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Introduction

Theme

The following work analyzes the term "ethnocentrism" from the perspective of its use in communication. Relevant for this work are both the viewpoint of the speaker, who uses the term, as well as the viewpoint of audience, and the connotations aroused by the term's use. This work doesn't primarily aim to analyze the *phenomenon* of ethnocentrism as such: a particular human attitude or cultural trait that we can observe in action, criticize for its consequences, treat as an illness or justify as a part or a limitation of universal human nature. I'd like to analyze various *approaches* instead: to present the idea of ethnocentrism in its historical context, its place in the terminology of social sciences and also its usefulness, the conciseness of its meaning and its critical power within particular discourses. The phenomenon itself isn't irrelevant for this work, but its definition is open for interpretation.

The phenomenon of ethnocentrism isn't easy to observe. It is a subjective phenomenon, a private, personal bias, conscious like a mood or unconscious like an urge, observable introspectively rather than in the outside world. The term itself is very general, defined as "*the technical name for this view of things in which one's own group is the center of everything, and all others are scaled and rated with reference to it*"¹. It denotes that there is one group seen as one's own and that one's membership in the group is represented by a set of characteristics, which its ethnocentrist member defines and contrasts with characteristics of the world around.

This term has been used in a variety of contexts: social psychology, anthropology, history, postcolonial studies, intercultural philosophy, and even in marketing and architecture. The use of the term has become so wide that it's hard to say to what extent these instances still reflect the original view presented by Sumner. Local differences in perception can be seen as a cause of an ethnocentrist *worldview*². The most developed tradition, which actually studies ethnocentrism as such, sees it as a nearly universal

1 – Sumner 1906: 15

2 – Tuan 1974: 75f

*syndrome*³ of either growing human societies or of individuals, showing itself in inclusivity and exclusivity of group membership, views or prejudices towards oneself and others, and finally in the effect of this syndrome on group cohesion and outward relations. Combining these two points, ethnocentrism has been used in postcolonial studies to criticize the social sciences for promoting the distortion caused by local (e.g. European or Islamic) characteristics, thus creating an ideology of domination through scientific and social values⁴.

The constitution of this worldview may thus be considered a matter of aesthetics (i.e. the view is determined by the subject's physical environment⁵), of psychology (when determined by "*assumptions in the individual's conception of society*"⁶) or of anthropology, which relates both of these factors to each other. Secondly, it could be considered a trait of an ideology, be it an abstract (philosophical) or a concretized (political) one. In such a case, the question of the cause is an interesting one, as the one pertaining to the factors that caused its spread, its influence, and its noticeability in general. It may be interesting to look into the process by which an ideology inspires an individual to formulate and elevate his ethnic identity; alternatively, people may search for objective conditions, which act as a fertile soil for an ethnocentrist ideology or culture.

The problem however, is somewhat deeper. In using term "ethnocentrism", referring to the phenomenon in which "*one's own group is the center of everything*", one presupposes that there is a *group* which can be seen as one's *own*, and that the spatial metaphor of *center* refers to certain hierarchical structure being imposed on *everything*. Some of these aspects have already been questioned: most ardently, is this *group*⁷? Can the group be said to cause specific behaviors⁸? What kind of thinking or action can be considered ethnocentrist⁹? Following this set of doubts cast on the term itself I consider it a ripe moment to ask the question – what does one want to attain by the very *use* of the

3 – Levine & Campbell 1972: 61

4 – The term "ideology" has been elaborated in various ways, from psychological, as well as from economic perspectives. In my own view, I consider "ideology" to be a habit, i.e. a set of values directing decisions.

5 – Tuan 1974: 31

6 – cf. Levinson 1949: 19

7 – cf. Benhabib 2002: 147f

8 – cf. Geertz 1989: 142

9 – cf. Wimmer 2004: 54f

term?

It seems to me that an inquiry about relations between personal worldviews and ideologies can't escape the problem of influence. It touches not only the hard-philosophical problem of truth, of what *it* is that gives an idea its persuasive power, but also the more philological or anthropological question of what kind of ideas can *become* interesting or important for a particular person or tradition of thought. As I'm working primarily with real groups (e.g. of populations or political movements), my focus is on the latter question. This doesn't mean, however, that there is no objective, ahistorical truth behind the matter. The cultural and historical context of an argumentation strategy, such as using term "ethnocentrism" against the opposing party in a debate, can be analyzed, yet it would be quite ethnocentric to say this is the *only* context in which it has ever existed.

The concepts of group and membership are common to humans in most parts of the world, I dare say the community can be seen as a sociological constant throughout humanity. This makes the problematisations more philosophical than purely anthropological or linguistic. This inquiry first has to present the variety of processes through which group identification is developed, then to enlighten the means of the elevation of its importance and subordination of other values to it, and finally to analyze the practices, influences and policies of those, who claim to observe ethnocentrism, whether as a *syndrome* or an *ideology*, at large.

Methodology

This work aims primarily to be a study of the uses of the term "ethnocentrism". I don't think it is necessary to provide a list of all possible and actual uses of this term; it is quite a long and unwieldy word for everyday speakers, politicians, activists or journalists, who prefer to use terms like prejudice, nationalism, imperialism, far-right and others. Ethnocentrism is thus a purely scientific term, already in its etymology operating with two very complex ideas – namely *ethnos* (which I analyze in the first chapter of section B) and "centrism" (discussed in the third chapter of the section B). It isn't simply "said", but always "studied". Some kind of everyday use along the lines "you showed quite a high rate of ethnocentrism today" is a phenomenon which doesn't seem to me to be very frequent, at

least without being followed by the question of what specifically the speaker means by "ethnocentrism". One can use the term as an adjective, describing something as "ethnocentrist". Then, because the term is complex, one doesn't merely categorize his object, but he also expresses his ideas of group, as well as of "centrism".

To analyze a term, one can follow the following procedures. The first is to proceed from historical examples of its use. One compares the understanding of the term in, say, the 16th century with its modern use. Alternatively, one may construct a timeline of uses, of the development of the idea, roughly put into order as a "tradition", encompassing consecutive studies of a problem or related problems. Thus I'll first make an outline of this tradition, showing the most influential contributions to the study of ethnocentrism and its precursors in similar problematics. The open question for this section is, what is the criteria for relevance. Other theories may illustrate the problematics here better than those I've chosen and Sumner didn't quote a lot extensively from those mentioned anyway. On the one hand, it may be helpful to see both the context in which Sumner, Levinson and others were writing; on the other hand, the themes they talked about existed already before they proposed their own views.

In the second section I'll approach the term from an analytical perspective, analyzing not only the recurring themes, but also the harmonies and discords in the understanding of the term between particular studies. The comparison between particular uses will be made in accordance with five aspects, which I consider relevant for the meaning of the word, namely,

1. the understanding of *ethnos* (in-group, on which a subject is "centering" on),
2. the process of identification with this *ethnos*,
3. ways of expressing *centrism*,
4. the subject (who or what can be ethnocentrist), and finally
5. the reason behind employing the term, as defined above.

This analysis requires only a short outline of the positions which are used in particular sub-themes by authors addressing the general theme. Recurring instances of similarity may then help us to find a kind of minimalistic definition – or to prove the impossibility of creating an adequate one.

The third section is synthetic: I use the analytical data to work on the problem of the cosmopolitan-ethnocentric dichotomy. The idea is that of a tertiary discourse: I am reacting here to another person writing about someone else. I question the polemical use of the term, when the validity of the addressed works is doubted because of the alleged ethnocentrism of their author. My point of criticism will be primarily the question, of how far a notion which (as observed in the analytical part) may have no universally acceptable meaning, can be used as an argument against presenting biased (also non-universal) theories. Because of this variety of meanings, the criticism may differ in respective examples. Against some cases, one can apply a "table-turn" argument, seeking ethnocentrism in the exclusivist attitude behind the very use of the term – and even behind my own analysis of its use. On the other hand, there is still the holy grail of intercultural discourses, the pluralistic attitude, which underlines the cultural dependency of every statement. Thus, if every term belongs to a specific language, and if a language is a part of a culture, what is the "culture", which we try to purge of ethnocentrism?

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A. History of the Term

I. Prehistory

Ibn Khaldun – Bacon – Vico – Montesquieu – nationalism and ethnology – conflict

This chapter is very short, as the actual history of the term begins only in the year 1906, when Sumner coined the term for the first time. However, the number and variety of examples used in his book connote an ethnological discovery; the phenomenon he was talking about wasn't meant to be limited only to the instance in which he coined the term. For this reason we can talk about a certain prehistory of the term and search for similar or equal terms.

Actually, as early as the late 14th century, 'Abdarrahman ibn Khaldun created a dialectical theory of history based on the socio-political dynamics of contacts between nomad (*badū*) and sedentary (*hudr*) populations. He also defines a sentiment, in Rosenthal's translation called "group feeling" (*'asabiyya*), which can be perceived in smaller social groups such as clans. One cannot choose to which group he will feel he belongs to. Beduins lived in smaller tribes, comprising a few families related by blood, complemented by their clients and allies. The blood relation is for him the basis for this group feeling¹⁰. An aspiring leader of a tribe has this sentiment to thank for his own authority; when he wants to stretch his power beyond the tribe, he must resort to force. On the one hand, this need (or willingness) to rule more than a single tribe is itself considered to be the reason for these group feelings. It gives to the members security and an ability to support their claims against those of another kin¹¹. Their affiliation is the main motivating force for gaining strength (and oppressing other subjects) as long as it inspires new warriors to fight for the tribe. However, the growth of their empire and the change from a nomadic dynasty into a sedentary one can bring them a preoccupation with luxuries and

10 – *Muqaddima* p.170: "everybody's affection for his family and his group is more important (than anything else). Compassion and affection for one's blood relations and relatives exist in human nature as something God put into the hearts of men. It makes for mutual support and aid, and increases the fear felt by the enemy."

11 – *Muqaddima* p.185

make their lineage mixed, inhibiting the group-based loyalty of their subjects¹². Finally, the ruling dynasty may resort to clients to do their oppressive work instead of their own kindred; a client group may then have a stronger group feeling and thus be able to wrestle authority for itself¹³.

In Europe, an interesting point of discussion about bias was made during the formation of early modern science. Francis Bacon in his criticism of contemporary scholarly work employed the term *idola* for the biases caused both by human nature and by cultural influence. Terminologically, "ethnocentrism" could be a way to translate *idola tribus*, but here the "tribe" means the whole human race – a socially universal concept, and thus in direct opposition to the modern, particularist use of the word. It is hard to say which of the three "social" idols – "of cave", "of market" and "of theater" – is closest to the idea of ethnocentrism. The first category, *idola specus*, includes "peculiar nature", "education and conversation with others" and "preoccupation", so here the bias reflects a person's professional (or, as a scientist could say, disciplinary) focus¹⁴. The same can be said about the *idola theatri*, which address particular philosophical methods of logical demonstration¹⁵. *Idola fori*, idols of market, are "the most troublesome of all", representing bias based on language. Scholarly communication was done in Latin throughout the whole of Europe, and these *idola* were thought by Bacon to be caused by an insufficient description or an imaginary reference, if not by incompetent translation¹⁶. These three idols are what we could call particularistic and cultural, but Bacon doesn't offer a comparison between different "markets" or "theatres"; a certain plurality can be found only in individual focuses, i.e., in "caves".

In his *Principles of New Science*, published a century later, Giambattista Vico speaks about the "conceit of nations" (*boria delle nazioni*), which can be observed in

12 – *Muqaddima* p.173; "dynasty" (*dawla*) means here the group holding power, not merely the royal family, but also its military forces, bureaucratic apparatus and so on, according to on 14th century requirements

13 – Such cases were not uncommon in the medieval Muslim world, the most visible being that of Turkic commanders ruling de facto over the 'Abbasid khalifate. The largest Islamic empires of Ibn Khaldun's time – the Khanate ruled by Timur Lenk and the Mamluk Empire in Egypt – were in a similar situation. Cf. *Muqaddima* p.185f

14 – *New Organon* I 42, 54

15 – *New Organon* I 62

16 – *New Organon* I 59

cosmologies in which these nations each claim to be the first to have been created¹⁷. He traces the idea itself to Greek historian Diodorus Siculus from the 1st century BCE¹⁸ and argues for the universal nature of this conceit by giving examples from both antiquity and present times. In their "empty magnificence", people tend to create imaginary stories for their lands even if a real history is preserved, choosing Hercules as their founder instead of some trivial mortal¹⁹. Already attempting to create a kind of universal history, Vico gives examples, such as the Swedish scholar Olaus Rudbeck and Dutchman Johannes van Gorp, who each considered his respective nation to be the source of various inventions in the world: Gothic runes became Phoenician letters and so on²⁰. Even more than Bacon, Vico sees this overemphasis of one's folk properties as a hindrance to scientific progress. The problem isn't so much linguistic as psychological. By focusing our attention on our own nation, we ignore the universal properties of all nations, which Vico had seen in his theory of three languages. It is a methodological attitude similar to the one Bacon demonstrates against Aristotle or Gilbert²¹: criticism of the focus on a single object and deduction solely from its properties, the promotion of a broader view, the comparison of different objects and the induction of knowledge based on recurring properties in various observations.

Montesquieu's *Persian Letters* take an approach more similar to modern studies of ethnocentrism, although not in so serious an atmosphere as that of Bacon's and Vico's work. Here the author speaks through Persians, the archetypal foreigners, constantly comparing European customs with the Oriental ones²². He doesn't claim in his treatise to be universally right, like those of Ibn Khaldun and Bacon; rather, he wants to seem biased. He operates with the common assumption that Orientals were biased by their cultural peculiarities and puts this into contrast with Usbek's view. The reader – let's say an upper-middle class Frenchman of 18th century – thus faces, in the end, his own worldview being addressed. In these letters, Montesquieu describes both the Bacon's idea of "centrism"

17 – *New Science* p.55

18 – *Historical Library* b.I, ch.9 §3

19 – *New Science* p.269

20 – *New Science* p.125

21 – *Advancement* I, V, 7

22 – *Letters* I.61, 114

based on profession or estate²³, as well as the concept of tribal feeling²⁴, interestingly similar to Ibn Khaldun's. It is, however, not a dedicated analysis of these biases. Speaking from the mouth of a foreigner, the author creates a kind of alibi, by which he can allow himself more freedom in making fun of the present society²⁵. Only later, in *The Spirit of the Laws*, did he try systematically to find out the relationship between environment and customs. Both works took a certain step towards the need to define an "ethnos", the abstract unit behind these customary differences²⁶.

The 18th century in general is considered to be approximately the period in which *nationalism*, a political ideology calling for the sovereignty of nations, emerged. The term itself seems to have been coined by Herder in his *Auch eine Philosophie der Geschichte zur Bildung der Menschheit* in 1774, although in a rather ironic context²⁷. Which ethnic group was then the first to demonstrate widespread nationalism is then hard to say. Hroch²⁸ outlines seven countries which could be candidates for the birthplace of modern nationalism in 18th century. For example, Bell²⁹ argues for France: the term "nation" hasn't changed meaning in French since the early 12th century; it was in France that the earliest works (from the first half of the 18th century) on national character were written; and they were the first to establish a National Assembly, declaring that "sovereignty resides essentially in the nation"³⁰. An important development was the extension of the role of the state in matters of education and culture, which was already taking place in the revolutionary years³¹.

23 – *Letters* I.57

24 – *Letters* I.13; Gates attempted to trace the influence of Ibn Khaldun on Montesquieu's works through travellers, who served him as a source of information for the *Letters*. A partial French translation of *Muqaddima* has been published first in 1806, but the book was known in the circle of Orientalists since the end of 17th century.

25 – The work itself has been published in Netherlands, of course anonymously. Although the general belief about Montesquieu's authorship was widespread from the beginning, he himself publicly declared it in a second edition of the *Letters*, two years before his death. The idea itself wasn't that original anyway: already in 1687 there was a book of letters by a "Turkish spy" getting popularity in France. It contained the popular views about foreign peoples as well.

26 – *Letters* I.117, *Spirit of Laws* p.275f (b.XIV, ch.10)

27 – Herder 1774: 510; cf. Blanning 2002: 260

28 – Hroch 1985: 9; namely France, Spain, Portugal, Britain, the Netherlands, Denmark and Sweden

29 – Bell 2001: 5

30 – Bell 2001: 14

31 – cf. Hyslop 1934

Hastings³² and Hayes³³ argue for England, considering the decentralized nature of English politics, combined with religious autonomy, highly developed literary activity in London, and the generally horizontal spread of the interest in politics. Hastings argues explicitly against France: the exceptionalist view of France as the prototypical Christian kingdom in Middle Ages in fact hindered its national identity, which developed as a mere emulation of English nationalism, after England's success on economic and colonial battlegrounds³⁴.

The question as to how far the formation of a nation and nationalism itself are intertwined has been a matter of many debates³⁵. However, nationalism wasn't limited to "state nations" in Hroch's terminology, but involved many ethnic groups with only a marginal (if any) political influence. The first works of this ethnic nationalism were primarily attempts to differentiate a certain ethnic group from the dominant nation. Another (somewhat more politically motivated) endeavor was to describe these groups as indigenous. Both of these ideas can be found in work of Viennese court scholar Adam Kollár, *Historiae jurisque publici regni Ungariae amoenitates*, which is also known for coining the term "ethnology" for the examination of a group's customs and culture in general³⁶. The term spread in the German-speaking intellectual world, where a certain study of cultural traits had already been carried out by travellers since the early 18th century³⁷. It was actually Herder who provided the first arguments for understanding the world as a place of many cultures, which despite their variety share a common rational principle and thus follow a common model of progression, with only local differences³⁸. However, the systematic ethnological research existed as such only since the first half of 19th century. Even after many ethnic groups were mobilized to form mass revolutions in 1830s and 1840s, the most research – and agitation too – focused on customs or cultural traits.

32 – Hastings 1997: 28; Other factors include ius soli principle (p.34) and, as a glimpse of Andersonian reasoning, a very early literary development of a spoken vernacular (p.31).

33 – Hayes 1960: 38f

34 – Hastings 1997: 97; On the spread of national identity in 19th century France, cf. E.Weber 1976

35 – e.g. cf. Gellner 1983, Hobsbawm 1992, Hastings 1997

36 – Kollár 1783: 72f

37 – cf. Barth et al. 2004: 71

38 – *Ideen* b.XV, ch.3

Herder's understanding of nations in this work was crucial for the later scientific concept of an ethnic or cultural group. The term "nation" which entered the English language along with "nationalism" in the first half of the 19th century, meant first an attitude of devotion or the belief in the exceptionality of one's own nation, and only later received political connotations³⁹. The attitude described by it was in Herder's use positive; it didn't imply a negative attitude towards others as well. The negative attitude was called *chauvinism*, the feeling of other nations' inferiority and subordinacy. The term was coined in 1831, in a comedy by the Cogniard brothers⁴⁰. Unlike "ethnocentrism", which practically unifies the meanings of these two words while presupposing relations between them, these terms don't stem from any coherent scientific discourse. They describe things we can see in the world.

The need for the profound analysis of such terms arose first when nations became agents of politics, as I'll describe in the following chapters. The relationship between nationalism and chauvinism became an object of sociology, especially British and American, in the latter part of the 19th century. Van der Dennen⁴¹ traces these themes to thinkers generally interested in social evolution, both pre-Darwinian and those influenced by Darwin. His examples include Comte, who sees social solidarity as a product of defence against enemies, Tylor's view regarding different perceptions of violence (praiseworthy against the others, but a crime within the group), Spencer's notion of codes of "amity" and "enmity", and others.

A conception of a society as a living organism struggling for survival in an environment comprising hostile groups was expressed by Sumner as well⁴². These thinkers observed the interdependence of favoritism and exclusion within a group, while intergroup conflicts were seen to act as catalysts for these developments. Nationalism and chauvinism were observable expressions of a hypothetical single attitude within the human

39 – Smith 2009: 5

40 – Taken from the online etymological dictionary by Douglas Harper, ret.12.3.2013; link – <http://www.etymonline.com>

Nicholas Chauvin, the fictional character around whom the play revolves and after whom the chauvinist attitude is named, seems to have been the subject of more stories, which were popular during the Restoration-era in France (1815-1830).

41 – Van der Dennen 1995: 466f; The main motivator in these debates was for him (ibid., p.102) the difference in opinion between Hobbes and Rousseau: Hobbes considered war to be the natural state of relations between humans, while Rousseau believed it to be peace.

42 – Sumner 1906: 21

mind, which Sumner described as ethnocentrism. As is usual with influential theories, the one in *Folkways* isn't interesting for introducing a new theme, but rather for the coherent combination of already existing ideas, which drove attention in a new direction.

II. History

Sumner – Levinson – realistic conflict – frustration and displacement – theory of prejudice – sociobiology – postcolonial studies

The actual history of the term "ethnocentrism" begins in 1906, in Sumner's book *Folkways*, where the author mentions the term in a generalizing way. The term is used to explain the existence of terms like "barbarian" and "heathen", as well as literary works of outcast intellectuals and propaganda articles in state-controlled media, as the result of one attitude⁴³. What is interesting in his theory – at least in comparison to the aforementioned "pre-historic" definitions – is the attempt to find a historical source of this sentiment. In his model, Sumner traces modern ethnocentrism, i.e. the exaggeration of the differences between cultural practices (folkways), to "primitive societies" of limited size and outside contact, which devoted themselves to the protection of their resources⁴⁴. Here he introduces the term "we-" or "in-group", for the extent of peaceful and cooperative relations, always implying an "out-" or "others-group", to which "we" are hostile. The form of these relations, as well as the boundaries between "us" and "them", are seen as highly dynamic and evolving. A group is always developing its own means of promoting cohesion (government, law, comradeship) according to its needs, that is, according to the strength and threat level of its hostile neighbours. The more intense the warfare, the more intense the development of ingroup relations, cohesion and interests as well⁴⁵.

Levinson wrote his first thesis⁴⁶ on the measurement of ethnocentrism in 1947. He

43 – *"Each group nourishes its own pride and vanity, boasts itself superior, exalts its own divinities, and looks with contempt on outsiders. Each group thinks its own folkways the only right ones, and if it observes that other groups have other folkways, these excite its scorn."* Sumner 1906: 15

44 – Sumner 1906: 19

45 – Sumner 1906: 13

46 – *"Ethnocentrism is based on a pervasive and rigid ingroup-outgroup distinction: it involves stereotyped negative imaginery and hostile attitudes regarding outgroups, stereotyped positive imagery and submissive attitudes regarding ingroups, and a hierarchical, authoritarian view of group interaction in*

didn't search for the cause – why ethnocentrism existed at all – but rather he attempted to make a quantifiable factor out of it. An actual study with some theoretical basis was published in 1950 in *Authoritarian Personality*, a team effort led by Theodore Adorno. This work dealt with the peculiar post-WW2 question of the incompatibility of democratic and fascist ideology⁴⁷. Fascism was interesting as a relatively quickly growing mass-movement led by a demagogue, exploiting anti-Semitic hatred and democratic institutions⁴⁸. Adorno and his team tried to show it was comprehensible: to outline social groups within American society, which are likely to align with fascist movements, and to go beyond anti-Semitism by searching for a "generality of outgroup rejection". The first was presupposed as a thesis, the second was carried out by statistical means, and the third was in fact proposed by Levinson. He tried to find the roots of ideology within an individual⁴⁹, while considering the ideology itself to be merely a "medium of expression". The historical background wasn't so important here: his objects of study was the individual, not historical groups. The core problem was the individual's identification with the ingroup (and also his counter-identification against the outgroup), which Levinson considered a psychological rather than sociological problem⁵⁰.

These two early studies, despite the terminological similarity, have two different objectives. While the first analyzes intergroup relations especially in "primitive societies", as well as the cultural impact and legacy of these relations, the latter is a study of prejudice, of personal attitudes and relations between the individual and the society. Thus, in comparison with the "prehistoric" approaches, the problematics mentioned by Ibn Khaldun or Vico are closer to Sumner's view, as whole cultures and their ethnocentric ideologies are addressed. Dynasties and nations in both cases are the main actors; their members merely represent the groups. Levinson, following instead the style of thinking we could see in Bacon and Montesquieu, concentrates on ethnocentrism as an aspect of personal worldview, determining one's loyalty, opinions and attitudes. Any group can be shaped by local specifications. How far the group needs to express its identity depends

which ingroups are rightly dominant, outgroups subordinate." Levinson 1949: 36

47 – Levinson 1949: 20f

48 – Fascism as a psychological phenomenon had been already examined by Reich (1946) before the WW2, drawing greatly on Freud's account of social psychology. Of course, the question of the degree to which a political movement can be reduced to a psychological problem is an open problem, which I will discuss more closely in the 4th chapter of the analytic section.

49 – Levinson 1949: 28

50 – Levinson 1949: 32

only on its members, in how far they'll need to express their identity. Although the term has found its place in both the cultural and the psychological sciences, the approaches of the respective traditions are different from each other. These two traditions of study we call "social" and "psychological", roughly corresponding to the differentiation of "sociogenic" and "psychogenic", established by Robert Levine and Donald Campbell⁵¹. These two were the first to summarize the problems related to ethnocentrism from the perspectives of both traditions and to compare them in order to see to what degree they are complementary.

One such recurring theme is that of intergroup conflict. Such conflicts consist primarily of wars, but also of other kinds of mutual expressions of disagreement as well. Sumner's own formulation⁵², as we've seen, sees conflicts between groups as standard outward behavior. His point, however, could be interpreted from both perspectives. A sociologist could focus on searching for laws behind the group's development in various environments. A long-held standard was the theory of a "realistic conflict" between groups, i.e., conflict based on the accessibility of a resource or a capacity. The existence of a competing interest is crucial for the conflict; otherwise, both groups would stay calm towards each other⁵³. Boundaries, as well as rules of engagement and cooperation, were considered by these thinkers, including for example White⁵⁴ and Coser⁵⁵, to be the products of conflict between groups. The creation of boundaries and other forms of integration are important from the perspective of the survival instinct of group members⁵⁶. When resources are limited, the interests of groups clash when they have similar needs. In this case, a problem is formulated and interest groups become more sharply delineated, and thus also more capable of considering alternative solutions to it⁵⁷. The groups themselves emerge in conflicts. Ethnocentrism as an attitude is thus related to a group's boundaries and development: the closer the enemy with similar needs to our group, the more ethnocentrism will be expressed⁵⁸. Levinson's focus, individual aggressivity, is considered marginal as a cause of wars, as groups are seen to act as organic units with a

51 – Levine & Campbell 1972: 23, 210

52 – Sumner 1906: 13

53 – Levine & Campbell 1972: 29

54 – White 1947: 132

55 – Coser 1956: 48f

56 – Otterbein 1970: 4

57 – Coser 1956: 87

58 – Coser 1956: 54

group interest. The militant development of a group actually aims to promote the subordination of individuals⁵⁹.

On the other hand, we should note the quantifier used in the Sumner's definition of ethnocentrism: "*each group thinks its own folkways the only right ones*". He saw this "syndrome" as a universal one. For this reason, it can be considered a part of human nature, and an object of psychology and biology. The idea of tracing social phenomena at the individual level wasn't new and in fact the sociological focus on group interaction seems to be a reaction against it. Nevertheless, not only classical psychologists derived their views about society from their theories; many thinkers in the sociological sciences were inspired by them as well. When considering the conflict, thinkers like MacCrone, Murdock and Levine⁶⁰ concentrate on the relation between the group and the individual, or specifically, the ingroup's restrictive values and personal aggressivity stemming from frustration. Restrictions imposed by society frustrate individuals, who tend to find new targets for their aggression; because of this, more restrictive societies tend to show more ethnocentrism as well⁶¹. The political implications of this theory are a bit darker. A cunning demagogue focuses on strengthening ethnocentrism and nationalism to mobilize popular support for himself⁶². Militarization and the degree of aggressivity of a society's foreign policy is seen as a reflection of individual emotions: Mañinowski spoke about "harnessing" of aggressivity by culture⁶³. War doesn't have to have a real target or objective; a threat may be fostered to improve the ingroup's solidarity⁶⁴. On the other hand, research in ethology shows that intergroup violence isn't limited to the human species⁶⁵.

However, ethnocentrism doesn't necessarily lead to conflicts, nor do our aggressive impulses⁶⁶ always have to be "vented" by acts of violence. Instead, especially when we stay close to the original definitions of the term by Sumner and Levinson, it is a factor which creates prejudices towards others. Worldviews can be created and spread without

59 – Otterbein 1970: 23-28

60 – Levine & Campbell 1972: 117-133

61 – cf. Levine & Campbell 1972: 125

62 – cf. Rosenblatt 1964: 133

63 – Coser 1956: 56

64 – Levine & Campbell 1972: 41

65 – Van der Dennen 1995: 143f

66 – or "*protest masculinity*", cf. Levine & Campbell 1972: 153

the need for conflict inflicting damage in their name. Levinson sees the readiness to commit a violent act to be a sign of ethnocentrism, not the act itself; ethnocentrism is an ideology or opinion⁶⁷. Prejudices are reflected strongly on group's culture, its myths and its language. On the one hand, such reflections include the instances mentioned by Sumner: ethnies using a term equal to "human" for themselves, presenting national interests as universal ones and similar examples⁶⁸. This line has been used many historians of nationalism, who, however, didn't operate with the same terminology. Structuralist explanations of social developments like those by Lévi-Strauss⁶⁹ or the symbolic one by Geertz⁷⁰ follow this line of thought, discussing the compatibility of universal law systems (e.g. human rights) with local traditions and their reflections upon the world political order. The establishment of a clear group identity, no matter if it is by settling a social contract or by the delineation of borders by the emperor, suffices to develop loyalties⁷¹. Nationalism (if not the nation-building as such) has often been considered to be the systematic work of a few activists who serve as symbolic representations of this identity, the *minorité agissante*⁷².

A more critical approach towards Sumner's idea of ethnocentrism as a universal phenomenon comes from anthropology. Field research found instances which did not fit Sumner's conceptions. One such is the case of "negative ethnocentrism", described by Marc Swartz⁷³, in which one group expressed views of its own inferiority in comparison to Americans. A more recent study about "Balkan orientalism" by Močnik produces a similar case, refined to a political theme and adding the factor of international hegemony to the problem⁷⁴. However, Swartz himself doesn't argue against the universal nature of the phenomenon; the mentioned group doesn't perceive Americans as the "out-group", while at the same time it holds negative prejudices against peoples living on adjacent islands. The conclusion developed to the reference group theory which distinguishes a

67 – Levinson 1949: 19

68 – Sumner 1906: 16

69 – cf. Lévi-Strauss 1985: 279-288

70 – cf. Geertz 1985

71 – "*the advantages for survival of bounded groupings are perceived by the participants themselves, who act on this information to create sharper boundaries*"; Levine & Campbell 1972: 111

72 – Hobsbawm 1992: 12

73 – cf. Swartz 1961; see below, section B, chapter III, p.82

74 – Baskar & Brumen 1996: 129-158

membership-group from an in-group. In other words, it distinguishes between the group I'm a member of and the one I would like to be a member of. Ethnocentrism, according to this theory, is based on the latter feeling.

One of the important points made by Levine and Campbell was the discovery of a similarity between key concepts in the social and psychological interpretations of the term, namely those of the "realistic conflict" at the group level and the "frustration-displacement" theory at the individual level. Thinkers of both traditions came to an equivalent conclusion on individual points like perception of the out-group as strong and fear-inciting, while at the same time being in discord with some of Sumner's theses⁷⁵. This development, which is still ongoing today, now encompasses a much wider body of research of a sociobiological nature. Thinkers like Meyer, Rushton or Van der Berghe⁷⁶ followed the criticism of Sumner from 1950s and 1960s, trying to outline an evolutionary pattern of kin selection and favoritism and seeing ethnocentrism – with its hostility towards an out-group – as a hypertrophy of this function. Besides these developments, further psychological research on individual nationalism⁷⁷ and sociological research of cultural developments⁷⁸ limited themselves to case studies and the application or criticism of existing theses.

Can there be a meaningful use for such a term in journalistic or vulgar language? My experiment with Google Alerts shows the term frequently carries connotations of ethnic divisions within a country, racism and exceptionalism⁷⁹. However, many scholars who don't

75 – Levine & Campbell 1972: 212

76 – Van der Dennen 1995: 490

77 – cf. Forbes 1982

78 – e.g. cf. Geertz 1985, Hobsbawm 1992, Dikötter 1997

79 – The "Alerts" have been observed for one year (30.5.2011-11.6.2012) using the following criteria: string "ethnocentrism", type "news", volume "all", collected once a week. In 54 weeks, the searchbot returned 223 articles written in English, in which the term was used at least once. Only about a dozen of the articles and blogs were *about* ethnocentrism, as their titles show. The most frequent connotations of ethnocentrism were its impact on divisions within a state and tribalism (45 cases), followed by cultural or state exceptionalism (36) and racism, alongside chauvinism and xenophobia (34). Ethnocentrism in consumption and preferences of particular cultural products was quite a frequent theme too (21). Violence (16), interestingly has a score equal to nationalism, to stereotypy and to intolerance (all 10). Psychological themes didn't occur very often, but when they did the most frequent was nepotism, which was usually linked to political favoritism (10), less common still were hate and paranoia (both 4) and its relation to oxytocin (2).

Individual cases of ingroup exceptionalism and outgroup intolerance show interesting differences, while both were linked as a single ingroup-outgroup dichotomy in only 6 cases. Particularly interesting was an analysis of ethnocentrism in the motocross world (<http://motocrossactionmag.com>, ret. 25.9.2013), which applied this dichotomy to a presupposed superiority of Japanese motorbikes: "*if it isn't made in Japan, it can't be any good; thus a Honda CRF350 would be enthusiastically supported, but a*

directly follow the mentioned traditions tend to present quite a different explanation of the term, namely an entanglement in culture-specific stereotypes or values, which become tools for promoting group interests. The first such instance is, of course, in Sumner's *Folkways* itself. Since the 1970s, however, the term has entered into the wider literary scene much more in this sense. A new field of postcolonial studies has emerged, criticizing the research of cultures for its connection to political hegemony in the researched areas. The very definition of colonies or research objects likely entered the cultures suffering under this hegemony, making them see colonial powers as ideal cultures worthy of emulation. Works by Fanon⁸⁰ and Foucault⁸¹ provided the vocabulary to turn the attention paid to ethnocentrism towards the anthropological scientists themselves. On the one hand, Fanon described the influence of political dominance on an individual's psychology, on the other Foucault introduced a method, which could be used to reflect the formation of scientific discourses. Ethnocentrism gained a new meaning when it was seen not as an aspect of an individual's psychic profile or of cultural development, but rather of the discourses of specialized, intercultural groups like scientists and artists. This new meaning was finally elaborated by Edward Said.

Said⁸² characterized the scientific Orientalist tradition as developing the racist and "*almost totally ethnocentric*" imagery of the outgroup (Orient), observable in both literature and the visual arts, into culture-specific methods and goals of research. Art and science together provided justifications for aggressive politics. Said's work centers on Western Europe and the USA, with a particular focus on colonial powers like Great Britain, France or The Netherlands. The concept of "eurocentrism" became very popular among postcolonial scholars and historians, leading them to question nationality-centered

KTM, Husqvarna, TM or Aprilia 350 would be subject to scorn". Only once was ethnocentrism dubbed as a problem of science, twice it connotated the incommensurability of cultures, and once it referred to Richard Rorty. In a single case, in a blog written for New Zimbabwe by rheumatologist Batsi Chikura on 17.3.2012, Sumner's definition was cited, though without mentioning him by name. From non-English speaking countries, the term was particularly frequent in articles from Ghana (especially ghanaweb.com, where there were 24 articles mentioning it, most of them touching on the divisions aspect) and Israel (mostly concerning Jewish exceptionalism), and since early 2012 also Kyrgyzstan as well, where a public initiative "against fascism and ethnocentrism" took place. These samples, of course, don't reflect the term's spread in discourses throughout the world, but nonetheless they illustrate the eclecticity behind its meaning.

80 – cf. Fanon 1963: 50

81 – e.g. Foucault 2002: 197-199

82 – Said 1978: 205

narratives⁸³ in Europe and actual cases of the adoption of its supremacist views in its "provinces"⁸⁴. The criticism differs in intensity. Some, like Tuan⁸⁵, using the term just to denote the tendency to organize cartography or urbanism around the ethnies's symbolic center, mention only the influence of ethnicity upon perception. Yet, this perceptual difference isn't necessarily criticized or contrasted with an "objective" view, which is hard to define.

This line of methodological criticism was begun started by Derrida⁸⁶, who analyzed the influence of written language on the Western scientific tradition. The emphasis on less political determinants is also present in multiple postcolonial works of late 1980s and 90s⁸⁷, although they still consider the emerged ethnocentrism to be politically laden and dangerous, for it diminishes the role of other cultures on the formation of the present world and its science. For example, in historical sciences, according to Rüsen, ethnocentrism can be seen in the choice of historical studies, which are considered to be globally relevant⁸⁸. Other thinkers point out Said's own ethnocentrism, his preoccupation with the West⁸⁹, or question the worldview and dominant role of the Enlightenment, ancient Hellenic civilization or modernity in the development of the current science or political situation⁹⁰. A similar line of thought can be seen in the research of "sinocentrism", the application of Said's observations to Chinese science and politics⁹¹. Finally, some researchers⁹² see ethnocentrism as a positive aspect of science, because some views may be adopted by many ethnies who perceive them as enriching or complementary.

As can be seen from this short history, the criticism of ethnocentrism in secondary discourse – i.e., the criticism of other scientists as "ethnocentrist" – developed quite

83 – For effects of the idea of nationality on individual postcolonial thinkers cf. Bhabha 1990; for open criticism of such narratives in relation to dominant political powers cf. Billig 1995

84 – Either in considering the Eastern Europe (cf. Wolff 1996), or Balkans in particular (cf. Todorova 1997).

85 – Tuan 1974: 30f

86 – Derrida 1997: 3

87 – e.g. cf. Amin 1988, Rüsen 2002; similar points within the discourse of intercultural philosophy were discussed by e.g. Josef Estermann (Mall & Schneider 2004: 129f).

88 – Rüsen 2002: 7

89 – e.g. cf. al-Azm 1980; Carrier 1995

90 – e.g. cf. Foucault 1976; Bernal 1987

91 – cf. Tuan 1974; Dikötter 1997

92 – e.g. cf. Geertz 1985; Fox 1992; Rorty 1991

independently from the systematic line of thought, which focuses on functions; of the term which should lay behind cultural organization and individual behavior. Yet the question remains open as to how far these uses have an influence on each other. Some important questions, which may seem to have been already solved in 1960s, such as the universal nature of ethnocentrism, have been opened again, often without regard to the previous debate. Finally, as a wide, but vague term, it has to be clarified by the authors in some way in order to make their points clear. In the following section we try to see what these critical voices have found against ethnocentric sciences.

B. Analysis of the Term

In this section I hold on to the idea behind the term as a substitute for at least different four debates in (and between) various sciences. The first of these revolves about the group – *ethnos* – behind the personal or cultural ethnocentrism. Despite the existence of a lot of literature and research about various ethnies or groups in general, there isn't a lot of abstract discussion behind it. The theories about what defines these groups, how they emerge and what the nature of their existence is, became themes only much later. The other side of the problem is self-identification with the group, the most important aspect in the "psychological" tradition I've mentioned above. These include personalized versions of the themes above: how one becomes a member, and what the nature of membership is. The idea of "centrism" behind "ethnocentrism" is partly connected to self-identification: membership is often intertwined with rituals, institutions and requirements. The question of the subject and the object of ethnocentrism – whether it is a matter caused by the process of a group's integration or vice versa – constitutes the fourth chapter of this section. At the end comes the main theme of this section. the variety of functions which the term can fulfill.

I. *Ethnos*

Said and Chow – "historical" views – "modern" views – primordialism and constructivism – criticism of the term

What is the "one's own group" mentioned in the works concerning ethnocentrism? This question is often avoided by using the name of the object group for the name of the work itself. I will illustrate the general types of groups through two examples. Said's *Orientalism* refers to European or Western ethnocentrism, while Kai-wing Chow's article in *Construction of Racial Identities in China and Japan* pertains to the Chinese version. A closer look shows us that the scope of these works isn't quite the same. Orientalists are considered ethnocentric for both the methods or beliefs, which are specific to their scientific discipline and for their view of their own civilization (say Western, European or

Western European)⁹³. The identity of "Orientalists" is defined by the scope of their work: research on the differences between the European and the Oriental in a generalizing way. The "centric" aspect of their work is that the delineation of these two cultures proceeds from their own point of view. It is their own culture, religion or nation – i.e. an abstract, high-level group – from which they stem and which determines their ethnocentrist way of doing science. Science is merely a branch of a larger, cultural structure⁹⁴.

On the other hand, Chow speaks about a particular person, Zhang Binglin, a nationalist activist of the late Qing Dynasty. In his article, he recounts Zhang's attempts to create an ideology for country's modernization⁹⁵. In this context, "modernization" can be understood as a capability to withstand invasions. Throughout his career, his definition of the invader changed significantly: his early period defines the struggle on racial terms ("white" and "yellow"), but conflict with Japan in late 1890s and Boxer Rebellion forced him to be more specific. Around the end of the century he abandoned the physiognomic criteria for genealogical ones, focusing on the differences between the Han and Manchu people, the former being descendants of the ancient Xia civilization while the latter were represented by the ruling dynasty⁹⁶. The delimitation between them seems to have been a very hard task. Unlike in Said's case, the "other" – in this case the official ideology of the dynasty – didn't distinguish the Han as a different people. Zhong's work was creative, becoming fundamental for his ingroup political culture, rather than reflecting some of its already present features. Zhong's audience consisted of very concrete, low-level groups, namely politicians and scientists, whom he wanted to win for the national cause⁹⁷.

It is a matter of wide debate whether an "ethnie" is a starting point, a determining factor of individual worldviews (like in Said's example), or the product of systematic work attempting to mobilize the masses (like in Chow's text). The debates around the nature of ethnicity are of course much older than the idea of ethnocentrism itself. The term *ethnos*

93 – In the introduction to his *Orientalism* (1978: 2-4), Said defines three meanings of the word: the a) name of the particularly existing research institutes, combining anthropological, sociological, historical or philological studies; b) *the style of thought based upon an ontological and epistemological distinction made between "the Orient" and "the Occident"*; c) a discourse based on both previous definitions, concerning the *"dealing with Orient"*.

94 – Said 1978: 144f

95 – Dikötter 1997: 34-53

96 – Dikötter 1997: 50

97 – cf. Dikötter 1997: 42

was introduced to modern cultural studies only a half century earlier than the term "ethnocentrism". In these debates, however, a general distinction between in- and out-group, the search for a group's boundaries and motives, and even ways of determining people's attitudes and actions, can be observed. These views can be generalized as "historical", addressing the nature of *ethnos*, and "modern", based instead on researching the performance of these ethnic identities and the fields of cultural activity in which they are presented or asserted. On a temporal scale, the "historical" views include those of Ibn Khaldun, Montesquieu and the romantic nationalists beginning with Herder; the "modern" then partly those of Herder himself, Renan, Max Weber and Levinson. It should be noted that the actual debates, like the one ongoing in political anthropology since the 1980s, are based on both "historical" and "modern" views. As I'll try to show, they combine the search for causes of the former with a focus on the intentionality of the latter. These debates often point not only to an ideal meaning – which specifying meaning should "ethnicity" have? – but also take heed of the complex developments behind the term throughout the ages, as well as the functions, which the very idea has served.

"Historical" views on ethnicity

The quasi-historical views on ethnicity have been formulated in discussions about popular wisdom and attitudes towards the other. But over the scope of several thousand years, it is hard to distinguish between "popular", "mythical", "scholarly", and "politically sided" versions. The emergence of a systematical science doesn't mean that these views became invalid, irrelevant, or outdated. If Sumner's thesis regarding the universality of ethnocentrism is right, it means that every culture builds its borders by excluding the others, and thus can be, in a reverse way, perceived as a separate ethnies. The primordial question was thus the nature of these borders: what makes the "others" different from "us"? Some differences were seen as critical enough to overshadow particular similarities. Generally speaking, the five common critical differences – language, religion, genealogy, territory and historical continuity – are used, either alone or in combination, as the definition of separate ethnies in modern anthropological works⁹⁸.

98 – One could bring in many more categories, based on various artefacts of particular cultures. The most obvious of them are, of course, various works of art, which are sometimes the only source of information about a particular culture. But it is quite a controversial category: first, there is no exact distinction between "natural" and "artificial" (plus some theologians wouldn't omit a "divine" realm), thus social

– *language*

As an obvious fact, language is primarily a tool for communication which helps people to cooperate and share their experiences. However, through migration and varying environments, languages tend to diverge and consequent differences actually form obstacles to communication. Mastery of a foreign language is the very criterion for access to many advantages of a realm preferring another language – perhaps I wouldn't have been able to write this text if I hadn't obtained a certificate of skill in German. On the other hand, it is more likely that one would establish relations when sharing a language than by simply being a physical neighbour. A mutually comprehensible language (leaving the intelligibility of particular dialects aside) was the main connection between the diverse territories of two politically decentralized "cultures", existing parallelly in the ancient Mediterranean: the Phoenicians and the Greeks. The term *ethnos* itself is from Greek, which has driven me to search for the roots of this term in the artefacts ascribed to the ancient Hellenic civilization. However, it is likely that the original use didn't reflect the same idea as we denote by an "ethnic group" nowadays. Greek writers didn't use it for themselves – for their *phylai*, *polis* and *genē* (γένη) – but rather for groups of animated beings of a different nature – such as animals and barbarians. There are various *genē*, but only the non-Hellenic ones are described as *ethnoi*⁹⁹. As the term "barbarian" itself shows, the difference was primarily a linguistic one, as religious practices revolved around local deities and syncretism. As Georges points out¹⁰⁰, it was instead a means of integration or communication with "barbarians". Even the difference in political organization propagated by Greek writers, namely the one between "Asiatic" despotism and "Hellenic" democracy,

phenomena like language, religion and political organization may be understood as "artefacts" as well. For the sake of mere classification, there is no objective reason why one should distinguish between the use of runes, a particular order of ornamentations on pots or the name of highest god, when distinguishing cultures.

Other important factors in ethnic differentiation in history were for example the means of production (e.g. for Ibn Khaldun), the conduct of warfare (Jordanes), political organization (Herodotus) and clothes (Isidore of Sevilla). Changes in these realms were, however, much more dynamic than in the other five factors I've mentioned. It seems to me they belong to the lists of general cultural differences, but not to those which are critical for the meaning of the term "ethnos" in the mentioned theories. I try to focus on groups actually discussed in the debates about ethnocentrism and nationalism, which makes the list of "usual" critical differences in the time of globalization and uniform perceptions of modernity a bit shorter; still, my list isn't any more or less arbitrary than the ones employed by Herodotus or Isidore.

99 – Tonkin et al. 1989: 11; For inward segmentation within the Hellenic culture terms such as *phylē* (tribe) or *polis* (political unity) were used, respectively for hereditary or political reasons.

100 – Georges 1994: 6, 18

seems to be based more on the comparison of hellenized Lydia with Athens, than on the perception of the barbarian Persian monarchy¹⁰¹.

Most ethnonyms are cognate or the same as the name of the language as well. In the development of modern nationalism, the first sign of activism in most cases which as of today have reached a certain level of independence was the codification of language¹⁰². The same can be applied vice-versa: countries, which gained independence without reaching a sufficient level of linguistic differentiation have to stress it afterwards¹⁰³. It is remarkable that the codification of Spanish language in 1492 temporarily converged with the conquest of the last Muslim emirate on Iberian Peninsula (Grenada), as well as with Columbus' first expedition. Although mass nationalism, as I'll show later, is usually linked to modern times, linguistic difference already served as an argument for political integration in the Middle Ages. The Bible already provided medieval man with an example in which the language differentiation is employed to recognize an enemy¹⁰⁴. Přemyslid king Ottokar appealed in this way on Poles when seeking an alliance, while already in 9th century, an ecclesiastical organization in Moravia of Slavs with their own language was considered a threat to the interests of the Latin-imposing Frankish Empire in the region¹⁰⁵. During the Hundred Years' War, similar variations of the *shibboleth*-story were recorded in both Bruges and Scotland¹⁰⁶, with the pronunciation of one phoneme being sufficient for recognition of the other.

– *religion*

On the other hand, there are communities that share language, but are diverse in other aspects of their culture. Religion may also define ethnicities. The language of present-day Bosniaks, Croats and Serbs was codified in the 19th century, based on the same dialect, used in various parts of the entire Yugoslavia-to-come. However, the Yugoslav identity didn't break down the ecclesiastical differences. Religious identity can, of course, serve as a means of both inclusion and exclusion. In our local¹⁰⁷ religions, Jesus'

101 – Georges 1994: 37

102 – Hroch 1971: 5

103 – cf. Maxwell 2009, Todorova 1997

104 – *Judges* 12:5

105 – Hroch 1971: 15

106 – Hastings 1997: 45

107 – This text was written in Austria.

and Muhammad's reforms are sometimes seen as the points of transformation from local, ethnically specific cults to global, universal religions¹⁰⁸. It is sure that Hebrews and Arabs linked the worship of their gods to their culture, demarkated mostly by genealogy – the people of Israel retained their identity, even if it was damaged from the point of view of biblical prophets, and in the same way, Christian Arabs still shared a certain identity with their polytheistic compatriots. The Hebrews had a special term for other ethnies whom they encountered: *goyim*, meaning "nations", but often translated as "heathen" or "gentile"¹⁰⁹ in English translations of Bible. To "be dispersed among the heathen" is a recurring threat from God towards His children for not obeying His commands¹¹⁰, while the others prophesize¹¹¹ that God will turn to them. This was the idea which Jesus took on as his job and which St. Paul outwardly propagated¹¹². An even sharper kind of revolution can be seen in Muhammad's formulation, which considered as heathen not only the "unconverted", or *'ajam*, but even those Arabs, who retained their old beliefs¹¹³. In that moment "heathen" was no longer a genealogical category, but became an explicitly religious one instead.

This demarkation further took even more shape with development of dogmatic theology in both of these "universal" religions, as it provided many new ways of setting a border, depending on the particular debates. Dogmatic differences in fact often led to the persecution of certain groups within the religious/ethnic community, which they often solved by emigration. In such cases – for example, the Protestant English in America, Nestorian Christians in Central Asia or the Bektashi order in the Balkans – religious identity was followed by development of the linguistic, territorial and other aspects of the group's identity. The reverse situation, where ethnicity affected religious identity, was among the debated points as well. Already in the 8th century, some expressed the thought that it would be better to have a non-Arab khalif (particularly a Zanj is named) because the majority of Arab Muslims wouldn't be biased in his favor if he broke the law, and thus

108 – This narrative is also explicitly expressed by their authorities (e.g. cf. The Catechism of the Catholic Church §767). This aspect will be further discussed in the next paragraph regarding the "modern" views.

109 – Tonkin et al. 1989: 12; It surely isn't very surprising that already the first Greek version of Old Testament, *Septuaginta*, already uses the term *ta ethnē* to translate *goyim*.

110 – e.g. *Deuteronomy* 4:27, *Ezekiel* 22:15

111 – e.g. *Isaiah* 66:19, *Malachi* 1:11

112 – e.g. *Galateans* 3:28, *Romans* 11:11

113 – e.g. sura *al-Nahl* 103-104

would depose him more easily¹¹⁴. The ethnic factor was important much later, in the Ottoman Empire, which administered its population according to their religion. The partitioning of the *Rum millet* was thus an important step in the struggle for independence in Greece (1833), Romania (1865) and Bulgaria (1870), despite the refusal by the Orthodox Synod in 1872 to succumb to the "heresy of ethnophyletism"¹¹⁵.

– *genealogy*

The idea of the common descent of members is of course a very important factor of one's ethnic identity. Etymologically, it can be seen as the most important. Although *ethnos* is a term associated with practices, many other terms for the same concept, such as the English "nation", the Greek *phylē*, the Latin *gens* and the Slavic *narod* are semantically related to "birth"¹¹⁶. In the definition of one's ethnic identity as inherited, one presupposes that a person's genetic information ("blood", contemporaries of Ibn Khaldun would say) contains the distinctive traits of the group. In nature, a genetic relationship is often suspected when observing even superficial physical similarities. This tendency has a strong effect on determining one's identity as well. In some cases – like in the mainstream-American definition of Hispanic and African American ethnic groups¹¹⁷ – there are visible physiognomic traits. Although the racial or rather color-centered distinction fades away with interbreeding quite quickly, the difference isn't usually merely "seen". The "heritage" includes cultural phenomena as well – practices and manners – in the same way as superficial similarities. Even less obvious are the distinctions between castes and other status groups, where membership is based on inheritance, but the specific "trait" of the lineage is mythical, pertaining the religious sphere of life. The European model nation¹¹⁸, biblical Israel, was defined primarily as a genealogical unit and the fear of its dissolution by interbreeding is present in the Bible as well¹¹⁹. Even if the practice of Hebrews didn't

114 – Tritton 1949: 131

115 – Synod documents are available online at <http://www.ec-patr.org>, ret. 15.4.2013

116 – Tonkin et al. 1989: 11f

117 – For the discussion about racial differentiation in USA, cf. Levinson 1949.

118 – Aside from the spread of Christianity and its religious role, Bibles were among the first books translated into many languages, sometimes as the only written work providing a certain kind of codification. Hastings' argument (1997: 18), however, centers on the role of the English language in this development. Thus Wycliff's Bible provided the English culture with an ancient model nation ("unity of people, language, religion and government"), which became a model not only for England itself, but also for those who have emulated it.

119 – e.g. *Genesis* 28:1, *Exodus* 34:15-16; This, of course, has been affected by the fact that marriage implied cultural influence on the children – who would then "prostitute" themselves for the foreign gods – as well.

accord with the law, they remained Children of God, while the Christians, for their own reasons, added a counter-argument by invoking Adam as the all-father¹²⁰. Finally, the group can be seen merely as a family, without any references to mythical aspects such as divine blessings or curses imposed on the bloodline. Nowadays, some sociologists even reduce ethnocentrism to a kind of nepotism, a positive bias toward blood relatives, and consider the other factors of ethnic identity as mere substitutes¹²¹.

The first of those to elevate the genealogical theory of the origin of nations above the level of foundation myths, was Ibn Khaldun with his theory of group feeling, as I've mentioned above. The idea in his case is that a group feeling is present only in the case of a *real* blood relation. Other language groups may be assimilated and religion can be adopted to strengthen the integration, but as emotional binding is reserved only for the family, the integration of other clans into the tribal union can come about only by force. A mere servant doesn't feel anything toward the state, and if there are more servants than the state (*dawla*) can rule by its power, they'd have no urge to stay loyal¹²². Ibn Khaldun was in fact criticizing the theory of common origin, but on another level – namely on that of *jayl*, the races, which were considered to differ not only visually, but also in temperament. According to this precedent, a rather popular view was that black skin color was a trait inherited from Ham, son of Noah, against which Ibn Khaldun proposed an explanation due to the influence of local climate.

– *territory*

The territorial definition of ethnicity is another story, perhaps more linked to the economic and political organization of the group. Compared to the other factors, it leads to less emotionally laden dichotomies of "nomads" and "settlers", "highlanders" and "city-dwellers", "peasants" and "shepherds". Nowadays people have machines capable of moving large groups around the world, which may lead to the assumption that people tend to seek the lands which they consider best suited to their needs. If need be, a shepherd group would travel to satisfy its preference for steppe over forests. The historical view, however, sees the groups as products of their environment rather than as immigrants. In the Latin- and Greek-speaking world of early Middle Ages, stereotypy usually distinguished

120 – *Acts* 17:26

121 – e.g. cf. Van den Berghe 1980

122 – *Muqaddima* p.205f

territorially and politically defined groups, especially when dealing with outgroups¹²³. There were also attempts to find objective reasons for these differences, which found popularity especially in Arabic literature. Ibn Khaldun, who is perhaps the best known author of such an attempt, wasn't the first to raise the issue in this context; already in the 9th century Jahiz considered skin color to be a trait caused by the environment, owing to its "*properties of water and soil, distance from the sun, and intensity of heat*"¹²⁴. Ibn Khaldun applied this theory to a kind of sociology. Warmth and cold affected the motion of the human spirit, and thus the way one behaves and thinks. The tougher environment of the extreme north and south made it impossible for people there to develop sciences and societies to the extent which could be observed in the "middle" latitudes¹²⁵. A couple of centuries later, Montesquieu and Herder repeated the same assumptions, although without the terminology of elemental theory. Their conclusions don't address personal physiognomy, but instead focus on environmental perception and social institutions¹²⁶. However, they use a similar style of describing the differences between how the environment affects their own lands in the "middle" and those in "extreme" climates. Even here, the "others" can be defined only as long as they are sufficiently different.

Of course, territorial definitions aren't devoid of mythical aspects. While foundation myths are usually linked with religious and genealogical aspect, migration often occurs as well. Abraham and Moses move to Canaan, and similarly, many nations arise out of their migration periods. Eliade¹²⁷ mentions several of myths from the Balkans concerning the foundation of peoples through the hunt: the hero, allegedly the father or leader of the nation (sometimes a historical leader) is mesmerized by a sacred animal (e.g., an aurochs, a hind or a stag), which eventually leads him to discover a new land. Of course, such a choice of myths may lead to criticism: were these "hunters" the first to come to the new land? Where they the only one? The history of England, for example, shows a succession of invading ethnies, each of which contributed a certain part of national identity; yet it

123 – cf. Curta 1997: 153

124 – al-Jahiz 1969: 196; The theory of climates seems of course to be much older. According to Honigmann (1929: 10) it was developed by Greek geographers under Eratosthenes' (273-194 BCE) influence.

Honigmann thought that the theory entered the Arab world through Syriac sources and developed later with the translation of Ptolemy under caliph al-Ma'mun (813-833 AD) .

125 – *Muqaddima* p.205f; Actually, these thoughts may have been inspired by Jahiz as well, who was one of the first propagators of this fire-spirit theory in the Muslim world.

126 – *Spirit of Laws* p.275f (b.XIV, ch.10), linking the environment to the laws, Herder (*Ideen* b.II, ch.7, 3) to cognition and the education system.

127 – cf. Eliade 2000

remains hard to say who the founder was. Which aspect of ethnicity can be said to be continuously present there?

– *historical continuity*

Continuity of an ethnies is quite an ambiguous term. Temporarily continuous groups can be observed as natural units. In itself, this is perfectly neutral, as it says nothing about the ethnies being addressed. It is akin to how one of the possible etymologies of the term "tribe" (Latin *tribus*) is "one third" (i.e., one of the three tribes which founded Rome), with the term first adopted in the 14th century for the tribes of Israel and only later used with a more general meaning¹²⁸. Yet to proclaim the time together to be the only reason for the group's coherence was somewhat appealing. National movements of the late 18th and 19th centuries usually preferred this factor of ethnicity above the others, and the idea gained prominence in Marxist circles through its elaboration by Stalin¹²⁹. While speaking various local dialects, confessing universal faiths, interbreeding with invaders and natives and being dispersed in various parts of a territory ruled by foreign monarchs, many activists were apt to turn to glorious past of their (alleged) ancestors. This approach can best be seen in the formulation of ethnic history, connecting a group's mythic foundations, ancient independence and modern revival. The idea is that while some aspects may have changed, the identity still preserves something substantial – at the very least the historical greatness. This view diverts attention from the present to the past. Even if the "revivalist" finds historical facts, he constructs a semi-mythical account of history, relativizing the changes, which occurred. It was not the historical events that were important, but rather the way particular people acted: how they reflected the existing customs, how they added to the nation's glory. This enabled the continuity of the innate national character between the past and the present to be seen.

An example of this is the national "revival" in Bulgaria, at that time a subject of the Ottoman Empire, sparked by an account of their history written by Paisiy of Hilendar. It starts with the lineage and continues with a list of the rulers and saints of the country. Interestingly, the Bulgarian revival didn't necessarily mean political targeting, but rather meant first the preservation of language and the very identity of the group. The "other"

128 – <http://www.etymonline.com> , string "tribe", 15.4.2013

129 – "A nation is a historically constituted, stable community of people, formed on the basis of a common language, territory, economic life, and psychological make-up manifested in a common culture." (Stalin 1913:1)

identity which Paisiy argues against is Greek, not Ottoman. Greek isn't taken as the language of the political elites, but rather as a language of intellectual or merchant circles¹³⁰. When Paisiy speaks of the Bulgarian "tribe" and "customs" (*rod i obichay*), the latter being an unspecified way of life, there is actually no need to be more exact. Particular differences with Greek customs are of secondary importance. The main point is that Bulgarians were different from them, and thus should take care to preserve their identity. Continuity was important in the Middle Ages as well: on her example of Passau, Brigitte Resl showed the narrative strategy in historical texts of the bishopric, which by claiming its roots in the fallen Roman diocese of Lauriacum (Lorch) tried to stress its exceptionality against the Archbishops of Iuvavum/Salzburg, who administered its ancient territory¹³¹. This method stresses the dependency of identity on individual choice, a trait more typical for "modern" views of ethnicity.

It should be noted that any views of ethnicity can only partially be seen as "historical". "Ethnicity" itself is a neologism; terms like "nation", "people" or "tribe" were often used with similar, but not entirely historically coherent and unchanging, meanings. Thus far, focusing on several critical differences which make a body of people different from another one is only a *quasi*-historical phenomenon.

"Modern" views on ethnicity

The idea of "modernity" somewhat expects us to see the period since 17th or 18th century as an exceptional time, radically different from earlier times. And it was so – at least for the idea of ethnicity implied in the theories of ethnocentrism. The major differences between the "historical" and "modern" views can be observed in at least three aspects. First, the modern view perceives the definition of an ethnies as a normative or ideological act, not as a description of the nature of things. Consequently, the group doesn't exist unless its existence is somehow confirmed, required or realized by its members. Finally, language, religion and other aspects of ethnic identity are seen as symbolic expressions of identity. Interest in individual motives thus makes the search for causes of difference obsolete.

130 – Paisiy 1914: 6

131 – Resl 2002: 91f

Some of the old theses, e.g., Ibn Khaldun's, aren't sufficient to explain what was going on. European politics, which spawned nationalism in the second half of the 18th century, were (if we omit the eastern borders of Anatolia and Russia) devoid of nomadic dynasties; the kings dealt with each other according to the Peace of Westphalia and yet tried to harness the potential of sedentary civilization as much as possible. The term "nation", however, combines some of the "historical" definitions of a group perfectly. Identification of the population with the territory is a first step towards a horizontal encompassment of wider masses. A genealogical myth granted justification to the sovereignty over the land. Finally, this justification was supported by the cultural continuity presupposed between the ancient tribe and the contemporary nation. These thoughts were already crystallized during the first years of political nationalism: the French (1789), Polish (1794) and Serbian (1804) revolutions, Napoleon's occupation of Germany (1806) and Russia (1812) and so on. Herder, whose *Ideen* was first produced in 1784, became a kind of philosophical background for these revolutions. For him, peoples (*Völker*) are primarily historical entities, combining innate character (*Genius*) with environmental influence, as we've seen above. Although Fichte¹³² was fascinated by the idea of a static national character, Herder was interested in its dynamics as well. He elevated not only migration, already mentioned by Montesquieu¹³³, but also education and art as factors behind changes in ethnic properties¹³⁴. Ethnicity is first seen here as an activity, a dynamic aspect of life, rather than a mere category. The *Volk* was a living organism, and "young" and "fresh" peoples could threaten or revitalize "old", "experienced" ones by their impetus. This theory was especially popular among Russian thinkers like Chaadaev, Khomyakov and Leontiev, for whom the fate of their country was meant to be determined by the suppression of or focus on the common man's character. On the other hand, Herder didn't speak of "Russians" as a nation but rather of "Slavs", considering their common language. This introduced an idea of fraternity between Russians and the Slavic peoples of the other empires on its borders, providing an ideological weapon, used for example in the persistent wars for control of the Black Sea coast¹³⁵.

132 – cf. Fichte 1808 §311

133 – cf. *Spirit of Laws* ch.15

134 – *Ideen* b.II ch.7, 3

135 – This aspect of the Russian – and generally Slavic – reception of Herder will be discussed more closely below in the 5th chapter of this section.

Considering the relatively rash nationalist turn in politics, it may seem that Herder's work was that of a normative ideology with an immediate effect. Miroslav Hroch instead tried to explain this process, at the end of which was a modern national state, by social and economical factors. A merely ideological turn is for him insufficient¹³⁶. At its start was a grassroots movement of historians or artists – "native" thinkers, like the monk Paisiy, but also some researchers from among "ruling classes". Their ideas about their forefathers later gained support with a group of scholars, consisting of smaller fellowships and societies, trying to spread this knowledge (and interest) together with the broader idea of educating the masses or preserving the legacy. Thus far, the work is merely cultural: in the first stage, ethnic activity comprises scholarly research and artistic expressions, in the second come education and agitation as well. Only when this nationalistic motivation hits material obstacles, like differences in estate and wealth, does the nationalism become a political question as well¹³⁷. The revolutions and other forms of political pressure (like the cases of Austro-Hungarian *Ausgleich* in 1869 or German unification in 1871) are the conclusions of this process. Hroch's view, however, serves us better for orientation in the history of particular national movements than in the history of the thought itself.

This revolutionary idea, that for a nation's existence its present rather than its past is important, with a focus on the importance of the mobilization of its members when needed to assert the national identity, comes from no one else than Ernest Renan, the prominent Orientalist anti-hero of Said's work. The existence of a nation is for him a voluntary action of the majority which constitutes it. On the one hand, it constitutes itself by focusing on similarities between the members; on the other, it expects readiness to forget their divisions¹³⁸. The principle of national integrity is the desire of citizens to be a nation: the desire to uphold the myth (i.e., the "nature" of the group), forgetting its mythical basis. Unity within a nation has been created in many instances by conquering dynasties, and although the various groups within a territory differed in customs, the imperial state enforced its language. It is, however, a tool of formulating will, common to both the dynasty and its subdued people. Thus democratic revolutions, which led to the replacement of the old system, did not spread across the linguistic borders. The idea of equality and fraternity, which was meant to bridge the difference between an aristocrat and a peasant, was of

136 – Hroch 1985: 178

137 – Hroch 1985: 185

138 – Renan 1882: 3

course theoretically universal, and is applicable, so to say, anywhere. Historically, however, as a political power, it had to rely on language, and thus was limited to a single language territory. Both components – popular revolt and the linguistic unity of a territory – are expected to occur together in a historical moment. The case in which links of kinship exist between distinct territories (for example, between USA and Britain or Latin America and Spain and Portugal) without political dependency is given as an example¹³⁹.

Renan's view differs from the "historical" views in following aspects: first, he tries to change the very object of debate. Any static *Genius* or other idea of the nature of a nation (linguistic, environmental, innate or historical) is struck off as a myth. On the other hand, he considers the use of historical continuity to be an analogue of the idea of the divine rights of kings¹⁴⁰. The genealogical definition is for him unacceptable as well, as physiological differences emerged a long time ago, before those of culture or language. Similarly, territorial specifications don't have to create borders. Finally, a linguistic definition of a nation would contradict all three of these notions. A nation doesn't exist per se, it can (and according to Renan also will) be replaced by a group definition distinct from "nation" at any time. Thus we are led to turn our attention away from the nation and the outside world to its members as the active factor in the definition of ethnicity. Although the idea may seem to a large degree voluntary – the very formulation of a "daily plebiscite" makes Renan's view quite democratic in political terms as well – it shouldn't be omitted that memory functions here as a constraint. I can change the expressions of my beliefs and persuasions easily, but not the beliefs and persuasions themselves. For Renan, ethnicity was a factor which could be employed as a tool in political struggles.

Max Weber described ethnicity in the other direction. It should be noted that at the time of his last work (1922) there were various terms used for the same thing, all freely interchangeable. The adjective "ethnic" was already used in the present way: Sumner had already coined "ethnocentrism" in 1906 as well. For the noun behind this term, in English and French the terms "nation" or "people" (*peuple*) were used in political discourses, "race" and since the late 19th century, "culture" in anthropological ones. In fact, Renan criticized

139 – Renan 1882: 7

140 – In this way, Renan seems to have tried to reconcile the theories of nationality at the time of the 1789 revolution: that of Boulainvilliers, focusing on genealogy and continuity and promoting the rights of the nobility, and that of Bréquigny, focusing on the territorial definition, which was critical against the oppressive order imposed by foreign invaders. For a contrasting analysis of these theories cf. Foucault 1976: 177-212.

the mythical connotations behind terms "nation" and "race" as well, pointing to historical or biological foundations in depths of the past¹⁴¹. The terms *Volk* in German and *narod* in Russian not only unified the anthropological aspect with the political, but even tied it to a particular social class. Weber thus brought up the term *ethnische Gemeinschaft* as a possible replacement and tried it, so to speak, in action¹⁴². However, this did not prove helpful. His main idea was that of a *Gemeinschaft*, a group of individuals bound together (and delimited from others) by mutual activity. The term *ethnos* isn't suitable for such a group, as it focuses attention merely on similarities in language, customs, clothes or nostalgia towards an emigrant's homeland; these don't constitute a mutual *gemeinschaftliche* activity at all. These particular aspects rouse only a feeling of solidarity (*Gemeinsamkeitsgefühl*). These can be used as categories for a high-level, large-scale, abstract group, which is the *ethnie*, but he was more interested in interactions on a lower, more personal level. Any kind of custom or cultural trait can affect the feeling of solidarity and Weber considers it natural that people seek its basis in kinship (*Blutsverwandschaft*), which is actually a "lower-level" feeling – and thus, it also imposes some norms¹⁴³.

The problem is that people sharing a common feeling of solidarity don't automatically share mutual activity as well. The term was thus empty from the viewpoint of sociology, although the question remains: why do we use it? Weber compared ethnicity to membership in an estate¹⁴⁴: it imposed conventions in a variety of cultural areas, with language taking over profession as the main aspect of identity. Estates delimited themselves by specific customs and rituals for distinguishing the members and the others,

141 – Renan 1882: 8

142 – M.Weber 1922: 2.Teil, Kap. IV, §2

143 – M.Weber 1922: 2.Teil, Kap. IV, §2

144 – M.Weber 1922: 2.Teil, Kap. IV, §2: *"Neben wirklich starken Differenzen der ökonomischen Lebensführung spielten bei ethnischem Verwandtschaftsglauben zu allen Zeiten solche der äußerlichen Widerspiegelungen, wie die Unterschiede der typischen Kleidung, der typischen Wohn- und Ernährungsweise, der üblichen Art der Arbeitsteilung zwischen den Geschlechtern und zwischen Freien und Unfreien: – alle solche Dinge also, bei denen es sich fragt: was für »schicklich« gilt und was, vor allem, das Ehr- und Würdegefühl des Einzelnen berührt –, eine Rolle. Alle diejenigen Dinge mit anderen Worten, welche wir später auch als Gegenstände spezifisch »ständischer« Unterschiede wiederfinden werden. In der Tat ist die Ueberzeugung von der Vortrefflichkeit der eigenen und der Minderwertigkeit fremder Sitten, durch welche die »ethnische Ehre« gespeist wird, den »ständischen« Ehrbegriffen durchaus analog. »Ethnische« Ehre ist die spezifische Massenehre, weil sie jedem, der der subjektiv geglaubten Abstammungsgemeinschaft angehört, zugänglich ist. Der »poor white trash«, die besitzlosen und, bei dem Mangel an Arbeitsgelegenheit für freie Arbeit, sehr oft ein elendes Dasein fristenden, Weißen der amerikanischen Südstaaten waren in der Sklavereiepoche die eigentlichen Träger der den Pflanzern selbst ganz fremden Rassenantipathie, weil gerade ihre soziale »Ehre« schlechthin an der sozialen Deklassierung der Schwarzen hing."*

which aroused a feeling of solidarity and also of appropriateness (*Schicklichkeit*). There were interest groups within the estates – parties, guilds or ministers – who justified their policies by pointing at similarities in the interests of other members. A "representant" of an *ethnos* would thus do the same, turning attention to similarities and carving out differences. Unlike in Renan's view, there is no nation at work, just masses under the guidance of a demagogic group. For Weber the term wasn't only a tool used by politicians to mobilize the masses, but to shape their organization as well. The political group tries to force people to stop perceiving certain differences between each other and to live in an order it creates. Using the examples of the Athenian *phylai* and of Jewish tribes, Weber argues that ethnic groups are in fact relics of administrative groups imposed on society by politicians, who merely play with the feelings of solidarity experienced by their followers¹⁴⁵. Traces of this criticism can be found in the later works of Gellner, Anderson and Van den Berghe as well. They all address the idea of a cross-level fallacy, the invention of a high-level group by a low-level one, and the mingling experiences with others with images about "them". Ideologization, which Herder and Renan, but also Hroch, understand as the *result* of a process, is taken by Weber (followed by Anderson, Van den Berghe and the constructivists of the next chapter) to be the *cause* of the construction of ethnicity.

A somewhat different approach to the matter was shown by Carlton Hayes. In his view, it is not the ideologization which leads to the emergence of the category of nationality. Hayes distinguishes between nation, nationality and nationalism. His basic definition of nationality, that is, of personal affiliation with a nation, is described in quasi-traditional terms, stressing the role of language and the continuity of an established state¹⁴⁶. However, the fervor of nationalism is for him hard to explain. Natural patriotism, as he calls the love for familiar places and for the community, usually focuses on much smaller phenomena, so it would also focus on the lower-level rather than the high-level groups. While language and history can explain *nationality*, the national identity of a person, they can't explain *nationalism*, the sudden emergence of nationality as a political theme and a force for mobilizing the masses. This is where religion comes in – before nationality took a firm position in determining one's political affiliation, it was his confession¹⁴⁷. Religious practice in Hayes' historical examples was communal: already in

145 – M.Weber 1922 §3

146 – Hayes 1960: 6

147 – Hayes 1960: 170

pre-Christian times, common practices adjoined various individuals and families in local "cults". Here, Christianity brought two important developments: the idea of the universal Church, the ideological extension of local ritual groups characterized by uniform rituals throughout the Christian world, and the practice of proselytism, which turns heathen enemies into potential members as not-yet-baptized pagans. In comparison to both its pagan and Judaic predecessors, Christianity didn't require a religious center, such as the Jerusalem temple, as its main rites could be performed anywhere, and any central locality could be reproduced. The content of religion was very abstract and easily translatable into different cultural contexts.

However, collective rites and the collective expansive effort didn't make the Christian religion immune to dynastic struggles; existing states used theological differences and adherences to various sects of Christianity as the ideological background for their policies. These two tendencies became the model for collective organization. The critical point is seen by Hayes in the 16th and 17th centuries, when Protestant countries gradually ceased their struggles against Catholicism and began to focus on the development of national churches instead¹⁴⁸. In some countries, like England or Sweden, adherence to the church was bound with dynastic loyalty; in other cases, like among Poles in Protestant Prussia and Orthodox Russia, the transformation of a religious community into a national one was made by contrast. National states of the 19th and 20th centuries then invented a number of civic rituals, cultivating nationalism as pan-national solidarity and loyalty. Nationality, an element of individual identity, thus replaced the external references of Christianity. The rituals are now focused on humans; their own collective replaces God.

Although this theory was practically limited to predominantly Christian European countries¹⁴⁹, it gives us a clue to possible positivistic approaches to the matter. A group lives from the images which arise throughout its history, help its subjectivization, and make it an experience for its members. Not only do the members identify themselves by their

148 – Hayes 1960: 30-38

149 – An ongoing multidisciplinary project "Visions of Community", led by Walter Pohl and Andre Gingrich of the University of Vienna, aiming at wider understanding of the relations between tribal, dynastic and confessional identities in the Middle Ages, includes also identity-building processes from the Tibetan Empire and from medieval Yemen. The researchers have chosen Muslim and Buddhist lands because of their universalism and proselytism.

ethnicity or nationality, but further the group itself has content and means to sustain it. The reproduction of a group's symbolic content was very influential among thinkers like Smith, Geertz and Said, as well as in various schools of historical thought, from Wenskus and Pohl focusing on the Middle Ages, to Hroch, Wolff and Todorova focusing more on present categories of identity. Ethnicity remains a constructed, historically situated category, but it is a modern transformation of the ancient identification mechanisms. These can be traced to the parallels of rituals, to a *Kulturraum* defined by myths and language, to the persistence of identifying symbols and to other similar phenomena. Continuity of these symbolic features in respective ethnies isn't necessarily the case: reactivations, reinventions, parallel developments and so on are common problems, which Weber's tradition tried to place on the periphery of interest in face of the modern developments.

Levinson, writing even before Hayes, in his use of term "ethnic group" not only ignored Weber's criticism, but even choose the term because of its broad and generalizing meaning¹⁵⁰. His work also played with the terminological problem, and he argued against using the term "race" similarly to Renan; he understood the term "nations" as "*cultures...which do not form politico-geographical entities*". The question of an ethnic group's emergence or the reasons behind the use of the idea of ethnicity weren't interesting for him. The historical context of Levinson's work is quite relevant here: after the war and the escalation of anti-Semitic sentiments to the level of genocidal hysteria – both the products of an initially massively popular political movement – it was the source of these sentiments which interested intellectuals. The term "ethnic group" was taken for granted, as it helped to carry the main argument of Levinson's work – as well as that of whole of Adorno's team – namely, that anti-Semitism was a particular expression of a phenomenon that can be observed in any culture and in any "ethnic group", including Americans. Every person marks the borders of his in-group by himself: some are more tolerant, some less. This opens one of the important current debates, namely in how far we need the notion of an "ethnic group" at all.

Primordialism and Constructivism

Definitions of "ethnies" such as those in Said's and Chow's cases deviate widely not

150 – Adorno et al. 1950: 103

only from popular views, but also from some modern depictions. Both consider the identities of their objects as something actively constructed, modified or interpreted. Both seek – or rather postulate – ideological interests behind the work, yet acknowledge a certain cultural determination of their views. To understand them completely, I'd have to make an overview of the present situation in the understanding of ethnicity. First of all, the "historical" views haven't been fully eradicated; rather they have been institutionalized in various ways and are reflected in almost all political scenes. From the viewpoint of history and sociology, there is a raging debate between "primordialism" and "constructivism" about the origin of nations. The question is whether people tend to stick with traditionally or naturally given groups, or if they prefer to create new types of organization according to their actual situation. Some anthropologists go even further, questioning the function of the idea of an "ethnie" in science in general, namely by the above mentioned problem regarding the extent to which the use of the idea of an "ethnie" is credible at all. In this case, a pragmatic acceptance of the conventional boundaries between ethnic groups and cultures is in opposition to an exact functionalism, focusing on local self-identifications.

Philosophers opened this theme sooner than the scientific disciplines. "Primordialism" was the Romantic position, coming primarily from Herder and Hegel, promoting the cultural predestination of an individual. The other, the Kantian tradition, was by contrast universalist and cosmopolitan, promoting the role of individual choice in value and identity formation. In an attempt to cross from the romantic to the universal view, in the 1870s Nietzsche¹⁵¹ already considered the cultural stagnation of Germans to be due to sticking to a herd-like religious tradition. Yet the innate universalism of that tradition was one of the main reasons why nationalism worked there at all social levels. Even better, one can see the difference between Spengler¹⁵² and Cassirer¹⁵³, with the former worrying about the diffusion of the soul of the culture in universalism and the latter about the subordination of individuals to man-made symbolisms. Throughout the second half of the 20th century, the debate regained vigor in more specialized anthropological and ethnological circles, with both sides claiming the other's naivity and obsolescence.

151 – Durgun 2004: 26-31

152 – Spengler 1920: 165; *"For me, the "people" is a unit of the soul. The great events of history were not really achieved by peoples; they themselves created the peoples. Every act alters the soul of the doer. Even when the event is preceded by some grouping around or under a famous name, the fact that there is a people and not merely a band behind the prestige of that name is not a condition, but a result of the event."*

153 – Cassirer 1944: 43

"Primordialist" or "essentialist" views are often linked to those I've dubbed "historical"; they view ethnicity as a set of attributes which persists through inheritance¹⁵⁴. This "essentialism", as criticized by modern "primordialists"¹⁵⁵, can be traced even further, to the medieval realism. The idea of "primordialism" is explained as the claim that ethnicities persist through ages; their specific marks are reflected in social changes. Some "primordialist" thinkers tend to support the idea of a historical link between a primitive ethnic group and a modern nation, developed alongside social-evolutionary principles – like in Sumner's book, where the tribe and nation are both "genetic" units¹⁵⁶. While at their core they bear similarity to the "Romantic" position, the aims of these theories include a wider set of tools and goals. Ethnicity is thought to reflect objective, non-temporal facts – biological, psychological, sociological – which determine its formation. It cannot be "invented" or "created", although the forms of its expression may change over the course of history; for the same reason, personal identification proceeds involuntarily as well. When the causes are analyzed, scientists search for factors which can be applied to any human society. The definition by Geertz¹⁵⁷ points out that people stick to their cultural "givens", i.e., the language, practices and other things they receive from their environment. The fact that people see their culture as something given, something primordial, helps them to understand the world. Culture thus brings people together to form ethnic groups. Ethnic identity is determined by the parents and the environment, in which a child is born. Early perceptions of behavior and culture form the ethnic identity of the child¹⁵⁸. The causes are generally two: psychological and situational, one being the natural mechanism of a reaction, the other depending on dynamics of changes in the environment. When the changes are too deep, people turn to their "givens" in search of security. There is a natural inclination towards certain cultural phenomena which are considered ethno-specific, and which can (and usually do) develop in certain situations. The core of ethnocentrism for Geertz means thus the "*longing not to belong to any other group*"¹⁵⁹.

154 – e.g. Van den Berghe 1980: 17f

155 – e.g. Smith 2009: 122

156 – Sumner 1906: 51

157 – Geertz 1963: 108-113

158 – cf. W.Connor 1994

159 – Geertz 1963: 110

Van den Berghe¹⁶⁰ takes the reverse approach: ethnic groups are seen as extensions of families, of natural groups. Unlike Geertz, he tries to understand the problem at the biological, individual level. Similarly to Ibn Khaldun's view, ethnocentrism is seen as a kind of nepotism, but somewhat extended: kin can be disinherited or otherwise excluded, while other kinsmen may be selected according to individual needs. Family membership is usually supported by physical resemblance between the offspring and the father, for whom this is the way of directing his "investment". The problem is that the larger the group, the lesser their biological similarity. Within extended families or clans, this search for similarity doesn't limit itself to physical markers, but also looks for cultural ones, like names, behavior or symbols. These, in the end, fully replace the function of biological markers. On a higher (quantitative) level, biological similarity within a group may fade out completely – as he says, it is hard for Norwegians and Swedes to be racist towards one another – but it can still be widely accepted as a myth¹⁶¹. Because of this, Van den Berghe believes that ethnocentric sentiments reflect a kind of extended, but biologically rooted nepotism¹⁶². As in Ibn Khaldun's description of group feeling, for Van den Berghe personal ethnicity isn't a voluntary marker: it can't be simply constructed or imagined, although it is prone to manipulation and exploitation. Van den Berghe tried to create an explanation independent of historical circumstances, but there are two problems with his theory. First, there is still a possibility, that the described understanding of biological similarity may be secondary to the cultural markers. It can work for an individual, but the whole group must *a priori* have a kind of definition of a family or nation, before it establishes itself as one. Second, only certain members of ethnic groups are usually interested in their recognition.

The "constructivist", "instrumentalist" or "modernist" view considers ethnicity to be an intentionally constructed phenomenon, created to support the social order or its understanding by an external observer. Psychological or sociological explanations aren't considered irrelevant, but the stress falls on intentionality and situational factors. Social differences are not considered the results, but rather the causes of identification with one or another ethnic group, while the biological, linguistic or other "essential" characteristics are attributed to the other groups only secondarily. Constructivists set the focus on the

160 – Van den Berghe 1980: 15-36

161 – Hutchinson 1996: 61; *"The Nazis tried to be racists with Jews but their biological markers worked with perhaps 10 to 15 per cent reliability. In practice, they used mostly cultural markers: circumcision, synagogue attendance, the Star of David, denunciations, surnames, etc."*

162 – Hutchinson 1996: 57

interdependence between high- and low-level (class, political affiliation) identities within a society. Ethnocentrism is usually replaced by nationalism, to denote the fervor of a politically active group trying to attain a position of power. The earliest criticisms came already in the form of "modern" views, propounded up to the 1940s and 50s, followed by a blend between primordial and constructivist ideas. Wenskus¹⁶³, for example, argued against the genealogical myths spread amongst many German-speaking historians. According to him, it was the capability of aristocratic clans to free themselves from pure nepotism and to accept warriors from other families which helped them to grow and to found the first tribal states. Yet this position acknowledges the general primordialist assumption of a link between ancient tribes and modern nations. In the 1980s Anderson, Gellner and Hobsbawm formulated purely constructivist theories of political history, moving the moment of ethnogenesis to modern times, the motives being the needs of industrial society and political work. Supported by the research of an ethnically marked historiography, a unified educational system and the need for an effective administration, the idea of an ethnic community was meant to be planted in the social life of the citizens, providing a scientific justification for the new order¹⁶⁴. Points still in question are then the relations between the definition of nations and ethnic groups, the relations between the dominant and politically minor groups (in cases where they can be identified), as questions of diasporas, new concepts of universal identity and, of course, the relevance of the very idea of ethnic identity.

Gellner constructed an anthropological view instead of a biological one. His primary focus was on nations rather than ethnic groups, but he generally considered ethnies to be constructed along linguistic lines. Society evolves together with language. Humans are extremely creative and their behavior can vary at immense rates in comparison with other species which makes them adaptative but also unpredictable. Language and customs, including violent ones¹⁶⁵, serve as restraining measures to limit this variety of behavior and thus make cooperation and communication within the society easier. Mutual development of the group, its language, and its rules and methods of imposing these rules can be considered the development of the ethnic group itself. However, ethnicity wasn't considered relevant for contemporary people. They rather turned to other customary sets:

163 – cf. Wenskus 1977

164 – e.g. cf. Anderson 2006, Hobsbawm 1992: 85

165 – Gellner 1996: 58

religion, tribe or direct rule by hierarchical superiors. Then Gellner proposed the Enlightenment as the revolutionary moment, when society (or, rather, societies) became so large and complex that they required higher educational standards¹⁶⁶. Mass education led to the relativization of the social hierarchy and other traditional means of coercion. The force of Ibn Khaldun's "dynasties" no longer needed when the people themselves find it actually beneficial to follow (or define) the laws. "Nationality" is invented to replace such means. People don't relate their standards to tradition or to religious or secular authority, but to themselves. As they become homogenous, they begin to perceive this *new* kind of similarity between each other, and they term it "nationality"¹⁶⁷. It remains a means of self-organization in times of turbulent modernization and industrialization.

The problem of the link between the ancient and the contemporary, however, persists. Kellas¹⁶⁸ objected to Gellner's theory on the basis that it doesn't explain nationalist movements in pre-modern (e.g., medieval Scotland) or underdeveloped countries; it shows merely the possibility of a constructivist explanation of the phenomenon. Smith¹⁶⁹ tried to solve this problem along essentialist lines too, while taking into account some of Gellner's thoughts as well. He proposed two models of national formation: territorial and "ethnic" (in our terms, based on historical continuity). Territorial formation, typical for Western countries like France, Spain and England of 17th century, expects a certain ethnic group to dominate over a certain territory through various economic and political means, accompanied by the emergence of urban centres concentrating these kinds of power. In the Middle Ages, this domination did in fact influence some aspects of the cultures of minorities. They could claim the history of the dominant group as their own, even if their culture was diametrically different. The eve of nationalism started when the rivalry between states laid rising demands on resources, which meant that minorities had to be more firmly incorporated into the system. Culturally, it meant the subordination and assimilation of peripheral ethnic cultures to the one presented by the nation-state¹⁷⁰.

166 – Gellner 1996: 68

167 – Gellner 1996: 47; Not "ethnicity", which is a term of anthropology rather than of personal identity.

168 – Kellas 1996: 60

169 – Smith 1986: 130f

170 – Smith 1986: 139; For example, Smith mentions here how the English lessened autonomy of Wales and the Highlands and French of Brittany and Languedoc. Certain cultural differences can be seen nowadays, but their languages have mostly been replaced by the royal one or downgraded to dialects.

"Ethnic" formation, typical for Eastern Europe in the 18th and -19th centuries, was more a kind of cultural rather than political process; the main constitutive aspects of nations were their language and historical continuity. The recruiting grounds for nationalism were the nobility and the clergy, who aimed against multiethnic universal empires like those of the Habsburgs, the Ottomans and Russia. To stand up against a universal empire meant first to act as a "western" nation-state, imposing the dominant ethnicity on the subordinate classes such as peasantry and free artisans. While in the German and Italian cases the territories were linguistically sufficiently homogenous, in the Polish and Hungarian cases the nobility found an ethnically diverse population, which made the task much harder and eventually aroused the same attempts within these minorities¹⁷¹. Both formations are accompanied by the exploitation of history, which is presented as the history of the nation; there are real grounds for every ethnic group, although hyped and exaggerated when it becomes nationalistic.

Although this solves the first problem of Van Berghe's view, the objection by Brass¹⁷² is actually supported by it. Brass supports the constructivist view, more explicitly than Gellner. Ethnicity may be considered as a "given" only from a subjective viewpoint. However, if we take this as a sufficient definition, we won't be able to explain how people come to have this group identity in the first place¹⁷³. Objectively, it is primarily a symbol, a set of common cultural phenomena elevated over other ones in order to distinguish the group from another one. People within the group not only share a similar culture, but this culture makes them a community. Followingly, the community considers the culture its heritage, protects it, fights for the rights to cultivate it and becomes a nation¹⁷⁴. What forms this heritage, however, doesn't come in a "pack"; some aspects are contrasted, some aren't. The aspects which literally turn an ethnic group to a political community, a nation, usually reflect the source of the activism and its opponent. These activists, or "elite" in

171 – Smith 1986: 142; Hungarians based their rights on the autonomy of the kingdom, Polish had a sovereign state in a fresh memory, but Slovaks (Great Moravia) and Ukrainians (the 17th century hetmanate, Kievan Rus') simply did the same by summoning ancient state entities as "their own". For the same reason, Smith argues, the Young Turk movement with its pan-Turanist tendencies was doomed from beginning, as it only alienated the remaining ethnic groups, especially non-Turkish Muslims. Most people with a similar language in fact lived outside the empire, while most of the Ottoman subjects were non-Turkish Christians.

172 – cf. Hutchinson 1996: 89f

173 – Brass 1999: 18

174 – Brass 1999: 22

Brass' terms, use and develop or transform various linguistic, religious or other cultural properties in a way distinguishing them from another "elite". Finally Hutchinson tried to solve the question by defining two distinct types of ethnic activism: cultural and political¹⁷⁵. Whereas the first is generally an antipolitical, even anarchic search for knowledge and alternative education regarding the special characteristics of the group, the second is a struggle to gain the power and recognition as a nation from other nations. It is similar to Smith's theory, although the formation of both kinds of nations would mean primarily a work of activist groups, "elites" in Brass' sense of word.

Thus, the real difference between primordialist and constructivist views lies in their focus on the subject of ethnic identification – the group and its ideologization. It can be said the main arguments were, in fact, anthropological ones. Both views were considered to be as coherent by their opponents, but there were instances, in which their conclusions couldn't be applied. An influential compromise solution, proposed already in the 1970s by Hroch, was to limit these views to particular periods in the histories of particular nations. The intentional (constructivist) activity is limited to the second and third stages of national development, while the first is initiated by primordialist sentiments. In the third stage, primordialism is revived again and promoted. The first stage of national development thus reflects the Geertz' theory, while Brass and Van den Berghe describe rather the second stage, and Smith and Gellner speak about the third.

Criticism of Ethnicity

The previous debate reflected the origin of particular ethnicities, namely of those calling themselves sovereign (or wishing to be sovereign) nations; the next focuses around the idea of ethnicity itself. As we've seen the idea itself was criticized by Weber already in the 1920s, but without sufficient elaboration. The vagueness of the "ethnic" category led him to simply fill it with religious or other aspects. Małinowski¹⁷⁶ still in the 1940s thought we could make easy analogies between modern nations and any group we wanted to research. His set of integrating attributes of a group included physiological, voluntary,

175 – cf. Hutchinson 1996, introduction

176 – Małinowski 1944: 50

professional and status factors, but excluded language and religion¹⁷⁷. Malinowski believed in the similarity of integrative mechanisms on both higher- and lower levels, yet he was already aware that the most traditional high-level attributes are insufficient.

In the next decade, Edmund Leach¹⁷⁸ disputed the claim that such an analogy can be made. While Leach emphasized temporary changes in self-identification, on the scale of generations, Barth attempted to describe these changes on a spatial scale¹⁷⁹ as well. Anthropologists found that the borders of the groups they researched were shifting too quickly. They found it a generation before the historians, among whom Gellner was in the 1980s the first to question the credibility of ethnic borders, as they were abused by political mobilization¹⁸⁰. Anderson consequently criticized Gellner, pointing out that the fact that something was *falsified* meant also that there had to be some *genuine* nations¹⁸¹. The emergence of multiple ethnicities as political agents – nations – was seen as an effect of pluralization on multiple cultural levels: religious, linguistic, and communicative channels¹⁸². For Hobsbawm, the mere emergence of a national state, ruled by a sovereign community of equal citizens (instead of a universal aristocracy), is considered to be a major factor contributing to the present views of ethnic identification¹⁸³. Yet this problem became even more important than the intentionality behind the "origin" of traditionally accepted ethnies. Self-definition as a nation became a source of "natural rights" for some groups, others were thus often reduced to their representatives. The same – perhaps more importantly – may be applied to the researchers, who write about the groups.

To understand the definition of ethnicity, as presented by Malinowski, one may look to the first part of this chapter, namely the five "historical" types of borders – language, religion, territory, genealogy and continuity. These categories were (and still are!) very widespread in historiography. One can speak of a kind of internationally accepted meaning of ethnicity, with its origin somewhere in Europe; Hayes and Hastings argued it's because it was already included in the biblical definition of Israel, becoming widespread during the

177 – Malinowski 1944: 62-65

178 – Leach 1956: 6

179 – Barth 1982: 22f

180 – Gellner 1983: 73f

181 – Anderson 2006: 6

182 – Anderson 2006: 12f

183 – Hobsbawm 1992: 80f

Middle Ages. Others, like Wenskus¹⁸⁴ or Smith¹⁸⁵ later, tried to find the roots of ethnicity and nationality already in "pagan" times, analyzing the political organization of early medieval tribes. Even if they attained quite good results in identifying the weak points and ideological bias of genealogist histories in Europe, the fact is that they were still limited to the modern idea of ethnic borders. Wenskus and Hastings provided primarily theories suitable for German or English history, namely describing the factors behind the formation of their respective ethnies; this was, evidently, their intention. Wenskus' account of the historical factors behind formation of ethnicity was influential, but was created in respect to existing states, already internationally recognized and constitutionally self-expressed entities. Ethnicity, as some have found out, doesn't follow this target entirely.

Leach¹⁸⁶ describes the cultures in Northern Burma, which, despite enjoying a certain level of autonomy in most times of their history, were neither sovereign nor comparably identifiable comparably to European nations (and minorities) or to the island cultures observed by Mañinowski. Many ethnies were recognized (i.e., identified) by different means: the Shan by religion, different Kachin groups by political organization, and the Chinese by ancestry. To make nice overviews with maps wouldn't help us much, as these groups inhabit discontinuous territories. Consequently, the aspect of territory was defended by Barth, who pointed out the spread of more dynamic ethnic identities according to the environment. Of course, there was a certain migration taking place too. These groups were quite small (with the largest village-clusters around a thousand), often with blood relations affecting local politics. Conflicts sometimes preceded identification by outward means: two clans with a lasting feud tended to convert a religion different from that of the other clan. Yet they were still considered part of the old unit, for example, a language group or a village cluster. As the groups were delimited by political organization, these ethnicities were highly unstable. Myths and rituals observed in the society actually hinted at recent changes in political organization, but often more in terms of ideals than in realized changes. The practices of political and religious life reflected more the ideals

184 – Wenskus 1977: 46-54

185 – Smith 2009: 49; *"From an ethno-symbolic perspective, nations may be regarded as named and self-defining communities whose members cultivate shared symbols, myths, memories, values and traditions, inhabit and are attached to a historic territory or homeland, create and disseminate a distinctive public culture, and observe shared customs and standard laws. Sociologically speaking, this means that nations, by definition, are repeatedly formed and re-formed, at least in part, on the basis of the symbolic processes of ethno-genesis such as naming, boundary definition, myths of origin and symbolic cultivation."*

186 – Leach 1956: 9f

before the change of situation than the present organization. Only in the case of ecologically defined ethnies could one speak of a stable, common practice, e.g., in the building of terraces or a specific type of agriculture. But as these didn't reflect actual lines of difference in other aspects – religion, name, language nor politics – Leach stated that these changes were too stark to say of Shans or Kachins that they were some kind of persisting object. They were an object during his fieldwork in Burma, and perhaps still in 1956, when the book came out, but it was written for this situation alone.

Levine and Campbell¹⁸⁷ later summarized five points of debate about the credibility of Małinowski's assumption: territorial interpenetration, linguistic or cultural discontinuity, disagreement about labelling, relations with outgroups and shifts in identity and culturally defined lifestyles. From our point of view, the first two and the last aspects question the "historical" views of a group. Differences in ethnic borders undermine the reliability of conventional borders when making an overview of single cultural aspects. They help us to understand the variety of possible kinds of borders, and thus also to understand the differences in groups unlike those of our cultural circle. The other two aspects of Levine and Campbell's work point not only to the nature of these borders but also to indigenous definitions of their own borders. These are sometimes misinterpreted or ignored by researchers. Scientists often bring up their own ideas about group coherence, which may, or may not be in accordance with the understanding in the group they claim to speak about. Finally, group relations are especially important for the liability of the whole theory of ethnocentrism. In Tylor's and Sumner's work, they are strictly categorized into the realms of law and war, while the borders tend to be extended either through stressing commonalities with other groups (Evans-Pritchard¹⁸⁸) or by rituals (Goody¹⁸⁹). Of course, here remains the notion of a common enemy, which may be behind such integration attempts. But still, the categories of loyalty and nationality are of the same nature as conventions regarding the group's extent, and one can ask in how far the scientist describes the view of the culture he speaks about, or his own view. For this reason Małinowski was described as biased¹⁹⁰, even if his goal was in fact to extend his own knowledge by researching the views of his object group.

187 – Levine and Campbell 1971: 83-98

188 – Evans Pritchard 1940: 139f

189 – Goody 1961: 156

190 – Lévi-Strauss 1985: 245-250

But what did they actually criticize? Leach could say Małinowski was an ethnocentrist – he used his own group as a reference model for other groups. There is a clear similarity in the understanding of the groups researched by Małinowski and the aforementioned historians. When one writes the history of a group, he necessarily already implies a certain continuity of the group over the time. Thus we can say he presupposes a *static* identity, i.e., a set of constants during the flow of the time. A set of attributes, which are imposed upon the object group by the researcher, defines first the idea of the group's nature; only then can one proceed with the actual definition of a group. In the case of Małinowski, it was this methodology, more than the content, which led some people to consider the work to be ethnocentrist. But then we can ask the following: which of these attributes, thought to be common to all researched groups, were given in the researcher's *ethnos* and which were acquired through training in his scientific discipline? Which of them were arbitrarily chosen by the researcher as original ones? What makes an idea original within a scientific tradition? Ethnicity determines more the contents than the framework of research; the discipline affects the theory behind them. An allegation of mere ethnocentrism not only obscures the levels of researcher's group identity, but also the core of the problem, which is the idea that human groups have a constant set of attributes.

The step out of this circular reasoning about how the group determines the researcher's intentions (while itself being constructed by the researcher's intentions) lies not as much in the understanding of one's relation with the groups he is a member of, but rather in finding an alternative to the static set he uses to describe it. Leach's work has already proposed the idea of a *dynamic* group. A certain dynamism must exist in history as well, if the researcher wants to write something at least a bit interesting. When one writes the history of France or the Ottoman Empire, one talks about some "brand" which persisted through a number of changes to be remembered nowadays.

The static view of groups is a part of the very definition of the discipline. Behind the "brand", however, the actual community may vary a lot. It can at one time be a language-group, but then become a cult, first a dynasty, then a country or; let's say, a dish (the phrase "eating china" is one of the curious results of this process) or a particular way of using spoons. Historians work with the presumption that despite the changes there is still something persistent and universal. Thus we can have a world of "united" nations, a

history of peoples, or a "tradition" as a multitude of "schools"; in short, we are able to use the plural in speaking about human groups. For anthropologists, at least since Leach, it was enough to comprehend only the current state of affairs. In his work, the "brand" or name of the group is the only thing which remains after all of the other attributes change. A factor which was important for self-identification at one time, may not be important later; the tendency grows to see these factors as culturally embedded in the same way as the name of the ethnies, its language or other properties. The sets of attributes which we give to a group may change, and the change itself can become an object of study, like in the Kachin case.

The difference between the static and dynamic definitions has wider consequences than the first of the "actual" debates. Leach's idea of dynamic ethnicity adds to the vagueness of the very idea of identity, sometimes considered indispensable to the modern world¹⁹¹. First, it should be noted that this difference doesn't necessarily reflect primordialist and constructivist positions. One can consider the evolution of tribes to nations to be a rigid pattern, followed by every group as far as the environment and resources allow it; this was one of the points of criticism against Gellner's constructivism¹⁹². On the other hand, Levine and Campbell¹⁹³ mention various instances of shifting identities, where groups change their views about their origins and special characteristics. In such cases, the identity is dynamic while remaining primordialist at its core. Another difference is in the reaction of, and the capability to persist within, the scientific discourse. While primordialism found strong roots in the sociobiological area, static views on identity are rarely supported due to their association with state-bound attempts to generalize and summarize for administrative purposes, and thus also with hegemony.

But also, both definitions have larger scopes than the primordialism/constructivism debate. That debate concentrated itself too much on established, high-level groups like nations, ethnies or civilizations. If low-level groups mattered, they were taken as predecessors, activators or (often self-proclaimed) representatives of the high-level groups. To define a specific low-level group which perfectly reflects the high-level mentality, as in the case of Said's orientalists, reflects an attitude similar to that of Herder,

191 – Bentley 1987: 24

192 – Smith 2009: 122

193 – Levine and Campbell 1971: 91

who saw science as an expression of the cultural spirit. In the cases where the scientists are themselves objectified, the relations between the group and the member are much more dynamic, easier to observe and very concrete. It is possible to compare such low-level groups defined by a static set of properties.

However, when the variety of groups is at stake and we try like Said to describe the relation between culture and a school of thought, a dynamic view of their attributes can be very fruitful in understanding of the situation. In general I believe that any cross-level interactions – like between the public and, say, NGOs – are better understood through these views. On the other hand, the static view can still be effective when we speak about same-level groups. Weber's criticism of the idea of "ethnicity", which would cross-cut many levels of social interactions, was thus in place, but it still isn't fully feasible for us now. An idea of ethnic group is known in many disciplines and has extended its set of attributes since the time of Weber's work. There are even legal formulations for it. However, analogies can be made in various fields. A scientific research group can be described as an *ethnos*, thus making it too a subject of ethnocentrism, while we can ask whether its set of properties isn't equal to that of an ethnic community.

Conclusion

The "ingroup" of ethnocentrism has many definitions. However, in so far as we approach this phenomenon outside of the specialized discourse referring to *Authoritarian Personality* or theories of intergroup conflict, ingroups are defined traditionally, or at least by reference to traditional ethnies, i.e. high-level groups. We have seen that groups may define themselves by traditional, quasi-persisting factors (language, religion, origin, territory and persistence itself), or by more modern, situational factors (discourse about the former, cultural development and political solidarity).

Criticism of the former set led to a long debate, which in the end brought only a new extreme – namely, that bias and loyalty can occur in any group if its leaders can manipulate the masses sufficiently. Yet the idea that behind every formation of a wide-scale group should be a political ideology has already been doubted. First, there are groups which consider themselves different from "others" despite having only minimal

contact with them. Second, the view itself presents a kind of ethnocentrism, considering other groupings analogical to "our" group. We speak always through "our" own categories. We can merely classify these categorizations by their features, both qualitative (static/dynamic) and quantitative (actual size of the group, with abstract tribes and nations at one end of the scale and the other persons we cooperate and share experiences with on the other – its higher and lower "levels").

Chow and Said, mentioned in the beginning, analyzed their respective "ethnies" in a very dynamic way, although one from a constructivist (casting doubt upon the obviousness of the Chinese-Manchu difference), and the other from a primordialist viewpoint (researching "European" views, its ethnocentrism). The combination of constructivism attributed to high-level groups, and primordialism to low-level, cooperative groups, shouldn't be surprising. The conclusions of Ibn Khaldun, Weber, Hroch and Gellner followed similar patterns. The same goes for their argumentation. The criticism they offer is highly dynamic, unlike the static views provided by those they speak about. Yet to say the static views are politically inclined and thus should be avoided would be to look only at one side of the coin.

The very existence of nationalist policy casts doubt on any adherence to the question of how far one can consider ethnicity to be an "objective fact" or something globally plausible. As long as historians and anthropologists with static views on ethnicity are seen as politicized, this line of criticism can't be devoid of attitudes towards the politics they carry on. Whether it is then a left-wing antiglobalism, a right-wing nationalism or anything else isn't that important. On the other hand, ethnicity isn't the only kind of membership. Low-level activism tends not to depend on, but rather tries to determine, high-level values. We can still look at how these authors see the affiliation process within a group, whether their theories allow for a kind of apolitical approach, and which parts of this self-identification are unconscious or "given" in Geertz' sense. With which one do we identify? How does a person become a "member of a group"?

II. Identification

Levinson and Tuan – external identification – reference group theory – alteration – performative identification

In the previous chapter we've looked into the nature of nations, tribes and other groups, but these groups are formed by humans with personal convictions and worldviews. When we first happen upon these we think of both the general idea of a group, as well as of particular groups like ethnies. These groups have been examined by anthropologists and historians, who worked with or simply talked to certain individuals whom they took as representatives of the group. However, I haven't yet said anything about whether these persons were seen as born into the group or became one of "them" later by marriage or some initiation ritual, like a statement of belief or the fulfillment of requirements for citizenship¹⁹⁴. It is possible to say that every type of group has its own way of expressing membership; some may not need to do so at all. In theories of ethnocentrism, however, some have tried to give a general overview of how identification works. For example Levinson, with a more "dynamic" view of ethnicity, saw membership as an urge in ethnocentrist individuals, who psychologically (and not because of critical evaluation) tend to hold patriotic views¹⁹⁵. Yi-Fu Tuan, using a rather "static" definition, described the "ethnocentrist" actions of individuals as rooted in their psychology as well; however, persons act according to their attitudes, which are partly determined by their ethnicity, which is in turn defined by the environment¹⁹⁶. In the first case, Levinson's model, an individual expresses the fact of his membership in a particular group because he needs to belong somewhere. In Tuan's model, reversedly, he belongs somewhere because he expresses this belonging through his actions, attitudes and views.

These two views, most generally, can be described as external and internal

194 – In Western states, two major principles for obtaining citizenship were followed – *ius soli* and *ius sanguinis*, i.e., the "right of the soil" and the "right of the blood". Being born in the state's territory is still sufficient for a person to obtain citizenship in Britain and most American countries. However, most European states introduced *ius sanguinis* elements during the 20th century, requiring the citizenship of one or both parents, and instituting special procedures of declaration and naturalization for persons born to immigrant parents. Law attaches cultural background to one's blood deep unless the person initiatively performs the rites of inclusion. Cf. Vink & de Groot (2010: 20).

195 – Levinson 1949: 23

196 – Tuan 1974: 31-44

identification. These two form the usual approaches to the problem of choosing or receiving identity. A debate has been sparked¹⁹⁷ about identification with nations – political units claiming natural rights – as it has brought up a number of problems. First, the traditional borders – language, religion, genealogy, territory and continuity – are often blurred on the individual level. There are many cases of polyglot education, intermarriage, religious conversion or syncretism and migration which differentiate groups within a traditionally established nation¹⁹⁸. Furthermore, Leach observed quite coherent groups changing in a more dynamic way, penetrating even family ties within a generation¹⁹⁹. Second, national states emerged in an age of excessive demographic classification and statistics²⁰⁰. A state sets demands, but is also a perfect reference group, expecting external and internal identification to converge on an individual level²⁰¹. Third, there is still the problem of motivation and order of priority in identification²⁰², with one aspect of identity being preferred over another one. And last – but not least – even if identifications are subjective, the constructivist view of ethnic groups hints at associations and cooperations between people with similar views²⁰³, as well as the reverse when their differences are stressed instead²⁰⁴.

The distinction between internal and external identification is never total. Eriksen²⁰⁵, an anthropologist, remarked that these debates merely show that both external and internal identifications contribute to each other. But the debates also showed us more than a compromise solution to one of the problems. First, after these debates questioned the validity of one or another view, new ideas emerged. Similarly, individual researchers of ethnocentrism differed in their explanations and proposed various ideas about the functioning of the identification (and exclusion) mechanism. It can be argued that the original theories in this problem aimed exactly at this mechanism, not at group relations.

197 – cf. Handelman 1977; Eriksen 2010

198 – e.g. Eriksen 2010: 204f

199 – Leach 1956: 197f

200 – Anderson 1998, first chapter

201 – Anderson 1998: 35f

202 – Merton 1964: 225f

203 – Handelman 1977: 199

204 – Baumann and Gingrich 2004: 14f

205 – Eriksen 2010: 66

These relations, as some thought already during WW2²⁰⁶, are only secondary to the actual process of imagining an in- and an out-group. If one aims his studies at internal identification (as psychologists and sociologists tend to do), it doesn't necessarily mean that the external categorizations one can hear are false. For an anthropologist or historian, who researches certain practices – the worldviews and self-identifications of each classified person – may be likewise irrelevant. The difference is clear, but the views are complementary. This debate doesn't have the polemical nature of that between primordial and constructivist views on the origin of ethnicity. Unlike the problem of an actual group, identifications are subjective, always concerning only the individual making classifications in his head, no matter if he puts it down on paper or not. Thus there will be two objectives in this chapter. First, to find out what the main fault lines in the understanding of self-identification are. Second to explain how these differences affect particular ideas about ethnocentrism.

External Identification

In the case of identification from the outside, we've already gone through some of the problems, identified by Weber, Leach and even Ibn Khaldun. Categories set by "uninvolved" researchers can be seen as an application of their own, natively acquired principles to another people, presumably with other identificatory mechanisms. They reflect the prejudices and the extent of our education, which can never be perfect, and often doesn't even encompass an adequate experience with those, whom we categorize. In short, such categories show one's ethnocentrism in Tuan's meaning. The adequacy of this experience with the "other" is, of course, the key point. Ethnocentrist classification, as it goes, usually denotes a lacking or surplus ascription of attributes to the object of study. Thus Ibn Khaldun could have thought that climate theory provides a sufficient explanation for the revision of the quasi-biblical, genealogical understanding of races. Leach, on the other hand, attempted to limit himself to political relations in his own actual situation, presenting local identifications on a clan or village level instead. But were these theories adequate for their respective situations? Both remain influential more thanks to the polemical content than to actual solutions they provided. It is, in the end, still a recurrent philosophical question whether a good theory should contain more factors or have a more

206 – Van den Berghe 1980: 2f

limited scope instead.

The criticism of such classificatory work is generally important in particular cases. An observer's native views may be misleading when trying to describe any object, both in the natural and the human sciences. But still, sometimes their definitions serve as mutually accepted reference points. What makes the adoption of the meter (instead of e.g. English *yard* or Chinese *bu*) different from similarly spreading notions of nation, ethnicity or identity? We've already gone through a number of highly "eurocentrist" theories²⁰⁷, which offer very pragmatic reasons for the adoption of these terms. This view is similar to what some once called "clash" theory²⁰⁸. In the formative period of many states in the 19th and 20th centuries, when various countries needed a new source of mass legitimacy to replace the aristocratic system, the idea simply prevailed²⁰⁹. Herder's view, national revolutions and Wilson's idea of post-WW1 order competed with other forms of horizontal organizations in society, alongside e.g. Marx' utopia or revolutionary Islam, keeping them isolated at the end of the 20th century by both the force of arms and better integration into the global market²¹⁰. Such views are, of course, based totally and thoroughly on the Western European experience and are thus open for criticism. In many cases the alternatives show themselves to be complementary and the paradigm of nations doesn't fit everywhere. In fact the "adoption of a foreign system" by somebody is a vague idea, at least with regards to the aspect of the adopting or inspiring subject²¹¹. Instead, we may look more closely at the matter of relations between the observer and the group, and the explanation, postulated by Sumner, but elaborated first by the likes of Hroch, Handelman, Fox and Billig. They didn't presuppose the human-scientific interests of politicians in the theory of nations, but researched them instead.

Sumner's work functions with both high- and low-level identifications very freely, postulating the ethnocentrist attitudes on both levels to be equally powerful. Low-level identifications naturally precede high-level ones; they are given by nature. From nature

207 – Of these, Malinowski (1944), Hayes (1960) and Wenskus (1977) with their focus on European categories and history are the most prominent, yet newer ones like those of Gellner (1983) and Hroch (1971) are significant too.

208 – cf Huntington 1996

209 – Billig 1995: 60

210 – Billig 1995: 22

211 – cf. below, chapter 4 of this section

comes their mutual enmity as well. Higher political and cultural units emerged historically first as peace pacts, for example through similarities in group interests²¹². Key for a peace unit's survival is its integration and efficiency, i.e., its ability to resolve collisions of human interests²¹³. The problem with Sumner's theory is that not only both high- and low-level memberships were presupposed, but also the group's interests, which I will analyze in the next chapter. Memberships and categorizations were taken too naturally by Sumner, who thus omitted any idea of the systematic work of individuals behind the integration of high-level political units.

The theories of Hroch²¹⁴ and Handelman²¹⁵ provide alternative views on the process through which a scientific category can turn into a political faction. Hroch's theory is based on research into historical demography, focusing around the 19th century. His work from 1969 provides a collection of data from particular "small" nations of Europe, whose cultural activism (phase B) actually started in the researched period. It's basic premise is an essentialist one: a contemporary national identity always recalls an ancient one²¹⁶. These developments coincided with an overall rise in urbanization and education in the society, with the nationalist activists often providing criticism of or alternatives to the language or the history as presented by the empires they were part of. Cooperation between particular movements was necessary for them to spread throughout at least a coherent territory or class. The mass-consciousness of ethnic identity, the true "national revival", came in the final C phase²¹⁷. Handelman wrote down his theory practically in a parallel with Hroch. Similar to Hroch, he considers ethnic groups to be produced by historians and ethnographers in the beginning, but he draws on the constructivist thoughts of Barth and Cohen instead. Also instead of presupposing an activist group, Handelman offers the development of the organization of their activities along more spontaneous lines. This development is understood to continue in a way inverse to that in Hroch's theory: first on a level of mere worldviews (association), and then in cooperation and convergence with

212 – Sumner 1906: 69

213 – Sumner 1906: 549

214 – cf. Hroch 1971, 1985

215 – cf. Handelman 1977

216 – Hroch 2004: 12; Earlier Hroch's work in 1960s and 70s was without any reference to the "Western" discourse, which made the difference between essentialism and constructivism actual, but was generally unavailable (or looked upon with suspicion) east of Iron Curtain.

217 – Hroch 1985: 22-24

individuals and networks based on ethnic (i.e. what they see as common) lines – although the development, as Handelman adds, may also proceed at all levels simultaneously²¹⁸.

Both theories include a mutual idea. Many national identities require their identification by outsiders to stress their contrast to other (e.g., imperial) groups; some even owe the others for their consequent existence. In the beginning, the very interest of individuals – philologists and historians especially – makes further development possible. Research within a nationally-defined category (e.g., of Bosnian literature) has the effect of sedimentation by repetition. The association of individuals with a nation is insufficient; they have to identify with the group and also act like members. On an individual level, the procedure has proven its effectivity – one can still meet Slovaks falling into a rage when mislabeled as Slovenes or Czechs, or Austrians refusing to be called Germans. The same outward orientation is mentioned in the respective sections about the final stages, described as phase C or ethnic community: here nations demand recognition from the political majority or from foreign nations²¹⁹. This means a formal recognition, an act of legislation, rather than mere extension of personal worldviews.

The difference between formal and informal identification has been interestingly analyzed by Anderson²²⁰, working as usual with Southeast Asian examples. The identification of a group, termed with Sartre's term "seriality", is described as both its definition by the imposer and its individual recognition by the member. Within cultural works – of writers, scientists – seriality is considered free, reflecting mere trends and prejudices. By means of ideological declarations, demography and laws, states set rules for serializing, forcing culture to recognize the official view. This is what Anderson calls "bound seriality", the attempt of the state to monopolize the identification process²²¹. Unlike Hroch and Handelman, however, he thinks that after the formal recognition of a group this seriality is more likely to function as a "given". The systematic policy of a state not only strengthens, but also creates, a rigid form of behavior, through which persons acknowledge their national identity. An even stronger effect of formalized national identification has been observed in the case of the Soviet Union. Despite the original

218 – Handelman 1977: 198

219 – Hroch 1985: 24, Handelman 1977: 197

220 – Anderson 1998: 35-45

221 – Anderson 1998: 35

"internationalist" character of political communism, Suny²²² observed the consequences of the so-called *korenizatsiya* policy. Freely translatable as "back to the roots", its aim was primarily to support development of various languages and cultures within the Union, in contrast to the policy of Russification, typical for the preceding monarchy. The focus on a single, Russian historiography, which was determinant for many Slavic nations outside of the empire, turned to multiple, similarly primordialist historical discourses representing each nation of the Union. Administratively, nationality – i.e., *narodnost'*, ethnic membership – was included in every passport, no matter the residence, imposing cultural ties between the individual and both one of the Union's republics and its autonomous circles. The national identity becomes inescapable and determinative for further informal discourse as well.

Billig²²³, referring to Barthes, went deeper into the matter, seeking nationalism in the everyday life of American society. He complains that nationalism becomes a theme only when it gets "hot", when a rise in its intensity threatens stability of a country²²⁴. Theories of nationalism, in his view, overstress its revolutionary character and emotional charge, as they focus on special situations in which nationalism is strengthened. In his own words, sociologists focus on exotic, rare and often violent specimens. The national state, the goal of national movements and the ideal carrier of the nationalist ideology, doesn't get much attention. Billig thinks, in accordance with Anderson, that nationalism doesn't end with the establishment of a state, nor does it limit itself to excessively nationalist ideologies, such as those of fascist states. Actually, a nation-state first makes the idea of the nationhood "normal", although emotions may be from time to time stirred by wars and other threats. While rituals like salutations to the flag are an important part of the cult of the nation, as we've seen in Hayes' theory, the repetition of nation-based language has even greater effects, such as the presupposition or "assumed naturalness" of nations as agents in world politics. An everyday situation is created in which nationality is expressed: through flags, monuments, remembrance days and other symbols one can (but doesn't even have to) pay heed to the nation²²⁵. He tried to show how this formalization of nationality actually makes it hard to grasp the problem, for we already cannot think outside of national

222 – Suny 2001: 872

223 – Billig 1995: 102f

224 – Billig 1995: 43

225 – Billig 1995: 93-128 ; For a detailed study of nation-building rituals in another case, that of Bulgaria, cf Todorova 2009

categories. The banalization of national identity is the other side of the *korenizatsiya* coin, providing the linguistic base for the general consciousness of the world of politics as the world of nations. With the nation as the main political unit, at the individual level the primary social identity of a citizen of a national state is his membership in the nation.

It should be noted that in the two latter cases – the Soviet Union and the USA – the ideologies of both states were neither inherently nationalist nor in any case ethnic. Both countries were ethnically very heterogeneous, and their respective political elites were also in conflict with various movements, which we can bluntly label as radical nationalists. The intensity of nationalist behavior in the American case, and the Soviet nation-based administration in the other show us that the radicality of nationalism may not be that important for the acknowledgement of the externally imposed identity. This radicality is rather an effect of these policies. Moderate nationalism, even called "banal" by Billig, is presented as drawing strength from the same feelings of threat as in the more "radical" examples. This may lead us to wonder in how far such a nationalist self-presentation of a state affects the individual. For this reason we can now turn to the "inner" side of self-identification, i.e., to the personal idea of membership and its discursive formulation.

Internal Identification

Critics of ethnocentrism often address external identification as a method, not necessarily the person who uses it. Use of a certain method doesn't have to reflect one's psychological character. In Rösen's or Amin's cases of ethnocentrism in historical research, we deal only with the cultural or scientific background of researchers. The same can be said of Said's theory in *Orientalism*, though in his earlier work²²⁶ he expressed the idea that an ethnocentrist actually does choose what he belongs to, what he represents – at least partly. There is often an external identity that is imposed on the person, against which one can merely apply a liberum veto and exile himself. Said tries to combine both origin and acceptance in his view of how personal identities emerge. His is an interestingly organic view of things: one usually chooses the identity, which is the most productive. Infertile, uninteresting or corrupted origins can easily be replaced by means of exile to a new world which he finds worthy of reproduction. Said doesn't make it clear whether this "*kind of*

226 – Said 1975: 29

*compensatory order*²²⁷ works primarily on a single-level scale, as Orientalism does (i.e., intercultural), or crosses through multiple levels, in which case high-level group affiliation compensates for low-level deficiencies, e.g. in family life. It may even be the same group one thinks he has always been a member of, while he only adopts a new view towards it. While the size or level of the original group doesn't matter, Said considers the newly affiliated group more authoritative, and the affiliating person prone to represent it in an exclusivist and glorifying way. In short, affiliation, or internal identification with abstract groups of any size or pattern, leads to ethnocentrism.

Such views have found their place in the psychological tradition of ethnocentrism research as well. Already Levinson's original work²²⁸ may be seen as an attempt to unify Sumnerian ethnology and psychology. It is hard to say whether his aims and perceived social effect were something different. Both Levinson and Said speak about a kind of vile trend in society: the socio-psychological backgrounds of the Holocaust and colonialism. The question is in how far the behavior of the masses and their representatives is comparable to the precise opinions of scientists or cultural/political commentators. The comparison isn't out of place. Merton²²⁹ focused on the questions of harmony between group and personal values, conformism, relative deprivation and motivation, instead of the dynamics of group contact, the recognition of borders and prejudices about the "other". The relation between the individual and the group (and, most basically, the consequent conformist or rebellious behavior) is highly dependent on the individual's attitude towards the group's value system. In his own view of the theory, Merton presents both Said's types of membership – by an acquired "given" and by personal affiliation – plus another one, namely, by fulfilling a requirement²³⁰. The first is ascribed, as already said, from outside, and an individual can do nothing against it. It is a "work" done by the environment and we can merely try to ignore it. The second category, on the other hand, is wholly dependant on individual views. Membership by requirement comes from outside the individual as well. He is faced with requirements and can, by certain personal efforts, fulfill them and receive membership. The person striving for it can't say he is a member, yet he already shows

227 – Said 1975: 19

228 – cf. Levinson 1949

229 – Merton 1964: 284-286

230 – Merton 1964: 289f ; The theory had a substantial effect on the study of ethnocentrism by Levine & Campbell (1971), as it can be seen in its structure. The book is split into four parts. The core of the work is in part 2 (Societal Theories; p.25-114) and part 3 (Sociopsychological Theories; p.115-202), which practically reflect these differences in group identification.

interest in group's values, property or anything else he ascribes to it. This ideal doesn't need to reflect the reality.

In Sumner's terms²³¹, this theory emphasizes the distinction between the (ideal) ingroup and the (real) group one belongs to. Worldview, particularly the cognitive construct behind understanding of group relations, is in discord with personal wishes. The ingroup is a reference group; its definition is an act of the individual. Mere membership, even if consciously accepted by the individual, is a fact of only minor importance to the person's values, although it can have an influence on his behavior²³². Membership defines the reference point for relative deprivation, and thus for motivation as well. Thus it can deepen the rift between the ideal and reality, and consequently lessen the person's conformism. In short, their research found what one would expect – one goes quite often against the grain if he doesn't like the group's values. Yet in this case the use of the terms isn't as free as in Said's. Merton explicitly doubts that the theory could explain the behavior of nations²³³. Instead, this theory aims at rather low-level groups, characterized by active membership and cooperation between members. The ideal ingroup may function as a motivating force for organization and change in real membership groups. It could still hypothetically motivate Hroch's B-phase agitators, but the mobilization of impersonal masses would belong to another category.

But does a personal ideal need to be realized in reality? Šindelář²³⁴, similarly trying to explain internal factors of identification within a group in his MA thesis, used the concept of cognitive closure instead. The theory, first proposed by Kruglanski, focuses on the relation between personal authoritarianism and the need for cognition. The inclination towards authoritative ideologies included the intolerance of ambiguous ideas and open questions: insufficient work on this fact was one of the major critical points against *Authoritarian Personality*²³⁵. Identification with a group, as well as the branding of outsiders, occur in an attempt to consolidate one's worldview, to create a neat and tidy

231 – Sumner 1906: 12; cf. Merton 1964: 297f

232 – Merton 1964: 250f

233 – Merton 1964: 299: "*The term 'group' has often been stretched to the breaking-point...by being used to designate large numbers of people among the greatest part of whom there is no social interaction, although they do share a body of social groups.... Failing to meet the criterion of social interaction, these social structures should be conceptually and terminologically distinguished from groups.*"

234 – Šindelář 2011: 14f

235 – Kruglanski 2004: 54-58

concept encompassing the whole world. The result is a simplified view of society, seen as a state of warfare between the ingroup's virtue and outgroup's vice. The simplification that results from this process comes hand-in-hand with similar results in acts, the declared acceptance of the harshness of legal punishment (especially in cases of violent crimes) and xenophobia; the same effects can be produced by an excessive ambition for open-mindedness. The categorization of humans into large-scale groups and the search for behavioral patterns and psychological characters determined by their memberships constitute parts of this simplification process. This process furthermore affects one's actions, as Kruglanski tried to prove in experiments with a war game.

Kruglanski further developed the theory²³⁶ by using data from the processes for the deradicalization of terrorist suspects in various countries. It should be noted that in this case personal identity greatly exceeds the scale of the factors behind one's memberships. The theory speaks not only about one's idea of an ideal group and how the feeling of group's uniqueness emerges, but also about the whole worldview comprising existing groups as agents and their relations. The reference group always comes with a broader idea of group relations. In this way, psychology comes to an accord with the social sciences. First comes the worldview, which acts as a disposition for particular group identifications. The idea of group membership doesn't differ in "my" case from in the case of "others". This framework furthermore includes the qualities, according to which we can compare the groups. The idea of the exceptional status of one's own group is indivisible from the worldview behind the very acceptance of the idea that people belonged to higher-level groups. In this way Kruglanski and Šindelář depart from the scepticism proposed by Merton. The idea of an ingroup helps to build up a worldview, an opinion encompassing more than interactions on the everyday scale. It then helps us to actually transcend it, to postulate new relations, to imagine the national community and so on. Another interesting contrast is in comparison to Sumner's theory (and even more the Van den Berghe's later interpretation²³⁷), which sees ethnocentrism as a necessity for group survival. Kruglanski sees a difference between the principles behind group cohesion, which is more an effect of the struggle for social dominance, and group-bound ethnocentrism, related more to authoritarian personality and aggressivity.

236 – cf. Kruglanski et al. 2007

237 – Van den Berghe 1980: 75

The implications of this theory within the intercultural discourse, however, are grave. The cognitive apparatus isn't seen here as an instrument, by which an individual develops his capabilities in interaction with his environment, but rather as an innate cause of barriers in communication and cooperation with others. In the case of language, following the mastery of one in the early childhood, we have to work hard to learn other ones outside the linguistic continuum of the first. Thus also, by adopting one concept of "us", or of an "ethnie", "culture" or "nation", one reflects the personal needs to identify himself with his own ingroup. And of course it shows the character of the ingroup and the desires of the thinker himself. One thinker would see the group as an expression of solidarity, another would see it as an ideal, and a socially dominant individual would see it as a source of power. For the actual constitution of a group, personal reasons do in fact reflect the possibilities offered by environment. For this reason it isn't necessary to focus on either the external or the internal aspects of identification, but rather on what they have in common.

Dialectical Identification

In the case of purely external or internal forms of identification, a predicate is given to people, who don't have to be in contact with "us". However, pure cases of external or internal identification are hard to observe, for we're usually working with texts or speeches, in which opinions merge with mutual language. A view about "us" inevitably reflects itself on every "them"; and the same vice-versa. Already Sumner's idea of ethnocentrism is based on the development of the ingroup/outgroup dichotomy. It is a common feature of both traditions of this discourse. The identification of an object implies the existence of objects which are in some way different from it, thus postulating at least two categories at once. A statement about a group implies in the same moment a negative group, for which the statement doesn't have the same validity. As a powerful rhetorical tropus, this aspect of common logic enables us to speak of present categories and worldviews without a direct reference. This, of course, doesn't mean that there can't exist ambiguous relations, fuzzy borders or cosmopolitan worldviews; yet in the same way, the very utterance of these examples evokes relations, which are clearly defined, as well as rigid borders and local-bound loyalties.

Michel Foucault commented in his lectures at Collège de France²³⁸ on a number of historical narratives from the times leading up to the French Revolution, employing this dichotomy on the relatively high level of estates and of "the nation" itself. The nation, at least the French one he addressed in these lectures, is for him a product of numerous clashes whose arbitrary nature tends to be forgotten²³⁹. Yet it is a fact that many historians try to analyze the current social order exactly by searching for these decisive clashes. This search is in no way innocent: he tries to show in example of the historical writings of various adherents of the aristocracy, the monarchy and the Third Estate, how they consciously stressed the importance of their "party" for the existing unity and law of the country. Practically, as Foucault stresses²⁴⁰, they tried to identify the nation with the party they supported, excluding the other ones as historically foreign or politically unproductive elements: Roman or Frankish conquerors, indifferent subjects and so on. These theories worked of course with a strong primordialism, freely unifying ancient tribes and professions with contemporary estates and offices, but this method isn't the point of Foucault's analysis. It is the identification itself: historians describe the enemy and actualize past conflicts in order to restart them and change the present power relations. By exposing the negative influence of their enemy – the king limiting the warrior-democracy of nobles, the aristocracy forcing free peasants and artisans to work for them – they set up a battlefield on which the current privileges and powers should be challenged and their holders disposed of. Only the oppressed group, which had once lost its rights, is the true nation; the enemy has to be identified.

This feature opens the problematics of negative identification. To what extent does a group need open declarations of adherence or identity? In many cases the ingroup is defined purely in a negative way, i.e., by statements about the generalized other, about the definition of the outgroup. Baumann and Gingrich²⁴¹ identified three kinds of discourse which constitute an outgroup. The first of these is "orientalism", based on Said, the description of the "other" by evoking characteristics contrasting with "us". The description of the other doesn't have to be diminutive: negative elements of self-image reflect themselves in the more positively-looking opposite characteristics of the "other". If I say

238 – cf. Foucault 1976

239 – cf. Foucault 1976, lectures 6-10; Although his study is also very interesting from the functional perspective, in this chapter I'll discuss only the identificatory mechanisms.

240 – e.g. in case of Sieyès (Foucault 1976: 219)

241 – Baumann and Gingrich 2004: 20-26

"we" are "passionate", I may describe "them" as "dull", but also as "rational". Yet in discourse one doesn't always try to create such clear borders; sometimes one has to choose an ally, to compromise. The second kind of discourse, "segmentation", combines similar points like shared origin or common goals with (often presupposed) differences. Referring to Evans-Pritchard's view of Nuer society, the search for natural allies is described as following culturally accepted patterns of similarity and relatedness. In some contexts, religion can thus be the uniting factor for two nations, in other case it can be the language which brings two religious communities together. Also, in the case of "universal" groups, when one speaks for "all" of mankind or for truth as such, groups can still be mentioned that do not exactly understand the truth or don't have all of the aspects of true humans. This discourse, termed "encompassment", considers the other as complementary to the dominant group, its extension. Some of these aspects can be seen in the language itself, e.g., mankind encompasses women as well.

An important point of Baumann and Gingrich is that it is impossible to describe "them" without a reference to "us". In the first discourse, definitions are always binary, presupposing the direct opposites about the "other" when characterizing "us". A negatively perceived trait of the "other" would have its positively-sounding version or opposite attributed to "us". Any notion of difference thus helps "us" define ourselves²⁴². However, it doesn't have to be a sign of hostility. By referring to group differences, one invokes standard, traditional relations between the alleged groups. While social psychologists, as well as Sumner and Levinson, often refer to this binary view as an actual symptoms (if not the cause) of intergroup conflict, for Baumann and Gingrich these "grammars" are seen as more or less typical for stable relations. When cases of interethnic violence appear, they speak about a "breaking of grammar", the negation of difference, in which the majority group claims not only superiority, but also universality²⁴³. Conflict thus emerges when the dialectical identification doesn't function any more. A negative identification takes place, alienating minorities, making them scape-goats for not being the same as the majority.

Negative and situational identifications are in no way a matter only of present-day

242 – cf. Baumann and Gingrich 2004: 11; in this way, Gingrich makes a sharp distinction between the theory of identity of Heidegger and postcolonialist thinkers like Spivak or Lacan.

243 – e.g. Baumann and Gingrich 2004: 42-46, 194

politics. Archaeologist Florin Curta²⁴⁴ described a similar case with 6th century Slavs, or rather, Sclavenes. In his view their identification was purely external. Quite similarly to many minorities in European countries, they were presented by Byzantine scholars as invading aliens threatening the majority culture. The term "Sclavene" was used in texts first in connection to raids during the reign of Emperor Justinian (527-565), who initiated a massive fortification program south of the Danube to protect the northern border of his empire. Sclavenes were defined, according to Curta's claims, mostly negatively. The crucial factor of identification was the interaction with peoples across the frontiers. "Sclavenes" was an umbrella term for those barbarians (non-Romans) who weren't subject to any established polities, such as those of Gepids, Huns or Langobards. All of them were undergoing wide-scale changes, if not disintegration, during the period, which led to changes in everyday life, trade networks and power relations. These interactions, sometimes friendly and sometimes violent, caught the interest of Byzantine (and later also Frankish) strategists and historians, who needed a new terminology for the political changes in the area. A distinction was made primarily between Sclavenes, barbarian raiders and later allies of the Avars, and Antes, who became allies of the Byzantine Emperor. Most Sclavene tribes received names only after new social and trade structures beyond the border had begun to stabilize, especially under the influence of the Avars in the 580s. Curta's point was to criticize the usual interpretation of "Sclavenes" as the ancestors of Slavic-speaking peoples, migrating from Upper Dnester area south- and westwards during the period. Linguistic, archaeological and cultural unity was presupposed due to the influence of Herder's and Kossina's views on ethnogenesis²⁴⁵. Besides the emergence of "Sclavenes" within the Byzantine and Frankish historical and military discourse, he also addresses their emergence in modern historiography.

But the controversy between Curta and the migrationists is not relevant for this work; what I'd like to highlight is the fact that an ethniefully depends on both external observation and the situational need for identification. A polity needs a representative, and when the one defined by an observer is too abstract – like early medieval *Sclaveni* or Kollár's 19th century *Slované* – one has to simply go for more particular units, like "Antes" or "Croats". First by building up an identifying grammar, in the terms of Baumann and Gingrich, a territory, polity, practice or language can be assigned to a certain group of

244 – Curta 2004: 346f

245 – Curta 2004: 248

people, it can then also be used for self-identification of its representatives²⁴⁶.

Baumann and Gingrich show not only the mechanism behind identification with a group in their theory, but also important situational factors, which are lacking in other theories, e.g., those of Handelman or Kruglanski. They can easily address both the low-level group (activists, medieval scholars) and their environment, because the language and dialectical recognition of identity and difference is common to both levels. Still, there are some problems with this theory. Baumann and Gingrich overemphasize their instrumentalist position, making the emergence (or rather radicalization) of nationalist movements look like Hroch's theory taken to the extreme. In one of the analyses based on the theory by Karel Arnaut²⁴⁷, the effect of mass media was considered strong enough to lead to genocide in a relatively short time. Mass media could mobilize part of the population by identifying them with the victims of a massacre. This, so to say, accelerated the development through first two of Hroch's phases, allowing activists, such as oppositional politicians, to identify themselves with the oppressed object. From the government's perspective, the "diabolization" of a group, which was constructed in the name of the victims of the massacre and a very loosely defined tribal group, led to a civil war about two years after the first repressions took place.

The conclusions of the work are unclear. We can't say whether the situation in which a politician addresses the differences between groups would stabilize the relations between them, or cause conflict by breaking them. The examples they provide speak for the conservation of this relation, including its prejudices and exclusivisms, rather than for offering new views, for these actually destabilize the reactions of the groups by creating dichotomies between the universal and its negative. Curta's theory doesn't solve this neither, but it differs in two interesting ways. In his case, we don't see a rushed change of political scene, with alignments hyped by mass media, a few years preceding a civil war. The processes of change which he describes sprawl over centuries. The agents of this change are relatively independent scholars from various parts of the world, having various relations with and influence on those, who hold political power, as well as variously complex academic and cultural circles. The convergence of views is thus here somewhat different than that of the debates, narrowly focusing on actual political divisions, generally

246 – Curta 2004: 343

247 – Baumann and Gingrich 2004: 112-143

following the template of a centralized national state. Second, he addresses different practices (material, trade, migrational) in his work, which alienate one group from another, and compares them to declarations of difference.

Thus it lays open to which extent a group can differentiate itself from another one by practice and in how far this difference depends on the group's external description by observers or the subjective views of its members. Dialectical identification is, in my opinion, a quite narrow, symbolic kind of performative identification. The cases observed by Foucault, Baumann and Curta show contexts in which the dialectical approach has importance. Yet the following question remains: in which contexts are *the other* practices relevant?

Performative Identification

In the previous cases we've seen mostly abstract notions of identity. It was a kind of brand, a flag, or a scientific category imposed on certain people or taken over by an individual. In the third case we've seen two theories that see identification primarily as a situationally determined act. On the one side we have arbitrariness and convention, and on the other, a subjective idea of the group one would like to belong to or of what kinds of groups should exist. Groups of people, which arise from cooperation or at least from mutual activity, weren't discussed much in the scope of this chapter. Such an identificatory mechanism can be called *performative*, with mutual activity as a quasi-objective criterion for identity. This isn't limited to human societies. A bee determines its membership in a particular hive by bringing resources to it; in this way, a multitude of bees are defined as a "swarm" as long as they serve the same hive. While this mechanism of identification cannot totally escape the dialectical factor (the idea of "a swarm" includes the postulate that there are a multitude of swarms as well), it exceeds the limits and prejudices of descriptive categories, of ascription of and affiliation with an identity. The studies of ethnocentrism presented by Merton in his theory of reference groups found a discrepancy between actual membership and ethnocentrism, which he called "anticipatory socialization"²⁴⁸. Said, on the other hand, postulated the relation between membership and ethnocentrism as the core of the mechanism behind the culture-preserving institutes, i.e.,

248 – Merton 1964: 264-265

behind the "affiliation"²⁴⁹. Performative identification can be found behind the legal prescriptions for naturalization, behind the ideal ingroups, and also within the mobilization rhetorics of nationalist politicians. An idea of citizenship cannot exist without exact rules for its obtainment; to speak about a particular ethnic group would be senseless if we hadn't any clues about the ways in which their daily activity makes them different from other ethnies.

First, what is the relation between group membership and group-specific activity? The above mentioned "historical" views of group's borders – language, religion, territory, genealogy and continuity – refer to various practices as well. Ethnicity is expressed by speaking the language, performing common rites, long-term presence in the territory, following familiar traditions and obeying common laws. More traditionalist approaches see the member of an *ethnos* in a passive role, with performance determined by membership. For Herder, these differences are reflections of a particular "spirit" shared by the group. If one doesn't act as a German, it is likely that he somehow didn't inherit the German spirit. Less romantic approaches to the performance of ethnicity retain the causality, but choose another cause. Essentialist thinkers often tend to search for the influence of ethnic background and symbolisms behind actions of individuals. It is with Leach that we can first speak of a switch in the assignment of the roles of cause and effect, with practice seen as a determinant of the group's identity. External identification is possible, but a researcher should be aware that he can give only a situational, and not an essential description.

Some of the more primordialist theories focus on the objectivity of the identity-performance claims. One of these is the above-mentioned climate theory, with both its modern and ancient proponents. The modern ones focus on epistemology and experience instead of character. For example, Tuan in his *Topophilia* presents various contrasting examples to show the environmental determination of sensory perception²⁵⁰. Not only perspective and language, but also cartography, were among the phenomena he observed as determinants both in perception of members of particular ethnic groups as well as in their ethnocentric worldview. The geographical location of peoples – as in theories of Ibn Khaldun and Montesquieu – is for him here a sufficient reason to identify them as an ethnic group, and also to identify the ethnic group as both a geographically and a

249 – Said 1975: 20f

250 – Tuan 1974: 113f

performatively coherent unit²⁵¹. Their geographic isolation from other groups provides the negative aspect of their identification. Ethnic differences thus copy differences in environmental experience and its expressions in behavior and worldviews. In Tuan's definition, ethnocentrism is consequently seen as the practice of defining one's own worldview as a universal one, and all others as distortions²⁵².

Curta's example of the Sclavenes and their observers may seem to belong to the realm of more instrumentalist theories: he underlines the arbitrariness and situational needs of the Byzantine historians, as well as the attempts of modern low-level groups to mobilize high-level nations in the case of Slavic studies. It is interesting that he uses Bourdieu's theory of practice, mainly its interpretation by Bentley, as the theoretical framework explaining the formation of ethnicity²⁵³. Bentley sees this theory as the much-needed compromise between instrumentalist and primordialist understandings. The theory starts with Marxist attempts "*to relate class consciousness to objective conditions of existence*"²⁵⁴, but considers this practice to be as yet unconscious. But where then do we consciously perceive our ethnicity? Not on an ID card – individual ethnicity develops as *habitus*, a set of practices learnt from childhood, as in Geertz' case²⁵⁵. However, ethnicity becomes a classificatory context only later, for example in cases of "breaking the rules" or of dilemmas in choosing between conflicting memberships. Bentley's example of a Filipino lady trying to belong to communities both of Muslims and Manillian students shows a particular case in which practices are performed and perceived as declarations of membership. However, in the end she contradicts both identities in her attempts to create a compromise and doesn't feel herself to belong to neither of the groups – both on the high-level scale, and in feeling alienated by her family and friends. Practice is seen as a communication of motives, and these simply seem to differ. The misunderstanding of the motives of differently acting members of other ethnicities is thus considered the core of (ethnocentrist) stereotypy²⁵⁶.

Secondly the following question arises: is mutual activity enough arouse

251 – Tuan 1974: 79

252 – Tuan 1974: 37

253 – Curta 2004: 21f

254 – Bentley 1987: 27

255 – Geertz 1963: 112

256 – Bentley 1987: 34

ethnocentrism? The previous two theories speak of identification as a process in which an individual reflects his social or physical environment. Both have a certain primordialist basis, seeing the human being as determined, and thus avoiding the question. Universalism and stereotypy occur at the points of contact between conflicting worldviews and habits. Quasi-instrumentalist thinkers, focusing on politics and history, usually speak of people deliberately "working" for a group. Fishman²⁵⁷ thinks ethnocentrist situations – in his case considered to be extreme cases of aggression towards foreigners – are largely confined to specific situations, which depend both on psychological fears and mobilization by activists. He uses quite an abstract definition of ethnicity, somewhere between Bentley's and Tuan's views. He describes ethnicity as including both acquired ("being") and active ("doing", "knowing") aspects. Predispositions and the historical situation have a "directing" effect on personal activity and worldview. The "knowing" aspect is crucial here, for it may include the consciousness of identity as a symbolic motive, which can be easily communicated. By using the example of the Jewish ethno-religion, he shows how certain practices come to mean together that their practitioners belong to the ethnicity they actually constitute. Certain practices are consciously declarative towards "others"; yet there is a difference in whether they see the others as partners (as did Irish or Polish nationalists in the 19th century) or as enemies (as do Fascists)²⁵⁸. Instrumentalism, from this point of view, explains more the destructive expressions of nationalism than the identity itself.

On the other hand, the above-mentioned examples of Anderson, Billig and Suny provide extreme instrumentalist views, disapproving of this declarative performance. Renan wouldn't think about the dependency of the nation upon the national consciousness of its members, if he didn't have an idea about "nations" in plural first. The fact that some practices can be communicated as ethnically specific means some are not, and that some are considered special. The use of national flags and practices supported by *korenizatsya* policies, as both argue, are examples of the dominant culture imposing its rules upon the dominated ones. They can present themselves, but only in the context of "United Nations" or of "*Soyuz...sozdanny voley narodov*"²⁵⁹, about which the Soviet anthem sings. For these thinkers, the dominant culture creates a universalism which leads to ethnocentrist

257 – Hutchinson & Smith 1994: 63f

258 – Hutchinson & Smith 1994: 68

259 – "*The Union...established by the will of nations*"

worldviews: adherence to the organization of a model or dominant nation becomes a requirement for other collectivities to become its partners²⁶⁰. The geographical isolation (in Tuan's sense) is replaced here by the phenomenon above described above as the grammar of encompassment. Methodologically, this line of criticism leads the debate back to Leach and his problem of culturally bound group categories. Notwithstanding this, it is hard to consider performative identification a fully conscious or voluntary process. On the one hand, self-identification with a group by the performance of specific rites can be seen as an expression, an experience and even as the real *Gemeinschaftlichkeit* of an ethnic group. However, when compared to any alternative performance, it can only barely avoid being seen as a situationally bound, dialectical practice of conceding difference. Only here words are replaced by actions.

Conclusion

The problem of performative identification shows the tautological character of the "ethnocentrist" accusation. Membership in a group determines a member's activities, while at the same time his membership is defined by these activities. When I'm a Slovak, i.e., a Slovak-speaking person or one living in Slovakia, then I'm an ethnocentrist, in so far as I perform such acts. Within the discourse, we can extend the number of activities which are relevant for our identification. However, in that case we cease to make an overview of the facts, but rather create an ethnological categorization, idealistic reference groups or rhetorically defined factions. The facts can be found in the actual declarations of membership or loyalty, either by a (aspirant) group representative or a (aspirant) member. Outside this range we don't speak about actual memberships, categories or identifications, but rather about group relations and comparisons. Moreover, as I believe it has been sufficiently shown in this chapter, one may also find in such comparisons and conventions about group relations, clues to the motives behind the factual declarations of membership.

The controversy around the use of the word "ethnocentrism" by Levinson and Tuan is mostly of this nature. The phenomenon of ethnocentrism described by Levinson becomes visible only with the application of his scale to a variety of individuals: in

260 – For the case of the EU, cf. Billig 1995: 141; for the case of the USSR, cf. Suny 2001: 874; for the general theory of nations, cf. Amin 1988: 255f

comparisons between individuals with higher and lower results. Similarly, Tuan's definition, which affects "cultures" instead, has meaning only in such comparisons as between worldviews operating with categories of "group" and "center" (and thus also of "other" and "periphery"). Outside the specifically constructed (Levinson) or observed (Tuan) discourses, identification doesn't seem to take place. It is hard to imagine, whether the observed subjects would actually do such things, e.g., introduce harsh punishment in the real world or impose restrictions on minorities if they themselves received power. Aside from the current state of politics and the changes it may bring upon the activist's character, Kruglanski, in his war game experiments, tried to prove it thus, yet this doesn't shed enough light on the general problem, for some of the cultures in Tuan's sense still haven't annihilated each other. Is ethnocentrism inevitable also for the membership? One might be a member without yet doing anything special for the group. What, then, makes this zeal? Which actions may be considered ethnocentrist?

III. Structure of Ethnocentrism

ethnocentrist view – claim of superiority – aspirations – inspirations

One of the reasons for studying ethnocentrism – if not the only one – is to understand the motives of individual actions. Ethnocentrism, like language or power relations, is seen by Levinson as an unconscious setting of the mind, determining the actions or attitudes of human beings – i.e., it can be seen as what linguists and anthropologists (and Levinson himself²⁶¹) call a structure. Membership in a certain group, like a culture, should thus inspire and motivate us to act in a particular way; vice-versa, as seen in the previous chapter, particular actions can classify us as members of a group. When one searches for the use of the term, it is easy to find arguments that there are conflicts going on "because of x's ethnocentrism (plus racism, xenophobia...)", especially in cases where the notion of nationalism lacks clear nations to work with. The notion of the "unrealistic"²⁶², psychological nature of a particular conflict may be a mere attempt to simplify the situation; on the other hand, it may point to deeper aspects of the present culture. The variety of explanations comes hand in hand with the variety of actions.

261 – Levinson 1949: 32

262 – Coser 1956: 48

Drawing maps with London in the middle of the world or describing outgroups I don't want to deal with²⁶³, should be seen as acts of a similar sort. While speaking of ethnocentrism, we can see practices ranging from worldviews to world wars.

This greatly distorts the problem. General statements by scholars tend to reduce these actions along various lines. One of these is to recognize different levels of self-consciousness of a person as a group member and of the actions by which he expresses his membership. These were mostly handled in the previous chapter, but the question as to whether expression of membership already counts as an ethnocentrist action, remains open. Another line of thought focuses on the dynamics of the group's borders and coherence. Sumner saw this mechanism operating simply in two ways: "folkways", whose carrier is the group, either grow or decay²⁶⁴. German historian Rüsen follows this view as well: we make "our" view of history compete against other histories, thus making it more and more subjective²⁶⁵. The same argument was used by al-Azm and later Carrier against Said, who, in the way he perceives the Orientalist discourse from the ancient to the modern era, actually builds an inverse (hostile) opinion against the West, supporting the essential difference between the East and the West²⁶⁶. Such work is thus still interpreted as in opposition to the hegemonial aspirations of the West, but in effect it works with similar aspirations. If Orientalists once emerged as a group, the Postcolonialists come to take their place.

Yet this view on ethnocentrism is a traditional one, reflecting not only Sumner's, but also Levinson's contribution. Borders and coherence are deeply dependant on each other: the more a group becomes coherent, the more easily its borders are expanded. Moreover, they develop the popular view that internal equilibrium is a necessity for group's expansion; on the other hand, discord leads to its fall. This view has been questioned repeatedly. On the one hand, Machiavelli already thought it was – in the right measure – discord rather than harmony, which made a political entity expand. On the other hand, the above mentioned theories of Coser and Leach show that the expansion of a group follows

263 – Tuan 1974: 30f

264 – Sumner 1906: 42

265 – Rüsen 2002: 7; "...there is the irritation for the next generation when freeing the value and self-esteem of Others from eurocentric models of otherness... This kind of culturalism tranforms cultural differences into a hermeneutic monadology, preventing intercultural communication at all or enabling it only at the expense of any generally accepted rules."

266 – al-Azm 1980: 219

factors other than group's strength or coherence. Alongside the different views on conflict and group coherence one can add another category – that of *aspiration*. One extension was proposed by the philosopher Wimmer, who described the variety of motives behind the presentation of a group-centered view²⁶⁷. Another one touches inspiration: the problem of values, which can be seen in the crude typology of "Western" and "Eastern" anthropology described first by Hans Kohn and later again by e.g. Gellner²⁶⁸. The former sees anthropology as a science seeking universal laws, the latter searches for and refurbishes folklore and other aspects of one's own nation's uniqueness.

The definition of ethnocentrism as a view, in which others are scaled according to one's ingroup, requires me to know what "views" and "scalings" actually are. The assumption that I know what my group wants from me is a very weak point in Sumner's theory, so it will have to be dealt with first. "Views", which are thought to be the causes of conflict situations, and the variety of possible "scalings", by which these views are made, can only follow afterwards.

Ethnocentrist View

The first step to take after the chapter about identification with a group is to distinguish views which are mere requirements for membership in an ingroup from those views which make ingroup values appear as a "center of everything". In Sumner's definition, the existence of one's own group is taken for granted; one is born into a group²⁶⁹. Birth itself is the identifying act, as every human is biologically imbued to favor his group (as are many animals). Group values are adopted because of the universal nature of ethnocentrism, which shapes each group's institutions and traditions such that its members are obliged to act in the interest of the ingroup's harmony and cooperation²⁷⁰. Identification and ethnocentrism are in this respect two aspects of the same phenomenon, ontological and ethical. Thus in Sumner's case it is clear that identification is primarily external: one is ascribed to the group; his membership is declared by someone else. The

267 – Wimmer 2004: 54f

268 – cf. Jaskułowski 2009; Gellner 1996: 229-240

269 – Sumner 1906: 73

270 – Sumner 1906: 543

personal worldview of a member of a group is here merely hypothesized; it follows a line of ascriptions to the perceived culture, i.e., its institutions. Institutions, in this case, replace the family as the value carrier in higher level groups²⁷¹. It is the *assertion* of these values by the institution or family which can be seen as an "ethnocentric" act. This can mean the self-aggrandizement of the group, or direct, sometimes violent support for norms, the customs or integrity of the group.

The problems with this concept, namely the assumed existence of group interests and the nepotistic foundation of ethnocentrism, show themselves perfectly in the "psychological" tradition of understanding of the term. For Levinson²⁷², institutions don't play a very big role. Motives are primarily individual; institutions merely reflect the motives of individuals. Identification with a group proceeds not only from kinship-like affiliations, but rather from a variety of reasons, including the frustration displacement of frustration and resource competition. Such triggers may come both from within a Sumnerian ingroup and from without. The psychological ingroup doesn't carry its own set of interests, it may not even exist at all. Because of this the act of identification is at the same time an expression of the idealized ingroup, and we have no need to distinguish between special declarations for both. The innermost motive for both declarations of membership in a group and of its superiority is the same syndrome of ethnocentrism. In Levinson's theory, the ethnocentrist aggrandizement of one's ingroup isn't seen as a group's evolutionary feature (as it was by Sumner): it isn't related to actual coherence or the existence of a real, institutionalized or simply continuous group. Ingroup interests reflect my own. The ethnocentric act, in this case, is the very *identification* with the ingroup.

With two traditions of ethnocentrism, the sociological and psychological, we thus have also two basic paradigms of worldview construction. Sociologists also search for the causes of ethnocentrism in a group, its institutions and its emulation of family characteristics. An ethnocentrist group, in Sumner's sense, also plays the nationalist card, aiming at family instincts to improve loyalty and submission. Psychologists search for the causes in an individual – his own motives for loyalty and submission, which come mostly from uninstitutionalized sources.

271 – Sumner 1906: 546

272 – Levinson 1949: 35

Later uses by Said²⁷³, Chow²⁷⁴ and Geertz²⁷⁵ offer a view, which tries to unify both traditions. Principles of identity and difference emerge because of individual activity, but consequently affect the further development of personal worldviews. Thus for this mostly poststructuralist and postcolonial tradition, the problem of Sumner or Levinson is their overemphasis of a single aspect of worldview formation. This doesn't make the difference disappear: on the one hand, a certain emphasis can be seen in the works of mentioned authors as well, with Said and Chow being more psychological and Geertz more sociological in this respect; on the other hand, they can't fully decide whether to distinguish the external identification of groups and from ethnocentrism, as Sumner does, or to accept them as a psychological act accompanied by the claim of ingroup superiority, as Levinson does. Compromises between the two can't erase the moments of presupposing either the harmony between individual and group interests or the very existence of group interests. The sociobiological basis for Sumner's presumption – the understanding of particular societies as the subjects of natural selection – reflects itself in these theories. The dynamics of intercultural relations are straightforward: the emergence and decay of groups depends on its assertivity and the fulfillment of its interests. Able to only grow or shrink, a group in Sumner's system has primarily the potential to incite conflicts.

The understanding of the group as a carrier of interests, e.g. by means of institutions or mentality, is a complex matter which deserves its own chapter. On the other hand, the problem of the nature of the harmony between such interests and personal motives can't be easily ignored. To prove the existence of such a harmony – which I must do to avoid being being lost in stereotypes – I must observe both the group's interests and the motives of a single person. Without seeing both aspects clearly at once, there is no reason to compare them, no matter whether I take the group as defined by persons or vice-versa. There is no possibility of evidence that one really thinks about what he seems to or is supposed to think about. When speaking of group interests, we need not only evidence of coherence between particular individual worldviews, but also of their coordinated emergence, and of their influences and expressions in individual action. The reduction of these worldviews and expressions to a certain upholding, aggrandizement or propagation of the ingroup doesn't suffice; it is doubtful as well.

273 – Said 1975: 19

274 – Dikötter 1997: 34-53

275 – Geertz 1985: 257f

Ingroup Superiority

A claim of superiority is an important part of both definitions of ethnocentrism. This idea supports the legitimation and upholding of the ingroup's institutions, and thus group coherence and external power, in the sociological tradition: on the other hand it provides a substitute for frustrated desires in the psychological tradition. Their views differ in the understanding of superiority as well: Sumner sets superiority alongside related (though not identical) phenomena such as attempts to dominate and expand²⁷⁶; for Levinson, the superiority of one's ideal ingroup is reflected in his conservatism and adherence to authority. However, there is an important similarity in the desired effect: the ideal of an internally coherent and externally powerful group, capable of not only defending, but also asserting its (or its members') interests. To place the ingroup at the "center of everything" means for them first to consider it exceptionally good and worthy of the position.

Such a claim hasn't been proved by anthropological research. Swartz²⁷⁷, directly referring to both Sumner and Levinson, but defending the psychological definition more, than they, found a relatively isolated society in Truk atoll which in contacts with Americans created a quite positive stereotype of them, contrasted with a negative image of their own group. The Trukese, identified externally by an anthropologist, did perhaps perceive themselves as a group as well, but according to Swartz, they didn't see "Americans" as another group. His criticism wasn't meant to be fully destructive of the concept. In fact, it helped the reference group theory, as he found that the local notions of "Americans" actually reflected subjective idealized ingroups. This ideal contained various Trukese characteristics, enriched by "American" intelligence, good food and also the capability to sustain active life well into one's 60s. One can't say here that when questioned the Trukese find "American" values better – they may not even know anything about them; instead, they relate America to local values of intelligence and fitness²⁷⁸. The superiority of their idealized ingroup, even placed outside the known society, is seen as negative ethnocentrism.

276 – Sumner 1906: 16

277 – cf. Swartz 1961

278 – Swartz 1961: 79

Amin and Said, with their concept of ethnocentrism reflected in outgroup construction, consider the claim of superiority typical only for European thought. Like the Trukese in Swartz' example, they don't internalize this value, as if they thought the attempt at dominance was something ideal. Amin distinguished between "banal" ethnocentrism, a universal phenomenon²⁷⁹ (which may be related to the problem described by Swartz as well), and eurocentrism. The eurocentrism is a special phenomenon which presupposes specific action: a missionary or messianistic spirit, a Promethean self-image, based on the taming of nature together with natural barbarians²⁸⁰. The Orient, as described by Said, embodies the contrasting image of inferiority.

While the political attitude resulting from this opinion has its own chapter, the structure behind the labelling of two contrasting images at once has many times been called into question. The terms "inverted orientalism" or "occidentalism", known from Said's critics al-Azm and Carrier, were used to describe stereotypes of Western Europe, which were thought to be highly influential on postcolonial scholarship. As in the Orientalist case, they see Said's work as an outgroup construction, reflecting essentialistic descriptions²⁸¹. But who is then the ingroup? Did Said mean to represent academics, oppressed and postcolonial peoples, or the Orient itself? Is a tertiary discourse on individual ethnocentrism the right way to describe a popular mentality of a different social group? What they deny isn't Said's claim of the existence of a special, widely encompassing category of Orient in European discourse, but rather Amin's claim that eurocentrism is something contained in (Western) Europe. The dichotomy in this work is, however, the same: Europe versus the rest of the world. Whether we take the secondary discourse about orientalists or the tertiary discourse about postcolonialists, one can't escape the image of one ingroup upholding its superiority while another one, considers itself a subaltern or victim.

Historians differ in their perception. Todorova, in her treatise concerning the idea of the "Balkans"²⁸², found that this identity is carried by those who identify themselves with it,

279 – Amin 1988: 178

280 – Amin 1988: 173

281 – al-Azm 1980: 230; Carrier 1995: 85

282 – Todorova 1997: 38

with ambiguous results. On the one hand, it connotes both its peripheral position with respect to the Orient and to (Western) Europe, while on the other it takes on a more positive view concerning the group's mediative role (be it in cultural exchange or defence), sense for freedom and so on. In the case of "Central Europe" – nowadays often called "East Central Europe" – the situation is even more complicated, with "Centroeuropeans" identifying "Western" values within their culture, while considering themselves outside of the West because of communist or similar legacies, and yet still worthy of integration; in contrast to the "Balkans" and the "truly Eastern" Europe²⁸³. One can say that ingroup superiority is present here as well, but its formulation is, as in the case described by Swartz, utopian, seeking ideals in a spatially or temporarily distant situation. Neither upholding nor aggrandizement are present within these discourses. Instead, a kind of consciously peripheral identity takes its place. Both the Balkans and Central Europe define their own position in subjective hierarchies of cultures, but neither on the top, nor on the bottom.

In contrast, the "historical thinking" idea developed by Rüsen²⁸⁴ is closely bound to one's group identity. Identity exists as a connection between one's imagined future and one's past. Ethnocentrism, which is understood here as truly the promotion of ingroup superiority, with the borders of the ingroup defined by good characteristics, is seen as a basic motivation to study history in the first place. This motivation can't be devoid of a certain idea of our ingroup's exceptionality, but we have to "tame and overcome" this tendency by acknowledging such motivations in others. According to Rüsen, the main problem was identified in the postcolonial debate, namely the self-presentation of historical thought in the West as universal. Burke explains this claim as various characteristics of the historical method (like objectivity, collective agency, linear view, etc.) as specifically Western. The idea is that a historian actually should put his ingroup on the top of the hierarchy, but he should also express the subjectivity behind such a choice, as well as the possibility of different explanations.

Superiority in both Sumner's and Levinson's definition is flawed in such conceptions. We can say that an ingroup can be considered to be the "center of everything", but the extent to which that means we see the outgroup as inferior is

283 – Todorova 1997: 147

284 – Rüsen 2002: 7f

questionable, as are the aspects in which we perceive the superiority of our own group. Subjective affiliation or inborn membership can make the group subjectively exceptional, but it doesn't necessarily have to be seen as something exceptionally good. When we take a dynamic view on human identity, ethnocentrism is no longer a mere description of group's self-image. Superiority, inferiority, or evaluation takes place in any aspect within a discourse in which groups are contrasted to each other. Such a discourse can be either conservative, reflecting the supposed situation of the ingroup, or critical, aspiring to change the hierarchy of the groups. The views about the ingroup expressed in such a discourse can be radically different from each other.

Aspiration

Ingroup preference, even if not claiming superiority or universality, shows itself in Sumnerian terminology as an attempt to make the group stronger. According to Wimmer, the starting point of intercultural philosophy should be the discovery that a certain thesis is found in more than one's own culture²⁸⁵. Yet thinkers aspire to support their cultures by influencing others. The context of the debate is the same as with Rüsén's or Said's, namely the spread of European science. However, instead of presupposing hegemonical aspirations like the latter, he rather describes possible relations between various traditions of thought. First, he is critical against voices like that of Amin: one shouldn't think of eurocentrism as something different from that centrism of, e.g., China²⁸⁶. Here, Wimmer uses simply "centrism" instead of "eurocentrism". One can define trends and then merely seek those, which occur more frequently in history. Furthermore, his theory shows that the supposed coherence and growth of a group are in a dialectical relation with each other: one can't effectively achieve both.

Wimmer distinguishes between expansion and integration, both seen as "growth" by the evolutionary terminology of Sumner. Expansion proceeds as the replacement of a previous tradition which is deemed not valuable in comparison to my own²⁸⁷. For example, a mainstream doctor may criticize alternative healing methods, for they cannot be proved

285 – Wimmer 2004: 69-73

286 – Wimmer 2004: 54

287 – Wimmer 2004: 54-56

by means imposed by the mainstream. Thus they are considered ineffective and a patient had best avoid them. This is, of course, the "best known" type of ethnocentrism in Europe, with various forms ranging from the Christian missionary movement, through English colonialism aimed at spreading civilization, to evolutionary theories (still present) in anthropology, which tend to set the free, industrial society as the ultimate goal of mankind. In comparison, integrative centrism tries to modify instead of replacing. Let's say the alternative healer finds it is hard to enter the market, so he gets his methods tested by mainstream methods. Whether successful or not, he is open for integration to the mainstream. His practice is acceptable as soon as it proves itself to be in accordance with the mainstream. Integrative centrism is similarly bound to the idea of progress, setting its own cultural values as the rightful goal, but without the forcing aspect. If we take ethnocentrism as a rigidly psychological term, integrative activity doesn't imply a conflict, because my ingroup is open for reinterpretation by the other. The other lets "us" expand.

These two types of "growth" reflect more trends or ideas than actual practice. While missionary activity differs between individual churches, congregations, nations and even in particular cases, its reception from the side of affected community is varied as well. Many conversions were merely nominal, or meant only additional rites in the community's practices. One may oppose the idea of missions because any additional rites are superfluous. The culture of the others is incommensurable with the culture of rites which are implanted to that culture. Why should we export themes, which only "we" see as problems? Why should we give them new values? They know what they want. Wimmer observed this mechanism in a more peaceful way, thinking of this separative centrism as one of plurality²⁸⁸. The problem is that it bars any possibility of dialogue. When we speak here about ethnocentrism in general, there is a slight, but important difference in comparison with the "growth" models. This aims partly to strengthen the group from within: we define differences, the borders of the group, more clearly. On the other hand, such statements don't expand the group. They are aimed primarily against the idea of universality, against the encompassing principle seen in the previous chapter. If, for example, Eastern Slovaks wanted their independence, they would also stress the differences between them and, say, Western Slovaks. But as the political center of Slovakia is in the country's western part, the Eastern Slovaks would have to dispute the Western Slovaks' claim to be a more encompassing category. While integration makes the

288 – Wimmer 2004: 57

borders wider at the cost of inner coherence, separative centrism does exactly the opposite. The coherence of the group becomes stronger, but at the cost of the capability to grow.

In this way, we can see a discrepancy between the attitudes described by Said and those, for which he was criticized by al-Azm and Carrier. Said himself criticized primarily the *integrative* centrism of the West, which remained after the *expansive* activity – colonialism – was politically defeated. Yet his own position was a *separative* one: his goal was, if something like that can be inferred, was the recognition of Palestinians' (and of course Lebanese, Pakistani...) right to have their own ideology and their own land. It was similar to the idea of self-determination present in 19th century nationalism, but in the intellectual sphere, although the political goal was an important part of the work as well. The criticisms of al-Azm and Carrier were based on the fact that Said merely used the same rhetoric, with an inverted center – not in "Europe" but in Palestine. In fact, Said never claimed his work was ultimately encompassing any possible interpretation of the problem of Orientalism.

Wimmer distinguishes three kinds of aspiration – moving the borders further or making the ingroup's supposed influence stronger (expansion), making them more rigid, and thus protecting the ingroup from outside influences (separation) or, reversibly, distorting them in a way that makes subtler influences possible (integration) – while asking, similarly to Rösen, whether there can be a *tentative* centrism, i.e., one which wouldn't aspire to change borders and would allow mutual influence between groups²⁸⁹. But simply scratching any aspiration from our works in order to "tame and overcome" its ethnocentrism does not necessarily help. As in the case of the "Central Europe" term described by Todorova, such work can in the end have a conservative influence, barring any criticism of actual situation²⁹⁰. The claim of universality, seen by Amin as a problem specific for "eurocentrism", an exceptional position²⁹¹, doesn't merely present a program which we'd like to present to the others. It is embedded much deeper in the works of social scientists, or rather in their language, working with vague definitions of the group, yet claiming positive evaluations each time when it is used.

289 – Wimmer 2004: 57; Rösen 2002: 8

290 – Todorova 1997: 160

291 – Amin 1988: 178

Inspiration

The "inspirative" or narrative aspect of ethnocentrism is another dimension besides the aspirative; it is the reason why we prefer one group over another. To understand the expansion, separation or integration of a group, one doesn't ask "why", but rather "how". This problematic here already has caused some confusion in another attempts to apply the theory of *Orientalism* to the Balkans. Unlike Todorova, who effectively questioned Sumner's understanding of superiority as the core of the ethnocentrist attitude, Rastko Močnik described the idea of "Balkan orientalism" as a reverse one, but in a way closer to Swartz. The "Balkan peoples" (that is, Croats, in his study) accept foreign views and value systems thoroughly and imitatively. They place themselves lower on the "hierarchy" not because they are trying to acknowledge their intermediary role, but rather because they subjectively see "Europe" as the dominant ideology, into which a Balkan-orientalist ideologue prefers to integrate²⁹². This is analogous to the imaginary ingroup and source of values in Swartz's sense.

Močnik, instead of putting the externally defined Balkan ingroup to question, actually committed a little postcolonial sin by conserving it. Many actual Croats may be vehemently opposed or even hostile to any notion of their own categorization amongst Balkan peoples, yet he describes this externally imposed identity as something effectively influencing their attitudes. Putting aside any possible political criticism, Močnik actually may have found an interesting case, in which an external category has an *inspirative* effect. While we may aspire to change the order, to conquer the world or, at least, to prevent the other from "conquering" us, our rhetorical strategies differ in effectivity when we use categories taken from outside and when we use "domestic" ones. Why is this so effective in Močnik's example of the Balkans and not for example in France, he doesn't explain. For certain ingroups, it doesn't suffice to have a boastful self-image; external identification takes the role of a neutral judge, sometimes supplanting the objective truth. Unlike in Coser's system, where an ingroup grows stronger and more cohesive under a threat or in a conflict²⁹³, this self-identificatory discourse adopts formulations which don't have to be

292 – Baskar & Brumen 1996: 147

293 – Coser 1956: 87

particularly boastful, or to make it seem superior or exotic, but which rather accept the group's extent and have a coherent, although negative image.

There are more such examples which can be found in history. The foundation of national states on the ruins of the Habsburg monarchy didn't merely follow indigenous separatisms, presenting the incommensurability of local cultures; instead, their representatives, Masaryk especially, referred also to the Western categorization of nations when formulating their right to be sovereign²⁹⁴. Foreign models served as inspiration for a very specific domestic policy. Although this policy stressed differences between cultural units, which were thought to be illogically united into a single political unit, this pattern of thought presupposed that there weren't as many possible relations between them as there were cultures involved. In this view, there were various possible systems of international relations, yet not so many, and only one of them could be justified.

Gellner provides another approach to this question within the methodological discourse of anthropology. He distinguished the "East European", or "Romantic" ideal from the "Western", "enlightened" anthropology. The anthropological East, represented in the West by the influence of Małinowski, is inspired more by *"love than theoretical universality"*²⁹⁵. He linked the idea of incommensurability between cultures with the romantic idealization of the past community, and thus also with the core of many movements of national revival. From Norway to Turkey, many nationalist groups have developed a kind of historical narrative, which searches for reflections of their national spirit, either in as self-thought or as acquired views about their national character or mentality²⁹⁶. The narrative proceeds with negative definitions of others, usually the

294 – Masaryk 1924: 434

295 – Gellner 1996: 234

296 – On the individual level, this may seem like the static view on ethnicity, but the social level shows dynamic developments. In some national movements, the romantic accent faded out as they turned to "phase B", as they tried to agitate among a variety of social classes, but elsewhere it went well beyond "phase C". The acknowledgement of difference has certain pluses for the reference group: higher cohesion, easier demarkation, origin-based historiography which can be easily taught through the education process. In matters of extent, however, it isn't very helpful. Domination over other nations can be justified only by declaring itself a naturally dominant nation which is a statement that can't be supported by merely verbal arguments. The integration of outsiders is also hard because of the "natural" character of the mentality. One can formally receive the nationality, but the personal reference group of a romantic type can't include converts.

The same problem comes up when the group is identified with a certain social class or way of life, like the peasantry or the aristocracy. Hroch's (1985) observations of "small-nation revivals" try to determine the leading social strata in national movements. While literacy and education are generally typical of all of the individual proponents of the "A" and "B" phases, these observations actually reflect the

dominant nation they are trying to separate themselves from. This "Eastern" view, which aims at preservation of indigenusness, considers the main value to be the *uniqueness* of the group. The "Western" type, on the other hand, has been linked already by Gellner himself with colonization and domination, with research on exots reflecting a general interest in spreading cultural and political influence. It is, of course, a misleading prejudice to consider Western nationalisms to have no "romantic" elements; many Arthurs and Asterixes have been imagined. The ideal proposed by these anthropologists, described by Gellner in this case, is that of *progress*, of civilization. Civilization isn't unique, rather but rather universal. It can be openly formulated as a reflection of particular culture's "spirit", or simply cover up one's idea of ingroup²⁹⁷.

Uniqueness and progress are two types of inspiration, which we may try to preserve through our ethnocentrist activities, yet Gellner didn't identify their works correctly. Aspirations and inspirations may differ profoundly. The idea of uniqueness may seem to lead to separation, for incommensurability makes the border between two cultures inpenetretable. Progress is, on the other hand, a frequent argument for imposing our specific values on others. However, in the real case of Masaryk's propagation of a new international order and Močnik's version of the Balkan's reaction to the Orientalist narrative, it seems they can function inversely as well. The right to declare oneself as a separate cultural unit, and thus to establish a sovereign state, was formulated by Masaryk within a framework of (as he claims²⁹⁸) universally acceptable principles of justice. The "Western" way to analyze and to dominate, on the other hand, doesn't need to include exclusivity, claiming as it does to understand universal good or truth. This doesn't affect merely anthropologists or politicians (be they selfish or honest nationalists): already

changes in contemporary views in the beginning of "phase C". The demography (population size, spread, social status) of literate subjects can serve as an argument for the use of a single (dominant) language in the country, so the agitator tries to stress some factors of demographics. If we take statehood as "phase D" and perhaps the mass-media images of minorities as "E", romantic-based nationalism – if not ethnocentrism – can perfectly flourish by the same means by which dominant countries during "phase C" try to stop it.

297 – A striking example from contemporary politics is the European Union. The narrative concerning "euroscepticism" and "European consciousness" imposes a future ideal of unity between 28 states, despite the barriers to spreading some of the actual unifying policies (euro, Schengen zone) throughout the whole Union. It is of course hard to say at what moment such an union becomes a "state", but we could take monetary or foreign policy as an example. Unlike the USA or the former USSR, which unified and centralized their foreign and monetary policies effectively from the beginning, the EU is meant perhaps to consciously come to a moment when all countries will be integrated enough with each other that they will give up these policies willingly.

298 – Masaryk 1924: 524f

Francis Bacon dedicated his treatises about scientific methods to the King, expecting them to flourish more within the confined, government-financed research teams than in universities²⁹⁹. Similarly, historical discourses promoting intracultural cohesion, intercultural conflict, *herrenrasen* and expansion – like those of Leontiev, Spengler, and in our era Huntington³⁰⁰ – do also acknowledge there may be inherent reasons for doing so in any high-level group. Preferring uniqueness over progressivity is typical for right-wing expansionism: ingroup superiority is a drive which becomes weaker when trying to define the group universally.

The variety of inspirations may include various concepts, which reflect local ideas of high-level, but sometimes also low-level, groups. Certain mechanisms may be identifiable though. Inspiration stemming from the group's uniqueness is in general a view looking towards the past, towards a rather static view of ethnicity. The future, which inspires progress-based ethnocentrism, is within these frameworks something cloudy and uncertain. Basing ethnocentrism on progress sees the past as dark, and focuses on the group's dynamics and the complementary roles of other groups who help the ingroup develop. Furthermore, Levinson's concept actually doesn't say that every kind of ethnocentrism has to be linked to a past or future ideal: true conservatism aims at the present situation. This basic, or in Amin's words banal, ethnocentrism operates usually without any need to formulate itself as a specific policy or ideology. On the contrary: An ideology or policy can be formulated in a way which makes it interesting to persons sympathetic towards such views. These are the policies of *mobilization*: providing freely defined delineations of borders, proposing alternatives of cooperation or enmity. Such models of discourse don't see any difference between identification and ethnocentrism: dialectical alignment is itself an "act" of support.

A fourth possibility on the time scale is to search for a universal, ahistoric idea which would only consequently be identified with a particular group. True essentialism, of course, considers the ingroup's values ahistorical; the same is true for a progressive thinker, for whom the idea of progress is thought to be potentially effective anywhere. It is also true for "basic" or "banal" ethnocentrism, which also may consider ethnocentrism a universal

299 – *Advancement* p.4

300 – cf. *Vizantizm* p.33f for an apologetics of the Russian autocracy (below, in the next section, his theories are referred to more closely); Spengler 1920: 419 for the warring century ahead for the Faustian civilization; Huntington 1996: 212 for the necessity of conflict between Islam and the West.

human condition. The problem is that such an interpretation – and Gellner and Amin do exactly this – misses the original reasoning of constructivism, i.e., the arbitrary character of group borders.

Conclusion

This chapter shows another inconsistency in the term "ethnocentrism", which results from the differences between Sumner and Levinson. When we take both seriously, it is hard to distinguish identification from actual specifically ethnocentrist actions (outward assertions of ingroup values) and impossible to generalize such actions according to any activity or worldviews, such as the claim of superiority or attempt for domination. Furthermore, the dialectical relation between group cohesion and expansion has already reflected itself in philosophy and now we can't even say that either cohesion or expansion could be chosen as "the" mark of ethnocentrism. We can instead look for the inspirations behind emerging worldviews which promote one's group membership to the status of an idol.

Aspiratory variations, i.e. theories, policies and actions which follow from these views, can belong to any of Wimmer's three (or four) categories of centrism. They may include evaluation (positive, negative or anywhere between), a variety of ideals (future, past, actual) and various policies (open, aggressive, closed). These actions don't define ethnocentrism, they can merely be caused by it. Even when we try to prevent ourselves from having an aspiration, i.e., we indulge in a type of tentative centrism, in which we find a way to deal with others as others without imposing our categories or claiming their incommensurability, we still can't escape doing so. We still refer to inspiring, mobilizing or essentialist concepts, which are proposed to others as universalist solutions or impenetrable borders, as a Sumnerian assertion of group's power or a Levinsonian pathological striving for self-identification. These come from lower (scientific group, intercultural philosophy) or higher (enlightened civilization, ancient nation) levels alike.

Relating an activity from the outside is, however, the same as the external identification of persons with a particular group: we have to be cautious, lest some kind of confirmation bias lead us to relate particular activities to ethnic background. But then, the

question of which actions should be linked to ethnocentrism is empty and inconsequent. Instead, one could try to define a certain ethnocentrist character, psychological profile or mentality of the agent, as well as its objects, which will follow in the next chapter.

IV. Subject and Object of Ethnocentrism

agent – mentality – worldview – object – norms

I've already mentioned the fact that an individual can have multiple social identities – some high-level ones, like those based on nation, religion or estate, and some of a lower level, like families, circles or platoons. I've tried to explain the variety of these groups, which can be found behind their emergence or remembrance. This plurality of personal memberships opens another question: why are we ethnocentrist in relation to one group, but not to another one? Or, are we ethnocentrist towards every group?

Notwithstanding the uses of the term by Sumner and Levinson, the "subject" of ethnocentrism can be interpreted in two main ways. On the one hand, it may mean an ethnocentrist *individual*, with his own set of social identities which determine his views, opinions and actions. Psychological or epistemological analysis provides us with clues to his motives, why he might consider one of his identities special. Above (in the section concerning performative identification) I've introduced a theory by Bentley³⁰¹ in which he shows that one tries to attain multiple group identities in order to solve dilemmatic situations. The ethnocentrist position, in this case, wasn't limited to a certain group or value system: it is strictly individual, based on individual habits and their differences. The groups of which we are recognized as members don't always overlap with our subjective ingroups, i.e., the groups we'd like to belong to.

On the other hand, the act of constituting a group can be traced only vaguely to popular representations, cultural stereotypes. These can be traced only hardly, if ever, to a more particular, historical source of the idea. Stereotypes are a part of culture, reflecting the intensity of contacts with the other. Sometimes, like in Anderson's case of bound

301 – Bentley 1987: 29f

seriality³⁰², government policies and legal norms have a direct influence on the understanding of factions in the political arena. Yet these policies seem to acknowledge, rather than to create, stereotypes, which already exist in the society they govern. In this case, the "subject" is not only the ideologue, but also the *group* itself. A state with its clear rules who is a worthy representative of the "others" and who not, is a kind of ethnocentrist too. The question is which properties characterize a group, and which make its members act in an ethnocentrist way.

These views are only partly complementary. When we search for ethnocentrist individuals within a certain group, we can't take the whole group as ethnocentrist. When we search for properties specific to ethnocentrist groups, the number of ethnocentrist individuals can be one of the factors, but it may blur others, for example structural factors. Whether it is an individual character or his environment which we consider ethnocentrist, thus depends highly on the researcher's own field of study. In the case of scientists, reflecting their own discipline, this matter is often blended, with unclear borders of group (tradition) determination and individual contribution. Science is a specific area of human activity, for those who practice it usually aim at extraordinary levels of clarity and unambiguous expression. The ultimate goal of science, at least since Kant, has often been defined as the provision of universally acceptable, globally comprehensible utterances. But what makes an expression clear? For whom is it clear? In scientific debates, it is not as much the subject, but rather the object, of ethnocentrism which is being examined. It could be an individual, a group, a certain value or theory – even the thinker's own group or the thinker himself. Some researchers in anthropology³⁰³ have revisited the question as to whether it actually creates a problem for anyone when they come up with ethnocentrist views; others, with a philosophical background, doubt the very possibility of avoiding ethnocentrist views by practices, which make a theory more universal³⁰⁴.

Agent

In the field of science, ethnocentrism is sometimes seen as a local limitation of

302 – Anderson 1998: 35f

303 – Lévi-Strauss 1985: 279; Geertz 1989: 142; Geertz 2000: 56-57

304 – Wimmer 2004: 54f; Waldenfels 2005: 109f

perspective, while the selection of objects of one's research reflects his group affiliation. In the second chapter of this part, I mentioned examples of a group-constituting process described by Handelman and Hroch in which one's own ingroup becomes the object of his research. Other examples, most prominently Leach's and Said's, dealt with the objectification of an outgroup. They actually don't try to explain why the agents of these processes chose those objects and not other ones, yet sometimes that is a part of their strategy of presupposing bias and stereotypy to be something unconscious, some kind of a supposed pathological incapability to write objectively. This is the ethnocentrism of the agent – the nationalist agitator, the eurocentrist thinker.

For this reason I'll focus on works, where these motives, and not the mere ethnocentricity behind methods, are discussed. Geertz³⁰⁵ approaches the motives of important reformers in cultural anthropology. He attempts to analyze both the way in which they became interested in their object and how they expressed it, i.e., the ways in which they tried to make their work attractive and interesting for the audience. The idea behind this view is to view not their culture, but rather a quasi low-level group of academicians or people interested in anthropology in general, as the ingroup, which these anthropologists tried to influence, if not create. The scientists he describes tried to create a kind of fandom, arouse interest and fascination; persuasion and criticism were only a part of the general rhetorics. They expressed a kind of group ideal which they tried to attain. These motives don't actually present a limitation or epistemological barrier, yet they still express the need to belong, subjective preferences and bias. The view provided by Geertz isn't critical towards the motives of anthropological research, but rather provides an inflationary view of anthropology (if not science in general), which has to cope with many different approaches because its objects – ethnic groups, the "other" – have been put to question as a concept so many times. For another anthropologist, the most obvious weak point of Geertz' description may be the difference between him and the great ones he describes: the lack of a methodological approach towards them. When Ruth Benedict³⁰⁶, for example, writes a paper in defence of cannibalism, she uses a significant amount of ethnographical evidence. In our case, however, such an approach doesn't seem to me to be necessary. One of the points behind the Benedict's work seems to be the fact that anthropology as a science isn't as exact as, say, nuclear physics. It requires subjective input – an evaluation

305 – Geertz 1989: 142f

306 – Geertz 1989: 146

or comparison – either with "our" society, the analyzed "other", or any universal notion and local characteristics in general.

In Said's description of Eliot's affiliation with a "fruitful tradition"³⁰⁷, we have another case of a deliberate ethnocentrist attitude. The idea of choice in the construction of a narrative isn't always very clear in Said's works. On the one hand, his assumption is that scientific (and imaginative) writing is never free, i.e. its imagery, assumptions and intentions are always limited by circumstances and public institutions³⁰⁸. On the other hand, the matters in which this power is materialized – the limits of meaning and choice – aren't specified. Circumstances determine the imagery and assumptions, i.e., the modes of comparison, with which the writer can operate. His intentions, however, are limited only as far as we see them as dependent on assumptions.

Of course it can be asked whether literary science and anthropology differ so greatly from other "more exact" scientific disciplines like geography or biology. All of these compare at least two instances of experience, which they must subjectively consider different or identical, and then draw conclusions. The "exactness" of each discipline remains in the exclusion of the agent's capacity to determine the identity of or difference between the instances by himself, while similarly limiting the role of the views of his colleagues. For a biologist, focusing on e.g. ornithology, a difference between the colors of feathers can be considered a relevant fact by another whose eyes shares the same function of distinguishing colors. The impression is presumably the same on all people with similarly functioning eyes, making the results of his discoveries easily accessible even to laymen. An impression from a book, on the other hand, highly depends on the subjective expectations and previous experiences of the reader; these all act as the "visual sense", distinguishing more complex ideas, access to which is partly determined by being conscious of these subjective factors. Said doesn't explain anything other than the impressions the book has made on him.

Anthropologists like Geertz or Leach also criticize the "senses" themselves, i.e., the perception of the criteria of identity and difference. Some of these practices are so wide spread – like the functioning of the eyes of an ornithologist – that they can be considered

307 – Said 1975: 17f

308 – Said 1978: 202

exact. However, the tendency to see them as conventions remains, especially when we see how many basic concepts have been found to be ethnocentrist or subjective. The critical factor here might be the functioning of truth and the tenability of values within a low-level group, which maintains its cohesion via the authority of its head. By the mastery of the more widely used methods he becomes capable of leading an epistemological discourse about them and yet to assert their validity within the group (i.e., by encouraging other members to learn them) at the same time. In so far, the use of an "ethnocentrist" – or any other subjectively dependent or locally accepted – method reflects a deliberate choice made by an individual agent. However, scientific authorities don't have such clear positions as political ones.

Ingroup Mentality

The term "mentality" is in no way something scientific. It is a substantive derivate of the adjective "mental", which has meanings e.g. in distinguishing between the mental and corporeal aspects of an illness, or in the mental processes behind a thought; etymologically the word "mental" itself is an adjective based on the Latin substantive *mens* or English "mind". As we've seen in the first chapter, the assumption that humans of various "nations" and "races" function differently from each other is very old, if not reflecting certain inborn ethnocentrist tendency in humans. These ways of functioning of course included mental ones, yet one can't use the word "mind", which seems to be reserved for a universally present mental faculty. The newer form "mentality" can be localized freely with cultural, national, religious and other adjectives, so we can speak about locally specific "mentalities". Any definition of a group also enables an idea of the group's specific "mentality", e.g., the mentality of pre-modern peasants³⁰⁹. The term has persisted up to the modern day and can be found in various languages.

Various scientific traditions have continued to approach the local differences between minds or mentalities up to the present day too. Sensory and humoral differences, which were considered important by proponents of medieval climate theory, were later replaced by linguistic and social factors, especially since Herder. He³¹⁰ was one of the first

309 – Whose changes can become a historical subject, e.g. E.Weber 1976: x

310 – *Ideen* b.VII, ch.1

thinkers to take the both ideas – the universal *Vernunft* and the local *Geist* – into consideration, trying to create a coherent theory of the historical development of cultures (or of history itself, he would perhaps say). Despite the common rational faculty in humans, individual development differs; at the same time these developments tend to converge locally. From the present point of view, it is interesting that he finds the same mechanism functioning in both high- and low-level groups. Herder thought that any low-level group reflects or represents a culturally disseminated view: this however, doesn't have to be the case.

In the case of a scientist's ethnocentrism, the situation is more complex because scientists tend to create an autonomous mentality which acts as an alternative to the common conceptions of things. Already Bacon's typology of idols distinguishes between those of "market" and "theater", i.e., between vulgar language, which "*steals into the understanding secretly*" and its methodical review, "*plainly impressed and received from the playbooks of philosophical systems*"³¹¹. There are different kinds of these specifically scientific mentalities, similar in their way of uncritical reproduction and simplification, but different from each other in content. However, the extent to which the "market" idols determine those of "theater" isn't fully clear. In Herder's case, the congruence between both levels is taken for granted. Neither does Sumner's definition doesn't make important this distinction between the influence of high-level culture and of low-level action group, despite his occasional references to various kind of cultural self-reflection. In the case of Said's Orientalists, and according to some interpretations of Said himself³¹², the very distinction is called into question. It can be said that a low-level mentality, the special atmosphere of a given scientific group, is a kind of self-deception within this group: a vain intellectualism considering itself elevated over everyday stereotypes, but in truth unconsciously acknowledging them in a very effective way. Finally, Anderson³¹³ describes this kind of relation in its most politicized form, by media descriptions and administrative notions; here lower levels define high-level identities.

The idea of "mentality", despite its vagueness exceeding even that of "ethnos" or "ethnocentrism", cannot simply be stricken from use. It can be seen as a recurrence, a

311 – *New Organon* I, 61

312 – Said 1975: 16

313 – Anderson 1998: 30f

tradition, a habitus or another form of uninstitutionalized convergence in the thinking of various agents. Reduction to the level of an agent may help us identify influential creators of nationalistic ideologies, formulations and arguments, but not necessarily the mechanism for preserving the ideology, meaningfulness behind the formulations or strength of an argument, which I consider to be cultural phenomena independent of particular persons.

Mentality and Worldview

In the second chapter of this section, I've described multiple models of the deliberate influence of a low-level group on a high-level. One of these models was described by Anderson: the influence of state administration and statistics. The other were Hroch's notion of phases of nation-building and Hobsbawm's idea of print-capitalism. But this doesn't cover all of the possibilities. Influence can be of various natures. One is deliberate influence, for which a person or group struggles openly, as a part of program, ideology or choice, as in Anderson's case. Per definition, the smaller and more coherent a group is, the more conscious choices its can be made; a high-level group can't make "choices" without a representative, an institution or a similar body.

The other end of this scale consists of unconscious influences: content of the group's ideology at one level reflects the other level. Such influences have been described by Wimmer³¹⁴, who shows that the influence can be either one-sided, with one mentality or agent having their ideas reflected on another one without being influenced themselves, or open, with both agents/mentalities engaged in a mutual dialogue. In this case, the influence is not between groups of various levels, but rather horizontal, between groups of a similar nature. Important here is the perception of the "other", whether it is considered worthy of influencing "us" or not. Thus we have, in utmost abstraction, four extreme outcomes: deliberate one-sided influence, deliberate influence open or receptive for feedback or contrary influence, unconscious one-sided influence and unconscious open influence. The final dimension comprises the possible subjects of this influence, i.e., the agents and mentalities of low-level or high-level groups.

Deliberate one-sided influence is presupposed especially in cases of influence of

314 – Wimmer 2004: 68f

agents and low-level groups upon high-level ones. The high-level group can be considered "ours", but it doesn't have to be: there is no reason to make a distinction here between identification by another and self-identification, as both include notions of "us" and "them". When I try to change a group, it is its mentality I'm aiming at; personally, if I were a member of the group, I would try to go beyond the limitations imposed on me by the group. This is what Bacon wanted to do for science with *New Organon* – to make those interested in it adopt new goals, revise their methods and abandon ineffective ones. It's what I'm doing by trying to persuade you through my text. There is dialogue involved neither in describing some questions as persisting or crucial for a discipline or for life in general nor in the solutions I try to provide.

Deliberate but receptive influence can be seen in examples where the agent doesn't want to necessarily "reform" the group, but primarily to "represent" it. In Anderson's or Billig's cases, the described agents chose both individuals and mentalities as their targets of influence, but still they tried remain open to feedback and to understand the other's wishes and worldviews. Both of the theories of nationalism they describe (of a nation and of a *system* of nations³¹⁵) went through a number of revisions, sometimes reflecting local needs, sometimes merely the wishes of a dictator. The propagation of an idea needs to be readable and made attractive: it needs to be well-advertised. But to create an efficient propaganda, one has to analyze the audience and appeal to its expectations, rather than doing only what the agent wants.

Unconscious influences are harder to prove, in so far as the problem of "performative identification" persists. Do we describe deliberate actions, the practice of which shows the unconscious influence of mentality, by such a term? Or rather does it describe involuntary actions which we carry out despite our worldviews? When is an action "natural" and when it is merely chosen to appear so, as an attempt to "represent" myself as a member of the group I identify myself with? When we consider groups to be the subjects of ethnocentrism, we may easily come to such dilemmas. The best approach is simply to use a negative definition: every time an attempt to influence isn't deliberate, it is unconscious. This category would thus include any mentality-based ethnocentrisms with the group, usually on the higher levels, as its subject. The mentality, presence of a dominant ideology or similarity of personal worldviews is more a matter of fact than

315 – Anderson 1998: 31; Billig 1995: 60f

something chosen and constantly asserted. A nation or religion has no "will"; it can't choose as human subjects do. An individual can proclaim something to be in the group's interest, and other members of the group, also individuals, can adhere to it or not. The influence of the group itself can still be traced to individual actions or views, to the extent that we can map the identification of another individual with the group³¹⁶. There are thus two ways of finding unconscious influences: either from the viewpoint of groups, by a synchronous comparison of mentalities or their most persistent points, or by focusing on an individual, by a recursive analysis of the development of his worldview.

One-sided unconscious influence is mostly a matter of closed, coherent societies, the relations of which have been observed by Sumner and Levinson. As they define it, the ethnocentrism of a group is not something deliberate: it is its ability to survive, strength and coherence. These notions reflect the degree to which it is *closed* to outside influences. There is often a dominant group which plays the largest part in defining the worldview of an individual. Outside of this discourse, which takes the group as main subject of ethnocentrism, it's hard to find a solution for the individual. Tentative centrism, as described by Wimmer³¹⁷, is something impossible within Sumner's and Levinson's theories. The group, in the process of instituting itself, aims its influence similarly inwards and outwards: towards both other groups and its own members alike.

On the other hand, unconscious open influences have been described by Said and in various reactions to his work³¹⁸. The idea of the Orient (as well as of the Balkans or the Occident) becomes strong because it can adopt parts of its object's view. An Orientalist tried to grasp a specifically Orientalist view. His personal worldview is formed by both his own and the other group's mentality, i.e., its image in the ingroup's view. Unlike in the earlier theories of Sumner and Levinson, this image isn't merely a set of culturally-specific prejudices, for it seems to reflect changes in both intra- and intercultural relations³¹⁹. Anyway, the idea of "culture" itself is a perfect example of an unconsciously adopted term which shows influences from a variety of cultural sources, languages and uses, while also

316 – Bentley 1987: 33

317 – Wimmer 2004: 57

318 – Cf. Said (1978: 144f) for the usual requirements for someone to be recognized as an Orientalist; Carrier (1995: 86) for the "European" anthropological concepts (the gift) unconsciously influencing Said; Todorova (2009: 447f) for the peculiar case of a nationalist cult, whose political usability was gravely miscalculated.

319 – Amin 1988: 172

reflecting influences from the "outside".

We've already seen the weak point of both the original and postcolonial view of ethnocentrism in how they cope with performative identification. Actually, all of these influences in the end try to somehow reach an individual, changing both his views and his practices. This includes even direct, deliberate influences aimed at a wider audience. The question is what the nature of this influence is and how the process itself supports ethnocentrism. The relation of the the speaker to his passive audience or an ingroup/outgroup dichotomy is partially observable, but not as intensely as the relation between the speaker and the object of his speech what he speaks about (a "third one" by Waldenfels' terms)³²⁰. The definition of this "other", or "third" one – e.g., the Baconian alchemysts, Anderson's nationalists, Sumner's ethnocentrists or Said's Orientalists – shows, in my opinion, an important link between the agent's self-identification and the supposed mentality of his ingroup. In short, without understanding what is meant by the object of ethnocentrism, we can't understand what its subject is either.

Object of Ethnocentrism

The idea of ethnocentrism is in general an attitude of wanting a certain mode of asymmetric social interaction. It is bound with at least two objects: one of them is the "ingroup", under which the subject subordinates himself, the other is the "outgroup", which the subject wants to subordinate and which "suffers" from his ethnocentrist attitude. For Ibn Khaldun, medieval dynasties suffered as a result of blood ties which were always stronger than any other kind of loyalty, while Adorno emigrated from his homeland after an ideology of racial superiority had taken a firm hold there, barring him from doing his job – this was one of the first steps on the road to Holocaust. The definition of ethnocentrism reflects these oppressive and socially destructive phenomena. By being ethnocentrist, one damages the dignity, rights or the very existence of another³²¹; one marginalizes or silences another's voice³²²; one determines, or wishes to determine his access to ingroup-

320 – Waldenfels 2005: 124f

321 – Sumner 1906: 15; Levinson 1949: 35

322 – Mall 2004: 133

specific goods³²³. When I deal with somebody, from a merely pragmatic point of view, it's better for me when he considers me a part of his ingroup.

In the scientific context, it has become widespread to treat ethnocentric concepts in the cultural sciences, which we then impose on groups of various levels (ethnic, gender, professional) as reflections of the dominant relations in the society or politics. In such a discourse, scientific distance becomes impossible: the object of research is considered an object of ethnocentrism as well. In this respect Geertz³²⁴, basing his theory on that of Ruth Benedict, went even further than Said, who criticized the definition of an object of research, as he puts the whole discipline of anthropology to question. On the other hand, the effect isn't inherently polemical or political.

The diversity of approaches, both from the viewpoint of motivation as well as of the object and audience, diminish the value of the discipline as an exact science. On the other hand, this is what makes the discipline viable, for each thinker (despite his own dependency on the culture he is coming from) adds something new to the definition of his "object", be it a culture in general or particular practices, which has no alternative in the scientist's "home" culture. According to Benedict³²⁵, phenomena considered "normal" or usual, and thus overlooked as uninteresting, may also be the results of complex cultural developments, which we identify first through contact with an exotic, abnormal culture. This is an "ethnocentrist" view, Geertz himself doesn't see the point of anthropological research which would be different from the individual wish. The comparison of cultures is crucial. Diversity, as defined by the anthropologist and in contrast to his "own" culture, then serves as a starting point when no empirical objects can be found³²⁶. Furthermore, by reflecting on his methods, an individual can approach his own, subjective relation to the object, leading to a fully "philosophical" turn and making an object out of one's own culture and practices – yet without the claim of universality, found in classical sociology.

This problem isn't confined to anthropology and political studies alone. Intercultural philosophy constantly reflects on its own definition: what is the "culture"; what is a

323 – Van der Dennen 1990: 446

324 – Geertz 1989: 143

325 – Geertz 1989: 142f

326 – This interpretation was also adopted by newer movements in object-based anthropology (cf. D'Andrade 1995: 182f)

"philosophy"; what's the "between"? This very text you're reading can't define interculturality without definitions of "other", the "difference" between the agents of relation and the "relation" itself. This process functions similarly to Geertz' method of anthropology in its focus on interpretation and the interdependence between the definitions of the object and the method.

As already sketched in the previous chapter, this discourse aims both at the reinterpretation of history and to create a kind of manual for intercultural contact in future. The first provides an overview about the development of key concepts, the latter speculates on problems, which may become actual later. In the earlier version of his *Interkulturelle Philosophie*³²⁷, Wimmer focused on the object of ethnocentrism as crucial for its structure. Stereotypy of a "barbarian", the "exotic" or the "heathen" were more important for the formulation of the "arrogant" (in the later version "centrist") discourse, more so than the intraculturally defined aspirations of the culture. Stereotypes are closer to reality than "centrisms". On the higher-level, in cultures or religions, stereotypes can be observed in contrast to the "normality" of the culture itself. These stereotypes don't function as methodological biases; they very precisely reflect (although not explicitly referring to Sumner's theory) an ingroup/outgroup distinction, with the former being a realm of normality and rights, and the latter devoid of these traits. With the idea of "heathen", even the autonomy of the other is brought into question, if not to a trial. In the later formulation of intercultural theory, it becomes clear that normality can't be ascribed to the other; however, autonomy can be ascribed and it is possible to recognize mutual rights at least within the discourses of philosophy or the history of philosophy. A solution to a high-level problem thus can be found on a low-level or even individual scale.

Waldenfels³²⁸ goes further into abstraction in this matter. For him, it is important to know who actually participates in the "arrogant discourse"; "the other", who is treated in this discourse, usually isn't a part of it. Stereotypy is treated as a paradox: it is an attempt by the subject to internalize "the other", which is in fact defined as something external. His focus isn't on the actualization of otherness, but rather on essentialism, the philosophical counterpart of primordialism: not to consider the "otherness" as persisting, but rather to take it as something actually existing, yet open to debate. Instead of addressing external

327 – Wimmer 2001: 75-93

328 – Waldenfels 2005: 118-121

"others", Waldenfels suggests it would be better to speak of the culturality of participants, with participants taking the role of "the other", which is described, themselves.

Cultural biases emerge in me as much as in other persons, be they from "my" culture or not. The variety of centrisms and stereotypes observed by Wimmer are thus differences in personal biases; they are "specular" rather than "market" idols. In Waldenfels' understanding of cultural stereotypy and the objectification of the "other", it is a problem of intersubjectivity, which is reflected on higher, intercultural level. The limits provided by the unique experience of one group in comparison to another perfectly reflect individual differences. Every person can thus become a "representative" of his culture (as he perceives it) and transcend its ethnocentrism by the mere sharing of his subjective views with a particular "other" (from his own point of view), who is willing to share his own views as well. A cultural border itself is for him something like a watershed in the differences between individuals. The solution to ethnocentrism is thus fully in the hands of an individual; no special category of rules or recognition of the other's influence is needed for a discourse to follow. The discourse itself, with properly self-reflective participants, makes it possible to include themes from other viewpoints, be they considered from another "culture" or another objectified source.

This method of philosophy doesn't seem to me to be very distant from that of cognitive anthropology. It is similar in its use of phenomenology to review, and partly replace a structuralist paradigm, which presupposes existence of traditions that copy cultural or territorial borders and consequently influence the worldviews of its members. Instead of researching common characteristics within an externally defined group, it focuses on the identification of individuals with the group, i.e., the process by which an idea is accepted, reformulated and expressed. However, the acquisition of a stereotype by an individual has different outcomes in each of these traditions. Waldenfels and Wimmer try to motivate the individual to reflect these stereotypes by exposing the limitations they impose on communication and personal knowledge. Waldenfels even compares openness towards the other to Plato's idea of the beginning of philosophy as fascination³²⁹. For Geertz, stereotypes do emerge and are very individual, very much like in Waldenfels' theory, but tend to vanish within the mass of data a researcher has to bring³³⁰. The

329 – Waldenfels 2005: 125

330 – Geertz 1989: 149f

methods employed, not self-reflection, produce the fruit. The researcher's own motivations, the exoticity or barbarism or – why not? – the strikingly similar features he observes in his object, tend to lose relevance in the face of the reception of data produced by his work.

Normative Effects of Ethnocentrism

The problematics of the "agents" and "victims" of ethnocentrism are related, but make the term function very differently. When we focus on the "agent", trying to overcome (or at least cope with) limits imposed by its ethnocentrism, the result can be very different from an approach with respect to the "object". The ideal of anthropology, as presented by Benedict and Geertz, is a tradition which tries to be influenced by its object's properties. Subjectively perceived differences and interesting points shape the tradition not as a kind of universal science for all, but as a culturally-embedded artistic work, which is yet very rich and sound in its descriptive power. The problem is that this can't escape from being considered politically loaded. The differences which are outlined by such a method warn us against bringing reductionism and stereotypy into the science. Geertz himself identified this problem in his *Uses of Diversity* lecture³³¹, yet he couldn't do much more than turn to the abstract term of ethnocentrism, which should be avoided. Richard Rorty³³² didn't wait long to simply say that there was nothing wrong with such an ethnocentrism: we do have values, which shouldn't be simply withheld because we need to be liberal and tolerant towards other cultures.

The other aforementioned philosophers tend to be more critical towards the subject. In his articles on intercultural philosophy, Waldenfels doesn't directly refer to Rorty's view on ethnocentrism, yet one can see he is in a harsh opposition against it. While Billig³³³ had already criticized the certainty, with which Rorty identified himself – and "ourselves" – with "liberals", Waldenfels not only calls this self-identification into question, but also criticizes bringing up the very idea of identity, or even the origin of certain thoughts in the debate. When two "culturally-biased" persons enter a debate about their own identities and find a common theme, it has no meaning to talk about whose tradition thematized it first. Rorty,

331 – cf. Geertz 1985

332 – Rorty 1991: 209f

333 – Billig 1995: 154-173

from this view, does his best to maintain the culturally biased and politically loaded discourse, at best showing a strong integrative centrism. Cultures are for him defined by ideas and themes, with pluralistic discourse being a product of the "liberal West".

Wimmer's solution in the later formulation of his theory is a kind of compromise between these two positions, accepting both the possibility of personal ethnocentrist motivation from Rorty and its marginalization within a debate from Waldenfels. In comparison to the view provided by Geertz, this eliminates the political problem: the rights and autonomy of the "other" are preserved, even when they aren't considered "normal". On the other hand, it leaves open problem of the "culture" and its claims, which remains, and which may really include nothing other than a political worldview. Rorty's diabolical advocacy of integrative ethnocentrism in favor of "western bourgeois liberals" is able to overcome the limits proposed by Wimmer – in so far as he is able to hold the debate within the sphere of politics.

When we take the original sense, ethnocentrism can't be seen as a source of injustice, bias and other aberrations from normality. Quite the contrary, it is what defines "normal"; the ingroup is the realm of law and familiarity³³⁴. From this point of view, the search for a specific rules or discursive situations means nothing else than expansion of the ingroup, which in this case is a low-level group of interculturally sensitive philosophers. The subject of this kind of ethnocentrism, which indeed would express the idea of Rorty's "cultural bazaar" or Wimmer's tentative centrism, is the normative outcome of this methodological preparation. The result as such isn't necessarily so to be that bad; it was actually through questioning the universality of human rights, that Lévi-Strauss³³⁵ stirred this debate. The problem is that differences in norms and values, whose expression is an important part of both identification with a group as well as an expression of loyalty towards it, tend to be derived from differences in other aspects, and vice-versa. The influence by which an expansive ethnocentrist tries to change values of, say, a separative one, most likely doesn't affect all of the normative or practical differences between their value systems. For example, both Christian missions and Republican ordinances were aimed at the change of festive rituals in France³³⁶, but didn't aim to affect, e.g.,

334 – Sumner 1906: 13

335 – Lévi-Strauss 1985: 279-288

336 – E.Weber 1976: 377f

consumption of alcohol. The expansion of an ideology with respect to one aspect of life doesn't change everything.

Moreover, the concepts of both Geertz and Wimmer presuppose influence to be an integral part of the contact between two bearers of different cultural dispositions. It is hard to say in how far the contact itself may be truly devoid of attempts to influence or persuade; still, it is a different problem when we speak of bias (being influenced by a culture-specific term) or of expansion (attempt to influence). The very interest, which in Benedict's sense brings us to research a foreign practice, can be described as a bias too, but the object of our ethnocentrism isn't the normative structure of the "other" that I'd like to change: I am, so to say, the object of my own ethnocentrism. In the worst case, my knowledge would be limited by revolving too much around a single object, like Gilbert around his magnet³³⁷.

The problem of normative influence, considered an integral part of the ethnocentrist attitude, in my opinion reflects a presupposition that a choice of some specific differences is always an attempt to choose the most representative or most important – either in general or simply for the culture we are speaking about – factor. This point in Rorty's philosophy was first criticized by Benhabib³³⁸: his theory defines borders too rigidly, which leads to think that comprehension, identity and acceptance need each other. But I can find common language with a foreigner and yet neither consider us to be part of one ethnos nor accept all of his thoughts. And vice-versa, feeling favorably towards one aspect of a foreign culture doesn't mean claiming it to be representative of the whole culture. Nor does this attitude have to determine attitudes towards other aspects of the culture. From this viewpoint, to disagree with a specific norm in a culture, one doesn't claim to judge the whole set; yet Benhabib goes further by trying to decontextualize the discourse on norms totally. A norm itself can be culture-specific, depending as well on how we define the culture. However, neither the criticism nor the situation in which one speculates about an alternative is limited to the extent of the one culture, in which the norm (or its criticism)

337 – *New Organon* I, 54

338 – Benhabib 2002: 193; *"It is inconsistent of Richard Rorty, after his admission that there is no essential asymmetry between intercultural and intracultural disputes, to continue to assert that "the pragmatist, dominated by the desire for solidarity, can only be criticized for taking his own community too seriously. He can only be criticized for ethnocentrism, not for relativism... A distinction between the general idea of a community of conversation and a culturally specific ethnic community would help sort out some of these contradictions."*

takes place.

Norms appear as objects of ethnocentrism exactly in most of the mentioned theories – in those of Rorty, Geertz, Waldenfels and Wimmer. Benhabib tries, in this respect, to distinguish normative ethnocentrism from cognitive one, which may be enough for the sake of the present work. On the other hand, it still may be questioned to what extent the discourse, necessarily adopting universalistic but historically contextualizable concepts such as culture or moral rights, may work independently from the context. The thematization of a problem, the aim and practice of a discourse, can also be seen as something historically or culturally determined. Extremes of lax pragmatism and postcolonial cautiousness, reducing the discourse on universal norms to a battle of personal preferences against the haunting vision of imposing culture-specific terms upon dominated aliens, are very hard to avoid.

Conclusion

The variety of possible subjects of ethnocentrism isn't, in my opinion, as colorful as the variety of its objects. The definitions of these terms are deeply interdependent, similarly to the dichotomies of ingroup-outgroup, identification-alteration, and acceptance-disagreement presented in the previous chapters. On the other hand, it seems to me there are different objects of ethnocentrism. Low-level groups, identifying with their own high-level group "mentality" in the way of either Herder or Said, have for example their own high-level group as the object of influence. Locally motivated fascinations and perceptions of differences in "other" cultures, as defined by Benedict and Geertz, don't necessarily make a "victim" out of the object of their research, but rather make their own corpus of knowledge, which revolves around the interesting. Normative influence, either in philosophy (Waldenfels, Geertz) or in politics (Rorty, Benhabib), finally tries to affect mostly ingroup normativity and its relations with the outside.

These dimensions, the self-constitutive, the cognitive and the normative, don't necessarily overlap. In some of the mentioned theories we can see that compromises in one aspect help us to find solutions for problems identified in another one. We could see them as a complex of ontology, epistemology and ethics – different parts of philosophy,

aimed at different operations of the mind. When there is a problem with normative ethnocentrism, i.e., the imposition of culture-specific norms on the others, one can, following Wimmer and Waldenfels, take the self-constitutive ethnocentrism as acceptable: the resulting discourse between low-level groups or individuals, which take it as a granted they can be seen as representatives, can thus more easily achieve mutual understanding. One doesn't need to rigidly declare these practices to be "wrong philosophical assumptions", as Benhabib does, pointing at once to the relativism of cultural borders, environmentally determined perceptions of differences or the historical context behind norms. It suffices to say that these three dimensions add another aspect to the ambiguity of the term "ethnocentrism".

V. Function

descriptive uses – polemical-descriptive uses – methodological uses – political uses

In the previous four chapters, my analysis concentrated itself on terms' meaning. Ambiguities show themselves in the definitions of *ethnos*, in the understanding of group membership and in expressions of loyalty. Yet alongside these ideas there is always the general aim of a work, which is only partly related to them. The term "ethnocentrism" arouses different associations in different contexts, which are defined by this aim. The idea of a term's function means not merely what it signifies: it is an arbitrary aspect, which can be read from associations made by the author himself. The function of a term is fully independent of whether or not the relations posited by it really work as the user thinks. It isn't important, whether he has understood the term "correctly" or not. The array of associations is something an author – especially a philosopher – tries to build up. Under the "function" of a term I mean the attitude of the user towards the object he addresses with it: how the term is used in a particular instance.

In the following chapter I will to describe situations which are created by the use of the term. There are various objects stirring the debate on ethnocentrism: history, the reality of actual intergroup relations, and both the subjects and objects affected by ethnocentrism. The author may or may not be involved in particular any one of these or not. Each of these situations entered the public and scientific discourses differently; individual thinkers were

in different situations, holding different responsibilities and aspirations. This was reflected in each individual's approach to the problem. The questions set by Sumner or Levinson don't match those set by Said or Wimmer. Comparisons between them can be made not only from the aforementioned perspectives, but also from the perspective of their overall understanding of the word and their personal categorization of the phenomena denoted by it. Did they accept ethnocentrism as a natural phenomenon or did they take it as an aberration? Did they fight against it or use it to fight their critics?

The ambiguity discovered through the analysis of the term makes it, of course, hard to focus on any "phenomena" seen as corresponding to the idea of ethnocentrism. The problem of ethnocentrism can be seen also as an epistemological one. We have no "idea" of it, only associations. An individual tries to comprehend the world by creating representations in his mind of the phenomena he experiences in the world. Communication, which is important to share and reflect critically my knowledge, is the harder part. Memory then has to be formulated using words, and compared with similar, but not always analogical, terms.

In this way, philosophy can act as a science critical of vocabulary, identifying effective and fruitful terms or discourses, as well as those which because of their low descriptive content can be seen as a waste of time. Sometimes an idea can be identified as a phenomenon only within a certain territory, lineage, tradition, etc. – i.e., within a single *ethnos*. Elsewhere, it may not even be perceived as a distinct phenomenon or have its own word. Such locality can always be not only questioned, but also used to stress one's own difference. Thus, the problem of ethnocentrism receives a new dimension of meaning in philosophy. We can always ask why a certain term was used – and not another one. Attempts to be objective or to resolve conflicts are easily put to question from the perspective of this locality of certain terms. Dogmatically posited ideas of objectivity and social order can't be taken as unquestionable. When a philosopher speaks of the usefulness of a term, he also expresses a certain idea of ethnocentrism.

The very discourse about ethnocentrism can thus lead to a very "ethnocentrist" view regarding philosophy itself. This view can be then expressed in questions such as: Which side may have more interest in the resolving of the conflict? For which "side" am I writing?

Descriptive Uses

As seen in the first section, the first ideas of a union between nationalism and chauvinism in the human mind were still reflections of actual politics. They arose in the 19th century, in times of raging nationalistic separatism within several multinational empires (e.g., the Ottoman Empire), as well as of the nationalistic integration of others (e.g., Germany). An ideology is a very real, persistently repeated phenomenon, both motive and justification. The first works on nationalism and chauvinism were historical reflections – somewhat ironic³³⁹, but with a profound effect on many languages. The economic or security concerns behind these conflicts were banalized in the face of Herder's discovery of the "nation" as a natural unit of high-level politics, equipped with its own character and culture, and showing an organic development or life-cycle. In comparison to other cyclical theories, like those of Plato or Ibn Khaldun, Herder saw political developments as interdependent with culture.

Descriptive use was handy in defining of the borders, where nationalism and chauvinism were acceptable as "domestic" or "patriotic" in the face of external threats. Many historians took over Herder's idea of the culture-nation, arguing for a certain extent of their home culture. Herder's description of Slavic peoples³⁴⁰ especially is very open to interpretation, depending on how dynamic we think his theory is. One of the more dynamic interpretations, proposed by Leontiev, was that Slavs were seen as a cultural unity at Herder's time, but were in only an embryonic state of nation building³⁴¹. Because of the diverse influences from existing (e.g., Germanic or Byzantine) states, their unity was slowly but inevitably crumbling. Russians, on the other hand, acknowledged the Byzantine legacy, which was both imperial and expansive, thus saving themselves from the destructive separatism of smaller, more democratic Slavic nations³⁴². Such was his analysis of the situation which was ravaging the western parts of Russia's sphere of

339 – cf. above sect.A, I, n.40

340 – *Ideen* b.IV, ch.16, 4

341 – *Vizantizm* p.3

342 – *Vizantizm* p.36; Especially that of Bulgars and Czechs, aimed first against clerical organizations – Leontiev considers the parallel between the Hussite movement and Bulgarian separatism against the Greek Patriarchate of Constantinople as their primordial, anarchist element.

influence. This was in direct opposition to the Pan Slavist ideas of Ján Kollár³⁴³ and Khomyakov³⁴⁴, who took the stateless or non-expansionist organization of their peoples as their primordial quality. The main expression of their identity was in culture and religion, not politics, which was usually in hands of foreign rulers and described as an alien element. This interpretation gave justification to both separatism and opposition to the Russian imperialism. Concentration on culture and religion, however, was also another point of criticism. Especially Palacký and Masaryk criticized Russian thinkers for overemphasizing of religious (Orthodox Christian) aspects of Slavdom, thus making their nations seem peripheral (in case of Khomyakov) or even bastardized (Leontiev). Religious borders thus influenced the emerging ideas about nationality as well; the goal of these historians and philosophers was to find the right balance of collective identities, i.e., the one which contained the strongest nationalist potential.

On the other hand, in such cases it becomes visible that affiliations with two high-level identities can easily be in conflict. A solution suitable to a local group of Catholics may put Protestants at a disadvantage, even if the cultural-linguistic (*Volk*) or political (aristocracy, *gens*) traditions of both are observed. Further discrepancies between state nations and cultural nations, followed by the rise of anthropology and Marxism – areas generally comprising various traditions of thought working with cultural groups not exactly fitting these categories – inspired a critical review of the historical role of nationalism. Furthermore, Herderian the idea of collective character determining individual minds was later turned upside down, especially by Renan. The modern theories of Hroch or Anderson, described in the first chapter of this section, show possible approaches to nationality as a high-level construct, made by mostly low-level groups. These movements rehabilitated the narrative of "real" causes of the aforementioned conflicts (the economy, social stratification, religious dogma), but also inspired the search for "real" causes behind nationalism, primarily sociobiological and psychological.

In contrast, Ibn Khaldun described different mechanisms for both levels – environmental (climatic, humoral, civilizationary determination of character) for high-level,

343 – *Hlasowé* p.11

344 – Masaryk 1913: 247

externally identified groups³⁴⁵, and genealogical (*'asabiya*) factors for low-level ones³⁴⁶. While his work is already interesting for the variety of pre-modern ethnic criteria it discusses, his criticism of the application of the genealogical principle to describe high-level differences has, in my opinion, a point in the current tradition of debate on ethnocentrism as well. When a population grows to a certain number and civilizational level, its size prevents the reproduction of group feeling throughout the whole collective. Dynasties fall, because they usually arouse no *asabiya*, no "ethnocentrism", which they can use to mobilize warriors from the population on a higher-level scale. Large empires are described as rare exceptions, in which an influential ideology (like Islam) supplants *'asabiya* (or rather multiple *'asabiyun* of various clans) as the main cause of a polity's coherence³⁴⁷. The tone of the work is cold and skeptical of any ideologies which try to present themselves as special; even Islam couldn't escape this judgement.

Even when the relations between high- and low-level groups are irrelevant, there are problems with description of certain acts or situations as "ethnocentric". Notwithstanding their variety (treated in the 3rd chapter of this section), making ethnocentrism itself into a factor of motivation can be misleading. First and foremost, such descriptions come when no other possible motivations can be observed. Such situations are common to historians, who work with limited sources. Historians sometimes infer identity or loyalty motivations behind actions – and also behind the choice of information in their sources – when for example no economical or tactical advantages behind decisions are apparent. While the overall preference to describe historical events as effects of nationalism and religious fervor has faded in certain traditions, systematic research of the role of the identity has remained a part of them.

While generally critical of Herder's approach to writing history, Wenskus³⁴⁸ differentiated between external and internal identities, i.e., between *Fremd-* and *Selbstbezeichnung*. Cases in which *Selbstbezeichnung* was present, were thought of as instances of continuous consciousness of group identity. The 19th century "awakening" scales were just made smaller: comparisons were made between the Germanic peoples of

345 – *Muqaddima* p.123f

346 – *Muqaddima* p.172f

347 – *Muqaddima* p.211f

348 – Wenskus 1977: 141

early Imperial era (Tacitus, Livy) and the Early Medieval polities succeeding the Western Roman Empire. The continuity between (mythically) original clans and full-fledged empires still remains an open question³⁴⁹. The scale is smaller, finer and more carefully defined; the author tries not to refer to any cultural or political unit existing in the same territory but in another time. Part of this method is the preference for source languages – *regnum* instead of "empire", *Sclaveni* or *Σκλαβηνοί* instead of "Slavs" and so on – thus focusing on ways of thought contemporary to the studied period.

Is this method sufficient to avoid the criticisms of ethnocentrism described above? Is it a break with an old, anachronistic tradition, or rather a refined *Volkskunde*? Wenskus' work coincides with that of Lévi-Strauss³⁵⁰ more than merely temporarily: both try to preserve the distance of their tradition from objects (spatial or temporal), and to avoid bringing up any implications drawn from their own cultures or lives. The phenomenon of ethnocentrism is seen as belonging merely to the realm of scientific objects. This object had to be refined, especially from the aspects of structure (nationalism plus chauvinism) and pattern of influence (high- and low-level groups, individuals). On the other hand, a closer methodological analysis makes these highly objective, specialized and distanced studies prone to expecting similar ethnic determination of the actions of criticized scientists as of those of the Early Medieval *gentes*. Both are seen as subjects of ethnocentrism. The patterns of influence, which tend now to go from lower to higher levels, make a model which is used in "field" science as well as in methodology. A tradition of thought is seen as belonging to a similar, low-level group, which is in opposition against the present time. Before a closer look at this *tropos*, however, I'd like to compare its purely descriptive uses with the approaches which offer criticism even without the need to reflect on the methodology.

Polemical-Descriptive Uses

Machiavelli's description of "social humours" – the interests of the "great" and of the "people" (*grandi e popolo*)³⁵¹ – works with an interesting typology of lower-level groups.

349 – e.g. Goetz, Jarnut & Pohl 2003: 55-84 for Vandals, p.85-134 for Ostrogoths

350 – cf. Lévi-Strauss 1985

351 – *Discorsi* I, 4

They are taken as sociological, timeless categories, very modern from this text's point of view: they are often defined negatively against each other, are practically observable in political debates, and are not bound by mythology or essentialism, even if their concrete instances employ myths for self-propagation. High-level groups, mostly states or nations, are for him merely the limits of an historian's interests, and are defined by their continuity. While Ibn Khaldun's work stresses their fragility, Machiavelli tries to find a solution: to write a manual on how to put (and hold) an empire together. Excessive domination of either the *grandi* (ability to freely use and exploit the privileges) or the *popolo* (ability to prevent an unequal oligarchy to form itself in contrast to the average) makes the state unhealthy; it is the situation of Marius' or Caesar's Rome, of Savonarola's Florence or the late Venetian Republic³⁵². Discord, mutual isolation and the unlimited assertion of group interests (*licentia*) makes the state (acting as the high-level group) vulnerable to attacks from the outside. His goal isn't the mere description or interpretation of historical events, but rather the diagnosis of the current state of things by the comparison of the symptoms, which were apparent when the states fell, i.e., when they were absorbed or destroyed by foreigners. Equilibrium between these groups makes the individuals more respectful for the whole, and thus make the state stronger.

In this instance, the very existence of group-specific interests is taken for granted and seen as nearly universal. However, their existence is seen, if not as absolutely bad, then surely as mutually destructive as long as no intervention occurs. In comparison, Levinson doesn't directly advocate interventions or psychotherapies for persons with higher F-scale results. Although the context of the *Authoritarian Personality* studies makes at critical stance towards anti-Semitism and other forms of outgroup-bashing inevitable, Levinson himself tries to stick to descriptive formulations. The psychological tradition doesn't make direct suggestions: already Levinson's first paper finds it hard to relate higher results with either any specific group constitutions, or with individual pathological profiles. We can train children from their earliest moments in cosmopolitan worldviews, to hold the ultimate goals of global peace and universal love, and yet it doesn't give us observable results. The rise of nationalism in most post-communist countries after 1989 can be interpreted as a sound counter-argument.

In how far can we relate the polemical approach to the ability of the scientist to

352 – cf. McCormick 2011: 50

affect the current state of things? Comparing Ibn Khaldun and Machiavelli doesn't help us very much: both held politically important offices in their lives, which can't be said of Sumner or Levinson. Strong criticism against ethnocentrism within society comes from sociologists and historians, who focus on more recent periods of time. Such works search not only for the existing influences of past events in the present world, but also focus on the possibility of their being repeated. It is very unlikely one would, like Bumin Khagan³⁵³, establish a nomadic kingdom in Kazakhstan, initiating a mass migration and profound change in political relations on the continental level. From today's point of view, we simply don't *need* to relate Bumin to the contemporary situation. It's very hard to decipher his effects on present continental politics, and also we have only scarce information about his deeds and no proof of their authenticity.

A polemical use the term has arisen in the sociobiological tradition. Sumner recognized the destructivity of ethnocentrism on primitive societies based on "natural" kinship groups. His view on blood feuds is illustrative: in the case of Arabs³⁵⁴, they were able to establish a shortlived caliphate, but later the morality of their tribal bonds and blood feuds prevailed among them again. Combined with the lack of political experience, he thinks it ultimately not only disrupted their empire, but also pervaded the Muslim religion. It is questionable here, of course, whether Sumner is critical towards ethnocentrism itself, as for example Van der Dennen is, or rather of "primitive societies" and their current state of affairs. His idea of world and history is perfectly progressive, with some peoples rising in complexity and others remaining mediocre, and continuing to revolve around nature. Ethnocentrism is especially powerful in this state, but still can be observed in more "civilized" societies. The criminal law of developed countries is based on the blood feud principle as well, as he argues³⁵⁵, but it is more complex, reflecting centuries of revisions and criticism. Similar to his idea of peace-pacts, he believes that an infusion of continuous rational thought harnesses ethnocentrism to make high-level social units function coherently and thus minimizes its harmful effects, which take place between natural low-level groups.

The main critical point of Sumner's work isn't the existence of ethnocentrism, but

353 – cf. Amitai and Biran 2005: 202

354 – Sumner 1906: 551

355 – Sumner 1906: 555

rather the disruption of social phenomena, which hold it by the reins, in the service of the modern state, the upholder of rational civilization. The existing morale may seem from some aspects erroneous or perverse, but as long as it provides a constraint for the disruptive behavior of low-level rivalries, it is justified. This also means that changes in the persisting morale are important, even necessary, to prevent the disruption of the "peace unit" of the state by conflicting value systems. Any such morale is always better than moral anarchy³⁵⁶. Sumner saw a model situation in which this quite Machiavellian vision of how morale can be revisited in Renaissance Italy³⁵⁷. One should not adhere to moral principles – to folkways – too much, while a state must be flexible enough to adopt any change in them to ensure its survival.

In comparison to him, Van den Berghe³⁵⁸ speaks of "pseudospecific lines": ethnocentrism reduces outgroups to a different species; cannibalism and racism are thus very similar attitudes. For Billig³⁵⁹, it is the concentration on the survival of the state, which makes its interests, though defined by a handful of representants, more important than individuals. Successful uses of the rhetorical power of nationalism are still remembered and it is likely its arguments will be used again soon. The everyday reality of nationalism and expressions of loyalty make people more supportive of wars, reducing themselves to parts of the whole and suppressing opposing views. Van den Berghe and Billig try to show that the complexity of society doesn't diminish the functionality of the ethnocentrism of low-level groups; self-constituting states are more effective than those of tribes, and they are capable of replacing natural kinship groups. Sumner seems, from the point of view of these theories, not to care about outgroups at all. His definition of the problem was limited, so to say, to his own ingroup, for which he was offering only a more effective system of inner workings. It remains open in how far Sumner (or for that matter Machiavelli) saw morality or "folkways" as bound to a state, that is, to a continuous political entity. Here it should be noted that the understanding of *ethnos* differs between all four authors, with only Van den Berghe offering a systematic definition.

A similar situation was described by Geertz. He seems less radical: racism,

356 – Sumner 1906: 728

357 – Sumner 1906: 722

358 – Van den Berghe 1980: 40

359 – Billig 1995: 11

suppression of ingroup opposition and outgroup destruction fall outside the scope. Geertz³⁶⁰ perceives the problem mostly on an individual level, with the variety of possible ingroups being considered – for example, a doctor trying to persuade an Indian to stop drinking after an operation. Ethnocentrism is for him a source of ethical dilemmas: we have to choose between adherence to personal values and openness toward different opinions. It is important to point out that both of these choices are per definition a part of *one* ingroup's value system. On the other hand, it isn't helpful to identify it with any externally definable value system or *ethnos*, as Rorty does. In a such moment, the debate becomes evaluatory and comparative, as in the case of Sumner's text, primarily creating a pretext for justifying ethnic separation and incommensurability.

Methodological Criticism

Francis Bacon's *Novum Organum* and Giambattista's Vico's *New Science*³⁶¹ are not merely "new" because of the revolutionary principles they offer for scientists, but also for their systematic analysis of the plurality of scientific traditions. Bacon relates the differences to methods and objects, while Vico presents the idea of local differences as well. Both offer an idea of universality – Bacon methodological, Vico linguistic – which would make the scientific quest more effective. The idea is to abstain from individual emotions, such as Bacon saw in scientist's interest and Vico in national pride. Science has to be objective, not stained by any prejudices, if she is to bring something fruitful – something capable of working anywhere in the world. It has to include practices which are not necessarily pleasant, and thus a scientist has to turn off his moods, affiliations and emotions in order to discipline himself to work perfectly.

The majority of precedent works which described the nature of science followed two main patterns: encyclopedic and critical – although their difference is more or less arbitrary, depending on the reader. Encyclopedic works are descriptive: they place various traditions of thought in parallel, without aspiring to evaluate their veracity or coherence. Their goal is to present the richness of knowledge, not solutions to problematic questions. The author doesn't have to be aligned with any of the traditions presented in his work.

360 – Geertz 1985: 266f

361 – For their contributions to the "pre-historical" debate on ethnocentrism, cf. above p.10f.

Typical encyclopedic works are for example those of Diogenes Laertius and the *Placita philosophorum*³⁶². They give us an overview of many ancient theories and sources which would otherwise be unknown; a contemporary reader values their content especially for this very reason, even if Diogenes and the author of the *Placita* sometimes express their opinions. Critical works, on the other hand, are first of all polemic: they present clear relations, choose topics more overtly and distinguish the fruitful from the totally irrelevant. They are important for a single tradition, whose definition is the reason of the work's writing. Heresiological works like those of Job of Edessa and al-Ghazali, as well as many modern "encyclopediae" of science and philosophy³⁶³ tend to present the variety of traditions primarily in relations to their present worldview, either as "stray" views or steps in a line of progression.

The problem which any encyclopedic or critical work has to solve first is the relevance of its themes. Such a work is built similarly to a social group. First one has to define its scope and its borders. Any omitted topic would make the work lacking, compromising its richness and the strength of its arguments. On the other hand, the capability to exclude themes seemingly irrelevant or discordant with the whole makes the work coherent and soundly founded. Bacon and Vico use an absolute definition: science is the study of nature. The question is what can be considered "nature" and what can't. From the perspective of relevance, their answers vary a lot.

For Bacon, the group of scientists includes anyone interested in nature's works³⁶⁴. This description, however, implies a very clear dialectical identification. The main dialectical axis is between the "works" and "words". With nature – the world of mechanically representable, empirically observable phenomena – defined as the very object of science, his choice of audience immediately excludes speculative philosophers or theologians. *Novum Organum* doesn't allow hypotheses and broad metaphysical worldviews; it defines the scientist as one capable of deriving axioms from repeatable model situations. Errors in science, which his work enumerates, include both the preoccupation with a single phenomenon, which compromises an inquiry's relevance in any broader debate, and speculation, which drives the mind beyond its capabilities. On the

362 – cf. Daiber 1968

363 – e.g. cf. Legowicz 1986

364 – *New Organon* I, 5

other hand, he excludes other phenomena of voluntary action from the scope of science as well. Social phenomena like ethics, language or discourse – the "words" – are relevant only as far as they limit the cognitive faculties of man in his observation of "works"³⁶⁵.

Vico's text is somewhat more open than Bacon's, for it tries to find a place for social phenomena in science as well. Although local social phenomena are still considered to be limitations in the attempt to understand the workings of nature, they are important subjects of science as well. On the other hand, they require specific methods of analysis. He criticizes at once primordialism both in the understanding of nations³⁶⁶ as well as in science (the idea of perennial philosophy³⁶⁷). Science, as the business of particular persons, is for him still primarily a "national" phenomenon: certain languages are better suited for scientific reasoning, especially ancient Greek³⁶⁸, some worse. Yet none of them can itself be considered the source of science. Vico's goal is to uncover a common framework for all languages and to prove that their limits are merely local and that, potentially, any human is capable of scientific reasoning. Seeing scientific reasoning as a highly developed kind of language, he tries to formulate a philosophical history along Cratylean lines, developing from primitive, passionate utterances, through wondering, symbolisms, superstitions and poetry. Differences between nations emerged through the variety caused by the isolation of nations from each other; scientific progress is caused by the subsequent refinement of national cultures.

For both theses, scientific traditions are phenomena, which can be localized both spatially and temporarily. Although their development requires a certain cultural base – financial support for academia and communication systems in Bacon's case, refined language and urban civilization in Vico's – for self-sustainment, they exist merely within these cultures or nations as cooperative, low-level groups. The mere presence of ideas within a culture is irrelevant; character and mentality are insufficient for the scientific tradition to emerge. Bacon and Vico both see science as a possible way towards a universal rationality³⁶⁹, but differ from each other in their exclusivism. Bacon defines non-

365 – *New Organon* I, 59

366 – *New Science* §126

367 – *New Science* §127

368 – *New Science* §159

369 – *Advancement* II, I, 13

natural, and thus non-scientific, topics: universal categories, which can be applied to any local tradition of thought. Vico goes the other way, starting from locally defined scopes, which may then become universally relevant. He even stresses the need to overcome this "ethnocentrism" and share one's thoughts with others, because otherwise, the findings of individual traditions may fade out with the nation, in which they exist.

Political Uses

While Bacon and Vico most probably never had uttered the word "ethnocentrism", their works paved the way for the exclusivism of thought traditions on the grounds of specific group identities. Yet there is still a strong descriptive moment in their works: *idola* and *boria* are observable phenomena, which aren't specific for particular groups. While one could read their texts as criticisms against those who write "as theologians" or "as Swedish", but surely not because they write "for theologians" or "for Swedish". Affiliation wasn't a problem for them; the discourse was more methodological than political. The identification of ethnocentrism as one's own limitation and at the same time as the attitude of an aspiring missionary is a modern, or rather a postmodern, line of thought. For thinkers like Derrida, Said and Foucault, the question isn't what can be known, but rather why some people want to know this or that (and not something else).

One of the aims of this text was to search for the source of the pejorative meaning of ethnocentrism – the turning point at which the *analysis* of the local factors of science was replaced by the *polemics* against the ethnocentrist thinker. The earliest discovered instance was that in Derrida's work *On Grammatology*, which was also one of the first to bring the term into "hard" philosophy. Within the book, the term "ethnocentrism" unifies the negative associations of earlier research, linking it to primitive, pre-scientific periods³⁷⁰; it is even considered a "sickness"³⁷¹, and an important facet of his work is to provide a way, in which ethnocentrism can be avoided and delegitimized³⁷². Already in Derrida's view, ethnocentrism includes the claim of universality³⁷³ of scientific works, as well as praise for

370 – Derrida 1997: 40, 83

371 – Derrida 1997: 212

372 – Derrida 1997: 56

373 – Derrida 1997: 132

the political goals of a collective³⁷⁴. Direct political programs and scientific aberrations were yet to be found; writing and history were fields too broad to harness the critical potential of this term in a debate.

One instance in which tries the author to "avoid and delegitimize" ethnocentrism in Derrida's sense is that of Edward Said. According to his views in *Orientalism*, many scientific traditions, especially those of history, anthropology, sociology and others of a generally humanistic nature, follow the needs and political expressions of a Western or (Western-) European culture. These needs are already expressed in their disciplinary scope. The epistemology and ontology of their object is inseparable from their political attitude towards it³⁷⁵. In this way, Said thinks, Western political colonialism remains active within the scientific field. The works of Renan or Evans-Pritchard aren't seen as inherently false; rather, the problem is in the choice of topics which make up the "borders" of their scope. They define what should be seen as an object and what shouldn't – while Said compares this to colonialism and its understanding of conquerable land. As I've already mentioned in the second chapter of this section, it isn't totally clear whether he sees the allegiance between science and politics in the West as an "error" caused by passion and conceit, as Vico does, or rather by conscious affiliation with the political nation (or a broader, Western culture), as propagated by Bacon. Said criticized his objects for both their methodological limitations and their political bias. These two are practically set in equivalence. In comparison to Sumner's or Levinson's views, his approach to ethnocentrism is *purely* polemical, addressed towards scientists of the criticized disciplines.

Michel Foucault's examples in his 1976 lectures, which I've already addressed above³⁷⁶, show another kind of a narrative, which works not only within the presupposed paradigm of "scientificity" but also that of French history. Here, Foucault shows that a scientific discipline doesn't define only its scope and methods, but also provides enough space for political expressions. Objects of historiography are modelled along the patterns of present conflicts: the original equality of nobles versus the king, or the indigenous roots of the Third Estate versus the aristocracy, considered Germanic and foreign. Group

374 – Derrida 1997: 296

375 – Said 1978: 3

376 – in the second chapter of this section, p.68

construction is already marked by conscious affiliation with one of these groups, as well as by the exclusion of other thinkers, not always explicitly named, who are categorized as natural supporters of the opposing party. Unlike the Orient of Said's analysis, both the reformist and anti-reformist of Foucault's lectures are supposed to have a political program, which they support by the same means. Historical research serves to reactivate ancient conflicts within a new, yet still very easily localizable field, namely a scientific discipline.

Yet these thinkers aren't criticized for their diminishment of ethno-specifically relevant points of history, as in Rüsen's work³⁷⁷. The existence of a local historical discourse here isn't aimed at export. It remains inside the "culture", the high-level unit comprising the parties of the ongoing conflict, correctly identifying its nature as different from that of a low-level, politically aligned and active group. The understanding of the political and polemical loads of social disciplines like historiography and anthropology is very similar between Foucault and Said, but they differ a lot in their understanding of political agents³⁷⁸. The term for the group itself can serve as the external identification of an object – a scientific work – with an adjacent high-level group. To call somebody an ethnocentrist can be merely to identify his thoughts with those of his alleged ingroup's ideology, mythology, or simply linguistic or anthropological character. In early modern analyses by Bacon and Vico of the local determination of one's thoughts, the scope is merely methodological, aimed at the perfection of their respective disciplines.

Such description can be, however, very easily turned to polemics when we start to describe one's intentions as determined by his ingroup's interests, his understanding of outgroups as reflecting political boundaries and foreign relations or his findings as strengthening his ingroup's scientific arsenal. Although such relations may exist, can we speak of any group's *interests*? In how far do individual views about the "other" reflect politics? Do our thoughts about society make it stronger? And finally, is this "strength" of any society also in our personal interest?

377 – Rüsen 2002: 4-6

378 – cf. the preceding chapter

Conclusion

The original theories of ethnocentrism by Sumner and Levinson worked primarily with the conformamnce of individuals to ideas, which were common to the whole group. After a good century of discourse about ethnocentrism, three general functions – reasons behind the term's use – can be identified. The earliest part of the discourse was characterized by the *purely descriptive* function of the term, attempting to critically reflect and unify the common sense ideas about nationalism and chauvinism. The most basic use is merely descriptive: ethnocentrism can be an object of study, a *theme*, as well, yet without any ethical or ideological attachment. The value of a term used in this meaning depends merely on the truth behind it: whether the description corresponds to reality, whether the formulation or definition is sound enough to be fruitful in further discourse, or the extent to which the phenomena described by it can be considered different as a class from other phenomena, described by something else. It is hard for the description of these phenomena to be totally devoid of any subjective, evaluative input. Anyway, in works like those of Ibn Khaldun, Hroch, Levinson, Lévi-Strauss, Coser, Merton, Levine and Campbell, Wenskus, Van der Dennen and Tuan, the question as to whether nationalism or ethnocentrism are acceptable motives for human activity is not explicitly stated. It is considered a reality, a possible object of science thanks to its (nearly) universal spread around the world. This doesn't mean that these authors were unaware of the conflict potential and destructivity of prejudices, nor that they were unaware of the criticisms, which I'd call *polemically descriptive* uses. They just try to abstain from searching for solutions or believe that an exhaustive analysis and awareness of the situation is a sufficient solution in and of itself.

The polemically descriptive function of the term combines analysis with a certain author's evaluation, which thus comes to the center of his work. Machiavelli, Sumner, Benedict, Van den Berghe, Billig, Benhabib and Geertz (in some of his works) all search for the effects of ethnocentrism or simple loyalty towards social groups. Its effects on high-level group cohesion, openness of mind, its aggressivity towards foreign countries, the protection of an individual's rights, etc., aren't seen here as something distant. The political situation and local customs are felt by these authors as well, while they try not only to describe them, but also somewhat to turn the attention of their readers toward them, to get them to form an opinion, if not take action. Ethnocentrism itself isn't the main point of their

works; that it is its effects, namely groupthink, aggressivity, injustice or close-mindedness. The goal of such works isn't mere understanding, but primarily to make a solution possible. It is more an issue than a mere theme, it is used for description, but followed by polemics as well. It is natural, but not desirable; it can be interesting, searched for and observed by a researcher like a smallpox epidemic, but one wouldn't like to catch the illness personally. With ethnocentrism seen so medically, it is a kind of social illness, causing strife, wars or simply supremacist worldviews. As a cause of violence and hatred, but also of misguided worldviews and superficial representations, ethnocentrism is looked upon as a problem, which has to be solved, not merely described. Identifying the causes and the relations of the phenomenon with other, better known areas, can help its eradication.

Finally, but not least, there are works of secondary discourse, which criticize the methods and ideas of other thinkers as ethnocentric. It isn't always important, how far these criticized works are determined by membership or ingroup perception, or to what extent formulate or establish the border. Such works work with a specific, *purely polemical* function of the term. They aren't aiming necessarily at action within the social sphere, but rather they aim at the validity and reinterpretation of individual works, if not whole scientific disciplines and traditions.

The purely polemical function isn't simply one of the three possible discourses about an object discussed here. It is, so to say, the most self-reflective and philosophical one of them. It is sometimes the very scientific character of such works, which is being discussed – Bacon, Vico, Amin, Said, Rorty, Waldenfels, Foucault and Derrida, and Geertz in some works as well, place works from various traditions alongside each other. "Targets" of their criticism are put into specific categories, which don't follow the lines of traditions, but rather of ethnic or cultural backgrounds, be they linguistic, religious or even territorial. It is also a quite philosophical function due to the attempt to redefine the borders of scientific disciplines and also to analyze the capabilities of an individual to go beyond these borders. The definitions by Waldenfels or Wimmer don't merely describe the phenomenon in the outside world, nor do they always follow the pattern of its uncritical eradication. From a subjective point of view, those who don't do so, limit themselves. The third function of the term is thus to criticize the others: thinkers not showing such a self-reflection. The "other" can consequently be defined precisely as an outgroup – as a thinker who doesn't share the idea of taming and overcoming our own ethnocentrism.

This text itself is, so to say, working within a tradition preferring to use the term mostly in its purely polemical function. I'm not going to change that, though. In the following section, I'm going to present a short systematic overview of the findings from this analytical part, and also to critically reflect on a historical tradition of thought which was modelled using this purely polemical function. Any polemics I present won't be merely descriptive, for I'm part of these traditions, not only as a member of a certain high-level group, but also as an individual who is under the direct influence of their works. It isn't possible to abstain from all attempts to evaluate them from the aspects, which were already taken as critical (fruitfulness, isolationism, political allegiance) and, I believe, it wouldn't be fruitful either.

C. Synthesis

In the previous sections, I tried to outline the development of the idea of "ethnocentrism" into a concept, though it remains on the fuzzy border between science and opinion. Alleged ethnocentrism in thought gives rise to questions about the group or the effects of such thinking, but these also define the field, outside of which the concept loses its functions. It is senseless to speak of ethnocentrism when we don't have a certain group as a radical example of its inspirative power – the salvatory Church, civilizing France, the liberating Proletariate. It is also very hard to avoid any notion of identification or its power (be it conscious or unconscious) in inspiring acts or opinions which can consequently be seen as ethnocentrist: science becomes a vanguard of imperialism, and politics becomes crucial for scientific categories. The disciplines of science working with "natural groups" and membership in them can't be totally devoided of the political potential they produce. National historical narratives and sectarian allegiances in theology are among the most vivid examples of science emulating or inspired by political workings.

I. Case Study: The Place of Ľudovít Štúr in National History

What makes Slovak nationalism interesting from the viewpoint of the study of ethnocentrism? I could argue from a merely subjective viewpoint: I can't reflect on another national tradition better than the one I have written in my ID card. However, it is also an example of an identity with a definition that has shifted frequently. These shifts reflected various social divisions present in 19th century society – estate, religion, language – but in many cases also individual choices, aims and identifications. Historical narratives and artistic impressions weren't merely influential on national politics: historians and artists were practically both political and intellectual leaders of the nation they defined. This trend wasn't limited to nations such as that of the Slovaks, which was categorized as "small" for its numbers and lack of political power by Hroch³⁷⁹, but also can be seen in the Hungarian

379 – cf. Hroch 1985: 98-106; The first politically active groups using the name "Slovak" were active in the 19th century, of which the strongest was actually Štúr's circle. Although many politicians and soldiers of Slovak origin helped in the constitution of Czechoslovakia after WW1, Slovakia appeared as an autonomous body only in the form of a German puppet state during WW2 and later, since 1968, as a part of federal CSSR.

historical "mainstream", in historical Prussia and among the Poles as well³⁸⁰. Ľudovít Štúr, the first notable "Slovak patriot"³⁸¹ and the codifier of the modern Slovak language, was a student of theology and philosophy, as well as of history and linguistics. The tendency of toward historicism can be seen in the works of other such patriots as well: Ján Kollár, Palacký, Vajanský and others³⁸², though not all of them – in fact, only Vajanský in his later works – stressed (Czecho-)Slovak exclusivity within the proposed Slavic nation. The others promoted the position of Pan Slavism. Conflicts, in which their ingroup's borders were shaped in contrast to Russian, Hungarian and Czech, were very often fought on a scientific level, with only occasional escalations of violence, mostly developing within wider-scale regional wars, with the proponents of violence having more or less only symbolic contributions.

In this chapter I'll try to outline the role of Štúr and his mythos in the development of this identity, as well as some of the causes behind the persisting influence of its primordialist interpretation. I'll try to show how the variety of instruments of identification was diminished by selecting certain differences as critical and subordinating the rest as mere contrasts of national character.

Definition of the Nation

Koloman Tisza, the Prime Minister of Hungary, declared in 1875 that "*there is no Slovak nation*"³⁸³. Although present Slovak historians tend to use this declaration as the prime example of chauvinism in the Hungarian post-*Ausgleich* ideology³⁸⁴, it did bear some truth. It has been argued that the Hungarian idea of nation was defined mostly politically and historically³⁸⁵. As a group, its definition was primarily traditional, but based on continuity: although Hungary was no longer a sovereign kingdom, as it had been in the Middle Ages, its aristocracy preserved its privileges and was apt to transform them into the status of a modern nation-state, at least within the federal union with Austria.

380 – Seton-Watson 1913: 16f

381 – Hroch 1985: 98

382 – Seton-Watson 1913: 20

383 – Hroch 1985: 99

384 – Čaplovič 2007: 14

385 – Nakazawa 2007: 155

This definition left Slovak intellectuals, and similarly Romanians in Transylvania and Ruthenians in the north-east, outside the political mainstream. Medieval history doesn't know of distinct a "Slovak" tribe as a political unit. Although 17th century history spoke of *Tóthország*, "Slavic lands", as the northern portion of the country under the control of rebellious count Thököly, it didn't provide any connection to the *Tóths* themselves, being a name used for both Slavs in general and northern Hungarian Slavs in particular. The Slovak ethnonym, in the end, is a cognate of "Slav" as well. The difference between its masculine (*Slovák*), feminine (*Slovenka*) and adjective (*slovenský*) forms also shows the confusion in distinguishing the ethnies within the wider group of Slavs³⁸⁶.

The need for a historical tradition and the clues in linguistics led Štúr to propagate the short-lived 9th century realm of Great Moravia, especially during the rule of Svätopluk (Zwentibald) of Nitra, once called *rex sclavorum* by the Pope himself – as the first "Slovak" state³⁸⁷. This interpretation is often repeated by nationalist historians³⁸⁸. Nitra had an important position: being the first attested "Slavic" bishopric, the lack of information about its conquest by Magyars in the 10th century left an open space for speculation about its role in the constitution and christianization of Hungary. Štúr's position was that Nitra was able to resist the initial invasion, but subsequently joined the formation of the new kingdom as soon as its leader, Vajk (later King Stephen), was baptized³⁸⁹. The interpretation of Hungary as a successor state of Nitra undoubtedly played a major role in Štúr's aims to reform the country, instead of creating a new, separate Slavic state.

A competing view was proposed by Ján Kollár. The Magyar conquest was for him a politically important turn of events, in which the continuity of the Slavic principalities east of the Morava river was broken³⁹⁰. On the other hand, their population retained its cultural ties with Slavs on the right bank. While Kollár distanced himself from politics, the Pan Slavist movement, highly based on his teachings, thus promoted the political reflection of these

386 – Štúr 1943: 18

387 – Štúr 1935: 4; In the 9th century, the Latin term *sclaveni* was used mostly as an external identifier of settled, often pagan tribes on the eastern Frankish border, with power centered around fortified towns, or *gradové*. However, its native form, *slověně*, is attested as an ethnic self-designation first in the 12th century Primary Chronicle of Nestor (cf. the end line of Curta 2004).

388 – e.g. Ďurica 1996: 8f

389 – Štúr 1935: 4

390 – *Hlasové* p.11-13

cultural similarities and became highly adversary toward Hungary³⁹¹. These positions later intermingled, with many thinkers actually abandoning one view in favor of the other in their later lives³⁹². Finally, contemporary attempts to unify these differing views within a single tradition of "Slovak national awakening", stress the futility of attempts to integrate within both the Hungarian and the Czech (or wider Slavic) cultures³⁹³.

Another problem is the question of *autochtonity* of Slovaks: the search for prehistoric, or at least pre-Hungarian clues to the Slavic ethnicity of the local population. The main point of this discussion is whether Slovak lands were the *Urheimat*, from which Slavic migrations of the 6th century proceeded, or rather their destination. This debate proceeded mostly "outwards", that is, migrationists were seen as "Magyarones" or "Hegelians", supporters of anti-Slovak views, and autochtonists as pro-Slovak thinkers. Since the 18th century, the majority of Hungarian thinkers have promoted the narrative of the *Honfoglalás*: At the time when Magyar tribes conquered the Carpathian Basin, it was in a state of political vacuum, left by Charlemagne's campaigns against the Avars³⁹⁴. All of the emergent Slavic principalities were subdued or fled the land, mostly to Bulgaria³⁹⁵. The continuity between the empires of Hungary, the Avars and even the Huns was seen as a tradition of nomadic, militaristic state-crafters, in contrast with anarchistic but hard-working Slavic sedentary population³⁹⁶.

Promoting the autochtonity of Slavs thus fulfilled two functions, on the one hand providing a clear distinction against the "nomads", and on the other questioning their right to claim the land. Great Moravia also functioned here as an argument against the lack of historical continuity³⁹⁷. However, the briefness of its existence, attributed to the primordial Slavic anarchism³⁹⁸, had to be interpreted against those who thought that Avar traditions

391 – Osuský 1936: 163

392 – Maxwell 2009: 137-139

393 – e.g. Hroch 1985: 98; Ďurica 1996: 114

394 – However, more recent theories speak of more fluent migration between the Pontic Steppe (especially the Lower Dnieper area) and the Carpathian Basin. The migration ensued in both directions. Cf. László 1978

395 – This version is also attested to in the Bulgarian *Legend of St Naum*

396 – This concept in fact didn't set nomads against the Slavs, but rather against Germanic tribes: Attila is seen by Šafárik as a "liberator" of the Antes, a Slavic tribe under Gothic dominion (*Starožitnosti* §23, 1).

397 – Avenarius 1976: 189

398 – cf. Štúr 1852 DE: 10; Štúr was amazed (probably referring to the Hegel's theory that Germany – i.e. the empire founded by the Saxon and Ottonian dynasty – was integrated in reaction to Norse and Magyar

had remained strong even throughout the 9th century³⁹⁹. This instance of performative identification is an important part of the historical narrative calling itself "Slovak" to this day.

The third critical difference, which is at first sight the most "ethnocentrist" one, is the dominant self-presentation of Slovakia as part of *Central* Europe. This doesn't include merely the popular search for the geographic "midpoints" of Europe, claims of the location of which Wikipedia knows at least seven examples⁴⁰⁰. Centrality reflects itself on various axes: allegiance to Catholic Christianity and the German cultural sphere, contrast with the countries of the Balkan peninsula or Eastern Europe, and the stress upon regional similarities rather than purely linguistic ones⁴⁰¹. This question is important for the distinction between the Pan Slavist movement on the one side and particular national, regional or compound (Illyrian, Czechoslovak, the "Little Entente" of 1920, and also earlier conceptions such as Štúr's idea of supraethnic Hungarian nation) movements on the other, yet the influence on Slovak nation-building was only minimal and came quite late⁴⁰².

Nationalist Views of Štúr

It can be said that up to the present his person has never aroused at cult in Slovakia similar to that of national heroes like Kossuth for Hungary⁴⁰³ or Levski for Bulgaria⁴⁰⁴, but he has still enjoyed a prominent position throughout the various ruling ideologies. His name became widely popular during the First Republic (1918-1938): although Osuský⁴⁰⁵ had already expressed his discontent that the greatest Slovak patriot didn't even have a biography, by 1943 is he was counted among the favorite authors of the new "national

raids in the 10th century) that "*if Slavs somewhere had a sufficient reason to create strong, powerful states, it was surely there, where they were in contact with the foreign nations, i.e. on Elbe, Oder and Lower Danube; however, exactly there we see the opposite.*" (my translation)

399 – cf. Pohl 1988: 323f

400 – http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Geographical_midpoint_of_Europe, 25.9.2013

401 – Todorova 1997: 147

402 – e.g. Masaryk 1924: 504-508

403 – e.g. cf. <http://hungarianspectrum.wordpress.com/2011/06/13/the-kossuth-cult-and-the-orban-syndrome/>, 25.9.2013

404 – cf. Todorova 2007

405 – Osuský 1936: 35

hero", the Catholic priest Andrej Hlinka⁴⁰⁶, while Matula⁴⁰⁷, writing in the 1950s, saw him as the great leader of Slovak national awakening. Critical assessments of his role vary greatly. Hroch as well considers him a Slovak patriot, placing him at the heart of the agitative phase of Slovak nation-building, although his movement didn't develop after his death; later on, Hlinka was important for its mobilization. For Ďurica's narrative, in his eloquent and sometimes even far-fetched style, Štúr is the most important representative of Slovaks during the Kossuth Revolution, the commander of their first army, and even the founder of the first government⁴⁰⁸.

The fact is, he was neither a great revolutionary nor a moral symbol in his own time. He was neither supported by the masses, nor was his name well-known at the moment when Royal Hungary was dissolved (1918). His personality first became interesting to biographers and thinkers in the consequent years. Maxwell thinks⁴⁰⁹ Štúr earned a major position in the historical narrative first thanks to his codification of the language, later variants of which were adopted by the new Czechoslovak administration as well. According to Maxwell, the decision to adopt two official languages for a single state-nation had a strong alienating effect: use of different standards of grammar (despite their mutual comprehensibility) made it very clear who was speaking or writing in Czech and who in Slovak, and thus who belonged to which of the respective ethnies. In this way, the ruling elites of the country made a mistake which was, as Maxwell concludes, counter-productive for promotion of a united Czechoslovak nationality. We may think about what would have happened, if they had adopted a standard comprehensible to the whole population, like the language of Kralice Bible⁴¹⁰.

This constructivism, which not only Maxwell, but also Hroch, Gellner and many others, have identified, is important for explaining the turbulent events of the 1930s, but it doesn't help us understand the functioning, or even the very existence, of "pro-Slovak"

406 – Faguľa 1943: 15

407 – Matula 1956: 5

408 – Ďurica 1996: 79

409 – Maxwell 2009: 166f

410 – Maxwell 2009: 77; Similarly to the case of the 9th century translation of the Bible by Constantine the Philosopher (Old Church Slavonic), this 16th century Bible became the source for orthography and grammar for most of its users: Protestants, speaking Slavic vernaculars throughout the Czech lands and Hungary. Foremost, it was a widely used language of literature among Hungarian Slavs, together with the Croatian redaction of Church Slavonic. Also cf. Ján Kollár's *Hlasové*, cited in this work above (n.343 and n.390)

groups as early as 1918 and before. The strongest one of these – and the one most hostile to the Czechoslovak establishment – was the People's Party led by Hlinka. This party was officially founded in 1913, but many of its members were active even earlier within the ranks of its all-Hungarian predecessor, Néppart. In comparison to the ruling circles, which were mostly based on the support of the urban population, the People's Party had more supporters among the lower clergy and the peasantry. These circles propagated education as well; one of the reasons behind Hlinka's parting with Néppart was the party's support for laws banning languages other than Magyar in elementary schools⁴¹¹.

His opinion about joining Czechoslovakia was unstable at best. After his initial support for the newly emerging republic, he started to criticize its constitution and the influence of the Czech culture upon the Slovak one, and called for the autonomy of Slovakia within the country. This change of opinion, which wasn't adopted by his party immediately, was explained in various ways⁴¹². The argument was mostly populist: the influx of Czech teachers and doctors to the eastern part of the country was described as a job-taking immigration⁴¹³, and was thought to have even wider cultural consequences. The elections in 1920, won by social democrats, only supported his expressed opinion that through cooperations with Czechs, the Slovak "Catholic spirit" was being "endangered" by the influence of socialist thought⁴¹⁴.

The People's Party also needed to review its political strategy after its previous main theme – the defence of the local culture and language – was resolved. Štúr's main political theme wasn't valid any more. The sudden break of the economic ties between Slovakia and the southern parts of Hungary had profound effects on its industry, which was visible in various crises throughout the 1920s. The failures of the immediate solutions

411 – Maxwell 2009: 141f

412 – cf. Kramer 1962: 72; Among the arguments was the influence of his party colleague Ferdinand Jehlička, who later moved to Budapest and became the major voice for reunification of Slovakia and Hungary; the government's hesitation to support his initiative to create a separate Church province; and also Hlinka's personal ambitions. Kramer, following the tenets of the official history of the 1960's, argues for Hlinka's fear of communist ideas, which could spread easily among the emerging class of industrial workers.

413 – Ďurica 1996: 114

414 – Ďurica 1996: 116; It should be noted Hlinka (and Ďurica too for that matter) criticized primarily the immigration of middle-class, educated people to Slovak cities. The migration of factory and agricultural workers, proceeding in both directions (and massively abroad as well), wasn't seen as an important factor.

proposed by ruling the social democrats were easily interpreted by the People's Party as effects of the prioritization of Czech industry. The party became the main proponent of Slovak autonomy within the country, supported as well by parties representing the German and Hungarian minority. The axes of self-identification had to be actualized as well. Notwithstanding changes in actual political debates, the primary political force in Slovakia saw its – still primordialistically understood – national spirit as defined more by aspects of religion and territory than by the language itself. Kramer mentions an instance where Hlinka appealed also to the linguistic differences between Czechs and Slovaks⁴¹⁵, but his main argument was still aimed against the anti-clerical fervor of communists and Hussites, which were seen as a foreign threat to the nation's piety⁴¹⁶. The political fight for workers' votes became crucial for creating a new definition of the nation he wanted to lead. Focusing on the actual social strata, the emphasized difference shifted from Slavic/Magyar to Czech/Slovak; the aristocracy, seen as the main carrier of the cultural-engineering Magyar enemy, were replaced by the social-engineering, communist and free-thinking Czechs.

The politicization of language seems to have been rather something of a secondary effect of these policies. Štúr, himself a Protestant and urban intellectual – and one who studied in Germany at that – wasn't exactly Hlinka's ideal Slovak. Štúr would only barely pass as Slovak given the critical difference as set by the People's Party narrative, but still his evocation could serve as a sign of the Party's openness. He had an really important role, although at first only a limited one: he was evoked by a younger generation of Slovak grammarians, who saw the further revisions of language in late 1920s as assimilating attempts to make it closer to Czech⁴¹⁷. Maxwell's argument thus didn't have to be abandoned at all: due to its interconfessional spread, his version of politics surrounding the choice of language was a good tool for the further expression of one's commitment to the national movement. The effect of learning two languages in the country wasn't only the extension of literate population capable of using the language, but also the very politicization of such uses.

415 – Kramer 1962: 81f; Also interesting is Hlinka's reference to Samo Czambel, a linguist who focused his work on similarities between Slovak and South Slavic languages.

416 – Kramer 1962: 38 (against Hussites), p.48 (against communist movement)

417 – Maxwell 2009: 168

Non-Nationalist Views of Štúr

During WW2, the People's Party rose to the leading position within a formally independent Slovak Republic, a satellite state of Nazi Germany, declared after the occupation of Bohemia and Moravia. A Czechoslovak government-in-exile was formed shortly thereafter in London. After the war and the country's reunification, the People's Party was banned, marked as collaborationist and clerical-fascist, and its leader, Jozef Tiso, executed. However, this didn't mean the end of Slovak exclusivism. Shortly before the Red Army reached the borders of the country, Nazi Germany sent SS forces to deal with local guerillas. Two divisions of the Slovak army declared loyalty to the government-in-exile and fighting bursted out between them and the SS. Despite the rebels' ultimate failure to meet their main objective – to connect with the 1st Ukrainian Front of the Red Army fighting on the border⁴¹⁸ – the event afterwards came to be called the "Slovak National Uprising". As command of the revolting divisions was delegated by the government-in-exile, the communist historical narrative focused on the heroism of the common soldier instead⁴¹⁹. They celebrated the willingness to continue to fight – alongside the Soviet partisans – even after the army's defeat, and linked it to previous battles of mostly small-scale and asymmetric natures, fought between Slovaks and their oppressors. The "revolutionary potential" of the "national character" was consequently expressed in various symbols throughout the communist era⁴²⁰.

Miroslav Hroch, one of the main theoretists in the field of national studies, doesn't omit the revolutionary potential of national awakenings. In Hroch's understanding, Slovaks were a dynamic group, coming through phase "B" (that is, of agitation) in Štúr's time (the

418 – It is questionable in how far, if ever, the operations between the rebel command in Banská Bystrica and the guerillas were coordinated. Many of the guerillas acted autonomously or under directives from the secret Communist Party headquarters in Košice.

419 – Kšiňan 2012: 30

420 – The coat of arms of the Slovak Socialist Republic, a federal part of Czechoslovakia after 1960, replaced the double cross symbol with a flame on a mountain. This was a symbol of the "mountain lads" (*hómi chlapi*), monarchy-era bandits seen as a type of popular resistance against feudal oppression, and as precursors of the new image of the communist guerilla warrior. Juraj Jánošík, the most famous of the bandits, also gave his name to one of these guerilla brigades. One of Bratislava's main city squares, as well as the largest bridge built in the 1970s are both named after the uprising. Although City Hall changed the bridge's name to *Nový most* (New Bridge) in 1993, the name was changed back in 2012. A sure sign of the continued popularity of the event, a large reggae music festival called Uprising takes place in Bratislava annually on the weekend nearest to the 29th August, the uprising's anniversary. For a more detailed list of Uprising-centered rituals and symbols cf. Kšiňan 2012: 13-27

late 1840s). His own definition of a nation followed a Marxist tradition which at first replaced nationality as the main high-level (or "large social" in Hroch's terminology⁴²¹) identity with that of socioeconomic class. Marx and Engels saw nationalism as an ideology of the bourgeois elite and the idea of a nation as its product⁴²². The debate in Marxist circles started first in the early 20th century, based especially on the views proposed by Otto Bauer and Stalin⁴²³. Common to both is the criticism of essentialist views: nations are seen as "historical coincidences"⁴²⁴. Identifications are due to external observations and can't be reduced to mere nature⁴²⁵ or subjective choice⁴²⁶. Although Stalin's definition gained prominence with his political rise in the following decades, it was no longer authoritative at the end of 1960s. He was criticized for underestimating the effect of political relations and also for omitting the notion of national consciousness (*uvědomění*), i.e. of subjective identification in the process of nation-building⁴²⁷.

But Hroch accepts only some of the Marxist theses. He acknowledges the idea that the change from the feudal to the bourgeois social base is crucial for the development of nationalism, but not for the nation itself. Rather, he saw this change as leading merely to centralism, for which nationalism was an important ideology. As we've seen in the debate on the various aspirations of ethnocentrism (chapter B/III), in Hroch's view a newly emerged nationalism can lead to (at least) two different attitudes. Here he breaks radically with Engels: while more powerful nations tend to develop nationalism as an ideology of centralism and expansion, stressing their right to conquer smaller ones, in the less powerful it is a more defensive, egalitarian, separative movement, popular more among the masses than the elite. Thus, Hroch concludes, the nationalism of smaller nations in fact

421 – Hroch 1985: 4

422 – Manifesto (ch.2) is clear in this respect: "*The working men have no country.*"; On the other hand, Rosdolsky already (1965) collected Engels' articles showing his opinions on nationality. Engels operated largely with the contrast between *geschichtslose* and *revolutionäre Völker*, taken directly from Hegel. According to Engels (quot.in Rosdolsky 1965: 3), only state-holding peoples, like Hungarians in 1848, are capable of carrying out a revolution; stateless peoples were apt to support the reaction, as Štúr and Croats in fact did. Rosdolsky criticizes these views as state-centric and ignorant of class distinctions within particular nations, and furthermore in contradiction with the universalist tendency of the Manifesto.

423 – Hroch 1971: 18

424 – Bauer (2000: 23) calls it "spiritualism". However, Stalin (1913: 1) criticizes Bauer's notion of "national character" on the same grounds.

425 – Bauer 2000: 34f

426 – Stalin, in contrast to Bauer, introduced his own kind of environmental determinism into the debate. Trying to avoid the formulation "national character", he speaks of "psychological make-up", "*developed from generation to generation as a result of dissimilar conditions of existence*" (1913: 1)

427 – Hroch 1971: 18

tends to conform much more with proletarian internationalism⁴²⁸. Political and economic relations are only two structures among many (religious, linguistic, cultural, territorial) which can be used as reference points by dominant or oppressed groups either to support their right for expansion and domination or to defend themselves a defence against it⁴²⁹. Nationalism thus isn't expressed only by certain policies and opinions, but also through various – e.g., religious, literary, linguistic, etc. – ways, depending on which structures are is important for the identification of the nation. A nation isn't for Hroch a "historical coincidence" but rather a long-lasting set of structures, while nationalism refers only to one or two similarities which can provide points of contrast (i.e., critical differences) to distinguish it from its neighbors.

In this view, Štúr's project is seen as an attempt to mobilize the masses on the grounds of a persisting linguistic structure, in an environment where political and economical relations are dominated by an expansive outgroup, i.e. Magyars. The introduction of the Magyar language to the administration and higher-level schools was interpreted as a systematic, top-down expansion, trying to homogenize the most powerful cultural structure first among the elites (rich nobility and clergy), and then among the middle class (lower clegy, major cities, intellectuals). Linguistic minorities within these social groups thus agitated first among the middle class (among lower clergy and smaller cities) and then among the peasantry as well as the emerging urban working class⁴³⁰. As the richest and poorest social groups were defined nearly primordially by the language and location, the middle class was seen as the only part of society, where one could "choose" his allegiance. It was also mobile enough to agitate in various cities throughout the "national territory". Most of the patriots "active" in Bratislava in the 19th century weren't born there, and most of the activity was concentrated in the cities of central Slovakia, such as Zvolen⁴³¹, where Štúr found his way to the Diet of Hungary.

Although the use of a particular language was seen by Hroch as the main critical difference⁴³², the limits imposed by territory seem to have been clear. On the other hand,

428 – Hroch 1971: 20

429 – Hroch 1985: 5

430 – Hroch 1985: 102

431 – Hroch 1985: 104

432 – Hroch 1985: 102; This view was taken by Hroch from an earlier historian, Hučko, to whom he contrasts his own "*selection of patriots who were engaged in literary activities in a definitely patriotic*

Hroch doesn't turn his attention to the patriotic communities active outside of the territory of the 1985-era Slovak Socialist Republic, thus omitting numerous very active communities in Prague, Pest, Békés in southern Hungary and in Vojvodina, as well as more in eastern Slovakia, even though some of their representatives openly identified themselves as Slovaks, and not as Czechs⁴³³.

The reason for their omission seems to me to be the use of the Reformation-era language of the Kralice Bible. Failing to fulfill the main criterion for identification with the Slovak revival movement as set by Hroch, they were left out of its "mainstream", which was quite arbitrarily limited to users of modern codifications. In fact, the place of the Kralice Bible language within Slovak cultural history is questionable. One issue is its self-description, as the pre-19th century linguists and users called it either "Slavic", "Czech" or some combination of the two⁴³⁴. After the Protestants of eastern Slovakia composed a critical treatise on Štúr's codification, his contemporary and supporter Hurban described its authors as "Czech voices" and their language as "biblical Czech"⁴³⁵. This name became a part of the national narrative about the event, and was also supported later by the People's Party magazine, *Slovák*, particularly on confessional grounds⁴³⁶. Disagreement with such a classification would of course be a mere replacement of the language-based definition of nation with a territorial one, as in Maxwell. Anyway, Hroch isn't dealing with the political movements of Štúr's or Hurban's time; he is ascribing them to political entities active in his own period.

spirit". However, when Hroch compared the social origins of his group to Hučko's results, the percentual structure was very similar.

433 – Maxwell 2009: 130

434 – Maxwell 2009: 87; Contemporary Slovak historians consider *bibličina* to be a historical form of the Czech language (<http://ii.fmph.uniba.sk/~filit/fvb/biblicina.html>, 25.9.2013); its spread in Slovakia is linked to the exodus of Protestant intellectuals after the Battle of White Mountain (1620) and its local modifications are described as consequent "slovakization". Both the naming and use of this language standard were controversial in the 19th century.

Although it still had a certain sacred status among Protestants around Štúr's time, it quickly became obsolete in the face of modern, more complex and more systematic grammars, which were created for Czech and Slovak standards independently. Called "Old Slovak" by its users and proponents, it was used for legal writings in the Slovak territory in the decade after the Kossuth Revolution; opponents of its use called it simply "Czech" (Ďurica 1996: 83; also cf. above, n.408)

435 – Maxwell 2009: 131f

436 – Maxwell 2009: 177; Although Štúr's codification was first effective only among Protestants, a revised version formulated in the 1850s by Martin Hattala, a Catholic, gained popularity among both communities within one generation.

Štúr's Own Views

Štúr's political activity can be placed into the context of the turbulent times of numerous European revolutions in 1848. In October 1847, the free royal city of Zolyóm, or Zvolen, delegated Štúr as its representative in the Diet of Hungary in today's Bratislava. Although his position wasn't directly involved with ethnicity, he was already known for his involvement in the Slovak question, actively writing to various newspapers and organizing cultural activities. His policy was from the beginning focused on this question. The primary issue was the declaration of the Hungarian language as the sole administrative and educational language in the country, to which he objected with a petition subscribed by numerous local intellectuals⁴³⁷. The Diet concentrated on other issues and, supported by mass demonstrations in Pest, in March 1848 it abolished the feudal obligations of peasants defined in rental documents, as well as similar obligations towards the Church and judicial privileges of nobility in the country. It declared Hungary a sovereign country in a mere personal union with Cisleithania, the Austrian part, and some of these changes were confirmed by Emperor Ferdinand a month later. Štúr himself, unable to find support in the Diet for his multilingual project, gave up his mandate in March as well. In the following months he turned his political attention to Croatian counter-revolutionaries, as well as intellectuals from the Czech and Ruthene circles, gaining even – as Ďurica claims⁴³⁸ – financial support from the Serbian prince. In September, an army led by Jelačić, the Ban of Croatia, marched out against Pest, while at the same time Štúr founded a council in Vienna organizing a volunteer corps, nominally loyal to the Emperor, against Hungarian revolutionaries. An armed conflict erupted, ending after nearly a year in August 1849.

Štúr's representation wasn't the only instance of a Slovak in a higher political position in the empire. However, the combination of systematic political action with linguistic and historical work was decisive both in the development of Slovak political orientation during the following decades and in the role and content of the historical discourse. It should be noted that despite Štúr's political support for the Emperor, he acknowledged many points proposed by the Diet, including the inclusion of peasants and

437 – Ďurica 1996: 78f

438 – Ďurica 1996: 80

small (non-royal) towns in the "political nation of Hungary" represented by the Diet⁴³⁹. In his earlier works, especially those concerning cultural rights, his understanding of contemporary Slovak ethnicity was based on linguistic and territorial definitions, characterized by the use of a Slavic language (in contrast to Hungarian- and German-speaking population) and settlement in the northern regions of the country (in contrast to Croats in Banat and Serbs in Vojvodina)⁴⁴⁰. Štúr worked with the historical neologism of "Ugro-Slavs", stressing their integration into a single, yet multilingual, Hungarian nation. This was a major point of Štúr's rhetorics against various proponents of linguistic magyarization, who operated with the suspicion that the Slavic intellectuals of Hungary conspired together with foreign Slavs, especially Russia, to subdue ethnic Magyars⁴⁴¹. To deflect these accusations, Štúr emphasized the unity of the Hungarian nation in the historical process, despite the linguistic differences between its particular ethnic communities.

Nakazawa⁴⁴² sees the historical view proposed by Štúr, based on the continuity of Great Moravia with contemporary Slovak communities, as an attempt to describe them as a traditionally constituted corporate subject. Such a subject, Sl. *obec* (community) or Latin *gens*, was characterized by continuous genealogical and cultural factors, nominally referring to the idea of various *gentes* under a single Crown, or *communitas regni* as an administrative term for corporate subjects. Towns and guilds were the smallest types of *communitas*, and states within the empire (having their own crown and diet – Austria, Bohemia, Hungary etc.) the largest ones. He saw medieval Hungary as an "ideally founded *obec*", common to both ethnic Slovaks and Magyars⁴⁴³. In this way, Nakazawa argues, he followed the tradition of self-description from earlier texts, constitutive of the contemporary order in Hungary. The linguistic definition of ethnic groups wasn't common in Hungary before the late 18th century. For example, the *natio Hungariae* in the treaty of Szathmár (1711) isn't named alongside Germans or Croats, with their institutions and freedoms, but rather alongside ancient Jazyges (Jassy), medieval Cumans and Haiducks,

439 – Nakazawa 2007: 159

440 – Štúr 1986 [1842]: 162f; Ruthenes, an East-Slavic-speaking ethnic group of the northeastern regions weren't yet mentioned in his text, but they appear in his political speeches from the end of the '40s (Nakazawa 2007: 169), as well as in some suggestions to reorganize Hungary on an ethnic basis, listed in detail by Ďurica (1996: 79).

441 – Štúr 1986 [1842]: 172

442 – Nakazawa 2007: 155

443 – Štúr 1986 [1842]: 149

a contemporary category⁴⁴⁴. The groups addressed in such documents were defined primarily by inherited privileges or the political situation. His later (1846) rhetoric distinguishes two *gentes*, i.e., separate communities of Slovaks and Magyars, but still sees them as components of a united Hungarian nation⁴⁴⁵.

On the other hand, his *Nárečja slovenskuo* also provides an alternative classification of the Slovak community within the Slavic nation. Štúr didn't distinguish "Slovak" as a separate "language" (*jazik*) of a nation (*národ*), but rather as a "dialect" (*nárečje*) specific to a locally defined tribe (*kmeň*). A *kmeň* is for Štúr still a high-level community, yet it is a genetic subordinate of the *národ*, which is defined as multiple tribes sharing the same national spirit and, with linguistic relations. Unlike Tisza's *nemzet*, he defined *národ* as merely a cultural and psychological unit, which, unlike a political nation, is prone to local changes based on the different social experiences of its members⁴⁴⁶. Štúr saw this inner diversity not only as an aesthetically valuable trait, but also as one with a future potential: he saw the capability to communicate different experiences between distant cultural "tribes" as national spirit's freshness, as its ability to contribute new ideas to the Civilization. Thus he compared the Slovak and Ruthene situation and that of the early Iron Age Hellenic tribes⁴⁴⁷. He criticized many of the integrative rhetorics of "Magyarones", considering the attempts to unify linguistic, cultural and political aspects of social life as a sign of their cultural poverty. The people with the most highly developed social life were for him the French, whose rich, separate vocabulary used for social activities specifically of a political or of a cultural nature he uses as an argument⁴⁴⁸. When speaking of the relation between one's nationality and soul, Štúr considered the present cultural wealth to have both aesthetic and productive value, and saw the main danger in the replacement of highly developed Indo-European languages (like Slavic and German) by an Uralic one, which he considered structurally and lexically inferior⁴⁴⁹.

444 – von Engel 1814: 253; The categories referred to specific groups enjoying privileges for their military service: e.g., the "Haiducks" meant the population of counties Hajdú and Bihar, which fought under Stephen Bocskay in the early 17th century.

445 – Nakazawa 2007: 163

446 – Štúr 1943 [1846]: 6

447 – Štúr 1943 [1846]: 7

448 – Štúr 1986 [1842]: 177

449 – Osuský 1936: 84; Štúr 1935: 8

In this way, it is hard to see Štúr as the first "Slovak patriot": his loyalty, i.e. his political allegiance, was defined in monarchist rather than nationalist terms. It was aimed towards the country, not the nation. We've seen that Štúr wasn't strict in his adherence to the Crown. Only after his unsuccessful lobbying against the attempts to define the Hungarian nation as monolingual, during the outbreak of revolution in March 1848, did Štúr turned to the idea of a new block of unified Slavic communities throughout the monarchy under the Habsburg Crown⁴⁵⁰. Rhetorically, he turned his attention to similar democratic movements in adjacent parts of the empire, but practically he supported counter-revolution. In this way, Slovaks were defined as an autonomous body, alongside Czechs, Ruthenes and Croats. The linguistic and territorial components of self-definition were invoked again, defining the hilly territory of the northern Carpathians as the ancient Slavic homeland and the plain of the Carpathian Basin as a place of migration for many different peoples, with Slovaks and Hungarians as only two among many settlers lured by its riches, and the tolerant kingdom as the only possible way to reign over such colorful mixture of peoples⁴⁵¹.

His cultural allegiance followed a rigid segmentary scheme, upholding Slovak "tribal" identity against Czech, Slavic "national" identity against other nations such as Hungarians, Germans and French, and finally also Indo-European "civilizational" identity against the Asiatic and, particularly, its Uralic, Magyar offshoot. His early concept of a community, *obec*, still resembles the feudal system: it is understood as a quite static, but still low-level, group, capable of expressing its loyalty towards the king, whose power is dependent on the sum of the loyalties of all his subject communities. It isn't the same as *kmeň*, as one might think from Nakazawa's interpretation, because the *obec* is a historical unit, perhaps more similar to a "party" in a pluralistic political system. Nakazawa also sees that the long-term constitution of a realm bound by multiple communities leads to the emergence of a dynamic high-level category, which is the nation, or *národ*. In this view, the Moravian king couldn't hold his empire together, and the Slovak *obec* didn't have enough time to constitute a *národ* until a new viable king took power, namely Stephen of Hungary. But here he'd speak only for the political nation, the Crown, and not for the *Volk* or *národ* in Štúr's (and now also in the contemporary Slovak) sense of the word. If we wanted, let's

450 – Nakazawa 2007: 165

451 – Štúr 1986 [1842]: 597; In other places, he proposes the space of the Danube basin and the Carpathians as the Slavic "homeland", although he doesn't elaborate the concept (e.g. Štúr 1943: 18).

say, to extend the political rights of the nobility to the broad masses in 1842, a legal low-level community had to formulate the rights of a tribal or national unit to preserve their cultural specifics. Štúr defined *národ* in his later text *Naše položenie vo vlasti*⁴⁵² in a very Herderian way: as a static, high-level group, constituted by the nature. Meanwhile, the *obec* was the a dynamic political body, emerging through its power of political integration. One could choose his loyalty towards an *obec*, but not his civilizational, national or tribal group identity. The Hungarian *obec* thus meant the country, formed by virtue of cooperation and the submission of multiple nations.

Štúr's understanding of nation and community, of *národ* and *obec*, is characteristic of this era, in which traditional rights were gradually replaced with nationalist and democratic ones. He tried to affect such a change, but without success. The Slavic element was considered by the dominant narrative as a foreign one; the ethnicity of the counter-revolutionary generals Radetzky and Jelačić, as well as of the Russian troops supporting them, supported this view. His cultural-but-not-political community within a multilingual political one was too fine a concept, and too complicated to elaborate amid escalations of violence based on much simpler group concepts. It didn't take heed of the importance of language in national symbolism preached so extensively since Herder. The symbols he referred to were still those of the pre-national regime: the Crown, ancestral land, and loyalty towards a person. His later idea of unified Slavic communities as rightly described by Nakazawa, is a radical break in his loyalty, but not in his thoughts. The attitude in his works after the revolutionary era, which support the adoption of the Cyrillic script and submission to Russia, shows a change in both⁴⁵³. In this way he didn't deny the Kossuthian vision of one nation with one state and one language: he adopted it.

Comparison

With both previous national symbolisms – the Catholicism of the People's Party and the revolutionary charge of National Uprising – tainted by the regimes under which they were promoted, Štúr remains the most important element of national identity. Thanks to the ephemeral influence of his direct political activity, his non-Catholic origin and his mistrust of

452 – Štúr 1986 [1842]: 541f

453 – Štúr 2008 [1852 RU]: 8

communist ideology, he still stays outside the realms which are controversial nation-wide. By invoking Štúr as a national symbol, one doesn't identify himself with any of the communist or nationalist traditions. With the recent politicization of the notion of "King Svätopluk" and its consequent criticism⁴⁵⁴, it may be expected that Štúr's cult will become even more central to Slovak identity in the future as well.

The search for differences between the interpretations of Štúr's work and the literal meaning in his works themselves isn't an attempt to defuse his symbolic meaning. The literal meaning, which we may define as we wish, still remains dependent upon the categories of truth and falsity employed by the author. The symbolic meaning is an integral part of the interpretation. Because Nakazawa and Maxwell focus on the original ideas and personal career of Štúr, the reception of the myth becomes irrelevant for them. From a historical viewpoint, however, this cannot be simply ignored; mythologization is a historical process as well, even if it causes methodological shortcomings like omissions of disturbing facts, evaluations from present-day moral standpoints, or simple contradictions. Particular mythologemes tend to remain intelligible only within the historian's own ingroup, but this shows their function in the group's constitution.

The obvious similarity between Štúr's own view and the interpretations given by historians of the national revival is his classification as an actual proponent of the revival. He is described as a patriot; he himself describes his dedication to the national work. In our terminology, he is an ethnocentrist who wishes his work to be seen as ethnocentrist, and who is seen as such by others. From the aspect of Wimmer's types of ethnocentrism, we may have difficulties with his classification. As he wasn't in a position of power, didn't enjoy authority as a foreign anthropologist and never really had a leading position within the local intellectual scene, it is hard to see him as a dominant representative of a certain culture. His work reflects a very ambiguous vision of the Hungarian state and the cultural communities (the "Slavdom") which he describes, but is nevertheless aware of their fluid

454 – In 2010, shortly before parliamentary elections, a new horseman statue of Svätopluk of Moravia was erected under the castle in Bratislava. The reaction was quite polarized due to the double-cross sign on the horseman's shield (in a circle, with equally long cross-arms, very similar to the insignia of WW2-era Slovak fascist militias) and also a subscript calling Svätopluk "the king of the Old Slovaks". A committee of historians was called by the new government to counsel them on the fate of the statue, as it is located on grounds owned by the Parliament.

In the end the double-cross sign was deleted from the shield and the text of the subscript replaced by a papal bull from 880 – http://www.lidovky.cz/svatopluk-uz-neni-kral-slovaku-ze-sochy-zmizel-kontroverzni-napis-1p2-/zpravy-svet.aspx?c=A101117_201321_in_zahranici_mev, 25.9.2013

borders. In his pre-revolutionary works, Štúr didn't advocate the assimilation of Magyars or the Slavicization of Hungary, so one is tempted to speak of his approach as that of an ideal, tentative, cross-cultural dialogue. On the other hand, he believes in the superiority of the Indo-European language family. His arguments against the spread of the Magyar language reflect the idea that some languages offer greater capacity to adopt new concepts and new ways of life than the others. His program, although powerless, was one of preventing certain policies on culture-specific grounds, i.e., it was an expansive policy aimed against another expansionism.

The historians whom I've mentioned tend to differ from the group whom Štúr was representing. For local thinkers like Osuský, Hroch and Ďurica, this group is of course that of Slovaks, the modern nation, which constituted itself first within the Czechoslovak Republic, later in the federation and finally in a separate state. Štúr played an important role in its "preparation" for sovereign existence by arguing for its distinction along the Czech/Slovak and Slavic/Magyar axes. Thus, even if his own program never advocated such a result – his last work deeply criticized intra-Slavic political divisions⁴⁵⁵ – his place is still among those who did. He was, so to say, culturally embedded in the future Slovak nation even before it existed.

"Foreign" thinkers, such as Nakazawa and Maxwell, tend to be quite critical of this ascription. They point out, instead, his own hierarchy of preferences, in which Slavic unity and distinctiveness was put before distinctions between its "tribes" and actual political borders. Although Štúr expressed himself as a pure political Panslavist only in his work, he was inclined to it throughout his earlier years too. This view, of course, doesn't differ much from that of local thinkers: a fictive cultural entity is chosen as the one determining his own thoughts. Štúr is "writing for" the group he wishes to have come into existence, he prepares the ground for them and propagates his prophetic visions.

While I won't argue against the point that Štúr was an ethnocentric, nationalist writer, I consider this perspective very limited. Ascription of him to a revival or Panslavist movement is an instance of an *identificatory* mechanism, the reduction of an individual to group interests. On the other hand, Štúr is a Hegelian, a programmatic thinker: while often descriptive in his texts, he focuses on forces which he believes are already in action and

455 – Štúr 1993 [1852 DE]: 6

urges the Slavdom to seize the opportunity. He sees that there is actually no common group interest, but instead of acknowledging the non-existence of the group, he tries to create one. What he does is practically a *polemically-descriptive* approach to nationalism – an agitation for its strengthening. His work is ideological, utopian and dialectical. His description of Slavic autochtony in Hungary isn't an argument for the existence of a Slovak nation, but rather a call for mobilization against the Magyars. The theory targets the "Magyarones" themselves, who prefer traditionalist views on the organization of society. The claim of the superiority of Indo-European languages is an agitation against the proposed predominance of the "lesser", Asiatic one. In this instance, Štúr is referring to Hegelian and Herderian philosophies of language with a strong claim of universality, which appealed to his Slavic students. To describe these arguments as purely enclosed within the culture of the nation where Štúr felt himself to be would be misleading. He knew when to employ a "separative" and when an "expansive" argument; he prepared them according to his audience, and he surely didn't expect a full-fledged group to follow his voice.

The culture, in which one is "embedded", doesn't reflect his loyalty or his personal (or, for that matter, external) identification with a certain group. Even when considering himself a Slavic or Slovak thinker, he could still be embedded in another "culture" – Hungarian or Hegelian, linguistic or political-journalistic, if we want to name it. The culture he lived in included Magyarones, Panslavists and Slavophiles: people who saw culture not only as a background, but also as a material to be shaped. His elements of influence don't need to be reflected in the political and aesthetical visions of the thinker. They are instruments, by which Štúr built up and presented his political program. A merely historical approach to his person and his classification under the umbrella of national revivalist movements causes these elements to be often ignored or marginalized.

Conclusion

The debates between Štúr and his Magyar and Czech opponents can be seen as an intercultural struggle: linguistic differences are followed by differences in the predominant cultural values, the national "character" or "mentality", the style government, estate identity, minority relations etc. The Slovak identity reactivated by Štúr was seen as a necessary tool in both progressive (the petty bourgeoisie, peasants and workers against

the powerful German and Hungarian aristocracies and capital holders) and traditionalist (true Catholics against liberal and masonic Czechs or "Czechoslovakists") struggles, as described respectively by the historians of both objects. Štúr is thus seen as a representative of a Slovak counter-culture in the conflict for its independence.

On the other hand, this interpretation is at first anachronistic – for we are referring mostly to the post-liberation or WW2 category of the Slovak nation, for which was Štúr more a symbolic hero than an agitator or representative in his own time. Second, it obscures his ideas of Panslavism, European supremacism and Hegelianism, which in the time were quite influential and politically effective, and which shaped Slovak – and more generally the West-Slavic – intellectual scene in the crucial, formative period of its development. Third, it obscures even more the social and political setting of his work – the struggle for the abolition of feudalism, the Hungarian discourse on the shape of the Republic, the scope of the bourgeois revolution of 1848 – thus reducing his Magyar-speaking opponents to chauvinists. This all, despite the fact that many of Štúr's works were written bilingually, amounts to his performative adherence to the common culture of contemporary Hungary.

In my opinion, it isn't possible to abstain from drawing parallels between the present situation and the past one. It is also in question why should we do that – one can't speak about politics, past or present, and not have a political opinion at once. The choice of historical objects for one's narrative, the parallels drawn, and the ascriptions of loyalty or national identity to persons and other agents of change, are all tools for ethnic reproduction, for strengthening the borders between "us" and "them", for isolating and confining a narrative, for "protecting" it from outside influence and socio-critical ideas, and in the end, for sedimenting the order. The content – elements of ethnic, cultural or political identity – is only secondary to the order of social relations.

In the following chapter I'll present the negative version of such a discourse: instead of an anachronistic ascription of membership, in the following case we'll see a systematic exclusion within a mostly apolitical and rather scientific tradition.

II. Case Study: Sectarianism in *Kalām*

The study of *kalām* has only recently gained the attention of professionals working in ancient philosophy. Medieval Muslim theology is a discursive tradition which flourished until the 12th-13th century, while its development practically ceased afterwards. While Hellenic tradition of philosophy was quite continuously absorbed, criticized and reinterpreted by some Christian patriarchs, the Mongol and Turkish princes who conquered the territory where *kalām* tradition was practiced, seem to have sought a rather unified version of Islam. Perhaps they sought judicial systems of comparable effectivity to those of the Genghisid or Buddhist traditions: in any case, they replaced theological debate with preset tenets of faith. Theological speculation was confined to the field of metaphysics and mathematics, and although it could have been performed by the persons in juristic offices, its formulations were no longer relevant for jurisprudence.

But when we go back a couple of centuries, especially to the times of the first 'Abbasid rulers, the situation is a bit different. In the view of 9th century theologians, an explanation (e.g. of a prescription for prayer) based solely on holy scripture or hadith was prone to more possible interpretations because of ambiguity. One could compare the reliability of two hadiths in cases where they contradicted each other, but this wasn't acceptable in the case of the Quran. The Quran didn't provide them with sufficient and unambiguous descriptions of free will, of the relation between God and evil, and other problematics. Other sources of knowledge, both sensual and intellectual, were called to aid in cases where the scriptures led to sectarian divisions according to particular practices. But in the end, one didn't end up with mere reasonings. Practitioners of *kalām*, or *mutakallimūn*, enriched the debates with arguments of various natures, building within their respective schools not only specific religious and sectarian-political views, but also quite original theories of physics, metaphysics, biology, causation, time, rhetorics, and psychology.

A nominal categorization of medieval *kalām* as a philosophical discourse, as a discourse bearing parallel to our contemporary ones, is questionable. Its inner dynamics, its proneness to give influence and to receive it, and its perception of – and also by – other traditions of thought varied throughout history. For this reason I consider it a perfect object

to observe the dynamics of scientific group identity and coherence, the mechanisms of border maintainance and influence, and also the relation between the scope of a science and the membership in its practicing group. I'll present the levels, at which the *mutakallimūn* presented themselves as a coherent ethnies (or as multiple ethnies), their performative methods of inclusion and exclusion, the aspirative aspect of their work and also the relation between the theologian and the heresiographer. I don't believe that such an analysis of local ethnocentrism can be sufficient to explain the fading of *kalām* in the 12th and 13th century, but it surely can shed light on the last statement of the previous chapter: are the elements of ethnic, cultural or political identity really only secondary to the order of social relations?

Group Categories of the Mutakallimūn

As mentioned above⁴⁵⁶, the variety of traditions which we consider to be a part of *kalām* are now known mostly from secondary texts of a rather critical nature. This is why we're not working with mere lists of works, but rather with lists of "errors" and heresies, through which one "correct" tradition, a kind of orthodox theology, is propagated and also negatively defined. This is the representative of *kalām* in its late form, in which one can "represent" the tradition against other traditions of thought, such as the ancient philosophy, mathematics or history in al-Ghazali's *Tahāfut*. This is also the *mutakallimūn* known to a medieval Christian philosopher from Ibn Rushd, who despite addressing the whole category, actually criticizes only al-Ghazali himself⁴⁵⁷. This also shows us the highest category of contemporary scientific-ethnographical hierarchy, the *'ilm*⁴⁵⁸, even though it is a relatively late phenomenon.

- *'ilm*

'ilm, pl. *'ulūm*, is best translated as "science", which is also the most popular choice in online translators, but the modern use of "scientific discipline" or even "knowledge"

456 – ch.V, sect.II

457 – cf. Van den Bergh 1978: introd.

458 – The <'> sign denotes the voiced pharyngeal fricative consonant (or [ʕ] in IPA notation), which is written by the letter *'ayn* <ع> in Arabic. For the sake of simplicity I'll omit in transcriptions the glottal stop, or *hamza* in Arabic words starting with a vowel. Writing it only when used within or at the end of the word, I use the standard accent sign <'> for *hamza*.

would also suffice. The root is also used in *'alima* meaning "to know, to teach" and also "to learn", and in *'alim*, meaning "learned one", which is the core of one of the 99 holiest names of God – *Al-'Alīm*, "the All-Knowing"⁴⁵⁹. As with the *basmalla* dedication at the beginning, the phrase *wa-llāh ā'lam*, "...and God knows best" couldn't be omitted at the end of any scientific treatise in those times. Yet the sciences weren't always culturally specific. Al-Ghazali expected certain continuity within *'ilm al-ilāhiya*, the speculative theology or metaphysics of ancient philosophers and al-Ghazali's contemporaries. The term *'ilm* is a countable word, and we can differentiate a number of *'ulūm* which, unlike modern sciences, are far from being complementary or considered a way to universal truth (that is denoted e.g. by the term *hikma* "wisdom"). Two *'ulūm* may have the same object, but the differences in the definitions and approaches make them isolated from each other. Furthermore, al-Ghazali elaborated a hierarchical structure of the sciences, considering the "basic" (*usūl*) ones, such as the study of the main religious texts, to be more important than the interpretative "branch" (*furū'*) disciplines such as law (*fiqh*), which determine the recommended practice. Linguistics and history are then a third layer of supplementary or auxiliary sciences, which serve to make the branch sciences more effective⁴⁶⁰. *'ilm al-kalām* is one such supplementary science, being methodologically – but perhaps even more historically – detached philosophical and juristic *'ulūm*, whose objects it (at most only) describes. For *kalām*, the typical features of the discourse were its dialectical method, its concentration on one of four or five basic themes⁴⁶¹, and its attempt to supplement the traditional texts as a source of religious jurisdiction⁴⁶².

Another characteristic of the *'ilm al-kalām* was its historical location. Yet it cannot be said that science was confined totally to Baghdad, Basra and Samarkand. Simon Van den Bergh⁴⁶³, in his introduction to Ibn Rushd's *Tahāfut*, provides an alternative hypothesis, considering *kalām* to be an Arab translation of the term "dialectics". Van den Bergh noted the frequent use of term "dialecticians" to denote the Stoic thinkers in late antiquity. Thus behind the term *mutakallimūn*, the practitioners of *kalām*, one has to perceive not an isolated school of Muslim theology, but rather a continuation, or even a transcultural

459 – *al-Baqārah* 29

460 – *Ihya* p.31

461 – Shahrastani 1984: 11f

462 – Tritton 1947: 174; this aspect was in fact achieved by at least the Maturidite and Ash'arite schools, though exactly this "legalization" led to the fading of further dialectical procedures.

463 – cf. Van den Bergh 1978: introd.

tradition, of Stoicism. He posits a strong influence of ancient philosophies on *kalām* practitioners, not confined to the Stoics only, but rather including also the Skeptics, the Neoplatonists and other schools of late antiquity. Although this assumption is wrong to generalize for the whole historical *kalām* because the first sources on ancient philosophy seem to have been first translated later on⁴⁶⁴, the possibility of positing the influence of other, pagan traditions on theological authority could have been a powerful rhetorical device in its undermining. A scientific work, as defined in the later period of *kalām*, was categorized not only by its methodological distinction from the works of other sciences, but also by its basic texts.

This isn't very far away from the present working of the sciences. Mathematical or logical axioms are also taken from fundamental texts, whose authority is mostly the result of mutual agreement among professors. Mutual agreement (*ijma'*) was similarly crucial for the definition of the basic texts behind a science in the tradition of *kalām*⁴⁶⁵. A thinker could only barely participate in institutions bound to the Muslim tradition if he worked solely with Aristotle. The choice of basics, *usūl*, was crucial for the acceptance of his status as a *mutakallimūn*, a mathematician, a biologist, or whatever he wished to be. On the other hand, when we take the tradition as a marker of identity, we don't find only the obvious dichotomy of Muslims and pagans or heathens. Tradition as a category of identification works as a parallel system. We have a number of differing traditions of accepted basics within a single *'ilm*, as in the case of the four Sunni schools of law, as well as in traditions of a more "interdisciplinary" character, like that of "metaphysicians" (Neoplatonists), which were influential among philosophers and theologians, as well as among astronomers and practitioners of other *'ulūm*. The question of the source was especially important for Shahrastani's distinction: for him, philosophy was a tradition based on logic and individual reasoning, but *kalām* rather on prophetic tradition⁴⁶⁶.

- *milla*

Another dimension of distinction we have from Shahrastani is between school and sect. Sect (*milla*) is the more general term, which can mean any group of humans: in the

464 – For a more detailed analysis of this problem feel free to consult my own MA thesis (2008).

465 – *Ihya* p.31

466 – Shahrastani 1984: 32

19th century it was used to translate "nation"⁴⁶⁷. In contrast to *umma*, "community", it points out the division rather than the unity of people. In confessional divisions, its counterpart is *firqa*, a religious group differing in theological questions from the orthodox community, the *umma wahida*, as defined in the oft-cited Muhammad's saying⁴⁶⁸.

This distinction was of course the matter of most discussions, which we today denote as *kalām*, and thus most of the sects described by Shahrastani and other heresiologists actually reflect historical schools of thought. These contain those who formulated specific creeds (*nihal*) and their students, who often merely repeated them⁴⁶⁹. In heresiography, such a *firqa* or *milla* often took its name from its originator (like Karramiya, followers of Ibn Karram) or a characteristic point of its teachings (like *qadarīya*, proponents of *qadar*, the power to create one's acts, i.e., free will). From our historically distinct perspective, the sects and schools are an intra-religious, or rather intra-traditional, intra-*kalām* phenomenon. They don't differ in their selection of sources, only in their interpretation. The hadith of the 73 sects, before everything else, hints at the idea that most interpretations of Quran and hadith are in fact erroneous; only one is right. How to find the right one? Were discourse and dialectics everything one needed? As the debates touched political questions – like that of Shi'a and Kharijites – the division was never a purely intra-*kalām* phenomenon, but reflected (and sometimes tried to influence) actual political divisions. Following a certain leader, or claiming the Imamate or not, can only barely be reduced to a theological opinion.

Adherence to a certain creed could have legal consequences, as I'll try to illustrate in the following chapter. In this respect, Shahrastani was less radical: in his view, most of the sects were seen as subdivisions of Muslims; he saw only the general Muslim community as a "religion" (*dīn*), while the "outgroup" religions with respect to them were Christians, Jews, and Magians. Heretical sects (*kufir*) had a different creed (*nahl*), but weren't considered a high-level community: he says the same about categories like

467 – Van Ess 2011: 1820; Also used in Ottoman Turkish (*millet*) for major religious communities like "Roman" Christians, Armenians and others (cf. above p.30).

468 – Cf. Van Ess 2011: 10: "*The Jews were divided among themselves into seventy one sects [furuq], and the Christians were divided among themselves into seventy two sects. And My Ummah will be divided among itself into seventy three sects.*"

Although the *hadith* was reported by Abu Dawud and al-Tirmidhi, another influential collection, the Sahih Bukhari, doesn't mention it. For further discussion concerning the hadith cf. Van Ess 2011: 7f

469 – cf. Tritton 1947: 113

philosophers and atheists⁴⁷⁰. For Baghdadi however, this would be unacceptable. A *kufri*, which teaches something in violation to the unity of God couldn't be considered a Muslim: in this way he excluded the extreme Shi'a (*ghulāt*), sects believing in reincarnation as well as others. Followers of these sects were seen by him as *mushirkūn*, or "polytheists", which was an outlawed category⁴⁷¹.

On the other hand, it is hard and not always necessary to distinguish schools from sects, because we simply have no apolitical, purely *kalām*-based sects left. Only a few sects survived the debate for more than a couple of generations or flourished in multiple cities. The sect of Mu'tazila had two main schools in Iraq, namely in Basra and Baghdad⁴⁷². Both cities were in fact centers of *kalām* during the whole period: Basra was important primarily as the birthplace of Mu'tazila, while Baghdad was more the center of its confrontation with the other sects, the crystallization of the creed and its spread⁴⁷³. The multiplicity of Mu'tazili schools was primarily an effect of their political power, due to the elevation of the Mu'tazili creed to the rank of orthodoxy by al-Ma'mun. In this way, *kalām* became more than a local practice of some lawyers. On the other hand, *kalām* wasn't seen in the variety we now know from the heresiologists, but rather in the unified form of the dominant Mu'tazili creed. Only after khalif al-Mutawakkil lifted his support for it could *kalām* regain its variety. Tritton describes two schools of "orthodoxy": the Ash'arite in Baghdad and Maturidite in Samarkand⁴⁷⁴. These were, however, not two geographic divisions of a single sect, but rather parallel cases of criticism against Mu'tazila.

Practices and Means of Identification

As described above, the number of sects is so high not only because of the hadith, which inspired the search for them, but also because of the variety of their kinds. We have political movements around charismatic leaders and militaristic tribal unions. At the other extreme, there are lawyer circles differing from each other on a single question, and also

470 – Shahrastani 1984: 9

471 – Baghdadi 1978: 241

472 – For general differences in the teachings and leading personalities of both schools, cf. Tritton 1947: 162f

473 – Van Ess 2006: 5

474 – Tritton 1947: 174f

schools of theology converging on the same topic a thousand miles away from each other. This makes the question of what made one a follower of a particular sect a complex one. It actually addresses the structure of the various subcultures in the Khalifate, as well as the systematic attempts to organize them both from above and from the grassroots. In fact, identity categories like *mu'min* or *kāfir* were claimed by all of these movements. How one becomes a believer or sinner, a follower or an apostate, was a matter of debate.

- *takfir*

The primary debate, focusing on the identity as a good Muslim was the one between the Kharijites and the Murji'a. These are both among the earliest divisions within Islam; their theological differences were better described by early Mu'tazili theologians than by their own. Both were theologically defined by contrasting opinions about the relation between sin and belief. While the Kharijites considered a sinner to become an apostate, a *murtadd*, with the evil deed, the Murji'a saw belief as the most important aspect of life. If one committed a sin, his judgement was postponed until his death, and thus he retained a certain hope (*irja'*) of God's mercy. Kharijites, on the other hand, saw sin as something irredeemable even for a prophet; failure to join them was one such sin as well⁴⁷⁵. The declaration of one's apostasy, the *takfir*, became for them the main critical difference in distinguishing between friend and foe.

The Kharijites, or "the exiled", can be seen as a historical, politically integral sect. It was composed of former followers of 'Ali ibn Abi Talib who were united by their opposition against both the central authority of the khalif and the Shi'a⁴⁷⁶, although their divisions appeared among them very soon. Thus for the Khariji a true Muslim was identified by his denial of loyalty to them. The term *khurūj*, "the exile", became synonymous with "rebellion" and *khārijī* with "rebel", meaning the political stance opposite to *qu'ūd*, "quietism" or "conformism"⁴⁷⁷. Some rebellions inspired by this movement were on a large scale – the largest of them led by Nafi' ibn al-Azraq, rose up in the 680s, fielded an army of forty thousand and controlled a large part of Iraq, before being finally put down in 697 by Khalif

475 – Shahrastani 1984: 103

476 – 'Ali, the fourth khalif, reached a compromise with his adversaries after the Battle of Siffin. According to the Khariji narrative, in this way he transgressed the will of his father-in-law the Prophet. Cf. Shahrastani 1984: 99

477 – Spannaus 2007: 6; According to Spannaus, the term seems to have been used both as a heresiographic category and as a self-designation – as well as among the "true" Kharijites against other opponents of the Shi'a and the khalif, who didn't join the rebellion.

ʿAbd al-Malik. This sect, reported by Shahrastani and others to be the Azariqa, was one of the most radical. To simplify the choice of targets for their raids, the lands under the Khalif's control were declared *dar al-irtidād*, "abode of apostasy", and this category was integrated into their tenets. A good Muslim, in their view, should exile the corrupt community in the same way as Muhammad did. Whoever didn't do so was automatically considered a *murtadd* and *kāfir*, becoming a legal target of violent actions: he could be killed, robbed or enslaved⁴⁷⁸. The theologian Wasil ibn ʿAta' nearly met his fate in this way⁴⁷⁹.

There were also more moderate Kharijites, who elaborated the idea of *takfīr* on both a theological and a legal basis. According to Van Ess, their thinkers were among the very first Muslim heresiologists, with their first known texts dating from the first half of the 8th century⁴⁸⁰. In one, written by Salim ibn Dhakwan, the binary view held by previous militants was generally abandoned. He recognized three sects in his epistle: the classic *murji'a*; as well as another opposition group called the *fatana*, or the ones who accept authority due to the fear of civil war (*fitna*) and the *al-furqa al-akhīra*, extreme Kharijites such as the Azariqa, who act more according to their mood (*ahwa*). He, along with the other followers of Ibadiyya sect, rejected the description of himself as a *khārijī* (a term imposed on his sect again by the later *kalām*); he, himself reserved it for the extremists, or rather exaggerators (*ghulāt*)⁴⁸¹.

Already in this case we can see the need for multiple axes of identification in *kalām*. On the one hand, we have the tenets, which provide an identity based on righteous belief and impose legal obligations (*taklīf*). These contrast with apostatic deeds (*irtidād*) imposed by heresy (*kufr*). On the other hand, there is rationality or wisdom, which makes the difference between a fanatic and a fearful servant, placing right conduct in the golden middle among two extremes. The tenets of the Murji'a or Azariqa were equivalent to those of the sect Salim followed, and which he, most probably, considered the righteous *umma*. However, the *fatana* and Khariji militants were for him in the category of heresies (*kufr*),

478 – Bonney 2006: 56

479 – Tritton 1947: 36; Wasil, knowing enough about their strict following of (their version of) Quran, found it better to declare himself a non-believer outright, expressing eagerness to be informed about the true faith (referring to *al-Bara'a* 6) and thus survived the encounter.

480 – Van Ess 2011: 109

481 – Van Ess 2011: 110

but defined more psychologically than theologically.

From a broader perspective, the Murji'tes may also be seen as a less rational school of thought. The first axis touches on the problem of conscious self-identification as a believer or witness to the faith (the *credo* or *shahāda*). As with its Christian counterpart, the Muslim *shahāda* was not proscribed in the main sacred text. Theologians were the ones who formulated the creed. The identification was not only the expression of an internal belief, but a public declaration, a performative act with a legal effect. This was true of its contents, as well as its form. Radical Kharijites didn't care about these declarations very much; other actions could negate them. The Murji'tes, on the other hand, thought that formal criteria – personal conviction, sincerity and love of God – earned Paradise not one's deeds⁴⁸². In another contrast to Kharijites, they also accepted *taqīya*, "dissimulation", hiding one's true belief in the face of danger, as a righteous deed⁴⁸³. The lack of or only a general knowledge of the creed could also be used as an excuse⁴⁸⁴.

- *hashwīya*

Formal declarations of belief were also especially important for the Mu'tazilites, whose formulation of orthodoxy was the most influential of the 9th century. Dirar ibn 'Amr, *qādī* in Kufa, described the theological scene in the late 8th century in a way similar to Salim, both describing two axes of "equal" sects (Murji'a, Shi'a and Kharijites) and one lacking in knowledge – the *hashwīya*⁴⁸⁵. This category was a clearly diminutive one, meaning "common masses", or blind followers of hadith, in contrast to those, who seceded from the masses (*mu'tazila*) to engage in debates about hadith. In Dirar's view, they were similar to Salim's category of *fatana*: these were the quiet ones, who abstained from debate to prevent conflicts. But at the time the term wasn't reserved for hadith-collectors, *ashāb al-hadīth*, but rather meant those preferring an "easier", less rational and politically active way in general⁴⁸⁶. Later, Mu'tazilite theologian Ja'far ibn al-Harb used term

482 – Shahrastani 1984: 120

483 – Shahrastani 1984: 103

484 – Baghdadi 1978: 191

485 – Van Ess 2011: 133; For Dirar's classification under the *mu'tazila*, Van Ess points out Dirar's influence on later thinkers, as well as his late-life adoption of their creed. Medieval heresiographers tend to classify him among the Jabrites, i.e., those who deny free will (e.g. cf. Shahrastani 1984: 76) or the *nawāsib*, the opposition of the Shi'a (namely Ja'far al-Harb; cf. Van Ess 2011: 143). Among modern scholars, Tritton (1947: 69) and Rudolph (1999) also count him among the pre-Mu'tazili thinkers.

486 – Criticism of hadith-collectors for their "blind obedience" (*taqlīd*) to dubious texts doesn't come only from the Mu'tazili circles, but their arguments were very influential. Also Maturidi (cf. Rudolph 1999: 335)

hashwīya for the Iraqi followers of the first 'Umayyad khalif Mu'awiya, in contrast to the followers of the third khalif 'Uthman⁴⁸⁷; however, notwithstanding the rising role of hadith in society, the original connotation of the *hashwīya* as the proponents of hadith (instead of *kalām*) became predominant⁴⁸⁸. In that time, the *mutakallimūn* were already seen as one group competing with the *ashāb al-hadīth* for the main method of obtaining legally usable teachings.

- *negative theology*

As the role of hadith increases, *kalām* becomes more specific as a science, and its teachings and methodology are easier to recognize. The Mu'tazilites had a significant influence on Khalif al-Ma'mun, possibly through Thumama ibn Ashras⁴⁸⁹. He created the *mihna* institute to oversee the adoption of the Mu'tazili creed not only among the officials, but also among lower clerks and lawyers; the creed became an orthodoxy. The *mihna* officials could issue a *takfir* on lawyers and practically bar them from work. They could also negate marriages, although (at least) no direct executions were made in their name⁴⁹⁰. Ahmad ibn Hanbal, the most radical of the hadith collectors, withstood even flogging during a speech denouncing the Mu'tazili creed⁴⁹¹. His popularity made the *mihna* backfire not only on the Mu'tazila, whose creed was declared heretical soon after by Khalif al-Mutawakkil, but also on theology in general. Popular opinion started to support traditionalist hadith-collectors, for instead of trying to define the one and only way, they focused on *ijma'*, mutual agreement⁴⁹². Later theologians became more cautious in positive formulations of the orthodoxy as well, focusing instead on its negative forms: heresiography, apologetics and so on. As Van Ess reports, those who still adhered to the Mu'tazila had to compare the hadith collectors and the *mutakallimūn* in methodological detail now, like Abu 'Amr al-Jubba'i did in his lost work⁴⁹³.

thought, that *taqlīd* was the primary source of errors in theology, of the division of the *umma*.

487 – Rudolph 1999: 144

488 – Tritton (1947: 50) considers *hashwīya* a Mu'tazilite derogatory name for the anthropomorphists (*mushabbiha*), or "those who believe in God's attributes" (*sifātiya*, i.e., the literary meaning of traditional texts). Shahrastani (1984) classifies Ash'ari under *sifātiya* too.

489 – Tritton 1974: 99

490 – Van Ess 2006: 32

491 – Lohker 2008: 87

492 – Shahrastani 1984: 10

493 – Van Ess 2011: 160

The later period, characterized by the works of Ash'ari and his students, was more about this negative theology: again about recognizing "extreme" (*ghālī*) formulations⁴⁹⁴. The first exaggeration, the *ghulāt*, was the aforementioned extreme Shi'a, some of whose sects didn't declare only 'Ali to be a god, but also his descendants⁴⁹⁵. In the Sunni narrative – i.e. Ash'arite heresiology – this is the other extreme in contrast with the creed of Kharijites, who consider rebellion against sinful rulers an obligation. In the same way, the Murji'tes and Kharijites were seen as two extremes in the question of divine punishment, and the Mu'tazilites and *mushabbiha* had extreme stances on divine attributes.

The orthodox "saving" sect abstains from both extremes and adopts a middle way⁴⁹⁶. In the Ash'arite view, they were the *ahl al-sunna wa-'l-jamā'a*, "people of the tradition and common religion", a more general category, contrasting themselves with the names of the 72 heretical sects, and marking clearly their "errors" and leaders⁴⁹⁷. Furthermore, while these sects differed from each other in their beliefs, Baghdadi shows the divisions within the saving sect as well. These are, interestingly enough, based mostly on profession: orthodox *mutakallimūn*, jurists, hadith collectors, grammarians, warriors, and the rest of population⁴⁹⁸.

Thus, in the 10th century the formulation of the creed became only supplementary to the *kalām* methodology – the debates in which the creed becomes formulated. The critical difference was also here one of moderation between two extremes. The study of hadith was at the one extreme, for it allowed only Islamic sources. Philosophy, using totally un-Islamic sources for their teachings, was the other extreme. However, it seems to me that by this focus the *mutakallimūn* couldn't contribute much to jurisprudence anymore. Al-Ghazali's classification of *kalām* under secondary, if not peripheral, *'ulūm* thus seems to be a late development, when *kalām* was already beyond its golden age.

494 – Lohlker 2008: 86

495 – especially Ja'far al-Sadiq, cf. Tritton 1947: 206

496 – Baghdadi 1974: 300f

497 – cf. Van Ess 2011: 1274

498 – Van Ess 2011: 303

Structural Aspects

The militancy of the early Kharijites and the age of *mihna* are perfect examples of religious narratives used to satisfy political aspirations. Their enemies were identified by means which brought unambiguous results; they were given the choice of conversion or expulsion, if not put to the sword immediately. On the other hand, they were the extreme cases, to which category some isolated, often politically motivated processes against the so-called *zandaqa* (originally meaning the Manicheists) can be added⁴⁹⁹.

The above mentioned heresiographic works by Salim ibn Dhakwan and Dirar ibn 'Amr converge in their use of two axes of exclusion: one excluding false beliefs, the other false "methods" or conduct of behavior. Both were seen as sects (*firāq*), but their origins were different. The cause of false beliefs was not as important as their mere existence; they were mostly seen as innovations (*bid'a*), arbitrary creations of an individual⁵⁰⁰, and also as doubts caused by contradictions in particular hadiths. Shahrastani traces the primary doubt to the problem of theodicy, that is to Iblis' question to God: why did He create him when He knew, what Iblis was going to do⁵⁰¹? From this problem, Shahrastani thinks, all other innovations could be traced. Baghdadi shows another possible source in the example of the *bātinīya*, the Shi'a mystics – namely, the secret adherence to a pre-Islamic religion⁵⁰². According to Van Ess, the sects didn't usually develop as deviations or secluded groups: they arose as an effect of a scandalous misunderstanding between two lawyers⁵⁰³. The authority of a lawyer was based on his *ijtihād*, his study of traditional texts, while "errors" could arise from both laxity as well as an overzealous eye which could uncover evidence against authenticity of a hadith. When exposed, every theological difference caught attention of many, while heresiographical works are seen as attempts to document them, though they are the "headlines of yesterday"⁵⁰⁴.

In how far can we reduce this sectarian exclusion to personal conflicts? One has to look to earlier stages of *kalām* than Shahrastani to find an answer to this: in his time, the

499 – Van Ess 2006: 27

500 – e.g. cf. Shahrastani 1984: 25

501 – Shahrastani 1984: 13

502 – Baghdadi 1975: 115

503 – Van Ess 2006: 21

504 – Van Ess 2011: 1203

Sunni-Shi'a political division was much stronger than in the 9th century. The militant Kharijites were a tightly integrated, aggressive group, but they didn't control the cities, where the theological debates were held. People like Salim, who supported their basic creed (opposition to both the Khalifate and 'Ali) and yet criticized them harshly for exaggeration, lived in cities outside their sphere of influence. Sectarian divisions occurred on a very individual basis, even among siblings⁵⁰⁵. The practice of *takfir* was in cities only a symbolic act by a single individual⁵⁰⁶. Nonetheless, the adoption of such a declaration could have legal or political effect. Of course, it depended mostly on the rank of the person who declared it.

In cities, the first systematic attempt to control the theological debate was al-Ma'mun's *mihna*. However, the theological scene was too variable in that time; the *mihna* was quickly seen as an exaggeration and looked upon with scorn by many influential Mu'tazilites⁵⁰⁷. More than trying to influence and convert the others, the *mihna* was a selective institution. The Mu'tazilites were such as well: the *hashwīya* were seen as rabble, who didn't interest them at all. Their reputation was based on their extraordinary knowledge, and also on their readiness to translate works from other languages. Any attempt to "hide" knowledge, like in the case of Baghdadi's *bātinīya*, was looked upon with suspicion as a *taqīya*, behind which one hid his own exotic beliefs – something not as much twisted as irrelevant, spatially distant or prehistoric, if not unknown⁵⁰⁸.

In my opinion, *kalām* reached here a kind of "tentative-centrist" phase. Mutual influence was possible and expected by the most of its agents. The followers of the sects were inspired by a supremacist narrative, which was provided by the hadith of the 73 sects and access to special knowledge. On the other hand, this hadith doesn't lead such supremacism to outward aggression. The total submission or integration of the "lesser" sects would practically deny the Prophet. Despite numerous ad hominem attacks and calls on the state authority for support and demagoguery, we have in the period between Salim and (early) al-Ghazali a period of open debate, in which individual specific creeds (*nihal*) were discussed, contrasted and constructed. The *kalām* debates were limited to some cities, to

505 – Tritton 1947: 51

506 – Van Ess 2006: 9

507 – e.g. in case of Ja'far ibn al-Harb (Van Ess 2011: 140f).

508 – cf. Shahrastani 1984: 1f

a certain period and to a limited number of educated persons. Although the opinion of *ashāb al-hadīth* wasn't very relevant for the Mu'tazili heresiographies, they participated on the debates too⁵⁰⁹. There were multiple axes of distinction at work. Although there were cases of a *takfīr* being declared or others being called *hashwī*, such moves were not as much violence against the other groups, as rhetorical interjections specific to the *kalām* language.

Mutakallimūn and Heresiographers

Who is the "subject" of sectarianism? Is it the one who utters an idea, which distinguishes him from the others his followers, his opponents, or the one who documents it? Sectarianism has a very different meaning when seen from the view of a theologian engaged in a debate with an opponent, and a heresiographer trying to understand a past debate its context. To be considered a member of a sect – and not the *umma wāhida* – is bad for both, but the heresiographer is at least in no direct "danger" of being so categorized. A theologian "in action" can always make a statement which his immediate audience may consider heretical. He can more easily feel what it means to be an "object" of exclusion.

Of course, these categories are often interchangeable. Abu'l-Hasan al-Ash'ari, followed the course of negative *kalām* set by his teacher al-Jubba'i, yet he turned it against al-Jubba'i and the Mu'tazila itself⁵¹⁰. Van Ess takes his *Maqālāt al-Islāmīyīn* as a model work for all heresiography⁵¹¹. According to the translator of Shahrastani's *Kitāb al-Milal wa-l-nihal*, he seems to have depended on Ash'ari's *Maqālāt* a lot, especially in the sections on Kharijites and Shi'a, although Ash'ari wasn't credited⁵¹². The translator also remarked that Shahrastani changed the order of the Shi'a sects: Ash'ari began with the

509 – Tritton 1947: 104

510 – Tritton (1974: 167) describes his apostasy from the Mu'tazila as a gradual process, especially in the matter of divine attributes. This was especially important from the viewpoint of Shahrastani, who tried to stress al-Ash'ari's similarities with the *ashāb al-hadīth*, although Tritton also points out that his teachings were often confused with those of his followers (ibid.). Another important point of criticism was the theory of reason, seen e.g. in his *Kitāb al-Luma'*, which criticizes the Mu'tazilites for their qadarism.

511 – Van Ess 2011: 1202

512 – Shahrastani 1984: 4

extreme Shi'a (*ghulāt*), Shahrastani with Kaisaniya, named by 'Ali's teacher⁵¹³. This shows an important difference between them: Ash'ari's work seems to be more activist, showing the gravest heresy first, and only then coming to the inner divisions of the sect. Shahrastani is more a kind of encyclopaedist, attempting to make a historical order of sects. For Ash'ari, heresiography was an integral part of his campaign against the still dominant movement within *kalām*. Its goal wasn't only to document the "headlines of yesterday", but rather to expose the enemy. Ash'ari tried to present himself as one influenced by *ahl al-sunna wa-'l-jamā'a* and a supporter of its creed. A similar strategy seems to have been followed by Salim ibn Dhakwan already. In this way, he was important for the very construction of *kalām* orthodoxy and of *ahl al-sunna wa-'l-jamā'a* as a "historical" sect. Nevertheless, it is hard to say whether this was the result of his contribution or of the rising importance of hadith research.

But not every heresiologist can be seen at once as a *mutakallim*, a proponent of the sect, nor vice-versa. It is obvious for modern scholars like Josef Van Ess or Ulrich Rudolph, whose spatial and temporal detachment needs no comment. But this could be the case of Ibn Tahir al-Baghdadi (11th century) as well, who experienced Shi'a as the dominant ideology of a foreign usurper. Even if he'd written a mere encyclopaedia like Shahrastani, it could be seen as a politically loaded text, at least for describing adherence to 'Ali as a doctrine of only a specific sect of Islam. For Shahrastani himself, Shi'a was most likely a curious tradition of thought – one of many – yet his interest in them sometimes aroused suspicion⁵¹⁴. Although living in a "multicultural" town, Salim was faced with a negative popular view of his sect, which he had to negate first, if he wished to gain over support against 'Abbasids. Dirar's disdainful view of the *hashwīya* contrasts with Salim's motive: popular views didn't concern him, because they'd accept the best viewpoint as soon as his own team scholars formulated it.

In such cases, the group identity (of Baghdadi as a Sunni scholar under Shi'a dominance; of Dirar as a *mutakallim* faced with "plebeian" hadith collectors) could be seen more as an agent than as a constructed category. Ash'ari's *Maqālāt* is a persuasive work of *kalām*, which calls up group categories to describe heretical groups, appealing to individuals to guard themselves against their influence. It isn't detached from *kalām*: we

513 – Shahrastani 1984: 126

514 – Shahrastani 1984: introd.

can take it as a manual in a theological dispute. In comparison, Baghdadi's book is more didactic and repetitive. It doesn't only speak of a "tradition"; it describes it thoroughly and invites the reader to study the tenets of orthodoxy (and not some Shi'a or Khariji texts). Dirar ibn 'Amr, and even more Maturidi⁵¹⁵, whose works touch on the "interdisciplinary" axis, do a similar thing by excluding not as much traditions of thought, as traditions of practice, namely the collecting of hadiths. The "ingroup" in their case is the group of users of the *kalām* method, as described above, and their identity is that of *mutakallimūn*.

This also invites a comparison of the works of later scholars on *kalām*, both critical voices like (late) al-Ghazali, Ibn Rushd or Arberry⁵¹⁶, as well as the more descriptive, like Tritton, Rudolph and Van Ess. From their perspectives, *kalām* is an distinct object: they could experience neither the situation of a Mu'tazili scholar in its heyday, nor the reactions of society characteristic for the period between Salim and (early) al-Ghazali. *Kalām* has to be located within society, among the Muslim sciences, and within Islam as such – if the perspective of the scholar allowed it. In this, the critical voices are much more exact and objectifying: it is an *'ilm* for al-Ghazali, a competing philosophical tradition for Ibn Rushd, and a rather traditionalist Muslim intellectual movement for Arberry. Thus the study of *kalām* has sense from the perspective of the the contributions of *kalām* to the *'ulūm* in general, to philosophy or to Islam in general. In the works of a more descriptive nature, it has primarily a place in history. *Kalām* retains its "exotic" status, but the environment in which it exists is less clearly defined. Philosophy, other *'ulūm* and Islam in general don't function as sufficient categories for the description of *kalām*: we have to study to what extent they are relevant for the study of *kalām*. Such works are more studies of *kalām* perspectives than their content, structure or history.

Heresiography also interested itself in the "environmental determinants" of the respective heresies, but not to a great extent. We have tales of Iblis' disputes and of hidden religions, but they are only secondary to other question: the relation between the 72 sects and the *ahl al-sunna wa-'l-jamā'a*, the relation between the fruitful work of a theologian and blind obedience to a hadith; and the relation between a sinner and a good Muslim. The object of sectarian research is always dependant on the more general category which is posited by the researcher. Either he hopes that it will become a major

515 – cf. Rudolph 1999: 335

516 – cf. Arberry 1957

field, like the Ash'arites attempted with their idea of an orthodox *kalām*, or the adherence to an already prevalent order, like the generally accepted plurality of modes of thought: philosophic schools and eras, professions and religions.

Conclusion

In comparison with the idea of the nation-state, *kalām* was far from being politically "successful". Even if we take some of the movements it inspired as important for political ideas, they never passed the important step from phase "B" as defined by Hroch. Truly political movements like the Azariqa, the Isma'iliya and the modern Muslim Brotherhood didn't participate much in the *kalām* debates: they were, rather, active contributors of "extremes", a source of painful situations for moderate Kharijites like Salim ibn Dhakwan. Political sects presented the cases, for which *kalām* was a place of detached critical evaluation. Some reached influential people, including the Khalif himself. But none of the *mutakallimūn* was ever able to carve out a long-term, high-level community of people.

Yet this is a false view, coming mostly from the scholars trying to carve up *kalām* as a separate phenomenon within the categories of Muslim sciences or intellectual movements. The ability to impress political leaders with learning was the same in time of the Khalif al-Ma'mun as in the cases of the Turkish and Genghisid princes – in fact, it was the Seljuq vizier Nizam al-Mulk who founded the madrasa in which al-Ghazali taught the Ash'arite creed, and a theologian who followed Timur Lenk on his destructive campaigns and brought a pristine Mu'tazili creed into the debate with Ibn Khaldun. Phenomena such as group supremacism, aspirations and self-glorification could be found in any *kalām*-practicing company, like the Mu'tazili school of Basra, but not in *kalām* itself. It never was an *ethnos* – an influential, value-defining group or tradition – although some individuals were able to gain such a status.

The analogy of a sect (*milla*) and a nation is more comprehensive. The interaction with other sects – *kalām* – was a field of battle in which the credibility of the other sects was put to question. It was a contest based mostly on its own inner rules: the value of holy scriptures, logical coherence and exactness of expression. Sects didn't coexist alongside each other as integral subcultures of a common Islamic world, but rather as potential

agents of conflict. They were two alternatives of the common theological views, of that which could be universally acceptable. The dispute didn't last long. When differences appeared, a "sect" was constituted and the need for the single true sect pushed one or the other to the periphery and later to oblivion. For later writers, like Ibn Rushd, *kalām* became synonymous with the "winners", i.e., the most influential participants of these disputes.

Final Remarks

In this work I attempted both an analytical and a practical analysis of a term. The main goal, even without setting out any clear hypothesis at first, was to find out what is meant by being "ethnocentrist": what do we talk about when we use the term? Only Chapter 5 of the analytical section, concerning the function of the term in various discourses, actually offers three various theses regarding these issue.

First, its meaning isn't limited to the term itself and a corresponding reality. Instead of summoning up a clearly defined term, each use of the term reflects the context of the discourse, the rhetorical goals of the speaker, and the language's constraints, connotations and ambiguities. The meaning is never given, but rather is open for situational construction and complex messages. In the human sciences, naming a problem is of fundamental importance. Research into a phenomenon requires a term ("ethnocentrism", in our case) for the very manifestation of a perceptible phenomenon and for distinguishing an operation within a more general activity: language, history or behavior. In this way, however, the researcher actually posits a separate existence behind the phenomenon, and the term becomes both the tool and the object of study. This affects primarily anthropological and historical studies, which require a selective approach to their objects⁵¹⁷, but it can't be totally avoided in attempts at philosophical meditation as well. In dictionaries and clear-cut critiques, philosophers enjoy pointing out possible differences and nuances between particular phrases. On the other hand, such an approach doesn't help when one term is used to describe various objects. Context is indispensable in any use of the term "ethnocentrism".

Second, the definite meaning can be seen as a class of the uses of the term. I called this class the descriptive function. Such uses have a set of required semantic connotations: the *ethnos* is defined by the scope of the science (ethnology focusing on high-level groups, social psychology on cooperative groups or the relation between the levels), the subject is impersonal, and the structure is clearly expansive and aggressive. In this case, it isn't the term which is important, but rather its analytical environment. Sumner and Levinson analyzed instances of aggressive behavior and claims of superiority imposed by groups or individuals, pretending to represent them, against groups of people

517 – cf. Todorova 2009: 10

denoted by a clear difference and subordinate status. To spare us from such gargantuan sentences, however, they had enough wit to use a single term instead. I attempted to analyze instances of ethnocentrism in the syncretical part of my work, in order to clarify the grouping principles in two different cultural contexts. By analyzing the conflict situation – the claims, rhetorical strategies and belligerents involved – it is possible to understand the development of scientific traditions such as national histories and *kalām* sects. The main ethnocentric tendency in the studies of Štúr's work were their appropriation of him as member of the Slovak group (reflecting more Levinson's definition of ethnocentrism), while in the case of *kalām* we had more the claim of superiority and universality made by its late proponents (Sumner's definition) as the motive. Both tendencies led to the isolation of their traditions within the contemporary scientific scene⁵¹⁸.

Third, "ethnocentrism" can be used as an offensive term not only aimed at disqualifying a thinker from the "objective" discourse because of a certain membership bias (cultural, racial, political), but also to construct a scientific/political opponent. In this aspect, Said's work *Orientalism* isn't interesting only as an attempt to describe the construction of the scientific object, but also with regard to the subject who is doing the science. This point was criticized in very early reviews of his work⁵¹⁹. Studies focusing on the dominant subject instead of the passive object even precede it⁵²⁰. It is, however, a very important aspect of the work from the philosophical point of view. It is fully the author's

518 – In Štúr's case, this can be seen on the contrasting historical narrative concerning him mentioned by foreign and Slovak authors. While Maxwell and Nakazawa concentrate on his exploits of influence within the sphere of Hungarian and Panslavist circles, "local" authors like Osuský, Kramer and Ďurica mention mostly his opposition to the language laws of the 1840s and to Czech grammarians. Both of these approaches – the one trying to analyze the political developments as such and the other describing "phase B" of the Slovak national movement – practically ignore the other.

In the case of Muslim theology, the isolation is a much more radical one. Despite being once a dialectical, rapidly developing tradition, its later perception by al-Ghazali and Ibn Rushd gives us a picture of this discipline as a monolithic sect. The attempt to build up an orthodoxy, a "national narrative" within the *kalām* circles, led to the disappropriation of non-*kalām* sources of knowledge, which were dubbed either *hashwī*, or heretical.

The key difference between the perceptions of Štúr and those of late *kalām* is in the actual aspirations of those writing about them. Describing one as a national hero is an inherently separative discourse. The category of a national hero is hardly translatable to the historical narratives of other peoples – heroism shows itself mostly in oppositions to other nations. The isolation of Slovak national history within the discipline is not as important to a subject of this ethnocentrism, a historian, as the role of historical research within the cultural scene of the nation.

In *kalām*, the history was somewhat longer and more dynamic. Competing groups of early *kalām* contrast with the attempts at orthodoxy of the 9th and 10th centuries as well as and the late apologetics developed in the face of other Islamic sciences. The general tendency was always universalistic.

519 – cf. al-Azm 1980

520 – cf. Nader 1972

choice whether to classify a thought as "groupthink" or to consider it an expression of his original character. When a group of people from different backgrounds (e.g., linguistic) meet to discuss a common matter, it is merely personal choice whether we consider it an intercultural meeting or a process constructing a hierarchical structure. The political identity or loyalty of such a "low-level group" would be, however, always questionable. In this way, works like Said's *Orientalism* and Amin's *Eurocentrism* tend to reflect the idea of conspiracy theories: they suspicious towards any possible crossing of traditional borders. This suspicion isn't totally pointless – the claim of universality, found for example in "humanitarian bombardment" or in holy wars for the salvation of all, is a very common *casus belli* throughout history. On the other hand, is writing *for* some ethnically definable group the same as writing *as* a member? Is loyalty inseparable from the requirements of identity? It should have been so in the Orientalist case, as colonialist science was considered a part of political colonialism. But what if there could be a nationalism without chauvinism, as Masaryk believed⁵²¹?

These three theses open both new questions for philosophy and hint at the methods which could be used to solved them. The first thesis shows that semantic analysis can't give us a clear definition of the term. While a single person can have a clear definition for himself, the meaning can move freely between its connotations when used by multiple persons at once. This is also the reason, why we can't even translate the term. Languages which have adopted the term from English merely change the last suffix or remove the third letter to make it more familiar to their tongue, but an unquestionable translation to an equivalent term, using a native root is impossible. This trait shows itself not only on the interlinguistic, but also on the interdisciplinary level. "Ethnocentrism" means one thing for a historian describing the causes of a conflict, something very different for a psychologist comparing groups of football fans, something else for an anthropologist criticizing his colleagues from another country, and yet again something else for a politician in a Central African or Central European country. This work tries to illustrate the possible limitations of these connotations based on observed occurrences. I can't say whether their combinations give us all the possible limitations or not. There can always arise a new instance in which the term is used in a new context, arousing new associations.

The analytic power of the term to describe of psychological profiles and group

521 – Masaryk 1924: 435

relations is very limited. This doesn't come as much from the broadness of the term's meaning as from its redundant character. The specific attitude and behavior, which was described as ethnocentrist by Sumner and Levinson, and to which I tried to draw an analogy in my interpretations of a national historic narrative and a theological discourse, itself doesn't suffice without clear descriptions of actual group relations, identificatory principles, aspirations and agents. The term has to be defined anew at every instance of its use. For this reason, it would be perhaps better to abandon the term altogether, focusing instead on the particular problems which we are trying to point out: the bias or political engagement of scientists, or racist crimes and interethnic tensions in society. For the sake of analysis, it is important to understand both the relations between one's cultural background and bias when analyzing methodologies, and those between cultural stereotypes and hate attitudes in society. The terminological unification of these fields, however, makes us think about the relations between cultural background, politics and hate towards "others" – which, I hope, isn't the only possible outcome.

The third thesis I've formulated is about this problem as well. In the case of the Orientalists, their cultural identity, political allegiances and stereotypes are seen as a single object, a kind of colonialist ethnicity. From this standpoint – and also in the comparison of the "colonialist" to the "subaltern", the "colonial", or the "objectified" – the reasons behind the scientific work are questioned. But the definition of the West as a source of both modern science and colonialism is a misleading reduction, not least because the scientific approach to history, ethnology and geography was in no case limited to those Western countries which founded expansionist empires.

There are various enterprises whose invention can be localized in a specific geographic area or social niche, yet which have become global: the consumption of rice, TCP/IP protocol and international drug conventions. Why don't we consider the expansion of rice a threat to good old European wheat? What hidden powers bar the spread of SCTP protocol for the internet? Who dictates to the rest of world which substances can be used for recreational purposes and which not? Such questions are pointless: phenomena like rice, the internet and drug legislation have turned global, detaching themselves from their cultural identities. They aren't universals because they are prone to change, nor they can be seen as products of a specific universalism, as they may adapt to the demands of various parts of the world. The question of human rights is one of the more serious forms

of this debate.

In this respect I think the debate over ethnocentrism concentrates too much on the limits and presuppositions of "Western" science. One thing is that globally influential scientific discourses were never merely "Western", nor were they limited to Indo-European languages. The most important thing is the unification of a cultural category (civilizations, linguistic areas) with the political powers, coinciding territorially with each respective ethnic unit. This problem has already been discussed in the first part of the analytic section, but its consequences are especially visible in both case studies presented in the synthetic part.

In Štúr's case, the main "political representative" of the constructed ethnic group was the "scientist" himself. First came Štúr himself, although his sincere Panslavism casts doubts on his role as a Slovak representative. That interpretation is typical of later generations from the Czechoslovak era. His persona – a linguist, philosopher and ethnographer, endowed with a political mandate at the Hungarian Diet – became a prototypical freedom fighter in the domain of politics using science instead of traditional methods. Instead of choices and interests, this field demands scientific knowledge. Instead of ethics, it requires epistemology. One's identity is the only truth that he can follow in a political movement, and the morality of the ethnic representative is found only in the degree of his awareness of this identity. It's the confusion between Sumner and Levinson which bars us from understanding which came first: the political group formulating its interest or the ethnic group, which became the democratic body, giving blessing to its representation. Studies of ethnocentrism have focused too much on both at the same time, missing the critical moments⁵²² in which nationalism took hold of the masses.

In the case of *kalām*, we don't have political representation in the same meaning as in the Slovak case. Formulations of orthodoxy were instances of attempted *theological* representation within a wider field of Muslim dogmatism. Nowadays, instances of *mihna*, Khariji propaganda and the clash of the Mu'tazilite and Ash'arite (and *hashwī*) worldviews may look banal to us, especially in light of their context⁵²³, but in fact they may had played

522 – E.g., the "Soissons vase" incident: when the future King of Franks Clovis killed a soldier who reminded him about his competences during looting. Clovis enjoyed sufficient support of the "masses" to receive no sanction for the crime. Cf. Foucault 1976: 150-152

523 – cf. Van Ess 2011

a parallel role to the ecumenical councils of Christianity: on the one hand, they established the limits of "Islamic" and "heretical" thought, but on the other, they preserved the decentralized character (or lack) of dogmatism in Islam. Perhaps these limits were too small for the theological discourse to persist. Because of these limits, it was harder for theologians to produce results comparable to those of the study of hadiths or medicine. The choice of what to study was, for the 12th or 13th century scholar, quite rational – the *kalām* was simply abandoned. It was by then a mere repetition of dogmas.

But such limits aren't typical only of Islamic – or generally of religious studies. A small nation also can only barely have two coexisting narratives of its history – first and foremost because of the limited time its schoolchildren can spend in history. The result in both cases is, in the end, the cessation of truly scientific, critical research; instead, we have the reproduction of dogmas and heroic monuments. This would be, in short, a comedy for Bacon's theater.

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Abstrakt

In dieser Arbeit beschäftige ich mich mit dem Begriff „Ethnozentrismus“ und seinen Anwendungen in verschiedenen Diskursen. Der Begriff wird aus mehreren Seiten untersucht. Auf einer Seite beschreibe ich die Geschichte und Vielfalt der Anwendungen des Begriffes, auf anderen Seite aber auch die wesentlichen Ideen, die mit dem Begriff verbunden sind. Dazu gehören vor allem soziale und psychologische Phänomene wie politischer Nationalismus, ethnische Konflikte usw., aber auch semantische Konnotationen, die zum Verständnis des Begriffes notwendig sind – die Idee der ethnischen Gruppen, der Mitgliedschaft, der Praxis, die mit vom Ethnozentrismus beeinflusst wird, und des Subjekts des Ethnozentrismus. Weiterhin werden die Anwendungen auch aus der Perspektive der situationellen Funktion vergleicht. Ich argumentiere gegen die Vorwürfe des Ethnozentrismus in philosophischen Debatten, da es zur Konservierung und Isolierung der Denktradition führt.

Lebenslauf

Ich bin geboren in Bratislava, wo ich an dem Gymnasium der Hl. Ursula studierte. Das Abitur habe ich im Mai 2004 abgelegt. Im September 2004 habe ich das Studium der Philosophie und Geschichte der Philosophie an der Comenius-Universität in Bratislava angefangen. Dieses Studium habe ich im September 2005 an der Universität Wien fortgesetzt und im 2008 habe ich die Diplomprüfung bestanden. Meine Diplomarbeit „*Parallels of Stoicism and Kalam*“ wurde von Prof. Franz Martin Wimmer betreut. Seit dem Jahr 2009 arbeitete ich weiterhin unter seiner Betreuung an der vorliegenden Dissertation. Die einzelnen Punkte der beiden Werken habe ich an mehreren Konferenzen in Bratislava (2009, 2011, 2012), Salzburg (Mai 2012), Poznan (September 2012), Wien (Dezember 2012) und Pilsen (Dezember 2012) vorgestellt. Seit 2010 studiere ich auch an dem Institut für Slawistik im Bereich der Bulgaristik. Die Problematik der Kulturologie habe ich mit Hilfe der Prof. Ljubka Lipcheva-Prandzheva und Prof. Alois Woldan in meine Dissertation eingegliedert. Einige Schlüsse von dieser Mitarbeit habe ich an einer Konferenz in Karlovo (Juni 2013) vorgestellt.