Titel der Masterarbeit

„The Effects of Electoral Systems on Party Systems: The Cases of Japan and Taiwan“

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1. Introduction

Japan and Taiwan offer the rare opportunity of comparing electoral systems, as they both had a similar electoral system before and after their respective electoral reforms, which occurred in Japan in 1993 and in Taiwan in 2005. For many years, both countries used the rather uncommon single non-transferable vote system (SNTV) and after their reforms switched to a mixed-member majoritarian system (MMM). The SNTV system is basically a plurality system with more than one seat to be elected per district. The MMM system combines both plurality (i.e. single-member districts) and proportional representative component (further explanation in chapter 2.3). But why do electoral systems matter, and what consequences a reform can have?

Electoral systems are important institutions in a democracy. They determine how votes get translated into seats, thus an electoral outcome can lead to very different seat distributions depending on the electoral system. The result may be a complete different government. Further, electoral systems are hardly ever changed, as too many factors have to coincide and very diverse actors have to come to an agreement that may hurt one political party afterwards while advantaging the other political party. In 1994 Japan reformed its electoral system after many years of consideration. In Taiwan as well reforms had been in discussion since the first real competitive election in 1992, but it took until 2005 for the reform to get realized (Lin 2006: 121-124). Before the reforms in both countries, the populace was highly dissatisfied with governmental processes and political corruption. The interests of political actors as well as popular support shifted to a pro-reform stance and forced political actions to be undertaken in form of an electoral reform. Reformers promised that a new electoral system would end problems caused by the SNTV system. In Japan and in Taiwan for many years a predominant party monopolized governmental power and one of the major explanation for this was found in the SNTV system. Thus it was promised that two centrist political parties would emerge allowing the voters a real viable choice and producing alternations of power between the governing party and the opposition party. Further other problems and issues that arose under the SNTV system were said to “disappear” under the MMM system, like for example candidate-centered elections, pork-barrel politics, corruption, factionalism and so on (Reed 2002: 244-245; Göbel 2012: 71; Christensen 1998: 986). So why should the change of the electoral systems in Japan and Taiwan bring forth a two-party system, with two equally viable parties?

Many scholars starting with Maurice Duverger in the 1950s hypothesized that the electoral system causes the party system. This means that a certain type of electoral system tends to result in the formation of a certain type of party system (Sartori 1999: 13-15; Lijphart 1990: 488-490). To be more specific, it is argued that an electoral system using single-member districts (SMD) will lead to a two-party system, while a proportional representative system (PR) will most likely lead to a multiparty system. These assumptions are also called Duverger’s law or hypotheses. The SNTV is a rather rare electoral system, hence it was not covered by Duverger. Still later on Duverger’s theory was extended to also cover the SNTV system (for example Reed 1990). The hypothesis is therefore, that a country using SNTV is more likely to have a multi-party system (depending on the district magnitude), while SMD is more likely to lead to a two-party system. Furthermore not only the SNTV was not covered by Duverger, but also mixed electoral systems such as the MMM system were not part of Duverger’s assumptions, as such systems are rather new. They may not fit to Duverger’s hypotheses as the mix of PR
and SMD components can contradict the tendency towards a two-party system. In general though the weighting of both components may be of importance here.

Yet, other factors are also said to highly affect the party system, ranging from societal cleavages, to institutional differences and historical developments. Further it seems rather unlikely that simply changing the electoral system would eradicate the manifold problems of the old electoral system, as those problems may have grown historically and are a product of other issues in a polity. Whether parties are considered viable or not is also not necessarily related to the electoral system, but rather depends on the performance of the parties, their policy appeals, public opinion and so on.

The comparison of Japan and Taiwan thus makes it possible to see connections between electoral system and its effect on party system. The effects can be compared in two separate countries, and the differences and similarities in party systems can potentially be traced to electoral system and/or other exogenous factors such as societal cleavages. A comparison of the countries thus may lead to answers concerning choosing a (new) electoral system in a polity. While on paper some changes are said to occur fast or immediate, in reality changes may never happen as expected or it may take a very long period of time. Parties that choose to ask for a certain type of electoral system in order of getting an advantage under a new system may be disappointed with the actual outcomes. It is therefore of high relevance to look at case studies and how they fared with their decision for a new electoral system and what effect it had on an existing and established party system. Hence this master thesis offers the chance to analyze Japan’s and Taiwan’s electoral systems in form of a comparative case study and possible findings will answer those raised problems.

Further, not much research was done comparing the two countries’ electoral systems before and after the reforms yet, as the electoral reform in Taiwan occurred in 2005. Only one journal article (Jou 2009) so far examines the developments of the two countries under the new electoral systems, though this article was published after the first election under the new electoral systems in Taiwan. As only one election in Taiwan thus was analyzed in it, the possibility of slightly hasty conclusions is high. By now two elections were held in Taiwan, and new results may make it possible to come to new conclusions. So to expand and update the research done by Jou (2009) so far, as well as to offer more detailed and alternative explanations to his findings, the aim of this thesis is to analyze the electoral systems of both Japan and Taiwan before and after the reform and the effect they had/have on the party system. In detail the following research questions are the aim of this paper:

How did the electoral reforms of the parliamentary elections affect the party systems in Japan and Taiwan by looking at the Japanese SNTV system since 1958 and the Taiwanese SNTV system since 1992 and comparing them with the MMM system adopted in Japan in 1993 and in Taiwan in 2005?

Sub-questions:

What are the possible changes caused by the institutional constraints of the new electoral system compared with the intended changes of the reformers in both countries? Did they come to happen in regards of number of parties, party realignments, two-party system, an
alternation of government power, more party-centered elections and continued party dominance?

What other factors such as historical developments, societal cleavages and issues, and institutional differences in both countries may have affected the party systems that have led to results fitting to possible and intended changes or led to results contradicting them?

The time period for the two countries was chosen in order to have a similar starting point for the analysis. In Taiwan, the first completely free elections of the parliament called Legislative Yuan (LY) were held in 1992. The party system consisted of one dominant party and one major opposition party, but no other viable party. In Japan, in 1958 the House of Representative (HR) or Lower House election was the first parliament election after the 1955er system had been established. This resulted in a party system similar to that in Taiwan: one dominant party and one major opposition party, with only one other party, the Communists, which only received marginal vote shares. The analysis further will only cover the parliamentary elections from a nationwide perspective. The district level perspective will only shortly be explained in the theoretical framework and how it can get extended to the nationwide level. Furthermore the promises of the reformers that the manifold problems caused by the SNTV system are to improve/disappear cannot be analyzed deeply. First there is not enough research done yet in Taiwan to answer all those possible questions. And secondly, too many issues would be raised in this thesis to cover all of them. Problems such as corruption, factionalism, clientelism, party cohesion and so on are thus only marginally or not at all mentioned.

Further a few words have to be said about institutional differences here: the main institutional difference between Taiwan and Japan is, that Japan has a pure parliamentary system and Taiwan has semi-presidential system. In Japan the parliament consists of two houses: the House of Councilors (HC) and the House of Representatives (HR), similar to the system in Great Britain. Electoral systems for the chambers are not the same and elections are not held simultaneously. The tenno is the ceremonial head of the state, and the Prime Minister is the head of the government. Taiwan was first a parliamentary system as well (at least on paper) but during the 1990s, the system was gradually changed to a semi-presidential system. The head of the state is the president, but as the president also selects and appoints the premier, he/she has more power over the government than a parliamentary system would allow. In Taiwan there are not two chambers, but only the Legislative Yuan (i.e. parliament) (LY). This will be further elaborated later on in thesis (refer to chapter 5.4.3).

The method that will be used in this thesis is the comparative method. First Taiwan and Japan are compared separately in regards of SNTV and the new electoral system and if any changes in the party system occurred. Then the separate findings of the two countries are compared with each other. So it is possible to see changes that occurred within one country due to the change of the electoral system and between two countries of similar electoral systems before and after the reform. Main theories that will be used for the analysis are Duverger (1954) and his hypothesis about two-party systems, Sartori (1976) as he offers more concrete definitions than Duverger, as well as further theories by Rae (1971), Lijphart and Grofman (1986), Taagepera and Shugart (1989) and Cox (1997), and many more. Part of the theories are more of a mathematical approach by operationalizing specific variables such as effective number of parties, fractionalization of the party system, district magnitude and threshold.
Scholars that fall into this line are for example Rae (1971), Taagepera and Shugart (1989) and to a lesser extent Lijphart (1999). The other part of the theories follow a more theoretical approach by defining variables such as relevant parties, societal cleavages and polarization more closely. Such scholars are for example Cox (1997) and Sartori (1976). Accordingly the master thesis also follows both lines: empirical part one looks closely at mathematical operationalization of variables and the empirical part two looks more thoroughly at societal and political developments.

State of the Art

It can be said that the starting point of the theoretical foundations of electoral system research was set by Maurice Duverger in 1958. As Riker (1982) and Taagepera and Shugart (1989) illustrate in far more detail, Duverger’s work was by far not the first, but can be traced back as far as the 18th century. For this paper though Duverger’s work is the first relevant and most important theory, as he first formulated the tendency that a single-member district electoral system would lead to a two-party system and he further explained why such a tendency comes to happen. The next major works were released in the 1970s then: Douglas Rae offered the first try at operationalizing variables of electoral system in 1971 and Giovanni Sartori released his book Parties and Party Systems in 1976. While Rae’s book is the first attempt to operationalize variables of an electoral system, Sartori looks rather at party systems and parties per se. Sartori’s most important theories are about relevant parties and polarization of party system. Though both are based on assumptions of Duverger and try to reformulate Duverger’s law, which is reoccurring also in many other theoretical books and articles from then on. Sartori’s other major work is Comparitive Constitutional Engineering (1994), where he looks at political institutions in more detail. Rein Taagepera then continued to further operationalize variables related to Duverger’s law, starting with in the 1980s, where he together with Markku Laakso formulated the advantage profile. All major findings then are found in Taagepera and Shugart’s work Seats and Votes in 1989. It is one of the most comprehensive books on operationalization of electoral system variables and another important source for this paper. Their index for effective number of parties is widely used in literature even now. Further they also offer additional operationalization of variables outside of the electoral system that may be in correlation with the number of parties and party system, most importantly issue dimensions.

The first major work on issue dimensions was done by Seymour Lipset and Stein Rokkan in 1967. In it they describe the development of societal axes along which socioeconomic and religious cleavages emerged in Europa in the 19th and 20th century. Arend Lijphart (1982) then expands issue dimensions theory, as new dimensions such as postmaterialism emerged in the latter half of the 20th century. But as Jou Willy (2009) shows such theoretical issue dimensions may not be fit to East Asian countries as their development was quite different than that of Europe. Lijphart’s other works also focus on the rather uncommon SNTV system and how to classify it (1986) and the effect of district magnitude and electoral formula on party systems as well as an analysis of Rae’s work (1990). Another major author to be mentioned is Richard Katz. In his work A theory of Parties and Electoral System (1980) he focuses on how electoral systems affect the behavior of parties especially in party member elections and campaigning. His second major work Democracy and Elections (1997)
then looks at the relationship between political elections and political democracy, as according to Katz this relationship is not well covered in literature.

Gary Cox also is an important scholar for electoral system and the SNTV system in particular. In his work *Making Votes Count* (1997) he looks at strategic coordination in electoral system and whether successful coordination will lead to Duverger’s law. As SNTV brings forth many strategic coordination problems, Cox’ other articles cover strategic voting equilibrium under SNTV (1994), whether SNTV is superproportional (1996) and together with Emerson Niou (1994) he looks at the seat bonus under SNTV. Steven Reed first extended Duverger’s law to the Japanese SNTV system in 1990, which again was proven for the Taiwanese SNTV in 1999 by John Hsieh and Richard Niemi. Further topics involving SNTV are nomination errors in Japan (Reed 1990, Christensen 2015) and Taiwan (Tsai 2005, Wang 1996, Hsieh 1996), as well as under which circumstances SNTV is either maintaining a dominant party system or leading to multiparty system (Lin 2010). The topic of SNTV issues and problems are covered by most works found that were dealing directly or indirectly with Japan’s or Taiwan’s polity.

Major works for the Japan part are by Steffen Heinrich (2007), as he covers the effects of the electoral reform in Japan on the party system and party competition. Then Ronald Hrebenar and Akira Nakamura’s book (2015) covers a wide range of topics about the party system and party developments in Japan after the electoral reform. Another important author is Steven Reed. Beside his work about extending Duverger’s law, he also evaluated the electoral reform (2002, 2003) and published a book together with Kenneth McElwain and Kay Shimizu (2009) about political developments since the 1990s. A comprehensive overview of the SNTV and the MMM system’s particularities are given by Ray Christensen (2015), who also looked at effects of the electoral reform first in 1998. While the first evaluation about the electoral reform’s impact are quite negative (Christensen 1998), since the mid of the 2000s more and more research was done about a wide range of topics related to the effect of the reform. The topics range from “presidentialization” of the prime minister (Estévez-Abe 2006), to issue-based campaigns (Reed & Shimizu 2009a), policy convergence of the two largest parties (Scheiner 2012, Zakowski 2011), a somewhat decline and change of factionalism (Reed 2002, Krauss & Pekkanen 2004), the low impact of the reform on corruption (Reed 2002), the persistence of *koenkai* (Krauss & Pekkanen 2004), in contrast to the LPD’s decline due to the ineffectiveness of *koenkai* in recent years (Nakamura & Hrebenar 2015), and the growing alienation of the electorate from the political parties (Hatoyama 2014).

Topics about political developments before the electoral reform encompass Japan’s powerful bureaucracy (Hori 2012), the semi-democratic system before World War 2 (Takenaka 2014), political developments from 1945 to the 1990s (Kohno 1997), the spatial dimensions changes of the party system in the 1990s (Weisberg & Tanaka 2001), and issue dimensions and voter behavior until 1970 (Richardson & Flanagan 1984). Japanese sources though proved difficult, as the access was quite limited, and Japanese sources that were found often quoted only Western sources, making them rather negligible.

For Taiwan a major source is Davydd Fell with this book *Government and Politics in Taiwan* (2012). While quite some sources can be found on the topic of SNTV, there are less new sources to be found on politics in Taiwan. Several books cover the topic of the democratization process from martial law until the 1990s (for example Rigger 1999, Tien 1996) and until the mid of the 2000s (Meernik & Paolino 2008). Another popular topic about Taiwan’s
politics is the national identity issue (for example Hsieh 2008, Niou 2005). Information about political parties is rather less well covered, with the most important work done by Fell (2005, 2012), and additional two other sources were found (Hsu 2006, Yu 2005).

Not much is yet researched on the topic of effect of the electoral reform. So far only the following topics were looked at: the changes in the personal vote (Baito 2009), the effect the reform has on local factions (Göbel 2012), voters’ understanding of the new system (Rich 2014), and the effect on the number of parties (Stock 2010, Jou 2009). Beside these, other works dealing with the electoral reform mostly look at how the two largest parties fared under the MMM system so far (O’Neill 2012, Rich 2014, Kuo 2015), how the reform came to be but then backfired on the DPP (Chi 2014), growing popular discontent and polarization (Huang 2011), campaign topics (Fell & Chen 2014) and the recent changed focus of policy issues (Wu 2013). No research so far seems to be done about the effect of the reform on corruption, pork-barrel politics, intra-party factions, party cohesion, policy shifts towards the median voters and so on, pointing at a lack of research here.

Structure of the Thesis
The following structure of the thesis will be used: first the theoretical framework will be explained. The start of that chapter will be the introduction of Duverger and his major findings, then the most important definitions and classification of party systems and electoral system will be given. Afterwards definitions and explanations of other major variables follow. Then concrete operationalization of the variables will be closer looked at. Other important variables, that cannot be operationalized and are not directly linked with the electoral system, are also discussed later on. The end of this chapter will be a short explanation of the concrete theoretical framework, as not every theory and definitions given in the theoretical chapter will be of importance for the rest of the paper, but they are still important for understanding the topic and the connections and relevance of single factors. Before starting with the actual empirical main part, a short chapter deals with the explanation and political implications of the SNTV system and the MMM system in general. The SNTV system is a rather rare and particular electoral system, with many unique features. The extension of Duverger’s law to SNTV will also be explained. A short overview of the MMM system and its operationalization is also covered here.

The empirical main parts follow: in two major chapters Japan and Taiwan will be first analyzed respectively. In these country chapters, first a historical background will be given that mainly focuses on the political development of the two countries, up to the point where the actual analysis starts. In Japan the historical overview starts in 1868 (Meiji Restoration) and in Taiwan the overview begins in the 16th century, but it will mostly focus on Japanese colony time (from 1895 to 1945) and martial law period (from 1947 to 1989). Then a short overview of the most relevant parties and the rough political orientation follows in order to make the later empirical part easier to follow. Then the empirical part one will deal with the electoral systems before and after the reform with the specific variables that are lined out in the theoretical part. These encompass the relevant number of parties, seat bonuses, proportionality and deviation of proportionality, advantage ratio profile of the electoral systems and fractionalization of the party system. The empirical part two then supplements this by looking at societal and political developments. Here issue dimensions, polarization of the party system, right-left constellation of parties, policy-setting of parties and other factors will be illustrated, which all may have
affected and still affect the party system. Then a short summary and analysis that compares the findings of empirical part one and part two ends the country case part. After the two major chapters are finished, an analysis and comparison of the two countries will further show whether and how the electoral systems in both countries have similar effects on the party system, and whether other variables can explain deviations.

The conclusion looks again at the aims of the master thesis and whether the research questions could be answered. The method and approach will also be shortly looked at again. Then the major findings will be summarized. Important other findings and problems that were encountered during research will also be highlighted. Another major part of the conclusion is the political consequences of electoral systems and the relevance an analysis of the effect electoral systems have on party systems and on particular parties. Current events in both polities end the master thesis and may point towards future developments.
2. Theoretical Framework

2.1. Duverger’s Hypotheses

The first major work about electoral systems Political Parties was penned by Duverger in 1954 and it will be used here as an introduction to the theoretical framework before looking closer at definitions, relevance and operationalization of variables. Duverger’s book by far was not the first that covered the topic of electoral systems and their consequences. Scholars before him started to write about electoral law as soon as the 1860s, and many ideas that are later found in Duverger’s Political Parties were already well known beforehand. But those works before Duverger’s in 1954 suffered from bias and were written in a polemical style, as Taagepera and Shugart point out (Taagepera & Shugart 1989: 50). In his book, Duverger proposes two hypotheses, which later on were often called Duverger’s law, though Duverger himself never considered them as universal laws and instead writes rather of tendencies. His two hypotheses are that (1) “the simple-majority single-ballot system favours the two-party system” (Duverger 1954: 217) and (2) “both the simple-majority system with second ballot and proportional representation favour multi-partism” (Duverger 1954: 239).1

In the case of his first hypothesis he considered it an almost complete correlation, as “dualist countries use the simple-majority vote and simple-majority vote countries are dualist”, and any rare exceptions can be explained by special conditions (Duverger 1954: 217). Two effects are responsible for this: the mechanical and the psychological factor. The mechanical factor is due to the electoral rules and how they often over-represent larger parties (for example threshold and seat bonus to larger parties), which then leads to an under-representation of the weaker parties. This means that in an election the third strongest party is either extremely underrepresented or not represented at all in a simple-majority system. The psychological factor is more ambiguous and often effective only after a longer period of time (i.e. a few elections): voters are considered as rational beings and thus figure out that their votes are wasted if cast upon the third party (due to the mechanical factor). Hence the rational voters would rather vote for the lesser evil of the two major parties than waste their votes. The mechanical and psychological factors both can lead to a reduction of numbers of parties, therefore resulting in a bipartism or at least in a tendency of bipartism (Duverger 1954: 224-226). In case of social cleavages, so Duverger, it is possible though that more than two parties exist. He argues that splits from parties can lead to multipartism if there are antitheses that differ from the normal right-left policy axis in a country. These antitheses differ in every country and can be comprised of political, social, economic, religious and ethnic issues. He explains extreme numbers of parties that are not within his hypothesis as an exception due to such antitheses, though he does not elaborate further on this (Duverger 1954: 230-237). Turning to Duverger’s second hypothesis, he is less assertive here. For him PR (proportional representative; refer to chapter 2.3) does not necessarily multiply parties but often coincides with a multi-party system. The reason is that the mechanical factor affects PR and runoff systems way less than single-majority systems. Further this means that the psychological factor is less relevant here as well (Duverger 1954: 239-243).

While being the first major work and the starting point for research in this field, Duverger’s work also highly polarized over the years and was criticized in many scientific works. Two major criticisms can be found in the literature: one is about Duverger’s vague definitions and terminology, the other is about the hypotheses and the non-existent distinction between causality and association within them. So did Sartori write that Duverger never defined

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1 For an explanation of electoral systems refer to chapter 2.3
a concrete way of counting the numbers of party and changed his method throughout his books several times (Sartori 1994: 29-30; Sartori 1999: 13-14). Others point out that he only considers party aggregation as already established without ever explaining this (Ferrara 2011: 3). Riker (1982: 754) even goes that far and puts into consideration that Duverger used vague terminology on purpose. The other critic is two-fold: one is Duverger’s wrong use of “causality” and “association” in his hypotheses, the other is the excessive imprecision of them (Riker 1982: 754; Riker 1986: 27; Sartori 1986: 44, Sartori 1994: 29-30; Cox 1997: 15), which again might have been on purpose, as Duverger seemed uneasy about the second hypothesis (Riker 1986: 27). Another important critic is by Cox (1997: 15-16, 23) as he further remarks that Duverger took social structure basically as residual error, as social cleavages seemed to have no systematic role for Duverger, which was later proved wrong by scholars. Another wide known problem with Duverger’s hypotheses is that they only are supposed to work on district level, still Duverger used them in a nationwide context. This will be discussed later on.

So with all the critique: Are Duverger’s hypotheses inoperative and unusable? Most find enough evidence in their own research to confirm at least the tendencies of the hypotheses. So writes Rae (1971: 94) there is a strong relationship between plurality systems and two-party system, even it is weaker than a “sociological law”. Many scholars further try to “save” the hypotheses by reformulating and extending the original hypotheses to make them fit to as good as every exceptional case and turn them more deterministic (for example Rae 1971, Riker 1986, Sartori 1994, Taagepera and Shugart 1989) Further Duverger’s psychological and mechanical factors are widely recognized and accepted in their effect on party systems (like Riker 1982: 761-762), supporting the tendencies of the hypotheses.

Duverger later answered some of the critiques by stating that “certain errors of interpretation have resulted from my own tentative and imprecise formulations” (Duverger 1986: 69), though he emphasizes that he only ever wrote of tendencies and never of actual laws and while the electoral system is usually only an accelerator or a brake, there are of course many other factors having an effect on party systems (Duverger 1986: 70-73). Therefore Duverger’s hypotheses are a major topic in political science even nowadays, and his formulations still are of importance as starting point in the research of electoral systems. In this thesis Duverger’s hypotheses are the base for analysis as well. The analysis though will only look closer at the mechanical factor that is the base of the hypotheses and not at the voters’ behavior. The remainder of this chapter will look closer at variables in electoral systems that have an effect on party systems, and variables that help explain certain developments. Further variables outside the electoral systems will also be put under consideration.

### 2.2. Definitions: Party System and Electoral System

Here the most basic terms of this paper will be defined and explained: electoral system and party system. Both terms can be easily defined though the whole aspects of their meaning in the context of political science can be far more complex. Beginning with political party system, Rae (1971: 48) defines it as “[...] the competition between parties within a single political regime, and it is this system of competition (the party system) which gives to democratic political parties their unique importance”. Lipset and Rokkan (1967: 6) see political parties as a conglomerate “of groups differing on wide ranges of issues, but still united in their greater hostility to their competitors in the other camps”. From both definitions it becomes clear that competition is a key determinant for party systems at least in democratic systems. The reason given by Lipset and Rokkan is that competitive party systems “protect[s] the nation against the
discontents of its citizen” so that the citizen can put the blame on the current government instead of the overall system (Lipset & Rokkan 1967: 4). Also political parties are united in certain policy appeals that separates them from other political parties in a particular regime. This enables competition among political parties.

Then turning to electoral system, Rae (1971: 14) defines electoral system as “electoral laws […] which govern the process by which electoral preferences are articulated as votes and by which those votes are translated into distribution of governmental authority (typically parliamentary seats) among competing political parties”. Katz (1997: 107-108) considers a far broader meaning in electoral systems as he would include everything from conduct to outcome of elections as stipulated in electoral laws, which also means economic, cultural and social spheres if they have a direct impact on elections (like campaigning). This would go too far for this paper though, therefore only the mechanical aspects of how votes are translated into seats can be put under consideration here. Further for Katz the functions and the dimensions of electoral systems are of importance in democratic systems, even if they vary depending on the concept of democracy. He finds five main functions which are (1) legitimation that makes a political system democratic, (2) installation of officials to fill office vacancies, (3) selection and choice for population, (4) to create and foster representation by establishing and facilitating recruitment and reward structures for electors, and (5) popular involvement where electorate have to take an active role in politics (Katz 1997: 100-105).

All components and rules of an electoral system do not necessarily work at the same time. Rae defines three main phases when electoral systems work: (1) balloting to express the electorate’s choice, (2) districting as a limiting factor in the translation of votes to seats, and (3) electoral formulae as key factors for translating votes to seats (Rae 1971: 16). Katz’s dimensions of electoral system in contrast are again extending this mechanical phases to laws that further limit voters and candidates. In total he writes of four dimensions: (1) translation of votes into seats that include electoral formulae and constituencies (districting), (2) nature of choice in regards of what object and types of choices are there and the form of balloting, (3) access to balloting that includes suffrage and location of voting, and (4) control of candidacy in terms of suitability and seriousness as well as limitations on campaign activity and public subsidy (Katz 1997: 109-118). Katz’s broader dimensions of electoral system are again encompasses too many topics, but they show how important electoral rules are and how far reaching they can be.

Coming to the relevance of the two key terms party systems and electoral systems: what is the relation between them, and do electoral systems matter? Already in 1954 Duverger writes of the effect of electoral regimes on party systems, in particular on the number and sizes of parties, alliances between parties and representation. Furthermore, for Duverger electoral system and party system are “indissolubly linked” and difficult to separate (Duverger 1954: 204-205). Other scholars are also vocal of the decisive factor of electoral rules: Taagepera and Shugart emphasize that electoral rules do matter, as with different electoral rules, electoral outcomes could be quite different. Further they consider electoral rules as easier to change than most other features of a political system, though of course they are tied by local political conditions and traditions (Taagepera & Shugart 1989: 2-5). Sartori argues that electoral systems are made of independent variables and their effects are certain, even if many scholars appeal against this and say that electoral systems do not cause the party systems (Sartori 1994: 27-29). Thus a certain relation between party systems and electoral systems cannot be denied, though other factors may also be of importance in shaping party systems and the choice of an electoral system.
2.3. Classifications: Types of Electoral Systems and Party Systems

The two basic classifications of electoral systems are: single-member systems and the proportional representation (PR) systems. In the single-member system, each district consists of only one seat, while in the PR systems the number of seats of each district is above one. The single-member systems further can be split into plurality and majority formulae. The plurality system is also often called “first-past-the-post” or relative majority, and means that the candidate who has more votes than his/her strongest single competitor wins the seat, even if the vote share is not higher in total than all the other candidates combined (Rae 1971: 25-28; Sartori 1994: 3-4). The majoritarian system requires a winner of over 50 percent of the vote shares, hence an absolute majority. For achieving an absolute majority, there is usually a recourse in the election: either through alternative vote (where candidates with the fewest preferences are eliminated) or the double ballot system that admits to the runoff only the two front runners of the first ballot. The advantage of single-member systems is that a clear winner is sought and a more stable government is elected (Sartori 1994: 5-6). Further they offer a clear choice to the voters between two more moderate alternatives. The moderation effect occurs as the main parties want to gain the most votes by covering a broad spectrum of policies (Lijphart 1999: 63).

The PR system is defined as district sizes larger than one seat. Besides this PR systems in every country vary tremendously, especially in terms of proportionality, electoral formulae, list systems and other complex electoral rules. The function of the electoral formulae can be defined as “[…] to interpret these numerical data [the results of elections] as the basis for a legitimate distribution of parliamentary seats among the competing parties” (Rae 1971: 22), and the proportionality of an electoral system is made up of district sizes and such electoral formulae (more on this later). These PR formulae can further be divided into two “chief families”: (1) based on quotas and largest remainders, and (2) based on divisors and largest averages (Cox 1997: 56). To the first belongs the single transferable vote system (STV) that is only used in Ireland. It is considered the “purest” or most proportional among PR system.

Here each voter ranks candidates in order of preferences and any vote surplus to the quota is reassigned according to second preferences. The bottom candidates are eliminated and their preferences redistributed. This will be repeated until all seats are determined (Sartori 1994: 8). The other family of PR formulae is “based on the calculation of ratios (or “averages”) that reflect how much each party has paid in votes for its seats” (Cox 1997: 57). The two most known formulae are the d’Hondt formula, which is also the most commonly used one, and the Sainte-Lague formula, which is rather rarely used (Cox 1997: 57-58). Concrete explanations of these formulae depend on the complex calculation method of each, and will not be covered here. But in general it can be said that d’Hondt is the least proportional and especially favors larger parties, and the Sainte-Lague formula’s proportionality is between d’Hondt and the STV (Sartori 1994: 8).

Beside these three PR formulae there are also other less used and known ones. Further often electoral systems use more than one electoral formula, making them even more complex (Cox 1997: 59). Another distinction between PR systems is their list system: (1) closed party list, (2) open party list, (3) free list, and (4) limited vote. In a closed party list system the party determines the candidates’ order, in the open party list system the voters decide themselves their ranking preferences of candidates. In free list systems voters have as many votes as there are candidates. And in limited vote systems the voter has more than one vote to give, but always less than the number of candidates that are to be elected (Sartori 1994: 9-10).
Katz (1997) and Lijphart (1999) also find a third class of electoral systems: semi-proportional systems. To these systems belong limited vote and the single-non-transferable vote (SNTV) that was also used in Japan and Taiwan before their electoral reforms. The name though has nothing to do with how proportional these systems are, but just means that they are ranked between single-member systems and PR systems (Katz 1997: 109-110). The SNTV system will be further discussed in the next chapter. Lijphart defines semi-proportional systems as intermediate systems that combine features of both plurality and PR systems, hence the name (Lijphart 1986: 154-156). Another two types of systems can be found that are not covered by the mentioned classifications: Parallel plurality-PR (PPP) and Mixed Member PR (MMP). Both systems mix PR and plurality formulae and can be considered mixed systems. In both systems one part of legislature is elected by plurality formula in single-member districts and the other part by list PR. The difference here is though that in MMP PR seats are compensatory, while in PPP plurality and PR components are completely separated, thus PPP systems are the same as mixed-member majoritarian systems (MMM) (Lijphart 1999: 149). To make the classification of electoral systems less confusing, the following table 2.1 is taken from Lijphart 1999. It puts most of the aforementioned ways of classifications into one classification:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Plurality and majority formulae</th>
<th>Semi-proportional formulae</th>
<th>PR</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>✓ Plurality</td>
<td>✓ Limited vote</td>
<td>✓ List PR</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>✓ Majority-plurality</td>
<td>✓ SNTV</td>
<td>✓ Mixed-member PR (MMP)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>✓ Alternative vote</td>
<td>✓ Mixed-Member Majoritarian (MMM) = Parallel plurality-PR (PPP)</td>
<td>✓ STV</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Lijphart 1999: 149

There are many different ways to classify electoral systems, which cannot be covered here. The given classifications and definitions here are widely used and the easiest to understand the remainder of this paper.

Before finally moving on to concrete theories, a short classification of party systems will also be given here. Sartori defines seven classes of party systems which are widely accepted in the literature: (1) one-party system; (2) hegemonic party system; (3) predominant party system; (4) two-party system; (5) limited pluralism; (6) extreme pluralism; and (7) atomized system. In the case of a hegemonic party system, there is one dominant party that still allows the existence of subordinate parties but the power of the party is not challenged. A predominant party system means that one party governs alone without alternation of governing power, but there is open competition and opposition. A two-party system exists when there are two strong parties and there is an alternation of governing power between those two parties. Limited pluralism of three to five parties and extreme pluralism of six to eight parties are multiparty system, with no clear dominant party. And when no party has any noticeable effect on the other in regards of governing power then it is an atomized party system (Sartori 1976: 125-128).
2.4. Counting Parties

One of the major critiques about Duverger’s work was that a clear definition of how parties are to be counted was missing. This though played an essential role in Duverger’s hypotheses and his work, and has been of importance in all the following researches about party systems and electoral systems since then. The number of parties are also important according to Sartori, as it indicates the degree of fragmentation or non-fragmentation of parties as well as the dispersion or concentration of political power (Sartori 1976: 120). Thus this issue will be elaborated here.

In literature two ways of counting the number of parties can be found: counting relevant parties, and counting effective number of parties. Sartori advocates counting relevant parties and argues that it is not possible to count parties at face value, but they only should be counted depending on their relevance to political power. Size does not matter, but only the power they may have on other parties to form a government. Thus he defines that a party is relevant if it either has a governmental/coalition potential or blackmail potential. Parties with coalition or government potential have to be ideologically acceptable and they have to have an interest in governing. Larger opposition parties that are more like anti-system parties are relevant as they can affect the tactics of party competition and force governing-oriented parties to adopt their ideological orientation. A minor party can be discounted as irrelevant according to Sartori when it is never needed or used for any feasible coalition majority. If the minor party though is put into consideration for a coalition-forming, then it is of relevance, no matter its size (Sartori 1976: 120-122). Sartori’s method of counting though presumes a very detailed knowledge of the polity over a very long period of time, and it also seems unfeasible that every researcher would come up with the same number of parties in the end, as it still is quite open for interpretation. Sartori himself admits that using his method is not an easy task as a lot of data is needed that may not even be available and the way to calculate is comparatively difficult (Sartori 1976: 124). But his method assesses the systemic relevance of parties. The other methods introduced below leave out this information (Sartori 1990: 36).

Rae was the first to find an operational way of counting parties with the Fractionalization Index (F). This index measures how competitive strength is dispersed among parties in regards of number of party shares and relative equality of these shares (Rae 1971: 54-55). In other words, F of elective parties shows the degree of fragmentation of the number of elective parties. F of legislative parties shows how fragmented the parliament is. When both F of elective and legislative parties are put in relation, the degree of Defractionlization becomes visible. This basically shows how strong the mechanical factor of translating votes into seats is and how effectively it reduces the number of parties (i.e. de-fragmentation of the parliament).The formula for F is:

\[ F = 1 - \left( \sum_{i=1}^{n} T_i^2 \right) \]

\( T = \text{any single party’s share of total vote} \)

Which is the sum of all parties’ individual vote shares that are squared. For more detailed explanation, refer to Rae (1971). The results can range from zero to one, which means a continuum between extremes of concentration and infinite fractionalization. If F equals zero, it would be a perfect one-party system; If F equals 0.5, it is two-party system (Rae 1971: 57-58).
In an unrealistic complete fractionalization $F$ would approach unity. Rae defines party-systems according to the degree of fractionalization, as can be seen in table 2.2. But Rae does not further explain which value $F$ has to have to speak of a concrete three-party system, or extreme multi-party system.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Party System</th>
<th>One-party</th>
<th>Two-party</th>
<th>Three-party</th>
<th>Extreme multi-party</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Fractionalization</td>
<td>None</td>
<td>Intermediate</td>
<td>Intermediate</td>
<td>extreme</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Rae 1971: 55

Another method of counting numbers of parties is the Effective Number of Parties Index ($N$) by Taagepera and Shugart (1986). Similar to Rae, this index is also based on the Herfindahl-Hirschman concentration index and is defined as:

$$N = 1 / \sum Pi^2$$

$Pi =$ fractional share of the $i$-th component

As the results of $N$ range from 1 to unity, it is more intuitive and easier to visualize than Rae’s $F$. For example one can speak of a two-party system if the value of $F$ is 2.3 and of three-party system if the value of $N$ is 3.2. Again, the effective number of elective and of legislative parties can be calculated. The difference between the two shows how the electoral system reduces the number of parties through the mechanical effect of translating votes into seats.

But the Effective Number of Parties Index is not without its critiques: Taagepera and Shugart themselves point out that some information is lost in the process, though it is the same amount as Rae’s Fractionalization would be (Taagepera & Shugart 1986: 81). Sartori criticizes technical flaws in Rae’s Fractionalization Index, as larger parties are overvalued and smaller parties undervalued in this method of calculation. Further it is insensitive to “position values” and “cleavage differences” of parties, and thus leaves out too much relevant information. The same is true about $N$, though Sartori admits that it is more straightforward (Sartori 1994: 34-35). Still Taagepera and Shugart’s $N$ offers a good way of calculating number of parties that comes very close to Sartori’s index of number of relevant parties and is widely used in literature (Taagepera 1999: 498). In this thesis both methods will be used to point out different issues. The effective number of parties are used to show the number of parties of both elective and legislative parties. The fractionalization is more used to highlight the (dis)proportionality in the form of a graph, as the actual result of $F$ is less intuitive than $N$.

### 2.5. District Magnitude

Usually votes are counted and electoral formulae are applied in constituencies smaller than the whole political system. One of the rare exceptions would be Israel as only one constituency for the whole country is used. The size and the boundaries of constituencies are important in an electoral formula, especially in regards of proportionality (Katz 1997: 110). Malapportionment and gerrymandering can also be manipulating factors here. Malapportionment means that the voters-to-seats ratio is not the same in every district but may vary tremendously. This usually
happens when many people move from rural to urban areas. Conservative parties tend to be stronger on the countryside, while socialist parties are often stronger in urban areas. The urban population, even if they are the majority, are suddenly a minority due to malapportionment and it becomes very difficult to achieve a reapportionment, as the conservative parties would lose their majority then (Taagepera & Shugart 1989: 14-15). Gerrymandering is usually only of interest in single-seat districts: here district lines are drawn in order for giving a particular party an advantage in winning (Katz 1997: 111; Taagepera & Shugart 15-16).

An important factor in constituencies is the District Magnitude (M), a term that was first introduced by Rae (1971). Rae defined M as “units within votes are translated into distribution of parliament seats” (Rae 1971: 19), or simply put the number of seats to be elected in an electoral district. Here the broad differentiation is between single-member vs. multi-member districts, in other words everything above 1 seat is a multi-member district (from 2 to over 100 seats) (Rae: 1971: 19). M is considered as one of the most decisive factors in an electoral system to affect party systems (Rae 1971; Taagepera & Shugart 1989: 112), though other important constituency variables that can also be of importance for party systems and the outcome of elections are according to Katz: number of districts, number of voters per district, number of voters per candidate and district size (Katz 1997: 110-111).

To give a better outline over possible sizes of M, Rae defines five M in total (in table 2.3.), from single-member, to small, medium, up to very large M. Rae however never explained fully how he grouped the sizes of M, bringing Lijphart to look at of M more closely and regroup them slightly (table 2.3.) (Lijphart 1990: 486). The following table has both Rae’s and Lijphart’s classifications of M and will help to understand what range of sizes are there.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Rae (1971)</th>
<th>Lijphart (1990)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Single-member</td>
<td>M = 1 (single-member)</td>
<td>M = 1-1.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Small size</td>
<td>M = 2-6</td>
<td>M = 1.1-5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Medium</td>
<td>M = 6-10</td>
<td>M = 5-10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Large</td>
<td>M = 10-20</td>
<td>M = 10-25</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Very large</td>
<td>M = 100-150</td>
<td>M = 100-150</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Rae 1971: 54-55; Lijphart 1990: 486

District magnitude is a very important factor in electoral systems because of two reasons: first, the size of M has a strong effect on both PR and plurality systems. Under PR systems, larger M usually leads to greater proportionality and are therefore more favorable to smaller parties. Plurality systems with larger M have the opposite effect, leading to a decrease in proportionality and disadvantage of smaller parties. The explanation for this is that a large party may win all seats in a three-seat district with a relative majority, but may not win all seats if they are split into three single-member districts. If district magnitude is increased to a nationwide district, then this party will receive all seats if it wins a simple plurality of votes, thus making the outcome extremely disproportional. Second, M varies greatly in PR systems and has a strong effect on how proportional a PR system is in a particular country, so a PR system per se does not necessarily lead to very proportional outcomes (Lijphart 1999: 150-152). Sartori here considers M of 1 up to 10 as the least proportional option, and M of over 100 as
most proportional (Sartori 1994: 9). Rae finds that proportionality increases in relation to the magnitude of electoral districts: the higher the magnitude, the greater the proportionality (Rae 1971: 117-118). Taagepera and Shugart, similar to Sartori (1994), find that M larger than 10 is getting closer to an approximation to a perfect proportionality, and write that if M is 1 or 3, this usually leads to manufactured majorities, while if M is 5 or 6, the outcome is relatively proportional (Taagepera and Shugart 1989: 114). Smaller districts in combination with PR are very disproportional. In case of two-seat districts under PR, usually a two-party system is maintained, when it is already established. In case of a PR system with three-seat districts, the outcome can be either a one-party domination or three equal parties (Taagepera and Shugart 1989: 114-116). Rae’s original findings correspond with Taagepera and Shugart: high district magnitude leads to many parties that compete on rather equal terms. Low magnitudes thus lead to a (near) two-partism (Rae 1971: 123-124). Lijphart (1990) too concludes that M and electoral formula have strong effect on electoral disproportionality, though only a weak effect on multipartism (493).

Now a nation may have a variation of district magnitudes, no matter what kind of electoral system it has, to balance the ratio of voters-to-seats in each district. Hence an average M needs to be calculated in most cases first. Basically this average M is the numbers of total seats plotted against the number of districts (Taagepera & Shugart 1989: 127). Multistage electoral formulae may lead to complications when calculating average M, but they are negligible in the case of this thesis and will not further be discussed here.

2.6. Proportionality

Proportionality is a main variable for comparing electoral systems and the effect they have on party systems. So writes Lijphart (1990: 488) that “[…] the more proportional the electoral system is, the more favorable it is for small and new parties and hence the more it will allow […] a larger number of parties”. Proportionality can be defined as “[…] the degree to which the proportion of the votes won by a party is rewarded by an equal share of the legislative seats […]” (Katz 1997: 128). But proportionality is composed of several different variables, some independent and some dependent, thus making the analysis more complex. Such variables are: electoral formula, district magnitude, number of districts, the number of parties, threshold, and other electoral rules. First overall methods to show proportionality will be elaborated here, yet exact ways of calculation and graphs will not be covered, as this beyond the scope of this thesis (refer to authors). Then some of the other mentioned variables will be looked at and how they can be operationalized.

Rae offers several easier methods to compare electoral systems. In a first step it can be looked if any party was penalized by the electoral system and is not represented in the legislature, even if it won a certain amount of votes. Further the relative share of the strongest elective party and the strongest parliamentary party can show the relative advantage given to this particular party. And when the degree of fractionalization of elective and parliamentary parties are compared, the outcome is the degree of defractionalization that the electoral system exercises on the parliamentary party system. Another simple way to look at proportionality is to plot the proportions of seats against proportions of votes. This is also called vote-seat ratio. When the vote-seat ratio of the two largest parties is compared, the relative distance between
the two becomes visible. This can highlight a possible seat bonus of the largest party, or the relative proportionality of an electoral system for example (Rae 1971: 61-62, 70-73, 79).

Taagepera and Shugart (1989) offer similar calculation methods, though they go more into depth. First they define an advantage ratio, which is, like Rae’s vote-seat ratio, the percentage of seats plotted against the percentage of votes. If no seats are obtained then the result is zero. Less proportional shares are in the range of zero to one, and more proportional shares are between one and two. This allows a proportionality profile, where the perfect proportionality line (which equals one) is shown in comparison to the real proportionality of the given country. When the perfect proportionality line is crossed by the share of votes, then it is called the break-even point (B). Above the break-even point parties are overrepresented, beneath B parties are underrepresented (68-69). Depending on when the break-even point is reached, electoral systems can also be classified into: flat profiles (B < 5 percent), early rise profiles (B = 5 to 15 percent), late rise profile (B = 15 to 20 percent) and very late rise profiles (B > 25 percent). Further rare advantage profiles are: wide scatter profiles (unpredictable advantage ratios in the lower vote shares), middle valley profiles (approximates the cube law), middle peak profiles (modest peak of advantage ratio at B = 7 to 15 percent) and geyser profiles (unique to Iceland) (Taagepera & Shugart 1986: 69; Taagepera & Laakso 1980: 434-442).

Finally, a very good way to calculate proportionality is proposed by Gallagher (2012, 1991). Here the disproportionality is shown instead of the proportionality. This Gallagher Index (G) weights deviations by their own values, so larger deviations weigh more than smaller deviations. The results range from 0 – 100, where 0 is absolute proportionality and 100 is absolute disproportionality. It is a widely used index and will also be used in this thesis. The calculation of the Gallagher Index is:

$$ G = \sqrt{\frac{1}{2} \sum (vi - si)^2} $$

*Vi is the vote percentages, Si is the seat percentages of a particular party*

### 2.7. Threshold

Thresholds can play a certain factor in proportionality, as they can exclude parties with too low vote shares, thus grant the remaining parties more seats. On the whole, there are two different types of threshold: legal and effective threshold. The legal threshold is stipulated by law and can vary tremendously depending on the polity. Such legal thresholds are found in PR systems to decrease the proliferation of splinter parties, or in other words reduce the number of minor parties (Katz 1997: 134).

The effective threshold is an interplay between district magnitude and allocation formulae (Taagepera & Shugart 1989: 133-134). PR formulae represent a threshold, as a certain amount of votes are needed to obtain a quota or remainder for receiving a seat. The highest threshold here has the d’Hondt formula, followed by Sainte-Lague, and the STV formula has one of the lowest thresholds (Katz 1997: 123). This again reflects the proportionality of PR formulae that was mentioned above. Beside electoral formulae and legal threshold, the number of competing parties and the district magnitude represent also an effective threshold in PR
systems. Here it also can be differentiated between the threshold of representation, which is the percentage sufficient to win a seat in the most favorable situation, and the threshold of exclusion, which is the maximum percentage of votes where a candidate does not win the seat. Depending on the seats that can be won in a district and how many parties or candidates compete with each other, the chances of winning a seat with either a higher or lower percentage of votes change immensely (Lijphart 1986: 157-158). And finally, thresholds can be on national and/or district level, which again can have different effects, though the impact on district level is greater than on national level (Katz 1997: 138).

It is possible to calculate an average threshold, regardless of number of parties and allocation rules. The percentage of average threshold is about 50 percent plotted against district magnitude. This though is only an approximation and Taagepera and Shugart write only of “usually close to” (Taagepera & Shugart 1989: 117), thus deviations can happen. Lijphart (1999) proposes a slightly different equation for the theoretical threshold (T):

\[ T = \frac{75\%}{M + 1} \]

Lijphart’s method is actually only intended for the district level. Hence Taagepera (2002) attempted to make a new threshold calculation for an approximation on the nationwide level that also includes the assembly size this time. The formula is:

\[ T_{nation} = \frac{75\%}{(M + 1) \times \left( \frac{S}{M} \right)^{0.5}} \]

\( S = \text{Assembly size} \)

The two methods given here by Lijphart (1999) and Taagepera (2000) will be used in the thesis for showing the difference in the effective threshold on district and nationwide level. In the thesis, nationwide threshold refers to Taagepera’s method, and all other thresholds are calculated using Lijphart’s method.

2.8. From District Level to Nationwide Level

Duverger’s law is based on the assumption that the single-member districts will lead to a two-party system, as only two candidates have viable changes to win in each district if the rational voter does not want to waste his/her vote on another candidate. This does not necessarily mean that a nationwide two-party system develops. In this thesis Japan’s and Taiwan’s party systems will be presumed to be nationalized. There are studies found that look at the district level and support the assumption that in both countries the party system is nationalized (for example Reed 2002, Jou 2009). But as this master thesis will look at the Japanese and the Taiwanese cases only at the nationwide level, a link needs to be established first to explain how a district-level two-party system can become nationalized.

Cox (1997) sees a linkage that connects local candidates with nationwide parties, and therefore a possible emergence of a nationwide two-party system, the “cross-district linkage” (182). Candidates need a reason to join a party that runs candidates nationwide and only then local bipartism will be nationalized into a two-party system. According to Cox such incentives
are that candidates see more chances to be in a high-ranking executive office if they join a nationwide party (201). There can be extreme cases as Moenius and Kasuya mention, as the example of India shows, that at the district level, the effective number of parties is around two, but nationally the party system is very fragmented. They also point out the lack of scholarly attention to this matter, as scholars often overlook the issue (Moenius and Kasuya 2004: 544-545). Besides centralization of executive positions that only can be filled if the candidate is from a large and nationwide party, there is also the theory that social cleavage is a link. If there are the same cleavages and similar distribution of supporters in a large portion of districts, then strategic voting will also be similar across districts and a two-party system emerges. If cleavage-structures and voters’ interests are very diverse throughout the nation, then a real nationwide two-party system will probably not develop (Hsieh & Niemi 199: 103).

2.9. Issue Dimensions

Issue dimensions represent a very important variable in party systems that, in contrast to the variables introduced before, are not institutional and thus cannot be directly affected by electoral systems. Yet they have a high significance in a polity, as there is a very strong correlation between the number of parties and the number of issue dimensions (Lijphart 1999: 87-89). Theories introduced so far have partly neglected the issue dimension, hence a few additional theories are covered here.

One of the first theories about issue dimensions (or also called social cleavages) is from Lipset and Rokkan (1967). The initial bases for cleavages are the economic, polity, public and private sphere, which all interact with each other. In a developmental approach they then look at two axis-dichotomies that connect the bases. Following the development of early democracies in Europe, they find four basic cleavages that are reflected in party systems: socioeconomics (workers vs. employers conflict), religious (church vs. government conflict), rural-urban (primary vs. secondary economy conflict) and ethnic-cultural (subject vs. dominant culture conflict). Their social cleavage analysis only goes until the 1920s, as the main cleavages in Europe emerged before the 1920s. The later cleavage structures of the 1960s reflect the already existing ones from the 1920s and before. Further political parties were founded and established by the 1920s, and remained roughly the same afterwards (Lipset & Rokkan 1967: 50-52).

Social changes in the second half of the 20th century though led to a change in societal cleavages. Lijphart (1999) finds seven issue dimensions that he could observe in thirty-six countries in a period from 1945-1996. These seven are: (1) socioeconomic, (2) religious, (3) cultural-ethnic, (4) urban-rural, (5) regime support, (6) foreign policy, and (7) postmaterialist issues. Further Lijphart differentiates between salient issue, medium-salient issue and not salient (not existing) issue. The socioeconomic dimension is the most significant according to Lijphart and the only one found in all researched democracies. Important here are the differences in policies of right-oriented and left-oriented parties. The left-right differences though have started to decline in the 1960s, but still are of relevance up to now. The religious dimension is the second most important. Here the differences are between religious and secular parties. Most of the found religious issues are in Catholic and/or Protestant countries. Cultural-ethnic issue dimensions are often found in very heterogenic societies. The urban-rural issue
dimension occurs in every democracies looked at by Lijphart but only in a few countries this dimension is of medium-salience, in all others this issue dimension is of no significance. The regime support dimension occurs in countries where parties oppose the democratic regime. These are mainly Communist parties, but it should be mentioned that most of the Communist parties became very moderate in the 1970s and 1980s. Thus this issue dimension became of less relevance. The foreign policy dimension covers a very broad spectrum of foreign policy differences between parties. The postmaterialist dimension is a rather new dimension and found only in a few developed countries. Often ecological concerns are important here, leading to the emergence of green parties.

But how to analyze issue dimensions? Lijphart defines four basic rules that are important when looking at issue dimensions represented in political parties: first official party manifests and points-of-views may not always reflect the voters alignment, he still finds that “[…] there is usually a mutual relationship between a party program and the objective and subjective interests and needs of party’s supporters” (Lijphart 1999: 78). Second, sometimes issues do not separate parties but are found within fractions of one party. Third, only relevant parties as defined by Sartori should be put under consideration. Lastly, the issue dimension has to be durable over some time (Lijphart 1999: 78).

Now looking at the correlation between number of issues and number of parties in a polity, Taagepera and Shugart (1989) suggest that the relationship of effective number of parties (N) and issue dimensions (I) can be expressed as:

\[ N = I + 1 \]

They base their equation on Lijphart’s seven issue dimensions, and take his rating of salient issues (1 point) and medium-salience (0.5 point). The problem though is, that their classification of issue dimensions based on Lijphart and how to count them is very vague and seems rather subjective, thus this formula will not be used in this paper. But still it highlights the correlation between the two variables. Looking at how parties embrace issue dimensions, Taagepera and Shugart give additional explanation: in case of a new arising issue dimensions, existing parties split so that the number of party is doubled, though new issues may be espoused by existing parties, thus the number of parties does not necessarily have to increase with a new issue dimension. This happens especially in electoral systems that make it very difficult to form new parties. Further new issues are sometimes only “half-dimensions”, as they lack the symmetry of a real bipolar conflict within a society. Most new issues are so “monopolar” that the existing parties tend to not accept their existence. In the case of a fading issue dimension this has the opposite effect: the elimination of a party, even if it is usually a very slow process (Taagepera & Shugart 1989: 93-98).

While issue dimensions are considered a non-institutional variable, Taagepera and Shugart argue that electoral systems and issue dimensions are not completely independent from one another. When a new polity implements an electoral system, the choice of the type of electoral system may be influenced by the number of issue dimensions that exist at that time (Taagepera & Shugart 1989: 97). Since issue dimensions and the number of parties are also correlated, this seems quite reasonable. If many parties exist (as there are many issue dimensions that are espoused by the parties) in the time of political development, the choice for an electoral system that helps maintain many parties seems very likely.
2.10. Polarization and Left-Right Axis

Lastly, a few words should be said about polarization of party systems and the left-right position of parties. As defined above, party systems can be classified into seven groups according to Sartori (1976). This classification of party systems depends on the number of parties (fragmentation), but the degree of polarization within a polity is also of high importance. Polarization may reflect the ideological distance between the most distant relevant parties. The ideological distance is either centrifugal (left-right position) or centripetal (moderate position) of political parties. Segmentation refers to the degree of heterogeneity of the population within a polity, though this means rather cleavages than ideological differences. Countries with high segmentation often have a high degree of fragmentation in their party systems for example (177-178). Polarization of a party system can be considered as a mirror of social cleavage structures under the restraints of an electoral system. The restraints of the electoral system means that with larger M, centrifugal incentives are favored and extreme positions in campaigning are more likely. In case of single-member districts, centripetal incentives are more likely, as more voters have to be reached, so parties are more appealing to the median voter. Thus centrist parties are more likely under SMD. This does not exclude the possibility though that polarization can still occur in plurality systems (Cox 1990: 903-927).

Sartori (1976) then groups party systems not only depending on the number of parties but also on the ideological distance to each other: moderate or polarized systems. A one-party system would be a system of high ideological intensity. Two-party systems usually have two moderate parties of similar size, in a centripetal dynamic that alternate in governing. A moderate pluralism is defined by Sartori as a multi-party system of at least three parties that all have no absolute majority. This moderate pluralism system may resemble or imitate the mechanics of a two-party systems, but the distinguishing trait is the coalition government. The parties are not anti-system parties but governing oriented. In comparison, polarized pluralism have relevant anti-system parties that force coalitions of the center. The high level of polarization leads to centrifugal effects that prevail over centripetal drives leading to extremist parties and irresponsible bilateral oppositions. Polarized pluralism systems are considered to be dysfunctional (Sartori 1976: 177-178).

Ideological distance and the right-left axis on which parties are positioned, are based rather on Western understandings. The most important are socioeconomic and religious issues (Jou 2011: 37) and it should be put under consideration that East Asian countries not necessarily have the same understanding of right-left. Thus when speaking of right-left in East Asian countries, other issue dimensions may have shaped the positions of parties there. This will be discussed later in this paper.

2.11. Methodological Approach

This chapter covered many theories and definitions that are necessary to understand the topic of this thesis. Not all of them though will be put into use for the framework for the rest of this paper. Further the order of the theories here were chosen to make the understanding easier, but is not the order of the framework. Thus shortly the framework for the empirical part will be explained here. The proceedings will be to first compare the electoral systems of one country in regards of single components, average district magnitude, number of districts, and legal and
effective thresholds. Then the next part looks at the effective number of legislative parties alone, the percentage of seats of the two largest parties and effective number of elective and legislative parties split into single components. By starting with the effective number of legislative parties, this offers the opportunity to show general trends first and start to introduce the developments of the polity. The seat percentage of the two largest parties show the relative distance between them, how the vote shares for them changed and whether an alternation of governing power occurred. The effective number of elective and legislative parties split into single components shows more details about how Duverger’s law works over time and on the single components. Afterwards the Fractionalization Index by Rae in form of a graph is given to show overall trends, and the degree of defractionalization gives first impressions of how the mechanical factor works. Proportionality will be looked at then by first showing the seats-to-vote ratio of the two largest parties. This illustrates how stable electoral outcomes are over time and how large the seat bonus of the largest compared to the second largest party is. Then the Gallagher Index offers a concrete look at the disproportionality, again split into single components, to see whether PR and SMD work according to Duverger’s law. In the end, the advantage profile with the break-even point of first the SNTV system and the MMM system are shown to see when parties get under- or overrepresented and whether there are any particularities that make the advantage ratios unpredictable. Afterwards issue dimensions and developments of the party systems will be analyzed to give a more detailed explanation of developments in that country.
3. The SNTV System and the MMM System

3.1. The SNTV System in Overview

The SNTV system is a rarely used electoral system with particularities not found in other electoral systems. It is therefore necessary to take a closer look at the SNTV system, how it works, how it fits into Duverger’s hypotheses, what the consequences and possible problems are and why it often is viewed negatively in the literature. As was already mentioned in the theoretical framework, the SNTV is often defined as a semi-proportional system. The actual classification though is rather difficult (Heinrich 2007: 61) and different classifications can be found. Further why it is grouped under semi-proportional is sometimes critically viewed, especially by Katz (1997), as it does not necessarily mean that it is less or more proportional than PR or plurality systems. But before turning to problems of proportionality and possible negative consequences, it is first essential to understand how it actually works.

The SNTV system is basically a mix of SMD plurality system and the STV system used in Ireland. Each voter has one vote and may cast it on only one candidate of all available ones within one district. The difference to SMD plurality system is now that the district magnitude is more than one, hence several candidates will be elected for seats in one district. The actual vote share is not necessarily important as only top vote-getters get elected to the available seats. Thus if a district has three seats, the top three vote-getters are elected. The difference to STV is that the votes cannot be transferred (thus the name non-transferable vote system) and are wasted. Further a candidate can get elected with a relatively low vote share depending on the vote allocation. SNTV is thus neither a plurality system nor a PR system. This leads to the question of how it works according to Duverger’s hypothesis and law, as Duverger only put PR and plurality systems under consideration for the mechanical and psychological factors, that may lead to a tendency of two-party system or multi-party system.

Several scholars (Reed 1990; Cox 1994; Hsieh & Niemi 1999) have looked at this problem and came to the conclusion that Duverger’s law can be extended to SNTV. Hsieh and Niemi (1999: 103) see SNTV as a “natural extension of the SMD plurality system”, as it is basically a simple plurality system with multi-member districts that according to Reed (1990: 338) “tends to produce a competition among n+1 serious candidates”. SNTV has more seats available for winners, but the “necessary number of losers remain one”, thus behaving like a simple majority system (Reed 1990: 339). The strategic voting equilibrium that Duverger’s law takes at its basis is thus n+1 serious candidates, and can be explained due to the Droop Quota, which means that with 1/(n+1) plus one vote one seat is guaranteed to be won (Reed 1990: 339; Hsieh & Niemi 1999: 103-104). While a complete voting equilibrium is probably rather impossible to achieve, analyses showed that Japan moved very close to voting equilibrium starting in the 1980s (Reed 1990; Cox 1994), and that this extension also was held in Taiwan in the elections in the 1990s (Hsieh & Niemi 1999).

3.1.1. The Nomination Problems and Issues caused by SNTV

The SNTV system with its multi-member districts leads to nomination and strategic campaigning problems. Three problems can be encountered by a party: over-nomination, under-nomination and failure to equalize votes. Reasons are nontransparent information environment
of the electoral system, as well as not rationale choices of the party and a weak party cohesion (O’Neill 2012:164; Cox & Niou 1994: 226; Fell 2012: 62-64; Wang 1996: 94-95). A party has to determine before each election how many seats are feasible to win and then accordingly has to nominate the right number of candidates in each district. Further under the SNTV there is the unique issue that several candidates from the same party may compete for seats in the same district. If the party does not find a strategy to allocate votes evenly among their candidates, or too many candidates are nominated, one candidate may garner most of the votes and the others may not get elected at all. So even with a large vote share, the party would lose seats in this district. If more seats had been possible to win in a district but too few candidates were nominated, then the few candidates got many votes but not more seats. For smaller parties, nomination strategies are easier as often only one candidate is nominated in one district, thus some of the strategic problems may not pose such problems for them (Wang 1996: 94-95; Fell 62-64).

Negative issues linked with the SNTV system that also complicate the nomination strategies are numerous: they include factionalism, intraparty competition instead of inter-party competition, candidate-centered elections, extreme campaigning, vote buying, clientelism, pork-barrel politics and corruption (for example Chi 2014, Rich 2014, O’Neill 2012, Hsieh 1996, Wang 1996). Factionalism is said to be caused due to the high intra-party competition as several candidates from the same party are running in one multimember district. This further causes candidate-centered politics as the candidates need some method to be distinguished from each other. The party label here is not of importance in the decision of which candidate from the same party the voter should vote for. So the candidate may turn to extreme campaigning or mobilization of votes in form of clientelism and vote-buying (Chi 2014: 662-663). For vote-buying and clientelism local factions or local support groups are needed, and those often have a lot of power and “choose” their candidate to support (Göbel 2012: 71). Inter-party competition is less of importance in this system as elections are focused on single candidates. Another problem is that SNTV fosters extremism, as many small parties are trying to win over the extreme voters. While Wang (1996: 100-101) sees the whole system as extremely faulted with more drawbacks than advantages, Göbel (2012: 71) thinks that the informal practices and the agency of relevant individuals are the main cause for the problems.

3.1.2. Proportionality and the Party System under SNTV
As was explained above, depending on vote allocation, seats in a multimember district may be lost or won by a party. Under the assumption of an optimal allocation SNTV though is “equivalent to the d’Hondt highest average formula for allocating seats in a proportional representation (PR) system” (Hsieh & Niemi 1999: 8). But as such optimal vote allocation seems unlikely to actually occur, the result is often very unstable proportionality. Thus Hsieh (1996: 206) further remarks that “[…] although the SNTV system can bring about a certain degree of proportionality, because the need to coordinate under such a system is so important and for many parties so difficult, the degree of proportionality is often discounted”. Still the assumption of Rae (1971) hold true, as well as Hsieh and Niemi’s findings confirm: the larger the districts are in Taiwan, the more proportional the outcome (Hsieh & Niemi 1999: 113). Thus
SNTV can be considered as a rather proportional system that is between less proportional PR systems and more proportional majoritarian systems (Lijphart et al. 1986: 163).

Further in the literature there are two different opinions about whether the SNTV is superproportional and favors smaller parties or it is subproportional and favors larger parties. Cox (1996) attempts to reconcile the viewpoints and sees validation for both. The superproportional view comes from the nomination problems: as smaller parties have it easier under SNTV and face less nomination and vote division problems, they also are more likely to get a seat bonus. The subproportional view stems from the assumption that government parties have more privileges and access to benefits that they can bestow upon their supporters, which then helps in stabilizing nominations and intraparty division. For Cox the superproportional view is only possible if resources were the same for all parties. But as he finds that governing parties have more access to benefits, he rather supports the view of a subproportional view. Both views are not a contradiction though (Cox 1996: 753-754).

The superproportional versus the subproportional view also shows the possibilities how the party system can develop under SNTV. For Lin (2010) SNTV can lead to multiparty system or a dominant-party system. He sees the SNTV as a self-reinforcing system that maintains a dominant-party system, as long as there is: (1) steady economic growth with enough surpluses for (2) delivering benefits to a majority of voters that are recognizable for the distribution. The SNTV is self-undermining a dominant-party system and may lead to a multiparty system if: (1) economic development leads to the mobility and anonymity of voters and thus it becomes difficult to benefit voters as they are not recognizable, and (2) citizen become more aware of corruption due to urbanization. Thus in both Japan and Taiwan the SNTV system reinforced the one-party system, but it was also slowly hallowed out and eventually led to a decrease of power of the dominant parties (Lin 2010: 367–375). Hsieh and Niemi further consider societal cleavages as a reason for a likely development of a multiparty system (1999: 114-115). So both party systems are possible under SNTV.

### 3.2. The MMM System in Overview

The electoral reform in Japan was realized in 1993 and in Taiwan in 2004. In both countries the SNTV system was replaced by a mixed system called mixed-member majoritarian system (MMM). The idea behind the MMM system is to combine positive attributes of both plurality/majority and PR system. The electoral system itself is sometimes also called parallel system (in Japan heiritsu) as even though both plurality/majority and PR is used, the results of the two systems are calculated separately from each other for allocating the seats (ACE Project 2015). Thus the parallel system does not compensate for any disproportionality in SMDs. As explained in the theoretical framework (Chapter 2.3), the difference between the MMM system and the mixed-member proportional system (MMP) (for example used in Germany) is that the SMD and the PR components are separated in the former, while in the latter the PR seats are compensatory. Therefore, the MMM system can be classified as a semi-proportional system, while the MMP system is a PR system. Both can also be grouped as mixed systems of course.

The operation of the MMM system is that each voter has two votes: one for his/her preferred candidate of the district and one for the PR bloc. Variances of MMM systems in different countries may be how the PR bloc is organized (nationwide or district-wide), how the
PR-list is handled (open list, closed list or ranking according to votes received in the SMD component) and what formula is used for PR. Further differences can be the weighting of the SMD and the PR components, as the larger the PR component is the higher proportionality gets.

Whether the MMM system is superior to the SNTV system is impossible to answer. Both systems have their advantages and disadvantages as well as their critiques. Advantages of the MMM system can be that: (1) a majoritarian result is achieved and one party is more likely to gain majoritarian representation, (2) which may lead to a more stable government, and (3) small parties still have higher chances to be represented under the MMM system than under a pure majoritarian/plurality system (ACE 2015). A major critique comes from Sartori, as he writes that the MMM system actually combines the worst of the two systems, because under such a system the voter has to both vote sincerely (PR) and strategic (majoritarian system) (1994: 74-75). It may be difficult for the voter to differentiate between the two components. This rather leads to confusion. Further it may lead to two classes of representatives: constituency and nationwide. The constituency representative may only feel responsible for his/her district, while a nationwide representative is without geographical ties and has less direct ties to his/her party (ACE Project 2015).
4. Japan

4.1. Historical Overview

After the forceful opening of Japan by Commodore Perry of the United States Navy in the middle of the 19th century, a period called Meiji Restoration began in 1868. In this period major economic and political changes were undertaken and rapid industrialization was started in order to catch up with the West. One of the major changes was the abolishment of the Tokugawa Shogunate and the return of the emperor as the sole sovereign of the nation. However, the emperor had more a passive role, and his advisers, the oligarchs, were the real people in power from then on. They shaped the economic and political development of Japan up until World War 2. Political parties on the other side took longer to form and establish. The first were formed in the 1880s with their sole purpose of calling for a parliamentary representation. With the growing public pressure for a parliament, the oligarchs finally paved the way for a constitution, which was promulgated in 1889, and a parliament consisting of two chambers (House of Peers and House of Representatives) was established in 1890 (Richardson & Flanagan 1984: 1-6; Hori 2012: 20-22).

For the first HR election, several political parties formed, and later on merged into three major parties, the Rikken Jiyūtō (Constitutional Liberal Party), the pro-governmental party Taiseikai (Great Achievement Society), and the Rikken Kaishintō (Constitutional Reform Party) (Sims 2001: 71). Members of the parties were usually young, inexperienced and well off landlords. The major objective of the political parties in the late 19th century was to oppose the government. Political parties were not part of the decision-making processes though, and only gradually got more involved in the government in the time of the Sino-Japanese (1894-1895) and Russo-Japanese Wars (1904-1905), when their approval to increase the budget was needed in times of ever rising military expenditure (Hori 2012: 27). Suffrage was low as well at 1.1 percent from 1890 to 1898. It gradually got increased by lowering tax requirements afterwards, and in 1925 all men over 25 were allowed to vote, which increased the suffrage to 20.1 percent (Christensen 2015: 31-32). The first electoral system used from 1890 to 1900 was a small district system, with mostly SMDs and a few two-seat districts in which two votes could be cast (Christensen 2015: 24).

In 1900 the Rikken Seiyūkai (Constitutional Association of Political Friends) was formed and should become one of the two major parties in the 1920s. Gradually the members of parties also changed by the 1910s, and now most were educated people with a background in business or bureaucracy (Hori 2012: 28). The late 1910s up to 1932 were then called the period of Taishō Democracy. In this period, party-led government was the norm, partly due to the decline of the oligarchs’ influence. During that time the two major parties were Rikken Seiyūkai and Rikken Minseitō (Constitutional Democratic Party). Further several leftist parties also formed out of labor and farmer movements in the time from 1925 to 1932. Two of the most important parties were the Shakai Taishūtō (Social Masses Party) and the Nihon Musantō (Japan Proletarian Party), as they would form the Socialist Party after World War 2 (Sims 2001: 175-178). In the Taishō Democracy, the parties took more initiatives, but beside the universal male suffrage no fundamental reforms were undertaken to change the political system.

That finally led to the demise of the party-led government in the 1930s, when the military took over power. Several incidents caused by the military in the early 1930s made it obvious that the government had no control over it anymore and so the power shifted towards
In 1932 the party government was ended by the military (Takenaka 2014: 99-101, 123-129) and in 1940 all parties were dissolved (Hori 2012: 22), though elections were continued to be held even during World War 2. Only one party was allowed to participate, the Taisei Yokusankai (Imperial Rule Assistance Association) and many candidates preferred to run as independents in those elections instead (Christensen 2015: 32).

Three electoral reforms were undertaken between 1900 and 1925. From 1901 to 1918 a large district system was used, with a varying district magnitude of 1 to 12 seats in each district. From 1919 to 1924 it was changed again to a small district system with mostly single-seat districts and some two- and three-seat districts. And from 1925 to 1945 a medium district system was used with a magnitude of 3 to 5 seats. The change to larger multimember districts (of up to 12 seats) was a choice of the oligarchs so that political parties would not monopolize the parliament and to cause anti-government parties to splinter. Later the electoral system remained a multimember district system, even if the magnitude was reduced, as established parties preferred it and they thought it would make it harder for new leftist parties to succeed (Christensen 2015: 24, 31-32).

The Meiji Constitution and the Power of Political Parties
The Meiji Constitution was designed by the oligarchs to let them to stay in power and to subdue opposition movements. It was modeled close to the Prussian constitution. Three major flaws made it a rather difficult basis for the establishment of an effective democratic government: (1) sovereignty laid with the emperor, not the people; (2) the military was not subordinated to civilian authorities; (3) there was no integration of political structure and decision-making processes nor a clear line of authority and responsibility.

Since the emperor was the sole sovereign power, all state institutions acted independently and only answered directly to the emperor. This meant that the responsibility was delegated to his advisers, the oligarchs. The only way to amend the constitution was if the emperor himself amended it. Another problem with the constitution was its flexibility in interpretation. This also explains the easy shift from oligarch-led government, to party-led government to finally military-led government. All organs acted more or less independent, and the prime minister had insufficient power for coordinating the decision processes. The military only answered to the emperor and had complete autonomy. The only authority structure was established by the oligarchs, who controlled indirectly all organs, but they all grew old and died over the years, which on the other side paved the way for the Taishō Democracy (Richardson & Flanagan 1984: 6-13). Furthermore the policy-making expertise was monopolized by the bureaucracy from the beginning of the Meiji period. First, because the parties lacked experience and were excluded from the government. Later on, in times of the Taishō Democracy, parties took over some policy-making, but their main interest lay in areas of political interest that could garner votes through benefits. Those areas included public works, public security and police works (Hori 2012: 30-32; Sims 2001: 162-168).

From 1945 to 1955: the Establishment of the 1955er System
The time from 1945 to 1955 often is described as political turmoil. After World War 2 had ended, Japan was under US occupation (1945 - 1952), often referred to as GHQ (General
Headquarters). Under the GHQ several reforms were undertaken and the constitution was rewritten in that period. The constitution now put the sovereignty to the people, though the emperor remained the ceremonial head of the state. As it was written by GHQ personal, it remains controversial up to now especially the Article 9, as it renounces the right to wage war. Further two electoral reforms were passed: in 1945 the electoral system was changed to a large district system, with a district magnitude of 2 to 14. Each voter cast two or three votes depending on district size. In 1947, after only one election, the electoral system was changed back to the one before 1945, the SNTV, and would remain the electoral system until 1993 (Christensen 2015: 24). So what caused the change of the electoral system and the political turmoil after war?

Directly after the war, the Nihon Jiyūtō (Japan Liberty Party) and the Nihon Shimpotō (Japan Progressive Party) were founded. The Liberty Party had 43 senior Diet members first that sat in the Diet (some had belonged to the Minseitō), though the Progressive Party had the most existing Diet Members at that time. Further the Nihon Shakaitō (Japan Social Party, the JSP) was also founded. It combined elements from two prewar social parties leading to divisions that continued to split the party henceforth. And the Nihon Kyōsantō (Communist Party, the JCP) was finally legalized. This led to a serious challenge from the left side that had not been seen before the war (Sims 2001: 246-249). As the Progressive Party was the largest party first, it had pushed the reform to the large district system, to undermine new parties and contain the process of democratization. But short before the elections in 1946, the GHQ purged up to 35,000 people, mostly senior politicians. This seriously damaged the parties as mainly inexperienced junior politicians remained (Hori 2012: 39-40). As the Liberal Party became the largest party afterwards, it pushed for the re-adoption of the SNTV system, hoping it would be in its favor.

Both reforms were undertaken under constrains of the GHQ (which would not have allowed a SMD system in order to renew the party system), but driven by political incentives by Japanese politicians (Kohno 1997: 34-35). In the next election in 1947 the JSP became the largest party in the Diet and formed a coalition with the Minshutō (Democratic Party) that had formed before the election from a split from the Liberal Party and the merging with the Progressive Party. In 1951 the JSP split into the left-wing and right-wing group, but merged again in 1955. The Liberal Party and the Democratic also fused in 1955 into the Jiyū Minshutō (Liberal Democratic Party of Japan, LDP) and continued to hold the majority in the Diet until 1993 from then on (Hori 2012: 40-41). This was the beginning of the so-called 1955er System, which would be characterized by the dominant right party, the LDP, the main opposition party on the left, the JSP and several other minor opposition parties that would form in the ideological space between the LDP and the JSP, and of course the far left Communist party.

The period from 1945 to 1955 (or even until 1960) thus was marked by party system alignment, and parties were more concerned with winning elections than with policies. This also led to a very characteristic feature of Japanese Politics, the very strong bureaucracy. The strong bureaucracy that had already developed during the Meiji period was strengthened when the US occupation power completely rewrote the constitution after the World War 2 and placed sovereignty in the hands of the people, yet the bureaucracy remained intact the same way it was before war and was not subjected to the major purge in 1946. Hence the bureaucracy continued to monopolize the policy-making processes after war (Hori 2012: 37-39; Reed & Shimizu 2009: 6). Further, in this period a multiparty system existed. Lastly a very important social cleavage
manifested (the peace cleavage), that was reflected among others in the right-left position of the LDP and the JSP, and will be elaborated later on.

4.2. Overview of Political Parties and Party System in Japan

Here a short overview of relevant political parties will be given, that may have shaped the political environment in Japan, even if some were only short-lived parties. All parties that ever existed cannot be covered here, but only the most important which are also often mentioned in the literature and that will be of relevance in the empirical part later on. Further Hrebenar and Itoh’s division into two party systems will be followed here: the first from 1955 to 1993, the so-called 1955er system; the second from 1993 – ongoing, the post-reform party system (Hrebenar & Itoh 2015).

The 1955er Party System

The LDP was a merger from the Democratic Party and the Liberal Party in 1955. It was a rightist party in the early years, especially supporting constitutional amendment of the Article 9 (refer to page 32), close security ties with the US and was against international relations with the People’s Republic of China. Over the years the party proved to be very adaptable in its ideology, characterizing it as a catch-all party. This enabled the LDP to remain the dominant party over such a long time. After 1960 it reduced its polarizing position on issues such as constitutional amendment and focused more on economic development and in the 1970s policies for a better welfare system and environmental improvement were undertaken (Reed & Shimizu 2009: 6-7; Richardson & Flanagan 1984: 258-259).

The JSP was a very leftist party, and in contrast to the LDP did not adapt to the changing political environment over the years. It was close to worker unions and more a rural party. Its outright opposition to constitutional amendment and foreign policy with the US remained strong even after social issues lost their salience somewhat after 1960. It remained the strongest opposition party until 1993, though it was never considered a viable alternative. The other leftist party that was formed right after war was the JCP. It is the most leftist party, with its major bases in urban areas (Richardson & Flanagan 1984: 260; Kohno 1997: 116; Reed & Shimizu 2009: 6-7).

Due to the high polarization of the JSP, JCP and the LDP, there was ideological space in the center. Parties that emerged after 1960 are thus more center-left or center-right. The first was a split from the JSP in 1960: the Democratic Socialist Party (DSP). It was more moderate than the JSP especially on foreign affair issues (Kohno 1997: 116). The Kômeitô (Clean Government Party, CGP, henceforth simply Komeito) was founded in 1964 by the Buddhist sect Sōka Gakkai and remains the only religious party in Japan. It is center-right, as it is generally more a party with traditional values but emphasizes liberal economic policies (Richardson & Flanagan 1984: 255-257; Itoh 2015: 148).

The first split from the LDP occurred in the 1970s and was the New Liberal Club (NLC). It was founded in 1976, though it merged with the LDP again in 1986. Another new party in the 1970s was a split from the JSP, the Socialist Democratic Federation. But as the party system had stabilized by then, both parties were only short-lived (Kohno 1997: 117). Hence in total
five parties made up the more or less stable party system from the 1960s to 1993: LDP, JSP, JCP, DSP and Komeito. Other new parties were only short-lived. The time from 1990 to 1993 though was marked by the beginning of a drastic party realignment that would continue on after the electoral reform. In the early 1990s, two splits from the LDP occurred: the New Party Harbinger (Shintō Sakigake) and the Japan Renewal Party (Shinseitō). And a complete new party was founded the New Party (Nihon Shintō). All called for political reform (Reed & Shimizu 2009: 12-13).

The post-1993 Party System

After the electoral reform party realignments continued. First the New Frontier Party (Shinshintō, NFP) was founded in 1994. It was a merger of several parties: the Japan Renewal Party, the Komeito, the DSP and the New Party. It was under the leadership of Ozawa Ichirō, one of the most prominent and controversial politicians in the last three decades (Christensen 2015: 34-35; Reed & Shimizu 2009: 14-16). Originally coming from the LDP, he started to roughen up the Japanese party system in the early 1990s, when he first founded the Japan Renewal Party, and continued to play a major role in party realignment from then on. The NFP was a new catch-all party but was internally so ideological diverse that it dissolved in 1997 (Koellner 2015: 81). In 1996, the Democratic Party of Japan (Minshutō, DPJ) was founded, coming from a split of the New Party Harbinger and moderate JSP politicians (Reed & Shimizu 2009: 14-16). After the NFP dissolved, four smaller splinter parties from it went to the DPJ in 1998. From then on the DPJ was also called the “New DPJ”. It presents itself as a “liberal alternative” to the LDP and the JSP. The DPJ is placed as liberal center-left party (Koellner 2015: 80-81) and became the second largest party in Japan in the 2000s. The last “new” party in the 1990s is the “new” Komeito. After it had merged with the NFP in 1996, it was resurrected in 1998 and became the long-term coalition partner of the LDP from then on, even though the Komeito is ideologically closer to the DPJ (Itoh 2015: 169). This also marked the end of the drastic party realignments in the 1990s.

The party systems continued to be in turmoil in the 2000s, even if the two major parties DPJ and LPD became the stable two strongest parties. So were a total of 13 parties represented in the Diet from 2009 to 2012, which cannot be covered in detail here. The largest of the new parties that entered the Diet in that period is the Japan Restoration Party (Nippon Ishin no Kai, JRP), founded in 2012 by former governors of Osaka and Tokyo. It is a more conservative party that wants to decrease the 47 prefectures of Japan to only 9-11 large district prefectures. Most of the other new parties were rather conservative (Hrebenar & Haraguchi 2015: 178) and also very short-lived. The JRP split later and a part merged with another minor party to form the Japan Innovation Party (Ishin no Tō, Innovation Party) in 2014. It still emphasizes decentralization and now is opposing nuclear energy (The Japan Times 2014b). The other part of the JRP formed the Party for Future Generations (Jisedai no Tō, Generation Party) in 2014, describing themselves as “neoconservative”, as they emphasize traditional values and liberal economic policies (The Japan Times 2014a). These examples show the ongoing minor party realignments in Japan.
4.3. Empirical Part 1: Electoral Systems

With the introduction of the MMM system several changes were said to occur to campaigning methods, inter-party and intra-party competition, and the party system itself. At least according to reformers the new system should take care of the manifold problems (like corruption, factionalism, intra-party competition) the old SNTV system has caused. One major goal of the reformers in Japan was to bring forward a two-party system with two centrist parties, allowing the voters a choice and therefore making a real alternation of governing power possible (Christensen 2015: 36).

Since Duverger’s “law” that simple-majority system with a single-ballot vote tends to lead to a two-party system was probably part of the consideration in choosing the new electoral system, both the mechanical effect and the psychological of the SMD should reduce the numbers of parties. Further alliances and mergers of the smaller parties should occur to establish a real competitor against the LDP.

The problem now is that the new system is giving the minor parties contradictory incentives. While the SMD tier is rather working according to Duverger’s law, as the mechanical and psychological factors give smaller parties the incentives for merger and alliance, the PR tier is causing the opposite effect. For winning a seat, smaller parties can boost their PR percentage if they nominate candidates in every district or at least as many as possible, and candidates can get “resurrected” via the party list of the PR bloc if they fail in their SMD. Further the relatively small (effective) threshold of 4.3 percent makes it possible for smaller parties to win seats. Both incentives may undercut Duverger’s mechanical effect and thus in the long run also the psychological factor (Jou 2009: 763; Christensen 1999: 987-988).

This leads to very mixed opinions among scholars over the years whether Japan is moving towards a two-party system or not (Jou 2009; Reed 2002; Christensen 1999). Further many criticize that the electoral reform was disappointing in its results, and many issues such as factionalism, clientelism and corruption remain even now, though these opinions may be caused by too high or wrong expectations (Scheiner 2012, Krauss & Pekkanen 2004, Reed 2002). To analyze these problems, the following chapter will look closer at the number of parties, fractionalization, disproportionality and the advantage ratio of the old SNTV system and the new MMM system in a timespan from 1958 to 2014. But before looking at these issues, a short introduction to the specifics of the SNTV and the MMM system in Japan will be given.


4.3.1. SNTV System and MMM System in Japan

The SNTV system was re-adopted in 1947 and consisted first of three-, four- and five-seat districts with a total of 117 districts, translating into 466 seats. Over the years, reapportionment and the return of several Japanese territories changed the number and sizes of districts. So was Amami Oshima returned in 1953 and remained the sole single-seat district until 1986, where it was merged with another district. Okinawa was returned in 1972 and became a 5-seat district. The assembly size was also gradually increased and reached its highest number in 1986 with 512, before it was reduced again to 511 in 1993. In the 1993 elections then there were a total of

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2 Calculations by Author unless otherwise stated; for methods of calculation refer to chapter 2.5 and chapter 2.7. Data source: Stockin 2003: 70-71; Schreiner 2012: 353; Heinrich 2007: 105
129 districts, ranging from two- to six-member districts (Stockin 2003: 70-71). The average M hardly changed over the years though and was 3.98 in 1947 and 3.96 in 1993.

The reform then brought a system consisting of 300 single-member districts and 200 seats distributed via PR blocs, using the d’Hondt (refer to page 14). Thus the assembly was reduced slightly to 500 seats. The PR component consists of 11 PR districts, ranging from 6- seats to 29-seats districts. In 2000, the assembly was further reduced to 480 by cutting 20 seats from the PR tier. The average M of the PR bloc is 18.18 in 1996 and from 2000 16.36. In total the SMD component made up first 60 percent of the assembly and after 2000 62.5 percent, making it the larger part of the two components. The legislature period remained the same under both electoral systems, and is four years (Scheiner 2012: 353; Heinrich 2007: 105).

There was no official threshold under the old SNTV system. The effective threshold was at about 15.1 percent and remained roughly the same over the years. The nationwide threshold also stayed at about 1.39 percent. More important under the SNTV system is the range of thresholds according to district sizes, which is 37.5 percent in a single-member district and 10.7 percent in the largest districts, the six-member districts. However this can vary depending on the number of candidates, vote allocation and nomination strategies of all parties represented in a particular district. Under the new MMM system there is a legal threshold for the PR bloc, but it is rather low at 2 percent (Jou 2009: 762) compared with the effective threshold according of 3.9 percent (1996) and 4.3 percent (2000 onwards). The nationwide effective threshold of the PR bloc is at around 1.2 percent since 1996, which appears lower than the legal threshold, but since there is no nationwide PR bloc, the range of districts between 6 and 29 leads to a variation in effective thresholds. The effective threshold of PR bloc of the new MMM system is in the range of large SNTV districts or even lower, thus making it probably easier for smaller parties to achieve representation in the Lower House.

At a first glance, the SNTV system enabled representation of minor parties in more constituencies than the MMM system. The MMM system makes it far more difficult for minor parties now to win in a district, but the PR bloc still allows for the representation of them in the parliament. As the PR bloc is the smaller component of the MMM system, this may indicate that minor parties are less represented now. In the rest of this chapter this will be analyzed.

4.3.2. The Number of Parties
The effective number of legislative parties (refer to chapter 2.4) in Japan from 1958 - 2014 are shown in table 4.1. Right after the establishment of the 1955er System, the year 1958 marks the lowest number of legislative parties, with a value of 1.98. When the two socialist camps merged back into the JSP and the conservative camp fused and became the LPD, only one other party remained beside the two parties. It was the Communist party, which only received marginal vote shares in the early years of the 1955er System. It would take a few years until new parties are formed, which explains the low number of parties. Not even under the MMM system with strong incentives for a two-party system such a low number of parties was seen so far. From then on a gradual increase of effective number of parties can be seen which also corresponds with the formation of new parties: in 1960 the DSP joined the political field. The next party then was the Komeito in 1967. In 1976 the NLC and in 1979 the SDF also were first represented in the Lower House, though those two parties were rather short-lived. By then seven parties
were represented in the Diet, which was above the equilibrium described by Kohno (1997: 125-133). With the extension of Duverger’s law to an equilibrium of $M+1$ parties under SNTV systems (refer to chapter 3.1), the prediction in the Japanese case is that the equilibrium of numbers of parties should be under 6 (as there $3 – 5 \ M$ districts). There were five long-standing parties from the 1960s to early 1990s (LDP, JSP, DSP, JCP and Komeito), and all other minor parties disappeared fast, which emphasizes this equilibrium.

From 1980 to 1990, the gradual increase stopped and rather a fluctuation between 2.57 and 3.23 can be seen. The election of 1993 then led to an extremely high number of elective parties (4.14). In this election the LDP lost their majority for the first time, and electoral reform was achieved by an 8-parties coalition. This all marked the beginning of several years of political turmoil, where several new parties emerged, disbanded or merged into larger parties. Several reasons may be the cause for the party turmoil, which will be gradually analyzed throughout the remainder of this thesis. In general it can be said that political dissatisfaction, incentives of the new electoral system to merge and build alliances, economic recession and social changes and cleavage changes can be seen as among many of the possible explanations.

After the reform, the New Frontier Party (NFP) was founded in 1994, but it was very short-lived. Before the next election for the House of Representatives in 1996, another party, the DPJ was formed, which later merged with several parties in 1998. The numbers of 1996 and 2000 still are relatively high and in the range of the effective number of parties of the 1980s. A possible reason can still be the political turmoil with party realignments that still was going on. After the election of 2000 for example, the DPJ further merged with the Liberal Party in 2003, becoming the major opposition party to the LDP (Lin 2006: 126).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year of Election</th>
<th>Under SNTV System (seats total)</th>
<th>Year of Election</th>
<th>Under MMM System (seats total)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1958</td>
<td>1.98</td>
<td>1996</td>
<td>2.94</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1960</td>
<td>2.00</td>
<td>2000</td>
<td>3.16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1963</td>
<td>2.15</td>
<td>2003</td>
<td>2.59</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1967</td>
<td>2.41</td>
<td>2005</td>
<td>2.26</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1969</td>
<td>2.50</td>
<td>2009</td>
<td>2.10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1972</td>
<td>2.67</td>
<td>2012</td>
<td>2.45</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1976</td>
<td>3.18</td>
<td>2014</td>
<td>2.48</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1979</td>
<td>3.29</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1980</td>
<td>2.74</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1983</td>
<td>3.23</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1986</td>
<td>2.57</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1990</td>
<td>2.70</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1993</td>
<td>4.14</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Calculated by Author

Since then a gradual decline in effective number of legislative parties can be seen, until 2012 and 2014 where again it increased. This also suggests that the party realignment that was going on in the 1990s and early 2000s had come to an end by the mid-2000s, but started again after 2009. In the election of 2009, the number of 2.10 pointed out that a two-party system was in reach. In this election, the DPJ managed to win the majority in the House of Representatives,
marking it the first time that an alternation of power between two larger parties was achieved and only the second time the LDP was forced into opposition. The effective number of legislative parties then went a little bit up again in 2012, but nevertheless it is possible to see the tendency that SMD so far has reduced the number of parties compared to the 1980s. Further the numbers of the last years since the gradual decline in 2003 seem to imply that equilibrium could have been reached, where the number of effective parties stays at around 2.35. But a closer look at the actual number of represented parties in the LH shows that since the electoral reform more parties have been represented in the Diet (ranging between 8 to 10 parties per legislature), than the highest number of parties before the reforms (which was 7). This may imply that even though there are many minor parties now, the vote share they gain is quite low, thus making them “less relevant” according to the index.

So far, though, the numbers never reached as low as two, implying that the PR component of the electoral system is still allowing smaller parties to maintain a certain percentage of representation. Also in the 2012 election, the LDP managed a landslide victory, and returned to governing power. Therefore there is quite some skepticism found in the literature whether true alternation of governing power will continue, as the DPJ lost tremendously in the 2012 and 2014 elections (Hrebenar 2015: 191). Still a second larger party emerged with the DPJ in the late 1990s, allowing the voters a choice.

### Table 4.2. Percentage of Seats of the two largest Parties, 1958-2014

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year of Election</th>
<th>Largest Party</th>
<th>Second largest Party</th>
<th>Combined seats of two the largest parties</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1958</td>
<td>LDP 61.5%</td>
<td>JSP 35.5%</td>
<td>97.0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1960</td>
<td>LDP 63.4%</td>
<td>JSP 31.1%</td>
<td>94.5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1963</td>
<td>LDP 60.6%</td>
<td>JSP 30.8%</td>
<td>91.4%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1967</td>
<td>LDP 57.0%</td>
<td>JSP 28.8%</td>
<td>85.8%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1969</td>
<td>LDP 59.3%</td>
<td>JSP 18.5%</td>
<td>77.8%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1972</td>
<td>LDP 55.2%</td>
<td>JSP 24.0%</td>
<td>79.2%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1976</td>
<td>LDP 48.7%</td>
<td>JSP 24.0%</td>
<td>72.7%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1979</td>
<td>LDP 48.5%</td>
<td>JSP 20.9%</td>
<td>69.4%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1980</td>
<td>LDP 55.6%</td>
<td>JSP 20.9%</td>
<td>76.5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1983</td>
<td>LDP 48.9%</td>
<td>JSP 21.9%</td>
<td>70.8%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1986</td>
<td>LDP 58.6%</td>
<td>JSP 16.6%</td>
<td>75.2%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1990</td>
<td>LDP 53.7%</td>
<td>JSP 26.6%</td>
<td>80.3%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1993</td>
<td>LDP 43.6%</td>
<td>JSP 13.7%</td>
<td>57.3%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1996</td>
<td>LDP 47.8%</td>
<td>NFP 31.2%</td>
<td>79.0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2000</td>
<td>LDP 48.5%</td>
<td>DPJ 26.5%</td>
<td>75.0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2003</td>
<td>LDP 49.4%</td>
<td>DPJ 36.9%</td>
<td>86.3%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2005</td>
<td>LDP 61.7%</td>
<td>DPJ 23.5%</td>
<td>85.2%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2009</td>
<td>DPJ 64.2%</td>
<td>LDP 24.8%</td>
<td>89.0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2012</td>
<td>LDP 61.3%</td>
<td>DPJ 11.9%</td>
<td>73.2%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2014</td>
<td>LDP 60.4%</td>
<td>DPJ 15.2%</td>
<td>75.6%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Light grey: SNTV System; mid-grey: NFP only in that year; black: DPJ is largest party
Source: Calculated by Author

To make the development more visible, table 4.2 is showing the largest two parties, each of their percentage of seat and their combined percentage of seats since 1958. As can be seen, the LDP maintained to be the strongest party until 1993, and it took until 2005 to achieve a
majority in the Lower House again. The LDP lost tremendously in 2009, but since then it is again holding the majority. The second largest party before the 1990s was the JSP, but they too gradually declined in percentage of representation, until 1993. In 1996, a part of the party split off and joined the SDP. The JSP itself never made a comeback. The short-lived NFP managed to be the second largest party in 1996, but by 2000 already, the DPJ had become the major opponent of the LDP. Further table 4.2 shows the gradually increase of the combined percentage of seats of the two largest parties under the MMM system. Though the 97 percent of 1958 are still far off and in 2012 and 2014 the combined vote share was quite low again. The election of 2012 and 2014 hampered the percentage of the combined seats, as the DPJ performed extremely badly. After the 2012 elections it even looked as if a new party, the Japan Restoration Party, could soon become the new major opposition party, as they won nearly as many seats as the DPJ. The Restoration Party though was short-lived.

Table 4.3. Effective Numbers of Elective and Legislative Parties in Japan, 1958-2014

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year of Election</th>
<th>SNTV (V)</th>
<th>SNTV (S)</th>
<th>SMD (V)</th>
<th>SMD (S)</th>
<th>PR (V)</th>
<th>PR (S)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1958</td>
<td>2.24</td>
<td>1.98</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1960</td>
<td>2.40</td>
<td>2.00</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1963</td>
<td>2.55</td>
<td>2.15</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1967</td>
<td>3.03</td>
<td>2.41</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1969</td>
<td>3.35</td>
<td>2.50</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1972</td>
<td>3.41</td>
<td>2.67</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1976</td>
<td>4.02</td>
<td>3.18</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1979</td>
<td>3.76</td>
<td>3.29</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>1980</td>
<td>3.44</td>
<td>2.74</td>
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<tr>
<td>1983</td>
<td>3.64</td>
<td>3.23</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1986</td>
<td>3.35</td>
<td>2.57</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1990</td>
<td>3.41</td>
<td>2.70</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1993</td>
<td>5.16</td>
<td>4.14</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1996</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>3.53</td>
<td>2.36</td>
<td>4.28</td>
<td>3.84</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2000</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>3.78</td>
<td>2.36</td>
<td>5.15</td>
<td>4.72</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2003</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>2.97</td>
<td>2.28</td>
<td>3.42</td>
<td>3.03</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2005</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>2.71</td>
<td>1.77</td>
<td>3.68</td>
<td>3.15</td>
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<tr>
<td>2009</td>
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<td>2.64</td>
<td>1.70</td>
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<td>2012</td>
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<td>3.82</td>
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<td>5.80</td>
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<td>2014</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>3.25</td>
<td>1.76</td>
<td>4.97</td>
<td>4.14</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

V = Votes = elective; S = Seats = legislative
Source: Calculated by Author

As already mentioned above, the mixed system with both SMD and PR elements, is said to undercut Duverger’s mechanical factor, which in the long run also has an effect on the psychological factor. In order to look closer at the difference of the mechanical factors of SMD and PR components, a separate look at both components is needed. Table 4.3 shows the effective numbers of elective (votes = V) and legislative (seats = S) candidates, split up into SNTV, SMD and PR. The largest difference is between SMD (V) and SMD (S), being roughly at around 1.2. The difference of SNTV (V) and SNTV (S) is relatively small until the 1980s with far less than 1. Since the 1980s the difference increased somewhat to slightly over 1. The closest approximation is reached between PR (V) and PR (S) with a rough average of 0.5.
Furthermore, the effective number of parties in PR is far higher than in the SMD component. Jou sees in the fact that the effective number of parties in PR is higher, that “voters have been able to distinguish between the two components of the new system from the start”, and that smaller parties either nominated less candidates in the SMD or received less votes in SMD compared to PR (Jou 2009: 768). Further, table 4.3 highlights that Duverger’s law only applies to SMDs, where the effective numbers of elective parties stayed stable in the lower twos until the landslide victory of the LDP in 2005. Additional the difference between SMD (V) and SMD (S) compared with the PR (V) and PR (S) is larger. After 2005 SMD (S) continued to decrease, which contradicts Duverger’s law.

Reasons could be the disproportionality due to very unbalanced votes, the high effective threshold and a decrease in district competition if for example the DPJ as the second largest party does not run candidates in every district. Further LDP is “bypassing” Duverger’s law with creative ways like tag-teams to avoid defectors and independents in campaigns. Here two LDP competitors in the same district alternate in running either under the SMD component or under the PR component. Additional the coalition with the Komeito since 2000 and Prime Minister Junichiro Koizumi’s master stroke in the 2005 campaign when he ran against his own party are considered as ways to “bypass” Duverger’s law (Reed & Shimizu 2009b: 30).

The PR (S) on the other side was starting to come closer to the two-party system and was under 3 in 2009. But in 2012, it suddenly jumped to over five. In the election of 2012, the LDP’s landslide victory was mostly in the SMDs, while the PR result was relatively balanced between the first five parties. The number of parties winning seats through PR slightly increased since 2005, from total 8 parties in 2005 to 10 parties in 2012. In 2014 the total number of parties represented in the Lower House was again 8. This emphasizes the statement from above that third parties still can thrive relatively well and can gain representation in the Lower House under the new system due to the PR tier. But at the same time, many of the new parties are relatively short-lived and prone to splinters and realignments.

4.3.3. Fractionalization

In graph 4.1 the fractionalization of votes and seats (refer to chapter 2.4) are shown, as well as the degree of defractionalization of the Lower House. F (V) shows how the electoral rules reduce the number of elective parties and F (S) illustrates how the translation of votes into seats reduces the number of legislative parties. The difference between F (V) and F (S) is the Degree of Defractionalization of party representation in the parliament.

Looking at the complete timespan, it becomes obvious that the fractionalization of votes and seats, and the defractionalization of the Lower House are fluctuating quite a bit. From 1958 to 1976 the degree of fractionalization of both votes and seats steadily increased, reflecting the increase of effective number of parties over the same time. The degree of defractionalization remained high at 1.2 though and only decreased somewhat from 1969 to 1976. So while both the fractionalization of votes and seats increased, the SNTV system still reduced the number of parties more until 1969. This probably reflects the nomination and campaign errors, until the Japanese parties adopted and reached the equilibrium in regards of numbers of candidates, which was reached in the 1970s (Reed 1990: 349). From then on there are quite some
fluctuations in all three lines, though the fractionalization of votes remained more stable than the fractionalization of seats.

**Graph 4.1.** Japan: Fractionalization 1958-2014

This was already seen in the fluctuations of the effective number of parties in the same time span and can hint at different degrees of proportionality, as even though an equilibrium in number of candidates was reached, the parties were prone to still make nomination and campaign errors. 1993 marks the highest value of \( F(V) \) and \( F(S) \) then, though the gap between is relatively small, making the degree of defractionalization also relatively low. From then on \( F(V) \) and \( F(S) \) start to decrease in total, and the difference between the two starts to increase. The lowest point of \( F(S) \) is reached in 2009, the highest point of defractionalization in 2012. A real increase in the degree of fractionalization and hence an increase in disproportionality can be seen in 2003. From a first view, graph 4.1 implies that while lots of fluctuations occurred, the mechanical factor of the SNTV system was less strong in decreasing the number of legislative parties than the mechanical factor of the new MMM system. Thus disproportionality and the factor of decreasing legislative parties seem to be more prominent under the MMM system.

**4.3.4. Proportionality**

As the analysis has shown so far, the proportionality under the new electoral system decreased. To highlight the (dis)proportionality of the MMM system, first a look at the graph 4.2 should be taken. In this graph 4.2 the vote-seat ratios (refer to page 19) of the two largest parties from 1958 to 2014 are shown. It should be pointed out here that the second largest party changed over the years: JSP until 1993, 1996 the NFP and from 2000 the DPJ. The vote-seat ratio of the
LDP remained relatively stable from 1958 to 1993, ranging from 1.06 to 1.24, with a mean value of 1.15.

In case of the second largest party, the JSP, the ratio fluctuated more, ranging from 0.86 to 1.16, with a mean value of 0.96. Thus until 1993, the LDP had a slightly higher seat bonus than the JSP, but the general trend was very close between the two parties. After the electoral reform in 1993 this changed. Under the MMM system seat bonuses are far more fluctuating. The lowest point for the LDP was in 2009 (0.76), when they were defeated by the DPJ. 2012 marked the highest seat bonus ever for the LDP with 1.74. The second largest party ranged between 1.43 (2009) and 0.58 (2012). The gap between the largest and second largest party also increased since 1993.

Looking at the years 2005 to 2014, the drastic changes of the curve stand out. The reasons are swing votes. The SNTV system was a far more proportional system compared to the MMM system. Further due to the multi-member districts under SNTV, the cumulative loss of the LDP was far less in times of unpopularity. Single-member districts are now magnifying losses far more, resulting in more drastic electoral outcomes. The increasing number of floating votes since the 1990s may also play a crucial role here (Christensen 2015: 25-30; Reed 2002: 259-260).

Graph 4.2. Japan: Votes-Seats Ratio of the two largest Parties, 1958-2014

To further analyze the disproportionality of the parallel system in comparison to SNTV, table 4.4 shows the Gallagher Index (refer to page 20). As mentioned in chapter 3.1.2, SNTV is considered a system with proportionality being between PR and majority systems. The figures of the SNTV disproportionality therefore are slightly higher than under the PR component of the new parallel system, but far away from the disparity between votes and seats of the SMD component. The disproportionality of the PR component has steadily been rising since 1996. In 2012 it shortly fell to under 4, and rose again to above 4 in 2013. As Jou points out, even though
the PR component should be favorable for smaller parties, in the last years it gradually put smaller parties at a disadvantage, possibly due to a sunken PR vote share of the smaller parties under the effective threshold (Jou 2009: 771). The overall disproportionality under the parallel system is higher than under the SNTV, and it is actually becoming more disproportional since 2005, which is especially due to the suddenly extremely risen disparity of the SMD (S) and SMD (V) since 2005 (table 4.3). According to Heinrich (2007: 114), under the parallel system, parties now need to win at least 20-25 percent to reach a proportional result, which is 5 percent more than under the SNTV. Further especially LDP as the largest party (beside the DPJ in 2009) gained under the parallel system over 30 percent more seats than votes, in 2005 even 40 percent, in comparison to the years under the SNTV system where the LDP had an average seat bonus of about 16 percent. This also will be illustrated in the next section ‘Advantage Profile’. Therefore the new system is definitely an advantage for larger parties and the mechanical factor of electoral rules is reducing the effective number of parties in the Lower House.

Table 4.4. Disproportionality 1958-2014, Gallagher Index

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year of Election</th>
<th>SNTV</th>
<th>Year of Election</th>
<th>SMD</th>
<th>PR</th>
<th>Overall SMD/PR</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1958</td>
<td>4.33</td>
<td>1996</td>
<td>15.82</td>
<td>2.96</td>
<td>10.67</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1960</td>
<td>6.36</td>
<td>2000</td>
<td>15.57</td>
<td>2.49</td>
<td>11.49</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1963</td>
<td>5.38</td>
<td>2003</td>
<td>10.64</td>
<td>4.01</td>
<td>8.52</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1967</td>
<td>6.97</td>
<td>2005</td>
<td>23.00</td>
<td>4.65</td>
<td>15.63</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1969</td>
<td>9.13</td>
<td>2009</td>
<td>22.47</td>
<td>5.85</td>
<td>15.11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1976</td>
<td>7.52</td>
<td>2014</td>
<td>21.91</td>
<td>4.44</td>
<td>15.87</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1979</td>
<td>4.07</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1980</td>
<td>6.59</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1983</td>
<td>4.27</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1986</td>
<td>7.22</td>
<td></td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>1990</td>
<td>6.73</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1993</td>
<td>6.36</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Calculated by Author

4.3.5. Advantage Profile

The advantage profile (refer to page 19) of the SNTV system (graph 4.3.) shows what vote percentage a party needs to be advantaged by the electoral system (i.e. gaining a seat bonus). Usually a large time period is taken to show the cumulative results of all parties over the years to get a clear picture of the electoral system and its bias towards larger parties. So in the case of Japan, the period from 1958 to 1993 is taken with all parties ever gaining representation in the Lower House.

The SNTV system of Japan can be grouped into the late rising profile, meaning that the break-even point when a party is not underrepresented is usually ranging between 15 to 25 percent of the vote share (Taagepera & Shugart 1989: 69). In the Japanese case the break-even point is at about 19 percent of the vote share. Fluctuations of the median curve below 19 percent
can be explained by outliers of advantage ratios and are rather negligible. Most important here is when the median curve is crossing the perfect ratio line.

The break-even point of 19 percent is mostly advantageous for the two largest parties (LPD and JSP). This further reflects the relative proportionality of the SNTV system, as the graph 4.3 also shows that advantage ratio of the LDP and the JSP was relatively similar and low with only 1.03 to 1.18. Among the worst advantage ratio has the Communist party. An explanation is probably that the party ran (and still is running) candidates in nearly every district in every election, even though they had and still have no chance of winning (Reed & Shimizu 2009a: 11-12).

**Graph 4.3. Advantage Profile under the SNTV System from 1958 - 1993**

The advantage profile of the MMM system is quite different than under the SNTV system (graph 4.4.). This one can be grouped into the scatter profile. Characteristics of such scatter profiles are unpredictable advantage ratios especially with lower vote shares in the range of under 20 percent. The break-even point in the Japanese MMM system is at around 35 percent. From zero to 10 percent though, the advantage ratio is relatively unpredictably, even though the amount of parties that get underrepresented here is larger. Taagepera and Laakso (1980: 440-442) offer a few explanations for a possibility of such scatter profiles, mostly ranging from the electoral system itself to unstable party systems. Even though the party system has been in turmoil since the electoral reform in 1993, there are still several stable parties with relative stable vote shares. Thus the most likely explanation for this scatter profile in the Japanese case is the mix of SMD and PR components. Smaller parties can get represented easily via the PR
component, but it is the smaller share of the two components, with the larger SMD component being far less proportional.

At the same time minor parties hardly have chances in SMDs. The combined vote share of SMD and PR component has the result for minor parties of being mostly underrepresented. The outliers here that received a seat bonus with less than 3 percent of vote share are the New Conservative Party, the Independents Union and independent candidates. All three groups only ran in SMDs. The independent candidates and the Independent Union further are not directly a party per se. Thus if parties or independent candidates running only in SMDs and actually win there, they receive quite a large advantage ratio of ranging from 1.2 to 1.6. Parties with more than 35 percent receive only a slightly higher advantage of 1.3 to 1.7. In total though is the seat bonus for parties above the break-even point under the MMM system a lot larger than under the SNTV system.

Graph 4.4. Advantage Profile under the MMM System from 1996 - 2014

Source: Author
4.3.6. Summary of Empirical Part 1

This chapter covered several indicators for analyzing the changes of the party system in Japan since 1958 in order to look if the electoral reform of 1993 had an effect according to Duverger’s law. The analysis started in 1958 as then the 1955er System had been established resulting in a two-party system with only one other minor party. But while it was highly likely that the party system would evolve around the two largest parties (LDP and JSP) with a two-party system, it more transformed into a multi-party system with one dominant party. The LDP started in 1958 with a vote share of over 60 percent, but gradually declined and was at about 40 to 50 percent from the 1970s to the 1990s. The JSP started with 35 percent, but also declined to around 20 percent by the end of the 1960s. In the ideological space between the two, new centrist parties formed and the effective number of parties increased to an average of 2.9 parties from 1963 to 1993.

Under SNTV system an equilibrium of five long-standing parties was reached, with the LDP as the dominant party and a highly fragmented opposition. Further the SNTV system “punished” the LDP far less than the new MMM system, as voters always could vote for a different candidate of the LDP instead of voting for a different party. Under the new MMM system, this possibility is not given anymore and the cumulative loss in SMDs can lead to extreme election results, as were seen in 2009 and 2012. The SNTV system compared with the MMM system was also more proportional, which was an advantage for third parties.

While since the electoral reform in 1993 in general more parties have been represented in the Lower House, the effective number of parties was still higher under the SNTV system, as third parties received higher vote shares. Seat bonus of the largest party also increased a lot under the MMM system, enlarging the gap between the first and second party. Further a vote share of about 35 percent is needed now to no be disadvantaged with the seat distribution. Under SNTV, the break-even point was only at 19 percent, and the advantage ratio of parties crossing the 19 percent hurdle also was less high than under the MMM system.

The mix of SMD and PR components also lead to interesting outcomes: in the lower ranges of up to 5 percent, very unpredictable advantage ratios can be seen. The explanation found is mostly the mix of the two components: parties or independent candidates that run only in SMDs and manage to win seats there, are nearly as advantaged as large parties with over 35 percent of the votes. Smaller third parties that run only in the PR list are rather disadvantaged. Some authors point out the possible incentive the PR list offers for smaller parties to run in SMDs even though they have no chances of winning, as that could boost their vote share in the PR vote. This again can lead to an increase of competition on the district level. The analysis of the advantage ratio profile and the findings of several scholars point out that there is no evidence of such a strategy of minor parties (Heinrich 2007: 115; Scheiner 2012: 354-355).

The cumulative vote share of the two largest parties is now higher with about 75 to 90 percent, compared to the time span of 1970s to early 1990s, further implying the tendency towards a nationalized two-party system. The mechanical and psychological factors of the SMDs, which is the larger part of the electoral system, is seemingly outweighing the counter fighting effects of the PR component. Further an alternation of government power was given in 2009, with the victory of the DPJ, which was one of the major reasons behind the electoral reform. In addition, under the MMM system, many mergers and realignments occurred, resulting in the DPJ becoming the second largest party. Another major change was that
coalitions became the norm. The LDP is in a long-standing coalition with the Komeito since 2000. The DPJ too had to resort to a coalition in 2009 with the SDP and another minor party (Christensen 2015: 48-52; Hrebenar 2015: 191-195). Thus the mechanical and psychological factors did have an effect on mergers, alliances and coalitions, even if the PR component still allows for fragmentations of minor third parties.

However, it is questionable if there really is reason for optimism for a continuation of the alternation of power between two viable parties with distinguishable policy-setting. First the DPJ lost badly after their victory in 2009. Many reasons are found: inexperience in policy-setting, issues with the bureaucracy, the promise of consumer tax increase shortly before the Upper House election in 2010, the disastrous handling of Great Earthquake and the Fukushima Dai-Ichi incident and so on (Hrebenar & Haraguchi 2015: 175-176; Hyde 2011: 173-175). Secondly, there is hardly a policy-difference between the LDP and the DPJ. This will be further discussed in the following chapter.


4.4.1. Issue Dimensions before the Electoral Reform

Class cleavages and other issue dimensions in Europe developed between industrialization and World War 2. Thus looking at Japan in the period from Meiji Restoration (which marked the beginning of industrialization) to World War 2, Richardson and Flanagan (1984: 19) identify three salient socioeconomic cleavages, but those all failed to be reflected in the party system from 1890 to 1940. Those three cleavages were an urban-rural cleavage, a class cleavage and an ideological cleavage. They resulted from rapid industrialization, the growing inequality of rural and urban population as well as between peasants and landlords, entrepreneurs and workers. And finally the rapid modernization polarized the cultural/ideological poles of traditional Japanese versus modern Western values. But due to the strict restraints on political activities, a weak Diet partly due to the Meiji constitution and late extension of suffrage, they never were mirrored in the party system (Richardson & Flanagan 1984: 19-29; Heinrich 2007: 73).

Right after World War 2, the occupational power (the US) undertook several drastic reforms, among them the revision of the constitution and the strengthening of labor movements. This led to a left-right conflict mirrored in the fight over control of the workplace between labor movements and entrepreneurs. Further the revision of the constitution, with the changed role of the tennō as only a figurehead with no sovereignty anymore, challenged the more traditional values of the prewar generations. Additional according to Article 9 of the new constitution, Japan was not allowed to have any military anymore. Out of this, two camps developed, the right and left parties. The general trend of the conservative right camp was to promote capitalism, private ownership and the amendment of the constitution. The left parties became the progressive camp promoting socialism and nationalization, and opposed constitutional amendment. Voter affiliation however was not along the lines of class conflicts, but rather correlated with the level of education, with higher educated people voting rather for left parties, and right parties were rather supported by farmers and merchants. The social gap between upper and lower social groups was also not as wide as in other nations at that time. Thus even though the left camp was laden with Marxism and Leninism rhetoric, there was no real class cleavage,

Still until 1960, the party system was highly polarized along the right-left axis, climaxing in huge strikes and mass demonstration against the renewal of the bilateral security treaty between Japan and the US between 1955 and 1960 (Chiavacci 2010: 50-51). The security treaty issue along with the amendment of the constitution is also called the anpo cleavage or peace cleavage. While the anpo cleavage became relatively non-salient, it should remain of importance to politicians from then on. In the highly polarized ideological space between the LDP and the JSP, new centrist parties then formed from 1960 onward. After 1960 though, the LDP changed the policy appeals towards economic growth and moved away from the constitution and security issue: the new national project and the social contract was the “National Income Doubling Plan” started under Prime Minister Ikeda, where the whole population was to participate in it. From 1960 to 1973, rapid economic growth diminished the class struggle and Japan became the so-called “middle-class society”. But while the LDP became more moderate, and polarization had decreased completely by the 1970s, the JSP continued to emphasize the class struggle and did not adopt to the growing egalitarian system in Japan (Kohno 1997: 116-118; Reed & Shimizu 2009: 11-12; Chiavacci 2010: 52-54).

4.4.2. LDP Dominance and Adaptability
The LDP proved the most adaptable party in the 1955er system. While their vote shares constantly dropped from the 1960s onwards, they still managed to expand their voter support groups. So they started to promote a better welfare system, antipollution law and environmental improvement in cities in the 1970s, winning many urban voters and resulting in a “comeback” of the LDP in the 1980s. Still the voters became more critical about the LDP over time, and several new centrist parties formed, but no opposition party was considered to be a viable alternative for the voters. In the 1970s and 1980s the middle-class society was further enhanced, and the JSP continued to lose relevance in its position of class struggle. The dominance of the LDP was even more enabled by the opposition, which was highly fragmented and failed to cooperate and coordinate during campaigns (Richardson & Flanagan 1984: 258-260; Chiavacci 2010: 54; Heinrich 2007: 79-81; Reed & Shimizu 2009: 29-30). Further the SNTV system allowed the LDP to use elections as quasi referenda about their policy agenda, as voters simply voted for a different LDP candidate when they were dissatisfied instead of voting for a complete different party. Reelection of incumbents was therefore also relatively low with only 85 percent (Reed & Shimizu 2009: 32; Nakamura & Hrebenar 2015: 119).

The major stronghold of the LDP is the rural area. In the late 1940s, traditional values of the rural population were mirrored in the conservative camp. Further, in this time political processes were started to strengthen the connections of politicians with rural grassroots organizations in order to win election (Chiavacci 2010: 52). This would develop into the very characteristic feature of Japanese political environment: clientelism in the form of public works and heavy subsidies and income substitution programs for farmers. But with the new economic growth policies and the resulting rapid growth, regional inequalities still widened in the late 1950s and 1960s. Economic growth and development were centered in urban areas, and rural areas started to be left behind. The LDP overcame the agrarian-industrial conflict by starting to
distribute and transfer money to weak local governments and public services (like education and health care) in order to equalize them nationwide. Further a particular pattern of redistribution emerged in the form of public works and infrastructure development in rural areas. And the LDP developed financial support systems for farmers and introduced high protections against agricultural imports. This all reinforced the clientele networks with the LPD, and strengthened the rural-urban cleavage (Chiavacci 2010: 54; Song 2015: 126-128; Heinrich 2007: 81-82).

Another reason found for the LPD dominance is the serious malapportionment (refer to page 17) under the SNTV system. With the rapid economic development and increased mobility more and more people moved to urban areas, but the LPD refused to reallocate the Diet seats, as the overrepresented rural area was their stronghold. The Supreme Court repeatedly criticized this, but only minor reforms were undertaken. The malapportionment partly reached a ratio of 1:9, but after reforms it was only reduced to 1:3. Soon afterwards, the high mobility had increased the malapportionment again. Only when the new electoral system was adopted in 1994, district lines were redrawn and malapportionment was drastically reduced finally. The new law allows now a ratio of maximum 1:2, which is not strictly followed, as in 2012 the ratio was up to 1:2.38. Still the situation gravely improved. Further the seat bonus due to malapportionment especially under the SNTV system was relatively low, and is even lower under the MMM system (Baker & Scheiner 2007: 478-488; Christensen 2015: 41-44). Baker and Scheiner (2007: 488-489) even find only one elections were malapportionment helped the LPD to get a false majority: in 1983.

4.4.3. Issue Dimensions after the Electoral Reform

By the end of the 1980s, several scandals befall the LPD. The public and politicians both wanted an electoral reform, but the LPD failed to enact any change. Only after a no-confidence vote by LPD parliamentarians against their own government in 1993, several splits from the LPD and an electoral defeat of the LDP, the electoral reform was achieved by a coalition of 8 parties, many of them only formed in order to advance reforms (Reed & Shimizu 2009: 12-14). Even though the coalition fell apart shortly after the reform and the LPD returned to power in a coalition with the JSP, the party system remained to be in turmoil. The JSP already had lost most of their policy appeals by the 1990s, but they completely lost their voter support when they joined the coalition with the LDP, “betraying” all they stood for as they had always been the major opponent of the LPD until then (Zakowski 2011: 190).

In all the party realignments, the DPJ emerged, positioning itself as the new center-left alternative to the former JSP and the LDP (Koellner 2015: 81). But the early 1990s also marked the burst of the bubble economy and the beginning of the “lost decade(s)”, where Japan fell into economic recession. In the late 1990s calls for neoliberal reforms in order to make the Japanese economy more competitive became loud. PM Koizumi (2001 – 2006) then undertook several reforms (among them the postal privatization, fiscal decentralization and neoliberal market reform), but managed only to push them through by actually threatening to destroy the LPD from within and running an electoral campaign against his party in 2005 after the LPD had blocked the postal reform (Chiavacci 2010: 55-61; Reed & Shimizu 2009a: 17-19). While Koizumi was one of the most popular prime ministers in Japanese history and the second
longest to be in office, his reforms later on “backfired” and were criticized to have worsened the social gap and inequalities (Nakamura & Hrebenar 2015: 124-126; Hyde 2011: 160; Chiavacci 2010: 139-140).

Already in the late 1990s, talks about the growing inequalities in Japan had become a popular topic in the media. While Japan even nowadays is still among the most egalitarian nations in the world and most of the debate about the growing inequalities were overblown, the decreasing chances of social upward mobility started to be reflected in Japan’s growing awareness of the “end of the middle-class society”. By the early 2000s a new buzzword replaced the middle-class society: divided society (kakusa shakai) (Song 2015: 126-128; Chiavacci 2010: 55-64). Further due to economic recession, the budget deficit increased tremendously in the 1990s, forcing the LPD to reduce public works and local expenditure drastically. PM Koizumi then continued to cut local infrastructure development, along with cutting the intergovernmental fiscal transfers and allocating tax-collecting authority to localities. This led to fiscal strains on economically weak rural localities and the cuts of public works worsened the job situation on the countryside. But also the liberal market reform increased disparities, as atypical jobs increased, excluding many from social security coverage (Chiavacci 2010: 63-64; Song 2015: 131-138).

This all led to growing inequalities between social groups and worsening of the rural-urban gap. The LPD after Koizumi tried to lessen the inequalities by introducing reforms and back-paddling on some of Koizumi’s reforms, but none yielded any results. It can be argued that this then led to victory of the DPJ first in the Upper House election in 2007 and the Lower House election in 2009. The LPD had lost the support of their rural stronghold, but also of many others who felt left behind in the growing inequality. Further the image of the LPD as reformed new party suffered, when the successors of Koizumi started to go back to old LPD politics (Zakowski 2011: 195).

The DPJ used their advantage and changed their stance from neoliberal policy appeals to social welfare and income aid programs and campaigned on “local revitalization”, gaining the support of many of the rural areas in the 2007 and 2009 elections (Song 2015: 139-142). But voters were seriously disappointed with the DPJ’s government ability, policy setting and disaster handling, mirroring in the devastating defeats in 2012 and 2014. Further the regional inequality topic seemed to have lost its momentum by 2013, and now other political, social and economic issues are more important after the Great Earthquake, among them disaster recovery, restarting of nuclear power plants and economic growth and fiscal health (Song 2015: 143). But while nuclear power plants are a huge topic in the media in Japan, interestingly it is hardly mirrored in the campaigns of political parties. In the 2014 Lower House election, it was hardly a topic and the focus was on economic recovery. Further the LPD is advocating and pushing the restart of nuclear power plants even though the population is rather against it, showing that economic policies of the LPD (especially “Abenomics”) are more salient at the moment (Sagara 2015: 30-38).

Returning to the issue dimensions of pre-1990s, three trends can be seen since the late 1990s: first the urban-rural cleavage as already discussed is still salient. Second, the right-left cleavage (or anpo) is still there, but with the decline of the socialist parties, the lines got blurred. Neither the LPD nor the DPJ are completely pro or against it, and are internally fragmented on this topic and the current advancing of the re-interpretation of the constitution under PM Abe
in summer 2015 and the protest against it shows that the cleavage is still very ongoing (Yomiuri 2015; Mainichi 2015). Lastly, the right-left cleavage of socialists versus conservatives is replaced by an old-new cleavage: new parties like the DPJ all formed rather on the right spectrum, but the DPJ is very similar in policy appeals to the LDP. Rather the new versus old may have played a factor for the DPJ for becoming the largest opposition party than its political stance (Reed 2003: 175-176).

4.4.4. Issue-Oriented and Party-Centered Campaigning

The electoral reform was said to bring (among other changes) issue-oriented, party-centered campaigns and stronger party-branches. After 12 years several trends can be seen now, though not all have been caused by the electoral reform per se. Other administrative reforms, the Campaign Finance Law of 1994, individual actors and the emergence of the mass media in the 1990s were crucial factors as well (Estévez-Abe 2006 646). First there are now (more) issue-oriented campaigns which are also based on the image of parties and party leaders. This was mostly caused by the growing significance of the mass media and more sophisticated media strategies with the party leader in focus (Christensen 2015: 36-37). Further the DPJ started to make use of manifestos in 2003, and by now they are the norm in Japan (Christensen 2015: 19-20; Maeda 2009: 52). And PM Koizumi transformed the position of the prime minister and LPD party leader into real sources of power, centralized the party and “presidentialized” the role of the prime minister (Estévez-Abe 2006: 642). The new public funding law further increased the power of the parties themselves, taking away the power of the single candidates. Now money needs to be transferred through party branches, instead of receiving money from the candidate’s personal fundraising (Reed 2002: 246-248). So party loyalty and discipline were definitely strengthened in the last 12 years partly due to the MMM system, partly due to other factors and political actors, and campaigns seem to be based more on issues with the use of manifestos.

Further it was predicted that under the MMM system parties would appeal more to the median voter (Scheiner 2012: 352). But the actual outcome is that the Japanese centrist parties show no clear policy distinctions anymore (Kobayashi 2006: 10-11; Yamada 2009: 61). Both the LPD and the DPJ are highly fragmented internally, and issue orientation is depending on which faction inside of the parties prevails for the time being. In both the LPD and the DPJ there are similar divisions along the right-left axis and “this mosaic of intra-party groups exposes the non-issue-oriented character of the Japanese two-party system” (Zakowski 2011: 202). This leads to the problem that voters can only distinguish between the two parties based on valence issues. Valence issues are mainly based on the performance than on particular policy stances of a party. Thus the valence issue party image is now a crucial factor in winning elections. Scheiner (2012) looked at district level campaigns from 2003 to 2009 and finds a growing convergence of policy proposals of candidates of different parties. He argues that in 2005 and 2009 most of the valence issues over reform commitment and reform competence were important for winning the election. He further concludes that while an alternation of power is possibly now, there is no alternation of policies (Scheiner 2012: 363-366).
4.4.5. Summary of Empirical Part 2

As Hrebenar (2015: 199) writes, the first party system in Japan (pre-1990s) “was really very boring”, as the same party kept on winning elections with always the same main opposition party. The cleavage structures in Japan formed in the 1940s and 1950s, and the clientelistic networks were institutionalized. This all was in favor of the LPD, which proved to be highly adaptable over the years. It managed to cater to rural voters (their stronghold), and urban voters in the 1970s. The LPD overcame the rural-urban division by tax money transfers in the form of infrastructure development and farmers’ income support. Further it achieved rapid economic growth with their social contract and by the 1970s, Japan was considered a middle-class society. The JSP gained its momentum on the anpo cleavage, but after the LPD changed its policy focus to economic growth, the JSP did not adapt. It continued to emphasize a class-conflict that arguably was marginal from the beginning on and then was even more redundant when Japan became an egalitarian nation.

With the electoral reform and the burst of the economic bubble in the 1990s, the Japanese party system got into turmoil. Many parties formed, merged and disappeared in a short amount of time. The DPJ emerged out of this turmoil, becoming the first viable opposition party. But it cannot be said that the party system has stabilized until now, as still parties come and go fast. LDP returned to power after 1994 and tried to overcome economic recession by moving to neoliberal reforms, which in the long run actually caused the loss of their rural stronghold. By the 2000s the talks of a divided society became loud and more and more social groups felt left behind.

Under PM Koizumi, the LDP was reformed internally, and he pushed through several wide-reaching neoliberal reforms. As criticism about the social consequences of these reforms became more serious, the LDP tried to back paddle on several of them, resulting in even more critique as the LPD seemingly simply returned to their former self. The result was a huge victory for the DPJ in 2007 and 2009, not because voters supported the DPJ but to protest against the LDP. Further both parties are very similar in their policy settings now, so a real distinction can hardly be found. Only the valence issue of reform competence matters now. So after the electorate also was disappointed with the DPJ’s government performance, they returned to support the LDP in 2012 and 2014.

4.5. Analysis Japan

The changes of Japan’s party system before and after the electoral reform were analyzed in this chapter. Both the institutional constraints of the mechanical factors and the societal influences in the form of cleavage dimensions were in the focus. The first part covered mechanical factors responsible for the votes-to-seats distribution from 1958 to 2014. These factors in the long run also affect the psychological factors and can lead to a change in the party system according to Duverger’s law. The second part looked at the political environment and societal issues in Japan since the Meiji Restoration and whether the party system mirrored those societal issues or not.

The 1955er party system in Japan started with the merge of the left and right camp into the JSP and the LDP. But from the starting point of a relative equal two-party system, the party system then developed into a party system consisting of one dominant party and several fragmented opposition parties. Institutionalized processes like the clientelistic networks with
the rural electorate and the very effective economic growth policies from 1960 onwards, ensured the LDP a continued dominance. The opposition parties failed to gain public trust and were mostly considered unviable. The second largest party JSP was rigidly continuing their class-struggle policy appeals, which more and more lost its relevance when Japan’s economic growth resulted in a middle-class society. The first highly polarized party system allowed for the formation of more centrist parties and by the 1970s a quasi-equilibrium of five long-standing parties was reached according to Duverger’s extended law. This also correspondences with the developments of the effective number of parties, which increased until the 1970s, and then fluctuated at around 2.5 to 3 effective parties, depending on the nomination and campaign errors. The SNTV system also led to more stable electoral outcomes. Unsatisfied voters did not need to vote for a different party but just voted for a different candidate from the same party. SNTV is a relatively proportional electoral system, depending on the district size and good nomination strategies, and seat bonus for the largest party LDP remained small. Still the party system was more or less frozen with no visible change, and some as Reed and Shimizu point out, only an internal split of the LDP could dethrone the LDP (Reed & Shimizu 2009a: 11-12). This happened in 1993: after several scandals in which high ranking LDP politicians were involved, internal pressure for reform started but the LDP failed to enact any reform. Several LDP politicians asked for a non-confidence vote and some of them split from the LDP soon afterwards. In 1993 the LDP lost the first Lower House election in history and an 8-parties coalition pushed through the electoral reform, throwing the party system into turmoil.

But changes did not occur as fast or to the extent as they were expected: in 1998 Christensen writes that no fundamentally changes could be found after one election (1003-1004). Only gradually changes came, and not all of them were caused by the new electoral system itself. One of the major changes was that the conservative opposition parties gradually merged and the new major opposition DPJ was formed. Further changes to campaigning can be seen: they now are more issue-oriented with the party leader in the focus. This and the changes in the effective number of parties in the 2000s point towards a two-party system that was predicted. The SMD tier of the MMM system is having a strong mechanical factor, as it is far less proportional and has a high effective threshold for winning. The PR tier is still allowing the representation of minor parties relatively well, but they are more disadvantaged now unless they run also in SMDs and win there. The two components of the electoral system basically allow two large parties, with several minor parties due to PR but there they achieve only low vote shares.

The downside though is the policy-convergence of the major parties: the LDP and the DPJ are nearly identical in their policy-settings. Voters can only distinguish between the two through valence issues. It matters more now which party is more reform competent. But both parties have disappointed the electorate: the LDP after Koizumi’s neoliberal reforms had worsened the social gap and the DPJ, when they proved to be inexperienced in governing. While the Japanese electorate has been described as passive with many floating voters (Flanagan & Richardson 1984: 253-254), the dissatisfaction in the form of floating voters seriously increased after 1993. As Hatoyama describes, there is a growing alienation between the electorate and the parties, worsened by the up-down approach of the parties coupled with a growing disinterest to the interests of the population, and by the MMM system, as its narrows down the representation of values and cleavage structures, when minor parties are underrepresented (Hatoyama 2014:}
Kobayashi comes to a similar conclusion: over 50 percent of the electorate seem to think that their interests are not represented by the political parties and that they have no real say in politics anymore (Kobayashi 2006: 15, 36-37). The growing number of floating voters and the MMM system then lead to drastic electoral outcomes: the landslide victories of the DPJ in 2009 and of the LDP in 2012 and 2014. The alienation of the electorate may also explain the ongoing turmoil of the party system, as many new minor parties form and try to attract voters by addressing neglected societal issues: the Tomorrow Party of Japan was formed in 2014 just before the Lower House election with their mere policy-goal of nuclear power abolishment. The party lasted only roughly two months, and was criticized later on for utilizing the issue to get votes (Sagara 2015: 32-38). As all of this shows, the Japanese party system is definitely not the same as before the electoral reform anymore.
5. Taiwan

5.1. Historical Overview

Taiwan is a country with a complicated political history under constantly changing territorial rule and foreign occupation. Independent until the year of 1624, it was first a Dutch colony and used as a trade basis for the Dutch East India Company in the East Asian area. When the Ming Dynasty was overthrown by the Qing Dynasty in 1644, Qing loyalist Zheng Chang-gong (also known as Koxinga) retreated to Taiwan and established his own government, the Kingdom Tungning (1662 – 1683). Afraid of a rebellion by Zheng Chang-gong, the Qing dynasty took control of Taiwan in 1683, and made it part of the Fujian province, directly across the Taiwan Strait. However the Qing dynasty never completely took control of all of Taiwan and did not take responsibility for the many pirate-bases on Taiwan that often attacked other countries. Similar to the Dutch, the Qing dynasty pitted locals against each other, with an inefficient, corrupt and brutal government that led to many rebellions in the next 200 years. As settlement for the loss of the First Sino-Japanese War (1894–1895), the Qing dynasty then ceded Taiwan to Japan as part of the Shimonoseki treaty. To ward off the Japanese, the Taiwanese tried to persuade the British to take over administration, but to no avail. In the same year the Republic of Formosa was founded to resist the Japanese rule. But the republic lasted only for roughly 150 days, before Taiwan was officially annexed to Japan, becoming Japan’s first colony in 1895 (Bedford & Hwang 2006:4-5).

The Japanese took fierce control of Taiwan, and gradually modernized and expanded the infrastructure, as well as improving agricultural production. They also provided public education and a public health protection. Soon Taiwan’s inhabitants were better off than mainland Chinese, especially as they were not part of the many upheavals on the Chinese mainland, like the Boxer Rebellion, 1911 Revolution, Warlord period, communist movements and Anti-Japanese War. The Japanese tried to assimilate the Taiwan into Japanese society but still let them have some freedom to express themselves politically even if the Japanese dominated the political realm. From 1918 Japanese education along with the Japanese language was accelerated, with the result that by the end of the Second World War most Taiwanese spoke Japanese. After 1937 intermarriage between Taiwanese and Japanese was legalized and only Japanese broadcasts were allowed. Taiwanese political organization were allowed and thus emerged in the 1920s (Fell 2012: 11-12; Bedford & Hwang 2006: 4-6).

The League for the Establishment of a Taiwan Parliament was also formed later to petition for more autonomy and home rule on Taiwan. The first local election occurred on Taiwan in 1935, though the suffrage was very restricted. The electoral system used back then was the SNTV, the same as in Japan. The SNTV should have been in use in Taiwan until 2005. By the 1940s, the Japanese authorities strengthened their effort to assimilate the Taiwanese, and incorporated the Kominka policy that banned Chinese broadcasts and publications and promoted Japanese Shintō religion and the adaption of Japanese names. The Japanese colony period left ambiguous sentiments in Taiwan. Compared to other Asian nations, there are less Anti-Japanese sentiments and even if the Japan was a brutal colonial power that treated Taiwanese as inferior, they still improved living conditions tremendously with a very efficient bureaucracy (Fell 2012: 11-12; Bedford & Hwang 2006: 4-6).
Martial Law Period

When Taiwan was ceded back to the Republic of China (ROC) after the Second Word War, the Taiwanese first welcomed it. But soon resentments against the Mainlanders arose. While the Japanese did not leave much space for political participation, the government under the Kuomintang party (KMT, Chinese Nationalist Party) limited it even more. For mainland Chinese the Taiwanese were Japanized and not trustworthy and the official language was suddenly changed to Mandarin, which was not spoken by most Taiwanese. Thus civil services were taken over by Mainlanders and misgovernments through state-run firms and monopolies that the KMT established led to corruption. Further the Mainlanders saw the resources and the infrastructure more as a mean to finance their struggles with the Communists on mainland China and exploited Taiwan. Whole factories and infrastructure were dismantled to be sold in parts to mainland China. This led to high unemployment rates among Taiwanese, crime rates, a drop of agriculture production and high inflation. In 1947 February 28 all the ongoing issues with the Mainlanders led to the infamous 28-2 incident, where a cigarette swoop in which a bystander was shot escalated into an open rebellion. The KMT answered with revenge killings and estimations of deaths are of up to 10,000 (Rigger 1999: 6; Bedford & Hwang 2006: 6-7; Fell 2012: 12-14).

After the KMT lost control of mainland China and the People’s Republic of China (PRC) was officially established in 1949, all of the KMT members, the ROC army and about one to two million Mainlander fled to Taiwan in the time between 1948 and 1950. That amounted to estimation of about 15 to over 25 percent of total population in Taiwan back at that time (Rigger 1999: 6; Fell 2012: 15-15). Martial law was declared in 1949 and would be held upright for about 40 years. During the martial law period demonstrations, strikes and political parties were forbidden. Taiwan was considered as a temporary base of the ROC to retake the mainland. The government that was elected before throughout all of China was transferred to Taiwan. The national level of this government though could not be re-elected, as all of China had to participate in the election. Thus after 1949 the elected officials of the national level were frozen in power (Rigger 1999: 6).

After the 28-2 incident, the Taiwanese became hostile against the Mainlanders and the KMT slowly lost hopes to retake mainland China, and rather feared now to be invaded by PRC. What saved ROC was the Korean War, as the US started backing ROC to ward off the expansion of the Communists in the 1950s (Fell 2012: 15-16). This gave KMT a legitimacy to continue its policies in Taiwan and with the financial helps from the US of about 100 million US dollar until 1964, and with the provided military security as well as the economic advice by the US, Taiwan’s GNP steadily increased with an average growth rate of 8.9 percent from 1951 to 1987 (Fell 2012: 17-18). In the 1970s though the support for ROC throughout the world shifted: the KMT was effected from the UN and official relations were cut with many nations. The KMT again had to find a new reason for legitimacy as well as means to win support within Taiwan now: more Taiwanese were recruited into the party and gradually the KMT liberalized its system under Chiang Kai-shek’s son Chiang Ching-kuo.

The years of the so-called “White Terror” with heavy and hard repressions of dissidents slowly shifted in the 1970s (Rigger 1999: 25) and in the early 1980s under Chiang Ching-kuo, a switch from hard to soft authoritarianism was undertaken. Fell summarizes five points of this switch: (1) Joint Mainlander-Taiwanese technocratic rule; (2) collective party leadership; (3)
elections offered space for new social forces; (4) less frequent use of repression; and (5) more legalistic and less direct repression (Fell 2012: 24). All in all, the KMT slowly liberalized their party system and lessened their authoritarian stance. Martial law finally was lifted in 1987, followed by the resignation of the legislature in 1991 and the first free election in 1992 (Bedford & Hwang 2006: 6-9).

**Political Participation under Martial Law**

After severe repressions in the 1940s, local grassroots elections were allowed in the 1950s. Based on the 1947 ROC constitution, the government consisted of four layers on national and provincial levels. The highest layer was the national, with the president, the national assembly that was elected in 1948 in all of China and the five yuans (legislature yuan, executive yuan, judicial yuan, control yuan, examination yuan). This layer could not be re-elected after 1949 and was frozen in power until 1991. The next layer was the provincial layer, which was overlapping with the national layer after ROC consisted only of Taiwan anymore. Provincial governors and the provincial government was appointed by the president. Further the provincial assembly was started to be directly elected in 1951 and was the highest office to elect in Taiwan. The third layer was the city and county layer with mayors and magistrates. This layer was the level with the most powerful elective execute posts to be elected on Taiwan, with a total of 23 districts. The fourth and lowest level was the grassroots local level, with township and county level city mayors as well as village and neighborhood chiefs (Fell 2012: 18-21).

Since the 1950s all but the national level were open for elections in Taiwan. Even though political parties were forbidden to be established, electoral system on the local level was very competitive. Either the candidates ran under a KMT faction, or they participated in elections as individuals (Fell 2012: 18-21). According to Tien (1996), there were three stages in Taiwan that slowly led to party development and free electoral competition on national level: during the first stage (1947-1971), only at the provincial level electoral competition was possible. Beside the KMT, only two other satellite parties, the Young China Party and the Democratic Socialist Party, existed. Both were founded in mainland China before martial law was erected, and were ally-parties of the KMT. The second stage was from 1972-1985. Establishment of new political parties was still banned, but a few national representative seats were opened to be elected. The third stage beginning in 1986 was the start of a real competitive and liberalized system. Opposition parties were allowed and elections to all levels were opened. The first open elections were held in 1992, and since 1996 the president is elected directly (Tien 1996: 5).

**5.2. Overview of Political Parties and Party System in Taiwan**

Since the year 1894, which corresponds with the founding year of the KMT, there have been a total of 271 registered parties (stand 22.05.2015), most of them founded after 1987 (Department of Civil Affairs 2015). As Fell (2005: 215) notes, it is not feasible to analyze the sheer of amount of officially registered parties, but rather the most important (i.e. the relevant) parties should only be put under consideration here. I follow Fell’s criterion for relevant parties on the whole here, though the Non-Partisan Solidarity Union (NPSU) will be included, even if it only is an alliance and not a party strictly spoken. Still if any alliance reached a significant amount of
numbers to be represented in the Legislative Yuan, it will be of relevance here. In total there are nine parties of importance according to Fell, and I further include one more, so in all 10 parties: Kuomintang (KMT) and DPP (Democratic Progressive Party) as the old and dominant parties. Then the new parties: Taiwan Independence Party (TIP), the Taiwan Solidarity Union (TSU), New Party (NP), People First Party (PFP), Labor Party (LP), Green Party (GP), Chinese Social Democratic Party (CSDP), and Non-Partisan Solidarity Union (NPSU).

From a Western point of view, parties usually are found on a left-right axis. This though is rather difficult to transfer to Taiwan. Fell (2005: 216; 2012: 135) thus defined a different way to place Taiwanese parties on a left-right spectrum. Important here is the position a parties takes on the national identity issue, the most salient issue dimension in Taiwan. So the four main positions on the national identity issues are:

1. Far left: Ethnic Taiwanese nationalism
2. Center left: Civic Taiwanese nationalism
3. Center right: ROC Chinese nationalism
4. Far right: PRC or Greater Chinese nationalism

The far left parties favor the exclusion of Mainlanders and non-Taiwanese speakers and want immediate independence. The center left parties are opposed to unification as they consider Taiwan as quasi-independent. Further all citizens are equally Taiwanese. The center right parties oppose independence but remain vague on the unification topic. They emphasize that all citizens are equal but they should be loyal to ROC instead of Taiwan. The Far right parties are in favor of a rapid PRC unification (Fell 2012: 135).

The “old” Parties
Starting with the old parties, in other words parties established before the termination of martial law in 1987, there are the Kuomintang (KMT) and the Democratic Progressive Party (DPP). The KMT was already partly introduced in the historical overview of Taiwan. It was founded in 1894 in mainland China, with the founding father Sun Yat-sen. The KMT exercised full authoritarian control over Taiwan after 1947 and only gradually started to liberalize and democratize Taiwan. The KMT’s plan was to retake China with Taiwan as its base, though it gradually had to shift towards a position that would legitimize their power when international relations started to crumble in the 1970s. Hence it started to adopt a more open approach towards the China issue and gradually relaxed their authoritarian rule, even though Taiwan remained a one-party state until 1987. The KMT is further considered as one of the richest parties of the world, as during the martial law period, all major businesses were controlled (either directly or indirectly) by the KMT. This remains an issue even nowadays, as campaigning in Taiwan is among the most expensive in the world and new parties cannot compete with the KMT financially wise (Fell 2005: 231-231). After the lift of martial law, the KMT stayed the strongest party, though it gradually declined in power. Reasons for their decline in the 1990s and early 2000s were bad public image (Lin 2006: 38) and several splits from the party, though after the second half of the 2000s, they gained back their political power. On the political spectrum they can be placed as center right at the moment.
The DPP was first illegally founded in 1986. It emerged from the political protest movement tangwai (literally meaning outside the party) that was mostly active in the 1970s and 1980s. First it was the only opposition party, and only slowly other parties followed in the late 1980s and early 1990s. Still it proved to be the only one to gain the most public support and became the second strongest party in Taiwan. While first the DPP was quite extreme on their stance on independence, it became more moderate in the 1990s (Fell 2012: 86). In 2000 and 2004 the DPP held the president with Chen Shui-bian, though afterwards it started to struggle with the new electoral system and lost a significant amount of legislative seats (Chi 2014: 675). The DPP can be placed as center left now.

The “new” Parties
The Labor Party was founded in 1987 and was a split from the DPP. It took one legislative seat when the members left the DPP, though in the next election the LP was not re-elected into the Legislative Yuan. The founder Wang Yi-hsiung wanted the DPP to focus more on labor issues, which led to the formation of the new party in the end. It was ideological divided though and soon members left the party. The party managed to win only one seat in the Kaoshiung City Council and became irrelevant after 1991. It still exists though it ceased to participate in elections (Fell 2005: 220-221). They favor gradual unification but insist on Taiwan’s autonomy (Labor Party 2010). Thus the LP can be placed on rather right.

The next shortly relevant party was another split from the DPP: the Chinese Social Democratic Party (CSDP). It was formed in 1990 by Chu Kao-cheng, a legislator and founding member of the DPP. He left the DPP when it became increasingly radical in their position of Taiwan’s independence. While the CSDP was more ambitious in elections than the LP, it still failed miserably and only Chu himself won a seat in 1992 (Fell 2005: 222-223). On the political spectrum the party was rather rightist.

Another new party emerged by 1993: this time it was a split from the KMT. After internal divisions of the DPP, the two major factions reached a compromise and agreed to put Taiwan’s independence on the party’s Charta. This saved the DPP from a further divisions and led to a rough balance of power between the factions, but forced the KMT to also take a stance in this matter. The two main factions within the KMT struggled for power and a clear position on the national identity issue. The non-mainstream faction of the KMT wanted to take legal actions against the DPP for officially voicing territorial independence which was forbidden back then, but the mainstream faction only amended the constitution. Further internal power struggles finally led to a split from the party and to the formation of the New Party (NP) (Cheng & Hsu 1996: 151-152). Later in the same year the CSDP merged with the NP. Soon the NP became a significant political actor and the third largest party. But internally it was greatly divided and became more extreme in the late 1990s. To remain relevant it started to ally with the KMT in the 2000s (Fell 2005: 223-224). The NP is rather a far rightist party.

In the second half of the 1990s the DPP became less radical in their position of Taiwanese independence leading to dissatisfaction in the party and another party split in 1996 led to the formation of the Taiwan Independence Party (TIP). TIP was also quite ambitious but managed to win only one seat in the 1998 legislative election and failed to win any seats in the 1998 Kaoshiung City Council Election and never recovered from the loss. The party can be placed as rather left wing (Fell 2005: 224-225).
The last party founded in the 1990s was the Green Party in 1996. Founder was the anti-nuclear activist Kao Cheng-ya, who was not satisfied with the DPP’s position on ecological issues. After some minor success in the beginning, the party could not achieve to win any seats after 1996 (Fell 2005: 225), though in 2012 it was the largest extra parliamentary party with 1.7 percent of received votes and managed to win two seats in local elections in 2014, marking that year as the party’s most successful since formation (Focus Taiwan 2014). Beside the NP, no other party founded in the 1990s except the GP managed to win elections after their initial success. On the political spectrum the party is rather pro-independence and center left.

From 2000 to 2004 several new parties were formed, all of them quite successful. The first was the People First Party (PFP), founded by Soong Chu-yu (James Soong), a popular politician from the KMT that narrowly failed to win presidency in 2000. The PFP also attracted many members of the NP. It soon replaced the NP after 2001 and became the third largest party for some time. Shortly it even appeared as if the PFP would outrun the KMT and become second strongest party (Fell 2005: 225), but lost most of their seats in the following elections. The PFP favors unification and is rather a rightist party.

The next party founded after the presidential election of 2000 was the Taiwan Solidarity Union (TSU). After former president and head of the KMT Lee Teng-hui left the party in 2000, his faction was not satisfied with the new direction of the KMT and with the new Party Leader Lien Chan. The TSU thus was founded around Lee and soon replaced the TIP as leftist party. It attracted members of all major political parties, including the KMT and the DPP. It was rather on the DPP’s side, though remained still critical about the DPP. The TSU became the most successful new left-wing party, though similar to the PFP they soon lost public support (Fell 2005: 225-226). Still the TSU and PFP are the most relevant third parties up to now.

The Non-Partisan Solidarity Union (NPSU) is not a party per se but a loose formation of political actors under a unified front. It was founded in 2004 by ten legislators and their motto was “speaking for the disadvantage”. The NPSU is not aligned with any of the major camps (DPP or KMT). It favors independence and a de jure Republic of Taiwan (Ministry of Foreign Affairs Taiwan 2013), thus it is rather left-center.

**Camps in the Taiwanese Party System**

As becomes obvious with the policy alignment and party splits, there are two general positions a party takes in Taiwan: either the party is from the left-wing and rather supports independence and a Republic of Taiwan to some extent, or the party is right-wing and favors unification with mainland China. In the early 2000s two larger parties (PFP and TSU) were formed out of the established old parties, and together with the NP and the NPSU, a strong centrifugal force seemed to be at work in the Taiwanese party system leading to greater fragmentation of the party system. At the same time two major alliances started to be built: Pan-Blue Coalition (KMT, NP and PFP) which favors unification with China, and the Pan-Green Coalition (DPP and TSU) which focuses more on Taiwan’s independence (Hsu 2006: 9). Hsu sees several advantages for parties to form alliances: due to lesser changes of a majority government with more parties competing, alliances decrease the uncertainty and ambiguity after elections when forming the government. Further investments and resources of campaigns are better protected and larger camps increase the mobilization of the electorate (Hsu 2006: 10). Camp alliances will play a bigger role in the 2000s and still divide Taiwan’s political arena nowadays.
5.3. Empirical Part 1: Electoral Systems

Similar to Japan, in Taiwan the SNTV system was said to be the cause of personality-based voting that caused more radical messages with no regards to win over median voters, and further causing intra-party competition, factionalism and corruption. In general the effect of the change of electoral system according to Göbel should change the problems linked with SNTV in the future (Göbel 2012: 75). Further the popular opinion was also negative of the electoral system, and voters especially asked for a reduction of the size of the legislature. At the same time the larger parties KMT and DPP hoped to gain an advantage by changing the electoral system to one that rather favors larger parties. Especially the DPP was a driving force in the electoral reform as they thought they would have better changes to increase their vote share under a more majoritarian system (Chi 2014: 664-666). Predictions before the first Legislative Yuan (LY) election of 2008 were the emergence of a two-party system, reduction of effective numbers of parties, more party consolidation, less party diversity, lower prospects for smaller parties to be represented in the LY and a lower proportionality (Stockton 2010: 25). Considering the relatively similar electoral systems of Japan and Taiwan both before and after the reform, the effects of the electoral system change should be similar in both countries. This also is in accordance with the predictions before the 2008 LY elections. Therefore mechanical and psychological factors of Duverger's law and hypothesis should also occur in Taiwan, similar to Japan’s case, with the PR system undercutting the SMD component to a certain extent.

But while the electoral systems before and after the change are very similar, various differences may also bear an influence on the effect of the electoral system change. These differences include the national identity cleavage and the semi-presidential system. Further after the period of service of the LY was changed from three to four years in 2005, an unusual electoral cycle was the result. The presidential and the LY elections are both on the same day now, so it is quite possible now that one party wins both elections (Lin 2006: 28). Additional small aberrations in the electoral system from the one in Japan may also have an effect on the outcome of elections.

In this chapter I want to focus mainly on Taiwan and the effect the electoral system change has on effective number of parties, in regards of a possible emergence of a two-party system and disproportionality. Further the advantage profiles of the SNTV and the MMM systems may show certain particularities of the Taiwanese electoral systems. The institutional aberrations and additional explanations for establishment and change of the party system under the electoral systems will be looked at later on. Electoral data from 1992 to 2012 is taken from the Election Study Center of the National Chengchi University (2015).

5.3.1. SNTV System and MMM System in Taiwan

The SNTV system starting in 1992 was not a pure SNTV system, but had a PR component both nationwide (30 seats) and for overseas Chinese (6 seats). The two sets of PR seats were distributed to parties based on their district vote share, using d'Hondt (refer to page 14) (Fell 2012: 61). Further 6 seats were elected in SNTV style but were reserved for aboriginals. So of the total 161 seats, 117 seats (or 72.7 percent of the seats) were elected through SNTV, making

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3 Calculations by Author unless otherwise stated; for methods of calculation refer to chapter 2.5 and chapter 2.7. Data source: Fell 2012: 61; Taiwan Documents 2005; Hsieh 1996: 196; Chi 2014: 643
it the main component of the electoral system. In 1995 the legislature size was slightly increased to 164 seats, and the SNTV part made up 122 seats or 74.4 percent.

From 1998 to 2004, the size of the legislature was 225 seats. The district magnitudes ranged from 1 to 16 seats in 1992 and 1 to 28 seats in 2004. That is an average M of 4.31 in 1992 and 4.41 in 2004, aboriginal seats included. 168 seats were elected through SNTV (74.4 percent), 41 seats by nationwide PR bloc and 8 seats were reserved for overseas Chinese (through PR), the same way as before. Further 8 seats were reserved for aboriginals (SNTV). During the time from 1992 to 2004 thus SNTV was the main component of the electoral system. Furthermore the terms of the legislature were 3 years, while the presidential term was 4 years (Taiwan Documents 2005; Hsieh 1996: 196).

As part of the electoral reform, the size of the legislature was drastically reduced to 113 seats in 2008. Now 73 seats are elected through SMD (64 percent), 34 seats by a nationwide PR bloc, and 6 seats are still reserved for aboriginals by the use of the old SNTV system. The percentage of the PR component was increased from an average of 22 percent to 30 percent. Further the term is now 4 years long and elections are held simultaneously with the presidential election. An important difference to the Japanese MMM system is, that SMD and PR bloc are separated. Candidacy in both components is not possible in Taiwan (Chi 2014: 643).

The legal threshold for the PR bloc before and after the reform is 5 percent and can be considered relatively high (Jou 2009: 762-765; Stockton 2010: 24). It is higher than the effective threshold of the PR bloc under both systems. The effective threshold of the PR bloc varies between 2.3 and 1.78 percent between 1992 and 2008. The effective threshold is rather difficult to pinpoint under the SNTV as district magnitude varies a lot. Under SNTV the average effective threshold is between 14.1 percent (1992) and 10.6 percent (2004). The approximation of the average nationwide effective threshold lays between 2.3 (1992) and 1.7 (2004). But due to the huge variations in district sizes, the effective threshold on district level is actually between 37.5 percent (SMD) and 2.6 percent (28-seats district since 1998). Further depending on the vote allocation in each district the actual threshold may also be very different under SNTV.

Under the new MMM system the effective threshold of the SMD districts is 37.5 percent and the nationwide approximation of the effective threshold 2.8 percent. The 6 aboriginal seats elected under SNTV have an effective threshold of 15.3 percent. In total the effective threshold increased under the new MMM system and should make it more difficult for smaller parties to gain representation in the LY.

5.3.2. The Number of Parties
The effective numbers of legislative parties (refer to chapter 2.4) in Taiwan from 1992 to 2012 are shown in table 5.1. The year 1992 marked the first openly competitive election of the LY after the abolishment of martial law. By that time the KMT and the DPP as the “old” parties were the only established parties and gained the most votes. Even though two other parties are considered of relevance for that election according to Fell (2005), the LP did not win any seat and the CSDP achieved to win only one seat. The largest third party in 1992 might be considered to be the individual candidates, as in total they won 14 seats. The establishment of third parties took most of the 1990s, as can be seen in the only slight increase of effective number of parties during that time. In that period the NP, the TIP and the Green Party were founded, the two
former ones splinter parties from the KMT. Only the NP stayed of relevance, as the Green Party did not manage to win any seats in LY until now and the TIP only gained representative in LY in 1998. Further in that year, the highest number of parties so far were represented in the LY, in total 7 parties and additional individual candidates. But beside the NP, none of the other parties gained a significant amount of seats. In 2001 in total less parties were represented in the LY, but the third parties gained more votes and thus seats than before. Two new parties (TSU and PFP) had been founded before that election, all being of relevance up until now. Several scholars (Hsieh 1996; Hsieh & Niemi 1999) had predicted the emergence of a multiparty system in Taiwan, which was achieved in the early 2000s. In 2001 and 2004 the effective numbers of parties are well above three, reflecting the emergence of a multiparty system and the growing strength of third parties.

Table 5.1. Effectives Number of Legislative Parties in Taiwan, 1992-2012

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year of Election</th>
<th>Under SNTV System (seats total)</th>
<th>Year of Election</th>
<th>Under MMM System (seats total)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1992</td>
<td>2.19</td>
<td>2008</td>
<td>1.75</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1995</td>
<td>2.54</td>
<td>2012</td>
<td>2.23</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1998</td>
<td>2.49</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2001</td>
<td>3.49</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2004</td>
<td>3.26</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Calculated by Author

During this time the two political camps pan-blue (pro-unification) and pan-green (pro-independence) were formed. Highly competitive elections further deepened the split between the two camps, as well as the second period of Chen Shui-bian’s presidential term from 2004 to 2008. Public opinion about Chen’s governmental ability went downhill and the DPP were considered as extremely corrupt (Kuo & Yeh 2015: 250). Furthermore while the population called for electoral reform as punishment for bad government in the early 2000s, the actual knowledge about the new electoral system in the populace is rather low (Rich 2014: 48). There may be many more possible explanation, but the outcome was a drastic reduction of the number of legislative parties in the 2008 LY under the new electoral system. While a reduction of parties was predicted, the actual results of the election were surprising. The effective number of legislative parties in 2008 actually decreased to under two. In this election the KMT won the super-majority, the DPP performed worse than expected and third parties hardly managed to win any seats at all. The PFP had performed quite well in the elections of 2001 and 2004 and had become the third largest party, suddenly faced many internal issues before the 2008 elections and actually collapsed before it. Hence it was only running in one district and in one aboriginal SNTV district. The NPSU collaborated with KMT, therefore run in only 4 districts. The TSU also campaigned in only a few districts, but completely failed to win any seats (Stockton 2010: 28). This is an additional explanation for the extreme figure of 2008: smaller parties either had internal conflicts, campaigned in relatively few districts or collaborated with KMT and therefore running their candidates under KMT. Further the pan-blue camp fared much better in this election as the parties cooperated more than the pan-green camp. The figure of the effective number of legislative parties goes up again in the election of
In the election of 2012, the DPP managed to win more seats than in 2008, and other smaller parties too fared better than before. This time the pan-green camp cooperated more, and smaller parties made more use of the PR bloc (Fell 2014: 23-24).

Table 5.2. Percentage of seats of the two largest parties, 1992 - 2012

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year of Election</th>
<th>Largest Party</th>
<th>Second largest Party</th>
<th>Combined seats of two the largest parties</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1992</td>
<td>KMT 59%</td>
<td>DPP 31.7%</td>
<td>90.7%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1995</td>
<td>KMT 51.8%</td>
<td>DPP 32.9%</td>
<td>84.7%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1998</td>
<td>KMT 55.6%</td>
<td>DPP 31.1%</td>
<td>86.7%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2001</td>
<td>DPP 38.7%</td>
<td>KMT 30.2%</td>
<td>68.9%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2004</td>
<td>DPP 39.6%</td>
<td>KMT 35.1%</td>
<td>74.7%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2008</td>
<td>KMT 71.7%</td>
<td>DPP 23.9%</td>
<td>95.6%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2012</td>
<td>KMT 56.6%</td>
<td>DPP 35.4%</td>
<td>92%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Grey: SNTV System; Dark Grey: DPP largest party
Source: Calculated by Author

Table 5.2 is showing the seat percentage of the two largest parties separately and combined from 1992 – 2012. In the 1990s, the KMT was still able to easily maintain their majority in LY, and the DPP stayed around 30 percent. Then in the elections of 2001 and 2004 the KMT became only the second largest party, the first place taken by the DPP. The KMT lost about 20 percent in both elections compared to the 1990s and the DPP gained 8 percent. When looking at the combined seat share of the two largest parties, it shows that their seat share decreased over the years from 1995 to 2004. In the election of 2008, the new system was most advantageous for the KMT, as it reached 71.7 percent, twice as much as in 2004. The DPP lost over 10 percent compared to 2004, marking it their worst performance since 1992. The figures of the combined seat share in 2008 and 2012 are now higher than in the 1990s. In the election of 2012, the DPP managed to return to the same seat percentage as of the 1990s, which was about 30 percent. The KMT lost about 15 percent compared to 2008. Looking at the result of the two largest parties in 2012, they are very similar to the results of the 1990s. Hence a future alternation of governing power still seems to be in the range of possibilities from the current outlook.

The extreme election results of 2008 and the slightly normalized results of 2012 could imply that besides the KMT, the parties as well as the voters needed some time to start adjusting to the new system. Further the threshold of the parallel system is higher than under the SNTV, which is of serious consequence for smaller parties. And in Taiwan there is only one nationwide PR bloc, so dual candidacy is not a possibility. Thus it seems that the higher effective threshold is suppressing the effective number of legislative parties, and the nationwide PR bloc without dual candidacy is suppressing the effective number of elective parties (Jou 2009: 765).

The effective numbers of elective and legislative parties are shown in table 5.3. The figures show that under both SMD and PR component the number of elective and legislative parties were drastically reduced in the election of 2008. As Jou points out, voters seemed to have voted mostly for the two major parties, with no regard of established smaller parties or new smaller parties (Jou 2009: 769). It could be reasoned that not only the parties per se but also the voters did not adapt to the new electoral system in 2008 yet, or did not manage to
distinguish between the two components that well. This is most likely in accordance with the low knowledge of the new MMM in the population (Rich 2014: 48). Further the disparity between votes and seats further does not seem that drastically different in 2008 than from the SNTV system the years before. It is striking though that both SMD (S) and PR (S) figures in 2008 are below two, therefore below the two-party system according to Duverger’s law.

Especially the PR component was supposed to undercut the mechanical factor, and increase the number of parties. While the PR (V) figure is slightly bigger than the SMD (V) and both above two, the mechanical factor well reduced the number of legislative parties of both SMD and PR components to below two. In 2012 the general trend of a strong mechanical factor can be seen again, but the reduction from numbers of elective to legislative parties was not as extreme as in 2008. Interestingly, the PR component here is more reductive than the SMD component, hinting that many smaller parties did not overcome the 5 percent threshold. Still in 2012 smaller parties concentrated their efforts more on the PR component, as it becomes obvious when looking where the smaller parties won seats: the TSU won only seats in the PR bloc and the PFP won most of their seats there. It seems that for smaller parties the PR bloc and the aboriginal SNTV component are their only way to gain seats in the LY now. Furthermore voters as well as parties may have started to understand and adapt to the new system.

Table 5.3. Effective Numbers of Elective and Legislative Parties in Taiwan, 1992-2012

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year of Election</th>
<th>SNTV (V)</th>
<th>SNTV (S)</th>
<th>SMD (V)</th>
<th>SMD (S)</th>
<th>PR (V)</th>
<th>PR (S)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1992</td>
<td>2.48</td>
<td>2.19</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1995</td>
<td>2.89</td>
<td>2.54</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1998</td>
<td>3.34</td>
<td>2.49</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2001</td>
<td>4.11</td>
<td>3.47</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2004</td>
<td>3.76</td>
<td>3.26</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2008</td>
<td>2.3</td>
<td>1.6</td>
<td>2.49</td>
<td>1.94</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2012</td>
<td>2.32</td>
<td>2.0</td>
<td>3.04</td>
<td>2.64</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

V = Votes = elective; S = Seats = legislative  
Source: Calculated by Author

5.3.3. Fractionalization

In graph 5.1 the fractionalization of votes and seats (refer to chapter 2.4) are shown, as well as the degree of defractionalization of the LY. Under the SNTV system, the fractionalization of votes and seats slightly increased, which reflects the increase of the number of both elective and legislative parties. From 1992 to 2004, the degree of defractionalization in the LY remained roughly the same, with a value of slightly over one. Thus the mechanical factor of translating votes into seats caused a small defractionalization under the SNTV, but it remained a relatively stable factor. This points at a more or less stable relative proportional electoral system. The extreme outcomes of the 2008 then show that the new MMM system had a drastic effect on both elective and legislative parties. But here especially the mechanical reduction under the new system from votes to seats becomes visible. In 2012 the outcome was less drastic, but the defractionalization effect still is greater than under the SNTV system. Hence the MMM may be less proportional and less advantageous to smaller parties than the SNTV system was. In the
next part, the proportionality of the two electoral systems will be compared, so this may give some concrete answers.

**Graph 5.1. Fractionalization of the Electoral Systems in Taiwan 1992-2012**

5.3.4. Proportionality

To highlight the (dis)proportionality of the MMM system, the seat and vote share (graph 5.2.) of the DPP since 1992 is a good example. While the DPP managed to increase their percentage of LY seats in the 2001 and 2004 to about 40 percent, it drastically fell to under 24 percent in 2008. In 2012 it increased again to about 35 percent, but still it is not at the level as before the electoral reform. Especially in the 2008 LY election the DPP was perceived as the huge loser of the LY election (O’Neill 2012). The reason could be either that the DPP lost tremendous amounts of voters’ support or that the new electoral system is quite disproportional.

As graph 5.2 shows, the DPP actually increased their vote share in 2008 and 2012, reaching their highest vote share ever with 39.2 percent in 2012. O’Neill (2012: 169-171) points out that mainly the change of the electoral rules and the worse cooperation of the pan-green camp led to the drastic decrease of seat-share of the DPP under the new MMM system. Thus the disproportionality is having a great effect on the outcome of LY elections since 2008 as was already hinted at in the defractionalization section above. This also becomes clearer when looking at graph 5.3. Here the seat-vote ratios (refer to page 19) of the two largest parties KMT and DPP from 1992 to 2012 are shown. Under the SNTV system the ratio clearly shows an advantage for the larger party: KMT until 1998, then the DPP in 2001 and 2004 gained more seats than votes. With the new MMM system in 2008 the outcome is very obviously disadvantageous for the DPP: they lost about 36 percent of the seats in comparison with their
vote share. The KMT instead gained about 38 percent more seats in comparison with their vote share. In 2012 the effect was less drastic but still well above the rates under the SNTV system.

**Graph 5.2.** Vote and Seat Share of the DPP in the LY, 1992-2012

![Graph 5.2](image)

Source: Author

**Graph 5.3.** Taiwan Vote-Seat Ratio of the two largest Parties

![Graph 5.3](image)

Source: Author

This all reflects the increased disproportionality of the new MMM system. When comparing SNTV, SMD and PR components separately in regards of disproportionality, the result should be that PR is the most proportional and SMD the least, with SNTV in the middle. Table 5.4 shows the disproportionality split up accordingly to SNTV, SMD, PR and overall SMD/PR using the Gallagher Index (refer to page 20). The fluctuations of disproportionality under SNTV can be explained due to the nomination and campaigning strategies of the parties. The better votes are allocated among the candidates in the same district and with less over-
nomination or under-nomination of candidates, the more proportionality increases. In 2008 the figures show that the disproportionality of the PR component was not very different than under SNTV. Disparity here can be explained according to Jou, by the higher threshold of 5 percent and the small number of PR seats. Since not many third parties managed to win seats in the election of 2008 (in both SMDs and PR list), the result was quite disproportional (Jou 2009: 771).

In case of SMDs, the explanation for the exorbitant disproportionality is, like in Japan, that a party needs quite a high percentage of votes to reach an accordingly proportional seat allocation. This and in accordance with the relatively high effective threshold, put the KMT at a huge advantage in 2008 and gave the party a large seat bonus. More surprisingly is the overall SMD/PR figure of 2012, as it is only slightly bigger than under the old SNTV system. It can be explained that since more third parties managed to clear the 5 percent threshold in 2012, the seat bonus for the KMT was less than in 2008. The SMD and the PR component respectively were far less disproportional in 2012 than in 2008. The PR component in 2012 actually reflects that of all three components it is the most proportional. Further SMD in 2012 still is far more disproportional than SNTV. As in the case of Japan, the SMD/PR system is mainly putting the larger parties at an advantage here. The bigger hurdle for the smaller parties under the new system though should give them more incentives for mergers and alliances than in Japan (Jou 2009: 771).

Table 5.4. Disproportionality (Gallagher Index), LY Elections 1992 – 2012

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year of Election</th>
<th>SNTV</th>
<th>Year of Election</th>
<th>SMD</th>
<th>PR</th>
<th>Overall SMD/PR</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1992</td>
<td>7.15</td>
<td>2008</td>
<td>22.79</td>
<td>7.30</td>
<td>16.89</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1998</td>
<td>7.41</td>
<td>2004</td>
<td>5.71</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>4.78</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Calculated by Author

5.3.5. Advantage Profile

In graph 5.4 the advantage profile (refer to page 19) of the SNTV system in Taiwan is shown. It can be grouped as a wide scatter profile. Mostly this profile is distinguished from the others by the unpredictability of advantage ratios especially with lower vote shares of the range of under 10 to 20 percent. Explanations for wide scatter profiles can be electoral system itself (though they greatly vary in this group) and a not established and/or not stable party system (Taagepera & Laakso 1980: 440-442). When looking at possible explanations in the SNTV system in Taiwan, two factors may have led to the unpredictable advantage ratio under 10 percent: very large district magnitude and aboriginal SNTV seats. The largest district magnitude is 28, leading to an effective threshold of only 2.6 percent in that district. If now the votes are not well allocated among candidates, the threshold might become even lower. For aboriginal seats less than 10.000 votes could suffice to get elected. Thus in both cases a small party or independent candidate may rather easily win a seat with a very low percentage of votes. At the
same time, if a party nominates many candidates in many districts, those may not get elected even if they gain quite a significant amount of votes in total. Thus the SNTV in Taiwan with the particular feature of large district magnitude and SNTV seats reserved for aboriginals can lead to unpredictable outcomes in terms of vote-seat ratio. Further the democratization process and the establishment of the party system only started in 1992 with the first open LY elections. While the KMT and the DPP remained the largest parties over the years, there were quite some party realignments among the third parties. The SNTV system with partly quite large district magnitude as well as quite efficient nomination strategies of the two largest (for example Cox 1994; Tsai 2005; Hsieh 1996) parties may also explain the near perfect ratio with a vote share of over 15 percent. Neither the KMT nor the DPP were especially advantaged or disadvantaged with their higher vote shares under the SNTV system.

Graph 5.4. Advantage Profile under the SNTV System from 1992 - 2004

The next graph 5.5 shows the advantage profile under the new MMM system. While only two elections were held under this new system, with the first election in 2008 as probably rather irregular (due to learning process of parties and voters and other reasons), it is still possible to illustrate two trends in this new system. This profile is a scatter profile as well: in the range of zero to 2 percent of the votes, the ratio is as unpredictable as in SNTV system with a vote share of less than 15 percent. Now the range of unpredictable advantage ratios correlates
with a lower vote share than before. The reason for this is once again the aboriginal SNTV seats that were carried over to the new MMM system. Especially the example of the PFP in 2008 highlights this: their advantage ratio is 45 in this election. This is not included in this profile as it would distort the graph too much. The PFP achieved this high seat advantage as they won one aboriginal seat with just 0.01 percent of the total votes. The SMD component makes it very difficult for smaller parties to gain seats. Their last resort to remain politically relevant is either to cooperate with DPP or KMT and let their candidates run under them, and/or hope to overcome the 5 percent threshold of the PR component. Third parties started to make use of the PR component more in the 2012 elections, and PFP and TSU won seats through PR in that election. Still the advantage for the largest party is especially pronounced in the new MMM system. Only the KMT with over 45 percent got a seat bonus. Parties with a vote share of 2 to 40 percent are very disadvantaged now.

**Graph 5.5. Advantage Profile under the MMM System, 2008-2012**

To sum up, both under the SNTV and the MMM system irregular advantage ratios in the lower vote shares are enabled. The reason under SNTV are the aboriginal SNTV seats and the partly very large district magnitudes. Under the MMM system, the unpredictable advantage ratio is only given in the very low vote ranges of up to 2 percent. Again this is caused by the SNTV aboriginal seats. But while under SNTV no particular seat advantages or disadvantages were given to parties over 15 percent, all parties within the 2 to 40 percent vote range are extremely disadvantaged under MMM and only the KMT with above 40 percent of the vote share profited from the new system so far.
5.3.6. Summary of Empirical Part 1

In this chapter the electoral systems of Taiwan before and after the reform were empirically analyzed in regards of Duverger’s law and hypothesis as well as the predictions made by various scholars before the elections of 2008. In 1992, the first open LY elections under SNTV system resulted in a two-party system with one dominant party, the KMT. From then on new parties were formed in the 1990s and early 2000s, continually increasing the effective number of parties well above three. As explained in the SNTV chapter, the SNTV system both enables the emergence and maintenance of a dominant one-party system, as well as a multiparty system. While the one-party system was continued from the martial law period up into the 1990s, the predictions of scholars (like Hsieh & Niemi 1996) in the 1990s came true and Taiwan became a multiparty system in the 2000s. This was enabled by (depending on districts) a relative low effective threshold, aboriginal SNTV seats and a quite proportional vote-seat ratio above a vote share of 15 percent. Another big hurdle in the process of democratization as well as government-ability that was overcome in the 2000s was the change of government power in 2001 and 2004, where the DPP provided the president and became the largest party in LY.

The electoral reform pushed by the DPP in the early 2000s led to the introduction of the MMM system, a system very similar to the new Japanese electoral system. One particularity of the old SNTV though was held upright: the aboriginal SNTV seats. This still causes unpredictable advantage ratios in the low vote ranges of around 2 percent. But beside this, the new system makes it extremely difficult for third parties to remain political relevant in the LY. The effective threshold increased immensely, as well as the disproportionality and the legal threshold of the PR bloc is relatively high. In fact the only party benefitting from the new system so far is the KMT. Parties with a vote share of under 40 percent are disadvantaged now, basically meaning that the electoral reform pushed by the DPP in order to boost their LY seat percentage actually backfired so far. While the DPP’s vote share increased in 2008 and 2012, their seat share decreased extremely.

The 2008 elections were a surprise to many: while the return to a two-party system was predicted, the actual outcome was a party system with an effective number of parties under two. But the 2008 elections might have been only an irregular exception, due to learning process, lack of knowledge, internal issues of some of the parties, low public opinion about some parties and so on. In 2012, the outcomes approximated more to the actual predictions. In total the trend shows a party system that is more similar to the one in the 1990s: a two-party system and third parties with a very low seat share in LY. The PR bloc of the MMM system was predicted to undercut the SMD component somewhat, but either the PR bloc’s percentage of seats is too small to have a more significant effect on the outcome, or the third parties are only starting to learn how to effectively campaign and nominate in the new system. Either way, the new MMM system is highly disadvantageous for smaller parties, making it difficult for them to remain relevant.
5.4. Empirical Part 2: Societal & Party System Developments

5.4.1. Issue Dimensions

In the previous chapters it was presumed that national identity is of high salience in political environment in Taiwan. Fell (2012) even positioned parties on a right-left axis depending on their political position on this topic. In the early 2000s the political split between the pan-blue and pan-green camps started to form. This all hinds towards a very significant issue dimension in Taiwan. But yet, issue dimensions are said to have formed in the period before World War 2. In the case of Taiwan though, political participation and freedom was highly limited, first under Japanese colony time and then under the KMT’s martial law rule. Thus no issue dimensions could really evolve before World War 2, and afterwards only one became of salience until the democratization processes started in the late 1980s.

As was pointed out in the historical overview of Taiwan, the KMT and its supporters had to move from mainland China to Taiwan in the late 1940s. When the minority mainland Chinese took over power in Taiwan and declared martial law, while the majority Taiwanese and aboriginals were discriminated against, an ethnic dimension issue developed. The differentiation between Taiwanese and Mainlanders is that Taiwanese are Chinese that moved to Taiwan several hundred years ago, while Mainlanders arrived only after World War 2. The Taiwanese are further divided into Minnan (from Southern Fujian province) and Hakka (eastern Guangdong province), both groups representing about 80 percent of the population now. And there is also a small group of aborigines of Malay stock (about 2 percent of population) (Hsieh 2008: 11-12). The ethnic dimension was further foiled by severe repression and especially the 28-2 incident. Only gradually Taiwanese were allowed into the KMT and to positions of power, though by the 1980s, Lee Teng-hui became the first Taiwanese leader of the KMT, and was president until 2000. The ethnic dimension played a more salient role in the martial law period, but it started to decline as democratization progressed. It was mirrored in the protest movement tangwai, out of which the DPP was formed later (Cheng & Hsu 1996: 139). But the DPP was also supported by Mainlanders in the 1980s (Fell 2012: 136-137), and a gradual shift from an ethnic to a national identity issue dimensions was seen from the late 1980s to the early 1990s. Many scholars see the ethnic issue dimension as a rather subliminal issue now that is often related to other issue dimensions, but not necessarily the most salient. Furthermore social-cultural differences between Taiwanese and Mainlanders are not great anymore, as due education and intermarriages lines were blurred over the years (Hsieh 2008: 12-13).

Thus due to severe repression of democracy during martial law, beside ethnic issues no other issues emerged before the late 1970s up to the early 1980s. Only then a slow process of democratization and relaxing of martial law enabled the formation of other issues. Wu (2013: 2-5) sees two emergent issue dimensions in the initial stage of democratization in the 1980s and early 1990s: class cleavage and national identity. Both of them could have become the salient issue in Taiwan’s party system (Wu 2013: 2; Cheng & Hsu 1996: 141). Further by looking at campaign issues in the early 1990s the following policy issues appeared: land reform, corruption, pension plan, national identity, social/political stability and economy (Fell 2012: 87; Cheng & Hsu 1996: 170-171; Hsieh & Niou 1996). Hsieh and Niou group them into four positional issues (economy, national identity, environment and social stability) and two valence issues (local public work and corruption) (1996: 221). The economy dimension was new in the early 1990s and represented the class cleavage that started to become more prominent due to a
starting unequitable income and wealth distribution. National identity started to be of topic in the 1980s, and the DPP turned it into a major issue by taking an official stance towards rapid independence. Environment also was a new issue in the early 1990s as so far Taiwan’s priority was on economic growth which led to severe environmental problems. Social stability, which was mostly important in the 1970s and 1980s, is about democratization and political reform. The valence issues reflect that Taiwanese in general are very concerned about political corruption (Hsieh & Niou 1996: 221-227).

All of the mentioned issues could have become the salient issue in Taiwan’s politics, but issues as land reform were quickly excluded from political talk, corruption issues led to anti-corruption laws like the Sunshine Law and were considered of being taken care of. Social welfare issues were finally both embraced by the DPP and KMT, and no leftist parties of relevance formed. The DPP was more social-democratic oriented than the KMT but both parties had and still have close ties with the economy (Wu 2013: 2-5; Cheng & Hsu 1996: 170-171). Further environmental issues did not become salient, even though a Green Party formed. It was embraced by the DPP and KMT as well, but in the early 1990s the understanding and awareness of environmental issues were relatively low in Taiwan (Hsieh & Niou 1996: 225). At least in the early 1990s, the most salient issue Hsieh and Niou (1996: 228) find is political stability. Still national identity “remained a factor affecting voters’ choices over political parties despite the fact that very few candidates campaigned on that issue” and the majority of Taiwanese preferred to “play down the importance of national identity issue” (Hsieh & Niou 1996: 235). This is also in correspondence with Fell’s finding several years later: he writes that national identity is the most studied topic in Taiwanese political science. And even though it is a salient issue, he still cautions that it may be exaggerated, as voters rank it lower than politicians and electoral scholars think (Fell 2012: 133).

Constitutional revision debates have also been on the political agenda since the 1990s. It became again a serious topic when Taiwan’s independence and rewriting of the constitution were major campaign issues from 2000 to 2008 (Wu 2013: 4-5). The constitution reform issue though is part of the national identity, as the KMT opposes a complete revision of the constitution, while the DPP advocates a new constitution instead of mere amendments. The compromise so far were six constitutional amendments until 2000, changing the Taiwanese democracy from a parliamentarian system towards a semi-presidential system. After 2000, constitutional reforms were blocked by the KMT, with the only exception being the electoral reform in 2005 (Fell 2012: 46-47).

From the middle of the 1990s onwards, national identity was a major issue in Taiwan’s politics, though it remained only domestic until the 2000s. It became an international issue when Chen Shui-bian from the DPP became president in 2000. This marked the first alternation of power in Taiwan and a consolidation of the democratic processes (Copper 2009: 464), but it also resulted in a gridlock of the parliament, as the DPP had no majority there. President Chen preferred to have a minority-government, even if he did not have the support of the legislature (further explanation on page 75). The high competitiveness of the 2000 and 2004 presidential elections further widened the gap between the two camps. Especially in 2004 there was a high use of negative campaigning. So Huang (2011: 428) argues that the gridlock of the LY, the over-competitive elections and the division of the two camps mostly led to the highly negative image the DPP and President Chen had after 2008. The gridlock led to a stagnation of reforms,
and Chen’s weak leadership worsened the perceptions of growing corruption. Ironically, the voters’ perception of corruption under the KMT rule was one of the reasons found for the DPP’s victory in presidential election in 2000. But during Chen’s first period from 2000 to 2004, the voters’ perception of a corrupt DPP already were worse than under KMT rule and only the questionable shooting-accident right before the presidential elections in 2004 are highlighted by the pan-blue camp as the main reason Chen was re-elected (Copper 2009: 474-478; Huang 2011: 420-425). Further President Chen seriously deteriorated cross-strait relations with China and East-Asian stability and affected economic relations by stressing “Taiwanization” and a possible referendum about Taiwan’s independence (Niou 2005: 91-92; Hsieh 2008: 20-21).

After 2008 though there was a shift: in 2008 the KMT with Ma Ying-jeou as presidential candidate focused their electoral campaigns for LY and presidential elections on economy and dropped the national identity issue. The DPP continued their focus on Taiwan identity and stressed social welfare (Fell 2012: 90). The outcome of the elections demonstrate that the KMT captured the public’s opinion far better. There is even speculation of a radical turn after 2008 in politics. Wu (2013: 7-11) sees a shift from national identity to economic priorities. For him there are three reasons: the economic slowdown, exhaustion from identity mobilization and the need to improve cross-strait relations. After Ma Ying-jeou’s landslide victory in 2008, the DPP and its presidential candidate Tsai Ing-wen also turned less vocal on the identity issue and focused more on economy issues. Tsai’s main campaign focus in 2012 was on economy. While Tsai and Ma were both stressing economic issues, Tsai emphasized the downside of Ma’s liberal mainland policy and Ma stressed the need to continue his economic policies. This is according to Wu the beginning of a left-right socioeconomic division and the start of a paradigm shift (Wu 2013: 7-11).

Nevertheless national identity is still a salient issue as it was prominent in the 2012 elections as well, even if toned down (Fell 2014: 31). Furthermore, ethnic issues are subliminal behind other issues and also motivate voters’ in their choice for political parties. For example, Taiwanese still tend to favor pro-independence, while Mainlanders rather would vote for unification. Though the majority of both ethnic groups prefer the status quo, still the national identity weights more in voter affiliation than ethnic background, as Mainlanders that favor pro-independence would rather vote for DPP and the pan-green camp (Hsieh 2008: 14-15). Further the identity issue with the subliminal ethnic issue also reappears in other debates, like the social distribution issues (especially pension system), as some ethnic groups continue to feel discriminated against (Wu 2013: 13).

5.4.2. Polarization of the Party System
In the early 1990s, the political system was highly polarized on many core issues, especially on national identity and constitutional reform. But from the middle of the 1990s to early 2000, both KMT and DPP moved towards the center, though still were very distinctly placed on right and left of each other. During this time they also cooperated on many reforms, like the constitutional reforms (Fell 2012: 86). In the early 2000s, the political camps pan-blue and pan-green formed, pointing at a re-polarization of the party system. While the KMT and the DPP became more and more moderate in their political stance towards national independence and advocated more the status quo, other parties started to form in the 1990s and 2000 to fill the
political space on the far right and far left. The high competitive negative campaigns, Chen’s persistence on a minority government and the gridlock of the LY further have further worsened the polarization since 2000. But while elections remain fierce and hostile on the matter of national identity, they are still peaceful (Hsieh 2008: 20-21). Further as was already mentioned, the national identity issue may start to lose its momentum. So beside a policy shift towards economic issues, a new party was founded in 2015, the Minkuotang. It is a split from the KMT and places itself outside of the pan-blue and pan-green camp division (Liberty Times Net 2015). The MMM system may also bring some degree of de-polarization, as SMD tends to advance median-voter campaigns.

5.4.3. Parliamentary and Semi-Presidential Systems in Taiwan
Taiwan underwent six constitutional amendments in the 1990s that moved the country away from a pure parliamentary system towards a semi-presidential system. This may have some effects on the party system and will be shortly discussed here. The constitution is in part Imperial Chinese, part Western parliamentarian and part presidential system, modeled after the Constitution of the Weimar Republic. It therefore is both parliamentarian and presidential with a focus on the cabinet system, at least in the beginning, with both president and premier (Fell 2012: 44). During President Lee Tung-hui’s time (1988-2000), with the amendments of the Constitution, a major shift was made from more parliamentarian to more presidential, giving the president more powers and reducing the powers of the Legislative Yuan and the premier (Shen 2011: 137).

Government stability depends now on the party system, the relationships between the president and the premier and whether there is a parliamentarian majority. As long as the party from which the president comes from holds a majority, it is a consolidated majority government and stable. When the president does not have the majority but the premier does, then it is a divided majority government. The cabinet is still stable but constitutional operations are uncertain. But when the president and the premier are from the same party which does not hold the majority, then it is a divided government, leading to a gridlock in the parliament (Shen 2011: 140). While the first semi-presidential government in 1997 was a consolidated majority government, the next government in 2000 was a consolidated minority government as the DPP won the presidential elections but was in minority in the Legislative Yuan. This minority government was held upright until 2008 (Shen 2011: 141-142). During this period, the majority of the Legislative Yuan was held by the KMT and it was possible to block for example any reform program by the DPP government (Shih et al. 2012: 317), basically putting the Legislative Yuan in a state of gridlock. In 2008, the KMT won the presidential elections, and has been leading a consolidated majority government since then. The president is therefore quite powerful in Taiwan as he/she can appoint the premier without the consensus of the LY, and also sets the political agenda of the government during his/her office period.

Further, as Lijphart (1999: 155) remarks, “[p]residential systems can have an indirect but strong effect on the effective number of parliamentary parties.” Only the largest parties have a chance in winning this position, putting larger parties in an advantage, and that is even affecting legislative elections under PR elections. This effect is strengthened when there is no run-off (like in Taiwan) for presidential elections, and when the elections of the president and
the parliament are on the same day (Lijphart 1999: 155), which is the case too in Taiwan since 2012.

The gridlock of the parliament in Taiwan led to high polarization of the two camps. Further many reforms could not be undertaken as the bills were simply blocked in the LY and President Chen alienated other parties by persisting to rule in a consolidated minority government with no coalition partner. Additional it can be reasoned that the disproportionality of the new electoral system is further deepened by the fact that now presidential elections and LY elections are held at the same time.

5.4.4. Summary of Empirical Part 2
To sum up the national identity became the salient issue in Taiwan’s politics in the early 1990s, even though there were several other issues that all had the possibility to become the main focus of the parties and the public. As Hsieh wrote in 1996 national identity will probably bring voters to be attracted by smaller third parties if the voters are dissatisfied with the stance the KMT and the DPP have (206-207). In the 1990s both parties were first rather extreme on their position: the KMT supported unification and the DPP supported complete independence. Both parties shifted more towards the median voter and promoted more the status quo starting in the mid of the 1990s (Fell 2012: 137-138).

This may explain the emergence of third parties in the second half of the 1990s and the early 2000s. Authors as (Fell 2012; Hsieh & Niemi 1999) predicted a multiparty system would emerge in the 1990s. While the SNTV system enables both one-dominant party systems as well as multiparty systems, a possible explanation for the move towards multiparty system may have been according to Lin (2010) the change of economic growth and the urban mobility. But the shift of the two largest parties towards the center may also be an explanation. The new parties that formed in the 1990s and in 2000 (NP, TSU and PFP) are more on the extreme left or right position towards national identity.

The drastic reduction of relevant number of parties after 2008 can be explained partly due to the quite restrictive new electoral system, which makes it harder for smaller parties to be represented, as well as for larger parties to gain enough vote share to not be disadvantaged by the electoral system. But at the same time, the national identity issue according to Wu (2013) was exhausted by the political situation from 2000 to 2008, when the DPP overstressed it in the electoral campaigns and severely threatened international relations, especially with China. The largest parties KMT and DPP moved away from the main focus national identity after 2008 and are stressing more economic issues now. The smaller parties, which mostly formed on more extreme national identity positions, may have lost to some extent their political relevance. This also could mean that the high polarization between the pan-blue and pan-green camp may lessen and an incentive is given for smaller parties to merge, seek alliances and re-position themselves on the right-left axis. Or new parties, such as the Minkuotang, may gain political momentum and change the political field in the future. It seems definitely likely that party realignments will occur from now on.
5.5. Analysis Taiwan

In this chapter Taiwan’s party system before and after the reform was looked at. The first part of the chapter dealt with the mechanical factor related to the electoral systems and the effects it has on the effective number of parties and whether they are advantageous or disadvantageous for smaller parties. Further the two largest parties over the years were pointed out, and how they changed and if a move toward a two-party system has started. The disproportionality of both SNTV and MMM system were compared and particularities of both systems were highlighted by the advantage profiles. The second part looked at issue dimensions and how they may have influenced the party system in Taiwan.

Under the SNTV system the effective threshold varied tremendously depending on district magnitude and effective nomination strategies, and thus could be very low. Further the particularity of SNTV aboriginal seats was also advantageous for smaller parties. Their chances of representation was therefore rather high under SNTV. While there still was a one-dominant party system in the 1990s, predictions were already made that the party system would move towards a multiparty system. This was achieved in 2000 and 2004. Several explanations for the change of the party system can be found: the relatively low threshold made it easier for smaller parties to gain seats. Further the advantage of larger parties to get access to benefits they can bestow upon their supporters became less relevant when the economic situation started to change and urban mobilization made it difficult to bestow such benefits. Lastly the issue dimensions in Taiwan, especially the national identity, enabled new parties to form and establish when older parties moved towards the moderate center and voters were dissatisfied. The SNTV often leads to extreme campaigning, as seats can be won with a relatively low vote share, once again enabling new third parties to take extreme stances.

But the dominant party KMT struggled to maintain their majority in LY and they actually lost it in 2000 and 2004. This might have been an important step in the consolidation of democratization and showed that an alternation of power was in the range of possibility even under the SNTV system. The second largest party DPP managed to become the strongest party in the LY, and hoped to further increase their vote share by pushing electoral reforms towards a system that would be advantageous for larger parties. The loss of power by the KMT, the intentions of the DPP to boost their vote share, as well as public dissatisfaction of the electoral system enabled the electoral reform towards a MMM system, similar to Japan (Chi 2014: 664-667; Kuo & Yeh 2015: 248-250).

However the results were not what the DPP imagined and scholars predicted. In 2008 the effective number of parties fell under two. The DPP was the big loser, even though their vote share had actually increased from 2004 to 2008. Smaller parties nearly completely disappeared in 2008. Several explanations could be found for the dramatic results of the 2008 LY elections ranging from lack of knowledge about the new electoral system, poor party adaption, infighting in parties and bad public opinion over DPP’s governmentality as well as the start of a paradigm shift towards a more economic oriented issue dimension. Still as the empirical part showed, the MMM system is extremely disadvantageous for every party except the KMT, as a vote share of over 40 percent is needed to gain a seat bonus now. In 2012 the results normalized somewhat and were closer to the predictions. This might mean that parties started to adapt to the new electoral system, public knowledge of the new system became better, and the DPP also focused more on the economic issue dimension.
Still the new MMM system is viewed rather critically: Kuo and Yeh (2015) and O’Neill (2012) criticize the unequal districts. The original electoral districts from the SNTV system were taken and turned into single-member districts under the new MMM system. The result now are extremely overrepresented and underrepresented districts. But to relativize this, the KMT won seats in both underrepresented and overrepresented districts, so it is not possible to speak clearly of the advantage of gerrymandering (refer to page 17) here (O’Neill 2012: 172-173), but still malapportionment became a problem after the electoral reform. Kuo and Yeh (2015) see a double disproportionality under the new system, as it “failed to balance governability and proportionality” (251). They also list the unequal size of the districts as one of the reasons, as well as the electoral system with its extreme disproportionality and the halving the seats of the LY. This is not just unviable for small parties, but pushed the party system towards a dominant party system again according to them (251-253).

Therefore both SNTV systems and the new MMM system are viewed rather negatively. The SNTV system was said to cause corruption, extreme campaigning, and intra-party competition and so on. While two elections are not long enough to see whether there was a change to any of these problems that arose under the SNTV system, new criticism came up now: the MMM system is very disproportional, leading to a dominant party system, instead of a two-party system that was the goal before the reform. Furthermore gerrymandering or at least unequal representation under the new system may also bring problems in the future. Soon after 2008 the DPP started to call for electoral reforms again, and in 2014 even some members of the KMT started to voice the possibility of a new reform (Kuo & Yeh 2015: 254; Chi 2014: 675). Fell and Chen see this less negative. They consider the new MMM system to bring forth a more balanced party system with greater checks on ruling power (Fell & Chen 2014: 39). Only more elections under the MMM system may show in which direction the party system develops and whether the problems caused by the SNTV system disappear.
6. Analysis: Japan and Taiwan in Comparison

6.1. Historical Developments
The Japanese and Taiwanese polities share many similarities as well as many differences. The previous chapters highlighted the political developments and the effect electoral systems have on the party system in each country separately. Now both countries are compared with each other to look further at how similar electoral systems may have similar effects or if other explanations can be found when two polities with similar institutional settings develop in other ways.

The historical development in both countries was already very different: in Japan a constitution was promulgated and elections for the Lower House were already started in the 19th century. Yet political participation was highly limited and restrained, and political parties were only gradually involved in the actual government work. Takenaka (2014) even goes that far and describes the political system before World War 2 as semi-democratic. In the late 1910s to early 1930s, party politics (also described as Taisho Democracy) was the norm and suffrage was gradual extended. The electoral system and the major parties out of which the parties after World War 2 formed, also were established by that time.

In comparison, Taiwan had become a Japanese colony by the beginning of the 19th century, and while the Japanese colonial power steadily developed and improved the living conditions in Taiwan, political activism was not welcomed first. Further it was the goal of the Japanese to assimilate the Taiwanese. In the 1920s then some political activism was allowed, and local elections were enabled in 1935, with a very limited suffrage and only less important local offices were to be elected though. Still this political organization meant the introduction of the electoral system SNTV in Taiwan which was continued to be used after World War 2 by the KMT under martial law. While local elections were constantly held under martial law in the second half of the 20th century, political development still was highly restrained in Taiwan during most of its modern history, until the late 1980s when the KMT finally paved the way to democratization.

In Japan, after World War 2, the US occupation power undertook several wide reaching reforms, among them a revision of the constitution and liberalization of labor movements, but in general let Japanese politicians continue to decide their own politics within certain restraints. Political parties formed right after the war, and after several years of party realignments, the 1955er system emerged: the LPD became the largest conservative party, and the JSP the only large opposition party. The LPD continued to dominate the political field, but gradually new parties emerged. Thus political organizations and democracy thrived in Japan in the second half of the 20th century, while in Taiwan it took until 1992 for the first completely free LY elections to be held. The late democratization of Taiwan also had implications on other developments, such as the late formation and establishment of the party system and the issue dimensions found there.

6.2. The SNTV Systems in Comparison
The question is now whether the SNTV systems in both countries are really the same and thus comparable. Looking just at the electoral rules in both countries that were highlighted in the
previous country chapters there seem to be several differences but also many similarities. As differences and similarities may have a different effect on the party systems in both countries, the findings of the chapters 4.3 and 5.3 with the focus on only the SNTV system will be compared here.

The district magnitudes in Japan remained relatively the same, first ranging in 1947 from 3 to 5 and by 1993 from 2 to 6, with only one SMD in the time between. That makes an average M of about 3.97 over the years. In Taiwan the district magnitudes had higher variances, in 1992 ranging from 1 to 16 and in 2004 from 1 to 28. Further there were more single-member districts in Taiwan (4 to 5 over the years). The average M in Taiwan was in the range from 4.31 to 4.41. The thresholds accordingly also were quite different: the lowest district threshold in Japan was 10.7 percent and in Taiwan it was 2.6 percent. This implies that according to Duverger’s extended law, more parties could have been represented in Taiwan than in Japan. In Japan the equilibrium was reached with five long-standing parties. In Taiwan there were 6 parties in 2004, though one was a union of independent candidates. Thus five to six parties also seemed to be the likely equilibrium, and as the average M in Taiwan is only about half a party larger than in Japan, the equilibrium is probably only slightly higher than in Japan. Further the quite large district magnitudes in Taiwan might be balanced by the higher amount of single-member districts. In general, Taiwan’s SNTV system appears to be more permissive for smaller and new parties, as it also includes a nationwide PR bloc. It also could imply that the proportionality is higher in Taiwan than in Japan under SNTV. The average disproportionality in Taiwan is 6.18 and in Japan 6.27. The difference of proportionality is not very high, thus making it rather negligible.

The degree of defractionalization in both countries is also in the same range from slightly over 1.0 to 1.2, thus parliaments were only slightly defractionalized and the mechanical factors seemed to be quite stable in both polities. The comparison of the seat bonus of the two largest parties further also shows very similar results: in Japan the largest party (LPD) received an average seat bonus of 1.15 and the second largest party (JSP) 0.96. In Taiwan the largest party (1992-1998 the KMT, 2001-2004 the DPP) has an average seat bonus of 1.14 and for the second largest party (first DPP, then KMT) it is 1.04. Therefore the largest parties in Taiwan and Japan received a similar seat bonus, while the second largest party in Taiwan received a slightly higher seat bonus. But the differences are only marginal between the countries, thus it cannot be said whether this really had any effect on the position of the second largest party.

Finally looking at the two advantage profiles under SNTV, a few differences can be seen. First, in Taiwan the advantage profile can be classified as a wide scatter profile, while in Japan it is a late rise profile. This means that in Taiwan the advantage or disadvantage of a party that received a vote share of zero to 10 percent is very unpredictable. It was reasoned in the Taiwan chapter, that the aboriginal seats and large district magnitudes could be possible explanations for this, as only a small amount of the vote share of less than 10.000 votes could suffice to win a seat. Second, the real break-even point in Taiwan is at about 15 percent, while in Japan it is somewhat higher at about 19 percent. And third, parties overcoming the break-even point in Taiwan are less overrepresented than in Japan, but the difference is marginal.

Therefore it can be reasoned that the mechanical parts of the SNTV system, even if there are differences, lead to very similar results in proportionality, possible equilibrium of number of parties and seat bonus. Yet the Taiwanese system is more permissive for smaller parties, as
there is a nationwide PR bloc, large districts of up to 28 in magnitude, and aboriginal seats, and so gaining a representation with a very low vote share is more possible in Taiwan. This may also have implications on extreme campaigning, which is often found in the literature about Taiwan (for example Hsieh 1996: 208-209), or may lead to high numbers of independents. But independents are a “problem” in both countries under SNTV, due to institutional and traditional reasons, such as strong clientele networks and the (re-)acceptance into the major party after the independent candidate won in his/her district. In both countries the situation about independence improved under the new MMM system, as less incentives are there to run outside of a party (Hsieh & Niemi 1999: 107-114; Reed 2002: 248-252).

6.3. Developments under the SNTV Systems
The analysis in both countries started with the free competitive elections and the formation of one dominant party. In the case of Taiwan, the KMT as dominant party was established and institutionalized under martial law and when free elections were legalized in 1992 the high peak of GDP growth had already been reached. In Japan the LPD institutionalized its dominance in free competitive elections, and when electoral reform was undertaken in 1993, Japan had fallen into a recession. In both countries the dominant parties were responsible for the high economic development growth rates until the 1990s, and as Lin (2010) argues, this enabled them to distribute benefits to voters and supporters in order to maintain their dominance. While in Taiwan the period during martial law cannot be analyzed regarding the slow decline of the dominant party, in Japan Lin’s argument may explain the slow decline of the LPD. From above 60 percent of the vote share in the first years, it fell to around 50 percent in the 1970s. The mobilization of the populace towards urban areas may have made it difficult for the LPD to reach the voters there, as their stronghold is the rural area. Urban voters rather preferred the left parties. Still the LPD was very adaptive and proved in the 1980s to also include urban voters in their policy appeals by introduction environmental protection laws and managed a small comeback. In Taiwan, the dominant party KMT lost their majority after only three free elections in the 1990s and the DPP was the largest party in the LY in 2001 and 2004. As was already pointed out in the Taiwan chapter, the decrease of economic growth and the increase of mobilization probably was a factor in the decline of the KMT.

But while in Taiwan viable opposition parties formed under the SNTV system, the same cannot be said in the Japanese case. In Japan the opposition parties often are described as unviable and not trustworthy of government according to opinion polls and the actual evidence that the largest party JSP never managed an alternation of governing power. The LPD constantly lost in vote share, but the JSP also lost. Starting from a point of nearly 36 percent in 1958 it was at around 20 percent by the 1970s and never recovered. So while the LPD lost votes, the JSP did no manage to gain more votes as they did not adapt to new social circumstances and issue dimensions and the fragmentation of the opposition further worsened the chances for all parties but the LPD. Further in literature it is often argued that the SNTV system brings mostly disincentives for mergers and alliances (Hsieh 1996: 206-207; Scheiner 2012: 362). Reasons can be the knowledge problem of the SNTV system, as it is not very transparent for parties and leads to nomination problems within parties and between possible alliance parties (Heinrich 2007: 66-69). In the Japanese case it is said that the SNTV system created highly
competitive elections in multi-member districts that pulled apart the opposition, and this was further worsened as there was no real incentives to compromise except to go against the LDP (Christensen 2015: 25-30).

In Taiwan a multi-party system also emerged by the 2000s, but the KMT did not manage to stay in power. Many of the new parties in Taiwan actually are splinters from the KMT, thus hurting the KMT while being positive for the DPP. It was argued that the only way in Japan to dethrone the LPD was by the formation of splinter parties from it, but the LPD remained mostly intact until 1993 with no serious splinters. Thus in both countries a dominant party within a multi-party system emerged, but while in Taiwan it evolved into a real multi-party system with possible alternation of power, in Japan the opposition was too fragmented and untrusted to be a real challenge for the LPD dominance.

6.4. Issue Dimensions and Polarization under the SNTV Systems

Issue dimensions are also quite different in both countries: in Japan a socioeconomic right-left dimension formed right after war that soon developed into the peace cleavage over the fight regarding remilitarization and constitution-amendment. In Taiwan the main issue dimension is national identity and it developed out of an ethnic-dimension caused by the “invasion” of the Mainlanders that discriminated against the Taiwanese during martial law period. In Japan the peace cleavage lost its salience by the 1960s, but the JSP did not adapt to the new social situation of a middle-class society. The LDP proved as a highly adaptive party and also embraced social and environmental issues by the 1980s. In Taiwan the main issue dimension national identity continues to be of salience. Other important issues in the 1990s were social stability, political reform and the valence issue of corruption. Constitutional amendment also is of salience in Taiwan, but it is part of the national identity issue. In Japan there is further a rural-urban cleavage that emerged in the 1940s and was further institutionalized by clientele networks and redistribution in forms of infrastructure development on the country-side. While clientele networks are also a major issue in Taiwan, no such rural-urban cleavage was found in the literature. Further, while there is a religious party in Japan (the Komeito), a religious cleavage cannot be found. Also there seems to be no serious development of postmaterialistic cleavages such as green parties, as while there were some green parties in both countries, they were very short-lived and received marginal vote shares in elections.

This all is in correspondence with Jou’s findings about the understanding of left-right in East Asian countries. So writes Jou (2011: 37) that the typical Western (i.e. European countries) understanding of right-left is based on economic and religious cleavages. He then looks how citizens in East Asian countries (Australia, New Zealand, Japan, Taiwan, South Korea and the Philippines) understand right and left. In general Jou finds that left-right positions in East Asia derive from identities and beliefs, or in other words from demography, socioeconomic issues and evaluations of democracy. But the understanding of postmaterialism is not highly developed. Important in Japan is demography, socioeconomic issues, new politics (political activism, environmental protection) and democratic support. Rather unimportant for Japanese citizen is the class cleavage and religion. In Taiwan the most important factor is political activism and democratic performance. Of no importance is religion and postmaterialism (Jou 2011: 39-47). Thus the understanding of right-left is also different in Japan and Taiwan.
In case of polarization, different developments in the party systems can be found under SNTV. In Japan the party system was first highly polarized on the peace cleavage, and that left space for new centrist parties, the Komeito and the SDP. By the 1970s though, polarization had completely disappeared as the LDP focused on economic development instead of the peace cleavage. In Taiwan high polarization on the national identity issue first was reflected by the KMT and the DPP, but the two parties moved fast towards the center and the new parties that formed in the 1990s then were rather on the far left or far right. The polarization was further increased by the formation of the pan-blue and the pan-green camp and overly competitive elections from 2000 onwards. Another reason for the increased polarization in Taiwan may be found in the semi-presidential system that Taiwan has since 1997. As long as there is a consolidated majority government, where the president and the premier both are from the same party that holds the majority in the LY, the government is stable. But during President Chen’s period (2000 – 2008), there was a consolidated minority government, leading to a gridlock in the parliament. President Chen preferred to have a minority government instead of a coalition which further alienated the other parties.

Japan in contrast has a parliamentary system (refer to page 6), but two chambers with the House of Councilors and the House of Representatives. Actually no party since the late 1980s has been able to hold the majority in both chambers at the same time, leading to skewed parliaments. In principle this also leads to a gridlock, but in the case of Japan, coalitions became the norm since the 1990s in order to overcome this problem and there is the possibility to overrule the HC with a two-third majority in the HR (Hrebenar & Itoh 2015: 14).

6.5. The MMM Systems in Comparison
Similar to the SNTV systems, there also may be many differences and similarities between the Japanese and Taiwanese MMM systems. As the effect on party systems can be different if the electoral rules differ too much, it first needs to be looked at how different the mechanical factors of both MMM systems are. Thus a comparison of the findings of the chapters 4.3 and 5.3 with the focus on only the MMM systems will be given in this section.

One of the major parts of the electoral reform in Taiwan was the reduction of legislature seats, from 225 to 113. 73 seats (or 64 percent) of the seats are elected through SMD now, 34 seats by a nationwide PR bloc and 6 are reserved for aboriginals using SNTV. In Japan the legislature was only slightly reduced from 511 to 500 in 1993 and to 480 in 2000. 300 seats (62.5 percent) of the parliament are selected through SMD, the rest through 11 PR blocs ranging from 6 to 29 seats in Japan. The legal threshold of the nationwide PR bloc in Taiwan is with 5 percent higher than the effective threshold of 2.8 percent. At the district level the threshold is now 37.5 percent, except for aboriginal seats, where the threshold is only 15.3 percent.

In Japan the legal threshold for PR is 2 percent, which is lower than the effective threshold of 4.3 percent (since 2000). The nationwide approximation of threshold is at around 1.6 percent in Japan and 2.8 percent in Taiwan, further emphasizing the higher threshold in Taiwan. In Taiwan the threshold increased under the MMM system, while at least the PR bloc in Japan is still in the range of the old threshold under SNTV. Further the SMD component is weighted more in Taiwan with 64 percent of the seats elected through it, in comparison to now 62.5 percent in Japan.
As both countries’ SMD component is the largest component of the MMM system, according to Duverger’s law both countries should come closer to a two-party system. In Taiwan only two elections so far were held under the MMM system, but a tendency can be seen: the move towards a two-party system seems to be much faster than in Japan. In 2008 the effective number of parties fell to under 2, while it moved up to 2.23 in 2012. In Japan, the first two elections under MMM system still resulted in effective number of legislative parties of about 3. Only after 2000 the number started to decrease with its lowest peak in 2009, but it never fell below two. In Japan, the average value of the effective number of legislative parties decreased from 2.73 under SNTV to only 2.57 under MMM. In Taiwan the difference is larger: the effective number of legislative parties decreased from 2.79 under SNTV to 1.99 under MMM. Taiwan seems to approach Duverger’s law much faster, while in Japan there is only a tendency of a slowly decreasing effective number of parties.

As was shown by splitting the SMD and PR components into effective numbers of elective and legislative parties, in Japan the PR bloc is far more permissive with a PR (V) of 3.42 to 5.8 effective numbers of parties resulting in PR (S) of 2.91 to 5.1 effective numbers of parties. In Taiwan the PR (V) is much lower with 2.49 to 3.04 effective number of parties and again is decreased much drastically in PR (S) of 1.94 and 2.64. The degree of PR disproportionality of average 5.22 is in the lower range of the SNTV disproportionalities, while the SMD disproportionality of average 16.52 is now higher than SNTV, and the overall disproportionality went up to an average of 12.99. It is thus far higher than under SNTV, which had an average of 6.1. In Japan the average SMD disproportionality is now 19.71, the average PR disproportionality is 4.04 and the overall disproportionality is 13.89. PR is thus more proportional than SNTV was (average was 6.27), the SMD far more disproportional. This is resulting in a higher disproportionality of 13.89. Therefore Japan seems to have a less proportional MMM system than Taiwan, but after only two elections in Taiwan this conclusion should be seen with caution.

In terms of defractionalization, the trend in Japan was first similar as under SNTV and only after 2003 it increased. The highest peak can be seen in 2012 with 1.34. In Taiwan defractionalization went up right after the electoral reform and peaked with 1.37, but went down again in 2012 to 1.19, while in Japan defractionalization in 2014 was still higher with 1.23. The same development can also be seen in the vote-to-seat ratio of the two largest parties. In Japan the gap widened right after the electoral reform but it only became relatively large in 2005. In Taiwan the gap between the two largest parties is instantly relative large in 2008. The highest seat bonus in Japan can be seen in 2012 with nearly 1.8 for the LPD, and in Taiwan in 2008 with 1.4 for the KMT. In both countries the combined vote shares of the two largest parties increased under MMM, but while it is above 90 percent in Taiwan now, it is only in the range of 80 percent in Japan. The largest party in Taiwan is around 60 percent now, while in Japan it took until 2005 for the largest parties to reach over 60 percent of the seat share. In Taiwan the combined seat share of the two largest parties is thus higher under MMM than it was under SNTV, while in Japan it is in the same range or lower.

In general this all points out that the Taiwanese MMM system is more proportional, even though the SMD component is weighted more and the threshold is higher than in Japan. But still Japan only shows tendencies towards a two-party system, while Taiwan is moving much faster towards it. In the Taiwan chapter a few explanations were already found for the
landslide victories of the KMT, among them the low knowledge of the new electoral system among the electorate, the low cooperation of the parties, and bad image of the second largest party DPP. But while the DPP is suffering of a bad image after President Chen’s period, their actual vote share increased under the MMM system. The advantage profile of Taiwan shows that now a vote share of over 40 percent is needed to not be underrepresented, while small parties may have quite good chances in reaching representation in SNTV aboriginal districts.

In Japan, the DPJ also suffers from a bad image after their government period, but their vote share decreased dramatically in 2012 and 2014 in contrast to the DPP. The vote share is now below the break-even point of 35 percent to reach an advantage and the seat share is far below that of the DPP in Taiwan. Thus the Taiwanese MMM system is disadvantaging the second largest party far more if it does not reach the high break-even point of 40 percent. In Japan the break-even point is lower with 35 point making it easier for the second largest party. In both countries now there are unpredictable advantage ratio in the lower vote shares, in Taiwan due to aboriginal seats, in Japan due to independent candidates and minor parties running only under SMD and managing to win there. And SMD in general is increasing the chances for swing votes and more drastic electoral outcomes in both countries, in comparison to the more stable SNTV electoral outcomes.

Further several major differences can be found between the polities and the MMM systems: (1) the nationwide PR bloc in Taiwan compared to the 11 PR blocs in Japan with smaller M. Then (2) there is the major difference that in Japan double candidacy in both SMD and under PR list is possible. The parties can additionally rank candidates on the PR list in that way, that only their results in the SMD will decide on the actual order of the PR list afterwards (the more votes a candidate gets, the higher he/she gets ranked). In Taiwan double candidacy is not possible (Fell 2012: 65-66; Reed & Shimizu 2009b: 33-34). Furthermore (3) in Taiwan the legislature period was extended to four years and the LY elections are now held on the same day as the presidential elections, which is an advantage for larger parties. Lastly (4), in Japan several reforms were undertaken as part of the electoral reform or afterwards (among them the public funding law for parties and redistricting of the constituencies), which further had effects on the party system. In Taiwan no such reforms were undertaken, and existing constituencies were simply changed from multi-member districts to single-member districts, resulting in malapportionment.

6.6. Developments under the MMM Systems

The electoral reform in Japan can be seen as a turning point for the party system. After many years of a stable dominant party with multiple opposition parties, the party system is now moving towards a two-party system. The reform was the cause of many splits, mergers, formations and disappearances of parties. The second largest party JSP lost its remaining trust of their supporters when it agreed to form a coalition with the LDP in the middle of the 1990s. In the same time, a new centrist party formed, the DPJ. After several years most conservative splinter parties had merged with the DPJ, making it the second largest party. But while two large parties are now present in the Japanese party system, it is still far from being stable. Even though the effective number of parties decreased under MMM, the actual number of parliament parties went up to 8 to 10, with constantly new minor parties forming and disbanding. Another
major development now is that coalitions became the norm: the LPD is in a long-standing coalition with the Komeito since 2000s, and the DPJ in their short governing period also had to form a coalition with the SDP and a third party. Even though the LDP regained its majority in the HR, coalitions are still needed for preventing a skewed parliament and to have control over both chambers. Further the Komeito has proven to be strategic partner in elections, as their support can help to boost the LPD’s vote share in urban areas. Further cooperation among opposition parties can also be seen now (Christensen 2015: 48-52).

In Taiwan the incentives of the SMD for mergers and cooperation is showing less results so far: the KMT and the pan-blue camp worked better together and cooperated for elections in 2008, while the pan-green camp failed to coordinate at all. In 2012, the pan-green camp coordinated better. Further minor parties failed to adapt in 2008 to the new rules, and only started to concentrate on the PR component in 2012. Yet so far no major mergers or disappearances of parties happened in Taiwan. But the new party Minkuotang may show a new dynamic in the party system in Taiwan as well. The effective number of parties decreased drastically in Taiwan under the MMM system, and the actual number of parties also decreased. From 6 parties in 2004 to 4 in 2008 and 5 parties in 2012. This shows that the party system in Taiwan is more stable now than in Japan, yet Duverger’s law is working more in Taiwan than in Japan, which may lead to party realignments in the new future.

6.7. Issue Dimensions under the MMM Systems

No major changes in the issue dimensions occurred either in Taiwan or in Japan. In Taiwan the two elections under MMM system showed a policy shift towards more economic issues, while the national identity issue was toned down. Reasons can be that the topic of national identity was overstressed in President Chen’s period. It had led to a high polarization of the party system, and a worsening of international relations especially with China. In 2008 the KMT focused on economic topics which seemed to bring more fruits especially considering the economic downturn in recent years after the financial crisis. The DPP followed suit in 2012 and also started stressing economic issues, even if they focused more on the economic downturns of the KMT’s economic policies. Wu (2013) sees a shift towards socioeconomic issues here, and maybe even an emergence of a right-left axis more similar to European countries. Yet national identity is still salient and the ethnic issue dimension is still subliminally present in economic issues.

In Japan, similar issue dimensions as before the 1990s can be found now. There is still a rural-urban gap and the peace cleavage is still of relevance. The right-left cleavage mirrored in the JSP – LPD constellation disappeared completely in the 1990s. At the same time social gaps started to worsen, which were more widened by neoliberal reforms under PM Koizumi in the early 2000s. The image of a middle-class society in Japan was replaced by the kakusa shakai (divided society) (refer to page 86) at the same time. While it is questionable if Koizumi’s reforms directly had an impact on kakusa shakai, it seemed to have at least worsened the situation by expanding atypical work, reducing the infrastructure development on the countryside and transferring tax allocation to localities. This all backfired later on when the LPD lost support of their stronghold, the rural area, which suffered the most under these developments. After the DPJ disappointed the populace as well during their government period, the KMT returned to
power even though some of their policy appeals are not very popular. PM Abe is currently pushing the re-interpretation of the constitution through the HR with the help of a two-third majority, after it was rejected in the HC. Further nuclear power plants are turned on again. But it seems that even though both issues are of relevance in Japan, the economic issues are more salient, as it was reasoned that PM Abe only won the elections due to his “Abenomics” (Song 2015: 144).

In comparison, in Taiwan and Japan economic issues are currently in focus. But while in Taiwan there might even be an emergence of a right-left axis, in Japan the parties all are very similar in their policy-settings now. It cannot be said that the DPJ in Japan is strictly against nuclear power or constitution amendments, nor LDP is completely supporting this, but rather that internally both parties are highly fragmented. Mostly valence issues are important now for winning elections in Japan. Yet, elections have become more based on issues nowadays. One reason for this is that the DPJ started to use manifestos in 2003, and they became the norm, even if the manifestos are still very vague in their content (Hyde 2011: 162-163). Further the party leader and the party image is more in the focus now, mostly due to the development of the mass media. But also because PM Koizumi (2001 to 2006) strengthened the position of the party leader and prime minister during his period, turning the position of the prime minister nearly into that of a president.

In Taiwan, the KMT had been more policy-based during SNTV already (Cox & Niou 1994: 226-230). Furthermore the parliamentary system was gradually changed into a semi-presidential system in the 1990s, thus the position of the president and of the party leader was already stronger during SNTV. Manifestos in Taiwan started to be used in the 1990s as well (Fell 2005: 227). In Taiwan valence issues have been of importance since the 1990s already, yet the parties in Taiwan are clearly distinguishable due to their position on the national identity issue. While a detailed research could not be done on this topic, this all points that Taiwan’s party system was already more issue-oriented with a focus on the party leader and party image in the 1990s. And the party system is more clear-cut with distinctive differences between the parties. In Japan, these developments only occurred in the 2000s, due to reforms and political actors, but not due to the new MMM system. However, the Japanese party system has become very blurred.

### 6.8. Summary

**What effect did have the SNTV and the MMM system on the party systems?**

The electoral system may be seen as a framework in which political actors are acting. In such a sense it can be argued that the SNTV system led to a more stable environment than the MMM system. In both Taiwan and Japan the mechanical factors of the SNTV system are very similar, even if differences in the electoral system exist. Both have a similar degree of proportionality, threshold, a possible degree of the number of party equilibrium and seat bonus. In both cases, there was first a dominant party and an alternation of governing power seemed out of reach. But while in Taiwan an alternation of power relatively soon occurred, in Japan the LPD remained the dominant party under the SNTV system. Still in both countries a multiparty system developed, bringing forth an equilibrium of five-long standing parties in Japan, and a
possible equilibrium of about five to six parties in Taiwan. Thus it can be argued that in both countries Duverger’s extended law was reached.

The MMM system then made the political environment much less stable, at least in Japan. While in theory, a two-party should come forth in Japan, there hardly was a decline in effective number of parties, and the actual number of parliamentary parties actually increased. Further the party system is in turmoil since the 1990s, and there seems to be no equilibrium in reach at the moment. Hrebenar and Itoh even go that far and call the Japanese politics as among the world’s “most unstable, established democratic governments, characterized by constant changes in the makeup of its party system, cabinets and parliamentary electoral rules “ (Hrebenar & Itoh 2015: 12). The MMM system of Taiwan and Japan in comparison show that Japan has higher disproportionality, but a lower threshold and SMD is less weighted than in Taiwan. Japan is more permissive to smaller parties now than Taiwan, which is reflected in the constantly new minor parties represented in the HR.

In Taiwan, two elections may be too short yet to make too many conclusions, but the effect of the MMM system seems to be more drastic than in Japan. The higher threshold and the more weighted SMD component, in combination with the radical reduction of the assembly size and the malapportionment are definitely showing faster changes than in Japan. The effective number of legislative parties are reduced to about two and the actual number of parliament parties also decreased. The MMM system though seems not to disrupt the party system in Taiwan much yet.

What other factors might have affected the party systems?
The electoral system may restrain the party system according to Duverger’s law, but it is by far not the only factor in determining a party system. As was shown, issue dimensions and the position of existing parties in Japan and Taiwan led to formation of new parties. In Japan the right-left and the peace cleavage resulted in a highly polarized party system with no center party. In that space, two new parties formed over time. Other issues were embraced by the dominant party LPD, like the rural-urban cleavage, the social welfare and the pollution issues, which again strengthened the position of the LPD. In Taiwan the most salient issue dimension is the national identity issue, and when the major parties became more moderate on their positions on it, new left and right parties formed by the end of the 1990s. Other issues were embraced by the major parties, so is the DPP more social welfare-oriented for example.

The electoral reform in Japan coincided with economic recession and the beginning of growing social gaps. This may be an explanation why the Japanese party system is in turmoil even now. The economic problem has not been solved so far, social gaps were worsened during PM Koizumi’s period, and the DPJ has made too many mistakes during its government period. As was pointed out by Hatoyama (2014), the MMM system may be a less optimal electoral system to represent the wishes and interests of the electorate. Further there seems to be a growing alienation between the population and the political parties, resulting in higher numbers of floating voters. Swing votes have become more common and they may not be caused by the electoral system only.

In Taiwan, two elections may be too short to make an analysis, but a shift towards more economic-oriented issues and a toned down national identity issue may imply an issue dimension shift. Already during President Chen’s period, economic performance decreased in
Taiwan, and the high polarization of the party system may have led to an overstress of the national identity issue. Further the pan-blue and pan-green camp division is starting to be seen as critical, as the emergence of the Minkuotang party shows. So not necessarily the new electoral system may bring forth party realignments in Taiwan, but a shift of issue dimensions and the demand of de-polarization by the electorate may also play an important role in changing the party system in the future.
7. Conclusion

The aim of this master thesis was to look at the effects that electoral systems may have on party systems by analyzing Japan’s political developments starting in 1958 and Taiwan’s from 1992 onwards. Both countries offered the unique possibility to compare polities with similar electoral systems. Japan and Taiwan both used the rare SNTV system until their electoral reforms, which occurred in Japan in 1993 and in Taiwan in 2005. Then they changed to similar MMM systems, a mix of both SMD and PR components. To make the political situation and the development of the party systems comparable, the analysis started in both nations when the party systems were relatively similar, offering the chance to look at how party systems develop under similar rules. Thus the main research question of this master thesis was how the electoral systems (SNTV and MMM systems) of the parliamentary elections affect the party systems in Japan and Taiwan. The two major sub-questions were: (1) Did the electoral reforms have the effect predicted and intended by literature and reformers? (2) What other factors may have affected and still affect the party systems that could lead to different developments in both countries even if they have similar sets of electoral rules?

With the main assumption of Duverger’s law that a single-member district system tends to lead to a two-party system and a proportional representative system will likely result in a multi-party system, the two nations’ party systems should behave accordingly. As was highlighted in this paper, Duverger’s law can be extended to the unique SNTV system that was in use in Japan until 1993 and in Taiwan until 2005 as well. The extension of Duverger’s law assumes that the STNV system will most likely lead to $M+1$ parties in the country. Thus there should be a multi-party system in the range of the average district magnitude plus one under SNTV in Japan and in Taiwan. In regards to the MMM system, the question was raised how it will affect the party systems: either the SMD component will lead to a two-party system or the PR component may foster the development of a multi-party system. The assumption was that it most likely depends on the balance of the two components.

Reformers thought Duverger’s law would be in their favor and promised that the new electoral system would reduce the manifold problems caused by the SNTV system, like corruption, candidate-centered elections with weak party cohesion, strong local support groups and clientelism. Most importantly in Japan, the goal was to bring forth a party system with two viable large parties that would alternate in governing. In Taiwan, especially the DPP hoped that the MMM system would boost their vote and seat share in the LY.

In this paper the approach was to compare the two case studies Japan and Taiwan separately, and combine the results to see similarities and differences. The method was to introduce the polities, their political developments from industrialization up to the start of the analysis and give a short overview of the party systems. Then the analysis of the separate polities was split into two major parts: empirical part one looked at the electoral systems and variables that are important for the mechanical factor of the electoral rules. Such variables included: specific rules, district magnitude, threshold, effective number of elective and legislative parties, the two largest parties, fractionalization, seat bonus, proportionality and the advantage profile with the break-even point. Empirical part two covered the analysis of the exogenous factors. The most important factors were the issue dimensions, policy-appeals of parties over the years, polarization of the party system and developments in the party system.
After the two countries were analyzed respectively, the separate findings were combined in a final analysis.

**Findings**

The findings were that the SNTV system led to a multi-party system in both countries, fitting to the predictions of Duverger’s extended law of \( M+1 \) parties. Japan had five long-standing parties, and Taiwan’s party system was between 5 to 6 parties after 2000. The differences though were that in Japan the dominant party LPD stayed in power until 1993, while in Taiwan alternation of power already occurred under SNTV. Under MMM then, Japan’s long-time stable party system got into turmoil, and no equilibrium seems to be in reach since then. Yet the second largest party DPJ had been established by 2000. The DPJ emerged as the first real viable party beside the LPD. In 2009, the DPJ became the governing party, reaching the long-promised alternation of power. Further Japan’s effective number of elective parties was reduced under MMM, but it is still far away from a two-party system. While the seat share of the largest parties increased under MMM somewhat compared to the later years of SNTV, the actual number of parliament parties also increased compared to SNTV. There are more minor parties in the Lower House now, but with smaller seat shares.

In Taiwan two large viable parties had already been established under SNTV. The introduction of the MMM system did not plunge the party system as much into turmoil as in Japan. Yet, the reduction of effective number of legislative parties is far more drastic in Taiwan, as it fell to under two in the first election under MMM and now is only slightly over two. Different reasons all led to the drastic electoral outcome in 2008: poor knowledge of the new system, no cooperation and alliances between parties, infighting of several parties, bad reputation of the DPP and less focus on the national identity issue, the most salient social cleavage. In the 2012 election, party adaption has increased as minor parties now made use of the PR component far more.

Further the DPP, which pushed for the electoral reform, is the loser of the reform now, as even though its vote share has increased under MMM, the seat share decreased dramatically. The answers found to this are the high break-even point of the new MMM system and the increased disproportionality of a small assembly and malapportionment. Additional, the incentives of more alliances and mergers of parties under MMM seemed not to affect the Taiwanese party system, while in Japan alliances and coalitions became the norm after the electoral reform. Alliances though became only important to have a majority in both chambers in Japan. In Taiwan there is only one chamber, and it is more important to win both presidential and parliamentary elections there. In the two elections under MMM, the presidential and parliament elections were won by the same party, the KMT. So while the MMM system in Japan led to a turmoil, in Taiwan no such disruption of the party system is seen yet.

In this sense: what explanation was found for the different developments in both party systems? The build-up of the party system is different in both countries. Starting with different issue dimensions in both countries, parties positioned themselves differently on the right-left axis. In Japan issue dimensions formed mostly in the 1940s and 1950s and consisted of a rural-urban gap and a peace cleavage on constitution revision and remilitarization. While the second largest party JSP emphasized a class cleavage, it was never fully developed in Japan and was marginalized completely by the 1970s, when the LPD moved Japan towards a middle-class
society thanks to a focus of economic policies instead of focusing on the peace cleavage. Still the party system was highly polarized on the peace cleavage until the 1960s, with the LPD and JSP positioning themselves on the right and left. This opened ideological space for two new centrist parties.

In Taiwan, issue dimensions only started to develop in the 1980s. There was an ethnic issue dimension between mainland Chinese and Taiwanese found, but it soon became subliminal and part of other issues. The most important issue dimension became the national identity issue then, and both major parties KMT and DPP were rather extreme on their position first. But they soon moved towards the middle, which opened the space for more extreme right or left parties. In the 2000s then, a polarization occurred and the party system was split into the pan-blue and pan-green camp.

Not only the issue dimensions were different, but how the parties adapted differed as well. In Japan the LPD dominated most cleavages, as it easily adapted and embraced new ones. Further it built and strengthened it links to the rural area, which became the LPD’s largest stronghold. Other parties, especially the JSP, did not adapt but continued to hold on to their old policy stances, which partly explains why the opposition parties were considered unviable for many years. In Taiwan, new issue dimensions were embraced by the two largest parties KMT and DPP quite equally.

Issue dimensions hardly changed in Japan after the electoral reform. The right-left cleavage disappeared though, as the new large opposition party DPJ is a centrist party. The JSP had become completely irrelevant in the 1990s. The rural-urban disparities and the *kakusa shakai* became major topics in Japan after the 1990s, due to increased social gaps worsened by neoliberal reforms under PM Koizumi (2001 – 2006). Those reforms also led to the landslide victory of the DPJ in 2009, as the LPD had alienated their rural stronghold with the growing inequalities. But the social disparities policy appeals had lost their momentum in the next election already. Economic policies are currently the most salient, even though the peace cleavage seems to be on brink of return. A new nuclear power cleavage was not found.

In Taiwan, the DPP’s ruling time led to an exhaustion of the national identity issue and a return of the KMT under the MMM system. There also was a possible issue dimension shift found: economic policies are more in the focus now, and a possible right-left position according to socioeconomic issues may occur in the future. After the KMT started to focus on socioeconomic issues in 2008, the DPP followed suit in 2012. The findings in Taiwan point towards the beginning of a change in the party system and of the issue dimensions. Additionally, in Japan elections became more policy-based with a focus on the party leader and the party image. But in Taiwan no such changes were found. A possible explanation can be found in the semi-presidential system of Taiwan, as many of those changes had already occurred under the SNTV system.

The major differences between the Japanese and the Taiwanese party systems are now, that the Japanese is very blurred and it became difficult to distinguish between parties. LPD and DPJ are very similar in their policy-approaches, as they are internally similarly fragmented on them, and depending on which faction is currently in power, the policy appeals change. In Taiwan, there is a clear cut party system with a concrete distinction between the parties on the topic of national identity. Furthermore, the party system did not fall into turmoil under the MMM system, implying that a strong and stable party system had been established before the
electoral reform. In Japan, the problem of the blurred party system, as well as social issues and economic recession that started in the 1990s have not been solved so far. This proved a possible explanation for the turmoil of the party system, which again is magnified by the permissiveness of minor parties under the MMM system.

By coming to these findings, several issues and problems arose. First it proved quite difficult to get access through the University of Vienna to new relevant Japanese sources. Secondly, Taiwanese newspapers are mostly in Chinese and information found on Western Newspapers is marginal at best. As my knowledge of Chinese is very basic, I encountered some problems here. Beside those hurdles, it also became obvious that not much research is done about the effects of the electoral reform in Taiwan so far, beside the effective number of parties. Just to name a few questions that emerged during the research: Are elections becoming more tailored to the median voter as predicted and is extreme campaigning disappearing? Is there a change of the intra-party competition, especially the factions? Are there changes in pork-barrel politics? How about the party cohesion? In the Japanese case research about these question is plentiful and was already undertaken in the 1990s right after only one election under the new electoral system. While it is possible that research is done in Chinese and access was not granted and understanding of the language was not possible on my part, the difference in the degree of research was striking.

In Japan the question arose about the possible emergence of a new postmaterialistic issue dimension about nuclear power and the importance among the populace about it. There was hardly any information found, beside the ongoing protests in the media. Furthermore the peace cleavage that polarized Japan in the 1960s, has become of high relevance again this summer with the re-interpretation of the constitution, but whether this will lead to a polarization again remains to be seen, even if protests occur throughout Japan. Thus a future research would be needed to look closer at changes caused by the Great Earthquake of 2011 on policy appeals and voters’ support, as well as the possible re-emergence of the peace cleavage.

Summary and Outlook
The findings of the development under MMM system show how relevant it is to look at actual case studies and over a longer period of time in order to make better choices in political engineering. The DPP had planned to increase their vote and seat share by adopting the MMM system. But in the end, this backfired, as even though the vote share increased after the electoral reform, the seat share has decreased dramatically. In Japan, many changes in the party system only occurred due to other reforms and political actors taking initiatives, as well as due to exogenous developments like the increased popularity of the mass media for campaigning. Furthermore, the MMM system led to an actual increase of legislative parties in Japan. The promise of two viable large parties that would alternate in governing proved to be a double-edge sword, as the two major parties are too ideological converged now to offer a real alternative. It remains to be seen if a real alternation of power will become the norm in Japan as at the moment it looks rather as if the DPJ gambled the electorate’s trust away during their governing period.

Looking at the results of the reform in Japan, it definitely brought more dynamic into the party system. In comparison, the SNTV system with the quite large district magnitudes led to elections that were mere referenda for the LPD, but never really punished the LPD. Now the
nature of SMD is leading to clear vote swings, reflecting changes of the voters’ support. As was predicted and expected, party realignments were started with the reform, and mergers, alliances and coalitions became the norm. The alternation of power also was reached. The manifold problems caused by the SNTV system though could not be all solved by simply switching the electoral system. So here the promises were not fulfilled.

In Taiwan the period to judge the reform may be too short yet. What is striking though, is that the Taiwanese party system is not in turmoil. It was not part of the thesis to analysis this, but a possible reason could be how the reform was initiated in the first place. In Japan, it was only achieved by splinter parties from the LPD, which also marked the beginning of party realignments. But in Taiwan, the parties sooner or later all agreed to the electoral reform, and no struggles within the party system emerged. The reform brought no real changes to the party system in Taiwan so far. Minor parties still resist mergers and alliances. If this strategy will work over a longer period of time is questionable though, as the psychological factor should sooner or later force minor parties to act.

Furthermore, the reform in Taiwan is actually seen quite critically now. After the extreme landslide victories by the KMT in Taiwan and the too drastic reduction of elective parties, voices not only among the DPP but also among the KMT became loud for yet another electoral reform. However electoral reforms were made very difficult to realize after the last constitutional amendment in Taiwan. Thus it seems rather unlikely that it can be achieved, even if the KMT and DPP cooperate on this (Kuo & Yeh 2015: 253-254). Also it might be too early in Taiwan to judge the results of the reform as too negatively: in Japan the first analyses of the MMM system also were quite pessimistic about the intended changes that did not seem to occur then (for example Christensen 1998).

This all shows that the results and effects of political engineering are quite difficult to predict. Furthermore, nothing should be judged too hastily. In Taiwan the Sunflower Movement started in 2014 as a protest movement against the KMT’s trade policies with China. In 2015 the Minkuotang split from the KMT and is demanding to reduce the high polarization of the two camps. The KMT lost in the recent local elections and the pan-blue camp lost in popularity support, which could lead to a swing of support towards the independence camp (BBC 2015). These developments together with the mechanical and psychological factors of the MMM system may lead to party realignments in the near future. The DPP never really lost their voters’ trust, in comparison with the DPJ. This is reflecting in their increasing vote shares even under the new MMM system. Thus a voters’ shift as well as a better cooperation of the pan-green camp may lead to the first alternation of power under the MMM system.

In Japan too, much is going on at the moment. Under PM Abe a right shift in the LPD started in 2013. The LPD is now appealing for more nationalistic policies and aggressive foreign policies (Hrebenar 2015: 192-193). Further PM Abe is pushing several unpopular policies through the HR, among them the re-interpretation of the constitution and the restart of the nuclear power plants. So far, “Abenomics” was among the major reasons for Abe’s electoral successes. But recent economic developments do not show the intended results of the economic reforms, as Japan’s economy is still shrinking (The Guardian 2015). This might lead to a popularity shift back to the DPJ, but only if the DPJ is taking a counter position to the LPD on policy settings. While the party system is in turmoil, actually the two largest parties LPD and DPJ are not affected by it. But the realignment of them (or better of their internal factions)
would be necessary to bring forth a more distinctive party system with concrete policy appeals to give voters an alternative to choose from. Further the DPJ has to gain back the electorate’s trust, before it can return to power.

Thus nothing is certain in both polities at the moment. While electoral systems are important for setting the rules of the game and creating the environment for political competition and party systems, exogenous factors also play an important role in what decisions political actors make and how party systems are shaped. The electoral reform is more a starting or turning point, but many other factors then influence the developments within the frame of the new electoral system. These should not be left out when political engineering is undertaken. Further the intentions of the reformers have to be clear, and possible negative effects should also be put into consideration before a reform is realized.
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### Appendix 1: Important Abbreviations

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<th>Abbreviation</th>
<th>Description</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>F</td>
<td>Fractionalization</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HC</td>
<td>House of Councilors (Japan)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HR</td>
<td>House of Representatives (Japan)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LY</td>
<td>Legislative Yuan (Taiwan)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>M</td>
<td>District Magnitude</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MMM</td>
<td>Mixed-Member Majoritarian</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PR</td>
<td>Proportional Representative</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PM</td>
<td>Prime Minister (Japan)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SMD</td>
<td>Single-Member District</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SNTV</td>
<td>Single Non-Transferable Vote</td>
</tr>
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</table>
Appendix 2: Abstract

This paper deals with the question how electoral systems affect party systems, and whether exogenous factors influence the party system. Under the assumption of Duverger’s law, majoritarian systems lead to two-party systems and PR systems rather lead to multi-party systems. Yet they are just one variable among many political and societal variables. Thus it is important to take exogenous factors into consideration for party system research as well. Japan and Taiwan offer the opportunity to answer this, as they both first used the rare single non-transferable vote system (SNTV) for parliamentary elections. After their electoral reforms they switched to similar mixed-member majority systems (MMM) that combine majoritarian (SMD) and proportional representative (PR) components. While a lot of research was done about Japan’s electoral reform of 1993, not much research has been done about a comparison between the two countries so far, as the reform in Taiwan occurred only in 2005.

The approach is to split the analysis into two country cases first. There one empirical part deals with the mathematical operationalization of various variables of electoral systems, such as proportionality, threshold, district magnitude and effective number of parties. The analysis here will be on a nationwide level. In Japan the analysis encompasses the period from 1958 to 2014 and in Taiwan from 1992 to 2012. The other empirical part covers societal and political developments within the polity, like social cleavages, policy settings and polarization of the party system. Afterwards the chapter of country comparison analysis follows. This chapter puts into comparison the electoral systems of Japan and Taiwan and the mechanical factors in terms of similarities or differences. Further societal and party system developments are compared whether they are similar in both countries or not.

Findings of the paper are that under SNTV an equilibrium of the number of party was reached in both countries. The SNTV system further stabilized the electoral outcomes more. Minor parties easily found representation but when the equilibrium of the number of parties was reached, no new party managed to establish itself over a long time. Within the framework of the electoral system, a multi-party system slowly formed in Japan and Taiwan. But in Japan the predominant party remained in power until the electoral reform of 1993, while in Taiwan an alternation of power already occurred before the electoral reform of 2005. Further due to high polarization of the party system in Japan, new parties that formed during the SNTV system were centrist parties. In Taiwan, the two largest parties became more moderate resulting in the formation of new more extreme parties, which then led to a polarization into two major political camps.

The switch to the MMM system resulted in Japan in a party turmoil, that is still ongoing. No equilibrium was reached so far, even if the tendency is going towards a two-party system. Further two large viable parties exist now in Japan and an alternation of power occurred in 2009. Yet due to the mix of SMD and PR components, the MMM system still allows the representation of many minor parties. Further the growing number of floating voters and the nature of the MMM system lead to more drastic electoral results.

In Taiwan, parties and the electorate needed at least one election to adapt to the new system. This is reflected in the extreme outcome of the first parliament elections in 2008. Minor parties are having more difficulties to find representation in the parliament than in Japan. Yet the party system that established itself in the early 2000s remains mostly intact now, even though the effective number of parties has decreased to two now.
The results show that the consequences of political engineering are difficult to predict. The new electoral system was said to reduce the manifold problems of the SNTV system, but it took longer than many expected in Japan. Further those changes are not necessarily caused by the electoral system, but by other reforms, political actors and exogenous factors. In Taiwan especially the second largest party that had pushed for the reform is now the looser, as the seat share for them decreased under the new system even though their vote share has increased.
Appendix 3: Zusammenfassung


Appendix 4: Curriculum Vitae

Silvia Höger

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Education

11.2012 – present  | Master Study East Asian Economy and Society at University of Vienna
10.2011 – 08.2012  | Academic exchange year at Tohoku University, Japan
03.2010 – 02.2011  | Study of Business Administration at Vienna University of Economics and Business
10.2009 – 11.2012  | Bachelor Study Japanology at University of Vienna, graduated
10.2008 – 07.2009  | Study of Intercultural Communication (Translation) at University of Vienna
09.2000 – 06.2008  | High School GRG15 Diefenbachgasse, Wien

Abroad Experiences

04.08.2014 – 29.08.2014 | Intensive Chinese language course
                         | National Cheng-Kung University, Tainan
01.10.2011 – 31.08.2012 | Study abroad in Japan
                         | National Tohoku University, Sendai
16.08.2010 – 11.09.2010 | Volunteer at a Japanese farm
                         | Flowergarden Iijima, Japan

Other Skills

Languages: German (mother tongue), English (fluent), Japanese (advanced), Chinese (basic)
IT-Skills: Office, Adobe Photoshop
Hobbies: Reading and music, skiing, Japanese culture