MASTERARBEIT

Titel der Masterarbeit

„Vienna-Bratislava relationships. Living apart together. From the long 19th Century up to now.“

Verfasserin

Mirjam de Klepper

angestrebter akademischer Grad

Master (MA)

Wien, 2015

Studienkennzahl lt. Studienblatt: A 067 805
Studienrichtung lt. Studienblatt: Individuelles Masterstudium:
Global Studies – a European Perspective
Betreuerin / Betreuer: Ass.-Prof. Mag. Dr. Walter Matznetter, MSc
Vienna-Bratislava relationships. Living apart together. From the long 19th Century up to now.

Verfasser /Author
Mirjam de Klepper

angestrebter akademischer Grad / academic degree aspired
Master (MA)

Wien, 2015
# TABLE OF CONTENT

**Preface** 1

1. **Chapter 1 About territoriality, borders and cities** 4
   1.1 The extraordinary case of Vienna and Bratislava 6
   1.2 Territoriality, the example of Burgenland in the late 1940s 9
   1.3 The production of space and others in the borderlands 13
   1.4 Set up of this thesis 15

2. **Chapter 2 From Pressburg to Bratislava: The development of a city’s identity in the late 19th and early 20th century** 17
   2.1 The basis of the Slovak nation 18
      2.1.1 Ethnic awareness 18
      2.1.2 Language development 19
   2.2 From Pressburg to Bratislava 21
      2.2.1 The people 21
      2.2.2 The city’s self perception 24
   2.3 The Slovak road to the first Czechoslovak Republic 28
      2.3.1 Conditions and hindrances 28
      2.3.2 The violent international struggle for a Czechoslovakia 29
      2.3.3 The new capital of Bratislava 30
   2.4 Wartime 32

3. **Chapter 3 'Die Zeit dafür und die Zeit danach': Keeping up the image of Vienna during the collapse of Austria-Hungary** 34
   3.1 On Vienna and Austria 35
   3.2 The creation of a myth 36
      3.2.1 Events in the city 37
      3.2.2 Rising tensions 38
   3.3 Nostalgia for the Empire 40
Chapter 4 Austria's relationships with its eastern neighbours

4.1 Austrian political and economic ties to the East
   4.1.1 Austrian political neutrality
   4.1.2 Economic benefits of neutrality

4.2 The special case of Czechoslovakia
4.3 Czechoslovak-Austrian relationships
4.4 Slovak-Austrian relationships
4.5 Bratislava-Vienna Relationships

Chapter 5 After the Wall. EU accession, cross-border development and metropolitan integration

5.1 Austria and the EU
   5.1.1 The Austrian accession to the EU
   5.1.2 Austria and the EU accession of its direct neighbours
   5.1.3 The EU and Austrian public opinion: territoriality and the meaning of space

5.2 Slovakia and the EU
   5.2.1 Opening of the border
   5.2.2 Slovakia's accession to the EU
   5.2.3 Local differences and the Bratislava paradox

5.3 Cross-border cooperation in the Vienna-Bratislava border region
   5.3.1 The development of the EU framework for cross-border cooperation
   5.3.2 Examples of cross-border cooperation in the Vienna-Bratislava region
   5.3.3 The development of a metropolitan region?

Conclusion

References
PREFACE

For a large part of my life I never had anything to do with borders. Growing up in a small coastal town in the Netherlands, the only border I knew was the strip of sandy dunes and dikes along the coast. I occasionally went on holidays with my parents to other beaches, like those of Turkey or Greece, but that was about it. I never gave a single thought to Eastern or Central Europe. I did not know what it looked like, what happened in its history and imagined it rather grey and cloudy.

In 2007, freshly graduated from high school, I moved to Dresden in Germany. Being a part of a Europeanwide exchange program, I suddenly met people from Poland, Slovenia, Romania and the Czech Republic. I was amazed to find they were lively, colourful people and upon visits to their homecountries I realized the east was not grey, and actually often quite sunny. I also came to realize that borders do play an important role for many people. For example, many of my friends were not allowed to work in Germany, where we had met. And that whilst simultaneously, many Germans visited their countries, like Poland, for cheap dental treatments. Their country's accession to the European Union (EU) did not change much about it either.

Being in East-Germany and having visited the remnants of the Iron Curtain, another border came into my vision. I realized that in Germany internally people still categorized former East-Germany as a different kind of Germany than the former West-Germany. Distrustfulness, misunderstanding and a wage gap still kept them apart, even if only through jokes. Spending quite some time with people from all over the east side of the former Iron Curtain, it became clear to me that this border had left a deep imprint on the European peninsula. Economic, political and societal structures which had developed due to the different systems during the years after World War II and the developments after 1989 influenced the mind and ways of people.

As this dawned upon me ever more clearer, I moved to Vienna in 2013 to write my thesis and I had become convinced that this inner breakline within the EU should be my point of focus. However, being in Vienna gave me a whole new perspective. As I had hardly ever learned anything about the region, I was again surprised to find that the history of Central Eastern Europe goes even farther back than World War II. As the Netherlands was neutral in
World War I, this part of European history was often conveniently skipped in my high school and I never had anything to do with it during my academic training as an anthropologist, as we focused on regions on the other side of the world. The Austrian-Hungarian Empire meant even less to me. Then, as I studied Viennese history, I understood that any history of borders in Europe should be preceded and completed by an understanding of the developments of the long 19th century. With a mind indoctrinated by anthropology, I believed that going local would make the most sense. Accordingly, I decided to make the particular border region of Vienna and Bratislava my area of focus.

With that region in mind, I attempted in this thesis to bring together those three personal revelations which I experienced in the past eight years: one, that Central and Eastern Europe is not grey, cloudy and dull, but colourful, sunny and interesting; two, that borders do matter a lot to many people; and three, that those borders, both geopolitically as in the minds of people, are deeply historically informed.

In order to structure my thesis, I of course had to find an approach. Which is never easy, but when you study Global Studies, an interdisciplinary study programme run by different departments of two different universities, each with its own approach, it becomes even harder. That is why this thesis is influenced by different theories from different disciplines, but is historical in its core. I draw on Henri LeFebvre (1991) and his theory of the tripartite production of space. It gives insight in how space is perceived in different ways, and hence, indeed, how it is produced. Robert Sacks (1983) theory on territoriality then brought me one of the ways we can interpret this production of space in relation to borders. The publication 'B/ordering Spaces' by Van Houtum et al (2005) opened a wide range of other approaches as well as concrete case studies of border regions, which helped me place my research in a wider framework of current research on the matter.

As I am not a trained historian and my time was limited, I have had to rely on secondary sources. Though it is relatively easy to find sources on Austria and Slovakia, it is a lot more difficult to find research on the two of them together. Even though they are so near, most publications about the entire area stem from the past ten years. However, the production flow is now steadily increasing and I am very grateful to authors Giffinger and Sohn (e.g. 2015), who together and with others have done a lot of research on the current relations between the two
cities, and focus specifically on the role of the border within that relationship.

All in all, I aim to give an insight in the diverse workings of territoriality in the Vienna Bratislava region. We will see how the instalment and alleviation of a border can have profound consequences on city identity and perception. Furthermore, I will demonstrate the effects of the border on economic and political development in such a paradoxical situation of two national capitals sitting on the edges of the national territory.
Chapter 1
About territoriality, borders and cities

It has been known for a while now that globalisation is not the process leading to a borderless world with freedom of movement of all the world’s inhabitants. Instead, as many argue, despite the growth of flows of finance, people and information and a seemingly increasing freedom of movement, more and more boundaries have come into existence (Wilson 2009; Van Houtum et al 2005). And those boundaries come in different shapes and sizes. On the one hand, we see that the process of the ‘awakening’ of nations and their ‘struggle’ for territorial autonomy which started in the early 19th century with revolutionary France is still ongoing. Similarly, the cosmopolitan ideology so popular in the last few decades has been countered with many instances of nationalist upsurges defending entitlement to whatever is en vogue. These nationalist movements base their arguments and rightful ownership on a form of ‘Blut und Boden’-rhetoric, whilst denying such rights to whoever they perceive as outsiders or newcomers. I agree with the anthropologist Thomas Wilson who argues that these processes make it difficult to keep up the idea that the end of the nation-state is near. In fact, the number of nation-states has increased (Wilson 2009, 2). Simultaneously, political entities such as the EU are melting their inner border structures whilst reinforcing their outer ones in an attempt to control flows into its territory. Moreover, the gap between rich and poor seems to grow, dividing not only the world in a global North and South, but simultaneously splits society everywhere into groups of haves and have-nots, those who are indeed mobile and those who are not (OECD 2011).

And although the increase of international flows and scapes, and the existence of transnational networks cannot be denied, such factors do not erase bordering and ordering principles (or b/ordering as the geographers Van Houtum et al write it). Instead, they are informed by them, creating more complex layers of shifting identities and entities (or id/entities; Van Houtum et al 2005, 1).

Research field
All these differentiations between poor and rich, North and South and again (or still) East and
West are characterized by both real and metaphorical boundaries, borders and frontiers. They are often created physically in the form of adjustments in the landscape, enforcing demarcations of territory and control. And always they are co-shaped through the spread of texts, images and maps, influencing people’s perception of identity and belonging.

In order to study such phenomena there are two routes one could take. On the one hand there is the field of border studies, which according to Wilson focuses on ‘geopolitical and legal demarcations between nations and states’. On the other hand there is border theory, which aims at ‘understanding and expressing how identities can be better understood through reference to metaphors of borders’ (Wilson 2009, 1). Both fields are necessary, because as Van Houtum et al argue:

> Local id/entities have become informed by globalizing economic, political, cultural and technological development, but the various spatial b/orderings involved in identity-construction have certainly not become fully universalizable, either in form or content. (Van Houtum et al 2005, 2)

Therefore, my aim here is to combine the two, as I study the geopolitical developments influencing the cities of Vienna and Bratislava, and simultaneously how these developments are and have been interpreted over the years. As I was working on this topic, I have come to the conclusion that any such undertaking cannot solely focus on the present. Current conditions are inherently shaped by the past. This is a simple fact which is unfortunately often overlooked and hence leads to unrightful claims of newness. When it comes to border studies and theory, I find that this holds especially true. In the case of Vienna and Bratislava, where the border and the roles of the city in their respective state territory have been subject to so many massive changes, history definitely matters.

Ultimately I aim to contribute to an unfortunately scarce field of research on the Vienna-Bratislava area. Although more and more studies are published on the current developments in the region, only few of them offer a detailed historical analysis. Here I attempt to outline historical developments, and furthermore provide a theoretical perspective for the interpretation of these developments. By doing so, I offer an angle at long-term developments in the Vienna-Bratislava region which I hope can be used in the future for more detailed, or more on-the-ground research.

1…And adding to that of course, the intersectional dimensions of gender, skin colour, age and religious affiliation.
There are three issues that I will deal with here in the remaining part of this chapter. First, I will briefly sketch the specifics of the Vienna-Bratislava region. I will do so by interpreting both cities in their border context. Then, on a more theoretical level, I will more precisely formulate what I understand as territory, territoriality and territorialization, which will provide my approach to the subject. I will use theories by Robert Sack (1983) as well as Middell and Neumann (2010). I will clarify the theory with an historical example from the Austrian-Hungarian border region of Burgenland. Finally, I will define how I understand space and borders by drawing on the anthropologists Gupta and Ferguson as well the geographer and philosopher Henri Lefebvre.

1.1 The extraordinary cases of Vienna and Bratislava

In their introduction to the dossier on borders and cities in Europe and North-America in the Journal of Borderlands Studies, Sohn and Lara-Valencia (2013) state that in studies on border regions and cross-border cooperation the urban dimension has been under-researched. The authors bring to the fore how combining cities and borders in research feels ‘somewhat counter-intuitive’:

“As an institution of the nation-state, borders have long evoked the idea of peripheries or limits, of closedness and emptiness, whereas cities have always been associated with the notion of centrality (…), openness, and accumulation.

(Sohn and Lara-Valencia 2013, 181)

They explain how this perception comes forth out of the initial perception upheld by the Westphalian states, which deliberately hampered development on the fringes of their territory to prevent those regions to run beyond the control by the state centre. The functioning of the border regions as ‘military buffer zones’ has contributed to this status as well. Together this has led to a general low level of urbanization in border regions. There are however exceptions. These exceptions can be divided in two groups: either the city existed already before the border came into being, or the city developed as a consequence of the creation of the border (Sohn and Lara-Valencia 2013). The cases of Vienna and Bratislava however form an exception to these exceptions for two reasons.
Firstly, the two cities are not just border cities, they are the capitals of their nation-state. The combination of the two types forms a rare paradox. Because, as Donnan and Wilson explain, border regions (and thus border cities) are often regarded with suspicion by state bodies:

‘...because of the tensions residing in states’ attempts to impose national culture on all of this localities, and the ambivalence border regions often experience as they are both pushed away from national centres, as part of the centrifugal forces of being the state’s frontier with non-national others, and pulled in by the centripetal forces of the borderlands and state centres across their borderline. (Donnan and Wilson 1999, 53)

Thus, whereas most border cities are considered a part of the periphery, located dangerously far away from the state capital, Vienna and Bratislava are both border cities and state capitals in one. In the latter function, they form the locale where central state policies are formulated, in the former they co-shape the borderlands. As such they are part of an area that includes ‘extremely important symbolic territories of state image and control’ as a zone for first contact when entering the state, and that is simultaneously the locale where relationships with the other side are negotiated and where the differences between the one side and the other are perhaps most strongly blurred (Donnan and Wilson 1999: 13). Leaving aside the possible
consequences this situation has for the rest of the territory of Austria and the Slovak Republic, it definitely makes clear that Vienna and Bratislava have an ambiguous role to play.

Secondly, both cities had been united under one empire — although Bratislava was the capital of the Hungarian part of the Dual Monarchy — and performed empire-wide functions as well as regional centre functions. The collapse of the Empire after the First World War led to the first Czechoslovak Republic and a much reduced Austria. During the Second World War, Austria became part of Nazi-Germany and Slovakia was separated from the Czech lands to become a Nazi satellite state. After the war, it took Austria nearly 10 years to shed Allied supervision and Slovakia once again became part of the then communist Czechoslovakia. The Cold War that followed much influenced the relationship between Vienna and Bratislava, not in the last place because of the most prominent border of the European peninsula; the Iron Curtain. After 1989, the situation at the border changed again, transforming the role of Austria’s Vienna once more. Moreover, from 1993 Bratislava became the capital of the newly independent Republic of Slovakia. Soon thereafter Austria joined the EU, to be followed by its eastern neighbour in 2004. This again led to a different kind of border. The constant fluctuation of the geopolitical meaning of the border, has made these cities unique in their development and in their relation to each other². A more detailed description of the historical processes in both Slovakia and Austria and their ties will follow below in the history chapters.

Besides the paradoxical demands on both cities and their complicated history, another force is exercised upon them, namely the pressure to compete economically on a global scale. In the past decennia the global economy is often understood to be most strongly connected through cities and ran by them as well, as they operate as agglomerations of financial capital, based on knowledge-intensive industries. This conceptualization of cities as competing and connected ‘global cities’, famously introduced by Saskia Sassen (2005), seems to drive cities such as Vienna — which in the reviewed literature is portrayed as the main actor of the two — towards an ideology of expansion and development of metropolitan proportions. With the much smaller Bratislava only 60 km away, the desire for a metropolitan cross-border urban region is easily understood. The border itself in that respect is not so much configured as a barrier, but rather as a ‘chance for future development’ (Giffinger and Hamedinger 2013: 206).

However, innate to global cities, says Sassen, is a growing class divide, with a large proportion

²Not to mention the influence on the rural zone of Burgenland and Lower Austria, which lie between the two, and the former of which had belonged to Hungary for centuries (see for example Burghardt 1962; Heintel 2001).
of urban dwellers living close to or below the poverty line, working in the lowest parts of the service industry and making up a large part of activities in the informal economy (2005). Similarly, cross-border urban cooperation poses questions about power and equality as well, since urban cross-border development benefits from economic disparities between the one side and the other, a process which Decoville et al call ‘integration by polarization’ (2013). Although in their research comparison, Vienna and Bratislava are not that well integrated yet, as the polarization is not that high, the question remains how this will develop in the future. We will look at recent integration and cooperation efforts more closely in our final chapter.

1.2 Territoriality, the example of Burgenland in the late 1940s

To be able to understand the phenomenon of borders as part of a wider theoretical conceptualization we have to look at the concept of (human) territoriality. Robert Sack (1983) defines territoriality as ‘the attempt by an individual or group (x) to influence, affect, or control objects, people and relationships (y) by delimiting and asserting control of a geographic area. This area is the territory’ (56). He identifies eleven characteristics of territoriality. Three of them are relevant for our purpose here.

First, '[t]erritoriality occurs at all scales from the room to the nation-state. Territoriality is not an object but a relationship. A room may be a territory at one time and not at another' (56). For us, this means that the occurrence of borders and the spaces they delineate can vary over time and be interpreted differently by differing (sets of) actors. Moreover, it allows us to distinguish between different scales of action, such as the regional, national or local scale, as well as their interaction. This leads us to Sacks' second point, which explains that '[t]erritories most often occur hierarchically and are part of complex hierarchical organizations' (56). As such, territory is influencing access to knowledge and division of power and influence. Hierarchical territoriality would thus lead to an understanding of a complex interwoven system of hierarchically organized levels of territoriality ‘with the lowest and the smallest territory having the least knowledge, the highest having access to the most, by having access to the entire territory' (Sack 1983, 60).

Furthermore, Sack asserts that any 'x does not have to be in the territory to assert control over it' (1983, 56). This leads us to our third characteristic, namely that instead of by
presence alone, X can control an area in many different ways, 'including legal rights to property in land and cultural norms and prohibitions about usage of areas (Sack 1983, 56). With that, we can understand how territoriality works in a nation-state or an empire. We have to keep in mind though that in order to put territoriality in action, non-territorial action is required. In order to assert and maintain control monitoring might be necessary, as well as initial action to clarify to all parties that territoriality is in place (Sack 1983).

Sack continues to outline ten tendencies of territoriality. Three of them are necessary, the other seven can come into play in varying degrees depending on the specific context. We focus only on those three necessary tendencies.

1. **Territoriality involves a form of classification that is extremely efficient under certain circumstances.** Territoriality classifies at least in part by area, rather than by type. When we say that anything in this area or room is ours, or is off-limits to you, we are classifying or assigning things to a category such as 'ours' and 'not yours' according to their location in space. (...)

2. **Territoriality can be easy to communicate because it requires only one kind of marker or sign – the boundary.** The territorial boundary may be the only symbolic form that combines direction in space and a statement about possession or exclusion.

3. **Territoriality can be the most efficient strategy for enforcing control, if the distribution in space and time of the resources or things to be controlled fall somewhere between ubiquity and unpredictability.** (Sack 1983, 59, emphasis in original)

In the context of a state or empire as the governing factor of territorial container, we interpret these three point as follows: Exercising control and power over a certain area is easiest when the territory is economically stable and the type of market in place provide sufficient goods to its population to sustain itself. In such a case territoriality is a functioning mechanism to designate what is 'ours' and thus 'not-yours'. Hence, when a territory's stability is challenged, the existence of the territory itself might be in danger. Such challenges might come, for example, in the form of economic crisis, the upsurge of new socio-political ideas or a combination thereof. If and how challenges are solved depends on the context and the territorial structure and (hierarchical) organization.

A complicating factor for the above is the question who can appeal to what is 'ours'. Sack brings two options to the fore: the 'social definition of territory' and the 'territorial
definition of social relations' (1983, 61). The latter defines entitlement by being part of a territorial community by being physically present. The first indicates social ties to a territory which can stretch beyond the territory itself. Often we see a combination of the two (61). For example, I, the author, have Dutch citizenship, which allows me to take part in Dutch national elections even though I am not living in the Dutch territory. Simultaneously, I am allowed to take part in Viennese local elections because I am registered here as an inhabitant of the city. So, my Dutch entitlement to vote runs along the social definition of territory, whereas my Viennese vote demonstrates the territorial definition of my social relationship with the city community. This is the case, because both Austria and the Netherlands are part of a larger territorial organization, the European Union. The latter is a territory in which I am both physically present and am tied to socially.

Now, my personal territorial affiliations might seem rather clear, it can become a lot more complex. The different ways to define the relationship between territories and ties can be used to manipulate territoriality. For example, Pittaway (2012) brings to the fore how after the Anschluss in 1938 Austria's borderlands were rearranged. Not only was Petržalka annexed, which was up to then part of Bratislava and situated on the left bank of the Danube, the make up of the border province of Burgenland changed as well. It had already changed its political affiliation after 1918, when the former Hungarian counties in the province were attributed to Austria. From 1939 onward the northern and central district became part of the Gau of Niederdonau, while the remainder henceforth belonged to Steiermark.

This led to issues with two groups: the Magyar speaking communities in Austria and the German speaking communities in Hungary. In the late 1930s territorial authorities in the region tried improve their grip on their territory. In order to do so they argued from a social definition of territory. This resulted in the argument that all German speakers – as such classified as ethnic Germans – should live on German territory. Similarly, all Magyar speakers were supposed to live on Hungarian territory. A population swap was proposed, so to purify the region on both sides of the border. This however proved more complicated. The Magyar populations in the different villages in the Austrian Burgenland did not identify with Hungary. They did not see their language as a significant indicator for social ties to Hungarian territory. Instead they identified on a village level, which happened to be situated in Austrian territory (Pittaway 2012). Thus they did not want to move: they used a territorial definition of social ties.
On the other hand, the Germans in Burgenland, speaking for the Germans on Hungarian territory, employed a social definition of territory. The proposed swap should not take place, they argued, because that would imply the loss of potential German territorial claims across the border. Thus also displaying a reverse argumentation for the social definition of territory: when a place is inhabited by Germans, it must be(come) part of German territory.

These arguments reached up all the way to the highest level of the territorial hierarchy. It was decided in Berlin that potential expansion was more important and hence the population swap in Burgenland and the Hungarian lands did not take place. In the words of Pittaway this example thus demonstrates 'how … borderland spaces … were reproduced through the sometimes conflicting territorializing logics that were produced by nation states, their ruling regimes and the nationalisms that legitimized them' (2012, 149).

Middell and Naumann (2010) describe such processes of territorialisation and territorial regimes as ‘the assertion of political sovereignty against a plurality of spatial references by the regulation of flows and interactions’ (162). The negotiations which took place in Burgenland as well as along the entire Austrian border in the past 150 years, we can thus interpret as a sign of changing territorial regimes in the area. The government of territory through the regulation of such flows and interactions is what Baerenholdt (2013) refers to as *governmobility*. He explains how a focus on government as only controlling spatial fixedness renders the power infused in mobility invisible. The concept of governmobility allows to examine how (cross-border) mobility
actually ‘has been fundamental in making and bing together societies, nations, cities and regions’ (20). In other words, studying the way that cross-border cooperation is handled on a governmental level can help us uncover processes of identity making and power constellations. Keith and Pile (1993) quote Edward Soja (1983, 6) when they state that ‘relations of power and discipline are inscribed into the apparently innocent spatiality of social life, ... human geographies become filled with politics and ideology’ (4). Hence, the way the border region is viewed and how the other side is viewed, is never neutral; it is filled with power. However, it is precisely in the border regions, which contain the official boundaries, where territorial regimes are hardest to carry out. In academia, such complications have for a long time been ignored though. It is to this issue we now turn.

1.3 The production of space and others in the borderlands

In 1992, Gupta and Ferguson illustrated how space has been treated as unproblematic for a long time. Although they speak about anthropology specifically, I think it is safe to say that, leaving geography aside, their point (still) holds true for other disciplines as well. In daily speech and the media this is even more so. The authors describe how our world is mistakenly presented and understood as “naturally” discontinuous spaces’, and as such erroneously has been the basis of much research. In describing the world and places, be it on maps or in words, patches of land (and sky and water) are marked and fused together with groups of people who are believed to be a community, a society or a nation(-state). According to Gupta and Ferguson this ‘assumed isomorphism of space, place and culture’ lead to four main problems: it homogenizes people living in a certain locale, whilst most cultural differences are often traced back again to coming from another place. Second, it leaves little room for the actuality of the post-colony, whilst it is there that it is very clear this isomorphism is problematic. Third, the assumption of discontinuous space, filled with distinct societies obscures the reality of hierarchical interconnections and asymmetrical power relations, which in fact have always existed. Finally, and most important to us, relating to the world as made of out of distinct patches, as it is represented on many maps, turns the border into an obvious line. On this line, one culture, nation(-state) and society stops, and another one begins. This is not the case:

*The fiction of cultures as discrete object-like phenomena occupying discrete spaces becomes*
implausible for those who inhabit the borderlands. Related to border inhabitants are those who live a life of border crossing – migrant workers, nomads, and members of the transnational business and professional elite. What is the ‘culture’ of farm workers who spend half a year in Mexico and half a year in the United States. Finally, there are those who cross borders more or less permanently – immigrants, refugees, exiles and expatriates. (Gupta and Ferguson 1992; 7)

Following Lefebvre and his understanding of three types of space, we will approach the border as a spatial phenomenon first. Lefebvre’s tripartite understanding of space is made up out of a. spatial practices, i.e. how we experience space with our senses; b. representations of space, which are the maps, drawings and ideas of architects, urban planners, and policy makers; and c. representational spaces, which relates to how we interpret space (Lefebvre 1991; 38-9).

Van Houtum et al (2005) explain how Lefebvre’s concept of space applies to borders. They bring to the fore that traditionally the experienced space gains the most attention. For borders this means that in academia and the media the focus lay with visible border phenomena such as walls, fences and map demarcations. They argue however that ‘crucial to an understanding of borders is not so much their material morphology, but the various forms of interpretation and representation that they embody’ (Van Houtum et al 2005, 2).

When applied to the border region between Vienna and Bratislava we understand that spatial practices thus relate to seeing how the road expands with additional lanes as you drive up to the point where the border checks used to be. The road itself and the border checks were built there, because governmental powers planned them there. Their decisions were based on their study of their maps which are in themselves already representations of space, as they were developed by cartographers with a certain aim in mind. Finally, driving towards those abandoned border checkpoints might bring back unpleasant memories of endless border control waiting time spent in anxiety. Or passing them might emphasize the feeling that you are free and crossing into another country on your way to a holiday; the checkpoint and its surrounding is the physical representation of meaning, which can be different for each person who travels through it. It is a particular place, ‘the distinct space where people live [or move through]; it encompasses both the idea and the actuality of where things are’ (Donnan and Wilson 1999; 9).

To summarize, we can now understand how space is produced and how that comes to life in
any particular place. Furthermore, we can conclude that territorially is one of the factors that plays a part in the production of space. With these two elements, it becomes clear that nation(-states) are not a-historic, inert and place-bound. Instead, any kind of conceptualization or perception is dependent on historic processes, what is remembered of these processes, spatial practices, social surroundings and personal context for each individual.

1.4 Set up of this thesis

In this paper we look at three crucial periods in time where the regime of territoriality changed: the coming into being of the Slovak nation and the collapse of the Habsburg Empire, the Cold War and the EU accession of Slovakia and Austria. We will focus on the effects of these changes for Bratislava and Vienna, by examining instances of identity making as analyzed by other researchers of the region. The reliance on secondary literature of course limits our insights, as information has already been filtered. However, the large historical scope of this paper, combined with the time and space dedicated, did not allow for field research or the study of primary historical sources.

In the chapters to follow I will describe the historical processes that have heavily influenced both Vienna and Bratislava, as well as the relationship between the two. Chapter A will explain the development of the (Czecho)Slovak Republic and the role of Bratislava. This will demonstrate how the long nineteenth century has shaped Bratislava, its population and its self-image as well as its relation to Vienna. This helps us to see how territoriality can come into place.

Chapter B focuses on the first three decades of the twentieth century. We will examine the identity of Vienna and how the crumbling of the Austrian-Hungarian Empire has influenced it. By looking at the city's promotion towards touristic audiences, we will gain insight in the Vienna's self-perception and its conflicting internal dynamics. It will become clear that the changes of the territorial regime changed Vienna itself.

Leaving the difficulties of the Second World War to experts in the field, we move directly to the Cold War period in Chapter C. We will take a closer look at the relations between Austria and its neighbours to the east and how the two cities of Vienna and Bratislava related to each other in that period. This chapter will clarify how border regions hold a special role in
territoriality and can both reinforce territorial disputes as well as mitigate them.

The last, and most contemporary, chapter D looks at how the accession to the European Union (EU) has influenced both Austria and Slovakia. It will summarize the economic effects and elaborate on the consequences for the meaning of space, and how that relates to identity. By doing so, it will give an insight how hierarchical territorial organisation shapes local level decision-making, identities and the production of space.

In all chapters I will place special emphasis on identity making, based both on the social definition of territory as well as territorial definition of social relations. We will see that both definitions contribute to the production of space, as it interacts with what is already there to experience, how it is then conceptualized and how it is interpreted.

By doing so, we will see that both cities are part of hierarchically organized regimes of territoriality, with scales varying in size from the Austrian-Hungarian empire and later European Union to regional pacts, then breaking down into nation-states, border regions and finally cities and their suburbs. The interaction between the different scales co-shape the identity construction on all levels and ultimately give shape, both physically and metaphorically to the cities of Vienna and Bratislava.
In this chapter I aim to shed a light on the birth of Bratislava, and its role as a city in the former nation-state of Czechoslovakia, whilst being so close to the border. I think that a city's history and the perception thereof can much effect attitudes of its inhabitants as well as that of outsiders. Furthermore I deem social and geo-political historical contextualization of a region highly important for anyone who wants to understand a certain place. Especially when considering that all these developments and their different meanings are packed into space, in all three understandings that Lefebvre supplies us with.

In 1918, after the First World War ended, the Czechoslovak Republic (ČSR) became a fact. As the concept of national self-determination had spread in the decades before, the Czechs and Slovaks in the former Austro-Hungarian Empire found themselves compelled to cooperate in order to form a majority vis-à-vis the presence of a large German and Hungarian population. With Prague as the largest, as the most industrialized and understood as the most modern city in the territory, Pressburg became the state's second capital. In breaking with its earlier identity as the crowning city and the capital of the Hungarian empire it was to be called Bratislava from March 1919 onwards. This was the first time in history that Slovakia, as part of a republic, was imparted with political autonomy and rule. None of this however, was apparent or based on clear-cut and obvious decisions. At the time, there was no city which was self-evidently to become the Slovak capital, as there was no entity which was self-evidently Slovakia. Thus, according to Mongu, the founding of Bratislava as the capital of the Slovak part of Czechoslovakia was closely connected with Slovak identity building (Mongu 2012; Urbán 2012; Bugge 2004).

My first purpose for this chapter will therefore be the exploration of what lay the foundation on which Slovak identity and nationhood was built. In order to do so, I will elaborate on two factors which both initially hampered but later enhanced these processes. The first factor is language development, which first divided Slovaks, but later became a successful instrument in creating unity. The second factor is the role of the city of Pressburg,
which at first failed to function as a Slovak centre, but later as Bratislava became intensely ‘Slovakised’. In discussing this development, I will also take into account the role of Vienna, and how it functioned in the self-perception of Bratislava/Pressburg. My second purpose is to briefly outline geopolitical developments of the time, namely the birth of the ČSR and the first Slovak Republic and what role Bratislava/Pressburg played in that. Finally, I will briefly outline what happened to Slovakia during the Second World War, although there is no space to deal with this in detail. The outcomes of these three purposes will demonstrate that territory, people, culture and nationhood are indeed not isomorphic, but created, and shifting and changing over time, just like Gupta and Ferguson have argued.

2.1 The basis of the Slovak nation

2.1.1 Ethnic awareness

Although it took a long time indeed for Slovak groups to unite as one nation, and the founding of Bratislava did have a big impact as we will see later, I follow Nurmi here, who argues that there were certain elements in place that made it possible for a Slovak identity to come into being at all. Historically, she explains, the Slovak groups in Hungarian territory benefited from the Hungarian presence, as these rulers protected the outer boundaries of their lands. This led to the preservation of different ethnic groups inside the Hungarian territory who independently might have been usurped by conquering forces. Furthermore, as the landscape throws up many hurdles such as large mountain ranges and wide forests, roads were difficult to maintain and communication lines were poor. This led to a wide variety of local customs and dialects. Nevertheless, the Slovaks did differ from their German and Magyar neighbours and this difference contributed to an awareness of similarity amongst Slovak groups. So we see that during the Middle Ages in some towns Slovaks united to fight for their position there vis-à-vis the Germans and Magyars. However, as societies were highly stratified, this did not mean all Slovaks were united. The matter of fact was that indeed it were mostly Magyars and Germans in higher positions. Up to the 19th century most Slovaks were peasants or small artisans, whereas Germans and Magyars made up the ruling and trading classes, along with Jewish elites. This meant that mid-nineteenth century when Slovaks started to stand up for their rights as a national group they were arguing for social equality as well (Nurmi 1999).

The Slovak struggle for acknowledgement was not easy however. After all, nationhood is
a modern invention, which was irrelevant for most people in history. Inspired by the French revolution and German Romanticism, different groups in Central Europe did start to pick up on the topic though. Despite the slumbering consciousness of such a thing as ‘Slovakness’, in Slovak circles this development was hindered by several factors. I will deal here with two of those factors. Firstly, I will discuss Slovak language development, because the people involved in the codification of language viewed this not only as a literary or artistic undertaking, but as a political project as well. Some of them fulfilled key positions in political negotiations with both Austria and Hungary. The second factor I will elaborate on is the role of Pressburg. As Kirschbaum points out the lack of a strong Slovak ethnic awareness and language had much to do with the absence of a strong Slovak centre, such as the Czechs had in Prague (1995, 95).

2.1.2 Language development

Slovak language development for a long time ran along religious lines. The protestants of the late sixteenth century had developed *bibličtina*, a Slovak based on Czech, in which they translated the Bible. This language however was far removed from the people and served mainly clerical purposes. The Jesuit Catholics on the other hand had created *jezuitská slovenčina*, also known as Cultural Western Slovak, in the 1630s. Although this language was also based on Czech, it held more Slovak vernacular. It was on this language that the priest Anton Bernolák based his 1780s Slovak, which is known as *bernoláčina* and is recognized as the first codified standard Slovak. However, it never got the chance to spread, as the Josephinian reforms under which Bernolák got the chance to develop his Slovak soon came to a halt and were followed by an intensification of repressive rule. On top of that, the language at that point did not appeal to all those Slovaks who spoke their own dialects and protestant clergy was not interested since they had their own *bibličtina*. The Catholic Church was hard to enthuse as well, as by now the first current of Magyarisation had set in and many parishes were under Magyar control. They were of course not happy to see a language develop, and thus potentially a group of subjects emancipate, in times when Magyar nationalism was on the rise. Nevertheless, *bernoláčina* was essential for the cultural development and awareness of the Slovak nation. Ján Hollý, who is known to be the father of Slovak poetry, wrote his translations of classic epical poems as well as the first epic Slovak works about mythical and/or legendary Slovak figures such as Cyril and Methodius in *bernoláčina*. These poems, in combination with the *bernoláčina*
historical works written by Juraj Fandly were a foundational factor in the development of a cultural sensitivity for Slovak identity (Brock 1976; Kirschbaum 1995; Schönfeld 2000).

In the first half of the 19th century, the two religious camps started to join forces. The Lutherans that had continued to look to the Czechs for support, found themselves continuously not been taken seriously, neither in issues of language nor in other matters. Others that had held on to biblica had come to admit that this language would never play an important role outside the church. The Catholic adherers of bernolácina also had to acknowledge that this version of Slovak would never appeal to those in the east. Moreover, all participants in the debate realized that the ever growing influence of the Hungarians and their project of Magyar assimilation would pose a big threat to the life of a divided nation. Not only had the Hungarian inspector of the Lutheran church, Count Károly Zay, appointed Magyar as the only and official language of the church in 1840, four years later the Hungarian Diet replaced Latin with Hungarian as well. It was with these issues in mind that both Jan Kollar (1793 – 1852) and his pupil Ľudovít Štúr (1815 – 1856) started to combine their literary aspirations with the larger political project of building a strong Slovak nationhood.

Jan Kollár was a famous poet and one of the main figures in the development of Slovak nationalism. After he completed his education in Bratislava, he moved to Jena to study there at university. Here he got in contact with the ideas of the Romantics, most pronouncedly the thoughts of Herder. Under the influence of this philosopher Kollár came to connect language, soil and people as the trinity that underlies a nation. Together with his friend Pavel Šafárik, an important (literary) historian and ethnographer, he developed the concept of Pan-Slavism. Kollárs Romantic contributions to the literary repertoire of the Slovaks have been of utmost importance for the development of the Slovak nation. In 1824 he published the epic poem ‘The daughter of Sláva’ (Slávy Dcera), as well as a ‘National Songbook, or secular songs of the Slovaks in Hungary’ in 1835. His goal with the latter was to publish works in the language that people actually spoke and his publications were very well received, especially under the younger generation. (Kirschbaum 1995; Brock 1976).

As Kollar opposed the assimilation policies of the Hungarians, he mainly aimed at the acknowledgement of the Slovaks as an independent cultural nation. However, unlike his younger counterpart Ľudovít Štúr, he would always be a proponent of a Czechoslovak identity, continue to turn to the Czechs for acknowledgement and support and finally somewhat
abandon the Slovak idea all together. As such, he came to disprove of the separatist nationalists who strived for an independent political Slovak nation, which he reckoned too radical.

L’udovit Stúr, like Kollár inspired by the Romantics from his study time in Halle, and his fellow students and friends started to work on a new Slovak language based on central Slovak dialects, which could be understood both in the east and in the west. They created štúrovčina. The discussions about this form were not only held within the own Lutheran lyceum or Catholic seminary, but travelled between people of all denominations journals, publication and (student) societies, who would not only sit, read and write, but also convene in the countryside at locations deemed important for the Slovak nation. Furthermore, Stúr, who had become a leader in the Slovak nationalist movement by then, was strongly politically involved and engaged in the struggle against Magyarization in the church and in the revolutionary turmoil presented a petition for Slovak rights and territory to the Austrian emperor in Vienna, the outcome of which rendered the Slovaks disappointingly little result in the end (Brock 1976; Kirschbaum 1995, Schönfeld 2000).

Then finally, after years of internal debate, quarrel and different versions of Slovak – and during which Kollár uttered that Stúr and his friends were nothing but bookish and inexperienced students – both Catholics and Lutherans agreed on a final version of new Slovak in 1852, drawn up by Stúr’s friend and critic Martin Hattala (Brock 1976). This language unity represents a key moment in the development of the Slovak nation as it helped to replace a mainly religious and/or local affinity with a basic common Slovak ethnic and national identity. Up to this day Stúr and his involvement in language and nation-building, as well as Kollár’s poetry are still part of Slovak high school curriculum.

So, we see that the development of the Slovak language, the texts that it produced and the people involved in the process formed important building blocks for Slovak identity.

2.2 From Pressburg to Bratislava

2.2.1 The People
Before 1919, the city of Pressburg, Pozsony or Prešporok as it was called by its German, Magyar or Slovak inhabitants respectively, was known to be a multi-ethnic city. And although the Hungarian Pozsony was the official name, the other versions, especially Pressburg were in popular use as well. Bratislava was not in use at all. The city itself had for a long time belonged
to Hungary and had served as its capital from 1536 to 1784. It was only then when the Ottoman occupation ended, that state institutions were slowly moved to Buda and Pozsony changed into a hub for industrialization in the northwest of Hungary (Bugge 2004).

One of the reasons that Kirschbaum (1995, 95) points out for the lack of a strong Slovak ethnic awareness and language is the absence of a strong Slovak centre, like the Czechs had in Prague. With Pressburg being one of the region’s largest cities, it could be expected that this city would be that centre. It was not however.

Babejova supplies us with three reasons for this lack of Slovak ethnic identity in Pressburg. First of all, most Slovaks in the city were small artisans and labourers and had little interest for nationalist issues beyond a basic love for their vernacular. Second, it is very likely that those Slovaks who did belong to the upper class and/or came in to power as urbanization slowly progressed, let go of their Slovak identity and adopted a German or Hungarian one over the years. After all, it is not hard to imagine that also in towns in the 18th and 19th century, people either over- or undercommunicated their ethnic identity depending on the situation and their needs, through the usage of cultural practices, such as language. Hence, the presence of the Slovak language was therefore mainly noticeable in shops and on the market, when the farmers from the surrounding rural areas would come to town to trade. Ethnic identity in the censuses at the time was often determined by what was considered to be the mother tongue. Since people in Pressburg were often bi- or even multilingual, they would rather use whatever fitted their needs best at that moment, or what they felt reflected their (aspired) social situation best. Finally, Babejova’s third argument is that in the city people did not so much identify along ethnic and hence linguistic lines, instead they identified with the city and as such saw themselves as Pressburgers; this in contrast with other city or rural identities (Babejova 2003). We can see in the anecdote from the Pressburger Zeitung of 1919 that Kováč refers to:

Two “Pressburger” met in the street.
“What nationality will you declare on the census? Are you a German?” the first one asks.
“I am not a German,” answers the second.
“Will you declare yourself a Magyar?”
“No, I am not a Magyar.”
“Then you must be a Slovak.”
“No, I am not a Slovak.”
“And what nationality are you actually?”
“I am a Pressburgeaner.”

(Kováč 2004, 229)

Although the pressure of Magyarization was certainly felt, and had a strong assimilating effect on smaller and less well identified and limited nations, such as the Slovak, multilingualism prevailed in Pressburg. Even after Hungarian became the official language of the Diet in 1844, many bureaucrats continued to use German which, alongside Latin, had been the language of communication. Similarly, the theatre of Pressburg, which hosted both German and Hungarian performances was forced to reduce the season of the German theatre in favour of Hungarian companies. Furthermore, despite, or maybe because of, efforts to rid the town’s look of signs of multilingualism and the attempts to improve incorrect Hungarian shop signs, non-Magyar ethnic identities were not that easily oppressed. In fact, it was in this period of increasing Magyarization that the need for a distinct Slovak language was felt stronger and stronger and nearly ten years after the implementation of Hungarian in the Diet, resulted in the publication of an official uniform Slovak language in 1852 (Babejova 2003; Brock 1976; Engemann 2012).

Whilst the establishment of this official language had an impact in the conception of Slovak identity, the city of Pressburg remained multi-ethnic, also after its renaming in 1919. Those who identified as German still held the most positions in government as well as in the cultural sector. However, Mongu holds that soon a ‘Slovakization’ set in and the number of German inhabitants sank. This Slovakization largely had to do with the industrialisation of the city. This process started around 1870 and drew in Slovak people from the country side. From 1918 onwards, the growth of the city and that of the Slovak population, was probably helped by the Czech reformers sent from Prague who were supporting the build up of a Slovak government and other institutional bodies such as the Comenius University, which was founded in 1919. When looking at the censuses of the time we see that in 1921 the city counted a total amount of inhabitants of 98 189; 25 837 were German, 27 481 were Slovak and 20 731 were counted as Magyar. In 1930 Bratislava’s population had grown to 123 844 people, of which 32 801 were German and over 60 000 were Slovak (Mongu 2012, 80). However, as Bugge states ‘such figures […] should be read less as statements about the distribution of three welldefined national groups than as testimony to the general laxity or opportunism with regard
to declared ethnicity among the city’s inhabitants’ (2004, 215).

Nevertheless, as the Slovak and Czech population grew, another form of social differentiation came stronger to the fore, namely that of old inhabitants vis-à-vis new inhabitants. The latter were the Czechs and Slovaks (or Czechoslovaks as they were called in the press), the former mainly the Germans and Magyars. The first group was annoyed with the old inhabitants, especially the small group of Slovaks who in their eyes were stuck in patriotic Hungarian mentality and would not give up Hungarian language. The old German and Magyar inhabitants of the city did not identify along the ethnic or nation-state lines though. Again, they would identify as ‘Pressburgers’ rather than German, Magyar or Bratislava people, for that matter. In order to keep the peace between this different affiliations the new Pressburg government set out to have three different official languages, with Slovak as the first, but still plenty of room for German and Magyar. Still, the new government did use other ways to increase Slovak presence. Hungarian and Austrian statues and symbols were removed from the streets, and Slovak ones were put up. The same happened to street names (Bugge 2004).

The process of Slovakization did continue over the decades to come. More and more Slovaks and Czechs from the countryside move into the city; the latter only to be expelled again in 1939. After World War II the Jewish population had been eradicated and soon thereafter the Germans were expelled. Once the communists took over after the war and expelled everything middle class, the whole make-up of the city had severely changed. Or as Bugge mentions when he quotes Lipták: ‘Bratislava remained, but the Bratislava people [...] got lost’ (Bugge 2004, 226).

In these developments in Pressburg/Bratislava we can see how Lefebvre’s production of space works out in reality. The struggle over who belongs in the city is made visible through changes in the street image, by removing and placing other signifiers and symbols as well as through attempts to eradicate some languages and reinforcing others. Language in itself then is loaded with meaning; what is spoken in a certain place co-determines the meaning of that place. Language becomes a boundary, an indicator to point out who belongs where, and as such is an instrument of territoriality.

2.2.2 The city’s self-perception
Back in the interwar period though, the Germans still determined a large part of Pressburg cultural life. It was this group who partially determined the image of the city. Mongu, Urbán
and Motyková all use that argument to explain why they particularly look at German periodicals to understand the city’s self image in the interwar period. All three studies analyse how German publications, of which there were about 90 different ones in the 1920s and 1930s, build a Slovak identity. However, when studying their analyses it becomes clear that the identity built in those newspapers and journals is not as much Slovak as it is urban. Pressburger identity, or now Bratislava identity, thus still runs along urban lines, and is based on ideas of what is urban for the German inhabitants, not on what is Slovak. I think this indicates a research gap. It would be very interesting to see how Slovak publications dealt with Slovak identity. This might also help to enlarge the view of Slovakia as a whole. How do other cities view Bratislava, for example? However, since I do not have space for this here, I will focus on what the aforementioned authors conclude when it comes to Bratislava’s self-image and especially how the publications under their scrutiny relate Bratislava to Vienna.

Urbán (2012) analyses two literary magazines published between 1920 and 1921, called *Heimat* and *Das Riff*. The first magazine draws mainly on German and Hungarian literature, which is explained by its interpretation of *Heimat*: ‘Was Deutsche und Magyaren gemeinsam geschaffen, das wollen sie auch gemeinsam pflegen und erhalten – ihre Heimat’ (What Germans and Magyars create together, is that what they also want to cultivate and preserve – their Homeland). Furthermore, this magazine describes Pressburg (not Bratislava!) as the obvious predestined centre for Hungarian Germainhood, due to its location, its connections to east and west, its political power and its eminent culture. In the fragments used by Urbán this magazine only relates to Germany, not Austria or Vienna. *Das Riff* does not relate back to Austro-Hungarian relations, but is focused on the formulation of a more worldly perspective. It offers both local authors as well as Czech, Hungarian and French ones. And we even find a contribution about Slovak folk songs. Thus we see that in these two magazines who co-shape the landscape of cultural literary life in Bratislava do not allow a lot of space for the formulation of Slovak identity. Instead they focus either on identities of the past or the desire for an interconnected European-wide cultural identity.

The two other publications, by Motyková (2012) and Mongu (2012), have analysed how Bratislava has been portrayed and imagined in two German periodicals, the *Bratislavaer Zeitung am Abend* and the *Pressburger Presse* from the period between 1920 and 1924. Mongu explains how in the first newspaper most articles about the city related to the new city of
Bratislava and what it should be like. When the newspaper wrote about the city before 1918 it would speak of Pressburg. In this latter case the city is often seen as related to Vienna, as well as both its citizens. Mongu quotes:

‘Mit dem Pressburger Kraxelhuber konnte sich der Wiener Spiessbürger sich stets ganz ungestört unterhalten, und umgekehrt machte jener keine Vorwürfe wegen seines Mangels an Pressburger Bodenständigkeit. Instinkt und Instinkt verstehen sich immer leicht’. Mongu 2012, 84

(With the Pressburg Kraxelhuber the Vienna Spiessbürger could always speak untroubledly, and the other way around no one made accusations because of he is not as down-to-earth as Pressburgers are. Instinct and instinct always get along well. MdK.)

In other words, despite the small differences the people of Vienna and those of the old Pressburg are the same type. The Pressburger Kraxelhuber who according to Van Duin (2009, 72) is the archetypical Pressburg German or “the opportunist and somewhat provincial Pressburger [who] had a great ability to adapt to the situation of the moment and the powers that be’, and the Viennese Spiessbürger who I understand as the archetype for the bourgeois philistines of Vienna, understand each very well. When looking at the clipping that Motyková took from that same article, we see that this understanding might very well have to do with the connectedness of the two cities:

‘Ich erinnere mich noch gut an eine Zeit, wo die gemütlichen Wiener, als sie gelegentlich die melodischen Namen ihrer einundzwanzig Bezirken herzählten, keinen Anstand nahmen, Pressburg als den zweiundzwanzigsten anzuführen. Die Brigittenau und die Vorstadt Pressburg waren im Ideenkreis des waschechten Wiener Spiessbürgers in einer und derselben Gedankensphäre aufgelagert’. (Motyková 2012, 99)

(I remember the times when the jovial Viennese, when they would occasionally recount the melodious names of their twenty-one districts, held no scruples to mention Pressburg as the twenty-second. Brigittenau and the suburb of Pressburg were in the imagination of the true Viennese Spiessbürger understood in one and the same thought sphere. MdK.)
This natural understanding was bound to change though when the two cities became separated by the new national border. Not only did the people of Vienna bemoan the difficulty that is now bestowed upon them every time they go to visit ‘its little sister’ Pressburg, which was a natural, casual undertaking, the whole city changes. Pressburg is no longer Vienna’s Vorstadt (suburb, more or less), instead it has become a regional centre in a whole new nation-state. Similarly, Vienna was no longer the royal capital of an empire, it now merely was the state capital of Austria.

For the city the collapse of the Empire and the founding of the new state meant that it had to reinvent and reorient itself. The invention of a new identity was reflected in the usage of metaphors as explored by Motygová. She describes how Pressburg was described as a wealthy but sleeping provincial city, unimportant, stagnating and narrow-minded, whilst the new Bratislava was seen as a modern, ever-developing centre that is waking up and serves as a gateway on the border between Orient and Occident (2012). Reorientation meant that Vienna (and Budapest) were no longer the obvious standards to look and live up to, instead the city now started to mirror and compete with Prague. Nevertheless, in its ambition to become a major city (‘Gross-Bratislava’), it often related its city life to that of metropoles like London, Paris and indeed at the time Vienna (Mongu 2012).

In summary we find that Bratislava originally was a multi-ethnic city, that did not concern itself so much with the territory it found itself in as it did with its own changing role as a city. Though struggles for power and acknowledgement amongst its inhabitants did run along ethnic lines sometimes, it can be claimed that this was for a large part due to the intersection with class and religion. Thus we see that the voices who created the image of Bratislava in public debate, base their definitions in relation to the space around them. It would have been very valuable to have reports on the perspective of the Slovak speakers living in and visiting the city, as they might have related the city more to the Slovak hinterlands, such we have seen as we discussed Slovak language development. This might have painted a different picture of the role and perception of Bratislava and the experience of space and belonging.
2.3 The Slovak road to the first Czechoslovak Republic

2.3.1 Conditions and hindrances

By the mid-nineteenth century the champions of the cause of the Slovak nation, like L’udovít Stúr, had been fighting for national equality with the Magyars within the Hungarian state. However after the Hungarian revolution of 1848 which resulted in the Austro-Hungarian Compromise (der Ausgleich) and the Dual Monarchy, and the growing Hungarian nationalism and Magyarization, this national equality became more difficult to obtain. One of the policies influenced by Magyarization was for example the increasingly Magyar school system, within which Slovak vernacular and learning did no longer have a place. Furthermore, illiteracy amongst Slovaks was still high. Another reason which made it hard for the Slovak nation to come into existence was the rigid social order upon which society was based. Although Slovaks in general usually made up the lower social strata, in comparison with Magyars and Germans, the inner divisions were not to be underestimated. Moreover, many Slovaks in the higher echelons of society often took up Hungarian language and identity. Others decided to leave the region all together and emigrated to the United States. All-in-all this led to a rather passive Slovak movement by the early twentieth century (Nurmi 1999).

However, some Slovaks went to Prague for their university education and got in contact with Tomáš Masaryk (1850 -1937) and his Czechoslovak ideas. These contacts led to closer ties between the Czechs and Slovaks and made it increasingly possible for Slovaks to imagine a move away from Hungarian rule. Voluntary organizations and non-political societies, such as women’s groups or cultural associations also fostered this awareness. Still, this did not mean that the idea was accepted, viewed as realistic or well-spread throughout Slovakia. Furthermore, the community of emigrated Slovaks also fed back ideas through their newspapers which they sent to their families. Then in 1918 when the war drew to an end, bands of still armed Slovak military returnees as well as civilians violently went out on a rampage looting and pillaging with their actions mainly aimed at the former Hungarian (and Jewish) establishment. In their doing, it was demonstrated that the Hungarian Empire no longer had the power, means or personnel to keep its subjects in control (Nurmi 1999).

It was in this chaotic times in which many ideas about class solidarity and national autonomy were gaining momentum and former rulers were exhausted and divested of their
power and monopoly of violence, that Slovak independence was declared. This happened only two days after Prague declared Czech independence on 28th of October 1918. Nurmi emphasizes that these two events happened independently from each other. It was not clear at all that these two declarations would lead to a Czechoslovak Republic. In fact, this was cooked up by Czech representatives who were in Paris in the period just before the official Peace Conference started (Nurmi 1999, 19).

The Czechoslovak National Council who were to represent Czechs and Slovaks at the Conference, did not communicate about its actions with Slovakia’s main politicians. Instead, the Council’s main spoke persons consisted of prominent politicians, namely Masaryk, Beneš and Slovak immigrant Štefánik, who all three had always been in favour of the Czechoslovak idea. The first two were to become the Republic’s first presidents. Despite this lack of Slovak voices in the issue, the Czechoslovak Republic as a new state did win the approval and support of the ‘Big Four.’ Thus the Council became the ‘de jure government of the de facto still non-existent state’ (Nurmi 2009, 20). Nevertheless, as Bugge (2004) brings to the fore, despite the brand new government sitting in Prague, other power centres competed for the final say over Slovakia as well. Budapest refused to give up, the Slovak National Council in Martin maintained an independent separatist line and in Žilina the Prague-supported and self-acclaimed ‘Minister with Full Power to Administer Slovakia’ Vavro Šrobár fought for a piece of political power pie too.

2.3.2. The violent international struggle for a Czechoslovakia
Regardless of what cultural resemblance the Czechs and Slovaks might have or have not had – which informs the social definition of territory –, the main reasons for the founding of the ČSR of all involved parties were tactical ones. Initially, many Slovaks did not see the point of a Czechoslovak state. On the one hand, many people were poorly informed, and on the other hand many people in Slovakia were Magyar or Slovak Magyar sympathizers (‘Magyarones’). The Czechoslovak movement thus found a lot less cooperative people than expected and the build-up of a new administration proved difficult in war-torn lands, raided by violent gangs of former soldiers. Hungary did not give up its territory that easily either. Especially early on in the formation of the new republic the Hungarian authorities called upon their followers in Slovakia and mobilized reserve troops still present in the region to defend ‘Upper Hungary’ against the
new Czechoslovakia. As a consequence, Prague sent a somewhat unwilling army to Slovakia. Once the communist Belá Kun came into power in Hungary, Prague actively attacked the region to ‘free’ the country of Hungarian rule. Reception of this action on the Slovak side strongly differed, many saw their supposed rescuers as perpetrators instead. It was only after France came to the support of the Czechoslovak troops that the near-victors of Hungary were brought to defeat and the region became pacified (Zückert 2008).

By then, joining in a Republic with the Czechs seemed Slovakia’s best option, as Béla Kun’s new communist regime in Hungary, the general upsurge of bolshevism and German growing power were large and threatening forces for such a new and still fragile nation. For the Czechs, the inclusion of Slovakia economically meant the growth of access to resources, waterways (the Danube) and a new market. Politically it entailed the consolidation of general Slavic presence in the face of large German groups. For the Allied parties who agreed to the new state, it meant having a partner in instable Central Europe, and for France in particular, a gateway to Romania. For the parties in the west it would also come to mean a buffer vis-à-vis Russia and an army branch in Siberia where Czech military troops were still present (Zückert 2008; Nurmi 2009).

### 2.3.3. The new capital of Bratislava

Meanwhile, as demarcation lines between Czechoslovak and Hungarian territory were pushed around, the fate of multi-ethnic Pressburg fate remained undecided. All three states, also including Austria, although it never had much of a say, claimed the city as their own. According to Bugge, this made the city into ‘a real political and military frontier city’ and its naming was of utmost symbolic importance (Bugge 2004, 206). Masaryk already announced in an interview with the Times early in 1919 that the city, which he named Prešpurk, was to be Czechoslovak:

*Pressburg is a German and Jewish city with a significant Slovak minority. But although the city is racially mixed, it is the metropolis of an extensive agricultural area, solely inhabited by Slovaks, for whom it is a natural marketplace and harbor.* (Masaryk in the Times, 9th of January 1919 quoted and translated by Bugge 2004, 214)

And to the Hungarian daily newspaper Déli Hírlap Masaryk stated:
What concerns Pressburg, it basically belongs as little to you as to us, it is after all a German city. In spite of this we have more right to it than you do, as its surroundings are Slovak. We need the Danube. (Masaryk in Déli Hírlap, 11th January 1919 quoted and translated by Bugge 2004, 214)

As Bugge points out, Masaryk does not once refer to the large proportion of Magyars who lived in Pressburg too. The Germans of Pressburg who one might expect to have been in favour of Austrian rule, were in fact anti-Austria. They did not identify along ethnic lines, and often were either Hungarian patriots or in favour of a neutral, independent city. Once again pragmatism prevailed: the main reason for anti-Austrian sentiments is claimed to be economical. The city’s inhabitants feared to be reduced to a Viennese suburb, instead of an independent economic actor. This led to active demonstrations against Austria’s claims to Pressburg, and newspapers loudly announcing that Pressburg was to be ‘Los von Oesterreich!’ (Bugge 2004, 216).

Those who preferred Pressburg to become a neutral city, much like Danzig, opted for the name Wilsonovo Město (Wilson City, Wilsonstadt). This name which had also been suggested earlier by American Slovaks, and was actually in use for a short while in official documents and newspapers; just like its other names Prešporok, Prešpurk, and the recently reinvented ‘Bratislava’ which according to linguists of the time was the oldest, most authentic Slavic name. In general, the name of the city continued to be a source of symbolic conflict well into the 1920s. This led to such petty incidents as the forced name change of the Pressburger Liedertafel (Pressburg Choir) in 1923, and conversely heavy penalties for local post offices who refused to take on letters addressed to Pressburg, as this such letters were private matters, not public ones. Similarly, in government the unclear name of the city led to logistic problems as well. No one knew whether the stamps and letterheads to be ordered should say Bratislava or something else (Bugge 2004).

All in all, the general confusion, all the different parties and interests in the city and Slovakia in general made it difficult to decide and to make decisions become reality. Still, Šrobár who had become the most powerful Slovak politician by then, did decide to move his growing registration office from Žilina to Pressburg. It was also Šrobar and his administration who increasingly consistently adopted Bratislava as a name for the city and sent out the official statement in March 1919. Notwithstanding, it was not until June 1919 at the Peace Conference in Paris that Bratislava was officially acknowledged as Czechoslovak territory (Bugge 2004).
2.4 Wartime

After the Austrian *Anschluss* in March 1938 and the separation of Sudetenland in September of that same year, the pressure on the Czechoslovak Republic increased. Internally, the Slovak separatist movement had grown stronger, and with the support of the Germans Slovakia became an autonomous Republic for the first time on the 14th of March 1939. The Czechs had no choice but to capitulate and become a part of the Nazi-German empire. Without question, Bratislava became the new Slovak state capital. It was seen as the gateway from east to west and vice versa. It provided economic access to the west and served as a bastion of German culture for those in the east. It was famed for its multiethnic character, although only certain ethnicities were welcome: the Slovaks, the Germans and the Magyars. The Czechs were expelled and the Jews deported and killed. The usage of the name Pressburg came back, occasionally as Bratislava-Pressburg. Jewish and Czech street names changed to German ones (Engeman 2012; Bugge 2004).

Despite occasional revolts by Czechoslovak activists Slovakia remained a German client state, up to 1944/45 when the Red Army entered Slovak territory. Once the Army had occupied Bratislava on the 4th of April 1945, the official capitulation took place on the 8th of May. On the same day, the new government, which was already secretly in the making, took control of both Slovakia and the Czech lands. In 1948 the communists took over this new Czechoslovak Republic. The new socialist state emphasized Slovak autonomy and the equality of Czechs and Slovaks in every matter. The Germans and Magyars of the region who in the first Republic of the interwar period were treated equally through minority policies now faced expropriation and expulsion (Engeman 2012).

Concluding we see that different parties present had different goals for Slovakia over time. Slovak nationalism started off slowly because of all those different affiliations of the people on the territory, as well as the simple fact that ethnicity simply did not matter that much. Later on, Slovak political life was characterised by pragmatic decisions. This is demonstrated in the choice of joining in with the Czechs and later with the Germans. Of course, such decisions were only made by a few, and in how far they were backed up by the population is always hard to find out.
The importance of Bratislava for Slovakia grew over the years. Whereas it used to be a city not much concerned with state or ethnic affiliation, it steadily turned into a symbol both for the ruling group of the time, as well as for urban modernity and development. By the 1950s ethnic policies going as far as extermination had completely changed the make up of the city. The free and multi-ethnic city had turned into a closed-off communist Slovak bastion. Nevertheless, contacts towards the west still existed, even in times of the Cold War. It is to this time period that we now turn.
Chapter 3

'Die Zeit dafür und die Zeit danach': Keeping up the image of Vienna during the collapse of Austria-Hungary

In this chapter I set out to describe the meaning of the place named Vienna around 1900. As we have seen in the case of Bratislava, cities are often ascribed distinctive traits. Through metaphors and comparisons a city’s character is drawn up and extended to its inhabitants. This can lead to stereotypes, as well as practices of in- and exclusion (see for example Eriksen 2002; Geschiere 2009). City governments attempt to influence such characterisations by designing space and determining the kind of usage and who is allowed to be there. These attempts also took place in Vienna, as we can see in the elaborate project of the Ringstrasse (Coimbra-Swiatek 2011). From the mid-nineteenth century onwards this city underwent large changes. Just like in most places in Europe, Vienna was under heavy influence of industrialization. In this period, also referred to as the Gründerzeit, it changed its demographic make-up as well as its political structure. Moreover, in the turmoil of the first half of the 20th century Vienna lost its status as an imperial city and with the fall of the Empire was thus deprived of most of its previous hinterlands. Hence it no longer held a central geographical position within the Monarchy and had to reinvent itself as a peripheral capital.

With Lefebvre's production of space still in the back of our head, we can see that le perçu did not change; neither Vienna nor Bratislava moved somewhere else. Nevertheless, the interpretation of its location and the reshuffling of its surrounding territorial outline (le conçu) has had a profound influence on the representational space, i.e. the imagined meaning or le vécu. Now, some might say this is a simplification of Lefebvre's theory. I think that interpreted this way it helps us to understand complex processes of territorialization and their significance for understanding issues of belonging.

Thus, in order to understand Vienna as a place we have to look at how it was spatially produced. First, I will describe the consequences of the collapse of the Habsburg Monarchy for the perception of the city of Vienna. In order to do so I will briefly bring to the fore two major events which contributed heavily to Vienna’s image: the Vienna Congress of 1814-15, as well as the World Expo of 1873. Scholars such as Steward (1999) and Schnitzler (1954) point out how these happenings were of major importance in shaping the notion of 'gay Vienna' which was
very important for the growth of the tourist industry. The splendour and glamour that accompanied the gaiety had always been enforced by the royal presence of the Habsburg family. Emperor Franz Joseph used such imagery to propagate his own relevance to the empire at large and beyond. After the demise of Austria-Hungary in 1918, the image of Vienna as a happy city was continued, but against an ever darkening backdrop. Nostalgia for the olden days increased alongside anti-Semitism, nationalism and xenophobia. This resulted in Austrofascism and later in pan-German Nazism after the Anschluss: ghastly examples of the importance of borders for the creation of the state and the development of national belonging.

3.1 On Vienna and Austria

In order to be able to write about the history of Vienna and Austria, it is important to realize the influence of the Second World War on Austrian history writing. This is important because the writing and remembrance of historical events influences perception and identification processes. Thus, we see in the case of Austria that before the Second World War Austrians faced north and often identified as 'the better Germans' (Bischof 1997, 1). This became problematic after 1945 and a new historical paradigm was much sought after. From then on Austrians turned south and brought their roots as a continuation of the Roman Empire to the fore, so to predate any relations to the Germans to the north. Austria came to rely on the early term of Ostarrichi, a reference from a document from 996 indicating an area in what is now Lower Austria. Later it came to refer to all the lands belonging the Babenbergs, the predecessors of the Habsburgs. When the Habsburgs came into the power the term came to refer both to the lands and the family. The countries in the west of the Empire however never took up the name. Despite the inventions of Vorderösterreich and Innerösterreich, such indications never took root. As late as the 1867, when the Dual Monarchy of Austria-Hungary was established, the western part was referred to as 'the kingdoms and the lands represented in the imperial council' (Mathis 1997, 21).

It is therefore not surprising to find that the creation of a coherent national identity has long been problematic in Austria. Bischof argues that identification processes developed much more persistently at local and regional levels. Vienna is often perceived as situated too far away and its image is not all together of a positive nature (Bischof 1997). On top of that, both
Schillhacke and Mathis argue that the main bonding factor in the Habsburg Empire was the figure of the Emperor, especially in the time of Franz Joseph. Bischof points out that those regions that formed the place from where the Monarchy governed its empire, such as Lower Austria, Burgenland and indeed Vienna displayed a stronger identification with Austria at large than with regional entities (1997). However, for many people the state of Austria-Hungary or later the state of Austria did not bear much meaning, as it did and had done for the French, for example. It was the Emperor that united the different people, not the shared political system (Schillhacke 2014; Mathis 1997). Thus, when the Empire fell apart after the First World War, it was not at all obvious what was to happen to the much reduced Austria. Without the Emperor as a unifying factor and without the hinterlands in the East to spur the economy, few people had faith in an independent Austrian state. Most opted for inclusion in the German Reich, but this was blocked by the Allied in the negotiations of 1919 (Mathis 1997).

Thus, again we see, much like in the case of Bratislava, that the contemporary borderlands were by no means an obvious or self-evident result of historical processes. Similarly, we must bear in mind that Vienna is not representative of an entire Austria or Austria-Hungary. Instead, we examine its changing role from central imperial capital to a peripheral state capital in this wider geopolitical context and the effects thereof on its self-image.

3.2 The creation of a myth

According to Steward (1999) the increase of tourism was partially caused by the improvement of the ease of travelling. As railroad networks were built up and other dimensions of industrialization led to a new affluent class of day-trippers and travellers, tourism as an economic branch grew. In the Habsburg Empire Vienna was a central point in the railroad network, and the normal roads leading to it were under continuous improvement. Moreover, the presence of the Danube allowed for swift access to the city via water. This combination of spatial factors led to Vienna’s status as the 'largest and most important city in central Europe' (Steward 1999, 124). However, in a larger geographical setting Vienna was rather peripheral to big tourist movements, like the one from north to south. Cities such as Berlin, London and Paris drew more visitors. However, since Vienna was home to so many different activities,
functioning as a hub for both administration, politics and culture, its visitors had diverse backgrounds (Steward 1999). So, we see that the geographic location of the city, and how that location is interpreted, namely as 'central', leads to intervention, such as the new lay-out of the city, as well as the direction of the train tracks in the surrounding lands. Coordination of access and direction are controlled and population might diversify in different ways, even though the people might only be there temporarily.

3.2.1 Events in the city

The image of the city is made by its population and rulers, both intentionally and unintentionally, and is producing its own space in the meaningful way we have discussed earlier. The image of Vienna as a city of gaiety and entertainment came into being as early as 1814-15, writes Stewards when she quotes Wickham Steed (1999, quote from 1919). Schnitzler explains how the Vienna Congress of those years was not only about politics, but also offered a large range of frivolous activities in its additional program. Though the Congress was intended to restructure Europe and the colonies after the Napoleonic Wars, many participants famed the event for its 'flood of amusements, balls, masquerades, parties, sleigh-rides, tournaments, receptions, horse-shows, parades and other entertaining distractions' (Schnitzler 1954, 103). According to Schnitzler, some historians argue that these extracurricular activities were tantamount to the partial failure of the Congress. He repeats the famous words which the Prince de Ligne allegedly has spoken: 'The Congress does not move – but it is dancing' (103). The hosting of such a nearly two-year city wide party did not only leave Vienna with a reputation, it also took a toll on the city itself; financially the city was drained. The first new luxurious hotels started to rise nearly sixty years later, along the famous Ringstrasse, with the next large event the city was allowed to organize: the World Expo of 1873.³ It had thus far only been hosted by Paris and London. Vienna wanted its first attempt to be even more splendid and spectacular as so to prove its power as as a leading force, especially after being defeated by Germany and the rise of that Empire. Unfortunately, it did not work out that well. The

³ The Ringstrasse bouvelard had been constructed on the old former glacis and was meant for the display of both imperial and bourgeois ideals. It formed both an excellent location for flânerie and at the same time was designed in such a way that it was hard for a mob to gather and riot – as had happened earlier in the Revolution of 1848 –, yet easy for an army to manoeuvre fast, as the barracks were located there as well (lecture series by Prokopovych 2013).
construction of the location for the expo was not finished, the weather was terrible, leaving large muddy puddles on the unfinished site and, to finish it off, a cholera epidemic had come over the city. Entrance prices were high, yet even after they were dropped people stayed away. To finish of the catastrophe for the city, the worldwide market crashed not much later as well. The World Expo had bankrupted Vienna (Stewards 1999).

Nevertheless, in the decades to follow the inflow of tourists went up and tourist industry grew. Production of guide books, post cards and souvenirs rolled out and hotels and pensions became successful businesses. By then Vienna could pride itself in modern public transportation, excellent running water, parks, architectural feats and a large variety of entertainment through theatre, opera, festivals, museums, wine cellars, balls and of course music (Stewards 1999). This demonstrates once again how space is produced. The combination of an already established and planned grid of the city, the guidebook offering itineraries suitable for visitors, postcards displaying the ‘must-sees’ and the actual routes taken by the visitors all affected the experience and meaning of a particular place in time. According to a famous guidebook quoted by Stewards a visitor of Vienna around 1905 could thus expect the famous park **Prater** to be 'a fashionable resort in spring, when many fine horses, elegant toilettes, and handsome faces will be observed' (128). Similarly, the Emperor Franz Joseph made use of the **Ringstrasse** to host large parades in honour of himself and the Empire. Paraphernalia made for such events sold like hotcakes, displaying and enhancing the Emperor as a symbol of power and unity. However, by 1908 the changes in the empire were impossible to deny. In the Jubilee of that year the festivities consisted of representative groups of each ethnic community parading along the **Ringstrasse**. This can be interpreted as a clear sign of the rise of nationalism (Stewards 1999).

3.2.2 Rising tensions

This was not the only sign of impending troubles though. Although many tourists famed Vienna for its diversity, many city locals were not so charmed by tourists from other parts of the empire, who for their own part might have held quite different interpretations of the cultural and war monuments on display in the capital. The eruption of violence between Czech visitors of an exhibition and ethnic Germans in 1910 is another example of tensions in the Empire which transpired to the city.
Similarly, the large influx of migrant workers from Bohemia, Moravia and Galicia, who formed about 65.5 per cent of Vienna's inhabitants in 1890 had its consequences as well. Strained relations between self-identified locals and perceived newcomers led to an heavy emphasis of Austrian Gemütlichkeit as a true and local Viennese characteristic. By the same token, many restaurants proudly displayed their menus of 'authentic' Wiener Küche. Differences between real Viennese and migrants were also carved out by use and love of German and more particularly Viennese dialect. The populist and anti-Semitic mayor Karl Lueger said: 'Vienna must remain German, and the German character of the city of Vienna should never be in doubt' (Wischenbart 1997, 38).

All these issues feeding into the difficulties between the diverse communities within Vienna, might be interpreted as a part of a wider emotion of the Viennese: the longing for old times, when the Ringstrasse was not yet there and the villages on the outskirts of the Vienna had not yet become part of the outer districts. This nostalgia for earlier times was part of the charming, gay and romantic image of the city which was offered to tourists, but at the same time it channelled underlying currencies of xenophobia and tensions within Vienna itself (Stewards 1999).

However, as Schnitzler (1954) explains, that image of a glorious Vienna of the past was in itself a myth. The parties of the Vienna Congress were after all accompanying difficult political debates after a devastating war. And although the time thereafter the image of a happy and fun Vienna was glorified through waltz and operetta, this was partially the result of a heavy censorship of more serious works. Metternich's and Emperor Franz's isolation and distraction politics aimed to prevent revolutionary ideas to reach Austria, as they were cropping up elsewhere in Europe. It is said that Franz told professors at university that he has 'no use for scholars but only for good citizens. It is up to you to mould our youth into such. Who serves me, must teach what I order; who cannot do this or comes along with new ideas, can leave – or I shall get rid of him' (Schnitzler 1954, 105). Regardless, the Revolution arrived in Vienna after all. After 1848 the new Emperor Franz Joseph saw himself forced to liberalize the Empire and allow some degree of civic political participation. After several military defeats the need for keeping up appearances grew large. According to Schnitzler, after the heavy defeat of Austria at a battle in 1866, the Viennese elite enjoyed a masquerade in the Prater. Schnitzler quotes the line of the classic operetta Die Fledermaus by Johann Strauss: 'Happy is he who
forgets what cannot be changed anyhow’. In Schnitzler’s opinion this line is characteristic for the Viennese attitude and it heavily influenced the perception of Vienna outside the city:

> The Viennese were running away at full speed from the increasingly sinister reality of their dying Empire, but enjoyed themselves so splendidly in the process that their enjoyment became contagious for the rest for the rest of the world.
> (Schnitzler 1954, 116)

Thus, we see that in the sixty-eight years of reign by Franz Joseph (from 1848 -1916) the image of a splendid, luxurious capital was to be kept up. It was under his reign that the Ringstrasse was built and the World Expo came to Vienna. Though in reality the rise of nationalism, anti-Semitism, xenophobia, and the growth of poverty and unemployment in the city were undeniable.

### 3.3 Nostalgia for the Empire

When the First World War had made an end to the Habsburg reign, the city and the new country of Austria were left devastated, impoverished and in political chaos. Schillhacke (2014) gives her interpretation how this sudden end of an Empire and the loss of an Emperor affected the Viennese. She does so by analysing the content of Austrian literary works written in the Interbellum. The author argues that the fall of the Empire made such an heavy impact that it was experienced as a disruption in the movement of time: 'In Kappacher’s novel, the Hoffmannsthal figure (“H.”) expresses this break as follows: “Man weiß, das Leben wird von nun an in zwei Abschnitte geteilt sein: die Zeit dafür und die Zeit danach”’ (1). Schillhacke continues to explain that with the end of the Empire, World War I demonstrated the consequences of modernity. One of them was the possibility brutal territorial war between new political entities, aspiring to become nation-states. Whereas Empire had meant diversity and multiple and peripheral centres of power, whilst being held together under one common denominator of the empire, in nation-states the people were supposed to be homogeneous and united based on a set of ethnic traits, including language, religion and birth grounds. In another literary example Schillhacke demonstrates how “die Zeit dafür” was characterized by
feeling at home anywhere within the Imperial territory:

Ich spreche von missverstandenen und auch missbrauchten Geist der alten Monarchie, der bewirkte, daß ich in Zlotogrod ebenso zu Hause war wie in Sipolje, wie in Wien. Das einzige Kaffeehaus in Zlotogrod, das Café Habsburg, gelegen im Parterre des Hotels zum Goldenen Bären, sah nicht anders aus als das Café Wimmerl in der Josefstadt, wo ich gewohnt war, mich mit meinen Freunden am Nachmittag zu treffen. [...] all dies war Heimat, stärker als nur ein Vaterland, weit und bunt, dennoch vertraut und Heimat: die kaiserliche und königliche Monarchie. (34) (Schillhacke 2014, 6, quoting Trotta, a Serbian born Viennese character from Roth's novel 'Kapuzinergruft' from 1938)

(I am speaking of a misunderstood as well as a misused spirit of the old Monarchy, which affected that I felt just as at home in Zlotograd, as in Sipolje, as in Vienna. The only coffee house in Zlotograd, cafe Habsburg, located in the ground floor of Hotel zum Goldenen Bären, did not look any different from cafe Wimmerl, where I was accustomed to meet up with my friends in the afternoon. [...] All of this was Heimat, stronger that just a fatherland, wide and colourful, yet still familiar and Heimat: the imperial and regal monarchy. MdK)

Another character from the same book, the Czech Count Chojniki laments about another figure:


(This gentleman had sold his chestnuts everywhere, in half of the European world, one could say. Everywhere, wherever one had eaten his roasted chestnuts, was Austria, ruled Franz Joseph. Nowadays, there are no chestnuts without a visa. What a world! MdK)

Both examples show that the symbols of the Emperor, the city Vienna and the Empire itself
organized the way space was organized and understood. Schillhacke argues much like Stewards and Schnitzler that the break away from intelligible stability through industrialization and other modern feats gave rise not only to nationalism but also to nostalgia. We have seen above that those two factors can reinforce each other, when the symbols that are nostalgically idealized become means to mark the differences between in- and outsiders. This however, is not necessarily the case. Schillhacke also relates to Jewish authors such as Stefan Zweig to make clear that nostalgia for the Empire was also caused by the fear of anti-Semitism which rose under the same circumstances.

The above demonstrates how history and history writing, i.e. what is remembered and forgotten, is influencing the production of space. We have seen that living in the territory of an Empire, embodied by a unifying Emperor has helped authors such as Roth make sense of their surroundings. As the Empire collapsed and new structures chaotically came into being, the longing for the old and familiar rose. Ideas about what Vienna was supposed to be, were based on invented, or already reinvented traditions in the form of the dominant presence of German or Austrian ethnicity and Viennese music and festivities. The war-ridden, poverty struck Vienna with different leaders fighting for power appeared to be worse than whatever bad times where known before. This heavily affected the already strong presence of nostalgic tendencies, as represented in tourism, earlier escapism and identity politics. In other words, nostalgia for die Zeit dafür comes from 'its structural doubling-up of two different times, an inadequate present and an idealized past' (Hutcheo 2000, 198; quoted in Schillhacke 2014, 7).

These developments in Vienna stand in contrast with contemporary Pressburg/Bratislava. Although ethnicity did matter and increasingly so, the diversity in the city and the presence of more languages mostly added to the city's self-perception in a positive manner. For a long time, Bratislava did not adhere to a larger national sentiment as Vienna did with Austrian/German identity. Furthermore, in my interpretation, Bratislava seemed to be more focused on the possibilities of 'die Zeit danach' than on what was lost from 'die Zeit dafür'. This seems to be in accordance with the general tendency of the newly independent cities. Like Stewards says: 'for as Vienna's imperial power slipped away to the peripheral regions of the empire, to the regional and national centres like Prague and Budapest where many of the principal tourist
sights were associated with national hopes for the future, their Viennese equivalents appeared to be associated only with the past' (1999, 137).

Another point that needs to be made here is that where Bratislava often did identify in relation to Vienna, it seems that Vienna did not look at Bratislava. It is likely that this perspective is influenced by an internal research gap in this paper. Nevertheless, I am convinced that relatively little research has been done. For future research, I would therefore suggest a look into Vienna's historic relations and perceptions vis-a-vis its immediate hinterlands. This might broaden our perspective of the development of cities in borderlands.

A lot more is known about the relationships between Vienna and its Eastern neighbours in the Cold War period. Unfortunately, it goes too far to elaborate on the in between lying period of the Second World War. This topic is too complex to deal with here, as so many other issues would come into play which ethically could not be ignored. Therefore, we will now indeed turn to the years 1945 to 1989, so that we can focus on the developments in our cities at the time when the border seemed at its most significant.
Chapter 4
Austria’s relationships with its eastern neighbours (1945 - 1989)

In order to understand Vienna’s current relation to Bratislava, it is important to outline what has happened before 1989. Here I describe what Austria’s relations with the Eastern bloc looked like during the years after World War II up to the Fall of the Iron Curtain. I combine political and economic relations in order to clarify the backdrop of current cross-border cooperation. First, I shortly summarize the political attitude towards and economic relationships with the East. Secondly, I focus Czechoslovakia. And finally I pay specific attention to the Slovakian part of that state. Because, as Stiefel (2009) explains, ‘seeing the eastern bloc as a unity was political propaganda (104).’ The Soviet Union and the various countries and regions in the Eastern bloc did differ from each other. Their individual attitudes towards the west and here Austria in particular, as well as the porosity of their official borders, has been dependent on larger political movements and events, as well as on leadership personalities. I mainly draw on the volume edited by Suppan and Mueller (2009), who collected a number of detailed historical works on the relations between Austria and the east.

4.1 Austrian political and economic ties to the East

After World War II Europe once again had to reinvent itself. In fear of Germany rising again, the countries who took part in the Anschluss were divided and kept under control of the allied. The ideological differences between the socialist Soviet Union and the other Allied soon drove a wedge between the territories under their control and the Iron Curtain arose through Europe creating a dividing line between ‘East’ and ‘West’.

Simultaneously, nationality had come to serve as an important identity marker; with the reshuffling of the borderlines, authorities tried to expel other nations of their lands and import those who they saw as original citizens. Against this backdrop of lingering national conflict and border issues, around 30 million people were resettled in East Central Europe and beyond. For example, the Beneš decrees in Czechoslovakia forcefully swapped 74 000 Hungarians/Magyars for 73 000 Slovaks, who were all to ‘return’ to their native lands in Hungary and southern and eastern Slovakia respectively. Another 12.5 million of people on the move were German-speakers, who fled from the countries in the east to Austria and Germany. On the one hand
they more or less voluntarily left in fear of the Red Army, who violently set up camp in their
new territory, on the other hand they were violently expelled by the authorities who wanted to
cleanse their regions of anything German to make a statement against Nazism (more about
that below).

Despite the millions of lost lives that Austria and Germany had suffered, this mass
migration led to an effective population growth. This growth is said to be part of the factors
that made the *Wirtschaftswunder* in these countries possible. The differences in economic
development between Austria and its neighbours to the east had a thorough influence on the
relations between them. It is to these relations that we now turn (Suppan 2009).

4.1.1 Austrian neutrality

In the first years after the war, Austria remained under the control of the allied. The
western part was governed by the British, French and Americans; the lands in the east,
Burgenland, Lower Austria, and parts of Upper Austria and Vienna by the Soviet Union. This
situation lasted up to the Austrian State Treaty which was signed on May 15th, 1955. The treaty
reinstated the Austrian borders of 1938 and included a declaration of neutrality. Up to the
Treaty, after an initial rekindling of eastward business and political ties in 1946-47, relations had
been kept to a minimum. Under Stalinist rule, the eastern people’s democracies had been
purposefully isolated. However, after Stalin died in 1953, Soviet politics in the Kremlin changed.
The State Treaty’s inclusion of a declaration of permanent political neutrality in October of the
same year, was interpreted in the Soviet Union as a signal. Neutrality was perceived as less bad
than pure capitalism. This interpretation, along with Austria’s well-kept personal relations to
the Kremlin, resulted in relatively high level of trust in Austria on the side of the Soviet
rulership. Thus, after 1955, with efforts from Chancellor Raab and later on with the help of
Foreign Minister Bruno Kreisky, the Soviet policy of ‘peaceful coexistence’ came into being.
Such carefully pursued *Ostpolitik*, including the partial censorship of the media in the coverage
of the Hungarian uprisings in 1956 and the Prague Spring in 1968, as well as the country’s
internal stability, its geographical location and its political neutrality led to Austria’s unique
position between east and west. This position fostered Austria’s role as an intermediary
between east and west, and enabled the country to be one of the few to host Soviet officials
and the first to send its representatives to Soviet states such as Poland in 1971 (Mueller 2009;
Even though Austria’s neutrality on matters of human rights violations was morally doubtful, the choice for contact over boycott was beneficial for political and business relations. Throughout the fifties and sixties Austria held a unique position in east-west trade. This uniqueness was not only based on geographical location, but also on other internal and external factors. This position was beneficial for Austria’s own relations to the east, but was relevant on an international level as well (Stiefel 2009; Mueller 2009).

As Suppan (2009) explains, Austria’s social-political structure showed a strong continuity, despite the devastating effects of the war. Faith in a system of law which keeps the executive power of the government in check had firmly taken root before the Nazi-regime took over, and was still present in the late forties, especially amongst those who returned Nazi-imprisonment. Labour and trade unions functioned well and were powerful enough to deal with the state and employers. Similarly, on the countryside people were properly organized and did not feel the need for property redistribution. These two factors fenced off the call for strong turn to the left or communism. Thus, the socialist party SPÖ (Sozialistische Partei Österreich, since 1991 Sozialdemocratische Partei Österreich) and the Christian-conservative party ÖVP (Österreichische Volkspartei) managed to steer Austria towards prosperity, through stimulation of mixed economy, with many small and middle-sized companies, alongside agriculture and larger industry. It should be noted that most in the latter category had become state-owned businesses. These businesses, mainly consisting of heavy industry, which were built-up by Germans or taken over by Nazis through expropriation, were often heavily damaged or inoperative. With a severe lack of private capital in 1945-46, it thus became the task of the state to bring these industries back to life through nationalization. This take-over was a heavy burden for the Austrian government budget, but it was supported through the European Recovery Program (ERP) which was a part of the Marshall Plan, which Austria was quickly to accept. However, despite Austria’s income through the ERP coming from the west, many Austrian assets were flowing out towards the east (Suppan 2009; Schriffl 2009; Stiefel 2009).

Whilst the Soviet Union emphasized ‘peaceful coexistence’ as a political project, it was also economically necessary. It needed western, and specifically Austrian support to sustain its economy. To channel the reparations which had to be paid by Austria to the Soviet Union after the war, the latter founded the USIA (Administration of Soviet Assets in Austria, or Upravlenie
Sovetskím Imushchestvom v Austrii. This administration, whose existence was confidential, owned five percent of all businesses in Austria, of which thirty percent was located in Vienna and its adjacent federal province Lower Austria. It is estimated that over the period 1945 to 1964, when Austria’s dues as they were noted down in the State Treaty of 1955 were officially paid off, the Soviet Union collected between 1,325 - 2,425 billion international dollars. (This is almost double the amount that Austria received as part of the ERP.) Similarly, through the USIA excess produce from the Soviet Union could be sold on the Austrian (black) market (Stiefel 2009; Suppan 2009).

Austria did not acknowledge the USIA appropriation of property. This led to dodgy and corrupts practices by the USIA concerning Austrian tax system and other regulations. Nevertheless, the existence of the institution did bring with it a direct connection to the Kremlin. It were such direct relations, along with Ostpolitik, that contributed to the perception of Austria as a non-threatening actor when it went into business with Soviet satellites such as Poland, Bulgaria and Hungary. Because the Kremlin-Vienna relations were close, such activities were not seen as undermining the power of the Soviet top. After all, through these USIA connections information about business, innovation and politics on either side of the wall could be shared. For that reason this institution has also been called the ‘hole in the Iron Curtain’. Salient detail: many of these relationships ran through the Austrian Communist Party, whose political importance waned as its economic and strategic importance grew. Furthermore, the founding of ‘friendship societies’, initiated by the east, was meant to increase cultural exchange, especially classical music. These societies were conveniently interpreted in a wider sense and often frequented by Austrian business people in order to find and sustain trade contacts on the other side (Stiefel 2009; Mueller 2009).

4.1.2 Economic benefits of neutrality
On an international level Austria was important for business as well. When due to the crisis of the 1970s all sides had to ease their policies to keep their economies going, Austria and especially Vienna became the hub for the signing and execution of exclusive trade deals and commissioned works between the Soviet Union, the bordering people’s democracies and the West. Austrian banks adopted their strategies to facilitate such deals, and the knowledge of eastern markets in Austria acquired through personal and business relations, as well as
geographic and cultural proximity and shared history helped ease the path. As Austria is a small country, it was seen as too small to combine economic efforts with political leverage, which furthered its position as a neutral partner. (Stiefel 2009; Mueller 2009).

During the détente period however, the East managed to make its own deals with non-Austrian partners, as it switched to foreign currency for its transactions. In the long run, the currency shortage which was caused by that move led to a huge debt, which was felt deep into the 1990s. On a more immediate scale, this led to an instant plunge of Austria’s importance as a mediator in international east-west trade market. Nevertheless, the benefits for Austria itself through its own trade networks were large and have had a long-lasting effect on Austrian businesses as is demonstrated by the quick build-up of Austrian presence in the east after 1989 (Stiefel 2009).

4.2 The special case of Czechoslovakia

In Czechoslovakia the initially fairly divided political power during the first elections in 1946, soon became skewed in favour of the communist party. Though the president of the country Beneš and many ministers were drawn from the conservative party, the prime minister Klement Gottwald was a communist. This powerful position led the communists to have the opportunity to start up propaganda and censorship. Furthermore, they had strong control over labour unions and other mass organisations, and they could manipulate the people in doubt, as the party was handing out ownership deals of former German property. Similarly, despite the vote in favour of the ERP, after a message from Stalin, the government decided to not take part in the Marshall Plan. Soon after, although the interest of the people in the communists waned, the party took to power following a harsher course of action. Despite protests, the police corps underwent large staff changes on the order of the Interior minister Nosek. Pro-communist crowds were abetted, and soon armed militias were allowed. Non-communists ministers resigned to forge a new government, but it did not occur the way they planned. Communists took complete control, after forcing Beneš to accept a list of new ministers, who were all communists. A few months later Beneš resigned and the communist constitution was instated. By the end of June of 1948, the dominant Catholic church suffered oppression and the state had officially taken over all agricultural lands, along with all businesses, schools and legal institutions (Suppan 2009).
For the first decade the communist path performed economically well, but soon the economic development of Czechoslovak Republic stagnated and reached a severe economic crisis. By the mid-fifties Austria’s economy had grown larger than that of Czechoslovakia, which up to then always had been the stronger of the two. The crisis led the Czechoslovak authorities to ease their regime, allow their people to travel more and make adjustments towards a more market-oriented economy. More and more voices expressed a desire for the move away from the Soviet Union, and to follow the Austrian model of neutrality. However, by August 1968 Warsaw pact troops marched into the Republic and violently beat down what came to be known as the Prague Spring. Processes of ‘normalization’ were forced on the Republic and 70 000 military troops took permanent seat. The presence of the military made it difficult for dissident groups to gain critical mass, as they did in Poland for example. Only at the end 1989 were protests successful and did the Velvet Revolution bring an end to Soviet Rule (Suppan 2009; Webb 2008).

4.3 Czechoslovak-Austrian relationships

These volatile developments in Czechoslovakia of course also had an effect on its bilateral relations with Austria. Despite the fact that Austrian relations towards the east were in general relatively good, the relationship with one of its closest neighbours was tense. According to Schriffl (2009), there were three main reasons for the particularly difficult understanding between Czechoslovakia and Austria. First of all and as mentioned earlier, directly after the war Czechoslovakia expelled and expropriated all its German speaking citizens, as it was feared they were all national-socialists. For example, the Austrian representative in Prague, who had been tacitly reinstalled immediately in early 1945 in his former official position, was arrested on the suspicion he had cooperated with the Gestapo. He died in an internment camp in 1947. As these Beneš decrees on the expulsion of German-speakers solely looked at language as an identifier, it was not concerned with issues of citizenship. Thus, the expelled population included an estimated forty thousand people who could make a claim to Austrian citizenship. The new Austrian representative in Prague consequently was given the task to distinguish between Germans and Austrians, and defend the cases of the latter, i.e. to have them emigrate safely, with all their possessions. This was an often unsuccessful undertaking; and much of this property turned into state property, as was of course common in the people’s democracies. The
tensions that this caused lingered for many years thereafter and were not eased by the still very Stalinist attitude – in comparison with other Soviet states – of the Czechoslovak authorities. So, we see at a UN conference in New York in 1966, how the Czechoslovak foreign minister Václav David lashed out at his Austrian colleague, who had just brought up the appropriation of Austrian owned goods and land as a reason for diplomatic difficulties. Václav David stated that all German-speakers who had been taken in by the Austrian state were in fact ‘fascist spies who want to prepare an attack on Czechoslovakia’ and that this is ‘the background of the entire situation’ (Schriffl 2009, 347). On the Austrian side, the impression existed that Prague was delaying negotiations on the matter for two different reasons. First, since such a large group was involved, the value and amount of the property was very large, not giving it back would thus be beneficial for the Czechoslovak state. Second, since the decree was issued in relation to all German-speakers, any compensation towards Austrians would have political implications as well. It was not until 1975 that a treaty was signed which brought at least the financial complications to an end. Similarly, it was only after that treaty that the contemporary Austrian representative in Prague finally gained the status of ambassador, instead of that of a lower ranking envoy. And only then did Bruno Kreisky, who by then had become Austria’s Federal Chancellor, visit Prague. This was the first time Austria’s highest ranking official did so (Schriffl 2009).

Another reason for the diplomatic difficulties between the two states was the presence of the border. The Iron Curtain and the control thereof had led to many, sometimes deadly incidents, such as in 1967, when the fatal shooting on a GDR refugee by Czech border guards, which took place on the Austrian side of the border, caused an outrage among Austrian politicians (Mueller 2009; Schriffl 2009).

The final reason I want to mention here is related to the regions’ waterways. In the years immediately after Second World War, when land claims were still to be made and Austria had not yet officially regained its independence, Czechoslovakia demanded, both for military and economic reasons, a part of the west bank of the March river as well as the possibility to create a Danube-Oder connection. As Austria did not comply with these demands, the issue was taken to the international level through a conference in London in February 1947. There the Czechoslovak demands were not supported by foreign ministers of the allied parties. The renewed bilateral negotiations which followed from that in the next months did not render any
results. This unresolved waterway issue is yet another topic that continued to influence Austrian-Czechoslovak relations far beyond the late 1940s (Schriffl 2009).

Nevertheless, regardless of all the political issues between the two countries, in different areas a lot of exchange did take place. On a business level we see for example that the ease with which business deals were closed was facilitated by the fact that so many large industries were nationalized after the war. The size and organization of such national enterprises proved to be a practical business partners for Czechoslovakia’s state owned businesses, which were of similar size and organizational structure. In times of less intense (ideological) conflict, such as in the period leading up the to Prague Spring, in- and exports expanded, the tourism sector flourished, university cooperation grew and broadcast stations worked together on televisions shows about the other side. It was also in that period that Austria’s neutrality became an example for the Czechoslovak reform-government, as they tried to get away from the Soviet Union. Similarly, many people in that time applied for visa to travel to Austria, never to return. When in August 1968 Warsaw Pact troops marched into the Czechoslovak republic, some 96 000 people fled directly to Austria, and another 60 000 came through Yugoslavia. To deal with this influx, Austria was compelled to even put up tent camps. However, only 7000 of them remained in Austria, many of them returning back home after a few days.

Connections which had come into being during the Prague Spring decreased after the bloody ‘normalization’ by the Warsaw Pact invasion. Political and economic reform and resistance movements went back deeper into the underground, until the larger scale détente phase set in during the early seventies. In the late eighties when the Velvet Revolution set in, Austrian (Viennese) contacts with Czechoslovak dissidents made the first official cuts in the barbed wire of the Iron Curtain (Schriffl 2009; Stiefel 2009).

4.4 Slovak-Austrian relationships

Although Czechoslovakia was united after the Second World War, the Slovak part did have its own space for political decision-making. After all, Slovak territory had been an independent state during that war and the Czech capital Prague was rather far away. From the first of January of 1969, Czechoslovakia changed into a federal republic made up out of the Czech
Socialist Republic and a Slovak Socialist Republic, with equal rights and sovereignty. On top of that, back in the past, during the Dual Monarchy, the Czech part had belonged to Austria, whereas its Slovak counterpart had fallen under Hungarian jurisdiction. Consequently, its attitude and politics towards Austria was different from the mainly Czech state centre (Webb 2008; Schriffl 2009).

According to Schriffl (2009), the sentiments expressed by Slovak authorities in dealing with the Beneš decrees and the following agreement that allowed the Austrian representative to seek out and support Austrian citizens in their battle against appropriation, might have been informed by this particularly Slovak attitude towards Austria. So we see that before the State Treaty of 1955, the Slovak authorities deny the existence of the Austrian state. Based on this denial the Slovak authorities drew the conclusion that there were no Austrians to be exempted from the Beneš decrees and they could continue the deportation of all German-speakers and confiscation of their belongings. However, during the last months of the war many German-speakers in Slovakia had already been evacuated by the Germans. Thus the effects of the Beneš decrees had a smaller impact and did not affect Austria’s perception of Slovakia as much as the issue had done in the interaction with the Czech part of the People’s Republic. Another example of the Slovak attitude towards Austria is to be found in the Slovak Democratic Party program. In its section about foreign policy the Party maintained that the good relationship between Austria and (Czecho)Slovakia can only be rekindled when it is sure that ‘Austria has done away with fascism and positions itself as truly democratic without attitudes of great power’ (344). Schriffl explains that the formulation of Austria with ‘great power’ aspirations, can easily be related back to the former imperial power that Austria had over the region. Nevertheless, since Slovakia’s most resented imperial influence came from the Hungarian part of the Dual Monarchy, Schriffl argues that in general the Slovak authority were more relaxed towards Austria than its Czech counterpart. Moreover, he says, such strong language expressed by the Slovak party, might also have functioned as a tool. By following the rigid directions of the larger ideological framework of the Soviet Union, it hoped to be taken seriously as an independent entity that had its own agenda separate from the dominant Czech part (Schriffl 2009).

4.5 Bratislava-Vienna relationships
I argue that another element influencing the Slovak-Austrian relations might be the proximity of its capitals and subsequently the personal ties between powerful individuals in both cities. An example for such ties can be found in the Schriffl’s explanation about the Austrian representative who was installed in Bratislava shortly after the war. The name of this representative was Friedrich Lenhardt, and he had been an Austrian expat business man who had lived in Bratislava long before 1938. Interestingly enough, Lenhardt, who was *de jure* a representative of the consulate in Prague, had not been chosen by that consulate. Instead he was recommended by Viennese connections of the Slovak authorities. From 1947, the office in Bratislava, which had up to that point been run from Lenhardt’s living room, became an official consulate, with diplomatic responsibilities. Also, with the intensification of Stalinist pressure on the new Soviet states, the consulate simultaneously functioned as a hub for gathering information on the developments concerning the newly put up Iron Curtain. Such undertakings were however not without risk. One of the consulate employees who managed to collect opinions amongst Slovaks about the political and ideological direction of the state through a secret survey, soon got arrested and locked up for six years after a show trial in 1951 (Schriffl 2009). This unfortunate event however, does not necessarily have to do with local attitudes towards Austria, but might be more connected to higher politics, much like the statements made in the Slovak Democratic Party programme mentioned earlier.

In fact, whenever possible, such as in the sixties and parts of the seventies, thousands of people regularly visited Vienna and other parts of Austria for leisure, shopping, business or education. Even when the Iron Curtain became more rigid again, the socialist government could not prevent broadcasting signals to cross the border and many households attuned their receptors to Austrian TV and radio broadcasts to stay in touch with the developments on the other side. As Schriffl again puts forward, until 1968 ‘we can see the disparity between sovereign acts of the communist regime ... and the conduct of “lower levels,” i.e. local authorities, persons engaged in the cultural sector or citizens with an increased interest in their neighbo[u]r’s lifestyle’ (2009, 360; Suppan 2009).

To summarize, Austria’s position vis-à-vis the east have been co-determined by its geographic location, its political neutrality and carefully conducted Ostpolitik. These factors allowed the country for closer relations to the east than most other countries in the west. Though political
upheaval and conflict had its repercussions in diplomatic relations, contacts never ceased to exist. Through various channels information about business kept going back and forth. Sometimes to the dismay of other western countries, although Vienna’s knowledge of eastern markets did help them as well during the détente.

Austria’s relations with Czechoslovakia was heavily burdened with the heritage of the war, as well as with territorial conflicts, especially in the first decade after World War II. Nevertheless, in the years leading up to the Prague Spring, these conflicts did not prevent the two states to cooperate in the fields of trade, tourism, education and culture. Although the authorities of the Slovak part of the republic was initially reluctant to accept Austria’s independence as a state, compared to its Czech counterpart, the relationship on the whole was less invested with traumatic or negative historic experiences and much more affected by the particular ties between Vienna and Bratislava.
Chapter 5
After the Wall. EU accession, cross-border development and metropolitan integration

In this chapter we will look at the developments in the Vienna-Bratislava region in the past 25 years. First, we will examine how the EU accession of Austria and that of its neighbours has influenced its internal dynamics. Second, we will focus on the consequences of the EU accession of Slovakia in that country. In both cases I will argue how territorial processes have affected both countries in their own way. In the case of Austria I will emphasize the effects on Austrian national identity. In the Slovak case I will concentrate on decentralization as a restructuring of territoriality and the specific role of Bratislava therein. Finally, I will provide a brief overview of cross-border cooperation programmes that have come to affect the relationship between Vienna and Bratislava and look at the development of the cities as a joint cross-border urban region.

5.1 Austria and the EU

5.1.1 The Austrian accession to the EU
According to Kaiser (1997) it is often wrongly assumed that Austria's accession to the EU in 1995 was both logical and easy. According to him, neither descriptions are appropriate. Although Austria had over the years signed several treaties to enhance economic cooperation with EU states, an EU membership entails a lot more more commitment, both politically and financially. Kaiser holds that these large differences between those treaties and EU membership were effectively downplayed by the government of the time. Similarly, the need for structural adjustments in Austria in order to be able to be a part of the EU were hardly ever mentioned. Thus, the referendum which resulted in a 'yes' to EU membership, quickly led to a strong backlash as soon as the costs of membership became visible (Kaiser 1997).

The accession to the EU did not only lead to a budget crisis; it was followed by the collapse of the coalition in 1999. Furthermore, the opportunities offered by the EU for institutional reform inside Austria left the federal counties empty-handed and disappointed, despite the possibility for more independence. Similarly, national political decision making, in Austria often based on long discussions and bureaucratic processes engaging all stakeholders,
could be sped up with an EU framework behind it. This too led to disappointed and disgruntled parties. Finally, the self-image of Austria as a landlocked 'island of the blessed' was no longer applicable once it had entered the EU. According to Kaiser, politics in Austria were nevertheless still highly self-involved and characterised by:

[t]he superficial internationalist rhetoric [of Austrian politicians] which stands in sharp contrast to societal reality, the idea of moral superiority of a neutral and peace-loving nation, and the somewhat immodest belief that the other EU states were only waiting for Austrian leadership, a slightly modernized political version of 'Am österreichischen Wesen soll die Welt genesen'. (Kaiser 1997, 147)

With this attitude, Austrian politicians would reflect many actions undertaken at the EU level with positive effect as an Austrian accomplishment, whilst diminishing Austrian influence in decisions that sat less well with the wider Austrian public. In general in the mid-nineties, after years of boosting about neutrality and inward politics, Austria lacked the political capacity to handle international EU politics, let alone within institutions such as NATO (Kaiser 1997).

Thus, we see that a change of territorial regime, in this case the legal absorption within a larger political entity, brings along different economic and political difficulties, as well as conflicts of identity and power on a national level. We will now jump in time and take a closer look at the effect of the EU accession of Austria's neighbouring countries, a process which influenced territoriality and the understanding thereof even further.

5.1.2 Austria and the EU accession of its direct neighbours
Although Austria's own accession has seen difficulties, the accession of its neighbours proved rather positive. The year 2004, in which its direct neighbours to the east accessed the EU, meant that it was no longer placed on the outer border of western Europe. Instead it became central again in 'politically integrated Europe' (Jordan 2006, 676). According to Jordan, this was 'a development that very corresponds to Austria's self-image as a country in the heart of Europe' (2006, 676).

Politically, it meant that Austria was from now on a part of a larger bloc of small countries with a similar backgrounds within the EU, which would benefit leverage within the EU. However, Jordan argues that such affiliations from the past can also pose a danger. Many
cross-border cooperation projects, including transport network improvement, are initiated and led by Austria, and more particularly Vienna, which can create tricky situations when it comes to issues of power and equality (Jordan 2006; Coimbra-Swiatek 2011). Or, as Swiatek's respondent from the Vienna government put it: 'extending [...] cooperation to this kind of cross-border cooperation (...) something natural to reactivate the relations of the Hapsburg [sic]' (2011, 256).

Economically, Austria has benefited from the 2004 accession. Not only did Vienna become a major hub for investors, business and international organisation, the border regions profited as well. Although the opening of the border partially restored the traditional larger towns across the border, drawing Austrian borderlands closer to the east. Still, tourism, shopping and the influx of labour have overall benefited the border region and impacted population growth positively, after years of slumber. However, Austria now also has to compete with its neighbours for FDI and economic input by companies. As countries like Slovakia were – and thus far, are – able to offer lower tax rates and cheaper labour, Austria had to adapt its tax system as well. Nevertheless, Austria has not yet sacrificed everything; due to its high environmental standards and strong regulations companies prefer to go east, and North-South road freight travels around Austria (Jordan 2006).

Jordan concludes that the EU has had many positive effects on Austria, yet only the social elites seem to perceive it that way, leading Austria to be one of the most eurosceptic countries in the EU (Jordan 2006; also: Karner 2010). We will now examine this phenomenon. It will become clear that Austria's euroscepticism can be interpreted as a consequence of changing territorial regimes.

5.1.3 EU and Austrian public opinion: territoriality and the meaning of space
Considering the rather bumpy start of Austria's own EU accession, it is not surprising that, despite the initial 'yes' in the referendum and fifty percent of the population viewing the EU as a necessary given, only 28 percent of Austria's population had a positive attitude towards the EU in 2008 (Karner 2010, 387). Even though the economic results for Austria by then were overall positive, especially after the accession of their neighbouring countries in 2004, the dislike of the EU continued. According to Karner, this dislike goes beyond whatever EU-related incidents occurred at the time, such as the signing of the Lisbon treaty. Karner argues that the
Austrian aversion towards the EU is rooted in much deeper emotions, embedded in a wide range of 'identity discourses'.

I argue that one of those changes is the alteration of the meaning of Austrian space. The island of the blessed is no more. Not only has it been taken up into the larger framework of the EU, the entire space has been re-produced; previous distant neighbours, excluded for most people by the Iron Curtain, have now come close, changing the meaning of the border and what is on the other side. Of course, space is always changing and in production, but I think it is fair to say that this pace is exceptional. How people make sense of such a change is context-dependent for each individual person. Yet some general trends can be discerned.

In his study, Karner (2010) evaluates readers' letters and responses to the reports on the Lisbon Treaty of 2008 in the *Krone Zeitung*, the most widely read tabloid newspaper of Austria. The Lisbon Treaty, which redefined the responsibilities and engagements, was controversial and hotly debated in Austria. Karner recognized two trends in these letters. On the one hand, letter-writers made use of personal pronouns, such as 'we', 'us' and 'them', as such reproducing national identities and boundaries (2010). I argue that although these boundaries do not always directly refer to borders, we can still recognize territoriality at work. The distinctions between 'us' and 'them' established in these letters at one point refer to 'us in Austria' versus 'them in Brussels'. Thus indicating a conflict of who has the right to decide what belongs to whom, and how relationships are to be interpreted. The same 'us' versus 'them' can be seen on at another level, between 'us, the normal people' and 'them, the politicians in Vienna'. Similarly, the nationalist argument of 'us, Austrians' versus 'them, non-Austrians' is an example par excellence as it indicates who is perceived to have certain entitlements and who does not, or who only want best for Austria and who is there to ruin it all.

Throughout his article Karner formulates another argument, namely that to support such differentiations people make use of historical arguments, i.e. to produce meaningful space, people refer back to the past. They use pieces of history, and interpret them in such a way that it helps to make sense of the now. Take for example this letter-writer, where the author reflects on the 1960s and compares those years to 2008:

> If affluence is (...) seen as a state of well being, it becomes apparent that people in our country were considerably better off in the 1960s than today. There were fewer existential uncertainties
and environmental problems ( . . . ), one could leave the door unlocked, would speak to the neighbours (a shared language and mentality were taken-for-granted) ( . . . ). [N]ews about our politicians were largely positive ( . . . ) whereas today they just make up the numbers at EU-summits. There were no concerns about UV-light, HIV, BSE, bird-flu, genetically modified food, nuclear accidents or rising crime. (Kronen Zeitung 31/05/08: 31 in Karner 2010, 393, translation by Karner)

We see here that this letter both speaks of a better time in the past, compares it to the present, whilst referring, albeit a bit more implicit, to an 'us, who speak the language' and 'those, who don't'. Similarly, there is 'us, the people' represented by politicians, who used to be good, but now fail, especially in the EU. So, we see that the changes in territorial regime is part and parcel of the tripartite production of space, closely interwoven with developments on all scales. Or, summarizing in the words of Karner:

[The s]ocial, economic, and political changes typical of life in an increasingly global, post-industrial 'network society', which is nonetheless lived in particular local settings by the vast majority, [...] yield themselves to being read as 'changes for the worse', 'things going downhill,' or even breaches of a social contract taken-for-granted until recently. (Karner 2010, 407)

This being the case in Austria, in Slovakia the main outcomes of changing territorial conditions under scrutiny here occurred in a different manner. In the Austrian case we have looked at dynamics between Austrian citizens and politicians. For Slovakia I chose to look at local differences first. These differences provide us with a different angle of examining the consequences of territorial change in the same region. I will first briefly describe the main outcomes of EU accession for Slovakia and then take a closer look at the local level, with, of course, as special emphasis on the role of Bratislava.

5.2 Slovakia and the EU

5.2.1 Opening of the border

The Slovak Republic came into existence on the 1st of January in 1993, after the federation of Slovak and Czech Republic had been peacefully dismantled. As we have seen above, Slovakia had already briefly existed as an independent state in the 1940s, but no institutional stability
had come from that. During the Cold War era, many things in Slovakia had been coordinated through Prague. Thus, by 1993 the country had to (re)invent itself, both politically as well as socio-culturally. On the one hand it had to organise itself internally, by forming efficient regions and institutions, on the other hand it had to create its own national identity. Both goals however were to fit in the aspiration of becoming part of the EU, or as Bitušíková says, to 'return to Europe' after being separated for decades (Bitušíková 2002, 41).

Williams and Baláž point out that after the Wall fell in 1989, the changes in the territorial regime of Slovakia were very significant. Not only did the market open up, and was thus in need of restructuring, people's freedom of movement changed as well. The first years of the nineties were marked by heavy economic crisis due to that restructuring of the market. Old socialist systems did not function anymore and a new system was not yet in place. The reforms that were carried out did not sufficiently focus on regulation of markets, and unfortunately paved the way for corruption practices and high risk, complemented by a lack of a legal framework. Transborder business, involving different economic systems, increased such risks. However, although Slovak business might have been difficult on its eastern and southern borders, transborder contact towards the west, i.e. Austria was relatively easy and nearly risk-free. Thus, one of the coping mechanisms of households and individuals with the economic crisis was heavily characterised by the other consequence of border alleviation: re-found mobility options (Williams and Baláž 2002).

The Slovak border to Austria was relatively easy to cross, though work permits were not easy to obtain. Nevertheless, skilled workers in the western border region of Slovakia found suitable and better-paid jobs in the labour-short Vienna. Daily and weekly commuting options made it relatively simple to work abroad without having to break social ties with home in the Slovak side of the border region. Furthermore, although border controls could heavily delay travel times, many Slovaks, especially from Bratislava and the wider Bratislava district, travelled almost every month to Vienna for shopping and/or business. Shopping trips like these were stimulated by the still uneven divide of product availability. In other border regions, such trips were mainly characterised by the purchase of of basic goods. However, consumers from Bratislava, who were generally more affluent than other Slovaks, shopping in Vienna mainly bought luxury or high(er) quality which were still hard to retrieve in Bratislava, as they had
done earlier under state socialism as well. Yet, with the opening of Slovakia for foreign retail companies such as Billa, Tesco and Carrefour in the beginning of the 2000s, such shopping trips might have changed in nature (Williams and Baláž 2002).

In general, from the early nineties to the late 2000s, Slovakia was part of a larger trend visible in all the CEE; it became a buffer zone. As Williams and Baláž continue to explain, the regulations on access to the EU led to a situation where people from the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) could enter the CEE, but not the EU. Hence the pattern emerged of a solid in-migration into CEE from the CIS as well as the Balkans and Asia. These migrants took up the low-skilled jobs coming available in service and construction, whereas Slovaks and other CEE people either moved or commuted into the EU for high(er) skilled jobs (William and Baláž 2002, 655).

5.2.2 Slovakia's accession to the EU
Politically, the first four years of Slovakia as an independent nation-state were marked by its prime minister Mečiar. Although his government initially faltered, he managed to build a coalition between extreme left and extreme right and stay in place until elections in 1998. The Mečiar-government left Slovakia in political isolation and it did not necessarily aspire EU membership. Mečiar and his companions, though successfully boosting the economy, formed a repressive and corrupt government, dividing formerly state owned companies amongst themselves, censoring critical voices and running dubious minority policies. They undertook attempts at ruling out the opposition and the building of a single party state. Furthermore, they deliberately took measures and decisions of which the outcome would hamper EU accession. Though the economic growth rates fuelled support for Mečiar for a long time, by the 1998 elections he had to leave office. The new centrist government, based on a five-party coalition, pulled the country out of its isolation and was 'warmly welcomed' by the EU. Although corruption scandals and minority issues had not yet disappeared, it ultimately resulted in Slovakia’s accession to the EU on the first of May, 2004 (Field 2001).

Although Slovakia’s accession did change some things acutely, many European integration processes had already commenced in the early nineties and continued to be gradually developed after 2004. Although Slovakia was not an immediate member of the Schengen zone,
and it did not take up the Euro instantly, the freeing of flows of goods, capital and services did take place. The increase of export flows, the development of the car industry – especially around Bratislava – and the improvement of labour productivity, went hand in hand with an increase in domestic demand, thus creating an increasing economic growth rate in the years after the accession. Incoming foreign direct investment which already started in the early nineties expanded after the the controversial Merciar government was replaced in the elections of 1998 and has continued since. Furthermore, the income gained through EU structural and cohesion funding supported develop the country by means of different national and (cross-border) regional projects. However, not all funds coming from the EU have been absorbed. Due to lack of experience with EU-funding as well as the phenomenon of brain drain, Slovakia, especially the non-Bratislava regions, lack the capacity to adequately make use of the funds available (Jordan 2006).

The EU structural funds are allocated through complex systems of requirements for specific regions, which take into regard economic development, income and unemployment levels and other factors (Jordan 2006). However, since Slovakia has only become an independent country since 1993 it is not yet set in stone what constitutes a region, how it is organised and in what way it fits in a national framework (Bitušíková 2002). Therefore we now turn to Slovakia's internal local differences.

5.2.3 Local differences and the Bratislava paradox
The regional differences in Slovakia are large and have led to big divides in income and unemployment. The differences appear along three binaries: urban-rural, lowlands-mountains, and west-east. The urban, lowland and western parts of the country are generally better off than the rural, mountainous and eastern parts (Jordan 2006; Bitušíková 2002). Nevertheless, regardless of the higher prosperity in urban and western regions, in 2002 the population of Slovakia was still relatively equally spread over rural and urban areas. This stands in stark contrast with the European average of 80% of urban dwellers. The institutional framework for that had already begun to take shape in the tenth century, when Slovakia was part of the Hungarian Kingdom. The districts created back then followed natural boundaries such as rivers and mountains. This did not only contribute to developing economic differences, it also led to strong local identities. Furthermore, the continuous change of rule, which took the Slovak lands
in and out of larger political entities, has contributed to the development of local identities as well, as there was no stable larger unit to identify with (Bitušíková 2002).

When it comes to politics we find that Bratislava is not particularly representative for Slovakia as a whole and plays a fairly limited role in issues of Slovak identity. Nevertheless, the government – especially under Mečiar – kept a strong centralist state well up to the early 2000s. However, in order to be able to join the EU, amendments had to be made, and power had to be partially transferred to smaller entities within Slovakia. These rearrangements started to take place in 2000, when the Slovak government accepted the *Conception of Decentralization and Modernization of Public Administration*. The actual decentralization process proved to be quite problematic and many items were never implemented due to many different reasons. Yet, some new institutional entities were built. The creation of these entities required difficult political manoeuvre as different factors had to be taken into account. Not only did regions aim to reorganize in such a way that they became suitable for certain types of EU funding, they also had to deal with minority policies, which has lead to some dubious gerrymandering (Jordan 2006; and for more detail, see: Bitušíková 2002).

The decentralization process also brought the paradoxical role of Bratislava to the surface. Bitušíková argues that for many Slovaks Bratislava is a central point in the simplified perception of 'an “advanced west” and a “backward east”'. This simplification does not only exist in the minds of Slovak citizens but of foreigners as well, most of whom 'start and finish their visit to Slovakia in Bratislava' (2002, 56). Any suggestion about naming another city capital has led to strong opposition by institutions already seated in Bratislava. Many EU organisations have settled in Bratislava as well. This does not sit easily with the other districts of Slovakia, where it is felt that despite EU policies firmly focusing on regions, everything still necessarily needs to run through Bratislava due to bureaucratic logistics. Bitušíková demonstrates the uneasiness some people have with Bratislava when she quotes Mesík (2000), an environmental activist and bureaucrat at the time:

*Can this country afford to have its capital in Bratislava, on the geographical periphery? Doubts about acceptability of Bratislava do not arise from historical concerns (…), but from practical ones. Bratislava, partly because of its extremely asymmetrical position near Vienna, functions as a thick filter stopping progress and investment trickling*
Although Mesík seems to forget that Vienna is the same geographical position, it does become clear that the uniqueness of Bratislava, sitting on the border with Austria and so close to Vienna, as we have described in the beginning of this paper, does play a role in the perception and function of Bratislava for Slovakia as a whole.

We can recognize how the shifting regimes of territoriality opens windows for further empowerment and a redrawing of boundaries of local entities, potentially leading to a reorganization of power or at least to fresh input for old debates. In addition to internal reorganization, the EU has had a large influence in cross-border cooperation as well, thus influencing the meaning of a nation-state as a space and its territorial power. We will now turn to the development of a EU framework for such cross-border cooperation and how it is carried out on the ground in the Vienna-Bratislava border region.

5.3 Cross-border cooperation in the Vienna-Bratislava border region

5.3.1 The development of the EU framework for cross-border cooperation

In order to demonstrate how cross-border cooperation projects came about in the Vienna-Bratislava region it is necessary to outline the wider framework in which these projects act. Drawing on Wastl-Walter and Kofler (2000) I will summarize the development in Europe which created the setting for cross-border cooperation in Europe. After World War II, international cooperation treaties and communities came into existence. As the European Coal and Steel Community, which was founded in 1952, turned into the European Economic Community (EEC) and then in 1995 transformed into the European Union (EU) the dimensions of cooperation fostered under these institutions grew more diverse. Initially setting out to spur economic prosperity, ‘overcoming (national) barriers as well as achieving political and economic stability’ were later on added to the goals of these supranational organizations.

The opening up of the central and eastern states of Europe after 1989 increased the felt need for cooperation, leading to the signing of economic cooperation treaties such as the
European Association Agreement and the Trade and the Cooperation Agreement. Out of these
decennia-long processes came forth an awareness for borders as a place for mutual
cooporation and development. As early as 1958 the first Euregio was founded in the
borderlands connecting the Netherlands with Germany (Wastl-Walter and Kofler 2000).
Euregions, or Euroregions, are voluntary associations combining at least two organizations on
both sides of a border. As a Euregion they work together on common policies concerning cross-
border issues. Although the organisations all work within the legal framework of their own
state, the Euregion is an entity with its own administration and financial sources, deriving from
regional income and EU funding (Yoder 2003, 92-3). In 1971, thirteen years after the founding
of the first Euregio, the Association of European Border Regions (AEBR) was founded (Wastl-

In the early nineties the AEBR started up LACE (Linkage, Assistance and Cooperation for
the European Border Regions), which was later expanded to LACE - TAP, adding Technical
Assistance and Promotion of Cross-border Cooperation. Around that same period, the Poland
Hungary Assistance for the Restructuring of the Economies (Phare) was grounded, which later
turned into Phare CBC (Cross-Border Cooperation). From 1996, LACE and Phare started to
cooperate along what was then the external border of the EU. LACE Phare laid the foundation
for the future entrance to the EU of the Newly Independent States (NIS) which had borders to
EU member states of the time. Not all cross-border cooperation institutions were focused on
EU-access only. The CREDO multi-country grant program, which was founded in 1997,
supported projects focusing on cooperation between NIS non-EU candidates, as well as on
cooperation between Central European Countries (CEC) and mixed NIS-CEC projects. The aim of
CREDO was to enhance (social) stability, cooperation and decentralization (Wastl-Walter and
Kofler 2000).

Through all these institutions and grant schemes ran the INTERREG Community
Initiative, which also allocates structural funds for regional development (Jordan 2006; Wastl-
Walter and Kofler 2000). According to the EU webpage on regional policy, this initiative
provided funding and expertise to border regions in Europe from 1989 to 2006. However, for
the period between 2007 and 2013 its name changed to the European Territorial Co-operation
objective. This objective consisted of three programs focusing on either cross-border
cooperation programmes along internal EU borders, transnational cooperation programmes
which included larger regions such as the Danube region, or inter-regional cooperation programmes which facilitate the comparison and exchange of experience between such larger regions. These programmes, which are still referred to as INTERREG IV A-C, have been aided by the legal body European Grouping for Territorial Cooperation (EGTC), which has facilitated the creation of legal personalities needed for cooperation. The main budget was supplied by the European Regional Development Fund (ERDF) (European Commission 2014). At time of writing, a new INTERREG program has been launched. For the period of 2014 to 2020 the programmes will run under the name INTERREG EUROPE. The first call for proposals under this new flag is set for February 2015 (INTERREG IVC n.d.). It is under the previous INTERREG IVC that cooperation along the Danube was fostered by the name of Centrope. We now turn to these kinds of regional programmes between Vienna and Bratislava.

5.3.2 Examples of cross-border cooperation in the Vienna-Bratislava region

Immediately after the Iron Curtain fell, cross-border contacts increased through different public and private channels and combinations thereof. Centrope, founded in 2003, is an example of a supranational project. It brings 'the urban regions of Vienna, Brno, and Bratislava, as well as northwestern Hungary – an area with a total of six million inhabitants – into closer co-operation [...] a resurrection of sorts, of Vienna's former metropolitan hinterland' (Jordan 2006, 677). Fostered through INTERREG IIIA, it aims at capacity building and creating frameworks for cooperation. Under Centrope several Euregions are coordinated, as well as other platforms such as Wirtschaftsraum Wien-Bratislava (Economic Space Vienna-Bratislava), which is run by the Chambers of Commerce (Coimbra-Świątek 2011; Giffinger and Hamedinger 2013).

Characterizing for Centrope, according to Coimbra-Świątek (2011), is that power is indeed askew in favour of Austria, as Jordan (2006) formulated as a danger for co-operation. Furthermore, within Centrope decision-making mainly lies with governmental institutions operating on a national level in the respective countries. Local institutions, as well as trade unions, civil society and business have a rather limited role to play (Coimbra-Świątek 2011). According to the OECD territorial report on the Vienna-Bratislava region from 2003, CEE-EU cross-border activity in general was not yet sufficiently guided by institutional framework and coordination, thus leaving a lot of room for improvement (OECD 2003, 11-19). Coimbra-Świątek (2011) confirms that within Centrope this has not yet changed much. Moreover, she
argues that the members of Centrope are mostly guided by EU policy and regulation. Thus we see that, just like in Slovakia, regions are established to fit within a EU standard, in order to get hold of funding. Coimbra-Świątek argues that this kind of co-operation might lead to nothing more but 'an elaboration of “planning visions” or rhetoric joint agendas, with little practical changes more than a collective discourse that reproduces a hegemonic rhetoric' (2011, 286).

Other fields where co-operation has been initiated are industry and education. The first sector started up the Twin City project, focusing on the improvement of infrastructure and accessibility as a tool to improve general ease for cooperation and improvement of competitiveness (Giffinger and Hamedinger 2013; for more insight on cross-border business networks after the EU enlargement see Leick 2012). In the sector of education cooperation was quickly initiated as well. As soon as 1989, sporadic cross-border contacts between the Universität Wien (University of Vienna) and the Comenius University of Bratislava were intensified, field trips previously aimed towards the west were relocated to the east and extensive collaboration programmes were started up. In a collection of interviews gathered by the Institut für den Donauraum und Mitteleuropa (IDM, Institute for the Danube Region and Central Europe) participants reflect on their participation and experiences in German teachings programs (Lektorate), the Aktionen (cooperative Actions between coordinated through the Austrian federal ministry for Science and Research such as the Aktion Österreich-Slowakei), Summer Schools, CEEPUS (Central European Exchange Program for University Studies) and communally organized lecture rooms, bus transports and excursions (Prager 2009).

5.3.3 The development of a metropolitan region?
By 2012 Vienna had 1.73 million inhabitants; taking into account the wider Vienna region, this number nearly doubles. During the nineties the service industry grew with 80 percent, and although it stagnated afterwards, unemployment rates are low. It continues to attract enterprises and international headquarters, leading to a wide creation of jobs and a large investment input (Giffinger and Hamedinger 2013). According to Giffinger and Hamedinger (2013) these developments have made Vienna and its surroundings with smaller cities such as
Bratislava, Brno and Györ into a metropolitan region. The authors see these developments as a consequence of a changing meaning of the border.

The free movement across the border, has created the opportunity to now capitalize on the differences that exist because of it. Decoville et al (2013) point out that Vienna and Bratislava are a border region were cross-border integration is mainly facilitated precisely because of the border. With Vienna as the strongest and largest centre and Bratislava as its periphery, the region is integrated through what the authors name 'integration through polarisation', benefiting Vienna more than Bratislava. Due to its inequality, they pose the question whether or not such a process is durable (Decoville et al 2013, 232).

An answer might come from Giffinger and Suitner (2014) who argue that the concept of polycentric metropolitan development can balance out the unevenness between ‘dominant cities and “the rest”’ (5). They describe polycentricity as 'the circumstance that the structure and development of a metropolitan territory are determined by multiple instead of a single node' (Giffinger and Suitner 2014, 5). For a city to apply polycentricity in its policy means that multiple centres are to be developed both within the city, the city area and the wider metropolitan region. Distinguishing between different types of polycentric development, namely strategic polycentricity, ensured by policy makers aiming for such developments, functional polycentricity, the infrastructure of knowledge, transport, networks et cetera, and morphological polycentricity, the hierarchical interrelations between nodes in the territory. In the authors' assessment of Vienna and Bratislava they have reached the conclusion that the cities individually have different levels of metropolitization, and that this influences the actions of stakeholders in both cities in working together towards polycentric metropolitan cross-border integration.

Moreover, in a very recent publication by Giffinger and Sohn (2015) it becomes clear that the hierarchical relation between Vienna and Bratislava reflects upon direct cooperation between people. Not only are power and knowledge divided askew, the border plays into it as well. Or as one of their interviewees says: 'There is still something of the Iron Curtain here' (Giffinger and Sohn 2015, 17).

Although the border is no longer perceived as a peripheral zone, but rather as a 'key site of globalization', working together as one zone is still prone to perceived conflict of interest.
The openness of the border does not erase differences in policy making and execution, institutional organization and cultural sensitivities. These differences make cooperation more difficult. In their network analysis Giffinger and Sohn thus concluded that Austrian cross-border players tend to work mainly with other Austrian actors, leaving out their Slovak counterparts. Simultaneously, Slovak actors also reach out to Austrian, and mostly Viennese organizations, instead of to other Slovak partners, on the basis that Viennese have more knowledge and funds available. This then reinforces the continued centrality of Vienna, and the related power imbalance. This leads to suspicion towards Vienna amongst the other Austrian and non-Austrian players and results in reluctant cooperation at best, as they fear that Vienna will always get the better end of the deal. On top of that, one of their interviewees at the Chamber of Commerce Austria added:

The Centrope region is far away from working together as an economic region. The borders in the minds are very strong; and also the cultural, political and economic borders, especially concerning profit and money. The main challenge is therefore to degrade the borders in the minds. (Chamber of Commerce Austria, 13 July 2011)
(Giffinger and Sohn 2015, 16-17)

Thus, we see that the border and its effect has left deep traces in the systems in place, as well as in the minds of people. However, as Decoville et al have argued, the chance for developing common goals and policies has not yet been in place for that long (2013). Things might still change. Therefore I reckon that future research into the possibilities continuous development of the region as a cross-border polycentric metropolitan area remains very interesting and worth studying. Even more so when a more theoretical, territorial analysis is applied, inclusive of cultural and social factors.

In this chapter we have seen how EU accession has influenced Austria and Slovakia, both in (economic) relation to each other and internally. We have analysed how processes of territorialization have affected different elements in each country respectively. For Austria we have examined the opinion of Austrian citizens and the behaviour of their politicians. For Slovakia we have observed how it influenced debates on local institutional organisation. These different approaches demonstrate the far-reaching effects of territoriality. Ideally, both studies
would also be carried out vice versa to create an equal comparison. In conclusion, and with an eye on the future, we have to acknowledge that cross-border cooperation, though in place and stimulated by EU funding and institutions, still leaves much room for improvement. One way to grasp and work on such improvement is through inclusive development and execution aiming at polycentric metropolitan development. And lastly, an adequate evaluation of what cross-border cooperation and integration does and has done to local identity in the region would be highly relevant to be able to create a policy which resonates the voice of the locals.
Chapter 6
Conclusion

In thesis we have built on the assumption that space is produced and comes to life in particular places, amongst other elements, through processes of territoriality. As such, we have concluded that nation(-states) are not a-historic, inert and place-bound. Instead, any kind of conceptualization or perception is dependent on historic processes, what is remembered of these processes, spatial practices, social surroundings and personal context for each individual.

With that assumption in mind we have looked at Vienna and Bratislava and the developments of the meaning of those places in relation to each other, as it has been influenced by changing territorial regimes over the past 150 years. With Lefebvres production of space still in the back of our head, we can see that le perçu did not change; neither Vienna nor Bratislava moved somewhere else. Nevertheless, the interpretation of their location and the reshuffling of their surrounding territorial outline (le conçu) has had a profound influence on the representational space, i.e. the imagined meaning of both places or le vécu.

In the case of Bratislava we have examined how the city and its role developed along with larger processes of nationalism and ethnic orientation. We have seen how the city became pivotal in the shaping of an Slovak identity, although the city itself for a long time was not perceived as Slovak at all. Instead the identity of the city, the meaning of the place, was made up by its different ethnic groups, who did not consider themselves part of a larger territorial entity, but rather imagined themselves as a separate entity: an independent city-state, almost. As it then became an important regional hub in the new state of Czechoslovakia, the city's population had great dreams for the development of their city. Always having been the baby sister to Vienna, it started to conceptualize itself as a growing metropole, only a few years away of developing into a grand city like indeed Vienna, or its brother to the north, Prague, where many decisions were taken about the larger country Czechoslovakia of which Bratislava was now part.

Meanwhile in Vienna, former grandeur was crumbling. As Czechoslovakia took shape, the great Austrian-Hungarian empire was falling apart and Austria had to reinvent itself, as well as the former emperial capital Vienna. After WW1 and the decay of the monarchy, the city was
left poor and divided. Quite different from Bratislava, where people dreamt about the future, Vienna longingly looked back to the past, building the city’s identity upon its former political as well as cultural dominance.

After WWII, Bratislava had become a city mainly dominated by people who spoke and identified as Slovak. Simultaneously, all over the new Czechoslovakia, the communists were rapidly taking over. Within three years after the end of WWII the communist regime had taken over politics and the armed forces. In Vienna, WWII left deep traces in the landscape and its political structure, as for the years after the war it was ruled by the Allied. The Iron Curtain which rose throughout Europe was essential for the development of relations between Vienna and Bratislava, and the east at large. Austria’s position vis-à-vis the east had been co-determined by its geographic location, being a large capital situated on the border, its political neutrality and carefully conducted Ostpolitik. Though political upheaval and conflict had its repercussions in diplomatic relations, contacts never ceased to exist. Through various channels information about business kept going back and forth. Sometimes to the dismay of other western countries, although Vienna’s knowledge of eastern markets did help them as well during the détente. However, contrary to the times of the Austrian-Hungarian empire, the border to Czechoslovakia and Bratislava was closed, although the level of porosity would shift along with political changes and was much influenced by the particular ties between Vienna and Bratislava.

Then, as the Wall fell in 1989, the situation changed again completely. Slovakia soon became independent and named Bratislava its capital. Austria joined the EU, and a few years later so did Slovakia. We have seen that a change of territorial regime, in this case the legal absorption within a larger political entity, brings along different economic and political difficulties, as well as conflicts of identity and power on a national level. Moreover, we have noted that the influence of EU policies also influenced the relations between the two nation-states, even on a local level, as the EU aims for strong internal border regions, especially when it can be seen as a cross-border urban region.

Internally, the accession to the EU changed the meaning of Austrian space. The island of the blessed was no more. Not only had it been taken up into the larger framework of the EU,
the entire space had been re-produced; previous distant neighbours, excluded for most people by the Iron Curtain, have now come close, changing the meaning of the border and what is on the other side. In Slovakia the EU accession and the process of adapting to its requirements had influenced debates on its institutional organization.

Although by now both Vienna and Bratislava are capitals of states who are full members of the EU and cross-border cooperation is taking place on paper, in reality, a lot of this cooperation is still heavily influenced by the history of the region. People have incorporated the past in their perception of the region and of the people in it. Put very simply, Vienna is still seen as the big player, who wants and takes all the power for its own benefit. Similarly, Bratislava is perceived as a city with very little power, even by those who represent it. Maybe this is not only because of its size, but also because of its history; the social groups who traditionally ruled the city dissappeared over the past century and communist period and it being closed off from the west also left its marks. This might have contributed to the unequal divide of power, as well as to the fact that actors from Bratislava are not always taken seriously, neither by the Viennese nor by other Bratislava stakeholders, who often prefer to work with Austrian or Viennese partners.

Thus we have seen that although the border is no longer perceived as a peripheral zone, but rather as a 'key site of globalization', working together as one zone is still prone to perceived conflict of interest. The openness of the border does not erase differences in policy making and execution, institutional organization and cultural sensitivities.

Concludingly, we have examined different historical instances of the interaction of territorial changes and identity in the Vienna Bratislava region. For Vienna and Austria, such changes often triggered a nostalgic response in which social in- and exclusion mechanism (us versus them) were located, leading in the twentieth century to the monstrous consequences of World War II. In the case of Bratislava and Slovakia the same historical moments have had other prominent effects. For Slovakia it meant having to define its political structure in space. Over the last century the production of space went through the creation of a nation and the construction of new geopolitical entities, both of which were reflected in the production of space, through identity making in general and more specifically through different spatial
practices and territorial redefining. Taken together, this observation of the developments in the region give us an insight in the diverse workings of territoriality. We have seen how the instalment and alleviation of a border can have profound consequences on identity and self-perception. Furthermore, we have seen the effects of the border on economic and political development in such a paradoxical situation of two national capitals sitting on the edges of the national territory. How the region continues to develop and what will constitute the interplay of the different scales of territoriality remains to be seen.
References


Google Maps. 2015. 'Vienna and Bratislava.' Accessed 1st of May.

http://www.google.com/maps/d/edit?mid=zm8spAF6V78g.kkCCgaiF78lw


http://www.google.at/maps/place/Burgenland/@47.9661294,16.6497711,7z/data=!4m2!3m1!1s0x476c20c30e4adcf1:0x98424bb7b83ee8fa


http://www.interreg4c.eu/interreg-europe/


Abstract

In this thesis, the author aims to give an insight in the diverse workings of territoriality in the Vienna Bratislava region. It will be demonstrated how the instalment and alleviation of a border can have profound consequences on city identity and perception. Furthermore, the effects of the border on economic and political development in such a paradoxical situation of two national capitals sitting on the edges of the national territory will be examined in an historic context.

The development of Slovakia as a nation-state, with Bratislava as its capital will be studied. Specific attention will be given to Bratislava in the early 20th century. Vienna is discussed in the context of the crumbling Habsburg Empire, and the city's changing role within that. The focus lies with Vienna's self-identification, ethnic and the glorification of its past during the early 20th century. The roles of both cities during the Cold War are examined as well, looking closer at diplomatic relations between East and West and how they shaped the Vienna-Bratislava landscape. Finally, the cooperation between the cities after 1989 and the development of cross-border cooperation is explored, with an emphasis on the influence of a larger territorial entity: the European Union.

The author mainly draws on Lefebvres theories on production of space and Sacks concept of territoriality. Thus it will become clear that nation(-states) are not a-historic, inert and place-bound. Instead, any kind of conceptualization or perception is dependent on historic processes, what is remembered of these processes, spatial practices, social surroundings and personal context for each individual.

Zusammenfassung

In dieser Arbeit zielt die Autorin darauf ab, einen Einblick in die unterschiedlichen Arbeiten zu Territorialität in der Wien-Bratislava Region zu geben. Es wird demonstriert, was die Errichtung und der Abbau einer Grenze an tiefgreifenden Konsequenzen für die Identität und Wahrnehmung einer Stadt haben kann. Dazu wird der Einfluss der Grenze auf die ökonomische und politische Entwicklung in einer derart paradoxen Situation von zwei Hauptstädten in einem historischen Kontext analysiert, die an den Grenzen eines Nationalstaates liegen.


Die Autorin benützt vor allem die Theorien von Lefebvres über „Produktion von Raum“ und Sacks Konzept der „Territorialität“. Damit wird es klar, dass National(staaten) nicht a-historisch, träge und ortsgebunden sind. Stattdessen ist jede Art von Konzeptualisierung oder Vorstellung abhängig von historischen Prozessen, was von diesen Prozessen in Erinnerung bleibt, räumliche Praktiken, soziale Umgebung und dem persönlichen Kontext jedes einzelnen Individuums.
Academic Curriculum Vitae

Personal information

Name Mirjam de Klepper, BSc
Date of Birth 22nd of November 1987
Nationality Dutch

Education

2012 – 2014 MA, Erasmus Mundus Global Studies University of Vienna, Austria/
University of Leipzig, Germany
2011 – 2012 pre-master track Humanistics University of Humanistics, Utrecht,
the Netherlands
2008 – 2011 Bsc, Cultural Anthropology and Radboud University, Nijmegen,
Development Sociology the Netherlands

Honours

2009 – 2011 Radboud Honours Academy Radboud University, Nijmegen, the Netherlands

Summer School

2014 The European City in Transformation: from the GRAINES network, University of Vienna, Austria
Early Modern Period to the Present