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„Ethnic Policies Toward People of Chinese Descent in Indonesia and Malaysia“

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1 Introduction

With the research focus set on the Chinese cultural heritage in Indonesia and Malaysia, this thesis intends to add new knowledge to the field of overseas Chinese studies. As Indonesia and Malaysia gained independence in the middle of the twentieth century, people of Chinese descent became increasingly targeted by different ethnic policies. In the case of Indonesia, the implemented policies went beyond political and economic aspects and aimed at a complete eradication of the Chinese cultural heritage. What did these policies imply? Which consequences thereof can presently be discerned? What differences and similarities can be identified when comparing the outcome of the political agendas targeting the citizens of Chinese descent in Indonesia and Malaysia? To understand the historical context in which these questions are posed, the reader will be provided with a short yet comprehensive introduction to the main social, cultural and political issues that can be regarded as making up the backbones of the overseas Chinese culture in Indonesia and Malaysia.

The first substantial wave of Chinese migration to Southeast Asia took place in the twelfth century. It was however not until the colonial era, with its imposed divide-and-rule policies, that a system of ethnic segregation was put into practice. This system was to a certain extent both backed by and perpetuated with the help of anti-Chinese sentiments, which were accentuated during the formative years of nation building in Indonesia and Malaysia. As the concept of the nation state was completely new to the Southeast Asian region, where Indonesia and Malaysia came into existence in the middle of the twentieth century, the question of belonging turned out to be volatile. In his often cited seminal work “Imagined Communities”, Benedict Anderson tellingly visualizes how the artificial construct of the nation state has often been successfully advocated as a kind of community where its members are made to believe in their common roots: a narrative that inevitably leads to cardinal questions of defining powers over inclusion and exclusion.

When the nation state concept gets intertwined with the notion of a community sharing common roots, there is also a need for a founding myth (Anderson 2005). This myth is mostly established within the context of the dangerous triad of ‘one nation, one people, one language’

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1 Questions regarding naming and framing of Chinese outside China will be discussed in chapter 3.1.
2 According to Li and Li (2013:15-28), four major phases of Chinese migration can be discerned: the first phase was related to merchants on trade missions between the twelfth and the sixteenth century, the second phase lasted from the end of the sixteenth century up to the First Opium War (1839 –1842), which was followed by a third phase between the 1840s and 1940s predominantly focused on filling the gap of slavery, and a fourth phase from 1949 onwards.
and, in the fervent processing of the nation state, the cases of Indonesia and Malaysia were no exceptions to this rule, which forced the people of Chinese descent into involuntary alienation and identified them as essential outsiders (Chirot and Reid 1997). The people of Chinese descent were thus often treated as a “disconnected analytical category” (Liu 2011: 15) instead of being regarded as an integral part of these newborn nation states.

1.1 Aim of Research

The point of departure for this research can be found in the following questions:

- What does the concept of Chinese heritage in Indonesia and Malaysia imply?
- Who claims to belong to this heritage?
- How is this heritage advocated?

In an attempt to provide some satisfactory answers to these questions, this thesis starts with a chapter presenting the research methods (chapter two). The key terminology, which is followed by a theoretical section presenting an explanatory framework for the relationship between ethnic oppression and demographic structures within the parameters of the nation state, as well as a short introduction to the specific ethnic policies in Indonesia and Malaysia, will be provided in chapter three. Chapter four is focusing on the first Chinese contact with Indonesia and Malaysia, incorporating the socio-political conditions of the Chinese migrants, as well as the role of the Chinese under colonial rule. Chapter five examines the terminology of Chinese self-ascriptions in Southeast Asia, along with a brief introduction to the aesthetics of the Peranakan culture. A more extensive chapter revolves around the problems and opportunities arising after the Japanese invasion and the colonial withdrawal, analyzing various stages of political change during the trajectory of independence and the challenges of integration and assimilation policies that eventually culminated in racial riots and the atrocities of 1965, 1969, and 1998 (chapter six). Chapter seven offers an insight into the history and the activities of Boen Hian Tong, the oldest Chinese Non-Governmental Organization (NGO) in the Javanese city of Semarang, which will be contrasted with another NGO, namely Penang Heritage Trust in Penang, Malaysia (chapter eight). Although strikingly different in almost all conceivable comparable categories such as: administrative set up, age of active members, financial resources, focus of interest, national and international recognition, organizational genesis, and overall raison d’être, an insight to the functions of the
two mentioned NGOs provides valuable data about the sensitive and intricate nexus of politics and heritage that has increasingly influenced the situation for people of Chinese descent in Indonesia and Malaysia ever since the colonial era. The comparison with Malaysia explicitly illustrates the magnitude of the more than three decade long sanctions against the Chinese Indonesians, and leads to the research question:

**Have ethnic policies affected the dynamic dimensions of Chinese cultural heritage in Indonesia and Malaysia?**

The situation for people of Chinese descent in both Indonesia and Malaysia started to deteriorate in the 1960s. In the case of Indonesia, this is manifested in the calamities of 1965, when Suharto’s (1921–2008) war waged against communism meant the death of more than one million people allegedly suspected of being communists. Many of these victims were of Chinese descent. In the aftermath of this human disaster, Suharto’s regime decided that the Chinese had to become “less Chinese” to make the South Asian state more “secure”, with the argumentation that the People’s Republic of China would thus have less impact on their overseas communities. On top of this agenda was the destruction of the cultural pillars of the Chinese ethnic organizations (political and social), language (as manifested through schools and mass media) and religion (Suryadinata 2001, 2005 and 2013).

In the case of Malaysia, the political landscape changed after racial riots in 1969, as new claims were made in the name of Malay supremacy (*ketuhanan Melayu*). Suryadinata’s concept of the Chinese cultural pillars and the different degrees of their intentional destruction in the nation states of Southeast Asia are central to this thesis, as without a cultural fundament, the Chinese identity is devoid of its meaning.
1.2 Benefits of Study

The intention of this thesis is to socially and politically contextualize the various degrees of oppression of Chinese culture in Indonesia and Malaysia. This contextualization is twofold: Firstly, Indonesia and Malaysia are placed within a framework that allows for a more global comparison, proving that the trajectories of these countries are by no means unique, as ethnic oppression has been a surging phenomenon worldwide since the end of WWII. Secondly, the individual cases of Indonesia and Malaysia are portrayed as giving an account for the specific development that has shaped the lives of people of Chinese descent in both countries. This thesis thus provides rich and useful materials for both scholars and laypersons that have an interest in broadening their understanding of the underlying processes that have come to affect the contemporary situation of overseas Chinese in Indonesia and Malaysia. Further, it can also be regarded as a small step and a first endeavor to study how anti-Chinese policies have framed and changed the self-concept of the people of Chinese descent in Java, as seen in the work carried out by a Javanese NGO. The outcome of the challenging attempt to trace the 139 years long history of the organization, of which there are hitherto no written sources apart from the NGO’s own yearbooks of 1976 and 2012, will also be presented in this thesis. The findings, although rather modest, do offer some new data that both broaden the understanding of the stigmatization process under Suharto’s rule and also provide information that can facilitate further research on Chinese Indonesian history in Java from the second part of the nineteenth century onwards. The findings related to the Javanese NGO are juxtaposed with the findings of a Malaysian NGO, which can be seen as instructive in order to grasp the range of contemporary Southeast Asian heritage advocacy.
1.3 Limitations of Study

As this thesis focuses on the nexus between politics and cultural heritage, issues related to the role of people of Chinese descent within the economic domains of Indonesia and Malaysia have been largely excluded. ³ Although the study has the aim to contextualize the oppression of people of Chinese descent in Indonesia and Malaysia, this contextualization cannot be expected to go beyond an argumentation of relevance for the theoretical framework which is focusing on the policies affecting ethnic minorities. This means that no other ‘voices of the nations’ are being heard that could possibly try to explain and legitimate some policies necessary for national stability and a more equal distribution of wealth and resources. Due to the limitations of the study, I am also willfully “sacrificing epistemological clarity” (Shamsul and Sity 2006: 134) through the definition of Malaysia as a nation state, in spite of the justifiable critique of this definition.⁴

³ Some examples of explicit curtailing of Chinese economic activities as a part of the anti-Chinese agenda have been included (see chapter 6). The production of academic literature focusing on underlying reasons for the economic supremacy of the “ethnic Chinese” in Southeast Asia is constant and abundant. For research questioning and proving the erroneousness of the persistently upheld notion of Chinese Malaysian economic predominance as related to intra-ethnic structures, see Gomez 1999, as well as Tarling and Gomez 2008. For a slightly different approach to the altering relevance of ethnicity within Southeast Asian Chinese business activities, see Lim 2013.

⁴ Shamsul and Sity (2006: 134-135) argue that we should be wary of the difference between ‘state’ and ‘nation state’, as has already been proven by the trajectories of a variety of postcolonial countries. Singapore is a ‘state nation’ where the state reinvents the needs of the nation according to the needs of the state, and Malaysia is an example of ‘states-without-nation’ as it is made up of a two-tier federation. The first tier is the Federation of Malaya with 11 provinces becoming independent in 1957, and the second is made up by the Federation of Malaysia, consisting of the previous mentioned Federation of Malaya plus the provinces of Sabah and Sarawak, which were declared independent in 1963.
2 Research Methods

The research methods applied have been qualitative and comparative. Due to its comparatively active Chinese community, the city of Semarang was regarded suitable for a case study on Chinese cultural heritage in Indonesia.\(^5\) Research was carried out in Semarang in January and February 2014, followed by a second visit in January 2015. As sources are very scarce on Chinese heritage, and as there are no written materials about the NGO apart from two yearbooks in 1976 and 2006, interviews played an important role in the process of gathering data.\(^6\) In Malaysia, the city of George Town was chosen as an interesting comparison to Semarang due to its strong heritage advocacy. Research took place in George Town in February 2014 as well as December 2014. Contrary to Semarang, there is a vast pool of data available in George Town, which means that the research process in Malaysia has not been focusing on interviews or on the gathering of data \textit{in situ} to the same extent as in Indonesia.\(^7\) During research various museums have also been valuable when highlighting the complex questions of heritage and “Chineseness” in Southeast Asia.\(^8\)

2.1 The Art of Fieldwork

Since the topic of research was sensitive, attention had to be paid not to expose interviewees to any undesired situations. For that reason, a smaller amount of data collection took the shape of oral interviews by a research assistant in Indonesian or Javanese, which remained recorded only by pen and paper, a procedure which Kvale refers to as an ethical standpoint with an

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\(^5\) The company of a research assistant with a background in the field of Javanese history proved to be very helpful during both research journeys to Semarang. In addition, living with the family of a young entrepreneur and founder of the Chinese Youth organization IPTI (Ikatan Pemuda Tionghoa Indonesia) that has the mission to reinforce the bonds and strengthen integration of Chinese Indonesians into the Indonesian cultural and political landscape, as well as in Tjiang Residence next to the NGO headquarter together with a team of Taiwanese musicologists, has also proved useful to understand the topics of concern for the community from within.

\(^6\) These interviews refer to: a meeting with the board of the NGO, individual interviews with former members of the NGO (Mr. Po Han, Fauzan Hidayatullah and S.N Wargatjie) as well as with Maksum Pinarto, the leader of the Central Java Branch of the Chinese Muslim organization in Indonesia, i.e. PITI (Persatuan Iman Tauhid Indonesia).

\(^7\) Yet the research trips to George Town were helpful to get an insight into the daily work of the NGO in question, as well as an awareness of the impressive impact that the NGO have had in order to raise the understanding for the city’s unique cultural heritage among both tourists and inhabitants.

\(^8\) These museums refer to: the Peranakan museum, the Sun Yat Sen museum, and the House of Yeap Chor Ee in Penang; the Baba House in Melaka; and the Baba House, the Peranakan museum, and the private museum Intan in Singapore, the latter being of crucial interest due to the extensive interview with its founder, Alvin Yapp.
awareness of “consent, confidentiality and consequence” (Kvale: 1996). In the case of an interviewee with fluency in English and a willingness to be recorded, the interview would be filmed. The qualitative criteria of a valuable interview are characterized by short questions and long answers that are mostly spontaneous, specific, relevant and followed by a large number of follow-up questions, which makes the interview “self-communicating”, thus of interest without a strong contextualization (Kvale 1996: 145). These interviews can be regarded as essential in order to understand the magnitude of the stigmatization process that Chinese Indonesians faced in Indonesia during the rule of Suharto (1966–1998).

At times, participant observations were regarded to be the best method for gaining data. Participant observation is in this case to be understood in the broader sense, as it only refers to the researcher’s presence at specific gatherings and events under a period of time limited to eight weeks. In academia, the accurate usage of the participant observation method refers to the collection of data that requires the researcher’s presence in the community or group that is being investigated over an extended period of time. This is normally stretching over a period of at least six months, while in many cases it extends to two years or more (Amid 2000; Creswell 2012; Geertz 1997). This method is predominantly utilized in the field of anthropology, where the outcome of participant observation comprises the capital of the research outcome. In the case of participant observation in Semarang in 2014 and 2015, the collected material is related to different activities in Chinatown (Pecinan).

For a foreigner to conduct research in a country that seems notoriously hostile towards any kind of filing, recording, or processing of data is quite an arduous task. In fact, Indonesia hits the bottom level when it comes to higher education, a remark that might be regarded as
instructive as it possibly conveys a general attitude towards the handling of data and also indicates the challenges of research in the area.\textsuperscript{14}

\textsuperscript{14} In the report “U21 Ranking of National Higher Education Systems 2013”, measuring different categories such as: resources, environment, connectivity and output of higher education in 50 different countries (including all continents apart from Africa), Indonesia landed on the 50th place. See: http://wenr.wes.org/2014/04/education-in-indonesia/ (retrieved on 27 February 2015).
3 Theoretical Framework

To avoid any ambiguity and ensure a thorough understanding of the following chapters it is necessary to clarify the definitions of the following: people of Chinese descent, ethnic, ethnicity, *imperium in imperio*, *middleman minority*, as well as Chinese community. These terms can be regarded as problematic, yet of key importance in the discourse on Chinese heritage in Southeast Asia. With a clarified terminology, a second part will be introduced that provides an explanatory framework for the rise of minority ethnic conflicts within the specific historical context of post-colonialism. Lastly, a short section will present a summary of the major policies that have been applied toward people of Chinese descent ever since the independence of Indonesia and Malaysia, a topic that will be explained in detail throughout the following chapters.

3.1 Terminology

It is pertinent to consider the variety of ways with which one may refer to the Chinese outside of China, a population that is currently estimated between 40 and 45 million individuals, whereof 75% are living in Asia, making it the largest diaspora in the world (Tan 2013: 4). One common appellation has been *overseas Chinese*, which has for long been the English term established in the era when the Chinese were predominantly regarded as sojourners (Coppel 2013: 345), i.e., individuals more inclined to nourish the dream of returning to the motherland than migrants in general. This also explains why this term is rejected by many *people of Chinese descent* as it insinuates a strong bond with China that does not necessarily correspond to the socio-political reality and intentions of the individuals in question. Concurrently, however, the term is academically widespread and established as a field of study in itself, for which this term cannot and should not be completely bypassed or

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15 Actual figures are not available as ‘ethnic Chinese’ (referring to all Chinese who have not undergone complete assimilation) tend to be excluded from the national censuses in Southeast Asian countries (Suryadinata 2013: 274).

16 According to Riemenschneider and Madsen 2009, the difference between sojourning and migration lies in the implicit notion that the sojourner has stronger bonds with the motherland, where migration is more open and unpredictable in this respect. The denomination sojourner is further related to *huáquió* 华侨 (overseas Chinese) that first appeared in 1883 “implicitly implying a presumptuous jurisdiction of China over all ethnic Chinese outside of China based on a loose interpretation of descent” (Tan 2013: 17). Since 1978, however, *huáquió* has been restricted to “Chinese citizens living abroad, while the Chinese who have adopted the citizenship of the countries of their residence are referred to as haiwai huaren [hàiwài huárén 海外华人]” (Tan 2013: 2-3).
disregarded. Another denomination has been Chinese diaspora which might seem rather problematic due to the religious connotations being evoked and also through its strong legacy with the Jewish and Armenian diaspora (Coppel 2002).

Another term I regard as unfortunate is ethnic Chinese. The problematic implications of this term will be discussed at length in the following section.

As all the listed options seem unsatisfactory and even misleading due to their ineptness to describe what they intend to, namely the people of Chinese descent living outside China without insinuating a strong contact with the “motherland”, I made the choice to use the rather lengthy, yet seemingly more accurate definition namely people of Chinese descent as designation for Chinese individuals living in Southeast Asia. The political implication that emerged from the power over nomenclature has a long history that will be discussed in detail throughout the thesis.

But how can we proceed when terminology seems incapable of adequately representing reality? Resort to the least embarrassing solution, which in the academic context would be to turn a blind eye and reproduce the mishaps of the experts in the field? Or eloquently forgo the problems altogether? These questions refer to the rather unfortunate situation when the two politically charged terms of ethnicity and community are presented without an explanatory framework. In my opinion, a prevalent problem in academic literature on overseas Chinese in Southeast Asia is the lack of such an explanatory framework that could illuminate the complexity and the dynamics of change when defining ethnic and ethnicity.17

Who is an ethnic Chinese? When and why is the adjective ethnic of importance? Has there been sufficient scholarly attention paid to the difference between ethnic groups and cultural groups?18 What is intended when referring to a Chinese community? And finally, the all-encompassing cardinal question: can anybody possibly be part of an ethnic community unintendedly?

As a first step to answer these questions we have to consider that ethnic identity is primarily a collective one, where the most common attributes are related either to skin color, language,

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17 This is most salient in literature on “ethnic Chinese supremacy” within the economy of Indonesia and Malaysia, but also a weakness in other academic works related to people of Chinese descent in Southeast Asia.
18 “A cultural group is simply any group of people who consciously or unconsciously share an identifiable complex of meanings, symbols, values and norms” (Patterson 1975: 309). According to Patterson there are three differences between a cultural group and an ethnic group: 1) in a cultural group no conscious awareness of group identity is needed; 2) the social phenomenon of a cultural group is objectively verifiable; 3) the whole cultural group, or segments thereof, can become an ethnic group “but only when the conditions of ethnicity are met” (Patterson 1975: 310). These conditions will be specified later on in this section.
religion or territorial occupation. These attributes further stand in correlation with “ideas of
inheritance, ancestry and descent, place and territory of origin, and the sharing of kinship”
(Tambiah 1994: 430). Yet, although these ideas might seem clear-cut and defined (from the
actor’s point of view) both in time and space, there are many possible changes to this identity
(e.g. new members entering the ethnic group, changes to the defining criteria within the ethnic
identity) that render *ethnic labels permeable in their applications*. The definition of ethnic
identity thus offers an answer to the last question posed above, which has to be put in the
negative, since “the fact that *ethnicity is a chosen form of identification* cannot be
overemphasized. An ethnic group only exists where members consider themselves to belong
to such a group; a conscious sense of belonging is critical” (Patterson 1975: 309, emphasis
added).19 The usage of ethnic and ethnicity has proved to be rather imprecise when analyzing
literature about people of Chinese descent in Southeast Asia: neither has the aforementioned
definition been applied, nor has it been replaced by any other one that would provide the
reader with an understanding of the dynamic dimension of ethnicity, i.e. how the definition
can be changed or manipulated in accordance with political aspirations and needs. Without a
clear understanding of this term risks are looming large that “ethnic Chinese” will effectively
be understood as a homogenous, *predetermined category* in the newborn nation states of
Indonesia and Malaysia.20

Historically this representation of a “Chinese category” might seem plausible and relevant as
people of Chinese descent often created their own cultural enclaves, which have naturally
influenced and at times also impeded the depth of interaction with other cultural groups
within the different Southeast Asian societies. But even in such a situation when people of
Chinese descent voluntarily created a separate cultural unit (which has rather been the
exemption than the rule in the case of Indonesia), we have to be careful and question if this
was really related to a *consciousness of being ethnic Chinese*. In the case of Malaya in the
nineteenth century, Chinese immigrants were immediately integrated into cultural enclaves
depending on their native home districts, which were also naturally related to a specific
speech group, e.g. : Cantonese, Hakka, Hokkien, Hokchiu or Teochew. These speech groups
were often linguistically so far apart from each other that direct communication was rendered
impossible. According to Patterson “*ethnicity can only be understood in terms of a*

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19 For further indications of the universality of this definition, see the congruency with Glazer and Moynihan
(1975: 4).
20 As will be explained in chapter 3.2, this categorization of the ethnic *is* relevant if we observe contemporary
political reality: however, I want to bring attention to the fact that academia has in certain respects, through the
unspecified usage of the term ethnic, enabled the primordial perception to solidify.
dynamic and **contextual view of allegiances**” (Patterson 1975: 305, emphasis added), and it is questionable whether the idea that allegiances were created between these different speech groups as *a consequence of being Chinese* is not a mere afterthought.

Following Patterson’s line of thought, the correct ethnic categorization, in this specific Malayan case, would not then be ethnic Chinese but rather the specific speech group, as ethnicity means “that condition wherein certain members of a society, in a given social context, choose to emphasize as their most meaningful basis of primary, extrafamilial identity” (Patterson 1975: 308).

The importance of guarding ourselves against any deceptive primordial definitions of ethnic and ethnicity as *intrinsic values* cannot be overestimated as such definitions distort the complex reality of voluntary allegiances, political interests, and cultural traits that are all related to each other on different layers.

The Chinese scholar and anthropologist William G. Skinner (1925–2008) has also been adamant in underscoring that the definition of who is Chinese in Southeast Asia cannot be judged neither in legal (since citizenship cannot be considered a definer) nor in linguistic terms (since knowledge of Chinese cannot be regarded as a criterion) but is “essentially a matter of self-identification” (Skinner 1959: 137). This definition is congruent with the aforementioned discussion, and is also analytically useful due to its dynamic dimension and self-attributive content.21 It is also further helpful when we want to understand the complexity of Chineseness and belonging, both crucial issues in the mid-twentieth century, closely connected to questions regarding citizenship status and debates on educational and political integration.

Central for an understanding of the questions revolving citizenship status and the tensions arising in the early stages of the new nation states of Indonesia and Malaysia is the concept of *imperium in imperio*, which refers to the existence of a state within a state. The fear of such a materialization on Indonesian or Malayan soil originated in China’s attitude towards its overseas citizens, as it was stipulated in Article No. 98 of the Chinese constitution, stating that “the People’s Republic of China protects the proper rights and interests of Chinese citizens abroad” (Purcell 1965b: xiii). If the People’s Republic of China (henceforth PRC) had the overseas Chinese within its judicial grip, it would naturally influence both their economic and

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21 Yet it is clear that the aggressors against those of Chinese descent in Indonesia did not care about this categorization during the atrocities in 1965, 1982 and 1998, where the “essential outsider” was defined through the concept of race: if somebody looked Chinese, then that was regarded as being the case.
emotional decisions that could further trigger serious social and political instability in the
area. Although the PRC relinquished its intention to influence and protect what they regarded
as “their” overseas Chinese community in the 1950s, the suspicion of the people of Chinese
descent to be unreliable or disloyal toward the new nation state remained, as the idea of the
Chinese unreliability suited certain fractions of the indigenous political elite and could be
exploited politically, whenever a scapegoat was needed.

With scapegoat as keyword, it seems appropriate to introduce another concept that is also of
vital importance for an understanding of the Chinese role in various Southeast Asian societies:
the middleman minority. According to Edna Bonacich (1973: 586) “Middleman minorities
typically evince the following traits: a resistance to out-marriage, residential self-aggregation,
the establishment of language and cultural schools for their children, the maintenance of
distinctive cultural traits (including, often, a distinctive religion), and a tendency to avoid
involvement in local politics except in affairs that directly affect their group. They form
highly organized communities which resist assimilation”.

Coined in 1967 by Hubert M. Blalock (1926–1991), the concept of middleman minority
encompasses a variety of ethnic minorities (e.g. Armenians in Turkey, Parsis in India,
Koreans in the United States, etc.) that have come to hold a role in their host societies with
certain similar structural features, and “in contrast to most ethnic minorities, they occupy an
intermediate rather than low-status position” (Bonacich 1973: 583), which is notably related
to trade and commerce.

According to Bonacich, there are two concurrent themes trying to explain the conditions that
influence the existence of the middleman minority. The first theme is focusing on the forced
marginality the middleman minority faces as a consequence of a hostile surrounding society,
which in turn triggers a strengthened sense of identity and solidarity within the group. The
second theme focuses on how the middleman minority is able to fill the status gap between the
elite and the masses, which in the Southeast Asian historical context would be related to the
gap between representatives of the colonial powers and the “indigenes” (Chua-Franz 2002;
Coppel 2002; Reid 1997; Skinner 1959). In Bonacich’s opinion however, the themes

22 It should be noticed that Bonacich (1973: 589) disagrees on the common observation that the hatred against
middleman minorities is related to scapegoating, and instead regards this as “a surface impression”.
explained above do not get to the heart of the matter, as the characteristic of the middleman minority is above all related to liquidity.  

One reaches a different conclusion about the structural role of the middleman minority through the comparison between people of Chinese descent in Southeast Asia and the Jewish population in Europe prior to WWII (Reid 1997). Both minorities, which had been seen merely as just two among many specialized ethnic groups in their respective heterogeneous societies prior to the implementation of the nation state concept, were gradually regarded as a threat to the new paradigms of the nation state (Chirot and Reid 1997: 8). With the growth of nationalism and the new concept of the nation with its unifying foundation myth and a common language (as pointed out by Anderson, mentioned in the introduction), these two successful minorities were gradually regarded as something fundamentally disturbing. Their loyalty towards the nation was questioned, and regardless of the efforts made to actively counteract this claim, suspicion remained (Lim 2013: 249). The greater the success and adaptability, both in economic and modernizing terms, the greater the uneasiness among the locals. In the case of the Chinese in Southeast Asia, their role in the economic field was rather disproportionate due to a strong family culture, elaborated knowledge of the mechanisms of the local market, and good political connections, all attributes that further fueled resentment and jealousy. Among the manifold parallels between these two minorities, the most apparent one is related to the rise of modern nationalism and the fact that it was often the “most assimilated, the least easily identified, the most cosmopolitan and liberal Jews who were the most resented” (Chirot and Reid 1997: 9), which in some respects resembles the situation people of Chinese descent faced in Java half a century later.

23 Liquidity is characterized by the proclivity to enter occupations were economic investment is ‘very light’, exemplified through the grocery store with largely unpaid family members in the workforce, which has been the preeminent characteristic of Chinese minorities worldwide. Another typical example of light investment can be seen in the comparison between the money lender (or broker) and the industrial entrepreneur. That the minority choose this ‘very light’ economic investment is, in Bonacich’s opinion, related to the previously explained characteristic of sojourning, where the minority is directed towards a homeland that, in turn, influences the way investment is carried out and the aforementioned example on employment structures, where thrift and family solidarity make up the core values.

24 For any reader who finds the Jewish Chinese comparison inadequate, attention can be drawn to the situation at the Fine Arts Department in Thailand in June 1938, where the director compared the situation of Germany and Thailand concluding that “the Nazi solution might be applicable” (Skinner 1958: 261).

25 We should however not forget that these criteria did of course only apply to a minor number of individuals within the heterogeneous Chinese minority. The majority of Chinese in Malaysia were rural dwellers, predominantly working in either the tin or the mining industry (Clarkson 1968; Heidhues 2000; Purcell 1965b; Tan 2013).
What did the anti-Jewish proponent regard as being characteristic? What criterion was encompassing the imagined Jewish community? What similarities are discernible when talking about the Chinese community? Again, I want to bring attention to the dangers of generalizations and will avoid the concept of “Chinese community” unless it is related to concrete individuals that have themselves declared their sense of belonging to a specific Chinese community.

3.2 Modalities of Ethnic Oppression

Ever since the term ethnicity experienced a surprising resurgence on the academic stage in the 1960s (contrary to the sociological expectations that the term, being a relic of the past, would give way to the paramount categorization of class) there has been a mounting awareness that ethnic affiliation and ethnic identity are overriding other social cleavages and superseding other bases of differentiation to become the master principle and the major identity for purposes of sociopolitical action” (Tambiah 1994: 431, emphasis added).

In the late twentieth century this has been manifested in various ethnic conflicts on a more or less lethal scale: Belgium (between Flemings and Walloons), Canada (between French and English-speakers), Cyprus (between Cypriots and Turks), Peru (between Indians and mestizos), and the Balkans. In addition, minority language problems arose in India, nationality issues turned violent in the USSR, minority conflicts spread along the Chinese border, and African tribal conflicts grew, just to mention a few of the manifold nation states or areas where ethnic conflict were intensifie within the span of less than two decades in the twentieth century (Glazer and Moynihan 1975: 2).

The social anthropologist Stanley J. Tambiah (1929–2014) has put forth a theory that can be divided into a three-step explanatory framework that summarizes the fundamental aspects

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26 If the argument is put forth that this criterion is related to religion, then the argument itself seems rather implausible, bearing in mind the high percentage of Jewish communists as seen during the Russian revolution. And even the weakest mind, thus the easiest pray for any arbitrary conspiracy theory, ought to have some difficulties at this point to defend the hypothesis that “all Jews are capitalist” when the previous fear of the “Jewish community” was based on their alleged religious or communist affiliation. Regardless if they were liberals, socialists or orthodox, the Jews were irrationally and jealously accused of being anti-nationals and clairaudient to any subversive corruption in the name of capitalism and greed. That there was never such a thing as ONE Jewish community and that different individuals of Jewish origin were involved in competing visions of politics and society, was a political reality completely ignored during this apocalyptic phase of the European history that ended in one of the largest human tragedies, namely the Holocaust.
necessary to understand the ubiquity of ethnic conflict. The framework starts with a
distributional chart that classify nation states according to their ethnic compositions, whereby
focus of interest is directed towards newly established nation states with two ethnic groups of
approximately the same size (chart A).

This chart is followed by a characterization of three phases of political development that have
been representative for a number of countries that gained independence shortly after the end
of WWII, which has also been the case for both Indonesia and Malaysia (chart B).

As a last step, three different scenarios are described that have been observed following the
conflicts arising in plural societies due to the intensified “ethnic discourse” during the early
phase of national independence (chart C).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Chart A:</th>
</tr>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. Countries of homogenous ethnic composition (referring to between 90 and 100 percent being ethnically the same): Japan, Korea, Bangladesh.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. Countries with a dominant ethnic majority (75 to 89 percent): Bhutan, Burma, Cambodia, Taiwan, Vietnam, Turkey.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. Countries with one large ethnic group making up 50 to 75 percent, with several minority groups: Thailand, Sri Lanka, Laos, Iran, Afghanistan, Pakistan, Singapore, and (probably) Nepal.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. Countries with two groups of approximately the same size: Malaysia (Malay and Chinese), Guyana (East Indians and Creoles), Fiji (Fijians and Indians) and Guatemala (Ladinos and Indians).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5. Truly pluralistic countries with many different ethnic groups, where either no group or two of them are perceived as dominant: Nigeria (Ibo, Yoruba, Hausa and Fulani), Indonesia, the Philippines and India. Within these societies however, internal politics can take regional dualistic forms (i.e. Sikhs versus Hindus in Punjab, and Christians versus Moros in the Philippines).</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Tambiah’s writing is adamant to underscore that ethnic itself is a vital and changeable category, as argued in the previous section.
In Tambiah’s opinion, it is also important to analyze whether the groups in question are ranked (by asymmetrical definitions of value), unranked, or if they are rather parallel groups vertically divided. The most salient category for comparison would be the countries with unranked ethnic groups, such as Sinhalese and Tamils in Sri Lanka, Filipino and Moro in the Philippines, or Chinese and Malays in Malaysia, where the colonial legacy plays a significant role (see chapter 4).

Prior to the latter part of the twentieth century, ethnic groups were mostly understood as marginal sub-groups or minorities, expected to assimilate to the dominant political demands of their host societies. This political reality changed during the latter part of the twentieth century, as

“now we are also faced with instances of majority ethnic groups within a polity or nation exercising preferential or ‘affirmative’ policies on the basis of that majority status” (Tambiah 1994: 431, emphasis added).

The Malays in Malaysia can be regarded as being an example of a majority ethnic group claiming special rights due to their preferential status as bumiputera, meaning “sons of the soil” (see chapter 6.9). According to Tambiah, a number of third world countries (e.g. India, Malaysia, Guyana, Nigeria, and Sri Lanka), which received their independence soon after the end of WWII, have certain traits in common as visualized in the chart below.

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**Chart B:**

1. After decolonization, the power is “transferred” to the local elites, often interrupted by civil disobedience (in the case of Malaya this is manifested through the Chinese communist guerillas, see chapter 6.7).

2. A second phase followed in the late 1950s and 1960s, which was characterized by optimistic “nation-making” involving demands of national sovereignty and a strengthened national integration, which played down internal diversity and social fissures in favor of the pre-eminence of the nation state (in the Malaysian case, this is visible through the Malaysian Alliance under Tengku Abdul Rahman). Confident economic expectations were growing in this phase, and the general political climate enabled collaboration between political parties with divergent agendas.

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28 Rwanda, Zanzibar, Ethiopia, and Liberia would be examples of societies with ranked ethnic groups (Tambiah 1994: 433).

29 It could be argued that Malaysia’s status has changed since Tambiah created his framework in the 1990s and should now be referred to as a developing country.
3. The optimistic second phase is interrupted by ethnic conflict (also related to language, race, religion, and territory) and political debates as well as academic analyses, which become increasingly framed within old concepts that are given new force (e.g. plural society, self-determination, traditional homelands). The state, which had hitherto been the prime actor in helping, directing and controlling the development of the nation state takes a new role as arbitrator to enable the different regional cultures (which could also be referred to as the different ethnic groups) to obtain their “authentic” interests and identities.

During the last phase of conscious politicization of ethnicity, collectivities (or ethnic groups) increasingly take on the role as political actors and “ethnic equalization rather than freedom and equality of the individual is the principal charter of participatory democracy in many of the plural and multiethnic societies of our time […] once political demands are made on the basis of ethnic affiliation for the distribution of economic rewards, occupational positions, and educational privileges, the norm of ‘equality and opportunity’ is progressively and irreversibly displaced by the norm of ‘equality of result” (Tambiah 1994: 437, emphasis added).

When groups, regarding themselves as being disadvantaged, start pushing for direct redistributive policies, political competition and conflict are inevitable. This contested area related to worth and honor can be divided into:

a) capacities and symbolic capital (e.g. education and occupation)

b) material rewards in the form of income and commodities

c) honors, such as titles and offices

In the competition for the material and immaterial goods described above, conflict arises.

Chart C presents three different scenarios of ethnic conflict taking place in the latter part of the twentieth century as a result of redistributive policies.
Chart C:

1. The first scenario is predominantly applicable to former British or Dutch colonies (i.e. plural societies in East and West Africa, the Caribbean, and Indonesia), where certain ethnic groups may have occupied special niches (merchants and traders, see also *middleman minority*) that tended to create a segmented labor market, where solidarities beyond the ethnic boundaries were almost non-existent. The colonial rulers had intentionally created this system with a deliberate degree of ethnic segregation, with different groups benefitting from rewards and protection depending on the colonial own interests and benefits (see chapter 4). As these niches entered the stage of independence in the new born nation states, a range of governments forcefully tried to “open up” what they regarded as unjust monopolies of ethnic groups, which led to dispossession (i.e. Natukkottai Chettiars in Rangoon) and expulsion (i.e. Indian merchants from Uganda). This policy took place in the name of governmental protection of “indigenous” majority interests.

2. The second scenario is related to expectations of peripheral minorities facing majority domination (e.g. Burma, Laos, Thailand, and the northeastern part of India), and conflicts in matters such as agricultural techniques, language, or religion. These tribal or ethnic minorities have the tendency to push for secessionist actions (i.e. Nagas and Mizos in India, Kurds in Iraq, and Muslims/Moros in the Philippines).

3. The third scenario is concerned with the subordination of certain collectivities (or ethnic groups) within plural societies. The application of different mechanisms to augment the power of the ruling class through unequal distribution of rights (educational, legal, occupational or political) creates a social category that can be referred to as holding only a “second-class citizenship” due to discrimination (commonly on economic, racial, or religious grounds). Guatemala and South Africa have been extreme examples, with less extreme examples referring to the Malays and the Sinhalese in Sri Lanka, who have made claims to “affirmative action” based on mytho-historical legitimacy (in the Malay case this is manifested in the *bumiputera* status) and demographic strength. These efforts to subordinate groups (in the Malaysian case, the Chinese) that were previously unranked and equal, and
incorporate them as inferior citizens in the new nation state will not be accepted without contention, and possibly even retaliation.

3.3 Ethnic Policies targeting People of Chinese Descent in Southeast Asia

The Chinese Indonesian sinologist Leo Suryadinata (b. 1940–) concludes that the different policies directed towards people of Chinese descent in Southeast Asia are most probably reflecting the demographic structures of the different nation states as pointed out by Tambiah in chart A (Suryadinata 2013: 275). If the percentage of people of Chinese descent is low, the “temptation” of the government to enforce assimilation policies tends to be rather strong.\textsuperscript{30} If the percentage is high, the assimilation will prove to be both problematic and unrealistic, and the governments will instead resort to either policies of accommodation or partial acculturation.\textsuperscript{31} Regardless of the chosen strategy, however, the Southeast Asian governments will make efforts to keep the population of Chinese descent small in number, either by stopping Chinese immigration or through the “import” of other migrants from neighboring countries.

Suryadinata (2013: 275) has concluded that government policies applied towards the people of Chinese descent in different Southeast Asian nation states depend on:

- a) the political system (which can be either a liberal or an illiberal democratic system)
- b) the economic situation of the nation state
- c) the relationship between the “indigenous” elite and the people of Chinese descent
- d) the nation states’ relationship with China

\textsuperscript{30} Assimilation is “the process of erasing the boundary between one group and another. There are two principal varieties of assimilation. Two or more groups may unite to form a new group, larger and different from any of the component parts. This we refer to as amalgamation […] alternatively, one group may lose its identity by merging into another group, which retains identity. This we call incorporation” (Horowitz 1975: 115). When Suryadinata describes the situation in Southeast Asia, he refers to the latter variant of assimilation.

\textsuperscript{31} Acculturation commonly refers to a dynamic process where the culture of a society (or group such as an ethnic group) is modified and changed through the contact with another society (or group). However, acculturation could also be understood on an individual level, and is, contrary to assimilation, which constitutes a “give-and-take relationship”, a one-way unidirectional process of change. For a thorough discussion about the difference between assimilation and acculturation, see Telke and Nelson 1974. In my understanding, Suryadinata refers to acculturation as a less invasive, thus “weaker” form of assimilation. With accommodation, Suryadinata refers to the development of different working arrangements, whereby the distinct identities of the groups are maintained, by which he decidedly “uses the term in a liberal way and do not exclude a certain degree of common national identity” (Suryadinata 2013: 288).
There is high probability that a nation state with a liberal democratic system will introduce a policy embracing cultural pluralism, whereby certain pressures of integration prevail. In the case of an illiberal democratic system, accommodation, acculturation, or assimilation will be established. If the economic situation is problematic and the relationship between the “indigenous” and the people of Chinese descent becomes shaky, there is a high probability of authoritarian rule followed by assimilation, expulsion, or genocide. Whether China intervenes or not influences the risk of escalation: the probability of intensified expulsion policy rises if China intervenes.

3.3.1 Ethnic Policies toward People of Chinese Descent in Indonesia

Following Suryadinata’s argumentation, and with a decreasing population of Chinese descent (between 2 and 3%), the temptation of the state to apply a policy of assimilation ought to be rather high. The years between 1949 and 1958 can nevertheless be characterized as following a rather liberal policy, comparable to cultural pluralism, and the years between 1959 and 1965 can be characterized by a policy of integration. The policy of assimilation was implemented during the authoritarian rule of Suharto (1966–1998), in which occasional expulsions were also on the agenda. This has been followed by the policy of cultural pluralism (since 1998).

Different curtailments of economic activities among people of Chinese descent were introduced in the 1950s that were nevertheless abandoned as the results proved disastrous for the Indonesian economy. The assimilation policies that were introduced by Suharto in 1967 were instead focusing on the areas pertaining to culture, which Suryadinata refers to as the ‘three pillars’ (in Chinese also called sānbǎo 三寶, the “three treasures”), that is politics, education and mass media. These ‘three pillars’ were complemented in 2005 by a fourth one, namely Chinese religion, and will for that reason be referred to as sānbǎo + in this thesis. Apart from restrictions and prohibitions to religious practices regarded as being dominated by people of Chinese descent, ethnic based politics were also prohibited and Chinese press and schools were forcibly closed. These repressive policies had decade-long consequences as they created a “Chinese elite but no credible sociopolitical leaders to represent Indonesia’s Chinese minority” (Suryadinata 2001: 505).

Suryadinata (2005) further argues that this explains why the Chinese individuals residing in Indonesia cannot be regarded as overseas Chinese anymore but must be seen as Chinese Indonesians, as they lost their language skills and cultural attachment.
3.3.2 Ethnic Policies toward People of Chinese Descent in Malaysia

As the population of Chinese descent in Malaysia is rather high (approximately 22% of the overall population in 2010) and the constitution safeguards ethnic rights in the domain of language and culture, the government has applied an accommodation policy. However, after the racial riots in 1969, the importance of the Malay language has increased. Most children receive their schooling in Malay but, contrary to Indonesia, a large number of students still receive their schooling in Chinese. Chinese newspapers are widespread and there are a variety of active Chinese associations substantiated by ethnic based political parties of importance. This proves that sānbāo+ has been able to exist rather intact in Malaysia. However, following the argumentation of both Tambiah and Suryadinata, as the population of Chinese descent is steadily declining, this demographic decline might weaken the position of the people of Chinese descent and, subsequently, invite for a shift toward politics of assimilation.

33 By 1996, almost 60,000 Chinese students were studying using Chinese as their medium of instruction (Suryadinata 2013: 284).
The first recorded traces of Chinese presence in Southeast Asia are dating back to the earlier centuries of the Common Era, where the testimonies of the Buddhist monks Fǎxiǎn 法顯/法显 (334 –420) and Yījìng 義淨/义净 (635 –713) play an eminent role (DeBernardi 2006; Dutt 1960). According to Purcell (1965b: 11), the archeological findings of prehistoric stone sculptures in Southern Sumatra displays striking similarities with stone sculptures in the Chinese Shānxī province erected in 117 BCE. The Chinese tributary system furthermore enforced exchange between mainland China and Southeast Asia, which in the case of Indonesia reached its peak during the Ming dynasty (1368–1644).
“In the 1420s alone, 15 tribute missions from Java to China were recorded and the Chinese emperors seemed to give them favorable treatment” (Liu 2011: 35).

In the fourteenth century, the Chinese, who were predominantly committed to pirating, subjugated the town of Palembang in the southern part of Sumatra, and ruled it for two centuries. This town can be regarded as one of the first places in Southeast Asia where Chinese presence could be counted in substantial numbers (Purcell 1965b: 16).

A historical character from this era that still seems to be vividly present in contemporary societies of Southeast Asia is Zhèng Hé 郑和 (1371–1433), in older literature also referred to as Cheng Ho or Sam Po. He and his fleet set out for seven expeditions between 1405 and 1423, heading for as far-flung destinations as Calcutta, Java, Sri Lanka, Java, Hormus and Mogadishu, with the aim to “enhance the prestige of the Ming dynasty and, incidentally, to keep a look out for any rebels” (Purcell 1965b: 17). One of his missions was also to defeat the Chinese pirates of Palembang.34 Zhèng Hé, being a Muslim himself, has been regarded as an important factor for the spread of Islam in Indonesia. From the dynastic records during the period of Zhèng Hé’s journeys, there are many references to the Chinese in Java and Sumatra, where they seemed to belong to the better offs on the islands. With very few exceptions, also true for the rest of the Chinese migrants in Southeast Asia, they came from the southeastern provinces of Guǎngdōng, Fújìàn, and Guǎngxī, as a result of internal pressures.35 There were thus emerging Chinese communities present in Indonesia already in the fifteenth century (Liu 2011: 156).

The first recording of a Chinese colony in the Malay Peninsula stems from a Chinese merchant in 1349, who is referring to Tumasik, which is the name of old Singapore, the “Sea Town”. Malacca started to have a close contact with China at the beginning of the fifteenth century (Purcell 1965b: 235).

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34 Information gained from the regular exhibition of the Singaporean Peranakan Museum on 27 February 2014.
35 This migration pattern was predominantly a result of population pressure: however, internal problems in China as a consequence of changes from the Ming to the Qīng dynasty (1644–1912) also played a vital role.
4.1 The Chinese in Indonesia during the Colonial Era

During the pre-colonial era, the Indonesians saw China in a positive way, due to its rich civilization and strong polity. However, this was progressively reversed during the following centuries, under the gradual colonization by the Dutch East Indies Company, the Vereenigde Oost-Indische Compagnie (henceforth referred to as VOC), which was established in 1602. The Dutch colonial state, which can be seen as a follower of the VOC, was founded on 31 December 1799 (Claver 2014: 14). After 1600, and as a consequence of the Dutch deployment of a divide-and-rule policy, the Chinese became increasingly linked to their rule (Liu 2011: 39-41). This linkage, combined with the intentional “singling out” of the Chinese by the Dutch VOC and colonial government, evoked repercussions deep into the twentieth century. The Chinese, with their alleged comprador tradition, were the ideal unequal partner for the Dutch, at least in the beginning of the burgeoning spice trade, which was predominantly focusing on pepper, nutmeg, and cloves.

There are still different opinions on how the cooperation between the Dutch and the Chinese was conducted prior to the Chinese Massacre in Batavia (Jakarta) in 1740, where 10,000 Chinese were killed inside the ghetto constructed by the Dutch, and possibly as many as 70,000 people outside the ghetto (Purcell 1965b: 389-403; Kemasang 1981: 24). Despite different perceptions of the true power balance in the cooperation between the Chinese and the Dutch, it is clear that the Chinese were the preferred trade partners, instead of the local Javanese (Claver 2014:133-135) and that this position, generated with the help of the Dutch VOC or colonial administration, can be seen as pivotal in the continuous segregation process of the Chinese, both with their status as “Vreemde Oosterlinge” or Foreign Orientals (Coppel 2002) and as brokers, which can be understood as constituting a middleman minority (described in chapter 3.1).

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36 For further reading about the VOC, see: Parthesius 2010.
37 In Kemasang’s opinion (1981: 124-125), this “aptitude for trade” had already been exploited by the Indonesian ruling class, prior to the colonial era, and the Chinese should be seen as client-capitalist, and thus subservient to the Dutch in all decision making processes.
38 The Chinese Massacre of Batavia was the tragic result of an attempted uprising by the Chinese as a reaction to deteriorating living conditions under the Dutch. After the plundering and burning of sugar factories by Chinese workers, where 50 Dutch soldiers were killed, the whole Chinese ghetto was searched for weapons, and then attacked, looted, and burned.
39 The Batavia massacre also increased the Islamization among the Chinese as a means to escape persecution. This, however, was not accepted by the Dutch, who wanted to keep the different ethnic groups separated (Salmon 1996: 193).
Apart from a short period between 1824 and 1855, the Chinese had a special status in legal matters, and were trialed in the European court *Raden van Justitie* instead of *Landraden*, which was the court for the general, local Indonesian population. Regarding criminal matters however, *Landraden* was also the court for the Chinese until 1918. The status as Foreign Orientals also included Arabs, Indian Muslims, and the Bengalis, but the Dutch were predominantly concerned with the Chinese “since the Chinese presence was of far greater economic significance” (Claver 2014: 19). The Foreign Orientals were in the middle position, ranked between the Europeans, who were at the top, and the natives at the bottom of the social ladder.  

The *middleman minority* (or entrepreneurial minority) of the Chinese in Southeast Asia has often been understood as a buffer between the elite and the mass, which serves “as a convenient scapegoat in times of unrest” (Coppel 2002: 98). This societal position is also related to structural and cultural factors through which the Chinese gained an economic as well as social position “always distinctive and usually superior to that of the indigenes” (Skinner 1959: 138). They often worked as merchants, frequently in areas that were regarded as “impure”, such as money lending, tax collecting, opium, or pawnshop tax. This position is normally understood as correlating with that of a sojourner, thus alienated from establishing roots in the society.

Another form of administration and control of the different minorities was the assignment of power into the hands of authoritative and powerful individuals within the different ethnic communities. These leaders were appointed by the Dutch and had titles of military character: *Majoor* (Major) *Kapitan* (Captain), or *Luitenant* (Lieutenant), all taken over from the Portuguese, who had been present in the eastern part of Indonesia prior to the Dutch arrival.

In the earlier phase of the Dutch colonial rule, the Chinese immigration improved greatly. In 1820 there were 62,000 Chinese on the island and, in 1880, the number had soared to 207,000, most of which lived in an urban surrounding (Claver 2014: 19). This migration was due to push and pull factors, where overpopulation and food scarcity augmented migration (Yen 2013: 73-88) as well as the Dutch increased need of workers, who were predominantly employed in coastal settlements.  

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40 For further reading on the legal status, see Coppel 2002: 157-168.
41 For further reading on the topic, see Lim 2013: 249-260.
42 Attention should be paid to the fact that a large number of Chinese were also living in rural areas, due to their work in the tobacco industry: “I found the rules made by the authorities fairly good on paper; but on visiting the tobacco-fields, and closely enquiring from the coolies themselves, I was convinced that the majority of them
Dutch and the Chinese was in revenue farming, where the Dutch favored the Chinese over the Javanese aristocracy, as the latter were seen as a bigger threat to the colonial rule. In the years between 1826 and 1895, the revenues from the farms counted for 22% of the total state revenue, which proves that the colonized economy profited “from colonial public and ethnic Chinese private investments in infrastructure and human capital” (Lim 2013: 250). After an official inquiry of the economic situation of the Foreign Orientals at the end of the nineteenth century, the Chinese, who were demonstrated to have a very strong grip on the economy, although being a marginal minority of only 2-3% of the whole population, had to be financially curtailed. As a wind of resentment against the Chinese started to blow, the Chinese reinforced contact with mainland China (Claver 2014: 133-140).43

The years leading up to the Japanese invasion (1941–1945) were marked by a growing nationalism on both sides, coupled with a slowed down assimilation rate. With more women among the Chinese immigrants, fewer mixed marriages took place, and the emphasis on the Chinese language also grew stronger. As the Nationalist Party Kuomintang (Zhōngguó Guómíndǎng 中國國民黨) came into power in China in 1927, all Chinese people were regarded as citizens of the country, regardless of their other national status. This policy led to frictions with the local governments and was eventually harmful to the Chinese, since it made their loyalty towards the country of residence questionable. On the other hand, China’s new role, with its staggering social upheavals, had a strong inspirational appeal beyond the ethnic borders (Liu 2011: 42).

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43 The policy of the Qing dynasty was to protect their “citizens overseas” but also “to consolidate the support for the imperial empire” (Tan 2013: 17).
4.2 The Chinese in Malaya during the Colonial Era

As well as in the case of Indonesia, the first Europeans to take interest in the area were the Portuguese, who held Malacca from 1511 to 1641, followed by the Dutch, who lost their control to the British with the Anglo-Dutch treaty of 1824 (Purcell 1965a: 24-26). The Chinese population of Malacca accounted for 6,882 persons out of 46,097 in 1842. After the British takeover of the island of Penang (formerly Prince of Wales Island) in 1786, the Chinese immigration increased rapidly, and they had the monopoly of the sugar-planting industry already in 1800 that lasted for 46 years, yet the majority of the immigrants were either merchants or artisans. Predominantly due to economic reasons, a large number of Chinese and Indians were brought to Malaya to work in the tin mining and the rubber industries (Berman 2011: 143). Between 1825 and 1900 tin mining was the dominant field of employment for Chinese working in non-urban areas (Clarkson 1968: 48).

The Chinese were rather autonomous in this earlier period, governed by the Captain that the British authorities had appointed, a system identical to the one used in Indonesia. When Singapore was founded by Raffles in 1819, it was populated by only 150 people, a number that rapidly increased to a total of 10,683, whereof 3,317 were Chinese (Berman 2011: 249). In terms of the administrative concept, the Dutch and the British were similar in their “divide and rule” policies, however the Chinese under British rule did enjoy a far greater freedom, both socially and economically, than they did under Dutch rule (Claver 2014: 195). Another factor, where the situation in Malaya differed from the one in Indonesia, was in the power of the established Chinese secret societies, referred to either as *Huì* or *Kongsī* (see chapter 8.2 for further explanation). In Penang and Singapore, when these societies were busy quarreling, although palpably violent with hundreds of deaths in the years between 1846 and 1885, the issue was seen as being a “private Chinese matter” of little concern to the colonial administration. This shows the general policy of leaving the Chinese a big amount of self-rule, mixed with the general incapacity of the British to intervene due to their lack of language knowledge (Claver 2014: 252).

It is important to bear in mind that these societies, although with an inward strict hierarchical order, also functioned as networks enabling alliances and certain upward mobility. This also holds true for later, poorer migrants, reflecting their kinship structure and marital status (Duara 2009: 108-109). Most of the Chinese who settled in the area had the aspiration to return to China once substantial means were gained, but for a vast majority this turned out to
be an illusion. The literature on people of Chinese descent in Southeast Asia has used the word “sojourner” to describe these migrants, literally denoting someone visiting very briefly, with the intention to return home shortly. In Chinese this term is translated *huàqiáo* 华侨, a politically loaded denomination, since it implicitly means that, being only short term migrants, the loyalty is directed towards China (Wang 1996: 1-14). These earlier migrants were predominantly men, with a sex ratio of 13 women to 100 men (Claver 2014: 254), since female migration seemed suspicious and highly unsuitable for a patriarchal society like the Chinese. The women left behind were described as *huó guǎfù* 寡妇, meaning widows with living husbands abroad. However, these migration patterns changed considerably during the first decades of the twentieth century (Tan 2013: 7). In the years with predominant male migration, it was not uncommon for men to marry local women, which meant the emergence of the *Peranakan* (or *Baba-Nyonya*) culture.
The Difference within: Baba-Nyonya, Peranakan, and Totok

Interview with Alvin Yapp at his home turned into museum, known as the Intan museum in the residential area of Katong, Singapore, on 6 December 2014. (Photo: Gabriella Szabó)

Peranakan, Baba, or Baba-Nyonya are different terms referring both to the culture and the individuals related to it that emerge from the intermarriage between Chinese and local Southeast Asians of Indian, Indonesian, Malaysian, or Thai origin. Originally these terms referred only to the offspring of a Chinese male and a local female and not to the reverse
situation, i.e. with a Chinese woman and a local male, since it was only the patrilineal structure that mattered within Chinese culture. If the mother would be Chinese and the father e.g. Malay, the child would be regarded as Malay. *Anak* in Per-anak-an, is the Malay/Indonesian word for child, with the dictionary definition as “offspring of indigenous and foreign” (Coppel 2013).

The *Peranakan*, *Baba* or *Baba-Nyonya* culture (henceforth referred to as *Peranakan*) was a consequence of the migration structure, since as already mentioned in chapter four, the first waves of immigration to Southeast Asia until the beginning of the twentieth century were predominantly male, and when these men married local women then their children would become *Peranakan*. This culture has certain traits that can be seen as unique, since the *Peranakan*, although itself being a fusion, nonetheless managed to create a “new socio-cultural system that achieved autonomy and stability despite continued contact with both parents’ societies” (Skinner 1996: 51). This means that the individuals related to *Peranakan* were not trapped in a situation where they would have to choose between either their fathers’ “ethnic” affiliation (in this case Chinese) or their mothers’ culture (locally born); instead they could find and create ways of expression that could be understood and shared with others who had the same cultural background. This distinctive culture, mixing Chinese with local elements, can be found in Indonesia (Java), Malaysia (Malacca and Penang), India, Singapore, and Thailand. With an indigenous mother, the language used at home would be the local language and not Chinese. This linguistic difference is one of the major features to distinguish between *Peranakan* and *Totok*.

*Totok* (in the twentieth century also referred to as *Singkeh*, deriving from Chinese for “new guest”) means “pure, genuine, full-blood”, and is thus an antonym of *Peranakan*. *Totoks* usually speak Chinese, or one of the dialects of origin, and are culturally oriented towards China (Tan 1991: 120). In particular during the first half of the twentieth century, the *Peranakans*, who regarded themselves as members of a distinct group in society, preferred to marry other *Peranakans*, thus intentionally setting themselves apart from the indigenous population (Skinner 1996: 52). A variety of social, cultural and educational differences, in addition to that of birthplace, were indicating a clear boundary between these two groups. In the 1950s, *Peranakans* and *Totoks* often went to different schools, had different customs, pursued different careers, lived in different neighborhoods, and spoke different languages, thus being regarded as two different cultures within the Chinese community (Willmott 1960:

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44 For a more detailed overview, see Coppel 2002: 106-123.
As Suryadinata rightly claims, Suharto’s assimilation policies reinforced the *Peranakan* culture, since access to Chinese culture and language was actively restricted and confined to the private realms of society during his rule between 1966 and 1998. The tendency towards *Peranakan* or *Totok*, thus essentially meaning an identification with either Indonesia (*Peranakan*) or China (*Totok*), has been a waning movement since the nineteenth century, following colonial or other political interests (Salmon 1996). It is also important to bear in mind that the *Peranakan* society itself is very heterogeneous, with quite a few individuals following the beliefs of Islam or Christianity. Yet it is very probable that most *Peranakans* would accept the depiction of their “historically formed identity” as it is showcased in various museums throughout the region, embracing common aesthetics in clothing and furniture, food culture, weddings, funerals, and religious paraphernalia.

The term *Baba* (a Persian loan-word, originally denoting the honorific for grandparents) is another way to name the *Peranakan* or Straits Chinese. The Babas in Malacca accounted for approximately 5,000 individuals in 1988 (Tan 1988: 298). Sometimes, *Peranakan* in Singapore are also called *Baba*, distinguishing themselves from the *Baba* of Malacca through their Christian faith, compared to the practice of traditional Chinese religion in Malacca by the majority. This practice in Malacca, along with the maintenance of rituals that are long outdated in China (e.g. the wedding custom of *kahwin dulu-kala*), underscore their “Chineseness”, even though they use Baba Malay as their mother tongue (Tan 1988: 299).

From the 1890s to the 1930s, the publications in the so-called Baba Malay language thrived, with poetry, translations of the Bible, various newspapers, and even Chinese classics being published. Chinese loanwords were predominantly found in areas related to celebrations, customs, and beliefs. *Nyonya* (either a Dutch loan-word derived from *Nona*, meaning “grandma”, or Portuguese *Donha*, meaning “lady”) is today a widespread term found in *Nyonya* cooking, *Nyonya* ware, or *Nyonya* crockery. *Nyonya* artefacts would mostly be blue and white porcelains used within traditional ceremonies such as weddings and funerals. It is interesting to see how *Baba* and *Nyonya* are thus being gender-related, with *Baba* referring to the “male” domain, such as *Baba* community, *Baba* customs, or *Baba* language (Tahir 2008: 240). Demographically, the *Peranakan* population in Java grew from 100,000 in 1800 to

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45 Straits Chinese normally refers to Chinese in the Strait Settlements (Singapore, Penang, or Malacca) with British affinities and educational background.
46 There are 10,000 monolingual speakers of Baba Malay in Malacca and 5,000 in Singapore. Malacca is the birthplace of the Baba Language. Penang shares cultural practices with Malacca and Singapore, yet the Penang Baba is basically Hokkien with heavy borrowings from Malay (Tahir 2008: 41).
47 Tan is arguing that concurrently with the increasing awareness of ethnicity in the Malaysian political landscape, the *Baba* model of Chinese culture has been discredited as an undesired sub-culture, probably the consequence of its “linguistic impurity” as a Malay language with Chinese loanwords (Tan 1988: 313).
250,000 in 1900 (accounting for approximately 1% of the Javanese population), whereas the *Peranakans* in the Strait Settlements (normally referred to as the *Babas* of the Strait Settlements) numbered between 45,000 and 50,000 in 1890 (Skinner 1996: 58). In contemporary Southeast Asia, the *Peranakan* culture is in decline, while its most characteristic features, such as linguistic traits, dress code (e.g. the wearing of the traditional costume *kebaya*), and distinct educational patterns are currently only kept alive by very small communities in Indonesia and on the Malayan peninsula. The awareness of the *Peranakan* heritage, predominantly seen not as a lived dimension but as a cultural expression of the past, has experienced a strong revival during the last 20 years.\(^{48}\) This can be seen in the growth of both state and private museums that are either fully dedicated to the *Peranakan* culture or offering temporal exhibitions, as well as in the clothing, food, or furniture industry that caters to private individuals, who are fascinated by the eclectic aesthetics of the *Peranakan* heritage.\(^{49}\)

\(^{48}\) For example, Alvin Yapp, the owner and curator of the Intan museum in Singapore, defied the claim that *Peranakan* culture is an expression of the past, insisting instead on its contemporary vitality. Interview on 6 December 2014.

\(^{49}\) At the Singapore Museum, the first *Peranakan* items were collected in 1963, in an attempt to save “relics of the past” that seemed highly unfashionable and outdated for the new post-war generation. It was not until the early 1990s that *Peranakan* theatre plays, dance, and music suddenly thrived, and the “unfashionable turned nostalgic” (Tahir 2008: 10-11).
Peranakan heritage can generally be seen as a good example of heritage museumification, intending “to break any possible connection between the viewer’s present and the displayed past […] exhibits are presented as interesting for their antiquity, ingenuity, beauty or strangeness, but they possess no intrinsic ideological message of any significance to the present or the future” (Ashworth, Graham and Tunbridge 2007: 111).
6 Turmoil of War and Independence

The Japanese occupation of Indonesia lasted from March 1942 until the Japanese surrender in September 1945, which also marked the end of WWII. Although costing the lives for more than four million Indonesians, the Japanese presence in Indonesia facilitated the idea of an independent Indonesian nation, which was finally proclaimed by Sukarno (Indonesia’s first president, 1945–1967) and Mohammed Hatta (Indonesia’s vice president, 1945–1956) on 17 August 1945 (Kahin 2000: 1-3). The independence was not accepted by the Dutch, who fought to re-establish their colonial rule, eventually giving up in 1949, after more than four years of bitter struggle.

6.1 Sukarno, Integration, and Chinese Inspiration

Under Sukarno’s presidency, the newly established PRC increasingly came to play a dominant role in Indonesia’s nation building. After the period of Constitutional Democracy (1949–1958), with a policy of cultural pluralism, Sukarno used the PRC as a political point of reference, which resulted in the establishment of the Guided Democracy in 1959. During this period, which lasted until 1965, there was a stronger focus on the Chinese minority’s role as a vital part of the Indonesian nation building. Sukarno was utterly impressed by what he experienced during his visits to China, as can be seen in the following statement:

“I witnessed the realization of my ideals formulated since 1929… In the PRC I saw the practice of a guided democracy, and only this democracy with guidance can bring people into a new world, a truly just and prosperous new world” (Liu 2011: 222).

Sukarno admitted that he was greatly inspired by Sun Yat-sen, Sun Zhōngshān (孫逸仙/孫中山 1866–1925) the founding father of the Republic of China, and that the Three People’s Principles that Sun Yat-sen had developed, referring to democracy, nationalism, and socialism, had become a great source of inspiration for the Indonesian concept of Pancasila (see 6.2). According to Liu (2011), during these early formative years of the Indonesian nation, China became a contested metaphor that served both as desired target and fearful threat, whereby the positive opinions outweighed the negative ones. As a target, China was seen as a country where people, contrary to the Indonesians, worked energetically and

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50 For a more thorough introduction to the Japanese presence in Indonesia, see Sluimers 1996: 19-37.
selflessly towards a greater aim, with a powerful administration, a rapid economic growth, and an orderly social system. As a threat, this system was seen as denying people their basic rights and religious freedom. In Ruth McVey’s opinion, it is crucial to understand that from an Indonesian point of view, China was more comprehensive than being just a role model of remarkable social and cultural engineering; China had a powerful threefold identity, as “a state, a revolution, and an ethnic minority.” (cit in. Liu 2011: 9)

Two things are noteworthy in this selective perception of China:

1) The PRC was conceptually delinked from communism, seen instead as a showcase of a gigantic, profoundly nationalistic, and populist experiment.

2) The stronger the enthusiasm for China as a nation grew, the stronger the disdain against the Chinese ethnic minority in Indonesia developed, thus the Chinese in PRC and in Indonesia were seen as “brothers of different kinds” (Liu 2011: 168), with the Chinese Indonesians depicted as opportunists, only looking after their own interests and lacking in loyalty towards the Indonesian nation. A new economic policy, the Presidential Regulation No.10, was promulgated in 1959, prohibiting foreigners from retail trading in rural areas. A vast number of Chinese were affected, and an estimated number of 100,000 individuals left Indonesia for China, which further resulted in economic chaos (Suryadinata 2013: 276).

The anti-Chinese sentiments that were growing during the 1950s got a strong expression in the Assaat movement, where economic reforms in his name got widespread support, favoring “pure” Indonesians, thus discriminating against “new” citizens of foreign descent (Skinner 1959: 141). 51 Although the PRC was admired for its accomplishments, Indonesian policy makers were wary of Beijing’s increasing power, and the question of citizenship among the Chinese locals became a pressing issue. In a two-year period between 1949 and 1951, Indonesian-born Chinese could choose their citizenship, with the status of wives and children following the father’s choice (Willmott 1960). Due to the lack of any easy voluntary naturalization process, the concept of jus sanguinis that the Qing Nationality Law had promulgated in 1909 was applied (Tan 2013: 7). 52

51 Assaat Datuk Mudo (1904–1976), the founder of the “Assaat movement”, targeted the Chinese Indonesians and accused them for being monopolistic in their business practice. Further the “Assaat movement” propagated the Chinese exodus from Indonesian soil.

52 Jus sanguinis (Latin for “right of blood”) refers to citizenship not determined by the place of birth but by the citizenship of one or both parents, which is the opposite of jus soli (Latin for “right of the soil”): citizenship determined through location of birth. Due to the application of jus sanguinis, some Chinese individuals became stateless in these years, a status which was passed on to their children and has lasted until the twenty-first century.
Following the policies of Assaat, various decrees and regulations were imposed on trade and finance, and Chinese Indonesians were excluded from the establishment of banks, factories, and insurance companies. The “Ali-Baba” business structure was adapted (1953–1955) to trigger co-operation between Chinese and Indonesians (the Indonesian locals, *pribumi*, were referred to as Ali, and the Chinese as Baba), with the intention that the Indonesians could learn some business skills from their counterparts. Chinese were thus encouraged to find Indonesian business partners to participate in their enterprises in leading positions. However, the concept did not work out as initially desired, since it usually only transformed into a division of labor, where the Chinese maintained the control and the Indonesians the responsibility for public relations (Willmott 1960: 56). In the educational sector, a standard national curriculum was imposed to limit the active usage of the Chinese language within the school system.

### 6.2 Five fundamental Pillars of the Indonesian Nation?

“*Pancasila*, unlike other ideologies, does not contain a program of action and a prescription of how to reach a desired political or social future […] it is not abstract but operational definitions of *Pancasila* that matter and it is Indonesian political actors who control the definitions” (Ramage 1995: 203).

*Pancasila* (a Sanskrit derived term meaning the five principles) can be found in the preamble to the Indonesian constitution, promulgated on 18 August 1945, one day after the declaration of independence. It comprises the official philosophical ideas of the Indonesian state:

1. Belief in the divinity of God (*Ketuhanan Yang Maha Esa*).
2. Just and civilized humanity (*Kemanusiaan Yang Adil dan Beradab*).
3. The unity of Indonesia (*Persatuan Indonesia*).
4. Democracy guided by the inner wisdom in the unanimity arising out of deliberations amongst representatives (*Kerakyatan Yang Dipimpin oleh Hikmat Kebijaksanaan, Dalam Permusyawaratan dan Perwakilan*).
5. Social justice for all the people of Indonesia (*Keadilan Sosial bagi seluruh Rakyat Indonesia*).

Controlled by the Japanese, the Investigating Committee was established on 1 March 1945, and comprised representatives from different social backgrounds with very divergent ideas.
about the constitution of the new state and its legal model (Suhadi 2014: 32). The most controversial challenge for the Committee was to establish a dasar negara, a philosophical basis of the state (Ramage 1995: 11). The first principle was a significantly contested field especially opposed by different Islamic groups, since the choice of the word Ketuhanan (Lordship) instead of Allah or Tuhan (God) allowed for an inclusive approach to religion, which seemed to be at odds with the Islamic majority. On the one hand, Ketuhanan was seen as an inclusive choice that could be accepted by many different religious groups in the Indonesian society. On the other hand, however, it could also be argued that, by taking this divinity concept as the very first principle of the new nation state, a monotheistic approach to religion was enforced, alien to traditional Chinese religiosity (Daiber 2010: 55).

The second principle is referring to humanitarianism, which under Sukarno’s rule also referred to “internationalism”. Due to the changes of the political agenda during the New Order regime after 1966, this connotation had to be dropped and was instead replaced by an emphasis on tolerance and respect between all Indonesians. The third principle, Persatuan Indonesia, is urging for the maintenance of both unity and integrity throughout Indonesia (Ramage 1995: 13). The fourth principle refers to Indonesia’s right to define democracy, including concepts of traditional village governance, musyawarah and mufakat, referring to consultation and consensus. Both Sukarno and Suharto argued that Western forms of democracy are incompatible with the traditional processes steering Indonesian political ideas of decision-making. The fifth principle, referring to economic and social egalitarianism and prosperity, conveys the idea that “the state exists for the well-being of its citizens as a collectivity, not as individuals” (Ramage 1995: 13-14).

The five pillars of Pancasila have proved to be of extraordinary importance in the nation-building process of Indonesia, managing to constitute a fundament for the new nation state, without being either Muslim, although the majority of the population is of Islamic faith, or secular, thus avoiding the path that Turkey took under Atatürk 20 years prior to Indonesia’s independence. The new nation state embraced pluralism and, to a certain extent, even “enforced” religious tolerance (Daiber 2010: 55). Consequently, Pancasila became an

53 In the first document, the Jakarta Charter (Piagam Jakarta) from 22 June 1945 by the Committee of the Investigating Body for the Preparation for an Independent Indonesia, the Islamist fraction was adamant to include “dengan kewajiban menjalankan Syariat Islam bagi pemeluk-pemeluknya”, meaning “the obligation to implement Syariah (sharia) for adherents of Islam”, in the first Pancasila principle, however this was objected by both Christians and Balinese Hindus and finally was exempted from the final version (Suhadi 2014; Nishimura 1995). Another reason for dissatisfaction from the Muslim side due to the wording of the first paragraph is that it levels out the difference between mere belief (kepercayaan) and religion (agama) (Morfit 1981: 840).
ideological tool to “manage national diversity in regard to suku (ethnicity), antar golongan (intergroup), ras (race), and agama (religion)” (Suhadi 2014: 33). Due to the deliberately open character of the Pancasila philosophy, the interpretations of content have changed according to the prevailing ideological context.54

6.3 The Incident of September 30th

During the night of 30 September 1965, six high-ranking generals from the Indonesian Army were assassinated. The identity of those behind the attempted coup is still a contested field where different political interests still seem to play a vital role (McVey and Anderson 1978; Roosa 2008).55 Regardless of the actual intention of the coup, the result was a wide reaching extermination of alleged communists, who, according to the President Suharto, were the ones to blame. This mass murder was orchestrated through massive propaganda machinery throughout the whole nation, with the aim to purge the entire PKI (Partai Komunis Indonesia), which at that time, with its three million members, was the largest communist party in the world. In Bali, up to 80,000 people were murdered within two weeks, and in Java and Sumatra the killings were extended and lasted for three months. These atrocities that vastly targeted the population of Chinese descent definitely altered the political landscape. The consequences of this incident, so effectively exploited by President Suharto, played a

54 An example thereof can be seen in the implementation of Pancasila in the national education. During Sukarno’s regime, the educational aim was linked to socialism, as seen in the Higher Education Law of 1961, stating that the purpose of higher education was “to breed the builders of a socialist society that embodies the spirit of Pancasila” (Nishimura 1995: 26). After the incidents of 1965, however, this idea made a U-turn. The General Principles of National Policies, formulated by the People’s Consultative Assembly under Suharto in 1973, claimed that the aim of education was to “foster a ‘development-oriented person’ (manusia pembangunan) who can contribute to the promotion of the national development plan” (Nishimura 1995: 27). In the late 1970s, an initiative, referred to as P4, was on the agenda. P4 required all civil servants “below the rank of cabinet minister” (Morfit 1981: 838) to attend a rigid two-week seminar course with the sole aim to upgrade their knowledge of Pancasila that, in this context, was “an ideology of containment rather than one of mobilization” (Morfit 1981: 846).

55 Both articles convincingly underscore the political interests, especially of the United States, to distort any possible investigation that might allow for a more accurate account of what really happened. For a graphic introduction to the underlying geo-political motivations behind the scenes, see the documentary “Shadow Play” (2001) by Chris Hilton based on declassified documents including the correspondence between the State Department in Washington DC, the US ambassador in Jakarta, the British foreign officer Norman Reddaway in Singapore, and the foreign office in London. There are some telling arguments in this correspondence, like the Internal Memo of the British Foreign Office on 30 December 1965: “A premature coup may be the most helpful solution for the West – provided the coup failed.” Or the wording of Phoenix Park in Singapore directed to the foreign office in London on 5 October 1965: “We shall have no hesitation on doing what we can surreptitiously to blacken the PKI in the eyes of the people in Indonesia.” Also see: http://asiasociety.org/filmmaker-chris-hilton-anti-communist-purges-indonesia-1965-66?page=0,2 (retrieved 17 February 2015).
pivotal role in the stigmatizing process of Chinese identity discourse for the following decades.\textsuperscript{56}

6.4 Suharto, Assimilation, and the “Chinese Problem”

Suharto, taking over power after Sukarno in 1966, had dreadful ambitions. Central to his aspirations was the extermination of all communists and an assimilation policy that severely affected the population of Chinese descent. As a first step, the restrictions of economic activities that had been imposed by Sukarno were loosened, which resulted in a growth of economic strength among the Chinese Indonesians. The power-holders, predominantly from the military, could thus collaborate with Indonesian Chinese businessmen (later this system would be known as \textit{cukong}), which eventually had negative effects for some indigenous businessmen, provoking embittered tensions. The second step was the implementation of assimilation policies with a clear-cut aim: to eradicate the \textit{sānbāo}+ (see chapter 3.3.1).

Already in 1966, with a few exceptions, all Chinese schools had been closed. Those excepted were also closed down in due course. There were no written laws on enforced name-changes for Chinese-sounding names, but different kinds of regulations were imposed making it virtually impossible to live in Indonesia using a Chinese-sounding name. This sanction caused severe damage to the traditional patriarchal Chinese family structure, where a name carries a deep function in a complex kinship system. The usage of the Chinese language was restricted in public places, and all independent Chinese newspapers had to be closed down. In June 1967, “The Basic Policy for the Solution of the Chinese Problem” was promulgated, followed by another one on Chinese religion, beliefs, and customs.

“All forms of cultural affinity based on the country of origin should be removed, in order to give all elements of culture in Indonesia the opportunity to develop according to the \textit{Pancasila}” (Coppel 2002: 115).

The Chinese, lacking any bargaining power, complied with these new restrictions, a reaction that is more than understandable, bearing the atrocities of 1965 in mind and Suharto’s burgeoning military power. Sukarno’s citizenship policy was liberalized resulting to only 300,000 alien Chinese being left in Indonesia in 1990. This “Chinese problem” (\textit{masalah}

\textsuperscript{56} See Joshua Oppenheimer’s highly acclaimed films “The Act of Killing” (2012) and “The Look of Silence” (2014) for a further understanding of the magnitude of this tragic event and how it still influences all levels of the Indonesian society.
Cina), a top priority one on the assimilationist agenda, also included a financial redistribution program, with the intention to concurrently assure the reduction of Chinese capital while curtailing cultural expression.57 The intentions of Badan Permusjawaratan Kewarganegaraan Indonesia (BAPERKI), a Chinese mass organization proposing integration based on the idea that the Chinese Indonesians were just another minority among a wide range of national minorities were not accepted and the organization was banned. All these enforced policies led to a gradually peranakanized society (Suryadinata 2013: 276). During the next 32 years, with Suharto in power, there was a firm attempt to restrict any possible political or social involvement of Chinese Indonesians, with the consequence of neither ethnic-based parties nor sociopolitical organizations being allowed. The aim was to “depoliticize the Chinese community” (Suryadinata 2001: 505) and to direct their activities away from culture and politics and, instead, channel them into the domain of economy.

6.4.1 Assimilation Policies in the Era of Suharto

In the following section a few paragraphs from “The Basic Policy for the Solution of the Chinese Problem” (1967) will be presented (Coppel 2002: 35-47). They correspond to the cultural domains discussed above and clearly demonstrate how Suryadinata’s claim of an intentional destruction of sānbǎo+ holds true.

1. Appendix B to Article 5 of The Chinese Problem, decision No. 240 of the President of the Republic of Indonesia, concerning the basic policy related to Indonesian citizens of Chinese descent stated: “in particular, Indonesian citizens of foreign descent who still use Chinese names are urged (dianjurkan) to replace them with Indonesian names pursuant to current legislation.”

2. Appendix K, instruction of the Cabinet Presidium No. 49 concerned with the efficient use of the Chinese mass media, insists on the necessity to “increase the efficiency of the Chinese character newspaper ‘Harian Indonesia’ as a channel for information and fostering of Indonesian residents who only understand Chinese language, in the

57 Although the regulation from 1967 only allowed Chinese culture and religion to be celebrated in private, the regulations have proven somewhat arbitrary, with some religious activities continuing, as seen in the temple festivals adherent to Sam Po Kong in Semarang (Coppel 2002).
framework of overcoming subversive activities and foreign propaganda that are hostile to the Government of the Republic of Indonesia”.

3. Appendix D to The Presidential Instruction No. 14 related to the Chinese Problem issued on 6 December 1967, stated that “the Chinese religion, belief and traditional custom in Indonesia which focus on the country of their ancestors, and which in their manifestation can give rise to inappropriate (*kurang wajar*) psychological, mental and moral influences on Indonesian citizens and so form an obstacle to the process of assimilation, need to be regulated and their functions placed in their proper proportion.”

As the latter indicates: cultural practices such as dragon performances or lion dance, were now banned in the public and had instead to be carried out within individual households. The fear and insecurity arising from these new instructions also altered various practices around the *klenteng* (Chinese temples). The *klenteng*, of crucial importance in its social role as a place for meetings as well as collective or individual worship, had been a hub for Chinese communities ever since its formation. In the wake of the implementation of these new instructions, people were afraid to continue the rite of placing commemorative tablets of their deceased family members at the altars of the *klentengs*, as this could put the tablets at risk. It also revealed that the family was still under “Chinese cultural influence” which was not a wise choice politically speaking. The consequence thereof was that different ceremonies related to ancestral worship were instead carried out in the private domain, and the *klentengs* often fell into neglect. Questions were also officially posed as to what extent it could be acceptable to venerate ancestral ashes (Alabahin 2005: 128).

That the matters related to “The Basic Policy for the Solution of the Chinese Problem” show a high degree of arbitrariness is clearly visible in case number three, as President Suharto was quoted in 1967 to have written an opening statement to GAPAKSI (*Gabungan Perhimpunan Agama Khonghucu se-Indonesia*, the Indonesian Federation of Confucian Religion) saying that “the Confucian religion (*agama Khonghucu*, which could at that time be regarded as almost exclusively Chinese) deserves a decent place in this country” (Yang 2005: 2). However, the statute on marriage from 1974 made it mandatory to declare religion and faith, and the ministerial directive No. 477/74054/BA.01.2/4683/95 (issued on 18 November 1978)

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58 In the case of Semarang, many *klentengs* were built in the end of the eighteenth century.
59 Interview with an anonymous custodian of a *klenteng* related to the foundation of Tjie Lam Tjay. Semarang on 5 February 2014.
stated that there were only five religions in Indonesia (Yang 2005: 3). Confucianism had thus been deleted from the list of official religions, although the decree from the 1960s was never revoked. As Confucianism lost its state-recognition as a religion, followers were encouraged to register themselves on the mandatory residential identity card as Buddhists or opt for one of the other four religions. The religions pertaining to sam khaw, referred to as sān jiào 三教 in Chinese meaning the “Three Teachings”, were also placed under Buddhism according to the Ministry of Religion in 1967. They also had to be “de-Sinicized” as all Chinese insignia had to be covered or removed.

As religious registration was mandatory, the propensity of the Chinese Indonesians had been to affiliate with either Buddhism or Christianity; belonging to a Christian community could possibly enhance the feeling of being protected, as these communities were widely accepted among the indigenous Indonesians.

60 Although the Presidential Decree 1/1965 (Tambahan Lembaran Negara No. 2726 of 1965), promulgated by President Sukarno on the Prevention of Blasphemy and Abuse of Religions, declared that there were six officially recognized religions (agama) to be accepted in Indonesia: Islam, Protestantism (Kristen), Catholicism, Bali-Hinduism, Buddhism, and Confucianism, which can also be seen as an explicit attempt to exclude kepercayaan and kebatian, nature religions and mysticism, “this marked the beginning of the endless debates over state-recognized and non-state-recognized religions in the years that followed” (Yang 2005: 2).

61 The “Three Teachings” commonly refer to Buddhism, Daoism and Confucianism, together with specific traditions within medicine, astronomy, astrology, agriculture, alchemy, fēngshuí, and mantric arts that are partly based on a “correlative cosmology” following calendric indications (Clart 2012: 219–222), make up the nucleus of Chinese religion. The religious scholar Tan Chee-Beng emphasizes that we ought to understand the Chinese religion “as a whole system and put to rest once and for all misleading classifications of Chinese worshipers as Buddhist, Taoist or Confucians” (Tan 1983: 217). This is also congruent with Nadeau’s conclusion (2012: 5) that most practitioners of Chinese religion, if questioned to choose between Buddhism, Confucianism and Daoism “would respond that their religious beliefs and ritual practices are informed significantly by all three traditions, and would be hard-pressed to distinguish between them”. In Indonesia, however, only Buddhism was accepted as a state-recognized religion, which forced all klonengs (Chinese temples) to register as Buddhist institutions.

62 In 1976 there were four million Protestants in Indonesia, whereof at least 330,000 were Chinese, equaling to 10,6 % of all Chinese, and 15,8% of the Peranakans (Italiaander 1976: 185). During the colonial era, Christianity sought identification with the elite, while after independence it meant identification with a part of the indigenous population and acceptance within the community, which became more important after 1965 (Italiaander 1976: 185-190).
6.5 The Riots of 1998

In May 1998 large-scale turmoil including rape, torture and killing, especially directed towards women of Chinese descent, took place in various Indonesian cities. There are three plausible explanations to why these riots broke out, and the first one is that the riots were deliberately ignited by a certain individual in the upper echelons of the Indonesian power structure, namely Prabowo Subianto (b. 1951), the son-in-law of Suharto and later, during the Indonesian elections in 2014, the main rival of Joko Widodo (b. 1961). It is possible that the intention of the riots was to create a necessary amount of instability, which would then allow for the declaration of martial law. Another explanation suggests internal strife within the military, and the third explanation is suggesting that this was a critical intent “to terrorize the Chinese community into leaving Indonesia forever” (Suryadinata 2001: 507). The final report of the Join Fact Finding Team, an investigative group made by the Indonesian government, clearly proves the “willingness of state officials at both local and national levels to incite violence against ethnic Chinese as a diversionary strategy aimed at stabilizing the regime nationally” (Panggabean and Smith 2011: 231).

During the protest that had originally started as a mass mobilization against President Suharto and the New Order Regime, the army was successful in its frame-shifting strategy to redirect the anger from the intentional target and redirect it towards the Chinese Indonesians. The Human Rights Watch has also exposed evidence of meetings between preman (criminals) and army officials to plan anti-Chinese violence in Java earlier that year (Panggabean and Smith 2011).

6.6 The Chinese in Malaya prior to Japanese Invasion

The Chinese Malays, in a territory without a unified administration and thus virtually without a clear concept of nationhood, were prevalently directed towards their motherland, in both political and psychological terms.63 This identification also grew stronger due to political developments and surging nationalism in China.64

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63 To understand the underlying conflicts in Malay political thinking of the late nineteenth and early twentieth century, see Milner 1995.
64 Sun Yat-sen’s teachings were later adopted by Chiang Kai-shek (Jiäng Jièshí 蔣介石, 1887–1975), President of the Republic of China (Taiwan), as the basis policy for Kuomintang. The teaching San Min Chu I refer to: 1)
The Kuomintang, although being suppressed by the British who were anxious of its subversive activities and anti-imperialistic stance, was well established on the peninsula. A general fear was that recognition of its political content, with almost half of the Malays being Chinese, could lead to an *imperium in imperio* (Purcell 1965a: 298) with strong demands of political ideas coherent with the ones prevailing in China. In 1930, the Malayan Communist Party (MCP) was established. Although claiming to fight for Malayan independence, the Malays were wary of the true motivation, since 99% of its members were of Chinese descent.65 When the MCP tried to recruit new members they strongly emphasized the aim in Malayan national terms, but most Chinese approved or disapproved of MCP as a consequence of its liaison with the ideals of Chinese communism. Chinese patriotism and communism were seen as strongly intertwined. According to Gungwu Wang, the Chinese in Malaya during these years could be divided into three groups, where the majority is to be found in the second one. The groups were: 1) individuals culturally and politically directed towards China, subdivided into two groups; either pro-Kuomintang (or liberal), or communist; 2) individuals more concerned with direct politics such as trade and community life; 3) individuals with Malayan loyalties (Wang 1970).

### 6.7 The Japanese Invasion and the Years prior to Independence

Due to their easy victory, the Japanese invasion shattered any previous concepts of an alleged British superiority. The hatred between the Japanese and the Chinese, who were the ethnic group to suffer the most under the Japanese rule, was fueled by the Japanese aggression in China.66

Similar to the Dutch in Indonesia, the British tried hard to retrieve their lost power after Japanese surrender in 1945 and, in 1947, the MCP that had been actively fighting the Japanese called for armed struggle against the colonial government. With their members, approximately 4,000-5,000 in number, they managed to outwit the 60,000 troops of the Malayan police. The main fear from the Malayan side was the uncertainty about the extent to

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Nationalism: “China is the only country where ‘race’ and ‘nation’ are the same. To save China we must certainly promote nationalism”; 2) Democracy: “The five administrative powers of the Government are the legislative, judicial, executive, examination, and censorship”; 3) Livelihood: “The principle of livelihood is Socialism; it is Communism; it is Collectivism.” See: Purcell 1965b: 297.

65 For more background information about the Southeast Asian Communist movement, see Hara 2013: 323-341.

66 Chinese particularly selected for execution were: 1) individuals connected with the China Relief Fund; 2) rich men; 3) adherents of the founder of the Relief Fund; 4) journalists and students; 5) people from Hainan; 6) newcomers to Malaya; 7) tattooed men; 8) volunteers; 9) Government servants (Purcell 1965b: 306).
which an independent government of Malaya would be accepted by the MCP, being backed up by China and possibly more loyal to the communist cause than to the Malayan independence.\textsuperscript{67} According to Skinner, it was clear that “a general consensus opposing communism extends to all ethnic communities” (Skinner 1959: 143); nevertheless, the core strength of the MCP guerilla fighting was the help from Chinese squatters.\textsuperscript{68} In 1951 alone, 6,100 incidents of terrorism were carried out on Malayan soil.\textsuperscript{69} The British government saw as the only solution to declare a state of emergency and to break the guerilla’s morale and remove sources of supply, leading to the resettlement of half a million Chinese squatters into “New Villages”, a strategy implemented in the 1950s that proved to be successful (Heidhues 2000: 149).

The segregation between the different ethnic groups was widening, a beneficial development for the British who were afraid that independence would threaten their investment in mining and plantations. For that reason, they had discussed independence as a matter “in due time”, expecting this to be projected far into the future, when the racial balance that the Japanese invasion had distorted could be restored. They were then taken by surprise by the coalition arising between the United Malay National Organisation (UMNO) and the Malayan Chinese Association (MCA) in 1952. This alliance “was based on a tacit agreement to maintain the pre-independence status quo – the Malays retaining the political and the Chinese the economic ascendency” (Purcell 1965b: 347).

\textbf{6.8 New Policies following the Malayan Independency}

The alliance between UMNO and MCA fulfilled the criteria of a more harmonious balance between the different ethnic groups and, as a result, Malaya successfully negotiated its independence from the British in 1957. In 1963, the Federation of Malaysia (comprising the Federation of Malaya, Sarawak, Singapore, and North Borneo) came into existence. The new Constitution of 1957 stated that “Chinese residing in the Federation on Independence Day may, on satisfying an eight years’ residence requirement, register as Malayan citizens, while

\textsuperscript{67} For a fictional input to understand the situation in Malaya during the Emergency (also locally referred to as the Insurgency), see Tan Twan Eng’s acclaimed novel “The Garden of Evening Mists” (2012).

\textsuperscript{68} Isolated in the Malayan jungle, it is hard to estimate to what degree the squatter support was genuine and not merely a necessity, since retaliation in case of no compliance was imminent in the case of MCP.

\textsuperscript{69} For a more comprehensive understanding of the Malayan society and the different ethnic groups, see Khoo Kheng-Hor’s historic novel “Nanyang – The Lure of the Southern Oceans to Lands of Opportunity and Danger” (2007).
all persons born in the Federation subsequent to independence are automatically citizens” (Skinner 1959: 143).

It is striking, at this point, that the generous concept of *jus soli* as citizenship policy was applied, which granted both the Indians and the Chinese on Malayan soil immediate rights as nationals: “As Independence approached, the Malay political leaders showed a generosity in accommodating the newly settled communities, granting them citizenship on flexible terms – changing a Malay nation into a multiethnic and multi-religious modern nation almost overnight” (Muzaffar 2002: 319). According to Muzaffar, this inclusive and tolerant approach towards different ethnic groups and religions stretches back to the Malay-Muslim polity prior to British colonization. These policies inevitably forced a new reality upon the Malay majority: from now on they were merely one community among others. To be certain that the Malay would remain the dominant ethnic group within the new nation state, the predominantly Chinese state of Singapore was given autonomy and granted complete independence on 7 August 1965.70

Concurrently with the new conditions regarding citizenship, a change within the Chinese language media was notable. In the years prior to independence, the Chinese newspapers published in Malaya had called China their “homeland” and focused to a large extent on Chinese news. In 1957 this was changing, marking a decisive twist within the framing of the Chinese Malayan identity.

“From now on, we must make a clear distinction between ‘our country’ and China […] our national founding father is no longer Dr. Sun Yat-sen, but Prime Minister Tengku Abdul Rahman […] Our “national portrait” is no longer a Chinese picture scroll, but rather a *batik sarong* work of art […] The character for “country” is not the “guo” in Zhongguo; it is the ‘Federation’ of Malaya” (Essay in Nanyang Siang Pau, 7 October 1957, cit. in Hara 2003: 44).

An important issue on the agenda was the new language policy. In 1950, both the Kuomintang and the Communists had been engaged in fostering Chinese nationalism, but they were pushed back by the British, who tightened the regulations in order to control leftist elements and make the school curriculum more Malayan (Hara 2003: 12, 28).

In 1961, the Education Act put up one clear criterion: governmental subsidies for Malay primary schools only. All secondary schools were also obliged to follow the Malay curriculum. Out of 70 Chinese schools, 54 accepted the new constraints of the Educational

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70 This is certainly not the only reason for Singaporean independence; however, it is important to highlight this fact.
Act. In 1969, all national schools had to use Malay, but a large number of Chinese secondary students chose to attend private schools (Suryadinata 2013: 284). Two distinct pressure groups, the Dǒngzhǒng and the Jiàzhǒng,71 fought for Chinese instruction at schools, and “the debate over education policy and the future of Chinese schools became part of a larger discourse on the status and rights of the Chinese within the Malayan nation. This took the Chinese education issue into the center of Malayan politics” (Collins 2006: 302).

In 1967 it was clear that the Chinese had partly lost their cause because a new law, declaring Malay as the only national language, came into effect (Wan 2011: 232). Linguistic interaction between Malaysia and Indonesia in the 1960s and early 1970s brought results and a certain terminological standardization was adopted in 1972 to create a uniform system of spelling for Bahasa Indonesia and Bahasa Melayu (Watson and Watson Andaya 2001: 290).

6.9 The Riots of 1969 and the New Economic Policy

Three days after the federal elections, held on 10 May 1969, racial riots broke out. The funeral procession of a young Chinese man, allegedly communist and certainly killed by the police, took place one day prior to the elections and 10,000 people came together to attend the ceremony, which eventually turned into a big demonstration. The struggle about language and education was a concern among all communities in the Malaysian society, and extensive tension spread during the following days resulting in the declaration of a State of Emergency on 14 May, after 196 persons were found dead and 6,000 homes destroyed. The Malays were infuriated that the concept of “Malay supremacy” (ketuhanan Melayu) was being challenged (Berman 2011: 6). General distrust spread from all sides while the government tried to control ethnic animosity through the press (Watson and Watson Andaya 2001: 298-299). The Government tried to appease the displeased bumiputera Malays (literally “sons of the soil”, i.e. native Malays) through the New Economic Policy (NEP) and the National Culture Policy (NCP) that where both implemented in 1971. NEP and NCP intended to strengthen the position of the bumiputeras in different spheres of society, where civil service came to play an important role as heavily dominated by the Malay (Chin 2011: 141).72

72 During my visit to Arkib Negara (National Archive) in the 65-story building Komtar in Penang in December 2014, no person of Chinese descent seemed to be employed in any of the administrative sectors visited. When
The need of the NEP was understandable since, in 1970, almost 50% of all households lived below the poverty line, estimated at 33$ per capita/month. The goals of NEP were to eradicate poverty, *irrespective of race or ethnicity* and “to restructure society so as to remove the identification of race or ethnicity with economic status and/or function” (Zainal 2006: 1). Further concerns central to NEP were to:

- raise the *bumiputera* ownership of total share capital of approximately 2% in 1970 to 30% by 1990
- create an employment structure that reflects Malaysia’s ethnic composition in large firms
- provide subsidized loans, credit, financial as well as management training to businesses run by *bumiputera*
- use quotas for ethnic groups in tertiary education
- provide support to the poorest households (e.g. aquaculture, livestock, or petty trading)

NEP was initially programmed to last 20 years. This could be regarded as reasonable as the Malaysian society proved to have had a partition related to education and wealth, which could possibly be leveled, at least to a certain extent, with the help of this new economic policy. However, NEP did not come to an end after twenty years and is still in practice today. A variety of other policies such as: the Internal Security Act (1960) that allows detention without trial, the Publishing and Printing Presses Act (1984), the Official Secrets Act (1972 revised 1986) that reduces governmental transparency, as well as the Peaceful Assembly Act (2012) can all be regarded as enactments that can be used in order to enhance *bumiputera* privileges. NEP, although clearly manifesting the aspiration to eradicate poverty for *all* Malaysian citizens, has proven to cater only to the *bumiputera*.73

“This has caused the evolution of a de facto two-tier citizenship in the country and has provided the Malay elite with the vehicle for the institutionalization of racism in Malaysia” (Ganesan 2012).

Further restrictions on public discussions about “sensitive issues”, such as race relations, religion, the sultans, and Malay special rights were passed by law in 1971, which clearly followed NEP’s intention to separate *bumiputeras* from non-*bumiputeras*. The special rights

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73 Although *bumiputera* implies being Malay Muslim, Muslim Indians might as well have a slight chance to be entitled to enjoy some of the *bumiputera* privileges.
for the bumiputera Malays meant entitlement to “preferential treatment by the government” and easier “entry to universities, bank loans, scholarships, business licenses” (Berman 2011: 6). The Sedition Act from 1948 (revised in 1969) can also be regarded as having played a crucial role in muzzling any criticism of the bumiputera rights.\(^\text{74}\)

Although the current Prime Minister Najib Razak (2008–) promised to repeal the archaic law in 2012, he nevertheless made a U-turn in 2014 and in April 2015 a bill was passed with various amendments that increased the maximum jail sentence for general sedition cases from three to seven years. Another problem in contemporary Malaysia during the last decades has been deterioration of the civil legal system due to the encroachment of sharia law: “The unclear overlapping between civil and Islamic law courts produces a number of legal, social and religious controversies” (Khoo 2010: 290).

Ganesan (2012) also put forth the argument that the consequences of the NEP, instead of the alleged aspiration to eradicate poverty, have rather provided for a new identification of occupation with race. This is visible by a very high percentage of bumiputera in the Malaysian administration, judiciary, armed forces, and police force, as well as in academia and public universities. As non-bumiputeras are excluded from the positions where public policies are made, as well as from the implementation processes, the Malay elite has ensured absolute control over national resources. The question that follows is whether it is justifiable to regard Malaysia as a country with a strong institutional discrimination.\(^\text{75}\) The following statistical data might serve as useful indicators for finding an answer to this sensitive question (Ganesan 2012; Soong 2012).

| Student distribution in 2011, according to enrolment in 20 different public universities: |
|----------------------------------------|--------|
| Malay                                  | 328,309 | (72.37%) |
| Chinese                                | 43,624  | (9.62%)  |
| Indian                                 | 11,639  | (2.57%)  |
| Orang Asli (Aboriginals)               | 260     | (0.06%)  |

It could be questionable how NEP can justify a percentage of less than 0.1% of the real bumiputera participating in higher education.


\(^75\) “Institutional racism is that which, covertly or overtly, resides in the policies, procedures, operations and culture of public and private institutions - reinforcing individual prejudices and being reinforced by them in turn.” See the definition by Institute of Race Relations. http://www.irr.org.uk/ (retrieved 13 July 2015).
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Deaths in Malaysian custody 2011</th>
<th>Deaths by police shootings 2011</th>
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<td>Malay</td>
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<td>24</td>
<td>42</td>
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<td>Chinese</td>
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Notice should be taken that the Indian Malays make up approximately 8% of the country’s inhabitants.

According to Freedman, the political participation of the Chinese was stronger between 1950 and 1969 than after the 1969 turmoil. The underlying reasons for this development are connected with political and institutional changes where “there is less need for political leaders to rely on Chinese business support for political funding, and since the ruling coalition has institutionally ensured greater electoral victories, there are fewer electoral incentives to reach out to the Chinese community for votes” (Freedman 2000: 12). In Freedman’s opinion, next to other cultural circumstances, these factors are crucial to bear in mind when analyzing the role of the Chinese political participation in the Malaysian society in the twenty-first century.
Semarang, located on the northeastern coast of central Java, is one of Indonesia’s ten biggest cities with approximately 1.5 million inhabitants, whereof 225,000 are expected to be of Chinese descent. For Indonesia in general, the population of Chinese decent was estimated at around 3% in 2009, which equals 7,834,000 people, a number that is currently decreasing (Li and Li 2013: 23). Apart from Semarang, there are a number of cities in Indonesia where the Chinese heritage is also manifested in Chinatowns. These cities are: Bandung, Jakarta, Malang, Solo and Surabaya in Java; Medan and Padang in Sumatra; Makassar and Manado in Sulawesi; and Pontianak in Kalimantan (Alkatiri, Irmayanti and Waworuntu 2015). The intention of this chapter is to give a primary insight to the organization of Boen Hian Tong in Semarang (hitherto referred to as BHT) which, due to its 139 years of uninterrupted existence, can be regarded as emblematic of Chinese heritage and interaction in the city, which might also be indicative of the situation of Chinese Indonesians in other parts of Java.

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76 The estimation for Semarang is based on the statement of Harjanto Kusuma Halim, the head of Boen Hian Tong, which seems as a plausible estimation taking Willmott’s statistics from 1955 (Willmott 1960: 7-9) into consideration. However Willmott could, due to all the inaccuracies he found both in the city population reports and the civil registration records, not be certain himself (Willmott 1960: 359).

77 There are two common denominators for Chinese immigration to Java that differs from other areas in Indonesia. These refer to the fact that Java was one of the first areas for Chinese immigrants, who were also belonging to higher social strata than the immigrants of other areas (Alkatiri, Irmayanti and Waworuntu 2015: 65).
7.1 The Chinese History of Semarang

The Chinese foundation-myth of the city diverges from the more established one, since Chinese lore claims that the birth of the city is connected to Zhèng Hé, also referred to as Cheng Ho or Sam Po (as described in chapter four) and not to the revered Muslim leader Ki Pandan Arang. This point of view deserves attention, since Zhèng Hé plays a vital role in different historical narratives throughout Southeast Asia, and predominantly in Semarang (Heidhues 2000: 88). According to the Chinese historical account, the history of Semarang can be traced back to the event when Ong King Hong, Zhèng Hé’s second in Command of the Míng empire fleet, fell seriously ill and was treated by his superior in a cave for ten days on the hillside of Simongan (which would eventually develop into the city of Semarang), not far from the Javanese east coast. Once recovered, Ong King Hong stayed in the area and as a devout Muslim he cleared the land and spread the teachings of Islam, including the veneration of Zhèng Hé. During these years, colonies of Chinese and indigenous Muslim communities were formed in the neighboring Kaligarang estuary. The area was an important port for foreign vessels, especially for Chinese traders from Gǔngdōng sailing under green flag to distinguish themselves from traders from Fújiàn, who sailed under red flag. When Ong King Hong died at the age of 87, he got the name Kiai Djuru Mudi Dampo Awang, or the Veritable Navigator of Zhèng Hé, and was worshipped both by Chinese and Indonesians on days set according to the Javanese calendar. Zhèng Hé was venerated as Sam Po Tay Djien, and the local people came to worship him in front of his statue on the first and the fifteenth day of every month according to the Chinese lunar calendar, marking the birth of Semarang, either in the year 1398 or 1476 (Soenarto 2013: 1; Tio 2013: 4; Willmott 1960: 1-2).
The statue of Zhèng Hé at the Sam Po Kong temple complex in Semarang. (Photo: Gabriella Szabó)

The statue of Zhèng Hé in front of the klenteng (Chinese temple) Tjay Kak Sie in the outer area of Pecinan, Semarang. (Photo: Gabriella Szabó)
According to Soenarto the first Chinese immigrants were inclined to live in the vicinity of the area where they first entered Java. But, eventually, they moved to the hill of Simongan, as the area became increasingly popular among newcomers as a place of residence that was connected with good fēngshuí calculations and the sacred spirit of Sam Po Tay Djien. The harbor of Semarang also played an important role attracting Arabic, Chinese, and Indian merchants (Tio 2013: 2).

In the seventeenth century, the commercial trade of the VOC spread further into central Java and every town of importance had a Chinese colony, normally made up by merchants and traders, bringing items from China such as pottery, porcelain, cotton goods, silk, and paper in exchange for Indonesian goods like pepper, nutmeg, and cinnamon (Willmott 1960: 3). As briefly described in chapter four, the Dutch authorities implemented an administrative system among the different ethnic communities during this century. Within this system they also appointed the leaders who were given the military titles of Luitenant (Lieutenant), Kapitan (Captain) and Majoor (Major). These leaders were usually respected personalities within the Chinese communities and, by this representative system, they obtained both executive and administrative power that provided a link between the colonial authorities and the Chinese communities (Claver 2014: 18). In the case of Semarang, the first captain was Kwee Kiauw, holding his position from 1672 to 1684 (Willmott 1960: 212).

The Chinese residents of the area established sugar cane mills to produce refined sugar for both the local market and export and were often proprietors of small candle factories. The production of peanut oil was also common among almost every Chinese family in the city. As previously described, the Chinese often had occupations that were regarded as “impure” and, as the local Indonesian rulers had created a “system of farming out monopoly tax rights, including import and export duties, the head tax, market tax, gambling concessions, and taxes on wine manufacture and the trade in salt, rice and wood” (Willmott 1960: 3-4), these exclusive rights were mostly held by wealthy Chinese merchants. The Chinese community prospered, especially in 1644 when migration increased, due to the turbulence in China. The situation was the same in 1678, when the Sultan of Mataram gave Semarang and the surrounding villages to the VOC.

In 1783, records of Chinese travelers claimed Semarang more illustrious than Batavia (Willmott 1960: 5) and “by the early 19th century Peranakan culture dominated the North

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78 It might be impossible to verify the statement that Semarang attracted Chinese migrants due to good fēngshuí, however, according to Jongkie Tio, Semarang is currently popular among Chinese businessmen due to its positive fēngshuí. Interview with Jongkie Tio on 19 January 2015.
coast of Java” (Reid 1996: 56). The Chinese immigrants were steadily increasing in number and accounted for 17% of Semarang’s urban population in 1890, while on the Javanese north coast (Pasisir) there were more Chinese traders than indigenous Indonesian ones (Claver 2014: 18).

### 7.2 The History of Pecinan

Pecinan (the name of Semarang’s Chinatown) was designated for the Chinese in the aftermath of the Batavian massacre of 1740 (described in chapter 4.1). The Chinese exodus from Batavia (Jakarta) followed the route along the northern coastline towards Eastern Java. Under the leadership of captain Ni Hoe Kong, or Souw Panjang, the rebellion against the Dutch continued with looting and burning of Dutch plantation and property until 1743. The Chinese in Semarang also participated in this revolt under the Chinese Captain Kwee An Say (Willmott 160: 159). As the Dutch gained control of the area, they decided to relocate all Chinese inhabitants to the area next to the river Kali Semarang. This was an attempt to separate the Chinese from the local Indonesians with whom they had previously successfully joined forces against the Dutch for more than three years. This Dutch segregation policy marks the birth of the quartier that has ever since been called Pecinan. A military camp (De Wertenbergse Kazerne), maintained by Dutch employed mercenaries, was built next to Pecinan in order to keep the Chinese under constant surveillance (Tio 2013: 24-25) in a zoning area which the Dutch referred to as “Wijkenstelsel” (Soenarto 2013: 6). The idea to create ethnic enclaves had its origin in Batavia in the beginning of the seventeenth century, but it was first in the nineteenth century that it was put into practice.

The hardship for the Chinese was intensified in the period between 1820 and 1850, during which a restricted travel-pass and residence system was established, referred to as “Passenstelsel.” A special pass was required for every journey out of the city and all Chinese had to live inside the designated “ghetto” that, apart from Pecinan, also included a very small area close to the harbor. This so-called “ghetto period” lasted from 1830 until 1916 (Willmott 1960: 6, 12). According to Tio, Pecinan is different to many other Chinatowns around the world, as it is located in the very center of the city and the Chinese had to establish a self-
sufficient system with hospital, cemetery, school, pharmacy, market, and various temples within the confined aria, which renders the neighborhood historically rather unique.79

7.3 The Icon of Pecinan: Boen Hian Tong

Apart from two rather thin yearbooks, written in 1976 and 2012, and an article in 2007, there are no written sources about BHT. According to Willmott, BHT was the earliest “social club” in Semarang, founded in 1876 as a Chinese music society and initially open only to wealthy men of high social ranking (Willmott 1960: 130). Over time, this “social club” changed its raison d’être away from elitist mutual-aid activities in order to become social in the broader sense of the word. This means that the organization has provided a venue for both weddings and funerals as well as financial help to destitute citizens, irrespective of their ethnic background. Since the beginning of the twenty-first century the venue is also serving as a location for inter-religious ceremonies. When did these changes of organizational profile occur? How did the Japanese occupation influence the activities of BHT? What happened during Suharto’s New Order regime? The challenging task of researching BHT’s history follows the hypothesis that, in observing these changes, we can find a testimony of the assimilation process that was forcefully implemented through the assimilation policies under Suharto’s rule (1966–1998). If analyzed concurrently with the Chinese Indonesian history as shortly outlined in the previous chapters, a chronicle of BHT can provide indications of the momentousness of various anti-Chinese policies, as it depicts how the organization had to react to their implementations, which could be indicative for the destiny of many Chinese Indonesians in Semarang and possibly also for Chinese Indonesians in other parts of Java.

7.3.1 Initial Phase

According to most interviewees, the first members of the “social club” were in the majority Dutch educated Peranakans of high social standing who gathered to listen to indigenous Indonesian musicians playing Lam Kwan (Chinese string and wind instruments) for them.80 It

79 Interview with Jongkie Tio on 1 February 2014.
80 There are various opinions about to whom the music of Lam Kwan was dedicated. One opinion states that it is dedicated to the musician Toapekong Long Koen Ya from Song Tiaw Kingdom. Toapekong, who was the inventor of Lam Kwan lived 900 years ago. The 2007 yearbook claims that it is dedicated to a king of the Chinese Ming dynasty who had created this type of music himself, and who also founded the famous music and
is also very probable that *gamelan*, although not related to traditional Chinese music, was also part of the musical repertoire.\(^8^1\) There was a famous *Peranakan* called Tan Tiang Tjhing, who pioneered a fashion for *gamelan* in Semarang already in 1814 (Coppel 2013: 350). BHT was established in a house in the Gambiran street in *Pecinan* on 9 February 1876, (also referred to as year 2427 according to the Chinese calendar) by *Luitenant der Chinese* Tan Ing Tjong together with Be Bie Sang, Liem Kiem Ling, Tan Tjong Tien, Auw Yang Djie Kiauw and Oen Tiauw Kie, who were all important individuals within the Chinese community. BHT was also referred to as *Wen Xian Tang* 文献堂 which meant “a room to preserve books of historical value” (or library), and was acknowledged by the Dutch government. The number of members was limited to 500 and the election eligibility criteria were restricted to healthy members of “high social standing” between the age of 18 and 50.\(^8^2\) A registration to the board along with a health check-up or a medical certification was also needed, as well as a signature promising to comply with the organization’s rules and regulations, accompanied by an annual member-fee that could be revoked if circumstances impeded full payment. From being merely a social gathering, BHT added a new scope to the organization and became a funeral association as well.\(^8^3\) Money was collected for grieving the deceased members of the club as well as their relatives, a practice that led to the establishment of a funeral fund. The *Sangseng* and *Maysong* rituals were also practiced. *Maysong* refers to the ritual the night before the burial, where people gather at the house of the deceased, and *Sangseng* refers to the ritual in the morning of the burial, when the coffin was picked up at the house of the deceased and taken to the cemetery. There was a strict dress code for this event: white outfit, black hat, white or black shoes, while the members were not allowed to laugh on the way to the cemetery.\(^8^4\) After the funeral, the name of the deceased would be carved into a board referred to as *San Hiang*. The idea was that cooperation and solidarity among the members, regardless of age, class, and profession, were key to the success of the organization. This concept of cooperation and solidarity is reflected in the rituals performed by BHT, which were designed to foster a sense of community among its members.

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81 *Gamelan* refers to the traditional music of Bali and Java that is played in an ensemble, including xylophones, bamboo flutes, and percussion instruments. In nineteenth century Java it was common to pay back debts in the form of a gamelan set, and since the members of BHT belonged to the wealthy strata of society, it is very probable that the gamelan set, that for many decades was part of the organization’s interior, had this background. Interview with Widjajanto Dharmowijono on 22 January 2015.

82 If the person was between 51-55 years old according to the Christian calendar calculation, the case needed further special approval (Yearbook 1976).

83 According to Fauzan Hidayatullah, this happened as the Indonesian musicians playing Lam Kwan died and the Chinese wanted to pay them tribute. Interview on 24 January 2015.

84 The regulations were strictly implemented and if someone failed to participate in the ritual three times in a row, this individual might be dismissed from the organization, have the membership revoked, or be punished (Yearbook 2007).
of their individual social standing, would increase if they implemented certain rules. Religion was originally not a matter of concern, but there was an altar for the god of music and occasional praying ceremonies for deceased members would be arranged.

7.3.2 The Golden Era

The beginning of the twentieth century can be referred to as BHT’s golden era, prosperous for the Chinese Indonesians in Semarang in general, during which: the Chambers of Commerce was established, Sun Yat-sen’s revolutionary thoughts were spread, Chinese consuls arrived, and the Chinese press (published in either Javanese or Indonesian) proved to be prolific. From 1916 to 1924, the leadership of the organization was at the hands of Oei Djie Sien, also referred to as the “right hand” of Oei Tiong Ham (elected as Majoor in 1896). These years have been referred to as “the golden age” of BHT, due to its widespread social and communal activities. Oei Tiong Ham, also called Rasa Gula (the Sugar King), was the owner of Tiong Ham Sugar Concern and the founder of the first multinational conglomerate in Southeast Asia, making him the richest man of the entire region in the beginning of the twentieth century. Due to his enormous wealth and high social standing, Oei Tiong Ham was one of the very few Chinese Indonesians who were permitted by the Dutch administration to wear western clothes, cut the Chinese queue and live outside of Chinatown. In his role as a progressive stakeholder he also managed to improve the situation of the people in Chinatown through his pressure on the Dutch administration to eliminate regulations that hindered the Chinese community from thriving (Tio 2013: 30-31). Although spending the last years of his life in Singapore, Oei Tiong Ham had a widespread influence on the Chinese community in his city of birth. During the time of Oei Djie Sien’s leadership, the venue of BHT was not used for praying ceremonies anymore, but instead served as a Convention Hall for wedding and art performances. There were for several decades only a few premises for wedding ceremonies in Semarang, which also increased BHT’s popularity.

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85 The Dutch policy of segregation was not restricted to Chinese and Indonesian exclusion from certain residential areas, hotels, resorts, and the Dutch school system, but also included severe penalties for individuals caught using the Dutch language (Willmott 1960: 22).
86 In 1910, Oei Tiong Ham donated $10,000 to the Tao Nan School which was later turned into the Singaporean Peranakan Museum, and in 1919 15,000 guilders for the construction of a secondary school in Semarang (Tahir 2008; Willmott 1960). He is also commemorated with a street in the city of Singapore, the Oei Tiong Ham Park.
In February 1935, the board of BHT decided to allow the first woman, Mrs. Kam Siok Bian Nio, to enter the organization. She became member number 657 on 9 February 1938. This could possibly be indicative of the organization’s rather progressive identity compared to the standards of overseas Chinese, especially to those in Malaya. It could also be evidence of the Peranakan domination of BHT, as by Totok standards, being more traditional in habits and education (see chapter 6), it might not have been regarded as appropriate to let women enter this male dominated area. During this period, the organization started to carry out different kinds of social work for poor and destitute, regardless of their ethnical affiliation.

7.3.3 Occupation and Oppression

In the phase of interregnum between Dutch withdrawal and Japanese rule in 1942, a large number of Chinese Indonesians sought refuge in Semarang, as local plunderers (perampok) seized the moment of political instability to attack Chinese property in the countryside (Heidhues 2003: 3). The Japanese forcibly merged all Chinese organizations into one central association, called Hua Ch’iao Tsung Hui (Overseas Chinese Central Association), also referred to as Kakyō Shōkai 華僑總會. Each city or municipality had its own association that was responsible for maintaining their community under control and collecting funds for the Japanese war, while also carrying out welfare activities for the dismissed organizations (Willmott 1960: 137). Although the leadership of the different associations remained Chinese, it had to be approved by the Japanese. BHT was no exception and, during the organizations’ suspension, it was integrated into a branch of Hua Ch’iao Tsung Hui/Kakyō Shōkai. The Japanese confiscated all BHT’s furniture and used them at their own headquarter and also seized most of the board members. The organization was closed until 17 August 1945, two days after the Japanese surrender. The activities of BHT were resumed under the leadership of

87 See Appendix 1.
88 The comparison between Malaysia and Indonesia is too complex to be discussed here, as most overseas Chinese organizations in Malaysia are clan-structured. Yet the fact that Khoo Kongsi in Penang did not extend their funding to include women until the 1990s might be significant. Interview with Cheah Cheng Seang in Penang on 12 December 2014.
89 According to Jongkie Tio, the Japanese occupation was facilitated with the help of a fifth column, which refers to “a group of people who undermine a larger group from within.” In this case the fifth column were the Japanese who had lived in Semarang as petty traders, but as soon as the Japanese occupation began they changed their identity to officially become part of the military. As the Japanese had access to the register of financial contributions to mainland China during the Japanese War, an important issue on the agenda was to punish all individuals on the list. Death penalty was the common retribution. Interview with Jongkie Tio on 19 January 2015.
Liem Siauw Tjong, who remained in a key position of the organization until the middle of 1966. The election process was a biennial matter, where the outgoing officers would nominate a higher number of members, among which all members would vote for twelve thereof on a secret ballot. The twelve candidates with most votes would then divide the offices among themselves, which means that “the formal structure of Chinese organizations is thus seen to be quite democratic” (Willmott 1960: 145-146). There is little information about the years between the Japanese interference and Suharto’s rise to power, other than that the organization was growing due to old members renewing their membership and new ones being accepted. It is possible that this era was marked by a shift away from the “elitist” approach that had prevailed prior to the Japanese occupation and described by Pandji B Suprana (chairman 1974–1977) as the need for reflecting “quality” and not “quantity” in the membership (Yearbook 1976). The 1950s were marked by regained economic strength, as the city’s total volume of production “was turned out by Chinese enterprises” (Willmott 1960: 44), which accounted for approximately 75-80 % of Semarang’s entire business activities.

As described in chapter 6, the Presidential Regulation No.10 (Peraturan Pemerintah), also known as PP 10/1959, was adopted in 1959, prohibiting aliens from business activities in rural areas. Although on paper this was an initiative against all kinds of foreign involvement, with the aim to strengthen the indigenous Indonesians (pribumi), 90% of the businesses affected by the regulation were in the hands of Chinese Indonesians, which resulted in a rural exodus and a strong influx of Chinese Indonesian migrants to Semarang (Tio 2013: 93). Oei Tiong Ham’s successful welfare fund Kian Gwan, founded in 1863, was also discontinued as it became nationalized in 1961 (Tio 2013: 32). After the display of Pancasila and the photos of President Suharto next to the second vice President Sri Sultan Hamengku Buwono IX (in office from 24 March 1973 to 23 March to 1978), the organization’s yearbook of 1976 starts with an introduction by Semarang’s Mayor and the Head of the Social Department. None of the persons mentioned had any connection to BHT. This is followed by a brief introduction to the organization, images of committee members, and various articles by authors who do not explain who they are or how they are related to the organization. The topic of the 1965 tragedy is completely ignored, which is indicative of the lack of sources to express anything that could be regarded as controversial during those years. Although many of the organization’s members, like other people of Chinese descent all over Indonesia, had been persecuted, got their homes and belongings looted, destroyed, or even burnt down to the ground, there were no initiatives to confront this abusive turmoil among the Chinese
Indonesians. On the contrary, they kept distance and rather avoided each other.\textsuperscript{90} In the middle of 1966, Liem Siauw Tjong (chairman since 1941) was replaced by Oei Po Tien and Oei Kiong Hwie (chairmen 1966–1970). On 16 June 1966, BHT had to change its name as all Chinese names had to be converted into Indonesian.\textsuperscript{91} BHT was changed into Budi Dharma and then into Rasa Dharma on 17 December 1966 as there was already another organization with the name Budi Dharma.\textsuperscript{92} After a brief period of less than three years under the leadership of Lie Ing Liem (1970 until 13 August 1972), Koo Djien Swan took over the leadership of Rasa Dharma. During these one and a half years (from 13 August 1972 August to 2 February 1974) the location was restored to accommodate the activities of the organization and to cater to the surrounding communities. To fund this restoration they had to sell their most valuable assets, namely most of its real estate (Yearbook 1976). What is not mentioned in the yearbook is that the restoration was enforced in order to change the façade of the building, as it was carrying “Chinese features.”

The current building of Boen Hian Tong located at Gang Pinggir 31, devoid of any Chinese attributes on its façade. (Photo: Gabriella Szabó)

\textsuperscript{90} Various interviewees depict the situation as stated above. One interviewee got his shop looted and burned while another one had to help deconstructing his own century old heritage villa due to its Chinese architecture, as this kind of architectural heritage had no right to exist in the new Indonesian nation state. Out of courtesy no names will be mentioned here. Interview with Boen Hian Tong members on 23 January 2015.

\textsuperscript{91} As described in chapter 6.4.1, this name-change was a political imperative. It was carried out on an individual basis, often trying to represent the old Chinese name within the new Indonesian one. In the case of one respondent, the Javanese king was asked for help to create a new name, but most people were not that lucky.

\textsuperscript{92} Notorial Deed RM Soeprapto no. 59 on 29 July 1966, in the Yearbook of 1976.
After the inauguration of the restored building on 22 September 1973 by Semarang’s Mayor Hadijanto, the leadership was changed again, under S. Gitoatmodjo (2 February 1974 February). An internal conflict arose in 1974, as it was discovered that S. Gitoatmodjo was also chairman of another similar organization. The Government intervened and forced him to resign and Lie Hoo Soen took over (from 15 July to August 4 1974) followed by Panji B. Soeprana (from August 4 1974 to 1977). The hardest task at that time was to fulfill the aim of the organization’s own directive as read under article 22: to strengthen friendship, harmony, and to help each other (Yearbook 1976).

The above description, regarding all changes of leadership, serves as a comparison with the years prior to Suharto’s rule, where the mean value of a chairmanship was much longer. The first decade under Suharto’s rule is reflected through a constant change of chairmen, a forced restoration of the building, which could only be financed through the disposal of the organization’s real estate, and a subdued yearbook that did not even mention the year 1965. The situation ameliorated as Kwik Hian Siang took over the leadership of Rasa Dharma in 1977 and stayed in office until October 1993. His appointment can be expected to have been a conscious political decision, as it has been proven that Kwik Hian Siang had been a previous member of Heiho 兵補, a branch of the colonial Japanese military. After Indonesian independence he was also an adviser for the National Army, which most probably gave him the power to protect the organization from any further drawbacks. The predominant problem during this period was related to the economy but, nevertheless, access to more electricity was enabled as well as the purchase of a new hearse.93

One of Suharto’s policies from 1967 promulgates that “Chinese practices of observance which possess aspects of cultural affinity which have their source in the country of their ancestors are all those forms of activity such as the realization (perwujudan) of the internalizing (penghayatan) of beliefs, religiosity (kerokhanian) and spirituality (kejiwaan) which have characteristics and features of Chineseness (ke-Chinaan)” were banned from the public space.94 This meant that religion became forbidden in the public space and that Rasa Dharma arranged an altar for praying ceremonies within their premises in 1975. In 1967, the rules of the organization were also changed in order to encourage non-Chinese membership.

After the short chairmanship of Widjaya Sutandyo (10 November 1993 to 21 May 1994) and Sidharta B. Christiansanto (23 May 1994 May 23 to June 25 1995), Ridwan Reksabuana took

93 Interviewee wanted to remain anonymous. Interview on 21 January 2015.
over (25 June 1995 to March 7 2010). During the earlier years of his leadership the organization regained its stability, improved the administrative work as well as the maintenance of the facilities and visits to elderly people and orphanages were increased. According to the yearbook from 2007, a library was opened on 1 June 2005, with a limited collection of approximately 80 volumes of high value due to their uniqueness. However, at the time of research (2014–2015), no library was available, as the books had all been “stolen”, which rather means that they were preserved by other members as they were afraid that these precious volumes could easily disappear, as had been the case with so many other items of value through the course of Rasa Dharma’s history. The books that are currently regarded as important for the Chinese Indonesians in Semarang are kept in private and although localized, access was denied throughout the entire period of my research.

The yearbook of 1976 is scrutinized and the question is raised whether the researcher should be allowed access or not. (Photo: Gabriella Szabó)

Some other charity activities had been abandoned during the 1990s, the hearse had disappeared, and the library had also ceased to exist. New tasks of that decade were to
structure the administrative work, increase the financial circulation, improve the maintenance of the facilities, and enhance the social work through more visits to elderly people and orphanages.

During the “state orchestrated violence” in May 1998, when “the regime both cultivated and responded actively to the expression of popular anti-Chinese sentiment on Java by stoking those prejudices and giving them official cover” (Panggabean and Smith 2011: 234), large scale violence spread along the road between Surabaya and Semarang, but Semarang was essentially saved from any major disturbance. Immigration statistics show that more than 150,000 people fled Indonesia via airports and seaports in Sumatra, Bali, and Java between the 14th and 20th of May, and, according to a Javanese business research report, as many as 110,000 Chinese families left Jakarta during these days alone (Suryadinata 2001: 508). After these calamities it became clear to a fraction of the Chinese Indonesian’s that there was a need of self-protection for people of Chinese descent and that this had to be organized politically. As the ban of ethnic-based parties was lifted in 1999, political activities among people of Chinese descent were re-initiated.

7.3.4 The Era of Gus Dur

The religious and political leader Abdurrahman Wahid, also referred to as Gus Dur (1940–2009), served as President of Indonesia between 1999 and 2001 and is a personality of major importance to the Indonesian Chinese. Advocating the principles of minority rights and a more tolerant pluralistic Indonesian society, he implemented the Presidential Decision 6/2000, which cancelled the Presidential Instruction 14/1967 referred to above as Appendix D of the “Chinese Problem” (chapter 6.4.1) and related to the ban of Chinese religion, beliefs, and customs in the public space. Although not in office in 2002, he can also be regarded as the protagonist behind the decision that Imlek (Indonesian Chinese New Year) should become a national holiday from that year onwards (Alkatiri, Irmayanti and Waworuntu 2015). Gus Dur has often been called the father of all Chinese “Bapak Tionghoa”. The proclamation of “Bapak Tionghoa” took place on 10 March 2004 as Gus Dur was visiting Tjay Kak Sie (see page 58), the main kelenteng of Pecinan in Semarang. This was an event of great importance as the Rasa Dharma board members put it: “Gus Dur has a special place in the heart of the
Chinese, especially in Semarang. As a sign of devotion, Gus Dur also received a commemorative tablet placed next to the altar, as the only Javanese throughout Rasa Dharma’s history to have a plaque at their premises. Gus Dur’s official pronouncement that he too was “to a certain extent Chinese” had direct impact on the functions of Rasa Dharma.

Calligraphy courses, gamelan for children, different seminars on Chinese culture, screenings, book presentations and puppet theatre (Wayang Potehi) show how the activities have increased since Gus Dur’s presidency, which was also marked by the revoked status of Confucianism and the appointment of Chinese individuals in high political positions, such as Kwik Kian Gie (b. 1935) as joint minister for finance and industry and, Sofjan Wanandi (b. 1941) as chairman of the National Economic Committee (Suryadinata 2001: 521). More social gatherings such as line-dance, table tennis, tàijí, and other activities suitable for an organization of which most members are older than 60 years of age started to take place in the venues on a daily basis. A fitness studio also became part of the building in 2004.

There are two events that have been mentioned on several occasions and seem to be characteristic of BHT’s (the resumption of the old name took place in 2014) self-perception. The first event is Yap Thian Hiem’s talk-show on Chinese culture, where it was argued that the Chinese Indonesians contribution to the Indonesian society could be more variegated and community oriented. The second event was a lecture about Gus Dur on 23 August 2014, explaining the fundamental elements of the traditional Chinese culture related to the patrilineal structure and family lineage and connected to the ancestral tablet of Gus Dur. Both events are characterized by a content that opens up for a discussion of the Chinese Indonesian’s role in contemporary Indonesian society.

Since 19 March 2011, BHT tries to hold a meeting on the fifteenth of every month according to the Chinese calendar. The meetings include activities in cooperation with the cultural venue Sobokartti (i.e. modern and traditional dance performances, concerts, talks or dinner events). Other activities are also taking place during the Independence Day as well as during the Muslim New Year, all attempting to reach out to the surrounding ethnic communities. As commented by the chairman Harjanto Kusuma Halim (since 7 March 2010) in the introduction of the 2012 yearbook:

“We feel proud to be able to offer a platform for religious life in the spirit of tolerance and mutual respect.”

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95 Interview with Boen Hian Tong board committee on 23 January 2015.
All activities are open to the general public. Since 2010, *King Hoo Ping* is also celebrated in the premises of BHT. *King ho Ping* is always commemorated during the seventh month according to the lunar calendar and refers to a joint praying ceremony where six religions are represented: Buddhism, Confucianism, Daoism, Hinduism, Islam and Catholicism. It should be noted that in Indonesia the Catholic (*Katolik*) and Protestant (*Kristen*) denominations are regarded as being two different religions (*agama*). *Qīngmíng Jié* 清明节, the “Tomb-Sweeping Day” to remember past ancestors (called *Cheng Beng* among Chinese Indonesians), is another day of importance for BHT members.
The current chairman of BHT is trying to create a new social framework in order to prove that the Chinese Indonesians, who regard themselves as being part of the Chinese community in the city, are open minded and genuinely interested in their role as representatives of a multicultural Indonesia. One challenging task is to attract the younger generation, which has proved to be rather difficult, as it is an intrinsic value within the Chinese culture not to overstep the boundaries of the generations. It would be regarded as disrespectful of younger people to take a leading role within an organization that predominantly cater to older individuals.

In various respects the trajectory of BHT can be seen as paradigmatic for the destiny of Chinese culture (and the individuals pertaining to it) in Semarang during the twentieth century. Four prosperous decades, both in economic and social terms (modernization in education, literature and religion), also gained momentum in BHT in 1938, as the first female entered the organization that had previously been an exclusively male domain. This social and economic upsurge came to a complete halt during the Japanese occupation, when anyone of Chinese descent could be prosecuted without trial. For BHT, the Japanese occupation

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96 Similar to Malaya, the Japanese were mostly interested in individuals that had been supporting China during the Japanese war. If proven guilty, prosecution was definite. Interview with Jongkie Tio on 19 January 2015.
resulted in three years of suspension, confiscation of valuable assets, and seizure of the majority of the organization’s board members. The second phase of Chinese Indonesian oppression in the twentieth century started in the 1950s and is not directly reflected in the functions of BHT, as the target was related to economic activities in rural areas and economic nationalization policies. The third phase of Chinese Indonesian oppression, starting with the “war against communism” in 1965, and followed by the assimilation policies dictated in 1967 (Chapter 6.4.1), which lasted until 2000, is clearly mirrored within the organization BHT. This is visible in a variety of forced changes (i.e. name, guidelines, ceremonies, membership, and leadership) that resulted in what the political strategy, as declared in “the Chinese Problem”, was aiming for: a slow and gradual dissolution of Chinese heritage.

Since the ban of Chinese religion, beliefs and customs in the public space (Appendix D to Presidential Instruction 14/1967) was lifted in 2000, BHT has managed to regain some life spirit. The most vivid example is the yearly participation in celebrations during Imlek (Indonesian Chinese New Year). During the three days prior to Imlek, Pecinan holds a variety of lectures, performances, exhibitions, and street food festivals, where the venue of BHT plays an important role. The festivities around Imlek are not restricted to Chinese-related topics, but welcome any kind of contribution that celebrates Indonesian multi-culturalism.

Chinese New Year Concert at Boen Hian Tong, 30 January 2014. (Photo: Gabriella Szabó)

However, the traces of 37 years of Indonesian Chinese stigmatization are clearly visible in various respects when analyzing the content of BHT:
139 years of history has remained largely unrecorded as artefacts and documents have disappeared (either destroyed or stolen)\textsuperscript{97}

The few remaining artefacts in the building describing or depicting BHT’s past are unintelligible to almost all members, as there are very few individuals who speak Chinese

After the building was forced to remove its Chinese façade, the interior has been adjusted with white tiles that do not reflect Chinese aesthetics

The majority of the current 550 members are older than 60 years of age

More than half of the members are native Javanese without any specific Chinese connections or interests

The consequences of Suharto’s anti-Chinese policies are clearly visible in the deliberate neglect of Chinese architecture in \textit{Pecinan}, which does not accord with the Indonesian Charter of Heritage Conservation (Wijajanti et al 2014: 56).

\begin{figure}[h]
\centering
\includegraphics[width=\textwidth]{china_image.jpg}
\caption{One of the few remaining original Chinese rooftops in \textit{Pecinan}. (Photo: Gabriella Szabó)}
\end{figure}

\textsuperscript{97} Most interviewees (who wanted to remain anonymous) admit to have destroyed a majority of their personal belongings related to China, such as birth certificates, photographs, documents and books during Suharto’s rule for security reasons. Interviews were held in February 2014.
The island Pinang (Malay word for areca nut) is located in the Strait of Malacca, off the western shore of the Malay Peninsula. After Francis Light (1740–1794) obtained permission from the Sultan of Kedah, he established the city of George Town (after George III) as a British trading post on the northeastern cape of the island in 1786. The island, at that time practically an uninhabited swamp, seemed of little value to Lights’ employer, the East India Company, but of greater value to the local traders, as a free British port was preferable both to the Dutch trading posts with their heavy taxes and the dangerous native ports with their constant rivalries and piracy (Khoo 2007: 5). Due to its strategic location and liberal policies, Penang quickly became a multilingual and mercantile trading center for “Malays,

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98 Until 1808 “there was no proper legal system and Light had been instructed to act according to ‘universal and natural justice’” (Küchler 1968: 246), which possibly underscores the liberal character of the settlement.
Indians, Arabs, Chinese, Europeans, Armenians, Burmese, and Thais as well as other peoples from the Malay Archipelago” (Walker 2012: 308). All these groups can be regarded as having participated in the creation of a unique cosmopolitan reality, whereby the Peranakan Jawi (Muslim Peranakan), the Straits Chinese (predominantly English-speaking and westernized Chinese), and the Indian Muslims (predominantly the Tamils, often referred to as Keling or Chulia) possibly played decisive roles. As early as 1833, four major religions, namely Buddhism, Christianity, Hinduism, and Islam had institutions of worship in the city, which indicates that “the policy of religious freedom which characterized British rule in Malaya was first articulated in Penang” (Khoo 2010: 274).

The following brief outline of Penang’s recorded history divides the vicissitudes of the island into five different phases. The first one, starting at the beginning of the eighteenth and lasting until the mid-nineteenth century, was dominated by regional trade involving American, Arab, Chinese, European, and Indian ships. Penang was used as a transfer site for the export of local products such as tin, spices, rattan, ivory, and ebony and the purchase of goods from Great Britain and India including opium, steel, gunpowder, woolens, iron and china, products which were all being distributed throughout the archipelago (De Bernardi 2009: 17).

After a promising start to the new settlement with its thriving commerce, Raffles’ establishment of Singapore in 1819, a settlement which was far better located on the route from the Far East to Europe and also better in terms of administration, proved to be a setback for Penang, that had to contend itself with second place as a free trade port in the region. Being in the second position after Singapore, remained throughout the second phase of the island’s history, which started in the mid-nineteenth century and lasted until 1941, which was nevertheless characterized by an economic boom for Penang and Singapore in the industries of shipping, tin, and rubber. This economic upsurge started with the immigration of Chinese coolies to work in the Malay tin industry, a branch of economic activity that was further facilitated through technological advancement of steamships and the advent of the telegraph, which helped regional trade expand: “Medan, South Thailand and Rangoon looked to Penang as a provincial capital – which in turn looked to Singapore as the metropolis” (Khoo 2007: 13).

The accelerated growth of the island is visible in the population figures that had changed on a rather slow pace from approximately 29,000 inhabitants in 1824 to 43,000 in 1851. During the following nine years, however, the population grew to 60,000, which was most probably the result of Chinese immigration to George Town (Küchler 1968: 49). According to Küchler
(1968: 70), there were four reasons for the growth of George Town during the latter part of the nineteenth century:

1) the opening of the Suez Canal in 1869  
2) the British intervention on the Malayan Peninsula and exploitation of tin reservoirs  
3) the development of the “Ostkust – Kultuurgebieds” in Sumatra (Indonesia)  
4) import of the hevea (rubber tree) to Southeast Asia after 1890.

The years between 1931 and 1963 can be regarded as a phase of stagnation. With the outbreak of WWII, the 155 years long period of “Pax Britannica” came to an end and the Japanese occupation from 1941 to 1945 brought further recession, which gradually changed after Malaysia’s independence in 1957, the same year as George Town was granted city status.

The fourth phase of Penang’s history started in 1963 with the revitalization of the industrial sector and a general growth in the tourist sector. In the years following the ethnic tensions of 1969, the political landscape was dominated by the enforced politics of muhibbah (goodwill) characterized by a strong sensibility towards any ethnic provocation and backed by the Malaysian Sedition Act. The 1970s and 1980s were marked by ethnic discourse and Malay nationalism accompanied by an invigorated push towards intensified redevelopment of real estate (Khoo 2010: 286). This fourth phase culminated in the prestigious status of the first site in Malaysia to be listed under the category of cultural heritage, as the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO) listed both George Town and Melaka as World Heritage Sites on 8 July 2008. The fifth phase of Penang’s history starts in the wake of this prestigious nomination, as the consequences of the UNESCO award has brought about extensive changes to George Town’s inner landscape, both in practical and metaphorical sense.

8.1 The Chinese History of Penang

On the second day of Penang’s existence as an English trading emporium a Chinese from the Kedah province, most probably descended from the Fújiàn province named Koh Lay Huan, came to pay homage to Captain Light, who would later appoint him as Kapitan (De Bernardi 2009: 17). The responsibility of the Kapitan included the administrative system that recorded births, marriages, and new arrivals, and since religious freedom was propagated, along with
the right of the different ethnic groups to follow their own customs, the Kapitan also had to conciliate different kinds of social, legal, and religious conflicts.

The Chinese traders were generally regarded as attractive companions in the eyes of the British settlers due to their valuable products, and they were further regarded by Light as the “most valuable” citizens of the settlement due to their “all-round capacities” and their key role in commercial life. As wealthy Chinese held monopolies in important commodities, such as opium and liquor, they came to be regarded as a middleman minority at an early stage of the settlements history. At this point, it is important to pay attention to the fact that the Chinese immigrants to the island came from different parts of China and had different educational and even linguistic backgrounds that did not necessarily create a unifying identity.

“The immigrants divided themselves into subethnic communities, each with its own associations and distinctive occupational specialties […] Conflict rather than cooperation often characterized the relationship” (De Bernardi 2009: 21).

This is reverberated through the discussion of ethnic affiliations (chapter 3.1), as it is debatable if the identity of the individuals in question were perceived as Chinese and not rather as members of the different sub-ethnic communities. To differentiate between the various Chinese languages spoken by the immigrants, the concept of ‘dialect groups’ have often been used, a concept which Skinner regards as unfortunate, as the differences between the Chinese languages are wider than the range of dialects. Due to their mutual incomprehensibility, ‘speech groups’ would be a more correct category (Skinner 1957: 35; Willmott 1960: 98). The most important ‘speech groups’ in Penang have been the Cantonese, Hakka, Teochew, Hokkien, and Hokchiu (Küchler 1968).

During the period of Penang’s history when the Chinese migrants came “to clear land, to plant, to mine or to trade” (Tan 2007: 34), the immigration could be divided into two different groups: contract or credit-ticket laborers and voluntary immigrants. In the credit ticket system, the immigrants got their journeys paid, which put them in a position of “debt bondage rather
than a servile contact as was the case with the contract workers” (Lau-Fong 1992: 45). The power of the different Huìguǎn backed the enforcement of the debt payment.

The immigrants were related to different dialect groups or ‘speech groups’ that were in turn related to different Hui/Huìguǎn or Kongsi/Gōngsī, institutions that played a crucial role in the organization of Penang’s social life: “Property rent, investment dividends and bequests were transferred and retained by these communal institutions, leading to an accumulation of wealth for collective and intergenerational disposal” (Cheng, Li and Ma 2014: 626).

According to Ji (1997: 103), the Kongsi “which originated in mainland China is one of the key organizations in peninsular Malaysia”. Kongsi and Huìguǎn have often been used interchangeable, although Ji opines that Kongsi changed into Huìguǎn in modern times and could refer to: 1) a voluntary association based on dialect groups, created for mutual assistance; 2) a cooperative for tin-mining; 3) a merchant house; 4) association with a common venture, which could include secret societies, or 5) a company building (Ji 1997). Commonly, Kongsi can be regarded as a “functional assembly of members” (Küchler 1968: 91), either of the same occupation, guild, or clan, where the clan includes all individuals who share the same surname, and where this surname can be traced to a common ancestor.

In 1968, there were 81 clan associations, 57 regional and dialect associations, 71 occupational and business associations, and 62 benevolent and charity associations registered in Penang (Küchler 1968: 87). By using the censuses of 1881, 1921, and 1931, in addition to inscriptional data from temples and Huìguǎns and burial grounds between 1700 and 1941, an extensive list has been created that proves the strong correlation between occupational choices of the Chinese immigrants and socio-demographic factors related to their native regions.

“All sources of evidence underline the fact that dialect group identity serves as a very vital access to ethnic/subcommunal resources, and these resources had been broadly and fully utilized among the early Chinese subcommunal immigrants. From getting a job to burial, each dialect group provided adequate assistance to its own members” (Lau-Fong 1992: 63).

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100 Two thirds of all Chinese are expected to be part of an association or organization (Küchler 1968: 85).
101 As this list does not provide any numbers it is only indicative for the separation between clan and regional/dialect associations.
102 From the records of the British Malayan census of 1931 and 1931 it can be concluded that the Hokkiens were the predominant traders, shopkeepers, and farmers; the majority of the prostitutes were Cantonese; most of the Hakkas were planters of cloves, nutmeg and rubbers; the Hainanese worked predominantly as domestic servants to European families; and the Hokchius and Hokchias were commonly rickshaw pullers (Lau-Fong 1992: 51). Apart from prostitutes there were hardly any other women migrating, which is visible in the population census of 1885, where there were only 2014 women, accounting for 2% of the migrants, compared to 113,469 men. (Information provided in the regular exhibition of the Yeap Chor Ee Museum, Penang in December 2014).
In 1881, after extended disputes between different *Kongsis* and *Huiguâns*, the Penang Chinese Town Hall was build, where the dominant clans were given equal power. This Town Hall “became an *imperium in imperio*, substituting the functions of the state and representing the state’s authority in the community, enabling the provision of public goods such as communal peace, social order and charity services to the population of Penang” (Cheng, Li and Ma 2014: 627).

Penang has for an extended period of time been the most vibrant area with a living Chinese heritage in Southeast Asia. In contrast to Semarang, there has never been any Chinatown in George Town, which is logical since the Chinese were for long the most populous “ethnic group”. In 1881, the Chinese numbered 45,189 inhabitants, compared to 21,776 Malays with a total Penang population of 61,978 men and 29,027 women. However, different streets would have different ethnical imprints, and “Pitt, China, Armenian and Acheen Streets were considered Hokkien areas, whereas Bishop, Church, Penang and Chulia Streets were Cantonese” (Cheng, Li and Ma 2014: 635). Sometimes an “enclave” could be organized around a *Kongsi*, providing housing for the clan members as in the case of Khoo *Kongsi*, one of the “*Goh Tai Seh*” (five major surnames) of the Hokkiens in Penang. The Khoo *Kongsi*, regarded as the most impressive *Kongsi* in Southeast Asia, only represents the interests of the male progeny with the surname Khoo from a specific geographical location in the Chinese province of Fújiàn. Khoo *Kongsi* provided free education and welfare for their fellow clansmen that had accepted different rules and regulations, which were often concerned with respectable behavior and veneration of the ancestors, traits that can be regarded as typical for the patriarchal Chinese society.

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103 The third largest group in Penang were the Tamils with 14,396 inhabitants, and the fourth the Jawi Peranakan, with 4,486. Information received from the regular exhibition of the Yeap Chor Ee museum in Penang on 12 December 2014.

104 The other clans refer to Cheah, Yeoh, Lim, and Tan.

105 This refers to the Sin Kang village of the Sam Toh county, in the Hai Teng district, in the Chiang Chew prefecture, eight kilometers from the Amoy island (Trustees of Leong San Tong Khoo Kongsi 2003: 2).
An entire room of the Kongsi is decorated with plaques proving the success of the clan’s educated offspring, who have all been able to study due to Khoo Kongsi’s financial support. (Photo: Gabriella Szabó)
A picture of Khoo Kongsi complex with numbers indicating buildings of importance: 1) the clan temple Leong San Tong; 2) the opera stage; 3) the meeting hall with head office; 4-6) shophouses as residential houses 7) Cannon square. (Photo: Gabriella Szabó)

Although the Huiguăn was also called “sworn brotherhood” or “secret society” their leaders were known to the British authorities and their members would also occasionally gather in public. The British feared their existence and they were finally banned in 1890. If this is what led to their cessation is questionable, as they could easily change their names and continue carrying out their rituals in local temples. It is possible that the ban of “brotherhoods” turned out to have a different result than expected and, instead, triggered a stronger involvement with the underground economy (De Bernardi 2004).

Concurrently with the networking and the pride of ancestry, as manifested through the Khoo Kongsi, the earlier part of Penang’s history can also be understood as a phase of intercultural mélange between Chinese and Malay culture, which is also notable in the language. The outcome of this mélange in Penang, the Peranakans, referred to as Baba-Nyonya or Straits Chinese, who had used Malay as their lingua franca in this earlier phase, eventually became attracted to a new development rising in the nineteenth century, namely the establishment of

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106 The most important secret societies in Penang were: the Heaven and Earth Society; Ghee Hin; Ho Seng; Hai San; Chun Sim; and Kian Tek Tng (De Bernardi 2009: 55).

107 This language is the Penangite Hokkien, essentially Hokkien with borrowed words and expressions from Malay, commonly used in more informal settings.
English schools. As the colonial language was used for administration and commerce, its mastery was seen as very attractive in order to pursue a career in these fields. It also gave the Straits Chinese a possibility to approach the Victorian world and identify with the British colony, its culture and values system, as well as a tool to keep a certain distance from the other Chinese on the island (De Bernardi 2009: 23).

“The Straits Chinese came to be identified by social-economic class, political orientation, gentrified lifestyle and an eclectic taste for the finest things from all cultures” (Khoo 2007: 16). It is also the material culture of the Straits Chinese that have given the city of George Town its most characteristic traits that are best visible in temple and shophouse architecture.

The white building with the “horse head” gables houses the Wu Ti Meow (War Emperor’s Temple), which belongs to the Toi San dialect association. It displays a Cantonese architectural style from the 1890s. The pink building to the right shows the Tua Pek Kong temple, controlled by the Cantonese and Hakka dialect groups. This has to be mentioned as there is another Tua Pek Kong temple of the Hokkiens in the Armenian Street (Khoo 2007: 100). King Street in George Town, 10 December 2014. (Photo: Gabriella Szabó)
A row of typical Chinese shophouses from the latter part of the nineteenth century. Originally the ground floor was used for business and the first floor as residence. George Town, 11 December 2014. (Photo: Gabriella Szabó)

8.2 The NGO Penang Heritage Trust

Penang Heritage Trust, (henceforth PHT) is possibly the most influential NGO in Penang in terms of operating range, and has the mission “to promote the conservation of Penang’s heritage, to facilitate cultural educational programs, to organize public awareness programs and to cooperate with other like-minded organizations in Malaysia and abroad.”

Established in 1986 as a charitable NGO, PHT has played a crucial role campaigning for George Town’s listing as a world heritage site, which was finally accomplished on 7 July 2008. As stated in the mission, PHT is adamant to underscore that the focus is set on the material and immaterial heritage of the whole island, regardless of ethnic provenance, and is actively striving towards a multi-cultural agenda that would at best be reflected in the organization’s membership. However, when scrutinizing the name lists of those present at the Annual General Meetings of the years of 1993, 2007, 2008, 2010, 2011, 2012 and 2013, which represents all years with recorded annual reports, these names (which in the case of Malaysia can be seen as affirmative of ethnic provenance since mixed marriages are

108 PHT has no other publicly available archive apart from the extensive material available through the organization’s homepage (www.pht.org).
uncommon) shows that the Chinese members percentage is well over 95%.\textsuperscript{109} The census of Penang in 2013 shows an estimated population of approximately 1,647,000 inhabitants.

![Population census for Penang in 2013. Penang Institute: 2015](chart)

The chart clearly displays the perception of the different “ethnic groups” in the Malaysian society, as instead of choosing the wording “Chinese Malays” or “Indian Malays” it is “Chinese” and “Indian” that are being used. As we can see, there are slightly more Chinese Malays living in Penang than 	extit{bumiputera} Malays, however the number is shrinking due to lower birth rate among the Chinese Malays, and this number does not at all correspond to the membership of PHT, where there are literally less than 5% non-Chinese members. Why is that the case when the agenda of PHT is clearly dedicated to the heritage of all Malaysians? It is certainly not the intention of PHT to be a “Chinese NGO”; in fact, the chairwoman Khoo Salma, an acclaimed local historian who has been writing about Penang’s history from various perspectives for more than two decades, has tried to reach out to individuals of other “communities” but these efforts have not proven to bring any long-lasting results.

Due to PHT’s broad agenda, what follows cannot be expected to do justice to all initiatives carried out during the nineteen years of PHT’s existence, but will instead focus on activities that can be regarded as representative for the NGO’s work at large.

\textsuperscript{109} This was also mentioned in an informal interview with a PHT volunteer on 11 December 2014, who stated that “PHT is basically 99% Chinese”.

When PHT included the issue of heritage on their agenda for the first time in 1993, this new field targeted four different projects. The shorter term project, which was also the easiest to implement, focused on the restoration of the Syed Alatas Mansion, as well as the aspiration of turning it into a heritage resource center where additional training of conservation skills to preserve particular Malaysian traditional craft would be practiced. The long-term projects involved the cleansing of the Protestant Cemetery as well as a financially rather challenging project to save a former residence of Captain Light, namely Suffolk House. It is clearly visible that these projects all set out to protect what the NGO regarded as crucial landmarks of the city without following any specific ethnic agenda but, instead, paying tribute to the extraordinary multi-cultural heritage of Penang.

One of the first attempts to strengthen inter-cultural awareness and take pride in Malaysia’s history through the highlighting of material heritage can be traced back to the first heritage map, “the melting pot”, created in 1992. “The melting pot” was an initiative of the Deputy Prime Minister at that time, Anwar Ibrahim (b. 1947), following an idea of the Harvard Professor Tu Weiming (b. 1940) in reaction to Samuel Huntington’s (1927–2008) theory about the Clash of Civilizations (prior to the book in 1996, Huntington held lectures with roughly the same content in 1992). Tu’s ideas also inspired the Malaysian Civilizational Dialogue between Islam and Confucianism in the following years (Khoo 2010: 287). The melting pot heritage map illustrates a trail stretching over approximately one kilometer in the center of George Town, which housed eleven important places of worship of seven different major religions. The area in which the trail was located took on the nickname “Street of Harmony” and would later turn out to be related to one of PHT’s most noted achievements, the “Street of Harmony” concept. In the years to follow, the focus of PHT changed, and instead of being directed towards the preservation of valuable monuments, the inner city of George Town became of increasing concern. This was intimately related to the repeal of Rental Control, which has been of major importance for PHT ever since it came into force in 1997.

The Malaysian Control of Rent Act was passed in 1966 following the Control of Ordinance, which had been enacted in 1948 to help returnees in the wake of WWII. “In a sense this was a

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10 The Mansion of Syed Mohamed Alatas (also referred to as Al-Attas) “is a well preserved example of an early Straits Eclectic-Style Muslim bungalow” (Khoo 2007: 35). Penang Heritage Center started using the premises in 1996.
socialist piece of legislation inspired by the British Labour Party” (Hashim 1997: 4) that had the objective to protect tenants against greedy landlords, as neither could the rent be increased nor could the tenants be evicted without the approval by the Rent Assessment Board. Two major drawbacks of the rent control were that the tenants started to sublet the premises to others, making big profits in the process, and as the owners could not make any claims on their premises, investments and reparations were seldom carried out. George Town was heavily influenced by the Rental Act Control, which left a big part of the inner city in a terrible state of neglect. As rent control was an obstacle on the Malaysian agenda of the 1990s that pursued deregulation and full exercise of property rights, and had also proven to seriously hamper urban development, the Control of Rent Repeal Act came into force on 1 September 1997 (Atsumi 2003: 29). A 28-month transitional period was meant to alleviate the situation of the tenants that needed to find new housing, while rental increase remained restricted by law. As the phase of transition came to an end in 2000, many low-income tenants had failed to find new housing and were also incapable of paying the new rent that normally increased between 50% and 300%. In George Town this had serious consequences for small-scale businesses carried out in the old shophouses that had survived for many decades. As many of the rent-controlled premises were old shophouses of historical value, PHT had asked the state government to provide guidelines for the purpose of preservation. An SOS group was also formed resist abusive landlords, and PHT was involved in a monitoring project with the same objective. In this respect, PHT can be regarded as a social organization, as they sided with poor tenants and tried to help them find solution to this conflict that evicted more than “529 premises on 123 streets of George Town” (Atsumi 2003: 34) in 2000. Concurrent with these changes to the historical center of George Town, a massive mall complex was under construction, causing damage to at least 150 old buildings in the neighborhood as an inadequate system of piling was being used. PHT was also actively participating in various action groups to bring the inappropriate construction methods to a halt.

In the 1990s, Penang showed an increasing awareness of potential cultural tourism, which meant a shift to promote inner-city tourism next to the existing beach tourism that had already given Penang its share of visitors for decades. When Richard A. Engelhardt, the UNESCO Regional Advisor for Culture in Asia and the Pacific, visited Penang during the Hindu Thaipusam festival he observed that Guānyīn 觀音 / 观音, the Chinese Goddess of Mercy, was also venerated, which made him exclaim that George Town “is more than historical layering – it is cultural fusion” (Khoo 2010: 286).
As a consequence of this new perception, that beach life and profoundly rich heritage could be combined into a lucrative tourist business, the slogan “we have it all” was coined and Engelhardt advised George Town to apply to be listed as an UNESCO world cultural heritage. It is interesting that the ancient city of Hội An in Vietnam, which became listed as a UNESCO heritage site in 1999, has never been mentioned in relation to George Town, although Engelhardt played an important role as advisor on issues related to heritage and conservation in the Vietnamese port city, which were later also of vital importance in George Town. There are many “heritage strategies” where the cases of Hội An and George Town show similarities. The most striking parallels between the two cities are seen in various initiatives to preserve intangible heritage through the revitalization of traditional trades. In Hội An, one example thereof is the revitalization of traditional woodcarving skills. “UNESCO provided funds, technical advice and training to revitalize the woodworking craft in Kim Bong Village in partnership with the municipal government of Hoi An. Woodcarving training workshops were initiated, with training provided by a master woodcarver” (UNESCO report 2008: 43). There were also other woodworking enterprises that provided training to apprentices, an initiative that proved to be sustainable during the 2000s.

In 2005, PHT initiated a similar project in George Town called the Living Heritage Treasurers of Penang Awards (LHTA). Like the first project of this kind in Malaysia, the intention of LHTA was to revitalize different endangered trades and, as Penang’s heritage is very heterogeneous, any traditional craftsman could apply to participate in the “competition”. The two winners would be rewarded with an annual sum of money for the rest of their lives, an incentive that aimed to both boost the pride of the craftsmen and also guarantee that the trade could be actively carried out. In 2007, out of fifteen nominees, six persons of different crafts (calligraphy, gold smithy, menorah dancing/shamanism, lantern making, artisan carving, and artisan craftsmanship) were shortlisted. In the name of protection and conservation of immaterial cultural assets, a menorah dancer and teacher, who is also known as a spiritual shaman and practitioner of Thai Wayang Kulit (shadow puppet performance), won the first prize, a nomination that also recognizes the historical connection between Thailand and Penang. The second prize went to Penang’s last traditional lantern maker.

If LTHA can be described as PHT’s most important initiative to revitalize intangible heritage, the most important PHT initiative related to tangible heritage would be the “Street of

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111 Craftsman is the correct denomination as female participation has been very marginal.
112 This lantern maker has not been willing to take on apprentices to learn his skills, which corresponds with the situation in Malacca where the last lantern maker also refuses to pass on his skills.
Harmony” trail concept. Introduced in 2002, the “Street of Harmony” concept provided a variety of maps, intended as self-guides for visitors who wished to get a deeper insight into the city’s heritage. Next to the “Street of Harmony” that indicated an area with a high density of religious institutions, there were also other maps such as the “Historic George Town Trails” and the “Traditional Trades & Food Trails of George Town” (Graezer Bideau and Kilani 2009: 154).

Since there was no tourist information in George Town during these earlier years of the twenty-first century, PHT premises also functioned as a drop-in center for a wide range of people: a) those seeking conservation guidelines; b) tourists looking for heritage walks; c) those searching for a place to hold exhibitions, talks, seminars, or workshops; d) locals wanting to know more on how to save their shophouse (also in financial terms, how to find suppliers and contractors); and e) students doing research.113

As a consequence of reinforced bumiputera empowerment, many street names in George Town that evoked the memories of the colonial era were changed into “Malay” names, where Muslim religious connotations played an important role. In this context, the “Street of Harmony” was not universally accepted, since a big part of the trail took place in a renamed street housing an important Mosque (Masjid Keling). The “Street of Harmony” had to be changed into “World Religions Walk”, although the intention stayed the same: to provide both local and foreign visitors with an opportunity to grasp the multidimensional essence of Malay history, portrayed through the different religions while also highlighting the importance that “different people at different times for different reasons create different narratives of belonging” (Ashworth, Graham and Tunbridge 2007: 6).

Following the Swiss theologian Hans Küng’s (b. 1928) draft on a “Declaration Toward a Global Ethic” in 1993, and the Berlin based Konrad Adenauer Foundation’s exhibition on “Global Ethic” in Malacca in 2005, George Town was seen as the perfect location to “accommodate interfaith dialogue” (Khoo 2010: 288). PHT provided free heritage walks within the “Penang Global Ethic Project”, which started in 2006 as an attempt to “superimpose the idea of interfaith harmony on a historic site, as a strategy to open up a space for inter-religious learning and dialogue” (Khoo 2010: 291). The overall project on global ethic lasted for five weeks and received a good public response, however the PHT heritage walk, which was carried out by youths from different ethnic groups and faiths, faced some

difficulties as a few Malay parents regarded it as a forceful intent to convert Muslim children and this kind of heritage walk had to be put to a halt.\footnote{However, the conflict was not between the different traditional religious communities but between Muslim groups in favor of exclusivism on the one side, and groups who strived for a strengthened inter-cultural religious understanding on the other (Khoo 2010: 292).}

Another heritage education project, partly financed and carried out by PHT, was a program called \textit{Anak-Anak Kota} (Children of the City), where intercultural teamwork was encouraged. This musical drama workshop for young people (10-19 years old) stretched over four to six months during the spring of 2006, and had the aspiration of bridging cultural barriers between children with the help of ethnomusicology. Interviews, participant observation, analysis, and audio-visual recording comprised the core techniques applied. The children also got to learn the traditional instruments of the other “ethnic groups” and, in this process, which was finally performed on stage, young people could find new ways to perceive and to voice different ideas about identity issues and heritage. Ethnomusicologists of Indonesia, Malaysia, and the Philippines regard themselves as vital in the process of deconstructing Eurocentrism in the education system, where Western music has been dominant and is still in many respects regarded as more prestigious. With the approaches applied by the ethnomusicologists to record and merge voices and sounds of the city, the project of \textit{Anak-Anak Kota} had the social incentive to promote tolerance and cultural diversity: “By crossing stylistic and ethnic boundaries and appreciating cultural differences, they help children to develop perspectives that are more inclusive and so challenge the dominant discourse of ethnicism” (Tan 2008: 71).

The project was divided into various areas, with theater research focusing on the processual act of development (based on a mixture of Berthold Brecht and Augusto Boal), and a ‘Music of Sound’ project, where the cultural heritage of different communities was mapped out and interpreted through music that was finally presented in the \textit{Kisah Pulau Pinang} (The History of Penang) at the Khoo Kongs. The children were also taken on heritage walks and learned how to make their own instruments with everyday objects. During fieldwork in George Town they were also recording sounds from coffee houses, markets, and various locations in the port where languages mixed and merged. Out of these collections they created their own “Penang History Song”.
Boria Pulau Pinang

Kisah Pulau Pinang tajuk dan tema
Tempat persinggahan berbilang agama
Pelbagai bangsa bercampur bersama
Boria anak kota dendang seirama
Rempah diimport dari India dan Burma
Lada dari Acheh, teh dari China
Ramai pedagang datang bersinggah
Seluruh kota riuh-rendah jadinya
Dari Malaya, Siam dan Sumatera
Singgah di Lebuh Acheh, tujuannya sama
Sambil tunggu Kapal Haji ke Mekkah
Duduk di Masjid dengar ceramah

The story of Penang is the topic and theme of this boria
[It is] A place where people of various religions sojourned
Diverse races mixed together
Boria “Children of the City” is sung in harmony
Spices are imported from India and Burma
Pepper from Acheh, tea from China
Many traders stopped [at the port]
The whole town became a din
From Malaya, Siam and Sumatera
[Many came] to Acheh Street with the same intention
While waiting for the pilgrimage boat to Mecca
[They] listened to talks at the Mosque

(Tan 2008: 75)

The history was accompanied by a set of gamelan (traditional music of Bali and Java that is played in an ensemble), which at the beginning of the song changed into boria (a local Malaysian traditional performance originating from Penang) to tell the story of pilgrimage to Mecca, capturing the syncretic spirit that is part of Penang’s heritage. Four different aspects were of central importance to the project of Anak-Anak Kota: to empower the young members of the community; develop new frames for performance; to reconnect with the sources of the music; and as an understanding of how to develop broader structural solutions (Tan 2008: 80).

During the workshop period the children got to know the performer who won the 2005 LHTA and also helped to gather materials about other endangered trades (e.g. signboards, lanterns, and traditional costumes), while using their new learned interview and recording techniques. The material was then used for pamphlets to be distributed to the general public, an initiative that was still ongoing in 2015.

A PHT initiative to strengthen the self-perception of a specific community of George Town that had long been marginalized was the clan jetty information center. After the destruction of the two clan jetties, i.e. Koay and Peng Aun in 2006 and despite the forceful heritage advocacy to save the Koay jetty in the years prior to demolition, PHT set out to work with scholars, photographers, graphic designers, and residents to visualize the heritage of one of the remaining clan jetties in large scale posters. As these posters were located at the gateway of the jetty, residents and visitors could meet in an informal way and interested jetty

115 A jetty refers to a housing structure built on stilts in the sea. Originally created by Chinese coolies searching for employment in Penang at the end of the nineteenth century, the collective coolie housing evolved into individual family units. At the end of the 1960s there were eight jetties on the outskirts of Penang, each occupied by one clan (Graezer Bideau and Kilani 2009).
inhabitants could take on the role of an expert of his or her own residential area. The concept behind this grass-root approach was most probably based on experiences drawn from the failed attempt to save the Koay jetty, where opposing interests had not been able to join in a satisfying solution. The destruction of the Koay jetty, inhabited predominantly by Chinese Muslims (alleged descendants of the Huí), exemplifies the difficulty of finding “the golden middle path” between the diverging interests of local residents, heritage agendas, developers, and the general aspiration of tourist agents to attract some of Penang’s increasing number of foreign visitors with yet another “exotic” location. The campaign to save the Koay jetty was carried out in a variety of ways (petitions, signature campaigns, news articles, press conferences), which culminated in the publication of the trilingual brochure *The Endangered Koay Jetty* (Graezer Bideau and Kilani 2009: 156). One contributor to the brochure chose to highlight the “ancestral purity” of the clan community as the relevant reason to save the jetty, while also underscoring how the jetty’s coherent community was harmoniously united in a specific and unique blend of both Muslim and Confucian cultural elements. Graetzer Bideau and Kilani (2009: 157) argue that, through the construction of a “pure” Koay identity, the true heterogeneous social reality was denied: “Once a composite and marginal place, in short ‘ordinary’, the Koay jetty was on its way to being transformed into a homogeneous and central space, in short a ‘site of memory.’” PHT also stated that one of the reasons to save the jetty was related to the well-preserved Chinese Muslim heritage, but there was also another reason, which was linked to the social history of Penang, as the jetty represented a part of the island’s working class history, being the location where some of the harbor laborers settled at end of the nineteenth century.

The questions arising when arguing for the preservation of the Koay jetty takes us to the very heart of heritage discourse, where different ideas, even within the same “action group” (as seen in the case of the contributors to the brochure) partly contradict each other. On the one hand, the argument put forth is that Penang is unique because it displays something different than just two centuries of “ethnic cohabitation”: it demonstrates a historical mixing and blending, which at times have even created unparalleled elements of syncretism in architecture, language, food, street art, and religion. On the other hand, it is argued that Penang’s uniqueness is the result of long-lasting traditions and customs (manifested both in tangible and intangible heritage as customs are also expressed in the material culture) passed on to the subsequent generation in alleged “pure lineage”, and it is this “purity” which can be regarded as worthy of protection.
Chinese pedigree depicted in the social history gallery, dedicated to the “rags to riches” forefront figure Yeap Chor Ee. The 114 generations of pure Chinese blood leads straight back to the first progenitor, “Zhu Liang”, Prime Minister General of the Zhōu Dynasty (544–468 BCE).

How can an acceptable interface between these two perceptions be negotiated? How much “social reality” can a heritage site openly represent, while simultaneously being conscious of the necessity of a “mythical dimension” to gain recognition and interest from the outside (e.g. visitors to the site and international recognition)? When identities are becoming essentialized (i.e. through an imagined lineage), what possibilities do the affected individuals have to oppose this narrative? Where is the borderline between a continuation of “business-as-usual”, allowing for dynamics of change for the inhabitants of the site, and a museumification that
blocks these initiatives in the name of heritage protection? When walking on the jetty among other visitors in 2014, the query was: how to exist in a neighborhood that slowly yet steadily is being turned into an outdoor museum? To find acceptable answers to all these questions has proven to be one of the major challenges for PHT after the UNESCO listing of Penang in 2008.

8.2.2 PHT after the UNESCO Heritage Listing

After an unsuccessful attempt to be listed as UNESCO world cultural heritage in 2002, George Town finally achieved its aim in 2008, together with the city of Melaka, that had also failed to be listed in the 1980s and 1990s, albeit on completely different grounds than George Town.116 In Melaka, the Chinese history is “essentially absent from heritage representation” (Ashworth, Graham and Tunbridge 2007: 153), which was also visible in the attempt to expropriate a Chinese burial site in the 1980s. The two cities of George Town and Melaka can thus be seen as complimentary, as “Melaka, dominated by federal and state apparatuses, is devoted to a museum-type conservation that aims to preserve orthodox history and built heritage. In contrast, George Town, with its vibrant voluntary sector, has nurtured a heritage discourse in which the people, the buildings, and the space they have created, are deemed to be targets for conservation” (Cheng, Li and Ma 2014: 618-619).117

For PHT, that had been one of the main protagonists behind the UNESCO listing since 1998, this new status of George Town was naturally regarded as an achievement, however it also meant an extension of the NGO’s field of responsibility. It was from now on expected to cover more events and ad hoc requests as well as an increasing input in mediation between different institutions, such as the Ministry of Heritage and Penang Tourism Action Council, to plan for sustainable tourist policies. As the government had proven to be inefficient in its duty to provide the necessary incentive for proper preservation of heritage buildings connected to

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116 The reason behind George Town’s failure to be listed can be traced to dissent between local and federal governments (Graezer Bideau and Kilani 2009: 154). “Melaka in the late 1980s and 1990s were respectively rejected on the grounds that the state government had destroyed the original waterfront and excluded the Chinese community” (Cheng, Li and Ma 2014: 619).

117 There are ten criteria on the UNESCO World Heritage List, where at least one has to be met for a site to be included. Three can be regarded as decisively fitting in the case of George Town. These are criterion number (ii): “to exhibit an important interchange of human values, over a span of time or within a cultural area of the world, on developments in architecture or technology, monumental arts, town-planning or landscape design”; number (iii): “to bear a unique or at least exceptional testimony to a cultural tradition or to a civilization which is living or which has disappeared”; as well as number (iv): “to be an outstanding example of a type of building, architectural or technological ensemble or landscape which illustrates (a) significant stage(s) in human history.” See: http://whc.unesco.org/en/criteria/ (retrieved 20 July 2015).
the repeal of the rental act control, one initiative of PHT was to provide support to shophouse owners.

A brochure displaying different heritage shophouse styles since the 1790s. Indications are also made where counseling can be found for owners who plan to repair or restore their shophouses. (Photo: Gabriella Szabó)

Another equally important initiative to strengthen the city’s tourism through an advanced “mapping out” of the inner city, as well as complying with the rules of the UNESCO listing, was to provide the inner city with historic street name plaques. The Penang Tourism Action Council officially appointed PHT as consultant for the project on 27 May 2008.  

The UNESCO listing further increased PHT’s role as a platform to learn more about different approaches to heritage conservation. One of the earlier initiatives was a conference on sustainable cultural development in October 2009. International speakers enabled local stakeholders to gain insight to new approaches related to increased returns from cultural tourism, as well as value adding among businesses and properties in the inner city. Besides widespread talks and discussions (i.e. heritage conservation in Australia and Britain), the
conference was also followed by capacity building workshops (i.e. cultural mapping, museum curation, and management) in 2010.

In the following years, two Australian institutions, AusHeritage and Historic Houses Trust, supported PHT’s initiative to develop a framework for a broader and more sustainable approach to heritage protection. PHT also realized the necessity of streamlining their activities and put a stronger focus on advocacy in different realms of society, related to participation in government committees, education for children, deliveries of media statements, heritage alerts,\(^\text{119}\) and the mobilization of public pressure.\(^\text{120}\) Most NGOs in Malaysia are proven to be “either collaborators or vehicles of the state” (Cheng, Li and Ma 2014: 621) as they, contrary to PHT, count on state funding or state cooperation. Apart from the growing awareness of the necessity to follow a more sustainable people-centered path of heritage advocacy along with the increasingly international outlook (both through different conferences and international internship programs), the main aims prior to the UNESCO listing have remained on PHT’s agenda. One example thereof is Penang Apprenticeship Program for Artisans (PAPA), that actively supports immaterial heritage through the assistance of artisans and performers, introduced in addition to the LHTA in 2009. The assistance is carried out through the help of organization and co-ordination of apprenticeship and financial aid (i.e. rent, material costs) in order to achieve sustainability and to transmit knowledge of traditional skills and techniques.

Another example of PHT activities initiated prior to the UNESCO listing was professional training of heritage guides. The idea to offer in-depth guide tours was based on the wish to counteract the spread of unofficial guides, as well as to strengthen PHT’s revenues. However, this initiative turned out to be less profitable than expected. The request for the rather expensive guide tours has been low, which is related to the distribution of the various Heritage Trail maps provided free of charge.

The different strategies implemented by PHT to increase its membership, both on local and global scale, have not proven to be very successful (from 352 members in 2008, to approximately 400 in 2015). As the membership fee is rather symbolic and only allows for a paid workforce of either two or three employees, PHT depends on funding and fundraising, which has increased substantially since the UNESCO listing.

\(^{119}\) Heritage alert is an initiative to publicly draw attention to unlawful developments where heritage is being damaged. The alerts can be related to different areas such as: demolition or changes to heritage buildings, illegal land clearing, or historical burial sites and memorial monuments.

While advocating sustainable heritage management along with initiatives to preserve and strengthen local traditions, it is highly probable that the main problem for George Town is related to what initially seemed a blessing: Tourism. This new challenge has been poignantly addressed by the PHT’s chairwoman: “one day we will wake up to find 50 souvenir shops, 500 hotels, but only 5,000 Penang residents left.”

With its explicit multi-cultural agenda, how can PHT be related to ethnic policies and their influence on Malaysian heritage discourse? Isn’t the specific socio-political context of PHT, located in George Town where the people of Chinese descent have demographically accounted for more than 60% of the city’s population ever since its establishment in 1786 (a number that only recently started decreasing due to low birthrate among people of Chinese descent and increasing Indian immigration), unsuitable for a research of Malay majority affirmative action? There are various aspects underscoring the uniqueness of both PHT and Penang: As already mentioned in the beginning of this section, Penang is opposing the way official heritage discourse is carried out in Melaka, where Chinese heritage has been willfully neglected. Further, the vital force enabling PHT to mount “resistance to the official criteria and modes of heritage conservation” (Cheng, Li and Ma 2014: 621) must be seen within the historical framework, where Penang has enjoyed both a geographical “peripheral grace” as well as a specific economic and educational composition among its inhabitants. The distance from the nation’s political center, often paired with oppositional party rule, has perpetuated specific structures of political activism and localism ever since Malaysia’s independence. As a matter of fact, the components that have come to shape Penang’s geo-political identity, which have regularly been influenced by an attempt to contest dominant Malay political discourse, go beyond Independence and can be traced already back in the middle of the nineteenth century, when Penang was regarded as a center for modernization of political thought and education (De Bernardi 2009). Alongside the modernizing trends experimented in Penang, the cultural institutions of Hui and Kongsi also played a crucial role in the social fabric and even partly substituted the State as provider of charity, public goods, and social order. PHT has thus been shaped by this specific socio-cultural context and can possibly be regarded as intending to “carry on” these embedded traditions, a conclusion that accords with Holst’s remark, that “although advocacy-oriented NGOs have developed only from the 1970s onward, these organizations build on a long tradition of associations that deals largely with

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community-related issues in a wider sense such as education, culture, religion, or economic development” (Holst 2012: 187).

What is telling when analyzing PHT’s agenda in relation to the “ethnic discourse” is that, although many initiatives have been carried out to reinforce the multi-cultural membership, very little has happened: PHT’s membership structure has stayed almost intact since the very beginning, and people of Chinese descent make up for at least 95% of the organization. How is it possible that an NGO with such a strong commitment and successful dedication to serve and celebrate Penang’s multi-cultural heritage fails to attract people of other descent? Currently, the non-Chinese members of the NGO also seem to occupy high positions, possibly “alibi positions” as the lack of non-Chinese membership is negatively affecting PHT, which is involuntarily regarded by many locals as “a Chinese NGO”. When comparing the situation with BHT in Semarang (chapter 8) the difference is striking: In Semarang, a patriarchal and completely Chinese-oriented cultural association has transformed into a predominantly female social organization, where the majority of the members are of Javanese descent. In Penang, an NGO dedicated to global values of concern to all citizens, proves incapable of attracting members from other “ethnic groups” than the Chinese.

All attempts to discuss ethnicization with employees or volunteers of PHT were turned down as the matter was regarded “too sensitive”, possibly related to the reinforced use of the Sedition Act (see chapter 6.9). Even to discuss the role of the heavily state funded George Town World Heritage Incorporation (GTWHI), established in 2009 and equipped with 15 full-time employees (compared to the meager staff of two full-time employees in the case of PHT) proved to be unfeasible. The reasons behind the establishment of GTWHI are to a certain extent questionable as the assigned tasks are very similar to ones already carried out by PHT, which might also be the reason behind the unwillingness among PHT staff and volunteers to touch upon the topic.

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122 That the intents to “reach out” are sincere were witnessed in interactions with Indian and Malay individuals visiting the venues of PHT between 11 and 17 of December 2014. Statements referring to the wish of a “balanced” membership have often been made, and it is also clear that PHT would benefit from a higher percentage of non-Chinese members as it would better reflect and prove the mission of the NGO.

123 Attention should be paid to the fact that language is not a barrier. PHT members that speak Chinese have only recently entered the organization, and working language will be split between English and Malaysian, thus available to all. Interview with PHT volunteer on 11 July 2015.

124 In an interview with Cheah Cheng Seang, a trustee of Leong San Tong Khoo Kongsii on 12 December 2014, the situation was identical, although the topic was not to be discussed in detail.
PHT can thus be seen as atypical for the general heritage discourse in Malaysia, as the NGO is strongly influenced by Penang’s geographical, demographical, and socio-political conditions as mentioned above. It is very probable that these reasons have a crucial impact on the dynamic dimension of PHT’s heritage discourse, which cannot be regarded as being hampered by any forms of ethnic policies.
9 Conclusion

In the wake of widespread decolonization in the middle of the twentieth century, many third-world countries gained independence. In the process of negotiating the political and social contracts within these new independent polities, ethnic policies gained momentum (chapter 3.2). In the case of Indonesia and Malaysia, a specific group became heavily targeted by these ethnic policies, namely the people of Chinese descent.

In Southeast Asia, the intentions of ethnic policies depended on the prevailing political systems and the economic situations of the new nation states. Other factors such as demographic structures, relationship between the “indigenous” and the “Chinese minority”, as well as the nation state’s relationship with China also influenced to what extent these ethnic policies reinforced assimilation, acculturation, accommodation, or cultural plurality (chapter 3.3). In Indonesia, policies of assimilation were implemented for more than three decades (1967–2000) with the intention to destroy Chinese cultural heritage. This heritage, which has also been referred to as sānbāo+ in this thesis refers to: political and social organizations, mass media and education, as well as language and religion (chapter 3.3.1). In Malaysia, instead of introducing explicit anti-Chinese policies, affirmative policies were introduced (1971) that granted special rights to the bumiputera Malays. The consequences of these policies have gradually reduced the people of Chinese descent (along with other non-bumiputera citizens) into “second-class citizens”, as access to different benefits such as scholarships, education, trade licenses and housing are reserved for bumiputera Malays (chapter 6.9).

The reinforced ethnicization after Indonesian and Malaysian independence cannot be regarded as a new phenomenon, but ought to be traced back to the colonial era, when the British and the Dutch regimes supported ethnic segregation for their own economic and political benefit (chapter 4). In order to understand the process of ethnicization it is crucial to define the “ethnic” and other key concepts, such as imperium in imperio and middleman minority with the aim to highlight the risks that might occur through negligent terminology (chapter 3). Why any homogenous concept of “ethnic Chineseness” has to be discarded is further discussed in relation to the Peranakan culture, along with its hybrid forms of language, religion, food culture, and aesthetics (chapter 5).
The aspirations to curb Chinese participation in socio-political life and prevent Chinese heritage from prospering have been partly successful in both Indonesia and Malaysia, yet to different extents. This thesis was based on the hypothesis that the scope and range of activities carried out by NGOs, which regard themselves as advocates of cultural heritage, could be revealing when searching for an answer to the research question, i.e. if ethnic policies have affected the dynamic dimensions of Chinese cultural heritage in Indonesia and Malaysia. In the case of Indonesia, the examined NGO provides a rather straightforward answer to this question (chapter 7.3.4): ethnic policies under Suharto’s rule have led to severe damage of different aspects of Chinese cultural heritage. This is visible in both tangible heritage, as architecture or artefacts with Chinese imprints have been either destroyed or neglected, and intangible heritage, as only a fragment of Semarang’s inhabitants speak Chinese. Further, the range of activities carried out by the NGO are very limited and predominantly focused on the festivities around the Chinese New Year (Imlek). Although the ethnic policies that targeted Chinese heritage in Indonesia have been lifted (2000), a certain stigma, which impedes a more dynamic stance towards heritage revitalization and/or preservation, is clearly noticeable. The Malaysian NGO proves to be strikingly different as it mirrors Penang’s ethno-economic composition, historic trajectory, and geo-political location far away from the bumiputera Malay dominated heritage discourse. The Malaysian NGO examined in this thesis shows no signs of any explicit state imposed retrenchment of Chinese heritage. However, the NGO in Penang can be regarded as highly atypical due to the “distinguished capacity of Penang’s voluntary sector in narrating and enabling heritage provision” (Cheng, Li and Ma 2014: 619) and it is, therefore, highly questionable if the action-range of the NGO really exemplifies Malaysian heritage discourse. The Malaysian policies affecting heritage can possibly be regarded as pragmatic: the state is inclined to approve if heritage generates revenues (e.g. through tourism, as is currently the case in Penang).

According to Ashworth, Graham and Tunbridge (2007) Malaysia is an example of a plural society referred to as category core+, which indicates that the society is represented through a consensual core identity to which a number of minority groups are added. In a core+

A telling observation took place during the Chinese New Year’s ceremony in the Chinese Christian Church Gereja ST Francis Xavierus (Francis Xaverius’ Church) in Pecinan in February 2014. The priest opened up the sermon asking the audience “Nhão mà?” (Chinese: how are you?). However, the priest did not wait for the reply but instead answered himself “Nhén Nhão, xièxiè!” (You are fine, thanks!). Apparently nobody realized the mistake, apart from the priest himself, who, somewhat embarrassed, cleared his voice to correct himself “Wó Nhão” (I’m fine). There were also other indications of the same kind during the ceremony, which was approximately attended by 400 people, almost exclusively of Chinese descent.

There are various forms of plural societies, referred to as: “integrationist or single-core, melting pot, core+, pillar or salad bowl-rainbow-mosaic.” See: Ashworth, Graham and Tunbridge 2007: 72.
society heritage is often a “consequence of ad hoc reactions and adjustments of governments and individuals […] It may be used as the instrument for creating and sustaining the leading culture. It can adopt a defensive position whose task is to preserve the integrity of the core, preventing its perceived essential character from being diluted and subsumed by the periphery. Simultaneously, it can be used to promote the values and norms of the core aiming the peripheral add-ons thus preventing society fragmenting into non-communication cells” (Ashworth, Graham and Tunbridge 2007: 81). In Malaysia both the Casado Malay-Portuguese and the Peranakan heritage are favored “as useful ‘add-ons’ to the Malay core” (Ashworth, Graham and Tunbridge 2007: 153). Following this strain of thought, Chinese or Peranakan heritage can only be referred to in marginal terms, without any ambition to be of crucial relevance and, therefore, constituting no threat to the Malay national narrative. This starkly contrasts the Indonesian case, where a Presidential Instruction from 1967 stated that any kind of manifestation of Chinese heritage had to be abolished as it could give rise to “inappropriate psychological, mental, and moral influences on Indonesian citizens” (chapter 6.4.1).

There has never been any direct contact between the BHT (Indonesia) and PHT (Malaysia) i.e. the two NGOs researched in this thesis; however, a group of members of the Komunitas Pecinan Semarang untuk Pariwisata (Semarang Pecinan Community for Tourism), also referred to as KOPI Semawis, concerned with the social, cultural, and physical revitalization of the city’s Chinatown (Pecinan) and headed by the same chairman as the BHT, made an excursion to Penang and visited PHT in March 2014. The objective of the excursion was to learn how Penang’s government, private sector as well as various NGOs conduct heritage protection, in order to find initiatives to inspire the inhabitants of Pecinan to realize the slumbering potentials of their neighborhood.127 Since virtually no heritage protection is carried out in Pecinan (contrary to Penang, chapter 8.2), these “wake-up calls” carried out by KOPI Semawis appear to be urgent, as it is evident in the case of the Wie Hwie Kiong temple (klenteng). Established in the early nineteenth century, this temple can be regarded as one of Pecinan’s most renowned landmarks.

127 Communication with Widya Wijayanti, urban planner and organizer of the excursion, on 9 May 2014 and 4 November 2014.
The Wie Hwie Kiong temple, also referred to as the Tan temple, established by the descendants of Tan Tiang Thjing (1770-1833). Since the temple served as a lineage organization, it is comparable with Khoo Kongsi (chapter 8.1). (Photo: Widjajanti Dharmowijono)

The first hall of the Tan temple on 6 February 2014. (Photo: Gabriella Szabó)
Paper recycling in the inner courtyard of the Tan temple. One of Semarang’s oldest altars is visible in the background, 27 January 2015. (Photo: Gabriella Szabó)

The door next to the altar on the photo above leads to the Tan temple’s outer courtyard. As space is scarce in Pecinan, the abandoned temple yard seems suitable for an extensive recycling business, 27 January 2015. (Photo: Gabriella Szabó)
The case studies of BHT in Semarang and PHT in Penang clearly indicate starkly contrasting attitudes toward heritage conservation and heritage protection. This is related to various factors such as national heritage policies, tourism, communal work and private initiatives. As has been evident in the case of Penang however, even George Town was in a state of considerable neglect until the repeal of the rent control in the latter part of the 1990s. Since the UNESCO Heritage Listing, the amount of “heritage labeled” enterprises such as cafés, hotels, restaurants, and souvenir shops in George Town have sky rocketed. Although this development seem very far away from Pecinan, as clearly noticeable in the photos above, Kopi Semawis realized the need to reflect on how not to follow in Penang’s footsteps, with George Town been portrayed as undergoing a certain “Disneyfication” (Teo 2003: 546) where the “attractions have been selectively scissored and strung together as a coherent entertainment image that appeals to tourists […] Rather than explore and discover, tourists are given exciting and exotic, if even predetermined, images to consume” (Teo 2003: 556). In Penang, a former devotee complained that the state conservation of Buddhist temples had transformed them into main tourist attractions, which scared away the temple gods. Now the temples are “too colorful, like a zoo for the gods” (Teo 2003: 558). But what is more humiliating for a temple god? The tourists or, rather, the rats that scavenge through a temple yard which has turned into a rubbish tip?

Despite all the differences between the two NGOs, there is one significant similarity: both have charity and financial support of people, regardless of ethnic affiliation, as a central issue on their otherwise diverging agendas. As people of Chinese descent are regarded as economically dominant, there are implicit pressures within society that they should provide a certain amount of economic compensation towards their “host societies”. In the case of Indonesia this implicit pressure still plays a minor role, which is visible in the NGOs agenda (see chapter 7.3.4). In the case of the Malaysian NGO, there are no indications that the agenda would be influenced by “political opportunism” to soothe bumiputera Malay sentiments. The function of the NGOs to strengthen social cohesion should instead be understood as an expression of philanthropy, which could be possibly also related to a comparatively high education among people of Chinese descent.

The current situation of Indonesia under Joko Widodo’s presidency can be regarded as a welcomed continuation of the policies initiated during Gus Dur’s rule (chapter 7.3.4), as resentments against minorities are decreasing while opportunities for people of Chinese descent to participate in national politics are increasing. But how solid is this perception?
Indonesian sociologists conducting research in Pecinan regard the Indonesian integration during the post-Suharto era (from 1998 onwards) as unsuccessful, concluding that “most of them [the people of Chinese descent] who have more resources than the other communities and have higher education than the non-Chinese communities don’t show enough care for the life of the nation. This phenomenon shows that they are still just economic animals who focus only on collecting wealth. This is also indirectly affected by their tradition” (Alkatiri, Irmayanti and Waworuntu 2015: 69). Next to a general accusation that people of Chinese descent fled with their financial capital in 1998 (chapter 6.5), the sociologists make a further odd remark: they question the legitimation behind the widely accepted and appreciated annulment of Suharto’s enforced derogatory term Cina which has been used since 1967 to describe both people and objects of Chinese descent (replacing the neutral term Tiongkok).  As Indonesian literature is very scarce on this topic, these points of view cannot be ignored.

Tambiah’s observation (chapter 3.2) that ethnic identity might override other social crevices for purposes of sociopolitical action certainly holds true for Malaysia. In addition, the current situation of Malaysia corresponds with yet another, more specific scenario (which can be found among nation states that gained independence after WWII), also pointed out by Tambiah: the state has changed its function from directing and controlling the nation state to instead act as an arbitrator to help the different cultural or “ethnic” groups to attain their “authentic” interests and identities. This means that Malaysia is bound to fail in its goal to become a “developed” country by 2020, as envisioned in Wawasan 2020 (Vision 2020): when an individual is not accepted on his/her own rights and, instead, is only perceived as a part of an ethnic collective, which in turn is supposed to be attached to “authentic” interests or expressions, there is little space for development and innovation. This has further caused Chinese Malaysians “especially the highly educated, to emigrate in large numbers” (Lim 2013: 255).

What are the consequences for a nation state when these “ethnic policies” backfire, and the citizens start investing an increasing amount of their emotional and financial capital in their “countries of origin”? Are there other nation states with a similar syndrome? Certainly there are, but Indonesia is not one of them.

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128 In his Presidential letter SE-06/Pred. Kab/6 of 28 June 1967, Suharto decided that all things Chinese should be referred to as “Cina”. In 2014, President Yudhoyono finally accepted the pleadings by overseas Chinese lobbying to change this term back to the previous one, Tiongkok (Anggraeni 2015: 12) According to Alkatiri, Irmayanti and Waworuntu, however, Tiongkok is degrading for the indigenous Malay (Alkatiri et al 2015: 67-68).
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<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Abbreviation</th>
<th>Definition</th>
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<tr>
<td>BAPERKI</td>
<td>Badan Permusjawaratan Kewarganegaraan Indonesia, a Chinese mass organization</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GAPAKSI</td>
<td>Gabungan Perhimpunan Agama Khonghucu se-Indonesia, the Indonesian Federation of Confucian Religion</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>KLENTENG</td>
<td>Chinese temple</td>
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<tr>
<td>LHTA</td>
<td>Living Heritage Treasurers of Penang Awards</td>
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<tr>
<td>MCA</td>
<td>Malayan Chinese Association</td>
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<tr>
<td>MCP</td>
<td>Malayan Communist Party</td>
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<tr>
<td>NCP</td>
<td>National Culture Policy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NEP</td>
<td>National Education Policy</td>
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<td>NGO</td>
<td>Non-Governmental Organization</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PANCASILA</td>
<td>preamble to the Indonesian Constitution</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PECINAN</td>
<td>Chinatown in Semarang</td>
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<td>PHT</td>
<td>Penang Heritage Trust</td>
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<tr>
<td>PKI</td>
<td>Partai Komunis Indonesia</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PRC</td>
<td>People’s Republic of China</td>
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<tr>
<td>sānbǎo +</td>
<td>Chinese cultural heritage</td>
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<tr>
<td>UMNO</td>
<td>United Malay National Organisation</td>
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<tr>
<td>UNESCO</td>
<td>United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>VOC</td>
<td>the Vereenigde Oost-Indische Compagnie, Dutch East Indies Company</td>
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This document indicates that the first woman to become member of Boen Bian Tong was Mrs. Kam Siok Bian Nio, on 9 February 1938 (member number 657). The fact that a woman could enter and actively participate in an organization pertaining to a predominantly male oriented overseas Chinese society can be regarded as rather unusual for Southeast Asia in the 1930s.
Appendix 2 – Curriculum Vitae
Mag. Anna Gabriella Szabó

EDUCATION

**MA.** East Asian Economy and Society  
University of Vienna  
Master thesis: “Ethnic Policies Toward People of Chinese Descent in Indonesia and Malaysia”  
2011 –

**CELT AL**, Cambridge Certificate in English  
Language Teaching to Adults  
International House, Budapest  
Sep – Oct 2006

**Mag. Phil.** European Ethnology  
University of Vienna  
Focus on migration studies  
1999 – 2006

**Diploma**  
High School of Södra Latin, Stockholm  
Professional acting school for selected students  
1993 – 1996

WORK EXPERIENCE

Co-management: Kühroint national park resort (Germany)  
2010 – 2014

Performing artist: Trotz Ensemble (Belgium)  
2009 – 2010

EFL teacher: English First, Wiz Island, Active literacy, Jungchul Academy (China and South Korea)  
2007 – 2008

PR liaison manager: Paul Frank Optometrics (Austria and Italy)  
2004

Secretary: Swedish Delegation to the OSCE, Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (Austria)  
1999

Translator and coordinator: SOS – Children’s Villages (Austria)  
1998

LANGUAGE SKILLS

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<td>French</td>
<td>fair communication skills</td>
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<tr>
<td>English</td>
<td>fluent</td>
<td>Hungarian</td>
<td>fair communication skills</td>
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<td>Chinese</td>
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<td>Italian</td>
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Abstract

Since the inception of the nation states of Indonesia and Malaysia, people of Chinese descent have been targeted by ethnic policies. These policies have followed different political agendas and ranged from cultural pluralism, acculturation, and assimilation to even expulsion. What have these policies implied? What differences and similarities can be identified when comparing the political agendas targeting citizens of Chinese descent in Indonesia and Malaysia? Are they currently affecting Chinese cultural heritage? To answer these questions, this thesis starts with a historical contextualization, introducing the most crucial aspects of Chinese socio-political history in both countries. The historical overview is followed by two case studies with the intention to highlight what consequences the ethnic policies have had in the contemporary Chinese cultural heritage.

Zusammenfassung

In Folge der Unabhängigkeit und Nationalstaatsbildung Indonesiens und Malaysiens wurde die chinesisch-stämmige Bevölkerung der beiden Staaten zunehmend durch ethnisch orientierte Politik diskriminiert, deren ideologische Zielsetzung im Rahmen des Pluralismus, der Akkulturation, der Assimilierung bis hin zu Vertreibung und Extinktion zu verstehen sind. Ausgehend von der jeweiligen historischen Situation werden in dieser Masterarbeit zwei NGOs in Semarang (Indonesien) und Penang (Malaysien) miteinander verglichen, um die Auswirkungen dieser Politik auf das kulturelle chinesische Erbe zu analysieren. Die Ergebnisse dieser Untersuchung zeigen eine markante Differenz: während in Indonesien eine bewusste Zerstörung des materiellen und immateriellen chinesischen Erbes stattgefunden hat, wurden in Malaysien spezielle Förderungsmaßnahmen zu Gunsten der malaysischen Mehrheit durchgeführt.