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“The Common Man vs. Corruption
or the Globalized New Middle Class vs. The Political?

Dynamics and Dimensions of the
Indian Anti-Corruption Debate of 2011”

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Introduction

“This second freedom struggle began in January 30, 2011 – just five months back. It is a long haul, a kurukshetra with the government and the political establishment on one side and a vast majority on the other [...] No other democracy in the world has ever had so many debates and discussions on a single bill. Millions now know of the details of the Jan Lokpal Bill and have strong views on the same. This is the strength of our democracy. Rejoice in this open and transparent democracy – don’t let a bit of stink and dirt deter you. It is all a part of the process.” (Gandhi 2011a)

On August 16, 2011, an anti-corruption movement (ACM) which had been likened to India’s “second freedom struggle” found its erstwhile apex when Kisan Baburao (“Anna”) Hazare went on an indefinite fast, demanding the passage of the so-called “Jan Lokpal Bill” (JLB), a bill supposed to establish a “people’s ombudsman” (Jan Lokpal) “who shall be able to question and investigate the integrity and ethics of the entire State apparatus irrespective of its political status or standing” (Shah 2012: 176).

Bills aiming to establish a similar anti-corruption apparatus had been introduced to parliament for a total of eight times since 1968 (cf. Bong et. al. 2012; Sengupta 2008; Monteiro 2013), but government after government had debated the “scope of the proposed Bill” (Jain 1985) and government after government was dissolved or voted out of power before any agreement could be reached. There was talk of a “curse” (Monteiro 2013: 331). But in the winter of 2010–11, a new bill was proposed by a NGO calling itself “India Against Corruption” (IAC) and describing itself as representing “civil society” (IAC 2010a). Anna Hazare (“Anna” meaning “father figure” or “elder brother” in Marathi - see Khandekar & Reddy 2013; Sawyer & Sawyer 2011) and a team of prominent Right-to-Information activists were the figure heads of that movement and would soon be dubbed “Team Anna” in the English-language media.

As Shah sees it, “The rest of the story of the Anna Hazare campaign is the stuff of political thrillers” (Shah 2012: 178):

“The involvement of political parties and civil society organizations, the extraordinary exposure in public media, the series of accusations and counter-accusations which often forgot the issues at hand, an expose on the intentions and histories of the people who had lent voice to the movement – all add up to strange and complicated stories.” (ibid.: 178)

What truly set this movement apart, though, was the “sense, if not the reality, of a united India against corruption” (Khandekar & Reddy 2013: 3), propagated by IAC.
reproduced by the media and manifesting itself, to some extent, in protest marches, mass fasts, millions of social media entries and SMS campaigns.

In the years preceding the movement, India had witnessed strong economic growth paired with a “substantial expansion of India’s middle class” (Kapur 2010: 143). Corruption, however defined, has been seen as a hindrance to this discourse of development, progress and global competitiveness. The Global Integrity Report\(^1\) of 2011 gives India an overall score of 70 (weak), a “Legal Framework Score” of 87 (strong) and an “Actual Implementation Score” of 55 (very weak) (Global Integrity Report 2012), indicating that the framework to battle corruption is available but not being used, turning the focus to what is called “governance” by the media, think-tanks and aid organizations alike. The decade before had been described as “scandalous”, exposing widespread misappropriation of funds by consecutive governments and a “hand-in-glove collusion of State and Market interests at the cost of citizen rights, benefits and services” (Shah 2012: 176). This had resulted in an “impending sense of impassable crisis” and, write Khandekar and Reddy in their valuable study of the movement,

> “the unthinkable scale and audacious recurrence of corruption scandals coming to light in the year leading up to 2011 that ultimately precipitated middle-class coherence, if not full blown class consciousness, around the Lokpal Bill issue.”

(Khandekar & Reddy 2013: 4)

Three questions come to mind from this observation. First, is this a kind of “moral revolution”? Does it respond to newfound moral urgency to act, some kind of awakening to an imminent “Crisis of Corruption” (cf. Parry 2000)? Parry reminds us that “we should not forget that ideas can change and that when they do not we must try to account for their continued rhetorical force” (ibid.: 52). What, then, are the mechanisms sustaining this sense of urgency, how does the corruption discourse reproduce itself?

A second question deals with the “middle class” seen as the main force behind the movement. What are the politics of this class, can it be seen as a homogenous group or is it more heterogeneous, complex? More precisely, is there, and if so, what is the “shared imagination of corruption and political dysfunction” (Khandekar & Reddy

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\(^1\)Which I prefer to Transparency International’s Corruption Perception Index (CPI) since Global Integrity also includes indicators like press freedom, the legal framework and its implementation, oversight & checks and balances, judicial impartiality and more.
2013: 4) of said class? And, if one follows a reading of the corruption discourse as a “mechanism by which the state is discursively constituted” (ibid.: 4), what are therefore the imaginations of the state and democracy of this class?

Thirdly, the broader context of the movement comes into focus. Is this middle class changing India’s political landscape and are there indicators in the movement’s ideology and social practices for that? Must we see the ACM as situated in a continuity of action beginning with the liberalization of the Indian economy in the 1990s and the subsequent rise of communalism, or is this of a different quality, the “awakening” (de Benden 2011) of a class that has long been understood to be apathetic, not interested in the unruliness and tit-for-tat of the political sphere?

Ultimately, if one analyzes the larger dimensions and dynamics of the movement, the question becomes whether this was a re-evolution (another term would be renegotiation) or a revolution of India’s hegemonial State-Citizen-Consumer-Market relationships (cf. Shah 2012).

In my thesis, I will try to answer these questions. I will first conceptualize the anti-corruption discourse\(^2\), beginning with an overview of the attempts at defining it, leading to the central understanding of the idea of corruption as a “mass-mediated imaginary” (Appadurai 1996: 6) which not only serves to construct the state/the political (another mass-mediated imaginary), but also legitimizes hegemony in such a state, through the discourses and practices of governmentality (cf. Dean 2010). A special focus will be on the corruption discourse in postcolonial societies, and, more specifically, I will also provide an overview of the discourse of “Corrupt India”, in order to better understand the urgency of the movement whose main actors and rough chronology I will present thereafter.

I will then turn to the so-called ”New Middle Class” (NMC) since, as Khandekar and Reddy explain:

> “precisely because corruption is held up as a marker of extreme political dysfunction, we see it as a mechanism by which an emergent middle-class politics discursively constitutes and legitimizes itself. What, then, are the class practices gathered under the “middle class” rubric, and how do these constitute the unusual politics of summer 2011?” (Khandekar & Reddy 2013: 4)

I will develop a framework of three central dimensions and dynamics which define the NMC and make it a case sui generis in my eyes. The first is a historically grown

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\(^2\) Focusing on the discourse on rather than the mechanisms of corruption itself – an important distinction, as I will show in chapter 2.1.
distrust of the state and subsequent focus on a state-civil society dichotomy. The second chapter deals with the dynamics and “hegemonic aspirations”\(^3\) of said NMC and shows how the increasing claim of “the political” sphere expands the dichotomy into a state-civil society-political society trichotomy. The last dimension I wish to analyze is the embeddedness of this class in discourses and social practices of neoliberal globalization. In this section I will also, for a better understanding of this framework, present Nishant Shah’s understanding of State-Citizen-Market relationships (SCMR) in the Indian context and my adaptation of his framework. One last part of the conceptualization deals with the changing Indian Mediascape\(^4\) and how this Mediascape is very much part of the creation of “Auras of Meaning” (Liechty 2003: 32 f.) for the corruption discourse.

In the second part, I will consolidate the findings of the previous part into a framework of understanding and then analyze statements by IAC, the discourse in social media as well as by some actors of the “traditional” medial discourse about the movement and a commenters debate on the critical blog Kafila.org in order to apply and test that framework.

My thesis will draw on a wide range of inputs for a broad, transdisciplinary review of the literature on corruption and anti-corruption (both general observations and theories as well as more specific analysis of the Indian case) and will conduct qualitative critical discourse analysis in the second part.

### 1.1 Personal Approach and Research Interest

My own interest in the topic of corruption in India was piqued through encountering corruption myself in the field, working for the human rights NGO FIAN India (Food First Information and Action Network - whose work is basically focuses on the divide between theoretical law and practical reality) in 2011 and 2012. Corruption was, as I learned to understand it, the reason why FIAN had to fight for rights which were theoretically guaranteed in the country’s constitution. It was the reason why, as my colleagues and I would begin the publicity work on a new “case study”, things would very soon change that apparently had not changed for a long time. It seemed to be, as Parry puts it, “the kind of data which more or less falls into the fieldworker’s lap” (2000: 29). But corruption always stayed hidden, even more so for the inexperienced

\(^3\) A title I borrow from Fernandes & Heller 2006

\(^4\) As conceptualized by Appadurai 1990: 298 f.
student who had no knowledge of the local languages (Hindi and Urdu) at the time. Corruption was in the shadows, but it was always there – in my daily work, but also very much so in the medial debates about “Team Anna” and the Jan Lokpal Bill, which reached their peak level and then (for me at that time, inexplicably) almost vanished from public debate while I was in the country. Conversations with a young, presumably middle class Mumbai resident working in the entertainment industry (Bollywood) in December of 2011 introduced me to the widespread criticism of the proposed law at the time. In his opinion, the Lokpal would be far too powerful, far too dangerous, another unchecked, extra-democratic institution to be abused by politicians.

Back in Vienna, a Seminar by Markus-Michael Müller titled “Rethinking the Relationship Between Corruption and Development” introduced me to the transdisciplinary approach so important for the topic and brought me closer to the question what talking about corruption actually can reveal about societal relations with authority, (postcolonial) history and democracy. Once I had decided to write about the movement of 2011, I then began to ask myself the moral question Harrison also asks: “does a deconstruction of the anti-corruption agenda divert attention away from the real problems of corruption for those who experience it most acutely?” (Harrison 2006: 16) The answer is more nuanced than one might imagine at first. If there is an “agenda” (I will call it hegemonic discourse), its discussion should not, writes Harrison,

“lead to a relativism that can effectively excuse the acts in which the more powerful assert such power over the less powerful. To avoid such relativism, analysis has to be carefully situated in the social relationships within which corruption is talked about and defined.” (ibid.: 26)

But, judging from the literature available on the anti-corruption movement of 2011, it also seems quite obvious that a more nuanced discussion is needed and valuable, expanding on the literature that exists and has mostly only recently been published.

In the most valuable contribution about the ACM published so far, Khandekar and Reddy (2013) have written about how the New Middle Class’ consumerism has shaped not only the anti-corruption movement but also underlying ideas of the state. Sitapati (2011) writes about the different strands of the middle class present in the movement. Shah (2012) presents his reading of the movement as a form of resistance (rather than revolution) in a functioning State-citizen-market relationship. Sengupta (2013) focuses on the reasons for the decline in interest and support for the
movement (which he mainly locates in liberal and leftist skepticism). Bong et. al.
(2012) present a quantitative analysis of Facebook activity in 2011. Harindranat and
Khorana (2012), analyzing Twitter-entries, try to locate the movement along the lines
of Chatterjee’s “political society”.

The aim of this thesis then becomes bringing together the different and often
preliminary or superficial analyses and strands of reasoning presented in said
literature, distilling an essence but also complicating the issue and creating a
framework for analysis. I will then try to test this framework in a very limited
manner (a more comprehensive study not only would have to conduct
interviews with the different actors described, but also analyze the vernacular
discourse which I am not able to do at this time).

1.2 Hypothesis and Research Questions

My main hypothesis is that the anti-corruption discourse of 2011 can be seen as being
embedded in a larger dynamic of a rising “New Middle Class” that is distrustful of the
(development) state and “the political”, consumerist and legalistic in its demands of
the state and understanding of corruption, and is asserting its discursive power ever
more loudly, through old and new mediums alike.

In greater detail, the dynamics mentioned above are

1 historico-politically developed middle class distrust with the “political”, the
   “elite” or the Nehruvian development state
2 the discursive power and rising cultural hegemony of a middle class
   negotiating India’s increasing embeddedness in neoliberal globalization
3 the socio-economic rise in importance of said “New Middle Class” and the
   consumerization and legalization of all aspects of the state-citizen-market
   relationships
4 changing constructions of the public sphere by a media catering to middle
   class sensibilities and reproducing middle class discourses

Consequently, taking into account these dimensions and dynamics, my research
questions and sub-questions are as follows:

1 What were the underlying dimensions and dynamics of the anti-corruption
   movement of 2011?
2 How do these dimensions and dynamics of the movement represent a unique
   case?
3 How were these underlying dimensions and dynamics expressed in the
 medial debate of 2011?
   a. Who was able to speak, who was heard? What might be the reasons for actors being heard and others not?
   b. What was the reasoning against the “political elite”/“politics” and the reasoning for a strong Lokpal?
   c. What was the desired role for the state? What does that say about the different actors?
   4 What does that imply for the future of state-citizen-market relationships and democracy in India?

This framework has, of course, some blind spots, mainly the lack of information on the actual social composition of the anti-corruption movement and the lack of interviews and other primary input. It also needs to be noted that the corruption discourse in India can be described as a male discourse (cf. Lukose 2005) and that the role of gender for the anti-corruption movement of 2011 has not been studied so far. What was the participation of women other than Kiran Bedi and Sonia Gandhi in the movement? This question will have to be answered in future studies as it would somewhat go beyond the scope of such a thesis.

1.3 Methodology

I recognize that my approach to the subject is quite limited (mainly by financial and time constraints). Corruption is a subject that is multi-layered and constructed mostly through the discourse about it. But that it no excuse to pursue some sort of “armchair corruption studies” if other means of engagement with the topic are possible. I agree with Robertson’s critique of the recent academic debate (2006: 11) that studying how people talk about corruption “still keeps our subjects at arm’s length” and that it ought to be the focus of corruption research to learn “more about precisely how ‘corrupt’ transactions are conducted, and how they are embedded in the lives of the people involved.”

But, as I wrote, this cannot be the aim of this thesis. I will therefore present a conceptualization of the topic, drawing on literature from various fields such as anthropology, development studies, sociology, economics, political science, South Asian studies and media studies. Additionally, to reconstruct the chronology of the movement, I will heavily rely on newspaper articles, as no detailed chronologies are available at this time.
For the empirical part of this paper, I will use the methods of critical discourse analysis, drawing on Foucault, Dean (2010), Fairclough (2003) and Richardson (2007). My sources for analysis will mainly be ones that are available online, be it journal articles, newspaper articles, press releases, blog entries or posts in social networks and article comments. Of course I can only begin to scratch the surface of the online discourses about corruption. As writes Harrison: “The internet has made the quantity of comment and analysis on the subject almost unmanageably huge.” (Harrison 2006: 15)
Before I turn to the Indian discourse on corruption and the dynamics and dimensions associated with it, I need to talk about the meanings that the term “corruption” can have and what these meanings can say about ideas of state, government and democracy. For this, I will present some common definitions of the term, and will then talk about what talking about corruption has to do with governmentality and, more specific to the Indian case, what talking about corruption means in a postcolonial state. I will then try to give a rough introduction and overview of the proceedings of the 2011 anti-corruption movement and will expand on this with the three dimensions and dynamics associated with in the (scientific) debate. Furthermore I will try to provide a short overview of some of the issues involved in the medial debate about corruption and the ACM.

2.1 Talking About Corruption

It seems that corruption is well known by everybody. It seems to be a simple concept – something that we all know about and we all assume exists. Most people (that I know) do also agree that corruption is “wrong”, from a moral standpoint as well as from a politico-economic perspective. Corruption is very topical and always present in today’s Mediascapes (cf. Appadurai 1990: 298 f.). Krastev (2003: 107) argues that “The last decade of the 20th century was remarkable for the global explosion of interest in corruption […] And this tendency still continues.” And just as topical and present are its moral undertones.

On that note, an important development for the corruption discourse seems to have been the “Cancer of Corruption” speech by World Bank president James Wolfensohn (2005: 50):

“If the new compact is to succeed, we must tackle the issue of economic and financial efficiency. But we also need to address transparency, accountability, and institutional capacity. And let’s not mince words: we need to deal with the cancer of corruption […] we all know that it is a major barrier to sound and equitable development.”

Mark Farrales (2005: 10) speaks of this as the “defining moment in corruption studies.” But Wolfensohn’s speech also hints at some important features of the corruption discourse. The use of the word “cancer” paints corruption in highly moralistic terms and Harrison notes that “metaphors of illness and disease have been common in
much writing about corruption” (2006: 17). Furthermore the use of “economic and financial efficiency” (among others) hints at what Krastev (2003) calls the “Washington Consensus on Corruption” and “can be seen as being broadly related to, the concern with governance that dominated the [neoliberal] development paradigm of the 1990s” (Harrison 2006: 17, comment M.K.). Corruption seems to be a term that has power. It also seems that “general perceptions about the pervasiveness of corruption do not quite square with the actual experience of it. Popular discourse seems prone to inflate its incidence”, as Parry notes in his important and widely cited chapter about the “Crisis of Corruption” (2000: 30). One study is actually claimed to have “found that perceptions of corruption are in fact only very weakly linked to actual experience” (Harrison 2006: 15). Although it seems easy to contest this study on the grounds that the actual experience of corruption, by virtue of its illegality, will be hidden from public view, it is nonetheless another indicator that corruption is not definable with a black and white scheme. As Mira Fels (2008: 9) concludes, “corruption, as well as development, and democracy, are terms whose meanings are contested.” I find it therefore imperative to deconstruct the meanings ascribed to the term, and, in parallel, to “throw light on the processes of meaning-creation, and on their relationships to social networks and power” (Harrison 2006: 16) in order to later understand who, in the Indian context, contests the meanings of corruption for what purpose. A first step of this is to look at the definitions debate of the latter half of the 20th century and to focus especially on what is said and what isn’t said.

2.1.1 Defining and (Mis)understanding Corruption5

Dieter Haller and Chris Shore begin their comprehensive look at what corruption actually means with the World Bank’s definition from 2002. According to this definition, corruption is “the abuse of public office for private gain” (World Bank 2002, cit. by Haller & Shore 2005: 2). They instantly note that

“this definition reduces corruption simply to a problem of dishonest individuals or ‘rotten apples’ working in the public sector. It also reduces explanations for corruption to individual greed and personal venality so that our focus – to extend the metaphor – is on the individual apples rather than the barrel that contains them.”

(ibid.: 2)

5 I take this chapter title from Robertson 2006
Mira Fels also asks “What if corruption was not only individual misbehaviour [...]? It might also be considered an institutional or systemic phenomenon” (Fels 2008: 10). Also, as Mark J. Farrales observes in his very good overview of the scientific debate on corruption “The detrimental impact to the public is simply taken to be a matter of fact and is, from these authors’ point of view, an indispensable aspect of defining corruption.” (Farrales 2005: 20)

But, as I will show with the help of Farrales, this seems to be the accepted minimal consensus of definitions. And it seems to be the only one. The author notes “continued difficulty in defining and conceptualizing corruption.” (ibid.: I) He writes that the “research has been disjointed, and no unified model or theory of corruption currently exists.” (ibid.: 1)

Before turning to the ongoing scientific debate, another common definition of the term might serve as an introduction. Merriam-Webster (n.d.) defines corruption as “dishonest or illegal behavior especially by powerful people (such as government officials or police officers)”. In this sentence, we find both the political dimension and the bureaucratic dimension of corruption as differentiated by Farrales below. Further corruption, according to the dictionary, is defined as “impairment of integrity, virtue, or moral principle”, as “decay, decomposition”, as “inducement to wrong by improper or unlawful means (as bribery)” and as “a departure from the original or from what is pure or correct”. All the terms of this definition are broad, moralistic and highly ambiguous. What is wrong for one actor might be acceptable for another.

Farrales observes several dimensions of “corruption” that have been the focus of scientific research – political “grand” corruption and bureaucratic “petty” corruption - or what Farrales calls “the grand-petty divide” (Farrales 2005: 30), “corruption in developed countries or corruption in developing countries” (ibid.: 1), and case studies on the one hand or broad, statistics based research on the other. He also observes two waves of corruption research, both connected to waves of “democratization and development” (ibid.: 6).

While corruption “may have been a subject of intellectual engagement since at least the time of Aristotle” (Harrison 2006: 17), the first contemporary attempts at definition of the 1960s divided scholars between “moralists” and “revisionists” (cf. ibid.), the “revisionists” having a more functionalist “value-neutral” (Farrales 2005: 14) view of corruption than the self-explanatory “moralists”, whose definitions, according to the author, “carried clear ethical overtones.” (ibid.: 14)
Some functionalist definitions from the 1960s focus heavily on the role of the public office held by those who are corrupted. One attempt at a value-free definition of something commonly perceived as violating the public interest is Joseph Nye’s. According to him, corruption is:

“behavior which deviates from the formal duties of a public role (elective or appointive) because of private-regarding (personal, close family, private clique) wealth or status gains; or violates rules against the exercise of certain types of private-regarding influence.” (Nye 1967, cit. by Farrales 2005: 17)

This excludes nepotism, as well as the gray area of lobbyism (cf. ibid.: 17 f.). It also excludes other reasons someone in a “public role” might have for corrupt behavior – for example acting “in the best interest” of the public, as understood by politicians or officials trying to keep their job, or acting under pressure from a family- or work-based hierarchy. But of all the definitions seen so far, it is the one that is the most unambiguous (aside from the distinction of public and private – see below) since it doesn’t use any moralistic, value-laden terms. It has also been, according to Farrales, one of the most popular definitions since it is neutral and the shortened version of Nye’s definition – corruption as the “misuse of public office for private gain” (cf. ibid.: 25 ff.) – was also used by the World Bank and Transparency International and therefore central during the aforementioned surge in interest on the topic.

Definitely less neutral but from the same era as Nye’s, James Scott’s definition focuses on the political side of things. Scott differentiates between expression of political interest before and after legislation has been passed. For him,

“Influence before legislation is passed often takes the form of ‘pressure-group politics’; influence at the enforcement stage often takes the form of ‘corruption’ and has seldom been treated as the alternative means of interest articulation which in fact it is.” (1969: 1142, emphasis i.o.)

This implies that corruption can be seen as a means for people who do or cannot organize into “pressure-groups” to “construe” the law after the fact to work for them, in other words as a form of democratic “empowerment” in hierarchical societies. This would be quite interesting in the Indian context, since one reading of the anti-corruption movement is that it signifies a conflict between those that are “empowered” through corruption (i.e. people who are dependent on benefits gained through bribery etc.) and those that are arguably not so dependent on it (i.e. the so-called middle class – see chapters 2.3 and 4).
Nathaniel Leff’s definition is in some respects quite comparable to Scott’s and what Farrales calls “value-free” (Farrales 2005: 15):

Corruption is an extra-legal institution used by individuals or groups to gain influence over the actions of the bureaucracy. As such the existence of corruption per se indicates only that these groups participate in the decision-making process to a greater extent than would otherwise be the case. (Leff 1964, cit. by Farrales 2005: 15)

Leff, according to Farrales (ibid.: 7) “even argued that bureaucratic corruption could, in some instances, actually promote efficiency”, although Leff is talking about economic efficiency, not about the democratic “potential” of corruption. Lastly, Samuel Huntington proposed that corruption “may be a means of assimilating new groups into the political system by irregular means because the system has been unable to adapt sufficiently fast to provide legitimate and acceptable means for this purpose” (Huntington 1968: 60 f., cit. by Farrales 2005: 16). Again this could point to the Indian case of the corruption accompanying the “Silent Revolution” of the 1990s (see Jaffrelot 2003; Sengupta 2008). All these examples show that corruption is a highly ambiguous term, ascribed with very different meanings for the actors participating in and being affected by it. Or, as Farrales sums it up, “corruption is a cross-systemic, cross-temporal and cross-cultural phenomenon. It can exist in any place, at any time, and under any form of government.” (Farrales 2005: 12)

What is central to most definitions is that the terms for what corruption seems to be abusing/neglecting are just as ambiguous as “corruption” itself. For Mulinge/Lesetedi (1998: 15 f.), only people working for the “public good” and abusing it are considered corrupt. Merriam-Webster talks about “integrity, virtue, or moral principle” that are not being followed. “Corruption” is then defined as a negative of these kinds of symbolic terms, public interest/public good, moral principle etc. They are situated at the heart of the corruption discourse and make clear, that “corruption” is always dependent on who talks about it. In the same vein, for Farrales, corruption is always an expression of the socio-political context it exists in. He asks of his readers to, “before we seek to understand how or why corruption works, we must first be familiar with the context in which it occurs.” (Farrales 2005: 33) If corruption is defined by the societal context, that means discourse alone determines whether corruption “exists” or rather whether it is necessarily a bad occurrence. In the end, “public opinion is what determines corruption” (ibid.: 22) and the urgency of the situation.
There were and are some attempts to incorporate public opinion – and the norms it is based on – into corruption definitions, although Farrales is critical of these attempts and stresses that:

“If norms [and therefore opinion] are so variable from place to place and from time to time, then there is no easy way to identify, let alone study, corruption. The concept of corruption becomes so vague and fleeting that it is almost rendered useless.” (ibid.: 23, comment M.K.)

In my opinion, this is an invalid argument. Corruption is defined differently by different people, but that doesn’t mean that this hinders the researcher’s ability to examine emic meanings and practices connected with corruption and compare them with each other or with those meanings and practices considered universal. It is a valid criticism of seemingly data- and fact-based indices like Transparency International’s well known Corruption Perception Index which aims to make the perception of the pervasiveness of corruption comparable by “drawing information from “experts” such as business leaders and journalists” (Harrison 2006: 18). As Harrison notes, “the CPI has a degree of recognition that serves to perpetuate the sense of crisis in developing countries, the majority of which fall in the “most corrupt” sections of the index” (ibid.: 18). Farrales stresses that “Because perceptions of corruption are sensitive to cultural variations from one country to the next, we can never be sure that perception-based indices really measure the same thing.” (Farrales 2005: 36, emphasis i.o.)

One classification whose inclusion of public opinion seems to be useful (also for the Indian context and the question of why some people protest and some people are interested in upholding the status quo) is Heidenheimer’s definition of “black”, “gray” and “white corruption”, which is why I will quote at length:

“The evaluation “black corruption” indicates that in that setting that particular action is one which a majority consensus of both elite and mass opinion would condemn and would want to see punished on grounds of principle. “Gray corruption” indicates that some elements, usually elites, may want to see the action punished, others not, and the majority may well be ambiguous. “White corruption” signifies that the majority of both elite and mass opinion probably would not vigorously support an attempt to punish a form of corruption that they regard as tolerable. This implies that they attach less value to the maintenance of the values involved than they do to the costs that might be generated as the result of a change in rule enforcement.” (Heidenheimer 2002: 152)
If we accept this definition as relatively value neutral and focus on public opinion, we will inevitably be led to the larger topic at hand, that this public opinion of corruption is at once embedded in the larger societal relations, namely views of the state and governmentality, as I will touch on below.

### 2.1.2 Corruption and Governmentality

“we should not see corruption in the narrow English sense of the word – with all its restrictive, provincial and puritan connotations – but rather as something more subtle, layered and complex, like ‘a conversation, a ritual’. In this respect, corruption is a form of exchange: a polysemous and multi-stranded relationship and part of the way in which individuals connect with the state. [...] We need to grasp both the politics and the poetics of corruption to gain the measure of its cultural complexity.”

(Haller & Shore 2005: 7, emphasis i.o.)

Haller’s and Shore’s quote explains the governmentality argument I want to make quite nicely. The corruption discourse is part of a larger “conversation” with the state and governmentality. The “poetics” and the “politics” of this discourse inform each other, are reciprocal. Gould (2011) writes about how, (not just) in the Indian case, “Accusations of corruption have historically been wielded as a political weapon – a means of tarnishing rivals in the right circumstances.” This means that talking about corruption implies and produces a certain (moral) authority, meaning that the discourse on corruption is a Foucaultian discourse of power (cf. de Sardan 1999). In a similar vein, Koechlin describes how “corruption is seen neither as social practice nor structural feature, but through the very lens of emancipation: as a discursive representation that creates the possibility of public spaces and discursive interaction.”

(Koechlin 2013: 87)

Corruption is then a larger conversation, interacting (“discursive representation”) with grand, yet undefined ideas if a collective interest, a basic governmentality we all share. It is therefore always important to keep these questions in mind: who is talking, for what purpose, to whom?

I will now turn towards the contemporary debate as an example of this embeddedness in a larger conversation of governmentality. As pointed out above, in the 1990s there was renewed interest in the topic of corruption. Some of the earlier “positive” definitions such as the ones by Scott and Leff were countered from the 1970s onwards with a more politico-economic actor and agency based approach to
corruption perceived as being negative in all instances (cf. Farrales 2005: 16 ff.) which gained more ground in the 1980s and especially in the 1990s (Krastev 2003: 120 ff.). If we now turn to the context corruption is debated in we see that a shift in debate on corruption runs parallel with a bigger shift towards neoliberal governmentality. Elizabeth Harrison observes how “attention to corruption has gone hand in hand with policies of market liberalization, decentralization and privatization.” (Harrison 2006: 17) Mira Fels, collating all the literature on the abovementioned corruption “explosion”, presents five explanations. The first, historical explanation “holds the end of the cold war responsible” as the “end of political hypocrisy” (Fels 2008: 4, 5). The second is about the subsequent wave of democratizations and a “more independent” media which, according to Fels, also started campaigning against corruption (ibid.: 5). The third reason interest in corruption spiked is economic/neoliberal globalization, as “international inter-connectedness makes it easier to ‘name and shame’ corrupt companies or governments, for instance on the internet” (ibid.: 6). A fourth explanation concerns the aforementioned “Washington Consensus on Corruption” with its messages of “transparency”, “accountability” and “efficiency” (the latter being the most important for business and therefore the biggest incentive to fight corruption) as posited by Krastev (2003).

The most important explanation concerns a shift in the scientific debate about corruption, “how the economic discourse marginalized all other discourses in debating corruption.” (ibid.: 120). Economists believe “that the corruption act is a rational behavior that takes place under certain incentives” (ibid.: 120). This is, once again, the same individualistic and unambiguously (though implicitly) moralistic approach as present in the World Bank definition that finds fault not in the structure (or in “culture”, which invited culturalism and was criticized, see for example Mulinge & Lesetedi 1998) but in the policy environment that incentivizes individuals to be/stay corrupt (cf. Krastev 2003: 120). Anti-Corruption therefore becomes matter of incentives, and corruption just another measurable phenomenon. As Krastev writes:

“The local was blind to the normative nature of the current anti-corruption crusade because for it »corruption« was never a normal policy issue. The »local« was hijacked by the rhetoric of anti-corruption. Democracy activists think anti-corruption politics is by definition progressive and reformist.” (ibid.: 123)

It is this “hijacking” that is of interest here. Arturo Escobar is examining the development discourse and its
“creation of an institutional field from which discourses are produced, recorded, 
stabilized, modified, and put into circulation. This field is intimately imbricated with 
processes of professionalization; together they constitute an apparatus that organizes 
the production of forms of knowledge and the deployment of forms of power, 
relating one to the other.” (Escobar 1995: 46)

This could easily be about the corruption discourse as well, which can be seen, as 
Harrison notes, “as a tool that may tell us less about a specific action than about the 
value system of the person [or institution] doing the labelling” (Harrison 2006: 16, 
comment M.K.). Corruption is not only a tool that assigns moral and political power to 
those claiming to fight it, it is also a discourse that is an end in itself, creating the 
“forms of knowledge” necessary to sustain it. It is an end in itself because of its 
reciprocal relationship with the development discourse. The discourse on corruption 
“provides the epistemology, the legitimization of terms and concepts, the categories 
and taxonomies, which the development discourse appropriates and applies in its 
intervention strategies” (Koechlin 2013: 88).

If these values, categories and taxonomies are then contested (for example by 
academics), the discourse still manages “to absorb and render intelligible a multitude 
of different and even antagonistic elements […]. This resilience to deconstruction is 
part of its adaptive strength” (ibid.: 88)

Mira Fels is one of these academics, contesting the notions of “public interest”/“public 
good”: “Who is to decide and thereby speak for the public interest at large?” (Fels 
2008: 11) She points to Haller and Shore who state that “The definition of ‘the public 
interest’ (and who speaks for the public) is […] vague and contested – and precisely the 
terrain over which democratic politics are fought” (2005: 5). It is also the terrain over 
which the development discourse so easily strolls, as if these questions were not a 
matter of constant democratic negotiation. And this brings us back to the academic 
discourse, which has a real impact on corruption policy and ideas of corruption. Lucy 
Koechlin, examining the reciprocity of development and corruption discourse, writes 
that “As a body of structuring principles the scholarly discourse contributes to the 
formation of social facts, social facts which inform and are informed by the way we 
think and perceive of ‘corruption’.” (Koechlin 2013: 87) Namely she is talking about 
“larger”, moralistic ideas of the “public good”, which serves the (neoliberal) 
governmentality propagated and spread through the development agenda of the late 
20th and early 21st century. Corruption itself then becomes a social fact, as Haller and 
Shore observe:
“its inexplicable pervasiveness and the curious fascination that people, in almost every part of the world, seem to have with stories of corruption. In this sense corruption represents both an ethnographic enigma and a ‘social fact’ in the classical Durkheimian sense. Or perhaps what makes corruption such an interesting object of study is not so much the ‘reality’ of its existence as the fact that it is widely believed to exist, the complex narratives that enfold it, and the new relationships and objects of study that those narratives create” (Haller & Shore 2005: 6, emphasis i.o.)

2.1.3 Corruption and Perceptions of the (Postcolonial) State

Coming back to the Indian case, it is now interesting to examine, who was and is central in the creation of such social facts. If we learn by whom and why corruption is defined and constructed, we might also learn more about why corruption is contested and why it is contested with a new form of governmentality, as I will expand on below. India being a postcolony, we are naturally confronted with categories of “inside” and “outside” when it comes to the power of discourse. “Outside”, that is mainly considered to be a certain “Western bias” when it comes to corruption. Once again, definitions are a good start. Farrales notes that moralistic study of corruption of the 1960s was mostly “descriptive”, since the authors “were simply writing about a characteristic of more “backward” societies” (Farrales 2005: 14). This means the authors were writing – and judging – from the safe distance of a more “civilized” world where corruption didn’t exist – an “inherent Western bias” (ibid.: 14). But, as the author points out, “the 1990s revealed that even established democracies were not immune from corruption” (ibid.: 11). This actually renewed the interest in corruption studies – the phenomena once thought to be characteristic of “underdeveloped” regions were observed right at home.

But all in all, there is an observable divide in the literature about corruption in “developed” and “developing” countries, as Farrales notes. According to the author, the distinctions made between the two categories are

“that market structures are inherently different in developing societies, that traditional notions of authority sometimes conflict with new forms of public office, and that economic and other types of market reform in developing societies lead to changing incentives for opportunistic behavior.” (ibid.: 31)

The first and third distinctions point to economistic understandings of corruption as another kind of interest- and incentive-based market, as discussed above. The waters become murky with “traditional notions of authority”. Another “cultural” argument
comes from D. Bayley and J. Nye who, according to Farrales, believed that corruption originated from a process "when new political institutions met traditional cultures, or when economic development outpaced legal development. In short, corruption was a by-product of modernization and development" (ibid.: 15).

These examples have clear culturalist undertones, and could also be critiqued as cultural determinism, associated with terms such as "tradition" and "lack of ethic" which render the Western model of corruption useless (cf. Harrison 2006: 19). Furthermore, they also construct the "Western" institutions and "modernity" as the norm, as something that is achieved through development. As Rajagopal concurs:

> "the discourse of corruption re-legitimizes the ideology of liberal democracy, rights, rule of law and the very idea of development. It does this by attempting to re-establish the “faith” in these western models by arguing that the violence and the decay of these ideas and institutions are not inherent social pathologies, but are mere aberrations or "corruptions" which can be remedied by appropriate technocratic intervention.” (Rajagopal 1999: 5)

If these "Western models" and norms are accepted, as they seem to have been by most in the contemporary anti-corruption debate calling for more “efficient” institutions, then it is not a big leap from revisionist quasi-benevolent relativizations of corruption as a necessary “byproduct” of “modernization” to seeing corruption as something that hinders state and society from achieving – in the thus created hierarchy – the same status as the “Western” antetypes.

One such way of understanding corruption is “as a measure of how well a society distinguishes between public and private spheres", but this “public–private dichotomy is often an arbitrary and inherently ambiguous cultural category", as Haller and Shore observe (2005: 5). Elizabeth Harrison comes to the same conclusion about the distinction between public and private:

> "It is this aspect of current thinking about corruption that has been the target of the most sustained criticism from a range of political scientists, who argue that the Weberian notions of bureaucratic rationality from which it is derived are inappropriate and fail to describe many non-western contexts.” (Harrison 2006: 19)

According to Mira Fels (Fels 2008: 11), Gupta, writing about the same topic in 2005, states that the idea of the “role-fulfilling, disinterested professional occupying a location in an organizational structure solely due to professional competence and merit” is not “as much a figment of modern imagination as his or her imagined contrast”. Fels follows this up with the question whether anybody can ever
“completely cease to be a regular human being with likes, dislikes, personal needs, interests and ambitions” (ibid.: 11) For the Indian case, Akhil Gupta’s “blurred boundaries” is a seminal work on the – obviously – blurred boundaries of the Indian state–citizen–civil society relationship. I will touch on this throughout the paper.

Further approaching the topic of this section, it needs to be emphasized, that colonialism can in no way be seen as the only prerequisite for a corrupt bureaucracy and state. Other factors could be strong economic growth (for example through the so-called “resource curse”), influences from outside actors (for example the support for anti-communist actors and parties during the Cold War), the effects of liberalization policies (for example neocolonialist land-grabs), the prevalence of monopolies (arguably an important factor in the Indian case) and the heterogeneity and resiliency of bureaucracies, the so-called “bureaucratic reproduction” (for some of these points, see Fels 2008, chapter 4: “Approaches to the Study of Corruption”).

A theory that might provide another understanding for the Indian case comes from M. Mulinge and G. Lesetedi (1998). They are writing about the connection between colonialism and the incidence of corruption in Sub-Saharan Africa and see similarities and differences on the global level, “depending on the peculiar systems of power distribution and the legal and moral norms operating therein” (Osoba 1996, cit. by Mulinge & Lesetedi 1998: 16). They note that there is a great quantity of literature on the topic, but that it fails “to incorporate its historical grounding […] and especially those associated with colonialism and how it has affected the institution of corruption” (ibid.: 17). For the authors,

“corruption appears to be a social phenomenon deeply rooted in the historical process of colonization (…) as by-product of traits of fraudulent antisocial behaviour derived from British, French and other colonial rulers This behaviour was instilled into the colonial peoples during the colonial period and was carried into the post-colonial era” (ibid.: 18)

They list several factors enabling corruption though colonialism. Firstly, they argue that before colonial rule in Africa, local economies didn’t appear to have the financial infrastructure to be sizable monetary economies “characterised by a clear differentiation of interests” and that were conductive to corruption (ibid.: 18). Especially the British introduced monetary taxes which were mainly collected by the local native elite, in the African context mostly by chiefs, who could retain a part of the money if they delivered enough of it to the center, which opened the door to abuse of that newfound power and made the local elite into “willing agents of
colonialism and blinded them to the plight of their people as a consequence of taxation” (cf. ibid.: 18 f.).

While the authors employ some of the same moralistic terms as discussed above, for the topic of this section this could be interesting in that it reinforced and set in stone local hierarchies, giving elites more power, financially and symbolically through their connections to the European colonizers. Also, looking at the moral aspects of it, it seems logical that if the pressure to collect as much money as possible encouraged abuse and it then seems logical that it must have encouraged those who did explicitly not work for the “public interest” of their people but for their own or for the interests of the higher authorities. As mentioned before, modern corruption works as a pyramid, where corrupt behavior can always be justified by who else is practicing the same implied the justification is as follows: My boss is acting out of self-interest, so why shouldn’t I do the same?

The authors also argue that the British practice of divide et impera, of heavily “favouring one tribe over others” (Mulinge & Lesetedi 1998: 19) in order to ensure loyalty and prevent the formation of a sense of unity created elites that had not existed before, “created immense regional disparities in the extent of educational attainment and economic opportunities” and therefore “sowed the seeds of corrupt behaviour” (ibid.: 20). It also arguably sowed the seeds for “ethno-centric favouritism and nepotism” (ibid.: 21) on the basis of religion, ethnicity, caste and other strata, transposed to the Indian context arguably for the Hindu/Muslim divide (although this is a large and complex issue). This, in turn diminished competence in favor of loyalty and connections as hiring conditions, therefore reinforcing the corruption cycle of the so-called “pastoral model” (ibid.: 21). Another point that is universally relevant is the so-called “African chief model’ of administration” (ibid.: 22), relying on chiefs with “new powers and occasional payment that translated them […] into agents of colonialism” (ibid.: 22) and consequently from rulers with limited power into “authoritarian figures” appointed to deliver stability, not rule of law (ibid.: 22). This is universal because of the power structure it created, which has been reproduced in (post-)colonial settings arguably not just in Sub-Sahara Africa – the Zamindari system in India comes to mind, creating a powerful aristocracy especially in rural areas.

Additionally, where they had to formally yield power, the British and other colonizers tried to ensure that the newly created power structures were as simple, centralized, hierarchical and therefore easily controllable as possible (ibid.: 22 f.), leading to the
“politicisation of bureaucracies” along party lines, further transforming the nexus between public office and public interest.

As I have hopefully shown, corruption is neither just the choice of the individual, nor is the structure the determinant alone. Rather, inbetween the two sits a specific governmentality, informed by historical relationships with the state (in the Indian case closely, but not only related to colonialism and the Emergency of the 1970s, which I will touch on below), by global and globalizing neoliberal, “Western” ideas, institutions and notions of “public good”, by a development discourse which is partly legitimized by and in turn legitimizes the (anti-)corruption discourse, and by underlying, particularistic class struggles, or, more broadly, hierarchies.

It is this governmentality that I want to examine, and therefore I will now come to the specificities of the Indian case which are important for the framework I will develop below.

2.1.4 “Corrupt India”

“local merchants who bring in foreign goods by caravan or by water routes shall enjoy exemption from taxes, so that they can make a profit. The King shall protect trade routes from harassment by courtiers, state officials, thieves and frontier guards... [and] frontier officers shall make good what is lost... Just as it is impossible not to taste honey or poison that one may find at the tip of one’s tongue, so it is impossible for a government servant not to eat up at least a bit of the King’s revenue... And there are about forty ways of embezzlement by the government servant...”

(Kautilya, The Arthashastra, cit. by Farrales 2005: 4)

This quote points to a long Indian history of practices called “corruption” today. It also points to a stark contrast to the contemporary discourse about corruption. It is seen as a fact of life that it is impossible not to at least “share” some of the wealth the authority accumulates. As Parry notes, under the Mughal administration

“no sharp distinction was drawn. Many officials received, not a salary, but a share of the revenue; and dastur (custom) and mamul (usual practice) and other like payments that would today be ‘corrupt’ were taken as a matter of legitimate right.”

(Parry 2000: 52)

This stems from different pre-British concepts of a social contract where “the political domain was located at a distance from the moral core of society” (ibid.: 27). Dumont, according to Parry, talked about the “strict jurisdiction’ between the moral order of dharma and the politico-economic domain of artha, the latter being peripheral to the core values” (ibid.: 51). It is Jawaharlal Nehru who is credited with
changing this contract, with the “establishment of the state at the core of India’s society” (Dumont 1970: 19 f., 41, cit. by Parry 2000: 27). In so doing, Nehru and his peers established the ideas of “rational legal authority”, “public office”, “impersonal rules” and the distinction of “public and private, office and home” which led to the creation of “the discourse of corruption as we know it” (Visvanathan and Sethi 1998: 5, cit. by ibid.: 52), since, as I have shown above, corruption springs exactly from this “misunderstood” (and Western) distinction of public and private.

Akhil Gupta, in his often cited article “blurred boundaries: the discourse of corruption, the culture of politics, and the imagined state” has written, according to Haller and Shore, about how this distinction just isn’t drawn so starkly in the (north-) Indian context and that

“Western assumptions about the rational activity of office-holders simply do not translate. The distinction between an official’s role as public servant and private citizen is collapsed not only at the site of their activity, but also in their styles of operation.” (Haller & Shore 2005: 5)

It is exactly this distinction whose boundaries Gupta sees as blurred. To quote from his article directly: “Officials [...] are seen as thoroughly blurring the boundaries between ‘state’ and ‘civil society’” (Gupta 1995: 384). And through the discourse about corruption, these distinctions and rights are also reproduced (in that they are seen as lacking). As Gupta posits, “The discourse of corruption, by marking those actions that constitute an infringement of rights thus acts to represent the rights of citizens to themselves.” (ibid.: 389)

Therefore, it can and has been argued that it was also Nehru “who started the post-independence rot” (Parry 2000: 28) – or rather who created the conditions (the rational, rights-based Nehruvian development state acting in the public interest) which made the discourse as we know it today possible.

No matter how the discourse came about, it is a reality, a social fact, as elaborated above. As Parry notes, “There is a ‘public’ domain, of which the state is supposed to act as guardian, and the appropriation of it by private interest has increasingly become a source of real resentment.” (ibid.: 52 f.) More than that, these misappropriations have produced and reproduced the notion of a “crisis of corruption” and it is this “disjunction between concern with corruption, the sense and claims of crisis, and our understanding of how people actually experience corruption” (Harrison 2006: 15) which is interesting here since it leads us to the question, what the media’s role is in the (re-)production of the values of the
developmental state and the (re-)production of a discourse of corruption. I will touch on that in chapter 2.4. I will now give a short overview of how the narrative about the state/"the political" in post-independence India changed through high-level corruption scandals and the Emergency in the 1970s.

The first corruption case, directly after independence, became known as the Mudgal Affair, writes Jain (1994: 336). Parliamentarian Mudgal was accused of accepting ₹ 20,000 “to canvas support and make propaganda on behalf of the Bombay Bullion Association”. After a committee was established to examine the case, Mudgal resigned from his post. The first "big" scandal of the young country was one of the two with whom Nehru, according to Parry (2000: 28), started the post-independence rot "by his embarrassed indulgence". In the Jeep scandal, India’s High Commissioner to Great Britain Krishna Menon “signed an unfulfilled but fully paid up contract on behalf of the Government. Menon’s refusal to face an inquiry sparked a public outcry.” (Jain 1994: 336). But Menon enjoyed Nehru’s trust since he “was an old friend of Nehru” (Guha 2010, chapter 8: "Home and the World”), no inquiry was made and Menon later became Minister of Defence.

The Mundhra deal of 1957, according to Jain, “raised important issues involving the ambit of powers of autonomous credit institutions, the role of civil servants, and above all, of Ministerial responsibility to Parliament.” (Jain 1994: 337) It was about the purchase of weak shares by the “nationalized Life Insurance Corporation” and the question who was ultimately responsible was debated until Finance Minister Krishnamachari had to resign.

The second scandal mentioned by Parry as an example for how Nehru was weak on corruption is the “first time an Inquiry Commission was appointed to inquire into the allegation of corruption and nepotism etc.” (ibid.: 337) against the Chief Minister (CM) of Punjab and Nehru’s “strong-arm” (Parry 2000: 28) Partap Singh Kairon, who was later forced to resign.

Taking account of the scandals described so far, Jain is of the opinion that, under Nehru and his immediate successors,

“the lingering memory of the freedom movement and the high standards of rectitude in matters of handling of public funds helped preserve some norms of public conduct […]. Things began to change thereafter, and under Mrs. Indira Gandhi, the standards of public morality had begun to decline which reached the lowest ebb under Rajiv Gandhi and their successors.” (Jain 1994: 337)
This "lowest ebb" was reached in the 1980s, a decade which stands out as the decade of large-scale corruption scandals irrevocably shaking the little trust left in the political status quo after the Emergency. Among them are land dealings, arrangements with an agency supposed to observe irregular foreign exchange dealings, nepotism in the procurement of fodder making machines, commissions for military equipment deals, and so forth (ibid.: 340 ff.).

The scandal most often cited from that era is the Bofors scandal, the perhaps, as Jain notes, "most celebrated case of political corruption which […] has assumed international dimensions". The issue were "alleged kickbacks" for the purchase of Bofors (a Swedish company) guns (ibid.: 341). What made the scandal one of a different caliber was that the kickbacks reportedly went to PM Rajiv Gandhi’s closest circle of friends and allies. These allegations "led to the collapse of Rajiv Gandhi’s government in 1989" (Farrales 2005: 8) and to his subsequent defeat at the polls. In retrospect, Bofors was just a foretaste of the corruption scandals rocking India post-liberalization. They are too numerous to name, but it can be put to record that "P. V. Narasimha Rao’s government, which held power from 1991 to 1996, likewise ended in a host of corruption-related controversies." (ibid.: 8). As Parry already wrote in 2000, “much of what does go on can hardly fail to seem increasingly unsavoury as one high-profile scandal follows another at ever decreasing intervals” (2000: 51).

Lastly, of interest for this thesis could be some of the recent corruption scandals come to light, which, according to Khandekar & Reddy (2013: 8)

"provided a crucial backdrop to the summer’s events. Each scam appeared more brazen than the last, involving wide collusions of political, bureaucratic, and business interests, and outrageous siphoning of public money. The violations were at once beyond dispute and incomprensibly egregious”.

The authors also provide an overview of this "backdrop": The 2G-scam, which involved Telecom Minister Raja allegedly selling 2G-spectrum licenses "at rates determined seven years prior to select firms in exchange for kickbacks" (ibid.: 8). A similar scam was uncovered for the sale of third generation (3G) spectrum licenses. Another scam uncovered in the months leading up to the ACM was the scam "In which key politicians, bureaucrats, and military officers appropriated prime government property in South Mumbai, building and allocating flats in violation of Environment Ministry rules” (ibid.: 8). Together with the 2G-scam, the Commonwealth Scam is one of those most often mentioned in the press reports and literature about the ACM. The 2010 Commonwealth Games "were budgeted at
US$270 million, went over to US$4.1 billion”, (partly) attributed to “incompetence, procedural irregularities with bidding and contracts, inflating prices, and outright bribes” (ibid.: 8). These scandals seemed to be the last straw. Corruption, the public concluded, had “reached the very top and it is not surprising if they suspect that it must therefore be everywhere else” (Parry 2000: 51).

The corruption scandals and explanations for them I have presented so far were part of a nationwide corruption discourse. From it sprung, as argued, the movement that is discussed below.

### 2.2 IAC, Anna Hazare and the Hot “Indian Summer” of 2011

“When Anna Hazare began his fast against corruption, the media and the social pundits saw it as an exercise in well-intentioned idiosyncrasy. A dour septuagenarian protesting with a phalanx of disciples was hardly going to create a ripple within the indifference of bureaucratic Delhi.” (Visvanathan 2012: 104)

This quote by Visvanathan points us towards the issue I want to touch upon in this chapter. Hazare and the anti-corruption movement of 2011 came from very different ideological parts of Indian society. It was considered a very unlikely marriage, Hazare leading a mass-movement against corruption. But the marriage seems to have worked (at least, for the movement of summer 2011), and to understand this, after a quick overview of the legislative history of the Lokpal Bill, I want to introduce the main members of “Team Anna”, as identified by some academics as well as the media reports that I have examined so far. Their biography and societal status will help to better understand who was talking, to whom, for what purpose (as described in chapter 2.1), and why this movement gained its momentum.

The Lokpal Bill was introduced fairly early, and, altogether a total of eight times. The first time the bill was debated was in 1968. The Lok Sabha passed the bill, but soon after Parliament was dissolved “following a split in the ruling Congress” (Monteiro 2013: 330). Just two years later, another attempt was made, but once again the bill didn’t pass because of the Emergency and the subsequent loss of power of the Gandhi-government. The Janata coalition did not fare much better. After the third introduction of a Lokpal Bill in 1977, the Lok Sabha was dissolved once again. Congress (INC) introduced the next bill in 1985, but nothing happened until the Bofors scandal had taken down the Gandhi government. Two more attempts, in 1989 and 1996 failed once again because the respective governments “could not complete their
term and collapsed midway” (ibid.: 330). The “curse of the Bill continued”, as Monteiro (ibid.: 331) writes, with its introductions in 1998 and 2001, both of which were soon followed by the loss of power of the ruling government. The bill was only introduced, after Hazare and the ACM had pressured the government to do so.

Hazare was a central figure of the movement, and I will therefore turn to this figure now. Mitu Sengupta, with one of his valuable insights on the movement (2012: 593) describes him as “a short, bespectacled, 74-year-old man”. His “real” name, as Sitapati reveals, is Kisan Baburao Hazare (Sitapati 2011: 39), but Hazare is just called “Anna”, which, in Marathi (which is Hazare’s mother-tongue) means “father-figure” (Khandekar & Reddy 2013: 2) or “elder brother” (Sawyer & Sawyer 2011). As Khandekar & Reddy observe, Hazare was “relatively unknown outside his native state of Maharashtra until he was decorated in 1992 with the Padmashree, a high civilian honor conferred for his work in rural development”. Hazare’s “ecologically conscious development work” (Sengupta 2013: 2) originated from and concentrated on Ralegan Siddhi (Maharashtra), his “ancestral village, where he took up residence in 1975, following a brief and unremarkable career in the Indian army” (ibid.: 2). Before joining the army, the celibate had sold flowers (Sawyer & Sawyer 2011). During his army career, which Sawyer doesn’t describe as unremarkable at all (in contrast to Sengupta), Hazare is described as having been “the only member of his unit who survived an attack during the 1965 war with Pakistan” (ibid.) and being heavily influenced by this destiny, as well as by Swami Vivekanand. This, according to Sawyer (citing Hazare’s autobiography) led Hazare “to dedicate his life to the service of others, to renounce material pleasures and to follow in the mystic’s footsteps.” (ibid.) However the case may be, Hazare worked to transform his village upon his return after “12 years in the army” (ibid.). In Ralegan Siddhi, Hazare is seemingly most well known for his “leadership in a watershed restoration project that made the arid hillsides bloom” (ibid.). Aside from his ecological activism, the “former soldier with a seventh-grade education” (ibid.) is/was also known for campaigns against alcoholism and untouchability, among others (cf. Sitapati 2011: 42). As Sitapati further notes, these issues and the ideals he stands for often “make the Gandhian connect between social reform and political emancipation. He preaches non-violence, is comfortable with religious idioms […] and makes personal probity the centerpiece of the campaign.” (ibid.: 42) Sawyer additionally ascribes a “stubborn streak” to him (Sawyer & Sawyer 2011). Furthermore, terms like “grassroots activism” and the Gandhian “satyagraha”
(“ethical-moral commitments articulated in non-violent protest” - Khandekar & Reddy 2013: 2) are linked to Hazare. But, as has been noted, the perhaps “most powerful tool in his repertoire was the fast, which Hazare had used a few times in prior decades to press state action against corrupt officials, weak legislation, or bureaucratic sluggishness in enacting anti-corruption laws.” (ibid.: 2) Another way of describing Hazare, therefore, is as a “Gandhian whose old-school values and sometimes regressive methods were ostensibly antithetical to the political sensibilities of his middle-class supporters” (ibid.: 9). This might refer to Hazare’s “authoritarian past” (Sengupta 2012: 594), advocating for controversial measures like the “death penalty for corruption, public flogging for alcoholism, and forced vasectomies for checking population growth” (ibid.: 594). Furthermore Hazare’s perceived ideological proximity to Hindu-Nationalism was seen as dangerous, as Sengupta and others note. There seems to be some debate about the veracity of these stories, though (cf. Sengupta 2013: 3). Sawyer confirms that Ralegan Siddhi “hasn't had an election for its local council in over 25 years” (Sawyer & Sawyer 2011), but that the Gram Sabha has been heavily involved in the decision making process.

Taken together, the picture that emerges on “Anna” Hazare is inconclusive, although it seems that the activist is, indeed, a stubborn man, as showcased by his continuing anti-corruption campaign. Visvanathan describes him as “not just an iconic figure but a spiritual warrior of a different kind” whose “presence electrified and puzzled the politicians of Delhi” (Visvanathan 2012: 105). One factor that might reveal more about Hazare is the team he worked with for India Against Corruption. Sengupta describes how there was some concern about his “dependence on a slick team of (decidedly un-Gandhian) advisers” (Sengupta 2012: 594). Sitapati and Khandekar/Reddy both speak of five members of “the core group comprising IAC”, but the authors name different names. Going to the original press release of IAC announcing their release of the Jan Lokpal Bill from December 1, 2010, the following names are given: “Sri Sri Ravi Shankar, Kiran Bedi, Swami Agnivesh, Anna Hazare, Sunita Godara […], BR Lall […], Devinder Sharma […], Arvind Kejriwal, Kamal Jaswal […] and Pradeep Gupta” (IAC 2010b). Of these names, three (Baba Ramdev, Agnivesh and Ravi Shankar) could be considered “religious and spiritual leaders”, as Sitapati writes (2011: 39). Visvanathan identifies two main spiritual groups which helped popularize the movement – the group around Baba Ramdev, and the movement around Sri Sri Ravi Shankar. Both are, for the author, “telegenic figures” whose “spiritual programs are a part of Indian
“everydayness” and both are “savvy businessmen, prone to franchising their products” (Visvanathan 2012: 104). These two figures and their movements, writes Visvanathan, made “the secular left” suspicious, but for the author, this was a false diagnosis since “Anna Hazare was made of sterner stuff.” (ibid.: 105)

Of the others on this original list, Godara, Lall, Sharma, Jaswal and Gupta seem to only seldomly appear in the medial debate of 2011, but Kejriwal and Bedi can definitely be considered to have been part of “Team Anna”. Arvind Kejriwal is described as “a one-time Indian Revenue Services employee” (Khandekar & Reddy 2013: 9) who became a “Right to Information” activist. Sitapati mentions that “In just one year, 2008, the NGO that he runs, Parivartan, analysed 52,000 queries sent under the RTI Act” (Sitapati 2011: 41). Kiran Bedi is described as “the first woman to join the Indian Police Services and a bureaucrat with a reputation for no-nonsense efficiency and incorruptibility” (Khandekar & Reddy 2013: 9). Sengupta also mentions that she was “the former warden of Tihar Jail” (Sengupta 2012: 594), ironically the same jail Hazare would be imprisoned in on August 16 (see Appendix A).

According to Khandekar/Reddy, three others complement the "team". There is Manish Sisodia who is Kejriwal’s assistant and the Bhushans (father Shanti and son Prashant). Shanti Bhushan is described as “a one-time Law Minister and now judicial reform activist” (Khandekar & Reddy 2013: 9) The elder Bhushan was a lawyer who “argued the case against Indira Gandhi” which would be the “casus belli for her declaring the Emergency” (Sitapati 2011: 41) and this, through her subsequent defeat at the polls, would make Bhushan the law minister of the newly elected Janata coalition government where he “shepherded the annulment of the 42nd amendment and passed the 44th amendment, providing protection to the judiciary and the bedrock for the [legal] activism that was to follow” (ibid.: 41, comment M.K.). Sitapati is of the opinion that all of these persons could be considered “middle-class icons” and further mentions one more member of the Lokpal drafting committee and “(retired) Supreme Court judge and current Lokayukta of Karnataka” (ibid.: 39), Shantosh Hedge. His father was also involved in the Indira Gandhi-case mentioned above, another reference to the Emergency and the subsequent importance of legal activism, which I will touch upon in chapter 2.3.1.

Another interesting detail, which I will return to below, is how Hazare became the leader of the campaign. Khandekar/Reddy (2013: 9) tell the story:

“Bedi, Kejriwal, and Sisodia, all linked through earlier work on "Right To Information” campaigns, apparently set their sights on the Lokpal cause in the aftermath
of the 2G spectrum scam. It was only then that Kejriwal recruited Hazare as the public face of the campaign precisely because of his reputation for personal incorruptibility, Gandhian austerity, and unquestionable moral rectitude. Thus, while IAC’s interest in Lokpal formed earlier, Hazare was conscripted as something of an “afterthought”

After having introduced the main players of “Team Anna”, I will now give a rough overview over the timeline of protests, what the reactions were and some basic analysis as provided by media reports.

As mentioned before, India Against Corruption first entered the spotlight in December of 2010 when they presented their version of the Lokpal Bill, the Jan Lokpal Bill, at a press conference. This version had been sent to the Prime Minister and was signed, according to the press release, along with others, by Bedi, Kejriwal, Hazare and Swami Agnivesh. The press release (IAC 2010a) calls for six main features of an effective anti-corruption law:

“independence from the government, complete jurisdiction over politicians, bureaucrats and judiciary, powers to investigate and prosecute without prior permission, capability of recovering losses from a convicted public servant, protection to whistleblowers and a transparent, participatory process of appointment of Lokpal which is independent of political interference.”

It would be these six pillars that would demarcate the government’s version of the Lokpal Bill from the movement’s version until the ACM slowly faded away between 2011 and 2012.

The story until Hazare’s first fast is told fairly quickly. In February, Hazare became the face of the movement, and, in a press conference, announced he would fast unto death unless the government would include “civil society” in the drafting process of the anti-corruption bill. The following day, Baba Ramdev, along with Hazare and most members of his team, held a large anti-corruption rally at the Ramlila Maidan grounds, which, according to reports, over 100,000 people attended (Ahmed 2012). At the beginning of March, the Prime Minister met with “Team Anna” und subsequently created a ministerial sub-committee “to look into the Lokpal bill”, led by Minister of Agriculture Sharad Pawar who was seen as controversial for his large land holdings. A few days before Hazare’s first fast, famous (former) cricket star Kapil Dev announced his support for Hazare and his demands.

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6 see Appendix A for sources and a more detailed chronology of the year’s events
Hazare started his fast on April 5 at Jantar Mantar in Delhi, after criticizing the government for not including “civil society” in the sub-committee. According to reports, there were protests by “thousands of college students, young executives and housewives” in “two hundred cities across India” (NDTV 2011) The movement grew and Minister Pawar had to withdraw from the sub-committee and was later replaced by Finance Minister Mukherjee. Shanti Bhushan of “Team Anna” was made “co-chair” in his function as an “activist non-politician” and it was announced that half of the committee would be composed of “civil society members” and that the government intended to introduce a Lokpal Bill in the coming monsoon session. Bollywood superstar Aamir Khan and BJP (Bharatiya Janata Party) star Modi, among other Bollywood stars, business leaders and political figures extended their support. The Facebook page of India Against Corruption garnered 220,000 “likes” in a few days. The government’s turnaround and the wave of public support convinced Hazare to end his fast on April 9.

Throughout April, May and June, the sub-committee met several times. But the six pillars as described above constituted a seemingly insurmountable problem for the government, especially the demand to have “complete jurisdiction over politicians” (including the PM). Furthermore, Baba Ramdev was arrested in Delhi while on a fast and 53 of his supporters were injured during the subsequent police raid. This prompted Hazare to boycott the next sub-committee meeting and set an ultimatum for the government to pass a Lokpal Bill by August 15, calling the ACM the “Second Freedom Struggle” (which I will touch upon below).

August 16 is the day the movement turned from something not well understood and neglected by several strands of the public into a mass movement. As Visvanathan writes,

“What began as a puzzle soon became panic as crowds congregated around the fast. Crowds create their own sense of the social, and rumor and gossip empowered the movement. Urban India broke out into an epidemic of protest, of candlelight marches magnified partly by media attention.” (Visvanathan 2012: 105 f.)

The escalation originated from the arrest of Hazare (as well as Kejriwal and Bedi, who were released soon later) before Hazare could begin his fast. This, according to Khandekar/Reddy (2013: 10), “unwittingly fanned Team Anna’s fire” and “proved hugely unpopular, even earned them the title kala angrez or Black Englishmen, but Team Anna capitalized just as hugely on this turn of events.” As Sengupta writes, the arrest “substantially changed the pace of events, sparking candle-lit marches across
the country and swelling the ranks of his movement, India Against Corruption (IAC)” (Sengupta 2013: 1). Furthermore, what made Hazare successful was his determination “to fast to death against corruption and set about the ritual as if it were a regular habit. Fasting for over a fortnight is not easy”, as Visvanathan (2012: 105) portends. Hazare continued fasting and voluntarily stayed in jail (although the government had set him free after just a few hours) until he was allowed to hold an indefinite fast at the Ramlila Maidan grounds on August 19, while public support grew manifold all over India.

When Hazare “walked out of Tihar four days later, a free man and national hero” (Sengupta 2013: 1), he was greeted by supporters shouting “Bharat mata ki Jai (Victory to Mother India)” (Singh 2011). He then proceeded to Ramlila Maidan, “surrounded by thousands of supporters, a sea of national flags, and a mammoth portrait of Gandhi” (Sengupta 2013: 1) and continued his fast there. On August 21, more than 100,000 people came to the grounds, and more than 50,000 attended a rally in Mumbai. Soon later the government caved in and offered to debate all versions of the Lokpal Bill in parliament. Meanwhile, Hazare had reduced his key demands to three, namely local ombudsmen in all states, a “Citizen Charter” for the time bound delivery of goods and services and the complete jurisdiction as outlined above. The parliament then, on August 27, “passed an unprecedented ‘sense of the house’ motion relenting to some of his key demands” (ibid.: 2). A day later, Hazare broke his fast. As Sengupta writes:

“Tens of thousands poured into the streets of Delhi, rejoicing what they deemed a ‘people’s victory.’ Hazare was hailed as a leader of Gandhian proportions and celebrated by the media in both India and beyond. [...] His movement, which appeared to be climbing from strength to strength, was regarded as a major political force that would have lasting influence. Hazare, it seemed, had hit upon the correct formula for success – a cause that united people across class, religion, and ethnicity (who is not touched by corruption, after all?), and an unassailable style and imagery (who, after all, could take issue with Mahatma Gandhi?). But things did not turn out as expected.” (ibid.)

On the same day, a video surfaced, allegedly showing Swami Agnivesh in a phone conversation with then Telecom Minister Kapil Sibal appearing to be “actively urging the government not to make any further concessions to Team Anna” (Firstpost 2011). Agnivesh soon broke with “Team Anna” and “withdrew, preferring the politics of reality shows like Bigg Boss to the actual realism of politics” (Visvanathan 2012: 109). The other personalities of “Team Anna” had their own problems. Both Bhushans “became involved in a controversy over the former Samajvadi Party leader Amar
Singh” (ibid.: 109) and Prashant Bhushan not only had to defend himself for remarks he made on holding a referendum on the status of Kashmir, but was also beaten up for these remarks in October. Around the same time, Bedi and Kejriwal came into the focus of public scrutiny. It was Swami Agnivesh, now at odds with the team, who raised questions “about the use of funds donated by the public” to a fund run by Kejriwal. Bedi, at the same time, was “facing allegations of overcharging institutions on travel bills” (The Hindu 2011a). As Visvanathan (2012: 109) comments, “The pair became a vaudeville show lacking the ease and iconicity of Anna Hazare. [...] It was clear the regime was after blood and had gone for the political jugular.” Hazare distanced himself from Bhushan’s remarks on Kashmir and began a maun vrat, a vow of silence, after which he announced plans for restructuring his team, to include minorities, youths and to have retired judges investigate the allegations against his team members. Meanwhile, the Lokpal committee reversed an earlier decision to include the PM and other higher government figures under the purview of the Lokpal. Hazare and his team once again returned to the Ramlila Maidan, and, later, to Mumbai. The rally in Delhi was relatively well attended, but the one in Mumbai was seen as embarrassing by some. While Hazare, in Mumbai, went on a fast, the Lok Sabha passed the aforementioned and criticized version of the Lokpal Bill. Hazare was “too ill to continue” his fast (ibid.: 109) and was admitted to a hospital. Meanwhile, even the “weak” Lokpal Bill was bogged down in the Rajya Sabha and didn’t get passed in this form. There was “a sadness in the air and a sense of cynicism” (ibid.: 109). Hazare suspended a campaign to recall corrupt politicians and returned to Ralegan Siddhi.

It would take another two years, almost to the day, to pass a Lokpal Bill that Hazare was satisfied with. On January 1, 2014, President Mukherjee signed it into law (The Times of India 2014). The PM, among all other public servants will be under the purview of the Lokpal, there is a mandate for states to set up local ombudsmen (Lokayuktas) and 50 percent of the Lokpal shall be from the judiciary (The Hindu 2013).

It remains to be seen, whether this institution will be able to work independently and make an impact. If one is to believe the current opinion polls, the curse (as described by Monteiro 2013: 330) of the Lokpal Bill (although finally enacted into law) will continue and the current INC-led government will be voted out of power in 2014. What concerns this thesis, though, is the impact of the fight for this institution and of
the processes that had to have happened before such a movement could exist. I will therefore now turn to some of the scientific explanations and the embeddedness of the ACM in a larger process, historical, economic, cultural, that seems to be changing the face of (at least urban) India.

2.3 The “New Middle Class” and the Dynamics and Dimensions of the Movement

“What began as a cottage industry of reform was ready to explode into an efflorescence of protest by 2010 [...] springing up where it [was] least expected, inspiring actors who have been otherwise indifferent to politics” (Visvanathan 2012: 103 f.).

Shiv Visvanathan identifies two main dynamics that shaped the beginning of the 21st century for India. First, there was and is the sense that India (along and in contest with China) is joining the ranks of the world’s superpowers. Second, there is “a sense of a demographic dividend [...] in recognition of the fact that 70 percent of the population was under the age of twenty-five.” (ibid.: 103) This new generation not only had different “memories” and “a new sense of India in terms of identity and perception” (ibid.: 103), as the author calls it, but also different needs and desires. It is a generation that grew up in a liberalizing India, with all the discursive transformations that went along with that process of the 1990s, “betwixt and between transcendence and embodiment, globalization and localization, capital and labor, elite and common” (Khandekar & Reddy 2013: 4).

I will touch on this below. I will also touch on how this new generation was arguably a richer one, and can be seen as inhabiting a new space in the strata of Indian society – a “New Middle Class”, as it is being called by most academics and other commentators. Theses commentators also quickly identified the ACM as a movement of said NMC, a “sector of which we had little sociological understanding” as Visvanathan admits (2012: 104), and it is therefore my intent to more closely examine those aforementioned perceptions, memories, desires, demands and ultimately, identity formations and to close in on that “heavily mediated terrain in which politics, activism, entertainment, and consumption can meld, commensurately widening the frameworks in which political action can be constituted and legitimized” (Khandekar & Reddy 2013: 3).

Drawing on various, transdisciplinary studies, I will try to delve deeper into the three main dynamics I have identified as being at the core not only of this “New Middle Class” but of the anti-corruption movement in general. I will begin with the historical
dimension – how did the current distrust with “the political” (as Chatterjee calls it - 2012), the elite or the Nehruvian development state come about? I will provide an overview of how Indira Gandhi’s Emergency rule of the 1970s changed the narrative, turned the focus away from the state and let to distrust (at least in urban India – for more on this divide, see Corbridge, Williams, Srivastava & Véron 2005). I will then observe the growing discursive power and rising cultural hegemony of said NMC negotiating India’s increasing embeddedness in neoliberal globalization and “modernity”, beginning with the liberalization of the 1990s, but also on a more theoretical level. Deeply entangled with that second is the third dimension, the economic and consequently societal rise of importance of the NMC, and the reformulation of the state-citizen-market relationships expressed through the ACM, as Nishant Shah argues (2012).

2.3.1 History of a Discourse – The “Middle Class” and “The Political”

“None of us sees the state (or the government, the market, even public culture) in a direct and unmediated fashion. We always see the state through the eyes of others, and with close regard for past memories, accounts that circulate in the public sphere, and how we see other people getting on or being treated.” (Corbridge, Williams, Srivastava & Véron 2005: 8)

Where did the “New Middle Class” come from? Fernandes, according to Khandekar and Reddy (2013: 5 f.), “traces the origins of the “new middle class” to colonial educational policy, which generated a cultivated class of clerks and low-level bureaucrats who would rise to lead India’s nationalist movement.” Under Nehru, the authors continue, said middle-class was deeply embedded in the bureaucracy of an ever expanding development state which “continued to preferentially consolidate the social bases of the middle class” (ibid.: 6). It also arguably generated a new sense of nationalist ideology and “The sense of pervasive corruption in a country such as India might then itself be a consequence of the changes in the discourse of accountability promulgated by postcolonial nationalists.” (Gupta 1995: 225) Here we have some evidence that the discourse of corruption has been deeply embedded in the post-independence consciousness of India’s middle-class, even when it was still very much part of the Nehruvian system it later became critical of.

The first fractures in this relationship started to appear when “economic stagnation, beginning in the 1960s” and the increased “claim to limited supplies of state-managed resources” by “subordinate and regional social groups” precipitated “a generalized
sense of disenchantment with Nehruvian state-led development” (Khandekar & Reddy 2013: 6). What gravely added to this was the Emergency of the 1970s. The Emergency, Khandekar & Reddy argue, resulted from, among other reasons, the emergence of a “Janata Morcha (People’s Front) [...] in protest of government corruption and then Prime Minister Indira Gandhi’s purported ineptitude.” (ibid.). Another interesting reason was the legal battle between Indira Gandhi and the judiciary concerning the alleged “electoral malpractice during her prior Lok Sabha campaign” (ibid.: 6). The PM not only “responded to unfavourable court verdicts by superseding judges she did not like” (Sitapatı 2011: 40 f.) but, on June 25, 1975, had the President of India (POI) declare a state of emergency, which allowed Gandhi to “rule by decree”. What followed were almost two years of “suspension of civil liberties”, “ban on dissent”, “forceful state action” and “shutting down of civil society institutions” (Rajagopal 2011: 1004), “excesses”, write Khandekar/Reddy, “that imposed middle-class notions of civic order onto the national body-politic” (2013: 6), and, according to Rajagopal, “contributed, ultimately, to the formation of a middle class that regarded such violence as legitimate, as law-making and law-preserving, enacted on its behalf, and on behalf of the nation as it ought to be” (2011: 1018). The Emergency, “producing a strong investment in the judiciary and law as the means to check the excesses of the state” (Khandekar & Reddy 2013: 6), is described by Sitapati as “crucial” for understanding the legal activism of the anti-corruption movement. It might be considered even more crucial for understanding the lack of trust for “the political” that Chatterjee identifies with the New Middle Class associated with the movement (cf. Chatterjee 2012).

Sitapati identifies four main intellectual strands of the Indian middle class which was so important for the ACM – Neo-Gandhians, legal activists, the consumerist NMC and (critical of the movement for reasons explained below) the Independent Left. She argues that the Emergency transformed the relationship of two of these groups with the state. Firstly these were the legal activists who, “From the excesses that followed”, learnt “that a powerful Supreme Court and an elaborate rights infrastructure was the best guarantor against state excess.” (Sitapati 2011: 41) Secondly this was the “Independent Left” (IL) which, according to the author, “learnt that the Indian state must be whittled down.” (ibid.: 41)

Sitapati recognizes that, what she calls “India Shining” (IS - the consumerist, liberalized New Middle Class), supplied the “Foot soldiers of the movement” (ibid.:
For her, the New Middle Class’ birth “is closely linked to the opening of the Indian economy, first in the early 1980s when curbs on internal capital were reduced and then in 1991 when foreign capital was allowed to enter India.” (ibid.: 41) I will touch on the liberalization and the consumerist narratives and desires it produced in chapter 2.3.3, but will now try to expand Sitapati’s argument by including the theory of Arvind Rajagopal who argues that the emergency led to a process that (together with liberalization, but also as a precursor to it) transformed old, developmental, socio-economic identity narratives into more communal, culture-, religion- and market-oriented ones. This could be, as Rajagopal (2011: 1003) notes, “critical to understanding the formation of the new middle class in India, as a category that increasingly defines itself through cultural and consumerist forms of identity, and is less identified with the state”- and, therefore, more distrustful and, perhaps, more likely to protest the status quo.

Interestingly (for understanding the ACM), Rajagopal posits that the “shift away from the Nehruvian focus on the economy as the crucial arena of nation-building” and the reinforcement of “the boundaries of the political […], emphasizing the friend/enemy distinction fundamental to politics” led to the “redistribution of the places where political conflict occurred, besides election campaigns” (ibid.: 1005). While he identifies “industrial conflict” (unions, strikes etc.) centered at a controllable, open to negotiation “civil society”, as the main pre-Emergency place, he observes how “a shift in both the site and the nature of political conflict” post-Emergency led to a significant increase in “communal violence”, a process in which

“culture and community became categories that gained political salience [… ] centred in what Partha Chatterjee has called political society, a realm of informal negotiation between the state and the majority of its citizens, whom the state lacks the resources to treat on an equal footing with members of civil society.” (ibid.: 1005 f.) (see also Chatterjee 2004: 27 f.)

Alongside (not in opposition, as one might expect) this process of redefining political conflict, Rajagopal also posits that it was the state itself which “participated in the transfer of legitimacy away from the state to the market, and in promoting the initiative of private forces in economic growth and in nation-building” (Rajagopal 2011: 1007). It needs to be emphasized that this was a limited transfer which once again illustrated the urban-rural divide in India. Gupta cautions that “the legacy of Western scholarship on the state has been to universalize a particular cultural construction of “state-society relations” in which specific notions of “statehood” and
“civil society” are conjoined.” (Gupta 1995: 214) These specific notions might be accurate for one setting and wholly inaccurate for another. One example of this is brought up by Parry who writes that in the rather rural area he did his fieldwork in “The state now reaches into areas it had previously left largely alone and has assumed the role of a gargantuan development agency” (Parry 2000: 50). This seems to describe the opposite of the process Rajagopal observed, but it isn’t. While the Nehruvian developmental state was very much part of everyday life, in rural India there was a “relative scarcity of the state” meaning that, at its best, “The state confers the blessings of consumption upon those who are able to access and milk it. At its worst, the state simply fails to work” (Corbridge, Williams, Srivastava & Véron 2005: 34).

But in urban India, it is exactly the loss of legitimacy of the “old” development state that could be seen as a central precondition for the apparent upset of the status quo, for the middle class fight against “the elite” and “the furor over expanded affirmative action programs” (Khandekar & Reddy 2013: 7). The “overt transfer of functions from state to private forces” has been understood as “a way of jettisoning state responsibility to the poor and of affirming an elitist stance thereafter” (Rajagopal 2011: 1009, 1010). Rajagopal understands this not only as an economic shift, but also, importantly, as a political regime-change. The middle-class, with its new-found role as consumers vital for an economy partly abandoned by the state, envisioned itself “as the humble hero of national development, capable but lacking privilege and deserving of assistance” (ibid.: 1010). Rajagopal describes this as “a proxy for state strategy, and a heuristic to indicate its changing relationship with civil society, that was increasingly mediated through corporate capital and staged through technologies of mass communication.” (ibid.: 1010). Another way of describing this new reciprocal state-civil society relationship is neoliberal governmentality. Rajagopal finishes this argument quite nicely, which is why I will quote him at length:

"[The Emergency] showed the limits of the state’s capacity to govern without actively and continuously seeking and winning popular consent. The rhetoric of the state became more self-conscious as it sought new loci of authority in support of its activities. The invocation of the middle class as a sanctioned actor, and as the favoured agent of growth, development and democracy is a feature of the post-Emergency period. ‘Middle class’ became a proxy for state reason, [...] and a force for criticism when government views were ignored or overlooked in the political process. The complementary era of market liberalization, involving new arguments
pertaining to the economy and bringing together issues of need and utility and the manner of their administration, highlighted the relatively autonomous domain of public opinion as an emergent second layer of the state that was, however, not distinguishable as the state."

In the 1980s and 1990s, the middle-class then slowly transformed this governmentality meant as a technology of rule, as a proxy of the state, into an ideal that was increasingly seen as not being adhered to by said state resp. by “the political”, which was understood more and more as “an “immoral vocation,” a site of unprincipled pragmatism, corruption, nepotism, and greed – in brief, as the profane antithesis to the sublime qualities of the cultural realm.” (Hansen 1999: 56)

It is exactly at this point, where the connection to the ACM becomes quite apparent:

“If “Brand Anna” stabilizes emotional meanings in a way that enables a powerful identification with IAC’s anti-corruption cause, [...] it does so by absolving the middle class of complicity, externalizing “corruption” onto the “political classes” and ethics into law” (Khandekar & Reddy 2013: 5)

These “political classes” are also seen as increasingly being part and playing the game of a “patronage democracy”, precipitated by “The extension of quotas to the OBCs in the 1990s” (Corbridge, Williams, Srivastava & Véron 2005: 38). This form of rule is characterized by the notion that

“access to state resources is fiercely controlled by ruling-group politicians acting in a discretionary manner. [...] and the Forward Castes in north India are losing out, or are required to make new alliances. [...] more and more citizens are forced to pay homage to their MPs or MLAs, or indeed to the highest-ranking politicians in the state, if they want to secure even the most meagre benefit.” (ibid.: 38)

Corbridge et. al. quote “Chatterjee’s claim that civil society and the poor co-exist in India like oil and water” (ibid.: 2) and describe how “it is a mistake to assume that the life-worlds of elite, English-educated Indians coincide with those of their subaltern or vernacular counterparts. Very often they do not” (ibid.: 5). The divide has been playing out in the domain of “the state”, of power and “the political”. This domain, is the argument, has “been captured by various demand groups [...]. It is then unable to prosecute the politics of command” (ibid.: 34) - leading to the aforementioned “scarcity of the state”. This scarcity matters much more in rural settings than it does in urban ones, is one argument. It is seen as having recently claimed a space “at the heart of people’s livelihood strategies” and having “been positioned as a source of social power, and then mainly by members of the political classes.” (ibid.: 7)
This dependency on the ubiquitousness and at the same time constant reminder of the scarcity of the state has also led to a politics that “aims to pit an authentic rural India, or Bharat, against a loose coalition of merchants, city dwellers and their government supporters. An urban-dominated state then comes to be seen as ‘a vampire that drinks the blood’ of the countryside, and which enforces price-twists that damage the interests of rural producers and consumers alike.” (ibid.: 24)

At the same time, the scarcity of and dependence on the state also leads to “Support for a strong exit option” (exit from dependency) on the left and right, as Corbdridge et al. write, leading, ironically, to “a strong measure of agreement in their shared disdain for dirigisme” (ibid.: 42) The same could be said for the urban middle-class, although its desire is not one for an exit option, but for a more “efficient” and at the same time “effective” and “accountable” dirigisme. And the NMC seems to be a leading force in superimposing these views onto not only the ACM, but onto much of the legislation of the post-liberalization period, meant to curb the excesses of an overarching state too focused on affirmative action and rural development to notice the needs and distrust of a class that is gaining discursive power every day.

2.3.2 “Hegemonic Aspirations” and the Discursive Power of the Middle Class

As Devesh Kapur observes, “The concerns about the role of the emerging middle class in India began shortly after the onset of economic liberalization” with some scholars “arguing that the Indian middle class in its single-minded material pursuits was gradually abdicating its social and ethical responsibility to the nation in general and to the poor in particular” (Kapur 2010: 148). He goes on arguing that

“the sheer heterogeneity of this group and the continued flourishing of identity politics in India mean that the likelihood of collective action by the middle class qua middle class will be modest […] the Indian middle class will be more a barrier than a standard bearer of progressive change” (ibid.: 166)

Another observation that led to the country being quite stunned when the “New Middle Class”, which “had up until now been presumed to be politically apathetic” (Khandekar & Reddy 2013: 2), actively entering political terrain, was the belief that “middle-class people have either failed to take on roles in political leadership, or have vacated the sphere of politics – as they have done according to the electoral studies that have demonstrated their declining political participation” (Harriss 2006: 461). Instead of the direct political sphere, civil society was seen as the NMC’s “domain for
their self-assertion” and “their preferred mode of action emphasizes rational problem solving rather than democracy.” (ibid.: 461)

But the NMC did enter the political sphere. Instantly, “statistics were marshaled to drive home the significance of their participation […] under-scoring the potential impact of anti-corruption agitations by so large a group […] making the point that the participation of this group not only disavows sectarian politics, but also ensures in this that “change is around the corner.”” (Khandekar & Reddy 2013: 3)

But was this really a new phenomenon, a new class finally waking up, claiming its space in the political sphere? Or was this just about the “social and cultural visibility” (and one might add economic visibility) of the NMC being in the foreground “while its political role is often invisible” (Kapur 2010: 149)? This is the question I want to ask in this section and a second dimension of the ACM.

One argument presented by Fernandes and Heller (2006: 500) is that the dominant fraction of the middle class already consists of people “who occupy positions of recognized authority in various fields and organizations and whose interests are closely aligned with the bourgeoisie.” Not only, posit the authors, does the middle class align with the bourgeoisie, it actually “has […] played a critical role in managing the ruling bloc (which includes the bourgeoisie and landed interests), [and] it has also been an important actor in its own right” (ibid.: 496). They present the history of the middle class under the Nehruvian development state (as discussed above) and the subsequent changes that occurred. Through all these historical and socio-political dynamics, they conclude, “the middle class, and in particular the dominant fraction of the middle class, plays a central role in the politics of hegemony” (ibid.: 496). Fernandes and Heller provide a very useful introduction into the hegemonic assertiveness of the NMC, which is why I will heavily rely on their analysis for this chapter.

The authors do stress, though, that there is a tendency to oversimplify and naturalize the “NMC relationship to liberalization (and implicitly modernization) but also exaggerate[…] and essentialize[…] its internal coherence” (ibid.: 497). It is therefore important to understand that the Indian middle-class is difficult to define, both numerically and conceptually, since it is “by any reckoning the most polymorphous middle class in the world” (Beteille 2001, cit. by Khandekar & Reddy 2013: 3). Kapur (2010: 145) provides a good overview of the different attempts to define and measure the extent of the middle class along economic criteria. His chart shows that a wide
range of estimates exists as to the size of the middle class (from roughly 1.4 million MC households to an estimated 264 million people) and as to how to define it (from fixed income at purchasing power parity, poverty lines, people filing tax returns to the means to consume or own “a car or scooter, a color TV, a telephone”). He also posits that one could “measure” the middle class through the access to higher education, which, according to Kapur, leads to an estimate of “the number of middle-class households [...] somewhat greater than 30 million”, but even he speaks of “definitional ambiguities” and of middle class as “not a particularly coherent category”. He admits that “Thus, the emergence of the middle class as a social category turns out to be a complex, episodic, and highly contingent affair” (ibid.: 147 f.). Fernandes/Heller consequently propose to, rather than looking for a clear distinction of who might count as middle class and who might not, one should be “focusing on the specific class practices through which it reproduces itself.” (Fernandes & Heller 2006: 496) Similarly, Khandekar/Reddy point to the definitional problem and for them the NMC can be understood

“less as a sociologically accurate descriptor and more as a “marker of identification, aspiration, and critique in contemporary Indian public culture,” a demarcation of a discursive-performative space whose practices constitute both class and its emergent politics” (Khandekar & Reddy 2013: 3 f.)

Additonally, the middle class in India cannot be understood solely in economic terms, since “it does not occupy either of the categorical and binary structural positions of the bourgeoisie or the working class (productive assets vs. no productive assets)” (Fernandes & Heller 2006: 499 f.). Therefore, Fernandes/Heller define middle class as follows:

“people whose economic opportunities are not derived primarily from property (the bourgeoisie) but rather from other power-conferring resources such as organizational authority or possession of scarce occupational skills” (ibid.: 500)

The authors further roughly divide the middle class into “three basic strata” – the “dominant fraction”, “closely aligned with the bourgeoisie” and the class that “articulates the hegemony of the ruling bloc” (Deshpande 2003: 139, cit. by ibid.: 503), the “petty bourgeoisie [...] most often engaged in emulating the practices of the dominant fraction” and the “subordinate middle class fraction of salaried workers” which does not “occupy positions of significant authority over other workers” (ibid.: 500).
So how did the NMC constitute itself? The authors note how "There have been of course significant regional variations, but by the early nineties a new alignment of middle class fractions had clearly emerged." (ibid.: 504) Social, educational and economic capital provide the “New” middle class with the means to set itself apart from “newly mobilized lower class constituencies and their varied claims for incorporation” (ibid.: 498- as discussed above). These “exclusionary social practices through which the middle class constitutes itself” and distances itself from the “unruly”, “dirty” masses, thereby “reproducing social distinctions”, are one part of the equation – Hindu-Nationalism (Hindutva) which “has resonated with large sections of the Hindu middle class because its doctrines of nationalism and cultural essentialism provide an ideological frame for NMC self-assertion” is the other (ibid.: 497, 498, 499):

"The new social bloc is formed by the convergence of traditional caste-community differences and class distinctions. It may be an exaggeration to say that the BJP represents the rebellion of the elite, but it is nevertheless true that its rise to political power has been accompanied by the emergence of a new social group that is defined by an overlap of social and economic privileges." (Yadav 1999, cit. by ibid.: 504)

Both sides of this “relational dynamic” come into being “at the intersection of liberalization and a political context marked by organized political challenges from below” and therefore the “hegemonic aspirations of the NMC have taken the form of a politics of reaction, blending market liberalism and political and social illiberalism” (ibid.: 497, 498). As Kapur understands it, “The politics of the NMC is as much about labor (the global competition over jobs) as it is about predefined images of consumerism (the global competition over consumer markets)” (Kapur 2010: 149). In the economical sphere, the NMC can therefore be understood as buying into and profiting from neoliberal globalization and thereby redefining “middle class identity through the language of liberalization” (Fernandes & Heller 2006: 500). On the political and social side, it is exactly the opposite, inequality and exclusion are main features of the post-liberalization middle class discourse (also see Six 2001 for the "illiberalism" and othering of Hindu-Nationalism). In both cases, the NMC doesn’t represent a new strand of society, a new class or strata, but rather it is defined through changing discourses (the language of liberalization and communalism & nationalism) and practices (consumerism, political activism – also the ACM!) of the dominant middle class which already existed before.
But the NMC-discourses have power and interact “in complex ways with the other middle class fractions and the broader social differentiation that actually characterizes the Indian middle classes” (Fernandes & Heller 2006: 501). In one of these ways the NMC becomes the “bearer of the liberal ethos of opportunity and mobility”, representing the “promise of inclusion to other aspiring social segments even as it reconstitutes the subtle hierarchies and exclusions that anchor its class position” (ibid.: 501). This is, of course, a contradiction, one of many pertaining to that part of Indian society. Fernandes and Heller explain the logic of this contradiction, which is why I will quote them at length. The NMC’s

“reworking of the role of the middle class and the ideology it articulates for the ruling hegemonic bloc […] is both transformative and grounded. The transformative element elevates the middle class as the carrier of India’s modernizing aspirations. It is the project of globalization, technological mastery, competitiveness, and striving, and it is manifested in the rhetoric of newness. […] Second, in a country of India’s inequality and diversity such a transformative project necessarily fails the hegemonic test of eliciting consent from below. […] Pragmatically then, the middle class articulates hegemony – that is, tries to extend support beyond its dominant fraction – through a more culturally grounded ideology that takes the general form of a nationalist-organicist ideology. This is characterized first and foremost by the construction of an organic whole – created through juxtapositions to demonized others – and asserted through an essentialized cultural unity that misrecognizes internal differences of class and other social cleavages.” (ibid. 507 f.)

The middle class as understood here can then be called “new” and “old” at the same time. It employs strategies and presents understandings of state, democracy, religion and hierarchy that are grounded in “both religious nationalist and secular forms of illiberalism” (ibid.: 507). The NMC’s “engagement in politics”, writes Harriss (Harriss 2006: 462), “is of the “anti-politics” kind, involving the attempt to find rational solutions […] to what are defined as key public problems that have to be addressed in the process of modernizing society.”

Fernandes and Heller give reference to Polanyi’s argument that, “under certain historical conditions, market liberalism and political illiberalism find each other, typically through the agency of the middle class” (Fernandes & Heller 2006: 505). The NMC’s perceived hegemony then allows it to ignore “The context of civil society organization in class relationships” and the “paradox that increasing opportunities for participation [in NMC-controlled civil society] may actually increase political inequality” (Harriss 2007: 463, 464, comment M.K.).
This illiberality is not a very democratic feature of this NMC, or, as the authors note, democracy has never been the focus of middle class discourses. Instead, "If middle classes helped usher in formal democracy, rejecting the status privileges of pre-democratic orders, they have also drawn the line at empowering those that would threaten their own privileges." (Fernandes & Heller 2006: 505) At the same time, paradoxically, authors like Kapur (with his undoubtedly more neoliberal views of the Indian NMC) are of the opinion that this line was never drawn, that the NMC's "distaste for politics and politicians has limited its influence on the state and public policy, as evidenced by the Indian state’s policies on affirmative action, enhanced pro-poor welfare spending [...] and an expansion in legislation guaranteeing economic rights" (Kapur 2010: 155).

If Kapur’s opinion is shared by some of the people he is writing about this then means that the NMC has bought into the “anti-politics” stance it constructed itself, being inherently political while doing so – what Lukose calls “the politics of anti-politics” which is mapped onto a set of political distinctions between left and right, pitting middle-class businessmen whose use of the roads is illuminated by the headlights of their cars and scooters against the ordinary folk [...] who walk on foot and carry burning torches” (Lukose 2005: 511).

Fernandes and Heller argue that “NMC politics today are fundamentally reshaping and restricting democratic practices and norms.” (Fernandes & Heller 2006 506 f.) These politics constitute/construct “civil society”, with their middle-class activism, which serves to distinguish them further from the “political society”/“denizens” who often do not have the capital to engage in such claims for empowerment (see Harriss 2006 553 ff.). In this context, the ACM’s anti-political stance comes to mind. Khandekar/Reddy describe how the movement “asserted the right of the civic to set the terms of the political, exceeding the form of traditional protest [...] categorized] as “anti-politics.” Instead, the movement deployed identifiable forms derived from anti-colonial nationalism (satyagraha, the fast) to displace all other political alternatives put forth, collapsing regional concerns into an overarching national anti-corruption stance premised on the freedom to consume and the promise of a reliable national brand.” (Khandekar & Reddy 2013: 5)

This seems to describe a mechanism that is very similar to the one introduced above (Fernandes & Heller 2006 507 f.). The “reliable national brand” represented by Hazare and the idea of Gandhi here serves as the grounding element of a “nationalist-
organicist ideology”, while the transformative element is a renewed (but not entirely new, as shown above) NMC claim to the political sphere, imposing market values facilitating the production of social & economic capital on the state, represented by terms like “accountability”, “efficiency” and “effectiveness”. These, it can be argued, are terms that are part of a neoliberal discourse on the state. As Corbridge et. al. summarize it:

“For many neoliberals the overriding concern has been to secure a rolling back of the state in the developing world. [...] At its crudest, a discourse of economic liberalism encourages a view of the state as a dead weight, or, worse, as the promoter of economic unreason, special interests and the continued impoverishment of the masses. [...] there is now growing recognition within the neoliberal camp that markets cannot be promoted in the absence of effective structures of governance.” (Corbridge, Williams, Srivastava & Véron 2005: 40 f.)

It is exactly these terms and the image of the state as “dead weight” (of course very much connected with corruption discourses!) which lead us to the next dimension of the ACM – the embeddedness of the movement not only in a larger geo-political context, but also, connected with this, in a geo-economical and geo-medial context – that of neoliberal globalization and its impact on the Indian middle class, in cultural, political and socio-economic terms.

### 2.3.3 State-Citizen-Market Relationships and the Consumerism of the NMC

Leela Fernandes (2000: 91) talks of

“the invention of the new middle class as the social group which is able to negotiate India’s new relationship with the global economy in both cultural and economic terms; in cultural terms by defining a new cultural standard that rests on the sociosymbolic practices of commodity consumption and in economic terms as the beneficiaries of the material benefits of jobs in India’s ‘new economy’” (ibid.: 90)

How did this invention come about, then? Kapur states that "It is widely accepted that, sometime during the 1980s, the Indian state started to become more pro-business and by the 1990s entered into a close alliance with capital (both domestic and foreign) to advance a neoliberal agenda.” (Kapur 2010: 153 f.) This goes back to the Emergency and the abovementioned partial retreat of the state from a planned-economy model. It also resulted, among other reasons, from the collapse of communism and the promotion of the Washington Consensus (imposing neoliberal ideas of a small, effective state in return for aid) in development policy. This resulted in a process
through which “the driver of production and services shifted to the private sector” (ibid.: 153), with the public sector losing importance (at least in urban areas – the rural story is a different one – see Corbridge, Williams, Srivastava & Véron 2005). These changes led to a MC “more likely to be self-employed, in entrepreneurship and in the services sector, rather than in permanent salaried employment in private sector manufacturing and industry” (Kapur 2010: 153)

Therefore, by the late 1980s, “a newly-fashioned investing ‘middle class’ was acquiring a life of its own. The private consumption of this segment of society would increasingly assume and partly replace the productive role of state investment” (Rajagopal 2011: 1009), leading to an ever self-reproducing cycle of private consumption-entrepreneurship-investment spurred on by a state encouraging these processes and therefore, at the same time, to some extent relinquishing its place as the main investor and driver of the Indian economy. At the same time, this led to a power shift in the sphere of the market. As Fernandes and Heller note, the “focal point of middle class structural power (especially the dominant fraction) has shifted not only from the state to the market, but also from playing an auxiliary role in the market to playing a leading role.” (Fernandes & Heller 2006: 503)

I will now examine some of these processes in more detail. First, as mentioned above, the rising cultural hegemony of the NMC led to new forms of exclusion and expressions of inequality. There is an argument to be made that liberalization and the subsequent turn to Hindutva are very much connected (Clemens Six has written a very good book on the topic – see Six 2001):

“...In both its timing and normative substance (family, order, hierarchy) the rise of Hindu nationalism is also quite clearly a response to the rapid socioeconomic change that has accompanied the transition from state developmentalism to liberalization. [...] social and economic disruption feeds directly into the traditional sources of middle class conservatism: preoccupation with cultural purity, order, stability, and discipline, inflected most notably by status anxieties.” (Fernandes & Heller 2006: 505)

While I will not examine Hindu-Nationalism in greater detail, the values listed above – “order, stability, and discipline” – could be seen as having been applied to the ACM, according to readings of the movement as “resistance” and the understanding of Gandhigiri (cf. Shah 2012; Sitapati 2011). I will touch on this below.

A second term closely associated with the liberalized NMC is entrepreneurship. The growth of private investment, writes Kapur, has been
accompanied by cognitive changes about entrepreneurship and capitalism [...] one issue that unites most entrepreneurs is their desire to be able to operate with minimum state interference, which in India usually means the grasping hands of state functionaries" (Kapur 2010: 154)

Entrepreneurship is then understood as leading to the (neoliberal) wish for greater independence from state intervention, or, as Kapur understands it, entrepreneurs "are more likely to support opportunity than state-mandated affirmative action, and self-help rather than welfare" (ibid.: 155) or the "grasping hands" of corruption. A third dimension and the one mentioned the most is the consumerism of the NMC. As Liechty notes, "the middle class’s position is determined [most directly] by its relations to the market, that is, by its ability to consume." (Liechty 2003: 16 f., comment M.K.). Consumption, the author stresses, is not (just) the simple act of buying a good, but rather

"the reality of socioeconomic inequality is the bedrock on which class-based consumer cultures are built. But the act of buying is only one ‘moment’ in the cultural process of consumption. Goods themselves have ‘social lives’ [...] Because of their ability to both include and exclude class others, and to both display and conceal class privilege, commodities (and their attendant practices) are the primary currency of middle-class life" (ibid.: 30 f.)

One interesting addition to the Indian discourse is the “Non-Resident Indian” (NRI). As Lukose mentions, "Within the cultural politics of consumption in contemporary India, the marketing of an NRI lifestyle has become associated with the effects of market liberalization and the aspirations of a globalizing middle class" (Lukose 2005: 520 f.). Writing about the Indian case, Fernandes stresses that the NMC is distinctive "in its discursive construction as a sign of the potential promise of the benefits of India’s integration with the global economy, benefits which public cultural representations associated with particular practices of commodity consumption" (Fernandes 2000: 91). Consumption then, on the one hand, represents that promise which was before the domain of the development discourse, the promise of progress, of opportunity and ultimately, of (“new”, “global”) identity.

And this is, at the latest, where the state and ideas of citizenship come in, since, "while consumption is not the exclusive domain of the middle class, laying claim to politics as itself a means of consumption – of public space, of state resources, of governance itself – is." (Khandekar & Reddy 2013: 5) In other words, the question that is often posed in the literature about the NMC is how its “discourses of consumption reconfigure politics, citizenship, and democracy” (Lukose 2009: 134).
Ritty Lukose analyzes how the

“private consumer” lays claim to the state by trying to construct a civic public, based on notions of efficiency and orderliness, in opposition to a political public, deemed to be unruly, disruptive, and sometimes violent, in ways that are reconfiguring politics, democracy, and citizenship under conditions of globalization.” (Lukose 2005: 508)

Lukose mentions Chatterjee’s distinction between civil society and political society, the former constituting the “formal”, institutionalized elite form of organizing and influence, while the latter constitutes “unorganized masses” not able to create the necessary structures for their expression of political will, mainly because of a lack of economic, social or cultural capital. While the political society or, as Lukose calls it, the political public has no other means of political expression than to join the party process (i.e. the “Silent Revolution” as discussed above and by Jaffrelot 2003), it now encounters “a privatized citizenship linked to a conception of a properly functioning civic public” (Lukose 2005: 512). This civic public’s goal is “the erasure of the political through the assertion of the well-mannered and orderly use of this public space and through the respect for property by those deemed to be citizens.” (ibid.: 513) In other words, the civic public/civil society “consumes” public space, whereby “The people” are disarticulated from these places in the reconceptualization of public space defined in terms of consumer citizenship.” (ibid.: 513)

As becomes clear from Lukose’s analysis, discourses of consumption play a big role in constructing a new kind of public – a public that works according to the logic of consumption. This also has an impact on conceptions of citizenship:

“a Nehruvian conception of a productive citizen […] is now linked with discourses of consumption, in which free talk articulates with the freedom to consume. This is a shift from an understanding of citizenship as building the nation to one in which one ought to be free to consume the nation.” (ibid.: 522)

As I have shown, the NMC which applies this consumer-citizenship is gaining cultural hegemony and, “as the key intermediate class of modern capitalism, […] is pivotal to political outcomes and can support reaction or revolution” (Fernandes & Heller 2006: 506). The question I want to pose next then becomes, whether it was a reaction or a revolution India witnessed in 2011 and how these new forms of citizenship are connected with it. For this distinction, I will now turn to Nishant Shah’s introduction to State-Citizen-Market relationships as observable in the ACM context.
Nishant Shah wants to complicate the reading of movements like the Arab Spring uprisings, Occupy or the ACM and "offer a framework that demands more attention, both to the geo-political contexts and the temporalities, which inform and shape these uprisings" (Shah 2012: 173). Shah understands the anti-corruption movement as resistance, rather than revolution, resistance meaning “an endemic condition of governmentality within a State-Citizen-Market relationship” (ibid.: 173).

I have tried to create a simple model of the different relationships as described by Shah and added the concepts of consumer-citizenship and corruption/anti-corruption as discussed above (Figure 1).

For Shah, each of these actors “interacts with and helps in conceiving the other two” (Shah doesn’t think of the consumer as separate - ibid.: 174). This happens through a “reciprocal flow of information” and “can only be imagined as a series of interactions and negotiations involving all three actors”(ibid.). Therefore the state creates the citizen, but is also created by the citizen, the market can only exist through consumers, and so on. Consumer and citizen are, in one sense, the same actor, a consumer-citizen, so to speak. This is a feature of a society (re-)constructed through neoliberal discourse.

**Figure 1**: State-Citizen-Market relationships and corruption
Another feature of this model is the inherent control function expressed through resistance and contestation, which “are not outside of this relationship structure” (ibid.: 174). On the contrary, resistance

“is an essential part of the SCM relationships, where each actor resists, questions and facilitates the different transactions that are mitigated and mediated by those technologies that produce assurances [of the future] and precariousness of [the risks of] time and space.” (ibid.: 174, comment M.K.)

Resistance is then distinct because it is not counter-hegemonic, a “paradigm shift” or a revolution to overthrow the hegemonic SCMRs, but rather, it

“seeks to reinforce the centrality of the State and the validity of the current model of governance [in order to] bolster existing relationships and address the existing problems in order for the model to survive. It introduces modes of engagement, ways of operation and frameworks of legibility that do not question or undermine the status quo in any ways. Instead, it builds scaffolding around the existing problems, in an attempt to produce a re-evolution of the contemporary structure” (ibid.: 175).

As I have tried to show in Figure 1, the fight against corruption (at least in its consumerist form) can be understood as taking place in such a SCMR (although I have used a simplified reading of corruption as part of a state-market negotiation). When the consumer-citizens of the ACM challenged corruption, their “resistance led to a re-evolution of the SCM model” (ibid.: 178). In this model, is Shah’s argument, the

“revolution that was supposed radically to overcome the democracy and trust deficit of the State becomes a way of endorsing the State’s centrality and importance in a rights-based discourse. The movement lost its political teeth, its claims at radicalism and its intentions of creating new modes of governance, only to strengthen the very system it had set out to oppose.” (ibid.: 178)

Of course, such a model has its limitations, first and foremost the essentialization of what “citizenship” and “democracy” might mean for some people (leaving out the moral sphere as discussed in the definitions chapter and other kinds of societal relationships that do not involve all the actors of the model). As Harriss writes about this kind of interpretation of the citizen as just another consumer, this is a “very stunted view of the meaning of “representation” because it reduces politics to a marketplace of buyers (people are presented as customers or clients rather than as citizens) and sellers.” (Harriss 2006: 464) Nonetheless it will help us understand the summer of 2011 and what has been written about it a little better.

I want to close this chapter with an examination of how the specific Indian SCMR created the “India brand” and how this affected the ACM as well. Ravinder Kaur
describes how in the “shift from nation building to nation branding, the very idea of prosperity and equity has now become first and foremost a matter of image” (Kaur 2012: 603). It was – sticking to the State-Market dichotomy established above – the state which first created “Brand India” in order to provide a better environment for the market. But establishing a brand creates a discourse that affects all actors of the relationship. Kaur writes how

“The global displays of a re-formed nation at the annual meetings of the World Economic Forum at Davos and the enticing images of ‘Incredible India’ campaigns had by now successfully iterated and circulated the idea of a market-friendly India.” (ibid.: 604)

Incredible India thereby not only achieved to create a business-friendly image of the Indian market, but came to represent the nation to its consumer-citizens, resulted in the ”convergence of the corporate interest with that of the nation visible in the brand initiatives” (ibid.: 615). Interestingly, this particular campaign (re)produced a nation of contrasts, a “new” and “old” nation, a nation for the middle class and a nation for the rest (or for “the other”) (cf. ibid.: 615):

“The contrast is clearly laid out to demarcate the new nation imagined and realised in conjunction with the world from its isolated other that keeps on holding it back. The idea of a schismatic India that is out of synch with itself as well as the world, and therefore unable to mobilise its full resources to reach its natural destiny of world leader is a worrisome theme frequently voiced in the media.” (ibid.: 617)

Kaur actually connects this dichotomy of “Brand India” and its widespread use in the media and corporate world to the ACM and writes that, “At the heart of this corporate activism was the fear that Brand India was being damaged beyond repair” (ibid.: 617 f.). He substantiates this claim with another claim that “The biggest support to fight corruption came from the corporate sector” and that “the government’s acquiescence to the broad demands for an anti-corruption legislation” (ibid.: 618) actually resulted from this fear that the trust in India’s corporate brand was endangered.

This calls to mind how Khandekar and Reddy describe the ACM as “the re-making of social relations in the image of products, and of “India” itself into a trustable brand personified by Anna Hazare” and how the authors understand “the emergence of Anna” as branded product through a series of successive “(re)qualifications” or stages of acquiring meaning, in the course of its production, distribution, and consumption” (Khandekar & Reddy 2013: 4, 5). It is in this last sentence where we see a convergence of what I have written about in this chapter. The movement of 2011, and “Brand Anna”
in particular, can be understood as advocating a “re-evolution” of the relationship a consumerist New Middle Class has with the state and the market. Through this re-evolution, the civic public’s consumer-logic was gently pushed into the political sphere said civic public has always (to the surprise of many authors) interacted with. One of the communication channels in this relationship is the media, and before I come to a conclusion and a framework for analysis, I will now quickly turn to the media’s changing role and its relationship with the NMC and corruption. I will not provide a full survey of the Indian Mediascape, since this would go beyond the scope of this thesis.

2.4 The Changing Indian Mediascape and the Creation of “Auras of Meaning”

One of the theories promoted in the literature on corruption in India is that the recent perceived exponential growth of corruption scandals debated in the Indian public might not (at least entirely) reflect a similar growth of actual corruption, it might just signify an expanding media becoming more sensitive to the sensibilities of a growing middle class to such scandals (additionally, of course, these scandals are undoubtedly “good” material).

A first aspect of this is the growth of Indian media in general. Parry, for example, describes how a “massive expansion of newsprint and broadcast media makes what goes on in the corridors of power [...] much more visible to a massive public outside the metropolitan areas” (Parry 2000: 50 ff.). Similarly, Gupta emphasizes how “local discourses and practices concerning corruption were intimately linked with the reportage found in vernacular and national newspapers (Gupta 1995: 386) The medial anti-corruption discourse of the 1980s, according to the author, served “to define “the political” but also served to constitute “the public” that was perceived to be reacting to corruption.” Gupta also emphasizes that “this was done largely through the mass media” (ibid.: 386) and gives the example of how the Times of India (TOI) covered the Bofors scandal, an example for how “the discourse of corruption became a means by which a fairly complex picture of the state was symbolically constructed in public culture” (ibid.: 386 ff.) and how

"The state constructed here was one that consisted of widely disparate institutions with little or no coordination among them, of multiple levels of authority, none of which were accountable to ordinary people, and employees (secure in the knowledge that they could not be fired) who treated citizens with contempt. At the same time,
these reports also created subjects who were represented as being exploited, powerless, and outraged” (ibid.: 388)

A second aspect is that already in the 1980s, Gupta writes, the English-language press “with their urban, educated, “middle-class” readership” differed greatly from the vernacular press and, for example, “focused almost exclusively on large-scale events” (ibid.: 387). One interesting difference was also how the state was portrayed – while national newspapers focused on the big picture, vernacular, local papers were “much less prone to reify the state as a monolithic organization with a single chain of command [and] made a practice of explicitly naming specific departments of the state bureaucracy.” (ibid.: 387)

Peggy Mohan has written about how English is, on the one hand, “the language associated in India with a middle class existence” (the “elite” as she calls it) but increasingly being claimed by the “non-elite” (Mohan 2005). Chaudhuri notes that the English-language media is only part of a bigger explosion (also see Jeffrey 2000) and provides the example of English newspaper readership, which is now relatively small compared to the well-known Hindi newspapers (cf. Chaudhuri 2010 58). But India is still ” one of the largest markets for English-language newspapers and magazines in the world” and the English-language press still enjoys “continued growth”, notes Schneider (Schneider 2013: 2, 3). And the author also stresses that the division “by language” springing from “colonial and postcolonial power asymmetries” has been weakened through “post-liberalization dynamics of a strong newspaper expansion into smaller urban and rural areas” (ibid.: 4). This means that, as the middle class (and its definition) expand, so does the populous that takes part in the cultural practices of said class – and language is one of the most important practices which exist. Part of the reproduction of said practices is also who gets to write and describe the NMC, and, according to Kapur, “Indeed, most Indian intellectuals [and, presumably journalists] who write about the Indian middle class are also from that class, except they are almost never first generation” (Kapur 2010: 155, comment M.K.)

The third aspect is that these practices are also embedded in processes (and languages) of consumption, which then spreads “consumer-logic” even further. Liechty, writing about Nepal (there might be an argument that Nepal’s and India’s Mediascapes are comparable) observes how

“the consumption of commercial entertainment media is inseparable from broader processes of middle-class consumption. [...] Media not only coexist with other cultural commodities but, much more importantly, are in constant ‘dialogue’ with
other goods [...] helping to create ‘auras’ of meaning that surround other goods with consumer desire” (Liechty 2003: 31)

It could be argued that one of these “goods” that is imbued with an “aura of meaning” is the state and democracy and that an

“increasingly market-based, media-saturated, and globally inflected cultural economy has begun to transform the ways, the terms, and the means by which individuals come to imagine themselves, others, and their society’s meaningful social categories” (ibid.: 32 f.)

In other words, this “new” media is transforming what could be called the Indian public (also see Rajagopal 2001). This is exactly what Maitrayee Chaudhuri has written about, observing how the “often strident appropriation of the nation and the Indian ‘public’ by a middle class ideologically aligned with the project of liberalisation” becomes visible through the media (Chaudhuri 2010: 57). This is achieved through “synergy between the substance and style of contemporary media”, making

“racy language and combative anchors with a weakness for scandals and conspiracies [...] an integral part of the ideological discourse. For ‘entertainment and media industries increasingly rely on gossip to stay ahead of rivals”’ (ibid.: 59).

“The ordinary is now co-opted as a badge of professional authenticity, a sign of the proximity of the professionals, including stars and celebrities, to the vernacular and plebeian. This is one master strategy of containment in which class is simultaneously acknowledged and conjured away in one stroke: the ordinary is valued precisely because of its contrast with the elites” (ibid.: 64)

This analysis of the media’s style is interesting if one thinks of the focus on “Team Anna”, on individual tit-for-tat instead of the movement at large (and if the larger movement was analyzed, it happened often in conjunction with this personality-focus, eclipsed by it, but also legitimizing it), which was quite prevalent in (some) parts of the English-language press (see Khandekar and Reddy 2013 for more on “Team Anna” and Muralidharan 2011 for more on how the media can be seen as having acted as an “echo chamber”).

What is the abovementioned substance, then? Chaudhuri and Jeffrey (cf. Jeffrey 2000 38 f.) describe how the media served the interests of nation building and was supposed to “spread the spirit of self-reliance and national development” (Chaudhuri 2010: 60) in the decades after independence, with the brief (but, for the media, very consequential, and, afterwards, beneficial) interlude of the Emergency restricting its relative freedom. But there was still some skepticism and awareness of limited censorship and consequently “The opening up of the media to private channels in the
early 1990s was [...] widely seen as freedom from state censorship” (ibid.: 60) – and, more broadly as freedom from the state, since it was a transformation towards neoliberal discourse. This transformation took place in two ways, writes the author:

“by an overt ideological defence of an unbridled market and an attack on the very idea of an interventionist and welfare state; and by the everyday quotidian features and news that inscribe corporate speech, create a new imaginary of a global Indian and a global Indian middle class.” (ibid.: 62)

While the latter aspect is clearly connected to the consumerism discussed above, the first aspect is a direct connection to the corruption discourse and the NMC distrust of “the political”. The media constructs itself as “some kind of knight in armour at the forefront of civil society, its last hope since the three organs of the state, the executive, legislature and judiciary have failed the system” (ibid.: 70).

In conclusion, it can be argued that an expanding media is changing India. As Chaudhuri writes,

“The nation is surely being reinvented. The media is central in this transformation of the ‘public’. The most challenging part of this transformation is its apparent democratising of form and content that conceal the hollowing out of a more critical public discourse.” (ibid.: 75)
I will now turn to the analysis of selected strands of the media and of statements by the actors involved in the ACM. I have tried to include as broad a range of actors as possible. Most of the sources were collected through the internet, due to time and financial limitations. As Visvanathan notes, “The television time given to Hazare made even cricket fans envious. A moment by moment commentary by TV anchors like Rahul Bansal of TV Today, a major channel, made Hazare a site for hot history.” (Visvanathan 2012: 106) It would, of course, be interesting to analyze what sort of “site” was ascribed to Hazare and the ACM. But due to the limitations of this paper, the role of television will, regrettably, not be discussed here. Instead, I will focus on the written word, both in its traditional forms (newspapers and scientific journals) as well as in its new forms (blogs, official websites and social networks).

First, I will analyze statements by “Team Anna” and IAC, putting a special focus on press releases, interviews and statements to the press that reference views of corruption and the way to fight it.

Second, talking about participants of the movement, I will also look at the role of “new” media, namely social networks like Twitter and Facebook, other blogs and the comments sections of select articles. Because of the sheer volume of Tweets and Facebook posts, I will have to rely on some quantitative studies that have already been conducted and that I will present in this section. Here the question will be which group is represented in these online discourses, how they are entangled in consumption discourses and whether they say more about the social composition and underlying dynamics of the movement.

Thirdly, I will analyze editorials, opinion-editorials and some allegedly descriptive news articles in English-language newspapers. Here, the focus will be on who is able to raise his/her voice in such a prestigious forum, what they say about corruption and whether the consumerism of a changing political public shine through.

Lastly, I will look at comments by academics and actors of the “Independent Left”, published in the comments section of the critical blog Kafila.org. Here I will try to observe whether there is a certain uneasiness and distrust with the ACM and where it comes from. But first, I will present my framework for analysis and quickly explain which methodology I will apply here.

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I take this title from a comment analyzed below by (Nirmalangshu 2011)
3.1 Framework for Analysis and Methodology

The observations presented in this thesis so far have produced a complex understanding of how the mechanics of the corruption discourse in general and the Indian corruption discourse on the one hand and the anti-corruption discourse and its underlying dimensions and dynamics on the other hand influence each other.

The actor identified as central to the ACM is the “New Middle Class”. It is this NMC which created a movement arguably influenced by a historically grown distrust with the Nehruvian development state and its inclusiveness; by the increasing claim of said “new” middle class to a public sphere and media that is transforming as India is continuing its path of liberalization; and by the effects of said liberalization on the discourses presented in the media, be it through a changing language, a changing focus on accountability or a changing view of what constitutes “democracy”.

It is this NMC which can be understood as being embedded in a larger State-Citizen-Consumer-Market relationship that, since the early 1990s, has seen a renegotiation, a re-evolution towards a more corporate-interest based political economy, towards legal activists as the main regulative actors, towards an (urban) society which challenges authority with authority.

It is a larger middle-class which is highly heterogeneous, with several strands part of the negotiation process – the consumerist, “Brand India” loving strand called “India Shining” by Sitapati (2011), the legal activists, the Gandhigiri (“The way of Gandhi,” as translated by Khandekar & Reddy 2013: 13) – and one strand skeptic of it (the so-called Independent Left).

And this NMC has been talking about corruption, and, in the process of doing so, maybe revealed a little about its inner workings, about its ideology and politics. And this is exactly where I will try to investigate.

I will rely heavily on Norman Fairclough’s excellent book “Analysing Discourse” (Fairclough 2003), in which he describes discourse analysis as

“oscillating’ between a focus on specific texts and a focus on what I call the ‘order of discourse’, the relatively durable social structuring of language which is itself one element of the relatively durable structuring and networking of social practices. Critical discourse analysis is concerned with continuity and change at this more abstract, more structural, level, as well as with what happens in particular texts. The link between these two concerns is made through the way in which texts are analysed in critical discourse analysis. Text analysis is seen as not only linguistic analysis; it also includes what I have called ‘interdiscursive analysis’, that is, seeing
texts in terms of the different discourses, genres and styles they draw upon and articulate together” (ibid.)

It is exactly this interdiscursive analysis which should become possible with the conceptualization of the debate I provided above.

Fairclough also presents very concrete questions to be asked for a comprehensive textual analysis. First, when talking about the “social event” a text is part of, Fairclough provides the question “What social practice or network of social practices can the events be referred to, be seen as framed within?” (ibid.: conclusion, also see chapter 2). This question should be helpful especially when dealing with “new” forms of media, which also have created and reproduced “new” social practices that might be of relevance to an analysis of the NMC.

Second, the question of how difference is dealt with is a central one. Is there

a) “an openness to, acceptance of, recognition of difference; an exploration of difference, as in ‘dialogue’ in the richest sense of the term”
b) “an accentuation of difference, conflict, polemic, a struggle over meaning, norms, power”
c) “an attempt to resolve or overcome difference”
d) “a bracketing of difference, a focus on commonality, solidarity”
e) “consensus, a normalization and acceptance of differences of power which brackets or suppresses differences of meaning and over norms” (ibid.: conclusion, also see chapter 2, 4)

Of course, a combination of these scenarios is possible and, maybe, the norm. In the case of the ACM, this might become obvious with the activist-state dichotomy, where the state is seen both as something “other” (the political) but also as a bigger whole which needs to be defended (a reference to the correction process in a SCMR).

A third category of questions deals with which voices are included and which ones are excluded, and whether included input by “others” is “directly reported (quoted), or indirectly reported? How are other voices textured in relation to the authorial voice, and in relation to each other?” (ibid.: conclusion, also see chapter 3) This should be relevant for all sources of analysis – it is exactly here where values and democratic understanding of a movement and the ones writing about it should become apparent.

Connected to this last category is also the question, which assumptions are made and if that says something about the ideology of the author(s) (ibid.: conclusion, also see chapter 3). This is a central point of analysis, of course, and it is aided by several subquestions: which automatic semantic/grammatical connections are made, and “Are there 'metaphorical' relations between exchanges, speech functions, or types of
statement (e.g. demands which appear as statements, evaluations which appear as factual statements)? What is the predominant grammatical mood (declarative, interrogative, imperative)?” (ibid.: conclusion, also see chapter 5.6)

Also connected to this is the question of modality, which

“involves the many ways in which attitudes can be expressed towards the ‘pure’ reference-and-predication content of an utterance, signalling factuality, degrees of certainty or doubt [...]” (Verschueren 1999, cit. by Fairclough 2003, chapter 10: “Modality and evaluation”)

Fairclough observes “levels of commitment” in a statement, from high to low (ibid.: conclusion). This is not only based on assumptions and ideology, but also on self-representation (which is of course connected to that).

A central question is also the one of representation, of elements of social events (of the ACM, in this case) and of social actors (as identified above). Terms that describe different representations are “activated/passivated, personal/impersonal, named/classified, specific/generic” (ibid.: conclusion, also see chapter 8). How actors and events are represented, in simpler words, how the participants of the movement are described, should already say a lot about the ones describing said events.

| historico-political dimension, distrust of state |
| construction/acceptance/accentuation of state-civil society dichotomy |
| automatic semantic/grammatical connections |
| metaphorical relations/accuracy of mood representation |

| hegemonic aspirations, discourses of difference |
| inclusiveness of different voices |
| how are voices embedded? “Intertextuality” |

| socio-economic influence on cultural and social practices |
| reproduction of these social practices |
| assumptions (ideological)/modality of statements |
| automatic semantic/grammatical connections |
| metaphorical relations/accuracy of mood representation |

**Table 1** - Dimensions of the ACM and corresponding dimensions of discourse analysis, as identified by Fairclough 2003

In Table 1 I have tried to assign the questions identified above to the dimensions and dynamics of the ACM.
In addition to these dimensions, I will ask the following questions

- Which of the groups identified above does the author/medium belong to?
- Who was addressed (which audience was the message for)?
- What do these factors say about the medium in which opinion was published (new media vs. old media, elite discourse vs. non-elite discourse)?

Of course, I won’t be able to always answer all these questions, but they will help in answering the central question I would like to pose for my media analysis: What does the person’s/group’s/medium’s opinion/explanation of the JLB and the ACM say about:

a) their understanding of causes of corruption and the ways to fight it
b) therefore, their understanding of state & democracy
   i. can it be seen as consumerist?
   ii. can distrust of the development state and affirmative action policies be deduced?
   iii. can a more general distrust of modernity be discerned?

I will now turn to the first of my sources for analysis, statements and imagery used by the representatives of the movement itself, by “Team Anna” and, more broadly, “India Against Corruption”.

### 3.2 Statements and Imagery Used by IAC

India Against Corruption released more material that was suitable for this analysis in the first half of 2011. In the latter half of the year, press releases and other materials were mostly dealing with minuscule details of the proposed laws or can be seen as defense against the various scandals described in Appendix A. The official website of the NGO (indiaagainstcorruption.org) is no longer available, but some archived versions (often mere skeletons) were available through the Internet Archive (web.archive.org) where they were saved in a period between the end of 2010 and the end of 2012. Most of my sources are so-called “notes” from IAC’s Facebook page, where they are publicly available. Often times, an exact replica of the day’s press release would also be released as a note on Facebook. I will now analyze the several press releases, Facebook notes, Op-Eds and letters chronologically.

The Mahatma Pamphlet
The first document is a pamphlet from March of 2011, shortly after Hazare announced his first fast for the beginning of April (IAC 2011a). It is titled “a mahatma announces fast unto death” and includes a portrait of Hazare, a section titled “Anna’s appeal to the people” and a section introducing the “Salient features of Jan Lokpal Bill”. The use of Mahatma for Hazare and the description of the ACM as “this next freedom movement” establishes his Gandhian format and a certain mythical, historicized discourse from the start. Also, strikingly, the other main members of “Team Anna” are mentioned only in the fine print of page one and on the backside of the pamphlet, where the JLB is praised as

"Drafted by Justice Santosh Hegde, Prashant Bhushan and Arvind Kejriwal, this Bill has been refined on the basis of feedback received from public on website and after series of public consultations. It has also been vetted by and is supported by Shanti Bhushan, J M Lyngdoh, Kiran Bedi, Anna Hazare etc"

Here, the legalist edge of the movement becomes apparent – the prominent position given to “Justice Santosh Hegde” (emphasis mine) and legal activist Bhushan is a testament to that. In addition, the importance allotted to “feedback” from “the public” is interesting, since this “public” is therefore seen as acting in concert, with one voice against a corrupt state. Here, the state/civil society dichotomy is taken as a given, is presented with low modality. The voice of the subsequent explanation of what the JLB provides for is very personal. The Lokpal is about “the common citizen” and it describes how “you could approach Lokpal if your [different services are not provided]. You could also report any case of corruption to Lokpal [different services not being provided]” (emphasis M.K.). This is then a similar language to that spoken in commercials and PR campaigns, reproduces the language and, in the end, social practices of consumerism. It is also interesting to note that the pamphlet is very inclusive, doesn’t seem to reproduce communalism. Readers are requested to “please pray to God (whoever you believe in) for better and corruption free India”. There are hints that this message is directed primarily at the NMC, though. People are asked to join the members of “Team Anna” in protest, along with “All India Bank Employees Federation, PAN IIT Alumni Association, Common Cause and many other prominent organizations and leaders, as India comes out on the streets”. The Bank Association and Institute of Technology Alumni speak for themselves and Common Cause is involved in public-interest litigation, a tool identified by Sitapati as part of the legal activist middle-class discourse (Sitapati 2011: 40).
In conclusion, two of the three dimensions and dynamics identified in this thesis are present here – the consumerist language and the state-citizen dichotomy. The NMC is spoken to, but other voices are also present, which makes this a fairly inclusive pamphlet (one indicator of this might also be that it is available in several other languages as well).

*The Letter to the Prime Minister*

The letter to the PM (IAC 2011c), published sometime before Hazare’s first fast, stands out for its claim to represent “the people”. The document pits the first person plural “We” representing the “Citizens of India” against the formal “You” representing “Mr. Chief Public Servant, Manmohan Singh”. Several assumptions are made on behalf of this “We” and a sense of urgency is (re)created:

“We have suffered enough due to corruption. We are deeply hurt and disappointed with any lack of a real and meaningful solution from you and your government. We want change, and we want accountability and we cannot wait any longer to have this! We will not vote for you if an effective anti-corruption bill is not enacted. Not the farce Lokpal Bill proposed by your government, but the peoples “Jan Lokpal Bill”. We want strict and effective punishment for the corrupt. They MUST go to jail!”

There seems to be no modality at all in this. The “citizens” are all subsumed under the banner of urgently needed anti-corruption of the consumerist kind, as probably evident by terms like “accountability” and “effective”. Later in the document, passages even speak for “the entire country”. But interestingly, there are also subcategories, which point to a certain accentuation of intra-citizen-difference. One such subcategory mentioned are the “honest and hardworking people of this country” who “refuse to be innocent bystanders”, another is “upright citizens”. There might be an argument to be made that this description does not purport to speak of all citizens of India. And “the people’s” voice is in need of legitimization, as this passage shows: “We urge you to consider the choice put forth by the people – credible names such as Justice Santosh Hegde, Prashant Bhushan, Shanti Bushan and others, to be part of the committee”.

These are, of course, also among the persons who drafted this letter and they naturalize their assumptions of representation through their own authority resp. “credibility”. That the “sentiments against rampant corruption in this country are quickly becoming as strong as those that led to the uprising in Tahrir Square” is seen as evident, similarly is the view that Hazare’s “demands are extremely beneficial for the future of India”. The question is then, which kind of future is meant by this. It
seems to be about the financial future of “the people” and the fairness towards “upright citizens” who, morally, are doing the “right” thing. Considering what I have written before – that corruption, in certain cases can be seen as empowerment for the subaltern and that in the Indian case, it has been seen as an unfair way for those groups to occupy the political sphere, this letter is clearly reproducing and accentuating differences and presenting a one-sided view and a claim to the political sphere by a NMC with hegemonic aspirations.

Note on the “Petrol Price Hike” and Corruption

This Facebook note, dated May 14 (after Hazare’s first fast and the establishment of the “joint committee” to draft the JLB) has a more direct tone, linking an apparent “petrol price hike” to corruption (IAC 2011d). It clearly states that this is the government’s way of “in effect, collecting the money from middle class in form of petrol price hike and bribing the farmers and SUV/MUV owners” (with its diesel subsidies), pitting the NMC against rural India and the Elite. An underlying graphic (Figure 2) shows a figure holding a fuel filler neck to its head as if it were a pistol. The picture is titled “Fuel Hike killing common man”. It now becomes clear who is meant with said “common man”. Here, we find a lack of inclusiveness into the space that is called “civic”. “Corruption”, in this case, is understanding the government’s subsidies for farmers as “bribes”. A third actor enters the state-civil society equation – it is the unruly, rural masses, the “political society” or “political public” Chatterjee and Lukose have introduced (see chapter 2.3.3).

Another point to be made has, once again, to do with whose voice is represented and whose is not. The only person mentioned (and quoted) in the whole note is “Delhi based industrialist Bharat Ram”, whose opinion that the subsidies for Diesel are promoted by a strong lobby of “two large manufacturers who produce primarily diesel vehicles” (as is explained in the article, Tata Motors and Mahindra & Mahindra are meant by that – see Dutta 2011) is quoted in full. The word “efficient” is mentioned four times in the short document and there is also talk of “a deficiency in governance and complete disregard for the people”, meaning that the vocabulary is also one influenced by the global discourses of “accountability” and “governance”. This is clearly a document meant for the middle class, in effect pitting it against the not to be trusted subaltern and the “elite”, with help of the market dimension represented by Bharat Ram.
The “Core Values” of India Against Corruption

The next document is also a Facebook note, detailing a draft of 10 main values of IAC (IAC 2011b), published on June 27, after the final split between government and IAC-participants of the joint-committee and a few days before Hazare’s most successful fast. It asks for the input of readers to change, add, delete or rearrange values and stresses that “It is not a battle of egos between government [sic!] and civil society. It is about making India corruption free”. Written in the now familiar first person plural, the second paragraph also reads “We are all Anna. This is not Anna’s movement. It is our movement. Anna and other key faces are the flag bearers and help to focus and crystallize our message”. This seems to contradict some of the representative aspects of the messages analyzed above. But as Khandekar and Reddy have written, “We are all Anna” represents “Brand Anna”, which

“had extremely successfully marshaled an “ersatz nostalgia – nostalgia without memory,” that taught the protesters to “miss things that they had never lost”. The ultimate value of Brand Anna was that it could return these lost things, in an accessible and eminently useable form, to a public convinced of its own moral rectitude and primed for consumption.” (Khandekar & Reddy 2013: 14)

“We are all Anna” also harkens back to the “second freedom struggle” and Gandhigiri. Another reference to this is possibly the last paragraph which states “Government, institutions, political parties or individuals may malign us but we will malign no one”, which could arguably be understood as a reference to Satyagraha (see chapter 2.2).
Of interest for this analysis could also be another “value”: “We believe in electoral
democracy but believe that all public servants and institutions including parliament
serve the people of India”. Seeing the two paragraphs as one gives support to
Visvanathan’s theory that, face with the allegation of being undemocratic, the ACM
“invokes the symbols of the national movement, creating a genealogy and invoking a
tradition that can challenge the procedural power of electoral representation. [...] It is
an early warning that electoralism cannot be equated with democracy” (Visvanathan
2012: 110).

In short, the (draft) core values of IAC as presented on Facebook (no “final” version of
this document could be found) show what “Brand Anna” meant in 2011: a challenge to
politics as usual, to the “political” in the form of parties and the old kind of
“unaccountable” electoral democracy, carried out invoking the Gandhian past in
order to legitimize what was seen as undemocratic, as the Ambedkarian “Grammar of
Anarchy” (cf. Vajpeyi 2011).

An Interview with Arvind Kejriwal
The interview I am referring to was published in The Hindu (and on TheHindu.com)
on September 12, two weeks after Hazare had ended his fast (Kejriwal 2011). The
headline quotes Kejriwal as saying “It is a long journey ahead”.

Several interesting questions and answers are to be found in this interview. The first
question is about the surprising success of the ACM. Kejriwal provides, as one of his
answers, that “Anna emerged as a credible leader at a time of huge leadership crisis in
politics”. It is interesting to, once again, have found this sense of crisis, of urgency in
remarks associated with IAC. It harkens back to Parry’s “Crisis of Corruption” (cf. Parry
2000) and the mechanisms inherent to the corruption discourse identified therein.
But the use of the terms “credible leader” and “leadership crisis” is also connected to
hegemony, to middle class activists identifying a power vacuum (in this case, this is
then the “empty political”) and filling it with their idea of credible, “upright” or “moral”
power, embodied by Hazare.

The question of the “politicalness” of the movement continues in this exchange,
which is so valuable I have to quote it in full:

Q: So are you an apolitical movement?
No, we are political but we are concerned with people’s politics. The movement will
always remain outside of political parties and outside of electoral politics.
Q: You will not float a political party?

No, never. We don’t need to get into the system to fight it. We want to pressure the government and assert our rights as citizens. Everyone who has a dream need not get into politics.

First of all the use of the term “people’s politics” stands out – recreating the state-people/citizens dichotomy identified above along the lines of electoral/party politics vs. people’s politics. But, with the next question, Kejriwal immediately provides the only possible outcome – a rights based “pressuring” from outside the system, therefore, paradoxically, engaging with the system (not to speak of Kejriwal’s founding of the Aam Aadmi Party). It might be argued that this is the dilemma of a reluctant civic society, aiming to occupy political space while claiming to stay outside of it.

When the interviewer makes the comparison that the movement’s tactics are mirroring the Ram Rath Yatra of 1990, when “the BJP said people were angry because the mandir had not been built for 40 years”, Kejriwal answers that the two events “are not comparable. One was communal and divisive and went against the grain of the Constitution. We are not asking for anything illegal. Our demands resonate with the people and our movement has been unifying, non-violent and entirely within rights given by the Constitution.”

The focus on the unifying aspects of the movement mirrors the Gandhigiri-element mentioned above. Also interesting is once again the lack of modality – this is the movement “the people” want, states the activist matter-of-factly. Furthermore, with the reference to the Constitution and the legality of the ACM, the legal activism-aspect becomes apparent.

An Open Letter by a NMC Activist

The last document I want to analyze here is an open letter by Mayank Gandhi, part of the regional Mumbai chapter of IAC at the time, explaining the reasons for his activism (Gandhi 2011b). The letter is published on Facebook and dated September 23, almost a month after Hazare’s big fast ended and the movement claimed victory. In his letter, Gandhi reveals some biographical details which might serve to bring some more light on the composition of the movement.

Gandhi’s first sentence is about his belonging to a middle class family. He then goes on to explain that he was “active in opposing the emergency as an activist, I had got disactivated in 1979 - busy in making my two ends meet since 1979”. But it was “The amount of corruption, injustice and indignity that I had to face in my life and the
similar state of affair for my countrymen, especially the poor” which led to him becoming an activist in 2002, Gandhi writes. Throughout the document he recounts the history of activism, from Right-to-Information campaigns to working for the “Remaking of Mumbai Federation (RoMF - a NGO consisting of over 40 stakeholder associations, NGOs and institutions)”. The emphasis on the poor is interesting, since it does not allow for a simple labeling of Gandhi as promoting NMC hegemony. But Gandhi’s letter roots him firmly in a market context. He describes how he has worked in housing development and “prepared a scheme to create a win-win solution for all stakeholders including the city, including change in the urban policies of Maharashtra for cluster redevelopment.” Terms like “stakeholder” and “win-win” point to a neoliberal development or business vocabulary. The connection to the Emergency is interesting, since it represents a continuum (at least for Gandhi, but maybe for more participants of the movement) from the middle class anti-politics activism of the 1970s to the activism of 2011. Gandhi also describes a phase of less involvement to “make ends meet” and re-entering activism after the 26/11 Mumbai attacks, which, together with “the spontaneous public response shook me up”. What is also quite interesting is his emphasis on having worked with “some of the most eminent people in India including Justice PN Bhagwati (ex-CJ of India), Narayan Murthy (Infosys), Girish Gokhale (ex-MC of Mumbai)”. Gandhi lists more persons and the list contains mostly justices and business leaders, which points to the legal activism and market dimension of activism.

3.2.1 #iamannahazare & the Role of Social Networks

In this section, I will focus on a review of the three studies that have been conducted so far on the social media dimension of the ACM. There are only three studies available so far, and they all try to illuminate the subject from a very different angle. Utpal’s very short overview might serve as an introduction. He presents the numbers of the social media movement (Utpal 2012: 108):

i. More than 150 Facebook pages related to 'Anna Hazare’ and 'India Against Corruption' had emerged […]

iii. According to Buzzref.com, 'The IAC Facebook page received over 71,000 'likes' and 13,000 comments for mere 170 posts upload in the month of August, 2011. […]

vii. The hash tag #isupportannahazare remained the most discussed topic on August 17, 2011 with over 8000 tweets mentioned or used this hash tag. […]
More than 9000 tweets cited conversations related to hash tag (#Janlokpal) during August 16 and 17, 2011. [...] It is also mentioned that You Tube was not far behind. Hundreds of videos were uploaded in support of Anna Hazare's campaign. These numbers are not only impressive, but they also point to some interesting dimensions of the social media movement. The focus on the person Hazare becomes quite apparent, as almost the same number of tweets mention him as do the JLB itself. There also seems to be very active engagement and discussion among the movement’s participants – pointing to an advantage of social media to enable (elite) discourse in a “civic” (one might call it “controlled”) environment rather than the allegedly uncontrollable political environment of the street protests. The use of Youtube-videos might also be an indication of the movement’s participants’ economically advantageous position (not only consuming, but also being technologically enabled to produce knowledge) and their ability to navigate the globalized technologies of communication.

Bong et. al (2012 p. ix) present the most extensive of the three papers, analyzing “how the anticorruption movement used Facebook, how frequency of user activity correlated to the type of content being shared on Facebook, and ways in which real-world protest events and government actions affected user activity”. It is not, however, the most useful for this section, since it is interested in quantitative analysis of Facebook’s usefulness.

Figure 3 – “Social and News Media Volume”. From Bong et. al. 2012: 11, Figure 3.
Figure 3 does present an interesting picture, though. It seems to show that the movement very much lived from Hazare’s fasts – the one in April is observable as a spike to the left of the graphic, the one in August resulted in the biggest spike of interest and the deliberations and subsequent fast in December show a considerable loss of interest in the movement, as indicated by traditional as well as social media interest alike.

One quote, hidden in Appendix J (“Methodological Ideals and Realities”) springs out: “The number of top-level posts written in Hindi was higher for the Anna Hazare Facebook page than for the India Against Corruption Facebook page” (ibid.: 63). While it might be speculative to do so, I posit that this could be seen as an indicator for the different strands involved in the movement – the urban, English-speaking activists interested in the JLB and the Hindi-speaking, Gandhigiri-following activists more drawn towards Hazare. This might, basically, also show the divide between “old” and “new” middle class. It definitely is an indicator for the power of “old” media in India, which seems to produce the attention to the ACM which is then mirrored in social media.

Harindranath and Khorana’s paper (2012: 1) tries to establish the developments of 2011 and the accompanying social media dynamics (in their case mainly tweets and blog entries) as understandable “within particular formations in the postcolony”. They cite Chatterjee’s distinction between civil and political society and ask whether the ACM’s use of social media should be understood as the NMC’s “further instance of the exclusion of the majority of the country’s population, including the urban poor and those living in rural areas?” (ibid.: 2).

Some of their key findings are that there is evidence that the online support “translated into offline action” (ibid.: 2 ff.), but the inclusiveness of the online movement was very limited, since “the masses constituting political society are almost entirely missing from new media deliberations occurring between civil society and the state” (ibid.: 6). It is, once again, a discourse of difference demarcated by the digital divide, but nonetheless “earmarking new media as a surrogate social-political space where ‘gradual legitimisation and the solidification of the politics of belonging occurs prior to the deployment of the movement in realpolitik’” (ibid.: 6). This means that social media is a way of renegotiating and transposing the political sphere onto the digital sphere, relying on new technologies of exclusion, conjuring
“old” imagery and symbolism (Gandhigiri) and claiming “bourgeois moral hegemony” (ibid.: 6) in the process.

The authors also cite some tweets which showcase the focus and reproduction of the state-civil society dichotomy. One tweet sees the state as the “uncivil” villain, claiming: “We get asked a lot, if you are the civil society, who is the un-civil society? Answer is obvious now” (unreferenced tweet, cit. by ibid.: 3). Another tweet more explicitly distinguishes between the political other and the state, stating “Soldiers protect country, politicians sell it to foreigners” (unreferenced tweet, cit. by ibid.: 3). Here it is “the state” which needs protection from “the politician”. And historical references are also to be found: “After 1942’s British Quit India... now it’s Corruption Quit India” (unreferenced tweet, cit. by ibid.: 4). This lifts the ACM once again onto the same historical dimension as the independence movement, thereby reproducing the discourse of “ersatz-nostalgia” mentioned above. A very common view of the movement is represented by this tweet: “#Parliament does not belong only to the leaders in Delhi. It belongs to all citizens of India: #AnnaHazare” (unreferenced tweet, cit. by ibid.: 5). This conception of democracy was at the heart of the public debate at the time, opening up to questions about the representative nature of the current system and once again, about who gets to occupy the political sphere.

3.3 Traditional English-Speaking Newspapers

In this section, I will present several editorials, Op-Eds and otherwise opinionated reports, published in the relatively short timeframe between August 16 (the beginning of AH’s biggest fast) and September 2 (a few days after the fast ended). I will mostly present pieces whose stance could be considered supportive towards the movement, since it is my intention to analyze the movement’s dimensions and dynamics. The sources for this section are two “traditional” newspapers, namely the Times of India and the Hindustan Times which are long-time contributors to the Indian Mediascape, steadily growing and gaining readership over the past decades (although not at the same pace as vernacular newspapers - see Jeffrey 2000: 46 and Schneider 2013). Additionally, the online news portals rediff News and Firstpost.com were picked for their decidedly middle class perspectives.
The Awakening Middle Class

Paul de Bendern’s article about how “Anna Hazare’s campaign awakens middle class” stands out in its lack of inclusiveness of different voices (de Bendern 2011). The author, writing for Reuters India, cites

“a 35-year-old sales manager at Sun Life insurance in New Delhi [...] a critically acclaimed Indian film maker [...] an optician who closed his business in Mumbai [...] a novelist and chief executive of Future Brands [...] a litigation lawyer at the High Court in Delhi [and] a 24-year-old software developer in Gurgaon”

Furthermore, he cites anonymous online post and a study by McKinsey. Of course, the intention of the article is to profile the NMC, so this is arguably to be expected. But what indicates that this is also written for the same audience is the lack of any other voices, be they critical or not, be they elite, subaltern, government or civil society voices. de Bendern mentions that “Corruption has hurt the poor most, and they had the fewest resources to fight it.” – but “the poor” don’t get a say. The cited people belonging to the NMC are described as “smartly dressed” and de Bendern mentions that one activist “took his two small children to the protest”, creating an image of normalcy, of a different quality of protest, if one wants to call it that. Further setting the movement apart, de Bendern cites Desai’s claim that the movement “does not represent the interests of a regional or narrow social group” – clearly a reference to subaltern movements and communalism.

In addition, for the author, corruption is just seen as a “deeply embedded culture”, naturalized as part of

“Indian bureaucracy [which] is almost a law unto itself, abetted by a lack of accountability, corrupt politicians and greedy businessmen. Part of the problem is the sheer density of India’s regulatory regime, a legacy of British rule which created a ubiquitous bureaucracy to tame an inherently unruly country.”

Here, de Bendern reproduces the “corrupt system”, the bureaucracy, as an almost uncontrollable unruly other in a state-civil society dichotomy, while providing the easy answer of “ancient” and colonial history for this travesty. India’s Transparency International ranking is quoted and compared to China, also hinting at increased concern for “Brand India” in the competition of a globalizing world.

In short, this article showcases all three dimensions of the NMC – lack of inclusiveness, accentuation of discourses of difference and state-civil society-political society trichotomy, and competitiveness and naturalization of globalized social norms.
To Be or Not to Be Anna

This section is based on the analysis of two articles dealing with the “I Am Anna” brand as described by Khandekar and Reddy (Khandekar & Reddy 2013 8 ff.). Samar Halarnkar, writing for the Hindustan Times, takes issue with the slogan, exclaiming “I am not Anna Hazare” (Halarnkar 2011) while G.V. Dasarathi (a “Bangalore-based software entreprenuer [sic]”), writing for rediff.com, questions whether every activist deserves the label and asks “I am Anna Hazare?” (Dasarathi 2011)

The two articles could not be more different. Halarnkar lists the reasons for his lack of support as follows:

“First, I find it hard to associate with the extreme passions at the core of this movement, a Bill to create a powerful anti-corruption ombudsman. [...] 

Second, [...] This is a protest, not a revolution. I sense a lack of emotional proportion and a troubling hypocrisy from a middle class that refuses to get as moved to action by graver things [...] 

Third, [...] A lokpal is no panacea for reforms and governance.”

Meanwhile, Dasarathi ends his article about the values of the movement with his proposition for a pledge to be taken by the activists in order to deserve the label:

“1. I realize that my country is being destroyed by my small acts of moral corruption as much as by the large acts of financial corruption that I am fighting. 

2. I will follow my moral compass. I will do what is morally and ethically right, irrespective of whether someone is watching or not. 

3. I will not be a passive spectator. I will participate in democracy, and help nurture it.”

But there are some similarities. Halarnkar’s warning of “extreme passions” are similar to Dasarathi’s telling of how, when walking to an ACM protest venue in Bangalore, “the footpaths had been taken over by two-wheeler riders [...] and I was horrified at their insensitivity”. Both of these descriptions can be understood as expressing a certain wariness towards the less “civil” members of the movement, the “extreme”, “insensitive” unruly masses. Dasarathi’s description presents him as somebody who isn’t accustomed to Indian street life, to “the noise and the energy level [that] was tremendous and impressive”. He then goes on to claim that

“Corruption come of various forms. The taking of bribes that we are fighting against is just one. Examples of other forms are people riding their two-wheelers on the footpath I was walking on, others honking impatiently behind me as I limped along, throwing paper on the ground at Freedom Park.”

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Both authors seem to be opposed to the unruly, the “old” ways of occupying the political sphere (cf. Lukose 2005), the “our-way-or-no-way approach”, as Halarnkar calls it. And both present their argument in a highly moralistic fashion. Dasarathi focusing on the individual’s “moral compass” necessary to overcome all forms of “corruption” (which, as seen above, he defines in very broad terms) while Halarnkar decries “hypocrisy” in the face of “graver things” like murder, child labor, poverty, the Kashmir issue and the like. These passages create a sense of urgency, constructing the anti-corruption discourse as part of larger-than-life problems and solutions around matters of (self) governance. By saying that “there is nothing to suggest a new Emergency is at hand”, Halarnkar reinforces that view, that corruption is only a very small part of a bigger moral problem with Indian society.

Both of the articles also have neoliberal undertones, one might argue. Dasarathi laments the view that “We think it is the government’s duty to do everything for us”. Clearly, for him, it isn’t, and “While we sit back and become passive spectators, Anna Hazare ACTS”. An ideal middle-class citizen is therefore constructed after the image of the self-reliant entrepreneur, acting where the government fails to act. In a similar vein, Halarnkar describes how “a nation’s daily frustrations, unfulfilled aspirations, stalled reforms and shoddy governance” are at the core of the ACM and that “It is clear that India’s rise over the last 20 years has been despite the government, not because of it. Only now, after the reforms of 1991, are we seeing some urgency”. It becomes clear that it is the NMC’s rise which is meant by that, a NMC which is better at negotiating the terms of the socio-economic contract with the market than with the state.

Democracy and the Currency of Confidence

The title of this section is a reference to a very interesting comparison made by Chetan Bhagat in the TOI. In his article, titled “How to reverse the trust deficit” (Bhagat 2011), the author asserts that “If confidence is lost, the institution does not work. And that is what we have to restore in Parliament now, before we ask people to respect it.” This is Bhagat’s justification of the fast, he sees it not as “blackmailing democracy” (which was a widespread argument in many articles I surveyed) but rather as restoring the confidence in democracy, as fixing democracy by replacing the “old political” with the “new civic”.

In the next paragraph, he compares this loss of trust in governance through corruption with currency devaluation through inflation. Matter-of-factly he then
states that “A good Lokpal Bill will actually bring back people's trust in the government. In fact, the government needs a Lokpal Bill almost more than the people”. Clearly, Bhagat is transposing mechanisms of the market onto the state, doing so with any lack of modality in his statements. The parallelism of these mechanisms is just stated as a fact.

One more interesting focus of the article is its emphasis on the contrast with earlier forms of agitation of the political society (repeating an argument that we have observed many times in other articles as well, see above and below):

“This time, our youth did not come on the streets to hurt people from another caste or religion. They came to simply demand a more fair and just society, in a peaceful manner. It is a proud moment for all of us. India’s class of 2011 is different, and a salute to that.”

The renunciation of communalism then becomes the democratic duty of the responsible NMC-citizen: “we as citizens have to do our bit to restore confidence as well. We can't vote for candidates only because they are from a particular caste, religion or region”.

Finally Listening to the Rising Middle Class

In the Times of India, Swagato Ganguly writes about the hegemonic rise and social practices of the NMC (Ganguly 2011). What stands out is that the contrast Ganguly constructs could not be more stark. The author first describes the typical NMC activist as “professionals, white-collar workers, housewives and college students”. But the real novelty of the movement’s agitations he locates

“in that they have been remarkably disciplined and peaceful wherever they have been staged – as opposed to the rioting, stone-throwing, brick-batting, arson, prolonged public bandhs and damage to property that are the norm for political protests in India. Moreover, instead of being relayed through caste, clan and kinship networks or routed through political parties, the organisers have used modern forms of communication – such as text messages, Twitter and Facebook – or relied on secular civic organisations”

These adjectives to describe the contrast between civic public and political public represent more than just this difference – they represent a threat. For Ganguly, it is not just actual corruption this movement is up against, but rather this is a movement that opposes the political public. These discourses of difference in their most concise form are also about the simple financial dimension of taxes (as the IAC analysis has also shown):
when a middle-class person looks at the taxes deducted from his hard-earned salary, he’s liable to ask what the government is doing with his taxes. That’s a basis of democratic politics everywhere [...] Taken in its widest sense, the theme of corruption is just a metaphorical way of broaching the question – what are you doing with my money?"

Democracy is then equated with accountability. The vote banks associated with “the poor” are seen as the defense of the unaccountable and the best way to attack is from the outside:

“this rapid rise in numbers indicates a shift in the balance of power within the middle class itself. The ‘new’ middle class – which owes nothing to state employment – is eclipsing the ‘old’ middle class that was a creation of the pre-liberalisation Nehruvian state”

This quote is quite remarkable in its complete negation of the role of the state. The question whether an entire class can owe “nothing to the state” does not even come up, but rather, the modality of this statement is non-existent. Entrepreneurial spirit, self-reliance and the concepts associated with them are seen as the human condition (homo autonomous, so to speak), not as something that is learned and reproduced, as I and many other authors would argue.

In short, Ganguly’s article is the clearest overview of the reasoning behind the ACM yet. It showcases all three dimensions – the discourses of difference, the claim to the public-political sphere in a dichotomy of civic-political public and the concept of such a “new” public being state-intervention free and self-reliant.

Anna and the Mahatma

A much simpler (but nonetheless just as interesting) view is expressed by Sandip Roy (Roy 2011), writing for Firstpost on the day of Hazare’s arrest (August 16). In a parallel fashion to Ganguly presenting the clearest explanation of the NMC’s SCM relationships yet, Roy provides the clearest justification of the movement’s success along Gandhian lines in his article titled “Anna Hazare: the last Gandhian standing”. Roy criticizes the PM for not mentioning Gandhi during his Independence Day speech and for instead committing so much time urging Hazare not to fast to death and then claims that

“In one fell swoop – in the name of defending progress - our Prime Minister repositioned his government as the Gandhi-shunning angrez sarkar. And come the morning after Independence Day, we found ourselves transported back to the days of the British Raj: preemptive arrests along with calls for a jail bharo movement”
This is a direct comparison of Hazare with Gandhi and of the Government of India (GOI) with the colonizers (represented by the term “angrez”). With the exclamation “Gandhi-giri zindabad!”, to follow Hazare and “his” movement becomes elevated to a national, almost patriotic duty in order to save the nation from the corrupt “colonizers” of the political sphere.

Another strength of this argument becomes clear when Roy explains that Hazare could only be successful “because there is no indication of a personal agenda or power grab. His claim to moral authority rests on the fact that he appears to have no interest in electoral politics, or in securing himself any position of political power.” This claim, if it also holds true for Hazare’s followers, has a lot of strength. A hypothetical reasoning would go like this: “I Am Anna”, so I don’t want to enter the system. But Anna gives me the moral strength to change it from the outside. In other words: Gandhigiri is defined through its distance from politics, which is exactly the argument the movement needs to close that distance and get moral absolution for it.

**Other Commentary**

In contrast to Roy, Venky Vembu, writing for Firstpost on the same day (Vembu 2011), opines that “Team Anna’s best days as an agent of change from the “outside” may be already over. From here on, it only risks elevating its politics of confrontation, which could erode the political goodwill it now enjoys. It’s perhaps time for Team Anna to enter the political arena and work for change from within.”

This is of course based on an understanding that the movement did stay on the outside of the political sphere but advocating stronger middle class engagement through the “system”. It is a view that is seldomly found and therefore noteworthy. The view that “Team Anna” enjoys political goodwill is stated as a fact with no modality, which is also a hint at where this goodwill is located.

Gautam Adhikari has written an article in the TOI, dated August 25 and named “Fasting as Democracy decays”. In it he opines:

“Accountability is one of the twin pillars, along with transparency, that uphold good governance. With a free press and a Right to Information Act available for use by the ordinary citizen, transparency is not all that bad in our system even as bureaucratic opacity continues to hinder openmess. But accountability degenerates by the day.”

(Adhikari 2011)

The use of the terms “accountability”, “transparency” and “good governance” points to a consumerist, neoliberal view of what the state and politics ought to be. This is
Interestingly one of the themes most commonly observed in TOI opinion pieces. In comparison to other newspapers analyzed (The Hindu, Indian Express, Hindustan Times), the Times of India regularly seems to represent the more consumerist views.

One example of this latter point is Barkha Dutt, writing for the Hindustan Times on August 19 (Dutt 2011), who is of the opinion that the government has been "Digging its own grave". She understands the movement along religious motifs:

"In the Inferno that is India today, public rage will either start an uncontrollable forest fire or take us to Purgatory where the flames may burn us, but will eventually cleanse our body politic. No matter where you stand on the efficacy of the Jan Lokpal Bill or the method and form of Anna Hazare's campaign, there is no doubt that because of him India stands at the intersection of churn and dramatic change."

The "cleansing" of the body politic is an interesting image, recalling the dirty, unruly political society analyzed above. The religious motifs also imbue the discourse with clear moral undertones and altogether Dutt’s quote creates the sense of history in the making. She also seems quite sure that there are only those two possibilities for the movement – revolution (forest fire) or a fundamental paradigm shift (Purgatory) – with no modality, no space for failure.

She also sets up a clear discourse of difference along class lines - the use of “political revenge” especially leaps out:

"The truth is that India’s political establishment has happily hobnobbed with the rich and electorally courted the rural poor. It’s the middle class that has always been treated with contempt and neglect. Today, it is this class that is enjoying its moment of political revenge."

Ravi Jagannathan gives an overview of “What we gained, and what we lost with the Anna movement” in Firstpost on August 28. He is of the opinion that

"The middle class’ involvement means change is round the corner. [...] Urban India accounts for one-third of the population now. The issues of urban India will increasingly gain more public attention. If the middle classes now start participating more in politics, it will correct the imbalance we see in public life – where caste and identity politics predominate. Also, when the middle class becomes participatory, change will follow. No movement anywhere in the world can succeed without middle class leadership and/or participation. [...] Caste, religion and other reasons for divisiveness are not going to disappear, but increasingly they will start becoming less important. People want solutions to their day-to-day issues, whether urban or rural. Governance, and not just corruption, is going to be the theme – and it transcends the middle class mobilisation.”
This somewhat triumphant quote can be understood as another example of the discourse arguably imposing NMC values and priorities onto the nation large and promoting NMC hegemony.

3.4 Readers Debate on Kafila.org

I will now analyze comments of Partha Chatterjee’s guest post on Kafila.org titled “Against Corruption = Against Politics”, which was posted on the blog on August 28, the day Hazare ended his fast. Kafila.org describes itself as

“collaborative practice of radical political and media critique, and an engagement with the present […] concerned individuals – scholars, activists, writers, journalists – to create a space for critical engagement on a wide range of issues of the contemporary world” (Kafila n.d.)

Chatterjee writes about how “There can be absolutely no doubt that the middle class, from top to bottom, is the biggest beneficiary of corruption in government because it is the middle class which populates the government, inhabits it, runs it on a daily basis” (Chatterjee 2011) but that for this middle class, corruption “is always what someone else does”, or, according to Chatterjee, what the political society does. In the anti-corruption fight, Chatterjee therefore observes an anti-political element, which he characterizes as “dangerous”. The debate which follows his post is a very different one than what I have presented so far.

Commenting on Chatterjee

In total, there are 47 comments on Chatterjee’s post. Of those, the majority is arguing that Chatterjee’s view is too simplistic, that corruption is more than just bribing, that it is not just the middle class which profits from corruption, and that, even if people are profiting, it might not mean they are willingly part of the system. I would consider these arguments (of which there are many more) to be the most balanced.

A second big group agrees with Chatterjee, often deriding the middle class for its perceived hypocrisy or warning of populism and fascism. I consider this group to be somewhat leftist or part of the “Independent Left” identified by Sitapati (2011). A much smaller group can be categorized as defending NMC-arguments, and it is those comments I wish to observe a little closer.

Rajeev Malhotra’s comment can be considered as belonging to the latter category. For him,
the idea that this movement does not represent a block is fallacious. It represents the tax-paying law-abiding [...] citizens who normally do not truck themselves to a political rally for 200 rupees and a bottle of rum. It represents those who actually suffer from lack of quality in infrastructure, bad airports and highways, slums and tenements, lack of parking and bad air quality. They have been silenced largely by being called elitist. But it is not elitism that until the whole country climbs out of the mess it is in, all will have to suffer equally [...] The casteist politicians who represent the “disaffected” make money in all this confusion” (Malhotra 2011)

Malhotra clearly reproduces the discourses of difference we have observed in many of the sources analyzed so far. The middle class, for him, is law abiding, while he sees the “elite” as exploiting those who are much too easily persuaded for “200 rupees and a bottle of rum”. For Malhotra, clearly this doesn’t seem to be a legitimate representation of interest – everything political is corrupted, so, in reality, it is not political anymore (in the sense that it expresses “real” positions of the subaltern). Therefore, “the political” or Chatterjee’s political society, in a way, does not exist for the commenter. There are only exploiters and the exploited, and the NMC is the only class that can help.

User “Padmanabhan”’s comment is quite short, which is why I will reproduce it in full:

“Actually, the real victims of corruptions as 2G spectrum are the corporate forces who were willing to take part in the auction. Political society is the main hindrance in their way to the take over of the supremacy in Govt. So they are the main supporters of the Hazare movement.” (Padmanabhan 2011)

His/Hers is the comment, it seems, of an outsider skeptical of the “corporate forces”. This represents a new kind of elite – while, for the NMC voices we have analyzed so far, the “elite” and “the political” were interchangeable, for this user, there is the political elite and the corporate elite, the ACM is an expression of their conflict and the middle class’ position in this remains unclear.

User “Nirmalangshu”’s comment is directed mainly at the Independent Left which he criticizes for pointless criticism, inaction and for just “thinking about how to satisfy the favourite “subaltern” conditions” (Nirmalangshu 2011). For him, left criticism is really only about one thing: “The “middle class” speaks. That’s the problem.” NMC arguments are therefore understood to be the only ones outside the traditional tit-for-tat, outside “politics as usual”, which he also sees the IL criticism belonging to.

The comment by user “Aparna” (Aparna 2011) may shed some light on the ideas of democracy of the NMC. He/she writes:
“What may baffle political-minded people about the Anna-gang is that they are not power-hungry. They don’t want to govern. They don’t want to stand for elections and come to power that way. They don’t want an armed rebellion and come to power that way. They don’t want to be legislators, they only want legislators to listen to them.”

Aside from the by now usual discourse of difference expressed in this argument (using a vocabulary of threat when describing electoral politics), it also expresses another sentiment that is present in many articles, comments and statements analyzed so far: people don’t want to directly occupy the political sphere – they want to influence it, thereby arguably abdicating the responsibility to see things through.

User “Ganguly” presents a fairly complex view of the issue, arguing that Chatterjee’s claim that the middle class prefers corporate jobs to government jobs is elitist and does not reflect the reality on many regions. But his most interesting point is presented at the end of his lengthy comment. Ganguly responds to Chatterjee’s assertion that the ACM is anti-political:

“That is a bizarre reading of political engagement. If anything, for the first time, in my lifetime at least (!) I find people around me directly engaged with the political domain. I find a new sense that politics matters – that, it is important for us to be directly engaged with the ideologies, institutions and policies of the state; that we need to think and fight for power to shape our society. Is that not politics?” (“Ganguly” 2011)

This is a different view than the ones presented before. For Ganguly, the ACM is not a movement against, but for something. He is very clear that this is about a “fight for power”, not a fight against power. But arguably, the mechanisms of such a “pro-politics” fight are the same as those of an “anti-politics” movement. The question then, once again, remains: what about the voices of those not represented in the movement?
Conclusion & Reflection of Results

Analysis of statements by "India Against Corruption" has clearly found that the three dimensions as developed from the conceptualization are present in the statements by IAC and some individual members of the movement.

The construction of a state-civil society dichotomy was often times labeled as "the government" vs. "the people". In some instances, the subaltern were added to the label of the corrupt political. There were many references to Gandhianism (more so than in the other sources analyzed, showing that this mattered more for the movement at large than for the arguable somewhat elitist media discourse) and understanding the movement as "the second freedom struggle".

The hegemonic aspirations and the claim to the political sphere of a rising NMC was often times justified as the only way to defend "upright citizens" against the unruly elite, although in some instances, an effort was made to include "the poor" in the reasoning against corruption. The inclusiveness of the movement could not be deduced since the restriction to English language (one also promoted by a much broader offering in English content compared to other Indian languages) can also be understood as a restriction to a well-educated elite.

The consumerism and reproduction of globalized social practices of the NMC became apparent and more often than not, a neoliberal vocabulary could be observed. Furthermore, the mechanisms behind "Brand Anna" were shown to reproduce patterns known from advertisements and PR campaigns.

The role of social media did not become as clear as was intended, for that, a more comprehensive study focusing just on this aspect is needed since the quantity of content is just too huge for simple qualitative sampling. What did become clear though is that social media has to be understood as a tool rather than a forum for alternate discourse, as it often seems to mirror either the language and social practices of the movement itself or the focus and perspective of the media (as evident by Figure 3).

When analyzing the more "traditional" newspaper response to the movement, one factor became clearer that wasn't present as such in the conceptualization I developed beforehand. I would propose to enhance the understandings of civic and political "public" or "society" as understood by Chatterjee and Lukose. In the case of the ACM, for some actors the political public is equated with an (ill-defined, obscure, and consequently powerful) discursively constructed "corrupt other", a discourse
promoted by a globalizing middle class. It would go too far to call it an imagined public, since corruption does, of course, exist. But corruption, in this discourse, represents more than just the actual socio-economic practice ("little corruption") or big political scandals ("grand corruption"). Here, corruption means corruption of morals. Corruption means inefficiency and taxes of the Nehruvian development state (associated with the "traditional" INC elites), Incredible India falling behind in the global competition of nations. Corruption means the "uncivil", violent, "unruly" lower castes and classes (represented by such infamous names as Mayawati or Lalu Yadav) occupying a political space that is claimed by the civil, peaceful and morally rightful middle class (represented by Hazare). Corruption means "backwards", and the only way forward is to renegotiate, reclaim the political. As Ganguly rightfully wrote: "It's the middle class, stupid" (Ganguly 2011). Other than that, again, all dimensions and dynamics of the movement were present, although often times coupled with wariness of the populist and authoritarian features of the ACM.

On Kafila.org, the analyzed comments were of a much broader ideological spectrum than in the "traditional" media. There was some criticism of the middle class, echoing Chatterjee’s claim of middle class hypocrisy and populism. Most users cautioned that the ACM was much more complex than portrayed by Chatterjee. Some arguments could be considered to represent NMC reasoning. There was the argument that the Independent Left (which Chatterjee was assumed to belong to) was blind when it came to subaltern corruption and very quick to present the “populism/fascism” argument towards the NMC. Often times, “the poor” or subaltern were portrayed as voiceless victims of the political class. All in all, these comments reinforced the image of a middle class understanding itself as the only reasonable actor navigating a wholly corrupt society of corruption from below and above the socio-economic hierarchy.

### 4.1 Future Research Implications

As noted before, the role of television in spreading the imagery and ideology of the ACM could not be the topic of this paper due to various contraints. This could be a very important aspect for further study, as television may speak to a very different dimension of the Indian public and might construct and reproduce different meanings of democracy, corruption and governmentality. Similarly, the vernacular media in all its forms does speak to a different (arguably broader) clientele and its reach extends much further than the urban, educated elites.
and consumers of the Mediascape I examined. A study of vernacular newspaper reports, blogs, social media entries and other forms of public debate should therefore reveal a great deal more about the other strata of Indian society and their relationship with the state.

4.2 An Awakening of the Middle Class?

Going back to the initial question whether this was a re-evolution or a revolution (cf. Shah 2012) and “what it might mean to call the protests a middle-class awakening” (Khandekar & Reddy 2013: 3) it is important to stress that it cannot be clear whether an accurate representation of who participated in the ACM is possible. This is because, at least in the traditional English-language media and in English language social media, the voices of the subaltern were, with very few exceptions, absent. If there was criticism, it was from the independent left or academia. What is clear, however, is that the voices that were heard clearly express the expected dimensions and dynamics as postulated in my framework. The discourses of difference of a distrustful NMC, the hegemonic aspirations and fight against what I have called the (discursively constructed) “corrupt society” and the consumerist, self-reliance-promoting values of a class embedded in discourses of competitiveness and “Brand India”. What held also true is that the “traditional” media is reproducing these values and discourses, and social media closely mirrors this, as, for example, Bong et al. have shown (2012).

As for the NMC’s idea of what the state and democracy should look like, the last dimension seemed to clearly dominate. The neoliberal paradigm of the “small & efficient” state seemed to be widely accepted, as well as the paradigm of “self-reliance” and “entrepreneurism”. Also, as I have written before, through the analysis it becomes clear that many participants of the movement do not want to directly occupy the political sphere – they want to influence it, thereby abdicating the responsibility to see things through. This might be an indicator why the movement, ultimately, fizzled out. But in this regard, there is a need for further study.

All in all, this is a unique case in that it was the first nation-wide movement that expressed NMC values openly and loudly. The claim to the political in this form can, indeed, be characterized as new and unique. In this sense, what happened in 2011 was a middle class awakening, but only in this sense. This is, as authors like Fernandes & Heller and Harriss have shown (cf. Fernandes & Heller 2006; Harriss 2006), a
middle class which has, for a long time, been a hegemonial force actively renegotiating India’s State-Citizen-Consumer-Market relationships. The new quality of the movement is that this renegotiation took place in view of the public, that this claim to be heard can be seen as an open claim to the political sphere, not just its managing.

As for the democratic credentials of the movement, Parry already warned in 2000 that

“the belief that corruption is all-pervasive can all too easily turn into the reality; and it has the potential to corrode what remains of the faith in Nehru’s ‘idea of India’. And if that were to happen, the most likely outcome is that the power of the state would remain, that the victim would be democracy and the end result a new and more sinister species of corruption.” (Parry 2000: 53)

It remains to be seen whether Parry will be proven correct. The Jan Lokpal Bill was passed in December of 2013, just before this thesis was completed (see Appendix A). It does create a powerful ombudsman with the PM also included under the purview of the Lokpal. At the same time the passage of the bill was a sidenote to a new battleground of the New-Middle-Class awakening: Arvind Kejriwal’s Aam Aadmi (common man) Party (AAP) had a – for some – surprisingly strong showing at the Delhi polls and Kejriwal was sworn in as CM of the state soon thereafter. This was seen as a political earthquake (Nigam 2013). It remains to be seen whether Sengupta’s prediction will turn out to be right:

“In a country where elections are the lifeblood of the body politic, it is perhaps unavoidable for social movements to be drawn into party politics. Yet the costs of doing so are typically high, as the impression of partisanship tends to undermine claims to universality and inclusiveness.” (Sengupta 2012: 601)

But one thing has been established now: If the AAP was a political earthquake, that earthquake had already been started in 2011. The Anti-Corruption Movement was a sign of newfound New Middle Class confidence and boldness, a sign that the participants of the movement will not leave the political sphere. The consequences for India’s democracy are not clear, but one thing is: The New Middle Class is here to stay.


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Appendix A – India Against Corruption Chronology

- **December 1, 2010** – India Against Corruption comes into the picture and presents its own version of AC-bill called “Jan Lokpal Bill”. Hazare among the names mentioned. (IAC 2010b; Baqri 2010; Singh 2011)

- **January 30, 2011** – Marches in more than 60 cities, Hazare participates in Delhi. (Bong et. al. 2012: 33)

- **February 26** – In press conference, Hazare announces fast unto death in April unless govt. includes “civil society” in drafting of Lokpal Bill. (Hindustan Times 2011)

- **February 27** – Baba Ramdev’s “Bharat Swabhiman” Movement calls for “stringent Lokpal Bill” @ rally in Delhi. (ibid.)

- **March 7** – Hazare, along with Bedi, Agnivesh and the two Bhushans, meets PM. (ibid.)

- **March 8** – PM creates ministerial sub-committee “to look into the Lokpal Bill”, headed by Minister of Agriculture Sharad Pawar. (Gupta, S 2011; Hindustan Times 2011)

- **March 30** – Kapil Dev, famous cricketer, joins Hazare in call for “independent Lokpal”, writes letter to PM. (Bihar Prabha 2011a)

- **April 4** – Hazare “comes into the picture”, announces govt. “had excluded civil society” from sub-committee, says fast will commence next day @ Jantar Mantar, Delhi (Kurian 2012; Bihar Prabha 2011a; Hindustan Times 2011)

- **April 5** – Hazare visits Gandhi-memorial (Rajghat), commences fast, “anti-corruption march[es]” in Bangalore and Delhi, protests by “thousands of college students, young executives and housewives” in “two hundred cities across India”, online support rises, BJP “extends support”, Congress “calls it premature” (NDTV 2011; Bihar Prabha 2011a; Hindustan Times 2011)

- **April 6–7** – Sharad Pawar withdraws from sub-committee amid criticism of his large landholdings. Bollywood actor Aamir Khan supports cause, writes to Hazare & PM. Narendra Modi (BJP) attacks PM for inaction, Sonia Gandhi “appealed to Hazare to end […] fast”. No politicians allowed @ Jantar Mantar (Bihar Prabha 2011a; Singh 2011; Hindustan Times 2011)

- **April 8** – Protests spread to many urban areas, many Bollywood personalities, business leaders extend support. PM meets with President, appoints Finance Minister Mukherjee to head Lokpal draft-committee. Shanti Bhushan as “activist non-politician” becomes co-chair, committee will consist of 50% “civil society members”. Hazare then announces end of fast. (Bihar Prabha 2011a; Singh 2011; Hindustan Times 2011)

- **April 9** – “Within a few days” FB-page of IAC “had more than 220,000 likes”. Govt. will present bill in coming monsoon session of LS. Hazare ends fast. ‘Victory celebrations […] throughout the country’. (Bihar Prabha 2011a; Singh 2011; Hindustan Times 2011)

- **April 16** – First draft-committee meeting. Audio-recordings of meetings, but will not be televised. (Bihar Prabha 2011a)
May 30 – “Differences emerge” @ 5th meeting of committee, govt. doesn’t want PM, “higher judiciary and conduct of MP’s inside Parliament und the ambit of Lokpal” (India Today Online 2011a)

June 4-6 – Baba Ramdev begins “indefinite hunger strike” @ Ramlila Maidan, Delhi “to bring back the black money stashed in tax havens abroad”. Is arrested, barred from Delhi for 15 days. Police raids grounds, 53 people injured, one critical. PM says “there was no alternative”. As a consequence, “Team Anna” boycotts next draft-committee meeting. (Bihar Prabha 2011a; IANS 2011)

June 9 – Hazare sets ultimatum for govt. to pass Lokpal Bill by August 15, calls movement “Second Freedom Struggle” (Singh 2011)

June 16-22 – Split between ACM and govt. becomes more apparent, Hazare again threatens fast from August 16 onwards, Congress leader Singh threatens Hazare could get “same treatment” as Ramdev. (Bihar Prabha 2011a; India Today Online 2011a)

July 28 – Cabinet approves government’s version of Lokpal bill (GLB), Hazare rejects and announces that hunger strike will go on. (Bong et. al. 2012: 34)

August 4 – GLB introduced in Lok Sabha, Team Anna members “burn copies” of bill. (ibid.: 34)

August 15 – PM devotes 1/3 of his Independence Day speech to Anti-Corruption. Govt. imposes section 144, barring mass assembly @ Delhi, denying Hazare permission […] to hold fast”. “Team Anna” say they will proceed. (Singh 2011; India Today Online 2011a; Bong et. al. 2012: 34)

August 16 – Hazare detained before he could start fast, refuses to leave jail, “demanding an unconditional permission to hold protests at JP Park.” (Singh 2011)

August 18 – Hazare allowed to fast for 15 days by Delhi Police. Stays in prison until Ramlila Maidan is prepared for fast. (Bihar Prabha 2011b)

August 19 – Hazare leaves jail to “A huge crowd”, shouts “Bharat mata ki Jai (Victory to Mother India)” and continues fast @ Ramlila Maidan. (Singh 2011)

August 21 – More than 100.000 @ Ramlila Maidan, “Around 50,000” in Mumbai (Bihar Prabha 2011b)

August 23 – PM “appealed Anna Hazare to end his fast”, govt. “initiates talks with Team Anna”. (ibid.; India Today Online 2011a)

August 25 – Govt. offers to “debate all versions of Lokpal bill in Parliament” (also Aruna Roy’s). Hazare pushes 3 key demands: Citizen Charter, Lokayuktas in all states, “inclusion of lowest to highest bureaucracy”. (Bihar Prabha 2011b; Kurian 2012; India Today Online 2011a)

August 27 – Parliament “adopts ‘sense of the house’ agreeing to Hazare’s three key demands” (Sengupta 2013: 2)

August 28 – Hazare breaks fast. “Thousands of Anna’s supporters celebrate victory.” Video of Swami Agnivesh, member of “Team Anna”, allegedly showing that he was “playing both sides” and “wasn’t entirely above board in his dealings” surfaces. (Singh 2011; Firstpost
September 2 – Notice sent to A. Kejriwal “for overdue taxes” (Bong et. al. 2012: 34)

September 10 – “Team Anna” calls for “right to reject” and “right to recall”. (Singh 2011)

October 12-13 – Prashant Bhushan “beaten up” for earlier remarks on holding a referendum in Jammu & Kashmir. Says he has “no regrets on my remarks”. (ibid.; Kashmir Dispatch 2011a; Kashmir Dispatch 2011b)

October 15-16 – Hazare “distanced himself” from Bhushan’s remarks, starts “maun vrat” (Vow of Silence). (The Pioneer 2011; Singh 2011)

October 24 – Questions by Swami Agnivesh “about the use of funds donated by the public” to fund run by Kejriwal. K. Bedi “facing allegations of overcharging institutions on travel bills”. (The Hindu 2011a)

November 7 – Hazare, with his “team rocked by controversies” plans restructuring of team “to also give representation to religious minorities, tribals, dalits and youths”. Retired judges to “probe the allegations” against team members. (The Times of India 2011)

December 1 – Lokpal committee “overturns its earlier recommendation” to include central govt. employees under Lokpal ambit. (Singh 2011)

December 11 – Rally at Jantar Mantar, “scaled-down version of Anna’s protest in August”, Hazare on hunger strike. (The Hindu 2011b)

December 27-28 – Hazare holds rally & fast @ MMRDA, Mumbai. Turnout only 5000 instead of expected 50.000 – seen as “embarrassing”. Lok Sabha debates and passes “weak” version of Lokpal Bill not accepted by IAC. Hazare ends fast after one day. (India Today Online 2011b; BBC News 2011b; Singh 2011)

December 29 – Rajya Sabha cancels debate on Lokpal, bill does not pass. Hazare suspends campaign to recall corrupt politicians, “returned to his native village”. (BBC News 2011a; Singh 2011)

Addendum

December 8, 2013 – Kejriwal-founded anti-corruption party AAP wins “nearly 40% of Delhi assembly seats”, Congress has “lost control” of city. (BBC News 2013a)

December 17-18 – Lokpal Bill passes Lok Sabha & Raiya Sabha, supported by Congress & BJP. PM, all public servants under purview of Lokpal. Anna Hazare ends a 9-day hunger strike. (BBC News 2013b)

December 28 – Arvind Kejriwal sworn in as CM of Delhi @ Ramlila Maidan in front of an estimated 100.000 people. (NDTV 2013)
This diploma thesis discusses underlying meanings and dynamics of the Indian anti-corruption debate which found its erstwhile peak with large-scale protests in the summer of 2011. The movement centered around “Anna” Hazare, described as a “Neo-Gandhian” leader who proclaimed that this was India’s second freedom struggle and on the idea of a legal, “efficient” framework to fight corruption.

The aim of this thesis is to elucidate the different complex understandings of which social practices and governmentalities inform the anti-corruption discourse in the Indian post colony, whereby talking about corruption is understood as constituting a formative element of ideas of democracy, accountability and the state.

The thesis’ main argument, drawing on a broad, transdisciplinary review of the literature on the topic, is that it was not the “common man” fighting against corruption, but the claim to represent the “political other” by an uprising “New Middle Class” which is distrustful of the development state (associated with “traditional elites”) and “political society” (as defined by Chatterjee and Lukose), consumerist and legalistic in its demands of the state and understanding of corruption, and is asserting its discursive power ever more loudly, through old and new mediums alike, amid its rising cultural hegemony and the socio-economic rise in importance and changing constructions of the public sphere by a media catering increasingly to middle class sensibilities and reproducing middle class discourses.

From these arguments, a framework for analysis is developed, in order to test these assumptions on statements by the movement’s main actors themselves as well as some English-language comments and news articles. The analysis shows that the middle class voices which were heard clearly express the expected dimensions and dynamics as postulated in the framework. What held also true is that the “traditional” media is reproducing these values and discourses. The neoliberal paradigm of the “small & efficient” state seems to be widely accepted, as well as the paradigm of “self-reliance” and “entrepreneurism”. In conclusion, the movement is a unique case in that it was the first nation-wide movement that expressed NMC values openly and loudly. The claim to the political in this form can, indeed, be characterized as new and unique, in that the anti-corruption movement can be seen as a renegotiation of functioning State-Citizen-Market relationships which took place in view of the public.


Hierraus wird ein Analyserahmen entwickelt, um diese Annahmen an Aussagen einiger Akteure der Bewegung selbst sowie einigen englischsprachigen Kommentaren und Nachrichtenartikeln zu testen. Die Analyse zeigt, dass die Stimmen der Mittelklasse, die gehört wurden, eindeutig die erwarteten Dimensionen und Dynamiken des Analyserahmens enthalten und dass die Medien diese reproduzieren. Das neoliberale Paradigma des kleinen und effizienten Staates scheint akzeptiert zu werden, ebenso Paradigmata wie „Eigenständigkeit“ und „Unternehmensgeist“. Zusammenfassend ist festzuhalten, dass die Bewegung einen neuartigen Fall darstellt, da es die erste landesweite Bewegung war, welche Werte der NMC offen und laut artikulierte. Die Anti-Korruptionsbewegung kann als eine Wiederverhandlung innerhalb funktionierender Staat-Bürger-Markt-Beziehungen, welche in der Öffentlichkeit stattfand, verstanden werden.
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