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“Nation-State Utopia and Collective Violence of Minorities, A Case Study: PKK from Turkey to Europe Since 1980 To 2013”

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1 Introduction

“A philosophy without heart and a faith without intellect are abstractions from the true life of knowledges and faith.”
G. W. F. Hegel

1.1 Research Questions

This thesis is about ethnic minorities and their links to violence. We will be questioning what the connections between collective violence and nation-state utopia of minorities in the society exactly are. As a case study, the past and present ideology of PKK will be described by means of the theories that will be discussed. Minorities under the sovereignty of a nation-state could be composed of various ethnic identities. For this reason, we will investigate the “ethnicity” and “nation” concepts under the concept of “minority”. Additionally, we will point out the similarities and differences between these two closely-related but different concepts. Afterwards, we will look deeply into two ideological movements, namely “nationalism” and “ethno-nationalism”. Our study will include nationalist policies of states and their applications about their minorities. On the other hand, we will analyze how the ethno-nationalist ideology of a minority is perceived by a nation-state. Nation-states follow a “nation-building” system via tools such as education and media. To counter this system, we will investigate what kind of a “nation-building” model is followed by the ethnic groups.

Within the dominant nation-state model, some ethnic groups resort to violence in order to be recognized by the public. In this context, we will put our focus on violence committed by these ethnic groups, which is called “collective violence”. We will investigate conflicts of many countries from Europe and Middle East to Northern and Middle Africa with ethnic groups. We will analyze methods they apply to solve these conflicts comparatively.

As a case study, Turkey’s Kurdish issue will be handled in depth for the time period between 1980 and 2013. PKK was founded as a political organization by a group of leftwing-communist students in 1978 with the aim of establishing an independent Kurdish state
within the Turkish territories. Then, they have took up arms and started violent acts in the society after 1984. In this study, reasons of this conflict are investigated and their theoretical bases are queried.

In the second chapter, concepts of “ethnicity” and “nation” will be investigated, which are very commonly and erroneously attributed distinct meanings. Contrarily, for political science, these two terms are synonymous. The etymology of *ethnic* refers to *nation*, and vice versa. The relationship of these two concepts will be addressed in more detail in Section 2.1. States typically introduce a disambiguation to these concepts in their official discourse in the way that favors the authority of the dominant nation-state within the public, since in the 20th century, saving the structure of nation-state was believed to be possible only by recognition of a unique nation in a state. After the World War I, states were established by the idea of “nation-state” as a global movement. United Nations recognize the term “nation-state” as “*a state where the great majority are conscious of a common identity and share the same culture*” (Davis, 1997). Therefore, the concepts which will be discussed in this study are going to be considered within a nation-state order.

According to T. H. Eriksen, ethnic groups are classified into four different categories: 1) *Urban ethnic minorities*, 2) *Indigenous people*, 3) *Proto-nations (ethno-nationalist) movement*, 4) *Ethnic groups in plural societies*. The ethno-nationalist movement will be our subject in Chapter 2. Before that, the notion of “ethnic identity” is defined by J. E. Trimble and R. A. Dickson. Moreover, by Donald Horowitz “ethnicity” and by Anthony D. Smith “ethnic group” are similarly identified as myths of common ancestry. Here, we will highlight the fact that there are differences among definitions of “ethnicity”, “ethnic identity”, “ethnic groups”, and “ethno-nationalist movement” in the terminology of social sciences. Briefly, ethnic identity includes an ethnic group as a political role-model. According to S. Saharso (1989), ethnic identity is related with choices and life chances of a person, and her interaction with others in the social environment without any blood tie among group members. Moreover, some researchers differ ethnic identity from the other definition which has a nationalistic perspective. F. Barth (1969) says that an ethnic group is about ethnic ties rather than cultural characteristics. Ethnic labeling has a social and political value and function, especially for census and demographic studies.

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1 UNESCO: Nation-State, Social and Human Sciences, International Migration, [www.unesco.org](http://www.unesco.org)
In Section 2.2, we provide detailed definitions for the concepts “nationalism” and “ethno-nationalism”. As the ideology of a nation, nationalism emerged along with French and American Revolutions in the 18th century. Primarily, it has to be known that all notions of ethno-nationalism and ethnicity are a subject of nation and nationalism. In other words, ethno-nationalism is a sub-section of nationalism, also in fact, nation represents the majority and a wider unity than ethnicity. Although these notions have etymologically the same meaning, here the definition of nation contains ethnicity’s elements. Nationalism is a subject about the ideology of the nation, not the state. The subject of nationalism will be in-depth questioned through pri-mordialist and modernist approaches in this thesis. Modernist theory will be stated by B. Anderson, E. Gellner and E. Hobsbawn who are known as key names on nation and nationalism studies. Furthermore, the differences between state and nation regarding nationalism will be listed in this same chapter.

B. Anderson’s “Imagined Communities” has been used as one of the fundamental resources. In his work, nation is defined in a different context from the definition of ethnicity. Being a part of a nation indicates variabilities such as mental interpretation, belonging sense, past, family and ideological opinion of a person. An imaginary community can be created by state, media, education or some common means in terms of governmental policies. Moreover, this thesis shows us what the essential distinctions and also similarities between a nation and and ethnicity are. Contrarily to Anderson, another significant theorist Gellner gives a different definition for nationalism. He considers nationalism as a synthesizer instrument in order to build nation and nationhood in a state.

Also in ethnic groups, nationalism is classified theoretically within various perspectives such as 1) Territorial nationalism, 2) Ethnic nationalism and others such as Protectionist, Economic, Integral fascist nationalism and racial nationalism. In Section 2.2, the first two of the aforementioned categories are investigated. As a second wave, ethno-nationalism will be broadly defined in terms of its distinctions and similarities with nationalism. According to A. Smith in his work “National Identity” (1991), ethnic nationalism is separated into two parts: a) Pre-independence movements (secession and diaspora nationalisms), b) Post-independence movements (larger ethno-national state). In “National Question in Marxist-Leninist Theory and Strategy” (1984), W. Connor correlates ethnicities with nationhood. According to Smith, the
difference between ethnicism and nationalism should be found in ethno-symbolism. In Section 2.2, we investigate what Smith wants to tell by means of ethno-symbolism in more detail.

In Section 2.3, minorities and ethno-nationalist minorities in a nation state will be covered. Varied groups based on religious, linguistic, cultural, or ethnic motives are recognized in a minority status on account of their populations or their active implementations in society. The concept of minority is defined in terms of the current state system by means of legislations regulated by international agreements within the scope of UN and EU. In 1991, an article was accepted by European Council about the definition of minority. However, this existing definition of international references is fairly comprehensive and inadequate. When ethnic groups are identified as a minority under a nation-state, the notion of ethnic-minority comes to light on the sociological context. These definitions of minority do not have a single and common usage in the international literature. Therefore, minority is considered as a controversial concept for international relations. In this Section 2.4, situations of minorities in a nation-state, their ideological attitudes and their familiarities to ethnic-nationalism will be put into focus.

In Section 2.4, we will study “nation building and its definition for minorities”. In summary, ‘nation building’ is a considerably significant means of creating a unity within a recently-founded nation-state. Here it has to be emphasized that nation building is defined completely differently than “state building”. H. Mylonas, in his work titled “A Theory of Nation-Building” (2007), expresses strategically nation building and actors who generate state. In this context, it can be seen that minority rights become under threat due to characteristics of nation building. On the one hand, minorities can be under pressure because of cultural, religious, linguistic, ideological politics of states for their own nation building purposes. Therefore, some discussions will be evaluated in the international relations literature regarding the critical distinction between assimilation and integration. On the other hand, W. Connor’s theory on nation building brings a new dilemma to the agenda as ethnic identification during the nation-building process. Ethnic groups are mostly in minority status in a country where national identity is exalted against their minorities. Under these circumstances, how ethnic groups can maintain their existences under great hegemony of a nation-state will be investigated.

Since nearly hundred years, nation-states have used ill-treatment to minorities by ignoring their fundamental rights, assimilating and insulting their identities, committing violence
and excluding them from their economic and cultural systems. For these reasons, especially after 1990, many minority groups resorted to armed struggle against their states, and fought for their unity, ideology and rights. This kind of groups at times have been interfering in civil violence. These groups which violate the law legislated by state and apply violence against civilians or security forces are entitled as terrorist groups. Nevertheless, the subject of this thesis does not contain terrorism, but is to search for the causes of violence. Before we seek broadly different types of violence in political science, actors of violence will be investigated in Section 3.1. Definitions of violence are classified as committed to a single person or a certain community. Thus, varied categories of violence will be explained at the introductory level, We will also investigate why excluded, suppressed minority groups (ethnic, cultural, religious, linguistic motivated) engage in violence in a nation-state under the notion of collective violence. These groups appeared firstly as political movements, then they are generally not taken into consideration by their states in the political arena. For this reason, lots of excluded groups turn into armed organizations during ongoing contentious politics in the 21st century. Especially since 1990, nation-states has encountered with civil war and/or internal conflict in modern era.

In Chapter 3, three types of human violence and collective violence will be investigated in the light of the works of the American sociologist and political scientist C. Tilly as well as the works of the political scientist R. Gurr. Tilly’s book “The Politics of Collective Violence” will be one of our essential sources. Besides, it will be underlined below that the concept of violence is not only used as a means by excluded and suppressed minority groups, but also by states who respond heavily with armed intervention against illegal organizations in order to wipe out their terrorist attacks. According to Max Weber, state resorts to violence over certain rebellious communities by means of its political authority, its police, and its military in order to strengthen its legislations and hegemony. Moreover, he adds that the monopoly of committing violence by governments is protected through legal systems. The state's resorting to violence is often seen in authoritarian dictatorships like the aftermath of the Arab spring in the Middle Eastern countries. Then, these regimes have turned into being a part of democide through police brutality, execution, massacre, slave labour camps, and sometimes intentional famine. To distinguish these aforementioned reasons of violence, a sharp distinction is made in the literature of political science between “force” and “violence”. Violence is formed by means of psychological and physical damages intended by groups or persons. Details will be given in Section 3.1.
C. Tilly classifies historically states with respect to their regimes and their democracy capacities such as low-capacity democratic countries (Belgium, Turkey) or high-capacity undemocratic countries (Iran, China). When we look into the democracy-regime capacity of countries throughout the world, we can understand whether their intensity of contentious politics-civil war is high or low level in their internal affairs. The analyses and tables presented by Gurr and Tilly show us what the relationship between participation to political clubs or non-governmental organizations, demonstrations, freedom of expression in short, and tendency for violence or to build an illegal organization to express themselves is.

It will be focused on together “ethnic violence and nation-state” under the sub-section “ethnic violence and ethno-political conflicts” (3.2.1). Due to lack of fundamental minority rights such as governmental recognition, equal opportunities with major citizens, free education in their mother languages, harsh clashes arise between states and minority groups. In this section, several incidents of ethno-political conflicts will be shown from “Peoples Versus States” of T. Gurr. Additionally, we will investigate how ethno-political movements turn into ethno-nationalist movements. Risk proportions of ethnic conflicts will be illustrated on tables in countries which include ethnic varieties and different minorities. These graphics analyzed by T. R. Gurr in 1999-2000 have important evaluations which shed light on situations of countries with ongoing conflicts. The link between ethno-nationalism and violence will also be built in this section.

In Subsection 3.2.2, a number of examples of ethno-political conflicts and their rebellion risk factors for states can be will be shown and compared. A few popular examples of ethno-nationalist organizations and their relations with the states will be shared together with the features of these organizations and the conflict solution models implemented by the related states. Illegal armed organizations such as ETA, IRA and PKK have been well-known examples regarding ethno-nationalist conflicts and have caused many bilateral deaths since 1990s in Western Europe and in Turkey. The differences and constitutional similarities among these organizations will be pointed out. In short, we study why ethno-political conflicts take place and how we can solve these centenarian controversies.

Section 3.3 refers to “conflict solution”. As a field of international relations, conflict resolution was constituted shortly after the World War II. However, this concept has already
started to be studied beforehand in a few countries such as Britain, Europe and Northern America between 1920-1945. After that in post Cold-War studies on conflict resolution have been enlarged to solve the increasing armed conflicts within the nation-states. Theories on conflict resolution will be introduced, and several different approaches such as “win-win approach”, “functionalist approach” and “win-lose theory” will be listed. As a key subject of conflict resolution, the importance of negotiations will be underlined by Etzersdorfer in seven phases.

In Chapter 4, we will refer to our case study in terms of relations of ethno-nationalist groups to violence. In the last three decades, Turkey’s bloody Kurdish issue has fast grown towards bilateral armed conflicts mostly in Southeastern Anatolia. Thereby, PKK will be analyzed historically from their being founded as a Kurdish political party to their evolution towards an illegal organization in Turkey. Kurds are the only ethnic group who do not have a state in the history of the Middle East. Since hundreds of years, Kurds have been living with Turks in Mesopotamia or in the Middle East. After the foundation of nation-states, namely World War I, mostly in Europe so many different countries were rebuilt based on a unique dominant nation. In 1923, the Turkish Republic brought to Anatolia with their age-long clashes against Kurds. Although a large population of Kurds existed, mostly in Southeastern Turkey, Turkish state did not recognize the Kurdish identity since late 1990s. In Chapter 4, the past of Kurdish issue and emergence of PKK will be investigated in depth, as well as PKK’s ideology and its military camps in the region. Many proposals for solution have been offered until present by both the Turkish state and PKK. These solutions will be reconsidered in the light of the causes of conflicts between them especially in last two decades. PKK is effective not only in Turkey and the Middle East but also in the Europe. This wing of PKK is called diaspora where important heads of KCK’s executive committee live. Diaspora contributes financial, cultural and social improvement of Kurds who support PKK’s ideology. A questionnaire to understand how PKK has an impact on diaspora Kurds is made and will be reported. This survey was conducted on anonymous test subjects chosen from the Kurdish diaspora in Vienna, Austria. To understand better why some big rebellious groups resort to violence in order to gather consciousness in their nation, we have specifically benefited from the opinions of people who approach PKK’s ideology as a sympathizer.

The subject of the Chapter 5 is different ideas and views of other researches regarding the PKK issue in Turkey. Several sources have been used in Chapters 4 and 5 such as the text of
KCK written by Abdullah Öcalan, his press release, Aliza Marcus’s book “Blood and Belief”, articles from various newspapers, academic articles, and international reports. Moreover, a number of theses by writers or researchers who are closely interested in Kurdish issue will be handled from different angles. In the Middle East, Kurds were spread over four adjacent countries (Turkey, Iraq, Syria and Iran), parallel to the interests of a number of states in this region. Hereby, various studies and articles on the Kurdish issue are published in the literature.

Furthermore, opinions and proposals of Kurdish intellectuals will be mentioned concerning the solution of the Kurdish issue. Kurdish language and piece archiving should be sorted out for compilation of the Kurdish history and for improving the Kurdish literature. Hence, Kurdish language and identity play an important role in solution of Kurdish question in Turkey. In this chapter, examples from Kurdish literature and history will be represented by means of Mehmed Uzun’s works. Then, current progresses on the Kurdish issue will be mentioned in the light of the statements of the Turkish state and the head of PKK Öcalan towards the solution process.

1.2 Methodological Background

This study is built on several related concepts such as ethnicity, nation, ethnic identity, nationalism, ethno-nationalism, minorities, violence, collective violence etc., which are research fields of international relations. Additionally, a number of journals, articles, books, papers, literature review and some comparative data are used in the methodological background. In Chapter 4, a case study is done that contains a small scale questionnaire which is anonymously analyzed in this text. Moreover, to compare the risk factor of violence and rebellion in ethno-political conflicts, some analyses are shown in tables based on the theoretical background provided in Chapter 3.
2 Self-Image of Minorities From Ethno-Nationalism To Nation-Building

“Patriotism is, fundamentally, a conviction that a particular country is the best in the world because you were born in it...”
G. B. Shaw

2.1 Ethnicity and Ethnic identity

This section is about how the concepts “ethnicity” and “ethnic identity” are defined in political science. Initially, we distinguish between the terms ethnicity, ethnic group, and ethnic identity. In order to understand how the concept of “ethnic identity” emerged, its etymological origins are firstly studied in this subsection. The term “ethnic” comes from Latin and Greek origins – ethnicus and ethnikas – which both mean “nation”. And the second construction of the concept identity is also derived from a Latin origin: “identitas”. This word is known to express the notion of sameness, likeness, and oneness.²

When we combine the definitions and interpretations of ethnicity and identity, we can find out that the nations look quite similar each other along with the common definition of a nation which is to share common traditions, customs, historical experiences, and maybe instances living in the same geographical residence. The concepts, “ethnic groups”, “ethnicity”, “ethnic conflict”, and “nation or nationalism” are commonly encountered in the media and the political science literature. At the first times when these concepts have started to be widely used, their meanings were not yet settled. Moreover, in the early 20th century, the definitions of ethnicity and nationalism have developed themselves in the political science in the world, although they were affected by the emergence of industrialism, modernization and individualism. Hence, it can be said that the notions of ethnicity and nationalism have indirectly arisen via the industrial revolution. The first usage of the term 'ethnicity' was by the American sociologist David Riesman in 1953. However, the word ethnicity is much older than its first use.³

Furthermore, the concept 'ethnicity' includes an ethnic group which is formed by people. And we identify the members of these people within a group by a common heritage, consisting of a common culture, including a shared language or dialect and so forth. The ideology of the group may be emphasized by common ancestry, religion or race. Eriksen lists four types of ethnic groups:  

(1) *Urban ethnic minorities*: this type of minorities are formed by non-European immigrants in the European cities and Hispanics in the United States, and migrants to industrial towns in Africa.  

(2) *Indigenous people*: this classification contains people who are aboriginal inhabitants of a region, and are politically powerless and partially integrated into the dominant nation-state. For example, the Basques of the Bay of Biscay and the Welsh of Great Britain are not considered as indigenous populations as well as the Sami of Northern Scandinavia.  

(3) *Proto-nations (ethno-nationalist) movement*: since 1990s, this ethnic group has been the most popular category in the news that includes Kurds, Sikhs, Palestinians, and Sri Lankan Tamils, Catalans, Walloons, etc. Generally, political leaders of this latest listed group aim to constitute their own nation-state without being ruled by others. After having a nation-state, it might be said that they have more substantial features like other nations. These people belonging to an ethno-nationalist group are territorially discriminated from other classes and the educational achievement of host society. Meanwhile, this group is known as “nations without state” in common terminology, such as Euzkadi and Basque country.  

(4) *Ethnic groups in plural societies*: The people in this category are repressed by their government and superiority of the majority. For example, in Kenya, Indonesia and Jamaica, ethnic minorities are forced to unite into the majority of their states. On the one hand, Eriksen concerns with whether an ethnic group has a distinctive culture or not. In fact, the cultural differences between two groups are not considered as the certain feature of ethnicity. For example, somewhere in New Guinea, people coming from different languages and religious

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5 Eriksen, Thomas Hylland: Ibid.
background do not identify themselves as coming from different ethnicities. For this reason, this sense of ethnicity is not the feature of an ethnic group, nor is it a consequence of social relations. On the other hand, after the collapse of Yugoslavia there was a tension in the relationship between Serbs and Croats as well as the relationship between Sami and Norwegians in the Northern Europe. Hence, the cultural diversity can exist without an ethnicity in a group. However, the cultural differences widely affect human manners in a group. And the social nearliness and social relationships can constitute an ethnic element. Then, the ethnicity is redefined by being a member of a group. Moreover, for Eriksen, ethnic groups tend to form the myths of a common origin and always have heartening ideologies.

Some ethnic groups represent a violent ethnic movement in order to gain their independence or at least their specific identities. Besides, their ideological targets comprise of demands and rights to have their freedom and ethnic identity. As a statistical example, in 1991, 35 of 37 armed conflicts seen from Sri Lanka to North Ireland were internal conflicts. Also, non-violent ethnic movements play an efficient role as well as violent ethnic movements to gain rights for ethnic struggle through vandalism or civil disobedience such as Québeco independence movement in Canada (1962), Indian independence movement led by Gandhi in 1947 etc.

Another concept to be defined is 'ethnic identity' in concern with political and sociological aspect of ethnicity. When we look at the first usage of ethnic identity in the last 19th century, the notions of ethnic identity and ethnicity were synonymous with race or racial identity. Ethnicity was defined by many nationalists and scholars later on. Max Weber stated the definition of ethnic identity which has been previously absent in an ethnic group. Besides, Weber distinguishes racial and ethnic identity. For the former, a blood relationship is necessary for racial identity, while for the latter it is not. According to Weber, an ethnic group identifies itself by affiliation to a subjective belief in a common descent because of similarities of physical appearance and customs, or because of memories of migration and colonization, or both of them. In the past few decades (1960's and 1970's), the concept ethnic identity re-emerged in the social and behavioral sciences literature. For example, in the U.S.A., the ethnic minority groups (especially African Americans) have been demanding their civil rights and privileges.

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To understand ethnic unity and ethnic identity, it should be dealt with identity which means a number of eligible characteristics to be a member of any social category. The ethnic identity is a subhead of identity categories. In the concept of ethnic identity, ethnic descent-based features are considered as the eligibility to be member of an ethnic group. Furthermore, the member of an ethnic identity feels to belong to a part of the common descent by means of descent-based attributes. Regarding this common root, descent-based attributes compose of genetical attributes (e.g. skin colour, gender, hair type, eye colour, height and physical features) or cultural and historical inheritance (e.g. the names, languages, places of birth and origin of one's parents and ancestors), or an acquired inheritance (by believing to be part of another group such as last name, tribal markings).

As mentioned earlier, ethnic identity is a subhead of the notion of identity. And the categories of ethnic identity are framed by a number of distinctive characteristics: (1) Ethnic identity categories are impersonal. (2) They comprise a section of a country's population rather than the whole country. (3) If one sibling is eligible to be a member of an ethnic group, then all other siblings are also eligible to be in that group. (4) The distinctive attributes of the membership are formed by genetically transmitted features or language, religion, place of origin, region, tribe, caste, clan, nationality, or race of one's parents and ancestors.

If we compare the definition of ethnic identity with the definition of ethnic group by different studies, the concept of ethnic identity can be seen from several aspects. Hence, it is necessary to know how an ethnic group is defined. From Max Weber's point of view, ethnic groups consist of human groups that share a subjective belief in their common descent through similarities of physical type, traditions or both, and through memories of colonization or migration. This belief is very significant for enlargement of the group formation. According to Weber, the membership to an ethnic group does not relate to objective blood relationship among members of group. For Donald Horowitz, ethnicity is about a myth of common ancestry. This approach of ethnicity is known that the traits of ethnicity come from the birth. Another approach is that of Fearon and Laitin, who identify an ethnic group by primarily collective descent. They mention that an ethnic group is conceptually autonomous, and has a traditionally recognized natural history as a group.

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Anthony Smith offered another definition for an ethnic group. He suggests that an ethnic group is formed by myths of common ancestry, shared historical remembrances, a number of factors of a common culture, a connection with a homeland and a sense of solidarity. All definitions of an ethnic group, we can add that the role of the descent seems to be very significant for defining this concept. The role of the descent can be extended in four different ways\textsuperscript{8}: (1) a common ancestry, (2) a myth of collective ancestry, (3) a myth of a common place of root, and (4) a descent rule to be a member of the ethnic group.

There are a number of approaches on the interpretation of the ethnic identity. One of them is by sociologist Herbert Gans (2003), which states that identity is no longer a convenient term. Because the identity increased its popularity and became a cliché. However, the definition of ethnic identity is partially contentious in the literature.

Ethnic identity can also be defined by means of both psychological content and social processes. Regarding psychological content, Yuet Cheung (1993) identifies ethnic identity as a psychological attachment to an ethnic group or heritage.\textsuperscript{9} This definition is the extended version of Sawiti Saharso's ethnic identification (1989) which suggests that ethnic identity contains one's choice of friends, selection of a future partner, perception of their life-chances and the influences of others in one's social environment.\textsuperscript{10}

As we shortly mentioned in the beginning of this section, the notion of ethnic identity is approached from anthropological, sociological, psychological, and socio-political perspectives. Alternatively, the language and one's mental images are emphasized by Alexander von Humboldt. According to Humboldt, the language consists of people's mentality, and the people's mentality is their language. Either of them can be their priority in their life. Particularly, people who share a common language develop a similar subjectiveness or a weltanschauung (world view). In Humboldt's case, ethnic identity is expressed differently from a nationalistic perspective.

According to Barth (1969), ethnic identity is formed by a group from another unity. This means that a group needs ethnic boundaries rather than cultural characteristics. On the one hand,

\textsuperscript{8} Ibid: 4-6.
social identity theory plays a critical role on ethnic identity research.\textsuperscript{11} On the other hand, ethnic identity is to classify the ethnic affiliation among people at an individual or societal level. It means that ethnic labeling has a socio-political value and function, particularly for census and demographic studies. However, this labeling provides formation of the identity process which includes other identifiers such as acculturation status, ego-involvement, and attitudes toward own and other groups. Besides, it relates to behavioral preferences such as language usage, friendship affiliations, music and food preferences, and participation in cultural and religious activities.\textsuperscript{12}

\section*{2.2 Nationalism and Ethno-nationalism}

Ethno-nationalism is a special case of nationalism. In this context, we are initially interested in the content of nationalism. To avoid confusion, it should be stated that nationalism is an ideology of the nation, not the state. In order to distinguish the nation from the state, it is worthwhile to remember Walker Connor's suggestion\textsuperscript{13} : The state is much more tangible an element than the nation. Because the state has a geographical location, population, president, and capital etc. But the nation comprises of intangible relationships.

The notion of nationalism was coined by Johann Gottfried Herder during the late 1770s.\textsuperscript{14} Although it cannot be known when exactly the term of nationalism appeared in the history, it is considered that the first wave of nationalism emerged with French Revolution and American Revolution in 18th century. Nationalism is a political ideology. It identifies itself as a group of individuals within a nation. Nationalism contains two main perspectives: pri-mordialist and modernist. The pri-mordialist approach says that people tend to organize distinct groupings based on an affinity of birth. And the modernist perspective describes nationalism in terms of citizenship and multi-nationality. The modernist school of nationalism includes several writers such as Benedict Anderson, Ernest Gellner and Eric Hobsbawm. In 'Imagined Communities', Anderson defines the nation as "an imagined political community and imagined as both inherent

\begin{thebibliography}{99}
\bibitem{Barth} Barth, F.: Ethnic Groups and Boundaries: The Social Organization of Culture Difference, Little, Brown,& Co. (Boston) 1969.
\bibitem{Trimble} Trimble, Joseph E./Dickson, Ryan A.: Ibid.
\end{thebibliography}
Anderson perceives a nation with the minds of its members as a mental image of their affinity, rather than the communication of these members face to face with each other in everyday life. For example, a nation is represented as an imagined community in a larger event such as Olympic games. For Anderson, this unity of an imagined community may be created by the media. Moreover, Anderson believes that the main reasons of nationalism are the declining interest of privileged access to special script languages (like Latin) due to mass vernacular literacy. This idea is supported by Anderson through the emergence of “printing press capitalism” with the start of the Industrial Revolution. In contrast to Anderson, E. Gellner does not agree with that the notion of nationalism comes into being through Industrial Revolution as first wave nationalism in European societies, because this argument cannot explain the nationalism in the Eastern side of the world, in other words, the ethnic-nationalism of the second wave. In this context, Anderson's definition of nationalism refers to formulas such as 'national consciousness' or 'nation-ness'. However, the nationhood must be differentiated from nationalism which are not the same notion.  

When we look into E. Gellner's seminal work 'Nations and Nationalism', the first aspect of his model is handled through the transition from traditional societies to industrial societies along with the framework of the modernization theory. According to Gellner, the consciousness of being a nation can only be established by a modern 'national' educational system, rather than by the kin or local units. This national educational system comprises of a pyramid built from primary school to advanced graduate school led by teachers. Then, this model turns into a viable political unit in order to gain basic national feelings. Within the cultural homogeneous society, the education and administration systems are formed by the majority which has the dominant language and strongly defend their rights in the process of national construction. Thus, a new national consciousness consists of cultural homogenization that Gellner calls 'nationalism' as a new form of collective consciousness. The important point is that Gellner does not think of nationalism as an ideology, but as nation-making and nationhood. Additionally, Gellner points out that all pre-modern cultures will generate nations. But some of them are far from creating the

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18 Ibid: 34.
raw materials of modern nations.\(^{19}\)

Smith defines the core doctrine of the ideology 'nationalism' as follows\(^{20}\): (1) The world is divided into nations which create their own individuality, history, and destiny. (2) The nation is the source of all political and social power and loyalty, and it is one step ahead from all other allegiances. (3) Human beings shall be defined by a nation if they want to be free and realize their aims. (4) Nations must be free and secure, if they live in a peaceful and fair world. Smith primarily considers nationalism as a cultural doctrine or a political ideology with a cultural doctrine. Then, every nationalist movement takes into account having their own state which is common, but not necessary. Some ethnic groups or ethno-nationalists such as Catalan, Scots, and Flemish have been living in a multinational state without their own fully independent state. Moreover, this cultural doctrine of nationalism depends on languages and symbols. Smith identifies nationalism as an ideological movement for attaining and maintaining the autonomy, unity and identity of a nation.

In his book, titled “Nationalism”, S. S. Öğün points out Herder as one of the architects of German nationalism, and his peaceful nationalism idea. Herder argues that mankind should be formed by a national family, and a nation's being insulted by another nation is unacceptable. Herder is against every social hierarchy. Öğün also underlines that cultural differences are not supported by equal financial means in a society. Thus, national ideologies have generally arisen from cultural restraints or tensions, and assumed themselves in a cultural struggle. According to Öğün, the distinction between 'us' and 'them' can critically reach a peak from moderate nationalism to radical nationalism. It even can cause hardly repairable or unrepairable hostilities.\(^{21}\) If 'nationalism' is sharply framed based only on the dominant element in a state, it finally creates its self-destroyer or Frankenstein along with ceaseless sub-cultural conflicts.

After identifying nationalism in different ways, the next step is to investigate how ethnicity defines itself. In this sense, Horowitz has asserted that ethnic groups are like 'super families' of fictive descent because members feel to belong their ethnicity as a combination of interrelated families, forming one huge 'family' linked by mythical ties of affiliation and ancestry.

\(^{21}\) Öğün, Süleyman Seyfi: Mukayeseli Sosyal Teori ve Tarih Bağlamında Milliyetçilik, Alfa Press (Istanbul) 2000, 16.
This process of being a solitary group or a unity can be considered to be similar to nation formation especially in nationalist mythologies. Moreover, it is difficult to maintain the presence of ethnicities without such descent myths. Then, we may link up between ethnic cores and the formation of nations. For example, in Sub-Saharan Africa, there are many different ethnic groups but the dominant one or elites rules the country. However, in Sub-Saharan Africa, ethnic conflicts and ethnic disagreements have been increasingly proceeding. It can be added that the relationship of modern nations to any ethnic core is problematic and ambiguous. According to Smith, a provisional typology of nationalisms is separated into two distinctions which are ethnic and territorial nationalism. When we look at the concepts of Ethnic or Territorial Nationalism from a general perspective, we can notice that particular communities and movements are on the way before and after independence.

First, **Territorial Nationalisms** are formed of two parts as pre-independence and post-independence. Pre-independence is related to (a) **Anti-Colonial Nationalism**, and post-independence is about (b) **Integration Nationalism**. The second typology of nationalism is **Ethnic Nationalism** which comprises of the following two parts: (a) **Pre-Independence Movements**, which arises from basically ethnic and genealogical concept of nation will. It seeks to secede from a larger political unit and constitute a new political ethno-nation in its place. That refers to secession and diaspora nationalisms. (b) **Post-Independence Movements** which arises from basically ethnic and genealogical (unlike civic and territorial) concepts of the nation will. It seeks to expand the present boundaries of the 'ethno-nation' and the lands towards their similar ethnic kinsmen. They may aim to form a much larger 'ethno-national' state by the union of culturally and ethnically similar ethno-national states. This sub-typology means irredentist and "pan"-nationalisms. Additionally, there are several well-known kinds of nationalism, especially Protectionist Economic and Integral Fascist Nationalisms and Racial Nationalisms. For example, the French irredentist nationalism was over the Alsace-Lorraine region. As another example, Latin American protectionism was dominated in Argentina, Brazil and Chile during the time of populist integration nationalisms.

John Hutchinson bases the concept nationalism on language and customs, ethno-scapes, ethnic history and myths of ethnic origin. According to him, nationalism means 'ethno-nationalism' and a loyalty to the ethnically defined nation. On the contrary, the patriotism
concerns with being devoted to the territorial state. That is considered as a kind of distinction between 'nationalism' and 'patriotism'. This distinction is also argued by people such as Walker Connor, Maurizio Viroli, and John Armstrong. Additionally, Connor says that nationalism is a doctrine about the nation, not the state, and based on the priority of ethnic ties for consciousness of nationhood. But patriotism is interested in loyalty to the state. However, Smith criticizes Connor's definition of nation, because it does not take into account shared memories, historic territory and shared public culture.

To understand what relationship of ethnicism with nationalism correlates with particular ethnies with nations regarding basic themes on ethno-symbolism. The notion of 'ethno symbolis' was conceptualized by Smith within the interdisciplinary field of nationalism studies. Ethno-symbolism concerns with the roots of ethnic groups and ethnic nations taking account of nations' symbolic dimensions. According to Smith, nationalism does not need that all members of a 'nation' look like (should be alike) each other but they should feel an intense tie of solidarity to the nation and other members of their nation. Nationalism is constituted on pre-existing kinship, religion, and belief systems. Additionally, he thinks that ethnic groups form the past of modern nations as 'ethnies'. That is the same bond as the one between nations and ethnic groups, as mentioned above.

Another important point is the relationship between to the rise of ethnic nationalism in political and economic circumstances. The extent of ethnic nationalism in a society depends on the level of ethnic based production and distribution of services. These service demands are provided by “ethnic clubs” in which ethnic affiliation and ethnic nationalism are much more greater and extensive. It necessarily means that the comparative statistics of the demand of 'ethnic club' services provides a kind of model of the intensity of ethnic nationalism and ethnic conflict. This explains how ethnic nationalism arises from the conscious of ethnic group or ethnic club. According to R. D. Congleton, residents of a small village gain varied services directly from their local community and other from regional, national or supranational organisations.

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These members of family also gain services based on their clan, tribe, ethnic group, extended families, race or culture. In this way, people want to be affiliated to one group rather than another or identify themselves as members of one group. Analogously, this will of belonging to a group is also seen in the pattern of citizenship in various level of government. The essential factor over the affiliation of members in a group stems from economic concerns, political interests, natural boundaries, and historical accidents for both citizenship and being a member of an ethnic group.27

To compare with ethno-nationalism and nationalism, we need to investigate the fundamental principles of nationalism itself. As mentioned earlier, ethno-nationalism is a kind of subhead of the concept nationalism. Therefore, its definition shall be known in depth in every sense. As mentioned above, the differences between nationalism and ethno-nationalism deal with the notions state and ethnicity. The nation has its own -generally nation-state, but ethnic folks exist under the hegemony of a nation-state. Another difference is about the preconditions of membership to the state. To be a citizen of the state formally requires unaffiliated individuals, but to be a member for the ethnic group requires a blood tie or strong fidelity. It means that being a member of an ethnic group is more difficult than the other.28 However, we know that every nation consists of an ethnic root which became more dominant. We can understand the utopian efforts of ethnic organizations for being a nation from this respect.

2.3 Minorities And Ethno-Nationalist Minorities In A Nation-State

So far, we have sought the ethnic issues from ethnic identity to nationalism in a wide framework. In this section, we will examine the notion of minority through the reports of international institutions. The distinction is inevitably necessary between the notion of ethnic minority and ethnic regional separatist movement. As well-known definition, 'ethnic-minority' means a group within a community which has different national or cultural traditions from the main

population. In the sociological context, minority is identified as a culturally, ethnically, or racially distinct group that is coexistent but is subordinate to a more dominant group.

Generally, the meaning of a minority group is not related to its population. However, in some cases, the population of several so-called minority groups may be many times more than double the size of the dominating group, for example; the case in South Africa under apartheid. Additionally, to be a minority group involves the significant distinguishing characteristics within certain groups. A cultural, ethnic, linguistic, racial or religious minority group can be recognized unlike freemasons or a trade union. However, some minorities are exposed to exclusion and alienation from the main dominant society by means of cutting off from a full involvement in the workings of the society and from an equal sharing of social liberties (rights) for members of distinct minorities. Hereby, this kind of minority groups are separated or increasingly segregated from the host society. Then, the status of minorities depends on the structure of social system and the relative power of the minority group. For example, in a closed society, individuals have no chance to gain basic rights of different cultural and ethnic groups such as the traditional Hindu caste system in the past.

Above all, we need to identify what exactly minority is from various international agreements and their perspectives. Initially, after the World War II period in 1978, a definition from other aspects was offered by Francesco Capotorti, a rapporteur for United Nations Commission On Human Rights, Sub-Commission on Prevention of Discrimination and Protection of Minorities. He states in his work that the rights of minorities comprise of ethnic, religious, and linguistic privileges. According to Capotorti, a minority has numerically less population than the rest dominant citizens of a state, and its members have different ethnic, religious, or linguistic characteristics. The members of a minority act even implicitly with solidarity in order to protect their cultures, customs, religions or languages. Another recommended definition of minority was made by Jules Deschenes, a Canadian member of the sub-commission. According to Deschenes, minorities are identified as citizens who have less population than the dominant group. They are in a non-dominant position in the state, and are different from the majority of the population, featured linguistically or religiously, acting

30 Sociology Encyclopedia Britannica.
implicitly solidarishly to each other, orienting to continue their existence with common will-power, targeting to obtain de-facto and judicial equality.\textsuperscript{32}

Both definitions are quite similar to one another. Except the document of UN regarding the definition of minority rights, there are a few articles such as Venezia Commission's Europe Contract concerning the protection of Minorities on the European Council (1991). The Parliamentarian Assemble suggested in an additional protocol to distinguish minorities from the notion of “national minorities”. This Parliamentarian Assemble defines “national minorities” as a group of people who: (a) who inhabit in the country of a state and are citizens of that state, (b) conserve the tight and constant relationships with that state from old times, (c) show features like distinguishing ethnic, cultural, religious or linguistic; (d) are adequately presented although this group's population is numerically less than large majority of that state; (e) aim to protect the components formed by their common identities including cultures, customs, religions or languages. In the light of all these definitions of a minority, it seems that there is no unique and common minority definition within the international community. Also the notion of minority differs from the notions 'ethnic minority', 'folk' and 'national minority' within the different European countries. Nevertheless, these notions are not used with their distinct meanings in the international literature. For example, 'national minority' literally refers to a group of persons who live in another country different from their country of origin, as in diaspora where they have historical, cultural, linguistic relations with the ethnically dominated group of the country they live. Nonetheless, this notion of 'national minority' is confused with the meaning of ethnic minority.\textsuperscript{33}

When we investigate the minorities and their rights in any country, we can understand whether democracy and equality exists in that country. For sure, there is no single measure of the presence of democracy. For this reason, we can compare the less democratic state with the one that is a bit more democratic. For example, in Turkey, the minorities consist of Kurds, Armenians, Alevis, Ezidis, Assyrians, Lazes, Caferis, Gypsies, Rums, Caucasians, and Jews. During the years under the Ottoman rule, there was a social system, called 'Millet', for those minorities. After the collapse of the Ottoman Empire, Turkey has recognized only non-Muslim minorities since 1923 with Treaty of Lousanne. However, Turkey has violated the Treaty since

then. Excluded minorities have been banned from using their languages, from cultural rituals and from exercising their religious rights and so forth.\textsuperscript{34} This example is related with the Turkish Republic's history of ethnic, religious, or linguistic minorities. Naturally, in Turkey, this issue has changed in many aspects until today. We will address this in following chapter.

As another example, Sami people in Finland seem to be an optimistic case study regarding minority rights. The constitution of Finland recognizes Sami as indigenous people who guarantee their cultural autonomy within their homeland. Sami have linguistic and cultural self-government in their native region. Nevertheless, in a Sami region, reindeer herding is on the line because of the exploratory drill conducted by an Anglo-American mining company.\textsuperscript{35} With this example, it can be said that some controversies between the province of minority and the state may take place on the common decision-making process about economic interests and territorial hegemony. Such like inconvenient decisions taken by autonomous province may affect the development of the whole country, if the minorities have more dominance in their autonomous territory. Therefore, this example is a subject of the contradiction between negative liberty and positive liberty regarding independence tendency of the minorities within the state. Minorities in a nation-state vary in the different regions of the world. Many of them are neglected by states of dominated culture concerning the topics of educational and cultural system and using own languages etc. Ethnic minorities unconsciously become polarized in their own rights from the central society. Then, the ethno-nationalism process may come true in a nation-state. In this part, we will handle ethnonationalism in the case of ethnic minorities by examples of some ethnic separatist movements.

After the rise of nationalist movements, the consciousness of national identities started to spread intensely upon territorial ethnic societies. That time, most probably the formation of ethnic nations arose from this influential national movement. Then, the dominant and powerful ethnic groups became nations and established their own nation-state in particular lands. However, a number of ethnic groups have been in the minority and may not be highly educated in their own ethnic culture. Hence, they could have the right to build their own nation-state. Besides, they were not aware of the unity and consciousness of being a nation due to lack of

\textsuperscript{34} Minority Rights Group International: A Quest For Equality: Minorities in Turkey, A4, 2007, 48.
socio-economic opportunities and lack of sufficient education system in their lifespan. In this part, we deal with the impacts and movements of ethno-nationalism within the nation-state particularly along with their separatist movements. First, we reclassify the nation models into two: (1) civic-territorial and (2) ethnic-genealogical. As Smith stated, there are two routes of the formation of nations: bureaucratic incorporation and vernacular mobilization.36

Before we classify the current ethnic movements in the nation-states, we need to remind the existence of ethno-nationalism. Since the early eighteenth century, there have been various ethno-nationalist waves. First one is the classic period of ethnic self-determination in the early to late 18th century. This wave was mostly seen in Eastern Europe and the center of the Middle East. Ever since, the states have generally dominated the diverse ethnic communities which have been forced to integrate and homogenize into majority. Therefore, the classic ethnic nationalism can be considered as rebel and provocative frame against an imperial nationalism of the dominant ethnie's ruling elites such as the Habsburg, Romanov and Ottoman empires.37

A second wave of ethnic nationalism is interested in overseas territories of European colonial empires in the early to mid-twentieth century. Some movements have been still struggling to pursue peace and power in post-colonial states in recent Africa and Asia. There are several examples of demotic ethno-nationalism in regions such as Bengal, Kurds, Karen, Ewe, Somali and BaKongo before and after the World War II. Many of them are inclined to violence in order to have the rights for their own identities, and prevent assimilation under the dominant elites. Within the protracted wars of ethnic liberation, some ethnies and their illegal organisations may threaten the stability of whole regions and the life of others. Some examples to such ethnies are: Tamils, Sikhs, Moros, Baluchis, Pathans, Uzbeks, Kazhaks, Armenians, Azéris, Kurds, Georgians, Palestinians, South Sudanese, Eritreans, Tigre, Oromo, Luo, Gande, Ndebele, Ovimbundu, BaKongo, Lunda, Ewe, Ibo and many others. In fact, all these ethnic communities seek to build a new state and many of them can be considered as ethno-nationalist movements.38

A third wave of ethnic nationalism has spread out mostly in the Western Europe, Yugoslavia, Romania, Poland and the Soviet Union for the purpose of autonomy or separation since 1960s. According to Smith, this third wave of ethno-nationalism was firstly seen in Canada among the

38 Ibid: 124.
Quebecois, and in the United States among the Southern Blacks and then the Indians and Hispanics. When we look at the European ethno-nationalism, there are lots of examples for ethnic separatist movements such as the Catalan and Basque in Spain, Breton in France, Scots in Britain, Flemish in Belgium.\(^{39}\)

If we come back to the rise of ethnic activism, there are no generalizeable reasons concerning the interaction of economic, political, cultural and geographic factors. However, there have been many disagreements about the effects of the economic or social reflections of the class structure among the ethnic minorities.\(^{40}\) In this category, we emphasize the separatist movements of more than 70 groups around the globe and approximately two dozen of them are active mostly in the Europe and Asia and seven of them are violent. Moreover, since 1990, more than two dozen new countries have been founded from separatist movements mostly as a result of the collapse of the Soviet Union along with the breakup of Yugoslavia. Almost half of these separatist movements were organized ethnically based and violent groups. According to the analysis of Unrepresented Nations and People’s Organisation, in Asia/Eurasia ongoing separatist movements comprise of Abkhazia, Aceh, Chechnya, Kurds, Moros, Nagorno-Karabakh, Palestinian Territories, South Ossetia, Taiwan, Tamils, Tibet, Xinjiang and in Europe Basque Country, Flanders, Northern Cyprus, Republika Srpska, Scotland and Wales, Transdniestria.\(^{41}\) It is well known from everyday media that some of these movements contain active violence. It can also be added that these separatist movements lead to more violent conflicts within their territories. In this context, we seek an adequate answer of whether nations or ethnicities should have the right for self-determination.

\textit{2.4 Nation-Building and Its Definition for Minorities}

Initially, the term “nation-building” should not be confused with the notion of “state-building” in political science. In general, the meaning of nation-building refers to an effort

\(^{39}\) Ibid: 125.
to be national unity within a state. Moreover, this term is mostly used by newly constituted countries such as post-colonial African countries or post Yugoslavian countries.

Before we examine the theory of nation-building, we shall define the main actors of a state. According to Mylonas, a state consists of the following actors: (a) The core group and its elites, (b) the non-core group and its elites, (c) the dependent variable: nation-building strategies. The core group refers to a clear 'national type' that is actively propagated within their territorial borders. For Mylonas, the "core group" is formed by a demographic majority that shares a common national prototype. The ruling political elite is distinguished from the "core group" that demands representation of this demographic majority. The non-core group is identified by Mylonas as individuals that aggregate a politically unity in terms of linguistics, ethnics, religion, culture or ideology that are different from the core group of the society in a country. This group's members might be citizens of the state but are definitely not counted as members of the nation before they are exposed to assimilation policies. As the dependent variable, he uses the policies pursued towards non-core groups. According to this, (1) assimilationist policies provide the adoption of core-group's culture for the non-core group of that society by means of educational, occupational, marital, cultural, demographic, and political state policies. These assimilation practices can be applied on a specific group (or a part of a specific group) or on the whole population nation-wide. As another dependent variable, (2) exclusionist policies deal with providing the national homogeneity of particular areas within the country. Exclusionist policies comprise of the population exchange, deportation, internal displacement, or even mass killing. The last one, (3) accommodation, means that the non-core group is allowed to have certain separate institutions such as schools, churches, cultural associations and so forth. Here is the less dependent structure and relatively less political loyalty to the central state.

After we have learned the actors of a state, now we can see a theory of nation-building. Nation building is necessary if the ruling political elites aim to reinforce differences between non-core groups and the nation of a state. In this case, the state eliminates the differences within their own boundaries. Although many different nations and ethnicities have been living together in peace, by the rise of modernity, especially in the middle of 19th century, they faced a political program of self determination. That time, many of the national leaders struggled to protect the

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43 Ibid: 12.
loyalty of their "nations" to the state and the presence of their borders particularly in Western Europe. These national leaders and their associations tried various policies to manage or manipulate the national/ethnic consciousness of the population within their territorial borders.

Mylonas maintains to put forward the characteristics of nation-building strategies as a theoretical analysis. The first is modern states and loyalty: the origin of rival claims to non-core group's loyalty. Weber mentions that a nation symbolizes the cultural structure, but a state corresponds to the political structure within a country. Thereby, we can add the way the state power passes through the domination on national will. For this reason, a modern state and its ruling political elite keep having the loyalty of whole population by means of cultural, educational and societal structures. Then, the legitimate rule enhances the taxing abilities of a state, facilitates conscription to the army, fosters compliance to the laws, and prevents separatist movements. This type of governance take place in many aspects, while a nation-state constitutes and conserves to develop it. However, the first theory refers to distinguishing between non-core groups that are mobilized by a rival claim, and that they are not targeted with assimilationist policies such as mass schooling, political rights, welfare benefits and military conscription, and so forth.

The second hypothesis of the nation-building theory is non-core group loyalty and revisionist claims. In this category, the large and sedentary non-core groups tend to territorially change the boundaries as revisionist and as status quo otherwise. This aim of non-core groups may damage the national unity and threaten the host state's sovereignty, if non-core groups are related with their distinctiveness to a political identity. The statements/claims of revisionist alliances are composed of political or economic grievance between great powers, neighboring states, and aggrieved nationally conscious non-core groups against the host state. In this context, the revisionist non-core groups and cultural distinctiveness of them are likely to be accommodated by the host state's policies. The third hypothesis is revisionist claims, revisionist states, and nation-building policies. When the revisionist non-core groups demand to expand their domain and even their living space, a revisionist state tends to pursue such a foreign policy in order to accomplish a territorial expansion or a massive population exchange. From Mylonas' view, the state should implement the status quo in the criteria of international system, along with

intense assimilation policies towards revisionist non-core groups within its borders. Moreover, Mylonas gives examples from the case of Southern Europe. For example, many of the Balkan states were conducted by a majority core-groups such as Kingdom of Serbs, Croats, and Slovenes. As another example, Albania is a kind of an ethnically diverse state with basis of its core group which consisted of Albanian speakers of Muslim, Christian Orthodox, and Catholic faiths. Nevertheless, the language of Albania's core-group was 78% of the total population. With these examples, Mylonas asserts that all of the countries have a core-group that was more than 60% of the total population. Additionally, the great heterogeneity was spread within the many Balkan countries. However, to measure this heterogeneity between cultural, ethnic or religious groups and the states, Mylonas' study is considered by non-core groups' level of mobilization and different group-level hypotheses such as: the impact of cultural distance, the effect of having an external homeland, and so forth.

With W. Connor's theses on 'Nation-Building or Nation-Destroying', the theory of nation building seems that is conceived in lack of ethnically homogeneous states or that ethnic diversity poses serious problems to integration. Then, Connor gives a number of statistical examples in order to indicate less coincidence between ethnic and political borders. For example, only 12 (9.1%) of 132 contemporary states can be described as essentially homogeneous from an ethnic viewpoint on the one hand. On the other hand, within a state there are nearly the hundreds of groups but in 53 states (40.2% of the total), the population is divided into more than five significant groups. Nevertheless, this problem of ethnic diversity is not sufficiently emphasized by the scholars of nation-building.

In Connor's theory on nation-building, two questions are discussed: i) Is loyalty to the ethnic group completely harmonized with loyalty to the state? ii) Will ethnic identification shortly appear withering away as modernization progresses? Members of an ethnic group from both of these loyalty aspects do not comprise of the main population of the country. And the loyalty to the state cannot be thought harmoniously at the same time by the same ethnic group in a state. This dilemma has been playing an important role for multi-ethnic states such as Belgium, Canada, Cyprus, Guyana, Kenya, Nigeria, the Sudan, Yugoslavia and in the past Habsburg

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46 Ibid: 37.
Empire. If we are to return to the nation-building process, some authors emphasize the creation of national paraphernalia such as national days, flags, anthems, national sport (football) themes, national languages, national stadiums, national airlines and national myths.\textsuperscript{48} Particularly, a national identity or elements of nation-building are necessarily constructed by molding different ethnic groups into a nation. As a result of this nation-building process, newly constituted model of the state has caused to arise homogeneous populations without emphasizing any ethnic identity.\textsuperscript{49}

To understand why nation-building comes on the scene of the political agenda of a state, from Karl Deutsch's perspective, the social mobilization leads to cultural and national assimilation in terms of the modernization theory within a community. Deutsch discusses the rates of social mobilization and of assimilation separately. He summarizes that a significant reason of national assimilation or differentiation was determined as the process of social mobilization which goes with the growth of markets, industries, mass communication, urbanization, schooling, and transportation facilities. The rate of assimilation among mobilized people has been higher than the assimilation among the native/remained population in Connor's quantitative and qualitative research.\textsuperscript{50}

It can be added that a nation-building process is reinforced by means of the policies on social mobilization and assimilation within a nation-state. These policies include different ways toward an eventual target. If the government's policies pass over the efficient ethnic or cultural groups which generate a piece of whole society in a country, in that time the culturally or ethnically excluded groups are destroyed by these assimilation policies. On the other side, the ethnic, cultural, linguistic, or religious groups have never got a country, but they may imagine to have their own country. With this imagination, these groups of a nation-state could strive to build their national ingredients. In that respect, the nation-building theory can threaten the unity and integrity of the state. Because, assimilation is necessarily perceived as an annihilation of an

\textsuperscript{50} Deutsch, Karl: Nationalism and Social Communication: An Inquiry into the Foundations of Nationality, Mass (Cambridge) 1966.
ethnic or culturally distinct group by themselves. Additionally, Connor stresses that the semantic
distinction between nation and state should not be confused with each other. Two important
questions that come to mind at the end of this theoretical analysis are whether the notion of
nation-building is held within only new constituted states, and whether mass groups stand at the
limit of ethnic nationalism before the states are not yet founded. Regarding this question, the
attitudes of ethnic minorities will be examined in the following chapters.

As we have seen in Mylonas' similar hypotheses regarding nation-building theory, it can
be said that only the unity of a state is featured with national infrastructure. Otherwise, the minor
component actors of a society are not adequately taken into consideration within a country. From
another perspective, the nation-building process can be considered through the discourse theory
which was re-framed in 1985 by Ernesto Laclau and Chantal Mouffe. Discourse theory refers to
how the ideological construction of the nation aims to accomplish a hegemonic rearticulation of
the national "nodal point". Additionally, this approach includes a starting point of the classical
debate in the nationalism theory between modernists (Gellner 1964), pri-mordialists (Guibernau
1999) and ethno-symbolists (Smith 1986).

At the beginning of this section, the difference between nation-building and
state-building is mentioned. The formation of nation-state is also a significant factor to
distinguish these notions. Ali Yaşar Sarıbay described the nation-state building process by a
combination of Tilly's and Rokkan's opinions which consist of four phases in Western Europe
societies: (1) interpenetration (appearance of state), (2) standardization (formation of national
identity), (3) participation (settling of political citizenship) and (4) redistribution of sources and
opportunities (settling of social citizenship). In the light of these four phases, the interaction
between 'center' and 'periphery' in Western Europe was implemented on the society by means of
law, military (power), culture, and economy. A. Y. Sarıbay points out that in the history of the
Western Europe, the power of the state, which is used for diffusing into the society, does not
strive to entirely dominate the periphery. When the state appears in a territory, it forms the
expression of the self-government of periphery across the center. This means that in the

51 Sutherland, Claire: Nation-Building Through Discourse Theory, Journal of Nations and Nationalism vol.11, no. 2,
ASEN 2005, 186.
53 Ibid: 93.
European societies, there is a liberty of diversity in terms of language, religion, etc. In other words, an integration took place on the center-periphery opposition, and this integration has been built on the existence of both. Thus, these Western societies had the chance to develop economic sources and opportunities instead of contending with the crisis of national identity. We can interpret from this formulation that the present day societies which encounter ethnic or sub-identity conflicts have followed oppressive and inadequate policies during their nation-state building process, such as emphasizing and putting forward of an unique identity rather than creating a synthesizer supra-identity, not allowing to develop the other, interfering freedoms of the other.

In brief, in the international system, it is perceived that the formation of nation-building appears in new constituted states and such countries that let in many immigrants. However, the notion of nation-building is not sufficiently defined and clarified in terms of minorities. The academic works and the manners of state aim to solve this minorities problem by means of assimilation policies rather than a compromise with minorities. Here, the best way of negotiation between the state and minorities seems to be mutual tolerance. At least, the temperate integration model can be implemented over minorities by the host state as the former step to the assimilation policy. Otherwise, the oppressive assimilation policies may cause that minorities head towards the violence in order to maintain their essential characters.

54 Ibid: 96.
3 Collective Violence and Its Extensions

“You see, people with power understand exactly one thing: violence.”

N. Chomsky

3.1 Violence and collective violence

In the previous chapter we examined the consciousness of the ethnic identity and national identity. Within this chapter, we will study the concept of violence and its distinctions in order to understand the reasons of the tendency of particular ethnic groups in a nation-state for collective violence. We will give examples of collective violence in terms of two key actors: ethnic groups and nation-states. However, this study focuses on the transformation of the actions of ethnic groups from collective violence to terrorism in a state under the hegemony of another dominant nation.

We can roughly define the propensities of collective violence as a reaction in order to annunciate especially aggrieved and inadequate people in a distinctive group. Before we try to explain such reasons and consequences of such a reaction by means of the approaches in political science, we point out interlocutors and governmental and/or non-governmental actors. In the first place, collective violence permanently damages the community psychology and inside its individuals and/or deadly harm to the people with violent actions. This kind of violent acts are derived from hopelessness and imperceptiveness about the unsolved disputes. Moreover, the actors of these violent acts are generated by both governmental interventions and certain ethnic or religious oriented groups. As a social responsibility, every entity within a state (such as governmental or non-governmental organizations and even the manner of a domain folk) plays a key role to prevent social separation among different characteristic groups in a society. As Gandhi said, the path to true non-violence requires much more courage than violence. According to his thoughts, any road towards peace and justice cannot pass through violence. In other words, A. J. Muste also uttered that there is no way to peace; peace is the way.
The notion of violence refers to that one person or a group or a community is exposed to deliberate use of physical power, and to threaten the security of the society. As a result of this force, these misconducts against persons or groups result in injury, death, psychological harm, maldevelopment or deprivation. In this definition, "the use of physical force or power" means negligence and all types of physical, sexual and psychological abuse, as well as suicide and other self-abusive acts. Violence is basically divided into three broad categories according to the characteristics of those committing the violent act: self-directed violence, interpersonal violence, collective violence. Self-directed violence is separated into two phases as suicidal behavior and self-abusive. The suicidal behavior contains suicidal thoughts, attempted suicides, and completed suicides. The second violence category, interpersonal violence, is also separated into two sections: (i) family and intimate partner violence, (ii) community violence. It is referred by family and intimate partner violence that violence happens between mostly family members and intimate partners at home as child abuse, violence to intimate partner. In contrast, community violence takes place between unrelated individuals generally outside home.

The third violence category, collective violence will be our main issue regarding resorted violence by ethno-nationalist groups in nation-states. According to Tilly, collective violence (i) immediately inflicts physical damage on persons and/or objects, (ii) requires at least two perpetrators of damage; and (iii) is partly the result of coordination among persons who resort the damaging acts. Collective violence generally does not include individual action, non-material damage, accidents, and long-term or indirect effects of such damaging processes as dumping of toxic waste.

Tilly comes up with three contradictory objections as opposed to three definitions of collective violence. First, he asks whether such disparate events could possibly have anything in common. We cannot state a universal law about all episodes of collective violence. However, similar causes in different combinations and settings conduct in a broad range. Second, he finds that there is an ambiguous distinction between individual and collective violence. Because, all sorts of violence do not explain general human propensities to inflict damage on others, but

56 Krug et al. (2002). WHO
propensities may simply activate more people at the same time in collective violence. Individual aggressions are based on complex interactions as well as social ties, structures, and processes. Hence, individual violence and collective violence cannot be separated from each other. Third, Tilly claims that the varieties of collective violence contain physical seizure or damage often occurred as a contingent outcome of conflicts. And this collective violence is the result of injustice, exploitation, and oppression without short-run damage in a society. Here, the effective causal relationships between exploitation or injustice, and physical damage could be considered separately in acts of collective violence.\(^\text{58}\) Additionally, we can consider that collective violence should include totalitarian regimentation, environmental degradation, exploitation, and injustice even in the short term.

On the one hand, the psychological dimension of collective violence is discussed without that persons do not physically damage other persons or objects. On the other hand, it is questioned that violence should be counted as violence, when it is committed with physical or moral damage by public specialists such as police, soldiers, guards. To answer this question, we shall adopt a single definition of collective violence. However, this generally accepted definition has powerful criticism in the literature. Hence, the semantics of collective violence should be questioned with all details.

When we talk about varieties of violence, we draw a frame for a broad understanding of fundamental causes in human affairs. Human violence is divided into three camps\(^\text{59}\): 1) idea people 2) behavior people and 3) relation people. Idea people say that human actions are based on consciousness. In this category, scientists generally claim that humans obtain beliefs, rules, goals, ideologies and values from their environments and act out their socially acquired ideas. In such studies regarding violence propensity of a person or a people, this theory helps us to figure out why a person or peoples involve in collective violence. In order to prevent individual or collective violence we must suppress or eliminate destructive ideas.

As a second source of human violence, behavior people are composed of the authonomy of motives, impulses, and opportunities. The theory of behavior people expresses offensive

\(^{58}\) Ibid: 4.
\(^{59}\) Ibid: 5.
behavior or violence as the product of the human genetic heritage that includes an instinct of protection against attack for survival. This type of human violence can be counted as individual violence. The third one, relation people deals with interchanges among persons or groups and is much more central than the idea and behavior people. In this theory, people develop their personalities and practices by means of transactions with other persons. Additionally, they can acquire a degree of negotiation and creativity. Hereby, relation people are affected by kind of conversation among peoples and groups in permeation of collective violence. In this context, the idea or behavior based people is less inclined to violence propensity than interchanging relations based people. By all means both groups have a point. At the same time, the causes of people's participation into collective violence are shaped by basic destructive ideas, injustice, discrimination, social disparity, hereditary propensity, and dialogs among interpersonal or intergroup.

When we look into formal approaches of violence propensity in political science, classical Marxists speak out the importance of relations, but take into account interaction among relations, ideas, and behaviors. In this respect, violence occurs as the result of promoted class interests. Besides, classic liberals claim that appropriate behaviors and social relations arise properly from instilled ideas. Thus, liberals assign priority to combination of ideal and behavioral approaches while relations have secondary importance. Tilly broadly schematizes a typology of interpersonal violence in which there are two basic segments: i) the individual phase, and ii) the collective phases. The individual phase includes individual aggression while collective phase contains brawls, opportunism, scattered attacks, coordinated destruction, broken negotiations, and violent rituals. A few of them, namely, coordinated destruction, violent rituals, and virtually broken negotiations can be counted as collective violence. These types of violence will be elaborated in the next section.

We examine the term “violence” comparatively through several explanations and definitions of violence. Some peoples or groups aim violence as a political means, their actual goal not being restricted to violence. In this section we refer to this type of violence in terms of the subjects of violence or collective violence's actors, interlocutors and peacemakers. The
collective violence is known as the terrain of contentious politics where people discontinuously claim public and collective issues on each other. In different cases of collective violence, government takes over the responsibility to reconcile diverse groups that are against each other. Thus, the government should avoid vigorous intervention or even visible involvement in the conflict. However, during a conflict, the government looms nearby parties as a setter of rules for collective bargaining, a supplier of police, and a possible mediator. This is the ideal type of a government regarding how to treat groups or peoples as a product of contentious politics. Participants of collective violence make a claim that affect the interests of each other. That causes contentious politics in which relationship of participants with the government is always at stake. For example, leaders of two Muslim activist groups compete for recognition and for being valid interlocutors for all Muslims in a society. That time the government spokesmen would inevitably speak with both interlocutors as stakeholder.

According to rulers, police, philosophers, and historians, there is a clear distinction between force and violence. Force arises from legitimate short-run damage and is counted as legitimate self-defense, but not as unprovoked aggression. On the contrary, violence means illegitimately physical or psychological damage but not based on legal self-defense. However, some thinkers criticize these explanations and the distinction between legitimate force and illegitimate violence. They come up with three objections to this ambiguous distinction. First, the certain boundary of legitimate force is always a controversial matter in political science. When people or groups peacefully demonstrate against unfair implementations or ill-treatment or any crime towards civilians by military and public forces, this peaceful demonstration may suddenly turn violent because of the disproportionate force among the sides. Hence, demonstrators and police struggle almost always at the boundary between legitimate and illegitimate usage of coercive instruments. Second, a long continuum gradually evolves from legitimate governmental actions to damage with secret support of some government such as Muslim activists' attacks on New York World Trade Center in 1993 and 2001 etc. Third, in a large share of the collective violence (such as riots, rebellions, or revolutions), people involve in governmental agents as suppliers or objects of damage. It means that during a rebellion or revolution, rebels encounter policies or troops. Consequently, death and violence may increase. For example, in 1871, about 16,000 rebels died in Paris due to in street battles with French national troops. After this massive rebellion, approximately 3,500 rebels were executed by the army. Moreover, during the conflict,
880 army members died. If we conversely thought that the bloody violent acts had never happened, then these interventions practiced by the state would count as a legitimate force.\textsuperscript{62}

For understanding how the formation of political life generally affects the form of collective violence whether they interact themselves into the way of more violent or none-violent forms, we can consider following explanations. The interactions of the government with its organized political actors constitute a political regime which can be distinguished by the following agents of the government\textsuperscript{63}: polity members, challengers, subjects, and outside political actors. The distinction among these agents should be legitimatized and be in touch with each other. For example, in the 1960s during the civil rights movement, U.S. government contacted with the leaders of the civil right organization without recognizing the ethnic identities of people who represented all African Americans in the U.S. Then, the organizations such as the National Association for the Advancement of Colored People obtained a legal standing in government-backed debates of race relations. Nevertheless, the U.S. Government maintained to discriminate many black nationalist groups. However, the bilateral recognition of both sides had always been a more positive beginning for the solution than a combat with inevitable collective violence.

As mentioned earlier, the relations among the government agents, the polity members, the challengers, and the subjects are a constitutive element for a regime. They should be separately constituted from each other. Furthermore, these relations or transactions among the above political actors affect also public politics within a regime. Thereby, when collective violence appears in a society, the contentious politics are initially applied by the government. Then, the effects of contentious politics exclude routine tax collection, reporting for military service, voting, and application for pensions. For example, in the old European regimes, many of the rebellious movements began as a resistance against new or augmented taxes and so forth by rebels who had low-income and who were discriminated by their nationality, ethnicity, language, religion etc. As another example of ethnic discrimination, Tilly refers to Rwanda's case study that in 1994 the head of Rwanda's government held the majority of the country. Polity members consisted mostly of Hutu. Besides, the challengers were from Tutsi and they also have militia power. Moreover, Tutsi militias and dissident Hutu groups were supported by the border

\textsuperscript{62} Ibid: 27.
\textsuperscript{63} Ibid: 29.
neighbor Uganda which is called outside political actor. This example show how the political actors stand separate from each other. Moreover, political identities can be mentioned, if the political actors are divided within a regime, they can be supported by outside actors etc. These political identities include the following elements; boundaries, shared stories, social relations across the boundaries and social relations within the boundaries. To define a contentious act, the 1750 of Great Britain indicated a variety of contentions such as attacks on coercive authorities, attacks on popularly designated offenses and offenders, celebrations and other popularly initiated gatherings, workers' sanctions over members of their trades, decision-making within authorized public assemblies.

In brief, the political actors and government agents are influential structures in combating contentious politics. If these actors and agents constitute a regime, the type of the regime affects significantly the degree or property of contentious politics. Therefore, we can identify various motivations for collective violence with regard to different kinds of regimes. Tilly considers the relation between regime reactions and contentious politics as a function of the variety in governmental capacity and degree of democracy. Moreover, he divides the regimes into four different types\textsuperscript{64}: high-capacity undemocratic (China, Iran); low-capacity undemocratic (Somalia, Congo); high-capacity democratic (Germany, Japan); low-capacity democratic (Belgium, Jamaica, Turkey). As one of these classifications, a high-capacity undemocratic regime is counted that it has the least tolerated domain within a dominant and the biggest prescribed area, while the whole domains are encircled by a great forbidden space where contentious politics spread into 1/8th of the tolerated domain without any contact in the prescribed area. On the contrary, high-capacity democratic regimes contain a much broader tolerated domain than the prescribed domain and both of them are in bilateral interaction with the contentious field in the surrounding forbidden space. (see below Figure 1) Thereby, if there is a highly oppressive regime in a country, a medium contentious domain appears there. This means that a number of minority groups or a minority are exposed to discriminations, maltreatments, ethnic cleansing, civilian massacres and so forth. This regime is simply called high-capacity undemocratic. On the contrary, the government can tolerate the contentious domain/circle more within a less forbidden domain. That time, both sides can negotiate with each other and find a midcourse for their bilateral demands. Thus, actions of collective violence are rarely seen within a high-capacity

\textsuperscript{64} Ibid: 47.
democratic regime. Even though the activist groups resort to violence, the collective violence is usually prevented by means of mediators. In summary, highest violence emerges within low-capacity undemocratic regimes and lowest violence in high-capacity democratic regimes while medium violence exists in high-capacity undemocratic and low-capacity democratic regimes.

![Figure 1](image.png)

**Figure 1** Configurations of Political Interaction under Different Types of Regimes.

Before analyzing the current violence wings from the views of Western countries, their recent history should be known. In World Wars I and II, 10 million and 15 million people died, respectively. But the 1990s brought virulent violence to the former Soviet Union countries and

others such as the Caucasus, former Yugoslavia, Liberia, Sierra Leone, Angola, Rwanda, Congo-Kinshasa, Haiti, Colombia, Iraq, Algeria, Lebanon, Palestine, Yemen, India, Afghanistan, Sri Lanka, the Philippines, Indonesia, Papua New Guinea, and Laos.\textsuperscript{66}

When we look at the recent incidents of collective violence, they have mostly arisen in East European countries, Northern Africa, Middle Africa or the Sahara, the Middle East, the Caucasus, and the Far East in the last two decades. Since the last two decades, researchers refer to collective violence that includes large interstate wars, civil wars, organized genocides. However, these kinds of collective violence leave almost behind the unprecedented twentieth-century violence and change direction from interstate towards intrastate concentrations of large-scale killing. In this study, we basically address incidents of collective violence on ethnically defined minorities. Regarding this issue, it is worthwhile to examine Ted Robert Gurr's catalogs of violence. He compares important cases with regards to inflicted violence on persons from an oppressed minority specifically between 1945 and 1999. Moreover, his study includes more than 200 non-state communal groups that were politically salient. These examined groups are Turks in Germany, Afro-Brazilians, Chinese in Malaysia, Kurds in Iran, Iraq, Syria, and Turkey, Egyptian Copts, indigenous Bolivians and Ecuadorians, Hutu and Tutsi in Burundi and Rwanda, Tibetans under Chinese hegemony, and India's Muslims. And also Germans in Kazakhstan, Romani in East Central Europe, Russians in Ukraine and Estonia, Kazakhs in China, Chechens in Russia, the Gagauz of Moldova and many other majority-minority combinations.\textsuperscript{67}

From Gurr's point of view, violence is mixed between governmental agents, allies with dissident groups and violent protesters, and open rebels. He points out that state-backed armies, police forces, militia, vigilantes, and other specialists in coercion inflicted violence on society. These governmental actors and rebels all share the same damage. Moreover, the minority groups of Gurr's focus also have the same common characteristic. For example, they received systematic differential treatment and had movements, parties, committees, and/or militia that claimed to speak on their behalf. According to Gurr, during the period from 1945 to 1999 activist minority groups commonly claimed the right to rule an existing state on the basis of nationality or

\begin{footnotesize}
\textsuperscript{66} Ibid: 55.
\end{footnotesize}
demanded autonomy in the name of a distinct nation. But they did not declare themselves as a distinctive ethnic identity. Gurr's catalogs reveal a great increase in types of violence, such as violent protest, open rebellion, and also non-violent protest for almost every five year period between 1945 and 1994. In these catalogs, the count of violent conflicts tripled from beginning to these days.

The Central Intelligence Agency published a report similar to Gurr's catalogs regarding the count of international terrorist incidents from 1968 to 2000. Furthermore, according to Mark Beisinger's study, the counts of protest events resemble to Gurr's worldwide catalogs. Beisinger's list shows that mass violent events remained infrequent from 1987 through 1990, but then increased extremely between 1991 and 1992 mostly analyzed in Soviet Union and its successor states. On the other hand, nonviolent demonstrations rose from 1987 through 1990. In those years, nonviolent protesters caused by nationalist and ethnic issues demanded the rights based on nationality or ethnicity. However, violent acts focused on the extent of the borders of the state. These violent events contained organized armed forces such as guerrilla forces, paramilitary groups, and militia which constantly involved many of the killing, wounding, and damaging.

Contemporarily, violence decreases in the domestic contentious politics of high-capacity democratic countries. Another long-term trend of collective violence shifts warfare on the world scale from interstate violence to intrastate violence originating from national or ethnic interests. As a significant point, we attentively emphasize that nonviolent protest demonstrations or collective violence acts concentrate on the rights about indigenous, national, or ethnic issues between 1945 and 1990. But they did not declare a demand for separation based on ethnic identity. Hence, it can be added that the concept of ethnic separatist movements has generally spread to the entire world partly from the second half of 1980s and mostly from 1990s to present time.

For the other forms of collective violence, broken negotiations and coordinated

destruction are mentioned which interact with both persons and objects as sources of almost all the damage. Wherever broken negotiation and coordinated destruction appear, the control over governments is at stake. Therefore, they generally arise in a state with a weak regime, in other words, with low-capacity undemocratic regimes. Moreover, broken negotiation and coordinated destruction are supported from outside by means of arms, money, military training, and markets for contraband. Then the distinctive groups of armed factions relatively succeed in large-scale collective violence. When we compare the differences between high-capacity regimes and low-capacity regimes regarding the frequency of collective violence, we observe a great difference. High-capacity democratic and authoritarian regimes are liberal or oppressive. On the other hand, low-capacity regimes have economic and hegemonic instabilities. Low-capacity regimes are less effective at opportunity exploitation. Therefore, a low-capacity regime provides fewer advantages for the rights of minority groups. On the contrary, high-capacity democratic and authoritarian regimes usually accord a little right for disloyal oppositions to accumulate military power. Furthermore, high-capacity democratic regimes have strong authorities over almost all violent incidents and non-state-backed armed organizations. Also the governments of such regimes can co-opt, monitor, and destroy their nongovernmental specialists in violence. However, they are open-minded and tolerant to negotiate for violence processes.

3.2 Ethnic violence and ethno-political conflicts

3.2.1 Ethnic violence versus nation-state

In the last half of the 20th century, the demands of people’s cultural identities have reshaped the political landscape within and across the boundaries of existing states. Generally, peoples from cultural identity groups have demanded collective recognition, rights, and autonomy from governments. Because of these demands, they have been threatening the civic identity and state security. In this subsection, it will be addressed that the tension between governments and challengers who represent cultural, ethnic, religious, or national identity groups. Additionally, incidents of ethno-political conflicts are studied by means of T. Gurr’s “Peoples Versus States”.
As Martin O. Heisler says, ethnic identity is a part-time aspect of people’s self-concepts. Thus, ethnicity varies salience and fundamental social relations in a society. The generalization is not in sense regarding any single definition of the ethnic identity. As a reminding for the definition of terminological ethnic groups, people share a distinctive and enduring collective identity based on a belief in common ancestor and on shared experiences and cultural traits. They are also defined as communal and identity groups. Ethno-political groups refers to identity groups which have political consequences originated in ethnicity and differential treatment of group members or political action in favour of group interests.70

The formation of an ethno-political group depends on the frequency of ethnic identity. Namely, if ethnic identity is highly salient, the ethno-political action and mobilization became an effective way to represent its ethnic ideology. In this case, as a passive formation, ethno-political groups became a strong ethno-nationalist movement in the late twentieth century. Generally, the proponents of nationalism (such as Basque, Russian, Greek, Kurdish) claim the ethnic identities or other identities of clan/same ancestry and locality and transcending identities. Another expression of them refers that national people have right to govern their own state. Because, the interest and identities of these national people are assimilated by the dominant nationality. As mentioned, nation-states were founded by means of the nationalist doctrines and movements in the era after World Wars I and II.71

E. Gellner describes the nationalist movement as the time national states spread everywhere in Europe and the rest of the world. According to Anthony D. Smith, the enduring ethnic identities provide a basis for nationalist movements.72

When we examine the relationship between violence and nationalism or ethno-nationalism, the main reason turns out to be that nationalist movements or ethnic, religious, cultural nationalism are affected by restraints on minorities in a society which is governed by the sovereign nation holding the majority. It means that a unique ethno-nationalist movement arises against a dominant nation upon this ethnic group. Contrarily, nationalism comprises of being opposed against intensive presence of an ethnic identity under this single and

dominant power. Thus, it can be said that this interactive otherization between nationalism and ethno-nationalism cause bilateral expectations and demands. When these expectations and fundamental demands are not achieved by both sides, an inevitable stage appears in which both sides do not avoid to engage in violence towards each other. Therefore, it can be summarized that nationalism or ethno-nationalism has close relationship with violence in some cases. Furthermore, it can be added it that the violence is just a means in order to gain primary rights for minorities or to provide consistency of supreme ideology for the power of the dominant majority.

Due to all these reasons, political upheaval, collective insecurity, and conflict with another group are mostly based on modern nationalist movements, in other words, on other ethno-political movements. If we focus on the root of nationhood, we see different origins from each other. For example, American nationalism emerged against the British crown and then ensued war of independence. On the one hand, modern zionism was reshaped in the late nineteenth century as a counter-reaction to the persecution of Jewish communities in East Central Europe. On the other hand, after the establishment of the state of Israel, Palestinian nationalism became stronger than the past. Particularly, Palestinian nationalism defines nationhood by itself against the invasion of the former Palestinian border by Israel. Rashid Khalidi states that the earliest Palestinian self-consciousness appeared in the collapse of Ottoman rule in the Middle East.\(^{73}\)

Generally, conventional politics include electoral politics, lobbying, control of local or regional governments for the politically organized communal groups to follow their interests. Some politically organized groups’ interests are not protected or uttered within the public area by the state. That time, the ethno-political groups resort to the “unconventional politics” or “political action”.

Politically organized communal groups struggle familiarly to do active politics through conventional politics such as electoral politics, lobbying, or control of local or regional governments. On the other hand, outside the institutional frameworks, there are other conventional strategies such as demonstrations, rioting, rebellion, protests etc. to be in politics.

\(^{73}\) Ibid: 7.
According to Gurr’s table, “characteristics of political action among minorities in 1995” (see Table 1), two general concepts within political action, protest and rebellion, are separated from each other. The main strategy of a protest is to mobilize by taking a stance against the discriminative policies of the government. Hence, the goal of the protests is to legitimize government which prompts itself officially. For example, the Chinese minority in Malaysia chooses to participate in conventional politics by means of political parties, communal associations, and so forth. On the contrary, the indigenous peoples of Ecuador have been heavily adopting protests such as marches, demonstrations, and blockades in order to demand their rights from the government. As the other figure of political action, the general strategy of a rebellion is to mobilize enough coercive power on the target to enforcement of the government by fighting or negotiating. For example, the leaders of the Gagauz in Moldova organized a local rebellion within broad classes in the society to dissolve warfare between dissident groups and state.\(^74\)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>World Region (number of groups)</th>
<th>Inactive in 1995</th>
<th>Mobilization</th>
<th>Demonstrations and/or Rioting</th>
<th>Small-Scale Rebellion</th>
<th>Large-Scale Rebellion</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Western democracies and Japan (30)</td>
<td>5 (17%)</td>
<td>11 (37%)</td>
<td>8 (27%)</td>
<td>6 (20%)</td>
<td>0 (0%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Eastern Europe and the newly independent states (59)</td>
<td>12 (20%)</td>
<td>27 (46%)</td>
<td>9 (15%)</td>
<td>6 (10%)</td>
<td>5 (8%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>East, Southeast, 19 (32%) and South Asia (57)</td>
<td>19 (32%)</td>
<td>8 (14%)</td>
<td>5 (9%)</td>
<td>13 (22%)</td>
<td>12 (21%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>North Africa and the Middle East (26)</td>
<td>5 (19%)</td>
<td>10 (38%)</td>
<td>4 (15%)</td>
<td>6 (23%)</td>
<td>1 (4%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Africa south of the Sahara (66)</td>
<td>23 (35%)</td>
<td>14 (21%)</td>
<td>10 (15%)</td>
<td>16 (24%)</td>
<td>3 (5%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Latin America and the Caribbean (30)</td>
<td>7 (23%)</td>
<td>16 (53%)</td>
<td>4 (13%)</td>
<td>2 (7%)</td>
<td>1 (3%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Totals (268)</td>
<td>71 (26%)</td>
<td>86 (32%)</td>
<td>40 (15%)</td>
<td>49 (18%)</td>
<td>22 (8%)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

\(^{74}\) Ibid: 29. 
\(^{75}\) Gurr, Ted Robert: Peoples Versus States: Minorities at Risk in the New Century, United States Institute of Peace (USA), 2000, 28.
**Mobilization**= Verbal opposition, symbolic resistance, or organizing activity.

**Demonstration and/or rioting**= Demonstrations or riots; any level of participation.

**Small-scale rebellion**= Political banditry, terrorism, local rebellions, or small-scale guerrilla activity.

**Large-scale rebellion**= Intermediate or large-scale guerrilla activity, protracted civil war.

When we look into the general situation about political actions of minorities all around the world in 1995, “Western democracies and Japan” (30) had mostly demonstrations and/or Rioting (27%) and no large-scale rebellion (0%). In East, Southeast, and South Asia (57), the demonstrations and/or Rioting took (inversely correlated with democratic western countries) least place with a rate of 9%. Additionally, these undemocratic countries had the biggest rate of large-scale rebellion. Its following region, small-scale rebellions were mostly seen large in Africa South of the Sahara with 24%.

Table 2 Background Characteristics of Ethno-political Groups and Risk of Rebellion: North Africa and the Middle East

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Group</th>
<th>GPOP98</th>
<th>CPOP98</th>
<th>PROP98</th>
<th>Type</th>
<th>Risk Indicator</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Algeria</td>
<td>Berbers</td>
<td>7620</td>
<td>30481</td>
<td>0.2500</td>
<td>indigenous</td>
<td>0.62</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bahrain</td>
<td>Shi'a</td>
<td>539</td>
<td>618</td>
<td>0.8700</td>
<td>religious sect</td>
<td>-1.28</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cyprus</td>
<td>Turkish Cypriots</td>
<td>142</td>
<td>749</td>
<td>0.1900</td>
<td>ethnonational</td>
<td>-2.13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Egypt</td>
<td>Copts</td>
<td>5944</td>
<td>66050</td>
<td>0.0900</td>
<td>religious sect</td>
<td>-4.23</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Egypt</td>
<td>Copts</td>
<td>5944</td>
<td>66050</td>
<td>0.0900</td>
<td>religious sect</td>
<td>-4.23</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Egypt</td>
<td>Copts</td>
<td>5944</td>
<td>66050</td>
<td>0.0900</td>
<td>religious sect</td>
<td>-4.23</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Iran</td>
<td>Arabs</td>
<td>2069</td>
<td>68960</td>
<td>0.0300</td>
<td>national minority</td>
<td>-5.08</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Iran</td>
<td>Azerbaijanis</td>
<td>16550</td>
<td>68960</td>
<td>0.2400</td>
<td>national minority</td>
<td>-5.08</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Iran</td>
<td>Baha'is</td>
<td>593</td>
<td>68960</td>
<td>0.0086</td>
<td>religious sect</td>
<td>-1.28</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Iran</td>
<td>Bakhtiaris</td>
<td>690</td>
<td>68960</td>
<td>0.0100</td>
<td>indigenous</td>
<td>-5.08</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Iran</td>
<td>Baluchis</td>
<td>1379</td>
<td>68960</td>
<td>0.0200</td>
<td>indigenous</td>
<td>-5.08</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Iran</td>
<td>Christians</td>
<td>310</td>
<td>68960</td>
<td>0.0045</td>
<td>religious sect</td>
<td>-4.23</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Iran</td>
<td>Kurds</td>
<td>4827</td>
<td>68960</td>
<td>0.0700</td>
<td>ethnonational</td>
<td>-5.08</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Iran</td>
<td>Turkmen</td>
<td>1379</td>
<td>68960</td>
<td>0.0200</td>
<td>national minority</td>
<td>-5.08</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Iraq</td>
<td>Kurds</td>
<td>4244</td>
<td>21722</td>
<td>0.2000</td>
<td>ethnonational</td>
<td>0.77</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Iraq</td>
<td>Shi'is</td>
<td>13033</td>
<td>21722</td>
<td>0.6000</td>
<td>religious sect</td>
<td>1.98</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Iraq</td>
<td>Sunnis</td>
<td>4344</td>
<td>21722</td>
<td>0.2000</td>
<td>communal contender</td>
<td>-7.23</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

76 Ibid: 66.
77 Gurr, Ted Robert: Peoples Versus States: Minorities at Risk in the New Century, United States Institute of Peace (USA), 2000, Appendix D.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Group</th>
<th>GPOP98</th>
<th>CPOP98</th>
<th>PROP98</th>
<th>Type</th>
<th>Risk Indicator</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Israel</td>
<td>Arabs</td>
<td>1015</td>
<td>5644</td>
<td>0.1800</td>
<td>ethnoclass</td>
<td>0.77</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Israel</td>
<td>Palestinians</td>
<td>2431</td>
<td>8255</td>
<td>0.2946</td>
<td>ethnonational</td>
<td>1.98</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jordan</td>
<td>Palestinians</td>
<td>2217</td>
<td>4435</td>
<td>0.5000</td>
<td>ethnonational</td>
<td>-2.77</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lebanon</td>
<td>Druze</td>
<td>210</td>
<td>3506</td>
<td>0.0600</td>
<td>communal contender</td>
<td>-3.34</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lebanon</td>
<td>Maronite Christians</td>
<td>876</td>
<td>3506</td>
<td>0.2500</td>
<td>communal contender</td>
<td>-3.34</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lebanon</td>
<td>Palestinians</td>
<td>350</td>
<td>3506</td>
<td>0.1000</td>
<td>ethnonational</td>
<td>-1.28</td>
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<tr>
<td>Lebanon</td>
<td>Shi'is</td>
<td>1122</td>
<td>3506</td>
<td>0.3200</td>
<td>communal contender</td>
<td>1.98</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lebanon</td>
<td>Sunnis</td>
<td>701</td>
<td>3506</td>
<td>0.2000</td>
<td>communal contender</td>
<td>-5.30</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Morocco</td>
<td>Berbers</td>
<td>10859</td>
<td>29347</td>
<td>0.3700</td>
<td>indigenous</td>
<td>-3.34</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Morocco</td>
<td>Saharawis</td>
<td>229</td>
<td>29347</td>
<td>0.0078</td>
<td>ethnonational</td>
<td>0.67</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Saudi Arabia</td>
<td>Shi'is</td>
<td>3118</td>
<td>20786</td>
<td>0.1500</td>
<td>religious sect</td>
<td>-2.13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Syria</td>
<td>Alawi</td>
<td>1834</td>
<td>16673</td>
<td>0.1100</td>
<td>communal contender</td>
<td>-5.08</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Turkey</td>
<td>Kurds</td>
<td>12913</td>
<td>54567</td>
<td>0.2000</td>
<td>ethnonational</td>
<td>1.98</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Notes for Table 2**

**Country:** country in which the group resides.

**Group:** full name of group. Where two similar groups are combined for the purpose of coding, both names are given, separated by a comma. Where a group has a common alternative name, it is given in parentheses.

**GPOP98:** estimated group population (in 000s) for 1998 based on the U.S. Census Bureau's estimate of country population for 1998.

**CPOP98:** estimated country population (in 000s) for 1998 (U.S. Census Bureau).

**PROP98:** estimate of group size as a proportion of the country population.

**Type:** type of the group

**Risk Indicator:** risk of future rebellion, or escalating current rebellion, based on conditions measured in 1998. Scores of greater than 0.5 signify substantial risks.

Table 2 shows us which type of ethno-political groups and risk of rebellion appear characteristically in North Africa and the Middle East. The regions of North Africa and the Middle East stand on the second line of the list regarding the most violent rebellion of ethnic groups in the world-wide scale. Risk indicators of various ethnic groups of a country can be used to predict their political and rebellion tendency in the future.
3.2.2 Ethno-political conflicts

In order to give several examples about ethno-political conflicts, we shall define what an ethno-political conflict means throughout the world. First, according to Stavenhagen, if a conflict describes itself as a national or minority group against the state or against other political actors, it means ethno-political conflict. Moreover, ethno-political conflicts may contain also consequences of intercommunal violence, such as attacks by indigenous Dayaks on Indonesian settlers in Bornea (winter 1996-97). Secondly, the ethno-political conflict includes a number of theoretical requirements; (a) members or leaders of an ethnic group may have a distinctive ethno-cultural identity, (b) the ethnic group may tend to collective will for political action, (c) the group’s capacity is important for collective action, (d) the availability of opportunities in the group’s political environment provides more participation through political action. These assumptions are related to the theory of collective action and are based on explaining political action by any kind of identity groups.

In terms of the etiology of ethno-political conflict, ethno-political action is formed by three general aspects: 1) Domestic political factors that encourage strategies of protest, 2) Domestic political factors that encourage strategies of rebellion, and 3) International sources of support for ethno-political action. Gurr states that collective disadvantages of certain groups consist of a goal from different ethnic origin than the majority of the state. Collective disadvantages of an ethnic minority contain social and economic inequalities even in the political area vis-a-vis with the other majority groups in a society. These generated discrimination policies by the state and the disadvantages involve powerful incentives for peoples’ actions. Because, the reappraisal of disadvantages are based on their (people) resentment on the agents of discrimination. In this context, Dudley and Miller made an analysis on 203 groups from the Minorities at Risk, where alternative explanations of ethnic rebellion in 1980s are investigated. In this analysis, the majority of the rebellions are caused by people who live under relative deprivation of economic opportunities and wealth, a group grievance.

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80 Ibid: 71.
The other relative incentives may be caused by the loss of political autonomy, and repression. The first one is related to the situation of such countries which get weaker in terms of political authority especially after the internal or external war, and some conquest process etc. such as the fragmentation of the Hungarian nation into a half-dozen segments in 1919. The second major source of incentives for collective action is about repression in which the majority as a government oppressively control a communal group or ethnic minority. For instance, there was a strict restraint on the black population by white supremacy in the South of America until the early 1960s along with legal repression and extralegal violence. Also Russian governments had used force to maintain control over the Chechnya, before they occupied to secessionist region in December 1994. Because of these reasons, some ethno-nationalists, national minorities, and indigenous peoples combine into a group which is motivated by a unique purpose and mobilize for collective actions.

To be inside collective actions, there is another important thing called coalition formation which is a critical connection between collective dissent and revolution. According to Gurr, the effective boundaries of an ethno-political group can depend on coalition formation due to that various identity groups are heterogeneous among diverse ethno-political groups. Factions within these groups damage a collective movement. Therefore, these boundaries are structurally variable. Here it can be added that the political initiatives and efforts by ethno-nationalist movements may give positive results in the mutual negotiations between the state and the minority group as well as with the democratic opportunities and peace efforts by the state. It means, if the permanent peace comes into the whole society, this will be only with mutual concessions and the realization of mutual demands. Otherwise, the conflict history remains at the same stage in which the peoples from both side would suffer more damage than the past time. For example, the Palestinian national movement consisted of a collective cooperation among Palestinians. Their movement, the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO), was founded in 1964 as one of the many organizations competing for Palestine’s victory until 1968-69. After that, the PLO gained support from different Arab states during the 1970s and 1980s, and in 1973, was recognized as “the sole legitimate representative of the Palestinian people” in spite of the presence of Yasir Arafat’s al-Fatah or other guerrilla organizations.81

81 Ibid: 77.
The situation is similar for Kurdish movements in Turkey, Iraq, Iran, and Syria from 1920s to present. In the region and from the beginning, Kurds have basically taken autonomy or independence as a goal for a number of acts of ethno-national rebellions. They still keep this ideal, but Kurdish leaders and their civil society institutions could not coordinate enough for cross-state political actions. Therefore, the rifts among the rebels themselves have crippled most of their rebellions. It is only two times when Kurds achieved independence and autonomy in the Kurdistan region. One was Republic of Mahabad in Iran between 1946-1947 and the other one was accounted as de facto independence in Iraq in 1991. That time, these enterprises failed after a very short process because of the faction among different parties of Kurdish movement. In this context, Gurr’s point of view is really reasonable; if the Kurds could have united/coalesced in a coherent and stable political movement, they would have their own state with numbering 20 million to 30 million people in the Middle East.82

From Gurr’s view, the timing of action and the choice of the strategies of rebellions or protests are determined by relationships of ethnic groups with state and external actors. In other words, the ethno-political tension between state and an ethno-national group in fact is not related with cultural or historical differences, but the conflict arises from contemporary ethno-political leaders, who seek to mobilize support for achieving their aims, and their rhetoric.83 Also the conflict solution processes are mostly affected by interrelated interests which carry weight with contrary or illegal organizations.

Since the beginning of this chapter, we pointed out what kind of minorities grow inclination to rebellion and extreme ethno-nationalism, and why ethno-national groups head to resort to violence extremely likely in order to gain autonomy or independence. To solve this violence and conflict, both ethno-national groups and states walk up to each other through international engagement and negotiations. This peace period mostly occurred in any decade after the Cold War. Table 3 shows examples to the negotiation process and their outcomes.

82 Ibid: 77.
83 Ibid: 95.
Table 3 Outcomes of Ethnonational Wars of Autonomy and Independence, 1960-99

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Group</th>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Serious Conflict(^a)</th>
<th>Status at the End of 1999</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Negotiated Autonomy or Independence: No Armed Conflict(^b)</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bengalis</td>
<td>Pakistan</td>
<td>1971</td>
<td>Independent in 1971 after popular uprising and Indian intervention</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Afars</td>
<td>Ethiopia</td>
<td>1975-85</td>
<td>Regional autonomy in 1985</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gagauz</td>
<td>Moldova</td>
<td>1991-92</td>
<td>Autonomous republic since 1994</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Catholics</td>
<td>Northern Ireland</td>
<td>1969-94</td>
<td>Full implementation of 1994 accord blocked in 1999 by dispute over arms</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Serbs</td>
<td>Bosnia</td>
<td>1992-95</td>
<td>Autonomy in confederal state since 1995</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Croats</td>
<td>Bosnia</td>
<td>1992-95</td>
<td>Autonomy in confederal state since 1995</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Trans-Dniester Slavs</td>
<td>Moldova</td>
<td>1991-97</td>
<td>Regional autonomy ratified by 1997 peace agreement</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Negotiated Autonomy or Concessions: Low-Level Armed Conflict Continues(^c)</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Palestinians</td>
<td>West Bank and Gaza</td>
<td>1968-93</td>
<td>Self-rule agreement phased in 1994-99; final-status talks began in November 1999</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>East Timorese</td>
<td>Indonesia</td>
<td>1974-99</td>
<td>Resistance largely suppressed by 1997; 1999 independence referendum prompted scorched-earth Indonesian withdrawal</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Negotiated Autonomy or Concessions: Serious Armed Conflict Continues(^d)</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Somali</td>
<td>Ethiopia</td>
<td>1963-present</td>
<td>Regional autonomy in federal state since 1994, major factions continue rebellion</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Moros</td>
<td>Philippines</td>
<td>1972-present</td>
<td>Autonomous region 1979; peace agreement in 1996 is rejected by MILF</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kashmiri Muslims</td>
<td>India</td>
<td>1989-present</td>
<td>Kashmiri moderates elected to regional government in 1996; separatist violence escalated beginning mid-1999</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Stalemated Conflicts: Violence Checked by Cease-Fires, Negotiations, Military Action, or Peacekeeping Forces without Peace Agreements or Decisive Military Defeats</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kurds</td>
<td>Iraq</td>
<td>1980-92</td>
<td>Internationally supported autonomy compromised by factional fighting between KDP and PUK</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>South Ossetians</td>
<td>Georgia</td>
<td>1991-93</td>
<td>De facto regional autonomy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Abkhaz</td>
<td>Georgia</td>
<td>1992-93, 1998</td>
<td>De facto independence</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kosovar Albinians</td>
<td>Serbia</td>
<td>1998-99</td>
<td>Autonomy assured by NATO intervention but ethnic cleansing of Serbs ensues</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Conflicts Suppressed without Significant Accommodation</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tibetans</td>
<td>China</td>
<td>1959-67</td>
<td>Defeat, episodic resistance continues</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

---

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Group</th>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Years</th>
<th>Status</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Papuans</td>
<td>Indonesia</td>
<td>1964-96</td>
<td>Defeated, episodic resistance continues</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ibo</td>
<td>Nigeria</td>
<td>1967-70</td>
<td>Defeated, reincorporated in state</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Baluchis</td>
<td>Pakistan</td>
<td>1973-77</td>
<td>Defeated, autonomy lost in 1973, partly restored in 1980</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kurds</td>
<td>Iran</td>
<td>1979-94</td>
<td>Defeated</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Muslims</td>
<td>Thailand</td>
<td>1995-98</td>
<td>Latest episode of local rebellion ended without settlement or serious repression</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Conflicts Persisting or Escalating in 1998-99**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Group</th>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Years</th>
<th>Status</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Tamils</td>
<td>Sri Lanka</td>
<td>197-present</td>
<td>Continued rebellion, Tamil militants reject government proposals for settlement</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Acehense</td>
<td>Indonesia</td>
<td>1977-present</td>
<td>Rebellion almost suppressed by 1996-97, resumed in 1998-99; government proposed negotiations in late 1999</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Southerners II</td>
<td>Sudan</td>
<td>1983-present</td>
<td>Government abrogated 1972 autonomy agreement, intense continued rebellion</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kurds</td>
<td>Turkey</td>
<td>1984-present</td>
<td>Severe repression and trial of PKK founder led to de-escalation in 1999</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Assamese</td>
<td>India</td>
<td>1990-present</td>
<td>Militants reject proposed talks, fight for complete independence</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Uighers</td>
<td>China</td>
<td>1990-present</td>
<td>Separatist rebellion in Xinjiang persists despite severe repression</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chechens</td>
<td>Russia</td>
<td>1991-present</td>
<td>Peace accord and de-facto autonomy in 1997, armed conflict resumed in 1999</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Notes for Table 3**

“This table includes all sustained or episodic armed conflicts and mass popular uprising aimed wholly or mainly at securing national independence or regional autonomy for an ethnopolitical group, or unification with kindred groups in adjoining states. ... It is compiled principally from information on groups included in the Minority at Risk study. It has been updated by Deepa Khosla through November 1999.

a For conflicts under way in 1985, serious conflict ends when rebellion codes in the Minorities at Risk data set decline to 2 or less (terrorism) and remain below that threshold through 1999. For conflicts that ended before 1985, the ending date is determined from political and historical accounts.

b Includes wars of autonomy in which autonomy agreements led to five or more years of peace before the resumption of armed conflict. Conflicts with shorter lulls in fighting are listed under subsequent categories.

c Groups with low-level antigovernment violence in 1998-99 (rebellion scores of 1 or 2 in the Minorities at Risk data set). Autonomy agreements are in place and partially or fully
implemented.

Groups with 1998 rebellion scores of 3 or more in the Minorities at Risk data set. Autonomy agreements are in place and partially or fully implemented.”

If the subject is the ethnic conflicts based on the willing autonomy or independence, people mostly bring to mind comparisons between IRA, ETA, and PKK, although they come basically from different roots in terms of the reason of their occurrences. However, they have similarities regarding their demands about ethno-cultural rights and self-determination against the discriminatory policies of the state. Both of these ethnic based illegal organizations have also used violence with guerrilla strategy and are counted as terrorist groups and as separatist problems in cross-national societies.

To understand whether the final situations of these organizations will follow each other’s way or not, we need to looked into their differences. Since early 1922 and 1969, IRA has been trying to secede from British sovereignty. In 2005, they ceased fire and nowadays are still waiting for the fulö independence of Northern Ireland from Great Britain. The main difference between IRA and PKK or ETA is related to the origin of the conflict. For IRA the origin is religion based. Irish Republican Army (IRA) has defended catholic Irish identity by means of armed conflicts against the mostly Anglican Christian British. On the contrary, PKK and ETA have arisen from ethnic grounds. Therefore, it can be pointed out that ETA and PKK are more similar organizations to each other than to IRA. Hence, we can compare them better than the other movements in order to estimate one’s future and conclude from each other. Nevertheless, the conflict between catholic IRA and protestant UVF (or the great Britain) became currently an ethnic, social and political problem for both sides. In this sense, IRA’s struggle is also accounted as both an ethnic and a religious conflict. The last status of Northern Ireland is a prospective referendum. Some related researchers think that the upcoming ultimate peace is attained not only from bilateral efforts, but also from NGOs’ contribution into the peace process between Northern Ireland (IRA) and Britain (UVF). Another important thing during the peace process is that the ceasefire was not a precondition, but the part of the negotiations.

On the case of ETA, after 43 years with armed conflict in 2011, they declared to cease fire. ETA has been supporting the independence of the Basque country, in other words the

85 Dr. Melaugh, Martin: The news from BBC, Ulster University (London) 15.01.2013.
autonomous community of Basques. This ethno-political conflict took place under Franco’s oppressive regime on the Basque ethnicity. In spite of the civil war of Spain, the polarization of communal hatred between Spaniards and Basques did not happen. Because, the state of Spain granted Basks some of their rights such as autonomy, constitutional recognition of Basque identity. However, ETA has demanded fully independence from Spain by means of violence and armed conflict. Currently, the state and ETA are continuing to negotiate for the conflict resolution.

When we compare PKK and ETA, it might be a wrong assessment in terms of the development level of both countries. The important point on the conflict issue is to be a more democratic state. Then, the bilateral rights and demands can be negotiated by both sides. On the one hand, Turkey’s Kurdish issue has expanded on violent dimensions since many years. The main source of the problem has been that the democratization process of Turkey was not completed yet. On the other hand, Kurdish nationalist movement, or PKK, could not take an opportunity as political improvement and not diffuse their political thoughts over the society, not even over the Kurdish populations. Therefore, serious violent conflict between PKK and Turkish state has not come to an end and has not been resolved yet, differently from the cases of ETA and IRA.86

3.3 Conflict Resolution

As a discipline and a subfield of international relations, conflict resolution appeared after the World War II in order to investigate the causes of the emergence of the war. Its subjects of interest are being broadened. For instance, the post Cold War period and attempts for dissolution of armed conflicts and for permanent peace. During 1920-1945, institutions of international relations started to study over conflict resolution firstly in Britain, Europe, and Northern America. Particularly after the foundation of United Nations in 1945, these academic studies improved quite further.87

86 Prof. Dr. Kurubaş, Erol: The Comparison to IRA-ETA-PKK: Futile Expectations And Learning Lessons, 2011.
87 Sandikli, Atilla/Kaya, Erdem: Çaışma Çözümü ve Türkiye'de Kürt Meselesi, published by Wise Men Center For Strategic Studies (BILGESAM) (Turkey) 2012.
Known as a basis for conflict resolution models, the “win win approach” comprises of the “common acquisition” concept used by Mary P. Follet on the field of business management, and “functionalist approach” developed by David Mitrany. According to Mitrany’s “functionalist approach”, a collaborative process can be possible based upon common benefits on the level of inter-states. On the contrary to the “functionalist approach”, in the discipline of international relations, the “realist aspect” internalizes the “win-lose theory” based on rivalry. Nevertheless, no successful result appeared by means of the “win-lose theory” along with realist point of view on the conflict resolution. Then, Ernest B. Haas and Karl W. Deutsch improved Mitrany’s functionalist approach and came up with the probable way of peace in which states generate integrated communities.88

To solve this conflict issues many researchers state various approaches. Quincy Wright claimed that wars shall be firstly understood to prevent wars. Therefore, Wright analyzed leading reasons of wars and explained under which circumstances peace can be materialized.89 On the conflict solution, the most important process is negotiations. For instance, there are seven phases of negotiations:90 1) Pre-talks (explorations about conditions of possible future talks.) 2) Secret talks (can be first step towards peace process, e.g. Israel-Palestine during Oslo Talks.) 3) Multilateral talks (no solution is a solution, e.g. Turkish Cypriot aphorism) 4) Settlement (F.e. UN: proposal of bizonal, bicomunal federation) 5) Endorsement (partial implementation or referendum, e.g. Good Friday Agreement in Northern Ireland 1998) 6) Implementation (flesh on the bare bones of original settlement) 7) Institutionalization (new order has taken root, change is seen irreversible).

Conflict resolution comprises of strategies and methods to facilitate peaceful ending of conflicts. For ultimate solution of a conflict, first negotiation process is initiated by communication among both sides. Negotiation plays an important role in the process towards peace, particularly along with mediation, diplomacy and creative peace-building. Conflict resolution can also be used in literature as dispute resolution. In terms of theories, the dual

89 Wright, Quincy: A Study Of War, Chicago University Press (Chicago) 1942.
90 Prof. Dr. Etzersdorfer, Irene: Conflict Resolution Strategies in Ethno-Political Conflicts, Institut für Politikwissenschaft (Vienna) 2012, 2-5.
concern of conflict resolution is based on two conceptual dimensions to deal with conflicts: 1. A concern for self (i.e., assertiveness) and 2. A concern for others (i.e., empathy). The intersection point between these two dimensions leads us towards different styles of conflict resolution. Hereof, the dual modal designates five conflict resolution strategies: 1. Avoidance conflict style: During conflict, avoiders implement “wait and see” attitude. 2. Yielding conflict style: their basic goal is to maintain stable environment through having respect for minorities. 3. Competitive conflict style: Competitive or fighting style increases assertiveness and decreases empathy of individuals for arriving at agreement between both sides. This style drags the process to conflict as “win or lose” predicament. 4. Cooperation conflict style: At the same time both parties exhibit highly assertive and highly empathetic attitudes. During the conflict, people from cooperation understanding strive to find any peaceable solution as “win-win” approach. 5. Conciliation conflict style: Conciliation (or compromising) conflict style is about gaining the rights of both sides at an intermediate-level as known mutual give-and-take interactions.

96 Ibid: 280.
4 Case Study: PKK in Turkey and Enlargement of the PKK’s sympathisers to Europe

“The real terrible thing is Erzincan's becoming a Kurdish center, but worse is Kurdistan's being founded.”

Ismet Inönü

4.1 Brief History on Kurdish Issue in Turkey

The Middle East (Mesopotamia) and Southeastern Anatolia are historically known as the old habitat of Kurds. Since the Ottoman Empire, Kurds have been living together with Turks mostly in the Eastern side of Turkey which has also officially been called as Kurdistan even by the first State of the Seljuks and then by the Ottoman Empire starting from Suleiman the Magnificent (1494-1566)’s reign. After the Republic of Turkey was founded, Kurds encountered with the assimilation threat due to abused of their rights by the implementations of the Turkish nation-state. Although Kurds gained the promise to be autonomous by decisions taken by the Turkish Grand National Assembly (TBMM) in 1922, and as also declared in Treaty of Lausanne (1923); ethnic and political identities, and languages of Kurds were forbidden and suppressed by the latter Turkish governments throughout many decades. According to Olson, on 10th February of 1922 a legislation including 18 articles was discussed regarding autonomy of the Kurds in the TBMM. As far as it is learnt from the Rumbold’s report that this legislation was not any more in question in the TBMM. Nevertheless, this report issued in British archives has not been proven by any Turkish government agency. Because, Turkish archives associated with their Kurdish history have not been declared to the public yet. Therefore, it could be a nominal draft of a law in which Western countries were convinced about the Kurdish settlement in order to keep away from their favoring mandates.

97 Olson, Robert: archive no: FO 371/7781 e 3553/96/65. A telegraph written by Sir Horace Rumbold (British chief inspector in Istanbul) to Lord Curzon (British Foreign Minister) on 29th of March in 1922.
Particularly, in the last days of the Ottoman Empire and the first period of the Republic of Turkey, the nation-state model ruled over the whole Europe and Western societies as conjunctural. Hence, Turkey’s Kurds were under intensive pressure because of the thesis of a single dominant nation. On the one hand, since 1800’s around 30 Kurdish rebellions took place in the Eastern Anatolia such as the riot of Zaza tribes (1818-1820, Dersim), Bedirhan Bey riot (1843-1847, Hakkari), Garzan riot (1839, Diyarbakır), Bedirhani Halil, and Ali Remo riot (1912, Mardin), and the Koçgiri riot (1921, Sivas) etc. On the other hand, in early years of the Republic there were approximately 17 rebellions such as Şeyh Sait riot (1925, Diyarbakır) which was concerned not ethnic origin but religious, Zeylan riot (1930, Van), and Dersim riot (1925, Dersim/ Tunceli), Ağrı insurgency movement (1926-1936) etc. turkey’s Kurds have been mostly comprised of the tribes (Aşiret) in an order of local feudality. For instance, that time in Dersim Kurdish tribes did not accept to pay tax to the Turkish state until the end of the Dersim riot (1937). Therefore, some of these rebellions might be based on land struggle between Turkish state and Kurdish tribe leaders. In this sense, this part of the Kurdish issue can be emphasized that it roots in neither ethnic hatred nor organizational ideology in the whole society. Nevertheless, these all riots have been intended to establish an independent Kurdish state in the Kurdistan region.

Struggles of Kurds have included classic political participation as well as these various rebellion movements. Here can be interpreted by Hannah Arendt's way of thinking who states that if these both formulations of the participation must conserve their humanity frame or show respect to the human rights; the will of political participation can come true. If our differences and our free acts do not exist, our political identities cannot comprise and we cannot find any peaceful society where we live with together. According to Ismail Beşikçi, when the Turkish state deals with the resolution of the Kurdish issue, they take into account only result-oriented resolution rather than referring to the reasons of the emergence of Kurdish issue. If we think about the main reason of the Kurdish issue in Turkey, a number of sociological disagreements and dispute of interests between Turkish governments and Kurdish movements can be mentioned. The most important one is for sure about the freedoms of expression and freedoms of

98 Demirel, Emin: Geçmişten günümüze PKK ve Ayaklanmalar, Published by IQ Kültür Sanat (Turkey) 2005.
100 Düzel, Neşe: Lozan’da Musul-Kürt Pazarlığı, The Interview with Ismail Beşikçi, Newspaper Taraf on 7th of September 2009.
ethnic or political identities.

During the one-party system (1923-1946), the national consciousness and political organization of Kurds were prevented by a number of legislations introduced by Cumhuriyet Halk Fırkası (Republican People’s Party). For instance, The Independence Courts were founded in which directly dealt with riots, and Kurdish activists, nationalist Kurdish intellectuals, and opponent against the government who Turkish intellectuals were put on trial. Here, at the end of the taken decisions, many activists and intellectuals were quickly executed. Taken quick decisions regarding execution caused an increase of the dissidents’ anger and injustice without any appeal process in Turkey. Also the Law on the Maintenance Order (Takrîr-i Sükûn Kanunu) was legislated in TBMM in 1925 in which the state prohibit all kinds of opponent publications and opponent political parties and activities. For example, in the TBMM of 1925, the Reform Plan for the East (Şark Islahat Planı) was accepted as a legislation. In this context, Kurds who survived from being executed, but were exposed to Turkification politics. In 1934 many Kurds of the Kurdistan region were expelled to another part of Turkey by means of the legislation of Compulsory Settlement (zorunlu İskan Kanunu). The rest of these Kurds were forbidden to speak their mother tongue.\(^\text{101}\) This prohibition on Kurdish speaking was legally put into effect between 1938 (after the Dersim uprising) and 1991.\(^\text{102}\) However, the Kurdish prohibition on broadcasting and publishing remained still in 1991 until the 2001. Then, in 2009 the government established the first Kurdish TV-channel (TRT Şeş).\(^\text{103}\) Moreover, the Prime Minister of that time İsmet İnönü who had a widely trip in Eastern Turkey where he observed Kurds' villages and took notes on Kurds' living and settlements. In 1935 his notes called the 'Journey Report for the East' (Şark Seyahat Raporu) was published and also implemented by the state. Some articles of it are as follows:\(^\text{104}\) - Habitation of Kurds to the cities must be prevented. - Immigrants from the Black Sea must be brought to villages where Kurds live there. - Schools must not be opened in Kurds' villages. - Kurds must be assimilated and constituted Turkish centers against Kurdish brotherhood. - Intervention must be necessary in Dersim. - Smuggling must be obstructed. Kurds must be prevented that they obtain economic power.

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\(^{103}\) Güler, Irfan: Dil ve Milliyetçilik: Kürtçe Örnegi, Rizgari Online (Galicia, Spain) 2009.
Since 1950s, lots of primary schools and high schools were opened in Diyarbakir and its surrounding. In the following years, the number of Kurdish students in many different universities such as in Ankara, Izmir, Istanbul, Anadolu, East, and Southeastern Turkey has increased. As a result of this, Kurds have become Kurdish intellectuals’ petit bourgeoisie. Afterwards, in 1959 in Istanbul, 49 Kurdish students were arrested. These Kurdish students were charged for joining demonstrations against that a deputy from Republican People’s Party (CHP) gave notice of motion for Turkey’s Kurds as a racist approach in TBMM. One year later, when in 1960 military coup d’etat took place, many Kurds were punished with serious tortures, and long term imprisonments. As a result of these restraints and extreme punishments, Kurdish intellectuals and youth have been evolving into an ideological and systematical organization. In 1968, especially in Europe, governments perceived student movements constituted by young people on the left wing as a communist threat. Therefore, many young Kurdish people were arrested in order to stop Kurdism activities by the state.¹⁰⁵

After the 27th May 1960 coup d’etat, Kurdish students were organized under the roof of illegal or legal left parties, and foundations such as “Workers’ Party of Turkey” (TiP), and “the Federation of Idea Clubs” (FKF) etc. A group part from left-wing established an organization called DEV-GENÇ (Giant Young) who support the thesis of democratic revolution. But, Kurdish youngs did not join DEV-GENÇ which because of being against a coup revolution. Then, they combined within “the Revolutionary Eastern Cultural Hearths” (DDKO) and proceeded to struggle in parallel to TiP. Along with the internal memo on 12th March 1971, Kurdish and Turkish leftist organizations were again closed down by the junta governance. After that, these closed organizations were divided into different fractions under the way of Marxist and Leninist thinking.

Moreover, Kurdish associations and their publication units appeared such as “Association of Revolutionary People’s Culture” (DHKD), and its publication; “Freedom Way”, and its similar political party; “the Socialist Party of Turkey’s Kurdistan” (TKSP), “the association of Revolutionary Democratic Culture” (DDKD) and its illegal political party; “Revolutionary Workers Party of Kurdistan” (PPKK), and also the organization of RIZGARi was founded by a number of Kurdish intellectuals. As examples of Kurdish organizations, there are also right

winger “the Democrat Party of Turkey’s Kurdistan” (T-KDP), and a left winger group separated from them; National Liberation Movement of Kurdistan (KUK). Other Kurdish intellectuals founded a political party called KAVA with Maoist ideology. Besides, other legal socialist political parties were “Workers’ Party of Turkey” (TiP), “Socialist Workers’ Party of Turkey” (TSiP), “Labour Party of Turkey”, “Socialist Revolution Party” (SDP), and Maoist “Peasant Workers’ Party of Turkey” (TKiP). Meanwhile, at that time, even “Communist Party of Turkey” (TKP) was illegal. This party is keeping its activities in legal terms legal today.106

When we looked into the second military coup d’état on 12th September 1980, numerous critical clashes and uprising were seen on the streets and any public area like before that so many bloody conflicts happened between right wing groups and left wing groups. The tension between Alevis or Kurds and Turkish Nationalist right wingers was augmented deliberately by the deep state and the coup military. Therefore, lots of massacres and unsolved murders took place all around in Turkey. During the early 1980s, many Kurds were under arrest and underwent torture in different prisons particularly in Diyarbakır prison. After getting out of the prison, a number of Kurds have chosen to join PKK which intended liberation fight for Kurds in Turkey.

4.2 Past and current ideology of the PKK

“The Kurdistan Workers’ Party” or in Kurdish “Partiya Karkerên Kurdistan” (PKK) arose at first under the leadership of Abdullah Öcalan and his 17 friends as a socialist student group in the early 1970s roughly in 1974 widespread revolt in the history of Turkey. According to Nikolaus Brauns and Brigitt Kiechle, parallel to the development of revolutionist worker and youth movements at the end of 1960’s and the beginning of 1970’s, Kurdish Workers’ Party (PKK) was founded.107 Before the 1980 coup d’état there were clashes between right wing groups and left wing groups in the disordered society. Therefore, PKK was founded by a group of Kurds in order to gain their basic rights in Lice’s Fis village of Diyarbakır in 1978. PKK has

107 Brauns, Nikola/Kiechle, Brigitte: Perspektiven des kurdischen Freiheitskampfes: Zwischen Selbstdetermination, EU und Islam, Schmetterling Verlag (Germany) 2010, 36.
been divided into varied terms since its foundation. In its first years until 1979, it was called as “Apocu” (Abdullah Öcalan supporter). After 2002, as Kongra-Gel (Kurdistan People’s Congress; KGK) PKK was separated into two terms: 1) Freedom and Democracy Congress of Kurdistan (KADEK), 2) The Community of Kurdistan Confederation (KKK). Particularly, until the 1980, PKK not only attacked to institutions of the state and rightists, but also other Kurdish organizations which were of opposite opinions such as National Liberation Organization of Kurdistan (KUK), TKSP, and Kurdish members of TKP. Instead of PKK, its armed wing is named as the People’s Defence Force (HPG) which was called formerly as the Kurdistan National Liberty Army (ARGK). After the 1980 coup d’etat, many co-chairmen and members of PKK escaped mostly to Syria and European countries. Hereby, Kurdish diaspora has been mostly spreading to Europe.\(^\text{108}\)

Since 1984, PKK has been fighting an armed struggle against the Turkish aiming for an autonomous Kurdistan region, and cultural and political rights of Kurds in Turkey.\(^\text{109}\) As a result of its attacks to the Turkish state, troops, and civilian people, PKK is in the list of terrorist organizations of United Nations, United States, NATO and European Union. The past ideology of PKK was formed as a fusion of revolutionary socialism and Kurdish nationalism. Although Öcalan has been in prison, he was successful in conveying an orthodox Marxist ideology.\(^\text{110}\) Since the leader Abdullah Öcalan (short name: Apo) was captured in 1999, the organization of PKK has been weakened by the Turkish military forces and suppressions on free thought regarding the Kurdish identity. The ideology of PKK is mainly on the ethnic nationalist line in terms of the basic Kurdish rights. Thus, this Kurdish movement took shape by means of the Marxist-Leninist thought along with the understanding of a communist struggle.\(^\text{111}\) Therefore, differently from the other separatist ethnic movements in other countries, the PKK has also female armed forces who have been fighting together against the Turkish state. In the foundation years of the PKK, as an illegal organization they aimed to be independent Kurdish state in the Southeastern Turkey.

\(^{109}\) Tahiri, Hussein: The Structure of Kurdish Society and the Struggle for a Kurdish State, Mazda Publications (Costa Mesa, California) 2007, 232.
In the recent term, Öcalan and the other co-founders of PKK, and the commanders of HPG have strategically different ideas regarding the ideology of PKK. Thus, in some cases the organization moves contradictorily due to double-headedness, one head being Apo trying to conduct the organization from the prison, and the other one being administrative body of the armed wing at the Qandil Mountains in Iraq. This dissidence within PKK will be broadly mentioned in next subsections. According to some political authorities, the changing ideology of PKK is not about the nationalist movement. Because the PKK does not anymore claim an independent nation-state based on Kurdish ethnicity. Instead they claim an autonomous region in the Kurdistan. Moreover, some state-funded commentators believe that there exists not a massive Kurdish movement, but instead an Öcalan’s movement. Because, the all Kurds who live in the Eastern part of Turkey, do not support a unique ethnic party or political thought. On the contrary, a remarkable Kurdish group takes part of the rightist wing centered interests of the nation-state. For example, since third electoral period, the ruling party has been still the Justice and Development Party (AKP) which has lots of Kurdish parliamentarians who are currently opposing the Kurdish ethnic-national party called the Peace and Democracy Party (BDP) which has 36 chairs in TBMM since 2011. However, a unique Kurdish movement is not defined as a monotype and as an Öcalan's movement.

Another example of the political representative of Kurdish existence in Turkey appeared first as an association which is called ‘Solidarity Association with Downtroddens’ (Mustazaflarla Dayanışma Derneği / Mustazaf-Der). Later on, in 2012, this generation turned into a political party called 'Hür Dava Partisi' (Hüda-Par). This political structure that time known as 'Hizbullah' (not to be confused with Lebanon's wing) was initially founded as a militarist organization against PKK in 1983. The supporters of this illegal organization have been mostly formed by Kurds with Sunni-Muslim identities. Especially during 1990's, as a Kurdish counterguerrilla organization, until the 2000's Hizbullah has been supported by the Turkish government and military institutions such as JITEM (in English 'Gendarmerie Intelligence and Counter-Terrorism’), and later on by Iran in order to terminate PKK. Particularly, in these

113 Akdoğan, Yalçın: Terör süreci nasıl etkiler, The Newspaper Star (Istanbul) 22 June 2012.
115 Özeren, Süleyman: The Turkish Counter-Terrorism Experience, Organizational and Psychological Aspects of Terrorism, Ed. Centre of Excellence Defence against Terrorism, IOS Press, 2008, 159.
days Kurdish movement of Turkey includes various poles even within its political party and the PKK.

When we think about the current ideology of PKK, we have to consider the history of the Kurd in the Kurdistan geographic region. In the past, during the Ottoman Empire, Kurds used to live in a common land called Kurdistan. After the Republic of Turkey has been founded, under the shadows of some conspiracies such as Sykes Picot Agreement\textsuperscript{116} (1916, among Russia, UK and France) and Treaty of Sèvres\textsuperscript{117} (1920, among France, Italy, Japan, UK) which was not put into practice, the land of Kurdistan split up into four different states: Turkey, Syria, Iraq and Iran. Therefore, many ethnic-nationalist Kurds dream of a unified land in the old Kurdistan. Today, the ideology of PKK is related to building a “United Kurdistan” in that region. The opinion of the “United Kurdistan” is strongly supported by Massoud Barzani who is the current president of the Iraqi Kurdistan Region and the head of the Kurdistan Democratic Party in Iraq.

The PKK uses still as a variant of socialism during their political propaganda and armed struggle in order to gain Kurds’ basic rights. In 2005 Kurdistan Region was officially announced in Iraq and is also known as Southern Kurdistan. Thereby, Kurds from Turkey, Syria, and Iran have also the same autonomous purposes in which Kurdish society and peoples try to congregate for a general meeting of “National Congress” to all Kurds.\textsuperscript{118} These activities speed up the consciousness of having an autonomous region for the whole Kurdish population.

In the last decade, the PKK has become in turnsKADEK, Kongra-Gel (KGK), KKK, KCK, and HDK in terms of the urban organization of the Kurdish separatist movement. KGK’s urban terrorism wing has been the Kurdistan Freedom Hawks (TAK). Herein, they were using terrorist tactics, including suicide bombings, to target Turkish tourist destinations in order to damage the Turkish economy.\textsuperscript{119} Particularly one thing separates the PKK from other socialist movements on minority issues. The PKK has the women forces and they fight together in facade. The women organization of the PKK is identified as Koma Jinen Bilind (KJB) in English “The Movement of Kurdistan's Woman Freedom”.\textsuperscript{120}

\textsuperscript{116} Sicker, Martin: The Middle East In The Twentieth Century, Praeger (Westport, Conn) 2001.
\textsuperscript{117} Helmreich, Paul C.: From Paris to Sèvres, Ohio State University Press (U.S.A.) 1974.
\textsuperscript{119} Counterterrorism 2013 Calendar: Kongra-Gel (KGK), National Counterterrorism Center, www.nctc.gov.
\textsuperscript{120} www.kjb-online.org.
The most salient one has been KCK which means Union of Communities of Kurdistan in Kurdish Koma Civakên Kurdistan. Unlike the former formations of the PKK, KCK has five main subdivisions: \(^{121}\) (1) The ideological front, (2) The social front, (3) The political front, (4) The military front, and (5) The women’s division. The president of KCK’s legislative council is Zübeyir Aydar who was also the president of the Kongra-Gel as European centre of the PKK. The chairman of the executive council is Murat Karayılan. On 17th of May 2005 the agreement of KCK was accepted by Kongra-Gel. The philosophy of the KCK agreement is based on the text which declares democratic confederalism in Kurdistan written by Öcalan on 20 of March 2005. According to Apo, the democratic confederalism of Kurdistan is not a state system, but it is a democratic system of people without a state. This projected system can only be provided by the people and adopts to reach self-sufficiency in every field including economy. Moreover, the democratic confederalism is formed by means of the Kurdish people to have democracy and to organize their own social system. This democratic confederalism brings the more democratic rights to Kurds rather than getting stuck in a nationalist state on strict borders. \(^{122}\) Some social researchers compare this KCK formation to Soviet model of state \(^{123}\) or have termed it as “radical democracy”. \(^{124}\) As the second head of KCK, Murat Karaylan expressed the guiding principle of democratic confederalism in his book called “Bir Savaşın Anatomisi” (Anatomy of a War) in that the democratic confederalism can be independently self declared as an alternative for the peace process. According to Karaylan, the society and nation should be independent and living together equally within a confederal system. \(^{125}\)

All around the Middle East there are approximately 22 million Kurds who spread into four countries in upper Mesopotamia and also in Europe. \(^{126}\) In this sense, Kurds from Turkey, Iran, Syria and Iraq want mostly to combine in a confederation system under a consistent state.

\(^{121}\) Yavuz, Ercan: Court evidence reveals KCK terror network is worse than PKK, Article in Today’s Zaman (Istanbul) 20 June 2010.
\(^{123}\) Türköne, Mümtaz’er: What sort of organization is the KCK?, Today’s Zaman (Turkey) 23th October 2010.
\(^{124}\) İstegün, Aziz: Is the KCK a party, an Organization or an Alternative State Structure? Sunday’s Zaman (Turkey) 6th November 2011.
In the KCK settlement, there are also public institutions and non-governmental institutions on the side of Democratic Society Movement (DTH) which later called Party (DTP) and was closed down in 2009. The DTH comprises of the old closed political parties of Kurdish movement by the constitutional court such as; HEP, DEP, HADEP, DEHAP and DTP. When PKK firstly appeared, it had a political vision and also armed front at the same time. Because of this multiple praxis within the PKK, lots of extrajudicial punishment against the members of PKK took place, as well as unplanned false attacks to peasants in Southeastern region of Turkey. Therefore, DTH renamed itself as Democratic Society Congress (DTK) in order to gather all Kurdish initiatives and associations under a common roof. For that purpose, on 14th July 2011 during the Oslo negotiations, DTK unilaterally declared democratic autonomy of Kurdish people with a number of implementations by county or province administrators of BDP in public institutions, and by separatist Kurdish youngs in the street of South East and Eastern Anatolia.

As recommended by Öcalan’s declaration, to put into practice his democratic society model, many civil organizations were initiated by Kurdish politicians in 2005-2006. That time, these first structures were known as an association entitled “Free Citizen Assemblies” which expanded by varied Kurdish groups such as NGO’s representatives, the members of BDP, woman organizations, businessman organizations, journalists, lawyers, engineers, lord mayors, scientists especially in Eastern and Southeastern of Turkey. Day after day this formation increased its influence over the society in the Eastern side of Turkey. For instance, the officers or volunteers of KCK carried out many different implementations such as traffic pull over implemented by their members, collecting their own taxes, establishing their own court of justice in the regions which are mostly populated by the Kurdish people.

During the local elections in 2009, BDP and this DTH achieved a great success in the East. After that, many administrators, members and electorate of BDP have been arrested for being member of PKK until these days because of these above-mentioned KCK’s implementations. Therefore, DTH is seen as a criminal organisation under the name of KCK. So far there are 6300 persons in custody and prisoners in total according to the BDP’s sources. This number can be verified with a wide range of claims such as providing aid for PKK, propaganda, demonstration.127 Moreover, while KCK investigations are proceeding in the whole Turkey, in

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127 Demirtaş, Selahattin: Statements by co-chairman of BDP, Milliyet Newspaper (Istanbul) February
their trials Kurdish prisoners did not have the right to give their defense in their mother tongue. These political arrestments and justice dilemmas have been controversially in the Turkish news with regard to the resolution of Kurdish issue in other words termination of the PKK’s violence. As a political voice of the PKK, KCK structure tried to bring a unique democratic society model. To support the PKK’s ideology KCK formation has built a strong unity. Besides, many prisoners sentenced in the KCK trial went on hunger strikes virtually over 60 days. After the end of the hunger strike, a new process of negotiations started between Öcalan and the National Intelligence Organisation of Turkey in the last quarter of 2012.

In the present days, the negotiation process has been still proceeding by means of the cooperation with the government (AKP) and authorities of BDP despite of the presence of opposition parties who stand fundamentally against the negotiations between a terrorist group and the state.

### 4.3 The organizational settlement of PKK in the Middle East and in Europe

#### 4.3.1 PKK in the Middle East: Northern Iraq / Qandil

Since the PKK’s first attack which took place in Siirt’s Eruh in 1984\(^\text{128}\), it is known that the death toll reached over 30,000 from both sides Turkish Military and PKK.\(^\text{129}\) During the first years of conflict with Turkish security forces, Abdullah Öcalan and many key men of the PKK fled to Syria, to Iraq or to Europe as an asylum-seeker. Essentially, Kurds from the armed wing of the PKK side live in the Middle East where they are divided into political unities. These following organisations are similar to the PKK; for Iraq in 2002 (The Kurdistan Democratic Solution Party, KDP), Syria in 2003 (The Democratic Union Party in Kurdish Partiya Yekîtiya Demokrat, PYD) and Iran in 2004 (The Party of Free Life for Kurdistan in Kurdish Partiya Jiyana Azad a Kurdistanê, PJAK).\(^\text{130}\)

Particularly, since 2010 the Arab Spring has arisen in the Middle East, the Kurdish

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Movement has gained more strength. In these days, countries have Kurdish population were also affected by the revolutionary soul inflicted the Arab Spring. For instance, in spite of the ongoing internal war in Syria (since the early spring of 2011), Kurds act with transnational solidarity in order to obtain their rights on self determination. Therefore, nearly 1000 or more PKK fighters have been transferred to Syria by that PYD will dominate strategic places where Syrian Kurds mostly live there.\textsuperscript{131} Hereby, PYD also started to recognize Apo’s the proposal of the democratic confederation and moves together with the PKK forces from Qandil in this process. Similarly, in the past many guerillas from Syrian Kurdish minority and from PYD transferred to Qandil reinforce PKK in the clashes. The old regimes of the Middle East are undergoing a changing in the beginning of 2000’s.

The most important bases of the PKK are situated in the Northern Iraq, Qandil where its inaccessible mountains envelop throughout 80 km from Turkey to Iranian border. PKK first arrived to Qandil in 1980s as a guest of Iraqi Kurds. Since 2007, Turkey has developed close relationships with Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG) whose president is Massoud Barzani. The KRG has closed the offices of the PKK concerning the proxy of Kurdistan Democratic Solution Party. However, it remains only one office on the edge of KRG territory in Kirkuk.\textsuperscript{132} These close relationships between KRG and Turkish government may provide that Barzani will implement strict politics against the PKK’s settlement in Qandil and even evict its forces entirely. Because, Turkey supports to KRG for oil and gas development and even though in disputes with Baghdad maintains reciprocal agreements with southern Kurdistan.

Some commentators say that Ankara will solve the PKK issue by means of collaboration with Barzani. On the contrary, others assess that the violence committed by PKK is an internal problem of Turkey, thus Barzani or others cannot have influence upon the resolution of the PKK issue.\textsuperscript{133} These two reverse views seem quite realistic, because Turkish combat aircrafts occasionally bomb to Qandil mountains. Although Barzani is disturbed by supraterritorial operations of Turkish military forces and also warns to PKK, he does not obstruct external military operations over northern Iraq region. On the other hand, the Kurdish autonomous region

\textsuperscript{131} Ibid: 16.
\textsuperscript{133} Interview with Turkish Deputy Prime Minister Beşir Atalay: The News by CNN Türk (Istanbul) 9 June 2012.
cannot purge all the PKK camps from the Qandil and its surrounding. It indicates that there is a very slim equilibrium for Barzani between Turkey and PKK sides. From the Iraqi veteran guerrilla leader’s point of view, Turkey and Iran send military forces to the northern Iraq border to finish this violent conflict. For this view, the must be avoided thing is Kurdish-Kurdish war. Therefore, PKK and PJAK should stop the idea of getting their rights by means of military means.

The camps in northern Iraq are used both as a base of military education, and as an inventory, also an arsenal as well. Some of the well-known camps in the region can be listed as Mount Kandil (the headquarters), Harun camp, Tang-i Shiwadiza camp, Kenicenge camp, Zap camp, Bole camp (based on women troops and ordnance depot), Levce camp (based on health entity), Bokrisan camp, Enze village, Mount Sari-1 Sule, Gırnako ve Pişteşan regions, Zargali village ve Kurtak village. The organisation members in these camps work in particular places determined by their duty in the hierarchy.

According to the Imralı record from the last interview between BDP and Abdullah Öcalan, in Syria 50.000, in Qandil 10.000, and in Iran 40.000 guerrillas exist. Herein, women and also children are included in these fighters. Moreover, there are critical contentions in the Northern Iraq regarding will of security check by Kurdish local government rather than by Iraq centralized government. In the last period, the president of Iraq Talabani and the prime minister Nouri al-Maliki had meetings with Barzani to determine the demands of Kurds, but they could not find any final solution to these contentions. In Iran, PJAK declared cease fire with the Iranian government in 2011.

In Syria, the relationships between PYD and PKK have also been day after day developing particularly since the outbreak of internal war. Originally PKK already has lots of members from Syrian background, and also common ideas in parallel with PYD regarding

134 Statement to Erbil meeting with Kurdistan representatives based abroad: Iraqi Kurdistan caught between rebels (Iran and Turkey) 7 September 2011, www.ekurd.net.
136 Records were leaked out from Imrali where Apo is in prison, Ankara Strategy Institute, 28 February 2013, www.ankarastrateji.org.
gaining a legal status under the name of Kurdish governance. Therefore, many guerrillas from PKK has come to support PYD against the Free Syrian Army (FSA) in Syria.\(^\text{139}\) Moreover, PYD has conquered politically and military temporal administration over a number of cities where Syrian Kurds are the majority. These cities are Kobani, Afrin, Cindiris in Halep province; Amude, Derik, Efrin in Haseke province, El Darbasiye, Ra’s al-‘Ayn and Tirbesipiye.\(^\text{140}\) When we consider the outcome of PKK’s settlement in Qandil in the light of the last resolution stepping, we can interpret that PKK has no plan of withdrawal from Qandil in midterm.

**4.3.2 Europe: PKK in diaspora**

The total population of the Kurds in the world is estimated to be about 23-27 million including all subgroups of Kurdish ethnicity such as Kurd-Kurmanji, Kurd-Sorani, Zaza-Alevica, Zaza-Dimli, Yazidi, Herki, in all around the world.\(^\text{141}\) Moreover, some thinkers do not count Zazas as an ethnic element, instead they claim that Zaza means more an arm of Kurdish language. With regard to the data of 2009\(^\text{142}\), 15.193.000 Kurdish people inhabit only in Turkey including the Zaza population. 1.5 Million Kurds originally from Turkey live in Europe. Germany has the largest Kurdish community in Europe with 800.000 citizens of Kurdish descent. 13.000 of them are said to be “stable core PKK members”, despite the fact that the PKK organisation has been illegal since 1993.\(^\text{143}\) The 44-member federation of Kurdish Associations in Germany, is also known in close relationship with the PKK.\(^\text{144}\) The other sizeable diaspora communities live in the UK, France, the Netherlands, Denmark, Belgium and Sweden. The Kurdish diaspora communities play a significant role for preserving the national identity and language unlike Turkey where Kurds’ rights were denied by former governments for a long time.

In Europe, the crucial centre of PKK is found in the Brussels which is also the de facto capital of European Union (EU). The head of Kongra Gel Remzi Kartal expressed that nearly half of Turkey’s Kurdish diaspora participate in activities for KCK legislature and vote in Kongra Gel elections.\(^\text{145}\) Moreover, the Kurdish diaspora conserve their own cultural habits and their

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\(^\text{139}\) News Report: PKK has come to support for PYD, The Star Newspaper (Turkey) 29 January 2013.
\(^\text{142}\) Joshua Project: Great Commission Status of the Kurds People Cluster.
\(^\text{144}\) Verfassungsschutzbericht: Bundesministerium des Innern, (Berlin) 2010, 286-292.
\(^\text{145}\) Khayati, Khalid (Sweden-based researcher on the Kurdish diaspora): Interview: The Kurmanji dialect was almost dead in Turkey, but had a chance to revive again in the diaspora, Rudaw (Iraqi Kurdistan) 5
links with PKK’s struggle. For example, in the Kurdish Community Centre in Haringey, London and in another centre in Vienna or in some where in Europe, the poster of Abdullah Öcalan is hung on the wall of honor. Besides, the pictures of some martyr guerrillas of PKK are displayed on the centre’s wall which is surrounded by PKK flags. Moreover, programs in Kurdish language are broadcasted all the day by mostly Kurdish television channels. The members of these Kurdish associations and Kurdish society, who visit the centre, have an opportunity to contact each other and to organise efficient activities on the way of Kurdistan Workers Party’s ideology.

In the whole world, from PKK’s side many Kurdish refugees and immigrants receive the common national information via varied TV channels in Europe. In 1995 this broadcasting sharing was by means of MED TV centered on London until it was closed down in 1999. Then, instead of MED TV, a new channel named MEDYA TV appeared, centered on France at the same year and its broadcast life lasted in 2004. After that Roj TV was founded and broadcasted until January of 2012. This last channel has been closed down due to publicly involving in PKK propaganda. Thereupon, the Turkish state proclaimed to Denmark that Roj TV had to be closed down. Currently, there are still a few Kurdish channels on the line of PKK such as Sterk TV (centered on Norway in Turkish-Kurdish), Nûçe TV (in Turkish-Kurdish), Newroz TV (for Syria and Iran in Kurdish), Rohani TV (for Syrian PYD and PKK) and Mesopotamia Music Channel (MMC TV).

When we examine the emigrant profiles of Kurdish diaspora, their first-generation is much more tired than the Kurdish youth and crave to live again in Turkey. Therefore, they find the ways of compromise to be able to return to Turkey. But, as the second-generation Kurdish youngs are reactive in a militant manner, and most of them have never been to Turkey. Due to these reasons, they have no more enthusiasm to negotiate with Turkey in the international forums about the Kurdish question. Thus, this generation is gradually rising within the European politics. Moreover, the first-generation of Kurdish migrants were poor and less educated than their children like in migrant families of Turkish origin. They worked only in the service sector,

such as Kebap shops, taxi driver, factory labourer. Second-generation Kurds have become better educated, had more wealth, and show their presence as lawyer, employer or skilled worker as well as Turkish immigrants. In coming close, we may predict that the current Kurdish youth will generate a comprehensive and powerful lobby for the interests of the Kurdish diaspora.\textsuperscript{149} Even though the Turkish state chases after legally prohibition and exclusion over the presence of PKK in Europe, the Kurdish diaspora is easily spreading and strengthening their organizations all over the Europe and the world.

Kurdish diaspora originally coming from Turkey provide a strong solidarity by means of Nevroz feasts (Mayday), Kurdish national days, various carnivals, and collective demonstrations as well as cross-national Kurdish media. European Kurdish diaspora aids financially to the PKK in which Kurdish workers or employers, closed by PKK, pay regularly a certain amount of money to offices of the organization with the help of Kurdish associations. This solidarity network contains the most important necessity of the PKK under the subject of its “pecuniary resource”. The best known economic resource of the organization comes from drug smuggling and trafficking. Since 2003 the head of Kongra-Gel is Zübeyir Aydar was wanted with red notice by USA accused of being among drug cartels in 2009. Then, he was arrested in Belgium in 2010.\textsuperscript{150} But after three weeks he was released due to lack of sufficient evidences. As a key man of the organization, Aydar took part in the Kurdish Parliament in Exile (PKDW, Parlamana Kurdistane Li Derveyi Welat) founded by PKK in 1995, also Kurdistan National Congress (KNK, Kongra Netewiya Kurdistan) in 1999, and participated in Oslo negotiations in 2009\textsuperscript{151} The other co-leaders of Kongra-Gel/PKK are Murat Karayılan, Ali Rıza Altun and Remzi Kartal. Furthermore, financial resources of PKK include also monetary aids coming from other countries which want to profit from Turkey's internal disorder such as intelligence services of Russia, UK, Israel, and US and other interest partners of great power politics, extortions taken by Kurdish tradesmen and businessmen, donations given by PKK’s sympathisers, and drug, cigarette, alcohol smuggling, human trafficking. According to some studies, PKK need to have per year at least 1 billion Turkish Lira (nearly 450 million Euro) in order to sustain its presence.\textsuperscript{152}

\textsuperscript{149} International Crisis Group Interview: Kurdish Community Centre worker, (London) June 2012.
\textsuperscript{150} USA Department of Treasury: Treasury Designates Three Leaders of the Kongra-Gel as the Significant Foreign Narcotics Traffickers, 14 October 2009.
If it is necessary to define the notion of “Kurd” or “Kurdishness”, there is no single way within the Middle East. Therefore, the Kurdish identity and Kurdish question have become a trans-border issue.\textsuperscript{153} The diffusion of conflict outside Turkish borders brings about Kurdish protests, Hunger strikes, and occasional violence between Turkish and Kurdish groups in Europe. As a result of these effects, the diaspora have succeeded to revive the Kurdish issue on European agenda and shares in the resolution of Turkey’s Kurdish question as a financial and intellectual actor of PKK from Europe.\textsuperscript{154}

\subsection*{4.4 How do the Turkish government handle the Kurdish issue in Turkey so far? What is the eventual solution for both sides?}

Before analyzing the current situation of how the Turkish state deals with the Kurdish issue, the political atmosphere and the democratization practices of the state have to be well understood. Along with the announcement of Tanzimat (in Turkish “Reorganization” 1839-76), Turkish political culture was acquainted with jacobin reforms of western countries. After the foundation of the Republic of Turkey in 1923, two dozens of revolution principles were accepted led by Mustafa Kemal Paşa (Atatürk) in the TBMM. Until the end of the term with one-party in 1950, the thoughts of Atatürk became to an ideology called 'Kemalism' which internalizes westernism to be a modern state. Under 'the Republican People’s Party’, as the prior of Young Turks, Kemalists defined the Turkish modernization. In this context, Şerif Mardin criticizes that the understanding of westernism and Islamic society are in contradiction with each other since the foundation of Turkey.\textsuperscript{155} He points out this contradiction between school and neighborhood and/or between the center and the periphery and/or between the new doctrines and traditional values. In the recent past, the constitutional implementations and institutions of the state were predominantly formed by the secularism model in Turkey. It means that the state has refused its own people’s in other words its own majority's demands and wishes. When the AKP came to power in 2002, the political dynamics of Turkey started to change on the way of moderate Islam without the shadow of military tutelage.

\begin{flushright}
\textsuperscript{154} Baser, Bahar: Kurdish Diaspora Political Activism in Europe with a Particular Focus on Great Britain, Berghof Peace Support and Centre for just Peace and Democracy (Berlin) 2011.  
\textsuperscript{155} Mardin, Şerif: Türk Modernleşmesi, İletişim Press (İstanbul) 2008.
\end{flushright}
Particularly, Turkey’s Kurdish question grewed up as a side-effect of coup d’etats between 1960 and 1980. When many Kurdish prisoners got out of jail, their Kurdish identities have become more dominant with feelings of revenge from the state and the military. For the resolution of the Kurdish issue, the military coup threat over the governments shall be removed in which the Turkish Armed Forces should abandon strict manners on imposing a monotype model consisting of only the Kemalist ideology. According to the statements from Ismail Beşikçi’s book named “The Lawsuit of Ismail Beşikçi”, while Kurds were on trial in the coup d’etat courts, their ethnicity or their language namely to be Kurd were not to be counted as a valid concept by that military court. The Kurdish prisoners were not allowed to defend themselves in Kurdish. Because the military judges have seen just one nationality which Turkishness within the Turkey’s borders.156

As government politics, the Kurdish issue has been discussed on agenda of the political parties excluding Kurdish nationalist parties: Central or sub-central parties; DP (the Democratic Party), AP (the Justice Party), ANAP (the Motherland Party), Ecevit’s CHP in the 1970s and the SHP (the Social Democratic Populist Party). Certainly the former governments have carried out limited activities to solve the Kurdish question. Nevertheless, the enterprise for education and broadcasting in Kurdish was in the agenda of Erdal İnönü’ SHP and Özal’s ANAP, even nominal Çiller’s DYP (the True Path Party) in the late 80s and 90s.157 In 1995, RP (the Welfare Party) was the coalition partner with DYP and has the most deputies originally from Kurdish in that TBMM. Fethullah Erbaş who was a member of parliament from RP that time. He went to the Qandil with different Turkish NGOs’ representatives in order to accept delivery of the kidnapped soldiers from PKK’s hands. In those years, it was not understandable to arrange any meeting or even any kind of contact with PKK. Despite of death threats and exclusions from the parliament, he succeeded to rescue 8 captives.158

The attacks of the PKK were generally formed by city clashes in 1978-1980. Then, in the light of the Maoist people revolution, in the 1984-1993 the PKK declared to start a long-term people’s war which involves:

1. the strategical defence,

156 Beşikçi, Ismail: Ismail Beşikçi Davası II - Savunma, Yurt Publication (Turkey) 1993.
2. the strategical stabilization,
3. the strategical attack.

The intensive conflicts between the PKK and the Turkish Army continued until late 1990s. According the Turkish resources, during the Çekiç Operation of the military in 1997, the PKK experienced their largest casualties summing up to: 2370 deaths, and 415 wounds. In terms of the Turkey’s side, 114 dead and 338 wounded. The Çekiç Operation was a wide-range combat operation with the attendance of 200.000 soldiers and rural guards. Since the last decade, the organization carried out to reduce speed and kidnappings nearby 154 civilians, and also suicide attacks. Another loss for Turkey in this process has been the financial resources that have increased in high-volume due to the reserved expense for terrorism. Eventually the Turkish state got into an economic crisis. The explanation of the Turkey’s former Defense Minister Ismet Yılmaz pointed that 6.169 Turkish soldiers were dead in the last 28 year.

As mentioned earlier, the PKK question is substantially related to the actions of counterguerrilla by means of the deep state. One of the most dangerous organizations of deep state was Gendarmerie Intelligence and Fight against the Terrorism (JITEM) which is accused by burning down of villages in the East, provoking the peoples of both sides against each other, committing secret murders. However, in the confessions of Karayılan, it is claimed that several attacks of JITEM belonged to one group known as the hawk wing of the PKK’s members. Although the former states collaborated with the apparatus of the deep state, currently there is no obstacle for the state and the PKK to come to an agreement on the same table.

Both Kurds and Turks still die because of the unidentifiable ethnicity question. To prevent these deaths, at least both sides have to be responsive and strong-willed for the solution oriented steps. To this end, since September 2012, the Turkish state initiated the process of negotiations with PKK again, especially with Öcalan this time. The deputies of BDP (the Peace and Democracy Party) have been allowed to meet Abdullah Öcalan in the Imralı prison where he is currently placed. In the recent days, the both Turkish and Kurdish societies expect that the

negotiation process will be differently successful from the older experiences and the sustainable peace will come to the Southeastern Anatolia and the entire Mesopotamia.

4.5 Questionnaire with peoples who live in Austria as a political supporter or sympathizer of PKK’s ideology

So far we have addressed the ethnic minorities from ethnicity to nation consciousness and their relationships with collective violence under the name of ethno-nationalism. In concern with these research concepts, we have conducted a survey with subjects from the Kurdish diaspora. A group of people who migrated from Turkey to Austria-Vienna as a refugee or/and as a student or/and as a worker, were determined as subjects. They were chosen to be either university students or members of Kurdish associations. Identities of these subjects are anonymized and mostly Kurdish origin who feel a sympathy to the PKK and its ideology. Additionally, in this questionnaire, the qualitative approach was used in terms of the measurement and the consideration.

The main purpose of this questionnaire is to find out above identified certain group’s aspects towards the Kurdish issue of Turkey and PKK’s violence paradox. An additional goal has been to investigate whether the diaspora Kurds support ideologically violent acts of the PKK or not. Furthermore, we analyzed whether those Kurds from diaspora are still faithful to the strategy and the ideology of the PKK. Why do these aims play an important role for resolution on Kurdish issue and why have we posed questions to Kurds who live in Austria? Firstly, it must be known that the centre of KCK and/or PKK settled down in Europe especially in France, Netherland, Sweden and Germany where Kurdish associations and unions are substantially active by means of their organization's propagandizing. It is striven that ideology and socio-cultural unity on Kurdish diaspora are kept alive by means of these above-mentioned institutional activities throughout the Europe. The opinions of members of these associations, young and families from Kurdish background generate a deterministic part of decision mechanism for the status of Turkey’s Kurds in the future. Therefore, to be able to understand relationship of Kurdish movement with PKK or violent actions, we interviewed with people who particularly were chosen from close environment to PKK ideology.
The method of this survey was determined to be as face-to-face interview with ten experimental subjects. The evaluation of the survey followed the qualitative approach. To this end, the questions were usually formed by closed questions such as multiple choice, yes-no, numbered classification scale as well as opened questions such as filling in the blanks, short answers, essay, own explanation by subject.\textsuperscript{163, 164}

\begin{figure}
\centering
\includegraphics[width=\textwidth]{age_distribution.png}
\caption{Age}
\end{figure}

Figure 2 shows the wide-range age groups of the subjects who participated in the survey.

80% of the subjects are coming from Kurdish, and 20% of Turkish origin, as seen in Figure 3. Particularly, it can be interpreted that genetic codes basically determine the political stance and identity. But also immediate surrounding, such as political parties, political associations, social groups, friendship cycles, neighborhoods etc., affect the people’s political choice and their sense of belonging. Therefore, non-Kurds also support the Kurdish Workers Party motivated by the soul of its socialist revolutionary and for Kurds’ self-determination rights.

Figure 3: Ethnicity
The question “how do you identify yourself” was asked to experimental subjects. 40% of the subjects identify themselves via the Kurdish ethnicity, and 20% via nation, the other 20% via Turkish citizenship (Türkiyeli), and the last group via other cultural identities (Figure 4). This result can be considered as that the Kurds have no certain specific self-definition of “Kurdishness”. All of them would like to have full freedom of using the Kurdish language and living with their identities without any obstacles.

**Figure 4: Self-definition of the identity**
According to Figure 5, 40% of the experimental subjects believe that the Kurdish movement in Turkey is based on a socialist purpose. Another 30% think that the Kurdish movement arises from the nationalist purpose, and the other 30% says it originates from both socialist and nationalist causes. As mentioned earlier, at the beginning the Kurdish movement, namely PKK, aimed at an independent, united and socialist Kurdistan as a Marxist-Leninist organization with Stalinist methods on their activities.¹⁶⁵ When Soviets (U.S.S.R.) and socialism collapsed years ago, PKK disused the symbols “hammer and sickle” on their flag.

In last decades, behind the socialist rhetoric of PKK’s top-level executives, PKK is much more closer to the Kurdish patriotic line. For example, there are also various fractions of youth movements founded by university students such as YDG-H (Patriotic Revolutionary Youth

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Movement, former YÖGEH) from left-wing, and as its opposite YDG (M) or known DGH (Patriotic Democratic Youth Movement) which clashes with the left-wing of both Turks and Kurds. Kurd-Islam synthesis has also been developed within the Kurdish movement. Thus, PKK has been intending to gain the religionist Kurds and Islamic values, Turk-Islam synthesis during the foundation of Turkish Republic as well. It is also observable that Apo’s rhetoric is changing from the socialist line to the moderate Islamic line. On the last 21st March (2013) in Diyarbakir (Amed), during the Newroz celebration, Abdullah Öcalan’s letter was read by the BDP deputy Sırrı Süreya Önder to numerous people in the central square. (See the following chapter for its discussion in detail). Öcalan message’s included that Kurds and Turks have been living together for 1000 years under the Islam flag. While Apo emphasizes the connective soul of Islam, he also mentioned about the truths on messages of prophets Moses, Jesus and Mohammed.  

When we look into the development of the Kurdish nationalism, from the 1920s and 1930s to the 1940s and 1950s by Kemalist Republic oppressed and deported Kurds laid a foundation of “the Kurdish National and Democratic Movement”. In the 1970s, Ismail Beşikçi developed and spread this movement in universities. Then, Orhan Kotan, who was the important for the organization Rizgarî’s theoretic thesis, stated that Kurdish people’s national liberation is only possible with socialist humanism. After the end of real socialism and coming capital system along with globalisation, he added that in theory the International Socialist Movement and the National Liberation Struggle must be separated from each other.

The outcome of the question “what do you think the Turkey’s Kurdish movement is based on...” shows that there is no single answer to the ideological purpose of Kurdish movement. Nevertheless, the ideology of PKK has been constantly changing with respect to the gaining of the time, but their rhetoric still remains in the socialist perspective.

166 Öcalan, Abdullah: Newroz Call to the People, (Diyarbakır-Amed) 21 March 2013.
Another question in the survey was about whether the Kurdish armed forces (PKK) are right in their struggle and should keep their current strategy or should cease fire. Almost all experimental subjects answered that violence should go on exactly in the same way (Figure 6). 10% say that negotiation must ultimately begin with the Turkish government. Some subjects expressed that “dialog is a more humanist method than violence”, “if the way of dialog is jammed, that time violence will be last resort”, “political dialog and more diplomacy are a peaceable process that PKK should take a position for the negotiation” etc. Nevertheless, all of them except two persons favoured violence for the resolution of the Kurdish issue.

The chairman of KCK executive council, Murat Karayılan currently announced with a written message during the Newroz celebration in Bonn that PKK declared the cease-fire. 168 In

this current negotiation period, it seems that PKK obeys Öcalan’s peace call in the last Newroz celebration.

![Pie chart showing Kurds' Main Demands](image)

**Figure 7: Kurds’ Main Demands**

In the light of Öcalan’s thoughts, Kurdish movement does not think about building an independent nation-state for so long. On the contrary, the nation-state mentality is despised by Öcalan’s books. As seen in Figure 7, PKK wants autonomy within a Turkish federation, hence they do want to not split up from Turkey.

When we look at the big picture in light of this questionnaire's data, it indicates that there is an ongoing proximity between ideological basis of PKK and its financial sponsors and supporters in Europe. Both two sides seem to be like-minded with each other. Causatively one of the reason comes to mind that PKK succeed at this point by its violence strategy for many years. Hereby, the violent and contentious process between PKK and the Turkish state has evolved
phase to phase toward negotiations. At this point, PKK does not want to lose their great trump and use it as enforcement and threat against the state during the bilateral negotiations. Therefore, PKK’s followers do not trust smoothly that the state implement definitively demands of Kurds in terms of the equal citizenship without of violence.
5 Other Studies and Opinions about PKK

5.1 Transnational resolution advisories

Under the effect of Tunisian revolution, since 2011 the waft of Arab spring has fast spread to the whole Middle East. While in there a number of countries have nominally transformed their regimes towards democracy, Middle East and North Africa have lost their stability and control in both internal and external affairs. Thus, the balance of the world began to vary among the states which USA and EU vs Russia and Iran give support to interfering groups choosing according to their own interests. Particularly, after the Iraq War (2003-2011), the Iraqi borders took a new form for the benefit of the Iraqi Kurds. In these days, similarly, the outcome of the Syrian civil war will determine whether the occupied territories by PYD will be Syrian Kurdistan. In this atmosphere, Turkey’s Kurds, Kurdish political parties, and Kurdish initiatives believe more strongly in building a Kurdish autonomous region in Turkey. In 29 years since the first attack in Eruh-Şemdinli in 1984, 35,300 persons lost theirs lives due to the bilateral conflicts.\textsuperscript{169} Although several times often PKK unilaterally ceased fire between 1998 and 2003, also between 2009 and 2011\textsuperscript{170}, in bilateral negotiations, the sides could not shake hands, and the bloodshed has not ended in the South Eastern Anatolia.

Aliza Marcus, in her book named “blood and belief”, discusses the Southern Kurdistan (Northern Iraq) and its regional resettlement. Marcus expresses that Northern Iraq can be a pilot model for the Kurds of Turkey, and PKK supporters make close contact with the Kurds in the Northern Iraq. In her view, the federate Kurdistan region integrates the other Kurds coming from the neighboring states. In the recent days, Northern Iraqi Kurds can contentedly live their relationships such as kinship and neighborhood in a more peaceful and consistent environment than the Southeastern Turkey where economic investments are way below the needs, and the unemployment rate is considerably high.\textsuperscript{171} Additionally, the exports between the Northern Iraq

and Turkey have been gradually increasing in different sectors such as first construction and contractorship, oil and energy, tourism, agriculture, infrastructures and aviation. In 2000s, it was predicted that 1.5 billion of Turkey’s 5 billion dollar trading volume would be with the Iraqi Kurdistan. Moreover, as the first foreign bank, Ziraat Bank of Turkey opened a branch in Arbil. This trend indicates that the developing trade and relationships between Northern Iraq and Turkey may affect Turkey’s relations with the western states.\(^{172}\)

Marcus emphasizes in her book that as an autonomous federation, the Northern Iraq nominally depends on the centralized administration in Bagdad and goes right on the way of building its own independent state by means of having already its own flag, own constitution, own army (former Peshmerga), own national anthem, own national football team etc. Primarily these inferences show that the author links a role-model relationship between Turkey and Northern Iraq. She means that the ultimate goal of the Kurds is to establish an autonomous Kurdish region in Southeastern Anatolia in the long run. She also mentions that the former guerillas of PKK who cannot return to Turkey, tend to study at a university or find a job in Northern Iraq. To bring the permanent peace, it is foreseen that Kurds (under the PKK) and Turks should talk to each other.

On the one hand, Turkey is pursuing full membership negotiations with the EU and its candidacy status requires some reforms to be done with regard to human rights to improve its democratic standards. On the other hand, international public opinion and Kurds do not trust the Turkish state in resolution of the Kurdish issue. Kurds supporting PKK’s ideology and some members of Parliament have already been charged due to their separatist statements. Even any symbol of PKK such as a fringed scarf (poşu), the colours of PKK flag etc. are severely reacted by the Turkish state. Therefore, Kurdish politicians or supporters of the Kurdish movement cannot publicly say what they really think and want to have for their identities. However, the Turkish state and the people of that region know very well where PKK’s military camps deploy in Qandil mountains. As Marcus stated, the PKK’s presence is no secret. Iraqi Kurdish villagers help supply the PKK’s guerillas, foreign journalists visit them, and many Kurdish businessmen or companies are sponsoring their media transfer and their vital necessities and also very often

the PKK sponsors are visiting families of the rebels.\textsuperscript{173} All these denial policies have hindered the eventual peace and the societal compromise among the sides. Furthermore, Marcus adds that Turkey’s relationship with the Iraqi Kurdistan government is very significant in the region. The president of the Kurdistan Region Massoud Barzani has been still exhibiting mild attitudes towards the PKK and its settlement in Northern Iraq. In some cases, Barzani has been a mediator between PKK and Turkish state. He expressed that the PKK is not their problem and the solution to Turkey’s PKK problem lies in dialogue and official recognition of the country’s Kurdish minority.\textsuperscript{174}

After the retreat of USA from Iraq (fully in 2011\textsuperscript{175}), Turkey was worried about that the economic stabilization and the internal order of the autonomous Kurdish state could be negatively affected and this foreseen damaging influences may also reflect to the trade relations of Turkey and Northern Iraq. In the first place, Turkey was irritated that the Iraqi Kurdistan can be an example of the state model for Turkey’s Kurds. At the same time, the government of the Kurdistan Region does not pursue to dismiss the PKK from the Northern Iraq. Because, they do not want to contrast with the PKK whose presence has already been in Qandil and its surrounding for years. This makes sense that if the sides do not negotiate with each other about their mutual interests, both the Middle East and Asia Minor, and also their economical development will result in competitive disadvantage against the other actors. Thereby, dialogue and compromise seem inevitably the most plausible line for the silence of weapons. Similarly, Marcus concludes that for the solution of the Kurdish problem, the only way is to open a real dialogue channel with the Kurds.\textsuperscript{176}

Since the start of the current negotiation process (in the beginning of 2013), Marcus, many peoples and a huge media as well, support the roadmap of both AKP (Justice and Development Party/JDP) government and Öcalan in parallel with the KCK executive council. However, Marcus states that the AKP is not strong-willed enough as much as PKK in the current peace process. She adds that a great part of Kurds espouse Abdullah Öcalan as their leader. Thus,

\textsuperscript{174} Ibid: 303.
\textsuperscript{175} The News Report: USA is retreating from Iraq with hauling down its flag in Bagdad, The BBC News (U.K.) 15 December 2011, \url{www.bbc.co.uk}.
\textsuperscript{176} Marcus, Aliza: Ibid: 304.
many Kurds find Apo’s calling to Kurdish people as an incredible case in 21st March 2013 in Newroz.177

In September of 2012, International Crisis Group (ICG) published a report with the title of “Turkey: the PKK and a Kurdish Settlement” which presents the mutual strategies for conflict ending. For the Turkish government, below items were recommended178:
- The government and the mainstream media should not be provoked towards the overall war calls for terror. Instead, they should focus on the long range conflict resolution along with the Kurds.
- It is necessary to change some oppressive laws which result in arrestment of numerous deputies and headsmen of BDP (Peace and Democracy Party).
- Briefly, in a reliable and eager way, the ruling party AKP has to maintain “the democratic initiative” started in 2005 in order to give more democratic rights to the Kurds.

For the Kurdish movement the following headlines were suggested:
- Including the head of PKK, the Kurdish movement has to give up the terrorist attacks entirely and announce to the public opinion their new heading on realistic political goals.
- If the Kurdish movement negotiates with the government, they have to talk to Ankara as one single organizational unit and fulfil the decisions of their leaders Öcalan.
- While the terrorist attacks go on in the same way, it is difficult to be successful in any peace building process. Moreover, recently, very few Kurdish politicians condemned the increasing suicide attacks and kidnapping of civilians in 2012. This means that the BDP politicians were opposing the disappearance of violence in the Kurdish liberation process.

For both the Turkish government and the Kurdish movement:
- All politicians from the opposite opinions should support the provision of some fundamental rights such as Kurds’ education in their mother tongue, equal laws, fair political representation, and increased decentralization. Hereby, the reinforcement to the violence of PKK will decrease and the government will be having the advantage of the negotiations on PKK’s cease fire. So far, it is seen that all the ideas of conflict resolution combine on a common ground. In every sense, violence cannot be counted as a legitimate political tool in todays’ conjunctural system. To understand different cultures and live altogether with a wide range of identities, it is necessary to talk and tolerate each other by means of the power of diplomacy.

177 Marcus, Aliza: The Interview: AKP is not strong-willed as much as PKK, Yüksekova News (Hakkari) 4 April 2013.
In November 2012, the International Crisis Group released a new advancement report which refers to Turkey’s Kurdish impasse through the view from Diyarbakır. ICG report address the economic and demographic importance of Diyarbakır which is the most Kurdish populated city of Turkey. While being Turkey’s third largest economic centre in the past, Diyarbakır and the Southeastern Anatolia have fallen to the 63rd place in terms of the economic investments due to the only security-based governmental policies, PKK sabotage, kidnappings, terrorist attacks, and extortion. Diyarbakır’s location is also important with its regional historic crossroads and monuments that could make it a touristic magnet. After the projected peace environment, it is considered that Diyarbakır can be the Kurdish administration under the Turkish state.

Since 2011, the ICG reports have suggested that the Turkish government should implement with the Kurdish political representatives four lines of reforms: mother language rights for Turkey’s Kurds; reducing the threshold for election to the national parliament from 10 per cent to 5 per cent; a new decentralization strategy; and discarding all discriminative content from the constitution and laws. In the report, it is emphasized that the Turkish government and Kurdish movement leaders should collaborate with civil society organizations, and that both communities should obey these decisions, particularly, giving more democratic rights for Kurds on one side, and cease fire of PKK on the other.

Today’s states have the capitalist thought. As Gramsci stated in his “hegemony theory”, the state has the great power, in other words, “hegemony” over the subordinated groups who accept the ideas, values, and leadership of the dominant group. Gramsci referred to the state not only as a political society (police, army, legal system etc.) in which the hegemony occurs through directly force, but also the civil society (family, education system, unions, and institutions etc.) by means of ideology or consent. According to Gramsci, cultural hegemony is crucial for power. It means that the minority classes should improve their intellectual and moral leaderships in order to have a strong voice on sharing power. At least, they should able to represent their own cultures in a society. From the view of the Gramscian theory, the struggle of

180 Ibid: 222.
minorities can be possible with the cultural development against the imperialist assimilation politics.

Concerning this aforementioned neo-marxist theory, A. Akkaya and J. Jongerden propose a way to resolve Turkey's Kurdish question. As an alternative to liberal democracy, they suggest the radical democracy model instead of the western democracies. Since the late 1970s, the understanding of radical politics has changed within the framework of Marxism. In the radical political thought, the significant three pillars of politics; state, class and, party turn into “politics beyond the state, political organization beyond the party, and political subjectivity beyond the class”. In terms of the radical democracy in Kurdish context, Akkaya and Jongerden state that in the 2000s, the PKK reinvented itself by a number of transformations and arguing that the nation must be defined not on the basis of ethnicity or language but on the basis of citizenship in a democratic republic. As mentioned by Öcalan in 2005 in the declaration of democratic sovereignty, the ideology of PKK has transformed towards a project of radical democracy. In both Öcalan’s defense and declaration there were no claims for an independent Kurdish state which previously was a central aim of struggle. Their current purpose conversely points out having a truly democratic republic. In these texts, the explanations of Öcalan do not stand against the Republic of Turkey. He states that as the Republic’s founding father, Atatürk intended to establish a democratic republic but it was sabotaged by external powers.

The second volume of Öcalan’s defense on the European Court of Human Rights (ECHR) deals with the old history of Kurds and the PKK. According to him, when class (state) societies and modernization appeared in the scene of history, that time a great destruction took place for Kurds. This point reminds us the Gramscian hegemony theory in which authoritarian power apparatuses interfere with the progress of a community or a minority group within a nation state. Öcalan extended his argument that PKK has become the last resistance of Kurds to this perilous process. Thus, PKK showed with might and main its all will powers through violence acts especially during the post-cold war era in Turkey. In this context, the radical democracy project was theoretically developed by Öcalan in three intertwined projects: (1) democratic republic, (2) democratic autonomy, (3) democratic confederalism. Hereby, the

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184 Ibid: 5.
Kurdish political demands were redefined and reorganized by the Kurdish movement and BDP in terms of the ideas and means. What Kurds expect from the concept of democratic republic is that fair state laws are made while the new constitution is sketched and they are literally implemented. Hence, this democratic republic context tries to dissociate the notion of democracy from nationalism and shall go back to “the early modern conception of democracy” in conjunction with citizen’s rights and equal rights for everyone. In the paper of Akkaya and Jongerden, a contradiction is underlined between the form of nationalism and a modern state. In modern thought, a modern state requires cultural homogeneity without any nationalist restraint over minorities. Otherwise, under the nationalist hegemony, the state dictates people who do not have the right cultural characteristics which are chosen between assimilation (genuine or superficial) and migration (or eviction, ethnic cleansing, or genocide). In the first years of the Republic in Turkey, democracy was adopted by the “Turkishness” concept as an integrative element among people. After that, the modernization project in cultural terms took form towards assimilation politics because of the adverse effect of Kemalism. Therefore, Öcalan demands a democratic regime based on the citizens’ rights.

To observe the Kurdish issue from different perspectives, U.S. National Intelligence Council released the “global trends” report, which leads us to speculate the balance of powers between states in the 2030. According to this report, in the 2030s, it is foreseen that in the Middle East, the Islamic Republics will not complete their democratic transition and will break out particularly in Syria, Iraq, Yemen, Libya, and the current Kurdistan region. These weak states, along with their autocratic regimes, cannot struggle with the rising sectarianism, tribalism, and ethnic discrimination in the coming future. Furthermore, the most spoken worst-case scenario is about the possibility of interstate conflict increase in the Middle East. As another dimension of intrastate conflicts, the dangerous instruments of war are extensively diversified such as cyber attacks, bioterror weaponry, and precision strike capabilities. Hereby, it will be easily accessible to small minority groups. This will alter the kind of violence and disruption, and their implementer rather than the former states.

188 The National Intelligence Council: Global Trends 2030: Alternative Worlds, Office of the Director of National
To provide a good security of the world order, the U.S. has been counted as a superpower of the world. This statement is a subject of contentious politics. Because in the international relations, the realist theory contains mostly economical and military interests of states. Explained by E. H. Carr and H. Morgenthau on the realist doctrine, states are based on self-interested structure, and aim only at maximization of their security and chances of survival.\textsuperscript{189} Hereof, the other great powers like Russia assert that the U.S. will never stop its interventionist manner over the unpowerful states especially in the Middle East. Therefore, there are several scenarios about the U.S.’s instigator position towards especially Iraq and Syria. At this point, it can be seen that the international balance of powers designate significantly the subsequent re-drawn borders regarding the intrastate conflicts in that region. Consequently, it is predicted that the borders of Kurdistan will change again with regard to ethnic and sectarian conflicts in the forthcoming decades.

Jonathan Powell was a British diplomat who is the Labour advisor on conflict resolution. He is well-known by his success of negotiations between Northern Ireland and Great Britain, ETA and Spain, nowadays also FARC and Colombia. In the current peace process, Powell was also involved in negotiations along with the head of Turkish National Intelligence service, Hakan Fidan, on the government’s behalf. For the Kurdish issue, his advices for consistent peace including 10 steps have been discussed in the socio-political platforms in the Southeastern Turkey.

In the first place, a communication channel has to be built between the two sides, and this channel should be well protected from the sabotage efforts of third-party interest groups. Secondly, a formal agreement should be signed for the start of the resolution process. Nevertheless, Öcalan’s Newroz speech can be counted as a great symbol for the beginning. For example, in 1998 Britain and IRA signed “the Good Friday Agreement” which was the beginning of an eventual solution in the subsequent nine years. Thirdly, the pride should be ignored by both the sides and NGOs should strive that the sides do not give up the agreement. Then, the sides have to rely on themselves. Fifth step, to get rid of the weapons, the government has to negotiate one-to-one with the armed wing of PKK. Sixth rule is about the segmentation risk of the rebellious group into anti-peaceable fractions. As another point, it should be considered that

external or internal factors may want to abuse the process. As Powell stated that four months after the Good Friday Agreement, an explosion took place resulting in 29 dead and 220 wounded civilians. As a similar disaster shortly after the Öcalan’s Newroz letter, three Kurdish women were mysteriously murdered in Paris. One of them Sakine Cansız was one of the founders of PKK. Powell's also states that the opposition should completely support the government’s peace policy. Then, ambition must be towards the peace process and should be insistently represented by the leaders of both. In his final remark, he says that for consistency in the process, none of the sides should feel like a winner or a loser. This is because children have grown up within violence and are still furious and rebellious against each other. Therefore, the sensibility of the next generations should not be instigated towards probable disagreements.  

In this subsection we tried to refer to different opinions and approaches from several thinkers and researchers. For conflict resolution, new points of view have been opened on our case study regarding Turkey’s Kurdish issue.

5.2 Kurdish intellectuals and their thoughts on the Kurdish issue in Turkey

Kurdish intellectuals have been mentioned in the previous chapter where our main focus was the re-formation of Kurdish intellectuals especially after 1950’s. That time, in the southeastern Anatolia, education reforms were being made and many schools and a few universities were quickly built particularly cities populated by a Kurdish majority. Speaking in Kurdish had also been utterly forbidden. Consequently, student movements and demonstrations began in 1959. Shortly after, the coup d’etat, many Kurdish intellectuals and activists were under arrest in 1960. After the coup, Kurdish people and their ideology became much more rageful and intense because of their being unfairly imprisoned and maltreated in prison. Several military interventions repeatedly took place against the communist or left wing groups and Kurds until the coup in 1980. As a result of those, Kurdish movements and the opinions of Kurdish intellectuals were separated into different political fractions.

In formation of a state or a nation, literati play a significant role by means of cultural

190 Başaran, Ezgi: Jonathan Powell'dan 10 Maddede Kalıcı Barış, The Radikal Newspaper (Turkey) 10 April 2013.
activities, literary and grammer works or their ideas on current politics in order to get the society under their influence. According to Gramsci, to provide hegemony, the only way gets through literati. This point relates to Gramsci’s hegemony approach which organizes particularly intellectuals into proletarian groups against the bourgeoisie created by capitalism. He emphasizes the significance of “cultural hegemony” which requires the working class to come to the power. Gramsci’s literati view deals with that all people have sophisticated thoughts, but they have no sufficient social functions to spread information through the education and media. For him, in a society, there are traditional literati and intellectual groups generated by every class in itself. These organic intellectuals represent opinions and experiences of different stages of society by means of cultural language.\footnote{Ransome, Paul: Antonio Gramsci: A New Introduction, Publisher Harvester Wheatsheaf (Hemel Hempstead, Hertfordshire U.K.) 1992.}

When we look at the history of the Kurds, since 4000 years in Mesopotamia and eastern Anatolia, many Kurdish thinkers have been seen on a variety of fields such as literature, science, art, philosophy, and religion. Famous historic Kurdish intellectuals include Mullah Gürani, the teacher of Mehmed the Conqueror, the pioneer of flamenco Ziryap, known as Mevlana II. Mevlana Halid, cybernetics specialist Ebu’l İz el-Cezeri el-Kurdî, spiritualists Said Nursî, Ahmedî Hani, Jerusalem conqueror Selahattin Eyyubi, El Dinaveri, Piremerd, Ahmed Arif, Dildar, Mullah Ahmedi Bate, Şeref Hanı, etc.\footnote{Altıntop, Ömer: Kürt Aydınları, My Kitap Press (Turkey) 2011.}

In the 20th century, tens of Kurdish artists contributed to the development of the Kurdish movement by means of literature, musical composition, movies etc. regarding the Kurdish question in Turkey. Firstly, Abdullah Öcalan is excluded from this following list as a co-founder and leader of PKK, since he has a more political identity than a cultural identity to be a component of the Kurdish intellectuals. In the recent past, many Kurdish artists especially Musa Anter (writer, poet, journalist), Yılmaz Güney (actor and director awarded by Cannes), and Ahmet Kaya (song composer and singer) gave lots of pieces to the Kurdish culture and its art. In the present day, Ismail Beşikçi who is a sociologist and an author known as one the of thinkers on Kurdish politics. The 21st century’s Kurdish intellectuals include Yaşar Kemal (literary author), Mehmed Uzun (author), Tarık Ziya Ekinci (writer, politician), Kemal Burkay (writer and politician, head of HAK-PAR from center-left), Orhan Miroğlu (journalist and writer against
PKK), Ibrahim Güçlü (writer and politician leader of Rizgari movement and founder of HAK-PAR), Muhsin Kızılkaya (writer, journalist, translator), Altan Tan (writer and politician), Suzan Samancı (poet, writer), Mehmet Bayrak (originally Turkish; researcher, writer), and Şeyhmus Dağtekin (poet, author). Additionally Kurdish dengbêjs/bards include Şakiro, Karabete Xaco, Evdâlê Zeynikê, Mehmet Arif Cizrawi, Şîvan Perwer.

Although their mother language remained banned for almost 63 years, this cultural and artistic constellation is a simple indicator of how the Kurdish issue has inherited until the present day. These Kurdish artists could not produce their work in their mother tongue. All movies and songs except dengbêj’s music were in Turkish. For example, the theme of Yılmaz Güney’s awarded movie “Yol” (the Road, 1981) is about imprisoned Kurds who took short leave to their homelands during the marital law time of 1980 coup. This movie shows that being a Kurd or leftist was enough to be charged for membership to an illegal organization or a political party in those years. It was probably inspired by a true story that showed to the whole world and the rest of Turkey the restraint and cruel treatment on the Kurds at that time.

Until the last decade, no one was allowed to talk about the coup history of Turkey in visual and written art. In 2012, the Commission for Coup Research was founded by the Turkish Assembly (TBMM). This can be counted as the beginning of justice. Because this enterprise assures to enlighten many unsolved murders particularly among Kurds such as Musa Anter (suspect: JITEM) in Diyarbakır in 1992. Moreover, from 1980s to 1999 lots of Kurdish authors were imprisoned due to supporting PKK as a result of their writings about the rights and the struggle of the Kurds.

Mehmed Uzun addresses development of the Kurdish literature in parallel with the history of Turkey’s Kurdish issue. He writes that after the War of Independence (1923) many Kurds were systematically assimilated under the isolated state against the external world. Everything about the Kurdish language, its literature and culture were exterminated, and aforementioned prohibitions on their mother language have lasted too long especially in the public. However, some Kurdish intellectuals fled to Syria, where they continued to publish journals such as HAWAR (1932-1943), and RONAHI, led by Celadet Ali Bedirhan (1893-1951) who is the first modern Kurdish linguist, poet and author, and announced significant measures to
protect the culture and literature of the Kurdish language.\textsuperscript{193}

In his another piece, Uzun deals with the relationships between Turkish and Kurdish intellectuals. According to him, Kurdish intellectuals had mostly “Ottomanism” identity until the collapse of Ottoman Empire. That time, Kurds were also feeling themselves as an Ottoman. After the breakup of Ottoman, a group of Kurds wanted to gain their portion from the crumbling state. On the other hand, a group of Kurdish intellectuals struggled to revive the identity of Ottoman and supported to obtain rights of Kurds under the Ottoman unity. At that time, the relations of many Kurds with Turkish intellectuals and with each actor of the society were very collaborative. After a while Kurds had nothing to do anymore with the extreme nationalist Turkish groups (like İttihat ve Terakki-Committee of Union and Progress), but sustained their intense relations to Armenians and Circassians. Those years, Kurdish intellectuals published lots of articles regarding the Armenian massacre in their journals. Moreover, Uzun states that Kurdish intellectuals see M. Kemal (Atatürk) and his party as a continuation of Committee of Union and Progress. Because M. Kemal did not keep the promise he gave to Kurds in the Treaty of Lausanne (1923). In the first years of the republic, Kurds were seen as a distinct ethnic group by the government. Solutions for giving the Kurds their right were discussed by that government through international and domestic popular opinions. However, after 1924, Atatürk altered his Kurdish policy into a more assimilative one. Thus, Kurdish rebellions and revolts started all around the Turkey. Here, the question in why M. Kemal changed his Kurdish policy from recognition towards assimilation. According to Uzun, Atatürk followed a pragmatic policy that essentially from the beginning aimed only to build a nation-state. Since that time the Kurdish problem was diagnosed inaccurately, and therefore today it is discussed as a more complex problem.\textsuperscript{194}

In the first quarter of 20th century, the press, associations, and clubs founded by Kurdish intellectuals aimed to save the Kurdish language and culture from getting extinct by means of national education, and develop the Kurdish national consciousness. This purpose was parallel to the political requirements of that time. For example, shortly after the World War I (WWI) Fourteen Points were announced to the whole world by the United States President Woodrow Wilson. The 12th principle was suggesting self-determination for the ethnicities of the Ottoman

\textsuperscript{193} Uzun, Mehmed: Kürt Edebiyatına Giriş, Ithaki Press (Turkey) 1992, 79.
\textsuperscript{194} Uzun, Mehmed: Bir Dil Yaratmak, Ithaki Press (Turkey) 1997), 299.
Empire however, the government of that time did not grant an autonomous state for Kurds in Turkey.

5.3 Current resolution process and “The Wise Men Commission”

The first planned program for resolution of the Kurdish question, called “the Kurdish expansion”, was stated by the ruling party AKP as Turkey’s 60th government in 2009. This expansion initiated the most extensive enterprise for solving the Kurdish issue since Turkey was founded. The first trial for expansion has been made in Oslo, where the Turkish state was represented by some National Intelligence Organization (MIT) officials and the Kurdish side by a senior manager of KCK. Some neutral representatives also joined as observers and coordinators. This attempt has been failed unexpectedly because of the controversies between the sides. In early 2013, a new session on the Kurdish issue has been started while the conflicts between PKK and Turkish military became critically strained. Afterwards, imprisoned PKK members started hunger strikes as a reaction to the efforts for blocking the Kurdish freedom movement.

Firstly, MIT restarted negotiating with Abdullah Öcalan. Then, a committee was constituted by three deputies from BDP (Peace and Democracy Party), who were permitted by the Ministry of Justice to interview with Abdullah Öcalan, who is imprisoned in the Imralı Island. Before that, Abdullah Öcalan was not allowed to see anyone except his brother. After a couple of meetings between BDP deputies and Öcalan, that committee mediated to deliver Öcalan’s messages to Qandil and to KCK’s executives in the Europe. During the last Newroz festival on 21st March in 2013 in Diyarbakır, Sırrı Süreyya Önder, a member of parliament from BDP and also a member of the interview committee, read the letter written by Abdullah Öcalan to Kurdish people. It was a historic moment in the squares of Diyarbakır where thousands of people celebrated the vernal equinox in other words “nawruz”. As mentioned in the previous chapter, Apo’s message included that briefly Kurds and Turks lived together in the same land for

a long time and fought together against the same enemies. Thus, two nations cannot be separated from each other, but peace should immediately be brought to this land through democratic innovations. Abdullah Öcalan also wanted from PKK to take initiative within this intended peace process.

After Öcalan’s Newroz letter, the chairman of KCK’s executive council M. Karayilan made a statement to the media that PKK ceased fire as the first step of this new process. Although some contrary opinions appeared within the organization such as a high-ranking commander F. Hüseyin, PKK and European council of KCK gave utter support to Öcalan’s call for consistent peace. Meanwhile, the opposition parties in the parliament have been against the AKP’s Kurdish solution process. Shortly after the call for peace, three members of PKK were mysteriously murdered in an office of a Kurdish association in Paris. They were three women preparing to leave to Germany. One of them was Sakine Cansız who was the co-founder of PKK together with Öcalan. Later on, the French government could not find any organizational link or person in charge regarding those murders. But it remained an appalling defiance for Abdullah Öcalan and Turkish government about the ongoing peace process. These murders that took place a short while after the cease-fire declaration of PKK showed that both external and internal threats played an active role in the peace process. After the subsequent negotiations at Imrali, Apo sent a letter to the public via BPD, where he asked PKK to withdraw the guerillas out of the Turkish boundaries. Afterwards, M. Karayilan made a press declaration where both mainstream Turkish and international press were present. Here, the claims of both sides have been listed as clear action points, as Apo suggested in his letters. These action points included the withdrawal of PKK out of Turkey starting from 8th May 2013, the Turkish government’s making the legal arrangements for the Kurds to gain their democratic rights, such as education in their mother tongue, and finally Öcalan’s being released. Based on which of these claims are satisfied in the progress, PKK declared to decide for a permanent cease-fire.

While the withdrawal period has been intensively debated in the public, the government established the “Wise Men Committee (Akıl Adamlar Heyeti)”, which consisted of several artists, journalists, academicians, scholars, actors, directors, singers, columnists, union and institution heads, etc. belonging to diverse world views. The 63 candidates in the list were offered to volunteer the task. The committee consisted of nine people per each of the seven geographic regions. The committee members visited all cities in the region of their responsibility,
and discussed the solution process planned by AKP with the public and trade bodies.

Three days after the withdrawal of the PKK started, two vehicles loaded with bombs have been exploded in Reyhanlı, a town at the Syrian border of Turkey, causing 53 deaths. The Turkish government who supported in the beginning, along with its western allies, the Syrian opposition in the civil war has been severely criticized by the public about not taking all the necessary precautions against terrorist attacks. In the following days, people against the government started to gather for public demonstrations and protests. The intensely furious reaction of the public dragged Turkey into a political tension. It is the author’s belief that the connections between murders and terrorist attacked on the public will be enlightened with clearer evidence as the negotiations with PKK fast proceed.

The idea of PKK’s withdrawal has been discussed among the public in the finest detail. It has been severely opposed and protested especially by the nationalist Turks, and several other fractions. The opposition parties in the assembly, CHP and MHP, have been disturbed by this big problem starting to be solved by their rivals, AKP. The first group of PKK has completed their withdrawal. Then HDK gathered while the tension in the country was very high. The 11th article accepted by HDK caused a reaction on the Turkish government’s side. After this stage, BDP and KCK expect a step from the government. This step could be a constitutional reform allowing the Kurds to have education in their mother tongue, legal protection of their identity, reducing the election threshold from %10, release of detainees (especially journalists) accused of PKK-KCK membership, improving the imprisonment circumstances of Abdullah Öcalan, who stays in an F-type prison with considerable restrictions. Moreover, MPs of BDP want to discuss federalism/confederalism during the constitutional restoration. Since 2011, Turkish government has put the presidential model, as opposed to the current parliamentary system, into discussion as a new government system. First, it needs to be known that this proposed presidential model does not mean to constitute a federal republic, but determines more acutely the principle of the divisions of power. On the other hand, a federal structure can also be debatable separately from this presidential discussions. In this presidential model, the government, led by the president, has a stronger executive power. The Turkish government will conduct further to solve inequalities on Kurds by a new constitution change in the peace process.
6 Summary and Conclusion

Ethnic uprisings, riots, ethnic discriminations, ethnic conflicts, exclusion of minorities by majorities made the question of minority rights a central topic of discussion. In the first quarter of the 21st century, we see examples of intolerance against the “other” at dangerous degrees in the developing countries. Civil wars taking place in Syria, Iraq, Afghanistan, and Northern and Middle Africa are unfortunate examples of the nation-state’s tyranny against minorities. Societies are manipulated by means of mass media such as TV, news, and social media. They can easily be converted to puppets of several interest groups. To this end, especially nation-states are supposed to fulfil their responsibilities to solve their minority issues, considering the possible severe consequences.

In this thesis, we investigated concepts such as ethnicity, ethnic identity, ethnic group, nation, nationalism, ethno-nationalism, nation-building, and state-building in detail. We emphasized violence with special focus on collective violence. As a research question, we attempted to understand the connections between political collective violence of minorities and nation-building utopia concepts in the theoretical basis, while regarding the practical applications. From the definitions of ethnicity and nation, we can come up with the following common conclusion. Regarding the etymological roots, ethnicity (ethnicus or ethnikas in Latin) has a meaning very similar to nation. As in the definition of nation, ethnicity is called a group consisting of people having common traditions, customs, historical experiences, and possibly living in the same geographical residence. According to Smith, the common attributes of people belonging to the same ethnic identity include common cultural heritage, common language and dialect, coming from a common ancestor, and being a part of a common ideological group.

As B. Anderson states, nation is an imagined political community. We think that his community is imagined as both an inherent and a sovereign entity. Hence, to be a nation, it is not necessary to be genetically related. A person can feel herself as a part of a nation. For instance, a football player coming from Turkish parents in both sides could represent Germany in olympic games. As detailed under the title of “Nation-building”, for an individual to gain the consciousness of a nationality, tools such as education and media could play a larger role than
genetic roots. The commonalities between ethnicity and nation reveal that these concepts are content-wise the same, but they are named differently in the political system. The main difference between these two concepts is that, a nation has a state, while an ethnicity does not. Here, the state is seen as a key factor to build a nation, but there is also lasting controversy on the priority line whether the notion of state or the notion of nation is initially founded. In our inference, the rise of a nation may take place earlier than the state formation. Eventually, all states could be constituted by their powerful nations who were naturally selected in history by territorial wars, educational developments, and demographic features. Another intensive controversy is going on about the future of the nation-states. In this context, we agree with J. Habermas who states that negotiations of nation-states or as in old system agreements or decisions among sovereign states (i.e. U.N.'s Security Council or Allied Powers in the WWI) are insufficient in practice without a sanction power especially along with the progress of globalization. These supranational structures cannot cope with current worldwide issues in terms of the political and judicial rights. Therefore, supra-state organization models have come out in Europe, North America and Asia as the substructure of the United Nations which in present day work inefficiently against long-lasting wars and war crimes. Habermas quotes from Hegel who refers that every historical construction is obliged to vanish, after it is matured.197 The theory of the end of nation-states indicates that confederate structures begin to revive with their ex-souls which can eventually be a resolution model for the conflicts in modern states.

At this point, in order to understand the ideas centered on ethnicity and nation, it is worthwhile to take a look at the related doctrines. We see the effects of nationalism after 18th century, after American and French revolutions. According to W. Connor, nationalism is not an ideology of a state, but it is an ideology of a nation. As mentioned previously, the idea of “being a nation” separates the people in the world into different nations, each of which assumes superiority to all others. For this, a nation strives for its freedom and security. When we look at the “ethno-nationalism”, which is a subsection of “nationalism”, as Eriksen outlines; since 1990 ethnic group issues have been the most popular subject in the news. These popular ethno-nationalist groups include Kurds, Palestinians and Sri Lankan Tamils etc. The leaders of these groups aim to build a nation-state where people from their own ethnicity are the

dominating community. The reason for these ethnic groups to incline to ethno-nationalist ideas is that they are kept out of the economic and educational system of the nation-state they live in. Consequently, these ethnic groups are usually under-educated and poor people who are out of the socio-cultural center. These groups are mostly named as “nationless states”. Ethno-nationalist groups struggle for their freedom or independence, due to the very nature of nationalism. However, when these groups are ignored by the state, they usually resort to violence. What lies at the roots of radical separatism is a suppressed, excluded, and ignored ethnicity. In the previous chapters of this study, we talked about the types and causes of violence. Ethnic groups could come together around an ideology, and could take violent actions towards the public or directly towards the target of interest. We name this type of violence as “collective violence”. On the other hand, there exist minorities who gained their rights without resorting to violence, such as Québec of Canada, and India’s independence from the UK under Gandhi’s leadership. According to the international relations terminology, ethnic groups may exist under another sovereign nation-state under the “minority” status. However, the concept “minority” does not have a sufficiently clear definition in the UN documents. Hence, it can be said that the future of the ethnicities under nation-states is left to their own faith, considering the defects in the existing laws and agreements. As M. Harris mentions, nation-states followed various policies against ethnic minorities including assimilation, exclusion (exile, torture, etc.), and accommodation (i.e. non-core groups are allowed to have certain separate institutions such as schools, churches, cultural association, etc.). In the middle of the 19th century, states faced the “self-determination” policies and attempted to assimilate the minorities to protect their borders.

In today’s world, the dominating ethnicity of a nation-state is called a “nation” and the other minorities are called “ethnicities”. Nations consist of strong groups who have been able to gain a region of sovereignty. The others known as ethnicities are the ones that have been ruled by another more dominant state, who are population-wise minority, and politically more passive. We have passed the age when the ethnic minorities were informed about the world as much as the central authorities allowed. In today’s age of information, communication media are developed. Poorly educated, ignorant, and poor minorities are replaced by well-education ones with a sense of interpretation and who look for their rights using legal mechanisms. It is possible to organize demonstrations using social networking sites such as facebook and twitter.
Following the theoretical concepts, when we look at the Kurdish question in Turkey, we see that the political struggle of Kurds evolved from demanding an independent nation-state, to fundamental rights and freedoms. Öcalan, the only leader of PKK and the freedom-demanding Kurds, expresses that the nation-state is an old-fashioned model. According to Öcalan, nation-states that are built after World War I by the great western powers of the time according to their interests, in a shape that would cause ethnic conflicts and chaos in the multi-cultural regions, such as the Middle East. Kurds do not demand an independent nation-state in the near future. All Kurdish initiatives and BDP (or HDP: People's Democratic Party) members of parliament gathered in the HDK congress in June 2013. The decisions of this congress include rights for Kurds, being a federal state, and freedom for Öcalan. From these decisions, it is possible to expect from Kurds to take concrete steps towards autonomy. However, in this congress the matter of self-determination was also discussed and taken as a positive decision. It means that this process may also go against the common willpower between Öcalan and Turkish government.

Moreover, it can be counted as an inconvenient decision by the Turkish government. Therefore, this peace process can run into a stone wall similarly to how Oslo negotiations stopped in 2011 because of the bilateral contentious politics. First, a new development plan regarding education and economy will be executed. Then, the destiny of the Kurds will be shaped by a referendum. It does not look possible to predict the future in Turkey by looking at the state models that have solved the minority problems by letting the violence stop. However, to provide an eventual peace, it primarily requires that Kurds obtain to live freely their cultures in the society. Then, they may demand to be autonomous state that remains dependent on Turkey.

Given the analyses above, it can also be stated that violent and armed groups coming from ethnic minorities revolted against threats intended destruction of Kurdishness. We can say that this uprising excludes all the organs of a nation-state, and resorts to all possible ways including violence. To this end, PKK struggled with a suppressive uninational state, following a revolutionist, freedomist ideology in order to develop a “national consciousness”. Although resorting to violence to struggle for fundamental rights has been repetitively used by minorities in the past, it cannot be introduced as a legitimate way of solving problems. However, violence should not be resorted by people who were aggrieved by restraint of the majority. On the other
hand, assimilation, suppression of uprisings using overdose violence, resetting the memories can also never be legitimized. Replying the violence with violence ends up with being oppressed and downtrodden. In today’s world, violation of human rights is penalized internationally. Penalizing people responsible of violence should be collectively supported by the entire community. It will be the ideas that will be fighting in the near future.
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Appendix

Survey

This is a survey about a research study in political science and does not have any relation to your personal identity by any means. Your identity will not be recorded and your answers will be anonymized during analysis. Thank you for your co-operation.

– Gender: ( ) male ( ) female
– Age: ........................................
– Birthplace: ............................................................
– Citizenship: ............................................................................................................................
– Occupation: ..........................................................................................................................
– Education: ( ) primary school ( ) secondary school ( ) high school ( ) university ( ) doctorate

Questions

1 How do you identify yourself?
( ) by ethnic identity ( ) by national identity ( ) other:
.................................................................................................................................

2 What is your ethnicity?
.......................................................................................................................................

3 What is your mother tongue?
.......................................................................................................................................

4 What is the ethnic origin of your family?
........................................................................................................................................
5 Where is your hometown?

6 Why are you living in Vienna? (You can tick one or more than one of the choices below from 6th to 11th questions.)

- because of family re-union
- because of better education chances
- because of political issues
- other: .......................................................... ........................................... ...........................................

7 What do you think the Turkey's Kurdish movement is based on:

- nationalist purpose
- socialist purpose
- both
- other: ..........................................................................................................................

8 Which one do you think is the most effective way for a minority group to gain their rights?

- massive demonstrations
- violence acts
- civil disobedience
- other: ..........................................................................................................................

9 How do you describe the main demands of the Kurds in Turkey involved in the Kurdish issue?

- education in their mother tongue
- an authonomous Kurdish region
- state government in a federal system
- an independent Kurdish nation-state
- other: .......................................................... 

10 Which action do you think the Kurdish armed forces (PKK) should take:

- they are right on their struggle, they should keep their current strategy
- they should avoid targeting civilians, but keep on attacking the Turkish soldiers
- they should cease fire
- other: 

- ..........................................................................................................................
11 What do you think of the role of violence in the solution of Kurdish issue:

( ) is the only way

( ) caused by bilateral conflict/respondent attacks

( ) is the last resort

( ) caused by respondent attacks

( ) none

12 What is your opinion about PKK’s future?

13 Could you express your opinion about the current situation of the Kurdish issue in Turkey?
Abstract

In this thesis, we study ethnic minorities and their links to violence. Our research question includes what kind of connection could be made between collective violence and nation-state utopia of minorities. As a case study, PKK (Kurdistan Workers' Party) is analyzed from its foundation to the current position particularly between 1980 and 2013. We initially focus on the wide definitions of 'ethnicity' and 'nation'. The ideological reflections of these terms on 'nationalism' and 'ethno-nationalism' are next taken into consideration. These notions are investigated under the theme of minorities which are also dealt in detail along with the ethno-nationalist movements of minorities in a nation-state. Under the same context, the differences between nation-building and state-building processes are discussed in terms of minorities. The second theoretical basis is collective violence, particularly, ethnic violence, and ethno-political conflicts. In this part, example conflicts between illegal groups consisting of ethnic violence and nation-state are studied. Lastly, the theory of conflict resolution is mentioned from the perspective of international relations.

As a case study, the history of PKK and the Kurdish issue are addressed. Firstly, the ideology of PKK is described from the past to the present day. The settlement of PKK in the Middle East and their financial network in the Europe are described. Then, the resolution methods of the Turkish governments are chronologically analyzed. In this case study, a questionnaire was applied to subjects who live in Austria as a political supporter or sympathiser of PKK's ideology. This survey reveals several aspects on their self identification (i.e. ethnic or national emphasis), their opinion about the Kurdish question in Turkey, and their ideological approaches regarding the Kurdish movement. Moreover, a review is made on the PKK-Turkey conflict from a transnational perspective. Also the opinions of the Kurdish intellectuals on the development of the Kurdish language and culture are listed. Finally, the progress of the resolution process by 2013 is mentioned, such as “the Wise Men Commission” who explored the cities in Turkey and lobbied in favor of the resolution policies of the Turkish government.
Abstrakt


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