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Nikolaos Karkavelias

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Contents

Acknowledgements 3
Abstract 4
Introduction 5
Alexicles 25
Andron 42
Archeptolemus 57
Aristarchus 79
Aristocrates Skelliou 89
Cleitophon 124
Dieitrephes 147
Laispodias Andronymios 162
Melesias 178
Onomacles 181
Phrynichus Stratonidou Deiradiotes 188
Theramenes Hagonos Steirieus 250
Thymochares 272
Appendix 1: Was Hippodamus of Miletos Archeptolemus father? 279
Appendix 2: The prytany and archon year of 412/11 295

Appendix 3: The chronology of Peisander’s mission to Athens re-visited: Thucydides 8.53-54 297
Appendix 4: εὐθύς in Thucydides 316
Appendix 5: Beyond the Four Hundred 317
Afterthought: The social origin of the known members of the Four Hundred and their motives for joining the movement 319

Bibliography 324
Vita 354
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Abstract

The “Studies in the Prosopography of the Four Hundred Oligarchy in Athens 411 B.C.” investigates the lives of thirteen members of the first oligarchy which ruled Athens for a short period, less than four months, in the summer of 411. Various classes of evidence, from historiography to comedy, tragedy and inscriptions have been critically interpreted with a view to revealing for us a narrative that tells the story of how these men happened to get entangled in one of the most bizarre but also obscure episodes of the history of Classical Athens. This narrative might be necessarily supplemented with conjecture since our sources are scanty, but this conjecture is informed by our knowledge of fifth-century Athenian legal, constitutional, anthropological and sociological frameworks. In this study an effort has been made not to attach preconceived ideological labels to those individuals whose family history and career-to the extent that our sources allow us- are being scrutinised. The picture that emerges is that of a small group of men with strong oligarchic views who managed to take control of the decision making process within the movement and imposed their will on a majority of loosely connected and unorganised individuals. This is in effect a coup within the oligarchic coup. The abrupt and traumatic end of the Four Hundred oligarchy caused a dichotomy in Athenian society, a sharp and bitter confrontation which widened the gap between perpetrators and victims; as the settling of old scores was continued under the regime of the Thirty Tyrants, this time it was the vanquished side in the first oligarchy who were the avengers.

Introduction

More than half a century ago, in 1959, Harry C. Avery completed his doctoral thesis Prosopographical Studies in the Oligarchy of the Four Hundred at Princeton University, USA. Since then our knowledge of the political life of late fifth-century Athens has tremendously advanced thanks to contributions from quite diverse scientific fields: archaeology, social anthropology, social history, epigraphic, philology. It seems, therefore, that the time is ripe for a fresh attempt at re-examining and re-interpreting the first successful overthrow of the Athenian democracy, as well as emphasising on its participants.

The last fifty-year research in this field have argued against Avery’s somewhat simplistic division of politically prominent Athenian figures into ‘parties’ and ideologically entrenched groups, a division that can hardly bear scrutiny any more. I believe that a different approach might yield better results, and deepen our understanding of the convoluted nature of the late fifth-century Athenian political life. Such an approach will take into account the outstanding advances occurred in the last few decades in social anthropology. I will propose that apart from ideological leanings, it was personal and family affiliations, antagonisms as well as political opportunism and financial pressures that were also crucial factors that determined the choices of those participating in the coup. Furthermore, the respective weight of these factors would have altered in response to the rapid changes in the current political conditions- changes of alignments in the current political struggles in conjunction with the fluctuating military situation- and therefore each case of the participants in the coup must be studied separately. Avery does not take notice of such subtler divisions inherent in such an unsteady constellation as that of the Four Hundred. In addition, further questions as to the intellectual and social background will be raised, to the extent our sources invite us to such an inquiry.

Since 1959 the prosopographical studies of individuals who lived in Athens in the classical era have made great strides. Avery’s research efforts were facilitated primarily by Kirchner’s monumental work Prosopographia Attica (PA), published in two volumes in 1901 and 1903, which is still consulted today, and additionally by J. Sundwall’s Nachträge zur Prosopographia Attica, published in 1910. Nevertheless, in the meanwhile, great scholarly works were published in the 80s and 90s, works that incorporated and made use of the abundance of the new epigraphic and archaeological material that came to light in the decades following the publication of Avery’s thesis. The first one was Davies’ Athenian Propertied Families, an indispensable work for the historian of ancient Athens. Davies’ laborious work records every individual in Athens who belonged to the leitourgical class, that is, the wealthy and well-to-do Athenians who could undertake a special form of taxation. In a sense, all the political, social and intellectual elite of classical Athens is presented in such a way that interrelationships and bonds of kin are amply demonstrated. Then, in 1994 P. M. Fraser and E. Matthews published the voluminous Lexicon of Greek Personal Names, the second volume of which is dedicated to Attica only. This joint
enterprise is the first to use a computerised database in which every instance of already known, published or newly found epigraphic and literary material is stored. At about the same time John S. Traill published his *Persons of Ancient Athens*, a twenty-volume work (of which only the first seventeen have been published) including all the personal names of people who lived in Attica in antiquity and whose names were recorded in inscriptions or in literary works. This work builds on Kirchner’s *PA* and on inscriptions discovered and published in the period from 1931 to 1967 by the American School of Athens.

A rough comparison with Kirchner’s century-old work reveals the volume of new material we now have at our disposal. Quantitatively, in some instances the entries under a single name, that is the number of individuals who lived in Athens in antiquity and bore a certain name, has tripled or even quadrupled. Qualitatively, in the ‘third watershed period’ lexica, namely *LGPN* and *PAA*, to use Debra Nails’ term, there is an observable presence of many homonyms in families, frequently including homonymous fathers and sons; this should warn us against over-indulgence in our identifications and in favour of a more conservative attribution, since there has been an overwhelming propensity to aggregate all scattered references to a name under just a few individuals.

**Methodology and personal approach**

To study the oligarchic coup of 411 B.C. in Athens from a prosopographical point of view one needs to examine the careers of its participants, their public and private profiles, their social background, political leanings, personal and family associations. Therefore, it seems necessary to inform ourselves of the ways and patterns in which the Athenians at the end of the fifth century B.C. formed political and social associations, personal bonds and friendships, and how these patterns were interwoven with and affected by the political framework of the polis. In this respect, I believe that certain anthropological studies could contribute a good deal to our understanding of the formation of certain social and political groups and sub-groupings, and their interactions, in late fifth-century Athens.

For example, the current view is that there were no formal patron-client relations in classical Athens, although the idea of *charis* was predominant, probably due to the lack of a legal framework, or to the introduction of state pay, or to liturgies and democracy in general. In fact “deliberate and in large measure effective steps were taken to minimize the scope for patronage in classical Athens”.

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On the other hand, recent research in social anthropology has shown that a powerful factor which played a central role in human interaction and relationships in ancient societies (and by no means exclusively in them) was that of reciprocity. To clarify the term as it is used by some social anthropologists (no full or exhaustive definition is intended to be given here), reciprocity is the exchange of goods, gifts and services between members of a finite community or between members of different communities (sometimes widely diverse in cultural terms from one another), the recipient of which is invariably left in a state of indebtedness, thus feeling obliged to reciprocate. Distinctions have been drawn between ‘positive reciprocity’, which takes place within the context of amicable, non-hostile relationships; ‘balanced reciprocity’, which resembles trade or barter; ‘negative reciprocity’, which is ‘the attempt to get something for nothing with impunity’, and its manifestations range from haggling, barter and gambling to chicanery and theft. Scientists also refer to ‘indirect reciprocity’ which concerns a group of members and can have the form of a chain (whereby A favours B who favours C, and so on) or a net (whereby the members of a group take turns to do the group a favour). It is certainly the case that in most societies several, often contradictory, competing strategies of reciprocity co-exist, from which people choose at their convenience. In the end, a given historical society will put to test these competing types of reciprocity, and, by means of a Darwinian mode of selection, it will adopt the most successful one (successful in that it yields its members the most possible benefits), although by no means may this acceptance be universal.

It has been pointed out that the nature of reciprocity, broad and ubiquitous as it is in that it embraces all kinds of human interactions, is nonetheless problematic, because reciprocity entails interaction whose course, end, and interpretation are under-negotiated. The term under-negotiation embraces under one heading all that is not explicit and not agreed in reciprocal exchange but which may impinge upon thoughts and actions surrounding that exchange or process of exchange. It is exactly here that the uncertainties and problems inherent in reciprocity principally reside. In other words, in every instance of reciprocity (giving of gifts, doing a favour, offering a service) any given interaction is subject to necessarily different interpretations on the

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6 Herman 2006: 33.


part of its participants. That entails a discrepancy in expectations, implicit demands and degree of obligation, and is often the source of misunderstanding and disillusionment. Finally, reciprocity should be understood in its historical context, since its manifestations, significance and role in a society varies from one culture to another and from one historical period to another.\textsuperscript{12} Applied to the present study, this model explains well the behaviour and the deeds of two oligarchs, namely Phrynichus and Diotrephes, who seem to have joined the oligarchic coup out of personal rivalry with Alcibiades.

A few words about Thucydides’ Book Eight, the most important source for the study of the Four Hundred oligarchy, in that it provides us with a view of the world in which the protagonists of the oligarchic revolution were reared and developed their mind set. I have benefited a great deal by works such as C. Macleod’s \textit{Collected Essays} Oxford 1983, D. Gribble’s “Narrator Intervention in Thucydides” \textit{JHS} 118 1998: 41-67, W. Connor \textit{Thucydides} Princeton 1984, T. Rood \textit{Thucydides: Narrative and Explanation} Oxford 1998. The common thread in these works is the premise that the change in style and state of the narrative (fragmentation and disintegration) in Book Eight of Thucydides is by design and that it signposts Thucydides’ attempt to represent the alteration in the progress of the war with an altered style of narration. This approach I find far more promising than the hitherto one followed by eminent scholars such as H. Rawlings (\textit{The Structure of Thucydides’ History} Princeton 1981) and A. Andrewes (\textit{A Historical Commentary on Thucydides} vol. 5 Oxford 1981) who take as point of departure the belief that the difference in style in Book Eight is due to it being unpolished and lacking final revision. An example of the bearing of the change in our perception of Thucydides’ history on our understanding of the oligarchic revolution is the events surrounding Phrynichus’ death: Thucydides’ narrative, far from showing any signs of incompleteness, is concise and does not fall in any respect short of the criteria the historian himself set at 1.22.2-3. Needless to say, H. Heftner’s \textit{Der oligarchische Umsturz des Jahres 411 v. Chr. und die Herrschaft der Vierhundert in Athen: quellenkritische und historische Untersuchungen} Vienna 2001 has been an invaluable guide to me and an excellent starting point to handle the vast scholarship on the 411 oligarchy.

In sum, for the study of the profile of the people who took part in the oligarchy of the Four Hundred in Athens in 411 B.C., I have striven not only to examine Athens’

\textsuperscript{12} Relevant are here E. Belfiore’s remarks that “the predominance in tragedy of violation of \textit{philìa} may reflect a period and social context (fifth-century democratic Athens) in which reciprocal relationships between family members and other kinds of \textit{philoi} had become problematic in a way that they were not in Homer, because of the emergence of new modes of social and economic life” (“Harming Friends: Problematic Reciprocity in Greek Tragedy” in C. Gill, N. Postlethwaite and R. Seaford (eds.) \textit{Reciprocity in Ancient Greece} Oxford 1998: 140. In a similar vein, R. Seaford \textit{Reciprocity and Ritual: Homer and Tragedy in the Developing City-State} Oxford 1994: 191-234. On the difficulties, problems and misinterpretations that arise in cross-cultural reciprocity in Herodotus, see Braund 1998: 167-170.
constitutional and legal framework of that time, but to approach those individuals as citizens whose natural environment was the polis, Attica with its specific geographical features, administrative and civic apparatus (the Cleisthenic demes), its associations, such as phratries and genes, its cults and festivals. To see those people not only as public figures who engage in political struggle with a view to influencing and directing the decision process within the polis, but also as private individuals, men with a special Athenian civic identity, with a certain social, educational and intellectual backdrop, who formed part of a particular kinship network, worshipped the same hero cults, took part in the same festivals, processions, rituals, met with friends in the agora and discussed business and politics.

Finally, a few words should be spoken about the difficulties inherent in our task as we must take account of the scarcity and condition of the evidence available to us. The historian of ancient Athens ought to reconstruct a picture of the past, using most of the times single unconnected pieces of information and try to look if there is a link between them. They hope that a consistent, inherently probable picture of events, structures, persons and political groupings would emerge. This picture will inevitably be incomplete as long as the evidence is scanty. In most cases what a historian can offer is a probable, but hardly in any case certain, reconstruction. Alternative reconstructions will as well be possible and the historian’s duty is to provide the reader not with imagined certainties, but with the means to critically examine their own reasoning, so that the reader draws their own conclusions on the base of the source material presented to them.

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Phratry: a group with hereditary membership and probably normally associated with a specific locality. They functioned as social groups concerned with matters of family and descent. Under Draco’s law of homicide, re-enacted at the end of the fifth century, members of the phratry of a victim of unintentional homicide are required to support the victim’s family, and, if the victim has no family, to take on its role (Oxford Classical Dictionary³).

Genos: it denoted ‘species’, ‘sort’, ‘category’, ‘kin’, ‘linage’, ‘family’, ‘generation’. In the 4th century orators and inscriptions it denoted a set of families or individuals who identified themselves as a group by the use of a collective plural name: Salaminioi, Bouzygai, Amyndridai, implying the descent of their members –the gennetai- from a fictive or real common male ancestor (Oxford Classical Dictionary³).
The oligarchic revolution

a) The economic background

Towards November 412 the oligarchic conspiracy to overthrow the Athenian democracy was set in motion. Our only contemporary source for the events, Thucydides, narrates:

καὶ ἐκκινήθη πρότερον ἐν τῷ στρατοπέδῳ τούτῳ καὶ ἐς τὴν πόλιν ὑπετεύθην ὅστερον ἦλθεν. τῷ τε Ἀλκιβιάδι διαβάντες τινὲς ἐκ τῆς Σάμου ἐς λόγους ἦλθον, καὶ ὑποτεύνοντος αὐτοῦ Τισαφέρνης μὲν πρῶτον, ἔπειτα δὲ καὶ βασιλέα φίλον ποιήσειν, εἰ μὴ δημοκρατοῦντο (οὕτω γὰρ ἂν πιστεύσαι μᾶλλον βασιλέα), πολλάς ὑλίδας εἴχον αὐτὸς θ’ ἐαυτοῖς οἱ δυνατότατοι τῶν πολιτῶν τὰ πράγματα, οἵτε καὶ ταλαιπωροῦνται μάλιστα, ἐς ἐαυτοῖς περιποιήσειν καὶ τῶν πολεµίων ἐπικρατήσειν. (8.48.1)

This (movement) was set in motion first at the camp and from there afterwards came to the city. Some men from Samos crossed the channel over to Alcibiades and had discussions with him, and as he (Alcibiades) offered them to make Tissaphernes first and then even the King their friends if they were not ruled by a democracy - because in this way the King would have more faith in them – the most influential citizens who suffered the greatest hardships had good hopes that they would get things into their own hands and that they would prevail over the enemies.

This passage, read in the wider context of the developments taking place in the diplomatic relationships between the key players in the Eastern Aegean Sea and in the international as well as in the Athenian political scene, throws considerable light on the mode of thinking of the Athenian elite at a most critical phase of the Peloponnesian war, when the very existence not only of the Athenian Empire but of Athens as an independent and sovereign state was at stake.¹⁴ The widespread anger and embitterment of the Athenian elite owing to the huge financial burden it had to bear at this crucial juncture of the war has been repeatedly underscored.¹⁵ In what follows, I am focusing on some somewhat neglected financial aspects of the conditions that prevailed in Athens when the events narrated by Thucydides were

¹⁵ M. Ostwald From Popular Sovereignty to the Sovereignty of Law: Law, Society, and Politics in Fifth-Century Athens Berkeley 1986: 345; D. Kagan The Fall of the Athenian Empire Cornell 1987: 113; T. Buckley Aspects of Greek History 750-323 B.C.: A Source-Based Approach New York 1996: 401; Thucydides characteristically comments: τὸ δὲ πλέον καὶ ἀπὸ ὅφον αὐτῶν ἔν τῇ Ἔλαιῳ τριήραρχοι τε τῶν Ἀθηναίων καὶ δυνατότατοι δόρμην ἐς τὸ καταλύσα τὴν δημοκρατίαν 'but of still greater importance was the fact that the trierarchs and the most influential Athenians of their own accord were eager to overthrow the democracy.'
unfolding. At the time the negotiations between Alcibiades and the conspirators began there were some seventy-four triarchs on Samos, the overall number in the Eastern Aegean at that period being over one hundred and fifty. Those people must have been well represented in the conspiratorial circles, understandably, one might say, in the light of the ever-increasing demand on the part of the state for further financial contributions to continue fighting the war. Although a rich Athenian could not be called to perform a trierarchy more often than once in three years, the demand for cash every time he was appointed by the state as a trierarch was so heavy that sometimes he had to resort to mortgaging his land or part of it. Now if the cost of a trierarchy ran to more than 3,000 drachmae, given the established practice of Greek lenders to demand twice the value of the loan as security of landed property, the value of the real estate of a a perspective triarch which was put on surety may have easily exceeded 6,000 drachmae or a talent, probably considerably more than that, assuming that one borrowed the whole amount of money necessary to cover the costs of the trierarchy. Diogeiton expended 2,400 drachmae on a syntrierarchy.

16 Triremes stationed on Samos: Thuc. 8.30.2; in the entire region: Busolt 1893-1904: 3.2 1441 and no 1. J. Davies has proposed a limit of three talents for the fourth century under which individuals were exempt from undertaking a trierarchy. On the contrary, property worth more than four talents was unlikely to escape the trierarchic obligation (Athenian Propertied Families: 600-300 B.C. Oxford 1971: xxiv). But V. Gabrielsen has challenged the census theory arguing that it was far more effective for the Athenian state to abstain from a clear-cut definition of the liturgical class in terms of income. The three-to-four-talent interval ought to be seen as average of properties attested in the liturgical class. Gabrielsen maintains that properties of two, or even one talent were not automatically exempt from trierarchic service (Financing the Athenian Fleet: Public Taxation and Social Relations Baltimore and London 1994: 45-53). Professor Heftner draws attention to the fact that it would have been natural in 412 for individuals whose property was less than the three-to-four-talent threshold to bear the burden of a trierarchy owing to the impoverishment of the liturgical class as a whole (communicated to me in a private conversation).

17 On the different ways of formal appointment to the trierarchy, see Gabrielsen 1994: 73-78. In Athens there does not seem to have existed a definite register of men liable to the trierarchy and the system relied on a judicious mixture of voluntarism and compulsion (through antidosis) (P. Rhodes “Problems in Athenian Eispthora and Liturgies” AJAH 7 1982: 3; Gabrielsen 1994: 70-71).

18 Isae. 7.38; Gabrielsen 1994: 86 argues that the two-year exemption rule was in force already before 413 and that it was probably introduced during the opening years of the Peloponnesian war. Rhodes observes that this measure was a concession on the part of the state to the liturgical class, since the burden was becoming too heavy to bear (1982: 3); cf. Osborne 2010: 114.


20 Lys. 32.14, 26-27.
and we hear that Demosthenes himself had to resort to borrowing money in order to find cash to perform a trierarchy. He accordingly, was forced to contract a loan of twenty minae, a sum which he gave to Thrasylochus and his brother Meidias in response to the latter challenging the then young Demosthenes either to exchange properties or accept to perform the trierarchy to which the two brothers were liable (antidosis).  A couple of years later, Apollodorus son of Pasion sued Polycles because as a trierarch he was compelled to prolong his service due to the defendant’s failure to relieve him in time. As a result he had to mortgage his estate against thirty minae which he distributed among the crew of the vessel. It is important to note here the unproductive character of such loans, since the purpose was not to improve one’s business or the productivity of his estate, but to pay taxes or fulfil liturgies. But in 412 with the Spartans having occupied Deceleia for more than a year, and having gravely disrupted or completely destroyed not only the agricultural production, but the whole system of borrowing and lending money on real estate, a practice on which the propertied class relied to finance their activities in times of emergency, the situation for the pool of rich Athenians from whom the trierarchs were appointed was desperate. The whole situation in 412 was a vicious circle: the longer the Spartans stayed in Deceleia the more urgent became the need for the rich landowners to find cash through borrowing on real estate surety, but at the same time the more unlikely it became for them to find lenders. Given the high amounts of cash necessary for a rich family to maintain an appropriate for its class lifestyle and pay for the trierarchy, and the impossibility of putting their landed property in Attica on surety, and given that in cases of real estates only Athenians could act as lenders, to obtain a loan must have become extremely difficult and dear, the consequence being the prospective trierarch having to face a dramatic change in his

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22 D. 50.13, 61, probably delivered in 359/8 B.C. From section 61 of the speech we get that the debtors issued the loan for a year at the expiry of which time the capital should be paid back or else interest on it may incur. Both Apollodorus and Demosthenes’ cases are not ordinary in that the expenditure incurred lies well bellow the average of what usually a trierarch had to pay when he discharged a trierarchy. cf. P. Milet Lending and Borrowing in Ancient Athens Cambridge 1991: 64-71; Gabrielsen 1994: 51-52.
23 Finley 1951: 84 and no 56. Finley graphically observes: ‘psychologically, their (the debtors’) approach was one of grief and despair, the atmosphere that is associated with ‘mortgaging the old homestead.’ To be compelled to hypothecate one’s property was a calamity to be rectified as quickly as possible’ (1951: 87).
24 Since the Spartans occupied Deceleia at the beginning of spring 413 B.C., it follows that both big Athenian landowners and peasants had lost by autumn 412 two successive harvests and almost certainly were about to lose a third one because in November the ploughing season was over and their land lay still waste.
25 It is not clear, for those rich Athenians who possessed overseas property, whether it was possible to mortgage this property to citizens of allied cities.
standard of living. In the light of these considerations it becomes clear what Thucydides really meant by ὁπερ καὶ ταλαιπωροῦνται μᾶλιστα at 8.48.1.

Such was the exhaustion of the wealthiest section of the Athenian elite that towards the end of the war it was extremely difficult for a single individual to perform the most expensive liturgy, the trierarchy, that the syntrierarchy was introduced to tackle the problem. To make the situation worse, since 413 the constant call for taxation of all sorts was coupled with a steady loss of imperial income (the newly introduced 5% tax on seaborne trade was introduced to address this problem, see below); this decrease in imperial revenues was aggravated by a stream of revolts and defections within the Athenian arche. The financial exhaustion of the liturgical class was the direct consequence of the steady depletion of the Athenian state funds as the following brief survey will demonstrate.

Andocides in his speech On the Peace with Sparta 3.8-9, composed in 392/1 B.C., argues that as a result of the Peace of Nicias the Athenians were able to transfer onto the Akropolis 7,000 talents and build more than four hundred ships, while from the annual imperial income more than 1,200 talents were amassed. The authors of the Athenian Tribute Lists believe the source of Andocides was a decree passed after the Peace of Nicias and that the repayment of 7,000 talents reflects the intention of the Athenians at the time to pay back the goddess but not the actual reality. They calculate the total loan during the Archidamean war plus interest to have been 7,024

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26 Under normal conditions a trierach would give as security against a loan for trierarchic expenditure a piece of land or that part of his estate which lay in fallow; by doing so, he would incur no financial loss at all, provided that at the end of the year he could pay off the capital. On the pattern of scattered aristocratic land holdings throughout Attica, see K. Pritchett “The Attic Stelai: Part II” Hesperia 25.3 1956: 275-276; R. Osborne Demos: the Discovery of Classical Attica Cambridge 1985: 47-63.

27 Osborne maintains that on a normal year (other than the Panathenaic) some 100,000 drachmae may have been expended by 100 citizens on festival liturgies (Athens and Athenian Democracy Cambridge 2010: 114); cf. M. Hansen Die Athenische Demokratie im Zeitalter des Demosthenes: Struktur, Prinzipien und Selbstverständnis Berlin 1995: 113; on liturgies, see also A. Jones Athenian Democracy Oxford 1957: 55-57, 100-101; R. Bonner Aspects of Athenian Democracy Rome 1970: 95-97; Hansen 1995: 112-117.

28 Osborne 2010: 114 believes a reckoning of 3,000 drachmae for a trierarchy is conservative.

29 Busolt 1893-1904: 3.1 54 and no 5; R. Thomsen Eisphora: A Study of Direct Taxation in Ancient Athens Aarchus 1964: 176-177.

30 Defection of Chios and Erythrae: Thuc. 8.14.2; Klaizomenae (for s short period): 8.14.3; Miletus: 8.17.3; Lebedus and Aia: 8.19.4; Methymna and Mytilene (to be brought back to the Athenian alliance soon afterwards): 8.22.2; Eresos: 8.23.4; Iasos (as a result of Phrynichus’ action): 8.28.2; Rhodes 8.44.2 (but at a time posterior to the birth of the oligarchic conspiracy on Samos); Cyme and Phocaea: A. Andrewes “The Spartan Resurgence” in D. Lewis and I. Edwards (ed.) The Cambridge Ancient History 5: The Fifth Century B.C. Cambridge 2003: 467.
talents. Andocides also claimed that the annual revenue at the time of the Peace was 1,200 talents. Meritt, Wade-Gery and McGregor estimate the tribute (phoros) to have been in 422/1 938 talents and other funds 307 talents, a sum of 1,245 talents annual income. The decree must have stipulated that 1,000 talents were to be paid as initial instalment and thereafter 500 talents yearly until all debt to the Goddess was liquidated. But everyone conversant with fifth century Athenian history knows how notoriously unreliable Andocides is when it comes to deriving historical information from his work. Accordingly, L. Samons has argued against Meritt, Wade-Gery and McGregor’s assumption that Andocides used a documentary source, an inscription now lost on which the above-mentioned figures featured. Sammons believes the occasion about which Andocides speaks is also misdated, the context being not the Peace of Nicias but the period before the outbreak of the Peloponnesian war. Unfortunately, we are not in a position to affirm or refute Andocides’ figures concerning both the state of the reserve fund at the conclusion of the Peace of Nicias and the amount of tribute revenue in the period 421-415 B.C., but his data do seem to be in the right order of magnitude. Scholars estimate that something like 500 to 600 talents per year accumulated in the Athenian treasury in the period under discussion. On this view, Athens’ treasury may have had something like 3,500-4,200 talents on the eve of the Sicilian expedition. If now one bears in mind that the expedition itself cost more than 3,000 talents, it becomes evident why the Athenians on hearing the news of Chios’ revolt decided to lift the ban on the 1,000 talent reserve to be used in case of extreme emergency. Approximately one year earlier, in the summer of 413, the Athenians took the decision to scrap the collection of the tribute from the allies and in its stead introduce a 5% tax on seaborne trade within the Athenian empire (Thuc. 7.28.4). Apparently, the Athenians thought that this measure would bring in more revenues than the allied phoros, that is, more than 1,000 talents annually. These estimates, however, soon proved to be over-

32 See, for example, R. Thomas Oral Tradition and Written Record in Classical Athens Cambridge 1989: 119-123.
36 Thuc. 8.15.1; the measure was taken in the summer of 431 (Thuc. 2.24.1). Hornblower wonders how the spend-happy Athenians managed to resist the temptation of lifting the ban for so long (A Commentary on Thucydides vols 1-3 Oxford 1991-2008: 3 794).
37 Samons 2000: 252. Controversy prevails as to when exactly the traditional collection of phoros was re-introduced, estimates ranging from as early as 412 to 410 (see Samons 254 no 21). Although earlier views that the 5% tax continued to be operational throughout the war have gone out of fashion (G. Gilbert Beiträge zur innern Geschichte Athens im Zeitalter des peloponnesischen Krieges Leipzig 1877: 285-287), some scholars have proposed that the tax remained valid for at least Athenian colonies such as Aegina (R. Meiggs The Athenian Empire Oxford 1972: 369).
ambitious and the Athenians were forced to resort to old practices once more reinstating the traditional system.\textsuperscript{38} It may be revealing of the change in the public mood in Athens that the imposition of the 5\% tax in the harbours of the empire may have been voted because it shifted the financial burden in the allied cities from the rich landowners, usually oligarchically minded, to the middle class merchants and traders of all sorts, a class which owed its prosperity to the Athenian radical democracy and the open, unified market the latter had created in the Aegean Sea and beyond; as a consequence this class was usually favourably disposed toward the Athenian demos.\textsuperscript{39}

The exhaustion of the public treasury necessarily precipitated the ever more frequent imposition of probably the most loathsome form of taxation among the propertied classes, namely the \emph{eisphora}.\textsuperscript{40} Introduced for the first time in 428/7 (Thuc. 3.19.1), this measure of extraordinary direct taxation was repeated down to 425/4.\textsuperscript{42} We know that in the last third of the fifth and the early fourth century the \emph{eisphora} yielded 200 talents every time it was levied.\textsuperscript{43} The \emph{thetes} were exempt from any contribution, and this is a reason why this levy was hated by the propertied classes in Athens. According to Thomsen, of the 200 talents, the 166, 66 were raised by the \emph{pentakosiomedimnoi}, \emph{hippeis} and \emph{zeugitae}, while the remaining 33, 33 by the \emph{metics}; the Athenian citizens were divided into 100 groups, each to yield 1, 66 talents, the \emph{pentakosiomedimnoi} contributing 1 talent in each group, the \emph{hippeis} half a talent, and the \emph{zeugitae} ten minae.\textsuperscript{44} Now the amount of money each individual

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\textsuperscript{38} Xen. \textit{Hell.} 1.3.9: the Chalcedonians are to pay the customary tribute to Athens in 410/9; \textit{cf.} H. Mattingly \textit{The Athenian Empire Restored: Epigraphic and Historical Studies} Ann Arbor 1996: 158-159, 205-208.

\textsuperscript{39} Samons 2000: 252; on the 5\% tax, see Busolt 1893-1904: 3.2 1407-1408; J. Beloch \textit{Die attische Politik seit Perikles} Leipzig 1884: 67; Meyer 1884-1902: 4.1 524.

\textsuperscript{40} In Aristophanes’ \textit{Lysistrata} 648-655 the women’s chorus castigate the reluctance of the old men, that is, the Athenian establishment, to pay their \emph{eisphora}.

\textsuperscript{41} J. Griffith has suggested mid fifth century as the introduction date of \emph{eisphora} in Athens, arguing that τότε πρ\'ωτον at Thuc. 3.19.1 does not refer to the year (428/7 B.C.) but to the fact that for the first time such great sum of money, 200 talents, was raised through an \emph{eisphora} (“A Note on the First \emph{Eisphora} at Athens” \textit{AJAH} 2 1977: 3-7).

\textsuperscript{42} Thomsen 1964: 172; for the view that the \emph{eisphora} was also levied after 425/4, see Gomme, Andrewes and Dover 1945-1981: 1 17; 2 279; 3 502; contra Meritt (“Indirect Tradition in Thucydides” \textit{Hesperia} 23.3 1954: 223-224) who plausibly argues that the sharp increase in the assessment of the allied tribute in 425 removed the need for yet another \emph{eisphora}. The feeling of repugnance among the propertied classes will have intensified when the first \emph{eisphora} was levied since it was decided through a decree in the assembly (Hansen 1995: 114 and nos 316, 317).

\textsuperscript{43} For the institution of \emph{eisphora} in the fourth century, see Hansen 1995: 114-116.

\textsuperscript{44} Thomsen 1964: 144 has dated the system of symmories to the time of Themistocles, but Philochorus (FG\textit{H}ist. 328F41) says that the Athenians were divided into symmories in 378/7 for the first time. J. Keaney has argued that Thomsen’s conviction that the epitomizer of Harpocrates added the word πρ\'ωτον in Philochorus’ text in order to stress his
had to pay depended on the total number of citizens in the first three census classes, but also on the relative size of each one of the three classes in relation to one another. If in 428 B.C. there were 22,000 Athenians of the first three classes, an individual, depending on which class he belonged to, would have to pay as follows:45

*Pentakosiomedimnoi* 150 to 300 drachmae

*Hippeis* 50 to 100 drachmae

*Zeugitae* 6 to 8, 33 drachmae

Notwithstanding the problems and obscurities *eisphora* is fraught with, the principle of proportional contribution within either the whole body of Athenian citizens and metics or whatever groups the Athenians were divided into in the fifth century must have held good.46 For our purposes it suffices to know that every time an *eisphora* was levied it was the propertied classes who bore the brunt of this form of direct taxation.

The Athenians may have resorted to an *eisphora* in the winter or 414/3 when the decision to send Demosthenes with massive reinforcements to Sicily was taken and IG I³ 93 may attest to such a measure. Indeed, the speaker of [Lys.] 20.23, the son of the defendant Polystratus who actually happened to be a member of the Four Hundred, claimed in his father’s second trial, which was conducted not long after the restoration of radical democracy, that his father did not evade taxation, all sorts of liturgies and *eisphorae*.47 Of course, the speaker presents these contributions as tokens of his father’s faith in and loyalty to democracy, hushing up the fact that no well-to-do Athenian was particularly happy with paying the *eisphora*. It is certainly no coincidence that we do not hear of any *eisphora* being levied in the period 411-410, that is, when the upper classes in Athens held power. Both regimes of the Four Hundred and Five Thousand were concerned with alleviating the financial burden of the propertied classes; accordingly, they put emphasis on saving money through abolition of state pay and other measures such as maintenance of allied revenue, but direct taxation was apparently not an option.48 In the light of these considerations, I would read the oligarchs’ vow on Samos to carry on the war by providing funds of their own through *eisphorae*, at a time when the Persian help was not an issue any

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45 *Thomsen* 1964: 118, 166; *cf.* Osborne 2010: 113.


47 On the date of the trial, see under Phrynichus page 188 no 759.

48 Thuc. 8.65.3; AP 29.5, 30.1, 30.5.
more, either as chimerical and naive or purely hypcritical. Now Polystratus’ son may have been referring to the first imposition of *eisphora* in 428, but a fair inference from this passage may be that he is referring to a more recent incident, the *eisphora* of 413, a measure which was still fresh in the memory of the jurors. Also in 412 after the revolt of Chios an *eisphora* may have been levied.

The picture, then, that emerges is that of an Athenian upper class deeply embittered with the financial stringencies it was going through because of the war, especially after 413. This disaffection will have soon turned into a critique of the Athenian administration and the fundamental political principles that underlay it. As the political pendulum in Athens on the eve of the revolution had swung to the conservative side, attempts were made to reorganise and reform the fundraising system, the imposition of the 5% tax probably being a declaration to the effect that the upper classes in the empire should cease to be the principal source of raising funds; at the same time, the abolition of state pay in Athens ensured some revenues but more importantly the political domination of the Athenian upper classes in Athenian domestic politics. The oligarchic plans for the installation of oligarchies throughout the empire as it was carried out by Peisander and his accomplices in the spring of 411 were thought to have been an effective measure to enhance and ultimately to ensure the class solidarity between the upper classes in the metropolis and the subject states and actually are a corollary of the fiscal reforms of 413; seen from this perspective, these measures fit well into a wider context of profound and comprehensive criticism of radical democracy in the period that immediately followed the Spartan occupation of Deceleia and the catastrophic Sicilian expedition. It remains to be seen how this criticism was expressed in terms of

49 Thuc. 8.63.4: καὶ ἐσφέρειν αὐτοῖς ἐκ τῶν ἱδίων οἶκων προθύμως χρήματα ‘and that they themselves would contribute money from their oikoi zealously.’

50 Thomsen 1964: 175. Unlike the oligarchic regimes, from 410 down to the end of the war the radical democracy seems to have levied at least two *eisphorae*, probably in 409 and 406 (Mattingly 1996: 221; Thomsen 1964: 176). The speaker of Lysias 21 (Ἀπολογία δωροδοκίας ἀπαράσημος) mentions two *eisphorae* in which he paid 30 and 40 minae respectively (21.3). For sources on the *eisphora* during the Peloponnesian war, see Thomsen 1964: 177 no 177.

51 Although the context seems to be the Archidamean war, Andocides’ fragment from his *To the Members of his Party* vividly elucidates the kind of sentiment the upper class Athenians that lived in the countryside might have felt in the spring of 413 when the Spartans were establishing what turned out to be a permanent military base at Deceleia. The speaker wishes that the Athenians will never again experience charcoal-burners arriving in Athens with their wagons, nor cattle and women cramming the city, nor workers and old men arming themselves for battle and that they will never eat again wild herbs and chervil. For general accounts of the reasons that led to the oligarchic coup and the financial, social and political situation in post-Sicily Athens, see Gilbert 1877: 281; Busolt 1893-1904: 3.2 1401-1404; 1459-1460; Beloch 1884: 66; Meyer 1884-1902: 4.1 537; M. McGregor *The Athenians and their Empire* Vancouver 1987: 157-158; Buckley 1996: 399-400; Kagan 1987: 111 summarises thus: ‘the moral standing of the democratic regime, the alleged foolishness of its policies and incompetence of their execution, the decline in the quality of leadership and the heavy
political propaganda in every nuance, and how it developed in the passage of time up to the oligarchic revolution.

b) The ideological struggle within the oligarchy

Any study of the individuals who got embroiled in the dramatic developments that occurred in Athens in 411 B.C. should tackle the thorny issue of the ideological struggle in the Athenian political scene and the propaganda that certain groups and factions employed to justify their actions in the eyes of their followers and further their interests. The issue deserves a separate and extensive study and cannot be fully discussed here. However, an explanation is necessary as to how the individuals included in the present study fit into the historical, political and ideological context of the early phase of the Deceleian war, from the Spartan invasion to the eve of the revolution.

It has been customary in earlier scholarship to offer an analysis of contemporary Athenian politics in which three ‘parties’ featured prominently, namely extreme and moderate oligarchs and democrats. Notwithstanding the fact that ‘party’ is a most unfortunate term to employ when one analyses fifth century Athenian politics since the term carries connotations pertinent to modern times, and granting with Rhodes burden of public financial obligations were all problems of long standing for those Athenians sceptical of the democracy, although all of them intensified in the years after Sicily.’

52 Busolt 1893-1904: 1461-1467; Meyer 1884-1902: 4.1 540-543; Kagan 1987: 117 and no 42, 119-120, 142; W. Ellis “Reasons for the Coup of the Four Hundred” UCLA Historical Journal 6 1985: 102; R. Koerner “Die Haltung des attischen Demos zu den Umsturzbewegungen nach 412 v. u. Z.” Klio 57 1975: 406. Koerner employs an analysis in socio-economic terms according to which the big landowners were aristocrats, who had always opposed the idea of the Empire because they did not derive any profit out of it (but see under Phrynichus pages 213-218), the rich businessmen were oligarchs and the demos were either landless workers or small land owners; there was no clear line between poor oligarchs and the relatively better-off small landowners; there was also a third party, the moderates, who by the time of the revolution had played an important role in Athenian politics; he concludes: ‘Eine eigene Zielsetzung der Mittelgruppe ist zunächst nicht zu erkennen, in manchem stimmte sie mit den Oligarchen überein, in der praktischen Politik lieβ sie sich aber weitgehend vom Demos bestimmen, dem sie ja auch zugezählt wurde’; A. Fuks The Ancestral Constitution: Four Studies in Athenian Party Politics at the End of the Fifth Century B. C. London 1953: 5-6, 11, 21; Hignett 1952: 272-273; F. Jacoby Atthis: The Local Chronicles of Ancient Athens Oxford 1949: 384 no 30.

53 On the intricacies of Athenian politics in the fifth and fourth centuries and the impossibility of identifying political groups with consistent agenda and definite membership (i.e., individuals that belonged exclusively to one group only) see L. Mitchell and P. Rhodes “Friends and Enemies in Athenian Politics” G&R 43.1 1996: 11-30; Osborne 2010: 30, 35 views the Athenians as a folk with strong corporate identity, a relatively homogenous body not so much in social terms (he acknowledges the huge disparity in wealth and life style between rich and poor) as in cultural; due to this homogeneity lively forensic and political
that the participants in the oligarchic coup were by no means all doctrinaire lovers of oligarchy.\footnote{P. Rhodes \textit{Oligarchs in Athens} in Brock R. And S. Hodkinson (ed.) \textit{Alternatives to Athens: Varieties of Political Organisation and Community in Ancient Greece} Oxford 2000: 133.} I shall attempt to offer a somewhat different analysis of the Athenian political scene in the period under question. While not denying that towards the end of the fifth century a chasm had occurred in Athens within the oligarchic/conservative movement resulting in some circles favouring an extremely narrow oligarchy, what Osborne has called prospective group tyranny,\footnote{Osborne 2010: 277.} ruling unaccountable the city on the one hand and some circles favouring a relatively broad oligarchy based on the elite and the best part of the hoplite class and ruled by a small body of magistrates who would operate along some constitutional lines, on the other, I shall argue that this split had not occurred yet, or at least was not as yet perceptible, in the period from the Spartan occupation of Deceleia to the eve of the revolution. Furthermore, I shall argue that while the pre-Sicilian expedition period did not experience any intense ideological struggles or radical reshaping of the political landscape - rather it was a relatively quiet period, the radical democracy’s ascendance in the moral, and ideological field never being seriously challenged - what followed after the disaster in Sicily was a rapid development of the conservative, anti-democratic thought in Athens. While previous scholarship has offered a somewhat static and crystallized picture of the Athenian politics in this period, that is, three political parties (democrats, moderate and extreme oligarchs) having their own followers, distinct agendas and engaging in an entrenched ideological battle with one another, I believe that the process of the oligarchic thought becoming mature was a dynamic one and that in this period concepts, policies and practices were only hazily formulated, devoid of nuances of doctrine and therefore difficult to be distinguished from an ideological point of view. This crystallization came about only later, when the regime of the Four Hundred was already history and when the role, policies and ideology of certain members of the oligarchy had been duly evaluated and appreciated by the contemporaries and the participants in the tumultuous events of 411.\footnote{For example, evidence for the three-front struggle in Athenian politics at the closing years of the fifth century is undoubtedly the AP 34,3 passage (see under Cleitophon pages 138-140). But it would be a grave error if one extrapolated from this passage the exact content and ideological colour of issues debated in the period 413-411. On this passage as a posthumous rehabilitation of Theramenes, see Heftner “Oligarchen, Mesoi, Autokraten: Bemerkungen zur antidemokratischen Bewegung des späten 5 Jh. V. Chr. in Athen” \textit{Chiron} 33 2003: 31-34.}

Contemporary literary works do not seem to attest to the existence of an elaborate and nuanced oligarchic discourse in Athens. In the work titled \textit{Athenaion Politeia}, a text that inaugurates a long tradition of texts written by Athenian authors hostile to
and critical of popular rule,\textsuperscript{57} transmitted to us under the Xenophonic corpus,\textsuperscript{58} the closest its author comes in sketching a broad outline of what an oligarchic state should be like is at 1.6, where it is argued that only the cleverest and the best men have the right to speak in the assembly and serve in the council, and at 1.9, where a well-governed (oligarchic) state is the one in which the cleverest men draw up the laws for their own interest and the good men punish the bad and deprive them of their right to attend the assembly and serve in the council.\textsuperscript{59} After the upheaval that followed the death of Cambyses, seven Persian nobles meet to confer with each other on the best constitution to be adopted; three of them, Otanes, Megabysus and Dareius, air their views in what is known as the constitutional debate in Herodotus (Hdt. 3.80-82).\textsuperscript{60} Megabysus champions oligarchy; he juxtaposes the ignorance of the multitude (Ὀμίλου γὰρ ἄχρηστον οὐδὲν ἐστι ἄσυνεπώτερον οὐδὲ ἀβριστότερον) with the tyrant’s knowledge (ὁ μὲν γὰρ εἰ τι ποιεῖται, γνώσιμον ποιεῖται) but he holds that the superiority of oligarchy over monarchy lies in the fact that decisions in an oligarchic state are taken collectively by the best men (ἀνδρῶν τῶν ἁριστῶν ὁμιλήτων) a practice that guarantees that each time the best decisions are taken.\textsuperscript{61} In Euripides’ \textit{Suppliant Women}, produced in the late 420s, perhaps in 423,\textsuperscript{62} the Theban herald

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\textsuperscript{58} For the authorship and date of this work, see J. Marr and P. Rhodes (eds.) \textit{The ‘Old Oligarch’} Oxford 2008: 6-12, 31-32; R. Osborne \textit{The Old Oligarch} London 2004: 4-5, 9-10.

\textsuperscript{59} I do not quite agree with E. Herrmann-Otto that Pseudo-Xenophon’s pamphlet allows us a clear view of how an oligarchic state should look like. True, as Herrmann-Otto observes, some key oligarchic demands, envisioned in Pseudo-Xenophon, such as the abolition of state pay and the restriction of the franchise were realised when the oligarchs came to power, but that does not prove a high level of sophistication in constitutional matters. As the devil is in the detail, the exact number of those who would be enfranchised under the oligarchic regime became a major issue of contestation and disagreement at the preparatory phase of the revolution and during the oligarchic reign (“Das andere Athen: Theorie und politische Realisation eines antidemokratischen Oligarchenstaates” in W. Eder and K. Hölkeskamp (eds.) \textit{Volk und Verfassung im vorhellenistischen Griechenland} Stuttgart 1997: 133-152. Marr and Rhodes 2008: 72 actually draw attention to the discriminatory nature of the constitutional drafts found in the \textit{Athenaion Politeia} 30 and 31, while H. Yunis underscores that the author’s (pseudo-Xenophon) ability to attack deeply entrenched oligarchic conventions such as the belief that the nobles should have exclusive control over political affairs on the virtue of their intelligence is unprecedented in early Greek political texts (\textit{Taming Democracy: Models of Political Rhetoric in Classical Athens} Ithaca and London 1996: 49).

\textsuperscript{60} On the date of the composition, mid 420s or a little earlier, see W. Connor \textit{The New Politicians of Fifth-Century Athens} Princeton 1971: 199-206.


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argues that in his city there is a one-man rule. There are no demagogues who trick the people out with specious words courting their favour, yet escaping punishment whenever his advice is harmful to the city. Ordinary people do not understand politics because they lack leisure, a poor farmer, even if he was not uneducated, is too busy with private matters to dedicate some time to politics, and the figure of the demagogue is an unwelcome by-product of the rule of the many (409-425). The common thread to be found in these texts is the harsh critique of democracy as a constitutional form and form of government. The arguments mustered in these three works by the adversaries of democracy, i.e, the elite’s eligibility to power on the grounds of its fine education, the ignorance and irrationality of the rabble, the common people’s lack of leisure that renders them unsuitable for political deliberation and the demagogue as the inherent feature of a bad constitutional form that is democracy, are common denominators in contemporary anti-democratic criticism and thought. They, however, do not constitute any positive proposal, an ideological template, even in broad outlines, as to what an oligarchy should be like; in fact, in Herodotus and Euripides oligarchy is not seriously considered as a real alternative to monarchy/tyranny.63 On the other hand, some sophistic theories which built on the nomos-phusis antithesis may have celebrated the strong, free, self-centered individual who does away with all conventional social norms, norms instituted by the weak in order to suppress and control the strong, thus virtually becoming a tyrant, but, focusing on the individual and their personal traits, tell us next to nothing about the social environment in which such persons may thrive.64

I would then argue with Rhodes that in conservative circles in the post-Sicily period discussions were made about what was wrong with contemporary democracy rather than concrete plans as to what could replace it were laid down.65 Heftner also argues that in the oligarchic circles there does not seem to have been any elaborate, alternative to democracy, constitutional concepts prior to 411. AP 30, the

63 Osborne 2010: 268-269. Osborne argues that the polarization between democracy and tyranny in fifth century Athens may stem from the Athenians’ apprehensions of what they perceived as real danger of tyranny in the contemporary Greek world (2010: 270-273). Raaflaub has argued that in both Herodotus’ constitutional debate and Euripides’ Suppliant Women the emphasis on the dipole democracy-monarchy brings out forcefully the strengths and weaknesses of democracy. For the fifth century Athenians tyranny encompassed all that democracy was not, oligarchy included; this outline of the Other helped a complex and multifaced community that was Athens to define itself (“Stick and Glue: The Function of Tyranny in Fifth-Century Athenian Democracy” in K. Morgan (ed.) Popular Tyranny: Sovereignty and its Discontents in Ancient Greece Austin 2003: 75, 83). For a discussion of the three texts, see also Yunis 1996: 36-50.


65 Rhodes 2000: 130-131; similarly, Yunis 1996: 38 reads the Athenaios Politeia, Euripides’ Suppliant Women and the constitutional debate in Herodotus as reflections of the contemporary polemical discussion of democracy.
constitution for the future, seems to address current problems and strongly reflects the current debates of 411. On the other hand, Heftner identifies a central dilemma in the oligarchic thought, namely the desire to emulate Sparta and her constitution on the one hand with all the ramifications such a turn entailed (e.g., decentralizing or dissolving the Athenian state in its original constituent, independent demes, thus reversing the process that Theseus allegedly had started), and the need on the other hand to retain in a way the naval empire. This fundamental contradiction in the oligarchic thought will have hampered any attempt to develop and openly propagate any constitutional concepts alternative to democracy. To this I would add that while Lakonophilia was popular among Athenian extreme oligarchic circles as a life attitude or a set of moral values, it only developed into a conscious and well-formulated policy of foreign affairs during and after the downfall of the oligarchy of the Four Hundred. Furthermore, while the debate on the patrios politeia, whose beginnings may be traced in this period, is probably a token of disaffection with the current political system, we have no evidence that it amounted to a concrete, systematic expose of oligarchic theory and practice, not to mention the fact that it was claimed by the democrats also. In conclusion, I propose to see the period after Sicily and prior to the revolution as the formative years of the Athenian oligarchic movement on a purely political and constitutional level. The great differences in outlook and political goals that lay beneath the surface before the revolution first became apparent after the collapse of the regime to the effect that by the time of the second oligarchy there were in Athens two clearly identifiable oligarchic factions. The protagonists of both factions had studied well the lessons the first oligarchy had taught them and in the summer of 404 B.C. were ready to draw their conclusions and act accordingly.

How do the individuals included in this study fit in the above-mentioned context? From the discussion so far it emerges that it would be problematic to attach ideological labels to some oligarchs because such a procedure ignores the ongoing and ever-evolving confrontation of ideas, the gradual development of concepts that

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67 See also Heftner “Die politische Haltung des Kritias im Jahre 411” in P. Mauritsch and C. Ulf (eds.) Kultur(en)-Formen des Alltäglichen in der Antike: Festschrift für Ingomar Weiler zum 75. Geburtstag Graz 2013: 279-280. Heftner argues that Critias always favoured Cimon’s policy which furthered the political domination in the Greek world of Sparta and Athens and that already since 411 he promoted the idea of co-operation with Sparta on an equality basis.
68 Thuc. 8.76.6; cf. M. Hansen “Solonian Democracy in Fourth-Century Athens” in W. Connor, M. Hansen, K. Raaflaub and B. Strauss (eds.) Aspects of Athenian Democracy Copenhagen 1990: 76-77; Heftner sees the patrios politeia theme as an ideological, propagandistic construction which sought to bridge the gap between the elite with moderate convictions and the democrats. Heftner 2001: 225,228 recognises basic principles of this construction in Thrasybulus’ policy on Samos in 411; see also under Cleitophon pages 130-132.
took place in the whole revolutionary period, and the possibility that a number of oligarchs changed sides either out of ideological reasons or simply out of expediency. Such movements would be almost impossible to trace, hence the characterization of one person as ‘moderate’ would become problematic. For example, I have argued in this study that Theramenes co-operated closely with the extremist faction at the early days of the regime (see pages 251-272). Similarly, the fact that Thymochares appears to have emerged unscathed after the collapse of the oligarchy does not guarantee that he as well did not enjoy the confidence of Antiphon and his accomplices (see pages 273-279). Finally, to better understand the development of the anti-democratic/conservative thought in Athens in the 413-411 period, I propose the following phases, or stages of development:

a) From spring 413 to November 412: this period begins with the Spartan occupation of Deceleia and ends with the decision on the part of the conspirators to enlist Alcibiades in their camp and do away with democracy. It is characterised by an intensification of the critique on and disaffection of democracy, but this critique is expressed on mainly negative terms, triggered off by Athens’ gloomy financial situation and the unbearable burdens of the upper classes. Probably the first discussions about the patrios politeia are to be dated to this period.69

b) From November 412 to Peisander’s first visit to Athens in February 411:70 plans for altering the democratic constitution and replacing it with an oligarchy are discussed openly for the first time in public in front of an Athenian audience on Samos. News arrives in Athens where an atmosphere of uncertainty prevails. Peisander’s appearance in the assembly causes tempestuous reactions but essentially the plan to change the constitution is ratified by the people.

c) During Peisander’s absence from Athens, March-May 411: intense political and ideological propaganda takes place in Athens. In this period certain key concepts are moulded, namely the restriction of political rights to a body of five thousand citizens and the abolition of state pay for all offices but the military. The first differences in the political agendas of certain factions within the revolutionary movement become apparent, for example the inability of the thirty sungrapheis to agree on concrete measures to be proposed at the Colonus assembly,71 the motion of Pythodorus and the rider of Cleitophon,72 the two draft constitutions in the AP 30 and 31 and probably the so-called...

69 See appendix 3.
70 For the proposed timetable of Peisander’s first visit, see Appendix 3.
71 Ostwald 1986: 368 asserts that unless one assumes several weeks of discussions and deliberations having taken place before their appointment, it is inexplicable that the thirty sungrapheis were given such a short time to complete their task. This period of intense discussions fits exactly in the present phase c.
72 For the rationale and political intent of Cleitophon’s rider in relation to that of Pythodorus’, see under Cleitophon pages 132-138.
constitution of Draco found in the *AP* 4.73 Probably towards the end of this period debates over the continuation of the war or conclusion of peace with Sparta were waged (*AP* 29.5).

d) During the oligarchic reign and after the collapse of the regime until the restoration of full democracy in May-June 410 and beyond: the huge differences between the extremist and moderate faction within the Four Hundred become apparent; the extremists deny participation in the political life to all Athenians except the members of the Council and are ready to accept subjugation to Sparta as a last resort, while the moderates strive for a sovereign assembly of all Athenians of hoplite status and above and retention of the empire.

In the present thesis the profiles of thirteen members of the Four Hundred oligarchy are being presented. In the course of my research it became apparent that it is not possible to include all known members of the oligarchy since the bibliography and the research conducted in this field has grown out of proportion with regard to the amount of work required for a PhD thesis. Two options were available to me. Either I would try to include all the known members but as a result compromise the scope, the clarity and eventually the quality of the individual profiles, or restrict the research to fewer individuals, but being exhaustive instead in posing and discussing questions that were somewhat overlooked by previous scholars (for example, the ethical, moral and cultural issues raised by the harsh treatment of the convicted as traitors Antiphon and Archeptolemus (see pages 72-76), or how the agonistic lavish display as life attitude, directed in Athens to serve the community as a whole rather than promote the excellence of an individual aristocratic *oikos*, can throw some light on otherwise insoluble questions of identity as in the case of Aristarchus (see pages 79-82). But the remaining individuals shall be included in the complete *Prosopography of the Four Hundred Oligarchy*, a work that still awaits publication. The following parts have been already published in various journals: “Laispodias Andronymios” *AClass* 56 2013: 93-113; “The Chronology of Peisander’s Mission to Athens Re-visited” *AClass* 57 2014: 54-76 forthcoming; “Phrynichus Stratonidou Deiradiotes and the Ionia Campaign in 412 B.C.: Thuc. 8.25-27” *AHB* 27 2013 152-164.

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73 For the view that this part of the *Athenaion Politeia* stems from the revolutionary period of 411 and that it reflects the propaganda of the moderate circles within the Four Hundred oligarchy, see C. Hignett *A History of the Athenian Constitution to the End of the Fifth Century B.C.* Oxford 1952: 273; Rhodes *A Commentary on the Aristoteleian Athenaion Politeia* Oxford 1981: 86-87; Osborne 2010: 276.
An obscure figure in the oligarchy of the Four Hundred is Alexicles. His patronymic and demotic are unknown, but the possibility that he is related to Alexicles PAA 120300 should not be neglected (see below page 25). The information we get from Thucydides is scarce. When the historian first mentions the oligarch, the regime was already being in its death throes. Since Phrynichus’ assassination, which had gone unpunished, Theramenes, Aristocrates, and other members of the oligarchy had been stepping up their agitation against the leading faction within the regime. A Peloponnesian fleet had been spotted sailing off Aigina and overrunning it, at which point the opposition began to spread rumours in the open, accusing the stalwart members of the oligarchy of treason. There took place a lot of incendiary, seditious talks (στασιωτικῶν λόγων καὶ ὑποψιῶν), before the protesters decided to act:

οἱ γὰρ ἐν τῷ Πειραιαῖ τῷ τῆς Ἑτηονειας τείχῳ ὀπλίται ὀικοδομοῦντες, ἐν οἷς καὶ ὁ ἀριστοκράτης ἦν ταξιαρχῶν καὶ τὴν ἑαυτῷ φυλῆν ἔχων, ἔγανησαν ἀλεξικλέα στρατηγὸν ὅντα ἐκ τῆς ὀλιγαρχίας καὶ μάλιστα πρὸς τοὺς ἑταίρους τετραμμένον, καὶ ἐς οἰκίαις ἁγαγόντες εἰρξαν. (Thuc. 8.92.4)

The hoplites who had been building the Eetioneia wall in the Piraeus, to whom was also included Aristocrates the taxiarth in charge of his own tribe, arrested Alexicles the general of the oligarchy, a man having great recourse to the hetairoi, and having led him to a house they imprisoned him.

It is not quite clear whether this chain of events was triggered off through spontaneous reaction and anger against the leading figures of the regime, or if it was directed from above, that is, from those members of the Four Hundred who disagreed with the policy the leading faction was following. From Thucydides’

74 Thuc. 8.92.3
75 The latter support H. Avery, Prosopographical Studies in the Oligarchy of the Four Hundred PhD Diss. Princeton University 1959: 79-80; W. MacCoy Theramenes, Thrasybulus and the Athenian Moderates PhD Diss. Yale University 1970: 86-87; D. Kagan, The Fall of the Athenian Empire Cornell 1987: 194, concedes that there might have been a degree of improvisation, but he concludes: ‘there certainly was a considerable element of degree and significant communication between the dissidents at Athens and the hoplites who were working on the walls at Piraeus.’ G. Pesely is more cautious: he points out that Thucydides does not indicate if there was a kind of pre-arrangement with Theramenes, or whether Aristocrates took the initiative on his own (Theramenes and Athenian Politics: A Study in the Manipulation of History PhD Diss. University of California 1983: 138). H. Heftner suggests that the allusion to an opposition plot may stem from an informant of Thucydides of extreme oligarchic convictions who attributed the fall of the regime to a conspiracy (Der oligarchische Umsturz des Jahres 411 v. Chr. und die Herrschaft der Vierhundert in Athen: quellenkritische und historische Untersuchungen Vienna 2001: 274-275).
narrative it emerges that the dissidents had become more audacious since the failure of the Four Hundred to punish Phrynichus’ assassins, a clear sign that the regime was crumbling. There had been meetings of the discontented, although we are not told whether also in public, before the decision was made to move into action. Their first move was to arrest Alexicles who was supervising the building of the Eetioneia fort, because the purpose of this fort had been recently fiercely contested: it was not to protect the city against an attack from Samos, as the oligarchs had initially proclaimed, but to admit the enemy fleet as Theramenes insinuated. It has been argued that Alexicles undertook personally the supervision of the construction at Eetioneia, because he was closely associated with the oligarchic clubs, the implication being members of the latter were particularly eager to betray the city to the Lacedaemonians. There should be little doubt that there must have been discussions and criticism against the regime’s poor performance among the hoplites, in the presence and probably the support of Aristocrates and Hermon. The latter’s presence in the area, however, on the day of the mutiny may have been accidental, the headquarters of his περίπολοι being in the neighbouring Mounichia. Under these circumstances the soldiers took the initiative and arrested their general. Thucydides makes clear that the soldiers themselves strongly endorsed this action, that is, they did not simply follow orders. It would be then safe to conclude that the dissidents had been discussing the possibility of some sort of reaction against the sinister, in their view, dealings of the leading faction with the Spartans, but had waited until they had clear signs of popular endorsement of their disaffection. The arrest of Alexicles was the second test, after Phrynichus’ death, which the leading faction failed to pass: their reaction was pitiful and totally inadequate to restore order and regain control of the situation which was getting out of hand rapidly. The next day,

76 Professor Heftner in a private letter has raised doubts as to whether the dissidents actually met in public. This, Heftner contents, would have been a grave challenge for the regime and would have provoked immediate action on the part of the leading faction within the Four Hundred.

77 See, for example, Pesely 1983: 127-128.

78 G. Calchoun Athenian Clubs in Politics and Litigation Austin 1913: 145-146.

79 8.92.5: τῶν ὀπλιτῶν τῷ σύφος ταῦτα ἔβούλετο. G. Bugh, The Horsemen of Athens Princeton 1988: 116, makes Aristocrates the instigator of the arrest, while the hoplites merely supported the taxiarch’s actions, or followed his orders. But this interpretation of Thucydides is somewhat strained. E. Meyer preferred to see the majority of them as moderates (Geschichte des Altertums : Das Perserreich und die Griechen: Athen das attische Reich und die attische Kultur der peloponnesische Krieg 7 Essen 1952-1958: 559). Professor Heftner rightly asks why the Four Hundred did not entrust the building of the Eetioneia fort to their sympathisers. Was it because they either did not want to raise suspicions among the population or did they believe that their excuse for the construction of the fort, protection against the democratic fleet on Samos, was enough to quell any misgivings on the part of the Athenians? (communicated to me through a private letter).

when the tensions were appreciably reduced, Alexicles was released from his makeshift prison, a nearby house, his person apparently being of little importance for the dissidents since their goal was accomplished, namely the demolition of the fort.\textsuperscript{81}

Apart from his flight, on which see below, this is the only incident in which Alexicles plays a role in Thucydides’ narrative. But a nugget of information, namely that Alexicles was closely associated with the \textit{hetaireiai}, may entitle us to draw some inferences with regard to his conduct during the preparatory phase of the revolution. At 8.54.4 we are told that Peisander, after he had been appointed by the assembly to conduct negotiations with Tissaphernes, he contacted all the \textit{hetaireiai} in Athens and urged them to work in concert, in order that democracy would be overthrown.\textsuperscript{82} Later on, we are informed that certain individuals, among whom Androcles, the man most responsible for Alcibiades’ exile, were done away with, and, what is more, that the conspirators controlled through terror the agenda in the Council and the Assembly.\textsuperscript{83} Perhaps, it would be legitimate to infer from all these that Alexicles zealously undertook to accomplish the tasks Peisander had assigned to the \textit{hetaireiai}, the assassinations included. Perhaps, also, Alexicles owed the fact that later on he became a general to his wholehearted commitment to the oligarchic cause. In this respect, his case may be parallel to that of Aristarchus and Melanthius;\textsuperscript{84} All three men emerged as men of action; they became generals; they had close connections with the oligarchic \textit{hetaireiai}; we do not know of any public record of any of them, so they probably came from obscure families,\textsuperscript{85} the revolution being their chance to achieve credentials and prestige among the Athenian oligarchs.

As to the time of Alexicles’ entry into the generalship, it has been argued that according to the \textit{Athenaion Politeia} provisions were made for two elections, one for the remainder of 412/11, and a second one for 411/10.\textsuperscript{86} But it seems that the Four

\textsuperscript{81} Thuc. 8.93.1: οὗ δὲ ἐν τῷ Πειραιᾷ ὀπλῆται τὸν τε Ἀλεξικλέα ὁν ἴσωσάν οἱ ἑφέντες καὶ τὸ τείχος καθελόντες; ‘the \textit{hoplitai} stationed in the Piraeus let Alexicles, whom they had arrested, free and pulled down the wall’; cf. Gomme, Andrewes and Dover \textit{A Historical Commentary on Thucydides vols. 1-5} Oxford 1945-1981: 5314.

\textsuperscript{82} For the \textit{hetaireiai}, see Calhoun 1964; F. Sartori \textit{Le eterie nella vita politica Ateniese del 6 e 5 secolo a. C.} Rome 1957; for a useful survey of the numerous nuances of the word \textit{ἑταίρεια}, see Gomme, Andrewes and Dover 1945-1981: 5128-129.

\textsuperscript{83} Thuc. 8.65.2-66.

\textsuperscript{84} Melanthius, general of the Four Hundred: Xen. \textit{Hell.} 2.3.46.

\textsuperscript{85} G. Gilbert, \textit{Beiträge zur innern Geschichte Athens im Zeitalter des peloponnesischen Krieges} Leipzig 1877: 310.

\textsuperscript{86} P. Rhodes \textit{A Commentary on the Aristotelian Athenaiion Politeia} Oxford 1981: 401; M. Chambers \textit{Aristoteles: Staat der Athener} Berlin 1990: 290-291. But Andrewes points out that the contrast should be between the time of the immediate and the future constitution, allowing thus for a single election (Gomme, Andrewes and Dover 1945-1981: 5230). He stresses the fact that on Rhodes interpretation the interim election becomes problematic because the appointment of the generals is supposed to take place before the creation of the Council. Heftner remarks that on both interpretations, one must assume that the provisions of the \textit{AP} 31.2 should have been drafted before the Colonus assembly, but after the assembly
Hundred did not feel compelled to follow the procedure described in the *AP*. The actual appointment of their generals may have occurred either in the week between the actual seizure of power and the formal inauguration, or after it, that is, after Thargelion 22nd. The *Athenaion Politieia* does not state what body is to decide on the selection of the generals, and the suggestion has been made that it was the inner caucus of the revolutionaries who made the choice. As Kagan remarks, 'this was a departure from legality and normality, but in matters involving military force, and therefore, the immediate security of the regime, the conspirators could not afford such niceties.' I would assume that, in the eyes of the revolutionaries, one criterion which would have carried a lot of weight would have been revolutionary fervour, reliance and faith to the oligarchic cause. If our considerations about Alexicles' conduct during the preparatory phase of the revolution are valid, then he might have got the office on the grounds of his subversive activity. If Rhodes' observation is sound, namely that the *Athenaion Politieia* 31.2 alludes to the possibility that men under thirty were not to be excluded from the generalship under the oligarchic regime, then there is a distinct possibility that this clause was precisely inserted to gratify the political aspirations of young and eager revolutionaries, perhaps men like Aristarchus and Alexicles.

Although there is almost unanimous agreement with regard to Alexicles' political profile, that of an extreme oligarch, the circumstances under which he fled Athens, as well as the actual timing of the flight are matters of dispute. Earlier scholars had accepted, one may say, a straightforward interpretation of Thucydides 8.98.1, arguing that the loss of Euboea precipitated the collapse of the regime, at which juncture its leading figures and most ardent members fled. More recently, however,
scholars have, in effect, rejected Thucydides’ emphatic assertion that the most prominent members of the extremist faction within the Four Hundred fled to Deceleia immediately after the news of the defeat and the loss of Euboea had broken in Athens. M. Jameson in a highly influential article was the first to put forward a reconstruction of the events that ensued the sea-battle off Eretria, according to which the leaders of the extremists did not immediately flee Athens, but waited in the hope that they might (re)gain control of the affairs in the city, after the challenge, at first tentative but later audacious and brazen, of their authority by a rival faction within the regime, led by Theramenes and Aristocrates. Their decision to stay and defend their conduct during the oligarchic reign ushered in an intense political struggle, conducted not in the Council but in the jury courts, where the so-called moderates in a series of political trials managed to discredit their opponents and take control of the affairs in the city. Since I shall deal with Jameson’s reconstruction of the post Four Hundred era in Athens in detail elsewhere, I am going to give here the outline of his argument with a brief comment only, and focus on the evidence of Thucydides, which strangely has been misinterpreted and misrepresented by an impressive array of prominent scholars (see note 34). Jameson has taken three passages in Aristotle’s *Rhetoric* as referring to one single occasion, and has reconstructed a situation in which Sophocles the poet and one of the *probouloi*, an administrative panel of senior citizens which had been appointed in 413 B.C., and were active in the set up and during the reign of the Four Hundred, brings Peisander to trial in defence of a dead man. Having Peisander’s trial as a point of departure, Jameson goes on to piece together the days and weeks that followed the downfall of the Four Hundred, and signalled the establishment of the regime of the Five Thousand, a turbulent period marked by intense juridical activity and public prosecutions of ex-comrades.


95 On the role of the *probouloi* during the oligarchic regime, see Heftner “Bemerkungen zur Rolle der Probouloi während des oligarchischen Umsturzes in Athen 411 v. Chr.” *Prometheus* 3 2003: 213-228.

96 The relevant passages are: 1419α25-30; 1416α14-17; 1374β35-1375α2.

97 The decree of Patrocleides makes reference to soldiers who had stayed in Athens during the oligarchic reign and, as a result had lost in part their civil rights, and members of the Four Hundred who had been disenfranchised (And. 1. 75, 79). Fragments of contemporary comic plays allude to a prolonged and fierce forensic activity during the post Four Hundred era (Ar. *Tryphales* K-A 563; Polyzelos K-A 3; cf. schol. Ar. *Frogs* 541; Hesychius τ 1332: τρία Θηραµένους; τ 1754 τού τριών ἐν). See Heftner “Die τρία κακά des Theramenes: Überlegungen zu Polyzelos fr. 13 und Aristophanes fr. 563 Kassel-Austin” *ZPE* 128 1999: 33-43, who places these fragments in the context of the political struggle during the period of
Before we turn to Thucydides, I shall present Jameson’s main arguments and briefly comment on them. In brackets the relevant pages of Jameson’s article are given:

A. Jameson takes the Sophocles mentioned in the three passages in the *Rhetoric* to be the famous poet, on the grounds that the three out of eleven references to his person are made in neighbouring passages, and, if Aristotle had meant a different person, it would be awkward not to make it clear to his readers; more importantly, the three passages stem from a single occurrence, a forensic dispute (543, 546). Concerning the first part of the argument, the identity of this Sophocles is disputed, but for our argument it is immaterial who this Sophocles is. As to the second part, it is not at all clear that, first, all three passages refer to a single incident, and second, that they present part of a forensic dispute, an ἀνάκρισις, as Jameson believes. Our meagre knowledge of this preliminary procedure does not allow us to draw such inferences as Jameson does, namely that an extensive exchange of arguments and cross-examination took place in homicide cases such as this in question. The name of the other participant in the exchanges with Sophocles, Peisander, is also not certain. It has been proposed that at 1419α25-30 the name could be Teisander, who in this instance acted as prosecutor against Sophocles (548 note 26). A likely candidate named Teisander was active in Athens at the end of the fifth century B.C. But, one may admit, there is no reason in principle why the reading Peisander should not be allowed to stand. This argument, then, is not conclusive against Jameson. In the third passage, 1374β35-1375α2, a certain Euctemon is mentioned. There were three individuals bearing this name in late fifth century Athens: a Euctemon was archon in 408/7 B.C. (PAA 438265), there was a general Euctemon in 412/11 (PAA 438070), and one Euctemon was denounced by Teucros on the strength of his participation in the scandals of 415 B.C. (PAA 438065) (556). The identification of Euctemon with the participant in the scandals, is, however, crucial for Jameson’s argument, because only in this case Peisander’s role in the trial becomes meaningful, the oligarch having been appointed as a public investigator into the Mysteries and Hermes affairs in 415, and thus he is likely to have precipitated Euctemon’s death in defence of whose memory Sophocles is supposed to have spoken in court. To conclude, the prosopographical part of

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98 See Heftner 2003: 216 no 8 for bibliography.
100 T. Bergk (*Griechische Literaturgeschichte* 3 Berlin 1884: 363), pointed out that the manuscripts of Diodorus at 13.7.1 deliver a Πίσανδρος and Πείσανδρος as the Athenian archon of 414/3, whose name we know it was Τείσανδρος (IG I³ 371,1).
101 Plato *Gorgias* 487C. He is registered as PAA 877910.
102 And. 1.35.
Jameson’s elaborate argument is based on shaky grounds: None of the three participants in the three passages can be securely identified, the most important ring in this chain, Euctemon, being the weakest, since the existence of other bearers of the name renders the identification doubtful. Furthermore, since Aristotle does not name the defendant in the trial on behalf of Euctemon, we are not entitled to assume that it was Peisander.\(^{103}\)

B. The legal procedure, according to Jameson, by which the case was introduced to the court was a graphe hubreos, which, as a καινόν ἀδίκηµα, may have been introduced in the form of an eisangelia to the assembly or council (558). This is a legal absurdity, and it is highly unlikely that any Athenian citizen would contemplate to initiate such a procedure for the plain reason that in classical Athens all graphae were introduced to the thesmothetai, whereas all eisangeliae to the council or assembly.\(^{104}\) In addition, a graphe hubreos was almost never employed by a perspective accuser, because, first, it was difficult for him to prove in the court that the state of mind of the defendant when he committed the crime was hubristic, and, second, because as a procedure it was extremely dangerous for the prosecutor who would fail to secure the one fifth of the jury’s votes.\(^{105}\) Furthermore, an eisangelia, at least in the fifth century was used in cases of treachery or subversion of the constitution exclusively.\(^{106}\) The nature of Peisander’s presumed crime would exclude an eisangelia as the process followed.

C. As with the case of Antiphon’s last speech, published by sympathizers of the extremists to vindicate their role in the oligarchy, Sophocles’ indictment was likewise published by moderate circles in Athens as a justification of their own role in the oligarchy of the Four Hundred, a kind of ideological manifesto (559). This is purely conjectural. Apart from the fact that the moderates, unlike the extremists, would have had little need to vindicate their conduct during the oligarchic regime, the origin of those extracts Aristotle collected in his Rhetoric is nearly impossible to ascertain. A possible source could be his son Iophon and grandson Sophocles the Younger, both tragic poets, despite the story that the former accused once his father of not being able to manage

\(^{103}\) I owe the last point to Professor Heftner.

\(^{104}\) Dem. 21.47; Isoc. 15.314; see M. Hansen *Eisangelia: The Sovereignty of the People’s Court in Athens in the Fourth Century B. C. and the Impeachment of Generals and Politicians* Odense 1975: 9.


\(^{106}\) Hansen 1975: 16-20.
his own affairs. But it is also possible that the three passages come from a collection of historical anecdotes, conversations between historical personae. Aristotle’s purpose is to show how one should answer questions whose purpose is to trap the person questioned, not to verify the historicity of such incidents.

We turn now to Thucydides to see what he actually says about the downfall of the Four Hundred. I quote the two relevant passages:

8.97.1: Ἐπὶ δ’ οὖν τοῖς ἠγγελμένοις οἱ Ἀθηναῖοι ναὸς τε εἶκοσι δμῶς ἐπλήρουν καὶ ἐκκλησίαν ξυνέλεγον, μίαν μὲν εὐθὺς τότε πρῶτον ἐς τὴν Πύκνα καλομένην, οὕτε καὶ ἄλλοτε εἰώθεσαν, ἐν ἄλλοι καὶ τοῦς τετρακοσίους καταπαύσαντες τοὺς πεντακισχιλίους ἐψηφίσαντο τὰ πράγματα παραδοῦναι.

As soon as the announcement was made, the Athenians, nevertheless, manned twenty ships and summoned an assembly, one then immediately for the first time at the so-called Pnyx, where they used to summon in the past, in which they deposed the Four Hundred and handed over the affairs to the Five Thousand.

8.98.1: Ἐν δὲ τῇ μεταβολῇ ταύτῃ εὐθὺς οἱ μὲν περὶ τὸν Πείσανδρον καὶ Ἀλεξικλέα καὶ ὅσοι ἦσαν τῆς ὀλιγαρχίας μάλιστα ὑπεξέρχονται ἐς τὴν Δεκέλειαν· Ἀρίσταρχος δὲ αὐτῶν μόνος (ἔτυχε γὰρ καὶ στρατηγὸν) λαβὼν κατὰ τάχος τοξότας τινὰς τοὺς βαρβαρωτάτους ἔχωρει πρὸς τὴν Οἰνόην.

In this change of constitution immediately those around Peisander and Alexicles and those most deeply involved in the oligarchy ran away in secret to Deceleia. But Aristarchus alone (he happened to be a general) took in a hurry some barbarian archers with him and made it for Oenoe.

In the first passage Thucydides explicitly says that when the news of the defeat at Euboea arrived in the city, the Athenians prepared twenty ships for battle and immediately (εὐθὺς) summoned an assembly at the Pnyx, during which they deposed the Four Hundred and established the Five Thousand. The second passage informs us that when this change of constitution was ratified, immediately (εὐθὺς) those most involved in the oligarchy, and those around Peisander and Alexicles fled to Deceleia, Aristarchus being the only one who took a different route, as he betrayed the fortress of Oenoe to the enemy. Jameson interprets the passages as follows:

‘I would understand the εὐθὺς of the extremist party of Peisander and Alexicles (which made a clean break) to be in contrast with those members of the previous regime who participated in the new government until the full democracy regained control. Thucydides is not concerned to modify his contrast by speaking of trials, not even that of so prominent an oligarch as Antiphon which he has mentioned earlier out of chronological context, but simply draws a distinction

107 Cicero De senectute 7.22; Plutarch Moralia 785B.
between the oligarchs and the new regime at its outset (composed of moderate members of the old).\textsuperscript{108}

In other words Thucydides contrasts those oligarchs who fled early in the regime of the Five Thousand, but stayed long enough in the city to be brought to trials, to those who stayed all along the eight approximately months until the restoration of full democracy in May/June 410 B.C. Bleckmann, who follows in the main Jameson, observes that Thucydides’ narrative at this point is condensed; the historian narrates the events in a summary fashion because he wants to get to the Hellespont events as soon as possible. Furthermore, the words \( \text{ἐν δὲ τῇ μεταβολῇ ταύτῃ} \) should not be understood literally, but should be associated with the events that ensued after the fall of the oligarchy. According to Thucydides’ presentation, so Bleckmann, there followed multiple assembly meetings in which power was transferred to the Five Thousand step by step, and the above-mentioned phrase should describe this transitional period.\textsuperscript{109} Both interpretations are unconvincing, since they do not tally with what Thucydides actually says. It is thus necessary, in order to reconstruct the train of events that followed the defeat in Euboea, to undertake a twofold task. First, to elucidate the exact meaning of \( \text{εὐθὺς} \) at 8.97.1 and 98.1, and, second, to evaluate the importance of the negative outcome of this naval engagement for the Athenians and the oligarchy.

In connection to the first task, a preliminary comment may be apposite. A modern reader, eager to determine the course of events, the sequence and temporal interrelations of actions and counter-actions, may be struck, or even disappointed, by the ambiguousness and laxity with which the ancient writers approached their subject. Thucydides is not immune to such criticism, but it is clear that he has striven to be precise with regard to the timing of events a good deal. Whenever he fails to provide us with a dating which would perhaps meet our standards of accuracy, this is due to the impossibility of getting access to the relevant piece of information.\textsuperscript{110}

\( \text{εὐθὺς} \) appears 252 times in Thucydides. Seldom, it is used as an adverb of place, its meaning being ‘straight,’ ‘above,’ or ‘next to something.’\textsuperscript{111} It also denotes a logical consequence, the result of an action.\textsuperscript{112} But the bulk of instances fall into two categories, the criterion being whether one can determine, to a degree which would satisfy our modern standards of precision, the amount of time the word \( \text{εὐθὺς} \) indicates in each particular case. Of the remaining 232 cases, 62, or 26.7%, do not provide the reader with any clue, with the help of which to quantify the amount of

\textsuperscript{108} Jameson 1971: 555.
\textsuperscript{109} Bleckmann 1998: 376.
\textsuperscript{110} See, for example, 1.2.6: The population of Attica increased rapidly because people, driven out of their homeland, became Athenian citizens as soon as they resorted to Athens; 1.93.8: the Athenians built their city walls as soon as the Persians departed from Greece.
\textsuperscript{111} Four times in total, see appendix 4.
\textsuperscript{112} Sixteen times.
time indicated, that is, εὐθὺς is used vaguely. This is not to say that a considerable amount of time lapses between the actions mentioned in the passage. On the contrary, sometimes the sense of urgency and hasting is conveyed in connection with the action accomplished. The remaining 170 instances, or 73.3%, concern situations in which a scene, or an event in progress is described, and the word εὐθὺς refers to the transition from a previous to a subsequent phase of the event in question. The described action is usually a campaign, battle scenes, or assembly meetings, whereas in three times it refers to the symptoms of the pestilence in Athens. In many cases the context provides such strong clues that it is possible to infer that the amount of time in question is no more than a few hours to one day. Turning now to our passages, 8.97.1 and 98.1, there are four close parallels in Thucydides which can contribute a great deal to our understanding of them. First, the story of Chrysis, the priestess of Hera in Argos. Thucydides tells us that in the ninth year of the war the temple of Hera in Argos was burnt due to an accident inadvertently caused by the priestess of the goddess during a summer night. Chrysis is in panic and scared to death. She flees the temple that very night as a result secretly. The second and third parallels make unequivocally clear what happens in a classical Greek city amid war and stasis, when the political enemies or the rival faction within the city gain control, especially when the presence of a dominant power in the area tips the balance in their favour. At 6.51.2 when some citizens of Catene, politically attached to Syracuse, realize that the city is flooded with Athenian soldiers who have entered the city to purchase food, they escape in a state of panic, whereas the rest of the Cataneans vote for an alliance with Athens. Thucydides uses the verb ὑπεξέρχοµαι, go out secretly, for a scene almost identical with ours. There is an assembly going on and the political faction that cannot carry the day withdraws stealthily. In the next instance, at 4.74.2, those of the Megarians who had actively supported the Athenians withdraw secretly at once, as soon as the latter desert Megara, prudently, one might say in the light of the subsequent developments.

113 For example, at 4.110.1 Brasidas interrupts the siege of Sane and Dion, and in haste launches an attack against Torone.
114 For example, at 8.92.6 when the Four Hundred get informed about the developments at Eetioneia, they want to rush off to the Piraeus to meet the challenge from the mutinied soldiers. At 4.134.2 the Tegeans set up a trophy to commemorate their victory against the Mantineans as soon as the night falls. 1.89.3 is the most vague instance in this largest group. Here the Athenian folk return to Attica when it has been made clear that the Persians have left. But even here we can draw the inference that they began the repatriation on the day they got the news of the enemy flight.
115 4. 133.3: καὶ ἡ Χρυσὶς µὲν εὐθὺς τῆς νυκτὸς δείσασα τοῦς Ἀργείους ὡς Φλειῶντα φεύγει 'Chrusis as soon as the night came, fearing the Argives, escapes in Phleious'. Note Chrysis’ state of mind and the verb φεύγει at the end.
116 ὃν δὲ Καταναίων οἱ µὲν τὰ τῶν Συρακοσίων φρονοῦντες, ὡς εἶδον τὸ στράτευµα ἐνδον, εὐθὺς περιδεεῖνς γενόµενοι ὑπεξέρχοντον οὐ πολλοὶ τινες, οἱ δὲ ἄλλοι ἐφυσίσιαν τὸ τε ξυµµαχιάν τοῖς Αθηναίοις 'those of the Cataneans who were pro Syracuse, when they saw the troops be inside the town became immediately very timid, and run away in secret, not many of them, whereas the rest voted for an alliance with the Athenians.'
Note here that Megara, like Athens, is beset by *stasis*, a state of affairs which represents the ultimate danger for those who happen to be on the losing side.\(^{117}\) Once again the verb used is ὑπεξέρχομαι. In another interesting instance the Peloponnesians, alarmed by the arrival of Eurymedon with sixty ships, wait until the night falls, and then hurriedly evacuate Leukas by land, while they carry their ships over Laukas isthmus so as to avoid detection by the Athenian fleet which was approaching the area (3.81.1). The text goes οἱ Πελοποννήσιοι τῆς νυκτὸς εὖθυς κατὰ τάχος ἐκομίζοντο ἐπὶ οἴκου παρὰ τὴν γῆν 'the Peloponnesians, then, as soon as the night fell returned home hurriedly through land'.\(^{118}\)

There should, therefore, remain little doubt that the εὖθυς at 8.97.1 and 98.1 belongs to the larger group, and that it is possible with a fair degree of certainty to estimate the amount of time indicated by the adverb. The news of the defeat may have reached Athens the day after the disaster, at which point an assembly meeting was hastily summoned to address the new development and take counter-action. In this assembly which was summoned at the Pnyx, a place laden with overtones of a long democratic tradition, a highly symbolic gesture and indicative of the current mood of the Athenians on that day, a change in the constitution was effected.\(^{119}\) It was the beginning of the regime of the Five Thousand and the end of the Four Hundred. I take then, contrary to Bleckmann, the μεταβολή of 98.1 to refer to this single assembly, while the subsequent ones of 97.2 as dealing with other constitutional issues of less importance. We can then reconstruct the day of the assembly on the Pnyx as follows: early on that day the news from Euboea breaks in Athens. Immediately, the Athenians organize their defence, equip twenty ships and summon the assembly. The extremists, among whom, Aristarchus, Alexicles, Peisander and others, do not contemplate very long. Having been utterly discredited politically, they decide to take shift action. They do not dare to appear in the meeting because they know how unpredictable, revengeful and nasty the Athenian *demos* are. A relevant question is, of course, who gave the order for summoning the assembly. It is highly unlikely that the order was issued by the extremist faction of the Four Hundred. Those around Peisander and Antiphon had decreed that the assembly of the Five Thousand would be summoned at the discretion of the Four Hundred and when they

\(^{117}\) οἱ δὲ ἐν τῇ πόλει Μεγαρῆς, ἀποχωρησάντων καὶ τῶν Ἀθηναίων ἐπὶ οἴκου, ὅσοι μὲν τῶν πραγμάτων πρὸς τοὺς Ἀθηναίους μᾶλιστα μετέχον, εἰδότες ὅτι ὥφθησαν εὐθὺς ὑπεξέλθον τοὺς Μεγαρίδας ἐν τῇ πόλει ἐπὶ οἴκου, ὅσοι μὲν τῶν πραγμάτων πρὸς τοὺς Ἀθηναίους μᾶλιστα μετέχον, εἰδότες ὅτι ὥφθησαν εὐθὺς ὑπεξέλθον τοὺς Μεγαρίδας ἐν τῇ πόλει ἐπὶ οἴκου, ὅσοι μὲν τῶν πραγμάτων πρὸς τοὺς Ἀθηναίους μᾶλιστα μετέχον, εἰδότες ὅτι ὥφθησαν εὐθὺς ὑπεξέλθον 'the Megarians in the city, since the Athenians returned home, those who had been most involved in the affairs in favour of the Athenians, knowing that they had been seen, immediately ran away in secret.'

\(^{118}\) The present passage, along with that of 8.98.1, Aristarchus’ flight to Oenoe, are the only ones in Thucydides in which εὖθυς and κατὰ τάχος appear in the same context, the effect being that a sense of urgency, secrecy, and fear is forcefully conveyed. The Peloponnesians fear the numerically superior Athenian fleet, while Aristarchus the wrath of the Athenian *demos*.

\(^{119}\) In the opening scene of the *Acharnians* 1-42, Dikaiopolis waits alone early in the morning at the Pnyx for the Prytaneis to come and convene the meeting.
saw fit. It is characteristic that when under adverse circumstances the Four Hundred were compelled to call an assembly meeting to reconcile with the mutinied hoplites, the place is the precinct of Dionysus (Thuc. 8.93.3). The meeting under discussion takes place at the Pnyx, not at Colonus, and the crowd is beyond the oligarchs’ control.\textsuperscript{120} In the utter confusion and chaos prevailing in the city they do not waste time. Aristarchus with his faithful mercenary troops makes it for Oenoe, while the others run for safety to Deceleia.\textsuperscript{121}

But the evidence from Thucydides is contradicted by a fourth century source, Lycurgus’ speech \textit{Against Leocrates}, dated to about 330 B.C. Lycurgus essays to demonstrate how the Athenians of the old dealt with traitors. Not surprisingly, he picks Phrynichus as the most suitable example. Those men were so steadfast in their determination to punish those who would harm their country that decreed a law, on Critias motion, which stipulated that the dead be put on trial, and, if found guilty, their bones be thrown out of Attica.\textsuperscript{122} What is more, those who defended the dead should be sentenced to the same punishment as Phrynichus’ corpse was. Lycurgus claims that two prominent members of the oligarchy, both generals, Aristarchus and Alexicles, undertook to defend the memory of their dead comrade, and thereby met their death, while they were denied burial in Attica.\textsuperscript{123} We know that Phrynichus’ trial took place early in the regime of the Five Thousand, certainly before the trial of Antiphon, Archeptolemus and Onomacles.\textsuperscript{124} If Lycurgus’ version is correct, then, we must suppose that the two men did not immediately flee the city, as Thucydides

\textsuperscript{120} Kagan comments: “The return to the Pnyx must have been the result of a deliberate choice meant to indicate a return to a situation before the establishment of oligarchy” (1987: 201).

\textsuperscript{121} Another contemporary source, namely Lysias 13.73, states that the majority of the members of the Four Hundred fled after Phrynichus’ death. Although we do not know the exact number of those who fled, it cannot have been the majority and certainly those who did flee did not do so at Phrynichus’ death but, at any rate after the sea-battle off Eretria. We had better take the statement of Lysias’ speaker as rhetoric exaggeration.

\textsuperscript{122} Lyc. \textit{Against Leocrates} 113-114.

\textsuperscript{123} Lyc. \textit{Against Leocrates} 115: Ἀκούετε ὦ ἄνδρες τούτου τοῦ ψηφίσματος. ἔπειτα ἐκεῖνοι μὲν τὰ τοῦ προδότου ὡστά ἀνορέξαντες ἐκ τῆς Ἀττικῆς ἔξωρισαν, καὶ τοὺς ἄπολογουμένους ὑπὲρ αὐτοῦ ἀρίσταρχον καὶ Ἀλεξικλέα ἀπέκτειναν καὶ οὐδ’ ἐν τῇ χώρᾳ ταφῆναι ἐπέτρεψαν ἵνα ἀκούσατε, μέλης ὀσοὶ δέν τις ἰχθυαίοις. ἐπεκτείναν καὶ οὐδ’ ἐν τῇ χώρῃ ταφῆναι ἐπέτρεψαν. Ἐπειτα ἐκεῖνοι μὲν τῶν ἀντικήσεως μέλης ἰχθυαίοις διακόπτεραν καὶ οὐδ’ ἐν τῇ χώρᾳ ταφῆναι ἐπέτρεψαν ἵνα ἀκούσατε, μέλης ὀσοὶ δέν τις ἰχθυαίοις. ἐπεκτείναν καὶ οὐδ’ ἐν τῇ χώρῃ ταφῆναι ἐπέτρεψαν. Ἐπειτα ἐκεῖνοι μὲν τῶν ἀντικήσεως μέλης ἰχθυαίοις διακόπτεραν καὶ οὐδ’ ἐν τῇ χώρῃ ταφῆναι ἐπέτρεψαν. Ἐπειτα ἐκεῖνοι μὲν τῶν ἀντικήσεως μέλης ἰχθυαίοις διακόπτεραν καὶ οὐδ’ ἐν τῇ χώρῃ ταφῆναι ἐπέτρεψαν. Ἐπειτα ἐκεῖνοι μὲν τῶν ἀντικήσεως μέλης ἰχθυαίοις διακόπτεραν καὶ οὐδ’ ἐν τῇ χώρῃ ταφῆναι ἐπέτρεψαν. Ἐπειτα ἐκεῖνοι μὲν τῶν ἀντικήσεως μέλης ἰχθυαίοις διακόπτεραν καὶ οὐδ’ ἐν τῇ χώρῃ ταφῆναι ἐπέτρεψαν. Ἐπειτα ἐκεῖνοι μὲν τῶν ἀντικήσεως μέλης ἰχθυαίοις διακόπτεραν καὶ οὐδ’ ἐν τῇ χώρῃ ταφῆναι ἐπέτρεψαν. Ἐπειτα ἐκεῖνοι μὲν τῶν ἀντικήσεως μέλης ἰχθυαίοις διακόπτεραν καὶ οὐδ’ ἐν τῇ χώρῃ ταφῆναι ἐπέτρεψαν. Ἐπειτα ἐκεῖνοι μὲν τῶν ἀντικήσεως μέλης ἰχθυαίοις διακόπτεραν καὶ οὐδ’ ἐν τῇ χώρῃ ταφῆναι ἐπέτρεψαν. Ἐπειτα ἐκεῖνοι μὲν τῶν ἀντικήσεως μέλης ἰχθυαίοις διακόπτεραν καὶ οὐδ’ ἐν τῇ χώρῃ ταφῆναι ἐπέτρεψαν. Ἐπειτα ἐκεῖνοι μὲν τῶν ἀντικήσεως μέλης ἰχθυαίοις διακόπτεραν καὶ οὐδ’ ἐν τῇ χώρῃ ταφῆναι ἐπέτρεψαν. Ἐπειτα ἐκεῖνοι μὲν τῶν ἀντικήσεως μέλης ἰχθυαίοις διακόπτεραν καὶ οὐδ’ ἐν τῇ χώρῃ ταφῆναι ἐπέτρεψαν. Ἐπειτα ἐκεῖνοι μὲν τῶν ἀντικήσεως μέλης ἰχθυαίοις διακόπτεραν καὶ οὐδ’ ἐν τῇ χώρῃ ταφῆναι ἐπέτρεψαν. Ἐπειτα ἐκεῖνοι μὲν τῶν ἀντικήσεως μέλης ἰχθυαίοις διακόπτεραν καὶ οὐδ’ ἐν τῇ χώρῃ ταφῆναι ἐπέτρεψαν. Ἐπειτα ἐκεῖνοι μὲν τῶν ἀντικήσεως μέλης ἰχθυαίοις διακόπτεραν καὶ οὐδ’ ἐν τῇ χώρῃ ταφῆναι ἐπέτρεψαν. Ἐπειτα ἐκεῖνοι μὲν τῶν ἀντικήσεως μέλης ἰχθυαίοις διακόπτεραν καὶ οὐδ’ ἐν τῇ χώρῃ ταφῆναι ἐπέτρεψαν. Ἐπειτα ἐκεῖνοι μὲν τῶν ἀντικήσεως μέλης ἰχθυαίοις διακόπτεραν καὶ οὐδ’ ἐν τῇ χώρῃ ταφῆναι ἐπέτρεψαν. Ἐπειτα ἐκεῖνοι μὲν τῶν ἀντικήσεως μέλης ἰχθυαίοις διακόπτεραν καὶ οὐδ’ ἐν τῇ χώρῃ ταφῆναι ἐπέτρεπ
emphatically stresses, but stayed until the trial. It is important to note at this juncture that Critias’ decree did not stipulate a separate trial for the defenders of Phrynichus’ corpse. Rather, the verdict was to be enforced on both accused and defence witnesses alike. But Lycurgus’ account raises a very serious problem, namely whether Aristarchus had delivered Oenoe already to the enemy at the time of Phrynichus’ trial, or not. We must rule out the first alternative, though, for Aristarchus could not have hoped to return to Athens and meddle in politics as if nothing had happened. If we accept the second alternative, defence of Phrynichus first, then escape and betrayal of Oenoe for Aristarchus, then Lycurgus’ account cannot stand as it is, for the orator asserts that both oligarchs met their death as a result of their appearance in the trial as defenders of Phrynichus.

There are indications, coming from another contemporary source that Lycurgus’ account cannot stand in its entirety. In Xenophon’s *Hellenica* Euryptolemus, a third cousin of Alcibiades, and a friend of the accused general Pericles, delivers a speech in an effort to defend the six Athenian generals accused of neglecting to recover the bodies of the dead sailors. In this speech Euryptolemus protests that it is inconceivable that the Athenians had allowed Aristarchus to stand trial according to the law, and had given him a whole day to defend himself as he pleased, but were denying the same right to the people who had delivered such a crashing defeat to the enemies. Euryptolemus must be alluding here to a trial in which Aristarchus defended himself alone, a trial that was conducted by a democratic court, the accusation being his conduct in relation to the Oenoe fort, and subversion of the democracy, not defence of Phrynichus at his posthumous trial. It emerges, therefore, that Lycurgus presents a distorted account of the events connected with Phrynichus’ posthumous trial. But, perhaps Xenophon and Lycurgus’ accounts are not totally irreconcilable. Given that Euryptolemus was addressing a contemporary audience perfectly aware of the fate of such controversial a personality as Aristarchus, some of whom may have sat as jury in his trial, his testimony rather corroborates Lycurgus in that both Aristarchus and Alexicles were condemned to death. But either the fourth century orator misunderstood the context in which their trials arose, two unconnected processes which resulted from the otherwise unattested to us arrest of the two oligarchs, which may have occurred between 411

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125 Xen. *Hell.* 1.7.28.
126 For suggestions as to the date of the trial, see Avery 1959: 69; Ostwald 1986: 403.
127 On the use and misuse of history by the attic orators P. Rhodes has commented: ‘the extent to which inaccuracy could be risked even in examples of recent history where we might think that the inaccuracy could too easily be exposed for the risk to be worth taking is itself striking.’ Rhodes cites Andocides 3. 3-12 which is is full of errors and Aesines 2.172-176 (“‘Alles eitel gold”? The Sixth and Fifth Centuries in Fourth-Century Athens” in *Aristote et Athènes: Friburg 23-25 mai 1991. études rassemblées par Marcel Piéart* Paris 1993: 62). On the use on the part of the orators of official documents, among which decrees sometimes forged, as supporting evidence see R. Thomas *Oral Tradition and Written Record in Classical Athens* Cambridge 1989: 83-94.
and 406 B.C.,

Jameson attempted to save the credibility of Lycurgus’ version by assuming that the orator had got the reason for their execution wrong. The oligarchs did stay to defend Phrynichus, but when their defence failed, they managed to escape. We must, however, rule out such a possibility, since in the Athenian courts the jury’s verdict was enforced at once, the Eleven being responsible for the immediate arrest of the defendant and execution of the penalty. Besides, if one assumes the defendants managed somehow to dash to the exit before the Eleven could get hold of them, it is hard to imagine how they could escape the numerous bystanders outside the court who were watching the proceedings inside and could hear what was going on. In a public trial such as that of Phrynichus’ corpse one expects hundreds of people to have been present outside the building. One would expect their attitude towards two escapees who had dared to contest the will of the people to be particularly nasty.

We have offered a reconstruction of the developments in Athens after the sea battle off Eretria, arguing in a sense that those oligarchs most compromised in the eyes of their compatriots and most involved in the coup fled as soon as news of the defeat reached the city. This interpretation rejects the evidence, in the form of allusions and slight indications, coming from other sources, but relies on Thucydides. This is not to say that there is not a single grain of truth in Lycurgus (Critias’ decree for example is authentic), but the right procedure, when the two relevant sources divert from each other, is to correct Lycurgus through Thucydides and not the other way round. It remains to offer an explanation for the oligarchs’ decision to flee.

The key to understanding the Athenians in general and the oligarchs’ in particular state of mind on hearing the bad news is Thucydides’ statement that the defeat caused great consternation among the people, even greater than the disaster in Sicily. That was understandable under the current circumstances, i.e., the Athenians being

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129 Hansen has drawn a similar conclusion. He makes the astute observation that Lycurgus only mentions the names of Aristarchus and Alexicles after he had Critias’ decree read out to the court or the assembly. This, according to Hansen, proves that the orator could not find the oligarchs’ names in the bronze stele. His mentioning of them is the result of an inference on his part: ‘Phrynichus’ defenders were sentenced to death. Aristarchus was Phrynichus’ friend. Aristarchus was sentenced to death. Conclusion: Aristarchus was sentenced to death as Phrynichus’ defender.’ (Eisangelia: The Sovereignty of the People’s Court in Athens in the Fourth Century B.C. and the Impeachment of Generals and Politicians Odense 1975: 83 and no 8). This inference could have drawn on oral tradition.
132 See the testimonia in Boegehold 1995: 92-94.
beset by *stasis*, lack of ships and crews, imminent civil war, loss of their most valuable asset, Euboea, imminent invasion by the enemy, in which case the fleet on Samos would have been compelled to sail to the Piraeus to defend the city, the outcome being the loss of the whole of Ionia, the islands and the empire.\(^{133}\) In addition to the occupation of Deceleia and its financial repercussions, underscored by Thucydides earlier in a passage where he undertakes an analysis of the Athenian finance at the time of the Sicilian expedition,\(^ {134}\) the loss of Euboea, foreshadowed by the loss of Oropos,\(^ {135}\) must have had a tremendous impact on the Athenians. A lot of them had property on the island, land which had acquired either through inclusion in a *cleruchy*,\(^ {136}\) or simply purchase from a *cleruch*.\(^ {137}\) It is true that the Four Hundred had understood well the strategically important role of Euboea for the nourishment of the population within the city walls, a role immensely enhanced since the permanent presence of the enemy in Attica at Deceleia, and the loss of control of the fleet on Samos which simply meant that the Hellespont and its wheat were inaccessible to the regime. The meagre information we have indicates that the oligarchs had taken measures to secure the route from Euboea to the Piraeus through Sunium.\(^ {138}\) Those Athenians affected by the loss of the island and the subsequent loss

133 Thuc. 8.96.
134 Thuc. 7.28. Note in particular: (1) ἡ τῶν ἐπιτηδείων παρακομιδὴ ἕκ τῆς Εὔβοιας, πρότερον ἕκ τοῦ Ῥωποῦ κατὰ γῆν διὰ τῆς Δεκελείας θάσσων οἶος, περὶ Σουνίου κατὰ θάλασσαν πολυτέλης ἐγίνετο… ‘the transportation of the foodstuff from Euboea, while it was quicker from Oropos through Decelea before, now it had become expensive by sea through Sounion’ (the occupation of Deceleia) (4) δι’ αἱ καὶ τότε ύπό τῆς Δεκελείας πολλὰ βλαπτούσης καὶ τῶν ἄλλων ἄναλομάτων μεγάλων προοπτικῶν ὀδύνατοι ἐγένοντο τοῖς χρήμασιν ‘for those reasons at that time due to Deceleia which caused a lot of harm and the other expenses which had incurred, they became poor.’
135 Thuc. 7.60.1. On the importance of Oropos as an Athenian bridgehead into Boeotia, see L. Losada *The Fifth Column in the Peloponnesian War* Leiden 1972: 121.
136 Herodotus tells us that as early as 506 B.C., Athens had established a *cleruchy* of 4000 men in Chalcis (5.77). Athenian *cleruchy* on Euboea under Tolmides in Carystus (453/2 or 452/1): Paus. 1.27.5; Diod. 11.18. Diodorus raises the number of *cleruchs* sent to Euboea and Naxos to one thousand; under Pericles in 446/5: Thuc. 1.114; FGrHist 328 Philochorus F118. Diodorus (12.22) mentions one thousand *cleruchs*, whereas Theopompus FGrHist 115F386 raises the number to two thousand. A. Moreno argues for Athenian *cleruchies* also elsewhere on the island, e.g., Chalcis and Eretria (*Feeding the Democracy: The Athenian Grain Supply in the Fifth and Fourth Centuries B.C.* Oxford 2007: 99-100).
137 Moreno argues that the typical Athenian owner of land on Euboea was an absentee landlord (2007: 89-93). There is epigraphic evidence that many reach Athenians owned multiple lots of land in a pattern reminiscent of aristocratic land ownership in Attica, i.e., many scattered agricultural units. The Attic *stellaria*, the list of confiscated property owned by individuals involved in the Mysteries and Hermes affairs in 415 B.C., reveal that a certain Oeionias of Atene owned land in Le lentan, Diros and Geraestus, the value of which fetched over 81 talents (IG I\(^{3}\) 422, 217-218, 375; IG I\(^{3}\) 428; IG I\(^{3}\) 430, 36).
138 Thus, the decision of the Four Hundred to embark the crew of the Paralos on a transport ship, and send them to Euboea (Thuc. 8.86.9), and the appointment of Polyclitus as an officer in Eretria can be best understood as parts of a defence strategy, the objective of which
of income, would naturally belong to the *hoplite* class, the sort of people who one would naturally expect to have supported the oligarchy. Those people must have been disenchanted with, and even outraged by their leaders’ false promises about a successful pursuit of the war. Another important point Thucydides raises, in connection with the reception of the news of the defeat and the Athenians’ mindset, is the expectation that everything had been lost and that soon the enemy would knock at the gates.\(^{139}\) This expectation, one may infer, may have been shared by the extremists as well. Under these conditions, from the oligarchs’ point of view, it would have seemed prudent to seek shelter at the enemy’s camp, rather than face the wrath and the fury of their fellow-citizens.

We do not know the exact conditions and time in which Alexicles was caught and brought to trial in Athens. If Lycurgus got only the context of his trial wrong (*Against Leocrates* 115), Alexicles must have somehow been arrested sometime between 411 and 406. The exact circumstances under which these events unfolded are not known to us. Busolt observed that Xenophon’s passage, in contrast to Lykurgus’, points to the fact that Alexicles was caught and tried independently of Aristarchus (1893-1904: 3.2 1511 and no 1). Ostwald 1986: 403 and Avery 1959: 69 suggested that the date of Aristarchus’ trial should have been close enough to Euryptolemus’ speech for the Athenians to recall the case. Avery in particular suggested summer 407 and conjectured that Aristarchus was caught by Alcibiades on his triumphal return to Athens.\(^{140}\) If the testimony of the speaker of Lysias 18.9 has any value, Alexicles may have taken refuge in Deceleia whence he operated against the city of Athens on the side of the Peloponnesians. It is not inconceivable that he got caught prisoner in one of the skirmishes between the raiding party and Athenian forces. If, as we have suggested, he was young, revengeful action against his homeland would have seemed particularly apposite to him, bearing in mind his strong oligarchic convictions.

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\(^{139}\) Thuc. 8.96.3: μάλιστα δ’ ὑπός καὶ δι’ ἐγγυτάτου ἐθορύβει, εἰ οἱ πολέμιοι τολμήσουσι νενικηκότες εἰθῷ σφόν ἐπὶ τῶν Πειραιῶν ἔρημον ἄντα νεων πλείν· καὶ ὅσον οὐκ ἦδη ἐνόμιζον αὐτοὺς παρέῖναι ‘what bewildered them the most, due to the proximity, was lest the enemies dared to sail against the Piraeus, now that the harbour was empty of ships; they actually thought that they were already there.’

Alexicles is an extremely rare name in Attica. It appears only twice, the other bearer of the name being Alexicles, son of Satyros from the deme Aixone (Kekropis), PAA 120300, on a gravestone to be dated to the first half of the fourth century. The odds are, therefore, that this Alexicles is related to the oligarch.\textsuperscript{141}

\textsuperscript{141} Avery 1959: 17.
Andron
PAA 129130/129265

Andron’s case is perhaps most characteristic of the problems besetting Attic prosopography, in that the difficulties in reaching an undisputable identification are often insurmountable, when the patronymic and/or the demotic are not recorded in the sources.\textsuperscript{142}

An Andron, son of Androtion, appears in Plato’s \textit{Protagoras} to be in the company of the sophist Hippias of Elis.\textsuperscript{143} When Socrates and Hippocrates arrive at Callias’ house to meet Protagoras, Hippias and Prodicus, they find Protagoras in the portico surrounded by such famous Athenian figures as Callias, the host, Paralus and Xanthippus, Pericles’ sons, and Charmides, Plato’s uncle and member of the Piraeus Ten during the reign of the Thirty tyrants.\textsuperscript{144} He then glances at Hippias, sitting on a couch surrounded by another group of men:

\[ Τὸν \ δὲ \ μετ’ \ εἰσενόησα \ Ἡσίπαν τὸν Ἡλείον, \ καθήμενον ἐν τῷ κατ’ \ άντικρύ \ προστήφῳ \ ἐν θρόνῳ- \ περὶ \ αὐτὸν \ δ’ \ ἐκάθηνε \ ἐπὶ \ βάθρον \ Ἐρυξίμαχος \ τε \ ὁ \ Ακουμενοῦ \ καὶ \ Φαίδρος \ ὁ \ Μυρρινοῦσιος \ καὶ \ Άνδρων \ ὁ \ Άνδροτίωνος \ καὶ \ τῶν \ ξένων \ πολίται \ τε \ αὐτοῦ \ καὶ \ ἄλλοι τινές. \ ἐφαίνοντο δὲ \ περὶ \ φύσεως \ τε \ καὶ \ τῶν \ μετεώρων \ ἀστρονομικά \ ἄττα \ διερωτάν \ τὸν \ Ἡσίπαν, \ ὁ \ δ’ \ ἐν \ θρόνῳ \ καθήμενος \ ἐκάστοις \ αὐτῶν \ διέκρινε \ καὶ \ διεξῄει τὰ \ ἑρωτώμενα. \ (315C) \]

Next I noticed Hippias from Ellis sitting on a couch in the opposite portico. Around him, sitting on benches, were Eryximachus, the son of Acumenus and Phaedrus from Myrrhinous and Andron, the son of Androtion, and some foreigners, fellow-citizens of his and some others. They seemed to be placing such questions to Hippias as on nature and heavenly bodies, questions pertaining to astronomy. He sat on his couch and gave them explanations for each one of these matters and went through the questions in detail.

The dramatic date of the \textit{Protagoras} is set in about 433 B.C., before the outbreak of the Peloponnesian war.\textsuperscript{145} At that time Andron may have been in his (late?) teens and the fact that he was offered a first-rate and particularly expensive education with the best teachers available is an unequivocal sign of the wealth, social status and aspirations of his family. D. Nails observes that Andron should have been the youngest among those who gathered around Hippias, but consensus about Andron’s date of birth is yet to be reached.\textsuperscript{146} Hippias taught geometry, mathematics,

\textsuperscript{142} W. Thompson “Tot Atheniensibus idem Nomen Erat” in D. Bradeen and M. McGregor (eds.) \textit{ΦΟΡΟΣ: Tribute to Benjamin Dean Meritt} New York 1974: 143-149.

\textsuperscript{143} He is classified as PAA 129265. The editors of \textit{Persons of Ancient Athens} consider the identity with the oligarch as possible. \textit{LGPN} lists him as Andron (12), thus separating him from the oligarch who is listed as (1).

\textsuperscript{144} Xen. \textit{Hell.} 2.4.19.

\textsuperscript{145} C. Taylor \textit{Plato Protagoras} Oxford 1976: 64.

\textsuperscript{146} \textit{The People of Plato: A Prosopography of Plato and Other Socratics} Indianapolis 2002: 29. Nails, however, places his birth in 445 B.C., in which case Andron would have been only
grammar, rhetoric, dialectics, music and astronomy, and his erudition must have been despised by Plato. It is interesting that in this passage and in the Gorgias Andron is named by his patronymic, whereas the other persons either by the demotic or patronymic. It has been suggested that Plato wanted to draw distinction between two contemporaries with the same name, namely Andron Androkleous Gargettios (see below) and Andron Androtionos Gargettios. It is however, more likely that Plato wanted to relate Andron with his famous and universally recognizable son, Androtion. Of the other individuals named in the company of Hippias, we know that Eryximachus was, like his father Acumenus, a doctor. He was a good friend of Phaedrus and he might have been implicated in the mutilation of the Herms in 415 B.C. Andocides includes an Eryximachus among those who perpetrated the atrocity, but the identification of the mutilator with the doctor and friend of Phaedrus is not certain, for Andocides does not give the patronymic of the denounced persons. However, it has been assumed that the two references should be clustered under one individual on the grounds that in Plato’s Symposium, set in 416 B.C., a spectrum of figures are gathered together who, a year later would be implicated in the profanation of the Mysteries and the mutilation of the Herms. The other figure, Phaedrus the son of Pythocles from Myrrhinus, was a speaking character in Plato’s Phaedrus and Symposium. There, he is portrayed as an enthusiast for oratory and erotic themes. Plato may have exploited his origin (the deme Myrrhinus in Attica was named after its groves of myrtle) to draw a connection with erotic undertones between Phaedrus’ deme’s name and his interest in love.

147 With regard to astronomy, Hippias may have secularized the theories first expounded by the Ionian philosophers (W. Nestle Vom Mythos zum Logos Stuttgart 1940: 365-366). In Plato’s Hippias Major 285b he is depicted as an expert on the stars and the movement of the planets: ἂ δὲ καλλιστα ἐπίστασαι, τὰ περὶ τὰ ἁστρα τε καὶ τὰ οὐράνια πάθη; One cannot fail to detect, however, the irony in Socrates language. On Hippias, see Nestle 1940: 360-371; W. Guthrie The Sophists Athens 2003: 341-346.


149 Pesely 1995: 70.

150 Pl. Smp. 214b.

151 And. 1.35.

152 Nails 2002: 143; D. MacDowell Andokides On the Mysteries Oxford 1962: 86. It is definitely not a coincidence that an Acumenus was also denounced by Lydus for profaning the mysteries (And. 1.18). In both sacrileges the perpetrators were members of a few families and relatives with each other (R. Littman Kinship and Politics in Athens 600-400 B.C. New York 1979: 196), and it would be legitimate to think that this Acumenus was Eryximachus’ father.

415 B.C. he fled Athens as a result of his denunciation by the metic Teucer for having implicated himself in the profanation of the Mysteries.\textsuperscript{154} Andron also appears in Plato’s \textit{Gorgias}. The dialogue does not have a fixed dramatic date, but it is definitely set after the \textit{Protagoras}.\textsuperscript{155} Socrates is discussing with Callicles:

\begin{quote}
oίδα ύμᾶς ἐγώ, ὦ Καλλίκλεις, τέταρας δότας κοινωνοῖς γεγονότας σοφίας, σὲ τὲ καὶ Τείσανδρον τὸν Ἀφίδναίον καὶ Ἄνδρωνα τὸν Ἀνδροτίωνος καὶ Ναυσίκεδην τὸν Χολαργέα· καὶ ποτὲ ύμῶν ἐγὼ ἐπῆκουσα βουλευομένων μέχρι ὅποι τὴν σοφίαν ἀσκητῶν εἰς, καὶ οἴδα ὅτι ἐνίκα ἐν ύμῖν τοιάδε τις δόξα, μὴ προθυμεῖσθαι εἰς τὴν ἀκρίβειαν φιλοσοφεῖν, ἀλλὰ εὐλαβεῖσθαι παρεκελεύσθη ἀλλήλως ὧς μὴ πέρα τοῦ δέοντος σοφώτεροι γενόμενοι λήσετε διαφθαρέντες. (487c-d)
\end{quote}

I know that the four of you, Callicles, have become companions in wisdom, yourself and Teisander from Aphidna, and Andron the son of Androtion and Nausicydes from Cholargus. Once I overheard you deliberating on the extent to which wisdom should be practised, and I know that this opinion prevailed among you, not to be eager to philosophise with minuteness; rather you exhorted each other to be cautious lest you become more wise than necessary and become corrupted unawares.

One gets the impression that this passage is couched in subtle, dry irony and symbolism. Those young men, Socrates argues, are κοινωνοί to a kind of degenerated σοφία, a kind of meddlesomeness at which Plato always sneered.\textsuperscript{156} Perhaps Plato also disapproved of their world view, ideology and public image. Teisander was an offspring of a wealthy and well-known family of Aphidna. The property of his father, Cephisodorus,\textsuperscript{157} appears in the confiscation stele of the property of the Thirty as a means of locating exactly the confiscated lots. He might have owned property to the north of the confiscated land.\textsuperscript{158} On those grounds, Neils tentatively proposed that Teisander was born at about the same time as Andron, circa 445 B.C.\textsuperscript{159} Nausicydes is portrayed by Xenophon as a slave owner and a miller. Through the trade of barley flour he became rich, he kept herds of pigs and cattle and, owing to his surplus of wealth, he entered the liturgic class.\textsuperscript{160} In Aristophanes’ \textit{Ecclesiazousae} 424-426, it is

\textsuperscript{154} And. 1.15.
\textsuperscript{155} See, E. Dodds \textit{Plato Gorgias} Oxford 1959: 247 for a discussion on all historical events alluded to in the text and the improbability that Plato had intended to fix the dialogue chronologically.
\textsuperscript{156} Dodds 1959: 283 considers the possibility that this passage is a covert criticism against the Isocratean notion of ‘useless’ philosophy.
\textsuperscript{157} IG II² 1929, 22.
\textsuperscript{158} The inscription is SEG 16 121 and Cephisodorus’ name appears in lines 8-9. M. Walbank proposes that he is Teisander’s father (“The Confiscation and Sale by the Poletai in 402/1 B. C. of the Property of the Thirty Tyrants” \textit{Hesperia} 51.1 1982: 86).
\textsuperscript{159} Nails 2002: 295.
\textsuperscript{160} Xen. \textit{Mem.} 2.7.5-6.
implied that he sold flour at astronomical prices. Callicles, finally, was probably a historical figure. He is contemptuous of the masses, an attitude, no doubt, shared by Plato himself. He is well-educated (487b6), and eloquent. He upheld a life attitude which was gaining popularity in the closing years of the fifth century, and which could be summarised thus: ἡ δὲ γε ωἴμαι φύσις αὐτή ἀποφαίνει αὐτό, ὅτι δικαίον ἐστιν τὸν ἀλόιμον τοῦ χείρονος πλέον ἔχει καὶ τὸν δυνατότερον τοῦ ὀδυνατωτέρου ‘I believe that nature itself shows forth this, namely that it is just the better man to have more than the worse, and the stronger than the weaker.’ (Gr. 483c9-d2). He was a proponent of the ‘might is right’ doctrine, and inasmuch as human laws (νόμοι) represent a hindrance to the purpose of nature, set by the worthless masses, namely the prevalence of the strong and gifted over the weak, he was an adherent of tyranny. It emerges, thus, that Andron’s company encompassed young people largely from wealthy and well-known, respectable families. They were extremely sociable, energetic and extrovert. They were curious and desirous of knowledge. Some (Nausykides) proved themselves to be exceedingly successful businessmen, while others (Eryximachus) built a good reputation as a respected practitioner. They all seem to have had a keen interest in oratory for personal reasons which differed widely between them. We are not entitled, however, to attribute views and ideas to any of them solely on the grounds that they belonged to the same circle.

We know for sure that Andron came from the deme Gargettos, and that his son was the famous fourth-century Attidographer Androtion, mainly through epigraphic evidence. Androtion proposed a decree in 347/6 honouring Spartokus and

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161 J. Davies remarks: ‘To judge from Aristophanes’ notice of him (Eccl. 424) as ἀλφιταμοβός (corn dealer), his gains from his milling in the 390s were not all quite as legitimate as Xenophon’s language might lead us to believe’ (Athenian Propertied Families 600-300 B.C. Oxford 1971: 315). M. Vetta, on the contrary, casts doubts on the identity of Nausycides in Plato’s Gorgias with the one mentioned in Aristophanes’ Ecclesiazusae (Aristofane le donne all’assemblea Rome 1989: 187).

162 See Dodds 1959: 12-13 for discussion on the problem of his historicity. W. Guthrie (A History of Greek Philosophy 3: The Fifth Century Enlightenment Cambridge 1969: 102 concludes thus: ‘three views are possible and have been held: 1) he is purely fictitious, 2) the name is a mask for a well known character like Critias or Alcibiades, 3) he is a historical figure. The last is the most probable.’


164 Its location was between Hymettos and Pentelikon, at the modern Ieraka (J. Traill The Political Organization of Attica: A Study of the Demes, Trittyes, and Phylai and Their Representation in the Athenian Council Princeton 1975: 4; Map 1). The deme belonged to Aigeis and contributed four members to the Council of Five Hundred.
Pairisades in which the patronymic and demotic are recorded. Similarly, a decree moved ten years earlier, in 357/6 by the demos of Arcesine, honoured the politician Androtion. In addition, the entry under Androtion in the Suda lexicon runs: Άνδροτίων, Άνδρωνος, Άθηναίος, ρήτωρ καὶ δημαγωγὸς, μαθητής Ἰσοκράτους Ἄνδροτος, the son of Andron, an Athenian, a rhetor and demagogue, Isocrates’ pupil.

It seems probable that Andron’s family owned a farm in Gargettos which was apparently the source of its wealth. Andron’s father, Androtion must have been a wealthy Athenian with great aspirations for his son since he provided him with high quality sophistic education, something that only the rich families in Athens could afford. This assumption is supported by the fact that Androtion, the Attidographer wrote a farmers’ manual (Γεωργικόν), probably a treatise in one book which seems to have had good reception in antiquity. From the remaining fragments it emerges that Androtion had a keen interest in agriculture (imbued to him through his father?) and specialized knowledge, which might have derived from personal experience of life in the countryside and occupation with agricultural work. Androtion was still considered a wealthy man in 357/6, when at his own expense he met the cost of more than one talent for various services on behalf of the Arcesinians.

Since the discovery of six ostraka belonging to another Andron at the excavations carried out by the German archaeological institute during the period 1966-1968 in Athens, it has been proposed that Andron Androkleous Gargettios, the man whose name was written on the ostraka unearthed from the great Kerameikos deposit, may have been the member of the Four Hundred and the prosecutor of Antiphon, Onomacles and Archeptiolemus. If we can determine to which ostrakophoria Andron Androkleous’ six ostraka belong, we may be able to give a satisfactory

165 IG II² 212, 8; cf. IG II² 61, 7 (before 378/7), a decree in which Androtion was the epistates of the boule gives his deme, Gargettos.
166 IG XII 7 5 line 17.
167 F. Jacoby (Die Fragmente der griechischen Historiker Leiden 1968: 3b suppl. vol. 1 86) believes the last piece of information, i.e., that Androtion was Isocrates’ pupil, can be traced back to Zosimus and the tradition on Isocrates and ultimately to Hermippus, Callimachus’ pupil, who wrote at least three books titled Περὶ τῶν Ἰσοκράτους μαθητῶν. But the validity of Hermippus’ information has been challenged by Harding 1994: 18 on the grounds that this work tended to classify all prose-writers of the fourth century as Isocrates’ students regardless whether they were in reality.
168 F. Jacoby 1968: 3.2b 79 note 23. Jacoby observes that there seem to have been two revised editions in Hellenistic times by Phillipos and Hegemon.
169 FGH 324F75-82: fr. 75 on different species of fig-trees; fr. 76 on the etymology of the word συκή, from Συκεύς, a titan who was pursued by Zeus and was received by Gaia; fr. 77 on species of apples; fr. 78 on pears; fr. 79 on vats used to press grapes; fr. 80 on species of grapes; fr. 81-82 on cultivating myrtle and olive-trees.
170 IG XII 7 5, 4-16. Davies 1971: 33 points out that this expenditure indicates ‘substantial property.’
171 P. Harding 1994: 15.
answer to this identification problem. We know that the vast majority of the ostraka come from the ostrakophoriae in the 480s or soon afterwards, some from the period of Thoukydides’ ostracism, but none from that of Hyperbolus. H. Mattingly relates Andron’s ostraka to the ostracism of Thoukydides, son of Melesias, which he dates to 437/6. The candidate for ostracism, according to Mattingly, may have been an elder cousin of Andron Androtionos. Theoretically, therefore, he could have been the member of the Four Hundred, even though at an advanced age, if he was active in Athenian politics in 437 B.C. Pesely, without having access to the ostraka himself, assumed that if the ostraka come from an early ostrakophoria, Andron Androkleous may have been the grandfather of Andron of 411, but if they come from the ostracism of Thoukydides, he could have been an uncle, first cousin or first cousin once removed. It is possible, however, by surveying the archaeological evidence as well as examining the letter forms of these six ostraka, now available to me, to determine the date of Andron’s ostraka and the occasion in which he was voted against fairly precisely. The ostraka in the layer 2A of the great Kerameikos deposit were found in packets, probably transported there from elsewhere. Two groups of ostraka were identified: one with Kallias Kratiou being the predominant name and a second one with the names of Megakles Hippocraticus and Themistocles. R. Thomsen suggested that the names of those candidates who appear on a few ostraka represent the minor candidates; they are ‘scattered votes’ cast against those people when the ostrakophoriae against the better known men such as Kallias Kratiou, Megakles and Themistocles were held. In this case the famous candidates provide the chronological clue with the help of which we can date the lesser known candidates. On the grounds of all these S. Brenne has dated Andron’s ostrakophoria to 471 B.C., that is, the ostrakophoria in which Themistocles was ostracized.

Let us now turn to the letter forms, admittedly a less secure and often controversial method of dating. Dr Brenne has kindly allowed me access to his photographic archive of ostraka from the great Kerameikos deposit. In a private letter he communicated to me that the letter forms of Andron’s ostraka do not defer from the other ostraka found clustered together. In particular, the A and Γ look archaic; the former has a slanted cross bar, whereas the latter looks like an Λ. P is pointed, its

174 Pesely 1995: 70.
175 Brenne 2001: 32.
177 See the table in H. Immerwahr Attic Script: A Survey Oxford 1990: xxii. The A in the name Andron resembles that classified as number 5 (or 3) by Immerwahr. He concludes that the A with a horizontal cross bar (number 2 in his table) re-emerges and becomes standard on ostraka after the middle of the fifth century (ibid 133).
loop looking like a triangle.\textsuperscript{179} Lambda is backward slanting.\textsuperscript{180} Moreover, the name is spelled not with omega, but with omicron, ΑΝ∆ΡΟΝ, and the patronymic is spelt with omicron instead of ou. The text in the ostrakon I have seen goes: Άνδρον Γαργέτιον Άνδροκλέο. One might argue that letter forms, especially on ostraka, should not inspire great confidence when it comes to dating. A scribe could have used an archaizing alphabet well after this alphabet had been officially abandoned and become obsolete. In addition, ostraka are not official, state documents in which case rules and conventions about letter forms are expected to be observed more strictly. Therefore, dating based on letter forms is even less reliable with respect to ostraka. But in Andron’s case \textit{all} six ostraka bear signs of archaic letter forms, a fact that excludes the possibility of idiosyncracy on the part of the scribe. Taken together with the archaeological evidence, the letter forms on Andron’s six ostraka strongly suggest a date not much later than 480 B.C., and we may conclude with S. Brenne that the votes are likely to have been cast against Andron Androkleous at the ostrakophoria of 471 B.C.\textsuperscript{181} Less clear is, however, whether this Andron was a relative of Andron Androtionos. P. Siewert has acutely observed that Androtion was well-informed about and interested in the institution of ostracism, suggesting that this interest may well have stemmed from the family history.\textsuperscript{182} If this is true,
Andron’s family history encompasses the whole fifth century and stretches until the best part of the fourth, thanks to the Atthidographer Androtion.

The evidence for the participation of an Andron (the same as Andron Androtionos?) in the Four Hundred oligarchy comes from Harpocratio. Under the entry Ἀνδρῶν we read:

Ἀντιφών ἐν τῇ πρώτῃ τῆς Δημοσθένους γραφῆς ἑιμίκτα. Ἀνδρῶν ἁπαντήν τὸν Ψηφιομάταν τὸν γράφαντα τὸ ψήφισμα τὸ περὶ Αντιφώντος τοῦ ἤτορος. ἦν δὲ εἰς τῶν υἱῶν Ἁρπώνον.¹⁸³

Antiphon in the defence against Demosthenes’ indictment. Craterus in the ninth book of his Decrees says that Andron was the one who moved the decree about Antiphon the orator. Andron was one of the Four Hundred.

The first part of Harpocratio’s entry gives us the important information that Andron was somehow involved in a trial in which Demosthenes, the general in the Peloponnesian war, as a prosecutor had placed an indictment or an unconstitutional proposal (γραφή παρανόμων).¹⁸⁴ Unfortunately, we do not get the information in what capacity Andron took part in the trial, that is, whether he defended or opposed Demosthenes. We could, however, envisage the following possibilities:

1) Andron is the defendant in this case: a) As a friend of Antiphon he turned to him for his defence; b) This was a purely professional transaction, no personal relationship can be postulated.

2) Andron is not directly involved in the trial: a) He was only a witness of prosecution or defence; b) Reference to his name was made in the speech for another reason, unknown to us.

If Andron was the main defendant in this trial (case 1), the implication is that by the time of Demosthenes’ departure from Athens in the spring of 413 B.C. Andron had already been active in Athenian politics for some time, and he was conspicuous enough to attract Demosthenes’ hostile attention. In this case he would have been Demosthenes’ political opponent on a particular issue, a confrontation which resulted in the trial. Only in the case of 1a there could have been a personal bond or friendship between Antiphon and Andron. If 1b, 2a, 2b, then no conclusion can be drawn, but at any rate hostile relationship cannot be warranted out of Harpocratio’s entry. G. Pesely has put forward the idea that Andron’s prosecution of Antiphon may

¹⁸³ H. Avery opted for the reading ε΄ instead of θ΄ concerning the book of Craterus’ collection that contained the information on Andron, following Dindorf who believed that the ninth book contained a catalogue of Athens’ tributaries (24 and no 7). F. Jacoby thought the ninth book contained the decrees up to the year 411/10 (“Krateros” (1) RE 11.2 1922: 1618).
¹⁸⁴ That Demosthenes’ indictment was indeed a γραφή παρανόμων we learn from pseudo-Plutarch Life of Antiphon 833D: ἔπαινεται δ’ αὐτοῦ μάλιστα ὁ περὶ Ἑρώδου...καί ὁ πρὸς Δημοσθένη τὸν στρατηγὸν παρανόμων.
¹⁸⁵ Thuc. 7.20.2.
have resulted from this earlier speech. Andron may have been taking revenge on an old enemy or, if Antiphon and Andron had been friends, he might have been distancing himself from a man who at the time of his trial he was considered as traitor. However, as we have seen, we should exclude the possibility of personal animosity between the two men, at least as far as the evidence goes.

From the second part of Harpocration’s entry we learn that it was Craterus who included Andron’s decree in the ninth book of his compilation. Craterus himself may have used the state archives to compose his compilation rather than direct copying from the stelae, although the latter is not to be ruled out. But Craterus is unlikely to have used a literary source such as an Attis.

Pesely believes that Didymus of Alexandria may have been Harpocration’s source on the grounds that Didymus had written commentaries on Attic orators including Antiphon. He might have also been the source of the third part of Harpocration’s entry, that is, Andron was a member of the Four Hundred. But the assertion of Andron’s membership in the oligarchy, Pesely argues, does not seem to have been based on documentary evidence: first, it is unlikely that Craterus found this piece of information in the archives. Second, there was never published a list of the names of the Four Hundred and Patrokleides’ decree in 405 B.C. clearly stipulated that all records and documents be destroyed (And. 1.78–79). We may then conclude that the statement that Andron belonged to the Four Hundred rests on no documentary evidence and that it is a mere inference by a later researcher. Be that as it may, we cannot exclude the possibility that it was a correct inference after all. The fact that Demosthenes fails to incriminate Andron for having been a member of the Four Hundred cannot stand as a proof or indication that Harpocration’s information is false for the simple reason that Andron’s initiative could and would have certainly been viewed positively by his contemporaries and next generations of the Athenians as a move which rid Athens of its traitors. Demosthenes knew that Androtion would argue along these lines if he came forward with such an accusation.

Pesely argues in addition that the assertion on the part of Craterus or a later scholar that Andron

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187 B. Keil (“Der Perieget Heliodoros von Athen” Hermes 30.2 1895: 220) argued that the four decrees Caecilius had copied, including that of Andron, because of the anomalies in the preamble, namely that the name of the prytany is missing, and the date is put before the name of the mover of the decree, were copied from the state archive. The anomalies, according to Keil, had to do with the classification and archive retrieval systems. In addition, it would be unlikely that the Thirty would let the stele with the condemnation of Antiphon, Archeptolemus and Onomacles, their fellow-oligarchs stand in public reminding everybody of the treason in 411 B.C. cf. Jacoby 1922: 1618; Pesely 1995: 66.
188 It is also likely that the democrats destroyed all public documents on display erected by the Four Hundred during their reign after the restoration of the democracy in 410 B.C. (P. Rhodes A Commentary on the Aristotelean Athenaiou Politeia Oxford 1981: 336).
190 In the speeches 22 Against Androtion and 24 Against Timocrates.
was a member of the Four Hundred is conjectural and simply mistaken; Andron moved his decree after the downfall of the oligarchy and he is likely to have belonged to the Council of Five Hundred which probably succeeded that of the Four Hundred. In this case Andron did not take part in the coup at all.\(^{191}\) This is not a compelling argument since membership in the two councils in 411 must have overlapped, some members (the extremists) fleeing in autumn, but the majority staying in Athens to become members of the next moderate oligarchy of the Five Thousand.

Andron does not seem to have played a vital role in the oligarchy and his only involvement may have been the prosecution of Antiphon and his fellow-oligarchs. This incident, however, can hardly have given Demosthenes the scope to vilify Androtion through Andron’s treacherous or oligarchic dealings at the time of the first oligarchy, for Andron was bound to be remembered in this instance as a fervent Athenian patriot who rid his homeland of such shameless traitors as Antiphon and Archeptolemus. Androtion would have had no difficulty to underscore the services his family had rendered Athens by reminding the jury how his father saved Athens. The other two ancient sources referring to Andron as a member of the Four Hundred, the Suda lexicon and Bachmann *Anecdota Graeca* 1 p. 86, probably copy from Harpocration and therefore do not have independent value as evidence. I conclude that the evidence attesting to Andron’s participation in the oligarchy of the Four Hundred is not contemporary and should be treated with caution. Perhaps the tradition about Androtion and his supposed connections with Theramenian circles could throw some light on this thorny and perplexed issue.

Unfortunately, we know almost next to nothing about Andron’s political outlook in general, and his activities during the Four Hundred oligarchy in particular. As we have seen, if the identification of the oligarch with Andron Androtionos is correct, one could describe him as an intellectual, at least in his youth. Socially, he probably came from a wealthy family who resided in the countryside and adopted a rather conservative lifestyle. He might have joined the oligarchy out of a sincere conviction that a change in the government could turn the tide in the war which had not been going well for the Athenians until then. The financial and material loss his family and himself were bearing certainly played an important role in his decision to join the oligarchy. But whether his reasons were ideological or pragmatic is beyond our grasping. Most of the scholars classify him as a moderate and an associate of Theramenes.\(^{192}\) This necessarily need not mean that there existed an organized, ideologically clearly identifiable political entity within the Four Hundred. Rather, I would interpret the term ‘moderate’ as those who sought, in 411, a form of

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\(^{191}\) “Did Aristotle Use Androtion’s Attthis?” *Klio* 76 1994: 158.

administration (perhaps only as a means to address the ongoing crisis) open to an appreciable number of citizens and based on the hoplite class. Those people were not organized, but acted independently, or formed rather loose, small groups brought together through convergence of opinion on a specific issue, led by those inspirational individuals able to hold such temporary alignments for some (short) time.\footnote{F. Hurni Théramène ne plaidera pas coupable: Un home politique engage dans les révolutions athéniennes de la fin du 5 siècle av. J.-C. Basel 2010: 39.} It is rather doubtful that Andron had personal motives for prosecuting Antiphon, possibly arising from a past encounter with Antiphon (see above). He may have taken the initiative driven by political, patriotic considerations. He may equally well have been given instructions by Theramenes, the undisputed emerging political figure of that period, or he might have been doing Theramenes a favour in return of a past obligation. Given the state of the evidence, we should not give preference to any of these possibilities; rather all these questions should remain open.\footnote{On Andron’s political standpoint in 411, see also Pesely 1995: 68. On the political ambience in Athens at the time of the trial, see under the chapter Archeptolemus. On the anomalies in the decree of Andron, see Pesely 1995: 71-74 who draws attention to the corrupt archetype of the Pseudo Plutarch manuscript; H. Heftner 2001: 186-187 who accepts C. Hignett and G. de Ste Croix’ view that the text as we have it is not in its complete form owing to possible mutilation. On the date of the trial (autumn 411 and after the Phrynichus process), see B. Bleckmann Athens Weg in die Niederlage: Die letzten Jahre des peloponnesischen Kriegs Leipzig 1998: 377 and no 68; Pesely argues for the second prytany of 411/10 which fell around August 5th (1995: 74-76).}

The question of the identity of Andron Androtionos with the oligarch is interlinked with Androtion’s political outlook and the political heritage and biases the latter inherited from his father. It has been usually assumed that Andron as a member of the Four Hundred belonged to the faction of Theramenes, a group of moderate oligarchs. Andron imbued his son Androtion with these ideas and the son aired them in his \textit{Attthis}, a work displaying a conservative standpoint. In the \textit{Attthis}, Androtion tried to vindicate Theramenes and his father’s deeds through a favourable presentation of Theramenes, a fact reflected in \textit{AP} 28.5, which supposedly had Androtion’s \textit{Attthis} as its source. Moreover, the constitutional documents found in \textit{AP} 30, 31 may derive from Androtion who had access to his father’s archive.\footnote{P. Rhodes A Commentary on the Aristotelian Athenaión Politeía Oxford 1981: 367. Rhodes, however, cautiously remarks that it is equally possible that for chapters 30 and 31 the \textit{AP} made use of a source unknown to us (ibid 368).} My purpose is not to re-examine the relationship between \textit{AP} and Androtion’s \textit{Attthis}; rather, it is to point out that the assumption that Andron the oligarch is identical with Androtion’s father rests on no documentary evidence, and that the proposed identification should

\begin{itemize}
  \item \footnote{Rhodes, however, cautiously remarks that it is equally possible that for chapters 30 and 31 the \textit{AP} made use of a source unknown to us (ibid 368).}.
\end{itemize}
only be considered as possible.\textsuperscript{197} The only indication that Andron Androtionos may have joined the Four Hundred oligarchy is that his profile and social background make him a likely candidate. But this cannot by any means be regarded as evidence of his participation in the coup. On the contrary, Harding and Pesely have undermined the confidence of earlier scholarship in the identity of the oligarch with Androtion’s father.\textsuperscript{198} I conclude that the identification, given the present state of the evidence can only be regarded as possible.\textsuperscript{199}

Andron, Androtion’s father, was the subject of a venomous attack on the part of Demosthenes against his political enemy Androtion. In his speech Against Androtion, written on behalf of his client Diodorus and composed in 355/4 B.C., Demosthenes uses every means possible to discredit Androtion, who had recently, after the end of the Social War, emerged dangerously prominent in the political scene.\textsuperscript{200} In the speech, which was not the main in the accusation but a deuterology, Demosthenes hurls a string of insults, repeated a year or so later in his speech Against Timocrates, written in 353/2.\textsuperscript{201} I quote the relevant passages in full:

\begin{itemize}
\item[a)] \textit{Περὶ τοίνυν τοῦ νόμου καθ’ ὄν, ὥφληκτος αὐτοῦ τοῦ πατρὸς τῷ δημοσίῳ χρήματα καὶ οὐκ ἐκτετεικτὸς, οὐκ ἔξεστι λέγειν οὐδὲ γράφειν τούτω, ταῦτα δίκαια λέγειν ἄν ἔχοιτε εἰκότως, ἐὰν φη δεῖν ἡμᾶς ἐνδεικνύναι. ... ὡς οὖν οὐκ ὤφλεν ὁ πατήρ σου, τούτ’ ἐπιθέεις, ἢ ὡς οὐκ ἀποθαρσίας ἔχθεθεν ἐκ τοῦ δεσμωτηρίου, ἀλλὰ τα χρήματα ἐκτίσας. Εἴ \begin{itemize}
\item[b)] \textit{οὔτω δὲ αἰσχρῶς καὶ πλεονεκτικῶς ἔσχε πρὸς ύμᾶς ὡστε τῶν μὲν ἐαυτοῦ πατέρα ζητο \begin{itemize}
\item[197] See Pesely 1995: 65 and no 2 on scholars who argue for the identification.
\item[199] See note 83 above.
\item[200] F. Blass Die Attische Beredsamkeit 3³ 1 Hildesheim 1887: 258. This was the first attempt of Demosthenes at writing a speech for a public case, a γραφὴ παρανόμων against Androtion (Dionys. Amm. 1 c4).
\item[201] Blass 1887: 280. Demosthenes wrote this speech as well for Diodorus, it was a γραφὴ παρανόμων and meant to be the main accusation speech.
\end{itemize}
So corrupt and greedy was he towards you that he thought his father should escape from prison, after having been incarcerated by the state for owing money, without paying it back nor being put to trial, but any other citizen who could not pay should be dragged from their houses to prison.

According to Demosthenes, at some, unspecified, time in his life Andron became a public debtor, and owing to his inability to pay off the debt, he was imprisoned, but managed to escape. For this reason he lost his civil rights and became disfranchised, a condition that should by rights apply also to his son, Demosthenes’ rival, Androtion. The idle gossip, of course, found in passages c) and d), namely that Andron escaped in his shackles pretending he was a dancer at the Dionysiac festival, and that he spent many a five-year periods in prison have rather been designed to amuse the jury than be taken seriously. Yet, to what extent are we to believe Demosthenes? Munn seems to accept the validity of Demosthenes’ insinuations placing the occasion in which Andron defaulted on a loan in the context of the political struggle which preceded and led to the oligarchy of the Thirty tyrants. Others have been more cautious. Avery concedes that we cannot accept

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202 Schol. D. 24.250: δέον δὲ εἰπεῖν ‘πεντετηρίδα’ εἶπε πλῆθυντικῶς, ἐπὶ τῷ ἐπαχθέστερον φέρων τὸν λόγον. It is right to say that he said ‘five years’ in the plural, to make his speech more offensive. cf. Avery 1959: 27.

Demosthenes’ story as the complete truth, although he leaves room for a kernel of truth in it.\footnote{Avery 1959: 28.} Jacoby is more unequivocal. He asserts that Against Androtion and Against Timocrates are ‘perhaps the most unpleasant specimens of an altogether unpleasant custom,’ that is slandering an opponent.\footnote{F. Jacoby 1968: 3b sup. vol.1 93. See also Jacoby 1968: 3b sup. 2 p.89, for more references on this topic.} I am personally inclined to rather reject Demosthenes’ libel for the following reasons: Although the famous orator gives minute and lively details of Andron’s escape from prison, he fails to give concrete data as to the exact occasion on which he defaulted or, if it was known, the sum of money due. If his allegations were true, the only thing he needed do was quote from the relevant document. Secondly, Androtion had been around in politics by the time of the first trial (355/4) for at least twenty-five years. He might have started as an obscure and unimportant figure in the beginning, but by 355 he was already famous.\footnote{Assuming that Androtion was born at sometime between 415–405 B.C., he should have embarked on his carrier as a politician around 380, at the age of around thirty; \textit{cf.} Harding 1994: 14.} If his father had been disfranchised, how come that no other politician managed to capitalize on this and prosecute Androtion on the grounds of his \textit{atimia}? This is a valid argument reminding us that we should regard such sweeping allegations with skepticism.

It is doubtful if we are entitled to draw any conclusions as to the date of Andron’s death from D. 22.58. In this passage Demosthenes reproaches Androtion for his outrageous and immoral conduct, i.e., prostituting himself, and stresses the fact that Andron, his father, was responsible for such a horrible upbringing. Pesely concludes that the legitimate inference here is that Andron lived long enough to see his son reach adulthood.\footnote{Pesely 1995: 68 and no 23.} However, allegations of prostitution and reckless upbringing was a cliché in Athenian forensic speeches and we should, therefore, not rely on this passage for biographical information about Andron.

**Conclusion**

The problem of Andron’s identity seems to be insoluble as the information we possess about him is particularly scanty. It does not allow us to have a reasonably clear picture of his involvement in the oligarchy; indeed his very participation in it has been recently, not without foundation, disputed. If Andron the oligarch is the father of the Athidographer, thanks to his famous son Androtion, we can make reasonably fair inferences about his social standing, place of residence and wealth. The picture of him frequenting sophistic circles corroborates this information. Plato, however, insinuated that he hung around with a bad crowd, the company of Callicles, Nausycides, Teisander and Eryximachus. His involvement in the regime of the Four Hundred does not seem to have tainted his reputation or caused him trouble.
Apparently he was not a prominent figure among the oligarchs and he slips away quietly after the oligarchy collapsed.
Archeptolemus  
*PAA 210595*

Most of the modern accounts of the oligarchic coup in the summer of 411 B.C. in Athens pay little attention to this enigmatic, elusive, but also important figure that Archeptolemus is. Yet, his somewhat disputed origins, his political career before his involvement in the oligarchy, and his exact role in the coup urgently call for a reappraisal of the existing evidence and a thorough treatment of this individual, in the hope that new light will be shed on his life, political affiliations and the actual circumstances surrounding his death.

The name appears three times in the fourth century in Attica and two in the third. But it is not confined in the boundaries of Attica only. We know that three bearers of the name lived in Eretria, Euboea, in the fourth and third centuries, one in Torone, Chalcidice, in the fourth century, and one in Sinope, Pontos also in the fourth century, a fact that does not rule out the possibility that our Archeptolemus was not born in Athens, but perhaps in Miletus, his father’s homeland. For if our considerations are correct, it is likely that Archeptolemus moved with his father at an early age in the Piraeus, where Hippodamus was given a house to live, and most probably Athenian citizenship, apparently while he was supervising the building of the market bearing his name, and in recognition of his services to the city.

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208 The restoration in *SEG* 14 45, 2 [Ἀρχεπτόλεμος ἐγραμµάτευε] for a secretary in 371/0 B. C., which would be the fourth occurrence in the fourth century, is far from certain.

209 *IG* XII 245A, 88; 246A, 58; 246B, 16.

210 *SEG* 24 574, 18.


We do not know exactly how old Archeptolemus was when he arrived in the Piraeus, but we can be fairly sure that the port, along with the city of Athens, experiencing an unprecedented boom at the time, made a lasting impression on him and greatly broadened his intellectual horizons. Thanks to his father being a protégé of Pericles, young Archeptolemus had the chance to mingle with this international, riveting entourage of the great statesman and, no doubt, immerse himself in the gatherings, symposia and conversations that regularly took place in the houses of the Athenian intelligentsia. Growing up in this environment, the boy probably had the opportunity to be offered first class education by the best teachers in the Greek world readily available at that time, in mid fifth-century Athens. This combination of high quality education and socializing with the most productive and original brains of his era, enabled Archeptolemus to develop mentally and sparked in him the interest in politics which later, in the 420s, would launch him to relative prominence in the Athenian political scene.

**Archeptolemus in Aristophanes**

Archeptolemus first appears in the *Knights* of Aristophanes, produced in 424 B.C. If Aristophanes’ allusions bear any resemblance to historical reality, Archeptolemus should have already been a recognizable figure in the Athenian political scene to attract the poet’s attention. He is introduced in the play in the context of the peace negotiations between the Spartan envoys and the Athenian Assembly after the relationship: M. Erdmann “Hippodamos von Milet und die symmetrische Städtebaukunst der Griechen”, Philologus 42 1884: 193-227; A. von Gerkan Griechische Städteanlagen: Untersuchungen zur Entwicklung des Staedtebaues im Altertum Berlin 1924: 43-44; A. Gomme and D. Jones “Notes on Greek Comedy”, CR 8.1 1958: 1-5; R. Wycherley “Hippodamus and Rhodes”, Historia 13.2 1964: 135-139; A. Burns “Hippodamus and the Planned City”, Historia 25.4 1976: 414-428; D. Gill “Hippodamus and the Piraeus”, Historia 55.1 2006: 1-15; J. Traill Persons of Ancient Athens Princeton 1994 s.v. Ἱπποδάμας 538030. 213 M. Ostwald has drawn attention to the fact that Hippodamus’ participation in the Thurii mission in 444/3, together with such renowned personalities as Herodot and Protagoras, suggests that the architect supported Periclean politics and ‘may even indicate membership in the Periclean brains-trust’ (“Athens as a Cultural Centre” in L. Boardman, J. Davies and M. Ostwald (eds.) The Cambridge Ancient History 5: The Fifth Century B. C. Cambridge 1992: 316). In the case of Thurii, in particular, it is interesting to note the fact that the drawing of the constitution was entrusted to Protagoras (Diog. Laert. 9.50), whereas the town planning to Hippodamus (Hesychius, Photius s.v. Ἰπποδάμου νέμεσις; schol Ar. Knights 327). The whole enterprise may well have first been conceived, planned and given the green light by Pericles himself (Plut. Per. 11; Prae. ger. rei. 812D). It is a well known fact that in Pericles’ circle many a scientists and speculative thinkers, most notably Anaxagoras, could be found (Plut. Per. 6).
capture of a Spartan force on the island of Sphacteria, off Pylos.\textsuperscript{214} The Sausage Seller wonders how Paphlagon dare profess that he cares about \textit{demos}:

\begin{displaymath}
\text{καὶ πῶς σὺ φιλεῖς, ὡς τοῦτον ὁρῶν οἰκοῦντ' ἐν ταῖς φιδάκκαιοι/ καὶ γυπαρίσσι καὶ πυργίδιοι ἔτος ὅδουν οὐκ ἠλείρεις,/ ἀλλὰ καθείρξις αὐτοῖν βλήτεις; Αρχηπτολέμου δὲ φέροντος/τὴν εἰρήνην ἐξεκέδασας, τὰς πρεσβείας τ' ἀπελαῖνεις/ ἕκ τῆς πόλεως ῥαθαπυγίζων, σιὰ τὰς σπονδὰς προκαλοῦνται. (Knights 792-796)
\end{displaymath}

How on earth can you claim that you love him, since you watch him have lived in casks and crannies and towers for eight years and yet you don't take pity on him, but after having shut him in, you rob him of his honey? And you scattered to the wind the peace which Archeptolemus had brought, driving away the embassies which proposed a treaty and giving them slaps on the buttocks.

Before discussing the passage in more detail, some observations must be made here concerning the political background and the general mood in Athens, at the time the events associated with the Pylos affair were unfolding. After the Spartans had delivered their speech at Athens, in which they made peace proposals in order to get their men at Pylos—now captives of war—back, the Athenians finally rejected them, because they took it for granted that they could make peace any time they wanted as long as they held the Spartan prisoners, and because ‘they were grasping for more’ (τοῦ δὲ πλέονος ὤργοντο).\textsuperscript{215} S. Hornblower 1991-2008: 2177 has rightly observed that Thucydides’ presentation of the Athenian stance on the question of war or peace is here too sweeping, as he gives the impression that the Athenians were unanimous in their decision to reject the overtures for peace.\textsuperscript{216} He draws our attention to another source, namely Philochorus, asserting that when the Spartans sent ambassadors to Athens to negotiate the cessation of hostilities via a peace agreement,

\begin{footnotesize}
\footnotesubscript{215} Thuc. 4.17-20.
\footnotesubscript{216} Thucydides’ somewhat distorted presentation of the Athenian attitudes could be explained as follows: Having stated that the Athenians ‘were pressing for more’, he goes on to underscore how persuasive and influential Cleon was at that period (note the choice of words: μάλιστα δὲ αὐτοὺς ἐνήγε ἵπποι αὐτοῖς/ἐπεῖ δὲ πλήθει ῥαθαπυγίζων ἐπικρινασθαί ‘and he persuaded them that they give this answer’). In addition, Thucydides draws our attention to the almost theatrical, mesmerising performance of Cleon (Κλέων δὲ ἔνταξο δὴ πολὺς ἐνέκειτο). The devious, crafty demagogue cunningly tricks his audience into voting exactly what he had planned. For narrative purposes, any opposition is swept aside and silenced as Cleon climaxes in his crescendo. Alternatively, one may assume that for the sake of brevity, Thucydides has only reported the general outcome of this series of assemblies and debates, brushing aside the particulars.
\end{footnotesize}
Cleon rejected the proposals and then the assembly split, it was at variance. Philochorus seems to suggest that the decision to continue the war was taken by a narrow majority; a fact to which perhaps Aristophanes refers in his Peace 667, where Hermes reminds Trygaios that peace which came from Pylos on its own initiative was rejected three times in the assembly. These passages, therefore, strongly indicate that there took place a heated debate on the question of continuing the war or ceasing hostilities, and, even more importantly, that there was a staunch opposition to Cleon’s warlike politics. It remains to be seen what role, if any, Archeptolemus played in these developments.

Gomme suggested that Archeptolemus had probably been sent to Sparta as an ambassador, or had gone there on his own, and that by 425/4 he had not yet been made an Athenian citizen and being a stranger, a Milesian, he was suspect for his pacifism. But in the addenda to this volume (732) he cast doubts on the identity of Archeptolemus in the Knights 327 with the one mentioned in 794, arguing that the latter passage is actually an allusion to Archidamus, since in the eyes of the Athenians it was he who had started the war (cf. Thuc. 1.144.2; 7.18.2). Based on this interpretation, Gomme went on to question the family ties between the Milesian architect and Archeptolemus, and the identity of Archeptolemus the oligarch with the son of Hippodamus in the Knights 327. But this is only one possible way of reading the passage, and the rarity of the name – it appears only twice in the fourth century (PAA 210570; 210600) and twice in the third (PAA 210560; 210605), whereas there is no known fifth century bearer of this name, contemporary or near-contemporary to the oligarch - along with the compatibility of Archeptolemus’ pro-Spartan political outlook with his known activities during the regime of the Four Hundred, tell heavily against the existence of two different persons with the same rare name living in the same period. Besides, Aristophanes’ word play would have been particularly confusing to the audience since there was a real Archeptolemus

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217 FGrHist 328F128a=schol. Ar. Peace 665-667: Κλέωνος δὲ ἀντεπόντος ταῖς διαλύσεις στασιάσαι λέγεται τῇ ἐκκλησίᾳ. ‘Cleon having raised objections to the cessation of hostilities, the assembly quarrelled.’

218 Ἑλθοῦσα φησίν αὐτομάτη μετὰ τῶν Πύλῳ/ σπονδῶν φέρουσα τῇ πόλει κίστην πλέαν/ ἀποχειροτονηθήναι τρῖς εἰς τῇ ἐκκλησίᾳ: ‘when she came on her own initiative after the Pylos events bringing peace for the city in a big basket, she was rejected three times in the assembly.’ The scholiast to this passage is certainly confused as he mentions that the chairman (epistates) asked the Council (boule) three times whether it would vote for war or peace, the decision to go on war being exclusively in the Assembly’s capacity, of course. That there were protracted negotiations at this period is corroborated by Thucydides 4.41.4: οἱ δὲ μειζόνων τε ὀφέγγοντα καὶ πολλάκις φοιτώντων αὐτοῖς ἀπράκτους ἀπέσπασαν. If the Athenians had overwhelmingly decided to continue fighting, Spartan insistence on keeping sending embassies becomes incomprehensible. Did the Spartans hope that the ‘hawks’ may yield to their more sensible compatriots who were pleading for peace, and therefore think that a second or third try may not be entirely futile?

219 Gomme, Andrewes and Dover 1945-1981: 3 482.

220 Gomme and Jones 1958: 3.
around at the time. For, how could the poet expect the spectators to draw the association Archidamus=Archeptolemus=war beginner without identifying the second person in the equation with the son of Hippodamus? Neil is also rather cautious about attributing to Archeptolemus any part in the negotiations. He believes that Aristophanes chose the name partly for the pun: ‘Delawarr brought peace in his hands.’ A neater explanation is offered by Sommerstein. He believes that the Spartans, having previously failed to persuade the Athenians (Thuc. 4.17-22), approached Archeptolemus who, being sympathetic to their cause, and probably knowing some of them personally, spoke on their behalf in the assembly in favour of their proposals. In conclusion, Philochorus and Aristophanes’ passages seem to suggest a period of uncertainty and heated debate in the Assembly, and it would be legitimate to posit Archeptolemus’ anti-Cleon and pro-peace stance at this time. This is a plausible reconstruction, though we should remind ourselves that positive evidence is lacking.

Archeptolemus is mentioned in another passage in the *Knights*. The chorus is asking Paphlagon:

> ἄρα δή τ' οὖκ ἀπ' ἀρχής ἔδηλους ἀναιδεῖαν,/ ἡπερ μόνη/ προστατεῖ ῥητόρων;/ ἦ σφι πιστεῦων ἁμέργει τῶν ξένων τοὺς καρπίμους/, πρώτος ὄν· ὁ δ' Ἰπποδάμου λείβεται θεώμενος (322-327).

Have you not always shown that blatant impudence, which is the sole strength of our orators? You push it so far, that you, the head of the State, dare to milk the purses of the opulent aliens and, at sight of you, the son of Hippodamus melts into tears. (translated by Eugene O’Neill Jr)

This is a context different from the peace negotiations, but in both passages the opposition to Cleon is well established. Here Archeptolemus is disgusted by Cleon’s treatment of the rich allies, namely economic exploitation presumably through extortion or threat of legal action. Did Archeptolemus’ concern for rich allies falling victims to Athenian demagogues have to do with him being sensitive in allied affairs himself being a ‘naturalized’ Athenian only? λείβεται θεώμενος may imply

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223 A fact already noticed by the scholiast to Ar. *Knights* 794: παρ’ ἱστορίαν τοῦ Ἀρχεπτολέµου ἐμνημόνευσεν... οὐ μήν Ἀρχεπτολέµου πρεσβεύοντος τινος. However, he mixes up the Pylos negotiations with the one-year truce, described by Thucydides at 4.118-119, from where the scholiast copied the list of signatories.
224 Archeptolemus’ criticism has potentially oligarchic overtones as it reminds us of the criticism levelled in [Xen.] *AP* 1.14; there it is argued that the political ascendancy of the Athenian *demos* rests on its domination over the *chrestoi*, that is, the prominent citizens, of the allied cities. The Athenian *demos* deprives those individuals of their civil rights, robs them off their money and assassinates them; cf. J. Marr and P. Rhodes (eds.) *The ‘Old Oligarch’* Oxford 2008: 84-87.
negative criticism, i.e., reproach of his inactivity, but it may also point to Archeptolemus’ weakness compared to Cleon’s political muscle (πρῶτος ὄν). At any rate, both passages in the Knights seem to confirm that Archeptolemus’ opposition to Cleon encompassed several political issues, e.g., policy towards the allies, the question of war, and was sustained over a period of time, during which Archeptolemus rose to prominence. This opposition to his bitterest enemy may have prompted Aristophanes to treat him gently, a privilege rarely conceded to politicians by the poet, and an indication that the particular politician pursued the kind of politics Aristophanes himself was fond of, that is conservative.

Lysias 12.67

There are many questions we would like to pose concerning Archeptolemus’ activities prior to and during the reign of the Four Hundred. When exactly he joined the enterprise, with whom he aligned politically, what his contribution to the movement was. His participation in the last, fateful embassy to Sparta, along with other notorious die-hard oligarchs has led some scholars to classify him as extremist. Unfortunately, the sources do not allow us to draw a clear picture of these developments, save for a reference in Lysias’ speech Against Eratosthenes (12.67) in the midst of a venomous attack on Theramenes. The speaker, Lysias himself, asserts:

βουλόμενος δὲ τῷ υμετέρῳ πλήθει δοκεῖν Ἀντιφώντα καὶ Ἀρχεπτόλεμον φιλήτατος ὄντας αὐτῷ κατηγορῶν ἀπέκτεινεν, εἰς τοσούτον δὲ

226 Sommerstein has remarked ‘The number of living male Athenians mentioned favourably in comedy during the period studied is just five, and these are: Archeptolemos, Nikias, Oulios son of Kimon, Sophokles, and Thoukydides son of Melesias.’ Save Sophocles ‘they are all opponents of the dominant radical democratic trend.’ (“How to Avoid Being a Komodoumenos” CQ 46.2 1996: 334). Avery 1959: 42 has suggested that Archeptolemus may have been Antiphon’s friend since the Pylos affair and that both men were ‘partners against the extreme democracy in 425 as they were in 412/11’, because both men opposed Cleon at the time: Antiphon had written forensic speeches in defence of allied cities against excessive tax assessment and had favoured peace with Sparta (Avery, following Maidment, dates the speeches to 425. However, other dates are equally possible for the speeches (see, Avery 1959: 42 and no 13), and we should be careful not to attribute certain beliefs to a writer of a forensic speech written on behalf of a client. In addition, the circumstances of 425 were totally different from those of 411, and political alignments lasting over a decade are hard to be found in Athenian politics.
227 Thuc. 8.90.1-2; See Avery 1959: 40 and no 9 for references.
228 T. Murphy has argued that Lysias embarks on this attack on Theramenes due to lack of hard evidence against Eratosthenes. The speech writer strives to exploit class tensions rampant in post-war Athens, and resorts to generalisations in the hope of raising suspicion on the part of the democratic majority against a ‘persistent oligarchic threat’ (“The Vilification of Eratosthenes and Theramenes in Lysias 12” AJP 110.1 1989: 44-48).
κακίας ἦλθεν, ὡστε ἄμα μὲν διὰ τὴν πρὸς ἐκείνους πίστιν ὑμᾶς κατεδουλώσατο, διὰ δὲ τὴν πρὸς ὑμᾶς τοὺς φίλους απόλεσε.

As he wanted to appear faithful to you, he caused the deaths of Antiphon and Archeptolemus, who were most intimate friends of his, by levelling accusations against them, and he reached such a great degree of baseness that at the same time, because of his faith in them, he enslaved you, and because of his faith in you, he lost his friends.

In this passage Lysias is striving to demonstrate that Theramenes belonged to a circle of men who not only co-operated in politics, but were connected socially with bonds of close friendship as well. Lysias’ effort here is twofold: On the one hand he attempts to debunk Theramenes’ politics in the two oligarchies, since he is aware of the wholehearted approval and endorsement Theramenes enjoyed by a considerable part of the Athenian public and intelligentsia (12.62). On the other hand, he strives to cast Theramenes in a bad light in terms of morality. This man betrayed his best friends due to his selfishness and wickedness and caused their deaths. It is not a coincidence that Lysias fails to mention the reason the two men were condemned to death, or that the final verdict was passed by a popular court. Scholars have discerned his motives in attacking Theramenes personally, and doubts have been cast on the credibility of the information Lysias provides us here. It is obvious that this is an attempt at vilifying Theramenes and Lysias is using in this passage his favourite argument *e contrario*. In particular he creates two dipoles, Theramenes and his friends, and Theramenes and the Athenian citizens, who in this case are represented by the jury. In this way Lysias is able to exploit a rhetoric device doubly exposing Theramenes’ betrayal. It should be pointed out that Lysias achieves his objective by using language which is highly emotionally charged. Indeed, φιλότατος (superlative of φίλος: ‘dear one’, ‘one’s own’, ‘friend’) is a word frequently used in epic and tragedy (especially by Euripides). In the latter it usually denotes a variety of relationships, it is used in various contexts, and it is often spoken in moments of

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229 G. Pesely *Theramenes and Athenian Politics: A Study in the Manipulation of History* PhD Dissertation University of California, Berkeley 1983 110-111; Avery 1959: 39 though conceding that Lysias is biased towards Theramenes, is ready to accept the information as valid. D. Kagan sees these remarks as part of a ‘tendentious and hostile attack on Theramenes,’ but he seems to miss the point Lysias is trying to press here: Theramenes is a treacherous and unscrupulous fellow who does not hesitate, for the sake of personal aggrandisement, to put to death his best friends, ‘friends’ taken here not as ‘political comrades’ but literally ‘personal friends’, ‘pals.’ (*The Fall of the Athenian Empire* Cornell 1987: 208). J. Beloch, on the other hand, seems to accept the existence of a personal relationship, rather than political (*Die attische Politik seit Perikles* Leipzig 1884: 75).

230 On the use of the argument *e contrario* in Lysias’ speeches, see J. Bateman “Some Aspects of Lysias’ Argumentation” *Phoenix* 16.3 1962: 157-177. Bateman argues for the subtlety of the particular kind of argument which creates a situation implicating the audience intellectually and emotionally (163).
anguish. In Thucydides it appears only once at 3.57.3, where the Plataians call the Spartans τοὺς πρὶν φιλτάτους because of their common cause and fight against the Persians in 479 (note the emotional pleading of the Plataeans here who are in grave danger). In Xenophon it appears three times, most notably at 2.4.13, Thrasybulus addressing his troops before the battle at Munychia against Critias and the Thirty, where τοὺς φιλτάτους τῶν ἡμετέρων are the relatives and friends of those supporting the democratic cause, a deeply moving speech again. In oratory it is rather seldom used, a close parallel being Aeschines 2. 152, where the speaker rhetorically asks the jury if he could ever betray the three children he has brought with him in the court, and opts for Philip's friendship instead. Apparently, Lysias here is using an emotionally charged word which was probably in vogue at the time, knowing perhaps that many members of the jury might have heard it as audience in one of Euripides' plays. The man who resorted to blatant lies claiming that Alcibiades along with Adeimantus betrayed the Athenian cause and handed over the ships to Lysander on the eve of the sea-battle at Aegospotamoi and expected to get away with it was surely capable of subtler distortions of reality. It emerges, then, that in this passage an attempt at casting Theramenes in a bad light is at work. The supposed friendship of Theramenes, Antiphon and Archeptolemus is, therefore, an unwarranted assertion on the part of Lysias and should meet with our suspicion.

There are, however, other considerations, of political nature, that make Lysias' assertion of the existence of a personal bond between the three men sound spurious. Xenophon in his Hellenica states that in the initial period of the regime of the Thirty tyrants, Critias was a friend of Theramenes and that both men were of the same opinion with regard to the optimal political action to be undertaken. There seems to be proof that this is reliable information. Their friendship may have dated back to the period immediately after the fall of the Four Hundred, although the possibility that the contacts began before the downfall of the regime should not be ruled out. Theramenes' primary concern at the time was to restore relationships and communication between the Five Thousand and the fleet stationed at Samos, and

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232 τοὺς πάντων ἄνθρωπος ἐμοὶ φιλτάτους προδοναι Φιλίππῳ. '(I could ever) betray the dearest to me among men to Philip.'

233 Lys 14.38. It is important to note that the trial for which the speech was written took place just a few years after the end of the Peloponnesian war; still, Lysias was confident that the jury would not notice his lies.

234 2.3.15: τὸ μὲν οὖν πρῶτον χρόνον ὃ Κριτίας τῷ Θηραµένει ὁμονύμων τε καὶ φίλος ἦν. 'in fact, it the beginning Critias was like-minded with Theramenes and a friend of his.'
consequently with Alcibiades. In those days, Critias was acting as Alcibiades’ representative in Athens. He moves the decree stipulating Phrynichus’ posthumous trial;\textsuperscript{235} he also proposes and succeeds in effecting Alcibiades’ recall.\textsuperscript{236} It is likely that Theramenes approached at that time Critias, and saw to it that he connected personally and socially with him. He had good reasons to do so. They both had common enemies (Phrynichus) and Theramenes hoped that they would also have common friends (Alcibiades).\textsuperscript{237} By approaching Critias he hoped to enter Alcibiades’ circle, if he had not had the chance to meet him personally until then.\textsuperscript{238} Those three men came from well established, old, aristocratic Athenian families, and in the 411 circumstances it had so chanced that their interests converged, if they were not virtually identical. Given Theramenes’ opportunism, it is not unlikely that he approached Critias with a view to forging a close relationship and co-operation with Alcibiades later. He would thus, gain popularity and have the chance to be in the spotlight of the Athenian political scene. This idea is supported by Theramenes’ subsequent moves during the regime of the Five Thousand, and later after the restoration of radical democracy as his close co-operation with Alcibiades in the Ionian war highlights, when both men held the generalship and played an active role in its prosecution. Therefore, a friendship with Alcibiades’ close friend was not only beneficial but also politically correct in that period.

For these reasons, Lysias’ claim that Theramenes betrayed his closest friends, Antiphon and Archeptolemus, should arise suspicion. It is not possible that

\textsuperscript{235} Lyc. Against Leocr. 115.

\textsuperscript{236} Plut. Alc. 33. Critias’ initiative is presumably to be placed within the context of autumn 411, that is post-Four Hundred era, but Andrewes proposed 408/7 prior to Alcibiades’ return as a possible context (“The Generals in the Hellespont 410-407 B.C.” JHS 73 1953: 3 and no 7). Diodorus’ assertion that it was Theramenes who instructed the demos to recall Alcibiades after the deposition of the Four Hundred does not necessarily contradict Plutarch. Theramenes was the emerging dominant figure at the time and certainly favoured the rapprochement with the fleet on Samos and Alcibiades. Diodorus may have been telescoping and arbitrarily attributed to him what in reality was a motion of Critias, a motion which, at any rate, Theramenes himself strongly endorsed.

\textsuperscript{237} Since the decree forbidding the return of the exiles was moved primarily to hinder Alcibiades’ return to Athens (Thuc. 8.70.1), the latter’s unpopularity within the Four Hundred should not be doubted. Antiphon himself is very likely to have been one of Alcibiades’ bitterest enemies. He had written a libel against Alcibiades (\textit{Kατὰ Ἀλκιβιάδου λοιδορίαι}) (fr. 66, 67 Blass) accusing him of licentiousness and murder. See the discussion in H. Heftner Der oligarchische Umsturz des Jahres 411 v. Chr. und die Herrschaft der Vierhundert in Athen: quellenkritische und historische Untersuchungen Vienna 2001: 70 and no 328. For the presumed friendship between Alcibiades, Theramenes and Critias, see W. McCoy Theramenes, Thrasybulus and the Athenian Moderates PhD Diss. Yale University 1970: 126 no 49.

\textsuperscript{238} In Theramenes (page 235) it is argued that the supposed friendship between Alcibiades, Thrasybulus and Theramenes during the latter’s early days is theoretically possible, but we lack evidence of its existence.
Theramenes could entertain any hopes to approach Alcibiades while simultaneously being Antiphon’s best friend. He was a shrewd statesman and must have discerned in the initial phase of the regime of the Four Hundred that their choices would inevitably lead to a political dead-end. When Alcibiades, early in the reign of the Four Hundred, gave his ultimatum, through the envoys sent by the Four Hundred to Samos, that Athens should carry on the war more vigorously and abstain from any peace negotiations with Sparta, a policy, according to E. David, Theramenes himself is likely to have promoted energetically, the latter realised that the two camps were on a collision course. He therefore, rightly as it soon proved, opted to break away from the radical oligarchs, stir the opposition, and make overtures to the other camp. We cannot, therefore, use this passage to prove that Archeptolemus was a personal friend of either Theramenes or Antiphon. This passage only proves what we know from [Plut.] Life of Antiphon 833E3-F12, namely that Theramenes prosecuted the two men in his capacity as a general.

The last embassy to Sparta

Archeptolemus’ fate was sealed when he took part in the final embassy to Sparta comprising twelve delegates from the oligarchs’ ranks, among whom Antiphon and Phrynichus. Thucydides eloquently narrates that after the return of the oligarchic envoys from Samos the opposition within the Four Hundred became more brazen, determined to achieve their political goals, namely the appointment of the body of Five Thousand and the participation in the affairs of a broader basis of the Athenian populace than hitherto. The hardliners of the regime were alarmed, and after the failure of the oligarchic coup on Samos they hurriedly began to send embassies to Sparta to negotiate the end of hostilities and a peace agreement on whatever terms tolerable. At the same time they began to build a wall at Eetioneia, ostensibly to prevent an attack from the democratic fleet at Samos, but in reality to admit the enemy navy, as their last resort to remain in power. The delegates of the last embassy failed to reach an honorable agreement with the Spartans, but also failed to rid themselves of the taint of a treacherous secret pact, as Thucydides’ words

239 Thuc. 8.86.6-7.
240 The policy of reconciliation with Sparta might have already been advocated by Theramenes himself as early as the Colonus assembly (E. David, “Theramenes’ Speech at Colonus”, AC 64 1995: 17-19). See, however, the doubts expressed by Hefner 2001: 128-129, namely that the firm resistance to Agis’ attack on the city walls (Thuc. 8.71.1f.) and the turbulent period leading to Antiphon and Phrynichus’ conviction as traitors, highlight the firm determination in a wide circle among the hoplites and even the knights in Athens to prosecute the war. Peace with Sparta, therefore cannot have been openly advocated, as David supposes, although of course the idea was ripe and popular among the extremist circles within the Four Hundred; see also under Theramenes, pages 246-249.
241 For the view that there might have been only ten men in total in this embassy, see R. Develin The Athenian Officials 684-321 B.C. Cambridge 1989: 162; Ostwald 1986: 393.
242 Thuc. 8.89-90.
insinuate. There are several questions we would like to pose here, but our evidence, scanty as it is, cannot provide us with answers. Of the twelve oligarchs who travelled to Sparta we know the names of four only: Antiphon, Phrynichus, Onomacles and Archeptolemus. It is regrettable that no more names are known to us because we could then discern possible personal and political affiliations within the delegation. As the evidence stands, Onomacles must have been very close to Antiphon politically and ideologically. Phrynichus, Alcibiades’ arch enemy, was drawn in the oligarchic movement as soon as it became obvious that his rival would not put his back into that undertaking. But it is not clear where Archeptolemus stood in relation to Antiphon and the other hardliners in the Four Hundred oligarchy. We have seen that Lysias’ claim that Archeptolemus, Antiphon and Theramenes were intimate friends should not be taken at face value. Lysias’ passage tells us nothing more than that the three men collaborated in the oligarchy, but this regime comprised men of widely diverse political convictions, personal aims and social backgrounds. His peace initiatives in the 420s cannot be taken as an indication that he was prepared to betray Athens to the enemy in 411 B.C. We should, therefore, abstain from labeling Archeptolemus as ‘extremist’, or ‘traitor’. We lack so much information about this embassy and any considerations can only be conjectural. However, the high number of the delegates may indicate that the Spartans did not conduct the whole negotiation process in the presence of all of them. If Thucydides’ τοις ξύμπασι ξυμβατικόν is taken to mean not to all members of

243 8.91.1: ‘οί έκ της Λακεδαίμονος πρέσβεις οίδιν πράξαντες ἀνεχώρησαν τοῖς ξύμπασι ξυμβατικόν.’ ‘the ambassadors returned from the Lacedaemon without having achieved anything in the nature of an agreement, at least nothing for the Athenians as a whole.’ S. Hornblower 1991-2008: 3 1017 rightly observes that the hyperbaton here, that is, an unusual word order, has the effect of a qualification or afterthought. The oligarchs had struck a deal with the Spartans after all, but the price was Athens’ freedom. In his note to 90.2 he observes: ‘the real, emergency decision was made by an inner few...and these few will have included those here named’ (i.e., Phrynichus and Antiphon). Unfortunately we have no information whatsoever if Archeptolemus was ever included in this ‘inner few’ circle. On the negotiations and the peace terms in discussion, see Kagan 1987: 192-193, who takes the words τοις ξύμπασι to mean the whole of the population (contra Andrewes (Gomme, Andrewes and Dover 1945-1981: 5307) who believes that the word refers to the Four Hundred as a body only) ; Ostwald 1986: 393; Heftner 2001: 261 points out that the embassy embarked on its mission against the will of the majority within the Four Hundred.

244 F. Sartori argues that Onomacles was a member of the hetaireiai (Le etere nella vita politica Ateniese del 6 e 5 secolo a. C. Rome 1957: 119-121).


246 Already in 1877 K. Pöhlig (Der Athener Theramenes Leipzig 252 no 9) remarked: ‘in dem Bestreben, das Gehässige dieses Prozesses noch zu erhöhen, macht beide Angeklagte sogar zu den besten Freunden des Theramenes.’
the embassy then it becomes clear that some members of the embassy were made privy to a secret pact, the rest in the panel being left unaware. Is it not possible that the secret round, in which a deal to deliver Athens to Sparta was probably struck, was conducted with Antiphon, Phrynichus and possibly some other extremist only, and that the rest of the board were kept in the dark?

Apart from Lysias, the only information we have about Archeptolemus’ participation in the oligarchy is Andron’s decree initiating the trial of his, alongside Onomacles and Antiphon. I quote the whole text:

ἔδοξε τῇ βουλῇ μιᾷ καὶ εἰκοστῇ τῆς πρυτανείας· Δημόνικος Ἀλωπεκήθεν ἐγραμμάτευε· Φιλόστρατος Παλληνεὶς ἐπεστάται· Ἀνδρὼν εἶπε· περὶ τῶν ἀνδρῶν, οὕς ἀποφαίνουσιν οἱ στρατηγοί προσβεβομένους εἰς Δακεδαίμονα ἐπὶ κακῶς τῆς πόλεως τῆς Ἀθηναίων καὶ [ἐκ] τοῦ στρατοπέδου πλένε ὕπο πολέμιας νεὼς καὶ πεζέσας διὰ Δεκελείας· Ἀρχεπτόλεμον καὶ Ὀνομακέλα καὶ Ἀντιφόρντα συλλαβεῖν καὶ ἀποδοῦναι εἰς τὸ δικαστήριον, ὅπως δοῦσι δίκην· παρασχόντων δ’ αὐτούς οἱ στρατηγοὶ, καὶ ἕκ τῆς βουλῆς οὕσταν αὐτῷ τοῖς στρατηγοῖς προσελομένους μέχρι δέκα, ὅπως ἂν περὶ παρόντων γένηται ἡ κρίσις. ἀνακαλεσάσθωσαν δ’ αὐτοῖς οἱ θεσμοθέται ἐν τῇ αὐριόν ἡμέρᾳ καὶ εἰσαγόντων, ἑπειδὴ αἱ κλήσεις ἐξήκωσιν εἰς τὸ δικαστήριον, περὶ προδοσίας κατηγορεῖν τοὺς ἓμημέρους συνηγόρους καὶ τοὺς στρατηγοὺς καὶ ἄλλους, ἂν τὶς βούληται· ὅτου δ’ ἂν καταφησάσθη τὸ δικαστήριον, περὶ αὐτοῦ ποιεῖν κατὰ τὸν νόμον, ὃς κεῖται περὶ τῶν προδότων. [Plut.] Life of Antiphon 833E3-F12.

The Council decided on the twenty-first day of the prytany: Demonicos from Alopece was the secretary; Philostratos from Palene was the president; Andron proposed. Concerning the men whom the generals have denounced that they were on an embassy to Lacedaemon intent on doing harm to the city of Athens and to the camp, that they travelled on an enemy ship and went on foot through Deceleia, Archeptolemus, Onomacles and Antiphon, they are to be arrested and handed over to the court so that they face trial. The generals and up to ten other men from the Council, whom the generals may chose in addition, shall produce the accused so that the trial be conducted over the present charges. The six archons are to summon them tomorrow and bring the case into court as soon as the summons reach the court, and the appointed prosecutors and the generals and whoever wishes are to bring charges of treason. And whatever verdict the court reaches, let it do so according to the law which has been instituted against the traitors.

This piece of evidence provides us with important information concerning the political ambience and proceedings shortly after the collapse of the Four Hundred.247

The trial probably took place at least three weeks after the collapse of the oligarchic regime, and the process must have been an eisangelia to the Council, a judicial process against magistrates or citizens who had undertaken business of public interest. We shall discuss the implications of this later.

The trial of Archeptolemus, Antiphon and Onomacles was initiated in the aftermath and as a result of the naval defeat off Eretria, a disaster, according to Thucydides, graver than that of Sicily. The loss of Euboea caused the downfall of the Four Hundred oligarchy, and sparked off an intense inner-oligarchic struggle for power and survival, by means of a string of juridical processes, the outcome of which was triumphant for the group of oligarchs aligned around Theramenes. The politician from Steiria was emerging as the dominant figure in Athenian politics and was most probably personally involved in the trial as one of the prosecutors. The person who moved the decree to try the three men for treason was Andron, probably Androtion’s

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249 Hansen 1975: 114: ‘the trial against the ambassadors must be classified as an eisangelia partly because the ambassadors are charged with treason and partly because the council of 500 takes part in the preliminary stage of the trial’; Ath.Pol. 45.2.

250 8.96.1.

251 For an assessment of the political situation in Athens at this period and the political struggle that ensued in the aftermath of the collapse of the regime of the Four Hundred, see M. Jameson “Sophocles and the Four Hundred” Historia 20 1971: 547-558; Hignett 1952: 279; Ostwald 1986: 400-404; Kagan 1987: 206-210; B. Bleckmann 1998: 373-386; M. Munn The School of History: Athens in the Age of Socrates Berkeley 2000: 150-151; Heftner 2001: 312-322 places due emphasis on the impetus and uncompromised will of the masses tooust the tyrannical regime of the Four Hundred.

252 Antiph. fr. B 1,3 Maidment; Lys. 12.67. Plaintiffs: ([Plut.] Life of Antiphon 833E3-F12; Diod. 13.49.2-3 (Theramenes); Xen. Hell. 1.1.1 (Thymochares); Harpocrateion s.v. στασιώτης, s.v. Απόλλης (Apolexis), a sunegoros in the trial and one of the sungrapheis. See, however, the justified reservations raised by Ostwald 1986: 402 and no 225, who notes that Apolexis, according to Andron’s decree, could have been a private individual who volunteered.
father, and probably a member of the Four Hundred himself.\textsuperscript{253} We cannot
determine whether Andron was enlisted in Theramenes’ camp out of ideological or
other considerations and acted as his stalking horse, or whether his move sprang
from personal motives.\textsuperscript{254} A few years before 411 Antiphon and Andron had been
involved in the trial of Demosthenes, the fifth-century general, but we do not know
whether they supported the same side or clashed in court.\textsuperscript{255} As the evidence stands,
we cannot discern any personal issue between Theramenes, Andron, Apolexis and
Archeptolemus, nor of course, can we make any judgment as to the latter’s guilt.

At this point, it is worthwhile examining the political context in which the trial took
place by looking at the events prior to it, that is the three-week period between
the collapse of the regime and the trial of Antiphon and Archeptolemus. Soon after
the defeat at Eretria and the end of the rule of the Four Hundred,\textsuperscript{256} the posthumous trial
of Phrynichus took place,\textsuperscript{257} an event that has been regarded as crucial for the fate of
those oligarchs who chose to remain in Athens. In fact, it marked a turning point, the
beginning of a process which ‘eine entscheidende Etappe jenes Entwicklungprozesses..., der von der unblutigen Absetzung der Vierhundert zur
gerichtlichen Verfolgung ihrer prononciertesten Exponenten führte.’\textsuperscript{258} At the same
time, the murder and the trial were the outcome of the tension that had been piling

\textsuperscript{253} Pesely 1995: 67, however, has questioned the validity of Harpocration and Suda evidence
(s.v. Ἀνδρōν), arguing that Andron was Androtion’s father but not a member of the Four
Hundred, and that when he moved the decree against the three oligarchs, he was a member
of the boule comprising five hundred members.

\textsuperscript{254} Pesely 1995: 67: ‘(Andron) could be taking revenge on an enemy (Antiphon), or, if they
had earlier been friends, putting distance between himself and a man who wan now regarded
as a traitor.’

\textsuperscript{255} Harpocration s.v. Ἀνδρōν.

\textsuperscript{256} Thuc. 8.97.1.

\textsuperscript{257} Lyc. Against Leocrates 112-115.

\textsuperscript{258} Heftner 2001: 318-319; using Lycurgus’ speech Against Leocrates (112-115), Heftner
reconstructs the chain of events leading up to Antiphon and Archeptolemus’ trial. In
particular, he argues that Phrynichus’ trial, initiated by a decree moved by Critias,
constituted an expression of anger and discontent on the part of the disaffected and
embittered masses. It is then that the flight of the extremists should be placed, described
summarily by Thucydides as happening immediately after the collapse of the regime (8.98.1:
Ἐν δὲ τῇ μετάβολῇ ταύτῃ ευθὺς οἱ μὲν περὶ τὸν Πείσανδρον καὶ Ἀλεξικλέα καὶ ὅσιοι ἰσαν τῆς
ὁλιγαρχίας μάλιστα ὑπεξέρχονται ἐς τὴν Δεκέλειαν), a chronological gap of, admittedly, only
a few days (note also the fact that Aristarchus and Alexicles were present at Phrynichus’ trial
and undertook to defend him, as Lyc. Against Leocrates. 115 indicates). Heftner draws attention
to the fact that Phrynichus’ process signifies a phase in the post-Four Hundred era in Athens,
in which the settling of old scores was effected by the spontaneous reaction of the average
Athenians and not masterminded and waged by certain politicians who were aspiring to
political domination, especially Theramenes. The latter would indeed emerge as the leading
figure in the Athenian politics only later, by the time of Antiphon and Archeptolemus’
process.
up between several factions within the Athenian citizenry, in a city torn apart by dissent and internal war. Both events can be seen as the public and wholehearted denunciation of the regime of the Four Hundred, signed and carried out by its victims.\textsuperscript{259} It is worth noting here that Phrynichos was charged with treason, apparently on the strength of his participation in the final embassy to Sparta (Thuc. 8.90.2), a fact that seems to have sealed the fate of the other two participants in the same embassy.\textsuperscript{260} Phrynichus’ unequivocal condemnation clearly served as an indication as to who among the ex-comrades in the Four Hundred could have a political future in Athens, and in the course of the next few days or weeks it became clear in the city to which direction the political wind blew.\textsuperscript{261}

With the precedents of Phrynichus, and possibly Peisander’s trial in mind, let us turn to Archeptolemus’ process. The formal charge was participation in an embassy to Sparta, intent on harming the state, that is, treason. Thucydides tells us that after the envoys of the Four Hundred had returned from Samos, the oligarchs hurriedly sent an embassy to Sparta comprising twelve men, among whom Phrynichus and Antiphon. Their task was ‘παντὶ τρόπῳ ὅστις καὶ ὀπωσοῦν ἄνεκτός ξυναλλαγῆναι πρὸς τοὺς Λακεδαίμονιους’ ‘to reconcile with the Lacedaemonians in whatever way tolerable’ (8.90.2), but the result was a failure, insofar as peace was not concluded. However, as we have seen, Thucydides’ wording implies a secret agreement between the Spartans and the faction within the Four Hundred willing to come to terms with the enemy, even at a dear price.

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\textsuperscript{259} Lyc. Against Leocr. 112: τούτων ληφθέντων καὶ εἰς τὸ δεσμοθήριον ἀποτεθέντων ὑπὸ τῶν τοῦ Φρύνιχου φίλων, αἰσθόμενος ὅ δὲμὸ τὸ γεγονὸς τούς τε εἰρχθέντας ἔξηγαγε, καὶ βασάνων γενομένων τὸ πράγμα ἄνεκρινε, καὶ ζητῶν εὑρε τὸν μὲν Φρύνιχον προδιδόντα τὴν πόλιν, τοὺς δὲ ἀποκτείναντας αὐτῶν ἀδίκως εἰρχθέντας. ‘Once they (Apollodorus and Thrasybulus) had been arrested and placed in prison by Phrynichus’ friends, on getting wind of the deed, the people set the imprisoned free and examined closely the case by means of inquiry by torture, and found that Phrynichus had betrayed the city, whereas his assassins had been imprisoned unjustly.’

\textsuperscript{260} Contra Kagan 1987: 209, who believes that even after Phrynichus’ conviction there were hopes for Antiphon and Archeptolemus to receive a favourable verdict.

\textsuperscript{261} Jameson 1971: 547-558 believes that Peisander was also put to trial, through an eisangelia initiated by Sophocles. Peisander was only present at the preliminary hearing of the case at the Council, but did not wait to stand trial and escaped. In this context Jameson places the passage from Aristotle’s Rhetoric 1374b-1375a2, Sophocles serving as a sunegoros for a certain Euctemon. But Jameson contention that Thuc. 8.68.2 ‘καὶ αὐτὸς τε, ἐπειδὴ ἡ δημοκρατία καὶ ἐκ ἀγῶνας κατέστη τὸν τετρακοσίων ἐν υστέρῳ μεταπεσόντα υπὸ τοῦ δήμου ἐκακοῦσα’ can be used as evidence that there had been a series of trials against leading oligarchs soon after the collapse of the regime of the Four Hundred cannot stand. The text at this point is corrupt and therefore cannot be used as evidence of how the Four Hundred collapsed (see the discussion in Gomme, Andrewes and Dover 1945-1981: 5 174-176); See also, Hignett 1952: 279; Ostwald 1986: 400-404; Kagan 1987: 206-210; Bleckmann 1998: 373-386; Munn 2000: 150-151; Heftner 2001: 312-322.
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We have seen that Archeptolemus’ accusers chose to place an indictment through an eisangelia to the Council, on the grounds that the accused had broken the nomos eisangeltikos which dealt, among others, with cases of treason.\textsuperscript{262} In this case the Council would summon the parties involved, hear the case and reach a preliminary verdict of guilty or not guilty. If the accused was found guilty, a second vote would ensue determining whether a fine of five hundred drachmas should be inflicted or whether the accused deserved a greater penalty, in which case the defendant was brought before a court.\textsuperscript{263} It follows, therefore, that Archeptolemus and Antiphon defended themselves for a second time in a court, a fact that it was usually to the disadvantage of the defendant, since the jurors would normally have been influenced by the Council’s unfavorable verdict. Unlike Antiphon, about whose defense we have scanty information,\textsuperscript{264} the sources silence with regard to Archeptolemus. We know though that the two defendants must have spent their last hours together, since Andron’s decree stipulated that the accused be arrested by the generals and the ten sunegoroi the day before the trial.\textsuperscript{265} Since trials in classical Athens lasted one day, and the execution would have taken place the day after the trial, the two men might

\textsuperscript{262} A law eisangeltikos is quoted in Hyp. 3.8: ἀν τὸς φησί, τὸν δήμον τὸν Ἀθηναίων καταλύῃ... ἢ συνῆν ποι ἐπὶ καταλύσει τοῦ δήμου ἢ ἐταιρικὸν συναγάγῃ, ἢ ἐὰν τὶς πόλιν τινὰ προδοδῇ ἢ ναίς ἢ πεζὴν ἢ ναυτικὴν στρατιὰν, ἢ ῥήτωρ ὃν μὴ λέγη τὰ ἀρίστα τοῦ δήμου τοῦ Ἀθηναίων χρῆματα λαμβάνων. But the law as it stands here is not complete. Some parts have been omitted. Compare the Lexicon rhetoricum Cantabrigiense s.v. eisangelia: ἀν τὶς καταλύῃ τὸν δήμον ῥήτωρ ὃν μὴ τὰ ἀρίστα συμβουλεύῃ χρῆματα λαμβάνων, ἢ ἐὰν τὶς προδίδῃ χωρίον ἢ ναίς ἢ πεζὴν στρατιὰν, ἢ ἐὰν τὶς εἰς τοὺς πολεμίους ἄριστα συµβουλεύῃ καταλύσει τοῦ πολέμου; ἢ μετοικῇ παρ’ αὐτοῖς, ἢ στρατεύηται μετ’ αὐτῶν, ἢ δόρα λαμβάνῃ. Similarly, Pollux 8.52 has: ἐγένοντο δὲ εἰσαγγελίαι καὶ κατὰ τὸν καταλύσαντον τὸν δήμον ἢ πρὸς τοὺς πολεμίους ἄγεν τοὺς πεμψῆναι ἀπελθόντων, ἢ προδόντων φρούρίον ἢ στρατιὰν ἢ ναίς ρητόρον, ἢ μὴ τὰ ἀρίστα τοῦ δήμου λεγόντων. R. Bonner and G. Smith dated the law to the restoration of full democracy in 410 on the grounds that all three passages include allusions to well known acts of the oligarchs (the underlined sentences, i.e., the formation of hetairiai prior to the establishment of the Four Hundred (Thuc. 8.54), the betrayal of the Oinoe fortress by Aristarchos and the flight of the oligarchs (Peisander, Alexicles and others) to the enemy in Deceleia after the collapse of the regime (Thuc. 8.98), and incursions from Deceleia against the city walls in which oligarchs who had already fled were involved ([Lys.] 20.28) (The Administration of Justice from Homer to Aristotle vols. 1-2 New York 1930: 1 303). We may conclude, then, that the law under which the two oligarchs were tried, did not include all these clauses which were added later to anticipate future violations. See also T. Thalheim “Eisangelie-Gesetz in Athen” Hermes 41.2 1906: 305-307.


\textsuperscript{264} Thucydides who had evidently read it, greatly admired his defence speech (8.68.2). For a discussion of the surviving fragments, see Gomme, Andrewes and Dover 1945-1981: 5 198-201; M. Gagarin and D. MacDowell Antiphon and Andocides Austin 1998: 90-92; Ostwald 1986: 401-402.

\textsuperscript{265} [Plut.] Life of Antiphon 833E3-F12.
have spent two nights in prison. The two defendants had, thus, only one night to prepare their defense. Admittedly, the time conceded to them was not enough to compose a speech at least in a written form. Antiphon’s most celebrated speech Περὶ τῆς μεταστάσεως must therefore have been written after the trial, probably by a sympathizer who had witnessed the whole process and had taken notes with a view to publishing Antiphon’s political manifesto later. Perhaps Archeptolemus sought advice on his defense tactics from the great master and expert in forensic speeches, or the latter offered his help on his own accord.

Unfortunately, we have no information as to on what grounds Archeptolemus was chosen to be a member of the fatal embassy to Sparta and by whom. Nor, of course do we know what part he played in this mission. Some light could be thrown if we knew the names of the other ambassadors, but as it stands we must admit ignorance. However, we do have the verdict of the trial, quoted in full by pseudo-Plutarch who had taken it from Caecilius, who in turn had copied from Craterus’ συναγογή ψηφισμάτων:

Guilty of treason were found, Archeptolemus the son of Hippodamus, from Agryle, present, Antiphon, the son of Sophilos, from Rhamnus, present. It was decided that those two be handed over to the eleven and their property be confiscated and the one tenth be given to the Goddess; their houses be pulled down and tablets be put in their fields where their houses used to lie, bearing the sign THIS BELONGED TO ARCHEPTOLEMUS AND ANTIPHON, THE TWO TRAITORS. The chief official of the demos may give an account of their property, and may it not be possible to bury Archeptolemus and Antiphon in Athens, nor in any other land in which the Athenians rule. Archeptolemus and Antiphon may


267 See also, Pesely 1995: 73.

268 W. McCoy 1970: 118, however, does not hesitate to give his verdict on Archeptolemus: ‘Antiphon and Archeptolemus were traitors who had tried to bring in the Spartans through the fort at Eetioneia.’
themselves and their descendants, both legitimate and illegitimate, be declared without civil rights. And if someone does what Archeptolemus and Antiphon did, let him be without civil rights. This verdict should be written on a bronze stele, and be placed where the verdict on Phrynichus lies.

A striking feature of the verdict is its vindictiveness and harshness, although it does not contravene any existing law. Indeed, the law intended to humiliate society’s enemies, even if their death had rendered them harmless. Antigone’s question ‘οὐ γὰρ τάφου νόμον Κρέων τὸν μὲν προτίσας, τὸν δὲ ἀτιμάσας ἔχει;’ should be understood in this light. Note the choice of the word ἀτιμάσας, which, apart from ‘deprive somebody of his civil rights’, it means ‘dishonour’, ‘inflict indignity upon somebody’. G. Cerri sees a close correspondence between Creon’s decree and legal procedure and historical events in fifth century Athens. The cases of Themistocles and the Alcmaeonids were not unique, but only incidents of a recurring phenomenon which repeatedly shook Athenian society and politics. The whole play must be read, according to Cerri, in a context of rapidly evolving debate over the issue of denial of burial, and conflict between the polis and genos (as Themistocles’ case reveals). The secret burial which defies the will of the city is exactly what Antigone does. Her deed totally corresponds with the political conflict of that period (440s).

To deny somebody his burial is to pay him the ultimate insult of declaring his life and achievements worthless. But the harsh punishment of traitors in Attica is highly symbolic and exhibits a multiplicity of nuances. The community as a whole disassociates itself from the traitor by literally obliterating his name from the citizen catalogue, thus transforming, in a magical way one would say, the perpetrator into an ‘Other’, a non-citizen, for a citizen cannot be thought of partaking in such a degree of baseness. In the same fashion, burial within the border of Attica is forbidden, so that every sign of physical existence (such as the criminal’s tomb) be cast off, and

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269 ‘treatment of corpses in the ancient world remained one of the means by which men could hurt, humiliate, or honour one another, express contempt or respect. This is why the theme could be of central importance in great works of literature. It was the potential for humiliation that was particularly strongly felt.’ (R. Parker Miasma: Pollution and Purification in Early Greek Religion Oxford 1983: 46)
270 Soph. Ant. 21-22: ‘Why, has Creon not deemed one of our brothers worthy of burial, the other unworthy?’ (translated by A. Brown)
271 Cerri “Ideologia funeraria nell’Antigone di Sofocle” in Gnoli, G., and J. Vernant (eds.) La mort, les morts dans les sociétés anciennes Cambridge 1982: 121-131. See, however, the discussion in P. Easterling “Constructing the Heroic” in C. Pelling (ed.) Greek Tragedy and the Historian Oxford 1997: 26-28, where the author raises the objection that in a literary piece of art such as the Antigone real life considerations may quite easily be ignored as the action is set in a ‘heroic world.’ With regard to the treatment of dead bodies of traitors, he discerns a difference, as far as ritual significance is concerned, between exposing a dead body on the plain (Polyneices) and throwing it in the barathron.
uprooted from, the land.\footnote{273} One wonders what Sophocles, the author of the \textit{Antigone} but also a \textit{proboulos}, that is, one of the ten men whose names were connected with the Four Hundred assuming power in the first place, could have thought as the trial of the two oligarchs and the implementation of the verdict were carried out.

It was in compliance with the law dealing with traitors that Archeptolemus and Antiphon were not allowed burial in Attica,\footnote{274} and their properties were confiscated, but the denial of civil rights for their descendants and the razing of their houses may go beyond the strict interpretation of the law. Indeed, we are informed from a near contemporary source what the penalty in cases of treason in Attica was. Eryptolemus, in the trial of the generals who had fought at Arginousai, sets forth the contemporary source what the penalty in cases of treason in Attica was.

\begin{itemize}
\item According to Xen. \textit{Hell.} 1.7.20-21: ‘’Αντιπαθής ο Νικόπρος, δεδεμένον ύποδικεῖν ἐν τῷ δήμῳ, καὶ εὖ καταγνωσθῆναι ἁδίκειν, ἀποθαναίον εἰς τὸ βάραθρον ἔμβληθέντα, τὰ δὲ χρήματα αὐτοῦ δημευθῆναι καὶ τῆς θεοῦ τὸ ἐπιδέκαστον εἶναι.’ ‘If anyone wrongs the people of Athens, he shall plead his case in chains before the Assembly, and if found guilty, shall be put to death and thrown into the barathrum.’ \textit{OCT} prints δεδεμένον, but A. von Bamberg's emendation διασέλημεν makes much better sense and it should be accepted. According to this reading, the accused were to plead their case, on condition there were more than one, separately, in an individual process ("Über einige auf das attische Gerichtswesen bezügliche

\footnote{273} Dio Chrysostomus (31.84-5) approvingly quotes how the Athenians dealt with traitors: ἑκεῖ γὰρ ὅταν δημοσίᾳ τινὰ δῆτον πολιτῶν ἀποθαναίοις ἢ ἁδίκηματι, πρότερον αὐτὸν τὸ ὅνομα ἐξαλείφεται. τίνος ἔνεκα; ἐνὸς μὲν, ὅπως μηκέτι δοκῶν πολιτῆς εἶναι πάσχῃ τι τοιοῦτον, ἀλλ' ὡς δυνατὸν ἀλλότριος γεγονός: ἐπὶ οἴμαι καὶ τῆς τιμωρίας αὐτῆς τοῦτο μέρος οὐκ ἐλάχιστον δοκεῖ, τὸ μὴ δὲ τὴν προσηγορίαν ἐπὶ φαίνεσθαι τοῦ προελθόντος εἰς τοῦτο κακίας, ἀλλ' ἠρανίσθαι παντελῶς, καθάπερ οἴμαι τὸ μὴ θάπτεσθαι τοις προδότας, ὅπως μηδὲν ἢ σημείων εἰς ἀοίδος ἄνδρος πονηροῦ. ‘There (in Athens), when a citizen must die because of his having committed a public crime, first his name is obliterated. Why? For one thing, that people do not think any more that he suffers this misfortune while being a citizen, but that he has become an alien as far as this is possible. Accordingly, I believe that this part of the punishment seems to be very important, namely not even the appellation of that person who reached this point of badness to appear, but to be completely obliterated, just like the refusal of burial to traitors serves the purpose of removing every mark hereafter of a base man.’ Perhaps Dio Chrysostomus has the \textit{demes’} registry in mind from which the traitor’s name was erased. See also the discussion in D. Hester “Sophocles the Unphilosophical: A Study in the \textit{Antigone}” \textit{Mnemosyne} 24.1 1971: 19-21. Ferguson 1932: 335 lists a number of instances in which the decrees dealing with traitors were recorded in bronze stele as a warning in perpetuity to those that came after. On refusal of burial to traitors in Athens, see Cerri 1982: 123-126. On refusal of burial to certain criminals in other Greek cities, see J. Bremmer \textit{The Early Greek Concept of the Soul} Princeton 1983: 91 and nos 53, 54.

\footnote{274} On the history of the law and its development throughout the archaic and classical Athens, and the existence in earlier times of the alternative penalty of throwing the bodies to a barathon, see H. Hager “How Were the Bodies of Criminals at Athens Disposed of After Death?” \textit{JP} 8 1879: 3-9; cf. Parker 1983: 46.

\footnote{275} Xen. \textit{Hell.} 1.7.20-21: ‘’Αντιπαθής ο Νικόπρος, δεδεμένον ύποδικεῖν ἐν τῷ δήμῳ, καὶ εὖ καταγνωσθῆναι ἁδίκειν, ἀποθαναίον εἰς τὸ βάραθρον ἔμβληθέντα, τὰ δὲ χρήματα αὐτοῦ δημευθῆναι καὶ τῆς θεοῦ τὸ ἐπιδέκαστον εἶναι.’ ‘If anyone wrongs the people of Athens, he shall plead his case in chains before the Assembly, and if found guilty, shall be put to death and thrown into the barathrum.’ \textit{OCT} prints δεδεμένον, but A. von Bamberg's emendation διασέλημεν makes much better sense and it should be accepted. According to this reading, the accused were to plead their case, on condition there were more than one, separately, in an individual process ("Über einige auf das attische Gerichtswesen bezügliche
codification of the laws after the oligarchy of the Four Hundred and therefore cannot have been in use in 411. Then he quotes a law dealing with sacrilegious men and traitors, the law which should have been in force at the time of Archeptolemus and Antiphon’s trial, but, it should be noted, it is not clear if Xenophon quotes the law in its entirety, or, like Hypereides, only part of it: ‘έαν τις ἢ τὴν πολιτικὸν ἤ τὰ ἱερὰ κλέπτην, κρίθεντα ἐν δικαστηρίῳ, ἃν καταγνωσθῇ, μὴ ταφῆναι ἐν τῇ Ἀττικῇ, τὰ δὲ χρήματα αὐτοῦ δημόσια εἶναι. (Xen. Hell. 1.7.22) 278

After the execution of the penalty, which was carried out through the administration of hemlock, the body of Archeptolemus must have been exposed by the ἱερὰ πύλη, whence his relatives would collect it to bury it beyond the borders of Attica. If we are to believe Strabo (14.65.4), his father Hippodamus was still alive at the time, but it is unlikely that he was in Athens. If Archeptolemus was married, his wife or some of his friends would have carried out this duty.


277 Thucydides (1.138.6) tells a story of how Themistocles’ relatives secretly brought back his bones to Attica at his request, in order to offer their relative a dignified burial (note, however, that Thucydides expresses doubts concerning the credibility of the event); but it is not sure whether οὐ γὰρ ἔξην θάπτειν ὡς ἔπι προδοσία φεύγοντο meant that there was an established law in Athens, or that ‘Themistocles’ (and Alkmaionids’) case were dealt with through ad hoc decisions. So Hornblower 1991-2008: 1 225; Cerri 1982: 125, on the other hand, considers the possibility of the existence of a law forbidding the burial of traitors within Attica. Later on, the Athenians changed their minds and allowed Themistocles a proper burial in Attica (Paus. 1.1.2; 37.1). G. Steiner (Antigones Oxford 1984: 120), discussing J. Carriere’s “Communicazione sulla tragedia antica greca auxiliaria della giustizia e della politica” Dioniso 93 1969: 171-172, observes that the burials of Ajax and of Polyneices stand for the return of Themistocles’ remains to the Piraeus, as it is mentioned in Thucydides. This return would, in precise concordance with the Sophoclean tragedies, signify the victory of thesamos-traditional, divinely sanctioned custom-over nomos understood as legal ordinance.

278 ‘If someone betrays the city or robs the temples, he should be tried in court, and if found guilty, he shall be refused burial in Attica, whereas his property shall be confiscated.’ The scholiast to the Lysistrata 273 transmits the decree, inscribed on a bronze stele, which stipulated that those Athenians who had campaigned with Cleomenes and had occupied Eleusis were to be executed, their houses to be raised to the ground, their properties to be confiscated; cf. Hdt. 5.74.

279 Hager 1879: 10.

280 Hippodamus’ involvement in the building of the city of Rhodes (Diod. 13.75.1; Strabo 14.2.9), a Peloponnesian-sponsored enterprise in 408/7, may be thus indicative of his embitterment toward Athens.
The political background of Archeptolemus’ trial

Why did Theramenes and his supporters choose to launch an attack against their political rivals by means of an eisangelia? Archeptolemus, not being a native Athenian, and thus probably lacking powerful associations, but in any case not a match for Theramenes, looked like an easy target. But Antiphon was a formidable opponent, and there was always a danger that during the trial emotions would run high, and details would be disclosed as to Theramenes’ role in the establishment of the oligarchy and his endorsement of its policy. First, we need to bear in mind that the prosecutors were relatively immune to any danger arising from a potential failure to secure conviction for their rivals. The plaintiff did not have to pay the fine of one thousand drachmas if he failed to receive one fifth of the votes, at least by the time of this trial. Two passages from Hypereides’ speech For Lycophron (8, 12) indicate that there was no fine when the speech was delivered, in the third quarter of the fourth century. Second, the eisangelia, being a formidable legal procedure for the defendant, made it likely that the accused would not stay to stand trial, but would rather flee. The speaker in Hypereides’ For Euxenippus (2) complains that the process of eisangelia had been exceedingly abused by the Athenians, so much so that at the time of the trial (330-324 B.C.), it was routinely being used for petty crimes, whereas in his youth it was employed to try important persons such as Timomachos, Leosthenes, Philon from Anaia (all of them strategoi in the late 360s) Kallistratos, a famous politician, and Theotimos, a military officer, possibly a general, who all invariably did not wait to stand trial. It is evident then that Theramenes must have anticipated that the three oligarchs would flee before the trial, thus securing their conviction and political elimination. Peisander, who had already fled Athens, may well have done so in reaction to such a trial. In reality, however, only Onomacles reacted as had been expected, whereas the other two chose to stand ground ‘thereby causing great embarrassment to Theramenes.’

Conclusion

Archeptolemus remains an enigmatic, and at the same time tragic, figure among the Four Hundred. He had a conservative outlook, and he must have been held in quite high esteem by his compatriots. Aristophanes, at least, treats him very carefully and pays respect to his person. His patriotism seems not to have been in doubt in the 420s, when he rose to relative prominence thanks to his peace initiatives. If we accept that Hippodamus was his father, he had no family connections in Athens and therefore he had to make a name and reputation on his own. During the 420s he seems to have favored a policy of reconciliation and rapprochement with Sparta, a

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284 Hignett 1952: 279.
fact that must have made him popular in certain conservative circles in Athens, while attracting the scorn and hatred of the pro-war faction, especially Cleon. How he got involved in the movement and what his political convictions in 411 were, remain mysteries, but the possibility that Hippodamus’ conservative political and constitutional theories exerted some influence on him should be considered seriously (see appendix 1). A few scraps of information and allusions do not draw a clear picture of his political convictions. Although we lack positive evidence, Archeptolemus may not have been aware of the secret deal Antiphon and Phrynichus stroke with the Spartans, for otherwise we need to assume that all twelve delegates were privy to it. Indeed the close circle of the leaders may have deemed it expedient to include in the mission some oligarchs outside their close circle, individuals like Archeptolemus known as men of unquestionable integrity, so as not to come under suspicion. Unfortunately for him, the trial took place in a hostile political atmosphere, at a time when the Athenian public was looking for scapegoats to blame for the significant loss of Euboea and the failure of the Four Hundred to deliver what they had promised, i.e., a successful outcome of the war. As the evidence stands, we cannot be sure that he was guilty of treason. Archeptolemus met his bitter and undignified end, perhaps without deserving it.
Aristarchus  
*PAA 164155*

Relatively little is known about this puzzling figure, the obdurate and unrepentant general of the Four Hundred who would rather see his homeland reduced than admit defeat in the intense political struggle within the narrow elite which conducted the administration of the city during those tumultuous and eventful months in the summer of 411 B.C.

There are vexed and unresolved problems concerning the identity of Aristarchus. The name itself is by no means uncommon; there are fifty-nine entries in J. Traill's *Persons of Ancient Athens*, of which nine are of individuals active in the last third of the fifth century. *PAA 164110* was a drama instructor around 415/4; *PAA 164115, PAA 164120, PAA 164125* were three casualties in naval engagements probably in 412/11; *PAA 164130* was a friend of Socrates (Xen. *Mem.* 2.7.1-2); *PAA 164135* was an owner of a slave around 400; *PAA 164155* was the oligarch; *PAA 164250* was of Kekropis tribe around 420-395 B.C.; *PAA 164295* was a *choregos*, victor in boy's dithyramb at the Dionysia in 422/1 B.C. (IG II² 2318, 122). Individuals of non-Athenian citizen status, of course, have been left out.

Therefore, any attempt at identifying individuals bearing this name beyond doubt should be supported by undisputed and sound evidence. In any doubtful case, it would be justified if one expressed their reservations concerning the clustering of two or more occurrences of this particular name under one individual.²⁸⁵ Some scholars have accepted the identity of the oligarch with the *choregos* active in the 420s.²⁸⁶ Others have expressed doubts.²⁸⁷ Although we cannot attain certainty, in view of the

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²⁸⁷ J. Kirchner “Aristarchos” (8) *RE* 2.1 1895: 861; J. Davies *Athenian Propertied Families: 600-300 B.C.* Oxford 1971: 48 ‘It is impossible with any confidence either to assert or to deny his identity with the Aristarchos who was general in 411 under the Four Hundred (PA 1663)’; A. Gomme, A. Andrewes and K. Dover *A Historical Commentary on Thucydides* vols 1-5 Oxford 1981: 5 302 ‘he might be the *choregos* of 422/21’; D. Kagan *The Fall of the Athenian Empire* Cornell 1987: 190 ‘may be the same man’; Osborne, M., and S. Byrne *A Lexicon of
name’s frequent occurrence in the period we are dealing with and some conclusions we can draw concerning the profile and political outlook of an Athenian choregos, we should incline towards considering the oligarch and the choregos of 422/1 as two distinct and unrelated individuals. In particular, the choregia represented a huge financial commitment on the part of the choregos and was sometimes regarded as an investment which could facilitate one’s political ascendancy. Through this institution and the Athenian agonistic festivals (e.g., Thargelia, Rural and City Dionysia, Panathenaia), the elite’s drive for φιλοτιµία (desire for honour), and φιλονικία (desire for victory) was channeled in a way that would benefit and glorify not only a single aristocratic oikos, but the city as a whole. On the other hand, from the choregos’ point of view the more metaphysical returns of prestige and other pleasures of victory as well as the likely convertibility of a victorious choregia into election to high office and special consideration in court was exceedingly weighty.288 In the light of these considerations we should see Aristarchus the choregos probably as an ambitious, middle aged aristocrat who aspired to a political career and high offices, and who was willing to commit a good part of his resources to this goal.289 The implication here is that such a person would normally accept the values and rules of the system within which he was to operate, that is democratic Athens. As a vehicle to power he chose to take part in one of the most prestigious agonistic festivals in Athens—the City Dionysia-leading a boys’ dithyramb chorus, and his move met with success as he was elected general shortly afterwards.290 It does not follow that he was a convinced democrat by all means, but it is hard to see how a respected figure who had received recognition, prestige and rewards from his fellow citizens would transform into a revengeful and sinister individual such as the oligarch.

An Aristarchus is mentioned by Eupolis in his Autolykos,291 produced in 420, in the archonship of Aristion.292 Who is this Aristarchus? To begin with, it must be

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289 Aesch. 1.11; AP 56.3. The forty-year age limit for the choregos of a boys’ choros was institutionalized into law in the fourth century, but such an age requirement did not exist in the fifth century. We know of two exceptions, the speaker of Lysias 21 and Alcibiades (D. 21.147; Plut. Alc. 16; [And.] 4. 20). However, we should expect the rationale behind this limitation, namely the protection of young Athenian males against potential sexual misconduct on the part of young choregoi, to have had a powerful impact on the procedure concerning the appointment of choregoi in the fifth century as well.
290 Attention should be drawn to the fact that the usual theme of a dithyramb was praise of Athens’ military prowess. Socrates is said to have drawn a connection between distinguished chorus leaders and excellence in war (Athen. 628ε: οἱ δὲ χοροίς κάλλιστα θεοὺς τιµῶν, ἄριστοι ἐν πολέμῳ ‘those who honour the gods best through choruses are the best in war’).
291 fr. 49 K-A: ἥδη γὰρ Αρισταρχον στρατηγοῦντ’ ἐχθόμαι. ‘now I begrudge Aristarchus being a general.’
292 Athen. 216d.
considered as certain that there were two productions of the play, since this piece of information is recorded in six different ancient sources.\textsuperscript{293} This is important to stress because the date of the second production is an indicator, albeit not decisive, as to the identity of the Aristarchus mentioned in the fragment. But whereas we know the date of the first production, that of the second is nowhere attested. Some scholars thought the fragment alludes to Aristarchus’ catastrophic term of office as general under the Four Hundred, thus dating the second production to 410 B.C.\textsuperscript{294}

But Geissler refuted these arguments pointing out that in the fragment of Eupolis the present tense is used to describe Aristarchus as general as if he was still in office (στρατηγοῦντα), something simply not possible in the spring of 410, and that in all probability Eupolis was already dead by then.\textsuperscript{295} In addition, the scholiast to \textit{Iliiad} 13.353 who quotes the \textit{Autolykos} fragment maintains that this line featured in both productions and the assumption has been made that for Aristarchus to be general in both productions of the play, the second production must have occurred shortly after the first and not almost ten years after.\textsuperscript{296} Storey, accordingly, places the second production of \textit{Autolykos} in 419 or 418.\textsuperscript{297} If the play was produced in 418, we must allow for two generalships of Aristarchus. But Storey, like Geissler, does not consider the possibility, which in view of the frequency of the name is not at all remote, of the existence of two distinct Aristarchoi who became generals, the first in 421/20 and perhaps 419/18 and the second the oligarch, the general of the Four Hundred. A further argument in favour of this is the fact that it is rather unlikely that the oligarch

\textsuperscript{293} See I. Storey “Dating and Re-Dating Eupolis” \textit{Phoenix} 44.1 1990: 28 for the assembled evidence.

\textsuperscript{294} Meineke and Brandes cited by P. Geissler \textit{Chronologie der altattischen Komödie} Berlin 1925: 42; J. Edmonds \textit{The Fragments of Attic Comedy} vol.1 Leiden 1957: 327.

\textsuperscript{295} Geissler 1925: 43. The date of Eupolis’ death constitutes a \textit{terminus ante quem} for the second production of \textit{Autolykos} and has an indirect bearing on the identity of the Aristarchus mentioned in the play. This date, however, is by no means certain. There were several traditions about Eupolis’ death in antiquity: He was drowned at sea by Alcibiades as revenge for the latter being mocked in Eupolis’ \textit{Baptai} (Cic. \textit{Att.} 6.1.18; schol. Juv. 2.92; schol. Aristeid. 3.8; Platonios 1.13; Themist. 8. p. 110). Alternatively, he was buried outside Sikyon (Paus. 2.7.3), or died and buried in Aigina at a place called Kυνὸς Θρῆνος, named after his dog’s death lamenting the poet (Ael. \textit{NA} 10.41), or that he shipwrecked and died at the Hellespont during the Peloponnesian war (Suda ε 3657). Storey (op. cit. p. 6) shrewdly discusses the evidence and proposes that two traditions regarding Eupolis’ death have combined to yield the story of Alcibiades drowning Eupolis, namely a feud between Alcibiades and Eupolis, and a tradition of Eupolis’ service and death at sea. Although Suda is not precise about the exact campaign in which Eupolis met with his death (it could be either Cynossema or Aigospotamoi, the two major engagements during the Hellespontine campaign), Storey believes that Aelian’s story about Eupolis’ dog lamenting his master in Aigina at Kυνὸς Θρῆνος may reflect the tradition of Suda which accepts that Eupolis died in a campaign in the Hellespont, thus favouring the autumn 411 date (Cynosthrenos originating from Cynossema).

\textsuperscript{296} Geissler 1925: 43; Storey 1990: 29.

\textsuperscript{297} Storey 1990: 29.
had held office before 411, in view of his open and wholehearted hostility towards the demos. If this is correct, Eupolis’ reference to Aristarchus concerns another person, probably the choregos of 422/21 from Dekeleia, and not the oligarch.

The Aristarchus who was active in 411 seems to have always been a convinced oligarch, and it must not have taken long before he decided to join the movement at its initial stages. We know nothing about his whereabouts at the time when the oligarchs in Samos decided to go ahead with their plan to overthrow the democracy. If he was not on the island, being presumably himself already a member of an hetaireia, he must have enlisted himself into the conspiratorial groups which were becoming active in Athens, helped them augment their membership with new conscripts, and played a vital role in the agitation, propaganda and terror campaign, conducted under the auspices of Peisander which preceded the installation of the Four Hundred into power. These exciting and historical for the oligarchic movement weeks must have been a test, or a criterion, with regard to the pecking order within the Four Hundred. Lacking in previous, impressive public record, Aristarchus' initiatives, bold deeds and tokens of loyalty must have sufficed to secure for him a place in the board of generals of the oligarchy.

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298 This point was already made by Andrewes (Gomme, Andrewes and Dover 1945-1981: 5302); cf. Thuc. 8.90.1: καὶ Ἀρίσταρχος, ἀνήρ ἐν τοῖς μάλιστα καὶ ἐκ πλείστου ἐναντίος τῷ δήµῳ. ‘Aristarchus was a man amongst the greatest adversaries of the people.’

299 W. Judeich (“Aristarchos” (2) RE 2.1 1895: 860), Avery 1959: 63, and R. Develin (The Athenian Officials 684-321 B.C. Cambridge 1989: 160), all relate the Eupolis’ fragment with Aristarchus the oligarch. To the best of my knowledge, only W. Schmid (Geschichte der griechischen Literatur 1.4 Munich 1946: 122 and no 10) considers the possibility of the existence of two Aristarchoi who became generals. The upper-class origin of Aristarchus from Deceleia and his lavish display as benefactor tallies well with his presumed generalship a few months later. This consideration, of course, cannot attain the status of proof, but to aggregate all references to this name under one identity, i.e., the oligarch, runs contrary to the established principles and practices that are currently widely accepted in the Attic prosopography. Alternatively, we should postulate the existence of yet another Aristarchus, Eupolis fr. 49 K-A being the only sign of his existence.


301 Thuc. 8.98.1; Xen. Hell. 2.3.46. I do not agree with Avery 1959: 64 that the fact that Aristarchus became general under the Four Hundred is an indication of him having been already a general earlier in his career (the generalship in 420 attested by Eupolis fr. 49 K-A), on the grounds that the Four Hundred would appoint experienced militaries in that post. Of the other known generals of the Four Hundred, Alexicles had never been a general before, neither had Theramenes, Thymochares and Melanthius. Dieitrephes had held the office once before 411 (Thuc. 7.29). It was only Aristoteles who could display a long and illustrious career as a military (IG I ³ 366, 6: general in 431/30; Thuc. 3.105.3, 107.1: general or
We do not know when exactly the generals of the oligarchy assumed office, or under what circumstances and procedure. It has been suggested that they were appointed between 14th and 22nd Thargelion, that is, the week or so between the dismissal of the old Boule by the Four Hundred and their formal inauguration.\textsuperscript{302} Alternatively, the Four Hundred elected their generals at the Colonus assembly,\textsuperscript{303} or soon after their formal assumption of office.\textsuperscript{304} P. Rhodes points out that the oligarchs probably did not bother to appoint generals anew for the year 411/10. Nor does Athenaiion Politeia state clearly who is to appoint the new generals, the composition of the board being probably subject to the approval of the inner caucus of the revolutionaries.\textsuperscript{305}

In Thucydides’ narrative, Aristarchus occupies a central place in the presentation of the leaders of the Four Hundred, and in particular the group which opposed Theramenes (8.90.1). This second presentation comes at the beginning of the end of the regime, just before it is about to be overthrown. In this passage, Aristarchus is one of the μᾶλιστα ἐναντίοι ὄντες τῷ τοιούτῳ ἑιδεὶ καὶ προστότως, on a par with Phrynichus, Peisander and Antiphon, although he is ignored by Thucydides at 8.68.1, where the historian affords his readers an elaborate presentation, the first one, of the chief protagonists of the coup.\textsuperscript{306} This group, Thucydides asserts, had already begun to send embassies to Sparta before the news of the democratic revolution at Samos broke in Athens. They had also proceeded with the building of the fort at Eetioneia, even more determinedly after their envoys returned from Samos, and after they realised that the public opinion within the Four Hundred was turning against them and in favour of Theramenes and his group. It was at this time that they sent the twelve-member embassy to Sparta, apparently with a secret agenda to negotiate a settlement with the enemy at any cost so long as their authority would be secured.\textsuperscript{307} We do not know the exact role Aristarchus played in these dramatic developments, for Thucydides attributes the agency only collectively to the group of Phrynichus, Peisander, Antiphon, Aristarchus and some other unnamed oligarchs. Given his nauarchos in 426/5), but the identification of the general in the 420s with the oligarch is not secure either. It seems quite likely that this generalship was the first appearance for Aristarchus in the Athenian public life (cf. G. Gilbert Beiträge zur innern Geschichte Athens im Zeitalter des peloponnesischen Krieges Leipzig 1877: 310). In revolutionary times it is usually the up-and-coming men who seize the opportunity to forge a career in every aspect of public life.

\textsuperscript{302} Kagan 1987: 162. AP 32.1 delivers the dates.
\textsuperscript{303} Gomme, Andrewes and Dover 1945-1981: 5 230.
\textsuperscript{304} Heftner 2001: 237.
\textsuperscript{305} A Commentary on the Aristotelian Athenaiion Politeia Oxford 1981: 401.
\textsuperscript{306} S. Hornblower believes that Thucydides was influenced by the characterization of the three Persian conspirators at Hdt. 3.80-82, Peisander is only mentioned here as foil, and so chose to keep his main protagonists down to three only (A Commentary on Thucydides vols. 1-3 Oxford 1991-2008: 3 953-954).
conduct when the Four Hundred were in power, it is unlikely that Aristarchus would have travelled to Sparta as an ambassador along with Phrynichus and Antiphon and yet escape prosecution. On the other hand, his close involvement in the building of the Eetioneia fort and the intended admittance of the enemy through it must be placed beyond doubt. In his confrontation with Critias at a meeting of the Council of the Thirty Theramenes, in his effort to refute the charge that he constantly changes sides, asserts:

ἐπεὶ δὲ γε ἐκεῖνοι μὲν οὐδὲν ἀνέσαν, οἱ δὲ ἀμφὶ Ἀριστοτέλην καὶ Μελάνθιον καὶ Ἀρισταρχον στρατηγοῦντες φανεροὶ ἐγένοντο ἐπὶ τῷ χώματι ἐρυμα τειχίζοντες, εἰς δὲ ἐβούλοντο τοὺς πολεμίους δεξάμενοι ὑπ’ αὐτοῖς καὶ τοῖς ἑταῖροις τὴν πόλιν ποιῆσαιαθα...’ (Xen. Hell. 2.3.46)

‘But when the Lakedaimonians did not relax their war effort at all, and Aristoteles and Melanthios and Aristarchos and the other generals in their faction were building a fort on the promontory, to which they wanted to admit the enemy and so make the city subject to themselves and their fellow club-members... (translated by Peter Krentz)

Thucydides, on his part, twice attributes the allegation that the Eetioneia was being built in order to admit the enemy to Theramenes, and admits that there was an element of truth in it.

Aristarchus may have been one of the chief instigators of the Eetioneia fort, yet he witnessed its demolition which signalled the beginning of the end for the Four Hundred. When the accusations of treachery against the hardliners within the Four Hundred had become widespread, the soldiers who were helping with the building of the Eetioneia fort mutinied and arrested Alexicles, a general of the Four Hundred who apparently was supervising the construction. They committed this act of defiance with the endorsement and compliance of their commander, Aristocrates, and Hermon the commander of a patrol guard. On hearing the news some members of the Four Hundred resolved to take up arms against the mutineers and accused Theramenes of complicity. The latter tactfully denied any involvement or responsibility and proposed to rescue Alexicles with the help of two other generals. One of them was Aristarchus who rode down the Piraeus accompanied by a group of young cavalry men to see to it that his comrade Alexicles be freed and the audacious

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308 8.90.3: ὡς ἦρ Θηραµένης καὶ οἱ μετ’ αὐτοῦ ‘as Theramenes and his supporters claimed’; 8.91.2: ὡς ἦρ Θηραµένης οὐκ Εὔβοια μᾶλλον ἢ τοῖς τειχίζουσι τὴν Ἑπιονείαν προσπλεῖν ‘those ships, Theramenes argued, sailed not towards Euboea but to assist those who were building the wall’ (note how Theramenes’ accusations turn from general and vague to specific: first he alarms against a possible threat, then the appearance of Agesandridas’ fleet off Aigina comes as a corroboration of his warnings).

309 8.91.3: ἦν δὲ τι καὶ τοιῶν ἐπὶ τῶν τὴν κατηγορίαν ἐχόντων, καὶ οὐ πάνω διαβολή μόνον τοῦ λόγου ‘and this in fact had some basis on the part of those whom he accused and what he said was not a mere slander.’
soldiers be disciplined. All these proved wishful thinking, since it was impossible to restrain the angry multitude once they had taken the decision to destroy the fort. Theramenes had outwitted the hardliners and all Aristarchus could do was watch in exasperation the wall go down.

Aristarchus played a sinister role as well in the final episode of the deposition of the Four Hundred. When the news of the defeat off Eretria reached Athens it became apparent that the regime of the Four Hundred could not help crumbling any time soon. The Athenians held an assembly at the Pnyx, in which they decided to depose the Four Hundred and yield power to the Five Thousand. Soon afterwards, in successive assemblies, it was decided to elect a body of citizens who would draft new laws, and specifications were made concerning the new constitution. This must have taken a few days, at which point it became obvious to those who held fast to the oligarchy that there was no future for them in Athens. In the mean time, Peisander, Alexicles and some others, whose exact number we cannot determine, had withdrawn to Deceleia. Aristarchus, however, urgently summoned a group of mercenary bowmen and headed for Oenoe, a fortress on the border with Boeotia.

It has been suggested that the size of this relieve force (8.92.6) must have been considerable on the grounds of ‘the tumult generated among the citizens of Athens at their departure and the consternation among the hoplites at the Piraeus when they spied the oncoming procession.’ (G. Bugh The Horsemen of Athens Princeton 1988: 116). This is a misunderstanding. In the first place, Thucydides does not give any indication as to the size of the cavalry squadron; secondly, in an explanatory note following his statement ἢν δὲ θόρυβος πολὺς καὶ ἐκπληκτικὸς ‘there was loud confused clamour’ (8.92.7) the historian highlights the lack of information and, due to it, the state of confusion in which the people in the city and the people in the Piraeus had fallen, the former believing (ὁπόντο) that the Piraeus had been taken and Alexicles was already dead, the latter assuming that an attack from the city upon them was imminent. In those chaotic moments it would have been difficult for a sizeable force to be readily available to assail the insurgents, so the oligarchs could assemble only those who happened to be at the bouleuterion at the time. Besides, Theramenes’ avowed purpose was to investigate and re-conciliate, not to combat. I would, therefore, presume that Aristarchus’ escorts were rather few in number. For the possibility that those young followers were the same as those who planned and carried out the assassination of Androcles (Thuc. 8.65.2) and the infamous one hundred and twenty youths the Four Hundred used for intimidating the population, see Busolt 1893-1904: 3.2 1475 no 2.

For the time span of these developments, see J. Classen Thukydides Acthes Buch Berlin 1878: 142.

Elsewhere (see under Alexicles, pages 18-19), I argue that the flight of the oligarchs described by Thucydides at 8.98.1 may have taken place on the same day on which the assembly at the Pnyx was held, after the news of the catastrophic defeat off Eretria had reached Athens.
There some Corinthians who had suffered an attack from the troops defending the fort had laid a siege in retaliation. Aristarchus, using his authority as general, managed to trick the defenders of the fort into surrendering it to the Boeotians, falsely alleging that this was a requirement for the treaty that had just been signed between the Athenians and the Peloponnesians. Aristarchus’ device was successful since the defenders were cut off from the outer world and apparently ignorant of the latest developments in Athens.\footnote{Thuc. 8.98. The fort of Oenoe is probably to be identified with the remains at Myoupolis in north-western Attica, which controlled the roads through the Mazi plain. It was one of the only two forts in Attica used in the Peloponnesian war (J. Ober, *Fortress Attica: Defense of the Athenian Land Frontier 404 – 322 B.C.* Leiden 1985: 154-155). At the beginning of the Peloponnesian war Archidamus, the Spartan king, had besieged Oenoe and spent considerable time trying to capture it. Thucydides remarks that the reasons for Archidamus investing so much time in Oenoe were not in fact military, but primarily political (2.18.1-3).} After that he fled, for he knew he could return to Athens only under an oligarchic regime.\footnote{J. Seibert (*Die politischen Flüchtlinge und Verbannten in der griechischen Geschichte* Darmstadt 1979: 83) assumes that Aristarchus withdrew as an exile to Boeotia. This is possible, but of course, he could find refuge at any territory controlled by the Peloponnesian League. If he had wanted to maintain some communication with ex-comrades, fellow oligarchs and accomplices, it would have been reasonable to stay as close to Attica as possible. Megara, Euboea, Corinth, or Deceleia according to the speaker of Lysias 18.9 are the likely candidates. But we completely lack the evidence of his whereabouts after he fled.} A fragment of Aristophanes’ *Triphales*, produced in 410 or 409 B.C.,\footnote{Geissler 1925: 83.} alludes to this treacherous act.\footnote{K-A fr.564: λανθάνοντες τοις Ἰβηρας τοις Αριστάρχοι πάλαι/ τοὺς Ἰβηρας οὓς χορηγεῖς μοι βοηθῆσαι δρόμῳ ‘escaping Aristarchus’ Iberians’ notice long ago/ the Iberians whom you supply to me to help me at a run’; cf. B.Bleckmann *Athens Weg in die Niederlage: Die letzten Jahre des peloponnesischen Kriegs* Leizig 1998: 379. Bleckmann draws attention to Thucydides 6.90.3 where Alcibiades hails the Iberians as accomplished warriors. The word τῶν ὀμολογομένων indicates that Alcibiades was drawing on a commonly held view by the Athenians, namely that the Iberians were particularly ferocious and savage. It is exactly this stereotype Aristophanes exploits in his *Triphales*. The fact that the actual archers Aristarchus commanded were Thracians or Scythians should not deter us from relating Aristophanes’ fragment with the Oenoe incident (so quite rightly Bleckmann); Heftner 2001: 312. It is not certain, however, whether the title of the play alludes to Alcibiades as it was previously believed (Heftner “Die τρία κακά des Theramenes: Überlegungen zu Polyzetos fr. 13 und Aristophanes fr. 563 Kassel-Austin” *ZPE* 128 1999: 33-43 37 and no 25).} Aristarchus’ traitorous conduct seems to have sprung out of his abhorrence towards the ignorant and loathsome mob that, being audacious and disrespectful, would rather sponsor debased demagogues than resign themselves to being ruled by men of merit like him and his comrades. According to a fourth-century source, Oenoe’s deliverance to the enemy immediately followed the trial of the dead Phrynichus, at which Aristarchus and Alexicles tried unsuccessfully to defend their comrade’s
dignity and fame. In his speech, Against Leocrates, delivered some eighty years later in 331 B.C., Lycurgus informs us that when Phrynichus got assassinated, the demos investigated the affair and found out that the assassins had been unjustly imprisoned, whereas Phrynichus had committed treachery. Critias then moved a decree that the dead be brought to trial and if found guilty his bones be exhumed and cast out of Attica. It was also decreed (we are not informed whether this was a close in Critias’ decree or a separate one) that those who would defend the dead should suffer the same punishment if Phrynichus’ corpse was found guilty. Lycurgus then goes on to assert that Aristarchus and Alexicles were finally executed because of their involvement in Phrynichus’ trial as his defenders.

It is obvious from our reconstruction of the sequence of the events, soon after the downfall of the Four Hundred, and from the cross-examination of the above-cited passage with other sources that Lycurgus’ narrative is not devoid of mistakes and inaccuracies, both trivial and important. We learn from Xenophon that when Euryptolemus spoke in the assembly in favour of the generals who won the sea battle of Arginousai, he argued that the Athenians ought to allow the generals a fair trial, since they had rightly granted Aristarchus, the betrayer of Oenoe, a fair trial in which he was allowed to defend himself. It emerges that this trial was conducted under full democracy and was other than the trial in which Aristarchus allegedly defended Phrynichus, since Aristarchus is portrayed as the accused here, the charge being overthrow of the democracy and the betrayal of the fort, and not coming forward as Phrynichus’ defender. This trial, therefore, must have occurred after 411 and before the sea-battle of Arginousai, that is, autumn 406.

319 Ostwald’s contention that ‘Aristarchus did not leave Athens immediately after Oenoe but stayed long enough to defend his dead associate Phrynichus’ is apparently mistaken (1986: 403). On Ostwald’s reconstruction one cannot see how Aristarchus having returned to Athens after Oenoe could get away with no punishment. Did the garrison defending the fort not spread the word when they came back to Athens?

320 112-115.

321 In ‘Alexicles’ I argue for the supremacy of Thucydides’ account over that of Lycurgus with respect to the chronological order of events following the sea-battle off Eretria. The two accounts cannot be compatible with each other if one takes Thucydides’ εὖθύς at 8.97.1 and 8.98.1 literally. Indeed, I believe that this is the case in the passages under discussion.

322 Hell. 1.7.28.

323 Busolt observed that Xenophon’s passage, in contrast to Lykurgus’, points to the fact that Alexicles was caught and tried independently of Aristarchus (1893-1904: 3.2.1511 and no 1).

324 Any attempt to specify more precisely than the 411-406 period the date of the trial can only be conjectural. Ostwald 1986: 403 and Avery 1959: 69 suggest that the date of Aristarchus’ trial should have been close enough to Euryptolemus’ speech for the Athenians to recall the case. Avery in particular suggests summer 407 and conjectures that Aristarchus was caught by Alcibiades on his triumphal return to Athens. All this is too hypothetical. It should be remembered that the Oenoe incident must have gained notoriety among the Athenians and have evoked bitter memories in the months and years to follow, so much so
Conclusion

It is regrettable that we are not well informed about Aristarchus’ social background. The problem of his identity is a perplexed one, although I hope to have shown that there are indications that his involvement in the Four Hundred oligarchy was probably his first public appearance in the Athenian politics. If he was a relatively obscure figure before the coup, his bold actions and partisanship must have launched him to notoriety, for Thucydides affords him a place among the protagonists of the enterprise. On the other hand, if one considers the social origins of Aristarchus, Melanthius, Alexicles and possibly Aristoteles and the complete lack of references in the sources about them, the conclusion may be legitimately drawn, albeit tentatively, that all these men, extremists and men of action, had no public record prior to the revolution. They seized the opportunity in the spring of 411 and managed through their determination, solidarity and lack of scruples to dominate the movement, their reward being their appointment to the generalship a few months later. As regards Aristarchus, his final movements highlight his brazenness and perverse sense of duty. He had a deeply controversial personality, and he justly earned a place among Athens’ most nefarious public enemies.

that the association of Oenoe and Aristarchus would become indelible in the Athenians’ minds.
Aristocrates Skelliou
PAA 171045

Family history

The oikos of Aristocrates, son of Skellias, first appears in the Athenian history through a dedication commemorating a choragic victory at the festival of Thargelia. The inscription \(IG\ I^3\ 964 (=SEG\ 29:47)\), previously lost but now rediscovered, runs as follows: Αριστοκράτης Σκελίοι ἀνέθηκεν νικήσας\(\varepsilon\) Κεκροπιδῆι Ἐρεχθηδη. Although there is no doubt about the nature and purpose of this inscription and the monument onto which it was engraved (a fluted column with a tripod mounted on the capital), dating the inscription has proved notoriously complicated, and the chances are slim that scholarly consensus might be reached. The problem is that, lacking any historical allusions, the inscription can only be dated on grounds of prosopographical data and letter forms, but the former do not tie in with the latter in this particular instance. On the contrary, they quite sharply conflict with one another. In particular, in the text the three-bar sigma and the Ionic eta feature, while the patronymic Σκελίο is spelled with a single lambda, all these features suggesting an early date in the fifth century. On the other hand, we know that Aristocrates was active in Athens in the last quarter of the fifth century. Clinging on the old orthodoxy in attic epigraphy that the three-bar sigma went out of use after 446 B.C., and the single-consonant spelling became obsolete after 480 B.C., Davies dated the inscription to the 470s or 460s, and Lewis concluded that its style was not merely archaizing but archaic indeed. This unconditional faith, however, in the complete disappearance of the three-bar sigma after 446 B.C. has been shaken thanks to a new dating of \(IG\ I^3\ 11\), an alliance between Athens and Egesta, to 418/7 B.C. If the new dating is correct, there would theoretically be no objection to

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325 The dedicator appears to have represented two tribes instead of one. cf. \(AP\ 56.3;\ \text{Ant.}\ 6.11;\ \text{T. Shear Jr. “The Athenian Agora: Excavations of 1971” Hesperia 42.2 1973: 155. According to Harpocration s.v. Ὀνήτωρ, the perieget Heliodorus had written a book about tripods found in Athens. Heliodorus could not have missed the elaborate and delicate monument Aristocrates had commissioned.}

326 The inscription was first registered as \(IG\ I^2\ 772\) by Pittakys in 1835, (\(L’ancienne Athènes\ 122\ quoted by Shear Jr. 1973: 174 and no 127), but then it had gone missing until its rediscovery and publication by Shear.

327 J. Davies \(\text{Athenian Propertied Families: 600-300 B.C.}\ Oxford 1971: 56. Davies went on to propose that Aristocrates’ grandfather, Aristocrates I, was the actual dedicator. He tentatively identified an Aristocrates depicted in a symposium as a mature man on a cup of the Brygos painter with Aristocrates the elder; D. Lewis “The Dedication of Aristokrates” \(JHS\ 84\ 1964: 156-157.\)

328 On line 3 of the inscription only the last two letters of the archon’s name can be clearly read. The older reading was Habron, archon in 458/7 B.C., but it has now been suggested that we should read Antiphon. The implication is that the 446 B.C. terminus can no longer be invoked to support the theory that the three-bar sigma went completely out of use at that time (M. Chambers, R. Gallucci and P. Spanos “Athens’ Alliance with Egesta in the Year of
dating Aristocrates’ dedication even to the 410s. Other scholars have reached a diametrically opposite conclusion, namely that it had an archaizing style, and they have placed it in the period of the Archidamean war, or even later. Shear, in view of Aristocrates’ political activity, traces of which we find in the 420s, placed the choragic victory in the same period, and attributed the letter forms of sigma, eta and single spelling of lambda to either conscious archaism or personal idiosyncracy on the part of the stone cutter, whereas Mattingly surmised religious conservatism. Raubitschek has come up with a compromising solution. He maintains that the inscription was not inscribed on the monument at the time of its erection but considerably later, and it may have recorded an earlier dedication made by Aristocrates’ grandfather. The stone cutter was told to imitate the earlier letter forms and spelling. In conclusion, on the basis of the present evidence it does not seem possible that we could give the inscription a more precise date than the period 460-410s, since none of the arguments for or against an early date are compelling. Be that as it may, whatever the date and whoever erected the dedicatory monument along with the inscription, the oikos of Aristocrates must have played a prominent role in the Athenian politics and society throughout the best part of the fifth century.


331 A. Raubitschek “The Dedication of Aristokrates” Hesperia Supplements 19 1982: 130-132. As parallel cases of inscriptions engraved at a later date than the set-up of the monument, Raubitschek adduces the altar of Apollo Pythios, set up by Peisistratos the younger, and an early Ionic capital from Paros with a tomb epigram of Archilochus.

332 An Aristocrates depicted on a cup of the Brygos painter can hardly be Aristocrates, the member of the Four Hundred, on chronological grounds. The cup depicts a symposium scene. In particular, on one side, a Demonikos is leaning on a comfortable couch-bed and next to him sitting is a young woman with a bowl in her hands and behind them a young boy with a lyre. On a second couch a bearded Aristocrates is leaning and next to him a flute player girl is standing. The words ΔΕΜΟΝΙΚΟΣ, ΚΑΛΕ, ΠΙΛΟΝ ΚΑΛΟΣ, ΑΡΙΣΤΟΚΡΑΤΕΣ are written (see, W. Klein Die Griechischen Vasen mit Lieblingsinschriften Leipzig 1898: 116 for full description). The vase is dated to 450 the latest, which makes it likely that the man drawn on the cup is an ancestor of Aristocrates, probably his uncle or grandfather. So Davies, Athenian Propertied Families 1971: 56 who rightly rejects J. Toepffer’s assumption (“Aristokrates” (2) RE 2.1 1896: 940) that the man on the vase is the oligarch. See also Avery
The prominence of the oikos of Aristocrates and the good reputation it enjoyed among the Athenians of good birth is confirmed by a passage in Plato's Gorgias. Socrates in his discussion with Polus is attempting to show that in dialectics the truth is alien to rhetoric and it is not approached through majority vote (a process, incidentally, adopted in Athenian courts). Polus might call in the most respectable witnesses in Athens to support his case, fine specimens of reputable, socially powerful men, who as choregoi, represent the Athenian democratic and civic ideal, but their testimony is no more weighty than Socrates' truth:

μαρτυρήσουσί σοι, ἐὰν μὲν βούλη, Νικίας ὁ Νικηράτου καὶ οἱ ἱδὲλφοί μετ’ αὐτοῦ, ὃν οἱ τρίποδες οἱ ἔφεξης ἔστωτές εἰσιν ἐν τῷ Διονυσίῳ, ἐὰν δὲ βούλη, Ἀριστοκράτης ὁ Σκελλίου, οὗ ἄν εἶσιν ἐν Πυθίῳ τούτῳ τὸ καλὸν ἀνάθημα, ἐὰν δὲ βούλη, ἡ Περικλέους ὡλῆ οἰκία ἢ ἀλλή συγγένεια ἤντινα ἂν βούλη τῶν ἐνθάδε ἐκλέξασθαι. (472a-b)

and they will testify for you as witnesses, if you wish, Nikias the son of Nikeratos, and his brothers, whose tripods stand in a row at the Dionysium, and if you wish, Arisocrates the son of Skellias, whose beautiful dedication is at the Pythium, or if you wish, the whole of Pericles' oikos, or any other relative who you would like to chose from those present.

It has been argued that Gorgias' dramatic date could furnish a clue as to Aristocrates' age when he joined the coup, but it is not likely that such a date could be fixed, or even intended by Plato himself; nor can IG I₃ 964 be placed within a reasonably narrow chronological margin, as we have already seen.
Could it be possible that Plato’s reference to Aristocrates’ καλὸν ἀνάθηµα is identical with the monument onto which IG I³ 964 was engraved? Earlier scholarship was split and Avery was not committed. Lewis 1984: 156-157, on the other hand, thought ‘there is nothing positive to associate this stone with the Python. However, since the re-discovery of the stone it has been made possible to determine its actual script which points to a dedication for a victory at the Thargelia (see page 74 note 265 above). Suda gives us the crucial piece of information, namely that it was at the Python where the victors at the Thargelia stored their dedications, and modern scholars accept that the Gorgias passage refers to the monument and the inscription IG I³ 964.

The spelling also of Aristocrates’ patronymic has been the subject of considerable debate. In IG I³ 964 it is spelt with one -l- (Σκελίο), a fact that prompted some scholars to prefer the variant with the single –l- in Aristophanes Birds 126 and fragment 591 K-A 70-71. But the metre in both Birds 126 and 591 K-A 70-71 requires that the name be spelt with double consonant (Σκελλίου). and the epigraphic evidence in this case carries little weight since in Attic inscriptions prior to 480 B.C. the spelling of names with single consonant where double is required was predominant. In Thucydides 8.89.2 the manuscripts also give different variants, but again the variant Σκελλίου is to be preferred.

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335 1959: 70 and no 6 with bibliography.
336 ‘Πυθίων: ἱερὸν Ἀπόλλωνος Αθήνησι, ὑπὸ Πεισιστράτου γεγονός, εἰς ὁ τούς τρίποδας ἔτιθεσαν οἱ τῷ κυκλίῳ χορῷ νικήσαντες τὰ θαργήλια.’ ‘Python: temple of Apollo in Athens, erected by Peisistratos, in which the winners of the cyclic (dithyrambic) chorus at the festival of Thargelia used to place the tripods.’ Accepting the identity: Mattingly 1961: 149; Shear 1971: 155: Pittakys had reported the existence of the column near the gate of Athena. It was rediscovered within 50 metres from there, in the basement of a house at 3 Poikile Street; cf. Raubitschek 1982: 131.
337 Codex M (Ambrosianus L 39 sup. from 1320 AD) gives Σκελλίου, whereas the scholiast of the same codex corrects to Σκελίου. The scholiasts of codices V and Γ give Σκελίου. All MSS of Plato’s Gorgias give Σκέλλιου. Suda also spells the name with double consonant (Σκέλλιον υῖός: ὁ Ἀριστοκράτης). The metrical analysis of Aristophanes Κ-Α 70-71, probably a trochaic tetrameter, is as follows: αλλὰ διή τ’ ἐς τοῦ στρατηγοῦ κομάδῳ τοῦ Σκελλίου

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The papyrus fragment delivers Σκέλλιου, but v. Leewen’s emendation to Σκελλίου is on metrical grounds virtually correct. See the discussion in Dunbar (ed.) Aristophanes Birds 1995: 175. Aristophanes’ Birds 126 is an iambic trimeter: ἤκοστα· καὶ τὸν Σκελλίου βήδλωτημαι.

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338 Raubitschek Dedications from the Athenian Akropolis 1949: 146.
339 E (Palatinus Heidelbergenensis 252), F (Monacensis 430) and M (Britannicus Londinensis add. 11727) all give Σκελλίου. B (Vaticanus 126) and C (Laurentianus 69 2) give Σκέλλιου, which is obviously wrong. Only G (Monacensis 228) gives Σκελλίου but this codex is a
Aristocrates’ first steps in politics

Aristocrates seems to have launched his career in politics at the conclusion of the Archidamian war, no doubt as a promising young man whose family background guaranteed extensive connections and support among his fellow tribesmen and Athenian upper-class circles in general. An Aristocrates was among the signatories of the Peace of Nicias and the treaty between Athens and Sparta signed shortly after. Seventeen delegates signed both the Peace and the treaty on behalf of Sparta and Athens. Aristocrates’ name appears in the twelfth place and the assumption has been made that the Athenian side consisted of two religious men (Lampon, Isthmionikos), three generals (Nikias, Laches, Euthydemos), ten men, one from each tribe and in the official tribal order (those occupying the places 6-15), and two more (Lamachus, Demosthenes). In addition, these men who appear in places 6-15 must have formed a board, commissioned by Athens, with a view to conducting negotiations with its Spartan counterpart concerning the final terms of the Peace. If this is true, Aristocrates’ appointment to this post assumes great importance, but it should be noted that this committee was bound to have been given precise and strict instructions by the assembly as to how to proceed with the negotiations. On the whole, the board looked like a mixture of accomplished politicians (Nicias, Laches, Lamachus, Demosthenes, Hagnon, Leon) and up-and-coming ones (Aristocrates, Pythodorus, Thrasycles).

By spring of 414 B.C. Aristocrates had achieved prominence in Athens, for he is mentioned in Aristophanes’ *Birds*, produced at the City Dionysia. Peisetairos is asking Epops if he could recommend him and his servant a suitable town to settle down:

"Επείτα μειξώ τῶν Κραναών ζητείς πόλιν; /Μειξώ μὲν οὐδέν, προοφορωτέραν δὲ νόθων Αριστοκρατεῖθαι δήλος εἰ ζητῶν./Εγώ; /ήκιστα καὶ τῶν Σκελλίου βδελύττομαι (123-126).

recentior from the thirteenth century. OCT prints the name with a single –l-. However, I cannot agree with Thomas’ conclusion that the name’s spellings with single and double -l- were interchangeable (Oral Tradition and Written Record in Classical Athens 1989: 133 no 115).

340 Thuc. 5.19.2; 24.1.

341 Andrewes and Lewis “Note on the Peace of Nikias” JHS 77.2 1957: 177-180. The authors examine a passage in Diodorus (12.75), where reference is made to an Athenian decree stipulating the creation of a board of ten whose task would have been to negotiate with the Spartan counterpart the terms of the peace of Nikias. Diodorus asserts that the exclusion of any other city from these negotiations and the fact that Athens and Sparta unilaterally assumed the right to emend the treaty clauses as they saw fit, enraged the other Greek cities which, under the leadership of Argos, Corinth, Elis and Thebes were deliberating to form an alliance.
Then, are you looking for a city more powerful than that of Kranaus? Not more powerful by any means, rather more suitable for us. You are clearly fond of aristocracy. Me? No way, I even detest the son of Scellias.

Scholars agree that this passage cannot be used as evidence for Aristocrates’ political inclinations, whatever these might have been in 414. The charge that someone had oligarchic sympathies was frequently leveled in Athens (less than a year before, the Mysteries and Hermes affairs had shocked and scandalized the entire Athenian society), to such an extent that it verged on the hysteria. Epops’ fanciful argument is that since Athens does not appeal to Peisetairos he must be an enemy of the existing political order, i.e., democracy. Aristophanes uses ἀριστοκρατεῖσθαι here simply because he wants to make a pun on Aristocrates’ name, therefore this passage is not an allusion to Aristocrates’ noble birth, or to him being an oligarchic sympathizer.

Aristocrates’ first attested appointment to the generalship comes in the year 412. After the news of the disaster in Sicily had broken in the Greek mainland, many an allies of Athens were planning to revolt. The most audacious ones committed themselves to conducting secret negotiations with Agis, and Sparta. The Spartans responded promptly and in the spring of 412 the Peloponnesians were gathering naval forces in Corinth with a view to sending an expedition to Chios to effect its revolt from Athens. However, the Corinthians were particularly reluctant to allow the expedition to sail before the Isthmia festival was over. This proved too time consuming and gave the Athenians the opportunity to act preemptively. Thucydides reports:

οὐ ξυγχωροῦντων δὲ τῶν Κορινθίων, ἂλλα διατριβῆς ἐγγιγνομένης, οἱ Αθηναῖοι ἡσύχασο τά τῶν Χίων μίλλον, καὶ πέμφαντες ἕνα τῶν στρατηγῶν Ἀριστοκράτη ἐπηγιάντο αὐτούς, καὶ ἀρνοῦμένων τῶν Χίων τὸ πιστὸν ναῦς αφίσας ξυμπέμπειν ἐκέλευον ἐς τὸ ξιμαχακικόν. οἱ δ’ ἐπεμψαν ἐπτά. αὔτίνοι δ’ ἐγένετο τῆς ἀποστολῆς τῶν νεόν οἱ μέν πολλοί τῶν Χίων οὐκ εἰδότες τὰ πρασσόμενα, οἱ δὲ ὀλίγοι καὶ ξυνειδότες τὸ τε πλήθος οὐ βουλόμενοι πιο πολέμιον ἔχειν, πρὶν τι καὶ ἱσχυρὸν

342 See the relevant comments in T. Kakrides Aristofánous Oreithēs Athens 1974: 46-47.
344 U. Von Wilamowitz- Moellendorff Aristoteles und Athen I Berlin 1893: 100 no 3. M. Levi’s contention, namely that Aristocrates in the Birds is depicted as an example of aristocratic mentality and behaviour is obviously wrong (Commento storico alla Respublica Atheniensium di Aristotele Milano 1968: 325).
345 Thuc. 8.2.2.
346 Thuc. 8.3.5: The Euboeans.
347 Thuc. 8.5.4: The Chians and Erythraeans.
As the Corinthians did not accede, but a delay occurred, the Athenians started to have a clearer idea of the situation in Chios and sending one of their generals, Aristocrates, they leveled charges against them; as the Chians denied all charges, Aristocrates ordered them, as a pledge of good behavior, to dispatch ships along with them (the Athenians) to the allied force. They sent seven ships. The reason for the dispatch of the ships was that while the Chian commonalty was unaware of what was going on, the few, being privy to the plot, did not want the multitude to be hostile toward them yet, before they received strong reinforcements, and since they did not expect the Peloponnesians to arrive any longer, because they had been wasting time.

We cannot be entirely sure as to the type of constitution in force at the time in Chios, but the chances are that it was indeed an oligarchy. What we learn from this passage concerning the political situation in Chios is that the island was divided into an oligarchically inclined upper-class faction who conducted the secret negotiations with Sparta, an upper-class faction politically friendly to Athens, and the common Chians, who were not privy to the negotiations with Sparta (and certainly would not approve if they were aware of them). It is perfectly conceivable that Aristocrates approached the faction friendly to Athens first and the local proxenoi and phourarchoi for information. The oligarchs, on the other hand, were in dire straits, for the promised help had not yet arrived and Aristocrates’ presence on the island was a clear indication, if not an outright proof, that their faction was suspect in the eyes of the Athenians, or even worse, that information had somehow leaked that some Chians were colluding with the enemy. Feeling betrayed and fearing Athenian reprisals, they thought it prudent to concede to the Athenian demands and contribute seven ships to the allied contingent in the end.

It is interesting to note that Aristocrates’ term of office was coming to a close when he received the order to sail to Chios. When these events took place in Chios the Isthmia at Corinth had already begun. The Isthmia was a biennial festival celebrated in July or late June, but the accompanying truce could have started already one month earlier. From Thucydides’ language we understand that Aristocrates set out on the mission to Chios before the festival had begun (but after the Isthmia truce was heralded), and concluded it during the festival (8.10.1: Ἐν δὲ τούτῳ τὰ Ἴσθµια

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350 For the month the Isthmia were conducted, see Gomme, Andrewes and Dover 1945-1981: 5 23-24; Hornblower 1991-2008: 3 782-783.
ἐγίγνετο). It must have been therefore, the last mission in his term of office, due to end in a couple of weeks, and this may be an indication that the Athenians did not expect complications to crop up. Scholars have usually identified the Aristocrates in this passage with the son of Scellias. We cannot determine, however, if Aristocrates was elected regularly in his post at the elections in March 413, or at an interim election, later on that year after three or possibly four seats in the board had become vacant following the deaths of Nikias, Demosthenes, Eurymedon, ?Euthydemus; nor can we support the idea that the probouloi sponsored certain individuals of conservative outlook to replace the fatalities.

The Four Hundred

After the completion of Aristocrates’ mission to Chios we lose track of him for several months. Thucydides’ narrative does not throw any light on why, when and under what circumstances the main protagonists, Aristocrates included, decided to throw their weight behind the coup, nor are we informed in detail about the latter’s politics and behavior during the four months of oligarchic rule. By 411 he had already had a remarkable career in politics, therefore frustrated ambition can hardly have been his motive. But the fact that he failed to secure for himself the highest military post, i.e., the generalship, may be an indication that either he joined the enterprise relatively late, when the most important posts were no longer vacant, or that he was not a fervent supporter of the coup. It may also be the case that Aristocrates had no access through personal relationships to the inner caucus of the revolutionaries, the circle of Antiphon, Peisander, Aristoteles, Aristarchus and others. When we hear of


352 Avery 1959: 73. The theory that the probouloi had the authority to appoint generals is, as Avery himself admits (73 no 14), purely conjectural and cannot be adduced to suggest what Aristocrates’ political outlook was in 412.

353 Hornblower 1991-2008: 3 1007. Aristocrates’ decision to join the coup must have astonished the Athenians, as was the case with so many other prominent citizens (E. Ruschenbusch Athenische Innenpolitik im 5. Jahrhundert v. Chr.: Ideologie oder Pragmatismus? Bamberg 1979: 102).


355 Thucydidès at 8.89.2 describes both Theramenes and Aristocrates as τὸν πάνυ [στρατηγὸν] τῶν ἐν τῇ ὀλιγαρχίᾳ καὶ ἐν ἀρχαῖς ὀντῶν and Andrewes concludes that ‘this passage shows that he had taken a prominent part in setting up the oligarchy’ (Gomme, Andrewes and Dover 1945-1981: 5 295). It is not to be doubted that Aristocrates was a prominent figure among the Four Hundred, his reputation and family name at least would be enough to qualify him as such, but it is possible to modify Thucydidès’ evaluation of the role these men played at the initial stage of the coup. Firstly, Thucydidès includes an unknown number of other men as well among those most deeply implicated in the oligarchy
him again, he has emerged as one of the leaders of the opposition within the ranks of the Four Hundred, the man who effected the final collapse of the regime and paved the way for the transition to the Five Thousand.

The turning point for the oligarchy was the return of the envoys from Samos.\(^\text{356}\) Thucydides narrates:

> Οἱ δὲ ἐκ τῆς Σάμου ἀπὸ τῶν τετρακοσίων πεμφθέντες πρέσβεις ἐπεὶ δὴ ἀφικόμενοι ἐς τὰς Λήθνας ἀπῆγγελαν τὰ παρὰ τοῦ Ἀλκιβιάδου, ὡς κελεύει τὸ ἀντέχειν καὶ μηδὲν ἐνδιδόναι τοῖς πολεμίοις, ἐξόχα τε ἃ ὑπὸ τοὺς πολλοὺς ἐξελέγχα τὸ στρατεύμα διαλάβειν καὶ Πελοποννησίων περιέσχεσαι, ἀρετομένους καὶ πρότερον τοὺς πολλοὺς τῶν μετεχόντων τῆς ὀλιγαρχίας καὶ ἠδος ἂν ἀπαλλαγέντας τῇ ἀσφαλείᾳ τοῦ πράγματος πολλῷ δὴ μᾶλλον ἐπέρρωσαν. καὶ ἐξισταντὸ τε ἤδη καὶ τὰ πράγματα διεμέμφοντο, ἐξόχεις ἡμερῶν τῶν πάνω [στρατηγῶν] τῶν ἐν τῇ ὀλιγαρχίᾳ καὶ ἐν ἀρχαῖς ἄντων, οἰον Θηραμένη τοὺς τῶν Ἀγγενος καὶ Ἀριστοκράτη τοῦ Σκελίου καὶ ἄλλους, οἱ μετέχον μὲν ἐν τοῖς πρῶτοι τῶν πραγμάτων φοβοῦντοι δὲ, ὡς ἐφασαν, τὸ τέ ἐν τῇ Σάμῳ στρατεύμα καὶ τὸν Ἀλκιβιάδην σπουδὴ πάνω, τοὺς τέ ἐς τὴν Δακεδαίμονα πρεσβευμένους [ἐπεμπον], μὴ τι ἄνευ τῶν πλείων κακῶν δράσεων τὴν πόλιν, οὐ τὸ τα ἀπαλλάξειν τοῖς ἄγαν ϑα ὀλίγους ἐλθεῖν, ἀλλὰ τοὺς πεντακισχιλίους ἔργῳ καὶ μὴ ὀνόματι χρήναι ἀποδεικτέοι καὶ τὴν πολιτείαν ἱσαίτερα καθιστάναι. (8.89.1-2)\(^\text{357}\)

and uses the two men as examples (οἶνο... καὶ ἄλλους) without specifying the rank which each man possessed within this group (though undoubtedly Aristocrates would have been ranked high within this group). Secondly, Thucydides may have taken into account the whole conduct of the man during the four-month rule of the oligarchy, that is, Aristocrates’ assumption of the leading role of the opposition prompted the historian to attribute to him a leading role in the setting-up of the regime as well. At any rate, the exclusion of his name from the list of the oligarchic leaders at 68 alludes to him not having campaigned ardently from the first day on for the oligarchic cause, nor does any other source, especially Lysias 12.66, connect him with other known extreme oligarchs (unlike Theramenes). If Aristocrates had been a member of the inner circle of the revolutionaries, he would have legitimately borne grudges against his comrades since he was only awarded with a taxiaarchy, but there is no evidence whatsoever to support this.

\(^{356}\) It has been argued that Alcibiades’ message to Athens was censored by the Four Hundred owing to its potentially disastrous effect for the oligarchy on the population (W. McCoy Theramenes, Thrasybulus and the Athenian Moderates PhD Diss. Yale University 1970: 21-22; D. Kagan The Fall of the Athenian Empire Cornell 1987: 187). But see H. Hefter (Der oligarchische Umsturz des Jahres 411 v. Chr. und die Herrschaft der Vierhundert in Athen: quellenkritische und historische Untersuchungen Vienna 2001: 260 and no 196) who rightly remarks that if there was any censorship, it failed its purpose because even in its censored version the message did lead to defiance and severe criticism on the part of the masses. If, alternatively, we accept McCoy’s idea we need to consider the possibility that somehow the message in its original form leaked to the public.

\(^{357}\) The closing sentence οὐ τὸ τα ἀπαλλάξειν τοῖς ἄγαν ϑα ὀλίγους ἐλθεῖν is corrupt and the text as it stands does not wield any meaning in Greek. The negative οὐ produces a
When the envoys sent by the Four Hundred returned from Samos to Athens they reported Alcibiades’ message, namely that he urges them to endure and not to surrender anything to the enemy and that he has great hopes that the camp will reconcile with them and that they will prevail over the Peloponnesians. Since most of the participants in the oligarchy had already been vexed, and would much rather in safety release somehow themselves from this undertaking, they became much more eager. They were banding together and greatly blamed the government, having as leaders those most implicated in the oligarchy and holding offices, that is, Theramenes the son of Hagnon and Aristocrates son of Scellias and others who were among the first to be in the government, and they were afraid, so they alleged, of the army on Samos and Alcibiades very seriously, and those who were sent to Lacedaemon to negotiate, lest they do something harmful to the city without the consent of the majority (in the Four Hundred); they were of the opinion that they should get rid of the extreme oligarchy, and, instead, appoint the Five Thousand in practice and not only in theory and make the constitution more equal.

This passage tells us that even before the return of the envoys from Samos disaffection was widespread among the rank-and-file of the supporters of the oligarchy, and that they were ready to abandon the enterprise if there was a safe way to do so. Moreover, they had begun to conspire against the regime (ξυνισταντό τε Ἡδη; cf. 8.66.2 ἔτε ξυνεστηκός; 83.3: ξυνιστάµενοι), and had approached some leading members of the Four Hundred, among whom Theramenes and Aristocrates. It would be legitimate to infer that initially the mass of the disaffected citizens (those who reasonably expected that they would be included in the Five Thousand) approached first those men within the Four Hundred who were thought less likely to turn a deaf ear to their complaints, and not the other way round. At this stage the

meaningless contrast with the following ἀλλὰ and it should be excised, and we need a verb such as ἀπεφάνοντο (so Gomme, Adrewes and Dover 1945-1981: 5298) or ὥστε (Hornblower 2008: 1010) before the infinitive. Furthermore, following Andrewes, the variant οἰκεῖων of the manuscript M is to be preferred: ‘These men wish to be rid of the oligarchy they already have’ (Gomme, Adrewes and Dover 1945-1981: 5298). M. Ostwald’s interpretation of the whole passage, namely that the opposition at this point lacked the confidence to demand an end to the extreme oligarchy is rather unfounded. It is doubtful whether the disaffected members of the Four Hundred at this point perceived themselves as a group politically distinct from the rest. Their protest was rather against certain choices adopted so far by the oligarchic leaders (From Popular Sovereignty to the Sovereignty of Law: Law, Society, and Politics in Fifth-Century Athens Berkeley 1986: 391 and no 186). On the beginning of the opposition and Alcibiades’ message to the Four Hundred, see G. Gilbert Beiträge zur innern Geschichte Athens im Zeitalter des peloponnesischen Krieges Leipzig 1877: 329-320; Kagan 1987: 184-190; Ostwald 1986: 390-393; Hefter 2001: 260-265. On its purpose being to spread dissention among the Four Hundred, see McCoy 1970: 81; Ostwald 1986: 390; Kagan 1987: 184; Hefter 2001: 260.

358 If the interpretation of τοις πολλοῖς τῶν μετεχόντων τῆς ὀλιγαρχίας as ‘those within the 5000 who supported the oligarchy is correct. So, Lintott 1982: 141; Gomme, Andrewes and Dover 1945-1981: 5296.
opposition was still embryonic and it seems that it was initiated from without, not within, the Four Hundred.

Thucydides presents both men as leading the opposition at an early stage, that is, before the return of the envoys from Samos, rather in the early days of the regime. At this stage the opposition's main concern must have been to check on the one hand unilateral and possibly treacherous acts on the part of Antiphon’s group, and on the other to open a communication channel with the fleet on Samos, whose attitude and reaction to the coup was to a great extent unpredictable, at least until Alcibiades’ message arrived in Athens. Aristocrates will have been particularly concerned about Athens’ future and will have realized that it would take a lot of skill and cautious movements to thwart the extremists’ plans and effect the broadening of the oligarchy on the one hand, and ameliorate the relationship with the fleet, with which the city was on a collision course, on the other. We should, therefore, give him the credit as well as Theramenes of contributing toward a bloodless end of the stasis in Athens.

Thucydides’ language may afford us the chance to get a glimpse within the council of the Four Hundred and the way it deliberated over policy and thorny issues in general. The historian uses the phrase ἄνευ τῶν πλεόνων which may also be a hint at the way in which decisions were reached. ‘Without the majority’ or ‘against the

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359 The Four Hundred had already begun sending embassies to the enemy. First they approached Agis soon after they assumed power and then they sent Laispodias, Aristophon and Melesias to Sparta by ship. Both embassies had already been sent when the oligarchical envoys returned from Samos, and although there is no proof that at this stage the leading clique were considering to betray the homeland, their haste and insistence to reach a settlement will have seemed highly suspicious in the eyes of the rank-and-file and those members of the Four Hundred, convinced oligarchs included, who were ready to carry on the war until its successful conclusion. For the fears of the opposition at this critical point, see Kagan 1987:187-188 who stresses the fact that the dissidents perceiving the latent danger of either loss of sovereignty or civil war that the two opposing sides (extreme oligarchs and democrats on Samos) acted cautiously and prudently; cf. G. Großmann Politische Schlagwörter aus der Zeit des peloponnesischen Krieges Zurich 1950: 15.

360 Lintott maintains that the opposition leaders welcomed rather than feared Alcibiades’ strong position on Samos (1982: 151). This may be the case, but until Alcibiades’ manifesto became known to Athens the oligarchs had every reason to fear not only a negative reception of their coup but also outright intervention on the part of the fleet, a prospect which would have become reality had it not been for Alcibiades timely intervention.

361 The first known overtures to Sparta, the communication with king Agis and the Laispodias, Melesias and Aristophon mission to Sparta, would not have involved dishonourable terms for Athens, not to mention treachery, but for the dissidents those movements might have seemed suspicious any way. Thucydides’ narrative does not suggest deceit or foul play at this stage on the part of the leading clique. It was only later in connection with Antiphan and Phrynichus’ embassy that treachery and a secret pact are implied (8.91.1: οἱ ἐκ τῆς Λακεδαίμονος πρέσβεις οὐδὲν πράξαντες ἀνεχώρησαν τοῖς ξύμπασι ξυμβατικόν).
majority’ reveals a total absence of political debate at the meetings of the council. Decisions were taken behind the scenes, outside the body of the oligarchic councilors and against the law, practice and proceedings which were unacceptable for a number of members and quite probably Aristocrates.

Thucydides authoritatively asserts that the demand to appoint the Five Thousand and make the constitution more equal was a political smokescreen (σχῆμα πολιτικόν), and that in reality personal ambition was the real motive of most of the men who took part in the opposition movement. He comments that personal ambition and vanity is the usual cause for the downfall of every oligarchy, especially those springing from a democracy, and adds that Alcibiades’ strong position in Samos clearly encouraged them to abandon the oligarchy, especially since they had realized that it would not last long. They, accordingly, competed with each other to become the leader of the demos. Scholars have tried to ascertain to what extent Thucydides’ verdict is valid. Meyer took a compromising stance pointing out that in revolutionary times one is difficult to separate personal from idealistic motives. McCoy 1970: 85 is ready to accept the validity of the statement for most of the participants, but he believes this is too harsh a judgment for Theramenes. Kagan 1987: 189-190 underscores that fact that the opposition leaders, like every Athenian politician were raised in a highly competitive culture, had personal aspirations for power and glory (deemed as absolutely legitimate by their fellow-citizens) which was natural to pursue. However, patriotism and fear would override personal aggrandizement, and the honours some of them received after the restoration of the democracy prove that their contemporaries did not doubt their patriotism. G. Adeleye is convinced that Theramenes’ motives at least were complex: fear, self-preservation, personal aggrandizement and patriotism, but admits defeat in trying to determine which the primary one was. Lintott 1982: 151, on the other hand accepts Thucydides’ analysis in its main points and concludes that we should not rule out the possibility that the opposition leaders lent their support to the oligarchic coup not only out of lust for personal power but out of sympathy for the oligarchy as such as well. R. Sealey is convinced that Thucydides’ picture of personal motives attributed to the opposition leaders is essentially correct. Theramenes was jealous because Phrynichus’ group had gained the upper hand within the Four Hundred. M. Gianmarco believes that sudden unforeseen developments (failure at Samos and elsewhere in the Empire) suggested different political approaches to certain oligarchs and this prompted the opposition to Peisander, Antiphon and Phrynichus’ group. At the same time Gianmarco doubts whether an initial impetus for a moderate

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362 8.89.3.
363 Busolt 1893-1904: 3.2 1501 points out that the struggle to become the leader of the demos went hand in hand with the attempt on the part of the dissidents to re-conciliate with Alcibiades.
364 E. Meyer Geschichte des Altertumswohl 1-4 Stuttgart 1884-1901: 4.1 557 no 1.
constitution existed in the minds of these people in the first place at all. In interpreting this passage we need to bear in mind that here Thucydides' assessment of the motives of the dissidents appear next to a statement of general, theoretical nature with regard to the rivalries inherent in an oligarchy, and although it appears to have a universal application, we are not told to what extent each man was acting out of personal motives in this particular instance. Another problem, namely the apparent contradiction between the egoistic motives imputed to Theramenes, Aristocrates and their associates in this passage and the high praise the regime of the Five Hundred receives at 8.97.2 can be solved if, with H. Erbse, consider that while the opposition used the crumbling regime of the Four Hundred to further their own interests, they did so within a well-functioning framework worth of acclaim.

We need not doubt that the ambition to be influential, opportunism, the lust for power, personal jealousies and rivalries played an important role in joining the opposition movement. For ambitious individuals like Theramenes these motives may have been predominant. But political considerations, the instinct of survival, fear and patriotism must have also played an important role to many members of the oligarchy. In Aristocrates' case the latter set may have weighed more. At least his contemporaries viewed his participation in the oligarchy in a positive light, and never cast doubts over his patriotic motives.

**Eetioneia**

One key incident with which Aristocrates' name is connected is the demolition of the Eetioneia wall, at a time when the regime was showing clear signs of weariness and disintegration. Since the beginning of its erection Theramenes had been casting doubts, tentatively first but then more outspokenly, about its purpose, namely that it was not meant to protect the city from the fleet on Samos, but to admit a Peloponnesian fleet anchoring at La. After Phrynichus' assassination, and as the regime proved unable to assert its authority in the city, Theramenes and Aristocrates took on the offensive. Thucydides reports:

> οἱ γὰρ ἐν τῷ Πειραιᾷ τὸ τῆς Ἡπιωνείας τείχος ὀπλίται οἰκοδομοῦντες, ἐν οἷς καὶ ὁ Ἀριστοκράτης ἢν ταξιαρχῶν καὶ τὴν ἑαυτοῦ φυλὴν ἔχων, ξυλάμβανον τὸν Ἀλεξικέα στρατηγὸν δντα ἐκ τῆς ἡλικυρίας καὶ μᾶλιστα πρὸς τούς ἐταῖρους τετραμμένον, καὶ ἐς οἰκίαν ἀγαγόντες εἰρέξαν. Ξυνεπελάβοντο δὲ αὐτοῖς ἀμα καὶ ἄλλοι καὶ Ἔρμων τις τῶν περιπόλων τῶν Μουνικᾶι τεταγμένων ἀρχῶν· τὸ δὲ μέγιστον, τῶν ὀπλιτῶν τὸ στίφως ταύτα ἐβοῦλετο. (8.92.4-5)

The hoplites who had been building the Eetioneia wall in the Piraeus, to whom was also included Aristocrates the taxiarh in charge of his own tribe, arrested...

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368 So already Heftner 2001: 262 and no 205. Lintott 1982: 151 also notices the theoretical character of this passage which strives to give a general appreciation of politics based on a contrast with Thucydides' ideal, the detached, unbiased statesman.
Alexicles the general of the oligarchy, a man having great recourse to the *hetairoi*, and having led him to a house they imprisoned him. Other men assisted them, a certain Hermon, the officer of the patrols stationed at Mounichia; what is most important, the bulk of the hoplites willed the same.

It is important to note that Aristocrates’ regiment on that day was actually building the wall themselves, but, no doubt, through discussions between the soldiers and Aristocrates they had been convinced that the fortification was for no good purpose. It must have taken some time and a lot of discussion for the hoplites to reach an agreement and commit this audacious and dangerous act, the arrest of the general Alexicles. In doing so, they must have been ready to face the consequences, that is, an immediate confrontation with troops faithful to the Four Hundred. The events were unfolding fast, reaching a climax. A second observation is that the soldiers seem to have taken the initiative on their own, not passively receiving orders from their officer. In Thucydides’ narrative they, and not Aristocrates, are the agent. There are therefore signs that the soldiers’ unforeseen reaction was not the result of a carefully planned plot against the regime, but a spontaneous reaction to a forthcoming treachery. Whatever Aristocrates’ actual involvement in the demolition of the wall may have been, its importance was made clear to all parties concerned: free and unmolested entry to the Pireaus harbor was denied to the Peloponnesian fleet (8.94.2), whereas the Four Hundred had to re-assess the situation in the light of the latest developments and offer to compromise (8.93.1-2).

When Theramenes, Aristarchus and another unnamed general arrived from Athens, the former pretended to be angry with the soldiers as he tried to pool the wool over Aristarchus’ eyes, successfully as it turned out. But the soldiers would not be persuaded; instead, they proceeded with determination to demolish the wall. They asked Theramenes if he thought the wall was built for a good purpose, or if it should be demolished instead. When Theramenes conceded to its razing, the soldiers along with people from the Piraeus started to pull the wall down in earnest, and exhorted each other whoever wanted the Five Thousand to rule to carry on with the demolition. It has been suggested that the whole incident was prearranged and carefully planned in advance by opposition supporters, primarily Theramenes and Aristocrates. Others, on the other hand, argue that Thucydides believed there was

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370 G. Bugh (*The Horsemen of Athens* Princeton 1988: 116), on the contrary, ascribes the agency of the arrest to Aristocrates, the hoplites merely supporting the *taxiarch*’s actions, but this, I believe, is a loose interpretation of Thucydides.


373 Avery 1959: 79-80: ‘That the hoplites had a slogan ready at hand to rouse enthusiasm among the people also indicates that the whole programme was planned.’ Kagan 1987:194 allows for a degree of improvisation but he also concludes: ‘there certainly was a
a conspiracy involved in the demolition of Eetioneia, since his narrative implies a connection between Theramenes’ agitation and the mutiny. But the fact that Theramenes on the day of the mutiny was in the city of Athens does not support the idea of pre-arranged action. Furthermore, Aristocrates’ presence at Eetioneia could be co-incidental, since each tribe took on the building on a rota basis, and Harmon’s presence could be attributed to Munichia, his headquarters, being nearby. According to this interpretation of the events, the Eetioneia mutiny was sparked off by a spontaneous protest on the part of the soldiers, a protest which went hand in hand with the moderates’ agenda. The latter were of course quick enough to appropriate the people’s wrath and assume the leadership of the movement.\(^{374}\) It is not easy to determine if and to what extent the Eetioneia episode was a part of a well-planned scheme designed and executed from above. I am, however, inclined to accept a good deal of popular support, participation and initiative. We have seen that, initially, discontent sprang from the part of this population who considered themselves members of the Five Thousand (Thuc. 8.89.1) and then members of the Four Hundred joined the opposition. At the same time, the democratic mass and its leaders may have been temporarily silenced but were not decisively crashed. At Eetioneia they were present, ready to take action and eager to do away with the regime as soon as an opportunity presented itself (8.92.10: οἱ τε ὀπληται καὶ πολλοὶ τῶν ἐκ τοῦ Πειραιῶς ἄνθρωπον κατέσκαπτον τὸ τείχisma). Theramenes, ingeniously, does not take sides until it has been made clear that the masses are determined to pull down the symbol of hatred and tyranny and thereby depose the oligarchy.\(^{375}\) In revolutionary times quite often the crowds in the streets make their own history, and people who are able to sense their longings, and forge a course of action accordingly emerge as their leaders.

Thucydides asserts that Theramenes, Aristocrates and others led the opposition to the Four Hundred. It is regrettable that we are left in the dark as to who those other leaders were, for we would have a clearer picture of the political struggles and personal alignments within the ranks of the oligarchy. Be that as it may, we are left with only two names and the question naturally arises which one of them played the most important role in mustering the opposition forces and galvanizing them into action. To begin with, we need to note that in its initial stage the dissidents acted in a considerable element of planning and significant communication between the dissidents at Athens and the hoplites who were working on the walls at Piraeus’; McCoy 1970: 87; K. Welwe\_ Das klassische Athen: Demokratie und Machtpolitik im 5. und 4. Jahrhundert Darmstadt 1999: 225.  

\(^{374}\) Heftner 2001: 274-275: the allusion to an opposition plot may stem from an informant of Thucydides of extreme oligarchic convictions who attributed the fall of the regime to ‘Verschwörungs und Verratstheorien.’  

\(^{375}\) 8.92.10: καὶ τὸν Θηραµένη ἄρωτον εἰ δοκεῖ αὐτῷ ἐπὶ ἀγαθῶ τὸ τείχος οἰκοδοµεῖσθαι καὶ εἰ ἄριστον εἶναι καθαρευθὲν. ὁ δὲ, εἴπερ καὶ ἑκέινους δοκεῖ καθαρεύν, καὶ ἐαυτῷ ἐρή ξυνδόκειν. ‘they asked Theramenes if he thought that the wall was being built for a good purpose and whether it should be better demolished; he said that if they thought it should be demolished, it also seemed good to him.’
clandestine way: no open debate in the Council of the Four Hundred or elsewhere took place. Instead there were secret meetings in which those Athenians who had originally backed the movement aired their grievances over the policy and actions of the oligarchic clique.\textsuperscript{376} From Thucydides’ narrative one gets the impression that those first gatherings were spontaneous and unplanned, sprung up by their desire to express criticism at certain oligarchs, and their concern about the turn the revolution had taken. At this moment, it is likely that those people (who did not belong to the Council) approached those members of the Four Hundred who in their eyes were most trustworthy, among them Theramenes and Aristocrates. One could also argue that in Thucydides’ narrative Theramenes occupies a more central role: First, he is one of the architects of the movement, presented in detail and acknowledged as an undisputed leader at 8.68.4. Then, as the opposition grows stronger he again takes the initiative boldly, he is the heart of the resistance, he is verbal and outspoken, in fact he becomes gradually more and more brazen as the Four Hundred crumble, unable to counter-act.\textsuperscript{377} Against these acts of defiance and confrontation, Aristocrates is depicted as a silent man, content with lending his support unconditionally, content with keeping the second role for himself and leaving the glory to Theramenes. Even at Eetioneia, Theramenes is the key figure, he occupies the central place in the narrative,\textsuperscript{378} his approval of the demolition is decisive. Should we then assume that this is a faithful depiction of historical reality, or could this picture somewhat be modified?

At our disposal there are other sources which shed light on these events from a different perspective, unveiling a rather different picture. First, amidst an all-out attack against Theramenes Lysias in his speech \textit{Against Eratosthenes} castigates his enemy:

\begin{verbatim}
ὦς πρῶτον μὲν τῆς προτέρας ὁλιγαρχίας αἰτιώτατος ἐγένετο, πείσας ψυχής τὴν ἐπὶ τῶν τετρακοσίων πολιτείαν ἔλεσθαι. καὶ ὁ μὲν πατὴρ αὐτοῦ τῶν προβούλων ὄν ταύτ' ἐπραττεν, αὐτὸς δὲ δοκῶν εὐνοῦστατος εἶναι τοῖς πράγμασι στρατηγὸς ὑπ' αὐτῶν ἥρεθη, καὶ ἐὼς μὲν ἐτιμάτω, πιστὸν ἕαυτον [τῇ πόλει] παρεῖχεν· ἐπειδὴ δὲ
\end{verbatim}

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{376} 8.89.2: καὶ ξυνίσταντό τε ἢδη καὶ τὰ πράγματα διεμέμφοντο. ‘they were already banding together and were blaming the government.’
\item \textsuperscript{377} 8.90.3: ὡς ἔφη Θηραµένης καὶ οἱ μετ' αὐτοῦ ‘as Theramenes and those around him claimed’; 91.1: ‘Ταῦτ' οὖν ἐκ πλέονός τε ὁ Θηραµένης διειθάνει ‘now Theramenes had been spreading rumours for some time’; 91.2: ὡς ἔφη Θηραµένης... ‘those (ships) said Theramenes...; 92.2: καὶ ὁ Θηραµένης ἢδη βρασύτερον καὶ ἀριστοκράτης καὶ ὅσοι ἄλλοι τῶν τετρακοσίων αὐτῶν καὶ τῶν ἐξωθην ἦσαν ὁμογνώμονες ἦσαν ἐπὶ τὰ πράγματα ‘Theramenes and Aristocrates and all those of the Four Hundred and those outside them who were of the same opinion proceeded to work more boldly’; 92.3: καὶ οὐκ ἔφη ὁ Θηραµένης εἰκὸς εἶναι... ‘Theramenes said it is not normal that...’
\item \textsuperscript{378} Even in spatial terms, if one was to reconstruct the scene, Theramenes would be in the centre negotiating with the soldiers whereas Aristarchus and Aristocrates would occupy the two opposite ends. Note also that the means of discourse is reserved for Theramenes only, the other personae remaining silent.
\end{itemize}
Πείσανδρον μὲν καὶ Κάλλαισχρον καὶ ἕτέρους ἐώρα προτέρους αὐτῶν γιγνομένους, τὸ δὲ ὑμέτερον πλῆθος οὐκέτι βουλόμενον τούτων ἀκροάζει, τὸτ’ ἤδη διὰ τὸν πρὸς ἐκείνους φθόνον καὶ τὸ παρ’ ὑμῶν δέος μετέσχε τῶν Ἀριστοκράτους ἐργῶν. (12.65-66)

First, this man became the most responsible for the establishment of the first oligarchy when he persuaded you to vote for the constitution of the Four Hundred. His father, being one of the probouloi, partook in the same deeds. This man now, being thought of as most favourably disposed toward the government was appointed general by them. And as long as he was receiving honours he was faithful. But when he saw Peisander and Calaeschrus and others become more important than him and you not willing to listen to them any longer, then because of his jealousy toward them and his fear of you joined Aristocrates’ deeds.

What exactly τὰ Ἀριστοκράτους ἔργα were we are not told, but it is conceivable that their culmination was the Eetioneia incident, which in Lysias’ and the jury’s eyes, in less than ten years’ time after the events, it is perceived as something laudable and honorable, having already acquired in the democratic memory something of a legend status. Indeed, as we shall see, a fourth-century source inextricably connects Aristocrates’ memory with this celebrated event (see bellow, pages 107-108). But in Against Eratosthenes Theramenes is depicted as somebody deeply involved in the hideous oligarchy who sided with the opposition relatively late out of purely personal motives. As it has been stressed, Lysias’ objective in this part of the speech was to discredit and harass Theramenes through this personal harangue.379 We should therefore look elsewhere for additional information from sources which are less partisan and hostile toward the participants in the events. Indeed, some additional information about the opposition comes from the Athenaion Politeia 33.2:

αἰτώτατοι δ’ ἐγένοντο τῆς καταλύσεως Ἀριστοκράτης καὶ Θηραµένης, οὐ συναρεσκόμενοι τοῖς ὑπὸ τῶν τετρακοσίων γιγνομένοις. ἅπαντα γὰρ δι’ αὐτῶν ἐπιρράτων, οὐδὲν ἐπαναφέροντες τοῖς πεντακισχιλίοις.

The most responsible for the downfall (of the oligarchy) were Aristocrates and Theramenes, who did not approve of the actions of the Four Hundred, since they were unaccountable for everything they did without referring anything to the Five Thousand.

The reasons for the κατάλυσις of the Four Hundred as they are given here correspond with those given by Thucydides at 8.89.2. It is interesting that Aristocrates’ name is listed first and this may be an indication that the author of the Athenaion Politeia, a source, let it be noted, otherwise sympathetic toward Theramenes (cf. 28.5), or his source considered Aristocrates the heart of the opposition and his actions more instrumental in bringing about the downfall of the

379 For example, Ostwald 1986: 391; Heftner 2001: 260 and no 197.
regime. Zunino argues that *AP* had access to a tradition different from that of Thucydides, and that by adopting it its author sought to correct Thucydides. Such a tradition could as well have been oral and have drawn heavily on Aristocrates’ image in the popular imagination. Aristocrates, after all, came unscathed out of the oligarchy and in fact his career reached its peak after 410 when he held the generalship three times until his death. As Thomas argues, he must have enhanced his status as a democratic hero during this time. Considered against this image of a celebrated, respectable democratic hero, Lysias’ rewarding him with the leading role in the opposition to the Four Hundred may not have sounded as a blatant falsification of history to the members of the jury in 403 B.C. Diodorus, on the other hand, in his extremely short reference to the downfall of the regime mentions Theramenes only as the sole author of the restoration of the democracy, the recall of Alcibiades and the mover of a number of decrees. But his narrative is abridged to such an extent that it is difficult to determine if the failure to mention any other protagonists is the result of poor epitomizing on his part or if his source made mention of Theramenes only. The scholiast to Aristophanes’ fragment K-A 591 70-71 comments that ‘εἴρηται ὅτι Ἀριστοκράτης διέταττε σὺν Θηραµένει τότε καὶ αὐτὸς τὰ πράγµατα.’ ‘It is said that at the time Aristocrates himself, together with Theramenes, was in command of state affairs.’ It is not clear whether τότε refers to the period during which Aristocrates held one of his generalships, that is under democracy, or the scholiast here refers to the oligarchy of the Four Hundred, but in theory the regime of the Five Thousand may also be meant here. The expression ‘διέταττε τὰ πράγµατα’ is vague and it is hard to understand in what capacity Aristocrates ordained or arranged the affairs, but extensive powers as suggested by the scholiast would be out of place under democracy. It is questionable whether the scholiast had access to an independent source other than Thucydides, so it is probable that this is an inference from his narrative. We are therefore not entitled to

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380 Avery 1959: 76-78 discusses this passage in conjunction with Lysias 12.66 and argues that Aristocrates’ pre-eminence in the opposition suggested in these passages may be due to the fact that Theramenes was as a general too restricted to air grievances openly and lead the opposition, whereas Aristocrates had much less to lose; cf. Ostwald 1986: 391 and no 187; M. Zunino “Aristocrate figlio di Scelio: Storiografia e oratoria a confronto?” RSA 29 1999: 81. On the other hand, Rhodes in his Commentary on the Aristoteleian Athenaiion Politeia Oxford 1981: 413 does not make any comment on the particular order of the names.

381 Zunino 1999: 81; she argues that there was not only a chronological gap between *AP* and Thucydides, but also a difference in the method of investigation, retrieval and selection of the sources themselves-such as archives, to which Aristotle and his disciples had access. But it is difficult to see what kind of archives could be available recording Aristocrates’ actions in general and the Eetioneia incident in particular. In this case it is possible that a literary source provided the information for the author of the *AP*.


383 13.38.3.
draw any conclusions from this passage with regard to Aristocrates’ authority in the Four Hundred.\textsuperscript{384}

Additional information comes from a speech delivered about 341 B.C., some seventy years after the Four Hundred oligarchy. The speaker, an Epichares, the grandson of Epichares, nephew of Aristocrates, in pleading his case (in the assembly?) implores his audience to take into account the services his family has rendered Athens in the past.\textsuperscript{385}

\begin{quote}
Ἀναμνησθέντες οὖν, ὃ άνδρες δικασταί, καὶ τής τούτων πονηρίας καὶ τῶν προγόνων τῶν ἴμμετέρων, ἃν Ἑπιχάρης μὲν ὁ πάππος ὁ ἐμὸς Ὀλυμπίασι νικήσας παίδας στάδιον ἐστεφάνωσε τήν πόλιν, καὶ παρὰ τοῖς ἴμμετέροις προγόνοις ἐπιεικῆ δόξαν ἔχων ἐτελεύτησεν. ἴμμεις δὲ διὰ τούτων τὸν θεοὺς ἔχθρων ἐπεστερήμεθα ταύτης τῆς πόλεως, ύπέρ ἢς Ἀριστοκράτης ὁ Σκελίου, θείος ὃν Ἑπιχάρους τοῦ πάππου τοῦ ἐμοῦ, οὐ ἔχει ἄδελφος οὐτοὶ τούνομα, πολλὰ καὶ καλὰ διασπραζόμενος ἔργα πολεμοῦσα τῆς πόλεως Λακεδαιμονίους, κατασκάφας τὴν Ήετίωνειαν, εἰς ἢν Λακεδαιμονίους ἐμελλόν οἱ περὶ Κριτίαν ψυχέρεθαι, καθελὲ μὲν τὸ ἐπιτείχισμα, κατήγαγε δὲ τὸν δῆμον κινδυνεύων αὐτῶς οὐκ οἱ τοιούτους κινδύνους, ἀλλ’ ἐν οἷς καὶ παθεῖν τι καλὸν ἐστιν, ἔπαυσε δὲ τοῖς ἐπιβουλεύοντας ὑμῖν. ([D.] 58.67)
\end{quote}

Remember then men of the jury, both their wickedness and your ancestors, one of whom Epichares, my grandfather, having achieved victory at the discipline of stadium in children’s competition, crowned the city, and having among your ancestors fair repute his life came to an end. But we, because of this enemy of the gods, got deprived of this city, for which Aristocrates the son of Scelias, uncle of my grandfather Epichares, whose name my brother has, accomplished many and great deeds while the city was at war with the Lacedaemonians by raising Eetioneia to the ground, in which those around Critias had planned to receive the Lacedaemonians; he tore down the epiteichisma and brought back the demos, putting himself in dangers not like ours, but in those which if something befalls somebody it is welcome, and he deposed those who plotted against you.

This astonishing passage is less of an accurate historical record of the dramatic events pertaining to the final years of the Peloponnesian war, than a hazy and blurred amalgamation of two distinct episodes of the Athenian history. It has been argued that the tradition of the family of Aristocrates has appropriated a famous incident of the Athenian history, the restoration of democracy after the rule of the Thirty Tyrants, by misplacing or dislocating in time Aristocrates’ actions and presenting him as the flawless democratic hero, while conveniently leaving his role in

\textsuperscript{384}On the date of composition of this lost comedy of Aristophanes to which fragment 591 K-A belongs, see Avery 1959: 82-84.

\textsuperscript{385}For the family of Epichares, see Davies 1971: 57-59.
the establishment of the Four Hundred in total silence.\textsuperscript{386} We see, then, that what is left here as the core of historical reality is Aristocrates’ involvement at Eetioneia, which is naturally magnified and somewhat distorted, as in this narrative he is the sole, unassisted agent of a bold, heroic deed.

This survey of sources other than Thucydidides shows that there are indications that there existed in Athens other rival traditions about the collapse of the Four Hundred oligarchy and the people who brought it about, traditions that do not share Thucydides' views over those turbulent events and the role certain individuals had played in them. Different perspectives and political views involved apart, how else can this discrepancy over the two men’s role be explained?

First of all, Thucydides’ narrative itself provides some hints that Theramenes may have joined the opposition movement relatively late in comparison to Aristocrates. The historian presents Theramenes’ actions as a crescendo. His criticism, vague in the beginning, becomes sharper only gradually and he prefers to avoid confrontation if possible: At the session of the Four Hundred he denies complicity and offers to release Alexicles (8.92.6). At Eetioneia, as we have seen, he does not reveal himself until it is obvious that the soldiers are determined to push their agenda, i.e., appointment of the Five Thousand. Ostwald argued that all these are signs that Theramenes did not take an unequivocal stance after the return of the envoys from Samos.\textsuperscript{387} It seems that Theramenes had personal reasons to be careful not to raise suspicions about his person since he was deeply implicated in the oligarchy, he had been elected general, and contributed a great deal to its establishment, so he might have thought it better to leave all options open and wait until the situation became clearer. It is true that Thucydides attributes the leading role to him as the instigator of the overthrow of the regime, but he may have come to the conclusion that Theramenes was the most instrumental in their ousting because the politician from Steiria emerged as the most important, powerful and influential member of the Five

\textsuperscript{386} Thomas 1989: 132-139; the author strives to demonstrate how family tradition transforms the content of historical events through oral tradition to fit very strong general conceptions about Athens’ history, the patriotic polis traditions themselves. See also Zunino op.cit. who discusses the existence of other, parallel, and even hostile traditions to that of the oikos of Aristocrates, e.g., the oikos of Theramenes, whose traces can be found in other literary sources (AP, Lysias), and how Thucydides made use of and evaluated them. Her conclusions are that the author of AP has not necessarily drawn on the tradition of the oikos of Aristocrates; that Thucydides did, but his judgment on it was not particularly appreciative; that the tradition of the oikos of Aristocrates as presented in the speech has undergone considerable transformation almost beyond recognition and it is almost impossible therefore to reconstruct its initial content. Unlike Thomas, Zunino does not believe there is confusion in the speech between the fall of the Thirty and that of the Four Hundred: the κατήγαγε δὲ τὸν δήμον refers to the deposition of the Four Hundred and the establishment of the Five Thousand (cf. J. Ober Mass and Elite in Democratic Athens Princeton 1989: 265).

\textsuperscript{387} 1986: 391 and no 186. He concludes: ‘clearly action was taken by Aristocrates before it was taken by Theramenes.’ cf. Avery 1959: 76.
Thousand, a constitution the historian so much admired (8.97.2).\textsuperscript{388} Theramenes undertook to purge the extremists from the oligarchic movement through a series of trials, whereas the reconciliation with the fleet was achieved largely through his own intervention.\textsuperscript{389}

**Service under the restored democracy**

Aristocrates’ presence at Eetioneia and his conduct probably secured for him a place on the board of generals for 410/9 B.C. An account of the expenditure of the Treasurers of Athena for the same council year records a payment to the generals Dexioniates, Pasiphon and Aristocrates. Unfortunately from his demotic (in dative) only the last letter is preserved. The relevant text of IG I\textsuperscript{3} 375=ML 84 is on line 35 Ἀριστοκρά[τει ]8\.\.\.\.\.\.\.\.\.\.\.\.\.\.\.\.\.\.\.\.\.\.\.\.\.\.\.\.\.\.\.\.\.\.\.\.\.\.\.\.\.\.\.\.\.\.\.\.\.\.\.\.\.\.\.\.\.\.\.\.\.\.\.\.\.\.\.\.\.\.\.\.\.\.\.\.\.\.\.\.\.\.\.\.\.\.\.\.\.\.\.\.\.\.\.\.\.\.\.\.\.\.\.\.\.\.\.\.\.\.\.\.\.\.\.\.\.\.\.\.\.\.\.\.\.\.\.\.\.\.\.\.\.\.\.\.\.\.\.\.\.\.\.\.\.\.\.\.\.\.\.\.\.\.\.\.\.\.\.\.\.\.\.\.\.\.\.\.\.\.\.\.\.\.\.\.\.\.\.\.\.\.\.\.\.\.\.\.\.\.\.\.\.\.\.\.\.\.\.\.\.\.\.\.\.\.\.\.\.\.\.\.\.\.\.\.\.\.\.\.\.\.\.\.\.\.\.\.\.\.\.\.\.\.\.\.\.\.\.\.\.\.\.\.\.\.\.\.\.\.\.\.\.\.\.\.\.\.\.\.\.\.\.\.\.\.\.\.\.\.\.\.\.\.\.\.\.\.\.\.\.\.\.\.\.\.\.\.\.\.\.\.\.\.\.\.\.\.\.\.\.\.\.\.\.\.\.\.\.\.\.\.\.\.\.\.\.\.\.\.\.\.\.\.\.\.\.\.\.\.\.\.\.\.\.\.\.\.\.\.\.\.\.\.\.\.\.\.\.\.\.\.\.\.\.\.\.\.\.\.\.\.\.\.\.\.\.\.\.\.\.\.\.\.\.\.\.\.\.\.\.\.\.\.\.\.\.\.\.\.\.\.\.\.\.\.\.\.\.\.\.\.\.\.\.\.\.\.\.\.\.\.\.\.\.\.\.\.\.\.\.\.\.\.\.\.\.\.\.\.\.\.\.\.\.\.\.\.\.\.\.\.\.\.\.\.\.\.\.\.\.\.\.\.\.\.\.\.\.\.\.\.\.\.\.\.\.\.\.\.\.\.\.\.\.\.\.\.\.\.\.\.\.\.\.\.\.\.\.\.\.\.\.\.\.\.\.\.\.\.\.\.\.\.\.\.\.\.\.\.\.\.\.\.\.\.\.\.\.\.\.\.\.\.\.\.\.\.\.\.\.\.\.\.\.\.\.\.\.\.\.\.\.\.\.\.\.\.\.\.\.\.\.\.\.\.\.\.\.\.\.\.\.\.\.\.\.\.\.\.\.\.\.\.\.\.\.\.\.\.\.\.\.\.\.\.\.\.\.\.\.\.\.\.\.\.\.\.\.\.\.\.\.\.\.\.\.\.\.\.\.\.\.\.\.\.\.\.\.\.\.\.\.\.\.\.\.\.\.\.\.\.\.\.\.\.\.\.\.\.\.\.\.\.\.\.\.\.\.\.\.\.\.\.\.\.\.\.\.\.\.\.\.\.\.\.\.\.\.\.\.\.\.\.\.\.\.\.\.\.\.\.\.\.\.\.\.\.\.\.\.\.\.\.\.\.\.\.\.\.\.\.\.\.\.\.\.\.\.\.\.\.\.\.\.\.\.\.\.\.\.\.\.\.\.\.\.\.\.\.\.\.\.\.\.\.\.\.\.\.\.\.\.\.\.\.\.\.\.\.\.\.\.\.\.\.\.\.\.\.\.\.\.\.\.\.\.\.\.\.\.\.\.\.\.\.\.\.\.\.\.\.\.\.\.\.\.\.\.\.\.\.\.\.\.\.\.\.\.\.\.\.\.\.\.\.\.\.\.\.\.\.\.\.\.\.\.\.\.\.\.\.\.\.\.\.\.\.\.\.\.\.\.\.\.\.\.\.\.\.\.\.\.\.\.\.\.\.\.\.\.\.\.\.\.\.\.\.\.\.\.\.\.\.\.\.\.\.\.\.\.\.\.\.\.\.\.\.\.\.\.\.\.\.\.\.\.\.\.\.\.\.\.\.\.\.\.\.\.\.\.\.\.\.\.\.\.\.\.\.\.\.\.\.\.\.\.\.\.\.\.\.\.\.\.\.\.\.\.\.\.\.\.\.\.\.\.\.\.\.\.\.\.\.\.\.\.\.\.\.\.\.\.\.\.\.\.\.\.\.\.\.\.\.\.\.\.\.\.\.\.\.\.\.\.\.\.\.\.\.\.\.\.\.\.\.\.\.\.\.\.\.\.\.\.\.\.\.\.\.\.\.\.\.\.\.\.\.\.\.\.\.\.\.\.\.\.\.\.\.\.\.\.\.\.\.\.\.\.\.\.\.\.\.\.\.\.\.\.\.\.\.\.\.\.\.\.\.\.\.\.\.\.\.\.\.\.\.\.\.\.\.\.\.\.\.\.\.\.\.\.\.\.\.\.\.\.\.\.\.\.\.\.\.\.\.\.\.\.\.\.\.\.\.\.\.\.\.\.\.\.\.\.\.\.\.\.\.\.\.\.\.\.\.\.\.\.\.\.\.\.\.\.\.\.\.\.\.\.\.\.\.\.\.\.\.\.\.\.\.\.\.\.\.\.\.\.\.\.\.\.\.\.\.\.\.\.\.\.\.\.\.\.\.\.\.\.\.\.\.\.\.\.\.\.\.\.\.\.\.\.\.\.\.\.\.\.\.\.\.\.\.\.\.\.\.\.\.\.\.\textsuperscript{388}Avery 1959: 77 assumes that a reason for this could have been Theramenes possessing a superior office in relation to Aristocrates, but I do not think this would have seemed particularly impressive to the historian.


\textsuperscript{390} Meritt Athenian Financial Documents of the Fifth Century Ann Arbor 1930: 56; Avery 1959: 81-82 and no 29 where evidence is cited about the deme Trinemeia; R. Meiggs-D. Lewis A Selection of Greek Historical Inscriptions to the End of the Fifth Century B.C. Oxford 1969: 258 citing Davies. Develin 1989: 165 accepts the demotic without hesitations. It should be noted that the inscription is not in stoichedon style and in a previous IG edition (IG I\textsuperscript{2} 304) Hiller had opted for a space of 6 letters. Of the other bearers of the name, Aristocrates PAA 171225 from the deme Euonymon (Erechtheis) (Εὐώνυμος, dative Εὐόνυμοι), a Hellenotamias in 415 B.C. (IG I\textsuperscript{3} 370, 66), and Aristocrates PAA 171540 from the deme Phaleron (Aiantis) (Φαληρας, dative Φαληρεῖ) a Hellenotamias in 421 B.C. (IG I\textsuperscript{3} 285, 5) are the only possible alternatives on chronological and social grounds, but their demotics may not fit the gap in our inscription exactly.

\textsuperscript{391} Bleckmann 1998: 392 praisibly remarks that the sea battle at Kynossema was an important moment after which the city sought co-operation with the democratic fleet, a development to which Thrasyllus’ return to Athens in the winter of 411/10 may have contributed a good deal. Since the elections for the generalship took place before the battle at Kyzikos, Aristocrates’ election should be understood not in the context of the regime of the Five Thousand, but in that of the radical democracy.
Aristocrates was elected general again for the year 407/6 in an election which seems to have taken place later as usual, perhaps as late as May.392 His election, just like Conon’s, may have been accomplished due to his military performance during the previous years. Although we cannot include him in the close circle of Alcibiades’ associates and friends such as Thrasybulus and Adeimantus, also on the board of 407/6, there is no indication that Aristocrates was on hostile terms with Alcibiades.393 On the contrary, we hear that after staying about four months in Athens, Alcibiades embarked on a new campaign, whose objective was to subdue certain cities in Ionia, the island of Chios and to secure his rear by crushing the revolted Andros and perhaps Tenos.394 Alcibiades had been elected στρατηγὸς αὐτοκράτωρ, so he had extensive authority to select his co-generals personally. Xenophon reports that although the Athenians had appointed Aristocrates and Adeimantus as generals on land troops (Hell. 1.4.21: ἡρμῆνοι κατὰ γῆν στρατηγοί), Alcibiades demanded and succeeded in attaching them to his task force which included 1,500 infantry, 150 cavalry and 100 ships. If we understand, with Hatzfeld, the participle ἡρμῆνοι as concessive, this is an indication that Alcibiades objected to a decision previously taken by the assembly and insisted in the two chosen generals accompanying him. Apparently Alcibiades trusted the two generals and was convinced they were the right persons for the task at hand.395 This tells against Avery’s assumption that the Athenians sent Aristocrates and Adeimantus to Andros to check Alcibiades’ conduct.396 The campaign against Andros was not particularly eventful. After staying on the island for a few days, Alcibiades set out with most of his force to Samos, leaving behind him a small contingent to proceed with the siege.397

392 Kagan 1989: 287. Diodorus (13.69.3) reports that the Athenians vested Alcibiades with extensive powers and to gratify him they elected additionally as generals Adeimantus and Thrasyboulus who were Alcibiades’ protégés, but this story is rightly rejected by Bleckmann 1998: 481 on the grounds that if this were true it would mean that either there were more than ten generals on the board that year, or that two were deposed soon after their election to make way to the newly elected ones. Hatzfeld’s doubts on the identity of this Aristocrates with the son of Scellias are convincingly answered by Avery 1959: 85 and no 36.

393 On the composition of this board of generals and Athenian politics at the time, see McCoy 1970:141-142; Kagan 1987: 287.


395 cf. Plut. Alc.35: ‘οἱ δὲ δυνατώτατοι τῶν πολιτῶν φοβηθέντες ἐσπούδασαν αὐτὸν ἐκπλέσσαι τὴν ταχίστην, τὰ τ’ ἀλλα ψηφισάμενοι καὶ συνάρχοντας οὺς ἄκινον ἠθέλησαν.’ ‘the most influential among the citizens were eager for him (Alcibiades) to sail out as soon as possible, and they voted for all the rest and chose as fellow commanders those whom he wanted.’ Bleckmann 1998 : 481; Heftner Alkibiades: Staatsmann und Feldherr Darmstadt 2011 : 166.

396 Avery 1959: 85.

397 Xen. Hell. 1.4.22-3; Diod. 13.69.4-5. Diodorus erroneously reports that when Alcibiades departed, Thrasybulus was left on Andros to carry on the siege, but from Xen. Hell. 1.4.22 and 5.18 we can infer that Conon must have accompanied Alcibiades at Andros and was left there in charge to finish the job.
From Xenophon’s narrative we understand that Aristocrates and Adeimantus, being the commanders of the land troops, accompanied Alcibiades to Samos and from there embarked on missions on nearby positions held by the enemy. J. Roberts maintains that Alcibiades had at Notium his colleagues Adeimantus and Aristocrates, but if this were the case how can one account for the fact that Aristocrates got away with it so easily, since not only he maintained his post but was re-elected the following year? We must therefore accept that Antiochus was the sole commander at Notium.

**Arginusae**

Aristocrates’ name is connected with probably the most dramatic and dark episode of Athenian history, namely the Arginusae trial. The whole affair cost the lives of some two thousand Athenians and led to a fiercely disputed since antiquity, and highly controversial judicial process in which six Athenian generals were tried en masse, found guilty and got executed. In studying this grim chapter of Athenian history, a series of issues and problems, ranging from constitutional and jurisdictional aspects to source criticism, cultural and ethical contexts as well as political call for our attention and demand answers. Not surprisingly, therefore, the relevant scholarship has grown exceedingly extensive. In what follows, I am focusing on Aristocrates’ involvement in the sea-battle and the trial, especially in relation to the other participants and the networks operating around them. An explanation of the

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398 Diodorus mentions the islands of Kos and Rhodes (13.69.5).
399 Accountability in Athenian Government Madison 1982: 225 and no 76.

111
generals’ negligence to rescue the survivors and recover the dead will also be offered. It will emerge that Aristocrates shared to some extent the responsibility with the other members of the board of generals for failing to recover the bodies of the Athenian sailors and that unlike other colleagues of his, and as far as the evidence allows us to cast a glimpse on the situation, he had to fight for his life completely on his own, unassisted, and as it turned out, against all odds. But let us first see how the sources present the story.\footnote{Ancient sources on the Arginusae trial: Xen. Hell. 1.7.1-35; 2.3.35; Mem. 1.1.17-20; 4.4.1-2; Diod. 13.101-103.2; Ar. Frogs 1196; AP 34.1; Plut. Per. 37.5-6; [Pl.] Axioch. 368d-369a; Pl. Apol. 32b-c; Philochorus FGrHist328F142= schol. Ar. Frogs 1196; schol. Ar. Frogs 698; schol Ar. Clouds 6.}

First we shall turn to the immediate aftermath of the sea-battle. Little attention has been drawn to the inexplicable decision on the part of the generals to decline to commit themselves to picking up the dead even after the storm had abated, when admittedly they had ample opportunity to do so. The generals, experienced politicians themselves, can hardly have failed to grasp the ramifications of neglecting such a duty, sanctioned by religious, cultural and ethical norms.\footnote{On the importance of burying the dead as a religious duty, see A. Mehl “Für eine neue Bewertung eines Justizskandals: Der Arginusenprozeß und seine Überlieferung vor dem Hintergrund von Recht und Weltanschauung im Athen des ausgehenden 5. Jh. v. Chr.” Zeitschrift der Savigny-Stiftung für Rechtsgeschichte Romanistische Abteilung 99 1982: 32-80 esp. 66-79. The author points out that burial was a right everyone was entitled to except traitors and temple-robbers. Those men were forbidden to be buried in Attica. Burial was one of the unwritten laws enjoying universal acceptance in the Greek world, other laws being honouring one’s parents, the gods, helping a friend and abstaining from homicide.} What then forced them to turn a blind eye to their fellow-citizens who were so callously deprived of their right to proper burial sanctioned by gods and mortals alike? The answer can only be that something more important and urgent than paying respect to the dead demanded immediate action as soon as victory had been decided on the battle field. Kagan has pointed out that after the battle a unique situation emerged in that the wreckage had been spread throughout an extensive area (he gives a conservative estimation of four square miles), the pursuit of the enemy was exceedingly long, and more importantly an enemy fleet lay just a few miles away blockading Mytilene and Conon with his force. Hence the conference of the generals at Arginusae after the battle to determine a course of action, the conflicting tasks facing the generals, namely the pursuit of the enemy fleet and the recovery of the dead, the debate and the compromise to split the fleet. All this cost time and as the storm intervened, both tasks were aborted.\footnote{Kagan 1987: 356-358.} So far so good, but why did the generals not see to the recovery after the weather had cleared? The Athenian crews after a long pursuit stopped to return to the Arginusae islands to confer about what course of action to take next. At that particular moment each of the generals must have realized that urgent action had to be taken and that there was no time for celebrations. As they were returning to the islands they must have passed by sinking ships with their crews clinging on them.
and must have promised them to return soon. At the conference different options were put forward and in the end Thrasyllus’ compromise was adopted. Still both the recovery and the pursuit of the enemy had to be abandoned due to the magnitude of the storm. However, as soon as the weather improved and the main fleet met Conon who had meanwhile put to the sea and met the Athenians midway, both contingents sailed to Mytilene for a further conference.\footnote{Xen. \textit{Hell}.1.6.36-8; Diod. 13.100.5-6.} There it was decided to follow the Peloponnesian fleet to Chios and force a second naval engagement with a view to eliminating it and clearing the Aegean sea of the enemy. It is important to realize here that at the conference at Mytilene, in a sense, the recovery plan was abandoned for good and that Conon who may have or have not voted for this course of action was never implicated or accused in Athens. There can be only one explanation for this highly risky and controversial decision of the generals. Even before the battle, let alone after its positive outcome, the generals must have realized that this was Athens’ opportunity to give the enemy the coup de grace, a decisive blow which would decide the war once and for all, a Spartan Aegospotamoi. Men of action like Thrasyllus, Erasinides, Conon and Aristocrates would have taken the risk. Certain considerations almost dictated this option: the Athenians had managed to assemble an impressive naval force, unprecedented for the Greek standards so far.\footnote{The greatest sea-battle: Diod. 13.98.5.} But that was the best Athens could do since she managed to assemble this impressive naval force only through stretching her resources, material and human, well beyond her capabilities.\footnote{Ar. \textit{Frogs} 720 with scholion: The Athenians melted down statues of Athena Nike to issue golden coinage to meet the expenses of building and maintaining the fleet to free Conon; The Athenians conscript hoplites, hippies and slaves: Xen. \textit{Hell}. 1.6.24; Ar. \textit{Frogs} 693-694 with scholion=Hellanicus FGrH323aF25.} How long could Athens put to the sea such a large force? Certainly not for long; there was no money left to pay the crews and soon this great fleet would no doubt dwindle.\footnote{It was exactly this that happened to Conon’ fleet a few months before. Owing to lack of adequate funding for his crews, Conon could not man more than seventy ships with experienced sailors out of the one hundred vessels there were at his disposal (Xen. \textit{Hell}. 1.5.20).} The time was pressing hard the Athenians, and the generals thought a second engagement was worth the risk of abandoning the dead. How realistic this hope appeared in their eyes we do not know. Perhaps they counted on a stratagem, similar to that of Kyzikus, to entice the Peloponnesian fleet into a deadly encounter, for otherwise how could they expect that a defeated and cowed fleet would contemplate confrontation when a few months earlier a victorious Spartan admiral, Lysander, had declined Alcibiades’ offering battle after Notion? Be that as it may, their plan did not work out, their objective was not met and, what is more, they had to face the wrath of the Athenian folk. In fact their fate was sealed when the storm plunged into the straits off Arginusae, enabling the defeated enemy and Eteonicus to slip away in safety. Had the storm not occurred, Eteonicus with his fifty
ships would have been captured or sunk and Sparta would have been compelled to sue for peace on far better terms than those which Cleophon rejected.\footnote{AP 34.1: γενοµένης τής ἐν Ἀργυνούσσαις ναυµαχίας...ἔπειτα βουλοµένων Λακεδαιµονίων ἐκ Δεκελείας ἀπέλαναι καὶ ἐφ’ οίς ἔχουσιν ἐκάτερα εἰρήνην ἄγειν, ἕνιοι μὲν εὐποιοῦσαν, τὸ δὲ πλῆθος οὐχ ὑπήκουσεν ἐξαπατηθέντες ὑπὸ Κλεοφόντος, δὲς ἐκάλυσε γενέσθαι τὴν εἰρήνην, ἐλθὼν εἰς τὴν ἑκκλησίαν μεθύων καὶ ἰωράκα ἐνδεδυκός, ὃς φάσκων ἐπιστρέφειν εἰνάυτής ἡ τῶν ἀρχαίων ὀρφῶν ἡ λακεδαιµονία τὰς πόλεις... when the sea-battle at Arginusae was fought ... then although the Lacedaemonians wanted to leave Deceleia and conduct peace on a status quo basis, some were earnest but the multitude did not hearken since they were fooled by Cleophon, who became an obstacle to peace being materialized, as he came to the assembly in a state of drunkenness and wearing armour, arguing that he would not allow this unless the Lacedaemonians give up all cities.’ cf. schol. Ar. Frogs 1532.} When the news of the sea-battle reached Athens, the citizens deposed all generals except Conon and replaced them with Philocles and Adeimantus.\footnote{Scholarly opinion on the constitutionality of the process has been disparate. For Meyer Callixenus’ proposal was illegal and the whole process ‘ein schmachvoller Justizmord’ (1884-1901: 4.1610). Mossé also believes the process was illegal since there was no preliminary investigation (“Die politischen Prozesse und die Krise der athenischen Demokratie” in Welskopf (ed.) Hellenische Poleis: Krise, Wandlung, Wirkung Darmstadt 1974: 168), followed by Ostwald 1986: 439 and J. Bleiken Die athenische Demokratie Vienna 1986: 565). MacDowell concluded that apart from the short speeches and the collective verdict there were no breach in the legal process followed (The Law in Classical Athens 1978: 189). Mehl 1982: 42-48 has defended the legality of the Arginusae process. He makes a number of interesting points: Euryptolemus’ objections that the generals were not given adequate time to defend themselves and that they were tried en masse were no valid because both practices were customary in late-fifth century Athens. The controversy over the affair arose from the fact that the Attic law was imprecise and did not define the offenses clearly, which led to disparate verdicts for the same offence, and many offences falling in different conflicting laws.} Of the eight generals who took part in the engagement, Protomachus and Aristogenes fled, but the remaining six, Pericles, Diomedon, Lysias, Aristocrates, Thrassylus and Erasinides returned home. Erasinides was prosecuted by Archedemus, a leading demagogue who was in charge at the time of the \textit{diobelia}, the allowance given to the citizens to alleviate the burden of the enemy occupation of Deceleia, on the grounds that he had embezzled public funds deriving from the Hellespont, and he had conducted his office badly.\footnote{Xenophon in his Memorabilia (2.9.1-8) has Criton employ Archedemus in a sense as a means to protect himself from the sycophants. Archedemus is described as an able speaker and man of affairs but poor loving honesty (φιλόχρηστος). Criton would provide Archedemus with food and other goods; in return he would collect information which could be used against Criton’s enemies every time the latter threatened to bring Criton to court. On the historical Archedemus, see W. Connor The New Politicians of Fifth-Century Athens Indianapolis 1971: 35-36; R. Osborne “Vexatious Litigation in Classical Athens: Sycophancy and the Sycophant” in P. Cartledge, P. Millett and S. Todd (eds.) Nomos: Essays in Athenian Law, Politics and Society Cambridge 1990: 96-98; P. Millet discusses the Xenophon passage...} Erasinides was remanded in custody (Xen. Hell. 1.7.1-8 408)
2). Next, the generals gave account of their conduct during the battle at the council; the councillors accepted Timocrates’ proposal that the generals be referred to the Assembly (1.7.3). In the ensuing assembly meeting, Theramenes and some others pointed out that the generals should be held accountable because they neglected to rescue the shipwrecked. Attention was drawn to the letter the generals had sent to the assembly incriminating the weather only. After that each general was given a short time to defend themselves. They argued they had assigned the rescue plan to Theramenes and Thrasybulus. Those two men were to blame, although bad weather had made the execution of the plan impossible. Some captains and others were brought forward to testify all that (1.7.4-6). Their defense was persuasive and many Athenians volunteered to put up bail for the generals, but owing to the dark the assembly authorized the council to draft a probouleuma on how the generals should be tried (1.7.7). In the mean time the Apatoueria intervened, during which no public meeting was usually held on religious grounds, and Theramenes instructed some fake mourners to appear in the next assembly dressed in black; at the same time he suborned Callixenus to place a proposal on the council’s agenda according to which the assembly was to put to vote whether the generals were collectively guilty or not (1.7.8-11). Euryptolemus lodged an objection against Callixenus’ proposal through a graphe paranomon but was forced to withdraw it when Lyciscus made a counter-proposal: Euryptolemus and the rest were to be put on trial along with the generals and risk the same penalty if found guilty if they did not withdraw the graphe paranomon. When the prytaneis complained that they would not allow the voting to go through, Callixenus threatened them with the same penalty as Lyciscos had proposed. At this juncture all prytaneis but Socrates kept quiet (1.7.13-16). Then Euryptolemus made an alternative proposal, the generals be tried under Cannonos’ decree which stipulated a separate trial for each of the accused, or under the law against traitors and temple robbers (1.7.16-33). This proposal initially carried the day in the assembly but when Menecles lodged an objection (hypomosia) a second voting was carried out in which Callixenus’ proposal won the favour of the assembly. A final vote ensued in which the eight generals were found guilty, condemned to death, and the six present got executed (1.7.34-35).


411 It is remarkable that whereas Xenophon’s report mentions both dead and survivors, Diodorus speaks only about the recovery of the dead. Few scholars so far have tried to explain the discrepancy. Kagan assumes that Diodorus’ words at 13.100.2 reflect the sailors’ actual objections. It was only natural for them to stress that it was not worth risking their lives for people already dead, that is why Diodorus makes no mention of living men. Mehl 1982: 62-63 has proposed that Xenophon’s version may be favourable toward the generals because it focuses on the hours shortly after the battle and while the storm was raging. Diodorus’ on the other hand is unfavourable toward the generals because it implies that dead bodies could be recovered at ease after the storm, an order that was never issued by the generals, hence their guiltiness.
A somewhat different picture we get from Diodorus, especially of the precedents of the trial. The Athenians got discontented when they heard about the dead left unburied. Theramenes and Thrasybulus leave Samos and return to Athens in advance of the generals (13.101.1). The generals, estimating the two men would vilify them, sent a letter to Athens alleging an order had been given to those two to recover the bodies of the dead, the responsibility lying on them for having neglected it. This was an error of judgment because the generals turned the two powerful individuals against them (101.2-3). The assembly decided to put the generals on trial, appointed Conon as the commander of the fleet and ordered the other generals to return to Athens. Aristogenes and Protomachus fled, but the rest came back (101.5). In the assembly the accusers won the favour of the people whereas the generals’ spokesmen were bood. The relatives of the perished made their appearance in black and in unison with Theramenes’ friends convinced the people of the generals’ guilt. The accused were convicted to death, their property was confiscated (101.6-7). After the announcement of the verdict Diomedon held a speech (102.1).

The individuals involved in the trial and their place in the contemporary political scene

Let us first turn to Archedemus’ attack on Erasinides. Xenophon describes him as the leader of the demos and the man in charge of the diobelia, an allowance given to the Athenians to alleviate the financial loss after the Spartan occupation of Decelaia, first introduced by Cleophon.412 Other sources seem to confirm Xenophon’s statement.

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412 Scholarly evaluation of the two main sources, Xenophon and Diodorus, has been diverse. Earlier scholars, e.g., Busolt, favoured Xenophon. Cloché (1919) tried to reconcile the two accounts wherever possible. After the discovery of the Hellenica Oxyrhynchia, however, the tide turned. Andrewes (“The Arginouai Trial” Phoenix 28.1 1974: 112-122) remarked that in several points, especially the events concerning the preliminary stages prior to the trial, Diodorus’ account is superior to that of Xenophon, who is biased against Theramenes and his narrative at this point is not cohere. He has been followed since by Ostwald 1986: 434; Lang (“Theramenes and Arginouai” Hermes 120.3 1992: 267-279); Roberts (“Arginouai Once Again” CW 71.2 1977: 107-111). Kagan (1987: 354 no 1) is more balanced in his judgement. Mehl 1982: 38-41 also follows Andrewes and makes a number of interesting points: all ancient sources that present an account similar to Xenophon belong to the Socratic circle; in Euryptolemus’ speech conspicuous is the motif of the individual’s independence against the restrictions and limitations imposed by the city, a central theme in Socrates’ philosophy as well. Recently Xenophon bounced back and got precedence over Diodorus. Bleckmann 1998: 547-548 observed that Diodorus has used schematically passages from Hell. Oxy, especially the mixed reactions in Athens after the victory at Arginusae which highly resemble those after the battle at Kerata Hill (Hell. Oxy. 4.2). A second consideration is the positive bias toward Conon Hell. Oxy. and Diodorus clearly display.

413 1.7.2: ‘ὁ τοῦ δήµου τότε προεστηκὼς ἐν Ἀθήναις καὶ τῆς διωβελίας ἐπιμελόµενος.’ ‘the leader of the demos in Athens at the time and inspector of the diobelia.’ On the introduction of the diobelia: Unterhill 32-33; AP 18.3.
Lysias accuses him of embezzling public funds. Furthermore, Archedemus is depicted by the comic poets as not having fraters when he was a child, that is, he was a bastard who secured his citizenship somehow through corruption, and as a great rascal. The libel of foreign birth and lack of moral integrity was an unequivocal sign that the person mocked pursued radical democratic politics in Athens. Archedemus initiated the process against Erasinides in his capacity as a magistrate, probably a member of the council board of logistae. Suda seems to confirm this. Although Xenophon’s language is not explicit, the process may have been the euthyna. But what were Archedemus’ exact motives behind this move? Xenophon alludes to Erasinides’ conduct at Arginusae. It has been suggested that Erasinides’ prosecution was orchestrated by the democratic faction with the view to saving the lives of the other generals. But it would seem odd to attack a man with an admittedly democratic outlook while sparing others, e.g., Aristocrates, whose political past, at least in the eyes of the uncompromised democrats, was not spotless. Another explanation put forward is that Archedemus thought Erasinides was particularly vulnerable because of his advice at the generals’ conference at Arginusae to sail directly to Mytilene and abandon the shipwrecked, or that if he was singled out he might give evidence against his colleagues more easily. My interpretation is rather different. Rather than perceiving Archedemus as Theramenes’ tool or the leader of a democratic faction, we should consider him as an ambitious, and no doubt ruthless, politician pursuing radical democratic politics but having his own political agenda, plans and strictly personal interests which he would further and defend using all possible means, fair or unfair. As an administrator of the diobelia, he would make sure that the allowance be given to the people unobstructed and without interruption. In this way his followers would be satisfied

415 Gilbert 1877: 372 believed the process was a graphe against embezzlement of public funds (γραφὴ κλοπῆς δημοσίων χρημάτων); cf. schol. Ar. Frogs 1196.
416 ἐπιβολὴ καὶ ἐπιβάλλειν ὡς ὀρίζομένη ἐνδικτυρημένη περὶ ὀρφανῶν ἐπιτρόπων ἢ καὶ ἄλλως τοι τῶν τὰ δημόσια μὴ καλῶς διοικήσαντων ἢ τοῖς κατέχουσι τὰ ἄλλατρα καὶ μὴ εἰς ἐμφανὲς καθιστάσαι. ἢν οἱ ἄρχοντες ἱμίαν ὀρίζουσιν ἐπιβολὴ καλεῖται, καὶ τὸ ῥῆμα ἐπιβάλλειν.’ ‘they call ‘epibole’ and the verb ‘to lodge an epibole’ the penalty laid down for the guardians condemned for an offence against orphans, or for others who do not administer public offices well, or for those who withhold what belongs to others and do not produce it in court. The penalty which the magistrates impose is called epibole and the verb ‘to lodge an epibole.’
417 Kagan 1987: 365
420 Erasinides proposed the decree in 410/9 to honour the assassins of Phrynichus (IG I ³ 102=ML 85).
422 ‘ὁ τοῦ δῆμου τότε προεστηκώς’ illustrates exactly his prominence in the Athenian political scene.

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and he himself would retain his prominence. If we remind ourselves of the sorry state of the Athenian finance, especially after the strain on the public treasury the Arginusae campaign must have put, Archdeemus’ attack at this particular moment becomes perfectly intelligible.\textsuperscript{424} Regardless the integrity of Erasinides’ administration, Archdeemus will have seen there an opportunity to distribute money deriving from tribute to the people. This motive alone would suffice to explain the summons of the general and we need not search for intrigues or party political warfare.\textsuperscript{425} It seems therefore justified to disassociate Erasinides’ prosecution from that of the other five generals when it comes to examining the possible political motives of the accusers and the different political groups that pulled together or antagonised each other.

As far as Callixenus is concerned, Xenophon asserts that he did not act on his own device but was persuaded to lodge the \textit{probouleuma} in the Council.\textsuperscript{426} A second allegation in this direction is made in [Pl.] \textit{Axiochus} 368e, but one may doubt if this source is reliable or if it has got independent value, for there is a possibility that this author may have simply followed Xenophon.\textsuperscript{427} This bit of information has been variously interpreted. Kagan suggests that Xenophon here alleges that Theramenes bribed Callixenus to make his proposal in the Council. This, Kagan argues, would have been unnecessary because one would need the approval of the majority in the Council. But Xenophon does not quite say that. He only points out that Theramenes and his associates persuaded Callixenus to make his move.\textsuperscript{428} Ostwald is indecisive. He rejects the evidence from \textit{Axiochus} as weak and believes we cannot assess Xenophon’s allegation because elsewhere, i.e., in Theramenes’ defence against Critias, Theramenes is portrayed in a more favourable light and no mention is made of Callixenus. But as Ostwald himself admits, Theramenes’ speech is self-serving. The skilful politician would not mention any intrigues with Callixenus in this context.\textsuperscript{429} Bleckmann, on the other hand, accepts the validity of Xenophon’s passage, rightly I believe. There would have been no point for Theramenes in prejudicing the Assembly in his favour without preparing the ground in the Council as well. Theramenes was at pains to find a way to introduce a process which would be as detrimental to the generals as possible. He could mobilise a host of relatives in the Assembly, real or fake, and instruct them to behave as they did, but in case another process was

\footnotesize{\textsuperscript{424} Perhaps IG I\textsuperscript{3} 316 should be placed into this context. See also W. Thompson “The Date of the Athenian Gold Coinage” \textit{AJP} 86.2 1965: 159-174.\textsuperscript{425} Gilbert 1877: 372.\textsuperscript{426} \textit{Hell}. 1.7.8: ‘οι οίδι περι τόν Θηραµένην…καὶ Καλλίξενον ἐπεισαν ἐν τῇ βουλῇ κατηγορεῖν τῶν στρατηγῶν.’ ‘so, those around Theramenes…persuaded Callixenus to lodge an indictment in the Council.’\textsuperscript{427} ‘οἱ δὲ περὶ Θηραµένην καὶ Καλλίξενον τῇ ύστερᾳ προέδρου ἐγκαθέτους ύφεντες κατεχιεροτόνησαν τῶν ἀνδρῶν ἅκριτον θάνατον.’ ‘the next day those around Theramenes and Callixenus suborned the presiding officers and voted without trial the death penalty against the men.’\textsuperscript{428} Kagan 1987: 570 no 57.\textsuperscript{429} Ostwald 1986: 443.}
adopted, one which would have involved a popular court, there would have been no way for him to interfere with the jury on technical grounds. Hence it was important that the ‘right’ process was chosen to guarantee good chances of success for Theramenes. As for Callixenus, as a newcomer in the Athenian politics his service to the experienced and influential politician could only mean that in the future he could count on his help.

It is no wonder that, owing to the significance of this affair, the nature and interrelations of the political groups and individuals who got involved in it have been hotly debated with no hope of reaching a consensus. On the contrary, quite diverse and conflicting interpretations have been put forward. Gilbert refused to see the Arginusae process as an oligarchic intrigue. Beloch thought the generals assigned intentionally the recovery task to their political opponents, Theramenes and Thrasybulus. Since the victory at Arginusae was perceived in Athens as a victory of the moderate democrats, representatives of whom featured prominently on the board of generals, the radical democrats, and especially Archedemus, a friend of Alcibiades, aligned themselves with Alcibiades’ supporters against the generals. McCoy believes the moderate faction split after Arginusae as the generals, moderate democrats themselves, trying to explicate themselves, held Theramenes and Thrasybulus responsible for the failure to recover the dead. Thrasyllus as the leading figure on the board of generals was in hostile terms with Alcibiades and this was actually the reason that Cleophon, a renowned enemy of Alcibiades did not get involved in the trial as a prosecutor of his moderate enemies. Roberts assumed that the victory at Arginusae might have suggested to the Athenians that Alcibiades was not indispensable and that the war could be conducted equally well without him. Theramenes might have thought that by attacking the competence of the generals there was hope for the recall of his friend, Alcibiades. Nemeth concluded that the prosecutors of the generals were divided into two groups. The first under Theramenes included Timocrates whereas the second under Archedemus included Callixenus and Diomedon Cholargeus, men of radical democratic convictions. Of the generals, Protomachus and Aristogenes, the two who fled, were Theramenes’ enemies and could not expect help from Archedemus. The rest, Pericles, Erasinides, Diomedon and Thrasyllus were somehow connected with Alcibiades. Since there was fear that Alcibiades’ men on the board of generals would use the victory at Arginusae

430 Since in the Athenian law procedure took precedence over substance it was vital for the plaintiff to chose from a variety of available procedures the one which would involve the least risk possible and would inflict the maximum penalty on the defendant. cf. S. Todd The Shape of Athenian Law Oxford 1993: 66.
432 375 and no 10; cf. Meyer 1884-1901: 4.1 608 and no 2; Beloch 1884: 89 and no 2; Hurni 2010: 182-183.
433 Beloch 1884: 87-88.
to recall their friend currently in exile, Archedemus and his radical democrat followers sought to prevent this event by initiating legal action against the generals. Theramenes joined Archedemus out of jealousy; he had failed to play a prominent part in the sea-battle and he had witnessed his career withering away the last few years after failing to become general.436 Bleckmann is convinced that there was no animosity between Theramenes and Thrasybulus, on the one hand, and the generals on the other, before the sea-battle at Arginusae. The former two as taxiaruchs played a prominent role in the battle and they had no reasons to envy their superiors. An unfortunate series of developments and events led Theramenes to be on a collision course with the generals and found himself entangled in a bitter fight in which his own life was at stake.437 Hurni declines the view that the process was politically motivated, i.e., that the radical democrats and Theramenes sought to get rid of Alcibiades’ friends (Pericles, Diomedon, Thrasyllus and Erasinides). Those generals had been elected in the wake of the reaction against Alcibiades after Notion, and Lyciscos, Menecles and Callixenos appear to have acted in their individual capacity. As for Theramenes, Diodorus does not hold him responsible for the generals’ conviction, whereas Xenophon only reproached him for having gone far beyond what his defence required him to do, and having sacrificed two of his friends, Pericles and Aristocrates.438 Motives other than political are also invoked by Kagan and Ostwald. They believe that fear, anger and a desire to clear their names compelled the captains and taxiaruchs to launch their offensive which only followed up the generals’ accusations. As for Euryptolemus, his motives were not political, it was rather his desire to defend his friend and kinsman as well as his patriotism which prompted him to step forward.439

436 “Der Arginusen Prozeß: Die Geschichte eines politischen Justizmordes” Klio 66 1984: 51-57. Bleckmann objected that it does not make sense that Theramenes as a rival of Alcibiades attacked the generals connected with him with bonds of friendship or kin, and at the same time Archedemus, a friend of Alcibiades’ family initiated the process against Erasinides (1998: 556). But as we have seen, Archedemus’ attack should be disentangled from the other processes against the remaining five generals. Besides, even if we accept that Lysias’ insinuations have some substance, namely that Archedemus was Alcibiades’ son’s lover, any conclusion drawn from them concerning the nature of Archedemus relationship to Alcibiades can only be tendentious. Would Alcibiades have approved of this relationship which anyway seems to have been rather casual? It is dangerous to conclude that Alcibiades entertained the idea of being socially connected with a man of apparently low birth such as Archedemus. Neither can Lysias’ allegation be put beyond doubt. See, K. Dover Aristophanes Frogs Oxford 1993: 248.
439 Kagan 1987: 366-367; Ostwald 1986: 442, 444. P. Bicknell proposed that Euryptolemus’ father was Peisianax, the financier of the Stoa Poikile, who himself was the son of Euryptolemus, father of Isodike and brother-in-law of Cimon (“The Euryptolemus at Xenophon Hell. 1.3.12-13” Mnemosyne 24.4 1971: 390-391).
In the light of the state of our evidence, it would be futile to try to discern every political affiliation, every temporary alliance of yester foes against current common enemies. There is so much we do not know about the late-fifth century Athenian political scene that any claim to explanation would necessarily involve considerable speculation and inference. The main protagonists in the trial do not seem to fall into well defined political groups or constellations, that is, moderate versus radical democrats or Alcibiadists. It is difficult to determine how Theramenes was disposed towards Alcibiades at that time, or what Thrasyllus exact attitude towards Theramenes, Thrasybulus and Alcibiades were. The close co-operation of all these men during the Hellespont campaign a few years before may not be a definite guide to determine their disposition towards each other in 406. And what are we to make of Aristocrates’ relationship with Alcibiades? The latter handpicked him for the campaign against Andros, yet the Alcibiadists decided to attack him?

However, a certain pattern of behaviour seems to emerge out of this affair, a behaviour which, as it manifests itself in public areas, stretches beyond the private sphere and becomes political. I would like to draw attention to three men who stepped forward during the trial and risking personal harm defended the generals, or more precisely some of them. First Euryptolemus. He steps forward in the Assembly to defend his kinsman and friend. In doing so he conforms to an unwritten ethical code all Athenians respected, that is to help relatives and friends in hard times. He begins his eloquent speech like this:

Τὰ μὲν κατηγορήσων, ὦ ἄνδρες Αθηναῖοι, ἀνέβην ἐνθάδε Περικλέους ἀναγκαίοι, μοι ὄντος καὶ ἐπιτηδείου καὶ Διομέδοντος φίλου, τὰ δὲ ὑπεραπολογηθέντων τὰ δὲ συμβουλεύσων ἄ μοι ὑπεράσπετα εἶναι ἀπόστη τῇ πόλει.

I have mounted the platform, men of Athens, partly to accuse Pericles my relative and Diomedon my friend, and partly to defend them, and partly to recommend what i believe is best for the whole city. (translated by P. Krentz)

Some brief prosopographical notes would suffice here:

Socrates Sophroniscou from Alopece, PAA 856500. In his capacity as prytaneus he refused to put to the vote Callixenus’ proposal as illegal.  

Euryptolemus son of Peisianax, PAA 445115. Third cousin of Alcibiades, possibly with Alcibiades in the Hellespont in 408.

Axiochus, PAA 139755 from Scambonidae the son of Alcibiades II, an uncle of the notorious Alcibiades and an orator. He fled in 415 into exile after Agariste,

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441 Xen. Hell. 1.4.19; 1.3.12, 13; the Euryptolemus in whose wedding Pericles was invited is probably a second cousin of Pericles and not the same as our Euryptolemus (Plut. Per. 7.5).
Alkmeonides and Damon’s wife laid information against Alcibiades, Axiochus and Adeimantus that they had parodied the mysteries in the house of Harmides.\footnote{Pl. Euthd. 275b; [Pl.] Axioch. 368d; Pl. Euthd. 271b; And. 1.16; he is probably to be identified with the proposer of the second decree for the Neapolitans in Thrace (ML 89, 48; SIG\textsuperscript{3} 107 no 12).}

Family relations and ties of friendship played a paramount role in Athenian politics. They provided a steady network of people ready to support and defend a public figure when necessary. Unlike political alignments forged by temporarily common interests, family relationships and friendship ties are easier to detect and assess when attested in the sources, because they are of a rather more permanent nature. In our case we see that all three men belonged to the Socratic circle, Euryptolemus and Axiochus being relatives with each other, defending relatives and friends. The reference in Axiochus is vague, we are not told which general(s) Axiochus defended, but the odds are that he defended Pericles and/or Diomedon as well. In this trial the sources remain silent as to who spoke on behalf of Aristocrates, though. Since he did not belong to the Socratic circle, Xenophon may have deemed not worthy mentioning any support Aristocrates had been offered during the process. He was given a short time to defend himself along with the other generals. He claimed the order to recover the dead had been given to Theramenes and Thrasybulus, both experienced men. Further, that the storm made the task impossible and that there was no one to blame. He produced witnesses, people who had fought at the battle themselves. Probably some friends of his volunteered to put a bail on his behalf. But this was all that could be done. After a controversial process conducted in a rowdy atmosphere, Aristocrates was brutally led to his death after a long, uninterrupted service to his fatherland.

Two more references are made in the ancient sources about an Aristocrates, but in both cases the identification is not certain. In Polyaenus’ story (5.40), an Aristocrates from Athens sailed into a harbour in a city allied to Sparta on a Spartan ship. The deception was successful and Aristocrates with his armed men killed ten who happened to be in the harbour and abducted another twenty-five, who Aristocrates held to ransom, thus earning a lot of money. The story is exotic and difficult to believe. Kirchner in his Prosopographia Attica (PA 1904) identified tentatively the person with Aristocrates the oligarch, but Avery declined to do so. If the story is real its context could be the Ionian war, but it could also date to after the end of the Peloponnesian war. Like so many other stories in Polyaenus, historical details are blurred and we completely lack any geographical or time reference.\footnote{On Polyaenus’ use of earlier collections of strategems, his possible sources, as well as the extent to which Polyaenus compromised historical accuracy to suit his rhetorical aims, see P. Krentz and E. Wheeler Polyaenus: Strategems of War vol. 1 Chicago 1994: xiv-xvi.} I would regard it as fictitious. The second reference comes from Etymologicium Genuinum: ‘Λαπιδόρχας: ὁ μεγάλους ὄρχεις ἔχων. Ἀριστοκράτης δὲ οὕτω διεβάλλετο.’ It is possible that the reference comes from comedy, but it is by no means certain that our
Aristocrates is meant. Furthermore, it is doubtful if having big genitals is a libel at all or a reason for mocking. It may well be a compliment to someone’s virility.444

**Conclusion**

Having an aristocratic pedigree, and having already enjoyed universal recognition through his own achievements before 411, Aristocrates joined the oligarchy in the hope that a more sound administration and military organisation could be decisive in winning the war. He seems to have been a man of low profile, while his motives were sincerely patriotic. His hopes were soon dashed as the whole oligarchic enterprise did not live up to his expectations. He played a prominent role in ousting the oligarchic regime, and later the Athenians were grateful for that as he became a sort of democratic hero in the popular imagination. He also got ample reward as he was elected general three times until his inglorious death in 406. From 410 on, he fought bravely in the battlefields, following the orders of his homeland. In 406 at the Arginusae sea-battle his contingent fought against Callicratidas and carried the day. Together with other colleagues in the board of generals he had perhaps thought that Arginusae was the opportunity to annihilate the enemy and free Athens from future sacrifices. But the odds were heavily against them and the plan did not succeed. In an atmosphere heavily charged with emotions and bad foul temper he stood trial and received a penalty that he definitely did not deserve.

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Cleitophon PAA 576135

A possible relative: Cleitophon the general

There is a slight possibility that our Cleitophon was not a newcomer in Athenian politics when he moved his rider on the eve of the oligarchic take over. Another namesake from the deme Thorae (tribe Akamantis) was general in 441/40 B.C. His name has come down to us through a list, the only complete one of Athenian generals for a single year, preserved by a scholiast to Aristeides who quoted Androtion. This list contains names of distinguished personalities from established families who dominated the most important offices in the Athenian administration and featured prominently in Athenian politics for a long period on the one hand, and names of individuals who made their appearance for the first and only time, as far as the evidence goes. Cleitophon the general belonged to the second group. Since the name is relatively rare in Attica, there seems to have been only two other individuals named Cleitophon in the fifth century, and three, or possibly four, if PAA 576147, a registrant of a mine, is an Athenian citizen, in the fourth century, a legitimate inference may be drawn that the general and the oligarch were relatives. That would place Cleitophon into a family who had played a minor, though not negligible, role in the political scene during the heyday of the Athenian empire. A generation later, Cleitophon the oligarch was also to play a role in the downfall of the Athenian democracy.

Cleitophon’s rider

Aristotle in a condensed style unequivocally relates the establishment of the oligarchy with the disaster in Sicily and its repercussions. The Athenians, he argues, were compelled (ἠναγκάσθησαν) to abolish democracy and set up the regime of the Four Hundred. The coup de grace to democracy was given through Pythodorus’ motion which stipulated the set-up of a commission of twenty sungrapheis who

445 He is registered as PAA 576155. There was also a casualty PAA 576130 at the end of the 5th century 420-400 B.C.; a Cleitophon mentioned by Lysias, end of 5th century PAA 576140; a registrant of a mine in 341/0 (status contested) PAA 576147; Cleitophon from Melite (Kekropis) PAA 576190 350-300 B.C.; from Rhamnous PAA 576199 380-330 B.C.; PAA 576209 from Rhamnous 350-300 B.C.

446 Schol. Ael. Aristeid. (speech 46) p. 485 Dindorf =FrGrHist324F38. In fact the scholion as reported by Dindorf initially contained eight names, the last one being Ξενοφῶν Μελιτεύς, but Wilamowitz added those of Glauketes and Cleitophon (P. Harding Andration and the Atthis Oxford 1994: 143). Along with famous individuals such as Sokrates of Anagyrous, Andokides the grandfather of the orator, Pericles, Glaukon of Kerameis, Xenophon of Melite, we find totally unknown names such as Kreon of Scambonidai, Kallistratos of Acharnai, Lampides of Piraeus and Cleitophon.

447 Harding 1994: 147. Harding draws attention to the irregular manner lists such as Androtion’s have been preserved, usually at second or third hand, but still, nonetheless, of paramount importance for the modern historian.
would work together with the existing ten probouloi, and under oath would propose measures for the salvation of the city.\textsuperscript{448} It was also declared that whoever so wished, was invited to make their own proposals, so that the sungrapheis could choose the best among them. Aristotle adds an important detail, namely that the people were persuaded to forsake life under democracy in the hope that they could win the King’s support.\textsuperscript{449} At the same assembly meeting Cleitophon stepped forward and moved his rider:

Κλειτοφῶν δὲ τὰ μὲν ἄλλα καθάπερ Πυθόδωρος εἶπεν, προσαναζητῆσαι δὲ τοῖς αἱρεθέντας ἔγραψεν καὶ τοῖς πατρίους νόμοις, οὐς Κλεισθένης ἔθηκεν ὅτε καθίστη τὴν δημοκρατίαν, ὅπως ἄν ἀκούσαντες καὶ τοῦτον βουλεύονται τὸ ἀριστον, ὡς οὐ δημοτικὴν ἄλλα παραπλησίαν οὕσαν τὴν Κλεισθένους πολιτείαν τῇ Σόλωνος. (AP 29.3)

Cleitophon moved an amendment to the resolution of Pythodorus, that the commissioners elected should also search for the ancestral laws laid down by Cleisthenes when he was establishing the democracy, in order that they might decide on the best course to advise after hearing these laws also, on the ground that the constitution of Cleisthenes was not democratic but similar to that of Solon.

These undoubtedly bizarre and puzzling developments have provoked intense scholarly debate as to their historical setting, historicity, meaning and intent of the proposers, Pythodorus and Cleitophon. As we shall go over all the problems related to these obscure and enigmatic lines of the Athenaion Politeia, it would be wise to define as accurately as possible the historical context into which these dramatic for the Athenian democracy events were woven.

**Historical context**

We begin with the chronological setting and occasion in which Pythodorus and Cleitophon’s motions were voted. Mabel Lang put forward an ingenious theory in an attempt to reconcile the accounts of the Athenaion Politeia and that of Thucydides.\textsuperscript{450} Lang proposed that Pythodorus’ decree (AP 29. 2-3) was passed during Peisander’s first mission to Athens in winter 411 on the grounds that

\textsuperscript{448} Today, it is universally agreed that Aristotle’s account of thirty sungrapheis is to be preferred to Thucydides’ ten on the strength of Androt., FGrHist 324F43; Philoch. FGrHist 328F136.

\textsuperscript{449} AP 29 1-3.

\textsuperscript{450} M. Lang “The Revolution of the 400” AJP 69. 3 1948: 272-289. Lang would see the two ancient sources as supplementing each other. She would account for the omissions in the works of the two authors on the grounds of different purpose and method they employed (274).
Peisander needed a proof of goodwill in his negotiations with Tissaphernes: the Athenians asked for the King’s help and in return they initiated constitutional changes leading to a less democratic constitution. Furthermore, while the committee described at Thuc. 8.67.1 is said to have been unaccountable (autokratores), the one set up through Pythodorus’ motion was not. When Peisander arrived in Athens for the second time, that is, towards the end of May, he falsely announced, so Lang’s theory goes, that the Persian king was not satisfied with the mild oligarchy the thirty sungrapheis had proposed to set up. For this reason, Peisander proposed the establishment of another committee, the ten sungrapheis described at Thuc. 8.67.1, with a view to drawing a stricter oligarchic constitution, stricter in relation to that of the thirty sungrapheis which stipulated a body politic of five thousand Athenians. Since time was vital for the conspirators, or else their deception, that is, false promises for Persian help, would be discovered, they set a deadline of a few days only for the ten sungrapheis to complete their work before the assembly at Colonus was convened.

Cary, accepting Lang’s theory, observed that the report of the Thirty sungrapheis authorised the Five Thousand to conduct peace negotiation with whoever they wished (AP 29.5: κυρίους δ’ εἶναι τούτους καὶ συνθέκας συντίθεσθαι πρὸς ὧς ὃν ἐθέλωσιν). The other party, according to Cary, implied in this clause could have only been Persia, and this provision could only have made sense when the hope for an alliance with Persia was still alive, that is, during Peisander’s first visit to Athens. Caspari also pointed out that as early as 413 there had been in Athens a current of constitutional reform. Furthermore, given the enormous volume of work they had been assigned, the commissioners needed ample time to bring their task to conclusion. This time was simply not available if we, according to Caspari, assume

451 The events are described at Thuc. 8.53-54. K. Walters (“The ‘Ancestral Constitution’ and Fourth-Century Historiography in Athens” AJAH 1 1976: 130) believes Cleitophon’s rider was debated in this assembly, thus siding with Lang.
455 M. Caspari “On the Revolution of the Four Hundred at Athens” JHS 33 1913: 2. At note 7 Caspari quotes Thucydides 8.1.1, 3. 4 remarking that the expressions sophronisai and eutaktein were euphemisms for an oligarchic type of government. See, however, the response to Caspari’s arguments by F. Sartori (La crisi del 411 a.C. nell’ Atheneion Politeia di Aristotele Firenze 1951: 22-23). Sartori observes that there was nothing illegal or irregular in vesting the committee of the thirty sungrapheis with extraordinary powers. The illegality arose during the assembly in which the committee presented their only proposal, according to Thucydides, namely the lifting of the graphe paranomon. Sartori argues that since the sungrapheis continued to preside over this assembly and did not hand over the presidency to the regular prutaneis, a breach in the procedure had been made. Hence the prutaneis and the Boule did not acknowledge the Colonus assembly and had to be dissolved by force (op. cit. 24).
that the thirty *sungrapheis* were instituted after Peisander’s second visit to Athens. But the majority of modern scholars now accept that the two committees of thirty and ten *sungrapheis* reported by Aristotle and Thucydides respectively are in fact one body, and that the measures of *AP* 29 and Thuc. 8.67 are not distinct. Another line of argumentation has been followed by P. Rhodes who argued that due to the condensed account of the background to the revolution the author of the *AP* has failed to make clear that by the time of Pythodorus’ motion any hope for Persian support had been lost.

**The meaning of προσαναζητήσαι**

But scholars have not yet reached a consensus as to what exactly Cleitophon instructed the commission of *sungrapheis* to do. The oligarch seems to have used in his motion the verb προσαναζητήσαι which occurs only once in the sources. The exact rendering of the word has wider implications for the existence of a central state archive in Athens prior to 410 B.C., as well as whether Cleisthenes’ laws in their written form were easily accessible to contemporary Athenians. In principal there are two possible translations of the verb: ‘investigate’ or ‘search out.’ Andrewes pointed out that the regular meaning of ἀναζητεῖν is to investigate something whose existence is already known or presupposed, and he cited Thucydides 8.33.4 and 2.8.3. He also observed that the meaning ‘search for’ occurs later and is less common. In support of this view, it has been argued that since there was a very short interval between the setting up of the commission of the thirty *sungrapheis* and their actual report in the assembly, it would be difficult to see how an elaborate and time consuming search could have been ordered. We should then suppose that either the content of Cleisthenes (and Solon’s) laws were easily ascertainable, as Thrasymachus reminds us, or that the constitutional debates raging after the disaster in Sicily in...
Athens had revealed them.\textsuperscript{460} The opposite interpretation, that is, ‘search for’ or ‘discover’ has been proposed, among others, by G. De Ste Croix, who also cites Thucydides 2.8.3, 8.33.4 and Hdt. 1.137.2; Plato \textit{Critias} 110a; \textit{Apol.} 18b; \textit{Laws} III 693a; \textit{Alicib.} 140d.\textsuperscript{461} On this interpretation, the laws of Cleisthenes were not readily available to whoever wanted to consult them, and a search was thought to have been necessary in order to assemble them.\textsuperscript{462} Similarly, M. Hansen accepts that the verb προσαναζητήσαι can be rendered both as ‘search out’ and ‘investigate’ but he adds the qualification that usually the connotation is ‘detect,’ ‘track down,’ i.e., a research must first be conducted before the object can be investigated. Hansen proposed that in view of Thrasymachus’ fragment the search was to be done partly among documents that contained some of Cleisthenes’ laws on particular matters, and partly through interrogation of old people to find out what they knew of or had experienced from the ancestral constitution.\textsuperscript{463} Rhodes also tentatively accepts the rendering of the verb as ‘search for’ and points out that the Athenians might have not known whether the laws of Cleisthenes existed or not on the grounds that the re-codification of the laws which started in 410 B.C. was particularly protracted. Cleitophon’s rider ordered the sungrapheis to find those laws.\textsuperscript{464} Bibauw thought that through his rider Cleitophon urged for a research of Cleisthenes’ laws, and that, political considerations apart, Cleitophon was animated by his desire for encyclopaedic and academic research inspired through his contact with the sophists.\textsuperscript{465}

The next step would be to examine the implications of the phrase ‘προσαναζητήσαι δὲ τοὺς αἱρεθέντας ἐγραψεν καὶ τοὺς πατρίους νόμους’ and in particular the word καὶ and the prefix προσ-. It has been argued that both words here indicate that the committee of sungrapheis had been instructed through Pythodorus’ motion to


\textsuperscript{465} Bibauw 1965: 480.
consult in addition the laws of Solon. If this is the case, it emerges that in the turbulent days on the eve of the revolution the oligarchs had been engaging in discussions about the interpretation and appropriation for their own needs and purposes of Athens’ constitutional and political past, and that the famous lawgiver had been featuring prominently in those discussions. We may perhaps discern the trail of a conservative, oligarchic discourse which came into being at some time during the Peloponnesian war and which claimed Solon as its spiritual leader, long before the democrats of the fourth century claimed Solon for themselves. It is worth noting at this point that it is probable that the author of the *Athenaion Politeia* has not reproduced the whole text of both Pythodorus’ motion and Cleitophon’s rider. Perhaps an indication that this is the case is that Pythodorus’ motion is introduced in the text of the *Athenaion Politeia* at 29.1 with the word τοιόνδε, a word describing something less precisely than τόδε, which one may have expected if the motion was to be reproduced verbatim in its entirety. But despite some indications it is far from certain that Pythodorus had mentioned Solon in his decree in whatever context. It emerges, however, that the oligarchs by instituting the council of the Four Hundred emulated Solon and his Council, and the conclusion may be reached that these steps should be understood in the context of the patrios politeia discussions.

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467 Hansen 1989: 89.  
468 Ostwald 1986: 369: ‘As an amendment, the text Aristotle gives is comprehensible only if the prior motion proposed investigating something known or presupposed, and that something can only have been the laws of Solon especially those that were thought to affect the Athenian constitution.’  
469 In Thucydides the word τοιόνδε is used to introduce speeches which we know and Thucydides himself admitted that they were not reproduced verbatim. A few examples from the first book only would suffice: 1.31.4: the Cercyraeans’ speech at Athens; 1.36.4: the Corinthians’ response speech; 1.53.1: the Corinthian delegates address the commanders of the Athenian squadron operating off Cercyra on board a boat; 1.53.4: the Athenians’ response.  
470 AP 31.1: βουλεύειν μὲν τετρακοσίους κατὰ τὰ πάτρια. For our investigation the question of the historicity of the Solonian council is immaterial. Whether fiction or reality, (Rhodes 1981: 208 and 1993: 59 no 29 tentatively argues for its historicity; contra Hignett 1952: 92-96), the very fact that the oligarchs chose this particular number for their sovereign body of government cannot be coincidental; contra Jacoby 1949: 206: ‘the psephism [of Pythodorus] does not mention Solon or use the slogan of patrios politeia. It is quite obvious that the conception of the patrios politeia in the later we might say historical sense does not yet exist for the proposer. He does not think historically nor do other members of his party.’
Cleitophon’s view of the character of Cleisthenes’ constitution

Much controversy persists over the phrase ‘ὡς οὖ δημοτικήν ἄλλα παραπλησίαν οὖσαν τὴν Κλεισθένους πολιτείαν τῇ Σόλωνος’ which immediately follows the text of Cleitophon’s rider but, as it has been demonstrated, did not originally belong to it, since its language is not typical of documentary material. Some scholars have assumed that this phrase, which gives the motivation of the proposer of the rider, was included in Cleitophon’s support speech, or one of his comrades.’ The reason why such a statement was included in the rider may have been the desire to prejudice the voters in the assembly: the proposed investigation could only reveal that Cleisthenes’ constitution was not as democratic as Cleitophon’s contemporaries thought to have been. A suggestion put forward by Wade-Gery has not met with approval by the scholarly community. According to Wade-Gery, the motivation cannot reflect Cleitophon’s real views but that of Antiphon’s; it featured in the latter’s defence speech held in the autumn of 411 B.C., when the oligarchic regime had recently collapsed. But if this was the case, assuming that Antiphon in his defence strove to prove either that he had not been involved in the oligarchy or that the regime of the Four Hundred was not oligarchic after all, one would expect Antiphon to impute on Cleisthenes a statement such as ‘search for the laws of Cleisthenes because they were truly democratic.’

Other scholars, however, believe that what we read is Aristotle’s own comment on Cleitophon’s motivation. Wilamowitz proposed that Cleitophon was a convinced democrat and moved his rider in an attempt to block the sweeping reforms, or, better said, the abolition of democracy that the oligarchs were planning. Aristotle had inside information about the man through the Academy, but his surmise with regard to Cleitophon’s motivation was wrong since, according to Wilamowitz, the Cleisthenic constitution was both democratic and ancestral in comparison to that of

471 Andrewes “Androtion and the Four Hundred” PCPS 202 1976: 17; Rhodes 1981: 375; Gomme, Andrewes and Dover 1945-1981: 5 215. See, however, A. Fuks (The Ancestral Constitution: Four Studies in Athenian Party Politics at the End of the Fifth Century B.C. London 1953: 6) who considers the possibility that the original rider contained a statement on the nature of Cleisthenes’ constitution, namely that it was not democratic, and that Aristotle merely placed it where it stands and paraphrased it.

472 Fuks 1953: 7 and no 19. Fuks in considering the alternative possibility, namely that the motivation as we have it reflects Aristotle’s own surmise, which was correct, of Cleitophon’s views about Cleisthenes, is, I think, right. Similarly, G. Camassa believes the Athenaion Politeia somehow reflects the current political debates in general and probably the debate in the assembly in which the rider was proposed in particular: it is part of Cleitophon’s speech (“Clistene intorno al 411 a.C.” Politica Antica 1 2011: 11); cf. Levy 1976: 192. See, however, Hignett’s criticism on Fuks’ thesis: the statement that Cleisthenes’ constitution was not democratic cannot reflect the 411 political debates because it was not in the interests of the revolutionaries to present their reforms as radical. The moderates wanted their reforms not to stray too far away from democratic practice, while the extremists pretended they acquiesced to this plan (1952: 273).

the Four Hundred. C. Mossé believed Aristotle misunderstood Cleitophon’s intentions. Cleitophon, so Aristotle thought, had confused the constitution of Cleisthenes, which was democratic, with that of Solon, which was closer to the political ideas of the oligarchs. J. Day and M. Chambers hold that Aristotle’s comment is ill-informed because Solon was not usually perceived as the maker of a constitution until the middle of the fourth century. Aristotle, then, must have projected onto Cleitophon ideas that were current during his own time. Bibauw, mainly on textual grounds, thought the comment is Aristotle’s, since if it were Cleitophon’s, it should be placed immediately after the ‘ὅτε καθίστη τὴν δηµοκρατίαν’ clause. Furthermore, since the oligarch only proposed a rider there must have not preceded a speech from which Aristotle could draw information.

There is also another possibility, namely that the motivation was given in the source from which Aristotle drew when he wrote the chapters about the oligarchic revolution. According to many scholars, the most likely source was Androtion. Jacoby elaborated a theory according to which Androtion, interested as he was in constitutional matters, is sure to have handled in detail the developments during the first oligarchy, developments, to be noted, in which Androtion’s father, Andron was deeply involved as a member of the Four Hundred and a close associate of Theramenes. Androtion, the theory goes on, may have found relevant documentary material in his father’s archive. Androtion’s conservative outlook coincided with that of Theramenes and his group, and Androtion in his Atthis strove to vindicate their participation in the first oligarchy. Since the reference to Melobius at 29.1 points to the use of a narrative source on the part of Aristotle, this source, according to Jacoby, must be Androtion. In addition, given the fact that at 22.1 Aristotle presents his own view of Cleisthenes’ constitution, a much more democratic one in comparison to Solon’s, what we read at 29.3 cannot be his own evaluation as well. Similarly, E. Ruschenbusch sees the comment on Cleitophon’s motivation as an attempt, made by Aristotle’s source, at interpreting Cleisthenes in the light of the current, circa 354 B.C., political debates and ideological struggles over constitutional programmes and divergent interpretations of the origins of the Athenian state. This source was

477 Bibauw 1965: 466.
479 This, of course, is not compelling, since the comment at 29.3 does not represent Aristotle’s opinion about the Cleisthenic constitution, but probably his guess about what Cleitophon thought of Cleisthenes and his laws. Heftner 2001: 138 has proposed that Aristotle or one of his pupils thought that Cleitophon had made a false assessment of the Cleisthenic constitution.
Androtion, on whom Aristotle relied to draw information on the revolution. Androtion saw Cleisthenes as a mere successor of Solon, not a statesman in his own light at any rate.\textsuperscript{480} The \textit{Hellenica Oxyrhynchia} has also been proposed as Aristotle's source for Pythodorus’ motion and Cleitophon’s amendment. This source was familiar with Thucydides’ account of the revolution but wanted to refute it. Its author, therefore, chose to include the documents found in \textit{AP} 30, 31, which are not authentic but later falsifications, in order to present the revolutionists as benevolent constitutional theorists. This source had a conservative outlook, and it was fond of constitutional minutiae, such as are to be found in \textit{AP} 29.1-32.1.\textsuperscript{481}

\textbf{The relationship between Pythodorus and Cleitophon’s proposals}

There is a fundamental question which bears directly on the content of the political debates and ideological struggles within and without the Four Hundred during the preparatory stages of the revolution, as well as on the existence or not of political formations and factions that had presumably already appeared in the oligarchic ranks before the oligarchs finally assumed power. To put it briefly, how did the two proposals, those of Pythodorus and Cleitophon, stand in relation to each other? Did the two men and those who stood behind them work in concert, or was Cleitophon’s rider so designed as to block or somehow limit the political changes Pythodorus’ decree would introduce? Unanimity on this question has not yet been reached. Hignett has argued for the first view: since Cleitophon was a reactionary, it is unlikely that Cleisthenes’ constitution would have been palatable to him or to his likeminded comrades. His move had a purely propagandistic purpose, namely to camouflage what in a sense was the abolition of radical democracy as a revival of Cleisthenic constitution.\textsuperscript{482} S. Cecchin while admitting that Pythodorus and Cleitophon had different political profiles, the former being an oligarch, whereas the latter a Theramenist, he argues that when the two proposals were put to the vote in the assembly not only had there not occurred a split in the ranks of the oligarchs, but the two factions, extremists and moderates, had united in their effort to overwhelm the radical democrats. The ingeniousness in Cleitophon’s rider consisted in the fact

\textsuperscript{480} E. Ruschenbusch ΠΑΤΡΙΟΣ ΠΟΛΙΤΕΙΑ. Theseus, Drakon, Solon und Kleisthenes in Publizistik und Geschichtsschreibung des 5. und 4. Jahrhunderts v. Chr.” \textit{Historia} 7 1958: 420. But P. Harding has forcibly challenged this theory. As he has demonstrated, from Androtion’s fragments only number 6 corresponds with \textit{AP} 22. Harding refutes the view that Androtion can be classified as a conservative, member of a party whose ideological platform was the restoration of the Areopagus Council, the abolition of pay for magistrates, and the restriction of franchise to the hoplite class. Furthermore, this party identified fifth century men such as Nicias, Theramenes, Thukydides the son of Melesias and Cimon as their spiritual leaders. There is however, no fragment from Androtion’s \textit{Atthis} left to support the thesis that the fourth-century Atthidographer and politician was Aristotle’s source for the revolutions of 411 and 404 and the favourable treatment of Theramenes’ part in them (“O Androtion, You Fool!” \textit{AJAH} 3 1978: 179; \textit{Androtion and the Atthis} Oxford 1994: 51-52).


\textsuperscript{482} Hignett 1952: 130.
that by claiming the famous democratic lawgiver for themselves, the oligarchs forced the democrats either to abandon their hero or acquiesce in the formers’ plans, i.e., abolition of democracy as it was practiced in the end of the fifth century B.C. Recently Camassa has also argued that the two men had, for the time being, common goals, that is, to destroy democracy both on the level of reality as well as on that of symbolism. Cleisthenes, so is Cleitophon’s rider to be understood, did not create a constitution in which the people hold the supreme power (in a way reminiscent of late fifth-century reality), but a moderate polity.

But other scholars hold the opposite view. Jacoby saw Cleitophon’s rider in the context of the party political struggle which had intensified after Sicily and which revolved around the patrios politeia theme. Cleitophon, so Jacoby, was a democrat and what he tried to do was to claim Solon on behalf of the democratic tradition, since the conservatives of the late fifth century had sought to revive the constitution of Solon, the true ancestral constitution. Bibauw, picking up Foucart’s arguments, believes that in the history of the oligarchic revolution divergences and splits among the oligarchic ranks occurred early. Cleitophon attempted to prevent the oligarchic changes from becoming too sweeping. He, therefore, brought Cleisthenes into play, a universally recognized democratic hero. But his democracy, here lies the novelty in Cleitophon’s proposal, was not the same as the contemporary one, it was less excessive as we learn from Plutarch. Cleitophon’s rider could be seen in its wider political context, a strong anti-democratic movement operating after the disaster in Sicily but neither ideologically coherent, nor strictly organized. His was a moderate voice, deviant from the extreme oligarchic views that were gaining momentum in Athens. Heftner understands Cleitophon’s rider both as a positive suggestion to the sungraphes to search for and consult Cleisthenes’ laws, and as a warning against a sweeping change of the current constitution towards extreme oligarchy. In so doing, Cleitophon accepted the necessity of Peisander’s call for not to be governed in the same democratic way (Thuc. 8.53.1: μὴ τὸν αὐτὸν τρόπον δηµοκρατουµένος) and hoped that his proposal would be accepted by both political extremes in Athens. Hurni argues that after Peisander’s second arrival in Athens it became common knowledge that the negotiations with Tissaphernes had failed. Peisander and his group now had to make new plans for a more extreme version of oligarchy.

484 Camassa 2011: 11-12.
486 Pericles 3.2; Cimon 15.3.
487 Bibauw 1965: 473-478. She quotes the work of P. Foucart “Le poète Sophocle et l’olirarchie des Quatre Cents” on page 473 and note 55, but unfortunately this work has not been accessible to me.
488 Heftner 2001: 141.
Theramenes and Cleitophon opposed to this sudden u-turn by placing the amendment to the vote.\textsuperscript{489}

Any attempt to answer the question would have to deal with the problem of the internal struggles, alignments and personal relationships within the Four Hundred. This task becomes notoriously complicated since our main sources do not seem to tackle the problem as such. The \textit{Athenaion Politeia} focuses primarily on constitutional arrangements, not on factional strife. On the other hand, Thucydides’ account, coherent and meaningful though it is, focuses only on the essentials. It presents the Four Hundred as an ideologically monolithic group, at least up to their seizure of power leaving thus a lot of questions unanswered. If, as Thucydides asserts, the conspirators controlled the agenda in the Council and the Assembly,\textsuperscript{490} Cleitophon’s rider cannot have come as a surprise to them. We should then understand Pythodorus’ decree and Cleitophon’s amendment as a concerted action against the democratic regime still in force by then. On the other hand, Peisander’s group was able and prepared to take extraordinary measures to ensure that they would finally have the version of oligarchy they themselves favoured. In this respect they could tolerate a deviant voice in the assembly. I would tentatively side with the second group and argue that Cleitophon’s rider stroke a different note in the assembly that preceded that of Colonus.

\textbf{Cleitophon’s political goal}

It remains to be investigated what Cleitophon’s political goals were in moving his rider. Two scholars have come up with ingenious theories concerning the matter but these suggestions have met little approval. Wade-Gery suggested that Cleitophon proposed that the laws of Cleisthenes be studied from a procedural point of view in order to find out how Cleisthenes’ constitution came into force. One then had only to reverse this process so as to get rid of late fifth century democracy.\textsuperscript{491} Munro hypothesised three successive constitutional drafts of Cleisthenes. The Athenians lived under the third which was the most democratic of the three, but Cleitophon had meant the first and the second draft which were less radical.\textsuperscript{492}

Other scholars see in Cleitophon’s move nothing more than a propagandistic act, either to remove the revolutionary novelty of the dramatic developments,\textsuperscript{493} or to

\begin{footnotesize}
\begin{enumerate}
\item Hurni 2010: 69.
\item Thuc. 8.66.1.
\item Wade-Gery 1933: 20.
\item Munro 1939: 96. Both theories of Wade-Gery and Munro have been promptly dealt with and refuted by Bibauw 1965: 468-469.
\item D. Kagan \textit{The Fall of the Athenian Empire} Cornell 1987: 255 no 33. Kagan points out that what the Solonian council of Four Hundred and that of the oligarchs had in common was the number only. They functioned in completely different historical contexts and with widely divergent powers; cf. Mossé 1978: 83
\end{enumerate}
\end{footnotesize}
usurp ancient legitimacy for the revolution. In addition, it has been argued that the appeal to the image of Cleisthenes was made by Cleitophon out of psychological considerations: during his time the Athenians experienced the greatest days in their history and saved Greece from the barbarians. While these observations undoubtedly do bear relation to the historical reality of 411 Athens, it cannot be denied that both Pythodorus’ decree (if one accepts that his decree contained the Solon clause) and Cleitophon’s amendment offered concrete proposals whose content was not mere propaganda. We need then to evaluate the content of their proposals bearing in mind the intentions and the political outlook of those men to the extent that these outlooks are identifiable.

It has long been acknowledged that Pythodorus’ decree, Cleitophon’s amendment as well as the provisions found in AP 29.4 and Thrasymachus’ fragment (DK85B1) are all manifestations of the patrios politeia discourse. They reflect current political debates and the widely divergent interpretations and applications of the term ‘ancestral constitution.’ Hignett points out that both extremists and moderates favoured the slogan. A return to an earlier form of the Athenian constitution, the Solonian, would mean the exclusion of the thetes from the ekklesia, but the oligarchs could not have meant a complete restoration of Solon’s constitution, since this would have meant the restoration of a powerful Areopagus council which seems not to have been in the oligarchs’ plans. But Ste Croix answers that according to the tradition preserved in the AP 7-9 and Politics 1273b 35-74a 21, 1281b 32-34, the thetes were allowed to sit in the ekklesia and the courts but were barred from all the archai. Ste Croix goes on to ask: ‘If, then, this was the constitution desired by the moderate oligarchs in the spring of 411, when they were still co-operating with the extremists, why should the moderates in the autumn of 411, when the leading extremists were mostly dead or in exile, and they themselves were the dominant group, wish to set up a constitution which, denying even elementary political rights to the Thetic class, was far more oligarchic even than that of Solon?’ The answer to this problem lies, I think, on the fact that Cleitophon and whoever he spoke on behalf of when he moved his rider, did not intend a full restoration of Cleisthenes and Solon’s constitutions (regardless whether such a restoration could be technically feasible in the light of

495 M. Finley The Use and Abuse of History London 2000: 38.
496 Professor Heftner points out to me that in the light of Thrasymachus’ fragment, democrats and moderates were in 411 ready to reach a compromise on the basis of Athens’ early fifth-century constitution.
497 Hignett 1952: 273. Hignett sees in the first council of 400, chosen by Solon himself (Plut. Solon 19.1) and in the council of 401 of the constitution of Draco (AP 4.3) two different oligarchic versions of the ancestral constitution, the first being extremist, while the second moderate. W. Wallace also stresses the absence of the Areopagus from the oligarchs’ conception of the patrios politeia, as it is reflected in the constitutional documents delivered at AP 30-31 (The Areopagos Council to 307 B.C. Baltimore and London 1989: 137).
difficulties connected with the accessibility of those laws). His political concern on the eve of the revolution was probably to come up with practical measures that would address the current acute problems, regardless whether these measures would have done justice to the above-mentioned constitutions or not.

Ruschenbusch also believed that Cleitophon’s rider did not call for a return to Cleisthenes’ constitution since through continuous and successive alterations no Athenian of the late fifth century knew exactly what Cleisthenes’ constitution was like. The appeal to Cleisthenes was powerful and effective insofar as his constitution was relatively unknown but thought to have been far better than the current one under which the Athenians lived.\footnote{Ruschenbusch 1958: 419 and no 77.} G. Großmann believes Cleitophon’s goal was the ideal of μεσότης, (cf. Isoc. Areop. 7.16), a constitution neither extreme democratic, nor extreme oligarchic. Solon is described in the \textit{AP} 5.3 as a man belonging to the μέσοι, with regard to property and political ideas, and for this reason he must have been Cleitophon’s model.\footnote{Politische Schlagwörter aus der Zeit des peloponnesischen Krieges Zurich 1950: 16-17.} A. Fuks understands the phrase ‘ὅτε καθίστη τὴν δημοκρατίαν’ as a criticism on the part of Cleitophon of late fifth century democracy. The oligarch realised that the constitution of the founder of democracy was somehow different from the current one. Since he was what we would now call a constitutionalist, he and his party depended a great deal on propaganda. This was then a first-rate occasion to appropriate the name of Cleisthenes and include him in the ideological armoury of the moderate party which by then had been waging a war on two fronts: against democrats and oligarchs. But Cleitophon does not call for a slavish re-enactment of Cleisthenes’ laws, rather he recommends taking them into account, a kind of guide to the problems of the present. Fuks finds support for his contention in Plut. \textit{Pericles} 3.2 where Cleisthenes’ constitution is described as ‘πολιτείαν ἄριστα κεκραµένην πρὸς ὁµόνοιαν καὶ σωτηρίαν.’ This is in effect, pace Fuks, a mixed constitution, the ideal also of Isocrates and Theramenes’ group.\footnote{Fuks 1953: 8-13. At note 25 Fuks observes that since the issues of ὁµόνοια and σωτηρία had become topical at the end of the fifth century in Athens, it is likely that Plutarch in this passage of his \textit{Pericles} draws from a contemporary source. This source, then, would have shared Cleitophon’s views about the lawgiver and his πολιτεία.}

Cecchin has stressed the equivocation and ambiguity in which both Pythodorus and Cleitophon’s proposals are couched. Since it was dangerous for Cleitophon to attack a widely acknowledged and worshiped popular hero in person, it would be perhaps more prudent to challenge the view or interpretation according to which his laws were democratic. This was not too formidable a task because the average Athenian was ignorant of the details of the Cleisthenic constituition.\footnote{Cecchin 1969: 36-37.} Cleitophon’s political ideal was a πάτριος δηµοκρατία as described by Aristotle: the offices are elective on a census basis, and the magistrates are chosen from a list of candidates prepared...
It is a constitution which allows participation in the political life to everybody but reserves the right to hold office to those of sufficient financial means. These elite within the citizen body is led by the tiny minority of the elected magistrates. It has been proposed that Cleitophon called for a search of the laws of Cleisthenes and Solon because in the latter’s constitution the *thetes* were barred from the *archae* (AP 7). By the time the rider was moved the upper classes had suffered intolerable casualties in the protracted Peloponnesian war, and they had been constantly called to pay the price of the war through *eisphorae*. They thought, consequently, that they should not be valued equally, as it was the case under the current democratic constitution. Mossé argued that Cleitophon’s appeal to Cleisthenes hints at the existence of a rival tradition which saw the lawgiver not as a popular hero and founder of the radical democracy, a picture conveyed mainly by Herodotus and held by the ordinary Athenians of the fifth century, but as the founder of a πάτριος δηµοκρατία of moderate nature. Aristotle has not understood Cleitophon when the latter called for a search for and/or investigation into Cleisthenes’ laws, because for the philosopher Solon was the undisputed founder of democracy. The reforms of Cleisthenes, Ephialtes and Pericles, the latter introducing the *misthophorie*, threw out of balance Solon’s constitution, the µε σότης. Aristotle’s point of view, pace Mossé, is that of the men who in 322 B.C. established Antipater’s order, in a sense a census constitution. Recently Camassa has offered yet another explanation of Cleitophon’s intent. The oligarchs tried to justify their course of action by projecting backwards the defense of the aristocratically oriented Cleisthenic constitution mounted by Cimon against the pernicious and catastrophic reforms of Ephialtes (Plut. *Cím*. 16.3). In this respect they conceived themselves as Cimon’s successors.

Ingenious and insightful these explanations though may be, they rest, nevertheless, on conjectures. Such is the dearth of evidence on the preparatory stages of the revolution-this despite Thucydides’ account-that widely divergent theories about the installation of the oligarchy and the precise conditions it came into being can be formulated without us having any means of checking their validity. The problem of the existence or not of factions within the Four Hundred prior to their coming to power cannot be discussed fully here, but with respect to Cleitophon’s political stance during this period I can only briefly communicate some thoughts: a) despite the propagandistic overtones in his rider, Cleitophon seems to have aired a different view from that of Pythodorus; b) although fundamental differences in outlook, goals, and expectations in a wide range of issues (e.g., the strategy in the war against the Peloponnesians, the government and the body politic), I am not convinced that these

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505 Levi 1957 passim.
506 Hdt. 5.67 ff; 6.131; AP 20ff; 21.2; 21.4; Arist. *Pol*. 1275b36-37.
507 Mossé 1978 passim.
variant approaches to certain key issues had been openly discussed or had top priority in the thoughts of the protagonists. It would have been prudent, once such discrepancies had been detected, by men such as Antiphon and Theramenes for example, to put them temporarily aside until the coup had succeeded; c) although one can argue that by 404 B.C. in the oligarchic camp in Athens had appeared an ideological chasm between moderate and extreme oligarchs, one need to be very careful not to draw hasty conclusions about the situation in 411. What I mean is not that such differences did not exist on the eve of the first oligarchic coup; rather, such differences of practices and goals were hardly detectable and too nebulous to be perceived as such. In the light of these considerations, Cleitophon’s proposal may not have been thought of as troublesome by those men who later held supreme power in the oligarchic regime.

Cleitophon in 404 B.C.: AP 34.3

Next we find Cleitophon playing an important role in the developments surrounding Athens’ final defeat in the Peloponnesian war, its surrender, the negotiations with Sparta and the establishment of the Thirty. Aristotle narrates:

τῆς εἰρήνης γενοµένης αὐτοίς ἐφ’ ὑπὸ τὴν πολιτείαν, οἱ μὲν δηµοτικοὶ διασώζοντο ἐπειρόντα τὸν δῆµον, τῶν δὲ γνωρίµων οἱ μὲν ἐν ταῖς ἐταιρείαις ὄντες, καὶ τῶν φυγάδων οἱ μετὰ τὴν εἰρήνην κατελθόντες ὀλιγαρχίας ἐπεθύμουν, οἱ δὲ ἐν ἐταιρείαις μὲν οὐδεµία συγκαθεστώτες, [ἀ]γίλως δὲ δοκοῦντες οὐδένος ἐπιλέψεσθαι τῶν πολιτῶν, τὴν πάτριον πολιτείαν ἔβιβατον· ὅν ἦν μὲν καὶ Ἀρχίνος καὶ Ἀνυτος καὶ Κλειτοφόν καὶ Φορµίσιος καὶ ἕτεροι πολλοί, προειστήκει δὲ μάλιστα Θηραµένης. (AP 34.3)

The peace having been concluded on terms of their carrying on the government according to the ancestral constitution, the popular party endeavored to preserve the democracy, but the notables who belonged to the Comradeships and those exiles who had returned after the peace were eager for oligarchy, while those notables who were not members of any Comradeship but who otherwise were inferior in reputation to none of the citizens were aiming at the ancestral constitution; members of this party were Archinus, Anytus, Cleitophon and Phormisius, while its chief leader was Theramenes. (translated by H. Rackham)

It is noteworthy that the Athenaion Politeia is the only ancient source that draws a picture of the immediate aftermath of the Peloponnesian war in which the existence of a third political formation is attested.509 Those men share the same social background as the convinced oligarchs, they are members of the γνώριµοι, notables, the wealthy class, and their reputation is flawless.510 The four men mentioned were

509 Other contemporary and later sources which cover the events pertaining to the installation of the Thirty include Xen. Hell 2.2.20-4.43; Diod. 14.3.2-33.6; Just. 5.8.5-10.11.
510 Note that at chapter 2 of the same work the words γνώριµοι and πλῆθος are used in a political sense rather than social. The same meaning, political, should be conveyed in our passage as well.
all active in the political and social life of late fifth century Athens. Their profile tallies with the image of middle class, well-off individuals who show a kin interest in public life and have a strong sense of duty when it comes to defending their traditional way of life as they understand it. Archinus and Anytus feature prominently among the men in Phyle who formed the first make-shift resistance democratic army.\textsuperscript{511} Phormisius was also with Thrasybulus in the Piraeus.\textsuperscript{512} As it becomes evident from the profile and political career of these men, the information the \textit{Athenaion Politia} provides us at this point is by no means in itself objectionable or suspect.\textsuperscript{513} It is important to note that none of these men stayed in Athens during the oligarchy of the Thirty, thus the claim of men who did not belong to the \textit{hetaireiai} following a distinct political course is at least not refuted. On the other hand Theramenes himself mentions Anytus in his defence in front of the Council of the Thirty among those who had fled the city, and this is a reference to a friend, or political comrade if you will, with whose sufferings Theramenes sympathises.\textsuperscript{514}

But the reliability of the information about the existence of a group which sought the ancestral constitution has been cast in doubt. E. Meyer thought the passage is a

\textsuperscript{511} Archinus was probably the son of the famous Athenian general Myronides who fought at Plataia. He played a key role in the ousting of the Thirty, being among the men gathered in Phyle with Thrasybulus. Demosthenes, no doubt using rhetoric exaggeration, claims that Athens owes him alone, after the gods, the restoration of democracy (D. 24.135). Aeschines (2.176) claims that it was Archinus along with Thrasybulus who was responsible for the Athenians taking oaths not to remember past evils (\textit{μησκακεἰν}). \textit{AP} 40.1 reports that Archinus cut off the last days of the deadline set for those wanting to change their residence after the collapse of the Thirty, so as to prevent an excessive number of supporters of the Thirty from leaving Athens. Later he placed an indictment for unconstitutional proposal (\textit{γραφὴ παρανόμων}) against Thrasybulus’ decree which admitted foreigners and slaves to the Athenian citizenry (\textit{AP} 40.2). On Archinus, see W. Judeich “Archinos” (2) \textit{RE} 2.1 1895: 540; H. Avery \textit{Protopographical Studies in the Oligarchy of the Four Hundred} PhD Diss. Princeton University 1959: 45-62. Anytus, the accuser of Socrates (Plato \textit{Apol.} 18b) was probably a general in 409/8 B.C. (Diod. 13.64.6) and is alleged to have bribed the jury when he was brought to court in conjunction with his poor performance as a military commander and the subsequent loss of Pylos to the Lacedaemonians (\textit{AP} 27.5). He owed his wealth to a tannery inherited from his father (Xen. \textit{Apol.} 29; Dio Chrysost. 55.22). Anytus saw his property, consisting mainly of slaves, decimating during the oligarchy of the Thirty (Isoc. 18.23). For a full treatment of his family, see J. Davies \textit{Athenian Propertied Families: 600-300 B.C.} Oxford 1971: 40-41.

\textsuperscript{512} He must have gone into exile during the oligarchic reign, but he was with Thrasybulus in the Piraeus. After the restoration of democracy he proposed a decree whereby the exiles were to return and citizenship was to be reserved only to those who possessed land, a measure on which the Lacedaemonians were kin as we learn from Dionysius Halicarnassus (\textit{On Lysias} 32).

\textsuperscript{513} Rhodes 1981: 432-433. Rhodes makes the interesting point that those men after the restoration of the democracy would have wished not to draw attention to the fact that they had been supporters of Theramenes in the summer of 404.

\textsuperscript{514} Xen. \textit{Hell.} 2.3.42.
falsification, probably of Androtion, aiming at exonerating Theramenes. The three men mentioned in the passage did not belong to the Thirty; so, Meyer concludes, they cannot have stood close to Theramenes. But, as Großmann observes, there is nothing in the politics of these men which could contradict the assertion of the Athenaios Politeia that at that given moment they stood for the call to the ancestral constitution. Recently, L. Rocher launched an attack against the trustworthiness of the AP 34.3 passage. Rocher argues that one cannot reconstruct an account of the history of late fifth century Athens according to which there was a moderate party with a particular program which amounted to the revival of the ancestral constitution, the restriction of citizen rights to the hoplite class, and the preservation of homonoia among the citizens. Rocher rejects the evidence of the Athenaios Politeia in the light of Lysias and Diodorus (Ephorus) who do not mention Theramenes as the leader of a moderate party, but as an oligarch and democrat respectively. Influenced by the Aristoteleian virtue of mesotes, the author of the treatise, a pupil of Aristotle according to Rocher, read the theoretical discussions of 411 B.C. and reached the conclusion that Theramenes had contributed towards the creation of a mese politeia which coincided to some extent with the patrios politeia mentioned in the writings of fourth-century authors and pamphleteers. Thus, the inconsistencies with other accounts found in the Athenaios Politeia are due to the imposition of a specific interpretative scheme. There is admittedly some value in Rocher’s criticism of the Aristotelian work as a reliable source of historical information. Analogies from biology, political philosophy and political theory found in the Politics have been long ago detected and their role in the text of the Athenaios Politeia assessed and analyzed. Furthermore, it is natural that, since Aristotle’s (or his pupil’s) interests in this work were constitutional rather than historical, the author subordinated historical details to fit his general scheme of the evolution of the Athenian democracy. But one cannot arrive at a blanket rejection of whole passages on the strength of certain characteristics inherent in a source. Rather one should use this source with caution and try to establish the facts with the use and cross-examination of other sources. These sources, as we have seen (page 123 no 449),

517 L. Rocher “Athenaios Politeia 34.3 about Oligarchs, Democrats and Moderates in the Late Fifth Century B. C.” Polis 24.2 2007: 298-327.
519 See Day and Chambers 1967: ix. Using, for example, a cardinal doctrine of political theory taken from his Politics, according to which the degree of democracy in a state is related to the size of its citizenry, Aristotle reports successive rises of the citizen body as the constitution approaches radical democracy without basing them on any authority. The Athenian democracy conceived as a biological entity: AP 23.1 (Cecchin 1969: 33); according to J. Keaney, the latter passage highlights Aristotle’s teleological view of nature. In particular, it shows the progression of the Athenian democracy from a small and unimportant beginning to a quasi-determined end. (“The Structure of Aristotle’s Athenaios Politeia” HSCP 67 1963: 117-118).
rather strengthen the evidence in the AP 34.3 than undermining it. In my opinion, if one concedes the pro-Theramenian tendency of the work as a whole, the very fact that the three men are mentioned at this point as upholders of the ancestral constitution is proof that their political stance is accurately described. It was Theramenes who in the summer of 404 decided to co-operate (for a second time) with the extreme oligarchs, whereas the other individuals mentioned in the AP 34.3 chose to distance themselves from this undertaking. To put it in other words, it is Theramenes’ stance in the given point in the Athenian history that might come into question, since the author of the Athenaion Politeia had no discernible motive to impute false political ideas to men politically unimportant in relation to their alleged leader, Theramenes. On the contrary, it may have been tempting for the author of the AP to associate at that given point Theramenes with a host of respectable and well-known for their moderate views men so that his decision to join the Thirty might be more easily vindicated.

Given that one accepts Aristotle’s account as historically accurate, one could observe that like every formation in Athenian politics this one was loose and temporary; soon afterwards it disintegrated. Theramenes joined the oligarchic enterprise, while the rest chose the road to exile and resistance. After all, their ideological platform, attendance to the patrios politeia, did not offer them any solid basis of common action, partly due to the nebulous content and ambiguous meaning of their goal, partly due to their different political credos. Perhaps for Aristotle this group comprising of democrats and oligarchs was an example of a bipartisan group, ‘moderate’ in a sense of nonpartisanship ‘resistant to factionalisms that blind to what is best for the polity and to its attendant vindictiveness.’

Cleitophon in the Frogs

Cleitophon is mentioned in the Frogs of Aristophanes, produced at the Lenaia of 405 B.C., alongside with Theramenes as Euripides’ pupil. One need not press this bit of information too hard, since we are not supposed to understand that the two men studied drama under the guidance of the great master. Still, there are hints in the text of the play that Euripides’ loyalty to democracy had at the time come under suspicion. Hence, his acquaintance with Cleitophon and Theramenes, two men of

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520 See Heftner “Oligarchen, Mesoi, Autokraten: Bemerkungen zur antidemokratischen Bewegung des späten 5 Jh. v. Chr. in Athen” Chiron 33 2003: 31-34.
521 For the historical reliability of the account of the passage in question has also argued R. Osborne Athens and Athenian Democracy, Cambridge 2010: 282.
523 Ar. Frogs 952-953: Εὐρ: μή τον Ἀπόλλων υπερβολικῶς γὰρ σεβόμενον ἐδρῶν Διό: τοῦτο μὲν ἔσον, ὃ τάν. οὐ σοὶ γὰρ ἐστι πέριτατος κάλλιστα περί γε τοῦτον. ‘Εὐρ: not at all, by Apollo; I did it in the name of democracy. Διό: I should give that topic a miss, old chap. It’s not exactly the ideal theme for you to dilate on’ (translated by A. Sommerstein).
questionable democratic faith. But, of course, the resentment against Euripides may have stemmed from him preferring the ease of the Macedonian court at a time his country was going through its hardest moments.\textsuperscript{524} Of the four men mentioned in the play as pupils of Aeschylus and Euripides (965-969) the three appear to belong to the same political formation a year and a few months later, namely Theramenes, Phormisius\textsuperscript{525} and Cleitophon. One can argue that this cannot be a coincidence and that for a joke to make sense in a contemporary audience, the latter must recognize a link between these men. It has been suggested that in the passage we are dealing with there is a literary joke whose exact point we cannot get, and that this joke becomes more effective if members of the same group in real life are presented as rivals in the play.\textsuperscript{526} Alternatively, if one denies the political allusion, the contrast between the two sets of men may reflect different life styles and stances in life. Whatever the point Aristophanes wanted to make, he thought that Theramenes was the most obvious target to pick at, hence Dionysus’ dry comment that Theramenes knows well how to sidestep a dangerous situation. It seems that Cleitophon is simply mentioned as a mere associate of his famous comrade. The scholiast’s comment that the poet ridicules Cleitophon as a fickle, treacherous person is not supported by evidence.\textsuperscript{527} Another scholion, namely that Cleitophon is ridiculed as an idle, lazy person, may be an inference on the part of the scholiast from the fact that Cleitophon was known to have had connections with the sophists.\textsuperscript{528}

**Plato’s Republic and the Clitophon**

A Platonic dialogue, formerly believed to have been spurious, unfinished or mutilated, is named after the oligarch. In this short treatise, which falls into the category of protreptic speeches, Cleitophon appears as a young man who is desperate to learn what justice is. He has frequented Socrates’ circle where he learnt from the great master that people neglect their children’s education since they do not find them teachers of justice (407b6). Lack of such education causes acts of injustice and breeds wars between cities and stasis within them (407c1-d2). People commit these crimes because they are overcome by desires (407d7); for Socrates injustice is involuntary (407e2); people neglect their souls, the governing organ, but take care of the body, the subordinate organ; Socrates suggests that those who do not know how to use the soul should be left alone, live as a slave and hand over the rudder of their thinking to somebody else, to somebody who has learnt the art of politics which equals to justice (407e6-10). But Cleitophon, while agreeing with the principles of

\textsuperscript{524} K. Dover *Aristophanes Frogs* Oxford 1993: 311.
\textsuperscript{525} Phormisius may well have been chosen as Aeschylus’ pupil because of his hairy appearance; cf. Avery 1959: 231 and no 2 for references.
\textsuperscript{526} Avery 1959: 231 and no 3; S. Slings sees the situation the other way round: ‘the vicissitudes of the war may have united in 404 politicians who were diametrically opposed in the spring of 405’ (*Plato Clitophon* Cambridge 1999: 57 no 102).
\textsuperscript{527} Schol. Ar. *Frogs* 967; νῦν δὲ ὡς παλάβολον καὶ πανούργον βούλεται τούτον ἀποδείξαι
\textsuperscript{528} Schol. RVE on Ar. *Frogs* 967; cf. Dover 1993: 313.
Socratic teaching, is not content with the fact that Socrates only exhorts people to pursue justice. He wants to know the way to start learning justice. To this end he asks people if medicine produces doctors and health what does justice produce except for just men? The answers he gets are ‘the useful’, ‘the fitting’, ‘the beneficial’, ‘the profitable’, or that the proper product of justice is to achieve friendship in the cities (ὁμόνοια) which is the same as knowledge. But, Cleitophon objects, while medicine, which is a kind of concord too, like every art, is able to state its aim, this is not the case with justice or concord (408c3-410a7). Cleitophon reaches the conclusion that Socrates is the best at exhorting people but either he knows nothing about justice or he is not willing to share his knowledge with him and this is the reason why he has turned to Thrasymachus to find answers (410b3-c8).

It is questionable whether one can get information in this work about the real Cleitophon. Scholars have accepted the information we get at the beginning of the dialogue (406a1) that Cleitophon is the son of Arystonymus, and that he was a pupil of the renowned sophist Thrasymachus from Chalcedon, though probably not a regular student since Plato uses the verb πορεύοµαι when one would expect φοιτάω to denote a student-teacher relationship.

On the other hand there is no means of knowing if Cleitophon had in real life a tendency of being ironic in the way he treats Socrates with irony, nor can we argue that he owes his audacity to the bad influence the sophist had exerted on him.

Socrates’ failure to educate Cleitophon is picked up by Plutarch in his *Moralia* (*De Alexandri magni fortuna aut virtute*) 328C3. Plutarch makes the point that Alexander was much more successful as an educator in comparison with Plato and Socrates, because while the former managed to humanize such barbarians as Arachosians, Sogdians and Persians, the latter failed to educate their own fellow-citizens Alcibiades, Critias and Cleitophon; although they used their teachings to restrain them, the three pupils turned their backs on them. Of course, all three men frequented Socrates’ circle only. One would like to know whether Plutarch had consulted any other source apart from Plato’s *Clitophon*, but the fact that Cleitophon is bunched together with the other two notorious politicians on the strength of his intelligence and wasted talent is an interesting parallelism (εὐφυεῖς οὖτοι (sc. Plato and Socrates) καὶ ὁμογλῶσσος ἐπαίδευσεν).

Cleitophon makes also a brief appearance in the first book of the *Republic* in defense of Thrasymachus once again. The conversation at Cephalus’ house, where Socrates and Glaucon have been put up, revolves around justice. Cephalus says justice is giving one what is appropriate to them, good to friends and bad to enemies (332c). Thrasymachus objects that justice is what is good for the stronger (338c), admitting though, that rulers are sometimes capable of making mistakes, enacting thus laws

530 Slings 1999: 47 and no 88.
531 Slings 1999: 48: ‘literary characters have no existence outside a literary text.’
against their interests (339c). Socrates is quick to reduce Thrasy
machus’ syllogism to nonsense: it is not only just to do what is good for the stronger, but also the opposite. At this point Cleitophon intervenes to rescue Thrasy
machus; the sophist meant what is good is what the stronger thinks is good for him; but his explanation is readily dismissed by Thrasy
machus, since for the sophist a ruler does not make mistakes, he always acts what is good for him: justice is what is good for the stronger (340d-341a).

From the two Platonic works a relationship between the oligarch and the Chalcedonian sophist can be almost safely established. However, some scholars have suggested that Thrasy
machus had become actively involved in the Athenian politics by putting forward a political program whose essential features were the composing of stasis and the patrios politeia. Furthermore, that both Cleitophon and Thrasy
machus strove for the formation and propagation of a constitution of oligarchic nature. But the assumptions that Cleitophon was principally influenced by his teacher’s moderate oligarchic views, and that the latter was directly responsible for Cleitophon adopting the patrios politeia theme are in my view untenable for two reasons. First, the idea of the patrios politeia was so vague and so variously interpreted that one cannot argue that Cleitophon borrowed it from his teacher, even if it can be demonstrated that the sophist actually shared personally the desirability of a return to the ancestral constitution. Second, assuming that we can confidently place Thrasy
machus’ fragment DK85B1 in the 411 context (but this is overoptimistic) and not later, it is far from certain that Thrasy
machus personally had any interest in Athens’ internal political affairs and debates. The text we possess may have been written by the sophist in his capacity as a λογογράφος, or it may be a rhetorical exercise, a model proemium, in which case one should not associate the ideas found in the text with those of its author. Another point that may be raised here is the possibility of extrapolating from the Clitophon and the Republic the ages of Cleitophon and Thrasy
machus. In Aristophanes’ lost play Daitales fr. 205 K-A, produced in 427 B.C., a Thrasy
machus is mentioned, and the orthodox view held that this person must be the sophist from Chalcedon. Using this information, Slings proposed that Cleitophon must have been young enough to be a pupil of the sophist. The orthodox view, however, has been convincingly refuted by Storey who proposes

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532 Wade-Gery 1933:20; Bibauw 1965: 79.
533 Witte 1995: 24. But see H. Yunis’ reply: ‘πάτριος πολιτεία was not the sole property of oligarchs and was never identified with any particular constitutional arrangement. Rather, it was a contested notion and was advocated by virtually all parties to the political conflicts of the late fifth century in order to dress up their diverse goals in a universally acceptable, even desirable, form’ (“Thrasymachus B1: Discord not Diplomacy” CP 92.1 1997: 62).
534 On the dating of Thrasy
machus’ fragment, see appendix 3 “The Chronology of Peisander’s Mission to Athens Re-visited: Thuc. 8.53-54” 298 no 1166.
535 Yunis 1997 passim.
536 See the references in I. Storey “Thrasymachos at Athens: Aristophanes fr. 205 ("Daitales")” Phoenix 42.3: 212 no 2.
that the Thrasymachus mentioned in the fragment is a character in the play and not the sophist.\textsuperscript{537} Since the dramatic date of the \textit{Republic} cannot be established with reasonable certainty, the only observation we can make about Cleitophon’s age is that he was old and experienced enough to move a rider in 411 B.C.

We do not know what became of Cleitophon after 404 B.C., since \textit{AP} 34.3 is the last reference to him. Given the fact that the oligarch seems to have achieved prominence in the closing years of the fifth century, it is strange that he suddenly disappears with the advent of the Thirty, for the other persons mentioned in the \textit{Athenaion Politeia} as being supporters of Theramenes, Anytus and Phormisius, played an important role in post-war Athenian politics (see page 139 nos 511, 512 above). Therefore, Sommerstein’s note, namely that Cleitophon may have fallen victim to the Thirty, may deserve some consideration. According to him, it may not be a coincidence that Cleitophon in the \textit{Republic} converses with Polemarchus, another victim of the oligarchs.\textsuperscript{538} If this is the case, we may surmise that it was his property that the Thirty were after, for the tyrants would certainly tolerate the views of an oligarch, especially if one assumes that he must have been registered among the Three Thousand. That, however, would mean that the Cleitophon who is mentioned in a fragment of one of Lysias’ speeches is a distinct individual.\textsuperscript{539}

\textbf{Conclusion}

Cleitophon is an exceedingly interesting figure among the Four Hundred. He encapsulates all those intellectual forces that shaped the oligarchic discourse and filled its ideological armory. Scholarly debate has focused on the political position of Cleitophon within the Four Hundred and the rationale of his rider. Unfortunately, a definite answer to these questions cannot be given due to the scarcity of information regarding the preliminaries to the revolution, the internal struggles within the oligarchy and the personal alignments of its members. Did Cleitophon act on behalf of a moderate group within the Four Hundred whose leader was Theramenes and whose agenda even before the oligarchic coup was distinct from that of an extremist group? Was Theramenes’ opposition manifest to everybody when Cleitophon moved his rider? Furthermore, is the appeal to Cleisthenes evidence for the existence of a deviant tradition, a tradition which pictured the lawgiver as the founder not of radical democracy, but of a moderate polity as Mossé thought (see above pages 123-124), or is Cleitophon’s move an ingenious attempt to usurp the democrats’ cult hero, a novelty that was personally designed by the oligarch alone? I believe the question of Cleitophon’s political intent should be left open, although we may be allowed to

\textsuperscript{537} Storey 1988: 214-215.
\textsuperscript{539} Fragment 26 Thalheim. It comes from a lost speech titled ‘\textit{Ὑπὲρ Δεξιοῦ ἄποστασιοῦ}.’ The fragment is too short to make sense of it, but it seems that this Cleitophon had been engaged in a legal dispute with more than one litigant (ἐχρῆν τοὺς Κλειτοφῶντα καὶ τοὺς ἀντιδικοῦντας αὐτῶ); see also Avery 1959: 128.
say that among his intentions was a return to an earlier form of constitution which was less radical than late fifth century Athenian democracy. But we may feel more confident with regard to his personal background. His education and strong interest in the sophistic movement point to a high social status. His company with the sophists may have triggered in him the desire to study constitutions and government from a more theoretical point of view. At any rate, the man survived the first oligarchy unscathed and achieved some prominence in the closing years of the fifth century as the sources attest. Finally, from a historical perspective, his rider is probably the earliest attested case of the patrios politeía debate being introduced officially in the Athenian politics, a topic that was to fully occupy politicians and political thinkers in fourth-century Athens.
Di(e)itrephes
PAA 323750

Dieitrephes, or Diitrephes, belonged to a distinguished Athenian family whose prominence stretched throughout the fifth century, and whose members enjoyed the privilege of featuring in the narratives of Herodotus and Thucydides, albeit sometimes portrayed as controversial figures. The spelling of Dieitrephes’ name is disputed. Dunbar has argued for ∆ιειτρέφης on metrical grounds, citing Elmsley and epigraphic evidence. Indeed, M. Lang has assembled all the relevant evidence which clearly shows that the spelling was ∆ιειτρέφης. It is important that in all four ostraka examined in her study the ει is not a product of restoration but can be actually read on the surface of the pottery shred (serial numbers 98-101 in the study). OCT also supports the spelling with ει at Thuc. 7.29.1 and 8.64.2, and Dover followed suit, but Hornblower has opted for the ι spelling. It would, then, be better if we followed the epigraphic evidence.

Nor is there a consensus among scholars about who his father was. Vanderpool favoured Hermolykos II, one of the two sons of Dieitrephes I, because he was the elder, followed by Raubitschek. Develin, Sealey, Ruschenbusch, who registers Dieitrephes as Phlyeus, and Wade-Gery believe the younger brother Nikostratos was the father. Dunbar 1995: 484 has even proposed an unknown sister, daughter of Dieitrephes I, as a possible parent. G. Grossi remained uncommitted. I believe that in the absence of any decisive clues the question should remain open.

Notwithstanding this controversy, the fact is that Dieitrephes was born into a politically prominent family. Nikostratos, his father or uncle, was elected general in 427/6 (Thuc. 3.75.1); 424/3 (Develin 1989: 132); 423/2 (Thuc. 4.129.2; Diod. 12.72.8; Plut. Nik. 6.4); 418/7 (Thuc. 5.61, 65, 69; Androtion FGH324F41; Diod. 12.79), in which year he died fighting at the battle of Mantineia. Aristophanes calls

542 But see M. Lang, “Writing and Spelling”, Hesperia Supplements 19 1982: 79 on the two different Thetas, the first crossbar, the second dotted, in the names Dieitrephes Euthoinou.
546 Dedications from the Athenian Akropolis Chicago 1949: 143.
550 “The Year of the Armistice 423 B. C.”, CQ 24.1 1930: 34.
552 A certain Nikostratos PAA 717800 is depicted on a red figured vase dated to 49os or 48os (J. Beazley Red Figured Vase Painters Oxford 1963: 1603). If this individual belongs to the
him φιλοθύτην ‘fond of sacrifices’ and φιλόξενον ‘hospitable’ (*Wasps* 81, see below page 135), a fact that has prompted G. Gilbert to assume an amicable relationship between him and Nicias.\(^{553}\) Indeed, Nikostratos’ peak time coincides with that of the famous Nicias, since they co-operated in at least two campaigns against Cythera (Thuc. 4.53.1) and against Mende and Scione (4.129.2), having both been elected as generals. In view of both men’s hostility towards the oikos of Alcibiades, one should not rule out an alliance between the two, not necessarily on ideological grounds. Nikostratos seems to have been a successful general and it must have been his military skills, apart from his pedigree, which secured him the office all these years down to 418.\(^{554}\) During the civil war in Corcyra Nikostratos showed his clemency and skill as mediator. After failing to assure the Corcerean oligarchs, afraid of reprisals on the part of their opponents, to board the five Corcerean ships which were to escort him with his five Athenian ships to Naupaktos, Nikostratos persuaded the Corcerean democrats not to slaughter their political opponents who had sought refuge as suppliants in a temple (Thuc. 3.75). Later on, Nikostratos displayed his military and leadership skills by effectively engaging a far superior Peloponnesian fleet off Corcyra (3.76-78).\(^{555}\)

Nikostratos’ rival for the office of *strategia* was no else than the notorious Alcibiades, if his deme was Scambonidai (we shall return to this later). It has been noted that the two men held the *strategia* for the tribe Leontis on almost alternate seasons.\(^{556}\) This being the case, it would be legitimate to assume a tension, if not outright hostility, between the two families, having to compete each year for this highly prestigious office, and this negative sentiment may have carried enough weight in Dieitrephes’ family, he must have been an ancestor of Hermolykos I (see below, page 134), but the name is very common in Attica.

553 *Beiträge zur innern Geschichte Athens im Zeitalter des peloponnesischen Krieges* Leipzig 1877: 144.
554 W. Starkie, *The Wasps of Aristophanes* Amsterdam 1968: 123-124, remarks that Nicias was Nikostratos’ friend and that they had a similar character, in that they both were modest and superstitious. In any case Nikostratos’ record and achievements in the 420s is impressive, and we would be justified in assuming that the whole family must have taken pride in their distinguished member and acquired enormous prestige at the time. If MacDowell’s suggestion (*Aristophanes Wasps* Oxford 1971: 140-141) that line 82 in Aristophanes’ Wasps implies that Nikostratos was strikingly hospitable at sacrifices has some basis, then we could draw a picture of Nikostratos not only being a successful and highly popular general but a public figure, a politician if you will, who took great pains to build up a positive image and engage himself in what D. Whitehead has called ‘competitive outlay’.
555 cf. A. Gomme, *The Greek Attitude to Poetry and History* Berkeley and Los Angeles 1954: 144-148, who points out that Thucydides’ narrative of the events alludes to his appreciation and approval of his tactics and conduct at Corcyra.
556 Wade-Gery 1930: 34 and no 2.
decision to join the ranks of the oligarchs in 411. It may then not be a coincidence that Dieitrephes is assigned the important mission to Thasos soon after Peisander had returned from the negotiations with Tissaphernes to Samos. It was perhaps when it had been made known that Alcibiades was not to be trusted any more that Dieitrephes joins the movement, no doubt because the latter resented Alcibiades. Nikostratos is also mentioned in Aristophanes’ *Wasps* 81 as a member of the audience at the official performance of the play. It should be noted that, unlike Amynias who is accused of gambling, Aristophanes does not reproach Nikostratos but treats him gently. Is this a sign of respect for the general or an indication that Nikostratos pursued conservative politics? The passage provides us with an important nugget of information, namely his deme, Scambonidai.

Dieitrephes’ distinguished lineage stretches back two generations. His grandfather’s brother was Hermolykos I, son of Euthoinos, who was a pangratiast, fought and distinguished himself at the battle of Mykale in 479 B.C., and died at Karystos a few years later. Pausanias (1.23.10) also reported a statue of Hermolykos as a

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557 K. Singh has suggested that the rivalry between Alcibiades and Nikostratus’ families may originate in different political outlooks, Nikostratus being a more moderate democrat (than Alcibiades) whereas Dieitrephes a right wing politician (*The Impact of Family Relationships on Athenian Politics* 594-322 B.C. PhD Diss Wisconsin University 1971: 76-77). This is not improbable in itself, but we would be at great pains if we tried to establish Alcibiades’ political position throughout his career. The presumed rivalry could well be attributed to clashing interests and conflicting personal ambitions only. On the inevitable hostility that a certain ostentatious aristocratic life-style of the type Alcibiades promoted could cause, coupled with claims to privileges in the political sphere, see C. Tiersch “Politische Vorteile durch adlige Vorfahren? Aristokraten in der athenischen Demokratie” in V. Dement’eva and T. Schmitt (eds.) *Volk und Demokratie im Altertum* Göttingen 2010: 83.

559 Thuc. 8.63.3-64.2.

559 The identification of Scambonides in line 81 with Nikostratos the general has been disputed on grounds of his being a common name in Athens (see MacDowell “Nikostratos” *CQ* 15 1965: 41 and notes 1, 2 for references), but MacDowell in his ingenious article has striven to prove it. He concludes that although the evidence from the tribal affiliation of the board of generals for the year 424/3 is inconclusive, theatrical considerations require that Sosias, the slave who is walking to and fro at the edge of the stage, gets suggestions from the spectators who are sitting in the first one or two rows and passes them on to Xanthias, who occupies the centre of the scene. MacDowell contends that since it was the high officials to whom these seats were usually reserved, the persons mentioned in lines 74-81 must have been such people, a consideration which makes the identification of Scambonides with the general highly likely (p. 49-51). That having been said, MacDowell does not explain how Aristophanes new beforehand who among the high officials and magistrates would be present at the performance of the play. Should we assume a degree of improvisation in these lines? For the identification argues also C. Fornarà (“НИКОΣΤΡΑΤΟΣ ΔΙΕΙΤΡΕΦΟΥΣ ΣΚΑΜΒΟΝΙΔΗΣ” *CQ* 20.1 1970: 41).

560 Hdt. 9.105: Ἐν δὲ ταύτῃ τῇ μάχῃ Ἔλληνων ἠρίστευσαν Ἀθηναίοι, καὶ Ἀθηναίοι Ἐρμόλυκος ὁ Εὐθοῖνος, ἀνὴρ παγκράτιον ἐπασκήνας. ‘in this battle the Athenians were the
Hermolykos' brother, Dieitrephes I, was a candidate for ostracism probably in the 460s. Lang 1990: 43 maintains that the context in which the ostraka were found suggests either 461 when Cimon was ostracized, or 460 when Alcibiades the Elder may have received the most votes. Dinsmoor (163) mistakenly restored the patronymic as [Νικοςτρατον], but Vanderpool corrected it to [Ευθοινο].

Dieitrephes' elder son Hermolykos II (the father or uncle of our Dieitrephes) made a dedication to Acropolis (IG I² 527) either in 440 B.C. or around the mid-
On the base of the monument we can read inscribed: Ἑρµόλυκος Διειτρέφος ἀπαρχέν. Κρεσίλας ἐπόσεσεν. Raubitschek suggested that the stone bearing the inscription served as a base for a statue of Dieitrephes, the father of the dedicator, a figure falling backwards, resembling, thus, the volneratus deficiens of Kresilas. Pausanias mentioned a statue of Dieitrephes, observing that there were arrows sticking out of it and associated them erroneously with the fight at Mykalessos, and Raubitschek assumed that this man is Dieitrephes' grandfather who may have been killed during the expedition in Egypt, serving perhaps as a general (ibid). We do not know Dieitrephes' fate, but it is clear from Thucydides that he survived the Theban counter-attack at Mykalessos, for Dieitrephes who is involved in the oligarchy in 411 must be the same man.

We first hear from Dieitrephes the oligarch in Thucydides' Book Seven. The reinforcements for Sicily, headed by Demosthenes, had just embarked on their mission when a corps of 1300 Thracian mercenaries arrived in Attica (27.1), their task being to conduct operations against the recently fortified Deceleia. The Athenians thought it would have been too expensive to keep the Thracians in Attica for long, since they were paid a drachma a day (27.2), and the public treasury was running empty. At this point Dieitrephes was appointed to escort them back home, and was given instructions to raid the enemy territory on their way and do any harm they could (27.2). These orders they followed, and after landing at a Boeotian coast they marched inland and reached a tiny, obscure settlement. There:

They stormed Mykalessos and sacked its houses and its temples, killing every human being. They spared neither young nor old but killed everyone they met.
women and children alike and even the pack animals and every living thing they
saw. For these Thracians, like most other barbarians, are most bloodthirsty when
they are confident. There was there, then, a terrible confusion and every form of
death: in particular, they attacked a school—the largest in the town—where the
children had just come in and butchered every one of them. This whole city
suffered a catastrophe second to no other in its unexpectedness and horror.
(Translation by D. Grene Man in His Pride Chicago 1950: 70-71)

This passage is embedded in the narrative of the Sicilian expedition and directly
follows an excursus of how the occupation of Deceleia had badly affected the
Athenians and the introduction of the 5 per cent tax on imperial trade (28.4).
Scholars have not failed to notice that Athens was plunging into financial troubles at
that time, and that this somehow led to the massacre at Mykalessos.569 The narrative
is vivid and direct and Thucydides abstains from any comment, expression of feelings
or appeal to the readers’ emotions.570 Grene discerns a kind of detached humanity on
the part of the historian (1950: 70) and points out that it deals with events which are
peculiarly within the realm of chance rather than in that of necessity (75). I. Price
stresses the fact that Mykalessos was distant physically and psychologically from the
war.571 The incident caught Thucydides’ attention also because of the place in which
it happened, the violence of the war spreading to all parts of the Hellenic world,
engulfing it in the same way as stasis engulfs first the warring factions in a city and
then the entire population. He concludes that the Athenians were complicit in the
atrocities perpetrated by barbarians but somehow orchestrated by the former (2001:
216).572

569 D. Kagan The Peace of Nicias and the Sicilian Expedition Cornell 1981: 293-294, Hornblower Oxford 1991-2008: 3 596. See especially L. Kallet “The Diseased Body Politic, Athenian Public Finance, and the Massacre at Mykalessos (Thucydides 7.27.29)”, AJP 120.2 1999: 223-244, where, in addition, she argues that Thucydides here uses vocabulary with medical connotations in a fiscal and economic context (Athens’ financial hardship) and stresses its clustering and frequency (229). By doing so, Thucydides, Kallet argues, links Athens lack of funds with disease. The Athenians having to face the consequences of an overextension they themselves had caused, become the victims of their own passion, they resemble a diseased body politic which hastily takes irrational decisions. Thus, the moral responsibility of the massacre at Mykalessos is, according to Kallet, somewhat removed, as Thucydides does not explicitly blame Diletrephes or the Athenians for the bloodshed.


What was Dieitrephes’ authority when he led the Thracians back home? Develin lists him as general for the year 414/3. The only evidence is Aristophanes’ *Birds* 798-800, but it is not certain what exactly the text is at 799. The tradition is divided between εἴθ and ὡστ before ἐξ οὐδενὸς, the former reading implying that Dieitrephes had been recently elected as general for 414/3. Both readings are intelligible and a decision between the two rests on how we interpret μεγάλα πράττει. But, as Dunbar notes (1995: 486), it is more likely for εἴθ to have inadvertently replaced ὡστ, than to have been replaced by it (note that there is one more εἴθα at 796). More important, though, is the question to what extent Dieitrephes was responsible for the massacre. Did he personally give the order to kill, or did the situation simply get out of hand, in which case he could be accused of mere incompetence and lack of authority? As we have already noted above (page 152), Thucydides does not make any comments, or openly attribute any responsibility. But it has been suggested that as the historian uses the third person singular ten times in his narrative from 7.29.2-3 line 5, just before the massacre starts, with Dieitrephes as the subject, he, thus, keeps him firmly in view and implicitly makes him responsible for what follows. Then, almost without noticing, Dieitrephes disappears from the scene only to appear again in Book Eight in the context of the preparations for the oligarchic revolution in 411. Ancient authors also attribute responsibility for the atrocity to Dieitrephes. Pausanias reports that Dieitrephes did not follow the orders the Athenians had given him, but acted on his own (see page 151 no 568 for the text), but this is unlikely. Besides contradicting Thucydides 7.29.1, Pausanias may not have been aware of the degree in which the Athenians exercised control over their generals and officials in the fifth century, and thought that the atrocity was due to Dieitrephes being recalcitrant to follow orders.

The next time we hear of Dieitrephes is in the spring of 411. After the fiasco with Alcibiades, the oligarchic conspirators decided to go on with the plan to abolish the democracy in Athens, even without the man who had conceived it in the first place. Setting out from Samos, Peisander and other fellow-oligarchs, on their way to

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573 ὡς Διειτρέφης γε πυτιναία μόνον ἔχων πτερὰ ἱρέθη φύλαρχος, εἴθ’ ἵππαρχος, ὡστ’ ἐξ οὐδενὸς μεγάλα πράττει κάστι ναὶ ξουθὸς ἴππαλκετρυών 'Look at Diitrephes! His wings were only wicker-work ones, and yet he got himself chosen Phylarch and then Hipparch; from being nobody, [800] he has risen to be famous; he’s now the finest gilded cock of his tribe’ (translated by E. O’Neill).

574 Compare 3.75.1-4 where Thucydides also uses third person singular and adds emphasis by repeating the name Nikostratos three times to positively appraise his conduct in Corcyra and stress his skilful handling of the affair.


576 See D. Hamel, *Athenian Generals: Military Authority in the Classical Period* Leiden 1998: 115-117, on the kind of instructions and the margin of initiative the Athenian generals were granted when appointed to a campaign or a mission. Hamel observes that the generals were never left on their own devices, but the directives they were given would vary from very precise to just general outlines. See also W. Pritchett *The Greek State at War vols 1-5* Berkeley 1971-1991: 2 34-58.
Athens, called at some islands, with the intent to abolish the local democracies and set up oligarchies instead. To the same end the conspirators:

καὶ Διειτρέφη ὁντα περὶ Χίων, ἣμηένον δὲ ἐς τὰ ἐπὶ Θράκης ἄρχειν, ἀπέστελλον ἐπὶ τὴν ἀρχήν. καὶ ἀφικόμενος ἐς τὴν Θάσου τὸν δήμον κατέλυσεν. καὶ ἀπελθόντος αὐτοῦ οἱ Θάσοι δευτέρῳ μην πέμποντα τὴν πόλιν ἐτείχισαν, ώς τῆς μὲν μετ’ Ἀθηναίων ἀριστοκρατίας οὐδὲν ἐπὶ προσδεόμενοι, τὴν δ’ ἀπὸ Λακεδαίμονιων ἐλευθερίαν ὁσιμέραι προσδεόμενοι· καὶ γὰρ καὶ φυγή αὐτῶν ἔξω ἦν ἕπο τῶν Αθηναίων παρὰ τοὺς Πελοποννησίους, καὶ αὕτη μετὰ τῶν ἐν τῇ πόλει ἐπιτηδείων κατὰ κράτους ἔπρασε ναός τε καὶ τὴν Θάσον ἀποστήσασας, ἐξενέβη οὖν αὐτῶι μάλιστα ἅ ἐβουλόντο, τὴν πόλιν τε ἀκινδύνως ὀρθοῦσαν καὶ τὸν ἐναντιωσόμενον δήμον καταλελύσασθαι. (Thuc. 8.64.2-4)

They also sent Dieitrephes, who had been elected to command in the Thracian district but who was then in the neighborhood of Chios, to his command. When he arrived at Thasos, he overthrew the democracy. Within two months of his departure, however, the Thasians began to wall their city on the grounds that they no longer wanted aristocracy in association with the Athenians and that they were in daily expectation of freedom coming from the Lacedaemonians. They felt this way because a group of Thasians, exiled by the Athenians, were in the Peloponnese and were, in collaboration with their friends in the city, exerting every effort to send ships and effect the revolution of Thasos. Thus, these Thasians realized the goal they most desired: the establishment of their state on a proper foundation with no danger and the destruction of the democracy which would have opposed them. (translated by H. Avery)

This passage has been taken as evidence that the Athenian generals assumed office soon after their election, and did not have to wait until the beginning of the Athenian archon year which began mid-summer, but this view has been convincingly refuted. Fornara observes that Dieitrephes had been elected to govern Thrace, it having become thus a regular arche. He goes on to remark that this may mark the beginning of a new era in which the establishment of separate commands hardened gradually into a system because of the regularization of duties foreshadowed in the Peloponnesian war. Develin 1989: 160 is sceptical, and Jordan pedantically denies that Dieitrephes was a general on the grounds that Thucydides does not call him as such. He assigns Dieitrephes the title archon epi Thrakis, but there is no evidence

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577 A. Lintott (Violence, Civil Strife and Revolution in the Classical City 750-330 B.C. Baltimore 1982: 118) believes that Peisander’s group seem to have stopped at Andros, Tenos, Carystos, and Paros, but the oligarchy they set up there seceded. Eretria is another likely stopping place, and they may have unwittingly contributed to the secession of Eretria later that summer.

578 H. Mayor “The Strategi at Athens in the Fifth Century. When did They Enter Office?” JHS 59 1939: 45-64.


that such office existed in classical Athens.\textsuperscript{581} We do not know if the Four Hundred reaffirmed Dieitrephes’ generalship, or if they removed him from office, but his mission to Thasos may point to him retaining the office. Kagan’s assumption that the Four Hundred may have not trusted Dieitrephes because he had been elected under the democracy pays little heed to the fact that Dieitrephes was entrusted a very important mission, on the outcome of which the entire oligarchic scheme depended.\textsuperscript{582}

What were Dieitrephes’ movements when he reached Thasos?\textsuperscript{583} Probably, on arrival he came to contact with members of the local elite who were pro-oligarchic and on whose loyalty and discretion he could count.\textsuperscript{584} It is also possible that the Athenian

\textsuperscript{581} Professor Heftner has drawn my attention to a piece of epigraphic evidence where the title \textit{archon tou nautikou} occurs (SEG XXI 131, ll. 12-13 and 15-16 dated to 409 B.C.). Although in the inscription the title bears no geographical specification, this case could constitute an analogy; contra Hamel 1998: 194 no 4 who argues that phrases such as Thuc. 8.54.3 (στρατηγοὺς ἐπὶ τῶς ναύς) and Xen. \textit{Hell.} 1.5.18 (Κόνων...ἐπέλευσεν ἐπὶ τὸ ναυτικὸν) should not be taken as predicative.

\textsuperscript{582} Kagan \textit{The Fall of the Athenian Empire} Cornell 1987: 162 no 14.


\textsuperscript{584} Gehrke 1984: 40; Gehrke also notes that pro-Athenian oligarchies could not survive long and that this was a widespread phenomenon. Either they collapsed in the initial phase as it happened in Samos which was democratic and pro-Athenian, or they changed their foreign policy, they were oligarchic and anti-Athenian. With this policy the Athenian oligarchs had driven a wedge between the democratic leaders and their supporters in the subject states and
officer knew these people via connections through commerce (see below pages 143-145). The takeover must have been smooth (Thucydides does not mention any opposition), and the Athenian oligarchs’ wishful calculations that the local oligarchs would support their scheme proved right at the time.\textsuperscript{585} But once in power, it took the Thasian oligarchs only two months to organize and effect the defection of the island from the Athenian Empire, thus vindicating Phrynichus, whose advice to the oligarchic conspirators had been not to put too much faith on the loyalty of the subjects of the Empire to an oligarchically governed Athens.\textsuperscript{586} The reason why the Athenian conspirators decided to abolish the democracies throughout the arche and replace them with oligarchies may have been the existence on Samos of a staunch pro-Athenian activist group which was not prepared to compromise Samos’ loyalty to Athens. At the time of Dietrephes’ mission to Thasos the Athenian oligarchs were still resolute to carry on fighting Sparta and the Samian activists may have given them the false impression that what happened on Samos (overthrow of democracy) could happen elsewhere in the Empire.\textsuperscript{587} Since, however, Thucydides confirms that the oligarchs’ plans to establish oligarchies throughout the Athenian arche completely backfired, other cities defecting en masse, one cannot hold Diieitrephes responsible for the failure on Thasos. As agreement concerning the date of Dietrephes’ arrival in Thasos has not been reached yet, it is not possible to establish when exactly the Four Hundred got the news about Thasos’ defection, if they were still in power, and what effect this news had on Dietrephes. Did he lose face among his fellow conspirators? Was he deposed from office? If, as it seems probable, news from Thasos’ defection reached Athens towards the end of July, they may have had relatively little impact on the oligarchic regime and on Dietrephes in particular in the light of the avalanche of

\textsuperscript{585} Meiggs 1972:574 points out that when the Athenian oligarchs at Samos developed their plans for revolution they hoped to capitalise on the general negative feeling toward Athenian democracy by establishing oligarchies in power in the allied cities. He cites the developments in the Peloponnesian war, the successes of Brasidas in Chalcidice and Amphipolis and the radical reassessment of the tribute in 425 from 30 to probably 60 talents (but see \textit{ATL} 3 p. 349 on probable causes of the allies’ disenchantment with Athens). Kagan 1987: 140-141 holds that Dietrephes’ mission to Thasos and the abolishment of the local democracy constitutes a part of a greater scheme designed and carried out by the oligarchs to support the oligarchic coup and make the establishment of the oligarchy in Athens possible. The other parts were, namely, securing support of the Athenian army in Samos and bringing Athens itself under control. One of the reasons why the Thasian oligarchs did away with Athenian domination so resolutely may have been the presence on the island of estates belonging to Athenian citizens. IG I\textsuperscript{3} 426, dated to 414 B.C., testifies to the existence of two such estates (lines 45 and 144).

\textsuperscript{586} Thuc. 8.48.5-7. On Phrynichus’ speech and the light it throws on the actual workings of the Athenian Empire, see under Phrynichus, pages 199-205.

\textsuperscript{587} I owe this point to Professor Heftner who kindly read and commented on an earlier draft of this paper.

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the events that followed, developments that obliterated the Four Hundred in their short-lived reign.\textsuperscript{588}

Dieitrephes was also a likely butt of the comic poets. However, the image that emerges from the references in contemporary comic plays is controversial, and seems to be at odds with the epigraphic evidence. Connor noticed the discrepancy between the two classes of evidence and warned against generalisations concerning the background and public image of an individual who attracts the attention of the comic poets.\textsuperscript{589} In Aristophanes’ \textit{Birds} 800 Dieitrephes is pictured as ξουθός ἰππαλεκτρυών, a horse-cock, a mythical winged creature. Aristophanes may have got the phrase from Aeschylus’ \textit{Myrmidons} fr. 134=Σ Ar. \textit{Peace} 1177a,\textsuperscript{590} and in \textit{Peace} 1175-1177 Aristophanes used it to picture the cowardly taxarch who, terrified at the prospect of facing the enemy, evades fight and deserts the ranks.\textsuperscript{591} This parallel passage, combined with lines 1439-1443, where Dieitrephes is portrayed enticing youths into joining the cavalry or taking part in horse racing,\textsuperscript{592} may be an indication of Aristophanes’ contempt for the seemingly promising, but in reality ostentatious and cowardly military officer, who, despite his distinguished background, is only interested in luxurious living. But, although we should be fairly confident about Dieitrephes’ relationship with the cavalry, the statement of Σ 798b made by Euphrionius, that Dieitrephes owned a workshop manufacturing wicker flasks, that is, wine containers, should be treated with cautiousness.\textsuperscript{593} A second ancient commentator alerts us that this fact was not attested. It is then possible that it may

\textsuperscript{588} We do not know if Thasos was the first to revolt or if other cities had managed to break away within the two months from May to July 411 B.C. (Thuc. 8.64.5). If Thasos only followed the general trend, the news of its revolt should not have done too much harm to Dieitrephes, since he could argue that the policy of implementing oligarchies in the Empire was flawed in the first place.


\textsuperscript{590} Dunbar 1995: 486.

\textsuperscript{591} ἥν δὲ που δὴ μάχεσθ’ ἔχοντα τὴν φοινικίδα, τηνικαῦτ’ αὐτὸς βέβαται βάμμα Κυζικηνικόν-κέτα φεύγει πρῶτος ὅσπερ ξουθὸς ἰππαλεκτρυών τοὺς λόφους σείων. ‘though if by any chance he has to fight wearing that cloak, then he himself gets dyed Cyzicene colour! And then he’s the first to run away, shaking his crests like a tawny horsecock’ (translated by A: Sommerstein).

\textsuperscript{592} οὐκ ἀκήκοας,ὅταν λέγωσιν οἱ πατέρες ἐκάστοτε τῶν μειράκιων ἐν τοῖς κουρείοις ταδί; “δεινῶς γέ μου τὸ μειράκιον Διειτρέφης λέγων ἀνεπτέρωκεν ὡς’ ἵππαλατέν. ‘Have you not often heard fathers say to young men in the barbers’ shops, “It’s astonishing how Diitrephes’ advice has made my son fly to horse-riding.”’ (translated by E. O’Neill).

\textsuperscript{593} Edmonds (\textit{The Fragments of Attic Comedy} I Leiden 1957: 107) has suggested that the Dieitrephes mentioned in Ar. \textit{Heroes} fr. 3, produced in 419 B.C. and the one mentioned in \textit{Birds} 798 are two different men. Although we cannot exclude the possibility of two namesakes living and being active at the same period, the odds are that all references to Dieitrephes pertain to one individual only.
be a mere inference from Aristophanes’ text. In addition, in cases of mocked politicians, invariably radical democrats, the comic poets do not fail to scornfully and repeatedly stress their humble occupation: Cleon is a tanner (Ar. *Knights* 136 and passim); Hyperbolus a lamp maker; Cleophon a lyre maker (Cratinus K-A 209; Ar. *Peace* 690; Schol. on Ar. *Knights* 739); Lysicles is a sheep dealer and Eucrates a hemp seller (Ar. *Knights* 132, 129). This is not the case with Dieitrephes, to whose occupation there is only one equivocal allusion in Aristophanes’ text, not a likely treatment on the part of the poet when it came to ridiculing a target. But a counter-argument may be that Dietrephes never attained prominence equivalent to that of the above-mentioned demagogues. Dietrephes attracts Aristophanes’ scorn perhaps not because of him being a nouveau riche, a tradesman or a craftsman, as in the above-mentioned cases. Rather it is his extravagant life-style of a spoilt, arrogant and vainglorious, wealthy offspring of an old, distinguished Athenian family who leads a luxurious life and only cares about horse racing, which is loathsome to the comic poet.

Alternatively, if Euphronius used an independent source, and his statement that Dietrephes owned a workshop making wine containers was not a mere inference from Aristophanes’ text, we could imagine that Dietrephes’ family at some point during the war decided to go into the manufacturing business, and that this business did pretty well, for the scholiast calls Dietrephes νεόπλουτος, nouveau riche, and πολυπράγµων, meddlesome (cf. schol. Ar. *Birds* 1442). It is conceivable that the family’s decision to enter this particular business was anything but random. They might have carefully considered the opportunities the family connections with northern Greece and in particular Thrace could offer. Connor (1971: 156 no 45) has

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594 Dunbar 1995: 484.

595 Lape makes an important observation as she points out that the Old Comedy identifies politicians and rival poets by their occupation rather than ancestry in an effort to endow them with servile origins as well as foreign. A slave in classical Athens was identified by his name and occupation as they lacked kinship or group affiliations. “Hence, to refer to a citizen as “X” “the lamp maker” was a backhanded way of naming him a slave.” (S. Lape *Race and Citizen Identity in the Classical Athenian Democracy* Cambridge 2010: 66).

596 Euphronius, a contemporary of Callimachus and one of the teachers of Aristophanes of Byzantium, was the first Alexandrian scholar to write a commentary on Aristophanes. His notes elucidate the meaning of words and sometimes provide prosopographical data as do his notes on the *Birds* lines 1378, 1379 and 1536 (J. White *The Scholia on the Aves of Aristophanes* Boston and London 1914: xvii).

597 Σ Ar. *Birds* 798b, d. Grossi’s supposition (1984: 523) that we should interpret the epithets ἄρπαξ, πονηρός and πολυπράγµων, attributed to Dietrephes by the scholiast, in a narrowly political sense, i.e., as common accusations directed against members of the democratic party, should not be met without reservations. Sommerstein has conveniently classified the different types of personae which attracted the venality of the comic poets. Taking all the available evidence into consideration, we should put Dietrephes into his ‘idol of the market category’, that is practitioners and tradesmen, rather than ‘idol of the tribe’, that is, politicians (“How to Avoid Being a Komodoumenos”, *CQ* 46.2 1996: 327-356).
noted that both Dieitrephes and Nikostratos commanded Thracian troops and this fact may indicate a special interest or competence in the area. To this we may add Dietrephes’ mission to Thasos and the relative ease with which he accomplished it. Could it be that Dietrephes had trade partners in Thasos, an area renowned for its wine, and that he contacted them first on arrival? If the information given by the scholiast is not without substance, then the case of Dietrephes’ family is of great importance, since it shows how an old, aristocratic Athenian family coped with the financial strains the Peloponnesian war had imposed on them, and what kind of strategies they employed in order to maintain an acceptable standard of living and high social status accompanied with considerable wealth.

Dietrephes had also been mocked as a foreigner by Plato in his Festivals. The quotation comes from the scholia to Aristophanes’ Birds 798b: Πλάτων δὲ ἐν Εὔρωπαῖς καὶ ξένον τὸν μαινόμενον, τὸν Κρῆτα, τὸν μύγας Ἀττικόν. It is a well-known fact that contemporary politicians, especially those after Cleon, were frequently mocked as foreigners, so we should not expect that Plato’s libel bears any substance. However, there are other possible interpretations of the passage. Grossi (1984: 521) has drawn attention to the use of the definite article in front of the three epithets, suggesting that the character was already well-known to the Athenian public when the play was produced. He goes on to remark that the attributes hardly Attic and Cretan may denote not ethnic origin but a kind of behaviour. The verb κρητίζω signifies the deceiver, the liar and these characteristics, Grossi argues, are compatible with people having business activity of the sort Dietrephes had. The verse, then, would be a negative commentary on Dietrephes’ social behavior. In Cratinus (K-A 251) Dietrephes is presented as a shameless brute, summoned to appear before the naval court, which in Athens also tried commercial cases as well as those of usurpation of civic rights by aliens. The fragment can be read as an allusion to Dietrephes being a foreigner (similar to Plato’s mocking him as a Cretan), a reproach of his anti-social, hubristic behavior, or condemnation of his unfair practices as tradesman.

A decree, IG I³ 110, 6=ML 90, dated to 408/7 B.C., moved by a certain Dietrephes proposed that an individual, Oiniades, from Skiathos and his descendants be

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598 Perhaps we could explain the scholia at 798c οὕτως θάλλινα ποιῶν ἄγγεια ἐπισκόπησε καὶ ἱππάρχησε καὶ ἐφυλάρχησεν as an attempt on the part of the scholiast to connect the two pieces of information, namely Dietrephes running the workshop and his rising to high military offices as a consequence, especially as he would normally ignore the long history of his family (cf. schol. Ar. Birds 1442).

599 See Connor 1971: 169-171, where he explains how the Old Comedy intended to politically discredit and disqualify the target as a political leader by denying his membership in the Athenian citizenry. Lape (2010: 64) stresses the democratic ideology of birth and blood on which the comic poets drew to undermine demagogues, and rival poets.

600 καὶ πρῶτον μὲν παρὰ ναυτόδικον σπάγῳ τρία κνώδαλ’ ἀναιδῆ Πεισίαν, Ὀσφύωνα, Διειτρέφη, ‘first I will bring before the judges of the admiralty court three shameless brutes, Peisias, Osphyon and Dietrephes.’
granted the title of proxenos and benefactor of Athens on the island. This is the only decree conferring the title proxenos that survives intact, but the identification of its author is disputed. J. Traill (Persons of Ancient Athens vols 1-20 Toronto 1994) believes that he is possibly the same as the strategos. Dinsmoor and Connor believe the proposer, the archon (see below, page 145) and the strategos to be the same person. Dunbar (1995: 484) thinks it unlikely that the oligarch and the proposer were the same person on grounds of the former’s activities in 411, followed by Sommerstein. Andrewes raised the possibility that the proposer may belong to the family from Scambonidai, but that he is a namesake of the oligarch. Skiathos is situated in the Northern Sporades and was a convenient intermediate trade station for those who travelled by ship to Thrace and the Hellespont. Thasos and Thrace were renowned for their wine and Dietrephes’ family is likely to have owned a manufacture producing wine flasks. Dietrephes’ election, probably as strategos, with special authority on Thrace, his involvement in the overthrow of the Thasian democracy, and his earlier command of the Thasian mercenaries strongly suggest acquaintance with the northern regions of the Athenian arche, acquaintance, we may surmise, resulting from his business activities and connections with this region. In the light of the evidence provided by the scholia to Ar. Birds 798, I would follow Grossi (1984: 523) and the first group of scholars in accepting the identity of the two men. If the identification is correct, it means that Dietrephes escaped banishment and retained his civil rights after the restoration of the radical democracy in 410 B.C.

A Dietrephes, who belonged to Cecropis tribe, is included in a casualty list perhaps of 412/1. The inscription IG I² 950 bears the names of the deceased in three columns, and the editors of the IG maintained that the first two include names of those Athenians who died in a naval engagement that year, whereas the third, that of Dietrephes’, includes names of Athenians fallen in a land engagement, thus making it possible, but not certain, that this Dietrephes was of hoplite status. The modern view is, however, that the Athenians listed all their dead, hoplites and thetes, according to their tribal affiliations. It is possible that he was a distant relative of the general, bearing in mind that the name is not very common (it appears though in the fourth century in Aigis, Akamantis and Leontis tribes PAA 323800, 323805 and 323810 respectively). A Dietrephes was the eponymous archon in Athens in 384/3 B.C.

604 IG XII suppl. 347 I and II, dated to 425-415 B.C., are copies of laws establishing controls over Thasos’ wine industry. The laws attempted to encourage wine production on the island and through quality checks to boost exports to other markets while at the same time reducing costs. See P. Stanley “Two Thasian Wine Laws: A Reexamination” AncW 3 1980: 88-93.
605 D. Bradeen “The Athenian Casualty Lists,” CQ 19.1 1969 148 and no 1. The casualty, of course, could have been a member of the light infantry.
Unfortunately we do not know his tribal affiliation, so the identification with the general is not certain. If he is the same man he must have been very old when he became an archon.

Conclusion

Dieitrephes’ story is exceedingly interesting in that it allows us to cast a glimpse at the workings of Athenian politics throughout the fifth century. An illustrious, historic, prominent and aristocratic family such as Dieitrephes’ seems to have faced difficulties of two kinds in the closing decades of the fifth century. First, Alcibiades’ ascendancy together with the death in action of its most outstanding member, Nikostratos, threatened to throw Dieitrephes’ oikos into oblivion. His decision to get involved in the oligarchic coup may in all probability be best explained as driven by personal motives, that is, animosity towards the rival oikos of Alcibiades. Second, financial stringencies seem to have forced the family to occupy themselves with the lowly trade of wicker flask manufacturing. Dieitrephes undoubtedly had the pedigree necessary to launch him into a career in politics but seems to have lacked the ability. For the comic poets he was their favourite butt and he is portrayed as a superfluous, vainglorious person. He was entrusted important tasks under both democracy and oligarchy but his performance was mediocre at best. As a member of the Four Hundred he remained inactive, at least so far as our knowledge goes. He seems, however, to have survived the purges that followed the downfall of the Four Hundred oligarchy, since he was able to move a decree under the restored democracy.

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607 IG II² 3064, 3; IG II² 1407, 4; Diod. 15.14.1; FGH244F38b=Dion. Hal. Ad Amm. 3-5: ἐγενήθη δὲ (Ἀριστοτέλης) κατὰ τὴν ἐνενήκοστὴν καὶ ἐνάτην ὀλυμπιάδα, Διειτρέφους Ἀθήνησιν ἄρχοντος, τρισὶν ἔτει Δημοσθένους πρεσβύτερος ‘Aristotle was born during the ninety-ninth Olympiad when Dieitrephes was archon in Athens’; FGH328F223=Philochorus Vit. Aristot. Marc.:Ἀριστοτέλης δὲ τεχθεὶς ἐπὶ Διοτρέφους καὶ βιώς ἐπὶ ξὴν τελευτα ἐπὶ Φιλοκλέους ‘Aristotle was born in the year of Dieitrephes’ archonship; he lived sixty-three years and died in the archonship of Philocles’; SEG 18.69.
Laispodias Andronymios*

PAA 600730

Abstract

Laispodias, the son of Andronymis, was a rather obscure, but nevertheless important, figure in late fifth-century Athens. He had an aristocratic pedigree, became general at a turning point in the Peloponnesian war, and was the target of the comic poets on several occasions, probably for his funny physique as well as his politics. In 411 BC he became entangled in an oligarchic conspiracy which was to shake Athenian society for the years to come. Although he is an interesting case in Attic prosopography, Laispodias has attracted relatively little attention from scholars, and this article seeks to throw new light on his life and deeds, as well as the historical events of which he was a witness. Hopefully, a new appraisal of this historical figure may contribute to our understanding of some not so well-known moments and intricacies of late fifth-century Athenian history.

After almost one hundred years of uninterrupted democratic rule the hitherto dormant oligarchic opposition in Athens managed to emerge triumphant in a dramatic series of events culminating in the establishment of the Four Hundred, whose short-lived regime lasted approximately four months, from June to September 411 B.C. Twenty years of war, an unprecedented military disaster in Sicily two years earlier, the permanent presence of the enemy in Attica, the systematic ravaging of the Attic countryside, and the subsequent denial of access to their farms and estates in the countryside had begun to tell on the Athenian folk. The wealthiest strata in Athens felt the pinch to such an extent that they thought airing grievances and lodging complaints against the ineffective leadership and mainstream politicians would not do anymore. Urgent action needed to be taken and some individuals had concrete ideas how to overcome the crisis, namely through the abolition of the current constitution and the establishment of an oligarchy.\textsuperscript{608} The scope and the

* I remain deeply indebted to Professor Herbert Heftner and Doctor Christos Zapheiropoulos for their insightful comments on earlier drafts of this paper. I would also like to thank the journal’s two anonymous referees for their helpful and constructive suggestions. The translations of Greek texts are my own unless stated otherwise.

magnitude of such an undertaking clearly impressed Thucydides who handsomely appraised the make-up of this group.609
Out of the four hundred individuals who got involved in the coup the names of only approximately two dozen have come down to us.610 Although the leaders of the oligarchic coup are briefly portrayed by Thucydides in the eighth book of his Histories, we would like to know more about the less prominent, but by no means unimportant, figures, to whom only occasional references are made in our sources. Laispodias’ case is an interesting one, in that although his family belonged to the Athenian elite and had probably played important enough a role in public life to secure him a place in the board of generals, he himself denounced the established political order and mainstream politics to embark on an ambitious, and at the same time highly risky, enterprise. Perhaps Thucydides had Laispodias in mind as well when he remarked that citizens beyond suspicion took part in the coup, judging from their previous political record.611

Name and family history

As we learn from Theognostos’ Kanones Laispodias probably came from a well-established family.612 His father’s name has caused great confusion and bewilderment, especially among earlier scholars.613 A. Raubitschek asserted that “the addition Andronymios means only that Laispodias was a proper name.”614 However, since the publication of R. Develin’s article the patronymic Ἀνδρωνύμιος, genitive of Ἀνδρόνυμις, has been widely accepted.615 Develin points out that the fact that there is no other individual in Attic prosopography bearing this strange name should not

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609 8.68.4: ὥστε ὡς ἀνδρῶν πολλῶν καὶ ξυνετῶν πραχθὲν τὸ ἔργον οὐκ ἄπεικότως καὶ περι μέγα ὡς προσχόρησον: ‘therefore, as it was carried out by many and intelligent men, the venture, though so great, not unreasonably, succeeded.’
610 E. Ruschenbusch (Athenische Innenpolitik im 5. Jahrhundert v. Chr.: Ideologie oder Pragmatismus? Bamberg 1979: 102-104) raises their number to 29, but he includes supporters as well. H. Avery (Protopgraphical Studies in the Oligarchy of the Four Hundred PhD Diss. Princeton 1959) has argued for twenty-two sure members of the Four Hundred and has proposed another twenty-two as probable members.
611 8.66.5: ἕνισαν γὰρ καὶ ὦς οὐκ ὁντ' τις ὅπεθο εἰς ὀλιγαρχίαν τραπέσθαι. ‘There were among them some whom no one would ever think would turn to oligarchy.’
614 A. Raubitschek Dedications from the Athenian Akropolis Massachusetts 1949: 95.
615 R. Develin “Laispodias Andronymios” JHS 106 1986 : 184. Earlier, W. McCoy had proposed Andron as Laispodias’ father (Theramenes, Thrasybulus and the Athenian Moderates PhD Diss. Yale University 1970: 102 and no 70). The variant Ἀνδρόνυμιος which is offered in J. Traill Persons of Ancient Athens vols. 1-20 Toronto 1994 cannot stand, since the genitive would have been Ἀνδρωνύμιου, the noun belonging to the second declension including nouns masculine and feminine ending in –ος.
deter us from accepting it as real. Indeed, Attic names beginning with Ἀνδρω-, other than Ἀνδρων, are extremely rare. LGPN records only three persons named Ἀνδρωνίδης,\(^ {616}\) and two persons bearing the name Ἀνδρωφέλης, one lived in the fourth century,\(^ {617}\) and the other in the third, in Ramnous.\(^ {618}\)

It has been pointed out that the second part of the name Laispodias may derive from the nouns σποδός (ash), or σπουδή (haste).\(^ {619}\) There are, however, more possibilities. The name could derive from the adjective σπόδιος which means grey, or the verb σποδέω which means either to pound, smite, crush, or have sexual intercourse.\(^ {620}\) In the passive (σποδοῦμαι), it denotes women or boys having sex.\(^ {621}\) Finally, it can also mean to eat greedily, devour.\(^ {622}\) The scholiast to Aristophanes’ Birds 1569 apparently understood the name Laispodias as having sexual connotations: ∆ηµήτριος δὲ ὃν πάντες τὸν Ἱξίονα λέγουσιν, ἐν ταῖς Ἀττικαίς λέξεσιν ὡς γλώσσαν ἐξηγεῖται, ὅτι λαισποδίας ἐστίν ὁ ἀκρατῆς περὶ τὰ ἄρροδία, ὅστε και κτήνη σποδεῖν.\(^ {623}\) As to the first part, Λαι-, it means “very”, as in the words λαίσκαπρος, very lustful, and λαίσποτος, prostitute (LSJ).

The statement in Theognostos’ Kanóνες that Laispodias belonged to a distinguished Athenian family seems to be corroborated through an inscription with a dedication at the Akropolis, dated about 500 B.C.\(^ {624}\) It runs: [Τόνδε] Σποῦδις Λαισποδιὸν ἀνέθεκεν. The inscription is written by the artist Kalon and the object of the dedication may have been a bronze utensil, as the word hieron indicates. The name of the dedicator Σποῦδις could be a short form of Σπουδίας or Σπουδίδες,\(^ {625}\) but it is possible that Spoudis may well have been the actual name.\(^ {626}\)

A generation later another family member makes his appearance in Athenian politics. On an ostrakon found in the Athenian Agora we read: Λαισποδιασ ἐΚοῖλες----. Two restorations have been proposed: Λαισποδιασ ἐΚοῖλες---- Σποῦδις----, or Λαισποδιασ ἐΚοῖλες Σποῦδις----.\(^ {627}\) The ostrakon provides us with Laispodias’ deme, Coile, of the Hippothontis tribe. Given the rarity of the

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\(^{616}\) IG II² 10173 undated; IG II² 2988 74-63 B.C.: ἐπὶ Ἀνδρωνίδου ἄρχοντος.

\(^{617}\) IG II² 6984.2.

\(^{618}\) SEG 26 304.3.

\(^{619}\) Avery 1959: 199 and no 3 with further literature.

\(^{620}\) Ar. Ec. 942, 1016.

\(^{621}\) Ar. Ec. 908, 113; Thesm. 492.

\(^{622}\) Ar. Peace 1306; Pherecr. 55.

\(^{623}\) ‘Demetrios, whom everybody calls Ixion, in the Attic words explains Laispodias as a rare word which means intemperate concerning sexual drive, so much so that one may have sexual intercourse with animals.’

\(^{624}\) DAA 87=IG I³ 755. The editors of Inscriptiones Graecae date the inscription to 500-480 BC.

\(^{625}\) A. Raubitschek 1949: 92, 95.

\(^{626}\) R. Develin 1986: 184.

\(^{627}\) E. Vanderpool “Some Ostraka from the Athenian Agora” Hesperia Supplements 8 1949: 400.
name, Vanderpool and Avery have rightly assumed that the people involved in the dedication and ostracism belong to the same family, Laispodias being the son of the dedicator Spoudis. Nevertheless, dating the ostrakon has been proved more troublesome. Vanderpool has suggested the 480s on grounds of letter forms only. LGPN (s.v. Λαισποδίας (3)) is more ambitious, giving a date between 485-480, whereas M. Lang, more tentatively, believes that ‘it belongs by letter shapes to the early part of the fifth century.’ In fact, it is questionable whether dating an ostrakon based solely on letter forms can be that accurate. Perhaps it would be more justifiable if we abstained from giving the ostrakon a more precise date than the first half of the fifth century.

In the first half of the fourth century, probably around 370 B.C., the name Laispodias occurs in a list of councillors. Vanderpool suggested that if it is not the same person as the oligarch, then it is probably a descendant of his. The first four letters can be read in the inscription (ΛΑΙΣ[Π]Ο[∆ΙΑΣ- - -]), rendering thus Vanderpool’s suggestion more plausible, given the rarity of this name. In The Athenian Agora xv 492,152 he is mentioned as Anaphlystios (Antiochis 10), and the assumption is made that the general in 414/3 also came from the Antiochis tribe, in which case we have an occurrence of double representation in the strategia, the second strategos from Antiochis in that year being Conon Timotheou Anaphlystios (Thuc. 7.31.4). This, however, is not a necessary conclusion since the name could have passed to the deme Anaphlystos through marriage. It is conceivable that a sister of the oligarch, or her daughter, may have been given in marriage to a local family, perhaps of lower social status, so the councillor, who could have been born in the 410s, could be the oligarch’s sister’s grandson. J. Sundwall thought that this person came from the

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628 Vanderpool 1949: 400; Avery 1959: 200, where a family tree is offered in which a Spoudis II is conjectured as the father of Laispodias the oligarch.
630 R. Thomsen The Origin of Ostracism: A Synthesis Copenhagen 1972: 85; S. Brenne Ostrakismos und Prominenz in Athen: Attische Bürger des 5. Jhs. v. Chr. auf den Ostraka Vienna 2001: 207. See also the excellent discussion in T. Winters (“The Dates of the Dedications from the Athenian Akropolis” ZPE 107 1995: 282-288) on the insurmountable difficulties in dating an inscription within even a decade, based solely on letter forms. His well founded scepticism will of course apply to ostraka as well, regardless of the fact that the scribe in the case of an ostrakon is not necessarily a professional one; See also M. Lang (“Writing and Spelling on Ostraka” Hesperia Supplements 19 1982: 76), on the differences between inscription and ostraka writing.
631 IG II² 1698, 65.
632 Vanderpool 1949: 400.
Piraeus, but it is clear that in the inscription the name is inscribed under the
demesmen of Anaphlystos.635

Laispodias' entry into politics

Laispodias may have launched his political career in the 420s or early 410s. A speech,
titled Κατὰ Λαισποδίου, written by Antiphon the orator, is possibly connected with
Laispodias' activities as travelling commissioner, appointed by the Athenian state
presumably to ensure that tax contributions were duly paid and confederate
regulations and obligations well observed.636 This speech has been variously dated. F.
Blass opted for 418 B.C. on the grounds that there is no reference to Laispodias prior
to that date.637 G. Gilbert related the speech to his generalship in 414, but from
Thucydides' narrative it does not follow that the raid involved any adverse military
development, it was rather a routine mission with no major engagements, so it is
difficult to see how a trial could have arisen from this expedition.638 H. Avery dates it
to about mid 420s,639 on the grounds that Harpocration mentions the speech in
connection with the Περὶ τοῦ Λινδίων Φόρου, delivered in the context of the
reassessment of the allies' tribute in 425/4, and that both speeches seem to deal with
allied tribute quota.640 This is not necessary. Besides, while the title of Περὶ τοῦ
Λινδίων Φόρου is indicative of its content, i.e. disputes over tribute,641 that of Κατὰ
Λαισποδίου does not seem to fall into the same category. It would then be better to
assign the speech to the late 420s or early 410s as precision is unattainable. The
crucial piece of information comes from Harpocration, where in the entry ἐπίσκοπος
(cf. s.v. ἀπίστευν, s.v. Γαληψός, s.v. Οἰσύμη) the above-mentioned speech is quoted
beside the Περὶ τοῦ Λινδίων Φόρου, followed by the comment that in both speeches
references were made on the Athenian overseers. Harpocration and Suida (s.v.
ἐπίσκοπος) draw a comparison between the Spartan harmosts and the Athenian
episkopoi, but it is unlikely that it was in the overseers' power to exercise direct and
extensive control over the affairs and administration of a confederate city, as it was at
the harmosts’ discretion to do so; however, some personal interference should not be ruled out.\textsuperscript{642} Indeed, an Athenian decree, formerly thought to have probably been passed in 447 or 446 B.C., but now dated to 425/4 B.C., stipulates that the episkopos, along with the Athenian council and the magistrates of the confederate cities should be responsible for the due collection of the tribute every year and its safe transfer to Athens.\textsuperscript{643} What we can legitimately infer though, given that Laispodias was acting as a travelling commissioner on behalf of Athens in this case, is that at the time the speech was delivered in the court, Laispodias was playing some role in Athenian politics.\textsuperscript{644} But Laispodias’ post might not have been an elective one, so his appointment cannot possibly tell us much about his outlook, or his importance in the contemporary political scene.\textsuperscript{645} In addition, it could be argued that the post itself was quite administrative in nature, and does not reveal much about one’s political credos.\textsuperscript{646} Nor does Antiphon’s involvement in the trial as the accuser’s speech writer offer us an indication as to the exact sentiments or relationship between the two men at the time, that is to say Antiphon’s resentment towards Laispodias because of the latter’s democratic outlook. Antiphon’s professional expertise must have appealed to a confederate citizen (of oligarchic convictions?) who sued Laispodias probably for mismanagement or misconduct with regard to the execution of his duties as an episkopos, though the possibility that the trial sprang out of a personal feud between Laispodias and a local resident somewhere in an allied city, and the suing for misconduct in office was only a pretext should not be ruled out. It is quite conceivable that Laispodias resented Antiphon’s involvement in the case, in his eyes this should have been a warning that his prosecutor had formidable connections and was not to be sneezed at. To this we may add the customary mistrust of professional

\textsuperscript{642} R. Meiggs \textit{The Athenian Empire} Oxford 1972: 212-213, for the early date; P. Rhodes “After the Three-Bar Sigma Controversy: The History of Athenian Imperialism Reassessed” CQ 58.2 2008: 502, for the late date.

\textsuperscript{643} IG I\textsuperscript{3} 34, 5-11=ML 46. For the dating, see Meiggs 1972: 165. The office of episkopos was one of the ἀρχαὶ υπερόριοι mentioned in AP 24.3.

\textsuperscript{644} G. Lehmann (“Überlegungen zur Krise der athenerischen Demokratie im Peloponnesischen Krieg: Vom Ostrakismos des Hyperbolos zum Thargelion 411 v. Chr.” ZPE 69 1987: 68) labels Laispodias as radical demagogue, alongside Phrynichus and Peisander, but this may be too far-fetched. Bearing in mind the dearth of evidence and the equivocal character of the information we possess about him, Laispodias’ known activities do not indicate that he either had a distinguished career in politics, such as that of Peisander and Phrynichus, or he pursued radical democratic politics.

\textsuperscript{645} In Aristophanes’ \textit{Birds} 1022-1023 the episkopos asserts: ἥκω δὲ ἔξερο τῷ κυάµῳ λαχὼν εἰς τὰς Νεφελοκοκκυγίας. ‘I have been appointed, by due process of lottery to inspect the affairs of Couldeuckoobury’ (translated by R. Meiggs).

\textsuperscript{646} Meiggs 1972: 152-174 maintains that through the building up of a network of Athenian officers, political residents, garrison commanders, and travelling commissioners (episkopoi) Athens was able to maintain control of her empire and effectively tackle the disaffection of the allies, especially expressed in the 440s. In this sense Laispodias must have been regarded as Athens’ watchdog by some of the residents of the allied cities he visited as an episkopos, especially if he attended to his duties vigorously.
logographers the average Athenian felt. \(^{647}\) I assume that the two men discussed the incident when Laispodias joined the group which was to become the Four Hundred, and if there was any misunderstanding, it should have been sorted out then.

Next we hear of Laispodias is in the summer of 414 B.C. Leading a naval force comprising thirty ships, he, along with Pythodoros and Demaratos, landed at Epidaurus Limera (the Byzantine Monemvasia) and Prasiai, further south of modern Leonidio, and ravaged Spartan territories, a hostile action that blatantly violated the peace of Nicias. \(^{648}\) Earlier scholars assigned the raid to the year 415/4, \(^{649}\) but G. Busolt pointed out that we should date the event to the beginning of the archon year 414/3. \(^{650}\) A Spartan invasion in the Argolid seems to have taken place approximately when Gylipos set out with four ships from Leukas to Taras, \(^{651}\) and it is likely that both events occurred within the first half of July 414. \(^{652}\) The Athenian raid took place while the Spartan one was in progress, in fact some considerable time had already elapsed. \(^{653}\) If we consider that the Athenian year in 414 started on July 29th, \(^{654}\) the raid may have started at the very end of July, or early August, although a date in early September is not theoretically impossible. \(^{655}\)

It is not clear whether Laispodias was a general in this mission, for Thucydides uses the word ἀρχόντων. \(^{656}\) According to C. Fornara, the list of generals included thirteen names, Laispodias having been elected as general at the regular elections that year. \(^{657}\) Euthydemus and Menander had replaced Lamachus and Alcibiades until Demosthenes and Eurymedon arrived in Sicily and assumed office. \(^{658}\) R. Sealey in his list does not mention Laispodias at all, \(^{659}\) and Develin is sceptical as to whether

\(^{647}\) See the discussion in K. Dover Lysias and the Corpus Lysiacum Berkeley 1968: 156-158.
\(^{648}\) Thuc. 6.105; cf. 5.18.4: ὅπλα δὲ μὴ ἐξετῶ ἐπιφέρειν ἐπὶ πημονῇ 'may it not be possible to bear arms with hostile intent'. See also Thuc. 7.18.3 on the raid as a ground for complaints on the part of the Spartans; cf. And. 3.9.
\(^{649}\) See Avery 1959: 202 and no 10 for references.
\(^{650}\) Busolt 1893-1904: 3.2.1350-1351.
\(^{651}\) Thuc. 6.104.1.
\(^{653}\) Thuc. 6.105.1: καὶ τῆς γῆς τῆν πολλὴν ἐδίωθαν 'they ravaged the best part of the land.' See V. Hanson Warfare and Agriculture in Classical Greece Berkeley 1998, where the difficulty in destroying olive trees and vines is stressed, especially 185-194 on the exact meaning of the verb διόω and other technical terms employed by ancient historians to describe ravaging and devastation of enemy territory.
\(^{654}\) B. Meritt The Athenian Year Berkeley 1961: 218.
\(^{655}\) Raid occurs in 414/13: Gomme, Andrewes and Dover 1945-1981: 5 448. See the discussion in Gomme, Andrewes and Dover 1945-1981: 4 8 on the complications the September date entails, most importantly rejection of Lamachus’ death in 415/4.
\(^{656}\) 6.105.2.
\(^{657}\) The Athenian Board of Generals from 501 to 404 B.C. Wiesbaden 1971: 65.
\(^{658}\) Thuc. 7.16.2.
\(^{659}\) Sealey 1967: 91-94.
Laispodias, Pythodorus, Euetion, Conon and Melesander (this is his reading of IG I³ 371[3]) were indeed generals that year. On the other hand, U. Kahrstedt accepts the generalship, and Avery follows suit, while S. Hornblower underscores the fact that the Athenians had started to appoint supernumeraries with different titles to meet the then current command needs, but is inclined towards accepting the three commanders as generals. In view of Thucydides’ inconsistency regarding technical vocabulary indicating military leadership, the designation archon itself should not be a compelling reason to reject Laispodias’ generalship.

What were the implications of this mission, and how was it related to the domestic political scene in Athens? Avery perceives it as a decision to settle for good the uneasy peace of Nicias and proceed with the war more vigorously, a decision taken by the radical democrats, forming the majority in the new board of generals for 414/3 (actually this is the main reason Avery assigns the raid to 414/3, the raid signalling a u-turn in Athenian attitudes toward the resumption of hostilities in mainland Greece). E. Meyer described the act as ‘ein flagranter Bruch des Friedens von 421, die offene Ankündigung, dass Athen den Krieg wolle.’ G. Busolt attributed the attack to the pervasive feeling in Athens at the time that the fall of Syracuse was imminent, so much so that the Athenians had no qualms about violating the terms of the peace. D. Kagan believes that the Athenians were committed to helping the Argives out of the obligation the latter’s presence in Sicily entailed. At this point it should be noted that we need to be careful not to attribute political responsibility for a change in foreign policy to the persons who had to implement decisions that had been taken by the people in the Assembly. We do not know if the three generals actually supported the mission, if they actually campaigned openly in favour of it, speaking as rhetores in the assembly, or simply had to comply with the decision and see to it that the expedition was carried out as efficiently as possible. Nor does their common appointment signify a relationship of whatever sort between them. In addition, the military commanders need not endorse fully or in part the assembly’s decision to undertake the campaign and its objectives, political and geo-strategic. We should not forget that it was the assembly which appointed certain generals for a given campaign, and decided on the objectives and the size and composition of the

661 Paulys Realenzyklopädie der klassischen Altertumswissenschaft 12.1 1924: 517.
662 Avery 1959: 202 and no 10 with bibliography. Avery notes that it is his participation in the mission that prompted earlier scholars to classify Laispodias as democrat, E. Meyer being the exception in believing that he was only pretending to be one (Geschichte des Altertums vols 1-4 Stuttgart 1884-1901: 4.1 490 no 2.
663 Hornblower A Commentary on Thucydides vols 1-3 Oxford 1991-2008: 3 537.
664 Avery 1959: 203 and no 10.
665 Meyer 1884-1901: 4.1 493.
666 Busolt 1893-1904: 3.2 1354.
expeditionary force. D. Hamel points out that during their office, Athenian generals would address the assembly in connection with military issues far more frequently than any other citizen. In addition the Athenian assembly would exercise a tight control over their generals while being on campaign by issuing concrete and explicit instructions beforehand. Consequently, Laispodias’ appointment is not necessarily an indication, let alone proof, that he had actually endorsed, campaigned for, or exercised any influence over the raid in Laconia, and no conclusions can be drawn either as to his attitude toward the resumption of hostilities and the war in general.

**Laispodias and the Four Hundred**

Thucydides informs us of Laispodias’ involvement in the oligarchy of the Four Hundred incidentally only. Some Argive envoys reached Samos to assure the Athenians of Argos’ loyalty. They had been transported, Thucydides tells us, by the crew of Paralos. These men had previously captured three envoys, en route to Sparta, as they were transporting them on board an Athenian warship, namely Laispodias, Aristophon and Melesias, apparently all members of the Four Hundred. These envoys the crew delivered to Argos, and from there they transported the Argive envoys to Samos:

ἀφίκοντο δὲ οἱ Ἀργεῖοι μετὰ τῶν Παράλων, οἱ τότε ἐτάχθησαν ἐν τῇ στρατιωτίδι ηῇ ὑπὸ τῶν τετρακοσίων περιτλείν Εὔβοιαν, καὶ ἄγοντες Ἀθηναίων ἔς Λακεδαίμονα ὑπὸ τῶν τετρακοσίων [πεμπτοῦς] πρέσβεις, Λαισποδίαν καὶ Ἀριστοφῶντα καὶ Μελησίαν, [οἱ] ἐπειδῆ ἐγένοντο πλέοντες κατ’ Ἀργος, τοὺς μὲν πρέσβεις ξυλαβόντες τοῖς Ἀργεῖοις παρέδοσαν ώς τῶν οὐχ ἥκιστα καταλυσάντων τὸν δῆμον ὄντας, αὐτοὶ δὲ σώκτι ἐς τᾶς Ἀθήνας ἀφίκοντο, ἀλλ’

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669 Fornara 1971: 37.
670 Hamel 1998: 14 and no 24 with further bibliography. She concludes that ‘the influence which Athens’ generals enjoyed over the formulation of Athenian military policy, while more extensive than that of most politically active Athenians, fell rather far short of effective control.’
671 Hamel 1998: 115 no 1 with references to primary sources. Sometimes trouble could befall the generals if the assembly thought their conduct and performance was not in keeping with its directives. Characteristic is the example of Xenophon, Hestiodorus and Phanomachus, the Athenian generals who besieged Potidaea in 429 B.C., who were accused because they signed a treaty with the Potideans without consulting the sovereign assembly (Thuc. 2.70.4). There were eleven other cases during the Peloponnesian war of Athenian generals who were brought to trial and were convicted on various charges (K. Pritchett *The Greek State at War* Part 2 Berkeley 1974: 6-7).
672 On troop-carriers and whether they were a special type of ship or just an undermanned trireme, see Gomme, Andrewes and Dover Oxford 1945-1981: 4 309, 487; H. Wallinga *Ships and Sea-Power Before the Great Persian War* Leiden 1993: 175, who in discussing this passage concludes that ‘stratiotis had as much the meaning ‘trireme with minimal crew’ as that of ‘transport’; Hornblower 1991-2008: 3 1061-1066.
The Argives had arrived with the crew of Paralos, who had then been ordered by the Four Hundred to sail around Euboea on a troop-carrier. And as they were carrying the Athenian envoys to Lacedaimon, members of the Four Hundred, Laispodias, Aristophon and Melesias, when they approached Argos they arrested the envoys and handed them over to the Argives, since, in their opinion, they had played a most important role in the overthrow of the Athenian demos. They themselves did not return to Athens, but they transported the Argive envoys from Argos and arrived in Samos on the warship which they possessed.

Soon after the Four Hundred had usurped power in Athens, they began sending embassies to king Agis in Deceleia with a view to ending the hostilities. They also sent ten envoys to Samos principally to quell the fears of the navy and prevent a mutiny. Those men pleaded the cause of the oligarchic regime, arguing that the oligarchy had been installed not in order to harm the city but to salvage it. However, developments on Samos had taken an unexpected and unwelcome twist for the oligarchs, since a democratic counter-revolution ousted the recently installed local oligarchic clique. The Paralos’ crew played a prominent role in the Samian civil war on the democrats’ side, and distinguished themselves in the struggle against the Three Hundred Samian oligarchy. After the consolidation of the democracy in Samos, it was decided that Chaereas be sent on board Paralos to the Piraeus to deliver the news to Athens, the Athenian navy on Samos apparently being unaware of the oligarchic coup in Athens. This was done as scheduled, but upon arrival in the Piraeus, the Four Hundred arrested two or three men of Paralos’ crew, while they transferred the rest to another warship, ordering them to patrol off Euboea.

This embassy, of which Laispodias was a member, is not the same as the one in 8.71.3 because Paralos reached the Piraeus at 8.74.2 (that is at a later time than 71.3) and then the crew was ordered to patrol off Euboea. E. Heitsch wonders whether the decision on the part of the Four Hundred to entrust the envoys’ mission to the crew of Paralos, notorious for being fervent supporters of the democracy, was due to the dearth of experienced and able crews, or simply an indication that the oligarchs were already losing control of the situation. But his theory that the envoys were intercepted en route to Sparta by Paralos’ crew, and so consequently they were

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673 Thuc. 8.70.2-72.
674 Thuc. 8.73-74.2.
675 Busolt 1893-1904: 3.2 1491; Gomme, Andrewes and Dover 1945-1981: 5 289. Contra J. Classen Thukydides Erklärt Berlin 1878: 135; U. Wilamowitz Aristoteles und Athen vols 1-2 Berlin 1893: 1 101; K. Velwei Das klassische Athen: Demokratie und Machtpolitik im 5. und 4. Jahrhundert Darmstadt 1999: 224, believes that king Agis arranged so that the three Athenian envoys were escorted on their way to Sparta. K. Krüger (ed.) Θουκυδίδου ξυγγραφ η Berlin 1861: 163 abstained from reaching a decision on the issue. Hornblower has suggested that the present tense verb ἐκπέμπουσι at 8.71.3 may be iterative, an indication that there were more than one delegations to Sparta (1991-2008: 3 966).
travelling on a different ship is contradicted by Thucydides 8.86.9. Consequently, we should assume that the three envoys left the Piraeus on board the ship whose crew were the Paralos men.

It is probable that the three envoys left Athens after Chaereas’ arrival in the Piraeus on board Paralos and before the news of the mutiny in Samos had become widely spread. The news from Samos could have spread either through Chaereas (he must have met relatives, friends or accomplices who helped him to escape from Attica), or the relatives who must have visited the two or three men of Paralos crew who were arrested and imprisoned, or finally accidentally through a cargo ship travelling from Samos and reaching the Piraeus at about that time.

There is an indication in Thucydides’ narrative that the embassy to Sparta was a hasty reaction on the part of the Four Hundred, on receiving the news of the navy’s mutiny at Samos. After seizing Paralos the oligarchs ordered its crew to board another ship and set out for Euboia. It seems that this order was never implemented because it was decided on the spot that an embassy be sent to Sparta and that the Paralos’ crew was to transport the envoys first. One wonders why the oligarchs kept the Paralos ship grounded while appointing its crew to such an important mission. A probable answer is that Paralos was too closely associated with democracy for the oligarchs to allow her carry out important missions under their regime, but at the same time they were short of experienced naval personnel. Did the Four Hundred appoint a trusted captain on board and/or a number of ἐπιβάται, hoplites who acted as marines in naval engagements? If this is the case, there might have been a brawl on board before these persons were overpowered by the crew.

On what grounds were the three men comprising the embassy chosen? D. Mosley points out that the envoys were usually chosen on the grounds of their popularity in the city they were sent to. It was perhaps for this reason that Melesias was chosen. As far as Laispodias is concerned, perhaps, the choice to send him along could be intelligible owing to his prestige as general and his presumed influence on the crew. The latter, so the oligarchs hoped, would respect and obey a high officer with, until recently, a democratic profile. When the Four Hundred came to power they must have had doubts as to whether Sparta would recognize their authority. Their fears proved to be well founded, since in Agis’ view it was dubious that the Athenian

677 Thuc. 8.74.1.
678 8.74.2: τοὺς δὲ ἄλλους ἀφελομένοι τὴν ναῦν ἐταξαν φρουρεῖν περὶ Εἰβοιαν. 'whereas they ordered the others to patrol off Euboea, after having seized their ship.'
679 Envoys and Diplomacy in Ancient Greece Wiesbaden 1973: 44 with a list of relevant examples.
demos would acknowledge their authority as legitimate, let alone other cities.680 At this point, in contrast to later embassies led by Antiphon and Phrynichus themselves, the leaders of the Four Hundred might have feared that they might be viewed as revolutionaries by the Spartans and be arrested, so they refrained from taking part themselves.681 Three was the most usual number sent on a diplomatic mission by the Athenians, so in this respect the oligarchs did not depart from democratic custom.682 Bearing in mind that the envoys should be of considerable prestige, young individuals were not usually included.683

We would wish to know the terms on which the envoys were instructed to negotiate a peace agreement, but Thucydides is silent on this point. G. Busolt believed that the Athenians would have proposed that the status quo be observed, but the Lacedaimonians demanded that Athens give up her empire, quoting AP 32.3 and remarking that Aristotle in this passage had probably made an inference from Thucydides 8.91.3.684 Perhaps, following the failure of the first embassy (8.71.3), this one was more prepared to show flexibility in the negotiations, but we do not know the details, or to what extent they were willing to make concessions.685 Nor can we classify the envoys as extremists on the grounds of their participation in the embassy.686 It seems, indeed, that the Athenians did not bear any grudges against these oligarchic envoys, since Laispodias at least was never prosecuted. It was only the last embassy to Sparta that was deemed treacherous, manned with members of

680 Thuc. 8.71.1
681 cf. Thuc. 3.72.1: the oligarchic Corcyrean envoys, sent to Athens in 427, were arrested as revolutionaries.
682 Mosley 1973: 45: embassies of two, five and ten men are also attested.
683 Mosley 1973: 46. cf. Hornblower 1991-2008: 3 1003; Heftner 2001: 249 and no 155 where he additionally points out that there was a tendency among the Four Hundred to appoint rather aged individuals to important missions.
684 Busolt 1893-1904: 3.2.1491.
685 M. Munn’s contention that the negotiations with the Spartans entailed concrete concessions such as the handing over to the neighbours of Attica the disputed territories, as he calls them, of Oropos, Oenoe and Euboea cannot be supported by the evidence and should meet with scepticism (The School of History: Athens in the Age of Socrates Berkeley 2000: 145 and no 36). Nowhere in Book Eight does Thucydides give us any details of the negotiations, save a sense of ever growing hastiness and desperation as far as the Athenian oligarchs were concerned (8.71.3: μετὰ δὲ τοῦτο παρὰ τε τὸν Ἀγίν ἐπρέσβευσαν οἱ τετρακόσιοι οὐδὲν ἔσσον ‘after that the Four Hundred were sending embassies to king Agis in earnest’ 90.1-2: πρέσβεις τε ἀπέστελλον οὐδὲν ἐκ τῆς Ἀκεδαίμωνα καὶ τῆς ὀμολογίας προνόμιον...καὶ ἀπέστειλαν μὲν ἄντιφωνα καὶ Φρύνιχον καὶ ὄλους δέκα κατὰ τάχος ‘and they were sending envoys from among themselves to Lacedaemon and were eager to make peace... and sent hastily Antiphon and Phrynichus and ten more’).
the extremist faction within the Four Hundred, participation in which was fatal for Antiphon and Archeptolemus.\textsuperscript{687}

\textbf{Laispodias and Old Comedy}

Laispodias was frequently targeted by the comic poets and was their regular butt, an undisputable sign of his popularity and relative prominence in Athenian politics. In Aristophanes’ \textit{Birds}, produced at the city Dionysia in 414 B.C., Poseidon addresses the Triballian god and rebukes him (1567-71):

\begin{quote}
οὔτος, τί δρας; ἐπαρίστερ’ οὔτος ἀμπέχει; 
οὗ μεταβολεῖς θοιμάτων ὁδ’ ἐπιδέξια; 
τί ὁ κακόδαμον; Δαισποδίας εἰ τὴν φύσιν; 
ὁ δημοκρατία, ποί προβιβάς ἡμᾶς ποτε, 
εἰ τούτον κεχειροτονήκασ’ οἱ θεοί; 
\end{quote}

Here, what are you trying to do? Is this how you drape yourself, from right to left?/ You’d better re-drape your cloak from left to right like this./ What now, you wretched fool? Are you made like Laispodias?/ Oh Democracy, where are you going to lead us to one of these days,/ if the gods can actually vote this fellow into office? (translated by A. Sommerstein).

Poseidon is cross with the Triballian because of the way he has put on his ἱμάτιον. The gentlemanly way was to leave the right arm free. Apparently the Triballian has done it the other way round (1567-1568). When he haphazardly tries to fix it, he lets it hang too low on his legs. That is why Poseidon drops the remark Δαισποδίας εἰ τὴν φύσιν, hinting at Laispodias’ deformity of his calves which he tried to conceal by having his cloak hang down to his ankles.\textsuperscript{688} Other comic poets such as Theopompus in \textit{Παϊδές} (K-A 40) and Strattis in his \textit{Κινησίας} (K-A 19) also mock Laispodias for his deformed legs.\textsuperscript{689} Eupolis\textsuperscript{690} in his \textit{Δήμοι} (K-A 107) pictured the politician and

\textsuperscript{687} Thuc. 8.90.2. On the trial of Antiphon, Ononcales and Archeptolemus, see [Plut.] \textit{Life of Antiphon} 833E3-F12. I argue elsewhere that there is no compelling evidence that Archeptolemus was an extremist and personally attached to Antiphon.

\textsuperscript{688} N. Dunbar (ed.) \textit{Aristophanes Birds} Oxford 1995: 716. Given Aristophanes’ notoriety for jokes with sexual connotations, one cannot help considering the possibility that the actor playing Poseidon makes a movement imitating sexual intercourse when pronouncing ἰματίου (K-A 40) and Strattis in his \textit{Κινησίας} (K-A 19) also mock Laispodias for his deformed legs.\textsuperscript{689} Eupolis\textsuperscript{690} in his \textit{Δήμοι} (K-A 107) pictured the politician and

\textsuperscript{689} Schol. Ar. \textit{Birds} 1569: διὸ καὶ κατὰ σκελῶν ἔφορες τὸ ἰμάτιον, ὡς Θεόπομπος ἐν Παισί ‘for this reason he wore his cloak long covering his legs, as Theopompus says in his \textit{Boys}; ἔχει δὲ καὶ περὶ τὰς κνήμις ἀιτίας τινὰς, ὡς φησὶ Στράττις ἐν Κινησίᾳ ‘some charges are leveled at him concerning his shanks, as reports Strattis in his \textit{Kinesias}.

\textsuperscript{690} Laispodias’ featuring in Eupolis is picked up by Plutarch in his \textit{Questiones Conviviales} (712A 6-8) where the question is what sympotic entertainments are most appropriate at a dinner. Old Comedy is rejected because the persons appearing in it are too obscure for the
If the piece of information we find in Heschychius the lexicographer is right, then we can imagine the two men on the scene as two trees with bent trunks awkwardly following Cinesias, imitating Laispodias' walk. Poseidon's above mentioned scornful comment 'democracy, how far do you mean to carry us, if the gods have elected this man?' should also be read as a criticism about the recent election of Laispodias as general, but it is not clear whether this criticism is leveled at his presumed incompetence as a commander or at his politics, although we should remind ourselves that one need not necessarily be a politician to be mocked and ridiculed by a comic poet. Laispodias' funny name and his physique were good enough reasons on their own to make him a likely butt. This passage is a stronger indication of his election to the highest military office than the scholium to Ar. *Birds* 1569, because it is doubtful whether the scholiast had an independent source at hand, or simply inferred Laispodias' generalship from Thucydides' passage (6.105.2).

Laispodias was also mocked as warlike in Phrynichus' *Kωµασταί* (K-A 17), a play produced at the city Dionysia in 414 B.C., at the same festival as the *Birds*. The date of the production of the play is important, for at that time Athens decides to abandon the peace of Nicias and openly resume hostilities in the mainland as well as in Sicily. This evidence led some scholars to assign Laispodias to the war party, and even aligned with Alcibiades' party, or that he was an enemy of Nicias, an "Oppportunitätdemokrat". We have seen that Laispodias' involvement in the raid in the Peloponnese does not necessarily reflect endorsement on his part of Athens' average audience to make sense. They would need a grammarian to explain 'τίς ὁ Λαισποδίας παρ' Εὐπόλιδι καὶ ὁ Κινησίας παρὰ Πλάτωνι καὶ ὁ Λάµπων παρὰ Κρατίνῳ' 'who Laispodias in Eupolis, and Cinesias in Platon, and Lampoon in Cratinus are.'

691 ‘Those trees, Laispodias and Damasias, with those shanks are following me.’ Cinesias (450-390 B.C.) was an important dithyramb poet, but also a well-known politician of rather conservative convictions. In 400 B.C. he moved a decree whereby the chorus in the comic plays was to be abolished (schol. Ar. *Frogs* 404, 154). Probably for this reason he was mocked by Strattis in his *Kαινοθεία* produced around that time. Cinesias also moved a honorary decree in 394/3 for Dionysius I, the tyrant of Syracuse, and his brothers Leptines and Thearides (IG II² 18, 5-8) (P. Maas “Kinesias” *RE* 11.1 1921: 479-481).

692 Λαισποδίας ὄνομα κύριον. ἐναὶ δὲ τὸν Ἀλκμαίωνα ἐφήθησαν λέγοντα. οἱ δὲ τὸν ἀρσενόδεις πόδας ἔχοντα. ‘Laispodias: a family name. Some thought that Alkmaion was called like that, others that it was the man with sickle-shaped legs.’

693 Τοῦτον δὲ τὸν Λαισποδίαν καὶ στρατηγήσας φησὶ Θουκυδίδης ἐν τῇ η’. ‘Thucydides in the eighth book says this Laispodias was a general.’

694 Avery 1959: 205.

695 Schol. Ar. *Birds* 1569: μέμνηται δὲ αὐτὸῦ Φρύνιχος ἐν Κωµασταῖς ὡς πολεμικοῦ γεγονότος ‘Phrynichus mentions him in his *Revellers* as having become warlike.’

696 Gilbert 1877: 277.

choices concerning the resumption of hostilities in 414. Even if he did espouse ideas about an all-out confrontation with the enemy at that particular time (whether sincerely or not), it does not follow that he was enlisted in Alcibiades’ retinue, for a particular policy could be supported and pursued independently by several politicians at a time (nor was of course Nicias the only advocate for peace in that period). It is true that we have no information about Laispodias’ previous military record to ascertain the truth of Phrynichus’ libel, but it is not unlikely that it was the former’s recent election to the strategia that prompted the latter’s mockery.

Philyllius in his Πλύντριαι labels Laispodias as litigious (K-A 8), and Avery thought that this slander may reflect Laispodias’ involvement in the trials that followed the fall of the Four Hundred, that is after the restoration of the democracy, or the fact that in the last decade of the fifth century he was still prominent enough to continue being the poets’ target. But Πλύντριαι was probably produced between 405 and 400 or in 406, too long a time after for Laispodias to be tried for his involvement in the coup. We would naturally expect his presumed trial to have taken place shortly after the restoration (as in Polystratos’ case in [Lys.] 20) and not at least five years later. In addition, if this is not a stock charge on the part of the comic poet, φιλόδικος would rather denote a person who brought other people to trial, an accuser, and not a defendant, which would be the case of Laispodias being brought to justice for his conduct during the regime of the Four Hundred. Thus, the information given by the scholiast to Ar. Birds 1569 cannot be taken as proof of political persecution inflicted on Laispodias. Rather it is a slight indication of Laispodias’ juridical activity in the closing years of the fifth century, but we completely lack the context in which it was waged as well as its character, that is to say, to what extent it was political or involved personal matters only.

Conclusion

Coming from an old, aristocratic family, with long involvement in Athenian politics, Laispodias had naturally political aspirations which his background made easier to fulfill. His election to the generalship, at a crucial point in the Peloponnesian war when the Athenians were inclining towards pursuing the war more aggressively, is probably an indication that Laispodias’ political profile at the time was compatible with the prevailing mood in Athens, i.e., a head-on confrontation with the enemy.

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698 Schol. Ar. Birds 1569: μέμνηται δε αὐτοῦ Φιλύλλιος ἐν ταῖς Πλυντρίαις ὡς φιλοδίκον ‘Philyllius mentions him in his Washerwomen as litigious.’


700 P. Geissler Chronologie der altattischen Komödie Berlin 1925: 65, 83. R. Kassel and C. Austin have tentatively proposed the year 410 B.C. for the production of the play, quoting Geissler p. 65 and addenda p. xvii, but Geissler argued that ‘vor 405 könnte man das Stück also nur datieren, wenn zwingende Gründe dafür vorhanden wären.’ In his list of lost comic plays of Old Comedy at page 83, he dates Plyntriai to 405-400 B.C.

701 J. Edmonds The Fragments of Attic Comedy vol. 1 Leiden 1957: 905.

702 cf. Lys. 10.2; D. 56.14.
His frequent mocking by the comic poets may also be an indication that he did not have a consistent conservative outlook, which would have afforded him some protection against libel and ridicule. On the other hand, his decision to enroll in the oligarchic camp shows that he was prepared to go to any lengths in order to secure a place for himself and his family in the new establishment. It may also be the case that his decision to join the oligarchy sprang out of sincere hopes that a peace agreement could be reached with Sparta. To his good fortune, his involvement in the coup left him relatively unscathed. In the final days of the regime the instinct of survival might have dictated him to seek political alignments with certain oligarchic circles who seemed to have the potential to handle the crisis swiftly and effectively, and try to extricate himself from any unfortunate incidents he may have been involved in. His participation in the embassy to Sparta, at least, did not lead to him being entangled in the political trials which were conducted shortly after the downfall of the oligarchy, as it was not considered as treacherous by the victorious faction within the Four Hundred led by Theramenes, who took every pains to ensure that his political enemies be eliminated one by one. Nor does he seem to have suffered disfranchisement, or have gone into exile, for there are signs of his presence and activity at Athens in the last decade of the century. This reconstruction of Laispodias’ story is admittedly based on scattered and scanty evidence and may not be devoid of error and misinterpretations. At any rate, Laispodias seems to have survived the storm showing that he could easily run with the fox and hunt with the hounds if necessary.

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703 A. Sommerstein “How to Avoid Being a Komodoumenos” *CQ* 46.2 1996: 327-356. See, however, D. Pritchard “Aristophanes and de Ste. Croix: The Value of Old Comedy as Evidence for Athenian Popular Culture” *Antichton* 46 2012: 14-51, arguing, among others, that Aristophanes was not biased in favour of a certain group of political leaders, and that he subjected all of them to his relentless slander and abuse, irrespective of their social and political standing.

Melesias

PAA 639150?

Melesias appears in the opening scene of the Platonic dialogue *Laches* whose dramatic date is set in about 424. Lysimachus the son of Aristeides the Just and Melesias, the son of Thukydides, Pericles’ rival, two friends of mature age, are at a loss as to how they should educate their children Aristeides and Thucydides respectively, who are presented as adolescents, in a way that would ensure the attainment of the highest excellence possible. To this end they have invited the famous generals Nicias and Laches to a performance of armour fighting, expecting that these two men, fathers of young boys themselves, would be able to give a good counsel. Lysimachus in an apologetic way bitterly regrets the fact that while Melesias and himself can tell a lot of stories about their fathers and their glorious deeds when, along with their children, they have dinner together, they are unable to tell a notable deed of their own. The reason for their relative obscurity, Lysimachus thinks, is that their fathers were too busy running the affairs of the city and the empire in peace and at war to find time to educate and instruct their children morally. The outcome was that Lysimachus and Melesias as adolescents lived a luxurious life but devoid of valiant deeds and accomplishments, a fact which they now regret.⁷⁰⁵

We get prosopographic information about Melesias in another Platonic dialogue, namely the *Meno*, set in the closing years of the fifth century.⁷⁰⁶ Socrates in his discussion with Anytus argues that virtue is not teachable, and to press his point he furnishes examples of illustrious statesmen such as Themistocles, Pericles and Thukydides the son of Melesias. While all three men, Socrates argues, took pains to educate their sons in the fine arts in the best possible way, they all failed to instil virtue in them, the outcome being none of the sons surpassed their fathers in accomplishments. With regard to Thukydides, we learn that he had two sons Melesias and Stephanus, Melesias being the firstborn since he is mentioned first. The boys received training in wrestling by two famous masters: Xanthias trained Melesias, while Eudorus became Stephanus’ teacher.⁷⁰⁷ The boys became able

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⁷⁰⁶ Meno, the historical person, took part as paid mercenary in Cyrus’ expedition against his brother, in his unsuccessful attempt to usurp the throne. He is mentioned by Xenophon in the *Anabasis* 1.2.6. He was executed by the King in 400 B.C. (*Anabasis* 2.6.29). Since Anytus is presented in the dialogue as holding office under the restored democracy, the dramatic date of the dialogue should be 403/402 B.C. cf. J. Day (ed.) *Plato’s Meno in Focus* London and New York 1994: 14.

athletes, although we are not told if they attained the glory of their grandfather Melesias whose victories in the Nemean and Olympian games Pindar immortalised. A spurious dialogue of Plato, the de virtute, repeats the information found in the Meno, adding that Thukudides' both sons reached an advanced age and died very old. If Melesias was born in the late 470s, by the time of the dramatic date of the Meno he was approaching his seventieth year, and he must have lived well into the fourth century. In a fragmentary record of the sale of the property of the Thirty we may identify Melesias as one of the buyers. If this is the case, this is a proof that Melesias was still alive after the downfall of the Thirty and that his property was not confiscated during the second oligarchy since he possessed enough wealth to purchase land.

A Melesias is mentioned in Thucydides as a member of the Four Hundred who, while on a diplomatic mission to Sparta as member of an embassy to negotiate peace, was caught en route to the Peloponnese by members of the crew of Paralos; accordingly he was transferred to Samos, along with the other two ambassadors Laispodias and Aristophon and was handed over to the armed forces there who had recently revolted and declared themselves enemies of the oligarchs at Athens (8.86.9). I have argued elsewhere that Melesias might have been chosen on the strength of his popularity in Sparta. If the envoy is the son of Thukydides, his participation in the embassy might have been a symbolic gesture on the part of the Four Hundred: the man with whom the Spartans would negotiate was the son of a bitter enemy of Pericles, the statesman who the Spartans and other members of the Peloponnesian League must have deemed chiefly responsible for the outbreak of the war in 431 and Athens' imperialistic policy in the previous decades. But the problem is that Melesias is a common name in Attica; it appears twelve times in the fifth and first half of the fourth century. Apart from the son of Thucydides other possible candidates could be Melesias from Oe PAA 639175, the tamias of Athena in 414/3 (IG I³ 308, 66), or Melesias from Oa PAA 639205, the secretary of tamiai of Athena in 429/8 (IG I³ 323, 48). The problem of the identity of Melesias the member of the Four Hundred is difficult to solve. S. Hornblower observed that it is striking that Thucydides failed

708 Pl. Meno 93C-94E; Pi. Nem. 4.93; Nem. 6.68; Ol. 8.54
710 M. Walbank “The Confiscation and Sale by the Poletai in 402/1 B.C. of the Property of the Thirty Tyrants” Hesperia 51. 1 1982: 82-83. Walbank estimates the price to have been 3,255 drachmai.
711 In my “Laispodias Andronymios PAA 600730” Aclass 56 2013: 93-103.
712 H. Avery (Prosopographical Studies in the Oligarchy of the Four Hundred PhD Diss. Princeton University 1959: 214 no 2) observed that the tamias of Athena in 414/3, PAA 639175, could not have been the son of Thukydides because there is space for the missing demotic for only six letters, thus excluding Alopeke.
713 For the identity of the member of the Four Hundred with the son of Thukydides have argued among others: G. Busolt Griechische Geschichte bis zur Schlacht bei Chaeroneia vols
to give us Melesias’ patronymic, especially so since the historian could give the patronymic of one person only from a list as in the case of Theramenes at 8.68.4. But it is also curious that Thucydides bothered to give us the names of the ambassadors at all, the mission having been aborted in the first place. Could it be that the historian wanted to pay tribute to his uncle Melesias, an ἀπράγμων who did not meddle in public life and had no other achievements of his own to be proud of? This presupposes that the view that Thukydides was a κηδεστής ‘son-in-law’ or ‘brother-in-law’ is sound, then Melesias was reared in an aristocratic environment and his political outlook may have been compatible with that of the oligarchs in 411, at least in a moderate version. Another slight indication that Melesias the ambassador could have been Thukydides’ son is his advanced age. It is a well-known fact that the members of embassies in ancient Greece were respectable seniors. This is another reason why we should reject Avery’s idea that Aristophon, the third member of the aborted embassy mission was the fourth-century politician from Azenia.

The three captured envoys must have been remanded in custody for some time on Samos. They probably returned to Athens after the oligarchic regime had been ousted to continue their lives. Laispodias seems to have left some impact on the political scene in the closing years of the fifth century (see under Laispodias), and as we have seen Melesias was still alive after the restoration of democracy in 403, if this individual was the oligarch.

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716 The scholiast to Aristeides III.446 Dind. calls Thukydides γαμβρός of Cimon.


718 Avery 1959: 90-94.
Onomacles  
*PAA* 748215

Only scarce information is at our disposal about this elusive, but nevertheless important figure that is associated with the two most sinister episodes of the late-fifth century Athenian history, namely the oligarchic regimes of the Four Hundred and the Thirty Tyrants. If the oligarch is not identical with the treasurer of the Other Gods from Perithoidai, Oineis 6, who held office in 421/20, then his election to generalship in 412/11 is probably the first known occurrence of his in Athenian public life, but as it has rightly been observed our knowledge of the lists of generals and other top rank offices of the preceding years is far from complete to justify any claim to certainty. Scholars are more confident, however, when it comes to identifying the general with the member of the Four Hundred and as we shall see there are quite compelling reasons for doing so.

In the spring of 412 the elections for the generalship took place in Athens and yielded astonishing results, insofar as none of the elected generals had hitherto left his footprint in the Athenian politics, or at any rate had played any role of importance in the administration of the city in its recent past. These elections, conducted in the wake of the Sicilian disaster, are regarded as a turning point in the Athenian politics. Not only was the hitherto radical democratic politics of an aggressive pursuit of the war to be questioned and finally denounced, but the search for capable and responsible individuals who would be able to formulate, propose to the assembly, and finally implement an alternative policy also had to be set in motion. In this respect we could, following H. Heftner, call the successful candidates ‘neue Männer.’ It would be inadvisable, however, to regard the 412 elections as the harbinger of the oligarchic coup and the abolition of democracy some fifteen months later, since the circumstances and the background of both events were substantially different.

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719 IG I³ 472, 8.
723 For a portrayal of the elected generals of 412/11 and an analysis of the current political situation, debated issues as well as the meaning of these elections in relation to the oligarchic coup of 411, see Heftner 2001: 16-32.
724 324. M. Ostwald (*From Popular Sovereignty to the Sovereignty of Law: Law, Society, and Politics in Fifth-Century Athens* Berkeley 1986: 324 and no 24) draws attention to the fact that so many individuals came from obscure or unknown families, a fact that implies that the Athenian *demos* tacitly or openly disapproved of their hitherto entrusted elite and decided to cast their lot with fellow citizens who did not rank so high as their predecessors.
different, and the motives of the newly elected generals could not have been easily detectable by their voters at the time of the elections.\footnote{Heftner 2001: 23, 324; Kagan 1987: 52-53.}

At the end of summer 412 the Athenians were ready to take the initiative in the Ionian war.\footnote{Probably end of September or beginning of October, according to G. Busolt G\"{e}r\"{e}chische Geschichte bis zur Schlacht bei Chaeroneia vols 1-3 Gotha 1893-1904: 3.2 1432.} They accordingly sent a large expeditionary task force comprising 48 ships and 3,500 troops, of which 1,000 were Athenian hoplites,\footnote{Thuc. 8.25.1. On the composition of the Athenian led force, see Busolt 1893-1904: 3.2 1432, 1433 and no 1; E. Heitsch Geschichte und Personen bei Thukydides. Eine Interpretation des achten Buches Berlin 2007: 44-45.} to recover Miletos and quell any attempts at rebellion elsewhere in Ionia before the situation got out of hand.\footnote{Kagan 1987: 60-61.} Appointed as commanders of this expedition were Phrynichus, Scironides and Onomacles who attacked the city and gained victory in the ensuing infantry battle. The Athenians raised a trophy and had started to build a siege wall when news arrived that a Peloponnesian fleet was approaching, whereby a decision had to be taken immediately whether to meet the challenge and offer a sea battle risking thus annihilation of the Athenian armed forces in Ionia, or withdraw in safety to Samos and consequently fail to capitalize on their hard-won victory against Miletos,\footnote{Thuc. 8.25.2-26.3.} in which case Athens would admit inability to exert control and protect the allied cities on the Ionian coast against Peloponnesian and Persian interference.\footnote{Thuc. 8.27.6: καὶ οἱ ἀθηναῖοι ἀφ’ ἔσπερας εὐθὺς τοῦτῳ τῷ τρόπῳ ἀπελεί τῇ νίκῃ ἀπὸ τῆς Μιλήτου ἀνέστησαν. ‘thus the Athenians straight away after nightfall left Miletus in this way without completing their victory.’} In the war council that followed the announcement of the approaching of the Peloponnesian fleet late in the evening of the day of the battle at Miletos\footnote{Thuc. 8.27.1-4.} Phrynichus managed to convince his fellow commanders Onomacles and Scironides\footnote{Heitsch 2007: 45 and Andrewes (Gomme, Andrewes and Dover 1945-1981: 5 63) add Strombichides and Thrasycles to this board. S. Hornblower points to the possibility that allied commanders may have taken part in the war council as well (A Commentary on Thucydides vols 1-3 Oxford 1991-2008: 3 826).} that they should immediately lift their wounded soldiers, leaving behind the booty, and set sail to Samos whence they could conduct raids and harass the enemy.\footnote{Thuc. 8.25.2-26.3.} It is important to note here that Phrynichus had no other means, e.g., superior authority, with which to compel the other generals to give their consent and withdraw the task force from Miletos than his persuasiveness.\footnote{K. Dover “∆ΕΚΑΤΟΣ ΑΥΤΟΣ” JHS 80 1960: 73-77.} The implication is that a vote must have followed after the generals had expressed their views as to the

\footnote{K. Dover “∆ΕΚΑΤΟΣ ΑΥΤΟΣ” JHS 80 1960: 73-77.}
course of action to be taken in which Phrynichus’ view finally carried the day.\textsuperscript{735} Thucydides does not give us any information as to the attitude of the other generals in the war council, but the fact that Onomacles is not vilified by Peisander when the latter spoke in the Athenian assembly does not necessarily mean that Onomacles had raised any objections, was recalcitrant or sceptical about Phrynichus’ plan. It may be the case that Onomacles had already joined the conspirators and Peisander wanted to protect him from the people’s wrath. Andrewes made the acute observation that in his speech Phrynichus repeatedly used the word \textit{αἰσχρόν} and its cognates because he wanted to refute arguments from \textit{αισχύνη} (disgrace) which his opponents presumably used in their speeches.\textsuperscript{736} Hornblower 1991-2008: 3 827 observes that the most likely exponents of this argument should have been the recently defeated Argives, but it is not unlikely that some or all of the other Athenian generals, perhaps Onomacles as well, made use of this argument in their speeches.\textsuperscript{737} Concern for personal and civic honour expressed by Phrynichus’ younger and less experienced colleagues may have been genuine, but there might have been other motives operating here as well. Onomacles and Scironides were new comers in the board of generals and were bound to be intimidated by the sheer idea of their being held accountable at the end of their term. Abandonment of Miletus in the hands of the enemy, especially after a hard-won victory, surely would not have sounded good in the \textit{demos}’ ears and the prospect of prosecution and conviction must have been quite appalling to them. To this it should be added the huge commitment in finance, men and war material Athens had made in order to keep Ionia within the empire, an undertaking which must have drained the one-thousand talent reserve. It was basically on these grounds, namely the abandonment of Ionia, Iasus and the betrayal of Amorges, that Peisander persuaded the Athenians a few months later to depose Phrynichus and Scironides from their office, although of course in reality Peisander’s goal was to appease Alcibiades by removing Phrynichus from the scene.\textsuperscript{738}

Next we hear of Onomacles is a few months after the Miletus debacle. In the winter of 412 reinforcements of thirty-five ships were sent to Samos from Athens, Charminus, Strombichides and Euctemon being appointed generals. After they had gathered all ships together they decided to split the force in two and conduct naval operations against Miletus, while at the same time send the rest of the ships with infantry to Chios. Having cast lots, Strombichides, Onomacles and Euctemon were placed in charge of the Chios task force commanding thirty ships and part of the one thousand Athenian hoplites that fought at Miletos earlier in the autumn on board transport ships.\textsuperscript{739}

\textsuperscript{735} Thuc. 8.54.3 may imply that Scironides was easily persuaded by Phrynichus and even supported withdrawal right from the start.

\textsuperscript{736} Gomme, Andrewes and Dover 1945-1981: 5 64.

\textsuperscript{737} See the discussion in D. Chairsn Aidos: The Psychology and Ethics of Honour and Shame in Ancient Greek Literature Oxford 1999: 165 and no 60.

\textsuperscript{738} Thuc. 8.54.3.

\textsuperscript{739} Thuc. 8.30.1-2.
We do not know how long Onomacles stayed at Chios or in Ionia in general. It has been suggested that he was removed from office by the democratic assembly of the armed forces on Samos. The events pertaining to the democratic counter-revolution on Samos are described by Thucydides at 8.73-77. The historian adds an important piece of information, namely that the developments on Samos took place when the Four Hundred were about to assume power (8.73.1). Such a view implies, of course, that Onomacles cannot have been a member of the Four Hundred, and that the oligarchs entrusted a non-member with a very important embassy to Sparta (see below). This is not impossible, but one need further assume that Onomacles somehow escaped the vigilant democrats’ attention on Samos and managed to make his way to Athens.

Next we hear of Onomacles is in the summer of 411 when as a member of the Four Hundred he took part in the final embassy to Sparta, along with Antiphon, Phrynichus, Archeptolemus, and eight other individuals unknown to us. Has suggested that he might have given up his post and returned to Athens early enough to become a member of the council of the Four Hundred. This is probable, and bearing in mind his later conduct under the two oligarchies he might have joined the hetaireiai which paved the way for the establishment of the new order in Athens and were responsible for the agitation and terror campaign described so vividly by Thucydides. The participation in the embassy to Sparta was the cause for him being accused of treason and being brought to court soon after the collapse of the regime. We possess the decree ordering the trial of Antiphon, Archeptolemus and Onomacles as well as the verdict of the court. The fact that Onomacles’ name is absent from the verdict has led the overwhelming majority of scholars to assume that the uncompromised oligarch somehow managed to escape before the penalty could be inflicted on him. We must, therefore, neglect the tradition found in Thucydides’

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740 Gilbert 1877: 297; Busolt 1893-1904: 3.2 1493 no 1; cf. Heftner 2001: 222 and no 40.
741 The oligarchic coup in Athens was not known on Samos when the democrats sent Chaereas on board Paralos to Athens (Thuc. 8.74.1). Bearing in mind the time necessary for the news to cross the Aegean Sea, the two events were separated by only a few days.
742 Thucydides says the democrats made everybody, even those suspect of oligarchic sympathies, take an oath that they would be loyal to democracy (8.75.2). It is hard to see, then, how a deposed general who must have shown his credentials as an oligarchic conspirator in the previous months could have been allowed to leave Samos.
743 Thuc. 8.90.2.
744 8.65.2-3, 66. F. Sartori assumes that Onomacles was a member of the hetaireiai (Le eirie nella vita politica Ateniese del 6 e 5 secolo a. C. Rome 1957: 119-121).
745 Trial: [Plut.] Life of Antiphon 833E3-F12; verdict: ibid 834A-B. On the events connected with the embassy and the content of the negotiations with the Spartans as well as the political atmosphere, the conditions of the trial, the motives of the prosecutors and the implications of the choice of the particular procedure, i.e., eisangelia before the Council see under ‘Archeptolemus,’ pages 54-57.
746 J. Beloch Die attische Politik seit Perikles 1884: 75; G. Gilbert Beiträge zur innern Geschichte Athens im Zeitalter des peloponnesischen Krieges 1877: 333; Busolt 1893-1904:
Life which affirms that both Archeptolemus and Onomacles, along with Antiphon, were executed, their houses pulled down, while the latter’s family disfranchised.\textsuperscript{747}

In the intervening period between the two oligarchies we lose trace of him, but Onomacles got involved in the second oligarchy of the Thirty. Xenophon’s interpolator records him in the nineteenth place in the famous catalogue of the Thirty Tyrants,\textsuperscript{748} and according to R. Loeper’s theory he should belong to the tribe Kekropis \textsuperscript{7}. But this theory in its full version, namely that the Thirty Tyrants were listed in tribal order, three per tribe, and in trittyal order within each tribe, the sequence being City, Inland, Coast, was first shaken by M. Walbank who in a hitherto unpublished inventory of the confiscated property of the Thirty, the Eleven, the Ten, and the Piraeus Ten, restored [Eu]mathes of Phale[ro]n in fragment a, line 8, thus demolishing Loeper’s theory in its full form, since Eumathes comes indeed from Aiantis tribe but his trittys is not coastal, as in Loeper’s theory, but city.\textsuperscript{749} D. Whitehead has further undermined Loeper’s theory in its simplified form, namely that the tyrants are listed in tribal order, three per tribe. He maintains that the Thirty were chosen irrespective of tribe and then listed by Xenophon, or his interpolator, in tribal order.\textsuperscript{750} If this theory is correct, there is no reason to rule out the possibility

\textsuperscript{3} 2 1512; G. Reineke “Onomakles” \textit{RE} 18.1 1939: 491; W. McCoy \textit{Theramenes, Thrasybulus and the Athenian Moderates} Diss. Yale University 1970: 126 no 50; G. Pesely \textit{Theramenes and Athenian Politics: A Study in the Manipulation of History} PhD Diss.1983: 152; B. Bleckmann \textit{Athens Weg in die Niederlage: Die letzten Jahre des peloponnesischen Kriegs} 1998: 385; M. Ostwald \textit{From Popular Sovereignty to the Sovereignty of Law: Law, Society, and Politics in Fifth-Century Athens} 1986: 527; Kagan 1987: 209; Heftner “Die τρία κακά des Theramenes: Überlegungen zu Polyzeloς fr. 13 und Aristophanes fr. 563 Kassel-Austin” \textit{ZPE} 128 1999: 42 and no 54; S. Forsdyke \textit{Exile, Ostracism, and Democracy} Princeton 2005: 192 does not decide. C. Bearzot (\textit{Lista e la tradizione su Teramene: Commento storico alle orazioni 12 e 13 del corpus lysiacum} Milan 1997: 186) on the contrary maintains that Onomacles was acquitted. H. Avery (\textit{Prosopographical Studies in the Oligarchy of the Four Hundred} PhD Diss. Princeton University 1959: 228 and no 4) after considering the possibility that Onomacles stood trial but was acquitted, opts for the escape scenario; Heitsch 2007: 114 suggests that Onomacles along with the other two men was arrested and brought to court for the trial, but this assumption does not explain how Onomacles managed to escape. It is better to assume that he was summoned by the Boule for the preliminary hearing and when the Boule sent the case to the court, accepting the substance of the accusation, he fled, or that it so happened that he was absent from the meeting of the Boule in which the action against him was brought.

\textsuperscript{747} \textit{Life of Thucydides} 2: Καὶ σὺν αὐτῷ διεφθάρησαν Αρχεπτόλεμος καὶ Ὀνομακλῆς, ὅν καὶ κατεσκάφησαν καὶ αἱ οἰκίαι, καὶ τὸ γένος τὸ μὲν διεφθάρη, τὸ δὲ ἐτιμον ἐγένετο, ἀν with him (Antiphon) were destroyed Archeptolemus and Onomacles, whose houses were pulled down, and the family of the former was destroyed, whereas that of the latter was deprived of civic rights.’

\textsuperscript{748} \textit{Hell.} 2.3.2

\textsuperscript{749} “The Confiscation and Sale by the Poletai in 402/01 B.C. of the property of the Thirty Tyrants” \textit{Hesperia} 51.1 1982: 75.

\textsuperscript{750} “The Tribes of the Thirty Tyrants”, \textit{JHS} 100: 211-212.
that Onomacles, treasurer of the Other Gods from Perithoidai, is identical with the oligarch, since his tribe, Oineis 6, comes before Kekropis.\textsuperscript{751}

Onomacles must have returned to Athens from the exile in the summer of 404 after a treaty with Sparta had been concluded.\textsuperscript{754} The political struggle had been raging in Athens since Aigospotamoi. The Athenaiou Politeia describes the current political situation in the following terms:

τῆς εἰρήνης γενομένης αὐτῶς ἐφ᾿ ὅ τε πολιτεύονται τὴν πάτριον πολιτείαν, οἱ μὲν δημοτικοὶ διασώζειν ἔπειρόντο τὸν δήμον, τῶν δὲ γνωρίμοι οἱ μὲν ἐν ταῖς ἐταιρείαις ὀντες, καὶ τῶν φυγάδων οἱ μετὰ τὴν εἰρήνην κατελθόντες ὀλιγαρχίας ἐπεθύμουν, οἱ δ᾿ ἐν ἐταιρείᾳ μὲν οὐδεμιὰ συγκαθεστώτες, τὰ δὲ ὑπὸ ὁμοίως ὑπελείασθαι τῶν πολιτῶν, τὴν πάτριον πολιτείαν ἐξήτουν· (34.3)

After peace had been concluded for them (the Athenians) according to whose terms they were to put in use the ancestral constitution, the supporters of democracy strove to preserve the democratic constitution, whereas the notables, those of whom who belonged to the hetaireiai, and the refugees who returned after peace had been concluded were desirous of oligarchy, and those who did not belong to a hetaireia but in other respects were thought to be inferior to none of the citizens sought the ancestral constitution.

Those oligarchs who belonged to hetaireiai and the exiles, we learn, began to agitate and set up a board of five epheboi whose task was to gather the citizens, elect tribal governors and in short control the political life in the city.\textsuperscript{753} Although his involvement in these developments is a likely inference, we do not know Onomacles’ exact role in those events which led to the establishment of the Thirty Tyrants in Athens. Neither do we have any information about his conduct during the oligarchic regime, nor after its fall.

J. Kirchner thought that a lost speech of Lysias, περὶ τῆς Ὀνομακλέους Θυγατρός, was written in connection with the daughter of Onomacles the oligarch.\textsuperscript{754} Avery proposed that there is a connection indeed and placed the speech into the context of

\textsuperscript{751} See the modified sequence in P. Krentz The Thirty at Athens Ithaca 1982: 54.

\textsuperscript{752} Xen. Hell. 2.2.20; Plut. Lys. 14.4; And. 3.11; AP 34.3; S. Forsdyke Exile, Ostracism, and Democracy: The Politics of Expulsion in Ancient Greece Princeton 2005: 195. It must be considered as virtually certain that the decree of Patrocleides, passed between the disaster at Aigospotamoi and the surrender of Athens to Sparta, precluded the coming back of Onomacles since ὁπόσῳ ἐν στήλαις γέγραται τῶν μὴ ἐνθάδε μεινάντων in And. 1.78 should refer to the names of those leading members of the Four Hundred who fled to Deceleia after the regime collapsed (Thuc. 8.98.1; cf. D. MacDowell Andokides On the Mysteries Oxford 1962: 116-117.

\textsuperscript{753} Lys. 12.43-4.

\textsuperscript{754} Prosopographia Attica vols 1-2 Berlin 1901-1903 PA 11476, 11477.
litigation that arose after the confiscation of the property of the Thirty.\footnote{Avery 1959: 230; Avery dismisses H. Sauppe’s conjecture that the trial was part of the litigation arising from the confiscation of the property of the Four Hundred in 411 (J. Baiter and H. Sauppe \textit{Oratores Attici vol. 2} Turici 1850: 201).} Only the title of this speech is preserved by Harpocration under the entries \textit{Πεντακοσιομέδιµνον} and \textit{Ὑβάδαι}, and it is tempting to relate the first of them with either the oligarch or Onomacles, the treasurer of the Other Gods from Perithoidai, if the two are not identical. But P. Phraser and E. Matthews in \textit{LGPN} vol. 2, and J. Traill in \textit{PAA} register the oligarch, the treasurer and the litigant under separate entries, on good grounds it seems, since neither the relative rarity of the name, nor the fact that it is borne by near contemporaries is a compelling reason to incline towards identifying any of those individuals with one another.\footnote{For the inherent dangers in identifying persons who happen to be contemporaries and bear the same name in Athens see the discussion in W. Thomson “Tot Atheniensibus idem Nomen Erat” in D. Braden and M. McGregor (ed.) \textit{ΦΟΡΟΣ: Tribute to Benjamin Dean Meritt} New York 1974: 144-149.}

**Conclusion**

Onomacles seems to have enjoyed the trust of the democracy prior to 411, for he managed to get hold of the most prestigious office in Athens admittedly in its most perilous times. His participation in the last embassy to Sparta as well as in the second oligarchy reveals his strong oligarchic convictions. His generalship in 412/11 points to a high social status, but lamentably, we know almost nothing about his connections with other fellow-citizens. We know nothing about his role in the oligarchy of the Thirty, or about his fate afterwards.
Phrynichus Stratonidou Deiradiotes

The early days

We get the information about Phrynichus’ deme from Plutarch Alcibiades 25.5. The deme Deiradiotai was a tiny coastal deme in south-east Attica, probably connected with the nearby deme Potamos Deiradiotes, and belonged to the tribe Leontis. The scanty information we possess about the oligarch’s early days derives from a court speech delivered in 410. This is a speech written in defence of Polystratus, a former member of the Four Hundred, a spurious speech delivered to us in the Lysianic corpus under the title Ὑπὲρ Πολυστράτου (for Polystratus). Polystratus was brought to court for the first time in the early days of the regime of the Five Thousand (22), and again either before or shortly after the restoration of the radical democracy. The defendant, or rather his representative, who in this case was his second son, is at pains to fend his father off against the accusation that Phrynichus had been his relative. He claims that not only does this libel have no substance at all, but that they were not even friends, since there was a world of difference between their upbringing, a situation scarcely conducive to such friendship. Then he goes on to assert the jury:

ο μὲν γὰρ ἐν ἀγρῷ πένης ὄν ἐποίημεν, ὦ δὲ πατήρ ἐν τῷ ἀστεὶ ἐπαιδεύετο. καὶ ἐπειδὴ ἀνήρ ἐγένετο, ὦ μὲν ἐγεώργη, ὦ δὲ ἐλθὼν εἰς τὸ ἀστύ εὐσκοφάντει, ὥστε μηδὲν ὠμολογεῖν τῷ τρόπῳ τῶν ἀλλήλων. καὶ ὦτ' ἐξετινε τῷ δημοσίῳ, οὐκ εἰσήνεγκεν αὐτῷ τὸ ἄργυρον· καίτοι ἐν τοῖς τοιούτοις μᾶλλον δηλοῦσιν οἴ ἄν φίλοι ὀσίοι. (11-12).

757 No PAA number available since volumes 17-20 have not been published yet.
760 11: καὶ συγγενῆ Φρύνιχον αὐτῷ εἶναι ἔφησαν. This accusation was apparently levelled against Polystratus already in the first trial, presumably not much later than Phrynichus’ process.
For he (Phrynichus) was a poor one who was tending flocks, whereas the father was receiving proper education in the city. And when he came of age, the one became husbandman, whereas the other came to the city and became a vexatious litigant. Therefore, the tempers of the two men had nothing in common. Actually, when Phrynichus had to pay a fine to the public treasury, (my father) did not contribute. And yet, it is on these occasions that friends prove themselves.

As far as the suspicion of blood ties is concerned, we may note that the defendant feels confident he can refute this claim made by his accusers. He challenges any witness who so wishes to step up on the podium and verify the relationship, forfeiting his own allocated time as a litigant in the trial, a most convincing move indeed. In view of the fact that the allegation of kinship was leveled against Polystratus in the first trial, and probably not in the second, and the fact that Polystratus here vehemently and confidently denies the relationship, we may conclude that the accusation had probably no substance, and that the two fellow-demesmen were not connected with blood ties. However, it would have been more difficult for Polystratus to disprove the claim that the two men had never social contacts or were not friends. Since the two of them were peers and their deme was so small, it would be unlikely that they never came to contact in the course of seven decades since their birth.

The next cluster of information we get in paragraph 11, namely that Phrynichus in his youth had been of low birth, lacked education and was a shepherd is couched in literary clichés and topos and is difficult to control. The claim that one’s opponent

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761 Apostolakis 2003: 159 with references to other instances where the litigant accords his opponent part of his own time to speak.
762 Section 10 of the speech gives Polystratus’ age at the time of the trial as seventy. Phrynichus, then, cannot have been much younger. B. Bleckmann, quoting G. Herman, Ritualized Friendship and the Greek City Cambridge 1987: 16-29, points out that ritualized friendship often led to fictitious kin relationships, thus accounting for the accusation. Bleckmann concludes that the accusers’ objective was to expose Polystratus as a member of Phrynichus’ hetaireia (Athens Weg in die Niederlage: Die letzten Jahre des peloponnesischen Krieg Leipzig 1998: 384 no 89).
763 E.g., the contrast between the tranquil life in the countryside and the hustle and bustle of the city to which the sycophant is associated as highlighted in Aristophanes’ Birds 109-111, where Peisetairos and Euelpides introduce themselves as farmers and judge foes. Trugaios in Peace 190-191 introduces himself as Τρυγαῖος Ἀθήναιος, ἀμπελουργός δεξιός, οὗ συκοφάντης οὐδ’ ἔραστης πραγμάτων (I am Trygaeus of the Athmonian deme, a good vine-dresser, little addicted to quibbling and not at all an informer); cf. Eur. Orestes 918-920 ἄνδρειος δ’ ἄνήρ, ὀλιγάκις άστων κάγορας χραίνων κύκλον, ἀυτουργός, ούτε καὶ μόνοι σοφοίνων γῆς (but the man had courage./ He rarely came into the city and the market place./ He was a farmer, they’re the only ones who keep our country going). For bibliography on sycophancy, see G. Weber Pseudo-Xenophon Die Verfassung der Athener Darmstadt 2010: 94; R. Osborne has doubted that a συκοφάντης adopted a particular kind of prosecution as a profession and that the word was a relatively mild term of abuse (“Vexatious Litigation in Classical Athens: Sycophancy and the Sycophant” in P. Cartledge, P. Millett and S. Todd
was uneducated, boorish and unrefined was often employed in Athenian courts. In addition to the vilification of the rival litigant, a *rhetor* would take pride in his own education, social status and up-bringing, an elitist argument which paradoxically rang well in the jury’s ears.\textsuperscript{764} This elitist ethos could be tolerated by the jury as long as the speaker was able to provide ample evidence that his client was faithful to the democratic institutions, and had done the community many a great service. Hence Polystratus’ son strives to demonstrate the family’s devotion to the city by enumerating their services.\textsuperscript{765} It is, however, to be noted that the claim that Phrynichus was uneducated somewhat contradicts the claim made in the very next line, namely that Phrynichus moved to the city when he reached adulthood to become a vexatious litigant, for a συκοφάντης to become accomplished had to be well-educated and undergo vigorous training in rhetoric, a very expensive undertaking which only the rich could afford.\textsuperscript{766} Alternatively, the speaker may be hinting at the lack on Phrynichus’ part of aristocratic παιδεία, training in rhetoric being considered by the traditional Athenian aristocratic elite as a debased form of education suitable for demagogues and sycophants. Some scholars have accepted Phrynichus designation as a sycophant and have postulated a career for him in the law courts.\textsuperscript{767} But such a long career would have left its traces somehow in the contemporary comic writers who were particularly apt to repeatedly ridicule other public figures.\textsuperscript{768} Although it is always possible that none of the abusive references to Phrynichus has survived, it is perhaps more preferable to assume that the oligarch

\begin{itemize}
  \item \textsuperscript{764} See the discussion in J. Ober \textit{Mass and Elite in Democratic Athens} Princeton 1989: 183; Apostolakis 2003: 161.
  \item \textsuperscript{765} In paragraphs 23-29, the so-called πίστεις ἐκ τοῦ βίου (evidence from personal conduct).
  \item D. Allen (\textit{The World of Prometheus: The Politics of Punishing in Democratic Athens} Princeton 2000: 160) points out that the word sycophant derives from the word οὐκή, οὐκον (fig tree, fig) and has sexual connotations because those words denote the masculine and feminine genitals. T. Lenschau (\textit{“Phrynichos (3)" RE} 20.1 1941: 907) argued that in the court jargon sycophant simply meant member of a party, and assigned Phrynichus to the oligarchic party.
  \item E.g., Chairephon (Ar. Fr. 552 K-A); Euthlos (Ar. \textit{Ach.} 704f; \textit{Wasps} 592; fr. 424 K-A; Kratinus fr. 82 K-A; Platon fr. 109 K-A). An interesting case which resembles that of Phrynichus as portrayed by Polystratus is Meidias. The scholiast to Aristophanes \textit{Birds} 1297, lines 19-20, depicts him, in addition to gambler, sycophant and embezzler, as an impudent rogue and a poor man boasting about imaginary wealth: κόβαλός τε ἐλέγετο ἐίναι καὶ πτωχαλαζων. Notice that both Phrynichus and Meidias are claimed to be poor and sycophants.
\end{itemize}
evaded the comic poets’ mockery because his lifestyle and personality did not invite any scornful comments, or because of his moderate politics. Little though the light on his personality thrown by Thucydides is, it reveals a man who commanded and got respect from his fellow-citizens. Particularly helpful is in this respect M. Christ’s incisive analysis of the elite, forensic and comic discourses on the sycophancy phenomenon. Christ maintains that the elite representation of the sycophant is class-centered. Under the elitist’s eyes, the sycophant is a poor, greedy, unscrupulous creature who preys on the rich, often depicted as idle and a-political, an analysis that is in accord with the image of Polystratus as a rich landowner, and that of Phrynichus as a needy, voracious and base parasite.769

Another aspect of the problem, which must not be overlooked, is the social one. Whereas Polystratus is a typical specimen of the Athenian landed aristocracy, Phrynichus’ social status is at best obscure. Polystratus, no doubt, here adopts an elitist point of view, and exploits the elitist discourse in underscoring his advanced education, aristocratic lifestyle (and bloodline?) and above all wealth. Diametrically opposite stands humble Phrynichus, whom Polystratus does not fail to designate as a thetes, a social status and lifestyle particularly deplorable even in egalitarian Athens.770 We should therefore question the reliability of this piece of information and attribute it to Polystratus’ effort to discredit Phrynichus on the one hand and juxtapose himself with the oligarch so that the incompatibility of their characters could be amply shown: he was an ἄρδαγμον, an idle, private man, resembling Xenophon’s Ischomachus in the Oeconomicus, whereas Phrynichus an obnoxious, busybody litigant.771

As regards Phrynichus’ labeling as πένης, ‘poor’, we should keep in mind that this term was attributed to all those below the top leisure class, who possessed sufficient wealth so as not to have to work themselves. It was a social term and in Athens described the majority of its citizens.772 There are, however, indications pointing to us not to take this statement at face value. Allen has adduced a parallel passage from Cratinus’ Pytine (K-A 214), where Lycon, Autolycus’ father and presumed accuser of Socrates, is also called πένης although he came from an aristocratic family.773 It

771 It is not a coincidence that Ischomachus, the Athenian kaloskagathos par excellence, complained to Socrates of having himself problems with the sycophants who had targeted his wealth (Xen. Oec. 11.21-25).
773 Allen 2000: 160. I. Storey observes: ‘Kratinos’ description of him (Lykon) as penes is odd in view of his likely noble status and his son’s association with Kallias. Either the scholiast has misunderstood the joke (an ever-present possibility), or Lykon was made fun of in the
emerges, therefore, that it is hard to reconcile Polystratus’ depiction of Phrynichus as uneducated, poor and manual worker with the latter’s not at all negligible career which culminated in the acquisition of the generalship.

Another piece of information we can retrieve from paragraph 12 of the speech is that at some point in his career Phrynichus became a public debtor and had to pay a fine to the treasury. The language is vague and the speaker fails to give concrete details as to the occasion and time in which this debt occurred, thus giving ground to much scholarly speculation. P. Dobree argued that in this instance Polystratus was the debtor and Phrynichus the one who refused to help financially. This is unlikely. As it has been observed, it would have been detrimental to Polystratus’ cause to mention a previous conviction of his, especially on his own accord. In addition, Phrynichus’ financial help would undermine the image of him being poor and needy, previously drawn by Polystratus. Thalheim believed the fine arose from Phrynichus’ apocheirion, resulting from Iasus being captured by the enemy due to Phrynichus’ failure to intervene and support Amorges. Although this is not impossible, providing that there took place a trial at that particular moment, it is strange that Polystratus fails to give us details and concrete information, such as the sum of money or witnesses, to corroborate Phrynichus’ request. Apostolakis has made an attempt to connect the fine with Phrynichus’ presumed sycophantic activity. He maintains that the fine occurred when Phrynichus failed to secure the one fifth of the votes necessary for a prosecutor in a graphe. This, in theory, is not impossible. However, sycophantic activity was not the only source of incurring debts in Athens. The language ὅτ’ ἔξετινε τῷ δηµοσίῳ is characteristically vague, perhaps too vague for an accuser who had real evidence for an incident so clearly embarrassing for his opponent. From the passage, at any rate, it does not arise that Phrynichus did not pay the fine, if we assume that the accusation had a basis, for otherwise he would have lost his civil rights and become an atimos, a point which Polystratus could have hardly failed to underscore had this event really occurred. We should always remember, in addition, that Phrynichus was by then conveniently dead and could not refute or confirm any statement made against him. Polystratus

same manner as Amyntias, i.e., as a wealthy man fallen on hard times but still maintaining appearances.’ (“The Symposium at ‘Wasps’ 1299ff.” Phoenix 39.4 1985: 322).

774 P. Dobree Adversaria vol. 1 Berlin 1874: 137.
775 Apostolakis 2003: 164.
776 Quoted in Apostolakis 2003: 164. H. Avery (Prosopographical Studies in the Oligarchy of the Four Hundred 1959: 249) is of the same opinion.
778 Polyaenus, in Lysias For the Soldier 9.6, received a fine from the generals for slandering them (epibole). Another possibility was the failure on the part of a successful bidder at a public auction to meet the contract. Such was the case of a given Mnesidamas, who had his property confiscated probably after having bid too high for a mine and then failed to pay the treasury the rent (IG II² 1582, 356-364, dated to 441-439 B.C.).
could, especially for events placed in the distant past, impute any accusation to Phrynichus with impunity.

Phrynichus is mentioned, along with Peisander, in a speech delivered probably in 400 B.C. at the scrutiny of a suspected oligarch.\textsuperscript{780} The speaker is striving to demonstrate how many times the leaders of democracy and oligarchy changed sides. According to him, Peisander and Phrynichus were well known demagogues who did their utmost to establish the first oligarchy because of their previous misdeeds and of fear of punishment. But whereas we know from other sources that the two men held public offices and left their imprint on Athenian politics, we hear nothing of wrongdoing.\textsuperscript{781} The defender, a rather low profile and law-abiding member of the elite, and of moderate oligarchic convictions, uses the two men as examples to illustrate his generalization, namely that one’s political stance is determined not by ideological credos but by personal interest and aggrandizement (25.8,10). At the same time he hints at his own intellectual superiority and the \textit{plethos’} fickleness and frivolity in choosing their leaders.

Perhaps, a clue as to Phrynichus’ lack of high birth is provided in \textit{AP} 32.2, where its author enumerates the leaders of the oligarchic revolution. The text reads

\begin{quote}

\begin{greekquote}

ἡ μὲν ὀλιγαρχία τούτον κατέστη τὸν τρόπον, ἐπὶ Καλλίου μὲν ἄρχοντος, ἔτεσιν δ` ὀστερὸν τῆς τῶν τυράννων ἐκβολῆς μάλιστα ἐκατόν, αἰτίων μάλιστα γενομένων Πεισάνδρου καὶ Αντιφόντος καὶ Θηραµένους, ἀνδρῶν καὶ γεγενημένων εὖ καὶ συνέσει καὶ γνώμη δοκοῦντων διαφέρειν.
\end{greekquote}

The oligarchy was established in this fashion, under the archonship of Callias, more than a hundred years after the expulsion of the tyrants. Most responsible for this were Peisander, Antiphon and Theramenes, men of noble birth as well as thought to be deferring in sagacity and judgement.

\textsuperscript{780} Lysias 25 \textit{Δήµου καταλύσεως ἀπολογία} (\textit{Defense against a Charge of Subverting the Democracy}) was written for a client who had remained in the City during the oligarchy of the Thirty Tyrants. For the date of the speech, its peculiar style and structure and historicity, see T. Murphy “Lysias 25 and the Intractable Democratic Abuses” \textit{AJP} 113.4 1992: 543-558.

\textsuperscript{781} The only step of Phrynichus’ career we know of, his generalship, occurs one year before the coup of 411. His deposition is rather the outcome of his estrangement from the Alcibiades project than his poor performance during his office (see below). As regards Peisander, T. Murphy 1992: 553 rightly stresses how the Athenians entrusted him to carry out the negotiations with Alcibiades and Teisaphernes, a task which would have been unlikely to undertake if he were under suspicion. On Peisander, fundamental remains A. Woodhead’s “Peisander” \textit{AJP} 75.2 1954: 131-146.
Peisander, Antiphon and Theramenes are mentioned, but Phrynichus’ name is conspicuously missing from the list. Since this passage probably draws from Thucydides 8.68, Phrynichus’ absence has caused much discussion. U. von Wilamowitz thought the omission is due to Phrynichus’ sinister role in bringing about the downfall of the regime, at least as reported in Arist. *Politics* 1305b24.\(^{782}\) A. Andrewes toys with the idea that Phrynichus’ humble origin, as presented in Lysias 20.12, was the reason for the omission, only to reject it: ‘But it is more probable that Aristotle or his source meant only to represent the revolutionary leaders as respectable and responsible men.’\(^{783}\) Perhaps the omission may have been accidental, a mere error on the part of the copyist,\(^{784}\) but the double καί may be hinting indeed at Phrynichus’ lack of this particular quality, i.e., pedigree, and may be perceived as a conscious correction of Thucydides on the part of the author of *AP*. Σύνεσις and γνώμη are after all Thucydidean virtues, and I believe the echoing here is not accidental. On this view, Phrynichus was omitted from the list because he did not fulfill both criteria for entry into the oligarchic pantheon: pedigree and intelligence.\(^{783}\)

We may, then, recapitalize that the information found in [Lysias] 20.11-12 on Phrynichus in his early days is of dubious value. The political context into which the trial was conducted, the tumultuous early days of the restored and revengeful towards the oligarchs democracy, and the very persons who were its agents (Polystratus, an ex-Four Hundred, as the defendant, and certain demagogoi as the accusers)\(^{786}\) blur further and make difficult to ascertain the reliability of the information about such a controversial figure at the time as Phrynichus. Polystratus organizes the material relevant to Phrynichus in a dipole with two positively and negatively charged ends. On the positive side, which represents his perception of himself, we find his fine education, and noble occupation: he is a γεωργός ἄγαθός and ἀπράγμων. On the negative side he places Phrynichus’ attributes which, we should note, fit exactly the upper class stereotypes of men who were not fortunate enough to be of noble birth: The dead oligarch is depicted as πένης and συκοφάντης. Neither does the testimony of Lysias 25 lack slant. It is too general and rather vague, and comes from a time when Phrynichus’ memory had been irrevocably tainted. In addition Lysias’ client presents Phrynichus from the point of view of a conservative aristocrat of high birth who treats contemptuously men of ‘low’ birth such as Phrynichus and perhaps Peisander. I would sum up that all indications lead to the conclusion that the oligarch was not fortunate to have been born into an old

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\(^{782}\) *Aristoteles und Athen* vols 1-2 Berlin 1893: 1 100 no 4.  
\(^{783}\) Gomme, Andrewes and Dover 1945-1981: 5 327-328.  
\(^{785}\) Similarly, M. Chambers has proposed that the author of *AP*, through the omission of Phrynichus’ name, consciously chose to set apart the humble Phrynichus from the notables Peisander, Antiphon and Theramenes (*Athenaiion Politeia* Leipzig 1986: 294).  
\(^{786}\) Or, possibly, men from Theramenes and Critias’ circle, as professor Heftner has pointed out to me in a private conversation.
aristocratic house, and he had to fight all the way through to win recognition, respect, wealth and offices.

**Wasps 1299f**

A passage in Aristophanes’ *Wasps*, produced in 422 B.C., has generated much discussion among scholars with regard to identifying a group of Athenians, among whom a Phrynichus. Bdelykleon is striving to instruct his boorish father how to behave in a symposium, a social gathering of the Athenian high society. Two groups of symposium partakers are mentioned. The first one is imaginary, and in it men of Cleon’s circle are included (1220-1221). The second symposium, however, is an actual one which Philokleon attends. In this gathering the following prominent Athenians are present. Xanthias, the slave, is speaking:

οὐ γὰρ ὁ γέρων ἀτηρότατον ἃρ’ ἦν κακόν/καὶ τῶν ξυνόντων πολὺ παροινικώτατος;  
καίτοι παρῆν Ἡππυλλός, Ἀντιφόν, Λύκων,/ Λυσίστρατος, Θούφραστος, οἱ περὶ Φρύνιχον (1299-1302).

Was the old man not an outrageous nuisance and of those present the most drunken?  
Though there were there Hippyllus, Antiphon, Lycon, Lysistratus, Thouphrastus, Phrynichus’ set.

Various interpretations have been put forward as to the overall social character of the group and the identification possibilities of each of its members. According to some, the gathering has political and in particular oligarchic overtones since it is the counterpart of the first democratic gathering at 1219. Others have seen no political connection at all; the group consists of some poor drunkards, or theatre people. Alternatively, the group has a political character, but what is made fun of here is the social status and snobbery of those individuals.787

The identification problem is compounded by the fact that there were numerous individuals in late fifth century Athens bearing the names Antiphon, Lycon, Lysistratus and Phrynichus. Earlier scholars have identified Antiphon with the oligarch on various grounds.788 The most comprehensive, detailed and well-

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787 See the literature review in I. Storey “The Symposium at ‘Wasps’ 1299ff.” *Phoenix* 39.4 1985: 317-318 and nos 1, 2. For earlier bibliography, see also Avery 1959: 242 no 4.  
788 H. Müller-Strübing took Antiphon to be the leader of the oligarchic party whose members included the other men mentioned in the passage (*Aristophanes und die historische Kritik: polemische Studien zur Geschichte von Athen im fünften Jahrhundert v. Chr* Leipzig 1873: 708). E. Meier (*Geschichte des Altertums vols 1-4* Stuttgart 1884-1901: 4.1 525) confidently identifies Antiphon with the orator and oligarch from Rahmous. Lenschau 1941: 907 considered the possibility that the Antiphon mentioned here was the son of Lysonides, executed by the Thirty. D. MacDowell conceded that Antiphon was a common name in Athens, but ‘since Aristophanes seems to assume that his audience will know which
documented prosopographical study of this Aristophanic passage has been conducted by Ian Storey. Storey has assembled and discussed the evidence concerning the six individuals appearing in the passage and his conclusions are worth summarizing here.

Antiphon is not the orator and oligarch from Rhamnous, but probably the son of Lysonides, a man of the leitouritical class, mocked in other contemporary comedies (i.e., Kratinus' Pytine fr. 212 K-A). Lykon was the father of Autolycus. He seems to have been a butt for the comic poets because of his family life. He is not to be identified with the accuser of Socrates, a demagogue active in the 410s and later in Athens. Lysistratus from the deme Cholargus was the target of comic poets in the 420s. He used to make jokes, emulated the Spartan way of life and was a member of the upper class. As far as Phrynichus is concerned, Storey takes the phrase οἱ περὶ Φρύνιχον not to refer to the five individuals already mentioned, but to an unspecified new group attached to Phrynichus as his followers. He identifies three individuals as likely candidates: i) the comic poet, son of Eunomides, ii) the oligarch and iii) a Phrynichus associated with the family of Andocides, an anepsios of either Andocides or Kallias son of Telokles. Of the three possible identifications, Storey favours the third. In his view, the common denominator of the six individuals in this group is not their political outlook but their wealth and social status.

A more recent study, however, has reached different conclusions, namely that the group in the Wasps 1299f is political indeed and that Antiphon and Phrynichus are the oligarchs who a few years later subverted the democracy in Athens. F. Bourriot’s argumentation may be summarised as follows:

i) we may take the phrase οἱ περὶ Φρύνιχον to include Lysistratus and Thouphrastus only because by 422 B.C. Antiphon and Lykon were at an advanced age, and too famous and distinguished themselves to have been thought of belonging to Phrynichus’ set, whereas Lysistratus and Thouphrastus were rather obscure figures in Athenian society. Since what we have in this passage seems to be an hetaireia, it would be legitimate to connect this hetaireia with one of the hetaireiai which were particularly active in the run up to the coup in 411 B.C. (Thuc. 8.48.3, 68.3).

ii) since Thucydides praises both Antiphon and Phrynichus in his work, this should be taken as an indication that the two men in Aristophanes’ Wasps are the same.

Antiphon is meant here without further explanation, it is reasonable to conclude that he means the famous Antiphon, the orator’ (Aristophanes’ Wasps Oxford 1971: 296). W. Starkie also assumed that Antiphon should be the orator because Lykon was to be identified with the accuser of Socrates (The Wasps of Aristophanes Amsterdam 1968: 355). E. Bloedow (“Phrynichus the ‘Intelligent’ Athenian” AHB 5.4 1991: 90 no 4) thinks Phrynichus is the oligarch, but does not discuss the passage.

789 I. Storey 1985 passim.

iii) the term *kaloskagathos* appears in Aristophanes’ *Daitaleis* describing Alcibiades and the sophist Thrasy machus from Caledon. The term also refers to orators in general. Since in the *Wasps* Lycon, Antiphon and Phrynichus are referred to as *kaloikagathoi*, they are orators and they have a career in politics.

To begin with, we may note that Bourriot assumes what he has to prove, namely the identification of Antiphon in the *Wasps* with the orator from Rhamnous. Once we accept that Antiphon is the oligarch, it is indeed quite likely that the group as a whole takes a political colour and that Phrynichus is the son of Stratonides, the member of the Four Hundred. But such an assumption cannot be made without furnishing ample proof, something Bourriot fails to accomplish. As regards i), Phrynichus indeed assumes a leading role in the Four Hundred oligarchy, but it is not clear whether he takes part with his presumed *hetaireia* in the preliminary phase, prior to its set-up. At his first visit to Athens Peisander slanders Phrynichus in the assembly, thus effecting his deposition (8.54.3), and before his departure for the meeting with Teisaphernes directs the *hetaireiai* to take action (54.4). From then on, we are entitled to assume that Phrynichus adopts a negative attitude which does not change until it is made clear that Alcibiades has dropped out and the oligarchs do not count on him anymore. It is possible, though not certain, that Phrynichus changed his attitude after Peisander’s second visit to Athens which must have occurred only a short time before the Kolonus assembly (64.1, 65.1).791 There was, therefore, little time for Phrynichus to get involved in the terror and propaganda campaign as the leader of an oligarchic *hetaireia*. As to ii), the inclusion of Phrynichus in the circle of oligarchic leaders in 411 cannot be taken as an indication of his leanings in 422 B.C. Things would have taken a different turn for Phrynichus if Alcibiades had been included in the scheme. Finally, in connection to iii) we have seen that Lykon cannot be identified with the demagogue who prosecuted Socrates in 399 B.C. Furthermore, the identification of Antiphon with the oligarch is just one out of many possible ones, but certainly does not rank among the most probable. As far as *kaloikagathoi* is concerned, I believe Bourriot has misunderstood the meaning of line 1304: ἐόθος γὰρ ὡς ἐνέπλητο πολλῶν κάγαθόν, which refers to plentiful food rather than the *kaloikagathoi*.792

In conclusion, it is not likely that the reference to Phrynichus at the *Wasps* 1302 is to the oligarch.793 We should reconcile ourselves with the fact that although Phrynichus attained the highest political office in Athens in 412, the generalship, his career cannot be traced back to its earlier stages.

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791 On this interpretation, Phrynichus learns about Alcibiades from one of Peisander’s accomplices or even from Peisander himself. Alternatively, he might have got somehow information about the shattering of the negotiations and the subsequent fall-out with Alcibiades.

792 ‘After he had clogged himself with food and drink’ (translated by G. Theodoridis)

793 The identification is also denied by Avery 1959: 242 no 4.
Phrynichus’ election to the generalship (412/11 B.C.)

In the spring of 412 Phrynichus was elected general. Although we happen to know all ten members of the board, it would be precarious to draw conclusions as to the political atmosphere, alignments and public opinion at the time in Athens. As it has been argued, Phrynichus owed his election not to his allegedly democratic or oligarchic outlook, but to his realistic and pragmatic approach to foreign policy.\(^794\) This caution and reserve was undoubtedly accompanied by an impressive ability to assert himself and persuade his audience. Added to that the extraordinary analytical faculty he displayed at critical points and on crucial issues (see below), as well as his outspokenness and advanced age, Phrynichus was probably viewed at the time of the elections as the ideal person to be vested with the powers of a general. Since Thucydides makes Phrynichus echoing Pericles at 8.27.3, the Athenians were probably receptive to his policy which presumably advocated minimizing risks and safeguarding their possessions.\(^795\) His election proves undoubtedly the high social prestige and acceptance he enjoyed at the time and probably his wealth.\(^796\)

Phrynichus Stratonidou Deiradiotes and the Ionia Campaign in 412 B.C.: Thuc. 8.25-27\(^797\)

Abstract

Careful examination of the available evidence reveals that, contrary to modern scholarly opinion, the odds were overwhelmingly against the Athenian side, when in the autumn of

\(^{794}\) Characteristic are Heftner’s remarks 2001: 28: ‘Nicht die Anhänglichkeit an irgendeine innenpolitische Richtung hat demnach die Entscheidung seiner Wähler bestimmt, sondern der Wunsch nach einer Abkehr von der Kriegspolitik der vergangenen Jahre und die Hoffnung, durch eine Politik der Besonnenheit und der Mäßigung von der drückenden Kriegsnöt frei zu werden.’

\(^{795}\) On Periclean echoes in Phrynichus’ speech, see H. Goodhart ΘΟΥΚΥΔΙΔΟΥ ΞΥΓΓΡΑΦΗΣ Η: The Eighth Book of Thucydidies’ History London 1893: 41; Gomme, Andrewes and Dover 1945-1981: 5 64; Hornblower 1991-2008: 3 822. G. Grossi points out that Phrynichus was supported by certain democratic circles as well as conservative, hostile to Alcibiades who had taken the upper hand in Athenian politics after the disaster in Sicily (Frinico tra propaganda democratic e giudizio tucidideo Rome 1984: 100-101). Avery has stressed Phrynichus’ democratic profile and long service to democracy as the decisive factors for his election (1959 242-243).

\(^{796}\) Heftner observes that Polystratus’ description of him as penes primarily concerns Phrynichus’ childhood and does not necessarily reflect the reality in 412. It would have been difficult, if not impossible for the jury to check the accuracy of those statements on Phrynichus’ financial status because of the great time span involved (2001: 24). I am less confident than Grossi that his election ‘costituisce in qualche modo un’implicita conferma della non trascurabile ricchezza acquisita’ (1984: 21). Phrynichus could have been something less than extremely rich in 412.

\(^{797}\) A version of pages 177-190 appears in AHB 27. 2013: 152-164.
412 B.C. a Peloponnesian fleet under Therimenes came close to engaging in battle an Athenian fleet under general Phrynichus in the vicinity of Miletus. In this article it is argued that, perhaps drawing from past experience, the Athenian general took the right decision not to engage the enemy because he was facing an acute logistical problem, namely the presence of too many transport ships which were impossible to protect during the fight, and which could throw the whole Athenian formation into confusion, and thus, cause a catastrophic defeat. Additionally, it is suggested that no inferences should be drawn from Phrynichus' decision in connection with his general stance towards the Ionian war.

Introduction

The figure of Phrynichus, the son of Stratonides from the deme Deiradiotai, became one of the most controversial ones in late fifth century Athens. Through his wholehearted involvement in the oligarchic revolution of 411 B.C. the oligarch might have emerged as one of the most prominent figures in the Athenian political scene during the oligarchic revolution, but this engagement precipitated his violent death as well. The next generations of Athenians remembered him as an arch-traitor, a hated symbol of a tyrannical regime, which in its short life did everything it could to weaken the strength of the Empire, and reduce Athens to a mere compliant follower of its enemy, Sparta. Yet, despite the almost unanimous agreement in other sources, Phrynichus is presented in Thucydides (the present case under examination included) in an objective, neutral, if not outright positive light. The historian draws a picture of a man with outstanding intellectual capabilities, sound judgement, great logical faculty, rhetoric dexterity, and leadership talent. Accordingly, in this paper I shall undertake to examine Phrynichus' capabilities as a military commander in the Ionia campaign. I hope to demonstrate that, despite criticism levelled at the Athenian commander by modern scholars, Thucydides' judgement of his performance during that campaign, and in particular Phrynichus' decision to decline battle at sea, against a Peloponnesian fleet that unexpectedly arrived in the vicinity of Miletus, and withdraw instead to Samos in safety, was sound and correct.

The land battle at Miletus

In the autumn of 412 B.C., Phrynichus along with two more generals, Scironides and Onomacles, was entrusted the most important and ambitious Athenian counter-offensive in Ionia since the disaster in Sicily, the objective of which was to re-conquer lost territory and quell the wave of defections among Athens’ allies. The three men were in charge of a not insignificant force consisting of forty-eight ships and 3500

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798 e.g., [Lys.] 20.11-12; Lys.25.8, 10; Ar. Frogs 686-691; Arist. Politics 1305a36-1305b27. Phrynichus is depicted in these sources as a sycophant, opportunist, trickster, and plotter of schemes respectively.

799 On the date of the expedition, late September to beginning of October, see G. Busolt 1893-1904: 3.2 1432; Gomme, Andrewes and Dover 1945-1981: 558.
heavy infantry. After a short stay in Samos for regrouping and replenishment, the task force landed at Miletus, the subduing of which, was the main objective of the mission. At the gates of the city they won a victory after a pitched battle against the Milesian hoplites, Chalkideus and his Peloponnesian troops and Tissaphernes with his horse and mercenaries respectively. But later on the same evening, news reached the Athenian camp that a newly arrived Peloponnesian fleet was approaching. Commanding this fleet was Therimenes, who had been ordered to deliver fifty-five ships (twenty-two from Sicily and thirty-three from the Peloponnesian admiral Astyochus. Therimenes had first anchored at Leros, and when he got information about the Athenians’ presence at Miletus, he moved to Teichioussa in the Iasian gulf with a view to reconnoitring the area. There he met Alcibiades who briefed him on the critical situation that had evolved after the Athenian victory. The Athenian exile urged Therimenes not to abandon Miletus at that crucial moment, for otherwise the Peloponnesians would lose every hope of ever holding the entire Ionia region. Thereupon, it was agreed that the next day the Peloponnesians would attack the Athenian force at dawn, and try to save Miletus from falling into the hands of the enemy.

The war council at the Athenian camp

When news of the arrival of an enemy force in the area reached the Athenian camp, a war council among the generals took place to determine what course of action was to be taken. In this council, Phrynichus emerged as a charismatic leader, an officer

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800 D. Lewis 1961 drew attention to the possibility that Phrynichus may have been elected general ex apanton in 412. He pointed to the possible existence of a relationship between the general and a Scironides who proposed a decree at a meeting of Leontis tribe in the 340s ([D.] 58.18), in which case there would have been two generals from tribe Leontis in 412. Since Phrynichus was undoubtedly the most authoritative figure of the two, he would have been elected ex apanton. If this contention of Lewis is valid, the implications for Phrynichus’ public image and prestige that year become obvious. Lewis’ doubted the name Scironides on the grounds of its negative associations with the mythical Megarian bandit, thinking it awkward for an Athenian to bear this name, and he proposed the reading Κιρωνίδης, attested in the Vatican ms. B in Thucydides (he admits, however, that in [Demosthenes]’ passage the sound tradition reads Σκιρωνίδης). Hornblower, citing OCD³ under the entry Sciron or Sciros, suggests a connection with the Attic festival of Skirophoria (1991-2008: 3 186 822).

801 Thuc. 8.26. On the composition and origin of Therimenes’ force, see Gomme, Andrewes and Dover 1945-1981: 5 61; Hornblower 1991-2008: 3 823. Thucydides, 8.17.1-3, narrates how Chalkideus and Alcibiades with twenty-five ships, of which twenty were Chians, outpaced the Athenians Strombichides and Thrasycles, slipped from their grasp, and caused Miletus to defect. This force apparently joined Therimenes, and thus, the number of Peloponnesian ships reached eighty (cf. Busolt 1893-1904: 3.2 1435; Gomme, Andrewes and Dover 1945-1981: 5 27-28).

802 Those certainly included Phrynichus, Onomacles and Scironides, and probably Strombichides and Thrasycles (Busolt 1893-1904: 3.2 1434 and no 1; Gomme, Andrewes and
who commanded respect from his fellow officers and managed to carry the day by sheer weight of his arguments. He unequivocally stated that, as far as it was in his power, he would not allow the Athenian force to stay and offer battle to the Peloponnesians at that particular moment. It would not be prudent, he argued, to risk their necks in a single battle, especially when they had no clear information about the composition and size of the enemy force, since they could choose themselves the time and place of the battlefield, and fight when well-prepared and under favourable conditions. It would not be a disgrace either, if they decided to pull out from the region; rather a defeat would be more shameful. He concluded that they should think of the precarious situation in which their city had fallen; taking unnecessary risks in newly opened fronts should be avoided by all means.  

Brilliant, eloquent and persuasive Phrynichus’ speech though it may have been, there are indications that the oligarch used other means as well to force his opinion upon his colleagues, namely deception. Thucydides narrates:

Φρύνιχος δὲ ὁ τῶν Ἀθηναίων στρατηγός, ὡς ἀπὸ τῆς Λέρου ἐπώθετο τὰ τῶν νεῶν σαφῶς, βουλομένων τῶν ξυναρχῶντων ὑπομείναντας διαναμαχεῖν, οὐκ ἂρη σὺτ’ αὐτὸς ποιήσει τοῦτο σὺτ’ ἐκείνοις οὐδ’ ἄλλῳ οὐδεν ἐς δύναμιν ἐπιτρέψειν. ὅπου γὰρ ἔξεστιν ἐν ὑστέρῳ σαφῶς εἰδότας πρὸς ὅποιας τε ταῖς πολεμίας καὶ ὅποιας πρὸς αὐτῶς ταῖς σφετέραις ἱκανίας καὶ καθ’ ἠοχόν παρασκευασμένης ἔσται ἀγωνίσασθαι. (8.27.1-2)

Phrynichus, the Athenian general, when he got exact information about the ships, although his colleagues wanted to stay and fight through a sea-battle, refused, and declared that he would not do this himself, nor would he allow anyone else, as far as it was in his power. For whenever in the future they knew

Dover 1945-1981: 5 63; Hornblower (1991-2008: 3 825-826) ingeniously remarks that there must have been present Argive officers also. But how many there could have been we have no means of knowing. We know that the entire Argive army was divided into five squadrons, and was commanded by five generals (Thuc.5.59.5). One could argue that since the Athenians assigned the deployment of one thousand hoplites, plus the sailors for the ships, to three generals, there may have been more than one Argive general in charge of the fifteen hundred Argive hoplites. But it is not at all certain that the Argive army operated along similar lines to the Athenian. What about the allied troops?

803 Thuc. 8.27.1-4. On the view that one of Phrynichus’ colleagues, presumably Onomacles or Scironides, was Thucydides’ informant on this occasion, see N. Hammond 1977: 153. Phrynichus must have been on a par with his colleagues, as far as authority and command were concerned: Dover 1960; Gomme, Andrewes and Dover 1945-1981: 5 63; see, Hamel (1998: 84-99), for a useful discussion of the evidence. She also argues for shared responsibility and equality principle among boards of Athenian generals. Hornblower notes that there was no system of rotating command in Athens at that time (1991-2008: 3 826). On Phrynichus’ eloquence and persuasiveness, it is worth quoting Andrewes astute comments: ‘this hammering on the word (sc. αἰσχρόν) recalls 5.111.3. Phrynichus’ opponents had evidently used the argument from αἰσχύνη, as the Melians did (5.104), and he repeats their word to batter them into sense’ (Gomme, Andrewes and Dover 1945-1981: 5 64).
the exact number of enemy ships and the proportion of their own against them, he would fight after having made ample preparations at their leisure.

It appears, thus, that Phrynichus alone was informed by his scouts about the size and composition of the Peloponnesian fleet. The shrewd oligarch correctly anticipated his colleagues’ fervour for fighting the enemy, and concealed the vital information about the numbers of enemy ships. In this way, he could use the uncertainty arising from his concealment to support, and finally foist on his colleagues a strategic withdrawal which, according to him, was the only sensible course of action. The experienced politician was undoubtedly able to make exceptional use of rhetoric and deception, even at critical times, to further his goals. His decision, no doubt was a controversial one; it caused friction and discontent among the allies, and led the Argives abandon the expedition in rage, and withdraw from the war altogether until its very end. Another point worth noting is that Phrynichus was also gravely concerned about the composition of his own naval force, and how combat-effective in relation to the Peloponnesian it was. The phrase καὶ ὅσαις πρὸς αὐτὰς ταῖς σφετέραις alludes exactly to this problem, to which we shall return later. But first, let us see how Phrynichus’ decision to withdraw has been received by modern scholars.

Modern reception

Phrynichus’ performance during the Ionia campaign, and by implication Thucydides’ endorsement and praise of the general, have drawn heavy criticism. In

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804 Those men need not have been officially appointed by the Athenian state to serve as intelligence service, agents or scouts. It seems that Alcibiades, when he reached Ionia in 412, had set up his own private network of collecting information and delivering messages. Those men included some of his relatives, Alcibiades of Phegous, Alcibiades’ cousin, Axiochus, Alcibiades’ uncle, Adeimantus, Alcibiades’ fellow-demesman, and Mantitheus, a mutilator of the Hermae (Westlake 1985: 105-108). In the famous episode of the intrigues between Astyochus, the Peloponnesian admiral, Alcibiades and Phrynichus, there are signs, so it has been argued, that Phrynichus had his own network of intelligence (Gomme, Andrewes and Dover 1945-1981: 5 119).

805 Andrewes comments on this passage: ’οσφως εἰδότας reads a little awkwardly after par. 1 ἐπύθετο τὰ τῶν νεόν σοφως, which asserts that they did not know the facts of this situation: but that is a purely verbal point’ (Gomme, Andrewes and Dover 1945-1981: 5 64). Thucydides, however, uses the word ἐπύθετο, which is in the singular.

806 Notice the parallel at 8.51.1: καὶ ταῦτα σοφῶς πεπυσµένος εἴη.

807 Thuc.8.27.6; see note 748 below.

808 This point seems to have escaped U. Schindel’s attention, as he argues that ‘daß es einen Feldherrn gäbe, der nicht wüßte ὅσαις πρὸς αὐτὰς ταῖς σφετέραις er die Schlacht beginnt, ist ganz unglaublich’. He reaches, however, a similar conclusion, namely that the apparent contradiction at 8.27.1-2 concerning the information that Phrynichus had on the size of the enemy fleet was intended by Thucydides to show his readers how skillfully the Athenian general deceived his colleagues. Schindel rightly refutes Classen-Steup’s contention that this passage is another sign of incompleteness of Book Eight (1970: 294).
particular, two points have been made: the grave consequences that the decision to withdraw to Samos had on the chances of the Athenians to retain the whole area under their control, on the one hand, and the pessimism of Phrynichus in avoiding battle when the odds were, so the argument goes, particularly favourable, on the other. To begin with the first point, there is unanimous agreement when it comes to the price that Athens had to pay for the decision to withdraw from Miletus. The Athenians were not able to capitalize on their land victory since they had to abandon the booty on the field. Their relationships with the Argives deteriorated sharply, as the latter made their journey back home from Samos and they did not contribute to the war effort since then.\(^{809}\) Most importantly, Athens abandoned Iasos and Amorges into the hands of his enemy Tissaphernes.\(^{810}\)

With regard to the second point, Andrewes has argued that the Peloponnesians, although superior in numbers, lacked in self-confidence (an element, however, present in the troops from Sicily). Moreover, while up to that point the Peloponnesians had maintained the initiative to attack wherever they decided in order to help the cities within the Athenian arche to revolt, this time Therimenes had lost the initiative, since he had to force the enemy into battle if he wanted to rescue Miletus. Phrynchus, thus, had lost a unique opportunity to meet the enemy in the battlefield, and deliver a decisive blow: ‘the result might have been the disaster that Phrynichus feared, but, given the numbers of the two fleets and their current standards of performance, the chances of an Athenian victory were surely high, and victory at this stage, with most of the empire intact, would have done much more for Athens than the victory at Cyzikus 18 months later.’\(^{811}\) This judgment on Phrynichus may be too harsh. The argument that the Peloponnesians’ morale was low, or that they lacked self-confidence is almost impossible to check. Critics usually adduce Thucydides 8.30.2 τέσσαρι καὶ ἑβδομήκοντα ναυσὶ ἐθαλασσοκράτουν to make the point that the Athenians could retain supremacy at sea even when they were inferior

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\(^{809}\) Thuc. 8.27.5. The Argives were in fact enraged about the fact that they were not given a chance to level off their humiliating defeat at the hands of the supposedly inferior Ionians from Miletus. Thucydides (5.70) hints at their impetuosity and lack of discipline when at the battle of Mantinea pictures them to advance ἐντόνως καὶ ὀργῇ (eagerly and impetuously). For the suggestion that they might have had an extra motive for wanting to stay and help Iasus, which might have been their colony, see Hornblower Mausolus Oxford 1982: 112 and no 48. On an analysis of the ramifications Phrynichus’ decision had for Athens, see Busolt 1893-1904: 3.2.1435; J. Lazenby The Peloponnesian War: A Military Study London 2004: 178; Hornblower 1991-2008: 3 828.

\(^{810}\) On Iasus during the Ionian war and the existence of an active, pro-Athenian faction in the city, see de Ste Croix “The Character of the Athenian Empire” Historia 3 1954: 9; Westlake “Ionians in the Ionian War” CQ 29.1 1979: 24.

\(^{811}\) Andrewes “The Spartan Resurgence” in D. Lewis and I. Edwards (ed.) The Cambridge Ancient History 5: The Fifth Century B.C. Cambridge 2003: 467-468. J. Shear, without argument, suggested that Phrynichus may have been acting out of cowardice or, even worse, he may already have been dealing with the enemy (Polis and Revolution: Responding to Oligarchy in Classical Athens Cambridge 2011: 27).
in numbers. This view, however, overlooks the fact that those seventy-four ships were all fast, in contrast to the case under discussion.\textsuperscript{812} Moreover, with regard to the Athenian morale, indicative is Thucydides’ comment that it was only after the battle at Kynossema that the Athenians ceased to be afraid of the Peloponnesian navy, and to blame themselves because of the disaster in Sicily and their failures in smaller engagements in the Ionian war.\textsuperscript{813} It is startling, at any rate, that previous scholars have reached those negative conclusions with regard to Phrynichus’ performance as commander in the battlefield without examining the exact conditions that prevailed the night on which the war council in the Athenian camp took place. Accordingly, we shall turn our investigation in this direction to see how justified Phrynichus’ decision under those circumstances was.

The make-up of the Athenian fleet

The decision not to offer battle, but instead retire in safety to Samos, had grave consequences for the Athenians and their fortunes in Ionia, as we have already noted (see above page 189). It is therefore noteworthy that Thucydides at this very point affords us a warm praise of Phrynichus on the grounds of his performance on this particular, but also on other, future occasions.\textsuperscript{814} I believe that the historian deliberately made his eulogy to Phrynichus at this particular point, as an answer to the criticism that the general’s performance attracted in this occasion. Was Thucydides right? To pass fair and informed judgment on Phrynichus, a necessary preliminary is to ascertain the exact size of the two naval forces. The Peloponnesians had at their disposal eighty fast ships.\textsuperscript{815} The Athenians had sixty-eight, but not all of them were fast.\textsuperscript{816} How many of the Athenian triremes were transports, and what implications would this have on the fighting capability of the Athenian force? Thucydides (8.25.1) does not break down the number, but his wording ὅν ἦσαν καὶ...
ὁ πλιταγωγοί implies that the transports were the lesser part. Scholars have suggested a 60:40 ratio, based on the expedition to Sicily in 415 B.C. Alternatively, since Andrewes observed that the phrase at 25.1 ὃν ἦραν καὶ ὁπλιταγωγοί does not run smoothly, we should take καὶ as a mistake for κ’, twenty, which also lies well within the above-mentioned ratio. The next question is to specify what exactly a transport ship was, and how many troops it could carry. The prevailing view is that it was an otherwise normal trireme without structural modifications, manned with the thranites as rowers only, the men sitting on the highest of the three rows of benches in a trireme, around sixty in number. The troop-carrying capacity of those vessels might have been around one hundred men.

We understand from Thucydides 8.25.1 that the whole expeditionary force embarked on the ships at the Piraeus, and made their way to Samos across the Aegean Sea. Conditions must have been extremely crowded, as the 3500 men had to be crammed in just about twenty transport ships. Even if we raise the number of transport ships to twenty-two, the one hundred troops per ship would not do. We need to raise the number to one hundred and fifty per ship to accommodate all men. Of course, it is theoretically possible that some of the hoplites may have travelled as epibatae on the fast ships so as to reduce the number of troops per transport-ship. But Athenian practice which laid much emphasis on speed, lightness and ramming tactics tells against a squadron of sluggish, overmanned fast ships. It is more likely, then, that

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817 The composition of the Athenian fleet: Thuc. 6.43. G. Busolt, following L. Herbst Die Rückkehr des Alkibiades 1843: 52, assumed that for the transportation of 3500 hoplites there would be needed some thirty transport ships, well beyond the logistical capability of Athens at the time. He reckoned that eighteen transport ships carried the troops from Athens to first Samos and then Miletus (1893-1904: 3.2 1432 and no 1).


820 Hornblower 1991-2008: 3 1063-1064, with earlier bibliography. J. Morrison and J. Coates reduce the number of transported troops per vessel to thirty, which is too low (The Athenian Trireme: The History and Reconstruction of an Ancient Greek Warship Cambridge 1988: 226-227).

821 Andrewes suggested that the one thousand allied troops were picked up on the way to Samos, but this fact does not arise from Thucydides’ text. It was perhaps simpler, on logistical grounds, to assemble the entire force at the Piraeus and then allocate them to each ship. Andrewes’ solution entails a longer trip and a bit of a chaos, in terms of embarkation and accommodation on board (Gomme, Andrewes and Dover 1945-1981: 5 59).

822 Gomme, Andrewes and Dover 1945-1981: 5 28: ‘for the short voyage (sc. to Miletus) a degree of crowding might have been tolerated.’

823 The normal number of epibatae on an Athenian trireme was fourteen, ten hoplites and four archers: Thuc. 1.49.1-2, 50.1, 7.23.4; Xen. Hell. 1.6.19, 2.1.22 (B. Strauss “Democracy, Kimon and the Evolution of Athenian Naval Tactics in the Fifth Century BC” in Jensen, P. Nielsen and L. Rubinstein (eds.) Polis and Politics: Studies in Ancient Greek History Presented to Mogens Herman Hansen on his Sixtieth Birthday, August 20, 2000 Aarhus 2000: 316; H. van Wees Greek Warfare: Myths and Realities London 2004: 63. For the view
the Athenians would keep their fast ships as normal during the voyage to Samos, so as to act as protecting shield for the troop-carriers that they escorted. If these considerations are valid, then, we should have:

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\begin{align*}
22 \text{ transports} \times \text{ca. 148} & \quad \text{hoplites} \Rightarrow 3256 \\
26 \text{ fast ships} \times 10 & \quad \text{epibatai} \Rightarrow 260 \\
\text{Total} & \Rightarrow 3516
\end{align*}
\]

H. van Wees’ suggestion that the hoplites’ slave attendants acted as rowers in the transport ships neatly deals with the problem of having to transport those extra men, although perhaps not for all 150 men would have been possible to bring their slaves with them at this particular expedition. 824 This means that on board of any of the approximately twenty plus transport ships there would have been well over 210 men, thus making the vessel, considering the reduced repulsion force, quite slow and unfit for engaging a lighter and faster warship. 825 As van Wees also quite plausibly points out, the rowers usually acted as light infantry on expeditions in enemy territory. 826 We should expect, then, the Athenian and allied light infantry, ψιλοί, to be around 5700 strong, which could be broken down as follows: 26 fast ships by approximately 170 rowers = 4420; 22 transport ships by approximately 60 rowers = 1320.

that the standard rate of epibatae was fifty, see Gomme, Andrewes and Dover 1945-1981 vol. 5: 60. There was, of course, additional crew on board, the so-called hyperesia. Those included the trierarch, κυβερνήτης (steersman), κελευστής (boatswain), αὐλητής (flute player), ναυπηγός (shipbuilder), πρωιράτης (officer in command at the bow) (cf. IG II² 1951, 79-109). The overall number of men on board an Athenian trireme in the classical era was approximately two hundred. H. Wallinga (Ships and Sea-Power before the Great Persian War: The Ancestry of the Ancient Trireme Leiden 1993: 169-185), however, has argued that triremes were regularly undermanned. On the composition, positioning and exact duties of this personnel, see Morrison and Coates 1988: 107-18.

824 Quoted in Hornblower 1991-2008: 3 1064. On trireme tactics and fighting, see van Wees 2004: 206-232. The journal’s anonymous referee points out that conditions which existed at the beginning of the war and which allowed the Athenian hoplites to be accompanied by their personal slaves on state salary would not have obtained in 412 B.C., and that in any case the Argives could not have brought any slaves with them because they did not belong to the hoplite class. With regard to the first argument, I may commend that due to lack of man force it is not inconceivable that some Athenians were actually accompanied by their slaves. This does not affect the main argument, of course, that the Athenian ships were exceedingly overloaded. IG I³ 1032 records the Athenian’s decision to honour those who fought at the Aegospotamoi sea-battle. The partially preserved list records ninety-five slave owners of Athenian citizen status; of the ten epibatae recorded, six owned slaves (lines 83-93).

825 The total number includes rowers, hoplites, epibatai, archers, and hyperesia crew.

826 van Wees 2004: 63.
A new evaluation

Under these circumstances the existence of so great a number of transport ships on the Athenian side was a clear liability, a fact that Phrynichus was not slow to realise. Perhaps, it is of interest to note that a similar situation had arisen many years before, during the sea battle between the Athenians under Pericles and the Samian fleet, in the context of the Samian revolt in 440/39 B.C.. Although the Samians seemed to have enjoyed a clear superiority in sheer numbers, seventy against forty-four vessels, twenty of their ships were troop carriers. The presence of so many slow ships during an intense struggle against a renowned for their seamanship enemy must have contributed a great deal to throwing the rest of the Samian triremes into confusion, and ultimately to their defeat (Thuc. 1.116.1). Thucydides gives us the outcome in three words: καὶ ἐνίκων Ἀθηναῖοι. He may not have provided us with any details about the course of the battle, but has dropped a seemingly pedantic piece of information: among the Samian force, there were twenty transport ships. For the average reader this may seem irrelevant, but the perceptive one will grasp the implications. Note that the historian gives us the same detail at 8.25.1, and lets the reader draw the connection himself: transport ships are a liability rather than an asset, when it comes to engaging an enemy in open sea. Phrynichus, unlike his younger colleagues present at Miletus, would have had vivid memories from that occasion, and would have drawn the necessary lessons. At the time of the Samian revolt he must have been around forty. Could it also be that he personally fought in that battle?

To return to 412, Phrynichus and his colleagues had to take a decision on the spot when news of the approach of the enemy reached the Athenian camp. In the event, however, a decision to fight had been reached, what would have been the solutions available to them? It is more likely than not that the transport ships lacked the spare oars necessary to convert them to fast ones. For if more men than usual had been packed on the ships for the expedition against Miletus, how would there have been any space for spare oars and other gear? But, even if we assume that the oars were available, still the transport ships would have been relatively heavy, since there would have been something like forty extra men per ship. And what about their fighting quality? Those men (especially the Argives), mainly hoplites, would have lacked the rigorous training and drilling in trireme tactics that the proper sailors had.

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827 On the chronology, see Gomme, Andrewes and Dover 1945-1981: 1 354-356.
828 See, however, Hornblower (1991-2008: 1 191), who points to the scholiast to Aristophanes’ Wasps 283. Allegedly, a certain Karystion had committed treachery and later was rewarded with Athenian citizenship. Irrespective of the credibility of this story, the two major factors that must have contributed the most to the Athenian victory were superior command and lack of cohesion in the Samian fleet due to the transport ships.
829 [Lys.] 20.10 and 12 give us the relevant piece of information, namely that Polystratos, a member of the Four Hundred who was brought to trial twice after the downfall of the oligarchic regime, was of about the same age as Phrynichus. Polystratos was about seventy at the time of the trials; cf. K. Apostolakis [Ανωτέρου] Υψηλός Πολυστράτου Athens 2003: 37.
The other option theoretically available to Phrynichus, namely to embark only the usual number of rowers on board, i.e., ca. one hundred and seventy, and the usual number of *epibatae*, and leave the rest ashore for as long as the sea-battle lasted, was too risky to be worth considering at all, for the Athenians and their allies would have had to abandon a considerable part of their infantry on a hostile shore in the event they lost the sea-battle.\(^{830}\)

But, criticism against Phrynichus’ decision not to engage the enemy loses its force as there are further indications that the whole campaign was hastily designed and executed, and that the Athenians had not anticipated reinforcements coming from the Peloponnese. Thucydides after the battle of Miletus makes a statement which exposes the cursory character of the whole campaign:

> στήσαντες δὲ τροπαίον τὸν περιτειχισµὸν ἀθηναῖοι παρεσκευασάντο, νοµίζοντες, εἰ προσαγάγοιντο Μίλητον, ῥαδίως ἄν σφίσι καὶ τάλλα προσχωρήσαι (8.25.5).

The Athenians set up a trophy and were making preparations for the circumvallation since the place was like an isthmus, having the impression that if they could bring over Miletus, it would so happen that the other cities would effortlessly go over to them.

T. Rood has pointed out that the adverb ῥαδίως foreshadows failure when it comes to a human undertaking. Only gods achieve their goals effortlessly. This is therefore an oblique critique on the part of the historian, who wanted to underscore at this point the various vicissitudes that can beset a military campaign, and cause things go wrong, and perhaps castigate Athenian overconfidence. We should therefore subscribe to Thucydides’ assessment of Phrynichus’ performance, namely that, that given the circumstances, the Athenian general took the best decision possible, and handled the whole situation with *xunesis*.\(^{831}\)

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<td>(^{830}) Thucydides gives us the Argive casualties only, a few less than three hundred, that is, a little less than 20%, which is well within the figure of 14% for a defeated army. Since the Athenians and the allies won the engagement against Tissaphernes’ mercenaries and horse, at a 5% rate for the winning side, their casualties should have been in the region of one hundred (P. Krentz “Casualties in Hoplite Battles” <em>GRBS</em> 26.1 1985: 18; V. Hanson <em>Hoplites: The Classical Greek Battle Experience</em> London and New York 1991: 101). The survivors (injured and fit for battle) then would have been around three thousand one hundred men. But even with four hundred men less to embark it was impossible for the Athenians to take the booty with them. Phrynichus’ order and its financial consequences must have been equally resented among the Athenian, Argive and allied soldiers, but his rationale amply highlights the acute problem of space the Athenians had to deal with (Thuc. 8.27.4).</td>
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<td>(^{831}) Rood draws attention to the existence of a dissonance between intentions and reality in Thucydides’ narrative when it comes to realising ambitious projects: ‘Intensions can in themselves intimate failure, especially if they are founded on an expectation or hope that success will come easily’ (1999: 34 and no 30; cf. 259 and no 36); cf. 2.80.1.</td>
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We do not know Phrynichus’ attitude towards Amorges, or whether he thought Athens’ decision to back him was sound.\textsuperscript{832} He must have had no doubts, however, that his decision to withdraw from Miletus would seal his fate. Iasus was un-walled at the time, and Thucydides’ narrative makes clear that the appearance of the Peloponnesian fleet off Iasus was totally unexpected (8.28.2). But his foremost concern after the Athenian victory was to ensure the safety of the Athenian and allied troops, and avert a military disaster, which in his view would have been irreversible, had the Athenians offered a sea-battle. He was well aware that withdrawal meant territorial loss for Athens, and that his decision would not be universally accepted. But relentless criticism, scrutiny of conduct, and, quite often, heavy penalties were realities that every Athenian general had to live with. From Thucydides’ narrative, at least, it does not emerge that Phrynichus had any reasons to fear that his conduct in Ionia may cause his deposition. This unfortunate development occurred not in the immediate aftermath of the battle but considerably later, in a totally different context, amidst intrigues and clandestine stabs in the back.\textsuperscript{833} His removal from office, therefore, does not seem to have come as the direct consequence of his performance as general.\textsuperscript{834} What tipped the balance, then, in taking this particular decision was the acute logistical problem his task force faced, and probably the lessons drawn from Nikias’ fate in Sicily and the Samians’ in the 440s, a sea-battle, to be noted, fought in nearby waters, plus Phrynichus’ age and sagacity.

**Phrynichus’ stance on the war**

Finally, could we draw any general conclusions from the events during the Miletus campaign as to Phrynichus’ political convictions or his attitude towards the war? A. Ferrabino, suggested that the Athenian general was seeking a way to effect a


\textsuperscript{833} The scholiast to Aristophanes’ Lysistrata 313, quoting Craterus, mentions that at his posthumous trial Phrynichus was found guilty of treason which he had committed when he was general on Samos. This is almost certainly a wrong inference, drawn by the scholiast who had read Craterus’ copy of the verdict of Phrynichus’ trial. That verdict was passed on Phrynichus on the grounds of his contemplated treachery during his mission to Sparta as an envoy of the Four Hundred. But, even if the scholiast’s inference were valid, attitudes towards Phrynichus were probably not the same in the autumn of 412 as in that of 411, after the collapse of the oligarchic regime. This scholion, then, does not tell us anything about what the Athenians believed about general Phrynichus shortly after the battle.

\textsuperscript{834} Peisander, during his first visit to Athens in the winter of 411, charged Phrynichus and Scironides with treason: they had allegedly betrayed Amorges and Iasus to the enemy. That caused the deposition of the two generals. But Thucydides’ language (διέβαλλεν, ‘slandered’) strongly indicates that Peisander’s accusations were hollow, a pretext to eliminate Alcibiades’ deadliest enemy at a time the renowned exile was most valuable for the oligarchic conspirators. Thuc. 8.54.3; cf. 8.49: the agenda of Peisander’s mission to Athens.
conclusion of the war through a compromise treaty with Sparta. A decisive sea-battle would have led to either a defeat or victory and this would have jeopardised the prospect of peace. G. Grossi refuted Ferrabino’s arguments by pointing to Thucydides 8.30.2 and the Athenian domination at sea. At the end of Phrynichus’ speech, Grossi argued, the Athenian general urged his colleagues to move to Samos and, using the island as hide-out, to wage the war against the Peloponnesians energetically. H. Heftner sees in Phrynichus’ command in Ionia the latter’s conviction that the war could not be won for Athens, and that his approach towards the war would eventually lead to an Abnützungskrieg. I may, personally, raise an objection to these views, namely that we can discern patterns of a far-planned policy in Phrynichus’ conduct in this instance. The close examination of the prevailing conditions, and of the composition and fighting capability of the Athenian naval force at this particular instance that we have conducted strongly suggests that the Athenian general rightly took the decision to decline battle, and strategically withdraw to Samos. To be sure, it was a hard decision, but, unfortunately for Athens, imperative. We should not be rash to assume that Phrynichus took this particular course of action lightheartedly, or without weighing pros and cons thoroughly. Thucydides’ verdict may then be allowed to stand. Phrynichus’ was a decision, a right one we may say, dictated by ἀνάγκη, and one should be skeptical about interpreting his performance as part of a pre-conceived, far-reaching and well-planned policy.

It would be worthwhile examining the scanty evidence for scraps of information on how Phrynichus viewed the rebel Amorges and his alliance with Athens in connection with the wider problem of the relationship between Athens and Persia on the one hand, and the Athenian prospects, as dictated by the course the war had taken after Sicily, of maintaining their hold of Ionia. Amorges was the bastard son of Pisouthnes, himself satrap of Sardis, and probably of an extended area around it, who had also rebelled against the Persian King and whose relationships with Athens had ranged from uneasy and controversial to hostile. We do not know exactly

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835 A. Ferrabino L’Impero Atheniese Torino 1927: 347.
840 Pisouthnes helped the Samian oligarchs in 440 B.C. with 700 mercenaries and kept in his satrapy as prisoners the Athenian garrison on Samos who had been captured by the oligarchs (Thuc. 1.115.4-5; Diod. 12.27.3-4. He got involved in the revolt of Colophon in 430 B.C. by helping the medizing party in the city against the pro-Athenian one (Thuc. 3.34.1-2). He also sent mercenaries to assist the medizing party at Notium (Thuc. 3.34.2-3); Eddy 1973: 241-258. Ktesias narrates the story of Pisouthnes’ rebellion which cannot be dated with precision: Dareius II, the Persian king, sends against Pisouthnes Tissaphernes, Spithradates and
when Amorges’ rebellion took place, but it seems likely that it was not connected
with Pissouthnes’ resurrection. It is also not clear when exactly Athens decided to
lent her support to Amorges. An inscription recording a payment made by the
treasurers of Athena to an Athenian *strategos* at Ephesus in March 414 has been
traditionally adduced as evidence of Athens backing the rebel Amorges at that
time. But this interpretation is not totally cogent. H. Westlake has argued that it is
strange that an Athenian general was sent to Ephesus to assist Amorges when the
latter’s headquarters were at Iasus. According to him a more probable explanation
for that mission is Athens’ suspicion of Ephesus’ loyalty towards her, or the collection
of arrears of tribute by show of force. On the other hand, the passage from
Aristophanes’ *Birds* 1027-1030 cannot be pressed to indicate friendly relations
between Athens and Persia in the spring of 414. It seems that the problem on the
present state of our evidence is insoluble. But for our understanding of the state of
affairs between the two imperial powers, Athens and Persia, after the peace of
Epilicus, concluded in 423 B.C., September 413 B.C. constitutes an important
threshold. If, as the orthodox view has it, Athens’ decision to help Amorges is to be
placed before it, in a context of a highly optimistic and expansionist foreign policy

Parmises. Pissouthnes had employed the Athenian Lycon as commander of his Greek
mercenaries. But the three Persian generals bribed Lycon, who along with Peisouthnes’
mercenaries defect to the King. Tissaphernes gets as a reward Peisouthnes’ satrapy
(FGH688F15 52 (53). But no inference can be drawn from this story that there was an
Athenian involvement. So Andrews 1961: 4 no 10; Westlake 1977: 321 no 8, who argues
Lycon may have been an exile. Contra, J. Price *Thucydides and Internal War* Cambridge
2001: 368. The date of Pissouthnes’ revolt: end of 420s (Price 2001: 368; Lewis 1977: 80-81
(but he adds: ’a date as late as 416/15 does not seem excluded’; Hornblower 1982: 31 no 198;

841 Neither Thucydides nor Andocides *On The Peace* 3.28-29 mention Pissouthnes in
connection with Amorges’ rebellion. Amorges could not have used his father’s mercenaries
because the latter were taken over by the King, so a considerable amount of time may have
elapsed between the two rebellions. So Westlake 1977: 322. Amorges’ revolt as a follow-up of
in Greek History* Oxford 1958: 222. The date of Amorges’ revolt: not too long before winter
413/12: Andrews 1961: 4; maximum two to three years before 413/12: Westlake 1977: 322.

842 IG I3 370, 79; Wade-Gery 1958: 222-223; Andrews 1961: 5; Lewis 1977: 86 no 17; Price
2001: 368.

843 Westlake subscribes to the view that Ephesus did not fall in the hands of the
Peloponnesians until 412 when Alcibiades and Chalkides arrived in Chios (1977: 324).


845 The peace treaty between Athens and Dareius II was negotiated on behalf of the former by
Epilykus, Andocides’ uncle (3.29) in the second half of 424/23 (Wade-Gery 1958: 207-210);
cf. G. Cackwell *The Greek Wars: The Failure of Persia* Oxford 2005: 144 on the historicity of
the peace. For an alternative dating, namely 422/21, see A. Blamire “Epilicus’ Negotiations
with Persia” *Phoenix* 29.1 1975: 25. Blamire maintains that the purpose of this peace was to
supplement or even to replace the Peace of Callias. In his view the treaty contained a
declaration of non-aggression and an understanding that neither party would assist the
other’s enemies (23).
fanned by an imminent conquer of Sicily, this unfortunate alignment may be viewed as another example of ill-designed, opportunistic and even suicidal foreign policy. If, on the other hand, with Westlake, we assume a date for the coalition after September 413, it would seem more likely that it was Persia who took the initiative and decided to go back on her peace treaty with Athens seeing that there was nothing to prevent Ionia from falling into her hands. Athens, then, responded to the Persian newly-oriented aggressive policy by assisting Amorges. The problem is that Thucydides omits so much material on Persia from his narrative that we cannot have a clearer picture of the context in which debate took place in Athens with regard to Athenian-Persian relationships and the decision to help Amorges.

To return to Phrynichus, we do not know his attitude towards Amorges, or whether he thought Athens’ decision to back him was sound. He must have had no doubts, however, that his decision to withdraw from Miletus would seal his fate. Iasus was unwalled at the time and Thucydides’ narrative makes clear that the appearance of the Peloponnesian fleet off Iasus was totally unexpected (8.28.2). But his priority after the Athenian victory was to ensure the safety of the Athenian and allied troops and avert a military disaster, which in his view would have been imminent had the Athenians offered a sea-battle. He was well aware that withdrawal meant territorial loss for Athens and that his decision would not be universally accepted. What tipped the balance was the acute logistical problem his task force faced and probably the lesson drawn from Nikias’ fate in Sicily, plus Phrynichus’ age and sagacity. Nor does it emerge from Thucydides’ narrative that Phrynichus had any reasons to fear that his conduct in Ionia may cause his deposition which, as we shall see, was effected amidst intrigues and clandestine stabs in the back, but does not seem to have come as the direct consequence of his performance as general.

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846 It seems that Tissaphernes’ sending an embassy to Sparta (Thuc. 8.5.5) was directed against the Athenians (Gomme, Andrewes and Dover 1945-1981: 5 16). It may be thought that the initiative on the part of the King to claim the arrears of tribute at that particular time was dictated by the Athenian misfortune in Sicily and should be placed in its aftermath (D. Kagan The Fall of the Athenian Empire Cornell 1987: 32 no 33). Lewis, on grounds of tight chronology, assumed that the King ‘can have taken his decision out of fury about Amorges and a conviction that Athens had over-extended herself by reinforcing the Sicilian expedition’ before news of the disaster had reached his palace (1977: 87 and no 25). J. Wiesehöfer believes the King simply reacted to Athens’ backing Amorges and so instructed Tissaphernes to approach Sparta (“…Keeping the Two Sides Equal”: Thucydides, the Persians and the Peloponnesian War” in Rengakos, A., and A. Tsakmakis (eds.) Brill’s Companion to Thucydides Leiden 2006: 662).

847 Thucydides’ reluctance to integrate the Persian factor and its importance for the conclusion of the war into his narrative may be due to his concept of a bipolar power system in Greece, Athens and Sparta overshadowing any other player, within or without Greece (Wieserhöfer 2006: 661).
The oligarchic conference on Samos

The next episode in which Phrynichus makes his appearance, is at Samos where the conspirators after the negotiations with Alcibiades, organized a secret meeting to discuss what course of action was to be taken. The majority thought that the plan to reinstate Alcibiades with a view to securing Tissaphernes’ support in the war against the Peloponnesians and the establishment of an oligarchy was sound and had good chances of success. Then Phrynichus stepped in and held an astoundingly brazen speech, in what appears to have been a statesmanlike performance, raising his objections to and reservations about the whole scheme. It may be observed that Phrynichus spoke in defiance of the general atmosphere of elevation and enthusiasm prevalent at the moment, in full knowledge that his views were likely to be repulsive to his audience. He made a number of fully valid points, namely that Alcibiades main concern was his reinstatement, not the form of constitution, and that they should take every precautionary step so as to avoid dissension. Furthermore, that it was in the King’s best interest to support the Peloponnesians, with whom he conversed friendly, and with whose interests the Persian ones did not clash, and who possessed already considerable territory in the King’s dominion plus a military force to be reckoned with. Then he offered an incisive analysis of Athens’ relations with her allies:

τάς τε ξυµµαχίδας πόλεις, αις ύποκρήθηκα δη σφας ολιγαρχίαν, ὅτι δη καὶ αυτοὶ οὐ δηµοκρατήσονται, εὗ ειδὲναι ἐφη ὅτι οὐδὲν μᾶλλον σφίον συθ’ αἱ ἄφεσίνις προσχωρήσονται συθ’ αἱ υπάρχονσι βεβαιότεραι ἔσονται· οὐ γὰρ βουλήθησθαι αυτοὺς μετ’ ολιγαρχίας ἢ δηµοκρατίας δουλεύειν μᾶλλον ἢ μεθ’ ὅπως ἦν τὰχοι τοῖσον ἐλευθέρους εἶναι· τοῖσ τε καλοὺς κἀγαθούς ἀναµιχόµενους οὐκ ἐλάσω αὐτοὺς νοµίζειν σφίοι πράγµατα παρέξειν τοῦ δήµου, ποριστάς ὄντας καὶ ἐσηγητάς τῶν κακῶν τῷ δήµῳ, εἷς ὁν τῷ πλείῳ αὐτοὺς ὄφελεξθαι· καὶ τῷ µὲν ἐπ’ εἰκένισι εἶναι καὶ ἄκριτοι ἢ καὶ βιωτέρον ἀπονήσκειν, τὸν δὲ δήµον σφὸν τε καταφυγήν εἶναι καὶ ἐκείνον σωφρονιστήν. καὶ ταῦτα παρ’ αὐτῶν τῶν ἔργων ἐπισταµένας τὰς πόλεις σαφῶς αὐτῶς εἰδέναι ὅτι συτω νοµίζουσιν (Thuc. 8.48.4-6).

As regards the allied cities, to which of course they would promise an oligarchy, on the grounds they themselves would cease to have a democratic constitution, he knew very well, he said, that neither the already defected cities would come over to them, nor would the remaining ones become firmer. For they will not prefer being slaves under an oligarchy or democracy to being free under whichever of the two they may happen to have. [He also knew that] the so-called perfect gentlemen would no less cause trouble to them (the allies) than the populace, since they were the providers and proposers of evils to the populace, from which they get the most benefits. And if it were in their power, they (the allies) would be convicted without trial and meet with a more violent death, whereas the populace (of Athens) is their (the allies’) refuge and their (the perfect gentlemen’s) castigator. And these, said Phrynichus, the cities knew very well from experience, and he knew well that they (the allies) are of this opinion.

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This impressive for its clarity, and insightful analysis speech met with Thucydides’ wholehearted and unequivocal endorsement. It has been pointed out that in this speech certain thoughts and attitudes of Thucydides himself are reflected, especially with regard to Athens’ relations with her allies.\textsuperscript{848} It should not be doubted that the historian should have subscribed to most of the analysis offered in this passage, whether by giving his own comment in the case of Alcibiades, or by narrating subsequent events, e.g., Thasos (8.64), the treaty between Persia and Sparta (8.58) which confirm the validity of Phrynichus’ analysis.\textsuperscript{849} But in view of the fact that Thucydides allows other protagonists, e.g., Brasidas, to hold completely different views of Athens and her allies (see above), we need not doubt that these views faithfully represent Phrynichus’ political thought at the moment the speech was held.\textsuperscript{850}

It is at first sight strange that it is, of all persons in Thucydides, Phrynichus who issues a warning against the danger of \textit{stasis}, should the Athenians allow Alcibiades, the number one instigator of \textit{stasis}, to return. This danger of dissention and civil strife has been thought to refer to a possible struggle between various social or political groups in Athens,\textsuperscript{851} or alternatively, between the oligarchs themselves.\textsuperscript{852} We may alternatively view this paradox in the wider post-Sicilian world context in which individuals driven by ambition, fear and uncertainty strive to pursue their goals and thwart those of their opponents in a relentless struggle.\textsuperscript{853} Phrynichus makes these views public just before he himself lets the \textit{stasis} embrace him, and just before he decides to get entangled in a dangerous intrigue game with his rival, thus

\textsuperscript{848} K. Welwei \textit{Das klassische Athen: Demokratie und Machtpolitik im 5. und 4. Jahrhundert} Darmstadt 1999: 219.
\textsuperscript{849} I. Plant considers this an established technique of the historian for signalling that the politician speaking is a superior analyst (“Thuc.8.48.5: Phrynichus on the Wishes of Athens’ Allies” \textit{Historia} 41.2 1992: 250). Kagan observes Phrynichus’ analysis rejects the primacy of class struggle within the Empire (1987: 122). For a valuation of the reliability of the speech, see R. Meiggs \textit{The Athenian Empire} Oxford 1972: 411-412.
\textsuperscript{850} Heftner 2001: 45. Brasidas’ speech at Acanthus: Thuc. 4.85-87. Brasidas strives to assure the Acanthians that it is not in his intentions to interfere with their constitution by backing either the democratic or oligarchic party gain power in the city, because such an action (i.e., the domination of one faction over the other within the city) would be worse than subjugation to a foreign power; W. Connor \textit{Thucydides} Princeton 1984: 126-140.
\textsuperscript{851} Grossi 1984: 30; Heftner 2001: 47.
turning himself into a protagonist in a *stasis* episode where it is not factions that take a stand (ορτάως) but single individuals. But once one has descended the dangerous slippery spiral of *stasis*, it is impossible to exercise control over what is happening around them. In the end, Thucydides seems to be implying here, Phrynichus loses his coolness and is forced to follow a self-destructive course.

Another point Phrynichus makes in his speech must have sounded quite unconventional, even shocking, in the ears of his audience. The Athenian general argued that the allies would not trust the Athenian *kaloikagathoi* more than the Athenian *demos* because the former reaped the most benefits from the empire, being rapacious and unscrupulous. This startling statement put in the mouth of a member of the Athenian establishment, has caused much bewilderment and disbelief, to the point that quite disparate interpretations of this passage have been offered. One is that the oligarchs were ‘purveyors and proposers of the disasters to the *demos* (Baver, Poppo); and the other is that the oligarchs were ‘purveyors and proposers’ of the measures and atrocities committed by the *demos* against the allies (Classen, Steup, Jowett: they were the persons who suggested crimes to the popular mind; who provided the means for their execution’; Brunt: ‘it was they who prompted and proposed to the people the measures injurious to the allies’.854 This disparity in interpretation stems, I believe, from the fact that Thucydides’ discourse is at this point at its most dense and it is particularly contracted, a phenomenon not unusual in his work. Particularly compressed is the phrase referring to the *kaloikagathoi* at Athens at 8.48.6 ‘ποριζούσιν οἱ καλοὶ κἀγαθοὶ τοῖς συμμάχοις κακά τε καὶ εἰσηγοῦνται τῷ τῶν Ἀθηναίων δήμῳ κακά. Phrynichus, thus, appears to be pointing out that while the decisions concerning measures against the allies are taken by the Athenian populace through voting for decrees introduced in the Assembly by members of the upper classes, it is the latter who have the greatest motive to implement these decrees, since they reserve the lion’s share of the fruits of the empire for themselves. We should therefore prefer Classen, Steup, Jowett and Brunt’s interpretation, which is corroborated by considerable epigraphic and literary evidence of the fifth and fourth centuries, evidence which throws light on the ways the upper classes in Athens exploited financially the allied cities in a variety of ways. The picture that emerges is that of a convergence of interests between the upper and lower classes in Athens in the fifth century and for as long as Athens could keep her allies under her control. A notable corollary of this overlapping of interests was the absence of social tensions and class struggle in Athens.855

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855 IG I³ 421-430: Records of the sale of the property of those implicated in the profanation of the Mysteries and the mutilation of the Herm sculptures (422, 218: ἐπικαρπία ἐλ {λ} Δε<λ>ά[ντοι]; 424,15: [χορία υ]περόρια ε[. . ]; 430, 42: ἑπερορία γε φοιλ[ε]. Oionias’ overseas property in Euboea was worth a staggering 81,3 talents (IG I³ 422, 375-378). IG II/III² 43, 24-25: the declaration of the second Athenian alliance in 378/7 stipulating that
It is rather unlikely that the statement that the Athenian demos moderated the rapacity of the upper classes towards the allied cities would evoke positive reactions on the part of Phrynichus’ audience, which, let us not forget, consisted of members of the very upper classes designated as ‘rapacious.’ Perhaps it was a distinctive feature of Phrynichus’ character to show utter disregard for majority opinion or ingrained, cliché attitudes, as long as the latter did not conform to his own ideas and plans. But how unusual or radical did Phrynichus’ propositions sound? In this matter, that is Athens’ relationship with her allies, as viewed by a member of the Athenian upper class of radically conservative and oligarchic convictions, we can compare his speech with a contemporary writer whose work has been preserved among Xenophon’s. Pseudo-Xenophon in his *Athenaion Politeia* makes a series of points. He maintains that the Athenian empire would collapse if the oligarchs in the allied cities took control; the Athenian demos appropriates the property of the allied oligoi, assassinates and banishes them; the Athenian kaloi kagathoi support their counterparts in the allied cities out of mutual interest; the might of Athens rests on the revenue flowing into the city from the allies, and the Athenian demos takes every precaution to ensure that the allied oligoi pay their tribute; the Athenian populace profit financially from the fact that the allied oligoi have to travel to Athens when involved in a lawsuit; the allied oligoi are forced to adopt a servile attitude when they appear in a court of law in Athens so as to appease their judges. A comparison between Phrynichus and Pseudo-Xenophon’s picture of the Athenian empire and the Athenians were no longer permitted to acquire land in the allied cities. Andocides in his speech *On the Peace with Sparta* 3.15, 36 speaks of overseas properties owned by rich Athenians and debts owed to them by citizens in allied cities: he is corroborated by IG I3 426, dated to 414 B.C., an inscription which testifies to the existence of two estates on Thasos belonging to Athenian citizens (lines 45 and 144); Thuc. 3.50.2: Athens seizes allied land on Lesbos and distributes it to her citizens. See the discussion in Gomme, Andrewes and Dover 1945-1981: 5111-112; Hornblower and Greenstock 1984: 146-147; Hornblower 1991-2008: 3899.  

tensions between the leading city and her subjects underscores the unconventionality of Phrynichus’ contentions which, as we have seen, are corroborated to a great extent by epigraphic evidence. If pseudo-Xenophon’s picture of a greedy, insatiable demos reflected the opinions of a typical representative of the Athenian elite with conservative views, it becomes apparent that Phrynichus’ picture did not resonate with it.

Another question which arises is, who are these kaloi kagathoi Phrynichus refers to? Various proposals have been put forward: The term may refer to Alcibiades and a group of snobbish people accompanying him who distinguished themselves through the use of special vocabulary and were equally separated from the rest of the elite and the populace. According to another scholar, the kaloi kagathoi in this passage do not belong to the traditional upper classes but to circles influenced by the sophistic movement, people like Alcibiades and Critias who were a potential danger to the democracy and oligarchy alike. It has also been suggested that the term here describes not only the Athenian but the elite in the allied cities as well. The term cannot be understood to mean the oligarchs, as it does in Xenophon 2.3.12, 15, though, because, first, Thucydides uses other vocabulary to refer to oligarchs (ὀλίγοι at 8.66.5 and 8.97.2), and second, it would be strange if Phrynichus used a term in derogatory sense to describe people who had the same political orientation as his audience. It has also been suggested that Phrynichus in his analysis was concerned with three groups in Athens: the oligarchic conspirators, the democrats and the fine gentlemen who were a threat to the first two groups. However, Phrynichus in this passage ventures to highlight the workings of the Athenian empire and his analysis lies on past experience. On this interpretation, the kaloi kagathoi are the people mostly involved in the major administration and ruling of the empire, a wealthy elite encompassing both nouveau-riches and aristocrats alike. Those people might have been of oligarchic or democratic convictions but this is not Phrynichus’ concern here. His analysis rather focuses on the interaction between allied upper classes, on the one hand, and Athenian upper classes and demos on the other. The word ‘so-called’ (ὀνοµαζοµένους) is used sarcastically by Phrynichus in its socio-political sense, and

857 The word was appropriated by a certain class to designate themselves and itself has moral, political and social overtones, but eludes translation ‘for it is impossible in itself that we should have an equivalent for a cant political term in current use in a particular society at a particular time’ (A. Gomme “The Interpretation of Καλοὶ Καγαθοὶ in Thucydides 4.40.2” CQ 3 1953: 66).
859 Hammond 1977: 149-152.
860 K. Welwei 1999: 403 and no 283.
861 Hornblower and Greenstock 1984: 151. See also there the survey of translations of the term kaloi kagathoi by various commentators on Thucydides’ passage. Contra S. Forde 1989: 133, who argues that the kaloi kagathoi are the men who would come to power in an oligarchy.
862 Hornblower and Greenstock 1984: 151.
by picking it here the shrewd politician is casting doubts on the moral attributes attached to it, which its bearers claimed to possess.

It has been pointed out that Phrynichus’ speech is a response, point by point, to that of Alcibiades made at Tissaphernes’ court. Thucydides employed this narrative device to present the complex, convoluted situation in inter-state relationships as well as within the Athenian empire from two antithetical points of view. But Phrynichus’ speech failed to gain acceptance within the circle of the conspirators and his warnings against Alcibiades and the policy to be adopted towards the allies were not taken seriously, perhaps because the Athenian general could not offer a course of action which could eventually help Athens rid of her troubles and elevate her. But what could have been his political stance at the time? Some have thought him to have been a democrat. Kagan believes that by late 412 Phrynichus had already oligarchic inclinations; otherwise his invitation to the secret revolutionary caucus would have been inexplicable. Furthermore, his activity and whole-hearted involvement in the movement a few months later point to the same direction, i.e., oligarchic ideology. His opposition to the oligarchs’ plans was due to personal enmity with Alcibiades, not to constitutional or ideological considerations. Other scholars have held similar views, while Welwei has argued that Phrynichus had a motive to seek a way to subvert the democratic constitution by supporting the oligarchic movement because his deposition owing to his performance at Samos was imminent. But Phrynichus’ deposition did not occur until Peisander’s first visit to Athens, that is a few months after late September 412, and as we shall see it was the outcome of a diabole, political betrayals and realignments with a view to appeasing Alcibiades, and did not probably arise from the general’s actual performance at Miletus. Heftner observes that by the ξυνοµόται at 8.48.3 we are to understand a meeting of a wider circle of Athenian leading figures, among whom Phrynichus was perhaps one with conservative but not necessarily oligarchic views. With regard to the argument drawn from his subsequent, zealous involvement in the coup, it carries little validity in itself because this involvement seems to have been unforeseeable at the time of the oligarchic conference and only came about as a result of Alcibiades’

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863 Hammond suggested that Phrynichus sarcastically referred to the members of the nobility because he himself was of low origin, adducing Lysias 10.12 as evidence (1977: 155). But as we have seen we are not entitled to draw firm conclusions from this passage (so, rightly Heftner 2001: 47).
867 See the bibliography in Heftner 2001: 46 no 222; Grossi 1984: 28 no 35.
869 Heftner concludes his syllogism thus: ‘seine Haltung in der Praxis auf eine Bewahrung des innenpolitischen Status quo in Athen, also eine Beibehaltung der demokratischen Verfassung hinauslaufen musste…er damals …die Bewahrung der demokratischen Systems der Möglichkeit eines oligarchischen Umsturzes vorgezogen hat’ (2001: 48).
dropping out of the scheme (see below). Furthermore, his recent election to the generalship points to the direction of a politician willing to operate within the given constitutional framework, although we have no means of knowing whether he did so out of expediency or conviction. In addition, as Heftner remarks, his speech on Athens’ relationships with her allies does not conform to oligarchic, contemporary party political parlance (see above). We would therefore not be justified to assign Phrynichus any oligarchic leanings while he is at Samos, but we cannot define his political stance in more concrete terms.

The letters to Astyochus

Soon after the oligarchs’ meeting at Samos in which Phrynichus’ views were totally ignored, it was decided that Peisander as the head of an embassy be sent to Athens with a view to paving the way for Alcibiades’ recall, enlisting Tissaphernes as Athens’ ally and going ahead with the plan to install an oligarchy. At this point, Phrynichus, fearful of Alcibiades’ recall and the implications this event would have had on him, and a declared enemy of Alcibiades, contrived a scheme of unbelievable deviousness and intricacy. He sent a letter to the Lacedaemonian admiral Astyochus at Miletus in which he divulged the treacherous role of Alcibiades and his secret dealings with Astyochus. The Athenian exile, Phrynichus warned Astyochus, was damaging the Peloponnesian cause as he was trying to forge a deal between Athens and Tissaphernes. It was legitimate for the Athenian general to commit himself to this not so honorable deed, and even harm his country, owing to his personal enmity. Astyochus did not attempt to punish Alcibiades but instead took a trip to Magnesia at Tissaphernes’ court, where Alcibiades also had been for a short time residing, and revealed the content of the letter to the two men. Alcibiades sent immediately a letter to the Athenian officers at Samos, demanding that Phrynichus be put to death. At this juncture, Phrynichus sends a second letter to Astyochus, remonstrating with him that he did not keep the first letter confidential, and he did not co-operate. He was about, however, to make a second approach and offer the Peloponnesians a huge price, namely the entire Athenian naval force at Samos, which could be delivered to Astyochus if he was to follow his detailed instructions. Phrynichus claimed that he was not to be reproached; his life was in danger for their sakes and everything he would do was pardonable if he could by those means save his life. Astyochus, however, revealed the second letter as well to Alcibiades, and the latter sent another letter to Samos. But Phrynichus, having predicted his enemy’s move, issued an order to fortify Samos to repel an imminent enemy attack, just before the arrival of Alcibiades’ fateful message. As a result, Alcibiades lost faith with the soldiers at Samos, whereas Phrynichus was seen as a savior.

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870 Thuc. 8.49.
871 Thuc. 8.50-51.
Scholars have striven to ascertain the source or sources of this incredible story. E. Delebecque argued that Alcibiades would have not had the slightest inclination to disclose the incident, having been outwitted so decisively by his arch-rival. On the other hand, it has been proposed that when Alcibiades returned to Samos and got elected as general, he disclosed the story to his followers. The information could have thus reached Thucydides through these intermediaries, although, owing to the historian’s obsession with cross-examination, Alcibiades himself is not to be excluded. A similar version has been propounded by M. Lang. According to her, the Athenian authorities in Samos were the sources of information of this episode for the historian, as well as of the preceding secret meeting with the oligarchs. It has also been claimed that the episode, as it has been reported by Thucydides, constitutes almost a breach of the famous principle at 1.22.2-3. Phrynichus also has been considered as a possible source, especially for the second letter which he sent to Astyochus. The cunning general would have boasted about the way he managed to outwit Alcibiades and tarnish his public image at Samos while at the same time retrieved his own. M. Cagnetta has also proposed Phrynichus as the most likely source for the entire episode. According to her, Phrynichus, Peisander and Theramenes were most important informers of Thucydides and as far as the former is concerned chapters 27 and 48-51 of Book Eight reflect his own perspective. Rejecting Westlake’s hypothesis that Thucydides’ source for this episode was Phrynichus’ messenger, Cagnetta is convinced that it was the oligarch himself who provided Thucydides with all the information. Westlake has argued that Alcibiades cannot have been himself Thucydides’ source for the events covered in the eighth book, and that four individuals who were in the exile’s retinue are the probable sources.

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872 The whole episode is thought to have extended over a period of two to three weeks given the distances between Samos, Magnesia and Miletus. Peisander and his delegation should have left for Athens before Alcibiades’ first letter arrived in Samos, otherwise the former would have used its content to further blacken Phrynichus in order to secure his deposition (so Busolt 1893-1904: 3.2 1470 no 2).
876 ‘Thucydides’ account gives the impression that he has recorded what he has ascertained from a single informant without adding much comment or interpretation of his own’ (Westlake “Phrynichos and Astyochos (Thucydides VIII 50-1)” JHS 76 1956: 99).
879 Those included Alcibiades of Phegous, Alcibiades’ cousin, Axiochus, Alcibiades’ uncle, Adeimantus, Alcibiades’ fellow-demesman, and Mantitheus, a mutilator of the Hermae. All four individuals were in Asia at the time the events described by Thucydides were unfolding (“The Influence of Alcibiades on Thucydides, Book 8” Mnemosyne 38.1/2 1985: 93-108).
Consensus has not been reached either as to whether the story Thucydides reports is true or not. It has been suggested that the story was a sheer invention on the part of Alcibiades, intended to discredit his enemy. R. Sealey thought the whole episode was invented by Alcibiades who briefed the historian at a later time when Phrynichus was not at Samos any more (and perhaps already dead). One of Sealey’s arguments is that the fact that Peisander failed to denounce Phrynichus in the Athenian assembly during his first visit to Athens on the grounds of the latter’s treacherous dealings with Astyochus is an indication that the whole story was not true, but invented at a later time. The objection to this view has been put forward by Heftner, namely that if Phrynichus’ machinations were Alcibiades’ invention to discredit his opponent, the story of the second letter would have been unnecessary, since one treacherous letter would have been enough to compromise Phrynichus’ reputation. Welwei believes that the second letter was not authentic. On the other hand, Kagan accepts the authenticity of both letters and of the episode as such, while T. Rood contents that the very oddity of the episode confirms its historicity. Hornblower also treats the letters as historical, the first belonged to a plan A, and had genuine intentions (i.e., to discredit Alcibiades), whereas the second belonged to a plan B and was a fake in that it was meant to produce exactly the reactions it triggered off. I believe we should not doubt the historicity of the incident, or the accuracy of the account Thucydides gives us here. One would not be justified to argue that the historian on this occasion failed to cross-examine his sources, which could have been found in the environment of the Athenian authorities at Samos, Alcibiades’ circle and Astyochus’ lieutenants.

Let us now look into the affair in more detail with a view to elucidating some of its aspects, as this passage has given rise to a long and heated debate concerning what really happened in this intrigue and the real motives of its participants. It has been suggested that as far as the first letter is concerned, Phrynichus’ motives cannot have been purely personal, only that the letter was written in such a way as to convince Astyochus that Phrynichus made this move out of personal rivalry. The

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880 J. Hatzfeld Alcibiades: Étude sur l’histoire d’Athènes à la fin du 5 siècle Paris 1940: 235-236. See Westlake’s sensible reply, namely that Alcibiades did not have any compelling reason to resort to such machinations. His primary goal was to effect his return. It was Phrynichus who had put himself in a perilous situation after his vehement opposition to Alcibiades’ recall. In addition, some of the incidents took place in public and cannot have been Alcibiades’ invention (1956: 100).
882 Heftner 2001: 51.
883 Welwei 1999: 219, 403 no 286.
886 Phrynichus’ motivation seems to be explained by the historian through a certain pattern involving participial phrases stemming from verbs expressing knowledge and fear. His train of thought and reactions strongly resemble that of other important figures in Thucydides’ Histories (Lang 1996: 291).
Athenian general acted in the interests of Athens as well, namely the cessation of the negotiations between Persia and Athens, which Phrynichus found detrimental to the Athenian cause, through Alcibiades’ death. However, Phrynichus’ plan failed because it was based on a misconception, that is, Alcibiades was no longer co-operating with the Peloponnesians and he had meanwhile been out of Astyochus’ range. The reason is that Alcibiades’ flight to Tissaphernes’ court was quite recent and during his meeting with the Athenian conspirators he would have no reason to conceal his real status to them. 887 This view has been challenged by E. Bloedow, who maintains that Phrynichus had accurate and reliable information about Alcibiades, and his sending Astyochus the letter was part of an ingenious plan to frustrate Alcibiades’ ambitions. Bloedow interprets the phrase at 8.50.2 ὅτι Ἀλκιβιάδης αὐτῶν τὰ πράγματα φθείρει Τισσαφέρνην Ἀθηναίοις φίλον ποιῶν, καὶ τῶλλα πάντα σαφῶς ἐγγράψας as ‘Alcibiades was ruining the Lacedaemonian cause by making Tissaphernes a friend of the Athenians, and also wrote an explicit account of his other doings.’ 888 On this interpretation, it emerges that Phrynichus had accurate knowledge about Alcibiades’ whereabouts and the fact that he had broken away from the Spartans and had been residing at Tissaphernes’ court for quite a while. Thucydides’ Ἀλκιβιάδην...οὐδὲ διενοεῖτο τιμωρεῖσθαι (8.50.3) can be understood as Astyochus’ immediate reaction and not as Phrynichus’ real intention. Bloedow concludes, ‘far from falling prey (Phrynichus) to a ‘misconception’ or making a ‘mistake’-rather, on the basis of his accurate knowledge about Alcibiades’ movements and Astyochus’ character, he foresaw how events would unfold, and so acted deliberately. He calculated that Astyochus would in fact in the end take his letter to Tissaphernnes and Alcibiades.’ 889 But then what could have been Phrynichus’ objective in sending the letter to Astyochus? On Bloedow’s view, it was certainly not Astyochus’ punishing Alcibiades, since he knew the Athenian exile was out of the Spartan admiral’s reach. 890 Phrynichus knew how important it was for Astyochus and the Spartan side to secure the flow of the Persian subsidies, 891 and that in the Spartan’s eyes Alcibiades’ double dealings could only be perceived as lethal danger. He correctly thought that

887 Westlake 1956: 101; cf. Kagan 1987: 126-127; W. Ellis Alcibiades London and New York 1989: 75. In order to make his point that Phrynichus was in the dark as to the whereabouts of Alcibiades, Westlake quotes Thuc. 8.51.3 as evidence that the Athenians at Samos, when receiving Alcibiades’ second letter, assumed that the latter was still on the Peloponnesian side. But this does not prove that Phrynichus as well shared this view. I believe this passage proves nothing about Phrynichus’ knowledge of Alcibiades’ movements.

888 Bloedow, 1991: 94. See notes 21, 22 on other interpretations. Bloedow argues: ‘since the main point of the letter has to do with Alcibiades, it would be strange to take up also some completely unrelated subject, whereas Phrynichus would be more likely to induce Astyochus into action if he could show detailed knowledge about Alcibiades’ activities.’


890 This is Westlake’s argument: ‘It was undoubtedly the intention of Phrynichos that his first message would cause Astyochos to punish Alkibiades for his double dealing either by execution or by imprisonment, thus preventing his projected recall to Athens’ (1956: 100).

891 Meyer 1884-1901: 4.1 544.
Astyochus had every motive to communicate Alcibiades’ treacherous negotiations to Tissaphernes, a revelation which could only tarnish the former’s image. Indeed it has been pointed out that Alcibiades’ relationship and standing with Tissaphernes began to deteriorate soon after Astyochus’ journey to the satrap’s court. Astyochus must have taken the opportunity during his visit to Magnesia to complain about Alcibiades’ contacts with the Athenians at Samos, and see to it that Tissaphernes would remain tied to the Spartan vehicle. Phrynichus may have anticipated all that, and, by orchestrating this move, his objective was to drive a wedge between Tissaphernes and Alcibiades, whereby preventing the latter from returning to Athens and politically rehabilitating himself. Phrynichus’ move was masterly because he managed to entangle all three players in a confrontation, the outcome of which would be to the oligarch’s advantage. Indeed, it so happened that Alcibiades was discredited in the eyes of Tissaphernes and his standing at the satrap’s court severely undermined, whereas Tissaphernes unwaveringly drew closer to Sparta.

When Phrynichus’ first letter failed to achieve its ostensible goal, i.e., elimination of Alcibiades, (but we saw that Phrynichus’ objective was more complex and far-reaching), Alcibiades wrote himself a letter to the authorities in Samos demanding Phrynichus’ head, at which point the crafty oligarch responded by a counter-move: he sends the second letter to Astyochus.

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896 Heftner 2001: 53 and no 248.
The crucial question is whether Phrynichus’ offer to deliver the Athenian camp at Samos to Astyochus was genuine. Opinion on this perplexing issue, as usual, is divided. Some scholars believe Phrynichus was prepared to go to great lengths in order to secure his own survival and his enemy’s obliteration. Others declare agnosticism.\textsuperscript{897} Westlake points out that Thucydides nowhere implies that Phrynichus’ offer to Astyochus was insincere, and that in reality Phrynichus decides to warn the Athenian at Samos of the imminent enemy attack only after he gets information that Alcibiades’ second letter is on its way to Samos.\textsuperscript{898} But, according to Westlake, Phrynichus had calculated three possible reactions of Astyochus: a) the Spartan would report the second letter to Alcibiades, as he did with the first; b) he would attempt an attack on Samos, in which case - here Westlake’s interpretation departs from Thucydides’ text - military benefits were to be secured for Athens because Phrynichus’ instructions were false, he intended to lead the Spartan navy into a trap; c) Astyochus would ignore the second letter altogether. In the cases of a) and c), Phrynichus would issue his warning against the enemy attack and, as it so happened, he would fortify Samos.\textsuperscript{899} Andrewes believed that Thucydides thought that Phrynichus had indeed the intention to betray the Athenian camp (cf. Plut. Alc. 25.9-13); but Andrewes himself was reserved. He stressed the fact that Phrynichus network of intelligence was excellent (‘the messenger who took the first letter to Astyochus could probably report a good deal, and 51.1 οὐκ”σαφῶς πεπυσµένος implies a fair amount of correspondence across the lines), but he ran the risk that Astyochos might seize the chance and attack Samos at once.’ He concludes: ‘It is a striking indication of the lengths to which a Greek might expect personal feuds to be taken in politics, and what Thucydides was prepared to classify as οὐκ ἀξύνετος 27.5.’\textsuperscript{900} Heftner has taken a similar view. For Phrynichus the fact that Astyochus had delivered the first letter to Alcibiades did not mean he would do the same with the second. It was also possible that Astyochus would either ignore the letter or lead an attack on Samos.\textsuperscript{901} He believes that Phrynichus got information about Alcibiades’ moves through his emissary who may have discerned Astyochus’ plans through his reactions. Since Phrynichus, pace Heftner, had the means to secretly send envoys to the enemy, he would be in a position to spy on the enemy camp as well. In case an attack on Samos was decided, the preparations would have taken some time and, conversely, if an attack was not to be made, the military inactivity would also have been recorded by Phrynichus’ envoy. In this case Phrynichus could safely assume that Astyochus was to brief Alcibiades. In conclusion, Phrynichus ‘war bereit, sich tatsächlich auf eine hochverräterische Konspiration mit dem Nauarchen einzulassen,

\textsuperscript{897} Rood 1998: 267.
\textsuperscript{899} See, however, the criticism in Kagan 1987: 128, where inconsistencies in Westlake’s interpretation are brought to the fore.
\textsuperscript{900} Gomme, Andrewes and Dover 1945-1981: 5 119.
\textsuperscript{901} Heftner 2001: 56, following Westlake 1956 and Gomme, Andrewes and Dover 1945-1981: 5 119.
konnte sich aber dank seiner Informationsquellen aus dem Spartanerlager für den Fall, dass Astyochos nicht darauf eingehen sollte, einen Ausweg offenhalten.\footnote{902}

The whole passage is a riddle and the key to solving it is the interpretation of 8.51.1: καὶ ὃς προθυμητὸς αὐτὸν ὁ Φρύνιχος ὁδικοῦντα. Those who believe Phrynichus had treacherous intent take the phrase to mean 'when Phrynichus learned in advance that he (Astyochus) was doing him an injury,'\footnote{903} or 'Phrynichus im foraus erfuhr, dass Astyochos mit ihm falsches Spiel treiben werde.'\footnote{904} But the verb προαισθάνομαι has another meaning, also to be found in Thucydides. J. Steup interpreted the passage: 'nach der gemachten Erfahrung sah Phrynichos voraus, dass Astyochos abermals, Verrat üben werde.'\footnote{905} Schindel has offered an excellent discussion of the passage. He accepts Steup’s interpretation and argues that the verb προαισθάνομαι at 8.51 has the meaning ‘have a hunch’, that is, be able to perceive something which has not

\footnote{902} Ibid 58.  
\footnote{903} Westlake 1956: 101 no 17, who quotes 8.16.2 and 79.3 as similar uses of προαισθάνομαι.  
\footnote{904} Heftner 2001: 56, quoting also Thuc. 2.93.3 and 5.58.1. In a similar fashion, Busolt: ‘erhielt jedoch rechtzeitig Wind...’ (1893-1904: 3.2 1469). Avery also, endorsing this interpretation, is inclined to accept Phrynichus’ treacherous intent. He concludes: ‘As Andrewes has noted, we are not in a position to judge Phrynichus’ actual intentions; but the report that he was later found guilty of treason on Samos (Craterus, FGrH 342 F 11 =Scholium to Ar., Lys. 313) indicates that at the time of his trial it was commonly held in Athens that he had planned to betray the camp’ (“The Chronology of Peisander’s Mission to Athens” CP 94 1999: 142 no 56). Craterus in his συναγωγή ἡ τηρομάτων had copied the verdict of Phrynichus’ posthumous trial (cf. [Plut.] Life of Antiphon 834A-B). At any rate, whatever Craterus copied and Didymus wrote has come down to us indirectly through the scholiast to Aristophanes Lysistrata 313, that is to say, what we have is an interpretation of the two authors (Δίδυμος καὶ Κρατερός φασι), and the scholion as it stands is probably an abridged version of a longer text. The scholiast connects Phrynichus’ performance as general at Samos with the verdict of his trial written on a bronze stele. F. Jacoby rightly doubted the validity of Dydimus’ comment that Aristophanes’ verse alludes to Phrynichus (Die Fragmente der griechischen Historiker Leiden 1968: 3b Text and Notes 132-134). In Aristophanes’ play, the chorus is not aware of the generals’ oligarchic plots at Samos, and seems to count on their help (A. Sommerstein The Comedies of Aristophanes 7 Lysistrata Warminster 1990: 2, 169). For the scholiast, however, the words ἐν Σάμῳ στρατηγῶν, might not have necessarily seemed to refer to the exchange of letters with Astyochus, as Avery believes. Samos was the headquarters of the Athenian navy in 412, and it is equally likely that the scholiast, quoting Dydymus, had Iasus and Amorges in mind. Phrynichus compromised demos’ interests by handing over a useful ally to the enemy (so Gomme, Andrewes and Dover 1945-1981: 5 187). This was exactly Peisander’s accusation at the assembly (see below). Besides, what was believed at the time of Phrynichus’ posthumous trial is irrelevant to what actually took place in the vicinity of Samos in late December 412. Thucydides would have no qualms to correct a popular opinion on Phrynichus’ culpability if he thought his case was based on facts. I believe this is exactly what he is doing in this passage.  
\footnote{905} Classen-Steup Thukydides 4 Berlin 1963: 124.
occurred yet. With this meaning the verb is well attested in the Attic orators and Aristotle. Moreover, a passage in Thucydides, namely 3.38.6, where Cleon remarks that the Athenians can tell in advance what a rhetor is going to say, even before he delivers his speech points to the same direction. Perhaps, what is decisive in our passage, is the participle ἀδικοῦντα, which refers to the previous phrase ὁ δὲ Ἀστῦχος μηνύει καὶ ταῦτα τῷ Ἀλκιβιάδῃ, that is to the disclosing of the second letter to Alcibiades on the part of Astyochos. If we interpret the verb προαισθάνομαι as ‘become aware of something beforehand’, we should expect the participle to be in the aorist, ἀδικήσαντα: ‘when Phrynichus became aware of Astyochus having injured him...’ But the present ἀδικοῦντα denotes a continuous wrong-doing on the part of Astyochus, something that Phrynichus knew already since the first letter. On this interpretation, Phrynichus’ both letters were part of an elaborate schedule to further his private interests and political goals, namely the elimination of an arch-enemy, Alcibiades, and his alleged betrayal was not genuine, but only a stratagem.

From that time onwards, Phrynicus would stand in unwavering opposition to Alcibiades, a political stance which, in the end, would prove fatal for the seasoned oligarch, since it compelled him to take a downward spiral path leading to treason and his death. But when did exactly this abyssal enmity appear? Some believe that there seems to have been a pre-existing hostility, because when Phrynichus sends his first letter to Astyochus, immediately after the meeting with the oligarchic conspirators, Alcibiades was not yet informed about the content of his speech.

907 Ibid 290 and notes 46-50.
908 ὣξεως δὲ τῇ λέγοντος προεπαινέσαι, καὶ προαισθέσθαι τε πρόθυµοι εἶναι τὰ λεγόμενα καὶ προνοῆσαι βραδεῖς τὰ ἔξι αὐτῶν αποβησόμενα: (you) praise beforehand when somebody gives instructions in a sharp manner, and you are eager to perceive beforehand what is to be said, but slow to foresee the outcome of it.
909 Schindel 1970: 293: Wenn man den Wortlaut des Berichtes genau prüft, dann gibt es genug Formulierungen, die deutlich auf ein Strategem hinweisen und den aufmerksamen Leser über die wahren Zusammenhänge nicht im Unklaren lassen. Ingeniously demonstrating the real meaning of θορυβούµενος at 8.50.5, as a reaction to sudden incidents which one may perceive as dangers but by no means a reaction to sudden attacks and outwitting whose target one cannot recognize, Schindel 1970: 284 rejects the views of those who believe that Phrynichus was in desperation and had run out of options when Alcibiades’ first letter arrived (Ellis 1989: 75; Lenschau 1941: 908; P. Brunt “Thucydides and Alcibiades” REG 65 1952: 76-77). This interpretation is also accepted by Hornblower who points out that the whole story belongs to a favourite Thucydidean narrative category, the clever trick (1991-2008: 3 901, 906). Plutarch asserts that Phrynichus committed treason on this occasion, but in his narrative he links the intrigues with Astyochus with his assassination and posthumous conviction for high treason. It is possible that the grammarian read the Thucydidean passage in the light of the verdict and the name Phrynichus left behind him in posterity.
neither had he reacted to it.  Kagan goes on to speculate that in the wake of the scandals in 415, Phrynichus worked against Alcibiades, when he himself had a pro-democratic outlook. Ellis adds that this would explain the absence of any support for Phrynichus’ arguments against Alcibiades, because the other conspirators would know of his personal motives. But Phrynichus’ involvement in juridical processes in 415 is not attested in the sources. Furthermore, Phrynichus’ proposals at the meeting on Samos failed to win consent not because the conspirators knew he was biased against Alcibiades, but because such course of action could not bring Athens out of the military stalemate she was in. We should, therefore, assume that Phrynichus had every reason to believe that Alcibiades would bear him a grudge, and consider him a personal enemy solely on the strength of his speech at Samos. He correctly anticipated Alcibiades’ enmity and his cunning stratagem should be considered, as we have seen, as a maneuver to hinder Alcibiades’ recall and further his own political goals.

**Peisander in Athens**

Is it possible to ascertain when Phrynichus was deposed from generalship? The answer to this question depends on when Peisander and the delegation sent by the conspirators at Samos (8.49) reached the Piraeus. The chronology of Peisander’s mission is, however, the object of a long scholarly debate, so attention to this issue is necessary. The problem stems from the fact that while from Thucydides account

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910 Kagan 1987: 123 and no 70. Kagan seems ready to see some substance in Polystratus’ libel against Phrynichus that the latter had been a sycophant, and as such he had issues with Alcibiades. But such an accusation was common in an Athenian court, and we are not entitled to draw any inferences from it.


913 To this direction points Plutarch Alc. 25.5 as well: κρατούµενος δὲ τῇ γνώµῃ καὶ φανερὸς ἢδη τοῦ Ἀλκιβιάδου γεγονός ἐχθρός, εξήγευε κρύφα πρὸς Ἀστύοχον τὸν τῶν πολεµίων ναύαρχον (when his arguments failed to carry the day, and having already become openly an enemy of Alcibiades, he sent secretly a message to Astyochus, the enemy admiral).

914 I believe Thucydides is unequivocal on this point. Phrynichus has recourse to the intrigue only after he fails to persuade the conspirators with his arguments, a move which he rightly believes Alcibiades would take as a personal attack against him, although this was probably Phrynichus’ primary purpose: 8.50.1 γνοὺς δὲ ὁ Φρύνιχος ὑπὲρ τῆς τοῦ Ἀλκιβιάδου καθήκου λόγος καὶ ὑπὲρ τῶν Ἀθηναίων ενδέχεται αὐτὴν, δεῖσας πρὸς τὴν ἐναντίωσιν τῶν ύφ᾽ αὐτοῦ λεχθέντων μὴ, ἢν κατελύθη, ὡς καλύτερ δέν κακῶς δρᾶ, τρέπεται ἐπὶ τούτων τι (knowing that there would be discussion about Alcibiades’ return and that the Athenians would accept it, and fearing, in reply to the opposition he expressed, that, if he returned he would do him an ill turn since he was a hinderer, he had recourse to the following device).

one gets the impression that Peisander’s stay in Athens was brief, the decision to send Peisander to Athens, and the voyage from Athens to Tissaphernes’ court are firmly fixed in time, and are up to three months apart. For a full discussion, see Appendix 3, pages 283-300.

Let us now examine the grounds Peisander gave for the deposition of the two generals. Phrynichus and Scironides were removed from office because they had betrayed Iasus and Amorges, Athens’ ally. Thucydides gives no information as to how Phrynichus’ decision to withdraw from Miletus was received by the Athenian army, but his language is indicative of his views about Peisander’s motion: he uses the verb διέβαλλεν, ‘slander’, twice within a few lines. Clearly for the historian the real reason was that Phrynichus had openly declared himself an enemy of Alcibiades and he was a hindrance to his recall. It has been argued that at this passage, as in the cases of Sophocles, Pythodorus and Eurymedon and his own, Thucydides has presented the impeached generals as martyrs, hinting at the unreliability of the demos. It may also be a comment on the gullibility and ignorance of the Athenians who are rash to take decisions and are easily carried away by skilful politicians, or a conscious correction of the prevailing view in Athens after Phrynichus’ ignominious end that he had damaged Athens’ cause in every given opportunity. But, under the new circumstances Phrynichus’ withdrawal and the subsequent loss of Iasus and Amorges had created, a new possibility had opened up for the oligarchs. In their negotiations with Tissaphernes, the Athenians under the new oligarchic

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916 The conspirators in Samos decide to send Peisander and ten envoys to Athens around mid December: Thuc. 8.49, 50.2 (Astyochus is still at Miletus); cf. Gomme, Andrewes and Dover 1945-1981: 5117; Avery 1959: 128-129; Hornblower 1991-2008: 3903. Sparta and Persia ratify the third treaty on the thirteenth year of Dareius reign which may have started on 29th March 411 (Thuc. 8.58.1). The theory that Dareius’ regnal year is given in Thucydides with regard to the Babylonian lunar calendar was expounded by D. Lewis “The Phoenician Fleet in 411 B.C.” Historia 7.4 1958: 392; Andrewes 1961: 2 no 4; B. Meritt “The End of Winter in Thucydides” Hesperia 33.2 1964: 228-230. W. Pritchett (“The Thucydidean Summer of 411 B.C.” CP 60.4 1965: 259-261) has challenged this view, suggesting that Dareius’ thirteenth year was not a lunar but an accession one. Dareius entered office sometime after December 424, according to R. Parker and W. Dubberstein (Babylonian Chronology 626 B.C.- AD 75 Province 1956: 18). More recently E. Bickerman “En marge de l’écriture, I: Le Comput des années de règne des Achéménides (Néh i.2; ii.1 et Thuc. 8.58)” Revue Biblique 88 1981: 19-23) has also suggested that the treaty at 8.58.1 was dated by the regnal year of the court at Susa. The thirteenth year of Dareius reign began on 29th March 411: Parker and Dubberstein 1956: 9, 33.

917 Heftner rightly holds the verb προδοῦναι at 54.3 may as well mean ‘let somebody down’ or ‘fail to do something’, but here we should take it to mean ‘betray’, because it was Peisander’ intention to discredit Phrynichus in the eyes of the Athenians and the verb διέβαλλεν (twice) indicates that (2001: 72 and no 334); contra Gomme, Andrewes and Dover 1945-1981: 5127: ‘the charge is rather that by persuading his colleagues not to fight Therimenes he was responsible for these losses (Iasus) to Athens’; Kagan 1987: 60-61.

918 8.49 clearly presents the agenda of Peisander’s mission.

administration could argue that they had made the Persian king a favor by handing him over the rebel Amorges. We do not know if this line of argumentation was employed by the Athenian delegates at the three meetings with the satrap.

It is not clear whether a trial followed the deposition or not. The first alternative suggests Avery quoting [Lys.] 20.12: the speaker on behalf of Polystratus asserts that Phrynichus had paid a fine to the public treasury, which Avery takes to have stemmed from the trial ensued after the deposition of the general.\footnote{Avery 1959: 249.} But it is not certain that reference at this passage is made to such a recent event. Since the speaker makes an excursus to Phrynichus’ early days, the context indicates that the fine arose from a trial in the distant past.\footnote{So Heftner 2001: 72.} Furthermore, if the speaker had Phrynichus’ deposition in mind, one would expect him to be more specific since his audience would have remembered the trial held less than one and a half years before.

The second alternative suggests Grossi, quoting Thuc. 7.16.1: Nicias is asking the Athenians to be released from office.\footnote{Grossi 1984: 41-43.} This passage, however, is not relevant to our case. Nicias is stepping out voluntarily and there are no indications of malpractice during his office. Roberts gives perhaps the most plausible explanation. There was no trial arising from the deposition so that no forum for discussion of Alcibiades’ sinister dealings with the enemy would be given to Phrynichus’ supporters.\footnote{Roberts 1982: 40; In a similar fashion, Heftner 2005: 95: ‘[Phrynichus] über genügend politischen Einfluß verfügte, um sich gegen eine persönliche Verfolgung zu sichern.’ The apocheirotonia process automatically led to a trial: M. Hansen Eisangelia: The Sovereignty of the People’s Court in Athens in the Fourth Century B.C. and the Impeachment of Generals and Politicians Odense 1975: 41-44; contra D. MacDowell The Law in Classical Athens Ithaca and London 1978: 169. Hansen sees the apocheirotonia as the first step towards an eisangelia, both procedures being initiated in an ekklesia kuria (AP 43.4). But in the case of Phrynichus and Skironides Hansen is justifiably cautious since AP 61.2 cannot be applied indiscriminately to fifth century cases (Hansen 1975: 62).}

**The Four Hundred**

Phrynichus’ subsequent movements from the day of his deposition on are shrouded in mystery. Save for his participation in the last fatal embassy to Sparta, recorded in Thucydides, no other contemporary source mentions him in connection to events that occurred in the preparatory phase of the oligarchic movement and the brief oligarchic rule. If his deposition was effected in approximately late February, he could have been back to Athens as early as the second half of March. The negotiations between the Athenian oligarchs, Tissaphernes and Alcibiades collapsed perhaps late March. Then the delegation moved to Samos to contemplate what course of action was to be taken, while Tissaphernes moved to Caunos to convene with the Peloponnesians, the result being the third treaty between Sparta and Persia.
in early April. Given that the oligarchs at Samos considered Phrynichus an obstacle to their plans because of his outright hostility towards Alcibiades, when did Phrynichus join the conspiracy?

A possible juncture in the run up to the oligarchic takeover could have been shortly after Peisander’s second arrival in Athens, which may have taken place as late as the last week of May. In this case, however, it would be difficult to explain how Phrynichus managed to impose himself on the other leading figures of the Four Hundred in such a short time (see below). Heftner argues that from 8.68.3 it emerges that Phrynichus approached the oligarchs when it became clear to him that the best way to hinder Alcibiades’ recall was the installation of an oligarchy, but he does not become more precise (2001: 124). Sealey assumes the approach occurred already before the collapse of the negotiations with Tissaphernes, that is, according to our time plan, before late April (1967: 125 and no 73).

The earliest possible moment could have been, I think, when news broke in Athens of the treaty at the Maiandros plain, that is, not earlier than the last third of April, assuming of course that news of this alliance did reach Athens at all. Alcibiades was too important a figure for the oligarchs to allow any talks with his deadliest enemy while everything was at stake. If this is a sound conjecture, then Phrynichus’ political, diplomatic and military stance would have been vindicated in the eyes of the oligarchs in Athens. Had the shrewd politician not foretold that Sparta was more useful to Persia than Athens? It would then have been the right time for him to deliver a deadly blow to his enemy and politically eliminate him. A new order in the

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924 Thuc. 8.56.5, 57.1.
925 The roundabout trip from Samos back to Athens should have taken Peisander and his associates several weeks, since they called at a number of islands in the Aegean, where they established oligarchies and recruited troops for their final assault at home. For suggestions as to the places they visited, see Hornblower 1991-2008: 3943. Thucydides tells us that as soon as they made their way home they put a motion to the assembly to elect ten syngrapheis, not long before the Colonus assembly (8.67.1). Phrynichus joining the oligarchy after Peisander’s second arrival is W. McCoy’s conviction. But McCoy is, I believe, mistaken in maintaining that it was the oligarchs that first approached Phrynichus after his deposition, assuring him that ‘they had no intention of allowing Aleibiades to return to Athens regardless of the outcome of the negotiations with Tissaphernes’ (Theramenes, Thrasybulus and the Athenian Moderates PhD Diss. Yale University 1970: 62). This is not borne out of Thucydides’ text (8.49; 53.1.3).
926 This is also the view of Lenschau 1941: 909. An earlier occasion could have been when every hope for collaboration with Tissaphernes had been lost for the oligarchs in late March. But it is difficult to see how the content of these talks could have reached Athens, and the oligarchs had every reason to conceal the breakdown (Gomme, Andrewes and Dover 1945-1981: 5161).
Athenian politics opened up new possibilities for him, and Phrynichus was prepared to risk life and limb to restore his badly damaged public image.\textsuperscript{927}

Other literary sources seem to promote the image of Phrynichus as being the ringleader of the oligarchic movement. Aristotle in his \textit{Politics} makes an inquiry into how the oligarchies are deposed. He lists two possible ways: either they are too narrow, or there is rivalry among the demagogues within them. That was the case with the Thirty Tyrants in Athens, when Charicles and his group prevailed by acting as demagogues, and the Four Hundred, when Phrynichus and his group did the same.\textsuperscript{928} This passage suggests that Phrynichus was so important as to lead a faction within the Four Hundred, and by implication that he clashed with the faction of Theramenes and Aristocrates, but casts him in a bad light. We do not know if Aristotle expresses a personal view here, or if he follows a source hostile to Phrynichus. Andrewes considers the possibility that Aristotle here draws from a source which expressed the views of ex-members of the Four Hundred who wanted to shift all responsibility to Phrynichus for the turn the oligarchic revolution had taken.\textsuperscript{929} Aristotle certainly does not share Thucydides’ view on Phrynichus’ eagerness, enthusiasm and trustworthiness from the moment he joined the oligarchic plot.\textsuperscript{930}

In a speech delivered before a popular court after the second restoration of democracy, between 401 and 399 B.C., in the context of the scrutiny of a candidate eligible for office Peisander and Phrynichus are presented as examples of leading politicians who changed sides, from democracy to oligarchy.\textsuperscript{931} This passage establishes the prominence the two politicians enjoyed under the democracy, but we should not take at face value what the speaker says about their motives for joining

\textsuperscript{927} Thucydides tells us that during Peisander’s absence from Athens some conspirators assassinated Androcles, a well-known demagogue and instigator of Alcibiades’ exile (8.65.2). The historian gives the motive for this act as appeasement of Alcibiades. Clearly the oligarchs by that time believed that Alcibiades was still able to deliver his promises, i.e., Persian help. This might be an indication that the murder occurred before the end of April, when the news of the Persian-Spartan alliance might have reached Athens. Alternatively, if it occurred later, it means that the oligarchs failed to see the implications of this development with regard to Alcibiades’ status and his influence in the Persian court, but Phrynichus was too experienced to be misled (This is Andrewes’ view, i.e., the terror campaign started relatively late, despite Peisander’s instructions for no delay, because the outright extremists formed a small group within the Four Hundred and could therefore not maintain a prolonged terror campaign, Gomme, Andrewes and Dover 1945-1981: 5 190-193).

\textsuperscript{928} Arist. \textit{Politics} 1305a 36-1305b27.

\textsuperscript{929} Gomme, Andrewes and Dover 1945-1981: 5: 211-212.

\textsuperscript{930} Compare Thuc. 8.68.3: πολύ τε πρὸς τὰ δεινὰ, ἐπειδὴ ἡπερ ὑπέστη, φερεγγυώτατος ἐφάνη. ‘and when face to face with dangers, after he had once set to work, he proved himself a man he could quite be depended upon’ (transl. Charles Smith).

\textsuperscript{931} Lys. 25.8-9. For the dating of the speech, see T. Murphy \textit{Forensic Representation of Oligarchs in the Corpus Lysiacum} PhD Diss. University of Texas 1986: 173.
the oligarchy, i.e., fear of prosecution in the face of committed crimes while in office. Lysias’ passage forms part of an argument on the part of the speaker, aiming at vindicating his stance during the troubles, which in fact delineates his defence: the speaker stayed in the city during the regime of the Thirty, not out of ideological considerations, i.e., support for the oligarchy, but because this move would, to some extent, further his interests, i.e., safeguard his property and status. In the speaker’s opinion, one should not expect ideological consistency or loyalty from scoundrels such as Peisander and Phrynichus, people who know too well the mechanism of government and how to turn it to their own personal advantage.932 In another speech Phrynichus is made to have established the Four Hundred alone. Again this passage is couched in rhetorical exaggerations: a few lines below the speaker asserts that the Thirty and their council, five hundred men strong, were ex members of the Four Hundred in their entirety, an obvious non-sense.933 We should remember, however, that it was Lysias’ usual strategy to focus on a single individual and cast him responsible in the eyes of the Athenians for a certain calamity that befell the city if this suited his argument.934

Another reference on Phrynichus’ participation in the oligarchy of the Four Hundred is made in Aristophanes’ Frogs. In the epirrhema of the parabasis, the poet is giving his advice to his fellow-citizens, how best to handle the perilous situation Athens is in:

Τὸν ἱερὸν χορὸν δίκαιων ἐστι χρηστὰ τῇ πόλει/ ξυμπαραινεῖν καὶ διδάσκειν. πρῶτον οὖν ἡμῖν δοκεῖ/ ἔξισθαι τοὺς πολίτας κάψιλεν τὰ δείματα./ κεῖ τις ὁφαλεὶς τῷ Φρυνίχου παλαιῶμαιν, ἐγγενέσθαι φημί χρῆναι τοῖς ὁλοθυσίσι τότε/ αἰτιαν ἐκθεῖσι λύσαι τὰς πρότερον ἁμαρτίας. (686-691)

It is right and proper for the sacred chorus to take part in giving good advice and instruction to the community. In the first place, accordingly, we think that all citizens should be made equal and their fears removed; and if someone went wrong at all through being tripped up by the wiles of Phrynichus, I say those who slipped up at that time should be given the right to clear themselves of any charge and wipe out their previous errors. (translated by A. Sommerstein)

Aristophanes’ advice amounts to restoring citizen rights to those participants in the first oligarchy who were ‘thrown by Phrynichus’ tricks, wrestlings’. Those people are presented as living in fear, innocent victims who were carried away by a single rogue. Aristophanes clearly ran a great risk at that time, but we know that shortly after the

933 Lys. 13.73-74.
934 In his speech Against Eratosthenes, Lysias presents Theramenes as the sole responsible for the demolition of the walls after the end of the war against the Peloponnesians (12.63); he contributed the most for the establishment of the Four Hundred (12.65); he was the protagonist, actually the only one, in the peace negotiations with the Spartans, and the main responsible for the adverse terms Athens had to accept. Worse than that, he instigated the installation of the Thirty (12.70-75).
production, he was awarded an olive wreath for giving this particular advice. But why should Aristophanes choose Phrynichus in particular to render him exclusively responsible for a past error? The answer may lie in another part of the play. At 1420 Dionysus declares that he shall bring back to Athens the poet who would give the best advice concerning Alcibiades and the salvation of the city. Aeschylus wins the contest by proposing that the Athenians should recall Alcibiades, put him in command of the fleet, and make the best provisions for the ships, the only asset which can bring salvation to Athens. Although this advice could be deemed by many Athenians as controversial, especially with regard to Alcibiades, there is every reason to believe that Aristophanes himself approved of it, albeit tentatively. If this is correct, Aristophanes chose to blame Phrynichus for the revolution of the Four Hundred exclusively, because he wanted to conceal the role Alcibiades played in its establishment, especially at its initial phase, a role which is amply highlighted by Thucydides. All these references are admittedly vague and add nothing concrete with regard to Phrynichus’ activities during the oligarchic reign. We are left with one scrap of information, namely his participation in the last embassy to Sparta, referred to by Thucydides.

936 R. Moorton “Aristophanes on Alcibiades” GRBS 29 1988: 358 and no 40. Moorton synopsizes thus: ‘Aristophanes advocates the recall of Alcibiades to alleviate the dearth of military leadership after the Arginusae trial, and particularly to oppose Lysander.’ In response, Sommerstein draws attention to Lys. 13.73 and 25.9 (The Comedies of Aristophanes 9 Frogs Warminster 1996: 216). But we have seen that those passages do not draw an objective picture of Phrynichus for various reasons. On the political messages of the Frogs, see Moorton (op. cit. 350-359; K. Dover Aristophanes Frogs Warminster 1993: 69-76; G. Arnott “A Lesson from the ‘Frogs’” G&R 38.1 1991: 18-23. The latter author censures Aristophanes for his lack of political judgment owing to his prejudice in favor of administrations led by noble families (22). If this is right, Phrynichus may have been singled out as the sole responsible for the oligarchic debacle because he did not belong to this caste. Alternatively, we may discern a personal tone in Aristophanes underscoring Phrynichus’ role in the oligarchy: the poet may have approved of Phrynichus’ stance in 412 in being skeptical towards the aggressive, war-like politics of the demagogues and the continuation of the war until final victory. Phrynichus had warned against over-optimistic hopes of Persian help and alliance, stressing the need, instead, of managing Athens’ dwindling resources as carefully as possible and avoiding risks (Heftner 2005: 107 no 70).
937 Some inferences may be legitimately made concerning the authorship of the decision of the Four Hundred not to decree the recall of the exiles for fear of Alcibiades (Thuc. 8.70.1). Phrynichus would have been particularly affected by such a measure; he might therefore have managed to obstruct and prevent the matter from being discussed in the oligarchic council (so Heftner 2001: 124). But Alcibiades had numerous other enemies in Athens as well. Other conjectures have been put forward, namely, Phrynichus, Peisander and Antiphon were three of the five proedroi, the ringleaders of the coup who appointed the first one hundred members of the council in the oligarchy (Thuc. 8.67.3) (G. Gilbert Beiträge zur innern Geschichte Athens im Zeitalter des peloponnesischen Krieges Leipzig 1877: 308); Phrynichus and Scironides may have been re-elected generals at the Colonus assembly (Ostwald 1986: 381).
Thucydides, unlike Aristotle, underscores the positive aspects of Phrynichus’ contribution to the oligarchy, and grants him a conspicuous place among the leaders of the revolution. Only Antiphon and Theramenes are so generously acclaimed:

παρέσχε δὲ καὶ Φρύνιχος ἑαυτῶν πάντων διαφερόντως προθυµότατον ἐς τὴν ὀλιγαρχίαν, δεδιός τὸν Ἀλκibiάδην καὶ ἐπιστάμενος εἰδότα αὐτῶν ὅσα ἐν τῇ Σάµῳ πρὸς τὸν Ἀστυόχον ἐπραξέ, νοµίζων οὐκ ἐν ποτὲ αὐτῶν κατὰ τὸ εἰκὸς ὑπ’ ὀλιγαρχίας κατελθεῖν πολὺ τε πρὸς τὰ δεινὰ, ἑπειδῆτερ ὑπέστη, φερεγγυώτατος ἔφανη. (8.68.3)

Phrynichus also showed himself especially eager in the interests of the oligarchy, since he knew well that he (Alcibiades) was aware of his intrigues with Astyochus at Samos, believing that in all probability Alcibiades would never be recalled under an oligarchy; and in view of the dangers he submitted himself to, he was considered very dependable.

As it has been noted, there is in this passage an implied emphasis on the perception of others. That is, Phrynichus was at pains to prove himself eager in the interests of the oligarchic cause. He was particularly concerned with the idea the other ringleaders would form about him for good reasons. After his outspoken stance and outright rejection of the oligarchs’ plans at Samos, he must have realised that right and sound arguments are not enough to win the hearts and minds of his colleagues. φερεγγυώτατος here may be an allusion to his willingness to co-operate with the other oligarchs and enthusiastically offer his help.

This passage gives us the reason why Phrynichus joined the coup, that is, his personal enmity towards Alcibiades. But there must have been other reasons too. His recent deposition may have seemed humiliating to him, and despite his age, he might have still had ambitions and spare energy to continue being a high officer in Athens. Perhaps, he considered that in the immediate future, once the oligarchy had been

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938 But, see J. Shear (Polis and Revolution: Responding to Oligarchy in Classical Athens Cambridge 2011: 22), who maintains Phrynichus in Thucydides is self-serving and tyrant.
939 Hornblower 1991-2008: 3 958. Hornblower draws attention to Rood’s observation that Brasidas was acutely aware of the importance of his public image as far as the allies and the cities in Northern Greece were concerned. He consequently took every step so that others perceive him as moderate. The Greek text runs: ὁ γὰρ Βρασίδας ἐν τῇ άλλῃς μέτριον ἑαυτῶν παρέχε, καὶ ἐν τοῖς λόγοις πανταχοῦ ἐδήλου ὡς ἐλευθερώσων τὴν Ἑλλάδα ἐκπεµφθείη (Thuc. 4.108 2). Rood observes: ‘Brasidas moulds his behaviour in awareness of the public gaze’ (Thucydides: Narrative and Explanation Oxford 1998: 73).
940 H. Goodhart notes: ‘φερέγγυος refers not so much to his good faith, as to his power of rendering effectual assistance’ ΘΟΥΚΥ∆Ι∆ΟΥ ΣΥΤΤΡΑΦΗΣ Η: The Eighth Book of Thucydides’ History London 1893: 102.
established, there was no other way of exerting any political influence than joining the coup.\footnote{Westlake \textit{Individuals in Thucydides} Cambridge 1968: 246 no 1.}

**The embassies to Sparta**

In chapters 89, 90 Thucydides narrates the events that occurred after the return of the envoys the Four Hundred had sent to Samos. Alcibiades’ message to the Athenians had an incendiary effect on the oligarchy and its followers: While a faction led by Theramenes and Aristocrates began to disassociate themselves from the coup, and air harsh criticism toward the regime, another faction, among whom Phrynichus, Aristarchus, Peisander and Antiphon, sought reconciliation with the enemy. The historian asserts that the contacts with the Spartans had begun as soon as the oligarchy was established, that they were continuous, and that they intensified after the Athenians at Samos had openly declared democracy, and after the envoys had brought back Alcibiades’ message from Samos (8.90.1-2). This faction was eager to reach a peace agreement with Sparta (τὴν ὠμολογίαν προσθηκοῦντο) and it was resolved to build a fortification at Eteioneia. Finally, the historian goes on, the Four Hundred:

Καὶ ὑπέστειλαν μὲν Ἀντιφώντα καὶ Φρύνιχον καὶ ἄλλους δέκα κατὰ τάχος, φοβούμενοι καὶ τὰ αὐτὸ καὶ τὰ ἐκ τῆς Σάμου, ἐπιστελλόμενος παντὶ τρόπῳ δότις καὶ ὑποστοῦ ἄνεκτός εὐναλλαγήναι πρὸς τοὺς Λακεδαιμόνιούς, ὕποκοδόμουν δὲ ἔτι προθυμὸτερὸν τὸ ἐν τῇ Ηπτιωνείᾳ τείχος. (8.90.2)

So they dispatched Antiphon, Phrynichus and ten others in all haste, since they were alarmed by the situation both at home and at Samos enjoining upon them to effect reconciliation with the Lacedaemonians on any terms that would be at all tolerable. And they set to work with greater zeal than ever building their fort at Eteioneia. (translated by C. Smith).

We would like to know how the decision to send those embassies (especially the last one) to Sparta was taken. Thucydides speaks as if this group were unaccountable to the other members of the council of the Four Hundred, right from its establishment on.\footnote{Andrewes raises the possibility that this group, the ‘intransigent’ as he calls it, may have been the majority in the council on the strength of 92.6 (Gomme, Andrewes and Dover 1945-1981: 5 302).} But if Antiphon, Phrynichus and their accomplices could assume action virtually unchecked, why was it necessary to carry written instructions with them?\footnote{From Thucydides’ narrative we are to imagine that Antiphon’s faction gave written orders to Antiphon and the other delegates to conduct peace negotiations with Sparta (8.90.2). We should better imagine that the delegation received the orders from a plenary session of the council of the Four Hundred.} The answer may be that it was the norm in these cases that ambassadors to a foreign state carried written orders with them as did the delegation to Sparta of which Andocides the orator was a member when it negotiated in 393 B.C. peace.\footnote{And. 3.35.} As to...
the Eetioneia fort, it emerges that the project was approved by the Four Hundred as a whole, its ostensible purpose being to protect Athens from an attack from Samos, an indication that apart from the whole spectrum of the Four Hundred, there was a considerable section of the population in Athens which feared reprisals on the part of the democrats at Samos, and were ready to defend themselves against their fellow-citizens, even through the use of force.\textsuperscript{945}

There should be no doubt that Phrynichus played a crucial role in the negotiations with the Spartans, along with Antiphon, otherwise they would not have been singled out by Thucydides. As to the terms on which the delegation was prepared to accept an agreement, the παντὶ τρόπῳ ὅστις καὶ ὀπωσοῦν ἀνεκτός is not as precise as we would like to be, and it is not quite clear to whom these terms should be ἀνεκτοί; but in a belated reference on the agenda of Antiphon and Phrynichus’ group Thucydides allows us to draw inferences about the content of the negotiations and the lengths at which this group within the oligarchy was prepared to go in order to maintain power.\textsuperscript{946} At any rate, the negotiations proved futile and the ambassadors returned to Athens with empty hands, or at least this seemed to have been the case.\textsuperscript{947}

Thucydides endorses in part Theramenes’ accusations that a group of hardliners within the Four Hundred, especially those who were actively involved in the building of the fort and some (?) members of the delegation to Sparta, wanted to deliver the city to the enemy.\textsuperscript{948}

What were the reasons which led those people to commit treason? Heftner draws attention to the fact that the extremists had already established communications with the Spartans even before the news of the mutiny at Samos reached Athens. They might have taken the decision to make overtures to Sparta out of principle, and the idea of ceasing hostilities might have gradually become attractive among them. Phrynichus himself may have contributed a good deal to this development, since he had come to realize that the abandonment of the empire was for the Athenians a pre-condition if they wished to reach a peace agreement.\textsuperscript{949} Others are convinced that Phrynichus was the main responsible for the secret pact to deliver the city to the

\textsuperscript{945} In his defence speech in front of the council of the Thirty, Theramenes alleged that those in charge of the fort at Eetioneia were the generals Aristoteles, Melanthius and Aristarchus, the first and the last being notorious oligarchs. They were all guilty of treason. But Theramenes had every reason to conceal his responsibility for the decision to build the fort in the first place (Xen. \textit{Hell.} 2.3.46).


\textsuperscript{947} On Thucydides’ insinuations at 91.1 that there was a secret deal stricken, see under ‘Archeptolemus’.

\textsuperscript{948} 8.91.3: ἤν δὲ τι καὶ τοιοῦτον ἀπὸ τῶν τῆς κατηγορίαν ἐχόντων, καὶ οὐ πάνω διαβολῆ μόνον τοῦ λόγου. For an interpretation of the passage, see Gomme, Andrewes and Dover 1945-1981: 5308.

Spartan navy.\textsuperscript{950} The small group within the Four Hundred, described at 8.90.1, may have come to realize that they were running out of time, options and resources. The Four Hundred had at their disposal only a handful of ships, and Athens’ garrison. After Alcibiades’ message had arrived in Athens, they could no longer count on Athens’ most formidable military arm, the navy at Samos, and the tribute usually collected by it. At home, they had to feed the population, and supplies could be had only from Euboea. After the occupation of Deceleia, the short Oropos - Athens route had to be abandoned in favour of that of the much longer and costlier Sunium. Securing and maintaining the communications with the island was an awesome task, which further strained Athens’ anyway limited military capabilities.\textsuperscript{951} On the political level, they had to face an ever-growing opposition from disaffected members of their council at home and the great threat Alcibiades and the navy posed to them. If they allowed Alcibiades to play an active role in Athenian politics again, they would have to expect reprisals and persecution. Time, options and resources were running short. Facing this dilemma, capitulation to the enemy or political obliteration, they chose the first option. Certainly this was Phrynichus and Antiphon’s choice. Their faction deliberately proposed that a large delegation be sent to Sparta, probably representing the whole spectrum of opinions and policies within the Four Hundred, so that they could more freely strike a secret deal, the rest of the delegates being unaware of it.\textsuperscript{952}

**Phrynichus’ assassination**

Soon after his return from Sparta, Phrynichus was assassinated. It is important to note that Thucydides delivers this news immediately after he has discussed Eetioneia and the true purpose of its building, admittance of an enemy force and betrayal of the city. Thucydides asserts that the act was premeditated, a plot carried out by a soldier, member of the patrols. The murder occurred when the agora was full, and Phrynichus died on the spot, staggering a few steps from the council house. The perpetrator managed to escape, but his accomplice, an Argive, was caught and tortured by the Four Hundred. In the prison he did not give any names of those implicated, but claimed that he knew a lot of men who secretly gathered in the house

\textsuperscript{950} Meyer 1884-1901: 4.1 558.

\textsuperscript{951} Moreno calculates the voyage from Chalkis to Oropus to one hour only, while that of Chalkis to Piraeus through Sunium lasted nine hours on good conditions and longer on bad. He also attributes the building of the Thoricus fortress, half way from Euboea to Sunium to the Four Hundred as a measure to secure communications with the island. Thus, Oropus, Rhamnous, Thoricus and Eetioneia, according to Moreno, formed a series of defensive measures designed by the Four Hundred to secure the grain supply from Euboea to Athens (*Feeding the Democracy: The Athenian Grain Supply in the Fifth and Fourth Centuries B.C.* Oxford 2007: 117-126).

\textsuperscript{952} I have argued in ‘Archeptolemus’ that not every member of the delegation was privy to, or participant in the secret meetings with the Spartans, and that Archeptolemus may have been one of them.
of the commander of the patrols and elsewhere and conspired against the regime. Despite those revelations, the Four Hundred remained quiescent.\textsuperscript{953}

Other sources, however, draw a different picture of the event. In a speech delivered at about 400-398 B.C. at an Athenian court,\textsuperscript{954} the speaker is at pains to demonstrate that Agoratos, a slave and informer as he claims, had contrived to secure certain privileges, not amounting however to full citizenship, through deception. He reminds the Athenians that it was Thrasybulus from Megara and Apollodorus from Caledonia who committed the crime. Thrasybulus delivered the actual blow, while Apollodorus was standing by. Both managed to escape. For his benefaction, Thrasybulus later was granted citizenship via a decree.\textsuperscript{955} Some eighty years later, in another speech, delivered in about 330 B.C., the speaker gives a somewhat perplexed version of the events: Phrynichus receives the blow at night, near the fountain in the osier beds from Thrasybulus and Apollodorus. Those two are arrested by Phrynichus’ friends and are brought to prison. When the news spread around, the people released the prisoners and interrogated them with the use of torture. It was decided that the culprits were unjustly imprisoned and that Phrynichus was guilty of high treason. On a motion of Critias a posthumous process against Phrynichus was set up, and it was stipulated that those who would step forward to defend the dead would share the same penalty if the defendant would be found guilty.\textsuperscript{956} The last extant source that delivers the incident is Plutarch. According to him, the assassin was a certain Hermon, a member of the patrols, who later receives honours (along with his accomplices) by the Athenians.\textsuperscript{957} Plutarch’s testimony, however, should be rejected since it is based on a false premise, made by Plutarch, probably because of lapse of memory, or failure to consult his source for that part of the \textit{Alcibiades} which was undoubtedly Thucydides. Thucydides at 8.92.5 mentions one Hermon, the commander of the patrols at Munychia in the Piraeus, in connection with the demolition of the Eetioneia fort.\textsuperscript{958} There is also epigraphic evidence pertinent to Phrynichus’ murder. IG I\textsuperscript{3} 102 (=ML 85) is a record of the honours given to certain individuals in recognition of their presumed participation in the assassination of Phrynichus. It is dated to spring 409 (line 1); it grants citizenship to Thrasybulus as

\textsuperscript{953} Thuc. 8.92.1-2; Phrynichus’ assassination seen as a parallel episode to that of Hipparchus, the brother of the tyrant Hippias: Shear 2011: 28-29, 39.
\textsuperscript{954} L. Gernet \textit{Lysias 1 Discours} Paris 1955: 186 and no 1.
\textsuperscript{955} Lys. 13.70.
\textsuperscript{956} Lyc. \textit{Against Leocr.} 112-115.
\textsuperscript{957} \textit{Alcibiades} 25.10
\textsuperscript{958} Avery 1959: 255; Heftner 2001: 267. Andrewes adds that if Hermon had been implicated in the murder, it would have been impossible for him to command the patrol at Munychia, for the Four Hundred were still in power when the Eetioneia incident occurred (Gomme, Andrewes and Dover 1945-1981: 5 309); contra Grossi 1984: 91; Lenschau 1941: 909; both authors believe that Plutarch is using an independent source here.
the actual perpetrator, and lesser privileges to a number of other individuals, apparently metics.\textsuperscript{959}

How are we to evaluate these versions of Phrynichus’ assassination? The accounts of Lysias and Lycurgus, the latter being somewhat confused, are to some extent compatible with each other and, significantly, with IG I\textsuperscript{3} 102, since they agree on the names of the perpetrator and the main accomplices.\textsuperscript{960} But Thucydides’ account, at first sight less substantiated, differs greatly from that of his contemporary Lysias, and attempts have been made to reconcile them.\textsuperscript{961} Lenschau 1941: 907-908 thought Thucydides did not deal with the 409 events, either because he did not attach much importance to them, or he did not have the chance to revise the relevant passage. Gilbert maintained that the Argive who was caught in Thucydides should be the same man as the Apollodorus from Megara.\textsuperscript{962} Busolt 1893-1904: 3.2 1503 noted the differences between Lysias and Thucydides, but deemed the historian more trustworthy, i.e., he accepted the evidence that the accomplice was caught on the spot and was tortured. Sartori also included in the group which prepared and carried out the murder the names found in both Lysias and Thucydides’ accounts.\textsuperscript{963} Andrewes believed that Thucydides was ignorant of the series of honorary decrees (among which IG I\textsuperscript{3} 102 represents one step of a long drawn political process) passed around 409 in connection with Phrynichus’ murder, and for that reason he abstained from naming the perpetrators.\textsuperscript{964} Pessely also cast doubts on Thucydides’ account. He

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\textsuperscript{959} For useful discussions, see I. Valeton “De Inscriptionis Phrynicheae Partis Vltimae Lacvnis Splendis” Hermes 43.4 1908: 481-510; J. Pečírka The Formula for the Grant of Enktesis in Attic Inscriptions Prague 1966: 20-21; R. Meiggs and D. Lewis (ed.) A Selection of Greek Historical Inscriptions to the End of the Fifth Century B.C. Oxford 1966: 262-263; Gomme, Andrewes and Dover 1945-1981: 5 309; C. Bearzot “a proposito del decreto ML 85 per Trasibulo uccisore di Frinico e I suoi complici” RIL 115 1981: 289-303. Bearzot demonstrates how Lysias’ account corresponds with IG I\textsuperscript{3} 102. In particular, she claims that Lysias reads out two decrees, neither of which is identical with IG I\textsuperscript{3} 102; that there should have been other decrees now lost to us in a series of resolutions moved after and in connection to the murder of Phrynichus which Bearzot groups in four phases (1: at the time of the posthumous trial of Phrynichus, when citizenship was granted to Thrasybulus, a Theramenian. 2: shortly after the fall of the Five Thousand, when doubts about Apollodorus’ complicity were raised. 3: ML 85. 4: the results of the investigation ordered in ML 85, Apollodorus does not regain citizenship, but probably maintains lesser privileges).

\textsuperscript{960} For discussion on the evidence from Lycurgus, see Avery 1959: 257-259.

\textsuperscript{961} Avery 1959: 257, however, thinks the accounts are similar; G. Pesely (Theramenes and Athenian Politics: A Study in the Manipulation of History PhD Diss. University of California 1983: 136) argued that Thucydides was in error with regard to this incident, and that his informant was Hermon.

\textsuperscript{962} Gilbert 1877: 322.

\textsuperscript{963} Le eterie nella vita politica Ateniese del 6 e 5 secolo a. C. Rome 1957: 123.

\textsuperscript{964} Gomme, Andrewes and Dover 1945-1981: 5 371. These comments appear in the chapter “Indications of Incompleteness” (of Book Eight). Andrewes’ argument was that Thucydides wrote about the events narrated in Book Eight shortly after they occurred and that Book
claims that if the true perpetrator was an Athenian, a *peripolos*, he could not have failed to come forward after the fall of the Four Hundred and claim the honor of the deed, especially if there were many witnesses (but being an Athenian, he would have lacked the extra motive of being granted citizenship as a reward, and he would have run the risk of incurring the avenge of Phrynichus’ friends and relatives instead). Pesely believes Thucydides has chosen to ignore the two principal figures the explanation being he believed informants from among the associates of Phrynichus and Antiphon.\footnote{Pesely 1983: 137.}

But Erbse pointed out that Thucydides described a situation in which uncertainty and conflicting information about the events prevailed. We do not know whether Thucydides believed Thrasybulus was a member of the patrols or that the information that his accomplice was an Argive was mistaken, simply a lapse in the memory of his informant. But even in Book Eight, Thucydides’ statement on method and scrutiny at 1.22.2 should stand. We should therefore assume that the historian deliberately chose to dissent from the official story and not to include any names.\footnote{Thukydides interpretationen Berlin 1989: 23.} I believe this approach is sound. We had better not believe unconditionally that the people who stepped forward to reap the benefits of the rewards, Thrasybulus included, were the actual assassins. At least Thucydides, in his usual implicit way posed a question which we should take into consideration seriously.\footnote{Hornblower 1991-2008: 3 1020: ‘the emphatic negatives οὐδενός...οὐδέ (8.92.2) can be seen as a disapproving comment both on the swarm of people who later came forward to claim the credit and material rewards for the killing, and on the willingness of others to believe them.’}

If we cannot be sure about the identity of the murderers, could we at least have an idea about their motives? On the view adopted here, the group or faction that premeditated the murder acted on information which received from certain members of the last embassy to Sparta, to which Phrynichus, Antiphon, Archeptolemus and Onomacles were members. Those delegates did not take part in the secret negotiations with the Spartans, the outcome of which was an understanding to deliver the city to the enemy somehow, presumably through Eetioneia or otherwise, but took wind of them and secretly reported it to their confidants on return from Sparta. At least, the connection of the embassy, the secret deal and the murder is borne out of Thucydides’ narrative. Since the objective of the assassins must have been to hinder Phrynichus and his like-minded comrades’ plan to betray the city, and since it is likely that information about the betrayal might have leaked through certain delegate(s) of the last embassy, it follows that the perpetrators and/or their instructors belonged to those oligarchic circles within the Four Hundred who thought that capitulation or betrayal were unacceptable, or considered

\footnotetext[965]{Eight was left in an unpolished condition and unrevised. That is why Thucydides never came round to completing the names of the murderers.}

\footnotetext[966]{Thukydides interpretationen Berlin 1989: 23.}

\footnotetext[967]{Hornblower 1991-2008: 3 1020: ‘the emphatic negatives οὐδενός...οὐδέ (8.92.2) can be seen as a disapproving comment both on the swarm of people who later came forward to claim the credit and material rewards for the killing, and on the willingness of others to believe them.’}
rapprochement with Alcibiades and the democrats at Samos a less deplorable perspective. Phrynichus’ violent death triggered off a series of rapid developments culminating in the deposition of the Four Hundred after the defeat at Euboea, while his posthumous trial ushered in a turbulent period of instability and political persecutions.

Appendix

In an influential and thought-provoking article professor Heftner has put forward some propositions that deserve to be discussed separately here.

a) Two points are made concerning Phrynichus’ approach to Athenian foreign policy. First, the Miletus campaign: At the end of summer, or beginning of autumn 412 the Athenians launched a counter-offensive that initially took the enemy aback. Committing the largest military force since Sicily, the objective was to check a series of defections that had been mounting up in the last year in the Ionia region and the Eastern Aegean, as well as to drive the enemy off the whole area by cutting off communications and replenishment bases. In command were three generals, but there should be little doubt that Phrynichus was the most influential among them. After an initial success out of the gates of Miletus, Phrynichus persuades his colleagues in the war council not to engage a newly arrived Peloponnesian fleet, but to withdraw to Samos in safety instead. From this incident, Heftner concludes: ‘Wir erkennen hier also einen grundlegenden Aspekt in Phrynichos’ Anschauungen, der späterhin auch für seine Haltung gegenüber den Umsturzplänen der Oligarchen bestimmend werden sollte: eine fundamentale Skepsis gegenüber der Möglichkeit einer militärisch siegreichen Beendigung des Krieges.’ Second, Phrynichus joins the oligarchy when it is made clear to him that the conspirators have changed their plans: the aggressive pursuit of the war, advocated earlier by the oligarchs at Samos

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968 Avery 1959: 261; Sartori 1957: 123-124, who puts forward as indication the fact that immediately after the Four Hundred remain inactive, the faction of Theramenes and Aristocrates takes the initiative. Alcibiades, as well, may have been implicated in the murder due to his animosity with Phrynichus; Price (Thucydides and Internal War Cambridge 2001: 318), who attributes responsibility to Theramenes; G. Bockisch (“Der Kreis um Theramenes” Oikoumene 4 1983: 47) holds that the murderers were democrats; but Heftner 2001: 268-269 warns against overconfident assumptions: we do not know the political leanings of the plotters and the fact that they received honors under democracy is not indicative of their convictions. Theramenes and Aristocrates may have been implicated, but the deed may have been carried out by another faction within the Four Hundred.


971 Heftner 2005: 92.
found support no more; instead, a compromise with the enemy was deemed more attractive. This u-turn Heftner places at the time when the negotiations with Tissaphernes collapsed, that is spring 411, arguing further that at that specific time Phrynichus joins in, and steers decidedly the foreign policy of the Four Hundred towards a peace agreement with Sparta.\textsuperscript{972}

To begin with the last point, it is almost certain that Phrynichus exerted tremendous influence on the inner circle who took the decisions on behalf of the Four Hundred, whoever those men might have been. Phrynichus was an expert on foreign policy, among others, and he cannot have failed to grasp the implications of Alcibiades’ message and the developments at Samos. Given the circumstances, the only hope was a peace treaty with Sparta, the only question being at what cost. Less sure should we be, however, as to when the conspirators at Athens changed their ideas about the conduct of the war and possible overtures to Sparta. In the spring of 411 they could not determine Athens’ policy because they were not in power yet. Those thoughts could only have been aired in private meetings, of which, of course, we have no way of knowing. To be sure, the Four Hundred began negotiations with Sparta as soon as they were firmly established, but the turning point came with Alcibiades’ message via the oligarchic envoys. As to the first point, I think Phrynichus’ performance and actions during the Miletus campaign do not allow us to draw any conclusions about his attitude towards Athenian foreign policy, or the conduct of the war. The reason is, as I have tried to show, that Phrynichus had no other alternative the night he took the decision to withdraw with the whole force to Samos. Whatever the consequences of this decision may have been-modern scholars have amply highlighted them—Phrynichus was compelled to do what he exactly did in order to save Athens from a fatal, irrevocable disaster.\textsuperscript{973}

b) Heftner raises the possibility that the Eetioneia fort, in the building of which Phrynichus was fully involved, did not serve as a means to admit the enemy, as the opposition forces within the Four Hundred had propagated, and as Thucydides himself came to believe. The movements of the Spartan fleet off Aigina, easily detectable and counter-measured, speak against such an eventuality. The fort served a double purpose, first as a place of refuge for the hardliners in the likely event of political turbulences in the city, and as a pledge for negotiations with Samos and Sparta as well. In this way, Phrynichus would have been able to rely on a plan B, in

\textsuperscript{972} Op. cit. 96-97.

\textsuperscript{973} Thucydides gives us, as usual, two almost imperceptible hints in approval of Phrynichus’ decision. First the composition of the Athenian fleet would have guaranteed a fiasco had the naval engagement occurred (8.27.2: σαφῶς ειδότας πρὸς ὅποιας τε ναῦς πολέμιας καὶ ὅσιας πρὸς αὐτὰς ταῖς ορθέταραι). Second, the historian dryly comments that the whole expedition was hastily and ill-designed (8.25.5: νομίζοντες, εἰ προσαγάγοντο Μίλητον, ῥᾳδίως ἄν οφίσι καὶ τᾶλα προσχωρῆσαι) (see above 188-201).
case the negotiations with Sparta went bad.\textsuperscript{974} This double-ended plan bears similarities to the intrigues with Astyochus, according to Heftner, because in the latter case as well Phrynichus left the betrayal option open until the very last minute, only to warn the Athenian navy when he got information that Alcibiades’ second letter was on its way.

With regard to the Astyochus incident, I have followed that group of scholars who believe that Phrynichus’ offer to betray his city was only a stratagem, and was not really genuine. The first part of the argument, though, deserves attention. Heftner rightly underscores the fact that the accusations that the Eetioneia fort was built with a view to admitting the enemy reflect the opposition’s point of view, endorsed by Thucydides; but facilitating an enemy landing may not have been the initial purpose of the fortification, a fact Theramenes and his faction had every reason to downplay or outright conceal. It is difficult to see, however, how a fort at Eetioneia could have helped Phrynichus and his associates in the event of a confrontation with the dissidents within the Four Hundred and their supporters without.\textsuperscript{975} True, the fortification could guarantee the besieged plenty of food, it was connected with the wheat storehouse lying nearby, and certainly provisions for water would have been made in advance. But their cause and situation would have been utterly hopeless. They could not hope to overcome an enemy by far outnumbering them, and the besiegers could at any time send a message to Samos for assistance. They could not communicate with the Spartans either, without breaking through the lines of the besiegers, in this case by sea where they would have been utterly outnumbered. The purpose(s), therefore, of Eetioneia may have been others: to be able to allow or deny entrance to the harbour to whoever they wished (this includes the possibility of treachery of course), and to safeguard the route from Euboea to the Piraeus and the safe transport of the all-important Euboean wheat, on which the nourishment of the whole population in Athens depended.\textsuperscript{976} Phrynichus may well have been the main

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\textsuperscript{974} op. cit. 102: ‘…Phrynchos schon wegen der Erinnerung an seine Erfahrungen mit Astyochos sich nicht auf eine vorzeitige Geheimabsprache eingelassen hat – er hätte sich damit ja völlig von den Spartanern abhängig gemacht ohne jenen Rückhalt zu haben, den ihm die Fertigstellung der Eetioneia-Festung allenfalls gewähren konnte.’
\textsuperscript{975} With regard to the Eetioneia fort, I follow the reconstruction and the plan offered by Hornblower 1991-2008: 3 1014-1016, since Thucydides’ text at 8.90.4 can perfectly stand without emendations as Andrewes thought (Gomme, Andrewes and Dover 1945-1981: 5 303-306).
\textsuperscript{976} McCoy while noting that among the priorities of the Four Hundred was the control of the grain supply and the security of Euboea, he fails to connect them with Eetioneia. He postulates a trick made by the Four Hundred on the population of Athens. The workers at Eetioneia believed until the last minute that the purpose of the fort was ‘to ward off any sudden incursion by the Athenian fleet at Samos.’ This is possible, but does not exclude the possibility, raised to probability through Thucydides’ narrative at 8.90.4-5, that Eetioneia was organically linked with the wheat storehouse, both forming a part of a larger plan to safeguard Athens’ food supplies and communications (“The Political Debut of Theramenes” in Hamilton, C., and P. Krentz (eds.) \textit{Polis and Polemos: Essays on Politics, War, and History in Ancient Greece in Honor of Donald Kagan} Claremont 1997: 181 and no 28).
\end{footnotes}
exponent and designer of this defence strategy, a strategy which utilized and depended upon the available military resources of Attica only, the fleet on Samos being inaccessible for this task, and from a certain time on hostile to the regime as well. The question, as Heftner admits, whether a secret deal was struck in Sparta to deliver the city is impossible to answer beyond doubt. If such a deal existed, only a small number of the Four Hundred would have been privy to it. Phrynichus could have been one of them, not so much on the strength of his conduct as a general at Samos, but because he came to realize that betrayal represented the last and only option left.

c) Heftner investigates the circumstances under which the decree(s) recorded in IG I² 102 were moved, and the events surrounding them. I shall try to summarize his argument. Because Thucydides asserts that the perpetrators escaped after their deed, and that in spite of the rigorous efforts of the Four Hundred to unravel the case it all came to grief, it follows that the arrest of Thrasybulus and Apollodorus which Lycurgus records was effected not immediately afterwards, so Heftner argues, but that some time intervened, not too long though, because after the definitive flight and discrediting of the Four Hundred nobody would have flinched from stepping forward as avenger of Phrynichus. The arrest must have taken place during the transition period between the regime of the Four Hundred and that of the Five Thousand, when it had not yet been clear which faction would take the upper hand and dominate the political scene in Athens. Thrasybulus and Apollodorus may have timely presented themselves as Phrynichus’ assassins, whereby the latter’s friends brought them to prison through ἐπαγωγή. Alexicles and Aristarchus, who appeared in the trial to defend their dead and dishonored comrade managed somehow to escape, only to be caught again at a later juncture. This reconstruction draws heavily on Lycurgus’ Against Leocrates 112-115. However, as I shall try to show, Lycurgus’ account is neither devoid of blunders, absurdities and inaccuracies, nor is it compatible with that of Thucydides’, or even Lysias’.

Let us go through a number of crucial points arising from Lycurgus’ account, which professor Heftner accepts as valid. To begin with, Heftner argues that Apollodorus and Thrasybulus are arrested not on the spot, but at some time later, when the Four Hundred had already been deposed and the Five Thousand were in power, but had not shown signs of their political orientation yet. But this does not emerge from Lycurgus’ text. On the contrary, the orator wants us to understand that the arrest of Apollodorus and Thrasybulus is made immediately and as a direct consequence of the murder, and more importantly (here the confusion in Lycurgus’ account is fully exposed) the demos was able to set the prisoners free while the Four Hundred were still in power. This is an attempt to reconcile Thucydides’ account with that of Lycurgus, but I do not think that both can stand. Thucydides makes clear that while the perpetrator managed to escape after the murder in the turmoil that ensued, the

977 op. cit. 102-104.
accomplice was caught, we are to understand on the spot, by the Four Hundred. This is a perfectly intelligible account: the murder took place in broad daylight in the market place, near the Council House, presumably after a session of the Four Hundred had just finished. Those who caught the Argive could have been either members of the council, or their sympathizers who happened to walk in the nearby streets. Since there are indications that the administration of justice was left to the Four Hundred during their reign, it also makes perfect sense that the Four Hundred conducted the interrogation and the torture.\footnote{R. Brock “The Courts in 411” LCM 13.9/10 1988: 136-138; when Andocides makes an attempt to return to Athens in 411 he is arrested by the Four Hundred and is reminded in custody for a certain period (And. 2.13-14).} But this is not all. Lycurgus’ account is not logically consistent and coherent either. Lycurgus says, when the demos found out about the imprisonment, they took the two captives out of prison and interrogated them via torture, the outcome of which was that Phrynichus was found guilty of treason, and the two perpetrators had been unjustly incarcerated.\footnote{The text at this point is not clear. C. Scheibe and F. Blass’ edition has αἰσθόμενος ὁ δήμος τὸ γεγονός τούς τε εἰρηκτέντας ἐξήγαγε, καὶ βασάνων γενομένων τὸ πράγμα ἀνέκρινε, καὶ ζητῶν εὖρε... but in the codices the words τὸ πράγμα are transposed to before ζητῶν. Blass commented: ‘nisi transponatur τὸ πράγμα, sunt οἱ ἱπράχθεντες etiam ἀνέκρινε verbi obiectum, etsi propter το νοῦμ obiectum expectatur, et quaestio (βάσανος) de libertatis fit’ (Lycurgi Oratio in Leocratem Leipzig 1899: xii). If we retain the first reading, it is not clear who the tortured individuals are, although the mentioning of Apollodorus and Thrasybulus in the previous lines makes the association likely. If one denies that the two assassins are meant in this passage as the objects of torture, one has to explain who those tortured could have been. The assassination had been designed and executed in the most clandestine way; it would have been then almost impossible for the demos to find and interrogate people who could have been privy to the mashinations that resulted in Phrynichus’ murder. If we retain the mss reading - accepted by A. Thalheim in his edition of the text - the meaning becomes more intelligible, the object of ἀνέκρινε becomes Apollodorus and Thrasybulus. The usual syntax is ἀνακρίνοντας τινά, D. 48.23 ἀνεκρίθησαν αἱ ἁμφοβηθήσεις being the exception.} This does not make much sense. One normally tortures a suspect to make him admit that he himself committed a crime, be it treason, or murder, or what else.\footnote{An exeption to this rule is Plut. Phocion 34-35; when on arrival in Athens in 318 B.C. Phocion faced a capital charge to be decided in the Assembly through a vote. To this proposal an amendment was attached to the effect that Phormion was to be tortured before be put to death; the rationale then of this torture was not to extract information from Phocion, but to prolong and make his death more agonizing.} In Lycurgus’ story we are asked to believe that the assassins or a third party were tortured to reveal information about Phrynichus’ presumed treason, an outstandingly absurd procedure indeed.\footnote{This occurrence of torture would fall under what scholars call ‘judicial’ (as opposed to ‘evidentiary’) torture. Judicial torture was carried out by the Athenian state in order to investigate cases of public interest. Apart from Thuc. 8.92.2, other sources mention judicial torture: in Lysias 13.59 a certain Aristophanes, although an Athenian citizen according to the speaker, was subjected to torture on suspicion of posing as an Athenian citizen. In Demosthenes 18.133 a certain Antiphon, an Athenian, a spy of Phillip according to the
Phrynichosattentäter gehört in jene Phase der πυκνα ἐκκλησίαι, bei denen es sich, wie wir sahen, wohl tatsächlich um Versammlungen des Gesamt Demos handelte...’ (See time plan below).\textsuperscript{982}

With regard to the diversity in the accounts transmitting Phrynichus’ death, I am inclined to accept that of Thucydides. Far from being an incomplete and imprecise description, Thucydides’ version is patently so formulated as to raise suspicion with respect to the ‘official’ version of the story, as told by Lysias and documented in IG I\textsuperscript{3} 102. Rather than indicating ignorance of the events of 409 B.C., or lack of revision, Thucydides’ narrative reflects the atmosphere of uncertainty and intrigue that prevailed in that period. Thucydides’ version is meant to correct the official story; the historian had carried out extensive investigations, but he was not convinced that Thrasybulus and Apollodorus were the actual perpetrators.\textsuperscript{983} On the other hand, speaker, comes to the Piraeus with a view to destroying the fleet anchored at the shipyards by means of arson. The man is discovered and the council of Areopagus hand him over to the assembly whereby the man is subjected to torture. The same story albeit from a different perspective is told in Deinarchus 1.63; in Plutarch’s \textit{Nicias} 30 a stranger arrives in the Piraeus and in a barber’s shop casually talks about the disaster in Sicily, not realizing that the Athenians do not know yet. The barber rushes to the city, communicates the story to the archons who immediately arrest the man and torture him. Andocides (1.43-44) reports that Peisander moved a motion in the Council that the decree of Scamandrius be suspended and that all men who were on Diocleides’ list, some forty-two Athenians, might be subject to torture fro information. This provision, however, was never carried out (cf. V. Hunter \textit{Policing Athens: Social Control in the Attic Lawsuits}, 420-320 B.C. Princeton 1994: 174-176). What all these stories have in common is, of course, the clear rationale behind the torturing, that is, an attempt by means of violence to extract information from a person (an outsider) suspect of a crime, but never to extract information from a non suspect in order to ascertain whether a third person had committed a crime or not. C. Carey adduces other cases of private character, in which, as he claims, the persons subjected to torture cannot have been free non-citizens. Important for our argument is, however, the rationale underlying the torture in these cases, namely, to elicit information from the victim of torture in order to establish his participation in a crime or his guilt (“A Note on Torture in Athenian Homicide Cases” \textit{Historia} 37.2 1988: 241-245). For torture in Athens in general, see D. Mirhady “The Athenian rationale for Torture” in V. Hunter and J. Edmondson (eds.) \textit{Law and Social Status in Classical Athens} Oxford 2000; M. Gagarin “The Torture of Slaves in Athenian Law” \textit{CP} 91 1996: 1-18; V. Hunter “Constructing the Body of the Citizen: Corporal Punishment in Classical Athens” \textit{EMC} 36 1992: 271-291; G. Thür \textit{Beweisung vor den Schwurgerichtshöfen Athens. Die Proklisis zur Basanos} Vienna 1977; “Reply to D. C. Mirhady: Torture and Rhetoric in Athens” \textit{JHS} 116 1996: 132-134.

\textsuperscript{982} Heftner 2001: 318.

\textsuperscript{983} See the discussion in Erbse 1989: 23; Hornblower 1991-2008: 3 1020 remarks: ‘the emphatic negatives οὐδὲν ... οὐδὲ can be seen as a disapproving comment both on the swarm of people who later came forward to claim the credit and material rewards for the killing, and on the willingness of others to believe them’; R. Meiggs and D. Lewis \textit{A Selection of Greek Historical Inscriptions to the End of the Fifth Century B.C.} Oxford 1969: 263;
Lycurgus presents—let us not forget, some eighty years later— a confused version of an admittedly bizarre and unclear situation, the events surrounding Phrynichus’ death. His story is an amalgamated version of Thucydides and Lysias’ story, together with the version presented in IG I³ 102 and oral tradition. It is clear that Thucydides stands closer to the truth and his version is to be preferred.

Another point in Lycurgus’ account on which doubts should be cast, is the allegation that it was Phrynichus’ friends who arrested the two assassins and put them to jail, the implication being that this faction had enough self-confidence and thought it self-evident to prosecute the killers, as if they were operating in the old regime, or at least that nobody would dare to oppose their plans. But if we accept Heftner’s proposal that those events unfolded in the period in which πυκνα ἐκκλησίαι were taking place, overlooking the fact that it must have been virtually impossible for the discredited and decimated faction around Phrynichus and the rest of the extremists to embark on such a brazen action, we are compelled to reject Thucydides’ account of the deposition of the Four Hundred, which was the direct consequence of the crashing defeat off Eretria, was effected in the assembly described at 8.97.1, and occurred possibly within a few hours after the outcome of the battle had become known in Athens. Actually, according to Thucydides, the Four Hundred were already history on the very day of the assembly at the Pnyx, the most prominent figures among the hardliners, and a considerable number of their followers having already fled. In fact, I would suppose that they did not risk to attend the assembly at the Pnyx at all, they took to their heels instead as quickly as possible. Apollodorus and Thrasybulus’ arrest is not likely to have occurred when professor Heftner believes it did, the reason being this arrest did not happen at all. It is a figment of Lycurgus’ imagination, intermingled with the evidence from Thucydides, the decrees granting citizenship to Thrasybulus (undoubtedly available to Lycurgus), rhetoric distortion

Gomme, Andrewes and Dover 1945-1981: 5 371: ‘Thucydides appears not to know of subsequent decrees, passed earlier than spring 409, for the murders of Phrynichos.’

I discuss these events in ‘Alexicles’ pages 18-23. Professor Heftner points out to me that the fact that Peisander seems to be trying to justify his role in the set up of the oligarchy before his fleeing and that Antiphon, Archeptolemus and Onomacles stayed in Athens even after Phrynichus’ process are indications that Thucydides’ words at 8.98.1 are not to be taken literally and that his account needs modification. But even if one accepts the historicity of Peisander’s exchange with Sophocles (Arist. Rhet. 1419α 25-30), the event could have happened at a time after Phrynichus’ death, when the regime could be criticized openly even in the council of the Four Hundred, but still prior to Peisander’s flight which I believe took place on the day of the assembly at the Pnyx (Thuc. 8.97.1). This period could have been as long as ten days (see time table below). There took place, of course, no trial as Jameson believes. As to Antiphon, Archeptolemus and Onomacles staying in Athens, each one of them surely had their own reasons not to flee. For Antiphon, I presume, it was a matter of prestige and advanced age; Archeptolemus may have been not guilty of treason at all (see under Archeptolemus); Onomacles’ decision to stay remains indeed a mystery, but his case does not contradict Thucydides either, since the historian does not say that the entirety of the extremist faction of the Four Hundred fled.
and moralizing, and/or, possibly, a relic of the oral tradition, current in Athens in the 330s. But Lycurgus’ version blatantly contradicts even Lysias, who asserts that Thrasybulus and Apollodorus managed to get away after the murder, the former delivering the actual blow.\textsuperscript{985}

The last point in Lycurgus that deserves our attention is the allegation that Aristarchus and Alexicles appeared as defence witnesses in Phrynichus’ posthumous trial, and were convicted to death, in accord with the stipulations of the decree quoted after section 114 of Lycurgus’ \textit{Against Leocrates}. Professor Heftner assumes the two men managed somehow to get away after the court had reached their verdict. To begin with the last point, assuming that the two men actually defended their dead comrade, how could they have escaped from a building with possibly as many as one thousand Athenians? Would the guards not have anticipated a possible break-out, and made sure that the defendants could not leave the court?\textsuperscript{986} But a more serious objection to Lycurgus’ story has to do with the time again. According to my plan (see below), Phrynichus trial could have occurred only after day 10+, day 0 being Phrynichus’ murder, possibly as many as ten days later, and at least one day after Critias moved his decree. But by that time, Aristarchus and Alexicles had already deserted Athens, on day 10 of my plan, only to be accidentally caught and tried again at a very much later juncture.\textsuperscript{987} It seems that Lycurgus is reflecting oral tradition at this point, or interweaves two otherwise distinct instances for enhanced rhetorical effect.

Minor discrepancies aside,\textsuperscript{988} Lycurgus’ account, apart from Critias’ motion whose historicity we have no reason to doubt, since the orator and politician had certainly access to the state archives or to the stone itself, does not help us to reconstruct the post-Four Hundred era in Athens. Rather, it throws some light on the kind of memories shared and stories circulated among the Athenians in the 330s about the turbulent days of September 411.

I give here a possible timetable of the events that ensued after Phrynichus’ assassination, which I label as day 0.

\textsuperscript{985} Lys. 13.71
\textsuperscript{986} On the issue of the topography in Athenian courts and the virtual impossibility of the defendants to avoid immediate arrest after the negative for them verdict had been reached, see under Alexicles pages 20-21 and nos 71, 72.
\textsuperscript{987} Xen. \textit{Hell.} 1.7.28: Euryptolemus’ speech in the assembly in defence of the six generals referring to Aristarchus’ trial, but in an entirely different context and time. Busolt observed that Xenophon’s passage, in contrast to Lykurgus’, points to the fact that Alexicles was caught and tried independently of Aristarchus (1893-1904: 3.2 1511 and no 1). Ostwald 1986: 403 and Avery 1959: 69 suggest that the date of Aristarchus’ trial should have been close enough to Euryptolemus’ speech for the Athenians to recall the case.
\textsuperscript{988} Apart from the actual time of the murder, Lycurgus gives a different topography, on which, see Heftner 2001: 266 and note 221.
Day 0: Phrynichus’ murder, the accomplice is arrested on the spot (Thuc. 8.92.2: καὶ ὁ μὲν πατάξας διέφυγεν, ὁ δὲ ξυνεργὸς Ἀργεῖος ὁνθρωπὸς ληφθείς καὶ βασανιζόμενος ὑπὸ τῶν τετρακοσίων ‘the person who delivered the blow escaped, but his accomplice, an Argive man, was caught and got tortured by the Four Hundred.’)

Day 3: interrogation may have lasted a couple of days; arrival of the Peloponnesian fleet in Epidaurus (92.2)

Day 4: the turmoil at Eetioneia (92.4-11)

Day 5: hoplite assembly in the Piraeus, session of the Four Hundred in Athens (93.1 Τῇ δ’ ὑστεραίᾳ; the Four Hundred and the hoplite arrange an assembly (93.3 ἐς ἡμέραν ῥητήν ἐκκλησίαν ποιῆσαι ἐν τῷ Διονυσίῳ περὶ ὁμονοίας ‘(they decided) to call an assembly at the precinct of Dionysus about reconciliation on a fixed day ’)

Day 8: the assembly at the Dionysus precinct; Hegisandridas sails off Salamis (94.1); Hegesandridas arrives in Oropus (95.1)

Day 9: Thymochares in Euboea, sea battle (95.3-7)

Day 10: news of the defeat breaks in Athens; the Athenians immediately convene an assembly at the Pnyx; the Four Hundred are deposed; the Five Thousand are introduced (97.1: µίαν µὲν εὐθὺς τότε πρῶτον ἐς τὴν Πύκνα καλουµένην ‘one meeting for the first time at the so called Pnyx’); the extremist faction flees on the same day (98.1: ἔν δὲ τῇ μεταβολῇ ταύτῃ εὐθὺς οἱ µὲν περὶ τὸν Πείσανδρον καὶ Ἀλεξικλέα καὶ ὅσοι ἦσαν τῆς ὀλιγαρχίας µάλιστα υπεξέρχονται ἐς τὴν Δεκέλειαν ‘in this change of constitution those around Peisander, Alexicles and those most involved in the oligarchy immediately made their way secretly to Deceleia’)

Day 10+: frequent assemblies (97.2: καὶ ἄλλαι υστερον πυκναὶ ἐκκλησίαι)
Theramenes Hagnonos Steirieus
PAA 513930

Introduction

Theramenes’ brief albeit turbulent and highly controversial passage through the muddy waters of late fifth-century Athenian politics at a time of the most serious crisis Athens had hitherto experienced has been the subject of constant criticism both in ancient and modern times. The reason for this everlasting and intense interest is that the statesman from Steiria, for as long as his prominence in Athenian politics lasted, managed to remain in the spotlight, playing the role of the protagonist in what turned out to be the most agonizing, perplexed and ambivalent episodes in Athenian history and democracy. It is noteworthy that for no other individual were the opinions of contemporaries and near contemporaries so divided in antiquity as they were for Theramenes, and modern critics have unsurprisingly followed suit. Since the Athenian politician has been recently the subject of several voluminous studies, it is impossible to review his entire career in the present PhD thesis. Rather, I would concentrate on his involvement in the setting up of and participation in the oligarchy of the Four Hundred with a view to highlighting certain movements and choices of his that have been so far somewhat neglected.

Place of birth and early days

Thanks to the information we get from the scholiast of Aristophanes and the Suda lexicon we know that Theramenes came from the deme Steiria; the small coastal settlement which belonged to the Pandionis tribe was situated west of modern Porto Rafti, and formed an excellent natural harbour on the east coast of Attica. Steiria sent three representatives to the council of Five Hundred, and the inference may

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989 For example, P. Krenz The Thirty at Athens Ithaca, Cornell 1982: 36: ‘Theramenes had always been a patriot’; R. Buck “The Character of Theramenes” AHB 9.1 1995: 24: ‘Theramenes emerges...as a figure in the unscrupulous, unprincipled, opportunistic mould of such as Alcibiades’.
990 Two relatively not too distant in time PhD theses have been written on the subject: W. McCoy Theramenes, Thrasybulus and the Athenian Moderates PhD Diss. Yale University 1970; G. Pesely Theramenes and Athenian Politics: A Study in the Manipulation of History PhD Diss. University of California 1983; see also F. Hurni Théramène ne plaidera pas coupable: Un home politique engage dans les révolutions athéniennes de la fin du 5 siècle av. J.-C. Basel 2010.
991 Schol. Ar. Frogs 541; Suda s.v. δεξιώτ.
993 Traill 1975: 68.
be drawn that its population, or rather the number of *hoplites* Steiria provided, did not exceed two hundred registered adult male Athenians. Further substantiation of the literary evidence is now available to us thanks to four *ostraka* found at Kerameikos bearing the name Hagnon Nikiou Steirieus. These were found amid a great number of *ostraka* bearing the names of Kleippides Deiniou and Thukydidides Melesiou, a fact which allows us to date them with relative confidence to 444/3 B.C. Coming from such a tiny settlement and from a probably old, historic, aristocratic family (see below), Theramenes naturally would have had contacts with members of other prominent families living in the vicinity. Such a family lived in the same *deme* at the time of Theramenes’ youth, namely the family of Lukos, the father of Thrasybus the famous democratic leader of the late fifth and early fourth centuries. Indeed, on the grounds of their conduct, especially after 411 and during the campaigns in the Hellespont, it has been argued that the two men were on friendly terms since their childhood; their politics were similar, although in the course of their career they followed different paths. K. Pöhlig, an adherent of such views pointed also out to the close relationship between Alcibiades and Thrasybulus and argued that the three men were members of a close company.

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994 For the *deme* Deiradiotai, Polystratus and Phrynichus’ birth place, S. Todd estimates a population of 180 male citizens. Todd believes Deiradiotai contributed three representatives to the Council, in which case the two *demes*, Deiradiotai and Steiria, should have been of approximately equal size (*Lysias* Austin 2000: 221 no 9). Pesely estimates a total of 150 to 210 *hoplites* (1983: 67).

995 By the time of Theramenes’ involvement in the Four Hundred oligarchy, Hagnon had pursued a long, illustrious and highly commendable public career: general in 440/39 (Thuc. 1.116.1-117.1); *oikistes* of Amphipolis (Thuc. 4.102.3); general in 431/30 (Thuc. 2.58.1, 6.31.2; Diod. 12.46.2); general in 429/8 (Thuc. 2.95.3); signatory of the Peace of Nicias (Thuc. 5.19.1); *proboulos* (Lys. 12.65); see also J. Davies 1971: 227-228. For an evaluation of his career, and especially in relation to Pericles’ politics, see Pesely 1989: 193-206.


997 Buck estimates Thrasybulus was born between 450 and 445 B.C. (*Thrasybulus and the Athenian Democracy* Stuttgart 1998: 19).

998 *Der Athener Theramenes* Leipzig 1877: 233 and no 5 with references. Pöhlig insisted: ‘vollständig begreiflich aber wird uns erst die ganze Geschichte Athens von 411-403, wenn wir eine Freundschaft oder wenigstens eine aus gleicher Denk-und Handlungsweise hervorgegangene nähere Bekanntschaft dieser drei Männer annehmen.’ See, however, Buck’s careful comments, namely that on the strength of Nepos *Thras. 1.3*, where Alcibiades is presented to steal credit from Thrasybulus during the victorious campaign in the Hellespont, it is possible that the relationship between Alcibiades and Thrasybulus may not have been ideal (1998: 20-21). D. Kagan attributes the differences between the two men to personal style and temperament rather than political ideas (*The Fall of the Athenian Empire* Cornell 1987: 155). On the relationship between Theramenes and Thrasybulus and the lack of direct evidence Pesely comments: ‘the lack of any trace of hostility between them may be more significant than the absence of clear-cut evidence that they were friends’ (1983: 68).
If we are to trust a reference to Hagnon, Theramenes’ father, as being an ἀρχαιόπλουτος (of ancient or hereditary wealth) found in Cratinus’ Ploutoi, the family would have had aristocratic origins dating back perhaps to the seventh and sixth centuries. Because of the almost complete lack of evidence for the activities and social milieu of this as well as other Athenian aristocratic families in the sixth and fifth centuries, the fact that the first known to us individual who reached prominence was Hagnon does not exclude the possibility that his ancestors played an important role in regional as well as Athenian politics. From the fact that Theramenes’ grandfather was named Nikias another inference may also be legitimately drawn, namely that Theramenes may not have been Hagnon’s firstborn son, but one should not stress this point too far. One would naturally dismiss the claim that Hagnon’s father, Nikias, had been a merchant (φορητός), someone who carries cargoes, and a hireling (μισθωτός) as mere comic libel against Hagnon, but there may be some kernel of truth in this allegation. Admittedly, the family’s source of wealth must have been large land holdings presumably in Steiria, although property elsewhere in Attica or overseas should not be ruled out. There is evidence that Theramenes’ family had ties with the island of Keos, the connection with which would be most naturally facilitated through the best harbour in east Attica overlooking Keos, Steiria. Indeed, Aristophanes calls Theramenes a Kean, and there was an ancient tradition that Theramenes studied under the sophist Prodikus of Keos. Furthermore, the names Hagnon and Theramenes are epigraphically attested in Keos. From this evidence Pesely has inferred that there may have been an unattested proxeny of Hagnon for Keos in which case the allusions to Theramenes’ Kean origins could be explained. We may speculate further and attempt to relate also the reference in Cratinus’ Ploutoi on Nikias’ lowly trade, by postulating the engagement in trade on the part of Nikias with the island of Keos. Since the location of Steiria suggested itself as the most convenient point of departure for someone travelling to Keos, it is conceivable that Nikias somehow did engage in trading (perhaps agricultural products from his estate?) with Keos, hence his stigmatizing as ‘merchant’ and ‘hireling.’ Athenian big land owners normally tried to bring the surplus of the produce of their estates to local markets to sale it. One such big estate owner was Phaenippus about whom we get to know through a court speech delivered probably around 330 in the context of a diadikasia, that is a dispute about who was fitter to perform a liturgy. Phaenippus possessed property at the deme Kytherros, most

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1000 Cratinus Ploutoi K-A 73 lines 73, 74.
1001 Ar. Frogs 970.
1002 Athen. 5.220B-C; schol. Ar. Clouds 361; Suda s.v. Θηραµένης 342; s.v. Πρόδικος 2366.
1005 [D.] 42 Against Phaenippus; A. Scafuro Demosthenes Speeches 39-49 Austin 2011: 103-110; for a discussion of Phaenippus management of his estate and an assessment of his property, see R. Osborne Athens and Athenian Democracy Oxford 2010: 107-114; for the
probably a deme at the Mesogeia, south of Brauron. Phaenippus exploited his property intensively by cultivating barley and vines and by utilising the wood resources lying in his estate and probably beyond it, since his estate is described as an eskhatia ([D.] 42.5, 6, 7, 19). What is important in our case is the fact that Phaenippus had employed two donkey drivers to transport the wood to the markets with the six donkeys Phaenippus owned. That Phaenippus showed a keen interest in the market and saw to it that he would bring the produce of his estate (barley, wine and wood) to the market himself, bypassing all middlemen, should not be taken as idiosyncrastic or unusual. His case throws light on the material conditions in which rich landowners operated in Attica in the classical period. The fact that an aristocrat like Theramenes’ grandfather, Nikias could be mocked as a φορτηγός by the comic poets may mean that Nikias probably did what many big estate owners usually did, that is, place the produce of his estate to the local markets and engage in trade.

**Theramenes in 411**

It is exasperating that so little is known about Theramenes’ career prior to 411. If we accept the 440s as his date of birth, then he should not have been much older than thirty, the minimum age requirement for admission to certain offices in Athens, when he secured the generalship in the oligarchy of the Four Hundred. But this consideration may be in conflict with a reference on Theramenes in Eupolis’ *Poleis* produced either in 422 B.C., pace Geissler, or in 420, pace Dover. The scholiast of Aristophanes’ *Frogs* 970 in a gloss on οὐ Χῖος ἄλλὰ Κείος notes that in that play it was alleged that Hagnon had registered Theramenes, apparently in the deme catalogue of legitimate citizens, (προσγεγράφθαι τῇ πολιτείᾳ), the implication being Theramenes was adopted by Hagnon and of foreign birth (Keos). If we could be sure that Theramenes was the target of this libel here, this might have been an allusion to Theramenes being a recognizable public figure already in the 420s, and thus we should necessarily push backwards his date of birth in the 450s. Alternatively, the comic poet may have targeted the young lad Theramenes as the son

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1009 P. Geissler *Chronologie der attischen Komödie* Berlin 1925: 39.

of a famous Athenian that Hagnon was. But since we do not have the actual text of Eupolis we cannot be sure that it was not Hagnon himself who was the target of libel in this passage. On the other hand, when Critias in front of the oligarchic Council blatantly attaches the label of traitor to Theramenes, he claims that from the beginning of his career Theramenes was honoured by the people due to his father Hagnon. Although we can be fairly sure, despite W. McCoy, that what Critias meant was that Theramenes had acquired high elective offices prior to 411, we should not forget that Critias’ rhetoric here aims at exposing Theramenes’ treacherous nature in the eyes of the councillors, and the words ἐξ ἀρχῆς μὲν τιμώμενος ύπο τοῦ δήμου serve exactly this purpose, namely to impugn Theramenes’ faithfulness to both oligarchy and democracy.

Bearing in mind the dearth of positive and undisputed evidence concerning the career of such a prominent man as Theramenes we are reduced to making inferences, in the best of cases, about his involvement in the coup and how and why this came about. Characteristic of the extent of our ignorance is the fact that we simply do not know Theramenes’ whereabouts in the winter of 412/11, the crucial months during which the oligarchic movement was being tentatively conceived and then organized on a firmer basis on Samos. Did Theramenes serve with the navy on the island under whatever post, was he in Athens, or did he serve in one of the numerous overseas posts? If the first possibility is true, he is a strong candidate to have been one of

1011 Xen. Hell. 2.3.30: ὁτος γάρ ἐξ ἀρχῆς μὲν τιμώμενος ύπο τοῦ δήμου κατὰ τὸν πατέρα Ἀγνῶνα, προπετέστατος ἐγένετο τὴν δημοκρατίαν μεταστῆσαι εἰς τοὺς τετρακοσίους, καὶ ἐπρώτευεν ἐν ἐκείνοις. ‘for although this man was honoured by the people from the start due to his father Hagnon, he was extremely eager to change the democracy into the Four Hundred, and he held the first place among them’ (P. Krentz’ translation).
1013 If we place Theramenes’ birth close to 440, then his first appointments should have been to minor offices. In [And.] 4.11 we hear that in 425 the young Alcibiades was among the ten commissioners elected to reassess the tribute of the allies; the setting up of the commission was stipulated in a clause in Thoudippos’ decree (see B. Meritt, H Wade-Gery and M. McGregor The Athenian Tribute Lists vol. 3 Princeton 1950: 70-73 for a translation of the decree); similarly, Diotrephes seems to have occupied lesser military offices before he became general (Ar. Birds 798-800; pages 138-139 above; cf. J. Hatzfeld Alcibiade: Étude sur l’histoire d’Athènes à la fin du 5 siècle Paris 1940 : 68). No wonder, scholars are divided with regard to Theramenes’ debut in politics. Andrewes (“The Spartan Resurgence” in D. Lewis and I. Edwards (ed.) The Cambridge Ancient History 5: The Fifth Century B.C. Cambridge 1992: 476), Ostwald (1986: 365) and Hornblower (A Commentary on Thucydides vols 1-3 Oxford 1991-2008: 3 959, note on 8.68.4) believed Theramenes’ participation in the oligarchy was not his first public performance, whereas H. Avery (“Lysias 12.65” CP 61 1966: 258 no 4), C. Hignett (1952: 272) and W. McCoy (1997 passim) believe Theramenes was a political novice in 411.
1014 I cannot share Hurni’s confidence that Theramenes was not on Samos in the autumn of 412 (2010: 35).
the δυνατώτατοι ἄνδρες with whom Alcibiades came into contact when the movement was still incunabular.1015 Indeed, if one accepts the existence of earlier relationships between the two men and Thrasybulus, and bears in mind the close cooperation of them in the following years, it is likely that Theramenes was more than positive with regard to the prospect of Alcibiades’ recall. If, on the other hand, Theramenes was in Athens during the entire winter and spring of 412/11, his first contact with the movement must have been when Peisander arrived for the first time in 411 in Athens at some point in February as the head of a group of envoys sent by the conspirators on Samos to pave the way for the constitutional changes required for Alcibiades’ recall and an alliance with Persia.1016 To Theramenes Peisander’s arguments about the necessity of securing the King’s alliance as the only means of saving Athens at the time of its severest crisis must have sounded compelling. Peisander repeatedly, emphatically and unequivocally stressed Athens’ desperate situation: the Peloponnesians had no fewer ships than the Athenians, they had more allies, and most importantly, enjoyed the King and Tissaphernes’ financial backing. Those were challenges Athens could not meet under the current circumstances. As to the condition on which Persian money was to be secured on behalf of Athens, Theramenes must have had no doubts, despite Peisander’s rhetoric and carefully veiled language, that what was at stake then was the abolition of democracy and the installation of an oligarchy in its stead.1017

The question which naturally arises is what were the precise reasons that convinced Theramenes that a constitutional change in whatever form represented a good option for Athens at the given time? One should distinguish between personal reasons or motives and political, ideological ones, although it is difficult and probably not advisable to separate them completely. Theramenes may have made an approach to the oligarchs, whether on Samos or in Athens, because he was intrigued with the prospect of working together with Alcibiades in the first place. At the same time, his family must have felt too strongly the ever-increasing financial burden that lay on

1015 Thuc. 8.47.2.
1016 Thuc. 8.53-54; on the chronology of Peisander’s mission to Athens and the related problems see H. Avery “The Chronology of Peisander’s Mission to Athens” CP 94 1999: 127 – 146 and my “The Chronology of Peisander’s Mission to Athens Re-visited: Thuc. 8.53-54” Aclass 57 2014, forthcoming; McCoy 1997: 178 argues that Theramenes was not involved in conspiratorial activities before Colonus, but I cannot imagine Theramenes remaining indifferent to Peisander’s call for action in February. Even if he was not in Athens at the time he must have got in touch with the oligarchs as soon as he returned home.
1017 M. Taylor has argued for the responsibility, if not outright complicity, of the demos for the installation of the Four Hundred oligarchy in 411 B.C. She argues that, despite Peisander’s ingenious μὴ τῶν αὐτῶν τρόπον δημοκρατουµένος (Thuc. 8.53.1) ‘even the dimmest of Athenians must have heard the roots of oligarchy in the phrase ἐς ὀλίγους μᾶλλον τὰς ἀρχὰς ποιήσοµεν (8.53.3) ‘put the offices more into the hands of the few’. To give only the few the power to rule is, after all, the definition of oligarchy.’ (“Implicating the Demos: A Reading of Thucydides on the Rise of the Four Hundred” JHS 122 2002: 97). Nobody of course would classify Theramenes under the dimmest of Athenians.
their shoulders, especially so since Theramenes came from a rural deme, which, since the occupation of Deceleia by the Peloponnesian army, was completely cut off from the city of Athens and probably utterly devastated.1018 In this, he must have shared the fate of so many other aristocratic families whose whole way of life, connected as it was with the land, had turned upside down since 413.1019 On the political level, Theramenes, it has been argued, led a group of moderates who were inclined to lend their support to the Four Hundred not so much for oligarchy’s sake as such, as for the prospects of a victorious conclusion of the war that Alcibiades’ offer promised.1020 In a slightly different fashion, Theramenes, and his father Hagnon, have been seen as heirs of Nicias’ politics, representatives of the moderates, who joined the movement because of Athens’ desperate situation at the time.1021 Certainly, Hagnon must have exercised some influence on his son with regard to the latter’s active involvement in the new political initiative which in February of 411 seemed so promising in the eyes of many Athenians. Being a proboulos, Hagnon must have been among the first who came into contact with Peisander, already before the famous debate(s) in the assembly, so Theramenes should have been fully aware of the content of Peisander’s speech before it was actually delivered.1022

1018 Since we are in the dark concerning the make-up of Theramenes’ family property, we cannot tell to what extent the statesman from Steiria had suffered financial loss arising from the destruction of his Steirian estate(s). Did the family own property elsewhere in Attica (but with Agis in the area the exploitation of such property would have been problematic and intermittent in the best case) or overseas, in which case the loss could have been somehow mitigated? We simply do not know the source of Theramenes’ wealth (but see page 236 above for the suggestion that the family may have engaged in trading as well, as a means to supplement and augment its revenues arising primarily from landed property).


1021 Pöhlig 1877: 242. The author argued that Theramenes believed his friend Alcibiades was the only person who could save Athens at that critical moment (1877: 243). McCoy 1997: 178 also stresses the fact that the moderates had been an acephalous body since the death of Nicias. He concludes: ‘this lack of senior leadership explains why the moderates were more or less invisible in terms of real authority and far removed from the intimate discussions and decisions of the Inner Circle’.

1022 Elsewhere I argue that the developments on Samos in the autumn of 412, at least a rough idea of them, were already known in Athens on Peisander’s arrival (238 no 950). Since the probouloi were somehow involved in the preparation of the agenda of the Council, Theramenes may have had inside information of Peisander’s report to the Council on his arrival.
The preparatory stage of the revolution

Theramenes’ precise movements and contacts between Peisander’s departure from Athens for negotiations with Tissaphernes probably in early March 411 and his second arrival towards the end of May are shrouded in mystery.\footnote{M. Lang “Revolution of the 400: Chronology and Constitutions” AJP 88 1967: 177. Lang postulated a third assembly in which Peisander proposed the creation of a body of ten sungrapheis to replace the existing, pace Lang, thirty reported at AP 29.2 at the beginning of Thargelion which in 411 may have begun on May 28th (B. Meritt Athenian Financial Documents of the Fifth Century Ann Arbor 1932: 177-179); cf. Kagan 1987: 141. See, however Heftner 2001: 108 for the view that Peisander returned to Athens at the beginning of May 411; see also under Phrynichus, pages 216-217.} Thucydides gives a vibrant account of what transpired in Athens during Peisander’s absence but he does not attribute certain acts to individuals probably for dramatic effect. The young members of the hetaireiae had assassinated Androcles,\footnote{The assassination of Androcles was the first politically motivated murder since Ephialtes. This point has been stressed by Taylor 2002: 100 and no 37. Taylor acknowledges this as a contribution of an anonymous reader of her paper. Despite the small number of victims, Androcles’ murder clearly ushered Athens into a new era of trouble and instability.} a leader of the demos and personal enemy of Alcibiades, an act meant as a token of loyalty to the famous renegade, as well as a number of other democratic politicians. In public debate and open discussions the conspirators propagated a political programme which stipulated that no other than members of the armed forces should receive state pay and that the franchise be restricted to no more than five thousand Athenians, those who could serve the state through their bodies and property. The state machinery, Thucydides informs us, continued to function as before but the conspiracy controlled the agenda of both the ekklesia and the Council and dominated the debate process. The speakers in the assembly were among their ranks and they rehearsed thoroughly their speeches before delivering them. As a result of this combination of carefully planned propaganda and terror the populace was cowed to submission and passivity. Because of the magnitude of the city they could not estimate the actual numbers of the conspirators and they distrusted each other seeing that former popular leaders had turned oligarchs.\footnote{Thuc. 65.2-66.}

It is noteworthy how Thucydides accentuates the atmosphere of fear, uncertainty and mistrust that prevailed in Athens during Peisander’s absence by keeping the agents of these actions anonymous.\footnote{J. Shear Polis and Revolution: Responding to Oligarchy in Classical Athens Cambridge 2011: 29; Hornblower 2008: 944-946.} The protagonists will be presented individually, one by one only later at chapter 68. As far as Theramenes is concerned, Thucydides’ comment at 8.68.4 that he was among the primary catalysts for overthrowing the democracy should apply to the preparatory phase of the revolution as well.\footnote{καὶ Θηραµένης ὁ τοῦ Ἅγνωνος ἐν τοῖς ξυγκαταλύουσι τὸν δήµον πρῶτος ἦν, ἀνὴρ οὗτος εἶπεν οὗτος γνῶναι ἀδύνατος. Theramenes also, the son of Hagnon, was foremost among}
Aristotle in the *AP* mentions Peisander, Antiphon and Theramenes as the protagonists in the abolition of the democracy. Aristotle attributes noble birth and intellectual qualities, which were held in high esteem by Thucydides as well, to all three men: sagacity and sound judgement (*AP* 32.2). There are other contemporary witnesses who attest to Theramenes being a prime mover in the establishment of the Four Hundred. Xenophon has Critias directly accusing Theramenes that he ‘was extremely eager, like his father Hagnon, to change the democracy into the oligarchy of the Four Hundred and he was a leader in that government’ (Xen. *Hell.* 2.3.30) (C. Brownson’s translation). Lysias in his speech *Against Eratosthenes* asserts that Theramenes ‘first of all, was chiefly responsible for the former oligarchy by having prompted your choice of the government of the Four Hundred.’ (W. Lamb’s translation). Although Critias and Lysias were particularly hostile towards Theramenes for their own reasons, their testimonies cannot be totally dismissed, especially if they are corroborated by Thucydides, who had no reason to misrepresent Theramenes’ role in the establishment of the first oligarchy. We should consequently assume that the man was one of the champions of the oligarchic cause, and since Thucydides attributes great oratorical skills to him we may naturally infer that he made use of them in the assembly and elsewhere when he had to instruct the people and explain why certain constitutional changes were necessary.

When Thucydides summarises the political programme of the conspirators as it was circulated in Athens while Peisander was away, he adds the comment ‘these were only pretences intended to look well in the eyes of the people’ (Hornblower’s those who attempted to overthrow the democracy, being a man of no small capacity either in speech or in judgement’ (C. Smith’s translation). On the exact meaning of πρῶτος see Gomme, Andrewes and Dover *A Historical Commentary on Thucydides vols 1-5* Oxford 1945-1981: 5 178. I think Pöhlig’s contention that Thucydides attributes to Theramenes the role of a protagonist after he had played a key role in ousting the regime is wrong since it is clear from the context (8.65-67) that the historian presents the individuals responsible for the overthrow of the democracy, and in the present passage he directly connects Theramenes with the activities described at 65.2-66. McCoy 1997: 172 no 2 wonders whether Thucydides’ πρῶτος is an editor’s comment not borne out by the narrative. But Thucydides’ narrative is never exhaustive, nor do we expect him to record every detail of what transpired in Athens on the eve of the revolution.

1028 Diordorus’ source seeking to exculpate Theramenes does not associate him with the rise of the Four Hundred in power. The statesman from Steiria gets the credit only for the ousting of the oligarchic regime to which admittedly he contributed a great deal (Diod. 13.38.2: ἀνὴρ καὶ τῷ βίῳ κόσμιος καὶ φρονήσει δοκῶν διαφέρειν τῶν ἄλλων ‘a man who led a decent life and who was thought to excel in judgement in relation to others’). We do not know the social origins of Peisander and Antiphon, therefore Aristotle’s assertion that these men were aristocrats may be a mere inference. So P. Rhodes 1981: 407.

1029 Lys. 12.65: ὃς πρῶτον μὲν τῆς προτέρας ὀλιγαρχίας αἰτιώτατος ἐγένετο, πείσας ὑμᾶς τὴν ἐπὶ τῶν τετρακοσίων πολιτείαν ἠλέσθαι.

1030 Gomme, Andrewes and Dover 1945-1981: 5 162.

258
It has been noted that this statement amounts to the entire body of the supporters of oligarchy in spring 411 being a monolithic group of extremists, a statement which may stem from Thucydides’ extremist source. Later developments however showed that the movement was far from united with regard to its political goals and the ways and means through which those goals should be attained. But Thucydides’ words suggest that in the spring of 411 there was in Athens a wide public which was ready to listen to and accept proposals for the establishment of a moderate oligarchy which would operate on a basis of a citizen body with full political rights of five thousand Athenians and which would abolish all public pay save the military. Those ideas found supporters not only among the citizens in Athens but within the Four Hundred as well as far as we can judge from AP 29.5, the proposals brought to the vote by the thirty sungrapheis which materialized in effect what had been discussed during the preparatory stage of the revolution (Thuc. 65.3). Regardless whether one believes Theramenes when he claimed in his defence speech at the oligarchic Council in 404 that he had always been a consistent supporter of a hoplitae oligarchy, there is no reason to doubt that in 411 he would have campaigned for such a political agenda, an agenda which, ideological or theoretical considerations apart, seemed to deal quite effectively with Athens’ two acutest problems at the time: the need to save money and the need to secure an alliance with Persia. Let us not forget at this juncture that Peisander’s agenda in February addressed two points: first was the necessity of an alliance with Persia with a view to continuing the war until the end; the second one was a precondition of the first, that is, oligarchy. But Peisander did not lay out any constitutional schemes in detail. His language was deliberately vague at 53.1 and 53.3. Besides, his most valuable contribution to the movement was not theoretical constructions but the power of persuasion and organisation skills. We have seen that Theramenes had certain reasons to favour the prospect of Alcibiades’ recall and an alliance with Persia, and a constitutional change would not have been abominable to him. We may conclude that for Theramenes the programme laid out by the conspirators in the spring of 411 was not a mere propaganda.

1031 8.66.1: ἤν δὲ τούτῳ εὑρεπές πρὸς τοῦς πλείους.
1032 Gomme, Andrewes and Dover 1945-1981: 5 163. But Hornblower in a nuanced comment adds: The rhetoric of the chapter as a whole needs to be taken into account, and Thucydides’ determination to present, even slightly to force, parallels with 3.82-83 and 6.24.3-4; this involves him in some temporary elision of political nuances, and some simplifications for dramatic effect (2008: 946). Kagan 1987: 142 discerns significant differences between the true oligarchs, as he calls them, and their opportunistic collaborators on the one hand, and the moderates on the other.
1033 Taylor’s comments on 8.66.1 are particularly sharp: ‘One designs propaganda, of course, to be appealing to the target audience; one pretends to give the people what they want.’ (2002: 101).
1034 Xen Hell. 2.3.48.
1035 See A. Woodhead “Peisander” AJP 75.2 131-146 especially 140-146.
But before we turn to some chronological considerations concerning Peisander’s failure in the negotiations with Tissaphernes, we need to discuss Hurni’s views about Theramenes stance in respect to the programme described by Thucydides at 65.3. Hurni argues that Theramenes’ goal in 411 was not the creation of a hoplite oligarchy. The census of five thousand citizens with full political rights, that is the parole the conspirators forwarded in spring, was sponsored by the hetaereiai because this particular number was totally arbitrary; since the hoplite class in Athens consisted in 411 of many more than five thousand men, the selection process would necessarily exclude a large part of the hoplites from the citizen body. Who would finally become a citizen then would have been left to the sole discretion of the extremists. Besides, Theramenes was never in favour of quotas; he does not mention them in his speech in 404 and he raised grave objections to the decision of the Thirty to have only three thousand Athenians enrolled to the body politic (Xen. Hell. 2.3.19). Hurni is certainly right in stressing that in the autumn of 411 no numerical limit was set to those who would be included in the citizen body. The notion ‘Five Thousand’ simply designated all those who could afford hoplite armour and above, who in reality were many more than five thousand. But his assertion that the hetaireiai sponsored the slogan of the ‘Five Thousand’ in the spring of 411 does not stand scrutiny. Hurni claims that this specific number would have placed great power in the hands of the extremists because the number itself was totally arbitrary since it did not reflect the social realities of 411 Athens; the conspirators, therefore, seriously meant what they publicly propagated, the consequence being that they would have enrolled primarily their sympathisers in the citizen body. But this contradicts Thucydides who at 8.66.1 emphatically states that all this talk about the ‘Five Thousand’ was pretences intended to please the people. Furthermore, Thucydides says that the extremists within the Four Hundred considered a constitution in which five thousand citizens would take the most important decisions radical democracy (ἀντικρυς δῆμον).

Some chronological considerations

With regard to Theramenes’ positive stance towards Peisander’s call for an alliance with Tissaphernes and the Persian King some details of the chronology of Peisander’s mission to Tissaphernes and, more importantly, the flow of information between the two sides of the Aegean Sea might throw considerable light. What I mean is, we need to see in detail if the Athenians and the oligarchic sympathisers learnt about the collapse of the negotiations with Tissaphernes before Peisander’s second arrival in Athens in late May. I have argued that if the oligarchs in Athens did not hear about the failure in the peace negotiations as late as the end of May, the earliest possible


1037 Hurni op.cit.

1038 Thuc. 8.92.11. For the view that the number 5000 reflected a compromise between the extremists and the moderates within the oligarchic movement, and that the former group decided to do away with the sovereign body of five thousand citizens in their planned polity because of the ease with which they seized power, see Heftner 2001: 116, 146-148.
point in time is the last third of April, when news from the Meander plain finally broke in Athens.\textsuperscript{1039} Since, as it has rightly been pointed out,\textsuperscript{1040} Androcles’ assassins seem to have been ignorant of the breach in the negotiations between Athens and Persia when they committed their crime, this is a reason for placing Androcles’ death before the end of April 411, despite Andrewes’ arguing for a relatively short terror campaign on the part of the extremists.\textsuperscript{1041} We do not know how the news arrived in Athens and in what form, neither are we in a position to estimate how the ordinary people received it. I, for my part, doubt that every Tom, Dick and Harry grasped what had really happened in Asia Minor. Certainly, Peisander and the other delegates had no reason to spread the news, quite the opposite, so if the Athenians ever learnt the truth it must have come from a third source.\textsuperscript{1042} But men like Antiphon, Phrynichus and Theramenes were in a position to form a sound judgement even with little information at their disposal. The inevitable conclusion to this consideration is that the leading figures of the conspirators in Athens, Theramenes included, took the decision to carry on with their objective, i.e., installation of the oligarchy independently from those on Samos (Thuc. 8.63.4). Their rationale should not have been different from that of the oligarchs on Samos, namely their public appearances and speeches in favour of the constitutional change had unequivocally compromised them in the eyes of their fellow-citizens, plus the fact that an oligarchy could manage the state treasury better through the proposed cuts in state pay. Abandoning their course at that particular moment would have been too dangerous for them.\textsuperscript{1043} Theramenes, then, took the decision to continue with the plan towards late April, but as we will see it is unlikely that he changed his attitude towards the war, at least his public political discourse should have remained a pro war one.

**The assembly at Colonus**

Thucydides maintains that soon after Peisander’s second arrival in Athens a decree was passed to elect ten *sungrapheis* who would draft proposals for changes in the constitution.\textsuperscript{1044} Aristotle names the individual who moved the decree, a certain Pythodorus, and adds an important detail, the rationale with which Pythodorus and undoubtedly other speakers supported the decree, namely the prospect of Persian

\textsuperscript{1039} This point is made in “Phrynichus.”

\textsuperscript{1040} Kagan 1987: 142-143.

\textsuperscript{1041} Gomme, Andrewes and Dover 1945-1981: 5 190-193.

\textsuperscript{1042} Heftner in a private conversation has raised the possibility that the conspirators on Samos secretly informed their comrades in Athens about the unfortunate outcome of the negotiations with Tissaphernes and their resolution to carry on with their plan, i.e., establishing an oligarchy in Athens. Pace Heftner, with this move the oligarchs on Samos wanted to ensure their counterparts in Athens that despite obstacles their movement had not lost its momentum.

\textsuperscript{1043} Kagan 1987: 150.

\textsuperscript{1044} Thuc. 8.67.1; for the actual size of the committee of *sungrapheis*, see Heftner 2001: 130-132.
From this information we are entitled to infer that as late as end of May or beginning of June the oligarchs still played the card of Persian alliance despite the fact that Persia had long ago signed the third treaty with Sparta (Thuc. 8.58) and the oligarchs on Samos had decided to continue the war without Persia and Alcibiades. This inference seems to be supported by a passage of Aristotle's Politics where the philosopher discusses *stasis* and how constitutions come to change through deceitful means:

> ὃτε μὲν γὰρ ἐξαπατήσαντες τὸ πρῶτον ἐκόντων μεταβάλλουσι τὴν πολιτείαν, εἴθ’ ὅστερον βίο κατέχουσιν ἐκόντων, οὗν ἐπὶ τὸν Ἑπεκκοσίον τῶν δήμων ἐξητάτησαν φάσκοντες τὸν βασιλέα χρήματα παρέξειν πρὸς τὸν πόλεμον τὸν πρὸς Ἀκεδαμονίους, ἑπεξαίρουσι δὲ κατέχειν ἑπερῶντο τὴν πολιτείαν· (1304b10-15)

This was what happened in the case of the Four Hundred, who deceived the people by telling them that the king would provide money for the war against the Lacedaemonians, and, having cheated the people, still endeavoured to retain the government. (B. Jowett’s translation)

Diodorus’ extremely condensed account, for what it is worth, also gives the impression that the Four Hundred came to power as an emergency measure to address the desperate military situation, the understanding being the oligarchs would carry on the war since the Athenians were not willing to give up their Empire. Yet, E. David has proposed that Theramenes at the Colonus assembly stepped forward and instructed the people to pursue a foreign policy which would lead to the conclusion of peace with Sparta. As David admits, Thucydides does not mention Theramenes in connection with Colonus. But Lysias in Against Eratosthenes insinuated that Theramenes was the chief responsible for the installation of the first oligarchy, having used his powers of persuasion to achieve his goals. In addition to that, Theramenes in his speech in front of the oligarchic Council in 404 alleges that the Athenian demos voted for the installation of the oligarchy as they were instructed that the Lacedaemonians would rather trust an oligarchic regime than
democracy. David might have a point when he argues that the failure of the thirty *sungrapheis* to come forward at Colonus with specific measures for the salvation of the city and changes in the constitution is not due to disagreements between the different factions within the Four Hundred as many scholars believe, but due to the fact that the oligarchs wanted to dress up their machinations with an air of legality, democratic process and freedom of speech. David argues further that Theramenes, like Peisander belonged to the committee of *sungrapheis* and rose to the podium after Peisander’s speech to defend his proposals (Thuc. 8.67.3-68.1). Since Cleitophon in the previous assembly had moved his rider, namely to consult Cleisthenes’ laws because they were similar to those of Solon, Peisander’s motion for the election of a council of Four Hundred with unmistakably Solonian undertones would have been congenial to Theramenes. On the strength of *AP* 29.1, David believes that the conspirators made a u-turn in their foreign policy since until the assembly in which the thirty *sungrapheis* were elected the alliance with Persia was still desirable but a few days later they suddenly changed their minds. With regard to Xen. *Hell.* 2.3.45, Theramenes cannot have projected back to 411 conditions that existed in 404 because he had no reason to do so, nor is his allegation that the *demos* was instructed that an oligarchy would be more acceptable to the Spartans than democracy a blunder of Xenophon, as Andrewes believed. Plans to negotiate peace with Sparta would have been particularly welcome among the farmers who constituted the majority at Colonus, and, besides, the Four Hundred made overtures to Sparta for peace shortly after their coming to power. Thucydides does not mention Theramenes in the context of Colonus in part because Book Eight is unfinished and in part because he was not interested in propaganda moves such as this of Theramenes. Aristotle’s omission, on the other hand, is due to his source which is apologetic to Theramenes (a Theramenian pamphlet); his silence over Theramenes’ part in the selection of the Four Hundred forms a parallel to the silence over Theramenes’ role in the assembly which voted the Thirty. Hurni also has proposed, on the strength of Xen. *Hell.* 2.3.45 that Theramenes himself was one of the proponents of peace with Sparta in 411. Hurni notes that in 421 B.C. Hagnon had rallied for peace and was one of the seventeen signatories who signed the Peace of Nicias on behalf of Athens (Thuc. 5.19.2) and a little later the alliance with Sparta (5.24.1); and in 404 it was Theramenes who was chosen of all the Athenians to negotiate with Lysander (Xen. *Hell.* 2.2.16-23; Lys. 12.68). Theramenes’ family,

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1050 Xen. *Hell.* 2.3.45: τὴν μὲν γὰρ ἐπὶ τῶν τετρακοσίων πολιτείαν καὶ αὐτὸς δὴποι ὁ δήμος ἐυπρίστατο, διδασκόμενος ὡς οἱ Λακεδαιμόνιοι πάση πολιτείας μᾶλλον ἂν ἡ δημοκρατίᾳ πιστεύσειν. ‘in fact the people itself voted for the constitution of the Four Hundred, after they were told that the Lacedaimonians would trust any constitution more than a democracy.’ (P. Krentz’ translation)

1051 David 1995: 16 and no 5 with bibliography.


1053 Gomme, Andrewes and Dover 1945-1981: 5 207.

therefore, had always been favourably disposed towards peace with Sparta.\textsuperscript{1055} To begin with Hurni’s arguments, one cannot extrapolate from Hagnon’s attitude in 421 that of Theramenes in 411, nor can we use 404 as a guide for 411 simply because the negotiations with Lysander are a posterior event which cannot influence 411. But Theramenes is actually not guilty of gross misrepresentation and distortion of the situation in 411 regarding peace negotiations with Sparta. When the Four Hundred immediately after their seizure of power sent envoys to Agis in Deceleia to sue for peace they argued that it was high time that Agis should come to terms with them, since he had no longer to deal with the unreliable \textit{demos} (Thuc. 8.70.2). We see, rather, that Theramenes is guilty of misplacing events in time. The Four Hundred in reality did not advocate a peace policy with Sparta before they seized power but pursued it only afterwards.\textsuperscript{1056} In his attempt to rebut the charge levelled at him by Critias that he always shifted his attitude, he presented himself as consistent proponent of peace with Sparta throughout 411. Perhaps Theramenes judged that it would not have been prudent if he conceded that the Four Hundred (and consequently himself) were actually guilty of deceit, first promising that they would continue the war energetically with the help of Persia and then abandoning their avowed goal.\textsuperscript{1057}

An important aspect in our investigation of Theramenes’ role in the establishment of the Four Hundred is his reaction to the news of the failure in the negotiations with Persia. We have seen that signs of failure could have been inferred as early as the last third of April, not by the average Athenian, to be sure, but by men such as Phrynichus and Theramenes. When Peisander arrived in Athens in late May he provided the details. But, as we saw, the leaders of the movement in Athens must have taken the same decision to carry on with the plan independently from the oligarchs on Samos. I believe Theramenes was well aware of the diplomatic situation, and therefore we may not charge him with political stupidity or exculpate him as the victim of Peisander’s deception.\textsuperscript{1058} With regard to the alliance with Persia and the recall of Alcibiades we may therefore conclude that when the prospects vanished the oligarchs decided en bloc not to cancel their plans but carry out the coup instead

\textsuperscript{1055} Hurni 2010: 79.

\textsuperscript{1056} Heftner 2001: 125-130.

\textsuperscript{1057} See also the criticism on David’s views in Heftner 2001: 128-129: Heftner judiciously concludes that Theramenes and his followers were ready in the spring of 411 to follow the policy of the extremists and that they began to react to it only after Alcibiades’ message. This is also my conviction.

\textsuperscript{1058} Pesely 1983: 111. Pesely maintains that whereas in the assembly which voted the thirty \textit{sungrapheis} the oligarchs still played the card of Persia’s help, in the next one, at Colonus, they made a u-turn and advocated peace with Sparta. This does not make much sense, however. We may safely assume that when Peisander arrived in Athens a meeting with the leading members was summoned to discuss the latest developments and decide the course of action to be taken. We do not know if Theramenes attended that meeting, but even if he did not, he was well aware of the situation and fully responsible for his decision not to abandon the enterprise at that given moment.
despite the unfavourable developments. This is not to say that there was unanimity in goals, avowed or real, but that for the time being for a variety of reasons it was thought that they had better been put aside for the sake of the revolution. We will see that Theramenes had a very important personal motive in taking this decision.\footnote{The political situation after Peisander’s return from Samos is succinctly outlined by Kagan 1987:149-150.}

The question which remains to be answered is whether the public in Athens was aware of the developments on the diplomatic front, in which case the oligarchs’ campaign could have ended up in a fiasco, or whether the conspirators were able to play down any rumours that made their way from Asia Minor to Athens with regard to the third treaty between Sparta and Persia. One cannot give a definitive answer to this question. Certainly it is not impossible that news of the treaty had broken in Athens before Peisander arrived in late May. On the other hand, it is not certain that the average Athenian understood the complicated diplomatic language and the implications on the international level of a formal pact. It would be better to read the current situation as a widely fluctuating one with new and unexpected developments arising constantly. Note that when Thrasybulus delivers his speech at the assembly of the armed forces on Samos after the democratic revolution he argues for the necessity to recall Alcibiades because there was still hope that the latter could bring over Tissaphernes to their side.\footnote{Thuc. 8.8.1.1.} It is then not inconceivable that the conspirators continued the propaganda of Persian help as if nothing had changed. On a public level, they were able to downplay any rumour about the impossibility of an alliance with Persia. At the same time they started considering a conclusion of peace with Sparta, hoping that their enemies would accept peace on a status quo basis.\footnote{Heftner 2001: 101 and no 34 believes it was extremely unlikely that news of the collapse of the negotiations with Tissaphernes did not spread when Peisander arrived in Athens in May.} Theramenes should have no reasons to oppose such a policy. Peace on honourable terms could only do Athens good at the time. He was certainly not opposed to the first overtures to Agis described by Thucydides (8.70.2). We may then conclude that Aristotle’s testimony both in the \textit{Politics} and the \textit{Athenaion Politeia} reflects accurately the historical reality of the summer of 411 B.C.\footnote{When the Four Hundred came to power, Thucydides says, they did not recall the exiles lest Alcibiades would return as well. Andrewes remarks that if the oligarchs had actually decreed the return of the exiles they would have had to exempt Alcibiades on religious grounds. But such a move would have advertised their failure with Persia (Gomme, Andrewes and Dover 1981: 182) \textit{(cf.} McCoy 1997: 182 no 32). This might have been an indication that the oligarchs pretended to be conducting negotiations with Persia until the last minute.}

\textbf{Theramenes strategos}

Lysias in his onslaught on Theramenes denounces him as the chief responsible for the installation of the first oligarchy; he goes on to assert that:

\begin{footnotes}
\item[1059] The political situation after Peisander’s return from Samos is succinctly outlined by Kagan 1987:149-150.
\item[1060] Thuc. 8.8.1.1.
\item[1061] Heftner 2001: 101 and no 34 believes it was extremely unlikely that news of the collapse of the negotiations with Tissaphernes did not spread when Peisander arrived in Athens in May.
\item[1062] When the Four Hundred came to power, Thucydides says, they did not recall the exiles lest Alcibiades would return as well. Andrewes remarks that if the oligarchs had actually decreed the return of the exiles they would have had to exempt Alcibiades on religious grounds. But such a move would have advertised their failure with Persia (Gomme, Andrewes and Dover 1981: 182) \textit{(cf.} McCoy 1997: 182 no 32). This might have been an indication that the oligarchs pretended to be conducting negotiations with Persia until the last minute.
\end{footnotes}
καὶ ὁ μὲν πατὴρ αὐτοῦ τῶν προβούλων ὁν ταῦτ’ ἐπραττεν, αὐτὸς δὲ δοκῶν εὖνοστατός εἶναι τοῖς πράγμασι στρατηγάς ὑπ’ αὐτὸν ἠρέθη. καὶ ἡσ’ μὲν ἐτιμάτο, πιστὸν ἂν ἀντόν ξῇ πόλει ἔπραξεν· ἐπειδὴ δὲ Πεισανδρὸν μὲν καὶ Κάλλαιςχρον καὶ ἐτέρους ἐώρα προτέρους αὐτὸν γινούμενους, τὸ δὲ ὑμετέρου πλῆθος οὐκέτι βουλόμενον τούτων ἀκροάσθαι, τότ’ ἠδή διὰ τε τὸν πρὸς εἴκεινος φθόνον καὶ τὸ παρ’ ὑμῶν δέος μετέσχε τῶν ἀριστοκράτους ἔργων. βουλόμενος δὲ τῷ ὑμετέρῳ πλῆθει δοκεῖν πιστὸς εἶναι ἀντιφόντα καὶ Ἀρχεπτόλεμον φιλότους ὅντας αὐτῷ κατηγοροῦν ἀπέκτεινεν. (12.65-67)

His father, who was one of the Commissioners, was active in the same direction, while he himself, being regarded as a strong supporter of the system, was appointed general by the party. So long as he found favour, he showed himself loyal; but when he saw Peisander, Calaeschrus and others getting in advance of him, and your people no longer disposed to hearken to them, immediately his jealousy of them, combined with his fear of you, threw him into co-operation with Aristocrates. Desiring to be reputed loyal to your people, he accused Antiphon and Archeptolemus, his best friends, and had them put to death. (W. Lamb's translation)

This is the only source, apart from Thuc. 8.92.9, from which we learn that Theramenes was appointed general in the oligarchic regime. Lysias corroborates Thucydidides with regard to the vital role the statesman from Steiria played in the set up of the oligarchy, although his tendency to exaggerate when it comes to despicable Theramenes is obvious. But Lysias adds two important pieces of information; first, Theramenes was appointed general because he was thought to have been a trustworthy person for the regime; second, his father Hagnon was equally energetically involved in the enterprise taking advantage of his office (proboulos). The first assertion is based on the now universally accepted emendation of Sauppe to αὐτῶν instead of the mss reading αὐτοῦ at 12.65. But H. Avery has argued for the retention of the mss reading on the strength of a work attributed by some scholars to Theophrastus,1063 the fourth to third century philosopher from Eresos, in which the author in the context of his argumentation for certain offices being entrusted to young men under the guidance of older colleagues makes Hagnon giving advice to his fellow-citizens to do exactly that; Hagnon wanted to promote his son to the generalship and to press his point he drew a parallel from hunting: like the keen hunters who place young hunts among older ones when it comes to hunting, so the

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1063 The editor of the manuscript W. Aly (Fragmentum Vaticanum De Eligentis Magistratibus e codice bis rescripto Vat. Gr. 2306, Studi e Testi 104 Vatican City 1943: 48-49) has argued for the Theophrastrian authorship of this work; cf. A. Szegedy-Maszak The Nomoi of Theophrastus Salem 1987: 91-92. The author may attribute the Vatican fragments to Theophrastus but concedes that a definite attribution is impossible. J. Keaney also argued for the Theophrastian origin of the fragments (“Theophrastus on Greek Judicial Procedure” TAPhA 104 1974: 179-194, esp. 180.)
Athenians should entrust the generalship to young, talented men. Avery thought the occasion on which Hagnon gave this advice to the Athenians was on the eve of the revolution and that the recipients were actually the oligarchs themselves. But we cannot determine with certainty the historical context of Hagnon’s advice as transmitted by Theophrastus. Besides, the mss reading αὐτοῦ may be a mistake made by the scribe since in the immediate context we read ὁ µὲν πατὴρ αὐτοῦ.

How did Theramenes manage to secure such a prestigious office, especially if one accepts that he had no previous experience in 411? A clue to this question may be found in one of Lysias’ deprecatory remarks; in his effort to win the reputation of a faithful supporter of democracy, Theramenes had no qualms about putting to death his most intimate friends Antiphon and Archeptolemus. If we were to take this statement at face value it could explain why Theramenes was elected, or better said, chosen as a general under the oligarchy, given that Antiphon must have had a say in all important decisions taken by the leading faction of the conspirators whatever its composition may have been. But we have seen that there are reasons to doubt the validity of Lysias’ assertion (see above pages 60-64); Theramenes was probably not a personal friend of Antiphon and Archeptolemus, but he did co-operate closely with the former in the opening stages of the revolution. As to his actual duties as general, it is true that Theramenes is not connected with any known military activity during the oligarchic regime. But since we know so little about his career and life in general prior to the coup we cannot place too much emphasis on arguments from silence. Thucydides would not have got into trouble to mention mundane and trifling tasks such as the surveillance of the walls for example, nor does the historian mention any Athenian commander in connection with the repulsion of Agis’ attack. Theramenes’ performance later that year in Euboea and the Hellespont tell against McCoy’s views. We now must turn to the persons who became generals under the oligarchy to see if we can establish what the criteria for their selection were.

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1064 de eligendis magistratibus fragmenta b 118-129.
1065 Avery “Lysias 12.65” CP 61. 4 1966: 257-258. The corollary to Avery’s hypothesis is that Theramenes was about thirty in 411; he should then have been born in the late 440s, and those who believe he was a novice in politics in 411 would have been vindicated.
1067 Lys. 12.67.
1068 See under “Archeptolemus”.
1069 McCoy 1997: 183-184 has raised this point in his attempt to show that Theramenes’ appointment to the generalship was rather honorary than real. It was a ploy on the part of Antiphon to feed Theramenes’ ambition and secure his participation in the oligarchy.
1070 Theramenes on his way to the Hellespont leads a campaign against Chalkis and Euboea (Diod. 13.47.6-7) with thirty ships probably in the winter of 411/10 in February (B. Bleckmann Athens Weg in die Niederlage: Die letzten Jahre des peloponnesischen Kriegs Leipzig 1998: 377 and no 68).
The sources transmit the names of five out of the ten generals of the oligarchy: Alexicles \textit{PAA} 120295 (Thuc. 8.92.4); Theramenes \textit{PAA} 513930 (Thuc. 8.92.9; Lys. 12.65); Aristarchus \textit{PAA} 164155 (Thuc. 8.98.1; Xen. \textit{Hell.} 2.3.46); Aristoteles \textit{PAA} 174760 (Xen. \textit{Hell.} 2.3.46); Melanthius (Xen. \textit{Hell.} 2.3.46) \textit{PAA} 638280. To these we may add, with more or less confidence, Dieitrephes \textit{PAA} 323750 (Thuc. 8.64.2) and Thymochares \textit{PAA} 518930 (Thuc. 8.95.2).\textsuperscript{1072} Of these persons, we know that Dieitrephes and Thymochares were not fatally compromised after their involvement in the oligarchy.\textsuperscript{1073} I take this to mean not so much that they were moderates, but that in the public mind they were not perceived as traitors or as having compromised Athens’ integrity and \textit{arche}. Of the remaining ones we know that Aristoteles was an experienced military officer; he was elected general probably in 431/0 B.C. (IG I\textsuperscript{3} 366, 6), and again in 426/2 (Thuc. 3.105.3). He had also taken important posts in the administration of the city since in 421/0 he was a Hellenotamias (IG I\textsuperscript{3} 285, 5). But the identification of the general and the Hellenotamias with the oligarch is by no means certain since the name is very common in Athens.\textsuperscript{1074} The other three men remain an enigma to us. We know nothing about Melanthius save the reference in Xenophon that he, along with Aristarchus and Aristoteles were entrusted with the fortification of Eetioneia.\textsuperscript{1075} I have argued against the identification of Aristarchus with the \textit{choregos} and general of the late 420s; Aristarchus seems to have had close ties with Alexicles and both men are likely to have been members of a \textit{hetaireia}. Melanthius also must have had extremist convictions since he was involved in the Eetioneia project. Nothing is known about the social background of these men or their previous record under democracy. It is therefore possible that these three men (and possibly Aristoteles) owed their appointment to the generalship to their partisanship with regard to the oligarchic cause, especially their involvement in the terror campaign and assassinations known to us through Thucydides (8.65.2-66). Dieitrephes’ social prestige and his enmity towards Alcibiades were probably his most valuable assets. Social prestige and Hagnon should have been crucial for Theramenes. We know nothing about Thymochares. It is lamentable that we do not have the names of the remaining three generals, but as the evidence goes there is an indication that the extremists were generously represented in the board of generals of the oligarchy. If we accept that all ten men should have been thought as

\textsuperscript{1071} \textit{PAA} lists under different entries Aristoteles the Hellenotamias, Aristoteles son of Timocrates the general in 426/5, and the oligarch, but holds the identification of the first two with the third as possible.

\textsuperscript{1072} R. Develin tentatively adds Antiphon, probably the son of Lysonides who was put to death by the Thirty and who had performed as trierarch during the Peloponnesian war (\textit{The Athenian Officials} 684-321 B.C. Cambridge 1989: 161). The evidence comes from Pseudo-Plutarch \textit{Life of Antiphon} 832F. But the ancient author confuses Antiphon the orator with the son of Lysonides, so his testimony does not amount to much.

\textsuperscript{1073} See under the corresponding profiles.

\textsuperscript{1074} For his career, see H. Avery \textit{Prosopographical Studies in the Oligarchy of the Four Hundred} PhD Diss. Princeton University 1959: 95-100.

\textsuperscript{1075} He should not be identified with the tragic poet (Avery 1959: 212-213).
trustworthy by the leading clique within the Four Hundred, and that the appointment should have been postponed for as long as possible for reasons of personal rivalries and to avoid disappointment from those who were to be excluded, it follows that Theramenes enjoyed the confidence of the regime at least up to its establishment.\footnote{Kagan 1987: 162 quite plausibly suggests as a possible time the week between the seizure of power on the part of the Four Hundred on Thargelion 14\textsuperscript{th} and 22\textsuperscript{nd}. But Andrewes pointed to 86.3 and noted that since the oligarchic envoys display knowledge of Agis’ repulsion at 71.2, the embassy to Samos must have left after Agis’ attack, in which case Thucydides’ \textit{εὐθὺς μετὰ τὴν ἑαυτῶν κατάστασιν} at 72.2 could not be taken literally since Agis’ preparations for the invasion were necessarily time consuming—the summoning of the Peloponnesian army at the Isthmus should have taken several days, if not weeks.\footnote{Gomme, Andrewes and Dover 1945-1981: 5 184.}}

**Athens and Samos**

To understand the conduct and reactions of the oligarchs in the spring-summer of 411 B.C. it is important to keep track of the information flow between the capital and Samos where the Athenian navy was stationed. Developments on Samos were no less dramatic and unpredictable than those in Athens, and we need to keep in mind that there was always a fluctuating time lag in the dissemination of news throughout the Cyclades and the Aegean Sea. The chapters refer to Thucydides’ Book Eight.

70.2: The Four Hundred send the first embassy to Agis. The u-turn in the foreign policy first manifests itself at this point. Thucydides does not give any indication of dissent within the oligarchs with respect to the peace negotiations. We have no reasons to think that the conditions under which peace was to be agreed were, from the oligarchs’ point of view, other than the status quo. Theramenes misplaces these events in time for his own reasons (Xen. \textit{Hell.} 2.3.45), (see above, pages 264-266).

71.3: Embassy to Agis after the latter’s attack on the city walls. The conditions should have still been the status quo. According to Hurni 2010: 85, Theramenes at this point loses his faith in the revolution since the oligarchs fail to conduct peace with Sparta.

72.2: \textit{εὐθὺς μετὰ τὴν ἑαυτῶν κατάστασιν}. The Four Hundred send an embassy to Samos. Literally taken this should mean perhaps between Thargelion 14\textsuperscript{th} and 22\textsuperscript{nd}. But Andrewes pointed to 86.3 and noted that since the oligarchic envoys display knowledge of Agis’ repulsion at 71.2, the embassy to Samos must have left after Agis’ attack, in which case Thucydides’ \textit{εὐθὺς μετὰ τὴν ἑαυτῶν κατάστασιν} at 72.2 could not be taken literally since Agis’ preparations for the invasion were necessarily time consuming—the summoning of the Peloponnesian army at the Isthmus should have taken several days, if not weeks.\footnote{Gomme, Andrewes and Dover 1945-1981: 5 184.} This is not necessary. The oligarchic envoys could have learned about Agis’ attack while they were waiting on Delos, or they could have
been told about this development by the sailors on Samos. Since their delay on Delos was considerable, news from Attica may have made their way in the Aegean faster than the oligarchic embassy. It is important to note that at this point the oligarchs in Athens are unaware of the events on Samos; Chaereas has not arrived in the Piraeus yet. It is possible that the ships of the envoys and the Paralos put to the sea at the same time but, travelling at different directions, they did not meet.

73.1: The democratic counter-revolution on Samos. Thucydides tells us that the democratic reaction took place on the eve of the oligarchic take-over in Athens. Note the tenses of the verbs ‘ἐνεωτεριζετο’ and ‘ξυνισταντο’. The imperfect denotes longer processes. It must have taken some days before the outcome of the revolution on Samos became clear, that is, before the democrats prevailed over their enemies, and definite news could not have reached Athens earlier. Theramenes and the other oligarchs are still unaware of the adverse developments.

74.1: The Athenian democrats on Samos send Chaereas to Athens without knowing that the Four Hundred have assumed power. One can infer from this passage that the troubles and the final dominance of the Samian democrats took a certain amount of time. The seizure of power on the part of the Four Hundred may have occurred after the beginning of the democratic agitation on Samos and before the democrats’ victory. On Chaereas’ arrival, then, Theramenes may have finally taken the decision that the best way forward was against and not with the Four Hundred.

Conclusion: Theramenes’ stance in 411

“When a historian comes across an altruistic motivation which cannot be strictly proved, but does make sense in the historical context, he should credit this motivation to the person under inspection. He will thus use common sense and get a more balanced picture.” These are R. Merkelbach’s thoughtful comments on Theramenes, and one cannot but agree with him. We need for example not doubt that in the winter of 411 Theramenes like so many other Athenians were deeply concerned about Athens’ hopeless situation and that he had some reasons to believe that an oligarchy might be the solution to the current problems. As a young, talented politician he had also ambitions, totally legitimate, to dominate Athenian politics like his father Hagnon did in Pericles’ time. He had no misgivings about co-operating with individuals of extreme oligarchic convictions; he even condoned criminal acts in the belief that the end justifies the means. It is perhaps easy from the observer’s point of view to pass judgement on the moral aspect of Theramenes’ deeds or stance. But we should also not forget that those were troubled times. Twenty years into the Peloponnesian war and a stasis were serious enough reasons for the contemporary Athenians to push aside ethical considerations and moral taboos. In the spring of 411

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Theramenes rallied behind the oligarchic cause and was rewarded for this later with the generalship. He did not raise any objections when the Four Hundred changed their policy towards the war and sued for peace with Sparta. At the time and without the prospect of Persian help this seemed to be the only realistic course of action and Theramenes was a pragmatist above all. It was only when news of the democratic revolt reached Athens and especially when Alcibiades’ message was made known that he decided to change sides and form an opposition faction within the Four Hundred. He was extremely cautious however not to expose himself beyond redemption, at least not until it was clear who the winner in the ongoing political struggle would be. The episode of the Eetioneia when Theramenes managed to trick out the extremists amply shows that even at that late time and despite his opposition, the oligarchs had not completely lost trust in him.\textsuperscript{1080} Like other prominent individuals in Thucydides, Theramenes’ actions are partly dictated by fear.\textsuperscript{1081} During the course of 411 and as long as stasis in Athens lasts we witness Theramenes and the other protagonists to cater more and more for their survival and private interests over that of the city’s.\textsuperscript{1082} A highly controversial and divisive figure, Theramenes in 411 was for some of his fellow-oligarchs a traitor, but for the majority of Athenian citizens he was a patriot who saved Athens from slavery.\textsuperscript{1083}

\textsuperscript{1080} See under “Aristarchus” and “Aristocrates.”
\textsuperscript{1081} Thuc. 8.89.2: The opposition being afraid of the extremists and Alcibiades.
\textsuperscript{1083} Theramenes’ undoubtedly crucial role in the overthrow of the Four Hundred has been analysed in the profiles of Aristocrates, Archeptolemus, Phrynichus and Aristarchus.
Thymochares

PAA 51893

Introduction

It is lamentable that the information we have at our disposal about this important figure among the Four Hundred is so scarce. Thymochares is the only general, among the known ones at least, next to Theramenes himself, who emerged unscathed after the political purges and witch hunt which ensued in the wake (and as a result) of the naval defeat off Eretria. How Thymochares, as it seems, first enjoyed Antiphon’s trust and endorsement to the effect that he was chosen to be a general, how and why then he sided with the opposition led by Theramenes and Aristocrates, we cannot hope to find out, in the light of the present state of the evidence.

Possible fourth-century relatives

The name appears three times in the fifth century. The first (PAA 518915) in a casualty list of 464 B.C. The second was a treasurer of Athena (PAA 518945) in 440/39 B.C. The third was the general under the Four Hundred. Unfortunately in none of these cases are we given any information about their tribes. Avery proposed the identification of the treasurer with the general on the grounds that it would be possible for a pentakosiomedimnos at some point in his life to be elected as general. J. Davies has drawn attention to the possibility that the notable fourth-century Athenian family from Sphettos (Akamantis), owners of mines and politically prominent, whose members were Phaidros, general in 347/6, 334/3 323/2, and Thymochares (PAA 519010), general under the regime of Demetrios of Phaleron in 322/1 or 321/20, 315/4, 313/2, were connected with blood ties with one of the two Thymochares in the fifth century of high standing, most probably the general. However, the gaps in our knowledge with regard to the tribal affiliation of the fifth-century bearers of the name, and the evidence being so flimsy forbid any claims to certainty.

1084 Professor Heftner rightly has pointed out to me in a private letter that we know neither the fate nor the names of the other three generals of the oligarchy.
1086 IG I3 458, 11.
1087 Prosopographical Studies in the Oligarchy of the Four Hundred PhD Diss. Princeton University 1959: 291. However, even Avery himself realizes the difficulties with regard to this identification, for Thymochares must have been approaching seventy when he became general if he was a treasurer in 440.
1089 Davies based his assumption, first, on both fifth and fourth century namesakes’ prominent social background, and second, on the fact that since no other general under the
Thymochares and the Four Hundred

Thymochares was one of the generals of the Four Hundred (Thuc. 8.95.2), the others being Theramenes, Dieitrephes, Aristarchus, Aristoteles, Alexicles and Melanitus. Andrewes has suggested that Thymochares may have been elected as general ad hoc by the body which sent him to Eretria. But by the time Thucydides narrates these events (8.95.2) the oligarchic regime, though crumbling, is yet to be deposed. I have argued (see under Alexicles) that the collapse of the oligarchy was dramatic and sudden and was not effected before the news of the defeat off Eretria broke in Athens. That happens in Thucydides’ narrative only at 8.97.1. It is theoretically possible, of course, that the Four Hundred, that is the extremist faction, perhaps under pressure from the opposition, were compelled to designate Thymochares as general specifically for the expedition to Euboea. But it is perhaps less complicated if we assume that he was elected general with the rest of the board at the beginning of the oligarchic reign.

We do not know what procedure the Four Hundred followed to choose their generals. Rhodes proposed that ‘perhaps it was made by the inner caucus of the revolutionaries and in due course was ratified by the Four Hundred’. If this bears resemblance to the actual reality, Thymochares should have undoubtedly enjoyed great trust among his companions—at least at the initial phase of the revolution—including those whose political careers and even sheer presence in Athens became untenable after the Eetioneia affair and the naval defeat off Eretria, that is, the extreme oligarchs. This is important when it comes to attaching to the members of the Four Hundred such labels as ‘moderate’, or ‘extremist’ as though political alignments and personal relationships remained static throughout the oligarchic reign.

It has been assumed that the general Theramenes took to deal with the uprising at the Eetioneia wall and the imprisonment of Alexicles was Thymochares, on the grounds that all the remaining generals under the Four Hundred were extremists.

Four Hundred is known to have belonged to Akamantis tribe, Thymochares the oligarch could be from Sphettos. Accordingly, Thymochares the treasurer of Athena belonged to one of the following tribes: Akamantis, Oineis, Kecropis, or Hippothontis (Avery 1959: 291 no 6). Considering the dearth of evidence, any attempt at identifying relationships can be little more than mere conjecture.

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When the news of the mutiny broke, the Four Hundred were having a meeting. The extremists among them were pressing to take their arms and attack the mutineers, while throwing threats at Theramenes and his faction. The latter defended himself saying he was prepared to assist in saving Alexicles. He, accordingly, took one of the generals who was of the same persuasion as him and departed for the Piraeus, while Aristarchus and some young knights accompanied them (Thuc. 8.92.6). Andrewes expressed his surprise at the fact that the Four Hundred allowed Theramenes to take a trusted man with him, but Hornblower rightly notes that it is not sure whether this general had already openly sided with Theramenes by then. To this we may add that Aristarchus and the young cavalrymen’s surveillance may have been deemed enough by the Four Hundred who may not have anticipated Theramenes’ treacherous dealings or simply were unable to respond to the rapidly changing situation.

The expedition to Euboea

The next episode in which Thymochares was involved precipitated the downfall of the oligarchic regime. When Agesandridas with his fleet sailed past Attica and reached Oropos, the Athenians got exceedingly alarmed and mustered all the available naval forces with a view to defending Euboea, Thymochares being the general (Thuc. 8.95.1-2). Thucydides vividly describes the hastiness with which the Athenians assembled the crews, and how they managed to cobble together a fleet amidst stasis (ἀξυγκροτήτος πληρώμασιν... ἐν τάχει βουλόμενοι βοηθήσα). Notwithstanding their efforts, the Athenians lost the battle after offering some resistance, for the residents of Eretria had plotted against them by allowing the Athenian crews to provide themselves with food not from the neighbouring market, but from outside the city. This cost the Athenians precious time, and when the Eretrians sent Agesandridas the pre-arranged signal to attack, the former were caught unawares and soon thrown into disarray. As a result, they lost a considerable number of men, twenty-two ships and the whole of Euboea except for Oreos (Thuc. 8.95.3-7).

Thucydides, as usual, abstains from explicitly commenting on the

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H. Heftner Der oligarchische Umsturz des Jahres 411 v. Chr. und die Herrschaft der Vierhundert in Athen: quellenkritische und historische Untersuchungen Vienna 2001: 238.


1095 Busolt stresses the fact that ‘infolge der Abwesenheit der Masse des Schiffsvolkes verfügte man nur über ungeübte Mannschaften’ (1893-1904: 3.2 1507), which seems to imply that the crews had not received any training in the past, or at least only inadequate. Andrewes (Gomme, Andrewes and Dover 1945-1981: 5 317) may be closer to the real situation when he says that what was lacking was co-ordination and working together. LSJ translate ἀξυγκρότητος as ‘not trained to pull together’.

1096 Diodorus 13.34.2-3 and 36.3-4 gives a different version of the story; according to him, the Athenians had sent forty ships and two generals who lost the fight because they quarrelled with each other. W. McCoy suggests that Diodorus’ mention of two generals may be explained through the fact that there was already another general on duty at Eretria
performance of the Athenian officers, or attributing any responsibility for poor leadership. He underscores, however, the hastiness with which the Athenians conducted the whole of the campaign, and the total absence of the all important time for an army to gather intelligence concerning the whereabouts of the enemy and engage in reconnaissance (Thuc. 8.95.3: καὶ εὐθὺς ναυμαχεῖν ἤναγκάζοντο). At the same time the narrative draws the reader’s attention to the careful preparation and perfect timing and execution of Agesandridas plan. The loss of Euboea was a disaster which instilled fear in the hearts of the Athenians more than the Sicilian disaster did (Thuc. 8.96), but for Thymochares this defeat does not seem to have had any consequences. Apparently the Four Hundred and the Athenians did not hold him responsible, for he appears to be enjoying their trust as he retained his office as a general in the regime of the Five Thousand, presumably through elections held shortly after the downfall of the Four Hundred and before Thymochares’ mission to the Hellespont.

**Possible involvement in Antiphon’s trial**

It has been suggested that Thymochares, as a general, was one of the accusers who, along with Theramenes, acting as a general too, and Apolexis, one of the thirty syngrapheis, brought Antiphon, Archeptolemus and Onomacles to trial on a charge of treason for having taken part in an embassy to Sparta ([Plut.] Life of Ten Orators 833D20-F; Thuc. 8.90.2-91.1). Indeed, this carefully calculated move could explain Thymochares’ political survival after the collapse of the regime, but we cannot be sure that it was him and not one of the other four unknown generals of the Four Hundred who charged his former comrades.

(“The Political Debut of Theramenes” in Hamilton, C., and P. Krentz (eds.) Polis and Polemos: Essays on Politics, War, and History in Ancient Greece in Honor of Donald Kagan Claremont 1997: 183 no 37). In a slightly different fashion, professor Heftner communicates to me that Diodorus might have taken the commander of the Athenian detachment guarding Eretria as the second strategos, in which case Diodorus’ blunder lies in the fact that this commander was not sent from Athens like Thymochares. See Gomme, Andrewes and Dover 1945-1981: 5 318 on the possibility that the Hellenica Oxyrhynchia is the ultimate source of Diodorus in this passage, and that the number forty is not a round-up of Thucydides’ number but represents a different tradition.

1097 8.95.5: διὰ τοιαύτης δὴ παρασκευῆς οἱ Αθηναῖοι ἁναγαγόμενοι καὶ ναυμαχήσαντες ὑπὲρ τοῦ λιμένος τῶν Ἐρετρίων ὀλίγον μὲν τινὰ χρόνον ὅμως καὶ ἀντέσχον. ‘through such preparation the Athenians put to sea and fought off the harbour of Eretria; nevertheless, they held out for a while.’

1098 Busolt 1893-1904: 3.2 1510 no 2; Kagan 1987: 204.


1100 Kagan 1987: 210 seems to attribute Thymochares’ retention of his generalship to him cashing in on his involvement as an accuser in Antiphon and Archeptolemus’ trial.
The campaign in the Hellespont

A few weeks later, and after the Four Hundred had been deposed, we hear of Thymochares again. Xenophon begins his *Hellenica* with the description of the sea-battle between his and Agesandridas’ small fleets (1.1.1). This relatively minor naval engagement occurred in the context of the fierce conflict between the Athenian and the Persian-sponsored Peloponnesian fleet for the control of the Hellespont straits, the outcome of which could potentially determine that of the whole war. A few days after the Peloponnesian defeat at Kynossema, Mindarus, the Spartan admiral, sent Hippocrates and Epicles to Euboea with a view to collecting the ships stationed there and sent them back to the Hellespont as reinforcements for the next confrontation which was looming large. On arrival in Euboea, the two officers managed to assemble fifty ships (Diod. 13.41.1, 3), and hastily put out to sea to make it to the Hellespont as soon as possible. In the mean time, the Athenians had decided before Kynossema that their fleet at the Hellespont be reinforced, a move probably with political connotations as it constituted a gesture of good will and co-operation with the fleet on the part of the Five Thousand. To this end, they sent Thymochares with a small squadron, probably encompassing the ships that he managed to recover after his defeat off Eretria, fourteen ships in total. Xenophon makes it clear that the battle took place in the Hellespont and not on the way, that is somewhere in the Aegean, but he fails to record the storm off Athos which annihilated the entire Peloponnesian fleet. Some scholars have assumed that Agesandridas was with this force which encountered the storm and that he managed somehow to retain a small number of ships fit for battle, with which he intercepted and defeated Thymochares, but this reconstruction is fraught with difficulties.

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1102 Thuc. 8 107.2; Diodorus (13.41.1) only mentions Epicles.
1105 Diodorus 13.41.1-3, quoting Ephorus, who had copied the inscription on the dedicatory stone found at a temple at Koroneia. It is important that the dedication itself mentions the number of the shipwrecked ships, so this could not be a usual exaggeration or distortion of Diodorus, unless we assume that the number was rounded up or somewhat augmented to highlight the extent of the disaster by the dedicators themselves. Similarly, as Busolt noted, (1893-1904: 3.2 1522 and no 1) the small number of survivors (only twelve) may also be an exaggeration. However, we should have no doubt that the storm must have rendered the Peloponnesian reinforcements completely unfit for battle, and that their commanders would normally, under those adverse circumstances, seek first a suitable place to recover and repair the damages of their ships before continuing their voyage, let alone venturing an encounter with an enemy force.
1106 Marchant and Underhill 1979: 2; E. Meyer *Geschichte des Altertums vols 1-4* Stuttgart 1884-1901: 4.1 366 no 2; Busolt 1893-1904: 3.2 1522; Kagan 1987: 227. One wonders how a
would be better to assume, with Bleckmann, that Agesandridas was in charge of a small squadron, independent of Hippocrates and Epicles, while the bulk of the force stationed in Euboea was led by the two Spartan officers.\textsuperscript{1107} The separation of the entire reinforcements into two squadrons would make sense from a military point of view as well, as in this way detection would be more difficult.\textsuperscript{1108} Alternatively, we could assume that Thymochares set out to the Hellespont after Hippocrates and Epicles had departed from Euboea, and Agesandridas somehow observed this and realising that the Athenians had no naval force at home with which to attack Euboea took the remaining ships and sailed to the Hellespont as well.\textsuperscript{1109} An indication, albeit not decisive in itself, is the fact that Xenophon names Agesandridas as the sole commander of the Peloponnesian squadron.\textsuperscript{1110} But we know that Hippocrates survived the storm off Athos to carry the letter to Sparta announcing the crashing defeat at Kyzicos (Xen. 1.1.23).\textsuperscript{1111} According to the view held by Busolt and Kagan, the Spartan officer, and whoever survived the storm, must have been rescued by Agesandridas. But then, we may legitimately ask, is it not odd that Hippocrates relinquished his command to Agesandridas, when he had been personally given orders by the Spartan admiral to fetch the reinforcements from Euboea (Thuc. 8.107.2)? I believe that the assumption that Agesandridas led a separate squadron with which he intercepted and defeated Thymochares, and that Hippocrates, after

\textsuperscript{1107} Bleckmann 1998: 389 and no 8.
\textsuperscript{1108} Compare Thuc. 8.8.3 where king Agis decides to send the thirty-nine ships, destined to assist in the war effort at Chios, Lesbos and the Hellespont, in two squadrons so as to throw the Athenians into confusion and hinder their pursuit.
\textsuperscript{1109} Agesandridas might have commanded then something between ten and fourteen ships. He came with forty-two ships from La (Thuc. 8.95.7), then he captured twenty-two after the Eretria sea battle, but he had fifty ships taken off by Hippocrates and Epicles (Diod. 13.41.1-3). This would have left Euboea almost completely undefended, but Mindarus had correctly foreseen that the decisive battle for the whole war was about to take place in the Hellespont, and such a risk was worth taking. On the other hand, did the Athenians have any naval force at their disposal with which to raid Euboea?
\textsuperscript{1110} 1.1.1: ἐνίκησαν δὲ Λακεδαιμόνιοι ἡγουμένου Ἀγησανδρίδου. ‘the Lacedaemonians were victorious, Agesandridas being the commander.’
\textsuperscript{1111} Busolt’s objection (1893-1904: 3.2 1522 no 1) that the numbers in Diodorus’ story are grossly exaggerated partly because the vice admiral Hippocrates managed to survive is not convincing. Hippocrates could well have been among the twelve survivors who made the dedication at the temple in Koroneia. Note, however, that professor Heftner does not exclude the possibility of gross exaggeration on the part of the dedicators (as communicated in a private letter).
recovering and repairing a few ships, made to the Hellespont on his own, best explains both Agesandridas’ decision to attack and the outcome of the battle, as well as the question of command in the Peloponnesian fleet.

The question whether Agesandridas offered battle (and won it) with part, probably all, of his ships suffering damages from the storm off Athos is not merely academic, because if the answer is positive, this would have grave implications about Thymochares’ military competence. One might as well further ask what the criteria for choosing their generals on the part of the leading oligarchs were in the first place. We have already seen that there are indications that other oligarchs as well, namely Dieitrephes, were not deemed to be competent military leaders capable of securing for the Athenian forces victorious outcomes in the battlefields.

After this episode Thymochares disappears from the scene, never to appear again. It is noteworthy that he escaped the comic poets’ attention. Are we to take this fact as a sign of obscurity, or was his persona not comic enough to be ridiculed? Or simply he consistently pursued the ‘right’ politics, that is, he had a conservative, moderate oligarchic outlook.
Appendix 1

Was Hippodamus of Miletos Archeptolemus’ father?

The historicity of the family relationship between Hippodamus of Miletos, the famous fifth century town planner and political thinker, and Archeptolemus, the member of the Four Hundred oligarchy, has been disputed. In this article an attempt is made to verify the credibility of the ancient sources which assert the relationship through an examination of the ways Athenian citizenship was conferred on benefactors of the state. In addition, Hippodamus’ constitutional theories are discussed in connection with certain oligarchic ideas as they are transmitted to us in chapters 30 and 31 of the *Athenaion Politeia*.

The question whether Hippodamus of Miletos, the renowned town planner, but also an important, versatile and original political thinker, was the father of Archeptolemus, Antiphon’s comrade, condemned to death and executed during the political purges which ensued after the crumbling of the short-lived regime of the Four Hundred, is of paramount importance for the study of the oligarchic movement in late fifth-century Athens, because it could throw light on the origin of certain ideas on constitutions that were popular among oligarchic circles in late-fifth century Athens. Furthermore, if the answer to this question is positive, it will enable us to get a glimpse at the early days of the oligarch and probably explain how Archeptolemus’ political beliefs were moulded. In particular, should such a relationship have existed indeed, it would be legitimate to assume that Archeptolemus was brought up in an extraordinary and bright cultural and intellectual environment, that is, Pericles’ milieu. Perhaps, as it has been suggested, his experiences and background shaped the political ideas he brought into the oligarchic movement.

1112 Ancient sources on Hippodamus: Arist. *Politics* 2.1267b22-30; 7.1330b21-31; Σ Ar. *Knights* 327; Harpokr. s.v. Ἱπποδάμεια; Hesych. s.v. Ἱπποδάμου νέμησις; Photios s.v. Ἱπποδάμου νέμεσις, Ἱπποδάμεια; Suidas s.v. Ἱπποδάμεια; Bekker Anecd. Gr. I 266; Strabo 14.2.9.

1113 H. Avery *Prosopographical Studies in the Oligarchy of the Four Hundred* Princeton Diss. 1959: 42-44. Avery discerned similarities between Hippodamus’ tripartite political organization of the State and the constitutional sketches drawn by the theoreticians of the Four Hundred oligarchy and included in the *Athenaeon Politeia*, chapters 30, 31 (see below). M. Ostwald has drawn attention to the fact that Hippodamus’ participation in the Thurii mission in 444/3, together with such renowned personalities as Herodotus and Protagoras, suggests that the architect supported Periclean politics and ‘may even indicate membership in the Periclean brains-trust’ (“Athens as a Cultural Centre” in L. Boardman, J. Davies and M. Ostwald (eds.) *The Cambridge Ancient History 5: The Fifth Century B.C.* Cambridge 1992: 316). In the case of Thurii, in particular, it is interesting to note that the drawing of the constitution was entrusted to Protagoras (Diog. Laer. 9.50), whereas the town planning to Hippodamus (Hesychius, Photius s.v. Ἱπποδάμου νέμεσις; schol Ar. *Knights* 327). The whole enterprise may well have first been conceived, planned and given the green light by Pericles himself (Plut. *Per.* 11; *Prae. ger. rei.* 812D). It is a well known fact that in Pericles’ circle.
Although the majority of scholars have accepted the family relationship, doubts have been cast on the credibility of the Aristophanic scholia on *Knights* 327, the only source attesting the relationship. It is the purpose of this article to refute the arguments, put forward by various scholars, against the validity of the scholia on Aristophanes’ *Knights* 327, and therefore against the family relationship between Hippodamus and Archeptolemus, as well as against the identification of Archeptolemus in the *Knights* with the oligarch who took part in the coup which established the oligarchy of the Four Hundred in Athens in 411 B.C.. Furthermore, I will put forward an interpretation of the available evidence which is informed by the latest advances in our knowledge of granting Athenian citizenship and other privileges to foreigners living in Attica in the classical era, thereby hoping to demonstrate that unless we can positively refute the validity of the scholia on *Knights* 327, the possibility that at some time during his stay in Athens Hippodamus was granted first *engtesis*, that is the right to possess land and/or a house in Attica, and subsequently Athenian citizenship, is not contradicted by the other available evidence, but in fact underpinned by other similar cases.

Many a scientists and speculative thinkers, most notably Anaxagoras, could be found (Plut. *Per*. 6).

Let us first examine the evidence. In the *Knights*, in the course of an exchange of insults and accusations about Paphlagon’s dishonest conduct, the chorus exclaim (323-327):

ἄρα δὴ τ’ οὐκ ἄρξῃ ἑδήλους ἀναίδειαν,/ ἢπερ μόνη/ προστατεὶ ρητόρων;/ ἦ συ πιστεύσον ἀμέργεις τῶν ἔξων τοῖς καρπίμους,/ πρῶτος ὅν· ὃ δ’ Ἰπποδάμου λείβεται θεώμενος.

did you not, then, right from the start display shamelessness/ which alone/ protects politicians/ and on which you rely to pluck the foreigners from whom money can be wrung/ being the most powerful citizen, whereas the son of Hippodamus sheds tears seeing you doing that.

If this son of Hippodamus is Archeptolemus, then this passage, along with an allusion to the peace negotiations with Sparta, in which he may have played a part,\footnote{1115 Ar. *Knights* 794; cf. *Peace* 665; *Thuc.* 4.21-2; 4.41.3; Philochorus *FGrHist* 328F128.} are the only references to Archeptolemus’ political career before his involvement in the oligarchic coup in 411.\footnote{1116 As the scholiast on *Knights* 794b reminds us, there is no reference in the sources to Archeptolemus’ involvement in the negotiations (παρ’ ἰστορίαν τοῦ Ἀρχεπτολέμου ἐμνημόνευσε). Neil 1966: 115 suggested that Aristophanes made use of Archeptolemus’ name partly for the pun: Delawarr brought peace in his hands *Knights*, or the joke may be that even Archeptolemus, the war beginner, is again at war. A. Gomme (Gomme, Andrewes and Dover 1945-1981: 3 482) suggested that Archeptolemus had probably been dispatched to Sparta as an ambassador, or had gone there on his own initiative, and that by 425/4 he had not yet been made an Athenian citizen and being a stranger, a Milesian, he was suspect for his pacifism. But in the addenda to this volume (732) he cast doubts on the identity of Archeptolemus at *Knights* 327 with the one mentioned at 794, arguing that the latter passage is actually an allusion to Archidamus, since in the eyes of the Athenians it was he who had started the war (cf. *Thuc.* 1.144.2; 7.18.2).} The ancient scholiast asserted that Archeptolemus was Hippodamus’ son, since in the scholia to line 327 we read:

ο δ’ Ἐποδάμου οὖν ἦν Πειραιαῖς κατωκεῖ και οἰκίαν ἔχειν, ἤπερ ἀνήκε δημοσίαν εἶναι. καὶ πρῶτος αὐτῶς τὸν Πειραιά κατὰ τὰ Μηδικὰ συνήγαγεν. ἦν δὲ Ἀθηναίως τίμος. πικρὸς οὖν λέγει ὅτι σὺ μὲν ἀνάξιος ὄν σφετερίζῃ καὶ ἀπὸ πάντων κερδάινει, ὃ δὲ εὐνοῦστος <ὡς> τῇ πόλει καταλεῖται δάκρυσιν, ἀνάξιος όρὸν σε τὰ τῆς πόλεως καρποῦμενον. λυπεῖται, φησίν, ὁ Ἀρχεπτόλεμος. οὖν γὰρ πολλὰ ὄφελησε τὴν πόλιν .... καὶ οἱ μὲν αὐτὸν φασὶ Θούριον, οἱ δὲ Σάμιον, οἱ δὲ Μιλήσιον. Ἐκλέωνος δὲ ἐχθρὸς ἦν.

The son of Hippodamus: this man lived in the Piraeus and had a house which he owned but bequeathed to the city. It was he who first drew the plan of the Piraeus during the Persian wars. He was held in honour by the Athenians. The poet bitterly remarks that you (Cleon), although worthless, appropriate everything and make a profit, whereas he, being most favourably disposed toward the city, melts away in tears seeing you unjustly appropriate the city’s revenues. He says

\footnotesize{1115 Ar. *Knights* 794; cf. *Peace* 665; *Thuc.* 4.21-2; 4.41.3; Philochorus *FGrHist* 328F128.

1116 As the scholiast on *Knights* 794b reminds us, there is no reference in the sources to Archeptolemus’ involvement in the negotiations (παρ’ ἰστορίαν τοῦ Ἀρχεπτολέμου ἐμνημόνευσε). Neil 1966: 115 suggested that Aristophanes made use of Archeptolemus’ name partly for the pun: Delawarr brought peace in his hands *Knights*, or the joke may be that even Archeptolemus, the war beginner, is against the war. A. Gomme (Gomme, Andrewes and Dover 1945-1981: 3 482) suggested that Archeptolemus had probably been dispatched to Sparta as an ambassador, or had gone there on his own initiative, and that by 425/4 he had not yet been made an Athenian citizen and being a stranger, a Milesian, he was suspect for his pacifism. But in the addenda to this volume (732) he cast doubts on the identity of Archeptolemus at *Knights* 327 with the one mentioned at 794, arguing that the latter passage is actually an allusion to Archidamus, since in the eyes of the Athenians it was he who had started the war (cf. *Thuc.* 1.144.2; 7.18.2).}
that Archeptolemus is grieving. This man benefited the city a great deal...and some claim that he comes from Thurii, others from Samos, or Miletus. He was an enemy of Cleon.

This scholion is found in the codices Venetus (V), Estensis (E), Laurentianus plut. 31. 15 (Γ), Laurentianus e (Θ), and Ambrosianus L 39 sup. (M). Of these codices, Venetus contains ancient scholia on the aristophanic comedies which date back to the Hellenistic era.\(^\text{1117}\) The collated information in the scholia comes from different scholiasts to the effect that some confusion occurs as to which data is relevant to which person, i.e., Hippodamus and Archeptolemus. Be that as it may, there is no difficulty in sorting it out. Thus, we learn from the scholia that Hippodamus lived in the Piraeus and owned a house which was given to him by the city, and which he gave back. He was the first to build the city during the Persian wars and was held in high esteem by the Athenians. He benefited the city a great deal, and some claim that he came from Thurii, some from Samos and others from Miletus. This prosopographical information is consistent with what we know about Hippodamus and the era he lived in (see note 1046 above), and it is likely to come from a learned Alexandrian scholar.\(^\text{1118}\) About Archeptolemus we learn that he was well disposed toward the city. He thought that Cleon was a worthless man, appropriating money and accruing profit out of everything, and that he wept seeing him using the city’s resources to his own advantage.\(^\text{1119}\) It is not clear where the scholiast got the information that Archeptolemus was Hippodamus’ son from, but even if one assumes that it was not more than a mere guess from [Plut.] \textit{Life of Ten Orators} 834A-B, where Archeptolemus’ patronymic is given, one cannot see who else this Hippodamus could be in an Athenian context other than the famous Milesian architect.\(^\text{1120}\)

The existence of a family relationship between Hippodamus and Archeptolemus as attested in the scholia has not met with unanimous approval. Erdmann raised the objection that as Hippodamus, according to the scholia, lived in the Piraeus he should belong to the Hippothontis tribe.\(^\text{1121}\) But we know that Archeptolemus belonged to the Erechtheis tribe since he was registered with the \textit{deme} Agryle.\(^\text{1122}\) Therefore, Erdmann argued, this should be an indication against the family


\(^{\text{1118}}\) Such names as Euphronius (interested in prosopographical data), Eratosthenes, Aristophanes of Byzantium, Callistratus, Demetrius Ixion and Didymus, among others studied Old Comedy in Alexandria; their scholia are of great value due to their erudition and the fact that they could avail themselves of the vast resources of the Library; J. White \textit{The Scholia on the Aves of Aristophanes} Boston and London 1914: ix-xxxvii.

\(^{\text{1119}}\) For a discussion on the obvious confusion on the part of the scholiast about which information pertains to Archeptolemus and Hippodamus see Erdmann 1884: 199-200; Burns 1976: 426; Gomme and Jones 1958: 5.

\(^{\text{1120}}\) The doubt cast by Gomme and Jones 1958: 3.

\(^{\text{1121}}\) Erdmann 1884: 201.

\(^{\text{1122}}\) [Plut.] \textit{Life of Ten Orators} 833A-F.
relationship. To this we may answer that we know that Hippodamus only lived in the Piraeus, and that he was given a house there. It does not follow that he was registered with the Hippothontis tribe, nor did all native Athenians living in the Piraeus belong to this tribe. Of course, ownership of a house or land, or both, was strictly restricted to native Athenians only, and even metics were deprived of this right, but under special circumstances, usually in return for services that had been offered to the people of Athens, a grant of land and/or house ownership could be given to an individual who was not Athenian, but wished to settle in Attica. This privilege was called ἔγκτησις and it was granted by the Assembly through a decree stipulating that X was granted the right to possess a house and/or land in Attica. Presumably, in Hippodamus’ case it was the planning and building of the market in the Piraeus called Hippodameia which prompted the Athenians to grant the Milesian architect the right to own a house there, the very city to whose development he had so much contributed. Nevertheless, the scholia tell us that Hippodamus returned the house to the State, perhaps when he took the decision to join the foundation of the Thurii mission.

A second objection is that since Archeptolemus took part in the oligarchy of the Four Hundred, and apparently was active in the 420s as a supporter of the peace negotiations between Athens and Sparta, he must have had Athenian citizenship, and if Hippodamus were his father, he ought to have been made an Athenian citizen too at some point during his stay in Athens. But Hippodamus is never mentioned in our

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1123 See J. Pečirka, The Formula for the Grant of Enktesis in Attic Inscriptions Prague 1966 passim. The earliest example of a grant of enktesis to an individual for secular purposes, is IG I3 102 from the year 410/9. It is the decree granting citizenship to Thrasyboulos, Phrynichus’ assassin, and enktesis to Agoratos, known to us from Lysias’ speech 13 Against Agoratus in connection with the murder of Phrynichus in 411 B.C. It is interesting to note that the decree addresses the grantees as euergetes, benefactors. See Pečirka 1966: 138, on the chronological range of the inscriptions concerning enktesis. The right to possess land in Attica was usually given to proxenoi (148-149). A. Harrison believes that it is probable that enktesis was not automatically included in grants of isoteleia and proxenia, but that it had to be specifically conferred on the recipients of these two privileges (The Law of Athens: The Family and Property Oxford 1968: 237).

sources as an Athenian. Rather he is described as a Milesian, Thurian, or Samian. So, Erdmann asks “sollte erst Archeptolemos in den attischen Bürgerstand aufgenommen worden sein, auf Grund eines Verdienstes, von dem wir nichts wissen?” Furthermore, it would be unlikely on the grounds of the family’s friendly relationships with Sparta that Hippodamus and Archeptolemus would be granted citizenship. To answer the former argument, there are parallel cases of naturalized Athenian citizens who rose to prominence, whom the sources do not describe as Athenians, which would be technically correct, but according to their ethnic origin, apparently for identification reasons. Menon of Pharsalos aided Athens in the siege of Eion in 477, and later on embarked on a political career illustrious enough so as to be a candidate for ostracism. Phanosthenes from Andros, and Apollodoros of Kyzikos, both naturalized around 410 B.C., became generals. Herakleides of Klasomenai became a prominent politician; he raised the ecclesiastic pay to two obols in the 390s. Similarly, since Hippodamus had reached a celebrity status, internationally recognisable, and had become famous throughout the Greek world as a Milesian (probably the other two ethnic origins, Thurian and Samian, reflect rival claims on the part of the respective cities), he was identified as such by his contemporaries, notwithstanding his official citizenship status. Furthermore, we should bear in mind that the argument *ex silentio* in this case is extremely weak, since the specific decree granting citizenship to Hippodamus stands a good deal out of the time span of our available evidence, that is, from the late fifth century B.C. to the latter half of the second. As to the latter objection, private, friendly relations with another state could hardly be a reason for refusing a renowned personality, who had proved himself to be a benefactor of the city and for whom other cities had great rivalry, entry to the citizen body. Furthermore, as Burns admits, arguments based on the

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1125 Σ Ar. *Knights* 327; Harpocr. s.v. Ἱπποδάμεως; Hesych. Ἱπποδάμου νέμης; Photios Ἱπποδάμου νέμεσις, Ἱπποδάμεως; Suidas s.v. Ἱπποδάμεως; Bekker *Anecd. Gr.* I 266.

1126 Erdmann 1884: 201

1127 The only sovereign body to grant citizenship to non-Athenians was the Assembly, and it was through a decree that a foreigner became an Athenian citizen. It was necessary for the grantee to actively see to it that he registers with a *deme* and *phratri* of his choice, usually with that of the proposer of the decree. Quite often the admission to citizenship was the culmination of a series of lesser privileges, previously given to the grantee who was usually a renowned personality. For a comprehensive analysis and discussion of the evidence concerning the granting of citizenship and other privileges see M. Osborne *Naturalization in Athens 4* Brussels 1981-1983: 147-171.


1129 Pl. *Ion* 541d; Athen. 506a; cf. *IG I* 182,42.

1130 Pl. *Ion* 541d; Athen. 506a; Ael. *VH* 14.5; *Ath. Pol.* 41.3.

1131 D. 23.65, 89, 141, 145, 187, 188, 213; Arist. *Oikon.* 1351b; Athen. 436b; Ael. *VH* 2.41.

political outlook of Hippodamus carry little weight since nobody can discern exactly where his sympathies lay.\textsuperscript{1133}

The next argument against the identification is the fact that Hippodamus is a Doric name, although we should expect in an Ionian city like Miletos the form Hippodemos to be in use. For Erdmann this is “sehr auffallend”.\textsuperscript{1134} But it would not be impossible for a family in Miletos who had friendly relationships (\textit{xenia}) with other families in Doric colonies in Asia Minor, or in cities in the Peloponnese, to give their child a Doric name.\textsuperscript{1135} A famous instance is, of course, that of Alcibiades, an ancestor of whom was connected with \textit{xenia} ties with an ancestor of Endios, a Spartan ephor in the time of the Deceleian War. Several family members in previous generations bore the name Alcibiades (Isoc.16.26; \textit{cf.} Lys. 14.39; [And.] 4.34 on Alcibiades’ II ostracism). According to Thucydides (8.6.3), Alcibiades owed his Spartan name to this relationship.\textsuperscript{1136} Thus, a Doric name could and is in fact well be attested outside Doric cities.\textsuperscript{1137} Nor are there any metrical anomalies in the \textit{Knights} 327, as Erdmann complained.\textsuperscript{1138}

Gomme questioned the family ties between the Milesian architect and Archeptolemus, and the identity of Archeptolemus the oligarch with the son of Hippodamus in the \textit{Knights} 327.\textsuperscript{1139} But the rarity of the name – it appears only twice in the fourth century (\textit{PAA} 210570; 210600) and twice in the third (210560; 210605), whereas there is no known fifth century bearer of this name, contemporary or near-contemporary to the oligarch- along with the compatibility of

\textsuperscript{1133} Burns 1976: 423.

\textsuperscript{1134} Erdmann 1884: 200.

\textsuperscript{1135} Gomme, Andrews and Dover 1945-1981: 5 303. This assumption neatly explains what we know about Archeptolemus and his pro-Spartan tendencies.


\textsuperscript{1137} A search in \textit{LGPN} volume 5a (coastal Asia Minor from Pontos to Ionia) returns 28 occurrences of names ending in –δαµος.

\textsuperscript{1138} The metrical analysis goes as follows:

\begin{verbatim}
πρῶτος δὖν· ὑ/ δ᾽ Ἡπιοδήµου/ λείβεται θε/σµενος.
 - U - X    - U - X   - U - X - U -
\end{verbatim}

The line is a perfectly regular trochaic tetrameter, with no analyses of the long syllables into two short ones, whereas the division after the second metre coincides with the end of a word.

\textsuperscript{1139} Gomme and Jones 1958: 3: ‘one would not expect that the man who dissolved into tears at the sight of Cleon soaking the rich should later become the companion in a desperate enterprise of the able Antiphon.’ Gomme and Jones based their interpretation of Aristophanes’ passage on the assumption that Aristophanes’ depiction of Archeptolemus is literally true; but there is always a latent danger in always interpreting Aristophanes literally since the metaphorical, ironic, symbolic and other uses of language in the Old Comedy often take precedence over the literal.
Archeptolemus’ pro-Spartan political outlook with his known activities during the regime of the Four Hundred tell heavily against the existence of two different persons with the same name living in the same period.\textsuperscript{1140}

Another attack on the family relationship was made by Burns. He came forward with an elaborate argument in an attempt to prove that the Ἰπποδάμου in Knights 327 refers not to the Milesian architect, but to an Athenian general, killed in the Egyptian campaign between 460 and 458, named Ἰπποδάμας from the Erechtheis tribe.\textsuperscript{1141} Sharing Erdmann, Wycherley and Gerkan’s reservations, Burns admits that there is a problem with the language concerning the name Ἰπποδάμας (which he rightly stresses is a native Athenian in contrast to Ἰππόδαμος, which is alien to Athens), for in the genitive it should be Ἰπποδάμαντος, Ἰπποδάμας belonging to the third noun declension, whereas Ἰππόδαμος to the second. His ingenious solution was that since there is a parallel in Diodorus, where an Ἰπποδάμας, the Athenian archon of 375 B. C., is given as Ἰπποδάμου in the genitive, the scholiast might have read this passage and mistook Ἰπποδάμας the general for Ἰππόδαμος the architect. The real father, then, of Archeptolemus would be Ἰπποδάμας.

Let us now examine whether Burn’s argumentation bears scrutiny. Several inscriptions mention Ἰπποδάμας, the fourth-century Athenian archon, in the genitive Ἰπποδάμαντος, exactly as one would expect, as the noun belongs to the third declension.\textsuperscript{1142} On the other hand the passage in Diodorus, coming from the first century B.C., gives indeed the form Ἰπποδάμου in the genitive.\textsuperscript{1143} But Diodorus, having lived in the first century, made use of the Hellenistic Koine, a form of the Greek language markedly removed from the Greek of the classical era. In the centuries that had intervened between Aristophanes’ and Diodorus’ time the old, classical dialects, especially Doric and Ionian, had given way to the koine, the lingua franca of the Hellenistic times, a morphologically and phonetically simplified linguistic version of its predecessors. To clarify this point, after the conquests of Alexander there had occurred such morphological developments as the extinction of the verbs ending in –μι, and the virtual extinction of the dual, whereas through a gradual tendency towards uniformity the third declension of nouns, by far the most complicated and varied in terms of stem formation and endings, lost to the first and second.\textsuperscript{1144} But while an author in the Hellenistic times would use Ἰπποδάμου instead of Ἰπποδάμαντος for the genitive of Ἰπποδάμας, a fifth-century poet like Aristophanes would invariably use the latter type, i.e., Ἰπποδάμαντος, whereas

\textsuperscript{1140} Compare also Sommerstein 1981: 186 for a more balanced interpretation.
\textsuperscript{1141} IG I² 929.
\textsuperscript{1142} IG II² 96, 2; 99, 2; 100, 1; 1424, 27; 1424α 371; 1425, 321; 1428, 152; 1429, 53; 1445, 5; 1446, 1; 1622, 491; 1635. 3, 8, 27, 30, 57, 118, 123; 1689, 1; XIV 1098, 6; SEG 26 72; 39 171; 33 440A, 2; 33 440D, 2.
\textsuperscript{1143} 15.38.1.
Ἱπποδάµου would always be the genitive of Ἱπποδάµος. Furthermore, the epigraphic evidence adduced by Burns rather undermines his argument than supports it, for we would normally expect to find the genitive Ἱπποδάµου, even once, on the inscriptions, to claim that this is a sufficient proof that this type was in use in the classical era. Instead, the genitive is always Ἱπποδάµαντος, a further corroboration of the strict separation of the first and third declensions in the classical era. To this we may also add that the source which gives us Archeptolemus’ deme and patronymic, Ἀρχεπτόλεµος Ἱπποδάµου Ἀγρύληθεν, is a decree dating to 411 B.C., and the logical inference is that the father’s name was Hippodamus, not Hippodamas. 1145 Burns’ last argument, namely that Hippodamas came from the same deme, Agryle, as Archeptolemus, can be explained as a coincidence. Either Archeptolemus in implementing the decree granting Athenian citizenship to his father, or Hippodamus himself may have formally applied for entry to the deme to which the proposer of the initial decree belonged, that is the deme Agryle.

Going back to Aristophanes’ Knights 327, for the reference to the two persons to be intelligible by the average Athenian it was necessary both of them to be famous and universally recognizable individuals. By the time of the production of the play Archeptolemus had enjoyed a celebrity status, probably through his peace initiatives and anti-Cleon policy, 1146 whereas everybody living in late fifth-century Athens knew who Hippodamus was and what he had done for the city. In conclusion, ὁ δ’ Ἱπποδάµου can only refer to the Milesian architect Hippodamus, his son Archeptolemus and nobody else, for as it has already been noted, the person must have been a famous one in Athens and easily identifiable by every Athenian.

Assuming the family relationship between the two men as quite probable in the light of the discussion above, it would be interesting to examine Hippodamus’ political thought in connection with certain ideas which circulated among oligarchic circles in Athens on the eve of the oligarchic revolution of 411 B.C.

Hippodamus’ political thought and the Four Hundred

As the son of a considerable political thinker, Archeptolemus is likely to have inherited a keen interest in constitutional forms and government from a purely theoretical point of view. But before we turn to Aristotle to review Hippodamus’ constitutional theories some preliminary observations may be made. It has been

1145 [Plut.] Life of Antiphon 834A-B.
1146 The remark of the scholiast on Ar. Knights 327 is in this respect astute and accurate. There are indications that at the time of the Pylos affair fervent diplomatic activity and heated debates in multiple assembly meetings took place in Athens. Philochorus (FGrHist 328F128a=schol. Ar. Peace 665-667) seems to tell a different story from that of Thucydides 4.17-20. Hornblower has rightly observed that Thucydides’ presentation of the Athenian stance on the question of war or peace is too sweeping, as the historian gives the impression that the Athenians were unanimous in their decision to reject the overtures for peace (1991-2008: 2177). It is not inconceivable that in the context of these debates Archeptolemus assumed a markedly anti-Cleon and pro-peace stance; cf. Ar. Peace 665-667.
argued that Hippodamus was a leading theoretician of democracy in the first half of the fifth century on the grounds of him introducing in town planning the philosophical and mathematical theories of the Pythagoreans, theories which enabled him to produce plans of cities (Miletus, Piraeus, Thurii) which characteristically displayed the principles of ἱσονοµία (equality of political rights) and ἱσοµοιρία (equal share), that is, principles which were the synonyms of democracy. But one need not necessarily attribute to Hippodamus a democratic political outlook solely on the strength of his work as a town planner and his design of the new type egalitarian residence house. Besides, the ideal of ἱσονοµία was not a democratic prerogative. Terms such as ἱσονοµία and ἱσηγορία may have first circulated among aristocratic circles in Athens in the sixth century in an effort on the part of the Athenian elite to claim back what they had lost through Peisistratus and his heirs’ tyrannical reign. The oligarchs seem to have shared this ideal or political principle as well, since the Thebans define their constitution in 427 B.C. as ὀλιγαρχίαν ἱσόνοµον (Thuc. 3.62.3): if there had not existed, so the Theban representatives in the court martial to decide on the fate of the capitulated Plataians argued, a narrow oligarchy (δυναστεία ὀλίγων ἀνδρῶν) at the time of the Persian invasion in 480/79, responsible for Thebes siding with the Persians, the Boeotian city would never have medised under an oligarchy where all citizens have equal rights. In addition, Thucydides asserts that what destroys an oligarchy that has come into being through a μεταβολή from democracy is the personal ambitions of its leaders: they are not content with being equal, as it is the norm in an oligarchy, but compete for power and offices.

In the opposite direction, Avery argued that the two constitutional sketches included in the Athenaios Politeia 30, 31 bear affinities with Hippodamus’ tripartite organization of the ideal state as described by Aristotle in his Politics (1267b22-1268a16). But Avery’s hypothesis that Archeptolemus extracted considerable influence in the shaping of the oligarchic theorizing and constitutional drafts on the strength of his familiarity with his father’s political theories requires close

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1150 Avery 1959: 42-44.
examination. True, on the strength of Arceptolemus' political career in the 420s, and his likely sophistic education together with Hippodamus' heritage, the oligarch might have engaged in the intense political theorizing over constitutions and government that was waged on the eve of the oligarchic coup. But, unfortunately, the only traces of these debates, apart from the two constitutional sketches, are to be found in AP 29.3, Pythodorus' motion and Cleitophon's rider to it as well as Thrasyvuloc's fragment (DK85B1); all three instances are to be interpreted in the wider context of the patrios politeia debate. But the patrios politeia theme involved debate which addressed problems of practical nature, debate which drew on Athens' history to find acceptable solutions.

Aristotle in the second Book of his Politics, after having discussed the constitution of Phaleas, embarks on a brief exposition of Hippodamus' ideal city followed by his criticism (1268a14-1268b30), and some reflections on the role of innovation in the laws and their development (1268b31-1269a8). Let us now see how Aristotle presents Hippodamus' theories. First, the philosopher describes his appearance noting that it was eccentric. He was the first to have written something on government, him not being actively involved in the political life (1267b25-31). He constructed the city having ten thousand citizens in three parts, craftsmen, farmers and soldiers/warriors, the latter being the only ones who possessed arms (1267b32-34). He divided the territory accordingly in three parts: sacred, public, and private. The sacred land was dedicated to the gods; the public was to be used to rear the soldiers, whereas the private would belong to the farmers (1267b34-37). He thought there are only three kinds of laws since all lawsuits fall into three categories: outrage, damage, and homicide (1267b38-40). There was to be only one supreme court in which all appeals were to be brought, the court consisting of elected elderly citizens. He also proposed a change in rendering a verdict; the ballot was to be abolished and in its stead the juror would write on a tablet his judgement (1267b40-1268a5). Those who found something advantageous to the city were to receive honours, whereas the orphans of those who fell on the battlefield were to receive state salary. All the magistrates were to be elected by the people, the people being all three parts of the state. The magistrates were in charge of the affairs of the community, of the strangers and the orphans (1268a4-14).

**Evaluation**

At first sight the adherence to a threefold division of the state in all the aspects of its life, political, economic, and private becomes apparent. This may be an influence from the Pythagoreans for whom number three had an intrinsic quality of perfectness and Hippodamus may have thought that constitutional arrangements informed by this theory were bound to be successful.1151 A democratic element in

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1151 T. Saunders (ed.) Aristotle Politics Books I and II Oxford 1995: 140. W. Newman believed that Hippodamus learned Pythagoreanism through the tragic and lyric poet as well as philosopher Ion from Chios whose treatise Τριαγμός (the triad) or Τριαγμοί may have dealt

289
Hippodamus’ theory is, unlike e.g., Plato, his trust in and respect of the class of craftsmen. The Milesian thinker and town planner allows them to participate in the political process and to have access to the magistracies. But two important components of his constitution, namely the judiciary and the executive had a strong oligarchic flavour. By allowing all cases to be brought to a supreme court of elected judges of senior age Hippodamus in reality annulled the power of the popular courts, the unaccountability of which was a quintessential aspect of radical democracy as experienced by the Athenians of the late fifth century.

This concentration of power to a relatively small body reminds the extensive functions and formidable authority of the Areopagus council in late archaic Athens. Indeed, Aristotle defines as oligarchical element in the Spartan constitution the concentration of judicial power, amounting to inflicting death or exile, in a body consisting of a few men (Pol. 1294b14-34). The second oligarchic element in the Hippodamean constitution was of course the provision for the election of magistrates, common practice in oligarchies in the Greek world with all its variations.

To turn to Archeptolemus, the Four Hundred, and Avery’s contention that certain ideas circulating in 411 and adopted by the oligarchs were in fact Archeptolemus’ contribution to the coup, the latter adopting ideas pertaining to constitution making from his father Hippodamus. Avery contents that the idea that only those who bear arms and can contribute to the state financially through their property should possess full civil rights stems actually from Hippodamus; this idea featured in the program of the oligarchs and circulated in Athens on the eve of the revolution (Thuc. 8.65.3; AP 29.5). This is a misconception. It was in fact Aristotle who, levelling heavy criticism at this tripartite arrangement of Hippodamus, and with the eye on Greek reality, commented that in the long term the two classes of craftsmen and farmers will lose out to the soldiers with regard to office holding, thus becoming their slaves, since the most important offices in a Greek state were reserved for those who bore arms; furthermore, both craftsmen and farmers inevitably will lose interest in

with the first triad of the cosmos whose elements were πῦρ, γῆ and ἀέρ (fire, earth and air). Newman remarked that, Pythagorianism notwithstanding, Hippodamus’ threefold division may owe to Egyptian practices or to the fact that in Attica the population was divided into Eupatridae, Geomoroi, and Demiourgoi, and that it may have inspired Plato’s Republic (The Politics of Aristotle vol. 2 Oxford 1887: 296, 298).

On the contrary, Aristotle would only grudgingly admit the banausoi into the citizen body and would argue that the best city would not make labourers citizens (Pol. 1277b33-1278a13).

Aristotle classifies the courts which are drawn from a certain class to deal with all cases as oligarchic (Politics 1031a12-15). In Hippodamus’ case the restriction has to do with the age not with class, but the fact that not every citizen is eligible for jury service makes Hippodamus’ supreme court distinctly oligarchic.


Arist. Politics 1294b8-10.

Avery 1959: 42-44.
participating in the public affairs of the city and gradually they will retire and adopt a hostile attitude towards the state (1268a17-25). But the oligarchic tint in Hippodamus’ constitutional theories may have indeed been appreciated by certain theoreticians in the oligarchic movement who were fascinated with constitutional sketches; traces of their work can be found in chapters 30 and 31 of the Athenaiōn Politeia, In these constitutional drafts the election of magistrates from a pre-selected list of candidates is envisioned; similarly, Hippodamus favours the election process. With regard to the legislative, strikingly enough there are no provisions to be found in the AP 30, 31, the little we know about the administration of justice under the Four Hundred points to the oligarchic Council of Four Hundred having assumed supreme judiciary powers. A relatively small body exercising extensive, if not totally unaccountable, power is also what Hippodamus had proposed. One needs to note here that if we suppose that Hippodamus wrote on constitutions at the time of Ephialtes’ reforms or a little later, his views about the judiciary may not have seemed by then particularly conservative. But, by the time the generation of the Four Hundred had reached maturity, the central (and for some pernicious) role of the popular courts in the radical democracy would have been appreciated and understood well by the critics or haters of democracy. As a result, I believe that ideas such as these of Hippodamus may have started to gain momentum in the oligarchic circles only in the 420s, at about the same time when Aristophanes’ Wasps and [Xen.] Athenaiōn Politeia were written.

These faint resemblances, however, do not prove Avery’s thesis that there was a direct link between Hippodamus’ philosophy and the oligarchic think tank of 411 B.C. To begin with, there are problems that compound the attribution of certain ideas to one specific person. The origin of theories and ideas of political organisation are difficult to be identified with certainty, and a linear transmission or borrowing of ideas from one group of people to another is not the only possible pattern. Similar ideas may spring, develop, elaborate and be reformulated simultaneously and independently in different areas and different contexts. Second, we cannot be sure that the source that transmits these ideas has not misrepresented them. We should bear in mind that we do not have first hand access to Hippodamus’ work. It is only through Aristotle that we can cast a glimpse at it, and there are signs that Aristotle

\footnote{1157 \textit{AP} 30.1: the 100 commissioners (ἀναγραφεῖς) are elected from the body of Five Thousand by the Five Thousand; 30.2: the most important officers of the state, among whom the generals, the nine archons, the treasurers of Athena and the Hellenotamiai, were to be appointed by the Council from a larger pool, of selected candidates members of the Council themselves; 31.1: members of the tribes were to chose candidates from whom the members of the Council of Four Hundred were to be elected; 31.2, 3: election of generals: the generals were to be elected provisionally from the whole body of Five Thousand but as soon as the Council of Four Hundred was constituted the authority to elect the generals would rest on it exclusively.}

was somewhat biased towards the theories of Hippodamus and other early speculative thinkers.\textsuperscript{1159} What we can say, however, about Hippodamus’ constitutional theories in relation to his son Archeptolemus and the Four Hundred is that Archeptolemus’ conservative or oligarchic outlook may be due to him being exposed to the ideas of his father, but judging from the evidence at our disposal, there does not seem to be any direct link between what we know about Hippodamus’ theories as transmitted through Aristotle and the oligarchic movement in 411 B.C.\textsuperscript{1160}

**Hippodamus the Athenian: a reconstruction**

Let us now interpret the evidence pertinent to Hippodamus’ likely, though admittedly, by no means sure, entry to the body of Athenian citizens. The scholia to *Knights* 327 attest that the architect possessed a house in the Piraeus, from which we can deduce that either he did so through him being granted citizenship at once, or at least, first *engtesis* and later on citizenship. In particular, it was possible to grant citizenship to a person through an amendment to an original decree granting *proxenia*,\textsuperscript{1161} or through an additional decree.\textsuperscript{1162} Other cases indicate that it was possible for a person to attain citizen status after having been awarded several lesser privileges.\textsuperscript{1163} We have already explained why Hippodamus is not mentioned as an Athenian by the sources (see above pages 283-284). A further reason could be that Hippodamus may have never become an Athenian citizen, that is never enrolled himself in a *deme* and *phratry* of his choice after he had been granted citizenship, for

\textsuperscript{1159} From 1268a15 it is apparent that Aristotle has understood that Hippodamus’ farmers and warriors are numerically equal in his ideal state. But this does not emerge from 1267b31-33. Aristotle seems to have distorted the theories of other pre-Socratic philosophers as well. For example, Aristotle’s account of Philolaus and early Pythagoreanism is not flawless since he has the Pythagoreans content that the numbers were the essence of things and wrongly criticized them for constructing physical things out of numbers (C. Huffman “The Pythagorean Tradition” in A: Long (ed.) *The Cambridge Companion to Early Greek Philosophy* Cambridge 1999: 82). Again, both Plato (*Crat.* 402a4-11) and Aristotle (*Topics* I. II 104b21-22; *De Caelo* III. I 298b29-33) impute to Heraclitus the well-known story of the impossibility of someone stepping into the same river twice. This story was circulated by the self styled Heraclitean Cratylus who apparently held that one cannot step into the river even one time. But Cratylus’ version is not Heraclitean (E. Hussey “Heraclitus” in A: Long (ed.) *The Cambridge Companion to Early Greek Philosophy* Cambridge 1999: 99).

\textsuperscript{1160} For a useful survey of the prevailing views among oligarchic circles in Athens and elsewhere in Greece as to the optimal form of government and access to offices, see M. Ostwald *Oligarchia: The Development of a Constitutional Form in Ancient Greece* Stuttgart 2000: 21-30; for the view that the constitutional sketches in the *Athenaion Politeia* 30 and 31 bear close similarities to the federal organisation of Boeotia and that in fact they were influenced by it, see J. Larsen “The Boeotian Confederacy and Fifth-Century Oligarchic Theory” *TAPhA* 86 1955 40-50; C. Bearzot “La costituzione beotica nella propaganda degli oligarchi ateniesi del 411” in Roesch, P., (ed.) *La Béotie antique* Paris 1985: 220-226.

\textsuperscript{1161} IG II\textsuperscript{2} 19.

\textsuperscript{1162} IG II\textsuperscript{2} 17.

\textsuperscript{1163} IG II\textsuperscript{2} 374; IG II\textsuperscript{2} 222; IG II\textsuperscript{2} 448.
his own personal reasons unknown to us.\textsuperscript{1164} In this case, Archeptolemus’ Athenian citizenship should not be a riddle to us, since it was perfectly legal for the descendants of the grantee to re-activate the relevant decree and enroll themselves in a\textit{deme} and phratry in Attica.\textsuperscript{1165} Besides, it is also possible that Hippodamus retained both citizenships but was identified through his homeland. The case of the three Athenian citizens in the early fourth century, praised and invited to a meal in the\textit{prytaneion} on the occasion of their being awarded citizenship by the Phokians,\textsuperscript{1166} and that of Agesias, a citizen of both Syracuse and Stymphalos in Arcadia,\textsuperscript{1167} constitute parallels of double citizenship.

If Archeptolemus was a naturalized Athenian citizen we may expect that he should lack relatives, at least other than his own family, his wife and children, if he was married. There is a nugget of information in Anon. \textit{Life of Thucydides} which may be crucial, in that, if trustworthy, sheds light in his family background. The \textit{Life} asserts that when Archeptolemus and Onomacles were executed along with Antiphon as a result of them being found guilty of treason in the famous trial, both men’s houses were raised to the ground, while the former’s kin was destroyed, and the latter’s disfranchised. Now we know that Onomacles, in all likelihood, escaped arrest somehow and was not present in his trial, so the author of the \textit{Life of Thucydides} is apparently wrong in this respect.\textsuperscript{1168} But it should not follow that he was misled in the case of Archeptolemus as well. Archeptolemus’ kin was destroyed because there was no other family in Attica connected with blood ties with his.\textsuperscript{1169}

\textbf{Conclusion}

We cannot prove beyond doubt that Hippodamus from Miletos and Archeptolemus from the deme Agryle were connected with blood ties. The evidence that at some

\textsuperscript{1164} Although Athenian citizenship was regarded as a privilege and a priceless gift the state could offer a foreigner (And. 2.23), not every beneficiary accepted it. Hippodamus fell into this category of persons who did not particularly need it for status advancement reasons. Note that Zeno and Kleanthes, the philosophers, had also been offered Athenian citizenship but had declined (Plut. \textit{Moralia} 1034.4).

\textsuperscript{1165} The decrees clearly stipulated that the grant of citizenship applied to the descendants also and the implication is that this was the case even if the original grantee had refrained from implemented it (see Osborne 1981-1983: 152 and nos 73, 74 for instances of descendants reaffirming the decree for themselves). A person who had been offered citizenship, but had not taken steps to implement it, was not regarded as an Athenian citizen by virtue of the decree alone. On practical grounds, the proposer of the decree would enrol his beneficiary in his own\textit{deme} and\textit{phratry} (ibid, 149-153).

\textsuperscript{1166} IG II\textsuperscript{2} 70.

\textsuperscript{1167} Pindar \textit{Sixth Olympian}.

\textsuperscript{1168} [Plut.] \textit{Life of Antiphon} 833E3-F12; 834A-B.

\textsuperscript{1169} Anon. \textit{Life of Thucydides} 2: καὶ σὺν αὐτῷ διεφθάρησαν Ἀρχεπτόλεµος καὶ Ὀνομακλῆς, ὃν καὶ κατεσκάφησαν αἱ ὀικίαι, καὶ τὸ γένος τὸ μὲν διεφθάρη, τὸ δὲ ἄτιμον εγένετο. ‘with him (Antiphon) Archeptolemus and Onomacles were destroyed, their houses were raised to the ground; Archeptolemus’ kin was destroyed, whereas that of Onomacles was disfranchised.’
Hippodamus was granted Athenian citizenship, presumably for the services he had rendered to Athens, i.e., the building of the market bearing his name at the Piraeus, has vanished, as has the vast majority of similar evidence dating prior to the late fifth century. On the other hand, no convincing argument so far, either against the identity of Archeptolemus in the *Knights* 327 and 794 with the oligarch, or against the identification of Hippodamou in the *Knights* 327 with the Milesian architect has been adduced. Nor can we challenge the validity of the statements of the scholiast to Aristophanes, probably a learned scholar of the Hellenistic era, without new evidence. In addition, the recently accumulated knowledge over the nature, rationale, mechanism and exact procedure of the granting of Athenian citizenship to outstanding foreigners encourages us to be favorably disposed towards the idea that either Hippodamus, or his son became an Athenian citizen, without doing violence to the existing evidence. If we now accept the family relationship, it becomes easier to understand why Archeptolemus, influenced by his father’s conservative political ideas, decided to cast his lot with the oligarchs in 411 and probably explain the only known to us episode during the oligarchic reign in which he was involved, namely his participation in the last, fateful embassy to Sparta (him being chosen as member of the delegation could be due to family connections with Sparta, connections stemming from his father, Hippodamus). At the same time, although one cannot prove, on the strength of Aristotle’s passage in the *Politics*, a direct loan on the part of the oligarchic conspirators of Hippodamus’ constitutional theories, the latter may have been a subject of discussion and/or inspiration in the heated debates shortly before the establishment of the Four Hundred oligarchy in 411 B.C.
Appendix 2

Table 1: the Prytany Year 412/11

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Prytany</th>
<th>Days</th>
<th>Dates</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>I</td>
<td>37</td>
<td>July 9th-August 14th</td>
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<tr>
<td>II</td>
<td>37</td>
<td>August 15th-September 20th</td>
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<td>III</td>
<td>37</td>
<td>September 21st-October 27th</td>
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<td>IV</td>
<td>37</td>
<td>October 28th-December 3rd</td>
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<td>V</td>
<td>37</td>
<td>December 4th-January 9th</td>
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<tr>
<td>VI</td>
<td>36</td>
<td>January 10th-February 14th</td>
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<td>VII</td>
<td>36</td>
<td>February 15th-March 22nd</td>
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<tr>
<td>VIII</td>
<td>36</td>
<td>March 23rd-April 27th</td>
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<tr>
<td>IX</td>
<td>36</td>
<td>April 28th-June 2nd</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>X</td>
<td>36</td>
<td>June 3rd-July 8th</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 2: The Archon Year 412/11

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th>Dates</th>
<th>Days</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1.</td>
<td>Hekatombaion</td>
<td>Aug 5th-Sep 2nd</td>
<td>29</td>
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<tr>
<td>2.</td>
<td>Metageitnion</td>
<td>Sep 3rd-Oct 2nd</td>
<td>30</td>
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<tr>
<td>3.</td>
<td>Boedromion</td>
<td>Oct 3rd-Nov 1st</td>
<td>29</td>
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<tr>
<td>4.</td>
<td>Pyanepsion</td>
<td>Nov 2nd-Dec 1st</td>
<td>30</td>
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<tr>
<td>5.</td>
<td>Maimakterion</td>
<td>Dec 2nd-Dec 30th</td>
<td>29</td>
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<tr>
<td>6.</td>
<td>Poseideon</td>
<td>Dec 31st-Jan 29th</td>
<td>30</td>
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<tr>
<td>7.</td>
<td>Gamelion</td>
<td>Jan 30th-Feb 27th</td>
<td>29</td>
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<tr>
<td>8.</td>
<td>Anthesterion</td>
<td>Feb 28th-Mar 29th</td>
<td>30</td>
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<tr>
<td>9.</td>
<td>Elaphobolion</td>
<td>Mar 30th-Apr 27th</td>
<td>29</td>
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<tr>
<td>10.</td>
<td>Mounichion</td>
<td>Apr 28th-May 30th</td>
<td>30</td>
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<tr>
<td>11.</td>
<td>Thargelion</td>
<td>May 31st-Jun 28th</td>
<td>29</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12.</td>
<td>Skirophorion</td>
<td>Jun 29th-Jul 28th</td>
<td>30</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
The first table is based on Meritt *The Athenian Year* Berkeley 1961: 218. The conciliar year according to Meritt was a solar one and had 365 days when the year was not intercalary (contra W. Pritchett and O. Neugebauer *The Calendars of Athens* Cambridge Massachusetts 1947 who assume a year of 366 days. Both calculations are based on divergent interpretations of the famous logistai inscription IG I³ 369, the accounts of money borrowed by Athens from 426 to 422 B.C. See however the criticism in Meritt 1961: 203: ‘if we accept Pritchett’s 366 days, assuming that the conciliar year was introduced by Cleisthenes, by the year 422 B.C., it should be lagging behind the seasonal year 63 days and should begin at about the autumn equinox.’ The differences between this table and that which was published earlier in the *Athenian Financial Documents* are principally the use of observable new moon approximately rather than time of conjunction for beginning each festival year and the abandonment of any attempt to fix the order of full and hollow months within individual years.

The second table is based on Meritt’s Athenian Financial Documents Ann Arbor 1932: 177-179 but abandoned by its author as too schematic in the *Athenian Year* 219. The author, however, adds that ‘over relatively long periods of time it gives satisfactory results which could be, and probably were, checked by observation whenever it was felt desirable to do so’ (Meritt 1961: 36). W. Dinsmoor (*The Athenian Archon List in the Light of Recent Discoveries* Westport 1939: 221) had also made use of Geminus of Rhodes 8. 50-56, a passage of the 1st century astronomer in which it was argued that the months are to alternate between 29 and 30 days, with the exception that there are to be two full months in every 15. It is used here only as a rough approximate of the actual Athenian calendar of 412/11 and does not claim to produce a definite Athenian religious calendar of that year, since the sequence of hollow and full months cannot be precisely determined, nor can the volume of any intercalated days be ascertained either.
Appendix 3

“The Chronology of Peisander’s Mission to Athens Re-visited: Thuc. 8.53-54”

Abstract

The exact sequence of events in the winter of 412/11 and their correlation, as they are narrated by Thucydides, is unclear, and has long been a matter of scholarly dispute. In this paper an attempt is made to re-examine Peisander’s first mission to Athens. Taking into account major problems concerning the chronology of winter 412/11 in particular and the dating of events in the fifth century in general, as well as the patterns along which the Athenian state machinery operated, a new timetable of Peisander’s visit and the subsequent debates in the assembly is proposed. More importantly, it is argued that the oligarchic conspirators on Samos deliberately delayed the dispatch of the delegation which Peisander headed, because such a delay served their goals and tactics at the time.

Events and scope of this paper

In the winter of 412/11 a number of prominent Athenians and trierarchs at the military base on Samos began discussions, prompted by Alcibiades, who was then at the court of the satrap Tissaphernes, about the possibility of abolishing democracy at home and establishing an oligarchy as a means to entice Persia into changing sides in the war against the Peloponnesian League, and thus securing her financial backing. Once a plan was agreed upon, the conspirators sent a delegation to Athens headed by Peisander with a view to paving the way for the necessary constitutional changes and restoring diplomatic relations with Persia. These events are described in a masterly way by Thucydides in 8.47.1-48.4 and 53.1-54.4 of his Histories. It is the purpose of this paper to re-examine the chronological aspects of Peisander’s first visit to Athens, and suggest an explanation of the conspirators’ tactics in handling the thorny issue of introducing-for the first time in the Athenian history after the introduction of Cleisthenes’ reforms-proposals for the abolishment of Athens’ democratic constitution. Such an explanation should inevitably take into account the conditions of public and private political debate in contemporary Athens as well as its content, i.e., the topics that the Athenians discussed and disputed in the political and historical context of the post Sicilian expedition period.

From Thucydides’ narrative it emerges that the conception of the oligarchic plan and its preliminary steps occurred between November and early December 412.\textsuperscript{1171} After the battle at Miletus and Chalkideus’ death Alcibiades’ position in the Peloponnesian camp was compromised, especially so since the letter sent by Sparta to Astyochus, the admiral of the Peloponnesian fleet, ordering his death arrived in Ionia. Anticipating his demise, Alcibiades fled to Tissaphernes’ court, from which place he offered the satrap his counsel which he designed to have an adverse effect on Spartan interests.\textsuperscript{1172} At the same time he made overtures to Athenian officials on Samos thus

\begin{footnotesize}
\begin{enumerate}
\item \textsuperscript{1170} In AClass 57 2014 forthcoming.
\item \textsuperscript{1171} Avery “The Chronology of Peisander’s Mission to Athens” CP 94 1999: 127.
\item \textsuperscript{1172} Thuc. 8.45.1.
\end{enumerate}
\end{footnotesize}
preparing his own recall in case democracy was abolished. Actually, as some trierarchs on the island realised that Alcibiades exerted considerable influence on Tissaphernes, they laid down plans to abolish the democracy, making Alcibiades their go-between and an authoritative figure who could reach a rapprochement with Persia (8.45-48.3). Despite the concrete and substantiated objections against their plan, and especially against Alcibiades’ inclusion into it, raised by general Phrynichus at a meeting of the conspirators, the green light was given to Peisander and his delegation to travel to Athens and put their plans into effect (48.4-49). This decision was probably reached by mid December.1173 When Peisander finally arrived in Athens, he managed to curb any opposition and he had his proposals ratified by the people in a dramatic assembly meeting: Alcibiades was to be re-instated, whereas the generals Phrynichus and Scironides were to be deposed and a delegation was to travel to Tissaphernes to negotiate a settlement with Persia, whereby the empire was to provide Athens with money to successfully conclude the war against Sparta (8.53.1-54.4). The negotiations, however, collapsed and soon afterwards Tissaphernes signed a third treaty with Sparta renewing their alliance, in the thirteenth year of Dareius’ reign, before the winter was over, at the end of the twentieth year of Thucydides’ history, probably towards the end of March 411 B.C. (8.56.1-60.3).

Related problems

Any discussion of the events that occurred in the winter of 412/11 inevitably has to tackle the thorny question of what kind of scheme the historian employed to define seasons, a rigid or a flexible one. Arnold Gomme, among others, believed that Thucydides divided the year into winter and summer based on astronomically fixed points in time, the beginning of summer being fixed at the late rising of Arkturus, which he estimated to fall on March 4th.1174 William Kendrick Pritchett and Bartel Leendert van der Waerden, following Gomme and building on his theory, postulated that the end of winter in Thucydides was actually marked by the true evening rising of Arcturus falling on March 6th, whereas the beginning of winter by the morning setting of the Pleiades on November 8th. In their view, Thucydides may have adopted those particular dates from the parapegma of Euctemon.1175 One of Pritchett’s main

1173 For the chronology of winter 412/11, see Andrewes, Gomme and Dover 1945-1981: 5 94-95, 186-187;
1174 Gomme, Andrewes and Dover 1945-1981: 3 710; J. Smart (“Thucydides and Hellanicus” in Moxon, I., J. Smart, and A. Woodman (eds.) Past Perspectives: Studies in Greek and Roman Historical Writing. Papers Presented at a Conference in Leeds, 6-8 April 1983 Cambridge 1986: 24) too accepts that Thucydides’ summer began at a fixed point, but opts for the spring equinox on the 24th March instead on the grounds of 4.52.1. He believes that his solution, with latitude of 10 days before and after the equinox, satisfies the late end of winter in 411 as well (8.60.3) which fell at the beginning of April.
1175 A parapegma was a device designed by astronomers that established a relation between the seasonal and the civil calendar, encoded on the stone in the form of peg holes (Pritchett and van der Waerden “Thucydidean Time-Reckoning and Euctemon’s Seasonal Calendar” BCH 85 1961: 40; Pritchett Thucydides’ Pentekontaetia and Other Essays Amsterdam 1995:
arguments is that Thucydides at 2.2.1 states that when the war broke out there remained four months (following Krüger’s emendation) for the archonship of Pythodoros to be completed. According to Gomme, Pythodoros may have exited office on July 5th 431, and on the next day, marked by the first new moon after the summer solstice, his successor Euthemos took over. But, even if one accepts Gomme’s chronology and assumes that Thucydides here is accurate, the fact that the summer in 432/1 may have begun on March 6th does not prove that all summers that Thucydides reports began on that day. Yet, Gomme adds another passage to support his theory of fixed beginnings of summer and winter, that is, 5.20, where it is said that the Archidamean war lasted ten years plus a few days. Such a statement, Gomme argues, would only make sense if there was a fixed time of the solar year on which the seasons started. But, in order to make the facts fit this theory, one is compelled to resort to no less than three emendations of Thucydides’ text: First at 2.2.1 (see note 1102 above), then at 8.44.4 to read 50 or 40 instead of 80, that is, the number of days the Peloponnesian fleet remained inactive, beached at Rhodes, this
period of inactivity starting not before the middle of January, and a third time at 8.58.1, reading 12 instead of 13, the year of Dareius’ reign within which the treaty between Sparta and Persia was signed.

On the other hand, supporters of a rather elastic beginning of the seasons in Thucydides point out that for a system of fixed beginnings of summer and winter to make sense, this should have been familiar to the contemporary readers, which is an unlikely assumption, as Kenneth Dover has demonstrated. Furthermore, on the basis of 5.20.1-3, where Thucydides states his method of reckoning time, the reader is invited to count the seasons and verify the accuracy of the statement by checking the text, but has no means of verifying the calculation of the few days over the ten years that the Archidamean war had lasted. If we take the two termini of the first phase of the Peloponnesian war to be the attack on Plataia (Thuc. 2.2.1) and the treaty of Elaphebolion 25 (Thuc. 5.19.1), which, if 421/20 was an ordinary year, fell around 14th March, and since the peace came into force before the beginning of Thucydides’ summer (5.24.2), it follows that in 421 winter was not over by mid-March. Since our reconstruction of events suggests that winter in that year ended late, it follows that such a reconstruction can be valid only if the theory of elastic seasons in Thucydides is correct.

A related problem is to determine how we are to understand the information that Thucydides gives us, namely that the treaty between Sparta and Persia was signed on

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1178 Emendation to 40: Pritchett “The Thucydidean Summer of 411 B. C.” CP 60 1965: 259–261; emendation to 50: Gomme, Andrewes and Dover 1945-1981: 3711, following Wilamowitz Kleine Schriften 3: Griechische Prosa Berlin 1935: 83 no 1; note, however, that Wilamowitz abandoned his earlier emendation. Eighty days were thought enough to cover the crammed period from the despatch of the oligarchic delegation to Athens until Leon and Diomedon’s raids against Rhodes and the collapse of the negotiations between Tissaphernes and Peisander’s delegation (“Thukydides VIII” Hermes 43.4 1908: 582 and no 2). The beginning of the eighty-day-long inactivity of the Peloponnesian fleet on Rhodes: Andrewes, Gomme and Dover 1945-1981: 592.


1180 Gomme, Andrewes and Dover 1945-1981: 4 19-20


1183 See the criticism of the astronomically fixed beginning of summer and winter in Gomme, Andrewes and Dover 1945-1981: 5 148-149.
the thirteenth year of Dareius’ reign. If this date is calculated according to the Babylonian New Year, then the treaty was signed after March 29\textsuperscript{th} of 411, for this is the day that the Babylonian year begins.\textsuperscript{1184} But it is also possible that year 13 in Thucydides’ text of the treaty at 8.58.1 designates the year in Dareius’ reign; the Persian King acceded to the throne at some time after December 424 and was certainly a king by early February 423.\textsuperscript{1185} This, however, does not disturb our time plan considerably, because either way the difference could be as little as one day or more probably a week, i.e., the treaty could have been signed between 20\textsuperscript{th} and 28\textsuperscript{th} March 411.

But major problem in our investigation is the notorious scholarly minefield of Athenian and ancient calendars. For this reason the tables and the timelines that I have suggested require some qualification. There are mainly two rival theories on the Athenian calendar. The first has been advocated by Pritchett, Otto Neugebauer and Waerden. It postulates that there was a rigid prytany year in the fourth and later centuries of 354 ± 1 days and 366 days in the fifth century, and that there was a civil or archon year of varied duration, whose length was subject to manipulation and tampering by the archon.\textsuperscript{1186} Their suggestion of a rigid prytany year is based on a passage in the *Athenaion Politeia* (43.2), in which it is stated that the first four prytanies comprised 36 days, whereas the last six comprised 35.\textsuperscript{1187} As supporting testimonies from the classical era they cite such texts as Thucydides 4.118-9 and 5.19, on the dates of the one-year truce in 423 and the signing of the peace of Nicias in 421 respectively, where it is clear that days in one or both the Athenian and Spartan calendars were intercalated. They also cite Aristoxenos *Harmonica* 2.37 (R. da Rios, *Aristoxeni elementa harmonica*. Rome: 1954 page 46), who complains that the


\textsuperscript{1185} Bickerman *Chronology of the Ancient World* London 1981: 21-23. Bickerman has shown that in the Persian empire, apart from the administrative, Babylonian calendar, other calendars, such as a court calendar were also operative. So Tissaphernes may well have used the court calendar, not the calendar of the bureau. cf. Pritchett 1995: 183-185.

\textsuperscript{1186} Pritchett and Neugebauer 1947: 3-33; Pritchett 1957; Pritchett and van der Waerden 1961: 18-24.

\textsuperscript{1187} Pritchett and Neugebauer *The Calendars of Athens* Cambridge 1947: 36 point out that the epigraphic evidence seems to confirm the validity of the statement in the *AP*. Computations of payments in the accounts of the epistatai of Eleusis (IG II\textsuperscript{2} 1672, dated to 329/8 B.C.), show that the length of the prytanies conforms with the pattern given in the *Athenaion Politeia*. Moreover, from the logistai inscription (IG I\textsuperscript{3} 369), a record of loans made to the Athenian state from various sacred treasuries in four consecutive years from 426 to 422 BC, one gets indirect evidence that the length of prytanies was likewise fixed in the fifth century, 366 days (1947: 94-106); contra Meritt (*The Athenian Year* Berkeley 1961: 61), who estimates that the four prytany years in question had 366, 368, 365, and 365 days respectively.
principles according to which melody is produced are as unpredictable as the religious (archon) calendars in various Greek cities. Plutarch in his *Aristeides* 19 notes that the date of the battle at Plataea is recorded differently in the Boeotian and in the Attic calendar. Herodotus (6.106) reports that the Spartans would not leave Sparta on an expedition unless it was full moon on the 9th, the implication being that in the Spartan calendar there could be as many as 5 intercalated days in a single month. Aristophanes (*Clouds* 615-626) has the Moon mouthed by the leader of the semi chorus complaining to the Athenians that they don’t count the days correctly, and, as a result, the archon’s calendar is thrown into confusion. In the *Peace* 406-415, Trygaios explains to Hermes how the Moon and the Sun, deities worshipped by the barbarians, had connived with each other to betray Greece to them because they wanted to get all the sacrifices for themselves. These barbarian deities, accordingly, stole days from the sacrificial calendar to the detriment of the Greek gods. Finally, the epigraphic evidence shows that 5% of the decrees in Athens from the 4th to the 2nd centuries were passed on intercalated days. In sum, we cannot equate any given date in our sources with a Julian date.

The other theory, advocated mainly by Benjamin Dean Meritt, postulates a rigid civil and a varied prytany calendar instead. Meritt accepts the validity of AP 43.2, but allows room for a less rigid sequence of *prytanies*. On average the *prytany* year had 365 5/11 days in the 5th century. Meritt’s objection to a 366 day-long *prytany* year is that, if we assume that the system was introduced by Cleisthenes, then by 422 the *prytany* year should have retarded by almost 63 days, thus beginning in September, but there is no evidence that something like that ever happened. On the whole, although the evidence adduced by Pritchett, Neugebauer and Waerden has a cumulative force and strongly suggests that the civil calendar in Athens, as in other Greek cities, was subjected to tampering by the archon, we cannot share their assuredness that this tampering was extensive in the fifth century, at least to a degree similar to that of the second century B.C. There is no attested case in the fifth century where a great amount of days had been intercalated in Athens. Actually, the first known inscription with double dating, κατ’ ἄρχοντα and κατὰ θεὸν occurs as late as the early second century B.C. If such a disturbance of the civil calendar was nearly as common and pervasive back in the classical era, then it should have left its trail in our sources. To be sure, intercalation did happen in fifth-century Athens, but it is difficult to determine its extent. In this context, Arthur Geoffrey Woodhead’s remarks in his review of Pritchett and Neugebauer’s *Calendars of Athens* are perhaps most appropriate: ‘perhaps we are apt to expect too much not only of the scribes and

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1189 Meritt 1961: 3-15, 240.
1190 Meritt 1961: 203.
1191 Pritchett has shown that in 145/4 B.C., the archon intercalated twenty days, and adduces other instances with 3, 5, 11, 29/30 intercalated days, all from the second century B.C. The first known inscription with double dating, κατ’ ἄρχοντα and κατὰ θεὸν occurs in 196/5 B.C.
1192 Pritchett 1957: 280.
stone-cutters but of the Athenians in general: being so used to a civilization dominated by the time factor, may we not be in danger of demanding a calendaric, as well as an inscriptive, accuracy, be it of the civil or prytany calendar, which they neither had nor cared to acquire? The known mistakes of scribes, and the postulated tampering κατ’ ἄρχοντα, allow the scholar considerable latitude in using them to support his theories, and it is a matter for individual taste how much latitude is justified.'\(^{1193}\) So, we may be allowed to be a little more optimistic as regards the fifth century and attempt to translate dates into Julian time, but these can only be taken as approximate.\(^{1194}\)

### Peisander’s arrival in Athens: earlier views

Earlier scholars thought Peisander’s delegation to have arrived in Athens by late December, and that the assembly at which Peisander presented the conspirators’ plan took place in late January. And at the instigation of this assembly, the would-be oligarch and ten more envoys left Athens on a mission to negotiate an alliance with Tissaphernes, sometime in the first half of February 411 B.C.\(^{1195}\) But since the re-dating of the third treaty between Persia and Sparta to after 29th March 411, the day on which Dareius’ thirteenth year of reign began, attempts have been made to shift Peisander’s mission and the events concomitant to it, to a considerably later time.\(^{1196}\) Mabel Lang suggested that Peisander arrived in Athens in late February, well after Alcibiades’ contacts with the oligarchs at Samos and the intrigues between Astyochus, Alcibiades and Phrynichus. She maintains that Thucydides’ narrative is out of chronological order, because the historian included Phrynichus’ correspondence (chapters 50-51) at that particular point out of psychological considerations: given that Phrynichus is presented to have acted out of fear, the most functional narrative point in dramatic terms to bring in this story was when the imminent return of Alcibiades was about to be effected. As a result, Peisander’s departure from Samos (49) and the intrigues (50-51) are actually presented in reversed chronological order. According to Lang, the assembly described at 8.53 took place in mid March and Peisander sailed to meet Tissaphernes soon afterwards.\(^{1197}\) Anthony Andrewes, in his turn, believed that from Thucydides’ account one gets the impression that Peisander’s stay in Athens was brief, but since his voyages from

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\(^{1194}\) Meritt 1961: 240; Bickerman 1968: 36.

\(^{1195}\) Busolt 1893-1904: 3.2.1468, 1470-1471.

\(^{1196}\) Lewis 1958: 392.

\(^{1197}\) Lang 1967: 181-183, with a map of events from the winter solstice to the third treaty in March. See the criticism, however, levelled by Sommerstein and Avery respectively: the four weeks time that Lang allows between the first assembly and the signing of the treaty is too short to cover the travel to Tissaphernes, the negotiations with him and Alcibiades, Tissaphernes’ travel to Caunos, and the treaty itself (the former 1977: 115); if we accept Lang’s theory, then Phrynichus should have attempted treachery before trying to dissuade the conspirators from accepting Alcibiades’ plans (the latter 1999: 137).
Samos to Athens and then to Tissaphernes’ court are tied in fixed chronological points (winter solstice, beginning of the thirteenth year of Dareius’ reign on March 29th), Thucydides’ narrative must be telescoped, and, due to his oligarchic source, over-dramatized. Peisander left Samos before the conclusion of the Phrynichus-Alcibiades intrigues. He made a public announcement on arrival in early January and proposed the deposition of Phrynichus and Scironides. He did not reveal his plans until the day of the assembly and *Lysistrata* 489-491 seems to corroborate this. But this reconstruction requires Thucydides has presented events out of chronological order, since in his narrative the deposition of the two generals does not precede but follows the assembly in which Peisander’s proposals were put to the vote.\footnote{Gomme, Andrewes and Dover 1945-1981: 5 131, 186-187. Andrewes is followed by Henderson 1987: xxi-ii; Ostwald 1986: 353 and no 66.}

In an influential paper, Harry Avery challenged Andrewes’ views, especially the notion that Peisander spent almost a month in Athens, making contacts and lobbying for his plans, before appearing in the assembly described at 8.53. He points out that it would have been inconceivable for the crew of the ship on which the embassy travelled to Athens, some two hundred men, to keep their mouths shut for such a long time. The strong oligarchic views aired at the Samian meetings (8.48.1-2) would have been disseminated long before Peisander stepped forward to deliver his speech. Furthermore, the fact that Peisander put forward the proposal to depose Phrynichus indicates that he was aware of the intrigue and its outcome: fearing that Phrynichus would be an obstacle to Alcibiades’ reinstatement, a key figure in the oligarchs’ scheme to secure Tissaphernes’ financial assistance, he took this particular step. To reconcile the absence of allusions to Peisander’s oligarchic outlook in *Lysistrata*, Avery assumes there was a two-month delay after the decision in mid-December to send Peisander in Athens.\footnote{Thucydides does not actually record the departure of the embassy. Instead, he says that the conspirators were making, or began making, preparations to send Peisander and others to Athens (8.49: παρεσκευάζοντο πέµπειν), the imperfect here denoting not a completed action but an action in progress (see the famous passage 2.65.9: ἐγίγνετό τε λόγῳ μὲν δημοκρατία, ἔργῳ δὲ ὑπὸ τοῦ πρώτου ἀνδρὸς ἀρχῆ, and the discussion in De Ste Croix *The Origins of the Peloponnesian War* London 1972: 27-28 on the implications of the imperfect for the character of the Periclean regime and Thucydides’ political outlook). Furthermore, at 53.1 a number of manuscripts transmit the following text: (A B E F M Π24) οἱ δὲ μετὰ τοῦ Πεισάνδρου πρέσβεις τῶν Ἀθηναίων ἀποστάλλοντες ἐκ τῆς Σάµου καὶ ἀφικόμενοι ἐς τὰς Ἀθήνας... the καὶ has been omitted by most editors, but accepted by Classen, Steup and Tucker. The latter comments: ‘of the meanings legati, qui a Samo missi erant, cum Athenas venissent and cum a Samo missi essent Athenasque venissent the latter is more in keeping with the παρεσκευάζοντο πέµπειν of c. 49 (Tucker Θουκυδίδου Η: The Eighth Book of Thucydides London 1908: 60). Avery remarks: ‘The retention of the copulative offers some slight support for the view that a substantial period intervened between the decision to send the envoys (recorded in 49) and their actual departure from Samos’ (1999: 129 and no 10). This has been accepted by Hornblower (1991-2008: 3 912).} The embassy did not arrive until mid-February, shortly
after the Lenaea. The long delay can be accounted for on military grounds: the Athenian navy had to face a prolonged and intense enemy activity, and being heavily outnumbered could not spare a single ship for a mission to Athens. On this reconstruction, Avery places the assembly on which Phrynichus was also deposed towards the end of February, some four weeks before the negotiations of the Athenian oligarchs with Alcibiades and Tissaphernes reached a deadlock (8.56.4).

Avery’s observations seem sound. Regardless whether one accepts his explanations for such a long delay, Thucydides’ text seems to support a delay not in Athens but elsewhere, for reasons unknown to us. But Avery, like Andrewes and Lang, might have missed an important point, since they all assume that Peisander managed to have his motions ratified in a single assembly meeting. However, as Hartmut Erbse has demonstrated, Thucydides has focused on the essentials only, so as to give a dramatized version of the events. Yet, Peisander cannot have put forward his proposals on his very arrival; instead, several weeks must have passed, and debate may well have taken place in more than one assembly meetings, during which the skilful politician managed to silence every opposition. At the same time, parallel to the official debates, Peisander undertook to organize and galvanize the oligarchic sympathizers and the *hetaereia*.

The participles ἐπέλθον, παρακελευόμενος, παρασκευάσας (54.4) imply phases of a longer activity and are a belated reference to a task that Peisander carried out simultaneously to that of persuading the assembly.

To this we can add Simon Hornblower’s observation that since envoys on arrival in Athens had to report to the *boule*, the democratic council of five hundred, a few further days must have also intervened between admission to the *boule* and the first assembly meeting. There must have taken place, consequently, not a single decisive meeting, but a series of assemblies in which Peisander’s proposals were discussed and finally ratified. The implication of this is that the question whether *Lysistrata* was produced before or after the developments described at 8.53 loses its force. These events seem to have occupied a period of perhaps up to three or four weeks, a lengthy period during which the *Lysistrata* may well have been produced.

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1200 Professor Herbert Heftner in a private letter communicates to me: ‘diese Erklärung kommt mir fragwürdig vor; es würde sich doch wohl für die Reise ein Schiff von geringerem Kampfwert gefunden haben, als eine vollausgestattete Triere es war, und man brauchte ja wohl auch nicht unbedingt eine Mannschaft athenischer Eliteruderer einzusetzen.’

1201 Avery (1999: 145): ‘This date accords with the belief that *Lysistrata* was performed about the middle of February, that the Preliminary Assembly was held after the production of the play, and that the assembly took place soon after Peisander’s arrival in Athens.’


1204 I am inclined to follow the orthodox view which assigns the *Lysistrata* to the Lenaia festival of 411 BC., and the *Thesmophoriazousae* to that of the City Dionysia of the same year (Sommerstein “Aristophanes and the Events of 411” *JHS* 97 1977: 112-126; Avery 1999: 132-134).
So instead of its dating, we should turn to the very text of Aristophanes’ play to see if any additional information could be extracted regarding our investigation.

**The Lysistrata**

Actually, a fleeting reference to the Athenian politician and another one to the generals at Samos may be relevant to our discussion. After Lysistrata and her female comrades have seized the Acropolis a *provoulos* is hurriedly summoned to investigate the matter:

Πρ: διὰ τάργύριον πολεμοῦμεν γάρ; Λυ: καὶ τάλλα γε πάντ’ ἐκκήθη.

ινα γάρ Πείσανδρος ἐχοι κλέπτειν χοι ταῖς ἀρχαῖς ἐπέχοντες

ἀεὶ τινα κορκονυγήν ἐκύκων. οἱ δ’ οὖν τοῦτ’ οὖνεκα δρώντων

ὁ τι βουλονται- τὸ γάρ ἀργύριον τοῦτ’ σύκετι μὴ καθέλωσιν. (489-492)

Pr: Do you say it’s because of the money that we’re at war?
L: Yes, and that’s why there was all the other agitation. It was in order that Peisander and all those who were eager to hold office might have something there to steal, that they were always stirring up some brouhaha or other. Well, if that’s their aim, let them do what they will: they’ve no more chance now of getting hold of the money here. (translated by Allan Sommerstein)

Earlier in the play the chorus of old men makes an attempt to break open the wooden gates behind which Lysistrata and her comrades have barricaded themselves and set them on fire. They evoke the generals from Samos to lend them a hand:

Τίς ξυλλάβοιτ’ ἄν τοῦ ξύλου τῶν ἐν Σάµῳ στρατηγὴν;

Can any of the generals at Samos lend a hand with the wood? (translated by Allan Sommerstein)

These lines, among other allusions, have been cited as evidence for determining the order of production dates for the *Lysistrata* and the *Thesmophoriazusae*. Scholars have maintained that the *Lysistrata* shows no awareness on the part of Aristophanes of Peisander’s sudden and surprising political U-turn, either because the play was produced shortly before the assembly meeting described by Thucydides (so Avery), or that Peisander had already arrived in Athens some time before, almost a month, but had made no public statement as to his real intentions and clandestine plans (so Andrewes, Sommerstein, Jeffrey Henderson). For these scholars, Aristophanes’ Peisander is presented as a professional politician and a cunning

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1205 Avery 1999: 145.
1206 Andrewes, Gomme and Dover 1981: 185-186; Sommerstein 1990: 2-3, 179; Henderson Lysistrata Oxford 1987: 132. Sommerstein has withdrawn from his view (expressed in 1977: 113-115) that the *Lysistrata* was produced shortly after the assembly which he placed at the beginning of February. In this work he noted that the past tenses in 489-492 may indicate that there had been a recent transformation in Peisander’s outlook so recent that Aristophanes had only time to change the tenses and mood in the relevant passage.
demagogue. In this respect, Andrewes pointed out the importance of the adverb ἀεὶ and the fact that the imperfect tenses ἐκυκήθη, ἐκύκων indicate dramatic time, i.e., the time prior to the women’s seizure of the citadel. Accordingly so, Sommerstein explains: ‘Peisander and those magistrates were always stirring up before we women took action designed to put a stop to such doings.’ But Henry Dickinson Westlake holds the opposite view. The present and future tenses may indicate a change: ‘Peisander may appear to be making a political volte face, but in view of his record for conventional demagoguery it would be most unwise to trust him. His aim may well be, as it has been hitherto, to feather his own nest.’ Of the two, the former interpretation seems sounder: Lysistrata and her bunch of women represent the New Order, they have seized the source from which demagogues and magistrates of the Old Regime regularly embezzled money and grew rich. There does not seem to be any reason to suppose that Aristophanes in this passage presented Peisander as the instigator of oligarchic plots. As for the second passage, Sommerstein sees a possible hint at the generals’ ineffectiveness. The chorus insinuates that the generals should do some real work instead of wasting time and public money. Westlake, on the contrary, comments: ‘The appeal by the chorus leader for support from the generals in suppressing the revolutionary movement of the women who have seized the acropolis may be intended to suggest that those of the generals at Samos who felt that the prospect of Athenian survival might be wrecked by political disruption should use their power to halt the spread of the revolutionary movement known to be being planned by Peisander and his confederate.’ Nevertheless, if we follow Westlake’s contention that the play hints at Peisander’s oligarchic U-turn, still the text bears no clear message to the audience that there is any connection between Peisander and Lysistrata.

These arguments, though, may shed no light on our problem for reasons lucidly explained by Colin Austin and S. Douglas Olson in their commentary of the Thesmophoriazusae. First, Aristophanes must have produced a relatively solid draft of his plays well in advance of the festivals at which they were performed, so as to allow adequate time for the very complicated process of production. So, any difference between the political situation on the day of production and the text as we have it might simply be a product of that particular lag: hence Peisander is still...

1209 Westlake 1980: 48-49. Similarly, Heftner seems to read line 490 as an indirect comment of Aristophanes along the lines ‘wo Peisander die Finger im Spiel hat, ist sicher etwas faul.’
1211 Westlake “The ‘Lysistrata’ and the War” Phoenix 34.1 1980: 50.
1212 In a similar fashion, Westlake 1980 39: ‘Topicality is an essential element of Old Comedy, and minor alterations might apparently be made shortly before a play was produced, but the whole process of composing text and music and of assembling and training the performers must have occupied a period of months rather than weeks. Thus the plot of the Lysistrata had almost certainly been worked out, and much of the play very probably had been written, before the end of 412.’
presented as the well-known demagogue he has always been. The two plays reflect the situation at the time they were written, not at the time they were performed, and ‘if up to date topical material was inserted during rehearsal, it did not make its way into the copies of the text we have.’\textsuperscript{1213} Second, both the \textit{Lysistrata} and the \textit{Thesmophoriazusae} seem to avoid allusions to the political situation in the city at the time they were produced, though for different reasons. This seems rather awkward for aristophanic plays. Perhaps this was so because Peisander’s political reforms were unprecedented and Aristophanes may have felt the issue was too sensitive to refer to on stage. Peisander could be mentioned and be mocked \textit{en passe} on some other generic charge, (e.g., the greedy, dishonest demagogue). In our view, the developments in Samos albeit in a nebulous and imprecise form, were already known to the Athenians (and to Aristophanes) before Peisander’s arrival in the Piraeus, but Aristophanes, for reasons mentioned above, chose not to comment on them. Yet, the play as we have it does not help us determine if its production preceded, followed, or punctuated the series of assemblies in which Peisander’s wrenching proposals were debated.

\textbf{A new reconstruction}

Our reconstruction takes as its starting point Avery’s astute observation that considerable delay took place in Samos and that the embassy did not set out to Athens before late January. However, this did not happen because of the military situation as Avery has suggested (see below, pages 297-299). We shall later propose a different reason for this delay. The ramification of such delay as Austin and Olson have shown could only be that the developments on Samos were already public knowledge in Athens even before Peisander’s arrival. Such a huge and important public event as the assembly meeting of the military forces on Samos, which could well have numbered 15,000 men, was impossible to be kept secret.\textsuperscript{1214} Cargo ships, fish boats, replenishment troops, and the always heavy maritime traffic in the Aegean to and fro the Piraeus would have made certain that related news disseminated rapidly. To mention a few parallels: when the plans of a Chian faction to revolt with Spartan help were not carried out immediately, word made its way to Athens who thwarted the rebellion by sending general Aristocrates with a force (Thuc. 8.9.2); Alcibiades and Chalceides arrest anyone they meet as they sail to Chios in order to prevent word of their approach anticipating them (8. 14.1).\textsuperscript{1215} To these instances we may add 7.31.3: when Demosthenes reaches Anaktorio and Alyzia in Akarnania, he meets Eurymedon who tells him that he heard while he was out at sea that Plemmerion had been lost to the Athenians; and the envoys of the Four Hundred got the news of the democratic counter-revolution on Samos when they were on Delos -- fearing that their presence on Samos may provoke nasty reactions on the part of the

\begin{footnotes}
\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{1213}Austin and Olson 2004: xlii-iv.
\item \textsuperscript{1214}Ostwald 1986: 345 and no 31.
\item \textsuperscript{1215}Cited by Austin and Olson \textit{Aristophanes Thesmophoriazusae} Oxford 2004: xlii no 20.
\end{itemize}
\end{footnotes}
sailors they decided to stay where they were and wait until tempers cooled down (8.77).

If Peisander arrived just before the Lenaia festival, in early February, he would first have had to report to the council. The evidence shows that council meetings, unlike assembly ones, did take place on the first ten days of the month, especially from the 2nd to the 8th.\textsuperscript{1216} If the matter was thought to have been of uttermost importance, a totally legitimate inference, then the archon may have intercalated one or more days (which he had the right to do), in order that such urgent issues could be placed in the agenda and be discussed in the assembly before the Lenaia festival began.\textsuperscript{1217} Since no assembly meetings are known to have been held between 12th and 21st Gamelion, and since we should assign at least four days for all the events and the dramatic contests, it would be sound to infer that the festival was held during that particular period.\textsuperscript{1218} It is nevertheless quite probable that the time was not enough and the Lenaia could not be postponed any longer, in which case discussions would have had to be resumed immediately after the last day of the festival. If Gamelion in 412/11 fell between 30th January and 27th February, or in their vicinity, the first opportunity for discussion in the Assembly would have been the 9th-11th Gamelion (7th-9th February). The next cluster of meetings appears on the 22th-24th Gamelion (20th-22th February), and a third one a few days later 26th-29th Gamelion (24th-27th February).\textsuperscript{1219} We have no means of knowing how many meetings it took Peisander to

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\item 1216 Mikalson The Sacred and Civil Calendar of the Athenian Year Princeton 1975: 193. According to Meritt (1961: 218), the archon year 412/11 began on August 5th 412 B.C. Gamelion, then should have fallen on January 30th until February 27th, or in their vicinity. For problems related to dating events in the fifth and later centuries, and relating them to the Julian calendar, see above pages 286-287.
\item 1217 Mikalson 1975: 3; Pritchett and van der Waerden 1961: 20-23. These scholars hold that the archon must have been motivated to tamper with the calendar due to political or military reasons, and they quote Thucydides 5.54; Xenophon Hell. 4.7.2.; 5.1.29; Plutarch Alex. 16 and 25, and Dem. 26; Pritchett 1957: 298-300; Meritt 1961: 5.
\item 1218 Mikalson 1975: 109-110. Note, however, Pickard-Cambridge’s argument that during the Peloponnesian war the programme of the other festival dedicated to Dionysius, the City Dionysia, was shortened and that 13th Elaphebolion was the last day of the festival (1953: 63-66). If such a curtailment was imposed on the most glamorous Dionysiac festival, it is probable that in the stringent economic situation of 411 the Lenaia could have faced a similar fate.
\item 1219 The schedule of the assembly and council meetings is based on Mikalson 1975, and Harris Democracy and the Rule of Law in Classical Athens: Essays on Law, Society, and Politics Cambridge 2006. Both studies demonstrate that there was no change in the pattern in which the assembly and council meetings were distributed within any given month when the tribes became 12 in 307/6 B.C. with the creation of Antigonis and Demetrias. This is a strong indication that we may draw safe inferences from the evidence with regard to the 5th century as well.
\end{footnotes}
have his proposals voted, but his proposal for Phrynichus and Scironides’ deposition (ἀποχειροτονία) must have been put to the vote at the main assembly (ἐκκλησία κυρία). It is important to note at this juncture that the main assembly meetings in each prytany, at least in the fourth century, were not equally distributed throughout the approximately thirty-six day long prytany, instead they tended to shift towards its end. If this practice had not changed considerably since the fifth century, this might be a clue that Thucydides’ narrative at 8.53-54 pays due respect to the chronological order of events: Peisander addresses the assembly after some days of preliminary meetings with the council and parallel secret meetings with the oligarchic clubs. Since his language (that of a demagogue) is couched in euphemisms and politically correct terms, it is possible that the average Athenian did not fully grasp the implications of his proposals until the last assembly meeting. When Peisander had his motion passed, he moved on to put the second part of his plan into effect, namely the elimination of Phrynichus, the only man who stood in opposition to the oligarchs’ most important ally, Alcibiades. If these considerations are right, Phrynichus and Scironides’ deposition (ἀποχειροτονία) could have been effected just at the closing days of Gamelion, although another very strong candidate appears to be the period between 10th and 22nd March, because, at least in the fourth century the ἐκκλησίαι κυρίαι, as we have seen, tended to be

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1220 The question of how many meetings in a prytany were held has become the object of scholarly debate. Hansen defended AP 43.4 where it is stated that four meetings were held in every prytany (1977; 1979). But Harris has pointed to the scholia on D.18.73, 24.20, and Harpocrates s.v. σύγκλητος ἐκκλησία, where it is stated that apart from the three scheduled meetings every month, others called ἐκκλησίαι σύγκλητοι were also summoned at short notice to address emergency issues such as war or others (2006: 81-101).

1221 AP 43.4, 61.2; cf. Hansen Eisangelia: The Sovereignty of the People’s Court in Athens in the Fourth Century B. C. and the Impeachment of Generals and Politicians Odense 1975: 43.

1222 Hansen The Athenian Ecclesia: A Collection of Articles 1976–83 Copenhagen 1983: 89–90. If we divide a prytany into three sections (section 1: days 1-12; section 2: days 13-24; section 3: days 25-36/37), it emerges that during section 1 we have evidence of only four main assemblies (IG II² 340; Schwenk Athens Alexander 30; SEG 21: 281; SEG 23: 53), during section 2 of eleven (IG II² 336; 378; 448; Schwenk Athens Alexander 31, 41, 83; SEG 21:277; SEG 21:296; SEG 24: 103), whereas during section 3 of sixteen (IG II² 344, 352, 356, 359, 362, 367, 368; Schwenk Athens Alexander 33, 49, 53, 58, 63, 73, 81, 82; SEG 21: 284).

1223 Professor Heftner has communicated to me: grundsätzlich halte ich es für möglich, dass diese Praxis immer schon gültig war: die neu antretenden Prytanen benötigten Zeit, sich in die Geschäfte einzuarbeiten und die Einberufung der ersten von ihnen geleiteten Ekklesie vorzubereiten. Aber in 412 und 411 wird man schon aufgrund der Wechselfälle des Krieges darauf eingestellt gewesen sein, Ekklesiien je nach auftretender Notwendigkeit ganz kurzfristig einzuberufen.

1224 Thuc. 8.49: ὅτως περί τε τῆς τοῦ Ἀλκιβιάδου καθόδου πράσσονει καὶ τῆς τοῦ ἐκεί δήμου καταλύσεως καὶ τῶν Τισσαφέρνην φιλον τοῖς Ἀθηναίοις ποιήσειν ’so that they take action with regard Alcibiades’ recall and the abolition of the democracy there, and that they make Tissaphernes a friend of Athens.’
summoned towards the end of each prytany. Prytany VII for the year 412/11 fell between February 15\textsuperscript{th} and March 22\textsuperscript{nd},\textsuperscript{1225}

**Why the delay?**

In my view the conspirators at Samos deliberately delayed the dispatch of the envoys because they anticipated what actually happened: news of the talks in Samos over an alliance with Persia, Alcibiades' recall and constitutional adjustments did reach the Piraeus well before Peisander’s trireme. The oligarchs rightly saw that the initiative for any discussions with Persia had to be formally ratified by the assembly, so they decided to follow the constitutional path. Hence, in the ensuing negotiations, the oligarchs thought they would acquire a higher status if they had been empowered by means of an assembly decision. Accordingly, they decided to pretend playing with open cards and they communicated part of their plans to the crews on Samos. Drawing correct conclusions from the lukewarm reactions and the grudging acceptance on the part of the sailors of the abolishment in effect of the democratic constitution, they let time work for them.\textsuperscript{1226} Overcoming the initial shock, to be sure, for this some time was necessary, and bearing in mind the destitute financial situation Athens was in, the folk back home would inevitably succumb to their proposals. And if they had information on the problems between Tissaphernes and the Peloponnesians and the latter’s disaffection, they could well have drawn the conclusion that enemy military activity, especially in mid winter, was not imminent. Such information they could have got either directly by Alcibiades himself, or through intelligence reports: disaffection among Peloponnesian sailors could hardly have been contained for long. I would further speculate that it was Alcibiades who tipped the Athenians off about the not so amicable relationships between Tissaphernes and the Peloponnesians, especially about the funding problems the enemy was going through.\textsuperscript{1227} Indeed, Tissaphernes, far from proving himself a

\textsuperscript{1225} The year 412/11 was an ordinary one, according to Meritt 1961: 218. The sequence of prytanies can be reconstructed as follows: Prytany I, 37 days, July 9th-August 14\textsuperscript{th}; Prytany II, 37 days, August 15th-September 20\textsuperscript{th}; Prytany III, 37 days, September 21st-October 27\textsuperscript{th}; Prytany IV 37 days, October 28th-December 3\textsuperscript{rd}; Prytany V, 37 days, December 4th-January 9\textsuperscript{th}; Prytany VI, 36 days, January 10th-February 14\textsuperscript{th}; Prytany VII, 36 days, February 15th-March 22\textsuperscript{nd}; Prytany VIII, 36 days, March 23rd-April 27\textsuperscript{th}; Prytany IX, 36 days, April 28th-June 2\textsuperscript{nd}; Prytany X, 36 days, June 3rd-July 8\textsuperscript{th}. Since we hold, pace Meritt, that the prytany year had 365 days in the fifth century, the first five prytanies have been assigned 37 days, and the last five 36 each. Although we know that the allocation of days may have been different, this scheme could provide us with a rough approximation of the sequence of prytanies in 412/11.

\textsuperscript{1226} See, Avery’s remarks: ‘Careful planning of the strategy to be employed in approaching the Athenian demos on such a potentially explosive subject (cf. Thucydides' comments at 68.4) would seem not only prudent but highly advisable’ (1999: 141).

\textsuperscript{1227} At 8.29, at the beginning of winter, that is late October to early November, Thucydides tells us that the problems with the sailors’ wages in the Peloponnesian fleet began. In chapter
stalwart ally, hampered the Peloponnesian war effort in every respect.\footnote{1228} Alcibiades, then, could have communicated to the Athenian conspirators that an offensive on the part of the Peloponnesians under those circumstances was not to be expected. Nevertheless, these considerations apart, in the eyes of the Athenian generals at Samos the Peloponnesian fleet in this period did not convey the impression that it could stand a direct confrontation against its Athenian counterpart. At 8.30.2 Thucydides tells us that the Athenians, operating from Samos were masters of the seas. In at least two occasions the Peloponnesian fleet did not dare to challenge the enemy, even after it had recently received considerable reinforcements from the Peloponnesse and the financial stringency had not as yet begun.\footnote{1229} So the Athenians at Samos must have been rather confident that for the time being they could tackle the enemy fleet with whatever resources they had at hand and get the better of them. Therefore, they had time at their disposal to set their plan in motion. A pact with Persia, if it ever came about, would be implemented in spring, when the operational season began. Shock tactics and surprise toward the Athenian folk would definitely not do in the present situation. Instead, to overcome the anti-oligarchic reflexes, a great deal of propaganda was vital. Thucydides' narrative illustrates how the main players arranged their tactics to further their interests. They never allowed the other side to make a fair and informed judgement, concealing vital information and manipulating the wishes of the others: Thus, Alcibiades in his talks with the influential Athenians does not reveal his real status at Tissaphernes' court, he conceals his personal motives; his promises foster unwarranted aspirations in their minds. The conspirators themselves in the open discussions at Samos stress the financial relief for the crews and downplay through propaganda the price that will have to be paid for that help. In their proposed reforms they make no mention about

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\footnote{1228} 8.46.5: τῷ γὰρ Ἀλκιβιάδῃ διὰ ταύτα ὡς εἰ περὶ τούτων παραμονὸν προσθέμεν ἐκτὸς ἐς πίστιν τὴν τε τροφῆν κακῶς ἐπάριξε τοῖς Πελοποννησίοις καὶ ναυμαχεῖν ὅπως εἴαι... 'since he thought Alcibiades' counsel with respect to these matters correct, [Tissaphernes] placed confidence in him and provided the Peloponnesians with food inadequately, while he did not let them engage in sea-battle.'

\footnote{1229} 8.30.2: οἱ δ᾿ ἄλλοι εἰν Σάμῳ μένοντες τέσσαρες καὶ ἕβδομην καὶ εἴδαν ἡθομικόντα ναυοῦ ἐθαλασσοκράτουν καὶ ἐπίσης τῇ Μιλήτῳ ἐπιοικοῦντο 'while the rest stayed on Samos and became masters of the seas with seventy-four vessels and were sailing against the enemy at Miletus' cf. 8.38.5; 43.1.
\end{footnotesize}
abolition of democracy. Abolition is mentioned only in their meetings and in the instructions that the envoys are given. Instead another form of democracy is envisioned, or similar terms which are more palatable than the abominable word oligarchy.

Peisander’s proposals may have been publicly put forward for the first time in Athens, but we know that similar discussions had been waged in the city since the Sicilian expedition was still in progress. Thucydides graphically illustrates the gruesome reality the Athenians had to face as hardships mounted due to constant surveillance on the walls. The land route to Euboea was closed and Athens was besieged by the Peloponnesians via the Deceleia fort, whereas the public treasury was empty. Despite their resilience to carry on fighting, those new and adverse developments will have sown the seeds of discontent and strife among the Athenians. If our considerations are valid, the fact that the oligarchs on Samos seem to have been at their ease when it came to introducing their proposals to the people at Athens might be an indication that there existed a solid portion of the population that was already discussing constitutional issues and the horrible financial situation, and that those people were prepared to condone changes in the constitution if thus a way out

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1230 Thuc. 8.48.1-2; 49.1; 53.1; 54.4. Notice the word play: εἰ μὴ δημοκρατοῦντο...καὶ μὴ δημοκρατουμένων...δῆμου καταλύσεως...δημοκρατουμένος...μὴ τὸν αὐτὸν τρόπον...ἀπὸς καταλύσουσι τὸν δῆμον. ‘If they were not a democracy...and they were not ruled by a democracy...the overthrow of the democracy...if (the Athenians) modified their democracy...with a view to overthrowing the democracy.’

1231 Heftner has drawn my attention to Thuc. 8.53.3 and AP 29.5; he holds that the conspirators even from that time on (preparatory steps on Samos) attempted to present the necessary constitutional changes as corollaries of the war, and that they would be in force only for as long as the confrontation with Sparta lasted.

1232 Peisander’s mission to persuade the Athenians and have the oligarchic plans ratified, especially his performance in the assembly, is reminiscent of that of Themistocles in Sparta. Compare 1.91.4: καὶ ὁ Θεμιστοκλῆς ἐπελάθην τοὺς Δακεδαμονίους ἑνεκείν περὶ τὸ φαινομένος ὁτι η μὲν πόλις σφων τετείχισται ἤδη... ‘Themistocles came forward to speak to the Lacedaemonians and thereupon openly told them that their city had already been walled...

1233 J. Witte argues that already as early as autumn 413 for certain circles in Athens the defeat in Sicily meant the end of democracy (Demosthenes und die Patrios Politeia: Von der imaginären Verfassung zur politischen Idee Bonn 1995: 19, 21-22).

1234 Thuc. 7.27.2-7.28. For a detailed discussion on the economic effects of the Spartan siege through the Deceleia fort, especially the blockade of the land route Oropos-Athens, see Moreno Feeding the Democracy: The Athenian Grain Supply in the Fifth and Fourth Centuries BC Oxford 2007: 77-140. For the effects of the financial stringency on the morals of the Athenians during this period, see Kallet “The Diseased Body Politic, Athenian Public Finance, and the Massacre at Mykalessos (Thucydides 7.27.29)” AJP 120.2 1999: 223-244.
of the stalemate could be found. The men who initially conceived the oligarchic plan had been complaining that the burden they had to bear due to the war was intolerable. In that they knew that they were not alone. (Thuc. 8.48.1: οἱ δινατότατοι τῶν πολιτῶν…οὔπερ καὶ ταλαιπωροῦνται μᾶλιστα 'those influential individuals who are apt to bear the heaviest burdens'; cf. 7.28.3: κατὰ πάντα τετρυχωμένοι 'completely worn out': the whole of the Athenian population). Therefore, perhaps it was not accidental that in this initial phase of the oligarchic plan the plotters suppressed its constitutional/political aspects and its implications for the Athenian politics and society and they underscored only the financial ones. In the end Peisander’s first mission to Athens was successful: Thanks to a considerable lapse between the decision to send the mission to Athens and its actual arrival in the Piraeus, during which time news of the developments on Samos had broken in the capital, the oligarchs were in a position to draw safe conclusions on arrival about the chances their plan had to be successful. Through clever planning and propaganda they managed to capitalise on the widespread discontent, and made the first important step for the abolition of democracy a few months later.

A similarly tempestuous public debate over matters of current concern is also echoed in Thrasymachus’ deliberative speech περὶ πολιτείας, a fragment of which is preserved in Dionysius Halicarnassus’ On Demosthenes, which may be placed in the wider historical context of late fifth century Athens. Thrasymachus, the sophist

1235 See the discussion in Heftner 2001: 15-16 on the appointment of the board of probouloi after the disaster in Sicily and how differently it was viewed by various political groups and factions.

1236 See Gomme, Andrewes and Dover 1945-1981: 5106, no on 8.48.2 φανερῶς ἔλεγον. Heftner in a private conversation has pointed out to me that ‘die Äußerung in 8,48,1 verstehe ich nicht so sehr als ein statement zur Unerträglichkeit der Kriegslasten für die Wohlhabenden; es war eher eine Feststellung im Sinne von „sie hätten die größten Lasten zu tragen und möchten im Gegenzug dazu auch den entscheidenden Anteil an der politischen Herrschaftsmacht haben.“

1237 DK85B1. The nature of the text as well as the occasion of its composition is contested. Sordi (1955) argued for 401/400 as its time framework, the speech having been delivered to an oligarchic, pro-Spartan audience. More recently, White (1995) proposed that the speech was delivered by Thrasymachus himself who acted as ambassador of his home city Chalkedon. In his speech the sophist pledged for mercy on behalf of his fellow-citizens, probably in 407, after Chalcedon’s revolt had been quelled. This view has been adequately dealt with by Yunis (1997), who proposed four possible scenarios with regard to the classification of the text: written by Thrasymachus in his capacity as a λογογράφος, a model speech like Antiphon’s tetralogies, a political pamphlet like Isocrates’ Areopageticus, or a model proemium. As to its historical context, Yunis is more careful than other scholars, assigning the text to the late fifth-early fourth century period. On the contrary, Shear accepts the period after Peisander’s first visit as the most probable context of the speech (2011: 43). Wallace preferred a 404/3 context (1989: 137). See also, Fuks (1953: 102-106; Ostwald (1986: 367); Munn 2000: 135-136; Cecchin 1969: 12-25.
from Chalcedon, like Thucydides, draws a gloomy picture of distress and internal strife. He claims that the πάτριος πολιτεία, the ancestral constitution, is invoked by both parties in Athens, (are we to understand democrats and oligarchs?), but, though simple as it is in its conception, it has become a highly divisive issue. This text complements Thucydides, in that while the historian underscores the current, acute financial stringencies as the cause of the discontent the Athenians felt in the post-Sicily period, the sophist alludes to the constitutional dimension of the debates waged at the time: Athens had fallen into a state of disarray and confusion and concord among its citizens was about to eclipse. Accordingly, a return to an older, more successful constitution was the solution to the current evils the city was going through. Thus, both texts help us catch a glimpse of the contemporary political climate and the lines along which political debate was then waged. In the light of all these, Peisander’s proposals, seen in its wider context of a prolonged and intense political and ideological debate waged in public and private circles in contemporary Athens, should not have come as a surprise to his compatriots. Those ideas had been in the air for some time by then, but it was Peisander who had finally come up with a concrete, and to some the only viable, plan that could break the deadlock Athens was in.
Appendix 4

εἰθές in Thucydides

A) immediately after a given event: The amount of time can be estimated
1.1.1; 1.2; 26.3; 53.3; 64.1; 89.3; 90.3; 111.3; 115.5
2.2.4; 5.6; 5.7; 29.6; 49.2; 51.4; 53.2; 54.5; 58.1; 71.1; 80.2; 80.5; 84.5
3.2.1; 3.13.1; 3.36.1; 3.36.4; 3.36.6; 3.49.2; 3.71.2; 3.77.2; 3.81.1; 3.91.3; 3.110.2;
3.112.2; 3.113.5
4.3; 8.1; 14.5; 23.1; 25.10; 32.1; 34.1; 43.2; 44.4; 54.2; 57.3; 67.5; 69.1; 74.2; 75.6
76.1; 83.1; 490.4; 100.1; 112.2; 113.1; 116.1; 122.6; 123.3; 125.1; 130.4; 132.1; 133.3;
134.2; 135.1
5.3.2; 8.1; 10.9; 20.1; 21.1; 31.6; 44.2; 45.4; 46.5; 60.2; 61.3; 63.2; 65.2; 66.2; 72.4;
74.2; 85.1; 114.1
6.23.2; 26.1; 46.2; 50.2; 51.2; 54.3; 56.2; 57.3; 58.1; 58.2; 60.4; 62.4; 65.1; 69.1;
69.2; 74.1; 88.8; 91.4; 97.2; 101.6
7.2.2; 22.2; 26.3; 29.1; 34.7; 37.3; 39.2; 40.1; 43.4; 43.5; 43.5; 50.3; 56.1; 59.3; 65.1;
69.1; 69.4; 72.3; 74.1; 81.2; 82.3; 84.3; 84.5
8.6.4; 8.3; 8.4; 10.1; 11.3; 14.3; 15.1; 17.4; 27.6; 33.3; 41.1; 41.3; 42.3; 44.2; 50.4; 57.1;
62.1; 64.1; 67.1; 74.3; 76.2; 79.5; 82.1; 82.3; 92.6

B) immediately after a given event, but the adverb is loosely used. The event to which it refers cannot be exactly estimated in terms of time.
1.2.6; 61.1; 62.2; 90.3; 93.4; 93.8; 102.4; 125.2; 142.7; 146.1; 2.6.2; 10.1; 39.1;
4.75.5; 107.3; 5.14.1; 15.2; 25.1; 31.1; 35.2; 39.3; 43.3; 51.2; 80.2; 6.63.2; 88.4; 88.9;
7.13.2; 15.2; 16.2; 42.3; 8.1.2; 3.2; 5.3; 19.1; 40.2; 66.2; 72.2; 80.1

B1) transition passages in the narrative
1.56.1; 4.42.1; 4.84.1

B2) "hurriedly", in relation to another event which lasts long
1.67.1; 1.132.3; 4.110.1; 5.43.2

B3) at the beginning of a season
2.47.2; 4.52.1; 89.1; 117.1; 5.13.1; 40.1; 52.1; 76.1; 6.63.1; 94.1; 7.19.1; 20.1; 8.2.1; 3.1;
7.1; 8.61.1

C) as a logical conclusion, result of an action
1.140.5; 2.61.1; 3.47.2; 3.47.3; 4.73.3; 4.103.5; 4.104.2; 5.102.1; 6.91.3; 6.91.7; 7.56.2;
7.64.1; 7.77.4; 8.71.1; 8.86.4

D) adverb of place
4.118.4; 6.96.1; 8.90.4; 8.90.5
Appendix 5: Beyond the Four Hundred

The speaker of Lysias 25 (Δήµου καταλύσεως ἀπολογία), a defence speech in a dokimasia, audit, delivered shortly after 401 B.C., the capitulation of the oligarchs at Eleusis and the re-incorporation of Eleusis in the Athenian state, draws a bizarre picture of late fifth century Athenian politics. He argues that expediency and not ideology determine the choices an individual makes in politics. To support this preposition he furnishes the following examples:

σκέψασθε γάρ, ὦ ἄνδρες δικασταί, τοὺς προστάντας ἀµφοτέρων <τῶν> πολιτείων, ὅσικς δὴ μετεβάλοντο. οὐ Φρύνιχος μὲν καὶ Πεισανδρός καὶ οἱ μετ’ ἐκείνων δηµαγωγοί, ἐπειδὴ πολλὰ εἰς ύµᾶς ἐξήµαρτον, τὰς περὶ τούτων δείσαντες τιµωρίας τὴν προτέραν ὀλιγαρχίαν κατέστησαν, πολλοὶ δὲ τῶν τετρακοσίων μετὰ τῶν ἐκ Πειραιέως, συγκατήλθον, ἔνιοι δὲ τῶν ἐκείνως ἐκβαλόντων αὐτοὶ αὖθις τῶν τρίκαλον ἐγένοντο; εἰοὶ δὲ οἰτίνες τῶν Ἑλευσίναδε ἀπογραψαµένων ἐξελθόντες μεθ’ ύµῶν, ἐπολιόρκοντο τοὺς μεθ’ αὐτῶν. (Lys. 25.9)

Consider how often the supporters of each of the two types of constitution changed their allegiances, gentlemen of the jury. Did not Phrynichus, Peisander, and their friends the demagogues establish the first oligarchy because they were afraid of punishment for the many crimes they had committed against you? Did not many of the Four Hundred return from exile together with those from Piraeus? Did not some of those who had driven the Four Hundred into exile subsequently become members of the Thirty? Among those who had registered their names for Eleusis, there were some who marched out with you and besieged those on their own side. (translated by S. Todd)

One wonders to what extent these assertions are mere rhetoric distortions. No doubt, Lysias is capable of skilfully and cunningly manipulating his target audience by weaving anything from plane inaccuracies to blatant lies into masterly rhetorical designs which from the audience’s point of view are impressive and difficult to check. Accordingly, we need not believe that Peisander and Phrynichus established the Four Hundred for fear of reprisals against them. But one piece of information, albeit implicit, seems to refer to Theramenes, namely that after ousting the first oligarchy he became a member of the Thirty, and it is correct. It is then not inconceivable that some ex-members of the Four Hundred fought with Thrasybulus, Anytus and other democratic leaders against the Thirty in the civil war in 404 B.C.. Unfortunately, we do not know any of these names, nor can we estimate their number, but this passage is a reminder to us of how easily yester foes could become today’s friends despite different and sometimes incompatible ideological credos. What we know, however, about the individuals who got involved in the first oligarchy seems to confirm the speaker’s argument.

Of the known members of the Four Hundred, Onomacles, Mnesilochus, Aristoteles, perhaps Charicles and Eratosthenes became members of the Thirty in the summer of 404 B.C.. Pythodorus the proposer of a decree in 411 may be the same as the eponymous archon of the Thirty, but identification is not certain. Many of the
extremists in 411 went into voluntary exile when the regime was ousted; some of them returned home in 404 with Lysander, e.g., Aristoteles, while others, either died in exile (presumably Peisander and Melanthius) or were somehow caught, tried and executed sometime between 411 and 406 (e.g., Aristarchus and Alexicles). Those less fortunate lost their lives as a result of their involvement in the oligarchic coup: Phrynichus, Antiphon and Archeptolemus got assassinated (the former) or executed (the latter two). Of the remaining known members Theramenes and Aristocrates had certainly the most successful careers in the period between the two oligarchies before they both met their ignominious death under completely different circumstances and regimes. Laispodias and Dieitrephes continued to be active in politics in the last decade of the fifth century as did Cleitophon. Thymochares disappears from the scene after his generalship under the Five Thousand. For Andron from Gargettos (if we are to identify the oligarch with Androtion's father) his participation in the coup does not seem to have had any consequences or to have tainted his memory since the fourth-century rivals of Androtion, his famous son, do not attack him as the son of an oligarch. We know that Melesias, Aristophon, Polystратos survived the first oligarchy but they must have led an obscure life thereafter.
Afterthought

The social origin of the known members of the Four Hundred and their motives for joining the movement

Thucydides is our most reliable and comprehensive source on the oligarchic revolution in 411 B.C., its preliminary phase beginning on the island of Samos sometime in the autumn of 412. From the study of the relevant passages it emerges that the movement lacked pre-existing organisation and that it was rather spontaneous (8.47.2-48.3). The historian stresses the frustration on the part of the taxiarchs, embitterment arising from the fact that those people had to bear the financial burden of the war almost exclusively on their own and that they had no commensurate share in the government in return. Thucydides makes clear that it was the δυνατώτατοι τῶν πολιτῶν (8.48.1) that masterminded the whole scheme and set the movement in motion. In the context of Demosthenes’ reinforcements to the army on Sicily Thucydides narrates the catastrophic effects for Athens that the occupation of Deceleia had; he underscores the loss of revenue through decline in commerce across the Athenian arche, the huge loss of skilled manpower through the massive flight of the slaves to Deceleia and, on the other hand, the increase in war expenditure (7.27-28).

But the financial burden should have fallen somewhat unequal on the shoulders of the Athenian propertied families. Those less prominent families with no overseas properties must have felt the pinch from 413 on, whereas people like Dieitrephes, who probably owned a manufacture which could theoretically compensate to some extent for the presumed loss of landed property due to Deceleia occupation, could rely on alternative sources of income. In this context it may be worth noting that the loss of Oropos in the early spring of 411 (Thuc. 8.60.1) may have seemed particularly alarming to those affluent Athenians who possessed land on Euboea, and may have been another compelling factor to join the movement for those who initially were sceptical towards it.

In the light of these considerations and keeping the historical and economic background in mind, one may discern three groups in the individuals that became members of the Four Hundred:

a) The aristocrats, people like Dieitrephes, Laispodias, Aristocrates, Melesias (if he is the son of Thukydides), Theramenes; members of lesser local gentry such as Polystrotas and probably Andron if the oligarch is to be identified with the father of Androtion; the well-off like Onomacles, Cleitophon and possibly Thymochares. These individuals may have shared a common social background and social status, but beyond this they did not form an ideologically coherent group, neither did they have common goals as the case of the extremist Onomacles demonstrates. At this point I may raise an objection to Rhodes’ view that the division between democrats and oligarchs at the end of the century is not a division between the ruling class and the old
but a division within the new ruling class. For Rhodes most of the oligarchs were members of families who had risen to prominence during the fifth century (Rhodes 2000: 132). But the role of men like Aristocrates, Dieitrephes, Laispodias and Theramenes disprove Rhodes’ claims. The old aristocracy was well represented in the council of the Four Hundred.

b) The newcomers, people of obscure social origins like Aristarchus, Alexicles, Melanthius and possibly Aristoteles if one does not accept the identification with the general during the 420s. This is the most interesting group within the Four Hundred. They seize the most important offices in the oligarchy, that of the strategia, on the strength of their vigour and revolutionary zeal; they seem to dominate the movement shortly before the seizure of power by the Four Hundred, thus radicalizing the movement and diverting it off its initial course (Ostwald 1986: 377-378 rightly underscores the full authority of the council of Four Hundred envisaged in Peisander’s motion at the Colonus assembly and the fact that the well-chosen five proedroi ensured extremist control of membership in the Four Hundred). Due perhaps to their young age, their relative lack of experience in public political discourse as conducted in Athens they seem to abandon the city and seek refuge in the enemy camp when the regime collapses after the naval defeat in Euboea. This detail is very important in understanding the wider context into which those turbulent days unfolded in the summer of 411, that is, the stasis phenomenon rampant throughout the Greek world during the Peloponnesian war. Notice that while more experienced men of the oligarchy with quite strong oligarchic views such as Antiphon, Onomacles and Archeptolemus, all of them with attested previous public record, chose to stand their ground and remained in Athens to defend their ideology and conduct during the oligarchy, the most deeply implicated ones, men like Aristarchus, Alexicles and others fled. Members of this group may come from different social backgrounds, although it is probable that they are sidelined members of the Athenian aristocracy, but they have common goals and spare no means to achieve them.

c) The self made men, people like Phrynichus, Peisander and Antiphon. They have great experience and extraordinary organisational skills; they have no common denominator as regards political ideology. Like the second group, however, under the pressure of the current circumstances, they also have common goals and work together to realise them. In the course of the revolution they co-operate with the second group, members of which they have probably rewarded by appointing them as generals in the oligarchy.

An interesting picture emerges if someone looks at the motives that the known members of the oligarchy had when they joined the movement. First we may discern one group of people to which, personal ambition and φιλοτιµία apart, the call of duty and the idea of oligarchy as such was particularly resonant. We have seen that two of them, Alexicles and Aristarchus may have been quite young, at least they had close connections and bonds with the νεανίσκοι that assisted the Four Hundred in
carrying out the ‘dirty’ job, that is, assassinations and intimidation of the population. Antiphon was the moving force of the movement, quite probably the number one in the hierarchy, while for Melanthius and Aristoteles as well ideology must have played an important role in their decision to take part in the coup. We have also seen that personal enmity was a serious reason for some individuals to join the coup. A central factor in 411 in connection with the birth and growth of the movement was Alcibiades. Two men must have taken the decision to join the enterprise as a reaction to what Alcibiades did or did not do. First, Dieitrephes makes his appearance exactly when it was decided at the oligarchic conference on Samos on Peisander’s return from the negotiations with Tissaphernes that Alcibiades was not to be trusted any longer and that the conspirators had better move on without him. At this juncture, Dieitrephes is entrusted a very important mission the outcome of which was exceedingly important for the oligarchs in that it would determine whether the movement would be legitimised in the eyes of Athens’ subjects and whether the oligarchs could expect help from the allied cities, or, better said, from the local elites. Dieitrephes’ case is an excellent example of what the social anthropologists call ‘negative reciprocity’; Dieitrephes and Alcibiades’ families seem to have been at odds with each other for two successive generations, as long as our knowledge goes, the reason probably being clashing interests and rival political ambitions between the two prominent families which came from the same deme and whose houses must have been situated literally in the same neighbourhood. The other key figure in the movement, the person who determined like nobody else the course the movement finally took, was of course Phrynichus. His bold and outspoken behaviour caused him being exposed in the eyes of the conspirators when while being on Samos and holding the strategia made a harangue against the prospect of enlisting Alcibiades in the movement. At the time of this speech which Thucydides gives us in the form of oratio obliqua, an excellent specimen of political commentary on the inner workings of the Athenian empire, Phrynichus had no personal reason to attack Alcibiades, and the latter’s bitter enmity against the former comes as a result of Phrynichus’ speech rather than provokes it.

Financial loss of varying magnitude should have played an important role for nearly all members of the Four Hundred. We have seen that those who performed a trierarchy in the years 413-411 faced an acute cash problem (see pages 10-12). No wonder then that it was these men who initially became the driving force of the revolution. In the cases of Polystratus, Andron (if the oligarch is the same individual as Andron from Gargettos), and Theramenes the financial loss might have been quite severe since they came from rural demes and their estates might have suffered complete devastation during the Deceleian war. Polystratus, in particular, takes pride in having repeatedly paid for eisphorae probably levied the year(s) before the coup ([Lys. 20.23]). In reality, of course he will have loathed this tax like every Athenian ‘gentleman.’ It is very important for the historian of fifth-century Athens to be attentive to these details which throw considerable light on the conduct and movements of certain Athenian politicians in the period under examination. Since our evidence, even for the few names that we happen to know as members of the
oligarchy, is scanty and incomplete, the exact motives of a number of individuals cannot be identified. To this group belong Laispodias, Thymochares and Onomacles; the latter had been elected general for the year before the coup, that is, 412/11, so frustrated personal ambition should not have been the reason for joining the oligarchy. Aristocrates also had been already elected general and was a recognizable and respectable public figure well before 411. He seems to have been the most consistent, patriotic and reliable figure among the oligarchs known to us. For him, more than for anybody else, one may assume that what urged him to join the coup was the deep concern for Athens’ precarious situation in the years after the disaster in Sicily. It is also lamentable that we know so little about Archeptolemus and his involvement in the coup. His case is unique in that being a stranger, he managed to make a name in politics without the support of networks of kinship. What might have drawn him in the oligarchic movement is his imbuing with Hippodamus’ conservative political ideas about the organisation of the optimal polis. It has been argued in this thesis that Hippodamus was actually Archeptolemus’ father. Finally, as it has already been observed, it is apparent from the study of the lives of these individuals that the sophistic movement shaped the ideas of most of the known members of the oligarchy: Theramenes, Cleitophon, Andron, Peisander, Phrynichus had received sophistic education and had acquired exemplary rhetoric skills which they used in various ways to achieve their goals in politics.

A last note may here be written about the designation of the 411 oligarchs as ‘moderates’ and ‘extremists.’ I have found such classification as well as the belief that there were in late-fifth century Athens political parties organised along ideological lines problematic, and I have avoided engaging in this kind of discussion in the profiles of the oligarchs that are examined in this thesis. Since this is not the place for a full discussion, I will only explain how I see these individuals in the context of the 411 political struggles. Particularly helpful is in this respect Heftner’s work “Oligarchen, Mesoi, Autokraten: Bemerkungen zur antidemokratischen Bewegung des späten 5 Jh. v. Chr. in Athen” Chiron 33 1-41, especially his observation that there does not seem to have been waged a discussion about various constitutions in the period prior to 411 and that the evidence shows that the theorizing and public discourse over constitutions alternative to the existing one (radical democracy) was a product of the fervent political activity and debates that permeated the oligarchic circles in Athens, activity that was conducive to the sharpening and elucidating of political ideas and schemata that hitherto had been only nebulous (6-10). This is very important and helps us to understand how the movement as a whole and its members as individual agents developed and evolved politically in the months prior to the coup, but also during it and after its collapse in the autumn of 411. Since conditions in Athens prior to the Sicilian expedition did not encourage the development of elaborate oligarchic thinking little or no work at all must have been done in this direction. Indeed, the somewhat clumsy and fanciful constitutional drafts found in the AP may reveal the lack of previous debate and discourse on
abstract as well as practical aspects of constitutional organisation along oligarchic principles, discourse which would be so formulated as to respond to and meet the needs of the Athenians. It is then no coincidence that the neighbouring Boeotia exerted a strong influence in the political thought of the theoreticians of the movement. The notion then of ‘extreme’ of ‘moderate’ oligarchy must have crystallized only after the downfall of the regime, when the role of the leading faction of the oligarchs was fully appreciated and understood. This is not to deny, though that differences of opinions or of principles did not exist among the oligarchic circles prior to the coup; rather, that owing to the above-mentioned reasons, plus the fact that the oligarchs had a formidable enemy to deal with in the first place, that is democracy and its numerous supporters in Athens, these differences remained latent; they were not pointed out, were not discussed, and probably were not perceived as important for the time being. And to make the situation more complicated, one has to consider that certain key players in the revolution owing to opportunism or fear changed sides during the reign of the regime or adopted a neutral stance, avoiding exposure, until one side emerged stronger.
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Vita

Nikos Karkavelias was born on 2nd January 1968, the second child of Christos and Sophia Karkavelias. After graduation from 3rd Lyceum in Patras he attended the department of Philology at the University of Crete, Greece, where he attained his BA in Philology in 1992. In 2000 and 2001 he attained the MA degree in Classics and English respectively at the Queen’s University of Belfast. Since 2008 he has lived and worked in Austria where he completed the present PhD thesis in November 2014.