Titel der Masterarbeit

“Austrian Parties and the EU Accession – The Influence of Intraparty Decision Making Structures on Policy Shifts“

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**Introduction**

Political parties are the main vehicle of political competition in most western democracies. They provide structures to organize interests, they recruit political personnel, they allocate resources and they compete with other parties for office, votes and policies (Müller/Strøm 1999).

Normatively, political parties are frequently perceived as a link between the political arena and society. In this tradition of thinking they fulfill a necessary function for democracy by gathering similar interests and opinions under one party label. With their policy proposals they compete with those of other parties for majorities. Such idealistic perceptions of political parties have been challenged by empirical political research. Anthony Downs (1957) assumed that parties are not just accumulations of ideologically close individuals, which collectively try to implement their policies. They may rather have genuine interests to reach office via winning votes and use different policies in order to attract voters. There is a vast literature on the question what the motives behind the behavior of political parties actually are (see Strøm/Müller 1999).

But the fact that party behavior can fruitfully be analyzed by assigning genuine interests to them, should not lead us to misinterpret them as monolithic in nature. Parties are not unitary actors (see Mair 1994, 4; Budge 2010). In order to coordinate communication and avoid open conflict between differing interests within the party organizational norms about decision making processes are implemented. These may take a variety of forms ranging from highly centralized or “closed” forms, where very few individuals decide to more decentralized or “open” forms, where larger groups of people like party congresses take decisions.

To political science – and also to party members, who receive decision making power in exchange for the time and work they dedicate to the party (see Strøm/Müller 1999) – the question arises how influential they really are. Do decision making structures make a difference when it comes to hard decisions? Do they make a difference for policy decisions?

Empirical research on this question suggests that in general intraparty decision making structures do affect policy positions (see Schumacher 2013, Meyer 2013, Budge 2010, Evans 2008 etc.). But most comparative studies have their problems regarding the operationalization of decision making centralization. Case studies analyzing specific policy decisions of single parties can offer us insights, but generalization – if it is possible at all – is limited to a very narrow scope. This thesis attempts to settle on the middle ground between large N comparative research and single case studies, which focus on just one party. By the use of a
multiple case study research design and the application of process tracing and QCA techniques, the influence of decision making structures on policy shifts is examined for all parties of the political system in one country, regarding one issue.

The set of cases selected are Austrian parties and their policy shifts regarding the issue of EU accession. Austria’s accession to the European Union twenty years ago followed an unusually heavy dynamic in the Austrian party system. All parliamentary parties changed their positions about supporting or opposing the accession within a few years. Although there is a vast literature on the event of Austria’s accession per se, the role of political parties in this historical political process has never received primary attention. The question how it could happen that all of a sudden SPÖ, ÖVP, FPÖ and the Greens shifted their positions regarding EU accession, although we know that political parties are risk-averse in nature and hence reluctant to change (see Harmel/Janda 1994) has never been addressed. Thus, we know very little about the reasons for these shifts, what motives the parties had, and what constraints they had to overcome in terms of intraparty opposition and decision making structures. So, by analyzing this set of cases also an important and understudied aspect of Austria’s historical accession to the EU in 1995 is examined.

**Research Question**

Accordingly, the research question of this thesis is:

How did intraparty decision making structures affect Austrian parties’ policy shifts on the issue of EU accession?

In order to answer this question, policy positions concerning Austria’s EU accession, policy shifts on the issue and their causes are examined for Austrian parliamentary parties\(^1\) between 1985 and 1994.

This thesis ought to make two contributions: (a) The main goal is to test whether the – by now – historical policy shifts of Austrian parties can be adequately explained by theories of party policy change and more specifically if our theoretical understanding of intraparty decision making and how it affects policy shifts is confirmed by these cases. Do they really affect policy decisions? And if so, what are the causal mechanisms? (b) As a by-product, this thesis offers detailed explanations of Austrian parties’ policy shifts on the issue of EC/EU accession,

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\(^1\) These parties are: SPÖ, ÖVP, FPÖ and the Greens. The Liberal Forum (LIF) was founded not earlier than 1993 and initially competed in parliamentary elections in 1994. It is therefore excluded from the analysis.
which contributes to a better understanding of the historical processes leading to Austria’s accession to the EU twenty years ago.

The research design applied can be best characterized as a nested multiple case study. Policy shifts are first examined for every individual party by the use of process tracing techniques. At this first stage of the analysis, the plausibility of theoretical explanations for policy shifts is put to test. As a second step, results of the process tracing analysis and additional data are utilized to conduct a Qualitative Comparative Analysis (QCA). By the use of QCA techniques causal conditions found by process tracing can be reviewed and/or extended on a logical and reliable basis. Conclusions are finally drawn comparatively from this empirical evidence.

**Case selection**

First of all, Austrian parties qualify nicely as cases for any analysis of the relation between decision making structures and party policy shifts as the Austrian party system is well institutionalized and parties are the key actors of the political system. Moreover there is solid variation regarding their structural features, which are relatively stable over time (see Müller 1994, 52).

But why analyze policy shifts on the EC/EU accession issue? Austrian parties policy positions regarding this issue are particularly interesting even if they happened more than twenty years ago. Political parties, being conservative organizations (see Harmel/ Janda 1994, 264), are generally quite reluctant to change their policy positions. In most comparative research on party policy change, policy shifts can be observed only as slight variations behind the comma on a left right scale. In contrast, all Austrian parties have changed their positions concerning a potential EU membership of Austria between 1985 and 1994. Such an accumulation of changes in policy positions regarding such a highly salient issue is all but common, which qualifies this set of cases as deviant or at least unusual. Thus, by analyzing these cases, which at first glance are at odds with theoretical assumptions and extant empirical findings, we may deepen our understanding of this causal relation, learn more about the causal mechanisms at work or about variables, which have yet been overlooked by theory.

The observation period 1985-1994 has been chosen according to historical events on Austria’s path to the European Union, which mark the beginning and the end of the intense political debate about Austria’s EC/EU accession. The first event was a panel discussion in December

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2 Cases are nested as they are not independent from each other. As opponents in political competition parties are potentially responsive to each other’s actions.
1984, where the SPÖ’s Peter Jankowitsch and the ÖVP’s Andreas Khol publicly agreed about the necessity of EC accession. As a consequence of these public statements, which were at odds with the SPÖ’s as well as the ÖVP’s policy positions at the time, the Austrian accession debate started off in 1985 (see Kopeinig 2013, 23; Gehler 2002). In 1994 the Austrian accession referendum was conducted and the parliament implemented all necessary legal measures for Austria’s accession. On the 1st January 1995 Austria’s membership came to force. Thus, the year 1994 marks the end of the political debate about the accession issue.

With regard to units of analysis a differentiation has to be made between the process tracing analysis and the Qualitative Comparative Analysis (QCA). The former examines the long-term development of each individual party policy shift over the course of the observation period and accordingly uses four units, as there were four party policy shifts. For the QCA the same empirical material is split up on a yearly basis in order to generate party/year units.

But before the research design will be presented in further detail, it makes sense to discuss the theory and extant empirical work on the subject.

**Theory and Literature Discussion**

**Party Organizations**

As it has been argued in the introduction, the importance of political parties for all aspects of political life in western democracy can hardly be overrated. This is especially true for the Austrian case. Here, as Müller argues, post-war politics have essentially been party politics (see Müller 1994, 51). Various frameworks have been developed for the comparative analysis of political parties, which allow us to categorize political parties and party change according to several features, of which its organizational structure is only one. Prominent examples of such categories are “mass parties” (Duverger 1954), “catch-all parties” (Kirchheimer 1966) or “cartel parties” (Katz/ Mair 1995). André Krouwel nicely integrates numerous of these party models in one theoretical framework, with regard to the parties’ origins, their strategies on the electoral market, their ideology and their organizational structure (see Krouwel 2012).

Moreover a rich literature exists on party change (see Harmel/Janda 1994; Panebianco 1988; Krouwel 2012). Both of these strands of research partly deal with the internal structures of party organizations. Nonetheless much of parties’ internal functioning remains to be explored (see Mair 1994, 1 et seq.). Most parties are not very willing to provide information about the internal life of their organization. Still, there is some solid theoretical ground and useful empirical research that we can rely on for our global understanding of the inner structures of
party organizations. Most basically it has been shown that parties are not monolithic in nature, they are not unitary actors (see Mair 1994; Budge 2010), not even single factions must be mistaken for monoliths (Katz/Mair 1992). Katz and Mair (1994) provide a very useful theoretical framework for the general understanding of the processes and dynamics inside party organizations. According to them political parties have at least ‘three faces’: (1) the party in public office, (2) the party on the ground and (3) the party in central office (see Mair 1994, 4 et seq.). By this distinction they provide the conceptual basis for the categorization of differing interests within party organizations. Another framework for the analysis of intraparty processes is offered by Harmel and Janda (1994). In their theoretical work on party change they propose a five-fold categorization of intraparty actors. “(1) top leaders who constitute the party's key national decision makers; (2) middle-level leaders who head its divisions; (3) activists who regularly carry out party operations; (4) members who occasionally assist the party with votes, funds or activities; and (5) supporters who at least vote for the party in elections” (Harmel/Janda 1994, 274).

Hence we know that actors within parties are not homogenous, they have different characteristics and most importantly they have conflicting interests. Party organizations therefore have to provide institutions and mechanisms that contain centrifugal forces. From the perspective of rational choice institutionalism (see Weingast 2002), those are set up and used in order to channel interests, so that collectively actors will reach a better outcome (be it with regard to policy, office or votes). Decision making norms are such institutions. Formally (see Smith/ Gauja 2010) or informally (see Fabre 2011), they distribute power to the different actors within the organization and they may do so in a variety of forms ranging from highly centralized or “closed” forms, where one or very few individuals – leaders – decide, to more decentralized or “open” forms, where larger groups of party actors take decisions. In practice it is quite a task for political research to find out who actually decides or – put differently – who really has the power inside party organizations.

**Intraparty Decision Making and Policy Shifts**
The effect of intraparty decision making structures on policy shifts lies in the focus of this thesis. In extant empirical research it is expected that the more party leadership dominates

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3 Empirically they observe that these different faces become more and more independent from each other (see Katz/Mair 1994) and that there is a tendency towards a ‘governmentalization of parties’, which affects the balance of power between the three faces. As Mair puts it, parties generally move from closeness to civil society to closeness to the state (see Mair 1994, 8). Within the party organization this is illustrated by the fact that the weight of the party in central office decreases relatively to the weight of the party in public office. Representatives of the party in public office fill key positions in the party’s central office (see Mair 1994, 8).
decision-making procedures (centralized or “closed” decision making), the more easily policy shifts will occur (see Schumacher et al. 2013; Meyer 2013). This expectation is based on the theoretical assumption that interests, the political goals of party leaders and party activists will regularly diverge. More specifically it is argued that activists will be policy-oriented, while the leadership will be office-oriented.

“Party activists care about a party’s policies as they commit their time, money, and effort with the aim of voicing a specific ideological view. They are less willing to sacrifice policy ideas for the spoils of office given that their participation in the party is primarily based on the party’s policy platform. In contrast, party leaders seek to maximize material and status-oriented goals associated with political office” (Schumacher et al. 2013, 465; see also Strøm/Müller 1999, 17).

So, according to this assumption, as the party leadership is office oriented in nature it will make use of any freedom concerning policy decisions in order to reach office. Regarding this theoretical argument, that the party leadership is office oriented, one must not misinterpret the party leadership as being exclusively committed to strategic behavior. The party leadership must also adapt its party’s position in response to changes in the respective policy field, without primarily having strategic intentions in terms of electoral competition. As a consequence of changes in the “real world” – social, economic or political changes in the policy field – policy positions may become obsolete or certain positions need to be changed in order to maintain other, more fundamental positions (see Sabatier/ Jenkins-Smith 1999; Weible et al. 2009). Such instrumental shifts also have a strong potential to be opposed by the party on the ground, even more so if they are connected with specific interests of subgroups within the organization.

So, taking these different incentives into account, only decision making structures which involve veto players, such as activists or representatives of specific subgroups in decision making bodies, will prevent a party from shifting policy positions back and forth in response to public opinion, electoral results, changes in the policy field and so on. Basically this interpretation of the relationship between the party leadership and party activists can usefully be analyzed in the language of the principal-agent approach. The principal (the party on the ground) delegates power to the agent (party leadership) in order to overcome collective action and coordination problems. But as the agent may exploit his or her position in favor of his or her own interests, the principle must establish mechanisms, which minimize agency losses (Kiewiet/McCubbins 1991). Decentralized decision-making-structures are one way to do so,
namely they can be categorized as a mechanism of institutional checks (see Kiewiet/McCubbins 1991).4

Based on these theoretical foundations a simple model on the mediating role of intraparty decision making structures for party policy change can be constructed. It is assumed that decision making structures do not per se initiate policy shifts, but that they can constrain the party leadership (if they are decentralized) if it wants to change a certain position in response to an incentive and still only if those actors who are given a veto do not share the leadership’s desire to shift. In addition to external incentives, which lead party leadership to pursue a party policy shift, two other factors can have an impact on party policy change, according to Harmel and Janda’s broader theory of party change (1994). Besides such external shocks, they name change in the dominant factions and leadership change as possible causes for party change. Applied to the research question at hand, this would mean, that policy shifts could also be launched by these changes in the party’s inner power structures. However, whether they actually lead the party to policy shifts is still dependent on decision-making structures (see figure 1).

Extant research on the subject, has acknowledged the role of intraparty decision making as a mediating factor affecting the ability of parties to change policy positions. Empirically some support has been found for the effect of intraparty decision making on policy shifts. Schumacher, de Vries and Vis (2013) have presented a model for the explanation of policy shifts, which combines organizational variables with changes in mean voter positions, mean party voter positions and office exclusion. They find evidence for the effect that interactions between party organizational characteristics and these conditions from the parties political environment have on changes in policy positions (see Schumacher et al. 2013, 472 et seq.). However, their operationalization of party decision making – although it has to be stated that this is quite a task for comparative research – has its weaknesses. Schumacher et al. use data of an expert survey by Laver and Hunt (1992). This data is used for the present study as well, but it is rather old for their purposes.

4 Kiewiet and McCubbins name 4 mechanisms of reducing agency losses: 1. optimal design of contracts; 2. screening and selection procedures, 3. monitoring and reporting requirements, 4. institutional checks (see Kiewiet/McCubbins 1991, 48).
Other evidence for the relevance of intraparty organizational features for policy change is presented by Thomas Meyer (2013), who dedicates one chapter of his book on party policy change to this issue. He operationalizes intraparty power centralization by the use of three variables: a party’s mass organizational strength, its decision making process and its sources of income. The empirical results give some support to the relevance of internal power structures for policy shifts. In line with much of the literature on party organizations the openness of the decision making process is measured by a proxy, namely the involvement of party members in the candidate selection process. Meyer makes a good argument in stating that conflict over candidate selection frequently parallel conflicts over policy decisions, so that the selection process might serve as an arena for policy-struggles. But still, one has to be aware of the fact that it is no direct measure and personnel decisions may be – at least sometimes – no more than that.

Beside this comparative strand of literature, there are also some case studies, which try to explain the influence of intraparty structures on policy decisions taken by the party. Mostly they underline the relevance of intraparty structures for party policy change (see Evans 2008; Maravall 2008). Notable for the Austrian case is Müllers explanation of the SPÖ’s decision not to participate in a coalition government after the elections of 1966 (see Müller 1999). Although this in itself is obviously not a policy conflict, it fundamentally addresses the question of party goals and intraparty decision making.
So, based on extant literature, what we know about the influence of decision making structures on party policy shifts is that they matter, although empirical evidence is not too strong on the comparative level and that they mattered in specific parties concerning concrete decisions. For comparative research it seems difficult to find strong evidence concerning the impact of a theoretically strong argument. I assume that this problem mainly exists, because – as it has already been shown – intraparty decision making structures must be perceived as a mediating variable. In order to have an effect on policy positions, they need to interact with other factors, which means that there are a lot of intervening variables which can hardly be fully included in a comparative model with a large N. Therefore, for cross-national research designs with a large number of observations, where we find strong variation on multiple factors it is very hard, maybe impossible to adequately include it as an independent variable or, put differently, to measure its “real” impact.

Case studies on the other hand, do to a certain extent give insights about the role of decision making structures for specific policy shifts by showing how they interact with other factors. But what they cannot provide to an adequate extent is generalizability.

Facing this situation, the research design of the forthcoming work tries to cover the middle ground between these strands of research. By conducting a multiple case study including process tracing and QCA techniques, a low number of cases allows for relatively precise observations without much loss of information. On the other hand by examining more than one case (one party), but all relevant parties of the Austrian political system with regard to one specific policy issue it is possible to draw conclusions, which are at least generalizable to a greater extent. Hence the research design at hand, allows for a case-sensitive testing of theoretical assumptions, which both contributes to a better understanding of the specific intraparty processes leading to party policy change on the EC/EU accession issue and evaluates theories of party policy change.

**Hypotheses**

In line with the theoretical assumptions of the extant literature the hypotheses for the forthcoming research are:

H1: Policy shifts are more likely to occur if the party leadership finds external incentives to shift and decision making is centralized. Or:
H2: Policy shifts are more likely to occur if the party leadership finds external incentives to shift and does not face opposition from veto players if decision making is decentralized.

The first independent variable, which is included in both hypotheses is the external incentive for the party leadership to change the party’s policy position. Based on the literature on party policy shifts, there can be several reasons for the party leadership to take this decision. Incentives can either be strategic in character or they can be rooted in changes within the policy field. In the following these different incentives are used to refine hypotheses 1 and 2.

Regarding strategic incentives, the idea that parties respond to changes in public opinion has been very prominent in previous research. As Adams and his colleagues (2004; 2009) have shown, parties regularly update their policy positions regarding the policy preferences (opinions) of voters (see also Schumacher et al. 2013). Consequently it can be hypothesized, that changes in public opinion will lead political leaders to shift their party’s position accordingly.

H1a: Policy shifts are more likely to occur if changes in public opinion take place and decision making is centralized.

H2a: Policy shifts are more likely to occur if changes in public opinion take place and there is no opposition from veto players within decentralized decision making structures.

In order to measure changes in public opinion concerning the issue of EU accession between 1985 and 1994, survey data on the question whether Austria should join the EC/EU or not is used (Plasser/Ulram 1994). Unfortunately data was only available for the years 1987-1994. Another influential variable for strategic party policy shifts is electoral defeat. Extant research has shown that parties which have lost previous elections are more likely to decide to change their policy positions (see Somer-Topcu 2009; Adams et al. 2004). Parties, which had to face electoral losses, might want to change their policy platforms in order to be more attractive to voters. Thus, it can be assumed that party leaders who had to face losses in previous elections will have a stronger incentive to change policy positions than those who have succeeded.

H1b: Policy shifts are more likely to occur if the party has lost previous elections and decision making is centralized.

H2b: Policy shifts are more likely to occur if the party has lost previous elections and there is no opposition from veto-players within decentralized decision making structures.
Electoral defeat will be measured for national parliamentary elections by the absolute losses in percentage of votes. Data will be collected from the official online resources of the Bundesministerium für Inneres. For the process tracing analysis elections on the Land-level are taken into account.

In addition, parties can also shift their policy positions in response to other parties position changes, especially if this party is an ideologically close one. Shifting may be necessary in order to sufficiently differentiate from other parties, with regard to electoral competition (see Adams 2012; Budge 1994; Aldrich 1995). Empirical support for this argument has been found by Adams and Somer-Topcu (2009).

H1c: Policy shifts are more likely to occur if other parties shift their positions and decision making is centralized.

H2c: Policy shifts are more likely to occur if other parties shift their positions and there is no opposition from veto-players within decentralized decision making structures.

In contrast to such strategic incentives, party policy shifts can also be initiated by changes in the “real world”, meaning political, economic or social changes within the respective policy field. For this argument it is helpful to introduce a specification concerning the concept of policy position, derived from the literature on policy processes (see Sabatier/ Jenkins-Smith 1999; Weible et al. 2009). Based on this literature we can differentiate between positions with regard to their rootedness in the parties core ideology. Accordingly, we can distinguish between core positions and instrumental positions.5 While the former can be understood as political goals per se, the latter positions are “used” in favor of a higher end. So, applying this distinction, it can be expected that parties have to adapt certain positions if their environment changes, even if their core ideology remains stable. This assumption leads to the following hypotheses:

H1d: Policy shifts are more likely to occur within centralized decision making structures, if changes in the policy field cause the necessity to shift instrumental positions in order to maintain core positions.

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5 The terminology has been adapted to the research design at hand. For the complete theory and the original terminology see Sabatier/ Jenkins-Smith 1999; Weible et al. 2009.
H2d: Policy shifts are more likely to occur within decentralized decision making structures, if changes in the policy field cause the necessity to shift instrumental positions in order to maintain core positions and if there is no opposition from veto players.

In order to examine the actual impact of changes in the policy field on the concrete party policy shifts, information from party documents and interviews are utilized (see below). For the fuzzy set QCA, major political developments in Europe are coded following a simple coding scheme (see appendix 1).

Applying Harmel’s and Janda’s (1994) theory of party change, these first six hypotheses only cover one possible set of reasons for party change, namely external shocks. The second and third factor which can lead to party change are change in the dominant factions and leadership change. A new dominant faction as well as a new party leadership may have new policy preferences and make use of its power in order to change the party’s policy positions. This leads to hypotheses 3, 4, 5 and 6.

H3: Policy shifts are more likely to occur if the new dominant faction promotes policy change and decision making is centralized.

H4: Policy shifts are more likely to occur if the new dominant faction promotes policy change and there is no opposition from veto players within decentralized decision making structures.

H5: Policy shifts are more likely to occur if the new leadership promotes policy change and decision making is centralized.

H6: Policy shifts are more likely to occur if the new leadership promotes policy change and there is no opposition from veto players within decentralized decision making structures.

While leadership change is easily observable, information about changes in the balance of power between party factions will be collected mainly by the use of interview data (see below).

For the measurement of intraparty decision making structures, the main independent variable, expert survey data (Laver/Hunt 1992) is utilized. Although most research on party organizations derives data from party statutes\(^6\), there are good reasons to doubt their relevance.

\(^6\) In the literature there have been several attempts to measure this critical feature. Mostly decision making competences regarding candidate selection are used as a proxy for the overall power of the party leadership (see Katz 2001; Meyer 2013). Other authors measure party leader selection.
for actual decision making procedures. Put differently, the “official story cannot be regarded as a wholly adequate reflection of what constitutes the “real” story of the party” (Katz/Mair 1992, 7). Therefore, decision making rules in party statutes only serve as a starting point here (see Panebianco 1988, 53). What decision making processes were actually applied in the crucial moments of decision making (the “real story”) is examined by the use of interview data (see below).

The dependent variable, policy shifts, is measured using historical records of party behavior, such as party programmes, election manifestos, action programmes, voting behavior in parliament, speeches and party publications. Using these sources every party can be assigned a position and hence a shift/no shift value for every year from 1985 to 1994.

**Interview Data**
Interview data plays a major role for the present research design. It is the main source of information for the process tracing analysis as well as for the QCA. Eight semi-structured interviews, with politicians who had a seat in their party’s national executive bodies during the relevant period of time, have been conducted. As former members of their party’s national executive body, these people were insiders. They were themselves involved in the decision whether to support or oppose EU membership and therefore have an adequate overview of the process. Moreover most of the interviewees have retired from politics by now, which is expected to reduce misreporting. Interviewing at least two individuals per party serves as a control mechanism for the validity of the supplied information. Unfortunately it was not possible to suffice this threshold for the SPÖ case. Only one interview could be conducted personally by the author with an SPÖ interviewee. This lack of information for the SPÖ case is substituted by the additional use of interview transcripts with former SPÖ officials from a recently published book on the Austrian EU accession (Kopeinig 2013). Two interviews were conducted for the FPÖ and the Greens respectively and three for the ÖVP case.

**Methods**
This thesis uses a combination of two analytical approaches. After a special discussion of the main independent- and the dependent variable, the decision making procedures in all parties will be examined separately, using process tracing techniques (see Bennett 2008). By the use of process tracing instruments the plausibility of the hypothesis can be put to a first test. In a

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procedures (see Cross/ Blais 2012). André Krouwel combines both candidate selection procedures and party leader selection procedures for his measure of power centralization (see Krouwel 2012).
second step these processes will be condensed in a QCA framework (see Rihoux/Ragin 2009; Ragin 1987) Conclusions are then derived comparatively from the sum of this empirical material.

**Multiple Case Study (Process Tracing)**

The first and biggest step of the empirical analysis consists of four relatively separate case studies examining the policy shifts of SPÖ, ÖVP, FPÖ and the Greens respectively.

For each party the development of its position regarding EC/EU accession and the reasons for its policy shift are reconstructed and then confronted with the abovementioned hypotheses. At this stage of the analysis, these case studies are relatively isolated from each other. Hence it is appropriate to call it a multiple case study.

Following John Gerring, a case study can generally be defined as:

> “an intensive study of a single unit for the purpose of understanding a larger class of (similar) units. A unit connotes a spatially bounded phenomenon – e.g., a nation-state, revolution, political party, election, or person – observed at a single point in time or over some delimited period of time“ (Gerring 2004, 342).

More specifically, applying Gerrings typology of case studies, the four studies included in the present analysis can be defined as type I-case studies as they examine covariation in a single unit over time (see Gerring 2004, 343). By observing a certain unit diachronically, covariation of the dependent and independent variables can be discovered even if there are no other units involved. Thus, it is possible to test hypotheses based on these observations. Here, another specification is necessary as the term “case study” is generally used in various different contexts and for various research designs. How are hypotheses tested at this level of the analysis? The four case studies of this analysis are characterized by the use of process tracing techniques (see Gerring 2004, 342; see also George/ Bennett 2004).

Process tracing is basically a specific variant of a case study in the Gerring definition, as it always analyzes empirical evidence within one individual case (see Bennett 704). The specification is that process tracing involves not only the observation of covariance of X and Y, but also the focus on causal mechanisms (see Hall 2013).

> “Because process tracing is the technique of looking for the observable implications of hypothesized causal processes within a single case, the researcher engaged in process tracing often looks at a finer level of detail or a lower level of analysis than that of the proposed theoretical explanations. The goal is to document weather the sequence of
events or processes within the case fits those predicted by alternative explanations of
the case” (Bennett 2008, 705).

Process tracing essentially works through the affirmation or weakening of an explanatory
argument on the basis of empirical material. The researcher investigates which explanation is
most probably right with regard to the empirical evidence. Thus process tracing is a clearly
probabilistic endeavor, sharing the logic of Bayesian inference (see Bennett 2008, 708 et
seq.).

With regard to the procedural nature of the theoretical model defined earlier, process tracing
is exactly the kind of fine-grained instrument for process analysis, which is needed for the
purpose of this study. On the other hand case studies in general and process tracing
specifically are of course severely limited when it comes to generalization. For this analysis
these limitations are mitigated to some extent by the triangulation with other comparative
methods, as the analysis finally draws conclusions from an integrated view of all four cases
and later splits up these four units in order to generate a larger sample. Therefore it is finally
important to state that the case study label strictly refers to the first section or stage of the
empirical analysis, not to any cross-case inferences. This is a quite common procedure for
comparative historical studies which “may be looked upon as a series of case studies
combined with explicit cross-unit analysis“ (Gerring 2004, 343; see also Mahoney/
Rueschemeyer 2003).

**Qualitative Comparative Analysis (QCA)**

Qualitative Comparative Analysis strongly builds on John Stuart Mills achievements in logic,
especially the “Mill’s canon”. Initially, when QCA was developed in the late 1980s (Ragin
1987) it was used for small-N research designs and macro-level cases, mainly in comparative
political science and historical sociology. However, these techniques are increasingly used in
intermediate-N designs. Even in large-N studies QCA can be and has been successfully
applied. Moreover today, QCA-techniques are used on much more diverse research objects
ranging from the classical macro-level to meso- (collective actors) and micro-level analyses
(small groups and individuals) (see Rihoux/ Ragin 2009, 4).

The main goal of QCA is to fill the gap between qualitative (case-oriented) and quantitative
(variable-oriented) techniques and thus to find a way of combining their strengths (see
Rihoux/ Ragin 2009, 6). It does so by allowing for a replicable and transparent analysis of

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7 Bennett lists five probability tests: unique predictions, hoop tests, smoking gun tests, doubly
decisive tests, straw in the wind tests (see Bennett 2008, 706).
qualitative (but also quantitative) data (see Rihoux/ Ragin 2009, 12 et seq.). Nonetheless QCA is still leaning to the “case-oriented” side, as these techniques “deal with a limited number of complex cases in a ‘configurational’ way […] This means that each individual case is considered as a complex combination of properties, a specific ‘whole’ that should not be lost or obscured in the course of the analysis […]” (Rihoux/ Ragin 2009, 6). Moreover a substantive knowledge about each individual case – but also substantial theoretical knowledge – is required for the “dialogue between cases and relevant theories” (Rihoux/ Ragin 2009, 6).

A key feature of QCA techniques, which is probably the most fundamental difference to mainstream statistical techniques, is that it allows for “multiple conjunctural causation”. Multiple conjunctural causation basically refers to the assumption that there are various causal paths to a specific outcome and each path consists of a certain combination of conditions.8 Hence, applying QCA does not lead to the specification of just one single causal explanation, which is most compatible with the data, but to the identification of different causal paths to a certain outcome (Rihoux/ Ragin 2009, 8). Thus, as every causal path is important regardless of its frequency, QCA allows for more diversity in causal reasoning. Moreover, the centrality of combinations of conditions (variables)9 perfectly fits the theoretical model of this study.

Of course, these features set certain limits to the generalizability of QCA generated explanations. Still, QCA techniques allow for “modest generalization”. “More specifically from a systematic comparison of comparable cases, it is possible to formulate propositions that we can then apply, with appropriate caution, to other similar cases – that is cases that share a reasonable number of characteristics with those that were the subject of the QCA” (Rihoux/ Ragin 2009, 12).

In the following analysis the crisp set – as well as the fuzzy set variant of QCA is used. Both techniques are shortly described below. Crisp set QCA and fuzzy set QCA have both been applied computer-assisted using Fuzzy-Set/Qualitative Comparative Analysis 2.0 software (Ragin/ Drass/ Davey 2006).

**Crisp Set Qualitative Comparative Analysis (csQCA)**

Crisp Sets, developed by Charles Ragin and Kriss Drass, were the first QCA-technique and are still the most widely used (Rihoux/ Ragin 2009, 34). By the use of Boolean algorithms

8 For further differences between mainstream statistics and QCA see Rihoux/ Ragin (2009, 9) and Ragin (2008, 109).

9 QCA terminology is somewhat different than mainstream statistical terminology: QCA speaks of conditions instead of independent variables and of outcome instead of dependent variables (see Ragin 2008).
Crisp Sets allow both for the identification of causal paths (multiple conjunctural causation) and for the logical simplification of these complex “solutions” by Boolean minimization. A central property of Crisp Sets is the use of binary data as imposed by Boolean algebra. Any value a case is assigned for a certain condition therefore needs to be transformed into 0 (=not present, non-membership in the set) or 1 (=present, membership in the set). This dichotomization is made by setting thresholds based on theoretical and case-based knowledge (see Rihoux/Ragin 2009, 42). Central to the use of csQCA is the so called “truth table”, which is a first synthesis of raw data. Truth tables basically list all empirical configurations as illustrated below.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Number of Cases</th>
<th>Condition A</th>
<th>Condition B</th>
<th>Condition C</th>
<th>Outcome</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Table 1: Simple hypothetical Truth Table*

For the computer-aided data analysis, “logical remainders” (logically possible configurations, which are not represented by the analyzed empirical cases) are added to the Truth Table.

**Fuzzy Set Qualitative Comparative Analysis (fsQCA)**

For the following analysis also fuzzy set QCA, more specifically the fuzzy set truth table approach is used (see Ragin 2008, 124). This technique shares the basic logic of csQCA. Its major advantage is though, that it is not bound to simple dichotomies, but allows for the analysis of much more complex variation. Every value for every condition needs to be transformed into a value between 0 and 1. Fuzzy Sets therefore “extend crisp sets, by permitting membership scores in the interval between (0) and (1)” (Rihoux/Ragin 2009, 89).

The procedure of assigning membership scores is called “calibration”. Based on theoretical and substantive knowledge three “qualitative breakpoints” are defined, namely full membership, full non-membership and a crossover point (see Ragin 2008, 71 et seq.). Based on these breakpoints the respective values for each case are transformed into a continuous variable between 0 and 1 (see Ragin 2008, 71 et seq.; Rihoux/Ragin 2009, 89 et seq.).

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10 Beside continuous fuzzy sets, which is utilized in this analysis, three- four- and six-value fuzzy sets are also common (see Rixoux/Ragin 2009, 91).
transformation is not only necessary for the technical reasons, rather calibration allows the researcher to differentiate between relevant and irrelevant variation, based on theoretical or substantive knowledge (Ragin 2008, 83). Hence, calibration is the means by which fuzzy sets “have the best of both worlds, namely the precision that is prized by quantitative researchers and the use of substantive knowledge to calibrate measures that is central to qualitative research. With fuzzy sets, precision comes in the form of quantitative assessments of degree of set membership, which can range from a score of 0.0 (full exclusion from a set) to 1.0 (full inclusion). Substantive knowledge provides the external criteria to make it possible to calibrate measures” (Ragin 2008, 82).

After the calibration procedure, again a truth table can be constructed. According to Ragin (2008) this transformation can be achieved (without any loss of information) based on three pillars. These pillars are: (a) the correspondence between truth table rows and the corners of the vector space defined by fuzzy set conditions, (b) the distribution of cases across all combinations of causal conditions and (c) the consistency of each causal combination with the argument that it is a subset of the outcome (see Ragin 2008, 128).

The following section deals with intraparty decision making structures, the main independent variable of the present analysis. Decision making centralization in Austrian political parties is discussed examining the respective decision making rules in party statutes and expert survey data.

Power Centralization – Party Statutes
As it has been mentioned, most research examining the centralization of intraparty decision making uses party statutes as data source (see Katz and Mair 1992). Thomas Meyer (2013) uses the statutory rules on candidate selection as a proxy for the overall distribution of power within parties. Similarly Andre Krouwel (2012) includes candidate selection procedures along with the statutory selection procedures for party leaders in his measurement of intraparty power centralization.

Referring to Katz and Mair, these are valid approaches for large-N comparative research as party statutes are “a fundamental guide to the character of a given party” (Katz/Mair 1992, 7). Clearly they do also – to some extent – practically constrain the behavior of actors (see Fabre

11 For a detailed description of how fuzzy sets can be applied in a truth table framework see Ragin (2008, 124 et seq).
2011, 350). But still, the use of party statutes is limited regarding its access to the actual power struggles within parties or in the words of Katz and Mair “the real story” (Katz/Mair 1992, 7). Leaders can use informal channels in order to reach their goals. Therefore, the statutory decision making rules presented below can only serve as a starting point for the examination of intraparty decision making structures (see Panebianco 1988, 53). As the focus of this analysis is on the specific EC/EU-policy shifts of Austrian parties, those versions of party statutes have been used, which were in force by the time of the parties’ respective policy shifts (SPÖ 1987, ÖVP 1987, FPÖ 1992, Grüne 1992).

**Policy Decisions Making in Austrian Party Statutes**

Regarding policy decision making, the statutes of all four parties were quite similar. Basically, there were two executive bodies, of which the larger one, the *Bundesparteivorstand* (SPÖ, FPÖ), *Bundesparteileitung* (ÖVP) or *Erweiterter Bundesvorstand* (Greens) was responsible for everyday policy decisions (see SPÖ 1987, §43; ÖVP 1987, §20 22/1 lit. a; FPÖ 1992, §14/3, Grüne 1992, §10) and held accountable by the party congress, which decided about policy basics (SPÖ 1987, §30 et seq., ÖVP 1987, §16; Grüne 1992, §8). For the FPÖ this competence of the party congress was not explicit and therefore required legal interpretation12 (FPÖ §11). The smaller executive bodies were the *Präsidium* (SPÖ, FPÖ), *Bundesparteivorstand* (ÖVP) and *Bundesvorstand* (Greens) (SPÖ 1987, §47 et seq.; ÖVP 1987, §21 et seq.; FPÖ 1992, §14/7, Grüne 1992, §11). These smaller institutions, which had the competence to take quick decisions if necessary, were held accountable by the above mentioned larger executive bodies. SPÖ and ÖVP institutions were roughly comparable with regard to their size. The Green *Erweiterter Bundesvorstand* and the FPÖ-Bundesparteivorstand were significantly smaller than SPÖ-*Bundesparteivorstand* and ÖVP-*Bundesparteileitung*.

One interesting feature of the green statutes in this regard is their commitment that minority positions in party congresses (Grüne 1992, §8/7) and the *Erweiterter Bundesvorstand* (Grüne 1992, §10/14) had to be included in programmes and resolutions at a certain quorum. Another aspect worth mentioning is that the Green party congress had to be convened every year (Grüne 1992, §8), which already indicates the relevance of the party on the ground for intraparty decision making. The SPÖ and FPÖ party congresses had to be convened every 2 years (SPÖ 1987, §31; FPÖ 1992, §10/4), the ÖVP congress at least every 3 years (ÖVP 1987, §53).

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12 The use of german term „insbesondere“ indicates that a list is only demonstrative in Austrian jurisprudence. It follows that the listed competences of the FPÖ party congress were only exemplary.
One interesting feature of the FPÖ statutes – probably pointing to higher power centralization – is that they stipulated an explicit (whereas constrained) decisional authority of the party leader (FPÖ 1992, §15/2). Moreover the FPÖ party congress was the only one, which did not have an explicit authority regarding policy guidelines (FPÖ 1992, §11). Rather some of the competences, which the party congresses and *Bundesparteivorstand* had in other parties, rested on a third executive body called *Bundesparteileitung* (FPÖ 1992, §13). With the *Bundesparteirat* the SPÖ had a similar organ (SPÖ 1987, §51).

With regard to power centralization, these statutory decision making rules do not offer much insight. In all four parties of interest, the main responsible bodies basically share similar characteristics and competences. Although these procedural norms already hint to the fact that the Freedom Party might be closer to the centralized pole of the party centralization scale and that the Greens settle on the opposite side, the central question, how strong the party leadership is constrained by certain veto powers, cannot be resolved to an adequate extent on the basis of this information. Thus, expert survey data is used in order to broaden the perspective on decision making structures as expert surveys – in contrast to party statutes – take informal decision making rules into account.

**Power Centralization – Expert Survey**

One widely used survey, which includes power centralization, was accomplished by Michael Laver and Ben Hunt (1992) (see also Schumacher et al. 2013). Though in recent work its use seems somewhat questionable, due to its age, these data can definitely be used in the context of the present analysis, which deals with the late 1980s and early 1990s.

In this survey experts were asked to “[a]ssess the influence that party leaders, party legislators and party activists have over the formation of party policy”. The experts could do so by rating subgroups of the party on a 20 point scale, where 1 signifies that they have no influence at all and 20 that they have a very great influence. The mean party scores are demonstrated in table 2.

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13 The *Bundesparteileitung* became a very important arena for Jörg Haider’s intraparty campaign against EC/EU accession and the factional power struggles within the FPÖ at the beginning of the 1990s.

14 Of course the organizational conservatism of political parties (see Harmel/Janda 1994, 19) is an argument for the longevity of such data. Nevertheless, conservatism does not entail complete stability.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Party</th>
<th>Party Leaders</th>
<th>Legislators</th>
<th>Party Activists</th>
<th>Party Leadership</th>
<th>Legislators</th>
<th>Party Activists</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>SPÖ</td>
<td>16,33</td>
<td>11,13</td>
<td>7,78</td>
<td>1,8</td>
<td>3,76</td>
<td>3,87</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ÖVP</td>
<td>14,44</td>
<td>10,63</td>
<td>8,11</td>
<td>3,5</td>
<td>3,42</td>
<td>4,14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FPÖ</td>
<td>17,11</td>
<td>12,25</td>
<td>8,89</td>
<td>1,9</td>
<td>3,28</td>
<td>3,95</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Grüne</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>13,63</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>4,54</td>
<td>3,02</td>
<td>3,78</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Table 2: Power Centralization in Policy decisions. Source: Laver/Hunt 1992*

The experts’ judgments suggest that the FPÖ had the most centralized (policy-) decision making structures, with a very high value for the party leaders influence on policy decisions. The SPÖ reaches a very high value as well. SPÖ activists were even the least powerful activist group in comparison to the other parties. The People’s Party’s policy decision making was significantly less centralized, but party leadership was still the most powerful branch of the party. Only the Greens internal balance of power leaned towards the party activists, even making the party leadership the least powerful party branch according to the survey.\(^\text{15}\)

In the following these data are used for two ends: (a) it is examined whether concrete decision making procedures fit the expert survey values (b) they are used for the operationalization of the decision making centralization condition for the fsQCA and csQCA. But before that the dependent variable – party policy shifts on the issue of EC/EU accession – needs to be discussed.

**Pro or Contra EC/EU Accession - Party Positions and Party Policy Shifts**

How did Austrian parties positions concerning the relationship between Austria and the European Community – or later the European Union – develop? When did parties change their positions? This will be examined in the following section.

For every year of the analyzed time frame, statements from party documents, party organs, speeches and voting behavior in parliament related to the issue of Austria’s EC/EU accession have been collected in order to portray party positions and position changes over time. Party documents such as election manifestos (*Wahlprogramme*), action programmes (*Spezialprogramme*) and party programmes (*Grundsatzprogramme*)\(^\text{16}\) of course allow for the most direct evaluation of a party’s policy position, as they are direct and official expressions

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\(^{15}\) Recall that these data have been published in 1992 when the Austrian Greens did not yet have a formal party leader.

\(^{16}\) Differentiation adopted from Dolezal et al. (2012).
of the policy preferences of political parties. The downside of these sources is that they are not available for every year and may therefore only provide a rough impression of shifting processes. Hence available information from party documents was used if available. The remaining information gaps have been filled with information from party organs, speeches of high-ranking party officials, and parliamentary voting behavior. The result, which is presented in the following section, is a precise description of Austrian parties’ positions regarding EC/EU-accession for every year from 1985 to 1994. Based on this information, the policy shifts of SPÖ, ÖVP, FPÖ, and the Greens have been reconstructed. The policy shifts found are fully consistent with the (less detailed) assessments of existing literature (see Schaller 1994; Gehler 2002; Kopeinig 2013; Pollak/Slominski 2002; Luif 2006) and with the conducted interviews.

SPÖ
In 1985, Europe was not a priority issue for the Austrian Social Democrats. Its core policies concerned the national level and with regard to International relations, the party traditionally had a more global focus based on a strong commitment to Austria’s neutrality (see SPÖ 1978, 48). Nonetheless, the party’s Grundstatzprogramm of 1978 included short statements regarding the SPÖ’s Europe policy, which vaguely outline that the party was indeed supporting European integration in a sense (see SPÖ 1978, 49). The European Community though was not regarded as its primary vehicle. Moreover, in this context, the document highlighted the importance of national sovereignty and „obligations stemming from international law“17, which is again a reference to Austria’s neutrality (SPÖ 1978, 49). Regarding Austria’s relations to the EC, the document states that the SPÖ was „[f]or the exhaustion of all possibilities of the [existing] free trade treaty with the EEC in due consideration of all obligations resulting from Austria’s perpetual neutrality“ (SPÖ 1978, 49). Not even in the party’s intellectual communication medium Zukunft the question if Austria’s relations to the EC should intensify was put to discussion. In 1985, there was just a single respective statement by Erwin Lanc, arguing against a potential association with the EC.

„In the domestic discussion about Austria’s Europe policy it has recently become fashionable to argue in favor of changing Austria’s treaty with the Community. An association treaty should replace the trade agreement. […] What sense makes such a discussion at this point in time, but self-satisfaction for some politico-scientifically over-sophisticated politicians? […] Without trivializing this question of international law, if and to what extent a neutral state can associate with a supranational entity like

17 All citations of documents or interviews have been translated from Austrian-German to English by the author.
the EC, the decisive question is, if that path can offer better solutions than those, which we are approaching, and what imponderabilities and risks we would have to accept. […] Recently, the political issues of the EC have not focused on overcoming Europe’s fissuring from the Atlantic to the Ural […]. Europe policy today means, realizing the possible and checking every step, if it serves a real Europe policy or the policies of the supporters of close relations between Europe and the US [Europäische Atlantiker]“ (Lanc 1985, 5).

In parliament, SPÖ minister Leopold Gratz rejected the ÖVP’s Europa Entschließungsantrag as the federal government did not „intend to fundamentally change its integration policies“. He basically argued that the EC/EFTA agreement of 1984 would still suffice (see Gratz, Sten.Prot. 16.12.1985, 130).

The party’s 1986 election manifesto quite ambiguously states:

“Austria will continue its ‚way to Europe‘. We will search for new forms of participation in the dynamic process of European integration, in order to safeguard our participation in technological progress in the future. We will speak up against the establishment of new barriers between EC and EFTA, for the reduction of existing barriers and for a ‚Citizens Europe‘, becoming reality for Austria’s citizens” (SPÖ 1986, 16).

Which „new forms of participation“ the party was addressing here was left open to the reader. Accession to the EC was definitely not a new procedure for the European community, but it would have been for Austria. Moreover, what kind of European integration the SPÖ referred to was not entirely clear. Most certainly, with regard to this statement, any further step Austria would take in Europe policy had to be coordinated with Austria’s EFTA-partners. Furthermore, Europe had to „mean more to us than just free movement of goods“ and alongside the European Community, the SPÖ referred to the importance of CSCE and Austria’s neutrality for Europe policy (see SPÖ 1986, 16). In sum this rather indicates that for the SPÖ the EC was not the only road on the „way to Europe“. So, it is quite clear that by 1986, the SPÖ had acknowledged the fact that a stronger focus on Europe was necessary in foreign policy. But with regard to the European Community and the accession question, it seems that the social democrats cautiously avoided any straightforward commitment to European integration as well as any rejection of EC accession. With regard to the purpose of this chapter it is safe to say though that there was no shift to accession support in 1986, even more so as in 1985 and 1987 the SPÖ’s position was always contra-accession.

In 1987 the party had clearly put a stronger focus on Europe policy, even though an association or even an accession were still not mentioned. In the inaugural statement of the
Vranitzky II government, party leader, chancellor and driving force of the SPÖ’s new Europe policy Franz Vranitzky outlined that „the structuring of Austria’s relation to the European Community, which predominantly promotes the unification process, is hence a major concern for Austrian foreign- and foreign-economic policy. […] There is no doubt, that a decoupling of this development would have serious economic, but also social consequences for Austria and the future of its youth. Austria therefore has to strive for a far reaching participation in European integration, coordinated with its EFTA partners“ (Vranitzky 1987, 32 et seq.). In this context though, Vranitzky primarily referred to the EEC declaration of the EC and EFTA countries of 1984. He did not yet address accession or association as possible options. A statement by Peter Jankowitsch confirms the conclusion that accession was not yet on the SPÖ’s agenda at that time. Even if he personally was one of the party’s earliest supporters of EC/EU accession, he made this contrary statement in 1987:

„As an accession to the EC is for various economic and political reasons no effective alternative for Austria, the quest for a rapprochement has to be continued in every other, imaginable form – approximating Austria’s status to the benefits of full membership. Hence Austria’s integration policy will emphatically gear to a compensation of the disadvantages of non-membership“ (Jankowitsch 1987, 31).

In 1988, the Europe issue was more frequently addressed by party officials, than the year before. Still, there were no commitments to closer ties to the European Community or even accession. In a report about the 1988 party congress, Heinz Fischer stated ambiguously that the SPÖ was not a

„[…] Europe-grouch. The idea of European cooperation and integration is important. We want to participate in European cooperation actively and initiatively. We want to make use of the chances of the European common market. But we want to continue seizing the opportunities that result from Austria’s neutrality, not being an opportunistic unreliable fellow compared to Switzerland or Sweden“ (Fischer 1988).

In the party’s magazine Zukunft, negative evaluations of an accession to the EC were still by far dominating (see Steger 1988; Galbraith 1988; Binter/Höll 1988). For example, once again, former minister Erwin Lanc was very skeptical about the „dreams“ of „the EC-surrealists“: „[…] who could - with so many unanswered questions - proceed to accession“. These unanswered questions mainly concerned Austria’s neutral status, the work in progress character of the common market and the economic relations to Eastern European countries as „[n]o good merchant would risk save business dealings for 1989 or 1990, for ‚potential‘ dealings for the time after 1993“ (Lanc 1988, 13 et seq.).
The year 1989 marks the SPÖ’s official shift in European policy. Alongside with its coalition partner ÖVP, the party in government co-initiated Austria’s application for accession to the European community („letter to Brussels“), which was then approved by the SPÖ parliamentary group. All of that happened based on a resolution of the Bundesparteivorstand in April 1989 (see Kopeinig 2013, 43; Schaller 1994), which actually marks the party’s policy shift to accession support. In parliament chancellor Vranitzky argued:

„We want to participate in this great European market, because it promises a new, stronger and qualitatively superior cooperation in Europe, economic prosperity, breaking and modernizing outdated structures and because the chances of people closing ranks and of stable peace in Europe are included in this goal. We also want to be a part of it, aware of our responsibility, because we want to have a say, because we want to actively co-decide and not just accept. […] We want to take this open chance here. And no matter how we look at it: full participation in the great market of the future is reserved for member states“ (Vranitzky, Sten.Prot. 29./30.6.1989, 28; for other pro-accession statements see Fischer, Sten.Prot. 29./30.6.1989, 17 et seq.; Jankowitsch, Sten.Prot. 29./30.6.1989, 36 et seq.).

In its 1990 election manifesto, the party strongly confirmed its pro-accession course, basically arguing that „Austria’s place in the new Europe“ was in the European Community:

„Austria must not be excluded from the European Common Market. Two thirds of Austria’s foreign trade is transacted with the European Community. For this reason we are heading to the European Community and have applied for accession with clear preferences and conditions. […] Within the next four years we want to vigorously expedite the negotiations about Austria’s accession to EC and to press for the quick accomplishment of a clear negotiation outcome“ (SPÖ 1990, 7).

In 1991, there were generally fewer discussions about Austria’s accession itself than about the EEC. Nonetheless, the SPÖ clearly maintained it’s careful pro-accession position.

„The European Community has become the core of a European cooperation system, which reaches far into the East and which will also encompass the Soviet Union or parts of it in the end. Hence, Austria has decided that it has to be present, where the decisions are made in order to have a share of influence as a full and equal partner. Therefore, Austria has applied for membership in the European Community two years ago. The Commission of the European Community has responded to the application for membership. It is a very positive response and we can hence be assured that Austria will be a member of the European Community by the mid-nineties“ (Vranitzky 1991, 41).

Articles and commentaries about the accession in the party organ Zukunft were unanimously pro-accession (see Kubitschek 1991, Kienzl 1991, Winkler 1991).

Similarly in 1992, the SPÖ maintained its pro-accession position. Generally, EC accession
seems to have gained more and more weight on the party’s policy agenda. Franz Vranitzky even went as far as to state that: „A European future without social democracy cannot be, but neither is a future-oriented social democracy really imaginable without the project of a united Europe“ (Vranitzky 1992, 7). Regarding Austria’s relations with the EC Vranitzky stated:

„Austrian Social Democracy has a long, strong international tradition. [...] As a state Austria takes a great interest in a strong, capable, politically unified Europe, which preserves peace for its peoples. As a party with the commitment to shape the future and to better the fate of the people, we take a great interest to be present in that place and at that time, where decisions about the future of Europe will be taken. On the other hand we will also be useful for the European Community in several respects“ (Vranitzky 1992, 9; for other pro-accession statements see Swoboda/Fischmann 1992; Verzetnitsch 1992).

In 1993, the SPÖ clearly maintained its position. Finance minister Ferdinand Lacina and state secretary Brigitte Ederer, for example, alongside with economists of the WIFO presented a study about the positive effects of a potential EC-accession (see Rundschau, Zukunft 8/1993, 5). Again various articles about potential EC membership have been published in the Zukunft, all of them with a pro-accession message. The title of an article by Josef Cap in the party organ Zukunft probably catches the party’s credo best: „Europe, what else?“ (Cap 1993).

In 1994, the year of the Austrian accession referendum, the SPÖ waged a clear and intensive pro-accession campaign (Schaller 1994, 76 et seq.). Their support for EU membership, a „milestone for the political development of Austria and Europe“ (Vranitzky, Sten.Prot. 11.11.1994, 49), is nicely illustrated by the following statement from the party’s election manifesto of the same year:

„The Austrian citizens impressively spoke up for membership in the European Union. We social democrats have initiated and co-created this decision. This decision has made neither winners nor losers. The true winner is and remains Austria. However citizens have personally decided, meeting the great challenges and taking the great chances - this will be our common task for the next four years“ (SPÖ 1994, 5).

ÖVP
In 1985 the ÖVP, being in opposition, launched a motion for a resolution in parliament aiming at a closer association with Europe (Europa-Entschließungsantrag, see ÖVP 1986a). Besides demanding stronger cooperation with all European states, inside and outside the EC, and a strengthening of non-EC European Institutions, namely the Council of Europe and the CSCE, Austria’s “closer cooperation with the European Community” (ÖVP 1986a) was central to the text. Among other policy-claims, the ÖVP advocated measures for Austria’s
“closest possible” integration in the common market and in the European currency system, a reduction of border controls as well as measures of legal harmonization with EC standards (see 8 et seq.). More generally, the ÖVP demanded on one hand that Austria’s economic relations with the EC should be intensified based on the existing bilateral treaties with the community. On the other hand, the document included the claim for a “further institutional structuring of the contractual relation” (9), a “made to measure cooperation in a united Europe” (10).

“After the abovementioned intermediate-term measures have been implemented, the hence intense status of cooperation should be safeguarded by an additional special contract. Essentially the content of this treaty should be an EC decision making procedure according to Austria’s preferences and notions, which comes as close to full membership as possible, with regard to the obligations accruing from Austria’s perpetual neutrality” (9 et seq.).

Obviously the ÖVP held a very pro-European position already in 1985. Austria’s foreign policy should put a stronger focus on Europe. It should be “more Europe and less Arafat” as the party leader once put it later. Though, a formal accession to the European Community was not yet part of the People’s Party’s conception of Europe policy, not least because it was conceived as being impossible with regard to Austria’s legal obligations.

This position was maintained over the year 1986. Early in that year, Andreas Khol further stressed the dictum of the “made to measure cooperation of Austria with a united Europe” (Monatshefte 1/1986, 31).

“The past has shown that it is possible to solve European problems in a European manner, through a framework of bilateral agreements. Austria can participate: also without formal membership, also without a formal association treaty, but on the basis of intense bilateral relations[…].” (Monatshefte 1/1986, 31).

Nonetheless, there was a relatively open ideological internal discussion about European policy within the party, between the adherents of the “Central Europe” concept (see Brix 1987, 123) and those of a stronger engagement in “Western Europe” which included intensified cooperation with the EC (see Khol 1987, 137). In their 1986 coalition agreement ÖVP and SPÖ agreed on the “continuing participation on the further processes of European integration” (SPÖ/ÖVP 1987, 652).

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18 Colloquially, these party groups were referred to as „Ostler“ and „Westler“.
In December 1987, party leader and vice-chancellor Alois Mock advocated the future option of Austria’s accession in the council of ministers and was successful in reaching consensus on this issue with the ÖVP’s social democratic coalition partner. Although this clearly indicates a significant move of at least the party in public office and the party leadership, it was still only a first step towards full support for an EC accession. The option for accession effectively put the issue on the political agenda, in terms of seriously considering what would be the best decision for the Austrian government as well as for the People’s Party (see Monatshefte 2/1988, 15). Regarding full membership, Mock was actually still skeptical himself, at least until April.

“There are basically three reasons, political reasons, which make me pursue the goal of a Europe treaty and not full membership: We need a made to measure concept; we need quick outcomes; we don’t want to send the wrong signals. [...] we cannot force farmers into the crisis situation, which alpine farmers and stock farmers in the comparable areas of the EC (southern Germany) suffer from. [...] We also have to take care of our legal obligations stemming from neutrality” (Monatshefte 4/1987, 7).

In October he underlined this position in his speech at a ÖVP conclave in Villach (see Monatshefte 8/1987, 31). Other statements and articles in party media show that 1987 was the year, when the internal discussion about Austria’s accession effectively kicked off. Quite openly, different views about the pros (see Monatshefte 4/1987, 10; 17) and contras (see 9; 24; Monatshefte 5/1987, 14) of a potential accession were published.

The year 1988 marks the party’s actual move to a pro-accession position. After a polling procedure in a meeting of the party executive in January (see Process Tracing section), the ÖVP published a “Europe Manifesto”, which formulated their full support for a formal accession to the European Community.

“The Austrian People’s Party has set itself the goal of leading Austria into the Europe of the future. [...] As Europe party the ÖVP perceives itself as the engine of Austria’s Europe policy and gave priority to this goal by its resolutions in Maria Plain the 7th January 1988. Today, we have to end the discussion phase about the accession question and take decisions. The decisive parts of society have argued in support for an accession to the European Community. It’s now Austria’s turn to prepare our country for an accession to the European Economic Area, through social market policy and better performance and competitiveness. We have to reframe the social climate in Austria, as well as its international environment in order to reach the goal: Austria’s membership in the European Community under full reserve to its perpetual neutrality. Austria can step into the Europe of the future with self-assurance and confidence.

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19 At the end of the year Mock himself turned to accession support (see Process Tracing section).
Consequently the Austrian People’s Party urges the federal government to make an application for accession to the European Community within the next year. In 1989 Austria has to do this historic step, offering our country a European dimension and a new basis for our future” (ÖVP 1988, 2 et seq.).

From 1988 onwards the ÖVP held a stable pro-accession position. In 1989 Alois Mock pushed a report about the advantages and disadvantages of a potential EC accession through the council of ministers. A few months later the ÖVP reached agreement with the SPÖ about the guidelines for the accession procedure (Monatshefte 5/1989, 4). Moreover the application for accession was approved by the parliament, with the votes of ÖVP, SPÖ and FPÖ MPs. The party’s clear pro-accession position is nicely illustrated by the parliamentary speeches of party leader Alois Mock (Mock, Sten.Prot. 29./30.6.1989, 46 et seq.) MPs Ludwig Steiner (Steiner, Sten.Prot. 29./30.6.1989, 43 et seq.) and Andreas Khol (Khol, Sten.Prot. 29./30.6.1989, 91 et seq.).

In 1990 the ÖVP stressed its support for a quick completion of the accession procedure at several instances, both on the party level, as well as on the government level (see Monatshefte 1/1990, 4; Monatshefte 5/1990, 4). The strong support for Austria’s accession was also reflected in the party’s 1990 manifesto:

“Austria, as a modern, democratic state with a social market economic system has claimed its clear entitlement to membership in the European Community. We will dedicate all our energy to establish all requirements for the EC accession in the economy as well as in state structures” (ÖVP 1990, 5).

By 1991, nothing had changed regarding the ÖVP’s pro-accession position. Vice chancellor Busek and foreign minister – former party leader – Alois Mock reacted very positively to the EC’s positive evaluation of the Austrian application for accession (see Monatshefte 4/1991, 4). Erhard Busek moreover advocated entering the “common Europe with confidence” and claimed a strong informational effort in order to communicate the decision to join the EC.

“We shall step into Europe prepared and with a clear conscience, […] because we as Austrians can do so with self-confidence” (21).

This notion of a self-confident country joining the EC was continuously stressed until 1992. In this year the People’s Party was increasing its demands for more effort in liberalization and consolidation measures in order to fulfill Austria’s obligations for membership, as – in the words of state secretary Johannes Ditz – “if we commit ourselves to the western world, then there is no alternative [to EC membership]”. Moreover the ÖVP according to their image as
“Europe party” still claimed to be the driving force regarding EC and accused their coalition partner of lacking the necessary reformist effort (Monatshefte 1-2/1992, 15 et seq.).

In 1993, Austria’s participation in the EEA, which was soon to be completed, was a dominant issue in political debates. Nonetheless the party’s pro-accession position was stable (see Monatshefte 3-4/1993, 9). The ÖVP executive presented a memorandum, characterizing EC membership as “recipe against unemployment” (Moser 1994, 840) and the council of ministers – of course including those of the People’s Party – approved Austria’s positions for the accession negotiations with the EC, which started in February. Moreover the party started an intensive pro-accession campaign with regard to the accession referendum (see Schaller 1994, 78). Moreover, regarding opinion polls the SPÖ-ÖVP government was worried about losing the electorate’s support for Austria’s accession. The council of ministers commissioned a respective study. Hence, the ÖVP discussed changes in its communication style (see ÖVP Monatshefte 1993/5-6, 4) in order to convince Austrian voters about the necessity of accession.

In 1994, the ÖVP continued and intensified its pro-accession campaign. In its 1994 manifesto the party kept emphasizing the extraordinary importance of EU accession for the Austrian economy, claiming that it was the driving political force in this respect and that Austria’s decision for joining the EU as a full member was “the most important decision since the Austrian State Treaty for the benefit of our homeland” (ÖVP 1994, 26). Moreover it even added the notion of European identity to its support for EU accession:

“Homeland [Heimat] is Austria in Europe. The new notion of homeland demands – beside the particular commitments to countries and regions – a universal commitment to Europe. […] We do not lose our own identity to a culturally faceless unitary Europe. Contrarily: Europe itself gains its identity only with Austria. Europe without Austria and Austria without Europe are unthinkable concepts, which make no sense neither for Austria nor for Europe” (8).

On the 11th November 1994 Austria’s accession treaty was ratified by the parliament with all ÖVP MPs voting for ratification, and very positive, partly even euphoric statements of the party’s representatives in government and parliament (see Khol, Sten.Prot. 11.11.1994, 32, et seq.; see Mock, Sten.Prot. 11.11.1994, 52 et seq.)

**FPÖ**

In 1985, the FPÖ gave itself a new party programme (Grundsatzprogramm) at a party congress in Salzburg. This programme was adopted by the congress without dissenting votes and just one abstention, after a quite open drafting procedure (see FPÖ 1985, 142). This
document included a clear commitment to European integration and also to Austria’s accession to the EC:

“Regardless of all difficulties of the integration process, a united and strong Europe remains the goal, without any reasonable alternatives in freedom” (FPÖ 1985, 15). “In the pursuit of the greatest possible participation of our country in European Integration, we also consider Austria’s membership the European Community – of course with a neutrality clause – as being possible and necessary” (44).

One year later in its 1986 election manifesto, the party maintained its clear pro-European course. Partly identically worded as the *Grundsatzprogramm* of the year before and under the headline “For a United Europe” – it states that:

“the path to Europe has a great tradition in the liberal [*freiheitlich*] camp. Austria’s geographical location, its history, its affiliation with the pluralist-democratic states and our commitment as a mediator between East and West entrust a contributing role to our country. […] In the pursuit of the greatest possible participation of our country in European Integration, we also consider Austria’s membership in the European Community as being necessary” (FPÖ 1986, 8).

In 1987, the party’s position remained unchanged. Joining the European Community was still considered advantageous in political as well as in economic terms (see *Neue Freie Zeitung* 1/1987, 3; 47/1987, 4). In October the party prepared a motion in parliament for Austria’s accession to the EC as “[t]here is no way around the EC” (*Neue Freie Zeitung* 42/1987, 7; see also Sten.Prot. 27.11.1987). Also the FPÖ’s new party leader, Jörg Haider, by then, was supporting an accession:

“Mock is responsible for Austria’s economic isolation. If we do not reach accession until 1991/92, Austria’s economy will have to face a huge economic community, which will cover a common market of 350 million consumers. This would mean a disastrous situation for all Austrians. That’s why the Freedom Party urges the new foreign minister to strive for a serious Europe-spirit and courage for the economic and political accession to the EC” (*Neue Freie Zeitung* 7/1987, 2).

Accordingly in late 1987 the FPÖ proposed a parliamentary motion for the soonest possible accession application, which was denied with the votes of SPÖ, ÖVP and the Greens (see *Neue Freie Zeitung* 14/1989, 9).

In November 1988, the FPÖ declared, after a meeting of the party’s parliamentary group, that it’s European policy was an important part of its programme for the renewal of Austria. “The FPÖ reconfirmed its claim for a dynamic position regarding the EC-issue, for an immediate application for accession and for a referendum after the closure of negotiations with Brussels”
The Grand coalition government was heavily criticized for its “dilatoriness”, which put “our EC-future” at risk (Neue Freie Zeitung 15/1988, 1).

The final successful motion for the initiation of accession negotiations of June 1989 was proposed by SPÖ, ÖVP and FPÖ parliamentary groups (see Sten.Prot. 29./30.6.1989). In his speech before parliament party whip Norbert Gugerbauer once again referred to the FPÖ’s long pro-European tradition as outlined in the manifesto of 1985 (see Neue Freie Zeitung 26/1989, 1). For the “Europe party” FPÖ, there was still “no alternative to full membership in the EC” (Neue Freie Zeitung 14/1989, 9).

In 1990, the party’s pro-European rhetoric had weakened significantly. Still accession to the EC was not opposed. European Integration was conceived as an “inescapable test for Austria” (FPÖ 1990, 3), rather than a pursuit (see FPÖ 1986, 8). The FPÖ demanded “complete and steady information” of the public about the “economic, legal and technical development in the EC and about the respective status of integration negotiations” (FPÖ 1990, 16). Likewise “the affected economy has to be informed continuously and honestly about the effects of the EC accession” (FPÖ 1990, 16). In general, the question whether to support or oppose accession was not directly discussed in the party’s election manifesto. Accession already seemed to be a factum and most references to Europe are linked to the challenges arising from the fall of the Iron Curtain (see 16, 48 etc.). Nevertheless, at least the implicit support of EC related reforms indicates, that the party was not yet against accession. Still, compared to the FPÖ’s documents of 1985 and 1986, there was a clear change in tone, when it comes to Europe.

The year 1991 saw a further blurring of the FPÖ’s accession position. Generally the party opposed Austria’s accession to the EEA under the given conditions because it was basically regarded as not being enough (see Neue Freie Zeitung 17/1991, 1, see also 21/1991, 8) but it was still supporting full membership in the EC (6). In summer there was a significant caesura in the FPÖ’s – or at least Jörg Haider’s - perception of the EC. The community was increasingly critized for its structures and its policies (Neue Freie Zeitung 32/1991, 6). Haider outlined that he would refuse to “bow down to Brussels’ centralism” and urged the Austrian government to clarify “what kind of Europe it actually wants” (Neue Freie Zeitung 30/1991, 2). Haider, who was governor of Carinthia at the time, argued that the competences needed to be transferred both to Brussels and to the Bundesländer (see Neue Freie Zeitung 30/1991, 2; Neue Freie Zeitung 41/1991, 5). So basically at the same time the FPÖ supported a stronger political integration, but criticized the ongoing “centralist” developments in the EC, which Austria could not influence as the application for accession came “years too late” (Neue Freie

In 1992, there were further critical statements regarding EC accession (see Zeitung 7/1992, 5; 19/1992, 1; 24/1992, 2), but also some positive statements (see Zeitung 25/1992, 4; 47/1992, 1). Even Jörg Haider himself, in his inaugural speech in parliament, referred to the vision of the “United States of Europe as a political factor” (Zeitung 12/1992, 3), not mentioning Brussels’ “centralism” which he criticized on many other occasions. But again in September the party moved even closer to a contra-accession position. The party organ Zeitung titled “EC not at the price of Austria’s Identity” (36/1992, 1). The party executive drafted a resolution saying: “Yes to peace, a common market and a confederation; No to centralism, democratic deficit and unitary culture (Einheitskultur)” (Zeitung 36/1992, 1). In terms of the EEA accession, the party took a clear opposing position (Zeitung 38/1992, 3). Regarding the EC Haider stated that the FPÖ was not “EC euphoric, but Austria-conscious [österreichbewusst]” (Zeitung 38/1992, 3), which meant that accession to the community, had to be reassessed (see 1).

In May 1993, the FPÖ held a special party congress, fully dedicated to its European policy positions as “since last summer [1992] the FPÖ’s Europe course has caused stir and confusion inside and outside of the party. This deliberate confusion has now been ended with the special federal party congress of the FPÖ of the 8th May 1993” (Freie Argumente 3/1993, 3). The resolution adopted by this congress, was very critical about certain features of the European Community, accusing it of “departing from democratic principles in legislature, execution and jurisdiction” of being centralist and unable to cope with its political challenges (see 27). Moreover the FPÖ criticized the “idea of a multi-cultural European unitary society”, favoring “the preservation of our cultural identity” (28). Still, accession to the EC was not yet fully opposed. Membership was still “a possibility”, “a possible first step in order to realize our ideas of European Integration” (28). This possibility though, depended on the condition that the Austrian government would fulfill a list of rather unrealistic negotiation outcomes and domestic “home works” (see 29; see also Schaller 1994). Hence the party postponed its final decision whether it supported or opposed the country’s EC accession to another party congress:

“We, the FPÖ, will decide at a federal party congress which recommendation we will give our fellow citizens for the constitutionally prescribed referendum about the EC
accession, after the negotiations of the Austrian federal government and the EC have been closed” (30).

Finally, the FPÖ’s move to a contra-accession position was completed with a resolution of the follow up (special) party congress in April 1994. In this short resolution, which had been approved by the congress with 85.5% of votes the party claimed that the federal government had not fulfilled the above mentioned conditions. “The federal government did not fulfill any of these negotiation goals nor any of these home works and now tries, by the use of a overhasty referendum, to flee its responsibility for the bad negotiation outcome and its general failure” (Freie Argumente 2/1994, 12). Hence the congress recommended to the FPÖ parliamentary group to vote against the accession laws (and constitutional laws) as well as against the accession treaty itself (see 12), which FPÖ MPs collectively did later on.

**Greens**

For the young Austrian Green party, a pro- or contra-accession position could not be reconstructed for every year of this analysis’ observation period, simply because the party did not have a common position up to 1989. In 1985, the first year of the observation period, the Greens did not even exist yet. After the party’s „unification“ in 1986, common positions had to be defined. This process was fully completed not earlier than with the Greens first official party manifesto in 1990 (see Dachs 2006). Regarding Europe policy, the party was „forced“ to develop a position a little earlier as „a debate affecting all political domains was provoked out of the blue: EC integration“ (Die Grünen 1989, 2). Consequently, the Greens established a common position at their Europe congress in Innsbruck, February 1989. Hence for 1985, 1986, 1987 and 1988 Green positions are missing.

After their “Europe congress” in February 1989, the Greens published a “Europe Manifesto” (Die Grünen 1989), which outlined their opposition to any form of participation in the European Community and the reasons for this critical position. The document contained a list of various reasons not to join the EC, for example EC membership’s incompatibility with Austria’s neutrality (see 2), the “true face of the EC Single Market, which puts the case for an economic-industrial expansion based on liberalization, an expansion, that rules out ecological and social aspects” (2) or the “EC’s democratic condition” which “wipes away 200 years of […] democratic achievements” (5). In June the vast majority of the party’s parliamentary group then accordingly voted against the “Letter to Brussels”. Still the Greens anti-accession position was not an anti-integration position. The party rather claimed to be “for Europe, but against the EC”. “We, the Greens are for Europe. We are for a cosmopolitan Austria, which is aware of global problems, and we know that these problems can only be solved.
internationally. We are against an EC of destruction […]” (Wabl, Sten.Prot. 29./30.6.1989, 23).

In their 1990 manifesto the greens were again very clear about their rejection of the policies of the EC:

“The EC integration policy is a programme for the disenfranchisement of a whole nation, because this decision [the decision to join the European Community] ignores the undemocratic reality of the EC, of which the economic interests do not face democratic institutions yet. The European Parliament is powerless versus the EC-Council of Ministers. Various economic lobbies have organized around the Council of Ministers. Social and ecological questions are hence subordinated to economic interests” (Die Grünen 1990, 37).

At the same time, the party was supporting European integration in general terms, or put differently, a broader approach to European integration as it criticized that: “[t]he unique chance of founding a greater democratic, multicultural Europe, incorporating Central and Eastern European countries, is not even targeted in the concept of the EC Single Market” (37).

The year 1991 was characterized by the discussion about Austria’s accession to the EEC. The EEC was largely regarded as a first step to full membership or the EC’s „waiting room“ (see Gehler 2002). The Greens were very critical about this project (see Impuls 4/1991), arguing - alongside other critics, such as the FPÖ - that Austria would now be forced to accept the EC’s legislation without having any legislative powers (see Impuls 3/1991, 11). Accordingly, the party initiated a popular petition for a referendum about Austria’s EEC membership. In contrast to the Freedom party, which rejected the EEC, but (still) demanded an even faster accession to the EC, the Greens remained very critical about the EC as well.

„So, no to the EEC, no to EC-accession and hence yes to the reduction of transit traffic, to biological agriculture, to healthy nutrition, to stricter food law, to the maintenance of social and ecological protection norms and not least yes to the possibility of direct democratic political participation in Austria and to not being governed by Brussels. Yes to a referendum before it’s too late“ (Impuls 4/1991, 8).

Also in 1992 the Greens predominantly maintained their anti-accession position, although there was some internal dispute about the issue (see Impuls 1/1992, 23 et seq.). As Madeleine Petrovic summarized the party’s position at the time „There may be some different shadings regarding the strategy - how can I convince people? But I think that the whole parliamentary
group is really convinced by the substantial rightness of a clear No to the EC“ (Impuls 1/1992, 24, see also Impuls 2/1992, 21).

In 1993, at the Green Bundestagung, the party once more declared a „strict No to the EC“, although at this event, the intraparty conflict about the accession issue, probably gained most attention (Impuls 1/1993, 18). The party also started to prepare for it’s anti-accession referendum campaign (Impuls 2/1993, 6). In this context the party published the Brochure „Ja zu Europa, Nein zur EG“ („Yes to Europe, No to the EC“), which was basically an EC-critical manifesto for the accession referendum. The EC was criticized in various respects, in terms of environmental policy, economic policy, social policy and in terms of democratic legitimacy (see Grüne 1993).

The year 1994, the year of the accession referendum marks the Greens policy shift. Up to the referendum, the party waged an anti-accession campaign (Schaller 1994, 81 et seq.). But after the referendum turned out in favor of Austria’s accession, the Greens decided to support all further steps of the accession procedure. Hence, for the biggest part, the party’s parliamentary group voted for the accession treaty in parliament. The central official argument for the Green shift was that now as the democratic sovereign - the people - had decided, a democratic party had to follow this decision. This is nicely illustrated by the following quote of MP Andreas Wabl:

“Ladies and Gentlemen, the people have decided with great majority that politicians and the Federal Government should prepare everything for an accession and hence for the execution of European integration. Ladies and Gentlemen, this political situation must be acknowledged by all MPs. The sovereign has instructed us to conduct integration – regardless of which side we were on before the referendum, if we were of the opinion that a way outside the EU is more reasonable than within the EU” (Wabl, Sten.Prot. 11.11.1994, 61).

Summary
All Austrian political parties shifted their policy positions regarding EC/EU accession between 1985 and 1994 (see table 3). The ÖVP, which had always been quite “pro-European” but still against formal accession or association shifted to a pro-accession position in 1988. The Social Democrats too opposed EC/EU accession in the first place. Generally, they were a lot more skeptical about the EC than the People’s Party. Nonetheless they shifted to a pro-accession position in 1989. The FPÖ was traditionally a strong supporter of European
integration. Austria’s accession to the EC/EU had been a policy goal of the party for decades. From 1990 onwards though, the FPÖ’s accession support weakened steadily and significantly. Finally in 1994 the party officially turned to a contra-accession position. The Austrian Greens did not have a common position up to 1989, as the party’s unification process was not yet completed. By then they took a clear contra-accession position. In 1994, after the Austrian accession referendum, the party shifted to accession support. Thus the SPÖ shifted in 1989, the ÖVP in 1988. The FPÖ and the Greens both shifted in 1994.

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*Table 3: Austrian parties’ policy position regarding EC/EU accession*

But how did that happen? What were the factors that turned the whole Austrian party system upside down regarding the “Europe” issue? And do theories of party policy change adequately explain these shifts? These questions will be examined in the following sections.
The Processes of Party Policy Change – Process Tracing

In this section each shifting process is reconstructed in detail. Causal factors and causal mechanisms are identified in order to get the fullest possible explanation for every policy shift. Based on these findings, hypotheses are put to a first test, following a process tracing logic. Each party section is subdivided in a comprehensive process-overview and then according to the stages of the theoretical model in incentives-, party leadership-, decision making- and veto player-subsections.

SPÖ

Process

Historically the SPÖ had been critical about the integration efforts of the European Community and its predecessors over the longest period of Austria’s Second Republic, not to mention a potential participation of Austria in this process. Regardless of the immanent internationalism of the party’s core ideology, there were basically two reasons, why the EC was mistrusted: Austria’s neutral status and the notion that the EC was basically a “Europe of cartels and monopolies” (see Incentives section).

In contrast to the People’s Party (see ÖVP section), EC-membership was never on the party’s agenda up to the midst 1980s. Closer ties to the EC were regarded as neither possible nor desirable. For social democrats the European Free Trade Association (EFTA) of which Austria was a charter member represented an adequate mechanism of economic cooperation in Europe (see Vranitzky in Kopeinig 2013, 177). Over decades the party’s foreign policy had a very global focus. Based on the idea of “active foreign policy”, especially famous SPÖ-leader and chancellor Bruno Kreisky gave Austria’s (and the SPÖ’s) foreign policy a global, active and neutral profile (see Kramer 2006). When Kreisky resigned from party leadership in 1983 after 16 years as party leader and 13 years as chancellor, he was succeed by Fred Sinowitz and just five years later, by Franz Vranitzky. He became chancellor already in 1986, after Sinowitz himself had stepped back. With Franz Vranitzky then, the party entered into an important phase of change.

The SPÖ’s policy shift to a pro-accession position was one of these changes. Vranitzky’s personal contribution to this policy shift was tremendous. Already in 1985 as finance minister, he was convinced that Austria had to join the EC. His political companion and successor in the ministry of finance, Ferdinand Lacina, recalls a conversation of 1984 or 1985, where both agreed about the necessity of participating in the EC’s integration policies,
which was “far from the prevailing opinion” in the SPÖ (see Lacina in Kopeinig 2013, 213). Alongside Vranitzky and Lacina, Peter Jankowitsch was an early supporter of EC-accession. Jankowitsch and the People’s Party’s Andreas Khol (see chapter ÖVP) got the Ball of the public Europe debate running at a panel discussion in December 1984, when they argued that in the long term, full membership in the European Community was worthwhile (see Kopeinig 2013, 23). The SPÖ’s sitting minister of foreign affairs, Leopold Gratz, immediately disavowed these claims (see Kopeinig 2013, 23). Likewise, in 1986 a respective motion in parliament, proposed by Jankowitsch and Khol was denied by the SPÖ and the FPÖ – which formed the governing coalition by the time (see Kopeinig 2013, 25).

In January 1987, the SPÖ formed a coalition with the ÖVP under chancellor Franz Vranitzky. From that time on the party in government was pressing for a more ambitious integration policy. The inaugural government statement of the Vranitzky II government clearly put a stronger focus on European integration, though the issue of full-membership was not yet addressed (see Vranitzky 1987, 32 et seq.; SPÖ-positions section). A large-sized „Working Group for European integration“ was created (see Kopeinig 2013, 25). Later in that year, the council of ministers unanimously decided, that full-membership in the EC was an option for Austria’s future Europe policy (see 26). Although the party in government and especially the party leader and chancellor were aiming at accession, the party did not commit to an accession application until April 1989. At least up to that moment, there have been intense and controversial discussions within the party (see Interview Ederer, 6). SPÖ’s Fritz Verzetnitsch, chairman of the Federation of Trade Unions (ÖGB), argued like many others at that time that EC-membership was not “the only option” for Austria’s future Europe policy (see Kopeinig 2013, 27). Also the party’s parliamentary group voiced some skepticism about full membership in 1987 and 1988 (see 29 et seq.). Harsh critique came from Viennese party chairman Hans Mayr, who argued in a newspaper interview that accession was dangerous with regard to economic structures in Eastern Austria and that it was harmful to the fragile Austrian national consciousness, a statement which also lead to tensions with the coalition partner (see 41).

Regardless of the internal critique and skepticism, Franz Vranitzky finally achieved a resolution of the Bundesparteivorstand in favor of an accession application, the 3rd April 1989, which ultimately fixed the SPÖ’s policy shift (see Kopeinig 2013, 43; Schaller 1994). Though the party leader had to accept four dissenting votes. One of the dissenters was ex-foreign minister Erwin Lanc, who has been a declared EC-skeptic throughout the whole
discussion (see Interview Ederer, 6). After the SPÖ’s pro-accession position had been fixed with this decision of the Bundesparteivorstand, the party was streamlined to accession support. Although the social democrats were always a little more cautious about committing too strongly to the EC than its more Europe-euphoric coalition partner ÖVP – especially regarding the neutrality issue - the SPÖ ambitiously engaged in the accession project and waged an intense pro-accession campaign prior to the Austrian referendum (see Schaller 1994, 76 et seq.).

How can this process be interpreted in terms of theory? In the following, the process is analyzed, focusing separately on every stage of the theoretical model developed earlier.

**Incentives**

For the case of the SPÖ’s policy shift, party leadership change was essential. Franz Vranitzky assumed party leadership from Fred Sinowatz in 1988. By the time he had already been chancellor since 1986, after Sinowatz had resigned from that office. Whereas officially this was a reaction to the election of Kurt Waldheim, making Vranitzky the new party leader was rather a strategic decision, as the party realized that “it was not working with Sinowatz” (Interview Ederer, 8). According to interview data, without Franz Vranitzky as party leader the SPÖ’s shift to a pro-accession position would have hardly been possible (see 8). This gives some support to hypotheses H5 and H6. Broader factional change though, did not occur. Vranitzky, who was basically regarded with mistrust in the first years of his party leadership was rather supported by a smaller group of high party officials (see Veto Players section). Consequently, hypotheses H3 and H4 are not supported.

Just like in the case of the ÖVP’s policy shift (see ÖVP section), changes in the policy field (H1d, H2d) were very influential. In order to demonstrate this, it is helpful to shortly discuss the SPÖ’s initial opposition to EU/EC accession:

As it has been mentioned, for Austrian Social Democrats, participation in European integration was historically a problematic endeavor. Basically, there have always been two major factors, which made an accession to the EC (or its predecessor EEC) a non-option for the SPÖ’s foreign policy. The first factor was Austria’s neutrality. Back in the 1960s, when Austria was about to decide whether to join EEC or EFTA, it was Bruno Kreisky, who heavily opposed the former option as he and his party considered such a move as being incompatible with Austria’s neutral status (see Lacina in Kopeinig 2013, 214). Up to the end of the 1980s this had always been a central point to SPÖ officials and a serious reason to be
very critical of the option of EU accession (see Interview Ederer, 3 et seq.). Franz Vranitzky recalled, that when he first consulted the Parteivorstand in this context in 1986 or 1987, officials were partly shocked, mainly for neutrality reasons:

“We have always thought, Kreisky would lead us to the EFTA where the other neutral states are. Accession to the EEC? Do we have to join the NATO then? Some of them even said that this would contravene the Austrian State Treaty and the comprised prohibition of an Anschluss to Germany” (Vranitzky in Kopeinig 2013, 177).

Moreover, neutrality, as “a part of Austria’s identity” (Interview Ederer, 3 et seq.) was not only an ideological factor. Austria’s neutral status had for a long time been the basis for peaceful relations with the Soviet Union, one of the four signatory powers of the Austrian State Treaty. Hence, confidently holding on neutrality had a strong security aspect until the late 1980s. Even after the party had performed its policy shift, SPÖ politicians in this context frequently addressed the neutrality issue, whereas rather in an apologetic manner, arguing that an accession would not violate the legal obligations imposed by Austria’s neutral status.

The second factor was, that there were strong reservations regarding the nature and the policies of the EEC and later the EC. In the earlier stages of European integration this was clear to social democrats, anyhow, as former finance minister Ferdinand Lacina put it, referring to the 1960s: “[T]here was the famous wording of Bruno Pittermann, that the EEC was a Europe of cartels and monopolies. That means, it was also clear: The EEC back then, was to hundred percent a conservative organization” (Lacina in Kopeinig 2013, 214).

In this tradition, the EC’s “capitalist” nature still caused massive concerns about an association or accession in the late 1980s. “[B]asically, the critique of traditional officials was, as I have said, this is rather a structure of transnational corporations, of the economy and this is not a social structure and therefore we don’t want to be a part of it” (Interview Ederer, 1).

Hence, both the Kreiskyan tradition of active and neutral foreign policy (see Kramer 2006) as well as skepticism about the “bourgeois” nature of the European community were stable pillars of the SPÖ’s conception of foreign policy. When the party then shifted to a pro-accession position in 1989, changes in the policy field had created several inducements for this move over the course of the 1980s, which partly mimic those of the People’s Party (see ÖVP section).
In Europe, Glasnost was about to bring change to the continents polity. For the SPÖ the high value of neutrality seemed to decrease somehow with the success of Glasnost in the Soviet Union as neutrality without the cold war and without participating in European integration could result in economic and political isolation (in the sense of rather being “gemeinsam statt einsam”) (Interview Ederer, 3). Hence, for the SPÖ’s policy shift, these processes were decisive. “It started with the opening process of the Soviet Union and the much more open policies of President Gorbatchow. It was foreseeable, that relations between the Soviet Union and the EC would change significantly. This change in Europe was one of the main reasons for the change of thinking in the SPÖ” (Lacina in Kopeinig 2013, 213).

Moreover a Soviet Union, which itself reached out for the West could be expected to be more likely to accept an Austrian accession. In 1988 this expectation was even confirmed, when chancellor Vranitzky was able to resolve the Soviet reservations about a potential accession, at meetings with Russian Prime Minister Nikolai Rychkow in Moscow (see Vranitzky in Kopeinig 2013, 183).

Furthermore, regarding the development of the European Community, there was a significant intensification of European integration starting from the early 1980s, which started to put pressure on Austria. The more the European market grew together, the more Austria as a non-member was excluded or discriminated against (see Lacina in Kopeinig 2013, 214; Vranitzky in Kopeinig 2013, 177). Similar to it’s coalition partner ÖVP, there was a great fear in the SPÖ of being left out, a fear that “our last EFTA partners […] enter into the European Union and we do not take part […]”(Interview Ederer, 3). In fact it all came down to a decision for being “together instead of alone”. Hence, in general terms, participating in European integration was basically a reactive means of safeguarding economic prosperity and of modernizing outdated structures (see Vranitzky, Sten.Prot. 29.06/30.06.1989, 28). A very important role in this context played the idea, that by joining the European Community, Austria would finally be able to influence decisions, which would affect the country anyway.

“We also want to be a part of it, aware of our responsibility, because we want to have a say, because we want to actively co-decide and not just accept. […] We want to take this open chance here. And no matter how we look at it: full participation in the great market of the future is reserved for member states“ (Vranitzky, Sten.Prot. 29.06/30.06.1989, 28, see also Vranitzky 1991, 41).

These European processes were embedded in the general trend of economic internationalization and globalization, which generally caused increased pressure on Austrian
economic and foreign policy (see Interview Ederer, 3). “It was this intensified globalization, where we realized, as much as we love this country, but this is not an island of the blessed and more generally, this is not an island at all. And therefore a common effort in Europe is necessary in order to cope with certain issues, foreign policy issues, but also economic issues. Crucial was: We alone are too small for these great… and that had something to do with [the fact] that back then, there was this intensive internationalization coming up […]” (Interview Ederer, 3).

In sum, changes in the policy field provided massive incentives for the SPÖ to rethink their reservations against accession to the European Community. The value of neutrality was heavily diminished by the decline of the Soviet Union and accession seemed practically safe for the first time, with the breakthrough Vranitzky had achieved in negotiations with Nikolai Rychkov. The European market was increasingly growing together and in combination with the general trend of globalization, Austria was perceived as running into danger of being isolated both economically and politically. So, in order to safeguard the country’s economic and social achievements to change the party’s instrumental “no” to accession. Based on theses findings, hypotheses H1d and H2d, which state that policy shifts are more likely to occur if changes in the policy field cause the necessity to shift instrumental positions in order to maintain core positions, are supported.

Furthermore, with regard to strategic incentives, there is no direct empirical link between public opinion, electoral defeat and policy shifts of other parties on the one hand and the SPÖ’s policy shift on the other, neither in interview data or party documents. This is per se not surprising. QCA will shed more light on the validity of H1a-H2c. But there are a few facts that give a hint about the probability of the influence of strategic incentives. First, accession support in public opinion had decreased from over 50% in 1987 to about 35% in early 1989 (see Plasser/Ulram 1994b). About one third of the population was undecided in that period. So, if the SPÖ had intended to mimic public opinion, 1989 would not have been the best choice for a policy shift. Hence, public opinion was probably not decisive for the SPÖ’s policy shift. Electoral defeat on the other hand might have contributed to the SPÖ’s shift, as the party had lost around 4% of their vote share in the general elections of 1986 and the regional elections in Lower Austria in 1988. The ÖVP’s policy shift in 1988 may have had a reinforcing effect on the SPÖ’s shift. Therefore H1c and H2c cannot be dismissed. But, the fact that the party leader and others were pro-accession already years before the ÖVP’s shift indicates that it was at best, adding some pressure on the social democrats to shift.
Party Leadership

For the SPÖ’s policy shift to a pro-accession position, party leadership’s activities were central. As it has been mentioned Franz Vranitzky assumed party leadership from Fred Sinowatz in 1988. Vranitzky had leadership qualities and he had a profound economic professional background (see Interview Ederer, 9). Though the latter also caused some mistrust under SPÖ officials (6). It was exactly his focus on the economy, which early made him an accession supporter, long before his party was (see Lacina in Kopeinig 2013, 213). Asked when he had realized that Austria had to join the European Union he said:

“Already in the time as finance minister and even more so later as chancellor I frequently had discussions with economists of the national bank and other institutions. They have always pointed out to me that Austria is discriminated in foreign trade and diverse other intergovernmental economic areas compared to EU-members. My question was: ‘Why are we discriminated?’ This could be explained by the facts and by the simple fact that non-membership was no substitute for EU-membership […] To me the path to Europe was clear” (Vranitzky in Kopeinig 2013, 177).

Although this goal may have been clear to the economist Franz Vranitzky by at least 1985 (see Lacina in Kopeinig 2013, 213) his party still had to make a volte-face. In order to convince SPÖ officials, Vranitzky applied a cautious long-term strategy of internal campaigning and discussion.

“I started step by step with doing a lot of persuading. I invited economists, university professors, national bank experts, and so I established an objective and objectifiable support. I talked to the ÖGB-leadership, to AK-people, then with governors. I proceeded like building a house, first there is the foundation, then the upper stories follow. This cautious and definitive approach of mine, soon got me in touch with allies” (Vranitzky in Kopeinig 2013, 178).

The strategy of advertising, “caring” and discussing was ultimately successful in turning the party around (see Interview Ederer, 6).20 Actually quite similarly to the FPÖ’s Jörg Haider (see FPÖ), he was very cautious not to rush things. Although, he and minister Lacina secretly agreed already in 1985 that full membership was necessary, he waited carefully for the right moment to address the decision making organs. While in 1987 he suggested to the Bundesparteivorstand to think about further steps in European policy, yet only without arguing in favor of accession (Vranitzky in Kopeinig 2013, 177), he later addressed the party congress with regard to the issue (Interview Ederer, 1) and finally, in 1989 he received a

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20 Using this strategy Vranitzky also managed to redirect the party in another important policy field, namely Austria’s nationalized industry (see Interview Ederer, 7).
clear, though not a unanimous pro-accession resolution from the Bundesparteivorstand (see Kopeinig 2013, 43).

So the theoretical assumptions that the party leader plays a mediating role in the process of party policy shifts, as he or she is responsive to incentives and initiates the shifting procedure is confirmed by the case of the SPÖ’s policy shift.

**Decision Making**

In the literature, the SPÖ is categorized as the second most centralized organization in the Austrian party system (see Laver/Hunt 1992). But in fact, the decision making procedure regarding the party’s Europe policy shift of 1989 was even more decentralized than for example the ÖVP’s decision making process. Although party leadership initiated and enforced the policy shift, decision making bodies have been involved at several stages of the decision making process. Franz Vranitzky consulted the Bundesparteivorstand and the party congress in 1987 and the final decision was again taken in 1989 by the Bundesparteivorstand. Hence, basically the SPÖ’s decision making process regarding the question whether to support accession to the EC/EU or not was relatively decentralized.

So, formally veto players had the possibility to stop their party from shifting. But this did not happen. The Bundesparteivorstand voted for an accession application with great majority (only four dissenting votes) in April 1989. How this was possible will be examined in the following section.

**Veto Players**

As it has just been demonstrated, traditionally the SPÖ was very skeptical about closer ties towards the European Community. The strongest critics of the EC came from the left party wing as well as from traditional social democrats (see Interview Ederer, 2). For the SPÖ being a social democratic party, the support of the union movement was of course essential for any policy decision. The Austrian Federation of Trade Unions (Österreichischer Gewerkschaftsbund, ÖGB) was split though. While workers of the protected economic sector opposed accession, workers in export oriented companies shifted to a pro-accession position prior to the party’s policy shift (see Interview Ederer, 2; 7). “[T]here was a kind of change in thinking, as work councils of the export oriented branches were pro, there they were influenced by the company owners or managers, who said, well we would be enabled to export more easily and we could take more chances” (Interview Ederer, 2). In December 1988 the ÖGB published a “Europe-Memorandum” as a reaction to the governments announcement
to decide about Austria’s future integration policy and relations to the EC (see ÖGB 1988, 2).

The document carefully circumvents a clear commitment to or against accession, which on the one hand nicely mirrors the internal divide of the organization. On the other hand it can be accounted to a situation of uncertainty, as by the time, neither the party nor the government had ultimately declared their intention to join the EC. Economic integration in Europe though was clearly approved by the ÖGB:

“For Austrian workers it clearly turned out that the policies of economic cooperation in Europe, which have been in place since the end of World War II, brought advantages to all participating states and represent a crucial premise for the standard of living, which has been reached today. Based on this experience of basically supporting a world trading system as liberal as possible and because of the necessity of safeguarding the competitiveness of the European economy relatively to the American and South-East-Asian economies, continuing the process of European integration is also in the interest of workers” (ÖGB 1988, 2).

With regard to the integration policies of the European community the ÖGB argued that the EC was the project with the most concrete integration concept and that “[f]or Austria, being able to participate in the dynamic this process will entail, as well as preventing every relative deterioration of its competitive position is essential” (ÖGB 1988, 2). Accession to the EC though, is mentioned as a viable option, but is neither explicitly supported nor ruled out. The ÖGB rather articulated specific claims in case the government would apply for accession to the EC. Nevertheless, and regardless of some skeptical statements he made in the beginning of the internal discussion, ÖGB chairman Fritz Verzetnitsch supported the application accession quite early, being an important ally of the party leader in this respect (see Vranitzky in Kopeinig 2013, 178; Verzetnitsch 1992).

In general, it was rather individuals than organized interests who carried on the accession controversy (see Vranitzky in Kopeinig 2013). Former minister Erwin Lanc was one of the “most important” critics of the accession project, who frequently articulated his skepticism in internal discussions (see Vranitzky in Kopeinig 2013; see Interview Ederer, 6). Within the Vranitzky government, ministers Hesoun and Dohnal were rather skeptical (see Interview Ederer, 6). Important accession supporters were Peter Jankowitsch, Ferdinand Lacina, Fritz Verzetnitsch and Rudolf Streicher (see Vranitzky in Kopeinig 2013, 178). Peter Jankowitsch, foreign minister of the Vranitzky I government up to 1987, later MP and junior minister, early signaled his support for an intensification of Austria’s relation to the EC, already in 1985 and 1986 (see Kopeinig 2013, 23). According to Brigitte Ederer, Ferdinand Lacina played an important role in convincing accession skeptics within the Vranitzky government, not least
because he had good personal relationships to some of them (see Interview Ederer, 2). With Fritz Verzetnitsch, party leader Vranitzky had the young chairman of the powerful ÖGB on his side, who effectively tipped the scales in the divided union federation.

Still, how did the party leader finally manage to make his party shift, and how could he do this so smoothly, with only a handful of dissenting votes in the decisive meeting of the Bundesparteivorstand? Basically, as it has been mentioned, the accession project, was a personal endeavor of the chancellor, which he persistently pursued. Moreover, for the party leader’s success in changing the SPÖ’s policy position the support of such “established” social democrats like Ferdinan Lacina or Peter Jankowitsch was crucial with regard to the skepticism Vranitzky had to face from the rank and file. “It was definitely helpful, that also acknowledged social democrats like Lacina, who would not have been accused of going hand in hand with transnational corporations, that they supported accession” (Interview Ederer, 2).

Hence the party leaders personal effort in intraparty campaigning in combination with the support of specific leading figures of Austria’s social democracy – “very valuable and important co-opinion leaders” (Vranitzky in Kopeinig 2013, 178) – and a cautious campaigning strategy convinced a big part of the rank and file. This was even more effective, as there was no organized resistance against EC/EU accession (Vranitzky in Kopeinig 2013), as no party faction, neither the left wing, nor the traditional social democrats, nor the ÖGB-faction were undivided, the latter was then even explicitly supporting the shift.

Moreover, taking veto measures was definitely a strategic question for accession opponents, with regard to the party’s collective and their own individual interests. Challenging the party leader’s intention to shift would have meant weakening the party in government, and in general and hence risking electoral success. Whether it was this rationale or just simple loyalty to the party leader, Brigitte Ederer explained that there have never been serious attempts to stop the SPÖ’s policy shift just “because it was also clear that it [accession to the EC] is so important for the sitting government, well the SPÖ part” (Interview Ederer, 6).

**Summary**

In summary, the SPÖ’s policy shift was caused by external incentives related to the policy field. Party leader Vranitzky had been an accession supporter long before the SPÖ’s shift. He conducted a cautious, but intense internal pro-accession campaign and found high-ranking allies within his party. The decision making procedure was relatively decentralized, with the party congress and the Bundesparteivorstand being involved. Although a few dissenters remained, the policy shift was approved by the Parteivorstand. Hence, veto players did not
oppose the shift, due to successful intraparty campaigning and the fact that key party officials and the party in government supported the shift and that there was no organized resistance. So, H2d (changes in the policy field/decentralized) and H6 (leadership change/decentralized) are supported by the SPÖ case.

ÖVP

Process

In the last two decades, the Austrian People’s Party has stressed its image as the “Europe-Party”, meaning that they were the strongest supporters of European integration and of Austria’s participation in this process. Back in the midst of the 1980s, the situation was somewhat different. Austria’s role in the European Integration process was constantly an issue for the ÖVP, but there was no systematic intraparty discussion (see Interview Busek, 12), nor a common position regarding EC accession. During the 1980s “Europe” became more and more prominent in intraparty discussions (see Interview Khol, 23). As soon as 1985 the ÖVP, being in opposition, launched a motion for a resolution in parliament aiming at a closer cooperation – but not yet accession to – the European Community (ÖVP 1986a), which was defeated by the SPÖ/FPÖ majority.

In the same year MP Andreas Khol (1985) was already quite clear about his preference for an EC accession. In an article he advocated a “Triple Jump to Europe”-strategy, with cooperation being the first, association the second and union the third “jump”. In December 1987 – by then the SPÖ and the ÖVP had formed a coalition government – ÖVP party leader and vice chancellor Alois Mock had pushed through the option of Austria’s accession to the EC in the council of ministers.

Obviously there was growing support for EC accession up to 1988 from diverse individuals and party factions. Andreas Khol, who has just been mentioned was an early supporter, as well as party whip Fritz König and Othmar Karas, who was leader of the ÖVP-youth organization at the time (Gehler 2002, 276). These individuals plus a few other MPs made up a quite idealist pro-accession group within the ÖVP (see Interview Khol, 23). The Federation of Industry (VÖI) and its secretary general Herbert Krejci, were probably the most driving pro-accession force (see Interview Busek, 17; 20; Gehler 2002) due to their economic interests in market liberalization. During the 1980s they commissioned several scientific assessments, mainly demonstrating the potential positive economic effects of an EC accession. Though, probably the most important of these assessments, had juridical content. In a 1987 book, the international law scholars Waldemar Hummer and Michael Schweitzer
argued for the first time that EC membership was compatible with Austria’s neutrality and hence offered an alternative to the dominant law doctrine (Hummer/Schweitzer 1987). In May 1987 the VÖI followed up by making a public statement under the title “Europe – our Future” demanding from the coalition government to strive for EC full membership as early as possible (see Gehler 2002, 288).

In contrast to the strong pro-accession position of the industry, the representatives of small and medium-sized businesses, were rather skeptical in their evaluation of a possible full membership (see Interview Busek, 12). Especially Rudolf Sallinger, being one of ÖVP’s strongest defenders of small and medium-sized businesses and Austrian social partnership, was a strong critic of a potential EC membership (see Interview Khol, 23). As both groups – the industry and small and medium-sized businesses – are represented in the party’s Business League (Wirtschaftsbund), this party branch was strongly divided. The ÖVP’s workers and employees organization (ÖAAB) and the farmers league (Bauernbund) were further skeptical factions (see Interview Khol, 23; see Interview Schwarzböck 31 et seq.). While workers feared a worsen in labour law and more competition on the job market, famers were skeptical about being exposed to increased competition and a loss of state subsidies in the integrated agricultural market (see also Monatshefte 1992/5-6, 5). Though there was also a substantive subgroup within the farmers league, which supported the accession (see Interview Schwarzböck 39, see Interview Khol), making the Bauernbund another internally divided organization. Moreover there was a “very emotional group” around the MP Ludwig Steiner – a former resistance fighter against the Nazi-regime – which was rooted in the parties tradition of Austria patriotism (see Interview Busek, 13). This group opposed full membership, as they were concerned about Austria’s independence from Germany.

In addition to this functional split, there was also a regional one. While for example the Vorarlberg and the Styria branch favored EC accession, large parts of the Tyrolean party branch did oppose it, due to their concerns about an increase in transit traffic (see Busek, 13). With regard to the regional party leaders, the ÖVP governors Josef Ratzenböck (Upper Austria), Wilfried Haslauer sen. (Salzburg) and Martin Purtscher (Vorarlberg) were the strongest supporters of EC membership. But positions diverged also within the Bundesländer-organizations according to the functional divide just described. Consequently, with regard to Austria’s EC membership, the ÖVP was split up in various subgroups during the 1985-1988 period. According to Andreas Khol, the majority did oppose EC accession though (Interview Khol, 23).
The crucial moment in the ÖVP decision making process was the traditional meeting of the *Bundesparteivorstand* in Maria Plain (Salzburg) on the 8th of January 1988. According to Erhard Busek, who was one of the participants, the meeting started with a speech of vice chancellor and party leader Alois Mock, who discussed several issues not related to foreign policy or European Integration. After a while, the governors Ratzenböck and Haslauer interrupted Mock and demanded to finally “talk about Europe” (see Interview Busek 13 et seq.). What followed then was an interesting social dynamic which persistently changed the People’s Party’s policy position. In an Interview in the early 1990s Andreas Khol nicely illustrated this process:

“as Mock was talking about the EC accession, [he as] party leader, and he did not pronounce his opinion, instead he said, everyone on the table should advance his opinion, and the seating plan was like that, that to his right sat Purtscher, then Partl, Haslauer, and Purtscher started and said, for him it is very clear: accession – forget neutrality, Partl said, yes that was always his opinion, and Haslauer too, and then all of a sudden – that went around the table – and there were more and more and nobody opposed it, Sallinger mumbled something, and then there was an unanimous vote. That was really strange. If Mock had introduced and had said ‘for these reasons I am against it’, then everything would have been different, but he didn’t introduce, but he let it go around the table, [this] was very odd, Steiner was completely speechless, that it went this way, so that was the change in the Europe course […]” (Andreas Khol in Gehler 2002, 277; see also Interview Busek, 13 et seq.; Interview Khol 24).

So, what actually resolved the divide within the ÖVP was a party leader, basically letting others set the agenda and veto-players, not trying – or not daring – to stop the party from changing its position – as strange as it seems, that the opponents of an EC accession didn’t speak up in this crucial occasion.

A few months later, on the 23rd of May 1988 the ÖVP underlined its change of position by publishing the “Europe Manifesto” (ÖVP 1988). Basically this document was a plea for EC accession, which would bring a whole lot of – predominantly economic – advantages. In contrast to the situation earlier in the 1980s, the party had now united behind the issue of EU accession and the self-appointed label of the “Europe party” (see 2). Intraparty opposition to this course, which was formed by important party factions previous to Maria Plain seemed to have disappeared and there have never been attempts to reestablish it (see Interview Busek, 15).
How can this process be interpreted in terms of theory? What does it tell us about the validity of the hypotheses? At the first stage of the theoretical model used in this analysis, it has to be asked what initiated the shifting process in the first place.

**Incentives**

In the case of the People’s Party’s Europe shift, there had been no change in party leadership for nearly a decade, as Alois Mock chaired the party since 1979. Neither had the factional balance significantly changed in general terms. On the factional level, it was rather an imbalance of effort in putting pressure on the party between supporting and opposing groups. Hence, hypotheses 3, 4, 5 and 6 are not supported by this case.

What had changed was the policy field. And the ÖVP basically responded to the same changes, like its coalition partner SPÖ (see SPÖ section). Most basically, the quality of the European Community had significantly changed since the midst of the 1980s. With the Single European Act, and Jacques Delors as president of the European Commission, European integration had been pushed forward, which caused pressure on Austria and other European states to act (see Gehler 280 et seq.). The rising change in Eastern Europe did push in the same direction. With the proponents of Eastern European opposition movements aiming at a closer relation with the European Community, Austria was in danger of being outdistanced (see Interview Busek, 16). A lot was happening in Europe and there was a growing fear within the ÖVP, Austria would be left out in future developments. There was a feeling of “missing a train” (Interview Busek, 16). This sentiment is illustrated nicely in the conclusion of the 1988 Europe-Manifesto:

“[R]emaining outside the Community – a defensive strategy – leads to decreasing competitiveness, higher unemployment, growing current account deficit and to external deficit, a retardation of technical innovation and social friction. A decoupling from liberalization within the EC would mean stagnation and recession for Austria. Export-oriented, substantial enterprises would be forced to build factories in the EC area in order to safeguard this vital market. A loss of jobs would be the consequence” (ÖVP 1988, 7).

Additionally, Austria’s economy was already struggling with heavy structural inflexibility. Participating in European integration was expected to be a boost for necessary economic reforms (see Gehler 2002, 280). For the new ÖVP position accession to the EC was expected to lead to “a similar economic impulse, as the Austrian State Treaty was a democracy impulse: a dynamization boost for essentially necessary structural reforms in important economic branches” (ÖVP 1988, 7).
Moreover, from the foreign policy perspective, neutrality – at least as it was conceptualized at the time – became problematic, with the cold war coming to an end. The academic doctrine change initiated by Hummer and Schweitzer (1987) did consequently contribute a lot to the political resolution of this problem. It enabled the ÖVP to do the splits between keeping its official pro-neutrality position and supporting EC accession. Although there were tendencies within the party to abandon neutrality, this move would have been much more critical in terms of achieving consensus with the coalition partner SPÖ, but also with regard to public opinion (see Plasser/ Ulram 1994a, 227). Another very important development in the foreign policy field was, that the leadership of the declining Soviet Union informally signaled its acceptance of a potential EC membership quite early (see SPÖ section). This was crucial with regard to Austria’s obligations to the signatory countries of the Austrian Independence Treaty. In this sense, the Soviets new moderate diplomacy had opened a window of opportunity for Austrian policy makers, as hence, applying for accession - which seemed useful from an economic perspective - became a relatively safe move from a foreign policy perspective.

So, basically, in order to maintain the core position of achieving economic growth and maintaining economic stability, the party’s position on the issue of EC accession needed to be changed and this change seemed to be relatively safe. This gives some first support for hypotheses H1d and H2d.

According to Erhard Busek and Andreas Khol, the ÖVP’s policy shift to a pro-accession position was not a strategic move in terms of electoral competition. Opinion polls did not play a significant role in the decision making process (see Interview Khol, 30). Although the party used polls, they indicated that the electorate was very badly informed about the issue and that it had to be informed in order to be convinced (see Interview Khol, 30). Effectively that’s what the grand coalition did in the following years, applying huge campaign efforts (see Gehler 2002, 322 et seq.). On the other hand there was a general feeling that the majority of the population would support an EC accession at the end of the day (see Interview Busek, 18). Consequently Hypotheses 1a and 2a are not supported by the shifting process of the ÖVP.

Moreover, as no party had shifted its policy position on the issue before the ÖVP did, H1c and H2c can as well be dismissed for this case. H1b and H2b have some empirical basis, as the ÖVP had lost votes in previous regional elections in Burgenland, Vienna and Lower Austria and could not beat the SPÖ in the 1986 general election. Interviews though, did not indicate an influence of this factor on the ÖVP’s policy shift. QCA will shed more light on the general validity of these hypotheses.
Party Leadership
Alois Mock became one of the most passionate advocates of an EC/EU accession in the following years, whose role for the success of this project can hardly be underestimated (see also Interview Schwarzböck 36 et seq.; Busek, 17). But until 1987 he himself was in favor of a global approach to foreign policy which did not include neither accession to nor association with the European Community (see ÖVP Monatshefte 1987/4, 7; Interview Khol, 23; Gehler 2002, 276). As he advocated the future option of Austria’s accession already in late 1987, his personal position must have changed at least shortly before the party’s policy shift. Consequently, at the 1988 meeting of the executive, Mock was already on the pro-accession side (see Gehler 2002, 276). Unfortunately though, interviews could not clarify whether Mock had a proactive role in this process or not. While Khol (see Interview Khol, 23 et seq.) claimed that he had not, Schwarzböck (see Interview Schwarzböck 36 et seq.) argued that he was the driving force behind the policy shift. Similarly Busek claimed that Mock was the driving force behind the ÖVP shift (see Interview Busek, 17). Still he did not have a proactive role in the final decision making procedure in Maria Plain according to Busek (see Interview Busek, 14; see Busek in Kopeinig 2013, 189 et seq.). What we know for sure is that he did not predetermine the vote of the Bundesparteivorstand in this instance. Considering Mocks leadership style (see Eichtinger 2008), which included continuous and extremely intense communication with all party branches it is not too speculative to assume, that he knew very well, what the opinions of the members of the Bundesparteivorstand were and how they would vote. Consequently he might have further decentralized this concrete decision making procedure by leaving aside the “chairman democracy” mode (see below), but this move was probably not very risky for his own policy preference (and even very clever as he could “stay out of fire” by not predetermining anything). So, most probably he reckoned that veto-players would not get active, provided that the decision making situation would lead to a positive dynamic. In following this strategy Mock proved more cautious than the ÖVP-governors who demanded a vote, as he knew very well that once the council would have decided against accession, the accession issue would have been off the table for a long time (see Interview Schwarzböck, 37).

Decision making
Within the ÖVP, decision making combines centralized and decentralized aspects (see chapter Intraparty Decision Making Structures). Policy decision making within the ÖVP generally takes place in the Bundesparteivorstand. This executive body though, is not an open plenum, where all views of the participants are openly expressed and decisions are taken by a
democratic voting procedure. Rather the People’s Party’s “Intraparty democracy is a chairman democracy” (Interview Khol, 24). Regularly, the party leader predetermines a position and the Bundesparteivorstand votes accordingly, as in the end, a unanimous vote is desirable (see Khol, 24). In some occasions straw polls are used to test the support for a decision. Additionally, the party leader holds informal talks with representatives of party-branches. More generally, it is essential for an ÖVP party leader to keep the “15 Kurfürsten” – the heads of the nine regional party branches and the heads of the six leagues (Bünde) – on his side, by regularly consulting them on his decisions (Interview Khol, 28 et seq.). Especially the latter aspect indicates that ÖVP leaders are in general substantially constrained. In the crucial moment of decision making, the procedure applied was even more decentralized than regularly as the party leader did not predetermine the vote.

**Veto Players**

As it has been demonstrated, incentives, caused by a changing political environment basically surpassed the counterincentives of workers, farmers, small and medium-sized businesses, the Steiner group and parts of the Tyrolean party branch, as those did not veto in the crucial moment of decision making. So even though there was a significantly large group of formal veto players, they did not use their vote in the party executive body. Regarding the ÖVP’s chairman democracy this would not have been very surprising. But as it has just been mentioned, chairman democracy was suspended in this particular instance, a fact which actually supports veto player positions. Moreover the collective confidence was not in great shape. In 1988, the People’s Party did face some external stress. Alois Mock, who’s position as party leader was never uncontested (see Interview Khol, 28 et seq.) had to face critique, because he had not managed to win the 1986 general elections. Moreover the ÖVP had lost votes in previous regional elections in Burgenland, Vienna and Lower Austria. So still, the question remains, why would a powerful group of veto players not follow their incentives but stay loyal to an already weakened party leadership?

The interpretation of Maria Plain participant Andreas Khol is, that in this particular situation of uncertainty – departing from the norm of the People’s Party’s decision making procedures with an open voting procedure – it seemed to be the safest option to vote with the majority, which according to the sequence of votes appeared to be supporting Austria’s accession to the EC (see Interview Khol, 25).

Although this explanation based on the uncertainty aspect has something to it, it is most probably not the full story. Moreover it could be doubted how uncertain participants of the
meeting really were, considering the intraparty discussion of the year 1987. The quality of the veto players’ own positions seems to be a more plausible explanation for their behavior. Because, although their veto positions were very solid with regard to the balance of power in the party executive, they were rather weak regarding the support within their respective party branches. As it has been demonstrated, all party branches – although there was mostly a dominant position – were internally divided on the issue of EC/EU accession. The farmers league was split into supporters who wanted to get access to new markets and opponents, who feared losses in subsidies and increased competition. Within the business league, the federation of industries was pro-, representatives of small and medium-sized businesses were contra-accession. Moreover for the business league, an economically framed shift, aiming at liberalization measures could simply not be opposed with regard to its self-perception as the representative of market interests. Similar schisms can be found within all party branches. Ludwig Steiner – another opponent of accession – participated at the meeting, but as a regular MP he did not have the right to vote.

Summary
To sum up, on the incentive level, we find that the ÖVP’s policy shift was initiated by external incentives, all related to changes in the policy field (instrumental positions changed in favor of core positions). The party leader shifted in late 1987 and decision making was decentralized. At the veto-player level, there were several groups, who actually opposed the party’s policy shift. Though, they abstained from vetoing in the crucial moment, most probably because they were themselves constrained by the schisms in their respective party branches. Regarding the hypotheses of this analysis, the ÖVPs shifting procedure appears to confirm H2d (changes in the policy field/decentralized).

FPÖ
Process
Historically, the Austrian Freedom Party has a long “European” tradition. Very early the party was seeking stronger cooperation with – and also integration in – the growing European Community. The FPÖ’s pro-integration position before 1985 was of rather visionary character (see Interview Frischenschlager, 65). The goal of being part of a united Europe was designed for the far future as national and European political structures alike strongly limited its realization in the near future. Therefore, the party’s commitment to Europe remained very vague.
The goal of participating in the process of European integration was supported by both traditional factions within the party, the “national” and the “liberal” wing. As it has been shown, this pro-European attitude was nicely reflected in the parties policy positions up to the 1990s (see FPÖ positions). The most important document in this respect is probably the party programme of 1985, which was drafted under the liberal party leadership of Norbert Steger.

In the context of the party’s own government participation (1983-1986) the FPÖ needed to specify its policy positions in general and its European policy position specifically. The 1985 manifesto was an attempt to realize this (see Interview Frischenschlager, 67). The document was again not fully clear when it came to the party’s preferred practical form of European integration, but it was clear in stating the party’s goal of full membership in the EC (see FPÖ 1985, 16). The fact that the party voted against the ÖVP’s Europa Entschließungsantrag (1986a) the same year seems disturbing only at first sight. In fact the FPÖ’s ideas of European policy went further than those of the People’s Party. Supporting the ÖVP resolution, which was basically aiming at stronger bilateral relations with the EC countries (see ÖVP section), would have meant blocking the party’s own goal of full membership. Furthermore, it would have meant voting against the coalition partner, SPÖ, which would have caused a further destabilization of the coalition government (see Interview Stix, 54). Also from a practical standpoint this does not seem surprising, as according to Friedhelm Frischenschlager (defense minister of the SPÖ-FPÖ government) “the SPÖ decided and we were trying to set accents” (Interview Frischenschlager, 81). So, up to 1990 the pro-accession position of the Freedom party remained unchallenged. Jörg Haider, who became party leader in 1986, himself was one of its strongest supporters (see Interview Frischenschlager, 68; Sten.Prot. 27.11.1987.).

According to Friedhelm Frischenschlager things started to change in 1990 (see Interview Frischenschlager, 73). From that time on, Haider cautiously started to question the merits of a potential EC membership in internal discussions. This is also reflected quite nicely in the party’s 1990 manifesto (see FPÖ 1990, see FPÖ positions section). Additionally, Haider was very active in using the party organ Neue Freie Zeitung to establish a more and more critical mood regarding the EC (see Interview Frischenschlager, 70 et seq.). Nevertheless, up to 1993 critical arguments were mostly combined with more general commitments to European integration, which added some ambiguity to Haider’s personal position and to the party’s position alike (see Schaller 1994, 52).

At a special party congress in 1993, the party’s position should have been “clarified” (Freie Argumente 3/1993, 3). The resulting document was a “yes, under conditions” formally, but with regard to the conditions (“home works”) it was rather a factual “no” (see also Schaller
1994, 52), which also caused critique from inside the party, namely from party seniors (Freie Argumente 3/1993) the youth organization and others like the Viennese official Erwin Hirnschall (see Schaller 1994, 56). The FPÖ’s opposition to Austria’s accession was then formally signed and sealed with another party congress in April 1994. 85.5% of the congress participants voted against the accession (see Freie Argumente 2/1994, 12) An internal poll before the congress executed by the party organ Neue Freie Zeitung brought a similar outcome (see Schaller 1994, 58). The party’s parliamentary group hence voted against accession laws in parliament, arguing that there should be another negotiation procedure. Although the FPÖ explicitly did not voice a proposition to the public on how they should vote in the referendum (the congress’ proposition did solely address the FPÖ MPs in parliament) (see Freie Argumente 2/1994, 12) the following referendum campaign was clearly an anti-accession campaign (see Schaller 1994, 66). Haider took the role of a spokesman of accession opponents in the public debate which he also dominated in terms of agenda setting and style (see Schaller 1994, 70). The FPÖ turned into the advocate of EU-critics. In Mai, at the kick-off event of the FPÖ campaign Haider called on the electorate to vote “no” in order to “give the government something to think about” (see Schaller 1994, 70), which marked the beginning of his “Denkzettel” strategy. In the last two weeks before the referendum, Haider constantly emotionalized his argumentation, finally pushing it to absurdity when arguing that consumers would have to fear lice in food products as a consequence of an EU accession (see Schaller 1994, 70).

Incentives
In order to examine why the FPÖ shifted its position it makes sense to discuss the party’s motives to support European integration in the first place (up to the early 1990s). It is striking that these motives were not economic – in contrast to the People’s party’s – but political (see Interview Stix, 57 et seq.). The pro-accession position was based on a strong ideological sentiment of belonging to the democratic Western European societies and a rejection of state socialism in the context of the cold war. Associated with this ideological factor was the idea that stronger ties to the European Community and hence the West, were a practical means of military security, while neutrality – though this was not openly expressed too often – was perceived as too strong a restriction for Austria’s foreign policy, which the country had been forced to accept in the eyes of many FPÖ officials (see Interview Stix, 62). The FPÖ’s critics frequently interpreted the party’s pro-European position as being a subtle claim to another “Anschluss” (see for example Interview Busek, 19). Although the idea of creating closer ties to Germany might have played a role for the FPÖ’s support of European Integration (see
Luther 1988, 218), especially for the national (German-nationalist) wing, this interpretation cannot be proved empirically. Friedhelm Frischenschlager gives the alternative explanation that German nationalism and hence the notion that Austria was not a “natural” national entity allowed the national wing to stretch it’s political horizon to a European level and hence created a common basis for the nationals and the liberals in Europe policy (see Interview Frischenschlager, 66).

For the party’s policy shift, there were several relevant factors on the incentive level. First, joining the European Community meant, accepting a practical framework of European Integration, though the party itself was never able to develop a concrete position regarding the question of what kind of political structures they actually wanted for the “United Europe” (see Interview Frischenschlager, 65). Consequently, there was a growing potential for critique as the first concrete problems occurred.

But this factor was definitely of minor importance for the FPÖ’s euro-skeptic turn compared to strategy. Of course it is always difficult to prove strategic motives behind the actions of specific individuals or organizations, as strategic behavior in political competition is generally regarded harmful to the integrity of political actors, individuals and organizations alike. But in the case of Jörg Haider’s and the FPÖ’s policy shift, this can be stated on a solid empirical basis.

First, objectively, trying to win the large part of the electorate which was skeptical about an EC/EU accession was definitely rational in terms of electoral competition, as ÖVP and SPÖ shifted to accession support in 1988 and 1989 and left a large part of the electorate behind (see Plasser/Ulram 1994b). Second, although there is of course no documentation of Jörg Haider’s strategic intentions, the interviews, which have been conducted with former FPÖ officials indicate that this was at least the perception within the party. Moreover, as Gerulf Stix recalled in the course of our interview, it was Haider’s general approach to politics that “you first have to win elections”, policies could be discussed later on (Interview Stix, 59; see also Luther 2011, 455). According to Friedhelm Frischenschlager, it was in internal discussions, that Haider even explicitly reasoned about a change in the party’s European policy as “this is what the people want” (Interview Frischenschlager, 73). Erwin Hirnschall openly critized Haider for the strategic intentions behind his euro-skeptic shift, when he left the party in 1994 (see Schaller 1994). Hence, retrospectively it is quite obvious that after the two grand parties’ shifts, Haider was trying to maximize the party’s vote share by changing
the party’s European policy position. H1c and H2c are therefore supported by the FPÖ case. How he was able to pass intraparty resistance with this decision will be examined below.

In contrast to the previous cases, changes in the policy field did not have a substantive effect on the FPÖ’s policy shift, which is why H1d and H2d can be excluded for this case. Moreover even though this strategic move was intended to maximize the party’s vote share, it were not changes in public opinion, but other parties’ policy shifts, which induced it. Hence H1a and H2a can be excluded as well. Likewise H1b and H2b are not supported by the case, as the FPÖ had won in both general elections prior to its shift.

**Party Leadership**

With regard to party leadership, Jörg Haider’s role for the FPÖ’s policy shift was decisive. With his famous “Innsbruck-coup” to party leadership, Haider ended the dominant phase of the liberal faction under Norbert Steger. Haider himself could hardly be categorized in terms of the FPÖ traditional national-liberal split. Born into a traditional national family, he presented himself as a representative of the party’s liberal youth in the earlier years of his political career (see Interview Stix, 56 et seq.). Later though, he again broke with the liberal party wing, which may already indicate some ideological flexibility.

In the first years of his leadership the party’s European policy position remained stable. Haider himself even pushed the issue of full membership forward, for example by co-authoring a respective motion in parliament (Sten.Prot. 27.11.1987). Starting from 1990, Haider then cautiously began to make critical statements in internal discussions (see Interview Frischenschlager, 69), which he intensified over the course of the early 1990s. Moreover he used the party organ *Neue Freie Zeitung* to create a more EC/EU critical mood (see Interview Frischenschlager, 69). It was not a strategy of a clear cut or open change, rather one of two steps forward, one step back. In doing so, he was able to slowly destabilize pro-European forces and to establish an EC/EU critical consensus, without exposing himself to open intraparty conflict.

**Decision Making**

As it has been demonstrated earlier, expert survey data suggests that the FPÖ’s decision making was relatively centralized in the early 1990s (see Laver/Hunt 1992). This suggestion is partly supported by the information generated from the conducted interviews. But it does not conform to the concrete decision making procedure in the analyzed case, as the final
decision to perform a policy shift was taken by the party congress. This discrepancy requires some elaboration:

Decision making did in fact change within the time frame of this analysis. Traditionally, the FPÖ had a substantive democratic culture regarding intraparty decision making. During the leadership periods of Friedrich Peter and Norbert Steger, decisions resulted from very open, democratic and intense discussions (see Interview Stix, 54 et seq.; see also Interview Frischenschlager, 64). For party leaders, it was very difficult to overcome internal critique. In his first years as party leader, also Jörg Haider made some experiences with this structural feature of his party.21

He was able to overcome these structures over the course of his leadership period (1986-2000). Essential for this centralization, were changes in the factional balance of power, as Haider loyalists now outnumbered the traditional national and liberal officials (see Veto Players). This change in party structure, although it did not lead to formal changes in decision making structures,22 caused a change in the party’s decision making culture, which may best be described – in the words of Friedhelm Frischenschlager – as “intraparty populism” (Interview Frischenschlager, 74) or “Demokratur” (Interview Stix, 56). Open discussions and open critique in decision making bodies were replaced by overwhelming loyalty to the party leader (“He [Haider] was god”, Interview Frischenschlager 72) and social pressure on dissenters, which effectively strongly centralized the Freedom Party’s decision making over the course of the 1990s.

By the time the party actually shifted its position on the issue of EC/EU accession, decision making was already for a great part in the hands of the party leader. But, centralization developed to the full extent rather later, in the second half of the 1990 (see Luther 2006, 370). So, although Haider did already use a strategy of preempting formal decision making procedures by public and spontaneous announcements in the accession debate (see Luther 2006, 370), he was not as successful in imposing his decisions on the party as he would be later in his career. He was rather forced to let the party congress decide (1993 and 1994) by the intraparty resistance against a policy shift. Still the contra-accession position was approved by the party congress. This is closely related to factional change, which has just been mentioned and will be examined in the following.

21 When Haider tried to implement his intimus Meischberger in a high position of the Tyrolian party branch, this was rejected by local officials (see Interview Stix, 55).
22 Formal decision making rules changed shortly after the party’s policy shift.
**Veto Players**

In 1986 the party entered a phase of massive structural change with Jörg Haider’s “coup” to party leadership. Haider’s charismatic and populist leadership style as well as programmatic changes boosted the FPÖ’s electoral success and attracted new political personnel. Not only that besides the traditional national and liberal party factions, this new “Blutgruppe Null”-type of party officials entered the party’s decision making bodies, they did so in relatively large numbers. So, as a consequence of the party’s electoral success under Jörg Haider there was a large group of careerist, paid party officials, who were for a large part not rooted in the traditional organization. They were rather tied to the organization as a byproduct of their loyalty to the party leader, who – by winning elections – provided for their jobs and spoils (see Luther 2006, 370). As the FPÖ was now able to distribute posts and money, the party leadership was put in a position where it could maneuver much less constrained in terms of policy decisions. Veto-players – on the EC/EU issue – from the liberal as well as from the national party faction found themselves outnumbered and were soon pushed in the role of molesters, who were against anything (see Interview Frischenschlager, 72) by the new populist discussion culture within the party (see Decision Making section).

There was still substantive resistance against Haider’s policy shift at least up to 1993. The party’s youth organization, the *Ring Freiheitlicher Wirtschaftstreibender* (see Schaller 1994) and senior officials like Klaus Mahnert criticized the Euro-skeptical turn. The strongest defendants of the party’s pro-European course in the early 1990s were probably the liberals. But as a consequence of the huge divide in policy preferences between them and the newly formed majority of the party, five FPÖ MPs (Heide Schmidt, Klara Motter, Friedhelm Frischenschlager, Hans Helmut Moser, Thomas Barmüller) formed the splinter party Liberales Forum (LIF). The FPÖ’s policy shift on the EC/EU accession was a major reason for this move (see Interview Frischenschlager, 69). Similarly Erwin Hirnschall (see Schaller 1994, 66), Viennese party chair and former party leader Friedrich Peter (see Luther 1995) left the party in response to Haider’s Euro-skeptical turn. Others, like Hilmar Kabas – who had been a leading figure in the liberal factions heyday – adjusted to the new dominant faction. The national party wing, which had supported Haider at the coup-party congress in 1986 was rather incorporated in the nouveau regime.

As a consequence of these processes the intraparty opposition to a policy shift regarding EC/EU accession was strongly diminished. Hence, the decision could quite easily pass the
party congress in 1994. The remaining dissenters were even useful for Haider in order to present the FPÖ as a party where both opinions could coexist (Schaller 1994, 66).

**Summary**
The FPÖ’s policy shift from being the strongest pro-accession force in the Austrian party system to being one of the EC/EU’s strongest critics was made possible by multiple factors. On the incentive level there was a strategic incentive triggered by the grand parties’ policy shifts on the issue. The incentive finally led to an actual policy shift as the party went through a phase of massive structural change after a change in party leadership. On the basis of its electoral success, the new party leadership was able to implement a new dominant faction and to transform intraparty decision making into a much more centralized form. But the concrete decision making procedure analyzed was still very decentralized. Hence, with regard to the hypotheses of this analysis H2c (other party’s shift/decentralized), H4 (change in dominant faction/decentralized) and H6 (leadership change/decentralized) are confirmed. Regarding H4 there are two limitations: first, the Haider loyalist faction did not share a common ideological or organizational basis. It was therefore rather a group of individual political entrepreneurs than a traditional party faction with a common identity. Second, its role for the party’s policy shift was limited to passive support for the party leader. Hence, H6 is stronger supported by the FPÖ’s case.

**Greens**

**Process**
Within the Austrian Green Party, European integration had always been a very controversial issue (see Interview Petrovic, 85). Even more so as in the late 1980s and early 1990s the Greens were still a very young party. Hence, a lot of ideological heterogeneity had remained from the Greens very recent formation as a political party. Although starting from the early 1980s various Green groups have been active on the local and regional level, the Grüne Alternative was founded not until July 1986. This new party was the result of what was called the Green “unification process“, by which diverse smaller groups of middle-class and leftist Greens were unified (see Dachs 2006, 390 et seq.). In December 1986, the first eight Green MPs were sworn in, after the party had received 4,8% of the vote in the 1986 general election. It then took a whole legislative period to complete the unification process by negotiating and publishing the first official party manifesto in 1990, which extensively outlined the catalogue of Green policy positions (see Dachs 2006)
Europe policy was defined a little earlier, in 1989. Before that, a common party position regarding European integration that went beyond the preferences of individuals did simply not exist as, just like in other policy fields, a position first had to be negotiated internally (see Greens positions section). By early 1989, Europe policy had gained a lot of public attention with the policy shifts of the two grand parties in 1988 and 1989, which put some pressure on the Greens to react (Die Grünen 1989, 2). They did by presenting a “Europe Manifesto“ at a congress meeting in Innsbruck. Although, there had been a sizable group of accession supporters from the very beginning, the Greens decided for several reasons to oppose any closer ties to the European Community (see Incentives section; see also Die Grünen 1989). The title of the conference already said it all: „Yes to Europe - No to the EC“ (see Jordan 2014). Accordingly the party’s parliamentary group predominately voted against the application for accession in summer 1989.

From that time on, the Green position was clearly anti-accession. Though, in contrast to, for example the SPÖ, where the position remained widely unchallenged internally once it had been defined and approved by decision making bodies (see SPÖ section), the Greens internal divide persisted. Years of intense intraparty conflict about the accession issue followed, which centered on accession supporter MP Monika Langthaler and MP Johannes Voggenhuber, the leading figure of accession opponents in the Green party. Over the course of the early 1990s this conflict got more and more personal, which again caused some criticism within the party, especially regarding the behavior of party whip Voggenhuber (see Interview Petrovic, 90; Impuls 1/1992, 24; 23).

In 1991, the Greens initiated a popular petition for a referendum about Austria’s EEA membership, which preceded the country’s accession to the European Union. The petition was signed by only 2.25% of the electorate and was widely perceived as a major defeat for the party’s Europe policy (see Interview Floss, 99). Nevertheless the Greens maintained their anti-accession position. The „strict No to the EC“ was confirmed at the party’s Bundestagung and accordingly a „No“-campaign for the accession referendum was launched, including a recommendation for the electorate to vote „No“. The recommendation was based on a resolution by the Green Bundesvorstand and approved by the party congress in April 1994 (see Schaller 1994, 59). Even in the middle of the Green’s anti-accession campaign efforts, the dissenting opinions within the party were not hidden from the public. After the heavy internal fights under party whip Voggenhuber, party leader Madeleine Petrovic moderately declared that accession supporters could further articulate their opinions without
consequences, the Green’s policy position would stay the same though (see 56). In March 1994, when the Austrian parliament decided about the constitutional law legitimating Austria’s accession, Monika Langthaler, in contrast to the rest of her parliamentary group, voted in favor accession (see Sten.Prot. 5.5.1994).

The referendum finally turned the tables in the Green intraparty conflict. Shortly after the result was certain, Johannes Voggenhuber proclaimed on television that the Greens would now, out of respect for the will of the democratic sovereign, support all further steps necessary for Austria’s accession to the EU (see Interview Petrovic, 89; Interview Floss, 103). Although this decision was not coordinated neither with the party leader nor with any decision making body, the policy shift was accepted by the rest of the party and remained unchallenged. At best the way of proceeding, not the content, caused some minor disturbances (see Interview Floss, 103). The party’s Bundesvorstand later approved this new course in Europe policy.

Incentives
Since 1992, Peter Pilz held the office of the Green BundessprecherIn. He was the first party leader of the Austrian Green party, as this office was created not earlier than 1992. Between the party’s foundation in 1986 and 1992, party leadership was shared by the two BundesgeschäftsführerInnen. At this stage of the analysis H5 and H6 cannot be excluded, but it will be with regard to the actual role of the party leader in the shifting process (see Party Leader section). Moreover, H3 and H4 are neither supported by the Green case, as there was no substantive factional change prior to the Greens policy shift. In fact Johannes Voggenhuber, who initiated the shift, was even the strongest advocate of the anti-accession position in the first place.

As it has been demonstrated earlier, the Greens held a contra-accession position up to the accession referendum. Though the party was never Euro-skeptic in general terms. Based on the idea of international solidarity and the rejection of nationalism, the Greens were generally in favor of an intensified European integration. They “perceived themselves not only as European, but as a world-wide movement” (Interview Petrovic, 85).

“The Greens were actually a confluence of different civil movements, the peace movement, the women’s movement, the ecology movement, the human rights movement, anti-discrimination movements of different sorts, insofar it was completely clear that we would consider ourselves as very, very international” (Interview Petrovic, 85).
But from the Green standpoint, the form of integration offered by the European Community lacked basic characteristics. The conception of the Single Market and the liberalization policies of the EC in general were perceived as a mechanism designed solely for “economic-industrial expansion” and the “reduction of state regulatory policy on all levels, monopolization and oligarchization[…]” (Die Grünen 1989, 3). Hence environmental policies, which of course had high priority on the party’s political agenda, were expected to be incompatible with the EC’s economic policy. The Single Market was also criticized for being a “declaration of war for the great social achievements of the workers movement” (4) as it enforced the dismantling of the social welfare state. Moreover the Greens heavily criticized the EC’s lack of democratic legitimacy (see 5). What the Greens saw in the EC was rather an integration of the international capital than the integration of international solidarity they would have favored (see Interview Floss, 102). Furthermore, EC/EU-membership was expected to violate Austria’s neutrality (see Interview Petrovic, 88 et seq.), even more so as in context of the Balkan war the Greens internally discussed the potential threat of military activities by the EC/EU. Consequently, the party decided to oppose an accession to the Community.

After the Austrian accession referendum the party changed its course. Instead of further trying to block the accession procedure or supporting an exit-strategy, the Greens now supported the formal accession procedure, for example by accepting the accession treaty in parliament. Very influential for this move – at least according to the Greens official statements – was the basis-democratic self-perception of the party (see Interview Petrovic, 87). With the voters “yes” in the referendum, the sovereign – the Austrian people – had decided and a basis-democratic party like the Greens could not ignore this decision.

“I will approve the accession treaty today. I will do so against my own political convictions. I will not do so against my conscience. I will do so out of respect for the sovereign of this parliamentary democracy, the electorate […]” (Voggenhuber, Sten. Prot. 11.11.1994, 41).

Moreover, there was no immediate cut in the party’s EU critique. The only difference was that now, the goal was to change Europe from within the European Union instead of doing so as a non-member. As this strategy was also discussed as an option for the party in the years before (see Interview Petrovic, 89), accepting the accession and sending a party official to the European parliament was well acceptable for the biggest part of the party. It was rather a change of strategy, than a change in core policy positions. “[R]egarding the question accession: yes/no… it is ultimately a strategic-tactical question. But what is important: yes to
European common values, yes to peacekeeping […]” (Interview Petrovic 87, see also Impuls 1/92, 24). This is also nicely illustrated by the following statement by Johannes Voggenhuber, which he made during his speech in the accession ratification session in parliament.

“In my view, this question about an accession to the European Union is not a matter of conscience. To me – although the media framed it that way – it was never a fundamental decision. It was a decision for European policy, a strategic decision for the future of Europe. [...] We wanted the approval of the people for changing the European Union from outside. The Austrian people have decided against it and I respect that. I see today’s act of ratification as an act of executing the people’s will by the parliament, rather than a vote about our political opinions, our convictions” (Voggenhuber, Sten. Prot. 11.11.1994, 41).

In addition, from an electoral competition perspective, the Greens did always have problems with communicating their pro Europe-contra EU position to the electorate. The party was struggling to differentiate from the growing Euro-skepticism of the FPÖ. Especially in the months of the referendum campaigns, the FPÖ became the political force associated with the anti-accession position. As a consequence of the Freedom party’s emotionalized campaign, being against an accession to the EU was soon associated with Jörg Haider’s populism and nationalism (see Schaller 1994, 70; Impuls 4/1992). So, shifting to the majoritarian “yes” to Austria’s accession did also solve a serious problem in terms of electoral competition after the FPÖ’s policy shift.

“[W]e were constantly mingled with nationalist positions, and also the crazier the FPÖ’s argumentation got, with ‘blood chocolate’ and ‘lice yogurt’, it became more and more difficult to say we don’t mean it that way but very differently. We were always talking until we were blue in the face […], people never really understood that. And insofar, I mean Voggenhuber is not a stupid person, I think he was feeling what was going on there and to a certain extent this was also a sort of relief from a position, which was hardly communicable” (Interview Petrovic, 91).

So regarding the hypotheses of this thesis, the latter incentive gives strong support to H1c and H2c, as the Greens, at least in part, changed their position as a reaction to the FPÖ’s policy shift. The former factor, is harder to categorize, as the positive accession referendum is at the same time a manifestation of public opinion - as voiced by the mechanism of a referendum - and a change in the policy field, as it had legal and political consequences. The reasoning of Green party officials about their policy shifts suggests, that it was rather an ideologically rooted reaction to a change in the policy field, as it happened „out of respect for the sovereign of this parliamentary democracy“ (Voggenhuber, sten. Prot. 41). Hence it could be argued that H1d and H2d were supported by the Greens policy shift. But, in this concrete situation,
the role of strategic intentions with regard to public opinion and hence H1a and H2a seem more convincing. What challenges H1d and H2d even more is the counterfactual argument: What if the Greens had not changed their position? It is hardly imaginable that any political party could ignore a vote of 2/3 of the electorate. Even for parties with a weaker commitment to democracy than the Greens, the costs of maintaining such a position would have been extremely high. Thus, even if the Greens’ reasoning about their policy shifts indicates that it was an instrumental shift as a reaction to changes in the policy field, a large question mark remains behind H1d and H2d. The last variable on the incentive level, electoral defeat, cannot be ruled out completely, but it seems to be rather unlikely, that it had a major effect on the Greens policy position change. The Greens lost just 0.04% of their vote share in the general elections 1990, four years before the party’s policy shift. Nonetheless, the general validity of H1b and H2b will of course be examined in the QCA.

Party Leadership
In summer 1994, when the Greens policy shift took place, Peter Pilz was the Green’s party leader. His personal position regarding a potential EC/EU accession was clearly anti-accession (see Schaller 1994, 59). After the accession referendum, when it was up to the party to react, it was not the party leadership who initiated the Greens shift to supporting Austria’s EU accession. Pilz, although his decision might have gone in the same direction, did simply not have the opportunity to do so. Johannes Voggenhuber, the party’s spokesperson for Europe policy preempted him and the rest of the party, by announcing that the Greens would now back the electorate’s decision.

“To be honest, when the result of the referendum came out, we, I think Franz Floss was Bundesgeschäftsführer at that time, prepared for convening the party committees, in order to decide what this means. And there Johannes Voggenhuber preempted us and just declared on TV that we would accept this now and that we would ratify the treaty, which was not okay with regard to the party” (Interview Petrovic, 89).

So interestingly, in contrast to the theoretical model, it was not the party leader, who reacted to certain incentives and hence made the party change it’s policy position, it was rather the solo-run of a high party official using the normative power of the factual. It has to be stated though, that the Greens of the early 1990s had a rather strong aversion against emphasizing the role of individual politicians, stemming from their self-perception as a movement rather than a traditional party (see Dachs 2006, 394). As a result the office of the Green BundessprecherIn, was conceived as primus inter pares. This partly explains, why the role of party leader did not mirror those of other party leaders for their respective policy shifts. But it
does not explain why it was instead just another individual and not a collective decision making body. Anyway, for the moment H5 and H6 are not confirmed by the Green case, as they imply theoretically, that the new party leader actively promotes the policy shift, which was obviously not the case with Peter Pilz and the Greens in summer 1994.

**Decision Making**

As demonstrated earlier, the Green’s intraparty decision making is generally categorized as the most decentralized of the Austrian party system. This corresponds to the Greens initial decision for an anti-accession position, as well as the Green’s decision for an anti-accession campaign, which were both taken by the party congress. Furthermore the Green party congress had a broader set of competences than its counterparts of other parties (see Intraparty Decision Making Structures section). Moreover there is also a large amount of autonomy for the regional party branches (see Interview Petrovic, 94 et seq.). Nonetheless, and not least because the party was very young at the time and could not rely on party-affiliated organizations and the like specific policy decisions were mostly prepared by internal „experts“ for the related policy field (see Interview Petrovic, 91 et seq.). And in this period the Green parliamentary group was very influential when it came to policy decisions, as in contrast to the party, they controlled a significant resource base (see Interview Floss, 104; see Dachs 2006, 394).

With regard to the decision making procedure on the party’s 1994 policy shift though, this does not apply. In fact, the party’s shift resulted from the decision of just one person, Johannes Voggenhuber, though he was not even the party leader. A few days later, the Green *Bundesvorstand* confirmed this decision unanimously. So, the final decision was taken by a relatively small decision making body, which does neither match the Greens basis-democratic self-perception, nor the categorization of their decision making structures in political science. Nonetheless, there was at least the opportunity to block the policy shift. The question why this did not happen in the Greens case either will be examined in the following.

**Veto Players**

Within the Austrian Green party, there had always been broad agreement about the fact that European integration had to be supported, but that the EC and later the EU as they were constituted, needed to be changed. As it has been mentioned earlier, there were basically two opinions in terms of how the party should try to reach this goal. While the majority of the party opted for a “changing the EU from outside”-strategy, there was a pro-accession group („changing Europe from inside“) from the very beginning. The former group was lead by
Johannes Voggenhuber. But also party leader Peter Pilz and most other high party officials like Madeleine Petrovic and Franz Floss belonged to this EC/EU-critical group. For the pro-accession group, the role of MP Monika Langthaler was decisive. Within the Green party she became the spokesperson for accession supporters. Other proponents of this group were Christoph Chorherr and Herbert Fux (see Schaller 1994, 56; Impuls 1/1993, 19). Basically the Green accession supporters were not so different from their anti-accession counterparts in their perception of the European Community, as they were in strategic terms. They simply favored a more pragmatic strategy as they felt that „Yes to Europe no to the EC“ would be hardly communicable to the electorate (see Impuls 1/1993, 19, see also Interview Petrovic, 85 et seq.; Interview Floss, 99).

After the party congress decided to run a “no” campaign prior to the accession referendum with a majority of over 80 percent, it was one person who decided to turn this position upside down, without being the party leader, without coordination with anybody and without any legitimacy in terms of intraparty decision making rules. Still, Voggenhuber’s TV declaration was not challenged by the former majority of EU-critics. A few days later, the responsible decision making body, the Green Bundesvorstand, backed this decision unanimously. In fact there was no “outhaul” by the rank and file, although Voggenhuber’s solo run was considered inappropriate (see Interview Floss, 103). This can basically be explained by two factors, which have both been mentioned already.

First, the whole party felt delighted in the sense that they got rid of their communication problem regarding the EU issue (see Interview Petrovic, 91). Second, the pro-accession position had always been present in intraparty discussions and could still be regarded as just another strategy to the Green core position of aiming at an integrated, social and ecological Europe. So, at least as the Green shift was conceptualized at the beginning, the Greens could even maintain their EU-critique. Another factor, which might have hampered extensive critique on the policy shift was the fact that challenging Voggenhuber’s decision and consequently revealing intraparty conflict again, after the Langthaler-Voggenhuber dispute, would have definitely been counterproductive for the Greens fight against the image of a „chaos-party“, who is “always fighting” internally (see Interview Floss, 106). The fact that dissenting opinions were even accepted during the referendum campaign however, contradicts this interpretation to some extent.
Summary
The Greens’ policy shift to a pro-accession position is best described by H2a (public opinion/decentralized) and H2c (other party’s shifts/decentralized). The Greens on one hand reacted to the positive vote of the Austrian electorate in the accession referendum (H2a). Although it could be argued that this move was also a response to the legal and political change in the policy field entailed by the referendum, this interpretation is inferior to H2a, considering the argument that hardly any party could ignore a referendum result. On the other hand, the Greens shift was also a reaction to the FPÖ’s policy shift to an anti-accession position (H2c). Interestingly, the party leader did not mediate between incentives and decision making. In this respect, the Greens do not comply with the theoretical model utilized in this analysis. Regarding decision making structures, the Green policy shift, was still not completely centralized, as at least the Bundesvorstand decided, but it was far from being the decentralized ideal type one would expect taking the literature into account. This is why H2a and H2c are supported instead of H1a, H1c.
Process Tracing – Summary
Based on the process tracing analysis of party policy shifts, five of the twelve hypotheses derived from the theoretical model are supported by the empirical shifts of Austrian parties shifts between 1985-1994.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Hypothesis Type</th>
<th>SPÖ</th>
<th>ÖVP</th>
<th>FPÖ</th>
<th>Grüne</th>
</tr>
</thead>
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<tr>
<td>Public Opinion/</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Centralized (H1a)</td>
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<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Public Opinion/</td>
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</tr>
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<td>Decentralized (H2a)</td>
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<tr>
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<tr>
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<td>X</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Decentralized (H2c)</td>
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<td>X</td>
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<tr>
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<td></td>
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<tr>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Decentralized (H2d)</td>
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<td>X</td>
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<tr>
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<tr>
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<td></td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Centralized (H5)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Leadership change/</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Decentralized (H6)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>X</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 4: Hypotheses supported by policy shifts on the accession issue

First of all it is striking that H2d (changes in the policy field/decentralized) was decisive for the two governing parties’ policy shifts. The Green case is a border case in this respect, as the referendum result was of course also a change in the policy field with regard to the legal and political consequences the referendum entailed. Still, as it has been argued it was first and foremost an expression of public opinion (H2a), which the Green party had to react to. In contrast to SPÖ and ÖVP, interestingly, both opposition parties responded to the policy shifts.
of other parties (H2c). These causal connections are manifest in the interview data for both parties. For the SPÖ, there was no indication to assume, that the ÖVP’s shift had a similar influence on its policy shift in 1989.23 So, regarding external incentives, changes in the policy field and the policy shifts of other parties were most influential. The two governing parties, the SPÖ and ÖVP, were primarily reacting to changes in the policy field, while FPÖ and Greens reacted to strategic incentives. This makes sense, with regard to their incumbent/opposition status, but also with regard of their scope and the quantity and quality of organized interests within the respective organizations.

The FPÖ was the only party, where a change in the dominant faction had a verifiable influence on its policy shift (H4). For the other parties, changes in the factional balance of power have not been observed. Finally, for the social democrats and the Freedom party, a change in party leadership (Sinowatz to Vranitzky and Steger to Haider) translated into a policy shift (H6).

Seven hypotheses are not supported by the previous analysis. Electoral defeat did not have an observable influence on the examined policy shifts. Furthermore, none of the hypotheses, which included centralized decision making was confirmed, as every single one of the analyzed decision making procedures involved veto players. Hence all cases matched the decentralized versions of the hypotheses better. This leads back to the main independent variable of this analysis: decision making structures. It seems that veto players matter in centralized as well as in decentralized settings and that decision making structures accordingly do not have the expected direct effect on policy shifts. But before we finally turn to this variable extensively, QCA may add some further insights about the empirical material.

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23 This conclusion is confirmed by the fact that Franz Vranitzky, who initiated the SPÖ’s shift had been an accession supporter years before the ÖVP’s shift.
Qualitative Comparative Analysis (QCA)

In this compact section two additional analyses, fuzzy set QCA and crisp set QCA are conducted. This second stage is applied in order to confirm, disconfirm or extend the findings of the process tracing section. It will also help to logically order and reduce the results (in order to arrive at a reduced combination of conditions). Moreover we can reexamine the influence of public opinion changes and electoral defeat with QCA techniques, as these conditions (variables) are the most difficult to study with process tracing techniques.

Fuzzy Set Analysis (fsQCA)

Fuzzy sets provide a practical tool for the analysis of causal relations based on small or medium numbers of cases. They are especially useful, when the outcome (dependent variable) is expected to depend on the combination or interaction of conditions (independent variables) (see Chapter Methods).

In contrast to the previous process tracing analysis, not the four instances of party policy shifts are the units of analysis. Instead parties/year of the observation period are treated as units. Years after a party’s policy shift are excluded, as policy shifts are expected to involve a certain path dependency. E.g. it is not realistic to assume that a party would change its policy position on a given issue and then reverse the shift a few years later. Conditions match the variables of the previous chapters. The coding and calibration procedures are presented in Appendix 1. Table 1 demonstrates the results of the fsQCA.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Raw coverage</th>
<th>Unique Coverage</th>
<th>Consistency</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Public Opinion<em>Electoral Defeat</em>Other Party's Shifts<em>Leadership Change</em>Veto Player Agreement</td>
<td>0.180000</td>
<td>0.180000</td>
<td>1.000000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Solution Coverage</td>
<td>0.180000</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Solution Consistency</td>
<td>1.000000</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 5: Fuzzy Set Truth Table Results, Intermediate Solution.

Unfortunately these results cannot offer too much insight. The results of the fuzzy set truth table algorithm are not fully compatible with the results of the process tracing analysis. One very influential condition, with regard to the concrete policy shifts, namely “changes in the policy field”, is not included in the solution term. On the other hand “leadership change” and
“other party’s shift” are parts of the solution, alongside “public opinion”. Most importantly, “veto player agreement” is also part of the solution. Moreover “veto player agreement” is also a necessary condition. As the condition “centralized decision making structures” is not part of solution term, this result suggests that decentralized decision making (combined with veto player agreement) leads to policy shifts. “Electoral defeat”, although process tracing results did not indicate any relevance for this incentive, appears influential for policy shifts. So according to the solution, party policy shifts are a product of high membership in the set of parties confronted with public opinion incentives, high membership in the set of parties, which have lost previous elections, high membership in the set of parties confronted with other parties’ policy shifts, high membership in the set of parties with a new party leader and high membership in the set of parties with agreeing veto players.

However, the quality and generalizability of these results is doubtful. Although consistency is perfect with 100%, coverage with just 18% is very low, which means that: (a) the solution is to 100% a subset of the outcome but (b) that only 18% of the outcome are covered (or explained) by the solution. Thus, what we can say is that this combination of conditions is the perfect recipe for a policy shift. But with this solution, we can only explain 18% of the policy shifts.

Furthermore, Rihoux and Ragin (2009, 110) suggest that necessary conditions should be excluded from any QCA. So, if the (necessary) “veto player agreement” condition is not taken into account also consistency drops to 55% (see table 7).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Raw coverage</th>
<th>Unique Coverage</th>
<th>Consistency</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Public Opinion<em>Electoral Defeat</em>Other Party's Shift*Leadership Change</td>
<td>0.180000</td>
<td>0.180000</td>
<td>0.545455</td>
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<td>Solution Coverage</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Solution Consistency</td>
<td>0.545455</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 6: Fuzzy Set Truth Table Results, “Veto Player Agreement” excluded, Intermediate Solution.

So, apparently these data do not allow for too many conclusions regarding the validity of the theoretical model, individual hypotheses or the findings of the process tracing section.

Compared to the process tracing analysis, the main value added is that we find a relevance of electoral defeat. Moreover the necessary condition character of veto player agreement is
highlighted by the fsQCA. Still, we cannot make substantive inferences or organize the empirical results properly with the fsQCA instruments. This is due to the specific data structure. In most Fuzzy Sets, cases are more or less independent from each other (e.g. countries or parties). As party per year is the unit of analysis for this fuzzy set, they are clearly not. This per se would not be too problematic. But the fact that for each case, its past-versions are included in the set leads to severe analytical problems in combination with the fact that for these cases of policy shifts, long-term factors were decisive. As it has been demonstrated in the process tracing section, policy shifts take time. Changes in the policy field for example, need to be evaluated and discussed, intraparty campaigns may be waged, decisions have to be taken and communicated. Likewise, a new party leader or a new party faction will need time to consolidate their dominant position. Thus, there are a lot of rows on the truth table, which have high values on influential conditions but show no outcome (no policy shift), as they lead to the outcome years later (in other rows). As a consequence the fsQCA is severely distorted. Calibration, although it is a means of differentiating between relevant and irrelevant variation, values cannot and must not be “bended” too much.

In order to resolve this problem it is necessary to rely stronger on substantial knowledge about the cases, which we have already acquired using the process tracing analysis. Based on these findings a csQCA analysis is applied.

**Crisp Set Analysis (csQCA)**

The problems of the fsQCA are resolved by two factors: (a) the use of substantive case-knowledge from the process tracing analysis and (b) a restricted case selection. Hence first, as all the information acquired via process tracing is used, influential factors appear much clearer on the truth table, as e.g. not all objective incentives are included in the analysis, if they proved irrelevant in the process tracing analysis. Secondly, only the four cases (party/year) with a positive outcome (a policy shift) and six reference cases make up the set of cases for the truth table analysis. As reference cases serve the SPÖ-, ÖVP- and FPÖ-cases of 1985, the SPÖ 1987 case, the Greens 1989 case and the FPÖ 1990 case. Thus, basically for every party, the first year of the observation period was used. By this restriction of adding only baseline cases to the set of shifting cases, the problem that conditions will be present, which have a “delayed” influence on the outcome is avoided. Additionally, as there is no data on the public opinion condition for 1985 and 1986, two “most likely” cases with regard to public opinion have been added to the set: the SPÖ 1987 case and the FPÖ 1990 case. Table 7 shows the complete truth table.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Case</th>
<th>Public Opinion</th>
<th>Electoral Defeat</th>
<th>Other Party's Shift</th>
<th>Changes in Policy Field</th>
<th>Leadership Change</th>
<th>Change in Dominant Faction</th>
<th>Party Leader Decides</th>
<th>Decision Making Centralization</th>
<th>Veto Players Agree</th>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>SPÖ 1989</td>
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<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Table 7: Truth Table, Crisp Set Analysis.*
Based on the resulting truth table analysis we find the following (intermediate) solution, explaining policy shifts for the set:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Term</th>
<th>Raw coverage</th>
<th>Unique Coverage</th>
<th>Consistency</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Public Opinion<em>Other Party’s Shift</em>Veto Player Agreement</td>
<td>0.250000</td>
<td>0.250000</td>
<td>1.000000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Electoral Defeat<em>Changes in the Policy Field</em>Party Leader Decides*Veto Player Agreement</td>
<td>0.500000</td>
<td>0.50000</td>
<td>1.000000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other Party’s Shift<em>Leadership Change</em>Change in Dominant Faction<em>Party Leader Decides</em>Centralized Decision Making*Veto Player Agreement</td>
<td>0.250000</td>
<td>0.250000</td>
<td>1.000000</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 8: Crisp Set Results.

Hence for this set there are three “paths” to policy shifts:

1. Public Opinion*Other Party’s Shift*Veto Player Agreement
2. Electoral Defeat*Changes in Policy Field*Party Leader Decides* Veto Player Agreement
3. Other Party’s Shift*Leadership Change*Change in Dominant Faction*Party Leader Decides*Decision Making Centralized*Veto Player Agreement

Coverage indicates that term 1 and term 3 explain 25% of the outcome respectively. Term 2 explains 50%. Consistency is again perfect including the veto player agreement condition but also without it (see Appendix 3). In this context the consistency measure does not say too much, due to the relatively small number of cases.

Based on these solution terms, we can test the validity of the theoretical model defined earlier. Starting chronologically from the first level of the model, it is striking that all possible incentives are represented in at least one solution term. Again “electoral defeat” appears

24 Admittedly, these solutions are still quite individualized.
influential. The mediating role of the party leader ("party leader decides") is confirmed by two solution paths. In the first path though, which explains one of the four policy shifts of the set, this condition is not present. This is of course a limitation for the applicability of the theoretical model at hand.

Regarding decision making structures, “centralized decision making” is represented in one solution term and absent (equivalent to decentralized decision making) in two terms. This is consistent with the theoretical model so far, as under both conditions policy shifts are of course possible. The specification the theoretical model makes at this point, is that decentralized condition making leads to policy shifts only if combined with agreement of veto players. Accordingly paths 1 and 2 show this pattern. For centralized organizations this condition was expected to be irrelevant. Though, for the one path, where centralized decision making structures are included, “veto player agreement” is part of the solution term as well. This result matches the conclusion of the process tracing section.

In general the agreement of veto players is the most influential condition for policy shifts. It is the only necessary condition. Furthermore, when the parsimonious solution is applied “veto player agreement” is the only condition that remains influential. If the condition is excluded from the truth table analysis as recommended by Rihoux and Ragin (2009, 110) solutions make little sense from a theoretical standpoint. Specifically they run against the theoretical model with regard to two conditions: “public opinion” and “change in dominant faction”. Both seem to be inversely related to policy shifts (see Appendix 3).

**QCA Summary**

In sum, the QCA results confirm the conclusion drawn from the process tracing analysis: intraparty decision making structures do not directly affect party policy shifts, as it is always veto players who – in decentralized and centralized organizations alike – allow shifts to happen or not. All incentives were represented in at least one solution term of the crisp set analysis. Accordingly also electoral defeat, which appeared irrelevant in the process tracing section requires further attention. Moreover the initiative of the party leader is not a necessary condition, which challenges the theoretical model.

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25 If the ÖVP cases are coded 1 on the centralized decision making structures condition, then the condition is represented in the second solution path as well (see Appendix 3).
Summary and Discussion

What can we learn from this empirical evidence? At the beginning of this thesis two goals have been defined: (a) testing theories of party policy change and (b) finding an accurate explanation for Austrian parties’ policy shifts on the EC/EU accession issue.

The latter is examined in detail in the process tracing section of this study. In sum regarding goal (b), we may conclude that for the two grand parties, SPÖ and ÖVP, which had been in coalition governments for most of the observation period (1987-1994), changes in the policy field were decisive for their respective decisions to shift to pro-accession positions. Both parties were overwhelmed by the political changes in Europe. European integration had entered a phase of dynamic progress and the cold war was coming to an end. Thus, Austria was confronted with a European market where it found itself increasingly discriminated against as a non-member. Additionally one of the major reasons why it did not apply for accession earlier, Austria’s neutrality, was massively devaluated in its practical utility by the decreased political polarization of Europe or at least by perestroika and glasnost in the Soviet Union. Hence in this situation, where Europe started to grow together, SPÖ and ÖVP policy makers were concerned that Austria’s exclusion from this development could have severe consequences for the country’s economy and for it’s social achievements. In order to protect these goods both parties decided to support Austria’s accession. Within the Social Democratic Party there was a lot of resistance against accession to an organization, which had always been perceived as “conservative”, as “Europe of cartels and monopolies”. By a subtle intraparty campaign for accession Franz Vranitzky, chancellor and party leader, was able to convince his party to leave these doubts behind. Central to its success was the support of individual leading figures of the party and the support of the ÖGB. The People’s Party’s policy shift was initiated rather by the VÖI and ÖVP governors than by party leader Alois Mock. Admittedly though, Mock’s role for the policy shift could not be fully clarified by this analysis. Whether he cautiously pulled the strings behind the shift or whether he was himself surprised remains unclear. Although the party was generally a lot less critical than the SPÖ regarding the European Community, there was still substantive skepticism. Most probably the resulting resistance against the pro-accession shift could only be overcome, because it was scattered across various party branches instead of cumulated in one veto position.

For the Freedom Party and partly for the Greens, the policy shifts of other parties initiated their respective shifts. The FPÖ shifted in response to the SPÖ’s and the ÖVP’s policy shifts, because these shifts left a large part of the electorate, namely accession opponents, unrepresented. Thus, by adopting a Euro-skeptic position, vote gains could be expected. This
was clearly the strategy of party leader Jörg Haider. The price the party had to pay was abandoning the FPÖ’s traditional pro-European foreign policy agenda. Starting from 1990 Haider began to wage a subtle anti-accession campaign within the party. He was finally able to implement the shift based on his electoral success and the factional change it entailed. The Greens shifted in the opposite direction. Starting from 1989, when the young party had agreed upon a common position, the Greens opposed accession to the EC/EU. Still, there had always been an accession-friendly group within the party. Both groups, accession supporters and accession opponents agreed that the EC/EU needed to be changed, but they disagreed about the question whether it should be changed “from within” or “from outside” the Community.

As soon as the FPÖ had started its Euro-skeptic course, the Greens had massive problems in differentiating from the FPÖ position, in communicating their “For Europe, Against the EC” position. This communication problem was one reason for the party’s shift to accession support in 1994. The main reason though was the result of the Austrian accession referendum, where 2/3 of the Austrian electorate voted in favor of accession.

The other goal of this study was to examine whether theories of policy change can adequately explain Austrian parties policy shift on the issue of EC/EU accession. Along the specific focus on decision making structures, various theories have been combined in a theoretical model. How did this model perform?

**Incentives**

Starting at the first level of the theoretical model, we find that all incentives, which have been tested, appear influential, at least at first sight. If we take a closer look though, the empirical evidence does only give weak support to the general relevance of public opinion changes for party policy shifts, at least regarding specific issue shifts. A relevance of electoral defeat can not be concluded from this empirical material at all. The influence of all other incentive variables on policy shifts was confirmed.

According to Adams et al. (2004, see also Adams/Somer-Topcu 2009) changes in public opinion were expected to cause party policy shifts, in the sense that parties would adapt their positions to these changes. In fact, this explanation fits for the case of the Greens’ policy shift. Accordingly, with regard to the csQCA the condition is present in solution term 1, but not in solution terms 2 and 3. Still, the Austrian accession referendum, which the Greens reacted to, was of course a very special situation, where in contrast to everyday opinion polls the result was certain and entailed legal and political consequences. Thus, this result cannot be generalized for everyday policy making, where opinion polls are the only measure of public
opinion political parties can refer to. Even more so as public opinion already fails to explain the SPÖ’s, ÖVP’s and FPÖ’s shifts. For all these parties there was no indication in the process tracing analysis that public opinion did influence their shifts. On the contrary, the SPÖ’s policy shift happened, when the public support for accession was at a major low (see Appendix 1, table 10). In other instances, when more than half of the electorate did favor accession, no shift happened. Moreover, the ÖVP’s Andreas Khol explicitly argued in the interview that public opinion did in fact not at all influence his party’s policy decision. The electorate was rather expected to be very badly informed about the issue and that it could be convinced by information and campaigning. In general, public opinion support for EC/EU accession was volatile and there was no clear tendency (see Plasser/Ulram 1994b), which parties could have reacted to without taking irrational risks. In sum, evidence for the general influence of public opinion changes on policy shift is very weak, even if the Green case can be explained by this variable.

In the literature on policy shifts, electoral defeat is expected to cause policy shifts, as losing parties might feel a certain pressure to change course in order to be more attractive to voters. Changes in policy positions are one way to do so. This variable performs worst in explaining the four empirical policy shifts examined in this analysis. Process tracing did not indicate that electoral defeat was relevant for any of these shifts. QCA results show that electoral defeat was indeed relevant for one path (solution term 2), still this would be a rather weak basis for the argument that electoral defeat did influence these shifts and even more so for a general argument. With no other indication at all that these mechanisms were at work, electoral defeat was most probably not influential. Based on the empirical material found in this analysis, we could even make a counter-argument: The FPÖ’s policy shift showed that the electoral performance of a party can have substantive repercussions for the balance of power between party leadership and the rank and file. Haider was able to turn his party’s position upside down just because of his electoral success. So if we assume, based on this empirical evidence that electoral success strengthens the party leader’s positions, we can also assume that electoral defeat weakens his or her position, which in turn decreases – not increases – the probability of policy shifts all else equal.26

26 Of course this argument does only work if the assumption that it is the party leader who initiates policy shifts stands (see below).

The policy shifts of other political parties proved to be one of the most influential variables for the present analysis. Policy shifts of other parties within the same party system were
expected to have an influence on policy shifts, as it is essential for political parties to sufficiently differentiate from its competitors in order to be an attractive option on the electoral market (see Adams 2012; Budge 1994; Aldrich 1995). The FPÖ case and the Green case show exactly this pattern. For both parties the policy shifts of other parties were decisive. Only the theoretical specification that the effect of other parties’ shifts on policy shifts grows with the ideological closeness of the respective parties is not confirmed. As the Greens shifted in response to the FPÖ, they reacted to the policy shift of the most distanced political competitor in terms of ideology. Still, they desperately sought to differentiate from the FPÖ’s position.

Another very influential variable were changes in the policy field. It was hypothesized that in response to changes in the “real world” (economic-, political-, social changes) political parties will change instrumental policy positions in order to maintain core positions (see Sabatier/Jenkins-Smith 1999; Weible et al. 2009). As it has been demonstrated, that is exactly what happened in the SPÖ and the ÖVP. Both parties shifted to accession support in order to protect the Austrian economy and the country’s social achievements. It is striking that it were just the two governing parties to which this pattern applied sufficiently.27 It would be an interesting subject for further research to examine whether government parties are in general more likely to shift in response to changes in the policy field than opposition parties. Theoretically this argument seems plausible, as the policy preferences of government parties are more likely to be implemented. Therefore, they need to be more concrete and more up to date with regard to their instrumental positions. Another (complementary) explanation could relate to the scope of these two parties. SPÖ and ÖVP were much larger organizations than the FPÖ and the Greens with regard to party members as well as regarding organized interest groups within the parties. Especially the latter probably made both parties more responsive to economic and political changes in the policy field.

According to Harmel and Janda’s (1994) theory of party change, a change in party leadership was expected to be another potential cause of party policy shifts. A new party leader can favor different goals or strategies than his or her predecessor. Leadership change was found influential for the SPÖ’s and the FPÖ’s policy shifts. Both parties’ shifts would not have been possible without their new leaders. Still it is necessary to state that the FPÖ case does not perfectly fit the basic idea of the theoretical causal relation, as Jörg Haider was a strong

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27 Why the Green case is not classified as representing this causal relation is discussed elsewhere (see Process Tracing section).
supporter of EC/EU accession during the first two years as a party leader. He started his anti-accession campaign not earlier than 1990.

The second factor adopted from Harmel and Janda (1994), change in dominant factions, follows the same logic as the prior: a new dominant faction might have different preferences than the previous dominant party faction and may hence seek to implement policy shifts. Out of the examined set of cases only the FPÖ matched this pattern. Change in the dominant faction could only be observed in the Freedom Party, but in that case it was highly influential for the party’s policy shift. Without the massive changes within the party’s internal power structure, Jörg Haider would have not been able to overcome the opposition of the traditional liberal and national party wings against his Euro-skeptic turn.

**Party Leader**

According to the theoretical model, which was defined at the beginning of this analysis the role of the party leader with regard to policy shifts is quite clear: The party leader responds to various incentives, he or she decides whether a policy shift is feasible and accordingly initiates the shifting procedure or not. Both SPÖ and FPÖ perfectly matched this expectation. The ÖVP case is very difficult to interpret in this respect, due to contradictory statements of the three ÖVP interviewees. Hence it could not be clarified whether party leader Alois Mock played the hypothesized role in the ÖVP’s shifting procedure. What we can conclude based on the empirical evidence is that if he did, he did it in a very subtle manner. The Greens’ case on the other hand is very straightforward. Party leader Peter Pilz did not initiate the Greens’ policy shift. In the shifting procedure he did only ratify the decision taken by MP Johannes Voggenhuber as a member of the Green *Bundesvorstand*.

Based on the empirical evidence there are two possible conclusions for role of the party leader: The first one is that the party leader does not necessarily mediate between incentives and policy shifts. Taking into account that it was the two parties at the decentralized end of the decision making centralization spectrum, which did not (or not certainly) comply with the theoretical expectations, it could further be argued that this mediating role of the party leader is only valid for centralized organizations. In that sense, decision making would not only condition the success of a party leader in implementing policy shifts, but also the degree to which he or she initiates these processes in the first place.

The second possible conclusion is that the empirical evidence suffices the theoretical expectations. First, because we cannot be sure that the ÖVP case violates the theoretical
expectations and second, because the Greens were still an atypical party organization in the 1990s. In fact, the Greens were a very young basis-democratic party, which did not have a party leader at all up to 1992 and which was very skeptical about emphasizing individuals.\textsuperscript{28} Thus it is not surprising that the role of the party leader was less important in intraparty decision making. In that sense individual characteristics of the Green party could explain why this case deviates from the general theoretical model.

I argue that the first conclusion is more convincing. With regard to the ÖVP it seems more plausible that the VÖI, the regional branches and governors initiated the party’s shift on their own right and not that these powerful intraparty players were executing a decision, which the party leader had taken secretly. Maybe he knew about their plans and supported them, but even in that case it was still not his initiative. Regarding the Greens, even if the party was atypical, a proper theoretical model should ideally cover those cases too, as the formation of new parties is a common phenomenon in European democracies. Thus, the theoretical model needs to be refined in the sense that policy shifts may happen without the initiative of the party leader. In order to test the possible specification that this is more likely in decentralized organization further research is required.

**Decision Making Structures and Veto Players**
First of all, process tracing and QCA have demonstrated that veto players mattered in all four cases, regardless of their amount of centralization. The agreement of veto players proved to be a necessary condition for the success of all examined policy shifts. This violates the theoretical model in the sense that also in organizations, which were categorized as centralized, veto players were strongly involved in policy decision making.

Though, exactly the categorization of parties with regard to their decision making centralization seems odd taking the empirical evidence into account. It is very striking that the specific decision making procedures analyzed do not at all match the categorization of the Laver/Hunt (1992) expert survey. In fact, the FPÖ, which is the most centralized organization according to Laver and Hunt, applied the most decentralized decision making procedure, using two party congresses in order to arrive at a common position. For the SPÖ, the second most centralized party according to the expert survey, the relatively large Bundesparteivorstand decided, after a broad and long-lasting internal discussion. The People’s Party’s decision to shift was taken by the ÖVP-Bundesparteivorstand. Even if this

\textsuperscript{28} The Greens themselves abandoned their aversion against emphasizing individuals over the further course of the 1990s (see Dachs 2006, 394).
organ had the same name like the crucial decision making body in the SPÖ case, the ÖVP-
*Bundesparteivorstand* was the parties smallest decision making body by the time and also
significantly smaller than it’s counterpart in the SPÖ case. Thus, although participants
describe the councils voting procedure in this case as unusually open, it is reasonable to rank
it’s decision making procedure as the third-most decentralized behind the SPÖ. Finally the
Greens, the most decentralized organization according to the survey and probably according
to their self-perception as well, applied the most centralized decision making procedure. They
decided by unanimous *Bundesvorstand*-resolution, shortly after the policy shift had been
proclaimed on TV by an MP. This decision had not been prepared or coordinated in any form
and it did not follow a broader internal discussion.

So, intriguingly, these decision making procedures can in fact be sorted inversely to the
general categorization of decision making centralization by Laver/Hunt (1992), with the FPÖ
having the most decentralized and the Greens the most centralized procedure. SPÖ and ÖVP
cover the middle ground. This does of course not mean that the categorization of the expert
survey is empirically wrong. In fact, we can observe even in the examined shifting processes,
that for the ÖVP the initiative of the *VÖI*, specific regional branches and governors was
essential, which indicates that the party leaders decision making power is in fact limited by
the consent of organized subgroups. With regard to the FPÖ, the change of “decision making
culture” described by former party officials nicely mirrors its academic perception as the most
centralized party organization. Before the Greens shifted their policy position, they too had a
very open and intense discussion about the issue and decided about their initial contra-
accession position at a party congress meeting.

In order to resolve this contradiction between decision making procedures and decision
making structures, the theoretical model which was used in this analysis needs to be refined.
Specifically it makes sense to highlight the role of veto player opposition not only for the
success of policy shifts, but also for the way specific decisions are taken.

First of all it needs to be stated, that decision making structures do in fact provide a relatively
stable set of potential veto positions and this potential is bigger in decentralized, than in
centralized organizations. But the specific set of decision making procedures, which is applied
for a concrete decision, in centralized as well as in decentralized organization, seems to
depend rather on the presence or absence of substantial (veto player) opposition against the
respective decision.
This is illustrated nicely by the FPÖ case. In the self-stylized “Europe-party” of the past, there was massive resistance against the leader’s Euro-skeptic shift, from senior officials as well as from both traditional party groups. Hence, even if the party was already very centralized, the party leader was forced to include the party congress in the decision making procedure as a consequence of the heavy intraparty resistance. Similarly, the SPÖ went through an intense phase of internal discussion and decision making, including a party congress and a Bundesparteivorstand-decision, as there was a lot of skepticism about the intended pro-accession shift. The Greens are the counterexample. Without any doubt, they are a very decentralized organization and they were even more so in their earlier years. But in the concrete instance, the decision to change their policy position was taken swiftly, without a broader internal discussion, by a council of just eleven people. Moreover it was rather a ratification of the previous decision of just one person. The reason why this was possible, in a party that did never spare internal conflict, was that there was no intraparty opposition.

Conclusion
Based on these findings, the theoretical model needs to be specified and revised in three respects: (a) First, policy shifts may happen without the initiative of the party leader. (b) Second, veto player opposition matters in centralized as well as in decentralized organizations. (c) And third, the implicit assumption that decision making structures predefine specific decision making procedures has to be discarded. The centralization of these procedures and hence the odds for the success of policy shifts rather depend on the amount of actual veto player opposition.

Finally, the question how intraparty decision making structures affected Austrian party’s policy shifts (RQ) can be answered as follows: Intraparty decision making structures did not have a direct effect on Austrian parties policy shifts on the issue of EU accession. Particularly, they did not affect these shifts in the sense that more centralized parties could shift more easily. Decision making processes depended less on stable decision making structures than on the amount of veto player opposition against the policy shift.

This central finding appears solid with regard to its generalizability, at least for Austria. The four cases it was derived from include a broad variance in most relevant respects. We find everything from left to right, from centralized to decentralized, from government parties to opposition parties, from small parties to large parties, from consolidated parties to new parties in this set of cases. Still, further research would be useful to examine, whether this pattern
really applies to other policy shifts of Austrian parties. Interesting cases in the Austrian context would be the more recent policy shifts of SPÖ and ÖVP regarding compulsory military service. Foremost it is up to further research whether the pattern applies to other party systems and whether the theoretical model could be improved by this revision. Furthermore with regard to incentives, examining whether government parties are more likely to react to changes in the policy field, as it could be induced from the findings of the present analysis would be another interesting subject for further research.

Moreover what we can conclude for coming analyses of party policy shifts is that the structural level of intraparty decision making should probably be less relevant than the procedural level for future research designs. Researchers should focus on specific processes and concrete veto player opposition, which are strongly intertwined, when examining policy shifts on specific issues. Large N research will most probably further have to rely on decision making structures as a proxy for veto player opposition in the future, as it mostly does not deal with policy shifts regarding a specific issue, but with shifts of the party’s placement on the left-right-scale. Still, measurement could be improved. Even more so as interview data of the present analysis suggests that decision making centralization is strongly dependent on the party leader. This factor was stressed in all interviews conducted by the author. Although it might seem trivial at first glance, decision making structures may change tremendously with party leaders. The ÖVP for example, was definitely more centralized under Wolfgang Schüssel than it was in the Mock-era (see Interview Khol), the FPÖ was more centralized under Haider than it was under Steger (see Interview Stix), the SPÖ was more centralized under Kreisky than under Sinowatz and the Greens were more centralized under Van der Bellen than under Pilz or Petrovic. Future evaluations of intraparty decision making structures should be able to cope with this issue.


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SPÖ

ÖVP


**FPÖ**


Greens


Appendix

Appendix 1: Fuzzy Set QCA Coding
Variables for the fsQCA analysis have been coded as follows: “Public Opinion” (H1a, H2a) has been coded using survey data on the question if Austria should join the EC/EU (Plasser/Ulram 1994b). The share of responses in favor of an accession have been assigned to the respective years. The only exception is the year 1994. Here, the Green case was assigned the referendum outcome of 66.6% as the party responded directly to the referendum. The FPÖ was assigned the survey value, because the party shifted months before the referendum.

“Electoral Performance” (H1b, H2b) has been measured using the share of vote loss or vote gain of the last general elections. “Other Party’s Shift” (H1c, H2c) signifies a simple count of the number of parties, which have already shifted their policy position on the accession issue. “Changes in Policy Field” (H1d, H2d) are coded for every party individually as we know, based on the process tracing analysis, which party reacted to which general developments in the policy field. The SPÖ and the ÖVP reacted on the one hand to the practical devaluation of neutrality and the progress of European integration. Therefore both parties have been assigned a “1” for every major development in these respects. These counts are added to the subsequent counts. If there was no such development in a given year, the case is assigned the value of the year before (see table 9).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Neutrality devaluation</th>
<th>EC integration progress</th>
<th>SPÖ</th>
<th>ÖVP</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1985</td>
<td>Gorbachow taking office</td>
<td>Membership of Spain and Portugal fixed</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>White Paper Single Market</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1986</td>
<td></td>
<td>Single European Act</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1987</td>
<td>Talks USA-SU</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1988</td>
<td>Breakthrough</td>
<td>Declaration EC-Comecon relations</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Rychkow-Vranitzky-negotiations</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<td>1989</td>
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*Table 9: Coding of “Changes in Policy Field”-condition for SPÖ and ÖVP.*
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<td>-4.54</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>16.33</td>
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<td>0</td>
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Table 10: Uncalibrated Coding for fsQCA.
The same holds for the FPÖ and the Greens, with the exception that the events which they might have reacted to differ from the SPÖ, ÖVP and from each other. For the FPÖ, the reasoning, why the party could not support integration anymore was basically that EC integration went too far in terms of a federalist centralization. Hence, for the Freedom party every step, which further intensified EC-integration was coded “1”. These instances were the EC’s White Paper on the completion of the internal market (1985), the Single European Act (1986) and the Treaty of Maastricht (1993). With regard to the Green EC/EU critique, which focused on democratic legitimacy, environmental policy and social policy, the EC/EU did not change in any form that would have sufficed to initiate a Green policy shift to a pro-accession position. The referendum result was the only change in the policy field, which influenced the Greens policy shift. Therefore only the Greens 1994-case is assigned a “1”.

The “Leadership Change” condition (H5, H6) is a simple dichotomous variable, measuring if – within the observational period – there was a change in party leadership prior to the party’s policy shift. If there was a change, these cases are assigned a “1”, if not they are assigned a value of “0”. Likewise, “Change in Dominant Faction” (H3, H4), measures factional change. This variable though is not dichotomous as, for the FPÖ, which is the only party where factional change was observable, two phases of factional change can be differentiated. The first phase started in 1986, when Jörg Haider became party leader. From that time on, a new faction was constantly challenging the traditional ones. Hence the FPÖ-cases from 1986 to 1992 were coded as “1”. In 1993, a big part of the liberal party wing left the party and the dominance of the new faction reached an even higher level. Consequently FPÖ 1993 and FPÖ 1994 were coded as “2”. The “Party Leader Decides” variable was coded on a binary basis. Cases where empirical evidence was found that the party leader individually preferred accession to the EC/EU were coded “1”, cases where he or she did not where coded “0”.

“Decision Making Centralization” (all hypotheses) was coded according to the Laver/Hunt (1992) expert survey (see chapter Decision Making Structures). “Veto Player Agreement” was coded “1” if process tracing indicated that there was at least no effective opposition from veto players against the policy shift and “0” if this was not the case (all hypotheses). The dependent variable, “Policy shift” (all hypotheses), was also coded dichotomously, with “1” for cases where a policy shift was present and “0” for cases, where it was not. All of these measures have then been calibrated, which means that the values of every variable had to be
recoded to a value between 0 and 1 in order to conform to the fuzzy set approach. The complete uncalibrated coding is listed in table 10, calibration thresholds in table 11.29

<table>
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<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Public Opinion</th>
<th>Electoral Defeat</th>
<th>Other Party's Shift</th>
<th>Changes in Policy Field</th>
<th>New Dominant Faction</th>
<th>Party Leader Decides</th>
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<td>threshold for full non-membership (0.05)</td>
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</table>

Table 11: Thresholds for fsQCA.

Appendix 2: Crisp Set QCA Coding
As it has been demonstrated in the Methods section, the main difference between fsQCA and csQCA is that the latter is only applicable for binary data. Hence all data need to be dichotomized. Although this step is the most difficult in most applications of the crisp set analysis, it is actually pretty easy to code the presence/absence of most conditions for the set of cases used in this analysis. Moreover the binary data structure simply fits better the requirements of the process tracing results, which are almost by definition unquantifiable.

For the coding procedure a differentiation has been made between “strategic” incentives (changes in public opinion, electoral defeat and other party’s shifts) and the other conditions. These three conditions are coded on the basis of objective data, and not based on the results of the process tracing analysis. This is due to the fact that it is assumed that information about strategic behavior in terms of vote maximization is not easily detectable. Political actors will regularly attempt to hide this sort of strategic behavior as it is considered inappropriate from a moral standpoint. All other conditions are coded according to the process tracing results. Specifically, conditions have been coded as follows:

A “Public Opinion” incentive was coded present for accession support values over 50%. Unfortunately, for the 1985 cases these data are missing as the survey data used for this measure starts not earlier than 1987. As it has been mentioned, the SPÖ 1987 and the FPÖ

29 For Leadership Change, Veto Player Agreement and Policy Shift there is no calibration as the procedure is not necessary for binary data.
1990 cases have been added to the set in order to substitute for this shortcoming of the data. “Electoral Defeat” was coded 1 in cases where the party had lost votes in the last general elections compared the general election before. “Other Party’s Shift” was coded present when any other party (at least one) had changed its position on the issue before the party in question. “Changes in Policy Field” were coded 1, when – based on the process tracing analysis – they were influential for the respective shifts. For one case with no shift in the outcome, the objective measure introduced in the fsQCA is again used. The condition was coded present for the SPÖ 1987 as decisive changes in the policy field were already present at that time. The “Leadership Change variable” was coded present for all cases where a new party leader was introduced between 1985 and 1994, but only for cases where this new leader had a clear influence on the policy shift. Thus, the Greens 1994 case was coded absent, even though there actually was a new party leader since 1993. Based on the process tracing results, the “Change in Dominant Faction” condition is coded 1 only for the FPÖ 1990- and the FPÖ 1994-case, as the FPÖ starting from 1986 saw massive factional change. The “Party Leader Decides” condition was coded identically as for the fsQCA. Cases where empirical evidence was found that the party leader individually preferred accession to the EC/EU were coded “1”, cases where he or she did not where coded “0”. The central condition regarding this study’s research design are decision making structures. Centralized decision making structures have been coded “1” and decentralized decision making structures have been coded “0”. The condition name therefore is “Decision Making Centralization” instead of “Decision Making Structures”. On this condition the FPÖ and SPÖ cases have been coded as centralized, ÖVP and Greens cases have been coded decentralized. This coding was chosen according to the parties respective scores in the Laver/Hunt (1992) expert survey.30 “Veto Player Agreement” has been coded 1 if process tracing indicated that there was at least no effective opposition from veto players against the policy shift. And finally, the “Policy Shift” condition was coded “1”, for those party/year-cases where policy shifts have been found in the Pro or Contra EC/EU Accession section.

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30 As the ÖVP inhabits a certain middle position the analysis has also been conducted with a centralized score for the ÖVP. Results are identical except for the fact that centralized decision making is represented in solution path 2.
### Appendix 3: Crisp Set QCA Results, without Veto Player Agreement condition

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*Table 12: Crisp Set QCA Results, without Veto Player Agreement condition.*
Abstract
In general, political parties are risk-averse when choosing their policy positions and thus refrain from significant shifts of their policy platforms. In contrast, between 1985 and 1994 all four Austrian parliamentary parties radically changed their positions concerning one highly salient issue: Austria’s EU accession. Using Process Tracing- and QCA-techniques, this thesis examines how these party policy shifts were possible and if they can be adequately explained by theories of party policy change. Specifically this thesis focuses on the influence of intraparty decision making structures on policy shifts. Findings indicate that stable decision making structures did not have a major influence on concrete policy shifts. Rather the actual presence or absence of veto player opposition was decisive. Moreover, results suggest that our theoretical perception of the role party leadership plays in shifting procedures has to be adapted.

Zusammenfassung
Curriculum Vitae

Personal Information

Name: Matthias Kaltenegger
Date of Birth: October 1, 1988
Place of Birth: Vienna
E-mail: matthias.kaltenegger@univie.ac.at

Studies/ Education

October 2011
– April 2015
Master of Arts in Political Science at University of Vienna
Research focus:
Political Parties, Europeanization, Policy Analysis, Comparative Politics

Master Thesis:
Austrian Parties and the EU Accession – The Influence of Intraparty Decision Making on Policy Shifts

Since October 2009
Diploma Study of Law at University of Vienna

October 2008
– August 2011
Bachelor of Arts in Political Science at University of Vienna

1999-2007
Bundesgymnasium Bruck/Mur

1995-1999
Volksschule Oberaich

Conference Participation

July 2014
Funded participation at the ECPR Graduate Student Conference, University of Innsbruck.

- Chair of the panel “Party Leaders vs. Reality”.

Professional Experience

September 2010 – December 2014
Coder for Austrian National Election Study (AUTNES) - Supply Side; Vienna Institute of Government
- Coding of Party Manifestos, Leader Statements, Press Releases;
- Data management
- Other research assistance

April 2014
Country Expert/Coder within EUVOX 2014 Project (EU-wide Voting Advice Application)

September 2010 – January 2011
Mentor; Peer-Mentoring Programme (Institute of Political Science, University of Vienna)

October 2007 – March 2008
Military Service

August 2006, 2007
Internship BOEHLERIT GmbH & Co Kg Kapfenberg

August 2005
Internship, Bezirkshauptmannschaft Bruck an der Mur

Additional

Language skills:
- German (Native Language)
- English (Excellent Command)
- French (Fluent)
- Latin (Basic Knowledge)

Computer Literacy:
- STATA, SPSS, Fuzzy-Set/Qualitative Comparative Analysis 2.0, Microsoft Office,