar differs from Denzin’s theoretical triangulation (number 2 in the list, p. 129). The advocates of crystallization claim it to be a postmodernist deconstruction of triangulation. In fact, it seems to be nothing but a kind of theoretical triangulation, or multidisciplinary approach, as initially defined by Denzin (1978). Another question is whether any term itself or a substitution of one term for another can solve the problem of research validity (see Chapter 3). In line with Richardson and Janesick’s argument, I think that any framework in social sciences can yield only partial truth about the world, and, so, cannot guarantee an absolute objectivity, validity or reliability, or provide a complete explanation of the phenomenon under investigation. At the same time, despite the possible limitations, the multiple methods frameworks can provide a (relatively) reliable frame of reference within which procedures, findings, and argument can be evaluated. However, I do not think that the substitution of the terms solves the problem of validity and
The thesis is definitive.

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saying anything about the partial nature of truth. Neither does *crystallization* make research more valid by its presupposition that “texts validate themselves”. What such replacement solves is in fact the issue of other “linguistic representations for questions” or, to put it another way, other ways of labelling or categorizing things. As I have already argued, not texts but people have different angles-perspectives and validate texts by reading their discourses into those texts (see Chapter 4). Finally, it is questionable how far validity depends on the number of theoretical frameworks, ‘genres’, methods and data sources that are used in the research. I think there is no direct correlation here. Therefore, the main point and purpose of using multiple frameworks and methods in this particular thesis is not to make research more valid or replicable, but to examine how different kinds of methods and data can be mutually complementary and how they can add to our understanding of ELF couple discourse. It seems unreasonable, then, to replace Denzin’s (1978) initial concept of triangulation, despite “the rigid, fixed and two-dimensional” nature of triangle and the attractiveness of the imaginary of crystal, which “combines symmetry and substance with an infinite variety of shapes, substances, transmutations, multidimensionalities, and angles of approach” (Richardson 2000: 934). My suggestion is that triangulation can be a useful technique where a researcher is engaged with the polyphonic triple nature of voicing/positioning: first, second and third-person perspectives. Therefore, what I am attempting at is to base the research design on *triangulation* as a ‘geometrical’ three-cornered vision of the trinity of perspectives and to show whether and how the three are commensurate. The question here arises as to what kinds of methods and data sources can correspond to each perspective.

At this point, let us look at the distinction between different data sources that exist already in qualitative sociolinguistic and discourse-analytic research. Traditionally, any qualitative methodology is defined as observation and divided into four categories. They are private vs. public, and manipulated vs. natural observations (Chafe 1994: 18). According to Chafe, *private observation* is synonymous to *introspection*, which is defined as observation of “one’s own mental states and process” (Chafe 1994: 12). Private observation methodologies comprise ‘manipulated’ techniques such as semantic judgments, judgments regarding constructed language, and ‘natural’ methods such as daydreaming, or literature. Interestingly enough, other scholars refer to *introspective methods* as a cover term of any

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53 As my research is qualitative, I do not consider quantitative methods or data sources that can represent the trinity of perspectives.
kind of self-report. According to Dörnyei (2007: 147-151), for example, diaries, daydreaming, interviews, and any retrospective report are in this category. Further, private observation is normally put into opposition to public one (Chafe 1994: 12-13). Chafe lists experimentation and elicitation as ‘manipulated’ methods, and ethnography and corpus-based research as ‘natural’ types of such public observation. If we look at Hammersley and Atkinson’s definition of ethnography at this point, we will find the following:

We see the term as referring primarily to a particular method or set of methods. In its most characteristic form it involves the ethnographer participating, overtly or covertly, in people’s daily lives for an extended period of time, watching what happens, listening to what is said, asking question – in fact, collecting whatever data are available to throw light on the issues that are the focus of the research. (Hammerley and Atkinson 1995: 1)

In this definition, elicitation or ‘asking questions’ is categorized as part of ethnography. Moreover, it is said that ethnography uses “whatever data” or, in Dörnyei (2007) words, “an eclectic range of data collection techniques”. This includes participant or nonparticipant observation, interviewing, or the researcher’s field notes and diary (cf. Dörnyei 2007:130). As can be seen from the above, there is no agreement in definitions and typologies among researchers. Also, conceptual distinction among the methodological categories of introspection, observation and elicitation often rather ambiguous even within the same classification of (qualitative) methods. According to the listed typologies, such technique as interview, for example, can be categorized both as an introspective method, as a public manipulated elicitation and/or public natural ethnographic observation.

What I am proposing, then, is to provide the conceptual distinction between different techniques and to base it on the trinity of perspectives. My suggestion is that introspection, defined as “the examination or observation of one’s own mental and emotional processes” (TOOD) corresponds to the first-person position, or something that researcher experiences her/himself. Observation defined as “a statement based on something one has seen, heard, or noticed” (ibid.) can be categorized as a method of collecting third-person data, or something that researcher can observe. Finally, elicitation delineated as “evok[ation] or draw[ing] out (a reaction, answer, or fact) from someone” (ibid.) comprises the methods of gathering second-person data, or something that participants say about their experience to the researcher. Thus, for the purpose of this study, introspection is taken as perception and examination of my own thoughts, understanding and feelings of what I have experienced as an ELF partner. Observation is understood as the procedure of collection and interpretation of data that represent third-person reality. Elicitation, in turn, is defined as data that researcher elicits from participants in a direct contact/interaction. The data used in the present
research combine all three techniques and include anecdotes from my own marital experience and my self-report on it, a short questionnaire on partners’ personal background, couples’ self-recordings of their ‘naturally occurring’ private talk, interviews, and partners’ retrospective comments on the selected extracts of their talk. The three-cornered vision of all the data sources can be shown as follows:

**Diagram 5: Polyphonic triangulated inquiry (Diagram 4 revisited)**

As can be seen from Diagram 5, there are at least three ways to look at the same thing methodologically. First-person data represent human self-reflection and perception and comprise introspective methods. Second-person perspective can be gained through the methods of elicitation. The short demographic questionnaires, interviews and participants’ comments on their self-recordings are in this category. Finally, third-person perspective embraces the techniques of observing somebody or something. This includes the participants’ self-recordings without the presence of the researcher. It is important to note that there is no clear-cut line among those sets of data and, respectively, the methods, which the different perspectives can be deduced through. All three perspectives and data-sources overlap and build upon each other in one or another way. The idea and fundamentals of polyphony is to show how they do. In the following, I will give detailed information about the data that serve as an illustration of the communicative process of establishing and maintaining relationships through/in/with ELF and provide grounds for the following discussion.
6.1.1 PROCESS OF RECRUITING COUPLES-PARTICIPANTS

The main criterion for choosing the participants for my study was their ‘non-nativeness’ in English. It means that all the couples-participants use English as a lingua franca – L1 of neither partner – in their intimate interaction. Other variables are rather heterogeneous (see Section 6.1.2). I contacted all the couples-participants personally, per email or via Skype first and asked them whether it would be possible for them to participate in my study. It is worth noting that initially eight ELF couples from different countries of the European Union volunteered to participate in my study. Three couples from Belgium, Denmark and Holland showed interest in participating in my study but failed to do so. As it turned out, one partners in those three couples had a privacy issue and refused or did not manage to make a recording of any kind. In all, I have received a positive answer from both partners of five couples. I met each couple personally or contacted them per post, email or Skype in order to get their written informed agreement for participating in my study and to discuss the details of the procedure. The informed consent was necessary for a number of reasons. First, not everybody was familiar with the conventions of academic research. Therefore, it was crucial to clarify to the participants the implications of my use of the data for academic purposes. I was very straightforward about what is going to happen to the material my informants would provide. The most important implication of recording spoken data concerns the participants’ privacy. By being recorded, transcribed, analysed, and published, the ‘private’ conversations become accessible to other people that is always become public to some extent. In this relation, I explained to the couples that recordings and transcripts of their conversations might appear in the academic presentations, or published works, and therefore, can be read or seen by a larger audience. All the couples anticipatorily agreed to give publicity to the most transcripts of their recordings. Some of them, however, refused that I played their audio files in public so that their voices could not be recognized. After recording, I also asked my participants if there was anything they felt uncomfortable about other people hearing their audio data. If there was anything sensitive, I offered to delete those pieces or leave them untranscribed. That is to say, my participants were privileged to set whatever restrictions they thought appropriate on my use of the provided material.
6.1.2 **COUPLES AS SUBJECTS: SECOND-PERSON DATA - QUESTIONNAIRE**

After having obtained the partners’ informed written consent to participate in my study, I asked couples to fill in a short questionnaire on their personal background (see Appendix B). The aim of the questionnaire was to collect preliminary demographic information on such variables as the participants’ sex, nationality, first languages, age, education, occupation, country of birth and residence, children (if there were any) and their first languages. All the names are pseudonyms to protect the identities of the participants. The partners’ social, geographic and occupational backgrounds are summarised in Table 1 (Appendix C). As Table 1 shows, the partners’ first languages, age, place of birth and residence, nationalities and length of relationship are rather heterogeneous. The only three common features for all the couples are: 1. they all use English – a first language of neither partner – in their intimate interactions, 2. all the couples are heterosexual, and 3. none of the couples had children at the time of data collection. The latter two were not my precondition but rather it happened by chance.

6.1.3 **PSEUDONYMS**

As the step to minimize the invasion to the couples’ privacy, I gave all the partners pseudonyms in the transcripts and my analytic/interpretative comments. Very often, the couples themselves suggested those nicknames. To decrease the possibility that other people mentioned in the couples’ talk could be recognizable, I substituted their names by the markers with the subsequent number: [first name 1] [last name 1] (see also VOICE transcription conventions). In audio data, I replaced all the names with the audible beep tones. Usually I asked participants if they wanted to have any special pseudonyms before the recording took place. The couples were free to put those names in the agreement form. If the partners did not specify any, I gave them some random nicknames. When I showed the transcripts to the couples for the first time, I asked them once more whether they are fine with the given nicknames. Only one participant asked me to change a pseudonym that I chose since, in her view, it did not sound nice. Interesting in this relation is an example from Austrian-Czech couple (C4/au-cz) comment on one of the transcripts of their talk. I gave a female partner of this couple a pseudonym Monica. As it has turned out, the couple had already used the word as their private nickname. Consider the discussion that has been triggered by the pseudonym:
Extract 1  (C4/au-cz/Com1, 04.2011)\textsuperscript{54}: now we are monica and patrick

1. Monica: [...] now we are monica and patrick. [...] it just came in my mind that we actually use something taken from series from friends. you use it quite often do you know what i mean?
2. Patrick: no.
3. Monica: you put down monica?
4. Patrick: oh yes. @@
5. Monica: like you teasing (3) well explain it.
6. Patrick: well. @@ how to explain. well when someone pro- well it should be a kind of one person who puts down monica or i don’t say it like that. i say actually you turn to be monica.
7. Monica: no. you say NO. you say you put down monica.
9. Monica: so now i’ll tell you the things is [...] in this episode the mother is criticizing her daughter. she’s like criticizing her all the time. and it’s really? it it it very she’s overdoing it. yeah. yeah. people get the point. and she wants she to really criticizing her. she says you again put down monica. and he took it over. like when i am doing something very typical. or i when when most of the time there’s something that you want to criticize. then he says you put down monica.

In the interchange, I show Monica and Patrick a transcript of their talk. When Monica sees that she has turned to Monica in my transcription - now we are monica and patrick (turn 1) - she recalls that it is in fact one of her nicknames in their actual private interaction. The partners adopted it from a fictional character of the popular USA television sitcom Friends (1994–2004) Monica Geller who is portrayed by Courtney Cox. In the sitcom, Monica is constantly criticized by her mother Judy Geller. Fictional Judy openly favours Ross – Monica’s brother - and makes fun of, or “put down”, Monica. According to the couple, Patrick has taken the phrase “you put down monica” (line 7) over from the series and uses it when ‘real’ Monica is “doing something typical” or “there is something [she] want[s] to criticize” (line 9). This example is not only interesting with regard to the process of how the participants have chosen and reacted to chosen pseudonyms. It is demonstrable of at least two points. The first concerns how the nickname triggers a rather extensive discussion of the partners’ private language. The discussion, in turn, reveals the intertextual influence of public discourse (in our case, TV discourse) on such private code (see Section 8.1.3 for a more detailed discussion of such intertextual uses in couple discourse). The second is that in the course of communicating with the couples, from the analytic category ‘an ELF couple’ ‘real’ people have been emerging with their own private discourse established and maintained through particular pet names, jokes and idiomatic expressions. The couples as ‘emerging people’ will be the main topic in later chapters. Meanwhile, I introduce the couples as subjects and provide general information on the partners’ backgrounds.

\textsuperscript{54} Henceforth, the comments codes include a couple code (as specified in Appendix C), a comment code (or its number as specified in Appendix H) and the date when the comment was obtained.
6.1.4 INTRODUCING THE COUPLES: SECOND-PERSON DATA

I organized the couples’ codes numerically according to the chronological sequence of my contact with the couples. This means that Couple 1 contacted me first in May 2009, and the Couple 5 contacted me last in 2010. All the examples from couple talk in this thesis have first the number of the couple and then the number and date of the conversation (see Section 6.2). As indicated in Table 1 (Appendix C), the couples’ codes are also based on their native countries (with the international standard code for female partner’s native country and subsequent code of male partner’s native country). Thus “au” stands for Austria, “cz” – for Czech Republic, “fr” – for France, “hu” – for Hungary, “it” – for Italy, “ua” – for Ukraine.

6.1.4.1 Couple 1. Nargiz and Dan - C1/ua-fr

Nargiz (36) and Dan (46) had been married for one year and two months at the time of data collection. Nargiz is a fashion designer and Dan is a psychologist. Nargiz grew up bilingually⁵⁵ (Ukrainian-Russian) in Moldova and then in Ukraine. Dan grew up monolingually⁵⁶ in France. Both partners learned English at school and at the university. They met in France at one of the Buddhist program/retreat. In general, Nargiz and Dan spoke English for about one and a half year, and then French has become their common language. The couple claim that English was their only choice to communicate, especially in the beginning of their relationship. The couple does not have any children. The couple separated about half a year after the interview. Having divorced, both of them still kept in touch with me and agreed to comment on their recordings. After separating, Nargiz continues to live in France partly because she felt that she would not be able to afford the same life style in Ukraine on a single wage. Partly because she started new relationship with a Frenchman about a year after her divorce with Dan.

6.1.4.2 Couple 2. Sue and Henry – C2/il-au

At the time of data collection, Sue (30) and Henry (37) had been a couple for two years. They live in Henry’s native city in Austria. Henry works as a diving instructor and travels a lot. Sue is an English teacher. Henry’s first language is German. Sue’s first language

⁵⁵ Here, by *bilingually* I refer to the situation when a partner grew up in two first ‘national’ languages (L1s). It is important to note that some partners claim to grow up *bilingually* within one ‘national’ language (e.g. High German and an Austrian German dialect, see Section 7.2.3). The discrepancy between my classification and the participants’ own perception of their actual language use is a good example how ‘emerging’ people go beyond the category of ELF couples (see Chapter 7-9).

⁵⁶ Here, by *monolingually* I refer to the situation when a partner grew up in one ‘national’ language of primary socialization (L1).
is Hebrew. They met on a ship on their way to an island in Thailand. Henry worked and Sue had a holiday there. English was the only choice for them since they did not speak each other L1s and did not share any other L2s. Also, most communication with people and a service team on the ship was in English. For those reasons, the couple claim that it was natural for them to begin their communication in English. The couple did not have any children at the time of data collection. Sue gave birth to a daughter in 2012. Sue is my friend and was enthusiastic to participate when she got to know about my project.

**6.1.4.3 Couple 3. Sandy and Peter – C3/it-au**

Sandy (25) and Peter (31) had been a couple for three and a half years at the time of data collection. Sandy is an architect and Peter is a civil engineer. Peter grew up monolingually in Austria. Sandy, who grew up in Italy in one L1-Italian, had come to Austria two years before she participated in my study for both professional and personal reasons: she had a relationship with Peter at that time and she worked in an architectural bureau in Austria. Peter was looking for a job at the time of recording. By the time we met for the interview, he had already started working in a big architectural/engineering company. The couple does not have any children.

**6.1.4.4 Couple 4. Monica and Patrick – C4/au-cz**

Monica (27) and Patrick (30) had been a couple for four years at the time of data collection. Monica grew up monolingually in German in Austria. Peter grew up monolingually in Czech. Monica is an MA sociology student. Patrick works at the Czech Ministry of Foreign Affairs. They met at one of the exchange student program in Copenhagen. The environment at that program was English speaking: “everyone spoke English”. That was one of the reasons why they began their relationship in English. What is special about this couple is the fact that they have a distant relationship: they meet from time to time in their parents’ places either in Austria or in the Czech Republic. That is to say, the partners live separately - Monica partly in Austria, partly in Denmark; Patrick in the Czech Republic - and have their own apartment in none country. Despite the fact that they had the longest relationship among all the couples who participated in my study and Patrick spoke German rather well, they still used ELF as their common language, and claimed that they would stick to it in the future. The couple does not have any children.
6.1.4.5 Couple 5. Anna and Paul – C5/au-hu

Anna (28) and Paul (23) had been a couple for two years at the time of data collection. Anna grew up monolingually in Austria. Paul grew up monolingually in Hungarian in Budapest. Paul is unemployed. Anna is a language teacher. They live in Austria. Their common hobby is music and playing guitar. Both partners claim that music was a road to English in their lives. They met (played table soccer together, Paul played guitar) at a bar in Budapest where Paul used to work. Anna was teaching English for adults in Budapest that summer. Like all the couples in my study, they say that English was the only way to communicate with each other. The couple does not have any children.

6.2 DATA COLLECTION - RECORDING

After getting general demographic information about the couples through the questionnaire, the next step of my co-operation with the participants was the recording of their naturally occurring ELF talk. I will discuss what the term naturally occurring talk implies in my research in the Section 6.4. Here the focus is on the process of recording. As I have already mentioned, I absented myself from the actual proceedings, and left it to my informants to decide on what and how to record. Couple 1, for example, recorded their first conversations on their own computer and sent them to me as an audio email attachment. Couple 2 tape-recorded all their conversations by placing the portable recording device “Sony-WM-D6C” at their home. Most recording, however, was done with two portable digital audio-recording devices “Olympus Digital Voice Recorder VN-3100PC” that I offered to the couples. Three of them picked the devices up at the first meeting with me. To Couple 1, I sent the devices per post, as they lived in France at the time of data collection. I chose these particular devices for three reasons. First, they guarantee a rather good sound quality. Second, they are rather small - of cellular telephone size – and, therefore, easy to be placed and taken almost everywhere, and are practically ‘invisible’. Finally, each partner had her/his ‘own’ separate recorder and could move around the place independently from the other partner. This offset the limitations of the other mediums of recording that were confined to a single location.

The devices have four recording modes, namely XHQ (extra high quality sound recording), HQ (high quality sound recording), SP (standard recording), and LP (long-term recording). The correlation between modes (quality) and time of recording is summarized in
Table 2 (see Appendix D). I programmed the devices for the XHQ mode as I, understandably, wanted to have the highest quality of audio data. This mode enabled the couples to record up to six hours of their talk. I asked the partners to place their recorders on them with the microphones exposed towards mouth - the source of the sound - (for example, in a front pocket of a shirt), or somewhere in their homes, and record whenever they both were present at their own convenience. This entailed both advantages and disadvantages for the recording process. The fact that each partner had her/his ‘own’ recorder allowed for partners’ mobility, so they could move from one place to another without interrupting or stopping the recording. On the other hand, there was always a danger that moving partners could incidentally cover the microphone, which was at the upper part of the recorder, or place the recorder with the microphone in the counter direction from the source of sound. This could (and in some cases indeed did) decrease the quality of the sound or even make some audio data undecipherable.

As for time constraints, the couples and I arranged that they could use the devices for approximately one month. Such limitation was necessary as I had only two devices for all the couples-participants. However, the time the partners could keep the devices was not subject to exact restrictions: if they felt like having more or extra time for recording, they were free to do so. Neither did I place a limit on the length of each recording: the couples were free to record as much (or little) as they felt comfortable to do. The length of conversations, therefore, varies from 1 to 68 minutes. A total of 1509 minutes (about 25 hours) was recorded in this way in 2009-2011. Couple 1 (Nargiz and Dan) recorded about 46 minutes on their computer in May – June 2009 and about 324 minutes with “Olympus” digital devices in December 2009 - February 2010. Couple 2 (Sue and Henry) recorded 105 minutes with the portable tape-recorder “Sony-WM-D6C” in July and November - December 2009. The other three couples used only the “Olympus” digital devices. Couple 3 (Sandy and Peter) recorded about 350 minutes in June and November-December 2009. Couple 4 (Monica and Patrick) recorded about 350 minutes in November 2010 – February 2011. Couple 5 (Anna and Peter) recorded about 335 minutes in April-May 2011. The detailed information of the number and length of conversations recorded by the couples is summarized in the Table 3 (see Appendix E).

6.2.1 Synchronizing and Transcribing

I have stated in the previous section that the couples-participants had two separate recording devices. It turned out that the devices had the difference of timing in hundreds of
seconds. Despite such a paltry timing variance, partners’ separate sound tracks had to be synchronized into one because of echoing effect, different pitch tones and other difficulties that undesirable effects could cause for listening and transcribing the audio data. For synchronising and transcribing the data, I used the software “Adobe Audition 3.0”. For the transcription of the audio soundtracks of couples’ talk, I generally follow the Vienna-Oxford International Corpus of English (VOICE) transcription conventions (www.univie.ac.at/voice, see also Appendix A for selected conventions). As primarily content is relevant for the interviews and comments, I used a less detailed reduced format of transcription that is similar to one of the visual output styles of VOICE, specifically plain style. This means that for easier readability, the transcription of interviews and retrospective comments slightly differs from the exacter extracts of the couples’ recordings, as most markers of the extralinguistic features and conversational dysfluencies (noises, pauses, lengthening and intonation, repetition, and hesitation fillers) have been edited out. The focus, thus, is on the actual words uttered by partners. It is important to note that it has not been possible to include the whole transcript of all the data in an appendix, since it covers about 500 pages and would constitute a separate volume\(^57\). Therefore, in the thesis I present only excerpts that I have selected as examples for the analysis and interpretation.

### 6.2.2 Units of Analysis

During the process of synchronizing and listening to the data, I began to get a sense which extracts I would focus on for analysis. As it turned out, couples used languages other than English in their ELF talk quite extensively. For the purpose of this thesis, I first selected the extracts where such ‘hybrid’ uses of languages other than English that seemed to typify an identifiable kind of linguistic hybridity as non-conformist innovation at the formal level. I then looked for other occurrences of the hybrid formal features in all the couples’ data (also innovative ‘mixes’ of elements of the same virtual resource), isolated the episodes that seemed interesting and transcribed them. Some of the extracts I discussed with the participants after the fact (see Section 6.3.2).

\(^{57}\) Those researchers who are interested in the full transcription of the interviews and the partners’ comments, please contact me per email: svitlana.kloetzl@outlook.com. The transcripts of the self-recorded conversations are not available for confidentiality reasons.
6.3 SECOND-PERSON DATA: INTERVIEW AND COMMENTS

In order to remain in the polyphonic dialogue with my couples, I conducted interviews (see Appendices F, G) and discussed selected extracts from the recordings (Appendix H) after having obtained the audio data and while transcribing them. The main goal was to elicit direct self-reported information on the couples’ relationship and language practices. I began each interview with the thank-you words for the couples’ cooperation and consenting to participate in the further stages of my investigation. I repeated a short introduction with the special focus on the implications of participating in the academic research, and its next steps. I also asked the permission to record our interview and discussion. None of the couples refused the consent. I recorded interviews with the mentioned “Olympus” devices to which partners had already been used. I also used my laptop to record a back-up version of the discussion. With one couple out of five - Couple 1 - I contacted via Skype for the interview. Although the digital audio recording of interviews allowed me to engage in the discussions fully without taking detailed notes, I made some rough notes on partners’ comments, especially those concerning their nicknames, special ‘private’ words and phrases and my central interest - uses of other languages than English. In addition, I took notes of my thoughts and questions to be asked that were emerging in the course of conversations.

As far as form is concerned, there are two basic approaches to collecting qualitative data through interview (Patton 2002 [1980]). They are closed fixed responses interview and open-ended interviews. The approaches differ in the extent to which the topic and the interview questions are devised before the interview takes place. It was clear from the beginning that the closed fixed responses approach did not suit my purposes at all. This approach determines the questions and response categories in advance, and, therefore, limits the participants’ choices. This being so, the approach is rather mechanistic and impersonal, since the informants must fit their perceptions and experiences into the predetermined researcher’s categories. Contrary to closed fixed responses approach, open-ended approaches allows for relating the interview to my particular participants and circumstances and having it as natural as possible. There are at least three types of those: the informal conversational interview, the general interview guide approach, and the standardized open-ended interview.

58 Skype is a telecommunications application software that specializes in providing video chat and voice calls from computers, tablets and mobile devices via the Internet to other such devices.
The thesis is definitive.

Reality is frequently inaccurate: methodological issues

(ibid. 342). While choosing among open-ended approaches, my main concern has been that data, their collection and time of collection should be kept within manageable limits. This has not been possible to achieve with the informal conversational interview method that normally demands several meetings with the participants, where questions and wording are not predetermined at all and emerge in the natural cause of talk. The second - the standardized open-ended interview - method has not suited my purposes either. It suggests the exact wording and sequence of questions that are determined in advance. The standardized wording and order of asking questions constrain the flexibility in relating the interview to particular participants and purposes (for the detailed discussion of the strength and weaknesses of all the approaches see Patton 2002 [1980]). Therefore, I decided on the general interview guide approach. The approach presupposes that researcher specifies topics and questions (or prompts) in outline form in advance, and so comparatively many questions could be asked in a relatively short time. It was necessary since most couples indicated time constrains that kept them from being interviewed or delayed our meeting. At the same time, researcher can relate the sequence and exact wording of question to particular individuals and circumstances and decide on them in the course of the interview. The general interview guide approach has enabled me to find a compromise between conflicting demands I have come up with. On the one hand, then, the interview involves pre-set questions. The couples have provided information to more or less same prompts. On the other hand, I have been able to be rather flexible and open as concerns the raised questions, issues, and their order; and to give the interviewees freedom to take the lead and to talk about anything they think is relevant to our discussion without fear of being judged or embarrassed. The partners have been able to discuss not only the ‘guided’ questions but also all the questions or issues that have emerged from the immediate context (see, for example, the ‘Monica-extract’, Section 6.1.4). Thus, interviewing has been a balancing act among keeping on track of carefully prepared guides; being sensitive and flexible when participants are distracted from the researcher’s outline; and to keep the interviews within suitable time limits. Altogether, the interview consists of 26 questions or prompts in 8 sections. They are:

- background and short life history (3 prompts);
- love story and living together (3 prompts);
- cultural issues (3 prompts);
- current language use and practices (3 prompts);
- the role of ELF in the relationship (4 prompts);
- the role of other than English languages in the relationship (Sections 6,7: 7 prompts);
- and hopes for future (3 prompts) (See Appendix F).
I conducted all the interviews in English except a separate short interview in Russian with Nargiz (C1/ua-fr). I contacted all the participants via email or telephone and arranged the time and place of interview in advance. The partners themselves chose the place where they wanted to be interviewed. Three couples invited me to their homes. Couple 4 came to my place. With Couple 1, I conducted the interview via Skype. For several reasons, I decided to have both partners at each interview. First, as I have mentioned already, all couples indicated time constrains and claimed that it was more convenient and less time-consuming for them to be interviewed together. Second, since all the couples felt more comfortable together, I could count on more informal and friendly atmosphere. To make it more relaxed, I also offered the couples a cup of coffee, tea, or a glass of wine, and snacks when it was possible and appropriate. Finally yet importantly, I as a researcher could get a better insight into the couple relationship and the way they communicate with each other while having both of them. All this also contributed to one of my main purposes, namely to establish rapport with the couples. The duration, date and place of each interview are summarized in Table 4 (Appendix G).

6.3.1 Establishing rapport with participants in the course of interview

Despite limited time, I started interviews with the short self-introduction. A little chat on differences and commonalities between my own and partners’ experiences in the introduction and on our ‘life histories’ served as an ‘ice-breaking’ strategy. It was also necessary because I first met most male partners only at the stage of interview. I told partners that my husband and I also used to be an ELF couple for about one year at the very beginning of our relationship. After about half a year of our relationship, I brought my thirteen-year son to Austria who joined us in a fascinating ELF practice, since ELF was the only language we all shared at that time. I explained to my informants that this experience was one of the main reasons why I was doing the research into ELF. To raise the quality of my relationship with couples, I attempted to position myself not as a researcher but rather as a person who shared a similar experience of communicating to the partner in ELF, and who wanted to learn from the participants about their experience of being an ELF couple. Thus, I presented my study as a learning experience. It was also very important for me to position the participants as experts in ELF relationship, and to emphasize the significance of their expert knowledge for my project while both interviewing them and collecting their comments. I explained to the
couples that the purpose of the interview was to understand their ELF experience, since it is unique and so little inquired.

To create more confidence on the interviewees’ part, I asked each partner to tell me her/his short biography. In psychology, this strategy is referred to as life history method based on narrative (Polkinghorne 1995). There are at least two main approaches to the life history method (for a detailed description and overview of the research into bilingual family discourse based on life history method see Okita 2002). The first focuses on the detailed biography of one person. The second collects multiple life stories (of several individuals) within the same area of research. My purpose was neither to gain intensive individual information of my participants’ life nor to apply ‘multiple approach’ that could give a broader picture of ELF couples. Rather, this strategy intended to obtain more information on partners’ personal background (especially on language use in the course of partners’ life), to explore the unique and particular aspects of each couple relationship, and to establish supportive friendly atmosphere at the early stage of interview. Almost all the partners were willing to tell me about their lives and love stories and appeared to be encouraged by my sincere interest in their – as they themselves formulated it - “unique” situation. This helped me to position all of us as people ‘in the same boat’ and to show my capability to understand the partners’ situation. In the end, interviews resembled more a chitchat among friends than a formal procedure between a researcher and informants. This facilitated my way to the final step in my research, namely to the playback of selected extracts to the participants. This I describe in the next section.

6.3.2 PARTICIPANTS’ COMMENTS

As I have argued in the previous sections, the process of observation, transcribing and following analysis/interpretation inevitably leads to misrepresenting if not to distortion of the actual participants’ experience. To minimise this problem (at least as far as it is possible), I collected participants’ comments on selected episodes of their recorded talk. My main purpose was to gain some insight about how these interactions were perceived from a participant viewpoint. Such retrospective comments were also important for the reasons of securing the informed consent of the participants. All the participants listened to selected extracts after recording, read their transcriptions and once more consented to their publication with all the names changed. That is to say, the participants had a clearer idea about the format, in which their recordings would appear in my thesis, or any other academic setup.
I discussed most extracts directly after the interview with both partners. On the one hand, I did it because of time constraints: most couples did not have an opportunity to meet once more. On the other, as both partners were present, it was interesting to get a better insight how they communicate with each other while commenting on their talk. Often, partners made very interesting supplementation to each other’s comments. Sometimes, one of the partners could better reconstruct the context of the segments that made little sense not only to me as an outsider but also to the other partner. By reference to memory, retrieval to objects or people, the partners often made comprehensive numerous details about segments, called up its recollection and triggered the discussion of those with the other partner. That is to say, one of the advantages of having both partners in the process of collecting their comments was the fact that there were more chances to reconstruct more or less detailed picture of a conversation that otherwise would have remained opaque to me. Of course, the question here is how far such reconstruction is reliable. My purpose, however, was not so much to reconstruct an interaction but to look at how the partners explain and act upon their talk while attempting, so to speak, to re-enact it at my presence. In this respect, the presence of both partners also showed that sometimes they could perceive a piece of recording rather differently from each other and from the point of time when the conversation had occurred.

The partners’ comments differ in amount and duration. Couple 2 (Sue and Henry), for example, provided the most comments on a wider range of episodes. Couple 4 rather extensively commented only on two extracts. In this connection, it is important to note that my purpose was not to get partners’ comments on each particular conversation or language use. Rather, I wanted to gain some insight how partners themselves perceive their interaction and how it might be different from my own understanding of what is going on. It was important for me to show that a recorded conversation always becomes a new entity, often very different from the conversation as it occurred online in ‘real’ time even for the participants themselves, and, at least therefore, my interpretation cannot possibly be the interpretation. The information on the channel, amount, language and duration of partners’ comments is summarized in Table 5 (Appendix H).

6.3.3 **Playback Procedure**

Although I generally managed to establish rapport with the couples-participants, the process of playback was rather sensitive. I had to be careful not to influence participants’ answers by too specific questions and not to put my ideas in their minds (or formulations in
their mouths) about what was going on. Therefore, I prepared two general prompts for retrospection. The first is about general context of selected interactions. The second is more specific and is about particular uses of languages other than English in couples’ ELF talk that I selected for analysis. The prompts were formulated as follows (dependently on the participants and circumstances):

1. Could you describe the situation and general context of the episode? Where did it occur? What is the exchange about? What/Who are you discussing in the piece?

2. I do not understand the word/phrase. Could you explain its meaning? What do you mean by it?

Accordingly, I first asked couples to listen to an extract and answer the first question, specifically what they could remember about an interaction and its context, what it was about, and under which circumstances it occurred. I told partners that I was interested in anything they could tell me about an exchange in order to affect their answers as little as possible and let them focus on what they themselves thought was the most important information about it. Since I made it clear that my first languages were Ukrainian and Russian and I could not understand partners’ first languages, I expected that my informants would naturally (without any prompts) explain their uses of languages other than English. Paradoxically enough, partners often did not ‘notice’ those uses unless there was a mistake in my transcription. For example, I transcribed *ichsy* - one of the private coinages of Hebrew-Austrian couple (C2/il-au) – as *creepy* – the word that the couple used quite often in the same interchange where *ichsy* occurred (for more detailed discussion of ‘ichsy’ episode see Section 8.3.3). While listening to the extract, Henry pointed out that my transcription was wrong and corrected it. Even having corrected the transcription of the word, the partners explained it to me only when I directly asked them to do so. If such ‘foreign’ words were correctly transcribed – normally by chance – couples completely ‘ignored’ them and often focused on describing the context, their feelings, relationship and other ‘non-linguistic things’ they found significant about an interaction. As it happened, for example, to Italian *inaugurato* and *pesante* (see Section 8.3.3) in a conversation of Italian-Austrian couple (C3/it-au). I wrote the words correctly only because my husband and son could speak Italian and helped me with the ‘Italian’ part of transcription. While playing back the ‘inaugurato-pesante’ interchange, the uses were not the subject of partners’ comment either. In such cases, therefore, I did call attention to selected segments and forms. I started with the most general questions such as “I do not understand what you are talking about in this piece. Could you explain it to me
please?” As a last resort, I made a specific request for the uses I singled out for analysis and asked partners to explain their meaning, for example: ‘I do not understand/know the word pesante. What do you mean by it in this piece?’

To summarize, the interviews and participants’ comment have been necessary for several reasons. First, they have helped me to gather additional biographical information; this has not been possible to get through the demographic questionnaire and recording. Second, I have the participants’ introspections and perspectives on their linguistic practices and possible contextual and pretextual factors whose history (state of affairs pre-text) and meaning are not clear to me as an outsider. Third, I have engaged the participants in reflection on aspects of the research and analysis, and so have secured the informed consent. Forth, both audio data and comments have enabled to locate mismatches between my interpretation and the partners’ perception of their interaction, and on the partners’ reported and actual behaviour. It is worth noting that the latter is very difficult to prove, as, in retrospection, all the recorded talk may appear different from the partners’ actual experience even to them themselves. Hence, my point here is that I have tried not to create distance to ensure objectivity and to avoid bias (if it is likely at all) in my research, but to encourage the couples to participate in the analysis and reflection on their own practices as much as possible. Finally, in the course of transcribing the recorded data, interviewing the couples and collecting their comments, I have been getting more and more sense of the couples as ‘normal’ ‘whole’ people that are emerging from the category – ELF couples – of my study. Transcriptions of the couples’ self-recordings, interviews and comments, thus, provide grounds for a dialogue with ELF couples, which by definition cannot be final and exhaustive.

6.4 THIRD-PERSON DATA: “A PARADOX OF IRREDUCIBLE SUBJECTIVITY”

What is recorded and subsequently transcribed/analysed is “a second-hand derived version of the original: not the reflex of interaction but the result of intervention” (Widdowson 2004: 9, my italics). In this sense, the audio data presented in this thesis are the partial “result of intervention” for at least three reasons. First, the recording does not represent the actual experience of the participants themselves but is its “second-hand” trace. Consequently, what I have to do with in such “second-hand” audio version of couple interaction is the verbally realized linguistic text and not participants’ facial expression,
postures, moves, gestures, direction of gaze, touches of things or other people, and other paralinguistic features of interaction that can be highly important and meaningful for the participants. Finally, the recording is always influenced by the observation in one or another way. In my study, the absence of a human observer might have reduced the interventional effect of observation, but it does not entirely surmount what is referred to as the observer’s paradox in sociolinguistics (Labov 1978 [1972]). The paradox relates to the researcher’s attempt to observe how people speak and behave when not being observed and/or recorded, while at the same time doing exactly this. It concerns the extent to which the recorded or observed interactions can be claimed to be natural or naturally occurring. The term naturally occurring data must be clarified here. Following Silverman (1993: 403), I take such data as derived “from situations which exist independently of the researcher’s intervention”. That is to say, I have collected the conversational data that are ‘natural’ every day couples’ conversations without the presence of the researcher. However, I cannot claim that the recording is ‘free’ of the impact of observation, since the recorders themselves can remind the couples-participants that they are being observed independently from the fact if and to what extent they are at ease with the recorder. As Cameron surmises in this connection, the act of recording talks has the potential to affect participants’ behaviour and make the talk something different from what it would have been otherwise. All talk is shaped by the context in which it is produced, and where talk is being observed and recorded becomes part of the context. (Cameron 2001: 20)

Therefore, the impact of observation both while observing and recording people with or without observer as well as while interpreting the data has to be taken into consideration. As my data demonstrate, partners often treat the recorders as participants in conversation, and even talk to them directly. My point here is that independently from the fact if the observer is present or not, the very fact of observation will always make the interaction ‘unnatural’ to some extent. Moreover, the absence of the observer by no means makes the data more ‘natural’ in the sense that any observation will transfer partners’ interaction from ‘private’ and ‘natural’ to ‘public’, or ‘semi-public’.

The intervention is bound to be even greater, because my account is based on written transcription of recorded data. As Ochs points out, transcription is unavoidably “a selective process reflecting theoretical goals and definitions” (Ochs 1979: 44) and, therefore, even more remote from the reality of actual interaction. It is the researcher who decides what, how (detailed) and why to transcribe. This is what Widdowson refers to as “a paradox of irreducible subjectivity” (Widdowson 2004: 10) - another facet of the observer’s paradox that
is independent from the fact if a non-participant third-person/researcher is present or not while recording. It means not only that there will be some impact on the way the participants talk or behave but also that “the very observation of an interaction necessarily misrepresents it, and the more precise the observed record, the greater the misrepresentation” (ibid.) The features of immediate effect created or achieved in spoken interaction that are still reflected in recording disappear in transcription and depend greatly on the researcher’s purpose. Moreover, what a spoken interaction means for the participants from the insider perspective can be and often is very different from what it means for the third-person observer/transcriber. The experience of the original use of spoken text is often elusive for an outside analyst. This observer’s paradox, or rather “paradox of irreducible subjectivity”, will always set limits both on the researcher’s claims about naturalness/authenticity of the data and the validity of the analysis. I by no means want to diminish the importance of any empirical study in general and of my investigation of ELF couple talk in particular. Nor do I want to discredit the value of my findings. I only wish to make it clear that all that follows is based on the examination of the transcripts of the couples’ recordings, interviews and comments. These transcripts, however, are not presented as proof of the analysis. Nor do I offer my interpretation as the interpretation. Rather, the transcripts are intended to allow readers/the audience to check the grounds of my analysis and interpretation against their own perception on what is going on in ELF couple talk. In polyphonic terms, the transcripts enable readers to listen to the researcher and couples’ voices and to read their own voices/positions into the couples’ text.

### 6.4.1 The Paradox of the Virtual Researcher

Possible effects of observation on participants’ behaviour are extensively discussed in the sociolinguistic research (Cameron 2001, Garfinkel 1967, Labov 1978 [1972]). In her investigation of bilingual couples, Piller (2002), for example, discusses partners’ framing strategies that construct their private conversations as public by specifically positioning them as for the absent researcher. Likewise, many of the conversations in my data are framed as direct or indirect addresses to the absent virtual researcher, which take a variety of forms. These include greetings (“hello”, “good morning”), introductions, leave-taking formulae, and asides. As an illustration of the possible impact of (virtual) observation, consider several examples from my data. In the first example, Monica (C4/au-cz) explicitly reframes the
partners’ talk from private to semi-public by making the following introduction-summary to the ‘virtual’ researcher before starting recording her talk with Patrick:

Extract 2  
(C4/au-cz/Con13/02.2011)^9^:  i hope you can figure it out sveta

Monica: well (3) it’s also almost over. well. okay. so erm yeah. we didn’t have quite some time. ah what do i say. @ we haven’t taped anything for quite some time. because we were out of the battery. and actually both of them are short of battery. so i will need to change the other one as well. okay. it’s a little bit complicated because erm we seems like something like you can put around your name. erm we did we again only taped on one. (3) <sighs> and then (2) well that’s the he one, and on the he one there’s a little bit more than on the she one. and there’s also like ten minutes that i taped (2) because yeah i was doing the interview and yeah. i had this proved and i taped like ten minutes and then it was off because the batteries. a::nd erm which probably good because it’s hardly anything left from the (2) from the recording. okay. well but right now it’s like on this one it’s zero six. and on the other one it’s zero five. (3) which is also surprising. okay i don’t know. @ i am confused about that. i hope you can figure it out sveta. @@

In this extract, Monica first says that the couple have not taped anything for a while because of the technical problems, namely low batteries, which they needed to fix in the process of recording. She explains further that she used one of the recorders for her own interview (Monica is a sociologist) and failed to tape a full version of it for the same technical problem. The partners changed the batteries, but in the course of her introduction to the talk, Monica discovered that the other device is almost out of power as well. It is important to note that she refers to the recorders as she- and he-recorder because I marked them so for convenience purposes. Before introducing me to the context of the talk, Monica gives the total number of the data on each recorder, and explains that the numbers do not match to each other: one of the recorders has six and the other five conversations on it. Monica comments on this fact as surprising and expresses a hope that I will manage to figure it out: “i hope you can figure it out sveta”. After quite an extended introduction-summary about the couple’s recording progress and problems with batteries, she finally makes an introduction to the actual talk:

Extract 3  
(C4/au-cz/Con13/02.2011):  i just turn on the recordings. and now again forget about them

1. Monica: e::r yeah. i just arrived to prague. today. but already quite some hours ago. a::nd we are in the room of patrick. in prague. in <L1de> plattenbau. {an apartment house of bearing-wall construction} a::nd he is now checking his new laptop. he is trying to install a printer. a::nd it’s just <L1de> fat {boring} <L1de> <to patrick> i just turn on the recordings. and now again forget about them. </to patrick> […]
2. Patrick: okay. well. it doesn’t want to do much. (3) well. (it’s) drives. (4) if we <LNde> druck {print} <LNde> print (4) {the printer starts printing} oh wait. wait. wait. you see now it’s starting printing. (1) a::nd (1) the result is good.

^9^ Henceforth, the conversations codes include a couple code (as specified in Appendix C), a conversation code (or its number as specified in Appendix E) and the date when the conversation was recorded

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Here Monica informs me that she visits Patrick’s at his place in Prague. She further clarifies that Patrick is busy installing printer drivers on his new computer at the time of recording. After having made the introduction, Monica addresses Patrick and notifies him that the recording devices are on and instructs him to ignore them: “i just turn on the recordings. and now again forget about them” (turn 1). Patrick, in turn, shows readiness for and competence in the recording affairs by his short reply “okay” in turn 2. Further, in turn 2, the talk takes its natural flow. The couple discusses the process of installing printer. However, their talk lasts only about forty-five seconds. In the following, the couple interrupts the recording rather humorously:

**Extract 4** *(C4/au-cz/Con16/15.02.2011): no more taping*

1. Patrick: good. but what you just make off or on. and i am just going to take the shower.
2. Monica: okay.
3. Patrick: so (2) what a situation.
4. Monica: <@> (so much) no more taping </@>
5. Patrick: no more taping.

In turn 1, Patrick asks Monica to switch the recorders off because he is going to take a shower. They find the situation funny and make some humorous remarks about “no more taping” (turn 4, 5). It is interesting to note that this particular talk is rather short: it is three minutes and two seconds long. Monica’s two-minute introduction constitutes two thirds of the talk’s total length. The partners’ ‘no-more-taping’ wrap-up of the talk lasts about fifteen seconds. Most of the talk, thus, is framed as for the virtual researcher. This extract is the most vivid example how the process of observation can intervene into naturally occurring interaction. Specifically, Monica explicitly positions the talk as for the virtual researcher.

The next example illustrates a similar strategy that serves to reframe the private couple conversation to conversations for the researcher, namely a description of the context of the talk. The couple recorded one of their conversations in the car before visiting a museum. They interrupted the recording and continued it after having visited the museum. Monica starts the recording by introducing the context and ‘pre-story’ of the ‘interrupted’ conversation to me: “so. well. it’s a few hours later. we what follows up. see the flooded a sort of flooded kloesterneuburg and ethno museum and now we are back in the car.” *(C4/au-cz/Con17/15.02.2011)*. The fact that this information is provided makes it clear that the conversation is addressed to the absent researcher who does not have a grasp of the immediate context and will listen to the recording later on.
In the next example, Couple 2 discuss their plans for shopping the next day. They need a toilet seat for their household and discuss what store they can buy it at, when they should set off for the do-it-yourself-store and how much time they need for the shopping. In this context, Henry takes leave from me at the end of the couple’s discussion:

**Extract 5**  
*(C2/il-au/Con3/20.11.2009): good night sveta*

1. Henry: so twelve thirty. (4)
2. Sue: half an hour to look the toilet seat <LNde> oder? {or} </LNde>
3. Henry: no. to find a parking space. to look for the toilet seat. if they have in case they have to pay (1) and then may need my hand to take what is bought. (4)
4. Sue: <soft> {yawning} it’s okay. xxxx {/yawning} </soft>
5. Henry: good. (11) good night sveta.

Here Henry refraims the ‘private’ conversation from a couple talk to one addressed to the absent researcher (turn 5). Henry does not only use the farewell formula good night, but also directly addresses me by name good night sveta. It creates a feeling of connection between partners and me, and the effect of my “complicity” (as one of my participants worded it) to their ‘coupleness’. On the other hand, this leave-taking formula demonstrates that the recorder has an impact on the conversation and transforms it from ‘naturally’ private to semi-public.

The next example illustrates one more strategy that serves to reframe the private couple conversation to conversations for a researcher, namely direct asides to me. In the following example from the talk of Couple 4, Monica overtly indicates a piece of their recording as not intended for the researcher personally:

**Extract 6**  
*(C4/au-cz/Con10/15.02.2011): oh actually i am taping right now. i don’t want sveta to know about that*

Monica: well and then we were moving the pillows. you know like the ones that my aunt did. which are pretty old. but my mom doesn’t think it’s anything with cloths she is pretty sure that it’s about food. (2) so next time i will go to vienna i will go through food closer. i don’t know i don’t think and i i consciously haven’t left any food there. bu::t i know that i store a lot. so. ah it would be so stupid if it’s my fault. and you know i found so disgusting because i oh actually i am taping right now. i don’t want sveta to know about that, but it’s really i felt so much like what a person i am. i leave ripen food in the flat, and yeah and i was glad that that boy friend was there because he kind of like you d- you d- it’s not so serious. you know.

The extract is from one of the couple’s Skype talk. Monica describes a rather common situation in any household. Her flat-mate discovered some moths in the apartment but could not find the source where they came from. She asked Monica to help in her search. However, even together they failed to find the infested items. Monica is rather embarrassed and (as she says) disgusted by the fact that she could have looked like someone who “leave[s] some ripen food in the flat” and so could have caused the inconvenience to her mate. While telling
Patrick about this unpleasant incident, Monica suddenly is reminded (probably, by the recorder) that she is taping the conversation and says that she does not want me to know about this ‘facet’ of her personality: “oh actually i am taping right now. i don’t want sveta to know about that”. By this aside, Monica makes it clear that she is doing recording for the researcher and the conversation operates on two different levels, namely private and semi-public.

In another conversation, Couple 2 treats the audio-recorder as participants of an interaction, and, obviously, do not want to talk about some intimate affairs in its (or rather my) ‘presence’. In the end, the couple interrupts the recording for this reason:

**Extract 7 (C2/il-au/Con2/19.11.2009): forget it. i’ll just tell you this […] later**

1. Sue: you know? and he i mean you know he is just driving me crazy and what was it today oh. and then he said like? (5) no. forget it.
3. Sue: no. (3) forget it. i'll just tell you this (2) […] later.
4. Henry: is that secretly?
5. Sue: no. but i just realised that? (3) no i just tell you later […] you know wanna have some good news?
6. Henry: yaeh. always. (19) yaeh. tell me. (3)
7. Sue: no i'll tell you also later. (7)

Here, Sue describes one of her acquaintances as a rather annoying person. As can be seen in turn 1, she is about reproducing something that he has told her, but suddenly changes her mind and suggests talking about it later (turn 3, 5). To Henry’s request *is that secretly* (tun 4), she refers, supposably, to the audio recorder in turn 5: *but i just realised that? no i just tell you later*. One might interpret this reply as ‘I just realised that we are recording our talk, so I do not want to make it public and will tell you about it later’. Later on in turn 5, she is very close to speaking about some other “good news”, but again it seems that the news is not for the researcher’s and public ears: *no i'll tell you also later* (turn 7). As a result, the talk interrupts and the partners switch the recorder off. In sum, one might claim, then, that the couple’s conversations are natural in that the partners sometimes forget about the fact that they are being observed and recorded. On the other hand, the partners’ awareness (whether implicitly or explicitly expressed) that they are not ‘alone’ has an impact on their talk.

**6.4.2 TALK ABOUT ‘NATURAL’ TALK**

One more type of asides in my data can be labelled as ‘talk about talk’ or ‘meta-talk’. In many of those asides, the couples discuss their understanding of what counts as ‘valid’ natural ELF talk and, related to it, use of other available languages in it. It is important
to note that both partners have been provided with a written introduction to the research and written (mostly email) as well as oral instructions concerning recording procedure (cf. Appendix B for one of such instructions). The requirement was that they record as much as they could whenever they felt there was a good moment. As I did not want to affect the partners’ behaviour and the way they talk as far as it was possible, I did not specify what aspects of their talk I was planning to focus on. Since all couples claimed that they mostly spoke ELF at the time of data collection, I expected (and requested) that their talk would be mostly or at least partly in English. In most cases, only one of the partners met me to pick up the recorders. Therefore, I instructed personally only that partner—‘representative-of-the-couple’ as for how and what to record. At the personal meeting, I explained the term ELF (“a mother tongue for neither partner”\textsuperscript{60}) to a contact partner first and asked her/him to instruct another partner on the procedure of recording. In my explanations, I emphasised that I needed their ‘ordinary’ every-day conversations. I asked partners not to focus on producing ‘correct’ English but ‘normal’ talk, since the purpose of my research by no means was to test the partners’ proficiency in English, but rather to understand how partners established and maintained the relationship in the language which was a L1 for neither of them. Hence, I was rather vague about what exactly a ‘natural’ talk could be, except that it had to be very close to the usual way the partners spoke to each other (in ELF), and left it to the participants to decide what ‘normal’ was and what to record. Naturally enough, the partners interpreted my clarifications of what counts as ‘normal’ rather differently in different contexts and sometimes even set a limit on each other’s language use. As an illustration, consider the following example from Couple 3. It is worth noting that Sandy was a personally instructed partner in the couple and, therefore perhaps, had an upper hand in recording affairs for Peter. In the interaction, Peter is working with graphic software (presumably Photoshop) on a computer. Simultaneously, he is acquiring some new ways of manipulating the visual images in the program. In turn 1, Peter suddenly appeals to Sandy’s authority and asks if he can speak German – his first language - too. There can be at least two reasons for such a request. First, it is possible that the software was in German and it was easier and more natural to discuss it in ‘its own’ language. Second, the manipulated images themselves could be connected to some ‘Austrian’ context\textsuperscript{61} and consequently to a German-speaking environment:

\textsuperscript{60} See Appendix B “Agreement form”.
\textsuperscript{61} The couple lived in Austria at the time of data collection
Whatever the reason for Peter’s appeal, Sandy produces a rather categorical prohibition to the use of languages other than English in their talk (paradoxically enough) in forbidden German: “es geht nur englisch {only English is allowed}” (turn 2). Interestingly, Sandy does not react to Peter’s previous uses of German in the same conversation to which he refers in turn 3 – “also ich durfte nicht deutsch sprechen {ah so i was not supposed to speak german.}” - and makes the prohibition only when Peter directly articulates the question. At this point, let us look at another conversation recorded four months later by the same couple. Here, Sandy is rather liberal as for other languages than English in the partners’ talk. Again, Peter directly asks her if he can speak German in turn 2, but this time in English:

Extract 9  
(C3/it-au/Con3/05.11.2009): shall we talk english or german

1. Sandy: please. tell me. if not what we are going to do this weekend?
2. Peter: <yarns> i don't know </yarns> shall we talk english or german.
3. Sandy: we can switch to german too (this weekend?).
4. Peter: i see.
5. Sandy: so?
7. Sandy: yeah. we are going to krems on friday or on saturday. (1) or on sunday?

As can be seen, Sandy answers in English as well: “we can switch to german too” (turn 3). It is quite interesting, that Sandy forbids speaking German when Peter asks her about it in German and allows it when Peter articulates his question in ELF. The question here is if the language of discussion could influence her decision. Of course, there cannot be a definitive answer. One can assume, however, that English as a liberating (of specific cultural associations) ‘neutral’ medium of the partners’ relationship furthers more ‘neutral’ attitudes to the use of other than English languages in it. Whatever the possible Sandy’s motivations, my point here is that the couple treat languages other than English in their talk differently – as allowed and/or not allowed – at different points of time/stages of their relationship in different contexts. Those treatments covertly concern the aspect of ‘naturalness’ and ‘normality’ of the partners’ ELF talk. It is not clear whether the partners perceive the use of German (Peter’s L1) as ‘natural’ in these particular interchanges. What is definitely clear is that the partners do use languages other than English in their ELF talk.
Consider one more extract from Couple 1 where the partners discuss and make it quite explicit that they draw upon any available linguistic resources and conceive of it as their ‘normal’ ‘natural’ talk. It is important to note that I contacted this couple per email because they lived in France at the time of data collection. Therefore, they had only my written instructions on how to record their talk. The couple discusses their last party in this conversation:

Extract 10  (C1/ua-fr/Con1/16.06.2009): you speak ENGLISH

1. Nargiz: I didn’t sleep very well. <complains>
2. Dan: okay <L1fr> bien c’est pas grave {okay never mind} </L1fr>
3. Nargiz: <requests> you speak ENGLISH. </requests>
4. Dan: <L1fr> ah oui? {ah yes?} </L1fr> @
5. Nargiz: @ @ @
6. Dan: no. but we have to do like we do we do: at home i guess (. ) no? so sometime i speak a little bit french and (1) some word in russian and? no?
7. Nargiz: uhu <L1fr> oui. {yes.} </L1fr> <LNfr> ci. {yes.} </LNfr>
8. Dan: you want to have artificial speech or ( . ) normal speech.
9. Nargiz: <@> no i just want to speak ENGLISH. </@>
10. Dan: it’s a good <L1fr> nouvelle? {news?} </L1fr> ( .)

As can be seen, Nargiz complains that she has not slept well (turn 1). Dan reacts to her little bid for sympathy in his L1 French. Nargiz, in turn, requests her partner to stick to English: you speak English (turn 3), no i just want to speak English (turn 9). As it seems, Nargiz’s demand brings about Dan’s great surprise: ah oui? {ah yes?} (turn 4), you want to have artificial speech or normal speech (turn 8) it’s a good <L1fr> nouvelle? {news?} (turn 10).

Here, Dan explicitly describes his conception of their “home” talk: sometime i speak a little bit french and some word in russian (turn 6). That is to say, he perceives the use of other linguistic resources than English (predominantly their L1s) in their ELF talk as the usual ‘normal’ way they “do at home”. As Dan claims and Nargiz agrees in her L2 French (turn 7), to speak only English is not ‘normal’, but “artificial” situation in their relationship.

The discussed examples demonstrate that perception of what counts as ‘normal’ or ‘natural’ ELF talk can vary not only from couple to couple in my corpus, but also from context to context within the same couple. Often, discussions of ‘normality’ of talk touch the problem of languages other than English that the couples-participants have at their disposal. This I have occasion to address in the next sections. Meanwhile, my point is that it is rather impossible to have data that would be both private and natural, although the couples’ recordings constitute, strictly speaking, private naturally occurring couple talk. As the examples show, the process of audio recording is always interventional not only because it necessary misses some inaudible interactive features, but also because the observation itself
always has a certain impact on interaction. The way the couples record their private talk is influenced by the very pretext of it – pretext of positioning it as ‘for the researcher/research’. As can be seen from the extracts, this pretext operates at two different levels for two different addressees (a partner and a researcher) and transforms the conversations from private and ‘natural’ to semi-private/public and ‘artificial’. This being so, I would not claim that my data are necessarily the ‘natural’ ‘authentic’ reflex of interaction. They are rather the result of intervention that finds its covert and overt expression in the couple talk itself and includes such re/framing strategies as greeting and far-away formulas addressed to the virtual researcher, introductions to the conversations, asides, and discussions of what counts as valid ‘normal’ data for the research in particular. In other words, the fact that the couples recorded the data without the present researcher does not make them more ‘natural’, authentic or private. One should bear in mind that recorded private conversations always become to some extent public: not only accessible to other people, but also intended for those people (for the researcher/observer, in particular). At this point, however, I cannot agree more with Deborah Tannen’s (1994: 130) claim that the data are always natural to the situation in which they are produced. Hence, self-recorded ELF couple communication is still natural to the ‘paradoxical’ intervening situation in which it occurs.

6.5 SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION
OR WHAT PEOPLE THINK ABOUT PEOPLE

The history of the Galaxy has got a little muddled, for a number of reasons: partly because those who are trying to keep track of it have got a little muddled, but also because some very muddling things have been happening anyway.

(Adams 1992 : 1)

It's just a way of thinking about a problem which lets the shape of that problem begin to emerge. [...] It's just to do with people thinking about people.

(Adams 1992 : 12)

I have begun the chapter with Adams’ quotation. It seems reasonable to finish it with another one. Comparatively to Adams’ description of history of the Galaxy in the epigraph to this concluding section, I would say that my research into ELF couple discourse to some extent is bound to be “muddled” for precisely the same reasons. Partly because discourse analysts who are trying to keep track of private interaction (I am not an exception)
are bound to get a little muddled; but also because “some very muddling things” are constantly happening in such interaction. It happens, I think, because of the very nature of social sciences. As Adams puts it, they have less to do with ‘empirical science’ than with what people think about people and their practices. What I would like to demonstrate in this thesis is that one should be cautious in interpreting discourse from categorized data or in our case the couples’ text. Because of the complexity of discourse processes, I have forborne to make ‘ultimate’ judgments about partners’ contexts/pretexts read into and achieved through ELF and hybrid forms within it. Rather I attempt at “thinking about a problem which lets the shape of that problem begin to emerge”.

This chapter has introduced the basis for the analysis in the present thesis, namely the ELF couples’ data that I gained through recording of naturally occurring couple talk, interviews and participants’ comments. I have also explained what consequences the theoretical polyphonic (discourse analytic) approach has for the polyphonic method taken up in this thesis. Both are based on the conceptual distinction between text and discourse. It follows from this distinction that discourse analysis has to do with what people mean by text or what they take it to mean rather than with what text itself means. The polyphonic approach puts emphasis on the positional nature of any research. This means that the researcher will always read his own position into the first, second or third person data. To take such an approach also means that the author’s position is not the position. It is simply an account of certain aspects of a multiplicity of elements of five ELF couple interaction that is open to revision by other theoretical frameworks, by the participants themselves, and by the reader’s personal take on what is going on. The analysis of discourse in this thesis, then, is about relating ELF partners’ text to their possible contextual and pretextual factors. Due to the elusiveness of human discourse, I would make no claim that my study proves anything or provides anything like universal solutions applicable to any ELF private communicative practices. The main purpose of my thesis is to attract attention and interest to ELF couple discourse, and, in doing so, to “shape” those problems that couples (and the reader) themselves must solve. That is not to say that there is no author’s position in the enquiry, rather I would not claim that my position is definitive and ultimate. Although the nature of ‘coupleness’ that is being established and maintained through ELF practices cannot be equated to its rational accountability that I suggest in this study, “the fact that something is not provable does not mean that it is not demonstrable” (Tannen 1984: 37). Hence, the research (both from inside – as my personal experience - and outside – as my consideration
of couples’ experience) illustrates what can be involved in private couples’ experiences, makes it publicly accessible, open to discussion by other theoretical/methodological frames and demonstrable for wider relevance. The research, then, is valid in two respects: theoretically and methodologically. Theoretically, it serves as a source of ‘polyphonic’ ideas and insights that are of potential significance for the formulation of problems that people can encounter in intimate (ELF) couple relationship. Methodologically, the study provides example of what can be involved in critical enquiry of couple discourse, how couples’ text and its (the researchers’) analysis and interpretation can be the subject of continuing ‘polyphonic’ conceptual and experiential appraisal (by my own and other theoretical/methodological frames and common wisdom of ‘ordinary’ people/couples). My method then has been to record, transcribe, study the data, to generate ideas and insights, to engage in interview and playback with the couples and individual partners, or my colleagues to check my assumptions, and yet again generate new ideas and insights.

Thus, the method in general and the process of data collection in particular themselves demonstrate that the disparities between the researcher’s intuition and participants’ perceptions are unavoidable. It also yielded a number of important findings about communication of ELF couples. First, it makes it clear that it is impossible to collect data of couple talk that were both private and natural. Secondly, my analysis and interpretation is not necessarily the representation of interaction but rather the result of intrusion into that interaction. It has less to do with interaction itself but with what I and my participants ‘think about’ their interaction and language use within it. Finally, by introducing the couples as subjects of the research in this chapter, I would by no means claim that the polyphonic approach adopted in this thesis transforms the partners’ private world/voices “в безгласный объект [идеологии как] вывода (into a voiceless object of [ideology as] a verdict” (Bakhtin 2002: 94, emphasis in the original). Rather, I attempt at speaking not about ELF couples but with ELF couples in my thesis, and, consequently, giving the reader an opportunity to have a word with both the researcher and the participants of the study as far as it is possible. It seems quite natural that in the course of data collection the couples have developed from the subjects of the investigation into ‘real’ people. The emergence of ELF couples as ‘real’ people in the pragmatic process of meaning negotiation, and the role, functions and partners’ motivations for use of other languages within their ELF are the central concern of all that follows.
7. **A LOVE AFFAIR THROUGH ELF: THE ELF COUPLES - EMERGING PEOPLE**

In the previous chapter, I presented couples as part of my data, as the subjects of the investigation. I provided the preliminary couples profile and categorized them as *ELF couples* on the basis of their common feature – they all are non-native users of ELF. I classified them as Austrian-Italian, Ukrainian-French, and so on couples on the basis of their first national languages. It is a certain and necessary abstraction that can provide a starting point for exploring linguistic and cultural hybridity in ELF couple discourse. In the course of my inquiry, however, the couples have transformed from the subjects *non-native English users* who produce particular language to be analysed to *real people* who use language to pragmatic effect with the prevailing pretext/purpose of accomplishing their ‘coupleness’.

This chapter has at least two main purposes. The first is to provide information about ELF couples as part of my findings, as emerging people. My intention here is to describe those five self-selected ELF couples who participated in the project as people. On the other hand, the chapter focuses on their attitudes to ELF as the shared intimate language, and their vision of the role of languages other than English in their ELF talk by representing the partners’ insider perspective on what is going on in their interaction. What I am attempting at, then, in this chapter is to present what the partners think about ELF and other languages within it by drawing upon the participants’ second-person insider perspective. The following account mainly derives from the interview data but also from the information that the five ELF couples gave me in their questionnaires and comments.

### 7.1 COUPLES’ ATTITUDES TO ELF: LOVE STORY

It seems quite reasonable to begin the discussion of how partners position themselves in ‘a love affair with’ ELF and other available languages within it with the consideration of their love stories. I do so for several reasons. First, as I have discussed in the previous chapter, this strategy helped me to create a friendly relaxed atmosphere and to establish rapport with the partners-participants. Second, my assumption has been that everything the partners have to say about their relationship and language use can be symptomatic of the process that I refer to as positioning in general and positioning as a partner/a couple in particular, and of the role of languages other than English in this process.
Thus far, my argument has been that establishing and maintaining partners’ ‘coupleness’ or togetherness is not so much about the fact that partners have different first languages or cultures (and nationalities). Rather, it has to do with the general process of negotiating and establishing their shared couple identity. The partners’ discussion of their ‘love story’ implicitly can show to what extent the partners concern themselves with language issues in the process of creating their common private cultural space and how they perceive their ‘ELFness’ and coupleness. Thus, in the following, I present the couples’ love stories to introduce them as emerging people with their own feelings, expectations and worries.

7.1.1 NARGIZ AND DAN: “I COULD NOT IMAGINE I COULD MARRY WITH UKRAINIAN LADY”

The first love story comes from Nargiz and Dan (C1/ua-fr). They met at a Buddhist seminar in France - Dan’s native country. Consider the following comment on how they met:

Extract 11 (C1/ua-fr/I1/Prompt 2.1, 160-182): i didn’t want really to marry some foreigner

Dan: we met together in france. […] because we are buddhists we went together there to by chance. to kind of learning school in buddhism. […] so we met together in this in this kind of school. how could i say in a monastery if you want. but it’s not actual monastery. but is is the school of thinking in in a buddhism. so we met there by chance with this occurrence63. […] and i didn’t want really to marry some foreigner. but when i told my friends i could marry ukrainian they were not very surprised. […] because i was very interested in (other cultures). so at the beginning they imagine i could marry with thai people lao people because i went a lot to their countries. […] but then some ukrainian lady. but it’s i did by chance but not completely by chance in my case.

Interestingly, Dan describes his relationship with Nargiz both as a logical ‘cause-effect’ phenomenon of his life style and as an unexpected experience: we met there by chance with this occurrence (turn 1). He speaks about his friends’ reactions and says that they have expected him to marry some “foreigner” because he travels a lot. To put it in Dan’s way, he married Nargiz “by chance but not completely by chance”. According to him, it is rather likely to have a partner from another country if you are often abroad. However, further Dan contradicts himself and state that one foreigner is not like another, or, rather speaking, not like a Ukrainian. Consider the second sequel of the interchange:

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62 Henceforth, the interviews codes include a couple code (as specified in Appendix C), an interview code (or its number as specified in Appendix G), prompt number and line numbers as they occur in the original full transcript.

63 The word occurrence can also be an example of linguistic hybridity where the English and French concepts are fused.
Extract 12  (C1/ua-fr/I1/Prompt 2.1, 194-207): \textit{that i marry ukrainian i was very surprised} 

1. Dan: yeah, yeah, they were surprised not? well they were not surprised i marry a foreigner, they were surprised i marry a ukrainian, [...] well that i marry ukrainian i was very surprised. [...] yes i could not imagine i marry a ukrainian lady. [...] 

2. Nargiz: @@ @ 

3. Dan: because that’s i’ve got to say i don’t i didn’t like especially the east europa, it’s not my favourite destination.

While in the first piece of the discussion of the partners’ first meeting, Dan categorizes, or rather positions the couple by their shared feature, namely as Buddhists, in this sequel he brings their national differences centre stage. Dan states that he does not like the countries of Eastern Europe (turn 3). Therefore, he never wanted to have a partner from those countries. Ukraine is not an exception for him: “i could not imagine i marry a ukrainian lady” (turn 1). Moreover, he claims that his friends were also surprised at his having a partner from Ukraine: “they were not surprised i marry a foreigner, they were surprised i marry a ukrainian” (turn 1). Further, Dan accounts for his aversion by his bad experiences in the countries of Eastern Europe, particularly in Czechoslovakia where he has once been for vacations with his German friend. This he discusses in the following:

Extract 13  (C1/ua-fr/I1/Prompt 2.2, 223-233): \textit{i had a very bad feeling with the this countries and especially with ladies} 

1. Dan: and we were especially in this <LNua> чехи [czechs] </LNua> you know this <LNua> чехи [czechs] </LNua> 

2. Nargiz: <L1ua> чехословаки, [czechoslovakians.] </L1ua> 

3. Dan: <LNua> чехословаки, [czechoslovakians.] <LNua> but the [...] czech republic <L1fr> pas.[no.] </L1fr> okay, and i had a very bad feeling with the this countries and especially with ladies because that was full of prostitutes and my vision was very very bad with that. and i thought that this stories about foreigners foreigners (i wanted <un> xxxx </un> foreigners of) this part of europe, so i was really not attract. by this kind of (europe) @@ @@@ 

What Dan seems to be saying is that he has already had some general negative idea about people (“especially ladies”) from ‘Eastern Europe’ and their culture before having met Nargiz. One can assume here that there is a contradiction between Dan’s positioning himself as a Frenchman and as a partner in the couple and his attitudes to Nargiz’s nationality. He claims inter/cross-national differences as problematic and indirectly relates them to the marriage with Nargiz. Although Dan focuses on the cultural issues, or rather his own cultural preconceptions, and do not directly addresses any language aspects in the partners’ relationship, we can observe an example of linguistic hybridity, where he uses (presumably) the Ukrainian чехи\textsuperscript{64} (turn 1) and чехословаки (turn 3) to refer to Czechs. Such uses are the

\textsuperscript{64} This use can be indicative of how the partners use virtual resources of languages other than English within their ELF and is worth dwelling a moment into. Even at the formal level, it is rather ambiguous, mostly because
focus of the next chapter. Meanwhile, the point is that, Nargiz does not attempt at deconstructing Dan’s negative value judgments about these inter/cross-national differences. Dan goes on and clarifies that the partners began to fancy for each other at their first meeting at Buddhist school, but decided to be a couple later in Thailand where they arranged their first joint trip. In his account, the couple again transform from people with different nationalities into ‘normal’ people in love who give their relationship a try (CoI/ua-fr/I1/Prompt 2.5, 277-303).

To summarize, there are two points to make on the partners’ love story. First, the partners do not mention anything about their linguistic practices or any issues connected to them (e.g. at the Buddhist retreat where they first met). This first point relates to the second, namely to Dan’s indirect claim and negative assessment of the partners cultural/national differences. On the one hand, such judgments (even if they are not negative) can endanger the process of accomplishing the partners’ ‘coupleness’. On the other hand, Dan’s focus on the cultural rather than language issues can be symptomatic of the main argument of this thesis: what matters in the partners’ relationship is not so much the languages they speak but their capability and desire to negotiate and bring to a relative convergence their cultural worlds and positions.

7.1.2 SUE AND HENRY: “WE VERSTEHEN IMMER NOCH GAR NICHT @ @ @ @ @ ... I NEVER THOUGHT THAT WE WOULD GET MARRIED”

“We <LNde> verstehen immer noch gar nicht {still do not understand it at all} </LNde> [...] i knew that i would see him again. [...] i knew that it would happen. i knew it.

the medium of my contact with the couple was the online telecommunications application software Skype. Since the quality of connection was rather bad, we agreed to turn the video off in order to have a better quality of sound. This caused lack of some contextual extralinguistic features (such as gestures, the partners’ spatial position, and so on) and sometimes decreased the quality of sound. For these reasons (but also because of the elusiveness of pragmatic meaning), it is rather difficult to classify this use. On the one hand, it can be an unfinished indirect “appeal to authority” (cf. Tarone; Cohen and Dumas 1983: 6-7) that indicates the request for the missing word which, in Dan’s finished invented version, could sound чехи словацки /ʧehi/ słowaki/ instead of чехи словацки /ʧehi/ słowaki/ and should have been transcribed as чехи-. On the other hand, it can be an influence of Dan’s L1 French. The Czech Republic in French sounds like Tchéquie’s /ʧehi/ and is similar to Dan’s pronunciation here. In this case, it can be classified as fusion of French proper noun Tchéquie /ʧehi/ and the English possessive –s and could be the first word of such, for example, noun phrase as Tchéquie’s /ʧehi/ culture, since Dan obviously discusses the culture of ‘this part of Europe’ (turn 3). One more possible interpretation of this word is that the use is the case of, using Seidlhofer’s terms (2004: 220), “overdoing” plurality, since this ‘appeal to authority’ appears without a rising intonation and Dan accepts Nargiz’s plural version чехи словацки /ʧehi/ słowaki/ (turn 3) of his чехи /ʧehi/ by repeating it. In this case, Dan uses the Ukrainian plural noun чехи (singular чеха/чех) with the English plural –s. Thus, the word has two plural endings: Ukrainian –i and English –s, where one of the endings is, in fact, redundant. Clearly, the use can be a fusion of all three resources.
but i never thought that we would get married” – this is Sue’s reaction to my question how she and Henry became a couple. The couple met on a ferry on the way to an island in Thailand. Henry was working as a tourist guide on the Island of Ko Phi Phi and Sue took the ferry as a tourist with a Babylon trip. Like the previous couple, Sue and Henry do not mention any language issues in their love story. On the other hand, - contrary to Couple 1 – the partners do not focus on any cultural issues here either. Implicitly, the partners even claim a relative convergence of their cultural (in our terms contextual) worlds. While telling her version of the couple’s love story, Sue describes the partners’ first meeting on the ferry as very romantic (it was a New Year’s Eve) and makes a remark that they “talked and talked [...]

instead of few days we spent the whole week together and [...] then it was very long story. then i was back i mean i was back to bangkok. and henry he was back to ko phi phi to work. but then we met again, and we [...] were together for like three months in thailand? and then we went together to india” (C2/il-au/l2/Prompt 2, 240-246).

I interpreted these Sue’s words in the way that the partners felt a deep affection to each other ‘at the first glance’, or so to speak, at the first word – “we talked and talked” – and summarized her version with the following specification:

Extract 14 (C2/il-au/l2/Prompt 2, 220-224): absolutely. to say it in johnny’s words absolutely

1. I: new year’s eve. you felt that you knew him all your ti- all your life. [...]  
2. Sue: yeah. it was like this. right <LNde> schatzi {honey} </LNde>  
3. Henry: uhu. absolutely. to say it in johnny’s [65] words absolutely.

As can be seen, both partners agreed with my interpretation you felt that you knew him all your ti- all your life (turn 1) by replying yeah. it was like this. right <LNde> schatzi {honey} </LNde> (turn 2) and absolutely. to say it in johnny’s words absolutely (turn 3). Both responses are of special interest here. Sue’s acknowledgment is an example of linguistic hybridity, which the couple obviously perceive as normal for their communication. Austrian German schatzi is symptomatic of what resources the partners’ use to position themselves as a couple and how these resources – in this particular case, the use of languages other than English - are exploited to create and maintain the partners’ private (cultural) space. I have an occasion to discuss Henry’s second response absolutely (turn 3) as an example of intertextual use in Section 8.1.3. Meanwhile, what the partners claim here is that they had a feeling of knowing each other for their whole lives while talking at their first meeting on a ferry. One can assume then that the partners have been able to understand each other’s ELF well enough.

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65 I changed the name here for anonymity reasons.
and their contextual (and pretextual) worlds have been rather close from the very beginning of their relationship. This closeness has made their communication easier and the need of negotiation to converge lesser. This assumption is supported by the fact that, although the partners met by chance and had independent plans for the following weeks and months, they could not separate, and used any opportunity to be together and talk. So they spend three months instead of (planned and expected) few days in Thailand and then went together to India. Surprisingly enough, after the first two years of such intense occasional meetings, the couple did not have any contact for about three years. After this three-year break, the partners’ relationship developed at a lightning speed. Henry came to Israel from Austria “on the way to Mexico”, as Sue jokingly puts it, and in two weeks made a proposal to Sue.

Interesting is the partners’ reaction to my question if they have planned to marry somebody from a different country. The couple explained that they planned neither to have a partner from another country nor to marry each other. As Sue describes, “[it] really just happened. […] i never thought that we would get married” (C2/il-au/I2/Prompt 2: 302, 306-307). The couple does not show any attitude or prejudice to ‘having a partner of a different nationality’ either (compare with Couple 1). They see their age as the only problem and reason why they did not marry at the first two-year stage of their relationship, and why they needed three-year break afterwards: “when we met sue was TWENTY-ONE”; “i was very young. i was not ready” (C2/il-au/I2/Prompt 2: 322, 327). Thus, no language or cultural problems are reported in the partners’ love story. Despite the huge distance between their countries, their contextual worlds are rather close. What we have, however, in this love story is the examples of linguistic hybridity that are symptomatic of the couple’s language use in particular and of the way they position themselves by mediation of their languages in general.

### 7.1.3 Sandy and Peter: “We didn’t plan”

Comparatively to Couple 2, Sandy and Peter met abroad in Edinburgh. Sandy was there as an Erasmus student and Peter went to study in Scotland privately. They both did the same courses at the University of Edinburgh: Sandy as an architecture student and Peter as a civil engineering student. They met at those university courses but did not contact for about two months until they made a study trip to Barcelona, which was organized by the university.

**Extract 15**  
**(C3/it-au/I3/Prompt 2, p. 4): we were in the same courses at university**

1. Sandy: we were in the same courses at university. we because we studied the same. […] in edinburgh. and then we had beginning of november? so we knew a way who we are. <LNde> aber
we never really had contact before. and then during this trip we got to know really to know each other.

2. Peter: you said <LIde> aber {but} </LIde> instead of but.

3. Sandy: heah?

4. Peter: she said <LIde> aber {but} </LIde> @@@

5. Sandy: yeah. i know. the problem now that i am talking that much german in the office? […] it’s difficult to change into another language. @@@

6. Peter: yeap. the thing is as sandy start- studied the mixture between civil engineering and architecture? […] and the course was about sketching architecture of barcelona. and the getting idea of architectural way of thinking? and i was really bad in sketching and she was a bit better […] the thing is that sometimes i asked her how i could do better.

In this extract, Sandy and Peter explain how they “got to know each other” closer in a holiday trip to Barcelona. The purpose of that trip was to sketch the architecture of Barcelona and get an “idea of architectural way of thinking” (turn 6). Peter explains that he was not very good at sketching and, therefore, asked Sandy to help him with it, or, in Peter’s words, “sometimes [he] asked her how [he] could do better” (turn 6). As can be seen, like other couples, the partners do not specify any language issues in their love story. What is of special interest here is Peter’s aside in turn 2, 4: you said <LIde> aber {but} </LIde> instead of but. It is his reaction to Sandy’s use of German aber (turn 1) that goes unnoticed by Sandy and me. Contrary to other couples, this first use of languages other than English in the interview attracts Peter’s attention. It is important to note that in our later discussion this couple describe their private ELF as “a mixture of everything” (C3/it-au/I3/Prompt 5.2: 877), and claim that they try to speak neither ‘correct’ English nor ‘correct’ German but have invented their own unique private ELF that fuses the elements of all the available languages (mostly Italian and German). And, indeed, they do so in their interaction (see Chapter 8) and in the interview. This Peter’s ‘correction’ appears contradicting the partners’ later claim and their actual behaviour. One can assume, however, that Sandy’s use is inappropriate for Peter at least for two reasons. First, Peter (and Sandy) does not perceive aber as element of their established private code. Second, even if the partners do, they can see the word as inappropriate in communication with ‘outsiders’ – people who are not part to their conventions. Whatever the reason, this use is indicative of the partners’ ‘normal’ language use and the way how they position themselves in general.

Although the couple as a dyad does not explicitly specify any language issues in the discussion of their private relationship, some possible language problems in communication with the extended families come forth in the following interchange:
Peter: I knew that my parents that just speak a bit of English but good enough to understand each other but I didn’t speak any word of Italian and Sandy didn’t speak any word of German, so I thought how should it end up in this area. Is that future and I thought it would be too fast getting too serious. I was a bit scared to even start the relationship.

Sandy: And I didn’t making myself any of those thoughts. Also well, I think it also a bit the difference of the age maybe. I was yeah I was twenty-one.

As can be seen in this extract, to have a partner from another country was a new situation for both Sandy and Peter with new unexpected challenges. One of these challenges is connected to language issues. Peter formulates it as follows: “I didn’t speak any word of Italian and Sandy didn’t speak any word of German. So I thought how should it end up in this area [...] I was a bit scared to even start the relationship” (turn 1). Peter’s remark is worth attention at least for two reasons. On the one hand, Peter’s concern points out to the importance of being able to communicate with Sandy and her family as the main factor of the dyad’s marital success and happiness. It is clear that Peter puts a great importance to communication as a constitutive factor in establishing and maintaining relationship in general. On the other hand, Peter sees as problematic the fact that the partners do not speak each other’s L1s and, consequently, are not able to communicate with the extended families. Interestingly enough, such specification of language problems with the extended family as the main endangering factor for their relationship is rather unusual. As many researchers into private discourse state, people often see marriage as symbol of “permanence and security” (Broude 1994: 191) and focus on the sexual aspect or domestic advantages of marriage/relationship rather than on language issues or relationship with extended family. Broude (ibid.) reports, for example, that “people in many countries marry in order to attain personal fulfilment of one kind or another”, which they often associate with home, economic security and children. Peter, however, does not list any problems connected to this aspects of close relationship. He focuses on language or rather communication issues that the partners could have encountered in communication with their parents-in-law and other members of their extended family circles.

Peter’s concern with the partners’ inability to speak their L1s is similar to Piller’s (2002: 131) findings about non-standard varieties in “the macro-linguistic contexts which some of the participants have entered as L2 speakers”. Piller’s observation is that despite the situations where both partners-participants claim to be proficient speakers of Standard German – the language of the country where they live - they cannot comfortably interact with
other members of the extended family in the Swabian dialect. Inability of some partners to understand and speak what Piller refers to as “low varieties” (ibid. 131) such as granny’s “kitchen talk” (Piller 2002: 128) in Swabian has such negative consequences as reduced access to the extended family, experience of exclusion and dependency upon the partner. I have an occasion to discuss these issues in ELF couple discourse in a later section (Section 7.2.3). Meanwhile, Peter’s worries here are symptomatic of the fact that ‘only ELF’-situation can be seen as problematic for the communication with the extended families and friendship networks and so endangering the couple’s dyad relationship itself.

**7.1.4 MONICA AND PATRICK: “SUDDENLY THINGS WERE DIFFERENT”**

Monica and Patrick met abroad in Copenhagen as Erasmus students. They were studying at different departments and got to know each other at a country trip organized by the university. In the next extract, the couple discusses the events that took place in June - five months after their first meeting on a trip – when they actually began to think about having the relationship with each other.

**Extract 17 (C4/au-cz/I4/Prompt 2.1, 179-226): we were left-overs**

1. Patrick: in june july we were starting meeting more often and as monica put it once that we were some kind left-overs there. because other students already left copenhagen because it was end of the semester of course in the end of june the most of the students erasmus were leaving home? and i was staying there until the beginning of august if i am right and monica something as well. [...]  
2. Monica: the thing was like we were exchanging phone numbers and we were like we met at the cuba festival and <14> we got to know each other a little bit more </14>  
3. Patrick: <14> jass festival </14> [...]  
4. Monica: yeah. exactly. and that was the only time we met alone. [...] and then we arranged something and we just met? and while we were walking my mother called asked me if i am alone and yeah just told me something that my grandmother died. [...] and he was next to me when i when i got to know it. and i was not prepared for it. i mean yeah it was not that sudden and that that that i yeah i could have expected that but i didn’t. and i think that changed a lot. certainly we were not okay peo- he was somebody i know and nice chatting and i think that was a big impact that he was there. and we spend the evening together and then suddenly things were different.  

As can be seen, the partners do not specify any language aspects while telling me their love story either. Instead, they focus on the importance of communication in close relationship. In the extract, they describe themselves as “left-overs” (turn 1) since it was the end of semester, most students left home and Monica and Patrick had to stay at the university yet the whole summer. This was the reason why the partners met more often and why they were at a jazz festival together. The couple explain that the jazz festival has been a starting point of their relationship. It is connected to the sad news that Monica gets per telephone from her mother, namely death of Monica’s grandmother. Patrick was there and supported her in her
grief and from that point on “things were suddenly different” (turn 4), as Monica puts it. What Monica in fact is claiming is that Patrick has turned out to be a reliable and caring person – a person with whom she can share good but also bad times, to put it in a wedding vow wording, ‘for better, for worse, in sickness and in health, in joys and in sorrows’. In other words, here the partners see communication and their capability to create the effect of sharedness and supportiveness as a decisive factor for establishing their ‘coupleness’.

7.1.5 Anna and Paul: “Lonely Loveless Night Turned Out Nice/Net”

Anna and Paul met in Paul’s native country – Hungary – when Anna “was just spending the summer to work” as a language teacher in Budapest. This is what the partners have to say about their first meeting:

Extract 18 (C5/au-hu/I5/Prompt 2, 193-228): we met in Budapest [...] in a <LNde> lokal? [restaurant] </LNde> a bar

1. Paul: we met in budapest like two years ago [...] in a place where i used to work. in a <LNde> lokal? [restaurant] </LNde> a bar. [...] and i didn’t have work that day? and i just were there with my friend. we were together a few hours. and he started to talk with a girl. he just not? so i just thought okay. i was angry. and we went downstairs and that come the most reason i asked her if you wanna play table soccer. and so we did. @@ @@ and we played around the table soccer and drank some beer. i played some guitar. and from then? we met again and met again and we met again. [...] 

2. Anna: i was just spending the summer to work. [...] it was really exciting period of my life because i really wanted i knew that i wanted to work there for the summer. [...] then i found this really nice language school. [...] and then that night for me it was alone lonely loveless night. but then it turned out @@ <15> very well </15>


As can be seen, first Paul tells his version of how the partners met. He had a day off and spent it with his friend at what he refers to as a lokal or a bar66 (turn 1) where he actually worked in at the time of the partners’ meeting. Paul was angry with his friend who left him alone. That was the main reason why he went downstairs, approached Anna and suggested her playing table soccer. The evening that started for both partners rather unpleasantly, or, as Anna puts it, was the “alone lonely loveless night” (turn 2), turned out very “net/nice” (turn 3) in the end and became a starting point of the partners’ relationship. Again, the partners do

66 Paul’s uses a local and a bar (turn 1) denote a public catering establishment in this interchange. Lokal is a specific word for such establishment in Austria where the couple lived at the time of the data collecting. It refers to a restaurant and is an explicit use of Austrian German here. Contrary to lokal, bar is an English word. If we consult the Oxford Online Dictionary, it lists the following definition of bar: “a counter in a pub, restaurant, or cafe across which drinks or refreshments are served”. Paul, however, uses this word as a synonym to the German lokal. It is important to note that there is such word as bar or bár in the Hungarian language as well. The meaning conventionalised in Hungary, however, includes both provided by TOOD (see above) and “bistro or a (small) restaurant” (cf. DictZone dictionary).
not specify any language problems while discussing their love story. That is not to say that the couple do not have any language issues. However, such uses of other than English languages as a lokal (turn 1) or net (turn 3) are indicative of the partners’ perceiving of language alternation in their talk as normal and appropriate in establishing a joint position as a couple.

7.2 ELF AND OTHER LANGUAGES WITHIN IT:
“YOU DON’T TRANSLATE EXACTLY YOU TRY TO EXPLAIN. AND TRANSLATE”

Clearly, the partners’ perceiving of ELF and its role in their private space play the crucial role in how they understand their ‘ELFness’ and to what extent they identify their ‘coupleness’ with ELF in general. In the following, I will demonstrate how the partners position themselves as ELF couples, what they think about ELF and other languages at their disposal, what their reasons of using (primarily maintaining) ELF as their private language are, and what they report about the relationship of languages and culture/s in their private communication as related to the problem of translating. I am interested how the participants construct ELF and other available languages as the ways of affiliating with particular language groups and languages. The Section, thus, is organized around ELF and its role in the couples’ relationship.

7.2.1 IN THE BEGINNING WAS ELF: “WE HAD ONLY ENGLISH TO SHARE TOGETHER”

All the couples in this study declare that their ‘coupleness’ was established in ELF because it was the only common language and, therefore, the only choice or rather ‘no choice’ for them especially at the beginning of their relationship. For most couples to begin their relationship in ELF was “natural” also because it was the language of the surrounding/country where they met. This is what the couples have to say about the reasons why they used English at the time they first met:

Extract 19  
(C1/ua-fr/I1/Prompt 4, 415-416): we had only english to share together

Dan: we spoke only english? [...] because i didn't speak russian and she didn't speak french. we had only english to share together like that was like the same thing with my friends.

Extract 20  
(C2/il-au/I2/Prompt 4, 483-489): it was english at the beginning

1. Sue: it was english at the beginning. [...] only english. [...]  
2. Henry: 'cause i didn't speak hebrew. sue didn't speak german.
Extract 21  (C3/it-au/I3/prompt 4, p. 710-720): *we didn’t decide. it was naturally*

1. Peter: i think first of all we didn’t decide. […] the thing that it <38> was naturally </38>
2. Sandy: </38> comes naturally </38>
3. Peter: it was natural, because even if there was? as soon as there was one italian one one foreign guy in scotland we always tried to talk english. so it was natural. […] second of all reasons was the only way to communicate because it was the only language

Extract 22  (C4/au-cz/I4/Prompt 4, 723-727): *it was a kind of natural*

Patrick: well come on. but for germans it’s to some extent at least they can read who speak german. or so but well from the beginning we were speaking english because in copenhagen erasmus students speak english so it was a kind of natural and er we didn’t have any need to to that i would learn german or er monica would learn czech? @

Extract 23  (C5/au-hu/I5, Prompt 4, 376-380): *it was the only way to understand each other*

Paul: well that was the only way to understand each other. @@ @@ @@ […] there was the only way to talk to each other.

As can be seen, all the couples report that ELF was the only way to establish the partners’ ‘coupleness’, which they often see as most “natural”. They all claim that their relationship would not have been possible at all without ELF as the “the only way to talk” (Extract 23) and understand each other. Such perception of ELF as a “way” is interesting in that it focuses on the language as process rather than entity and highlights that the partners perceive their ‘ELFness’ and ‘coupleness’ as acts of doing rather than states of being.

Apart of the given above views on ELF, one couple out of five explicitly state fairness as the defining feature of their ‘ELFness’:

Extract 24  (C4/au-cz/I4/Prompt 5.1, 882-891): *english is really fair*

Monica: so i think it would be different if there would be if like he would be a native he would correct me. […] or if it would be the other way round as well. because yeah you have a kind of like you are in the position of correcting somebody but because we are both i think english is ex- is really fair. […] we are so equal and i think this whole thing with us probably wouldn’t have worked for such a long time if we wouldn’t be both if english wouldn’t be for both of us a foreign language.

What Monica means by fairness of ELF is that the partners are more or less equal in the sense that neither of them is “in position of correcting somebody”. Moreover, she surmises that their relationship would not have worked so long if English had not been “a foreign language” for both partners. Monica’s claim here is similar to what Pietikäinen describes as ELF couples’ being “linguistically equally disadvantaged” (2014: 4) the situations when neither partner has an upper hand in language competence and proficiency. By referring to the ‘foreignness’ of ELF, Monica apparently means that its detachment of any cultural associations has made their relationship not only possible but also successful “for such a long time”.

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The next extract from Couple 5 draws the bottom line of this section. It is Anna and Paul’s answer to my question whether they would like to add anything to what we have discussed in the course of the interview. The couple make the point that they have “never been unhappy with the [ELF] situation” (turn 1):

**Extract 25  (C5/au-hu/I5, Debriefing, 1093-1105): i never wished that it was any different than it is**

1. Anna: i never wished that it was any different than it is. i’ve never been unhappy with the situations, like i never thought oh my god i wish we could just share language. everything would be easier. […] i’ve never thought that. never ever.

2. Paul: me either. […] i can say. maybe at the beginning. <@> well i wished sometimes that you would learn hungarian. </@> […] but i mean) i also think that english is fine. it’s i don’t know i just like english. i think it’s a great way to find people i guess (in) such a world language.

In the extract, the partners agree that they are happy with their ‘ELFness’, and ELF as the (only) way of doing their ‘coupleness’. Paul makes an interesting remark here that only at the beginning of the relationship it has been desirable to him that Anna could speak his L1 – Hungarian. At the same time, he claims that “english is fine” and “is a great way to find people” (turn 2). The partners’ reflection here can be taken as evidence that they are aware of the need to negotiate their ‘coupleness’ by bringing their worlds to convergence in any language (whether it is ELF or L1s). Of course, it seems that the best or “easier” (turn 1) way of doing so is to draw upon the already familiar linguistic resources, namely L1s. However, as the participants of the study clarify, ELF often facilitates their understanding that any systemic knowledge/linguistic resource (also L1s) needs to be related to their individual schematic knowledge about the world in general and private discourse in particular. According to Sandy from Couple 3, “if both are talking language that is not theirs? then […] you have to think if what you’re saying […] what you mean and if he understands what you mean” (C3/it-au/Promt 7.2, 1459-1462). This point resonates throughout all the couple’ data. All of them explicitly or implicitly explain that the need to create and maintain their ‘coupleness’ by establishing the shared frame of reference, by negotiating a mutual understanding and/or a meeting of minds on such ‘coupleness’ in whatever language is more observable in ELF situations. This is what Paul describes in the interchange above although from a slightly different angle: he wanted Anna to learn Hungarian at the beginning of their relationship since ELF appeared to be not ‘enough’ for all those purposes. However, in the course of establishing their ‘coupleness’, the partners do make ELF ‘enough’ or make it their own by acculturating and accommodating it into their private space. In Paul’s words, English
as “a great way” to communicate with people all over the world has also turned out to be “fine” for the purpose of creating and maintaining the partners’ private affective territory.

In sum, what ‘my’ couples say about the use of ELF as a language of their relationship is comparable with what Gundacker’s (2009) lists as three main reasons why the five couples who participated in her investigation of ELF private discourse have picked out English as their language. They are language proficiency, the linguistic environment where partners met or live, or the factor of fairness for both partners. In the process of data collection, namely at the interview/comments stage, it became clear that the partners’ use of ELF as a private language have changed with the course of time. Four out of five couples (C2, C3, C4 and C5) in my study claim that their relationship is still being maintained mostly in the lingua franca. Three couples out of five (C2, C3 and C4) claim that they are maintaining ELF because they met in the English-speaking context and, therefore, identify their ‘coupleness’ with English. Couple 4 lists one more reason why it is still important to use English for them, namely ‘fairness’ of ELF. In the partners’ view, “English is fair” in the sense that nobody is disadvantaged when accomplishing ‘coupleness’ in the neutral lingua franca – a mother tongue of neither partner.

7.2.2  THE ROLE OF TRANSLATION IN THE PROCESS OF ESTABLISHING AND MAINTAINING COUPLENESNESS IN ELF

Despite such ‘good’ reasons for using ELF in the relationship, most couples see ‘only ELF’ situation as rather problematic. Some partners connect the drawback of ELF use with the necessity to ‘translate’ and its consequences such as reduces access to the extended family and friendship networks, dependency upon the other partner and (self) exclusion. I have already discussed the nature of translation as related to Becker’s (1995) notion of languaging in Chapter 3. The argument has been that translation as any language use, or as languaging, is an orientational process of people’s textualizing their discourses. In other words, it is about the relationship between text and discourse and has to do with the general process of meaning negotiation. According to Widdowson (2014: 11-12), this process as mediated through translation can be described as follows:

a first person (P1) has meaning to express, as indented discourse (Discourse A); and designs a text accordingly (Text 1) which the recipient (P2) then interprets, thereby deriving a discourse from it (Discourse B). [... Translators] have in turn assume a P1 role and produce a second text (Text 2) which will not only incorporate their interpretation with reference to the first text but also be designed for a different P2 recipient – so the discourse (Discourse C) which is rendered as the translated text may vary in its degree of correspondence to the discourse (Discourse B) that the translator derived
The whole complex process, in fact, is a common pragmatic process of discourse—a general process of making meaning into text. This process of making sense of language, of realizing discourse by mediation of text is what one also observes in what the partners refer to as translating practices in ELF communication. In the next extract, for example, Dan (C1/ua-fr) expresses his negative evaluation of translation as an interactive feature of the couple’s discourse and connects it to the partners’ cultural differences.

**Extract 26** (C1/ua-fr/I1, Prompt 4.1, 437-449): *it was translating and explaining*

Dan: first of all it’s difficult for me because my English is not really very good. Okay my English is not is very far to be perfect. So it’s the first difficult difficulty? it’s to translate in English because my English is not very good and the second is when you translate you you DON’T translate exactly you try to explain. [...] because there is this cultural habits for example. So if you translate if I was translating and explaining to Nargiz. Because the culture is so different, so you have to know which kind of glass you drink. When you drink water. When you drink wine. Which kind of position you have to have in when you eat. Or when you do something. Because it’s very different between France to Ukraine. [...] Dan’s claim is that his “English is not really very good” for overriding the partners’ cultural differences. For him, to use ELF means to translate. He explains such “translating” as merely a substitution of one text in French by another in ELF. It is rather a process of making meaning into and out of text. In a sense, Dan describes the process of creating the partners’ common private cultural space by negotiating his discourse with Nargiz as “translating and explaining to Nargiz. Because the culture is so different”. As can be seen, Dan’s understanding of the nature of translation concerns the relationship between language and culture in general (see Chapter 5). For him, translation has to do with the necessity of negotiating cultures rather than languages, of bring the partners’ contextual worlds into convergence. One of the negative aspects of such process of “translating cultures” is described as “a kind of dependence” between the partners in the next extract.

**Extract 27** (C1/ua-fr/I1, Prompt 7.1, 854-864): *it created a kind of dependence*

Dan: because for example it created a kind of dependence? Between from Nargiz to me. Because Nargiz when she came in France? Needed absolutely to be with me. [...] But if she (spoke) French she didn’t need. [...] She didn’t need to stay with me. She didn’t need to be with me to buy water. Or to go to cinema. Or to. But it took a very long time for her to go to cinema and to understand for example. So it’s very different.

Dan’s claim here is that Nargiz “needed absolutely to be” with him when she came to France. He evaluates ‘only ELF’ situation and Nargiz’s inability to speak French as a disadvantage since he had to accompany her everywhere: “to buy water. Or to go to cinema”. Nargiz also
connects the necessity to translate from French to English and vice versa to her sense of
dependence on Dan and exclusion from his friends at the beginning of their relationship when
she did not speak French:

Extract 28  (Co1/ua-fr/I1, Prompt 4.2, 616-624): at the beginning i didn’t understand
nothing

Nargiz: okay. yes it was difficult at the beginning i didn’t understand nothing. what people said ; then
sometimes dan translate sometime he didn’t or maybe i thought he said something else or he was
tired and he didn’t want. so <<@> sometimes i was angry @@ because of that </@> especially when
you know when we had some guest and and it was three four five people and then he could not
translate and the they start- started to spoke to each other speak with each other and {breathes} for
me i had nothing to do and i didn’t understand what is going on so it was a little bit shitty moment?

As one can see, Nargiz links her initial experience with ELF in the ‘monolingual’ situation
in France - when only few people speak languages other than French – with dependency,
frustration and exclusion, or even self-exclusion. However, she sees the problem from a little
bit different angle than Dan: it is ‘only French’ rather than ‘only ELF’ situation that is
challenging. Whatever the perspective, the partners perceive (‘only’) ELF and their
‘ELFness’ as rather problematic for their relationships in France. All this difficulties have
led to refusal from English (although not completely) in the partners’ relationship and
Nargiz’s acquiring French as fast as possible. It can be said that in the process of Dan’s
extending the previous experience of French into the couple’s private space in ELF, English
might have been acculturated into the partners’ intimate territory (for at least a particular
period of time) but rejected as foreign and inappropriate by the outer world of extended
family and friends’ network.

As can be seen from Dan and Nargiz’s account, the deeply entrenched mainstream
idea of ELF and French as different and distinct languages disassociated from each other is
in conflict with the partners’ actual experience of ELF as extension of their linguistic and
cultural experience through their L1s (French or Ukrainian/Russian) and/or as a different
realization of language in general. This is also what can be said about Monica’s (C4/au-cz)
reports about the nature of translation in her relationship with Paul. Consider the following:

Extract 29  (C4/au-cz/I4, Prompt 7.2, 1179-1188): there’s a tiny little bit missing

Monica: =no i just think about the point is in which language did i grew up. which language was the
the way how i explored the world. so it will be always the first language. it will be always the
language where i identify myself. th- all the other languages even if i really good at them they will
never reach this first language. so yeah to some extent of course there’s something? there’s a TINY
little bit missing because it’s always in some way only translating even if it’s like exactly fitting it’s
still it’s i’m not thinking in german and translating into english but still it’s (3) i would? to be very
precise whatever i say it must be in german.
In the interchange, Monica explains the reasons why the partners would want to use their L1s for private communication. According to Monica, since ELF “always in some way only translating”, “to be very precise whatever i say it must be in german”. Comparably to Dan from Couple 1, she connects her desire to use languages other than English with the fact that ELF is “in some way only translating”. Monica does not delineate the process of ‘only translating’ as a simple replacement of one text/word in L1 (German/Czech) by another in ELF either. Rather she describes the process of making sense of ELF as a different realization of language in general by associating it with what she has already experienced in her L1s in which she “grew up”. As she puts it, “i’m not thinking in german and translating into english but still”. Monica apparently delineates ELF as the systemic knowledge of English disassociated from her primary culture. However, it does not mean that she dissociates ELF from the linguistic resource of her L1 German in which she “explored the world”. Contrary, her claim is that she can only make sense of ELF by associating it with what she is already familiar with in L1 German. Her statement that there is always “a tiny little bit missing” in ELF as compared to her L1 German is in fact an expression of a deeply entrenched idea that there is some complete meaning encoded in whatever language/text that can be fully decoded and conveyed. However, as I have already argued (see Chapter 4), there is such complete encoded meaning in neither the ‘same’ nor ‘different’ language. What Monica refers to as ‘preciseness’ of her L1 is, in fact, her own discourse that she reads into it and intends by it. It is not that there is something missing in ELF but it is rather that Monica makes her own meaning/interpretation into and out of any language. In this sense, her intended discourse is not necessarily the discourse that her partner can derive from her text - no matter whether it is in her L1 or in ELF. For it is a matter of interpretation – a general process of pragmatic inference, of making sense of whatever language or rather of any language use. Thus, what Monica describes here as translation is in fact the normal pragmatic process of making sense of any language use by associating/relating of what is new to what is familiar.

To sum up, among the reasons to maintain English or not in private communication, the partners list different aspects of translation from ELF into their L1s, and vice versa. These aspects concern the nature of translation as understood by the partners. According to the partners, translation is not so much about replacing one text in L1 by another in ELF as about explaining the culture by extending the linguistic resource of their L1s. By referring to translation, the partners describe the general pragmatic process of making sense of any language use. Thus the partners’ accounts on translation in this section demonstrate that, to
put it in Widdowson’s (2014: 15) words, “we are all translators in that we are capable, in varying degrees, of interpreting texts so as to derive our own discourses out of them”. This capability especially makes itself visible in the situations when the partners need to establish their relationship in (relatively) ‘unfamiliar’ ‘foreign’ linguistic resource of ELF that is rather detached or ‘free’ from their own primary culture.

### 7.2.3 The role of first standard languages and regional varieties in doing coupleness in ELF

While the issues connected with the necessity to translate can be (although not necessarily) a reason for the partners’ refusal of ELF in the course of their relationship, the linguistic situation in the countries where they live - with presupposed existence of ‘high’ homogeneous ‘standard’ languages with the national names and ‘low’ non-standard dialect varieties within them - often furthers the couples’ maintenance of ELF as their private language. In my study, the partners-NSs of the ‘national’ languages often claim the dialect varieties to be their L1s and see the standards as languages of their secondary socialization, or their L2s. As is the case in Couples 2, 3, 4 and 5. Since in four out of five couples one partner is Austrian with one or another variety of Austrian German as her/his L1, it is worth looking at the linguistic situation in Austria closer at this point.

Most researchers characterize Austrian German as a standard-dialect continuum, with most Austrians having command at least at two varieties: one regional dialect and Österreichisches Standard Deutsch/Austrian Standard German. Austrian Standard German is codified in an official dictionary, “Österreichisches Wörterbuch” (ÖWB 2001). However, it is characterized by the high degree of interrelatedness with German German – Hochdeutsch - in morphology, phonology and lexis, and often is seen as “socially and culturally inferior and less prestigious” (Haidinger 2008: 14) variety of such German German. According to Haidinger, for instance, “Austrian German, therefore, is not to be seen as a national variety in its fullest sense, but “with reservation”, bearing in mind a considerable lack of codification of the Austrian German variety at the phonological and grammatical level” (ibid., cf. also Ammon 1995: 115). Thus, apart from the fact that dialects form a vital part in the Austrian linguistic landscape, the superior status of German German leads to negative evaluation and attitudes to the linguistic variety of Austrian Standard German itself and perception of it as a

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67 By the term German German I refer to a generalised way of thinking about German as a language with the national name in Germany.
‘low’ dialect of a dominant Hochdeutsch/German German variety. This attitude comes to the fore in the next extracts from Couple 2, 3 and 5:

Extract 30  (C2/il-au/l2/Prompt 4, 514-519): i have to speak proper german with sue and i couldn’t. that was the nuts

1. Sue: <24> yeah it </24> was VERY hard for henry. it was very very hard for him to speak to speak to speak in german. i mean with me. it was very very hard.
2. Henry: aha because it’s not the german i’m used to. we are come coming from a dialect counry and i have to speak proper german with sue and i couldn’t. <25> that was the nuts </25>

Extract 31  (C3/it-au/l3/Prompt 5.2, 751-764): talking hochdeutsch was heavier

1. Peter: not talking in spoken german really like <L1de> hochdeutsch? {high german?} </L1de> [...] was heavier for me especially than talking english, because to talk slowly and to think about every word at the beginning can i say it. is it too hard. is it the right german word. like <L1de> sprechen {speak} </L1de> and <L1de> reden {talk} </L1de> you know. what i should say <L1de> wir sprechen deutsch {we speak german} </L1de> or <L1de> wir reden deutsch. {we talk german.} </L1de> and i think that was a bit heavier. […]
2. Sandy: that’s the strange thing. because for him it was easier? <44> it was easier to talk english? </44> […] to talk in english than in german. […]
3. Peter: yeah. it IS strange.
4. Sandy: @ yeah. @ his mother tongue it’s like his mother tongue is german but his his:: […] language with me is english.

Extract 32  (C5/au-hu/IS, Prompt 1, 92-101): it’s not even german it’s a faistenau language

1. Anna: in my family it’s not even german <3> you couldn’t call it german </3>
2. Paul: <3> faistenau language. </3>
3. Anna: it’s it’s a faistenau language. it’s a very strong dialect. that has not much resemblance to high german. and of course we learned high german at school that’s like a way i am speaking it now. but you have to imagine like village dialect that we’ve learned to be very different than anything else. very like on all levels of language you know. like different grammar. different words. different intonation. very shortened kind of language.

It can be claimed, then, that if at the beginning of the relationship the ‘Austrian’ partners had no choice but ELF, they ‘consciously’ decided on ELF as their private language later on. Although partners often find this situation rather strange (Extract 31), the language ‘choice’ is definitely connected to their (or rather Henry, Peter and Anna’s) perceiving of Austrian German (and dialect varieties within it) rather negatively as ‘bad Austrian’, ‘spoken German’ (Extract 31: turn 1), improper German (Extract 30: turn 2) or ‘not even german’ (Extract 32: turn 1). At the same time Hochdeutsch/Standard German is delineated as ‘good’, ‘proper’ or ‘high’ German. Such negative attitudes to Austrian German and its dialects as well as a considerable lack of awareness among Austrian German speakers that there is an independent standard variety in Austria is also reported by many researchers of the language (De Cillia and Wodak 2006: 76). The association and/or confusion of the Austrian standard variety with

68 Faistenau dialect is a dialect of Austrian German spoken in Salzburgerland in Austria.
Hochdeutsch/German German – the language of another nation – can be one of the reasons why two out of four Austrian partners in my corpus reject the Standard German to be their L1. On the other hand, most partners describe Hochdeutsch as the language of their secondary socialization (at school or at work) and obviously take it as the standard variety in Austria: “of course we learned high german at school that’s like a way i am speaking it now. but you have to imagine like village dialect that we’ve learned to be very different than anything else” (Extract 32: turn 3). As Henry and Anna points out, they use their L1s – the Linzer and Faistenau language - in private communication with their families and friends, while High German serves ‘high’ functions in public domains such as school or work. It is also what both the researchers of High/German German (Piller 2002: 19-20, Mattheier 1990) and Austrian German (Muhr 1995, Steinegger 1998: 371-378) point out: most dialect speakers will be able to understand, if not actually use, the spoken standard language as a result of secondary socialization/educational practices and media exposure. The reverse is often not true about standard speakers who are not dialect users. These couples are not an exception. Both the difference between High German and dialect languages and the Austrian partners’ perception of it as one of their L2s, and unintelligibility of Austrian dialects to the non-Austrian partners – although most of them are L2 speakers of standard German - is the reason why the partners see ELF as more desirable than German in their private communication:

**Extract 33** (C5/au-hu/I5, Prompt 4, 833-838): *for ME:: if i speak high german or english it’s no difference*

Anna: the thing is and i would have to admit this that i and you know paul (used to it) so so much but i will have to talk high german. standard german you know [...] for him to understand me. for my dialect there’s no chance but that’s the easier way. so for ME if i speak high german or english <97> it’s no difference. </97>

**Extract 34** (C5/au-hu/I5, Prompt 1, 109-125): *if you wanna understand them </@> it’s really hard*

1. Anna: only after i went abroad only after going to australia and everything i realized that it’s a kind of necessary to often speak high german because otherwise people won’t understand you. you know. […]
2. Paul: also people speak so different. […] really. […] it’s a pain in the ass. […] <6> if you are a learner. </6> </@> if you wanna understand them </@> it’s really hard.

**Extract 35** (C2/il-au/I2/Prompt 4.3, 621-626): *sue doesn’t understand me when i speak dialect*

Henry: it depends on. it depends on. if i speak to sue i’d rather speak in english. if i speak to my friends i’d rather speak in german. […] because i’m not used to. i wasn’t used for thirty-six years to speak in proper german language. i’m speaking dialect. and sue doesn’t understand me when i speak dialect.
Both Anna from Couple 5 and Henry from Couple 2 would “rather speak in english” (Extract 35) or “high german” (Extract 33), since their non-Austrian partners do not understand the dialects. This is also what Paul – a non-Austrian partner – says about the linguistic situation in Austria where “people speak so different” “everywhere” (Extract 34: turn 2). For him such situation is “a pain in the ass”, because “if you are a learner. <@> if you wanna understand them [dialect speakers] </@> it’s really hard” (ibid.). It can be seen from the extracts above that the difference between the standard and dialects is an issue for the partners, especially for the partners who are L2 speakers of both Austrian German varieties. It is also often the reason why the partners prefer ELF to German in their private space. What the partners say about their experience with Austrian dialect-like varieties is similar to what Ingrid Piller (2002: 120-131) describes as diaglossic situations where “one code serves “high functions” in public domains and the other one serves “low functions” in private domains” (Piller 2002: 121). Piller’s focus is on the use of German/English partners’ national languages (namely, German and English). However, she is rather cautious about the mainstream idea of them as unified and homogeneous entities:

[T]he labels “English” and “German”, which are so readily used by the participants, and indeed by everybody else, are reifications. In a non-trivial sense languages do not exist as such, but are abstractions and idealizations on the basis of a number of related dialects. […] There is no principled (linguistic) way to predict what this abstraction will be based on. It is based on political considerations, most frequently ideologies such as “one nation, one language”, which stipulates that national and linguistic borders march. (Piller 2002: 120)

Piller’s claim is that any variety (or language with the national name) is not necessarily limited within national borders and is characterized by significant (in Piller’s terms, internal) variation (see Section 3.1). On the example of couples who live in South-Western Germany and confronted with the issues relating to non-standard varieties (specifically, Swabian dialect), Piller describes how such internal language variation influences the couples’ language use. According to Piller, “a non-standard variety may constitute an additional language that has to be dealt with” (Piller 2002: 121). Moreover, “dealing with this additional language [dialect] may be harder because it is not recognized as such” (ibid.). Similar to Piller’s findings is the partners’ view that the standard variety of Hochdeutsch is more intelligible and prestigious/’high’ while regional dialects are more appropriate for private communication (e.g. with family or friends). However, contrary to Piller’s claim, my participants conceive of the standard - Hochdeutsch/High German - as “additional” and problematic in their intimate discourse rather than of their L1 dialect varieties within such German. Despite this dissimilarity, the participants’ accounts about their experiences with
such variation, or what Bakhtin refers to as *vari-speechness* within the ‘same’ language (see Section 3.1), dispel the utopia that there is a standard of whatever language as a homogeneous entity, on the one hand. On the other hand, they demonstrate that such variation can further the partners’ preferences for ‘neutral’ lingua franca as their private language.

Whatever the preferences, however, all the couples in my study demonstrate a high degree of capability to use the potential of any available linguistic resources, or to language in general. The last extract in this section illustrates this partners’ capability of languaging and a positive effect of the experience with the ‘additional’ dialect-like variety of Austrian German. In the extract taken from Couple 4, Monica describes Patrick’s communication with her “bigger family” who are the users of one of the Austrian dialects – Carinthian/Kärntnerisch - as “really surprising”:

**Extract 36**  
(C4/au-cz/I4, Prompt 2.3, 387-394): *my grandmother who speaks really carinthian [...] is crazy about him*

Monica: well. he everybody is <@> crazy about him. </@> like (every-) like my bigger family it’s really surprising that my grandmother who spoke speaks really carinthian. and she knows that. okay. well. it’s a little bit more difficult for him to understand. [...] @@ <@@> she is talking to him. and she talks and talks and talks and? and she is </@> i think also because of this she is so yeah. crazy.

As can be seen, Monica (like other partners) emphasizes that, unlike Austrian Standard German, the Carinthian dialect of her extended family is “a little bit more difficult for him [Patrick] to understand”. However, she presupposes that this very fact makes “everybody crazy about him”. She accounts for such sympathy to Patrick by his ability to communicate even though he is not able to understand the Carinthian dialect. What Monica brings centre stage here is the importance of the partners’ general ability to communicate whereby they are doing discourse through different realizations of *language* rather than separate distinct *languages* (see Section 5.5). According to Monica, what makes her family “crazy” about Patrick is exactly his capability to communicate – to language – by drawing upon any available resources even if he is not proficient in or cannot understand a particular (separate) variety that is used in her family.

To sum up, as can be seen from the discussed extracts, most partners perceive their languages as different separate varieties – French as distinct from Ukrainian/Russian, Italian/Czech/Hebrew/Hungarian as distinct from German, and/or the Austrian regional dialect varieties as distinct from the Austrian/German standard variety. Moreover, they describe such differences as the main reason why they prefer to maintain ELF in their private communication. However, the partners’ perceptions often do not correspond to what they
actually do, experience and/or report. They all connect the difficulties of language variation and alternation to differences in doing culture rather than language. They explain these challenges as the result of different realizations of the same human process of negotiating meaning and/or doing culture. In this sense, they see their private ELF as an extension of their previous (cultural/pragmatic) experience with and through language in general (predominantly through their L1 varieties). As a result, on the one hand, most partners claim that they would prefer to do their ‘coupleness’ in their L1s. On the other hand, they maintain ELF in their private communication to avoid the challenges of the linguistic variation within those L1s. It can be said, then, that although the partners in my study often position themselves as ELF couples and connect their ‘coupleness’ to their ‘ELFness’, they often identify themselves with their L1s as individuals.

7.3 CONCLUSION: ‘EVERY LOVE STORY IS BEAUTIFUL BUT OURS IS IN ELF’

The central finding of this chapter is that all the participants in my study emphasise the primary importance of communication for their relationship. All the partners in my research claim that their capability to communicate with each other is the crucial factor for the successful establishment of the dyads’ relationship in whatever language. Hence, this also indirectly points out to the importance of ELF for such success, since it is the only language shared by all the partners at the time of their meeting. In Section 7.1, the partners’ discussion of their ‘love story’ demonstrate that the process of establishing and maintaining partners’ ‘coupleness’ and togetherness is not so much about the fact that partners have different first languages or cultures (and nationalities). Rather, it has to do with partners’ capability to establish and maintain the shared linguistic and cultural (in our terms, contextual and pretextual) territory and, in doing so, to achieve the desired pretext of togetherness in the process of positioning themselves as a couple. This, of course, is not to diminish the role of their languages and cultures in such process. Furthermore, language practices of all the couples can be primarily characterised as hybrid since they all are using languages other than English within their ELF during the interview. However, most couples do not pay much attention to the languages they use as long as they achieve their communicative purposes in sharing their love stories with the researcher.
Section 7.2 demonstrates that the concepts of ELF and ELFness as perceived by the couples are rather multifaceted. The only common feature of participants’ understanding of ELF and of themselves as an ELF couple is that English is often the only medium of communicative choice that partners can use to establish and accomplish their ‘coupleness’, especially at the beginning of the partners’ relationship. Other reasons such as fairness of ELF, the extent of partners’ identification of their ‘coupleness’ with ELF, proficiency in English, the role of translation, the relationship between L1 standards and dialects, and/or the fact that English is a language of the country/surrounding (e.g. an exchange students’ program) where they met are specific and vary from couple to couple. Thus, the partners’ understanding of ELF as a private language is a complex issue, and so is the couples’ ‘ELFness’. Even more complicated is the process of exploiting languages other than English within ELF and, vice versa, ELF within the partners’ languages. As can be seen from the data and comments of all the couples so far, those uses are the integral part of their ‘ELFness’, are not fixed and are as natural/’normal’ for the partners as the general practice of doing their ‘coupleness’ in any language. In fact, all the issues reported by the couples and discussed above point out to the partners’ awareness of the necessity to negotiate meaning and to establish a shared territory by drawing upon any available linguistic resources. In this respect, doing ‘ELFness’ is the integral part of doing ‘coupleness’. It is not the process that is unusual but a manner in which the process is realized. In other words, ELF situation in which the partners do not have a shared preconceived L1 resource makes the necessity to negotiate and create a shared lingua-cultural resource more apparent. This pragmatic process of meaning negotiation in ELF couple discourse, and the interactive features connected to the use of ELF and languages other than English within ELF in the process of establishing and maintaining the partners’ ‘coupleness’ are the central concern of all that follows.
8. A LOVE AFFAIR IN ELF: “THIS LITTLE WORLD OF OURS”

As I have preliminary demonstrated, towards the end of the process of data collection, it has become clear that the couples within the category subjects-ELF couples differ greatly as ‘real’ people in their understanding of the role of ELF and languages other than English (predominantly their L1) in their relationship. This has led me to the realization that the process of categorizing the couples-subjects on the basis of their common features always undermines the unique experience of each and every couple as people, and of each and every partner as an individual. This, in turn, emphasises the necessity to be aware of the essential instability of language, which gives rise to a multiplicity of possible interpretations of text/talk produced by the couples. What is common about all the couples in my study is that they perceive their ‘ELFness’ as something unique and often connect such uniqueness to the special characteristics of their private code as the use or fusion of any available linguistic resources. In the following, I first discuss what the partners in my project report about the role and use of such linguistic resources in their private ELF talk. In Sections 8.1, I explore the partners’ second-person perspective on linguistic practices in their private discourse. The focus is on what the couples claim to be significant interactive features of their private communication as mediated by hybrid forms, namely exploiting compensatory techniques, doing fun and using language intertextually. Section 8.2 is central in this thesis and brings together the first, second, and third person perspectives in the researcher’s position on the partner’s interaction. As a researcher and an ‘insider’ of ELF couple discourse, I present my own analysis and interpretation of the couple’s interaction by looking at the partners’ self-recorded naturally occurring talk. I also consider the partners’ perspective on the selected pieces of their interaction. The central concern here is to look at how different contextual and pretextual factors may act upon the same hybrid features of the participants’ text.

8.1 THE HYBRID NATURE OF ELF AS POLYPHONIC LANGUAGING: “IT WAS OUR LANGUAGE… OUR ENGLISH”

As we have already preliminary seen from the interview extracts above, most partners do not only report but also extensively do linguistic hybridity during their
interaction. All the couples-participants claim to use the unique “own English” (C3/it-au/I3, Prompt 5.1: 752-754) from the very beginning of the relationship. They delineate this special kind of English as a “mixture of everything” (C3/it-au/I3, Prompt 5.2: 906) from various available sources. The description of the couples’ hybrid practices as those encompassing all the virtual resources which partners have at their disposal comes forth in the next extract:

**Extract 37** (C5/au-hu/I5, Prompt 6, 392-403): *right now what we have it’s a little bit of a mix of german and er english and hungarian*

1. Paul: well we can speak only english. later on german mix but
2. Anna: english still the main language. […]
3. Paul: right now what we have it’s a little bit of a mix of german and […] english and hungarian.

Although Anna claims that English is “still main language” (turn 2) in their relationship, the partners describe their language use as “a little bit of a mix of german and english and hungarian” (turn 3). Throughout the interview and in their comments, the couple explain that they do not only use their L1s within their ELF, but also expressions from many other languages they have come in contact with in the course of their lives. They give examples of such expressions which include those in their L1s – German and Hungarian, but also a few words of Spanish and Portuguese (e.g. *mucho bueno*, Section 8.2.7) they adapted from their friends and also from the time Anna spent in Portugal.

What Anna and Paul say about their language use as fusion of all the available resources is true about all the participants in my study. However, most examples of linguistic hybridity in my data come from the partners’ L1s. As an illustration of how such private resource is being established, consider the following:

**Extract 38** (C3/it-au/I3/Prompt 4, 884-899): *you are mixing everything... which is not a problem at all for US because we understand each other*

1. Sandy: the risk is really like what i’m doing now that we are not talking any more english. correct english and correct german. that you are mixing everything.
2. Peter: (that) with each other we are talking like without trying to talk just good english or whatever it’s just often?
3. Sandy: which is not a problem at all for US because we understand each other.

As can be seen from the extract, Sandy and Peter make it clear that the linguistic resources in their ELF are not exhausted by the virtual resource of English. They devise new, “more natural”, lexical and grammatical innovations by drawing upon whatever languages available to them (predominantly their L1s - Italian and German) in the process of ‘attuning’ themselves to the context of intimate relationship. What the partners are saying is that they *are doing* their private English by “mixing everything”, by modifying “real/correct English”
into their own English for the purposes of their intimate discourse. What, in turn, the couples-participants say about the main features of such discourse is summarized in the extract from Couple 5:

**Extract 39** (C5/au-hu/I5, Prompt 4.2, 942-959): paul is really good with making comments/kann mann nichts machen muss man akzeptieren

Anna: paul is really good with making comments, you know this small things you know. so his his actually is somehow a very functional approach in that he you know he is not trying to produce relative sentences you know [...] like lo- like clauses attached to each other but more like you know [...] even like small comments like <L1de> aber sicher doch. oder {but sure. or} </L1de> [...] you know the things you say <L1de> passt. oder {it’s okay. or} </L1de> [...] <L1de> gehe schon. oder {i am fine. or} </L1de> [...] you know whenever i am telling him something what he should do or something that’s the way it is and then he says <L1de> kann mann nichts machen. muss man akzeptieren. {one can do nothing. one must accept} </L1de> @@@@@

In the extract, Anna lists some Paul’s German private expressions, or “small comments” that he, in her view, incorporates very neatly with “very functional approach” into the partners’ ELF. She explains the pragmatic significance of one of the phrases in their private space. According to Anna, there are situations when she tries to influence Paul’s actions for the good of the couple. She explains that Paul often does not protest and accepts Anna’s suggestions with the phrase: kann mann nichts machen. muss man akzeptieren. It is obvious from the context and partners’ reaction to Anna’s remark (both partners response with laughter marked as @ in the transcription) that the shared frame of reference has been already created for this German phrase (as well as other listed expressions) and it is part of partners’ private territory. The same is true about the Hungarian words and expressions that, according to Paul, Anna sometimes uses: “she uses this sometimes. [...] and i guess that’s just our little world. just few little things <L1hu> koeszoenoem {thank you} </L1hu> [...] yeah. exactly our private code” (C5/au-hu/I5, Prompt 5.4, 741-747). Here, Paul in fact summarizes what all the couples report about their private interaction. He gives an example of the Hungarian koeszoenoem and delineates it as one of “few little things” that constitute the partners’ shared “little world”. Likewise, most couples are as unanimous as Anna and Paul that linguistic hybridity as language alternation is the constitutive element of their private language and, consequently, of their private space. In sum, all the couples see their private language as a crucial characteristic of their relationship. The participants describe it as hybrid, or as fusion of all the available linguistic resources – predominantly English and the partners’ L1s. Taking into account what the couples report about their private language in this section, it is interesting to look at what they have to say about the process of its creating and maintaining
in more detail. This is the focus of the next sections. As before, my main concern is the use of languages other than English within couples’ ELF.

8.1.1 **ELUSIVENESS OF (ASSUMED) LINGUISTIC BOUNDARIES: COMPENSATORY STRATEGIES AS AN INTERACTIVE FEATURE OF COUPLE DISCOURSE**

Most couples report a lack of the English resource as one of the main reason why they incorporate elements from other languages (mainly their L1s) into their ELF. The partners often explain such a lack in terms of immediate availability and so relate it to the least-effort principle that drive all language use (cf. Seidlhofer 2009: 196-198). As Peter and Sandy from Couple 3 put it, “instead of really giving effort to think about the right word we just mix it with german with italian” “with words that come more natural” (C3/it-au/I3/Prompt 5: 940-947). This is what I refer to as *compensatory strategies* in this section. I define such strategies as uses of languages other than English that reduce the partners’ online producing/processing time and/or load, and so facilitate communication. This means that the partners do not necessarily compensate because they do not know the “right” English word but rather because the words and expressions come “more natural” and are more appropriate or fitting their purposes. Consider the following:

**Extract 40** (C3/it-au/I3, Prompt 5.1, 723-740): *we invented our own language*

1. Peter: first of all we invented our own <40> language so </40>
2. Sandy: <40> <@> english </@> @@@ </40>
3. Peter: for example it was some also <L1de> PYJAMA {pyjamas} </L1de> i think because if we didn’t know a word? we just try to find it in one other language and included it to our english. […] for example we always want and it was easy that we couldn’t remember the word motorway so it was <LNit> autostrada {motorway} </LNit> i think instead even while talking we say <LNit> autostrada {motorway} </LNit> instead of motorway. or whatever.
4. Sandy: or <LNde> nachtkastl {bedside table} </LNde>
5. Peter: <L1de> nachtkastl {bedside table} </L1de> for example

As can be seen, Sandy and Peter claim here that, from the very beginning, they created their unique couple language that nobody else shares. They explain that they use the expressions from all the available languages within their ELF. Throughout the interview, the partners give the examples of such expressions which include both Italian (Sandy’s L1) – *autostrada, coperta, tovaglia* – and Austrian German (Peter’s L1) – *nachtkastl* – words (C3/it-au/I3/Prompt 5.1). The partners use the words not only, as Peter puts it, “because it was like sitting in scotland and not knowing how it’s called in english” (C3/it-au/I3/Prompt 5.3, 962-966). As we can observe, the partners provide the English equivalents for most hybrid forms. The question arises why “mixing” then. The couple report at least two reasons for doing so.
The first motivation, as I have already mentioned, has to do with communicative efficiency. The second regards the expression of joint couple identity. These two basic functions of language – the communicative and the identifying – is a central theme that resonates throughout all my data and is the focus of Section 8.2. Meanwhile, let us have a closer look at Peter’s perception of *pyjama* as a non-English word. Here, we have an interesting example of the deeply entrenched – in fact, assumed - idea of boundaries between separate distinct languages. Indeed, Peter’s version of the word (most likely Austrian German) is slightly different from English plural *pyjamas/pajamas*. It is rather difficult to say whether Peter uses the German or Italian variant of the word. The spelling of the two is slightly different – *Pyjama* and *pigiama* (German and Italian respectively) – but the pronunciation and the meaning of the words are quite the same. If we consult The Online Oxford Dictionary for the meaning of *pyjamas*, we shall find out that it generally matches those in German and Italian as well: “a loose-fitting jacket and trousers for sleeping in”. Such similarities can be explained by the same etymology of all the listed lexical elements. TOOD informs us that the English term, for example, originates from early 19th century from Urdu and Persian *pāy* “leg” and *jāma* “clothing”. This is also true about all the other variants. The alternative expressions in the partners’ different languages are a good example of what linguists refer to as *cognates* that “are similar in both form and meaning and [...] go back to a common source” (Schendl 2001: 17). According to Hülmbauer (2011: 143), *pyjama* can be classified as “the upside of plurilingual influence”. Similar to Hülmbauer’s findings in the investigation of cognates in ELF talk, *pyjama* is an item with the relatively high degree of form-meaning correspondence in the partners’ languages. It forms at least a triangle of cognates in English, German and Italian and “falls under category of ‘internationalisms’” that Hülmbauer refers to as “true friends” or “true cognates” (Hülmbauer 2011: 144, 147). Thus, on the one hand, *pyjama* is an instance of compensatory strategy employed by the partners to create their own private language and space when they “didn’t know a word?” and “try to find it in one other language and included it to [their] english” (turn 3). On the other hand, it is an overt cognate – a hybrid form – that fuses English, German and Italian resources and can be taken as evidence of the elusiveness and fuzziness of what is often assumed to be separate language entities.

69 Cf. DUDEN Wörterbuch Online: http://www.duden.de/rechtschreibung/Pyjama for the definition of the German word and Wikipidea – of the Italian word.
A similar example of such compensatory strategy based on the assumed ‘non-Englishness’ and elusiveness of the item comes from Couple 4. It occurs in Monica and Patrick’s discussion of how they use words and expressions from (presumably) other languages to compensate a lack of the virtual resource of English:

**Extract 41  (C4/au-cz/I4, Prompt 5, 869-880): it doesn’t have to be better. it’s good enough**

Monica: the point is it doesn’t have to be better. it’s it’s good enough. i o- hardly ever can well right now there was something i didn’t know puk in in english you know like you have a puk and there’s i have no clue what it is in @@ @ <@@> english </@> […] so this is like it’s some- it’s happening that i do not know a word? but it doesn’t really matter. and about grammar and tenses it just doesn’t happen that we do not understand or we have a feeling okay we do not express something right.

As can be seen, Monica claims that the partners’ English “doesn’t have to be better. it’s good enough” for their purposes. Like Peter in the previous extract, she points out that the partners’ English is special in that it comprises elements from all the available languages. She reports the compensatory strategy as one of the main reasons for using other languages than English in their private ELF and describes this strategy on the example of PUK. This abbreviation stands for “a pin unlock key” which is a personal unblocking code used in mobile telephones to reset PIN – personal identification number – that has been lost or forgotten (cf. Wikipedia).

It is obvious from the discussion that Monica is not aware of the English origin of the abbreviation. Treating PUK as a German word, she says that “it doesn’t really matter” what elements from what languages the partners may use, since, as Monica puts it, “it just doesn’t happen that we do not understand or we have a feeling okay we do not express something right”. Although PUK may not be the best example of the partners’ use of linguistic resources other than English, there are two points that are crucial here. The first is Monica’s statement that words and resources are not important so long as the partners manage to establish the shared frame of reference and create the desired rapport. Second, similar to the previous example, Monica’s discussion of PUK demonstrates that the boundaries between languages and their separateness or distinctiveness is often imagined. This being so, the discussion of pyjama and PUK is a good illustration of the partners’ languaging whereby they are doing different realizations of language in general rather than a language or different separate languages that are dissociated from each other (see Chapter 3).

While in the previous extract PUK is reported as an incorporation of the presumed German item that compensates Monica’s lack of English vocabulary, in the next extract the couple discusses another such ‘incrustation’ which is clearly German. In the following,
Patrick discusses ‘English-is-not-enough’ situations and the importance of the partners’ L1s for their communication:

**Extract 42  (C4/au-cz/I4, Prompt 7.3, 1265-1274): i’m really begeistert**

Patrick: there are some PATTerns which are you know you can make a scale of expression, you are really satisfied or less satisfied and so on and your native language which you very much know which word or which kind of english you should use. [...] and in german and at all and in german definitely as well but in czech you have a lot of this kind of steps like to express yourself. you know from okay it was okay. and i’m really <LNde> begeistert {enthusiastic} <LNde> [...] well i don’t know what’s the word in english but (some) <@@> @ @ @ so yeah @ @ @

Here, describing the different “scales” of expressing satisfaction, deep sympathy or happiness, Patrick produces begeistert as a word for describing the highest degree of affection to somebody (see Chapter 9). This use, on the one hand, is a good example of the compensatory strategy when one does not know “what’s the word in english”. On the other hand, it is interesting that Patrick uses his L2 German rather than L1 Czech for such compensatory purposes. One can assume that he does so for at least two reasons. First, Patrick’s use can be motivated by the fact that all the participants of this interview are more or less proficient speakers of German, while Czech is unintelligible at least for me – the interviewer. Second, one can suppose that for Patrick the word has already undergone the process of what neurolinguists refer to as (language) embodiment (Pavlenko 2007, cf. also Chapter 9). According to Pavlenko, a language triggers emotions only when it is embodied in human brain that is integrated with an individual non-verbal sensory representations and experiential memories. Such integration, in turn, activates particular brain structures that are involved in the generation of emotions. As concerns begeistert, this means that Patrick experienced the word in some particular context in the past and, as a result, it invokes particular “sensory images and psychological reactions” (ibid. 155) to him. In other words (in our terms), Patrick has made the word his own by developing particular emotional memory or pretext for it. In this sense, the compensatory strategy here is not simply about substituting the unknown English linguistic elements by the corresponding words and phrases in the partners’ L1/L2s. It can rather be seen as a better match between form and function for its producer (and perhaps, for the recipients as well, at least for Monica). This relates to our discussion in Section 7.2.1 and to what Monica has to say about this particular word – begeistert – in the following extract:
Extract 43  (C4/au-cz/I4, Prompt 5.4, 1286-1315): *it’s much more emotional to (me) because that’s how you learned the meaning of the word*

Monica: this is the we like the MEANING of a word we got to know in our first language. […] so this will be always the best and most precise. and the other language will be always second. […] because it’s i don’t know `<L1de> begeistert {enthusiastic}`? `<L1de> in german […] it’s this that’s how i got to know to know what is `<L1de> begeistert {enthusiastic}` `<L1de> […] and exactly says in this `<L1de> sinn {sense}` `<L1de>` of word and english okay it’s? what is it excited? […] so okay that’s the that’s the translation but […] yeah i think it’s much more emotional to (me) because yeah that’s how you learned what the meaning of the word

Monica speaks here about the difference between communicating in ELF and her L1 Austrian German. Her point is that “the MEANING of a word we got to know in our first language. […] will be always the best and most precise”. Taking Patrick’s *begeistert* as an example, she argues that L1 is always “much more emotional” because “that’s how you learned what the meaning of the word” is. In fact, Patrick’s *begeistert* gives rise to the partners mixed and even contradictory descriptions of the emotional and cultural associations with their different languages. On the one hand, they both claim that English will always retain a shade of foreignness in that it is detached from what they “got to know” in their first languages and primary cultures. On the other hand, the fact that Patrick uses *begeistert* - the word of his L2 – as an example of the most emotionally loaded verbal manifestation deflates Monica’s claim that ELF or “the other language will be always second” in comparison with the partners’ L1s. As we can see, there is a contradiction between *what is said* (by Monica) and *what is done* (by Patrick and in fact by both partners). Like in Section 7.2.1, Monica’s claim that something always gets lost in another – foreign – language, or to be more precise in ELF, suggests that there is some complete meaning encoded in a language which can be fully expressed and recovered. The partners’ compensatory strategies, however, serve as evidence that there is no such enciphered meaning and no possibility of such expression. In other words, the partners’ compensatory uses often are not so much about lost meaning, a lack of words, or substitution of the English words with those in other languages in order to be more precise but rather about deriving different discourses from a form/a text/a language. Naturally enough, the partners report better march of form and function, or of text and discourse, in their own (although not necessarily) experienced and ‘embodied’ L1s. This, however, does not prevent the partners’ expressing intended discourse by designing a text in all the available linguistic resources – including their L2s - accordingly to their purpose/pretext of accomplishing ‘coupleness’.
8.1.2  ACCOMPLISHING COUPLENESS BY HUMOUR AND LANGUAGE PLAY:  
“IT’S REALLY FUNNY. IF YOU GET THIS”

Another reported reason for linguistic hybridity in couples’ talk is also connected to emotions or affective private space, specifically to a sense of fun. Commenting on their private language, Couple 2, for example, claim that “most of it is in english or […] hebrew” (C2/il-au/Prompt 5.2, 835-836) and often serves to create a humorous effect. In the next extract, the partners illustrate how they use other languages than English, namely their L1s – Hebrew and German – for such playful motivation:

Extract 44  (C2/il-au/Prompt 5.2, 840-856): bali la mut

1. Henry: <LNil> bali la mut. {i want to die.} 71 <LNil> for example. […] every time sue came home from studying in tel aviv university she opened the door she came in <LNil> bali la mut. {i want to die.} <LNil> (and i’m dead) […]
2. Sue: @::: @::: @::: @::: @::: @::: @::: @::: @::: @::: oh my god i can’t remember. <un> xx <un> bali la mut. {i want to die.} <L1il> is an i mean worn and <L1il> kl- {no-} <L1il>
3. Henry: <LNil> klum {nothing} <LNil>
4. Sue: <L1il> klum {nothing} <L1il> ja {yes} <LNde> yeah we have yeah we have a lot of things in hebrew. and english.

Here, the partners report the Hebrew bali la mut (turn 1, 2), and klum (turn 3,4) as the elements of their private language. According to Henry, bali la mut (like most Hebrew words and expressions) appeared in the couple’s lexicon when they lived in Tel Aviv. Sue uses this expression when she is very tired and exhausted, or as she herself puts it, “worn” (turn 2). Since Hebrew, so to speak, is Greek to me, I can only rely on how the partners themselves explain this word. Their definitions are different but not conflicting. Henry provides his understanding of bali la mut as the phrase “i wanna die” (turn 1). Sue classifies it only as an adjective that can be translated as “worn” (turn 2). According to the partners, they use this word humorously when feel tired and exhausted as a bid for sympathy and countenance in their private territory. It can be said that the word serves as a means of the partners’ positioning as a dyad to create the joint couple identity by achieving the effect of fun and togetherness.

This couple is not alone in adducing the sheer joy that they derive from language alternation. Couple 1 – Nargiz and Dan - also explain that they enjoy language play afforded by the available linguistic resources in the next extract:

70 Henceforth, the spelling and translation of all the Hebrew words and expression are preserved as provided by the couple.
71 Henceforth Henry’s translation.
Extract 45  (C1/ua-fr/Prompt 4.2, 493-509): because it’s funny for nargiz.

1. Dan: and some(times) i can use some russian name like <LNru> что это за дерьмо такой /tʃto eto za dermo takoi/ {what’s the shit} <LNru> because it’s funny for nargiz. […]

2. Nargiz: @@@@@

3. I: aha @@@ <@> okay. i see. </@> @@@ @@@

4. Dan: <@> so you see it’s funny. so it’s funny to use it or </@> <L1fr> oui ce qui est la mes {yes what is my} </L1fr> <LNru> тапушки. /tapotʃki/ </LNru> тапочки. /tapoʃki/ {slippers} <LNru> or? i know some words in russian. <LNru> чемоданчик. /tʃemodantʃik/ {a little suitcase} <LNru> котик. /kotik/ {a kitten} <LNru> пушка. /puʃka/ {gun} </LNru>

Here, Dan reports that, despite the initial dominance of ELF and later on French in the partners’ communication, there are a number of words and expressions from other available languages that have been established as part of their private code. They include some Russian words and expressions such as что это за дерьмо такой /tʃto eto za dermo takoi/, тапочки /tapotʃki/, чемоданчик /tʃemodantʃik/, котик. /kotik/, пушка. /puʃka/. Dan explains that he uses these words and expressions for at least two reasons. First, they are “funny for nargiz” (turn 1, 4) and “are very nice to hear” (C1/ua-fr/Prompt 5.2: 591). The second reason is that the Russian words and expressions are part of the couple’s private space, something unique and exclusive because the partners “use it only” (C1/ua-fr/Prompt 5.2: 606). Again, such partners’ language play is a deliberate strategy. In the interview, Dan responses affirmatively to my question if he understands what the words mean and provides their French equivalents such as, for example, pantoufles for the Russian тапочки. Clearly, then, all these expressions have been already familiarized and territorialized into the partner’s private affective space for the reasons of fun that, in turn, creates the effect of intimacy and ‘coupleness’.

However, similar to other examples that we have discussed so far, not all of the instances of language alternation here are used in conformity with the conventions sanctioned by the ‘native’ society/community. Such words as тапочки от чемоданчик are rather neutral nouns that delineate comfortable items of every-day domestic use in all the couples’ languages and differ from the English or French variants only by the degree of creating the effect of intimacy, fun and exoticism. The expression что это за дерьмо такой /tʃto eto za dermo takoi/ {what’s the shit} is of a different kind here. In Russian, it is an expression of obscenity that includes the taboo word дерьмо {shit}. It is obvious from our discussion of the extract that Dan does not identify himself with the ‘Russian’ native society whose code of verbal behaviour would classify this phrase an improper and inappropriate. He knows the

72 The Russian котик (“a kitten”) in private discourse is often used as an endearment term - equivalent to “sweet heart”, “honey” and the like.
semantic meaning of the phrase but has no social investment into it. Even if the expression embodied in his brain (see Section 8.1.1), it triggers rather different emotions and psychological reactions from those possible of a ‘native’ speaker. Obviously, for Dan the phrase is not invective and sounds “nice” and “funny”: he uses it for making Nargiz laugh. Once I myself heard the phrase distinctly, I also burst with laughter (turn 3). Dan’s reaction to my laughter is “you see. it’s funny” (turn 4). Understandably, what has made me laugh is not so much that I find the phrase itself funny. Rather it is Dan’s serene unawareness of its possible effect on me as an L1 speaker of the language. Yet, what might be unacceptable in Nargiz’s and my ‘native’ society appears to be quite appropriate in the partners’ private space.

Interestingly (and naturally) enough, Dan is not so enthusiastic about Nargiz’s merde /shit/ - the French (Dan’s L1) equivalent of дерьмо /shit/. Consider the following:

Extract 46 (C1/ua-fr/Prompt 5.6, 791-809): but <L1ru> дерьмо /dermo/ {shit} </L1ru> it’s er (.) yeah. you feel it.

1. Nargiz: i think it’s the same with kind bad words. you know. when you something like
2. Dan: <L1ru> дерьмо /dermo/ {shit} </L1ru>
3. Nargiz: <L1ru> дерьмо /dermo/ {shit} </L1ru> <LNfr> voila {well} </LNfr> <L1ru> дерьмо /dermo/ {shit} </L1ru> for dan it’s just <L1ru> дерьмо /dermo/ {shit} </L1ru> you know. and for me <LNfr> merde {shit} </LNfr> in french i can say <LNfr> merde merde merde {shit shit shit} </LNfr> every time?
4. Dan: you say it too much.
5. Nargiz: yes. i say it. he thinks i say it too much. but for me it’s just a sound. it means nothing. it doesn’t touch me you know. […] but it touch french. so sometimes somebody aha <LNfr> nana {woman} </LNfr> you can’t say <LNfr> merde {shit} </LNfr> all the time. all the time you know. for me it means NOthing. it’s just a word. it’s just a sound. you know. but <L1ru> дерьмо /dermo/ {shit} </L1ru> it’s yeah. you feel it. when somebody say you. <L1ru> ты дерьмо /ty dermo/ {you are shit} </L1ru>. it’s completely different <LNfr> voila. {here you are.} </LNfr>

Here, Nargiz discusses emotional associations of the partners’ languages, specifically “bad words” in their L1s. She explains that the French merde is “just a sound” that “means nothing” and “doesn’t touch” (turn 5) her. The same is true about the Russian дерьмо /dermo/ for Dan. As the partners explain, the ‘native’ conventions of using these L2 words have no psychological jurisdiction over their individual verbal behaviour. Moreover, the partners appear to develop their own pragmatic significance of the Russian phrase, although being aware of its semantic denotation and possible (negative indeed) pragmatic values that Nargiz might read into it. Nargiz herself reports that it is definitely a foul word in her ‘native’ Ukrainian discourse. As she puts it, contrary to her L2 merde, “<L1ru> дерьмо /dermo/ {shit} </L1ru> it’s yeah. you feel it. when somebody say you. <L1ru> ты дерьмо /ty dermo/ {you are shit} </L1ru>. it’s completely different” (turn 5). As we have seen, despite Nargiz’s
individual negative perceptions of the word, the partners created the shared pragmatic significance for it which is connected to the effect of fun and togetherness rather than insult and aggression in their private space. As regards the French *merde* (*shit*), though, the partners have not managed to establish the shared frame of reference and, consequently, shared position towards it. They read rather different discourses with different pretextual effects into it. For Nargiz, “it’s just a word” (turn 5) and retains its foreignness with no psychological/emotional rule over Nargiz’s conduct. For Dan, it is a linguistic element that is conventionalized as improper and vulgar in his ‘native’ primary – French – society/culture. It can be said, then, that the partners developed rather different contextual and pretextual frameworks for two identical - Russian and French words - with the similar semantic denotation. In the case of *что это за дерьмо такой* (*what's the shit*), the partners’ shared mutually developed private pragmatic (contextual and pretextual) value/position override Nargiz’s individual ‘native’ conditions of verbal conduct. While in the case of *merde* (*shit*), Dan’s individual ‘national’ linguistic territory with corresponding individual position based on the primary – ‘native’ French - code of conduct overrules the conventions of the partners’ private space. In other words, Dan’s (national/primary) culture is in conflict with Nargiz’s *merde* here and her unawareness of its possible effects on the French ‘native’ speakers. Nargiz uses this particular taboo word without being encumbered with the imposed foreign etiquette, and in doing so, disturbs Dan’s individual cultural security. The peculiarities of emotionally ‘un/loaded’ words in partners’ languages is discussed by almost all the couples in my project and is symptomatic of their social dis/connection with the ‘native’ cultures of particular communities. This is the focus of later sections. Now, the point is that despite the negative connotation in the native conditions of use, the Russian phrase *что это за дерьмо такой* (*what’s the shit*) does not create any undesirable negative effects but is reported to have a playful motivation in the partners’ private discourse. As is the case with the Russian *пушка* /puʃka/ (*gun*) in the next conversation from the same couple:

**Extract 47**  
(C1/ua-fr/Prompt 4.3, 493-546): **пушка** /puʃka/ (*gun*)

1. Dan: <13> because we like this word <LNru> пушка. /puʃka/ (*gun*) <LNru> @@@ @@@ @@@ <13> […] <LNru> пушка. /puʃka/ (*gun*) <LNru> gun if you want it. @@@ @@@ it’s a joke. but it’s true […] because i guess it’s one maybe the first or the second words i learn in ukraine? […] because i i tried to not to travel but to go to the city for example alone? […] so and i’d like to buy some <LNru> пушка. /puʃka/ (*gun*) <LNru> on the market.
2. Nargiz: @@ @
3. Dan: so i had to know <LNru> пушка. /puʃka/ (*gun*) <LNru>
4. Nargiz: @@@ @ @: :::
5. Dan: because if you know <LNru> пушка. /puʃka/ {gun} <LNru> you can buy <LNru> пушка. /puʃka/ {gun} <LNru>

6. Nargiz: @@@ @@@@@@@

7. I: @ so i can’t get the idea what does it mean @@@@@@@ <@@> how you can buy <LNru> пушка. /puʃka/ {gun} <LNru> in the market. @@@

8. Nargiz: @@@ @@@@@@@

9. Dan: yes. i wanted to buy <LNru> пушка. /puʃka/ {gun} <LNru> that was very important for me for my morale. ’cause

10. I: you mean gun. aha.

11. Dan: sometimes i felt alone in this market and <LNru> пушка. /puʃka/ {gun} <LNru> helped me to feel to feel better.

In this rather extended extract, Dan explains one more private word that the couple uses for fun reasons. The word is the Russian пушка /puʃka/ {gun}. It is important to note that I was bewildered by this use, despite the fact that Russian is one of my L1s. As it turned out in the course of our discussion, not only the partners’ private pragmatic values were obscure to me. We had different semantic denotations of the word in mind as well. The fact is that the most common semantic meaning of the word is a cannon: “A large, heavy piece of artillery, typically mounted on wheels, formerly used in warfare” (TOOD, cf. also Современный Толковый Словарь Русского Языка Ефремовой Online for the definition of the Russian word). This is what I understood under пушка {gun} when I heard it first in Dan’s list of the partners’ Russian private words and expressions. In this extract, Dan clarifies that the partners use this word in the meaning that is listed in the dictionary as a colloquial term – a revolver (cf. Современный Толковый Словарь Русского Языка Ефремовой Online). Despite the fact that Dan clarifies the meaning of the word, frames this use as a joke – “it’s a joke. but it’s true” (turn 1) – and the whole discussion is accompanied by Nargiz’s peals of laughter, I am rather puzzled with this example: “so i can’t get the idea what does it mean @@@@@@@ <@@> how you can buy <LNru> пушка. /puʃka/ {gun} <LNru> in the market. @@@” (turn 7). Only after several Dan’s clarifications, I realized that he wanted to buy a revolver or a pistol rather than a cannon at a market in Ukraine. The idea that пушка {gun} can somehow be linked to the frame of reference of a market does not immediately comes to my mind because I am inclined to interpret things by relating them to what is schematically/culturally established as normal and customary in my native ‘Ukrainian’ society. As I have argued, the schemata are cultural constructs that are often taken for granted. The same is true about my personal schematic frame for the word market, specifically a market in Ukraine. The preconceived schematic assumption of a market as a place or store where one can buy or sell different products such as food or household items is so deeply entrenched in my mind that it is rather difficult for me to imagine any alternative way of thinking of it. Neither can I say
that a gun or any firearms are household items. In other words, it is not easy for me to process how market and пушка /puʃka/ {gun} are linked to each other since they represent two different unrelated frames of reference in my mind and society. Dan, obviously, has rather different schematic expectations about Ukraine in general and Ukrainian markets in particular. His idea about Ukraine is that it is one of the ‘Mafiosi’ countries of the East Block: a country without laws or, so to speak, with the only law – the law of the jungles or street justice: “sometimes i felt alone in this market and <LNru> пушка. /puʃka./ {gun.}</LNru> helped me to feel to feel better” (turn 11). He sees Ukrainians as a society where it is common to buy weapons at the market and to solve all the social problems by means of those firearms rather than in the state institutions. Therefore, once he came to Ukraine, he expected (or rather reports his expecting) to buy a gun for self-protection. For this reason, it was “one maybe the first or the second words” (turn 1) that Dan learned in Ukraine. As he puts it quite reasonably, “if you know <LNru> пушка. /puʃka./ {gun.}</LNru> you can buy <LNru> пушка. /puʃka./ {gun.}</LNru>” (turn 7). It seems that in Dan views пушка {gun} as one of the words (such as привет /privet/ {hello}) that one must know in order to be able to communicate at the basic level in Ukraine. Because of these stereotypes or schematic preconceptions, he might have found himself in quite a ridiculous situation when trying to buy weapons at one of the markets in Nargiz’s native rather provincial cosy quiet city in Western Ukraine. One can assume this from Dan’s delineation of пушка {gun} in the partners’ private discourse as a joke and, at the same time, as derived from a “true” situation (turn 1). Whatever the meaning of this use, it is symptomatic of the partners’ interpersonal relations. By using this private term, the partners establish their shared position as a couple with the purpose of achieving the effect of fun, humour and togetherness. As Dan puts it, “so when i could say one word in russian real russian that my wife could understand i was very very happy. <LNru> привет /privet/ {hello}</LNru> it’s okay. <LNru> пушка. /puʃka./ {gun.}</LNru> it’s okay” (C1/ua-fr/I1/Prompt 4.1: 557-561).

The sense of fun is also tangible in what Nargiz has to say about the partners’ ELF and the role of other languages within it in the next sequel:

Extract 48  (C1/ua-fr/I1/Prompt 4.4-4.6, 637-653): we use @@ a few @@ words in russian and it’s very funny. </@>

Nargiz: @@ no they found this kind of language stupid, because or i speak english, or i speak french. but like i did the mix you know. […] it was already difficult to speak ONLY english, because i already knew some french and i heard some french every day. so it was kind of difficult speak only english you know. and then step by step i @@ i learned </@> more french. so now i can say
few words sometimes in english if i want or if i really if it’s really difficult to find a french word? for me. so i can use some english […] yes. and we use <@> a few @@ words in russian and it’s very funny. </@> and i find it wonderful because dan when he use this words he use it very […] naturally and in a good moments you know.

What Nargiz reports here is that the partners have been using all the available languages in their private space from the very beginning of their relationship and later on when “it was already difficult to speak ONLY english”. Despite the fact that some people from the partners’ surrounding evaluate such “mix” negatively as “stupid”, Nargiz explains that she finds the fusion “wonderful” since the words from other languages are used “in good moments” and “it’s very funny”.

In sum, this section have considered how the partners’ private ‘mix’ can be a source of fun. Most couples evaluate the hybrid nature of their ELF positively as language play that is a continuous source for creating their private jokes and so establishing the shared affective territory. The next section explores another resource that is often connected to the sense of fun and togetherness in couples’ private space. These are words and phrases from public texts and discourses such as TV shows or movies that partners use for their private communicative purposes.

8.1.3 (Dialogic) Intertextuality as an Interactional Feature of the Interplay Between Private and Public Culture in Couple Discourse

The central concerns of this study is functioning of ELF and hybrid forms within it to pragmatic effect. As I have argued in Chapter 5, this question directly relates to the relationship between language and culture. Such relationship, in turn, is about what (and to what extent) standards that represent a code of (verbal) conduct for particular social/cultural communities influence the partners’ behaviour within their private ELF territory. All the examples in this section in one or another way are connected to such public73 standards of (verbal) behaviour and show how they influence the couples’ private interaction. To be more precise, the examples demonstrate how the partners express their own feelings and values by intertextual repetition of words and phrases taken from other people in such public domains as mass media, movies, advertisement or public gatherings such as a party.

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73 For the purpose of this thesis, I refer to public discourse as that related to any kind of interaction outside the dyads’ relationship. For a more detailed consideration of the dynamic nature of the relationship between the private and public see Bourdieu (1996), Goffman (1959), and Gal (2005). For the discussion of the public and the private in family interaction see Tovares (2007).
The first example comes from Couple 3 and demonstrates couples’ intertextual uses of languages other than English. In the next sequels, the partners talk about the peculiarities of their private language and describe it as “mainly English but there are a lot of words from German and Italian that are coming together” (C3/it-au/I3/Prompt 5: 912-913). They give several examples of such hybrid ‘coming-togethers’ that are already established as elements of their private territory and originate from different Austrian TV shows. One of such examples is discussed in the following extract:

Extract 49  (C3/I3/Prompt 5.3, 1073-1097): ich muss weg

1. Sandy: <LNde> ich muss weg. [i must leave.] </LNde>
2. Peter: <L1de> ich muss weg. [i must leave.] </L1de> [...]
3. Sandy: <73> @: @@@@ </73>
4. Peter: <73> that’s something </73> something in the interview there was a funny scene. he’s always showing scenes from other <spel> tv </spel> shows. [...] and there was a politician that was interviewed and brought about something really embarrassing for him. and he was trying to get out of it somehow. and suddenly it was like <L1de> ich muss weg. [i must leave.] </L1de> [...] and left. and it was m- the such a funny thing that nowadays people always say in German when they (.) for fun reasons and now it’s getting a bit embarrassing <imitating> <L1de> ich muss weg. [i must leave.] </L1de> </imitating> [...] like just completely out of the context. [...] and those are phrases that we for example are using if we’re feeling sitting somewhere and it’s uncomfortable and <L1de> ich muss weg. [i must leave.] </L1de>.

Here, Peter discusses one of the Austrian TV shows with a politician who is interviewed at it. At some point, the politician finds himself in a rather embarrassing situation. In order to ‘save face’, to avoid answering embarrassing questions and to get out of the uncomfortable situation, he suddenly declares that he must leave and does so without any further explanations. As Peter puts it, “and suddenly it was like <L1de> ich muss weg. [i must leave.] </L1de> [...] and left” (turn 4). Such politician’s behaviour, however, makes the situation even more embarrassing and “like just completely out of the context.” (turn 4). According to Peter, the partners have adapted the politician’s “funny” German phrase for their own private space to signal each other that the situation is getting awkward and it is time to leave: “if we’re feeling sitting somewhere and it’s uncomfortable and <L1de> ich muss weg. [i must leave.] </L1de>” (turn 4).

Nicknames or pet names also are an important element in all the couples’ emotional affective territories. The next example comes from the same couple and illustrates how Sandy and Peter establish the special terms of endearment with the intertextual allusion to the public discourse of cartoon. Unlike the previous example, the nickname discussed below is not a direct intertextual repetition of words or phrases from the public discourse. However, the
partners’ recognition of such allusion creates a particular pragmatic effect of fun and intimacy in their private space. Consider the following:

**Extract 50 (C3/it-au/I3/Prompt 5.3, 1014-1035): topolino**

Peter: yeah <L1de> maus {mouse} </L1de> and mouse [...] i tried to find out that <LNi> -ino </LNi> is always the <L1de> -chen. </L1de> that making the small version. [...] in german and so i found out that a <LNi> topolino {little mouse} </LNi> is a small mouse? and that’s why […] for some when i was writing i was calling her <LNi> topolino {little mouse} </LNi> for example. [...] yes. ‘cause <LNi> topo {mouse} </LNi> is a mouse? and <LNi> -ino {little} </LNi> is always a small version. […] and then i found out that <LNi> topolino {little mouse} </LNi> is also a mickey mouse.

In the extract, Peter explains the process of his creating a new endearment term for Sandy. For this purpose, he has chosen the German word Maus (English mouse). It is important to note here that the German diminishing equivalent of the word – Mausì or Mäuschen – is a common endearment term in Austria. Perhaps, this is the reason why Peter has taken this word as a ‘basis’ for his verbal creation. He clarifies that, in the process of inventing the new nickname for Sandy, he was puzzled with the patterns of forming the diminishing forms in her L1 Italian. He took the path of analogy and found “out that <LNi> -ino </LNi> is always the <L1de> -chen. </L1de> that making the small version”. That is to say, he deliberately looked for the Italian morpheme that corresponds to the German diminishing (Verkleinung/Koseform) noun suffix -chen74 (Cf. DUDEN Rechtsschreibung Online for the rules of forming diminutives in German and meaning of the suffix –chen). The resulting form was topolino: “’cause <LNi> topo {mouse} </LNi> is a mouse? and <LNi> -ino {little} </LNi> is always a small version”. The form, clearly, has been invented to create the emotional effect of sympathy and intimacy. However, Sandy was only partly affected as intended. As it turned out, the Italian topolino also stands for the name of the famous animal cartoon character and the official mascot of the Walt Disney Company - Mickey Mouse (1929, cf. also Wikipedia). As Peter explains: “then i found out that <LNi> topolino {little mouse} </LNi> is also a mickey mouse”. Obviously, Peter’s hybrid creation of topolino with a triple meaning of a little mouse in Italian, allusion to the Austrian endearment term Mausì and its intertextual connection to the ‘American celebrity’ - Mickey Mouse - has also a humorous amusing effect upon Sandy whenever she is addressed so. In this respect, here the partners’ intimate culture is established in the linguistic term of topolino that combines the elements of at least three virtual resources - Italian, German and English.

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74 DUDEN Rechtsschreibung Online - http://www.duden.de/rechtschreibung/_chen#Bedeutung1a
Apart from such feature as intertextuality, the next two examples are those that can be an illustration of translation as an interactive feature of ELF couple discourse (see Section 7.2.2). As Sandy and Peter (C3/it-au) themselves characterize one of such ‘translations’ adapted into their private space in the next example, it is “with the german meaning but in english” (Extract 51, turn 5). Consider the following:

**Extract 51**  
(C3/it-au/I3/Prompt 5, 1101-1145): *let’s say it was nothing*

1. Sandy: **let’s say it was nothing** @@ [@] …
2. Peter: from erasmus students that (3) when we are really talking (not) right english. […] you know <L1de> ich </L1de> yeah in austrian we say <soft> how do we say it in austrian </soft> <L1de> *sag ma es war nix* {let’s say it was nothing} </L1de> in one of the phrase. […] if you try <L1de> genau {exactly} </L1de> it’s and a friend of us was trying? came to the party and there were ten austrians and ten <spel> us </spel> americans and he said trying party was not success. and it was like okay let’s close the party <L1de> *sag ma es war nix* {let’s say it was nothing} </L1de> and then he turned to the americans and <imitating> for you let’s say it was nothing </imitating> and they <imitating> haeh? what does he wanna tell us. </imitating> and so those phrases like *let’s say it was nothing* is used in english […] it’s just translated one to one so they never ever say it in english, but it means that the austrian version <L1de> *sag ma es war nix* {let’s say it was nothing} </L1de> but that is funny because we always remember that the <L1de> *sinn* {sense} </L1de> […] when we try to do something and it didn’t work out. […]
3. Sandy: with the german meaning but in english […]
4. Peter: because it’s funny because we always remember about the […] situation.

Sandy and Peter describe one of the parties for Erasmus students in Edinburg. According to the partners, a friend of theirs – an Austrian - tried to say to “ten” US Americans that the party was a failure in his L2 English. For this purpose, he directly translated the Austrian dialect idiom - *Sag ma es war nix* - into English. As the partners explain, this idiom describes the situations when one “tr[ies] to do something and it didn’t work out” (turn 2). The resulting literally ‘translated’ utterance was “let’s say it was nothing” (turn 1, 2). Of course, the partners’ American friends were not part of the ‘Austrian’ symbolic conventions and, therefore, were rather puzzled by the phrase since “they never ever say it in english” (turn 2). Peter describes their reaction to the phrase as follows: “and they <imitating> haeh? what does he wanna tell us. </imitating>” (turn 2). Peter himself provides a more corresponding translation of *Sag ma es war nix* in the same turn: “party was not success”. As can be seen, the Austrian idiom “just translated one to one” (turn 2) has caused the interpretative problems because an assumption of shared cultural knowledge established in linguistic terms is not warranted. The Americans simply do not know what is being referred to. This communication lapse creates, however, a humorous effect to Sandy and Peter for whom the English translation alludes to the Austrian idiom and functions with indexical effectiveness. The partners report this phrase to be a source of fun whenever they use it: “it’s funny because we
always remember about the [...] situation” (turn 4). As can be seen, the English idiom – *Let’s say it was nothing* - that has been created intertextually online by direct translation and allusion to the Austrian idiom in the public discourse of the party has become an element of the partners’ private affective space.

The next example comes from Sue and Henry (C2/il-au). Similarly to *Let’s say it was nothing* in the previous example, it is an example of ‘loan’ translation or “the use of literal translations of compound words, idioms, and lexical collocations from the source language” (Pavlenko, Jarvis 2002: 202) that intertextually alludes to a famous movie. It is reported to be an element of the partners’ private space and demonstrate how the partners jointly negotiate and establish their couple’s beliefs and values through (intertextual) interaction with such public media as DVD movies. The couple claim that it is their first German private joke within their ELF. What is interesting about this phrase is the story of establishing it as an element of the private affective territory and reasons why the partners use it. Those the partners discuss in the following:

**Extract 52 (C2/il-au/Prompt 5.4, 858-897): lustig mein mann ist**

1. Sue: a german <\<LNde>lustig mein mann ist</LNde> {funny my husband is} <\<LNde> […]
2. Henry: did you see star wars. [...] you know yoda. that’s he has a very funny way of talking. […] yeah? he twists. […] sentences, […] yeah? and he doesn’t say you are not ready yet? he says ready you are not yet. […] and also this is not my husband is funny? funny my husband <43> is. […]
3. Sue: @@@ @@@ @@@@ @@@@ but it’s also because i i i was speaking german incorrectly. and then he said that it’s you know it’s […] @@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@ @: it’s really funny. if you get this @@@ @: <LNde> lustig mein mann ist. {funny my husband is.} </LNde> @@@@:::

If we look closer at the syntax of the expression *lustig mein mann ist* (turn 1, 3), we shall find out that it is, as Henry puts it, ‘twisted’ (turn 2). The string of words deviates from German affirmative structure in Gegenwart SVP (subject-verb phrase) that generally corresponds to English affirmative SVP-structure in the Present Indefinite Tense. It does not manifest the grammatical rules of neither German nor English, since the verbal phrase *ist lustig/is funny*, where adjectives are used as complements after the link verb *to be/sein*, is split up and inverted here (cf. Swan 1980: 71, 174; Dreyer and Schmidt 2001: 224 for the usage of the English and German predicative adjectives correspondingly). But, as I have already argued, people do not normally manifest or exemplify the rules or grammars; they realize or textualize their discourses by exploiting linguistic resources. Why, then, this deviation? Henry’s explanation clears things up. It turns out that the couple have adapted Yoda’s “funny way of talking” (turn 2) in this expression. Yoda is a fictional character that first appears in “The Empire Strikes Back” – one of the films of the “Star Wars” (1977) space opera franchise.
created by George Lucas (cf. Wikipedia). Yoda’s speech syntax is generally characterised by
inverted word order such as OSV-structure (object-subject-verb), which is a deviation from
the English grammatical rules. According to Henry, Yoda would not say “my husband is
funny” but “funny my husband is” (turn 2). However, the intertextual allusion to Yoda and
his style is not the only source for establishing the phrase as an element of the partners’
timate space place. Sue claims that they find this expression particularly funny and
matching to their private language also because it is in German and she “was speaking
german incorrectly” (turn 3). Indeed, there are some differences between word order in the
English and German grammars. Such differences might bring about some idiosyncratic
‘Yoda-like’ inconsistencies when combined in Sue’s linguistic performance. I have occasion
to discuss one of such from the same couple in Section 8.5.5. Meanwhile, the point is that by
this deliberate ungrammatical use the partners transcend the limits of grammatical
conventions sanctioned by the ‘standard’ codes of both German and English for their own
purposes. Specifically, out of this syntactic anomaly, they intertextually create a meaningful
effect of fun and togetherness. As Sue puts it, “it’s really funny. if you get this @@@@:

<SLn> lustig mein mann ist.” {funny my husband is.} </Lnde>” (turn 2).

Thus far, we have considered how ELF partners adapt non-English ‘public’ words
into their private space. The last two examples come from the same Couple 2 and show how
intertextuality works ‘less apparently’ within one language, namely English. The examples
are also a good illustration of how the researcher and the partners’ contextual and pretextual
factors can act upon the same English form in different ways. The first is one of the couple’s
English private words – absolutely. It first appears in Henry’s response absolutely. to say it
in johnny’s words absolutely (Extract 14: turn 3) to my summary of their love story (see
Section 7.1.2). As it has turned out, the word is adapted from the partners’ friend and so is
an example of the intertextual hybridity. Consider the partners’ explanation of this use:

Extract 53  (C2/il-au/I2/Prompt 5.1, 806-820): absolutely

1. Henry: my favourite one now. absolutely. […] remember we were sitting in the restaurant with
[first name 1]. […] and he is not listening to her at all. and whatever she asks him [first name 1]?
absolutely. […] absolutely. absolutely. absolutely. absolutely.
2. I: and what does it mean in your code now. absolutely.
3. Henry: that i am <39> not listening. </39>
4. Sue: <39> that he is not </39> listening. @@@@<40> @@@@<40> @@@@<40>
5. Henry: <40> absolutely. </40>
6. Sue: @@ @@ @@ @@ /// he looks at me when he thinks about other things he says absolutely.
Here, Henry describes the context of the partners’ adaptation of the word into their private space. It came from their friend with whom the partners were out in a restaurant. The friend was not listening to Sue and for politeness reasons answered all her questions with absolutely. Henry explains that, likewise, he uses absolutely as a backchannel when he is not interested in or does not feel like listening to what Sue says. This explanation sheds new light on the partners’ discussion in Extract 14 (Section 7.1.2). In the extract, Sue’s appeal to Henry - right schatzi? - to join our discussion can be now taken as evidence that, at the time of producing absolutely, Henry is distracted by something or thinks, as Sue puts it, “about other things” (turn 6). However, as we have seen in Extract 14, Henry actively reacts to all the preceding and following discussion in the interchange. Therefore, it is more likely that his absolutely there is not only an ‘i-am-not-listening-but-would-like-to-be-polite’ backchannel. One can assume that my interpretation of what the partners felt at their first meeting - you felt that you knew him all your life (Extract 14, turn 1) - sounds too sentimental to Henry and so his absolutely has an ironical note as well. Whatever the reason and Henry’s intention, I was not part to the partners’ conventions when the word has first occurred in our discussion. I have interpreted absolutely literary, to use TOOD definition, as an adverb with the semantic meaning “with no qualification, restriction, or limitation; totally”. That is to say, I have known what absolutely signifies in the dictionary, but its pragmatic significance that the partners read into it has been rather obscure to me in this particular use. I have taken it as evidence of Henry’s strong agreement with what Sue and I have said. The partners, however, read their own (private) discourse into it, namely take it as evidence that Henry does not listen to, is not interested in the discussion, or does not agree with what Sue (and I) is saying. From the perspective of positioning, the partners’ absolutely extends their private space into the public domain of interviewing - with me as an interviewer and them as interviewees - whereby each party derives her/his own discourse from this use. The word, then, is demonstrative of the relationship between text and discourse in the process of positioning, whereby meaning is not only regulated by and constructed within the constraints of the genre (in our case, interview), which provides the necessary framework for our communication. It is also a function of individual manoeuvre that is driven by the partners’ private conventions which the researcher is not party to.

The last example of intertextuality is also an adaptation from a movie. It is the English word barely. The couple discuss it in the following extract:

**Extract 54** (C2/il-au/Prompt 5.5, 921-987): barely
Henry: **barely.** do you remember the word **barely.**

Sue: @@@@@@@@@@@ @@@@@@@@@@@@@@@ @@@@@@@@@@@ yes.

Henry: **barely.** […] it’s from (2) very funny movie with […] what’s his name. bill murray. is he ca-is it? what’s his name? is it bill murray? […] yeah. it’s a very funny movie. […] it’s about crazy guy who gets addicted to his […] psychiatrist. and follows him wherever he goes. a really funny movie. […]

Sue: no when we want to say when we want to say something you know we you know we want use this word or something similar? […] and then he says it in a funny way. the way he says it in the movie and then it’s funny. @@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@ @@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@ @@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@ @@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@
(turn 4). For the partners, the two networks of knowledge or frames of reference – movie and their private space – for barely are in close convergence here, and no negotiation is necessary. However, the intended and derived pragmatic significance of barely would remain obscure to the researcher without the partners’ account of their private individual contextual and pretextual factors that mediate this use.

In sum, all the examples in this section illustrate how the couples’ actual (linguistic) behaviour is realized intertextually in all kinds of variable ways. By focusing on the examples of uses that allude to particular texts of public discourse, I have demonstrated how the partners adapt ‘public’ phrases and words into their private conceptual and affective space for their communicative purposes. Apart from blending various linguistic resources within their private ELF that are observable on the textual level, the couples fuse the public and the private in the dialogic process of accomplishing their joint couple identity in ‘less apparent’ ‘monolingual’ ways as well.

8.1.4 SUMMARY

In this section, I go over the main aspects of what the ELF couples say about what they do with their private language. As we have seen, all the couples see linguistic hybridity as a central and unique characteristic of their private language and relationship in general. They either report/describe (often hybrid) features of their private language and tell the stories of how the words and expressions have become part of their private space, or simply use them during the interview and their retrospective comments. Various formal aspects of linguistic hybridity such as vocabulary and/or grammar come up in the participants’ talk about their private language. However, identifying these hybrids as textual features tells us nothing about their discourse function. As I have demonstrated, the partners use them for particular reasons such as better match between form and function, language play, humour, and intertextual expression of joint couple identity. That is to say, the partners exploit these various features to negotiate both some agreement on the conceptual meaning and to manage human relations.
8.2 DOING HYBRIDITY: “MAYBE THE THINGS WE GREW UP WITH”

As we have seen from the previous discussion of the couples’ data, the main point the partners make is that their ‘ELFness’ and language use in general is about textualizing their discourses to achieve particular communicative purposes. All their communication is interpersonal positioning. It means that couples must not only have the shared language but also some minimum of the shared prior knowledge of the world (cultural knowledge) for communication to take place. Partners’ communication, in this sense, is a matter of negotiating convergence of their contextual/cultural knowledge. However, ‘interpersonal’ also means that the degree to which the partners (as any other language users) converge does not only depend on how far they are able to do so. It rather depends on how the parties position themselves and how far they want to converge. That is to say, the extent to which partners achieves the agreement is regulated by the purpose of their communication at the first place. As I have argued and as the participants report, in couple discourse the process of positioning predominantly depends on the partners’ capability and desire to achieve the pretext of domestic intimacy and togetherness. In the previous sections, we have mainly focused on the partners attitudes to ELF and language use in general in their private discourse. In the following, I explore how the couples are engaged in the process of establishing their ‘coupleness’ in the examples of their actual (linguistic) behaviour in the self-recorded private conversations. I first represent my own perspective on the couples’ discourse by looking at language alternation and hybrid forms in terms of their formal textual features but also their possible cultural values. Apart from representing my own analysis and interpretation of the couple’s interaction, I also consider how the partners themselves explain the selected pieces of their recordings retrospectively.

8.2.1 “SOLL ICH RAEMEN?”: PARTNERS’ ACHIEVING ACCESSIBILITY AND ACCEPTABILITY OF MEANING IN THE PROCESS OF ACCOMPLISHING COUPLENESS

To begin with, let us look at how the couples use linguistic hybridity in the general process of achieving meaning in their discourse. Thus far, the crucial point has been that the partners in my project do not simply ‘mix’ certain separate words or structures from the languages other than English within their ELF. They rather textualize their discourses by

75 Some examples in this section were discussed in Klötzl 2013 and 2014.
drawing upon all the available resources for particular communicative purposes. In other words, what matters in partners’ communication is pragmatic function or pragmatic effect rather than language/s and/or formal (hybrid) features of their textualizations. In order to achieve such effect, partners must bring the networks of their knowledge – both systemic and schematic – into convergence. In other words, they do not only express something (or make the message accessible) but also address a partner to achieve contextual and pretextual – in Austin’s terms, propositional, illocutionary and perlocutionary - meaning of the message. In this view, the partners must make the message both accessible and acceptable to the other. Let us consider how Sue and Henry (C2/il-au) are engaged in this process in the following:


1. Sue: <LNde> soll ich raeumen? {should i clear away?} </LNde>
2. Henry: yaeh. (10) remember when we: went to the: apartment at leonding last time. i bought this cordial?
3. Sue: what <L1il /imam/ מאמי? {sweetie} </L1il>
4. Henry: last time we went to leonding i bought the cordial?
5. Sue: yeah.
6. Henry: still there. (8)
7. Sue: what do you mean? (1)
8. Henry: should i've brought it maybe? (3) no that drinks it in the leonding you know? we are not there. (3)
9. Sue: <LNde> schatzi {sweetie} </LNde> what does your mother do there <LNde> eigentlich. {actually} </LNde>

Let us go through the interchange utterance by utterance and look at how the partners use their languages and hybrid forms within their ELF to negotiate and process the message of the interaction. In this interchange, Couple 2 - Sue and Henry - have just finished their dinner. In turn 1, Sue asks Henry in his L1 German whether she should clear the table: “soll ich raeumen?” The utterance is produced in the language other than English. It is clearly the case of fusing two - German and English – resources in the same interchange. Such fusion however goes smoothly and Henry’s short positive answer in English – *yeah* (turn 2) - marks the successful connection between him and Sue. One can assume that both acceptance of Sue’s offer and request for action - ‘Yes, please. It is very nice of you’ - is conveyed here at the illocutionary level. After a short pause, the conversation shifts into a new state. Henry goes on with the preparatory utterance for another act and asks Sue - again in English - whether she remembers that they “bought this cordial” (turn 2). This time the connection fails because Sue cannot hear the message well. Sue asks Henry for repair: “what <L1he מאמי/ /mami/? {sweetie} </L1he>” (turn 3). She textualizes her request by blending (for whatever reasons) English *what* and the Hebrew endearing term מאמי/mami. Henry repeats
his question to restore connection: “last time we went to leonding i bought the cordial?” (turn 4). In turn 5, the message is received and understood by Sue. Sue confirms by her “yeah” (turn 5) that she does know what cordial Henry speaks about. At this point, let us briefly consider what Henry might mean by cordial. The Online Merriam Webster English Dictionary (henceforth TOMWED), defines cordial as follows: “1. a sweet alcoholic drink; 2. a drink of heavy fruit juice that is mixed with water; 3. stimulating medicine or drink; 4. liqueur”. As it turned out, Henry uses cordial in meaning 2. In his retrospective comment, Henry does not only demonstrate a cordial (a bottle of black current syrup) but also describes it as “an australian word” that denotes “syrup” (C2/il-au/Com 10). The reason for such classifying of cordial as the word with the national name is that Henry has never “heard it elsewhere else” (ibid.). Whatever the source of adaptation, turns 2-6 of the interaction can be taken as the case of propositional repair or the partners’ negotiation of the message accessibility. First, Sue does not know and/or cannot remember what cordial is being referred to. In the course of interaction, the partners have established the connection between their networks of knowledge: Sue has recognized what proposition Henry expresses and what he means by “the cordial”.

However, Sue still does not grasp the illocutionary force of the utterance: Henry’s message “[the cordial] still there” (turn 6) does not mediate. Sue shows no recognition of Henry’s intention and again calls for repair: “what do you mean?” (turn 7). Gradually it emerges that what Henry wants Sue to know is not only that the cordial is “still there”, but that he wants to do something about it. The message is not conveyed until Sue is led to realize that the utterance “remember i bought the cordial [...] still there” is meant to carry the illocutionary force of a service offer: “should i’ve brought it maybe? no that drinks it in the leonding you know? we are not there” (turn 8) (‘Since we are not living in the apartment now, I think I bring the cordial to our place so that it does not get out of order’). Sue, however, shows no verbal connection again. She does not answer Henry’s request and changes the focus on the other propositional content of interaction in line 9: “<LNde> schatzi {sweetie} </LNde> what does you mother do there <LNde> eigentlich {actually} </LNde>”. Of course, it is possible that Henry gets some Sue’s paralinguistic response – a nod or a gesture. It is worth mentioning that Henry himself reports such paralinguistic features of the partners’ private language and defines it as “talk with our hands” (C2/il-au/Com9) or characterizes it as a non-verbal private “face” communication: “i don’t know if it’s code. i think it’s we understand we know each other pretty well. [...]if i look in sue’s face if we are somewhere i
know pretty much if she likes it or not” (C2/il-au/I2/Prompt 5: 790-791). In fact, Henry says here that the partners’ networks of knowledge are so interwoven by close everyday contact that messages often are easy to achieve without language at all. This can be the case in this particular interaction as well. Instead of giving Henry any verbal request for action (such as ‘Oh, I see. Yes, please. Be a darling and bring the cordial to our place’ or ‘Oh, I see. But I do not think it is necessary. Your parents might wish to drink it when they are in the apartment’ or ‘Oh, I see. Do as you wish. I do not care about this cordial’), Sue might just have nodded or shaken her head, made any other gesture or somehow signalled her reaction on her, in Henry’s words, “face”. As I have already discussed in Chapter 6, audio data cannot provide a researcher with such evidence.

In my view, however, Sue’s last utterance (turn 9) most likely is an example of what Widdowson (2009: 192-193) refers to as selective interpretation. The scholar suggests that there are at least two kinds of procedures of text processing: those that result in immediate interpretation and those that result in selective interpretation. Immediate interpretation has to do with the processing of the propositions and their possible values as they appear in the sequence in the ongoing development of the discourse. Selective interpretation works towards recognition of what information is most important, and what is unnecessary. Consider the following:

Widdowson discusses this kind of interpretation in relation to the procedures of analysis and interpretation in the field of discourse analysis. However, as Widdowson surmises, the question of relationship between immediate and selective interpretation does not only have to do with the procedures of interpretation that discourse analysts employ in their analysis (which is most often a matter of selective interpretation according to the researcher’s pretext/purpose). It also concerns the problem of establishing correspondence between interactants’ own intention and interpretation in their actual experience. Taking into account what Widdowson says about interpretative procedures, what I have discussed thus far is an example of immediate interpretation of Sue and Henry’s interaction by going through and working out the propositions and possible function of their utterances as they appear in sequence – one by one – in the running discourse. This, however, does not necessarily explain
what the partners themselves focus on or disregard as unimportant at the selective level of their interaction. They might recognize as more relevant other functions of their utterances and interchange in general. If we turn back to the talk, it seems that there is a disparity between Henry’s intended and Sue’s interpreted significance of the propositional content at such selective level. It can be said that for Henry the main proposition of the interaction is the cordial and a particular action that must be done about it (turn 2-6). While Sue interprets all of the business about the cordial as unnecessary and takes it as an introduction to the main topic of their interaction – the apartment and what Henry’s mother is doing there (turns 2-7).

As I have already argued, such selective attention of both partners (and my own) on particular textual features and propositions of their utterances is regulated by their specific contextual factors and pretextual purposes. Henry’s pretext is to arrange things with the cordial so that it does not go bad. Sue’s pretextual agenda are regulated by her curiosity what “eigentlich {actually}” Henry’s mother is doing in the apartment.

Thus far we have considered how the partners establish the meaning of the message, how they establish the shared frame of reference (of the cordial or the apartment) in the interaction, and how they design their texts in such a way that each of them understands what the other is getting at. In short, we have looked at how they make the message accessible. The negotiation, however, is not only about the partners’ collaborating in practical action. It also involves the establishing conditions that facilitate the achievement of communicative purposes. In other words, it is a matter of interpersonal positioning, of each partner acting upon the other to receive recognition and approval of individual selves/positions without intruding too far to the territory of the other. To put it another way, to get the message accessible is not the only partners’ intention. The partners also want and need to make the message acceptable to each other. They need to design their texts in such a way that the other accepts the intended meaning and recognizes its validity. It can be assumed that one way to achieve such acceptability of individual positions in the partners’ private space is to draw upon languages other than English – the partners’ L1s. Why, after all, does Sue use all those non-English endearment terms such as /imam/ мами, or schatzi? Why does she textualize her offer for service in her L2 German: “soll ich raeumen?” Why does she use eigentlich instead of actually? Perhaps for the same reason why Henry does not get to the point straightaway in their shared ELF but produces a preparatory utterance first: “remember when we went to the apartment at leonding last time. i bought this cordial?” (turn 2). Specifically, because in both cases the partners need to prepare the ground beforehand, to make each other receptive.
to their purposes, and to mitigate the entry into each other’s individual world. Apart from other resources in this particular interchange and in the partners’ interaction in general, these are their languages other than English that function to such preparatory and mitigating effect.

Let us have a closer look at the partners’ endearing terms - the Hebrew מאמי/mami/ and German schatzi. It seems that these are already established terms of the partners’ intimate space that work towards creating common ground and achieving the effect of togetherness and intimacy. And this is also what the partners themselves state about the expressions. It is worth noting that initially I have not been sure whether I hear the word מאמי/mami/ right and have provisionally transcribed it as honey. During the retrospective discussion of the examples, Sue has repeatedly protested against this English term of endearment: “not honey. right, we don’t say honey to each other […] it’s not our language. honey. […] not honey. not honey” (C2/il-au/Com 3/16.04.2011). As can be seen, Sue characterizes honey as being not acceptable, as being “not their language”. The partners claim their L1s terms of endearment – מאמי/mami/ and schatzi – to be more appropriate for their purposes as a better match of form and function. I will discuss what the partners report about such ‘emotionally loaded’ expression and the reasons why they perceive some things as easier and more appropriately expressed in one language than in the other in more detail in a later chapter. Meanwhile, the point is that the pragmatic values of intimacy and togetherness are encoded here in linguistic terms of other than English endearment forms. It can be argued that by mediation of such alternative pet names the partners prepare the ground for performance of a particular act, to mitigate the intrusion into each other’s individual security and to ensure solidarity by appealing to their commonality and shared affective territory. Such acceptability is also a motivation why Sue often addresses Henry in his L1 German. In her retrospective comment, Sue explains that having English and German at her disposal in communication with her partner, she finds Henry’s L1 as the most appropriate while talking to him: “i prefer speaking in german than in english […] with henry” (C2/il-au/I2/Prompt 6, 530-532). Sue’s account to my prompt why she prefers to do so despite the fact that “it’s much easier for [her] in english” (ibid.) is rather simple and straightforward: “because it is his mother tongue” (C2/il-au/I2/Prompt 4.2, 600).\footnote{The issue of appropriateness of the partners’ languages in their private space, however, is not so simple. In our later discussion, Sue lists a number of other reasons - such as a country of residence, the language/s of the country of residence, her desire to acquire the language, and the sense of exclusion and dependence on the partner - as the reasons why she might prefer one language (German) to the other (English). More specifically, she would prefer Hebrew and English in Israel, and German in Austria.} It can be said that Sue sees German - her partner L1 - as more apt
to achieve acceptability of her textualization by making Henry’s individual ‘native’ territory their shared one. Whatever the purposes and preferences, the partners’ actual linguistic behaviour can be definitely delineated as hybrid: as defying all the possible demarcations between languages by fusing all the available resources for a better achievement of the propositional, illocutional and perlocutional/pretexutal value of their messages, or, in our terms, for a more accessible and acceptable textualization of their discourses.

In this section, I have described the partners’ interaction from my detached third-person analyst perspective. I have explored how the partners make connection between their frames of references, negotiate the convergence of their knowledge and achieve (or not achieve) the congruence of intention and interpretation necessary for the purpose of their interaction. In other words, we have considered how the partners achieve accessibility and acceptability of their individual messages and how they manage their interpersonal relations. I also have partly drawn upon the partners’ own second-person perspective on possible propositions and illocutionary/perlocutionary function of their discourse. As can be seen, the two perspectives on the discussed above extract largely correspond. The following extract is its sequel and is intended to demonstrate the possible disparities between my interpretation of the partners’ talk and the couple’s own perception of the interaction.

8.2.2 “Schatzi what does you mother do there eigentlich”: COUPLES’ USE OF HYBRID FORMS TO THE PRAGMATIC EFFECT OF INTIMACY

The example comes from the same Sue and Henry’s (C2/il-au) conversation. Here I consider how the partners’ text is designed and understood pretextually, and how its pretextual effect depends on my and the participants focus on particular aspects of meaning. As I have already mentioned the partners’ interaction in this sequel shifts to the new stage from the discussion of the cordial to the talk about the apartment and Henry mother’s activity in it. To make the processing of the partners’ talk easier, I start the sequel with the last Sue’s utterance from the previous extract (turn 9):

**Extract 56** (C2/il-au/Con 2/19.11.2009): you are not wearing jeans either [...] Stimmt

1. Sue: <LNde> schatzi [darling] </LNde> what does your mother do there <LNde> eigentlich. </LNde>
2. Henry: where?
3. Sue: in the apartment. (2) cleaning?
4. Henry: yeah. (.)
6. Henry: <L1de> na. [well] </L1de> she has to clean the toilet.
7. Sue: really?
In this extended example, we can quite easily follow the development of propositional content of the partners’ discourse. First, Sue wants to know what Henry’s mother is doing in the apartment. Henry clarifies that his mother is going to clean the apartment and provides a vivid description of her manner to do it: “my mother is not cleaning” (turn 8); “she is looking for the enemy. she is cleaning everywhere. you know. inside. outside. behind. up. down. everywhere” (turn 10); “all the closets in the kitchen you know she washes again and this and the backs. and she cleans the windo:ws. and everything” (turn 12). After Henry’s mentioning that his mother “cleans windows”, Sue is rather puzzled in turn 13: “the windows?” The discussion shifts into a new propositional content, namely cleaning windows in the apartment. That is to say, at the most general propositional level, we can quite uncontroversially say that Henry’s utterance “you can clean them. you know.” (turn 14) is about cleaning windows. However, as I have already argued, by textualizing their discourses, the partners do not only bring the two networks of knowledge (about what is and how to clean windows) together. They also position themselves in a particular way: they act upon each other to achieve a particular effect. As far as I have understood from the preceding discussion of the same conversation (see Section 8.2.1), the partners are speaking about the
apartment where they were planning to move to (or out) at that time. Presumably, Henry’s parents helped them to make it easier (e.g. to clean it before moving). This led me to recognition of Henry’s utterance - “you can clean them.” – as carrying the illocutionary force of a request for action and a pretext of picking a quarrel: ‘I do not think, Sue, it is good that my mother is cleaning windows in our apartment. I thought you might want to clean them”. This interpretation has set up my expectation of what follows in turns 13-23 as the partners’ fighting about who should clean the windows in the apartment and activated my schema of mother-in-law vs. daughter-in-law relations. Such schema presupposes (although not necessarily) the competing positions of two women with each one fighting for the recognition of her right to act upon one man – a son and a husband.

Consider my initial interpretation of the piece that has been activated by the discussed above frame before my having the partners’ retrospective comment on it: “The whole argument appears not to be about windows cleaning (proposition) but about cultural expectations (contextual factors) and desired effect (pretextual factors). In this extract, Henry obviously appeals for support and understanding on Sue’s part and tries to convince Sue in the necessity of cleaning the windows in their apartment. To some extent, it is a cultural or territorial clash caused by Henry’s intention to impose an obligation on Sue. Contextually, the reason for their argument in this instance might be the fact that Henry’s ‘Austrian’ reality does not correspond to Sue’s ‘Israeli’ one. Moreover, they both are not ready to co-operate in seeing things the partner’s way. That is why there is a disparity. What for Henry is a statement of fact (the windows must be cleaned) for Sue is an assertion to be challenged (cleaning windows is a waste of time). Pretextually, Henry’s impingement on Sue’s privacy causes the problem of acceptability. Sue’s reaction to Henry’s request in turns 14, 16, 18, 20 can be interpreted as carrying the meaning: ‘What do you think you are ordering about? Do it yourself’. Having exhausted his argument, Henry produces WHAT (turn 18) in high pitch tone. However, Sue does not seem to be affected by Henry’s high pitch, almost shouting. She counteracts Henry’s assertiveness by using his L1 and her L2 German stimmt in turn 23. It can be assumed that she uses an element of her partner’s L1 as co-operative reparatory move to mitigate the negative effect of their argument and to exercise solidarity. At the pretextual level, then, Sue’s German stimmt can be interpreted as an attempt to override the divergence of the partners’ individual contextual worlds and to appeal to their shared affective territory: ‘You are right, it is your country, your culture, your customary state of affairs, your schematic expectation about cleaning windows; but whatever your reality is I am appealing to you in
your language so that we would better try and find a compromise’. Sue’s stimmt, then, can be interpreted as an attempt to establish the couple shared reality and to accomplish their togetherness by fusion of their shared resource of ELF and the resource of Henry’s L1. As it can be seen, this interchange is a complex web of territorial and co-operative manoeuvres whereby the partners do not only negotiate convergence of their contextual/schematic worlds but also acceptability of their message.”

As can be seen, my position on the partners’ positioning in this interchange frames it as a quarrel. However, as I have already stated, there are at least two ways of looking at this interchange: the third-person perspective of the outsider observer and the perspective of the first person, the insider participant. In my interpretation above, I as a researcher have taken up the first position and this position in fact does not correspond to the insider positions of the participants. If we turn to the partners’ retrospective comment now, they reframe their interchange from what I have categorized as a conflict to a joke: “it sounds very different if we argue”, “then we break the plates. we don’t clean them. @ if we argue” (C2/il- au/Com10/16.04.2011). The partners are unanimous in rejecting my framing their ‘windows’ discussion as an argument or ‘fighting’. The perlocutionary effect that I have read off from Henry’s text does not correspond to what he has in mind either. Henry’s purpose here is to tease and amuse Sue rather than to mitigate or appeal for sympathy. This is what the couple retrospectively says about the piece:

**Extract 57**  (C2/il-au/Com10): if we don’t see through you know the window. we open them

1. Henry: we agree on this. we would not clean them.
2. Sue: no. what for. no. @ @ @ @ @ @ […]
3. Henry: @ you still can see. you know.
4. Sue: <11> @ @ @ @ @ @ @ @ @ @ /11>
5. I: <11> @ @ @ @ @ how /11> how the weather is outside.
6. Henry: yeah. and if we don’t see through you know the window. we open them. […] @ @ @

Here, intertextually referring to the partners’ discussion of cleaning the windows, Henry attempts to amuse both Sue and me in this comment again. His claim is that the partners “agree on this” (turn 1) and would not clean the windows, since “you still can see” (turn 3) and “and if we don’t see through you know the window. we open them” (turn 6). Henry’s utterance in turn 6, is an intertextual allusion to his utterance in Extract 56 (turn 16) - “to know how is the weather outside maybe?” – which is the response to Sue’s question why one might want to clean windows. Clearly, in both interchanges (the partners’ private talk and our retrospective discussion), Henry’s pretextual purpose is to amuse and create a humorous effect rather than pick a quarrel.
At this point, let us have a closer look at a source of confusion that brought about my alternative interpretation of this partners’ interchange and Sue’s *stimmt* within it. As I have already stated, the proposition of the partners’ talk is quite clear and uncontroversial. Both for the participants and the researcher, the frame of reference ‘cleaning the windows’ invokes windows, pane, rags, detergent, sponges, towels and other cleaning tools, supplies and procedures. The ambiguity of the partners’ text for me as a third-person observer is sustained by Henry’s utterance - “you can clean them, you know” – that call up (at least) two possible and competing illocutionary acts. I have taken Henry’s utterance as carrying the illocutionary force of request for action ‘Sue, can you (not my mother) clean the windows please?’ Henry intends it as an explanation and statement of the fact. The illocutionary function of the partners’ dialogue can be then reconstructed as follows:

Henry: My mom cleans windows in the apartment.
Sue: Really? What for?
Henry: You know some people do it. Here in Austria it’s normal to clean windows. I personally would not do it.
Sue: Neither would I. It’s waste of time.

However, the interchange is ambiguous not only because Henry’s utterance admits two different interpretations at the illocutionary level. The partners and my customary cultural schemata of cleaning windows provide us with opposing frameworks for understanding. In my version of social reality it is normal and necessarily to clean windows. In the partners’ private world, it is waste of time and energy. The same frame of reference activates rather different third-person observer and first-person insider schematic cultural/contextual and pretextual expectation. Consequently, what I interpreted as a conflict and divergence of the partners’ cultural beliefs is evidence of the convergence of their ways of ordering the world and recognized contextual conditions. Moreover, it is clear from the partners’ interaction that it is neither the propositional reference nor the illocutionary force that matters here but the perlocutionary effect. At such interpersonal level, the partners’ text and Sue’s *stimmt* within it is not so much designed to override the difference but rather to corroborate the convergence of the partners’ individual contextual worlds and pretextually achieve the desired effect of fun and what Aston (1988) refers to as comity by appealing to their shared affective territory. In sum, I have demonstrated how the contextual expectation and pretextual purpose regulates my and the partners’ focus of attention on the meaning of the couple’s text. My focus has been on the general process of meaning negotiation in which the partners refer their *texts* and hybrid forms within it to context, and realize those texts pragmatically by assigning them significance as *discourse*. In the next section, the main concern is the role of hybrid forms.
and languages other than English in general in the process of creating couples’ shared private territories.

8.2.3 “I’M OKAY TO PEDALER”: HYBRID FORMS AS AN ELEMENT OF PARTNERS’ SHARED PRIVATE TERRITORY

The first example in this section comes from Sandy and Peter’s data (C3/it-au). In the interchange, Sandy and Peter are discussing their plans to take a trip to the Dominican Republic over the New Year holidays. It is about half past eleven pm, late December 2009. They are looking for a hotel to stay at. Sandy is working on the computer and comments on the search results for the hotels and rooms available. Both partners are very tired. In this context, Sandy produces Italian *inaugurato* and *pesante*:

**Extract 58** (C3/it-au/Con 11/03.12.2009): you better did it less PESANTE

1. Peter: yes. so that that two ye- yeah. YOU said that it was it’s two or three years ago.
2. Sandy: no. that’s no i said that was the other one. it reads that it was inaugurated in two thousand and seven. but i didn’t say this.
3. Peter: what’s inaugurated? (2)
4. Sandy: yeah. to open something <L1it> inaugurato. {inaugurated} </L1it>
5. Peter: reopened it.
7. Peter: reopened it?
8. Sandy: we? no
10. Sandy: you know inaugurate it’s when you open for the first time.
11. Peter: yes and that was two years ago? or is it not?
12. Sandy: i didn’t see it. as i said i didn’t see it i don’t know if it was made two years ago so i no would told you?
13. Peter: haeh yes we: yesterday.
14. Sandy: no. because it was not that hotel peter. and we didn’t ever look at this <1> page yesterday. </1>
15. Peter: <1> maybe. </1>
16. Sandy: <2> because we’ve got it today. </2>
17. Peter: <2> i know that page </2> <3>maybe it’s not that hotel it looks exactly the same like one there <un> xxxx </un> </3>
18. Sandy: <3> it’s not other hotel because it’s that one. not one we saw yesterday</3>
19. Peter: good. so it’s a two year picture of course in google and that’s will be fair.
22. Sandy: <soft> what you did? </soft>
23. Peter: book. credit card. and what is showed on the screen.
24. Sandy: ah. pete::r.
25. Peter: <imitating> pete::r. </imitating> you better xxxx. it’s no time any more.
26. Sandy: you better did it less <L1it> PESANTE: {difficult} </L1it>
27. Peter: i am not <LNit> pesante. {difficult} </LNit>
28. Sandy: yes. you do::.

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77 This example was discussed in Klötzl, Svitlana. 2014. The discussion is substantially excerpted from: “De Gruyter [“Maybe just things we grew up with”: linguistic and cultural hybridity in ELF couple talk”], Walter De Gruyter GmbH Berlin Boston, [2015]. Copyright and all rights reserved. Material from this publication has been used with the permission of Walter De Gruyter GmbH.”
29. Peter: yes because i have all the right to be <LNit> pesante. {difficult} <LNit>  

If we look at the formal linguistic features only, Italian perfect participle *inaugurato* (turn 4) seems to be more accessible and, therefore, acceptable than *pesante* because of its formal resemblance to the English *inaugurated* (turn 2).\(^78\) Comparably to *inaugurato*, the hybrid *less pesante* (turn 26) with the English comparative *less* and Italian adjective *pesante* is a rather unusual configuration, which might lead to a decrease of accessibility. Interestingly enough, it seems that in this interchange the relatively accessible *inaugurato* provokes a (cultural?) conflict (turn 12-25) while intricate *pesante* repairs it (turn 26-31).

Let us firstly look at *inaugurato*. Here the connection between Sandy and Peter’s networks of knowledge fails since Peter does not understand the word at the general propositional level. However, the problem is not only (if at all) a matter of knowing the semantic meaning of the word. Neither is it the partners’ indexical reference to the different hotels. As I have argued above, the purpose of private conversation often has less to do with the exchange of information than with the pretext of intimacy. If we turn now to this pretextual level, it is Grice (1975) who can be useful for commenting on Sandy’s *yeah. to open something? inaugurate* in turn 4 and Peter’s *reopened* in turns 5, 7, 9. These utterances are clearly tautologous. In the framework of Grice’s (1975) Co-operative Principle, this counts as flouting of the Quantity maxim: do not say more than necessary. According to Grice, such violation is informative in the sense that a hearer must be able to understand the point of the speaker’s choice of a particular tautology. It can be claimed that Peter perceives Sandy’s insistence on the exact meaning of the term “open for the first time” (turn 10) as being unnecessarily precise in the situation where the date of the hotel opening does not really matter. Tensions are growing (turn 19-25) not because the partners do not understand what is being said, but because their different assumptions put them at cross-purposes. While Sandy tries to be semantically and indexically accurate, for Peter the conversation is the pretext for exchanging the necessary information in order to get the booking done. From his point of view, Sandy presses for precision with the pretext of picking a quarrel and denies the conditions of contextual relevance that Peter takes as self-evident. ‘Book whatever you would like to. We have no time anymore.’ - in other words, you know that “it’s late and I’m tired and I worked and I have all right to be like that” (C3/it-au/Com 3/19.09.2011). Sandy’s

\(^78\) Both terms signify the act of opening with the slight difference in their semantic meaning. Sandy provides the Italian equivalent of it and decodes it as: “when you open for the first time”. Online Oxford Dictionaries lists the meaning “mark the beginning or first public use of (an organization or project) with a special event or ceremony” (http://oxforddictionaries.com/definition/inaugurate?q=inaugurate, my emphasis).
inaugurato calls for Peter’s extra time and efforts to process the foreign Italian term and, therefore, is not acceptable but an unnecessary ‘encroachment’ into their private ELF territory.

So much for my researcher’s attempt to explain partners’ linguistic behaviour in this example. As I have already argued, my account of the couple’s interaction might not correspond with how the participants themselves perceive the positions they enact in this interchange. Therefore, it is worth looking at what Sandy has to say about the use of inaugurato: “I know there are lots of words in Italian, German and English that have the same Latin root [...] I’m just trying to say the word in Italian or to make an English/German version of it” (C3/Com 4/email/30.10.201179). As it can be seen from Sandy’s comment, she is far from asserting her national identity. What she attempts to do here is to get her message through, to make it accessible by using her L1: she simply draws upon the resources (L1 Italian) that have proved to be functional in the past. Ironically, Sandy’s concern for accessibility leads to Peter’s confusion and a decrease in acceptability. At least at this stage, the term fails to get territorialized and acculturated into the partners’ private discourse.

Interestingly enough, pesante, which occurs some minutes later in the same exchange, has quite a different nature. Although it can be assumed that pesante has the same motivation as inaugurato, namely Sandy’s attempt to ‘try the words’ from other available languages, it appears to serve another pretext for both partners. If one can claim that the partners attempt and fail to achieve the alignment of different states of knowledge and to create the shared frame of reference for the first concept inaugurato, then in the second instance Peter not only understands pesante but reproduces it twice in turns 27 and 29. It seems that here there is no need to negotiate the accessibility of the concept: the shared frame of reference has already been created. Contrary to inaugurato, pesante also appears to be rather acceptable. That is what the both partners have to say about it: “it also one of the words that we once added to our talking style”, “it’s a word of our english now” (C3/it-au/Com 4/19.09.2011). As it can be seen from this partners’ comment, pesante is not only the matter of indexical reference to the situation or state of affairs. The term has already been symbolically established to conceptualize reality in a way most convenient for the partners’ private culture. This is what Sandy herself says about pesante: “Maybe we wanted to have a figurative meaning of the word “heavy” in the meaning of strenuous and boring and we didn’t

79 Henceforth, in all the couples’ email comments, the original spelling is reserved.
know exactly how to say it in English so I said “pesante” which is a general, commonly used word in Italian that can have all three meanings” (C3/Com 8/email/30.10.2011). Sandy goes on explaining what could be the partners’ motivations to adapt the term into their private space:

Extract 59  (C3/it-au/Com 8/email/30.10.2011): for “pesante” the process is different

For “pesante” the process is different. In the first phase of our relation when we were not sure of an English word we just said it in our mother tongues and we somehow decided which one was for both easier to remember, so we included in “our English” German and Italian words, for example: Decke/coperta {blanket}; Nachtkasten/comodino {nighttable}; Kasten/armadio {wardrobe}; kuscheln/fare le coccole {to cuddle}; anstrengend, schwer/estenuante, pesante {strenuous/heavy}”

It can be said, then, that the partners have adapted pesante to textualize their shared private discourse: the couple’s cultural values of intimacy and togetherness are conventionalized in the linguistic terms and designed to counteract the influence of the outside cultural values. In other words, if this term is used outside this particular private context, it is unlikely to function with indexical effectiveness for those who are not party to the symbolic conventions. As an established private idiomatic term, it reconciles the conflicting forces of the co-operative and territorial imperatives in the partners’ private discourse, and creates the desired effect of mediating ‘comity’. According to the partners’ claim, this adaptation of the Italian concept to their private ELF discourse is driven by the least-effort-principle and is seen as better match of form and function for it serves as an umbrella term for all kinds of difficulty: physical, mental as well as social. Insofar as it can be seen, pesante pragmatically functions to achieve the very pretext of intimacy and togetherness, which is at a premium here.

The next example is taken from the conversation of Sue and Henry (C2/il-au). In the interchange, Sue and Henry are at home having dinner and relaxing together after a long working day in November 2009. They are discussing one of Sue’s acquaintances. Sue is complaining that the person is tiresome and annoying. Henry tries to reassure his partner and says that Sue’s meetings with the person will be over in sixteen working hours. In this context, Henry uses the following exclamation in line 2:


1. Sue: he told me that he would like to stay in touch and you know.
2. Henry: <LNhe>ichsi {yuck} </LNhe>.
3. Sue: yeah. really like this you know. he is like? he i- (.) creep like. he’s freak. (2) and look?

80This example was discussed in Klötzl 2014: “De Gruyter [“Maybe just things we grew up with”: linguistic and cultural hybridity in ELF couple talk”], Walter De Gruyter GmbH Berlin Boston, [2015]. Copyright and all rights reserved. Material from this publication has been used with the permission of Walter De Gruyter GmbH.”
As can be seen, Henry’s *ichsi* can be categorized as non-conventional in English and correlates with Sue’s description *yeah. really like this* you know in line 3. Therefore, from the formal perspective, one can assume that the word functions as a descriptive adjective: ‘She is really like ichsi’. For partners themselves the word seems to be both accessible and acceptable. However, it is rather incomprehensible for an outsider. If we turn to the retrospective explanation of this word, the partners reject my classifying it as an adjective: they have made it up from the Hebrew slang exclamation *ichsaltich* that expresses strong disgust. As Sue explains it, “*ichsi*” (original “ichsa” or “ichs”) is exclamation and not an adjective”; “it is slang and the original (slang) word is “ichsa”, Henry and I changed it into “ichsi” (C2/il-au/Com 11/email/09.07.2012). Moreover, the partners claim *ichsi* to be their private term: “*das ist* {it is} our language” (C2/il-au/Com 2/16.04.2011). It might be concluded from the partners’ comment that this Hebrew term is adapted into the couple’s ELF to create the shared affective and referential intimate space. Like *pesante* in the Italian-Austrian couple talk, *ichsi* is a hybrid form that is territorialized and acculturated into the partners’ ELF space as the symbolic verbal manifestation of ‘their’ language with the pretext of creating their private ‘micro-culture’.

The next example is taken from the conversation of Nargiz and Dan (C1/ua-fr). In the following interchange, Nargiz and Dan are at home having breakfast in May 2009. They are going to have a barbecue at the outskirts of the city. They are discussing how to get there. Nargiz suggests getting there by bicycle. Dan is surprised about her suggestion, since she was overstrained by their bicycle tour the day before. Nargiz reassures Dan that she can cycle and produces *pedaler* in turn 3:

**Extract 61 (C1/ua-fr/Con 1/May 2009): I’m okay to pedaler**

1. Dan: no? because yesterday you felt (...) a little bit tired with this bicycle or not? no? <L1fr> ca va (all right) <L1fr>
2. Nargiz: but it was yesterday today: i’m: o:kay to dri- to <LNfr> pedaler {cycle} </LNfr> come on <@> to drive with this bicycle <@> it’s not too far i hope.
3. Dan: no. no. not too far. (5)
4. Nargiz: @ @ @ (. ) @

At the textual level here, the English *to cycle* or *to ride a bicycle* is modified into *to pedaler* with the particle *to* as a formal element of English Infinitive and the French verb *pedaler*. Thus, *to pedaler* can definitely be categorized as a non-conventional use of either English or French and as a hybrid form that fuses the elements of both languages. The question here arises as to why to blend those elements here. One can assume that Nargiz does not know the
English variant of *pedaler*, and the use is motivated by compensatory reasons (see Section 8.1.1). However, Nargiz produces an English version of the phrase – “to drive with this bicycle” – in turn 2. The use, then, is unlikely to be a ‘deficiency’ or compensation of a lack of English words. One can assume that Nargiz purposely deviates from the sanctioned NS norms for particular reasons. Since in the hybrid form Nargiz uses the element of her partner’s L1 – *pedaler*, her motivation might be to please Dan by drawing upon his mother tongue and so achieve the effect of togetherness. In addition, Nargiz’s use is accompanied by her (and later on Dan’s) laughter (represented by @-symbols in the transcript). Therefore, another Nargiz’s motivation can be to create a humorous effect in the shared partners’ affective territory.

I have already stated, to be empirical in my terms means to look at the data, analyse and interpret them, but also consider what the insiders of the interaction – the partners themselves – have to say about it. It is worth, therefore, looking at what Nargiz has to say about her motivation for using the form. This is how Nargiz comments on *pedaler* in her L1 Russian (the extract is taken from an email comment):

**Extract 62** (C1/ua-fr/Com 14/email/13.01.2012): *A wot s -pedaler- eto drugoe.* 81


{And it’s something different with *pedaler*. When I heard it for the first time, it was funny for me, because there are pedals in the Russian language, that is *pedaler* means to pedal [literally to press the pedals]... I liked it, it’s much funnier than – to drive-, isn’t it? [...] Dan sometimes also used Russian or Ukrainian words, just so that it would be funnier. (such as: hello sunny, pussycat, little bottle, slippers, little hedgehog) Just like me, but I was doing my best to learn the language [French], for him it was just fun, and he also knew that it pleased me.} (author’s translation and italics)

As it can be seen, Nargiz does not simply modifies ELF by her L2 *pedaler*. The form sounds very similarly to that in her L1s: the Ukrainian тиснути педалі /tysnuty pedali/ or педалювати /pedaljuvaty/ and the Russian жать педали /zat’ pedali/ (English *to pedal*). That is to say, *pedaler* has a resemblance to the Ukrainian and Russian forms and so, for Nargiz, it can have the value of the already established socio-cultural significance in her L1s.

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81 This comment itself is an interesting example of the process of transforming of the virtual linguistic resources that are discussed in Chapter 2. The strategy exploited in this email comment can be described as a transliteration mode that is the Russian virtual linguistic resource (which uses the Cyrillic graphology) put into English (or rather Latin) letters.
To put it another way, what we have here is the Ukrainian/Russian concept in a mixed English-French wording. Nargiz adjusts her ELF by adapting her ‘non-native’ (French) resource and informs it with her primary (‘Ukrainian’) cultural/contextual associations. What Nargiz is doing here, then, is textualizing her discourse by drawing upon all the available linguistic resources. In doing so, as I have assumed above, Nargiz strives to achieve the humorous effect, to have fun with her partner, and to please him by using his L1. At this point, it is worth considering what Dan has to say about such uses in their private ELF:

Extract 63 (C1/ua-fr/Com 15-16/email/06.02.2012): a way to share a kind of complicity

Dan: And if we repeat in French or English or Russian it’s a way to learn another language or to confirm the meaning of our speech. May be a way to share a kind of complicity [...]

Extract 64 (C1/ua-fr/Com 15-16/e-mail/26.02.2012): a relationship between persons who knows each other very well

Dan: To explain more precisely I could tell you it’s a relationship between persons who knows each other very well. We can use it in a positive way or not. In our speech that was in a positive way of course.

As we can see, Dan describes such aspect of the partners’ linguistic behaviour as repetition in the other language. His claim is that the partners often repeat some words and phrases in all the available languages to both learn each other’s languages and increase accessibility of their utterances. What is more important is the purpose to create the effect of what Dan refers to as complicity, or “relationship between persons who knows each other very well”. To put it another way, the partners use any available semantic resources to get their message across and to achieve the pragmatic effect of accomplishing their ‘coupleness’/‘complicity’ and creating their shared affective territory.

To sum up, the examples in this section demonstrate that the couples negotiate their ELF (often hybrid) wording as well as the pragmatic conditions of its use. In the process of adapting language to their communicative purposes, the partners place a high premium on the performance of ‘complicity’ or intimacy and togetherness. So far, we have discussed the examples where partners use lexical alternation and blend languages at the morphological

82 Here, I deliberately refer to the Russian concept as Ukrainian Russian by analogy to, for example, American English. Although it is disputable whether it can be treated as a separate variety, similarly to American English, Ukrainian Russian has its peculiarities and differs greatly (at all linguistic levels) from Russian spoken and used in the Russian Federation.

83 This use is also an interesting example of linguistic hybridity. One can assume that the textualizing of complicity is influenced by Dan’s L1 concept – French complicité (English: 1. complicity; but also 2. harmony, concord, or accord). Dan might have blended the two – English and French – concepts here.
level within the shared linguistic resource of ELF for various communicative purposes within their private space. In the next section, the focus is on the fusion of grammars in the process of partners’ creating the shared affective space.

8.2.4 “CAN I WAS SAY IN A SECOND”: TRANSCENDING THE LIMITS OF GRAMMATICAL CONVENTIONS IN THE PROCESS OF ESTABLISHING RAPPORT

As I have already discussed in Section 8.1.3, the unique hybrid nature of the partners’ private language finds its expression not only in lexical or morphological alternation. It also involves the fusion of grammars. The following example of blended syntaxes of two languages with different national names can serve as illustration of such behaviour in my data. This extract is taken from Couple 2:

Extract 65 (C2/IL-AU/Con 2, June 2009): <Lnde> schatzī. {honey} </Lnde> no no can i <LNde> was {something}</LNde> say in a second?

1. Sue: don't know sometime sometime sometimes he isn't. sometimes i think he is a kind of like a jerky like today i couldn't any more. you know <LNde> schatzī. {honey} </LNde> like i COULDN'T. this gal is a torture on me. i'm ups- i don't know. i am not a psychologist. I DON'T KNOW. (.) <@> all she want is to TALK. </@> you know i just meet to listen you know. (what) do you (think how it is?) and she <18> <LNde> SITZT {sits} </LNde></18>
2. Henry: <18> @@@@@ </18> you ask ME?
3. Sue: no <LNde> schatzī. {honey} </LNde>
4. Henry: @@ @
5. Sue: no no no it's it's a monologue it's not a conversation and
6. Henry: ye:s. i'm very aware of this.
7. Sue: and she insist on explaining EVERY DETAIL you know and it's a lot of things it's like
8. Henry: <teasing> oh my god <19> really? </19> </teasing>
9. Sue: <19> you know about </19> about the air and particles and
10. Henry: <teasing> i have a déjà vu? </teasing>
11. Sue: <Lnde> schatzī. {honey} </Lnde> no can i <LNde> was {something}</LNde> say in a second?
12. Henry: i'm aware of it.
13. Sue: you know? and she i mean you know she is just driving me crazy. and what was it today oh. and then she said like? (5) no. forget it.

Here, Sue is sharing her teaching experience with her husband. She discusses one of her students and describes her feeling about the lessons that she gives to her as follows: “i am not a psychologist. [...] <@> all she want is to TALK. </@> [...] you know i just meet to listen you know” (turn 1); “no it's it's a monologue it's not a conversation” (turn 5); “she insist on explaining EVERY DETAIL” (turn 7); “she is just driving me crazy” (turn 13). Here, She frames the process of teaching as a psychotherapeutic counselling and evaluates the student as trying to dominate and/or control their conversations by making protracted contributions and unnecessarily pressing for precision. Henry’s reaction to Sue’s complaint is of special interest here. He utters his replies: “i’m very aware of this” (turn 6, 12), “oh my god <19>
really? </19>”; “i have a déjà vu?” – in a laughing teasing tone. Such feedback can be interpreted at least in two ways. On the one hand, Henry might wish to indirectly point out that he has heard the story many times before (“i have a déjà vu?” - ‘Do I listen to the same story again?’). On the other hand, his ironic remarks can be interpreted as mediating the message that Sue’s description of student’s conversational behaviour delineates nothing but her own way of talking and offering comments in the partners’ private space. In other words, Henry reframes Sue’s story about the conversational style of her student to that about Sue’s own communicative behaviour. Henry’s intonation and voice quality frames his utterances as a joke with the purpose to entertain and, again, to create rapport with Sue by inviting her to look at the situation humorously and to reassure her that he does not only tolerate but also enjoys her manner to talk much and explain “every detail”. In doing so, Henry mitigates the possible negative effect of his repeated interrupting Sue’s talk.

However, it seems that Sue takes Henry’s remarks as a sign of his impatience and reluctance to listen to her complaints, and operates on a defensive strategy by producing: “<LNde> schatzi. {honey} </LNde> no can i <LNde> was {something} </LNde> say in a second?” (turn 11) and “no. forget it” (turn 13). Let us have a closer look at Sue’s utterance in turn 11. From the purely formal perspective, here language alternation occurs at the boundary of two constituents, which are ordered differently in the two languages. The difference of word order between English and German causes a problem of incompatibility. English interrogative structure in the Present Indefinite Tense CAN SVO (subject-verb-object) generally corresponds to German interrogative KANN SOV-structure in Gegenwart. It can be said that Sue structures her utterance according to German (and perhaps Sue’s L1 Hebrew) grammar but textualize it by drawing upon both English and German vocabulary. The resulting configuration CAN SOV ‘Can I (et)was say’ manifests the standards of neither English nor German (“Can I say anything?” or “Kann ich etwas sagen?” correspondingly). It is difficult to say why Sue fuses the two resources here and if she does so deliberately. As I have already discussed in Section 8.2.3, Sue reported that at the time of data collection she tried to speak more German in order to be able to communicate in German-speaking Austria. Perhaps, this is the reason why Sue textualizes her utterance in such ‘Yoda-like’ style (see Section 8.2.3). Whatever the reasons, Sue’s transcending the limits of grammatical conventions of both German and English ‘standard’ codes does not
impede the partners’ conversation. It seems obvious that Sue’s ungrammatical use proceeded by German *schatzi*, as well as her whole story, is intended as a bid for attention and sympathy. What matters for Sue is neither the form of utterance, nor its propositional reference, nor the illocutionary force, but its perlocutionary effect. In sharing her feelings and describing her disappointment, she is appealing for domestic sympathy and togetherness. However, in this piece of conversation she achieves the desired effect only partly. Her utterance fails because her husband has something different in mind. He is not affected as intended, but focuses on its propositional meaning: ‘I need only a second to explain everything’. Pretextually, Henry tries to amuse Sue but at the same time indirectly criticises Sue’s loquacity. Therefore, perhaps, in order to mitigate possible negative effects of Henry’s critique, Sue intersperses her utterance with Henry’s L1 *was* and *schatzi*. In doing so, she is exercising both solidarity and territoriality through a co-operative manoeuvre of using the words in her partner’s L1, one of which – the endearment term - is obviously already part of the partners’ shared affective space.

### 8.2.5 “ICH BIN JÜDIN”: NATIONAL CONTEXTUAL ASPECTS IN THE PROCESS OF NEGOTIATING COOPERATIVENESS AND TERRITORIALITY IN COUPLE TALK

Thus far we have considered how couples adapt the elements of different languages mainly to create their shared private conceptual and affective space and to enact their shared position as a couple. However, the contextual/cultural (national/ethnic) aspects of partners’ individual background sometimes come to the fore and might override the joint couple perspective. The examples come from Couple 2 conversation. In the first interchange, the couple discuss their agenda for a weekend before Christmas. They are planning a shopping tour in their car to pick up some pieces of furniture (such as closets) and other goods and supplies for (presumably) their new apartment. Henry informs Sue that one of the members of his extended family asked him for favour to pick her order in one of the shopping malls with the partners’ car. Sue is rather surprised and annoyed that Henry has agreed to help without asking her. In this context, the couple produce the following:

**Extract 66** *(C2/il-au/Con 2/19.11.2009): but ich bin juedin auf jedem fall oder*

1. Henry: do i hear? do i hear some little criticism of my family?
2. Sue: <LNde> *jah sicher* {yaeh. sure.} </LNde>
3. Henry: o:h? (.) but you at least try to hide.
4. Sue: i told you she knows you know she knows how to ask favours but she doesn't know how to give something in return.
5. Henry: mhm (.) interesting?
6. Sue: now we need to spend? you know. like (2) we haven't got e- enough? you know. a lot of time anyway. (3)
7. Henry: <slow> i will go to heaven you will stay and have. </slow>
8. Sue: mhm? @@@@
9. Henry: you know. and there's no writing postcards in between <1> (hell and heaven) </1>
10. Sue: <1> yeah. </1> but <LNde> ich bin juedin auf jedem fall oder? </LNde> {but i am a jew anyway or?}
11. Henry: yeah. (2) guess so. (.)
12. Sue: YOU go to hell.
13. Henry: YOU go to hell. (2) <soft> it's so boring in heaven because all my friends are bastards. </soft>

As can be seen, the partners are arguing whether they should do a favour or not. Sue does not want to pick up the relative’s things and initially lists Christmas and a lack of time at this festive season as the main reasons of her reluctance to help. However, with the development of the conversation, it turns out that the main reason for Sue’s unwillingness is that the relative has never done favours at the partners’ request and “doesn’t know how to give something in return” (turn 1). Henry, in turn, tries to persuade Sue that favours are not about expecting returns but giving and sharing unconditionally especially at Christmas time. Having exhausted all his arguments, he resorts to humour and says that he “will go to heaven” (turn 4) with no “postcards in between” (turn 6) for his good deeds. Presumably, this Henry’s statement indirectly implies that, if he himself goes to heaven for his tolerance, Sue must go to hell for her unwillingness to forgive. It is worth mentioning that Christianity and Judaism have the similar ethical code and can be both understood as religions of love. Both religions believe in the existence of heaven - the eternal dwelling place of the righteous; and hell, the dwelling place of the wicked86. It means that at the general propositional level the partners refer to more or less the same notions of heaven and hell. There is however, a crucial difference in understanding love to one’s neighbour in two religions: Jews link love to fairness and justice87 while Christians primarily to charity. It appears that this difference in conceiving of how one should treat other people triggers the partners’ argument whether to help Henry’s kin. Sue, obviously, does not want to help because it is a kind of justice for her: ‘If you do not help me you cannot expect me to help you. I would be ready to co-operate only when you show me your readiness to do so by acting correspondingly’. In the retrospective comment, Henry actually agrees with Sue that his relative often acts inappropriately and has

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86 The concept of heaven is more or less the same in two religions. Hell, however, is understood in a slightly different way. Jews do not believe in Hell as a place of eternal torment as Catholics Christians do. Instead, Jews believe in Gehenna as a place of purgatory where Jews spend up to twelve months purifying to get into heaven. (Cf. Wikipedia)
87 This is also how Sue has explained to me her vision of love, friendship and doing favours, and also my Jew friends in Ukraine described the difference between Jewdaism and Christianity during our informal chats.
“very cheap excuses <L1de> immer {always} </L1de>” (C2/il-au/Com 1/16.04.2015). Sue’s reason why she does not want to do any favour is the same: “she asked you know i asked her for favour she said no. and she came back and asked me for favour” (C2/il-au/Com 1/16.04.2015). Even though, Henry sees the situation slightly differently and still wants to help his relative. In the preceding sequel of the same conversation, he complaints about Sue’s rancour: “doing a member of my family favour? Y:ES. i KNEW you wouldn't understand? [...] you never forget and you never forgive” (C2/il-au/Con 2/19.11.2009). In a sense, his attitude to the relative’s ingratitude can be understood as ‘Christian’ submissive turning-the-other-cheek behaviour to response to the reluctance and refusal to help with courtesy and kindness. This Henry wittily sees as a good reason to deserve the heaven afterlife (turn 4). Sue reacts to the remark about Henry’s going to heaven with laughter and counter argues it by calling attention to the fact that she is “jüdin”: “but <LNde> ich bin juedin auf jedem fall oder? {but i am a jew anyway or? } </LNde>” (turn 10). The utterance is redundant as information: both participants of the discussion know that Sue is a Jew. Since the utterance is not informing as a statement, the question arises what relevance it might have. This might lie in the belief that Jews are unlikely to get to (Christian Catholic?) heaven anyway, or, just the opposite, that they are unlikely to get to hell since they do not believe in such a place. Depending on the relevant conditions, then, the utterance can carry the illocutionary force of either agreement or objection. If we now turn to the partners’ retrospective comment, the connection between Sue’s nationality/religion and her chances to be blessed by eternal afterlife in ‘Christian’ heaven becomes clearer: “<@> no i won’t go to heaven </@>”, “she’s got no chance” (C2/il-au/Com 1/16.04.2011). Whatever the meaning, it is obvious that in her utterance – “ich bin juedin auf jedem fall oder?” (turn 10), Sue positions herself as a Jew (as opposed to Christians/Catholics?). Moreover, it can be said that the partners’ religious values are in indirect conflict in this interchange. I have an occasion to discuss how the partners negotiate such cultural differences in more detail later. Meanwhile, the question arises as to why Sue textualizes her position, which is associated with her ‘native’ (albeit national or religious) culture, in her L2 German. Let us turn to the partners’ comment at once. To my question if the topic is not too sensitive, Sue comments as follows: “no it’s also our joke. [...] that i’m a jew. [...] yeah. it’s also you know only joke. it’s no problem” (C2/il-au/Com 1/16.04.2011). One can assume, then, that Sue’s purpose is to mitigate the effect of her “critique” (turn 1) of Henry’s family and amuse her partner by positioning herself as ‘Jüdin’. The frame is then clarified: the partners’ reference to Sue as a Jew is a joke. However, what
remains unclear is why Sue textualize her position in her L2 German. As in many cases, I had to resort to a direct prompt:

**Extract 67  (C2/il-au/Com 1): a jew sounds nicer than juedin oder jueder**

1. I: why don’t you say i am a jew? <LNde> juedin {jew} <LNde> is?
2. Henry: i don’t know we mix sometimes.
3. Sue: i don’t know. no now we say a jew. because it’s a joke now you know. […] we don’t say a<br>LNdje> juedin. {jew.} <LNde> […]
4. Henry: a jew sounds nicer than <L1de> juedin oder jueder {jew or jew} <L1de> […]
5. Sue: a jew sounds nicer than <LNde> juedin, {jew.} <LNde> […]
6. Henry: there are words that sound nicer in english and there are words that sound better in german language you know. i think jew sounds better than <L1de> juedin. {jew.} <L1de> […]
7. Sue: you’ve got some problems with the holocaust.
9. Sue: or austrians. that’s importance with the holocaust. then when it comes any time to <LNde> jüden. {jews.} <LNde> @@@ @@@ @@@
10. Henry: […] probably it’s really a fiction probably. i don’t have any problems with the holocaust. i was born thirty years after so […]
11. Sue: right. nobody does feel comfortable […] when i talk about the holocaust with all our friends. you don’t feel comfortable.
12. Henry: i don’t feel comfortable at all when there’s a talk about politics. and i don’t give it a fuck and i am not interested in it. it’s very simple.
13. I: so it’s not so important for your relationship. or is it? @ @ @
14. Sue: yes it is. yes it is. […] i have an issue. i have an issue here in austria with the holocaust. definitely. and henry isn’t interested in politics.

In this rather extended comment, Sue first claim that she cannot explain why she positions herself as a ‘Jüdin’: “i don’t know” (turn 3). Henry, in turn, explains such behaviour as “i don’t know we mix sometimes” strategy (turn 2). Sue remarks that the partners “don’t say a<br>LNdje> juedin. {jew.} <LNde>” (turn 5) anymore and use the English Jew for their purposes. Henry goes on and claims that “a jew sounds nicer than <L1de> juedin oder jueder {jew or jew} <L1de>” (turn 4), which Sue echoes in turn 7. Such explanation makes the matter even more complicated: if a Jew sounds nicer than Jüdin, why then to position oneself as Jüdin not a Jew? The partners’ discussion in turns 7-14, however, can shed the light on Sue’s motivations for positioning herself as “Jüdin” in this particular interchange.

Sue explains the partners’ choice for the word Jew by the fact that Henry has “some problems with the holocaust” (turn 7). After Henry’s objection, she corrects herself and specifies that Austrians in general have problems with the word since they connect the word to the Holocaust: “or austrians. that’s importance with the holocaust. then when it comes any time to <LNde> JÜDEN. {jews.} <LNde> @@@ @@@ @@@” (turn 9). I am not in a position and it is not the place to discuss the historical details of the holocaust and the issues of responsibility for it. The main point here is Sue’s subjective personal perception and the couple Austrian friends’ attitudes to the events that date back to 30-40s of the last century
and so happened long before the participants of the conversation were born. Sue’s claim is interpretative: she sees Henry’s reluctance to use the word as evidence of his ascribing a certain symbolic meaning to Jüdin/Jüder that is conventionalized in the Austrian society in such a way that it ties the nouns with the holocaust and, perhaps, a burden of responsibility for it. In other words, the couple’s friends in Austria might be reluctant to discuss the issue because they see the topic of Jüden as evoking a feeling of responsibility for the former country regime’s collaboration in genocide against Jews and other ethnicities/social groups during World War II. This is what Henry tries to say in turn 10: “it’s really a fiction probably. i don’t have any problems with the holocaust. i was born thirty years after so”. It can be assumed then that the partners assign a particular symbolic meaning that conveys the negative associations with the holocaust to the German Jüdin, and therefore perceive it as undesirable for their private use. Accordingly, by using her L2 German Sue articulates the voice/position of others – the Austrians – who, in her view, link the word to the sensitive topic of holocaust. By saying “ich bin Jüdin” she might mean ‘Ihr sagt/meinte, dass ich eine Jüdin bin {you say/mean I am a Jew}’. Obviously, the English Jew has no such symbolic associations, sounds “nicer” and is accepted in the partners’ private world. It is interesting that in the end Sue reframes the issue of ‘Jüden’ from Henry’s and his Austrian friends’ to her own: “i have an issue. i have an issue here in austria with the holocaust. definitely. and henry isn’t interested in politics” (turn 14). This means that by uttering ‘ich bin Jüdin’ she in fact expresses her own vision of why “nobody does feel comfortable” (turn 11) when she talks about Jews and interprets it as the common prejudice about her nation in Austria who, apart from other things, do not deserve the heaven afterlife. That is to say, what Sue claims here is that, in the word Jüdin, it is not an ‘Austrian’ cultural element within the German language being symbolically encoded but her own (a Jew who lives in Austria) cultural element outside the language being indexically activated. It is her - not ‘Austrian’ - schematic expectations, her version of reality that she reads into the word. It is she (and obviously her partner as well) who finds the word unpleasant, or not “nice”, if not offending, stigmatizing and associating with the holocaust. Despite these cultural (national/religious) differences, however, the partners downplay them and place a high premium on the performance of ‘coupleness’ by using even such a tricky word as Jüdin as a private joke rather than a construct of difference. This relationship between language and ‘national/religious’ culture in Sue and Henry’ interaction as related to the more universal co-operative and territorial drives of discourse is also a focus in the next example.
The conversation comes from the same Israeli-Austrian couple and is also an illustration of how individual national positions can override the joint couple perspective. In this example, however, I would like to focus on how such cultural (national) features work towards negotiation of the more general territorial and co-operative dimensions and on their intertwined nature in couple’s talk. It is the same November evening. Sue is retelling Henry the discussion of the Christian Seven Deadly Sins with her friends:

Extract 6888 (C2/il-au/Com 1, p. 6-8): *i don’t know the new testament.*

1. Sue: but more than that you know i don't know the new testament. and. so like you know he said <imitating> okay what are the seven sins </imitating> you know everybody looked like they couldn't make <imitating> wow who said that these are sins? </imitating> @@@
2. Henry: @ @ aha. it was about <1> greed? </1>
3. Sue : <1> yeah. like </1> this before i <2> before? </2>
4. Henry: <2> anger? </2>
5. Sue: before he started listing all this?
7. Sue: i told him sorry who said that these are sins. @ @ @: and then one student she said <imitating> the bible. </imitating> and i was like you mean what bible. the second testament right? and well he looked puzzled like and he said yes. the second testament and i said sorry i don't know the second testament. although we have other sins @ @ @ in old testament. and then he started you know listing the sins?
9. Sue: and then he said LUST. and i was shocked? really? lust is a sin? ( ) so i told him what? really lust is a sin? @@@ i don'? cool. i didn't know. and then he said <imitating> it's time to reform sue. </imitating> @ @ @ @
10. Henry: @ @
11. Sue: @ @ @ @ it's a good one <LNde> (oder) {or} </LNde>

Once the Bible as the source of proclaiming the Seven Deadly Sins has been mentioned, Sue produces the unusual word combination *the second testament.* At the textual level, this expression can be classified either as a specific cross-linguistic transfer or as the creative use of the available English resources. However, it seems to be pretty accessible and acceptable for the partners. Although Sue insists on the word-combination *the second testament*, Henry does not pick up the expression. Moreover, it appears that Henry does not notice it at all: he does not react to Sue’s *you know i don’t know the new testament* in turn 1. Rather, he focuses on recalling the Seven Deadly Sins – the main topic of their interchange.

If we now turn to the partners’ comment on this extract, Sue’s term can be characterized as definitely deliberate. Sue claims that *the second testament* is “the political statement” (C2/il-au/Com 5/16.04.2011) conventionalized in Israel for there is only one (the

88 This example was discussed in Klötzl 2014. Part of the discussion is excerpted from: “De Gruyter [“Maybe just things we grew up with”: linguistic and cultural hybridity in ELF couple talk”]. Walter De Gruyter GmbH Berlin Boston, [2015]. Copyright and all rights reserved. Material from this publication has been used with the permission of Walter De Gruyter GmbH.”
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first and the only) testament in Judaism. Therefore, the conception of Bible in terms of the New Testament is not acceptable to her. Sue intentionally uses Hebrew phrase for *the New Testament*, and literally translates it into English. Taking into account Sue’s perspective, the term can be formally categorized as a loan translation (Pavlenko and Jarvis 2002).\(^{89}\) That is to say, what we have here is the *Hebrew concept in English wording*, or the Judaist worldview encoded and expressed in English. Sue separates and opposes two expressions of the same language, ascribing one of them *the new* and *the old testament* to the voice of others (Christians), and *the first* and *the second testament* to her own (national, religious, Judaist) voice. Interestingly enough, insisting on her (Judaist) and Henry’s (Christian) differing religious identities, she contextually puts their private space, their ‘coupleness’, in peril. pretextually, however, she strives to achieve the humorous effect: “lust is a sin? [...] it’s time to reform” (turns 9). Indeed, I surmise that cooperative-manoeuvre aspect of Sue’s chitchat is intended to override the territorial-manoeuvre terms of her religious and national beliefs.

In sum, the examples of linguistic hybridity in this section relate to our discussion of the relationship between language and culture, and preconceptions of both concepts as nouns with the national names in Section 5.4, 5.5. In the last example, we also have to do with the names, specifically the ‘Hebrew’ concept with the ‘English’ name. *The testament* with the numeric name neatly fuses two related notions: a division of the Bible; and a *credo* - an expression of conviction and beliefs, or, in our terms, the schematic cultural constructs. As can be seen, the couples usually are not so much concerned with what name the term, or language, has so long as they can use the available semantic resources to the pragmatic effect of accomplishing their ‘coupleness’ and creating their shared affective territory. That is to say, they do not take a (national) language and (national) culture together “as a package deal” (Widdowson 2009: 342). They negotiate their ELF (often hybrid) wording (accessibility) as well as the pragmatic conditions of its use (acceptability). This, however, does not exclude the construction of national difference. Yet, while exercising such ‘national’ aspects, the partners place a high premium on the performance of intimacy and togetherness. It can be concluded, then, that ‘national’/cultural aspects of hybrid uses and ELF couple talk in general are an inextricable tangle of more universal drives of cooperativeness and territoriality. On the one hand, the partners co-operate to create their private affective territory. On the other hand, such undertaking inevitably requires accommodations and adaptations that limit

\(^{89}\) see also Section 8.1.3 for similar examples.
freedom and so endanger partners’ individual (whether they are ‘national’ or not) spaces. This being so, cooperativeness always entails territoriality and vice versa.

8.2.6 “THINGS ARE LIKE... I HAVE A DOG”: PETS AS INTERACTIONAL RESOURCE IN THE PROCESS OF ESTABLISHING COUPLENES

The example in this section is intended to demonstrate how the couples use linguistic hybridity to mediate their communication with ‘others’ – e.g. pets or computers – and how these ‘others’ are used as resources in accomplishing partners’ ‘coupleness’. The example comes from Monica and Patrick (C4/au-cz). The conversation is recorded in Patrick’s apartment in Prague. Monica is working on Patrick’s computer. She has difficulties with removing her USB flash drive from the computer. This is what the partners discuss in the conversation, which is interesting at least for three reasons. First, this example in a way summarizes what most couples have to say about their communication with ‘others’, mainly with computers and laptops, vehicles or pets. Second, the partners are not alone in this interchange: there is a third participant - Patrick’s ten-year sheltie Charlie. Charlie’s presence brings about my confusion in interpreting the conversation and makes it a good example of how different (my and the partners’) discourses can be read into the same text. Finally, the interaction demonstrates how the partners use Patrick’s pet dog as a resource of competing in establishing their individual positions by balancing between the territorial and co-operative forces in their interaction. Let us have a closer look at the conversation first:

Extract 69 (C4/au-cz/Con10/November 2011): geh komm whatever he want give it to him

1. Monica: yeah. but i want to know it NOW (2) <the dog barks> <L1de> geh komm {come on} <L1de> (1) whatever he WANT? give it to him.
2. Patrick: i gave it to him. he just doesn't want to take. (1)
3. Monica: how is <L1de> auswerfen {remove} </L1de> in czech? to:::
4. Patrick: <LNde> aus- {remove} </LNde> what?
5. Monica: <L1de> auswerfen. {remove} </L1de>
6. Patrick: what is <LNde> werfen {throw} </LNde>
7. Monica: well. that i can unplug it. (2) remove.
8. Patrick: okay. <L1cz> odpojit. {disconnect} </L1cz>
9. Monica: heah?
10. Patrick: <L1cz> odpojit. odpojit. {disconnect. disconnect} </L1cz> (2) <the dog barks>
11. Monica: i don't see that. (3) <the dog barks> no it's not there. @@ <the dog barks>
12. Patrick: charlie. (3) sit. this all yours. <L1cz> sedni. {sit} </L1cz> (3) charlie. sit.
13. Monica: i don't find it. (3)
14. Patrick: er er er er e:::::::r (3) no click erm (3) <L1cz> sedni. {sit} </L1cz>
15. Monica: ah you can also do it in english. wow what are you doing. (3)

From the formal perspective, there are several examples of language alternation here. Two of them are ELF utterances with the ‘inserted’ computer terms both in Czech and in German:
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_{auswerfen [remove]} (turn 3, 5), _odpojit [remove/disconnect] (turn 8, 10). To reconstruct the situation, one can assume here that the operation system of the computer is in Czech. Monica does not understand Czech, and presumably cannot find the icon “remove” on the screen without Patrick’s assistance. This is also how she herself describes the context later on: “because the computer is in czeck so i was (totally) lost” (C4/au-cz/Com 2.3/14.01.2011).

For this reason, she asks Patrick what is the Czech for _auswerfen_. Patrick, in turn, does not speak German and asks Monica to provide the English equivalent for the German term. Monica explains the German _auswerfen_ in turn 7: “that i can unplug it. remove”. Once Monica has clarified the term, Patrick provides the Czech variant for it: _odpojit_ (turn 8, 10). However, Monica complaints that she cannot find such an icon on the screen in turns 11, 13. In the end, Patrick comes up to Monica and shows her how to change the operation system from Czech to English. This becomes clear from Monica’s remark in turn 15: “ah you can also do it in english”. It is quite obvious why Patrick produces the Czech term here: he provides the translation of _auswerfen_ to Monica so that she could remove her USB device.

The question is why Monica uses the German term. One can assume that Monica uses the terms that have proved to be functional in the past since her own personal computer has an operation system in her L1 German. Here again, my assumption is sustained by what Monica herself says in her retrospective comment: “because we either use a german computer? mine it is german so @@@ my computer is german. and his computer is czech. we never use really english computer” (C4/au-cz/Com 2.4/14.01.2011). According to Monica, the partners’ have computer operation systems in their L1s. This is also often the reason why other couples in my study talk a ‘computer’ language to their computers - predominantly their L1s – or to each other when working at the computer.

This interchange, however, is not only remarkable in that the partners talk their L1s with the national names to their computers. There are two more examples of language alternation in the interchange that are of special interest. The first is Monica’s hybrid utterance in turn 1: “&lt;L1de&gt; _geh ko:mm_ {come on} &lt;/L1de&gt; whatever he WANT? give it to him”. It follows the dog barking. The second hybrid remark is produced by Patrick and is also preceded by the pet’s barking: “charlie. sit. this all yours. &lt;L1cz&gt; _sedni._ {sit.} &lt;/L1cz&gt; charlie. sit” (turn 14) and “no click erm &lt;L1cz&gt; sedni. {sit} &lt;/L1cz&gt;” (turn 14). The latter use - _sedni_ – appears to be rather straightforward. Patrick definitely addresses the dog and gives it a command to sit in ‘their’ (Patrick and Charlie’s) L1 Czech. Patrick’s linguistic behaviour here is similar to Piller’s (2002) observation that the couples in her research often
use their L1s in communication with animals. According to Piller, some couples do so because of the ‘nationality’ of their pets identifying them as, for example, Americans: “we just talk English to our cats. coz they are American cats” (Piller 2002: 176). Others claim that they generally address their pets and animals in their L1s without specifying any reasons (ibid.). Patrick’s use of *sedni* can be explained by both motivations identified by Piller. That is to say, Patrick speaks Czech to his dog because the dog (like his computer) is ‘Czech’ and trained on specific commands in Czech. Consequently, Patrick may see his L1 as more functional than ELF in the particular domain of communicating with pets or animals of any, so to speak, ‘nationality’.

Contrary to *sedni*, Monica’s utterance “**geh ko:mm** whatever he WANT? give it to him” (turn 1) has turned out to be rather ambivalent. Independently from the meaning of *geh komm*, the whole utterance can be interpreted as Monica’s addressing Patrick with the demand to prevent Charlie’s barking. One can take such Monica’s request as evidence of her frustration with the animal who repeatedly barks and distracts Patrick’s attention from helping Monica in operating the computer. What I, however, could not initially explain here is Monica’s addressing Patrick in German. As I have already pointed out, Patrick did not speak German at the time of recording and Monica was aware of the fact that Patrick might not understand her L1. Moreover, *geh komm* is a dialect (non-standardized) use of Austrian German that makes its intelligibility for Patrick even less likely (cf. Section 7.2.3). From the formal perspective, only *komm* is codified in the dictionaries of Standard German. It is Imperativ of *kommen* (English *to come*) (cf. Online Duden Wörterbuch) that also can be used in the meaning similar to the English *come on*. Online Ostarrichi Wörterbuch (of Austrian German and Austrian dialects) – defines *geh* as “komm” (English *come*) or “ach komm” (English *come on*) and provides the following explanations of it:

1. Ausdruck der Enttäuschung oder Versuch, jemanden umzustimmen; 2. Verstärkung einer Aufforderung (auch einer indirekten); 3. Verneinung oder Protest 4. Ausdruck der Ermunterung oder auch der Skepsis, je nach Tonfall (1. Expression of disappointment or an attempt to persuade somebody; 2. Intensifier of a demand (also an indirect one); 3. Negation or protest; 4. Expression of encouragement/reassurance or also scepticism, depending on intonation) (Deutsch-Österreichisches Online Wörterbuch, my translation).

In my interpretational schema of Monica’s talk to Patrick, I have assumed that *geh komm* is used in meaning 1 and/or 2 listed by the dictionary: she either/both expresses her

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90 The phrase *geh komm* only appears in the example listed in the dictionary and is defined as “Beispiel für das Wiedersprechen” (“an example of objection”): “Der Nachbar ist sicher vom Geheimdienst!” – “Geh, komm” (‘Ach komm, dass ist doch Blödsinn’) {The neighbour is definitely from the secret police - Come on, it is really nonsense/you are talking nonsense}. 

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disappointment with the dog and/or intensifies her call for Patrick’s preventing the dog’s barking.

However, as I have already said, my researcher third-person observer perspective can be rather different from the partners’ first-person insider experience. My account for *geh komm whatever he WANTS give it to him* and my general applying the schema of ‘work at the computer’ to the conversation is not an exception. When I asked the partners to comment on this sequel, they mainly focused on the discussion of the dog and its role in their relationship rather than on the interaction itself. In his general comment on the conversation, Patrick shifts the focus to the topic of the partners’ relationship as mediated by his pet dog: “things are like [...] i have a dog [...] it’s he and it’s Charlie [...] yeah and monica is just not really liking him [the dog] so much” (C4/au-cz/Com 2.2/14.01.2011). Patrick’s explanation triggers the partners’ discussion of the pet, which later on takes a slightly different direction and develops into the (indirect) argument about Monica’s relationship with Patrick’s family in general. Their dialogue can be compared with a Ping-Pong game with each partner projecting and protecting her/his own vision of the dog’s role and so their own positions in each other’s individual and the shared private territory. At the first sight, Monica is competing with the pet in Patrick’s, so to speak, heart and rebuffs his statement about her disliking the dog: “the point is that he is not liking me”; “we have quite tough <@> relationship” <@>; “he is the most moodiest dog i’ve ever known”; “he bit everybody in the family” (ibid.). Patrick, in turn, takes a defending position and parries Monica’s negative evaluations of the pet by making excuses for him: “he feels quite left alone”; “but that was he was also small. [that is why he bit everybody] now he is already ten years old and he’s not biting” (ibid.) any more. Interestingly, Patrick finds it necessary to clarify to me that Monica speaks about her “tough” relationship with his pet (ibid.) rather than with him himself (or with his family in general?) and so to prevent my possible misinterpreting of Monica’s utterance. Despite this Patrick’s attempt to frame the partners’ verbal duel as the disagreement on the dog’s ‘place’ in their bond (and so as a potential conflict between Monica and the dog), Monica indirectly points out that the issue is not so much about the dog but rather about Patrick parents’: “i do not have <@> an option. just to like him [the dog] a lot</@>” (ibid.). Here, her I-utterance can be understood as They-utterance: ‘They do not even give me an option’ or claim that Patrick and his family would only accept Monica’s approve of the dog. Any other reaction – leave it alone aversion or disgust - would be seen as inappropriate in the family space. Later on, Monica makes the second attempt to reframe
the discussion of Patrick’s pet to that of her relationship with Patrick’s family: “but i’m not even allowed to touch him” (turn 12); “it would be a little bit easier if he if i wouldn’t always be teached that he is such a DANGEROUS DOG”; “i mean i think people are more doing troubles about him than about your nephew or your grandchild i mean” (ibid.). In two fist utterances, Monica uses verbs in the Passive Voice — *i’m not even allowed; if i wouldn’t always be teached*. This can be interpreted as her unwillingness to directly specify the agents of the action. Even though Monica spells out who is this mysterious agent by producing *people* in her third statement, it is still not clear to whom exactly she is referring. Hence, Monica’s ‘people’ excludes the dog from the possible agents who do not allow her to touch the pet or teach her that it is very dangerous. One can only suppose that ‘people’ are Patrick’s family, or more specifically, his parents. It can be said that, by exercising such indirectness, Monica in a roundabout way chastises Patrick (and his parents/family) in concerning with the dog more than with her and her feelings. This conversational move, then, is both territorial since it is face-threatening and co-operative since it deflects the direct confrontation between Monica and Patrick or Patrick’s family (as mediated by Charlie). On the one hand, Monica attempts to buffer the critique of Patrick’s family by using the dog as the object of direct appraisal: “well this dog is a topic” (ibid.). Addressing her critique to the dog and to unspecified ‘people’ provides a way for her to avoid to directly blame Patrick (and his family) to being concerned more with animals than with humans, to be more precise – with her herself. In this respect, she attempts not to impinge too far into Patrick’s privacy and appeals for his sympathy: ‘You love me not less than the dog (and your family), don’t you?’ On the other hand, she struggles for being accepted into Patrick’s world and touches him to the quick: his most intimate relationship with the family members (including Charlie) that Patrick had established long before he met Monica. As concerns Patrick, he seems to take Monica’s statements about the dog literally as those motivated exclusively by the partner’s annoyance at his pet. He shows Monica that he is not against her intrusion into his privacy but wants her to share his space with the dog and with his whole family, of course. He tries to reassure her and explain to her that she and his pet are not mutually exclusive and she has no reasons to be annoyed: she is not allowed to touch the dog for her own good, and so the family worries about her and her health since she cannot know “when he [the dog] is getting uneasy” (ibid.).

This all is very interesting, one might say, but what it has to do with Monica’s *geh komm*. As it has often happened with other couples, I had to provide a direct prompt about
the meaning of the phrase and Monica’s reasons for using it. The answer was rather surprising: “<L1de> geh komm {come on} </L1de> is to the dog. i’m talking to the dog and i’m taking in german. @@@@” (C4/au-cz/Com 2.5/14.01.2011). Here Monica reframes what I have understood as her address to Patrick to her talk to Charlie. This reframing, of course, changes the ground for interpreting Monica’s utterance. If we take into account the listed above definitions of the phrase that are provided by Osterrichi Wörterbuck, it can be again taken as realization of meaning 1, 2 but also 3 with the dog as an addressee, namely an expression of Monica’s frustration and annoyance with the dog, her protest to its barking/inappropriate behaviour, and the exclamation with the illocutionary force of command: ‘Come on. Stop barking! You are disturbing!’ The question arises as to what can be Monica’s motivations to talk German to the dog who is ‘Czech’. Monica herself cannot explain why she uses her L1 when speaking to Patrick’s dog. Since Monica provides no account on her linguistic behaviour, I take the liberty to make my own suggestions about her possible motives. It is worth noting that dogs can neither speak nor understand any language, and so there seems to be no difference what language you talk to them (except, perhaps, particular commands they are trained on in a particular language). As Monica puts it, to choose a particular language to address pets “<@> makes no sense. really not? </@>” (ibid.). It can be assumed, then, that where one can ‘choose’ a language, one would draw upon more familiar and ‘embodied’ linguistic resources. In this respect, Monica, like Patrick, inclines to use her L1 German – the language that has been experienced and served functional in the contexts of communication with ‘others’ (albeit computers and/or pets) in her primary culture. Another explanation is sustained by the fact that not only the formal features of two different languages are blended here but also different discourses or genres are fused. In other words, Monica communicates with the pet in her L1 and with her partner in ELF. Such use of German with the dog can be interpreted as the territorial manoeuvre to exclude Charlie from the partners’ private space that is established and maintained in ELF. This Monica’s reluctance to share neither linguistic nor physical territory with the pet comes forth in the final sequel of the partners’ conversation:

Extract 70    (C4/au-cz/Con10/November 2011): restovat. restartovat roštovat

1. Patrick: <1> just just </1> click on that.
2. Monica: no. i do <pvc> <LNcz> restovat. </LNcz> </pvc> no?
3. Patrick: <@> <L1cz> restartovat {restart} </L1cz> </@> @ @@
4. Monica: <@> <LNcz> restartovat {restart} </LNcz> </@>
5. Patrick: <L1cz> roštovat {roast} </L1cz> is cooking is frying.
As can be seen, Monica produces *oh come on* when addressing Patrick in turn 9. TOMWED definitions of *come on* are rather similar to what *ge komm* denotes in Austrian German. They are: “1. please - used in cajoling or pleading; 2 - used interjectionally to express astonishment, incredulity, or recognition of a put-on”. Here, *come on* is Monica’s reaction to the food that Patrick is treating his dog to. It is clear she thinks that the food – the ham - is too good for the pet. Patrick reassures her that he is doing nothing wrong since “that’s (Charlie’s) ham” (turn 8). Monica, in turn, demonstrates her distrust by producing “oh come on” (turn 9). The use can be interpreted as “recognition of a put-on” or as expression of her feeling that Patrick is doing a wrong thing. Whatever the meaning, such Monica’s use of the English *come on* when addressing Patrick can be interpreted as inclusive strategy whereby Monica recognizes that Patrick belongs to their shared private ELF space. On the other hand, the use of *geh komm* can be explained as her (unconscious) exclusive move to deny Patrick’s family access to the partners’ shared ELF space by using the pet to mediate and deflect the direct confrontation. It is important to note that in this particular interchange, the partners’ L1s also serve the mitigating effect. Monica’s innovative transformation *restovat/roštovat* (turn 1, 5) of the Czech term *restartovat* (turn 3, 4) creates the humorous effect and mitigates the partners’ disagreement about the proper food for the pet. The same situations and the point that such funny ‘mistakes’ contribute to the partners’ ‘coupleness’ and help them accomplish their relationship is made by most couples and can be observed again and again throughout the conversations (cf. also Section 8.2.3).

In sum, what the partners do in this interaction is similar to Tannen’s observation that family members often use their pets as resources “to manage and enact communication among themselves” (Tannen 2007b: 67-68). This ‘hybrid’ use of (at least) two resources - the dog as a resource to mediate communication and Monica’s L1 *ge komm* - involves a double bind of territoriality and cooperativeness with each partner projecting and protecting her/his own positions on their own and other family members’ place in the couple’s private space. By the complex negotiation of complaint, explanation, redress and humour as mediated by all the available linguistic resources, the partners try to resolve a potential conflict between their individual territorial claims and use the dog as a resource to mediate...
the disagreement. Monica competes with Patrick family for more room in the partners’ affective territory. Patrick rejects the challenge to decide who is more important for him and tries to deflect the confrontation by demonstrating that there is enough room for everybody in their private microcosm.

8.2.7 "Mucho Bueno": Representational Function of Linguistic Hybridity

The examples in this section demonstrate how ELF couples use their linguistic resources to function to representational effect. Such effect is often regarded as a quintessential feature of literary and art discourse where the main purpose is not so much to provide a referential connection to reality but to represent it. This is what Jacobson (1960: 358) refers to as poetic function of language that is disruption of the expectations of co-occurrence and play with language itself. The interplay of poetic processes in conversational discourse is also the central concern of Tannen’s (1989) book Talking Voices. She investigates stylistic elements of everyday talk – such as patterns of sound, rhythm, repetition, imagery and narrative – and argues that all these literary features make up what she refers to as aesthetics or poetics of conversational discourse as well. While agreeing that such literary linguistic elements are an integral part of everyday conversation, I am not so much concerned with the systematic analysis of stylistic features. My focus here is not on the differences or similarities of linguistic patterning in literary and non-literary discourse but on a basic distinction between their pretextual purposes and effects, and on how ELF couples achieve and exploit such ‘literary’ effects by mediation of linguistic hybridity in their everyday interaction.

At this point it is worth dwelling a moment on what makes literary discourse different from other types of social interaction91. As we have already seen on the examples of couple talk, in our social life language is normally used to make direct reference to the world of phenomena or state of affairs. Literary discourse, in turn, provides a representation of reality through its peculiar and unconventional uses of language, which invite and motivate readers to create imaginary alternative world (cf. Short 1996, Verdonk 1993). As Widdowson (1992: 71) puts it, literary discourse is “a representation of socially unsanctioned reality through the exploitation of unrealised possibilities in language”. The scholar’s point is that, unlike referential modes of meaning whose language is dependent on context, fiction and

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poetry is a representational mode of meaning whose context is dependent on language. The fact that literary/poetic texts are decontextualized representations of reality (Widdowson 1992: 3-31) allows for elusiveness of meaning, and, consequently, an infinite number of interpretation possibilities in literature and poetry (as well as in art in general). In the following, I consider how such representational effect that has traditionally been regarded as the central feature of literary discourse is achieved and exploited in the partners’ private interaction by mediation of hybrid forms.

Two first example comes from Anna and Paul (C5/au-hu) and illustrates how partners’ L2s other than English are used to ‘literary’ representational effect in the ‘public’ discourse, or in the presence of others. In the interchange, the partners’ are busy with their shared hobby - music. Both partners can play the guitar. Anna is an amateur. Paul is a professional guitar player. The partners often play some pieces of music together and truly enjoy the process. While playing together, Paul sometimes gives guitar lessons to Anna. The extract is from one of such recorded music performances/lessons that was interrupted by a partners’ housemate. Here is the interaction of the three:

Extract 71 (C5/au-hu/Con 2/May 2011): *mucho bueno*

1. Paul: or give them to me. you can handle three housemates’ plants. they just need some water. {starts playing the guitar} (20) {stops playing the guitar} now you.
2. SX1: just if you may maybe can put them to the light tomorrow.
3. Anna: uhu.
4. Paul: yeah. sure. if it’s not no no not a problem. if it’s like out there.
5. SX1: no. no. for me no. okay?
6. Anna: @@@@@@@@@@@@@@@
7. SX1: so thank YOU.
8. Anna: yeah. by the way thank you.
9. SX1: yeah.
10. Anna: <LNes> mucho <1> bueno. {much good} </LNes>,</1>
11. Paul: <1> we </1> give you *mula* soon.
12. SX1: yeah. fifty if you could soon. but
13. Anna: tonight. will be tonight. {starts playing the guitar}

As it has turned out from the partners’ retrospective comment, their housemate is going away for a couple of days. Therefore, he comes to ask the partners if they could take care of his ‘friends’ - pot plants - water them and put them into the light outdoors (turn 1, 2) at the time he is not at home. Anna and Paul say that they, of course, would do it with pleasure. In this context, a housemate and Anna exchange “thank-you” phrases in turns 7 and 8. For some reasons, Anna reinforces her “thank-you” with *mucho bueno* in turn 10. In turn 11, Paul speaks about mysterious *mula* that the partners are going to give back to the neighbour. Even from a formal perspective, both uses are rather difficult to categorize.
Let us first look at *mucho bueno*. In the retrospective comment, the couple are rather definitive that *mucho bueno* is a Spanish phrase that “means very good” (C5au-hu/Com7/07.08.2011). I am not a Spanish speaker and I have not found the entry of the whole phrase in a dictionary. Therefore, I consulted a blog of an online Spanish tutor (Garcia 2012) for translation and explanation of this phrase. The blogger explains that from the formal perspective the phrase is ungrammatical since an adjective *bueno* is complemented here by yet another adjective *mucho*. According to Garcia (ibid.), *mucho* can be only followed by a noun or preceded by a verb. *Bueno*, in turn, is used with nouns or adverbs. Neither can be used with adjectives. That is to say, there is no such expression in Spanish as *mucho bueno* (English “much/many good”). The ‘correct’ combination would be *muy bueno* (English “very good”), where *muy* is an adverb (ibid.). The partners, however, are not aware about ‘ungrammaticality’ of the phrase. One can suggest, then, that the partners have adapted the Spanish phrase either as they have heard it from other people for their own purposes or by having transformed it from *muy bueno* into *mucho bueno*. Whatever the source of the innovation, the couple clearly have made the phrase their own private term which is functional in their private space. It is important to note that neither partner has listed Spanish among her/his L2s. The question arises here as to why they use the language which neither of them can speak. One possible explanation could be that the housemate is Spanish and the partners would like to please him by addressing him in his L1. However, the couple provide no such substantiation of the housemate’s nationality or his proficiency in the language. Moreover, as we will see in the next example, it seems to be normal for this couple to use their L2s other than English not only outside their relationship with other people but in their dyad as well. It can be assumed that in this particular interchange neither the form nor the reference to a particular context really matters. What matters is the sound of this non-conventional use that creates the representational effect of local ‘Spanish’ colour. In other words, it is not so much that the partners refer to a particular state of affairs (‘All right’, ‘Very good. We shall take care of the plants’) but that they use the phrase to represent an aesthetic effect of the exotic ‘Spanish’ atmosphere, and so also attain a sense of fun. My suggestion, here, is that the effect of domestic intimacy and fun is at least partly realized through such representational effect of *mucho bueno*.

The mysterious *mula* (turn 11) might have a similar representational ‘poetic’ effect in this conversation. Additionally, the use is one of the numerous examples in my data of how blurry and indeed imagined the boundaries between different languages are. While
transcribing the partners’ talk, I was puzzled with the word and its spelling (I initially transcribed it as “nula”) since I had never heard it before. In the retrospective comment, the partners claim that they have adapted the word from one of their friends and categorize *mula* – quite hesitantly - as an English slang word with the meaning “money” (C5/au-hu/Com2/07.08.2011). Since the partners were not sure about the word, I consulted the Online Urban English Dictionary – a dictionary of non-standard English after having obtained the comment. The dictionary lists the same meaning for *mula*, namely “money, cash” (www.urbandictionary.com). TOMWED provides another homophone variant of the word: *moola* or *moolah* – and also tags it as slang term of unknown origin that denotes “money”. Thus, it can be rather definitely claimed that the word is indeed an *English* slang expression.

Bearing in mind these dictionary definitions let us again turn to the couple comment on the word. As we have already seen, initially they claim the word to be English. With the development of our discussion, Anna doubts that the word is an element of English and states that they adapted it from “a bangladeshi person. who’s lives in london. so where he’s got this word from i have no clue now” (C5/au-hu/Com7/07.08.2011). Paul’s further explanation makes things even more confused. He commented that Anna might use the word “because of her portuguese” (ibid.). The partners’ account for *mula* is rather controversial and, in fact, blurs the boundaries between/among languages. The fact that the partners refers to the word as English, or Portuguese, or ‘no clue from where a Bangladeshi person has got it’ shows that such boundaries do not really matter in the couple’s discourse so long as the resources they use are functional. In this respect, the use is a good example of what is often referred to as *language contact* in sociolinguistics (that presupposes such language demarcations), and what in fact is *people contact*. As the couple explain, they adapt particular words not from particular separate languages (or dictionaries) but rather from people with whom they have had contact in the course of their life.

Whatever the source from which the partners adapted the word, the question here arises as why they use it rather than, say, more common *money*, and the like. One can again assume that apart from being the partners’ private term to generally refer to *money*, the slang word functions to the representational ‘poetic’ effect. Such effect can be described as the affective impact of slang that includes such elements as “aggressive informality”, “raw vitality”, “ribald sense of humour”, “flip self-confidence”, “locker-room crudity and toughness”, and “tawdry sensibility” (Lighter 1994: xii). In other words, *mula* does not only
refer to “money” but also represents the romantic atmosphere of a (imagined) slang community in the couple’s private space. The word functions to express joint ‘coupleness’ as associated with a particular informal ‘slang’ group membership (of which the housemate might also be part of) and to oppose the partners’ little world to the established authority of the outer socially sanctioned ‘macro’ world (cf. also Eble 1996: 116 for most typical functions of slang).

While the first two examples in this section might have been motivated by the presence of the partners’ housemate, the next extract from the same couple illustrates how the partners adapt their L2s other than English in their dyad. In the interchange, the couple is enjoying dinner that they have cooked together. After having made themselves comfortable at the dinner table, they suddenly find out that they have forgotten to season the dish with an important ingredient: Parmesan. In this context, they produce a number of Italian words and phrases:

Extract 72 (C5/au-hu/Con 3/May 2011): cucina italiano: tutto beno

1. Anna: we forgot put to put parmesan on.
2. Paul: we can do it. (5) uh-uh-uh. not not so fast. (3) uh uh good.
3. Anna: doesn’t need much more <1> <un> xx <un> actually </1>
4. Paul: < LNde> that’s true. </ LNde>
5. Anna: @@ @@ oh my g:::osh. (5)
6. Paul: mh mh: (cake cups.) (3) it’ll make it a bit more (3) ITALIAN.
7. Anna: @@ @@ 
8. Paul: italianoN. (7)
9. Anna: of course it does. <LNit> italiano. {italian} <2> cucina italiana {italian cuisine} </LNit>
10. Paul: <2> <LNit> molto be:ne </2> be:ne {very good. good.} </LNit> (2)
11. Anna: are you showing it to me.
12. Paul: pardon. (1) pardon. (3)
13. Anna: that’s the one and only essential survival book of
14. Paul: <LNit> tutto? tutto bene. {all right} </LNit> […] <LNde> na:::. </LNde> (5) i don’t talk. you know that mean that <LNde> essen {food} </LNde> is good.
15. Anna: @@ @@ @ there was a good signs of it.
16. Paul: @@ (3)

I do not have the couple’s retrospective comment on this extract. Therefore, I can only provide my own vision of the context and meaning of the conversation. Taking into account that the missing ingredient is Parmesan – a hard dry Italian cheese, one can assume that the partners have made some Italian dish. The assumption is sustained by Paul’s remark that (presumably) Parmesan will make the dish “a bit more ITALIAN” in turn 6. As can be observed, while enjoying the food, the partners repeatedly produce the Italian words and expressions in a playful manner: “italiano”, “cucina italiana” (turn 9); “molto be:ne be:ne” (turn 10), “tutto? tutto bene” (turn 14). Like in the case of Spanish mucho bueno, neither
partner has specified that s/he can speak Italian in the questionnaire, and throughout the interview or retrospective comments. The question arises again why they textualize their discourse in the language that neither of them knows. On the one hand, it is obvious that the partners do it for fun, since they laugh (marked as @ in the transcription) a lot during the lunch. On the other hand, one can suggest that such shared playful atmosphere is (at least partly) achieved by mediation of the Italian words that represents the remote and romantic Italian culture (as the partners’ imagine it). To put it another way, the partners might not be so much concerned with the referential meaning of the Italian words and phrases. The desired impressionistic effect of ‘national’ Italian colour does not really depend on such referential meaning. It is neither the form nor precise denotation of the words nor the reference to the ‘real’ world that matters here but the representational effect that, in turn, furthers the achievement of humorous intimate atmosphere of the shared affective space.

The last example in this section demonstrates how the partners use hybrid forms intertextually from the public discourse of a commercial to the similar representational effect. The example comes from Nargiz and Dan (C1/ua-fr). It is of special interest because the pretextual effect of the commercial and the partners’ private use of its elements interact to a certain degree. In the interchange, the couple are having breakfast on Sunday morning in a relaxed and lively atmosphere. They are discussing their plans for a summer vacation in Indonesia.

Extract 73  (C1/ua-fr/Con 2/05.2009): kofe jacobs aroma::::::t

1. Dan: <singing> <L1ru> кофе якобс арома::::::т /kofe jacobs aroma::::::t/ {coffee jacobs aroma} <L1ru> </singing> what do you say my love. there is in the song. <singing> <L0ru> <pvc> разбудит /rabudit/ <pvc> нас /nas/ {will wake us up} <L0ru> </singing>
2. Nargiz: <singing> <L1ru> разбудит нас /razbudit nas/ {will wake us up} </L1ru> </singing>
3. Dan: <singing> <L1ru> разбудит нас /razbudit nas/ {will wake us up} </L1ru> </singing>
4. Nargiz: <singing> <L1ru> в начале дня /в нaчaле дня/ {at the beginning of the day} </L1ru> </singing>
5. Dan: <singing> <L1ru> в /в/ <pvc> нaтнaле /natnale/ <pvc> дня /dna/ {at the beginning of the day} </L1ru> </singing>
6. Nargiz:<1> @@@ @@@@@ (2) @@@ (2) @@@ </1>

As can be seen, at the beginning of the interchange the partners are singing a couple of strophes about coffee Jacobs – a popular German coffee brand that was founded and named by Johann Jacobs: “кофе Якобс аромат разбудит нас в начале дня” (turns 1-5). I have recognized this little song as an element of Ukrainian TV commercial where the whole family is woken up by the smoke of Jacobs’ aroma that smoothly rises up over a cup of hot coffee and moves from person to person. The commercial ends with slogans such as “Почнi свй...
день з кави Якобс” in Ukrainian (English: ‘Start your day with coffee Jacobs’). This is also how Nargiz describes the advertisement as a source of the adaptation in the partners’ private space:

**Extract 74  (C1/ua-fr/Com 4/15.02.10): Это же реклама кофэ Якобс !!!!**

Nargiz: Да ну как же откуда!!!! Это же реклама кофэ Якобс!!!! Несколько лет назад по телеку непрерывно крутили! разве ты не помнишь? там все дружно просыпаются от его аромата!!! :)))))

{Well, what means where it is from!!!!! This is a commercial of coffee Jacobs!!!! It was constantly up on tv several years ago! can’t you remember? there everybody is speedily waken up by its aroma!!! :))))} (my translation)

As can be seen from the comment, the partners’ performance is an illustration of what I have referred to as *intertextuality* in Section 7.3.4, namely adaptation of public texts into the couples’ private space. Let us first look at the possible meaning of the advertisement. As any discourse, it is an expression of a particular pragmatic meaning that has locutionary reference (proposition), illocutionary force and perlocutionary effect. The propositional meaning of the commercial is rather unambiguous: it refers to a particular merchandise product – Jacobs coffee. Its illocutionary force is also quite clear: it is a description of the product. At the perlocutionary level, the purpose of the commercial is to convince people to buy the product. For this purpose, the advertisement is intended to create an ideal alternative world of a happy family whose happiness depends on a proper start of day. This proper start is, of course, a cup of coffee Jacobs. In other words, the commercial does not only refer to reality but also represents it by creating an impressionistic ‘fairy-tale’ effect of an ideal romantic morning with a magic cup of coffee Jacobs that makes one’s whole day perfect. If we now look at the partners’ use of the commercial’s text in the extract as the expression of pragmatic meaning, it seems to be rather unambiguous as well. The partners’ text and the text of commercial are at least propositionally equivalent: both are about the same brand of coffee. What the texts are definitely not equivalent in is their illocutionary forces. While the commercial is mainly a description of the product, the partners’ song can be initially categorized as invitation for a morning cup of coffee or as a signal that coffee is made and ready for consumption. At this point, let us look at what the partners have to say about the song in their retrospective comment:

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92 See YouTube (https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=M66x7iR4l7s simja jakobs polska) for one of such video commercials.
Nargiz: ну, не помню уж точно... но мы оба любим кофэ, а Дэн всегда рад чего-нибудь по-русски выучить. а я ему песенку про кофе спела, он нашел ее весьма забавной. потому еще, что кофэ Якобз во Франции не существует. аромат он и тут аромат - это он понял, остальное я объяснила. он очень смейлся, а так как меня утром очень тяжело разбудить, может помочь только кофэ - это он тоже понял, вот он мне и поет песенку про кофэ, когда он готов... иногда просто говорит КАВА? и я выскакиваю из постели намного быстрее :))))

{well, i can’t remember exactly now ... but we both love coffee, and Dan is always happy to learn something in russian, and i have sung him a little song about coffee, he found it quite funny. also because there is no coffee Jacobs in France. aroma will be aroma here as well – he understood it, i have explained the rest. he laughed his head off, and since it is very difficult to wake me up in the morning and only coffee can help – he understood it too, and here he is - singing the little song about coffee once he has made it... sometimes he simply says <L1ua> KABA? /kava/ {coffee} </L1ua> and i jump out of bed much quicker :))))} (my translation)

As can be seen from the comment, there is a disparity between my interpretations and Nargiz’s explanation of the song. By coffee Jacobs, the partners indexically refer to any sort of coffee rather than to the specific Jacobs brand: “also because there is no coffee Jacobs in France. aroma will be aroma here as well – he understood it, i have explained the rest”. In this respect, “coffee Jacobs” may refer to the partners’ favourite coffee of another (say French) brand that they normally consume. At the same time, the song represents coffee in general as part of their ideal affective private space: “мы оба любим кофэ” {we both love coffee}”. As regards the illocutionary force of the song, it is a (mitigated) request for action - ‘Coffee is ready. It is time to get up. Wake up, darling’ - rather than simply an invitation to have a cup of coffee. According to Nargiz, Dan has understood that the best strategy to wake her up and get her out of bed is to make a cup of coffee and tempt her with its aroma: “and here he is - singing the little song about coffee once he has made it... sometimes he simply says <L1ua> KABA? /kava/ {coffee} </L1ua> and i jump out of bed much quicker :))))”.

Taking into account Nargiz’s clarification, my suggestion is that the representational effect of an ideal happy domestic morning with a cup of coffee is one of the motivations why the partners integrate this public text into their private world. Like in the commercial, the partners’ song is intended to convey the atmosphere of a romantic loving private space where a magic cup of coffee provides a perfect start into a new day. Perlocutionary, then, the song creates the representational atmosphere of a happy domestic world that alludes to the alternative reality of ideal happy family in the commercial. It furthers the partners’ achieving the pretextual effect of fun, intimacy and togetherness and mitigates the possible negative effects of the awakening procedure.

93 I preserve Nargiz’s idiosyncratic spelling of the word here, the conventionalized Russian spelling is кофе.
To sum up, in the section I have shown that the partners use ELF and other languages within it not only to make reference to the reality but also bring about a particular representation of it. As we have seen in the examples from Couple 1 and 5, such representations that are traditionally associated with what is referred to as literary effect are a significant interactive feature of couple private discourse as well. My point has been that the representational effect that the partners create by blending all the available resources contributes to the achievement of the perlocutionary effects of humour and fun as well as of intimacy and togetherness in their private space.

8.3 CONCLUSION:
ESTABLISHING THE SHARED PRIVATE TERRITORY

In this chapter, my focus has been on the actual linguistic behaviour in the couples’ private space. In the examples of the partners’ data, we have considered how ELF couples establish their own private language to describe or conceptualize reality, to negotiate the knowledge about the world and provide the convenient shared framework of understanding. Moreover, I have shown that the process of establishing the shared frame of reference is always regulated by some kind of communicative purpose. As we have seen, the partners’ ELF and other linguistic resources within it are flexibly used and adapted into the partners’ private discourse to function to various pragmatic effects: to establish rapport, to achieve a humorous effect, to negotiate national/ethnic/religious aspects, to mediate communication with ‘others (e.g. dogs and computers) and to convey a ‘artistic’ or ‘literary’ representation of reality. As the partners themselves summarize their conceptual and communicative needs in the process of accomplishing ‘coupleness’, they use ELF and hybrid forms within it to “just describe life” conceptually and to create a joint couple identity by taking “refuge in this little world of ours” (C5/au-hu/I5/Prompt 5.1: 426, 462). According to the couples, thus, they do not only seek agreement about the shared knowledge of the world but also co-operate and compete in establishing their shared affective territory in conversational negotiation. This is a crucial point that is relevant for and is discussed by all the couples in my research. The partners’ private language and hybrid forms within it do not only serve to conceptualize reality in a way most convenient for the partners but also to meet the partners’ individual cultural positions by creating their shared affective ‘microcosm’/‘micro-culture’, “this little world of [theirs]” with the pretextual ambience of domestic togetherness and intimacy. My
suggestion has been that in one way or another all the resources at the partners’ disposal are used to achieve such pretext and this very pretext of accomplishing the couples’ ‘coupleness’ is a defining feature of their private discourse.

In this respect, ELF couples interaction is not necessarily different from any other couple discourse. What is perhaps unique about such ELF discourse is that the partners have more linguistic (virtual) resources for creating and negotiating their private space. As Dan from Couple 1 puts it, “especially for us it’s very easy to do it [to create the shared private space]. because we can use russian for example. because in france no one understand russian” (Co1/ua-fr/Prompt 5.2: 584-585). Dan summarizes the view that all five couples express in the interview and retrospective comments, namely that they are rather similar to any couple who need to establish, develop and do “a kind of private communication or special communication [...] to create a kind of private space together” (ibid. 580-586). In this sense, the partners meet at the threshold or frontier of their individual cultural and linguistic spaces and establish their shared conceptual and affective territory whereby they adapt and hybridize their private ELF by drawing upon any available virtual linguistic resources.

Finally, the central finding of the chapter is that the discourses that the partners intend and ratify by means of ELF and their languages within it are often obscure not only to the researcher who is not party to the partners’ symbolic conventions but also to interactants themselves. By drawing upon the participants retrospective comments, I have shown that such interpretation is by no means definitive. It is always regulated by particular pretextual purpose and, therefore, is selective and indeterminable. As we have seen, it is always a matter of the relationship between text and discourse and, consequently, of correspondence between interactants and the researcher’s intention and interpretation.
9. **A LOVE AFFAIR WITH ELF?**

**ACCOMPLISHING COUPLENESS THROUGH EXPRESSING LOVE**

In the previous chapter, I have mainly demonstrated how couples negotiate their individual ideational schemata or knowledge of the world by mediation of ELF and other linguistic resources within it. The purpose of this chapter is to bring together the couples’ attitudes and their actual linguistic behaviour by going through the main interactional features of their discourse as realized through phrases that represent interpersonal schemata. In other words, the chapter has to do with particular routine verbal ways that regulate the interpersonal interaction with second persons rather than represent the shared ideational conceptions of the third-person reality. The focus is on the formulae that express love and affection, specifically on the phrase *I love you* and corresponding expressions in the partners’ available linguistic resources. As we have seen in the previous chapters, most couples agree that language/s do not really matter so long as the partners achieve the relative convergence of their networks of knowledge and the desired effect of domestic intimacy and togetherness. However, there are situations when the partners are concerned with the languages they use, specifically, such verbal and non-verbal manifestations that people primarily use to signal “their feelings, moods and attitudes towards the referential content of communication” (Pavlenko 2007: 115). Particularly, “the one thing that nobody would wish to get wrong is a declaration of love” (Dewaele 2008: 1753). According to Dewaele (2008) and Pavlenko (2007), such manifestations can also be categorized as *expressions of the emotional weight*. We have already discussed how the partners use such ‘emotionally loaded’ elements of interpersonal schemata as terms of address or endearment words (see Section 8.1.3, 8.3.1). Another element that all the couples in my study have discussed at some point of the interview is the English phrase *I love you* and the corresponding expressions in their other languages. In what follows, I look at what the participants say about and what they actually do in expressing affection by mediation of such interpersonal verbal formulae.
9.1 NARGIZ AND DAN - “Я ЛЮБЛЮ ТЕБЯ/JE T’AIME: WE HAD NO HEART RELATIONSHIP WITH THIS LANGUAGE”

Couple 1 – Nargiz and Dan – comment on expressions of affection during our discussion of the role of translation in the process of establishing and maintaining their ‘coupleness’ (see Section 7.2.2). As I have demonstrated, the partners reported that translation is not so much about substituting the words and expressions in one language by those in another. It is rather part of the ‘normal’ process of meaning negotiation where a partner reads her/his own discourse in and out of Text 1 in Language 1, and then textualizes this discourse in another language – Language 2. It is important to note that although ELF makes it possible for the participants to communicate at all, most couples perceive it as not precise enough for explaining certain things such as feelings, emotions and culture specific aspects. Nargiz and Dan are not an exception. According to Dan: “it’s more difficult. [to communicate in ELF…] firstly. it’s when you are tired and you are angry. you (would like to speak) your language directly. not to translate. […] and the second thing you have not the precision to explain. what is not okay” (C1/ua-fr/I1/Prompt 5.4, 756-762). In this connection, Dan describes ELF as ‘not enough’ to “explain some intimate things” in the following extract:

Extract 76  (C1/ua-fr/I1/Prompt 5.4-5.5, 776-789): when i say <L1fr> je t’aime {i love you} </L1fr> it’s much more difficult.

Dan: to explain some intimate things it’s difficult. […] if it’s not your mother language you don’t feel exactly the same thing when i say i love you it’s very easy for me. when i say <L1fr> je t’aime {i love you} </L1fr> it’s much more difficult. […] when i say <LNru> я люблю тебя /ja ljublju tebja/ {i love you} </LNru> it’s not <LNru> я люблю тебя /ja ljublju tebja/ {i love you} </LNru> for me. <LNru> я люблю тебя /ja ljublju tebja/ {i love you} </LNru> for me it’s just a very nice sound which mean <L1fr> je t’aime {i love you} </L1fr> but just mean. it’s not <L1fr> je t’aime. {i love you} </L1fr> it’s completely different.

Dan is reporting here that there is a difference in using the English I love you, the Russian я люблю тебя /ja ljublju tebja/ and his L1 French je t’aime in the partners’ private discourse. Dan claims that both L2 phrases – English and Russian – are “just a very nice sound” for him that “mean <L1fr> je t’aime {i love you} </L1fr> but just mean. it’s not <L1fr> je t’aime. {i love you.}”. What Dan is saying here is that he can decipher and understands what the English I love you as well as the Russian я люблю тебя mean but the phrases have no psychological jurisdiction over him. This is the reason why, as Dan puts it, “when i say i love you it’s very easy for me. when i say <L1fr> je t’aime {i love you} </L1fr> it’s much more
difficult”. In the next sequel, Dan describes such psychological power of conventionalized verbal conduct as “heart relationship” with a language/languages:

Extract 77  (C1/ua-fr/I1/Prompt 5.7, 811-820): we had no heart relationship with this language

Dan: when we spoke together only in english that was exactly the same. because we had no heart relationship with this language. [...] we had but only brain or mind relationship with this language. [...] so to explain to (each) other you are in love with her? it’s much more strange when you are when you speak in english. because in english you are not? you have a not deep link of this language with your feelings.

Here Dan explains his preferences to use ‘the language of the heart’ – namely his L1 French – rather than ‘language of the brain’ – ELF - for expressing his feelings to Nargiz or what he refers to as to “intimate things” in the previous extract. What Dan in fact describes here is ELF’s dissociation from the partners’ individual primary cultures that the partners have experienced through and connect to their L1s: “we had but only brain or mind relationship with this language”. According to Dan, both the English I love you and the Russian я люблю тебя are interpersonal formulae of the alien societies in which Dan has no social investment and so does not identify himself with. What Dan says about ‘the emotional weight’ of the partners’ languages is also generally true about Nargiz’s perceptions of it (see Section 8.1.2). That is to say, the partners of this couple generally agree on their vision of their L1s as the languages ‘of the heart’ that are more culturally embodied or territorialized to them and, therefore, more appropriate for expressing love and more acceptable in their shared affective territory.

9.2  SUE AND HENRY - “ICH LIEBE DICH, I MÅG DI GERN, I LOVE YOU”: EXTENDING ELF EMOTIONAL EXPERIENCE TO PARTNERS’ L1s

Another related aspect that ELF partners discuss in connection to the expression of affection is the relationship between their linguistic resources and the specific emotional experience of affection. We have seen in Chapter 7 how couples extend the linguistic resources of their primary cultures into their ELF. Clearly, this process of extending experience is at least bidirectional. The specific feature of Couple 2 in using the expressions of love is that they primarily had experienced affection in ELF and later on extended this experience into their L1s. The following discussion is the partners’ response to my prompt:
‘What languages would you prefer to use in your private discourse?’ Consider the partners reaction to it:

**Extract 78** *(C2/il-au/l2/Prompt 4.2, 575-612): really there’s no no language. when you know when you love someone. love has no language. BUT*

1. Sue: yeah definitely. because i don’t know there’s no you know really there’s no language. when you love someone. love has no language. BUT @ @ @ @ @ @ but still i so many times i wanted to speak i wanted to tell him things in hebrew. in my mother tongue. there are things that only your mother tongue can express. [...] without you know thinking these languages you think german english german and then just to say whatever comes you know. whatever you want to say it straightaway. and yeah and i missed that a lot. and that’s why i mean at least i can speak german. and i even though he says that […] it’s cultural. i think that when i say <LNde> ich liebe dich {i love you} <LNde> it’s not i mean it’s not as if you when you say i love you. it’s not the same. [...] i mean i try whenever i say i love you i say it in german. [...] because it is his mother tongue. [...] <LNde> ich liebe dich. {i love you.} <LNde> but i can’t say it in hebrew. [...] 2. I: okay if you could have spoken hebrew you would have done so.
3. Sue. yes. hebrew and german. no english.

Here we have two controversial statements. On the one hand, Sue makes a crucial point that it does not matter in which language one has romantic relationship so long as one achieves the effect of intimacy. On the other hand, she says that she would and does prefer to use the partners’ L1s for expressing affection: “hebrew and german. no english” (turn 3). Like does Dan in the previous section, Sue claims a strong connection between her L1 and primary ‘Israeli’ culture. Consequently, she sees ELF as inappropriate for expressing her feelings to Henry. Interestingly enough, she sees her capability to verbally manifest her affection in L2 German as a great advantage “because it is his [Henry’s] mother tongue” and has a greater emotional weight to her herself. As Sue describes her preferences, “i try whenever i say i love you i say it in german” (turn 1). Interestingly enough, Sue reports that for Henry himself “it was really hard” to use his “mother tongue” for these purposes:

**Extract 79** *(C2/il-au/l2/Prompt 4.3, 643-648): it was really hard for him at the beginning to say ich liebe dich.*

1. Sue: it was really hard for him at the beginning to say <LNde> ich liebe dich. {i love you.} <LNde> […] (anyone else says) i love you @ @ @ @ @ @ […] 2. Henry: basically the meaning is the same yeah. […] 3. Sue: that’s what i say 4. Henry: no it doesn’t make a difference now if in which language i say. […] not really. i think it’s not more intensive to say it in your native language.

Here we can observe a disparity in partners’ claims about the emotionality and appropriateness of ELF to express sympathy and love. In Sue’s view, ELF and the partners’ L1s have different emotional load in their private space (also for Henry, as she asserts). Contrary to Sue’s claim, Henry declares that there is no difference between German and English phrases: “it doesn’t make a difference now if in which language i say [I love you]”
(turn 4). One can assume here that one of the reasons why Henry sees no such difference is his perception of the Standard High German as his L2 and Austrian dialect variety as his L1 (see Section 7.3.3). Henry’s claim has been that this Austrian – specifically Linzer – dialect is his primary L1 in which he has learned the world. High German, in turn, is a language of his secondary socialization: the language acquired through media and education. This Henry’s account is the reason why I asked him about appropriateness of his L1 dialect for expressing sympathy to Sue. This is what he answered:

Extract 80  (C2/îl-au/l2/Prompt 4.3, p. 26): i måg di gern {i love you}

1. Henry: <L1de> i måg di gern {i love you} </L1de>
2. I: yeah. is it stronger
3. Sue: <LNde> ich hâb dich gern {i love you} </LNde> […]
4. Henry: no. actually i never said i love you in german language before i met sue. she forces me to. […]
5. Sue: no that’s what i’m saying. for him english is language of LOVE. […]
7. Sue: he was used to it you know. he was used to it.
8. Henry: i was always abroad you know.

As can be seen, Henry again makes no difference among the expressions of affection in his L1 dialect i måg/hâb di gern, his L2 Austrian Standard German ich liebe dich and the English I love you. Moreover, he sees the English phrase as the most fitting into his individual and the partners’ shared private space. Henry actually contradicts to what he himself has said about the reasons why he would prefer to maintain the relationship with Sue in ELF, namely exclusively to keep practising English (see Section 7.3.1). Here, he speaks about English as an established mediator in ‘love affairs’: “actually i never said i love you in german language before i met sue. she forces me to” (turn 5), “i was always abroad you know” (turn 9). It appears that Henry has experienced romantic relationship mainly ‘abroad’ and, therefore, in English before he met Sue. Sue agrees: “that’s what i’m saying. for him english is language of LOVE” (turn 6), “he was used to it you know. he was used to it” (turn 8). In this respect, ELF can be seen as the language in which the partners have gained their primary experience in love affairs. With the development of their relationship, however, the partners extend the experience that has been established and maintained in ELF to their L1s and L2s other than English within their private affective territory.
While Sue and Henry diverge in their vision of affective weight of *I love you* in English and in their L1s, the next two couples agree that English is rather detached from their primary experience. Their claim is that in English it is much more common to express love for anyone and anything, as Pavlenko (2007: 136) puts it, “from one’s children to movies to ice cream”. This is the reason why it might be either easier or, vice versa, more difficult for the partners in my study to express affection to each other in ELF. Consider what Couple 3 say about such phrases in English:

**Extract 81** (C3/it-au/I3/Prompt 7, 1352-1377): *it’s not like i i love you for example in english*

1. Peter: i think that it doesn’t happen that you say something just like because you’re used to it, especially if you are talking about feelings? you have you are thinking about it a bit more if you say something that is really meant. […] it’s not like i love you for example in english is for austrian harder to say than? because in austrian there are ten different steps in austrian german. […] there are ten different ways of saying it, but in like ich hâb dich lieb {I love you}<L1de> and i love you and how you would say it to your child. how you would say it to your mum. how you would say it to your […] girl-friend. but in english you are not used to talk about those things. so you really have to think what to say especially at the beginning.

2. I: you mean that i love you is harder to say in english than in austrian.

3. Peter: yeah. […] not for the americans especially because they love everybody. @@

4. Sandy: @@ they are saying it always. […]

5. Peter: yeah. you have to THINK more about it a bit i think what to say. it was a bad example. but if you talk about feelings then you you have to think a bit more. because yes it’s not that you learned at school. it’s not that natural.

In the interchange, Peter explains how the partners’ relationship is unique because of ELF. He explains that sometimes it is more difficult to communicate in ELF because “it doesn’t happen that you say something just like because you’re used to it. especially if you are talking about feelings?” (turn 1). According to Peter, it is easier to express feelings in his L1s German since, as he reports, there are “ten different ways of saying it” (turn 1) in his ‘embodied’ Austrian German “how you would say it to your child. how you would say it to your mum. how you would say it to your […] girl-friend” (turn 1). Peter further clarifies that it is not what one can learn at English classes: “it’s not that you learned at school” (turn 4). Another point that both partners make here is that to say *I love you* in English is “harder” for them as L2 users but “not for the americans especially because they love everybody. @@” (turn 3) and “are saying it always” (turn 4). In fact the partners are claiming here that they are detached from the English *I love you* culturally or contextually/pretextually. Even though they know the propositional content of the phrase (as learned at school through secondary
socialization of education), they have not experienced it contextually/pretextually in their primary culture (in our terms, have not territorialized it) and so do not connect it to their shared affective space, especially “at the beginning” (turn 1). However, the more established such space and the partners’ ELF is the more territorialized are the adapted and accepted interpersonal formulae in whatever linguistic resources and the less language and effort “to THINK more about […] what to say” (turn 5) is needed while expressing feelings, in general.

9.4 MONICA AND PATRICK - “THE FIRST TIME HE SAID IT IN DANISH”: L2 EXPRESSIONS OF AFFECTION AS EUPHEMISMS

While Sandy and Peter connect English expressions of love to difficulty to find the right and most appropriate phrase that corresponds to different ways of saying it in their L1s, Monica and Patrick consider English as the easiest way of verbal manifestation of affection in their private space. Consider the following:

**Extract 82** (C4/au-cz/I4/Prompt 7.3, 1219-1263): *english i love you - you can’t buy anything with it*

1. Monica: @@ english i love you is [...] you can’t buy anything with it that’s i mean that’s interesting @@ if he said it [...] actually the first time he said it in danish [...] so it must be in czech otherwise actually it’s not exactly [...] it’s not it’s not a maximum. […] for me it must be german. […]<pvc>
2. Patrick: that’s the language difference. but in english it’s quite ordinary and the most of the expression of certain feeling but in czech it’s of course when you translate it or you would use this expression or this way of saying things like that it would be completely little bit too strong or too weak. for instance i love you in english as monica says i love you in english means more i’m going shopping and i love you.
3. Monica: @@
4. Patrick: so i love you too. and then okay will see you in ten minutes. and you’re not saying in czech or not neither in german. so and you are not saying okay, buy meat potatoes and love you so or whatever i don’t know @ @ @ @ so in this way in english all this expression are a little bit used more not <pvc> flexiblyy </pvc> but sometimes the meaning is somewhere else than in cze- when you say well you do not use actually word i love you. well we use but very very well valued. so […] it’s not precise and partial

Here, there is a contradiction between the couple’s claim and actual behaviour. On the one hand, the partners discuss their preference to express their emotions in their L1s rather than in ELF. They claim that there is a difference of articulating emotions in ELF and in their L1s. Specifically, they explain how the ways to say I love you in the partners L1s German and Czech are different from the English equivalents. Monica clarifies that the phrase I love you in English is not “a maximum” (turn 1). In her view, to be “a maximum” it must be in one of the partners’ L1s. Patrick agrees and provides his own interpretation of the English I love
you: “i love you in english means more i’m going shopping and i love you” (turn 2); “buy meat and potatoes and i love you” (turn 4). He explains that the spectrum of “patterns” or “a scale of expressions” of conveying love in their L1s is much richer and more emotional than the English I love you and I love you very much. The English phrases make no affective difference and, in couple’s view, are rather commonplace, as Patrick puts it, “quite [...] ordinary” (turn 2), since everyone everywhere uses them: both in private and public domains. The partners are unanimous in their perceiving of communicating love in English: “english i love you [...] you can’t buy anything with it” (turn 1) “i love you in english is a bad example because everybody knows that this is really it’s not the same like in other languages” (C4/aucz/I4/Prompt 7.3: 1279-1282). Therefore, like most couples in my project they see the English phrases as not fitting for purpose, as “not precise and partial”, and prefer their L1s for the verbal manifestation of affection. On the other hand, despite their preferences, the partners do not speak each other’s L1s and report that the English I love you as an element of their actual linguistic behaviour and a verbal manifestation of their affective interpersonal schemata. As compared to ‘native’ uses, however, the couple describe their ‘own’ I love you as “very very well valued” (turn 4).

Another interesting point here is Monica’s statement that Patrick’s first I love you was in the partners’ L2 Danish (turn 1) – the language of the country where they met and established their relationship. The language of the environment is often reported as a reason for ‘language choices’ for emotional expression in sociolinguistic studies (Dewaele 2008, Pavlenko 2007, Piller 2002). In my view, however, the question is not so much how the language of the country itself – the partners L2 - influences couples’ communication of love but rather what factors further or hinder its use for expression of love and affection. One possible explanation in this particular case might be that by using his L2 Danish Patrick resorts to the euphemistic strategy and places himself and Monica at a greater emotional distance from what he wants to utter. In other words, he wields the language that has less psychological power over both partners. In such a way, one can assume, Patrick tries to avoid or mitigate possible negative effects of the first clarification of his affection to Monica (such as Monica’s rejection of his feelings) and to make sure that he neither intrudes too far into Monica’s individual territory nor hurts her feelings. This cultural/psychological detachment, in my view, is also the reason why all the couples in my study report that it is much easier for them to say I love you in English than in their L1s, especially at the beginning of their
relationship when the shared affective space and cultural values are not established in the linguistic terms.

9.5 ANNA AND PAUL - “ICH LIEBE DICHSZERETLEK”: ELF AS TERRITORIZED “LANGUAGE OF ROMANCE”

Anna and Paul are the only couple who agree on the acceptability of both their L1s and English as their “language of romance” (Anna/C5/au-hu/I5/Prompt 5.4: 696) for expressing affection to each other. The following sequels from the interview are part of the partners’ general description of their private language. The partners’ point has been that they have “reached that level where” (C5/au-hu/I5/Prompt 5.3: 613) they do not need so much language to understand each other. As Anna puts it: “i feel that even though i might say it wrongly or even though i only said a half of what i want to say he already understands me” (C5/au-hu/I5/Prompt 5.3: 609-611). However, like other couples in my study, the partners state that it would be perhaps easier to articulate themselves in their L1s in particular ‘emotional’ situations in the following extract:

*Extract 83 (C5/au-hu/I5/Prompt 5.3, 619-629): it might be easier in german.*

1. Anna: well i still realize i still realize when i’m really upset like something like today @ @::::: i guess i find it when you really like in the state of rage i maybe i find it a little bit difficult to articulate myself. […] in english. it might be easier in german. […]
2. Paul: <@> i guess for me too like in this regard. i don’t know. </@> because it’s a kind of strange if i speak like hungarian with you.

Here both partners describe the negative emotions (e.g. rage) as easier to express in the German language – Anna’s L1 and Paul’s L2. Their reasons for such claim, of course, are somewhat different. Anna’s motivation for using the language, on the one hand, is that it has proved to be functional as her L1 in the past. Paul, on the other, has made it his own, or has territorialized - contextualized/pretextualized - it into his individual emotional, or rather conceptual and affective, space while living, working and socializing in it in Austria. Although Paul would also prefer to use his L1 for expressing strong emotions, he uses German – Anna’s L1 and the language of the environment – for such purposes because, as he himself puts it, “it’s a kind of strange if i speak like hungarian with you” (turn 2). At the same time, the partners explain that ELF as a ‘foreign’ language might be preferable in such situations since it has “a mend-away effect” (Anna/C5/au-hu/I5/ Prompt 5.3: 639). This corresponds to what I have said about euphemistic strategies in expressing love in the previous section. According to Anna, “the basic question is do we refrain from having
arguments. because it would be too difficult in this foreign language you know” (C5/au-hu/I5/Prompt 5.3: 657-659). What Anna is saying here is that ELF’s foreignness lies in the less psychological power over the partners. In this sense, such foreignness or cultural detachment of the language can be advantageous not only because the partners’ avoid arguing in it (since it is difficult) but also because ELF does not hurt them so deeply as the negative emotions expressed in the partners’ L1s. Clearly, the ‘foreignness’ of any language depends on how far the partners have acculturated and territorialized it into their individual and shared private spaces. The partners discuss this process in the next sequels.

In Extract 84, the partners explain that ELF is preferable not only in such emotionally loaded speech events as arguments but also in communicating positive emotions such as sympathy and affection:

Extract 84 (C5/au-hu/I5/Prompt 5.3, 685-695): it’s easier to say i love you than ich liebe dich {i love you} [...] sounds better

1. Anna: i think we tell each other that we love each other and that we know mean a lot to each other and? […] well to me to be quite honest i even find it enough for me it’s easier to say i love you than <L1de> ich liebe dich {i love you} </L1de> you know […] i don’t know. because=
2. Paul: =sounds better.=

Here, Anna explains that one of the peculiarities of the partners’ private language is that they quite often manifest their affection to each other verbally. Moreover, they more often use English rather than their L1s for this purpose since it “sounds better” (turn 2) and, as Anna puts it in the next extract, “goes easier from the lips”:

Extract 85 (C5/au-hu/I5/Prompt 5.4, 696-731): english is a language of romance

1. Anna: perhaps english is a language of romance somehow a language which lent itself to rosy description of how much you love someone. […] @@@@ @ i mean it is not that i don’t know it but still you know it’s just to make it overt, to just express it. [...] i just i feel maybe it goes easier from the lips at to say i love you. […] but i don’t know why. because i really MEAN it. you know and in end effect it makes no difference if i say <L1de> ich liebe dich {i love you} </L1de>, but yeah it just comes easier in a way. for some reason. […]
3. Anna: in hungarian. that’s right. […] and and for me, you know like because i know a few phrases @@ @ […] i can say <LNhu> szeretlek {i love you} </LNhu> it is […] i love you <LNhu>

Although the partners use both Hungarian – “szeretlek” (turns 5) and German – “ich liebe dich” (turn 1) - for expressing affection to each other and claim that “in end effect it makes no difference” (turn 1) what language they use, they describe ELF as the most preferable mediator for this purpose in their private space. As Anna puts it, English is “a language which lent itself to you know rosy description of how much you love someone” (turn 1). However,
Anna puts a greater importance on expressing love and making it “overt” (turn 1) itself rather than on specific languages in which it is expressed.

To conclude, the crucial point about the general process of partners’ languaging and linguistic hybridity within it in connection with communicating emotions is summarized in Anna’s account that language issues are seldom about language. According to Anna, she was often “unhappy with the situation but you know like there was no language problem” (C5/I5/Prompt 5.3, 669-670). What Anna says is similar to the central finding of Piller’s observation in her study of bilingual couples. According to the researcher, problems of language use are rarely just that and often “are made to stand for other relationship issues” (Piller 2002: 1). As I have demonstrated in this chapter, such “other relationship issues” are generally about discourse as the process of interpersonal positioning. The defining feature of such positioning in couple interaction is the pretextual effect of domestic intimacy and togetherness. This effect is partly achieved by mediation of such interpersonal formulae as I love you, which all the couples use in all the available resources. Although most couples claim the differences in the emotional ‘load’ of the verbal manifestation of affection in ELF and their other languages (predominantly their L1s), the examples that I have discussed above demonstrate that such emotionality does not depend on the ‘foreignness’ or ‘non-nativeness’ of a language but rather on the degree to which the language is ‘embodied’, acculturated, and territorialized – contextualized and pretextualized – by the partners to meet their changing needs in the individual and shared private space. This being so, the couples’ intimate relationship are not so much about “language problems” (as Anna from Couple 5 puts it) but rather about the partners’ capability to establish and maintain their shared private conceptual and affective cultural space by mediation of all available linguistic resources within their ELF.

**9.6 CONCLUSION: “LOVE HAS NO LANGUAGE BUT”**

In this chapter I have considered how the partners accomplish their ‘coupleness’ by mediation of such interpersonal schemata as expressions of love and affection on the example of the English I love you and corresponding phrases in other partners’ languages. The couples report different attitudes to such emotionally loaded words and expressions. Some of them prefer their L1s, others – ELF or their L2s other than English for the purpose of textualizing affection to each other. Some participants see ELF as an extension of their primary
experience in love affair into their L1s. Others view their L1s as an extension of such primary experience into ELF. Most couples use ELF for expressing love since it is detached from their primary cultures and does not have so strong psychological power over them as their L1s, and, consequently, has a mitigating effect. For the similar purpose, namely to achieve the euphemistic effect, Patrick from Couple 5 uses the partners’ L2 Danish to declare his affection to Monica for the first time. At the same time, the couples prefer their L1s in verbal manifestation of love because they have a stronger psychological connection to them. Despite all these differences and controversies, the crucial point is that the ‘emotional weight’ of such textualizations of affection depends on the extent to which the partners have managed to territorialize and acculturate their languages or particular elements of them (as well as the phrase *I love you*) into their private contextual and pretextual spaces. In my participants’ words, it is a matter of establishing and developing a “heart” relationship – a love affair – with their languages by bringing the individual worlds into convergence and creating a joint couple identity as mediated by **language** in general rather than of having a love affair in/through/with **any** specific language.
10. SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION: A LOVE AFFAIR WITH ELF “БЕЗ ЗАВЕРШАЮЩИХ АВТОРСКИХ ОЦЕНОК”

This thesis has investigated linguistic hybridity in ELF couple discourse. Drawing upon main empirical findings in ELF research, the study has suggested that couples’ ELF undergoes the process of territorialization: a creative pragmatic process of hybridization and ‘acclimation’ of English into the partners’ private space. In this process, ELF couples adapt and accommodate the language by drawing upon any available resources, and re-load it with their own cultural values for the pretextual purpose of creating their common affective territory. In this respect, ELF is as natural as any other language use. What is specific about ELF is the manner in which it gets hybridized and territorialized. In this project, the participants are non-native speakers of English and have at least three linguistic resources at their disposal: ELF and their L1s. Consequently, the ELF partners often have more available linguistic resources than in ‘monolingual’ or ‘bilingual’ settings. What is more crucial, however, is the fact that ELF as the partners’ ‘non-native’ ‘foreign’ shared language is often detached from their primary cultures. This makes its functioning in the couples’ discourse more apparent. As we have seen, such functioning is a matter of the relationship between the partners’ text and discourse. Thus, the discourse analytic approach presented in this thesis is based on the fundamental distinction between text and discourse. The approach is applied to the naturally occurring private talk of five ELF couples, their interviews and comments on the selected pieces of the partners’ talk. The major theoretical implications that follow from the textual analysis and interpretation of the couples’ data can be formulated as follows:

1. Discourse as polyphonic positioning is a function of the interaction among text, context and pretext. In this sense, linguistic hybridity as a textual feature is part of the general process of meaning negotiation in ELF couple interaction.

2. Because the relationship between text and discourse is not fixed and is mediated by individual contextual and pretextual factors, any discourse derived from text and any text analysis is a matter of interpretation. Interpretation, in turn, is regulated by particular pretextual purpose and, therefore, indeterminate.

3. The defining feature of ELF couple discourse is the pretext of intimacy and togetherness. Such pretextual purpose involves the interplay of territoriality and

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cooperativeness in couple interaction. Like any interaction, it is always driven by both imperatives and serves the conflicting needs in complex ways.

10.1 LINGUISTIC HYBRIDITY IN ELF: TERRITORIALIZATION THROUGH HYBRIDIZATION

To answer RQ 1, that is to operationalize and identify linguistic hybridity, I have proposed a form-focused definition of it as a necessary abstraction that enables any linguistic analysis at all. From this perspective, linguistic hybridity is taken as textual manifestation of innovative fusion of all the virtual linguistic resource the partners have at their disposal. The definition does not exclude linguistic hybridity that involves non-conventional blending of the elements of one ‘national’ language. However, the main focus of this thesis is on language alternation and cross-linguistic influence of different languages with the national names within an ELF utterance or interchange. My suggestion is that linguistic hybridity as any language use has to be understood in relation to discourse as polyphony/positioning and its drives. I have argued against the codeswitching/bilingualism approach to linguistic hybridity in ELF as unsatisfactory since it presupposes a combination of two separate distinct codes. My conceiving of linguistic hybridity in ELF as integration is close to Hülmbauer’s (2013, 2014) description of ELF as integration of the two kinds of resources, namely the virtual English and plurilingual ones. Contrary to Hülmbauer, however, what I am primarily concerned with in this thesis is how ELF and linguistic hybridity within it functions to pragmatic effect rather than merely identifying possible re/resources involved in the ‘mix’. To put it another way, I describe the hybrid nature of ELF as the process of pragmatic hybridization and adaptation where ELF speakers textualize their discourses by drawing upon all the available virtual linguistic resources for particular communicative purposes.

My understanding of linguistic hybridity as the textual manifestation of such pragmatic use is based on the fundamental distinction between language as an encoded system and language as discourse, or polyphony (Bakhtin 1929, see also Becker’s languaging and Widdowson’s positioning). Here, I draw upon the Bakhtinian differentiation between sentence as a unit of abstract language system and utterance as a unit of verbal communication or polyphony. According to Bakhtin, polyphony is a dialogic process of negotiating – actualizing and realizing – people’s voices/positions by mediation of their language/s. In other words, the process of human communication or, in Bakhtin’s terms, word-discourse always entails interpersonal positioning. In this view, hybridity can be
delineated as polyphony that operates at and fuses two (inseparable indeed) levels – discoursal/positional and textual/formal. This Bakhtinian view has been further clarified by the distinction between text and discourse – one made by Widdowson (2004). The relationship between text and discourse is defined as those of product and process, which is mediated by particular contextual and pre-textual conditions. My argument has been that any language use is interpersonally motivated by a particular perlocutionary/pretextual purpose. It follows, then, that the process of realizing discourse as mediated by text and hybrid forms within it is always about interpersonal (polyphonic) positioning. This process of positioning or pretextualization – whereby particular perlocutionary effects are achieved - is brought centre stage in this thesis.

As concerns linguistic hybridity within ELF couple discourse, the focus has not been on what kind of language the partners produce or how they ‘mix’ or ‘switch’ among different languages. Rather, I have looked at how the partners textualize their discourses by fusing any available linguistic resources to position themselves: to act upon each other, to achieve a particular pretextual purpose. My argument has been that the defining feature of such positioning in intimate ELF discourse is the pretext of domestic intimacy and togetherness rather than partners’ linguistic behaviour or cultural affiliation (RQ 4). Moreover, the suggestion has been that it is driven by the two universal social forces that Widdowson (1984) refers to as territoriality and cooperativeness whereby ELF partners lower the barriers of their individual spaces in order to establish and maintain the shared intimate contextual-pretextual/cultural territory. That is to say what primarily matters in ELF couples discourse is not the languages they speak, or the cultures they ‘belong’ to but their desire and capability to co-operate in achieving this very pretext and establishing and maintaining their shared private cultural territory by mediation of their text. This is not to diminish the role of the languages and cultures in the process of establishing partners’ ‘coupleness’. The point is that there is no linguistic hybridity (as well as variation in general) separate from discourse, and vice versa. There is no textual without (polyphonic) positional. Hence, the process of modification of English by means of hybrid forms in such private discourse will usually be more pretext-dependent than context- or form-oriented.
10.2 LINGUISTIC HYBRIDITY AS TEXTUALIZATION AND REALIZATION OF COUPLES’ DISCOURSE: SUMMARY OF FINDINGS

With regard to the RQ 2, the study has showed that at the textual/formal level linguistic hybridity in ELF couple interaction is considerable and varies from morphological and lexical alternation to fusion of grammars of different languages available to the partners, to blending semantic and pragmatic (such as representations of interpersonal schemata) resources available to the partners. Chapters 7, 8 and 9 have considered how various formal aspects of linguistic hybridity such as vocabulary and/or grammar come up in the participants’ talk about their private language and in their actual linguistic behaviour. The analysis revealed that such instances of hybrid uses embrace lexical substitution, and syntactic/morphosyntactic variation that can be categorised as explicit uses of other languages than English (predominantly the partners’ L1s), specific implicit or explicit cross-linguistic transfer, coinages, and creative use of the virtual resource of English by extending the partners’ L1/2 experience into it. In general, the discussed instances of formal hybridization in ELF can be classified as fusion of the virtual resource of English itself, and the virtual resources of languages other than English (in Hülmbauer’s (2014) terms, plurilingual resources) - predominantly but not necessarily ELF speakers’ L1s.

As I have already mentioned, however, the central purpose of the thesis has been to look at the pragmatic significance that the partners develop by mediation of such hybrid forms rather than their systematic identification, analysis and categorization. The main concern has been with how ELF couples realize the meaning potential of hybrid forms and their language/s in general as discourse (RQ 3). With regard to this question, Chapter 7 has focused on the couples attitudes to ELF as their private language and the role of other languages within it. Here all couples emphasize the uniqueness and hybrid nature of their private ELF. In this connection, the partners discussed the process of translation and the relationship between standard and regional varieties within the same language. The couples often link their preferences in using ELF and other languages to the necessity to translate and their attitudes to dialect-like varieties within the ‘same’ L1s. While discussing translation as an interactive feature of their private discourse, the partners see the nature of translation not as simple substitution of words and phrases in one language with those in another but rather as ‘normal’ process of meaning negotiation whereby they bring into convergence the
individual cultural experience. Although the partners evaluate the ‘only-English’ situation as problematic and often frustrating (mostly in their communication with the extended family and friends), they connect its negative effects to the necessity to ‘translate’ cultures rather than to ELF itself.

Chapter 8 considered the couples’ actual linguistic behaviour in the examples of their naturally occurring self-recorded talk. As I have demonstrated, partners do not use hybrid forms for hybridity sake to simply exemplify such forms. They rather fuse all the available resources to textualize their discourses for achieving their communicative purposes. At such pragmatic level, the couples use linguistic hybridity for a range of functions such as compensatory purposes to get a better march between forms and functions; humorous goals of doing fun; intertextual mediation between public ‘outer’ and private ‘inner’ discourse in couples’ interaction; negotiation of national/ethnic/religious aspects; mediation of communication with ‘others (e.g. dogs and computers), and conveyance of a ‘literary’ representation of reality. All these interactive features of couples’ communication contribute to the general process of establishing rapport and the realization of the pretextual effect of domestic intimacy and togetherness.

The main purpose of Chapter 9 has been to bring together the couples’ attitudes to their languages (Chapter 7) and their actual linguistic behaviour (Chapter 8) by considering how the partners accomplish their ‘coupleness’ by expressing love and affection. As we have seen, there are considerable differences and controversies in the couples’ perception and use of such expressions of interpersonal schemata: some partners prefer ELF, other – their L1s for such purposes. What is common about most couples is that the partners’ preferences depend on the extent to which the partners have managed to territorialize and acculturate such phrases into their private contextual and affective spaces rather than on the partners’ languages themselves or presumed differences between/among them. Moreover, everything that the couples say about and do with their languages is motivated by the overall goal of bringing the individual worlds into convergence and creating a joint couple identity. In this sense, it does not really matter what languages the couples use to express love so long as the desired effect of intimacy and togetherness is achieved.
10.3 REFLECTIONS ON THE THEORETICAL IMPLICATIONS
AND FUTURE DIRECTIONS

In this thesis, I have looked at the formal features of linguistic hybridity and derived my own interpretation from the analysis. My focus has been on the pragmatic significance of partners’ ELF and hybrid forms within it in the process of establishing their joint couple identity. My purpose, however, has not been to infer such significance directly from the partners’ text. The analysis of the text has only provided particular (but not the only or ultimate) directions as to how it is to be interpreted. Since realization and activation of discourse into and out of text is mediated by individual contextual and pretextual factors, an interpretation is never the interpretation. My position in this thesis is not an exception. I, as a researcher, inevitably have read my own position into the couples’ text according to my pretextual purpose. Following Bakhtin and Widdowson, I suggested that such positioning embraces at least three different points of view: first-, second, and third-person perspectives. Therefore, I collected three sets of data that could provide me with all three perspectives and give me insights as for how particular contextual and pretextual factors can act upon the partners’ text. As an individual with a similar experience of ELF relationship, I read my own first-person ‘reality’, my own schema of private relationship, my own introspection into the partners’ text. As a researcher, I have observed the third-person ‘reality’ of ELF couples and derived my third-person interpretation by extending it to the scope of linguistic description. As an interviewer and/or friend, I have inferred my second-person perspective by asking the partners about their own perception of what is going on in their relationship. In sum, I have looked at how couples use ELF to establish and maintain their ‘coupleness’ rather than at what kind of language they produce. As we have seen, the textual analysis alone – whether it is systematic or not - says us nothing about the couples’ actual experience. The crucial point of this thesis has been that the analysis presented here is not (and cannot be) definitive, but rather is a function of the researcher’s own discourse/the researcher’s model of reality read into the participants’ text. My undertaking, as any other research, is a culturally – in our terms, contextually and pretextually - embedded activity. Within those contextual assumptions and pretextual goals for the research, one can take many different routes. The approach I have chosen here is polyphonic and, so to speak, does not fit into the requirements of the traditional methodology in sociolinguistics and discourse analysis. To be polyphonic means not only to attempt at dialogue with informants and readers, but also to be aware of
the distinction between text and discourse and related to it distinction between analysis and interpretation. Such awareness leads to the understanding that my ‘polyphonic’ model of reality is a function of interpretation and is open for investigation by yet another model.

The fact that my analysis and interpretation are not definitive does not diminish the validity of the research. Of course, at times I have inferred a pragmatic significance from couples’ text that might not correspond with the participants’ or the reader’s versions of intimate ELF ‘reality’. However, the validity of my undertaking does not depend on the degree of such correspondence. It is valid to the extent to which it is demonstrable of the linguistic practices and the pragmatics of positioning in ELF couple discourse. The value of my thesis, thus, is in deriving my own position on ELF ‘private’ reality from the textual data of five ELF couples’ and attracting the reader’s attention to the communicative problems that can be involved in ELF couple discourse. Thus, what I have done in this thesis is an attempt to make sense of ELF couple linguistic practices by producing my own version of couples’ ‘reality’, by inferring my own discourse from partners’ text. As I have argued, the validity of this thesis is not in providing a precise systemic description of hybrid lexicogrammatical features of the ELF couples’ text. Rather, I have looked at how such hybrid features and particular contextual and pretextual factors might act upon each other. As we have observed, meaning which gets pragmatically realized depends on the textual features that the parties involved perceive as contextually and pretextually relevant. I have shown how linguistic hybridity as textual facts is processed by me as a discourse analyst and by the participants themselves in the circumstances of actual use.

The central finding of the thesis is that interpretation is always a function of the relationship between text, context and pretext, no matter how detailed my analysis of particular hybrid forms has been. This implication concerns at least two domains here. The first is the academic enquiry of language use in general. The second is the domain of couple interaction in particular. Whatever the domain, the implication of indeterminacy of interpretation follows from the basic distinction between text and discourse. The main question has been how and to what extent the analysis of text and hybrid forms within it can provide directions as to how they are to be interpreted. As concerns the issues that arise in both the scholarly and the non-scholarly world, my argument has been that there is no underlying meaning inherent in the text itself that is not accessible to ‘common’ partners and can be only revealed by assigning specific significance to certain textual features in the course of academic enquiry. Clearly, there can be particular regularities both in textual
(hybrid) patterning and in the ways it is processed. At least, as we have seen, the partners
develop such regularities – although they are unique in each couple - in the course of creating
their ‘coupleness’. In this respect, describing and analysing the global spread of ELF at the
level of romantic relationship necessarily draws our attention to the general process of
language use and meaning negotiation whereby the shared linguacultural resource is being
established through hybridization and ‘acculturation’/territorialization into the couples’
private spaces.

Some of the theoretical implications and practical applications of the findings of this
thesis, therefore, would seem to be in the further exploration of hybrid and other textual
features of such shared ELF resource and their interaction with contextual and pretextual
factors. One kind of further investigation that might be based on the ELF couples’ empirical
database compiled for this project is to explore how the same textual features and
contextual/pretextual factors of people with different socio-cultural background from
‘outside’ of the couples’ relationship act upon each other in the interpretative process. It
would be interesting, for example, to look at how different groups of people (e.g. academics
and non-academics) respond to the text of my participants by providing particular comments
or summaries of their talk and compare them with the partners’ own comments on it. As
concerns linguistic hybridity, another possible examination might be modelled on the
retextualisation technique proposed by Widdowson (1994, 2004) in his enquiry of the nature
of discourse. One way of such proceeding could be elicitation experiments where the
participants are asked to react to the original couples’ text and a version of it in which the
hybrid forms I have focused on in this thesis are systematically changes to their, for example,
English equivalents. Furthermore, the responses can be compared with those of the ELF
couples. Such enquiries would provide more evidence of how different contexts and pretexts
can act upon the same textual (hybrid) features to give rise to diverse interpretations. Finally,
a more systematic linguistic description of particular regularities of hybrid features on the
basis of a bigger corpus of ELF (e.g. VOICE) would be desirable in order to further develop
some of the theoretical suggestions and findings made in this study. Such an enquiry would
provide a relatively definitive frame of reference for further exploration of linguistic
hybridity in ELF. Particularly with regard to enquiring deeper into possible regularities of
hybrid patterning in ELF text and the corresponding regularities in which such hybrid
features are processed. Such investigation would be rather detached from actual use of ELF
but would provide possible default interpretations of such hybrid uses. All this would add to our understanding of the nature of discourse in general.

In conclusion, the purpose of this thesis has not been to claim absolute validity for its argument and findings, but bring about the reader informed scepticism about the discussed and presented ideas. The thesis does not provide a practical guide of how to solve communicative problems that can arise in private ELF couple interaction but rather attempts at raising the reader’s awareness of its significance. Thus, I have expressed my own particular position on the nature of ELF couple discourse and hybrid forms within it to provoke a dialogue and raise questions to which the reader must find her/his own answers. I hope to have had the (pretextual) effect of stimulating thought about what a ‘love affair’ in/through/with ELF or, as my participants put it, “heart relationship” with language in general is/might be.
Summary and Conclusion:
A Love Affair with ELF “без завершающих авторских оценок”
A Love Affair with ELF

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Diagram 5: Polyphonic triangulated inquiry (Diagram 4 revisited) ............................... 134
## APPENDIX A: SELECTED TRANSCRIPTION CONVENTIONS


<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>er erm</td>
<td>Hesitation/filler</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>?</td>
<td>rising intonation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>.</td>
<td>falling intonation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CAPITAL LETTERS</td>
<td>emphasis</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(.)</td>
<td>brief pauses</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(1), (2), . . .</td>
<td>longer pauses (number of seconds)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>&lt;1&gt; &lt;/1&gt;, &lt;2&gt; &lt;/2&gt;, . . .</td>
<td>overlaps</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>=</td>
<td>other-continuation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>:</td>
<td>lengthened sounds</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>@@</td>
<td>Laughter</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>()</td>
<td>Uncertain transcription</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>&lt;pvc&gt; praxing &lt;/pvc&gt;</td>
<td>Pronunciation variations &amp; coinages</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>he i-</td>
<td>word fragments, a hyphen marks a missing part of the word</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>&lt;L1it&gt; inaugurato. {inaugurated} &lt;/L1it&gt;</td>
<td>non-English speech in the speaker’s L1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>&lt;LNit&gt; pesante. {difficult} &lt;LNit&gt;</td>
<td>non-English speech in the speaker’s L2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>&lt;un&gt; xxx &lt;/un&gt;</td>
<td>unintelligible speech</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>&lt;imitating&gt; &lt;/imitating&gt;</td>
<td>speaking mode: imitating</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
APPENDIX B: DEMOGRAPHIC QUESTIONNAIRE

English as a lingua franca in European couple talk

Dear couples, my name is Svitlana Klötzl. I am a doctoral student at the University Vienna. I come from Ukraine. Now I am married to an Austrian and live in Austria. About one year of our couplehood (the most decisive period of our relationship), my husband and I spoke exclusively English, which is a mother tongue of neither. This means that we used English as a lingua franca (ELF). Millions of people do the same right now all around the world. Researchers have recently started to study the flow of different kinds of ELF conversation. I would like to make my modest contribution to this field of study by describing a special kind of such interaction – couple talk. Interactions between you and your partner are unique examples of this kind of ELF communication. That is why I ask you and your partner to help me by recording your talk and commenting on your language use.

I assure that all data (recording, interview, comments) will be treated anonymously and confidentially, and used only for scientific purposes.

Important! In order to help me to better interpret and classify your data, would you mind telling me more about your personal background please?

1. Your name and surname

2. Nationality

3. Your first language/s

4. Gender (please circle) M F

5. Age

6. Education

7. Occupation

8. Country of birth

9. Place of birth

10. Country of residence

11. Place of residence
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Question</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>12</td>
<td>How long have you been together/have you been married?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>13</td>
<td>Name and surname of your partner</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>14</td>
<td>Your partner’s first language/s</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15</td>
<td>How many children do you have? (If you do not have children, please proceed to question 19)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>16</td>
<td>Age of your children</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>17</td>
<td>Your children’s first language/s</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>18</td>
<td>Which language/s do you speak to your children?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>19</td>
<td>Your email address</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Thank you for your time and co-operation!!!**

**For further information please contact:**

Svitlana Klötzl  
Email: svitlana.kloetzl@yahoo.com
### APPENDIX C: COUPLES’ PROFILE

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>COUPLES</th>
<th>First language/s</th>
<th>Partners’ age</th>
<th>Occupation</th>
<th>Country of birth</th>
<th>Nationality</th>
<th>Place of residence</th>
<th>Length of relationship</th>
<th>Couple’s code</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Nargiz</td>
<td>Russian/ Ukrainian</td>
<td>36, 46</td>
<td>designer</td>
<td>Moldova</td>
<td>Ukraine</td>
<td>France</td>
<td>1 year 2 months</td>
<td>C1/ua-fr</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dan</td>
<td>German</td>
<td>25, 31</td>
<td>architect</td>
<td>Italy</td>
<td>Austria</td>
<td>Austria</td>
<td>3½ years</td>
<td>C2/it-ua</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sandy</td>
<td>French</td>
<td>30, 37</td>
<td>psychologist</td>
<td>France</td>
<td>Austria</td>
<td>Austria</td>
<td>2 years</td>
<td>C3/he-ua</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Henry</td>
<td>German</td>
<td>27, 30</td>
<td>engineer</td>
<td>Israel</td>
<td>Austria</td>
<td>Austria</td>
<td>4 years</td>
<td>C4/au-ct</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Anna</td>
<td>Hungarian</td>
<td>23, 28</td>
<td>diver</td>
<td>Austria</td>
<td>Austria</td>
<td>Austria</td>
<td>2 years</td>
<td>C5/au-hu</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Table 1: Couples’ Profile**
APPENDIX D: TECHNICAL CHARACTERISTICS OF “OLYMPUS DIGITAL VOICE RECORDER VN-3100PC”

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Recording modes</th>
<th>XHQ (extra high quality sound recording)</th>
<th>HQ (high quality sound recording)</th>
<th>SP (standard recording)</th>
<th>LP (long-term recording)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Time of recording</td>
<td>Approx. 5 hours 40 minutes</td>
<td>Approx. 11 hours 40 minutes</td>
<td>Approx. 23 hours 30 minutes</td>
<td>Approx. 71 hours 40 minutes</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 2. Recording modes and available recording time ratio
### APPENDIX E: COUPLES’ SELF-RECORDED CONVERSATIONS

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Couple/Code</th>
<th>Couple 1</th>
<th>Couple 2</th>
<th>Couple 3</th>
<th>Couple 4</th>
<th>Couple 5</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Conversation 1 (Con 1)</td>
<td>12.43 min May 2009</td>
<td>47.23 min July 2009</td>
<td>44.54 min June 2009</td>
<td>34.41 min November 2010</td>
<td>12.21 min April 2011</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Conversation 2 (Con 2)</td>
<td>13.03 min May 2009</td>
<td>47.33 min November 2009</td>
<td>37.26 min June 2009</td>
<td>01.20 min November 2010</td>
<td>45.01 min April 2011</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Conversation 3 (Con 3)</td>
<td>20.36 min June 2009</td>
<td>11.09 min November 2009</td>
<td>29.03 min November 2009</td>
<td>01.09 min November 2010</td>
<td>38.53 min April 2011</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Conversation 4 (Con 4)</td>
<td>43.02 min December 2009</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>25.40 min November 2009</td>
<td>02.44 min November 2010</td>
<td>14.00 min April 2011</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Conversation 5 (Con 5)</td>
<td>39.29 min December 2009</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>24.15 min November 2009</td>
<td>24.22 min November 2010</td>
<td>22.14 min April 2011</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Conversation 6 (Con 6)</td>
<td>35.30 min January 2010</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>08.53 min November 2009</td>
<td>43.01 min November 2010</td>
<td>22.35 min April 2011</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Conversation 7 (Con 7)</td>
<td>47.47 min January 2010</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>38.29 min November 2009</td>
<td>30.56 min November 2010</td>
<td>41.08 min April 2011</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Conversation 8 (Con 8)</td>
<td>41.10 min February 2010</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>30.27 min November 2009</td>
<td>19.36 min November 2010</td>
<td>26.28 min May 2011</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Conversation 9 (Con 9)</td>
<td>68.16 min February 2010</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>03.25 min November 2009</td>
<td>07.45 min November 2010</td>
<td>50.45 min May 2011</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Conversation 10 (Con 10)</td>
<td>50.21 min February 2010</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>36.49 min November 2009</td>
<td>33.41 min November 2010</td>
<td>49.04 min May 2011</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Conversation 11 (Con 11)</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>26.17 min December 2009</td>
<td>02.57 min November 2010</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Conversation 12 (Con 12)</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>46.49 min December 2009</td>
<td>03.32 min February 2011</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Conversation 13 (Con 13)</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>03.02 min February 2011</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Conversation 14 (Con 14)</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>04.39 min February 2011</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Conversation 15 (Con 15)</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>11.34 min February 2011</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

For the detailed information about the couples see Table 1 Appendix C.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Conversation 16  (Con 16)</th>
<th>-</th>
<th>-</th>
<th>-</th>
<th>24.24 min. February 2011</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Conversation 17  (Con 17)</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>43.37 min. February 2011</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Conversation 18  (Con 18)</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>17.24 min. February 2011</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Conversation 19  (Con 19)</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>41.32 min. February 2011</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td>370.37 min.</td>
<td>105.65 min.</td>
<td>349.87 min.</td>
<td>347.96 min.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Table 3. Number length and codes of recorded conversations**
## APPENDIX F: INTERVIEW GUIDELINES

- Introduction
- Self-introduction
- Description of research
- Confidentiality
- Practicalities
- Purposes
- Procedure
- Confidentiality
- Recording permission

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Section/topic</th>
<th>Questions, prompts</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>
| **1. Background** | Q 1: Could you please tell me briefly about your background – where you were born, lived, your family, your childhood, study, work, relationship/marriage?  
1.1 family you grew up; what your parents did/do; brothers and sisters  
1.2 languages spoken in your family? |
| **2. Doing a couple/ Living together** | Q 2: Could you please tell me where and how you met each other? How did you understand that you would like to be together/you are a couple/partners?  
2.2 What do your families/friends think about your relationship? do you have any stories about their reactions?  
2.3 Could you please tell me how your relationship changed your life: e.g. What you day was/is like (before/after you are together)? What is about weekends? |
| **3. Cultural issues** | Q 3: Is it good or bad to have a partner from a different country?  
3.1 Did you want to marry someone from another country or did it just happened?  
3.2 Are there any cultural traits you really like/dislike in your partner? |
| **4. Language use: Importance of languages other than English** | Q 4: Can you explain how your couple decided what language/s you and your partner speak now, and the main reasons?  
4.1 most important reason  
4.2 Do you and your partner speak any other language/s? Where and when, in which situations? Is it good/bad? Why?  
4.3 – communication with partner; conflicts, pressures; encouragements; partner’s view, nicknames |
| **5. Role of ELF** | Q 5: the role of English in communicating with you partner  
5.1 How long/much do you speak ELF to your partner?  
5.2 is it important for you to speak ELF: why; why not? |
| 5.3 ELF as private code: how you can characterize it?  
5.4 Do you use English outside your relationship as well?  
Or is it reduced to the private couple language? |  
--- |  
6. **Change over time** | Q 6: Could you please tell me whether or not language use in your home has changed, and how it happened (any memorable incidents related to the change?)  
5.1 advice from someone? asked for it?  
5.2 ‘practical conditions’ related to learning the language of the community at work, of the country you live in? |  
--- |  
7. **If the arrangement were different** | Q 7: If you had not spoken ELF to your partner would your relationship have been different?  
7.1 Why? How/In what ways?  
7.2 Would you prefer to communicate in one of your first languages? |  
--- |  
8. **Future hopes** | Q 8: Could you tell me about possible scenarios of language use/choice in your family/couple for the future. Why?  
8.1 What languages would you pass on to your children?  
8.2 Where would you like to live and why? |  
--- |  
**Debriefing** | - Is there anything I should have asked and did not?  
- feedback  
- confidentiality  
- thanks |
## APPENDIX G: INTERVIEWS

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Couple</th>
<th>Couple 1</th>
<th>Couple 2</th>
<th>Couple 3</th>
<th>Couple 4</th>
<th>Couple 5</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Date</strong></td>
<td>September, 14, 2011</td>
<td>April, 16, 2011</td>
<td>August, 07, 2010</td>
<td>January, 14, 2011</td>
<td>August, 07, 2011</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Place</strong></td>
<td>via Skype</td>
<td>couple’s place</td>
<td>couple’s place</td>
<td>researcher’s place</td>
<td>couple’s place</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Duration</strong></td>
<td>99 min. (both partners) 18,38 min. with Nargiz separately in Russian</td>
<td>71,45 min.</td>
<td>72,30 min.</td>
<td>72,55 min.</td>
<td>55,05 min.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Code of interview</strong></td>
<td>I1</td>
<td>I2</td>
<td>I3</td>
<td>I4</td>
<td>I5</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 4. Duration, date and place of interviews
### Table 5. Comments, duration, languages and channels

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>COUPLE</th>
<th>1</th>
<th>2</th>
<th>3</th>
<th>4</th>
<th>5</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Nargiz</td>
<td>Dan</td>
<td>Sue</td>
<td>Henry</td>
<td>Sandy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Audio recorded</td>
<td>66.50 min Russian</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>92.41 min both partners, English</td>
<td>11.21 min both partners, English</td>
<td>24.55 min both partners, English</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>comments</td>
<td></td>
<td>31.14 min English, German</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Email comments</td>
<td>13 transliterated Russian</td>
<td>2 English</td>
<td>5 English</td>
<td>5 English</td>
<td>1 English</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Skype recorded</td>
<td>05.30 min Russian/English</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>comments</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
ABSTRACT (ENGLISH)

This thesis investigates the use of English as a lingua franca in the interactions between pairs of people in a romantic relationship. The study focuses on the hybrid forms in ELF couple talk and explores how language functions to pragmatic effect in the process of accomplishing partners’ ‘coupleness’. Reviewing a number of theoretical (sociolinguistic) approaches, the thesis defines linguistic hybridity in relation to the notion of a language with the national name. The definition is a necessary abstraction with the focus on the textual/formal features of linguistic hybridity that refers to fusion of all the available virtual linguistic resources within the limits of a single ELF utterance or interaction. Reconciling a descriptive lexicogrammatical and discourse analytical polyphonic perspective, the study suggests that linguistic hybridity like any other language use must be understood in relation to discourse and its factors. Using this conceptualization of linguistic hybridity, the thesis interprets it as evidence of how partners position themselves by activating and ratifying particular contextual and pretextual functions of their discourse.

The study applies such polyphonic approach to the process of collecting, analysing, and interpreting the data as well. The assumption is that there are at least three ways of looking at linguistic hybridity in ELF couple discourse: first, second, and third person perspectives. Therefore, I collected three sets of data that could provide me with all three perspectives and give me insights as for how particular contextual and pretextual factors can act upon partners’ text. The first set of data is the researcher introspection; the second includes questionnaires, interviews and partners’ comments on the selected extracts of their recordings; and the third comprises a corpus of self-recorded home conversations of five ELF couples. For the transcription of the data, I generally follow the Vienna-Oxford International Corpus of English (VOICE) transcription conventions.

The major assumption discussed from the theoretical and empirical perspectives is that the process of modification of English by means of hybrid forms and language alternation in couple discourse will primarily be pretext-dependent. The investigation of the data suggests that the defining feature of intimate ELF discourse is the pretext of domestic intimacy and togetherness, although such a pretext inevitably brings contextual/cultural factors into play. This leads to the conclusion that ELF couples are engaged in a creative pragmatic process of hybridization and ‘acculturation’ or territorialization of English into the
partners’ private space whereby they accommodate the language by drawing upon any available resources, and re-load it with their own cultural values for the pretextual purpose of achieving “the desired effect of mediating comity”.


Die Annahme aus theoretischer und auch empirischer Perspektive ist, dass der Prozess der Modifizierung des Englischen durch Hybridformen und Sprachwechsel im Diskurs der Paare, in erster Linie vom Prättext abhängig sein wird. Die Untersuchung der Daten deutet darauf hin, dass das entscheidende Merkmal des intimen ELF-Diskurses der
EDUCATION

Currently  PhD Program (Doktoratsstudium) English and American Studies, (Speciality: Discourse Analysis, Applied Linguistics) - Universität Wien/University of Vienna

PhD thesis (Linguistics): “A Affair with ELF: linguistic hybridity in ELF couple discourse”

09/2010  2nd Dylan Doctoral School, Vienna, Austria

Topics:
- Incentives in language behaviour by Prof. Dr. José Ramón Uriarte (University of the Basque Country Bilbao, Department of Economics).
- Models of Language dynamics by Prof. Dr. Bengt-Arne Wickström (Humboldt-Universität Berlin, Department of Economics).
- Socio-psychological dimensions of individual multilingualism by Prof. Dr. Jean-Marc Dewaele (Birkbeck College, University of London, Department of European Cultures and Languages) (Project presentation)

04/2009  Die Wiener Volkshochschulen, Vienna, Austria

Linguistic Seminar “Russian: Colloquial expressions. Diffusion of lexical and phraseological semantics in the Russian language”

1987-1992  Diploma Studies and Teacher Training Program in the Russian Language and Literature and the English Language (with honours) - Ivano-Frankivsk State Pedagogic Institute by V.Stefanyk, Ukraine

Diploma thesis with honours und recommendation for Doctoral Studies (English Linguistics, Russian Linguistics and Literature, Pedagogy): “Lessons in Russian and English: developing honesty in adolescents in the Russian language and literature and English language classroom” (“Воспитание честности у подростков на уроках русского языка и литературы и английского языка”)

Major focus fields:
- English Linguistics
• Russian Linguistics
• Russian Literature
• Linguistics
• Pedagogy
• Philosophy
• Psychology

1985-1987  **Ivano-Frankivsk secondary school № 9, Ivano-Frankivsk, Ukraine**
(School-leaving certificate with honours)

1977-1985  **Zaozerskaja secondary school, Zaozere, Sysolsky Region, Komi Republic, the Soviet Union**
(School-leaving certificate with honours)

**ACADEMIC ACTIVITIES**

**Publications:**

(In prep.) “A hitchhiker's guide to Global English: English as a lingua franca in intimate interaction”. In Holger, Rossow (Ed.) *Globalisation: Myth or Reality?* Heidelberg: Universitätsverlag Winter Heidelberg,


2013 “English with the “married” name”. *Discourse and interaction*, Brno: Masaryk University, 6 (2), 29-40.


1992  

Conferences:

11/2012  
Paper Presentation “You better did it less pesante”: the case of linguistic hybridity in ELF couple talk”, 5th Austrian students' conference of Linguistics 2012, University of Vienna.

09/2012  

05/2010  
Visual (poster) presentation: “A love affair with ELF: the case of linguistic hybridity in ELF couple talk”, 3d International Conference of English as a Lingua Franca (ELF 3), University of Vienna, Austria

12/2009  

02/2009  
Participation, International Conference “Bridging the Gap between Theory and Practice”, University of Vienna, Austria.

12/2008  
Participation, 36th. Austrian Linguistic Conference/36. Österreichische Linguistiktagung, University of Vienna, Austria

06/2004  

PROFESSIONAL EXPERIENCE

Since 1998  
Ivano-Frankivsk State Notary Office, Ukraine  
Translator for English-Russian, English –Ukrainian, Russian-English, Ukrainian-English

2007-2009  
Volkshochschule Favoriten – PAHO, Vienna, Austria  
Teacher for English and Business English

02/2009  
International Conference „Bridging the Gap between Theory and Practice“, University of Vienna, Austria  
Student helper

12/2006-01/2007  
Private Montessori School, Vienna, Austria  
English and Russian Teacher
2000-2005  Ivano-Frankivsk Institute of Law, Economics and Building, Ivano-Frankivsk, Ukraine
Teacher for English and English for Specific Purposes
Focus on English for Law and Economics

1999-2000  Ivano-Frankivsk State University of Oil and Gas, Ivano-Frankivsk, Ukraine
Teacher for English and English for Specific Purposes

1997-2000  Ivano-Frankivsk secondary school № 4, Ivano-Frankivsk, Ukraine
English Teacher

1992-1997  Ivano-Frankivsk secondary school № 19, Ivano-Frankivsk, Ukraine
English Teacher

FURTHER QUALIFICATIONS

First languages: Ukrainian, Russian

Other languages: English, German, Belorussian, Polish, Komi

A completed vocational training as a secretary-typist (including practical training) as part of secondary school education.

A completed training as a junior nurse of civil defense (including practical training) as part of high school education.