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1. Introduction

In today’s political and economic landscape, negotiations are considered a critical part of success or failure. Consequently, scholars from different fields are investing a significant amount of time and attention into negotiation research in order to develop a deeper understanding of this essential area. Whereas initial bargaining theory portrayed negotiators as rational agents (Curhan, Elfenbein, & Xu, 2006), research shows that negotiators perceptions differ substantially from rational economic analyses. Their decisions are often based on heuristics and rules of thumb (Bottom 1998; Curhan, Elfenbein, & Xu 2006; Thompson, Neale, & Sinaceur, 2004). One such deviation from rational models that has gained considerable attention in research is framing.

Literature refers to framing as the certain methods and ways of making sense out of ambiguous situations. The reduction of ambiguity results in a deeper understanding of the ongoing situation (Dewulf, Craps, & Dercon, 2004). As recognized by Dewulf, et al. (2011), a wide range of framing theories focus on how people consider diverse aspects of a situation and how these are related to their existing mental models. By looking at how different situations are interpreted by negotiators, a better understanding of framing can be obtained. The two underlying approaches of framing, cognitive framing and interactional framing, are reviewed in this thesis and can be summarized as follows:

Considered as dynamic representations, and meaning configurations arising from ongoing interactions, interactional framing is referred to as structures of communications established among people during social interactions like talking. This type of framing is seen more from a dynamical perspective and is considered to shape and enact ongoing interactions. Interactional framing are also described as transient communication structures (Dewulf, Gray, Putnam, & Bouwen, 2011).

The cognitive approach on the other hand is defined by Dewulf and Bouwen (2012) as a representation of stored memories. In this case, framing is considered as the process of relating cognitive frames to certain situations.

As highlighted by De Dreu and McCusker (1997), framing is about the question of how information is framed by people in making up opinions and decisions. Negotiation outcomes and framing are highly interrelated according to many scholars. In conflict situations, the disputants
possess different types of frames resulting in different perspectives of the discussed topics, a different evaluation of the issues and their own motivations for problem solving. The concepts of framing allow us to understand how people recognize issues and situations. As stated by Dewulf and Bouwen (2012), framing concepts describe the process of framing from a personal, group, and organizational perspective. Interestingly, negotiating parties often do not directly recognize the differences in beliefs and values. Ultimately, these unrecognized differences deepen the negotiation process and escalate conflicts through the polarization of the negotiating parties (Shmueli, Elliott, & Kaufmann, 2006). According to Dewulf, et al. (2009), conflict mediators often engage in different reframing techniques in identifying common interests between negotiators and the use of a neutral language in encouraging social accounts of the conflicts. This highlights and exemplifies the importance of language in framing. The influence of language is also underlined by Speech Accommodation Theory as well as Speech Act Theory:

Speech Accommodation Theory points out that convergence, also referred to as the behavior and communication values of others, persuade social approvals resulting in a more cooperative atmosphere – an essential criterion for building relationships and establishing trust among negotiators. Within this framework, framing is argued to be one aspect that enables negotiators to encourage disputants to move towards one another (Drake & Donohue, 1996).

Speech Act Theory investigates how frames are used by individuals to link the attention of a certain negotiation situation. In this case, language is argued to be performative rather than expressive. Thus, language choices of disputants do not only frame areas of discussions but also function as maintaining proposal systems of exchanging frame limits (Drake & Donohue, 1996).

Building on the theory of framing and putting it in relation with the aspects of language influence, the purpose of this master thesis is to investigate the reactions and outcomes arising from integrative and distributive communication of language. In order to obtain a well-rounded overview of the topic, a broad literature review of framing was conducted and taken as the foundation for the evaluation and interpretation process of this study. The underlying scientific work includes a sample of 76 graduate students from the University of Vienna and a negotiation task, designed as a business negotiation of mobile phone contracts. The concession patterns and payoff matrix of Van Kleef et al. (2004) was adapted for this exercise, and the one-factor experimental design of integrative or distributive language was considered as a variable between the participants. The negotiation process was designed to last six messages. After designing the study and collecting the sample, the data was processed by applying approaches
of Smka and Koeszegi’s (2007) "From Words to Numbers: How to Transform Qualitative Data into Meaningful Quantitative Results" and "Quantitative Coding of Negotiation Behavior" by Weingart et al. (2004).

The goal of this study is to examine the influence of integrative and distributive communication on the negotiation process. By investigating the reactions arising from different communicational actions, the authors seek to provide deeper understanding for the importance of communicational behavior during negotiations. The results will help scholars and negotiators to develop a better understanding for the importance of language in the negotiation process and provide better outcomes in future negotiations.
2. Framing

Framing is receiving more and more attention from scholars of different fields than ever before. Countries negotiate their futures; companies negotiate mergers and acquisitions while workers negotiate their salaries. Consequently, framing and its effects are considered highly relevant in research today. More than 248 published theoretical and empirical papers on framing from different research areas were found by 1997. A variety of scholarly, experimental, social, management and business as well as applied psychology and medicine journals have taken up the subject. In the eighties and nineties about 136 framing research reports identified and calculated 230 single representative framing effect sizes. The topic is still thriving – the average number of published empirical papers in one year is approximately 15 (Kühberger, 1998).

Several researchers have found the first framing effects in a broad range of disciplines. These disciplines include:

- medical decision making (e.g., Meyerowitz & Chaiken, 1987)
- consumer behavior (e.g., Puto, 1987)
- personnel selection (Huber, Neale, & Northcraft, 1987)
- marketing (Bettman & Sujan, 1987)
- auditing (Johnson, Jamal, & Berryman, 1991)
- security dilemmas (Kramer, Meyerson, & Davis, 1990)" (De Dreu & McCusker, 1997, p. 1093)
- psychology (Levin et al., 1998)
- sociology (Benford & Snow, 2000)
- communication (Scheufele, 1999)
- management (Creed et al., 2002; Fairhurst & Sarr, 1996; Stevenson & Greenberg, 1998)" (Dewulf, et al., 2009, p. 155)

This broad range shows the importance of framing. It is about how people frame information that subsequently influences their decisions and opinions (De Dreu & McCusker, 1997). Framing effects can be found in various fields of decision-making like “medical and clinical decisions (decisions made by both the provider and the recipient of health care), perceptual judgments, consumer choices, responses to social dilemmas, bargaining behaviors and auditing evaluations” (Levin, Schneider, & Gaeth, 1998, p. 150) and many more.
In conflicts, disputants have different frames about the matter they are discussing. They differ in importance and how they are willing or supposed to solve the problem. Results of negotiations are affected by framing effects in type and quality. In a conflict, mediators often use the technique of reframing to identify jointly pursued purposes. They do this by supporting a neutral language that is used to encode and decode messages as well as to establish social accounts of the conflict (Dewulf, et al., 2009). Benford and Snow also emphasized framing by valuing it through their statement “the concept of frame has considerable currency in the social science today” (Benford & Snow, 2000, p. 611). They highlight the topic including its concept and related processes in social movements and show that this area is examined in studies of (cognitive) psychology, communication and media, as well as political science and policy (Benford & Snow, 2000).

With the above-mentioned concepts, it is possible to describe and picture how people recognize situations and issues. In addition, the concept describes these processes from various perspectives of individuals, organizations and groups (Dewulf & Bouwen, 2012). These individuals and groups differ in their opinions and interests as well as in their beliefs and values, but they do not realize all these differences consciously. This factor can result in various interpretations and attention on certain outcomes and therefore affect decisions and arguments (Shmueli, Elliott, & Kaufman, 2006). They can be used in conflict situations between disputants or in cases of change and decision-making processes (Dewulf & Bouwen, 2012). Such differences in disputants’ frames intensify negotiations and conflicts; they polarize the bargaining parties and can support an escalation of a dispute. Each party has their own individual frame; hence, the participants are strictly and strategically concentrated on their arguments and goals. Because of that, they do not see or tolerate the frames of others. Moreover, the chosen frame also strengthens the disputants’ beliefs and convictions. Therefore, it can be said that varying frames can be considered as self-reinforcing (Shmueli, Elliott, & Kaufman, 2006).

The interplay of framing and reframing and the knowledge of its differences, processes and constructions make it possible for stakeholders and mediators to manage and solve problems and conflicts and to reveal new perspectives. This interplay provides understanding to the disputants regarding the situation and supports “mutual understanding and reframing of proposals in terms that might be more acceptable to the others” (Shmueli, Elliott, & Kaufman, 2006, p. 210). Schweitzer and DeChurch describe negotiation frames as “the way disputants perceive canner, influence behavior in predictable ways” (Schweitzer & DeChurch, 2001, p.
As mentioned before, frames can influence disputant’s preferences and arguments, the negotiation process itself and therefore the resulting outcome. Various individual negotiation frames can be used to manipulate and influence the facing party and the direction of the debate (Schweitzer & DeChurch, 2001). Putnam and Holmer also emphasize the importance of framing and reframing in negotiations and summarize the results of several scholars: Framing is a key concept to classify situations and negotiations with the help of experiences made in the past. It eases to react to and interpret current situations and behavior changes of the counterparty (Putnam & Holmer, 1992). Frames are related to various concepts. Examples are “concepts as cooperative-competitive orientations (Rubin and Brown 1975), expectations for a settlement (Gulliver 1979), biases of bargainers (Neale and Bazerman 1985), choice of dispute resolution modes (Merry and Sibley 1984), approaches to third-party intervention in formal and informal disputes (Donohue 1991; Sheppard, Blumenfeld-Jones and Roth 1989), and interpretative schemes (Gray and Donellon 1989)” (Putnam & Holmer, 1992, p. 128). Nevertheless, the concepts of framing and reframing are also linked to how negotiators conceive the problem and topic as well as relationships during the negotiation (Putnam & Holmer, 1992).

Putnam and Holmer state that framing and reframing to be a concept of communication research and should therefore be supported, as only a small number of researchers have yet to include this topic into their studies. They point out those key roles in the framing process to be information seeking of the parties and the interaction between them. In addition, framing assists the process of developing shared meanings, which symbolize cultural and social contexts. The scholars underline the importance of this field through their statement “framing are vital to the negotiation process and are tied to information processing, massage patterns, linguistic cues, and socially constructed meanings” (Putnam & Holmer, 1992, p. 129).
2.1 Definitions

As mentioned in the section before, a considerable number of scholars have concentrated on studying the phenomenon of framing in various areas. Because of this, framing is defined in many different ways. Chong and Druckman pointed out that the concept of framing makes it possible to treat a task from different perspectives and assist to create and rethink certain opinions and beliefs (Chong & Druckman, 2007). In addition, it can be said that framing helps to organize a person’s reality "by providing meaning to an unfolding strip of events" (Chong & Druckman, 2007, p. 106) and promoting "particular definitions and interpretations of political issues" (Chong & Druckman, 2007, p. 104). This phenomenon emphasizes frame-relevant information and reduces the attention of frame-irrelevant information (Pinkley & Northcraft, 1994).

The term “decision frame” can be used and understood in a broader sense as well as in specific ways. Kühberger (1998) cites Tverskys and Kahnemans (1981) definition of this notion, which refers to “the decision maker’s conception of acts, outcomes, and contingencies associated with a particular choice. The frame adopted by a decision-maker, is controlled partly by the formulation of the problem and partly by the norms, habits, and personal characteristics of this decision-maker” (Kühberger, 1998, p. 24). Beside this definition, decision-frame is further divided into a “strict definition” and a “loose definition” in literature:

“The strict definition relates to the wording of formally identical problems, i.e., to a semantic manipulation of prospects whereby the exact same situation is simply redescribed.” (Kühberger, 1998, p. 24).

“The loose definition of framing refers to framing as an internal event that can be induced not only by semantic manipulations but may result also from other contextual features of a situation and from individual factors, provided that problems are equivalent from the perspective of economic theory. Describing equivalent dilemmata as a give-some vs. as a take-some dilemma (e.g., Aquino, Steisel, & Kay, 1992) is an example of this type of framing.” (Kühberger, 1998, p. 24).

The definition provided by Goffman describes framing as “…can be understood as the specific ways in which sense is made in and of ambiguous situations” (Dewulf, Craps, & Dercon, 2004,
The reduction of this ambiguity is only possible in a specific way, and leads to specific sense being made of a certain situation (Dewulf, Craps, & Dercon, 2004). Putnam and Holmer point out that the concepts of framing and reframing are attached to the ongoing activity of negotiation and its outcome (Putnam & Holmer, 1992). The different definitions of both conceptions lead to the same conclusion: framing and reframing describe how negotiators understand their varying situation.

Besides other research areas, public opinion research observed “framing effects”, which can be exemplified as follows: If Americans are asked about their opinion on whether American politics spent too little on “welfare”, 20% will say yes. If they are asked about their opinion of whether American politics spent too little on “assistance to the poor”, 65% will agree. This example shows that (small) changes e.g. in wording, are followed by (large) changes of thinking and/or believing. In other words, alternative phrasing influences evaluation of a same issue (Chong & Druckman, 2007).

This Master thesis builds upon the two different approaches of framing: cognitive and interactional. Tannen and Wallat define these two approaches as follows: Cognitive frames, or frames as knowledge, are schemas that refer to "structures of expectation about people, objects, events and settings" (Dewulf, et al., 2009, p. 158). These frames are argued to represent stored memories. Thus, cognitive framing refers to the “process of applying cognitive frames to situations” (Dewulf, et al., 2009, p. 162). In this context, the cognitive paradigm can be defined as followed: “a conflict frame is a cognitive representation that guides expectations about the conflict situation.” (Dewulf, et al., 2009, p. 162) In contrast, interactive frames refer “to alignments that are negotiated in a particular interaction and focus on how communication defines specific aspects of what is going on in interaction” (Dewulf, et al., 2009, p. 158). When compared to cognitive frames, scholars refer to interactional frames as transient communication structures. That is why interactive framing is the “dynamic enactment and shaping of meaning in ongoing interactions” (Dewulf, et al., 2009, p. 162). Consequently, an interactional paradigm can be defined as followed: “conflict framing is an interactional process in which the meaning of the conflict situation is co-constructed through the meta-communicational aspects of discourse.” (Dewulf, et al., 2009, p. 162) This framing approach is explained in the second part of this scientific work in more detail.
Minsky (1975) investigated the cognitive approach in detail and evaluated it within the field of artificial intelligence: “When one encounters a new situation (or makes a substantial change in one’s view of the present problem), one selects from memory a structure called a ‘frame.’ This structure is a remembered framework to be adapted to fit reality by changing details as necessary.” (Dewulf, et al., 2009, p. 158) Dewulf et al. contribute to his definition by indicating the basis to be found in Bartlett’s (1932) schema theory of memory. Because of cognitive frames, individuals can simplify interpreting and organizing descrying information. This information is compared to individuals, who have already learned schemas or so-called frames about reality. People are argued to have an indefinite repertoire of frames. New information relating to different situations is framed by adjusting it with the available, individual frames. Drawbacks of cognitive frames are the limited view and understanding of dissimilar situations. As a result, conflict dynamics of conflict settings are often distorted because of biases in correct information processing (Dewulf, et al., 2009).

Valence framing effects can be defined as frames that describe the same critical information in either a negative or positive way. It can be found in the literature as prospect theory (Levin, Schneider, & Gaeth, 1998). Levin and Schneide analyzed valence framing and figured out three different types of framing manipulations: risky choice framing, attribute framing and goal framing.

1. Risky choice framing refers to the initial form of “framing” and was implemented by the scholars Tversky and Kahneman in 1981. It implies that “the outcomes of a potential choice involving options differing in level of risk are described in different ways.” (Levin, Schneider, & Gaeth, 1998, p. 150)

2. Attribute framing can be described as the kind of framing “in which characteristic of an object or event serves as the focus of the framing manipulation” (Levin, Schneider, & Gaeth, 1998, p. 150)

3. Goal framing focuses, as its title suggests, on the goal of an action or behavior and frames it. (Levin, Schneider, & Gaeth, 1998)

Those definitions as well as the explanations of framing and their effects, highlight the importance of this topic. However, this concept should also be examined critically. The vast amounts of definitions related to framing are argued to be the reason for a substantial
conceptual research-confusion (Dewulf, et al., 2009). Steinberg (1999) observed a lack of “conceptual precision in its delineation of constituent elements and processes” (Dewulf, et al., 2009, p. 156). In addition, frames are stated to be useful but are also vulnerable to errors (Shmueli, Elliott, & Kaufman, 2006). Moreover, Kühberger examined framing effects and presented a meta-analysis, which indicated that framing effects exist, but only at a moderate size (Kühberger, 1998).

Frames are argued to be useful in two ways: Interpretively on the one side, meaning that frames support the understanding of complex situations or give certain events a special meaning - both by integrating existing opinions and experiences. On the other side, frames can be used as a strategic tool, meaning that frames assist to “rationalize self-interest, persuade broader audiences, build coalitions, or promote preferred outcomes.” (Shmueli, Elliott, & Kaufman, 2006, p. 208). To exemplify these two approaches, it can be said some statements made by Martin Luther King were often double-edged: internal sense making and strategic intentions at the same time (Shmueli, Elliott, & Kaufman, 2006).

Consequently, frames are created to give situations a special meaning and sense. They support the thinking process in understanding certain situations by integrating personal and individual beliefs and experiences. Frames are referred to as keys in realizing and comprehending various circumstances of life, followed by communicating these interpretations to others. With these cognitive devices and structures, information overload can be reduced and reality can be displayed more clearly and simpler. It can be said that frames help to specify the field of vision: “Frames organize phenomena into coherent, understandable categories, giving meaning to some observed aspects while discounting others that appear irrelevant or counterintuitive.” (Shmueli, Elliott, & Kaufman, 2006, p. 208) Based on these facts, arising of divergent interpretations is uncommon. Different reactions to Martin Luther King’s speeches and statements exemplified this. (Shmueli, Elliott, & Kaufman, 2006).
2.2 Cognitive framing

As briefly mentioned before, Kaneman and Tversky condensed the theory of valence framing effects, viz. the homogeneous set of phenomena, to the prospect theory. Framing manipulations involving framing effects can be divided into three areas: risky choice framing, attribute framing and goal framing (see Table 1). Although various scholars examine framing and its effects, the research regarding framing effects processes have some restrictions (Levin, Schneider, & Gaeth, 1998).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Frame type</th>
<th>What is framed</th>
<th>What is affected</th>
<th>How effect is measured</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Risky choice</td>
<td>Set of options with different risk levels</td>
<td>Risk preference</td>
<td>Comparison of choices for risky options</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Attribute</td>
<td>Object/event attributes or characteristics</td>
<td>Item evaluation</td>
<td>Comparison of attractiveness ratings for the single item</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Goal</td>
<td>Consequence or implied goal of a behavior</td>
<td>Impact of persuasion</td>
<td>Comparison of rate of adoption of the behavior</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 1 Summary of Methological Differences in Risky Choice, Attribute, and Goal Framing (Levin, Schneider, & Gaeth, 1998, p. 150)

As illustrated by Table 1, it is important to mention that these three types of framing manipulations have different mechanisms of action. This is a fact that has been empirically proven by Levin et al. (Levin, Gaeth, Schreiber, & Lauriola, 2002). Besides, the scholars also point out all three framing manipulation types to be independent (Levin, Gaeth, Schreiber, & Lauriola, 2002). Besides the empirical study of Levin et al., scholars have conducted several other analyses. Kühberger summed up nine of them as followed (Kühberger, 1998):

- The first study is about the Asian disease design (ADP; e.g., Tversky & Kahneman, 1981). It is the standard design in which the participants have the choice between a risky and a non-risky outcome. In this case, the patricians describe the same outcomes, which can be losses or gains.
• The second experiment describes the gambling design, which is the same as the ADP and has the difficulties like gambling and lotteries, but it is accomplished with imaginary money.

• The third analysis, Kühberger depicts the tax evasion design, which was examined by Chang, Nichols, and Schultz in 1987. Participants had the choice between a loss, viz. tax payments, or a reduced gain, viz. refund withholding. The researchers’ goal was to find out “whether taxpayer attitudes toward tax audit risk vary as a consequence of such vantage-point-framing.” (Kühberger, 1998, p. 32)

• The fourth analysis is referred to as the clinical reasoning design (e.g., McNeil et al., 1982). The fundamentals of this study were clinical problems shown to participants. They had to choose one of two therapies with different outcomes: survival (positive frame) or mortality (negative frame).

• In the bargaining design, the fifth research experiment, the negotiation is about a fixed price commodity, which is explained on dissimilar subjects. Positive settlement levels represent positive frames and losses from a benchmark of a total asset represent negative frames of this negotiation. Risk is indirectly given by the possibility of not reaching a settlement. The number of settlements as well as the amount and distribution of payoffs are contained in the dependent variables of this experimental design.

• The sixth research design, message compliance design, explores if the positive consequences of doing something can be emphasized in persuasive arguments rather than emphasizing the negative consequences of failing. The latter can be more effective regarding compliance. Attitudes, behavior and intentions are measured in different ways.

• The seventh experiment is the escalation of commitment design. The experimental and the control group differ in an imagined investment they made or did not make before. The experimental group thinks they made an investment, which did not reach the prospected return. Afterwards, they were asked if they would like to invest further available funds to expand their original investment – this fact is defined as a loss situation. By comparison, the control group has not made any investments before. The participants were only
asked if they would like to invest the completely imagined investment – this fact makes the two expected values equivalent.

- The eighth design determines the correlation of different frames and different evaluations: the evaluation objects design. Attendees were asked to evaluate objects according to different framed information. In this design, a positive frame is a gamble described by a profit amount. A negative frame, on the other side, is a gamble described by a loss amount.

- The tenth and last design summed up by Kühberger is the game-theory design. Choice dilemmas can be divided into take-some and give-some dilemmas. These dilemmas are usually social, with consequences of individuals' decisions resulting in collective disaster. Take-some dilemmas are comparable to positively framed situations, because individuals are asked how much of a shared resource they would take to retain for themselves. This fact indicates a gain for individuals. In contrast, give-some dilemmas are comparable to negatively framed situations, because individuals are asked how much of a public good they would hand over to maintain a collective resource. That is why this kind of dilemma demonstrates a loss for individuals. This design verified whether a different kind of dilemma is related to risk attitude (Kühberger, 1998).

### 2.2.1 Risky choice framing

In 1979, Tversky and Kahneman examined, with the help of their “Asian disease design”, individuals’ behavior and decision-making processes in different situations. This prospect theory, originally called lottery-theory, is the basis for various research designs all over the world. They figured out that people, who evaluate a specific outcome, compare that outcome with another neutral and known outcome. If the neutral outcome is more favorable than the specific outcome, people recognize it as a loss and code it negatively. Thus, this person develops a loss frame. Contrariwise, they code a more favorable outcome - compared to the neutral outcome – to be positive. Thus, he or she has a gain frame (De Dreu & McCusker, 1997). In 2002, Daniel Kahneman was honored with the Nobel Memorial Prize in Economics for this theory. Besides other researchers, Levin, Gaeth and Schreiber argue the effects of risky choice framing occur when people have to decide between two options. This decision depends on two variables:
positive or negative wording and confronted risk. In other words, these framing effects arise when “willingness to take a risk (e.g., elect a medical procedure with variable potential outcomes) depends on whether the potential outcomes are positively framed (e.g., in terms of success rate) or negatively framed (e.g., in terms of failure rate)” (Levin, Gaeth, Schreiber, & Lauriola, 2002, p. 414).

Risk and uncertainty are argued to have three different sources in negotiations research, which are strategic risk, risk alternatives to agreement and the contractual risk (Bottom W., 1998). The basic form of the risky choice paradigm can be explained as followed: the participants are shown a hypothetical decision scenario. This scenario offers two different options or forecasts - one of those contains risk, whereas the other does not. The risky option is an all-or-none prospect. Opposed to this, the sure-thing option includes a definite outcome. To test the possible risky choice framing effects, the researchers defined a positive and a negative frame (see Figure 1): In the negative frame, the outcomes of both prospects are described in terms of losses. In the positive frame, they are described in terms of gains (Levin, Schneider, & Gaeth, 1998).

Figure 1: The standard risky choice framing paradigm
(own illustration based on Levin, Schneider, & Gaeth, 1998, p. 151)
The results show that people are less willing to take risks with positive framed outcomes than with ones that are framed negatively. These effects are proven in various research designs, especially by “Asian disease designs” (Levin, Gaeth, Schreiber, & Lauriola, 2002). Kahneman and Tversky condensed the results of the framing manipulation with the help of the S-shaped subjective value function (see Figure 2). This function is convex in the domain of losses and concave in the domain of gains. The convex part displays the risk seeking of people under negative framing conditions and the concave part displays the risk aversion under positive framing conditions. That means that people who were shown the positively framed scenario chose the sure thing option significantly more, whereas those who were shown the negative framed scenario selected the risky option, in which they can go for either all or none. This shows people are more likely to take risks if they see the possibility to avoid a loss rather than to realize a gain. The reverse selection, viz. the case where the risky opportunity is preferred for the positive rather than the negative frame scenario, as well the case when no effect occurs, is very rare (Levin, Schneider, & Gaeth, 1998).

![S-shaped subjective value function](image)

*Figure 2 S-shaped subjective value function by Kahneman and Tversky (own illustration based on Kahneman & Tversky (1979) and Levin, Schneider, & Gaeth (1998))*

Researchers investigating the “Asian Disease design” found out that framing effects can be reduced or removed if a particular component is added, e.g. if participants are asked to justify their decisions. Takemura found these framing effects to disappear if the participants are requested to think about their choice for three minutes. Another possibility to reduce risky choice
framing effects is to make the positive and negative outcomes salient. The intensity of these effects also depends on the problem type (Levin, Schneider, & Gaeth, 1998).

While interpreting risky choice framing effects, it must be noticed framing manipulation involves two parts:
1. the dependent measure of choice
2. the presence of risk

Choices can only be used as an indirect measure of the framing effect on information processing as several component processes such as option comparison or option-evaluation-influence-choices. When the situation includes risk, the decision process is more difficult extracting exactly the main argument of the final choice (Levin, Schneider, & Gaeth, 1998).

**Gain-Loss framing**

Within research related to negotiations, gain-loss framing has been evaluated as a vital part of risky choice framing. Levin and Schneider argue bargaining decisions to be settlement options. They refer to them as a “sure thing”, which means riskless with an assured and fixed outcome. The “risky” option leads to undergo arbitration. In more detail, the decision can lead to an unfavorable or a favorable outcome for the participant. This kind of frame emphasizes either potential losses or potential gains related to riskless and risky options to the negotiating parties (Levin, Schneider, & Gaeth, 1998). Kühberger conducted a different research design concerning gain-loss frames in negotiations, referred to as the bargaining design. In comparison to other studies, Kühberger argues risk to be not directly manipulative. His design explores how bargainers agree on a specific price of a commodity depending on various issues (Kühberger, 1998). De Dreu and Emans (1992) also investigated the influences of gain and loss frames providing the following two main results

“(a) an own gain frame produced less cognitive activity than an own loss frame
(b) another’s loss frame caused more cooperation than other’s gain frame, but only in the case of an own gain frame.” (De Dreu, Emans, & van de Vliert, 1992, p. Abstract)
Loss aversion

In 1979, 1991 and 1995, Kahneman and Tversky defined the approach of loss aversion and its impact on bargainers as “concession aversion”. In their opinion, loss aversion is an innovative part of prospect theory. The scholars argue losses, in comparison to similar gains, to play a significant role in negotiations (Kahneman & Tversky, 1979) (Kahneman & Tversky, 1991) (Kahneman & Tversky, 1995). In prospect theory, loss aversion is recorded within a value function (see Figure 2). This function describes the relation between subjective utility and objective outcome. The fact that the losses graph is steeper than the gains graph indicates decisions depend on the amount negotiated (De Dreu & McCusker, 1997). More specifically, Kahneman and Tversky claim “a given difference between two options will generally have a greater impact when it is evaluated as a difference between two losses (disadvantages) than when it is viewed as a difference between two gains (or advantages)” (Kahneman & Tversky, 1991, p. 1045). Their experimental data shows individuals and bargainers to value losses twice as much as comparable gains (Kahneman & Tversky, 1991). This outcome is exemplified by Bottom in 1998: “For example, a symmetric gamble providing an equal chance at winning or losing $100 is not attractive to most people because the thought of losing $100 outweighs the equivalent chance of winning it” (Bottom W. , 1998, p. 91). Moreover, losses, which are increased by concessions, are more unpleasant for bargainers than gains, which are decreased by concessions (Kahneman & Tversky, 1995).

Broadly spoken, a negotiator can be influenced both by a loss aversion and by a risk shift. This fact is proved in several studies, e.g. Bottom and Studt (1993), Bottom (1998), and Neale and Bazerman (1992). It can be said that a loss-framed negotiator negotiates more contentiously, which means that they set a higher aspiration, are less cooperative and make fewer concessions (Schweitzer & DeChurch , 2001). Bottom found that loss-framed bargainers perform with more effort and reach more integrative arrangements (Bottom W. , 1990). De Dreu and McCusker explored the profitability of loss-framed negotiators and found that their decision making process is more optimized than gain-framed negotiators. Loss-framed negotiators cooperate more when joint outcomes are to be negotiated. Nevertheless, when personal outcomes are at stake, loss-framed bargainers compete more compared to gain-framed bargainers (De Dreu & McCusker, 1997). Human decision-making research proved this as well. Some other negotiation studies display that loss frames are responsible for less cooperation. More specifically, De Dreu and McCusker found that cooperators under a loss frame cooperate more than under a gain frame (De Dreu & McCusker, 1997). When frames are communicated gain framed-negotiators, i.e. the
negotiator’s prospective outcomes, described as gains, are more cooperative as loss framed-negotiators (De Dreu, Emans, & van de Vliert, 1992). Additionally, in comparison to gain-framed negotiators, loss-framed negotiators settle less easily, request more and yield less. Interestingly, compared to these results, other studies showed no specific relation between cooperation and gain or loss frames (De Dreu & McCusker, 1997). Consequently, scholars are divided. It can be said that sometimes, loss-framed bargainers cooperate more than gain-framed bargainers do, especially in social dilemma and negotiation research. Sometimes, they also cooperate less. Nevertheless, negotiator’s social motives define whether defection or cooperation is chosen (De Dreu & McCusker, 1997). The frame of the facing negotiator affects a negotiators initial framing – under the condition that the contrary frame is communicated. In that case, disputants have deviating frames; the gain-framed negotiator adapts their frame towards a loss frame (De Dreu, Emans, & van de Vliert, 1992). The “frame-adoption hypothesis” adds “other’s communicated gain frame leads to lower demands and larger concessions than other’s communicated loss frame, especially when negotiators have a gain rather than loss frame themselves.” (De Dreu, Carnevale, & van de Vliert, 1994, p. Abstract).

2.2.2 Attribute framing

Beside risky choice and goal framing, attribute framing is also considered as an important approach to framing. This type is said to be the simplest and is used to explain how information processing is influenced by descriptive valence. The subject of this framing manipulation is only a positively or negatively framed attribute within any situation. In comparison to risky choice framing, the dependent measure is the basic process of a subject’s evaluation instead of a subject’s choice between two independent options (Levin, Schneider, & Gaeth, 1998). In avoiding confusion, the term “choice” is reserved by the scholars for choices between independent options, as explained in the case of risky choice framing. The term “evaluation” is approached to include degenerate cases involving simple complements like yes/no judgments or ratings of favorability (e.g. scales from good to bad) (Levin, Schneider, & Gaeth, 1998).

Consumer judgments or other item evaluations exemplify attribute framing in an understandable way. Levin and Gaeth (1988) examined this kind of framing in a research design whereby subjects had to evaluate ground beef, which was marked as “25% fat” (negative frame) or as “75% lean” (positive frame). The results show the positively framed attributes to lead to better
ratings like better taste or being less greasy. In different areas like condom use, medical treatments, industry project teams or job placement programs, attribute framing is an often-conducted study-application. All studies support the results from Levin and Gaeth in 1988: “the same alternative was rated more favorably when described positively than when described negatively” (Levin, Schneider, & Gaeth, 1998, p. 159). Additional studies with an attribute framing approach from different areas, such as radio news broadcasting, audit judgment or personnel selection, were conducted by the scholars Levin et al. in 1996 and in 1988, Loke and Lau in 1992 and Marteau in 1989 and support the results from Levin and Gaeth. In addition, no cases are known in which a positively framed attribute produced less favorable evaluations than a negatively framed attribute. Due to this outcome, it can be stated that an evidenced homogeneous phenomenon, the “valence-consistent” shift exists, “wherein the positive framing of attributes leads to more favorable evaluations than negative framing” (Levin, Schneider, & Gaeth, 1998, p. 160).

Attribute framing can also be conducted in a gambling context, e.g. when people were asked to evaluate a single bet. The positive and negative labeled attributes were “probability of winning” and “probability of losing”. The outcomes of this research design also showed that the gamble, rated with the positive framed attribute (“probability of winning”), is evaluated more favorably than the gamble with the negative framed attribute rating (“probability of losing”) (Levin, Schneider, & Gaeth, 1998).

The explanation of the prospect theory is not applicable for attribute framing and its effects. The reason is that the prospect theory explains changes in preferences for determined and positive or negative framed options, which vary in the degree of risk, instead of different evaluations, e.g. of objects, which don’t include risk. The differences between attribute framing and the prospect theory, viz. risky choice framing, can be summed up as followed (Levin, Schneider, & Gaeth, 1998):

1. Attribute framing frames a single attribute or characteristic.
2. Risky choice framing frames each option in an independent choice set.
3. Attribute framing does not include risk.
4. Risky choice framing includes riskiness of different situations and outcomes.
To differentiate between attribute framing and risky choice framing, it can be said that in an attribute framing research design, the characteristic or attribute, e.g. of the beef, is framed and affect the subject’s evaluation instead of the outcome of a risky choice. A situation should be described, e.g. in terms of success versus failure rates, when medical treatment is described in positive framed “survival rates” or negative framed “mortality rates” (Levin, Schneider, & Gaeth, 1998, p. 159). The fact that risk perception does not affect valence-framing effects can also be exemplified as followed: Students were asked to rate the performance of other students on exam scores. The positive labeled attribute was “percentage correct” and the negative labeled attribute was “percentage incorrect”. In this case, risk was not included. Only the differently framed characteristics of the scores influenced theirs ratings (Levin, Schneider, & Gaeth, 1998).

Independent of other studies, Schie and Van Pligt proved the contrast of this framing type, its effects and interpretations in a gambling context in 1995 and came to the same conclusion as explained above; the selective attention due to differently framed attributes. Nevertheless, they differ in names as they call it “prospect framing” and “outcome salience” (Levin, Schneider, & Gaeth, 1998).

Explaining attribute framing effects

In 1988, Levin and Gaeth investigated attribute framing and its effects. They explain that such effects occur “because information is encoded relative to its descriptive valence” (Levin, Schneider, & Gaeth, 1998, p. 164). In 2002, they argued that they “occur when evaluations of an object or event are more favorable if a key attribute is framed in positive rather than in negative terms such as percentage lean rather than percentage fat of a food product, percentage correct rather than percentage incorrect on a test, and success rate rather than failure rate of a medical procedure.” (Levin, Gaeth, Schreiber, & Lauriola, 2002, p. 413). That means that a positively labeled attribute indicates the encoding of information. This evidenced fact leads to evoke subjects’ favorable associations in memory. In contrast, a negative framed or labeled attribute leads, in the second step, to evoke the subjects’ unfavorable associations in memory (Levin, Schneider, & Gaeth, 1998). These evoked associations can be used in bipolar response scales. Subjects who evaluate situations or issues with these scales tend to evaluate the more favorable situation with positive labels than with negative ones. This homogeneous phenomenon is called “valence consistent shift” (Levin, Gaeth, Schreiber, & Lauriola, 2002). To sum up, “attribute framing is likely to influence the encoding and representation of information in associative memories, and this representational difference is viewed as the cause of valence-consistent
shifts in responses." (Levin, Schneider, & Gaeth, 1998, p. 164). In addition, negative encoding emphasizes a negative aspect of information and a positive aspect emphasizes positive encoding. If only one item in a subject’s choice set is positively highlighted and present in their memory, it can lead to a misrepresentation of that item's attribute. In this case, it leads to a more positive perception compared to other items in their memory. This effect, leading to a confirmation bias, is called “valence-based encoding” (Levin, Schneider, & Gaeth, 1998, p. 164).

Levin et al. (1998) examined valence-based encoding to conduct the associative model. This research was divided into two parts. The first part included as a key measure the difference in endorsement ratings of positive and negative terms; thus, they created an Associative Valence Index. As a result, this index was in the positive attribute framing condition significantly higher than in the negative condition. It must be noted that the general tone was not observed. The key measure in the second part was an overall judgment of the specific situation. This part showed a similar outcome to the initial part: judgments in positive attribute framing conditions were significantly higher than in negative conditions. This study is also evidence for the associative model of attribute framing effects (Levin, Schneider, & Gaeth, 1998).

In 2002, Levin et al. created and conducted another research design. For the first time, they used a within-subject design, distributed the individual-level effects and included a behavioral intensions measure. Each level supported the reliability of the effect and, in addition, they could show that a number of participants were “normatively correct” in appearing no framing effect. This design also proved the predicted effect. Additionally, they demonstrated that the risky choice framing effect arises with discrete choices as well as with preference ratings (Levin, Gaeth, Schreiber, & Lauriola, 2002).

**Priming and other resemble approaches of attribute framing**

A resemble approach of attribute framing is also referred to as the concept of priming. Compared to attribute framing, this theory proposes that subjects can be primed in a prior task by stimuli as well as negative or positive valence. In contrast to attribute framing, the framed attribute is a part of a situation’s description, viz. the target stimulus. In addition, this task need not be connected to the main task of evaluating, but the results are equal; “the stimulus object is evaluated more favorably following the positive prime than following the negative prime” (Levin, Schneider, & Gaeth, 1998, p. 165). Levin et al. (1998) explain this effect as the following: “the
prime sets up an “evaluative tone,” which determines whether positively or negatively valence knowledge is accessed during the impression formation process” (Levin, Schneider, & Gaeth, 1998, p. 165).

Shafir (1993) conducted another resemble approach to examine the role of attentional processes in attitude framing. He integrated positive and negative frames in a research design, which explored subjects’ choice of a more desirable option out of two. It is said that if a subject chose one option as the more desirable one, he or she automatically rejects the other option. Shafir manipulated this decision by creating a pair of options. One of them was “enriched” with both stronger negative and stronger positive characteristics, the second option, in contrast, was “impoverished” with weaker attributes. The results show that, when persons should choose the more desirable option, they prefer the enriched option. That is due to the fact that the positive task had concentrated their attention on a compare of the positive attributes. When participants reject the undesirable option, the task awoke their awareness to a compare of the negative characteristics thereby rejecting the enriched option. That means candidates finally chose the impoverished option. Shafir et al. explains this attentional effect “is realized as a shift in the weights applied to positive and negative attributes with a change in task frame.” (Levin, Schneider, & Gaeth, 1998, p. 166) In comparison to Shafir’s approach, Levin et al explain the associative model as something that “implies that this apparent shift in weights results from valence-based differences in the associations created during encoding.” (Levin, Schneider, & Gaeth, 1998, p. 166).

2.2.3 Goal framing

The third type of framing is goal framing. This type is an often-used topic in persuasive communication studies. In 1998, Levin et al. described this effect as “the impact of a persuasive message (…) depend(s) on whether the message stresses either the positive consequences of performing an act or the negative consequences of not performing the act.” (Levin, Schneider, & Gaeth, 1998, p. 167). In 2002, Levin et al. defined goal-framing effects similarly as they “occur when a persuasive message has different appeal depending on whether it stresses the positive consequences of performing an act to achieve a particular goal or the negative consequences of not performing the act.” (Levin, Gaeth, Schreiber, & Lauriola, 2002, p. 413). This framing type can be explained through persons confronted with the same action. On the one hand, they are
confronted in a positive way resulting in positive consequences when they perform the action. On the other hand, if the action is described in a negative way, it results in negative consequences when they do not perform the act (see Figure 3). The positive frame emphasizes the positive consequences (obtain gain) and the negative frame emphasizes the negative consequences (suffer loss). The researchers’ quest is to determine which manipulation or frame has a greater persuasive impact on the same outcome.

![Figure 3: The standard goal framing paradigm](own illustration based on Levin, Schneider, & Gaeth (1998))

This effect can be exemplified by the most popular study carried out by Meyerowitz and Chaiken in 1987. They presented selected women with the consequences of engaging in breast self-examination (BSE) and conducted which explanation is more persuasive and powerful: the positive framed information and hence positive consequences by engaging in BSE or the negative framed information and hence negative consequences by not engaging in BSE. For example, a positive framed sentence would be as follows: “Research shows that women who do BSE have an increased chance of finding a tumor in the early, more treatable stages of the disease.” (Levin, Schneider, & Gaeth, 1998, p. 9.168), whereas a negative framed sentence would read like this: “Research shows that women who do not do BSE have a decreased chance of finding a tumor in the early, more treatable stages of the disease.” (Levin, Schneider, & Gaeth, 1998, p. 9.168). The results show that, in terms of persuasive effectiveness, a negative framed message with good consequences is more persuasive than the positive framed message.
with good consequences. That means that women were more interested in avoiding a loss by engaging in BSE than they were in obtaining a gain by performing BSE (Levin, Schneider, & Gaeth, 1998).

The major differences between attribute and goal framing can be summarized as follows:

1. In goal framing, both frames describe an identical act with positive consequences and thus both as a “good thing” to perform.
2. In attribute framing, the positive frame describes the act as a “good thing” to perform and in the negative frame as a “bad thing” to perform (Levin, Schneider, & Gaeth, 1998) and (Levin, Gaeth, Schreiber, & Lauriola, 2002).

### Health, endowment, social dilemmas, and other examples of goal frames

Besides the studies of Meyerowitz and Chaiken, further studies with other focuses were also undertaken. For example, social dilemma studies, consumer choice and endowment effect studies. The results from social dilemma studies indicate that a negative frame, viz. a loss, has a greater influence on responses than a positive frame, viz. a gain. Generally, framing in a social dilemma context can be divided into the “commons dilemma” problem and the “public good” problem. Regarding the first problem, subjects were asked to take from a common resource – thereby receiving a personal benefit. Regarding the second problem, subjects were asked to contribute to a common resource – thereby sustaining a personal loss. Brewer and Kramer undertook a study in goal framing within social dilemmas in 1986 (Levin, Schneider, & Gaeth, 1998). The results showed that “subjects left more of the common resource for others under the common dilemma frame than under the public goods frame (…). In other words, subjects were more willing to forego a personal benefit in the interest of maintaining the common resource than they were to suffer a personal loss.” (Levin, Schneider, & Gaeth, 1998, p. 172).

Studies including the endowment effect describe an identical situation showing similarities to goal framing but referring to sustained losses and foregone gains. Accordingly endowment effects, as well as true valence framing effects, only occur if the identical action or situation is framed and compared to two different descriptions (e.g. loss vs. gain) (Levin, Schneider, & Gaeth, 1998). In 1998, Levin et al created a goal framing research design, in which they included both endowment effects and social dilemmas. Participants had to decide between a desirable and an undesirable potential outcome (gains and losses). They were differently framed but both
were associated with the same goal. The results proved positively framed information to be less persuasive than negatively framed information. The scholars conclude, “a negative frame tends to intensify the original valence of the outcome, making a desirable outcome more desirable and an undesirable outcome more undesirable.” (Levin, Schneider, & Gaeth, 1998, p. 172).

Although, many researchers explain goal-framing effects with the help of Prospect Theory, Levin et al. disagree with this explanation. In their opinion, the explanation of Meyerowitz and Chaiken (1987) is more probable as they say that a negativity bias is the cause for the resulting effects. A negativity bias occurs in processing the presented information. This empirically evidenced process leads to the assumption that “negative information has a systematically stronger impact on judgment than objectively equivalent positive information.” (Levin, Schneider, & Gaeth, 1998, p. 176). Consequently, subjects pay more attention to negative messages than to positive messages. Moreover, subjects are manipulated more by negative messages than by positive messages. Subsequently, Kahneman and Tversky (1979) included this negativity bias in their Prospect Theory, but used the description that “losses loom larger than gains” and called it “loss aversion” (Levin, Schneider, & Gaeth, 1998, p. 176). Subjects prefer to avoid a loss than to reach the same-dimensioned goal. Although this fact is empirically evidenced, it is argued to be not as strong as other framing effects, viz. risky choice and attribute framing effects (Levin, Gaeth, Schreiber, & Lauriola, 2002). Moreover, a goal framing study carried out by Levin et al. in 2002 could not evidence statistically significant framing effects. However, their explanation for the results of Meyerowitz and Chaiken (1987), in which they showed significant goal framing effects, is that negatively framed messages and their consequences regarding failing engagement in breast self-examinations to be more powerful and immediate than the information framed in their own study (Levin, Gaeth, Schreiber, & Lauriola, 2002).

### 2.2.4 Expectancy value model

A further framing approach publicized by Chong and Duckman (2007) is the Expectancy Value Model. They follow up thinking about how frames develop and how to define them. This approach can be summed up as the following equation: \( \text{Attitude} = \sum v_i \times w_i \). The variable \( v_i \) represents “the evaluation of the object on attribute \( i \)”. The variable \( w_i \) represents “the salience weight ( \( \sum w_i = 1 \) ) associated with that attribute.” (Chong & Druckman, 2007, p. 105). This equation shows that a persons’ attitude towards an object can be described as “the weighted
sum of a series of evaluative beliefs about that object.” (Chong & Druckman, 2007, p. 105). These evaluations can be both positive and negative. If a person believes that a project or object has advantages (ν₁ is positive) or disadvantages (ν₂ is negative), the relative scales of ν₁ and ν₂ as well as the amounts of the relative weights (𝑤₁ and 𝑤₂) are decisive for his or her final attitude towards the project or object (Chong & Druckman, 2007). Most individuals do not have deep notions on specific topics and thus, they do not have specific attitudes on those topics. If those individuals are asked in a survey to evaluate their opinions on such subjects, they can give a spontaneous answer, but nothing more. The survey question shows the imperfect representation of an individual’s feelings. These feelings are parts of the individual’s general feelings and beliefs, which come impulsively to mind at that moment (Chong & Druckman, 2007).

The fact that individuals have positive or negative considerations of objects is also brought into the discussion of the psychology of framing by Chong and Druckman. For example, if a person has different values of a specific topic - each one receiving a different weight - his or her overall attitude will depend on which value dimension is the most important for him or her. If only one value dimension matters, he or she weights this dimension with 𝑤ᵢ = 1, viz. the whole weight is assigned to this value dimension. In this way, 𝑖 can refer to a dimension, a consideration, a belief or a value (Chong & Druckman, 2007). Furthermore, the researchers define an individual’s “frame in thoughts”. This frame refers to “the set of dimensions that affect an individual’s evaluation” (Chong & Druckman, 2007, p. 105). It consists of the beliefs or values considered important to the individual on a specific topic. For example, free speech and public safety within the topic or question, or whether a hate group rally should be tolerated or not. Thus, it can contain one or a mix of different beliefs or considerations and can influence an individual’s opinion (Chong & Druckman, 2007). Due to this fact, many politicians use frames in their election campaigns. They try to encourage voters to think about specific - and for the politician, important – policies by invoking a so-called “frame in communications”. Chong and Druckman exemplify this frame as follows: “if a speaker states that a hate group’s planned rally is “a free speech issue,” than he or she invokes a free speech frame.” (Chong & Druckman, 2007, p. 105). This approach is discussed in more detail in the next section.
**Effects of frames in communication on individuals**

Framing effects in communications occur in different issues and topics, e.g. in government spending, Supreme Court support or campaign finance. Researchers examined these effects in connection with the following research questions: “how different communication frames bias the weight individuals give to various considerations” and “how different frames alter overall opinions without explicitly tracing changes in underlying considerations” (Chong & Druckman, 2007, p. 109). In comparison to other researchers, Chung and Druckman tried to explain the psychological mechanism behind the various framing effects (Chong & Druckman, 2007). Moreover, scholars argue framing to be a part in all three levels. Specifically, the first level refers to framing in “making new beliefs applicable about an issue”, the second level refers to framing in “making certain available beliefs accessible” and framing on the third level means, “making new beliefs applicable or “strong” in people’s evaluation” (Chong & Druckman, 2007, p. 111). All studies show that the described Expectancy Value Model, “frames in communications” and “frames in thoughts” can be assumed. To sum up, framing and frames can modify an individual’s attitudes of an object or topic by changing the underlying considerations of evaluation. People have a specific set of accessible beliefs; the strongest can be awoken by a specific moment or question. These beliefs are stored in people’s memories and draw their opinions (Chong & Druckman, 2007).

**2.3 Interactional framing**

In this section, the authors provide an overview of interactional framing by evaluating important findings and outcomes of past and current literature. Firstly, general theoretical concepts of framing are provided to interactional framing, followed by a detailed review of the interactional framing literature. The section is further divided into three sub-categories of interactional framing. These are: issue framing, identity and relationship framing and interaction process framing. The authors furthermore provide relevant differences between cognitive and interactional framing and highlight the importance of communication and framing in negotiations.

In the literature, framing is referred to as the methods of how ambiguous situations are understood. Reducing this ambiguity can only happen in a specific way resulting in a certain sense of what is happening (Dewulf, Craps, & Dercon, 2004). Moreover, defined as dynamic
representation and configuration of meaning occurring in ongoing interactions, interactive framing refers to the communication structures that people establish while talking to each other (Dewulf, Gray, Putnam, & Bouwen, 2011). The cognitive approach is in contrast to the interactional approach, where the frames are defined as representations of stored memories (Dewulf & Bouwen, 2012). More specifically, Dewulf, et al. (2009) point out some important differences between the two approaches of framing: Cognitive framing refers in general to a person’s representations stored in his or her memories. In this case, framing is considered as the process of relating cognitive frames to certain situations. The interactional approach, in contrast, sees framing from a dynamical perspective and argues it to shape and enact in ongoing interactions. Thus, the frames are considered as transient communication structures.

Dewulf, et al. (2011) argue most framing theories focus on how different aspects of a situation are seen by people based on their pre-defined mental models as well as individual views. In order to develop a better understanding of how negotiators, mediators and disputants frame different issues, interactions and identities interactively it is required to look into how situations are interpreted by those people in particular. Tannen and Wallat (1987) compare and differentiate interactive frames and knowledge schemas by arguing that knowledge schema-based frames about people, events, objects and settings refer to structures of expectations. In contrast, interactive frames refer to negotiated arrangements of a specific interaction, and focus on the influence of communication that defines particular aspects during the overall flow of interaction. For a better understanding, Dewulf, et al. (2009) point to Bateson’s (1954) past research approach on metacommunication, where framing is defined as an exchange of signs in order to develop and understand the way of interaction. The example of two children playing fighting without threat is a playful frame, which is given to highlight the issue. In this case, one inaccurate move from one of the children is considered sufficient enough to shift their frames from playful to threatening. Thus, it is concluded that the ambiguity of interaction interpretation creates the necessity for framing.

When framing is considered as an interactional co-construction and treated as an interactional alignment, a resemblance to the above-mentioned approach of Bateson (1954) can be recognized. Such alignments are products of negotiations generated from ongoing interactions through meta-communications indicating the frame in which the situation is to be judged. Thus, the participants signal to each other how the ongoing interaction is to be understood through non-verbal signals and indirect messages. As a result, frames are argued to be communicative devices used by individuals and groups in negotiating their interactions (Dewulf, et al., 2009).
Since framing captures the ongoing process of interactions arising from negotiators or disputants, it is argued to be built up systematically and be influenced by an almost infinite number of elements merging during the process of interaction (Gonos, 1977). Within short stretches of an interaction, the framing of a given situation may progress and change as the meaning and order of it are co-created and influenced by the participants (Stokes & Hewitt, 1976). The co-construction approach to framing is considered as an important aspect of framing and is discussed in more detail below.

**Frames as interactional co-constructions**

Dewulf, et al. (2009) state that the interactional framing approach provides an understanding of how meanings are co-constructed by negotiators and disputants during an interaction. It also resembles further approaches like Pearce and Cronen’s (1980) Coordinated Management of Meaning Theory (CMM), which argues that people construct social realities during conversations. Thus, a conflict is a phenomenon that resides in disputants’ social interactions and arises because people co-construct it interactively. Resolving conflicts requires finding new alignments in the interaction between participants. The Relational Order Theory of Donohue (1998) as well as the Interactional Approaches to Issue Framing of Putnam and Holmer (1992) can be considered as exemplified approaches, which will be explained and discussed in the further course of this work.

Furthermore, Dewulf, et al. (2009) indicate the above mentioned approaches of conflict and negotiation to be distinguished from a third approach, which excludes frames or framing from its main elements in general. The realist-objectivist approach assumes conflicts to be part of the external reality. Thus, conflict is argued to be a status that can be judged objectively. From this perspective, an external reality change is required to resolve conflicts. Conflict resolution theories based on game theoretic approaches are given examples of this.

Scholars state that people comprehend complicated situations, as well as make sense of uncertain issues, during conversations. This observation is considered as the first approach to interactional issue framing. Thus, interactive character of issue framing is required in arguing the following: that the enactment of a frame demands the responses of others to develop and evolve it’s meaning (Drake & Donohue, 1996). Beginning with the observation that people communicate differently regarding certain issues (depending on the person or issue they are talking about) the
interactional approach can influence the aspects of communication. This means that people use specific frames to serve their interactional objectives during a conversation (Dewulf, Craps, & Dercon, 2004). Furthermore, Edwards (1997) argues that the interactional approach stresses the discursive characteristics of issue framing are based on the decisions made in the use of linguistics, creating alternative illustrating versions and therefore creating different implications.

Dewulf and Bouwen (2012) explain interactional issue framing as the process by which an issue has been organized and reorganized to such extent that the meaning of that issue is altered. This process includes the selection of certain aspects of the issue as frame parts while putting others aspects aside. Some elements are considered more important and therefore given more focus, whereas others are considered less critical and therefore left by side with little or no focus given. This selection or reorganization happens at a discursive, language in-use level of how issues are formulated according to Wood and Kroeger (2000). Thus, interactional framing considers people as conversationalists generating specific meanings of certain situations through language in interaction. The role of frames in this context can be understood as co-constructions related to meanings. Thus, it can be argued that the reason for changes in frames lies in interactions (Dewulf & Bouwen, 2012).

Donnellon and Gray (1989) point out negotiators generate specific meanings for their experiences in certain moments through framing. The behavioral responses of the negotiators, which can be verbal or non-verbal, indicate whether the enacted frames are matching or not. Furthermore, new interpretations can further aggravate reinterpretations of others regarding the situation. Drake und Donohue (1996) state every mode in a negotiation frames the discussion issue further in a certain way. Furthermore, it aims the frame to an interaction mode that can be evaluated by other participants through re-evaluating their frame.

The above-mentioned argumentation provides an insight as to why issue framing is understood as a communication process rather than a cognitive process. The fact that people vary on issues when talking to different people, is argued to be a first clear indicator of there being more than the obvious. A reasonable explanation is that frames are to be used in serving ongoing interactional concerns during conversations. Thus, participants create transient communicative constructions around certain issues during talks (Drake & Donohue, 1996).

According to the differentiation of Tannen und Wallat (1987), what really becomes framed is the knowledge or interaction process. Thus, in a negotiation-based context, issues at stake refer to knowledge, whereas the interaction among negotiating parties refers to the communication
process. Moreover, disputants also tend to frame their relationships and identities. In the literature, three main categories are identified as being framed: issues, identities and relationships, and the interaction processes (Dewulf, et al., 2009). These three differentiation areas are discussed below:

- **Issue frames**: This type discusses meanings devoted to events, agenda items or problems.
- **Identity and relationship frames**: This type discusses the meaning devoted to one’s relationship with the counterpart as well as one’s meaning to him or herself.
- **Process frames**: This type is concerned with interpretations that disputant ascribe to their process of interaction.

It is argued that these approaches should not be considered as mutually exclusive but as different perspectives applicable in highlighting important aspects of a certain situation. In the literature, some studies focus on one of these aspects, while others consider several as equally relevant (Dewulf, et al., 2009).

Brummans, et al. (2008) focuses on conflict sense making and also argues it to be a matter of framing. Thus, the experiences are organized in a specific way to define the sense of a situation towards a specific outcome. Additionally, past studies have also investigated conflicts through a framing approach, demonstrating the following similarities in their limitations. Firstly, studies based on the cognitive approach of framing were generally incapable of explaining the intricate communication process of how people were making sense of a certain situation. Secondly, these researches failed to explain how certain disputants were set apart from others within the same dispute by similarities in conflict framing. Thirdly, the importance of framing an inflexible multiparty negotiation conflict was only examined by a few studies, as most studies focused strongly on interpersonal conflicts (Brummans, et al., 2008).

**Frame categories**

Drake and Donohue (1996) argue frame categories to recognize internal expectancy groups prospectively, which communicators raise in order to make sense of certain interactions. The subsequent experiences are interpreted through prior experiences that are accumulated and used as a frame. As pointed out by Gray (1991), substantive frames provide understanding for the reason of the dispute in general, whereas outcome frames are used to determine favored
solutions. Moreover, characterization frames explain behaviors of the participants as well as one self’s. When this perspective is taken into consideration, it can be argued that frames discuss the various cognitive systems of a negotiator when decoding received information and how this information is organized.

The findings of Donnellon and Gray (1989) point out bargainers can use multiple frames at the same time throughout an entire negotiation process. However, it is argued that frames are only noticeable in separate instances. Mismatches are stated to be a reason for conflicts; they arise in three different ways:

1. When different frame-types are used.
2. When the same frame has different content.
3. When interferences occur at different stages of abstraction caused by negotiators.

Thus, ambiguity of the above-mentioned mismatches (resulting in misunderstandings that are subsequences in statement escalations) could provide an opportunity for reframing. In this way reframing could lead to an adjustment of understanding and consequently to the resolution of conflicts (Putnam & Holmer, 1992).

According to the research conducted by Gray et al. (1990), the inferences of frame types are argued to build upon the lexical, social, and syntactical data they had analyzed. The result of the study contributed to important changes in the typology of frames. First, an evidentiary frame was added in order to encompass facts as well as supporting verification for outcome or loss-gain frames. Second, the category system was further developed into a hierarchy including process categories and substantive categories performing as meta-frames to categorize text into the outstanding frames. The findings of the study revealed that integrative agreements stem from the negotiation of a broad number of issues and exercising aspiration frames. Beyond that, a specific frame type dominated discussions of separate issues. Outcome frames explain concerns resulting from salary discussions, whereas characterization frames portrayed interactions on career issues (Putnam & Holmer, 1992).

Another important approach concerning framing in negotiations conducted by Donnellon and Gray (1989) intended to bring together the cognitive view of framing with linguistic analysis. In this research approach, linguistic patterns were used in categorizing and indexing different types of cognitive frames as well as the bargainers’ experiences. Thus, the researchers combined bottom-up concepts of frames with top-down perspectives from literature. The way frame
categories change during the negotiation process and the contribution of ambiguity as well as subsequent changes in conflict interpretation were referred to as reframing by the scholars (Putnam & Holmer, 1992).

2.3.1 Interactional issue framing

Felstiner, et al. (1980) state that the issue development perspective focuses on the argumentation and the redefinition of issues related to conflicts developing over time. During the process of negotiation, the conflict issues are built and shaped as processes by means of the arguments brought up by the negotiating sides. These then evolve in order to highlight salient elements of the issues. Although the negotiators enter into the negotiation with a certain pre-developed understanding of the issue, these impressions evolve separately during the negotiation process as arguments brought to the table by others redefine the participants understanding of that issue. Thus, new considerations can arise or be discovered through reframing or redefining an ongoing interaction processes (Drake & Donohue, 1996).

The issue development part of research relating to framing by Putnam and Holmer (1992) contributes important elements to the issue of framing in respect to the development of an interactional approach. As stated, “a frame is understood as the definition or meaning of an issue and issues correspond to agenda items or topics of concern in a negotiation...” (Dewulf, Gray, Putnam, & Bouwen, 2011, p. 16). Consequently, frames are considered as discussion themes that are in ongoing movement while negotiators argue about them. Moreover, Putnam and Holmer (1992) discuss frames not simply as individual cognition features but rather as co-constructed methods of how bargainers determine problems and solutions during the negotiation talks. Accordingly, scholars describe issue development as an ongoing process of evaluating and re-evaluating agenda topics with respect to the provided arguments as well as the exchanged information and the assigned interpretations by the bargainers.

With regard to this, Steinberg (1999) has provides an interesting research example in his investigation of the discursive performances of the cotton spinners in 1820s and 1830s in southeastern Lancashire. This research was based on writings provided by several news channels. The results highlighted that the representation choices of spinners were strongly structured through their challengers (Dewulf, Gray, Putnam, & Bouwen, 2011).
The approach of Putnam

The important work of Putnam and Holmer (1992) investigates how issues transform during the process of a negotiation. By assuming disputes develop through shifting frames, it determines the relevance of facts available in a certain case. Thus, a frame is argued to refer to the conceptualization, definition and meaning of an issue. When compared to cognitive heuristics, the development of an issue has a strong focus on the methods of how bargainers assess alternatives. Issue development differs from frame categories regarding a centering clash of issues or arguments as the foundation of framing and reframing. This line of argumentation provides a cognitive image of bargaining events as well as describing how events can be interpreted (Comaroff & Roberts, 1977).

From the theoretic perspective, Issue development has its roots in the research field of dispute resolution, policy deliberation and argumentation. This then conventionalizes issues (frames) that are co-constructed by individuals collectively, in order to generate sense of certain situations in which they were involved (Eden, Jones, Sims, & Smithin, 1981). This is because those issues undergo a certain process of “naming, claiming, and blaming” when people argue about them (Felstiner, Abel, & Sarat, 1980). When disputants label a situation as problematic, it is referred to in literature as ‘naming’. As an example, the ‘blaming” issue is negotiated by the disputants based on what caused the problem and who was to blame for it. When the grievant side confronts the other party on what they believe caused the problem, claiming begins. Although both sides enter into the process of negotiation following a specific agenda, the way they interact regarding the problems ultimately influences and defines the outcome. Based on that, frames become more than just individual cognitions but rather co-constructions of how negotiators define problems on their own (Putnam & Holmer, 1992).

As elements of issue construction as well as interrelatedness and scope, debate and argumentation are considered such as epistemic elements, as they create knowledge related to issues that are under negotiation and considered as interests of other parties. Thus, the discussions related to the agenda items are aimed to evaluate the opposite of the negotiators definition regarding an issue. In light of this, issue development is argued to become an ongoing process of attacks in order to exchange information among participants (Putnam & Holmer, 1992).

As explained before, framing occurs through shaping certain issues. Consequently, the definition of the initial issue also shapes itself over the interaction process. Moreover, in the literature
different interaction types are considered to reveal the jointly shaped characteristics of framing. One type refers to arguments among bargainers attacking the implication of problems and feasibility of solutions. As the importance of agenda items are debated from both sides, parties engage in a problem-shaping frame. Another type refers to argument clashes and convincing through case making. Cases are considered to be supporting constructs that justify one party’s arguments. If one party provides certain cases to strengthen their argument and the other party disagrees, the negotiations may become stuck with parties talking around the problem in order to find a suitable solution. Anyway, each party’s case shifts when the arguments of their counterpart are received and taken into consideration (Putnam & Holmer, 1992).

The research of Dewulf et al. (2004) strengthens the perspective of issue framing to be an ongoing process of communication. Moreover, it is assumed that people tend to talk in different ways about the same issue depending on the person to whom they are talking. Consequently, issue frames are considered as transient structures of communication built by participants during the process of interactions (Drake & Donohue, 1996). Situations are named to be problems to solve, the causers are to be blamed and responsibilities are to be claimed (Dewulf, et al., 2009). While negotiating parties keep providing each other with related information through questions or argumentations, they stress certain points and use specific formulations to influence how issues are to be labeled and understood by their counterparts (Dewulf, et al., 2009). Every move within the negotiation process reveals whether the frame of the counterpart is accepted or refused as their own frames are altered in the responses (Drake & Donohue, 1996). Accordingly, the literature states “…issues are defined in a situated context (rather than in negotiators’ heads) and evolve as negotiators establish, debate, affirm or redefine their framed, constructed and represented in particular ways” (Dewulf, et al., 2009, p. 170).

When negotiators cast issues in an incompatible way that fails to establish a suitable joint frame, conflicts are very likely to continue. The contribution of Salipante and Bouwen (1995) highlight the formulation differences of grievances resulting in breaches of meaning in a social construct. The importance of rapprochement of framing among negotiators was further stressed by Drake and Donohue (1996) in encouraging integrative conflict-solving approaches during aggressive disputes. This approach shows framing as an ongoing process among participants rather than a static process. Additionally, interactional framing also reveals how certain aspects regarding diverse issues are emphasized and challenged by linguistic variations of different actors in multi-party negotiation constellations (Dewulf, et al., 2009). Dewulf and Bouwen (2012) indicate interactional issue framing works through ordering and reordering certain elements of an issue.
so that its meaning becomes altered. This process requires certain issues of a frame to be selected and focused upon while others aspects are left out or marginally included.

A good empirical example of Interactional Issue Framing is given in the analysis conducted by Dewulf and Bouwen (2012). This analysis considers how participants enact diverse ways of handling differences by framing issues that can be presented in a method of typology interaction approaches. The analysis highlights diverse sequences leading to the identification of five interaction strategies for handling differences in issue framing:

1. **Incorporation of a frame:** A downgraded reformulation of a challenging component is incorporated into one’s own issue framing.

2. **Accommodation of a frame:** A challenging issue component is accommodated to one’s own issue framing.

3. **Disconnection of a frame:** A challenging component is disconnected from the actual conversation due to unimportance or irrelevance.

4. **Polarization of a frame:** Differences are polarized by repeating one’s own issue framing or a renewed version of that issue.

5. **Reconnection of a frame:** by considering both components seriously, the incompatibility among them is taken away so a reconnection can occur.

An empirical example of issue development and framing in negotiations is provided by Putnam and Holmer (1992), where issue development is considered as shifts in the process of how new definitions and issues on a certain agenda are developed through the participants. As an example, a negotiation between teachers and board members of a school was reported, where the discussion of extra payment for supervision duties was considered as the main issue. However, teachers defined the issue as gender discrimination among the gender of coaches, whereas the school board framed it as an issue of payment for extra work. During the advanced negotiation process, the discussion shifted towards the differences between sports undertaken by men and sports undertaken by women. Finally, both parties agreed on overhauling women’s sport. However, an agreement on equality of payment could not be reached and the sides agreed on parity.

The use of language, especially with regarding the framing process of a certain problem, is argued to be an important differentiator among the features and complexity of a given situation. It refers to a selection process of descriptions from a stream of events during a negotiation process and simultaneously makes sense out of these events in a larger context. In the above-
mentioned case between teachers and the board members of a school, participants brought the differences among men and women’s sports programs into discussion and shifted their labels. This approach supported the negotiation process by resulting in adjustments in the sports program. Thus, reframing helped the parties to identify the real problem and to find a suitable common ground based on that. The inadequacies among men and women were not referred to adequately at the beginning but the process of discussion pulled this issue into the center of talks and successfully addressed them later on (Putnam, 2010).

2.3.2 Identity and relationship framing

Dewulf et al. (2011) refer to identity and relationship framing as a focused process of definition regarding the identities of the participants and their relations to each other during the negotiation process. Identities and relationships are constructed through the statements of the participants. Broadly speaking, individuals construct themselves as part of a group. As a collective identity is developed through the group members, noticeable linguistic practices are employed to describe their interactions and rebuild their identities.

Good examples of negotiators creating identities through framing can be seen in conflict cases regarding environmental issues. A common position adopted in such disputes is that of the victim. Stakeholders in such clashes assume that they are suffering due to the behavior of other parties. Claiming to have no voice in such conflicts is one of the many possible components such an identity could possibly involve. For example, during a dispute regarding a national park, the activists argued to be voiceless as a result of their situation and subsequent victimization (Dewulf, Gray, Putnam, & Bouwen, 2011). On other occasions, some stakeholders positioned themselves as victims by accusing their counterparts to be rapists. The discursive framing applied strongly underlines their opponents’ negative influence as well as their helplessness in this given situation (Bing & Lombardo, 1997). The construction of “the suffering victim” including the help of symbolic language resulted in an oppression of the initial construction of their opponent (Lawrence, 2004).

Relational framing has also been investigated in both international and hostage disputes by Donohue and Roberto (1993) and Donohue and Hoobler (2002). An analysis regarding international negotiations was conducted between Palestinian and Israeli leaders using interviews and editorials to estimate the relational context among the sides. Their research
highlighted a shift from an affiliative to competitive relationship. Hostage disputes were investigated and results showed that the potential for relational consensus was boosted in hostage negotiation situations. This was most prevalent when a general moving-forward intention was signaled through relational language rather than moving away from each other (Donohue & Roberto, 1993).

According to Bateson (1972), distinguishing language patterns such as reporting or commanding language could be useful. A report is referred to be certain informational content packed in a message, whereas commands include specific signals referring to the way in which the speaker expects their counterpart to interpret the message. Thus, how the relationships among parties are framed depends on the command aspect of the message (Watzlawick, Beavin, & Jackson, 1967).

According to Karreman and Alvesson (2001), the way in which parties create and refine their identities as well as maintain relationships through negotiations are key elements addressed by identity and relationship framing. This process of co-constructing is also reported to be consistent in seeing identity as multiply fragmented, situational, processual as well as fixed and stable. Thus, identity is argued to be working as a social and discursive action that creates itself. Further theories identify the work related to identity, as a collective task in assigning certain meanings to one’s self as well as others in a certain context (Bartel & Dutton, 2001).

A discursive view on collective identity was added by Hardy et al. (2005) based on multi-party negotiation constructions. Instead of accepting identity as a cognitive concept, the researchers focused on conversations, where the participants defined themselves through their collective identity. As discursive objects resulting from conversations, these identities were actually produced rather than pre-existing. Joint sanctions become important for participants, who have negotiated a collective identity. Problems and solutions were commonly considered as parts of it. However, questioned identities remain as elements of pressure in a certain conversation, when parties differ in their identity constructs (Dewulf, et al., 2009). Certain language patterns are argued to point to both interactional relationship framing as well as identity construction. It can also be claimed that transferred messages include hidden cues, influencing the way in which individuals construct their relationship with others (Watzlawick, Beavin, & Jackson, 1967). If one considers the possibility submitted messages can work as a type of stimulus, response, or even as reinforcement for messages, relationship framing can be said to have a dynamic nature in general (Bateson, 1972). Moreover, in negotiation situations, especially in certain intercultural
constructs, disagreements regarding how a sequence of messages should be framed can result in internal problems (Watzlawick, Beavin, & Jackson, 1967).

### 2.3.3 Interaction Process Framing

Stokes and Hewitt (1976) argue interaction process framing to move the focus away from expectations and its underlying structures towards sense making out of ongoing interactions. Accordingly, process framing discusses the co-construction of sense making related to the interaction procedure itself. In other words, this framing type refers to the question of how negotiators co-construct the meaning of an interaction. Arguments, discussions, and conflicts as well as their developments over a certain period deliver specific clues to the participants in interpreting and understanding the dynamics of what is happening. This dynamic construction refers to framing through clues resulting in reactions among participants (Putnam & Holmer, 1992).

Dewulf et al. (2011) differentiate among three different pattern types supporting the sense-making process related to communicational and interpretational processing of social interactions as follows:

1. **Meta-communicational cues exchanged by parties.**
2. **Codified sequences of communication that evolve during interactions.**
3. **Communicators’ footing by Goffman (1981)**

**Meta-communication clues**

Dewulf et al. (2011) discuss the importance of meta-communication clues based on an example of a school-negotiation situation, where the negotiators for the side of the teachers withdrawing a previous demand by immediately replacing it with a more extreme one. This move caused ambiguity among administrators of the school regarding the perception of whether or not the frame of the situation had changed from integrative to distributive. A vast majority of the administrators recognized the new situation as an act of toughness and decided to match it with a similarly extreme measure such as locking into issues and withholding information. However, one of the administrators noticed the leading negotiators for the teachers-side to deliver further
cues of hesitation and insecurity. Thus, the new signals led to the new interpretation that the withdrawal might have been a naïve act in that situation and possibly not a frame shift at all. Resulting from the new acknowledgements from the latest meta-clues, the administrators returned to the negotiation and tested different interpretations by asking more questions. The answers given by the opposite side showed that the teachers were not fully aware of the defaulted proposal. Consequently, the right response of the administrators avoided a further escalation and encouraged further negotiations.

**Sequences of communication**

This type of process framing refers to certain patterns of a message-feedback-response construction. The extension of this frame results from kind responses to the opposing sides through clues highlighting further moves. Reciprocal and transformational sequences are paralleled by this work of research (Olekalns & Smit, 2000). Although the researchers tend to focus on strategies rather than on framing itself initially, the findings provide implications for message sequences, which are considered as signs for frame shifts. The effective mixtures of competitive and cooperative negotiation strategies transform the negotiation procedure from dysfunctional to productive arrangements. As a result, framing is preserved through responses of same-type messages. Therefore, it influences patterns of messages to be effective and appropriate.

**Communicators’ footing**

The third kind of process framing refers to the relation of a communicator and the message he or she is submitting. Depending on the development situation, the deliverer can be the original author of the message, a principal or just a herald. The role contributes to the differentiation, as an author is considered the owner of the message and expresses himself with his own words, whereas a principle expresses an intention from his mind. On the other hand, the messenger is only responsible for the words he is required to deliver. This footing is signaled to communicators through the use of language and message structure. An example statement for the above-mentioned situation follows: “The manager wants us to document our telephone use by tracking all incoming and outgoing telephone calls” (Dewulf, Gray, Putnam, & Bouwen, 2011, p. 27). The third-person referent in this sentence signals clearly that the deliverer is not the
original creator of the message. This happens by denying the personal ownership. A contrast example would be statement: “I think we should document our telephone use” (Dewulf, Gray, Putnam, & Bouwen, 2011, p. 27). This message obviously shows that the speaker is not only the creator of the message but also the principle. Consequently, the way of how words are used in certain contexts point out the type of relationship among senders and messengers (Dewulf, Gray, Putnam, & Bouwen, 2011).

The findings of Rawlins (1987) are also in-line with the previous statements in so much as a set of moves are guided by developed patterns resulting from different sets of messages. Indeed, process framing is argued to be reflexive, as it develops circularity considered to interactional framing, which is stated to be more fluid and reflexively linked to messages. Bateson (1972) adds that although framing can be fluid and linked to messages reflexively, the general procedure to should be associated to a broader social setting, where interactions become codified, patterned, and embedded in communication types and context markers. Accordingly, more than just one person is required to modify process framing, as the engagement of two parties to develop the meaning of the transaction is considered a key requirement (Dewulf, et al., 2009).

The study conducted by Blount and Larrick (2000) based on an experimental paradigm of interactional process framing examination, provides further valuable insight to this topic. The researchers studied the choices of bargainers being confronted with two different options for framing within a negotiation game. Based on the results the scholars concluded that negotiators demonstrated weaker performances when choosing the most profitable framing during the task. They also noted that unlike respect or fairness, their motivation was not related to profitability when influencing a particular choice of frame. One specific interaction step was also addressed by this study, which is how one bargainer dynamically engages in framing process for others. Consequently, the scholars suggest upcoming studies to document open-ended frame structures and to go further to the discussion of written information to include face-to-face communication, certain symbolic acts, gestures as well as vocal implications (Blount & Larrick, 2000).
### 2.4 Differences between frames

Dewulf et al. (2011) point out the general difference between the two approaches is that cognitive framing considers frames as representations saved in the memory of each person, whereas interactional framing is a more dynamic representation that shapes during the process of interactions. Tannen and Wallat (1987) differ between the two approaches by arguing frames based on knowledge refer to certain structures belonging to people, events, objects or settings. Interactive frames, in contrast, are argued to refer to alignments negotiated during interactions having a focus on how certain aspects are defined and shaped through the communication of those people.

Lakeoff and Johnson (1980) highlight the difference between the two categories depending on their root metaphors. On the one side, the cognitive approach considers people to be information processors, who are making use of frames during the process of collecting and handling information. The interactional approach, on the other side, is argued to describe people as communicators, who are engaging in interactions in different constellations and co-construct the meaning as a collective whole. The different nature of frames is reflected strongly in these differing conceptualizations. Consequently, the cognitive approach is referred to be highly subjective as it depends on the personal understanding and way of interpretation of related communication and information. In contrast, the interactional approach is referred to be objective. This is because it arises during interactions and depends on people's reactions while exchanging information and clues.

Tversky and Kahneman (1981) add an ontological perspective to the differentiation between the two fields. Within their work, frames are referred to as illustrations of the external world that are biased in general from the cognitive perspective. Thus, they capture the beliefs of people in external reality. The interactional perspective assumes frames to be co-constructs developed by participants in order to make sense of external world events (Edwards, 1997). These ontological variances based on the meaning, nature, and languages are epistemologically paralleled regarding the creation and organization of the knowledge around frames. Indeed, how information is processed and presented is accredited to research based on the cognitive approach. Consequently, understanding the frames held by individuals and the effects of them on negotiations and conflicts is possible through experiments, interviews, and observations (Dewulf, Gray, Putnam, & Bouwen, 2011)

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Dewulf, Gray, et al. (2009) point out a significant difference in framing to be the cognitive approach of considering frames as representations saved in memories of people. Accordingly, participants apply these memories to certain situations. Interactional framing approach builds on the dynamic aspect of framing, arguing that ongoing interactions among participants shape framing. Thus, considered from the cognitive paradigm perspective, a conflict frame would be a cognitive representation guiding expectations about the situation of conflict. However, if the interactional paradigm is considered, conflict framing becomes an interactional process. In such a case, the meaning of the situation is argued as being co-constructed by meta-communicational aspects created and distributed through participants.

Meaning is another element considered to reflect on the differences related to the nature of frames in literature. The cognitive approach argues the meaning of a certain situation to be located in the mind of the participants. Moreover, it depends heavily on the private understanding and interpretation of a person. The interactional approach argues meaning is located in the reactions of people, supplementing the communication process. Consequently, within the cognitive paradigm, meaning is considered as a pre-mindset, strongly dependent on each individual’s capacity for understanding. The interactional paradigm, however, refers meaning being located in the discourse relying on the interaction itself (Dewulf, et al., 2009).

Another topic of differentiation is referred to as interventions, which are argued to change frames in conflict situations. Thus, the theory of cognitive framing focuses on how individuals alter their frames based on different information and cognitive restructuring. It is based on the assumption that pre-existing cognitive frames remain stable over a certain period. The theory of interactional framing discusses if and how framing evolves along a certain interaction process, while participants respond to each other’s frames (Dewulf, Gray, Putnam, & Bouwen, 2011).

As briefly introduced before, language is considered as a key element in the transaction process of information among disputants. Moreover, it draws a border between the two approaches in respect to differentiation. The first approach - cognitive framing, is considered as a system primarily created to transfer words, whereas the second approach - interactional framing - is referred to as the substance of which the frames are built. Therefore, interactional framing can only be achieved through the use of language, according to scholars (Dewulf, Gray, Putnam, & Bouwen, 2011).

Besides, different points of entries were suggested by each theory regarding changing frames in situations of conflict. The theories related to cognitive framing focus strongly on the question of
how individuals could be led to changing their frames through cognitive restructuring and different information. Theories of interactional framing focus on participants, their reactions to each other’s framings and how these frames change along a certain process of interaction. Thus, the main criterion for changes of frames is located within the cognitions, as existing frames keep stable over considerably long periods within the cognitive paradigm. In addition, the interactional paradigm suggests changes are located in the interaction itself and the reactions of the participants are seen as the main catalyst for frame changes in this perspective (Dewulf, et al., 2009).

In order to illustrate the paradigmatic difference between the two approaches of framing, Dewulf, Gray, et al. (2009) provide an example referring to methodological preferences. They give the example of asking two researchers (one working on the cognitive approach and the other working on the interactional approach) what role framing would play during a phone call between the personnel of a service desk and an unsatisfied customers discussing the delivery of an item that did not meet their expectations.

Indeed, interviewing a certain number of service desk employees regarding their experiences related to customer calls would be a logical strategy for any researcher working on the cognitive approach. Based on the literature and the acquired answers, a broad number of descriptions of the complaint situations could be created and analyzed. By classifying these situations, asking control groups and conducting further cluster analysis, certain clusters of complaint situations could be recognizable to the researchers as reflecting the personnel’s cognitive frames. Accordingly, the results of the research would probably indicate mental classifications like warrant, unsolvable or fraud. By devising a questionnaire, dominant frames could be measured in order to assess the final relationship among these frames (Dewulf, et al., 2009).

Conversely, the logical strategy for the scholars working on the interactional approach would possibly involve the recording of many complaint calls as samples for further analysis. Through the transcripts of these calls, sequences could be identified and therefore help point out participants who are constructing the broad frame of the situation. By conducting a discourse analysis on these sequences, the interaction process would construct the meaning of the issues being discussed. Cases where the frames of both the service desk employee and the customer are misaligned would be of especial interest to the researcher. The results of that study might highlight three patterns in the orientation of interaction, which are alignments that are unproblematic misalignments that are escalating or misalignments that are repaired highlighting the general satisfaction of the customer (Dewulf, et al., 2009).
Consequently, it can be stated that every theoretical perspective on framing is also argued to have an implied understanding of other one. From the one side, interactions are considered sufficiently irrelevant to the research on framing from a cognitive perspective. From the side of the interactional approach, cognitive representations are considered as inputs, which are outside of interest by downplaying frame pictures such as reifications (Wenger, 1998).

In 2007, Chung and Druckman determined the differences between emphasis/issue framing (discussed in chapter ‘interactional framing’) and the approach of equivalency/value framing (Chong & Druckman, 2007). To explain these two divergent approaches the following examples are considered as useful. Issue framing in a negotiation context deals with specific issues, which are discussed between as few as two or more people, organizations or societal levels. It also describes, in the context of organizational behavior, the decision-making and action-undertaking process (Hallahan, 1999). A discussed issue, problem or concern of interpretation can be, for example, public safety, free speech, employment or unemployment (Hallahan, 1999) (Chong & Druckman, 2007). These issues or emphasis “focus on qualitatively different yet potentially relevant considerations” (Chong & Druckman, 2007, p. 114). This perception is also referred to as “socio-logic” and is argued by Chung and Druckman to have two existing values in a direct trade-off (Chong & Druckman, 2007).

The differences between attribute framing and the approach of equivalency/value framing can be described as follows: As mentioned before attribute framing can be investigated, for example, with the marked attributes of ground beef “25% fat” (negative frame) or “75% lean” (positive frame) (Levin, Schneider, & Gaeth, 1998). Both attributes describe the same fact, viz. the same fat content, but they have different meanings and lead to a different positive or negative perception. In comparison, equivalency communication or value frames use the same description of attributes, but from a reverse or alternative perspective. These effects occur when “different, but logically equivalent, phrases cause individuals to alter their preferences.” (Chong & Druckman, 2007, p. 114). This fact usually involves “casting the same information in either a positive or negative light” (Chong & Druckman, 2007, p. 114). This can be exemplified as the use of the attributes “97% fat free” (positive frame) and “3% fat” (negative frame). Another example of equivalency framing is the use of “90% employment” (positive frame) and “10% unemployment” (negative frame). Additionally, in this case, two different frames are used. However, the comparison to attribute framing should not influence the subjects’ final choice. It is highly likely to be realized that both frames are indifferent and thus equal. Nevertheless, issue
framing, attribute framing and equivalency framing put the defendant’s attention on a specific topic (Chong & Druckman, 2007).

Chong and Druckman (2007) also worked out the various differences between framing and priming. To explain priming in more detail, they cited the definition of priming from Iyengar & Kinder (1987) mass communication study: “By calling attention to some matters while ignoring others, television news influences the standards by which governments, presidents, policies, and candidates for public office are judged. Priming refers to changes in the standards that people use to make political evaluations” (Chong & Druckman, 2007, p. 114). To put it concisely, this approach implies that individuals derive their overall perception or evaluation of a situation from single pieces of information. For example, if people watch either good or bad news stories about energy policy in Austria, their resulting evaluation of the Kanzler’s performance will be founded on his management of the good or bad energy policy (Chong & Druckman, 2007).

The definition and description of priming differs to the definition among psychologists. They argue, “priming may be thought of as a procedure that increases the accessibility of some category or construct in memory.” (Chong & Druckman, 2007, p. 115). Exposing subjects to constant media emphasis of a topic is not the same as the typical method for rising accessibility. In addition to other researchers, Iyengear and Kinder’s results show that media emphasis on a specific topic can (only) increase the passive accessibility of this topic. In contrast, Miller and Krosnick state their definition not to be in line with the definitions provided by psychologists. They evidenced that through accessibility media emphasis on a specific topic would not work. (Chong & Druckman, 2007). In Chong and Druckmans opinion, framing and priming effects can be used interchangeably as they have processes in common. The scholars argue that the definition of the psychologists can be universalized under the circumstance that each vi (viz. evaluation component) generates a specific topic, image or aspect that can be used to rate an individual, e.g. a politician. Thus, it can be stated that mass communication generates attention on a topic, hence, that topic enjoys a higher rating by modifications in its applicability and accessibility (Chong & Druckman, 2007).

Lastly, Chong and Druckman (2007) differentiate between framing and persuasion. Persuasion in detail refers to modifications in the evaluation component, viz. in $v_i$. For instance in judging a new housing project, persuasions happen if a communication changes an individual’s evaluation of economic or environmental considerations. For example by altering an individual’s beliefs
about the economic consequences of the project. Framing explains modifications in the weight component, viz. in $w_i$, of an attitude. This modification occurs in response to a specific communication. To exemplify framing, the same situation of judging a new housing project can be used. Now, framing effects occur if a specific communication achieves environmental considerations to become less essentially comparative to economic considerations (Chong & Druckman, 2007).
2.5 Framing in negotiations

In this chapter, cognitive framing in negotiations will be discussed in more detail. To begin with, the general distinction between the two directions of framing, cognitive and interactional framing, will be shown and evidenced by the literature. This will be followed by a clarification of the different framing theories and approaches of cognitive framing such as: cognitive heuristics, cognitive issue framing in negotiations, cognitive identity and relationship framing in negotiations, cognitive process framing in negotiations, conflict frames in negotiations and additional framing approaches in negotiations. The chapter goes on to discuss and explain the second tradition of framing, interactional framing, in detail.

The theory of framing consists of two main traditions. These traditions form the basis for its development and additional framing studies. The first of these traditions is called the cognitive frame theory. Minsky (1975) conducted research primarily in the area of artificial intelligence, but its roots can be found in Bartletts (1932) schema theory of memory. Dewulf et al (2011) state these frames are used as mental structures. These structures aim to systematize and to decode new information, while using mental frames or schemas about reality (Dewulf, Gray, Putnam, & Bouwen, 2011). With their help, individual understanding is formed (Dewulf, et al., 2009). These mental frames or mind manacles systematize individuals’ general standard information as well as situation-specific information (Dewulf, Gray, Putnam, & Bouwen, 2011). The definition of cognitive frames and framing stated by Minsky (1975) is “when one encounters a new situation (or makes a substantial change in one's view of the present problem) one selects from memory a structure called a Frame. This is a remembered framework to be adapted to fit reality by changing details as necessary.” (Dewulf, Gray, Putnam, & Bouwen, 2011, p. 8). Dewulf et al. (2009) add that an individual has an undetermined number of frames. These frames are static, but increase in time (Dewulf, et al., 2009).

Bateson conducted the second tradition of framing, interactional framing, in 1954. His estimation is that framing is about meta-communication. He called this tradition "a theory of play and fantasy". With the help of meta-communication signals, people can influence a subject’s interpretation of an ongoing interaction. In detail he argues “it is the ambiguity of how to interpret our ongoing interactions that creates the need for framing.” (Dewulf, Gray, Putnam, & Bouwen, 2011, p. 8). Nevertheless, he notes “the meaning of a certain episode of interaction between the participants not to always succeed, as when confusion arises over whether a certain statement was serious or just a joke.” (Dewulf, Gray, Putnam, & Bouwen, 2011, p. 8).
Schweitzer and DeChurch (2001) highlight another distinction of framing. They further divide framing into two different directions, which are also comparable to the traditions mentioned earlier. These directions are referred to as reference framing and conflict framing. Reference framing discusses reference point adoption, which is comparable to cognitive framing. In contrast, conflict framing refers to a multidimensional construct. They describe how negotiators see, describe and orient themselves in a particular negotiation or conflict (Schweitzer & DeChurch, 2001).

In 1987, Tannen and Wallat found further divisions of frames. They state their findings of two categories to be framed as knowledge (like cognitive framing) and interactional process (like interactional framing). Especially in the context of conflicts or negotiations, they argue, “knowledge refers to the issues that are at stake, and interaction refers to the communication process between the conflicting or negotiating parties.” (Dewulf, et al., 2009, p. 165). Nevertheless, instead of dividing framing and frames in two different parts, they can be split into three individual categories as suggested by Dewulf et al. (2009). They claim there are more categories of framing in a conflict or negotiation than issues in the interaction process itself. Thus, besides these two aspects, negotiators and the conflict parties frame their relationship and identities (Dewulf, et al., 2009). Finally, they define three general framing categories: issues, identities and relationships and interaction process. These are defined as the following:

- “Issue frames refer to the meanings attached to agenda items, events or problems in the relevant domain or context.
- Identity and relationship frames refer to the meanings about oneself and one’s relationships with a counterpart(s).
- Process frames refer to the interpretations that disputants assign to their interaction process.” (Dewulf, et al., 2009, p. 165)

Nevertheless, it should be noted that these different theories are not mutually exclusive. If one approach is used, another one can also be affected (Dewulf, et al., 2009).

To sum up in the context of conflicts or negotiations, cognitive framing influences or affects individuals and the way they realize, understand, decode, handle or characterize an issue or an attribute as well as relationships, identities and interactions. As a result, it can be stated that, due to breakdowns and biases in information processing, conflict dynamics can be commonly contorted. Correcting this incorrect information processing is the main task of specific prescriptions, which are used in conflict and decision-making heuristics (Dewulf, et al., 2009).
Cognitive heuristics

Because not all information can be available in negotiations, negotiators and bargainers are
must bypass an information gap. This is the reason for various cognitive biases. By bypassing
these biases, negotiators make use of different cognitive frames and cognitive heuristics.
Consequently, this practice leads to cognitive mistakes. Some of the most common mistakes
negotiators and bargainers make are as follows:

“(1) Negotiators tend to be overly affected by the frame, or form of presentation, of
information in a negotiation;
(2) Negotiators tend to nonrationally escalate commitment to a previously selected course of
action when it is no longer the most reasonable alternative;
(3) Negotiators tend to assume that their going must come at the expense of the other party
and thereby miss opportunities for mutually beneficial trade-offs between the parties;
(4) Negotiator judgments tend to be anchored upon irrelevant information - such as, an initial
offer;
(5) Negotiators tend to rely on readily available information;
(6) Negotiators tend to fail to consider information that is available by focusing on the
opponent's perspective; and
(7) Negotiators tend to be overconfident concerning the likelihood of attaining outcomes that
favor the individual(s) involved” (Neale & Bazerman, 1992, p. 43)

As the above-mentioned mistakes are discussed in more detail later in this chapter, the authors
first explain the approach of cognitive heuristics: this approach declares that due to the
individual's tendency to classify situations as losses or gains, decisions are systematically
biased. If a negotiator or bargainer is positively framed, viz. his or her goal is to maximize
personal gain; he or she is less competitive and more concessionary than a negatively framed
negotiator, who tries to avoid a loss. Moreover, the positively framed negotiator achieves a
higher profit than the negative bargainer does. Consequently, it can be stated that a frame
consists of or reflects the relatively stable belief system about individual's needs and goals
(Drake & Donohue, 1996).

In a broader view, framing consists of various cognitive heuristics. Putnam and Holmer (1992)
pointed out that the cognitive heuristic approach is based on two different theories: the prospect
theory of human judgment by Tversky and Kahneman, and the behavioral decision theory and
its decision frames, conducted by Neale and Bazerman (Putnam & Holmer, 1992). Tversky and
Kahneman stated a frame to be "a decision maker’s conception of the acts, outcomes, and contingencies associated with a particular choice" (Putnam & Holmer, 1992, p. 130). Additionally, another task of framing and frames is to show how individuals make use of cognitive heuristics or other simple rules for making decisions under difficult circumstances. For example, making a decision on a specific issue or conflict without having all information to hand. Hence the goal of a person who has to make a final decision is, instead of realizing the best alternative, forced to reach a reasonable or satisfactory solution (Putnam & Holmer, 1992). In their studies, Putnam and Holmer summed up seven different types or characteristics of framing, which can be described as cognitive heuristics: "perceptions of loss-gain, risk aversion and risk seeking, anchoring or reference points for frames, overconfidence, availability, negotiator judgments, and the isolation effect." (Putnam & Holmer, 1992, p. 131). A frame, in the view of the prospect theory, is argued to be the amount of all probable gains and losses of a given outcome. The prospect theory implies that people who are confronted with a potential loss often wait for future concessions. In comparison, people who are confronted with a potential gain tend to accept a presented agreement (Putnam & Holmer, 1992).

**Perception of loss-gain, risk aversion and risk seeking**

Framing heuristics can be examined, for example, by manipulating and observing perception of losses and gains as well as risk aversion and seeking. In this case, heuristics can be converted into biases, such as in Neale and Bazerman’s approach (Neale & Bazerman, 1985). The results show the differences between positive and negative frames in negotiations can be very large. In negotiations, a positive frame refers to viewing a specific outcome as a potential gain. In contrast, a negative frame refers to viewing a specific outcome or trade-off as a potential loss. As a consequence, positive framed individuals are argued to be more willing to make concessions, conclude more operations, and achieve higher total profits. Moreover, they see theirs negotiated results as more fair than negatively framed negotiators. Additionally, it is proven that negative frames frequently lead to higher probabilities of third-party interventions, strikes, conflict-escalations and potential impasses. In the case of integrative negotiating, a positive affect can oppose the forecast of specific decision frames. Positive framed negotiators are less likely to make concessions but more likely to risk non-settlements. In addition, they are more likely to take risks than negatively framed bargainers are. The central prerequisite is that both parties exchange a positive effect in advance. Some mediator variables also affect...
negotiators and their frames. In particular, these variables include context and relational elements (Putnam & Holmer, 1992).

Additional factors, which effect loss-gain frames, are multi-issues versus single-issue agendas. This can be exemplified as follows: a positively framed person confronted with a multi-item agenda tends to agree less to negotiated results, perceives negotiations as less fair and is more dissatisfied with the outcome compared to a person confronted with a single-item agenda. In contrast, negatively framed people confronted with single-issue agendas are less satisfied with the outcome than with multi-issue agendas (Putnam & Holmer, 1992).

The role of negotiator and anchoring

The role of a negotiator or bargainer within a negotiation process is very important as it has an influence on every frame-set. For instance, is he or she a seller or a buyer? This fact influences the outcome and can lead to a decision bias (Putnam & Holmer, 1992). The cognitive heuristic of anchoring and the heuristic of using reference points for individual’s frame describe whether an individual is framed positively or negatively depending on the choice of the so-called “anchor” or “reference point”. This could be for example, last year’s contract in a contract negotiation. Hence, an anchor is a starting point, which helps individuals to evaluate whether a specific proposal or agreement is a loss or a gain. Individuals are able to access them quickly and easily and support framing objectives, initial offers and aims. Nevertheless, a disadvantage of these reference points is that they could lead to decision-making biases. This occurs, for example, when a negotiator does not adapt their anchors in the negotiation process because he or she interprets the negotiated result as a loss. Despite the fact that a positive bargaining range exists, a negotiator can be incapable to agree on an outcome. This is the consequence if a bargainer insists on the offer or on the definition of goals in view of confession. Several studies show that a significant effect on expectations and requirements for future negotiations or interactions can be achieved by setting easy or difficult goals (Putnam & Holmer, 1992).

Other experiments of negotiations verify that it is not just negotiators performances, but also strategies and efficiencies that are affected and dependent on reference points or framing effects in different ways (De Dreu, Carnevale, Emans, & van de Vliert, 1995) (Bottom & Studt, 1993) (Bottom W., 1998). Scholars have shown that in the case of a loss or negative frame over the outcome, bargainers with a high reference point make fewer concessions and utilize more tactics. These tactics may be contentious but are riskier than negotiators with lower reference
points. In comparison, negotiators who have high reference points, high gains or positive frames over the outcome are less likely to reach agreements. (Bottom W., 1998). Witte and Grünhagen integrated the prospect and framing theory in connection with anchoring and reference points in their studies. They found that potential home sellers, who use the sales price use as reference point, are willing to concede more than home sellers who use equity as reference point (Witte, Grünhagen, & Gentry, 2008).

**Overconfidence and availability bias**

Besides anchoring, the bias of overconfidence can also affect a subject’s cognitive frame. More precisely, due to anchoring, a selection of confidence is made while an evaluation is established. Overconfidence occurs when subjects judge an offer or situation and overvalue their own importance. This happens increasingly in uncertain situation or situations of moderate-to-extreme difficulty. Putnam and Holmer (1992) explain this bias and its effect on the subject’s cognitive frame as follows: “In framing the contingencies associated with uncertain outcomes, individuals rarely use disconfirming evidence to theist their judgments and they rely on initial estimates to anchor their confidence.” (Putnam & Holmer, 1992, p. 132). If an arbitrator is involved, overconfidence may occur as well. A negotiator overestimates his or her confidence when he or she believes or estimates the likelihood that the arbitrator will rule in the benefit of the negotiator. For example, they will accept the quotation of the negotiator or its team. A consequence of this fact is the probability that a negotiator will not compromise at the table increases. In more detail, he or she is unwilling to compromise in the presence of the other party. Other consequences of overconfidence bias in judgment are a higher percentage of outcomes with impasse as well as a reduction regarding the amount of concessionary activities. In comparison to judgments without involved overconfidence, overestimated confidence in judgments induces more impasses and fewer compromises (Putnam & Holmer, 1992). Neale and Bazerman also conducted another systematic bias regarding negotiator-overconfidence in 1985. They argued that if a negotiator is positively framed, he or she will be more concessionary and will perform more successfully compared to a negatively framed negotiator. In addition, bargainers, who are realistically confident, are argued to behave in a more concessionary manner and perform more successfully than overconfident bargainers (Neale & Bazerman, 1985).
Another important bias in cognitive framing is the so-called “availability bias” or, in other words, the simplicity of recalling unlikely events. Remembering or recalling a situation or event is supported by the ease or simplicity of imaging a situation or event, similarity of association and the irretrievability of cases (Putnam & Holmer, 1992). In this connection, Neale (1984) conducted the differences between monetary costs and time costs of arbitration and the ease or vividness of imagining perceived costs of negotiating. Personal costs, for example, refer to dissatisfaction with components. Neale stated that bargainers are less likely to settle at the table, if those personal costs feature prominently in a negotiation. Another result of this study is that a bargainer makes more compromises in agreements if the costs of arbitration are prominently in a negotiation. Furthermore, the various options of a negotiator’s frame can become more available and salient (as well as easier to retrieve) if the needed information is presented in a vivid and colorful manner, as opposed to colorless, unclear or vague points. For example, opportunity costs are less concrete than out-of-pocket costs. That is why the latter costs are more probable to be included in the financial decision-making processes of individuals and, hence, influence the negotiator’s judgment (Neale M., 1984).

Other judgments, which also affect cognitive frames, especially in bargaining situations, are the non-rational escalation of conflict, the mythical fixed pie as well as devaluing the other party’s concessions (Putnam & Holmer, 1992). Consequently, all these studies and results support the relevance of the negotiation theory of Tversky and Kahneman (1974) (Putnam & Holmer, 1992).

**Cognitive issue framing in negotiations**

The following parts of this thesis discuss the three different approaches of cognitive framing, i.e. cognitive issue framing, cognitive identity and relationship framing and cognitive process framing with regard to the context of negotiations.

Among other researchers, Dewulf et al. explored the first cognitive framing approach, the cognitive issue framing (2009). The scholars listed various studies and results that showed the importance of this topic as well as the effects of the cognitive approach (Dewulf, et al., 2009). Neal and Bazerman carried out the first of these studies in 1985. The scholars observed bargaining behaviors by using risky choice frames. The results show that if the outcome of a negotiation is stated as a loss, a preference for negotiation (i.e. a risky choice) is more possible. In contrast, if the outcome of a negotiation is framed as a gain a preference for settlement (i.e. a risk averse choice) is argued to be more likely (Dewulf, et al., 2009).
The results of another study conducted by Schurr in 1987 show that less risky negotiation settlements are made by bargaining teams who are concentrated on net profits (viz. gains) in comparison to teams who are concentrated on incurring expenses (Dewulf, et al., 2009). Hightouse and Yuce (1996) conducted attribute frames and goal frames determining that for possible lawsuits as well as for evaluations of joint business ventures, “a potential gain and loss, a risky situation was more likely to be favored when described as an opportunity than as a threat.” (Dewulf, et al., 2009, p. 167). Additionally, they stated that in social dilemma situations goal frames are seen as a critical key topic (Dewulf, et al., 2009). Another study listed by Dewulf et al. is the one made by Brewer and Kramer (1986). They state that in the interest of common good individuals “were less willing to suffer a personal loss than to forgo a personal gain” (Dewulf, et al., 2009, p. 167). In 1988, Fleischmann added that, on the level of cooperation, the stated relationship to be contingent. More specifically, in low cooperation, it was inverted (Dewulf, et al., 2009). McCusker and Carnevale (1995) found an influencing variable of goal frames, namely, whether a sanction is introduced or not. They proved that if a sanction is implemented the goal framing effect disappears. Ten Brusel and Messick (1999) added that the decision frames of negotiators are also affected by implementing sanctions. Consequently, the entire decision-making process is shaped by these implementations (Dewulf, et al., 2009). Finally, the last listed study conducted issue frames in more detail: Butterfield et al. (2000) state those issue frames influence whether situations cause or do not cause moral awareness. This fact depends on if a subject recognizes that his or her decisions could conflict with the ethical standards, beliefs and interests of another subject (Dewulf, et al., 2009).

The conflict researchers Lewicki et al. (2003) and Wiethoff et al. (2003) explored cognitive issue frames in a more intensive way than other researchers before them did. Lewicki et al. tried to find and prove connections among various frame approaches and frame types. To draw these links, scholars interviewed disputants’ and tried to identify their loss or gain frames in intractable conflicts. Wiethoff et al. instead analyzed a conflict over water regulations. Their results show that subjects framing themselves as less powerful than others in a conflict tend to frame issues as losses. On the other hand, subjects who saw themselves with more power assumed gain frames (Dewulf, et al., 2009).

Dewulf et al. (2009) explored cognitive issue frames, analyzing various comments from Wilcox. The scholars found a cognitive issue frame about management to exist: “The statements, ‘the minimum of flexibility management feels it must have’ and ‘we do not want to bind our hands’
indicate that flexibility is an important aspect of Wilcox's schema about management, and he sees this flexibility as inherent to the production process of a wide variety of chemicals. This issue frame lays out the elements that Wilcox considers relevant and how they are interrelated.” (Dewulf, et al., 2009, p. 176 f).

**Cognitive identity and relationship framing in negotiations**

The second cognitive framing approach to discuss is cognitive identity and relationship framing in negotiations. Among other researchers, Dewulf et al. (2009) determined this topic by arguing negotiators do not only hold frames about issues, but also about others, their relationships and themselves. These various frames are called characterization frames, identity frames, power frames and trust frames. The latter frame is an intensively discussed approach not accepted by all scholars (Dewulf, et al., 2009).

Besides other studies, cognitive identity and relationship frames are conducted in social psychology and is explained in social identity theory. Various researchers conducted subjects’ on identity and inter-group conflicts and figured out that the process of social categorization can influence inter-group behavior. In detail, with the help of frames, subjects divide and categorize their social environment, especially their own identity in as well as the identity of others. These frames consist of a small amount of different categories and numbers. Moreover, subjects selectively search for groups in which they attribute positive characteristics. Within these groups, they try to keep a positive identity. A negative side effect of this behavior (and evaluation thereof), is that this categorization can lead to conflictive relationships or conflicts between different groups within the subject’s environment (Dewulf, et al., 2009).

Characterization frames refer to evoking and using stereotypes. In comparison to other frames, these frames can be both positive and negative, but also neutral when describing other persons and their attitudes. Characterization frames should ease descriptions and judgments in a shorthand way. Additionally, these frames consist implicit and/or explicit expectations, which support stating how other persons should behave (Dewulf, et al., 2009).

Another approach to frames is the identity frame. This refers to how a subject evaluates his or herself alone and in a social group. Hence, possible frames could be to frame oneself as a victim or champion – both explained and proved, for example by specific situations, reasons or others
policies. This often occurs in social movements, i.e. if a self-framed victim tries to convince another person to be an adherent of this movement by supporting them. Strong situations and history reinforce identity frames. This is the reason why these frames are also characterized by resistance of changes. Moreover, researchers state vigorous defenses are generally produced when subjects’ identity frames are challenged. Owing to the defenses already existing in conflict, negotiations could be perpetuated (Dewulf, et al., 2009).

Besides identity frames, there are also other framing approaches whereby individuals frame their relationship with others. Power frames and trust frames are two of these relational framing types. Power frames are used by subjects to provide structures of expectations about their status in comparison to other people. Are they inferior or superior to others? Dewulf et al. (2009) add that “power frames differ in terms of the source of the status differences, for example, perceived power stems from expertise, resources, membership in coalitions, morality, sympathy, etc.” (Dewulf, et al., 2009, p. 169). As with identity frames, due to heavy reliance, power frames are argued to lead to perpetuation of existing conflicts (Dewulf, et al., 2009). Trust framing refers to subjects categorizing their relationship to others as either untrustworthy or trustworthy. When people explain or describe their harmonious relationship to others, trust is the most important factor, according to Greenhalgh and Chapmans. Additionally and under the assumption of existence of frame effects, whether individuals trust or do not trust other individuals depends on their experiences and any direct interactions made in the past (Dewulf, et al., 2009).

Trust frames have triggered an intense discussion among scholars. Some state that trust is not a framing approach and declare it as a relational heuristic. With the help of this, heuristic people are able to ease judgments about others and search for this within the process of information (Dewulf, et al., 2009). Dewulf et al. (2009) analyze various data and emphasize one comment as an example of a negative characterization frame made by Reilly: “some foreman – who does not understand labor relations any better than a kid in the fifth grade’. From this text, we could infer that Reilly holds a negative stereotype about a foreman in the company.” (Dewulf, et al., 2009, p. 176 f.).
Cognitive process framing in negotiations

The third framing approach, cognitive process framing, can be described as a "cognitive representations of interaction processes" (Dewulf, et al., 2009, p. 169). Individuals with a specific behavioral script are argued to use this kind of frame. Scripts are schemas with sequences of frames and can be divided into situational scripts and planning scripts. These scripts, especially a situational script, can be exemplified with the process of visiting a restaurant. It includes different expectations of sequences of the whole process and the different expected activities individuals go through. These steps are widely considered to be entering the restaurant, ordering the food and eating, paying and leaving (Schank & Abelson, 1975). Such process frames or scripted behaviors are often used by negotiators, beginning with the first sequence and action of an overdone initial offer, followed by first and second demands, followed by trading concessions (Adair & Brett, 2005).

Besides, process frames, negotiators also use conflict schemas or frames. These conflict frames can be defined as "learned social constructs that define (a) what kinds of social situations may be regarded as conflicts, (b) when and how a conflict starts and how it should end, and (c) the most desirable ways of dealing with such conflicts" (Golec & Federico, 2004, p. 751). These frames are formed by personality traits. They affect the competitiveness of an individual during a conflict. They make it easier for negotiators to reach a resolution (Golec & Federico, 2004). To give an additional example of a cognitive process frame, Dewulf and Gray (2009) describe a meeting script of collaborating organizations observed by Vansina et al. in 1998. Thus, routine meeting scripts ease the behavior and structure of meetings. They define the hierarchy, roles and issues and clarify how to behave and what behavior can be expected from the participants (Dewulf, et al., 2009). Such conflict frames are explained in more detailed in the next section.

Conflict frames in negotiations

Conflict frames can be seen as a common negotiator frame. They describe how disputants relate to conflicts and how conflicts are received. Individuals are influenced by conflict frames (or schema) concerning the organization or interpretation of specific information (Schweitzer & DeChurch, 2001). In comparison to schema, conflict frames are more specialized. They qualify negotiators’ orientation toward a conflict (Putnam & Holmer, 1992). They can be seen as a perceptual kit or orientation to realize and focalize some characteristics of a conflict while ignoring others (Pinkley & Northcraft, 1994). Contextual and individual factors affect conflict
frames and can therefore be described across multiple dimensions, e.g. process or outcome expectations (Schweitzer & DeChurch, 2001). Gray defined five specific dimensions of framing: risk, values, interpretation of rights, fairness and identity. These negotiator frames influence the maneuverability of a dispute directly (Gray, 1997).

To reach the negotiators or organizational goals, conflicts have to be defined and effectively managed - both before and after the negotiator participates in the conflict. In addition, they have to investigate and analyze the consequences of the various conflict frames. With the help of these frames, the negotiators can “view” the upcoming conflict situation (Pinkley & Northcraft, 1994). In 1990, Pinkley dealt with conflict descriptions in depth. Consequently, he defined three different orthogonal dimensions describing conflict frames:

1. Relationship versus task dimension
2. Emotional versus intellectual dimension
3. Cooperate versus win dimension

In all three dimensions, a negotiator relates to the extent and advantage of the different parts (e.g. the advantages of a cooperation compared to a solely individual win) and chooses the most favorable side (Schweitzer & DeChurch, 2001). Pinkney’s three dimensions can be explained in more detail as follows: his first dimension describes the negotiators focus in a conflict - relationship orientated versus a task orientated - that means material aspects are more important than the interpersonal aspects of a negotiation. His second dimension explains the negotiators’ distribution of attention. Does he pay more attention on involved feelings or on occurred behavior and actions? The third and last dimension explains what is more important for the disputant: whether to approve a compromise and minimize the benefit to both disputants or to win the whole amount and maximize his own gain (Pinkley & Northcraft, 1994). Frames have no static structure; they are dynamic and can change within a dispute (Bartlett, 1932). Donnellan and Gray support this statement and add that in a negotiation the parameters and definitions of conflicts are iteratively framed and reframed. This process is managed by new experiences and interactions arising during disputes. Finally, the cognitive conflict frames change and become more similar (Pinkley & Northcraft, 1994).
Other frames and framing effects in negotiations

In the chapters before the authors concentrated on general cognitive frames such as risky choice framing, attribute framing, goal framing and cognitive frames in negotiations such as cognitive issue framing in negotiations, cognitive identity and relationship framing in negotiations. Nevertheless, besides the frames and framing effects other factors influence negotiators cognitive frames. Framing effects can be moderated by individual and contextual factors. Additionally, the effects can be partially mitigated by social motives and mediated by perception of risk (Schweitzer & DeChurch, 2001). Furthermore, the gender of the negotiators (Small, Gelfand, Babcock, & Gettman, 2007), danger frames (Curşeu & Schruijer, 2008), frame choice (Blount & Larrick, 2000), happy and unhappy face icons (Shelton Hunt & Kernan, 2005) and the role of a second actor (Kanner, 2004) can affect negotiators.
2.6 Communication in negotiations

According to Rubin and Brown (1975) negotiation and mediation are exchanges based on communications used by disputants in evaluating the levels of possible trades. The role of communication is especially critical within this process as it gives the participants the possibility to demonstrate disagreement and methods of management (Hocker & Wilmot, 2001). Within this context, management refers to the control of communicative interactions in creating integrative processes (Drake & Donohue, 1996). Moreover, framing and reframing are considered to be essentially linked to the communication process among negotiators as they include processed information, messaging patterns, cues hidden in the language and socially constructed meanings (Putnam & Holmer, 1992). Accordingly, framing has an impact on the different tactics used by negotiators. In order to encourage concessions from the opponent, anchors are created and a positive frame is emphasized to the opposition regarding their possible gains (Neale & Bazerman, 1992).

Indeed, the role of communication is central to the approach of frame categories. A negotiator’s experience, her or his applied tactic, approaches and beliefs are reflected in the choice of the language used. By determining the uncertainty and corresponding nature of different frames and reframes, communication is argued to serve a critical role in enlightening the frame categories. In the interactional approach, frames exist directly in the meanings that are reflected in the interactions of negotiators, but not in their mental states. Therefore, communication has a primary role in the approach of issue development as social interaction is argued to be a critical initiator in frame changes. Changes occur through argumentation, the use of language, and symbolic forms like metaphors. As both parties react and restructure to each other’s argumentations, frames are considered as co-constructs. As non-stable entities, frames are processes shaping and reshaping mindsets through the involvement of arguments, cases and meanings (Putnam & Holmer, 1992).

Based on Bateson’s (1972) approach, frames are considered as sets of messages reflected as meaningful actions. Entailing non-verbal expressions as well as verbal statements, they contextualize situations and relationships. By performing meta-communication tasks, they provide cues at different levels depending on how frames are to be interpreted by their recipients. A linguistic example to this approach is the question of how the same words within a message can be interpreted with two different meanings. When a negotiator states that, he or she had already conceded as much as they could and the other party is now requested to
compromise, the recipient negotiator must deliver the statement in certain sets of categories and send a suitable reaction. Detecting cues on a non-verbal basis, analyzing ambiguity within the message and observing the power level of the language used, can possibly lead to the conclusion that the statement could be a bluff and should therefore not be called. However, a firm voice, rigid nonverbal cues and past behavior patterns of that negotiator could lead to the conclusion that a potential escalation might be just if no compromises are delivered as requested and could endanger the future development of the negotiation process. Within this context, frames are considered as sets of messages inside a psychological context, which are shaped by meta-communicational patterns. Frames are argued to be reflexive as the sets of messages include clues signaling how the message is intended to be interpreted as well as clues about how it is to be replied to or reflected back (Rawlins, 1987). Thus, extreme calls arising from a posturing frame such as emotional outbursts and rigid positioning can signal to the opposing negotiator how the message is to be understood during a negotiation stage. Moreover, if the cues delivered within the message are to be understood as posturing by the opposing negotiators, they could be re- reflected on the posturing frame (Putnam & Holmer, 1992).

Besides, bargaining is considered a social context, where confusing messages and indirect behavioral patterns are enacted in very complex ways like explicit statements, nonverbal clues and offers pointing out the priorities, interests and demands of the other negotiators. Messages exploring options may shift the general frame from bargaining to problem solving and push to a collective decision being made. However, messages of other sets may move the general frame to a competition of winners and losers and push towards conflict (Putnam & Holmer, 1992).

**Framing as interactive and communicative accomplishment**

According to Gray and Donnell (1990), framing is strongly dependent on the participants of a negotiation, as participant’s reactions can contest different types of frames. Each move of the participant frames a certain issue and offers a certain frame, which can either be accepted or refused by other participants. This happens when the proposed frame triggers the action of keeping or modifying visibility in their response.

The critical role of interactions is also considered an important aspect in literature. Cognitive structures are clearly deliberated to be an essential part of how frames are transported to interactions. Moreover, interactions are argued to be the communicational elements perceived by other participants (Dewulf, Gray, Putnam, & Bouwen, 2011). West (1984) strengthens the
above statement by arguing that interest are not located in the minds of participants but in the way in which meanings are achieved by conversational events and how these events contribute to the definition of the situation. Comparatively, Drake and Donohue (1996) conceptualize frames to be temporary structures of communications built around issues of conflicts during talks.

**Framing as language in action**

As framing is accomplished by the use of language, it can be stated that language is a key instrument of social interaction (Dewulf, Gray, Putnam, & Bouwen, 2011). The importance of language is also underlined in literature as the following: “language choices frame a disputed topic by verbally highlighting certain qualities of the topic” (Drake & Donohue, 1996, p. 4).

The meanings constructed by the use of words and their expressions depend on the social situations in which they are used. Words are anticipated to have a broad number of meanings in different languages and are not fixed by one definition. Thus, single and simple definitions are insufficient to capture the entire meaning of a certain word. One does not need definitions in general to make use of words in a correct way to express oneself. As gaming with languages keeps evolving over time, so too do definitions (Dewulf, Gray, Putnam, & Bouwen, 2011). The results of scientific research based on empirical observations of natural settings in linguistic behavior found that people do not only use language in order to give true representations of objects they perceive. People also use language to accomplish certain things or tasks using a broad variety of means (Potter & Wetherell, 1987).

Consequently, language is argued to have a performative element. This means it is used in the effort of achieving a certain task. Thus, language is not simply considered expressive but at the same time also as performative (Dewulf, Gray, Putnam, & Bouwen, 2011). Drake and Donohue (1996) state that beyond what is simply said, the aspects regarding the type of frame that is appealed and the reaction of the participants in general are important questions to address. Regarding the development of framing among participants, language can be considered as the action element. Its choice results in a certain definition and classification of a problem, but also effects frames related to decisions and interactions in the future (Dewulf, Gray, Putnam, & Bouwen, 2011).
Discourse analysis in negotiation research

This area of negotiation research focuses on the procedure of how meanings of identities, goals, and relationships are shaped through the use of language and symbols. The research highlights that the use of certain verbs, pronouns and adjectives are considered to be key differences in identifying warnings, threats or demands. Negotiators through the use of language patterns signal potentials for integrative settlements and commitment-making intentions. These language patterns are worded flexibly to opponents. Moreover, the usage of rude comments, interruptions, and demand signal distance and often results in conflict escalation. Whereas the use of collaborative pronouns indicate closeness and foster commitment (Putnam, 2010).

The discourse of a bargainer has also argued to have a close relation to identity management, as attempts on trustworthiness are associated directly with a negotiators image. This image can be positively or negatively associated to that person and depends on the dealings of that negotiator. Certain behaviors, such as providing an opening offer, appeal or concession are considered as projective elements of a negotiators image. An interesting example regarding this topic from literature points to negotiators dealing with hostage situations. They are argued to spend a significant amount of the talking time in reestablishing the “face” or “image” of the hostage taker in order to establish a connection (Putnam, 2010).

Drake and Donohue (1996) highlight the importance of language choices by arguing that they frame certain disputed themes by indicating specific verbal qualities. The following statement provided by the authors in underlining the application of the Communicative Framing Theory through the statements of a wife to her husband: “I buy them new school clothes every fall, out of my own pocket. The least you can do is buy their shoes!” (Drake & Donohue, 1996, p. 302).

Referring to the above-mentioned example, the language used by the wife primarily frames the issue of supporting the child with clothing as a value. According to this, the support of the husband in contributing to the needs of the child is perceived clearly as an ideally fair and correct way of how to deal with the situation. However, if the contributions are compared, the husband seems insufficient and therefore unequal to the mother. Moreover, the complexity of the interaction involves further frames hidden in the comments. By stating, that the husband is not even doing the necessary minimum his image or “face” can be violated resulting in more powerful responses than may actually be appropriate (Drake & Donohue, 1996).
Drake and Donohue (1996) call attention to the issue of how an interaction context is structured through frames. They refer to the Negotiated Order Theory in defining such processes. As social reality is established and preserved through communication, communicational activities are seen as implicit negotiations. Consequently, a negotiation is argued to involve elements such as the proposing, accepting or rejecting of a certain interaction model. This statement is further clarified through the example of a merger negotiation case, where moments of informality were discussed during the formal negotiation. A general shift from a formal to non-formal approach was proposed by one of the parties. Broadly spoken, this offer can be accepted by others through signaling the maintenance of the informal proposal. However, if the other party remains formal, the proposal should be considered as rejected. Fisher and Ury (1981) defines this process as the following: “Each move you make within a negotiation is not only a move that deals with rent, salary, or other substantive questions; it also helps structure the rules of the game you are playing. Your move may serve to keep the negotiation within an ongoing mode, or it may constitute a game-changing move.” (Fisher & Ury, 1981, p. 10). Negotiations are argued to occur at different levels at the same time. The boundaries are contextual properties like formality, proximity or limits of disclosure. Taken all together, the limits adopted by the negotiators allow a system constructed by the participants (Weiner & Mehrabian, 1968).

The Speech Act Theory is related to the question of how frames are used by individuals in order to link the attention of a certain negotiation situation. According to this theory, language is stated to be performative rather than just expressive. This also undermines the view that language choices of disputants do not only frame areas of discussions but also function as a maintaining proposal system of exchanging frame limits. Accordingly, the example provided above regarding a wife supporting her child is considered as an example of a fairness domain (Drake & Donohue, 1996).

The Speech Accommodation Theory deals with the question of how frames tend to converge or diverge in order to form cooperative interaction settings. This theory generally focuses on the interpersonal impact of the acceptance of limits resulting from these movements. More particularly, adopting others’ behaviors and values of communication is referred as convergence, whereas emphasizing differences among the others and one’s self is referred as divergence. Moreover, convergence is argued to have a positive effect on relationships by persuading social approval, as well as certain perceptions. Thus, a cooperative atmosphere is created through convergence, which is critical for an integrative negotiation process and for further trust building. Within this theory framework, framing is considered as an aspect of speech through which the
A negotiator can encourage disputants to move towards one another. The control of the situation can be maintained through an active participation during the negotiation process of related frames, as well as during the creation of the agenda. Productivity can be enhanced and further stress can be lowered through healthy organization (Drake & Donohue, 1996).

The research concerning Relational Order Theory is exemplified through framing enacting relationships. This theory focuses on how social orders are created through messages and how these influence the outcomes of negotiations (Donohue W., 1998). Within the framework of this theory, two main areas represent interpersonal limits associated to negotiations: interdependence of power and affiliation. The degree of control or influence among the parties is related to interdependence of power, whereas the level of communicated trust, liking and partnership refers to the area of affiliation (Donohue W., 1998). Four different types of relationship frames were identified in the literature based on a specific combination of messages related to interdependence and affiliation:

1. **Moving towards**: Refers to high affiliation and high interdependence.
2. **Moving away**: Refers low affiliation and low interdependence.
3. **Moving with**: Refers to high affiliation but low interdependence.
4. **Moving against**: Refers to low affiliation but high interdependence.

Moreover, it was observed by the scholars that when relationship types “moving with” and “moving toward” were established by the negotiating parties, a relational consensus was built more easily than in such cases where parties established “moving with” and “moving against” (Donohue & Roberto, 1993). Additionally, a more successful negotiation environment was promoted through the creation of stable interdependence messaging patterns in an early phase of the negotiation process (Donohue W., 1991).
2.7 Mediator variables

Beginning with attribute framing, Levin and Schneider (1998) state topics involving issues of rigid attitudes or intensive participation are less vulnerable to effects of attribute framing than others. As an example, Marteau's (1989) research failed to deliver any significant findings on framing effects concerning problems resulting from abortion decisions. Similar effects of attribute framing were found when the performance of someone else is explained in correct percentage versus wrong percentage statements, failing to result in a framing effect of when one's own percentage is estimated using those same expressions. Consequently, when dealing with extremes, effects of attribute framing are considered to be less likely. The findings of Levin et al. (1986) signify framing effects on gambling estimations to be pronounced on intermediate probability levels regarding winning or losing rather than extreme ones.

The effects of goal framing are considered strongest for situations of endowment, in which the possibility of manipulation of perceived ownership is possible, making the adaptation of the influenced frame even more possible. However, the effects could reverse or even disappear when the situation allows easy discounting of negative frames in avoiding adverse opportunities. This could occur when participants expand low cognitive efforts. Furthermore, the effect may also reverse or disappear when ones positive outlook interferes with a negatively associated frame message (Levin, Schneider, & Gaeth, 1998).

Rothman and Salovey (1997) introduced a classification scheme in health-related decisions. The main contribution of their work explains the need to look outside prospect theory in order to identify important factors in framing effects among different studies. These factors, as stated by the authors, refer to “… the importance of individual perceptions of gain, loss, and risk based on the decision maker’s prior experiences, involvement, and mood.” (Levin, Schneider, & Gaeth, 1998, p. 180). An important example from literature is the research conducted by Levin and Chapman (1993) regarding decisions on people suffering from AIDS. The outcomes revealed that attitudes to certain illnesses do affect treatment preferences. Thus, according to Levin, Gaeth, et al. (2002), the domain of a decision, its importance, the level of involvement, expertise as well as the decision-makers’ experience, differed among studies making a healthy comparison difficult. When individual differences are considered, Levin, Gaeth et al. (2002) state that past studies concerning decision-making have concentrated strongly on risky decision-making. Their study showed that people who had achieved high scores on Neuroticism demonstrated larger risky choice framings than others did. Additionally, neither gender was more
disposed to effects of framing than the other one, indicating there to be no difference between male and female candidates in this issue (Levin, Gaeth, Schreiber, & Lauriola, 2002).

Levin, Gaeth, et al. (2002), highlight faith in intuition, as an important positive relation to risk taking, could be demonstrated through their work. Need for Cognition (NFC), however, could not be set into a significant relation to risk taking. Although NFC was generally associated with the search for and processing of information, only thin evidence could be found for its relevance. The study of Le Boeuf and Shafir (2000) indicate diverse framing effects not to be impacted through effortful thoughts nor manipulated by the defense of choice. Therefore, it is concluded that the decision-maker implements the frame, which is provided by the statement of a certain problem. Thus, the scholars consider deep thinking in order to escaping that frame as relatively unlikely. This line of argumentation did find further support in other works. However, individual differences are argued to be more than just error variance and further insights can be generated through examining individual differences (Levin, Gaeth, Schreiber, & Lauriola, 2002).

Important differences regarding attribute-framing effects were reflected by several predictive factors in the literature: Individual differences are predicted by being conscientious and agreeable, whereas conscientiousness is considered as negatively related and agreeableness as positively related to attribute framing effects. Furthermore, faith in intuition is considered as negatively related to attribute framing effects (Levin, Gaeth, Schreiber, & Lauriola, 2002).

According to Kühlberger (1998), the following moderator variables are also considered as important: Within risk characteristics, risk manipulation is argued to show the strongest difference among others. Thus, as the manipulation of the preference point is considered effective, manipulation by outcome salience is considered as ineffective. Bigger framing effects are achieved through the presentation of risky versus non-risky options rather than options involving different risk categories. Among task characteristics, gain and loss wordings are seen as triggers for framing manipulation. The responses are generally in form of choices, which stimulate framing effects approximately five times greater than the framing effect dimensions for ratings or judgments. Regarding participant characteristics, the results indicate the framing effect size to decrease significantly, as the sample conducted between students and target populations do not differ in their openness to framing effects.

As the most specific of the risk manipulation, the effects of framing are argued to be strong with reference point manipulations. Moreover, they are stated not to be present at all among outcome salience manipulations. This differentiation can be argued as follows: If the situation includes a
manipulated outcome of salience, the threat-rigidity hypothesis is applicable. According to this hypothesis, the existence of threats might result in processing strategies that are in line with conservative behavior (Kühberger, 1998).

Kühberger (1998), states, regarding risk characteristics, the quality and number of options related to a risk can also be influential to framing. He indicates these as measures of appropriateness in considering the initial Prospect Theory design. Accordingly, this theory was originally developed for situations involving the selection of both a secure and risky choice. Hence, the scholar highlights the need for further carefulness in generalizing among options differing in risk. The problem is stated to be in the evaluation of a risky situation, as it is not known which outcome is considered riskier for each individual. Without knowing these risk perception levels, the question regarding the decision for the options of different risk types cannot be clearly answered.

Research among response modes used in framing experiments is dominated by choices creating stronger effects compared to judgments or ratings. Kühberger (1998) argue choices offer only two points of evaluation compared to judgmental or rating modes. These modes offer many more. In context of choosing alternatives in decision-making, at least two options are required as a minimum. Still, judgments or ratings can be delivered for a single option. Consequently, problem situations including two options involve choices, whereas problems including just one option involve ratings or judgments (Kühberger, 1998).

The overall analysis regarding framing manipulations through gains and losses showed a greater effect size compared to task-manipulative responses. Thus, the interpretation of the scholars is that task-responsive manipulations achieved framing manipulations as expected. According to this, framing is assumed not only to be an isolated effect demonstrable through basic research without utility. Indeed, the influence of framing is highlighted through relative indirect manipulations. Framing research therefore could provide bright insights to practical perspectives of judgment and decisions made daily by individuals (Kühberger, 1998). Moreover, higher effect sizes were produced by experiments involving single participants than ones using units. As negotiations are conducted after group discussions, the question of whether extreme preference points are adopted by such groups through internal discussions arises. Kühberger (1998), states this to be unlikely. According to him, this could depend on certain factors like the dynamic of the group as well as its size, positive or negative framings of the members or the discussed issue in general.
Arguing that the outcomes on decision research are based on experiments involving students as participants, the ability to generalize is also questioned by the scholars. As assumed, cognitive or motivational differences exist among students and these variances are stated to make the outcomes disappear in the reality. Moreover, framing research is argued to have only moved into the real world at a certain level. Experts in this area are therefore considered not immune against reference point effects, as framing might also influence them. Regarding the heterogeneity of framing effects, there is arguably no uniformity. If framing research is evaluated the framing effects could interact, diminish or vanish by certain characteristics such as individual difference dimensions of age, culture, gender or by cognitive dimensions such as emotion, knowledge or perception (Kühberger, 1998).

Chong and Druckman (2007) highlight a broad number of moderator variables that may condition framing effects: Predisposition is argued to be the strongest limit on framing effects. Predispositions are subject to the existing values of the individual. Scholars provide an example referring to past opinions concerning gay rights. These opinions are shape individuals’ responses to alternative gay rights frames. Accordingly, individuals with strong values are considered as less responsive to opposing frames. Strong predisposition increases one’s resistance by reducing framing effects. However, persons with firm values are vulnerable to framing of new issues to which they have not yet acquired a clear opinion (Chong & Druckman, 2007).

Knowledge is referred to be another moderator on an individual-level, which has brought contradictory results to science. Some studies came up with results highlighting strong framing effects on individuals with less knowledge, whereas other studies had proposed the exact opposite. According to Druckman and Nelson (2003), differing results from missing control of prior attitudes arise. Entrenched priors are possessed by well-informed individuals. After prior attitudes are controlled, framing effects become enhanced through knowledge, as it raises the probability that the considerations stressed within a frame will be obtainable or understandable to the individuals (Chong & Druckman, 2007). Moreover, the strength of a frame as well as its credibility is mentioned as further moderators influencing the applicability of a frame. If credible sources deliver a frame, it is argued to be more likely to shift opinions. The same can be said for frames invoking cultural values (Chong, 2000). Chung and Druckman (2007) further identify the availability of information as an important moderator variable as the success in framing issues depend strongly on the availability of certain information.
3. Research questions and expectations

As broadly introduced during the literature part of this master thesis, framing can be divided into two critical areas: The cognitive and the interactional approach. The cognitive approach is defined as representations of stored memories, whereas the interactional approach sees framing from a dynamical perspective, arguing that it develops and shapes during interactions (Dewulf & Bouwen, 2012). Based on the interactional perspective of framing in combination with the approaches of theories that have already built on the influence of language in framing (such as the Speech Act Theory and the Speech Accommodation Theory) this empirical study addresses the following research question:

**Research Question:**

“Does a negotiator’s use of integrative and distributive language result in a convergence of the proposed frame and an adoption of the respective language by the counterpart?”

As previously explained in more detail, the Speech Act Theory describes how individuals draw the attention of a specific negotiation using frames. In this connection, language is not only expressive; language can be performative. Thus, the language choices of a disputant frame discussion areas and exchange frame limits (Drake & Donohue, 1996).

The Speech Accommodation Theory is related to the question of how frames tend to converge or diverge with the purpose of creating a cooperative interaction setting. The theory emphasizes the importance of the interpersonal impact of the acceptance of caused limits. A more cooperative negotiation environment is shaped through convergence and is therefore critical for building trust in an integrative negotiation process. According to this framework framing is an aspect of speech, encouraging disputants to move towards each other. (Drake & Donohue, 1996).

Overall, we expect that a counterpart’s use of language will result in a convergence, and the counterpart will adopt the respective frame. Thus, we expect that negotiators confronted with integrative language to adopt a respective frame and employ more integrative language compared to negotiators confronted with distributive language, who will respond in kind by employing distributive language.
4. Method

In this section, the authors describe aspects of the study regarding methodology, acquisition of samples, the underlying design of the study as well as the process of qualitative coding in more detail.

In order to conduct the underlying study for this scientific paper, a sample of 76 graduate students from the University of Vienna was selected for a negotiation task. More specifically, 48 female and 29 male students participated in the study with the motivation of acquiring additional points to enhance their class grades as well as the chance to participate in a lottery. The participants were selected from ongoing classes discussing negotiation. They were also familiar with negotiation cases involving role-playing and payoffs. While certain aspects such as role instructions or payoffs were maintained equally, the one-factor experimental design of integrative or distributive language was considered as a variable between the participants. Moreover, each participant answered a questionnaire with measures relating to the negotiation task afterwards.

The negotiation task was designed as a business negotiation of mobile phone contracts. It included the issues price, period, warranty and the duration of service contract. The researchers adopted the concession patterns and payoff matrix of Van Kleef et al. (2004). The lottery as the second motivator of increasing participants’ involvement in the negotiation task included two possible payments of €50 depending on the outcomes of the participants.

The investigation of visual access in negotiations was named as the bold purpose of the experiment to the participants. On arrival, the participants were greeted and introduced to the task. They were told the task would include a two-party negotiation and their counterpart would be a person from another university. Moreover, the participants were informed the negotiation process would be instant messaging based. In order to enhance the awareness related to their opponents, the participants were told that their opponents had already begun reading the case information. They were furthermore asked to respect the preparation time of 30 minutes and not to leave their opponent waiting. The participants were left to believe that the assignment of the roles of seller and buyer to be random. In fact, the information given to each participant was the same. Moreover, the participants negotiated against a researcher sending certain, pre-formulated messages based on the conditions of the experiment. For the purposes of enhancing the realism of the negotiation task and to increase the involvement of the participants, each negotiation session was conducted on an individual basis with the duration of approximately 1,5
to 2 hours. This timeframe included briefing, the negotiation task, pre-questionnaire as well as debriefing.

After welcoming the participants to the task, 25 minutes were given to them in order to read the case instructions and to prepare for the negotiation ahead. Furthermore, the participants were provided with the information that due to random determination, the buyer would be the one sending the first message. They were then told from this point on the offers and counteroffers would alternate, thus resembling email conversations. The participants were told that they were free to formulate their own statements. Before the beginning of the negotiation, the participants were given one final opportunity to ask questions about the case and role instructions. Ten minutes after the start of the negotiation, the first message to include an offer was sent to the participants by the researcher. Pre-formulated messages were generally sent by the researcher, irrespective of the content of the messages submitted by the participants. The only exception to this case was if a participant’s offer had exceeded the offer the buyer would make. In such a case, the researcher accepted the offer of the seller with minor modifications to the reply. Minor typing errors were included in the messages in order to make conversation look more realistic to the participants.

In line with De Dreu and Van Lange (1995), the negotiation process was designed to last six messages in total. Thus, the sixth message included the final offer of the alleged buyer without referring to it as such. The alleged buyer then sent a 7th and final message to the participants. This message stated that he/she would take the negotiation outcome to his/her superior. After receiving this message, the participants informed the researcher about the end of the negotiation and continued with the post-questionnaire.

The messages used in this experiment was designed with the intention of recreating real conversations containing direct responses to the issues as well as questions and suggestions. The substantive and economic aspects were kept constant, whereas the language frame was manipulated. The foundation of the messages provided to the participants by researchers during the experiment was built on papers explaining the quantitative coding of integrative and distributive strategies. The offers, which had a distributive framing, included among other things: substantiation of position, highlighting differences, bottom line and power references as well as information related to the positions. On the other side, offers having an integrative frame included among other things: trade-off suggestions, insight showing, compromise proposals as well as questions regarding priorities and preferences. Moreover, the researchers mirrored integrative and distributive messages by possibility. As an example, integrative messages
involving questions about priorities were received. The distributive response included questions regarding preferences to a certain issue as well as respective bottom lines (Weingart, Brett, Olekalns, & Smith, 2007).

The messages used in the study were tested through a plot study in advance. This plot study included eight participants from the University of Vienna who were familiar with negotiation literature and integrative and distributive bargaining. Those participants had been excluded from the main study. Not being aware of having negotiated with a virtual counterpart using pre-defined messages, the participants were divided into two groups, four having negotiated in distributive condition and four in integrative condition. After the negotiation, the participants were asked about their general impressions and to rate the negotiation process as more integrative or distributive. One rated the process as distributive while seven rated it as integrative. Subsequently, the participants were introduced into the topic and presented the texts of both negotiations. The messages were evaluated to be integrative or distributive. Based on the feedback received, the messages were refined. Thus, only messages considered to be indisputably integrative or distributive were selected for inclusion in the main study. Moreover, none of the participants suspected their negotiating opponent to be a researcher.
5. Results

In this chapter of the master thesis, the coding type and the results are described. The first part, quantitative coding, includes the description of data processing, the general structure of the research and the coding scheme used. The second part, results, is about the used inter-rater reliability and the performed factor analysis. All factors and results are described and discussed in more detail.

5.1 Quantitative Coding

After successfully designing the study and collecting the sample, the authors processed the data by applying theoretical approaches introduced by Srnka and Koeszegi’s (2007) “From Words to Numbers: How to Transform Qualitative Data into Meaningful Quantitative Results” as well as “Quantitative Coding of Negotiation Behavior” by Weingart et al. (2004).

The direct analysis of negotiation processes provides an insight into the real dealings of negotiators regardless of their intentions or plans. The data resulting from those analyses capture the overall strategies of negotiators, their implementation and exact period. Besides acquiring a further understanding of the negotiation processes itself, such information can also be used in predicting outcomes of negotiations as well as the quality of achieved agreements. Thus, the gained insights can be applied in order to train more effective negotiators (Weingart, Olekalns, & Smith, 2004).

For the general structure of the research, the guideline introduced by Srnka und Koeszegi (2007) was applied as the underlying structure. The process was divided by the scholars into five essential levels:

1. Data sourcing
2. Transcription
3. Unitization
4. Categorization
5. Coding
In the first two sections of the quantitative coding process, the data sourcing and transcription, the foundation for quantitative analysis was established. At this stage, verbal material was collected and transferred into written form. Building on the second section, the unit of analysis was chosen and separated into categories for the purpose of coding in the third phase as recommended. In the fourth section, the researchers selected the coding scheme most suitable for the research purpose. In the fifth and final category, the coding was conducted (Snikka & Koeszegi, 2007).

According to Weingart et al. (2004), coding schemes based on negotiation theory have a strong focus on substantive characteristics of negotiations. These are value creation and value claiming. Indeed, certain behavior such as threats, questions on priorities or preferences and information seeking can be tied to one of the two strategic orientations – either integrative distributive.

The coding scheme developed by Weingart, Olekalns, & Smith (2004) was taken as a basis in conducting the research for this study. It was then divided in four main categories:

1. Integrative information
2. Integrative action – value creation
3. Distributive information
4. Distributive action – value claiming

Two additional categories (push to close and process management) were also considered. This scheme has been an essential part of the study when conducting the analysis based on the captured responses of the participants. The exact structure of the coding scheme is given in Table 2.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Strategy</th>
<th>Behaviors included in strategy cluster</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>• Integrative information</td>
<td>• States issue preferences&lt;br&gt;• States issue priorities&lt;br&gt;• Asks questions about preferences&lt;br&gt;• Asks questions about priorities&lt;br&gt;• Off-task comments (relationship building)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Integrative action – Value creation</td>
<td>• Makes multi-issue offer&lt;br&gt;• Shows insight&lt;br&gt;• Notes general differences&lt;br&gt;• Notes general similarities&lt;br&gt;• Suggests compromise&lt;br&gt;• Makes positive comments&lt;br&gt;• Suggests package trade-offs&lt;br&gt;• Other process suggestion</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Distributive information</td>
<td>• Facts&lt;br&gt;• Asks for bottom line&lt;br&gt;• Asks about others’ substantiation (attack)&lt;br&gt;• Asks miscellaneous task-related questions&lt;br&gt;• Notes differences&lt;br&gt;• Negative reactions&lt;br&gt;• Suggests discussion of an issue</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Distributive Action – Value claiming</td>
<td>• Makes single-issue offer&lt;br&gt;• Refers to bottom line&lt;br&gt;• Substantiation of position&lt;br&gt;• Mutuality as influence&lt;br&gt;• Threats&lt;br&gt;• Refers to power&lt;br&gt;• Suggests creative solutions to meet own interests</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Additional category – Push to close</td>
<td>• Time checks&lt;br&gt;• Notes similarities</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Additional category – Process management</td>
<td>• Reciprocity&lt;br&gt;• Suggests vote&lt;br&gt;• Suggestion to move on</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Table 2 Negotiation behaviors in strategy clusters (Weingart, Olekains, & Smith, 2004)*
After finishing the initial experiment, the researcher transcribed the responses that were given by the participants of the experiment into an Excel-sheet and added cluster options to the responses as given in the coding scheme. The authors then processed the responses. The authors are two independent business master students, who had prior experience in negotiation literature and knowledge about the coding scheme. First, the responses were evaluated to one of the four main categories and coded to the suiting behavior in the strategy cluster on own estimation. If a given response was seen to match with an additional category, this was also taken into consideration and coded by the students. In summary, the students coded each 1560 lines, resulting in a total sum of 3120 coded lines.
5.2 Inter-Rater Reliability

The inter-rater, inter-observer or interpretive reliability shows how many matches between the two coders exist. Results from independent coding and analyzing can be used for the interpretation. As mentioned before, the authors of this master thesis coded the same text independently and the consistency of interpretation and assignment can be explained with this reliability (Weingart, Olekalns, & Smith, 2004). “Thus, consistency of interpretation is assessed in terms of the reliable application of interpretative rules” (Weingart, Olekalns, & Smith, 2004, p. 448). With the help of Cohen's Kappa, this reliability can be shown. In detail, the formula of Cohens Kappa “determines the level of agreement corrected for agreements due to chance” (Weingart, Olekalns, & Smith, 2004, p. 448).

\[
Kappa = \frac{(P' - P_c)}{(1 - P_c)}
\]

*P*’ = percentage of agreement among the different coders  
*Pc* = proportion of chance agreement (Weingart, Olekalns, & Smith, 2004)

In this scientific study, the two coders agreed on 1480 of 1560 codes in 32 different categories. Kappa is calculated as followed:

\[
P' = \frac{1480}{1560} = 0.9487  
P_c = \frac{1}{32} = 0.03125
\]

\[
Kappa = \frac{(0.9487 - 0.03125)}{(1-0.03125)}  
Kappa = 0.947
\]

The Kappa of 0.947 shows a good reliability. The remaining disagreements between the two coders have been resolved by discussion so that each thought unit was assigned a unique code.
5.3 Factor Analysis

In a first step, categories with low frequencies (e.g., “Time checks”, “Suggests to move on”) were eliminated as some categories had low occurrence in the data due to the specific structure of the communication. For instance, due to the structure imposed by the experimental design, negotiators had little need to express “Time checks” or “Suggests to move on”. Additionally, “Makes multi-issue offer” and “Makes single issue offer”, although central to integrative vs. distributive negotiation strategies and tactics, were less critical in the current setting as participants were sending offers using a separate feature.

In a second step, a factor analysis (principal component, varimax rotation) was performed. After eliminating cross loading items and items that constituted a single factor, the following five-factorial solution (see Table 3) was obtained. Overall, the five factorial solution accounts for 60.74% of the variance.
As a measure of reliability, we calculated Cronbach’s Alpha and for the factors that are constituted only by two items the correlation (see Table 3). Overall, the measures are rather low, indicating suboptimal internal consistency. For the subsequent analyses, the items have been aggregated to form the respective factor.

After receiving the five different factors, the authors assigned generic names. In these decisions, all included items were taken into account:

1. The first factor was named “Integrative exchange”. It includes three integrative items, which are “States issue priorities”, “Asks questions about preferences” and “Asks questions about priorities”.

Table 3 Five-factorial solution (own illustration)¹

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Factors</th>
<th>Items</th>
<th>Cronbach’s Alpha</th>
<th>Correlation</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Factor 1:</td>
<td>States issue priorities</td>
<td>0.411</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Integrative exchange</td>
<td>Asks questions about preferences</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Factor 2:</td>
<td>States issue preferences</td>
<td>0.344</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Integrative action</td>
<td>Makes positive comments</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Suggests package trade-offs</td>
<td></td>
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<td>Factor 4:</td>
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<td>Factor 5:</td>
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<td>Distributive force</td>
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¹ * significant at the 0.05 level
** significant at the 0.001 level
questions about priorities”. This factor covers activities that have information seeking as a motive. It is characterized by asking questions in order to learn more about the opposite party as well as giving information about their own demands. The negotiators use integrative language. Information exchange is conducted to create more value and build trust.

2. Due to the two included items “Makes positive comments” and “Suggests package tradeoffs”, the second factor was named “Integrative action”. This factor covers integrative activities beyond simple information seeking as seen in factor 1. By making positive comments and using friendly language as well as offering trade-offs, a more comfortable negotiation environment was promoted and trust building was enhanced by the negotiator.

3. The third factor contains the items “Asks for bottom line” and “Notes differences”. It has been termed as “Distributive exchange”. In comparison to “Integrative exchange”, the elements contained in this factor lack a value-creating essence. By asking for bottom lines and noting differences among parties, the negotiators engage in a bargaining negotiation approach and collect information to raise their own benefits.

4. The fourth factor is called “Distributive action”. This factor includes the two items “Negative reactions” and “Substantiation of position”. This factor goes beyond information collection as seen in factor 3 and is characterized by actual actions like distributive usage of language, negative reactions to given offers or substantiation of own positions. The negotiators show a distributive negotiation approach. One’s own gain from the negotiation is in the foreground.

5. The fifth and last factor is “Distributive force”. This generic name was given due to the two different items “Threats” and “Refers to power”. Beyond the other factors, this factor is strongly associated with the use of force in a clearly distributive way. It is characterized by the usage of distributive language and actions. The negotiators fail to obtain their demands from counterparts during the negotiation process and stress their opponents to give in.
Factor 1 “Integrative exchange” and factor 2 “Integrative action” represent the two integrative factors in this study. In comparison, factor 3 “Distributive exchange”, factor 4 “Distributive action” and factor 5 “Distributive force” represent the distributive factors. In the following, the results of all five factors are described and discussed in more detail.

The results of the first factor “Integrative exchange”, which includes the items “States issue priorities”, “Asks questions about preferences” and “Asks questions about priorities” show that the participants who were approached in an integrative way also responded in an integrative way.

On average, in the integrative treatment the negotiators employed 1.76 (SD = 1.53) “Integrative exchange” as opposed to the distributive treatment, negotiators used only 1.08 (SD = 1.53) “Integrative exchange”. The difference is significant at the 10%-level (p = 0.053).
The second integrative factor "Integrative action" includes the items "States issue preferences", "Makes positive comments" and "Suggests package tradeoffs". The results show that in the integrative treatment, the negotiators employed on average 4.55 (SD = 2.51) "Integrative action", whereas in the distributive treatment negotiators used only 3.26 (SD = 1.99) "Integrative action". The difference is significant at the 5%-level (p = 0.014).

As also seen in factor 1 the results of factor 2 further prove our hypothesis. Participants who approached in an integrative way also responded in an integrative way.
The third factor “Distributive exchange” is the first of three distributive factors and includes the items “Asks for bottom line” and “Notes differences”. As expected, factor 3 shows a shift between integrative and distributive treatment resulting in a different picture. In the integrative treatment, the negotiators used on average less distributive exchange compared to the distributive treatment.

In this case in the integrative treatment the negotiators used only 0.079 (SD = 0.27) “Distributive exchange”, whereas in the distributive treatment negotiators employed 0.26 (SD = 0.55) “Distributive exchange”. The difference is significant at the 10%-level (p = 0.077). These results prove our hypothesis that participants who had been approached in a distributive way responded in a distributive way.
The forth factor "Distributive action" includes two distributive items, first “Negative reactions” and second “Substantiation of position”. As with the distributive factor “Distributive exchange” these results also show that participants who had been addressed in a distributive way replied in a distributive way.

The integrative treatment the negotiators used 2.13 (SD = 2.03) “Distributive action”, whereas in the distributive treatment negotiators employed 3.92 (SD = 3.03) “Distributive action”. The difference is significant at the 5%-level ($p = 0.003$).
The fifth and last distributive item “Distributive force” includes the item “Threats” and “Refers to power”. In this last case of the integrative treatment the negotiators used only 0.18 (SD = 0.46) “Distributive force”, whereas in the distributive treatment negotiators employed 0.74 (SD = 1.02) “Distributive force”. This factor and the forth factor “Distributive action” are the most significant factors (p = 0.003). The difference is significant at the 5%-level.

The results of the factor analysis support the stated theory and our expectations. The research question “Does a negotiator’s use of integrative and distributive language result in a convergence of the proposed frame and an adoption of the respective language by the counterpart?” can be answered as follows:

Yes, the use of integrative and distributive language results in a convergence of the proposed frame and an adoption of the respective language by the counterpart. When the negotiator uses distributive language, the counterpart adapts the distributive language. On the other hand, when
the negotiator uses an integrative language, the counterpart adapts it and makes use of the integrative language.

In addition, the results of Cornbach’s Alpha (factor 1: 0.411, factor 2: 0.344) and the results of the correlations (factor 3: 0.244, factor 5: 0.318) – except the correlation of factor 4 (0.379) – prove that the further expectation was also correct. The adaption of the integrative language of the counterpart employs more integrative language compared to negotiators confronted with distributive language, which then responds in kind by employing distributive language.
6. Conclusion

In the political and economic landscape of today’s world, negotiations are play a central and critical role. Therefore, negotiation research is steadily receiving a growing amount of attention from scholars among a broad range of different fields such as business, psychology and medicine (Dewulf, Craps, & Dercon, 2004). Consequently, a great amount of time and attention has been invested into the development of research in this field in order to gain valuable insights in the pursuit of a better understanding and higher performance in negotiations.

Building on the theory of framing and putting it in relation with the aspects related to language in negotiations, the purpose of this master thesis was the examination the reactions and outcomes arising from integrative and distributive communication language. The authors focused on the importance of framing within the negotiation literature and applied it as a foundation to their research.

Broadly speaking, framing is about how people make opinions and decisions and how the information from a certain negotiation processes are framed. Scholars of several fields agree that outcomes of negotiations are strongly influenced by framing. During conflicts, different frames arise from different perspectives regarding the discussed matters, the importance of issues, and the motivations of the disputants in truly solving the problem (De Dreu and McCusker, 1997). In many cases, the participants do not immediately recognize their differences, which can result in intensifying conflicts through polarization (Shmueli, Elliott, & Kaufmann, 2006).

According to Dewulf, et al. (2011) a sophisticated way in obtaining a better understanding for framing is the observation of how certain situations are interpreted by negotiators. The literature differentiates between two specific approaches of framing, which are cognitive framing and interactional framing. Interactional framing is referred as communication structures among people that arise during interactions. Interactional framing has a dynamical approach and shapes during interactions (Dewulf, Gray, Putnam, & Bouwen, 2011). The cognitive framing approach, on the other side, is referred to as representations of stored memories and considered as a process of relating cognitive frames during specific situations (Dewulf and Bouwen, 2012). Gray and Donnell (1990) argue framing to be strongly dependent on the participants of a negotiation and their reactions. Each move of a participant frames a specific issue and offers a different frame to the opposing party, which can be immediately accepted or
refused. Within this context, the role of communication is considered highly critical as it provides 
the necessary tool to the negotiators in demonstrating their intentions of agreement and 
disagreement (Hocker & Wilmot, 2001). Ultimately, framing influences the selection and 
application of the negotiators negotiation tactics in encouraging concessions, setting anchors as 
well as emphasizing positive frames to counterparts regarding common gains (Neale & 
Bazerman, 1992). As previously described, the literature points towards a strong influence of 
language as an instrument of communication on framing.

Framing is argued to be influenced by language, and language is considered to be a key 
instrument of social interaction (Dewulf, Gray, Putnam, & Bouwen, 2011). The importance of 
language is further highlighted in literature as “language choices frame a disputed topic by 
verbally highlighting certain qualities of the topic” (Drake & Donohue, 1996, p. 4). Both the 
Speech Accommodation Theory and the Speech Act theory underline the importance of 
language in negotiation communication as follows:

The Speech Accommodation Theory points out how frames converge or diverge - adopting 
opposing negotiators’ communication behavior versus stressing differences - in forming 
cooperative interaction settings. As convergence has a positive effect on relationships, a 
cooperative atmosphere can be developed through convergence – a critical element in 
encouraging an integrative negotiation process and trust building. Within the framework of 
Speech Accommodation Theory, framing is referred to as an aspect of speech, encouraging 
disputants to move towards each other (Drake & Donohue, 1996).

The Speech Act Theory, which describes how frames are used by individuals in order to link the 
attention of certain negotiation situations, argues language to be performative rather than 
expressive. This undermines the view that language choices of disputants not only frame areas 
of discussions but also function as a maintaining proposal system of exchanging frame limits. 
(Drake & Donohue, 1996).

The authors complement the research by investigating whether the use of integrative and 
distributive language results in a convergence of the proposed frame and an adoption of the 
respective language by the counterpart. It was expected by the authors that the language used 
by a negotiator would result in a convergence and the counterpart would adopt the respective 
frame. Therefore, negotiators confronted with integrative language were expected to adopt a 
respective frame and employ more integrative language when compared to negotiators 
confronted with distributive language.
The results showed that participants who were approached in an integrative way also responded in an integrative way. Based on this, it can be stated that the style of communication influences the opponent’s style of response. Accordingly, integrative communication leads to an integrative response and distributive communication leads to a distributive response. This outcome is in-line with both the Speech Accommodation Theory and the Speech Act Theory: Not only substantive content matters for the negotiation outcome but also how negotiators communicate. The right choice of language can result in a frame convergence and have a positive effect on the relationship and trust building. It also encourages an integrative negotiation process among negotiators. Ultimately, language is an influencing system of exchange.

A simple example of a practical implication of this research and its findings would be a simple salary negotiation situation between an employee and a manager. In this configuration, let us assume that the primary demand of the employee is to receive a rise in salary, whereas the goal of the manager is to keep the salary increase as low as possible in order to meet certain budgeting goals. Let us further assume that the employee has an interest in career development, which ideally overlaps with the manager’s demand for this employee to take more responsibilities and duties within the department.

Our results suggests that the employee would be most likely to achieve their salary goals during the negotiation process by using integrative and kind language. By demonstrating an interest in further career development and a desire to take responsibility within the firm, the integrative and kind language of the employee would be more likely to result in a convergence of the manager’s frame and therefore result in the employees demands being met. In contrast, if the employee enters the negotiation process with a distributive attitude, the manager is much more likely to diverge by applying a stressed behavior of his or her own and take an equally distributive position.

The findings of this research might be considered as obvious on first glance. The provided insight that when a negotiator uses distributive language, the counterpart would adopt the distributive language and when a negotiator uses an integrative language, the counterpart would adopt the same can be seen as naturally. However, if negotiation processes are looked at more closely, it is apparent that many professional negotiators make simple communication mistakes that can result in a less valuable outcome or even a breakdown in negotiations. Therefore, creating the right mindset as well as the selection of the right communication behavior regarding language in advance are both critical components to a successful negotiation. It should also not be forgotten that both parties are required to bring the correct mindsets and behavior to the
negotiation table if great value is to be created. If only one of the parties apply an inappropriate approach, this would directly affect the frame of the other party and reframe it from integrative to distributive.
Table of References


Framing in Negotiations


## Appendix

### Gruppenstatistik

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### Test bei unabhangigen Stichproben

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Mareen Jordan 0852717  
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Abstract:

Negotiations play a central role in today's political and economic landscape. Whereas initial bargaining theory portrayed negotiators as rational agents, research shows that negotiators’ perceptions differ substantially from rational economic analyses. Their decisions are often based on heuristics and rules of thumb. One such deviation from rational models that has gained considerable attention in research is framing. Based on interactional framing theory, the present master thesis investigates whether a negotiator's use of integrative and distributive language results in a convergence of the proposed frame and an adaptation of the respective language by the counterparty. The first part consists of a review of the negotiation literature with focus on cognitive and interactional framing. In the second part, the authors conduct an empirical study to investigate how a negotiator's proposed communicational frame impacts the counterpart’s response. For this purpose, communication protocols from a negotiation experiment are analyzed using quantitative content coding. The results of the study provide further evidence for frame convergence.

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Wien, am 13. Februar 2016

Seite 2 - Lebenslauf von Serif Cem Arpinar