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„Divided in Freedom: How British-Colonial Paradigms of Nationhood Influenced Ethnic Landscapes in India, Pakistan and Sri Lanka“

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Abstract
This thesis examines connections between British-colonial conceptualization of ethno-religious division and its role in defining modern-day ethnic fracture(s) in three post-colonial states. The paper uses archival information to analyze the historical interface of ethnic concepts between the British and their colonial subjects in India, Pakistan and Sri Lanka in order to offer a further understanding of the nature of internal tension in each country. The author finds that the manner in which pre-modern British cultural conceptions were present in the framing of national demands at independence resulted in differing amounts of ethnic tension in each of the three countries. This suggests that the interaction of colonial policy with indigenous ethnic landscapes provided different post-colonial experiences to former colonies after independence.
Introduction: The Peril of Perception

“Representative government in a single nation, harmonious, homogeneous, in one society is understandable, but you have got only to apply your mind a few minutes. Can such a system ever work or succeed when you have two different nations, more than two different nations?”

- M.A. Jinnah, Madras, 1941

At first glance, University of Karachi seemed similar to many Western educational campuses. The buildings themselves are organized in clusters and all are of a 1960’s modernist design. In one of these buildings’ outdoor courtyards, I noticed groups of students milling about between classes, much as would occur at institutions I had attended in the past. My host at KU pointed to one of them. “That’s where the MQM sits,” she informed me, referring to one of the country’s ethnicity-based political movements. As she went on to explain where other ethnic groups of students had staked out territory in other parts of the courtyard, I was reminded of social groupings that crop up one way or another in most educational institutions in developed, Western countries. Then my host casually mentioned that one prominent student at the university had been summarily killed after refusing to join and lead one of the student political cadres. On the surface, the scene before me looked familiar. In reality, the actuality of mortal peril inherent in university life was beyond internalization by my own Western, Anglo-Saxon background.

In many ways, that courtyard serves as a microcosm for the broader ethnic divisions that exist in the rest of Pakistan and many other developing countries.¹ These divisions are neither considered superficial nor are they recent developments. Instead, such ethnic divisions have been

¹ Post-colonial ethnic division has been highly visible at universities in south Asia for many years. For example, Inskeep notes that the student body at University of Karachi was already militantly divided into “Sindhis, Bengalis, Baloch, Punjabis…Pashtuns” and Mohajirs in the 1970’s (2011, 172). Unrest over Bengali language and culture was evident at Dacca University in East Bengal (present day Bangladesh) and began almost immediately after independence (Oldenburg, 1985, 717).
reinterpreted and sometimes intensified through centuries of colonial rule. As these countries seek to develop and encourage investment in the post-colonial environment, they remain bound by ethno-religious narratives of unity and discord that were heavily influenced by their colonial pasts. In some cases, local perceptions of these colonial conceptualizations serve to promote cohesion of those from many backgrounds. In others, divisions fostered by Western rulers served to promote an intensified continuation of strife after the colonial overseer’s departure from the region.

The colonial era is often regarded monolithically as a disastrous setback for newly constructed post-colonial nation-states. This view represents an oversimplified generalization. The immediate economic and human consequences during the colonial era were negative on the whole for colonized regions. However, the manner in which a colonial power chose to govern native populations, while creating infrastructure and transferring power-structuring institutional frameworks, played a large role in determining a country’s potential to avoid civil strife and, by extension, to unite and develop after gaining independence. Essentially linked to the creation of stable government is a colonizing power’s perception of the ethnicity or ethnicities of the subaltern populations they conquered. These colonial categories were not formed in a vacuum. Instead, they were informed by preexisting divisions as observed by the colonizer through conquest and during rule.

This thesis will focus on three modern states where consequences of colonial ethnic conceptualization remain especially evident: Pakistan, India and Sri Lanka. In each case, the colonizing power capitalized similarly on its understanding of pre-existing divisions in order to solidify its hold on power or achieve economic goals. These states shared a single colonizer, Great Britain, and thus a single colonial modus operandi. However, in governing each colonial space the British developed differing taxonomies of ethnicity, resulting in the creation of modern countries
dominated by multi-ethnic, uni-ethnic and bi-ethnic politics, respectively. Taking these countries as case studies, this text will advance the notion that the construction of British-colonial ethnic categories and the reinterpretation of colonial ethnicity-related policy by indigenous populations played a role in determining a country’s prospects for a lack of destructive civil conflict in the post-colonial era. In order to do so, it will analyze the colonial origins of conceptualization of ethnic and religious identities in these former colonies in order to better illuminate the manner in which such concepts have affected their modern day ethnic landscapes. Its further comparison may suggest that those countries with more readily apparent ethno-religious divisions created through colonization are more prone to civil strife in the modern era. The opposite is true of those in which the colonial period created an overarching narrative of unity while encompassing a plurality of coexistent ethnic identities. Through this, it will suggest that the ethnicity-based aspects of colonialism may have had a varying impact on ethnic tension in the independent offspring of the Crown’s and other colonizers’ possessions, eschewing a peaceable environment in some, while placing others at a relative advantage in the modern world order.

**On Ethnic Differences and Civil Division: Past Studies**

From an empirical standpoint, there are numerous works regarding colonial policy, development, and ethnicity, both in general and pertaining to south Asia specifically. Below I will outline some of these studies with an eye to the broader effects of the policies of colonial powers and to the effect of varying ethnic composition and British colonialism specifically on the presence of civil strife and post-colonial development in India, Pakistan and Sri Lanka.

*The Diverse Legacy of Colonial Powers*

Building on the plethora of literature suggesting that the identity of the colonizer has great explanatory potential for determining economic growth and the development of lasting democratic
institutions, Lange, Mahoney and Vom Hau have investigated the legacy of the modus operandi of a colonizer’s economic system in determining development (2006,1413). The study, which surveyed former colonies of the UK and Spain, found that nationality of the colonizer, along with the level and type of institutional development in which that colonizer choose to invest, resulted in higher overall levels of HDI development for former British possessions after they had achieved independence, especially in cases where Britain invested heavily in market-oriented institutions (1414-5, 1448).

It also mentions that India and Pakistan experienced a roughly intermediate to low level of institutional investment while Sri Lanka’s was only slightly higher, and thus that these countries show lower levels of development than their high-investment British colonial counterparts (1429). Thus, this work does lend credence to the fact that colonial experiences did not produce the same types of uniformly negative results for colonial regions. However, it does not offer an explanation for why development levels would continue to differ or civil strife would persist today in regions such as south Asia, where levels of investment in institutional transference were similar. The simple persistence of colonial economic systems is therefore insufficient to explain discrepancies in the pace of development in regions with a single colonizer and the application of a similar colonial mindset.

In order to investigate the long-term development effects of colonial policy on development and civil violence after the withdrawal of colonial administration, Lange partners with Dawson in a subsequent study. They find that British colonial policies were especially likely to result in internal ethnic strife (2009, 800). In making this discovery, they also note that countries with longer colonial periods, where few European immigrants were introduced during colonial times, tend to experience

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2 The survey notes that, as opposed to Spain, which emphasized mercantilism in its colonial economic system, the British often pursued a relatively more market-oriented approach. As a result, former Spanish colonies with the weakest institutions exhibited stronger development, while the opposite was true for former British colonies (1450).

3 Lange, Mahoney, and Vom Hau do mention the segregation of British India’s army along religious and caste-based lines (1447). They note that such policy could encourage sectarian violence but cite only the partition of India and Pakistan as an example. They do not note any further divisions.
more civil strife (798). This profile fits with India, Pakistan and Sri Lanka. Yet, their levels of growth and strife are not relatively homogenous.

Lange and Dawson’s 2009 study also culls a useful eight-faceted framework for the analysis of sources of strife in colonial policy, including: “(1. By constructing oppositional identities, (2. Institutionalizing an ethnic-based division of labor, (3. Creating ethnic-based hierarchies, (4. Introducing foreign populations, (5. Imposing arbitrary political borders, (6. Promoting despotic forms of rule, (7. Institutionalizing ineffective states, and (8. Opening a power vacuum at independence.” (786). Using this framework, they essentially find that the prevalence of communal violence in former British possessions was especially due to the first five ethnicity-related factors (806). But, with regard to south Asia they mention only religious divisions that became institutionalized in modern nation-states of Pakistan and India after colonialism, while not addressing remaining strife and division that persists internally.

Like the earlier study, the above work finds that different types of colonialism lead to different post-colonial outcomes. Although their study proves overall that there is a positive correlation between levels of civil strife and the presence of a colonial power, the relationship differs highly for different types of civil unrest, such as civil war, and by the identity of the colonizer (2009, 807). In doing so, the authors of the survey make an important cautionary point regarding moral grounding and empirical research regarding the effects of colonialism. The moral bias in “Anti-colonialism is so powerful,” they write, “that an entire discipline -- postcolonial studies -- has been organized in an attempt to highlight all of the negative effects colonialism had on colonized people… while academic anti-colonialism might be justifiable on moral grounds, it can pose a threat to empirical investigation” (785-86). By warning against moral blanket statements regarding colonization, the point is emphasized that both colonial policy and ethnic division did have a role to
play in affecting countries’ post-colonial experiences. These experiences were not similar, nor were they monolithically negative in the same ways simply because they were occupied by a colonial power.

This truth of differences is evident in the colonial stories and ethnic dividing lines of India, Pakistan and Sri Lanka. Though colonized by the same Western power each displays relatively different levels of HDI development and amounts of ethnic division (HDI UNDP, 2014). Said ethnic divisions will be described below:

**India:**

Since the end of the colonial period India has experienced much less outright ethnic strife than its other south Asian post-colonial neighbors. This is not because of an absence of ethnic or religious diversities or differences. On the contrary, the modern day country is characterized by one of the “most heterogeneous and complex [societies] on earth” to the point at which some analysts of India have preferred to avoid using the term ‘ethnicity’ to describe different groups in the country (Manor, 1996, 459). In order to better understand how the interaction of various identities has served as a possible unifying force Manor has attempted to overcome the dilemma of this complexity by developing a taxonomy of four relevant types of ethnic identities which are prevalent in India: Religious, Linguistic, separate identities of Hindu-related tribes and that of non-Hindu tribes (461-2). The first two of these four identities are most important as they often intersect with one another, but in such a way that they “almost never…reinforce one another” as is the case in countries such as Sri Lanka or Pakistan (ibid). In fact, this nature of overlapping complexity may be what moves India toward a broader sense of national unity. Although some evidence exists that the Muslim minority, especially in regions where Muslims controlled the administration of certain princely states during the colonial era, more readily asserts its unique identity at times when it feels
particularly frustrated or threatened by Hindu majority politics, these episodes appear to be highly regional and short-lived in nature (Benson, 1983, 55). This appears to be because, in a broader context, most in India hold multiple identities among which they can choose, making the concept of sub-national ethnicity somewhat fluid. Thus, while this situation does not preclude the possibility of any violence along an ethnic, religious, or tribal line, the plurality of the individual’s ethnic identities tends to prevent any one of those identities from gaining lasting traction as “Conflict among castes subverts Hindu solidarity and makes Hindu-Muslim conflict less likely. Regional [and linguistic] divisions undermine interregional alliances on religious and class lines. Caste, class and religious conflicts damage regional solidarity. Urban-rural rivalry weighs against most other types of conflict” (Manor, 1996, 466).

In attempting to explain the origins of these overlapping Indian identities, Manor’s article ironically notes the role of the British in defining the borders of Indian states without regard for linguistic differences as it conquered the subcontinent. Although such internal border definition possibly served to prevent opposition from forming to British rule by depriving those in any given province of a common native language through which they could communicate extensively, he theorizes that it has provided a boon to the ability of India’s people to effectively participate in a ‘normal’ political process in the post-colonial environment (1996, 466). When said borders were reorganized with linguistic differences in mind during the 1950’s, the former arbitrary border delimitations gave time for other non-language based identities to develop. This example points to the fact that some other aspects of India’s current ethnic situation could have colonial origins.

Varshney builds on this possibility by acknowledging the importance of the British colonial presence when it comes to defining a sweeping distinction between Hindus and Muslims. However, he points out that these divisions were not randomly created out of a singular colonial strategy to
‘divide and conquer’. Although British colonial policy did seek to exacerbate divisions between native populations, it was inconceivable to the British of the colonial era, who “could only think in terms of pre-modern religious communities,” that the two groups could constitute one nation (1997, 2). Thus, it would seem that the British’s own temporal-cultural grounding did play a role in the selection of division promotion. That said, it does not signify that these divisions were completely arbitrary constructions of only the colonizer. Indeed, the fact the colonial-era Indians responded to the British imposition of religious division speaks to the fact that “Hindus and Muslims may have existed before the British came to India, [even if] these names did not refer to large political entities. They only signified small, individual, and village based cultural identities” (Varshney, 2002, 34). In this, it becomes apparent that as divisions were created in British India, their construction was not the exclusive providence of the colonizing force. Instead, a mingling of both cultural viewpoints resulted in a hybridization of division conceptualization between already existent pre-colonial ideas of difference and British judgment as to importance of those differentials. Both UK and local actors became tacitly involved in re-defining societal differences on the sub-continent as their criteria for discerning differences between groups interacted.

Pakistan:

From the case of post-colonial India it is clear that the Crown played a role in creating modern ethnic conceptualizations in the south Asian region as one result of its colonial agenda. In India, colonial policy resulted in a multifaceted nation that can often transcend possible points of fracture. However, despite the fact that India and Pakistan constituted a single colonial space and administration, the latter of the two countries has been more violently split along ethnic lines. Over time, various explanations have been posited for this differential, some focusing on indigenous or religious cultural precepts, and others centering on colonial policy toward ethnic concepts. In the
literature, there has also been some confusion as to the post-independence categorization of ethnicity in Pakistan.

Some of these theories for explanation of differentials in the strength of national-state identity in India and Pakistan point to differences in religious theory. Ironically, in describing the multi-faceted nature of Indian identity, or identities, Manor hits upon a difference between Hinduism and Islam, which may have stark implications for Pakistan. “Hinduism”, he points out, “differs from the world's other great religious and cultural traditions in that it is not univocal: it is not focused upon a single sacred text and a single god or historical figure [whereas] Muslims look to the Qur'an, the Prophet Muhammad and Allah” (1996, 464). The fact that the religious worldview of modern India’s majority is pluralistic in nature, and by extension more tolerant of other ideas could partially explain ethno-religious coexistence on the part of Hindus with the Muslim populations in India, and the increased presence of internal intransigence on the part of Pakistanis within their own country toward non-Muslims and other Muslim ethnic groups. However, it does not account for the relative willingness to integrate with larger society on the part of Indian Muslims, nor the perpetration of ethno-religion-based violence on the part of both religious groups at the time of the partition of the British Empire on the Indian sub-continent (Inskeep, 2011, 54-60).

In addition to the Muslim-Hindu colonial era religious dynamic, Pakistan has subsequently exhibited higher levels of internal ethnic strife. Beyond the aforementioned differences in faith-based values, some have pointed to the massive influx or migration of refugees that Pakistan incurred as a result of the 1947 partition and subsequent internal instability factors. As Yinger observes, “Refugees are almost certainly destined for a prolonged period as seriously handicapped ethnic minorities, especially when they make up a high proportion of the population in a country
with few economic opportunities, such as Somalia, *Pakistan*, Jordan, and Sudan*” (1985, 160). Although the 1947 migration during the partition was two-way in nature, it is true that the Islamic republic has experienced increasing tensions as various migrant refugee and indigenous ethnic groups vie for power and influence. Here, the legacy of the colonial organizational framework, when combined with partition-related refugee patterns and the power implications which those patterns carry, make the structure of these divisions less than transparent owing to the ambiguous status of refugees as a separate ethnic bloc in public life.

Like India, Pakistan inherited its internal administrative bodies from the British upon receiving independence. However, these structures were divided along ethnic and linguistic lines, instead of cutting across them. Thus, while “Administratively, after 1947 there was substantial structural and procedural carry-over from Britain to Pakistan” it mostly served to reinforce a colonial “central policy toward the minority areas” (Khalilzad, 1984-85, 663). This included four princely states and a Federally Administered Tribal Area overlapping some provincial territory in the northern regions of the country. Although it was British practice to pursue broadly common policy throughout their dominion, the functional centralization of division present in modern Pakistani territory proved problematic as already crystallized groups began to fight over or became ostracized from the central government power once Pakistan gained independence. As a result of this inherited schema, it is intuitive to assume that such conflict would develop along the administratively entrenched ethnic lines of non-migrant groups: Sindhi, Baluch, Pashtun and Punjabi. Following in this line of reasoning, Khalilzad continues, purporting that the Pakistan-Bangladesh split was prompted by alienation of Bengalis on the part of “the dominant Punjabis of

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4 The italics in this quote are mine.

5 Although millions of each religious group migrated as a result of the 1947 partition, the presence of refugees seems more pronounced in Pakistan than in India. Educational differences between the two religious groups could account for this. Hindus leaving Pakistan were much more likely to be highly educated professionals while Muslims entering Pakistan were often illiterate peasants or, in smaller numbers, native Urdu tongued former administrators often from Muslim ruled princely states (Inskeep 2011, 71; Benson, 1983, 45).
the West” (ibid). He also makes cryptic mention of “New Sindhis”; referring to them as “Muhajira” or Punjabis and Pahtuns who immigrated to Pakistan from India and “filled the void left behind by the departing Hindu elite” (666). Such an understanding of ethnic tension in Pakistan is limited to divisions related only to the inherited British administrative boundaries as they stood at the moment of the country’s independence. As such, it is highly implausible for failure to take into account changes in ethnic and demographic composition that were resultant from the partition and subsequent migratory effects.

The first of these changes regards the way in which the center-minority dynamic in what we today consider Pakistan was altered by the partition. Although tensions do exist between Pakistan’s Baluch, Sindhi, Punjabi and Pashtun regions, the migration of Indian-Muslim Mohajirs to Pakistan and especially to its erstwhile capital of Karachi, brought a new dynamic to the Pakistani power structure. These migrants, although making up an absolute minority of the new country’s population, were often of a separate cultural and linguistic group than those that traditionally inhabited Pakistan’s land (Kennedy, 1991, 943-4). Thus, lumping the entire group of migrants from India into already physically present ethnic groups is inaccurate, as it fails to account for the effects of specifically the Mohajir preponderance in government, the military, and Pakistani business circles; especially prior to the 1970’s. Khalilzad is correct to note the consequences of British colonial administrative policy in Muslim majority tribal regions. The same is true for his assertion that migration of Punjabis did occur upon the splitting of the colonial province of Punjab. However, simply having migrated does not necessarily qualify Punjabi immigrants to Pakistan as Mohajirs. Instead, in the terms of the Pakistani census, “Indian immigrants from the Punjab, whose mother language was Punjabi, are considered Punjabis” (Kennedy, 1991, 939). Furthermore, defining Mohajirs as any form of Sindhi does not make sense as the two consider themselves to be different and competing ethnic groups, with the Mohajir majority in Karachi actually splitting the city off
from the rest of Sindh for a time due to a political and cultural power struggle with the indigenous inhabitants’ of that province (Inskeep, 2011, 63). The same is true for the Mohajir and Pashtun groups. Inskeep goes on to note that ethnic tension between Pashtun and Mohajirs rose in the 1980’s when millions left their traditional lands in the north for population centers in the south fleeing repercussions from the Soviet-Afghan war on Pakistan’s borders (169). Therefore, Khalilzad’s contention of a ‘Pashtun/Punjabi-Mohajir’ government dominance that also constitutes some form of ‘new’ Sindhi identity fails to align with indications of how those in Pakistan seem to define and discern threats from other ethnic groupings within the country.

Khalilzad’s Punjabi/Pashtun centered framework also does not explain the imposition of Urdu on all of the country’s groups as the official government language, simply because it is the mother tongue of none of Pakistan’s traditionally physically present groups. This is important as the issue of language has far reaching implications for the fomentation of ethnic-based tensions in Pakistan. It appears that the presence of Mohajirs in the upper levels of the Pakistani power structure could have resulted from their higher levels of education as compared to native Sindhis and the other Muslim groups at the time of partition. Many educated native Urdu-speaking professionals joined the migration, some of whom were from former Muslim-ruled princely states (Kennedy, 1991, 939). In many cases, these immigrants knew they would have an advantage, as due to the education differential with other Muslim groups “there would be a good chance of domination in the new country as ‘we’ [the educated ones] had made Pakistan” (Hasan in Inskeep, 2011, 60). Indeed, literacy levels in the province of Pakistan’s first capital, Sindh, which was

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6 In this quote can be seen evidence of what would evolve into bifurcation of the Mohajirs along class-based lines. In the present day, I have observed on my trips to Pakistan that the upper classes consist largely of specifically the descendants of partition-era Mohajir intelligentsia. For example, through discussions with my host family, I have found that their pre-partition ancestors were education system ministers at the court of the Nizam of Hyderabad (Interview Niazi, 2014). Many of their friends and relatives in the upscale district where they live also have ancestors who held similar positions, participated in the Pakistan demand and/or personally knew the Jinnahs. They also do not seem to identify closely with their Mohajir ethnicity; especially in the post-1980’s Pakistani political environment. Conversely, those Mohajirs who
dominated by ethnic Sindhis before partition, stood at only ten percent when Pakistan gained independence (Kennedy, 1991, 942). This educational differential provides an explanation for Mohajir installation in Pakistani power circles, along with the imposition of their language as Pakistan attempted to build its own institutions.

Both India and Pakistan are multi-lingual countries. However, some important differences in the exact nature of the plurality of language in each of the countries stand out. As has previously been shown for India, linguistic lines tend to cut across other identities. In Pakistan, language barriers serve to reinforce differences between geographic or tribal ethnicity-based rivalries, causing the use of one language over another to become a symbol of division and discrimination in many aspects of everyday life. Further, India’s official indigenous language, Hindi, is spoken in some form as a native language by a sizable number of Indians, who are mostly concentrated in seven Indian states (Manor, 1996, 465). It, thus, serves in a limited capacity as a force for unification. The same cannot be said of Urdu, which was the mother tongue of less than five percent of Pakistanis, while all of Pakistan’s native ethnic groups have their own languages (Oldenburg, 1985, 716). As will be shown later in this paper, administrative British policies toward the treatment of the Raj’s Muslim population and subsequently the creation of Pakistan laid the ground work for further language-based division of ethnicity among the Muslim population; serving as a centrifugal force leading to

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7 Inskeep finds that once Karachi’s Hindu minority, which was more likely to be educated, had departed Sindh, literacy rates for Sindhi Muslims stood at less than five percent and less than one percent for men and women respectively (2011, 71).
8 As another concrete example, this conversation with an MQM (Mohajir political party) affiliated former city official regarding government allotment of housing relocation plots in a Karachi neighborhood dominated by the Baloch minority. When asked if the people receiving the plots were not Baloch the reply was as follows: “No they were not.” “They were Urdu speaking?” “Yes, they were Urdu speaking.” “So it becomes a political or ethnic dispute?” “Yes, yes.” (Jalil and Inskeep, 2011, 187-8).
ethnic strife in Pakistan through the Bengali independence movement and continuing into the present day.

When viewed in more general terms, India and Pakistan display important differences in the nature of their diversity as well. In the former, it can be characterized as sharing some form of common identity, through the possession of many smaller ones on the part of its citizens. Thus, it represents a form of uni-ethnic society, in that its divisions are not split along clear-cut lines of animosity. It also has been able to maintain a stable democratic system since gaining independence. The same cannot be said for Pakistan, where “Ethnoregional actors and their motives have played very significant roles in the politics of Pakistan [which] has been unable since partition to develop effective national political institutions. Pakistan has had five constitutions; chronically weak, dissolved, or nonexistent legislatures; several bouts with martial law; and ineffectual political parties” which remain divided along ethno-linguistic lines (Kennedy, 1991, 941). As a result, while avoiding civil war on its present-day territory, the country has been prone to multi-directional strife and secessionist movements as multiple rigidly constructed ethnic groups, which have crystallized in opposition as a result of the colonial era, vie against one another.

Sri Lanka:

As we have seen, evidence exists to support the existence of multiple ethnic identities in India and Pakistan. It is the way in which these identities interact and the extent to which these constructions serve to reinforce each other that are influential in determining the propensity of these countries to function along the lines of overall ethnic fracture or unity of the same. A similar point can be made with the case of Sri Lanka. However, the manner in which the idea of ethnic identity was constructed during the British colonial period on the island of Ceylon seems to have resulted in a dichotomy between two dominant ethnicities – Sinhalese and Tamils, the latter of which constitute
the relative minority. This self-reinforcing, bi-ethnic paradigm has caused the two groups to focus their animosities almost exclusively on the opposing group. Thus, instead of identity overlap, or multi-vectored ethnic tension, the ethnic differences in Sri Lanka escalated into outright civil war.9

As with former British colonial India, modern Sri Lankan ethnic strife seems to have stemmed from British colonial policy. Although Ceylon did go through Portuguese and Dutch colonial periods before the arrival of British colonial forces, the British were the first to unite the entire island under one administration instead of maintaining boundaries inspired by the borders of pre-colonial indigenous states and the remaining indigenous kingdom on the island. This is significant, as it appears the island’s governments were formerly divided along religious or ethnic lines. For instance, one sixth-century Sinhalese-Buddhist chronicle tells of ancient battles with Hindu Tamil kings “that involved the wholesale death of Tamils” (Tamney, 2009, 107). This religion-based argument provides support for the stance that ethnic divisions were not arbitrarily generated by the British; as was the case with the Hindu-Muslim divide in British India. Some native conceptualization of difference did exist before the arrival of the Crown. However, the fact that these stories have become ‘rediscovered’ in the modern-day as Sinhalese justification for anti-Tamil policy, also points to colonial modification of the basis for this division (ibid).

To the above point, Nithiyanandam notes that the plantation-based nature of the Ceylonese British colonial economy combined with the relative abundance and diversity of arable land on Ceylon may have been causal factors in encouraging modification of the perceived importance of ethno-religious divisions. Because there was no need to dispossess local Sinhalese subsistence farmers of their land so that it could be put to use by plantations, there was at first little incentive for

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9 Although ethno-linguistic tension played a role in fomenting the 1971 Pakistan-Bangladesh war, a number of differences exist between the Pakistani case and the situation in Sri Lanka. These include the geographically non-contiguous nature of West and East Pakistan, and the existence of further ethnic fracture points in the western section of the country. As a result, the 1971 war may be to be of less relevance for defining a connection between ethnic constructs and development in modern day Pakistan.
those farmers to leave their lands in order to become plantation labor (Nithiyanandam, 2000, 286). This meant that British had to import workers; mostly from crowded Tamil regions in India. In doing so they visibly increased the island’s Tamil population (Kearney, 1987-88, 562-3). Over time as the plantation economy grew and became entrenched, the majority Sinhalese staple crop-producing peasantry became marginalized from the island’s economic system. As their ability to engage in subsistence farming was reduced, they found themselves shut out of the Tamil-dominated plantation and related sectors (Nithiyanandam, 2000, 287). The Sinhalese protested during the later colonial period. However, before independence this only resulted in granting Sinhalese tradesmen preferential treatment and did not affect the rural Sinhalese majority of the country (ibid).

After the 1948 British departure, the Sinhalese moved swiftly to secure a lasting position in the power structure of the newly independent country. However, due to the perceived preferential treatment of the Tamils by the British, this was accomplished through discriminatory policy toward the Tamils, at first those of original Indian descent. Between 1948 and 1949 the newly independent government passed three laws essentially denying citizenship, and thus equal rights, to the Indian Tamil minority (Nithiyanandam, 2000, 288). Following on this, the Sinhalese establishment declared its language to be the only valid language of government and declared Buddhism the state religion, ostracizing all Tamils and essentially declaring them ‘illiterate’ in their dealings with the state (291-4). Additionally, government development programs routinely ignored Tamil regions while university admissions policy discriminated against prospective students of any Tamil origin (ibid).

It should be again highlighted here that while ethnic fracture also is evident in Pakistan, the nature of those fractures differs somewhat from the division in Sri Lanka. In the former, it has been shown that multiple groups compete for control and influence with none holding the clear advantage, though a small immigrant minority clings to preponderance in elite circles. In the latter,
conflict is constituted between two main groups which become increasingly galvanized against one another as a result of offensive action on the part of the opposition. Thus, in Pakistan, “after the Hindus were swept away, the people who remained found other divisions among themselves. They divided by ethnicity, language, class, and Muslim sect, which they would still be doing more than sixty years later” (Inskeep, 2011, 70). While many of these differences served to reinforce the others, they still resulted in a number of separate, rigid group identities; providing multiple outlets for angst. In Sri Lanka, the differences reinforced each other along one fracture point between two groups where one has the clear advantage in numbers. As a result, one group became “divorced from the mainstream politics and economics of the country… [and] decided to emphasize their right to self-determination [and] shed most of their political differences” causing the group in government power to become increasingly repressive in order to maintain control (Nithiyanandam, 2000, 297). The result is a vicious cycle where grievance promotes unity within one group, which only accentuates the importance of opposition towards the other. As Nithiyanandam observes “The historical experience of Sri Lanka clearly demonstrates the most alarming nature of ethnic politics. Once launched, it becomes a canker in the body politic and eats into almost all areas of the political economy. Eradication is then impossible and the country can only glide slowly but steadily towards the brink of break-up” (291). By centering the governing of a nation around one ethnic fracture point Sri Lanka’s post-colonial experience became defined by outright civil war.

On the whole, the three modern day countries discussed above bear some striking historical similarities. All three gained independence from the same colonial power within one year of each other after undergoing a lengthy period of colonial rule. One may expect these similar colonial experiences to translate into post-colonial commonality in other areas. Yet, that is not the case. Instead, it is clear that they display strikingly different uni-ethnic (India), bi-ethnic (Sri Lanka) and multi-ethnic (Pakistan) paradigms. Despite this, it appears clear that these ethnicity related
differences are paradoxically connected with the similar colonial heritage of India, Sri Lanka and Pakistan. While the British colonial period is often mentioned as a (usually negative) factor in influencing the present day situation of its post-colonial states, the exact role of colonial policy in creating differences among them has been given less attention. In order to understand the origins of modern day ethnic differentials in south Asia, it is necessary to examine how the British colonial modus operandi functioned in order to maintain its hold on power and achieve economic ends with regard to the three modern states in question. Key to its strategy is the manner in which the colonizer categorized native ethnicities in order to carry out its objectives. In raising this issue, further questions pose themselves pertaining to how ethnic conceptualization and the cultural grounding of perception interact: What were native self-concepts before colonization? Did the British seek to construct completely new ethnic categories by means of their own cultural lenses? Or, did they tacitly modify the importance of pre-existing divisions? How can we know the way in which these new or modified British constructs were viewed from a native perspective? In what follows, I will address such epistemological issues.

**The Paradox of Viewpoint and Ethnicity: Theoretical Questions**

Ethnic tensions can and often do lead to strife between nations, or within states. However, the definition of ethnic and national groups is far from objective in nature. Instead, ethnic views are derived from cultural perceptions which themselves can change or be influenced by other groups over time. In the case of south Asia, it is clear that the British colonial categorization of those they conquered served to modify local ethnic definitions. Still, the manner in which it did so remains open to debate. Below, I will briefly survey some post-colonial theoretical assertions with regard to epistemological issues connected to cultural grounding and the modification of identity as a result of colonization.
The subjective nature of human self-definition means that when attempting to define ethnic perceptions within any former colonial space, there are multiple lenses of perception. In other words, one’s understanding of how others define their own group vis-a-vis a third group is colored by one’s own cultural narratives and perceptions. In this way, other ethnicities are constructed in terms of one’s own cultural viewpoint. Said notes the importance of awareness of this dilemma, especially when those from Western power centers attempt to confront their own constructs of ‘third world’ culture. In his book, *Culture and Imperialism* he explains: “There is an irreducible subjective core to the human experience… [but it is] not marked and limited by doctrinal or national lines, not confined once and for all to analytical constructs” (1993, 31). Implicit in this statement is an acknowledgement that ethnic concepts can change over time, and that despite Western historical-cultural preconceptions there are other viewpoints defined by different cultural conceptualizations of the world. Cognizance of this reality is helpful in understanding the colonial experience for those in former colonies.

Awareness of one’s own background, no matter what that background may be, is definitely a reasonable stance from which one can attempt to define another’s. Yet, whether it is possible to sufficiently divorce oneself completely from that background remains contested. Spivak, although agreeing with Said that former colonial powers tend to culturally construct in their own eyes the peoples they have colonized as a monolithic ‘other’, categorically denies the claim that it is possible for those from Western traditions or those influenced by them to accurately represent or account for the perspective of the subaltern colonial subject. Instead, the Western post-colonial accounts merely serve to reinforce conceptualizations which were adopted by the colonizers during the colonial period and thus became ingrained in Western mindsets. In this view, cultural preconceptions are rather immutable. “Thus, for Spivak, it is dangerous to assume that one can encounter the Third World, and especially the Third World subaltern, on a level playing field. Our interaction with, and
representations of, the subaltern are inevitably loaded...[by] our identity as privileged Westerner” (Kapoor, 2004, 631). This stance does sound a needed cautionary note and raises valid concerns regarding the accuracy of perception. However, it also proves restrictive and limiting. As Varadharajan points out, by asserting the inherent tendency of the Western intellectual establishment to functionally silence the subaltern through reinforcement of western cultural perceptions by simply addressing the topic of subalternism, Spivak forestalls any possibility of further debate on the subject (1995, 89). Further, her tendency to couch her arguments in normative ideals causes her line of reasoning to contradict itself in many cases. In unremittingly decrying the essentialized nature of Western-capitalist cultural thought, she ironically focuses the locus of her criticism exclusively on the West. In doing so, she places the silenced subaltern on a victim’s pedestal of one-way non-’speech’ in which “speaking and hearing complete the speech act”; and thus would result in barrier-less communication and receipt of an identical meaning (Spivak, 1996, 292). However, she does not appear to consider the possibility that distortion of meaning may actually flow both directions and be problematic for the subaltern in understanding the colonizer as well. This suggests her “conception of subalternity is sometimes disablingly nonrelational or even essentialized” itself (Moore-Gilbert, 2005, 463). Therefore, while raising the valid point that historical colonial-era baggage can belie accurate Western interpretation of local ethnic perceptions among the colonized, her normative paradigm restricts the available paths for further inquiry.

In mentioning the indivisibility between Western cultural identity and interpretations of the colonial ‘other’ despite attempts at objectivity, Spivak highlights an important methodological issue: How can the Western academic establishment approximate the effect of colonization on indigenous ethno-religious conceptualizations? Bhabha, in his 1994 work *The Location of Culture*, seems to provide an answer through his postulation of a cultural ‘Third Space’, in which colonial and local cultures unwittingly interact and influence each other, creating various hybrid forms. As Bhabha
writes, the act of cultural interpretation and change “is never simply an act of communication between the I and the You in the statement. The production of meaning requires that these two places be mobilized in the passage through a Third Space, which represents both the general conditions of language and the specific implication of the utterance in a performative and institutional strategy of which it cannot ‘in itself’ be conscious” (53). The implications of this view are powerful. Instead of decrying the opacity of a foreign culture or that of one’s own endemic cultural grounding as problematic, the concept of the ‘third space’ provides for a forum in which the “enunciation of cultural difference” in statements and actions can serve as a symbol of change in cultural and ethnic conceptions (51). Thus, while one’s own cultural constructions are both mercurial and indivisible from one’s interpretation of other ethnicities’ own self-concepts, the potential for bias flows both ways. The manner in which groups interact can be used as a barometer for the discernment of changes in ethnic conceptualization, making “it possible to begin envisaging national, anti-national histories of the ‘people’” (56). In this way, Bhabha’s concept of the Third Space makes it possible to narrow the epistemological gap between understanding the impact of colonization on indigenous perceptions of ethnic divisions and the necessity of looking on those divisions from the outsider’s perspective of Western cultural thought. It does so by providing an objective arena of action in which manifestations of unity and disunity can be seen amid changes in colonial policy, while dispensing with the need for accurate codification of subjective human cultural perception.

This concept of the Third Space implies that one’s own ethnic identity is in some way malleable. It is constantly being shaped, or manipulated, through interaction with other constructed identities. This contention intuitively makes sense. However, assuming that construction of an ethnic identity is nothing more than an instrument to be used for other ends, gives us an incomplete picture (Smith, 1996, 447). The fact that one perceives the possibility of manipulating ethnic
identities for his or her own ends, and that it is often successful, implies that some form of that perceived ethnic identity is both endemic to the other group and existent in some form even if it is subject to constant change in ways that neither party may intend or realize. As Smith writes: “On the one hand, the community seeks to compete with its neighbors by borrowing techniques and ideas; on the other hand, it clings to its received traditions and lifestyles and seeks to purify its culture of alien elements. This ambivalence lies at the heart of the debates about national identity” (458). In this, it also becomes apparent that the idea of ethnicity is paradoxically both resistant to perceived threats to its supposed long-standing integrity and, through this, prone to manipulation by other groups and individuals who themselves may be unaware that they are also participants in a multi-vectored process of cultural change and conservation.

Colonial Motives and Implications

While it may not be possible to actually know the subjective reality of another’s internal perception of culture from one’s own viewpoint, or gauge exactly how interaction with the other has modified one’s own, we can approximate changes in ethnic conceptualizations by examining the effects of the interface on actions as viewed from our own modern Western cultural grounding. For this reason, moving forward, I will concern myself mostly with the British conceptions of ethnicity. These conceptualizations were not formed with benevolent intentions in mind. Instead, they were formed over time through the cultural worldview of a colonizer with two main purposes in mind: to retain power and generate revenue. Below, British policy adjustments in both British India and colonial Ceylon will be analyzed in order to highlight how similar sets of colonial goals and cultural methods regarding the exploitation of perceived differences resulted in differing ethnic landscapes in each of these regions. This chronological analysis should demonstrate the importance of the development of
such ethnically oriented policy in understanding the current ethno-political situation in each of the countries in question.

From unity for conquest to divide and rule: changing strategy on the Indian sub-continent

The British Empire was large and powerful. Obviously, the success of the British in conquering vast amounts of territory and maintaining that control, sometimes for centuries, is related directly to its policies regarding governance. However, these modalities were not defined from the start of Britain’s colonial period. Often, policies seemed to be born simply out of a need for expediency. The above is also true of how the British initially dealt with ethnicity while conquering and administrating their colonies in south Asia. Britain’s original impetus for engaging with the region was economic in nature; conquest on the sub-continent was initially not carried out by the government itself, but began during the 17th century in India by a public firm – the East India Company. This entity was originally created as a monopoly for trading purposes by the Crown with its mandate quickly growing to encompass military activities and other quasi-governmental powers such as creating courts, building infrastructure, and creating educational institutions (Kaye, 1853, 110-9). This mandate imbued the Company with a political dimension of colonial power in British India and also served as an original basis for relatively limited institutional transference of British modalities to the sub-continent. The fact that this colonization of the subcontinent was originally a primarily economic endeavor influenced the colonial attitude toward native populations during south Asia’s earlier colonial period. Prior to 1857, the British presence did not initially seem concerned with defining or encouraging ethnic division in the region per se. Instead the matter of ethnicity was initially dealt with only when it stood to affect the company’s ability to conquer or control territory for economic purposes. The Company was capable of doing so because of its private army, the success of which was due to its ability to “strike a balance between the European
elements of war [and] the natural, human and animal resources of India in warfare” (Roy, 2005, 655). This military policy allowed the Company to defeat numerous indigenous kingdoms and force out other colonial powers with ambitions in the region.\textsuperscript{10} However, this military synthesis strategy was made possible only once the British company “adapted its polity and military in accordance with the demands of South Asia’s politics” (656). In other words, in order to militarily carve out a favorable colonial economic space, the company was required to pay heed to ethnic differences insofar as they affected the organization and local recruitment prospects of the Company’s private armies.

In keeping with this, some of the Company’s three main army divisions conducted recruitment based upon Hindu caste. The fact that these divisions existed implies that such differentials were evident in native populations as the organizational structure of the army took shape. However, those observing the management of the East India Company seem also to interpret these dividing lines in the structure of the native troops as representing a division of labor that could be managed for the benefit of the Company activities. Although the Company seems to have made tactical use of a cavalry derived somewhat from indigenous Muslim traditions, the overwhelming majority of the infantry were Hindus, along with some few Muslims who served alongside them (Roy, 2005, 687; Sykes, 1847, 124). One period article detailing a report to the House of Commons regarding the resilience of the native army troops makes distinctions amongst them “as having reference to habits of life arising from caste” (Sykes, 1847, 110).\textsuperscript{11} The article goes on to note a marked preference for the Hindu lifestyle; especially that of those from a higher caste, implying that they are more reliable soldiers (124-5). In this, an initial lack of concern for the nature

\textsuperscript{10} Although other colonial powers, including Portugal, Netherlands, and France were present on the Indian subcontinent their spheres of influence and tenure were rather small and short lived compared to that of Britain, the colonial power with which this thesis is mainly concerned.

\textsuperscript{11} Although Sykes (1847) appears interested in religious differences for purposes of productivity in the military, he seems relatively unconcerned with more intrinsic differences between groups. Tellingly, he uses the term of caste in reference not only to status differences between Hindus but also refers to Muslims as constituting one ‘caste’ in native society.
of difference between the Hindus and Muslims themselves, as opposed their military and economic implications, can be discerned as a feature of Company rule.

In addition to British concepts regarding the efficacy of Hindu and Muslim soldiers and cavalrymen in the military, the direction of British expansion toward the north of the sub-continent may provide another explanation for Hindu preponderance in the Company’s army, while pointing to the development of a tacit preference for Hindu soldiers or workers on the part of the British. As the Company moved north, they often encountered resistance from states descended from the Islamic Mughal Empire. As one outcome of these conflicts, there seems to have resulted in a perception on the part of the British that the inhabitants of most of Hindustan had been conquered by ‘Indianised’ Muslim interlopers, who had inspired the imperial descents with whom, some Muslim and some Hindu, the Company armies fought. Thus, to the extent that non-practical differences were discerned between the two groups they flowed from a British belief, that, as one nobleman put it: “Mussulman domination had called into full activity all the bad qualities which Hinduism has in itself a fatal tendency to generate… [which are] now the grand stumbling-block of British legislation” (Kaye, 1853, 51). The fact that some of the larger princely states, including Hyderabad, were historically associated with the Mughal Empire and continued to be ruled by Muslims only served to enhance this view (54). This narrative of the further debasement of Hinduism by Islam effectively served to encourage a relatively more positive perception of Hindus by the British and would have implications for future policy developments.

At the same time, the aforementioned narrative led the British of the Company-rule era to largely dismiss the pertinence of differences in religious tradition between the two groups and instead simply view them both as inferior on the whole and in need of Christianization. While the Company had originally pledged to respect religious freedoms of the natives in India, a greater move
to encourage Christianization, or at least a disregard for the local populace’s engrained traditions took shape over the first half of the 19th century (Kaye, 1853, 657). Some of these changes could be seen in colonial policy such as that pertaining to land property rights and the native education system which became bifurcated under the Company Raj between missionary schools and government-run centers, which in some regions also promoted Christianity (Sykes, 1845, 270-1; Rawat, 2007, 16). Although the native population had yet to become extensively involved with the colonial administration as a whole, the effects of the colonizer’s push toward imposition of western cultural and religious models became visible in the reaction of the Company’s indigenous armed forces. Despite its practicality-based nominal acknowledgement of religious differences, the de facto unitary attitude of the British towards the practices of Hindus and Muslims actually served as a force for unification against the British as both of their religions came under pressure from the colonizer. Their eventual reaction would see the formal dismantling of the Crown’s corporate lead strategy on the Indian sub-continent and have far reaching consequences for perceptions of ethnic divisions in south Asia.

The building tensions regarding the East India Company’s religious and land allocation policies came to a head in 1857 when a portion of the company’s ‘Bengal Presidency’ indigenous army finally revolted, the flash point ostensibly being an order to handle cartridges greased with cow or pig fat. While designed to be moral and efficient in British eyes, the Company-colonial discounting of indigenous religious traditions combined with its need for indigenous solders accorded “a crucial political role to the army as a centre of political resistance” (Rawat, 2007, 18). By failing to acknowledge differences in religious practice they had unwittingly created a situation where indigenous subjects of differing backgrounds could unite against the colonial power. As one knighted colonial Indian wrote, it was “inadvisable on the part of the government to put two antagonistic communities (Hindus and Muslims) into the same regiments as their constant inter-
course generated a feeling of friendship…if separate regiments…had been raised, this feeling could not have arisen” (Sir Syed Ahmed in Rawat, 2007, 22). Thus, it became clear that drastic policy changes were needed with regard to the British treatment of native ethnic concepts in British India if they were to hold onto power. It is also interesting to note that, even in light of the above assertion, most Brits at the time believed the rebellion to have originally been instigated by a Muslim conspiracy, despite the fact that “the Muslims only constituted one out of seven sepoys in the army” (Tinker, 1958, 59; Sykes, 1847,124). In this, a continued tendency to positively represent the Hindu Indian subjects on the part of the colonizer can be seen and may have influenced policy going forward.

The ‘Sepoy Mutiny’ radically altered British policy in India. Not only did the Crown formally take over administration of the colony, but the ruler’s governing strategy changed, bringing the politics of ethnicity to the forefront in achieving its economic ends. As Tinker writes: Before the revolt, “the Government of India initiated a coherent social and political economic administrative policy. Benthamite doctrine and Evangelical belief combined to work towards political and social change. But after 1857 the government attitude was dominated by a fear that the Mutiny should ever happen again; there was a preoccupation with religion and with the susceptibilities of the people” (1958, 63). While the army was re-organized along caste- and religion-based principals as a result, there were also implications for the borders of Indian states (63-4). Before the revolt, the East India Company was working to bring the ad hoc order of conquered Indian States under the same administration. However, afterwards this process was halted; the de facto result being the aforementioned system that cut across linguistic lines in what would become India, while reinforcing
them in the more tribal Muslim areas that would be split off into present-day Pakistan.\textsuperscript{12} The British governing rationale on the subcontinent had changed from one of religious-based practicality, to a strategy of dividing and ruling the colonial subject.\textsuperscript{13}

The aftermath of the revolt also saw the colonial power move to bring its indigenous subjects into a more active role within the colonial administration. This statement is not to suggest that there was no indigenous presence in the pre-1857 British administration. A limited Indian intelligentsia existed, which was sometimes critical of British colonial policy (Panikkar, 1997, 30). However, before the revolt this educational group was relatively small.\textsuperscript{14} Despite their criticisms, the Indian intelligentsia overwhelmingly sided with the British during the revolt, as their livelihoods depended on remaining within the British power structure (29). As a consequence, the post-1857 British Raj sought to involve native populations more heavily in colonial government. There was also an increased push toward infrastructure development – perceived as symbol of modernization by the Indian products of the British colonial educational system. These changes in view toward governance of the native population resulted in “development initiatives after 1857 [that saw] the rise of one of the world’s leading systems of modern transport… Western-oriented universities, the evolutionary advance of representative institutions, [and] the large influx of Indians into the Civil Service” (Klein, 2000, 549). Yet, while British India’s educated class did grow greatly in relative size,

\textsuperscript{12} As one 1930’s All-India Congress report notes “the present distribution of provinces’ in India has no rational basis. It is merely due to accident and the circumstances attending the growth of the British power in India” (Nehru Report in Tofail, 1931, 2).

\textsuperscript{13} Despite the major role that the rebellion played in altering British policy on the sub-continent, it seems to be downplayed in the contemporary UK. One exhibit at the Scottish National War Museum recounts the Indian colonial period without making overt mention of the revolt. Instead it provides the following quote from a member of the 90th Perthshire light infantry, which fought against the two year-long revolt, while only giving the year as 1857: “Soldiering in this country [British India] certainly leads to extreme laziness…out of your hut you must not stir between 9 and 5. I have no books to read and what am I to do…?”(Highland Soldier, 2014). On the other hand, the Sepoy Mutiny is remembered as a watershed event for the independence movement in India while in Pakistan it is regarded as an incident for which the British blamed Muslims and subsequently used the withholding of education to punish them (Interview Niazi, 2014).

\textsuperscript{14} Sources from the pre-revolt time period also call into question the quality of native higher education. Sykes remarked on the substandard quality of indigenous higher education in some company presidencies, describing one institution as “only a ‘High School’” (1845, 256).
it did not come anywhere near to encompassing the vast majority of British India’s population. As Klein continues, there persisted “limited diffusion of Western learning among the ordinary populace, which remained overwhelmingly illiterate… and ruled by the precepts of caste councils and customary village practices more than by any new tables of law or administrative mechanisms” (ibid). Thus, the 1857 rebellion caused a shift in British policy toward the inclusion of Indians in government, resulting in the creation of a relatively small but viable class of local administrators, who were neither wholly Western nor subaltern in nature. This allowed them to serve as imperfect interlocutors between the colonizer and the un-westernized, divided masses.

The creation of this ‘buffer class’ had striking effects for the future of ethnic conceptualizations. First, it allowed the educated locals to serve as pacifiers; effectively speaking for the uneducated “Indian feudal classes [who] were never again to challenge the might of the British rule” (Panikkar, 1997, 34). Second, it caused national demands to spring from the educated class whose own enculturation was a blend of Western education despite their indigenous origins. That identity ironically resulted in demands for the application of a right to uniquely Indian self-determination by calling “fourth the Ghandis, Nehrus…and firebrands of Indian Nationalism” who sought to achieve that independence as defined through Western, nation-state based, ideas of ethnicity (Klein, 2000, 579). Through the creation of an educated Indian class who, though being influenced by their native culture, did not think primarily in terms of caste or tribal relations, while effectually encouraging such divisions to varying degrees among the vast majority of the population, ethnic policy under the British Raj created a rift between actual ethnic conceptualization and national demands.

In addition to the creation of the class-oriented rift in the primacy of local versus national identities, a concurrent education-based differential served to foster divisions between Hindu and
Muslim groups. The British preference for Hindus seemed to carry over into the new university and civil service systems. In the years immediately following the Sepoy Mutiny, this may be attributable to a tendency for Muslims to study Urdu or Persian in primary school instead of English; thus making it impossible for the Urdu/Persian speakers to attend the British colonial universities (Interview Islam, 2014). However, in the latter quarter of the 19th century Indian Muslims educated before the 1857 revolt, such as Sir Syed Ahmed, began a movement to encourage the learning of English among Muslim populations of the British Raj through the founding of Anglophone Islamic grammar schools (Interview Ahmed, 2014; Interview Islam, 2014). Yet, despite this push toward English, Muslims continued to be proportionally under-represented in universities and governmental bodies into the 20th century. Still less likely to receive basic education and thus to study at western-oriented universities, Muslims were far less likely to be able to take and pass the proficiency test required for admission to government work (Potter, 1973, 56). Therefore as the indigenous element of government proceeded to take hold it also became more and more ‘Hinduized’. The All-India Congress was originally founded in the vein of representing all of British India’s indigenous populations. But, Muslims often found themselves sorely underrepresented and eventually formed their own chamber, the Muslim League, which for many years was considered secondary (Krishna, 1966, 420; Panikkar, 1997, 39). Thus, Muslim elites began to feel increasingly ostracized from inclusion in the colonial administrative power structures amid majority Hindu-led demands for change. This served to increase perceptions of religious communal difference.

One area in which this situation is exemplified is in the development of a religion-based language dispute which included a Hindu demand for a change of the court language to Hindi from

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15 While the extent of the impact that such schools had remains debatable, it is clear that they played some role in fostering the creation of what would become partition-era Indian Muslim intelligentsia, including Pakistan’s founder, M.A. Jinnah, who attended Sindh Madrassatul Islam’s grammar school.

16 Panikkar mentions that the ‘Indianization’ of the civil services was supported and promoted by various Indian groups including the Indian National Congress, which also became ‘Hinduized’ over time (1997, 34-7).
the Urdu traditionally used from Mughal times and “created a communal divide within the elite who regardless of religious affiliations had used Urdu as the common language” (Panikkar, 1997, 39-40). Afterwards, the linguistic difference became not only a matter of mother tongue, but also imbued with the religious element. By dividing the two religious groups and favoring one over the other the British also served to ensure that tensions would develop not only along regional or linguistic lines, but especially according to perceived religion-based economic and political tensions (Brush, 1949, 81). When inter-war period anti-colonial sentiment among both Hindus and Muslim threatened to overcome the religious divide, the colonial power responded by attempting to deepen this division with what on the surface would appear to be conciliatory measures. When the Congress and Muslim League moved toward closer cooperation for national independence, the British responded by introducing a quota system for the civil service, making it easier for Muslims to gain government positions (Krishna, 1966, 421; Potter, 1973, 56-8). While in the short term this may have been perceived to increase religious equality in the civil service and civil legislatures, it failed to curtail the overall national independence movement, while perhaps encouraging the entrenchment of religious divisions too well in the long run. Pointing to the quotas and organization of the census along religious lines, Brush revealingly observes that these measures could have been intended as a “device to divert the drive for independence by splitting the populace and setting its leaders at odds with each other. Yet, the rapidity with which the religious cleavage was transformed into a political schism raises doubt as to whether the cultural basis for the formation of a true national state existed in the Indian Empire” (1949, 82). The British successfully divided the populace along lines of religion-based class and language in order to maintain a hold on power. But, that hold continued to

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17 While this dispute does provide further historical grounding for the Mohajirs’ use of Urdu, that tongue ironically never got re-elevated to the status of court language even in Pakistan, where English assumes that role.

18 Potter cites one 1930 communiqué from the Indian colonial government to the UK Secretary of State suggesting that failure to adhere to the ‘Muddiman’ quota system could result in further Muslim support for the civil-disobedience movement (1973, 58).
grow tenuous; causing the British Raj to collapse in a way that would have striking implications for the determination of the ethnic landscapes in India and Pakistan.

After the end of World War II, Britain was growing low on finances. It sought to remove its colonial presence from the Indian subcontinent. This served to intensify the religion-based tension, which had by then developed into a sometimes-bloody struggle regarding whether British India should be divided into separate regions for Hindus and Muslims or remain intact. Further, the British were on a tight schedule. On February 20, 1947 the British prime minister specified that colonial withdrawal from India would happen no later than June 1948 (Wood, 1985, 655). Lord Mountbatten was sworn in as the last Viceroy of India a month later to oversee the transfer of power. The matter of partition became one of ethno-religious narratives in which no side seemed willing to compromise.

Originally, it was the British priority to facilitate the creation of a united free India. It is clear that this was the first choice of the Crown’s government and its representative in India. As Wood summarizes: Mountbatten “was personally in favor of a united India and he had been instructed to...preserve a unified if highly decentralized government system” (1985, 655). This view was staunchly supported by Gandhi, Nehru and the other Hindu leaders in the National Congress of India. However, the religious division that the British had helped to enunciate in the political and economic spheres now worked against the colonizer’s wishes. The Muslim League under the leadership of Mohammed Ali Jinnah rejected the creation of one single state for both Hindus and Muslims as independence from Britain drew near. Due to the time constraints involved, it quickly became apparent to the Viceroy that a two-state solution would be the only viable means of achieving an agreement within the duration of his assignment. In this context, the British representative faced rising religious violence in northern India. Also, the Hindu National Congress
of India demanded a faster path to independence in compensation for the loss of territory that the creation of Pakistan would incur them. Due to the fact that British India remained entangled with His Majesty’s Government, an accelerated independence schedule necessitated “a transfer of power before the end of the current parliamentary session, then expected only weeks away” (Owen, 2003, 427). Consequently, Mountbatten chose to move the deadline for independence closer to August 15, 1947 (Wood, 1985, 655-58). Although this may have been necessary in order to form a compromise, it also left less than half a year for the new borders to be drawn.

The division of India was decided. However, determining what the division would look like was a matter fraught with contention. Although the religious differences had crystallized, the physical distribution of Hindu and Muslim populations was not so clearly divided. Here, it appears that the divisions between Nehru and Mountbatten (the Hindus and British) on one side, and Jinnah (the Muslims) on the other, deepened. Of high concern to both parties was the determination of the national status of the religiously split provinces of Punjab and Bengal. Jinnah strongly maintained “that power should be transferred to the Provinces as they exist today” when India and Pakistan became separate countries (Jinnah in Moore, 1983, 558). Yet, Mountbatten proved unwilling to negotiate on this point. He held that if the Muslim League was going to insist that British India be physically divided along religious lines, then the same should apply to disputed provinces. As Wood notes: the Viceroy’s “intransigence on this point was as determined as Jinnah’s on Pakistan” (1985, 656). Wood goes on to interpret that while Mountbatten hoped insistence on provincial division would encourage Jinnah to “back away from the ‘moth eaten’ Pakistan that would result” it instead “drove the Muslim leader to even more tenacious demand” (ibid). Despite a tight time schedule, the architects of the partition remained deeply divided along indigenous religion-related lines and were reluctant to compromise. In doing so they would encourage mass migration and set precedents that would deeply influence the ethnic landscapes of the states that they were creating.
Crucial to better understanding the partition-oriented views of the British-educated local intelligentsia is the nature of their perceptions of local ethnic landscapes vis a vis British domination, as the demand for regional independence, and later for Pakistan, evolved. Archival information from the All-India Muslim League archives located at The University of Karachi provides illuminating primary source documentation for the discernment of an ethno-religious paradigm amongst the founders of modern day India and Pakistan, albeit with passive awareness of the existence of additional tribal identities. In addition to the constitutions and working committee resolutions of the All-India Muslim League (AIML), these records also provide a more personal perspective through their inclusion of correspondence between Gandhi, Nehru, and Jinnah and articles in Indian and Pakistani newspapers which date from the year after the Partition. The presidential speeches of the AIML prove useful for examining the interaction of colonial and local ethnic perspectives. In order to reveal how such constructs played a role in the creation of the modern-day ethnic situation in India and Pakistan I will discuss how the founders’ enunciation of religion-based differences impacted on their perceptions of the worthiness of Muslim loyalty to the Crown or the viability of ‘India’ as a single nation, of ethno-religious national identity and of linguistically distinct tribal groups as follows:

Although the All-India National Congress and the Muslim League did advocate for independence from Britain, this was not originally one of their charter purposes. Instead, their original intent was to work for the betterment their local, or communal, populations within the frameworks of British rule. Over time and at different paces for each organization, they moved toward demanding British withdrawal. The pace and manner in which they did so was informed by their respective religious-national concepts. In the annual constitutions of the AIML the
advancement of a demand for independence from British rule and later for Pakistan can be traced over time through article 2A. The changes in the wording of this article over time provide a ‘third-space’ barometer through which alterations in demands for independence and in the Hindu-Muslim ethno-religious dynamic can be discerned. When combined with statements from the Muslim League’s working committee it becomes clear that such changes in independence demands often coincided with resolutions of religious-national difference.

The first year for which the constitutions of the AIML’s central branch in British India are available at the University of Karachi is 1909, shortly after the League’s formation. During this year article 2A declares one of the main missions of the organization to be “to promote among Indian Mussalmans feelings of loyalty toward the British government and to remove any misconception that may arise as to the intentions of the government with regard to any of its measures” (Rules and Regulations of the AIML, 1909, 5). A constitution of the League’s London branch from the previous year echoes this sentiment of fealty, while also stating in the same article its wish “to promote concord and harmony among the different nationalities of India” (London Branch of the AIML, 1908, 4). Although the use of the term nationality here at first seems nebulous, it quickly becomes clear that it is most likely meant in the pre-modern religion-oriented colonial sense of the term. As the ability to read and write was a prerequisite for membership in the League it is likely that the members of the League termed it in this manner due to their educational history (Rules and Regulations of the AIML, 1909, 5). Thus, although it seems that the initial aims of the Muslim League were far from derisive, the seeds of a religious-national paradigm as well as implications of discontent through references to ‘misunderstanding’ colonial policy remain present and stood to develop over time.

Further support for the premise that the members of the AIML held a largely religion-based concept of nationality is provided by the organization’s 1912 constitution, which retains the
same goals of loyalty to Britain, and promotion of good relations with other religious groups, as had been stated three years prior. However, it also requires that the membership can only consist of Indian Muslim university graduates. This increased requirement of not only literacy, but also higher education suggests an even greater preponderance of British-style educated individuals in its ranks (Constitution of the AIML, 1912, 1). Though a colonial-style religious-based paradigm of ethnicity appears present amongst the League’s leaders from shortly after the founding of the AIML, their attitude towards Crown loyalty and the position of Indian Muslims within the British Raj seems to have become progressively more derisive. Over time this trend led to eventual demands for colonial and then a national independence based on religious communalism. Although article 2A remains the same insofar as the League’s official position of promoting harmony amongst religious communities through the 1920’s, it also took up the banner of achieving “Swaraj by the people of India by all peaceful and legitimate means” (Constitution and Rules of the AIML, 1924, 1; Constitution and Rules of the AIML, 1928, 1). In this way, it seems that League became quickly caught up in a wider desire for freedom from colonial rule.

Yet, as demands for colonial independence became more strident on the part of the Congress, steadily increasing concern by the League that Muslim rights would not be respected in a Hindu majority country became present in the wording of the AIML’s purpose. The 1932 constitution’s 2A provision voices a desire for home rule, but immediately adds as a caveat that such government must have “adequate and effective safeguards for Mussalmans” (Constitution and Rules of the AIML, 1932, 1). Six years later, the same article written after an October meeting of the League voices a desire for a decentralized “federation of free democratic states” so as to better protect the rights of Muslims (Constitution and Rules of the AIML, 1937, 1). The post-1940 constitutions demand an independent Muslim country. (Constitution and Rules of the AIML, 1941-6, 1).
It is clear from the evolution of the Muslim League’s stated purpose that the development of its independence demand developed along ethno-religious based lines. However, it does not provide a clear explanation for why the organization chose to adopt an increasingly derisive anti-colonial and religious communal attitude at certain points in time. Fortunately, the resolutions of the League’s Working Committee and its other publications and manifestos shed light on what may have prompted these changes in constitutional stance. Through providing the considered opinions of the committee’s membership regarding current events issues, it becomes clear that the League perceived many developments to be evidence of their marginalization by Congress Hindus and that such actions were abetted by the British. In this context, it is interesting to note that the League’s members appeared cognizant of the ‘divide and conquer’ strategy of the British with regard to the two main religious groups on the subcontinent. At first, they blamed the British for ethno-religious friction. During the 1920’s, when the ‘Swaraj’ demand was present in the AIML constitution, one resolution notes “the deplorable bitterness between the Hindus and the Mussalmans in different parts of the country and strongly deprecates the tendency on the part of certain public bodies to aggravate the causes of difference between the two communities” (Resolutions of AIML May 1924-Dec1936, May 1924 Res. 7, 5). Implicit in this statement is the stance that Hindus and Muslims do constitute two separate, if not inherently opposed, ethnic groups. Taken by itself this resolution would appear to indicate the continued will of the Muslim League to improve relations with Hindu groups. However, due to the British tendency to favor Hindus in the administration and government policy there also existed Muslim perceptions of Hindu-British conspiracy to relegate Muslims to the position of second-class citizens. Developments regarding the Hindi-Urdu language dispute, representation of Muslims in the administration, and even the Congress’ non-violent civil disobedience movement were interpreted through this lens. Although Congress leaders appeared not to understand the basis for accusations of their attempting to establish Hindu Rule, suspicions
continued to increase feelings of enmity on the part of the League. For example, a 1925 AIML presidential speech vaguely accuses “men belonging to the Hindu community [of engaging] actively in conspiracies with foreign societies and governments… which if at all successful would end in an indefinite postponement of self government” (Rahim, 1925, 11). In a seeming contradiction and criticism of early Hindu-led non-cooperation movements, the speech goes on to call for measures to “definitely check the baneful activities of those Hindu politicians who under the protection of Englishmen’s bayonets…are sowing trouble in the land to attain swaraj” (12). While it seems unlikely that the British occupiers would literally protect independence-seeking activists of either religion, Rahim points to the lack of Muslims in administration as well as the declining administrative use of Urdu in historically Muslim regions as evidence for Hindu favoritism on the part of the British; stating that the motive for such measures was “political though it was supported in the administration” (16). Even while aware of the British tendency to ‘divide and rule’, the Muslim community’s simultaneous understanding of their own un-favored status lead them to knowingly participate in strife encouraged by the British through perceiving the Hindus to be both at fault for the realities of the Muslim colonial situation and, thus, determined to dominate after the departure of the British.

Due to the perception of British-sanctioned Hindu ambitions for post-colonial rule, the Muslim League became increasingly preoccupied with language and education policies. They believed regulations made in these areas constituted further affronts to an under-recognized and separate Muslim nation. The organization often made its support of the official use of Urdu known,

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19 This quote should not be interpreted to mean that the Muslim League did not support independence from British rule at this point in time. Instead, as Rahim prefaces his statement, it reflects the fact that “all vague generalities such as Swaraj or commonwealth of India or home-rule for India have no attraction for” the Muslim League (11). In this can be seen the beginnings of the selective, codified nature by which the League would find the terms self rule acceptable with regard to Muslim rights. As we have seen, such requirements would increasingly become a part of its constitution as time went on.

20 Throughout the lead-up to partition, the AIML continued to be critical of the Congress’ non-cooperation movement. They feared that it would actually lead to curtailment of the rights of Muslims and other minorities (Resolutions of the AIML Apr. 1940-41, Feb 1941 res. 6, 32-3).
despite the continuing advance of Hindi. Regarding the status of Urdu as a court language, the League lent its support to those attempting to promote its continued use (Resolutions of the AIML May 1924 – Dec. 1926, Dec. 1925 Res. 15, 26). The AIML was still campaigning for the preservation of Urdu almost 12 years later; stating that Urdu’s “unhampered use should be upheld in all government offices, courts, legislatures, railways and postal departments” (Resolutions of the AIML Oct. 1937–Dec. 1938, Oct. 1937 Res. 11, 8). Additionally the AIML bemoaned the revocation of scholarships from only Muslim students following incidents of communal violence that occurred during the same year (Report of the Inquiry Committee…Muslim Grievances in Congress Provinces, 1938, 69).

In light of this pro-Urdu education perspective, the passage one year later of the Wardha educational scheme, a comprehensive education plan, was immediately viewed by the AIML through its lens of a perceived Hindu quest for domination. Although the plan was intended to promote universal basic education in Congress-held provinces, the League expressed concern that the standardized system of education would in fact “obliterate or weaken the religious traditions of the Indian Muslim, so that they may lose their separate national identity and be moulded according to the political ideals of the Congress” (Report of the Inquiry Committee…Wardha Scheme, 1938, 3). The AIML’s report on the Scheme continues, accusing its curriculum of bias toward Hindu cultural perspectives and maintains that its emphasis on ‘Hindustani’, as a national mother tongue in Hindu majority regions would place Muslim students at a perennial disadvantage as “forcibly coined [technical] Sanskrit terms…will be unintelligible to the Muslims even if written in Persian script” (8-9). The Inquiry Committee report also takes issue with the non-violence foundation of the scheme arguing that its place as a Hindu religious precept could be meant to instill a sense of cultural or religious inferiority in Muslim students (6).

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21 Conspicuously, the report makes no mention of which religious community instigated the violence.

22 On this point, the issues of the Working Committee were two-fold. First, they felt that non-violence measures were preferable, but that violence was permitted by Islam for protective reasons when passive tactics failed. Second, they
deepened as little was done to address their concerns. As the subcontinent’s independence from Britain became more and more likely, the League Muslims moved to demand their own national independence.

Amid the above developments, Congress leadership seemed not to understand the source of Muslim concerns. Unlike the Muslim League, the Congress maintained that it was inclusive of all peoples of India in its representation, although it did have a disproportionately Hindu majority. Due to said Hindu predominance in the Congress, the Muslim League tended to associate it specifically with Hindus and directed accusations of Hindu ambitions for domination towards it. Congress leaders, who apparently saw themselves as attempting to be representative of all of British India, reacted to the AIML’s charges with confusion. This lack of understanding is clearly shown in a series of letters sent between Gandhi, Nehru and Jinnah during 1938. While some of the Muslim League’s concerns regarding the de facto outcomes of Congress policy toward Muslims had clear rationales, League accusations that such measures were evidence of a concerted movement by Hindus to marginalize Muslims were often far more nebulous. In one instance, Nehru appears to have become befuddled by such accusations in Jinnah’s speeches and implies that the Muslim leader is simply being inflammatory: “In reading your speeches I have come across various statements to the effect that the Congress is trying to establish Hindu Raj. I am unaware of how this is being done or who is doing it” (Nehru to Jinnah, 4 Feb. 1938). He further offered to respond to Jinnah’s concerns if he would define them concretely in his correspondence. However, with the Hindus in a numerical majority, Jinnah appeared unwilling to debate from a disadvantage; maintaining that Nehru’s suggested method “may be appropriate between two litigants…but national issues cannot be settled like that” (Jinnah to Nehru, 8 Mar. 1938). Further, Gandhi’s response to Jinnah’s terming of the

feared that teaching non-violence in schools would institutionalize a second class standing of Muslims in the educational system while inhibiting Muslims’ ability to fight possible future oppression by Hindus.

23 All of the letters between Jinnah, Nehru and Gandhi cited in this thesis are from a booklet published by The Times of India in 1938. For purposes of clarity I have cited the individual letters by date.
Congress as a Hindu body points to the possible origins for the modern day Indian ethnic landscape in which multiple ethnic factors cut across one another to form a larger national identity. Upon receiving Jinnah’s opinion that Gandhi represents “the Congress and other Hindus throughout the country” Gandhi replied: “I am afraid that I cannot fulfill the test. I cannot represent either the Congress or the Hindus in the sense you mean” (Jinnah to Gandhi, 3 Mar. 1938; Gandhi to Jinnah, 8 Mar. 1938).\(^2^4\) Thus, while recognizing the Hindus and Muslims as two separate groups in the pre-modern Western sense, the concept of nationality expressed by the Indian leader in this statement is not necessarily limited to that paradigm. Still, the Congress-Hindu leaders denial of Jinnah’s view of the Congress as a Hindu body and ambitions of Hindu elements did little to address underlying concerns of the Muslim League’s leader with regard to the Hindu-Muslim power imbalance. It appears that Jinnah may also have misinterpreted the Congress leaders’ simple denial as patronization; eventually responding to Nehru: “Your tone and language again display the same arrogance and militant split as if the Congress is the sovereign power” (Jinnah to Nehru, 17 Apr. 1938). Although sharing similar conceptualizations of ethnicity derived from British education, the leaders of the two groups appear to have misunderstood the views and concerns of the other. Their intransigence increased as independence approached. Two years later, in 1940, the Muslim League passed the Lahore resolution, essentially enshrining its demand for a separate Muslim state. Speaking at the 1940 Lahore session, Jinnah mocked Gandhi’s denial of representing Hindus: “Why should not Mr. Gandhi be proud to say ‘I am a Hindu, the Congress has solid Hindu backing’? I am not ashamed of saying that I am a Mussalman” (Jinnah, 1940, 12). The Muslim League was aware of the British role in fomenting a Hindu-Muslim divide. Yet, its most prominent leader insisted on continuing to encourage further tension between the two religious groups for fear of further repression by Hindus in the post-independence environment. After almost 90 years of actively

\(^{24}\) The first quote in the sentence is from Jinnah’s letter to Gandhi on March 3rd 1938. The Second is from Gandhi’s reply on March 8th of the same year.
encouraging ethnic division in order to divide and rule its colonial subjects, the colonizer was no longer able to control the perceptions they had worked to instill. As withdrawal approached, the only viable near-term method of departure “for Great Britain [became] to divide and quit” (Jinnah, 1943, 12).

*Competing ideas of nationhood in the framing of demands for freedom*

As previously stated, Pakistan has experienced higher levels of ethnic strife in the post-independence environment, than has India. This is despite the fact that both countries have in common some form of a plurality of ethnicity. Pakistan’s ethno-linguistic identities tend to reinforce one another as land or tribal lines and seem to dominate the country’s modern day politics, rather than undercut one another in order to culminate in a larger sense of shared national identity. The origins of the chasm between Pakistan as a national idea, and the actual function of the country, can be traced back to the post-1857 gap in education. British-educated Muslim League elites were greatly inspired “by the writings of 19th century Muslim scholars such as Sir Syed Ahmed Khan and Syed Ameer Ali [who] had pleaded to build a rational and modern Muslim middle-class in South Asia [and] to construct a distinct political and cultural identity for the Muslim minority of India” (Paracha, 2014, 4). While the Muslim League did become the main Muslim body in partition-era India, other more Islamist chambers of the time did not necessarily agree with the League’s promotion of terming Indian Muslims as a single nation. Instead, they argued, the “AIML’s Muslim Nationalism was a construct based on the European idea of a nation-state and that Islam cannot be confined within the boundaries of nationalism” (ibid). Therefore, it seems that there was awareness at the time that a common religion – one that is widely found outside of the Indian sub-continent - is not necessarily enough to foment national cohesion and, thus, that other factors may be more important. The relative primacy of the linguistic and ethnic identities of Pakistan’s tribal ‘nations’ would have stark implications for the country moving forward.
Despite awareness of non-religion-based identity among indigenous Muslim peoples, the AIML intelligentsia appeared to sorely underestimate its importance; starting from the time of AIML’s formation. Intra-Muslim factionalism was seen as a mere distraction from awakening an ‘inherent national spirit’ in Indian Muslims. As one early AIML presidential address declares: “we must of all things discard sectional jealousies and personal animosities; two evils which are capable of cankering the heart of the sublimest purpose. We must work together as true children of Islam” (Peerbhoy, 1907, 6). In this way, the power of ‘sectional jealousies’ is seen to be acknowledged from shortly after the Muslim League’s founding, but their importance is discounted in favor of a pre-modern British national ideal based on religion. Further, by advancing the Western notion that those who share a single religion can constitute a single nation-state, the above quote lauds it as a better means of definition than tribe-based conceptualizations. Through this, it equates progress with embracing the said Western mode of definition, while still acknowledging the existence of local ones. This view was not uncommon among the British educated framers of Indian and Pakistani independence. As Chakrabarty writes: “generations of elite [colonial] Indian nationalists found their subject positions as nationalists within [a] transition narrative that…hung the tapestry of ‘Indian history’ between the two poles of homologous sets of oppositions”: the local “medieval” and the Western “modern” (2000, 32). This association of Western ideals with progress often caused champions of Pakistani independence to regard tribal identities as backward, or inferior to British means of defining ethnic groups when framing their demands.

As members of indigenous tribal societies and also products of British colonial higher education, it may be that these colonial elites had a Europeanized understanding of the primacy of ethno-regional rather than religious identities among indigenous populations, while at the same time remaining aware of both methods of conceptualization. As a result, AIML leaders seemed to believe that Indian Muslims were destined to unite in a European style nation-state, while at the same time
taking contradictory intra-Muslim factionalism into account as having inherently secondary relevance. Evidence of this ‘dual awareness’ can be found in the League’s presidential speeches as the partition drew nearer. In one instance, Jinnah dismisses the primacy of non-religious identity as inappropriate among Indian Muslims; declaring that “The Mussalmans have not yet realized what power and strength they possess if they were properly mobilized as one solid people” (Jinnah, 1938, 11-2). He echoes this sentiment in conjunction with the creation of the ‘Pakistan Demand’ two years later: “Mussalmans are a nation according to any definition of a nation and they must have their homelands, their territory and their state” (Jinnah, 1940, 25). In interpreting the above quotes, we can see that the ideologically essential nature of the religion-oriented definition of ‘nation’ was inherent in the thinking of one of the AIML’s most prominent leaders. At the same time, the religion-oriented British paradigm seems not to have completely canceled out other definitions based on tribal or linguistic identities. As a result, Jinnah seems to advocate for Pakistan as a singular state composed of many ethnic nations. But he seems unable to resolve the tension between the Western political model of creating Pakistan as a Muslim nation-state and local concepts of tribal or ethnic territoriality.

Jinnah’s seemingly intentional references to the plurality ‘homelands’ of Indian Muslims is also noteworthy and seems to contradict his earlier statement to the effect Indian Muslims can only constitute one ethnic nation in any sense of the term. His delineation of “Bengal, Punjab, N.F.W.P., Sind, Baluchistan” as “parts of this country” earlier in the same speech suggests that the reference to multiple homelands in fact refers to regional or tribal group oriented provinces (Jinnah, 1940, 16-7). In this way, he paradoxically insists on an agglomeration of British and local ethnic perception through the creation of one nation-state which must also be comprised of multiple factional nations.

25 This citation refers to the presidential speech made by Jinnah during 1938; not his letters.  
26 The Italics in the quote are mine.
Although the concept of religious-based ethnicity seemed to ideologically dominate in the framing of the partition of British India, the importance of crystallized homeland-based identities quickly made itself known in Pakistan. One 1947 newspaper account of post-partition Karachi shows the beginnings of such sub-Muslim ethnic division. It describes Pakistan’s former capital as having been “mainly a Gujerati town. Today its population is at least three to four times as numerous, is variously Sindhi, Pathan…and partly by forced migration of Bihari and Punjabi” (Pakistan Survey – Karachi a Capital Almost Against its Will, 1947). The article makes notes of differences in social class and ethnic grouping. In one instance it maintains that the newfound violence in the city is perpetrated by migrants from India, while “the Sindhi Muslim has, on a whole, behaved himself”. Elsewhere in Pakistan, other press accounts note heated disputes arising along linguistic lines in at least four of Pakistan’s sub-national ‘homelands’ within a year of partition (Reader Opinion - Punjabi, 1948; Bengal to Become E. Bengal’s State Language, 1948). Thus, the image of a united Muslim nation on the south Asian subcontinent appears to have vanished as quickly as its state appeared on the map.

The effect of the partition, based on ethno-religious divisions, in south Asia cannot be underestimated. Nor can the legacies of historical figures that were involved in it. Mountbatten attempted to close out the British colonial era on the Indian sub-continent with some measure of order and bolster the Hindustani position when reasonably possible. The Hindu and Muslim leaders, both from Western-educated colonial backgrounds, sought to graft nation-state democracy-like frameworks onto diverse societies riddled with fault lines that had themselves been altered by centuries of colonial rule. As a result, religion-based animosity became transmuted into the realm of international politics, while internal divisions remained in challenge to the idea of national unity in each new country to varying degrees. As the process of state building got underway, these partition-
related events and sub-national identities were entrenched in the ethnic landscapes of each independent country. They played a role in determining future events and internal pressures.

Those pressures necessitated that Jinnah take an authoritative approach at the helm of state in Pakistan. His decision to become Governor-General instead of prime minister was telling for the future of the country he had helped to father. Jinnah maintained that he would need the authoritative office to control the fledgling nation’s often-turbulent ethnic and tribal groups. When reminded by Mountbatten that democratic power lay in parliament, Jinnah reportedly responded: “Not in My Pakistan…there the Prime Minister will do what the Governor-General tells him” (in Wood, 1985, 660). As Wood interprets, Jinnah at some point “knew ‘that the greatest threat to Pakistan would be internal’ [and the] implications for a democratic Pakistan were ominous: …the only man who had real power in Pakistan chose not to be its prime minister” (Jahal in Wood, 1985, 660). Indeed, Jinnah died shortly after Pakistan’s independence. The ensuing power vacuum resulted in decades of military dictatorship, ethnic repression, and economic misallocation.

In addition to the internal ethnic problems especially endemic to Pakistan, the larger Hindu-Muslim religious dynamic did not vanish through the creation of separate states. It remained durable in the national narratives of India and Pakistan. For example, Jinnah is revered by present day Pakistanis as the Great Leader who fathered their nation in the face of great opposition. But to India he remains “the Lucifer who tempted his people into the unforgivable sin against their nationalist faith” (Moore, 1983, 529). In this light, it is no surprise that Indians would view the sundered lands as in some way still Indian. As Chatterji writes: “From the standpoint of the independent Indian state… it is easy to see why it has been convenient to depict [historical] Pakistan as a diseased limb that had to be sacrificed for the health of national body-politic” (1999, 185). This proverbial sacrifice was perceived as anything but willing; from independence onward democratic
India sought to rectify what it saw as an injustice. With this mutual animosity now transferred to the national level, India and Pakistan would become involved in a number of wars over the coming decades.

*The self-fulfilling narrative of warring nations in Sri Lanka*

While colonial history was unfolding in British India, a similar colonial past also developed on the nearby island of Ceylon. Though some aspects of Sri Lanka’s colonial story differ from that of British India, there are also several important parallels and connections between the two which have influenced ethnic concepts on the island. As such, its case merits investigation.

Like the Indian sub-continent, the island of Ceylon was divided amongst various kingdoms in the pre-colonial era. These kingdoms were divided along lines of religion, but not limited or constrained in terms of self-definition to those lines (Rogers, 1994, 16). It should also be pointed out that the presence of other colonial powers, the Portuguese and later the Dutch, was somewhat protracted on much of the island’s northern and coastal regions before the beginning of British rule during the end of the 18th and start of the 19th centuries. The two pre-British colonizers, who were mainly interested in producing and exporting spices “only controlled the maritime provinces and did not radically alter the indigenous administrative systems” (Liston, 1999-2000, 195). This situation fundamentally changed under the British. Although a Crown colony for most of its existence, in 1798 administration of Ceylon was originally transferred from the Dutch to

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27 Korbel finds in government communiqués regarding the breakout of the Kashmir conflict “a pronounced contempt on the part of India toward Pakistan (whose very existence Jawaharlal Nehru found difficult to recognize) and a deep seated mistrust in Karachi of any move coming from New Delhi” (1953, 501). Furber (1951) and Islam (1985) point to an Indian eagerness to reclaim princely states following the partitions and to provide assistance to East Bengal leading up to the 1971 war, respectively.

28 Rogers points out the Portuguese and Dutch focus on Christianization; requiring conversion as a sign of loyalty to the colonial power structure. This led them to be mostly unconcerned with indigenous religion and ethnic based concepts, leaving them largely unchanged. It also explains the presence of a sizable Christian minority in Sri Lanka (1994, 15; 2004 631).
the administration of the East India Company (196).

This meant that the same colonial administrators who were initially responsible for the creation of policy toward the indigenous populations in British India were also the first British rulers responsible for discerning the taxonomy of ethnicity on Ceylon. Existing British perceptions of the Indian identity served as both a grounding and a challenge in this case. When trying to apply the religion and caste-based distinction used in India to Ceylon, the presence of Buddhism and a viable indigenous Christian minority of various races confused British administrators (Rogers, 1994, 16). This confusion was partially due to an “early British ignorance” about the Buddhist religion which caused colonial administrators to shy away from its practitioners, at first thinking that Buddhism might be some unknown denomination of Hinduism as they applied their own Indian framework to Ceylon (ibid; Percival, 1803, 198-201).

As a result of this murkiness regarding religious differences, the British in Ceylon seemed to focus on perceived differences in racial ethnicity or nationality. Despite divergence from the completely religion-based model that was used in colonial India, the British also choose to favor one group over another in Sri Lanka as a means of institutionalizing a division of labor, while still using religious and linguistic criteria for conceptualizing differentials between two main ethnicities.

As occurred in India, the fact the British took notice of certain divisions over others in Ceylon does indicate that those divisions existed in some manner before their arrival. However, as with the distinctions drawn between Muslims and Hindus on the sub-continent, the paradigm through which the colonizer characterized the importance of these differences does not mean that those distinctions had been relatively important to pre-colonial indigenous populations. As Rogers writes of pre-British Sri Lankan society: “in contrast to early modern Europe, the idea that all

29 Marshall (1846) shows that despite nominally becoming a separate entity the Indian colonial government remained involved in operations on the island suggesting that the de facto connection between the Indian and Ceylonese administrations continued on after their formal separation in 1802.
30 Percival (1803) speaks of the Sinhalese as one grouping, despite relating that they were or are part of various indigenous Kingdoms. His attempt to understand the religious and cultural differences between the Hindus and Buddhists is clearly grounded in an understanding of British sub-continental ethnic perceptions (200).
inhabitants of the kingdom need…belong to a particular faith was not part of the prevailing political theory” (2004, 628). While indigenous kingdoms valued the importance of state religion, those of other ethnicities could and did participate in society (629-30). Thus, the formalization of ethnic distinctions under the British did serve to increase perceptions of difference. Initially, this was not done with the intention of creating societal divisions but instead, as with the Company’s army in India, the intrinsic differences were at first “largely irrelevant for a government that sought to maintain the caste-like social distinctions that underpinned the mercantilist political economy” (635).

In this way, British colonial economic and cultural attitudes that were used in colonial India also became applied to Ceylon. However, instead of religion being the primary dividing factor the British chose to define difference based on the concept of ethnic nations. Thus, instead of perceived religious differences being the basis for division as in colonial India, exaggeration of ethnicity or race in Ceylon came to serve as the primary fracture point. In both cases, these divisions spread to influence other points of identity formation. In colonial India, linguistic and educational factors either undercut or reinforced the religious difference to varying degrees for Hindus and Muslims over time. In what would become Sri Lanka, the initial enunciation of racial-national identity, which to the colonial British had a religious component, would be reinforced by cultural and economic factors splitting Tamil-Hindu and Sinhalese-Buddhist communities along an ethnic fault line.

When the British took control of the former Dutch coastal regions, much of the highlands on the island remained under the control of the Buddhist-ruled Kingdom of Kandy. It remained intact until its defeat by the British in 1815 in the second of two wars fought between the two. British hegemony on the island in the wake of these two wars with a nominally Sinhalese-Buddhist kingdom fundamentally changed Ceylon’s ethno-religious landscape. Because of the British framework for categorizing ethnic groups, the indigenous population had become viewed over the first few decades of British rule over the island as divided between “[t]wo different nations [which]
from a very ancient time have divided between them possession of the land” (Cleghorn in Rogers, 2004, 633-4). These ‘two nations’ can be termed as the Sinhalese and Tamil communities. It appears that some further sub-division was at first made between the Kandyan Sinhalese and those from the coastal areas. But, this distinction was lessened over time after the Crown’s defeat of the Kingdom of Kandy. Descriptions from the time indicate that the two Sinhalese groups increasingly became perceived as one. Thirty years after the British victory over Kandy, one survey speaks of the Sinhalese as one group; noticing: “Colloquially, the inhabitants [of all Sinhalese areas] are divided into two varieties, namely, Singalese an Kandyans…there is no specific distinction between them; they have the same origin, speak the same language, follow the same religion and have the same habits of life” (Marshall, 1846, 16).  

The author goes on to mention that the Tamil population is the same as that of the Tamil-Hindu population in southern India and cites unwillingness of the Sinhalese to enlist in British local armies, thus requiring the British to ‘import’ solders from India (17-9). While conceding that colonial conquest often fails to engender warm feelings on the part of the colonized, he takes note of special Sinhalese-Kandyan animosity toward their conquerors (174-81). This conquest of the Sinhalese kingdom may indicate the development of a tacit British preference for the Tamil population as occurred with Hindus in India. As Liston compares: “in a situation similar to that in India when the Mughal Empire was crumbling, the Sri Lankan Kingdom of Kandy was falling apart prior to British colonialization. This allowed the British to enter into the political arena of Sri Lanka and establish themselves” (1999-2000, 190). In doing so, they drew similar conclusions about the relative trustworthiness of the ‘races’ that they were fighting in both cases. Indeed, in the years after the war, reforms were instituted resulting in non-recognition of differences between the

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31 After mentioning the two different terms, Marshall appears to confuse them repeatedly. He scarcely mentions coastal Sinhalese while writing almost completely of the ‘present-day’ Kandyans almost as if they are representative of the entire Sinhalese group (1846, 16-20).
coastal and Kandyan Sinhalese-Buddhists, while institutionalizing a Sinhalese-Tamil dynamic (Rogers, 2004, 641-3).

The aftermath of the consolidation of British rule on Ceylon saw the rise of plantations on the interior of the island beginning in the 1820’s. In addition to the creation of an extensive railway and road infrastructure, the plantation system required the importation of laborers from British India, as at first the Sinhalese could not be induced to leave their subsistence farms (Wenzlhuemer, 2005, 147-8; Sivasundaram, 2007, 928). This trend runs from the fact that, as has been previously mentioned, during the beginning of the plantation industry’s expansion, economic incentives were not sufficient to attract the required numbers of local Sinhalese workers to quit their subsistence lifestyle in favor of plantation labor. It does appear that Sinhalese farmers often functioned in a tributary capacity to the plantations, as the economic pressure of the plantation economy increased, by trading produce to the plantations and contributing in a limited fashion to the plantation labor force (Wenzlhuemer, 2005, 147-8). The Sinhalese also provided infrastructure-oriented labor, but often under duress (Sivasundaram, 2007, 956). Still, they remained on the relative periphery as their economic situation worsened.

As the importation of workers became a staple of the Ceylonese labor market, it is interesting to note the selection of the Tamil ethnicity as the primary source of plantation labor supply. It is obvious that maintaining control over colonial populations would have been better served by combining laborers from a variety of racial, ethnic or religious groups from India. However, the Indian Tamils who were chosen shared a common religious, cultural and linguistic, if not historical heritage, with the second largest ethnic grouping on Ceylon. One possible explanation for the choice of the British to import specifically Tamil labor is the existence of a rationale of economic expediency in British colonial Ceylon, similar to that observed in British India. In fact, the simple proximity of Tamil Nadu to Ceylon may have been an original determining factor. As
Wenzlhuemer interprets: “Favoured by its geographical proximity, the island of Ceylon had become one of the early outlets for South Indian excess labour” (2007, 581). While perhaps not expressly intending to create a division of labor based on the island’s two main races, the need of the plantation to acquire workers and do so quickly seems to have caused it to happen. Tamil workers came to control in the British plantation sector, while its system crowded out the Sinhalese-dominated subsistence sector over the course of the 19th century. In doing so, the cultural groundings of the British colonial system produced in effect an ethnicity-based ‘divide and conquer’ paradigm in Sri Lanka, like that instituted between religions in India, while favoring one of the groups in each case.

Though British colonial administration resulted in the same division-encouraging modus operandi in the cases of both colonial India and Sri Lanka, the manner by which it was brought about was different. In India, already perceived religion-based differences in the indigenous population were actively encouraged following the watershed event of the ‘Sepoy Rebellion’. In Ceylon, differences became institutionalized de facto in the plantation system and were encouraged over time in a gradual process. The intense need for south Indian labor on Sri Lankan plantations resulted in the creation of the Kangany system, in which Indian Tamil workers were tasked to return to Tamil regions in India and recruit more labor (Wenzlhuemer, 2007, 585). As time passed, those skilled in the practice grew to become foremen and administrators of plantation work, in the process often extracting high fees from the plantations and imposing enormous debts on migrant workers for their recruitment and transport. The Ceylonese colonial government regulated and encouraged the practice (591-9).

The expansion of the plantation economy eventually put sufficient pressure on the majority highland Sinhalese to attempt entry into the plantation work sector. Some evidence suggests that these Sinhalese were eventually able to gain some share in the Tamil-dominated
plantedation labor force once their own economic situation had grown worse than that of the cash-crop laborers (Wenzlhuemer, 2005, 456; 2007, 580). However, as previously stated, it also appears that this share was quite limited as the Sinhalese peasantry was mostly crowded out by the Tamil dominated recruitment system (Nithiyanandam, 2000, 287). In this way, the relative patronage of (Indian) Tamils became part of the political-economic structure of governance in British colonial Ceylon.

It is true in post-colonial Sri Lanka that two-way civil unrest runs largely between the Sinhalese and Tamils of long-time Sri Lankan origin in the North and East of the country. Indian Tamils in the modern era often define themselves as a separate group from the Sri Lankan variety (Kearney, 1985, 899). The connection between the two groups of Tamils and its implications for strife lies in the fact that, for the British of the colonial era, the Tamils constituted one national group – one that had been in conflict with the Sinhalese-Buddhists for some time. Rogers describes the British colonial interpretation of a prime dynamic in Ceylon’s past “as the history of Sinhalese kingdoms which had constantly faced Malabar invaders from southern India” (2004, 642). The British seem to have termed the ethnic politics of Ceylon as a bi-ethnic struggle between Sinhalese and Tamils, no matter their origin. This conceptualization was, in turn, passed to the Western-educated Sinhalese who began the independence movement and seemed to favor the concerns of the Sinhalese peasantry (Samaraweera, 1981, 133). Therefore, instead of a Ceylonese independence movement rising out of a larger unity of the many ethnic or religious identities in Sri Lanka, the movement arose mostly out of “collective aspirations of the Sinhalese to retrieve their ethnic heritage and reassert their position as the majority of the island's peoples, which they felt had been undermined” by European rule that under the British resulted in mass importation of Tamil labors at the expense of the ‘local’ rural population (Kearney, 1985, 902).
As one result of this British-influenced bi-racial paradigm, the Sinhalese political discourse seems not to distinguish between Sri Lankan and Indian Tamils. "In this country the problem of the Tamils is not a minority problem”, remarked one Sinhalese member of the Sri Lankan Parliament, “[t]he Sinhalese are the minority in Dravidastan. We are carrying on a struggle for our national existence against the Dravidastan majority" (in Kearney, 1985, 903). The above concept of ‘Dravidastan’ is clearly in keeping with the Ceylonese British administration’s idea of all Tamils forming one nation or race based on their linguistic and religious identity vis a vis the Singhalese. The use of ‘Dravidastan’ here is also significant in that it may date from the time of Sri Lankan, Pakistani and Indian independence from Britain, which occurred within one year of each other, and was present in the conceptualizations of British-educated locals. One Muslim League speech makes clear the idea that in South Asia “there is another nation that is the Dravidian…[which] can establish Dravidistan where seven percent of Muslims [there] will stretch their hands of friendship” (Jinnah, 1941, 5-6). In this way, the idea of Dravidians as a separate nation seems to have developed among Muslims on the nearby subcontinent as a means of seeking alliance against perceived Hindustani cultural and linguistic domination. Jinnah’s speech elaborates this stance via comparison “Remember, there in Yugoslavia, you have the Croats, Sloans and Serbs. But the position was very much like our position in India – Dravidistan, Pakistan and Hindustan” (16).

According to the legacy of this pre-modern view, religious difference prevents unity as a nation, while nations of the same faith can still differ in cultural or linguistic traditions. Thus, the religious differences between Tamil and Sinhalese preclude their definition as one nation. Instead it lumps all Tamils, whether in India or on Sri Lanka, into a single group. Further support for this unitary conceptualization of the Tamils in Sri Lanka is provided by the fact that Sinhalese violence is

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32 By way of explanation, Croats and Slovenes (Sloans) share the same religion, but speak different languages, whereas Serbs follow a different denomination of Christianity, though they are closer to Croats in their linguistic tradition. Hindustanis and Dravidians share a common religion, but speak different languages whereas Pakistanis are of a different religion though their lingua franca, Urdu, is similar to Hindi.
often projected indiscriminately against the Indian highland Tamils even though they are not explicitly associated with the separatist movement and live mostly on a different part of the island (Kearney, 1985, 899). This British-conceived ethnic chasm manifested itself soon after independence with the Sinhalese majority depriving many Tamils of Indian origin of Lankan citizenship and later declaring Sinhalese the only government language; ostracizing the Tamil minority from civil participation. In this way a minority with over a millennium of tenure on the island was forced into martial conflict with a crystallized ethnic majority after achieving independence from Britain as a single country.

The specific actions by which the British system of colonization instilled in local populations concepts of difference varied in British India and its colony of Ceylon. However, the divisions themselves were formed by the same colonial temporal-cultural lens and market-oriented modus operandi. These methods resulted in the encouragement of internalization of British-conceived differences on the part of indigenous populations. The nation-state based colonial cultural grounding molded both south Asian territories that the Crown ruled into varying ethnic landscapes. This process was accomplished in differing ways that were informed by the realities of gaining and maintaining rule in each colony. On the sub-continent, the need to maintain a sizable colonial army of locally recruited solders resulted in a the need to actively accentuate pre-conceived ethno-religious differences between members of the populace while functionally allowing for the continuance of other differentiating factors and at the same time favoring the group that was relatively more trusted in colonial eyes. In Sri Lanka, the dominant factor for the enculturation of a British-originated ethnic divide in the local polities was the continuous need for the expedient provision of plantation labor, which came to rely on a relatively more favored racial group. In the first case, the preferred group was in the majority, already causing an educated Muslim minority to feel marginalized within the colonial system and demand the single independence of what were actually multiple crystallized and
conflicting groups. This movement in effect served to leave modern day India with a plurality in diversity. In Sri Lanka, this divide was such that the favored group – Indian Tamils – was conceived as synonymous with all of the Tamil ethnic grouping and in the minority as a whole on the island. The Tamil demand for independence rose from a post-independence tyranny of the Sinhalese majority. In all three cases the same British, religion-based de facto preference for certain ethnic groups and resultant policies served the creation of three separate national ethno-religious situations in the modern day nation states. While the two countries of Pakistan and India remain divided in their relations along the colonially-encouraged religious lines, internally the first remains divided by multi-vectored ethno-linguistic strife. In the latter, ethnic, linguistic and religious differences intersect one another resulting in the viability of a larger nationalist idea and limited internal violence. The creation of an intra-national bi-racial paradigm resulted in dividing lines forming along one fracture point in Sri Lanka; resulting in a civil war.

Avenues for Further Study and Concluding Remarks

Self-concept is a basic element in determining how one views, interprets and interacts with the world around him or her. This concept is not stable over time nor only confined to the space of one’s mind. It is constantly being influenced by the interface which it itself informs. The same is true of ethnic grouping as a shared, constructed identity. What perceived differences exist between groups can be enunciated or minimized through interaction, and even hijacked by a third party. This was the case with the British colonization of south Asia. The ethno-religious landscapes which the colonizing power perceived upon, or through conquest of the region were used and modified for the ends of the colonizer throughout the similar colonial histories in three of the region’s post-colonial countries. The British colonial market-economic modus operandi and religion-based method of dividing groups led to the furtherance of economic goals through the accentuation of ethnic and
religious differences, while often favoring one group over another. The manner through which these British-conceived differences were institutionalized in the colonial system and thus became reinterpreted by indigenous populations took different forms, but were dictated by a need for expediency on the part of the British and whether the favored group found itself in the majority or the minority. In British India, an initial lack of intrinsic interest in local divisions led the colonial subject to unite against the conqueror’s indifference; subsequently causing active encouragement of religious division by the Crown’s government even as it seemed to focus less on other linguistic and ethnic factors. On Ceylon, the British conceived the two major ethnic groups on the island as opposing nations, with equally rigid differences in religious tradition. This chasm became implicit in the administration of a dominant plantation agriculture sector. The interaction of British-perceived differences with indigenous realities resulted in the eventual creation of three independent states with differing levels of ethnic strife. India is comprised of a plurality of ethnic identities, which serve to undercut each other, minimizing lasting tension between any one identity or group. Pakistan has experienced multi-faceted ethnic violence as tribal and linguistic divisions serve to reinforce each other while the religion-based rivalry has continued as a matter of sometimes warmongering international politics. The Sri Lankan case led to a protracted civil conflict between the two main British-conceived ethnicities. What began as a common worldview and strategy on the part of the colonizer led to a legacy of differing ethnic landscapes in each of the independent countries.

As has been stated, post-colonial states display differing levels of development despite their history of being conquered. Each of the present-day countries in this thesis endured the same colonizer, but also experience unique and differing levels of ethnic tensions as a result. Thus, this colonially-influenced, ethnic-landscape framework may be useful in explaining the differing development situations in former colonies, when differences in ostensible world view and policy of
the colonizer and pre-existing ethnic differences in the colony are taken into account and is an avenue for further statistical research.

Humans are limited in their understanding of the world by their own cultural grounding. It is one disadvantage that is equal to all of us. Maybe we can never overcome it completely. But, we can attempt the process of explaining what we see from our own perspective. Through that, the extreme ethnic-political division that I witnessed in one courtyard at The University of Karachi became embedded in a much larger and on-going story. The historical forces which had created what I saw reach far into the past, and have implications for the future. They extended far beyond that one building and yet were implicitly distilled in the perceptions of all present in it. One may never internalize the perceptions of the other, or even one’s own with a sense of finality. It is through the exercise of approximation and re-contextualization that both find some modicum of common ground, be it a sense of understanding, or a declaration of mutual enmity.
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**Personal Interviews**

Ahmed, Faraz. Personal interview. 15 May 2014. The Interviewee is a student ambassador at Sindh Madrassatul Islam University. Interview took place on the author's personal visit to the SMIU Campus.

Islam, Zahid, Dr. Personal interview. 15 May 2014. Interviewee is a professor at Sindh Madrassatul Islam University.

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33 All of the interviews in this thesis were unstructured and have been paraphrased from the memory of the author.
Maqbool, Tahseen. Personal interview. 8 May 2014. The interviewee is my host's accounting clerk. He comes from a working class and proudly Mohajir background.

Niazi, Muzzamil. Personal interview. 6-17 May 2014. The Interviewee is the head of my host family. The relevant information that I obtained through discussions with him as well as his family and friends is in actuality culled from the period of my stay with them while researching this thesis.
### List of Abbreviations

- **AIML:** All-India Muslim League
- **Congress:** Refers to the All-India National Congress
- **E. Bengal:** East Bengal
- **HDI:** Human Development Index
- **Lib.:** Library
- **MQM:** Muttahida Qaumi Movement, a political party that represents Mohajirs in Pakistan.
- **N.F.W.P.:** North-West Frontier Province
- **Partition:** Refers to the partitioning of British India in 1947
- **Res.:** Resolution
- **SIMU:** Sindh Islam Madrassatul University
- **TS:** Type Script
- **UNDP:** United Nations Development Program
Europass
Curriculum Vitae

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Principal subjects/occupational skills covered  -Global and EU policy integration
-Applied International Trade
-Academic Research and Presentations
-Cross Cultural literary and historical analysis
-Recipient of ‘KWA’ Grant Abroad for field research in Pakistan
Name and type of organisation providing education and training  Joint degree: University of Vienna and University of Wroclaw
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<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Name and address of employer</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>United States Commercial Service</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7-9 Tudor Arghezi Street, District 2, Bucharest 020942 Romania</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Type of business or sector</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>International business consulting, public diplomacy</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Dates</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>From September 2009 to May 2010</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Occupation or position held</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Consultant and Translator</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Main activities and responsibilities</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-Consulting for agricultural small business development</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>-Marketing and distribution of Panamanian honey products</td>
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<tr>
<td>-Translator of micro-business skills instruction into the Spanish language</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Name and address of employer</strong></td>
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<tr>
<td>Global Business Brigades, El Centro Catholico, El Bale, Veriquas, Panama</td>
<td></td>
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</tbody>
</table>
Type of business or sector | Non-profit, business development
---|---
Dates | Summer 2008
Occupation or position held | English Desk Business Reporter/ Media Program Trainer
Main activities and responsibilities | - Researched current international economic issues
Name and address of employer | Television Maldives, Buruzu Magu, Male, Republic of Maldives
Type of business or sector | Broadcasting, journalism, media training

Personal skills and competences

Mother tongue | English
Other language(s) | Spanish, Polish

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Language</th>
<th>Understanding</th>
<th>Speaking</th>
<th>Writing</th>
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Self-assessment

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Language</th>
<th>European level (*)</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Spanish</td>
<td>C1 Proficient user C2 Proficient user B2 Independent user</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(*) Common European Framework of Reference for Languages

Academic Publications

- Pakistani Attitudes Toward the West and Field Hockey
- Shadows from the Past: How Iron Curtain Despots Continue to Dictate Economies
  [http://www.e-ir.info/2013/06/05/how-iron-curtain-despots-continue-to-dictate-economies/](http://www.e-ir.info/2013/06/05/how-iron-curtain-despots-continue-to-dictate-economies/)

Additional information

- Presidential scholar at the University of Southern California (merit scholarship)
- Rotary International Ambassadorial Scholarship for graduate study in Eastern Europe
- Member, Alpha Lambda Delta Honour Society (top 15% of USC students)
- Member, Society for Slovene Studies
- Strong Organizational and Leadership Skills in a cross-cultural context.
- Proficient in Microsoft Office, Bloomberg Terminal Financial Analysis