DIPLOMARBEIT

Titel der Diplomarbeit
“Securitization of Asylum Seekers in Austria during the Refugee Protests in Vienna 2012/2013”

Verfasserin
Anastasiya Ivanova, BA

angestrebter akademischer Grad
Magistra (Mag.)

Wien, 2014

Studienkennzahl lt. Studienblatt: A 057 390
Studienrichtung lt. Studienblatt: Individuelles Diplomstudium Internationale Entwicklung
Betreuer: Dr. Jan Pospisil
Acknowledgements

I would like to express my gratitude to my advisor, Dr. Jan Pospisil, for his valuable comments and constructive critique during the planning and development of this thesis. His enthusiastic encouragement and useful suggestions kept me motivated and my work progress on schedule.

Thanks to my family and friends for being an endless source of motivation and encouragement.

Alyssa, your friendship and useful advice helped me to get through difficult moments. Andres, you always found the right words, dissolved my doubts and gave me the courage to strive for my goals. Thank you.

Finally, special thanks go to my mother and sister for giving me the opportunity to pursue my studies and for surrounding me with love and comfort. Without their support this thesis would not be accomplished. Спасибо, мама и Аля
Table of Contents

1 Introduction ............................................................................................................ 1
   1.1 Literature review ................................................................. 2
   1.2 Research question and theoretical framework ........................ 4
   1.3 Research plans and methodology ........................................ 7
   1.4 Structure overview .............................................................. 7
   1.5 Further considerations .......................................................... 8
      1.5.1 Relevance to the discipline of Development Studies .......... 8
      1.5.2 Refugees, refugee protesters, asylum seekers: terminology clarification .. 10

2 Securitization of migration: theoretical framework ................................. 12
   2.1 Securitization theory by Copenhagen School of Security Studies 14
   2.2 Copenhagen School: critical considerations .............................. 17

3 Jef Huysmans: a Critical Security Studies approach to the study of
   securitization of migration ................................................................. 19
   3.1 Migration and security nexus .................................................. 19
   3.2 Critical Security Studies ......................................................... 20
   3.3 Securitization: Huysmans’ approach to the study of security ........ 21
      3.3.1 Moving beyond threat definition – modulation of insecurity domains ... 22
      3.3.2 Adding the technocratic point of view to the linguistic turn .......... 23
      3.3.3 Politics of insecurity ......................................................... 23
      3.3.4 Security, security knowledge and language: social-constructivist
           considerations ................................................................. 24
   3.4 Huysmans: securitizing migration ............................................. 26
      3.4.1 Security modulation of migration ........................................ 28
   3.5 Securitization of migration in the European Union .................. 32
      3.5.1 Internal security .............................................................. 33
      3.5.2 Cultural Security ............................................................ 34
      3.5.3 Societal security ............................................................ 37

4 Seeking protection in Austria: historical overview .................................. 39

5 Refugee Protest Camp Vienna: a chronology of the protest movement ...... 44
   5.1 “We demand our rights!” .......................................................... 45
   5.2 Refugee Protest Camp Vienna – towards a construction of a political subject 50
5.3 Role of the “security experts” ................................................................. 51

6 Methodological note - qualitative content analysis ............................... 53

6.1 Structuring content analysis ................................................................. 53
6.2 Material .............................................................................................. 55

7 Securitizing asylum seekers in Austria during the refugee protests in Vienna 2012/2013 ................................................................. 59

7.1 Internal Security .................................................................................. 61
   7.1.1 Terrorism ......................................................................................... 62
   7.1.2 Criminality ..................................................................................... 65
   7.1.3 Illegality .......................................................................................... 67

7.2 Cultural Security ................................................................................... 71

7.3 Societal Security .................................................................................. 73
   7.3.1 Labor market ................................................................................... 73
   7.3.2 Welfare fraud ................................................................................. 76
   7.3.3 Prioritizing nationals ................................................................. 77
   7.3.4 Usage of metaphors such as “flood” and “invasion” ..................... 79
   7.3.5 Lack of utilization of opportunities provided to the asylum seekers ................................................................................... 80

7.4 Abuse of asylum system ...................................................................... 81

8 Conclusion .............................................................................................. 85

References ................................................................................................. 92

Annex ......................................................................................................... 97

Primary sources quoted ........................................................................... 97

Content analysis grid .............................................................................. 99

Curriculum Vitae ...................................................................................... 104

Abstract English ...................................................................................... 106

Abstract German ..................................................................................... 107
Table of Figures

Figure 1 Step model of deductive category application (Mayring 2000) .......................... 54
Figure 2 Number of securitizing statements in the identified security sectors .............. 61
Figure 3 Internal security sector ...................................................................................... 62
Figure 4 Cultural security sector .................................................................................... 72
Figure 5 Societal security sector .................................................................................... 74
Figure 6 Abuse of asylum system .................................................................................... 82
Acronyms

BMI – Bundesministerium für Inneres (Federal Ministry of Interior)
BMWFJ – Bundesministerium für Wirtschaft, Familie und Jugend (Federal Ministry of Economy, Family and Youth)
BMASK – Bundesministerium für Arbeit, Soziales und Konsumentenschutz (Federal Ministry of Labor, Social Affairs and Consumer Protection)
BVT – Bundesamt für Verfassungsschutz und Terrorismusbekämpfung (The Federal Office for the Protection of the Constitution and Counterterrorism)
BZÖ – Bündnis Zukunft Österreich (Alliance for the Future of Austria)
EU – European Union
FPÖ – Freiheitlichen Partei Österreichs (Freedom Party of Austria)
NGO – Non-governmental Organizations
ÖVP – Österreichische Volkspartei (Austrian People’s Party)
SPÖ – Sozialdemokratische Partei Österreichs (Social Democratic Party of Austria)
UNDP – United Nations Development Programme
UNHCR – United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees
1 Introduction

On 24 November 2012 a “refugee march” with approx. 200 participants, among them approx. 150 asylum seekers, started in the small city Traiskirchen and made its way to Vienna in order to demonstrate for better living conditions for asylum seekers in Austria. After arriving in Vienna and voicing their concerns and demands publicly, 70 refugee protesters founded a protest camp in the Sigmund Freud Park, which lies in the Vienna city center. Few weeks later the protest camp set up a second sight inside the Votive Church. Round table discussions with politicians, hunger strikes and protest actions by the refugee protesters\(^1\) and their supporters followed. These events were accompanied by a substantial amount of public debate and media coverage. (Der Standard 2012)

Since the beginning of the protests the number of refugee protesters reduced due to deportations or detentions. Nevertheless, until today the remaining refugee protesters continue to meet and discuss their situation. (Brickner 2013) The goal of the protests was to raise awareness about the living conditions of asylum seekers in Austria and to demand their improvement as well as to call for changes in the current asylum and migration law. (Alvarado-Dupuy 2013:17ff.)

Refugee Protest Camp Vienna as a unique form of self-organized resistance has triggered a considerable amount of debates among Austrian politicians, NGOs, international organizations and civil society. The issue of asylum became widely discussed and reported in the media. Some parties discussed asylum related issues in a context of threat and insecurity – refugees and asylum seekers were presented as a threat to Austrian nationals and Austrian state. Such rhetoric was opposed by various NGOs and Austrian Green Party and other actors, which protested against such an image of asylum seekers and refugees and seemed to try to deconstruct those through a different contextualization (e.g. speaking of seeking asylum as a human right, or presenting asylum seekers as victims).

The interest of the present research is to look in depth at the security logic present in the public debate concerning asylum seekers in general as well as refugee

protesters in particular since the beginning of this protest movement. How did the securitization processes in Austrian political and public discourse unfold when the refugee protesters, de-facto asylum seekers, united and collectively demanded more rights from Austrian state?

1.1 Literature review

Present study can be located in the already well researched field of the study of securitization of migration. A substantial number of researchers dedicate their work to the different aspects of this issue. There is an overall consensus that in the USA and the Western European countries migration and asylum have emerged as “new” threats that are assumed to endanger the integrity and security of their societies. (cf. Buzan et.al.1998, Bigo 2002, Huysmans 2002, 2006, Ceyhan/Tsoukala 2002)

Ceyhan/Tsoukala summarizes this development as follows:

[…] both the EU countries and the Unites States have been marked, since the 1980s by a reversal of the image of migrants and asylum seekers in the public space. In both cases, migrants, who were welcomed after the World War II as a useful labor force, are now presented in political discourses as criminals, troublemakers, economic and social defrauders, terrorists, drug traffickers, unassimiable persons, and so forth. They are demonized as being increasingly associated with organized crime. They are accused of taking jobs away from nationals, taking advantage of social services and harming the identity of host countries. (2002: 22)

Bigo (2002), Huysmans (2002, 2006), Ceyhan/Tsoukala (2002) argue that such presentation of migrants and asylum seekers has led to evolving restrictions in migration and asylum laws as well as introduction of new surveillance and control mechanisms and devices. In the public debate all persons who crossed the borders were lumped together which was reflected in the similarly restrictive policies handling both migration and asylum – a process, which Ceyhan/Tsoucala (2002) describe as “policy amalgamation of migrants and asylum seekers” (ibid.). As consequence of these developments, migrants and asylum seekers are increasingly viewed as “economic-benefit seekers” (Ceyhan/Tsoukala 2002: 23). For asylum seekers, such image results in the weakening of their legal status. (ibid.)

This trend in the public debate and policy concerning migration and asylum has been also observed in Austria. Gruber (2011) aiming at indentifying how migration related issues are framed in political discourse analyzed party programs of the main Austrian political parties since 1970s and could identify politicizing tendencies. He
determined five frames which were applied when migration related issues were referenced:

- “security” frame - rising criminality and terrorism is linked to international migration flows;
- “cultural” frame - the threat to national cultural identity is threatened through migration;
- “genuineness” frame – immigrants are suspected of committing welfare fraud;
- “relief” frame - restricted immigration is demanded due to the limited capacity to receive more immigrants;
- “advantage” frame - diagnoses disadvantages that the receiving population is experiencing compared to minorities and non-citizens; here, the subordination of the migrants groups for the benefit of the majority society is stressed.

Gruber’s (2011) findings show therefore that there are certain processes in Austria, which render migration as some kind of threat. Another source showing that there are securitizing tendencies in Austria when it comes to debating migration and asylum was conducted by Andrijevic/Stadlmair (2012) in a research paper “Migrationspolitik im Kontext von Sicherheit und Europäisierung. Das Bundesministerium für Inneres unter Liese Prokop”. This report showed that security discourse was strongly present during the Office of the Minister of Interior Liese Prokop (2004-2006), when the migration related issues, and particularly asylum, were the matter of discussion: “Das Thema Asyl wird in den häufigsten Fällen aus einem Sicherheitsaspekt heraus diskutiert, in dem es vor allem um Missbrauch und dessen Verhinderung durch schärfere Bestimmungen geht.“ (Andrijevic/Stadlmair 2012: 20) This study showed that the security discourse was reflected in changes in the migration related legislation, e.g. the new asylum regulations, which aimed at effective prevention of “Asylmissbrauch” (“asylum fraud”) and declining asylum applications. Moreover, after Liese Prokop took office as Minister of Interior, overall migration policy has been presented as a common security problem of the European Union and, therefore, the need of Europeanization of migration policy was stressed.

Grubers’ (2010) study on politization of asylum presents another relevant work as it shows the prevalence of security logic in the public debate about asylum in Austria.
Author summarizes his findings as follows: “Das stark politisierte Themenfeld Asyl weist einen hohen Grad an Polarisierung auf und ist gekennzeichnet durch Bündelung des überwiegenden Anteils der Akteure in Diskurskoalitionen rechts und links der Mitte.” The „bundling“ of the actors identified included ÖVP, FPÖ and BZÖ with deployed frames such as security, abuse and burden on the one hand, and on the other hand the “leftist spectrum” of actors emphasizing human rights, solidarity and the need for integration measures for asylum seekers and refugees. (Gruber 2010: 80f.)

The discussion of the existing literature showed that securitization of migration and asylums have been well researched in the context of the EU. However in the case of Austria, aside from the presented studies that dealt with politization of migration and asylum in Austria, there was no research encountered, that specifically deals with securitization of asylum seekers in Austria. The present research endeavor aims at filling this gap by investigating how asylum seekers have been securitized throughout the refugee protest in Vienna in 2012/2013.

1.2 Research question and theoretical framework

Research question:

How have asylum seekers been securitized in public discourse during the refugee protest in Austria in 2012/2013?

Further research questions:

Was the securitizing rhetoric aimed at asylum seekers generally or at the refugee protesters explicitly?

Was there a difference between the securitizing rhetoric during the parliamentary debates and the one present in the press releases and interviews?

What is the insecurity quality that the asylum seekers have been invested with in the securitarian rhetoric present in the public debates?

Hypotheses

- Actors who were advancing security logic in the public debate presented asylum seekers as threat to public order (e.g. threat to public security), cultural identity (e.g. Austrian national identity), and societal security (e.g. exploitation of Austrian welfare state). The securitizing rhetoric was aimed primarily at the protesters and was present in the parliamentary debates as well as in the press releases and interviews.
• Representatives of political parties known for their conservative course regarding migration policies - Freedom Party of Austria (FPÖ), Alliance for the Future of Austria (BZÖ), Team Stronach and Austrian People’s Party (ÖVP) put forth a more securitarian rhetoric than Social Democratic Party of Austria (SPÖ), Chamber of Labor, Austrian Economic Chambers. Ministry of Interior played a key role in securitizing refugee protesters as well as asylum seekers in general. The Green Party, Caritas, Diakonie, Catholic Church refrained from securitizing rhetoric.

• Securitization of asylum seekers and refugee protesters was used by the government to justify restrictive measures and policies towards asylum seekers in general as well as to the refugee protesters in particular.

The presented research question will be approached within the framework of “securitization of migration” theory. The concept of “securitization” was first developed by the Copenhagen School of Security Studies; scholars such as by Barry Buzan and Ole Wæver (Waever 1993, Buzzan et al. 1998) are the prominent representatives of this school. Copenhagen School scholars belong to the group of “wideners” of the field of security studies. They argue that after the breakdown of the Soviet Union and the end of Cold War a global transformation in global geopolitics was observed: the security challenges to nation states had changed their form; new actors such as migrants seemed to cause new kind of threats (public disorder, disruption of cultural identity etc.). This development has to be seen as compared to the former constellation of highly militarized opposing state-blocks and the danger of a nuclear war. (Buzan/Wæver/de Wilde 1998)

The “securitization of migration” concept has gained on prominence and was investigated by scholars from various disciplines - Didier Bigo (2002) Ayse Ceyhan and Anastasia Tsoukala (2002), Jef Huysmans (1995, 2002, 2006), Christina Boswell (2007), to name a few. For the present study the research of Jef Huysmans (2006) forms the foundation. Huysmans (2006) studied extensively the securitization processes concerning immigrants, refugees and asylum seekers in the EU. He has made an important contribution to uncovering the processes in which migrants are constructed as security threats in the Western European society as well as revealed the consequences

---

2 Huysmans (2006) uses the term “migration” as a general category including immigrants, refugees and asylum seekers.
of such constructions. His understanding of securitization of migration and its implications is summarized accurately in the following passage:

Securitization governs migration as an inhibiting factor in the pursuit of freedom from threat. [...] the stake that defines the domain of insecurity is political autonomy in the double sense of independent identity and functional integrity rather than the physical survival of a political unit. The pursuit of freedom of threat is a quest of protecting (and shaping) political freedom. Securitizing migration thus transfigures it in a factor that challenges the continuation of political identity and the autonomy of the political unit to modulate itself as a free space of freedom. (Huysmans 2006: 61)

Huysmans (2000, 2006) has identified three dominant security domains in the European Union and its member states which, as he argues, emerge as a result of linking migration and some traditional security issues: internal security, cultural security and societal security.

Internal security

The central assumption regarding this security domain is that the abolition of internal border controls through the introduction of the Schengen area, transnational flows of goods, capital, services and people will challenge the public order and rule of law. Through the free movement within the Schengen zone the public order is represented as in danger, since facilitation of illegal and criminal activities by terrorists, international criminal organizations, asylum seekers and immigrants is expected. (cf. Huysmans 2006)

Cultural security

In this security domain, immigrants and asylum seekers are presented as challenge “to the myth of national cultural homogeneity” (Huysmans 2000: 762). Migration figures as the cultural challenge to social and political integration. Such security rhetoric has strong securitizing effects. National movements and extreme right-wing parties gained prominent place in the political field through structuring the political debates about migration in cultural terms. (ibid.)

Societal security

Immigrants and asylum seekers are defined as rivals to national citizens in the labor market and competitors in the distribution of social goods. In this rhetoric the immigrant is presented not only as a competitor at the labor market, but also someone who is committing welfare fraud. (Huysmans 2000: 767ff.). Rather moderate arguments belonging to this sector seek to curtail the social rights of immigrants and asylum seekers: “not because they are free-loading, but because a community should first and foremost provide benefits and welfare for its ‘own’ people.” (Huysmans 2000: 767)
The present research uses Huysmans (2006) findings to analyze their applicability in Austrian case in the particular case of asylum seekers during the refugee protests. Can the securitizing rhetoric about asylum seekers be categorized in a same way or were asylum seekers during the refugee protests invested with different insecurity qualities?

As to who is viewed as a legitimate actor to securitize migration Huysmans (2006) suggests: “Social movements, political parties and professional agencies, such as immigration officials, police, custom and the military compete over and coordinate different ways of knowing migration and its relation to the established” (Huysmans 2006: 53). This notion influenced the material selection for the present study, which aimed at analyzing the intermediary sphere of public debates.

1.3 Research plans and methodology

In order to respond my research question and verify my hypotheses, I will apply the technique of structuring content analysis following Phillip A.E. Mayring (2010). This approach is especially suitable for a theory guided analysis of the text material (Mayring 2010: 92) and, therefore, suits present research endeavor well. In the present study the text is structured according to the content, as it allows to extract the relevant segments of material and to summarize them in an efficient and clear manner (ibid.).

The material for the content analysis be constituted of press releases, interviews and parliamentary debates of the most active and relevant actors presented during the refugee protests: Austrian Government Officials, political parties, charitable organizations Caritas and Diakonie, representatives of the Catholic Church as well as Chambers of Labour and Austrian Economic Chambers. The detailed account on the composition of the material is provided in the chapter 4.

1.4 Structure overview

Chapter 2 of the study contains the theoretical framework of the present research endeavor. After a short overview of how migration and asylum evolved to a perceived security issue in the EU, the theory of securitization as developed by the Copenhagen School of Security Studies will be sketched and its limitations will be pointed out. Further, the migration and security nexus will be rendered for a better understanding of this connection. The main part of the first chapter constitutes introduction of Jef
Huysmans’ approach, as Critical Security Studies scholar, to the study of security and securitization of migration in the EU.

After the theoretical foundation is introduced, an overview of the development of asylum in Austria since the World War II will follow in chapter 3. Chapter 4 provides an insight into the refugee protests and the Refugee Protest Camp activities, their goals and demands as well as the government’s response to protests.

Following the introduction of the theoretical framework and the context, the methodology and the material selection are described in the chapter 5. In the 6th chapter the results of the conducted study will be presented and discussed. In the last chapter the conclusions about the findings of the present research and their discussion in terms of the theoretical framework of Jef Huysmans are delivered.

1.5 Further considerations

1.5.1 Relevance to the discipline of Development Studies

There has been an extensive academic work done on the nexus of migration and development issues. The variety of topics is rich and reflects an outstanding intertwining of both issues. In the following the present study’s relevance to the development studies will be reasoned.

Fischer/Hödl/Parnreiter (2007) argue that the concept of development is not a uniform and uncontroversial term. On the contrary, it is used by various actors across different fields in distinct manners. The present study bears upon the development concept of the political scientists Dieter Nohlen and Franz Nuscheler (1993), who in their extensive work on development issues, “Handbuch der Dritten Welt”, define development as a “magical pentagon” that consists in economic growth for the welfare increase of society, work understood as a productive and fairly paid activity, equality and justice, participation and democracy, independence. (Nohlen/Nuscheler 1993: 64ff.) Based on this understanding of “development”, Fischer/Hödl/Parnreiter (2007) conclude that “underdevelopment” then means not only a low life expectancy or insufficient education opportunities, but also inequality based on “race”, class or gender. Therefore, if the goal of development is to ensure an environment, in which people are capable of using their potential to its maximum, then the logical conclusion is that those societies, in which this premise is not fulfilled for the majority of the population, could be considered as “underdeveloped”. (cf. Fischer/Hödl/Parnreiter 2007: 27) Another
definition of “development” adopted in present study is provided in the UNDP (2003) report, where it is defined as follows:

Human development is about people, about expanding their choices to live full, creative lives with freedom and dignity. Economic growth, increased trade and investment, technological advance – all are very important, but they are means, not ends. […] The most basic capabilities for human development are living a long and healthy life, being educated, having a decent standard of living and enjoying political and civil freedoms to participate in the life of one’s community. (UNDP 2003: 28)

It is out of question that Austria is one of the paramount examples of a “developed country” with being the currently the world’s 37th richest country (cf. CIA, 2012), having unemployment rate of 4.3% in 2012 (the lowest within the EU), and being ranked 18 in the Human Development Report with the Human Development Index Value 0.895 for the year 2012 (Human Development Report 2013). However, the benefits of its development are not equally accessible to all individuals residing in Austria. One such group, for whom equality and justice, social or political participation, access to the labor market are unattainable or are full of obstacles even in Austria are asylum seekers. Their chances for “living a long and healthy life, being educated, having a decent standard of living and enjoying political and civil freedoms to participate in the life of one’s community” (UNDP 2003: 28) are limited, at least as long as they are not recognized as refugees.

In the EU they are deprived of electoral franchise, the social rights such as accommodation, social security benefits, and right for work – in some cases such as Austria, even freedom of movement are limited. (cf. Müller 2010) This state of affairs makes the present investigation of asylum seekers an issue that is relevant for the development studies, as it looks into the niche of “underdevelopment” in a “developed country”, in this case Austria.

---

3© The HDI is a summary measure for assessing long-term progress in three basic dimensions of human development: a long and healthy life, access to knowledge and a decent standard of living. As in the 2011 HDR a long and healthy life is measured by life expectancy. Access to knowledge is measured by: i) mean years of schooling for the adult population, which is the average number of years of education received in a life-time by people aged 25 years and older; and ii) expected years of schooling for children of school-entrance age, which is the total number of years of schooling a child of school-entrance age can expect to receive if prevailing patterns of age-specific enrolment rates stay the same throughout the child's life. Standard of living is measured by Gross National Income (GNI) per capita expressed in constant 2005 international dollars converted using purchasing power parity (PPP) rates. “(UNDP 2013)
1.5.2 Refugees, refugee protesters, asylum seekers: terminology clarification

Before going over to the main part of the paper, it is necessary to make some remarks in regard to the terminology used. This study deals with securitization of asylum seekers; however, the term “refugee” is also used in this study, as it was the term the refugee protesters used to describe themselves. To avoid any confusion it is essential to introduce and discuss the concepts of asylum and refuge at the outset of the study.

Refugees and ways to manage refugee movements have existed as processes of displacement took place and the people sought sanctuary or protection. But as Malkki argues, “refugee" as social category and “international humanitarian problem” (1995: 499) came into being in the aftermath of the Second World War: "The standardizing, globalizing processes of immediate post-war years occurred, importantly, in the institutional domain of refugee settlement and refugee camp administration, and in the emerging legal domain of refugee law.” (Malkki 1995: 498f.)

The international refugee regime was institutionalized by the adoption of the Geneva Convention on the Status of Refugees in 1951 that was later amended by the 1967 Protocol. These documents constitute the cornerstone of refugee protection in today’s approach in dealing with refugee in the majority of the countries. The refugee definition contained in the Geneva Convention determines the social, political and legal construction in addressing the “refugeeness” in the Western countries. The most universally cited part of the basic legal definition of refugee status is quoted bellow:

[T]he term "refugee" shall apply to any person who[,]…owing to well-founded fear of being persecuted for reasons of race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group or political opinion, is outside the country of his nationality and is unable or, owing to such fear, is unwilling to avail himself of the protection of that country; or who, not having a nationality and being outside the country of his former habitual residence as a result of such events, is unable or, owing to such fear, is unwilling to return to it.” (UNHCR n.d.:14)

It is important to underline that the Convention determines the rights and duties only for the recognized refugees. The legal status of an asylum seeker (a person who claims to be a refugee) as well as the procedure of legal status determination remains outside the regulations of the Geneva Convention and the 1967 Protocol. (Müller 2010: 50)

Whether an asylum seeker is recognized as a refugee, depends on the decision of national asylum system of the state where the refugee seeks protection. The recognition procedure is carried out by authorities responsible for the areas migration and asylum, or, in some instances, by the courts of the host countries. They evaluate whether an
asylum seeker fulfils the conditions for being recognized as a refugee. The description of these conditions is contained in the Art.1A of the Geneva Convention as well as in the national legislature of the states signatories, which adopted the Art.1 in their immigration or asylum laws. (Nuscheler 2004: 188) Müller summarizes this state of affairs as follows: “Die GFK begründet zudem kein Recht auf Asyl oder Schutz für den Einzelnen gegenüber dem Staat, sondern beinhaltet das Recht der Staaten, Asyl zu gewähren” (2010: 50). The „refugee“ - definition allows the national asylum systems to identify refugees according to the Geneva Convention; however, they are free to decide who to grant asylum, as the Convention does not include the right to asylum. On the other hand, signatory states to the Geneva Convention are obliged to grant the recognized refugees equal rights with other migrants. This is an important difference between the status of an asylum seeker and refugee that must be considered in the further discussion in this research.

Dealing with the refugee protests in the present study presents a challenge in using the correct terms for the description of the actual legal statuses of the protesters. Therefore, a short clarification is provided bellow:

- An asylum-seeker is someone who says he or she is a refugee, but whose claim of having a “well-founded fear of persecution” (UNHCR n.d.: 14) has not yet been evaluated
- Refugee – a person, who has been granted asylum and is recognized as refugee based on the definition of the Geneva Convention cited earlier in this section. (ibid.)

In the context of Refugee Protest Camp in Vienna, the members of protesting group who were at heart of the protests described themselves as “refugees”, “refugee protesters” or “refugee activists”. It must be clarified at this point these individuals, legally seen, were/are asylum seekers, i.e. were not recognized as refugees in Austria and were/are undergoing an asylum procedure. Therefore, the self-designation “refugees” will be used in the course of the paper on occasions when the refugee protests will be the subject matter. On other occasions, the legally “correct” terms will be used.
2 Securitization of migration: theoretical framework

There is an extensive academic literature on the rise of insecurities in Western hemisphere after the end of the Cold War confirming that the fall of the Iron Curtain did not mean that security would stop being an issue of concern. (Buzan et.al. 1998, Huysmans 1995, 2006, Bigo 2002) Falci argues that the prominence of security issues in national and regional political agendas, the apparently multiple and unforeseen global risks to mankind, the “new” threats and politics of fear indicate, that even though the Cold War ended, security matters have remained a concern to political actors as well as to citizens. (2011: 18f.)

One of the “new” threats that have gained a prominent place in the EU is migration. Watching television, reading newspapers or listening to politicians creates an impression of a wide-spread feeling of insecurity. Growing xenophobia and racism in Europe add to the general unease and spread the discourses of immigrants as danger to the societies and individuals that do not belong. (cf. Wodak/Van Dijk 2000, Krzyżanowski/ Wodak 2008) Huysmans (2006: 5) links these two developments to an event - that he views as a catalyst for an increased securitization of migration and asylum in the US and Europe - the terrorist attack on 9 September 2001. Since then terrorism has gained a priority and importance for the governments around the world. Moreover, as Huysmans and Buonfino argue, along with this priority setting, the rhetoric of fear and exclusion of immigrants as well as political demand for intensified control of population movements were developed. (2008: 766).

It must be noted that the efforts for anti-terrorism policies after 9/11 emerged in the EU in an already existing and pre-structured domain of insecurity as the security framing of migration had taken place much earlier than 9/11. (cf. Huysmans 2006) Starting 1960s and 1970s most of the West European countries have initiated development of instruments aimed at regulation of population movements that had to replace liberal immigration policies in the 1950 and 1960 that served for work force recruitment. At this time immigration was not in the center of the political and public debate and was discussed primarily in terms of social and economic rights as well as the construction of an internal labor market within which workers could move freely between European Community member states. (Huysmans 2006: 65) However, starting mid 1980s immigration became increasingly politicized through the question of asylum. Huysmans argues there was a “(con)-fusion” of immigration and asylum that took place
due to the presenting asylum as a possible route for economic immigration in the EU. (2006: 66) An example of such development can be found in the work program of Austrian Presidency of the Council of Europe that made an explicit connection between illegal immigration and asylum: “In recent years the steep rise in the number of illegal immigrants (and therefore potential asylum-seekers) caught has revealed the increasing need to include their fingerprints in the system.” (Statewatch 1998 cited Huysmans 2006: 66) Huysmans (2006) argues that even though some new measures were introduced in the wake of 9/11 (certain clauses related to family reunion, asylum procedures were adjusted; one tried to extend the use of information of existing databases and of databases under development such as Schengen Information System II; etc.), they did not dramatically change the already existing framing of migration and asylum in existential contexts in the European Union. They rather were reinforced and became more prominent in the EU. (Huysmans 2006: 65)

Moreover, Huysmans argues that in the case of the EU, the important factor for the administrative development of migration and security nexus was connected to the acceleration of the European integration process and specifically the emerging Internal Market and the Schengen Agreements. The central argument here is that the abolition of internal border controls through the introduction of the Schengen area, transnational flows of goods, capital, services and people will challenge the public order and rule of law. Through the free movement within the Schengen zone the public order is represented as in danger since facilitation of illegal and criminal activities by terrorists, international criminal organizations, asylum seekers and immigrants is expected (Huysmans 2006: 1f., 64ff.)

Present chapter is devoted to the introduction of the theoretical foundation of the present study. It starts with an account of rising unease und insecurities that have been observed as the migration inflows to the EU increased. Migration and asylum have become widely discussed issues in the EU and are primarily placed in the context of security and threat. (cf.Huysmans 1995, 2002, 2006, Ceyhan/Tsoukala 2002) This securitization process targeting migrants including asylum seekers is the subject of the research in this theses paper. The concept of securitization has been developed within the discipline of Security Studies, particularly by the Copenhagen School of Security Studies. (cf. Buzan et.al. 1998) The securitization concept is central to the present academic endeavor as it forms the core of the theoretical framework that the present study builds upon. Therefore, it will be introduced in some detail before an extensive
introduction and discussion of the theoretical framework of the Critical Security Studies scholar Jef Huysmans will be presented and discussed. Thereafter, it will be applied in the analysis of the securitization of asylum seekers in Austria.

2.1 Securitization theory by Copenhagen School of Security Studies

The present chapter is aimed at introducing theoretical framework which attempts to grasp and explain how security narrative is socially and politically established. The Copenhagen School is the first in the field of Security Studies to recognize the socially constructed character of security threats. For a reflected introduction of the “securitization” concept the main critical arguments as well as suggested amendments to this concept will be discussed. Thereafter, the theoretical framework developed by the Critical Security Studies (CSS) Jef Huysmans for analyzing securitization of migration in Europe will follow in detail.

The classical Security Studies developed in the age of Cold War in the field of International relations. Their goal was to provide policy advice to those in charge of states’ militaries, in order to “prevent [a nuclear war] if possible, and win it if necessary”(Mutimer 2012: 46f.) As the danger of the Cold War passed and the Soviet Union fell, the field of Security Studies has been contested by positivist/rationalist on the one hand and by the post-positivist or “critical/reflexive” approaches on the other. (Cavelty/Mauer 2012: 2f.) While the first represent the traditionalist approach that is interested in “the study of threat, use and control of military force” (cf. Walt 1991), the latter questions the primacy of the military element and the state in the conceptualization of security and advocates a wider approach by expending the field of security to study of economic, societal, political as well environmental risks (cf. Buzan et al. 1998: 5f). The widening of security agenda and introduction of the “new” insecurities to the field of Security Studies is also known as the “widening debate”. Present study is based on the wider conceptualization of the subject of security studies. Of particular relevance will be the work of the representatives of the Critical Security Studies, particularly when establishing migration-security nexus, and the concept of “securitization” that is at the core of the research question. As the Copenhagen School (CS) of Security Studies was the pioneer in development of the “securitization” concept and has laid the foundation for its further development, it is necessary to introduce its main characteristics and valuable points.

The main representatives of CS are Barry Buzan and Ole Weaver; they belong to
the group of the “wideners” of the security studies agenda that gained prominence after
the fall of the Iron Curtain. CS scholars suggest that after the end of the Cold War era a
broader understanding of security was indispensable. Other security concerns such as
human, environmental, societal security had to deepen the conventional understanding
of security that was limited in bipolar world to the study of politico-military security.
(Buzan et al. 1998)

In realism, which was the dominating theoretical approach in the field of
International Relations during the Cold War, security is about survival of a referent
object that is exposed to some kind of threat. A distinctive feature of the threat is that it
is existential (the existence of the referent object is at stake) and therefore justifies the
use of force to deal with the threat (emergency measures). In the politico-military view
of security agenda the state is the referent object. (Buzan et al 1998: 21) According to
the “wider” agenda in security studies, the identification of what is an existential threat
to what referent object requires a careful analysis. What is viewed as essential quality of
existence varies across the different security sectors. (Buzan et al. 1998: 22) Buzan et al.
(1998: 23) identify five security sectors: military, political, economic, societal and
environmental, and suggest the possible nature of existential threats and referent object
for each sector. For example, in the societal sector the referent object is “large-scale
collective identities that can function independent of the state, such as nations and
religions”. (Buzan et al.1998: 23) These identities can be threatened by changes that
might be caused by e.g. immigrants and their different ways of life. (ibid.)

CS assumption is that any issue can be placed on a spectrum ranging from non-
politicized through politicized to securitized. In the first case the issue is not of interest
to the state, neither it causes any public debate or decision. In the second case, the issue
is part of public policy and requires decision making and resource allocation from the
side of the government. In the last case the issue requires emergency measures as it is
presented as an existential threat. (Buzan et al.1998: 23f.)

The assumption, that any issue can be politicized and securitized, roots in the
constructivist approach of CS. It sees security as the result of a social process – the
construction of security. According to CS, security is constructed through “securitizing
speech acts”; therefore, the investigation of securitization is based primarily on analysis
of the speech acts. The securitizing effects of a speech act lies within successful
presentation of an issue in the context of an existential threat and danger. Weaver
(1995) defines security as something self-referential:
What then is security? With the help of language theory, we can regard “security” a speech act. In this usage, security is not of interest as a sign that refers to something more real; the utterance itself is the act. By saying it, something is done (as in betting, giving a promise, naming a ship). By uttering “security” a state-representative moves a particular development into a specific area, and thereby claims a special right to use whatever means are necessary to block it.” (1995:55)

The process of the securitization is what the language theory calls “a speech act”. A securitizing speech act is then performed when a securitizing agent defines an issue as threat to the audience. The speech act alone does not lead to the securitization: CS speaks of securitization move when securitizing actor discusses an issue as an existential threat and places it outside the “normal politics”. Once this issue is accepted by the audience as an existential threat, the securitization takes place. By achieving the acceptance of the audience the securitizing actor secures the legitimation for undertaking extraordinary measures which otherwise would go beyond the norms of everyday politics making. (Buzan et al.1998: 26) As Buzan et al. put it: “A successful securitization, has three components (or steps): existential threats, emergency action, and effects on interunit relations by breaking free of rules” (ibid). The task of analyzing securitization lies according to CS not in identifying objective threats, but rather in understanding what should be “considered and collectively responded to as threat.” (ibid.)

The success of securitization, which is conditioned by audience’s acceptance of an issue as an existential threat, depends to a high degree of the position of the securitizing agent. However, the power of the securitizing agent is not absolute. Therefore CS argues that the actors of securitization do not constitute a valid unit of analysis and urge to focus on study of practice of securitization. The security analysis in the tradition of the speech act approach distinguishes several units of analysis: the referent object whose security is at stake and who is threatened in its existence; the securitizing actor - a person or a group of persons, who perform a securitizing speech act, the functional actors – those actors who affect the dynamics of a sector which is being securitized and also contribute to securitization and the threat.

To summarize the essence of the securitization theory and its agenda that were discussed above, the quote by Buzan et al. is cited bellow:

“[…] securitization studies aim to gain an increasingly precise understanding of who securitizes, on what issues (threats), for whom (referent objects), why, with what results, and, not last, under what conditions (i.e. what explains when securitization is successful)” (1998:32)
2.2 *Copenhagen School: critical considerations*

Although the concept of securitization is viewed as a necessary contribution to the field of security studies, it has been a subject of discussion and amendments by different authors. In the following some of the critiques and amendments will be introduced. It is not the objective to bring together a comprehensive overview of the critique of the concept, but rather to mention contributions relevant to the analysis presented in the following chapters.

One of the main issues of debate regarding CS securitization concept is what should be the object of analysis. Thierry Balzacq (2012) is critical of CS concept of securitization arguing that it does not include in the analysis neither the context in which a speech act is performed nor the intention of the speaker in the analysis, and focuses primarily on the act of enunciation and the reproducibility of the performative. For Balzacq (2012) the consequence of such approach is that the performative is not seen and interpreted as speaker’s intention and argues that such analysis can go as far as allowing for a possibility of absence of a speaker which in turn makes a context analysis useless. (Balzacq 2012:62). He concludes therefore that “[…] the CS further strengthens the contention that its method is wholly devoted to the study of ‘lists of instances’ in texts, instead of meaning.” (ibid.)

Balzacq (2012) suggests a sociological approach of securitization that goes beyond “sheer collection of utterances and pleas” for argument analysis; it expands the securitization study by contributing a new process – the persuasive argument and reasoning – for a better understanding of securitization. In the center of this approach is the so-called “pragmatic act”. Pragmatic act is interested in the context in which securitization occurred as well as in the status of the speaker and its impact and effect of the audience. (Balzacq 2012: 63f.) Thus, the model that is suggested by Balzacq (2012) requires the analysis of three operational levels: the discourse analysis of text, whereby the focus lies in inquiry of how an agent argues the security case; discourse of action where the question of what the text tries to achieve is sought and the context.

Stritzel (2007) also argues for a reading of securitization that goes beyond the speech act analysis. He calls for an analysis of process of securitization, which he terms as externalist: “[…] security articulations need to be related to their broader discursive contexts from which both the securitizing actor and the performative force of the articulated speech act/text gain their power.” (Stritzel 2007: 360) Stritzel (2007) as a
The proponent of the externalist approach to securitization differentiates two dimensions of context - the socio-linguistic, which is necessary to understand the actual speech act, and the socio-political context, which looks at the social and political circumstances and structures, which put the agent into the position of power. (2007: 369f.)

The Copenhagen School focuses on speech acts primarily of those actors who have the political power and are visible in public domain. Bigo (2002) suggests going beyond this notion and looking at the role of the so-called “security experts”, who are less evident to the public, but constitutive of security framing. To the group of security experts in the West belong policemen, gendarmes, intelligence services, military, providers of technology for surveillance and experts on risk assessment. They have the legitimacy to define policy problems because they are trained as security agents, possess the security knowledge and are implementing their knowledge in their work. (cf. Bigo 2002)

The mentioned amendments and critique of CS securitization concept present important points of consideration in the analysis of securitization of migration. They call for moving away from an analysis of utterances to a broader analysis that includes socio-political context (Strizel 2007), as well as in the status of the speaker and its impact and effect of the audience (Balsacq 2012) and calls for expending the idea of who the securitizing agent can be by pointing to the decisive role of security professionals and technology. (Bigo 2002)
3 Jef Huysmans: a Critical Security Studies approach to the study of securitization of migration

3.1 Migration and security nexus

After the short introduction of the CS approach to studying security and the concept of securitization as well as showing the relevant critique of the concept, the necessary basis is provided for a better understanding of the process of securitizing migration. Before beginning this endeavor, the main approaches to linking security and migration will be introduced in the present section.

The study of security and migration has been undertaken by two different disciplines: security and migration studies. (Squire and Huysmans 2012: 170) In migration studies migration can be approached either in terms of economic migration or as a broader issue incorporating refugee studies or labor migration studies. (ibid.) In security studies migration is viewed as a state or condition that must be achieved and therefore is considered in national security strategy in same way as national security is regarded when migration policy designed. There are two approaches to view security in security studies: strategic security studies investigate to which extent migratory developments affect national security questions (such as “What effect does migration have on social cohesion?”) Moreover, they look at how security concerns effect migration policies. The human security approach is more interested in studying security of individual more than that of the state. The latter implies that migratory concerns transcend the state and are now located at a transnational level. The subject of investigation goes beyond the state and shifts to study of the individual security. Such an approach has been developed particularly in relation to refugees and asylum seekers. Huysmans and Squire (2012), Critical Security Studies scholars, are critical of this approach as it tends to approach the migrant as a disempowered agent or victim. (Squire and Huysmans 2012: 172) Squire and Huysmans (2012) are also critical of the strategic and human security approach since both seem to reify migration as “threat” and security as a condition to be achieved. They are critical of these approaches because they have an undesirable impact for the design of migration policies: either the security of states or security of migrants or both is the main concern, which results in putting migration on security agenda. Such an agenda setting allows for legitimate exclusionary distinctions in categories such as “illegal migrants”, “asylum seekers”, which are in turn identified
as necessitating strict controls. As Huysmans notes, strategic security studies eliminate
the normative question of how securitizing migration produces exclusion, violence and
inequality. Moreover they also reduce social and political complexity of migration to
the interactions between states. (Huysmans/Squire 2012: 173f.)

It is therefore evident that the link between migration and security can be viewed
from different angles and therefore is studied with different focus. The present study is
interested in investigation of how migration is framed as security threat as well as how
securitizing migration leads to exclusion, violence and inequality. In the following
chapter the approach adopted in this study will be discussed at length.

3.2 Critical Security Studies

Towards the end of the Cold War security scholars’ attention was drawn to the critical
theory, which they introduced to Security Studies – in consequence, the field of Critical
Security Studies was forged. Critical social theorists “seek to make changes to the
fundamental social organization of the present, so that future organization frees those
presently oppressed by the operation of the world as we find it” (Mutimer 2012: 45)
This approach differs from the Copenhagen School insofar that it raises the claim to
introduce the change in the society, while CS aims primarily at unveiling the
mechanism of the security framing. (Buzan et al. 1998: 33-35)

Critical Security Studies (CSS) scholars developed a comprehensive framework
for studying the nexus of migration and security. Their approach is interested in the
political framing of migration as threat and its impact on public opinion formation as
well as in investigating the discrepancy between perception of threat and the actual
threat that migration can pose. CSS scholars derive from the idea that security exists
primarily in mind. Such a cognitive approach requires a critical analysis of public
discourses, the language, technologies and professional routines which construct
migration as a security “threat”. (cf. Huysmans/Squire 2012: 172f.)

Security is viewed as practice or frame which is produced and reproduced by
security agencies and security professionals as well as technologies and public rhetoric
of politicians. These practices are investigated at the point of intersection of migration
and security. (Huysmans/Squire 2012: 173) CSS approach views security as language,
interest or knowledge that has to be seen in relation to other knowledge, actor or
practice. “[...] security practice is a specific strategy or technique of (de)-politicizing
According to Keith Krause there are three “rubrics” which are dominating the research agenda of CSS: the construction of threats and responses; the construction of the objects of security and possibilities for transforming security dilemma. (Mutimer zit. nach Krause 2012: 48) The main assumption here is that security is about identifying threats that are posed to a particular referent object and the formulation of policies to respond to those threats. The social construction approach opens up a possibility not only to answer these questions in realist terms (providing a reflection of the world as we find it), but also to find out “how is it that they came to be that way, given that they are constructed, contingent features of the world” (ibid.) This “how” question is of particular relevance in further investigation of how migration related issues, and particularly asylum are being “securitized” in Austria; how they come about as security threats and how are they being constructed?

After the preceding introduction to the CS as well as the CSS and the main assumptions about the security-migration nexus, the theoretical framework to the study of securitization of migration by the Critical Security Studies scholar, Jef Huysmans, will be introduced in the following in detail.

### 3.3 Securitization: Huysmans’ approach to the study of security

While CS served as the starting point for understanding securitization concept, the present research adopts Jef Huysmans’ approach to studying securitization of migration. Huysmans (2006) elaborated an extended analytical framework for analyzing security and migration nexus that roots in the core ideas of CSS. In the following part, Huysmans’ understanding of securitization, also mentioned as “security framing”, will be introduced: its dynamics, development as well as further underlying concepts, as delivered by Huysmans, will be discussed.

Huysmans (2006) is primarily interested in investigating what it means to politicize and regulate migration and asylum within security framework. He looks at how securitization is being put in place. In the tradition of CSS he aims at exploring the security quality, which security policy invests in the policy area. He develops an analysis framework of the security practice that has three conceptual arguments in its core: “modulation of insecurity domains”, technocratic understanding of these modulations and securitization as practice with a general vision of the nature of politics,
suggesting the idea of “dual politics”. (Huysmans 2006: 1ff.)

3.3.1 Moving beyond threat definition – modulation of insecurity domains

While accepting the important role of threat definition in production of insecurities Huysmans suggests that threat is not the only factor that is relevant. He suggests that the dynamics in the political and social shaping of insecurities is more complex. An issue does not have to be always defined or explicitly mentioned as a threat; instead, already its embedding in a security context of e.g. crime or terrorism constitutes it as a threat. Therefore, even when not directly spoken of as threat, when integrated in policy frameworks that concern policing and defense, an issue is rendered as security issue. Following this observation, Huysmans broadens the notion of insecurity from threat definition to “the political and institutional framing of policy issues”, something that he also names ‘domains of insecurity’” (Huysmans 2006: 4)

Such framing establishes a connection between an issue, e.g. asylum, and some traditional security phenomenon, e.g. criminality, and thus enables a transfer of insecurity from the latter to the former and produces the so-called “domain of insecurity”. Based on Bigo’s (2002) work Huysmans further argues that routines, administrative practices, competition between agencies and institutional history of security agencies are contributing to the modulation of domains of insecurity as well. Including them in the analysis allows grasping the “continuous and ordinary” (Huysmans 2006:5) practice in politics and knowledge that is prone to stress exceptionality or crisis.

“[…] the structure of political and bureaucratic interplay must be analyzed on a dialectic basis in order to understand better the “political spectacle” that is taking place through the securitization of immigration. Multiple discursive practices must be understood, as well as heterogeneity of the nondiscursive practices as part of the same “dispositif” (legal devices, political rhetoric, police practices, surveillance technologies, discourses on human rights, resistances of actors, and so on) in order to understand the articulation of knowledge and power relations. The discursive transversality of the immigrant figure need to be plotted, through all the twists, turns and meanings that link this figure with different structural problems and the figure of the sovereign state itself. (Bigo 2002: 84)

Insecurity is therefore rendered in a much complex way than by defining an existential threat: “The tension between claims of exceptionality and the continuous enacting of insecurity through routines and in the institutional competition between security agencies is a central element of how insecurity is politically and socially constructed.” (Huysmans 2006: 6) The analysis of securitization thus depends not only on the threat definition, i.e. speech acts, but on the kind of the framing that security practice implies.
3.3.2 Adding the technocratic point of view to the linguistic turn

Huysmans’ analysis framework was developed in the wake of the linguistic turn in security studies. While accepting the performative role of language, Huysmans adds the technocratic viewpoint to the analysis of security. Technology – i.e. hardware, trained skill and expert knowledge, and professionals of security – i.e. people who claim security knowledge and do “security work” on the daily basis - are viewed as important for the development of the civil society and governing of social conduct, it has political significance. Therefore, Huysmans argues that structuring and governing domains of insecurity is strongly influenced by technocratic processes. Publicly less visible, technologies and security professionals “assert expertise, institutionalized routines and available technological hardware.” (Huysmans 2006:154)

3.3.3 Politics of insecurity

The third move that Huysmans introduces is the concept of dual politics of insecurity. Politics of insecurity refers to “contestations of the modalities of security framing and their political and professional legitimacy.” (Huysmans 2006: 153) In Huysmans’ analytical framework it encompasses conflicts in decision making and implementation processes (policies). The duality of this concept consists in the view that politics is constituted on the one hand by the political spectacle and on the other by technocratic processes. (Huysmans 2006: 12f., 153ff.) The first is primarily interested in the development and circulation of symbols in public contests of policies and public positions. Politics of security framing in this sense implies evoking fears and at the same time reassuring that it is possible to control the insecurities. On the other hand the technocratic processes heavily modulate social process and have a strong potential to contribute to modulation of domains of insecurity. It therefore must be considered in understanding of the politics of security framing. For understanding of securitization it implies that it “emerges in the interstice of a symbolic politics of fear generated in the field of professional politicians, which also includes the media and opinion polling stations, and the technological governance of insecurity primarily generated in the field of security professionals, including most explicitly the different security services (police, military, and intelligence).” (Huysmans 2006: 154f.)

By introducing the bifurcated understanding of politics, Huysmans enables a constructive encounter between the discursive security studies (as for example the
theory of Buzan) and the technological interpretation of security framing as suggested by Bigo (2002). In the present study both levels of the politics will be considered in order to present a detailed picture of securitization of asylum in Austria.

The three conceptual arguments introduced briefly in this section offer an analysis framework that includes on the one hand the analysis from discursive security studies and on the other hand the study and role of technology and security experts. It brings a substantial contribution to the study of security and immigration and asylum as it allows capturing a wider variety of actors and processes that contribute to security framing of asylum.

3.3.4 Security, security knowledge and language: social-constructivist considerations

Another important issue to consider in within Huysmans’ theoretical approach is the role of language in the security framing. As well as for CS, for Huysmans language plays an essential role in construction of insecurities. It therefore will be discussed from his perspective in the present section.

Substantial research has been dedicated to the study of implications of widening security for the field of security knowledge. As was discussed in the first chapter, the widening debate presented a contest of meaning of security in terms of what kind of threats and referent object could be legitimately studied. This question was pursued with the goal to find out what kind of insecurities should be included in the research agenda. At the same time another debate took place that focused on finding out what were the consequences of using security language in these “new” areas for the political understanding and methods of governing. Huysmans showed particular interest in understanding how the definition and governing of policy problems such as immigration and asylum have changed in the wake of widening debate. How are policy problems constituted as objects of government by applying security knowledge to them? To respond this question it is essential to understand the conceptual and political rationality that security language invests in a problem. (Huysmans 2006:22)

Huysmans interprets security as social construction. From the perspective of social constructivism the transformation of an issue, e.g. migration into a security problem, is a result of the practice of definition. By talking security issue is brought into presence, therefore, it is to an extent what security agents make of it. (Huysmans 2002:22)
However, social constructivists do not believe that the process of definition depends on cognitive process of an agent resulting in a correct or incorrect understanding of threat. They consider the creation of threats as a social phenomenon in which security questions result from a work of mobilization “in which practices work upon each other and thus create an effect that we call security problem”. (ibid.) Immigration as security problem in this logic is not something that just emerges naturally and triggers policy measures to curtail the dangers that emanate from it. Turning immigration and asylum into a security issues requires mobilization of certain institutions, a particular kind of knowledge and expectations about the social exchanges between various social groups. Security framing is therefore an intersubjective process, in which exchange between different actions articulating security and the mobilization of security expectations in the already existing institutional setting is pivotal. (Huysmans 2002: 43)

Security is therefore conceptualized as an effect of mobilization, for which the role of language is crucial. Language has an integrative capacity: isolated features such as, for example, migration, terrorism and the European internal market can be brought together into a “meaningful whole” (Huysmans 2002: 44). The important role of language therefore consists in bringing together social practices into an institutionalized framework. It is not only a communicative instrument to discuss a development in the real world, but “a defining force, integrating social relations” (Huysmans 2002: 45). This performative view of language allows capturing the constructivist quality of security utterances. Language is never a simple representation of extra-discursive reality. It has a performative force, which implies that security problem results from successfully speaking or writing security. The security utterance, i.e. speech act, introduces security questions into the policy area. (ibid.)

Huysmans argues that the performative aspect of language is only part of the story. He also calls for a generic understanding of language, i.e. the idea that the use of language introduces “a generic structure of meaning which organizes dispositions, social relations and politics according to a rationality of security.” (Huysmans 2002: 42) Security rationality is a concept that Huysmans introduces for a better understanding of the process of security framing. It reflects the idea that security meanings have a historical structure in which institutional and social processes are embedded. It therefore is essential in defining meaning of security and understanding how security practice modulates objects of government and introduces certain technologies for governing insecurities. Security rationality invests the speech act with its power to securitize
issues. It enables a move from language to “categories of intelligibility”, that cut across linguistic and non-linguistic practices as well as technologies such as visa or databases that together institute domains of insecurity. (Huysmans 2006: 147f., 2002: 45f.)

The three conceptual themes as well as the role of language in the process of security framing discussed above offer a solid ground for further development of the theoretical foundation of the present study – securitization of migration theory as developed by Huysmans.

3.4 Huysmans: securitizing migration

In the European Union the connection between migration and asylum issues and security concerns has been on the rise. (cf. Bigo 2002, Ceyhan/Tsoukala 2002, Huysmans 1995, 2000) The general unease in the EU that is caused by different issues such as natural disasters, crime, underperforming institutions or immigration and asylum is often on the verge to being translated into existential dangers threatening the European society. Huysmans warns that framing immigration and asylum as phenomena that cause unease can be easily turned into their representation as existential threats. (Huysmans 2006: 48) Such turn leads to the increased perception of immigrants and asylum seekers as individuals who threaten to destroy the old familiar Western European way of life and imply certain actions such as restrictive migration policies or even violent attacks on migrants and asylum seekers. How this shift from the general unease to existential threat takes place and what consequences in might have, will be discussed in this section. (Huysmans 2006: 48f.)

In the realist theory of International Relations security means survival of the states as a political unit in a situation of existential threat. (Huysmans 2006: 48) In this logic, the process of securitization of migration or asylum requires the securitizing agent to institute credible claim that immigrant, asylum seekers and refugee are factors that endanger the survival of the political unit. Huysmans underlines that the physical existence of the political unit is not the only danger that communities are concerned about. They rather are concerned with their autonomy as a political unity. In Buzan’s et al. terms it is the “independent identity” and “functional integrity” that is at stake:

In the case of security, the discussion is about the pursuit of freedom from threat. When this discussion is in the context of the international system, security is about the ability of states and societies to maintain their independent identity and their functional integrity. (Buzan 1991: 18f.)
For a better understanding of this idea, Huysmans (2006) delivers the example of the EU migration policy by pointing to the contrast in the current migration discourse on the EU-level: on the one hand there is a negative portrayal of illegal immigration and asylum seekers and on the other hand the need for skilled migration to support the economic growth is emphasized. The resulting migration policies are very different, being repressive in the first case and permissive in the latter. Despite the differences, both policies express the need to control the population movement in order to ensure the wellbeing of society. This is done by controlling admission of the desirable groups of migrants and keeping away the unwanted. Once the ability to control the population movements is challenged, e.g. through illegal migration, the functional integrity of the political unit is challenged, that is, its capacity to keep the unwanted out is at stake. (Huysmans 2006:48) Hitherto, the threat and the referent object in the security story of migration have been identified: the (unwanted) immigrants, asylum seekers and refugees are the threat to the “independent identity” and “functional integrity” of the states.

In order to secure the independent identity and functional integrity, the securitizing agent claims political space within which the identity and the desired governing practices can develop. At the same time, by securing the referent object in this story, the political unity of the “own” is carved out. A typical security practice consists in placing attention on the “own” community in an indirect way by locating it in an existentially unsafe environment. In this manner the debate is centered outside the “own” community and securitization remains unquestioned. In this logic, it is not the identity and integrity of the own community that is problematic, but, e.g. migration and refugee flows. This consideration is important insofar that it points to the important implication of securitization: it sustains an image of a completed and harmonious unit that is threatened only when external existential threat starts disrupting it. (Huysmans 2006: 48f.) By these means, the unity of the own community is created and further strengthened:

Framing existential dangers is not just a matter of identifying the most urgent threats to the identity of a political community and the everyday life that takes place in it. It is also a politically constitutive act that asserts and reproduces the unity of a political community. […] It is also a particular mode of carving out a place as one’s own and identifying its unity in a plural world. (Huysmans 2006: 49)

Thus, according to Huysmans (2006) securitization is not only framing
immigration and asylum as phenomena that pose existential threat to the independent identity and functional integrity of a political unit. It is also a practice, a political act in which the unity and autonomy, or as Huysmans puts it “the sovereignty of the community” (Huysmans 2006: 50), is asserted. This logic is at work in everyday politics, e.g. when the need to increase national unity in diverse political contexts is necessary. In this manner, the political unity can be evoked between different population groups, by pointing to the threat stemming from increasing immigration and asylum flows. (ibid.) It is thus obvious, that securitizing immigration, asylum and refugee flows leads to production and reproduction of a political community of insecurity.

3.4.1 Security modulation of migration

The next step will be to explore the logic behind security modulation of migration, asylum and refuge and how it modulates political domain. According to Huysmans there are three main characteristics to it: distribution of fear and trust, administering exclusion and inclusion, and institution of alienation and a predisposition towards violence. (Huysmans 2006: 51)

3.4.1.1 Fear and trust

Huysmans (2006) suggests that by distributing and administering fear and trust the security framing becomes constitutive of political interaction. (51f.) Main assumption here is that human relations are based on distinguishing between those one should fear and others one can trust. For the process of securitization, fear is “political currency” and “organizational principle”: as currency it enables the securitizing agents to buy political and professional legitimacy and as organizational principle it is part of the security infrastructure and procedures “that govern social and political relations by governing dangerous people.” (Huysmans 2006: 52)

Determining the role of fear in the context of securitization Huysmans sought to understand its logic. In International Relations the Hobbesian fear of death - the fear of being killed by other men - informs the security framing. (cf. Blits 1989) Huysmans goes beyond this view by suggesting that fear lies rather in the uncertainty about who does intend to kill and who does not. This kind of fear is referred to as epistemological fear and the way of dealing with it is identification of who is to be feared. Knowing the
intentions of human beings allows for an objectified fear that follows from certainty of knowing if a particular community is dangerous. Thus, by knowing how to relate to whom an order is being provided that is based “on instituting certainty about who should be feared and by implication who can be trusted” (Huysmans 2006: 52) This notion is relevant as it introduces politics of insecurity not only as identifier of threats and of methods to govern them, but also as a struggle between competing understandings of phenomena. The interpretation of phenomena as threats impacts the security knowledge that will ultimately inform policy measures. Therefore, the politics of insecurity is also “a contest of the legitimacy of using a particular kind of security knowledge in migration policy.” (Huysmans 2006: 53) Whether refugees are interpreted as potential economic source for the country or as threat to social cohesion are different interpretations that will result in different policy decisions.

3.4.1.2 Administering inclusion and exclusion

As argued earlier in this chapter, claiming a threat outside the own community institutes its political unity. The imperative to counter this threat, to control it and secure the own community is concomitant in this scenario. In order to be able to sustain own security, the threatening forces must be controlled, fought and, if necessary, eliminated. The question that arises here is how can the existential fear be governed? Huysmans distinguishes between two approaches: strategies which aim at reducing the vulnerability of the political unit and strategies that are aimed at distancing from and/or eliminating threats. (Huysmans 2006: 55) The first is ensured by various policies that support trust within the community, e.g. by improving health care provisions, managing economic crisis, education of moral values etc. However, Huysmans claims that it is rather the second strategy that is applied by European governments. (ibid.)

The second strategy can take different forms: starting with increased border control, readmission agreements with third countries, technologies for control of migrants (visa, identity cards) and going as far as locking up asylum seekers in detention centers. Administering distance towards immigrants by such means leads inevitably to the dynamic of inclusion and exclusion. This dynamic is additionally perpetuated by administrative practices and day to day social relations. (Huysmans 2006: 56) Another aspect that contributes to the production of inclusion-exclusion dynamics is the feeling of embarrassment. Asylum applicants are ashamed to make use
of certain services they are entitled to, as they will be immediately identified as “the other”. (cf. O’Kane 2001) The explicit identification methods therefore are perpetuating the exclusion of immigrants and refugees and contribute to further distancing between them and the established community.

Additional characteristic of exclusion is that it does not recognize the differences among the immigrants, asylum seekers or refugees and their individual backgrounds. They are presented as a “collective force” that poses a threat to the established community. Therefore, it can be argued that securitizing migrants is not only contributing to the political unity of the established community but is also unifying the individual immigrants, asylum seekers and refugees into a collective dangerous force. (Huysmans 2006: 58)

The alternative to the distancing strategy is the elimination strategy. Integration of foreigners is viewed as the harmless form of this strategy. It strives to reduce the differences between foreigners and natives in order to make their qualities and ways of life less dangerous by, e.g. distributing moral, economic or cultural characteristics. The more radical strategy of the eliminating the danger of the “others” is killing them. Then the killing is justified as a strategy to ensure existence of the community in danger, it is a “life-saving and/or life optimizing” strategy. (Huysmans 2006: 57) This is another characteristic of securitization that needs to be stressed, it has the capacity to frame systematic killing as a survival strategy.

So far, Huysmans’ arguments about the instituting exclusion of immigrants, asylum seekers and refugees through framing migration as existential threat were introduced. He deepens this argument by stressing that not only the public discourse, but also everyday stigmatizing practices and policies are essential for sustaining the inclusion-exclusion dynamic. What are the risks of continuous intensification of exclusion through security framing and how it forms predisposition towards violence will be discussed in the following section.

3.4.1.3 Security alienation and predispositions towards violence

As it is evident from the section before, security practice is vulnerable to the intensifying distance between the host community and immigrants, asylum seekers and refugees. Intensification of border controls and concomitant criminalization of those who cross it illegally, the usage of metaphors of "immigrants flood" or "invasion"
produces distrust between the communities. Additionally, displacing regulations that ground on enhancing communication or dialogue that might have a positive impact on relations among communities jeopardizes a constructive dialogue. Furthermore, the administrative practices such as locking up asylum seekers in detention centers inhibit negotiating and communication. In such circumstances a constructive dialogue and constructive engagement between these communities becomes difficult. Former positive experiences with migrants that a local community might have had are replaced by mistrust and suspicion due to securitizing rhetoric and practice. (Huysmans 2006: 57ff.)

Another issue that Huysmans brings forward for consideration is that security framing often invests social and political relations with a predisposition towards violence (2006: 47). He argues that this aspect emerges due to the inherent for the security framing idea, that a phenomenon is dangerous because of its capacity of destruction. (Huysmans 2006: 60) Therefore, the images of violence have the capacity to co-shape insecurities. For example, the asylum seekers from the Chechen Republic/Russian Federation in Austria are often framed by images such as "ticking bomb" (cf. Höller 2013)

In addition, security framing is prone to support the organic understanding of social relations that consists in the notion of a dying or decaying body. The optimization of life therefore is central to existential renderings of insecurity and can be used as argument to justify radicalization to achieve freedom from threat:

Combine this [understanding of social relations] with the instrumental structure of the security framework – i.e. the imperative to counter dangers – and one can get a quite explosive cocktail in which the radical objective of survival of a community as a political unit and of optimal life within this community justifies a radicalization of the means to secure it. (Huysmans 2006: 59)

This argument is based on Hanna Arendt’s reflection on violence where she warns against organic metaphors which can "only promote violence in the end". (Arendt cited Huysmans 2006: 59f.)

Securitizing framing of an issue poses also an obligation on the securitizing agents to provide reassurances - the securitizing agents need to reassure the people, who they convinced of dangers stemming from immigration, that those in charge are in control and able to undertake action to counter the existential situation. The "tricky" side of this spectacle is that constant enforcement of dangers might lead to the questioning of the governments’ capacity to manage security problems. However, once
an issue is brought up to the dimension of emergency and exceptionality, "artication of an existentially dangerous situation may itself produce the reassurance in the form of unquestionable trust". (Huysmans 2006: 60)

This section introduced Huysmans’ conceptual basis for the study of securitization of migration and asylum as well as the ways in which security framing shapes political domains. The essence of securitization lies in the "circular logic of defining and modulating of hostile factors for the purpose of countering them politically and administratively" (Huysmans 2006: 61). In this existential logic fear is the political currency, which buys political and professional legitimacy, and the organizing factor in governing of social and political relations. It was also argued that by placing the source of fear outside the own community, the idea of its political unity is created. Moreover, presenting migrants and asylum seekers as one dangerous whole, also unifies and produces a group that is referred to as threat. By creating the dangerous other, security framing reinforces the processes of inclusion and exclusion; it intensifies alienation and inscribes the predisposition to violence in the domain of political judgment.

This view of securitization is presented by Huysmans as one of possible conceptualizations of security framing. It allows analyzing how general unease can be turned into an existential threat.

[...] the concept [...] draws attention to how the administration and politicization of migration can integrate the fragmented situations of unease into a more general existential domain in which independent identity and functional integrity of a political entity is a defining stake. (Huysmans 2006: 62)

After introducing the security story of migration and asylum, Huysmans’ findings regarding securitization of migration in the European Union will be presented. His findings will serve in the analysis of the securitization of asylum in Austria that will take place at a later stage.

3.5 Securitization of migration in the European Union

Security framing impinges on and is embedded within struggles between professional agencies – such as the police and customs – and political agents – such as social movements and political parties – both over cultural, racial and socio-economic criteria for the distribution of rights and duties and over acceptable instruments of control through which people are integrated within a community. (Huysmans 2006: 63)

With this quote Huysmans’ approach to understanding of the securitization process is well summarized. Considering this theoretical notion, Huysmans further investigates
how immigration, asylum and refuge are constructed to a security problem in the EU and how the European integration process is implicated in rendering immigration, asylum and refuge into a security issue in Western Europe. Huysmans (2000; 2006) has identified three dominant domains of insecurity which emerged in the wake of securitization of migration in European Union and its member states (Huysmans 2000: 758). When presenting his conclusions Huysmans (2000: 752) uses the term “migration” as a general category including immigrants, refugees and asylum seekers. The further presented domains of insecurity that the author has identified apply therefore to all of the mentioned groups of migrants. Present research endeavors to apply these categories to analysis of the asylum related issues in Austrian case. (Huysmans 2000: 753) It intends to investigate whether securitization of asylum in the case of Austria takes place along these three themes, to which extent they apply and whether there are other domains where security framing of asylum seekers takes place.

3.5.1 **Internal security**

Huysmans (2006) argues that internal security is one of the main domains in which securitization is rooted. The central argument is that the abolition of internal border controls by means of introduction of the Schengen area in the EU space and resulting facilitation of transnational flows of goods, capital, services and people challenges public order and rule of law in the EU. Public order is viewed as endangered because it is expected that with the abolition of borders illegal and criminal activities of terrorists and international criminal organizations will be facilitated and the number asylum seekers and immigrants will rise. Since such link has been constructed, it remains almost unquestioned in the public and political debate. (Huysmans 2006: 69)

With the removal of the internal borders, the EU has put efforts to strengthen external controls with the ultimate goal "to control who and what can enter legitimately the space of free movement". (ibid.) But not only external borders became increasingly stronger controlled, but also personal identity controls intensified in the aftermath of abolition of internal border controls. Bigo (1996) and Ceyhan/Tsoukala (2002) suggest that the internal borders were replaced by random identity controls. Moreover, Huysmans (2006) suggests that granting work permits or residence permits and providing access to welfare provision or social assistance are more important instruments to control free movement of people. These "alternative" methods to control
free movement signal that it becomes increasingly difficult to control the high number of persons and goods passing borders. (Huysmans 2006: 70) Despite this development, Huysmans emphasizes that border controls were responsible for the spillover of the socio-economic project of the internal market into an internal security project. This spillover was formalized by a number of official instruments regulating migration and free movement, e.g. Third Pillar on Justice and Home Affairs in the Treaty of European Union (1992), Treaty of Amsterdam (1997). (ibid.)

The key for security framing of migration as internal security threat consists in the identification of the side effects of the creation of the internal market (facilitation of illegal and criminal activities by terrorist, criminal organizations and migrants). The institutionalization of police and customs cooperation, discourses raising anxiety about these particular side effects were able to produce a security continuum in which border control, terrorism, international crime and migration were connected. Huysmans describes this security continuum as "an institutionalized mode of policy-making that allows the transfer of the security connotations of terrorism, drugs traffic and money laundering" to migrants (Huysmans 2006: 71). It emerged from professional and political cooperation in the area of internal security in Europe and was informed with knowledge produced and articulated by security professionals. (ibid.)

To conclude, the internal security theme has developed as a basis for securitization of migration in the wake of introduction of internal market in the EU and the gradual abolition of internal borders. The main assumed threat stemming from this development is the free movement of criminals, terrorist and migrants, which endangers the internal security in the EU.

3.5.2 Cultural Security

Another framing deployed to securitize immigrants and asylum seekers, refugees is speaking of them as the challenge to the national cultural homogeneity (Huysmans 2000: 762). Migration figures as the cultural challenge to social and political integration of a political unit. Even though it has been evident that European countries have become countries of immigration, in the popular discourse the mix of cultures as a result of migration is politicized based on the assumption that “multicultural developments challenge the desire for coinciding cultural and political frontiers” (Huysmans 2006:73) Protection and transformation of cultural identity is one of the key issues played out in
the political spectacle.

National movements and extreme right-wing parties gained prominent place in the political field by structuring the political debates about migration in cultural terms relying on the securitizing rhetoric:

Forms of new and radical conservatism, which include the clash of civilization discourses, articulate a dream of cultural, spiritual and/or racial unity which is threatened by factors such as a cultural decadence and a dawning cultural war. (Huysmans 2006: 73)

However, not only the national movements and right-wing parties employ the security rhetoric in regard to immigration and asylum. Also representatives of a more liberal immigration policy in the EU share the assumption that migration poses a challenge to the functioning of traditional instruments of social and political integration such as nationalism. (ibid.)

Huysmans (2006) identified three central themes that are relevant to the development of and struggle against the representation of migrants as cultural challenge in the wake of European integration process:

- cultural significance of border controls,
- integration and assimilation of migrants,
- relationship between European integration and the development of multicultural societies.

The border controls discussed in the previous section have also a cultural dimension. Huysmans argues that the EU border is for some nationalities more “real” than for others. To understand this better he suggests looking at the differentiation of admission requirements: while nationals from non-OECD states are subjects of strict visa requirements, for OECD nationals the EU borders are easier to overcome. It is argued that the cultural closeness among the western European nations is an important factor for the more liberal admission policy for OECD nationals, while immigrants and asylum seekers from the “periphery of the world economy” (2006: 74) are not desired within western European community. (2006: 73f.) The cultural significance of the border manifests itself therefore in keeping those who belong to the Western European value system and culture inside, while keeping out those who represent culturally different groups of people.

In the cultural security domain Huysmans also introduces racism as influential factor that plays a role in modeling exclusion and inclusion processes. Racism is connected to the EU migration policy in an indirect way: the constant emphasizing of
restrictions and controls of immigrants and asylum seekers leads to a negative image of these groups of people. (Huysmans 2006: 75)

Another concern of the EU that falls into the cultural dimension is integration of immigrants and asylum seekers. Huysmans suggests that the attempts to create a multicultural society undertaking integration efforts reiterate the strong desire of the European community to be a culturally homogenous society. The implication of such desire is that migrants and asylum seekers are viewed as obstacles on way to the homogenous society. (ibid.)

Further, the relationship of European integration and the development of multicultural societies in Europe play an important role in the cultural dimension. Pro-migration movements and anti-racist groups emerge and organize themselves EU-wide to support the rights of immigrants and asylum-seekers, to spread the idea of a multicultural society and to counter racism and xenophobic developments. (Huysmans 2006: 75f.)

Referring to Weaver’s (1996) argument that the security identity of European integration process is based on the fear of the return to the power system that ruled 19th century Europe and culminated in the First and Second World War, Huysmans argues that the EU debates about multiculturalism are routed in the fear of return to the “old Europe” articulating unrest about revival of extreme nationalism, racism or xenophobia. In this context, a common asylum and migration policy within the EU is often presented as an instrument to combating racism, xenophobia and extreme nationalistic practices. (Huysmans 2006:76)

One can see therefore that the EU migration policy has developed in an ambivalent way. On the one hand the nationalist, racist and xenophobic are a part of general reaction and rhetoric about migrants. The implication of this is that migrants are presented as not belonging members of society and obstacles to cultural homogeneity. It also undermines the initiative for culturally inclusive Europe, which would facilitate the access for migrants to their political, economic and cultural rights. On the other hand European integration is a multicultural project itself.

Concerning the multicultural project in the present European context, Huysmans (2006) warns that it risks reducing migrants mainly to their cultural identity. Cultural reification of immigrants and asylum seekers can then become problematic when political debate about migration is structured in cultural terms (as it is a spread practice among nationalist movements and extreme-right wing parties). Reifying dangerous and
different cultural others is a widespread strategy of these political players. Moreover, the rhetoric of these parties has not remained without influence on the actual policy agendas. This is due to the fact that mainstream political parties as well employ the issues of cultural security and migration in their struggle for political support of the voters. (Huysmans 2006: 77f.)

3.5.3 Societal security

Social and economic rights are another significant component in the governance of politics of belonging in the welfare states. Immigrants and asylum seekers play a role in the struggle for welfare rights and are increasingly seen as having no legitimate right to social assistance and welfare provisions. (Huysmans 2006: 77) Particularly in the moments of economic scarcity immigrants are declared to rivals to the nationals in the labor market and competitors in the distribution of social goods. The rendition of welfare chauvinism is central to the discussion of insecurity and migration as it actively renders the exclusion of migrants. It is mirrored in the social policy for example by excluding third-country nationals from social entitlements or favoring nationals of the EU member states in the labor market.

Welfare chauvinism is a strategy of introducing cultural identity criteria in an area in which belonging is determined on the basis of social policy criteria, such as health, age, disability and employment. It is not surprising, therefore, to find that support for curtailing social rights of immigrants often implies support for the idea that migration is a threat to cultural homogeneity. (Huysmans 2006:78)

Huysmans identifies two forms of welfare chauvinism - a radical and a moderate. In the first case the migrants are portrayed as persons “who try illegitimately to gain benefits from the welfare system of a community to which they do not belong.” They are seen as taking advantage of the welfare systems and constitute a burden to the state. Such rendering of migrants turns them into suspects of committing a welfare fraud. (Huysmans 2006: 79, Faist 1994: 61)

In the moderate argumentation logic, it is argued that at times of economic recessions, the preference in distributing social benefits and giving employment opportunities should be given to the nationals, while migration should be subject to efficient control. In this argumentation logic, the immigrants’ and asylum seekers’ social rights should be limited not because they are economic free-riders, but because own community should be given preference in the distribution of benefits and welfare:
“[…], shrinking resources create pressure for a redistribution of employment opportunities and social rights favoring the nationals of EU member states.” (Huysmans 2006: 79) The use of metaphors “flood” and “invasion” to refer to immigrants and asylum seekers additionally contributes to disqualification of migration so that the economic and social uncertainty “are translated into opposition to and fear of immigrants and asylum seekers” (Huysmans 2006: 79).

Moreover, Huysmans (2006) claims that securitization of migration is also part of the struggle of political legitimacy in and of the political order in Europe. Migrants are constructed as scapegoats to address the declining political legitimacy, which routes in the challenges to the welfare state: “[…] welfare chauvinism thus facilitates the connection between the socio-economic questioning of migration as a financial and economic burden to challenges to the political identity of welfare states and their governments.” (Huysmans 2006: 80)
4 Seeking protection in Austria: historical overview

The refugee protests in Vienna emerged in an already politicized context of asylum related issues. The development of the Austrian asylum system as well as the rendition of asylum seekers and refugees in public and political discourse has changed over decades from a rather liberal to a restrictive one. To capture this development and to provide the context, in which the debates about refugee protests in Vienna took place, a short overview about the development of Austrian asylum system will be given in the following. This introduction does not aim to provide a full account of the complex development in Austrian legislation concerning asylum. The goal is rather to provide an overview about the most relevant developments in the Austrian asylum system and about the public perception of asylum, in order to ensure easier understanding of the discussions that will follow in the upcoming chapters of this study.

By the end of the World War II (WWII), over a million foreign nationals were staying on Austrian territory. The numbers reduced rapidly by the end of 1945 and amounted to 500,000 to 600,000 persons - forced laborers and concentration camps captives, displaced persons, refugees etc. In the years following the WWII a considerable influx of refugees from Eastern Europe to Austria continued to take place. In order to address the hardship of the refugees and to assist Austria in handling the influx of protection seeking persons, United Nations Refugee Agency (UNHCR) has opened an office in Vienna in the very same year it was founded. However, only a minor part of these refugees stayed in Austria permanently - the majority was heading to other countries and used Austria rather as “stopover” or “waiting room” (Schumacher/Peyrl/Neugschwendtner 2012: 233) before their departure overseas.

Austria maintained this role until the end of the Cold War. (ibid.) After the Hungarian Uprising of 1956, 200,000 Hungarian nationals fled to Western Europe through Austria as well as the 160,000 Czechoslovaks, who fled after the Prague Spring in 1968. Only 10 percent of these refugees settled in Austria; the majority emigrated to other countries. Those who stayed in Austria were recognized as refugees. (ibid.)

During the Cold War the “neutral Austria” maintained a clear position between the power blocks and enabled Austria, without an “open confrontation” (ibid.) with the Soviet Union and based on international law, to recognize refugees as politically persecuted persons. Needless to say, that the recognition as a politically persecuted person implied his/her compliance with the Western values system as well a clear
rejection of communism. At that time Austrian asylum policy was presented as liberal one and Austria as state, where refugees were guaranteed the solidarity of the Austrian population. (ibid.) Schumacher/Peyrl/Neugschwendtner (2012) argue that such liberal position and self-image of Austria was conditioned by the fact that Austria played the role of a transit country, rather than host country for refugees.

However, in 1980s the situation changed and an increasing number of refugees was opting for Austria as the country of destination, which changed Austria’s role of a transit to a receiving country. Thousands of refugees from Iran and Turkey fled to Austria and were accepted primarily as guest workers or students; only a few of them applied for asylum. Also 35,000 Polish refugees settled in Austria, who sought refuge after the Solidarity-movement in Poland was defeated and the martial law was declared. (Schumacher/Peyrl/Neugschwendtner 2012: 234)

With the rising numbers of refugees actually settling in Austria, the public discourse on refugees begun to undergo changes – the credibility of the refugees from Eastern Europe as politically persecuted persons started being questioned. Refugees were more and more often accused of having economic reasons for emigration from their countries. It was then, that term “Wirtschaftsflüchtling” (“economic refugee”) was molded and found its way in the public rhetoric about refugees. (ibid.)

In the following years, persons fleeing from the communist states were no longer recognized as refugees “automatically” (Schumacher/Peyrl/Neugschwendtner 2012:235), so that by the end of 1980s the number of recognized refugees was sinking. Those refugees who were not granted asylum travelled to other countries, or tried to obtain a work permit in Austria, which could guarantee the right to stay in Austria. (ibid.) After 1989 further asylum related restrictions followed: “Foreigners were no longer welcome after 1989: visa requirements were introduced, e.g. for Bulgarians, the Turkish, and Romanians, and since 1990 the Austrian border had been controlled by the Austrian military forces in order to prevent illegal immigration.” (Sedlack 2000: 107)

Schumacher/Peyrl/Neugschwendtner (2012), Sedlak (2000), Krzyżanowski/Wodak (2008) suggest that the end of the communism in Eastern Europe and the “dawn of the era of freedom in Eastern and Central Europe” (Krzyżanowski/Wodak 2008: 57) led to the introduction of new strict immigration laws in Austria. This development was caused by the increased immigration from the Central and Eastern Europe as well as increasing numbers of asylum applications. (cf. Jandl/Kraler 2003).
In the light of these developments, the political parties “discovered” immigration as a topic to use in their political programs. This was reflected, e.g. in the media campaigns spreading hostile rhetoric in regard to asylum seekers/refugees. (Schumacher/Peyrl/Neugschwendtner 2010: 234) Images of a “storm of several millions of refugees”, increasing informal labor (“black labor”) and criminality, were penetrating the media. The refugees started being rendered not only as “economic refugees”, but also as a threat to internal security. The term “Kriminaltourist” (“crime tourist”) was created by opponents of liberal asylum system and is since then part of the vocabulary used in the public debate in order to criminalize and securitize refugees and asylum seekers. (ibid.)

In response to the increasing numbers of asylum seekers from Eastern Europe, Austrian government introduced a series of restrictive reforms in order to counteract asylum fraud and to accelerate asylum procedures. The restrictive asylum act of 1991, which came into force in June 1992, resulted in the decreasing acceptance rate of asylum seekers and dropping numbers of new asylum applications. (Schumacher/Peyrl/Neugschwendtner 2010: 234f., Sedlak 2000: 107) This development did not mean that there were fewer asylum seekers in Austria. Rather, fewer refugees opted to apply for asylum due to the low chances for a successful procedure. (cf. Jandl/Kraler 2003)

In contrast to the restrictive asylum policy concerning individual asylum seekers, Austria remained “moderately” open to receiving asylum seekers from the Balkans after the outburst of the armed conflict in this region:

Austria opened the door to thousands of war refugees from the former Yugoslavia during the 1990s. Like other European States, Austria did so by instituting a special legal basis for the admission and residence of conflict refugees outside the normal asylum procedures called “temporary protected status” (TPS). (Jandl/Kraler 2003: 7)

As a result, majority (70,000) of the biggest refugee movement from Bosnia-Herzegovina (95,000 war refugees) that arrived in Austria between 1992 and 1995 has been provided with long-term residence titles. (ibid.)

In 1998, after the outbreak of the conflict in Kosovo, which resulted in a mass displacement of Kosovars, European states tried to avoid refugee influx from this region and argued for measures to provide protection to Kosovars within the region. However, due to the unstable political situation in Macedonia the decision has been made to evacuate the refugees from camps that were located on Macedonian territory. In this case, Austria demonstrated the will to accept 5,000 refugees from Macedonia, who were
granted the TPS. Moreover, 6,000 Kosovars were granted other residence titles, the majority obtained them through the standard asylum procedure. (Jandl/Kraler 2003:7) Krzyżanowski/Wodak prescribe Austria’s willingness to accept Yugoslav refugee to its desire to fulfill its new role as the new EU-member state by acting according to the expectations of other EU member states and accepting the influx of refugees. (2008: 57)

Despite the alternative regulations for the refugees from the Balkans, Austrian Asylum Law kept its restrictive characteristics and was continuously criticized by NGOs and the civil society. In January 1998, the redrafted Asylum Law came into force and brought some positive changes such as creation of independent court of appeal for asylum seekers. (Schumacher/Peyrl/Neugschwendtner 2012: 235)

With the formation of a new governing coalition of the Austrian People’s Party and the Freedom Party in 2000, further change in the approach to address migration related issues took place. In 2002, the Parliament adopted major amendments to the Aliens Act and the Asylum Law as well as new directive to control asylum seekers’ access to the so-called “Bundesbetreuung” (“federal care”). It massively restricted asylum seekers’ access to the “feredal care”, which, as a consequence, led to a high numbers of asylum seekers being released from the federal care facilities and becoming homeless. This event triggered a heated debate about the reception system for asylum seekers in Austria. (cf. Jandl/Kraler 2003)

The situation improved in May 2004, after the so-called “Grundversorgungsvereinbarung” (“basic provision agreement”) came into force. It is an agreement between the federal government and the federal states about the coordination of the measures necessary for the temporary “Grundversorgung” (“basic provision”) of “hilfs- und schutzbüderfügte Fremde” (“foreigners in need of help or protection”) - asylum seekers, recognized refugees, displaced persons, and other persons who cannot be deported due to legal factual reasons. (RIS 2014) With this agreement Austria fulfills its duty to implement the EU directive (RL 2003/9/EG), which, aside of some limitations, regulates provisions to asylum seekers, who are in asylum procedure. (ibid.)

Three years after the 2002 reform, another revision of aliens’ legislation took place and resulted in the new “Fremdenpaket” 2005 (“Aliens Legislation Package 2005”). The asylum legislation was also amended and resulted in the new “Asylgetz 2005” (“Asylum Act 2005”). It brought further restrictions of asylum seekers’ rights, such as limitations of freedom of movement, which as a consequence impedes asylum
seekers from seeking support of NGOs or consult legal advisers concerning their asylum application, or deportations before the effective completion of asylum procedure. Schumacher/Peyrl/Neugschwendtner (2012: 237) describe the asylum procedures that were conducted in line with the Asylum Act 2005 as follows: „Das Asylverfahren unterschreitet rechtsstaatliche Standards in einem Ausmaß, dass nicht mehr von einem fairen Verfahren gesprochen werden kann.“

Further changes in the asylum procedure have come into force in January 2014. The kernel of these changes constitutes the establishment of the “Bundesamt für Fremdenwesen und Asyl” (“Federal Ministry for Foreigners and Asylum”) that i.a. is expected to process the asylum procedures more efficiently. (BM.I 2014) However, since these changes fall outside of the time span investigated in the present study, they will not be discussed here in further detail.4

From the short overview about the development of Austrian asylum system provided above, it is evident that in the recent decades a significant change in the perception of asylum seekers and refugees as well as in the policies regulating asylum took place. Being confronted with significant refugee influx during and after the WWII Austria established its role as a refugee friendly state, which continued to be the case during the Cold War period. However, such positioning changed once the refugees started settling in Austria instead of moving to other states, as it was the case before. Towards the end of the Cold War period, refugees coming from the Eastern Europe started being suspected of being rather economic refugees than “genuine” refugees fleeing persecution by their states. Increasingly hostile rhetoric of some political parties in regard to asylum seekers/refugees contributed to the creation of the images of “economic refugees” or “criminal tourists”. To address the increasing influx of refugees to Austria, a series of laws was passed, which gradually were becoming more restrictive and limiting asylum seekers’ rights; this trend continues to take place to date.

---

4 For more information on the changes of the asylum procedures that came into force on 1 January 2014 consult: http://www.bmi.gv.at/cms/BMI_Asylwesen/informationen/start.aspx, viewed 10.03.2014.
5 Refugee Protest Camp Vienna: a chronology of the protest movement

The present study aims at investigating how the public rhetoric about asylum seekers has developed during the refugee protests in Vienna and how asylum seekers have been securitized in the course of the protests. The present chapter aims at introducing the development of the Refugee Protest Camp Vienna, that is, the event that has triggered heated debates in the public and political discourse about refugees and asylum seekers in Austria. What began as a protest march, turned into a months-lasting protest movement in the heart of the city of Vienna. Until today, the protest movement is carrying out its activity with the support of NGOs and civil society, even though the majority of the refugee activists have already been deported. Those who are still in Austria were forced to find individual accommodations and currently arrange meetings at facilities provided by sympathizing NGOs or other organizations. (Brickner 2013)

Refugee Protest Camp Vienna has not been the first protest action of asylum seekers in Austria: previously, there were other individual as well as collective “acts of resistance”. (Alvarado-Dupuy 2013: 17) The most prominent was the protest carried out by Somali refugees in October 2012, who built up a protest camp in front of the Austrian Parliament and protested against the deficiencies of Austrian asylum system. (cf. Ataç 2013) In 2013, the refugee protests took place not only in Austria, but also in other EU member states. These refugee movements across the EU member states established networks to unite in the struggle for their “most elementary human rights, such as freedom and equality”. (The Independent Action Committee of Protesting Refugees: 2013). The organization of the Refugee Struggle Congress in Munich, Germany in March 2013 is an example of such collective efforts of the refugees to fight for their rights. (ibid.)

The Refugee Protest Camp in Vienna triggered a heated debate about the Austrian Asylum Law and the wellbeing of asylum seekers in Austria as well as about the right of asylum seekers to demand their rights. In the following a short account of the key developments starting November 2012 until September 2013 (the date of data extraction) will be presented for a better understanding of the discussions in the following chapters. However, this chapter does not claim to deliver a full and detailed account of the protests, as its main interest lies within analyzing the public rhetoric that
enflamed in response to the protests as well as the actions of the “security experts”, and not the protests per se.\(^5\)

5.1 “We demand our rights!”\(^6\)

The refugee protests in Austria began on 10 November 2012 as a demonstration of approx. 100 asylum seekers, who at that time were housed in the asylum seekers’ care facility (“Betreuungseinrichtung”) in Traiskirchen, a city that lies 35 km away from Vienna. Together with approx. 150 protest supporters, the refugee protesters called attention to the shortcomings of the Asylum Law in Austria. (Der Standard 2012b)

On 24 November 2012, a march took place under the slogan “Kein Mensch ist illegal” (“No one is illegal”). This time approx. 150 refugee protesters marched 35 km from Traiskirchen to Vienna. This protest was directed against the critical conditions in the “Erstaufnahmestelle”\(^7\) (“First Reception Center”) in Traiskirchen, and precarious situation of asylum seekers in Austria. (Der Standard 2012a) After the march had reached Vienna, approx. 70 refugee protesters together with their supporters set up a camp in front of the Votive Church in the Sigmund Freud Park in the center of Vienna. With this action the protesters aimed at pointing out the precarious living conditions in the state provided care facilities for asylum seekers and demanded their improvement. Additionally, the protesters requested access to health care services, qualified interpreters, normalized school attendance for refugee children, easier access to the labor market, free tickets for public transportation, better food and clothing as well as an increase of the monthly allowance (at that time 40 Euros). (Alvarado-Dupuy 2013:17f.)

In the following the official catalogue of demands is presented:

*The following are the concretized demands, 18.12.2012:*

1. Grundversorgung (basic support) for all asylum seekers, as long as they reside in Austria, irrespective of their legal status;
2. Free choice of their location of residence in Austria, and access to public housing for all asylum seekers residing in Austria – no transfers against the wishes of the people concerned;
3. Access to employment, educational institutions and social security for all migrants residing in Austria;
4. Stop all deportations to Hungary – stop all deportations associated with the Dublin Regulation 2;

\(^5\) For a detailed analysis of the refugee protests in Vienna consult Alvarado-Dupuy (2013) and Ilker Ataç (2013)

\(^6\) Slogan used by the refugee protesters during the protest movement. (refugee camp vienna: 2012a)

\(^7\) “Erstaufnahmestelle” (“First Reception Center”) is the facility, where an asylum seeker must file his/her application for asylum. The application must be filed in person, therefore all asylum seekers willing to apply, must do it at the first reception center. (Schumacher/Peyrl/Neugschwendner 2010: 242)
5. Establishment of an independent authority for substantive review and appeal of all negative replies to asylum applications;
6. Recognition of socio-economic motives in addition to the previously recognized escape reasons

If you don’t want to meet our demands, then please delete our fingerprints from your data bases and let us move on. We have are entitled to our future. (refugee camp vienna 2012b)

In the following weeks further demonstrations and press conferences took place, where the refugee activists called attention to their demands. On 18 December 2012 a group of refugee activists set up an additional camp inside the Votive Church. Due to the intervention of archdiocese Vienna and Caritas Vienna, in which they ensured that the camp inside the church would not be cleared by the police and presented the role of the church as a “Schutzraum” (“space of protection”), the camp was not cleared by the police. (Der Standard 2013)

On 21 December 2012, the archdiocese organized a round table to discuss the Refugee Protest Camp among the Minister of Interior, Johanna Mikl-Leitner, State Secretary, Josef Ostermayer, a church representative, the two charity organizations Caritas and Diakonie, UNHCR, Amnesty International and the refugee activists. The outcome of this discussion was the offer to provide refugee activists with “warm accommodation” (as inside the Votive Church the temperature was very low in December) and to review the possibility of continuation of “Grundversorgung” (“basic provision”) delivery to the refugee protesters, which they were no longer entitled to due to their absence in their care facility in Traiskirchen. (ibid.) The refugee activists were not satisfied with such outcome of negotiations and viewed it solely as a restoration of the status quo. (Alvarado-Dupuy 2013: 20) As a consequence of missing response to their demands, refugee activists went on a hunger strike from 22 December 2012 to 23 January 2013, which they again continued from 1 to 18 February. (Der Standard 2013)

On 28 December 2012 the Refugee Camp in the Sigmund Freud Park was dissolved at 4 a.m. in a massive police operation with participation of 200 policemen. (ibid.) During the clearance of the camp the major part of the equipment as well as furniture pieces and other items brought by the protesters and their supporters were destroyed. Such proceeding was justified with the reference to the so-called “Wiener Kampierverordnung 1985” (“Camping Act 1985”), which according to the law enforcement was violated by the protesters. The camp clearance undertaken by the police caused a wave of critical reactions from various actors (Amnesty International, the Green Party, Caritas et.al.); the legitimacy and commensurability of the operation
was doubted, so that its evaluation was demanded. (Alvarado-Dupuy 2013: 20) The evaluation of the operation was conducted by the Ministry of Interior and presented the protest camp clearance in the Sigmund Freud Park as “legitimate”. (Der Standard 2013: 2013)

On the same day the archdiocese, in consultation with Caritas, hired a private security company to conduct identity checks of the persons who enter or exit the church. This step was explained as follows: “Einerseits sollen die Asylwerber, die sich seit 18. Dezember in der Kirche aufhalten, vor Störaktionen geschützt werden und andererseits soll Gläubigen weiterhin der Besuch des Gottesdienstes ermöglicht werden.” (Die Presse 2012) The refugee activists in the Votive Church received special identity cards that they were obliged to use in order to leave or enter the church. Later, further control measure was introduced - only five supporters of refugee activists could enter the church at the same time. This regulation was a further obstacle to the organization of meetings and to communication between the refugee activists and their supporters. (Alvarado-Dupuy 2013: 21)

Soon after the beginning of the protests, some of the activists, who played a key role in the protest and were spokesmen of the protest movement, were put in the “Schubhaft” (“Detention pending deportation”) and thereafter were deported. The police explained that such steps were in line with the usual proceeding, when a negative decision in an asylum procedure was made, which was also the case of the refugee activists concerned. (Der Standard 2013b)

On 3 March 2013, upon the confirmation of the “Gastrecht” (“guest right”) for the refugee activists by the Cardinal Schönborn, the 63 refugee activists moved from the Votive Church to the Viennese Servite Monastery. They expressed their will to cooperate with authorities and thanked Caritas for its support. (Die Presse 2013a) The change of protest location provided refugee activists with a better accommodation; however their presence in the media and in the public reduced. (Die Presse 2013b)

By 27 March 2013 27 refugee activists in the Servite Monastery received negative decisions in their asylum procedures. This implied a possible “wave” of deportations of the refugee activists concerned. To reduce fears of the refugee activists, Caritas and other actors were discussing other possible options, e.g. the possibility of the so-called “Bleiberecht” (“right of residence”), which in practice would not be a solution as refugee activists did not fulfill the requirements for such option. (Die Presse 2013c) This development caused more fear and anxiety among the refugee activists, so
that they announced further protest actions. They claimed that the promises of the authorities to review asylum applications of the refugee activists on the individual basis did not take place and instead activists were “put under pressure” (Die Presse 2013j) and granted negative decision on their asylum applications. By this time they reduced their demands to one – to stop deportations to Pakistan. (ibid.)

In May 2013, the refugee activists were informed that the Servite Monastery has to be cleared due to the upcoming renovations in July. The refugee protesters expressed their will to move only if they would be able to move to a different accommodation in a group. They feared that once placed in different locations, the protest movement would be weakened and the deportations would take place. However this demand was, according to the authorities, impossible to fulfill as no appropriate building could be found. (Die Presse 2013d) By the end of June 2013 some of the refugee activists were moved to other accommodations individually. However, before the rest of the refugee activists had to leave the Servite Monastery, its renovation was postponed until the end of October 2013, securing a stay for the refugee activists until then. (Die Presse 2013e)

On 26 July, the 20 refugee activists who received negative decisions on their asylum applications were required to report to the police on the daily basis. This step was explained as an alternative to the detention pending deportation. Caritas as well as supporters of the refugee activists criticized this step as being excessive and accused the police to assume that the concerned refugee activists would go into hiding. The police spokesperson, Roman Hahslinger, described this proceeding as “nichts Außergewöhnliches, sondern […] eine ganz normale Maßnahme, dadurch, dass wir im Zuge des Verfahrens immer wieder Fragen haben”. (Die Presse 2013f)

On 27 July 2013, 8 refugee activists from the Servite Monastery were arrested and brought to a detention center. The police argued that these men, due to the negative decision on their asylum applications, could no longer stay in Austria. As they refused to opt for a voluntary return, they had to be detained before their deportation. For 12 other refugee activists the “Heimreisezertifikate” (“readmission certificates”) were requested from the respective authorities of their countries of origin, which made it only a matter of time until these 12 men would be deported as well. (ibid.)

---

8 The majority of refugee protesters came from Pakistan. The recognition of the Pakistani refugees in Austria is very low, which leads to a high number of negative decisions and results in deportations. (Asyl in Not n.d.)
On 30 July, three more refugee activists from the Servite Monastery were detained. They were charged with being members of a criminal organization that was smuggling people from Pakistan through Turkey and Balkan States to the EU, particularly to Austria, Germany and Scandinavian States. (Die Presse 2013g) These men stayed in the investigative custody since August 2013 awaiting court’s decision about the legitimacy of the charges. In February 2014 the cause of action was presented as sufficient in order to proceed with the trial. (Der Standard 2014)

By end of September 2013, the number of the refugee activists in the Servite Monastery reduced due to deportations, detentions and relocation to other accommodations to 25 persons. On 25 September 2013 the remaining refugee activists took further action to demand their rights by moving to the Votive Church once again, planning on staying there until their demands are heard and fulfilled. With this action the refugee activists hoped to regain public attention and to demand a stop of deportations to Pakistan:

Wir können nicht warten bis die Polizei uns fängt und abschiebt. In Pakistan sind wir in Lebensgefahr! ... Ist es wirklich so schwierig uns Schutz zu geben? Wir suchen Schutz. Wir besetzen nicht. Alles was wir wollen ist ein legaler Status oder das Löschen unserer Fingerabdrücke, damit wir in einem anderen Land um Sicherheit anfragen können. (Die Presse 2013h)

However, this time the archdiocese turned to the police to clear the church, which legitimized this step as a necessary in order to avoid negative consequences for the refugee activists themselves as well as to ensure the comfort of the parish. (ibid). A few hours after the refugee activists announced the plan to stay in the church, it was cleared by a considerable amount of police force. After the police intervention, the refugee activists returned to the Servite Monastery without being able to achieve any response to their demands.

By the end of the October 2013, the refugee activists had to leave the Servite Monastery due to the scheduled renovation of the Monastery. Their demand to be moved as group was no fulfilled, so that the remaining 24 refugee activists had to look for individual housing. (Die Presse 2013i)
5.2 Refugee Protest Camp Vienna – towards a construction of a political subject

Ilker Ataç (2013) views the Refugee Protest Camp Vienna as a unique form of self-organized resistance of asylum seekers, which contrasts the, until that point, persisting invisibility of asylum seekers. The self-formulated demands express the determination of asylum seekers to no longer be legally or socially marginalized and to speak on their own behalf. With their protest the refugee activists pointed to the problems in Austrian asylum system such as insufficient basic provision or precarious living conditions in the overrun First Reception Center, but also demanded a legal status in Austria. They take their demands for legal status and free movement further by requesting to “delete the fingerprints” in order to be able to apply for asylum in another EU state. With this request, refugee activist express their critique of the Dublin II regulation that allows deporting asylum seekers to EU member states which were entered by an asylum seeker prior to Austria. Dublin II regulation has been criticized by a number of human rights organizations; however, this was the first time that asylum seekers were the ones voicing their protest against this regulation. (Ataç 2013)

It is further important to note that the refugee protests did not solely aim at informing the public about the shortcomings in Austrian asylum system, but much more at directly negotiating with the political actors without “middlemen” such as NGOs or human rights organization. Even though the talks with the representatives of the Ministry of Interior did not lead to a fulfillment of the stated demands, the refugee protesters made significant steps in constitution of the refugee movement as a political subject, which identifies problems and makes them visible and is an acting political actor. (ibid.)

While Ataç (2013) and Alvarado-Dupuy (2013) view the protest as a movement initiated and carried out by the refugee activists, there were voices arguing that refugee activists were influenced by the leftist-minded activists, which exploited the problems of asylum seekers to advance with their political agenda. Such instrumentalization discourse was expressed, i.a. by the Minister of Interior Mikl-Leitner (Die Presse 2013h), Head of Caritas Vienna Michael Landau (Die Presse 2012b) , Cardinal of the Catholic Church, Christof Schönborn (Stuiber 2013), who accused the radical leftist activists of instrumentalizing refugee activist for their “radical” purposes. The kind of “radical” purposes was not further defined by the proponents of this view point.
While refugee activists were dependent on the support of the civil society representatives, they denied the accusations of being instrumentalised and stressed their role as political subjects, who under circumstances of the protest had to rely on the assistance of their supporters. (refugee protest camp 2013)

5.3 Role of the “security experts”

In the final section of this chapter, the role of the “security experts” during the protest will be discussed. As rendered in the description of the course of the protests, the police had an important role to play. The arrests of the refugee activists and their deportation, the massive police operation with 200 policemen to remove the protest camp in the Sigmund Freudn Park as well as continuous visible presence of the police have contributed to an image of refugee protests as an event that poses a threat to public order.

Additionally, the Federal Office for the Protection of the Constitution and the Suppression of Terrorism conducted random checks of the refugee camp inside the Votive Church. Even though these checks were soon stopped since they infringed the agreement with Caritas and the Church, they did have an additional securitizing impact. These controls were legitimized by the representative of the respective office, as the refugee march in November 2012 was seen as a possible beginning of protests against the upcoming “Akademikerball” (“Academics Ball”), which is a yearly event of the far-right in Austria. (Alvarado-Dupuy 2013:21) Such actions presented refugee protesters again as possible threat to internal security; this time as possible terrorists.

Even Caritas and the Church employed a security companies to conduct identity controls of the refugee activists when they enter or leave the church. At a later stage, this company was also responsible for overseeing the number of refugee protesters’ supporters, which could not be higher than 5 at the same time. The actions of this agency not only imposed an additional control mechanism over the refugee protesters, but also impeded the development of further protest actions. (Alvarado-Dupuy 2013:20).

All the mentioned instances of the security experts’ actions during the protests contributed to a rather negative image of the refugee protests. The imposed identity controls implied certain possible threats stemming from the protesters. The procedures requiring putting asylum seekers into custody, who were denied asylum before their
deportation, are the actions of security experts that contributed to securitization of the refugee activists.
6 Methodological note - qualitative content analysis

6.1 Structuring content analysis

For the analysis of the material presented above, structuring content analysis according to the approach of Phillip Mayring (2010) was chosen. This approach is especially suitable for a theory guided analysis of the text material (Mayring 2010: 92) and, therefore, suits present research endeavor well.

Mayring (2010: 94) views the structural content analysis as a rather general model and suggests different types of structuring to make the content analysis more precise, i.e. structuring according to scaling, content, type etc. In the present study the text is structured according to the content, as it will allow me to extract the relevant segments of material and to summarize them (ibid.).

Mayring (2010) suggests following steps when undertaking structural content analysis:

- The structuring dimensions must be specified and deducted from the research question(s) as well as posses a theoretical ground.
- These structuring dimensions are further differentiated according to some specific characteristics. These dimensions and features then form a category system.
- How the allocation of pieces of material to categories takes place, must be determined from the outset. To do that Mayring (2010) suggests the following procedure: The first step is determining units of analysis (categories) and formulation of definitions of those categories. As next, key examples for those categories must be provided along with the rules for coding. The rules and examples serve as the remedy to ensure a clear assignment of categories to the material. The determination of categories takes place prior to its application to the material. Mayring terms this way to proceed as “deductive category application”. (Mayring 2000: n.p.) A schematic account of the deductive category application is offered here:
Once all previous steps are done, one can start the “rehearsal”- run of a material-sample: after the first coding of the material the data locations are marked, and in the second run these are processed and extracted depending on the goal of structuring (Mayring 2010: 93).

As the goal of this research is the structuring content analysis according to the content, the extracted material will be summarized first according to the categories defined at the beginning of the process.

In order to facilitate the processing of material, the content analysis was performed with ATLAS.ti - a computer based program that is widely used in qualitative data analysis (Mayring 2010: 114). ATLAS.ti is a helpful tool for qualitative analysis of large bodies of data. With its tools management, extraction, comparison, exploration and reassembling of relevant pieces from a large amount of data is made easier. The different ways available to perform these tasks also enable a deeper look in the complexity of phenomena hidden in the data. (Friese 2012: 9) Moreover, it fastens the process of relevant segments extraction and subsequent summary.
6.2 Material

The present study aims at determining how the asylum seekers were securitized during the refugee protests in Vienna in 2012/2013. In order to respond this question and to draw a comprehensive picture of the securitarian rhetoric present in the public debate concerning asylum issues, a broad data sample was consulted for the analysis. The composition of the data analyzed will be presented in this section.

To respond the research question, the decision was made to use the material that would provide an insight into the rhetoric present in the public debate during the period of time from 11 November 2012 - the beginning of the protests - to 30 September 2013, when the collection of the material took place.

Before introducing the material it is important to present the concept of public debate used in this study. Wettstein argues that public debates constitute “the backbone of modern democracy” (Wettstein 2014: 1). Debating issues, exchanging arguments and reaching a consensus that satisfies majority of citizens nourish the democratic principle of today’s democracies. Such understanding of public debates makes them an important source of material for analysis as it provides an insight into a broad spectrum of ideas and arguments present in a society.

Wettstein (2014: 3f.) suggests that when attempting to study public debates, the distinction must be made between the different “spheres” of public debates: 1) the debates led by the political elites, which have the potential to amount in legislative output (“strong” sphere), 2) the debates in the “weak public sphere”, which are shaped by the discussions of citizens with no legislative impact, 3) the debates “in-between” that take place in the “intermediary public sphere” and have the function of mediating between the first two: “das intermediäre System vermittelt zwischen der Lebenswelt der Bürgerinnen und Bürger auf der einen und den politischen Entscheidungsträgern auf der anderen Seite”. (Jarren/Donges 2006: 120) The mediating actors are as a rule NGOs, social movements, political parties, unions or mass media. (ibid.)

In line with the theoretical framework of the present study, that suggests that securitization of migration is undertaken primarily by political elites as well as by security experts (cf. Huysmans 2006), the decision has been made to analyze the public debates of the actors in the “strong” and the “intermediary” sphere, as the debates in these spheres are shaped by political decision makers such as members of parliament (“strong sphere”) as well as political parties, unions, social movements etc.
(“intermediary sphere”). These two spheres have an impact on the legislation and serve as the ground for legitimating certain political decisions. (cf. Jarren/Donges 2006) Moreover, the inclusion of the intermediary sphere in the analysis allows to go beyond the analysis of the political elites or security experts and their rhetoric, and to consider other relevant actors such as charitable organizations, Caritas and Diakonie, or representational bodies such as Chamber of Labor, that proved to have a negotiating power during the refugee protests in Vienna and had the potential to render asylum seekers in a securitarian manner.

While the “strong” sphere will be investigated based on parliamentary debates since the beginning of the protests until the moment of data extraction, the composition of the material of the “intermediary” sphere is more complex and includes a broad spectrum of actors: 1) those that actively participated in the negotiations between the protesters and the government officials, 2) those that were involved in the public debate due to the nature of the demands of the protesters (e.g. the demand for an easier access to the labor market for asylum seekers triggered responses from the Ministry of Labor, Social Affairs and Consumer Protection), or 3) political parties, which informed the public of their views and plans of action in regard to the refugee protests. In the following a detailed overview of the material composition is provided.

To access the rhetoric in the “strong sphere”, which also can be viewed as the rhetoric on the legislative level, the parliamentary debates in the National Council during the given period of time were chosen as a suitable source of material.

The National Council (Nationalrat) is an institution elected directly by the people and is the main body of the parliament to propose, to deliberate and to pass laws. The government, the public authorities, the courts as well as all citizens must obey these laws. The 183 parliament members represent the parties which they belong to and also the interests of Austrian nationals (Parlament 2014a). This makes the parliamentary debates an appropriate data material for the analysis of the securitizing rhetoric on the legislative level. The stenographic protocols of the plenary sessions offer very solid material on all issues that are discussed in the National Council; they reflect the ongoing aspects of an issue being discussed, but also different views reflected in the statements of members of parliament (MPs).

The plenary sessions of the National Council take place two or three days every month. There, based on reports and recommendation of the competent committees, the decisions on individual items of business, bills or state treaties are made. The
stenographic protocols of the plenary session are available online on the website of Austrian Parliament. (ibid.)

To extract the relevant pieces of the data for the analysis, all stenographic protocol in the period of time from 11 November 2012 - the beginning of the protests - to 30 September 2013 – when the material was extracted, were filtered using the keyword “Asyl” (asylum). The total amount of the protocols amounted to 21, 4 of which turned out to be irrelevant due to the differing context in which the word “Asyl” was used. Therefore, 17 stenographic protocols of parliamentary debates in the National Council became part of the overall data.

In order to access the material that would represent the rhetoric of intermediary actors, the Original Text Service of the Austrian Press Agency (APA OTS) was chosen as the main source, since it is the most comprehensive database of the original press releases in Austria. The publishers of the press releases take responsibility for the contents which are made public by APA OTS online as well as by editorial network of APA. Media folders of the relevant actors (ministries, parliamentary clubs etc.) were searched for the term “Asyl” (asylum). Additionally, in order to find media interviews with the relevant officials, the WISO-data base of the University of Vienna was filtered with the keyword “name of the official’ Interview” and then filtered by the keyword “Asyl” (asylum). Below the detailed composition of the material that belongs to the intermediary sphere:

1. Press releases of two actors, which to a greater or lesser degree were involved in the negotiating between political decision makers and the refugee protesters: the charitable organizations Diakonie and Caritas. Both organizations are non-profitable and are affiliated with the church, the former with Evangelical and the latter with Catholic Church. The press releases published by these actors amounted to 18 from Caritas, 13 from Diakonie

2. Press releases of the Ministries which took stand on the demands of the protesters: Federal Ministry of Labor, Social Affairs and Consumer Protection (BMASK), Federal Ministry of Interior, Federal Ministry of Economy, Family and Youth containing official statements of the respective ministers in charge: Rudolf Hundstorfer, Johanna Mikl-Leitner, Reinhold Mitterlehner. Moreover, interviews with the mentioned ministers were sought. This piece of data seemed relevant in order to present the rhetoric in the executive branch. Additionally, official statements of the Chamber of Labor (Arbeiterkammer) and the Austrian Economic Chambers
(Wirtschaftskammer Österreich) were searched for as two of the four bodies that comprise the social partnership in Austria and represent the interests of the employees and consumers in the first case and the entrepreneurs in the second. A rather scarce amount of useful documents could be found:

- Federal Ministry of Labor, Social Affairs and Consumer Protection, represented through statements of the Minister in charge Rudolf Hundstorfer – 4 documents
- Federal Ministry of Interior, represented through the statements and interviews of the Minister in charge, Johanna Mikl-Leitner – 13 documents
- Federal Ministry of Economy, Family and Youth, represented by minister in charge, Reinhold Mitterlehner – 1 document
- Chamber of Labor (Arbeiterkammer) - 2 documents
- Austrian Economic Chambers (Wirtschaftskammer Österreich) – 2 documents

3. Press releases published by the parliamentary clubs of the political parties represented in the parliament in the given period of time and filtered by the key word “Asyl” (asylum). After sorting out the irrelevant press releases, following set of documents was available: Social Democratic Party of Austria (SPÖ) – 10, Austrian People’s Party (ÖVP) – 3, Freedom Party of Austria (FPÖ) – 41, Team Stronach – 0, Alliance for the Future of Austria – 9, the Green Party - 54 press releases.
7 Securitizing asylum seekers in Austria during the refugee protests in Vienna 2012/2013

The main objective of the present chapter is to convey the findings of structural qualitative content analysis of the parliamentary debates, press releases and other pieces of analyzed material that took place/were published since the refugee protests had occurred in Vienna in November 2012. As it was explained previously, the goal of this analysis is to uncover the ways in which the asylum seekers were securitized during this period of time by the political parties, relevant actors in the executive branch as well as charitable organizations Caritas and Diakonie, which actively participated in the negotiations between the government and the protesters. The objective consisted, therefore, in extracting the pieces of data that referred to asylum and asylum seekers in securitarian logic and analyzing the respective pieces of information through the lens of the securitization of migration theory discussed in the chapter 2.

As it was explained in detail in the chapter 2, present study, aiming to examine carefully securitization of asylum seekers in Austria, is based on Jef Huysmans’ (1995, 2002, 2006) analysis of securitization of migration in the EU. Huysmans’ theoretical approach and findings about this issue served as the basis for identification of possible security domains, in which asylum seekers in Austria could be presented as a threat. Therefore, this study, to a certain extent, represents a validity check of Huysmans’ findings using the example of Austria. Are asylum seekers securitized in the three main domains as suggested by Huysmans? Are there other domains in which securitization of asylum seekers takes place?

Given the amount of primary sources available for the analysis and the methodological framework of the study it seems to be appropriate to present the results according to the categories and subcategories determined in the course of the qualitative content analysis, which on the one hand were theoretically deducted from Huysmans’ (2006) work (internal, societal, cultural security) and on the other hand emerged in the course of the content analysis. Such presentation of the data renders the outcomes of the study in a comprehensible manner, as it allows singling out the different kinds of argumentation logic that was deployed by various actors in regard to asylum seekers in public debates. At the same time it allows for a breakdown into more specific threads of argumentation (e.g. internal security – asylum seekers as possible terrorists, criminals, illegal immigrants).
After conducting Mayring’s (2010) qualitative content analysis based on Huysmans’ work, the conclusions about the applicability of Huysmans’ theoretical approach and his findings for the present study could be made. To a high extent parallels between Huysmans’ findings in regard to securitization of migration in the EU and securitization of asylum seekers in Austria could be drawn. The theoretical approach as well as the theory-determined categories for the content analysis turned out to match the context of Austria and asylum well. However, some additional categories, not contained in Huysmans’ work, were identified, as it will be presented in the following report on the findings of the structural qualitative content analysis.

The present study is based upon the assumption that the securitization of asylum, along with other migration related issues, takes place in the EU member states. This assumption rests upon the existing literature on securitization of migration in the EU. It was therefore the objective of the study to verify this assumption in Austrian case with the particular focus on asylum. The undertaken qualitative content analysis has confirmed that there are indeed processes of securitization of asylum seekers that take place in the Austrian public debate. It became evident that, as in the case of the EU, the main argumentation threads in Austria, when it comes to securitizing rhetoric about asylum seekers, concern the three main security domains identified by Huysmans (2000, 2006): internal, cultural and societal.

The structural content analysis showed that while internal and societal security domains are presented as being threatened by the presence of asylum seekers in Austria, the cultural security domain was securitized to a far lesser degree than initially anticipated. In Austrian case, asylum has been much less a securitized in the cultural security domain, than migration on the EU level, as Huysmans (2006) has shown. In the course of the analysis another relevant category emerged; it was designated “asylum system abuse” and refers to the instances of securitizing rhetoric in which asylum seekers are referred to as “asylum abusers” with no further clarification as to how they abuse the system. While this category often overlaps with the other categories, it is in many instances used as an argument for itself, claiming that asylum seekers are a threat because they abuse asylum system. It is therefore asylum system itself that is presented as at risk.

Figure 1 contains the representation of the number of securitizing statements made by the actors, whose rhetoric was analyzed in the present study according to the four main categories identified and applied in the content analysis: internal security,
cultural security, societal security, asylum system abuse. From the figure it is evident that the main actor deploying securitarian rhetoric in regard to asylum seekers is the Freedom Party; the main issues being presented as being at risk are internal and societal security followed by “abuse of asylum system” accusations. Against expectations, the theme of cultural security has been securitized to a far lesser degree. Among other actors, the Ministry of Interior, represented by the Minister of Interior, Johanna Mikl-Leitner, was the only actor deploying securitarian logic in all four categories. The mainstream parties SPÖ and ÖVP deployed a low amount of securitarian logic in their statements, primarily in the area of societal security and asylum system abuse. BZÖ and Team Stronach have been using securitarian rhetoric concerning societal and internal security. BZÖ also raised concern in regard to the asylum system abuse. Caritas, which has played an important role during the refugee protests in Vienna, also deployed some arguments with securitizing effect concerning internal security, asylum system abuse and societal security. BMWFJ, Catholic Church, Diakonie have deployed few securitarian statements, as it is evident from the figure. Chamber of Labor, Austrian Economic Chambers and the Green party did not apply securitizing language in the material analyzed and are therefore not included in the Figure 2.

![Figure 2 Number of securitizing statements in the identified security sectors](image)

**7.1 Internal Security**

As Huysmans argued in the case of the EU, also in the case of Austria the internal security was one of the main issues being presented as at stake due to the
presence of asylum seekers. The public order is viewed as endangered also because it is expected that with the abolition of the EU borders the number of asylum seekers will rise.

The arguments that were brought forward by those arguing that asylum seekers pose a threat to internal security in Austria deployed three images of asylum seekers: terrorist, criminals and illegal immigrants. The chart below presents the amount of statements made by on the issues of internal security broken down into the three main subcategories: terrorism, criminality and illegality.

![Figure 3 Internal security sector]

7.1.1 **Terrorism**

As Huysmans (2000, 2006) argues, migrants, including asylum seekers and refugees, in the EU are often brought in connection with terrorism and are rendered as possible perpetrators of terrorist acts. The present research has shown that this is also the case in Austria. However, it is important to note that in the investigated period of time such rhetoric in Austria emerged after the Federal Office for the Protection of the Constitution and Counterterrorism released its report for the year 2012 (.BVT 2013). This report stated that there were 57 “jihadist” fighters from Austria, who were participating in the ongoing civil war in Syria. The current situation of Syria, a country torn by a civil war, was reported to be an attractive place for foreign “jihadists” and, reportedly, also for individuals from Austria. The Federal Office for the Protection of the Constitution and Counterterrorism expressed its concern about the dangers these
fighters could bring once they return from Syria to Austria, suggesting different scenarios: returnees could, e.g. serve as recruiters for further fighters or use their experience and knowledge to organize terrorist attacks in Austria. (Der Standard 2013c)

This report served as the main reference for the rhetoric that rendered the asylum seekers and particularly asylum seekers from the Chechen Republic/Russian Federation as “jihadists” and “radical Islamic fighters and terrorists”. The following passage by Heinz-Christian Strache, the leader of the Austrian Freedom Party (FPÖ), contains an example of such references:

Es gibt auch eine Entwicklung, die uns Österreicher betrifft, von der ich heute aber noch relativ wenig gehört habe, das sind keine Einzelfälle: Über 60 Dschihadisten, die sich angeblich in Österreich als Asylwerber auch in einem Verfahren befinden, sind aufgebrochen, um als radikale Islamisten und Terroristen in dieses Kriegsgebiet zu gehen und dort mitzumischen. Das sind keine Einzelfälle, wie man vielleicht meinen oder wieder behaupten könnte. (Heinz-Christian Strache, FPÖ; Plenary Session (PS) no.199: 26, 25.04.2013)

It is evident from the example above that the images of “jihadists” are additionally aggravated by the warning that the reported cases of Austrian fighters are “not isolated cases” of radicalization. Such rhetoric spreads the unease about the proximity and gravity of terrorism in Austria and links terrorism to asylum seekers as possible perpetrators.

The advocates of the view that asylum seekers pose a terrorist threat also raise concerns about the idleness of the responsible authorities in Austria on this subject, accusing them of simple “standing back” and not taking any measures when asylum seekers “abuse” Austrian asylum system and “get involved in terrorist activities”. Heinz Christian Strache (FPÖ) referring to the Chechen asylum seekers makes following point:


Criticizing the authorities’ inaction on this matter, Strache implies the necessity for increased measures to counteract activities of “radical Islamists” in Austria. By placing asylum seekers from the Chechen Republic in this context, the image of a “Chechen terrorist” is rendered and remains unquestioned. It is especially problematic because there is a high number of asylum seekers and refugees from the Chechen Republic/Russian Federation in Austria. Such rendition can perpetrate exclusion and inhibit integration efforts of the Chechens in Austria.
In the following passage, the responsibility for the increased terrorist threat connected to the asylum is given to the EU, which is accused of allowing radical Islamists to penetrate the EU under the pretense of seeking asylum. Heinz-Christian Strache (FPÖ) encapsulates this idea in the following passage:

Selbstverständlich muss man auch die radikalen Islamisten erwähnen, die ja auch vonseiten der Europäischen Union im Gebiet der Europäischen Union als Asylwerber aufgenommen worden sind, und, wie wir jetzt wissen, zu Hunderten aufgebrochen sind, um in den Krieg zu ziehen. (Heinz-Christian Strache/FPÖ, PS no. 207: 54, 13.06.2013)

In this rhetoric, the EU asylum system is also presented as being abused by the persons, who are in fact not persecuted, but deceive the EU authorities to receive asylum in order to carry out terrorist activities.

In the analyzed material, the majority of the statements that frame asylum seekers as terrorist stems from the representatives of the Freedom Party. However, also Minister of Interior, Johann Mikl-Leitner (ÖVP) in an interview uses securitizing tone on the issue of the returning fighters from Syria: “Das sind tickende Zeitbomben, wie einsame Wölfe, die sich immer weiter radikalisieren.“ (Mikl-Leitner 2013) Even though the Minister of Interior does not establish a direct link between the asylum seekers in Austria and the returning fighters from Syria, her statement does bear a securitizing logic in regard to asylum seekers. The report of the Federal Office for the Protection of the Constitution and Counterterrorism made massive waves in the media by making public that around a half of the fighters, who went to Syria from Austria, were of Chechen origin. It can therefore be argued, that Mikl-Leitners’ statement describing returning fighters from Syria as “clockwork bombs, which continue to radicalize,” could also have a securitizing effect on the Chechen asylum seekers in Austria.

Criticizing the inactivity of the responsible authorities in Austria in regard to the expected danger stemming from the asylum seekers, some of whom were proved to be involved in the terrorist activities, Harald Vilimsky (FPÖ) calls for deportation of these asylum seekers or annulment of their residence status: "Die Asylverfahren dieser Herrschaften sind sofort negative abzuschließen, bzw ist bei bereits erteiltem Aufenthaltsstatus dieser in der Sekunde abzuerkennen” (Freiheitlicher Parlamentsclub 2013a)

As it became evident from the analysis above, the framing of asylum seekers as terrorists took place in the investigated period time. However, it was not triggered by the refugee protests, but by the BVT report that indicated that some asylum seekers in Austria were involved in terrorist activities as fighters in Syria. Nevertheless, the
rhetoric clearly shows cases in which securitizing speech acts about asylum seekers as terrorist are made: they are presented as a threat to internal security in Austria. In order to respond to the threat, actions from the authorities on the national level, but also on the level of the EU are demanded, e.g. deportation of the asylum seekers, who are involved in the terrorist activities.

7.1.2 Criminality

As mentioned in the chapter 2, Huysmans (2006) argues that securitization can take place not only by means of a speech act that clearly declares something as a threat to a referent object, but also through the context in which an issue is placed. The content analysis of the material showed that asylum related issues are often placed in the context of crime, crime prevention and transnational organized crime. In the following example, the Minister of Interior (ÖVP) states that the crime rate among asylum seekers is often depicted as “too high”. While this can be viewed as an attempt towards a less dramatized rendition of asylum seekers as criminals, in the sentences that follow, she establishes a link between asylum seekers and smuggling and human trafficking businesses, which implies their involvement into these criminal activities:


It is evident from this passage, that placing asylum seekers in the context of transnational crimes such as smuggling or human trafficking crime, evokes the impression that asylum seekers are also the perpetrators of these crimes.

Another thread of argumentation presented mainly by the Freedom Party consists in anticipation that asylum seekers are prone to sliding into criminality:


In the passage above, Harald Vilimsky (ÖVP) argues that once asylum seekers realize that they will not be able to “improve their life economically” in Austria, they choose the path of criminality. Not only Vilimsky frames asylum seekers as a group inclined to
criminal activities, but also bases the argument on the initial assumption that the genuine reason for their stay in Austria is improvement of economic wellbeing.

In the statement below, it also becomes evident that the Freedom Party often uses words „criminals“ and „asylum seekers“ as synonyms:

Würde eine schon seit Langem in Kraft getretene Verordnung, nämlich die Drittstaatenverordnung, endlich voll zum Tragen kommen, dann hätten wir fast keine Häftlinge und weniger Kriminalität, somit zufriedenere Bürger und eine weniger überlastete Polizei“ (ibid.)

In this passage, Vilimsky refers to the concept of “safe third-country” (“Drittstaatenverordnung”) according to which an asylum seeker, who entered the territory of, in present case, Austria, can be sent back to a “safe third country” which he/she crossed on the way to Austria, provided his/her life will not be in danger in that country.9 (Europa 2013) The message of Vilimsky is therefore, that because of the lacking implementation of this regulation, asylum seekers are not sent back to the “safe third countries” and as a consequence, criminal activities in Austria take place. If it was implemented, “there would be almost no prisoners and less criminality”. Therefore, the statement of the Freedom Party representative directly alludes to the asylum seekers as “criminals” and “inmates”.

Another way, in which particularly the Freedom Party, but also representatives of mainstream parties Social Democrat Party and Austrian People’s securitize asylum seekers, is by referring to the high delinquency among asylum seekers. The example bellow is a statement at a press conference made by Heinz Christian Strache (FPÖ):


9 „EU countries may apply the concept of a safe third country only when the competent authorities are certain that in the non-EU country concerned:

- the life and liberty of the applicant are not threatened on account of race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group or political opinion;
- the principle of non-refoulement, in accordance with the Geneva Convention, is respected;
- the prohibition of removal, in violation of the right to freedom from torture and cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment as laid down in international law, is respected;
- the possibility exists to request refugee status and, if it is granted, to receive protection in accordance with the Geneva Convention.” (Europa 2013)
In example above numbers are used to enhance credibility of the claims that asylum seekers pose a significant threat to public order. These numbers are also presented in relation to the overall number of asylum seekers of mentioned nationalities, which serves as a dramatization tool. Moreover, mentioning asylum seekers of specific nationalities as particularly prone to criminality creates the impression that asylum seekers of a certain origin tend to be criminals (in this example Algerians, Georgians, Afghans, and Chechens). Sedlak (2000) refers to such framing as “discursive ethnicization, “which speaks for a more or less discriminating and racist attitude towards these groups of people”. (2000: 140)

Moreover, dramatizations and exaggerations are deployed to depict the scope of danger that is supposed to stem from asylum seekers. Christian Höbart’s (FPÖ) statement is a representative example of such rhetoric:


Here again, through contextual placement of asylum in the security domain, it seems that the term „Kriminaltouristen“(“criminal tourists”) refers to asylum seekers. Using such vocabulary as “Asylnotstand” (“asylum crisis”) and “Horden von Kriminaltouristen” (“hords of criminal tourists”), creates an image of a crisis that is taking place due to asylum seekers’ presence in Austria.

7.1.3 Illegality

Illegality is another frame that is used when securitization of asylum seekers takes place. Alliance of the Future of Austria (BZÖ) leader, Josef Bucher, states his party’s position as follows:

Das BZÖ steht für schnelle, aber faire Verfahren, wo echten Verfolgten schnellstmöglich ein sicherer Hafen garantiert wird, aber illegale Zuwanderer sofort wieder abgeschoben werden, bevor sie in der Illegalität untertauchen können. (Parlamentsklub des BZÖ 2012a)

In this statement, the reiteration of BZÖ’s support for the fair process where “real persecuted persons are guaranteed safe haven” serves a disclaimer that is supposed to boost the image of the party and show that party’s agenda as in line with human rights. However, demanding deportation of the “illegal immigrants” “before they go into hiding”, does not reveal that in the majority of cases, illegal entry to the EU is the only way to ask for asylum. Therefore referring to illegal immigrants and demanding their
deportation, Bucher refers to a high number of asylum seekers.

The Freedom Party also renders asylum seekers as illegal immigrants and demands legal steps in order to stop the “asylum fraud”, here the statement of Walter Rosenkranz (FPÖ):


This passage shows that even though there is an understanding of the connection between asylum and illegality – i.e. illegal entry as a way to be able to ask for asylum - it is not being viewed as problematic in a sense that illegality is for many the only choice in order to be able to ask for asylum, but rather in a sense of a burden that “illegal” immigrants, inclusively asylum seekers, pose on Austria. The goal is to stop the “illegal immigration”, which also would mean a stop to refugee migration to Austria.

While the discussion above presents evidence of existing securitizing framing of asylum undertaken by of various parties and actors in the given period of time with no reference to the refugee protests, in the following section an overview of the main securitizing arguments in regard to the refugee protests in Vienna will be given. Before presenting the results, it is important to give a short overview of particular events that took place during the refugee protests as they will be referenced to in the following. As mentioned in the Chapter 3 in more detail, on 30 July 2013 three of the refugee protesters, who were residing in the Servite Monastery, were arrested and charged with smuggling. They were suspected of belonging to a criminal organization that was responsible for at least 300 smuggling cases of primarily Pakistani citizens. (Der Standard 2013d) The arrest itself as well as the wave of reactions to it had a securitizing effect on asylum seekers, particularly those staying at Servite Monastery.

The Minister of Interior, Johanna Mikl-Leitner, said in an interview conducted by the newspaper “Kurier" vom 03.08.2013 in response to the question whether there will be further arrests in connection to the investigation of the smuggling case:

Die Ermittlungsarbeiten laufen noch weiter. Ob es noch weitere Verhaftungen geben wird, werden die Staatsanwaltschaften Wien und Wr. Neustadt entscheiden. Wir wissen, dass es sich hier um einen Schlepper-Ring handelt, der auf die brutalste Art und Weise vorgeht. Bis jetzt gab es sieben Verhaftungen, davon fünf allein im Umfeld des Servitenklosters. (Mikl-
Mikl-Leitner’s response contains a securitizing touch: while stating that the investigation is still in process, she points out the brutality of the smugglers’ network and proceeds with stating that five of the seven detained persons on this charged are from the “environment of the Servite Monastery”. Further, in response to the question of what were the „brutal methods that the smugglers deployed“, the Minister of Interior responded: “Sie haben äußerst unmenschlich agiert. Wenn es etwa Probleme mit schwangeren Frauen auf der Schlepper-Route gab, dann wurden diese Frauen hilflos auf der Route zurückgelassen.“ (ibid.) In this fragment of the interview, the refugee protesters are accused of being members of a smuggler’s network that acts in an “utterly inhuman” way, e.g. by leaving pregnant women behind once problems occurred on the smuggling-route. By stressing that 5 of the suspects are from ‘the environment of the Servite Monastery” the impression is evoked that in the environment of the refugee protesters are and could be (more) potential perpetrators of smuggling. At a later stage, the Ministry of Interior commented on this statement stressing that Mikl-Leitner was referring to the international smuggling network and not to the refugee protesters.

However, by bringing up such grave accusation against asylum seekers by referring to the “environment of Serviten Monastery”, Mikl-Leitner renders asylum seekers, and those involved in the protests in particular, as criminals and smugglers with no differentiation between the suspected asylum seekers and other refugee protesters. The leader of the Freedom Party Heinz Christian Strache produces the same image:


Here, as well, referring to the investigation of the smugglers’ network, the link to asylum seekers is established through the reference to the asylum seekers from the Servite Monastery. The leader of the Freedom Party, Heinz Strache, refers to these asylum seekers as „Scheinasylanten“ – “bogus refugees”. Not only he presents them as criminals, but also accuses them of asylum fraud.

While securitarian rhetoric in regard to the smuggling has been employed mainly by the representative of the Freedom Party and the Minister of Interior, also Secretary General of the Caritas Vienna, Michael Schwertner expressed his discomfort about the possibility of Servite Monastery refugees protester’ involvement in the smuggling
network: „Wir sind extrem verärgert, falls die Caritas hier von Einzelnen ausgenutzt wurde. Denn klar ist: Wenn mit der Not von Menschen Geschäfte gemacht wird, ist das völlig inakzeptabel und aufs Schärfste zu verurteilen.“ (Caritas 2013) In this passage, it is evident that the idea of „abuse“ of Caritas’ efforts to support the refugee protesters causes strong discomfort and even anger among its representatives. Schwertner without having a solid base to judge the validity of accusations reiterates refugee protesters’ possible guilt. Even though this statement does not have the typical characteristic of a securitizing speech act, its message has a securitizing effect – rendering asylum seekers as criminals.

Further, in regard to refugee protests, such reactions were evoked as: “[…] ganz offensichtlich eine versuchte Erpressung des Staates durch Mitglieder einer organisierten Asyl- und Bettlermafia, die ja von der rot-grünen Stadtregierung in Wien gutgeheißen wenn nicht sogar unterstützt wird.“ (Freiheitlicher Parlamentsclub 2013b) In this argumentation logic, as presented by Heinz Christian Strache (FPÖ) refugee protest is rendered as a blackmailing action that is enforced by “asylum and beggar mafia”.

The final relevant point that remains to mention concerning the nexus between asylum seekers and criminality is that it is followed by demands to take action against the asylum seekers as well against the refugee protesters. Particularly, the Freedom Party advocates in this context for the reintroduction of border controls, strict implementation of the Dublin II regulation, more restrictive asylum laws and a “harder” line of action of the Ministry of Interior. One such example makes these demands visible:


The presentation of results above showed that asylum seekers are securitized primarily by the Freedom Party and Ministry of Interior, but as well as by the mainstream parties such as SPÖ and even the charitable organization Caritas. In the particular, the case of the refugee protesters and the potential involvement of some of them in a smuggling network caused a wave of reactions, which also had a securitizing effect not only on the refugee protesters, but also on asylum seekers in general.

During the analyzed period of time asylum seekers were presented in different
ways as a threat to internal security of Austria. The most often used image of asylum seekers to create this link was criminality. This frame was followed by terrorism frame, in which asylum seekers were presented as having high potential to organize and be involved in terrorist activities. The last issue that is rendered as threatening to internal security is illegality. The main assumption and argument deployed was that asylum seekers tend to “slide” into illegality. It is important to point out that the significant amount of the analyzed material refers to the asylum seekers in general, not precisely to the Refugee Protest Camp protesters. The securitarian rhetoric in regard to refugee protesters was used primarily in the context of investigation of a smugglers’ network. In its course three members of the Refugee Protest Camp were accused of being involved in smuggling activities. Further, refugee protesters were presented as blackmailers of Austrian authorities and members of “asylum and beggars mafia”.

When comparing findings of the present research with Huysmans’ rendition of internal security sector in the EU, one main difference becomes evident. While on the EU level the rhetoric emphasizes the introduction of the Schengen area as the main reason for increased presence of asylum seekers and immigrants, who are viewed as potential threats to security, in Austria this argumentation was not present to this extent. Aside from FPÖ and BZÖ no other actors linked asylum seekers’ presence in Austria to the Schengen zone. They, however, did demand measures such as reintroduction of border controls to reduce the “threat” stemming from asylum seekers.

7.2 Cultural Security

Contrary to the assumptions made at the outset of the study, the cultural security has not been at the prominent place in the securitarian rhetoric of any of the political parties or other actors whose rhetoric was analyzed. The Figure 4 bellow shows the rather low employment of securitarian rhetoric in regard to cultural security.

Mainly the Freedom Party warns against cultural decadence that can be caused by the “radical islamist” Chechen asylum seekers. With reference to asylum seekers, Heinz Christian Strache (FPÖ) states the following:

Ich sage, in Europa gibt es Entwicklungen einer islamischen Parallel- und Gegengesellschaft, die gefährlich sind, die oftmals unterschätzt werden. Wenn wir zu Recht auf diese Probleme hinweisen, wischt man sie vom Tisch und ist in Wirklichkeit nicht dazu bereit, im Sinne einer westlichen freibeitlichen und demokratischen Gesellschaft ernsthaft und deutlich gegen solche Entwicklungen aufzutreten. (Heinz-Christian Strache, FPÖ, PS 207: 54, 13.06.2013)
In this passage, Strache warns against the development of an Islamic „parallel society“ and a “Gegengesellschaft” (“counter-society”), which implies that asylum seekers coming from Islamic societies pose a particular threat to the “Western liberal and democratic society”. This fragment evokes fear of the Islamic society that is deemed dangerous and “often underestimated”. Not only Islamic society as a whole is securitized here, but also a dividing line between the “dangerous” Islamic society that is developing in Western Europe and the “Western liberal and democratic society” is drawn, which is aimed at highlighting the “otherness” of the Islamic society. Placing asylum seekers such context, reiterates asylum seekers as culturally “other” and even “dangerous” persons.

In the analyzed material only a few culturally securitizing instances in regard to the refugee protests could be found. When the Protest Camp was evicted from its initial location in the Sigmund Freud Park (cf. chapter 3), the Minister of Interior welcomed such steps stating:


Here, the „vilification of the religious doctrine“ as well as a party organized at the Christmas Eve were two of the arguments deployed by Minister of Interior to justify the
camp eviction measures, which were heavily criticized by a number of actors for its incommensurability. (cf. chapter 3) Here, indirectly, the Christian religion and Christian way of life is depicted as not respected and ignored by the protesters. It seems therefore, that the protection the Christian values and religious customs was one of the reasons for the eviction of the Protest Camp.

As the study has shown, against the assumptions made at the outset of the study, the cultural security has not been an important subject in securitization rhetoric. The main arguments framing the asylum seekers as threat to cultural integrations were brought forward by the Freedom Party. In respect to the Refugee Protest Camp, there was one statement by the Minister of Interior that conveyed discomfort about the refugee protesters’ noncompliance with Christian culture, which was also used as one of the arguments to justify the eviction of the Protest Camp in the Sigmund Freud Park.

7.3 Societal Security

Huysmans’ (2006) claims that asylum seekers play a role in the struggle for welfare rights and are increasingly seen as having no legitimate right to social assistance and welfare provisions in the EU. They are declared rivals to the nationals in the labor market and competitors in the distribution of social goods. Which issues in particular were linked to the presence of asylum seekers in Austria will be discussed in this section.

In the course of the structural content analysis the following subcategories emerged and will be presented in more detail below: labor market, welfare fraud, prioritizing nationals, flood and invasion, lacking utilization of available opportunities. The Table 4 below shows what issues in the societal sector were securitized and who securitized them with what intensity.

7.3.1 Labor market

Asylum seekers’ access to the labor market has a prominent role in the material analyzed in the present study. The reason for such prominence is the problematic regulation of the labor market access for the asylum seeker in Austria. Due to the so-called Bartenstein-Decree, asylum seekers’ access to the labor market is de-facto strongly restricted. Even though in Austria it is possible for asylum seekers to work three months after the submission of the application for asylum, in reality it is more
complex, as the labor market access is restricted to seasonal and harvest-work. Until 2012, this Decree also restricted the access of asylum seekers to doing an apprenticeship as a “work permit” was required. Since 2012 asylum seekers under age of 18 were allowed to become apprentices, however, in sectors with an apprentices’ deficit and after their eligibility is confirmed after the completion of the so-called “Arbeitsmarktprüfung” (“labor market test”). (arbeitsmarktzugang.prekaer.at 2013)

Figure 5 Societal security sector

The concerns about the labor market restrictions for asylum seekers in Austria has been raised by various actors prior to the protests; however, during protests the issue gained pace and became highly debated by various actors. On 18 March 2013 the Minister of Labor, Social Affairs and Consumer Protection, Rudolf Hundstorfer, has approved a Decree that increased the age limit of asylum seekers willing to do an apprenticeship to 25 years. However, the situation of the labor market access for other asylum seekers has not changed. (ibid.)

After providing the context of labor market conditions for asylum seekers, the presentation of the results of the content analysis can take place. In the securitarian rhetoric detected in regard to the asylum seekers’ access to the labor market, one argument stands out – asylum seekers are presented as competitors to Austrian nationals on the labor market. It is deemed as inappropriate to liberalize asylum seekers’ labor market access in the light of high unemployment rate among Austrian nationals. Harald Vilimsky (FPÖ) provides a representative example for such argumentation logic:
Obwohl um die 400.000 Arbeitslose in Österreich zu verzeichnen sind, will die Bundesregierung nun den Arbeitsmarkt für Asylwerber öffnen. Dies sei ein Schlag in das Gesicht der österreichischen Arbeitssuchenden, aber auch ein weiterer Anreiz für die Schlepper-Industrie, Asylbetrüger nach Österreich hereinzuzukarren. Dies sei ein rot-schwarzer Geisterfahrerkurs gegen die österreichischen Interessen. (Freiheitlicher Parlamentsclub 2013c)

In this passage Harald Vilimsky stresses that opening the labor market for asylum seekers would be a „Schlag ins Gesicht“ (“slap in the face”) of the currently unemployed people in Austria. Bringing forward the numbers works as an additional tool for dramatizing the situation of unemployment in Austria. Such framing evokes fears that asylum seekers are competition to the unemployed nationals. Moreover, he renders opening of the labor market as an incentive for smuggling activities and asylum abusers to come to Austria.

In the similar fashion, the Minister of Interior, Mikl-Leitner, argues that the labor market will not be able “to take” an opening to asylum seekers: “Ich bezweifle, dass der Arbeitsmarkt das verträgt. Für das Innenministerium ist klar, dass jede Öffnung des Arbeitsmarkts Österreichs Attraktivität als Zielland von Asylwerbern erhöht.“ (Mikl-Leitner, 2013c) Moreover, Mikl-Leitner warns against such steps as they could “increase Austria’s attractiveness” for asylum seekers.

In a similar way, Minister of Labor, Social Affairs and Consumer Protection, Rudolf Hundstorfer, and Minister of Economy, Family and Youth, Reinhold Mitterlehner express themselves against the opening of the labor market to asylum seekers arguing that the labor market would not be able to bear such step. (Vasari 2013)

In regard to the Decree that prompted a raising of the age limit for the asylum seekers willing to do an apprenticeship, enacted in March 2013 by the Minister for Social Affairs, the following reaction in the Ministry of Interior was triggered: “Wir lehnen das ab, ja, angesichts der Arbeitsmarktlage finden wir es bedenklich.” (Mikl-Leitner 2013d) In this statement, the Ministry of Interior, with reference to the current situation on the labor market, does not approve of such step.

Labor market access for the asylum seekers has been one of the demands of the refugee protesters and has been a highly discussed issue during the Refugee Protest Camp. The securitarian logic has been detected mainly in the statement of the Freedom Party, Ministry of Interior, Ministry of Social Affairs and Ministry of Economics. Asylum seekers were rendered as potential competitors to the nationals, which particularly in the times of economic downturn was presented as a reckless step.
Welfare fraud

The securitization of asylum seekers is also performed by accusing them of welfare fraud. Such rhetoric is present in the speeches of FPÖ, but also of other political parties - Alliance for the Future of Austria and Team Stronach. Below an example delivered by Christof Hagen (Team Stronach):


Here, asylum seekers are generalized as a group of people who come to Austria under the pretext of being persecuted for their political views or religious beliefs, and abuse Austrian hospitality “living of” Austrian taxpayers’ money. Moreover, they are also accused to have the potential of radicalizing and becoming fighters in the “Holy War”.

The theme of tax money is brought up frequently to stress the burden that asylum seekers constitute for Austrian welfare system. In the light of difficult economic situation, when “Einsparungen für die die österreichische Bevölkerung auf der Tagesordnung stehen“ (Freiheitlicher Parlamentsclub 2012b), the asylum seekers are seen as illegitimate beneficiaries of the Austrian welfare system. This theme is brought up by the Freedom Party, Team Stronach, Alliance for the Future of Austria. The Social Democratic Party refrains from such accusations, however the stressed need to “save” in the area of asylum implies an equal message – asylum systems is too costly for the Austrian taxpayer:


In the passage above, Rudolf Pressl (SPÖ) expresses his support for FRONTEX, European Agency for the Management of Operational Cooperation at the External Borders of the Member States of the European Union, and its activities as it helps to “reduce costs” for the return of asylum seekers, who are not granted asylum as well as of those, who were convicted of an offense. He also points out the benefit of Austria’s EU membership referring to the “services” of such European Agency as Frontex that ensures the return of asylum seekers at lower costs – and, therefore, saves Austrian
citizens’ tax money. The reiteration of saving benefits on asylum related issues underlines that asylum creates high costs. Such rhetoric has therefore a securitizing impact.

A significant number of statements contain the argument that asylum seekers do not have a valid reason to seek asylum and therefore are not entitled to any assistance. In the following passage such argument is delivered by Heinz Christian Strache (FPÖ):

Österreich ist stattdessen zu einem Magneten für Wirtschaftsflüchtlinge aus aller Herren Länder geworden, die in Wahrheit keinen Schutz benötigen, sondern lediglich die Errungenschaften des Sozialstaates in Anspruch nehmen wollen. Asyl ist heute zu einem Synonym geworden für Einwanderung in den Sozialstaat. Österreich ist nämlich ein Eldorado für Asylwerber. (Freiheitlicher Parlamentsclub 2012c)

Strache securitizes asylum seekers by describing them as “economic refugees” who “in reality do not need protection, but are solely interested in the achievements of a welfare state”. With such argumentation he denies the validity of asylum seekers’ claims for asylum. Moreover, Strache renders asylum as synonym for “immigration to the welfare state” and presents Austria as a desirable place for asylum seekers because they perceive it as “Eldorado”. Such an aggressive rhetoric is characteristic for the statements of the Freedom Party. Team Stronach and Alliance for the Future of Austria, while accusing asylum seekers of being in their majority “economic refugees”, do not employ further securitizing rhetoric in this issue.

7.3.3 Prioritizing nationals

As introduced in chapter 2, next to the rather aggressive way to securitize migrants as economic free riders, Huysmans has identified another, slightly moderate argumentation logic that also has a securitizing impact. It consists in the stressing the need to prioritize nationals in the distribution of social goods: the immigrants’ and asylum seekers’ social rights should be limited not because they are “economic free-riders”, but because own community should be given preference in the distribution of benefits and welfare; especially at times of economic crisis. (cf. chapter 2)

The analyzed material offers a substantial amount of statements which contain this idea. Christoph Hagen’s (Team Stronach) statement, in which he refers to asylum seekers, is representative for such rhetoric:

Die Österreicherinnen und Österreicher, die hier für diese Menschen aufkommen, die mit ihren Steuergeldern für diese Menschen zahlen müssen, sollen einmal wissen, was mit ihrem Geld passiert. Ich glaube, wir investieren das Geld besser für die Österreicherinnen und Österreicher. Es gibt hier viele Frauen, die Alleinerzieherinnen sind und Probleme
Hagen argues for investing the tax money for the benefit of Austrian nationals. He dramatizes the need for such step giving the example of single mothers, who are in trouble to make both ends meet. What this statement conveys is that the investment into such needy groups of Austrians as single mothers would be a “better” step than investing in asylum seekers.

In the analyzed material the rhetoric that stressed the need to prioritize nationals was triggered by a specific occasion: the enactment of the Decree to the increase the cost rates of the “Grundversorgungsvereinbarung für hilfs- und schutzbedürftige Fremde”, which implied a slight increase in spending for asylum seekers und persons, who were granted asylum, or persons who cannot be deported for legal or other reasons. (Parlament 2013b) The main opponents of this Decree, the Freedom Party, Alliance for the Future of Austria, and Team Stronach, which viewed the Decree as an endeavor that neglects the interests of nationals and favors asylum seekers, put forward arguments against it. An example of such rhetoric provides Werner Herbert (FPÖ):

Ist es Instinktlsigkeit oder einfach politisches Unvermögen, dass in Zeiten allgemeiner Einsparungen und zunehmend eingeschränkter Sozialleistungen zum Nachteil der österreichischen Bevölkerung von dieser Bundesregierung nunmehr gerade die Kostensätze im Bereich der Grundversorgungsvereinbarung für sogenannte hilfs- und schutzbedürftige Fremde (also Asylwerber und solche Personen, denen in Österreich Asyl gewährt wird oder die aus rechtlichen oder faktischen Gründen nicht abgeschoben werden können) erhöht werden. (Freiheitlicher Parlamentsclub 2012b)

Here, Herbert expresses his disagreement with the decision to increase cost rates for the above-mentioned “Grundversorgungsvereinbarung für hilfs- und schutzbedürftige Fremde” (“basic provision agreement”) (cf. chapter 3), particularly at times when social benefits available to Austrian nationals are being reduced. Austrian nationals and asylum seekers are presented as competitors over the social goods. Pointing to the “increased” benefits for asylum seekers and “decreasing” benefits for nationals, Herbert draws an alarming picture in which the interests of nationals are neglected.

Prioritizing nationals in the distribution of the welfare benefits is the rhetoric deployed by the Freedom Party, Team Stronach, ÖVP, and Alliance for the Future of Austria. By stressing the need to prioritize nationals, asylum seekers are presented as rivals in the allocation of benefits. No particular statements were made in this logic in regard to the Refugee Protest Camp refugees.
7.3.4 Usage of metaphors such as “flood” and “invasion”

Another way of securitizing asylum seeker that was identified in the course of the content analysis is the deployment of such images as “flood”, “wave” or “invasion” of asylum seekers. As Huysmans writes:

The disqualification of migration in expressions of welfare chauvinism is given a wider societal significance through the use of metaphors such as an ‘invasion’ or ‘flood’ of migrants and asylum-seekers. When the welfare system is dominantly portrayed as being impossible to sustain in the near future these metaphors portray immigrants, asylum-seekers and refugees as a serious threat to the survival of the socio-economic system. (2006: 79)

In the analyzed material several instances of such metaphors were found in the context of asylum seekers in Austria. Additionally, such images as “mass immigration of asylum seekers” (Freiheitlicher Parlamentsclub 2013d), or “mass influx of asylum seekers” (Freiheitlicher Parlamentsclub 2013e), were used. These images are accompanied by provision of numbers and comparisons aiming at stressing the increase in the number of asylum seekers applications. An example is provided in the following statement of the Minister of Interior, Johanna Mikl-Leitner: “Allein im Jahr 2011 haben 14 416 Fremde einen Antrag auf Gewährung von Asyl gestellt, das ist ein Anstieg von 31 Prozent.” (Mikl-Leitner, PS 184: 136, 05.12.2013) What might appear as a simple statement about the current numbers, the adverb “allein” (alone) at the beginning of the sentence figures as a warning sign of a “too high” number of asylum applications for “just” one year. Further, for a “better” understanding of these numbers, the percentage of this increase as compared to previous years is delivered.

Another reference to the “flood” of asylum seekers offers the Freedom Party, Stronach and Alliance for the Future of Austria. In the following example, a member Team Stronach takes a stand on proceedings of the Italian authorities, who were accused of offering asylum seekers around 500 Euros to continue their journey to other EU countries and to apply for asylum there. Christoph Hagen (Team Stronach) argues in this case:

Es nützt mir auch das beste Gesetz nichts, wenn es eine solche Aktion gibt, wie sie in der morgigen Ausgabe der „Kronen Zeitung“ steht, nämlich diese Flüchtlingswelle aus Italien. Es werden dort Aufenthaltstitel an die Illegalen nicht verscherbelt, das hast du falsch gesagt, sondern die bekommen noch 500 € zum Titel dazu, damit sie ausreisen können. Das sind schon Sachen, die inakzeptabel sind. (Christoph Hagen, Team Stronach, PS 193: 211, 20.03.2013)
Hagen speaks of a „refugee wave” that is coming from Italy and condemns the actions of Italian authorities. Harald Vilimsky (FPÖ) expresses his concern on the same issue in the following passage in a highly securitizing manner:

Mit diesem 500-€-Schein und der Aussicht „Fahrt weiter nach Österreich, fahrt weiter nach Deutschland, dort werdet ihr bestens betreut!“, haben wir dann die ganze Problematik zu bewältigen. Das zeigt ja, wie verquert (sic!) das ganze Asylbetreuungssystem in Europa eigentlich funktioniert. (Harald Vilimsky, FPÖ, PS 193:200, 20.03.2013)

In this passage, Vilimsky tries to give the impression that all those asylum seekers who might be travelling from Italy to other EU countries will choose Austria or Germany and warns against “all the problems” that will emerge once they will arrive in Austria. While not deploying the classic metaphors such as “wave” or “invasion”, this is what is being implied in Vilimsky’s statement.

As it became evident, the images of “flood” and “invasion” are deployed in Austria in the context of asylum to a high extent. Team Stronach, Freedom Party and Alliance for the Future of Austria as well as Minister of Interior, create an impression that Austria is about to be or has already been overrun by asylum seekers. No statements concerning the Refugee Protest Camp in this respect were present in the analyzed material.

7.3.5 Lack of utilization of opportunities provided to the asylum seekers

Particularly in the context of the refugee protests in Vienna, further securitizing argumentation thread could be identified: accusing asylum seekers of not utilizing available opportunities in the labor market. In the analyzed material, such accusations originated in response to the demands of the refugee protesters to facilitate asylum seekers’ access to the labor market (cf. chapter 4). As a response to protesters’ demands, the Minister of Interior, Milk-Leitner, refers to the existing opportunities for asylum seekers to work:


Comparing the legal situation of asylum seekers’ in the labor market in Austria with the one in Germany, Mikl-Leitner creates an impression of a more liberal home labor market policy for asylum seekers. Further, she justifies the current policy referring to the EU Reception and Procedures Directives that requires granting the access to the
labor market within one year, which is longer than in the case of Austria – 3 months. Finally, Mikl-Leitner declares it a “fact” that there are opportunities for asylum seekers to work in Austria and stresses that the group concerned is not using these opportunities. Such statements are reinforced by the provision of numbers: „Pro Jahr gibt es 10.000 Arbeitsplätze für Saisoniers, aber nur 500 werden von Asylwerbern eingenommen.“ (Mikl-Leitner 2013e) By pointing out that out of 10,000 available jobs for asylum seekers, only 500 are taken by the asylum seekers, creates the impression that asylum seekers are not willing to work, i.e. do not use the provided opportunities. However, after presenting such “facts”, Mikl-Leitner does not provide an insight about the difficulties and risks for an asylum seeker of taking up an employment as a seasonal worker.¹⁰

The subcategory “lack of utilization of opportunities provided to the asylum seekers” emerged in the course of the content analysis and contains primarily the accusations of asylum seekers of not being willing to use the provided opportunities to work, e.g. seasonal work. In such manner, asylum seekers are presented as unwilling to work and at the same time the demands of the refugee protesters for a more liberal access to the labor market are discredited.

### 7.4 Abuse of asylum system

Aside of the three security domains in which migrants are securitized according to Huysmans (2002, 2006), another “domain” was detected in the course of this research. This domain was designated “abuse of asylum system”, as it is the asylum system that is threatened by asylum seekers, who are accused of abusing it. It is assumed that asylum seekers make false statements, lie and obtain asylum “by devious means” (Sedlak 2000: 139), such as claiming to be a target of persecution or discrimination. While this presupposition is the underlying argument in the securitarian rhetoric regarding the societal and internal security (e.g. asylum seekers abuse the asylum system in Austria by lying about persecution in order to improve their economic wellbeing), it is used as the argument on its own, with no reference as to what is the “real” reason for an asylum application. Lexically, the securitarian presentation of asylum seekers in this category is manifested in designations such as “Scheinasylanten” (“bogus refugees”) or “Asylbetrüger“ (“asylum cheater”). Asylum seekers are made

¹⁰ More on the limitations of the asylum seekers’ access to the labor market consult http://www.asyl.at/fakten_2/basis.htm, viewed 22.02.2014.
The accusations of asylum fraud are present in the rhetoric of a wide range of actors whose rhetoric was analyzed. An instance of such rhetoric is evident in the statement of Harald Vilimsky (FPÖ): “Hätten wir nicht so viele Asylbetrüger, dann könnten wir denen [die an Leib und Leben bedroht sind] auch guten Schutz bieten und hätten kein Problem. Das Problem ist, dass wir 80 Prozent Asylbetrüger haben.” (Harald Vilimsky, FPÖ, PS 184: 126, 05.12.2013) The FPÖ representative states that, if there were not so many “asylum cheaters” in Austria, they (FPÖ) would not have a problem with granting asylum to those who are “really” in need. He further states that 80 per cent of the asylum seekers in Austria are “Asylbetrüger” (“asylum cheaters”). In this example, Vilimsky does not provide any explanation as to how exactly the asylum seekers cheat and with what purpose. The image of asylum seekers as impostors seems to be so well established, that this is used as their main characteristic.

In the following, Barbara Prammer’s (SPÖ) statement shows a similar logic, however in a less explicit language:

Prammer praises the “independent judges”, who make their decisions “based on the ruling law”. This way the responsibility for the decisions regarding asylum seekers’ applications is placed on the responsible judges and legal framework. Such statement seems to have a disclaimer function. Put differently, a positive image of Austrian asylum system is reiterated, showing that the legal framework is enabling people “who really need protection” to be granted asylum. Stressing the existence of those “who really need protection” presupposes that there are asylum seekers who do not have a “real” reason to be granted asylum. In this manner, the idea of possible asylum abuse is reiterated. Moreover, as Huysmans argues, securitization takes place not only through a speech act or context, but also through enforcing legal instruments restricting migration (cf. chapter 2). By supporting the legal framework and its execution, the SPÖ representative contributes to the maintaining of securitization of asylum in Austria.

In a similar way, the ÖVP representative Günter Kößl, speaking in the context of upcoming amendments to the existing Asylum Law states:

Was wir heute beschließen, sind Anpassungen und Umsetzungen von Richtlinien. Ich glaube, Kollege Vilimsky, mit diesen Anpassungen und Umsetzungen werden an und für sich die Maßnahmen, die du gefordert hast – dass auf der einen Seite die tatsächlich Schutzbedürftigen Hilfe bekommen und dass wir gegen Missbrauch auftreten –, hier sicherlich besser umgesetzt. (Günter Kößl, ÖVP, PS 193: 202, 20.03.2013)

In this example, too, granting asylum to persons in need for protection and effectively preventing asylum fraud is put as an important goal. Reiteration of the necessity of tackling asylum fraud presents it once and again as a threat.

The Minister of Interior, Jonanna Mikl-Leitner, when asked in an interview, whether Austria has the right approach to asylum seekers, answered: “Wir haben eine sehr gute Strategie ? (sic!) die Hintertüre für Asylmissbrauch zu schließen, damit die Vordertüre offen bleiben kann, um jenen Hilfe zu geben, die sie tatsächlich brauchen.“(Mikl-Leitner 2012b) It is worth noting that being asked a general question about the approach to asylum seekers in Austria, the Minister points out the „good strategy“ in combating „asylum fraud“. The success of the strategy is therefore measured by effective combating of asylum fraud.

In the material analyzed, a number of arguments were present that pointed to the existence of “asylum industry”, which involves not only asylum seekers, but also NGOs
and some political groups that aim at gaining some profit – either financial or gaining political influence – by advocating for asylum seekers’ rights. An example for such rhetoric is evident from the statement below by Heinz Christian Strache (FPÖ):

> In allen Bereichen wird gespart, aber da sind Sie nicht bereit, Asylmissbrauch abzustellen, weil es heute eine Asylindustrie in Österreich gibt – NGOs –, eine Asylindustrie, die von diesem Asylmissbrauch lebt und gar kein Interesse daran hat, den Asylmissbrauch abzustellen.” (Heinz Christian Strache, FPÖ, PS, 184: 166, 05.12.2013)

The abuse of asylum was also a widely discussed theme that accompanied the refugee protests. Freedom Party and Alliance for the Future of Austria deployed in this regard images of refugee protesters, who “blackmail” the government for their benefit. Heinz Christian Strache’s (FPÖ) statement summarizes this thread of arguments:


Here, Strache not only aims his criticism at asylum seekers who “blackmail” the government, but also at the Minister of Interior, who he blames for her “failed asylum policy”, i.e. not proceeding effectively against refugee protesters.

Along with the securitarian rhetoric, the action against the “asylum abuse” is demanded: here the Alliance for the Future of Austria, the Freedom Party as well as Minister of Interior, Mikl-Leitner, argue for deportation of those who “abuse the asylum system”. Additionally, Alliance for the Future of Austria demands that asylum seekers are confined within first 72 hours, in which the “chances” of asylum seekers to be granted asylum in Austria should be evaluated.

It appears to be evident from the discussion in the present section that “abuse of asylum” is used as a category on its own when debating about asylum seekers in Austria. The image of asylum seekers as liars and abusers of Austrian asylum system is routed so deeply that none of the actors, who deploy such rhetoric, view it as necessary to provide a definition of “abuse of asylum” or to support their accusations with facts.
8 Conclusion

In the recent decades a significant transformation in the perception of asylum seekers and refugees as well as in the policies regulating asylum took place. Being confronted with a significant refugee influx during and after the WWII, Austria established its role as a refugee-friendly state, which continued to be the case during the Cold War period. Krzyżanowski/Wodak (2008) attribute such liberal approach to receiving refugees to the fact, that the majority of the refugees in this period of time did not settle in Austria, but used it as a stopover before departing to other European countries or overseas. In the 1980, when a significant share of refugees from Iran, Turkey and Poland indeed settled on Austrian territory, the tolerance towards the refugees influx scaled down, and a new, refugee hostile rhetoric, emerged. Since then Austrian asylum policy has undergone numerous changes that aimed primarily at reducing the numbers of asylum applications in Austria. There has been substantial amount of critique that addressed the worsening situation of asylum seekers in Austria, voiced by NGOs, international organizations such as UNHCR and Amnesty International, civil society and other actors. The Refugee Protest Camp that emerged in November 2012 joined these critical voices: for the first time a movement consisting of asylum seekers formulated and presented their views, critique and demands to the government of Austria. Speaking on their own behalf and pointing to the flaws in Austrian asylum system as well as demanding their rights as asylum seekers, the refugee protesters posed an unseen challenge to Austrian state and made it an interesting endeavor to analyze its response to the refugee movement and its demands.

The protests were accompanied by a heated public debate with a significant securitizing component. To look in depth at the securitarian rhetoric expressed in regard to the refugee protesters as well as to the asylum seekers in general became the main interest of the study. To address the research question - how were asylum seekers securitized in Austria during the refugee protests in Vienna - Jef Huysmans’ approach to studying securitization of migration was chosen as the theoretical framework. In the present section the results of this study are analyzed through the lens of Huysmans’ securitization of migration theory and compared to his findings on securitization of migration in the EU. The chapter will conclude with verifying or dismissing the hypotheses formulated at the outset of the study.

According to Huysmans (2006) the essence of securitization lies in the “circular
logic of defining and modulating of hostile factors for the purpose of countering them politically and administratively” (2006: 61) Security is, therefore, viewed as practice or frame, which is produced and reproduced by security agencies and security professionals as well as technologies and public rhetoric of politicians. Huysmans’ findings on securitization of migration in the EU showed that in the EU migrants are framed as threat to the “independent identity” and “functional integrity” of the states. Losing control of border crossing by migrants or increasing number of persons of other confessions are some of the instances for such threats.

In his theoretical framework Huysmans (2006) expands the securitization concept for the study of securitization of migration: he argues that not only the threat definition, but also the embedding of an issue in a security context constitutes it as a threat. Therefore, even if asylum is not explicitly rendered as a threat, its integration in the policy frameworks, that concern policing and defense, frames it as a security issue. Based on Bigo’s (2002) work Huysmans further argues that routines, administrative practices, competition between agencies and institutional history of security agencies are contributing to the modulation of domains of insecurity as well.

In line with Huysmans’ theory, in order to understand with what kind of security quality asylum seekers were invested during the refugee protests, the securitizing rhetoric in the public debate was analyzed. (cf. chapter 3). In addition to the analysis of securitizing speech acts also the rhetoric, that was placing asylum seekers in the security context, was taken into consideration. The material for analysis was comprised of the parliamentary debates, press releases and interviews with the actors of the intermediary and strong spheres of public debates ranging from members of National Council, political parties, government officials as well as charitable organizations. (cf. chapter 4) Additionally, the proceedings of the police and other security professionals were included in the analysis in order to observe how the securitization of asylum seekers was (re)produced through security knowledge and technology.

In the following each of the identified security domains which were established through the securitarian practice and rhetoric in Austria in regard to asylum seekers will be briefly summarized. They then will be analyzed in regard to the ways in which they were modulated.

**Internal Security**

Present research has shown that the asylum seekers were presented in different ways as a threat to internal security of Austria during the refugee protests. A frequently
used frame to create this link was criminality. It was followed by terrorism frame, in which asylum seekers were presented as having high potential to organize and to be involved in terrorist activities. This rhetoric addressed primarily the asylum seekers from the Chechen Republic/Russian Federation. Moreover, asylum seekers were rendered as prone to “sliding” into illegality. It is important to point out that the major part of the analyzed material refers to the asylum seekers in general, not precisely to the Refugee Protest Camp protesters. The securitarian rhetoric in regard to the refugee protesters emerged primarily after three members of the Refugee Protest Camp were accused of being involved in smuggling activities and were put in custody. Further, refugee protesters were presented as blackmailers of Austrian authorities and members of “asylum and beggars mafia”.

When comparing findings of the present research with Huysmans’ rendition of internal security sector in the EU, one main difference becomes evident: while on the EU level the rhetoric emphasizes the introduction of the Schengen area as the main reason for increased presence of asylum seekers and immigrants, who are viewed as potential threats to security, in Austria this argumentation was not present to this extent. Aside from FPÖ and BZÖ no other actors linked increased asylum seekers presence to the free movement in the Schengen zone.

Cultural Security

The study has shown, contrary to the assumptions made at the outset of the study, the cultural security has not been an important subject in securitizing rhetoric during the analyzed time frame. The main arguments framing the asylum seekers as threat to cultural security were brought forward by the FPÖ. In respect to the Refugee Protest Camp, there was one statement by the Minister of Interior that conveyed discomfort about the refugee protesters’ noncompliance with the Christian culture, which was used as one of the reasons to justify the eviction of the Protest Camp in Sigmund Freud Park.

Societal Security

In the course of the analysis, it became evident that a significant amount of overall securitizing rhetoric was deployed in the context of societal security. Welfare fraud was the most deployed frame in the securitizing rhetoric. Asylum seekers were presented as “economic refugees”, who came to Austria to improve their financial situation and to take advantage of Austrian welfare state. In another argumentation thread the need to prioritize nationals in the distribution of social benefits, instead of
providing support to asylum seekers, was stressed. Such arguments implied that asylum seekers are using social benefits, which should be allocated to the nationals. Further, asylum seekers were rendered as possible competitors to the nationals in the labor market. This was clearly visible in the debate about facilitating asylum seekers’ labor market access in which the interests of currently unemployed nationals were presented as threatened, should asylum seekers receive an easier access to the labor market. Moreover, the asylum seekers were accused of not being willing to use the available opportunities in the labor market (particularly the highly precarious seasonal work). By such means, the image of asylum seekers as persons who refuse to work and at the same time demand social benefits from Austrian state was created. Finally, the images of “flood” and “invasion” used in the context of societal security were employed. Hereby, the Austrian state was rendered as overrun by the high numbers of asylum seekers.

There were few concrete references made in regard to the refugee protests - mainly in the context of the asylum seekers’ access to the labor market, as this issue was on the demands agenda of the refugee protesters. Otherwise, the securitarian rhetoric in the societal security sector did not contain references to the protest movement.

**Abuse of Asylum System**

Aside from the internal, societal and cultural security sectors, another category that contained securitarian rhetoric emerged in the course of this research. The often used concept of “abuse of asylum” seemed to be used as a category on its own when debating asylum seekers in Austria: the asylum system that was developed to grand protection to “real” refugees is presented as being abused by asylum seekers, who are assumed to not have a valid reason to apply for asylum. This concept is routed so deeply in the discourse that none of the actors who deployed such rhetoric viewed it as necessary to provide a definition of “abuse of asylum”. However, from the majority of such arguments became evident that asylum seekers, which have not been able to prove that they were persecuted to authorities, were rendered as “abusers of asylum”.

The presented results confirmed the existing securitization of asylum seekers during the refugee protests in Vienna. However, the majority of rhetoric analyzed did not emerge as response to the refugee protests, but was deployed in other context. The identified security domains were comprised of variety of issues to which asylum seekers were linked, be it criminality, welfare fraud or abuse of asylum system. These security domains where modulated by evoking fear of asylum seekers.

Another factor that contributed to the securitization of asylum seekers was the security
practice of Austrian authorities: deportations, detentions or the introduction of the identity checks of those refugee protesters who carried out the protest inside the Votive Church. Such measures contributed to further “distancing” of refugee protesters from the public, impeded their visibility and created an image of protesters as criminals. As Huysmans argues, administering distance towards immigrants by such means leads inevitably to the dynamic of inclusion and exclusion.

According to Huysmans (2006), additional characteristic of exclusion dynamics is that it does not recognize the differences among the immigrants, asylum seekers or refugees and their individual backgrounds. They are presented as a “collective force” that poses a threat to the established community (cf. Huysmans 2006). During the refugee protests this trend could also be observed in the rhetoric of FPÖ in regard to asylum seekers— all asylum seekers in Austria were spoken of as a single group that constituted a threat to public order. Other actors, including SPÖ representatives divided asylum seekers in legitimate and illegitimate asylum seekers. To combat the latter was presented as the ultimate goal in order to protect the first. Moreover, the rhetoric also implied that the majority of asylum seekers did not have the legitimate right to actually seek asylum in Austria, for example due to the “safe third country” and Dublin II regulations.

The exclusion of migrants by such means as criminalization of those who cross borders illegally or the usage of metaphors of “immigrants flood” or “invasion” evokes distrust between the host and migrant communities. In such circumstances a constructive dialogue and constructive engagement between these representatives of these communities become difficult. In the particular case of the refugee protesters, the dialogue between the community of the refugee protesters and their supporters on the one hand and the public on the other hand was impeded by the high security measures put in place during the protests. For instance, only five visitors of refugee camp activists at a time were permitted to enter the Votiv Church. Overall, the willingness for dialogue from the side of the government officials has been very limited, particularly by the Minister of Interior. To justify such limited willingness for dialogue from the side of the Ministry of Interior, the refugee protesters were presented as being instrumentalized by leftist activists. Such reasoning discredited the refugee protesters as negotiating partners or as independently acting actors.

To conclude the present chapter, the hypotheses put forth at the outset of the study are brought forward to discuss their validity.
• Actors who were advancing security logic in the public debate presented asylum seekers as threat to public order (e.g. threat to public security), cultural identity (e.g. Austrian national identity), and societal security (e.g. exploitation of Austrian welfare state). The securitizing rhetoric was aimed primarily at refugee protesters and was present in parliamentary debates as well as in press releases and interviews.

• Representatives of the political parties known for their conservative course regarding migration policies - Freedom Party of Austria (FPÖ), Alliance for the Future of Austria (BZÖ), Team Stronach and Austrian People’s Party (ÖVP) put forth a more securitizing rhetoric than Social Democratic Party of Austria (SPÖ), Chamber of Labor, and Austrian Economic Chambers. Ministry of Interior played a key role in securitizing refugee protesters as well as asylum seekers in general. The Green Party, Caritas, Diakonie, Catholic Church refrained from securitizing rhetoric.

• Securitization of asylum seekers and refugee protesters was used by the government to justify restrictive measures and policies towards asylum seekers in general as well as to the refugee protesters in particular.

The analyzed material provided a substantial insight in qualifying the security narrative during the refugee protests. As presented in chapter 7 in detail, Huysmans’ conclusions about securitization of migration in the EU could be confirmed in the case of asylum seekers in Austria. Public security, cultural identity and societal security were identified as the main issues at stake when rendering asylum seekers as threats. However, an additional aspect could be determined in the public debate – the abuse of the asylum system itself. As to the actors bringing forward security rhetoric, the hypothesis was partly true: FPÖ and Minister of Interior deployed the most securitizing rhetoric, followed by BZÖ, Team Stronach, ÖVP and SPÖ. Contrary to the assumptions in the hypotheses, some securitizing language was observed in the statements of Caritas, Catholic Church and Chambers of Labor. No securitizing rhetoric from the Greens or Diakonie could be found in the analyzed material.

Based on the findings of the study, the conclusion can be made that in Austria the securitizing rhetoric is deployed by some government official in order to justify current or to demand further restrictive measures in regard to asylum seekers.
At this point, it is necessary to stress that the findings of the present research should be qualified keeping some reservations in mind. To begin with some limitations due to the chosen methodology should be considered: the process of content analysis and classification of content material is a process of interpretation even though it is guided by analytical rules. Moreover, the interpretations of the material corpus analyzed always remain “unfinished”, as further analysis or reanalysis are possible (cf. Mayring 2010). Further, the choice of the theoretical framework, the social constructivist approach by Jef Huysmans, determined the angle of the inquiry and the investigation as well as the interpretation of results. Additionally, being interested in uncovering securitization processes; the present study did not analyze the “de-securitizing” rhetoric also present in the public debate about asylum seekers, which certainly presents an interesting research endeavor. Despite these limitations, the goal was to provide an overview of the securitization of asylum seekers in Austria through the lens of securitization of migration theory of Jef Huysmans.
References


Falci, Paula (2011): Securitization of migration policies in Italy. Wien: [n.p.]


Mayring, Phillip (2010): Qualitative Inhaltsanalyse: Grundlagen und Techniken. Weinheim [u.a.]: Beltz.


Annex

Primary sources quoted

Press releases:

http://www.ots.at/presseaussendung/OTS_20121211_OTS0127/fpoe-strache-sicherheitsmonitor-zeigt-erschreckenden-anstieg-der-kriminalitaet [viewed 03.03.2014].

http://www.ots.at/presseaussendung/OTS_20121205_OTS0262 [viewed 03.03.2014].

http://www.ots.at/presseaussendung/OTS_20121211_OTS0127 [viewed 03.03.2014].

http://www.ots.at/presseaussendung/OTS_20130425_OTS0067/fpoe-vilimsky-kein-asyl-fuer-jihadisten-und-terrorsympathisanten [viewed 03.03.2014].

http://www.ots.at/presseaussendung/OTS_20130922_OTS0040 [viewed 03.03.2014].

http://www.ots.at/presseaussendung/OTS_20130122_OTS0028 [viewed 03.03.2014].

http://www.ots.at/presseaussendung/OTS_20130521_OTS0131 [viewed 03.03.2014].

Freiheitlicher Parlamentsclub (2013e): FPÖ-Mölzer: Geplante EU-Asylregeln öffnen neues Tor für Massenzuwanderung. 06.06.2013.
http://www.ots.at/presseaussendung/OTS_20130606_OTS0135, [viewed 03.03.2014].


http://www.ots.at/presseaussendung/OTS_20130730_OTS0127 [viewed 03.03.2014].

http://www.ots.at/presseaussendung/OTS_20121221_OTS0130 [viewed 03.03.2014].
Interviews:


Mikl-Leitner, Johanna (2013b): "Wir sind nicht ausländerfeindlich" In: Kurier, 03.08.2013, 3.


Plenary sessions:

1) Plenary session no. 199, 24.04.2013
2) Plenary session no. 207, 13.06.2013
3) Plenary session no. 184, 05.12.2012
4) Plenary session no. 191, 27.02.2013
5) Plenary session no. 193, 20.03.2013

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Code</th>
<th>Definition</th>
<th>Example</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. Securitization</td>
<td>Securitizing asylum transfigures asylum seekers “in a factor that challenges the continuation of political identity and the autonomy of the political unit to modulate itself as a free space of freedom.” (Huysmans 2006: 61) Securitization is detected through the identification of a securitizing speech act or derived from the securitized context, in which the issue is embedded.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1.1. Internal security</td>
<td>Public order is viewed as endangered because it is expected that with the aboliton of the EU borders the number of asylum seekers will rise. The presence of asylum seekers on the territory of Austria is perceived as a potential danger to the internal security of the state. The asylum seekers are presented as illegal immigrants or terrorists, who endanger the host society or use their presence in Austria in order to carry out different sorts of criminal activities.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1.1.1 Terrorism</td>
<td>Asylum seekers are rendered as terrorists, who pose a danger to internal security in Austria.</td>
<td>Es gibt auch eine Entwicklung, die uns Österreicher betrifft, von der ich heute aber noch relativ wenig gehört habe, das sind keine Einzelfälle: Über 60 Dschihadisten, die sich angeblich in Österreich als Asylwerber auch in einem Verfahren befinden, sind aufgebrochen, um als radikale Islamisten und Terroristen in dieses Kriegsgebiet zu gehen und dort mitzumischen. Das sind keine Einzelfälle, wie man vielleicht meinen oder wieder behaupten könnte. (Heinz-Christian Strache, FPÖ; Plenary Session (PS) no.199: 26, 25.04.2013)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>----------------</td>
<td>--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------</td>
<td>--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1.1.2 Criminality</td>
<td>Asylum seekers are rendered as criminals, who pose a danger to internal security in Austria.</td>
<td>Würde eine schon seit Langem in Kraft getretene Verordnung, nämlich die Drittstaatenverordnung, endlich voll zum Tragen kommen, dann hätten wir fast keine Häftlinge und weniger Kriminalität, somit zufriedenere Bürger und eine weniger überlastete Polizei“ (Harald Vilimsky, FPÖ PS 184: 125, 5.12.2012)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1.1.3 Illegality</td>
<td>Asylum seekers are rendered as prone to sliding into illegality, especially when they are not granted asylum in Austria.</td>
<td>Das BZÖ steht für schnelle, aber faire Verfahren, wo echten Verfolgten schnellstmöglich ein sicherer Hafen garantiert wird, aber illegale Zuwanderer sofort wieder abgeschoben werden, bevor sie in der Illegalität untertauchen können. (Parlamentsklub des BZÖ 2012a)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1.2. Cultural security</td>
<td>Asylum seekers figure as the cultural challenge to social and political integration of a political unit.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1.2.1. Cultural decadence</td>
<td>Cultural decadence and a dawning cultural war as threatening factors.</td>
<td>Ich sage, in Europa gibt es Entwicklungen einer islamischen Parallel- und Gegengesellschaft, die gefährlich sind, die oftmals unterschätzt werden. (Heinz-Christian Strache, FPÖ, PS 207: 54, 13.06.2013)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1.2.2. Challenge to social and political integration</td>
<td>The functioning of traditional instruments of social and political integration such as nationalism are challenged</td>
<td>Interessen der Asylwerber zu schützen aber auch die Interessen der Bürger. Es kam zu Behinderungen von Passanten, Bettelei, zu Anzeigen wegen Herabwürdigung religiöser Lehren. Es wurde auch eine Party in der heiligen (sic!) Nacht veranstaltet. (Mikl-Leitner 2012)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1.3. Societal security</td>
<td>Asylum seekers play a role in the struggle for welfare rights and are increasingly seen as having no legitimate right to social assistance and welfare provisions. Asylum seekers are declared to rivals to the nationals in the labor market and competitors in the distribution of social goods.</td>
<td>Asylum seekers are rendered as competitors in the labor market who “take away jobs” from the nationals.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1.3.1. Labor market</td>
<td>Asylum seekers are rendered as competitors in the labor market who “take away jobs” from the nationals.</td>
<td>Obwohl um die 400.000 Arbeitslose in Österreich zu verzeichnen sind, will die Bundesregierung nun den Arbeitsmarkt für Asylwerber öffnen. Dies sei ein Schlag in das Gesicht der österreichischen Arbeitssuchenden, aber auch ein weiterer Anreiz für die Schlepper-Industrie, Asylbetrüger nach Österreich hereinzukarren. Dies sei ein rot-schwarzer Geisterfahrerkurs gegen die österreichischen Interessen. (Freiheitlicher Parlamentsclub 2013c)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1.3.2. Welfare fraud</td>
<td>Asylum seekers as people “who try illegitimately to gain benefits from the welfare system of a community to which they belong.”</td>
<td>Diese Menschen kommen hier her unter dem Vorwand, in ihrem Heimatstaat politisch oder religiös verfolgt zu werden, nehmen die Gastfreundschaft der österreichischen Staatsbürger in Anspruch,</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1.3.3. Prioritizing nationals</td>
<td>At times of economic scarcity nationals must be privileged in receiving social goods before immigrants can access it. In this argumentation logic, asylum seekers’ social rights should be limited not because they are “economic free-riders”, but because own community should be given preference in the distribution of benefits and welfare.</td>
<td>Ich glaube, wir investieren das Geld besser für die Österreicherinnen und Österreicher. Es gibt hier viele Frauen, die Alleinerzieherinnen sind und Probleme haben, finanziell durchzukommen. Dort wäre das Geld besser investiert. (Christoph Hagen, Team Stronach, PS 199: 32, 25.04.2013)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>---</td>
<td>---</td>
<td>---</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1.3.4. “Flood” and “invasion” images</td>
<td>The use of metaphors “flood” and “invasion” of immigrants and asylum seekers additionally contributes to disqualification of migration so that the economic and social uncertainty “are translated into opposition to and fear of immigrants and asylum seekers” (Huysmans 2006:79)</td>
<td>Es nützt mir auch das beste Gesetz nichts, wenn es eine solche Aktion gibt, wie sie in der morgigen Ausgabe der „Kronen Zeitung“ steht, nämlich diese Flüchtlingswelle aus Italien. . (Christoph Hagen, Team Stronach, PS 193: 211, 20.03.2013)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1.3.5 Lacking utilization of available opportunities</td>
<td>The asylum seekers are accused of not using available opportunities such as access to the labor market or social services. Because they are not making use of the given opportunities, their demands for better access to the labor market or better living conditions are viewed as illegitimate.</td>
<td>Es gibt bereits einen Zugang zum Arbeitsmarkt nach drei Monaten nach Antragstellung. In Deutschland gibt es das erst nach zwölf Monaten. Und gemäß der EU-Aufnahmerichtlinie muss es einen Zugang spätestens nach einem Jahr geben. Fakt ist, dass es hier Möglichkeiten gibt, dass aber diese Möglichkeiten seitens der Asylwerber nicht ausgeschöpft werden. (Mikl-Leitner 2012a)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1.4 Abuse of asylum system</td>
<td>Asylum system is presented as being threatened by asylum seekers, who are accused of abusing it. It is assumed that asylum seekers make false statements, lie and obtain asylum “by devious means” (Sedlak 2000:139)</td>
<td>In allen Bereichen wird gespart, aber da sind Sie nicht bereit, Asylmissbrauch abzustellen, weil es heute eine Asylindustrie in Österreich gibt – NGOs –, eine Asylindustrie, die von diesem Asylmissbrauch lebt und gar kein Interesse daran hat, den Asylmissbrauch abzustellen.“ (Heinz Christian Strache, FPÖ, PS, 184: 166, 05.12.2013)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
**Curriculum Vitae**

**Personal information**

Name: Ivanova Anastasiya  
Date of birth: 22 June 1989  
Email: ana.rudespen@gmail.com

**Work experience**

02.04.2013 - 05.07.2013  
Intern, *United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR)*, Vienna, Austria

09.2012 - 02.2013  
Accompaniment of and interpreting for asylum seekers and refugees (Russian - German)  
*Caritas der Erzdiözese Wien*, Vienna, Austria

Intern, *54th International Congress of Americanists*, Vienna, Austria

07.2011 - 10.2011  
Intern, *International Organization for Migration (IOM)*,  
*Department for Assisted Voluntary Return and Reintegration*, Vienna, Austria

**Education**

*University of Vienna, Department of Development Studies*  
**Master’s degree in International Development Studies expected**

20.01.2012  
Presentation of the seminar paper “Migration Flows in Austria and France: Possibility of Comparison?” at the University of Paris VIII Vincennes-Saint-Denis, Paris, France

10.2007 - 11.2011  
*University of Vienna, Center for Translation Studies*  
**Bachelor’s degree in Transcultural Communication**  
Working languages: German, Russian, English

07.2008 - 09.2008  
*Rice University Houston*, Texas, USA  
English Second Language Program

09.2008 - 12.2008  
*Houston Community College Houston*, Texas, USA  
Courses in Economics, Spanish, English, Geography
Languages

Russian: Native language
German: Excellent active and passive skills
English: Excellent active and passive skills
Ukrainian: Good active and passive skills
Spanish: Intermediate active and passive skills

Computer skills

Microsoft Windows, Office (and similar), Atlas.ti
In November 2012, the Refugee Protest Camp Vienna, a protest movement comprised of asylum seekers, began its activity in order to protest against the precarious living conditions of asylum seekers in Austria and such EU instruments as Dublin II Regulation, as well as to demand fundamental changes in the asylum and migration law in Austria. Being a unique form of self-organized resistance of asylum seekers, it has triggered heated public debate in Austria. Joining the existing research on securitization of migration in the EU, the present study aimed at analyzing the public debate during the refugee protests in Vienna in regard to its securitizing component, i.e. at identifying how asylum seekers have been securitized. The research was based on the presuppositions of the securitization of migration theory as developed by Jef Huysmans (2006) and used the method of structural content analysis according to Philip Mayring (2010) to address the research question. The material analyzed is comprised of stenographic protocols of parliamentary debates as well as press releases and interviews with relevant actors in the period under review. The study confirmed that securitizing rhetoric and practices during the analyzed time frame did take place. Rhetorically, the asylum seekers have been securitized as threat to internal, societal and cultural security and as abusers of Austrian asylum system. However, the identified securitizing rhetoric was triggered to a lesser degree by the refugee protests and much more by a range of other events that occurred at the same time. This indicates that the refugee protests were not the crucial catalyst for the securitizing rhetoric in the public debate. They provoked however a response from the authorities that according to Huysmans (2006) approach can be interpreted as securitizing practices: deportations or disproportionate police presence controlling the protesters.