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„The Global War on Terrorism: the new macrosecuritisation? A case study on European Security Identity“

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i. Acronyms

CS      Copenhagen School
CFSP    Common Foreign and Security Policy
IR      International Relations
RSC     Regional Security Complex
GWoT    Global War on Terrorism

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1. Introduction

1.1. Research interest and research question

The 21st century was rung in by the truly devastating events of 9/11, when one airplane hit the pentagon and other two hit the World Trade Centre in New York City, bringing on the emergence of a new risk to international peace and security, international terrorism. Even though a century-old phenomenon, it was not until 9/11 that terrorism was conceived of as a global threat. In the aftermath of the attacks, the US government declared the War on Terrorism and rallied most Western Nations and entities, including the European Union, to their cause. The US administration repeatedly emphasised that this attack was not merely directed against the country and its citizenry, but jeopardized Western values such as democracy and freedom. As such, terrorism is a global concern, which had immediate repercussions on the framing of the international arena in the aftermath of 9/11.

For one, declaring an international war on a heterogeneous concept realized by what can be best summed up as a non-state actor highlights an interesting shift from the conventional paradigm of interstate warfare. Furthermore, in order to adequately and effectively counter international terrorism and its ambivalent nature in the era of globalization a distinct and novel set of mechanisms and policies is required. These measures however extend well beyond the scope of purely military responses. In order to tackle the problem comprehensively, security considerations have pervasively infiltrated areas traditionally not associated with the issue of terrorism.

The purpose of this thesis is to examine the impact of the Global War on Terrorism. In particular, it shall be analysed how this impact has incrementally appropriated new spheres in the name of security and how this has affected the European Union's concept of security.

By using the theoretical framework of the Copenhagen School, I endeavour to find an appropriate tool for answering questions relating to the issue of security in the context of international relations. Their philosophy of sciences is composed of two elements. On the one hand it uses assumptions of the neo-Realist School which defines the international system as
anarchic in the absence of an overarching government. This is combined with a constructivist take on security aiming to decode the mechanisms involved in the construction of threats.

This approach offers an insight into both the process of how specific threats become security concerns and, through applying it to various unit levels, system-wide trends and developments in this regard.

My analytical focus lies on the changes in European Union security concept in the period between the 1970s and 2014. From the framework presented above, I deduce the following central question that shall guide my thesis:

Central question:

- To what extent did the Global War on Terrorism, as declared by George Bush jr, affect the security identity of the European Union?

Sub-questions:

- Out of the above presented theoretical framework, does the Global War on Terrorism fulfil the necessary requirement to become a long-lasting macrosecuritisation from the perspective of the Copenhagen School?

- Did the European member states become incrementally security-interdependent since and as a consequence of 9/11?
1.2. Structure of the Thesis

The thesis consists of two sections – an abstract and an empirical part.

The abstract chapter, focusing on the theoretical foundations of the Copenhagen School, will present general ideas and tools of this security concept, such as the concept of securitisation, security sectors, regional security complexes and macrosecuritisation. This might appear extensive at first, but is necessary to understand all the practical implications of macrosecuritisation.

Secondly, the empirical chapter will explore, in light of this theoretical framework, how the formation and consolidation of a European Union’s security identity was augmented by two factors, namely the European integration process and terrorist attacks. In particular, this chapter will examine the appropriation of new sectors, the dynamics of counter-terrorism policies as well as challenges in the European Union security discourse.

Finally, I will recapitulate the most important findings and make an assessment on the European security identity – what it is and where it is going.
2. Theoretical reflections

This part of the thesis is going to introduce the Copenhagen School as a theoretical lens to Security Studies and present a comprehensive tool kit for analysing developments on an empirical level (see chapter 3).

2.1. Orientation in International Relations

Many debates about International Relations are concerned with the history and philosophy of social sciences in general. The comprehensive set-up of individual meta-theories, consisting of ontology, epistemology and methodology, permit social sciences to analyse circumstances, including that of science itself. “(O)ntology in terms of seeing different object domains, epistemologically in terms of accepting or rejecting particular knowledge claims, and methodologically in terms of choosing particular methods of study” (Kurki et al. 2013, 15).

These elements enable scholars to articulate perceptions of reality, with a certain predetermined outcome-range (Kurki et al. 2013, 25 ss.).

Reflections on the philosophy of international affairs are century old. Amongst others, they can be traced back to contributions of Thucydides, Aristotle, Machiavelli, Grotius, Hobbes, Kant (ten Brink, 2008, 50ss.). However it was not until the end of World War II that a discipline formed around interstate relationships which led to the formation of International Relations as a discipline (Kurki et al. 2013, 16).

The first debate developed around Idealism and Realism. Both academic Schools agree that the international environment is anarchically organized. This means, that there is no superior authority to regulate interests. Therefore, states must take charge of their own security concerns. However, the question on who is responsible for these security concerns is contested differently by Idealism and Realism.

1 Other key issues that IR tries to analyse include the agent-structure problem, also examined by Marx. Marx, who in this context states that “(m)en make their own history, but they do not make it just as they please; they do not make it under conditions chosen by themselves” (Marx 1962 cited in Wight 2013, 24).
The second debate was dominated by Behaviourism and Positivism. They assume that “scientific knowledge emerges only with the collection of observable data [which] would in turn allow the formulation of laws” (Kurki et al. 2013, 18). Behaviourists rejected the concepts of the first debate, because they said it to be a mere accumulation of subjectively collected knowledge² (Kurki et al. 2013, 18).

The third debate, also called the interparadigm debate, emerged in the 1970s and turned the debate away from the “methodological issues of the 1960s. The question of science was not an explicit component of this debate because to a large extent a consensus had emerged around a commitment to positivism” (Kurki et al. 2013, 19). This debate got heated after Thomas Kuhn published his study on “The Structure of Scientific Revolutions” in which he discusses phases of scientific evolution (Kuhn 1970 [1963]). He argues that in the revolutionary phase, advocates of a theory focus on establishing dominance (Kuhn 1970 [1963], 92). The revolutionary phase is followed by normal science. At this point, theoretical dominance has already been established, therefore, knowledge can advance, given that there is an accepted basis of “agreed methods and techniques” (Kurki et al. 2013, 19) to fall back on. Around the time Kuhn published his study, three major paradigms dominated the debate; “realism, Marxism, and pluralism” (Kurki et al. 2013, 19). Given the diverging scopes that different paradigms take into account, Kuhn concluded, that “paradigms were incommensurable; they simply could not be compared. Theory choice became largely a matter of aesthetics” (Kurki et al. 2013, 19).

The fourth debate has its focus on the fundamental divisions between the discipline, namely between explaining and understanding. While “explanatory theorist reduces the ontological complexity of the social world to those aspects of it that can be observed and measured. (...) Explanatory theorists privilege (...) unobservable, and hence immeasurable, contexts of action” (Kurki et al. 2013, 20s.). (Hollis et al. 1990)

² These viewpoints were challenged by Hans Morgenthau, scholar of classical realism and Hedley Bull, scholar of the English school, who argued that International Relations were unreducible to statistical models. “Study of IR for Bull and Morgenthau involved significant conceptual and interpretative judgements” (Kurki et al. 2013, 18).
2.2. Security Studies as part of International Relations

Security studies as one sub-discipline of International Relations comprises a number of different theoretical approaches\(^3\) to and analytical angles on the question of security. Ever since the end of World War II four fundamental questions have accompanied the development of International Security Studies. These questions enable the reader to interpret the evolution of Security Studies and elaborate viewpoints on how to define international security (Buzan et al. 2009 a, 10 ss.). As Buzan et al. (2009a) concluded, different Schools will shed light on different normative and political decisions that are involved in the process of defining security. According to them, at its core,

“security is always a “hyphenated concept” and always tied to a particular referent object, to internal/external locations, to one or more sectors and to a particular way of thinking about politics” (Buzan et al. 2009 a, 10).

Notwithstanding the differences in approach, each theoretical School will try to find answers to the following questions:

- Firstly, should the state enjoy a privileged status as a referent object? The underlining question revolves around security and something that requires securing. They may be the nation, religious groups or individuals.

- Secondly, should internal and external threats be included into the security concept? This question tries to understand the relation of threats and territory.

- Thirdly, is security reducible to military threats alone or can threats derive from other areas such as the environment, economics, society and politics?

- At last, is security “as inextricably tied to a dynamic of threats, dangers and urgency?” (Buzan et al. 2009 a, 10ss.)

\(^3\) For a comprehensive overview of the evolution of security studies, see Waever 2004.
Furthermore, geographical location has had a marked impact on the development and evolution of security theories. “One example is the “grand debate” in IR about rationalism and constructivism, where clearly constructivists and reflectivists have an easier time in Europe than in the US, and hard core rational choice is far more influential in the US than in Europe (...)” (Waever 2004, 3). These differences stem from different regional scientific and philosophical traditions which evolved in the course of the last century (Waever 2004, 3 ss.).

2.3. Copenhagen School

The Copenhagen School developed in response to the changing landscape of global and international politics. Rung in by the end of the Cold War and the European Integration Process, the Copenhagen Peace Research Institute (COPRI) was established in 1985, endeavouring to develop more flexible concepts of peace and security given the gradual global shift away from the classical state-centred concept of security towards a more inclusive, cross-sector model. This shift was mainly the product of a

“(…) mixture of civil war, ethnic strife, organised crime and (trans)national terrorism [which] could no longer be treated as purely local or domestic phenomena, but started to be linked with and, indeed, compete with the classical form of inter-state war” (Guzzini et al. 2004, 1).

The main focus of the Copenhagen School lies on the so-called process of securitisation. This process is established through a discursive practice, “where by saying something, something is being done” (Floyd 2010, 11). Such speech acts in turn influence the different layers making up the international community at the micro-, meso- and macro-level, thus establishing security complexes and security sectors.

The Copenhagen School suggests an eclectic framework that combines neo-Realist elements and combines it with a constructivism to examine speech-acts.
Aspects of Structural Realism

Relying on neo-Realist elements, the Copenhagen School assumes the international arena to be anarchic. This postulate is widely discussed by many Neo-Realist, sometimes also referred to as structural Realists. Kenneth Waltz, an advocate of defensive realism argues that certain states are more prone to use violence than others, which is why all states must necessarily be prepared to retaliate at all times. “Among states, the state of nature is a state of war” (Waltz 1979, 102). This, so Waltz, does not mean that war is omnipresent, but rather that across various units including the family, communities as well as at the global level, the absence of a Leviathan or “the absence of government, is associated with the occurrence of violence” (Waltz 1979, 102). Defensive realists like Kenneth Waltz argue that states are not wise to acquire too much power, because this would lead them to be in constant battle with other actors in the international field. On the other hand offensive realists like John Mearsheimer, claim that power is a strategic tool that is a “means to an end and the ultimate end is survival” (Mearsheimer 2013, 78).

One way to guarantee the survival of a unit, is to maximise its power, which is accomplished through acquisition of territory, expansion of population, but also increasing economic and military strength. In a similar vein, the Copenhagen School presumes that not every unit is sufficiently able to maximize power and/or capabilities to initiate securitisations. Thus, securitisations can only be initiated by actors possessing adequate capabilities and/or power (Waltz 1979, 130ss.; Mirtl 2012, 15ss.).

The international systems’ set-up contributes greatly to the fact that states go to war. If one state acquires too much capabilities, other actors might feel threatened, which in consequence decreases the cooperation and therefore the trust level. The amount of great powers, in the international arena this is referred to as polarity, will affect the war-proneness of the system. In particular, many scholars have asked the question whether “bipolarity (two great powers) is more or less war-prone than multipolarity (three or more great powers)” (Mearsheimer 2013, 84). Those scholars arguing that two great powers are less likely to go to war with each other emphasize on the following aspects. Firstly, bipolarity offers fewer conflict points because there are fewer great powers involved. Secondly, there is a significantly higher possibility that the distribution of wealth and power is more balanced in bipolarity. In multipolarity the
population, military capabilities and wealth will be distributed among three or more great powers which leaves more room for an imbalance of power. “Furthermore, it is possible in a multipolar system for two or more great powers to gang up on a third great power. Such behaviour is impossible, by definition, in bipolarity” (Mearsheimer 2013, 85). Thirdly, the assessment of threats in a bipolar system is clearer because of the amount of great powers involved.

Those scholars who disagree with the assumption that bipolarity facilitates peace argue that “deterrence is much easier in multipolarity, because that are more states that can join together to confront an especially aggressive state with overwhelming force” (Mearsheimer 2013, 85). Therefore, the balancing act allows the formation of alliances which in turn will contribute to a more peaceful environment. Furthermore, in a multipolar system, great powers will spread their attention equally to other powers. Hence, it is argued, that there is a lower chance for escalation.

In the context of the international system, there is one category, which has not yet been mentioned - unipolarity. Structural realists argue that unipolarity is the most peaceful of the three polarities. Given the fact that in unipolarity there is only one great power, there is no

“security competition nor war between great powers (...). Furthermore, the minor powers are likely to go out of their way to avoid fighting the sole pole. Think about the western hemisphere, where the USA clearly enjoys hegemony” (Mearsheimer 2013, 86).

In this context, states will refrain from starting conflicts, because they fear from suffering a defeat. This is particularly true in areas where the USA is hegemonically dominant (Mearsheimer 2013, 86).

The above mentioned assumptions have been heavily contested by Classical Realists. They believe that Structural Realism “is a parody of science” (Lebow 2013, 5) within which Realism has hit rock bottom. It fails to address the complex nature of societies that are made up of “appreciation of agency and understanding that power is most readily transformed into influence when it is both marked and embedded in a generally accepted system of norms” (Lebow 2013, 59). By reducing the international dynamics to survival in light of anarchy, Neorealism fails to see the true nature of power and interest. Therefore, it is incapable to
address change, justice, transformation, order, stability and communities from any other perspective than survival in light of anarchy (Lebow 2013, 59s.).

Mearsheimer has admitted in an interview that structural realism is limited in addressing questions that fall outside the state centric focus (Kriesler 2002, 1s.). This becomes more evident when analysing contemporary situations, such as the Global War on Terrorism. In this context he says the following:

“[A]l Qaeda is not a state, it's a non-state actor, which is sometimes called a transnational actor. (...) all Realist theories don't have much to say about transnational actors” (Kriesler 2002, 1s.).

However, he addresses the problem by arguing that contemporary developments will be played out by and within states.

**Aspects of Constructivism**

In light of the changing international landscape, it becomes useful to widen the scope of analysis and include other interactions as well. Especially since the end of the Cold War, many identities have been transformed, thus changed the way interactions are played out.

Constructivism moves its approach away from clearly defined objects. Instead, it focuses on circumstances that emerge from historic and cultural developments. They determine how realities are constructed by social agents. Therefore, to “construct something is an act which brings into being a subject or object that otherwise would not exist” (Fierke 2013, 188). They can include the construction of objects, e.g. processing wood to become a chair. However, the construction of norms, values and ideas are subject to the same constructive process. Their set-up will depend on the social context, dimension of the subject and interaction with other social agents. This approach allows application on all unit-levels. Therefore, in the process of interactions between social agents, choices are made that result in “historically, culturally, and politically distinct ‘realities’” (Fierke 2013, 189). This influences the identity of the agents involved and thus affects how relationships are constituted in the process of an interaction (Fierke 2013, 199).
The Copenhagen School coupled the neorealist framework with the constructivist approach which is sensitive to dynamics and a multitude of actors. Thus, it offers a unique insight to security. The Copenhagen School provides scholars with a toolbox that allows them to analyse “each element of what he considers to be the security package one by one in order to arrive at a more informed conclusion” (Stone 2009, 2).

2.3.1. Defining security

Berry Buzan, author of “People, States and Fear. The National Security Problem in International Relations” (Buzan 1983) and “Security: A New Framework for Analysis” (Buzan et al. 1998) and a scholar associated with the Copenhagen School, devotes his academic research on elaborating the repercussions of security on society. According to him, security manifests itself in many different forms, all of which share the will to survival in light of an existential threat as a common denominator (Buzan 1991, 432). In the context of international security, this usually means, that “a referent object (traditionally, but not necessarily, the state)” (Buzan et al 1998, 21) is faced with one or more threats, resorting to “extraordinary measures to handle them” (Buzan et al 1998, 21).

By avoiding narrow approaches to security, like e.g. the assumption that security is only guaranteed by the state, the Copenhagen School is able to examine a multitude of areas. Thus making its security concept applicable to various contemporary situations, especially those not readily fitting into traditional categories.

“Existential threat can only be understood in relation to the particular character of the referent object in question. We are not dealing here with a universal standard based in some sense on what threatens individual human life. The essential quality of existence will vary greatly across different sectors and levels of analysis; therefore, so will the nature of existential threats” (Buzan et al. 1998, 21s.).

In short, the Copenhagen School refrains from defining threats in an objective way, as this would render the picture of security – in a changing and globalizing world – incomplete. Instead, each threat “has to be understood as an intersubjective process” (Buzan et al. 1998, 30) which is constructed by aggregates of power declaring a certain issue an existential threat.
Therefore, whenever actors in power-positions construct such a threat in the process of a discourse, they have the chance of becoming a security issue (Buzan et al. 1998, 24ss.). Consequently, the School identifies five sectors from which threats can emanate: the military, the political, the economic, the societal and the environmental sector (see chapter 2.3.4. Security Sectors).

The Copenhagen School builds its theory around basic cornerstones which enlarge the concept of security. These include: securitisation, security sector, regional security complexes and macrosecuritisation.

### 2.3.2. Securitisation & Desecuritisation

Securitisation is one of the central tools for analysis under the Copenhagen School's theoretical framework. The methodology used in this process is based on the speech-act theory developed by John L. Austin. His research on „How to do Things with Words“ (1975[1962]) defines three types of speech act, one of which is the *illocutionary* act, also used in securitisation. *Ilocutionary* speech-act circumscribes the „*performance of an act in saying something*“ (Austin 1975 [1962], 99), thereby, provoking some kind of effect, which may range from emotions like fear to concrete actions (Austin 1975 [1962], 99s.).

Also Judith Butler works with similar assumptions when she highlights that speech acts are performative in the sense that they have “*productive power*” (Butler 1996, 1997). For her, language can change social realities as they are have the “*power to create authority and bring about change rather than any pre-existing context that would empower actors and/or speech acts in the first place*” (Stritzel 2007, 361s.)

When speaking of an issue in the context of security, a process is initiated that moves an issue beyond the normal scope of politics. Therefore justifying means to address the security issue that are not usually tolerated by the audience. In consequence, if and when accepted by an audience, the issue becomes securitised.

“In theory, any public issue can be located on the spectrum ranging from non politicized (meaning the state does not deal with it (…) through politicized (meaning the issue is part of
In light of security, any perceived hazard can be presented as a threat to the existence of a referent object. “’Security’ is thus a self-referential practice, because it is in this practice that the issue becomes a security issue – not necessarily because a real threat exists but because the issue is presented as such a threat” (Buzan et al. 1998, 24). The declaration of an existential threat does not however automatically render an issue securitised, but rather only constitutes the so-called securitising move. At this stage, the threat has been presented but has not yet been accepted as such by the referent object. Subsequently, a negotiating process between the securitising agent and the referent object is set into motion. This is an internal process of the unit, within which the securitising actor “can obtain permission to override rules that would otherwise bind it” (Buzan et al. 1998, 26).

The securitising process is therefore complete only when the three elements of securitisation appear, i.e., when 1) an existential threat has been presented 2) which engenders an emergency action by powerful securitising actors 3) which in turn will affect the audience by lifting norms and standards of “everyday politics” and introducing extraordinary measurements to address the presented threats (Waever 1996, 105ss.; Buzan et al. 1998, 26).

“The process of securitization is what in language theory is called a speech act. It is not interesting as a sign referring to something more real; it is the utterance itself that is the act. By saying the words, something is done (like betting, giving a promise, naming a ship). What we can study in this practice: Who can “do” or “speak” security successfully, on what issues, under what conditions, and with what effects?” (Buzan et al. 1998, 26s.)

Certain security areas such as the military are subject to constant threat exposure, wherefore in these fields the securitisation process takes on an institutional character. In contrast, within the environmental area securitisation occurs ad hoc (Buzan et al. 1998, 27ss.). In both cases however, security is understood as a form of power politics, in which different actors take up certain roles which in turn enable them to articulate a security argument to their audience. Securitisations in one sector are often connected to and have repercussions in other sectors,
resulting in the formation of an interconnected web of securitisations (Waever 1995, 46ss.; Buzan et al. 1998, 25ss.).

Academic scholars have criticized the Copenhagen Schools’ assumptions on securitisation and highlight three problematic aspects in the framework. Firstly, they consider the narrow form of the speech act limiting. They argue that the emphasis on the “speech of dominant actors” (McDonald 2008, 564) ignores other agents that might voice their concern in respective situations. Furthermore this framework excludes alternative “forms of representation (images or material practices)” (McDonald 2008, 564). Including additional mediums such as television, internet and other forms of communication, are essential if the Copenhagen School aims to address the true nature of contemporary politics and forms of influence (Coskun 2012, 42s., Möller 2007, 180). Secondly, by focusing on the speech act in only one respective moment, it fails to address the appropriate context of securitisations (McDonald 2008, Stritzel 2007). Critics argue, that the “potential for security to be constructed over time through a range of incremental processes and representations resonate with relevant constituencies is under-theorised” (McDonald 2008, 564). Thirdly, the securitisation framework emphasises on designated threats that influence the security of the referent object. However, it does not address the positive aspects of security, especially because the Copenhagen School considers security a negative process. Therefore, highlighting security a desirable process that is to be achieved within the society remain ignored (McDonald 2008, 564s.).

In conclusion, the focus of the Copenhagen School remains on the speech act. This approach does not take into account the form of institutional practices of bureaucracies. They usually do not follow the pace and process of speech acts performed by securitizing agents. Instead these institutional set-ups are connected to the security practices, which influence the form of communication and deepen the meaning of situations (McDonald 2008, 569).

**Desecuritisation**

Securitisation is not a desirable process, even though it might be particularly useful with regard to the environment in order to raise awareness on its deteriorating situation. In general,
“security should be seen as a negative, as a failure to deal with issues as normal politics. Ideally politics should be able to unfold according to routine procedures without this extraordinary elevation of specific “threats” to a prepolitical immediacy” (Buzan et al. 1998, 29).

Consequently, the Copenhagen School introduced the concept of desecuritisation, suggesting that issues that have once been declared an existential threat in the process of securitisation can equally be removed from the emergency-back to the regular political agenda. Given the interconnectedness of securitisations and security sectors, one means of determining whether a specific securitisation ranked high within its respective sector is to examine the implications its desecuritisation has on other sectors (Waever 1995, 46ss.; Buzan et al. 1998, 25ss.).

Facilitating conditions

The processes cumulatively resulting in an issue to become securitised, are enhanced by facilitating conditions, a term also originating from the speech act theory (Austin 1975 [1962]) that investigates the rhetorical structure of a discourse (Waever 1996, 107). This framework allows to identify “conditions under which the speech act works, in contrast to cases in which the act misfires or is abused” (Buzan et al. 1998, 32). One basic condition of the speech act is the proper set-up of security construction – a security grammar. It is essential to use the proper security grammar as well as to construct a plot that is existentially threatening comprising a point of no return-scenario and an exit strategy. Furthermore, facilitating conditions must include actors that enjoy some degree of authority to push the respective securitisation-agenda. They must be other than official authorities. Lastly, the securitising process is facilitated, when threatening objects such as military helicopters, tanks and hostilities are featured in the discourse (Waever 1996 104ss.; Buzan et al. 1998, 33).

2.3.2. Levels of Analysis

The Copenhagen School’s approach incorporates the traditional levels, such as micro, meso- and macro level, but argues for an expansion of the framework to include non-state and state
actors equally because “[t]here is no necessity for levels to privilege states” (Buzan et al. 1998, 7). If non-state actors unite sufficient legitimacy in their hands to formulate and communicate an existential threat to an audience, then there is no reason why they should be excluded. This widened-scope enables the Copenhagen School to emphasise on the collective concept of security. They differentiate between six levels of analysis, which shall be briefly introduced hereafter.

The individual level stands at the bottom of analysis. Individuals rarely appear as independent entities because they are considered part of a larger collective entity such as those founded on religion or class. Therefore, they will seldom claim for their own security (Buzan et al. 1998, 36ss.).

Secondly, at the subunit level small groups such as firms, lobbies and bureaucracies will try to claim security legitimacy. However they will only rarely wield sufficient influence to establish a “claim to survival. However, they can unfold the power to affect the (de)securitizations of their superior unit level” (Mirtl 2012, 31).

One step further up the scale, at the unit level states, nations, transnational actors, international non-governmental organisations, mafias, terrorist groups and others, will construct collectives that will define themselves through a “We” feeling in contrast to the “Others” in order to pursue their own respective securitisation-agenda.

Fourthly, at the subsystem level security complexes (see chapter 2.3.5 Security Complexes) and international systems (such as the OSCE) will compete with each other.

Fifthly, at the system level the subsystem level units will interact with each other.

Ultimately, at the global level one finds the top end of securitisations. However, the global level is fairly difficult to securitise, especially because of the absence of an opposing collective to humankind (Buzan et al. 1998, 36ss.).
2.3.3. Units of Analysis

The theory of securitisation builds on three distinct units to analyse security: referent objects, securitising actors and functional actors, while traditional international security studies, are based on the assumption that the state is the most important guarantor of security.

This state-centric approach is valid insofar as the state and security share close linkages. The Copenhagen School acknowledges that the state enjoys some privilege in the security discourse, but broadens the scope of security by acknowledging the relevance of other actors on the security stage.

Referent Objects

Referent objects are defined as “things that are seen to be existentially threatened and that have a legitimate claim to survival” (Buzan et al. 1998, 36). These referent objects can be found at different levels of analysis.

At the micro-level they might materialise as individuals or small groups, who speak security on their own behalf. However, given their limited scope and lack of legitimacy in a broader context, they rarely manage to establish larger security legitimacy.

The meso-level has proved to be a very successful referent object. This success is mainly due to the fact that “limited collectivities (states, nations, and (...) civilizations) engage in self-reinforcing rivalries with other limited collectivities, and such interaction strengthens their “we” feeling” (Buzan et al. 1998, 37). Through this self-referential practice of “we-ness”, individuals become embedded in and identify with a collective. According to Christoph Weller, the creation of enemy-images – Feindbilder – can be approached from five angles⁴, one of which lies in the social function that allows “the strengthening of unity of a population to legitimate government, arms race and diversionary warfare” (Guzzini 2004, 45). Therefore, if rivalries amongst competing referent objects are a precondition for successful

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⁴ The other four angles are: creating stereotypes, selective perception, reduction of interpersonal relationships to the friend-foe pattern and a “psychological projections from oneself onto others” (Guzzini 2004, 45).
securitisation, then the meso-level will most likely enjoy an advantage over other levels of analysis (Buzan et al. 1998, 37ss.).

At the system-level, units struggle to gather sufficient legitimacy to establish successful securitisation. This struggle can be explained by the difficulty to establish an identity. Therefore, if identification with a security claim is a necessary to establish legitimacy to securitise, then system-level referent objects are more prone to instability (Buzan et al. 1998, 37s.; see chapter 2.3.5 Macrosecuritisation).

To sum up, the smallest common denominator for defining ‘referent object’ at any unit-level is “security legitimacy in terms of a claim to survival” (Buzan et al. 1998, 39).

**Security Actor**

At the other end of the security spectrum stand securitising actors. This unit of analysis is constituted through the existence of referent objects, being defined as “actors who securitize issues by declaring something – a referent object – existentially threatened” (Buzan et al. 1998, 36) by performing a speech act. In order for a securitising actor to be successful, this act requires an aggregation of power to gather sufficient legitimacy. In the case of a government, this legitimacy might be bestowed upon the securitising actor either through legal norms, or with regard to more informal entities through other equivalent functions, such as trust (Buzan et al. 1998, 35ss.).

**Functional Actors**

Finally, functional actors also contribute to the securitisation process. They are

“actors who affect the dynamics of a sector. Without being the referent object or the actor calling for security on behalf of the referent object, this is an actor who significantly influences decisions in the field of security” (Buzan et al. 1998, 36).
Functional actors influence the process of securitisation before, during and after, although they themselves do not seek to securitise issues. Their influence derives from the power positions these actors take up in society (Buzan et al. 1998, 36).

2.3.4 Security Sectors

The following section focuses on a crucial research area of the Copenhagen School – the security sectors. Contrary to traditional IR Schools with their focus on “objective” threats that are usually associated with the military sector, the Copenhagen School operates with a five sector-model. Each sector represents the “views of the international system through a lens that highlights one particular aspect of the relationship and interaction among all of its constituent units” and threats may vary across sectors (Buzan et al. 1993, 31 cited in Buzan et al. 1998, 27).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Sector</th>
<th>Referent Object</th>
<th>Survival</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Societal</td>
<td>Nation</td>
<td>Identity</td>
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<tr>
<td>Political/military</td>
<td>State</td>
<td>Sovereignty</td>
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<tr>
<td>Economic</td>
<td>Firm</td>
<td>No</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Environment</td>
<td>‘Nature’</td>
<td>Sustainability</td>
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Figure 1 Dialects of Security (Waever 1996, 109)

Figure 1 summarises the dialects of security, depicting the relation between sectors, referent objects and the area that is existentially threatened. These components provide the ground and context for securitisation (Buzan et al. 1998; Waever 1996).
2.3.4.1. Military Sector

The military sector is strongly shaped by historic developments in the international system, which determine its current make-up. In consequence, in this sector “the process of securitization is most likely to be highly institutionalized” (Buzan et al. 1998, 49). This idea roots in the sovereignty-concept of modern states in which military forces are used to exercise control over territory, be it defensively, offensively or in order to maintain the status-quo (Mearsheimer 2013, 78s.).

Threats may emerge from the inside as well as from the outside. It is worth noting that there is a distinction between threats that may emerge from the inside (internal) and from the outside (external). Internal threats arise from a fragment of society aiming to destabilise civil order as established by the ruling class. In Neo-Gramscian tradition it is argued that the ruling class enjoys hegemony over other social classes. This structure is built on the historic construction of relations of capitalist production (Bieler et al. 2003, 345). Therefore, in light of these historically constituted structures internal threats are articulated when these structures are challenged. The challengers may include a wide range of actors from within the society (Bieler et al. 2003, 344s., Gramsci 1971, 258ss.)

“The typical forms of such challenges are militant separatists, revolutionary, terrorist, or criminal organizations or movements, although some governments also securitize unarmed challengers to their authority or jurisdiction in order to use force against them” (Buzan et al. 1998 50).

External threats derive from an altered balance of power, which in turn threatens the territorial integrity of a state. In the tradition of Structural Realism, states can never be sure about the true intentions of other actor in the international arena. This is one of the main reasons, why states want power (Mearsheimer 2013, 79). Therefore, “military security is primarily about the two-level interplay between the actual armed offensive and defensive capabilities of states on the one hand and their perceptions of each other's capabilities and intentions on the other” (Buzan et al. 1998, 51). Depending on the extent of these military capabilities, states will be able to exercise control in the international arena, may it be to keep the current status quo or in case of revisionist states to influence the balance of power by exercising force (Mearsheimer 2013, 79).
Referent Objects

Traditionally, military security developed around the assumption, that the state is the only referent object. This concept stems from the Westphalian understanding of statehood around which Western countries built and consolidated their societies. Prior to this process, absolutist rulers autonomously decided on questions of security and the use of military force. As democratic governance gradually replaced absolutism with "(...) popular sovereignty in which the national and civil society, as well as the government (...) claimed exclusivity as the legitimate referent object" (Buzan et al. 1998, 52). The concept around which democratic sovereignty is centred goes beyond the traditional understanding of the state - as the only referent object, since in case of a military threat, society as well as the government are considered to be equally affected, given the broad allocation of sovereignty under the democratic paradigm.

In states, where civil societies are not sufficiently incorporated into the exercise sovereignty, tensions may possibly arise between "the rulers and the ruled" (Buzan et al. 1998, 52). These frictions leave room for other referent object units such as tribes and rebel-, revolutionary or autonomous movements that aim to establish independence on the territory of an existing state. "The very nature of would-be states, and their position in the international system, means they are frequently objects of military interest and action and therefore of securitization" (Buzan et al. 1998, 53).

Security Actors

Given the scale of institutionalisation, and the central position and purpose of the inside the state, predefined rules exist "about which state representative can speak security on its behalf" (Buzan et al. 1998, 55). That means that the state as a referent object possesses sufficient legitimacy for it to be effective. However, this assumption does not signify, that states are necessarily coherent in their securitisation-policies. "In democracies, many voices, including pressure groups and defence intellectuals, will engage in the discourse of securitization – sometimes effectively (...)" (Buzan et al. 1998, 55). Furthermore, functional
actors, such as arms industries, will aim to influence referent objects in the process of securitisation.

2.3.4.2. Environmental Sector

The environmental sector is more challenging to subsume than the military sector, because problems that arise in the environmental field can not to be reduced to the logics of territorial integrity but rather consist of two distinct and at least partly divergent agendas, the scientific and political agenda (Buzan et al. 1998, 71s.).

The scientific agenda is formulated by scientific experts and academic establishments that evaluate and produce reports on the environmental challenges to underline the process of securitisation. Though relevant to all other sectors as well, the scientific agenda shapes environmental security to a great extent. This dependency stems from the repercussions of local developments on the international level which are reinforced by environmental threats that go far into the future (Buzan et al. 1998, 71ss.). As an example, one might think about the scientific report on “The Limits of Growth” which presented the world with the challenges, including the limits of environmental resources that lay ahead for the years to come (Meadows et al. 1972).

The political agenda on the other hand is concerned with articulating environmental issues to raise public awareness to perceived environmental hazards. Furthermore, by creating awareness for a particular agenda, it takes over responsibility to address environmental issues adequately and effectively. Given the transnational implications of environmental threats international cooperation is required in order to establish certain standards.

“Faced with the complexity of an international system in which many processes are beyond the control of individual governments, the urgency to decrease uncertainty about the effectiveness of policy initiatives has risen” (Buzan et al. 1998, 73).

The scientific and political agenda often overlap despite the fact that both follow different cycles. The political cycle is shaped by short-term planning so that it will not necessarily be influenced by threats that are “real or speculative but whether their presumed urgency is a
To sum up, the environmental agenda covers a wide range of issues. Given the strong interconnectedness of these concerns, environmental security will most likely affect other sectors as well. While the disruption of ecosystems might clearly be an issue for environmental security, related developments in the area of populations, food and economic problems are caused by environmental instability resulting in growing structural inequality. These challenges, will vary based on regional preconditions and geographical locations. Even though, many initiatives have been launched on a global level, regional projects have nonetheless shown the highest scale of effectiveness (Buzan et al. 1998, 74ss.).

Referent Objects

The environmental sector's referent object is twofold: “the environment itself and the nexus of civilization and environment” (Buzan et al. 1998, 76). The environment forms the basis for human existence. Notwithstanding this set-up, civilisations have continuously exploited the environment to further their own advantage. This self-destructive tendency catapulted humanity in a paradox situation, where the “only way to secure societies from environmental threats is to change them” (Buzan et al. 1998, 76) (Gudynas 2011).

Security Actors

The paradox can be explained by securitising actors favouring certain tendencies over others. Securitising actors in the environmental discourse include states, NGOs and International Organizations. They either aim to veto certain securitising tendencies by refusing to acknowledge specific threats to the environment, or they try to raise awareness by funding research and conducting information campaigns (Buzan et al. 1998, 77). In International
Relations Theories, Neoliberal scholars argue, that these actors fill up the vacuum of anarchy by producing interdependence through cooperation. Therefore, “*human-created processes and institutions (...) mitigate [fear] overtime*” (Sterling-Folker 2013, 117).

However, in this process, both sides are influenced by functional actors.

> “One large category is economic actors (...). These are functional actors (...) who generally do not intend to politicize let along securitize, this activity. [They are] generally motivated by profit making” (Buzan et al. 1998, 79).

By drawing on reflections from Neo-Gramscian scholars, such economic actors act within the constraints of projects that are hegemonically constituted. Such a project developed in the 1970s as a response to the changing production mode of Fordism and produced a new framework – Neoliberalism. This development brought forth a reconstruction process of the international arena that influenced the state, production methods and had the environment amongst others as its basis (Bieling et al. 2000, 106s., Bieler et al. 2003, 353s.).

### 2.3.4.3. Economic Sector

The security agenda of the economic sector revolves around the insecurities of the capitalist system.

> “The idea of economic security is located squarely in the unresolved and highly political debates about international political economy concerning the nature of the relationship between the political structure of anarchy and the economy structure of the market” (Buzan 1991, 230 cited in Buzan et al. 1998, 95).

Depending on ideological orientation and preference, economic security will be prioritised with regards to the governmental influence on the market, private economical actors or the market itself. The Copenhagen School highlights three positions that have been most influential in the area of International Political Economy: the Mercantilist and Neo-mercantilist, the Liberal and the Socialist (Buzan et al. 1998, 95ss.).

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5 Neoliberalism in International Relations argues that institutions produce stability and interdependence. This in turn facilitates cooperation and thus helps establish peaceful coexistence (Sterling- Folker 2013, 114ss.).
(Neo-)mercantilism allows for the state to intervene in market forces in order to provide security for national companies. In this framework, the state combines social and political agendas and acts under the assumption that exports must be increased, while reducing imports to reach a zero-sum game. Thus, “the benefit of one state equals the loss of another one” (Mirtl 2012, 22). Through this, trade-surplus can be achieved. This in turn will benefit the economic and national security of a country. (Buzan et al. 1998, 95ss.)

Socialism places the economy at the basis of its society. The state regulates the economy to the extent that it addresses socio-political issues which in turn will result in justice and equity. Ultimately, Socialism tries to balance out economic security by creating equal economic conditions (Buzan et al. 1998, 96s.).

The most influential economic dogma in the 20th and 21st century is Liberalism. Under its paradigm, economic insecurities derive from the freedom of markets. “Economic relations are seen as a non-zero-sum game in which every merchandizing party potentially benefits” (Mirtl 2012, 22). The state exists not to regulate markets but to provide a framework of institutions such as the police and the military to safeguard the free play of powers on the economic market. Hence, economic security in liberalism aims to “develop rules that create factor mobility among national economies” (Buzan et al. 1998, 96).

In the course of the 20th century events such as the global economic crisis in 1929 and in 1973-1974 as well as the collapse of the Bretton Woods System led to the shift from Fordism development model to a more globally oriented, flexible way of production – Post Fordism. A new era of neoliberal globalization was rung in by these developments, which came accompanied by a new logic of production. Flexible labour conditions and the deregulation of financial markets have become the new norm under which a great part of the world would be operating under (Gill et al. 2013, 56fss.). With the end of the Cold War, liberalism has become the most prominent dogma which also influences the economic security discourse. The liberal framework lifted national restraints and embedded economies into the global economic system. As a result, growing economic disparity has become more difficult to address (Buzan et al 1998, 95ss.; Bieling et al. 2000, 108ss.; Gill et al. 2013, 56ss.).

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6 Fordism existed until 1970 and worked under the assumption that mass production, consumption and distribution will allow for the internationalisation of the American hegemonic power model in the capitalist world (Gill et al. 2013, 54ss.).
“[T]he discourse on economic security is now shaped largely by the dominance of the liberal agenda and by the consequences of attempts to implement that agenda in the areas of trade, production, and finance. [Therefore] (...) economic security centers on concerns about instability and inequality“ (Buzan et al. 1998, 97).

In short, the economic security agenda is shaped by the fear that issues related to economic insecurity will have a spill-over effect on other security sectors. As a consequence, new threats might arise (Buzan et al. 1998, 96 ss.; 115ss.).

Referent Objects

The economic sector is marked by a great variety of referent objects, which are located on the individual, class, state and global level. The most important but a weak referent object is the firm. Liberal logic dictates that firms be subject to the market. “Thus, only in special circumstances, when firms are seen as crucial to the stability of the market system itself, can firms be successfully securitized in a liberal system” (Buzan et al. 1998, 101).

Security Actors

The economic sector has security actors operating on two levels: the local and the national level. The local level revolves around actors such as individuals, trade unions and municipalities that seek to ensure economic security within their scope, while on the national level, governments and trade unions might try to securitise firms that are crucial to the industrial foundation of a state (Buzan et al. 1998, 99ss.).

2.3.4.4. Societal Sector

Societal security is distinct from national security because societies cannot be reduced to a state. Rather society is a broad term, that is best summed up as an identity of a given community or group that is self-sustaining. “The concept of societal security, (...) refers (...)
to the level of collective identities and action taken to defend (...) “we identities”” (Buzan et al. 1998, 120). Thus, the security agenda in the societal sector derives from perceived threats to particular identities. These threats might include migration (perception that population set-up is changing over time), horizontal competition (perception that sociocultural influence is changing), vertical competition (perception that stronger identities such as e.g. the EU will replace old identities) and depopulation (perception of identity changes due to environmental effects such as wars, plagues and famines) (Buzan et al. 1998, 121).

Referent Object

The societal security agenda's referent objects are manifold. They may include religions, races, and clans amongst others. These groups are able to “carry the loyalties and devotion of subjects in a form and to a degree that can create a socially powerful argument that this “we” is threatened” (Buzan et al. 1998, 123).

Security Actors

Whenever any of these actors unites sufficient legitimacy to speak on behalf of a group, societal issues can become securitised. Depending on the set-up of the particular groups, semi-official or official actors will have united sufficient support to speak with one voice on behalf of the community. Given the great diversity of referent objects, each hierarchy must be evaluated on its own (Buzan et al. 1998, 123s.).

2.3.4.5. Political Sector

The last security sector focuses on political security. It deals with the “organizational stability of social order(s)” (Buzan et al. 1998, 141) and is thus crucial to the state's integrity. By the broadest definition, “all security is political” (Jahn et al. 1987 cited in Buzan et al. 1998, 141) because all threats are constructed and defined over a political process, namely that of
securitisation. In this context, politics aims to modify human behaviour in order to make it more governable (Buzan et al. 1993, 35 cited in Buzan et al. 1998, 142).

In this context, threats can be constructed on the basis of two motivating factors. Firstly that to destabilise a political unit that has gathered its legitimacy from an ideology that is linked to the state, such as Liberalism. Secondly that to externally question the legitimacy of a referent object. The latter was a recurrent practice during the Cold War (Buzan et al. 1998, 144).

**Referent Objects**

The most thoroughly standardized and recognized political unit is the territorial state. Therefore it serves as the principle referent object. That however is not to say that other institutions that enjoy sufficiency legitimacy are not included. The EU as a supranational organization for example might also be a political referent object.

**Security Actors**

Given that this area is dominated by institutional entities with considerable political legitimacy, “governments will usually be the securitizing actors. A government will often be tempted to use security arguments (in relation to the state) when (...) the government itself is threatened” (Buzan et al. 1998, 146).
2.3.5 Regional Security Complexes

Security complexes display a pattern of interconnectedness with regards to the process of securitisation. This is done by “combining the concerns of major actors into a constellation, a knot of mutual security relations” (Buzan et al. 1998, 43) (Buzan et al. 1998, 42ss.; Buzan 1983, 105ss.).

Regional security complex-theory builds on the assumption of the existence of such security complexes. Regional security complexes are formed through the “interplay between, on the one hand, the anarchic structure and its balance-of-power consequences, and on the other the pressure of local geographical proximity” (Buzan et al. 2003, 45). Geographical location has direct effect on security interactions which according to Stephen Walt is due to the ability of states to “project power [which] declines with distance” (Walt 1987, 23). Therefore, security interdependences are more likely to form in geographically proximate regions. In contrast, superpowers possess a penetration mechanism, which allows them to influence regional security complexes. Therefore, through forming alliances with local units, the balance-of-power logic is influenced. By doing so “local patterns of rivalry become linked to the global ones” (Buzan et al. 2003, 46).

Regional patterns develop through two features: power relations and patterns of amity and enmity. Amities and enmities result from an internal pattern of conflicts within a region that was shaped by historic, political, social and material conditions. As a consequence, states form alliances to balance out the power which constitute the regional security complex. When formed, they usually “possess a degree of security interdependence sufficient both to establish them as a linked set and to differentiate them from surrounding security regions” (Buzan et al. 2003, 47s.). The regional pattern forms part of the international system, which in turn indicates the degree of polarity in the region (Buzan et al. 2003, 49s.). Even though, the term region is used, it must be clarified that the definition of region in this context is not contingent on geographical aspects alone. We speak of region, because the “[r]egional security complex is (...) socially constructed in the sense that they are contingent on the security practice of the actors” (Buzan et al. 2003, 48).
2.4. Macrosecuritisation

The last contribution the Copenhagen School added to the academic discourse is macrosecuritisation. Most securitisations happen either on the individual or on the meso-level. A multitude of issues are constructed into existential threats by securitising actors pushing for their own selfish interests. However, this section of the thesis focuses on an all-encompassing threat that influences international security. “At such times a higher order of securitization embeds itself in such a way as to incorporate, align and rank the more parochial securitisations beneath it” (Buzan et al. 2009, 253). One reason why a large-scale securitisation is established is to demonstrate and legitimate a system-wide leadership, and in this context, sustain alliances and define enmities.

Levels of Analysis

The basic structure of sectors, referent objects, and security agents remain constant when shifting the research focus from the meso- to the system-level. At the meso-level referent objects such as states and nations have proved to be very durable, which is mainly due to the fact, that these units “engage in self-reinforcing rivalries with other limited collectivities and that such interaction strengthens their we-feeling” (Buzan et al. 2009, 255). When assuming that these rivalries facilitate securitisation because they help establish identity, then the process of securitisation will more likely succeed at the meso-level. At the system-level a similar principle can be applied. Here the balance of power can be maximized through the formation of alliances by uniting security interests together, thus establishing a common security identity.

Figure 2 depicts the most important macrosecuritisations on a three dimensional graph.

The x-axis describes the degree of comprehensiveness with regards to securitisation. Therefore, a “securitisation is comprehensive to the extent that it minimises the number of separate concerns, issues and conflicts that achieve strong securitisation separately from the macrosecuritisation” (Buzan et al. 2000, 258). The y-axis refers to the possible levels of
analysis, ranging from individual up until the global level. The z-axis refers to the success of an issue in terms of being accepted by an audience (Buzan et al. 2009, 258).

**Basic format of macrosecuritisation**

One important aspect of macrosecuritisation, is the question of what elements it is made of and of how they are organised. The Copenhagen School defines four areas that require inspection:

1. **Allies** pose an important component in international security politics. The adaptation of a security issue by a group of allies will indicate a certain degree of power influence of the securitising actor on a global scale.
2. *Other great powers* are nations outside the group of allies, wielding influence on the international security landscape. These powers might still securitise an issue, even though they don’t ally with the securitising actor’s interests. Usually this is done when an issue that requires securitising, is too attractive to pass up on.

3. The *Opposition* complements the macrosecuritised issue and creates a synergy. This aspect elevates the chances of a conflict to become self-propelled.

4. *Domestics* refers to the local scene legitimising extraordinary measures in light of an over-arching threat. Tolerating extraordinary means on a domestic level poses a great challenge to the long-term existence of macrosecuritisation. This is mainly due to the fact that overarching threats break away more easily than regional or local threats (Buzan et al. 2009, 274).

**Securitising Actor**

Security actors usually unite sufficient political legitimacy to postulate an existential threat. On a large-scale, these actors must be in an ideologically constituted power position. They may be nation states that possess a high degree of power allocation while other possible actors might be transnational actors such as groups fighting issues on the environmental, nuclear and globalisation agenda, as well as terrorists groups like the Al-Qaida or more recently the Islamic State. Transnational actors of this sort, can still unite sufficient authority and audience to act as securitising actors (Buzan et al. 2009, 268).

**Referent Object**

In order for a macrosecuritisation to be successful, it must be able to appeal and mobilize a wide range of identities within the international system. This is achieved by establishing a “unity of positives based on values shared across different actors and identities, and partly about generating a unity of negative where all the participants can agree on what they understand as threatening to them” (Buzan et al. 2009, 268).
Concept of Security Constellations and Macrosecuritisation

Whenever security interdependence is extended beyond single security complexes, this interconnectedness establishes security constellations. This concept aims to demonstrate that security relations exist “across all of the levels and sectors in which securitisations occur. Constellations suggest strongly that larger patterns exist in the overall social structures of securitisations” (Buzan et al. 2009, 256). From this assumption it becomes apparent that smaller units such as individuals, states and regions form part of a much wider constellation, which is why securitisations should not be regarded as separate processes but as an aggregate of elements, cumulatively constituting a security constellation (Buzan et al. 1998 201ss.; Buzan et al. 2009, 255ss.). The concrete shape of these constellations are determined by the degree of interdependences of securitisations (Buzan et al. 2009, 268).

Macrosecuritisation denotes the process of securitisation addressing referent objects “higher than those at the middle level (for example, “universal” religions or political ideologies; one or more of the primary institutions of international society) and which aim to incorporate and coordinate multiple lower level securitisations” (Buzan et al. 2009, 257). In the context of macrosecuritisation, the all-encompassing existential threat in question must be of paramount importance to the referent object, as is the case e.g. with regard to nuclear proliferation, resource scarcity and terrorism. The scale of a threat however, does not guarantee it to be accepted. “Only if they acquire a supportive audience on an appropriate scale and a possibility to operate as the interpretative framework for other securitisation (...) [with] the ability to subsume other questions” (Buzan et al. 2009, 26) they stand a chance to become durably securitised concepts.

The structure of macrosecuritisation is usually more complex than securitisation at the meso-level, as it comprises various levels of securitisation. This multi-layered structure is one of the reasons, why macrosecuritisation is more prone to collapse or become desecuritis ed than securitisations on the meso-level.

Finally, the question remains what connects security constellations to macrosecuritisation. “Macrosecuritisations generate constellations, because they structure and organise relations and identities around the most powerful call of a given time” (Buzan et al. 2009, 259). This strongly interlinked process is guided by a universalist claim.
Universal Claims

Universalist claims can be divided into four sub-groups, which in turn will affect the dynamics, constellations involved in a particular macrosecuritisation.

Firstly, *inclusive universalism* refers to a universalist ideological belief which may be guided either by religious or secular concepts. At the core, inclusive universalisms aim to optimise the human condition by imposing their belief-system, ideally on all of humankind. Examples for inclusive universalism include Liberalism, Marxism, and any monotheistic religion (Buzan et al. 2009, 260).

Secondly, *exclusive universalism* describes an ideological belief, such as Nazism, which constructs superiority of a group over the rest of humankind (Buzan et al. 2009, 261).

Thirdly, *existing order universalism* refers to “political claims about threats to one or more of the institutions of international society, which are universalist in the sense that they take the global level international social structure as their referent object” (Buzan et al. 2009, 261). Existing order-universalism, might also overlap with inclusive universalism.

Fourthly, *physical threat universalism* refers to existential threats which have the potential to affect the existence of humankind as such. Examples might be nuclear weapons, terrorism and newly emerging diseases (Buzan et al. 2009, 261).

2.4.1. The Cold War as an example for macrosecuritisation

As the Cold War unfolded following the end of World War II, a new international power-structure emerged. This power structure was supported by two distinctive features: 1) nuclear weapons and 2) the rivalry between the two dominant superpowers and their respective allies. On the one side, there was the US-led Western bloc comprised Western Europe, Japan and Australia. On the other side, there stood the Soviet-led Eastern bloc forming alliances in Asia. Each of these blocs pursued an ideologically founded universal claim “*in zero-sum opposition to the other*” (Buzan et al. 2009, 270). This structure contributed to the creation of superpowers in possession of an arsenal of WMD, and established a bipolar dichotomy in the
international arena, which remained unchallenged for over 40 years. “This meant that right to the end of the Cold War, bipolarity stood as the general framing for nearly all strategic theorising” (Buzan et al. 2009a, 69).

Furthermore, these components were complemented by the basic format of macrosecuritisation. The bipolar structure was supported through the dichotomisation of the world into allies and opponents. Most Great Powers joined forces with either one bloc or the other. On the one hand Japan and Western Europe were amongst the strongest US-allies during the Cold War. They accepted the dominance and leadership of the US with regards to matters related to economic, military and societal questions and structured their domestic politics according to this dominant ideology. On the other hand, the Soviet Union was backed by Eastern Europe and great parts of Asia, subordinating their domestic politics to socialist ideology. Even though “[t]here was some challenge to the bipolar framing from China after Mao's break with Moscow in the late 1950s, with some thinking of China as a third power, at least in Asia” (Buzan et al 2009a, 69), the bipolar power-structure could be maintained for more than four decades (Buzan et al. 2009a, 68ss.).

Universal Claim and its Implications

The Cold War is considered one of the most eminent macrosecuritisation in the 20th century, with the two blocks promoting two opposing “inclusive universalist claims” about political economy and aiming to optimise human condition through the imposition of their belief-system. This particular macrosecuritisation led the whole world to take sides in this zero-sum game over the future of mankind (Buzan et al. 2009, 269).

The rivalling dogmas created mutually exclusive “we-identities” which were reinforced by these belief-systems’ reciprocal opposition. This in turn facilitated a macrosecuritisation in which

“[w]atchwords like “democracy”, “freedom”, “socialism” (...) could be played not just to the domestic audiences of the superpowers but also to much wider international audiences. The sharing of the values associated with these watchwords facilitated the construction of an intersubjective sense of threat” (Buzan et al. 2009, 260).
These rivalries assisted in the ideological expansion to additional countries, meaning that by aligning new countries behind either belief, the universal political legitimacy of the other was reduced.

It shall be noted, that macrosecuritised stability can only be reached if an inclusive universalist ideology permeates a system in its entirety. Such degree of stability could be found in

“some of the “universal” empires of ancient and classical times, where a single polity and culture came to dominate a known world over a substantial period of time (for example, Rome, China, Incas)” (Buzan et al. 2009, 263).

Even though, the end of the Cold War resulted in the victory and acceptance of liberal market economy as the single globally dominant ideology, the model remains heavily contested in many Asian and Islamic countries. However, when the Cold War-constellation collapsed, the existing international power-structure dissembled and left a security void. Ever since the end of the Cold War-era there have been several attempts to macrosecuritise issues such as the environment, resource scarcity and finally also terrorism (Buzan et al. 2009, 269ss.).
3. Analysis of the European security identity

This section shall examine how the macrosecuritised GWoT affected the European Union's security identity as compared to that prior to 9/11. The goal is to examine the impact of the GWoT on the European security framework.

3.1. The Global War on Terrorism

This section shall introduce the GWoT as an example for a macrosecuritisation and analyse its elements. Even though this will form the core part of this section, it is important to consider dynamic factors such as globalisation that have influenced international developments as well.

Globalisation refers to “the development of social systems which transcend the borders of the nation-states” (Kelstrup 2004, 106). This dynamic influences all of the security sectors especially because it exposes the sectors to new areas, which in turn presents the sectors with new threats. The most remarkable effect globalization has had on the global society has been through shifting its focus from “government to governance. Governance might, in all brevity be understood as the ability of social systems with many different actors to govern through the constitution of norms and rule even without any fixed formal structure” (Kelstrup 2004, 107) which in turn engenders new conflict patterns.

According to scholars of Liberalism⁷, the changing conflict patterns can also be explained through three emerging trends in the world. They see the security dilemma on the decline because of 1) emerging democracies, 2) growing economic interdependence between states and 3) establishment of international organisations. They support their hypothesis by Kant’s arguments that people want to “be free and prosperous, so democracy and trade will expand, which leads naturally to the growth of international law and organization to facilitate these processes” (Russett 2013, 95).

⁷ Liberalism in International Relations originates in Immanuel Kant’s considerations on the “pacific federation” (Russett 2013, 95).
Nowadays, armed conflicts are rarely fought as interstate wars anymore. “Out of fifty-six major armed conflicts after the Cold War, only three have been interstate wars” (Kelstrup 2004, 109).

Furthermore the globalized world changed the warfare format, under which “there are no clear front lines; attacks on civilians become the norm; (...) and destruction of civilian homes become commonplace” (Wilkinson 2005, 17). Most wars are a consequence of non-state actors pursuing political interests. They utilize terror and destabilisation as a means to their respective ends (Kelstrup 2004, 108).

According to Philip Bobbitt, a military strategist and constitutional lawyer, international terrorism has developed in consequence to the changing of the international arena which has incrementally been dominated by decentralised and privatised market-state economies. In Bobbitt’s opinion, “the emergence of the market state is transforming warfare, evoking a new form of terrorism and changing the war aim” (Bobbitt 2009, 526s.).

This in turn requires the threatened entities to resort to extraordinary means in order to defeat terrorism. They may include intelligence gathering, mass surveillance and international cooperation in their bid to win the Global War on Terrorism (Wilkinson 2005, 18).

This changing relationship between warfare and terrorism has been amplified through the administration of US-President Bush declaring the War on Terrorism following the events of 9/11. “America and our friends and allies join with all those who want peace and security in the world, and we stand together to win the war against terrorism” (Bush 2001a). In light of this statement, made right after 9/11, the US successfully securitised the Global War on Terrorism on the domestic as well as on the international level. This securitisation owes its success to the fact that this “declaration of war” was constructed around the interests of the US government’s allies, framing it as a global concern to all people seeking peace and security.

In the US, domestic securitisation manifested itself in multiple ways, such as the establishment of the Department of Homeland Security in 2002 or the passing of the Patriot
Act\(^8\) strongly supporting a corresponding extension of US foreign policy (Kaunert et al. 2012). This legislative tool allows for extraordinary measures such as domestic mass surveillance to counter terrorist activities (US Department of Justice 2014). Furthermore, the US administration made torture (its most publicly known method was waterboarding), admissible and placed non-state actors charged with terrorism crimes “outside the normal rules of war, and not least the Geneva Conventions, because they were not viewed as conventional soldiers” (Fierke 2013, 200). Torture is used to inflict pain on a human being, in order to reach consent to respective demands and also to portray a power relations. These humanitarian and juridical violations were further deepened by the opening of Guantanamo Bay, a prison outside of US jurisdiction, where supposed terrorists were incarcerated without a charge. This prison has since been viewed as a grave violation of international law (Fierke 2013, 200).

Furthermore, the success of the US declaration of the War on Terror as impetus to the consequent securitisation of terrorism has been greatly enhanced by global mass media and the repeated broadcast of visual images all over the world, thus amplifying the impact of the attack by extending the aimed-for climate of fear beyond its original geographical reach (Speckhard 2011, 1; Gardner 2008, 295ss.). Thus, media coverage on and representation of 9/11 enhanced the perceived threat level of terrorism amongst most Western populations (Fierke 2013, 201; Ganser 2005, 28). “The shattered feelings of safety were quickly followed by a mobilization of military might first in Afghanistan and then in Iraq” (Fierke 2013, 201).

A Gallup-poll conducted in the aftermath of 9/11 among the American population on the perceived likelihood of another terrorist attack found that 40% of the surveyed considered this “very likely” and 45% “somewhat likely”. This indicates the high degree of securitisation only one month after the attack (Garnder 2008, 301).

The impact of 9/11 was vast and has contributed to creating an enemy identity that differentiated between the “We-ness” and “Other-ness”. This in turn determined how the interactions between the two parties were played out. “(I)deity was mutually constituted around a stark difference between good and evil” (Fierke 2013, 199s.). For former President George Bush this encompassed everyone opposing this course of action. Simultaneously, Bin

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\(^8\) The title is an acronym that stands for “Uniting and Strengthening America by Providing Appropriate Tools Required to Intercept and Obstruct Terrorism” (US Department of Justice 2014).
Laden constructed a similar identity by “declaring jihad on all Americans (...), articulating a distinction between ‘infidel Crusaders’ in the West and those who are part of the Muslim Ummah (community)” (Fierke 2013, 200).

This period marks a new area with very distinct features. The USA accepted the relationship pattern that was laid out by Al-Qaida and responded on an equal scale. Thereby, legitimizing any action deemed necessary to combat terrorists groups. The War on Terrorism continued its pathway to the invasion of Iraq. “It is known that intelligence communities on both sides of the Atlantic got it wrong in (falsely) believing that Iraq had weapons of mass destruction” (Fierke 2013, 198). However, it was reasoned that Saddam Hussein had affiliations with terrorist groups. Therefore, the political discourse was successfully constructed around the assumption that an invasion was necessary. After the invasion in Iraq and the discovery that Saddam Hussein did not possess any weapons of mass destruction, the threat level, which was communicated to the USA and the West, has incrementally decreased and domestic support started to break away (Fierke 2013, 200).

3.1.1. Concept of terrorism

Before discussing the macrosecuritised GWoT, it is important to define terrorism which, given its controversial nature, is a complex undertaking. It would be misleading to assume that terrorism is a new phenomenon that equates to insurgency and violence (Wilkinson 2005, 8ss.; Randall 2009 1ss.).

Many academics and politicians use terrorism either as a normative term by expressing a “moral judgement against violence that is inherently wrong” (Randall 2009, 2) or by framing it as an objective phenomenon. These objective assumptions however misconstrue the term and obscure its true features; rather it is important to analyse terrorism from a “neutral” perspective.

“Terrorism is not an ideology and does not exist as a specific worldview, a system of thought, or a political program” (Randall 2009, 3). Its nature is therefore not comparable to any
inclusive or exclusive universal claim. Terrorism does not constitute itself an end but is used as a tactic in the pursuit of specific ends.

Contrary to the way terrorism is usually depicted by decision-making bodies to the public, people committing terrorist acts do not act irrationally. As a unit holding certain cultural and political values they make conscious decision based on and in pursuit of these ideals. They use terrorist tactics as a “communicative act intended to influence the behavior of one or more audiences” (Randall 2009, 3), i.e. as a psychological weapon, in order to instil fear in these audiences. In this context mass-media enhances the impact of terrorist tactics by multiplying the effect of fear beyond their natural geographical reach (Speckhard 2011; Randall 2009, 4ss.).

Accordingly, terrorism can be summarised as

“the systematic use of murder, injury and destruction or threat of same to create a climate of terror, to publicise a cause and to intimidate a wider target into conceding to the terrorists' aims” (Wilkinson 1985, 12 cited in Wilkinson 2005, 9).

3.1.2. Features of a macrosecuritised Global War on Terrorism

Securitising actor

One central feature of the GWoT is that it emphasised the universal hegemonic position of the United States “as a superpower seen in the Cold War, through now under uni-polarity (Buzan et al. 2009, 272s.). Given this status, the US declared themselves the “future, and therefore having the right and the duty to speak and act for humankind” (Buzan 2006, 1103). The US administration⁹ kept emphasizing its unique role in the global struggle for freedom by taking on this “just” duty. However, pursing such a just cause comes at a high price and there is a significant probability, that in the process of this undertaking, some market states might become states of terror because “they are convinced that only authoritarian governments can

⁹ For more detailed discourse see Annex 1, a speech given by Dick Cheney in 2002, former vice-president of the US under President George W. Bush.
protect the individual and his opportunities in the face of terrorist violence “(Bobbitt 2009, 539).

Referent Object

Seeing how the development continued after the 9/11, it became apparent, that the attacks and the reaction thereto could not be reduced to an American securitisation. Being communicated as an attack against the belief-system of the West as such, the threat posed by this newly emergent form of terrorism became transferable to every democratic nation constituted on the principles of openness, individual freedoms and free markets, rendering them the referent object. This holistic threat was further accentuated by President George W. Bush's speech, declaring DPRK, Iran and Iraq the “axis of evil”, thus singling them out as opponents to these “Western” values and societies (Buzan et al. 2009, 271ss.).

In conclusion,

“(a) certain vagueness is probably often necessary for a macrosecuritisation, especially when the threat is not manifest and material, and the US securitisation of terrorism as a security threat has therefore been exceptionally loose in terms of referent object, threat and relationship between specific countermeasure and specific threats” (Buzan et al. 2009, 266).

3.1.3. Universal Claim and its Implications

The declaration of the War on Terrorism (GwoT) by the US government combined two universal claims.

Firstly, the end of the Cold War proceeded with an “imperial universalist project bent on using the superiority of US military power to enforce its model across the world. Unipolarity has therefore been securitised as a threat by both other great powers and by smaller powers fearing to become the object of this project” (Buzan et al. 2009, 264). In this context the main
securitising actor’s claim to universalism facilitates macrosecuritisation which was enhanced by the opposition of terrorist groups.

Secondly, the physical threat inherent in terrorism makes the physical fate of humankind the referent object (Buzan et al. 2009, 261ss.). This allows it to reach a global scale in terms of securitisation given that all of humankind might be subjected to the same threat. “An important element of this is that the GWoT has strong elements of existing order universalism - all states against non-state terrorists, order against chaos – mixed with a US-centred inclusive universalism” (Buzan et al. 2009, 265). However, the issue under threat is not just individual’s physical integrity. Metaphysical values such as human rights, the free market economies and democracies (Buzan et al. 2009, 272), which were partially responsible for creating a certain degree of insecurity, paved the way to the success of the GWoT (Kelstrup 2004, 106ss.).

3.1.4. Basic format of macrosecuritised GWoT

Along the lines of these combined universalist claims, the basic format of the macrosecuritised GWoT has developed as follows. The US could rally allies successfully up to the point that “[w]hen the US announced a GWoT and asked other states to declare if they were with the US or with the terrorists, the choice of terminology among allies and partners become an international issue” (Buzan et al. 2009, 267). The implication of this was that US-aligned nation states, constructed their own security agendas under a terrorism-template and adjusted their content accordingly.

The post-Cold War international security agenda made a marked upturn after 9/11, revitalising the zero-sum logic that had moulded the Cold War. This framework provided the US and Western allies as well as Russian, Chinese and Indian foreign policies with a dominant macrosecuritisation around which they could organize their interests (Buzan et al. 2009, 272). The threat posed by Al-Qaeda's ideology became “widely accepted outside the Islamic world, and also within the Islamic world” (Buzan 2006, 1103) and consequently the US-led war against Al-Qaeda and Taliban in Afghanistan was greatly supported by most parties (Buzan 2006, 1103ss.).
“Immediately following 9/11 NATO invoked article 5 [of the North Atlantic Treaty] for the first time, thereby helping to legitimise the GWoT securitization (...) Leaders in most (...) countries have associated themselves and their governments with the view that international terrorism is a common threat” (Buzan 2006, 1103).

Some countries such as Russia, Israel or India welcomed this macrosecuritisation of international terrorism, as it allowed them to link local concerns and problems to the broader complex of the GWoT.

In order to establish a long-lasting macrosecuritisation, an opposition willing to play along the scale of escalation is crucial. In the post-9/11 era, the Al-Qaeda leadership has successfully managed to construct its own enemy-concept. This resulted in a self-propelling conflict that has managed to sustain itself through the creation of a Western enemy-image (Buzan et al. 2009, 274ss.). The analyst Paul Wilkinson even argued that due to the widespread network of Al-Qaeda operating in more than 60 countries, chances for a sustained conflict are very high (Wilkinson 2005, 13ss.). However, since the death of Osama bin Laden in 2011, the leadership of the terrorist group has suffered from its decentralised and henceforth considerably weakened structures. Early in 2014, Al-Qaeda expelled the group “Islamic State and the Levant” from its ‘umbrella organisation’ for being too extremist. According to a US counter-terrorism official, this announcement portrayed the rupture within the group that at this point had already been latent for quite some time (Sly 2014). Later this year, the ‘Islamic State’ reconstituted itself in Northern Iraq and Syria, rekindling the macrosecuritised GWoT. This provided the macrosecuritised framework the boost it required to maintain the justification of counter-terrorism measures on a domestic scale.

Finally, sustaining sufficient domestic support and willingness of societies to sacrifice basic liberties in the name of security is one of the biggest challenges to macrosecuritisations. In the aftermath of 9/11, George Bush averred that terrorists appear in many different forms and hide in many different places (Bush 2001, 2), thus providing a justification for security to appropriate new spheres and making mass surveillance and intelligence gathering accepted tools for countering terrorism (Hansen 2004, 117ss.).
Michel Foucault analysed this form of *panoptic surveillance* in his work on Discipline and Punish: The Birth of the Prison. Originating his theory in Benjamin Bentham’s Panopticon (Gill 1995, 11s.), he describes the effects of surveillance as follows:

> “He who is subjected to a field of visibility, and who know it, assumes responsibility for the constraints of power; he makes them play spontaneously upon himself; he inscribes in himself the power relation in which he simultaneously plays both roles; he become the principle of his own subjection” (Foucault 1977, 202s.).

For him, acting under constant surveillance, leads to self-discipline which in turn affects and subjects the individuals behaviour to omnipresent power (Gill 1995, 11).

After more than a decade, the threat of a domestic attack has increasingly become exhausted as “*legitimisation for war time politics and executive prerogatives*” (Buzan et al. 2009, 274). The political discourse of justifying extraordinary measures has incrementally decreased by the end of the Bush administration in 2008.

However, through the declaration of the Islamic State, the waning consent on these special measures has witnessed a revitalisation. On this account, US President Barack Obama gave a statement in September 2014 concerning the situation of the Islamic State.

> “So ISIL poses a threat to the people of Iraq and Syria, and the broader Middle East -- including American citizens, personnel and facilities. If left unchecked, these terrorists could pose a growing threat beyond that region, including to the United States. While we have not yet detected specific plotting against our homeland, ISIL leaders have threatened America and our allies.” (Obama 2014)

One possible threat that US President is referring to, has been raised by the European Union as well – that of foreign fighters. The issue pertains to

> “those travelling from abroad to fight with terrorist groups in Syria, becoming (further) radicalized into violent extremism there, and on return to their home countries posing a
possible threat by committing acts of terrorism or acting as catalysts for it.” (A/68/841 2014, 134).10

In short, the issue of terrorism has been successfully securitised on a large-scale. The global support for the GWoT has decreased, especially because the domestic support has broken away. This notwithstanding, the international community has introduced several measures to prevent terrorism and address issues that might arise due to international terrorism. By doing so, adding new topics to the security agenda comes easier than in other cases. This is mainly due to the high degree of institutionalisation that is present in the military sector, allowing it to incorporate new issues to the security agenda without making an additional securitising move. Given the fact, that international terrorism is perceived as a top-ranking security issue across the globe, many new areas are appropriated by security issues in the bid to suppress terrorism. Issues such as counter-radicalisation mechanisms move terrorism into social and economic policy areas, while mechanisms of financial regulation to curb terrorist financing move security into the economic area. These are just some few examples demonstrating that terrorism affects most of the security sectors and subordinates their units to its security-umbrella. Ultimately, this has led to greater security-interconnectedness between the different sectors.

10 A/68/841 is the Report of the Secretary General on “Activities of the United Nations system in implementing the United Nations Global Counter-Terrorism Strategy”.

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3.2. European integration process as a basis for analysis

The process of European integration can be interpreted in many different ways. Many reflections focus on the economic aspects of the European integration. In contrast, the Copenhagen School tries to analyse the process of integration from the security aspect. Therefore its main goal is to shed light to the interwoven web of security issues in which the nation state as securitising agent is challenged by a bigger security identity – a supranational European one. Within this framework many different referent objects “are acted upon in a security mode” (Buzan et al. 2003, 352). This security mode refers to the process of integration given that securitisations within the European Union “converge on integration as the equivalent generalized measure” (Buzan et al. 1998, 188).

The European Union is a project that is in process of creating its own identity. It seeks to “secure the identity of the Member States (and the regions), and Europe's “security identity” (...) [which] is phrased as a predominantly political identity” (Waever 1995, 123). Through evaluating Europe's integration process through a security lens, it becomes evident that if the process of integration fails, the European Union’s fragmentation will be the result. This means that Europe's narrative past becomes the referent object (Waever 1996, 121s.).

European security identity is constructed around a security grammar that is based on the following assumption: “We integrate so we live or we fragment and we die”. This self-referential security process is composed of security, identity and the European integration that can only be understood through looking at all three components simultaneously (Waever 1996, 124ss.) Therefore, the European integration process modifies the securitisation practice, from a mere speech act theory and applies it as a “sequential practice embedded in a historic, political and social context” (Servent 2012, 51). By widening the scope of the securitisation practice from “the moment of intervention (...) to [a process] to be constructed over time” (McDonald 2008, 564), it addressed the appropriate context of the securitising act.

In this adapted framework numerous units in the European Union can act as securitising agents. Until the ratification of the Treaty of Lisbon in 2009, most securitising agents acted in the intergovernmental framework. They included, but were not limited to, national governments that voiced their concerns in the Council of the European Union. Further prominent voices in defining a European security identity, included the police and judicial
officials as well as military and intelligence services. On a European level, intergovernmental agencies such as Frontex and Europol have shaped the discourse. Due to the institutional pillar structure, that was in place until the ratification of the Lisbon Treaty, a wide set of agents were in place to construct the security discourse and constitute the European security identity.

Since the ratification of the Treaty of Lisbon, the European Parliament as well as the European Court of Justice have witnessed an institutional upgrade. The European Parliament had only limited influence on the area of security. During the intergovernmental process, the Parliament could only “submit an opinion that was often ignored or only partially taken into account by the Commission or the Council” (Servent 2012, 54). Ever since the unification of the European Union into a unified legal body, the Parliament enjoys more co-decision powers. Most importantly, they can influence policies through intervention in areas that are linked to security (Servent 2012, 51ss.). And as for the European Court of Justice, its role has also been upgraded, which manifests through its expanding influence into the area of security (Kostakopoulou 2012, 12).

In conclusion, the European integration process derives its legitimacy from its past. It establishes a “We-identity” permitting it to employ extraordinary measures to face existential threats declared by securitising agents (Waever 1996, 125).

The following chapters will analyse the European integration process with the goal to highlight the changing nature of the European security identity. While having in mind global events, like 9/11, and periods, like the end of the Cold War, which have framed the European security concerns, it shall be examined how the security interconnectedness has changed with the declaration of the Global War on Terrorism and certain events that have followed on European soil in the years after 2001.
3.2.1. European Union's security identity prior 9/11

During the Cold War, the prevalent security concern in the region was guided by the rivalry between the two superpowers (Buzan et al. 2003, 352ss.). Therefore, European security identity was dominated by externally defined security concerns. “[A]ll levels became organised by the Cold War so that is was reproduced by practices from the domestic thought the regional to the global level” (Buzan et al. 2003, 353). Security concerns, being interlinked, cut across all sectors. However, at that time, terrorism was not considered a regional security concern.

Consequently, most efforts pertaining to the suppression of terrorism remained restricted to the nation-state level. Local terrorist organisations and groups such as the ETA in Spain or the IRA in Ireland acted almost entirely within the boundaries of nation-states (Argomaniz 2011, 3ss.). That is not to say that “some cross-border movement of terrorists, or terrorist weapons and explosives” (Wilkinson 2005, 11) was not involved. These incidents however, did not require for international cooperation to adequately and effectively tackle the threat posed by these groups. Most terrorist activities before 9/11 can be found rooted in the colonial past of the countries or their institutional set-up that discriminated against certain minorities. Although the societal sector was threatened due to the potential undermining of national identity in the process of insurgencies, the threat thus posed to political security did not have significant repercussions on the regional level (Buzan et al. 1998, 357).

The great diversity in factors evoking the respective terrorism as well as their deep local rooting stood in the way of developing a comprehensive and coherent European framework to counter terrorism. Therefore, European countries struggling domestically with terrorism were less inclined to “prioritise “international terrorism” over their own domestic problems, particularly when these groups had separate goals than those acting within the state” (Argomaniz 2011, 4).

It was not until 1976 that European cooperation to counter terrorism was established by interior and justice ministers of the European Community under the name TREVI 11. TREVI’s initial aim was to address transnational crime as well as international terrorism. Over the years, this network intensified its output even though it continued to lack institutional stability

11 TREVI stands for “Terrorisme, Radicalisme, Extrémisme et Violence Internationale” (Argomaniz 2011, 5).
to guarantee long-lasting cooperation (Argomaniz 2011, 5ss.; Monar 2007a, 292ss.). The end of the Cold War in 1989 rang in a new era, adding new security concerns to the discourse. These included the environment, migration, organised crime as well as terrorism.

Even though these issues were not new to the European political agenda, due to collapse of the over-arching security concern originating from the Cold War, they re-emerged to the security platter (Buzan et al. 2003, 355ss.; Dannreuther 2007; Sheehan 2005).

Figure 3 shows terrorist incidents in Western European states over a period of 43 years. It graphically depicts the trend towards decreasing terrorist incidents in the period between 1975 and the end of the Cold War.

![Figure 3 Terrorist attacks in Western Europe (Global Terrorism Database 2014,1)](image)

This notwithstanding, the issue of terrorism has enjoyed an institutional upgrade in the form of article K1 (9) of the Treaty of Maastricht (Treaty on European Union) in 1992. TREVI, the intergovernmental forum which later became Europol, was integrated into the EU’s third pillar, thus providing a solid basis for cooperation in criminal matters between European member states. From now on forth, it “provided for police cooperation between member
states to combat terrorism, drug trafficking and other international crime, and made explicit reference to a European Police Office (Europol)” (Europol 2014, 1).

Furthermore, by virtue of Title VI of the Treaty, the policy area Justice and Home Affairs was established in the EC-Commission. This new institutional framework facilitated a coordinated intergovernmental cooperation as well as the formulation of long-term strategies on internal security within the European Community (Argomaniz 2011, 5ss.; Wilkinson 2005, 30; Hübner 2009).

This line of action was further reinforced by the Treaty of Amsterdam in 1997. Henceforth Member States decided to pursue the European integration as an “Area of Freedom, Security and Justice” for European citizens (Kaunert 2009, 46s.). Under Title IV the policy area of Justice and Home Affairs focused on “Police and Judicial Cooperation in Criminal Matters”. This included enlarging the objectives as well as reforming the procedural instruments. Consequently, most issues pertaining to terrorism on a European level were located within the third pillar. Whereas issues such as migration, border control and asylum were located in the first pillar. These issues are often constructed as a security concern related to terrorism (Argomaniz 2011, 6). This holds especially true in the context of EU policy making (Larsen 2000, 226 cited in Buzan et al. 2003, 239). Since the Schengen Treaty, which removed the internal borders within the European Community, a security deficit for nation-states developed. The underlining assumption to this perceived deficit is that

“immigrants are at the root of these problems\textsuperscript{12} and that the solution is to tighten the regime of “policing in depth” and other mechanisms that allegedly compensate for the removal of internal border in the EU” (Bigo 1996 cited in Buzan et al. 2003, 359).

This can be explained through the concept of the “Other” that existentially threatens the sovereignty and the identity of the nation (Buzan et al. 2003, 359). Therefore, provisions within the first pillar allow securing the external borders of the European Union in order to halt illegal immigration, including that of individuals and groups with intentions to commit terrorist crimes (Hübner 2009, 43ss.).

\textsuperscript{12} These “problems” refer to terrorism, organised crime and drug trafficking.
Whilst the third and the first pillar focused on aspects of internal security, the second pillar, as its formal name “Common Foreign and Security Policy” (CFSP\textsuperscript{13}) already denotes, is concerned with external aspects of EU security policy. The Treaty of the European Union did not specifically mention suppression of terrorism as one of its principal objectives. Nonetheless, strengthening international cooperation including partnerships with neighbouring countries, as well as alliances with regional and international organisations is of paramount importance in order to establish a comprehensive Foreign and Security Policy. Falling into the area of strengthened international cooperation was also the intensification of police and judicial cooperation in criminal matters on the basis of bi- and multilateral treaties, to enhance political dialogue (Hübner 2009, 46ss.).

At the Tampere Council summit in 1999, the Tampere Milestones were defined. This Programme provides for the pooling of “a significant amount of national sovereignty at the level of the EU through the establishment of internal EU competences” (Kaunert 2009, 42) in the years to come. Therefore, cooperation in the areas of migration, asylum, police, justice, combating crime and enforced external action was to be deepened in order to enable the EU to ensure the principles of the Treaty of Amsterdam, which include justice, freedom and security. From this point on, a common European security identity can be said to have come into the process of making (Kaunert 2009, 46ss.; European Parliament 1999, 1ss.).

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<tr>
<th>European Union's Pillars since 1999</th>
<th>“Area of Justice, Freedom and Security”</th>
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<td><strong>European Community</strong></td>
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<td>- Migration</td>
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<td>- Organised Crime</td>
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<td>- Terrorism</td>
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<tr>
<td>- Police and Judicial Cooperation in Criminal Matters</td>
<td>Intergovernmental cooperation</td>
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\textsuperscript{13} The Common Foreign and Security Policy's antecessor was the European Political Cooperation (EPC) which was established in the 1970s. At its core, it aimed at establishing a framework for political cooperation (Kaunert et al. 2012, 416ss.).
Figure 4 underlines the European pillar structure that was in place until the Treaty of Lisbon, which was ratified in 2009. It emphasises on the wide range of issues that are encompassed in the Area of Justice, Freedom and Security which had required for a cross-pillar approach to address counter terrorism measurements. Such “cross-pillarization” combined supranational as well as intergovernmental policies in order to achieve the highest possible synergy effect to suppress terrorism (Hübner 2009, 55).

Further endeavours to tighten European cooperation in security matters included the EU Convention on Extradition in 1995, the foundation of the European Judicial Network in 1998, the EU Convention on Mutual Assistance in Criminal Matters in 2000. All of the efforts contributed to the tightening of European cooperation in criminal matters and thus provided the basis for the post 9/11 period (Wilkinson 2005, 30).

Not surprisingly, prior 9/11 only six European member states had adopted counter terrorism legislation (Argomaniz 2011, 4), namely France, Germany, Italy, Portugal, Spain and the United Kingdom (Hübner 2009, 2). In consequence,

“[t]here is little doubt that by 10 September, the EU was not a significant producer of counter-terrorism policy and, save for very few exceptions, member states were reluctant to accept it as a legitimate arena for the discussion of these matters” (Argomaniz 2009, 153).

3.2.2. European Union's security identity post 9/11

On September 11, 2001 US President George W. Bush jr. stated that America and its allies would defend freedom and they would “win the war against terrorism” (Bush 2001a). The EU’s ambitions as a security actor have changed dramatically in the wake of the events of 9/11 and its immediate aftermath, stepping up their political and legislative efforts to suppress international terrorism. However, all these endeavours to contain terrorism both as an internal as well as an external threat further intensified after the terrorist attacks in Madrid in 2004 and in 2005 in London.
3.2.2.1. European security identity following the 9/11 attacks

Shortly after 9/11, on 21 September 2001 the European Council convened and accorded the fight against terrorism a central role. They consented and aligned with the pre-set direction provided by the United States (Bobbitt 2009, 13s.). This represented an important shift. Even though many member states of the European Union previously had strong relations with the United States empirically, on a European level, external action with a counter-terrorism focus has been limited. Following the response of the Belgian EU presidency aligning the EU’s interest in counter-terrorism measures, the European Commission also saw a window of opportunity to use this momentum to “lever for deepening political integration” (Coolsaet 2010, 870) (Kaunert 2009, 49ss; Coolsaet 2010, 869ss.)

The extraordinary meeting of the European Council of 21 September 2001, brought forth the following statement:

“The European Council has decided that the fight against terrorism will, more than ever, be a priority objective of the Union. (...) The European Council is totally supportive of the American people [and] [t]he European Union will cooperate with the United States in bringing to justice and punishing the perpetrators, sponsors and accomplices of such barbaric acts. The actions must be targeted and may also be directed against States (...)”

(European Council 2001, 1)

Following this, a Plan of Action encompassing five policies to fight terrorism was presented, encompassing four central features:

- Firstly it was decided that police and judicial cooperation were to be enhanced through the implementation of a European Arrest Warrant. The European Arrest Warrant was first introduced at Tampere 1999 and replaced the Convention on Extradition (Europe 2014). It is regarded as the “most important operational instrument in the European fight against terrorism, for its impact in the reduction of the length of time of the

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14 In contrast to the United States that declared “war on terrorism” (see Annex 4), the EU “fights” terrorism.
15 Plan of Action is part of sui generis series of documents. They are non-binding and reflect the views of a specific Organ within the European Union. Other documents of this category include white and green papers, resolutions, conclusions and agreements. These instruments are available to organs such as the European Council, the Council of the European Union and the European Commission (Hübner 2009, 82s.; Europe 2014b; Bossong 2008, 29ss.)
extradition procedures and its extensive utilisation by national authorities” (Argomaniz 2009, 155). Furthermore, a common European definition of terrorism was to be adopted.

- Secondly, Member States were to adapt and implement international legal instruments established by the United Nations. As of 2014, the UN has developed 19 legal instruments to counter terrorism. Amongst others, the thematic areas include Civil Aviation and Maritime Safety, Diplomatic Agents, Hostages, Nuclear Materials, Fixed Platforms, Plastic Explosives, Terrorist Bombings, Terrorist Financing and Nuclear Terrorism (UN 2014).

- Thirdly, financing of terrorism was to be put to an end, since this facilitates terrorist activities. Furthermore, air security policies shall be developed.

- Finally, the European Union was to coordinate its global action, reviewing in particular its relationship to states sponsoring terrorism (European Council 2001, 1ss.).

In the first months following 9/11, the primary focus of EU policy was on improving police and judicial cooperation between EU-member states, e.g. through the adoption of the European Arrest Warrant in 2002 or addressing the issue of financing of terrorism in order to prevent terrorist activities.

This Plan of Action was further developed and concretized. The “Anti-terrorism roadmap”16 presented by the Council of the European Union in 2001 named 46 strategies to counter terrorism, including “inter alia initiatives on the field of civil aviation security, police and judicial cooperation, external action and terrorism financing” (Argomaniz 2009, 154).

These efforts were followed by the framework established by the “Decision on Combating Terrorism” presented by the Council of the European Union in 2002. It recognised the importance of a harmonised approach of member states in suppressing and preventing terrorism “because of the need for reciprocity, [proposed action can] be better achieved at the

16 SN 4019/01
level of the Union, (...) in accordance with the principle of subsidiarity” (Council of the European Union 2002, 1).

These harmonising measures included the adoption of a common definition for terrorism as a basis for its criminalization, making European member states the first to produce such a common definition in the international arena. This definition included on the objective side, criminal provisions that define conducts, such as hostage taking and terrorist financing, as constituting terrorist acts, while on the subjective side they require that the incriminated conduct as defined in the respective criminal provision be committed with intent (Europe 2014a). Besides the definition of terrorist crimes, penalties for the respective offences were harmonized as well (Council of the European Union 2002, 1ss.). This framework constituted an important “precondition for the development of any substantial form of European governance in this area” (Argomaniz 2009, 155).

Aside from the European Arrest Warrant, the field of European security was further reshaped through the “Decision on Joint Investigation Teams”. The Council of the European Union adopted this framework in 2002, providing the legal foundation for interstate cooperation between member states in criminal investigations (Argomaniz 2009, 155ss.; Council of the European Union 2002, 1ss.).

Experts consider these decisions and measures following 9/11 reactive in nature. “The road map (...) and the subsequent Action Plan were not much more than an extensive list of measures and a strategic vision was sorely lacking in this (...) stage” (Argomaniz 2012, 156). Hopes were high that the European Security Strategy, presented in December 2003 by the European Council, would address the weaknesses of previous decisions. This Europe-wide comprehensive security policy is still valid today, and aims to tackle transnational crime and international terrorism through a Common Foreign and Security Policy not just within Europe but also outside its borders. Therefore, it has assessed five interconnected key threats to security within EU, i.e. terrorism, proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, regional conflicts, failed states and organised crime. In order to address these threats appropriately, the Common Foreign and Security Policy provides for enhanced international cooperation with organisations as well a strengthened European neighbourhood policy. The latter is supposed to help stimulate stability in the respective countries, thus preventing the occurrence of threats
already at its root and at an early stage (European Council 2003, 1ss.; Argomaniz 2009, 156s.).

However, the reality of the above mentioned efforts was that they had a poor implementation-record in the EU member states. Most measures of the Plan of Action in 2001 did not reach implementation status until the Madrid-attack in 2004 (Coolsaet 2010, 970ss.). In point of fact, most EU member states to this day have not succeeded in fully transposing the above mentioned frameworks (combat terrorism and joint investigation) into their national legislation and practice. Even though the European Arrest Warrant was presented as a successful operational instrument, especially because it provides for the recognition of criminal judgements between European member states, in reality its actual impact remained limited. The “unwillingness of some key member states to ratify it, and (...) the continuing desire of certain member states to maintain total national political control on these matter” (Wilkinson 2005, 31) undermined the instruments' effectiveness (Wilkinson 2005, 31; Argomaniz 2009, 155ss.).

This tendency emphasises the declining political will to combat terrorism among and within European member states. This growing lack in political support also becomes apparent, seeing how illegal migration had replaced terrorism on the top of the agenda in the area of Justice and Home Affairs by June 2002 (Council of the European Union 2002a, 1ss.; Argomaniz 2009, 157). “The strength and speed of the institutional process had come gradually to a relative standstill by 2004” (Argomaniz 2012, 157).

### 3.2.2.2. 2004 Madrid bombing

On 11 March 2004 Europe and European counter-terrorism policy received a drastic wake-up call – the railway station-bombing in Madrid. “As argued by a Commission official, “the moment that changes everything is the 11th of March”” (Argomaniz 2009, 158). This attack on European soil clarified the need to step up counter-terrorism efforts within Europe and consequently, European policies dealing with terrorism have become more focused to the actual threat. The European Council presented the “Declaration on Combating Terrorism” on 25 March 2004, containing a set of new elements to combat terrorism. One remarkable
accomplishment of this declaration was the inclusion of a clause on European **solidarity** in this area. Concretely, it highlights the need for member states to “act jointly in a spirit of solidarity if one of them is the victim of a terrorist attack. They shall mobilise all the instruments at their disposal, including military resources” (European Council 2004, 18). This commitment represents an interesting breakthrough, because it reinforces the European security identity through an existential threat. Nilsson calls this process the “symbolic ‘Europeanisation “of the threat’” (Nilsson 2006, 81 cited in Argomaniz 2009, 158).

Other important elements of the Declaration include the reinforcement of previous counter-terrorism commitments that were established after 9/11. This strengthened political will to counter terrorism also manifested itself through the **updated Plan of Action** which presented seven strategic objectives to counter terrorism, encompassing the following guidelines:

- International cooperation shall be fostered. This entails the cooperation with the United Nations and their respective organs\(^\text{17}\). Furthermore, the international legal instruments shall be implemented by European member states.

- Terrorism financing has to be stopped. Therefore, the EU foresees “enhanced exchange of information on terrorist financing” (European Council 2004, 14) as well as the development of a strategy to detect and suppress financing of terrorist activities.

- Investigative and judicial capacities should be expanded to prevent\(^\text{18}\) attacks of terrorist nature.

- Border control and transport have to be secured through setting certain control mechanism.

- Crisis management in the wake of terrorist attacks has to be improved.

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\(^\text{17}\) Within the United Nations the following organs focus on Terrorism: the Counter Terrorism Committee, (Resolution 1373) the Counter Terrorism Implementation Task Force, the Sanctioning Committees (Resolution 1267), the Terrorism Prevention Branch of the United Nations Office for Drugs and Crimes, the General Assembly and the Security Council.

\(^\text{18}\)The move from reactive to terrorism prevention marks an important shift.
• Terrorist recruitment has to be countered with appropriate tools. Therefore, conductions conducive to the recruitment of people engaging with terrorism have to be developed.

• Cooperation in the area of capacity building with third countries should be expanded to tackle terrorism at its root (European Council 2004, 14ss.).

This revised Plan of Action set course for a new direction for European counter-terrorism efforts. Firstly, it developed a European security identity acknowledging terrorism as a common threat and secondly, it shifted the focus from reactive counter-terrorism measures to a more preventative approach. In doing so the revised Plan of Action recognised

“underlying factors that can lead to terrorism. (...) Because of its historical experience with terrorism, Europe considered it to be of crucial importance to understand what drove this new wave of terrorism in order to be able to dry up the sources of individuals' involvement in it” (Coolsaet 2010, 860).

Thirdly, together with the Declaration to Combat Terrorism this expanded the scope of security thinking into many other areas some of which are not necessarily directly linked to terrorism. The fourth strategic objective for example concerning transport surveillance aims at gathering information on the movement of people within the EU. Whilst it is crucial to monitor suspicious individuals or groups, other interests and legal standards have to be considered in this context as well. Efforts in these area may however prove problematic in the light of such other values and principles, since for instance the “use of biometrics in travel documents would place the majority of people in the EU under surveillance” (Hayes 2004, 3). Although limitations to the right to privacy may to some extent be justified under article 8 of the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR 1950, 10), such restrictions are considered permissible only if these restrictions are necessary, effective and adequate to pursue a legitimate goal. In this context, the Declaration together with the revised Plan of Action have to some extent resulted in a “repackaging security instruments as counter-terrorism to facilitate their rapid adoption”, thus serving to undermine common human and fundamental rights standards in the name of terrorism prevention (Argomaniz 2009, 158).
Following the Declaration to Combat Terrorism, the European Commission published five Communications on the issue of terrorism, encompassing the areas of 1) improved information-exchange in the area of police and judicial cooperation to tackle terrorist financing\(^\text{19}\); 2) the protection\(^\text{20}\) of critical infrastructure\(^\text{21}\); and 3) crisis-response management\(^\text{22}\) for EU member states. “These and other initiatives (…) reflect a reinvigorated policy expansion” (Argomaniz 2009, 159).

In November 2004, the European Commission presented the **Hague Programme**\(^\text{23}\) which was adopted by the European Council. For the time-span of 2004-2009, this Programme set out ten priorities for the European Union in the area of security, most of which specifically address terrorism as well as areas related to terrorism as the paramount concern of the EU. Most of these priorities constitute a continuation of previous efforts in this area (Europe 2014d; Hübner 2009, 95ss.).

Aside from these policy innovations, certain structural re-orientations changed the EU’s anti-terrorism framework as well. A **Counter-Terrorism Coordinator** was installed to oversee the EU’s operational framework as well as to “monitor the implementation of the EU counter-terrorism strategy” (Council of the European Union 2014). Furthermore, located in the second pillar, *i.e.* falling into the ambit of the Common Foreign and Security Policy, the Joint Situation Centre (SitCen) was established. Its goal is to assess terrorist threats in cooperation with Europol – indicating the emergence of a European intelligence structure. This notwithstanding, the attempt to establish a supranational European Intelligence service\(^\text{24}\) failed, being rejected by certain member states not wanting to sacrifice this particular aspect of their national sovereignty (Argomaniz 2009, 159ss.).


\(^{20}\) COM (2004) 702 led to the creation of the European Programme for Critical Infrastructure as well as the Critical Infrastructure Warning Information Network.

\(^{21}\) Critical infrastructure is defined as a “physical and information technology facilities, networks, services and assets which, if disrupted or destroyed, would have a serious impact on the health, safety, security or economic well-being of citizens or the effective functioning of governments in European Union (EU) countries” (Europe 2014c, 1).

\(^{22}\) COM (2004) 701

\(^{23}\) The Hague Programme is the continuation of the efforts instated through the Tampere Programme and the European Security Strategy.

\(^{24}\) The initiative was launched through a Belgian-Austrian motion.
In short, these endeavours signal a strong reaction to the Madrid bombings. This development was further accelerated by another, subsequent event – the bombings in London 2005.

3.2.2.3. 2005 London bombing

The bombing in London on 13 July 2005 provided the ground for yet another boost of the growing European security-web and underscored the need for an overall effort to streamline all counter-terrorism activities into a single unified framework. In the wake of this attack, the Council of the European Union pinpointed a wide range of issues deemed to be of crucial importance to suppress terrorist activities. Consequently, EU member states agreed on an extensive list of counter-terrorism measures, including the adoption of


Another important action included the adoption of the EC-directive concerning the retention of communication data\(^{25}\) in March 2006. This highly controversial directive mandated “telecommunication companies (...) to retain details of all telephone calls, e-mails and web traffic for a minimum period” (Wilkinson 2005, 34) (European Parliament et al. 2006, 1ss.; Argomaniz 2009, 160ss.). However, in 2014 the European Court of Justice ruled \(^{26}\) that even though data retention to fight criminals and terrorists is an important tool, the directive constituted a disproportionate curtailment of European citizen’s fundamental rights and therefore void (European Court of Justice 2014ss.).

In December 2005, \textit{i.e.} in the more or less immediate aftermath of the London bombings, the EU adopted a common \textbf{Counter-Terrorism Strategy}\(^{27}\) which is still in force today, pursuing four objectives as shown in Figure 5,

\(^{25}\) Directive 2006/24/EC
\(^{26}\) Joint case judgement C293/12 and C594/12.
\(^{27}\) Council of the European Union 14469/4/05
This Counter Terrorism Strategy is one central part of the endeavour to establish a European security identity. It seeks to respect human rights and “make Europe safer, allowing its citizens to live in an area of freedom, security and justice” (Council of the European Union 2005a, 3), while addressing different facets of terrorism in order to establish a comprehensive, harmonised and streamlined strategy against terrorism. The Strategy restructures the principles set out in the European Council’s Declaration on Combating Terrorism summarising the seven objectives into four pillars.

The strategy’s prevention-prong addresses causes that contribute to radicalisation and recruitment. It highlights domestic radicalisation as a key priority, thus placing “emphasis on the threat posed by “home-grown terrorism (in) an obvious reaction to the attacks”” (Monar 2007a, 296). In this regard, prevention focuses on intervention prior to the process of radicalisation being set in motion. Particular places such as prisons, educational facilities, and venues of religious gatherings are cited as possible breading grounds for radicalisation. Furthermore, the internet is identified as a recruitment tool warranting special scrutiny. Such deterrence is to be facilitated by previously taken legislative steps, such as the retention of communication-data. Additionally, moderate worldviews shall be strengthened. Ultimately, conditions conducive to radicalisation such as poor governance, weak socio-economic...
backgrounds and lack of opportunities are to be reduced (Council of the European Union 2005a, 2005b).

An assessment of this pillar has shown that deradicalisation as a preventive measure is crucial in counteracting terrorism, marking a pointed shift in perception. In the first years after 9/11 most member states argued that terrorism was an external threat, thus neglecting the possibility of domestic recruitment. However, after the Madrid bombings where the

“perpetrators did not seem to conform with the implicit standard terrorist profile of a devout Middle Eastern Muslim, but were rather connected with the significant Spanish-Moroccan migrant diaspora” (Coolsaet 2010, 867)

this notion changed incrementally. This realisation led to terrorism being increasingly addressed through the bottom-up approach of de-radicalisation. Essentially this served to widen the scope of actors involved. Social and political issues such as integration and representation have become conceived of as ranking prominently amongst the conditions conducive to terrorism. Therefore these issues have come to be considered “security-related objectives, thus securitizing social policies” (Coolsaet 2010, 869).

The pillar focusing on protection is of only indirect relevance to terrorism. Protection focuses on security in the area of border, transportation and infrastructure. Its goals is to establish Europe-wide monitoring systems for agencies such as Frontex. Allowing to “share and access information and if necessary deny access to the Schengen area” (Council of the European Union 2005a, 10). An assessment of this pillar’s success has shown, that given member states’ desire to manage migration as well as according pressure from the US, this area has been enhanced considerably ever since (Coolsaet 2010, 865s.; Bossong 2008).

The third pillar has the goal to track terrorist activities and dismantle them accordingly through preventing access to CBRN materials and uncovering and investigating alleged terrorist financing and recruitment. An assessment of the pillar has shown, that due to the fact that national police forces make use of the European Arrest Warrant ever more often, “more than 2,000 criminal suspects have been extradited on short notice. Dozens of cross-border terrorism-related investigations have been supported by Europol and Eurojust” (Coolsaet
2010, 866). Therefore, Europe-wide collaboration in criminal matters has become an established procedure (Vries 2006, 1ss; Coolsaet 2010, 866ss.).

The fourth and last pillar focuses on response. Seeing how attacks cannot be prevented entirely, emergency planning becomes a requirement in managing imminent attacks (Council of the European Union 2005a, 1ss.). In this regard approaches at a national have been preferred over European ones, limiting the European Commission's role to coordinate tasks. Meanwhile crisis management capacities have become an important asset for national governments in sustaining political legitimacy. Therefore, member states have been reluctant to hand over this key responsibility to any other authority. This notwithstanding, the European Commission has established the Community Mechanism for Civil Protection, which has been installed to handle crises emerging “after major terrorist attacks, but (its) involvement depends upon voluntary national offers in case of an emergency” (Coolsaet 2010, 866). Interestingly, when the mechanism was first established its main purpose was to manage natural catastrophes. Therefore, up until today it is administrated by the Environment Directorate-General (Coolsaet 2010, 866s.).

To sum up, this holistic EU Strategy recognised the multidimensional nature of terrorism and thus sought to encompass a wide set of layers to tackle this threat while also addressing its root causes. Very importantly, the definition of terrorist threats has widened in the sense that it has come to recognise terrorism as an internal as well as external security threats. The strategy had the advantage of “not only streamlining, but also institutionalizing, the intra-European collaboration in counterterrorism, which as a result reached cruising speed” (Coolsaet 2010, 861). The idea behind the “Strategy was to clarify to the European public the efforts that the Union is committing in this area” (Argomaniz 2009, 161). Furthermore, by recognising that terrorist threats may also stem from the domestic arena, it provided a justification for linking certain social policies to a security objective, thus spreading security across sectors in the quest for “concerted and collective European action” (Monar 2007a, 297).

By 2009, before the Treaty of Lisbon entered into force, in a report Gilles de Kerchove, the then Counter-Terrorism Coordinator summarises the progress made on a European level but also “identifies the major risk of a growing sense of “CT fatigue”” (Council of the European Union 2009, 18) engendered by a lack of threats within the EU. Despite some terrorists’
arrests being made, these incidents could not generate extensive public attention comparable to that after the attacks on New York, Madrid and London (Coolsaet 2010, 861; Council of the European Union 2009, 18; Argomaniz 2009, 163s.).

According to the European Council, this lack of public attention and perception has also led to inertia with regards to the implementation\(^{29}\) of counter-terrorism legislation on the national level. This issue is also taken up in a report by the EU-Counter-Terrorism Coordinator. As shown in Figure 6, some Conventions have not even been fully implemented and/or transposed more than a decade after their adoption (Argomaniz 2009, 300ss.). Monar (2007a) has “blamed this situation on the absence of strong enforcement powers [like sanctions] available for the Community institutions in the pre-Lisbon period” (Argomaniz 2009, 305).

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<td>Framework Decision on Combating Terrorism(^{32})</td>
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<td>Decision on the exchange of information and cooperation concerning terrorist offences(^{33})</td>
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<td>Convention on Mutual Assistance in Criminal Matters(^{34})</td>
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Figure 6 Remaining implementation of EU counter-terrorism legislatives by number of countries (Argomaniz 2010, 302s.)

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\(^{29}\) Here, implementation refers to the “initial stage of the transposition of the law into national legislation (...) and the subsequent application in practice (...) by national (...) authorities” (Argomaniz 2010, 298).

\(^{30}\) Agreement date: 13 June 2002; Transposition deadline: June 2004

\(^{31}\) Agreement date: 13 June 2002; Transposition deadline: June 2004

\(^{32}\) Agreement date: 13 June 2002; Transposition deadline: June 2004

\(^{33}\) Agreement date: 20 September 2005; Transposition deadline: June 2006

\(^{34}\) Agreement date: 29 May 2000; Transposition deadline December 2004
3.2.2.4. European security identity since the Treaty of Lisbon

The Treaty of Lisbon was signed in December 2007 and entered into force in 2009 amending the Treaty of the European Union and the Treaty of Rome.

The three pillar-structure, introduced by the Treaty of Maastricht in 1992, has been abolished. Instead it places the third pillar concerning Justice and Home Affairs under community administration, merging it with the first pillar, thus subjecting it to the rules of supranational European community law. This ‘depillarisation’ was intended to simplify procedures of the EU as well as enhance the status of the European Union as an actor in the international arena. This resulted in the establishment of a “single EU personality (Article 47 TEU) and a single treaty-making procedure” (Article 218 TFEU)” (Monar 2012, 21). Hopes were high, that this would lead to a strengthened European identity in the long run. Henceforth, the European Union as a security actor aims to further enhance the supranational “area of freedom justice and security” by defining internal and external security as a key objective of the EU.

So, similar to the previous treaties, the EU shall be a Union without internal borders whilst securing external borders to prevent illegal migration and criminal activities. Therefore, the status of agencies such as Europol, Eurojust and Frontex has been enhanced through widening the scope of their remit as well as endowing them with legal personality. This allows them not only to sign international agreements on their own behalf but also to introduce “an integrated management system for external borders” with clear implications for the activities of Frontex, the border-control agency” (Renard 2012, 3).

At the same time, the European Parliament has experienced a power-boost. In the attempt to make the EU more democratic, the European Parliament received more control to scrutinize agreements that fall in the area of Justice and Home Affairs. This gives them the power to decide on agreements made by the European Commission. In February 2010, the European Parliament successfully made use of its influence and refused to give its consent on the agreement between the EU and the US on Financial Messaging Data (European Parliament 2010, 1). Consequently, the European Parliament has the possibility to “influence more
fundamentally EU counterterrorism (...) policy by establishing a new balance between legitimate security concerns and EU normative (...) policy aspirations” (Renard 2012, 5).

Furthermore, under the new structure, more actors, such as the Directorate-General for Humanitarian Aid and Civil Protection, are involved within the European Commission in formulating counter terrorism policies (Renard 2012, 2ss.).

Aside from these efforts, the Treaty re-emphasised the need for solidarity between EU member states in the case of terrorist attacks on European soil. Building on the Declaration on Combating Terrorism the solidarity clause receives an institutional character which enhances the “potential for the EU’s internal and external policies on counterterrorism” (Renard 2012, 3). This clause can be compared to Article 5 of the NATO agreement which calls for united action of member states in case of an attack. In terms of internal security it is unlikely that the solidarity clause will lead to a “full-fledged EU response to a terrorist attack against a European member state” (Renard 2012, 3). However, in terms of external security, it buttresses the Common Foreign and Security Policy. Also, this clause indicates a growing perception among EU member states that the suppression of terrorism increasingly requires a military response, thus approximating the US's approach to terrorism that reduces terrorism to a military threat (Hübner 2009, 208s.).

In terms of external security, foreign policy has been strengthened through the establishment of the European External Action Service. This institution somewhat resembles a foreign ministry, and aims to bring more coherency and consistency to European policy and action abroad. The external security objectives, as defined in the European Security Strategy36 in 2003, however have not been changed by this.

Furthermore, the office of High Representative was established and tasked to act as the European voice in Foreign Affairs and Security Policy. Furthermore, the position is intended to “coordinate simultaneously various EU external policies as well as the foreign policies of the 27 member states” (Renard 2012, 8). This however, has been met with resistance by member states who want to maintain their national integrity in the international arena (Renard 2012, 8).

36 They include terrorism, proliferation of WMD, regional conflicts, failed states and organised crime.
The sanctioning mechanism remains crucial foreign policy tools, though previously they only targeted states and did not apply to natural and legal entities and groups without state authority. However, the Treaty of Lisbon has reassessed this mechanism and added non-state actors to its ambit, thus complementing corresponding efforts of the United Nations, such as Resolution 1267 (1999). The Al-Qaeda Sanctions List created by this resolution encourages states to freeze the assets, impose travel bans and arms embargoes against individuals and entities under suspicion of being associated with Al-Qaeda.

In 2010, shortly after the Treaty of Lisbon entered into force, the Internal Security Strategy was adopted by the Council of the European Union. The Strategy followed the adoption of the Stockholm Programme\textsuperscript{37} including an Action Plan for implementation, which set out the policy priorities for the EU for a period of four years in the form of a roadmap for the “Area of Justice, Freedom and Security”. Building on the forerunner Programmes of Tampere and Hague, it highlights the following priorities.

Firstly, peaceful coexistence between European citizens shall be guaranteed through mutual respect for human rights, as this will help in developing awareness on racism, discrimination and radicalisation.

Secondly, by strengthening police and judicial cooperation as well as continuing the implementation process of respective legislation, standards are set that will help to create a just Europe.

Thirdly, citizens shall be protected from cross-border crime. Accordingly, an internal security strategy will be drafted.

Fourthly, the “Commission will take actions to further develop the integrated approach to managing the EU’s external borders” (Europa 2014e, 1).

\textsuperscript{37} Official Journal of the European Union 2010/C 115/01
Fifthly, the EU will develop a migration policy that builds on the cooperation with third countries and the necessities of the labour market. This shall help “tackle illegal migration through readmission agreements and return policies” (Europe 2014e, 1).

Finally, the Stockholm Programme and its Action Plan highlight the need to harmonise the “internal and external dimension of justice, freedom and security policies” (Europe 2014e, 1).

As mandated by the third priority of the Stockholm Programme and its action plan, an **Internal Security Strategy** was adopted in February 2010, with the aim to create a common agenda “on internal security that enjoys the support of all Member States, EU institutions, civil society and local authorities, and interestingly enough, the EU security industry” (Carrera et al. 2011, 199). The objectives of the Internal Security Strategy circumscribe the four pillars (prevent, protect, pursue, respond) of the EU’s Counter-Terrorism Strategy. As shown in the **final implementation report of the EU Internal Security Strategy 2010-2014** the following developments could be observed.

In this context, the area of **prevention** made extensive progress. Not only was an EU-US tracking-system to detect terrorism financing (TFTP) implemented but also, in 2011, a “Radicalisation Awareness Network” (RAN), was created, engaging various unit levels in the prevention of radicalisation (European Commission 2014, 6). Triggered by contemporary developments in the MENA region, in particular the Syrian civil war and the declaration of the Islamic State, the EU identified “**foreign fighters**” and returnees as one of the key challenges that lie ahead. A report of the International Centre for the Study of Radicalisation has shown, that that “**Western Europeans now represent up to 18% of the foreign fighter population in Syria, with most recruits coming from France, (...) Britain (...), Germany (...), Belgium(...), and the Netherlands**” (Zelin 2013,1).

More detailed numbers are depicted in Figure 7. Given the limited degree of certainty on the issue, this table lists Western European countries and their estimated lowest and highest number of foreign fighters. Furthermore, the last column shows the amount of foreign fighters in a per-million-capita-relation to a country’s overall population (Zelin 2013, 1ss.).
This development certainly heralds re-emergence of counter terrorism, thus helping to revitalise counter terrorism efforts on a European level.

The EU devised a way to detect and contain foreign fighters by interconnecting “national travel monitoring systems and (...) address[ing] the legal issues. (...) Member States should continue to make full use of the (...) (TFTP) and they should also push for UN listing of individuals who facilitate and organise travel of foreign fighters” (Council of the European Union 2014b, 2).

In the area of protection, the Strategy endeavours to strengthen external borders and enhance cooperation within involved agencies. To that end, three new regulations were presented, namely, the 1) Schengen governance legislation designed to enhance trust within the area, 2) Schengen information system (SISII) and 3) Visa Information Systems which “consists of legislative proposals for an Entry/Exit System (EES) and a Registered Traveller Programme (RTP) both of which are currently being discussed” (European Commission 2014, 9).

In the context of pursuit the Strategy lists successful cross-border cooperation via Europol amongst the greatest achievements. Under the title of “Prevention of and Fight against Crime”, Europol has so far assisted in the exchange of 220.000 operation messages and the opening of 13.500 cases. Whether or not they are connected to terrorism is, however, not apparent (European Commission 2014, 9s.).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Low Estimate</th>
<th>High Estimate</th>
<th>Per Capita</th>
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<tr>
<td>Austria</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>60</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Belgium</td>
<td>76</td>
<td>296</td>
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<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>France</td>
<td>63</td>
<td>412</td>
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</tr>
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<td>34</td>
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<tr>
<td>Ireland</td>
<td>11</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Luxemburg</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Netherlands</td>
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<td>152</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Norway</td>
<td>33</td>
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<td>8</td>
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<tr>
<td>Spain</td>
<td>34</td>
<td>95</td>
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<td>Sweden</td>
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<tr>
<td>United Kingdom</td>
<td>43</td>
<td>366</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Figure 7 Foreign Fighters from Western Europe in Syria (Zelin 2013,1)
Finally, under the response-prong both the EU Civil Protection Mechanism and the Emergency Response Coordination Centre were established in 2013 (European Commission 2014, 1ss.)

Summing up the developments since the Treaty of Lisbon, the following remarks can be made. By abolishing the pillar structure, the EU intended to become a more coherent actor in the international arena as well as “craft more coherent policies at the EU level” (Renard 2012, 13). This sought-for internal coherence can be detected in the many overlapping areas of the Stockholm Programme and the Internal Security Strategy, underscoring common priorities of the EU in the area of security. Nonetheless, Keohane (2006) has argued, that EU counter-terrorism policies lack a general sense for priority, because “counterterrorism efforts only make sense when they are included in a broader framework, for counterterrorism is not an end in itself” (Renard 2012, 15).

The Treaty of Lisbon marks the latest step in the evolutionary process of European integration. It is important to recognise the EU’s role in formulating counter-terrorism policies because it tries to bring all member states on the same page. Both in terms of external and internal security, under the Common Foreign and Security policy, it acts as a coordinator between member states. In so doing, it adds value by “strengthening national capabilities, facilitating European cooperation, developing collective capabilities, and promoting international partnerships” (Renard 2012, 16).

As past trends have shown, the absence of terrorist attacks decreased the political will to counter terrorism. However, recent incidents have moved terrorism back to the political agenda. The current phenomenon of foreign fighters certainly boosts the threat-perception regarding possible attacks on a pan-European level, thus mobilising a multitude of unit levels.
4. Conclusion

Coming back to my research question, the goal of this master thesis was to highlight the impact of the Global War on Terrorism on the development of the European security identity.

I approached this task by first introducing the Copenhagen School's theoretical framework. This School seeks out to highlight the changing nature of security and how particular securities are accepted in the course of a speech act. This assumption was later modified into a procedural approach, because one instant does not allow us the capture all implications involved in the process of securitisations. This enabled me to elaborate on the understanding of security underlying this thesis. Many traditional schools reduce security to “objective” therefore military threats. However, working with this assumption would render the picture of the current security landscape incomplete. Therefore, by introducing a total of five sectors, the Copenhagen School widens the scope of possibilities to perceive and act upon security. This is relevant in so far as it shows that any issue can become a security concern in the presence of an existential threat. To underscore this assumption, the concept of securitisation was presented. This process can be summarized as an action which is set into motion by a security actor that declares an existential threat to a referent object and calls for the employment of extraordinary measures to address this threat. This tool is useful insofar, as it can be applied to many different levels, including a system-wide analysis. In consequence, this theoretical framework was applied to a contemporary situation, namely the Global War on Terrorism.

The declaration of the War on Terrorism in the aftermath of 9/11 had a serious impact on elevating the perception of the threat posed by terrorism on a global scale. The course embarked on by the US administration to suppress terrorism, influenced many countries and entities, the European Union being one of them. Even though, its mission to combat terrorism was considered relatively successful in the first years after its declaration, in the aftermath of the Iraq invasion, it has decreasingly lost support. Even though, the Global War on Terrorism has suffered from crumbling domestic support, it has nonetheless raised terrorism as a global concern on most national agendas.
This theoretical basis, in turn enabled me to assess the implications of the War on Terrorism on the European Union’s security policies and the formation of a European security identity.

The European security identity developed through two respective elements. First of all, the European integration process formed the basis of analysis. Given Europe's bloody history, European integration is seen as a possibility to avoid friction and conflict between European states. Therefore, in this context, Europe's historical narrative is a referent object. Secondly, the Global War on Terrorism has had a significant influence on the formation of the European security identity. Prior to 9/11 2001, terrorism had been on the national agenda of many European member states, but pan-European cooperation was lacking because it was not considered a transnational challenge at that time. The Treaty of Maastricht and the Treaty of Amsterdam characterized the European Union as an area of freedom, justice and security. Therefore at this time already, establishing intergovernmental judicial and police cooperation between EU-member states to fight crime, including terrorism, had been on the EU’s agenda. Even though there were some initial endeavours to counter terrorism on a supranational level, it was not until 9/11 that terrorism extensively influenced the European security identity.

The US administration framed the threat emanating from terrorism to pertain not only to the country itself, but to all those countries believing in freedom and democracy. European leadership allied with the US administration and started focusing its efforts on counter-terrorism measures and instruments. On the one hand this included establishing an institutional framework to address the threat posed by terrorism. On the other hand this meant the adoption of legal instruments to suppress terrorism within the European Union.

The attacks of 9/11 had a huge impact on the reframing of the European security policies. However, the extent of these initials endeavours have declining by 2004. Even though, the Global War on Terrorism started the reshaping process of the European security identity, it was the emergence of terrorist bombings in Europe that accelerated the growing European security concerns. Increasing interconnectedness in many areas was the result, including areas that were not traditionally associated with terrorism. Furthermore, by introducing a solidarity
clause that calls upon European member states to assist each other in the aftermath of an attack, the threat has been “Europeanised”. This contributed to the deepening of the emerging European security identity. Furthermore, it was enhanced by recognising that threats of this nature are produced by internal dynamics.

To sum up, the development of the European security identity was not linear but followed a particular structure. After an attack, many new issues became appropriated in the name of security. This however was followed by a declining threat perception and political will to implement regulations and justify extraordinary means until another attack occurred. In recent months, the issue of foreign fighters has revitalised counter terrorism on the EU’s security agenda. This indicates an increasing domestic motivation that in turn bolsters the resurgence of terrorism as a collective security threat in Europe. Even though with regard to this new wave of terrorism, so far no attack has occurred on European soil, the trend indicates a continued solidification of the securitisation of terrorism.
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Annex 1: (Cheney 2002): War on Terror Most Urgent U.S. Task

The future security of the United States, and the hopes of the civilized world, depend on America's continued leadership in the war on terror, Vice President Dick Cheney said in a wide ranging speech August 7 in San Francisco at the Commonwealth Club of California.

"Even with a very full agenda for this fall and beyond, never for a moment do the President and I forget the most important responsibility we have: To protect this nation against further attack, and win the war that began on September 11," he said.

The attacks of 9/11 confront the United States "with a whole new set of considerations -- from our ongoing vulnerability to international terrorism, to the possibility that terrorists will gain access to weapons of mass destruction," he said.

"In the rubble of Afghanistan we've found confirmation, if any were needed, that bin Laden and the al-Qaeda network are seriously interested in nuclear and radiological weapons, and in biological and chemical agents."

"In the case of Saddam Hussein, we have a dictator who is clearly pursuing these capabilities -- and has used them, both in his war against Iran and against his own people."

And, "as President Bush has made very clear, the government of the United States will not look the other way as threats accumulate against us," Cheney said.

"Deliverable weapons of mass destruction in the hands of terrorists would expose this nation and the civilized world to the worst of horrors. And we will not allow it. We will not live at the mercy of terrorists or terror regimes," the Vice President said.

On the global economic situation, the Bush administration "strongly supports a new round of global trade negotiations," Cheney said.

"We're also working with nations in Central and South America to establish a Free Trade Area of the Americas by January of 2005. We will move quickly to build free trade relationships
with individual nations such as Chile, Singapore, and Morocco. Such agreements, and others we intend to pursue, will create jobs in America and hope around the world."

Every advance for global trade, he said, is an opportunity to expand the U.S. economy, and include more U.S. citizens in the nation's prosperity.

"Just as we stand to gain from wider trade, so do our trading partners -- especially the less developed nations. For them, the stakes are even higher. Short-term grants and foreign aid can only go so far. In the long term, open trade and investment can bring their first real hope for material uplift -- all the more when economic reforms are joined with political freedom."

Many nations on the path of democracy and open economies, he said, "look to the United States as an example, and an ally. They rely on our support, our encouragement, and our leadership in the world -- and we must always provide it."

Discussing the current U.S. economic situation, Cheney said in the last 18 months "the United States has gone through a serious economic slowdown -- a great national emergency - - a war abroad -- and a series of scandals in corporate America."

But despite all this, he said, "there is no doubt" about the nation's strength.

The primary objective of the administration's economic policy is faster growth that leads to new jobs, Cheney said. He presented economic statistics that show higher worker productivity in the last four quarters, a rise in personal income in the month of June at the fastest pace in two years, and the sale in June of new homes at an all-time high.

In addition, he said, the number of unemployment claims "has remained below the 400,000 mark for most of the last nine weeks. Industrial production has been rising since January, after 17 months of almost steady decline. Mortgage interest rates stand at near 30-year lows. Inflation remains firmly under control."

Cheney also praised the new measures against corporate corruption in the U.S. that President Bush signed into law recently.
"When there is corporate fraud, the American people can be certain that the government will fully investigate, arrest, and prosecute those responsible," Cheney said.

Following is a transcript of his remarks:

THE WHITE HOUSE

Office of the Press Secretary

August 7, 2002

REMARKS BY THE VICE PRESIDENT TO THE COMMONWEALTH CLUB OF CALIFORNIA

Fairmont Hotel San Francisco, California
Annex 2: Address to the Nation on the Terrorist Attacks (Bush 2001a)

Good evening.

Today our fellow citizens, our way of life, our very freedom came under attack in a series of deliberate and deadly terrorist acts. The victims were in airplanes or in their offices: secretaries, business men and women, military and Federal workers, moms and dads, friends and neighbors. Thousands of lives were suddenly ended by evil, despicable acts of terror.

The pictures of airplanes flying into buildings, fires burning, huge structures collapsing have filled us with disbelief, terrible sadness, and a quiet, unyielding anger. These acts of mass murder were intended to frighten our Nation into chaos and retreat, but they have failed. Our country is strong.

A great people has been moved to defend a great nation. Terrorist attacks can shake the foundations of our biggest buildings, but they cannot touch the foundation of America. These acts shattered steel, but they cannot dent the steel of American resolve. America was targeted for attack because we're the brightest beacon for freedom and opportunity in the world. And no one will keep that light from shining.

Today our Nation saw evil, the very worst of human nature. And we responded with the best of America, with the daring of our rescueworkers, with the caring for strangers and neighbors who came to give blood and help in any way they could.

Immediately following the first attack, I implemented our Government's emergency response plans. Our military is powerful, and it's prepared. Our emergency teams are working in New York City and Washington, DC, to help with local rescue efforts.

Our first priority is to get help to those who have been injured and to take every precaution to protect our citizens at home and around the world from further attacks.

The functions of our Government continue without interruption. Federal agencies in Washington which had to be evacuated today are reopening for essential personnel tonight and will be open for business tomorrow. Our financial institutions remain strong, and the American economy will be open for business as well.
The search is underway for those who are behind these evil acts. I've directed the full resources of our intelligence and law enforcement communities to find those responsible and to bring them to justice. We will make no distinction between the terrorists who committed these acts and those who harbor them.

I appreciate so very much the Members of Congress who have joined me in strongly condemning these attacks. And on behalf of the American people, I thank the many world leaders who have called to offer their condolences and assistance.

America and our friends and allies join with all those who want peace and security in the world, and we stand together to win the war against terrorism.

Tonight I ask for your prayers for all those who grieve, for the children whose worlds have been shattered, for all whose sense of safety and security has been threatened. And I pray they will be comforted by a power greater than any of us, spoken through the ages in Psalm 23: "Even though I walk through the valley of the shadow of death, I fear no evil, for You are with me."

This is a day when all Americans from every walk of life unite in our resolve for justice and peace. America has stood down enemies before, and we will do so this time. None of us will ever forget this day. Yet, we go forward to defend freedom and all that is good and just in our world.

Thank you. Good night, and God bless America.
This thesis seeks out to answer the question on how the Global War on Terrorism affected the European Union’s security concept and identity.

This question is approached through the theoretical lens of the Copenhagen School. This School works around central concepts such as securitisation, security sectors, regional security complexes and at last macrosecuritisation. These elements form an interconnected web of security issues which are essential to understand the constantly changing nature of security. As such, security can be interpreted as an existential threat that requires securing to guarantee the survival of a referent object.

This theoretical basis leads me to analyse the contemporary situation of the Global War on Terrorism. In this context, I emphasise on the European Union’s changing security identity which developed through two respective elements. The European Integration process and the influence of the declaration on the Global War on Terrorism. Even though counter terrorism measures have already been in place to some extent prior 9/11, it was not until after the attacks that terrorism appropriated many new spheres in the name of security. Furthermore, by recognising that terrorism is also produced by internal dynamics within the European Union – the threat has been “Europeanised”. A common reaction in the form of a solidarity clause institutionalises the European security identity. While these developments indicate intensified European cooperation, they are also accompanied by inertia if no major attacks occur. However, in more recent years the issue of foreign fighters has revitalised the European security agenda. In face of this resurgence the European collective security threat is witnessing a new wave, which indicate a continued solidification of the securitisation of terrorism.
7.1. Abstract (german)

Diese Masterarbeit versucht den Einfluss des „Global War on Terrorism“ auf die Sicherheitsidentität der Europäischen Union zu ergründen.

Der theoretische Rahmen wird durch die Kopenhagener Schule bestimmt. Diese beschäftigt sich mit der zentralen Frage von Sicherheit und untersucht unter welchen Bedingungen Sicherheit geschaffen werden kann. Dabei stützt sie sich auf die Annahme, dass Sicherheit das Überleben in Anbetracht einer existenziellen Bedrohung bedeutet. Im Rahmen dieser Überlegungen werden die Instrumente der Schule vorgestellt, welche ein dichtes Sicherheitsnetzwerk begründen und somit die Untersuchung der stetig wandelnden Natur von Sicherheit ermöglichen.

# 8. Educational resume of the author

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Luca Klara Pajer</th>
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<tbody>
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<td>Contact Information</td>
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<tr>
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