MASTERARBEIT

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Successful Interorganizational Cooperation?
Analyzing the EU-ASEAN Relationship

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<td>ACE</td>
<td>Asesores de Comercio Exterior</td>
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<td>AEMM</td>
<td>ASEAN EU Ministerial Meeting</td>
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<td>AFTA</td>
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<td>AICA</td>
<td>ASEAN Comprehensive Investment Agreement</td>
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<td>ASEAN Industrial Projects</td>
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<td>APRIS</td>
<td>ASEAN EU Programme for Regional Integration Support</td>
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<td>ASEAN Regional Forum</td>
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<td>ARISE</td>
<td>ASEAN Regional Integration Support Programme by the EU</td>
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<td>ASA</td>
<td>Association of Southeast Asia</td>
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<td>ASC</td>
<td>ASEAN Security Community</td>
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<td>ASCC</td>
<td>ASEAN Socio-Cultural Community</td>
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<td>ASEF</td>
<td>Asia Europe Foundation</td>
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<td>ASEM</td>
<td>Asia Europe Meeting</td>
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<td>AU</td>
<td>African Union</td>
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<td>COREPER</td>
<td>Committee of Permanent Representatives</td>
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<td>EAEC</td>
<td>European Atomic Energy Community</td>
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<td>EC</td>
<td>European Community</td>
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<td>EDSM</td>
<td>ASEAN Enhanced Dispute Settlement Mechanism</td>
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<td>EEC</td>
<td>European Economic Community</td>
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<td>EPG</td>
<td>Eminent Persons Group</td>
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<td>ECSC</td>
<td>European Community for Steel and Coal</td>
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<td>EU</td>
<td>European Union</td>
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<td>IO</td>
<td>International Organization</td>
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<td>IOR</td>
<td>Interorganizational Relation</td>
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<td>Acronym</td>
<td>Full Form</td>
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<td>IR</td>
<td>International Relations</td>
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<td>JCC</td>
<td>Joint Cooperation Committee</td>
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<td>JIC</td>
<td>Joint Investment Committee</td>
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<td>Mercosur</td>
<td>Mercado Común del Sur</td>
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<td>MIP</td>
<td>Multi-Annual Indicative Programme</td>
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<td>NATO</td>
<td>North Atlantic Treaty Organization</td>
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<td>PCM</td>
<td>Project Cycle Management</td>
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<td>PoA</td>
<td>Plan of Action</td>
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<td>PSC</td>
<td>Programme Steering Committee</td>
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<td>RDT</td>
<td>Resource Dependence Theory</td>
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<td>READI</td>
<td>Regional EU-ASEAN Dialogue Instrument</td>
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<td>RIP</td>
<td>Regional Indicative Programme</td>
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<td>ROO</td>
<td>ASEAN Rules of Origin</td>
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<td>SAARC</td>
<td>South Asian Association for Regional Co-operation</td>
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<td>SCCAN</td>
<td>Special Coordinating Committee of ASEAN</td>
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<td>Southeast Asian Treaty Organization</td>
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<td>Standard International Trade Classification</td>
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<td>Treaty of Amity and Cooperation</td>
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<td>Transaction Cost Economy</td>
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<td>TCT</td>
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<td>TREATI</td>
<td>Trans-Regional EU-ASEAN Trade Initiative</td>
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<td>UN</td>
<td>United Nations</td>
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<td>UNFCCC</td>
<td>UN Framework Convention on Climate Change</td>
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<td>ZOPFAN</td>
<td>Zone of Peace, Freedom and Neutrality</td>
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Introduction

As the number of International Organizations rises, their financial resources grow and their presence in many different policy areas is highly visible, it becomes clear, that they play an important role in the present international system (Rittberger, Kruck, Romund; 2010: 197). The United Nations (UN), the European Union (EU), the Mercado Común del Sur (Mercosur), the African Union (AU), or the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) are, amongst others, prominent examples of International Organizations (IO).

IOs are based on formal arrangements, the membership reserved to states. Going more into detail, Rittberger, Kruck and Romund state:

> International Organizations are intergovernmental institutions, with problem-based as well as problem-overlapping tasks, which can appear as actors in domestic and external relations due to their organized structure and their competence empowerment (Rittberger, Kruck, Romund; 2010: 202).

The reasons why states create IOs are manifold; to simplify the procedure of international negotiations and agreements, to serve as norm-creator and dispute settlement mechanism or the like (Abbott, Snidal; 1998: 5). On the one hand, IOs, are seen as instrument for states to pursue their interests, and on the other, as a frame for international problem-based negotiations (Czempiel; 1998: 136). Hence, IOs accomplish tasks which cannot be proceeded locally, due to rising international interdependencies (Goll; 2011: 43). As it will be explained in detail later on, IOs can also be seen as actors of international politics.

The aim of this master thesis is to present a critical review of the relationship between the EU and ASEAN. Starting with formal political relations in the early 1970’s, the two IOs have developed closer links in diverse policy fields ever since (Rüland; 2001: 4). Regarding the economic sphere for example, the EU (after China) was the second largest trade partner of ASEAN, and ASEAN accounted with 5 per cent to the EU’s total trade in 2009 (Wirtschaftskammer Österreich: 2013). The relationship has also experienced criticism, for example for its slow decision making caused by a combination of different decision-making processes of the two IOs and lack of interest and engagement on the side of the EU (see Camroux, 2008; Møller, 2007). The relationship between these two organizations is not the only interaction between Southeast Asia and Europe. In 1996, the

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1 International Organizations are also called 'Intergovernmental' Organizations (IGO). In this thesis, the term International Organization is used and abbreviated with 'IO'.
Asia-Europe Meeting (ASEM) was created as an interregional platform for dialogues on various policy domains. The number of ASEM member has almost doubled since its creation. Today the Meeting brings together 51 partner states, including inter alia the EU and ASEAN member states, the ASEAN Secretariat, China, Japan, South Korea, Australia and Russia (ASEM; 2014). ASEM summits are held every second year, and since 2010, annual meetings on the ministerial level are organized (ASEM; 2014a). Throughout the years, the policy dialogues were bundled into the three pillars of political, economic, and social, cultural and educational issues (ASEM; 2014b). Some authors argue that interregional fora, such as ASEM, can be perceived as challenging factors for the cooperation between the two IOs. Doidge (2004) even rises the question, whether or not a specific EU-ASEAN dialogue, alongside of ASEM, is still needed (Doidge, 2004: 45). Taking up on this thought, the research question of this thesis is as follows:

*In the light of criticism and interregional fora such as ASEM, can the relationship between the EU and ASEAN be termed as a successful interorganizational cooperation, and hence is it worth maintaining?*

Reviewing the literature on the relationship between the EU and the ASEAN, it becomes obvious that the cooperation offers a variety of research agendas. Besides the economic cooperation (Jetschke, Portela; 2013), scholars have been interested in the common goals and visions (e.g. fostering global peace and security), but also in the differences of the two IOs, not only within the individual organizations (structure, membership, bureaucracy, financial resources), but also in terms of cultural and historical backgrounds. For example do the members of the EU stay independent states, but they delegate parts of the decision-making power to the institutions of the Union, and are therefore pooling their sovereignty (Eibner; 2008: 196). ASEAN members, on the other hand, preserve their total sovereignty. Furthermore, the organization pursues a 'non-interference' strategy (ASEAN Charter; 2011). The EU is hence a supranational organization, whereas ASEAN still has an intergovernmental structure. Other researchers explored the difficulties of, and opportunities within the relationship (Ørstrøm, 2007; Lim, 2012), or uncover the benefits ASEAN could gather, or lessons it could learn from the European integration experiences (Plummer, 2006; Jetschke, Murray, 2011). Controversies related to the issue of human rights are also discussed (Petersson, 2006; Manea, 2008). The interregional approach to the relationship of the two IOs is particularly well explored. In several articles, Jürgen Rüland discusses the topic of interregionalism between the EU and the ASEAN. Not only does the author point out the difficulties of IO research, he also refers to the controversial
question of IO actorness and additionally explains interregionalism as a theoretical framework. (Rüland, 2001; 2010; 2011). Christopher Dent also explores the interregional relations between Europe and the Asian region, but concentrates more on the links between the Asia-Europe Meeting (ASEM) and the EU (Dent, 2004). Although there is a growing number of works by now, one still has to face some difficulties when conducting research about the relationship between the two organizations. Lim (2012) summarizes these problems well, by saying:

There are factors hampering research on ASEAN EU relations. One reason is the availability of information which researchers do not have access to. Secondly, there seemed to be a gap between policy-makers and the academic world. Thirdly, there has been a shift of interest over the years from Southeast Asia to North East Asia and to India. Fourthly, there is the perception in the EU and elsewhere that ASEAN does not work as a group. Fifthly, on the external front, ASEAN embassies in Europe have not been sufficiently cooperative in promoting ASEAN and, internally, in individual ASEAN countries, governments have not developed enough effort to promote ASEAN. (...) Sixthly, the EU is not promoting EU ASEAN relations in the European public and in research (Lim; 2012: 46)

The lack of available information indeed poses a problem. While the EU at least offers various documents (e.g. statements, speeches, reviews) dating back to 1975, ASEAN only presents a timetable overview of the dialogue and documents displaying the ASEAN point of view are rare. Therefore, most literature encounters a very euro-centric standpoint. Also the links on the homepages of both organizations are oftentimes deceptive, as sometimes the links still exist, but the corresponding articles were removed, or the links lead to completely different pages than indicated. As it will be shown, this is not the only difficulty one encounters when interested in the cooperation of the EU and ASEAN, and interorganizational relationships in general.

To approach the subject of interaction between two IOs, first of all, it has to be clarified, what is meant by the terms 'cooperation' and 'collaboration'. In general, cooperation is mostly referred to as "(...) the process by which individuals, groups and organizations come together, interact and form psychological relationships for mutual gain or benefit" (Smith, Carroll, Ashford; 1995: 10). In collaboration, engaging at least two partners, resources are combined and problems which outrun the capacities of one single partner are resolved (Gray; 1985: 912). It seems, that the term cooperation characterizes a less
formal type of relationship than the term collaboration. In the literature about inter-organizational relations, both terms are used to describe the same process frequently. In this thesis, however, only the term cooperation will be used, and defined as the collective interaction of two entities, based on resource exchange, with the aim to pursue common goals.

The thesis is organized as follows: The first chapter, subdivided in realistic-, institutional- and constructivist approaches, is constructed to introduce the different perceptions of classic IR theories regarding IOs themselves and international cooperation in general. As the focus of IR approaches lies upon relations between IOs and states, scholars interested in IO-IO relations face difficulties in their research. In presenting the research field of Interorganizational Relations, this problem is seized upon in chapter two. As IOs developed links of their own, and IO-IO cooperation emerged, IO scholars, in need for theoretical underpinning, turned to other disciplines, such as organization theory or sociology. After clarifying what is understood of the term 'Interorganizational Relations' (IOR), the first part of this chapter presents selected approaches from this field of research, as well as their possible contribution for IO scholars. Furthermore, where possible, a literature review of the different approaches taken by IO scholars will be added to the theories. The second part of the chapter provides an insight to the controversial topic of actorness. Different lines of thought regarding the autonomy of IOs are explained and later on applied to the case of the EU and ASEAN. The importance of this part is the circumstance, that whether or not a specific IO is seen as actor, influences the transferability of interorganizational approaches to the individual IO, and hence to the interorganizational cooperation in general. Rather than throwing light to specific characteristics of the relationship between the EU and ASEAN, the aim of this thesis is to cover a wider spectrum of the cooperation. As it will be explained in detail later on, there is no single concept of Interorganizational Relations, it is rather a collective term for different theoretical frameworks and analytical instruments. Therefore an integrated framework, composed of selected criteria and aspects of various interorganizational relations theories was developed. The first dimension of the framework (preconditions and motivation) covers the antecedents of cooperation, such as environmental circumstances as well as factors that motivate organizations to enter cooperative arrangements, for example a need for scarce resources, or the wish to accomplish common tasks. The first part of dimension two (polity and policy) aims to uncover the structural components of a relationship, for example on which contractual adjustment the
cooperation is based and how and why policy domains are selected. The second part of the dimension is occupied with the way interorganizational cooperations carry out and implement their previously declared goals. In the last dimension (success indicators) factors are presented which help to clarify whether or not the cooperation is successful. The literature about interorganizational relations offers a variety of success indicators. According to the previous dimensions, the factors distinctive goals and effective implementation, outcome and mutual gain and respect and committed leaders as well as the factor balance of power: process and indicator were chosen. The latter was chosen for two reasons: on the one hand would the examination of other factors, such as trust, legitimacy, learning or value go beyond the scope of this thesis, and on the other hand, is the balance (or imbalance) of power a crucial element for a successful cooperation. The second indicator will analyze if the two organizations are able to distinctively define their policy goals and later on implement them effectively. The third indicator will delve into the question of what the interorganizational relationship between the EU and ASEAN has achieved, may it be in the political, economic or socio-cultural domain. The last success indicator then analyzes the ability of the two organizations to acknowledge and act correspondingly to their different cultural and historic backgrounds. To answer the research question, after examining the cooperation of the EU and ASEAN according to the established framework, the results of the empirical part will be analyzed in detail and tested against the success indicators in the conclusion of the thesis. Moreover will the analysis provide clarity regarding two points: first, if the developed framework has proven its suitability to examine the relationship between the two specific organizations and second, where the strengths and weaknesses of the cooperation are located. As no reference regarding an interorganizational review of the relations between the EU and ASEAN could be found in the literature, with the combination of these two points it is aimed at filling a gap in the research field of International Relations. Furthermore, the future prospect of the cooperation will be discussed and further research possibilities presented.
1 Classic Theories of International Relations

1.1 Introduction
Since the 1920s' scholars of International Relations conducted a lot of research concerning International Organizations (Kratochwill, Ruggie; 1986: 754). The classic theories of IR are engaged with the establishing, the functioning and the procedure of IOs, as well as the relationship between IOs and states and international cooperation in general. The interpretation of international cooperation and the role of IOs vary significantly within the classic theories of IR. The following section offers an overview of different classical approaches to the analysis of IOs, but does not claim to be complete, as several approaches (e.g. feminist ;-; neo-gramscianist ;-) green theory) were found to be inapplicable for this topic and therefore been left out. The chapter is divided into three categories: realistic approaches, institutional approaches and constructivist approaches.

1.2 Realist Approaches
Realism ascribes IOs only little importance, and hence their influence on international politics is thought to be little (Rittberger, Kruck, Romund; 2010: 205). This assumption grounds on the realistic perception that due to the anarchic and constant insecure international system, cooperation between states is only possible on a short term basis (Freistein, Leininger; 2012: 9). Even if nations pursue the same goals, cooperation is hindered because of this anarchy, which is thought of as the source of conflict and competition (Grieco, 1988: 485). As survival is said to be the foremost objective of a state, it is occupied with obtaining, maintaining and increasing power (Slaughter; 2011: 4). The threat of betrayal of other states, along with the problem of 'relative gains' minimizes the willingness of states to engage in international cooperation, that is because states also fear that others achieve relatively greater gains (Grieco, 1988: 499). As IOs are sensed to have no influence on the anarchic nature of the international system, the struggle for power has to be solved through nation states (Rittberger, Zangl, Kruck; 2013: 29). According to realist assumptions, the establishment, decisions and proceedings of an IO are dependent on the hegemonic power of a member state (Rittberger, Zangl, Kruck;
Neo-realist scholars, sharing with realism the premise that states are the main actors, also assume that the international arena is dominated of anarchic, contesting and competitive situations (Lemke, 2008: 17). According to the neo-realist theory of hegemonic stability, IOs can offer the structure for temporary international cooperation, as the hegemonic state needs them to pursue its objectives, but at the same time are dependent on that state (Freisttein; Leininger; 2012: 9). From a neo-realistic point of view too, the problem of 'relative gains' hinders international cooperation through IOs, as "(...) cooperation, based on common interests, which offers all states involved absolute, but no relative gains (...) is practically only hard to achieve" (Rittberger, Zangl, Kruck; 2013: 30). Hence IOs are seen as mere diplomatic instruments of states (Rittberger, Kruck, Romund; 2010: 205). In general, Realism and Neo-Realism have a pessimistic perception of international relations in general (Schieder, Spindler; 2010: 78).

### 1.3 Institutional Approaches

_Institutional_ scholars share the (neo-) realistic view of states being the only actors in the international system, but emphasize the growing number of interdependencies, which cause problems no state can solve on its own (Rittberger, Zangl; 2003: 32). Scholars pursuing an institutionalist approach concentrate on the interdependence of actors in the international system, which are connected through IOs (Lemke, 2008: 21). International cooperation is considered a gainful behavior for states, and is most likely to develop when carried out through IOs (Rittberger, Zangl, Kruck; 2013: 32). One of the basic questions of liberal approaches is, how the various actors can work together to solve global problems (Lemke, 2008: 21). Progress in the development of new technologies and ways of communication is believed to diminish the significance of states, simultaneously raising the importance of IOs (Lemke, 2008: 22). Within Institutionalism several different approaches have been developed. According to _federalist_ theories, the federation of several states and the creation of an IO can be attributed to the desire to prevent war between its member states (Rittberger, Zangl, Kruck; 2013: Rittberger, Zangl, Kruck; 2013: 32). Scholars of _Functionalism_ also ascribe the creation of IOs to the rise of interdependencies (due to technical progress) and resultant problems, which are thought to be the cause for their growing importance (Rittberger, Zangl, Kruck; 2013: 33). Furthermore, IOs are seen as to have the ability and independence to fulfill their distinctive goals, because states bestow these capabilities on them (Koch, 2009: 436).
Keeping the European integration process in mind, scholars of *Neo-Functionalist* abandon the idea of technical progress being the cause of growing interdependencies as they highlight the importance of political and economic interaction (Schieder, Spindler; 2010: 33). IOs are created to solve problems of defined policy domains through cooperation. The preoccupation with these problems however often results in the development of new interdependencies in other political areas (Rittberger, Zangl, Kruck; 2013:33).

*Neo-Institutionalist* approaches claim, that the significance of IOs rises through the amounting interdependent relations and the emerging problems. The creation of IOs is ascribed to two circumstances: first, 'common aversion' defines a situation where states seek cooperation to avoid outcomes leading to losses for all participates, and second, 'common interest' characterizes the desire to realize shared goals (Rittberger, Zangl, Kruck; 2013: 35). IOs are seen as arenas, which develop and uphold norms and therefore help states to pursue and accomplish their interests, as they gain information and a structure for action through IOs (Koch, 2009: 434-435; Freistein, Leininger; 2012: 10). Cooperation is almost impossible without IOs, as the divergent interests of states always involve the possibility that one state leaves the cooperation (Rittberger, Zangl, Kruck; 2013: 34). From this point of view, a hegemonic state is no longer the premise for the survival of an IO, rather they gain stability because it is found to be more expensive and difficult to change them or create new organization, than adapt the existing ones (Freistein, Leininger; 2012: 11). The interdependence analysis, predominantly shaped by Keohane and Nye (1977), denies that the number of IOs grows according to raised interdependencies. The analysis points out that the creation of IOs falls in line with the distribution of power (Schieder, Spindler; 2010: 33). Power is seen as "(...) the ability to control social relationships" (Lemke, 2008: 24)

1.4 Constructivist Approaches

Constructivist approaches differ from realist and institutional premises as it is assumed that actors not only act to fulfill their interests, but are also willing to do this according to their established social norms. The creation of IOs is attributed to shared cognitive and normative perceptions of the founders. Constructivist scholars claim that although states create the normative structures of the international system, IOs change these cognitive and normative perceptions of political actors and hence alter their interests and identities.
They therefore have influence on their members (states) (Rittberger, Zangl, Kruck; 2013: 39-40). From a transactionalist point of view, transnational communication networks and exchange relationships foster the establishment of security communities. IOs facilitate the process of these transnational links, furthermore changing the perceptions of the partnering societies, so that the use of military force between members is reduced severely (Rittberger, Zangl, Kruck; 2013: 41).

Socio-constructivist viewpoints assume that social actors not only pursue their interests, but also act according to their perceived role in the system. The approach adds the topic of cognition to the norm- and value-creating debate, claiming that the perception of a problem may differ from society to society. Communication through an IO can then change the views and interests of participating states and hence facilitate the handling (or solving) of the problems (Rittberger, Zangl, Kruck; 2013: 42-43). Socio-constructivism pays particular attention to the bureaucracies of IOs. On the one hand, the shared values and norms also shape the institutional design of the organization, whereas on the other hand, IOs use this development to create their own bureaucracies, allowing them to follow their own paths (Rittberger, Zangl, Kruck; 2013: 44). According to that plus the notion that IOs do not solely follow the orders of their members, IOs are ascribed a certain amount of authority and, hence can become actors in their own right (Schieder, Spindler; 2010: 39-40; Freistein, Leininger; 2012: 13).

1.5 Summary

The classic IR theories offer a well established basis for the analysis of the backgrounds of and causes for the establishment of IOs, the relations between IOs and states, their effectiveness as well as their influence in the international system. Their views on IOs and international cooperation differ, but, except of constructivist approaches, they have the common assumption that IOs serve as instruments or arenas for states. As instruments, IOs execute the interests of the most powerful member states. When IOs are seen as arenas, they serve as platforms where states try to assert their interests and where international problems are discussed and worked upon. Actorness is only seen (in the best case) as common (Rittberger, Kruck, Romund; 2010: 201, ABB 3.4).
Figure 1: International Cooperation and IOs in International Relations (by author)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Approach</th>
<th>International Cooperation</th>
<th>International Organizations</th>
<th>Reference Articles</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Realist</strong></td>
<td>Only possible on short-term basis (international system = anarchic)</td>
<td>Little importance and influence; dependent on hegemonic power</td>
<td>Rittberger, Zangl, Kruck (2013)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Neo-Realist</strong></td>
<td>Hindered by 'relative gains'</td>
<td>Diplomatic instruments of states; platforms for temporary international cooperation</td>
<td>Rittberger, Kruck, Romund (2010)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Institutionalist</strong></td>
<td>Gainful behavior for states</td>
<td>Connect actors in international system</td>
<td>Rittberger, Zangl, Kruck (2013)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Neo-Institutionalist</strong></td>
<td>Almost impossible without IOs (divergent interests of states)</td>
<td>Important due to rising interdependencies; serve as arenas</td>
<td>Freistein, Leininger (2012)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Constructivist</strong></td>
<td>Influenced by social norms</td>
<td>Actors (change perceptions of states)</td>
<td>Schieder, Spindler (2010)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
2 Interorganizational Relations

2.1 Introduction

As mentioned before, the main focus of classic IR theories lies on the relations between IOs and states. But as the last couple of years have shown, IOs develop relations of their own and establish links to other International Organizations (Biermann; 2009: 6). If this relationship between IOs is at the center of research, the limits of classic IR theories seem apparent.

(...) disciplinary limits of IR itself and from the way its focus on states or state-IO relations underestimates the need to conceptualize IGOs in their own right (Koch; 2009:431).

As major international events pose puzzles which traditional IR theory cannot satisfactorily explain, the search for better theory sets in, and as the discourse within the discipline exposes explanatory limits of existing theories, these are redefined or even dismissed (Biermann; 2009: 7).

Rafael Biermann points out, that when IOs started to build their own ties to other organizations, respectively established networks in the 1990's, the academic discipline of International Relations was "caught off guard" (Biermann; 2009: 9). This need for explanation led IR scholars concerned with IO-IO relations to look into other research areas, such as economics, sociology and organization theory. In the need of new ways to explain the emerging phenomena of IO-IO relationships, the term 'interorganizational relations' was adopted from organization theory. In the last years, the number of empirical work in IO-IO relations in different policy areas rose, but as Ellis states out, there is yet a need for analytical frameworks and theoretical approaches to study these relationships. From Ellis' point of view the concentration of IR scholars on IO-state relations has hindered to establish new ways of theoretical thinking (Ellis; 2010: 12). From this it follows that up to now no common theory on interorganizational relations was formulated.

What are 'interorganizational relations' then? So far no common definition of the term has been developed. Joachim Koops offers a first explanation:
On the most basic level, the term 'inter-organizational relations' refers to the links, relationships and modes of interaction between two or more international organizations (...) most research in inter-organization relations is interested on the dynamics of purposefully structured links between organizations (Koops; 2012:3).

2.2 Theories of Interorganizational Cooperation

To analyze interorganizational relationships, IR scholars are using theories of other research fields, for example stage theory, transaction cost theory, network theory and resource dependence theory, as well as classic institutional theory (adapted from state-state/IO-state analysis). This part will offer an introduction to several theories of interorganizational relations, which might be useful for scholars interested in IO relations. Where possible, references to and discussion of articles using these theories for research on IO-IO cooperation are made.

Pfeffer and Salancik (1977) laid the foundation for Resource Dependence Theory (RDT). The theory is centered around the idea that every organization needs resources to survive and the obtaining of resources goes hand in hand with growing dependent on the environment (Casciaro, Piskorski; 2005: 167). As organizations correlate with their surroundings, they are called 'open systems' in RDT (Pfeffer, Salancik; 1978: 43). Furthermore, RDT aims to understand the distribution of power within cooperative arrangements (Davis, Cobb; 2010: 21). As organizations are created to accomplish specific goals, the ability to acquire resources and the way they proceed this task, influences their importance (Brosig; 2011: 149/154). A resource can be anything, from knowledge to legitimacy to financial assistance, and its assigned value may differ from one organization to the other (Pfeffer, Salancik; 1978: 43; Brosig; 2011: 155). According to these different perceptions the power distribution of the relationship between two organizations is likely to become asymmetric, which means that one organization is more dependent on the exchange than the other (Pfeffer, Salancik; 1978: 53). The dependence which arises out of this exchange procedure affects the autonomy of the organizations, therefore organizations will try to exert control over the exchange process, if the resource in need is critical (Pfeffer, Salancik; 1978: 44). To detect the dependence difference of
organizational relationships and hence uncover the distribution of power, Pfeffer and Salancik advise to analyze the cooperation according to three factors:

First, there is the importance of the resource, the extent to which the organization requires it for continued operation and survival. The second is the extent to which the interest group has discretion\(^2\) over the resource allocation and use. And, third, the extent to which there are few alternatives, or the extent of control over the resource by the interest group, is an important factor determining the dependence of the organization (Pfeffer, Salancik; 1978: 45-46).

Malte Brosig (2011) uses RDT to clarify the 'overlap' of African IOs. His results confirm that interaction of IOs depends on the differences of their ability for resource allocation and the variance of resources needed by the single organization (Brosig; 2011: 156). While RDT is useful to analyze the conditions prior to a cooperation, and the causes and effects of level of power distribution, it offers little theoretical underpinning for research about process-related components (Gray, Wood; 1991: 15). Another way to analyze why interorganizational relationships are formed from an exchange theory point of view is Transaction Cost Theory (TCT), or Transaction Cost Economy (TCE), but little attention to this theory was paid by scholars of IOs. An explanation for this might be the focus on 'efficiency and cost-minimizing rationales' and the neglect of other motivational factors such as legitimacy or domain consensus (Barringer, Harrison; 2000: 372).

The network theory in general seeks to clarify where cooperating partners are placed in a network of interactions (Smith, Carroll, Ashford; 1995: 18?). The goal of social network theory in specific is to analyze these interactions between the cooperating partners, which are 'embedded' in a social network. The theory shifts the focus from characteristics of organizations to their relationship (Kenis, Oerlemans; 2008: 289-290). The theory aims to explain why organizations\(^3\) enter a relationship with a specific partner, and therefore differs from other theories, for example RDT, which aims to identify the principle causes for relationship-formation (Kenis, Oerlemans; 2008: 305). When actors engage in networks, they benefit from the flow of information within the system. Social network theory lists two different ways of how information is transported throughout the network,

\(\text{\textsuperscript{2}}\) Discretion over a resource defines the level of ability of the organization to allocate the resource (Pfeffer, Salancik, 1978: 48).

\(\text{\textsuperscript{3}}\) In social network theory, actorness is not limited to organizations, but can refer to states, individuals, geographic entities etc. (Kenis, Oerlemans; 2008: 290)
'relational embeddedness' and 'structural embeddedness' (Kenis, Oerlemans; 2008: 293). Whereas relational embeddedness offers information about abilities and trustworthiness of other network participants, structural embeddedness reveals that the information which place a participant occupies within the network is very important, as participants might be connected not only with each other, but with the same third party (Kenis, Oerlemans; 2008: 293). The links between organizations are also called 'ties'. Biermann (2007) distinguishes between three types of ties: strong, weak or absent ties. One can speak of a strong tie, when the cooperation is characterized by frequent interaction and is coming to identifiable results. Although a cooperative action takes place between weak ties, the interaction is limited to the exchange of information (Biermann, 2007: 165). Rafael Biermann (2007) furthermore analyzes the creation of networks between Euro Atlantic Security Institutions, offers an introduction to the theory and discusses the benefits of network theory for IO scholars. Social network theory is undoubtedly useful to uncover the environment of interorganizational relations, the impact one cooperation partner has on the others, as well as the outcome of a collaboration in terms of value, trust or the like. However, the theory was found difficult to apply to a relationship with only two organizations.

The developmental process of interorganizational relationships is at the focus of life-cycle - or stage theories. In stage theory, the relationship of two organizations is thought of as to develop throughout consecutive phases or stages. Dwyer, Schurr and Oh (1987) described four stages: (1) awareness, (2) exploration, (3) expansion, (4) commitment, and (4) dissolution.4 During the first stage, organizations get to know each other and besides from informal contact, no exchange is conducted. After that, the organizations are occupied with exploring the positive and negative potential of the sought cooperation. During the third stage, expansion, the relationship deepens and the mutual gain rises, followed by committing to the cooperation in the fourth stage. As the name of the last phase 'dissolution' suggests, the authors assume that interorganizational relationships inevitably come to an end and dissolve the cooperation (Dwyer, Schurr, Oh; 1987: 15-19). Ring and Van de Ven (1994) use a developmental model to analyze these specific phases of an interorganizational relationship. Although the authors go along with Dwyer, Schurr and Oh in their description of the individual steps, they indicate the existence of an

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4 It should be noted, that the names for each phase vary between the various approaches. As it would go beyond the scope of this chapter to list all different designations, the terms from Dwyer, Schurr and Oh are used for this introduction to the theory.
additional phase. Since perceptions can change over time difficulties may emerge. Hence a phase of renegotiation sets in, to settle the occurred problems. The authors thereby point out that certain phases might recur throughout the cycle of the relationship (Ring, Van de Ven; 1994: 98). Developmental theory is an interesting approach for analyzing relations between IOs. The theory presents a theoretical underpinning to uncover the processes of an interorganizational cooperation, the change which takes place as well as the creation of norms and value. Finnemore and Sikkink (1998) for example use a life cycle model to analyze the emergence and development of norms within the international system, where they identify IOs (amongst other entities) as actors in the norm-creating process (Finnemore, Sikkink; 1998: 898). Haugenik (2007) also used a developmental concept to analyze the relationships between the UN, NATO, EU and AU in peace operations.

Insights from regime theory are also used to analyze interorganizational cooperation. Regime analysis has its roots in the desire to theoretically explain the rising global economic linkages of actors and the developing number of international institutions (Lemke, 2008: 25). Regimes are seen as institutional cooperative relationships in various different policy domains (e.g. protection of the environment), within which regulations and rules have been established over a longer period of time (Lemke, 2008: 25). Galbreath (2010), in an attempt to analyze the operating mode of the European national minority right regime, distinguishes between three approaches to explain inter-organizational action:

Interest-based explanations of regimes insist that actors are self-interested and only come together when there is a dilemma of common interest or aversion (...)

Power-based approaches to regimes however concentrate on the power dynamics between actors and assume that regimes will be used by the powerful to enforce submission on the less powerful (...)

Knowledge-based approaches to regimes see organizations as epistemic communities that coordinate and regulate complex issues that require expert knowledge. Actors participate in a regime in order to pool resources and to set common standards in a complex issue area (Galbreath; 2010: 80).
Figure 2: Theories of Inter-Organizationalism and IOs (by author)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Theory</th>
<th>Main Assumptions</th>
<th>Utility for IO Research</th>
<th>Reference Articles</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Resource Dependence</strong></td>
<td>Organizations need scarce resources to ensure survival; get dependent on environment</td>
<td>Preconditions and motivation; policy overlaps</td>
<td>Pfeffer, Salancik (1978); Brosig (2011)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Network</strong></td>
<td>Organizations are placed in networks</td>
<td>Analysis of interactions; selection of specific partner; impact on partner</td>
<td>Kenis, Oerlemans (2008); Biermann (2007); Koops (2007)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Life-Cycle/Stage</strong></td>
<td>Interorganizational Relationships = developmental processes</td>
<td>Analysis of change, trust, value, norms</td>
<td>Ring, Van de Ven (1994); Dwyer, Schurr, Oh (1987); Finnemore, Sikkink (1998)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Regime Theory</strong></td>
<td>Regimes = institutional cooperative relationships; cover wide policy spectrum</td>
<td>Analysis of interorganizational action based on interest, power, knowledge</td>
<td>Lemke (2008); Galbreath (2010)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Although overlapping in certain points, the introduction above has shown that the mentioned theories all analyze interorganizational relations from a different angle. Choosing one of the named theories would hence mean exploring only a limited number of aspects of the EU-ASEAN cooperation, leaving out other important parts of the relationship. Before turning to the developed theoretical framework, another important question has to be clarified. Although the usefulness of applying interorganizational theories to IO-IO relations has more or less become common, the question of IO actoriness still poses a considerable problem for scholars. The next part will discuss
different viewpoints concerning this problem, and will clarify afterwards if both the EU and ASEAN can be seen as actors in international politics.

2.3 The Question of Autonomy and Actoriness

Claiming that IOs develop their own relations and links to other organizations presupposes that IOs are seen as actors (Ojanen, 2004: 3). Whether or not IOs can be seen as actors is a controversial topic in IR theory. Researchers, which hold a state-centric point of view, argue that the organization needs to possess actorness which is not only collective, but corporate and can be differentiated from those of its members. Furthermore, sovereignty of the member states has either to be consolidated and/or delegated within the organization (Rittberger, Kruck, Romund; 2010: 201 ABB 3.4). From this perspective, the prerequisite for IOs to become actors is the creation, or existence of an independently (not solely based on interests/instructions of members) acting institution (Siedschlag, A.; Opitz, A.; Troy, J.; Kuprian, A.; 2007: 92; Rittberger, Zangl; 2004: 24). Other researchers however, claim that autonomy from states cannot be the only requirement which qualifies IOs as actors. Koch argues that organizations in general are created by its members to foster stability and generate information about the environment, and that this perception can be assigned to IOs too (Koch; 2009: 438). According to Koch, independence from members (states) cannot be seen as the only factor constituting the actorness of an IO (Koch; 2009: 442). He supports this statement by claiming: "Even if IGOs don't have the capacity to set binding rules for states, they do produce archetypical resolutions - like recommendations and declarations" (Koch; 2009: 442). The author thus discusses an additional notion to membership in IOs. He refers to 'political members' when talking about states, governments and states' representatives, whereas 'administrative members' is the umbrella term for secretariats and other organs within the IO (Koch; 2009: 437). The latter is a source of independence for the organization, as individuals working for the organs are loyal to the IO and not to a state (Koch, 2009: 437). Regarding socio-constructivist approaches, which include ideational factors such as knowledge and ideas, a necessity so see IOs as actors is that they have the power to change present perceptions and the identities of their members, appear as norm-creators and through this gain autonomy "(...) which justifies conceiving of them as high-order corporate actors" (Maier-Rigaud; 2008: 3). Building on Weberian arguments,
Barnett and Finnemore (1999) regard the bureaucracies of IOs as highly important, as in their point of view the power of an IO is generated through the creation of norms as well as through the accomplishment of administrative tasks (Barnett, Finnemore; 1999: 708). In their attempt to theoretically conceptualize IOs as organizations, Ness and Brechin (1988) already highlight the importance of IOs’ secretariats. In taking a functionalist approach the authors claim that secretariats of IOs use state sovereignty to expand their autonomy, by providing information and diplomatic frameworks for states (Ness, Brechin; 1988: 252). Haftel and Thompson (2006) analyze the degree of independence of IOs, which from their point of view constitutes "its [IO] ability to shape international politics" (Haftel, Thomspon; 2006: 254). The authors voice criticism as in their view the focus of research concerned with independence is put on major IOs, e.g. the International Monetary Fund (IMF), the UN or the EU. The horizon for research on IO autonomy therefore stays restricted (Haftel, Thompson; 2006: 254).

Regarding the legislative competence of the European Commission and the supranational features in general, the EU can be seen as actor (Wunderlich, 2012: 19). In their study, Haftel and Thompson declare that from their observations and within the organizations they analyzed, the EU has obtained the highest independence. The authors also highlight the European Commission as being "(...) the ideal type of secretariats with power to initiate" (Haftel, Thompson; 2006: 261). ASEAN on the other hand, has no institutional body which sets binding rules or sanctions; furthermore the preservation of sovereignty of its member states is one of the organizations main cornerstones (Wunderlich, 2012: 19). However, some authors point out that ASEAN has managed to change the perceptions of its member countries and created norms as for example the ratification of the Declaration on Joint Action to Counter Terrorism in 2001, or the creation of the ASEAN Intergovernmental Commission on Human Rights (AICHR) in 2009 proves (Chow; 2005: 306; Lin, 2010: 823). Haftel and Thompson ascribe ASEAN an 'intermediate level of independence'. Although the sovereignty of the members is still intact, the creation of a secretariat and the development of a dispute settlement mechanism is evidence for at least some kind of 'supranational authority' (Haftel, Thompson; 2006: 264). Regarding this, as well as making ASEAN a subject to international law by establishing legal personality in the ASEAN Charter of 2007, the organization can also be seen as actor (Wunderlich, 2012 : 21; Lin: 2010: 822).
3 Framework

3.1 Preconditions and Motivation

Why do International Organizations seek to develop relations to other organizations? The first dimension of the theoretical framework is constructed to answer this question and is subdivided into four categories: environment, legitimacy, access to resources and domain consensus. To secure their existence, organizations will make rational decisions. The entering into an interorganizational cooperation therefore is based on specific purposes (Schermerhorn, 1975: 852). The first dimension is essential as it will highlight the different motivating factors for both organizations as well as the political and economic circumstances prior to the relationship-building. Each organization may seek different benefits of a cooperative arrangement. The Berlin Plus Agreement for example, can be explained as the EU's step to gain access to needed military resources, but NATO in return gains greater control of the EU as military actor (Haugenik; 2007: 10-11). Hence one of the reasons NATO cooperated with the EU, was the wish to diminish competition through overlapping policies. The motivating factor for the EU therefore was a need for resources (access to resources), whereas NATO was concerned with overlapping policies (domain consensus).

3.1.1 Environment

The environment of an organization is often seen as uncertain, as it is in continuous change and hence unpredictable. Organizations enter cooperations to gain stability and reduce the lack of information (Oliver 1990: 246). Another though related to the first environmental factor for cooperation-building especially for IOs, are political incidents, respectively external political pressure, 'forcing' the organization to cooperate (Schermerhorn, 1975: 849). The latter may occur when powerful organizations seek to control other 'weaker' organizations, hence pressing them into coercive cooperation. Organizations may also feel forced to cooperate when others try to alienate their place in the system (Lotia, Hardy; 2008: 373-374). The above mentioned factors will motivate an organization to reach out to another one for cooperation and although this step is unconditional for the other organization, it might lead to cooperative interaction and formal agreements (Law; 2007: 46). This category thus seeks to analyze the political
environment at the time of the relationship formation, to identify which incidents had an impact on the formation and whether or not one of the organizations was exposed to external pressure.

3.1.2 Legitimacy

The issue of legitimacy can be both, a precondition and a motivator for cooperation. In order to attract prospective cooperation partners, a legitimate partner must possess the ability to play a part in the interaction, for example by holding scarce resources (material and non-material) or knowledge (Gray; 1985: 922). Although the issue of legitimacy has opened a separate field of theory driven research some authors argue, that legitimacy can also be seen as a resource and therefore explained with RDT (Lotia, Hardy; 2008: 370). In addition to that, legitimating the organization as a whole, or justifying its work is a motivating factor for interorganizational cooperation building. Oliver thus points out that organizations seek to reach legitimacy to "(...)improve its [the organization] reputation, image, prestige or congruence with prevailing norms in its institutional environment" (Oliver, 1990: 246). When organizations enter a cooperative relation with respected other organizations, they show their acceptance of the 'institutional norms' (Lotia, Hardy; 2008: 370).

3.1.3 Access to Resources

As explained in the previous chapter, resource dependence theory is based on the assumption that organizations are in constant need of resources to ensure their survival, which are rare and hard to access (Oliver; 1990: 243). As resources (material and non-material) are the fuel of every organizational action, organizations grow dependent on the links that provide them with the needed resource (Brosig; 2011: 154). In all likelihood will organizations enter relations with others to obtain otherwise unavailable resources, or to use existing resources more adequately. This creates a dependency towards their environment (Schermernhorn; 1975: 850). Hence organizations will seek interorganizational cooperation with others not before all introrganizational alternatives of resource mobilization were found insufficient (Brosig; 2011: 155). The EU for example in need for assistance in military crisis management sought a cooperative arrangement with NATO, which resulted in the Berlin Plus Agreement in 2003 (Koops, 2012: 10).
3.1.4 Domain Consensus

Organizations pursue various different interest and political fields. In all probability they will reach out to other organizations with which they either share common goals or visions, or perceive that the specific other organization could be helpful to reach their objectives (financial resources, knowledge...) (Oliver, 1990: 250; Schermerhorn, 1975: 851). The sole share of goals does not indicate that organizations work together. A consensus of domains, what Biermann (2009) calls 'overlap' might also result in competition between organizations, as it "(...) instigates rivalry for mandates, tasks and resources among organizations competing for relative relevance" (Biermann; 2009: 8). It is likely that this category will combine factors from the previous motivational indicators. When one organization suffers from an environmental shock it will probably reach out to another organization with which it shares a common viewpoint, or which even experienced the same situation. Economic issues are also likely to create consensus between two organizations, for example the allocation of resources, or the wish for investment opportunities.

3.2 Polity and Policy

The second dimension delves into the different structural elements and the political content of the interorganizational relationship. A closer look on, for example, the type of the relationship, the contractual arrangements and the management of the relations constitutes a basis to understand the processes within the relationship on the one hand, and helps identifying problems or challenges on the other. The dimension consists of three categories: type of relationship, policy domains, policy implementation and coordination.

3.2.1 Type of Relationship

The first category combines different factors to determine the type of interorganizational relationship. How long the process of establishing the 'rules' takes, a time of an interorganizational relationship, which scholars of developmental theories would refer to as 'commitment' stage (Ring, Van de Ven; 1994: 98), differs from one cooperation to another, according to accessible information and engagement (Dwyer, Schurr, Oh; 1987: 98).
The form of the contract is crucial to a further understanding of how the relationship functions, for example whether or not the contract is coercive and binding and consequential, if noncompliance of one organization is/can be sanctioned (Ring; 2008: 503). Agreements or contracts between organizations will supposedly experience revision or adaption as it is hardly possible to anticipate all future changes within the cooperation (Bachmann, van Witteloostuijn; 2006: 4). Following the literature of social sciences regarding the topic of contracts, agreements will be included into this section. This step might be seen as controversial to take (especially from an economic-based approach), which was nevertheless adopted as the thesis is concerned with the interorganizational relations of two IOs and not of corporate enterprises. Based on the contractual factor a distinction between formal (e.g. institutionalized, joint agreements and declarations) and informal (e.g. mere meeting of personnel) cooperation can be conducted (Smith; Carroll; Ashford, 1995: 10). David Law (2007) recommends a tripartite classification of cooperation forms in, what he calls 'first order cooperation', 'second order cooperation' and 'third order cooperation'. First order cooperation describes informal interactions (information-sharing) between the organizations’ personnel. Relations with a 'second order cooperation' character experience denser contacts, and interdependencies might occur. In a cooperative situation of the third order, exchange of resources and information takes place, and an interorganizational structure is developed (Law; 2007: 53-54).

3.2.2 Policy Domains and Goals

The second category aims to clarify in which policy fields the two organizations actually cooperate. Trist (1983) defines interorganizational policy domains as "(...) functional social systems that occupy a position in social space between the society as a whole and the single organization" (Trist; 1983: 270). Interorganizational Relations literature focuses mainly on a particular policy field, such as security institutions (see for example Koops), environmental issues or pandemics. Therefore theoretical approaches in interorganizational research to policy issues are rare. Here, insights from policy analysis might be useful. Policy analysis is used to point out which issues and goals a specific group identifies as important, which priorities are defined, how the policy is implemented and later on coordinated and evaluated (Jann, Wegrich; 2003: 72). The selection of policy goals and domains might become a longsome process as organizations often have divergent perceptions of a problem, due to different cultural and historical values (Gray; 1985: 925). The latter two, policy implementation, coordination and evaluation will be
part of the third category in this dimension. In summary, the second category will help to
answer the question of how and why key topics are addressed, goals defined and policy
outlines developed.

3.2.3 Policy Implementation and Coordination

Policy implementation reverts to the process of converting the declared goals into action
(Jann, Wegrich; 2003: 89). "Implementation literally means carrying out, accomplishing,
fulfilling, producing or completing a given task" (Paudel, 2009: 36). The third category of
this dimension explores the questions of how the declared policy goals are carried out, in
which form the developed programs are coordinated and which form(s) of evaluation is
(are) used in the relationship. As long as goals are unspecified and resources (e.g.
financial funds, technical assistance) are not assigned, the implementation process cannot
start (Van Meter, Van Horn; 1975: 448). In a similar vein, Gray (1985) highlights the
importance of clarifying the framework for action, i.e. assigning the developed tasks to
the according entities and defining the pattern of the implementation process (Gray; 1985:
928-930). Van Meter and Van Horn (1975) describe two factors influencing the
implementation process; level of goal congruence and degree of involved change. As the
authors explain in detail:

First, implementation will be affected by the extent to which the policy derivates
from previous policies. (...) Second, the implementation process will be influenced
by the amount of organizational change that is required (Van Meter, Van Horn; 1975: 458).

As mentioned before, changing organizations might be a difficult and longsome process.
The authors therefore expect that policies which will require a zero or minimum amount
of change will most likely be implemented successfully (Van Meter, Van Horn; 1975:
459). Elmore offers an apprehensive summary of the actions required for successful
cooperation. The author claims that after converting the policy goals into distinctive tasks
and plans, a management plan needs to be developed, delegating the implementation, as
well as the modes for implementation to subunits. Furthermore evaluation forms,
management controls and modes of sanctions regarding the executive departments need
to be clarified (Elmore; 1979: 195). In a similar vein, Thomson and Perry (2006)
highlight the necessity of supervision (both of the own organizations actions as well as of
those of the cooperative partner) and of the development and execution of sanction techniques (Thomson, Perry; 2006: 24).

3.3 Success Indicators

The last dimension has an explorative and summarizing function. The results from the prior categories will be tested against the chosen success factors and analyzed in the conclusion. What are the crucial factors indicating the success of an interorganizational cooperation? As so often, the answer to this question depends on the theoretical approach chosen. Some authors claim that a successful inter-organizational relationship needs to create value in some form (see Cropper, 1997; Bardach, 1998), others view concrete problem-solving (Lodgson, 1991), trust (Casey, 2008), financial outcomes or innovation (Provan, Sydow, 2008) as success indicators. Successful cooperation, Gray (1985) suggests "(...) depends upon the simultaneous interaction of several conditions at appropriate phases in the process" (Gray; 1985: 932). A combination of various success indicators hence appears useful. The factors chosen for this dimension mainly follow the classification of Druckmann, Singer and Van Cott (1997), as they were found to serve the purpose of this thesis best. The indicator 'distinct goals' was expanded with the factor 'effective implementation', as the clarification of a goal alone does not guarantee that it is implemented, for reasons of lack of financial funding, inability to adapt to environmental changes or the like. Declared goals might also be eliminated from the policy agenda, due to changing perceptions of the problem to solve of one of the organizations. In addition, the accomplishment of the goal might be seen as interfering for the relations outside the interorganizational entity at a later point of time (Van Meter, Van Horn; 1975: 473).

3.3.1 Balance of Power: Process and Indicator

The first indicator is occupied with the processes which develop within an interorganizational relation. The underlying question of this part is how specific components are carried out and if they contribute to or hinder the interorganizational relationship. Provan and Sydow suggest five process indicators to evaluate interorganizational success: power; legitimacy; learning; trust and fairness (Provan, Sydow; 2008: 699). For this thesis, the process indicator 'power' was chosen, as the
examination of the other topics would go beyond the scope of this thesis. Furthermore, the balance (or imbalance) of power is a crucial success indicator of cooperation.

Power is a commonly studied component of interorganizational research. Huxham and Beech define the exertion of power as a process "(...) which can be characterized as the ability to influence, control, or resist the activities over others" (Huxham, Beech; 2008: 555). In interorganizational literature, two approaches to power seem to be predominant. One approach sees power as a source which will inevitably lead to conflicting interests between the organizations, whereas the other focuses on the distribution of 'power over' processes and decisions within the cooperation. Both perceptions of power though predict a certain amount of asymmetry of power in all interorganizational relationships (Huxham, Beech; 2008: 559). Huxham and Beech (2008) classify three sources of macro-level power: power based on importance imbalances (strategic centrality); based on structural position, and based on need imbalances (resources) (Huxham; Beech; 2008: 565). In a different vein, Oliver claims that a power approach to interorganizational cooperation indicates, that organizations try to exercise power over other organizations which possess scarce resources, rather than seeking cooperation with them (Oliver, 1990: 244). As RDT explains, cooperative action leads to dependency and hence a loss of autonomy for the organizations (Casciaro, Piskorski; 2005: 179). The distribution of power is thus not a static component of interorganizational relations, but can change over time due to internal as well as external influences (Huxham, Beech; 2008: 571). Participants of the interorganizational cooperation may try to control the distribution of power, for example by influencing the decision-making process or dominating the goal-selection of the cooperation (Lotia; Hardy; 2008: 375-376). Gray (1985) emphasizes the importance of how interdependence is apprehended in the cooperation, because organizations, which "(...) perceive little or no interdependence will undoubtedly try to preserve their control over the domain and resist attempts to share power (...)" (Gray; 1985: 927).

The balance of power between the two cooperating partners is a crucial aspect for the survival of the relationship. An imbalanced power situation in certain fields might occur in successful interorganizational relations "(...) as long as the imbalance is favorable to the other partner in other areas" (Druckmann; Singer; Van Cott; 1997: 146). RDT explains that in a situation of power imbalance, the stronger partner is likely to use power over the weaker partner to raise its benefits (Casciaro, Piskorski; 2005: 179). On the other hand, balanced power can have a counteracting effect, obstructing the processes of an interorganizational interaction and hence is pushing the cooperation into a deadlock
This part will clarify if and in which fields the processing of power leads to imbalances and hence to conflicts within the relationship, or the contrary, if the power distribution is balanced and thus limits the possibility of the cooperation. As interorganizational relations are not static, but develop and change over time, both forms might occur.

### 3.3.2 Distinctive Goals and Effective Implementation

The success of an interorganizational relationship is inter alia dependent on the choice of policy goals. Developing distinctive and reachable tasks and implementation frameworks will facilitate the cooperative interaction, as results can be evaluated easily throughout the working process. Vedung (1997) distinguishes between undefined tasks:

> Particular goals may be ambiguous and carry two or more simultaneous meanings (...) a goal is vague if it does not delineate clearly cases where it is or is not applicable (Vedung; 1997: 44).

Clear goals are essential for the following implementation, as misunderstandings regarding the content of a domain, its boundaries and the way of implementation will distort further actions (Trist, 1983: 273-274). Furthermore, the ability to adapt and response to environmental changes is a necessary characteristic of successful cooperation. Accomplishing the selected goals, might require establishing new links outside the interorganizational relation (Gray; 1985: 931). Essential for the relations are what Druckmann, Singer and Van Cott (1997) call 'super ordinate goals.' A super ordinate goal cannot be reached by one organization alone, but only through the cooperation with that other specific organization (Druckmann; Singer; Van Cott; 1997: 146; Gray, Wood; 1991: 4). An implementation is effective when the declared (distinct) goals are realized successfully. Not only the goal has to be described accurately, also the implementation process has to be worked out in detail, providing sufficient information about who is going to implement the goal, on the basis of which rules and which means are available (Van Meter, Van Horn; 1975: 465-466).
3.3.3 Outcome and Mutual Gain

Another significant success indicator is the benefit generated from the cooperation. As Smith, Carroll and Ashford put it "(...) cooperation will not continue if its benefits do not equal or exceed its costs" (Smith, Carroll, Ashford; 1995: 17). The gain must thus not be the same, each organizations may seek different outcomes. For example might one partner need access to specific information, whereas the other wants to make use of scarce resources (Druckmann; Singer; Van Cott; 1997: 147). The outcome of an interorganizational cooperation is an important indicator for efficiency and hence to clarify if a relationship is successful. Furthermore will the category help to identify, if the declared goals and tasks were achieved as well as it will give a prospect for the future direction and survival of the cooperation in general. Therefore, the analysis of this indicator will include statistics on trade and economic development as well as of the other policy domains.

3.3.4 Respect and Committed Leaders

The awareness of differences, be they political, economic or cultural, between the cooperating organizations and thus the handling of and with these differences is an important success factor. Respect and understanding for the cooperating partner can develop throughout time. Information on and knowledge of the political and cultural background of the counterpart simplify the procedure of meetings and negotiations (Druckmann; Singer; Van Cott; 1997: 147). To reduce prejudices and uncover stereotypes, e.g. workshops or the exchange of staff can be helpful. Committed Leaders are essential in building respect and trust between the organizations. How the leaders handle specific situations, e.g. whether or not they participate in meetings, or if the actively get involved in negotiations, can either foster the cooperation or lead to conflicts, in signaling the sensed (un-) importance of the relationship to the respective members of the organization (Koops; 2008: 26-27; Druckmann; Singer; Van Cott; 1997: 147).
4 Empiricism

4.1 Introduction

This introduction will give a short overview of the developmental stage of the EU and ASEAN prior to their first interaction. The postwar period in Europe was characterized by the search for new ways of cooperation, in order to foster and maintain peace on the continent (Pollak, Slominski; 2006: 17). The formation history of the EU and its development can be seen as a process to ensure regional security and promote economic development (Freistein, Leininger; 2012: 94). The accession of Germany, France, Italy and the Benelux countries to the European Community for Steel and Coal (ECSC) in early 1951 paved the way for the creation of a European federation. Besides the promotion of economic integration, the purpose of the ECSC was to withdraw the disposal of coal and steel (important resources for the armaments industry) from the nation states. By delegating the decision-making authority regarding the mineral resources to a High Authority, the six founding members of the ECSC ceded parts of their sovereignty (Pollak, Slominski; 2006: 27-28). In March 1957, the European Economic Community (EEC/EC) was established by the ‘Treaty of Rome’. As basis for the EC, a customs union with free flow of goods is aspired in the Treaty. The Treaty furthermore lists the institutions which should be created to administer the activities of the EC, namely an Assembly (the European Parliament), a Council and a Court of Justice (European Commission; 2013: 4-9). The European integration process was taken to another level, when the ‘merger agreement’ was signed in 1965. This agreement consolidated the three organs of the ECSC, the European Economic Community (EEC) and of the European Atomic Energy Community (EAEC), and was put into force to simplify administrative tasks and to enhance the efficiency of the integration process (Pollak, Slominski; 2006: 35).

The foundation of ASEAN in 1967 resulted from the threats of its unsecure und unstable environment. The retreat of the colonial powers from the Southeast Asian Region fostered the establishment of new nation states, taking up the borders of the former colonial territories. After the colonial era and the experiences from the Japanese occupation of Southeast Asia during the Pacific War, one of the major concerns of the newly established nations was the preservation of their self-determination and autonomy.
This ambition for sovereignty indirectly led at least to one of the two major post-colonial conflicts in the region, the so-called 'konfrontasi crisis' (1963-66), and its settlement paved the way for the creation of ASEAN. The next passage will give a short overview of this specific crisis, demonstrating the need for cooperation amongst the countries of the Southeast Asian region.

After becoming independent from the British colonial power in 1957, the Federation of Malaya developed into the Federation of Malaysia (later Malaysia), including the territories Sarawak and Sabah (North-Borneo) and Singapore for the short term. As the British administration, together with the Malayan leadership was involved in this process, Indonesia, under the leadership of President Sukarno, sensed a neo-colonial intrusion to the political issues of the region and hence did not acknowledge the Malayan state. From 1963 onwards, Indonesian troops attacked Malayan positions in Sarawak and later on the Malayan Peninsula (Freistein; 2006: 5-6). After a request for help on the part of the Malayan leadership, Great Britain and Australia managed to settle down the situation, by sending contingents of soldiers into the region. Sukarno, whose power was already weakened due to the high military costs and economic sanctions, was replaced by Suharto. Together with the Indonesian foreign minister Malik and mediated by Thailand, the new President enabled the revival of diplomatic relations with Malaysia and with it the end of the conflict. This short adumbration of the tensions between the nations of Southeast Asia shows, how much it was sought to foster and maintain stability and security, and unanimity was needed in the region - the foundation for the creation of ASEAN was laid (Freistein; 2006: 7-8).

But ASEAN was not the first attempt to develop a regional alliance. The Southeast Asian Treaty Organization (SEATO), initiated by the US government in 1954, was meant to develop into a platform for security issues. As SEATO would not only have included the USA, but also western states, only the Philippines and Thailand agreed to participate in the organization. Tensions between member states led to the dissolution of two other organizations, the Association of Southeast Asia (ASA) and Maphilindo (derived from Malaysia, Philippines and Indonesia) shortly after their creation in the early 1960ies (Freistein; 2006: 8). In 1967, ten years after the Treaty of Rome established the EEC, the Bangkok Declaration was signed by Indonesia, Singapore, Malaysia, Thailand and the Philippines. The Bangkok Declaration installed ASEAN, as a "(...) regional organization with the aim to promote economic growth and social progress, as well as to foster peace and stability in the Southeast Asian region" (ASEAN 2013).
4.2 Preconditions and Motivation

4.2.1 Environment

When Great Britain (along with Denmark and Ireland\(^5\)) signed the accession treaty to the EC in January 1972, the former British crown colonies Singapore and Malaysia feared the loss of their Commonwealth trade preferences. In addition, the EC common market project posed trade barriers for the ASEAN countries. Both organizations were well aware of the Communist expansion, namely the before mentioned invasion of Cambodia by Vietnam in 1978 and the Soviet invasion in Afghanistan in the following year. The two oil crises of the 1970s (1973; 1979/80) led to major recessions in the developed nations. The American presence in Asia was a factor that motivated both organizations to look out for cooperation. The EC wanted to secure a place for itself in the region, and with the withdrawal of the United States from Vietnam in 1975, ASEAN, as an organization which declared itself to maintain peace and security, became more important in the Southeast Asian region (Robles; 2004: 12)

4.2.2 Legitimacy

With its supranational features, the EC did not need to be accredited with legitimacy from ASEAN. ASEAN, on the other hand, was a very 'young' regional organization, whose legal and political identity needed to be accredited. The political environment of the 1970s even raised the quest for legitimacy. Major powers, such as the Soviet Union, Japan and the USA refused to recognize the Southeast Asian ZOPFAN\(^6\). Especially the United States were eager to keep the status quo, which would facilitate to maintain its hegemonic power in the region. By refusing to acknowledge ZOPFAN and hence denying to attribute any strength to ASEAN in maintaining peace and security in the region, the US could pursue its influence on bilateral negotiations with the five member countries of ASEAN (Ong; 2012: 522-532). The EC, by contrast, saw a chance to upgrade its position

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\(^5\) Norway also signed the accession treaty, but the Norwegian people voted against an accession in September of 1972.

\(^6\) 'Zone of Peace, Freedom and Neutrality': the ZOPFAN declaration was signed in 1971 by the Philippines, Indonesia, Malaysia, Singapore and Thailand (ASEAN member states at that time). The declaration aimed at establishing a neutral Southeast Asian area, and expressed inter alia the opposition to interference of external powers (Wikipedia; 2014)
in Southeast Asia, when the Nixon Doctrine promised to usher a new era with the partial withdrawal of the US from the region (Ong, 2012: 532). Additionally, two major factors required the recognition of ASEAN by other international actors than the United States: the end of the war in Vietnam and the Cambodian-Vietnamese war (Camroux; 2008: 16-17).

4.2.3 Access to Resources
The EC was well aware, that the Southeast Asian region provided rich natural resources. Besides being a major supplier of natural rubber, abaca fibres, tropical hardwoods, palm oil and coconut, the ASEAN countries also produced a huge amount of oil, tin, copper, sugar, coffee, rice and tobacco (Jenkins; 1978: 2). Additionally, as the door to the Asia-Pacific region, ASEAN could also provide the EC with substantial information regarding the other Asian countries. Additionally to constituting a possible source for foreign direct investment, ASEAN also saw the potential of the EC, in being a huge market for its primary and manufactured goods (Robles; 2004: 12). As the EC already had experienced a certain amount of successful regional integration (e.g. Customs Union), it could provide this knowledge to ASEAN. The Southeast Asian organization was in need for financial and technical assistance, as well as trade preferences, to finance intraregional industrial projects. The idea behind the ASEAN industrial projects (AIP) was that member countries specialized in producing specific products, for example Malaysia specialized in the production of nitrogenous fertilizer. Furthermore, ASEAN was eager to launch interregional projects with, and financed by the EC (Robles; 2004: 20).

4.2.4 Domain Consensus
The Bangkok Declaration of 1967 already includes the motivation of ASEAN to cooperate with other regional organizations, as article 2 declares:

To maintain close and beneficial cooperation with existing international and regional organizations with similar aims and purposes, and explore all avenues for even closer cooperation among themselves (ASEAN; 2013).

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7 also Guam Doctrine, announced by US President Richard Nixon in 1969. Aim of the doctrine was to hand over the responsibility to the US allies (South Vietnam in specific) and thereby allow a gradual withdrawal of all US soldiers from Vietnam (Wikipedia; 2013)
Although economic issues, such as the benefits of trade cooperation with the European markets for ASEAN (Ong; 2012: 532), and the perspective of gaining access to resources for the EC, prevailed, the two organizations also shared common political goals. While the Communist expansion in the 1970s was a threat and therefore an environmental factor for cooperation-building, its containment was also a goal both organizations were eager to accomplish. It was important for both organizations to foster and maintain peace and stability. Although the EC was mostly interested in trade issues at the beginning of the dialogue, it soon realized that ASEAN as a non-communist organization could furthermore act as a stabilizing factor in the region. While ASEAN would benefit from financial assistance for its intraregional projects, the EC saw the advantage of these projects, in the enhancement of the stability in the region (Yeo; 2008: 83-84).

4.3 Polity and Policy

4.3.1 Type of Relationship

ASEAN undertook the first step towards the EC, in creating the Special Coordinating Committee of ASEAN (SCCAN) in 1972, to facilitate the relationship building. The establishment of SCCAN was preceded by negotiations of the ASEAN Foreign Ministers at their fourth Meeting in 1971, concerned with the enhancement of pursuing closer links with the EC (Narongchai, Rieger; 1982: 2). Informal dialogues between the ASEAN ministers, the vice president and the commissioner of the EC took place, to discuss topics such as greater market access and price stabilization schemes (Hwee; 2009: 46). In addition, the ASEAN Brussels Committee (ABC) was established, including ASEAN diplomatic representatives, whose main task was to assist the SCCAN and to offer a platform for negotiations (Narongchai, Rieger; 1982: 2). In 1974, the EC offered a commercial agreement to ASEAN, which was designed without any political dimension and was therefore rejected by ASEAN. Moving from informal to formal dialogue in 1975, a Joint Study Group (JSG) was created, tasked at overseeing the interactions regarding the
commercial, agricultural, industrial and development cooperation (Robles; 2004: 10; Rieger; 1991: 66).

After several rounds of talks between ASEAN representatives based in Brussels and the Committee of Permanent Representatives of the EC (COREPER), the first ASEAN - EC Ministerial meeting was held in 1978, where the wish to formalize a cooperation agreement was expressed by both parties. Displaying their interest in formalizing the relationship, the EC created a Commission of the European Community for South and Southeast Asia centered in Bangkok, and ASEAN appointed Thailand with the task to oversee the negotiation process (Narongchai, Rieger; 1982: 3).

1980 was an important year for the ASEAN - EC relationship, as finally the two organizations signed a Cooperation Agreement. After declaring the desire and ambition to intensify the relationship in economic and commercial means, the equality of the two partners but also differences between the developing member countries of ASEAN and the industrialized nations of the EC are taken into account. The Agreement meets at least two of ASEAN's motivating factors for relationship-building. While the EC already informally accredited legitimacy to the organizations at the AEMM in 1978, the acknowledgement of ASEAN as a "(...) viable and cohesive group, which has contributed to stability and peace in South-East Asia" (European Commission; 2013a: 1) formalized this legitimization. The first article of the Agreement then meets the concern of ASEAN member countries to lose their Commonwealth trade preferences:

The Parties shall, in their commercial relations, accord each other most-favoured nation treatment in accordance with the provision of the General Agreement of Tariffs and Trade, without prejudice, however, to the provisions of the Protocol annexed to this agreement (European Commission; 2013a: 3)

Article 2 and 3 are concerned with the commercial and economic cooperation. Besides considering the interests and needs of gaining greater access to, and further processing of resources, such as manufactured, semi-manufactured and primary goods, the aim to create new employment opportunities and foster the development in technological and scientific areas are included in these two articles. Furthermore, the circumstance that the Cooperation Agreement does not interfere with existing or future bilateral agreements

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8 Full title: 'Cooperation Agreement between the European Economic Community and Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines, Singapore and Thailand - member countries of the Association of South-east Asian Nations'
between the EC and single ASEAN member countries is reaffirmed (European Commission; 2013a: 3). A year before the Agreement was put in force, the European Commission issued a statement explaining details of the Agreement. The commercial cooperation for example includes the intention to study the removal of trade barriers, whereas the cooperation in economic terms entails forging ahead interaction and closer link-building between enterprises within the two organizations' regions (Unspecified; 1979: 4-5).

Article 4, declaring the will of the EC to assist ASEAN in its regional development, is significant for two reasons: first, the need and wish for development aid of ASEAN are met, and second, for the first time in any EC agreement with other nations, the EC declared to cooperate in developmental means with a non-associated country (Unspecified; 1979: 8). In article 5, the tasks of a Joint Cooperation Committee (JCC), which should hold a meeting once a year, are defined. According to the Agreement, the JCC is instructed to supervise the different processes of the cooperation and is set up to offer a framework for consultations to simplify the implementation of the declared goals. In the last article, the two organizations affirm a duration of the cooperation for the following five years after the signing of the Agreement, but nevertheless leaving a back door by expressing that either party can terminate the Agreement after the initial period of five years (European Commission; 2013a: 4).

The 1980's Agreement still serves as legal framework for the interactions between the EU and ASEAN (Lim; 2012: 48). In the late 1980ies, the two cooperating partners grew aware, that the Agreement needed to be reconsidered and reshaped, e.g. was a framework for political negotiations aspired. However, negotiations were put on hold, when Portugal opposed the proceedings for a new agreement in 1992, due to human rights violation in East Timor\(^9\). When the Cold War ended and the Treaty on the European Union (TEU) (Maastricht Treaty), the former EC and now EU made an effort in promoting its position regarding the issues of human rights, the rule of law and democracy (Lim; 2012: 48). In 1997, the Agreement was expanded to Vietnam\(^10\) and Brunei Darussalam\(^11\), followed by

\(^9\) inter alia Santa Cruz/ Dili massacre, 1991: refers to the violent recession of a demonstration on November 12, 1991, against the Indonesian occupation of East Timor by the Indonesian military (Wikipedia; 2013a)

\(^10\) admission to ASEAN in 1995

\(^11\) admission to ASEAN in 1984
the inclusion of Laos\textsuperscript{12} and Cambodia\textsuperscript{13} three years later. Before becoming a member of ASEAN, the four countries had to sign bilateral agreements with the EU including a human rights clause, in order to be admitted to the 1980 agreement (Lim; 2012: 49). Although the seriously conflictive situations regarding the development of the relationship in the early and mid 1990s (human rights debate; East Timor; Burma) could be resolved by transferring the disputes from a group-to-group to a bilateral level (e.g. Portugal and Indonesia) (Lim; 2012: 49), negotiations on a new agreement were not resumed.

The empirical findings of this category have shown that the relationship moved from informal dialogue in the early 1970s to a formal cooperation, culminating in the 1980s agreement. Laws classification of different cooperation levels (first order; second order; third order cooperation) also applies to the case of EU-ASEAN relations, as the informal contacts between staff of the two organizations developed into denser interactions, into the exchange of resources and the creation of an interorganizational structure, such as the Cooperation Agreement itself and the establishment of the JCC. Although the articles of the Agreement were kept rather vague (except of Article 1), the consolidation of the duration condition nevertheless has the notion of a legally binding basis, albeit lacking mechanisms or strategies to sanction non-compliance.

4.3.2 Policy Domains and Goals

Articles about the relationship between the EU and ASEAN are normally divided into four parts: 1972-1980; 1981-1990; 1991-2000; 2001-2013. Whereas the first decade of the cooperation is rather well documented, there is a noticeable lack of information for the second decade. A review of the available literature and data has shown that there are at least two reasons for this circumstance: first of all, the relationship was centered on economic and commercial issues in its first 20 years, therefore trade and development statistics prevail. Second, the Cooperation Agreement seems to be the main achievement of this period. It appears that the following ten years were caught up in exploring and testing benefits and weaknesses of its details. Hence, authors tend to include an (more or less) extensive analysis of the Agreement into the part of the 1980s. As the Agreement

\textsuperscript{12} admission to ASEAN in 1997
\textsuperscript{13} admission to ASEAN in 1999
constitutes the main part of the previous category, it was decided to divide the analysis of policy domains and goals into three parts: 1972-1989; 1990-2000; 2001-2012. It should be noted that, although this part aims to cover the policies (and its changes) of the economic; political and security; socio-cultural; and institutional cooperation, it by no means claims to be complete, as not all details can be included and discussed. Therefore, policy decision are presented, which were found to be important for the cooperation of the two organizations.

4.3.2.1 First Phase: 1972-1989
Throughout the 1970s, policy domains for the interorganizational cooperation were defined at conferences of the JCC and at the AEM meetings, by representatives of the two organizations, with ASEAN being the driving force in suggesting areas of cooperation. Although emphasizing the importance of the Southeast Asian region regarding economic exchanges, the EC also admitted its negligence of enforcing closer cooperation with ASEAN (Unspecified; 1979: 2). At the first meeting of the JCC in 1975, ASEAN showed its will for cooperation in areas ranging from industrial and development cooperation, to the creation of joint ventures, arrangements regarding price stabilization schemes, to possible transfer of technology and tariff adjustments (Unspecified; 1976: 4). At the second conference of industrial cooperation in 1979, policy domains were being defined a little clearer, as the emphasis to cooperate was laid on 8 specific industrial sectors:

- chemical industries
- electrical industries
- machinery/metal industries
- industrial processing of agricultural products
- timber and timber-based industry
- precision engineering
- transport and communications equipment manufacturing and
- plantation of export crops (Unspecified; 1979: 7)

Besides signing the Cooperation Agreement, the second AEMM in Kuala Lumpur in 1980, ASEAN and EU ministers also discussed political questions, where they "(...) revealed a total identity of views between [sic] the two groups of countries on the vital issues of Kampuchea and Afghanistan" (Unspecified; 1981: 12).
The AEMM was again the main forum for talks on policy domains and goals in the 1980s. At the 6th Ministerial Meeting in Jakarta (1986), it was agreed upon, that European investment in Southeast Asia should be promoted. With the aim of enhancing investment conditions and to offer a forum for investment-related discussion, as well as to establish a databank including all available information on industrial sectors in each ASEAN nation, Joint Investment Committees (JIC) were created in each ASEAN capital (Unspecified; 1991: 8). The next AEMM, held in Düsseldorf, was occupied with possible ways to improve the competitiveness and adaptiveness of ASEAN member countries. The ministers agreed on the creation of an industrial training program and an industrial standards and quality program for Southeast Asian manufactures. EC ministers also committed to assist its cooperation partner in adapting to changes caused by the future European single market (Unspecified; 1991: 8-9).

4.3.2.2 Conflictual Times: 1990-2000
As the new decade began, the different political views of the two organizations became apparent. During the Cold War, the EC connived authoritarian governance, as long as the country encountered a pro-Western and non-communist stance. After the East-West conflict was settled, the EC was eager to promote its ethical standpoint (de Fleurs; 2010: 3). How and why the policies changed and how this affected the relationship between the two organizations, will be explained in the following section.

In the previous 20 years of their relationship, the two organizations had a common opponent: communism. The EC encouraged ASEAN in its attitude towards the Cambodian problem, and ASEAN shared the EC’s concern in the Afghanistan question. But already in 1990, a year after the massacre at the Tiananmen Square in Beijing\(^\text{14}\), the ASEAN Post Ministerial Meeting in Jakarta was overshadowed by the divergent views on the current political developments in Asia, as ASEAN was opposed to the sanctions (arms embargo) imposed on China by the EC (Palmujoki; 1997: 272-273). Therefore, the major focus of the meeting was directed at the discussion of political questions. However, the Ministers also agreed upon the deepening of their interaction as far as business and developmental issues are concerned and to increase information-sharing between the two organizations (Unspecified; 1991: 10). To foster the business cooperation, it was decided

\(^{14}\) violent repression of pro-democratic demonstration in 1989 by the Chinese military, followed by oppression and the imposing of death penalty (bpb; 2009)
to create or maintain specific programs. For example the Business Familiarization Program, where young ASEAN executives were given the opportunity to gain further insights into the European business possibilities, or the Business Graduates Placement Program offering a two months training period in ASEAN countries for European business graduates, or the establishment of a EC-ASEAN Management Centre. In the same year, the AEMM furthermore decided to cooperate to find solutions to the emerging problem of drug abuse (Unspecified; 1991: 10-12).

In 1992, the EC underwent some significant changes. With the signing of the Maastricht Treaty, the EC was not only renamed in European Union (EU), but also defined its directions and guidelines regarding cooperation with third countries. Already in 1991, the Declaration on Human Rights pointed out the European stance regarding the violation of human rights, as it clarifies that:

The different ways of expressing concern about violation of rights, as well as requests designed to secure those rights, cannot be considered as interference in the internal affairs of a State and constitute an important and legitimate parts of their dialogue with third countries (European Commission; 1995: 10)

A year later the EU regulated the terms for economic cooperation as well as for assistance in technical and financial areas with developing countries (European Council; 1992: 2). By linking its moral standards to the distribution of development aid., the regulation furthermore includes the possibility for the EU to sanction governments when disrespecting these standards, as article 2 points out, that:

In the case of fundamental and persistent violation of human rights and democratic principles, the Community could amend or even suspend the implementation of cooperation to activities of direct benefits to those sections of the population in need (European Council; 1992: 2)

ASEAN was concerned that these changes would directly affect its relationship with the EU. As non-interference into the domestic politics of member states "(...) in order to preserve their national identities" (ASEAN; 2013) is one of the cornerstones of its founding declaration, the organization saw no possibility to respond to these changes. Due to the vast economic development of the region over the past decade, the ASEAN countries found themselves able to countervail this strategy, which was perceived as a neo-colonial and cultural hegemonic attempt from the West to create a unipolar world
order (Rüland; 2001: 17-18). This 'Western universalism' (Rüland; 2001) gave rise to a debate about 'Asian Values' especially driven by the then Prime Ministers of Singapore and Malaysia, Lee Kuan Yew and Mahatir Mohammad. The debate emphasized the idea, that these Asian values enabled the recent rapid economic development, and that Asia and the West differed in their historical backgrounds and experiences, therefore Western values would not be appropriate for the region.

Although the EU was keen to implement its regulations, the organization was also well aware of the rapidly developing Asia Pacific region and was concerned about its economic and political position in the future (Rüland; 2001: 19). At the 11th AEMM in Karlsruhe in 1994, although the importance of the UN Charta was emphasized, the EU did not raise the issue of East Timor, and the human rights debate was granted only little attention (Yeo; 2009: 49). The policy domains discussed included the area of trade, economic cooperation, development cooperation and political and security issues. The Ministers agreed to emphasize investments by the private sector of both regions, and that, as far as the economic cooperation was concerned, the two organizations should focus on improving the potential of their scientific and technological exchanges, and foster the cooperation between businesses (Unspecified; 1996: 8). Additionally, the organizations prioritized their concerns and the necessity to find cooperative strategies to reduce poverty, encourage health and family planning, respect for environmental issues and to enable sustainable development (Unspecified; 1996: 8-9). As both organizations were aware, that political issues would also interfere in the future relationship, an ad hoc Eminent Persons Group (EPG) was created to facilitate the relations in the future (Yeo; 2009: 49).

With the creation of the Asia Europe Meeting (ASEM) in 1996, the two organizations took advantage of this new communication channel to pragmatically develop their cooperation, without bringing up the issue of their divergent political views. However, the relationship suffered from another major setback, when Burma/Myanmar acceded to ASEAN in 1997. A year earlier, the EU already agreed upon its common position regarding the violation of human rights in Burma/Myanmar by the authoritarian regime, resulting in the reaffirmation of its arms embargo. When ASEAN accepted the country's membership application, the EU cancelled the bilateral dialogue with, and imposed sanctions on Burma/Myanmar (de Fleurs; 2010: 5). ASEAN clearly followed its path of

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15 see for example: Thompson (2004); Sen (1997)
non-interference. Furthermore, it defended Burma/Myanmar's accession to the organizations with the fourth article of the Bangkok Declaration, which declares, that:

(...) the Association is open for participation to all States in the South-East Asian Region subscribing to the aforementioned aims, principles and purposes (ASEAN; 2013).

The two organizations found themselves maintaining incompatible point of views. The impact on the cooperation was substantial, as de Fleurs (2010) explains, that "(...) both the EU and ASEAN side were unwilling to compromise on the issue, and therefore, meetings were put on hold for more than two years and the ministerial meetings for nearly three years" (de Fleurs; 2010: 5). The Asian Financial Crisis (1997-98) downsized the Asian Value debate in general, and especially between the two organizations. While the ASEAN countries tried to overcome the crisis, the EU acknowledged the serious impact of the Burma/Myanmar question on the interorganizational cooperation and the need to focus on other ways to solve this problem (Møller; 2007: 475).

4.3.2.3 New Paths: 2000-2012

The two organizations started with a joint declaration to deepen and foster their trade, economic and political cooperation at the AEMM in Vientiane, in December 2000. At the AEMM in Brussels three years later, the Ministers issued a joint declaration on combating terrorism, thereby paying tribute to the incidents after the terrorist acts in the United States in 2001 (Unspecified; 2003: 4). The organizations also discussed the political issue of Aceh as Southeast Asia was committed to send observers to oversee the Aceh Cessation Agreement (Geneva, 2002), whereas the EU assured to offer financial and political assistance to the Indonesian province, once the conflict would be settled (Unspecified; 2003: 4).

Besides political topics, the organizations also agreed to enhance their cooperation, by promoting trade and investment flows between member countries, stimulating cultural interaction between their people and continuing to exchange views about good governance, human rights and the like (European Commission; 2003: 6). In 2003, it was decided to launch the Trans-Regional-EU-ASEAN-Trade-Initiative (TREATI), an instrument created to simplify cooperation on trade related issues. TREATI is a rather informal instrument, as it is not based on a formal agreement, but on the common will to
cooperate more closely in trade issues (European Commission; 2007: 1). The Trade Ministers and the Trade Commissioner agreed upon eight issues, in which a closer cooperation was needed and useful:

- trade facilitation
- investment facilitation and promotion
- sanitary and phytosanitary standards
- industrial product standards and technical barriers to trade
- Intellectual Property Rights
- trade and the environment
- tourism and forestry products (European Commission: 2007: 1)

With the creation of an ASEAN Economic Community in mind, which should develop by increasing the integration of and specializing in priority sectors, the eight issues were redefined and reduced a year later. The cooperation on sanitary and phytosanitary standards was limited to agricultural and seafood products, the technical standards should focus on electronics, a focus was laid on wood-based industries as well as the promotion of cross-sectoral cooperation on trade facilitation and investment (European Commission; 2007: 2). In the communication from the European Commission called 'A new partnership with South East Asia' (2003) the significance of TREATI was taken a step further as the Commission declares that the initiative

(...) will thus permit serious consideration to be given to entering into a Free Trade Agreement following the successful outcome of the current round of multilateral trade negotiations, where each side will be able to assess the opportunities of eventually going further together, with regard to liberalisation and regulatory harmonisation, based on the 'WTO-plus' principle (Unspecified; 2003: 18).

Also in 2003 the 'Regional EU-ASEAN Dialogue Instrument' (READI) was created, aimed at facilitating non-economic interactions between the two regions (Yeo; 2009: 54). A newly formed Vision Group was assigned to conduct a feasibility study regarding a possible Free Trade Agreement (FTA) and to identify other areas suitable for closer cooperation (European Commission; 2006: 1). In their final report from 2006 the Vision Group also specified distinct goals for the economic, regional and institutional cooperation as well as it defined areas of support. Trade and investment, for example, should be facilitated and promoted through the standardization and simplification of
customs procedures and formalities and exchanges of information on legislative frameworks and best practices should take place between the two organizations. The Group also recommended improving standards and ensuring conformity. In addition, the technical infrastructure on e.g. accreditation, testing, certification, inspection and post-market surveillance should be enforced (European Commission; 2006: 16).

In 2007 the EU and ASEAN celebrated three anniversaries: 50 years of the Rome Treaty, 40 years ASEAN and 30 years EU-ASEAN dialogue. With these historical marks in mind the two organizations issued the 'Nuremberg Declaration on an EU-ASEAN Enhanced Partnership' at the 16th AEMM. The Declaration was followed up by a Plan of Action\textsuperscript{16} (PoA) to implement the agreed upon strategies (European Union; 2007: 2). The Declaration itself is somewhat similar to former statements of the two organizations. The political and security cooperation should profit from an intensified dialogue through the ARF, and cooperative interaction on addressing and combating terrorism, increasing the overall global and regional security should be focused, and special attention should be given to areas such as disarmament, arms control, or the non-proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (European Union; 2007: 3). To enhance the economic cooperation an accelerated utilization of the possibilities that TREATI offers is demanded and further exchange and interaction between the private sectors of the two regions is favored. To enhance the socio-cultural cooperation the dialogue on non-trade and non-economic issues should be enhanced through READI. Also closer interaction in areas of communicable and infectious diseases is requested (European Union; 2007: 5). In comparison to former declarations the passage of cooperative interaction on energy security, climate change and environment is expanded. To promote the implementation of the Kyoto Protocol and the UN Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC), the Ministers expressed their wish for a particular policy dialogue on energy issues. Additionally resources should be established and fostered in the areas of renewable energies and energy efficiency (European Union; 2007:4). The declaration also includes the reassurance of the EU to help ASEAN in its integration process, respectively in regard of the creation of an ASEAN Community by 2015 with its three pillars, the ASEAN Security Community (ASC), the ASEAN Economic Community (AEC) and the ASEAN Socio-Cultural Community (ASCC), for example by sharing experiences on community building (European Union: 2007: 1).

\textsuperscript{16} "Plan of Action to Implement the Nuremberg Declaration on an EU-ASEAN Enhanced Partnership"
The Plan of Action which followed the Nuremberg Declaration defines policy goals for each of the cooperation segments and is developed for the period from 2007 to 2012. As the actual implementation strategies will be explained and analyzed in the next section, the following passage will sum up the relevant goals according to the political and security-, economic-, trade and investment-, energy security and environmental/climate change, socio-cultural and development cooperation.

Political and Security Cooperation:

- review progress made in the implementation of PoA by holding Senior Officials Meetings (SOM) in years without Ministerial Meeting
- Enhance role of multilateral cooperation in Asia, including through accession of EU/EC to Treaty of Amity and Cooperation in Southeast Asia (TAC)
- co-host seminars on confidence building measures and preventive diplomacy
- conduct personnel exchange programs to inform about illegal drug trafficking and diversion of chemical precursors used in the manufacturing of illegal drugs (European Union; 2007a: 1-3)

Economic Cooperation:

- hold regular meetings to review progress
- support implementation of APRIS II as the key instrument for supporting ASEAN's integration
- Expand READI as a key instrument for reinvigorating EU-ASEAN relations by focusing on modern policy agenda
  - negotiate and conclude EU-ASEAN FTA
- continue implementation of, and expanding cooperation under TREATI
- strengthen capacity of Customs Administrations and ASEAN Secretariat by develop an improved customs clearance and transit regime in ASEAN
- strengthening cooperation on civil aviation (European Union; 2007a: 4)

Energy Security and Environmental/Climate Change:

- enter policy dialogue on energy and environmental issues
– further exploitation of available international cooperation and financial resources to promote sustainable forest management, inter alia actions to address deforestation, illegal logging and associated trade, and unsustainable agriculture (European Union; 2007a: 4)

Socio-Cultural Cooperation:

– possible areas of collaboration: upgrading the standard of teaching; teaching and learning of languages; use of Information and Communication Technology (ICT) in education

– encourage exchange programs between: media of the EU and ASEAN; cultural practitioners and administrators in the cultural heritage field: young artists

– support activities of Asia-Europe Foundation

– improve information sharing of EU experiences with ASEAN on disaster management

– develop science and technology infrastructure and content for enabling research, human resource development, information-gathering, technology transfer, technology commercialization and venture development (European Union; 2007a: 5-8)

Development Cooperation:

– support Initiative of ASEAN Integration (IAI)

– programming and delivering of development assistance in accordance with the Paris Declaration on Aid Effectiveness (European Union; 2007a: 8)

The overview of policy goals defined in the PoA shows, that the two organizations committed themselves to cooperate on a vast number of issues of mutual interest. The last part of the PoA outlines the specific actions to implement the declaration within the first two years (2007-2009) and will therefore be helpful for the next category to analyze the cooperation's policy implementation process.

Also in 2007 the first EU-ASEAN Senior Officials Meeting (SOM) was held in Singapore. At the 18th AEMM in Madrid in 2010 under the theme 'Partners in Regional Integration', a Preventive Diplomacy Work Plan was compiled and the Ministers also decided to develop the 'Bandar Seri Begawan Plan of Action for an ASEAN-EU Enhanced Partnership' for the years 2013-2017. Although this new PoA mainly reaffirms the willingness of the two organizations to further cooperate on and implement the
Nuremberg PoA (first and foremost enhancing the relationship and supporting ASEAN integration towards the building of the ASEAN Community until 2015) most of the passages set out a more directive and clear strategy and some new policy issues were included. Although passages about human rights issues are written in all AEMM declarations, with the creation of the ASEAN Intergovernmental Commission on Human Rights (AICHR) in 2010, an extra sub-item was dedicated to the cooperation on human rights, affirming EU support of the AICHR through the exchange of information, workshops and the like (European Union; 2010: 3). The economic policy domain also underwent a certain amount of specification, as the support from the EU for regional integration in Southeast Asia will be combined in the 'ASEAN Regional Integration Support Programme by the EU' (ARISE) (European Union; 2010: 4). The accomplishment of the ASEAN-EU FTA is still identified as the 'ultimate goal' of the economic cooperation. The FTA negotiations will be furthered by the examination of bilateral FTAs with ASEAN member countries and the implementation of a program aimed at increasing the Association's negotiating competencies (European Union; 2010: 5). The Ministers also agreed on cooperating in the policy domain of tourism, by organizing conferences and workshops and promoting both of the regions (European Union; 2010: 7).

Figure 3: Policy Goals 1972-2012 (by author)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Trade/Economic</th>
<th>Development</th>
<th>Political/Security</th>
<th>Socio-Cultural</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1972-1989</td>
<td>Promotion of industrial sector</td>
<td>Improve competitiveness, adaptiveness of ASEAN member countries</td>
<td>Communism (Cambodia; Afghanistan)</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1990-2000</td>
<td>Promote investment by private sector</td>
<td>Establish EC-ASEAN Management Centers; ASEAN integration</td>
<td>Divergent views on human rights (China, Burma/Myanmar)</td>
<td>Reduce poverty and drug abuse</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2001-2012</td>
<td>Trade facilitation; FTA; Accession</td>
<td>ASEAN integration; development</td>
<td>Combat terrorism; compliance of</td>
<td>Cultural interaction (exchange of professionals);</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

4.3.3 Policy Implementation and Coordination

The previous category has shown that the cooperation between the EU and ASEAN covers relations in the policy domains of political and security, economic, development and socio-cultural issues. Throughout the years of their relationship the two organizations issued a vast number of policy goals, programs or strategies for implementation. Whereas most of the policy domains and goals are defined at the AEMMs, the JCC and its sub units, as well as the SOM are instructed to transfer the policy outlines and goals into implementation strategies. Unfortunately, information on the policy implementation of the two organizations is rare, especially on the work of the JCC and its sub units, and on evaluation or monitoring instruments. Moreover, access to work plans is mostly restricted by the EU, as annexes including these indicative plans are usually not attached to the documents.

The Nuremberg Plan of Action represents an exception as it includes a list of actions for the subsequent two years (European Union; 2007a). For this category, the implementation process of this Plan of Action was chosen. This decision is based on two factors: First, the Nuremberg PoA is the most recent implementation plan of the cooperation between the two organizations for which data and results are available, as the Bandar Seri Begawan PoA is developed for the period of 2013-2017. Therefore, the analysis of this specific PoA will provide information on the current state of the implementation procedure, which will be of interest as a success indicator, and second, the PoA contains strategies and outlines for every cooperation area. The analysis of the PoA and its implementation offers information on which strategies are formulated to reach the declared policy goals and which goals were completed. For a more detailed insight, the implementation of the ASEAN EU Programme for Regional Integration Support (APRIS) will be presented.
PoA covers the outline for the second phase of APRIS, as the first phase (APRIS I) was implemented throughout the years 2003-2006. For a better understanding of the aims and the background of the program, the latter will be introduced shortly, before the focus will be laid on APRIS II.

The next section will first of all present the tasks outlined in the PoA (2007-2008), followed by the analysis of which of these tasks were accomplished. Where possible and reasonable, it was tried to trace the single steps from the outline to the result.

4.3.3.1 Implementation of the Nuremberg Plan of Action

The Nuremberg PoA is clearly the most distinct implementation plan available for research of the cooperation between the EU and the ASEAN to this date, as the annex of the PoA offers a detailed list of actions to be conducted within the first two years (2007-2008) of the process, and data regarding the accomplished goals is available (European Union; 2007a). This sub category is structured as follows: first, an overview of the strategies presented in the PoA will be offered, followed by the analysis of the implementation process for these first two years. The analysis of APRIS will offer a more detailed insight into the implementation process of the two organizations.

The previous dimension has shown, that the main goals within the political and security cooperation, are the deepening of the policy dialogue, as well as further exchange of information in the course of seminars or workshops. The PoA transfers these goals into the following strategies:

- organization of the 17th AEMM in Cambodia in 2009
- signing of the EU/EC's accession to the TAC when ASEAN has completed the necessary legal procedures
- organization of workshops and seminars:
  - EU-Indonesia ARF Workshop on 'Confidence Building Measures and Preventive Diplomacy in Asia and Europe' in Berlin/Germany in March 2008
  - ARF seminar on Anti-Personnel Landmines, in Kuala Lumpur, 2008
  - ARF workshop on small arms and light weapons (SALW) in Cambodia, December 2007; and
  - information visit of the ARF Unit to the Brussels EU institutions and of EU officials to the ASEAN secretariat (European Union; 2007a: 9)
The outline for the economic policy domain starts off with the direction to implement the 2007 and 2008 work plan of APRIS II, which will be discussed in detail later on. The further particulars of the economic implementation are as follows:

- advance the ASEAN-EU FTA negotiations, therefore organize seminars/workshops under TREATI on:
  - liberalization of services both horizontally and specifically in the financial and telecom sectors
  - technical barriers to trade
  - trade facilitation/customs; and
  - economic integration
- other workshops on:
  - Air Transport Economic Regulation; in Brussels, December 2007
- design a programme to enhance the Economic Partnership between the EU and ASEAN
- design successor programme on Intellectual Property Rights (IPR) by focusing on Intellectual Property (IP) utilization, administration of the IPR system, international cooperation, enforcement, dispute settlement, education and building awareness on IP
- engage in READI dialogue on Civil Aviation and design the successor programme to the 'Civil Aviation in South East Asia' by performing an identification mission in 2008 (European Union; 2007a: 9)

The outline for cooperation on the policy domain of energy security and environmental/climate change holds a single directive:

- Build on the first READI dialogues on Energy and Climate Change in 2007 by agreeing on the priorities for cooperation and the list of activities to be implemented (European Union; 2007a: 9)

The strategy for the socio-cultural cooperation lists three points:

- organize a workshop for civil society organizations in the EU and South East Asia with the aim to establish links and to exchange best practices
- establish a bi-regional platform for a dialogue on S&T involving all stakeholders, and
- build on the first READI dialogue on Employment in 2007 by agreeing on the priorities for cooperation and the list of activities to be implemented (European Union; 2007a: 10)
The last point on the list of activities on the PoA addresses the development cooperation, outlined in one strategy:

- facilitate the organization [of] the first EC-ASEAN Member Country policy dialogues to underpin implementation of new MIPs (European Union; 2007a: 10)

At the 17th AEMM in Cambodia, under the theme 'ASEAN-EU Partnership for Peace, Economic Growth and Development', whose organization was the first task on the PoA, the Ministers published a list of the implemented activities (111 points) (Council of the European Union; 2009). Within the political and security cooperation area, all workshops and seminars were conducted. Additionally, two ARF seminars (International Security Implications of Climate related Events and Trends; Energy Security) were organized, as well as a diplomacy training program and corresponding executive seminar. In addition, a program on border management and document security was initiated in early 2009. Moreover did the EU sign the declaration on the accession to the TAC. The actual signing of the TAC was not possible at that time, as an amendment for the entry for regional organizations to the treaty had still to be completed by ASEAN. To assist the ASEAN secretariat, capacity-building programs were organized in 2008 (Council of the European Union; 2009: 11-12).

The list of implemented activities regarding the economic cooperation area, covers 79 points, including the topics of APRIS II (4 sub items), standards and conformance (21 sub items), customs trade and facilitation (28 sub items), investment (3 sub items), capacity-building (8 sub items), and negotiations on the FTA (14 sub items). The workshops announced to advance the FTA negotiations were all conducted under TREATI, as well as two capacity-building measurements for the ASEAN Secretariat, a workshop on best practices regarding investment promotion, and a SOM on telecommunications and information technology. The successor program on Intellectual Property Rights, entitled as 'EU-ASEAN Project on the Protection of Intellectual Property Rights (ECAP III)' is stated as being under the process of completion. Furthermore, the first READI dialogue on Civil Aviation was initiated in 2007, and a workshop on Air Transport Economic Regulation was held in Brussels the same year (Council of the European Union; 2009: 12-17). However, there is no evidence in the list regarding the aspired civil aviation successor program, or an identification mission.
The tasks of the policy domain concerning energy issues were also completed, as an ARF seminar on Energy Security was organized in Singapore in 2008, and 3 READI dialogues on Energy and Climate Change were held in 2007 and 2008 (Council of the European Union; 2009: 18).

The achievements of the socio-cultural domain regarding the science and technology cooperation stand out against the other points. First of all, a READI dialogue on S&T was held in Manila in 2008, and a SEA-EU NET Program was launched. Furthermore, two conferences on Employment and Social Policy were organized in Indonesia, as well as a workshop on Civil Society Exchange, held on the Philippines (Council of the European Union; 2009: 18). Regarding the development cooperation, the list of activities implemented holds no specific information on how the policy dialogues between the member countries was facilitated, as it only states that it was facilitated (Council of the European Union; 2009: 19). The Strategy Paper 'Regional Programming for Asia', issued in 2007 and valid throughout 2013, offers more information on that issue. The paper, published by the European Commission includes an overview regarding the aims of cooperation between the EU and Asia, analyses the political, economic, social and environmental situation in that region and how the European Commission reacted to these circumstances. The paper addresses supportive measurements for ASEM, the South Asian Association for Regional Co-operation (SAARC) and ASEAN (European Commission; 2007). The European Commission identified three major fields to support in the ASEAN region: regional capacity building and support to region-to-region dialogue (e.g. support for ASEAN Secretariat; dialogue on FTA; implementation of Vientiane Action Plan); cooperation in statistical areas as well as the reformation of security policies (e.g. improving national border systems) (European Commission; 2007: 11-12).

The paper does not contain any detailed information on how the objectives should be transferred into strategies and later on implemented. Rather, the European Commission issued country-specific Multi-Annual Indicative Programmes (MIP), including detailed information about the budget, time-frame, focal sectors and implementation processes. Taking the MIP for Vietnam for example, the EU assigned a budget of 160 million Euro to the programs with the time frame from 2007 to 2010. The MIP centers the bilateral cooperation around the assistance for Vietnam’s Socio-Economic Development Plan and the country's health sector (Europeaid; 2007: 3). The support strategy is outlined in a very detailed manner, including the context and justification for the support, the strategy's
objectives, expected results, implementation, risks and conditions and the like (Europeaid; 2007)

4.3.3.2 APRIS

It was decided to analyze the ASEAN-EU Programme for Regional Integration Support (APRIS I + II) for this sub category. First of all, the program is divided into two consecutive phases. Although the focus is laid on the second phase of the program, this will allow an identification of the ability of the two organizations to adapt to changes, learn from experiences of the first phase and integrate them into the plan for the second phase. Secondly, compared to other programs and projects, at least a certain amount of information on all implementation steps could be found. Thirdly, regional integration constitutes an important part of the interorganizational relationship.

APRIS was launched in 2003 as a response to the lack of integration between the ASEAN countries, which became obvious during the Asian Financial Crisis (1997/98) (European Commission; 2005: 8-9). In addition did the China's rise as economic power intensify the need for integration as the Association aimed at consolidating its position in the region. The EU in contrast, saw the opportunity to consolidate its economic position in Asia by offering technical support to ASEAN (Jetschke, Portela; 2013: 2), and "(... share its half century's worth of experience in regional integration (...)" (Unspecified; 2003: 12).

APRIS I consisted of three main fields of work: the realization of studies; technical assistance and capacity-building for the ASEAN Secretariat. In the three years term of the program, about 40 projects were realized (Martin; 2009: 84-85).

In 2002 the European Commission published a proposal for a Council regulation concerned with the cooperation between the EU, Asia and Latin America. The proposal is an amendment of the 1992 regulation for the two regions17, and determines the fields for EU financing, as article 5 clarifies:

Community financing may be used to cover in particular expenditures for preparing, implementing, monitoring, checking and evaluating projects and programmes and for information on cooperation activities (Unspecified; 2002: 9)

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17 Council Regulation (EEC) No 443/92 of 25 February 1992 on financial and technical assistance to, and economic cooperation with, the developing countries in Asia and Latin America
Out of the total 2,523 million Euro granted by the EU for cooperative actions in Asia, 4 million Euro were designated for APRIS I, combined with in-kind support of ASEAN amounting to 0.5 million Euro (Unspecified; 2002: 18; Martin; 2009: 84). Information on the first phase of APRIS is rare, however, a brochure of the ASEAN Secretariat (2007) about the second phase of the program gives some indication about the realized tasks within the three main work fields of APRIS I. The studies conducted under APRIS I ranged from support to developing parts of the Vientiane Action Programme\(^\text{18}\) for the ASEAN Integration from 2004; to feasibility studies concerned with an ASEAN Single Window for Customs\(^\text{19}\) and Customs Union. Technical Assistance under the program led to the establishment of the ASEAN Consultation to solve Trade and investment issues (TAC), and to the implementation of the ASEAN Cosmetics Directive in Laos and Vietnam (ASEAN Secretariat; 2007: 1). A number of technical trainings, including for example regional economic integration, dispute settlement, standards and statistics were offered for employees of the ASEAN Secretariat, as capacity-building measurements (ASEAN Secretariat; 2007: 1).

APRIS I ended in September 2006, and as it was termed as a successful cooperative activity (see Martin; 2009; EU; 2005; ASEAN; 2007), it was decided to initiate a second phase of the program, with a time-span from 2006 to 2009. A strategy paper for Asia (2005) formed the basis for APRIS II. In the paper, the EU emphasizes the importance to support the ASEAN Secretariat in strengthening its ability to coordinate its problem-solving mechanisms (European Commission; 2005: 24). The paper furthermore clarifies that not only is ASEAN in need of assistance for its regional integration, but also that the EU is eager to remain present in the Asian region. By recalling the achievements of their trade cooperation, the Commission states that:

\[
(...) \text{the ASEAN region is set to become one of the most dynamic growth engines for the world economy. With its growing export-led economies and a quickly developing domestic market of 530 million people, ASEAN is a region of global economic importance that the EU cannot afford to neglect (European Commission; 2005: 12)}
\]

\(^{18}\) Support to Vientiane Action Programmes Annex 1 (ASEAN Security Community); Annex 2 (ASEAN Economic Community); Annex 3 (ASEAN Socio-Cultural Community); the Vientiane Action Programme refers to the strategies outlined at the 10th ASEAN Summit for the development of an ASEAN Community (ASEAN Secretariat; 2004)

\(^{19}\) regional initiative to connect and integrate national single windows of ASEAN member countries to facilitate trade within the ASEAN Community (ASEAN; 2013a)
The Commission also goes a step further, by recognizing the need to let ASEAN determine the areas of regional economic integration itself, within which EU assistance is useful and reasonable (European Commission; 2005: 16). Based on this strategy paper, a Regional Indicative Programme (RIP) for ASEAN regarding the years 2005 and 2006 was published. The RIP offers information on the backgrounds, objectives, implementation strategy, and risks and conditionalities. A budget of 6-8 million Euro was designated to the second phase of the program, again based on the EC Regulation and further amendments of 1992 (European Union; 2005). The end sum amounted to 8.4 million Euro, with the EU contributing 7.3 million Euro and ASEAN again supporting in-kind with 1.1 million Euro (European Union; 2005: 2). Eight specific objectives for APRIS II are listed, including the enhancement of "(...) strategic planning and policy development for key sectors of regional cooperation (...)"; increasing "(...) the capacity of ASEAN to propose, prepare, develop and implement sector-specific actions for regional economic integration (...)"; and assistance to the ASEAN Secretariat in the areas of "(...) institution-building, training and streamlining of procedures (...)" (European Union; 2005: 9). As far as the implementation process is concerned, the RIP offers first information. The ASEAN Secretariat in Jakarta was designated as location for the program. Experts at the ASEC were responsible to develop work plans, on which the technical assistance was coordinated. After the 'Programme Steering Committee' (PSC) agreed on the terms of the plans, they were appointed by ASEAN and finally approved by the European Commission. It was the task of the Delegation in Jakarta to monitor the projects carried out under APRIS II. The actual execution of the implementation process was outsourced to consulting companies and based on a technical assistance contract (EU, External Relations; 2005: 10). All projects which are supported by the EU with technical assistance (under service contracts), have to follow the guidelines of the so called 'Project Cycle Management' (PCM). The idea of PCM is

(...) to improve the management of external co-operation actions - projects and programmes of all kinds - by taking better account of essential issues and framework conditions in both designing and implementing projects and programmes (European Commission; 2001: 1)

PCM is subdivided into six consecutive phases, (1) programming; (2) identification; (3) appraisal; (4) financing, (5) implementation; and (6) evaluation. During the first phase, a Country Strategy Paper, or Support Paper is prepared, followed by the identification of which goals should be pursued with the project. During the third phase, precise
implementation plans are developed, including the appointment of resources needed to execute the projects. Within the fourth phase, the decision of whether or not to finance the project is taken. If the finance unit agrees to execute the project, it will be implemented and its work progress will be assessed during the fifth phase. The last step is occupied with the evaluation of the whole undertaking (European Commission; 2001: 3-4). As it was understood, IBF International Consulting\textsuperscript{20} was responsible for the overall implementation process (see ASEAN Secretariat 2007). Technical assistance for sub-projects included the European Standardization Committee (CEN)\textsuperscript{21}, the Crown Agents for Oversea Governments and Administrations\textsuperscript{22}, PEM Consult\textsuperscript{23}, and the Asesores de Comercio Exterior (ACE)\textsuperscript{24}. In the following analysis, these companies will be matched according to their assistance in one or more components of the program. Compared to the first phase of the project, a distinct identification of the main work areas under the program took place, divided into five components:

- Standards and Conformance
- Customs and Trade Facilitation
- Investment
- Capacity Building
- Support to TREATI and READI dialogues (IBF; 2008: 1)

Component I of APRIS II, \textit{Standards and Conformance}, was aimed at preparing the creation of an ASEAN Single Market, by adapting national standards of the ASEAN member countries to the corresponding international standards, and evaluating the conformity progress (ASEAN; 2010: 1). Within this component, the cosmetic sector made the most progress, with the ASEAN Cosmetics Directive (ACD) being its major achievement. To advance the implementation of the ACD, ASEAN staff was given the opportunity to get acquainted with the EU-Directive and it was evaluated whether or not the individual ASEAN member countries were prepared to implement the ACD (ASEAN; 2010: 5). Additionally, the national regulatory authorities were advised to inform the small and medium-sized enterprises in their countries about the changes necessary to

\textsuperscript{20} http://www.ibf.be/
\textsuperscript{21} http://www.cen.eu/cen/Pages/default.aspx
\textsuperscript{22} http://www.crownagents.com/
\textsuperscript{23} http://www.pem-consult.de/
\textsuperscript{24} http://www.aceconsultants.eu/en/CorpHomepage.aspx
implement the ACD (ASEAN; 2010: 6). Another achievement under APRIS II was the identification of *Priority Integration Sectors*, including electrical and electronic equipment, agricultural products and automotive products, within which harmonization was tried to pursue (ASEAN; 2010a: 1). The technical assistance for this component was provided inter alia by the CEN European Standardization Committee, and the ACE Consultants Group (CEN; 2013; ACE; 2013).

The second component *Customs and Trade Facilitation*, had three main objectives: harmonizing the national customs processes of the ASEAN members by introducing the *ASEAN Customs Declaration Document (ACDD)*, creating an *ASEAN Customs Transit System (ACTS)* to facilitate trade within the Southeast Asian region and developing a Self-Certification System for local producers to facilitate the creation of the *ASEAN Free Trade Area (AFTA)* (ASEAN 2010a; 2010b; 2010c). Support from the technical assistance team to reach the first objective was threefold. First, an ASEAN Customs Data Model was developed and member states trained on how to bring relevant data in accordance. Second, a study was conducted to uncover possible gaps within the member states, which could complicate the transition from the old to the new model. The results of the study helped the local governments to fill these gaps. The third step was to issue a directory to guide the member states through the handling of the ACDD (ASEAN; 2010: 10). To make the ASEAN business sector more efficient, the APRIS II team was tasked to design the future ACTS. Based on country missions and meetings with relevant representatives from the member states, the results of a business case report displayed the benefits of the aspired ACTS and confirmed the need for such a system (ASEAN; 2010: 1; 2010b: 1-2). Assistance from the EU was especially important for the design of the system, as the EU’s Common Transit System was seen as a successful model (ASEAN; 2010b: 1).

The development of a Self-Certification Scheme was a crucial objective for the second component of APRIS II. Until the pilot scheme was launched in 2011, designed by the technical assistance team after a background study and corresponding suggestions for the member states, producers needed to proof that their goods were of local origin according to the ASEAN Rules of Origin (ROO). A certificate (CEPT Form D) had to be applied for at the relevant local Ministries, providing the guarantee of ROO, to benefit from the reduction or elimination of tariffs within the AFTA. Additionally to the high expenses, the process also yielded delays. Moreover, small companies lacked knowledge and information on this procedure and were therefore often hindered to experience the
advantages of the AFTA (ASEAN; 2010c: 1). The ‘ASEAN Minus X Formula’\(^{25}\) enabled Brunei Darussalam, Malaysia and Singapore to implement the new pilot scheme in 2011, whilst the other member states were supposed to participate a year later (ASEAN; 2010c: 2). The Crown Agents Company was responsible for assisting in the second component, and was supported throughout the implementation process by ACE.

Information about the third component of APRIS II, *Investment*, is rare compared to the other parts of the program. In 2010, an overview of the main achievements under the program was published by ASEAN, which does not mention work related to the third component at all. An *Investment Promotion Best Practice Programme for ASEAN Investment Promotion Agencies* was initiated, as two reports found in the archive provided by ASEAN confirm (ASEAN archive; 2013). The program included benchmarking of Cambodia, Laos and Vietnam and two workshops on best practices, conducted by the UK based consulting company GDP Global Development (IBF; 2008: 2). Further work, for example the development of a PoA for Foreign Direct Investment was dependent on the progress of completing the ASEAN Comprehensive Investment Agreement (AICA) (IBF; 2008: 2). As the agreement came into force in mid 2012, two years after APRIS II was concluded (ASEAN 2012), and no further information could be found, it had to be guessed that no relevant other activities took place within the third component.

One of the main aims of APRIS II was to support the ASEAN Secretariat with capacity-building measurements. Work within the fourth component of the program was targeted on the development of an enhanced dispute settlement mechanism and the invigoration of the units concerned with legal services, as well as arrangements within the Secretariat (ASEAN 2010d: 2). The development of the ASEAN Enhanced Dispute Settlement Mechanism (EDSM) began in 2003, with the aim to strengthen commitments made for the future ASEAN Economic Community, and to create an instrument to administer disputes between ASEAN member countries, regarding economic and trade issues (ASEAN; 2010: 16). To ensure the implementation of the EDSM, the Agreements and Compliance Unit (ACU) of the ASEAN Secretariat needed to be trained on how to give legal advice to the member countries. The ACU asked the technical assistance team of

\(^{25}\) The *ASEAN Minus X Formula* refers to the second passage of Article 21 of the ASEAN Charter (2008), which states that: "In the implementation of economic commitments, a formula of flexible participation, including the ASEAN Minus X formula, may be applied whether there is a consensus to do so (ASEAN Secretariat; 2008: 23)".
APRIS II to conduct a legal analysis and meet with its stuff to later suggest which points of the EDSM should be revised and amended (APRIS II Report; 2007: 5). Furthermore, legal experts of the technical assistance team helped the staff of the ASEAN Secretariat and officials from the member countries to understand the full scope of the mechanism, supported by a number of practice tests. Additionally, the participants visited the WTO Secretariat and the legal services of the European Commission in Brussels and Geneva. A ‘Guidelines Aimed at Supporting the ASEAN Secretariat in the Management of the EDSM System’ practical set was created to facilitate the processing of the mechanism (ASEAN; 2010d: 2). The team of APRIS II also helped the ASEAN Secretariat to reach its ISO 9001: 2000 Quality Management Systems Certification\(^{26}\) (IBF; 2008: 3). Besides IBF, the technical assistance team consisted of PEM Consult, instructed to administrate skills training programs with the staff of ASEAN Secretariat (PEM Consult; 2013), and ACE, whose task was to conduct a legal approximation (ACE; 2013).

The fifth and last component of APRIS II was concerned with the facilitation of policy dialogues between the two regions through TREATI and READI. Cooperation within the two dialogue instruments was usually carried out with seminars and workshops, for example a TREATI workshop and seminar on aviation for Senior Officials of the EU and ASEAN, held in late 2007 in Brussels, or a READI workshop regarding telecommunications regulations with the title: 'Ensuring Competition for the Benefit of Citizens' in 2008 (ASEAN; 2010: 17-18).

As far as the actual mechanisms monitoring the process and progress of APRIS II (besides the rather general PCM outline) is concerned, little information could be found. However, the archive\(^ {27}\) of ASEAN provides access to submitted reports on sub-projects of the program. Most of the reports (ranging from 2 to 60 pages) are structured as to first of all clarify by whom and when they were submitted, followed by a description of the objectives and the expected results of the sub-projects. After listing the activities undertaken and the corresponding results, the reports finish with recommendations and suggestions for further activities. The archive covers reports of all five components, with

\(^{26}\) The International Organization for Standardization refers to ISO 9001: 2000 as "(...) the specific requirements for a quality management system where an organization 1) needs to demonstrate its ability to consistently provide product that meets customer and applicable regulatory requirements, and 2) aims to enhance customer satisfaction through the effective application of the system, including processes for continual improvement of the system and the assurance of conformity to customer and applicable regulatory requirements (ISO 2010)"

\(^{27}\) www.asean.org/archive
the biggest proportion being the first component, with 33 submitted reports. 6 reports could be found covering customs and trade facilitation related projects, 3 reports of investment activities, 1 report on capacity building measurements and 3 reports on the facilitation of policy dialogues through READI and TREATI. As no such reports could be found in the archives of the European Union, it is assumed that the reports were submitted to the ASEAN Secretariat, who itself reported to the European Commission.
5 Success Indicators

5.1 Balance of Power: Process and Indicator

While the EC was eager to get access to resources of the ASEAN countries and strengthen its position in the Southeast Asian region, ASEAN was in need of recognition from the Community, and access to its markets. The first decades of the cooperation were based on what is often called a 'donor-recipient' relationship (Rüland: 1996: 16). Although ASEAN made an effort to propose ideas and possible policy domains for cooperation, the final decision of which goals should be pursued, or which projects and programs implemented, rested by the EC. Until the late 1980ies, the EU exhibited a reluctant behavior vis-à-vis the Southeast Asian organization, as the latter was indeed seen as a stabilizing factor in the region, but not as a serious cooperation partner. For example, because of its lack of strategic decision-making ability. In the early 1990ies, the EU sensed the possibility to exert more power over its cooperation partner by insisting on its moral and ethical standards (de Fleurs; 2013: 3). As the economic growth and development of its member countries gave ASEAN encouragement, the organization opposed this 'western approach' with more self-confidence than ever before. The mentioned 'Asian Values' debate rose, and with the accession of Burma/Myanmar to ASEAN, the relationship was maneuvered into a stalemate, as both sides were not willing to deviate from their positions (Rüland; 2001: 17). Not until the Asian Financial Crisis set in, did the power tensions start to loosen up. On the one hand did the crisis lead to a turn-away from the values debate in the Southeast Asian region, and on the other hand did the EU realize that ASEAN is indeed a valuable partner and that the perpetuation of raising the human right issue could destroy the cooperation itself (Møller; 2007: 475). The following years were characterized by efforts to move the relationship closer together again, thereby displaying greater respects for the different views of both sides and concentrating once more on trade, economic development and the socio-cultural cooperation. Although the EU still supports ASEAN by financing and offering technical assistance for its integration process, the distribution of power seems to be more balanced than in the years before.

The above overview of the power relations within the EU - ASEAN relationship shows, that all of the three sources of power described by Huxham and Beech occurred during
the time-span under research. It has also shown, that power imbalances exist within the relationship between the two organizations, and as the corresponding theoretical category predicts, the distribution of power has changed throughout the years of the cooperation. ASEAN with its limited financial resources is oftentimes still seen as the afore mentioned recipient of the donor EU. At first sight, the EU is the more powerful partner in the interorganizational relationship with ASEAN. When looking closer, ASEAN too is in the position to exert power.

5.2 Distinctive Goals and Effective Implementation

Over the years, the two organizations declared a vast number of policy goals and strategies. Although this section will give an overview of the ability of the interorganizational cooperation to define distinctive goals and later on implement them in an effective manner, the focus is put on the last decade, as this will show the current state of the processes. Therefore, the focus in this section is put on the goals and the subsequent implementation processes analyzed before, namely the Nuremberg Declaration and the corresponding PoA, and APRIS II.

Whereas at the beginning of their relationship the EU and ASEAN concentrated mainly on trade issues, and the formulation of policy goals was kept rather general, a gradual improvement of defining distinctive goals can be observed as the cooperation continues. The Nuremberg Declaration and its PoA offer a good insight into the current goal definition and implementation capability of the cooperation. Three goals of the Nuremberg Declaration were chosen to show how the two organizations handle the process. First of all, the defined goal as written in the declaration will be presented, followed by the task in which the goal was transformed for the PoA, and the actual implementation result.

It should be noted, that the table below, which displays the transformation of policy goals, is based on the information available for research available. As the access to a lot of documents regarding the interorganizational cooperation of the two organizations is restricted, one of the points might be defined clearer, and some details about the implementation result might be listed elsewhere.
The Nuremberg Declaration and its PoA show that the EU and ASEAN work with a mix of distinct and vague goals. Whereas some goals are very well defined, for example the enforcement of cooperation on selected sectors through the organization of specific workshops, others tend to be of medium distinctiveness. In contrast, the formulation of
some goals is extremely vague, such as the above mentioned example of ‘design a programme to enhance the economic relationship of EU and ASEAN’. The analysis of the Nuremberg Declaration showed that most of the workshops and seminars were conducted. A program to enhance the economic cooperation is not even mentioned in the documents referring to the implementation process. This threefold classification goes with the statement of the corresponding theoretical category in this thesis, that is to say that the less distinct a goal is defined, the less probable a successful implementation will follow. Overall, the work under the PoA for the years under research can be identified as successful, as a mere 3 items of the indicative list of activities were not implemented.

Although the exact amount of projects conducted under APRIS II could not be determined, the number of submitted reports suggests that, as in the previous phase of the program, roughly 40 projects were implemented (see ASEAN archive). The analysis of APRIS I+II offers a good picture of the ability of the two organizations to evaluate the ongoing implementation process, recognize problems or disturbing factors, react and put the lessons learned into practice when structuring the next steps. Moreover, a detailed examination of what has been adapted from the first to the second phase, will clarify if some of the goals demanded too much change from the ASEAN member countries and had therefore been realigned.

Martin (2009) offers an extensive analysis of the policy changes during the two phases of the programme. The author finds at least three situations, where the two organizations adapted their strategies. The first change in direction was already undertaken within the first phase of the program, and refined for APRIS II. The funding for APRIS I was monitored by a program management unit, but the budget was divided into one fund for technical assistance and another one, which had to follow EC standards procedure and international tendering. It soon became clear, that this method was too time-consuming and cumbersome, leaving no room for quick decisions. The problem was solved by subjecting the implementation plan to a revision and concentrating the whole funding procedure under the framework contract facilities of the European Commission. By outsourcing the complete technical assistance for APRIS II to consulting companies, based on single service contracts, the implementation process experienced more flexibility than before (Martin; 2009: 90).

The capacity building measurements under the first phase were necessary for ASEAN as well as for its member countries, to get a more precise picture of the different possibilities
to strengthen regional trading agreements, but, due to a lack of sanctioning mechanisms, results were rather sparse (Martin; 2009: 91). Evaluating this component brought forward that the number of feasibility studies and training seminars should be limited in favor of target-oriented assistance as far as implementation processes are concerned (e.g. ASEAN Single Window) (Martin; 2009: 91). The third situation, where it was obvious that a change in direction had to be carried out, concerned the ASEAN Customs Union. Under APRIS I, it was studied how feasible such an arrangement would be at the given time. As the results showed, that neither the political will, nor the institutional set up within the ASEAN member countries were ready for such a change, it was agreed that first of all a regional transit system should be developed and introduced to the region (Martin; 2009: 92). Generally speaking, the second phase of the program showed a clearer structure and was more focused on the implementation process itself, than on the preparation for it.

According to the analysis of APRIS I+II, it is appropriate to say, that the EU and ASEAN have learned to transmit their experiences from prior to succeeding projects. As the theoretical underpinning for this category suggests, in some points the ambitions of the two organizations, and the therewith involved change for the ASEAN member countries were too high, and hence had to be reassessed and refined. In general the two organizations managed to transfer their interests and strategies into more distinct goals throughout the years of their relationship, however in some areas, vaguely defined goals still prevail. It is difficult to determine whether or not the cooperation has what Druckmann, Singer and Van Cott (1997) call a super ordinate goal. At first sight, almost every goal is super ordinate, as every programme, workshop or interaction in general between the EU and ASEAN, can only be fulfilled by the two organizations. On the other hand, projects such as regional integration programs for ASEAN can also be financed and supported by other nations or organizations, as the example of a development cooperation program financed by the Australian Government shows. If anything, the aspired FTA between the EU and ASEAN can be regarded as the super ordinate goal of the interorganizational cooperation.

5.3 Outcome and Mutual Gain

Outcome and gain are somewhat subjective entities, and it depends on the researcher, what he or she is interested in and considers being the result of an interorganizational relationship. Some authors are interested in economic interactions, others in the change involved, or the developed level of trust. This category will shed light on the results of the economic cooperation on the one hand and will give an overview regarding the achievements in other policy areas.

As trade is and has been one of the most important cornerstones of the interorganizational relationship the subsequent section will give an overview of the exports and imports (2012), as well as FDI flows (2006-2009) between the two regions. The European statistical institution, Eurostat, offers tables and graphs regarding the trade numbers between the EU and ASEAN countries in 2012, as well as FDI outflows from 2006 to 2009. Table 1 illustrates, that the FDI outflows and inflows present a rather unstable picture over the years, as the outflows from the EU reached 25 097 Billion Euro in 2008 and declined to 5 787 the following year. For the time-span outlined in the table, inflows from ASEAN were highest in 2007, amounting to 12 478 Billion Euro, and sinking to 2 597 Billion Euro in 2008. Of the ASEAN countries, Singapore has developed into the main FDI partner for the EU, both in terms of outflows and inflows, by amounting to Euro 11 Billion of a total ASEAN share of Euro 12 Billion (Eurostat; 2013).

Figure 5: FDI Outflows and Inflows EU-ASEAN (by author)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>FDI Outflows (Billion Euro)</th>
<th>FDI Inflows (Billion Euro)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2006</td>
<td>25 097</td>
<td>2 597</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2007</td>
<td>12 478</td>
<td>11 000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2008</td>
<td>5 787</td>
<td>2 597</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2009</td>
<td>11 000</td>
<td>11 000</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

data source: Eurostat 2013

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To give an overview of the recent trade flows, two tables which present the figures for 2012 are included according to the Standard International Trade Classification (SITC) for total goods. Table 1 and 2 show that the products both organizations exported, were machinery and transport equipment (EU: mainly aircraft, medical apparatus, oil and gas extraction machinery; ASEAN: mainly electronic equipment, computers, phones) followed by chemicals and related products (mainly pharmaceuticals) by the EU, and miscellaneous manufactured products (mainly clothing and footwear) by ASEAN countries. The lowest European exports concerned animal and vegetable oil, fats and waxes, whereas on the ASEAN side, the fewest exported products were beverages and tobacco. From the ASEAN countries, the EU imports the most from Malaysia, mainly the above mentioned electronic equipment, but also crude rubber, palm oil and furniture, and exports the most to Singapore (Eurostat; 2013)

Figure 6: EU Trade Flows by SITC Section, 2012

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>SITC Sections</th>
<th>Trade Flows in %, Total Goods</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>S0: Food and live animal</td>
<td>7.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>S1: Beverages and Tobacco</td>
<td>0.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>S2: Crude materials, inedible, except fuels</td>
<td>3.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>S3: Mineral fuels, lubricants and related materials</td>
<td>2.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>S4: Animal and vegetable oil, fats and waxes</td>
<td>5.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>S5: Chemicals and related products</td>
<td>13.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>S6: Manufactured goods classified chiefly by product</td>
<td>5.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>S7: Machinery and transport equipment</td>
<td>41.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>S8: Miscellaneous manufactured goods</td>
<td>19.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>S9: Commodities and transactions</td>
<td>0.4</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

by author; data source: Eurostat 2013a
Since the first meeting between Ministers of the EU and ASEAN, the two organizations accomplished a lot of their goals. At the beginning of their interactions, ASEAN sought to gain legitimacy from cooperating with the EU and access to the European markets. Both wishes were fulfilled by the Cooperation Agreement of 1980. Another major motivator for the Southeast Asian organization was getting support for its own regional integration, and hence to learn from the European experiences. ASEAN profited from the financial and technical assistance of the EU, through the successful implementation of programs and projects, such as APRIS I+II. For the EU, besides strengthening its position in Asia, access to important natural resources of the Southeast Asian region was a highly motivating factor for the initial relationship-building (Jenkins; 1978: 2). Although some authors argue that various tasks and strategies are left unfinished (see for example Lim; 2012), the two organizations made some noticeable progress in accomplishing policy
goals in every area of cooperation. As far as the political and security cooperation is concerned, the two organizations managed to approach each other regarding the conflict-laden issue of human rights. Besides the EU’s accession to the TAC, the creation of the EU-ASEAN Migration and Border Management Programme can be seen as a significant accomplishment (Lim; 2013: 57). Within the socio-cultural cooperation, the Science and Technology sector has profited the most from the interaction between the EU and ASEAN, for example by the creation of the ‘SEA-EU-NET Programme’ (Lim; 2012: 57).

5.4 Respect and Committed Leaders

The relationship between the two organizations appears to suffer from lack of commitment to the cooperation, and the incapability of the EU to fully understand its Southeast Asian cooperation partner. Especially the reluctance of EU officials to attend meetings and conferences, and to visit Southeast Asian countries, signaled ASEAN a certain amount of disrespect and indifference from the European side. For example did no high official of the EU visit ASEAN countries in the years 2007-2011. The EU therefore is said to diminish the possibility of closer political ties with the Asian region (Khandekar; 2011: 3). By sending junior officials or civil servants to the meetings, ASEAN sensed even more that the EU did not grant the relationship with the same importance as its Southeast Asian partner (Møller; 2007: 470). Møller captures these divergent views on the problem well, as he writes:

The ASEAN side looked forward not only to mutual briefings but also discussions, which have been less fruitful because the EU was not fully represented at ministerial level. The EU side often pointed to the common position being mapped out at earlier meetings among the EU ministers, which could not be deviated from (Møller; 2007: 470).

Compared to the EU, the US was willing to give attention to the region, as high representatives of the government, and even US President Barack Obama himself, visited ASEAN countries in the last years (Khandekar; 2011:3). Lack of knowledge or ignorance of cultural differences oftentimes lead to problems in interorganizational relationships. In the meantime, cultural conflicts are well studied phenomena. Prominent examples for research on cultural variance are the studies of Geert Hofstede, or the GLOBE study. In 1997, Geert Hofstede published his seminal book 'Cultures and Organizations: Software
of the mind’, based on his global analysis of IBM workers and their distinct values in the 1970s. Hofstede developed five dimensions to analyze and compare culture: (1) power distance; (2) collectivism vs. individualism; (3) masculinity vs. femininity; (4) uncertainty avoidance; and (5) long-term orientation. Although Hofstede and his team did not explicitly determine the values of EU and ASEAN, the Homepage of the Geert Hofstede Centre offers useful information on the cultural differences between nations in Europe and Asia in general, according to the above mentioned dimensions (Geert Hofstede Centre; 2013). The comparison of two nations of the regions, for example Germany and Thailand, shows how important it is developing and deepening intercultural competencies when working in an international inter-organizational relationship. According to the comparison on the Geert Hofstede Centre for Germany and Thailand, the two countries diverge the most regarding individualism and resemble the most in respect of uncertainty avoidance. Whereas the results for Germany unfold that it is an individualistic nation, meaning that "people are supposed to look after themselves and their direct family only (Geert Hofstede Centre; 2013a)". Thailand, on the contrary, resembles a collectivist society, where "people belong to 'in-groups' that take care of them in exchange for loyalty (Geert Hofstede Centre; 2013b)". Culture, of course, can be a very subjective perception, and generalization about region-cultures is a rather questionable scientific approach, as the very fact of differing national cultures within the EU and ASEAN proofs. Nevertheless does the comparison of European and Southeast Asian states illustrates the existence of contrary views of specific values and attitudes, which are likely to complicate the dialogue between the two organizations.

It could not be detected if the EU and ASEAN (together or individually) conducted trainings or workshops for intercultural negotiations or competencies. However, intercultural exchange does take place between the two regions, through the Asia Europe Foundation (ASEF). ASEF is an institution within ASEM and was founded in 1997, with the aim to deepen the understanding between, and intensify the dialogue of the regions. The foundation focuses, amongst other things, on intellectual, cultural and people-to-people exchanges, and conducts programs such as the 'ASEF Cultural Policy Dialogue Services', with the aim to "facilitate dialogue, knowledge exchange and networking between government officials and civil experts (ASEF; 2013)’, 'The EU through the Eyes of Asia/ Asia in the Eyes of Europe (ASEF; 2013)', where the public perceptions of the regions regarding its partner are studied (ASEF; 2013). The EU also missed other opportunities for engaging in a closer political cooperation with ASEAN. For example
did the Cambodian Prime Minister Hun-Sen ask the EU to mediate between the fronts, when conflicts arose at the border of Thailand and Cambodia at the beginning of 2011. The EU was given the chance to present itself as a serious international political actor. However, the office of High Representative Catherine Ashton only responded with an undetermined press statement, and no action directed at mediation was undertaken whatsoever (Khandekar; 2011: 3).
6 Analysis and Conclusion

The topic of cooperation between international organizations poses a few problems for the researcher, especially when interested in the interactions of the EU and ASEAN, two organizations which are not homogenous but differ in size, financial background, and institutional setup. While the theoretical school of international relations in general perceives IOs as diplomatic instruments for states, it denies that they possess actorness. When IOs do not dispose actorness, they naturally cannot build up relationships with each other. However it seems that IOs did not care if they were attributed with actorness, but instead established relationships and cooperation with other organizations over the last decades. Except for socio-constructivism, the theories of international relations were not able to explain this emerging phenomena, hence researchers turned to other scientific disciplines to investigate why IOs establish links to other organizations and how their interaction proceeds. A new field of research emerged, called inter-organizational relations, derived and adopted inter alia from economic sciences, policy analysis, and social sciences, aimed at explaining the interactions of business corporations. Although these theoretical principles have been applied for economic research, and since the beginning of the 1990s also for international organizations, no common theory has been developed so far. IOs snatch their place somewhere in-between the theories of international and interorganizational relations - being neither states, nor business corporations. Although the debate is still controversial, research about IOs at least offers the theoretical underpinning for the situations when IOs indeed develop relationships with each other. These circumstances in mind, and the question of actorness being clarified, a theoretical framework for this thesis could be developed.

The main idea of this thesis was to offer a broader picture of the cooperation between the EU and ASEAN, from its beginnings, to its interactions and current status, to later identify whether or not this specific relationship is successful and therefore worth to maintain. The questions which came to mind were fourfold: Why did these two organizations reach out to each other and started to interact? On which basis did the relationship develop? Which goals does this interorganizational cooperation pursue and how do they implement these strategies? There are four main factors which can determine why one organization wants to establish a relationship with another organization. First, existing or altering circumstances in its environment may lead an organization to seek for partners, either to get assistance, or to commonly approach the problem. For both organizations, the threat of Communism was a cause of major concern. In addition did the
two oil crises in the 1970s lead to major recessions in the two regions. ASEAN furthermore feared to lose its Commonwealth trade preferences when Great Britain signed the accession treaty to the EC (Robles; 2004: 12). Therefore was ASEAN eager to arrange itself with the Community. The EC however, realized its chance to build up a stronger position in Asia as the US started to withdraw from Vietnam in 1975 (Robles; 2004: 12). To gain legitimacy from other organizations is a second motivating factor to establish an interorganizational relationship. While the EC already possessed legitimacy, ASEAN still struggled to be accepted as a serious organization. As the US did not take any steps to accredit ASEAN with legitimacy, to maintain both its hegemonic position and influence in the Southeast Asian region, ASEAN hoped to be acknowledged by the EC. The third and very prominent motivating factor is the allocation of resources. As every organization, whether corporate or international, has to obtain resources to ensure its survival, gaining access to scarce resources is fundamental. The EC, as well as ASEAN, were both looking out for specific resources to meet their needs. ASEAN was a desirable partner for the EC, as it dangled not only with its rich natural resources, but also with the possibility for closer insights on the wider Asian region. For ASEAN, three indicators were crucial to be interested in a partnership with the Community. First, the European market had been be a reasonable recipient for its primary and manufactured goods. Second, Europe was a major source for Foreign Direct Investment, and third, the Southeast Asian organization could profit from the knowledge and experiences of the European integration process. The last motivating factor chosen for the first dimension of the theoretical framework is concerned with the question of whether or not the two organizations wanted to pursue objectives in the same domains.

By analyzing this category, two factors or circumstances turned out to be most important: both the EU and ASEAN wanted to foster regional integration projects in the Southeast Asian region, with the intent from ASEAN to strengthen its structure and international position and the understanding from the European side that deeper regional integration would develop ASEAN into a more peace- and stability-keeping organization. Even more important and, given the political environment at the time of the relationship-building not surprisingly, was the wish of both organizations to contain Communism. Reflecting the environmental circumstances and motivating factors, Communism, or its containment, is the one issue which occurs in every category. May it be in the foreground, such as an environmental shock, or a common domain, or in the background, deepening the need to obtain resources and market access, or as a factor urging ASEAN to gain legitimacy. The
empirical findings of this dimension show, that in general, despite all their differences, the EU and ASEAN were more or less on the same track regarding their interests and intentions at the time of their first interactions.

The second dimension of the theoretical framework delved into the questions of what type of relationship the two organizations have, what policy domains they are interested in, on which goals they agree and finally, how they develop strategies and implement the declared goals. This part therefore aimed at analyzing the underlying structure of the relationship and the direction the cooperation is heading to. While consisting only of informal dialogue in the early 1970s, initiated by ASEAN, the relationship of the two organizations developed into formal interaction with the first ASEAN-EU Ministerial Meeting in 1978 as stepping stone and finally, by signing the Cooperation Agreement in 1980, into a formal cooperation. The Agreement still forms the legal basis for the inter-organizational cooperation of the EU and ASEAN. While the Agreement itself is kept rather vague, and, keeping in mind ASEANs principle of non-interference, mechanisms or strategies in cases of non-compliance are not included, the Agreement nevertheless defines important topics for both organizations. Whereas for the EC it was ensured, that the Agreement would not have any effects on existing contracts with single member countries of ASEAN, two essential interests were met for ASEAN, namely gaining legitimacy and the accreditation with most-favored nations status. Although an amendment or reformation of the Agreement was oftentimes discussed, diverging views regarding the topic of human rights hindered any actions directed at a renewal up to this date. Even today, where a rapprochement on this precarious political topic is visible, no intentions to revise the Cooperation Agreement could be detected. The fact that the cooperation still exists stands in contrast to the corresponding theoretical underpinning, which suggests that the legal basis of a cooperative arrangement needs to be adapted to allow its further development.

Analyzing the different policy domains and goals of the two organizations showed that the interactions between the EU and ASEAN moved from an economic-oriented relationship to a cooperation interested in diverse policy fields over the years. The theoretical framework suggested that the environment of organizations will change over time and hence will have an impact on the inter-organizational relationship in general, as well as on the selection of policy goals and strategies in specific (see Bachmann, van Witteloostuijn; 2006; Van Meter, Van Horn; 1975). Throughout the development of their relationship, the EC and ASEAN experienced a couple of these changes. In the first 20
years of the inter-organizational relationship between the two organizations, the establishment and strengthening of inter-regional trade links was a major point of interest. With the Cooperation Agreement being signed, the two organizations focused on intensifying their economic interactions. The political cooperation was somewhat reduced to being commonly opposed to Communism. When the Cold War ended, the first major change within the relationship took place. While the EC transformed into the European Union in 1992, and was eager to promote democracy, the rule of law and the adherence to human rights, ASEAN saw the strategy it pursued since its establishment confirmed, as the Southeast Asian region enjoyed rapid economic growth, which was a source of more confidence for the organization (Rüland; 2001: 19). It soon became obvious, that the different political stances of the two organizations could develop into stumbling blocks for the relationship. The Asia Europe Meeting, created in 1996, could ease the tensions between the regions only on a short term basis, as, caused by the accession of Burma/Myanmar to ASEAN, the next change took place. Although interaction between the EU and ASEAN still took place at ASEM, the impact on the inter-organizational relationship was immense, as meetings on the ministerial level were put on hold for three years (de Fleurs; 2010: 5).

With the Asian Financial Crisis being a major environmental shock, the third change within the inter-organizational relationship occurred. As both organizations realized that the insistence on their political standpoints could strongly damage their cooperation, the focus was again put on the exploration of common policy domains and the definition of joint goals. It seems that with the beginning of the new century also a new spirit found its way into the inter-organizational cooperation. Over the years four major policy domains have developed: political-security; economic; socio-cultural; and developmental fields are pursued. With the creation of TREATI and READI, the handling of economic as well as non-economic issues was bundled, to facilitate the collaborative interactions. The EU and ASEAN also returned to their initial interest, by reinforcing their cooperation on regional integration. The EU’s accession to the TAC was a major goal of the two organizations throughout the last decade, and was accomplished through the signing of the Treaty by the EU in 2012 (European Union; 2012). Also, an emphasis was laid on cultural and scientific exchanges between the two regions. Additionally, in the wish to combat international terrorism, the two organizations again found an overall common political direction, which both can fully support.
Little information could be found on the implementation techniques of the interorganizational relationship for the first three decades. Therefore, in the empirical part, it was decided to analyze the implementation of the most recent Plan of Action included in the Nuremberg Declaration from 2007 as well as to provide an even closer insight into the realization of APRIS I+II. While the first phase of the Nuremberg PoA offers general information about how the two organizations formulate their strategies to implement their declared policy goals, the analysis of APRIS illustrates the underlying structure of the implementation process. In the corresponding theoretical category it was argued that the success of an implementation process depends on the level of involved change for either one individual organization, or the interorganizational cooperation as a whole. How the two organizations managed to respond to occurring problems will be discussed in the following analysis of the chosen success indicators.

The cooperation between the EU and ASEAN is oftentimes still viewed as a 'donor-donee' relationship (see for example Rüland, 1996; Lim, 2012), implicating an overly imbalanced power situation. While this might be true for the first decades of the relationship, with ASEAN proposing domains and directions for interaction indeed, but having to rely on the EC for approval and the provision of financial resources, the power balance shifted at the end of the 1990ies. The analysis of this success indicator has shown the amount of interdependence between the interorganizational relationship and its environment and how the processes of the cooperation are influenced by this interdependence. Here again it was found that the end of the Cold War, the signing of the Maastricht Treaty by the EC and the economic rise of the Southeast Asian region had a considerable impact on the power balance. Both organizations saw themselves in a position from which they could not and would not deviate and both tried to exert power over the other. This might be seen as a relatively balanced power situation, though it hindered the advancement of the collaboration. This development is in total accordance with the theoretical considerations for such a situation. As the EU as well as ASEAN realized the impact which this stalemate could have, but also the value of their interorganizational relationship, the balanced but somewhat destructive power situation changed into a more moderate one. Although the EU still provides the major share of funding for interorganizational projects and programs with ASEAN, it has also come to acknowledge ASEAN's role in the relationship and the overall importance of the Southeast Asian region for Europe. Generally speaking, the power distribution is relatively balanced at present, as ASEAN can counter the differences with the EU in size
and financial background, with its vast growing markets, natural resources, and geographical position, which opens the door for the EU to the wider Asian region.

Reviewing the according success indicator shows that the EU and ASEAN work with a mix of precisely defined, ill-conceived and rather vague goals. It seems that sometimes either the ambitions are too high when declaring future goals, or that the direction of the goal is not yet clear, but was nevertheless included in work plans. "Organize a workshop on energy security in 2007" stands in high contrast to "develop a programme to enhance the economic cooperation", as far as the distinctiveness of the goal is concerned. Whereas it is clear what (energy security) the first goal is about, how (through workshop) and when (2007) it should be accomplished, the latter misses these attributes and therefore appears rather as a wish or vision, than a distinctive goal. As the theoretical underpinning suggests, the implementation of such vague goals is very difficult, if not impossible as it lacks information about the financing, structure, time frame etc. Hence it is not a surprise, that the specific project was not mentioned in later statements of the two organizations, or in subsequent work programs. As it was discussed in the empirical part, it is hard to define whether or not the two organizations have a super ordinate goal, which would make the interorganizational relationship unique. The aspired Free Trade Agreement between the EU and ASEAN comes closest to such a goal. The two consecutive phases of APRIS display, that the EU and ASEAN are capable to detect problems in the implementation process and react accordingly, hence learn from past experiences. Although APRIS I was entitled as a successful regional integration program, there were still some fields which needed improvement. The aimed ASEAN Customs Union for example would have involved too much change for the ASEAN member countries at that time, therefore the focus was put on other strategies to foster that particular sector throughout the second phase of the program. Other mechanisms were found to be inefficient, such as the funding structure and thence were remodeled. From the empirical results of the analyzed PoA and program, the overall impression prevails that the implementation processes of the interorganizational relationship are indeed effective. Not only did the organizations learn from previous experiences and translate the findings into new strategies, but also were the funding, implementation structure, technical assistance coordination and monitoring worked out in detail.

Given the motivation, needs and interests of each organization at the beginning of their relationship, it is appropriate to say that both the EU and ASEAN benefit from their cooperation. Trade between the two regions as a major interest of both organizations, has
developed extensively and the two organizations became important trading partners. ASEAN's own regional integration profits from the financial and technical assistance, as well as from the knowledge of the European integration experiences (Martin; 2009). The EU on the other hand, found a supplier of natural resources as well as a market for its own products. In addition, for the European side the partnership with ASEAN offers closer insights into the Asian region as a whole (Jenkins; 1978; Robles; 2004). The two organizations also benefit from the cultural exchanges of professionals, artists and students, as it broadens the knowledge and improves the images of both regions vice versa. However, it seems that the interorganizational relationship does not tap its full potential, may it be due to a lack of interest of the EU, or insufficient institutionalization of ASEAN.

The last success indicator delved into the topic of respect and committed leaders. The analysis of this category shows the need for enhanced intercultural understanding and training. It seems that little attention is paid to the different historical backgrounds, cultures, traditions and negotiation techniques of the two regions. Sending high officials to meetings, for example, might be seen by the EU as an unnecessary and inefficient procedure. ASEAN on the other hand, perceives the absence of high representatives as lack of interest and respect. By now it is a common approach in the business sector to strengthen the intercultural competencies of the employees, through seminars, workshops or trainings, when working with partners of different cultural backgrounds. It is important to note here that it is not claimed that such trainings are, or have not been offered and adopted by either organization. However, as there could not be found any relevant information on this specific topic, it would be advisable to focus on the intercultural competencies of the inter-organizational cooperation in the future. Not only would mutual understanding of each other's culture facilitate the interorganizational negotiations, but it could also lead to a faster and more effective processing of the whole cooperation.

In the light of criticism and interregional fora such as ASEM, can the relationship between the EU and ASEAN be termed as a successful interorganizational cooperation, and hence is it worth maintaining? ASEM is a forum for informal dialogue, aimed at facilitating formal negotiations. It sees itself as a complementation and not as a substitution for other interactions between the two regions (ASEM; 2014b). Although ASEM has been helpful in loosening up tensions between the organizations and simplifying the procedures, it is not likely to substitute the formal cooperation between the EU and ASEAN. The above discussion of the empirical findings shows that the
interorganizational relationship between the two organizations leaves room for improvement. Positions, goals and strategies could be defined clearer, deficits in intercultural skills need to be reduced, and respect and appreciation to be fostered. Also, the images of each organization should be promoted in its partner region. However, the analysis of the selected success indicators draws a more positive picture of the interorganizational cooperation as three out of the four indicators had a positive result. Although a lack of mutual intercultural understanding exists, there is a relative balance of power within the relationship. The overall implementation process is effective, and both organizations benefit from their interactions. Therefore, the answer to the research question of this thesis is, that the relationship between the EU and ASEAN indeed can be termed as a successful interorganizational cooperation (albeit with reservations) and hence it is worth maintaining. The established theoretical frameworks was found to be suitable for the purpose of this thesis as the strengths and weaknesses of the cooperation could be uncovered. It will be interesting to follow the future development of the relationship and see, whether or not the two organizations manage to handle further problems and obstacles.

The interorganizational relationship of the EU and ASEAN offers a wide field for various research topics. Not only the economic relations are of interest, but also the political and socio-cultural as well as the development-related interactions. In times of climate changes and energy security discussions, it will be quite interesting to see, if the two organizations will strengthen their cooperation in this specific sector. Furthermore, an extensive analysis of the cumbersome FTA negotiations between the two regions might offer a good research ground. With the analysis of the interactions between the EU and ASEAN as an interorganizational cooperation, it was tried to enter a new field of research and fill a gap in the discipline of International Relations. There is clearly a necessity to conduct further research in order to establish Interorganizational Relations within IR theories as it is a challenging, but nevertheless interesting way to analyze International Organizations.
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Appendix

Abstract

This master thesis aims at analyzing the relationship between the EU and ASEAN. Starting with informal dialogues in 1972, the two organizations have developed closer links ever since. It is questioned, whether or not the cooperative interactions between the EU and ASEAN can be identified as successful. Researchers of International Relations have studied the creation of International Organizations, their functioning as well as their interaction with states, but have encountered difficulties when analyzing relationships between International Organizations. A new field of research, called Interorganizational Relations is introduced in this thesis. Different criteria of the various Interorganizational theories were used to develop an integrated framework. The categories of the framework allow analyzing the antecedents, the type, selection of policy goals and implementation routines of the relationship. Furthermore, the indicators balance of power, distinctive goals and effective implementation, outcome and mutual gain as well as respect and committed leaders were chosen to determine the success of the cooperation. The analysis of the empirical results shows that the relationship suffers from a lack of intercultural competence. However, the power distribution is rather balanced and an effort is made to implement the declared goals effectively. Furthermore, both organizations benefit from the interorganizational interactions.

Kurzzusammenfassung

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