MASTERARBEIT

Titel der Masterarbeit
„The role of NGOs in the expulsion of Sephardim from Spain during the Franco regime“

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angestrebter akademischer Grad
Master of Arts (MA)

Wien, 2013

Studienkennzahl lt. Studienblatt: A 066 656
Studienrichtung lt. Studienblatt: Masterstudium DDP CREOLE-Cultural Differences and Transnational Processes
Betreuer: Mag. Dr. Hermann Mückler
To Andrea Schuberth
Introduction

I first got interested in the situation of the Jewish population in Spain under Franco during a lecture at the Universitat Autònoma de Barcelona in 2010, where I spent two semesters as an exchange student. The lecturer, Maite Ojeda Mata, had written her doctoral thesis (Ojeda Mata 2009) on Sephardic Jews in contemporary Spain and presented her knowledge in the lecture. I was particularly fascinated by the use of a historical approach in anthropology and decided relatively soon to settle the investigation for my own master thesis in this area.

Originally I wanted to write about a particular Jewish community that existed in Barcelona until 1939. But soon, early interviews with informants shifted my focus to another topic that caught my attention. I decided to investigate the role of NGOs in the expulsion of Sephardic Jews from Spain during the Franco regime. This topic seemed particularly interesting to me for two reasons. The first is based on my personal experiences. I myself have worked in an NGO for several years now and I have experienced some of the difficulties that can arise from the relations of power between the state, the NGO and its clients. The second reason is more of scientific nature. When I first became interested in NGOs as a research object, I had the impression that very little literature on the organisations I was interested in (and in some cases, none at all) was available. During my research, this impression should be confirmed. There is very little scientific analysis on NGOs in the humanitarian sector, let alone from an anthropological point of view. For me it was intriguing that more and more scholars of our discipline engage in the investigation of NGOs in the area of development, but so far very little attention is given to the work of NGOs in the humanitarian sector, such as, for example, the Red Cross, which is one of the biggest NGOs worldwide. I will provide possible explanations for this lack of anthropological interest in this field in the fourth chapter.

In the following paragraphs, I will give a short overview of the historical setting that is important for my investigation. Since I will elaborate on some of the topics mentioned in more detail in later chapters, I will only provide a very short summary here.

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1 This work was published in 2012 with the title: Identidades ambivalentes. Sefardíes en la España contemporánea, by Sefarad Editores, Madrid.

2 The term Sephardic refers to a specific group of Jews and will be explained in the first chapter.
During the Spanish Civil War (1936-1939) and the following years of Francisco Franco’s dictatorship, the Jewish population in Spain suffered a range of measures of indirect persecution (Ojeda Mata 2009: 223f). Although the Franco regime didn’t persecute the Jews openly due to political reasons (Ojeda Mata 2009: 21), two important factors can be identified that gave rise to indirect persecution of the Jewish population. Firstly, Catholic nationalism excluded the Jews because of their religious practices, and secondly, their participation in Spanish Masonry was used to categorize them as enemies of the Franco regime. (Ojeda Mata 2009: 182, 193)

Measures were taken that socially and economically affected the Jewish population in Spain, and Ojeda has shown that some of these measures resulted in the emigration of Spanish Jews from the peninsula. (Ojeda Mata 2009: 223)

During World War II, the Franco regime allowed the entry of thousands of Jewish refugees from central Europe, who could escape from being deported to concentration camps, into Spanish national territory. The Franco regime permitted that measure because the residence of these Jewish populations would not be permanent, since these refugees would not be able to make claims to settle in Spain on any legal fundaments, and therefore international humanitarian organizations would take care of them and ship them to other countries. (Ojeda Mata 2009: 273f)

On the other hand, Spanish Jews residing outside of Spain, who could have claimed Spanish citizenship on legal fundaments, were rarely allowed to enter state territory. Those who were able to enter and settle in Spain were declared stateless and, together with European refugees, were “evacuated” to Palestine and the north of Africa by international organizations. (Ojeda Mata 2009: 273f)

In my investigation, I further explored the role of international organizations involved in these “evacuations” of Spanish Jews during the Spanish Civil War and the period of the Franco regime. I have formulated the following questions that I aim to answer in the course of this thesis:

3The Fascist regime in Spain was interested in maintaining good political relations with the Allied Powers, and did therefore where very carefully avoid openly anti-Semitic measures. (Ojeda Mata 2009: 21)
• Which NGOs were implicated in the evacuations of Jewish refugees from Spain after 1939?
• Did the participating NGOs know about the Spanish citizenship of the Jewish population they were evacuating? How did they see their role in the evacuation process?
• To what extent can those organizations at that specific time be seen as instruments of the Franco regime? And to what extent can they be seen as independent entities pursuing independent aims?

The first two chapters of this thesis will be dedicated to theoretical and methodological approaches from historical anthropology that shaped my investigation. I decided for a rather extensive elaboration on these approaches both because they are crucial to the outcome and conclusion of my investigation and because I have repeatedly encountered incomprehension and even disapproval of these approaches on behalf of fellow anthropologists.

In the third chapter I will explain in detail how Catholic nationalism and Filosephardism gave rise to the development of categories of inclusion and exclusion based on religion in Spain under Franco. I will show in which ways this categorisation affected both the Jewish population that had been living in Spain for years and those Sephardim who tried to settle in Spain.

In the following chapter, two NGOs will be presented that played a crucial role in the evacuation of Jewish refugees and expulsion of Spanish Jews and other groups of Sephardim. The organisations that I have found most important in the evacuation/expulsion of Jewish migrants are the American Jewish Joint Distribution Committee and the Red Cross. I will first give a brief overview on the NGOs' histories and organisational structures and then go on to an extensive analysis of their work during the Civil War and Franco's dictatorship in Spain.

In the last chapter I will analyse the two NGOs' positions between an activism based on the organisation's own interests and values and a (sometimes necessary?) collaboration with government authorities and other organisations. In the first part of the chapter, I will critically reflect on the Red Cross' concept of impartiality and show how, in the case of the Spanish Red Cross during the period I investigated, this concept should be seen as an
ideal rather than an actual practise. In the second part of the chapter, I will then show in which ways the American Jewish Joint Distribution Committee was instrumentalised by the Spanish government as a means of expulsion of certain parts of the population. The ways in which members of this organisation deal with such influence from government authorities will be given special attention.

In the last part of the chapter I will resume a topic that I already dealt with in the second chapter: the anthropological analysis of the archive. My aim in this part of the chapter is to show in which ways the Spanish government, the JDC and the Red Cross actively engage in the production of historical knowledge in relation to the Sephardic Jews expelled by the Franco regime.

1. Theoretical Approach

The decision to engage in an investigation that required an approach from historical anthropology proved to be both blessing and curse during my fieldwork. On the one hand, learning about people and situations that no longer exist fascinated me. The more I learned about historical anthropology, the more excited I was about having „discovered“ a relatively young sub-discipline that provides, in my opinion, such fruitful approaches for anthropology.

On the other hand, the resistance precisely against this historical approach, was considerable. More than once I was confronted with bewilderment, if not open rejection, against the idea of working with archival material in anthropology. My investigation was criticised because one of anthropologists' most successful tool- participant observation- could not be applied in this kind of research. And frequently I was asked how the outcome of my research would differ from a historical investigation of the same topic. The answer that I have found for myself in the course of the investigation is that the difference lies, firstly, in the questions I am asking, secondly, in the way I treat historical documents, and thirdly, in the way in which my research questions the production of historical categories. While I have already exposed my research questions in the Introduction, the second and third points will be addressed in the second and fifth chapter, respectively.
Since historical anthropology is a relatively young sub-discipline that receives still very little recognition from more traditionally oriented scholars, I have decided to dedicate the first part of this chapter to exploring the interrelations between the two institutionalised disciplines of history and anthropology. This institutional separation is not as clear and “natural” as it may seem at first sight, since the two disciplines are interrelated in ways I will explore in the following section. I will then go on to characterise a historical anthropology that is not a mere dialogue or collaboration between these two disciplines.

1.1. History, anthropology and historical anthropology

In anthropology's early stages, history formed a crucial part in anthropological theories. Evolutionism and Diffusionism, each in their own way, were engaged in the struggle to explain the history of culture(s). But after these theories were criticised by Functionalists, the importance of history in anthropological analysis diminished considerably. (Evans-Pritchard 1962: 172) Evans-Pritchard claims that what followed was “[the tendency] to overestimate what are called functional ethnographic studies of primitive societies at the expense of developmental studies, and even to ignore historical facts altogether […].” (Evans-Pritchard 1962: 181)

Although Evans-Pritchard recognises the problematic use of history by Evolutionists and Diffusionists, he criticises Functionalism for the strict separation of history and anthropology. (Evans-Pritchard 1962: 181) He even goes so far as to call the difference between the two disciplines “largely illusory” (Evans-Pritchard 1962: 187).

This criticism was followed by a debate about the role of history in anthropological analysis, to which anthropologists such as Isaac Schapera in the 1960s and Bernard Cohn in the 1980s contributed. (Axel 2002: 6ff)

Anthropological studies of topics related to colonialism were one of the reasons that Functionalist studies on relatively “isolated” societies in the present lost importance and
were replaced by analysis of “larger scale cultural phenomena and transformative processes over the long term”. (Axel 2002: 9)

As we can see, Anthropology has been concerned with historical questions from its beginnings. However, the institutional separation of the two disciplines does not only create a debate on how much and in which way anthropologists should engage in historical topics. According to Axel, this separation also has a great impact on anthropological theories:

“Our conventional institutional structures not only support the separation of history and anthropology, they also encourage the development of theoretical models that are place-dependent or that presume regions to be naturally isolable.” (Axel 2002: 10f)

According to John Comaroff, leaving behind the strict separation of history and anthropology is necessary in order to develop fruitful theories in the social sciences:

“In my own view, there ought to be no ‘relationship’ between history and anthropology, since there should be no division to begin with. A theory of society which is not also a theory of history, or vice versa, is hardly a theory at all.” (Comaroff 1982: 144)

As I have pointed out so far in this chapter, anthropology and history have never been completely separated from each other, and their strict separation can even have negative influences on the building of anthropological theories. But then, how can we describe a historical anthropology and what are its topics?

In the introduction to his book “Islands of History” (1985), Marshal Sahlins points out two important insights that are significant for historical anthropology. The first is related to the assertion that there is no one history, but rather a range of different histories that are culturally (and socially) shaped. Or, as Sahlins puts it: “History is culturally ordered, differently so in different societies, according to meaningful schemes of things.” (Sahlins 1985: vii) The same historical event, for example, can be interpreted differently in different societies. And even what is historically relevant differs from one society to another: “An
event becomes such as it is interpreted. Only as it is appropriated in and through the cultural scheme does it acquire an historical significance.” (Sahlins 1985: xiv) Sahlins argues, for example, that in societies where the king is seen as representing “the form and destiny” of the group, the “stories of kings and battles are with good reason privileged historiographically”. (Sahlins 1985: xi) But it is not only culture that shapes the historiography of a society. Issues of power also have to be taken into account, since official historiography is likely to follow the interests of the dominant group in a given society. The second point Sahlins makes is that “cultural schemes are historically ordered” (Sahlins 1985: vii), that is, since people act according to (or consciously against) specific cultural schemes, these schemes can be consolidated or altered in practise.

Both historians and anthropologists have become aware of these insights and they are reflected in new approaches to their topics of investigation. While anthropologists no longer only investigate underlying cultural patterns but also struggle to explain actual events, historians give more and more importance to including underlying structures in their analysis of historical events. (Sahlins 1985: 72)

As I have tried to show in this chapter, anthropology and history, although institutionally separated, are intrinsically related in some aspects. But it would be short-handed to see historical anthropology as a mere dialogue, or collaboration, between the two disciplines. Neither can historical anthropology be characterised only by studying societies and cultures in former times. “Rather than the study of a people in a particular place and at a certain time,” Axel argues, “what is at stake in historical anthropology is explaining the production of a people, and the production of space and time.” (Axel 2002: 3) So it is the problematic notion of history itself, that has to be questioned. Or, as Sahlins puts it, “[the] problem now is to explode the concept of history by the anthropological experience of culture.” (Sahlins 1985: 72) He adds that the inclusion of a historical approach in anthropological studies will in turn question our notion of culture.

Indeed, as John Comaroff argues in his essay “Dialectical Systems, History and Anthropology”, a mere call for anthropology to be “more historical” is superficial and can not lead to the production of fruitful theories in historical anthropology (Comaroff 1982: 144).
Historical anthropology can be described as a “dynamic and open synthesis of cultural phenomena and economic and political logics”. (Ojeda Mata 2009: 26, my translation) It has the potential to create new insights in both our notion of culture and the production of space and time. Or, in Marshal Sahlins' words: “Suddenly, there are all kinds of new things to consider.” (Sahlins 1985: 72)

During my fieldwork I have often been asked about the advantages of approaching my topic from an anthropological- instead of a historical- point of view. In many cases, the implicit question was, in fact, the following: What is anthropological about that topic? After many moments of doubt and even more occasions where I was encouraged by my tutors and fellow students, I am now quite sure about my position to this question. The role of NGOs in the evacuation of Sephardim during the Franco regime could of course be investigated by historians. The outcome would be equally valid and valuable to the scientific community, but the research focus and the results would probably be quite different. What makes my investigation anthropological are, on the one hand its research questions, and on the other hand, my approach to historical sources. Firstly, the research questions I aim to respond to in this thesis are concerned with anthropological topics such as power relations and the scope of action of individual actors and whole organisations. Secondly, I do not treat historical sources- such as archival documents- as evidence of historical facts, but as part of a culturally constructed discourse.

1.2. Concepts and definitions

Sephardim

In the Middle Ages, two major Jewish traditions developed in Europe, namely the Sephardic tradition and the Ashkenazi tradition.

The term Sephardim or Sephardic Jews refers to those Jews, whose ancestors lived on the Iberian peninsula in the Middle Ages and “[...] were influenced by both the Muslim and the Christian intellectual traditions of the peninsula.” (Mackenzie 2005: 358) According to Zimpel, in the 15th century around 50% of the Jewish population worldwide were
Sephardim (Zimpel 2001: 487), while today the majority of Jewish population is part of the Ashkenazi tradition, that forms around 80% of the total population (Mackenzie 2005: 358).

As Ojeda explains, the term Sephardim is a sociopolitical category that is the outcome of a historical- anthropological process. In Spain, it is a category for juridical, political and symbolic classification. (Ojeda Mata 2009: 19) In contemporary Spain, it implies a certain cultural proximity to Spain, which also includes the use of the Castillian language.

For this thesis, it is also necessary to define two other categories of Jews, which are more or less related to the term Sephardim. The denomination Spanish Jews is used for those parts of the Jewish population who, according to Ojeda, “[...]from the 19th century onwards, held some kind of juridical bond to the Spanish state, but who continued residing in their countries of origin, or, in any case, outside Spanish national territory.” (Ojeda Mata 2009: 29, my translation)

The denomination Jewish Spaniards, on the other hand, is used in reference to those Jews who possessed Spanish citizenship. (Ojeda Mata 2009: 29)

**NGOs**

The term Non-Governmental Organisation (NGO) has become popular from 1945 onwards and was introduced by the United Nations (UN), who wanted to separate participation rights of intergovernmental organisations and those of international private organisations. For the UN, the requisites for being recognised as a NGO are (1) independence from government control, (2) absence of the intent of challenging governments, (3) being non-profit and (4) not being a criminal organisation. (Willetts 2001) For my investigation, I will expand this definition on two aspects that are also proposed by Clarke in his book on NGOs in South-East Asia. NGOs are therefore also (6) professional organizations that have (7) “a distinctive legal character“ (Clarke 2001: 2).

NGOs vary extremely in their organisational structures, in the aims they pursue, in their mode of membership and in funding. (Fisher 1997: 5, Willetts 2001)

Although the term NGO was not in use during the historical period I will focus on in this thesis, I have decided to use it in order to name those private organisations that were
involved in the evacuation of Jewish refugees from Spain after 1939, especially the International Red Cross and the American Jewish Joint Distribution Committee. I have decided against the use of other terms (such as social movement, for example) since these organisations in that particular time already fit into the definition of an NGO I have used here. Furthermore, the application of a different terminology would, in my opinion, create terminological confusion without having significant advantages.

1.3. Abbreviations

ARO: American Relief Organisations
CRE: Cruz Roja Española (Spanish Red Cross)
HIAS: Hebrew Sheltering and Immigrant Aid Society
HICEM: Collaboration of HIAS, ICA, and EMIGDIRECT
ICA: Jewish Colonisation Association
IRC: International Red Cross
ICRC: International Committee of the Red Cross
IFRC: International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies
JA: Jewish Agency
JDC/ Joint: American Jewish Joint Distribution Committee

2. Methodological Approach

During my fieldwork, I have carried out research in different public and private archives. In November 2011, I worked with historical documents in the archive of the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) in Geneva, Switzerland. I will analyse part of this experience in the next part of this chapter. During several months in 2011 and 2012, I also visited a private Foundation in Barcelona, called Fundació Baruch Spinoza, where I was allowed to gain insight into transcripts of interviews with members of the Jewish population in Barcelona, that had been generated in the course of an investigation about the Jewish
Community of Barcelona (Comunidad Israelita de Barcelona). In February 2012 I carried out research in the archive of the Spanish Red Cross in Madrid. During the summer months of 2012 I did an online research in the archives of the American Jewish Joint Distribution Committee. Apart from documents, the database of this archive has provided especially rich in photographic material, that has become an important part of my field material. Furthermore, I used the online database of PARES (Portal de Archivos Españoles), which is a project of the Spanish ministry for education, culture and sports, that aims at providing a database of historical documents that can be found in different public and private archives in Spain. Many of these documents can also be viewed online.

In my research, I tried to visit different archives in order to achieve a greater objectivity in my data. Nevertheless, I could not gain access to all the archives that I would have found relevant for my investigation. One of the archives I would have liked to do research in is the archive of the American Friends Service Committee, an organisation that assisted many refugees in their attempt to emigrate from Spain during the period covered by my research. However, this archive does not yet have an online catalogue of its documents available, and since I had neither time nor financial resources to visit the archive in the United States for this MA thesis, I have to postpone this part of the research for a possible doctoral thesis. In the case of the archive of the Spanish Red Cross, my access to available documents was limited by the responsible archivist. In this particular case, I was granted access to the Red Cross journal, but I was told that the Spanish law for protection of personal data did not allow for me to access other documents from the period of the Franco government. However, I was not only denied access to documents containing sensitive information about individuals, but also to material documenting internal Red Cross communication.

Apart from the work in historical archives, I have also done online research on official web pages of NGOs. Some of the documents that were published on these pages have provided important sources for this investigation.

My methodological approach towards the work with historical documents from archives derives in large parts from the theoretical approach of historical anthropology I have

4The results of this investigation are presented in “Memorias Judías (Barcelona 1914- 1954)” by Martine Berthelot.
described in the first chapter. I will give a detailed explanation of anthropological fieldwork in the archive in the following part of this chapter. I will then go on to outline the methods I used for the analysis of the different kinds of data I have collected.

2.1. Anthropology and the archive

Axel points out that since the 1950s “questions of ethnography and the archive have been given the most attention” within the debates in historical anthropology. (Axel 2002: 13) The question of how to approach historical data from an anthropological viewpoint has accompanied me throughout my research. In the following, I therefore want to analyse my own experience during fieldwork in historical archives.

My first experience in a historical archive was at the archive of the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) in Geneva, Switzerland, in November 2011. I had gone there for one week in order to do research for this MA thesis. Before my arrival in Geneva I was required to send an e-mail to the head archivist, specifying my arrival date, the number of days I would be staying, as well as the topic of my investigation. When I finally arrived at the ICRC headquarters, I was expected to go to the information desk for registration. There I had to hand in my passport and in return was given a visitor's badge, which I was asked to wear so that it was visible at all times. Then I was asked to wait for the head archivist, who came to guide me to the reading room, which was situated in the same building as the information desk on the basement floor, and provided desks and chairs for five or six researchers. Since the access to the basement floor is restricted for the public, this procedure was repeated every morning at my arrival at the archive. Even when I wanted to re-enter the building after lunch-break, the receptionist had to call the archivist to come and guide me to the reading room. Before I could begin my investigation, I was asked to sign some documents with guidelines regarding the protection of data and the obligation to provide the ICRC with a copy of every publication where data from the archive was used.

As an anthropologist who had never before set a foot in a historical archive, I felt quite intimidated by this procedure. In fact, I remember feeling a bit ridiculous, being a student— and, worse, not even of history— among the other, senior researchers in the reading room.
When I opened the first boxes with documents the archivist had brought me, I felt an enormous respect, and I remember treating the papers extremely careful. It almost felt like having been granted privileged access to a sacred place. When I look back now, that I have gained the necessary analytical distance, the episode reminds me of what Foucault writes about history: “[In] our time, history is that which transforms documents into monuments.” (Foucault 2007: 8) The experience in the archive did, in fact, contribute to my perception of dealing not only with simple documents, but with monuments that give evidence of facts from the past.

Foucault continues his analysis as follows:

“In that area where, in the past, history deciphered the traces left by men, it now deploys a mass of elements, that have to be grouped, made relevant, placed in relation to one another to form totalities.” (Foucault 2007: 8)

The author points out two important aspects related to historical archives. Firstly, he mentions the transformation of documents into monuments, that is, their construction as being important objects for commemorating the past. The procedure of gaining access to the archive I have described above is part of this construction of the archive as a place of historical monuments, since all the preparations that one has to get through contribute to the impression that one is actually about to enter a sacred place. The practise of keeping the visitor's passport (the material representation of one's citizenship) during his or her stay also contributes to this construction of the archive as a special site and would deserve further analysis.

In the second part of the quotation, Foucault points out that the papers that can be found in the archive do not naturally turn into historical documents, but in order to do so, they have to be “grouped, made relevant, [and] placed in relation to one another” (Foucault 2007: 8). The mere action of placing a document in an archive is to declare it historically relevant. In the archive the document is then placed in a certain series, or category, which has in turn its own history and is often based on cultural (or historical) assumptions. The document we find in the archive has therefore already been interpreted. By placing a document in a series, it not only interpreted but also put in context with the other documents of the same series.
This insight is easily forgotten or overlooked by researchers. Even though I had read literature about an anthropological approach to the research in archives, when I finally was there, I was overwhelmed by the culturally formed assumptions of what historical documents in the archives are (that is, neutral facts from the past). While working in the archive it was very difficult for me to realise how these documents could be anything else than “neutral facts”. Indeed, as Axel points out, we “[…] must be careful to regard archival documents not as repositories of facts of the past but as complexly constituted instances of discourse that produce their objects as real, that is, as existing prior to and outside of discourse.” (Axel 2002: 13f)

It is important to bear in mind that documents themselves do not simply come into being, but that they are created by historic agents with their own specific interests. (Axel 2002: 14) In the case of the archive I visited in Geneva, the documents I found were mostly about internal communication between members of the ICRC. So the historic agents in this case were the members of this organisation. Although often wrongly seen as a “neutral” actor, the Red Cross also follows certain interests and world-views.

As I have shown so far, it is crucial to see a historical document not as a paper that indicates “pure historical facts”, but to analyse it according to the considerations I have outlined in this chapter. However, it is not only the documents we should reflect upon. The archive itself also has to be analysed critically (Dirks 2002: 48). While Foucault argues, as I have cited above, that today’s history “transforms documents into monuments” (Foucault 2007: 8), Dirks also talks about the “monumentality of the archive” itself, which is, he argues, “[…] enshrined in a set of assumptions about truth that are fundamental both to the discipline of history and to the national foundations of history.” (Dirks 2002: 48) Dirks, whose research concentrated on the features of the state in southern India, has such archives in mind that are founded and maintained by the state. Nevertheless, the same is also true for those archives that are established by private organisations, such as the International Red Cross.

Sagnac notes that the modern form of the archive is a product of the French Revolution. The revolters in many cases burned the documents that represented their subordination to the old regime. (Sagnac 1973: 85, cited in: Dirks 2002: 62) In former times, these documents had been kept by the powerful (especially by kings or in courthouses) in their
own archives and had been used as a tool to enforce their authority. (Dirks 2002: 61) After the French Revolution, the access to the French national archives was declared as granted to every citizen (although this right has later been restricted). (Posner 1984, cited in: Dirks 2002: 61)

As Dirks points out, the structure of the modern archive is intrinsically related to the state: In the archive, “[the] state literally produces, adjudicates, organizes, and maintains the discourses that become available as the primary texts of history.” (Dirks 2002: 59) In consequence, what we encounter in the archive are not “true facts” about history, but discourses that are embedded in the context of the nation state. But dominant discourses are not only influenced by the nation state. They are related to structures of power and have to be analysed in this context. Since we are so accustomed to these structures of power, social scientists have to be careful not to overlook them as something “natural” or given. Historical anthropology is in my opinion specially well-qualified for this task, since the ability to observe social and cultural phenomena “from the outside” is one of anthropologists' key qualifications.

Also, it is important to take into account that archives always show a certain “bias”. In the case of the expulsion of the Jewish population from Spain, I have found documents that contain the written conversation between members of the ICRC about a planned evacuation of a refugee camp in the south of France. So I can easily imagine how this operation was seen by the ICRC. However, I have no possibility of knowing how the refugees themselves, or the population of the neighbouring villages, for example, talked and thought about it, simply because there are no documents available to that account. That means that the archive never shows the whole image of an event, but rather a small piece of the puzzle.

2.2. Data analysis

The ways in which I handle my data is directly related to the methodological considerations that I explained in the first part of this chapter. As an anthropologist, I regard historical documents as evidence of a discourse about the past. In my analysis, such a document
does therefore not so much represent an evidence for an occurrence of the past as it indicates, together with other sources, how this occurrence is represented in a specific context. Therefore, I am inclined, as Cohn puts it, to “[...] treat the materials of history the way an anthropologist treats his field notes” (Cohn 1987:2)

As a first step in my analysis, I situated the document in its specific historical and archival context and identified the producer(s) of the document. This consciousness of the context was very useful for the analysis of the context and significance of each document.

In a second step, I went on to apply a method normally used in Anthropology for the analysis of interviews and field notes: The attribution of codes. This method proved particularly fruitful for my analysis since it permitted a cross-referencing of topics that appeared in several documents.

In some cases, I also incorporated content from websites of the organisations I investigated into the analysis. These are partly publications about the organisation's work made available on the web pages, but also contents on the web page itself. They can, however, all be regarded as part of a self-representation of the respective organisation and can therefore also be seen as part of a discourse. I analyse them in a similar way as I do with historical documents, emphasizing the context of their production and presentation.

I also use codes in the analysis of interviews that I use in this investigation. In most cases these interviews have been carried out in the context of other investigations with a related, but nevertheless different research topic. This circumstance has to be considered in the analysis.

3. Jewish population under Franco

In order to understand the special situation of the Jewish population in Spain under Franco, it is important to give some attention to socio-political tendencies that had appeared in Spain already before the Civil War and the following dictatorship.
Spain’s Jewish population was categorized differently according to the territory they lived in: In the Spanish territory of the Iberian peninsula, Jews were considered to be absent since the expulsion by the Catholic kings in 1492. (Ojeda Mata 2009: 20) As we will see, this considered absence of Jewish population in Spain was important for the construction of Spanish nationalism during the period of dictatorship. In Spanish colonial territories the relation with the Jewish population was characterized by the need of the colonial power for intermediaries between Spain and the colonized countries. In this context, the Jews who resided in the occupied territories were of particular importance because their cooperation with the colonial power could be justified with the Spanish origin of this population. (Ojeda Mata 2009: 65) The Spanish frontier territories of Ceuta and Melilla were important places of residence for the Jewish population who’s ancestors had been expelled from Spain in the 15th century. These populations were considered to share a Spanish identity and could therefore be used as an instrument for colonial penetration. (Ojeda Mata 2009: 74f)

3.1. Catholic nationalism and Filosephardism

In order to be able to explain the ambivalent constructions of belonging of Spain's Jewish population, I will summarize, in a small excursion, one of the basic anthropological approaches to the nation-state.

The nation-state is the most frequent form of state today, or at least it is the form of state to which most states aspire. (O'Leary 1994: 990) The nation state unites the two concepts of state and nation. Both the concept of the nation and the concept of the state describe a collectivity, but the two concepts have different characteristics.

As O’Leary explains, the state is a hierarchic institution, whose existence does not depend on individual persons, but on the functions these persons perform. Other important characteristics of the modern state are its centralization and its legislative monopoly. (O'Leary 1994: 990)
The concept of the nation includes suppositions about a common origin of a determined
group and the cultural homogeneity of this same group. (Barfield 1997: 337f) In the
anthropological dictionary by Thomas Barfield, the nation is described as a community that
demands loyalty from its members. Nationalist movements frequently try to present the
nation as a naturally existent community. Myths of origin are presented like facts and
national traditions are invented and cultivated. (Barfield 1997: 338) Nevertheless,
anthropologists and other social scientists have demonstrated that nations are not natural
communities, but that they are constructed. (Barfield 1997: 338)

The concept of the nation-state unites the notions of state and nation. In the ideal nation
state, the state includes the totality of the territory that is inhabited by one nation. At the
same time, all members of the ideal nation state belong to one same nation. In this sense,
national movements try to construct and cultivate the illusion of a unified and
homogeneous nation state. (Barfield 1997: 337)

This short definition of the concept of the nation state will help to understand the situation
of minorities in the nation state in general, and, more specifically, the situation of the Jews
in Spain during the 20th century.

In the intent of creating an illusion of a culturally homogeneous population, the nation state
develops categories of inclusion and exclusion, using, for instance, differences of religion,
of ethnicity, or of linguistics between groups that reside in the national territory. Departing
from these categories, the nation state implements differentiated politics, depending on the
belonging to one category or another. One example that has already been studied by
anthropologists is citizenship. In nationalist discourses, categories of inclusion and
exclusion are constructed and cultivated in order to determine who belongs to the nation
and who does not.

During Franco’s dictatorship in Spain, belonging to the nation was constructed on the base
of religion. Nationality was strongly tied to Catholicism:

„In spite of the Spanish colonial approximation to the Sephardic Jews, the
secularisation of the country and the formation of new Jewish communities in
Spain, the definition of Spanish nationality in the field of legislation strongly
attached this national identity to Catholicism. “ (Ojeda Mata 2009: 182, my translation)

This connection of nationality and Catholicism in juridical terms means that citizenship, as the juridical expression of national belonging, was bound to Catholic confession.

Spanish citizenship was therefore rarely conceded to Spanish Jews residing outside the Iberian peninsula, and even less was it foreseen for Jews living (or trying to settle) on peninsular territory. (Ojeda Mata 2009: 182f)

While the Jewish population on the Spanish peninsular territory was constructed as not belonging to the nation, as an impurity to the nation state’s ideal homogeneity, the Jewish population in colonial areas in the north of Africa were constructed as having a shared Spanish identity and could therefore be used for colonial interests. (Ojeda Mata 2009: 65)

This assumption of shared cultural identity evolved within a new line of thinking, called Filosephardism, that appeared in Spain in the second half of the 19th century. It promoted the idea of cultural proximity of Spanish citizens and descendants of the Jews that had been expelled from Spain in 1492. (Ojeda Mata 2009: 20) It so defended the use of this population for economic and political influence in the colonial context. (Ojeda Mata 2009: 20) Since the Jewish population that had been expelled from Spain by the Catholic kings had for the most part conserved the Spanish language, they could be used as political, cultural, and economic intermediaries between local authorities and merchants on one side, and the colonial power on the other. (Ojeda Mata 2009: 72ff)

For the areas that were of special colonial interest for Spain, most of all Morocco, the colonial power even proposed measures in order for the Sephardic population not to lose touch with the Spanish language. (Ojeda Mata 2009: 79f)

The emerging of these two concepts - Catholicism and Filosephardism- in Spain in the middle of the 19th century had enormous consequences for Sephardic Jews and shaped their experiences depending on the territory they lived in. While Spanish Jews in the north of Africa were classified as „indigenous“, and could therefore improve their social position in the local society by acting as intermediaries between local powers and Spanish
authorities, Spanish Jews on the Iberian peninsula were classified as „strangers“ and were therefore excluded from the nation. They generally had low incomes and had to organize religious activities covertly. (Ojeda Mata 2009: 140f)

3.2. Persecution of Jews on peninsular territory

Some scholars who wrote about anti-Semitism in Spain under Franco sustained the image of the dictator as tolerant in regard to the Jewish population for a long time, even after Franco’s death. (Ojeda Mata 2009: 20f) This image had been created by the fascist regime itself and is still present in the imagery of large parts of the population today. (Ojeda Mata 2009: 20)

Although Germany under Hitler and Spain under Franco were both fascist regimes and existed at nearly the same time, Franco found himself in a different political situation, that led him to intend to please the Allied Powers. (Ojeda Mata 2009: 21) Therefore, Spain never persecuted the Jews openly, as was the case in National- Socialist Germany. Nevertheless, there can be identified a range of policies that aim at a socio-economic exclusion and expulsion of the Jewish population from Spain. (Ojeda Mata 2009: 200, 223f)

In contrast to the situation in Fascist Germany, Franco didn't directly persecute the Jewish population because of being Jewish. The dictator's principal enemies were members or sympathizers of leftist political parties as well as participants in the Spanish Masonry. While the participation of Jewish population in the former was low, there was a considerable amount of Jews who participated in Masonry. This participation made the Jewish population in Spain one of the primary targets of persecution of the fascist regime. (Ojeda Mata 2009: 193)

During the period of the Civil War (1936-1939), the Jewish population couldn't openly practice their religion and the number of conversions to Catholicism increased considerably. Furthermore, a great part of the Jewish population lost their citizenship and were expelled from Spanish territory. (Ojeda Mata 2009: 225f) These expulsions of parts of
the Jewish population was achieved through a variety of mechanisms. In the following, I will explain two of the most important mechanisms: expulsion and loss of citizenship as penalty, on the one hand, and measures of socio-economic repression, on the other hand.

As Ojeda mentions, many Jews that were believed to be critical of the fascist regime were persecuted or even executed in the beginning of the military uprising, mostly in the regions of Ceuta and Melilla and the Spanish protectorate in Northern Africa. In one documented case it is even probable that the fascist party systematically searched the homes of Jewish families in search of political adversaries. (Ojeda Mata 2009: 197)

In the following years of the Civil War and during the fascist dictatorship, the persecutions of Jewish participants in masonry and political adversaries continued systematically. This systematic persecution becomes particularly obvious when we look at convictions pronounced in trials against participants of the Spanish masonry. Documented cases show that the Special Tribunal for Repression of Masonry and Communism5 pronounced different types of punishments for people convicted as guilty of participating in masonry, depending on their religious orientation. Catholic convicts were mostly sentenced to imprisonment for long periods of time. In the case of Jewish convicts, on the contrary, these punishments were very often replaced by the expulsion from Spanish national territory and the loss of Spanish citizenship. As Ojeda affirms, the expulsion and loss of citizenship was seen a recommendable measure for Jewish convicts. (Ojeda Mata 2009: 200)

Furthermore, in their efforts to reduce the Jewish population residing in Spain, the fascist regime implemented indirect measures, mostly of socio-economic nature, that led Jewish members of the society to leave the country “by choice”. (Ojeda Mata 2009: 220)

The Jewish community Agudad Ahim, a small community that had established itself in the neighbourhood of Poble Sec and Raval, in Barcelona, is one example of a group of Jewish population that was severely affected by these measures.

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5 Tribunal Especial para la Represión de la Masonería y el Comunismo
Agudat Ahim mostly consisted of young Sephardic immigrants from Turkey and their descendants. (Ojeda Mata 2009: 119) The vast majority of the members of this community worked as ambulatory vendors in the market of San Antonio, one of the biggest commercial areas of its time in Barcelona. (Ojeda Mata 2009: 118ff). Because of their Turkish origin, this population frequently had problems obtaining Spanish citizenship. On the one hand, children of these immigrants, who were born in Spain, didn't automatically receive Spanish citizenship. On the other hand, documents that certified the Turkish citizenship of the immigrants frequently were not renewed by the Turkish embassy. This often resulted in the statelessness of the immigrants. (Ojeda Mata 2009: 119f)

After the Civil War, the Franco regime established measures that severely affected the life of the members of Agudat Ahim. In 1940, the government of Barcelona implemented the „Reglamento del Mercado de los Encantes“ (Ojeda Mata 2009: 223), a regulation that legally limited the work in the market to Spanish citizens. (Ojeda Mata 2009: 223) For the reasons that I mentioned above, the Jewish population that worked in and around the market of San Antonio rarely possessed Spanish citizenship. Therefore, using this regulation, the regime took away the basis of livelihood of the great majority of the members of Agudat Ahim. (Ojeda Mata 2009: 223)

As Maite Ojeda points out, this was the principal mechanism to “make disappear” the Jewish community of the market of San Antonio. (Ojeda Mata 2009: 224)

3.3. Evacuation or expulsion?

During the historical period this thesis focuses on, two major reasons for the large migration movements of Sephardic people can be identified. On the one hand, Sephardim, who found themselves in territories under the power of national socialist forces during World War II, were in some cases allowed by the Franco regime to enter Spanish national territory as part of their route to emigrate to other continents. This group of war refugees was not allowed to reside permanently in Spain, but were evacuated together with the refugees from Central Europe and in many cases with the help of international
organisations to the north of Africa, Palestine and the Americas. (see, for example, Ojeda Mata 2009: 274)

On the other hand, as I described above, Sephardim that had been living in Spain for years and had, in many cases, acquired Spanish citizenship, were forced to leave Spain due to mechanisms of economic exclusion or loss of their citizenship.

Furthermore, it has to be mentioned that many Jews living in Spain during the years of World War II were worried about their safety in the country due to anti-Semitism, the presence of the fascist Falange and also members of the fascist regimes of Germany and Italy in the streets of Spanish cities. (Berthelot 2001: 473) This feeling of insecurity may have contributed in some cases to the decision to leave the country.

In spite of this diversity in the reasons for emigration, members of all of these groups came in touch with international organisations at one moment or another that helped them in their struggle to leave Spain. What is important here is that although the act of helping (Sephardic and other) refugees from central Europe to cross Spanish borders and emigrate to other countries on behalf of international NGOs can rightfully be called evacuation, there were other cases where Sephardim were forced to leave the country due to persecution by the Franco regime. To sustain that this particular group of Sephardim were evacuated is to maintain the image of the Franco regime as tolerant towards the Jewish population- a notion created by the fascist regime itself. In these cases it is accurate to speak of an expulsion.

4. The role of NGOs in the expulsion of Spanish Jews

Non Governmental Organisations are a relatively recent phenomenon that is embedded in a specific historical, political and social context.

Firstly it has to be kept in mind that the existence of international NGOs is directly related to what we call Globalisation. Organisations like the International Red Cross/ Red Crescent have a global structure, and operate on a local basis. The IRC (International Red
Cross/ Red Crescent), for example, has common aims, principles, and organisational statutes that are valid for all local branches of the organisation. The existence of such organisations shows that there is a global discourse about human rights, in this case especially the rights of prisoners, victims of war and victims of natural disasters. Nevertheless, the organisation operates locally, being based on local branches and sending groups of members to local places where they perceive their assistance to be necessary. (Eriksen 2001: 298ff)

NGOs are also intrinsically related to the existence of the modern nation state. NGOs exist either in opposition or cooperation with the nation state. The Red Cross, for example, was founded by Henry Dunant in the course of World War I. According to the Red Cross historicity, Dunant felt that medical assistance in situations of conflict needed to be neutral. He therefore encouraged the establishment of national Red Cross societies that should ensure this task. (URL1, 13.1.2013) So the Red Cross was founded with the aim of performing necessary tasks that the nation state was unable to perform.

In general, NGOs such as Oxfam, or the IRC have a positive image in the broader public. According to the anthropologist Zivets, this positive image is transmitted by two important perceptions: Firstly, NGOs are generally perceived as “doing good”, helping and assisting others. Secondly, they are seen as “neutral”, that is, not being influenced by state politics on the one hand and market economy on the other hand.

So, NGOs are idealised as “disinterested, apolitical participants in a field of otherwise implicated players”. (Fisher 1997:4)

Both these perceptions can - and must - be viewed critically in an anthropological analysis of the work of NGOs.

The perception of NGOs as “doing good“ is certainly an advantage for the organisations, for example when they are trying to raise funds for their work. For anthropological analysis, on the contrary, it is problematic in two ways: Firstly, the notion of “doing good“ is highly subjective and depends on the observer's political and ideological background, on the historical context, etc. Often, NGOs are also seen in relation to public welfare, which is a concept that has emerged together with concepts of the welfare state and therefore has political implications.
Secondly, the anthropologist him-/ or herself may sympathize with the NGO he or she wants to analyse. Although this case may be quite common in anthropological investigation, it may influence the analysis insofar, as it may prevent us from being sufficiently critical towards the research object, in this case the work of the NGO. Furthermore, the anthropologist may face ethic difficulties when it comes to criticising aspects of the work of an organisation whose work he or she otherwise values.

The view of NGOs as „disinterested, apolitical participants in a field of otherwise implicated players“ (Fisher 1997:4) is also highly problematic, since from an anthropological point of view, actors are never disinterested nor apolitical.

Another important aspect that should be taken into account when analysing the work of NGOs is the ways in which funding influences processes of opinion-shaping, decision making and action. Clarke (1996) states, for example, that the „[...] vulnerability of their position as beneficiaries of outside funding and support may make NGOs less willing to advocate positions that run counter to those taken by the agencies funding them or their home governments.“ In the case of the IRC, most national Societies also receive public funds. (Beigbader 1991: 73)

During my investigation I have identified the American Jewish Joint Distribution Committee (often in collaboration with other organisations such as the American Friends Service Committee) and the Red Cross as the two major organisations that carried out the evacuation of Jewish refugees from Spain, and both were also implicated in different ways in the expulsion of Spanish Jews.

After shortly introducing their organisational structure and information about historical development, I will explore in detail the organisations' activities during Franco's dictatorship and their implication in the expulsion of Spanish Jews.
4.1. American Jewish Joint Distribution Committee

The American Jewish Joint Distribution Committee, or JDC, is an organisation that was founded in 1914 in the United States, when two previously existent organisations, namely the Central Relief Committee for the Relief of Jews and the American Jewish Relief Committee, merged to form a new Jewish relief committee. Later on, the People's Relief Committee also became a part of the JDC. (URL2, 13.1.2013)

According to the organisation's own historical portrayal, the JDC (like the IRC) came into being out of necessity: It was a call for help from an American ambassador in Turkey, who drew attention to the difficult situation of Jews in Palestine due to the outbreak of World War I, together with calls for help from Jews in Europe, also greatly affected by the war, that led to a huge campaign of fund-raising and subsequently to the foundation of the JDC. From then on, the organisation's function was the distribution of funds raised by the three organisations mentioned above- the Central Relief Committee for the Relief of Jews, the American Jewish Relief Committee, and later on also the People's Relief Committee- to Jews in Europe and Palestine suffering from the war. (URL3, 13.1.2013)

The organisation describes itself as “the world's leading Jewish humanitarian assistance organization” (URL4, 13.1.2013). Today it provides financial and other assistance for diverse measures such as humanitarian relief in the case of conflicts and natural disasters, promoting Jewish cultural activities and financial support for Jewish communities, as well as financial and other assistance to impoverished Jewish populations around the globe. Furthermore, the Jewish Joint Distribution Committee, together with the Israeli government, develops measures that aim at reducing the economic and social gap between the richest and the poorest parts of society in Israel. (Ibid., 13.1.2013)

During my research, I have been able to locate transcripts of interviews with members of the Jewish community of Barcelona, who were in Spain during the Civil War and/ or the following period of dictatorship. The interviews were carried out by the author Martine Berthelot and her team for her book on the oral history of one of the Jewish communities of Barcelona (Berthelot 2001). In these interviews, many of the informants name the American Jewish Joint Distribution Committee as an important organisation for the Jewish
population in Spain during the Civil War and the following years. The informants know the organisation by the abbreviation *Joint*, which I also use in this text.

From the sources I have been able to encounter it is not clear if the Joint directly operated in Spain during the Civil War. An article published by the organisation itself mentions that “*JDC allocations for Spain began in 1936 and continued through the war years [...]*” (JDC New York 2010:5) Nevertheless, I have not been able to find out how such “allocations” were spent in Spain during the Civil War.

Berthelot publishes part of an interview with Luisa, a Jewish woman with a Turkish background who came to live in Barcelona in 1931. In the interview, Luisa talks about preparations for the transport of children from Spain to the Americas in order to save them from the dangerous and difficult situation during the Civil War. According to Luisa, the Joint was in charge of these operations. (Berthelot 2001:32, 343f) However, during my research in JDC archives, I was not able to find any evidence of such operations during the period of the war. It is possible that the informant confusion the issue in this case with measures of the republican government during the Spanish Civil War. It is known that the government organised the evacuation of thousands of children in order to save them from suffering the war. (Collado 2006, 195f)

Interestingly, documentation and Photographs from the archive of the American Jewish Joint Distribution Committee indicate that measures like those described by Luisa were carried out by the Joint in the 1940s. It is possible that the informant, in this particular case, confuses either the date of the occurrences or the role of the JDC in the same.

The Joint might have contributed financially to operations of other, non-Jewish, relief organisations (or in the case of Luisa’s testimony, of governmental institutions), that operated in Spain during that period, but during my investigation, I did not find evidence of such practices. The documents and publications on the topic that I encountered so far indicate that there was no direct, or “personal” humanitarian support on behalf of the Joint in Spain before the 1940s. Further research may shed light on the type of support the Joint provided in Spain during the Civil War.

From 1939, when the nationalist party under Franco won the Civil War, the fascist regime prohibited the official actuation and presence of the Joint and other Jewish organisations in the country. (Bauer 1981: 45) This prohibition can be partly understood as part of a
general refusal to grant access to national territory to “foreign” (non-Spanish) and international organisations. In an article from the Spanish Red Cross Journal from 1945, a speech held by Franco is referenced, where he emphasizes that Spanish (political) issues should not be subjected to influences from outside of the nation:

“With convincing words, Franco once again claims our exclusive authority to resolve our own issues. 'What we are and what we ought to be is exclusively incumbent on the Spanish [...]’.” (Spanish Red Cross journal 02/1945: 6, my translation)

Although taken from a speech that was held a few years later, the regime's position shown in this statement can also be applied to its politics towards international organisations during the first years of Franco's dictatorship. The activities of such organisations in Spain were probably seen as an intrusion of other nations.

Furthermore, the refusal of international humanitarian organisations on Spanish territory reflects Franco's concerns in foreign politics. For a better understanding of this topic, I will shortly portray the relation between Franco's Spain and the fascist regimes of Italy under Mussolini and Germany under Hitler. In my explanations, I will mostly follow the findings of the author Bernd Rother.

As Rother explains, the relation of these three regimes can be characterized by “ideological proximity, but not analogy”. (Rother 2001: 69, my translation) While all three dictatorial regimes were based on strong nationalist feelings, the ideological foundation of these nationalisms was different. In national socialist Germany, religion was rejected by the regime. As I have already outlined in the third chapter, in Franco's nationalism, it was precisely Catholic confession that was used to determine the belonging to the Spanish nation. (Rother 2001: 69; Ojeda Mata 2009: 311)

During the Spanish Civil War, the nationalist insurgents received considerable military support from Hitler and Mussolini, which certainly contributed to Franco's victory over the republican forces. (Rother 2001:69) Shortly after Franco's victory and his taking over the political command of the Spanish state, Hitler invaded Poland and thereby started World War II. During the first months of the war, Spain maintained an official position of neutrality, although Germany was granted facilities such as the care of its submarines in Spanish ports. In 1940, when Hitler occupied France, Spain changed its foreign policy, declaring
the so-called “no beligerancia” (Rother 2001: 70f). This term meant that “Spain admitted its support of the Axis Powers, although at the moment not with military means.” (Rother 2001: 71, my translation) This change of Spanish foreign policy was caused by the assumption that Germany would most likely win the war and Franco had strategic ambitions in Gibraltar that he hoped Germany would fulfil if he contributed to the victory of the Axis Powers. Later in the same year, Franco actively tried to convince Hitler to agree to Spain's terms and conditions in order to enter the war on the side of Germany. This possibility was discussed on both sides, but Hitler repeatedly objected a Spanish participation, among other reasons due to Spain's weak economic situation after the Civil War. By the end of 1940, an active Spanish participation in World War II had moved beyond reach because the country's economic situation worsened and it became increasingly dependent on the relations with the Allied Powers. (Rother 2001: 70ff) Rother shows that Franco indirectly continued supporting Germany, but an official entry of Spain into the war had become unlikely. From the winter of 1941/1942 onwards, Spain gradually began to turn more and more towards the Allied Powers. Franco continued to grant Germany certain strategic and economic favours, but he also sought to establish good relations with the United Kingdom and the United States of America, given their military success, above all the Allied landing in North Africa. In 1943, the Allied Powers exerted pressure on Franco to drastically decrease his support for Germany. From then on, Spanish foreign policy was characterised by an increasing abandonment of Germany and its allies. (Rother 2001: 74ff) Although Franco felt ideologically proximate to Hitler, strategic interests led him to gradually turn towards collaboration with the Allied Powers from 1942 onwards.

These historical developments are crucial to understand Franco's politics towards international relief organisations. The work of the Joint, as an American relief organisation, was particularly affected by these developments. Bauer states that the organisation was not allowed to officially open any office on Spanish territory during World War II (Bauer 1981: 45). While the organisation's headquarters for the support of European refugees during World War II was situated in Lisbon, Portugal (JDC New York 2010:5), from 1939 to 1942 the Joint indirectly operated in Spain through different representatives (Bauer 1981: 49f).
In Madrid, money was transferred by the JDC to Moshe Eisen, who was himself a refugee and worked in Madrid in the early 1940s, in order to be distributed among refugees. Later, this task was given to two women, Dorsey Stephens and Virginia Chase Weddell, the latter being married to the ambassador of the United States: “Between $1,000 and $1,500 a month were transferred to these women, who then tried their best to administer aid to refugees in Madrid and some other places.” (Bauer 1981: 49)

According to Bauer, the situation of the Joint in Barcelona was even more difficult. There, businessman Fred Max Oberländer was provided with funds to forward to refugees in Barcelona as well as in the camp of Miranda de Ebro, where many refugees were detained. (Bauer 1981: 49; Berthelot 2001: 486) This entrepreneur had had connections with the Jewish community in Vienna, but he himself was probably not Jewish. His position as representative of the Joint indicates the difficulties of the organisation to find a better alternative: “The Viennese IKG, headed by Josef Löwenherz, had sent there [to Barcelona; note from the author] a man named Fred Max Oberländer, apparently a non-Jew, who had been in the fountain pen business. His firm, Ofir, opened a branch in Barcelona. His origins, the background for his activity, his contacts with German and Jewish groups---all these are somewhat of a mystery.” (Bauer 1981: 49) Bauer also pronounces doubts about the efficiency of the transmission of money to the refugees and mentions the possibility that part of the funds was used for bribery. (Bauer 1981:49) Kurt A., who lived in Barcelona since 1933, remembers a representative of the Joint in an interview for Berthelot's Memorias Judías (2001). In Berthelot's publication, the name of this representative is transcribed “Huberlander” (Berthelot 2001: 456). Due to the similar sound of the two names, and taking into account the difficulty of transcription of oral interviews, I suspect that in fact Kurt A. referred to Oberländer. Kurt A. also mentions that Oberländer and his successor had already worked together for some time when Oberländer left. (Berthelot 2001: 456)

In autumn 1941 the situation of the Joint in Barcelona seems to have improved somewhat. The Portuguese citizen Samuel Sequerra, who had formerly worked as secretary of the Jewish community in Lisbon (Bauer 1981:46), took over the position of representative of the organisation and the possibility of transferring funds also improved: “American Treasury licences for the transfer of money for charitable purposes to Europe had been granted for Spain since June, 1941, so that Sequerra could use official funds.” (Bauer
1981: 49) It seems that officially, Sequerra was the representative of the Portuguese Red Cross in Spain. Although the Spanish authorities knew about his activities on behalf of the Joint, he was tolerated, although not without close vigilance through the police. (Bauer 1981: 209f)

Finally, from 1943 onwards, the Franco regime allowed the JDC to open a representative office in Madrid, and David Blickenstaff became the official JDC delegate in this city (Ojeda Mata 2009: 236; Bauer 1981:5).

In Barcelona, Franco allowed the Joint to run a centre for refugees after April 1943. (Archives JDC NY, Item ID 175536, 1944) The photograph below shows children outside this so-called “Receiving Home” in the Catalan capital city. The photographs that I found related to this refugee centre show that children residing there received care by nurses and some of them also attended Hebrew lessons. (Archives JDC NY, Item ID 175536, 1944; Archives JDC NY, Item ID 175573, 1944)

In the same year that David Blickenstaff became the JDC representative in Madrid, Herbert Katzki took over the position of the organisation's representative in Barcelona. (JDC New York 2010:5)

The change in Franco's attitude towards allowing the Joint and other humanitarian organisations to open official representations on Spanish territory can be explained with the general shift in Spain's foreign politics from 1942 onwards. As I have already mentioned, due to the economic dependence on the United States and the growing probability of a victory of the Allied Powers, Franco needed to improve his relations with the Allied
Powers (Ojeda Mata 2009: 236). Allowing an American relief organisation to officially operate on national territory may have been seen as an act of demonstrating cooperation. But this is certainly not the only reason why Franco finally allowed the Joint to set up an office in Barcelona. As I will show in the following chapter, the Joint was used by the Franco regime as a collaborator in the struggle to expel both Sephardim living in Spain for years as well as Spanish Jews that had lived in central Europe and had come to the country as refugees.

In Spain, the work of the JDC from 1939 until well after the end of World War II covered a wide range of activities. In my investigation, I have focused on the activities of the Joint in Barcelona.

In the Catalan city, the organisation seems to have moved their office various times. Avner N., who settled in Barcelona in 1931 with his family and was very active in the local Jewish Community, explains that the organisation’s first office in Barcelona during the Franco regime was in las Ramblas, a central and popular street in the city center. From there, it was moved to a hotel called “Bristol”. (Berthelot 2001: 460) This hotel, according to Kurt A., whom I already mentioned above, was located in the Avinguda del Portal de L’Àngel (Berthelot 2001: 456), a street that opens out into Barcelona’s central square, Plaça Catalunya. Later it was transferred to Passeig de Gràcia (Berthelot 2001:460), also an important centric street that leads into Plaça Catalunya.

The range of services provided by the Joint during the period of time I have investigated includes financial and material support, intervention with the authorities, as well as the organisation and (partial) financing of the emigration from Europe.

Firstly, many Central European refugees that passed Spain in their struggle to immigrate to Palestine, North Africa and the Americas, were provided with financial support by the JDC. According to contemporary witnesses Isaac P., Marcos and Rosalie, those who needed economic assistance (above all refugees from other European countries) could contact the representatives of the JDC in Barcelona to have themselves registered (Isaac P. in Berthelot 2001: 457). It seems that those registered could obtain a certain amount of money per month to subsist (Rosalie in Berthelot 2001: 469). In some cases, it seems that the organisation also paid for health care of its clients, including therapy aimed at the
recovery after major illnesses (Alfredo in Berthelot 2001:460; Marcos in Berthelot 2001:461). Funds were also distributed among Jewish internees at the camp of *Miranda de Ebro*, where many refugees who had crossed the Spanish border illegally were detained. (Bauer 1981: 48f) In addition to economic assistance, the Joint, together with the Hebrew Immigrant Aid Society, also sent food to the *Comunidad Israelita de Barcelona*, one of the local Jewish Communities, which was then distributed (Avner in Berthelot 2001: 459).

Furthermore, the Joint played an important role in the evacuation of refugees (and with them probably a considerable amount of Sephardim) from Spain and Portugal. On the one hand, the JDC appears to have worked as intermediary between Jews who wished (or were forced) to leave Spain and the Spanish authorities. Alfredo, an Italian who arrived in Barcelona in 1941, explains that the organisation provided assistance to obtain the necessary permits for the Jews to migrate to North America and other countries (Alfredo in Berthelot 2001: 460). This testimony is supported by Bauer, who describes that in 1941, Joseph Schwartz, the JDC's "Director of Overseas Operations" (URL5, 13.1.2013) representative in Portugal, "[...] tried to obtain Panamanian visas [...]" (Bauer 1981:54f) for a group of Jewish refugees that had managed to reach Lisbon through Spain. Apart from the assistance of refugees (and possibly other groups of migrants), which was, as I will show in the next part of this chapter, also an important task of the different branches of the Red Cross, the Joint's major task during World War II was the organisation and accomplishment of the transport of migrants from Spain and Portugal to countries that would receive them.

In the course of World War II, as Hitler invaded and occupied a growing amount of European territory, refugees tried to reach countries such as Switzerland, France (before its occupation through the German), Spain and Portugal in order to escape detention and deportation to concentration camps. In most cases, these neutral countries were places of transit on their way to final destinations such as Palestine, North Africa, and the Americas. As an (officially) neutral country, Spain played an important role as a country of transit for many refugees from Central Europe. This was particularly the case after 1942: "Following the Nazi occupation of northern and coastal France in June 1942, Spain became the land bridge to the high seas for Jewish refugees [...]" (JDC New York 2010: 3) The transport of refugees from Spain via ship was nearly impossible. Between Spain and North America, for example, "[o]nly two Spanish ships were available, on a very limited basis, sailing
usually from Seville to the American continent.” (Bauer 1981: 47) As Bauer explains, Portugal therefore became one of the most important points of departure for refugees to leave Europe in the south: “The only real possibility for arranging transport was therefore to use the medium-sized Portuguese ships: the Nyassa, Guinee, Teneriffe, Serpapinto, Magallanes, Mouzinho, and Colonial.” (Bauer 1981: 47)

During the first major immigration to Portugal, among the refugees' nationalities figured “French, German and Austrian, Czech, Belgian, Dutch, Polish, and stateless.” (Bauer 1981: 46) The category of “stateless” refugees is particularly interesting for my investigation. Although it is probable that among them were many Jews that lost their (German or Austrian) citizenship due to Hitler's politics in relation to the Jewish population, a part of this group possibly consisted of Sephardim, who were declared stateless by the Franco regime. All together, around 100 000 refugees left Europe through Portugal's ports and the JDC financed a large part of these voyages, providing the refugees with tickets for the ships named by Bauer (JDC New York 2010:5). The purchase of tickets for the refugees was often problematic. Those refugees who wanted to emigrate to the United States, for example, had to prove that they already possessed a ticket on a ship to this country in order to receive a visa. This meant that the JDC had to buy these tickets in advance, not knowing if the refugees would be able to reach Portugal (on time). Regulations of the shipping companies made calculations even more difficult: “[...] sometimes, especially in 1941, the shipping company would not agree to book individual berths, but only blocks of places or even the whole ship.” (Bauer 1981:47)

Such regulations show the importance of NGOs in the process of emigration for refugees. Since shipping companies often did not
allow the purchase of single tickets, refugees had to address NGOs in order to be able to board one of the ships. These regulations provided, of course, an additional financial risk to the Joint.

During my investigation I have encountered testimonies and documents about several ships that transported Jewish immigrants from Spain and Portugal. In the transports that I have been able to find information on, the Joint- at least partly- organized and/ or financed the journey of Jewish passengers. This may be the result of my searching, above all, in archives of the Red Cross and the Joint, but, as I will show in the following chapter, it was the Joint that was mainly responsible to transport Jewish refugees out of Spain.

The earliest transport organised in collaboration with the JDC that I have encountered was the ship *S.S. Mouzinho*, that sailed from Lisbon to New York. Apart from adult refugees, the ship also carried Jewish children that had been released from internment camps in France. This transport of children, with the majority below the age of 13, was a joint project of the JDC, the American Friends Service Committee and others. The ship cast off in June 1941. (Archives JDC NY, Item 14554, 1941)

Later in the same year, the *Serpa Pinto* sailed the same route and on board was another group of Jewish children, whose evacuation had been planned by the JDC in collaboration with other organisations. The *Serpa Pinto* left the port of Lisbon in September, 1941. (Archives JDC NY, Item 14554, 1941)

Although the number of sailings that I could find evidence of in the JDC archives' online database is quite reduced, there must have been a much greater amount of transports organized by the Joint. Bauer, for example, speaks of “[...] 3,682 [passengers; note from the author] in nine sailings between June and the end of the year 1941” (Bauer 1981: 199).

In the online database of the JDC archives I could not find documents or photographs of ships that carried refugees departing from Lisbon or any other port in Spain or Portugal from October 1941 until early in 1944.
Nevertheless, Bauer talks about more than 4000 Jews that left the Iberian peninsula in the first half of 1942. According to this author, the JDC organised eight sailings during this period of time. (Bauer 1981: 199)

I located documents, however, about an important transport of refugees from Lisbon to Haifa, Palestine, on the ship Nyassa in 1944. Unlike other transports, where the JDC had bought individual tickets or blocks of tickets (Bauer 1981: 47), this sailing was entirely organised by the JDC, that means that the JDC had booked the whole ship (Archives JDC NY, Item 11081, 1944).

I was able to locate a photograph that documents that on January 23rd, 1944, a farewell party was organised for the Jewish refugees that were about to leave Lisbon on the Nyassa. Joseph Schwartz, who worked for the JDC in Lisbon, also attended the celebration. (Archives JDC NY, Item ID 14543, 1944).

In January 1944, the S.S. Nyassa left the port of Lisbon. But instead of heading directly to Haifa, the Nyassa berthed in a Spanish port, Cádiz, where more Jewish refugees boarded the ship. (Archives JDC NY, Item ID 14542, 1944; Rother 2001: 129; Vera 2009: 12) They were transported to Cádiz from Barcelona (384 persons), Madrid (138 persons) and the camp in Miranda de Ebro (42 persons) (Rother 2001: 129). Some of the Jews that boarded the Nyassa in Cádiz had resided in Spain for years before this “evacuation”:

“50 persons that got on in Cádiz were not refugees, but Jews, who had lived in Spain and now took the opportunity of emigration to Palestine, in order to escape from the discrimination against Jews in Catholic Spain.” (Rother 2001: 129, my translation)
Mauricio Palomo (later Moshe Yanai) and two of his relatives were among this last group of Jewish passengers of the Nyassa. His story, that will be told in the next chapter, will show that at least some, if not all, of these Jews did not just take the opportunity to emigrate, as Rother formulates it (Rother 2001: 129), but were in fact deported from Spanish territory. The Nyassa reached Haifa on February 1st, 1944 (Bauer 1981: 214).

At this point I want to draw attention to the fact that the Nyassa, coming from Portugal, stopped in Cádiz to accept passengers when, according to Bauer, the transport from Spain via ship was extremely difficult (Bauer 1981:47). The stop in Cádiz must have been considered important to the Spanish authorities in order to allow the Nyassa to land in the Spanish port. Nevertheless, according to Vera the Nyassa's stop in Cádiz was not mentioned in any of the country's more important newspapers (Vera 2009: 12). Mauricio Palomo suggests that the Spanish authorities were probably not interested in drawing the public's attention to the operation (Palomo in Vera 2009: 12).

"The ship, Guine Portugal, which transported refugees from Cádiz to North Africa." (Archives JDC NY, Item ID 175533, 1944)

Later in the same year, another ship, the Guine Portugal, left from the port of Cádiz carrying Jewish refugees whose transport was organized (and probably financed) by the Joint. Unlike the Nyassa earlier the same year, the Guine Portugal carried its passengers to North Africa. According to the description of a photograph found in the online database of the JDC Archives, most of the refugees that sailed on board of this ship had made their way to Barcelona. From there, their transport to Cádiz was arranged by the JDC. (Archives JDC NY, Item ID 175533,
1944) Once in Cádiz, the refugees were provided with accommodations in a hotel in the city, where they were also provided with meals. (Archives JDC NY, Item ID 175529, 1944) It is possible that this hotel was the “Hotel Playa”, since this hotel had also accommodated the group of Jews that boarded the Nyassa some months earlier. (Vera 2009: 12) Since the photographs that I found in relation to the journey of the Guine Portugal all date from 21st of June, 1944 (Archives JDC NY Item ID 175525, 1944; Archives JDC NY, Item ID 175528, 1944; Archives JDC NY, Item ID 175529, 1944; Archives JDC NY, Item ID 175531, 1944; Archives JDC NY, Item ID 175533, 1944), there are reasonable doubts about the accuracy of this date. One of the photographs shows two refugees in a train station in Barcelona, shortly before their departure to Cádiz (Archives JDC NY, Item ID 175525, 1944). In my opinion, it is unlikely that the JDC would run the risk of having the refugees arrive in Cádiz on the same day their ship would leave from there, given that the JDC had to pay for the tickets on the ships in advance, as I have explained earlier. In addition, Bauer mentions a group of 425 Jews that arrived in Haifa on this ship on November 4th, 1944 (Bauer 1981: 214). Unless the Guinee made the journey twice in 1944, it is not likely that it left Cádiz in June. This is of course only a presumption, which could be verified in a further investigation of the topic.

Rother mentions another transport from Portugal and Spain in October, 1944, but gives no details about the name of the ship or its destination. (Rother 2001: 129) Further investigation could also reveal whether the transport mentioned by Rother is that which the photographs I have located are taken from.

Other than these sailings that are known to have departed also from a Spanish port, Bauer mentions two Spanish ships that sailed the route from Seville to the Americas. So far I have not been able to find out more about these ships, and Bauer explains that they were available only “on a very limited basis” (Bauer 1981: 47).

Apart from the refugees’ evacuation (or expulsion, in some cases) to Palestine, North Africa, and the Americas (in a very limited amount of cases), the JDC was involved in another interesting project, namely the settlement of European refugees in the Dominican Republic. According to a paper resuming a meeting on the project held in New York in September, 1941, the project was initiated upon an offer from the President of the Dominican Republic at the time, Rafael Trujillo. The initial financial means for the project were provided by the American Jewish Joint Agricultural Corporation, which, later on
formed the *Dominican Republic Settlement Association Inc.* (also called *Dorsa*) to handle this special task. In early 1940, an agreement was signed in which the state Sosua, in the northern part of the Dominican Republic, was made available to *Dorsa* for the settlement project. Already in 1940, the first Jewish settlers arrived on the island. (Archives JDC NY, Item ID 587885, 1941: 3f) Unlike the JDC's evacuations of refugees from Spain and Portugal, participation in the *Dorsa* program was not open to all Jewish refugees. Apparently certain criteria existed for the admission or rejection of Jewish refugees to the program, one of them being “fitness for farming life”. (Archives JDC NY, Item ID 587885, 1941: 3f) *Dorsa* developed its own plan of support for Jewish refugees who were chosen to settle in Sosua, which included maintenance for the first time in the new country, and free credit in the local warehouse. Additionally, they were provided with a house and land to settle on, as well as basic tools for agriculture and some farm animals. (Archives JDC NY, Item ID 587885, 1941: 20)

There is evidence that at least some of the refugees accepted into the *Dorsa* programme were brought to the Dominican Republic on board of the *Serpa Pinto* or the *Nyassa*, ships that were also used by the JDC for transport of refugees to Palestine and North Africa. (Archives JDC NY, Item ID 586703, 1942: 1) In a letter sent to the JDC New York in August 1942, a listing can be found that includes the numbers of refugees provided with a *Dorsa* visa. One of those visas was also granted to a Spanish citizen. (Archives JDC NY, Item ID 586659, 1942: 4) However, since the name of the settler is not written on this document, it is unclear if this person was Sephardic or rather a political refugee of the Franco regime.

Further investigation, especially in the archives of the JDC in New York, could reveal more details about possible settlement of Sephardim in Sosua in the 1940s.

### 4.2. The Red Cross

The work of the International Red Cross/ Red Crescent Movement in general has so far been given very little attention by anthropologists. Given the size and importance of this NGO, the lack of anthropological analysis of its work is surprising.
I will start by shortly explaining the organisational structure of the International Red Cross/Red Crescent Movement and its interrelations with the state. Then I will explain the role of both the Spanish Red Cross and the International Committee of the Red Cross during the Spanish Civil War. Finally I will go on to the analysis of the role of the Spanish Red Cross during the Franco regime and especially in the expulsion of Spanish Jews during that time.

According to Beigbeder, the Red Cross is the largest secular NGO in the realm of humanitarian relief, with branches in 149 countries. (Beigbeder 1991:61) The Red Cross was founded in 1863, and in 1919, the League of Red Cross Societies was created. (Beigbeder 1991: 61) The International Committee of the Red Cross, which was part of the Red Cross Movement from the organisation's foundation in 1863 (URL 6, 13.1.2013), “[...] was the first international body to define the basic principles of international humanitarian law during conflicts.” (Beigbeder 1991: 61) The Red Cross/Red Crescent Movement consists of three major bodies which are independent from each other:

- The International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC)
- The International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies (IFRC)
- National Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies (Beigbeder 1991:62)

The first of these three components, the ICRC, coordinates and directs international activities of the IRC during situations of conflict. It is also responsible for campaigns about the importance of international humanitarian law. The ICRC “[...] has a permanent mandate under international law to visit prisons, organize relief operations, reunite separated families and undertake other humanitarian activities during armed conflicts.” (IFRC 1997: 3)

The second component, the IFRC, “[...] coordinates and directs international assistance following natural and man-made disasters in non-conflict situations.” (IFRC 1997: ) It is also responsible for “development work”, and health care efforts, such as fighting HIV and tuberculosis. (IFRC 1997: 4)

Finally, the National Red Cross Societies are the basic units of the IRC and are composed of volunteers and staff. The national societies carry out a variety of activities, such as first aid training or medical services. They also “[...] support the public authorities in their own countries as independent auxiliaries to the government in the humanitarian field.”
Furthermore, the national societies carry out the IRC activities that are organized by the IFRC and the ICRC during conflicts and disasters. (IFRC 1997: 5)

Although the different bodies that form the Red Cross Movement are independent from each other, they share common principles and guidelines for their work. Their belonging to the same international organisation is stated in their organisational statutes. (Beigbeder 1991: 63) Beigbeder describes the International Red Cross as a “transnational movement or network”. (Beigbeder 1991: 62).

During the Spanish Civil War, the ICRC sent several delegates to Spain who worked both in the Republican and the Nationalist zone. In September 1936, nearly two months after the outbreak of the Civil War, Marcel Junod, a Swiss doctor and delegate of the ICRC (URL7, 13.1.2013), visited the Red Cross in Barcelona and Madrid. In a report about this visit to Spain that I located in the archives of the ICRC, Junod explains that “[t]he Red Cross in Barcelona is completely isolated from the Spanish Red Cross.” (Archives ICRC, Junod 1936, my translation) During the Civil War, two national Red Cross societies existed in Spain- one on the Republican side and one on the side of the Nationalists. (URL 8, 13.1.2013) However, since Barcelona and Madrid were both in the Republican zone at the time of Junod's visit, this cannot be the reason for the isolation of the two committees, that is described by the delegate. So far, I have not succeeded in finding out more about this issue. After his visit to Barcelona, Junod continued his journey to visit the Committee of the Spanish Red Cross in Madrid. There he obtained an accordance with the Spanish Red Cross, in which the Spanish Red Cross under Aurelio Romeo declares, among other issues, that it would support the ICRC's plan to send delegates to Spain that should carry out different activities on behalf of the Red Cross. (Archives ICRC, Romeo 1936) I have located documents that confirm that Junod obtained permission from the Republican authorities to send delegates of the ICRC to both zones of conflict. (Archives ICRC, Giral 1936) It is clear that Junod was able to obtain a similar permission from the Nationalist authorities because soon afterwards, the ICRC sent a delegation of eight members that worked in Barcelona and Madrid (in the Republican zone) and a delegation of four members to Burgos and Seville (in the Nationalist zone). Junod himself formed part of the delegation situated in the Republican zone. (Information provided by member of CRE, November 2012)
As I have already mentioned above, two national Red Cross Societies existed in Spain during the Civil War, one for each party of the conflict. (URL8, 13.1.2013) This is highly interesting for this analysis, since it questions the organisation's discourse on its own impartiality. I will elaborate in more detail on this topic in the next chapter. At the moment, it is important to state that the ICRC, not the Spanish Red Cross, took over the role of intermediary between the conflict parties in some areas during the time of the Civil War. For example, the ICRC delegates in Spain organised the exchange of prisoners of war as well as civilian prisoners between the conflict parties (Giral 1938: 22).

During the period of time I investigated for this thesis, the Red Cross was assigned the task of arranging exit permits for Jewish Refugees leaving Spain. Other NGOs whose task was the assistance of (Jewish) refugees in the process of emigration from Spain had to forward necessary documents to the Spanish Red Cross, who functioned as an intermediary between the refugees (and the NGOs that attended them) and the Spanish Foreign Ministry. (Ojeda Mata 2009: 270)

It is therefore clear that the Spanish Red Cross was implicated, at least in administrative terms, in the expulsion of Sephardim. At this state of my investigation, however, I can not definitely answer the question whether or not members of the Spanish Red Cross knew about the expulsions of Sephardic Jews. It is in any case probable that those implicated in the task of issuing transit visa or exit permits from Spain were confronted with evidence of such cases. Whether members of the NGO chose to pick up the topic and, what is more, whether documents remain that can help to recreate discourses about this topic within the Red Cross could be investigated in a continuing investigation, above all, in the archive of the Spanish Red Cross in Madrid.

5. NGOs between activism and collaboration

NGOs are a phenomenon that has evolved in the context of the nation state. Although they may claim, to a greater or lesser extent, the ideal of impartiality and independence for their
work, the field in which they act is based on the system of nation states. Even by placing themselves in opposition to the nation state, they do already establish a relation to it. Since they, like other social actors, are embedded in society, NGOs also have to interact with different forms of power.

In this chapter, I will analyse the ways in which the JDC and the Red Cross interacted with different forms of power during the time of the Spanish Civil War and the following period of Franco's dictatorship. We will see how the organisations struggle to maintain their position as independent actors and in which ways they are in some situations forced into collaboration and even assistance to the dominant political power. It will be interesting to see both how these relations were dealt with at the time and how they are represented by the organisations retrospectively.

5.1. The Red Cross and the concept of impartiality

In contrast to many other NGOs, the IRC claims to be impartial in its actions. That means that apart from assisting victims of war, other conflicts and natural disasters, the organisation insists in not taking any position in wars and other conflicts. They do not declare the organisation to sympathise with one side or the other in a conflict. NGOs that are working in the development sector, for example, often claim to act according to the interests of indigenous peoples. They are taking sides. The IRC, however, insists on being neutral in wars and other conflicts in order to be able to assist victims on both sides of the conflict. This may be one reason for the international success of the Red Cross/Red Crescent Movement.

In terms of diplomatic interests, such a neutrality is desirable and most probably even necessary for the work of the International Red Cross. From an anthropological viewpoint, however, the concept of "impartiality" has to be reviewed critically in the context of this NGO. As I will show in this chapter, the International Red Cross, and especially the Spanish National Red Cross society, has been influenced by and subjected to the interests of political powers of the time.
Although the term NGO implies a certain independence from national governments, in most cases there is a strong connection between national Red Cross societies and their respective governments. As Beigbeder points out, most National Red Cross Societies are national NGOs, but they are strongly linked to national governments. This is in part because of their common activities that I have described in the last chapter. Also, in many countries, the Red Cross carries out „[...] quasi-governmental functions, such as blood collection and transfusion, first aid duties, or training nurses.“ (Beigbeder 1991: 73)

Beigbeder also gives another reason why it is difficult for the national RC Societies to be really independent from their respective governments: „[...] the National Red Cross tends to be part of the 'establishment', and its leaders are often appointed by the government.“ (Beigbeder 1991: 73) It is known, for example, that the German Red Cross during World War II was under Nazi control and that its leaders took part in the persecution of Jews. (Bugnion 2002).

In an article on the ICRC's homepage, the question is raised whether the ICRC should have denounced the genocide going on in Germany and the annexed countries (of which they had become aware by 1942). In fact, the ICRC discussed this issue in a plenary session in 1942 and decided against launching the appeal. The main reasons for the decision was, according to Bugnion, a general sense of helplessness and the fear of „compromising activities that the ICRC was actually able to carry out on behalf of prisoners of war“. But he also mentions „the fear of causing embarrassment to the Swiss authorities“ as one of the motives of the decision. This is because the NGO was founded in Switzerland and at that period, its ties with this country were even stronger than today. In fact, Bugnion states that one of the consequences of the ICRC's own reflection on their work during World War II was that „the ICRC's relationship with Switzerland was redesigned to ensure its independence“. (Bugnion 2002)

These arguments show that there is a certain dependence of the IRC on government policy. It becomes clear that the national Red Cross societies are not „neutral“ actors as they claim to be. As an anthropologist, it is particularly interesting for me to see how NGOs such as the Red Cross position themselves in relation to government policy.
As I have already mentioned, during the Civil War two national Red Cross Societies existed in Spain, one on the side of each conflict party. (URL8, 13.1.2013) This separation of the organisation during the conflict indicates that the ideal of Impartiality could not be implemented by the members of the organisation. During the Civil War, it seems that the identification with one of the conflict parties was more important (probably not only in terms of the identification with certain values, but also in very practical terms of loyalty) than the identification with the Red Cross' ideal of Impartiality. It is difficult to evaluate if this ideal was even practicable in these specific circumstances. What is more interesting for this analysis, however, is the way in which the existence of more than one national Red Cross society in Spain at that time is dealt with by the organisation itself.

Since 1965, “unity” (URL9, 13.1.2013, my translation) is one of the International Red Cross' fundamental principles. This principle is explained on the web page of the Spanish Red Cross:

“In every country only one Red Cross or Red Crescent Society can exist, which must be accessible for everybody and extend its humanitarian action over the totality of the territory.” (URL9, 13.1.2013, my translation)

Although the relation with the history of the Spanish Red Cross is obvious here, no comment on the temporary existence of the two national societies in Spain is made on this part of the web page, nor could I find any explicit reference to the topic in other parts of the homepage of the Spanish Red Cross.

I myself learned about the existence of the two national societies “by accident”, reading an article about the ICRC handing over historical documents concerning the Civil War to the Spanish government, published on the web page of the ICRC. On this page, the existence of the two national societies is mentioned, but since this is not the topic of the article, explanations or more detail about the topic are not provided. (URL 8, 13.1.2013) I then began to search for the issue in other articles provided by the ICRC about the topic of the Spanish Civil War (see, for example, URL 10, 13.1.2013), but could not find it mentioned anywhere else. In an article on the Spanish Civil War, for example, the author repeatedly refers to the Spanish branches of the organisation as “the Spanish Red Cross” (URL 10, 13.1.2013), exclusively using grammatical singular.
This nearly complete absence of the topic on both the web pages of the Spanish Red Cross and of the ICRC lead me to the conclusion that the avoidance mentioning of the topic is part of an active process of hiding of this aspect of history both on behalf of the Spanish Red Cross and, to a lesser extent, the ICRC.

During my investigation, I have been able to take insight into the journal of the Spanish Red Cross, which is published every month under the responsibility of the Central Commission of the Spanish Red Cross. I have consulted the issues published from 1936 until 1975 in the Documentation Center of the Spanish Red Cross in Madrid. This journal has become one of the most important sources for my analysis of the concept of “neutrality” in the context of the Red Cross in Spain. For my analysis, I have compared texts from issues published before 1936 (in the period of the Republic), in 1938 (towards the end of the Civil War), and after 1942 (during the Franco dictatorship). I will elaborate my findings in the following paragraphs.

The last issue of the Spanish Red Cross journal before the Civil War was published in May, 1936. In that issue, the ongoing conflict in the country, that would soon afterwards turn into a civil war, was not mentioned.

In general it can be said that political topics were not directly addressed in the journal. If they appeared, they did so in the context of other topics that are relevant to issues concerning the Red Cross. In an article titled „Neutrality of the Red Cross“ (Spanish Red Cross journal 05/1936: 227), for example, the USSR and Germany under Hitler are mentioned as politically counter-posed countries and it is explained that the Red Cross has to be neutral in order to attend victims of war in both countries.

During the time of the Civil War in Spain, the journal was not published for several years. The next issue of the journal was published in December 1938. It is an extraordinary issue that aims at recapitulating the work of the Red Cross during the time it couldn’t be published. From this issue I know that by December 1938, Dr. Romeo Lozano was the president of the Spanish Red Cross. Lozano wrote an introduction to the journal in which he talks about the difficulties but also the achievements of the Spanish Red Cross during the Civil War. (Spanish Red Cross journal 12/1938: 1f) The text mentions that, being a Civil War, the conflict in Spain made the work of the Red Cross especially difficult because of „passions and inner struggles“ in society (Spanish Red Cross Journal 12/1938: 1f, my translation). Despite this vague observation, the article does not mention the real effects of
these conflicts for the Spanish Red Cross, namely the separation into two different Red Cross Societies in Spain during the Civil War.

In the editorial of the issue from December 1938, the journal expresses “absolute loyalty and adhesion to the Republic” (Spanish Red Cross journal 12/1938: 4, my translation). It is also mentioned that it was the government of the Republic that called the members of the Central Commission to constituting the directorate of the Spanish Red Cross. (Spanish Red Cross journal 12/1938: 3) These lines indicate a general identification of the Spanish Red Cross at the time with the values and aims of the Republic and this tendency within the organisation may be one of the reasons for the later restructuring of the institution by the Franco government. Since the Spanish Red Cross was divided into two societies during the Civil War, it is most likely that the editorial department of the journal was part of the Republican section of the Spanish Red Cross. It then becomes clear why it took so long until the journal was published again after 1938, since all the posts that had to do with the journal had to be assigned to members of the Nationalist fraction.

Although the war ended in 1939, after February 1939, the journal was not published again until 1942 (!). The first issue after those years was published in July 1942. On one of the first pages of this issue, a portrait of the size of an entire page of Carmen Polo, the wife of Francisco Franco, was printed. In the subtitles of the picture it is explained that Carmen Polo is the president of honour of the Spanish Red Cross (Spanish Red Cross journal 07/1942: 4).

By July 1942, the president of the Spanish Red Cross was no longer Romeo Lozano, but Manuel Martinez de Tena, a lawyer and national counsellor during five legislature periods under Franco. But this politician was not only the president of the Spanish Red Cross, but he was also named delegate of the government in the same organisation. (Spanish Red Cross Journal 07/1942:6) In an article in the journal Martinez speaks about the importance of the contribution of the Red Cross in the recovery and prosperity of the Spanish state. He thanks the journal for the opportunity to write some “words of orientation” (Spanish Red Cross Journal 07/1942:6, my translation) and closes the article with a praise of Francisco Franco. The existence of the position of a government delegate in the Red Cross, and what is more, the identity of this post and the post of the president of the Red Cross leads me to the conclusion that between 1939 and 1942, the Red Cross had been subject to restructuring on behalf of the Franco government. Although I have so far not been able to
find direct evidence, I assume that the Franco government also influenced the assignment of other important posts within the Red Cross.

Both the presidency of honour of Carmen Polo and Manuel Martinez' function as government delegate in the Spanish Red Cross clearly show the proximity of the Spanish Red Cross to the regime. If and to which extent this proximity is perpetuated throughout all levels of Red Cross members remains to be investigated.

The Spanish Red Cross journal itself, however, clearly supports the regime ideologically. From the issue of July 1942 onwards, the language of the Spanish Red Cross journal differs considerably from former issues. While the content of issues published before 1937, as I already mentioned above, was characterised by a general avoidance of political topics, let alone declarations of political opinions on behalf of the authors, from the issue of July 1942 onwards, the articles in the journal show open sympathy, loyalty and praise for the Franco government.

The armed conflict in which the Nationalist troops under Franco fought the Republican forces, for example, is called “el Glorioso Movimiento Nacional” (the Glorious National Movement, my translation). (Spanish Red Cross journal 07/1942: 13) This expression, typical for the regime's political propaganda discourse, clearly shows a distortion of the Civil War and a glorification of the acts of the rebellious army. The use of this phrase also implies a heroic view on the members of the Nationalist troops, especially of Franco himself. This is illustrated in an assertion of the president of the Spanish Red Cross, Manuel Martinez de Tena: In an article in the journal he writes that the duty of the Spanish Red Cross is to “[...] take part in achieving the unlimited destiny that has been opened again for Spain through the triumphant sword of our Caudillo Franco.” (Spanish Red Cross journal 07/1942: 6, my translation) The heroic language (“triumphant sword”) and praise of the dictator as the one to bring Spain to a better destiny is evident here.

The Red Cross Journal of July 1942 (and also many of the subsequent issues) also provides a section that describes historical events that took place in the month of publication but in former years. In the article, the Spanish Civil War is called a “crusade” (Spanish Red Cross journal 07/1942: 13, my translation) that has been carried out by Franco and his troops. It is obvious that this section was used in this case to propagate the Nationalist view on the Civil War and to spread propaganda.
By calling the Spanish Civil War a *crusade*, the Red Cross journal also draws attention to Christianity as a moral value. As I have explained in former chapters, during Franco’s dictatorship in Spain, belonging to the nation was constructed on the base of religion and nationality was strongly tied to Catholicism. (Maite Ojeda 2009: 182)

In May 1936, the Spanish Red Cross was portrayed as neutral in religious terms: "*The Red Cross doesn't know about parties and religious beliefs.*" (Spanish Red Cross journal 05/1936: 228) In 1942, in contrast, the organisation is described in an article as an "*exceedingly Christian and Spanish institution*" (Spanish Red Cross journal 07/1942: 7) This shift in the representation of the organisation on behalf of the journal shows that the Red Cross journal was used to spread national ideals and propaganda.

Another example of the penetration of the Spanish Red Cross by nationalist politics of the Franco government is the formation of nurses that was organised by the Red Cross in Spain. Apart from other requirements, prospective nurses had to accompany their application with a certificate of baptism and a certificate of good conduct issued by ecclesiastic authorities. (Spanish Red Cross journal 11/1944: 32)

The examples I have outlined in this chapter clearly indicate that the neutrality claimed by the Red Cross is, at least in the historical context of Franco’s dictatorship, an illusion. From 1942 onwards, the Red Cross journal fulfilled the function of a means of propaganda.

It is important to state, at this point, that I do not intend to create any kind of moral evaluation on the work of the Red Cross in this text. As an anthropologist, it is more interesting for me to analyse the mechanisms of power as well as underlying ideological discourses that led to the actors’ decisions.

In this sense, it is especially interesting for me that the proximity of the Red Cross to the Franco regime from 1942 onwards has so far not been picked up as a central topic in any way in scientific publications, and even more importantly, by the Spanish Red Cross itself.

On its web page, the Spanish Red Cross presents a section dedicated to the history of the organisation in Spain. In the first two paragraphs of the section, basic information about the foundation and organisation of the NGO is mentioned. Here, the organisation also admits a certain interrelation with Spanish governments: “*Since then [1864, note from the*
author], the different governments of the nation have been represented in one form or another in the heart[6, note from the author] of the organisation, although this has not prevented it to act according to the principles that inspire the Institution.” (URL11, 10.1.2013, my translation) This phrase can be interpreted as a sign of consciousness on behalf of the Spanish Red Cross about the problematic concept of impartiality, although here it is seen merely as a theoretical problem.

In the fourth paragraph, reference is made to the Spanish Civil War:

“Durante la guerra civil de 1936 a 1939 realizó una importante actividad y, finalizada ésta, lleva a cabo la repatriación de los españoles que se encontraban en la URSS.” (URL11, 13.1.2013)

This part of the text is interesting, in the first place, in terms of quantity. It is the shortest paragraph of the text, consisting of only one sentence containing 30 words. In comparison, the average number of words in all ten paragraphs would be 63.9 words, while the longest paragraph consists of 130 words.

Secondly, the content of the paragraph is held extremely general. The organisation only declares to have carried out an “important activity” (URL11, 13.1.2013, my translation), without mentioning any concrete details or examples. After this declaration, that takes about half the sentence, the author of the text immediately goes on to describe the organisation's task after the Civil War (the repatriation of Spanish citizens). It is remarkable, that even within this one sentence, the first part, that actually deals with the work of the Spanish Red Cross during the Civil War, is held more general than the second part, that addresses its activities after the war.

Here, the Spanish Red Cross actively engages in creating a kind of representation that minimizes the importance of the NGO's activities during the period of the Civil War as compared to those in other historical periods.

In this context, it is also interesting to mention that the archive of the Spanish Red Cross in Madrid does not grant access to documents from the time of the Franco regime. When I first contacted the archivist in charge, I received the response that the documents of the

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6 In the Spanish original text, the word used is “seno”, which means breast or womb.
7 English translation: “During the Civil War from 1936 to 1939, it [the Spanish Red Cross, note by the author] performed an important action, and, once finalized, conducts the repatriation of Spaniards who resided in USSR.” (URL11, 13.1.2013, my translation)
archive are protected by two laws, namely the “law for Spanish historical patrimony” and the “law for the protection of personal data”. (E-mail by archivist, received on 23.11.2011, my translation) Although I repeatedly declared that I was not interested in documents containing personal data, but rather in documents referring to communication between the Spanish Red Cross and the Franco government, the archivist insisted on the named regulations and denied me the access to any documents. As I later was informed by my tutor at the Universitat Autònoma de Barcelona, other archives (including national institutions) containing documents with similar kinds of personal data from the same period, such as the Centro Documental de la Memoria Histórica in Salamanca, do grant access to these documents to researchers. In fact, article 57 of the “law for Spanish historical patrimony” does restrict access to documents containing personal information for 25 years after the date of death of the person concerned. In case the death of the affected is not known, the period of time the document is protected is 50 years from the date the document was created. (Ley de 25 de junio 1985 del Patrimonio Histórico Español, Boletín Oficial del Estado, 29/06/1985). In the case of my investigation, I should have been granted access to all documents created prior to 1960.

5.2. State politics and the role of NGOs

From what I have explained in previous chapters, it has become clear that the JDC and the Red Cross were involved not only in the evacuation of Jewish refugees from Europe through Spain and Portugal. Instead, they offered the same assistance to those Jews that had lived in Spain for many years or to Sephardim who had managed to get to Spain and would have been able to claim citizenship on a legal basis. I will begin this chapter by addressing an important question that intrigued me throughout my investigation: Did these refugees, that in fact were expelled from Spain, really “disappear” in the much bigger group of European refugees, so that their nationality wasn't noticed by the involved parties? Or did members of these organisations' staff actually notice?

During the investigation for this thesis, it was not possible for me to fully answer this question in the case of the Spanish Red Cross, since I was not provided full access to the
Red Cross archives. However, I have been able to gather important information on this issue considering the JDC, which I will present in the following.

In the fourth chapter I discussed the change of attitude of the Spanish government towards the JDC and other American humanitarian organisations in 1943, when some of these organisations were finally allowed to open official representative offices in the country. As I mentioned, this can be partly explained by Franco’s need to improve his relation with the Allied Powers. As I will show, nevertheless, the regime also made use of the work of these organisations as a means of hidden deportation of Spanish Jews and Sephardim. Whether this possibility had already been calculated by Franco at the time when he decided to allow the organisations’ presence in Spain remains unclear.

Spain's restrictive immigration policy during World War II has been discussed by a variety of authors, among them Bauer (1981), Avni (1982), Rother (2001) and Ojeda (2009). Therefore, I will not explain the issue in great detail. What is important, however, to the point I want to make in this chapter, is that Spain rarely issued permanent visas to refugees during World War II. But the receipt of a transit visa was also tied to conditions:

“Jewish refugees had to obtain transit visas through Portugal in order to obtain transit visas through Spain, which meant that they had to acquire visas to some final destination first.” (Bauer 1981: 45)

As I have described in the last chapter, the Joint, together with other organisations, organised transport out of Europe for many of the refugees, but it seems that the JDC also financially supported the refugees from their arrival in Portugal or Spain until their departure by ship. Bauer mentions that already in 1940, “[...] there were 1,500 refugees (out of a total of 8,000 in Portugal) supported by d'Esaguy's [the head of a refugee committee in Portugal; note from the author] committee with JDC funds [...]” (Bauer 1981: 47) Nonetheless, the financial aid of the refugees seems to have been, at least during a certain period of time, rather insufficient. In fact, Bauer mentions that at one point it was even cut down “below subsistence level” (Bauer 1981: 47)

But it was not only Spain, whose immigration policy was restrictive during World War II. In 1940, some members of the U.S. Government supported an attitude of hostility towards
Jewish immigrants, which resulted in a drastic reduction of visas issued to refugees of the war as compared to the late 1930s. (Bauer 1981:50f) This visa policy on behalf of the United States did of course complicate the JDC's task of evacuating Jewish refugees from Spain and Portugal. In addition, it shows that the U.S. was itself not prepared to accept an increased amount of refugees on its territory.

Several incidents that took place in the 1940s show that the Portuguese and above all the Spanish government more or less successfully tried to transfer the responsibility for the refugees to the NGOs.

As early as 1940, the Portuguese Police tried to persuade the JDC to take full responsibility of a group of Luxembourgian Jews in order to grant them Portuguese visas. This group was threatened with deportation after the German occupation of their country in 1940 and Albert Nussbaum, the representative of the community, tried to find a country that would grant asylum to the group. When negotiations were initiated with the Portuguese police about the issue, “[…] JDC was induced to offer a guarantee that they [the refugees, note by the author] would be supported in Portugal […].” (Bauer 1981: 54) The Portuguese government was highly concerned about the entry of refugees that could become a “burden” to the state. (Bauer 1981: 54)

The JDC refused, in this case, to offer such a guarantee. (Bauer 1981: 54) It is not clear if the reasons for this refusal were a lack of available funds or considerations about the role of the JDC in relation to the state, or a combination of both. Through negotiations with other governments, it was possible for a great part of the Luxembourgian Jews to migrate to other countries. Some of them, however, did not find a possibility for emigration. (Bauer 1981: 54f) In this context, Bauer allows himself a short reflection on the importance of funds for the fate of numerous Jews during World War II: “JDC did not have enough funds in 1940-41 to pay the $200,000 for transportation and the $25,000 monthly needed for the 2,000 Luxemburg (sic!) Jews. Had it had them, would more Jews of that small community been saved? Quite possibly.” (Bauer 1981: 55) It is interesting how it is not the refusal of granting asylum to the refugees on behalf of neutral countries but the lack of funds of the relief organisation that Bauer finds disturbing and worth mentioning. The refusal to issue visas is somehow taken for granted, while the availability of funds is seen as the variable that could have made the scale incline in favour of the Jewish populations.
But the JDC was not only asked to take over the responsibility of European Jews. As I have already explained earlier, the Spanish government did not allow Sephardim that wanted to repatriate to Spain to remain in the country. As Ojeda explains, it was very important to the Spanish government to make sure that those Sephardic Jews that were allowed to enter the country would leave soon. (Ojeda Mata 2009: 259)

In 1943, the Spanish government proposed to the Spanish branch of the *American Relief Organisations (ARO)* a joint board of American humanitarian organisations of which the JDC was a member, that it would grant an “*imaginary Spanish citizenship*” (Ojeda Mata 2009: 259, my translation) to those Sephardim who wanted to come to Spain, if the organisation, in turn, would care for them once they arrived in Spain and also ensure their migration to third countries. The regime therefore offered a “false” or temporary citizenship to Sephardic Jews, who could have claimed Spanish citizenship on the legal basis of the “Real Decreto” of 1924, a law that ensured Spanish citizenship to those Sephardim who claimed it. In this way, the regime tried to hide the fact that this group of Jewish refugees “*were legally Spanish citizens*”. (Ojeda Mata 2009: 259)

The Spanish foreign minister wanted the JDC and other Jewish organisations to finance the Sephardic Jews’ stay in Spain and assure their immediate departure to other countries that would grant them asylum. (Avni 1982:188) It was in the course of these events that members of the JDC noticed that this group of “stateless” Jews were not European refugees but Spanish citizens. Blickenstaff, who found out about this situation, declared his opposition and refused to organise their “evacuation” out of the country. (Rohr 2006: 238, cited in: Ojeda Mata 2009: 267) In reaction to Blickenstaff’s refusal to attend to the Spanish Jews, the foreign ministry repeated its demands to Baraibar, the go-between of the ministry and the JDC, in August 1943. Additionally, as further groups of Sephardim entered Spain, “[...] the foreign minister required to be kept informed.” (Ojeda Mata 2009: 268, my translation)

The Spanish government went so far as to threaten to refuse the entry to its own citizens (!) in case the Joint would not cooperate in the terms the government wished it to. (Bauer 1981: 212; Ojeda Mata 2009: 268) Furthermore, the foreign ministry demanded “[...] a written commitment from Blickenstaff that they [the Joint; note from the author] would cover all expenses of these refugees, both in relation to their stay in Spain and their
evacuation, and that they would arrange for the visas for the countries of destiny.” (Ojeda Mata 2009: 268, my translation) The government repeated its threat to not allow the entry of further Sephardic Jews, if the Joint wouldn’t assure the exit of those already in the country. The foreign minister corroborated his threat mentioning the imminent deportation of a group of Sephardim from Salonica that could only be averted by their repatriation to Spain. (Ojeda Mata 2009: 268f)

In spite of Blickenstaff's obvious discomfort with the situation, the Joint seems to have decided that under the existing conditions, it would be best to agree to the Spanish government's conditions in order to be able to save the life of those Jews that still found themselves in German occupied territories. In a letter written by Paul Baerwald, chairman of the JDC at that time, to John Pehle from the War Refugee Board in Washington, D.C., in February 1944, Baerwald also explains the JDC's view on how to approach the situation of refugees in Spain. It is not known if Baerwald himself knew about the expelled Sephardim in Spain. The “care and maintenance of refugees in neutral countries” (Archives JDC NY, Item ID 446994, 1944) was considered by Baerwald as one of the JDC's priority tasks at the time:

“The JDC has regarded this task as one to which it should devote a considerable part of its attention and means. [...] By helping to maintain the refugees in these countries, and by trying to emigrate them to such countries as will give temporary or permanent refuge to these people, undoubtedly a more favorable (sic!) attitude can be secured from the governments and people of those countries toward the admission of additional refugees.” (Archives JDC NY, Item ID 446994, 1944)

Although the JDC decided to evacuate the Sephardic Jews together with other refugees, Blickenstaff repeatedly resisted to adapt to the terminology used by the Spanish government to conceal the Spanish nationality of the emigrants. As Ojeda explains, the Joint elaborated lists of emigrants which were then passed on to the Spanish Red Cross in order to obtain the exit permits for the refugees. When the list of the first Sephardim to be “evacuated” was passed on to the Red Cross, Blickenstaff had specified on top of the list that the persons named on the list were Spanish. “However, the foreign ministry, in its application for exit permits to the General Direction of Security for this group of refugees, referred to them as 'stateless':” (Ojeda Mata 2009:270) In another case, a similar practise
can be observed. Again, Blickenstaff titled the list using the description “Spanish”, whereas in a subsequent document, “Spanish” had been substituted by the classification “Sephardic”. Ojeda explains that “[f]rom that moment on, this would be the formula of classification that would be repeated and that was also adopted by the Red Cross.” (Ojeda Mata 2009: 270, my translation)

This episode shows that although the JDC saw the necessity to agree to the conditions the Spanish authorities imposed on its work, Blickenstaff used the scope of action available to the organisation to refuse to adopt the government's policy of hiding the practice of expulsion of Sephardic Jews.

The Spanish government wanted to expel the Jewish population resident in Spain without catching the attention of the international community, above all that of the Allied Powers. Franco was clearly interested in building and maintaining the regime's image as one that saved as many Jewish refugees as possible. The expulsion of Sephardim had to remain hidden. Therefore, apart from declaring them “stateless” and forcing NGOs such as the Joint to evacuate them together with European refugees, the government wanted to assure that the Sephardim themselves would not talk about their situation. (Ojeda Mata 2009: 269) Ojeda located documents that show that in December 1943, Doussinage from the Spanish foreign ministry sent a telegram to the head office of security, giving instructions to threaten a group of Sephardic emigrants in a similar way as the ministry had done with Blickenstaff only a few months earlier:

“En el momento de embarcar en Málaga [el] grupo [de] sefarditas […] conviene que Policía les haga saber que de su conducta una vez salida de España depende que Gobierno español siga gestionando con autoridades alemanas salida de campos de concentración de otros sefarditas internados y venida a España de los demás no internados todavía así como gestiones para que estos que se hallan libres no sean conducidos a campos de concentración.” (AMAE, R 1716-4, 1943, cited in: Ojeda Mata 2009: 269f)

In the telegram, the police was given instructions to tell the refugees that it depended “on their attitude once outside of Spain” (AMAE, R 1716-4, 1943, cited in: Ojeda Mata 2009: 269f, my translation) if the government would negotiate further entries of Sephardic Jews in the country.
Another example of the Spanish obliging Sephardim to lie about the reasons for emigrating is the case of the Ezratty family. This family was repatriated from Salonica to Spain and in the following had to leave Spain on one of the ships that travelled from Cádiz to Palestine. On a form they had to fill out to get a permit to get access to the port, the family had to specify the reason for their emigration from Spain. According to Ojeda, they were forced to indicate personal motives on the form as the reason for leaving Spain, although it was actually the government that had refused their demand to stay in the country. (Ojeda Mata 2009: 270f)

These acts of threatening both the JDC and the emigrants can be clearly described as acts of extortion.

In order to be able to evacuate a greater number of Jews from Spain, a camp was established in 1943 in Fedala, near Casablanca in Morocco, where a large number of Sephardim was brought from Spain in 1944. (Avni 1982:117f). The Joint provided financial support to the transport of this group of Jews from Spain to the camp (Bauer 1981: 212). Some of them probably did embark on one of the ships going from the Iberian peninsula to North Africa that I mentioned earlier. As Ojeda explains, “[t]he Spanish Sephardim were also embarked in direction to Palestine. Exceptionally, they were allowed to depart towards some American country like Mexico, and always in individual cases.” (Ojeda Mata 2009:270, my translation).

An interesting topic in this context is also the granting of Palestine Certificates to refugees as well as expelled Sephardim. The Israeli state only formed in 1948, and during the period of the expulsions of Sephardic Jews during World War II, Palestine was still under British mandate. During this time, the British limited the number of Jewish settlers that were allowed to immigrate to Palestine. (Bauer 1981: 129; URL 5, 15.1.2013) The Jewish Agency (JA), a Zionist organisation, was in charge of giving Palestine Certificates to Jews willing to migrate to this country. According to Bauer, the collaboration between this organisation and the Joint was “especially close and cordial”. (Bauer 1981: 212ff) Already in 1942, the possibility of sending a JA representative to work in Lisbon to facilitate refugees’ immigration to Palestine was discussed. But due to administrative difficulties on behalf of JA, this plan was delayed until spring 1943, when Wilfrid B. Israel took over the task until the end of May of the same year (Bauer 1981: 212, 214). Before his decision to
grant certificates to 200 Jewish refugees in Spain could be transformed into action, he was killed in an attack on a plane that was supposed to carry him to England. In October 1943, Peretz Lichtenstein took over Israel's position in Lisbon. As Bauer mentions, Lichtenstein directly worked with HICEM rather than with the JDC in the process of selecting refugees to immigrate to Palestine. Nevertheless, Lichtenstein and the two organisations did collaborate in order to organise the transport to Haifa for the refugees that had been granted Palestine Certificates. Examples of such collaboration are the organisation of the transports of Jews on the ships Nyassa and Guinee Portugal during the year 1944, that I have already mentioned earlier. (Bauer 1981: 214)

The Jewish Agency, as a Zionist movement, benefited from the immigration of Sephardic Jews in the sense of a numeric support to the Jewish settlers already residing in Palestine. In a time when, due to the mass movements of Jewish refugees and restrictive immigration politics of many countries, it was difficult to get visas for the immigration out of Europe, the Spanish government, on the other hand, used this collaboration to drive the Sephardim out of Spain.

Apart from these operations in the Iberian Peninsula, the JDC (unofficially) engaged in the funding of illegal immigration from Eastern Europe to Palestine. According to the organisation's website, it did so through the so-called Bricha escape network. (URL5, 13.1.2013) In addition, the Joint also funded illegal border crossings into Spain, that were organised by Jewish associations like the Armée juive and the Fédération des sociétés juives. Nevertheless, different attitudes seem to have existed among different members of the JDC regarding the support of such illegal operations. During the war the JDC never officially supported the border crossings. Bauer mentions several statements that show that members of the Joint received instructions from the JDC headquarters in Lisbon to not finance these illegal operations. While Sequerra, for example, refused to fund such projects, Schwartz seems to have permitted this funding, although never officially. Schwartz left the task of dealing with the groups organising the border crossings to a man called Jefroykin. (Bauer 1981: 256f)

As Bauer explains, in this case “[...] JDC pursued a double policy. It could not afford to be caught organizing a smuggling operation and remain a respectable, legal American body in Spain, Portugal, and Switzerland. On the other hand, Schwartz seems to have been determined not to allow anything to tie Jefroykin's hands.” (Bauer 1981: 256) It seems that
Schwartz tried to save the lives of as many Jewish refugees as possible while at the same time trying to maintain the image of satisfying the expectations and conditions of both the states the JDC operated in and the Joint's headquarters in the United States. (Bauer 1981:256f)

Although it is not known if there were Sephardic Jews among the refugees that crossed the Spanish border illegally, I have included this aspect of the JDC's work during World War II in my thesis because it shows that within its possibilities, the members of the Joint did act independently from the Spanish government's orders. In this particular case, they even acted against the official position of the organisation. The question of independence, in this case, was a political issue. The organisation had to respect the conditions of the Spanish government in order to be able to save Jewish lives. In some cases, however, and always unofficially, members of the Joint ignored the regulations imposed by the government in order to achieve their goals. The use of the term independence in the context of the JDC's work in Spain during World War II therefore has to be questioned. Rather than working independently, the Joint had to orientate itself among the different players in the existing field of power. It had to measure the possibilities to achieve their goals and weigh them against the demands of governments and other agents. In this sense, the JDC can be described itself as a player in the field of power. On the other hand, the Joint was used by the Spanish government as an instrument to expel part of the Jewish population residing in Spain.

In 2009, Pilar Vera published an article in the Spanish newspaper “Diario de Cádiz” about the transportation of Spanish Jews from Cádiz to Haifa. For this article, she interviewed Mauricio Palomo (later Moshe Yanai), who was a child when he was expelled from Spain and, together with his parents, boarded the ship Nyassa, that brought them to Palestine. (Vera 2009: 12)

Mauricio's father, Josef Palomo, was Sephardic with turkish origins and had lived in Barcelona for several decades before the expulsion. Vera mentions that he worked as a vendor in the Catalan city. (Vera 2009: 12) This information leads me to the assumption that he could have worked in the surroundings of the market of San Antonio and belonged to the Jewish community Agudad Ahim, since he shares all the characteristics of the members of this community.
In 1940, Josef Palomo and Alberto Adjiman, Mauricio's uncle) were arrested by the Spanish authorities and detained in the concentration camp *Miranda del Ebro*, in the north of Spain. According to Mauricio, the reason for this detention was unknown even to the detained themselves. (Vera 2009: 12f)

In January 1944, together with Jewish refugees from Central Europe, Mauricio and his mother were brought from Barcelona to Cádiz by train, where they reunited with Mauricio's father and uncle, who had been brought there by the Spanish authorities. In Cádiz, they boarded the Nyassa on 26th of January. (Vera 2009: 12f) Both Rother and Avni confirm the existence of this transport of Jewish refugees and expelled Sephardim from Cádiz to Haifa. According to these authors, around 550 passengers boarded the Nyassa in Cádiz. (Avni 1982: 113, Rother 2001: 129) According to Rother, 50 of them were Sephardic Jews resident in Spain until their expulsion (Rother 2001: 129).

In a list containing the names of the detainees of different Spanish concentration camps who were transported to Cádiz, that the General Director of Security in Madrid sent to the Civil Governor of Cádiz, Josef Palomo and Alberto Adjiman were denominated as stateless. (Vera 2009: 12) Vera mentions that one day after the Nyassa's arrival in Palestine, the Spanish authorities sent several telegrams to the provincial authorities in Cádiz, prohibiting the entry to Spanish national territory to several of the expelled Jews, including Josef Palomo. (Vera 2009: 13)

The case of the Palomo- Adjiman family is only one example for the expulsion of Sephardim who had resided in Spain for years. It shows that this group of Spanish Jews did not voluntarily migrate from Spain “[...] in order to escape the discrimination against Jews in Catholic Spain [...]” (Rother 2001: 129), as Rother suggests, but that they were declared stateless and forced to leave Spanish national territory.
5.3. Expelled Sephardim and the archives

In the first chapter, I have already explained the implications of the insights from historical anthropology for my approach to the topic of my research. In this chapter I want to pick up this thread and explain the impact of dominant forms of historiography on the groups of Sephardim that were expelled from Spain by the Franco regime.

As I have already mentioned in the first chapter, historical knowledge, according to Sahlins, depends on culture (Sahlins 1985: vii). What follows is that historical events are not discovered but produced in a social, cultural and political context.

This conclusion may seem quite provocative at first sight, since history is, as Trouillot explains, considered by the European and North American public as being consistent of fixed events in the past (or historical facts). According to this view, historical knowledge is built by discovering the truth about events in the past. (Trouillot 1995: 5) This notion of history has its roots in what Trouillot calls the “storage model of memory-history”. (Trouillot 1995: 14)

“The model itself is well known: history is to a collectivity as remembrance is to an individual, the more or less conscious retrieval of past experiences stored in memory.” (Ibid.)

As Trouillot explains quite extensively, this notion of memory as storage of important events that can be recalled at will is an antiquated model that has been criticised by scientists of different academic background. The author concludes that since memory itself is constructed, the notion of a fixed past that can be discovered by historians (and others) is no longer accurate. (Trouillot 1995: 14f)

If we accept this insight, the main question to be addressed by anthropologists is then the question of the ways in which historical knowledge is produced, and to determine if and how power influences this process.

In his analysis of the production of historical knowledge regarding the revolution of slaves in Haiti in 1790, Trouillot engages in uncovering powerful structures, inherent in “Western”
Historiography, that operate in this process. According to the author, historiography in our society is based on *Mentions* and *Silences*. (Trouillot 1995: 48) The principle is easy to understand: In recounting any specific event, the narrator will talk about certain important aspects that he or she will explain in more or less detail, while other events, which are not considered important to the narrative, remain untold. However, the ways in which such silences enter historiography, are not so obvious and often difficult to uncover.

The production of silences may seem “natural” because it is inherent in any form of narrative. Nevertheless, it is important to state that it is not a passive process:

“By silence, I mean an active and transitive process; one silences a fact or an individual as a silencer silences a gun. One engages in the practise of silencing. *Mentions and silences are thus active, dialectical counterparts of which history is the synthesis.*” (Trouillot 1995: 48)

The perception of this production of silences as passive and “natural” may indeed be a result of the unmarked position of historians themselves. Due to a perception of science as being based on “facts” (an assumption that draws from an imitation of the natural sciences), historians and other social scientists who consciously position themselves in relation to their topic of investigation are very often dismissed as being influenced by ideology. As a consequence, “[...] the historian’s position is officially unmarked: it is that of the nonhistorical observer.” (Trouillot 1995: 151)

In his analysis, Trouillot describes the critical moments, in which the production of historical knowledge can be influenced by the production of silences:

“Silences enter the process of historical production at four crucial moments: the moment of fact creation (the making of sources); the moment of fact assembly (the making of archives); the moment of fact retrieval (the making of narratives); and the moment of retrospective significance (the making of history in the final instance).” (Trouillot 1995: 26)

The first moment in the production of historical knowledge is the “joint creation of facts and sources” (Trouillot 1995: 29). I will build on one of the author’s examples to explain this
process: Let us imagine a football game which is transmitted over the radio. The sports commentator will inform the audience in detail about the ongoing game, but even the most detailed description of the game will never be a complete description of the situation. Commentators will, for example, not bother the audience with information that is of no importance to the game. The same is also true for sources of the kind that can be found in archives, such as business accounts, population censuses, or private or official correspondence. (Trouillot 1995: 50f) Events become facts because they are meaningful in some sense, and meaning is not natural, but created. (Trouillot 1995: 29) I have already mentioned in the first chapter that Sahlins explains that this selection of some facts (as being relevant) and the omittance of others (as being irrelevant) represents a (cultural) interpretation. (Sahlins 1985: xiv)

As Trouillot observes rightfully, these silences are often not the result of ideological influences, but they are inherent in the process of historiography:

“(…) whatever becomes a fact does so with its own inborn absences, specific to its production. In other words, the very mechanisms that make any historical recording possible also ensure that historical facts are not created equal.” (Trouillot 1995: 49)

At the same time, it would be superficial to argue that the most powerful parties in any event will always be represented most strongly in historical narratives, since “(…) the outcome [of any event] does not determine in any linear way how an event or a series of events enters into history.” (Trouillot 1995: 47) Over time, power distributions can change and events that happened in the past can be re-interpreted. Furthermore, the quantity of created sources doesn't always reflect the distribution of power at the time of the event (Trouillot 1995: 47f).

The second moment of knowledge production in history, the making of archives, is no less subjective to the creation of Mentions and Silences than the creation of facts. The creation of archives and, more importantly, the collecting of sources and their placement in the archive, like the creation of facts, is an active engagement in the production of history. As Trouillot explains, the collection of documents in the archive “(…) is an active act of production that prepares facts for historical intelligibility.” (Trouillot 1995: 52)
In “The Past as a Scarce Resource” (1981), Appadurai identifies four “formal constraints” that set limits to what can be regarded as history in any given culture. One of these constraints proposed by the anthropologist is “Authority: this dimension involves some cultural consensus as to the kinds of source, origin or guarantor of 'pasts' which are required for their of credibility.” (Appadurai 1981: 203) In today's dominant form of historiography, the archive is an institution that undoubtedly conveys the kind of authority Appadurai refers to. Since the archive conveys authority to its sources, it also has “[...] the power to define what is and what is not a serious object of research and, therefore, of mention.” (Trouillot 1995: 99)

Therefore, in the next step in the production of historical knowledge (the making of narratives), researchers are subjected to powerful influences by the archive. This process consists of selecting facts available at the archive and their putting together to form stories, or narratives.

Finally, in the last moment of the production of history, retrospective significance is granted to the events described in the historical narrative. (Trouillot 1995:58f)

In his analysis of narratives about the Haitian revolution, Trouillot recognises two different ways in which Silences are produced in history:

Firstly, Silences can be produced by erasure. In this case, facts may be denied entirely or they may be portrayed to have less importance. As mentioned by the author, this strategy is used in many cases of argumentation that aim at questioning the importance of the Holocaust. (Trouillot 1995: 96f)

Secondly, Silences may be produced by trivialization: “[...] other narratives sweeten the horror or banalize the uniqueness of a situation by focusing on details [...].” (Trouillot 1995: 97) An example for this kind of Silencing in the context of slavery may be the argumentation that some slaves in the United States faced better living conditions than workers in Britain. (Ibid.)

As I have mentioned above, these structures of silencing do not necessarily depend on the political or ideological orientation of those involved in the historical production. Trouillot
concludes from his analysis that there are structural reasons for this kind of historiography. (Trouillot 1995: 106) Since historiography is dominated by “the West”, its narratives tend to silence facts that question this dominance. In his analysis of the Haitian Revolution, the author concludes that the revolution itself questioned the view of slaves as less human than their owners (a view that was generally accepted at the time) and thereby also questioned the position of dominance of “the West” over the rest of the world. Since such an alternative view could not be accepted, it was denied through strategies of erasure and trivialization. (Trouillot 1995: 106f)

I have found Trouillot's concept of Silencing as a powerful tool in historiography to be very useful for my own research. Firstly, it helps to explain the denial of the existence of an important Jewish population resident in Spain on behalf of the Franco regime. After the Reconquista, in the year 1492, the Catholic kings of Spain expelled all Jews unwilling to convert to Catholicism from Spanish territory. From then onwards, Jews were considered absent in Spanish territory. (Ojeda Mata 2009: 20) However, during the Second Republic (1931-1936), Jews and other religious minorities were granted some religious rights. (Ojeda Mata 2009: 186) In Barcelona, for example, the Jewish community had their own Synagogue in a central area of the city. (Berthelot 2001: 286f) After Francisco Franco took over after the Civil War, the presence of the Jewish population in Spain was again publicly denied and the religious rights formerly granted were taken from them. (Ojeda Mata 2009: 186, 188) This public denial was sustained even though evidences, like the destruction of the Synagogue by members of the Falange (Berthelot 2001: 504), show that the presence of Jews was not a secret to the regime. Similar to the case of Haiti, evidences were denied because this served a historiography that secured the dominant position of “the West” (in the case of Haiti) or of the Catholic majority (in Spain). Since the presence of Jews in Spain would show that the Catholic kings had not fully succeeded in expelling the Jewish population, it would have questioned the dominant position of the Catholic majority itself. Differently to the Haitian case, however, the course of the events in Spain (namely the decline of the fascists' power after Franco's death) resulted in a smaller success of the narrative than in the case of Haiti.

Secondly, the phenomenon has important implications for the presence of the group of expelled Sephardim in (Spanish) history itself. As I have already mentioned, the Sephardic Jews that returned to Spain as repatriates, were declared “stateless” by the Spanish
government. This designation was also used in official papers, such as lists of refugees, documents, etc. Since the same designation was also used for refugees from Central Europe that had lost their citizenship in the course of World War II, it is now difficult to distinguish these different groups of Jews. In some cases, it is only possible to speculate on the Spanish background of the “stateless” Jews on the base of their family name. This formal assimilation of the status of Spanish Jews to that of European refugees (Ojeda Mata 2009:267) is a strategy aimed at making this group disappear among other groups of Jews. By formally assimilating the Spanish Jews to European refugees, it was not only the Spanish origin of the Jewish immigrants, that was actively silenced by the Franco regime. It was, in fact, the very existence of this particular group of Jews that was silenced in the first moment of the production of historical knowledge, namely the production of facts.

It is very interesting to see, in this special case, how the production of historical facts can be subject to debate among different agents. I have already explained in this chapter the case of David Blickenstaff from the JDC, who protested against the “evacuation” of Spanish Jews. As I have mentioned, Blickenstaff denominated this group of immigrants as “Spanish” on a series of lists that he had to pass on to the government. The foreign ministry, in turn, replaced this term, first by “stateless” and later on using the term “Sephardic” (Ojeda Mata 2009:270). Although Blickenstaff somewhat resisted to use the terminology of the Franco regime, he could not change the dominant discourse imposed by the regime. By actively mentioning the Spanish nationality of this group of Jewish migrants, he did succeed, however, in preserving their visibility in some historical documents.

In the second moment of the production of history, the making of the archive, the non-existence of the expelled Sephardim was further consolidated. Since the expelled Jews are normally referred to in the documents as “stateless”, or their Spanish nationality was hidden using the term Sephardic (which does not always imply Spanish citizenship) this group is not represented as a category in the archive. Although this may also be the case for other groups, in the case of expelled Sephardic Jews it is part of a larger intent to hide their existence. Since this lack of knowledge about the identity of the expelled Jews is already present in the historical documents themselves, the same is true not only for Spanish national archives, but also for the archives of implicated NGOs.
This reproduction of the Silences about the existence of expelled Sephardim not only in Spanish archives, but also in archives run by “independent” NGOs confirms that it is not ideology that determines the ways in which an event enters history. The JDC and the International Committee of the Red Cross certainly did not have any active interest in arranging their archives in a way that suited the discourse of the Franco regime.

Authors such as Bauer (1981), Rother (2001) and Ojeda Mata (2009) later tried to recover histories of this group of Jews that contradict the dominant version of the Franco regime. Recently, even publications of the JDC recognise the “evacuation” of Spanish Jews from the Iberian peninsula (JDC New York 2012).

As I have shown, the archive and the data that is collected in the same are the outcome of a complicated process of interpretation. What Trouillot calls Mentions and Silences do also enter the production of history in the archive:

“[…] the making of archives involves a number of selective operations: selection of producers, selection of evidence, selection of themes, selection of procedures—which means, at best the differential ranking and, at worst, the exclusion of some producers, some evidence, some themes, some producers.” (Trouillot 1995: 53)

In this chapter, I have tried to describe some of the mechanisms that were (and still are, in many cases) used to hide the presence of Sephardic Jews in Spain during the dictatorship and their expulsion with the collaboration of different NGOs.

**Conclusion**

In this thesis I have put great emphasis on theoretical approaches and methodology from historical anthropology. As I explained in the first chapter, historical anthropology is not a mere collaboration of two disciplines, but a discipline that is based on critical reflection on history from an anthropological viewpoint and vice-versa. In the first chapter, I expressed my agreement with Axel when he proposes that “[…] what is at stake in historical
anthropology is explaining the production of a people, and the production of space and time.” (Axel 2002: 3)

In the context of my investigation, Trouillot's concept of Silences (Trouillot 1995: 26) proved to be especially fruitful. As I have explained in the fifth chapter, the Spanish authorities actively engaged in silencing the Spanish identity of Sephardim that were about to be expelled from Spanish national territory. The principal tool for the production of such silences in historical documents was the use of specific terminology. Spanish Jews were referred to as stateless or, later on, by the term Sephardic (Ojeda Mata 2009:270), instead of the term Spanish. Trouillot's concept also allows the inclusion of phenomena that do not follow the dominant historiography. When Blickenstaff from the JDC found out about the Spanish identity of some of the refugees his organisation was supposed to evacuate from Spain, his first reaction was to protest. As I have described in chapter five, the JDC finally decided to collaborate with the Spanish authorities due to strategic reasons, but, unlike the Spanish Red Cross, Blickenstaff did not follow the Spanish authorities in the production of Silences in this particular case. On the contrary, he actively mentioned the identity of this group of Jews in documents that have now become historical sources. (Ojeda Mata 2009: 270)

Blickenstaff's protest against the expulsion of Spanish Jews shows that at least some members of the JDC knew about the presence of expelled Jews among the European refugees the organisation assisted. Although the JDC did not approve this policy, they decided to collaborate with the Spanish authorities so that more Jewish refugees from Central Europe could be evacuated. As I have outlined in the fifth chapter, the JDC did, in other cases, act against explicit orders of the Spanish authorities. The (unofficial) funding of illegal border crossings may be mentioned as an example.

I therefore conclude that the JDC was, in some cases, instrumentalised by the Franco regime. The organisation did, in other cases, act according to its own interests.

The same can not be said of the Spanish Red Cross. At least parts of the organisation were reorganised by the Franco regime and important posts were assigned to people that showed a certain proximity to the regime. The Red Cross journal, that I used as a source for this thesis, was used by the regime as a means of political propaganda. As I have
shown, the organisation's ideal of impartiality has to be viewed critically from an anthropological viewpoint and could certainly not be maintained during the time of Franco's dictatorship. An analysis of contents found on the NGO's web page has shown that this proximity to the Franco regime as well as the existence of two different Red Cross societies in Spain during the Civil War is not mentioned by the organisation. Together with the denial of full access to the organisation's archives, these findings lead me to the conclusion that the Spanish Red Cross actively engages in hiding this part of the organisation's history.
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Archives JDC NY, Item ID 14554 (1941): Scene of refugees on the gang plank of the S.S. Mouzinho, sailing from Lisbon to New York. Photograph including description.

Archives JDC NY Item ID 14628 (1944): The S.S. Nyassa sailing from the port of Lisbon. There is a flag with the star of David sticking out of the steamer's window. Photograph including description.

Archives JDC NY, Item ID 175525 (1944): Two refugees in the train station. Photograph including description.

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The digitalised journal can be consulted at the Centro de Documentación of the Spanish Red Cross in Madrid, Spain
**Appendix**

**Archives JDC NY, Item 11081, 1944**

Title: The remaining worldly goods of refugees from Lisbon are stowed aboard the SS *Nyassa* en route to Haifa.

Description: SS *Nyassa* carried up to 700-800 passengers on many of the voyages. Usually, it plied between Lisbon, North Africa and the US, but it sailed to other lands, as well, when occasion warranted. In January 1944, the JDC arranged for a special run to carry some 800 Jewish refugees from Portugal and Spain to Palestine. For this voyage, the JDC paid 460,000, virtually the entire cost. (from JDC catalogue, subject matter, emigration).

Location: Haifa, Palestine

**Archives JDC NY, Item ID 14542**

Title: Aboard the S.S. *Nyassa*, a man and a woman look out towards ocean. The ship sailed for Palestine from Lisbon.

Description: The S.S. *Nyassa* carried up to 700-800 passengers on many of the voyages. Usually, it plied between Lisbon, North Africa and the US, but it sailed to other lands as well when occasion warranted. In Jan. 1944, the JDC arranged for a special run to carry some 800 Jewish refugees from Portugal and Spain to Palestine. For this voyage the JDC paid $460,000, virtually the entire cost...

Location: Lisbon, Portugal
Title: Farewell party held for a group of refugees leaving for Palestine aboard the S.S. Nyassa, Lisbon.

Description: The farewell party held for a group of refugees leaving for Palestine aboard the S.S. Nyassa, Lisbon. In the middle is Dr. Joseph Schwartz of the JDC talking to unidentified man. S.S. Nyassa carried up to 700-800 passengers on many of the voyages. Usually, it plied between Lisbon, North Africa and the US, but it sailed to other lands as well when occasion warranted. In Jan. 1944, the JDC arranged for a special run to carry some 800 Jewish refugees from Portugal and Spain to Palestine. For this voyage the JDC paid $460,000, virtually the entire cost...

Location: Lisbon, Portugal

Title: Scene of refugees on the gang plank of the S.S. Mouzinho, sailing from Lisbon to New York.

Description: Jewish refugees board the S.S. Mouzinho in the port of Lisbon. In September 1940, HICEM (the Jewish Overseas Emigration Association) began making plans to facilitate the immigration of Jewish children to the United States on special State Department visas. Though the program was designed to help children below the age of thirteen, children as old as sixteen were admitted if they were accompanying younger siblings. Relatives in the United States obtained American visas and subsidized the cost of the trip. The JDC facilitated and financed the emigration of children without American relatives. HICEM made arrangements for French exit visas, Spanish and
Portuguese transit visas, and reservations on ships out of Lisbon... The children were released from French internment camps, such as Gurs and Rivesaltes, and taken to OSE children's homes while awaiting emigration. However, both the French and American governments were slow in processing the visas and some children had to wait a full year before they received the necessary papers. The first convoy of 111 children left the Marseilles train station at the end of May 1941. They were accompanied by OSE workers Isaac and Masha Chomski, who coordinated the transport with the assistance of Morris Troper of the JDC as well as the American Friends Service Committee. The train stopped briefly at the Oloron train station, located outside the Gurs concentration camp, so that the children could say a final goodbye to their parents. The children had saved their morning food rations and presented it to their parents as a gift to the amazement of all the adults present. The brief reunion was traumatic for both the children and the parents, and the OSE decided to discontinue the practice on future convoys. From France, the children traveled to Portugal by way of Spain. In Lisbon, they boarded the S.S. Mouzinho which sailed on June 10, 1941. Two additional groups of children reached Lisbon in the late summer of 1941 and sailed aboard ships that left in September, one of which was the Serpa Pinto. In all, the three children's transports that left France for America rescued 311 children. (Information from USHMM)

Location: Lisbon, Portugal

Archives JDC NY Item ID 14628, 1944

Title: The S.S. Nyassa sailing from the port of Lisbon. There is a flag with the star of David sticking out of the steamer's window.

Description: The S.S. Nyassa carried up to 700-800 passengers on many of the voyages. Usually, it plied between Lisbon, North Africa and the US, but it
sailed to other lands as well when occasion warranted. In Jan. 1944, the JDC arranged for a special run to carry some 800 Jewish refugees from Portugal and Spain to Palestine. For this voyage the JDC paid $460,000, virtually the cost...

Location: Lisbon, Portugal

Archives JDC NY, Item ID 175525, 1944

Title: Two refugees in the train station.
Description: Two refugees talk to one another in the trainstation where they will travel from Barcelona to Cadiz, and then on ships to North Africa.
Location: Barcelona, Spain
Title: A group photo of the football team.
Description: Refugees part of a football team pose for a group photograph. They are waiting for transportation from Barcelona to Cadiz, where they will travel out of Europe to North Africa.
Location: Barcelona, Spain

Title: Young refugees sharing a meal in the Cadiz hotel, where they wait for further transportation.
Description: A group of young refugees eating a meal together in the Cadiz hotel where they wait for further transportation to North Africa.
Location: Cádiz, Spain
Title: Refugees gathering in the port of Cadiz to travel to North Africa.
Description: Refugees were transported from Barcelona to the port of Cadiz, where they will travel to North Africa.
Location: Cádiz, Spain
Title: The ship, Guine Portugal, which transported refugees from Cadiz to North Africa.

Description: The ship, Guine Portugal, which transported refugees from the port of Cadiz to North Africa. Most of the refugees managed to reach Barcelona, where they were then helped by JDC with immigration out of Europe.

Location: Cádiz, Spain
Title: Refugee children doing their Hebrew lesson homework outdoors.
Description: Refugee children doing their Hebrew lesson homework outdoors in the JDC Receiving Home in **Barcelona**. JDC and the American Friends Service Committee were allowed to provide aid to refugees after April 1943.
Location: Barcelona, Spain
Title: A nurse reading a story to young refugees.
Description: A nurse reading a story to young refugees living in the JDC Receiving Center, where they wait for immigration opportunities. The Franco government allowed JDC and the American Friends Service Committee to distribute aid in 1943.
Location: Barcelona, Spain
Abstract

This thesis addresses the role of two NGOs, namely the International Red Cross and the American Jewish Joint Distribution Committee in the expulsion of Sephardim from Spain during the period of Franco's dictatorship (1939-1975). In my investigation I focused on the different forms of instrumentalization of these organisations on behalf of the dictatorial regime in Spain and the NGOs' ways of dealing with their role in this process. Special attention is also given to the representation of expelled Sephardim in historical archives run by the named NGOs.

Both theoretically and methodologically, this thesis is rooted in historical anthropology. Research was conducted in different public and private historical archives and online on official web pages of the NGOs in question.


In meiner Forschung habe ich mich einerseits auf die Frage konzentriert, in welchen Formen und Ausprägungen die genannten Organisationen durch das diktatorische Regime instrumentalisiert wurden. Andererseits behandle ich die Sichtweise der Organisationen auf die eigene Rolle in diesem Prozess, sowie deren retrospektive Darstellung. Ein besonderer Fokus der Arbeit liegt weiters auf der Repräsentation der aus Spanien ausgewiesenen Sefarden in historischen Archiven.

Theoretisch und methodisch ist diese Arbeit in der Historischen Anthropologie angesiedelt. Zusätzlich zu transkribierten Interviews mit Zeitzeugen wurde Quellenmaterial aus verschiedenen öffentlichen und privaten Archiven verwendet.
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