Titel der Master-Thesis
„A European Army: Realistic project or utopic vision? “

Verfasserin
Jessica Fernandes, BA

angestrebter akademischer Grad
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Betreuer: Doz. Dr. habil. Wolfgang MUELLER
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Introduction

Since the very beginning of its foundation, the European Union (EU), at that time: European Communities (EC), followed the ideology of a peace-keeping concept. This concept was built on the idea that through a common trade market and the common regulation of trade, a sustainable peace within the Community would be reached.

As the years passed by, this ratio proved to be true: For over 60 years now, no war has occurred within the union. Initially, the focus was on economic matters. An alliance of states, has evolved over the years. In addition to economic integration, integration with regard to other matters and common policies have become necessary.

The creation of a common trade system raised the security aspect of such a union. Common trade would adhere to security within the system, but to ensure security within this apparatus and at the same time contribute to further trade, there was a persistent need for the parallel creation of a military and political body which would frame the economic parts and enhance security. By following a logical reasoning, questions about security and how to best ensure it necessarily involve the creation of an army to defend against possible risks and threats.

Thus, it is not surprising that the EU as a peace and security oriented concept has already dealt with questions regarding the necessity for and creation of a common defense policy and a European Army. The question first came up with the idea of creating a European Defense Community (EDC). A European army was part of the EDC-framework and although the project failed to be established, the dilemma is a recurrent subject on the agenda of the EU, even if the reasons behind a defense cooperation and building a common army may have varied over time.

The idea of establishing common European armed forces has been widely discussed in Europe and the conception today suggests three key arguments in favor of merging European forces. Firstly, the European states increasingly have common interests. Secondly, the circumstances which surround common risks and threats. Thirdly, the member states are all confronted with declining defense budgets.

However, important limitations and obstacles of a political, legal and cultural nature persist. Decisions about war and peace have traditionally been the choice of states, and the protection of its territory and citizens have been considered the sovereign responsibility of a state.
Consequently, national laws regulate nearly every aspect dealing with the military. Despite the fact that European militaries are increasingly operating shoulder to shoulder in operations from Afghanistan to Somalia, each nation has a distinct strategic and military culture.

Examining the current state of affairs, a way of cooperation between de EU countries has been achieved through the delegation of nationally owned resources to a multinational structure. A good example may be the Movement Coordination Centre Europe (MCCE), created in 2007. Its mission is to coordinate transport (air and sea) and air-to-air refueling capabilities of participating countries so that they may be used more efficiently.

Furthermore, European governments are currently in the process of stepping up the European Air Transport Fleet (EATF), which will place European airlift fleets under the recently established European Air Transport Command (EATC) in Eindhoven.

Another example for cooperation is the introduction of the Battlegroup Concept, through which the EU formed a military instrument at its disposal for early and rapid responses when necessary.

In brief, it can be stated that since the beginnings of a Union of the European States, security and defense matters, their common regulation and outreach it should imply have been a highly discussed subject not only within the Union’s institutions, but also in scientific debates, in the Medias, etc.

This paper aims to discuss if a European army constitutes a realistic project or merely appear as a utopic vision. To this end we are going to analyze the necessity and feasibility of a common army within the European Union. This paper will be therefore divided into two parts; the first one examining the necessity and the second one, the feasibility of a European army. The questions which will stand in the focus of this paper will address in one hand the evolution of the CFSP on the EU until today and, one a second hand, deal with the practicability of a European Army. To this aim, this paper will examine the need of a Strategic Culture for the creation of an EU army and analyze the Member States’ reactions to Jean-Claude Juncker’s latest call for a joint army of the European Union.

The necessity of an army will be examined through the development of a common European defense policy, starting with the first attempts of joined security. These efforts had already begun by the end of World War II and are still on the top of the European integration today. The first attempts for the creation of a European Army occurred in the beginning of a post-
world-war integration process. But even the failure of a European Army in 1957 within the EDC-framework, has not impeded several undertakings being engendered since then. The past actions to ensure and build up a common defense strategy constitute the roots and contributed to the contemporary Common Security and Defense Policy (CSDP) of the European Union. The fact remains that if a common defense policy had never been necessary, there would have not been any engagement in that direction.

So, the presentation of the development of coordinated defense policies will be the subject of the first part of this essay. Setting as a starting point, the common defense strategy under the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and the first exclusively European attempt to build a defense system with the European Defense Community, this chapter will contribute to the understanding of the European defense policy as it is known today. This examination of the development of the CSDP will help to clarify if and why Common European forces are essential for the EU.

Although no common army has been reached until now, the member states of the European Union all dispose of military forces and facilities. With the increase of common threats e.g. the imminence of Islamism, the threats from Russian aggression particularly in Ukraine, cyber-attacks, etc., there should be an effective coordination of these military infrastructures in order to face these risks and dangers in a most productive form. Even though multinational forms of cooperation in defense matters among the European Member States is the preferred mean of action, there are some joint European defense assets, which have been established to the present date.

The second part of this paper will expose the capabilities and institutions created in the EU as common military instruments. The CSDP and the military capabilities will be laid down on a first section. The second part will focus on the reasons hindering the further development of CSDP and argue the need of a common strategic culture for the establishment of a Common Army. Furthermore, the second part will lay down the concept of pooling and sharing, as a mean to encourage military cooperation between the Member States of the European Union. The conclusion of this chapter should lead to a comprehensive approach to the benefits which could result from of the establishment of a European Army and the feasibility of this project. The opinion of the Member States as well as of the reactions from Russia, NATO and the USA shall also illuminate the attainability of the idea.
If necessary or not, if feasible or not, the European Army has once again been at the top of the discussed matters. Most recently, the current President of the European Commission, Jean-Claude Juncker, called for a European Army in order to strengthen the position of the Union in the exercise of its foreign relations. The last part of this paper will therefore tie in with Juncker’s generated discussion and sum up if his proposal goes beyond a utopic vision and finally constitutes a realizable project.

Overall, this paper focuses on a comprehensive study on the question of the necessity and feasibility of an Army of the European Union, enabling the answering of the question whether it can be realized or not. The division into two parts may clarify the diverse issues calling for common armed forces and thus, demonstrate the necessity of it. Equally, it will highlight the difficulties and obstacles to realize the project, accounting for the feasibility or not of a European Army.

This paper is based on the analysis of scholarly literature. To guarantee the response of the research questions, the literature used is going to focus itself on scientific studies particularly from political science and humanities. The literature has been selected as to reflect basic currents of the scientific debates. An important work is therefore Howorth Jolyon’s book “Security and Defense Policy in the European Union”. Furthermore, several academic essays and papers will be analyzed. One example whose relevance is undeniable is Benjamin Zyla’s and Peter Schmidt’s “European Security Policy: Strategic Culture in Operation.

Additionally, in order to achieve the aim of this paper, information provided by the EU and its institutions, as well as articles of EU or NATO treaties, will be consulted. Finally, to analyze the reaction of the Member States to the latest proposal of the creation of a European Army, some recent media reports will be closely examined.

There might be aspects of a European Army, however, which might be difficult to highlight, due to the challenge to acquire pertinent information regarding them. These aspects might concern the actual loss of sovereignty the member states would have to face/encounter and the structure of such an Army. Would a European Army imply that the whole national military infrastructure of the several member states underlay European command? What would be the scope of this command and how would it be constituted? On the other hand, the term “army” might just not fit the purposes sought by the establishment of such a European common armed forces, given its very national characteristic. Would the employment of an alternative wording, which would perhaps better fit with the supranational character of the EU, make
such an apparatus more acceptable and, at the same time, more realizable? The answer to these questions may finally be more decisive when looking for the realistic or utopian feature of the project.

I. The Defense of Europe…

The subject of defense, especially in the contemporary globalized world, covers more than just purely the military aspect. It encompasses the whole field of economics, ideology, propaganda, and, the entire political current of our lives. Therefore, though I shall largely confine myself here to the military aspect of the question, it is not for a lack of appreciation of the other sides of the subject; this paper aims at analyzing the necessity and potential degree of realization (or not) a European Army or organized common European forces, holds.

As the military aspect figures as a substantial component of a defense system, it is appropriate to examine the development of the European defense policy. The purpose of this chapter therefore is to itemize the milestones of the evolution of the Common Security and Defense Policy (CSDP) with a particular focus on the development of common armed forces.

I.i …in the aftermath of World War II

The idea of a union or an alliance of the European countries had been on the agenda since the emergence of the modern state in the mid-17th century facing the long and often violent history of the European continent. Philosophers, as well as political thinkers, imagined a united Europe, which would triumph over national interests and allegiances. However, it is only after both world wars that the countries which formed the European Communities, as a basis of the contemporary European Union, choose to limit their own sovereignty in favor of collective peace, economic integration and supranational governance. European politicians wanted above all to end international discord, foster social harmony, and promote economic well-being. Facing the growing awareness that the guarantee of their collective security hangs in an uncomfortable balance between dependence and autonomy, European integration was
regarded as the only and the most effective way to peace and prosperity for the European Continent.

Thus, the direct aftermath of World War II was characterized by alliances which should prevent and minimize the risks of new escalations and protect the European populations from the sufferings additional wars would bring. These post-1945 attempts for a common European Defense were moved largely by fear of a possible resurgent Germany and the perceived growing Soviet threat.

The US played a major role in the integration process of the Western European countries at that time. In an economic aspect in the form of the Marshall Plan and in the creation of the OEEC as a means to better coordinate the Plan, the US were not only a substantial financial aid, but also contributed to the first steps of European Integration. The Marshall Plan and the OEEC are not going to be closely examined in this paper, but they are worth mentioning. Given the general fragility of Western Europe and its military limitations facing the perceived strength of the Soviet Union, the need for a military and political equivalent to the Marshall Plan and the OEEC became obvious (Urwin, 1994). Military cooperation was needed to develop in parallel with economic and political progress in order to achieve security.

This focus set, Western European Democracies came together in order to elaborate frameworks and projects for enhanced military cooperation and for the development of a collective defense system.

The Dunkirk Treaty signed in March 1947 between France and the United Kingdom set the first milestone of a cooperated defense in the Western-European continent. This Treaty of Alliance and Mutual Assistance against a possible German attack can be seen as the starting point for an attempt to develop a Western European Defense Group and a North Atlantic security system (Baylis, 1982).

This was quickly expanded by the Brussels Treaty 1948 and the creation of the Western European Defense Union, whereby Belgium, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, France and the United Kingdom pledged mutual assistance against aggression. Besides containing a mutual defense clause, the Brussels Treaty envisaged the establishment of a permanent military committee which would draw up defense plans and coordinate military activity. In practice, however, nothing substantial was done and this concept was finally overtaken by the North Atlantic Treaty which led to the establishment of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization.
(NATO). The latter focused on the perceived Soviet threat emphasized by the Communist Coup in Prague and the first Berlin Blockade (Quinlan, 2001).

Other Western European States, especially in Scandinavia were reluctant to become involved in security pacts and preferred keeping their traditional neutrality by resisting any involvement in a military bloc by either side. Sweden proposed the creation of a Nordic Pact, which however became quickly insignificant as the USA declined the proposal for any kind of commitment to it (Urwin, 1994). In the end, Denmark and Norway joined NATO. Sweden did not join the NATO in order to preserve Finland from a greater soviet pressure and both remain until the present date, out of a NATO membership.

I.ii ....within NATO

Though it cannot be conceptualized as an exclusive European cooperation in the provision and use of military facilities, the creation of the NATO cannot be neglected when analyzing the development of the European Defense Policy and therefore, requires further illustration.

As already mentioned before, the Treaty of Brussels can be held as the precursor of the NATO Agreement. Facing the Soviet threat and the fear of a revival of nationalist militarism in Europe, particular from Germany, the Western countries i.e. the USA, Canada, the UK, France, Luxembourg, Belgium, the Netherland, Italy, Denmark, Norway, Portugal and Iceland agreed to enter in a military arrangement for the collective defense of Western Europe (Urwin, 1994). This alliance consisted essentially of a defensive agreement and (particularly from a US point of view) a key element of a strategy to contain Communism. The terms of the pact included the promise of the member states to provide military forces according to their means. A common Atlantic or European army, though, was not the intention and NATO until today has not developed fully and effective integrated forces. Each member country would provide its own battalions which would be subject to orders from the NATO chain of command. The USA, as the dominant partner, was obviously the dominant military commander (Urwin, 1994).

NATO has stood from the outset for something which goes beyond a strictly European defense organization. Taking a skeptical point of view, even a lack of integration can be seen in the fact of the US’ dominant role in the administration control, but also in two other aspects as illustrated by Derek Urwin in his book on the history of European Integration:
“Whereas the Brussel Treaty had guaranteed automatically assistance to any signatory under threat, under the NATO agreement, a member state need only take “such action as it deems necessary”. The qualification had been added at the insistence of the United States, which did not want involvement without discretion: and since American involvement was the main objective of the exercise, Western Europe, no matter what its opinion might be, had to defer. In addition, there was nothing in the agreement which specifically forbade members from decreasing their defense expenditure (...) or even from using NATO-designated forces for other tasks in other parts of the world (...)”. (Urwin, 1994:24)

Nevertheless, Article 5 of the Washington Treaty alias North Atlantic Treaty stated that: “The Parties agree that an armed attack against one or more of them in Europe or North America shall be considered an attack against them all (...)” (NATO: A short history) making the contracting parties allies, although without creating a military structure which could coordinate their actions in an effective way.

This changed quickly with the growing concerns about the Soviet actions and intentions which reached their apex in 1949 with the detonation of a Soviet atomic bomb and the outbreak of the Korean War 1950. The Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers Europe (SHAPE) with US General Dwight D. Eisenhower as the first Supreme Allied Commander Europe was established along with the nomination of NATO’s first Secretary General, Lord Ismay of the United Kingdom, as the chairman of the NATO Council.

Over the years, NATO expanded, including more member parties and developing its structure to enhance effectiveness in the defense of the allied Western democracies and their values.

At this point, the illustrations made above are sufficient for the understanding of the development of the European Security and Defense Policy. Further clarifications will be made in the following steps when needed for the understanding of the matter.

In a first place, it is adequate to know how and under which events the creation of the NATO occurs. Moreover, it highlights the need for military enforcement in the European continent and how it has led to further steps in the European Defense integration in the following years.
The events of the international scene at the time claimed for an effective security plan for Western Europe by the Western European countries. Besides the apparent growing Soviet threat and the outbreak of the Korean War, the Western European Countries were facing a question which could only be solved by themselves and thus, without the leading hand of the United States. This question concerned the rearmament of Western Germany and how the West German resources could be mobilized to strengthen the West. The US set pressure, calling for the Western European Countries to find a cooperated solution in order to effectively ensure security in the continent.

In October 1950, the first attempt to create of an integrated European force under a collective European political authority was initiated. The Prime Minister of France, René Pleven, proposed this ambitious concept of a European Defense Community (EDC) (Quilan, 2001). The Treaty Constituting the European Defense Community held in its introduction that:

“\textit{The President of the Federal Republic of Germany, His Majesty the King of the Belgians, the President of the French Republic, the President of the Italian Republic, Her Royal Highness the Grand Duchess of Luxembourg, Her Majesty the Queen of the Netherlands, resolved to contribute to the maintenance of peace, particularly by ensuring the defense of Western Europe against any aggression, in cooperation with the free nations, in the spirit of the United Nations Charter, and in close liaison with organization having the same purpose; (…).}” (EDC Treaty, 1952).

In its original form, the EDC aimed at integrating the defense of its members within a supranational project, establishing \textit{“common institutions, common armed forces and a common budget”}, as well as \textit{“common armament programs”}. The EDC would have ensured the security of its members, in the framework of the NATO and based on similar collective defense provisions to NATO's Article 5. The \textit{“European Defense Forces”} would have replaced members' national armed forces, with few exceptions (Koutrakos, 2013).

Furthermore, the purpose of the EDC to keep West Germany out of NATO and prevent the creation of any German military formations cannot be neglected.

The project of a European Defense Community (also called the \textit{“Pleven-Plan”}) was rejected by the French National Assembly in 1954. The essential point for this paper, however, is the idea of a common European Army which should have been created with the establishment of
the EDC. It was indeed the first time that the idea was officially proposed and discussed and that an army was deemed necessary to deal with common threats, as well as to solve collective issues.

I.iv …within the Western European Union

After the failure of the ECD, the Western European Union (WEU) was established in 1954 on the basis of the Brussels Treaty of 1948. One of the immanent questions which led to the further elaboration of the Brussels Treaty was the fact that an alternative to the ECD had to be found in order to integrate the Federal Republic of Germany into the Western Security System.

As stated in the Preamble of the Treaty establishing the Western European Union, the objectives of this new international organization are:

“To create in Western Europe a firm basis for European economic recovery;
To afford assistance to each other in resisting any policy of aggression;
To promote the unity and encourage the progressive integration of Europe. ” (WEU: History of WEU).

The WEU played an important role by promoting the development of consultation and cooperation in Western Europe. In its early years, it permitted the integration of the Federal Republic of Germany into the Atlantic Alliance, the restoration of confidence among Western European countries by assuming responsibilities for arms control, the settlement of the Saar problem and consultation between the European Community founding Member States and the United Kingdom (WEU: History of WEU).

Under the Amsterdam Treaty, the WEU was given an integrative role in giving the EU an independent defense capability. Furthermore “The WEU was the only existing security structure which acted as an interface between the EU and the NATO, but it was too weak politically, too insignificant militarily and too unwieldy institutionally to be able to carry out the major responsibilities which were being thrust upon it. ” (Howorth, 2014:6).

In 2000, under the Marseille Declaration the WEU Ministers agreed to transfer the WEU’s capabilities and functions to the European Union under its CSDP (EEAS: About CSDP).
The adoption of the Treaty of Lisbon finally incorporated the mutual assistance clause, incorporating all tasks and functions of the WEU into the EU. Subsequently, the organization was closed on 30th June 2011 (EEAS: About CSDP).

I.v …with the Fouchet Plan, the European Political Cooperation and the Single European Act

The end of the 1950s marked a new period in the development of European integration. Intergovernmentalism gained drive and European unification was to be achieved through closer cooperation by the Member States and regular consultations among governments. This was partly due to General the Gaulle’s appointment as head of government in France and his call for “an independent political authority capable of asserting itself in the world” (Neisser, 2014:20) for Europe. This idea was elaborated in a proposal called the “Fouchet Plan”, after the French Ambassador in Copenhagen, Christian Fouchet, who chaired the discussions (Neisser, 2014).

The Fouchet Plan aimed at an intergovernmental cooperation in foreign policy and defense, in contrast to the supranational structures of the Communities, and outlined a framework that included a ministerial council, a European Political Commission composed of senior foreign ministry officials preparing and implementing the decisions of the Council and a European Parliament in form of a consultative assembly of delegated national parliamentarians (Fouchet Plan I, Art. 4, 7 and 9).

However, the lack of supranationalism generated fear of an unbalanced hegemony of some member states (especially France and Germany) over the others, which made the plan incompatible with European integration. Other member states resisted the idea and the Fouchet Committee collapsed in 1962.

At this point, it is worth mentioning the Elysée Treaty as it was central for the ability to ensure further integration within the Community. Even though it consisted of an intergovernmental agreement between two EC Member States, it made further steps towards EU-supranationality possible in the first place. This Franco-German Treaty of Friendship and Reconciliation was an essential step in the process of “rapprochement” between France and
Germany. In this treaty both sides pledged “to consult each other, prior to any decision, on all questions of foreign policy (...) with a view to reaching an analogous position.” (Dinan 1994: 43). The Elysée Treaty was a cornerstone of closer political and economic integration. The relations between France and Germany improved rapidly and both became a major driving force of European Integration.

Further decisive steps in European defense integration were then taken with the then enlargement of the Community and particularly with the accession of the United Kingdom. The gaining political weight of the European Community meant that coordination towards foreign matters became unavoidable (CVCE, 2012).

At the Hague Summit of 1969, the Foreign Ministers of the six EC members were instructed to draw up a report on the potential for cooperation in foreign policy. As a result, the Davignon Report was adopted in 1970, laying down the so-called COREU (Correspondance européenne) system. This system included regular meetings and reports on political cooperation and made up a network by which the foreign ministers of the member states exchanged information in varied forms. This network was an essential tool for European political cooperation and has been kept as part of the CFSP (Neisser, 2014).

The Davignon Report held that:

“Governments will consult each other on all important policy questions and will work out priorities, observing the following criteria: - the purpose of consultation is to seek common policies on practical problems; - the subject dealt with must concern European interests whether in Europe itself or elsewhere where the adoption of a common position is necessary or desirable. On these questions, each State undertakes as a general rule not to take up final positions without prior consultations with its partners within the framework of the political cooperation machinery.” (Hill/ Smith, 2000: 104).

The European Political Cooperation was seen as the first attempt in the European integration process to set up a system of cooperation in foreign policy as foreseen in the Davignon Report (Neisser, 2014). To this end and due to an intergovernmental form of cooperation, the European Council was given a preeminent role in the formulation and implementation of a common foreign policy. In order to find a common point of view, States would undertake to define the broad guidelines for their policy within the European Council, which later would have the obligation to reach a common decision on specific questions (Hill/ Smith, 2000).
This underlines the very essence of integration: states will have to accept that some of their desires will not be fulfilled in favor of greater integration.

Within the meaning of a cooperated foreign policy, the Member States of the EC published the “Document of the European Identity” in 1973. This Document somewhat defined the relations between the EC member states with other countries and where the EC placed itself in world affairs (Neisser, 2014).

Practically viewed, the EPC was not really effective though. Through the EPC, the EC was able to present a common stance in the negotiations in the first round of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe which finally led to the conclusion of the Helsinki Final Act in 1975. This was indeed a success; however, the inadequacy of the EPC became obvious when the EC attempted to negotiate a broad political and economic agreement with the USA. The EPC was insufficiently flexible to enable the USA to take part in the Intra-European negotiations on the future of Western European Security. Moreover, the EPC did not provide the EC with the ability to negotiate with its partners with a single voice, which complicated the consultations. (Neisser, 2014).

The European Single Act formally enshrined the EPC in 1987 in the first and comprehensive revision of the founding treaties (Eur-Lex: Common Foreign and Security Policy). Besides aiming at the establishment of a Single Market by the end of 1992, it also introduced provisions of intergovernmental cooperation in foreign policy. The SEA stressed the intergovernmental aspect of the EPC and of the cooperation in foreign policy.

I.vi Preliminary Conclusion

These attempts endorsed since the 1950s show how the Member States of the Community tried to create an institutional framework in order to establish an effective common foreign policy and a common defense system. These early efforts clarified above are embedded in the atmosphere of the Cold War. The bipolarization of the world in two distinguished camps had an undeniable influence on the attempts of the EU to coordinate its defense capacity, reducing these efforts to attempts to outright dependence on the USA (Cogan, 2001).
It can be concluded that from 1957 to 1999, for nearly 40 years, the attempts of the Union to forge a coordinated defense capacity were somewhat unsubstantial and the results were poor (Howorth, 2014:2), making the EU an essentially “civilian” actor.

Many scholars link this expression to the fact that the Union’s focus during this period of time centered on “the core policy areas of trade and economics, its existence as an institutions-driven project rooted in international law, and its total absence from the military ambition of coercive diplomacy area.” (Howorth, 2014). The attempts of the member states to achieve coherence and coordination in their foreign policies from the 1970s onwards, were essentially done through the informal channels of the European Political Cooperation (Howorth, 2014) and only allowed for a minimalist alignment on the matter.

Howorth traced the failure of the above efforts back to what he called the “Euro-Atlantic Security Dilemma” (Howorth, 2005), holding that “the most significant factor which stymied these early efforts was the contradiction between the respective positions of France and the UK. For 50 years, Britain and France effectively stalemated any prospect of serious European cooperation on security issues by their contradictory interpretations of the likely impact in Washington of the advent of serious European military muscle. (…). London tended to fear that if Europe demonstrated genuine ability to take care of itself military, the US would revert in nationalism. (…). Paris, on the other hand, expressed confidence that the US would take even more seriously allies who take themselves seriously. Both approaches were based on speculation and on normative aspirations rather than on hard strategic analysis.” (Howorth, 2014:3).

The first attempts were therefore highly linked with the achievement of a common European identity and the surpassing of contradictions within the EC. At that time, there was no question about EU autonomous military assets and capabilities. Instead, it was rather a question of finding agreement on a common position on foreign matters and thus creating a common base on which further integration could be built up on further steps. The regulation of a common European identity would have at least two consequences regarding the CFSP. On the first hand, it refers to the question who represents the EU (and speaking for its common identity) in international relations, and on a second hand, which external means does the EU have to implement the CFSP (Koehler, 2014). The further integrative steps undertaken by the EU in the post-Cold War period would soon bring clarifications to these issues.
The necessity of a common defense system, however, was already clear in the early ages of the EC and even the better realization of such a system with a common European Army eventually was highly considered as can be noticed with the EDC.

I.vii Post-Cold War Developments

The developments of the EU’s target to become a security actor in its early years can be seen as a somewhat daunting effort. Though many initiatives were undertaken, the results of these may be considered as disappointing and to some extent useless in practice as it was clarified with the Wars Of Yugoslav Secession from 1991 to 1999. Indeed, the breaking apart of Yugoslavia constituted the first direct security challenge facing the EU in the post-Cold War period.

Furthermore, the Common Security and Foreign Policy (CFSP) was set in motion in particular this moment of the outbreaks at the Maastricht European Council in December 1991 (Howorth, 2014): “The violence which engulfed former Yugoslavia was a wake-up call for the whole of Europe.” (Howorth, 2014:5).

But also the developments occurring shortly before the Yugoslavian Wars had an impact on the political landscape of Europe and required a change in the conception of security and defense matters within the EC. The revolution in Central and Eastern Europe in the course of 1989 and the German unification in 1990 forced foreign and security policy in the EU’s agenda (Neisser, 2014): “In April 1990 the French and German governments proposed, that the planned intergovernmental conference should formulate a Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) as a central feature of the EU.” (Neisser, 2014:25)

Nonetheless, the Yugoslavian Wars constituted the trigger to ask about the military aspect of the European Common Foreign and Security Policy. Facing the challenge of containing this new threat, which lay inside the boundaries (with Greece, Austria and Italy) of the European Union, the EU had to face the fact that European military forces were just too poorly configured to intervene. Imbedded in the NATO framework, the EU could just hope for an intervention together with the US. The US however, did not have “a dog in that fight” (Baker, 1995) and the Clinton-administration had to recognize that there could be crisis in Europe in which the US did not want to intervene (European Union, 1995-2015) and, thus, was in favor of the idea of constructing a European
pillar within the NATO, a so-called European Security and Defense Identity (ESDI). This ESDI allowed European forces, in crisis-situations in which the US had little or no interest in, to borrow American military assets via NATO and to organize Europe’s security arrangements entirely within the NATO framework: “project of generating European Security and defense identity from inside the NATO.” (Howorth, 2014:77).

While procedure was a first attempt, it remained unsatisfactory for both sides: The US showed themselves to be not that eager to provide their military assets to European forces which they would not have control over and the Europeans had reservations that EU forces would be “double-hatted”- available to an US-commander or to a hypothetical EU-commander (Howorth, 2014:76).

Before the ESDI, the deployment of EU armed forces had been discussed in Petersberg in 1992 within a WEU framework. During this meeting, the problem of developing a serious EU military capacity that would allow the Union to assume responsibility for the new crisis management and containment tasks of the post-Cold War world, were the center of discussions.

The so-called Petersberg Tasks involved humanitarian and rescue tasks, peacemaking tasks and tasks of combat forces in crisis management including peacemaking and requested a fundamental transformation of the EU’s capacity to provide deployable, professional intervention forces (Ortega, 2005). The questions which inevitably entered these discussions were if these forces were to be found and how to equip these forces in order to tackle crisis management missions (Howorth, 2014).

Concerning the equipment to tackle crisis management missions, stop-gap-measures were elaborated in procedures known as “Berlin plus” which allowed the EU to bridge the lack of capabilities by borrowing necessary assets such as strategic lift, C4I (command, control, communication, computers, and intelligence), and logistic from the US (Koenig, 2010). Strictly EU-units could be put together from the insight of the NATO by generating European Combined Joint Task Forces (CJTFs) (Terriff, 2003):

“Through the CJTF mechanism, NATO member states do not have to actively participate actively in a specific mission if they do not feel their vital interests are involved, but their opting out [...] would not stop other NATO members from participating in an intervention if they so desired.” (Khovanova, 2008:37).
These “Berlin Plus” negotiations started at a ministerial meeting in Berlin 1996 between the NATO and the WEU; the “Berlin Plus” Agreements, however, only came into being in December 2002 (Keohane, 2010).

In the course of this period of time, between 1996 and 2002, the EU’s common security and defense policy moved ahead greatly.

The EU governments formally agreed on the creation of a European Security and Defense Policy (ESDP) in June 1999 as a specific program within the CFSP (King, 2005). The Saint-Malo Declaration in December 1998 is considered as being a milestone in this regard and had major consequences for European military capacity. The Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) was developed as the second, intergovernmental pillar of the Treaty of European Union, signed at Maastricht in December 1991. However, the decisive moment for the development of the CFSP occurred when Britain finally committed itself to a common European defense policy (King, 2005).

In the Joint Declaration on European Defense the President of France, Jacques Chirac, the Prime Minister of France and the Prime Minister of the United Kingdom, Tony Blair, agreed:

“(…) [t]he Union must have the capacity for autonomous action backed up by credible military forces, the means to decide to use them, and a readiness to do so, in order to respond to international crisis.” (Rutten, 2001:8).

It can be deduced from this declaration that Chirac and Blair laid the grounds for the establishment of a military force within the framework of a Common Security and Foreign Policy (CSFP) (Trybus, 2005). An autonomous military force has not been on the agenda since the failure of the EDC and would have represented a major step beyond the *acquis communautaire* of the Maastricht Treaty, which was in force at the time. Such an innovation in the security and defense policy, however, would be insignificant without a structural shift in the basic framework of the CFSP. As a result, the ESDP was designed as a specified program within the CFSP and was ratified at the Treaty of Nice in 2000 (King, 2005).

Furthermore, the declaration also points out the importance of the NATO: “The EU is to act only when NATO as a whole is not involved” (Trybus, 2005:94) and aims essentially to call for an autonomous and comprehensive security and defense policy within the framework of the EU which complies with NATO obligations (Trybus, 2005).
Thus, it is no wonder that issues with regard to how to clarify the role and the position of NATO were at the top of the agenda when it came to the elaboration of the plans for the creation of the ESDP. The main topics of the debate were:

“First, how to develop a close working relationship between the EU and NATO, in particular granting the EU access to NATO military assets. Second, based mainly on the experience of the Kosovo war and the apparent lack of useful military capabilities in Europe, how to ensure compatibility between EU and NATO capability plans.” (Keohane, 2010: 128)

These issues had already been discussed during the Berlin 1996 meeting between NATO and the WEU. The birth of an ESDP in 1999 at the EU Cologne Summit replaced the WEU as the negotiator with the NATO at the “Berlin Plus” Arrangements by the EU, and in January 2001, the EU and NATO engendered direct talks on “Berlin Plus” (Keohane, 2010). The main difference consisted in the fact that, contrary to the WEU, the EU was not a military alliance, but consisted of a political Union, thus emphasizing on diplomatic, political and economic means (Keohane, 2010).

Finally, after long negotiations, the NATO members agreed to give the EU access to NATO assets and capabilities for action in which the NATO as a whole was not militarily engaged, followed by the EU-NATO declaration on ESDP in December 2002 (NATO Press Release, 2002).

The ESDP accounted for a quite incisive shift in the European defense orientation. At the EU Helsinki summit, the EU governments committed to a ‘Headline Goal’ of a European Rapid Reaction Force (ERRF) and, additionally, to supporting naval, aerial and civilian capabilities by 2003. The ERRF consists of a force of 60 000 troops, deployable anywhere within the world within 60 days, capable of fulfilling the Petersberg tasks and sustainable for a year (King, 2005). “The ESDP has effectively created a European Defense Community for the first time, some 50 years after the initial efforts to create a union foundered” (King, 2005:44).

However, the results produced by the “Helsinki Headline Goal” could only be considered as “meagre” (Grevi/ Keohane, 2010:72). In order to improve their performance, the EU government agreed on a new implementation program in 2002. This program, called European Capabilities Action Plan (ECAP), aimed to focus European efforts on acquiring particular crucial assets and, equally significantly, the EU’s equipment goals complemented NATO’s in most areas.
To sum up, the ESDP became operational in 2003 through the initiation of the first ESDP missions. Since then, the EU has launched over twenty crisis management operations and missions (Lindstrom, 2013) and became a truly international actor with operations ranging from southern Europe to Africa, the Middle-East and South-East Asia (Schmidt; Zyla, 2011).

Moreover, the EU presented its first European Security Strategy (EES) in 2003, outlining key threats and challenges facing Europe. The EES provides the conceptual framework for the Common Foreign and Security Policy, which results from the need for a common strategic vision to enhance internal cohesion at EU level (EEAS: About CSDP). This marks the first steps in strategic thinking, rapidly resulting in strategic planning with the formation of the European Union battle groups in 2004 (Schmidt/ Zyla, 2011).

With the entry into force of the Lisbon Treaty in 2009, the ESDP was renamed CSDP and the extension of the “Petersberg Tasks” was formally endorsed. In pursuance of Article 43 (1) of the Treaty of the European Union (TEU), the “Petersberg Tasks” now include:

“(…) joint disarmament operations, humanitarian and rescue tasks, military advice and assistance tasks, conflict prevention and peace-keeping tasks, tasks of combat forces in crisis management, including peace-making and post-conflict stabilization.” (Art. 43 (1) TEU).


Besides the already mentioned expansion of the Petersberg tasks, the Treaty also introduced a number of important new instruments related to the CSDP, including a mutual assistance and a solidarity clause, the creation of a framework for Permanent Structured Cooperation, and the creation of the European External Action Service (EEAS) under the authority of the High Representative for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy (EEAS: About CSDP). The second chapter of this paper will provide a closer examination of the post-Lisbon CSDP innovations.
The Post-Cold War Period and its institutional adjustment

From an institutional perspective, the post-Cold War period and the creation of the CFSP entailed quite drastic changes in the European defense structure. The capacity-building efforts laid down above, included the need for institution-building. There was an urgent need for putting in place governance mechanisms to oversee the planning, deployment and the evaluation of the Union’s CSDP and missions abroad, as well as for the establishment of coordination mechanisms with the United Nations (UN) and the NATO (Schmidt/Zyla, 2011).

As already mentioned, the Treaty of Maastricht in 1992 introduced a system of pillarization: The EU was based on three pillars:

“First pillar: the European Community, embracing the European Coal and Steel Community, the European Economic Community and the European Atomic Energy Community. The European Community was a supranational one. A concept of an economic and monetary union has been established;

Second pillar: the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP), subject to intergovernmental agreement;

Third pillar: police and judicial cooperation in criminal matters, also based on intergovernmental cooperation.” (Neisser, 2014:26).

The Treaty of Maastricht established a Common Foreign and Security Policy as a system of intergovernmental cooperation and brought new goals, new instruments and a new decision-making structure particularly for the CFSP. These were further enhanced by the Treaty of Amsterdam, particularly through the establishment of a “High Representative for the CFSP” (Neisser, 2014).

The Maastricht Treaty is said to have failed to provide for institutional leadership and effective implementation; the EU’s external representation has suffered mainly from three weaknesses: the lack of visibility, continuity and coherence (Neisser, 2014).

The High Representative for the CFSP introduced by the Amsterdam Treaty, a function to be fulfilled by the Secretary-General of the Council, should have been the face of the external representation of the EU (Neisser, 2014): “This function was discussed over years in the idea for a “Mr. or Ms. CFSP”, a high-ranking and special appointment to entrance Union’s
visibility on the international scene.” (Neisser, 2014: 27). The Role of the High Representative for the CFSP was principally to assist the Council in CFSP matters, particularly in assisting in the formulation, preparation and implementation of policy decisions and through conducting political dialogue with third parties as laid down in Article 26 of the TEU (Neisser, 2014).

Furthermore, the Treaty of Amsterdam set up the “Policy Planning and Review Unit” to monitor and analyze developments in areas relevant to the CFSP and provide an evaluation of the interest of the EU’s foreign and security policy, focusing on future assessments and early warning of events with possible repercussions on the Union’s CFSP (Neisser, 2014). The task of the Unit was to improve the cooperation and coordination between the High Representative and the Commission’s Vice President responsible for External Relations and provide institutional bridges between the Union and the Member States. This task should have been perfectly fulfilled through the preparation of long-term study papers, linking the planning staffs of the foreign ministries and the institutions of the EU (Neisser, 2014).

Summing up the role of the CFSP in the Pre-Lisbon era, one can say that it lacked the adequate instrument, ambitions and means to give Europe a strong position in the international scene. “Foreign policy was an example of a policy of the smallest common denominator” (Neisser, 2014:31) in which national interests predominated the common European interests.

Lisbon was assumed to constitute the final stage of institutional adjustment with the fusion of the two key posts of the High Representative and Vice President of the Commission in a single one called the “High Representative of the European Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy”. Another two innovations introduced by the Lisbon Treaty were the creation of the European External Action Service (EEAS) and of the position of a President of the European Council (Eur-Lex: Common Foreign and Security Policy).

Furthermore, the Lisbon Treaty introduced a name change replacing the former ESDP by Common Security and Defense Policy (CSDP), dedicating a new section to this policy in the founding treaties (Eur-Lex: Common Foreign and Security Policy).

The Lisbon Treaty launched the idea and the vision for a more active external role of the EU with a service to support it, the EEAS. It considerably strengthens the EU as an international actor, although unanimity is still the prevailing decision-making procedure in CFSP matters, and, thus, making the implementation of the European foreign policy in concrete situations to
a great extent, dependent on the Member States’ willingness to cooperate and compromise (Koehler, 2010). Nevertheless, critics may state that the Lisbon Treaty generated inter-institutional struggles by making too many actors responsible for the EU representation externally (Dialer, 2014).

I.ix Conclusions on Part I

At this stage, it is important to clarify that although an army may be a component of a defense system, it would be wrong to interpret the Common Security and Defense Policy of the EU as an attempt to create a European Army (Howorth, 2014). Howorth provides three key arguments (Howorth, 2014) against a reasoning which implies that further developments in CSDP would create “the foundations of a European Army” (O’Donnell 2011:426).

Firstly, Howorth refers to the fact that there have never been any suggestions that national military assets should fall under and be permanently reassigned to a European command. Further, he argues that there has never been any question on a common European ownership of weapons systems or of developing a common EU defense budget. Moreover, the EU does not have a single unified political executive, thus a “European army in the strict sense of the term is logically unconceivable and it is unwise to use the expression lightly” (Howorth, 2014:17). The second argument shows that the army which the CSDP amounts to cannot be conceptualized as a “traditional army based on citizen conscripts, but to a professional firefighting force acting in the interest of the Union as a whole” (Howorth, 2014:18). Finally, Howorth stresses that this reasoning does not have any evidence to support it, as a result of the fact that every official EU statement about European defense accentuates that the defense of the European territory remains the sole responsibility of the NATO. He concludes his argumentation by affirming that: “[t]he “Euro-Army” argument is usually either emotive or ideological and designed to evoke strong visceral reactions.” (Howorth, 2014:18).

An Army of the European Union would not engender that a Pole, a Slovene or a German should die for Europe (Howorth, 2014), it would rather ask for an organization which would remain strictly voluntary, consensual and intergovernmental (Howorth, 2014). Further, the term “army” used to describe the kind of cooperated action it would include, might have a too strong connotation in a nationalistic way and consequently, not fit to the supra-nationalistic purposes it aims to attain.
As Howorth states, the term of a European Army in a strict sense cannot be applied, but the recent developments occurring to the CSDP stand for the creation of a European armed force, for use on behalf of the European Union and the wider international community (Howorth, 2014). This European Armed forces have been increasingly deployable over the past years and have several potential uses: As a CSDP force, they can operate under a European Commander and a European flag and use exclusively European military assets. Other circumstances may call for an assignment to NATO, the UN, or even to an ad-hoc coalition (Howorth, 2014).

While throughout the 1990s, the EU sought to discover the necessary and possible framework for its security policy ambitions, most EU member states continued in practice to look for their security and defense requirements to NATO. In 1990, only one (Ireland) of the 12 actual member states was not also a member of the NATO. In 1995 with the accession of Sweden, Finland and Austria, the group of “neutrals” increased to 4 out of 15 member states. With the accession of Central and Eastern European states to the European Union in 2004, 2007 and 2013, nearly 80%* of EU member states were and still are reliant for their defense on NATO (Howorth 2014).

The question which naturally arises here is why should there be a necessity for the EU to engender steps to build up its own autonomous security project (Howorth, 2014). Answers to this question may vary. At this stage, four points may be considered which may have an impact on a European self-ruling security policy.

First, the EU as a comprehensive project started with an economic cooperation and later became a political union encompassing more and more aspects which actually belong to the sovereignty of a state. This integration process is the very essence and characteristic of the European Union and working together toward a common security and defense policy naturally follows. An autonomous security projects would continue with this ideology. The idea of further security integration and the creation of a common army already came up with the EDC, showing how the idea of encompassing security and defense areas beneath the EU umbrella has been and is one of the top items on the EU agenda.

Furthermore, the helplessness in crisis containment and crisis management during the outbreak of the Yugoslavian Wars as a result of a lack of military capabilities may have resulted in the Union realizing that the time had come for autonomous military possibilities and options. The steps undertaken since then have been a clear way to ensure European
military assets and capabilities beyond a NATO framework, even though NATO still has and will have a dominant role and function in European security policy.

A third reason why the European Union should engender steps for a security project on its own results from the deep divisions in the transatlantic community exposed through the Iraq War in 2003. The NATO alliance and Europe itself were not able to reach a workable consensus on questions of the legitimacy and efficacy of the use of coercive military power to bring out political change and address perceived security threats (Hyde-Price, 2004). These disagreements raised questions about the future of European security cooperation and of the European strategic culture. After 2003, it was clear that there was a need for a strategic culture beyond NATO’s framework.

Finally, the CSDP is the result of the attempt to tackle security issues through an integrated approach that includes civilian and military instruments. This common European identity is of a crucial importance for the development of military capabilities and assets. In view of the fact that an army would not only secure and afford military strength, but also figure as an undeniable statement of unity between the Member States of the European Union, it would be the clear expression of a consolidated European position on foreign, security and external matters:

"A joint EU army would show the world that there would never again be a war between EU countries. [...] Such an army would also help us to form common foreign and security policies and allow Europe to take on responsibility in the world. [...] …a common European army would convey a clear message (…) that we are serious about defending our European values." (Juncker, 2015).

This chapter has shown through the illustration of the development of the CSDP what it has entailed for the EU and its Member States to agree on what has already been achieved. A European Army would imply even greater concessions.

This part of the paper aimed at illustrating the necessity of a European Army by exposing the historical development of the CSDP. It can be stated that an army has always been considered as a way to raise the effectiveness of the defense system of the EU. The necessity and the benefits it would bring are undeniable as history has already demonstrated and as the considerations drawn in Part II of this paper will confirm. The perpetual rising of common
threats and issues for the EU Member States would definitely be best addressed with coordinated actions and budgets, thus affirming the EU’s strong position to the rest of the world.

II. The EU’s military muscle

The EU has often been characterized as a “civilian power”, relying on Joseph Nye’s conception of “soft power”, which states that a country may obtain the outcome it wants in world politics through the power of attraction and persuasion (Nye, 2004). A “civilian power” in its ideal type, “is an actor which uses civilian means for persuasion, to pursue civilian ends, and whose foreign policy-making process is subject to democratic control or public scrutiny.” (Smith, 2005). This definition implies that no military means may be used for any purpose and that a country may not have any military forces at all, not even if they are for primarily defensive aims.

There has always been some kind of discrepancy within the EU-system concerning further integration, particularly the defense dimension. One side kept pledging that the EU would be somewhat incomplete without a common defense framework while the other side preferred a civilian EU be retained, underlying it with several ideological reasons, for example its attachment to neutrality or a military EU would undermine NATO (Smith, 2005). The latter was to become the dominant conception of a common foreign policy until the late 1990s.

Accordingly, the development of a civilian international identity, which characterized the EUs foreign policy for a long time, was unavoidable:

“The EU was born of an innovative attempt to reduce the threat of war within western Europe, by transforming the anarchic international relations between sovereign states into a law-bound framework resembling domestic politics, and that this experience and philosophy translated into a civilian foreign policy.” (Smith, 2005: 7).

The question arises if the EU can still be seen as a civilian power today or, if it may be conceptualized as a military power. In the last couple of years, the EU has developed and strengthen the military instrument and even if this should only be employed as a residual utensil to safeguard other means of international action, it allows for a reconsideration of the “civilian power” conception (Smith, 2005: 16).
This part of the paper, in fact, shows why the EU cannot be seen as a civilian power EU anymore, as a result of a demonstration of the military muscle of the EU.

The principal aim of this part of the paper, however, will consist of examining the feasibility or not of a European Army. To this end, besides mentioning the present state of defense and military assets of the EU, it will also examine why no further undertaking has been initiated until the present day.

II.i Common Security and Defense Policy

The first Chapter of this paper has already demonstrated how the Common Security and Defense Policy (CSDP) developed as a branch of the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) into its contemporary appearance. The CSDP aims to strengthen the EU’s external abilities and the following part of this paper illustrates the various cooperative structures that have been established within the institutional framework of the Union in order to improve European Defense military capabilities in the field of crisis management and conflict prevention.

First, it should be clarified that the EU does not have its own army or its own defense budget. The member states have full sovereignty over their armed forces and can choose if and in what form they want to contribute to each CSDP operation. The EU institutions cannot tell the Member States how much their national defense budget should be nor how this budget should be spent (Grevi/ Keohane, 2009).

In the previous chapter, we have already mentioned the Petersberg Tasks and their extension in role and scope since the Lisbon Treaty as stated in the Article 43 (1) of the Treaty of the European Union (TEU).

The Lisbon Treaty also introduced the solidarity clause as well as the mutual assistance clause. The solidarity clause is found in Article 222 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU), and states “the Union and its Member States shall act jointly in a

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1 I may refer here to the argumentation drawn in an article of Karen E. Smith “Still “civilian power EU””, where the author gives a perfect explanation why we must today, consider the EUs position between the two ideal-types of civilian and military power and tie this chapter of my thesis to her in the conclusion formulated request “to move on from classifying or categorizing the EU (...) to debating what it actually does (...) in international relations.” (Smith, 2005: 17)
spirit of solidarity if an EU Member State is the object of a terrorist attack or the victim of a natural or man-made disaster” (TFEU; Art. 222). The mutual assistance clause is inspired by the Article V of the WEU Treaty and states: “If a Member State is the victim of armed aggression on its territory, the other Member States shall have towards it an obligation of aid and assistance by all the means in their power, in accordance with Article 51 [the right to self-defence] of the United Nations Charter. This shall not prejudice the specific character of the security and defence policy of certain Member States”. (TEU; Art. 42 (7)).

The mutual assistance clause includes a caveat which provides that “commitments and cooperation in this area shall be consistent with commitments under the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, which, for those States which are members of it, remains the foundation of their collective defense and the forum for its implementation.” (Lisbon Treaty, Article 28A.7). This means that the defense of the Member States of the EU which are also allies of NATO is primarily regulated through NATO.

Furthermore, the establishment of the Permanent Structured Cooperation as an agreement for the “Member States whose military capabilities fulfil higher criteria and which have made more binding commitments to one another in this area with a view to the most demanding missions” (TEU Art. 42.6) is designed to contribute to a new stage in the development of the CSDP. Member States are encouraged to cooperate to reach objectives concerning “expenditure on equipment, harmonize defense apparatuses, when appropriate pool and specialize resources, and coordinate logistics and training” (EEAS, About CSDP). Unlike what is provided in the Treaty provisions on enhanced cooperation, the Permanent Structure Cooperation does not require a minimum number of states. Moreover, this is one of the few areas in the CSDP where decision are taken by qualified majority voting (QMV) and not by unanimity. The European Defense Agency (EDA) is responsible for a regular assessment of the contributions of the Member States.

Finally, Denmark does not need to participate in the "elaboration and the implementation of decisions and actions of the Union which have defense implications”, due to the Danish opt-out (FMD: The Danish Defense opt-out). In practice, this means that Denmark is unable to participate in EU military operations or in the cooperation on development and acquisition of military capabilities within the EU framework, and Denmark will not participate in any decisions or planning in this regard.
The Danish defense opt-out is based on the so-called national compromise which finally resulted in the Edinburgh Agreement in 1992. The Lisbon Treaty did not alter the content of the Danish defense opt-out (FMD: The Danish Defense opt-out).

II.ii Military Capabilities

The EU has managed to organize some strategic capabilities and institutions in order to best encounter crisis management missions.

The military of the European Union encompasses the different cooperative structures that have been established between the armed forces of the Member States within the institutional framework of the Union.

As already mentioned in the previous chapter, since the European Council in Cologne in 1999, measures to ensure autonomous capacity in order to respond to international crisis have been gradually established (EEAS, Military Capabilities). The Military Headline Goals, which appeared for the first time in the Cologne Summit 1991, are designed to ensure that the EU possesses the military capabilities required to conduct the full range of missions encompassed by the Petersberg tasks.

The core military capacity of the EU is the EU Battle Groups. The Battle Group Concept was endorsed at the informal meeting for defense ministers in Brussels in April 2004, where it became a central part of the Headline Goal 2010: “Battle Groups are high readiness forces consisting of 1,500 personnel that can be deployed within 10 days after an EU decision to launch an operation and that can be sustained for up to 30 days (extendible to 120 days with rotation).” (EEAS: Military Capabilities). At the 2004 Military Capability Commitment Conference, Member States made an initial commitment to the formation of 13 EU Battle Groups, with the aim of always having two Battle Groups on standby. On 1 January 2007, the EU Battle Group Concept reached full operational capacity, but the EU Battle Groups have not been deployed yet.

A further strategic asset of the EU consists of the European Union Military Staff (EUMS) working under the direction of the EU Military Committee (EUMC) and under the authority of the High Representative. The EUMS is considered to be “the source of collective (multi-disciplinary) military expertise within the European External Action Service (EEAS)” (EEAS,
Moreover, the EUMS coordinates the military instrument, focusing on military missions and operations and on missions and operations requiring military support. This includes early warning via the Single Intelligence Analysis Capacity (SIAC), strategic planning, situation assessment, etc.

In order to enable the European Union to fully assume its responsibilities and provide an institutional framework for crisis management, the European Council (Nice, December 2000) decided to establish permanent political and military structures. On that basis, a Capability Development Plan (CDP) was submitted on 8 July 2008 to the Steering Board of the European Defense Agency (EDA) composed of Member States' "Capabilities" chiefs. The Board endorsed the CDP conclusions and started work on an initial list of priority capability areas. The EDA, the Member States, the EU Military Committee (EUMC) the EU Military Staff (EUMS) and the General Secretariat of the Council shall cooperate together in order to achieve these tasks.

The European Union Military Committee (EUMC) is the supreme military body set up within the Council and is composed of the Chiefs of Defense (CHoD) of the member states. As a forum for military cooperation and consultation between the Member States in the field of conflict prevention and crisis management, the EUMC is responsible for directing all EU military activities and provides the Political and Security Committee with advice and recommendations on military matters (EEAS, Structure, Instruments and Agencies).

The European Defense Agency (EDA) is a key institution for the coordination of the Member States on defense matters. The EDA is an intergovernmental Agency of the European Council and with its structure brings together each aspect of the defense process, ranging from cooperation planning, through capabilities, research & technology, armaments cooperation, to industry and market, as well as wider European policies (EDA, Organization). Established in 2004, the EDA supports the Member States in order to improve European defense capabilities: "EDA acts as a catalyst, promotes collaborations, launches new initiatives and introduces solutions to improve defense capabilities” (EDA, What we do). A central feature of the Agency is, moreover, its flexibility, making it possible for projects to be launched even if only by two Member States.
The EDA is a very effective agency and, similar to all the other EU military assets, dependent on cooperation between the Member States, for a successful and productive deployment of its value-adding features. We will notice at a later stage of this paper, the EDA also plays a central goal in the “Pooling and Sharing” concept of the Union.

Finally, the Treaties provide for further integration under article 42 of the TEU: “The common security and defence policy shall include the progressive framing of the common defence policy. This will lead to a common defence, when the European Council, acting unanimously, so decides” (TEU, Art.42). This means that if the Member States agree and cooperate, there is room and possibility to drive common defense to the next level. The next part of the chapter will, first, examine the current situation of the EU defense and then explain why further cooperation still lags behind.

II.iii The state of defense cooperation in the EU

In II.i and II.ii we saw the institutional framework of the military capabilities of the EU. Besides illustrating the military assets of the Union, the first chapters of part II already demonstrated that common defense and military organization is at least feasible on an institutional basis. The implementation and the application of the cooperation forms provided by the frameworks and institutions with military aims seem more difficult to realize.

The upcoming chapter will therefore consist in demonstrating the current state of the implementation of the assets previously discussed. Furthermore, the various concerns which trigger this reluctance to engage in further cooperation will be examined.

The shortfalls in European strategic capabilities and the dependence on US assistance are often disapproved and criticized by Europeans, as well as by Americans. At the same time however, Member States either maintain an excess of military capabilities or duplicate already existing equipment. They do not fully take advantage of the potential for cooperation as a mean to increase efficiency in spending and avoid duplication.

The European Council Meeting in December 2013 required a number of actions in order to deepen defense cooperation to underline a “credible and effective CSDP” in “full complementarity with NATO” (EUCO 217/13:2). Increasing the effectiveness, visibility and impact of CSDP, enhancing the development of capabilities, and strengthening Europe’s
defense industry consist the *three axes* around which the actions should be built (EUCO 217/13:2).

The European Council emphasized the importance of a fast and effective deployment of the right civilian and military assets and the need to improve the EU’s rapid response capabilities as well as the flexibility and deployment of the EU battle groups. Furthermore, it called for the new security challenges and their interdependence to be considered and efforts to act effectively and in conjunction with NATO to encounter/address them. Given the fact of constantly emerging threats, the Council sets the focus on developing an EU Cyber Defense Policy Framework and an EU Maritime Security Strategy and encouraging further cooperation between Member States in the area of capability development to respond to key shortfalls through a series of priority projects (EUCO, 217/13).

Those priority projects need to be managed in close cooperation between the Member States, supported by the European Defense Agency. They consist of the development of a Remotely Piloted Aircraft Systems (RPAS) in the 2020-2025 timeframe; the development of a Air-to-Air Refuelling Capacity, especially as regards the establishment of a MultiRole Tanker Transport capacity; the development of satellite communication through close cooperation between the Member States, the Commission and the European Space Agency; and the improvement civil/military cooperation on the basis of the EU Cybersecurity Strategy as well as the protection of assets in EU missions and operations (EUCO, 217/13:6).

The European Council also called for a policy framework for systematic and long-term cooperation by the development of an integrated and competitive European Defense Technological and Industrial Base (EDTIB). The European Council also mandated the High Representative (HR/VP), in cooperation with the Commission, to ‘assess the impact of changes in the global environment’ which should later lead to the revision of the European Security Strategy in 2015 or 2016 (Cîrlig, 2015).

During the conclusions of the CSDP from the Council of the EU Meeting in May 2015, the Council recalls the importance of more efficient crisis management structures and welcomes the progress in line with the European Council Conclusions of December 2013 on security and defense: “*The Council reiterates the need to enhance the effectiveness of CSDP and the development and maintenance of Member States’ capabilities, supported by a more integrated, sustainable, innovative and competitive European Defence Technological and Industrial Base (EDTIB)*” (Council of the EU, 8971/15: 8).
A decisive role in the enhancement of an effective defense cooperation at various levels between the Member States is the so-called “Pooling and Sharing” initiative. The concept refers to initiatives and projects to pool and share more military capabilities among EU Member States (EDA, Pooling and Sharing). The approach is based on the Ghent-Initiative (a German-Swedish initiative) (Ghent Initiative, 2010) and was further developed by the EDA and the Member States.

In 2011, following a proposal of the EDA, the Defense Ministers adopted a list of “Pooling and Sharing” priorities which include Air-to-Air-Refueling, maritime surveillance and a Helicopter Training Program. The adoption of a Code of Conduct on Pooling and Sharing followed in 2012 (EDA, Pooling and Sharing) in order to support cooperative effort of the EU Member States and make “pooling and sharing” the first instrument for action.

The European Council in 2013 called for an increase in defense cooperation and even though it welcomed the progress achieved through the Code of Conduct, this showed that the desired level of cooperation in defense matters had not been achieved and that much remained to be done. The adoption of the Policy Framework to complement the Code of Conduct did not change much as the call for enhanced military cooperation was still heard in the Council of the European Union on CSDP in May 2015 (Council of the EU, 8971/15).

Despite these incentives launched by the European Council and their gradual implementation, the situation in European defense remains disappointing. The security context has changed over the past years for Europeans and is still changing dramatically. Europe is now confronted with major crises at the EU’s borders and the aggression of Russia against Ukraine. The questions which arises at this point is “to what extent Member States have the political will to adjust their foreign policy and military tools to deal with the new security challenges.” (Cîrlig, 2015:4).

The reason for this quite bleak situation of the European defense may be explained by several occurrences. First, intensified as a result of the global economic and financial crisis, defense budgets of the Member States are declining. According to the NATO Wales Summit Declaration of 2014, European NATO members pledged to stop the cuts in defense spending and will aim to achieve the NATO guideline of spending 2% of their GDP (Gross Domestic Product) on defense. Furthermore, the European Allies will strive to improve over the next decade
efficiency in spending and invest the 20% of their annual defense spending on major new equipment, including related Research & Development (NATO Press Release, 2014).

Despite the strong condemnations of Russian actions in Ukraine and the defense policy responses taken by NATO, there has been little change in military spending budgets and plans in Western Europe, especially among the largest spenders (SIPRI, 2015:6). In the EU countries accounting for 80% of EU defense spending (UK, France, Germany and Italy) (SIPRI, 2015:6ff.), defense spending has experienced long-term downward trends, in real terms.

However, on the other side, particularly central and eastern Member States, which are also allies of NATO, including Poland, Romania and the Baltic States, have announced an increase in their defense spending for the coming years. This can eventually be explained by the present situation in Ukraine. Nevertheless, the growing defense expenditures cannot compensate for the stagnation in defense. Seen as a percentage of GDP, the defense spending of these smaller-sized states’ economies cannot counterbalance the dead lock in the larger Member States’ economies. As a result, according to the Stockholm International Peace Institute, among European NATO members, only Greece, Estonia and the UK have managed to meet the 2% target on defense spending recommended by NATO and the outlooks for the coming years are uncertain (SIPRI, 2015:7). It is expected that probably only Estonia will meet the 2% threshold in 2015 (SIPRI, 2015:6).

An additional problem is that defense budgets are reduced without consultation between Member States, increasing imbalances or leading to inefficient spending of the budgets (Cîrlig, 2015).

The second reason for the lack of European defense lies in the shortfalls in European strategic capabilities and the (perpetual) dependence on US assistance (Cîrlig, 2015). Parallel to this, Member States do not take advantage of the potential which lies in cooperation, and either maintain an excess of military capabilities or duplicate existing equipment. As in defense budget-matters, the absence of consultation between Member States worsens the situation. Cîrlig suggests explanations on why this lack of communication can traced back to: “(...) loss of strategic autonomy, the sensitivity of the defence sector, and reluctance to give up a strategic industrial base, seen as a matter of national prestige.” (Cîrlig, 2015:5). The weak coordination in European defense capabilities results in slow progress in the
development of joint capabilities and the ability of the EU to state its power, and might in the long run even jeopardize the execution of crisis management missions (Cîrlig, 2015) (as seen in Libya for example).

Defense cooperation is mainly hindered by sovereignty concerns (Marone/ Nones, 2013). As already mentioned in the introduction section of this paper, decisions about war and peace have traditionally been the choice of states, and the protection of their territories and citizens is considered the sovereign responsibility of a state. Consequently, national laws regulate nearly every aspect of the military and States want to be the sole deciders in this core national task. In addition, trust issues among partners, the fear of free-riding by others, and the procurement of equipment from foreign companies reinforce these unilateralist leanings (Marone/ Nones, 2013).

Another aspect closely linked to sovereignty is the one of specialization: A common European military project implies that all the Member States develop specified capabilities in order to have a more effective defense system and avoid double-hatting. This, in turn, creates concerns in Member States about becoming more dependent on their partners. Nevertheless, preference for acting nationally has already resulted in capability gaps becoming critical, and has increased dependence not only on other Member States but also on the US (Marone/ Nones, 2013).

A further reason examined in this paper as an explanation for the weak defense system of the Union is the unexhausted frameworks for defense cooperation and the unused provisions of the EU Treaty: “Although the Treaty of Lisbon, in its provisions related to CSDP, has laid the bases for 'flexible cooperation' in defense for those Member States wishing to advance further in this area together, these opportunities have not been taken up.” (Cîrlig, 2015:5). An example is the rapid reaction force of the EU Battlegroups, established in 2007 and yet to be used.

A phenomena discussed by Alice Pannier in one of her publications is the emergence of “minilateralism” (Pannier, 2015). While multilateralism has always played a major role in international cooperation, it seems that it has decreased in importance in European defense cooperation matters. Minilateralism suggests cooperation in smaller groups of states. Some Member States have showed a preference for bilateral or minilateral initiatives outside the EU framework.
These states have focused their defense cooperation in what they see as more comprehensive and permanent frameworks: “Defense cooperation between a limited number of neighboring states of equal size and/or with a common vision on defense” (Military Cooperation: European regional defense cooperation). Examples of such initiatives are the Nordic Defense Cooperation (Denmark, Finland, Iceland, Norway, and Sweden) or the Benelux Defense Cooperation. A further, more ambitious example of bilateral cooperation is the Lancaster House Treaties between France and the UK. These agreements take hitherto cooperation to a next level, providing for the creation of a Combined Joint Expeditionary Force, a joint program for the deployment of aircraft carriers, and industrial cooperation including cooperation in R&D. In November 2014, the UK and France signed contracts for the feasibility phase for developing a combat drone (the Future Combat Air System – FCAS) (Altmeyer/ Hepher, 2014).

While the potential of such minilateral cooperation might be effective, and these efforts surely improve cooperation between Member States, they might, at the same time, undermine EU-level initiatives. Depending on what these regional defense cooperation aim at, they can have a different outcome on integrated EU cooperation. While the latter are embedded in the CSDP framework and focus on serving a wider European interest, regional cooperation efforts aim largely at preserving individual national interests” (Military Cooperation: European regional defense cooperation).

Cooperating at a regional level between limited numbers of neighboring states sharing a common vision on defense is much easier than the coordination of 28 Member States with different geostrategic issues and interests, capabilities and last but not least, cultural backgrounds.

The share of a common vision of defense seems to be an essential feature for a cooperated defense system. The next chapter will consider the impacts of and the need for a common European strategic culture as an important tool for the realization of an EU army.
II.iv European Strategy on the Use of Force: Strategic Culture and Common Identity

The fact is that European attitudes to the use of force are characterized by heterogeneity (Hyde-Price, 2004; Dyson, 2013; Schmidt/ Zyla, 2011). These differences can be attributed to the diversity of European history, geography and culture (Hyde-Price, 2004), but also to material variables, especially the variance in energy dependency and geostrategic position (Dyson, 2013). This discrepancy among EU Member States could be seen in the disagreement with regard to the air campaign against Gaddafi’s authoritarian regime in Libya (Schmidt/ Zyla, 2011). The EU’s strategic role in international security policy was clearly challenged after the NATO decided to carry out air operations because the EU was unable to reach a common decision (Schmidt/ Zyla, 2011).

Even though there has been undeniable progress with the CSDP, finding a common response to Libya between the Member States resulted in a deadlock which shows that there are still difficulties in finding a coherent or shared European reaction. The degree of institutionalization in the CSDP initiated through the Lisbon Treaty is not going to develop further unless the EU Member States find consensus on the values it should be based on (Margaras, 2010): “Only if there is a commonly accepted EU normative space through the development of a common strategic culture, can the CSDP flourish.” (Margaras, 2010:5). This had already been the conception of the European Security Strategy (EES): “We need to develop a strategic culture that fosters early, rapid, and when necessary, robust intervention.” (Council of the European Union, 2009:39).

The strategic culture of the EU is a very controversial topic in academic literature. It is even disputable if the strategic culture of the EU is, as emphasized in constructive literature, de facto significant for the progress and stasis of a Common European Defense (Dyson, 2013). Neorealist theory argues that the key forces driving the approximation in European Defense Cooperation is the “balance of threat” (Dyson, 2013:420) faced by the Member states, accentuated through material variables like energy dependency or geographical position. Nevertheless, the idea of a strategic culture to strengthen a common European idea, and, thus, the need to create an army within the EU is worth examining more closely.

Cornish & Edwards define EU strategic culture as “the institutional confidence and processes to manage and deploy military force as part of the accepted range of legitimate and effective
policy instruments, together with general recognition of the EU’s legitimacy as an international actor with military capabilities (albeit limited).” (Cornish/Edwards, 2001: 587).

A further definition by Per Martinsen, expands this definition by conceptualizing the European strategic culture “as the ideas, expectations and patterns of behavior that are shared across the actors involved in the processes surrounding European security and defence politics.” (Meyer, 2004:4). Strategy is interpreted here as the civil and military means employed in ranked order to reach particular ends defined as crisis management (Meyer, 2004).

Margaras defines the strategic culture of the EU as “the ideas and values of Brussels-based ESDP officials regarding the current and potential use of force as well as their practices on the deployment of police and military instruments in various ESDP missions. [...] The strategic culture of the EU consists of ideas, values and policy practices, which are manifested in the way missions are discussed and planned. [...] The implementation of CSDP missions is another important process in the shaping of strategic culture.” (Margars, 2010: 5ff.)

The first attempt of formulate a coherent approach to CSDP in the form of a strategic cultural plan was the EES, published in December 2003 by the European Council. The failure to draft a new updated version of the ESS since then, that would address its shortcomings, demonstrates the existence of different (and even conflicting) opinions of EU states in the field of geopolitics.

Unfortunately, EU unity in security is not the norm. As a further matter, the challenges are unprecedented, ranging from “the stabilization of large areas if the globe marked by failing and failed states; the integration into a consensual new international order of large and powerful states marked by vastly different political, economic, social and religious cultures but linked by dense networks of global interdependence; the elimination of global poverty and despair and the violence it engenders; the management of weapons proliferation and the pursuit of arm controls; the reversal of looming climate catastrophe; the generation of renewable and sustainable energy supplies.” (Howorth, 2014:217). What makes these challenges even greater is their inter-connectedness and the EU as a principal global player has to be able to act effectively in order to face them in a successful manner if the Union does not want to become a “figment of the political imagination (...) which simply failed to open.” (Howorth, 2014:220).
In fact, the EU Member States still tend to some degree to perceive matters of war, peace and security through a national lens (Howorth, 2014). The development of an EU culture is an ongoing process, which has already brought positive results in the field of security and defense. Actually, there has been convergence of states with regard to for example employing a soft approach to the use of force, the Petersberg Tasks or the development of a humanitarian agenda (Maragars, 2010). Nonetheless, several grey areas and discordance remain within the Member States as to how to reach a common culture: the acquisition of a UN Security Council Mandate and the question of the NATO-EU relationship, the belief in the intergovernmental nature of CSDP, the lack of clearly defined interests and the existence of different geographic priorities among the EU member states constitute considerable obstacles to the development of a dynamic strategic culture.

The importance of national sovereignty in the fields of security and defense have obstinately remained under the supervision of the Member States: “Most EU member states have a national security strategy: but most of these documents are incoherent, derivative, devoid of the sense of a common European geostrategic situation, and often long out-of-date. Yet Brussels continues to shun any elaboration or revision of the ten year-old European Security Strategy.” (De France/ Witney, 2013:1). In a report of the European Council on Foreign Relations, De France and Witney call for a closer alignment of the strategic world views of the Member States, making this an indispensable condition to achieve greater coherence and interdependence (De France/ Witney, 2013). For this alignment to be fulfilled, there is an urgent need for Europe to define a global strategy “- that is to decide what it wants to be in the world and work out ways to match the means at its disposal (including its defence capabilities) to those ends.” (De France/ Witney, 2013:2).

This report is based on an examination of the security strategies of the then 27 Member States carried out at the Institut de recherche stratégique de l’Ecole militaire (IRSEM), entitled Etude comparative des livres blancs des 27 États membres de l’UE and published in 2012. The examination considers the military strategies of the Member States, classifying them in the strategists, the globalists, the localists, the abstentionists, and the drifters (De France/
Accordingly, the Member States are classified as those having a strategy (France, UK), those that have somewhat a strategic purpose (Sweden, Finland and the Czech Republic), those with a global horizons but no real operational plan (the Netherlands, Slovenia, Germany, Spain, Hungary), those whose main preoccupation is to preserve territorial integrity, those who abstain themselves having no concrete plan and in some cases no defense ministry as such (Luxembourg, Austria, Ireland, Malta), and the drifters who have not updated their national plan for different reasons for considerable time (Portugal, Belgium, Greece, Italy) (De France/ Witney, 2013). De France and Witney propose in this report a “European Defense Semester” to convince Member States that coordination could only be beneficial. To this end, the 28 Member States would submit their national defense budgets for inspection in order to highlight the extent of the waste of and duplication in the European defense expenditure and the incoherence of the national programs when taken together.

Moreover, these issues illustrated here are intensified by at least three further matters. First, the decision-making process in CSDP complicates coordination in common security and defense affairs as it requires unanimity and is subject to member states veto (Maragas, 2010). Second, the achievement of unity and cohesion is impeded by the fact that problems of synchronization and synergy are not only part of a CSDP framework, but are also imbedded
in a NATO structure, which also requires consensus (Maragas, 2010). Third, the capabilities gap between small Member States with limited resources and bigger Member States hinders cooperation and coordination of national strategies (EDA, 2015), as the graphics below will clarify.
This capability gap reflects the different perceptions and values in terms of strategic thinking (Maragas, 2010) and the importance of defense investment.

Besides being based on common interests or a common identity, the European strategic culture can be founded on “preferred means of action” (Schmidt/ Zyla, 2011:487). In fact, Schmidt and Zyla argue that it is possible to identify cases in which the member states shared the same interests and managed to install a system of “effective multilateralism” (Schmidt/ Zyla, 2011:488). An example is the Balkans as a regional priority for all member states and the attempt to establish soft power as the EU’s primary mode of influence (Schmidt/ Zyla, 2011).

Finally, disagreement between the Member States on the role of other international organizations and their impact on the development and deployment of EU autonomous military actions, especially regarding the NATO and the UN underpins another reason for the difficulties in coordinating Member States in order to create a European strategic culture, Indeed, military action within the framework of CSDP occurs only when mandated by international law and “For some EU member states the acquisition of a UNSC mandate is a valuable prerequisite to participate in a security mission, while for others it is less so. [...The priority of the UNSC mandate is proof of an important division among EU states when it
comes to the legalization of the use of force. It demonstrates that there are countries that demand the ‘green light’ of intervention by an international body whereas others prefer to cooperate within ‘coalitions of the willing’ in order to promote their own strategic plans.” (Maragas, 2010:9). Furthermore, the importance and incorporation of NATO structures in the EU’s defense policy is undeniable as has been already highlighted in this paper. However, NATO is said to play a contradictory role in the future development of the EU’s strategic culture: “On the one hand it allows (...) for deadlocks among EU member states to be overcome; on the other hand, it’s involvement can also be understand as a stumbling block to the further development of the CSDP and thus the EU’s strategic culture.” ((Schmidt/ Zyla, 2011:487).

II.v Preliminary Conclusions on Part II

The picture, or at least the framework, of the common European defense program has been seen. The CSDP as well as common military capabilities are at the disposal of the Member States to engage in common defense and accordingly develop more institutions, assets, capabilities, etc. In analyzing the feasibility of a European Army, there has to be a differentiation on the technical feasibility and the political will.

Looking from the technically-feasible-perspective, a European army would be realizable. However, an army is not just about the institutions framing military capabilities and actions, nor is it just the military equipment or the military personal. The political will of an army suggests an ideology behind it, a reason to fight for, not just in the personalization of an enemy or a threat, but also realizing people needing to be secured and protected. The EU Member States have certainly a substantial interest in ensuring protection for their population and their own strategic culture to do so. The EU also wants to protect its population. However, the matter here is that people often identify themselves more with their national states than with the EU. This is necessarily the result of the lack of a common European identity and, thus, achieving a common European strategic culture is a distant goal.

Furthermore, the lack of a European strategic culture is compounded by the fact that even though the EU is facing more and more common threats, there are still issues that affect some Member States more than the others, and, thus, require more engagement in handling them.
Minilateralisms, cooperation in smaller groups of states, or individual action are the result of this disproportionality, grouping Member States confronted with equal issues.

The previous chapters of this part of the paper illustrated the EU-perspective of the difficulties in creating an EU army. The next chapter will focus on Jean-Claude Juncker’s latest proposal on the creation of a European army and the reactions and opinions of the Member States of the EU. These attitudes toward the subject have an undeniable impact on the feasibility of a common army for the EU, and, thus, on the response to the question if an army of the EU consists more of a utopic vision or a realizable project.

II.vi Juncker’s European Army

With the appointment of the new Commission, the so-called Juncker Commission, on the 1st November 2014, European Commission President Jean-Claude Juncker called for a stronger global actor:

“We need a stronger Europe when it comes to foreign policy. The Ukraine crisis and the worrying situation in the Middle East show how important it is that Europe is united externally. There is still a long way to go. [...] (…) we need to work on a stronger Europe when it comes to security and defense matters. Yes, Europe is chiefly a ‘soft power’. But even the strongest soft powers cannot make do in the long run without at least some integrated defense capacities.” (Juncker, 2014:11).

Juncker suggests, to reach this aim, following what is provided by the Lisbon Treaty in form of permanent structured cooperation. Member States which wish to engage in joint EU Missions shall pool their defense capabilities, create synergies in defense procurement, and match their ambitions in order to avoid duplication and manage defense spending costs, “even if only for fiscal reasons.” (Juncker, 2014:12).

However, he also emphasizes that should be no attempt to establish an alternative to NATO to correct and strengthen the Common Security and Defense Policy. Instead, NATO and EU need to cooperate in order to satisfy the needs of both (Juncker, 2014:20).

Moreover, Jean-Claude Juncker recently nominated Michel Barnier as special adviser on European Defense and Security Policy to provide direct assistance to Members of the Commission on the defense matters. Barnier served as European Commissioner in the Prodi
and Barroso II Commissions. During the latter, he presented a report to the European Council proposing the creation of a European civil protection force and was one of those leading the “Defense” Task Force. (European Commission Press Release, 2015). Barnier’s wide experience and interest in matters of European defense has been positively viewed by advocates of developing EU defense.

In an interview on the 8th March 2015 with the German newspaper Welt am Sonntag, Juncker then expressed his support for the idea of a common army, bringing this idea back on the Union’s agenda. The European Commission President states that such an army would stand for the will to keep peace between the European States and convey a clear impression to Russia that Europe is serious about defending European values (Balzli, 2015).

Juncker’s comments on an EU army has heated the debate and the discussions in several milieus. The reactions and opinions of the Member States will be considered before drawing an overall conclusion on the necessity and feasibility of a European Army.

II.vii Member States on a European Army

Among the Member States, Juncker’s proposal for a European Army generated different views and opinions. According to media reports, the reactions of the Member States differ as regards to those which focus on NATO and those willing to strengthen it e.g. most Eastern European Member States, those which position themselves in line with the future development of a unified army e.g. Germany, Finland, those which are skeptical about the idea e.g. the UK and France, and those who have not expressed themselves yet or who have remained rather unimpressed by the idea. At least one example of each of these positions mentioned above will be given in this paper. As a matter of space, the 28 positions cannot be individually examined, but a broad scheme of the different views represented by the Member States will be presented.

This paper has already suggested a comprehensive layout of the creation of a European Army, pointing out the role the different views of the Member States play in its development. An army needs an efficient and responsive command and while it takes considerable time and great efforts to unite the Member States over economic sanctions against a state whose actions are not in line with the EU’s expectation, it seems almost impossible to reach a consensus between all Member States and organize military response (Rublovskis, 2015).
This lack of trust in the capability of EU Member States to agree on a common military response have led Poland and the Baltic States to doubt the effective European protection of Eastern borders: “Looking at cautious-minded Angela Merkel’s and Francois Hollande’s politics towards Moscow, the Poles and Balts are far from being sure that Berlin and Paris will dare to use force, if Russia invades.” (EESRI, 2015:3). Another problem intensifying this mistrust is the fact that the EU lacks enough military capabilities without NATO’s assistance to guarantee the protection of its borders. This problem is far from being solved due to the declining defense budgets (EESRI, 2015).

Such circumstances make the East European Member States more interested in strengthening the EU-NATO solidarity rather than in creating an alternative concept, that is a parallel concept (EESRI, 2015).

Nevertheless, Juncker’s proposal increased the attention the security issues the EU is facing receive, thus raising the will to intensify European defense cooperation in the fields not exhaustively covered by NATO (EESRI, 2015).

In this regard, it is not surprising that Poland’s Foreign minister Grzegorz Schetyna perceived the EU army proposal as a “very risky idea” (The Baltic Times, 2015). Also Latvia expressed concerns about the idea, fearing a duplication of NATO (The Baltic Times, 2015). Estonia, even though the idea is definitely worth for further considerations, finds itself perplexed as to the implementation of the project. As for all Baltic Member States, the problem revolves around the difficulty to find consensus on financing and structuring of such an army, and training of the combat units (The Baltic Times, 2015).

Another relevant issue triggering the skepticism in the creation of a European Army is that it would mean taking a step towards further supranational regulation and changing what is considered as being a key national responsibility.

The UK Government immediately rejected the prospects of an EU army or of the EU having autonomous military capabilities: “Our position is crystal clear that defense is a national, not an EU, responsibility and that there is no prospect of that position changing and no prospect of a European army” (UK government spokesperson in: Hale, 2015).

In Austria, the Defense Minister, Gerald Klug, also disapproved of the idea, stating that Austria is a neutral country, making Austrian participation in an EU army unjustifiable.
Furthermore, a European army is not seen as an option or a solution to the current world problems, particularly to solve the “Russian Issue”.

On the other hand, Germany’s and Finland’s governments welcome the idea. The German Defense Minister, Ursula von der Leyen, underlines the importance of the project as a long-term objective (Deutscher Bundestag Presse, 2015). Even though it raises difficult questions mainly with regard to the organization and implementation of the army since national parliaments decide on military assignments (at least in Germany), the time has come to develop a common defense policy in the EU and to clarify the vision of a European army (Deutscher Bundestag Presse, 2015).

In Finland, the Foreign Minister, Erkki Tuomioja, expresses his doubts about the realization of a European Army. However, he warmly welcomes the debate on the issues:

“It’s good that an initiative to start a discussion was made. We have wanted common EU security policy to be moved forward. Now that we are preparing a new EU security policy, it is good to go through this idea. It may become a reality someday, but not very quickly.” (YLE News, 2015).

Even though the realization seems unrealistic at the moment, the Finnish government would welcome the formation of a common army, stating that it would not replace national armies, but consist of military units (YLE News, 2015).

Smaller member countries like Luxembourg for example also support the idea of a European army (Luxemburger Wort, 2015).

Other countries have not reacted officially yet. For example; French analysts, have, however, suggested above all that the idea was an illusion, despite the country's long-standing vision of a stronger Europe in defense (Cırgli, 2015).

II.viii Concluding remarks

The opinions differ in the Member States for various reasons. We have already analyzed a few of them ranging from mistrust in EU capabilities to the fear of loss of sovereignty, in the course of this paper. Another issue is based on the assignment of a European army. While some countries have expressed their skepticism, indicating that an EU army will not solve the
current problem concerning Russia and Ukraine, other Member States do not focus on the creation of a common army to solve this question explicitly, but rather to enhance cooperation in a long-term perspective. Again others have reservations on organizational matters. They are in fact not against a European army, but question the decision-making process and the training and formation of European combat units. Another reason which hinders the realization of an army is that some countries do not want it to replace national armies, when others do not think of it in this way at all, seeing it more as an effective complementation of the latter.

The realization of a European army and therefore its feasibility completely hinges on the Member States’ political willingness to establish such a corpus. This chapter provided an explanation of the emergence of issues hindering the feasibility of an EU army, namely the lack of a common identity and common strategy. However, the main obstacle which effectively hinders the creation of a European army is the Member States’ reluctance to engage in further defense integration for several reasons.

Conclusion; Juncker’s European Army – Vision or illusion?

This paper has analyzed the necessity and the feasibility of a European army. The necessity, as well as the feasibility, largely depend on the will of the Member States to increase the effectiveness and credibility of their defense. This paper focused on European initiatives and means aiming at the creation of a common army, leaving aside individual Member State capabilities which could facilitate and help the formation of a unified militia. The Member States however, play a crucial role in the process of the creation of an army within Europe.

Common threats and boundaries, as well as the protection of the benefits the European Union, mean that an EU army is more than just an obsolete thought.

The feasibility of Juncker’s proposal, however, might be limited. Daniel Keohane, research director at the European think thank FRIDE, for example sees a challenge particularly at the political level, as armed forces are the ultimate expression of sovereignty: "There's no point in talking about an army unless you're talking about a federal state. You need to be clear who is the political authority controlling it and who pays for it." (Hale, 2015)
Keohane argues that the idea of military integration as such is a good one, there being a demilitarization problem and falling defense budgets in the EU. This is what pooling and sharing is about. The problem, however, is that the drivers behind this integration are not the national governments of the Member States but they are the EU institutions. The EU defense is considered by the Member States as a policy, not a project, making it thus an option in NATO or UN policies to be used as part of the EU’s external action (UEF, 2015).

Defense integration, however, requires a merging of capabilities in order to increase effectiveness. The difference here between NATO and the EU is that NATO is meant to be, and surely will remain, an alliance of sovereign countries contributing to the common purpose by making nationally acquired military assets available to the NATO allies. This difference appears as the “(...) Achilles’ heel of Juncker’s proposal: NATO favors collaboration over integration, while the EU could deliver integration but lacks consensus over desirability or feasibility.” (Janning, 2015). The problem with the creation of a European Army today is, as we argued in Part II of this paper, the lack of a common strategic culture: “An army of the EU could hardly be used given the differing military strategies, the various constraints on its deployment, and the diverging modes of parliamentary caveat.” (Janning, 2015).

Furthermore, Keohane expresses the strategic challenge in the creation of a European Army: “NATO defends EU territory and, from what can been seen, EU member states have no intention nor the capabilities of changing the situation and this will remain the case for a long time.” (UEF, 2015).

Bearing these perspectives in mind, neither the rejection of Juncker’s proposal by the British government nor the positive reaction of the German government to it is surprising. In fact, both responses serve the same purpose which is: “[to] avoid answering the question of how to seriously improve Europe’s defense. If they did, it would be impossible to bypass the military, industrial, and budgetary benefits of mergers in the sense of integration.” (Janning, 2015); the European Army being a vague and long-term goal which should lead in its ultimate aim to an “ever closer union” (Janning, 2015).

The fact that European defense is quite hollow and lacks effectiveness constitutes a serious problem facing the threats and challenges of the contemporary world: “Europe’s current defense has no rationale other than the fact of its existence – it is neither adequate nor efficient.” (Janning, 2015).
We saw that *minilateralisms* are the current trend between the Member States, resulting in an intergovernmental organization of a few larger and many smaller “armies”. The actual structure consumes too many resources and delivers too little effect: “*Taken together, EU member states still deploy around 1.5 million soldiers in far too many garrisons, equipped with partly incompatible weapons systems, inefficient procurement that is under the command of too many generals and administered by vastly oversized ministerial bureaucracies. Based on 2011 data, EU member states spent more on defense than Russia and China combined, second only to the United States, which spent about 2.5 times the combined European effort.*” (Janning, 2015).

From this perspective, Jean-Claude Juncker’s call for a European Army seems more than appropriate and an effective implementation of “*pooling and sharing*” within the EU and NATO could result in effectiveness and gains for all parties (Janning, 2015). Pooling which consists of installing a multinational structure in order to make national capabilities available to all the Member States and the combination of national efforts would enhance cooperation and coordination among the EU countries. Furthermore, the *sharing* aspect would strengthen these combination efforts, making it possible for one or more countries to provide their partners with existing capabilities and machinery, or fulfil tasks for them. All partners would save resources and duplication would be avoided. The coordinating efforts provided by an effective implementation of pooling and sharing would push Europe quite a few steps ahead towards a European army. However, such a concept needs detailed arrangements and effective coordination structures.

A further very controversial aspect of the EU defense system is “*outsourcing*” which it resorts to deal with crisis-management responsibilities. “*Outsourcing*” resources refer to NATO capabilities but also to individual Member States assets utilized instead of EU common military capabilities. A good example is that no Polish, French, or German battle groups deployed to Mali, Paris considering unilateral action to be quicker, safer and more efficient (Gowan/ Witney, 2014).

So, simply saying that the EU must do more does not necessarily imply that the efforts will be effectively implemented in the end. The EU can do more by supplying common cooperation frameworks, for example battlegroups, but if they are not used by the Member States due to different reasons, the worth of these is quite limited. The value the EU is giving at the moment to the defense of its Member States and boundaries is therefore quite restricted.
If the Member States wish to increase cooperation in defense matters it would be worthwhile to take the initiative to organize common defense. There is no substantial argument that can be made against merging the defenses of Member States facing the same defense issues and threats, and geopolitical challenges, for example by fully merging the defenses of Belgium and the Netherlands or Spain and Portugal (Janning, 2015) “Such partial mergers by way of integration could be implemented under the current treaties, making use of “permanent structured cooperation” (Janning, 2015). Minilateralisms which detach themselves from a solely intergovernmental form of organization and completely integrate defense resources of smaller countries could be a leap forward:

“Collective defense would then become a joint operation under one command and a single political decision, not subject to a veto from one of the [concerned] parliaments. Constitutions would have to be adapted accordingly. Insofar as both countries would wish to maintain military capabilities to be deployed out of area on the basis of a national decision alone, they would have to embed such units into the merged territorial defense force and fund such missions from the national budget.” (Janning, 2015).

Such a differentiated scheme of defense integration could be accompanied by an invitation for neighbors to participate. Even the participation of the Scandinavian EU members and Austria could be realizable if these countries took initiatives to adapt their status in such a way as to allow a gap between EU solidarity and the obligations and commitments of EU/NATO allies. This would allow the creation of an integrated defense structure covering the territory of more and more EU Member States. This then emerging army should be put under a single command and joint political control with a single budget and single procurement process in defense infrastructure (Janning, 2015). Occurrences rather than national borders would dictate deployment patterns, making further layers of deeper cooperation possible, and even involving other Member States and NATO (Janning, 2015).

Over time and following the best possible development, “political consensus inside the core builds up, common approaches on missions out of area could become more frequent, ultimately reducing the need to embed separable intervention capabilities under purely national command.” (Janning, 2015).

An integration method engendered by the Member States, rather than imposed by the EU, would strengthen the tie between the EU countries and allow for trust and cooperation. Furthermore, integration with regard to defense from inside the EU would not weaken NATO.
It would strengthen both organizations by showing a renewed meaning of traditional alliance purposes: “*i.e. to defend the territorial integrity, the political and social order against any armed aggression from outside.*” (Janning, 2015).

The EU is ready for a common army – on an institutional level. The Union has the structure and the institutions needed, and even the treaties provide for further integration. The framework exists, but the picture is missing and this picture must be set up by the Member States if they intend to increase their common defense capabilities and enhance effectiveness in security and defense matters. The Member States of the EU may not be ready for a European Army, just like they were not for an EU constitution or for EU laws in the strict sense. A compromise on the wording will not solve the present deadlock on the matter, but it might help to overcome it. Whatever is the most appropriate label, the EU needs an integrated and interoperable European force at the service of Europe. Furthermore, it does not imply the end of national armed forces, but it spells the beginning of something new.

The question may be asked whether an EU army is a utopic vision or a realistic project. At the present moment the vision of a European Army seems far from realistic. Besides all the reasons demonstrated in this paper, a real army needs a political basis for its establishment, and, at the time, Member States seem unable to provide such a profound reform of the current structures. For such an army to exist, the EU needs a common foreign policy and a shared defense budget. For a perfectly fair, transparent and comprehensible implementation, the forces would need to be implemented by the European Parliament and commanded by an EU-wide government with corresponding competencies. Much remains to be done in order to realize this utopic project. However, the creation and the development of the CSDP is not to be underestimated. Even if the CSDP is still fighting to consolidate its place in between the persistent national defense policies, the EU together with its Member States must ensure that the work in progress begins to make qualitatively significant steps forward. The enhancement towards an effective implementation of the CSDP should allow for better cooperation between the Member States, and, for the present moment, this improvement consists of a realistic perspective and should therefore be the first focus.
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Die Europäische Union (EU) kann als seit mehreren Jahren, (mehr oder weniger) erfolgreiche Friedensgemeinschaft konzipiert werden. In dieser Friedensgemeinschaft macht nationale Verteidigung im Verhältnis zu den anderen Mitgliedstaaten schon länger keinen Sinn mehr. Das Gegenteil ist sogar der Fall: die europäische Integration schreitet voran und mit ihr, das Aufkommen einer immer größeren Interdependenz und Verflechtung der Mitgliedstaaten untereinander. Dies hat zur Folge, dass unter anderem sicherheitspolitische Fragen längst nicht mehr als Angelegenheit einzelner Staaten allein angesehen werden können, sondern dass diese die anderen Mitgliedstaaten und somit die EU als Ganzes betreffen.


Diese Arbeit und dessen Inhalte sollen hervorbringen, ob eine europäische Armee überhaupt ein mögliches Projekt wäre und unter welchen Umständen diese realisierbar wäre oder ob eine Europäische Armee bloß eine utopische Vision ist.