Titel der Diplomarbeit

„(Irregular) Migration and Development - Policy Approaches in The Gambia and the Role of the EU and Member States“

Verfasserin

Hannah Schrems, B.A.

angestrebter akademischer Grad

Magistra (Mag.)

Wien, 2012

Studienkennzahl lt. Studienblatt: A 057 390

Studienrichtung lt. Studienblatt: Internationale Entwicklung

Betreuer: Univ.-Ass. Dr. Ilker Ataç
Acknowledgements

It would not have been possible to write this diploma thesis without the help and support of the kind people around me.

Above all, I would like to thank my friend and family Kebba for his support, motivating words, great patience and assistance at all times, especially during the field study and the examination of the interviews. Without him by my side I would have never been able to meet all my interview partners and gather that much information and data.

Second, I would like to thank my supervisor, Ilker Ataç, for his advice, his support, and his time and especially for his flexibility and encouragement and the fruitful discussions we had on some parts of the thesis.

I am very grateful to each and every one of my interview partners for spending their time on my research, for providing me with data, for sharing their thoughts with me and for the fruitful discussions and thoughts we were able to develop together.

Special thanks go to my mother, who always tried to find the right words for me and to listen to all my doubts and worries. She proofed incredible patience with me. I also want to thank my father who also tried to motivate me and give me strength, energy and the required calmness to continue. I love you both the same way.

Last, but by no means least, I thank my friends, fellow students, work colleagues and flat mates in Vienna/Austria and Frankfurt/Germany for their support, for their open ears and encouragement. I will always be grateful to all of you, you know who you are.

For any errors or inadequacies that may remain in this work, of course, the responsibility is entirely my own.

***************Danke, Merci, Gracias, Thank you, Hvala, Obrigada***************
# Table of Contents

1. Introduction ........................................................................................................ 2
  1.1 Research Interest............................................................................................. 3
    1.1.1 Research Questions .................................................................................. 4
    1.1.2 Hypotheses ................................................................................................ 5
    1.1.3 Structure of the Thesis ............................................................................. 5
  1.2 Research Methods ........................................................................................... 6
    1.2.1 Policy Papers, Secondary Literature and Media Reports ...................... 6
    1.2.2 Elements of Content and Discourse Analysis ........................................ 7
    1.2.3 Research in the Field - Interviews, Conversations and Observations ........................................ 7
    1.2.4 Coding and Categorizing .......................................................................... 9
  1.3 Working Definitions, Terms and Concepts ................................................... 9
    1.3.1 Development .............................................................................................. 9
    1.3.2 Migration/Migrants .................................................................................. 11
      1.3.2.1 Short-term, temporary, circular, seasonal migration vs. long-term, permanent migration .................................................. 12
      1.3.2.2 Internal Migration vs. International Migration .................................................. 12
      1.3.2.3 The Purpose of Migration ............................................................................... 13
      1.3.2.4 Voluntary vs. Forced Migration ....................................................................... 13
      1.3.2.5 Dimension of the Actor ................................................................................... 14
      1.3.2.6 Low-skilled, Highly-skilled, Skilled Migration .................................................. 14
      1.3.2.7 Regular vs. Irregular Migration ....................................................................... 15
        1.3.2.7.1 Characteristics of Irregular Migrants ........................................................ 16
        1.3.2.7.2 Reasons for Irregular Migration Flows ..................................................... 16
  2. Theoretical Approaches ................................................................................... 17
    2.1 Historic overview of different academic paradigms on migration and development ........................................................................................................................................... 17
    2.2 Current Issues and Debates in/on Migration Development Nexus ............ 20
      2.2.1 Reduction of Emigration through Economic Development ............... 20
      2.2.2 Development Through Migration? ........................................................ 21
2.2.3 Policy Approaches for a Fruitful Migration Development Nexus

2.2.3.1 Emigration Countries

2.2.3.2 Immigration Countries

2.2.3.3 Both Countries

2.3 The External Dimension of European Migration Policy

2.4 Characteristics of External Governance

2.4.1 Different Forms of Governance

2.4.2 Institutionalist vs. Power-based

2.4.3 Approaches in the Externalization Policy

3. The EU Cooperation with Third Countries

3.1 Control and Security-led Approach in the Cooperation with Third Countries

3.2 Between Preventive Approaches and Security-led Interests

3.3 The role of intergovernmental organizations in migration management in cooperation with third countries

3.3.1 ICMPD

3.3.2 IOM

3.3.3 Frontex

3.4 Frameworks of Cooperation with African countries

3.4.1 The COTONOU Agreement

3.4.2 The EU’s Global Approach on Migration

3.4.3 Bilateral and Multilateral Agreements on Migration with Third Countries

3.5 National Policies

3.5.1 Spanish Migration Policy
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Acronyms</th>
<th>Full Form</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>AECID</td>
<td>Agencia Española de Cooperación Internacional para el Desarrollo</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>APRC</td>
<td>Alliance for Patriotic Reorientation and Construction</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AVRR</td>
<td>Assisted Voluntary Return and Reintegration</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CSP</td>
<td>Country Strategy Paper</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DOSTIE</td>
<td>Department of State for Trade, Industry and Employment</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DOYS</td>
<td>Department of Youth and Sports</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EC</td>
<td>European Commission</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EOWAS</td>
<td>Economic Community of West African States</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EDF</td>
<td>European Development Fund</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FAO</td>
<td>Food and Agriculture Organization</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FIIAAP</td>
<td>Fundación Internacional y para Iberoamérica de Administración y Políticas Públicas</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GAMJOBS</td>
<td>The Gambia Priority Employment Programme</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GBOS</td>
<td>Gambia Bureau of Statistics</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HLGW</td>
<td>High-level Working Group</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IBM</td>
<td>Integrated Border Management</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IBRD</td>
<td>The International Bank for Reconstruction and Development</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ICMPD</td>
<td>International Centre for Migration Policy Development</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IOM</td>
<td>International Organization for Migration</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LGA</td>
<td>Local Government Area</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MAEC</td>
<td>Ministerio de Asuntos Exteriores y de Cooperación</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MDG</td>
<td>Millennium Development Goal</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MIEUX</td>
<td>Migration European Union Expertise</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MOTIE</td>
<td>Ministry of Trade, Regional Integration and Employment</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MOU</td>
<td>Memorandum of Understanding</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MOYS</td>
<td>Ministry of Youth and Sports</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NEPAD</td>
<td>The New Partnership for Africa’s Development</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NIA</td>
<td>National Intelligence Agency</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Acronym</td>
<td>Full Form</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>---------</td>
<td>-----------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NGOs</td>
<td>Non-Governmental Organizations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NYC</td>
<td>National Youth Council</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NEDI</td>
<td>National Enterprise Development Initiative</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NYSS</td>
<td>National Youth Service Scheme</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ODA</td>
<td>Official Development Assistance</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ONBE</td>
<td>Operation No Back Way to Europe</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PRO</td>
<td>Public Relations Officer</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PRSP</td>
<td>Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PS</td>
<td>Permanent Secretary</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RSP</td>
<td>Regional Strategy Paper</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SDF</td>
<td>Social Development Fund</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TCN</td>
<td>Third Country Nationals</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOT</td>
<td>Training of Trainers</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNFPA</td>
<td>United Nations Population Fund Agency</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNHCR</td>
<td>United Nations High Commissariat for Refugees</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNDP</td>
<td>United Nations Development Programme</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>WB</td>
<td>The World Bank</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>YMCA</td>
<td>Young Men´s Christian Association</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
1. Introduction

Already in the 1990s, the imagination of a “migration pressure” on Europe had manifested and security-led concepts to alleviate this pressure were primarily developed. The border regime and the control mechanisms were further developed, readmission agreements were formulated and signed and visa conditions became stricter. As the migration flows did not stop and as the events in Ceuta and Melilla showed, it has been realized that restrictive control-led approaches alone are insufficient and that migration should be incorporated into other policy fields including development cooperation, liberal trade policy, development of democratic societies (good governance) and regional refugee alternatives and so on. Since migration flows cannot be managed that easily and particularly not from the destination only, the European Union (EU) started to strengthen the cooperation with third countries on migration issues. Moreover, European countries also realized that they need a migrant workforce on all skill levels due to the aging population and low fertility rates. The first steps toward the so-called “Global Approach” and the partnership with third countries were formulated at the Tampere Conference in 1999 and in the Hague Programme. Since then, many strategy papers and action plans on the cooperation with third countries on migration have been published or adopted (cf. Bendedikt 2004, Baldaccini 2007, Boswell 2003, Lavenex 2007, Haas 2007). The Global Approach also aims to enhance efforts on legal migration and the migration development nexus instead of merely combating irregular migration. This thesis will examine how this approach is put into practice in the case of The Gambia. Incentives and “refunds” for third countries for cooperating on migration, which is often, in fact, the readmission of irregular migrants, frequently take the form of an increase in official development assistance. On the other hand, however, they also consist of threats to reduce the official assistance in order to increase the interests in combating irregular migration and to put it on the agenda (cf. AGEZ 2007:3, Faist 2006:7). So far, the cooperation with third countries has focused on neighbor states of the EU, but in recent years, the EU has extended the cooperation to West Africa and other areas. The cooperation on migration with West African States started around the year 2005 at which time, the Global Approach had already been adopted. This thesis will examine whether it is already part of the ongoing cooperation with The Gambia. Moreover, what interest in migration is at stake for Gambian stakeholders must be investigated and if the current, ongoing policy measures represent a comprehensive approach from their perspectives? Considering the policies of single EU Member States, differences can be found: Italy, for example, has the reputation of having a very restrictive cooperation with third countries, particularly considering irregular migration that is not taking human rights and
development potentials into consideration on one hand but, on the other hand, Italy pursues regularization policies. Spain has the reputation of using a more balanced approach between control measures and the increase in development aid to create job opportunities in the sending countries. How these governments act in the Gambian case shall also be part of this thesis (cf. Adepoju/ van Noorlos/ Zoomers 2010).

1.1 Research Interest

Even in the small country, The Gambia policy measures on migration are identified. The Gambian population in Europe is about 0.03% of the entire migrant population, the numbers for irregular migrants might not be significantly higher. Nevertheless, migration has become an issue in development cooperation between the EU and The Gambia under the 10th EDF (cf. UNDP 2009: 80, 149; EC/Government of The Gambia 2008: 17). In the Country Strategy Paper (CSP)¹ for 2002-2007, migration is mentioned only marginally, meaning immigration to The Gambia from conflictive sub-regions, while irregular migration is not mentioned at all. This changes significantly in the Country Strategy Paper for 2008-2013. Regular and irregular migrations become a “non-focal sector” with budget support and irregular migration and the fight against it is defined as a problem several times (EC/Government of The Gambia 2008: 5, EC/Government of The Gambia 2002). The cooperation with Spain started in 2006 and The Gambian government signed an agreement with Italy in 2010 (cf. EC/Government of The Gambia 2008: 17).

The Council of the European Union states itself that the new approach should be of benefit to all countries involved: “The European Council agrees on the urgent need in the short term for broad-ranging concrete actions, which form part of ongoing work to ensure that migration works to the benefit of all countries concerned” (Council of the European Union 2005b: 3).

Can these new approaches often referred to as a “global”, “integrated” or “comprehensive approach” really be interpreted as “fair multilateralism” and “win-win” situations for receiving and sending countries (Adepoju/ van Noorlos/ Zoomers 2010: 42)?

¹ The Country Strategy Papers define the priorities of cooperation with each country while the Regional Strategy Papers define the priorities with sub-regions. (Civil Society Helpdesk 2010).

A Country Strategy Paper (CSP) is an instrument for guiding, managing and reviewing EC external actions. The purpose of CSP is to provide a framework for EU assistance programs based on EU objectives, the beneficiary country government policy, an analysis of the beneficiary countries’ situation and the activities of other major partners (Central Finance and Contracting Agency n.y.).
Several authors and many critical voices still see the approaches of the EU and its Member States as “externalization of border control” or still as a sign of the “securitization of migration era”, where the combat against irregular migration stands in the forefront (Adepoju/ van Naersen/Zoomers 2008 Engbers/Broeders 2007; Mitsilegas 2007; Ryan/Mitsilegas 2010). Commitments to ensure the benefits of migration for development and to minimize the negative effects are rather rhetorical than followed up with emphasis. The new efforts on the migration and development nexus are rather seen as a “keeping them in their place policy”, different faces of “externalized control” or “stay at home” development (Bakewell 2007 34-35; Haas 2008b:1).

So how is it in the case of The Gambia? Are the projects and measures on migration supported by Member States or the European Commission a sign for a comprehensive approach, as to say a development-friendly approach, or are projects and measures on migration control and combating irregular migration still in the forefront? How are Gambian actors assessing the migration policy of the EU and Member States? Is it a comprehensive approach for them?

According to Adepoju/van Naersen/Zoomers, very little is known about how sending countries perceive migration (cf. Adepoju/ van Naersen/Zoomers 2008: 4). As the right to assess how Gambian actors perceive the migration policy measures is not personally reserved, several experts and officials involved in migration policy on a governmental or non-governmental level were interviewed to get to know their assessments and perceptions of the policies, projects and measures in place. Of course, there cannot be only one Gambian position on that issue. The opinions are diverse and will be integrated in the analysis of the case study.

1.1.1 Research Questions

a) To what extent can the policy approaches, projects and measures influenced by European actors in The Gambia be interpreted as a comprehensive approach on migration, as to say a development-friendly approach?

b) To what extent do the policy approaches meet Gambian interests and migration issues and challenges? Are the measures also comprehensive in regard to the interests and challenges on migration outlined by Gambian stakeholders?

c) Which strategies of the external governance of European migration policy can be found in The Gambia and how do European actors influence The Gambian migration policy development and the policy measures on migration?
1.1.2 Hypotheses

a) The approaches of the EU and its Member States on migration in the cooperation with The Gambia are signs of a security-led, control approach on migration, where the combat against irregular migration and the export of border control stands in the forefront. If the linkage of migration to development is made in the Gambian case it is for the purpose of a “keeping them in their place” policy.

b) Gambian interests on migration are only partially represented and power imbalances in negotiations on the agreements and an imbalance of interest representation can be found in the priority action lines on migration. The measures on migration are not comprehensive in regard to the interest and challenges on migration outlined by Gambian stakeholders. Commitments to ensure the benefits of migration for development and to minimize the negative effects of migration as well as the creation of legal migration channels are not followed up with emphasis.

c) The EU and Member States make use of the hierarchical, asymmetric power relations and a broad range of incentives to include their interests in the agreements with the Gambia. Due to lack of resources and expertise the Gambian stakeholders are highly influenced in migration policy development.

1.1.3 Structure of the Thesis

As the research questions and leading hypotheses of the thesis have already been presented, further explanation of the structure will now begin. The working definition of important terms and concepts like migration, irregular migration and development, etc. will be part of the first chapter. The second chapter will discuss relevant theoretical approaches on migration and development and will link them to migration policy in order to identify policy failures as well as potentials to make migration fruitful for development. The discussion of this chapter is important for the analysis of the migration policies present in The Gambia, the ones supported by the EU or its Member States as well as national initiatives, either governmental or non-governmental. The theoretical discussion allow for analysis of whether there is a comprehensive approach on migration that can meet the relevant problems and potentials of migration in The Gambia. Before it comes to the analysis, the European Migration Policy with special focus on the cooperation with third countries and on the externalization of the border control will be described and major contents will be highlighted in the third chapter. In the same chapter, there will be taken a look at Spanish, Italian and British migration policies and their main aims and contents, particularly considering the external dimension of the migration policies. Critics on the policies that are already discussed in Chapter two in a smaller scale will be
integrated. The fourth chapter will be dedicated to the Case Study of The Gambia. First, there should be a discussion of major issues, problems or potentials of migration by using the literature available as well as the outcomes of the analysis of the interviews. Moreover, it will be examined how migration is addressed in Gambian policies. In the following section, the cooperation with the EU, intergovernmental organizations and EU Member States will be analyzed by taking a deeper look at the projects and measures implemented in The Gambia that have a direct or indirect link to migration. After that, room will be left for answering the research questions and discussing the hypotheses by using the outcomes of the preceding chapters and the outcomes of the conducted interviews in Chapter Five.

1.2 Research Methods

The following section will describe the mix of qualitative methods that will be used in this thesis. A mix of methods seems to be appropriate for analyzing the available material and answering the research question in the following because the material itself is a mixture of different, very diverse kinds and sorts of sources. This section will describe the framework of the research and the different sources that were used.

1.2.1 Policy Papers, Secondary Literature and Media Reports

On one hand, there are the policy papers, political agreements, memorandums of understanding and communications from the different, respective actors that allow for first approaches to be drawn on the topic. In this case, it is primarily policy papers from the European Commission, the European Council, Europe Aid, the Spanish government and the respective ministries as well as the Italian government and their respective ministries and last but not least, The Gambian government on migration and cooperation with third countries. So policy papers from governmental institutions or supranational bodies form a great part of the analysis, but also policy papers from international organizations working in the migration field and present in The Gambia will be part of the analysis. All in all, policy papers regarding migration, irregular migration and migration and development from the actors involved will be analyzed through qualitative methods in order to elicit the dominant aims, suggestions and assumptions.

So as to contextualize the policy papers and to be able to critically reflect them, the support of scientific literature of migration researchers will be used. That literature will first of all provide for theoretical knowledge on important concepts on migration, migration control and migration management and the literature will also provide for the needed elements for finding working definitions and conceptualizations of certain terms
used in the thesis. The same literature will also support the critical discussion of the policy measures on migration in The Gambia.

Other important sources of information are media reports and press releases. Since the literature on The Gambia in general and on bilateral and multilateral agreements with European countries or the EU is scarce, a dependence upon information from the media is required.

From an overview of these text sources, the interview guidelines have been prepared for the field research in The Gambia and to gain an idea of who might be the possible actors in the field and therefore, potential interview partners.

Furthermore, contact with the Ministries of Foreign Affairs, the Ministries of Interior and Border Agencies of the EU Member States collaborating with The Gambia on migration, namely Spain, Italy and UK was attempted, but each of them refused to provide further information.

1.2.2 Elements of Content and Discourse Analysis

For the analysis of strategy papers and policy papers of the EU and its respective Member States, scientific secondary literature will be used for interpretation and also theoretical approaches on the migration and development nexus, the EU border regime and on the cooperation with third countries on migration issues. Likewise, elements of discourse analysis will be used to gather the relevant elements of the EU policy and its Member States for this work so that the focus point of a discourse analysis is the content of the respective document (cf. Flick 2007: 104). The sampling strategy for discourse analysis helped to build a literature corpus or archive first so that parts of that corpus can be selected afterward (cf. Flick 2007: 105).

1.2.3 Research in the Field - Interviews, Conversations and Observations

In accordance with Flick/Kardoff/ Steinke, qualitative research is focused on the opinions, views and perceptions of people (cf. Flick, Kardoff 2000: 14). The initial purpose of the field research to gather information about ongoing projects and activities in the migration field from government representatives themselves and non-governmental organizations and to find out which projects and cooperations were/are ongoing with the European Union and EU Member States. Secondly, it was important to bring in different Gambian perspectives and perceptions on the ongoing policies and activities. That is why a qualitative approach seemed appropriate and since it was already clear that for the analysis of the above-described documents and text sources, a qualitative approach is adequate, it is simply logical to continue this approach in
analyzing the fieldwork. Before the research in the field I conducted two expert interviews on EU migration policy with a focus on the return policy and readmission agreements. Part of the research was conducted in The Gambia from February 2011 through May 2011. While onsite, several libraries, the national library, the library of the University of The Gambia, the library of UNFPA, the library of The Gambia Bureau of Statistics and the Timbuktu library were visited to search for more material in the migration field. Since the outcome of the literature research was rather scarce, more emphasis had to be put on interviews to gather information and as a result, ministries, national and international organizations and diplomatic delegations that worked in the migration field or the development field were contacted and can be considered as experts in those fields due to their professional position\(^2\) (cf. Flick 2007:30). In some cases, there was a good success and recorded interviews could be arranged, others refused to be recorded and in other cases, interview or access to information was refused from the beginning and it was rather difficult to gather information. Some interview partners agreed to provide information, but refused to be recorded. This was particularly the case with members of the ministries or diplomatic delegations of European countries. In that case, a memo (a protocol of the conversation) was produced that was put down on paper directly after the conversation by using the notes made during the conversation (cf. Flick 2007:78). The total number of interviews and memos is about twenty-five, in which one group discussion and one telephone interview are included. There was also the chance to participate in a workshop on irregular migration open to the public and organized by the non-governmental organization “Operation No Back Way to Europe” where different representatives of the government presented their views on the topic and were discussed by the group. This data will also be used for the analysis. Personal observations on location such as sea border control points or at the Immigration Department will also be integrated into the analysis.

According to the rule of “No deception” regarding participants or interview partners, each person that was communicated with was informed this was for the purposes of research

\(^2\) Government institutions attempted to contact: Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Ministry of Interior, Immigration Department, Ministry of Trade and Employment (GAMJOBS-Project), Ministry for Youth and Sports, Ministry of Finance and Economic Affairs, Ministry for Economic Planning, National Youth Council (NYC), Gambian Radio and Television Service; International Bodies, delegations and organizations: International Organization International Organization for Migration (IOM), Red Cross the Gambia, Diplomatic delegations of Spain, Italy and UK, National Authorizing Office System Support Unit (NAOSU), European Commission Delegation, UNHCR; National organizations: Youth Ambassadors for Peace, Operation No Back Way to Europe (ONBE), Young Men’s Christian Association (YMCA), TANGO Umbrella Association of Non-Governmental Organizations in The Gambia; Expert interviews: Employee of the Fundamental Rights Agency; United Nations Special Rapporteur on the Human Rights of Migrants;
for a diploma thesis and that information was being gathered for that purpose. All of the participants were informed about the topic of the research (Flick 2007:72). Because the interviews where primarily an open dialogue, the method of second questions and probing was often used since particularly when it came to negative aspects of EU influence on migration policy, the interview partners were often inhibited and as a result, it was very important to leave the structure of the interview quite open and to develop a feeling for the respective position of the interview partner or his/her expert knowledge (cf. Flick 2007:74). Using a continuously flexible design throughout the research, the interview guidelines were adapted and improved and new interviewees were selected by using the snowball-effect method, which means that some interview partners established contacts with others (cf. Flick 2007:79).

1.2.4 Coding and Categorizing

When it comes to analyzing the data, the rules of anonymity will be followed for all of the partners in conversation and collaboration by not mentioning their names (cf. Flick 2007:74). In the event of being important for the respective argument, the institution where the data was collected and the position within the institution of the respective person will be mentioned. In order to keep the anonymity, the transcripts, field notes, memos and conversation protocols will not be attached, but further information may be supplied upon request.

“Coding and categorizing are ways of analyzing that can be applied to all sorts of data and are not focused on a specific method of data collection” (Flick 2007:100). One of the main steps is to name, classify and categorize relevant parts of the available material and compare them with other material. In most of the cases, the categories for coding are developed from the data. There are different ways to compare them: Either different interviews within a category, within one interview to find out if there are contradictions or similar statements or also chronologically (cf. Flick 2007: 101-102).

1.3 Working Definitions, Terms and Concepts

1.3.1 Development

Development has long been defined as growth of GDP per capita. Many international organizations, governments and so on still define it as pure economics. This definition has been stressed by other concepts like human development, human security and development as capability or autonomy, which are also very important factors (cf. Castles 2008:11). Development should not and cannot be simply defined by economic parameters.
In the glossary of the EU, the following definition can be found that is also quite in line with the working definition of this work:

“Development is the process through which societal changes are achieved. This process has to ensure that people lead lives of dignity and are able to meet their daily needs and to reach their highest potential through addressing societal challenges such as poverty, injustices and imbalance of power. [...] Development is a process leading to a higher quality of life.” (Civil Society Help Desk 2010).

The United Nations Development Programme defines Human Development as follows:

“Human development is a process of enlarging people’s choices. The most critical ones are to lead a long and healthy life, to be educated and to enjoy a decent standard of living. Additional choices include political freedom, guaranteed human rights and selfrespect” (UNDP 1990:10).

The working definition of development for this thesis is a composition of the two given definitions. The most important aspect is that the understanding of development puts people in the center of action:

“People are the real wealth of a nation. The basic objective of development is to create an enabling environment for people to live long, healthy and creative lives. This may appear to be a simple truth. But it is often forgotten in the immediate concern with the accumulation of commodities and financial wealth.” (UNDP 1990:9)

It makes sense to put the focus on longevity, knowledge and decent living standards of a person when talking about development, particularly when considering development in regard to migration. The contributions of migrants to development mostly put people in the center of action, especially families and relatives. Remittances are often used to cover the daily needs such as food, school fees and so on and so forth. As a consequence it can be assumed that migration can contribute positively to a decent standard of living. Migration can often lead to knowledge exchange or knowledge transfer, which can have positive educational effects. Migration can raise awareness about values like political freedom, human rights and selfrespect and can lead to a different perception of the given standards and choices in the country of origin. In general migration can influence attitudes and cultural aspirations. The lack of these rights can often lead to emigration. Considering health migration has often negative effects on the health sector of developing countries, due to high brain drain rates of doctors and nurses on the one hand. On the other hand migration could also have positive effects on the health sector, when it comes to a “brain gain”, which means that doctors and nurses return to their countries of origin after having acquired additional qualifications and experiences in a different country. In the long run migration can
Contribute to a societal change and address challenges like poverty, imbalance and injustice. Consequentially the working definition of development for this thesis is: Development is a process, which should ensure that people have a long and healthy life, that people are educated and enjoy a decent standard of living and are able to meet their daily needs. Additionally people should be able to enjoy political freedom, human rights and selfrespect. The development process should ensure that “people lead lives of dignity” and “reach their highest potential through addressing societal challenges such as poverty, injustices and imbalance of power” (UNDP 1990: 9-10; Civil Society Help Desk 2010).

1.3.2 Migration/Migrants
There is no universal or objective definition of migration, migrants or migration movements. However, most of them include a spatial dimension and some of them also a time dimension or a political dimension (cf. Krohnert 2007: 2-3). Many theoretical approaches on migration try to explain the reasons for emigration. Considering the legal status of migration has recently become a new way of categorizing migration (cf. UNESCO n.y.). The Latin word “migrare” offers a very wide and open definition for migration that simply means the change of location (Düvell 2006a:5). The IOM offers a quite general definition covering most cases: “The term migrant was usually understood to cover all cases where the decision to migrate was taken freely by the individual concerned for reasons of "personal convenience" and without intervention of an external compelling factor; it therefore applied to persons and family members, moving to another country or region to better their material or social conditions and improve the prospects for themselves or their family” (IOM 2011). The rather broad definition of the IOM also suits as working definition for this thesis, although there are several details to be considered which shall be analysed in the following.

There is also no common definition of migration by the European Union. However, what can be found is a rather broad definition, but it is remarkable that the reference to non-EU citizens is already present in the definition of migration: “There is no official definition of migration in the European Union. The term describes the process of persons moving across borders to live and work and generally implies non-EU citizens moving into or within the EU.” (Eurofound 2012).

So it seems that EU citizens who are moving are primarily covered by the term mobility and non-EU citizens moving within or into the EU are meant by “migration”, while the term mobility is positively connoted, the term migration has often negative connotations. The distinction between to terms for EU citizens and non-EU citizens lets assume that
there are two different perceptions of movements depending on who makes the movement.

In the following, the complexity of migration will be looked at from a sociological perspective (cf. Düvell 2006a:6). According to Düvell (2006a), the dimensions of time, of the actor, of the distance, the political dimension, the dimension of the purpose and the dimension of the character of the decision will be considered when trying to define migration. Not all of the outlined dimensions are relevant for the working definitions of this thesis, so only some will be considered. Consequentially the outlined definitions in the following should be considered as the working definitions for this thesis.

1.3.2.1 Short-term, temporary, circular, seasonal migration vs. long-term, permanent migration

The criteria of time in the definition of migration movements concentrates on the length of time (cf. Krohnert 2007:2). The period of time that a person must live and work outside his/her home country to be considered as migrant varies strongly in the literature. Some argue that only a permanent change of the place of residence can be considered as migration while others already speak of migration when the transfer of the domicile takes place for a period longer than twelve months. Others use the mark of six or even three months for the definition of migration. The definitions also diversify by using more concrete concepts like short-term migrant or temporary migrants, long-term migrants and so on (cf. Düvell 2006a: 7). According to the IOM, a short-term migrant is “A person who moves to a country other than that of his or her usual residence for a period of at least three months, but less than a year […].” (IOM 2011: 91) while with a period from more than a year, the person is already considered as a “long-term migrant” (IOM 2011:60). Temporary labor migrants are to be considered as people who work in a foreign country for a certain period of time that is limited (cf. Castels 2000:270). Also, seasonal migrants are “migrant worker[s] whose […] migration for employment is characterized dependent upon seasonal conditions and is performed only during part of the year (IOM 2011:89). Circular migration is defined as the “fluid movement of people between countries” that can be temporary or long-term and can also be part of the category of migrations defined by the time dimension (IOM 2011:19)

1.3.2.2 Internal Migration vs. International Migration

Migration can be either internal as to say, an inner-state movement as for example, rural-urban migration or international when crossing the boundaries of nation-states. From a political perspective, migration means crossing the border of an administrative or political entity, may it be a district, a county or a nation-state (cf. Düvell 2006a:8). Düvell explains that political science and sociology focus on the borders between nation states and
demography also analyses smaller administrative entities. That means that definitions of migration can also vary for demographers, for example, a movement of few kilometers can already be interpreted as migration while for political scientists, a movement of hundreds of kilometers does not necessarily have to be defined as migration because no border has been crossed (cf. Düvell 2006a:8). “Internal migration refers to a move from one area (a province, district or municipality) to another within one country. International migration is a territorial relocation of people between nation-states.” (UNESCO n.y.) In the EU, the term “mobility” is used for movements within the EU borders and the term migration is used for the movements beyond them (Düvell 2006a:8). Düvell (2006a) states that political frontiers are rather arbitrary and can be changed over time, although most of the time, it is the migrants that move beyond borders, sometimes borders move beyond them. Düvell emphasizes that migrations are historically specific and take place under certain historic circumstances, for example, when you look at state transformations or the transformations of borders (cf. Düvell 2006a:11).

1.3.2.3 The Purpose of Migration
Considering the purpose of migration, the first division is between touristic travels and migration whereupon time and purpose are distinctive. The reasons for travels are diverse, but mostly pleasure and tourism, while the reasons of migration are family reunification, asylum, search for protection, educational reasons or work (cf. Düvell 2006a:9).

1.3.2.4 Voluntary vs. Forced Migration
A further characteristic for differing among migration movements is how a decision for migration is being formed. Düvell (2006a) differs between voluntary and forced migration (cf. Düvell 2006:9). Castels (2000) includes refugees and asylum seekers in the category of forced migrants, but he also mentions that external factors like environmental catastrophes, conflicts or war that can force people to migrate (cf. Castels 2000: 270-271). Düvell further argues that it is often difficult to categorize between voluntary and forced migration because, for example, economic migration is seen as voluntary migration, but often economic migration is necessary to secure the livelihood that can be endangered through political-economic decisions. Düvell argues for a distinction between politically forced, economically forced and voluntary migration (cf. Düvell 2006a:8). For the purposes of this work, economic migration will not generally be considered as voluntary migration based on the above-mentioned reasons. Particularly when talking about “South-North Migration” in the specific context of African migration to Europe, it is important to raise that issue because the EU Immigration Policy does not
consider the possibility that economic migration can also be forced and claims it to be unjustified, at least for low-skilled migrants, and subsequently does not leave any legal channels to enter and work in the EU. In accordance with Busch (2006), economic marginalization is also a form of political prosecution. In classifying between legitimate migration (political refugees) and illegitimate (economic migration/irregular migration), he sees an opportunity for the EU to justify the curtailment of rights (cf. Busch 2006:111).

1.3.2.5 Dimension of the Actor
According to Düvell (2006a), it is also important to look at the actor of the migration. With this, it is possible to distinguish between persons that move by their selves from their own will and people who get moved by others against their own will. Persons who move by their selves can be considered as migrants while the phenomenon of persons being moved is normally defined as “human trafficking”, which is also defined as migration by some, though the author rejects that. The dimension of the actor also allows differing between individual movements\(^3\), collective movements and mass migration. This dimension allows for the capturing of the number of actors and the form of organization of the movement (cf. Düvell 2006a:10-11).

From the view of this work, other forms of migration like repatriation, voluntary or forced return can also be sub-summarized under this category because the role of the actor is also very important in these forms, particularly when considering EU policy in regard to return. Of course, other dimensions also play an important role when looking at those forms of migration, particularly the dimension of the character of decision as well as the dimension of purpose. Return migrants are defined as migrants who return to their countries of origin after spending a certain period of time in another country (cf. Castles 2000:270-271).

1.3.2.6 Low-skilled, Highly-skilled, Skilled Migration
Another form of distinguishing migrants is the profession or the level of education. Düvell names the categories as “unskilled”, “low-skilled”, “medium-skilled” or “highly-skilled” migrants (Düvell 2006a:11). Low-skilled migrants move within global labor markets for sex, entertainment, construction and domestic work and so on (cf. Karakayali/Tsianos 2005: 7, Wickramasekara 2008: 1251).
Highly-skilled migrants are people with qualifications such as managers, executives, professionals, technicians or similar who move within the internal labor markets of transnational corporations and international organizations or who seek employment

\(^3\) Translated from the German term: “Wanderung”
through international labor markets. In most countries, there are programs to resurrect those migrants (cf. Castels 2000: 270-271). Particularly in the EU context, it is important to bear the distinction between highly-skilled and low-skilled migrants in mind because highly-skilled migrants primarily only face bureaucratic barriers to enter the European Union while low-skilled are left to irregularity although the labor markets also need labor forces in low-skilled areas (cf. Castles 2006:741; Ruhs 2009: 11-12; UNDP 2009: 46).

1.3.2.7 Regular vs. Irregular Migration

Düvell only differs between legal and illegal migration. He further points out that the legal categories differ from state to state and have developed historically (cf. Düvell 2006a:11). In the following section, the phenomenon of “irregular migration” will be discussed more specifically due to its high importance in the context of EU Migration Policy and African migration to the EU.

The terms “illegal migration” or “illegal migrants” need to be rejected right away because illegality is connected to criminality, but migrants are not illegal per se due to transgressing some legal provisions by entering the country without the required documents or entering the labor market without legal access to it. Infringement of the law does not make a person illegal, so the term “illegal” has to be considered as a stigmatization. Many authors prefer the terms “undocumented” or “irregular”, which will also be used in this work. If it comes to use of the term “illegal” in this paper, then it is only within the context of the EU or when quoting an interview partner; the negative aspect must always be kept in mind and its use serves further interpretation and answering the research questions because the use of this term has to be interpreted as an expression of the “securitization” of migration through its link to criminality (Angenendt 2008:1).

Irregular migrants are further described as “spontaneous, undocumented, unauthorized, irregular or illegal” and include those migrants who immigrate in spite of infringing restrictive immigration laws because they do not have legal access (Düvell 2006a:142). There are many subcategories distinguishing between the finer aspects of whether the entry was legal or illegal or whether they work illegally, for example, some migrants are allowed to stay in the respective country, but are not allowed to work and so on. In the European context of a strongly controlled migration system, most of the irregular migrants have been regular at one point in time and became irregular through the expiry of their visa or through transgressing against a work prohibition (cf. Düvell 2006a:142-143). According to UNDP (2009), about two-thirds of all irregular migrants in European countries became irregular through the expiry of their residence title (cf. UNDP 2009:34).
1.3.2.7.1 Characteristics of Irregular Migrants

From a European point of view, irregular migrants are further characterized by originating from neighbor countries or former colonies (although there are many exceptions). Many of them move within migration systems still originating from the guest worker resurrection and a great number are rejected asylum seekers. Furthermore, it should be considered that many irregular migrants move within global labor markets for sex, entertainment, construction, domestic work and others. Irregular migration also often happens, just like regular migration, through chain migration by using transnational networks and social capital. Some organizations and NGOs working for the support of refugees and immigrants also play a decisive role in sustaining the flow of irregular migrants (cf. Düvell/Jordan 2002:44-46; Düvell 2006b:144-145; Karakayali/ Tsianos 2005:7, Wickramasekara 2008:1251).

1.3.2.7.2 Reasons for Irregular Migration Flows

Due to the restrictive asylum policy and miserable perspectives for obtaining asylum as well as poor conditions during the asylum application process, the refugee migration is converted into an undocumented form of migration. Milborn (2006) also notes that the legal channels to Europe are limited to family reunification and protection from political prosecution, although more immigration will be needed due to the demographic decline of Europe’s population (cf. Milborn 2006:8-9; Adepoju 2008:26). The control of the EU’s external borders is often legitimized in the name of combat against human trafficking, although critical voices doubt that (cf. Karakayali/ Tsianos 2005:3-4). Globalization has worsened the imbalance and the enormous income gap between the North and the South, which is a pushing factor and trigger for migration (cf. Castles 2006:746). Normally, there is a distinction between political refugees and economic migrants however, developing countries are suffering impoverishment amongst others due to the international free trade regime, which means that due to political decisions, fleeing the economic conditions of their home country can also be seen as a political flight, as already mentioned above (cf. Düvell/ Jordan 2002:15-18). Busch also argues that making a connection of refugees with asylum abuse, covered economic migration, irregular migration and human smuggling and trafficking is to be interpreted as curtailment of the right to protection in the sense of the Geneva Convention on refugees. In accordance with Busch (2006), economic marginalization is also a form of political prosecution. In classifying between legitimate migration (political refugees) and illegitimate (economic migration/irregular migration), he sees an opportunity for the EU in the curtailment of rights (cf. Busch 2006:111).
However, as already discussed above, migration is not easily controllable and it will not stop as long as there is a certain demand within the labor markets of Europe and particularly for irregular migrants due to the flexibility of some labor markets as long as there are certain pictures transported through the media and as long as there are networks in the destination countries (cf. Düvell/ Jordan 2002:15-18/55).

2. Theoretical Approaches

In the first part of the following chapter theoretical approaches on the migration development nexus will be discussed and be linked to possible policy responses to migration and the factors that could lead to the failure or success of policy options. The second part of the chapter will be dedicated to theoretical approaches on the external dimension of European Migration Policy and will examine the characteristics of external governance, the different forms and strategies of external governance and approaches in the externalization policy.

2.1 Historic overview of different academic paradigms on migration and development

“The two [Migration and Development] are part of the same process and therefore, constantly interactive”. (Castles 2008:1). The interactivity of migration and development per se is out of question, but Castles is questioning the direction of interactivity: What comes first? Migration or development? (Castles 2008:1).

While in the 1950s and 1960s, there was a quite positive view of the interplay of migration and development, the perspective changed in the 1970s and 1980s. Castles explains that the main controversy was between neo-classical economic theory and historical-institutional theory and compares that with the controversy of development economists, political economists and sociologists (cf. Castles 2008:3-4). The Neo-Classical view was present in the 1950’s and 1960’s and was a quite positive one on migration and development, described as a “virtuous circle”. 
The Neo-classic model (see figure above) is based on the assumption that economic disparities in two regions automatically lead to migration flows because the individual rationally compares the costs and benefits of migration or remaining at home. The individuals decide whether to migrate or not by comparing wage levels and employment opportunities. So migration should lead to economic equilibrium in the long run because wages adapt to each other and other conditions in more and less developed countries also equalize. The assumed links on migration and development can also be seen in the graphic above (cf. Castles 2008:4). Bakewell adds that, by then, development practice was aiming at reducing rural-urban migration flows by improving conditions in the rural areas (cf. Bakewell 2007:11).

The Historic-Institutional approach (see figure below) sees the relationship between migration and development quite critically and pessimistically, influenced by Marxist political economy theory and dependency theory in the 1960s and by the world system theory in the 1970s and 1980s. This approach sees “migration mainly as a way of mobilizing cheap labor for capital” (Castles 2006:4). A main asset of this approach is the argument of exploitation of the resources of the less developed countries for the purpose of enrichment of the more developed countries, which happened, according to world-system theorists, through the incorporation of the peripheries to the world economy by the core regions. The rapid incorporation and presence of multinational concerns in the peripheries quickened rural-urban migration, which led to more poverty, displacement of workers and the growth of informal economies. What Neo-Classical theorists called the
virtuous circle is presented as the “vicious circle” instead (Castles 2006:4). Here again, the assumption is that the reduction of the imbalances would reduce migration (cf. Bakewell 2007:12).

Hein de Haas also states that migration has been seen as more negative and problematic since the 1970s, but he describes it from the perspective of European countries or developed countries (cf. de Haas 2007:2). Castles acknowledges that there have been advances in migration theory and that the academic debate has moved toward more holistic approaches to migration by linking it with broader social changes. Transitional theories assume that at the beginning of an industrialization process, emigration often rises due population growth and a loss of employment opportunities in the rural areas. Low average wages stimulate rural-urban migration and later emigration. Later on, the labor supply declines and wage levels start to raise again, which results in a start of immigration of labor migrants after a long period of sustained development. This process is called “mobility transition”, which is accompanied by a fertility transition, which says that there is population growth through improved public health, and then with the latter, stabilization due to fertility decline (Castles 2008:5; de Haas 2008b:21-22, Bakewell 2007:12). The “Migration Hump” (Martin and Taylor 2001 cited after Castles 2008) follows a similar logic and assumes that more economic development leads to more emigration for a certain period of time and then an industrial
economy emerges in the home country and it comes to a decline in the long run (cf. Castles 2008:5).  

2.2 Current Issues and Debates in/on Migration Development Nexus

Nowadays and since approximately the year 2000, there has been a shift again in the perception of the migration development nexus. Politicians and officials once again praise the positive potentials of international migration on economic and social development and the positive impact migration can have in the countries of origin. South-North migration was long perceived as a threat to national identity, social cohesion, national security and so on, although this political discourse is somehow still present (cf. Castles 2008:3). Bakewell also argues that the migration development nexus has moved to the “center stage” of interest, but he also acknowledges that there is still a strong focus on international South-North migration as a problem – the connection to Brain Drain, the exploitation of migrants in Europe, the separation of families, human trafficking and smuggling (Bakewell 2007:18). Nevertheless, he also acknowledges that “the hunt is on for the win-win-win scenario”, but he also points out the contradictions within the development model on migration. Stakeholders agree that migration can contribute positively to development, but the development policy aims at keeping poor people at home (Bakewell 2007:35).

2.2.1 Reduction of Emigration through Economic Development

The “root causes” approach follows the assumptions that more development and tackling the reason for migration by the roots can reduce migration and also tackle poverty and violence. So the “virtuous circle” is still present in current debates. Castles rejects that “because a higher level of development brings more mobility” and it is proven that improved living standards and a peaceful surrounding create more mobility (Castles 2008:1;13, Haas 2007:13). Exenberger (2007) also argues that development is enabling

4 Other theoretical approaches: New economics of labor migration still follows the arguments of Neo-Classical theorists on cost-benefit decision and economic equilibrium, but it widens the approach by including the importance of families’ and communities’ role in the decision-making process. The Dual Labor Market theory puts the demand of employers in the center of analysis and states that it is the demand determining migration in numbers and directions. Migration Networks Theory shows the importance of communities and social capital in the decision-making process for migration and in the integration in the receiving country. Transnational Theory states that through new communication and transport means, maintaining the social, political, cultural and economic ties to home communities and communities in receiving countries is eased. Transnational Communities gain on importance as social actors (cf. Castles 2008:5).
more and more people to afford the move, establish networks and become effective (cf. Exenberger 2007: 118). Castles further argues that this approach is underlined by the presumption that South-North migration has negative effects and needs to be stopped or reduced. This negative view on migration goes back to colonial times when rural-urban migration was perceived as negative because it was seen as a migration of the poor people to the rich people (cf. Castles 2008:1, 13/ Bakewell 2007:35).

2.2.2 Development Through Migration?

According to Adepoju et al. (2008), there are two views on the contribution of migration to poverty reduction and development:

a) The **optimists** consider the contribution of migration to development very positive: Remittances are considered as the new finance flow (cf. Adepoju/van Naersen/ Zoomers 2008:2; Haas 2007:1). Oucho (2008) also points out that remittances exceed the Official Development Assistance and that they normally are the second largest source of foreign currency after Foreign Direct Investment Flows (cf. Oucho 2008:53). Social Remittances means the transfer of skills, attitudes, information and ideas, know-how, norms and values and different forms of behavior to the migrants’ countries of origin and from an optimistic view, they bring positive changes. Newly-skilled returnees can also be considered as bearers of social remittances (cf. Adepoju/van Naersen/ Zoomers 2008:3, Castels 2008: 12, Oucho 2008:52). Optimists further state that migration implicates a balance in supply and demand in the labor market and that it would contribute to the reduction of inequality and these are the advantages of globalization. The destination countries benefit from skills and labor and the migrants themselves benefit because they find jobs, develop their skills, earn money and are able to send some money back home or even invest there (cf. Adepoju/van Naersen/ Zoomers 2008:3). Nevertheless, Oucho warns of a “brain waste”, meaning that highly-skilled migrants work in demeaning, dirty and dangerous jobs (Oucho 2008: 52).

b) The **pessimist** view on the contribution of migration to development sets its focus on the loss of labor and intellect because it is normally the youngest and able-bodied people who are leaving. Returnees are often old and considered as unsuccessful within the society. It is only the poorest, unskilled, disabled without a network that remain behind in the countries of origin (cf. Adepoju/van Naersen/ Zoomers 2008:3). Exenberger (2007) highlights that a third of intellectuals in African countries’ are lost and that the rate of highly qualified (tertiary educated) is far higher than the average rate. Nevertheless, there are still some positive
effects for the families back home because the emigrants have a higher productivity in the host country than in the country of origin and private benefits (cf. Exenberger 2007: 117). But considering the entire context, the sender country loses and the receiving country gains (cf. Exenberger 2007:115). Adepoju additionally argues that there is a high cost for sending countries and that the skilled labor is not easy to replace. Additionally, there are no experienced leaders who could bargain successfully in spite of the imbalance in South-North relations. At the moment, northern countries can easily pick whoever they want to (cf. Adepoju 2008:30).

Castles (2008) reminds us that remittances without state intervention leading them to the right channels and appropriate economic and political conditions can cause high inflation and even greater inequality (cf. Castles 2008:13). Oucho (2008) highlights that throughout Africa, financial and monetary policies and regulations have created barriers to the flow of remittances and their effective investment. Major problems include: Restrictive licensing of money transfers, the environment for investment is unattractive due to corruption and poor infrastructure. The remittances are not appreciated by the governments. Furthermore, the high cost of money transfer organizations may discourage remittances in the long run (cf. Oucho 2008: 54).

Oucho further states that remittances are seen as great hope for development: For individuals, households, communities and national economies, but the real impact has to be viewed critically because most of the empirical evidence is based on individual or household surveys, but not on the community or national level. According to Oucho (2008), remittances alone cannot lift people from poverty, rather it is the interplay with other economic, social and cultural factors that can have impact on poverty reduction (cf. Oucho 2008: 64).

c) The **growing consensus** in the debate is that migration can contribute to development, but a policy must be in place to promote the nexus. Many national governments are now trying to maximize the nexus between international migration and national development. How these policy approaches to promote the positive relationship between migration and development should be conceptualized will be considered in the following section. There, it is particularly shown what the “Southern perspective” could be on migration policies by presenting the ideas of authors specialized on that perspective.
2.2.3 Policy Approaches for a Fruitful Migration Development Nexus

Recommendations on policy approaches will be examined here and are categorized in policy approaches for emigration countries, immigration countries and policy approaches that have to be pursued jointly or from both sides in order to be successful.

2.2.3.1 Emigration Countries

a) Considering remittances, the governments should create an enabling environment for their productive use. The costs of transactions and loans should be reduced. In general, fiscal changes should be made there to stimulate the inflow of remittances. Furthermore, there should be a facilitation of an investment environment (cf. Adepoju/van Naersen/Zoomers 2008:8, Oucho 2008:50). Castles also states that remittances without state intervention leading it to the right channels and appropriate economic and political conditions can cause high inflation and even greater inequality (cf. Castles 2008:13). But, many officials and theorists believe that remittances can contribute significantly to development on the local, regional and national level (Castles 2008:10).

b) Emigration countries should have strong linkages with their Diaspora community. For example, they should provide conditions for easy investment and establish platforms for dialogue (cf. Adepoju/van Naersen/Zoomers 2008:9). Exenberger highlights that there can only be positive network effects when there is a well-functioning integration policy in the host country (cf. Exenberger 2007:115).

c) "Migration alone cannot bring about development" argues Castles. He further states that there have to be “improvements in governance, creation of effective institutions, construction of infrastructure and the emergence of an investment-friendly climate" in order to be able to create an environment so that migration can play a positive role in the development process (Castles 2008:13). Migration has to be included in much broader policies.

d) Instituting a ministry for Diaspora-cooperation and intensifying contacts with populations overseas can also be considered as a pre-condition for a fruitful contribution of migration to development (cf. Adepoju/Zoomers 2008b:287).

e) Oucho (2008) states that a huge obstacle for the use of migration for development is the lack of Africa-based research to generate information in order to formulate policies in the countries of emigration (cf. Oucho 2008: 50). Many developing countries do not keep data on their emigrated professionals, but should start doing so (cf. Oucho 2008: 50; Adepoju/Zoomers 2008b:288). Wagbou supports that argument and also speaks out for the strengthening of
data collection, which should be supported by migrant associations and consular departments. A reliable database is needed (cf. Wagbou 2008:151-152).

f) Another recommendation is to draft a common (in this case) African position on migration and development, for example, to develop a strategic framework for a policy on migration in the scope of the African Union. The ECOWAS could also be a body to tackle the problem of youth employment and to stem emigration in clandestine situations to rich countries (cf. Adepoju 2008:28).

g) The reduction on the dependency on remittances and promoting greater stability is also a goal to be achieved in the long run (cf. Adepoju/Zoomers 2008b: 288).

h) Adepoju (2008) argues that anti-migration campaigns designed to make people aware of risks and dangers are not very high on the agenda of the sending countries, but this cannot be confirmed for The Gambian Case, will be shown in the later sections (cf. Adepoju/Zoomers 2008b: 288). Meanwhile, Haas (2008b) states that this solution is advocated by European and African government (cf. Haas 2008b:3).

i) Return policies can be considered as a powerful tool for development. Politicians have the responsibility of returning migrants and that is why they should get training and support. A better organization of return and reintegration is needed so that countries of origin can gain from returning migrants’ knowledge and experience (cf. Wagbou 2008:152).

Wagbou (2008) recommends the establishment of a 5-year commitment to serve the country for all students who receive a national scholarship. If they do not serve the country for a certain period of time, they have to refund all tuition and fees that have been used for their education. Wagbou further suggests the introduction of a plan of action for the reintegration of migrants who have been returned home in agricultural activities and rural development because those in that workforce field are particularly lacking. In general, he claims that it is necessary to include transnational networks in state policies to promote the Diasporas’ participation in development (cf. Wagbou 2008:153-154).

j) According to Wagbou (2008), there are two conditions for development programs to be successful: First, they should focus on the education of the potential emigrants in the countries of origin and second, they should create and promote permanent bridges between origin and destination societies. The local communicates should establish contacts with transnational communities in order to involve them in local the development process.
Due to economic uncertainties and unemployment, the emigration states should create and expand job opportunities in rural and urban areas as a local alternative to international migration (cf. Wagbou 2008:155-157).

2.2.3.2 Immigration Countries

a) However, recent studies have also concluded that development policies alone or migration policies addressing poverty and inequality are not sufficient (GCIM 2005). There also needs to be a change in trade policies. In the African context, particularly the fishery and agricultural products, import policies to the EU so that developing countries have a more fair access to the global trade market. Moreover, the structural adjustment programs did not support the developing countries and quite on the contrary, they worsened the situation for developing countries. The agricultural protectionist policy of the EU and USA and the subsidies for their farmers, which leads to price-dumping, do not allow African farmers to compete in the agricultural sector although it is one of the largest (cf. Adepoju 2008:26; Castles 2008:13, Haas 2007:3). Other important approaches are the reduction of the export of arms and an inclusion of human rights standards into aid and trade agreements (cf. Castles 2008:13).

b) Another very important recommendation is to alleviate anti-migration policies and stricter border controls because they are not effective in reducing irregular migration. As discussed above, it only has the negative effect of an increased vulnerability and most migrants become irregular by overstaying and not by entering illegally anyway (cf. Adepoju/Zoomers 2008b: 292).

c) Though it was already mentioned above by highlighting the responsibilities and recommendations for both parties, it will be mentioned here again because the destination countries have more power in the relations and could stop recruiting highly-skilled people more easily. So again, there is the call, particularly from a southern perspective, that there should be ethical recruitment and more initiatives as for example the “Code of Practice for International Recruitment of Health Workers” brought forward by the Commonwealth Ministers in 2003 or like the “Code of Practice for International Recruitment” of the World Health Organization (WHO). There should also be more policies for encouraging return and also the retention of skilled migrants. Destination countries should support countries of origin by creating the environment for return and job opportunities (Adepoju 2008:32; Adepoju/Zoomers 2008b: 287). Another responsibility of the host countries is to protect the rights of migrants, to sign the International Labour Organizations’ (ILO) and United Nations Convention on Migrant Workers’ Rights would be a first
step, like “The International Convention on the Protection of the Rights of All Migrant Workers and the Members of Their Families (ICMW)” or the ILO’s Migration of Employment Convention (1949) and the Migrant Workers (Supplementary Provisions) Convention (1975). The UN Convention on Migrant Workers’ Rights is the least ratified treaty among all major human rights treaties. None of the typical Northern receiving countries have signed the convention so far (cf. Ruhs 2009: 3-4; United Nations 2012; Wickramasekara 2008: 1254-1255).

d) There needs to be a good integration policy in the host country. Exenberger highlights that there can only be positive network effects when there is a well-functioning integration policy in the host country. To be well-integrated serves as a pre-condition for developmental engagement (cf. Exenberger 2007: 115).

2.2.3.3 Both Countries

a) Both countries should promote migration governance, which means providing data, monitoring, assistance and the protection of migrants rights (cf. Adepoju/van Naersen/Zoomers 2008:9).

b) Circular migration for Brain Gain and Brain Circulation?

Brain Drain can be described as the outward migration of skilled and highly-skilled workers from developing countries to developed countries, which has reached an alarming magnitude from a southern perspective. Recently, debates among development organizations and international organizations have been trying to find ways to transform that phenomenon into “Brain Circulation”, which can benefit sending countries, receiving countries and migrants. Nevertheless, this transformation is highly dependent on the political will of the Western powers. Currently, the policies still recruit highly-skilled and leave the low-skilled behind (cf. Adepoju 2008: 25-26; Castles 2008:12). In recent times, there has been an emphasis on circular migration and it is presented as a win-win-win situation for migrant sending and receiving countries and migrants themselves, so to say, all parties involved, particularly in the European Union (cf. Castles 2008:12; Glick Schiller 2011:45, Haas 2007:16). It should have benefits particularly for the countries of origin, but Castles (2008) argues that from their perspectives, it would be the best if low-skilled workers emigrate permanently and highly-skilled workers temporarily while for labor-importing countries in Europe or North America, the opposite is preferred. Glick Schiller (2011) and Adepoju (2008) support that argument by highlighting that short-term migration often restricts the rights of the migrants and diminishes the chances for naturalization and settlement (cf. Adepoju 2008: 288; Glick Schiller 2011:46). She further emphasizes that researchers are supporting that “rosy picture” by laying the research focus on remittances and blinding out the negative effects of circular migration,
particularly when considering the aspect that those migrants should function as development actors (Glick Schiller 2011:46). Haas (2007) also has “serious doubts on the proposition that temporary migrants would be better development agents for origin countries that integrated and settled migrants” (Haas 2007:16). European governments welcome highly-skilled workers to stay permanently while lower-skilled migrant workers are only welcome for a limited period of time. As the supply of low-skilled workforce is higher than the demand, the demand has the necessary market power to lead political-economic decisions in its interest. In countries where the recruitment of a low-skilled workforce is politically difficult, the employers fall back on irregular migrants (cf. Adepoju 2008: 25-26; Castles 2008:12, Glick Schiller 2011:45-46) though Glick Schiller argues that highly-skilled workers are also increasingly depersonalized and recruited temporarily or for jobs under their qualification.

“The faceless migrating workforce is portrayed as potentially lawless border invaders who require restriction, regulation and contractual constraints that limit their rights to change employers or challenge working conditions. The depersonalization of labor as contractual services allows for labor policy statements in which the separation of workers from home and family, without rights of settlement and family reunion, becomes good economic policy” (Glick Schiller 2011:47).

Even still, the highly-skilled have advantages in several countries compared to the low-skilled. This picture fits into a neo-liberal approach on the labor market, as does the desire to control labor migration into nationalist views (cf. Glick Schiller 2011:47). Adepoju et al (2008) also point out that circular migration could be win-win-situation when there is the possibility for a Brain Gain, but the policies should not just focus on labor needs of North, but also on the needs of the South (cf. Adepoju/van Naersen/Zoomers 2008:8). The emigration of skilled professionals is a huge problem for the South, so there should be ethical recruitment and direct recruitment should be discouraged. Very often, the EU or its Member States unilaterally select workers on an international market Adepoju et al. (2008) call for a shared responsibility in recruiting and a compensation for Brain Drain through projects that bring the highly-skilled back home at least for a certain period of time (cf. Adepoju/van Naersen/Zoomers 2008:9).

Oucho points out the lack of bilateral agreements between countries of origin and countries of destination to convert Brain Drain into Brain Gain. The power relations do not allow the countries of origin to have a strong voice in international agreements, for example, because EU countries threaten or literally withdraw ODA from countries that are insufficiently cooperating with the destination countries (cf. Oucho 2008: 50;56). So the call is on both parties: On countries of origin to organize them regionally to have a
stronger say and to formulate policies themselves and on countries of destination to acknowledge the mutual dependency and to allow negotiations at eye-level. Oucho (2008) suggests the African Union set up a bureau on emigration matters to elaborate policies, research and programs that should work closely with "Regional Economic Communities and African Economic Community" (Oucho 2008: 61).

c) Adepoju et al. argue that international migration is just marginally included in poverty reduction strategy papers; so far there is no systematic policy and international migration in a structural element of policies for combating poverty (cf. Adepoju/Zoomers 2008b: 285).

d) Policy on channeling remittances.
The sending and receiving states should take some more responsibility in channeling remittances and should promote transfer through official channels. For a better use of remittances for development, it is important to reduce costs and enhance accessibility of remittance services for migrants. This means to facilitate improved access to financial services in cooperation with financial intermediaries, local communities and the public and private sectors and to facilitate access to banking for migrants in countries of destination and their families in countries of origin. And particularly important to consider in the context of this work: “As irregular migrants also can have a positive development impact on their home country, it is important to assist undocumented migrants to gain access to financial access” (Wagbou 2008:154-155). Modern technology can be used to reduce transfer costs. Moreover, it is very important to create incentives to invest in, for example, small and medium enterprises, industry, education, infrastructure development, establishment of enterprises and micro-credit institutions (cf. Wagbou 2008:155).

2.3 The External Dimension of European Migration Policy
The European Union is currently following many strategies and approaches on a wide range to deal with (irregular) migration. Keeping irregular migrants out by building fences, surveillance instruments, watchtowers, guards, sea patrols, and control systems and the establishment and work of the border agency Frontex are just part of the diverse strategies (cf. Broeders/Engbersen 2009:869-871). These measures focusing on engagement and policies beyond the EU borders can be referred to as the externalization of border control or the external dimension of migration policy (cf. Aubarrell et al 2009:12).
The EU started recognizing that merely restrictive measures are insufficient to address the migration issues and to prevent undocumented migrants from entering. Controls at
the EU borders also had negative effects like the expansion of smuggling and trafficking networks and the usage of more dangerous and risky entry routes, the decline of the supply of migrant workers and growing tensions with countries of origin. As a consequence, the EU started to build up partnerships with third countries and involve private actors in migration policies. The cooperation with migrant-sending countries and transit countries nowadays characterizes the external dimension of EU cooperation in justice and home affairs (cf. Boswell 2003:619; Haas 2007:7). Actions targeting the root causes of migration in order to keep migrants in their place are further components of the externalization of immigration policy (cf. Aubarrell/ Zapata-Barrero/Aragall 2009:12; Bakewell 2007: 34-35; Boswell 2003: 619, Broeders/Engbersen 2009:869-871).

2.4 Characteristics of External Governance

Some academics also call it the extra-territorialization of immigration policy because the policy of the external dimension, as to say, the externalization of control measures and preventive measures requires the engagement of third countries because they often take place in their territories. Immigration policies were usually clearly addressed to the national territory, national borders, as to say, there was a clear link between sovereignty and territory. European migration policy is increasingly taking place in territories of third countries and is aiming at a greater involvement of external cooperation policies, which is referred to as extra-territorial control (cf. Aubarrell/ Zapata-Barrero/Aragall 2009:5, 12-13). The most traditional instrument where the shifting of the control of migration flows to actors other than the EU itself becomes clear is the visa policy, but also carriers’ sanctions or the creation of databases for travelers’ data where private actors, like airline companies, get involved and/or third states when it comes to repatriation. Another sign for the increasing externalization of migration control is the proposals for processing asylum claims outside the European territory or the emergence of regional protection programs. The demands will be processed outside the EU territory, which is why it is referred to as extra-territoriality (cf. Aubarrell/ Zapata-Barrero/Aragall 2009:13; Brouwer 2010:199; den Heijer 2010:170; Lavenex 2007:248). The newly created strategies of the EU can be seen as “shifting and multiplication of the European external border” (den Heijer 2010:169). The EU complements measures at the external border and close to it with measures “targeted at migrants who have merely shown an intention to cross that border, but may still be far away […]. The border is no longer limited to a state’s territorial boundary, but is being exported such that a person may experience a foreign border

5 “Carriers´ sanctions” are sanctions against carriers of irregular migrants, like airline companies, transport companies and single persons. They can all be prosecuted for the transport of irregular immigrants (Schwenken 2008:17).
Internal border control has also become more important and its components and instruments are stricter legislation, control, documentation and registration of migrants and digital surveillance. Part of internal control measures for irregular migrants and consequences are often return, expulsion, deportation and repatriation that again requires the cooperation with third countries for signing readmission agreements (cf. Broeders/Engbersen 2009:869-871). As these internal control elements of the domestic, internal system have implications on third countries, as to say, external effects, many authors also summarize these measures under the externalization approach (cf. Aubarrell/ Zapata-Barrero/Aragall 2009:12-13).

However, it is not only third countries and private actors involved in the external governance of migration policies. The network of actors and institutions involved in the externalization policy take a very important part when analyzing the externalization of migration policy because it is a very diverse and growing field and there are new actors, other than governments, emerging such as intergovernmental and non-governmental organizations, private companies and expert rounds that are gaining on influence in policy-making (cf. Aubarell et al. 2009: 16-17; Geddes 2003:5; Geiger/Pécoud 2010:3).

This process leads to a fragmentation in the migration policy field that can be feasible for the Member States because they can choose what issues they want to deal with which institution. Geiger/ Pécoud (2010) give the example that EU states could discuss the migration and development nexus on the UN level while having IOM implementing border control measures in third countries. The organizations play an enabling role for the Member States. Moreover, those institutions often do not underlie democratic control, like IOM, Frontex and ICMPD, for example, which can benefit the Member States assigning the international institutions. UNHCR is also a very important policy-making institution in the migration field, but it is much more bound to human rights obligations and external observers than IOM and ICMPD, which are only responsible to their Member States (cf. Brochmann 1999:12;18; Geiger/Pécoud 2010:3-4;13).

The fragmentation of the policy field migration and the increasing networks of actors involved can be captured in the concept migration management that emerged in the late 1990s and early 2000s. The migration management or managerial approach is a rather new term in the migration policy field. Its main characteristic is its comprehensiveness because it claims to cover all movements and types of migration (cf. Geiger/Pécoud 2010: 2-3). Aubarell et al. (2009) state that its main characteristic is the orientation toward the needs of the labor market Geiger/Pécoud (2010) do not deny that and see the regulation, due to economic needs, as a key characteristic of the migration management concept, though there are continuing controls and restrictions on irregular migration. One
important argument brought up by Geiger/Pécoud is that “[migration management] is a notion that is mobilized by actors to conceptualize and justify their increasing interventions in the migration field [...] [and it] refers to a range of practices that are now part of migration policies and that are often performed by the institutions that promote the notion” (Geiger/Pécoud 2010:1). This argument comes back to the importance of the diversity of actors and institutions present in the field and their role in the externalization process. Hess (2010) points out a further, very important characteristic of the managerial approach by describing the general structural changes of that time. Migration management developed in the context of overall privatization and in formalization of politics. It was the time of general transformation of statehood and outsourcing of former governmental duties to external services (cf. Hess 2010:97). A central figure in the development of the migration management was Jonas Widgren, who led the international discussion platform on migration policy “Intergovernmental Consultation on Asylum, Refugees and Migration Policies in Europe, North America and Australia” and later became the Director General of the ICMPD. He argued that governments were incapable of a rational response to migration challenges because they rather only deal with them as short-term election issues and do not search for sustainable solutions. Widgren argued for “governance instead of government” (Widgren (2002) cited after Hess 2010:101) that fit into the general motion toward “European governance”. However, the essential assumptions of the externalization policy or external governance of migration policy can be summarized as follows:

- The territory of the nation-state or a supra-national body like the EU is no longer the framework for policy-making.
- There is a greater link between internal or external action and internal and external effects.
- The externalization policy can be described as “policy at a distance” or “remote policy”, which means that the policy is implemented in the sending country aiming to have internal effects in the receiving country (Aubarel/ Zapata-Barrero/Aragall 2009:12-13).

According to Papadopoulos (2007), there are three main strategies for the externalization of migration policies:

1. Remote control: The transfer of border control to third countries.
3. Capacity building strategy in certain sending and transit countries, which mainly includes the transfer of know-how, surveillance technologies, facilities and institutions (cf. Papadopoulos, 2007:98).
Aubarell et al. (2009) further distinguish between three concrete practices to define the externalization policy, which will be complemented by the “three main avenues” of external migration policy described by Lavenex (2007):

a) Diplomatic practices can be bilateral or multilateral meetings or political agreements, in this context, particularly readmission agreements, whereby the main aim is to condemn irregular migration. Lavenex (2007) describes those diplomatic practices as “positive conditionality linked with intergovernmental negotiations” that mainly consist of negotiations on readmission agreements (Lavenex 2007:247).

b) External institution building: There are structures and institutions built simply for the aim of implementing some dimensions of the external migration policy. Most of them only have temporary status. Some examples are: Camps and processing centers, but also immigration offices that also have a diplomatic dimension because they establish contacts between the sending and receiving country even before the migratory process. Border control institutions like the Spanish SIVE and FRONTEX can be summarized under this category. Following the argumentation of Lavenex (2007) and Geiger/Pecoud (2010) as explained above, it is not just the establishment of institutions characterizing the notions of migration management, it is also the mobilization of international organizations like the IOM or the ICMPD as subcontractors for the promotion and implementation of EU policies. The role of these institutions and organizations is also very important when considering The Gambian Case as will be shown further in this work.

c) Policies: Of course, there is also a set of policies for the management of migration flows, as already mentioned above (cf. Aubarell/Zapata-Barrero/Aragall 2009:16-17). However, it is not just about policies within the EU because, as explained, internal policies also have external effects and furthermore, Lavenex (2007) states that these policies are transferred and exported to third countries through transgovernmental networking with the support of supranational institutions (cf. Lavenex 2007:247;249). The networking often concludes in projects like capacity building of border police on a bilateral level with the technical support of Frontex. This practice goes along with the strategy of capacity building described by Papadopoulos 2007. It is another form of transferring EU policies on a more symmetric level relating to power relations based on network governance (cf. Papadopoulos, 2007:98).
2.4.1 Different Forms of Governance

Lavenex (2004, 2006) gives us further instruments to capture the current trends and notions in the outsourcing of migration policy by exploring the different forms of EU governance. The basic definition helps to understand the overall concept: “External governance takes place when parts of the *acquis communitaire* are extended to non-Member States” (Lavenex 2004:683). The focus of a governance perspective is not the nation-state, but rather the emphasis is on “institutional processes of norm diffusion and policy transfer” (Lavenex/Schimmelfenning 2009: 794).

External governance describes the diffusion of EU rules beyond its borders. According to Lavenex/Schimmelfenning (2009), there are three main types/modes of governance: Hierarchical governance, network governance and markets governance.

The application of a hierarchical mode can be observed, for example, in the conditionality of adapting EU immigration laws that potential new Member States face. The respective third countries must adapt the predetermined set of rules and laws and there is no possibility for the third countries to bargain on those rules. In the context of EU external policy, hierarchy can not only be interpreted as one actor dominating the other on unilaterally taken decisions because formally third countries have their full sovereignty and the EU cannot simply order them to adapt rules and laws, but in practice, there is a certain kind of hierarchy and asymmetry in powers because the EU can still give incentives and conditionality or sanctions because there is always an imbalance in resources and political power. While hierarchical systems pursue the objective of producing binding laws, networks produce less binding instruments such agreements or memorandums of understanding.

Lavenex and Schimmelfenning (2009) describe network governance as kind of a “new governance” form where rule expansion takes place in a more participatory manner. Organizational inclusion is not necessarily happening by overtaking central laws as the inclusion of organizations, like Frontex or IOM, in the policy-making of the EU show (Lavenex/Schimmelfenning 2009:797-798).

In some external policy fields, representatives of third countries have been included for consultation, so network governance is characterized by co-ownership concepts and interaction, which gives the externalized rules more legitimacy. When it comes to market governance, the EU’s impact on third countries is due to the interdependence of third countries on the single market of the EU, the EU’s presence is sufficient to lead to the adaption of EU rules by third countries because ignoring the EU rules would create financial or competitive losses (cf. Lavenex/Schimmelfenning 2009:797-798).
2.4.2 Institutionalist vs. Power-based

When it comes to the mode and effectiveness of European External Governance, there are two relevant explanatory perspectives: The institutionalist explanation and the power-based explanation.

The first perspective puts the EU institutions in the center of the scope, which shape the policies, rules and approaches to governance and condition their effectiveness. The internal modes are transferred to the external, so external governance is following the internal logic. The effectiveness of the external governance increases with the international legitimacy of the rules, for example, if an international law supports the policy. Lavenex and Schimmelfenning (2009) come to the conclusion that the hierarchical type is the most effective one.

The power-based explanation states that the external governance is characterized by the EU’s power and interdependences with third countries.

When looking at the hierarchical mode, the third countries have to be highly dependent on the EU and more dependent on the EU than on other parties, as it was the case in the Eastern Enlargement. In contrast to that, network governance goes along with symmetric as well as asymmetric power relations and medium degrees of interdependence.

When the high degree of dependence and asymmetric power relation is lacking, the effectiveness of EU rules for cooperation or whether the EU rules will be adopted depends on the bargaining power of the EU and on the institutionalized communication mechanisms and social learning.

When it comes to accession to the EU, the EU has an extremely strong incentive and is in an advantaged position and normally it comes to a very fast adoption of EU rules. When there is no incentive for accession, like it is the case with the African countries and immigration policies, bargaining power and incentives vary across countries.

Both the institutionalist explanation and the power-based explanation come to the conclusion that the hierarchical mode of governance is the most effective one. While institutionalism explains the effectiveness to high legitimacy of the rule, the power-based explanation names superior power as the decisive factor for hierarchy and effectiveness (cf. Lavenex/Schimmelfenning 2009:803-804). But what forms of conditionality and strategies does the EU take into account when dealing with countries that cannot potentially become a Member State of the EU? What happens when there is “no such carrot of accession inducing their cooperation with the EU”? (Lavenex 2007:246).
2.4.3 Approaches in the Externalization Policy

The stronger external dimension of EU migration policy can be described in two main approaches:

The first approach of externalization is the “control and security-led approach”, which means the export of control mechanisms to transit and sending countries (Boswell 2003:619). In particular, supporting third countries in the strengthening of their borders, combating human trafficking and smuggling and irregular entry are on the agenda of the EU. The second element of externalization of migration control is the cooperation with third countries on the return of rejected asylum seekers and irregularly staying migrants. Primarily, it is exercised through readmission agreements, which obliges third countries to readmit their nationals as well as other nationals when they are declared as a safe third country (cf. Boswell 2003:619; 622).

Aubarell et al. (2009) also call this approach the “remote-control approach” because the aim of the policy measures in sending countries is to have internal security effects in receiving countries. It is a security-based, reactive approach with the aim of restraining migration movements. The approach basically means the transfer of border controls, surveillance technologies, facilities and institutions to third countries (cf. Aubarell/Zapata-Carrera/Aragall 2009:14-15, Haas 2007:2).

The second approach can be termed “preventive” (Boswell 2003:619). It is focused on tackling the root causes of migration and refugee flows, which means incorporation of migration policy in development assistance, trade, foreign direct investment and foreign policy. Aubarell et al. refer to this approach as the “root causes approach” (Aubarell/Zapata-Carrera/Aragall 2009:14-15). In contrast to the security-led approach, it is development-based and preventive. The root causes approach can also be interpreted as a “keeping them there” approach, which has the main assumption that more development aid and trade would prevent people from migrating and consequently, it is another form of trying to control migration flows. Whereas as shown above, more

---

6 Article 27 The safe third country concept
1. Member States may apply the safe third country concept only where the competent authorities are satisfied that a person seeking asylum will be treated in accordance with the following principles in the third country concerned:
   (a) life and liberty are not threatened on account of race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social
group or political opinion;
   (b) the principle of non-refoulement in accordance with the Geneva Convention is respected;
   (c) the prohibition of removal, in violation of the right to freedom from torture and cruel, inhuman or
degrading treatment as laid down in international law, is respected; and
   (d) the possibility exists to request refugee status and, if found to be a refugee, to receive protection in

Boswell argues that the external dimension is still in the establishing process, but so far, she observes a combination of both types: The externalization of control measures as well as preventive measures, which fits into the overall picture of migration management trying to cover all types of migration (cf. Boswell 2003:620).

Aubarell et al. (2009) also state: “In general, the integration of migration into the EU’s foreign policy agendas reveals a constant attempt to balance cooperation with the agendas of security and development.” (Aubarell/Zapata-Carrera/Aragall 2009:18). But, which agenda is predominant in the starting cooperation with The Gambia?

3. The EU Cooperation with Third Countries

The beginnings of ideas on cooperation with third countries on migration issues dates back to the early 1990s when the Commission sent out a communication highlighting the need to integrate migration issues in the external policy in 1991 (cf. Boswell 2003:621). A further communication was sent out in 1994 describing the needs to cooperate with third countries when the overall aim of the reduction of the migratory pressure should be achieved because domestic border controls were considered as inadequate in facing the fact of a rising number in migrants and a refugee influx (cf. Baldaccini 2007:277, Boswell 2003:621, Lavenex 2007:247).

During the Austrian EU Presidency, a confidential strategy paper on the future EU Migration Policy leaked in June 1998. By acknowledging the shortcomings of past policies on the reduction of “illegal” immigration, it proposes some new approaches on migration and asylum. For the first time, a common approach to link all migration-relevant decisions from different policy fields such as foreign policy, trade policy, and justice and home affairs and so on was considered. A further suggestion was to “use political leverage in agreements with migrants’ countries of origin and transit” (Baldaccini 2007:279). For example, to make development aid dependent on some fulfillments considering visa policy or to ease border crossings when there is cooperation on readmission and so on. Another strategy presented by the Austrian leaders was to build “concentric circles of cooperating states” around the European Union so that they function as a buffer for the EU. In return for cooperation on border control, they could receive more aid or good trade conditions (Baldaccini 2007:279).
The Amsterdam Treaty is crucial when it comes to the development of the external dimension of European migration policy: The free movement principle manifested in the Treaty of Rome 1957 and implemented in 1968 never applied to third country nationals (TCN), rules for their entry, their residence and employment permits remained in national hands until the Treaty of Amsterdam 1997 that set up common rules for asylum and integration. The treaty moved cooperation on migration and asylum to the first supranational pillar, which implied more competencies of the European Commission in proposing policies and negotiating agreements with third countries. So the ideas and concepts for increased cooperation with third countries were already there before the treaty, but under Maastricht, the Commission and Parliament lacked the competencies to implement them or put them on the agenda of the Council (cf. Castles 2008:6; Lavenex/Wallace 2005:460-461, Boswell 2003:627, Brouwer 2010:211).

The official embracement of the external dimension of the EU asylum and immigration policies took place at the European Council on Justice and Home Affairs in Tampere. European Parliament (1999): “The European Union needs a comprehensive approach to migration addressing political, human rights and development issues in countries and regions of origin and transit. This requires combating poverty, improving living conditions and job opportunities, preventing conflicts and consolidating democratic states and ensuring respect for human rights, in particular rights of minorities, women and children. […] Partnership with third countries concerned will also be a key element for the success of such a policy, with a view to promoting co-development.” So since then, partnership with third countries is always present in JHA Council working plans, but a comprehensive approach as mentioned in the Tampere conclusions was not pursued in the following years as will be shown in following section (cf. Lavenex 2007:247/ Boswell 2003).

3.1 Control and Security-led Approach in the Cooperation with Third Countries
The first approach of externalization is the control and security-led approach as described above in Chapter 2.4.3.

The emergence and consolidation of this security and control-led approach will be described in the following by explicating the factors that led to the securitization of migration.

After the ban on recruitment of the guest workers, the refugees came up in the political debate instead of the irregular migrant. Due to the oil crisis in 1973 and raising social conflicts between guest workers, the national population policies of migrant reduction were on the top of the agenda. Politicians realized for the first time that migration is not
that easy to control because the total number of migrants rose after the ban on the guest worker recruitment in the 1970s. The policy on reduction of migration had the opposite effect, the increase of migration. Many migrants decided to settle permanently and use the option of family reunification because the possibilities for circular migration were restricted. The social and societal denial of immigrants found their expression. From the 1980s onward, the political and public debate centered on political refugees and the so-called *bogus asylum-seekers* and economic refugees (cf. Busch 2006:111, Castles 2006:742-744). Boswell explains a further dilemma of the nation states: Domestic constitutions and human rights obligations constrained attempts to restrict family reunification, deport migrant residents or restrict asylum procedures (cf. Boswell 2003:621). Busch (2006) argues that the development of a hostile policy against migrants and asylum seekers also started in the 1970s and 1980s because the reduction of immigration was formulated as political aim. Though, at that time, the policy on migration was regulated by single nation-states and not yet on a supranational level (cf. Busch 2006:113; Huysmans 2000:755; Karakayali/ Tsianos 2005:3-4).

The understanding of security of the European Union transferred from military threats to newly defined threats. The incertitude about the stability and security of the EU external borders, particularly after the fall of communism, gave incentives to suggest that irregular migration and organized crime could extend easier and faster (cf. Busch 2006:119; Castles 2008:6; Mitsilegas 2007:360). These fears were obviously exaggerated (cf. Boswell 2003: 621, Haas 2008b:2). Moreover, there was a rise in labor migrants and asylum seekers coming from the South and the East to the European Union (cf. Busch 2006:119; Castles 2008:6; Mitsilegas 2007:360). Already in the early 1990s, governments defined migration and organized crime as new security threats, the state was no longer at the center of the threat, it was rather societies and their identities: “Indeed, transnational organized crime and migration were flagged as major new security threats by governments in the early 1990s, with the securitization of migration helping to coin the concept of “societal security”, which focused on societies rather than states being threatened in identity terms.” (Mitsilegas 2007:360).

The first reaction to these developments was the Schengen Agreement, the fall of internal borders gave incentives to start a debate about compensating measures and widening the control competences of the Union. The external borders control in particular should become reinforced to be able to control better who is entering the space of free movement (cf. Huysmans 2000:759; Laitinen 2007:127). The Schengen Border Code states that external borders may only be crossed during the opening hours at the entry points, the border check points. There are some exceptions for “pleasure boating, coastal fishing, seamen going ashore, groups of special nature and unforeseen
emergencies” (Guild/Bigo 2010: 267). Anyone who tries to cross the border outside (another crossing point or outside the office hours) this legal framework should be punished by the respective Member State under national law.

The Treaty of Maastricht introduced the three pillar system of the Union under which asylum, immigration and international crime were summarized under the third pillar of common interests. It is important to highlight the association of criminality and migration under the third pillar (cf. Mitsilegas 2007:359-360, Husymans 2000:758-759, Boswell 2003:623). Boswell argues that the treaty enabled Member States to cooperate in questions of border control without supervision and control of NGOs or the press. Moreover, the treaty permitted the Member States to transform their control-oriented cooperation from intergovernmentalism to transnationalism (cf. Boswell 2003:623).

The Schengen Acquis became implemented by the ratification of the Amsterdam Treaty. So the fall of the internal borders among more states legitimized higher border control and migration control to prevent and limit migrant or refugee movements into the EU (cf. Mitsilegas 2007:361/Neisser 2007: 139, Boswell 2003:622).

In 1998, the European Union formulated an Action Plan for curbing illegal migration, which aims at already hindering immigrants and asylum seekers in the first EU country and to avoid the continuance of their journey. Furthermore, the EU formulated an action plan on the combat of organized crime, which strengthened the security forces competences. So actually, the understanding and conceptualization of security had already been changed before the terror attacks of 9/11, which often serves as a legitimizing factor for more control and surveillance (cf. Leuthardt 1999:XIV-XV).

The attacks on USA in 2001 caused an acceleration and intensification of the restrictive rhetoric in the debates on the EU’s external borders and in the manner of looking upon irregular migration (cf. Castles 2008:6). The following terror attacks in Madrid and London led to a consolidation of the security-led approach and to a further link-up of anti-migration measures with anti-terror measures (cf. Götzelmann 2010:45;Lavenex/Wallace 2005:473; Mitsilegas 2007:362, Vaughan-Williams 2008:64).

The 2004 and 2008 eastern enlargement made irregular migration one of the largest challenges of the Union. It became easier for third country nationals to move within the European Union while it became harder to control the migration flows (cf. Castles 2008:6, Neisser 2007:139). Particularly for the new Member States, it was a big challenge to enforce the control measures because their own borders had just fallen through the end of the Soviet Union and all of a sudden, the borders to their neighboring states, to whom they had very good relations, had to be strictly controlled. Nevertheless, intense and effective border control was a condition of admission to the European Union,
so the new Member States had to find new measures to deal with that (cf. Geddes 2003:16, Geddes 2008:37, Mitsilegas 2007:362).

According to Neisser (2007), the rise of right-wing parties also played a decisive role in tightening immigration laws and procedures for asylum seekers and introducing directives and conventions on EU level (cf. Neisser 2007:140).

Huysmans argues that the perception of migration as a security threat is socially constructed and that migration became highly politicized as a danger for public order, security and cultural identity as well as for the national labor market. The purpose was to demonstrate the control mechanisms just as reaction or as prevention from a high number of asylum seekers and irregular migration and to legitimize them through the social construction as a new security threat (cf. Huysmans 2000:751-753). Boswell also argues that: “Migration issues provided an easy target on which to focus a range of concerns about crime and internal security, welfare state reform and job security [...]” (Boswell 2003:624). Political parties used those generated fears by pretending to solve the social and economic fears through restrictions on migration (cf. Boswell 2003: 624).

Huysmans further states that the perception of migration as well depends on which institutions are dealing with migration issues, which is a very important aspect that can also be observed in the case study. Most of the time, it is the ministries of interior or other governmental security organs dealing with immigration and asylum that are also responsible for security issues and the production of knowledge about security. So the perception of migration as a security problem is nearby. Huysmans argues that securitization of migration is built on three concepts of security: Internal security, cultural security and the crisis of the welfare state (cf. Huysmans 2000:757-758). Aside from the combat of irregular migration, the EU names other reasons for the extension of the control regime: One of the important aims is the reduction of transnational crime to ensure the internal security and this means the combat of terrorism, human smuggling, drug trafficking and arms trafficking. One of the newer legitimizations that started to appear in the policy papers two years ago was the reduction of the deaths overseas (cf. EC 2010a).

So as we can see, the securitization of migration has consolidated over decades and control instruments have been developed.

The most traditional instrument of shifting the control migration flows to actors other than the EU itself is the visa policy, but also carriers’ sanctions and the “safe third country-concept” where private actors and third states get involved as control actors. Another

7 “Carriers sanctions” are sanctions against carriers of irregular migrants, like airline companies, transport companies and single persons. They can all be prosecuted for the transport of irregular immigrants (Schwenken 2008:17).
very early developed instrument was the placement of liaison officers in airports in countries of origin (cf. Aubarrell/Zapata-Barrero/Aragall 2009:13; Brouwer 2010:199, Lavenex 2007:248). The further externalization of the control approach took form in many different concepts and tools such as “pre-frontier control, capacity-building for migration management and asylum systems in transit countries or the deployment of EU police in neighboring countries”. Boswell argues that “The export of such control instruments to countries outside the EU can be seen as a logical extension of this approach” (Boswell 2003:623). Papadopoulos (2007) also sees the externalization of control as one of the main strategies of external migration policy. Predominant in that time was the hierarchical mode of external governance, for example, safe third countries were simply declared to be safe, instead of consulting with them or looking at their needs and capacities (cf. Papadopoulos, 2007:98-99).

3.2 Between Preventive Approaches and Security-led Interests

As Boswell works out, the logic of prevention or addressing the root causes of migration also developed since the 1980s. As pointed out above in chapter 2.4.3 this approach is focused on tackling the root causes of migration and refugee flows (cf. Boswell 2003:619, 624). The aim of this approach is to enable potential migrants and refugees to stay in their country of origin, which can also be interpreted as a “keeping them in their place” approach (Bakewell 2007:35).

In the 1990s, proposals on the prevention strategy started to take form. One factor was the recognition that control measures are limited in their impact. Irregular migration and trafficking of human beings were not reducing as expected. Moreover, it pushed refugees into more dangerous situations and even encouraged trafficking networks to expand. Many officials started to view prevention measures as possible alternative to control-led approaches, particularly Scandinavian countries and the Netherlands advocated such approaches. From the early 1990s onward, international humanitarian organizations and refugee organizations were increasingly involved in countries of origin. The protection of internally displaced persons, the prevention of displacement and assistance for returnees paved the way for including preventive activities on the spectrum of migration management strategies.

Already at the Edinburgh Council Meeting in December 1992, the Member States agreed upon addressing the reasons for migration and refugee flows to the EU through external policy. Nevertheless, they did not set any specific time frames or action plans and the issue was not a forming part of any policy plan from the Council until the Tampere Programme in 1999 (cf. Boswell 2003:625-626, Aubarell/Zapata-Barrero/Aragall 2009:15).
Although, the Commission sent out the already mentioned communications in 1991 and 1994 promoting a root causes approach to be one of the future elements of a European Strategy on migration. The approach should be integrated into all external policy areas of the EU.

The already mentioned Austrian Paper clearly stated the interest to put the preventive approach on the agenda and to involve migration policy into all areas of external policy, but that it should be combined with a further externalization of control measures. The later Dutch initiative created High Level Working Group that also included both concepts, externalization of control and prevention in the agenda for cooperation with third countries. The Tampere Conclusions overtook many points of the HLWGs mandate. The JHA officials “had little incentives to hand over the task of migration management to development and foreign affairs officials” (Boswell 2003:626). Moreover, officials were still focused on the externalization of control, in spite of already recognizing the need for preventive measures (cf. Boswell 2003:626; Lavenex 2007:248). The reasons for keeping the preventive approach behind are outlined by Boswell (2003):

“The combination of a control-oriented Council of Ministers, an institutionally weak Commission JHA Task Force and a lack of political will from the European Council meant that preventive approaches were effectively marginalized until the late 1990s” (Boswell 2003: 627).

With the Tampere Programme of 1999, the European Council adopted a 5-year program (1999-2004) for the development of EU policies in the area of Justice and Home Affairs. After the Amsterdam Treaty 1998, the European institutions had increased competences in the area of asylum and migration. Under Article 63(3)(b) of the Treaty, the return policy became an EU competence because it was considered as a crucial part in fighting illegal migration (cf. Phuong 2007; European Parliament 1999). At the meeting in Tampere, the Council created the area of Freedom, Security and Justice in the European Union. The Council set specific priorities regarding the common migration and asylum policy of the European Union. Four important elements were defined: Partnerships with countries of origin, a common European asylum system, fair treatment of third country nationals and management of migration flows (cf. European Parliament 1999). According to Baldaccini (2007), it was a first framework for discussion on the external dimension of the migration policy (Baldaccini 2007:277). Chapter 17/ Article I of the Tampere Programme is dedicated to the Partnership with Countries of Origin. The EU Member States, as to say, their Council Representatives, concluded on enhancing “activities in the regions of origin, combating poverty and conflict, improving living standards and increasing job
opportunities" in the countries of origin⁸ (EP 1999). So it can be clearly seen that there is a tendency toward the root causes approach or preventive approach and that the main presumption that migration can be reduced by mitigating the push factors and increasing development. Baldaccini also concludes that, by then, the attention was given to the root causes of migration and their alleviation, although sometimes in practice, it means keeping refugees in their regions of origin and exporting the responsibility for asylum seekers, which can be found for example in the safe third country concept (cf. Busch 2006:129-130; Neisser 2007:150; Baldaccini 2007:278, Bakewell 2007:35).

Article III in Chapter 17 also refers to third country nationals, but more to the internal border control where a clear tendency toward the security-led control approach can be identified. The Article III states the necessity of fair treatment of TCNs among the Member States. It further relates to efficient management of migration flows that require closer cooperation between the Member States concerning border control, combating illegal immigration and the involved criminal network. Considering the management of migration flows, the article moreover points out that information campaigns on the actual possibilities for legal immigration will be pursued in the migrant sending countries. Again, there is the aim of prevention of all forms of human trafficking and tackling illegal immigration at its sources present that will be reached by cooperation and mutual technical assistance between the Member States’ border control services (cf. EP 1999; Neisser 2007: 150) Krause also argues that, there, the cooperation with third countries is about enhancing migration control while Busch also sees that the focus of migration management is control and restriction (cf. Krause 2008:257-259; Busch 2006:129-130).

---

⁸ Partnership with Countries of Origin

11. The European Union needs a comprehensive approach to migration addressing political, human rights and development issues in countries and regions of origin and transit. This requires combating poverty, improving living conditions and job opportunities, preventing conflicts and consolidating democratic states and ensuring respect for human rights, in particular, rights of minorities, women and children. To that end, the Union as well as Member States are invited to contribute, within their respective competence under the Treaties, to a greater coherence of internal and external policies of the Union. Partnership with third countries concerned will also be a key element for the success of such a policy with a view to promoting co-development.

12. In this context, the European Council welcomes the report of the High-level Working Group on Asylum and Migration set up by the Council and agrees on the continuation of its mandate and on the drawing up of further Action Plans. It considers as a useful contribution the first action plans drawn up by that Working Group and approved by the Council and invites the Council and the Commission to report back on their implementation to the European Council in December 2000.” (Tampere European Council 15 and 16 October 1999 Presidency Conclusion, available at: http://www.europarl.europa.eu/summits/tam_en.htm#a
Considering this part of the Tampere Programme, we see that the security approach is still present in the discourse, although tendencies to cooperation are noticeable. Nevertheless, Boswell also argues that the Tampere Programme was an important milestone in including preventive approaches in the external dimension (cf. Boswell 2003: 630).

The High-level Working Group (HLWG), which was established shortly before that, focused on measures to keep migrants in their regions of origin in its proposal and not really on addressing any causes for migration flows. So the focus was still on control and containment, which is not very surprising when keeping in mind that the HLWG predominantly consists of JHA officials who are not experienced in dealing with third countries, neither in questions of development nor in conflict prevention (cf. Boswell 2003:630). Nevertheless, the HLWG “forced the pace of action in this area” and it pushed the officials working on development and external relations to develop their own approaches on migration prevention (Boswell 2003:632).

It is important to mention that the DG for Development and External Relations spoke out for readmission and cooperation on control because they feared that migration prevention goals would diminish the priority of development and external goals (from sight) and that, for example, emigration countries would receive more than, in fact, poorer countries because the target group of preventive approaches to migration are not the most vulnerable groups. Middle income countries normally have greater numbers of emigrations than low-income countries because they have greater pressure due to economic restructuring and social changes. They have greater resources to emigrate and they are more exposed to the Western media. Moreover, many experts at the EU level argued that higher development could generate more migration flows for the first two decades, the so-called migration hump, which has its scientific and empirical foundations as highlighted above. So following a migration prevention approach would slow down the economic transition, which is a negative effect to the country’s development. And finally, the experts in the DGs were concerned about the impact of the integration of migration in the relations with third countries. So actually by doing so, they went along with the control approach of the JHA Council or at least gave the approach space to develop (cf. Boswell 2003:633).

The practical implication of the preventive approach slowed down drastically due to the factors explained in the section on the security-led approach. For example, at the Laeken European Council in December 2001, the Commission did not send out any proposals for integrating a preventive approach, the focus was once again on the externalization of control. Boswell further notes that there was a shift from a root causes, preventive approach to a partnership with third countries. Against all odds of the DGs, the Council
Member reiterated the will to integrate both approaches, so the DG for Development finally elected an official to be entrusted with the task of the migration issues in 2002. The DG for External Relations already had appointed such an official in 2001. In 2002, the Commission finally released the Communication on “Integrating migration issues in the European Union’s relations with third countries”, which was the first attempt to form a Commission strategy on the integration of migration issues in external relations. The Commission emphasizes preventive approaches over control/security-led approaches in contrary to the JHA Council (Commission of the European Communities 2002; Boswell 2003:634; Lavenex 2007:249). Boswell argues that the proposal was carefully balanced and in order to safeguard existing development goals, the Commission called for extra funding for any migration-related projects. The Commission also called upon the EU to be more sensitive in the negotiations on migration or readmission agreements and that the matters for migrant sending countries, like Brain Drain or remittances, also need to be addressed (cf. Boswell 2003:635). Lavenex (2007) also calls that initiative the creation of that aforementioned “positive conditionality”, the EU needed to give third countries incentives to conclude readmission agreements (Lavenex 2007:249). The outcome of the Commission’s proposal was the creation of a budget line (B7-667) to support “cooperation with third countries in the area of migration” (Commission of the European Communities 2002:24). In 2004, it was replaced by a 3-year financial framework, the Aeneas Programme. The Aeneas Programme financed 107 migration-related projects for an amount of about €120 million in the years 2004-2006. The overall objective of the program was to support third countries financially and technically in the management of migration flows. Another objective was to “strengthen cooperation between EU actors, third countries and the international actors involved in migration issues” (European Commission n.y.:2). The main objectives of action were, for example, the development of legislation for legal immigration to host countries, but “in accordance with an analysis of the demographic, economic and social situation in the countries of origin and in the host countries and of the host countries' reception capacity” (European Commission n.y.:2). So the conditions leave enough room for interpretation and possibilities to reject legal entry possibilities to Western countries. Other objectives were the development of legislation on refugee protection and, of course, the third countries get support in “the establishment […] of an effective and preventive policy in the fight against illegal migration, including the fight against trafficking in human beings and smuggling of migrants and the development of relevant legislation” and not to forget, the obligation to readmit and reintegrate expelled expatriates from the European Union (European Commission n.y.:2). The thematic program is the follow-up program of the AENEAS Programme and also works on a 3-year period basis. While the regional and
country strategy papers are developed in cooperation with third countries and have to align to their national and regional policies, the Thematic Programme is purely oriented on the EU’s interests in migration and asylum policies. The issues addressed under the Thematic Programme are: Fostering links between migration and development, promoting well-managed labor migration, fighting illegal immigration and facilitating the re-admission of illegal immigrants, protecting migrants and supporting the fight against trafficking in human beings (European Commission 2012, ECMPD 2010:4). As the Commission states, the program is not addressing the root causes of migration, it rather tries to give third countries capacity building to encourage cooperation among them and to enable a “better migration management” (European Commission 2012). The Thematic Programme is eligible to all countries covered under the ENPI, DCI or the EDF and it works on a project basis by giving calls for proposals, but it also finances some EC actions pointed out in the Annual Action Programmes of the regional and country strategy papers (cf. European Commission 2012). The Thematic Programme also supports transgovernmental networking activities of civil servants, as for example, “twinning” agreements like the one between Morocco and France in 2005 on training the border police (Lavenex 2007:250-251).

Further ideas for conditionalities and incentives for third countries to cooperate were created in the Seville European Council in 2002. Baldaccini interprets the Seville European Council Conference 2002 as an important milestone in the shift further away from a root causes approach to control of migration. The Tampere Programme only addressed migration in context with combating the root causes of migration, as shown above, it was not exactly like that since security-led control approaches were still present (cf. Baldaccini 2007:280, Haas 2007:3). Boswell goes along with that argumentation and also sees a “shift back to a migration control dominated agenda” and further argues that this already emerged at the European Council Summit in Laeken 2001 (Boswell 2003:636). The Seville Conference Representatives concluded that any future agreement with a third country should include migration management, particularly compulsory readmission. There were also discussions about reducing development aid or the EU relations in general in the event of a lack of cooperation by the third countries, primarily on Spanish and British initiative (cf. Baldaccini 2007:280; Aubarell/Zapata-Carrera/Aragall 2009:10; Boswell 2003:637; Castels 2008:7, Haas 2007:2 Pinyol 2008:3; Lavenex 2007:250). The proposal was rejected though the Council conclusions included a paragraph saying that “an unjustified lack of cooperation in the joint management of migration flows [could] hamper the establishment of closer relations between that country and the Union” (European Council, Presidency Conclusions, Seville:10-11). So actually, there is a quite high conditionality and clear signs for a hierarchical mode of the
European Union’s export of migration policies. The power-based explanation is fruitful here because there are clear signs of an asymmetric interdependence that does not leave any necessity for high bargaining. Nevertheless, we can come to the conclusion that through initiatives like the AENEAS Programme, the EU tries to establish such incentives.

Very noticeable is the lack of any reference to tackling the root causes of migration at the Thessaloniki European Council in June 2003. The focus was on discussing the cooperation of third countries in return and readmission measures, the ratification of human rights and refugee protection instruments by the third countries, the contribution to border control and interception of illegal migrants. So there was no process of bringing the EU Member States closer to a comprehensive approach on migration, which would also benefit the third countries (cf. Baldaccini 2007:281).

The Hague Programme had ten priorities for 2005-2009 to strengthen the area of Freedom, Security and Justice. In the Hague Programme, “a comprehensive approach involving all stages of migration, with respect to the root causes of migration” is mentioned for the first time (Neisser 2007:151-152). But, the EU also wants to re-conceptualize “entry and admission policies and integration and return policies”, although Euractiv argues that the focus is on the return policy: “A policy to expel and return illegal immigrants to their countries of origin” was one of the main points of the program (Euractiv 2004). Other activities planned in the Hague Programme relating to the partnership with third countries are the improvement of the capacities of third countries to improve the capacity for migration management and refugee protection. The EU seeks to prevent and combat illegal immigration by informing on legal channels for migration, resolving refugee situations by providing better access to durable solutions, building border control capacity, enhancing document security and tackling the problem of return (cf. Neisser 2007: 151-152; Baldaccini 2007:282-283). The partnerships with countries and regions of transit became a crucial part in the migration and border management, but so far, it can be observed that the focus is on combating irregular migration and keeping the migrants in their home countries (cf. Krause 2008:265). Three Member States are particularly involved in building bilateral partnerships with third countries: Italy, Spain and Malta, which suffer the most from the “African Wave of Refugees” or often also referred to as illegal migrants. Krause also argues that there is once again an observable link-up of counter-terrorist actions, migration control, combat on organized crime, integrated protection of the EU external borders, etc. (cf. Krause 2008:260).

Another sign of the still present security approach is the endorsement of the establishment of Frontex. Frontex should have a coordinative role in the Integrated Border Management. Moreover, Frontex should work with Europol and Eurojust to
analyze migrant routes and characteristics of irregular migration, early warning systems and so on. The Hague Programme specified the compatibility of databases and information systems, as well as the incorporation of biometric data in visas, passports and so on (cf. Krause 2008:261-262). The Hague Programme can be seen as crucial in the externalization of migration policy. Nevertheless, the externalization policy developed in the context of the security-led approach and it is still emphasizing migration control (cf. Aubarell/Zapata-Carrera/Aragall 2009:10). So it can be said that the external dimension of European Migration Policy primarily developed in a security-led context where the combat on illegal migration is a leading element (cf. Aubarell/Zapata-Carrera/Aragall 2009:10).

3.3 The role of intergovernmental organizations in migration management in cooperation with third countries

As already mentioned above in chapter 2.4, the role of intergovernmental organization emerged with the migration management concept, which was created by the very same intergovernmental organizations such as the IOM or the ICMPD (cf. Geiger/Pécoud 2010:6-8). They strengthened and consolidated their role and experienced large expansion and growth in the context of the “migration control crisis” in the 1990s, when Western States enforced control mechanisms and cooperation and harmonization in migration policies (Georgi 2010:54). In that time, new research institutes, governmental institutions and international organizations, like the ICMPD, were founded while already existing organizations like the IOM expanded (cf. Georgi 2010:54; Hess 2010:100). So far, many projects are implemented through actors such as IOM, UNDP or ICMPD. They offer their “migration services” to EU Member States and by doing that, shape the migration policy making and put their activities on the agenda (Geiger/Pécoud 2010: 3-4). But this exchange is also suitable for the Member States, as has been discussed above, because it allows them to follow their interests by choosing the specific, institutional context for specific issues like partnerships with third countries or control-oriented agreements. Moreover, the EU benefits from their expertise, their knowledge and their established contacts in targeted third countries (cf. Lavenex 2007:253; Geiger/Pécoud 2010: 3-4). The organizations function almost like private enterprises when offering their services to Member States. Migration control has been privatized gradually since the 1980s just like other public services. Practices like the production of knowledge, deportations, and the management of detention camps experienced an outsourcing of governmental structures (cf. Georgi 2010:62). As the organizations get
little budget from their Member States, they are dependent upon project-based financing. Their great dependence on funding contravenes with their goals and mandates, as for example, the IOM has the goal of managing “migration for the benefit of all,” but it has to fulfill mandates from governments like repatriation and return operations (IOM 2012b). Moreover, IOM is heavily dependent on the United States for funding (cf. Geddes 2003:5; Geiger/Pécoud 2010: 6-8, Georgi 2010:62-63, Lavenex 2007:253). So it is not surprising that IOM, Frontex and ICMPD often have to face critical voices accusing them of merely serving the interests of Northern States and of becoming “subcontractors to the EU and its Member States” (Lavenex 2007:253). Critiques do not only arise due to their financial dependency, but also due to their lack of transparency and democratic control (cf. Geddes 2003:5; Geiger/Pécoud 2010: 6-8, Georgi 2010:62-63, Lavenex 2007:253). Most of their projects and measures are not evaluated or even known about. Nevertheless, in the public sphere, they “have the advantage of being regarded as impersonal, value-neutral, not self-interested and hence, technocratic actors whose purpose is not the exercise of power, but equitable problem-solving”, which might be a further explanation for the increasing importance of such organizations (Lavenex 2007:253). Still, it is undeniable that the organizations are “instrumental to EU interests in managing migration better” (Lavenex 2007:257).

Their practices do include, which can be seen as the practices of migration management at the same time, counter-trafficking efforts, training of civil servants in irregular migration and border control, development of migration policies, return migration and readmission programs, development-focused projects trying to use the positive potentials of migration in transit and ending countries. A very important characteristic of these practices is the dependence on domestic actors. Intergovernmental organizations like the ICMPD and the IOM cannot implement their activities without the cooperation of government agencies, non-governmental organizations, local actors and other international organizations (cf. Geiger/Pécoud 2010: 6-8). How these practices and activities are implemented in The Gambia will be examined in the empirical chapter.

3.3.1 ICMPD

The ICMPD was founded in 1993 on the initiative of Austria and Switzerland. As the two states were affected by the migration-related developments after the end of the Cold War and did not take part in the exchange of knowledge and the consultations in “Intergovernmental Consultations on Asylum, Refugees and Migration Policies in Europe, North America and Australia”, they founded ICMPD to develop a long-term migration policy with the focus on Eastern Europe (Hess 2010:96). The historical context of beginning EU harmonization in migration and asylum policies was also very important.
given the framework for the foundation of ICMPD. The overall aim was supporting the harmonization process of migration policy on the supranational EU level and capacities of migration regulation of the European States. The focus was predominantly on irregular migration in the beginning (cf. Hess 2010:96; 101). Over the last years, different themes were added to the agenda of ICMPD and the regional focus was widened as well. Today, the hierarchically organized, semi-private institution is one of the leading intergovernmental organizations in the migration policy field. It counts 11 Member States and 60 staff members at the Vienna headquarters, compared to other international organizations in the field like IOM and UNHCR, it is still small and European-based (cf. Hess 2010: 98; 101).

ICMPD wants to “serve as a support mechanism [...] and provide expertise in the newly emerging landscape of multilateral cooperation on migration and asylum issues”. (ICMPD 2009) The importance of the ICMPD as service-based institution for the European Commission and the externalization of European Migration policy toward Africa, Central Asia and the Far East can be shown in its role in promoting the “Global Approach to Migration” in the Eastern and Southeastern Regions (EC 2007). Since 2002, the ICMPD functions as Secretariat for the “Dialogue on Mediterranean Transit Migration” (MTM) in cooperation with Frontex and Europol, which is directed toward Maghreb and sub-Saharan countries, as it has also been doing for the Barcelona Process since 1994 (cf. Hess 2010:102). 90% of the budget is secured through project financing from the EU or national governments, just as in the case of the IOM. The areas of these projects are mainly border management, visa facilitation, return and readmission politics and anti-trafficking (cf. ICMPD 2009).

Concrete activities are, for example, the leading role in the Barcelona Process and the so-called MTM process (cf. MTM 2008). That ICMPD is also following security-led approaches can be shown in the cooperation with Frontex and Europol, but also in some of the statements on goals of the MTM: “preventing irregular migration and thus creating the conditions for legal migration” (MTM 2008). The same actors collaborate on the so-called I-Map, which is an internet-based digital map trying to chart migration flows in African and Mediterranean regions in real time. A data archive will be established, which will form the base for “Migration Profile Reports” because migration policy development requires the “accessible and comparable information, data and statistics” as explained in the project proposal (Cited after Hess 2010:110). So the importance of knowledge production and dissemination is a big issue for ICMPD as can also be shown in The Gambian Case. Despite the fact that the focus of the discussion was still on migration control, for the first time, North and sub-Saharan African countries were discussing with ICMPD, Frontex and Europol on an egalitarian level. Beforehand, the top-down approach
of the EU was omnipresent and there was not much room left for dialogue and discussion (cf. Hess 2010:111).

“The tendency for states to send international organizations in order to not dirty their hands is annoying.” (Zürchner 2008 after Hess 2010:104). Nevertheless, they want to “support the governmental actors so that they can do this task in the best way for themselves, but also in the interest of the migrants.” (Hoffmann 2008 cited after Hess 2010:104). The main task is the facilitation of states and they clearly state that ICMPD has no independent policy making function. In the interviews Hess conducted with ICMPD staff, the predominant key words for the services to Member States, trying to make clear that ICMPD was not making policies, were: “Knowledge”, “neutral information”, “advice” and “expertise” (Hess 2010:105). Knowledge productions in themselves can also be functional and are in most cases, like Hess also points out: “[…] It is getting more and more difficult to draw a line between scientific knowledge production on the one hand and operative knowledge production with the objective of controllability and governmentality on the other (Hess 2010:112).

Of course, it is undeniable that ICMPD also has its political positions and “hidden ways” of policy-making, for example, conclusions on consultation processes within the Barcelona Process are often written in advance. Very important to note in the overall context of attempts to control migration and the notion to strengthen regulation is that leading officials of ICMPD do not believe their selves in migration control and acknowledge the autonomy of migration: “For the public, it seems to be good to use this term [migration management] in order to show that the government has migration under control, but people are not stupid and they notice that this is not true.” (Zürchner cited after Hess 2010:103-104).

The close relationship to the EC as an implementing organization becomes further clear through the project MIEUX. Migration EU Expertise (MIEUX) is a joint EC-ICMPD initiative. The main aim is to support “third countries in addressing irregular migration and mixed migratory flows as part of a comprehensive approach to migration management through peer-to-peer transfer of knowledge and experience by EU Member States’ experts” (ICMPD 2011). As clearly stated, the actions concentrate on addressing migratory flows, particularly irregular flows and not on other parts of “migration management”, so it can be assumed that migration and development and the promotion of positive potentials for migration remain underrepresented in the discourse as well as in practice. This assumption experiences affirmation when looking at the potential actions, which the ICMPD offers assistance for through MIEUX: Border management, management of mixed migration flows, visa management, reception and detention capacities, identification procedures, international legal and human rights norms and
standards, data collection, analysis and data protection laws, integration measures, asylum and international protection issues, return and readmission, document security and biometrics, trafficking in human beings, victim protection and support, human smuggling, Unaccompanied minors (ICMPD 2011).

MIEUX I was running from 2009-2011, while MIEUX II is the follow-up program for 2012-2015. Though already in the first project phase, the ICMPD claimed to assist in developing a comprehensive approach on migration management, it becomes clear that the focus was on irregular migration and human trafficking when looking at the description of MIEUX II: “MIEUX II […] now offers a larger and broader scope of intervention to encompass all thematic areas of migration management. […] the scope now includes legal migration, labor migration, migration and development, migrant rights and asylum and protection systems (ICMPD n.y.b). In any case, the Global Approach was already adopted in 2005 and bearing its three main areas, legal migration, irregular migration and migration and development in mind, very little of the above mentioned potential actions are in alignment with the areas of legal migration and migration and development (cf. Commission of the European Communities 2008: 2; Commission of the European Communities 2006; ECMPD 2010:3).

3.3.2 IOM
For a better understanding of the activities and policies of the IOM, the historic genesis of the organization must be considered. The IOM was actually founded 1951 to facilitate overseas emigration after the Second World War to counteract to “over-population” in Western Europe. During the Cold War, the organization became the facilitator of resettlement of Eastern European refugees, where it also took an ideological role in the Cold War by sowing Western superiority. From the 1960s to the 1980s, IOM primarily managed the refugee flows from the CSSR, Chile and Vietnam. From the 1980s onwards, it served the Western powers in trying to control migration and hamper the unintended and unexpected outcomes of the globalization process (cf. Georgi 2010:52-53; 66; Lavenex 2007:256). The war in Bosnia and Kosovo and the planned EU Eastern Enlargement, the Amsterdam Treaty, the Tampere Programme strengthening the role of the EC, established the conditions for further expansion and greater involvement of the IOM in the European migration policy field. From 1998 to 2008, the IOM’s membership grew from 67 to 125. It was also about that time that the IOM, as predominant actor, developed the “migration management” concept, going along with managerial concepts in other spheres of public organization like education, security and water, for example (cf. Georgi 2010:56). The focus turned to combating illegal migration, human trafficking, the establishment of control institutions and other measures to control irregular migration
Nowadays, the IOM is the second largest intergovernmental organization in the migration field, only the UNHCR is bigger. The great difference to UNHCR though is that the organization is, in its actions, only responsible to its funding Member States and not to international law. IOM has often been the subject of criticism to NGOs like Amnesty International and Human Rights Watch and has been accused of human rights violations of migrants, which should actually be the target group of their assistance (cf. Georgi 2010:45; HRW 2005). Georgi clearly states rooted in Neogramscian theories: “[…] the practices of IOM migration management are conducted in the interest and for the benefit of the dominant or hegemonic social forces in its major donor states, which are mainly Western industrialized countries” (Georgi 2010: 66-67). The Human Rights Watch Organization comes to similar conclusions when examining the work of IOM: “IOM cannot be guided disproportionately by the dictates of individual Member States that are willing to fund projects that promote their particular state interests, but which do not necessarily take fully into account the rights of migrant and refugee populations” (HRW 2005). Nevertheless, the financing of IOM is mostly project-based and the IOM can only implement the activities financed within a project, mostly funded by one of its Member States. IOM is highly dependent on its donors who are also the determents of the activities implemented (cf. Georgi 2010:63). Many perceive IOM “as an agency that will do anything as long as there’s money with which to do it” (ICVA 2004).

This does not mean that IOM does not have its own dynamic and policies. As already mentioned above, the IOM played a crucial role in defining the overall present migration management concept, which shows that the IOM has its own political interests. Due to its competitive, private constitution, it is constantly fighting for political influence, institutional consolidation, expansion, financing and survival of its staff, the organizations must also follow their own corporate policy (cf. Georgi 2010:67). The ambivalence of IOM can also be shown in its activities:

- Traditionally, the IOM supports emigrants, migrant workers and resettled refugees in the prearrangement and in the post processing of their travel, in the placement with employers abroad and in facilitating remittances.
- The IOM supports states in capacity building for migration control. They implement trainings for border guards, politicians and public servants and they also give advice on policies, laws and measures like institutional building and capacities for migration control.
- IOM also takes a part in operative migration control, like information campaigns and knowledge production, but IOM also runs detention, reception and deportation camps and other activities in immigration and border management.
harshly criticized practice is the assisted voluntary return programs that support migrants financially who want to return to their countries of origin. The IOM itself categorizes the return program under the theme “Regulating migration” (IOM 2012b).

- IOM conducts emergency operations after natural disasters and wars.
- The IOM conducts a great deal of research and publishes reports, magazines and books and takes part in the competitive discourse production of migration policy (cf. IOM 2012b; Georgi 2010:47-48).
- The IOM also has its policy on migration and development and, for example, forms part of The European Commission-United Nations Joint Migration and Development Initiative (JMDI) together with the UNDP, the EU and the UN High Commissioner for Refugees, the UN Population Fund and the International Labour Organization (cf. IOM 2012a). When it comes to the description of the vision on migration and development, the IOM states that: “Maximizing the positive relationship between migration and development has long been a focus of IOM’s work.” And of course, the IOM wants to support the positive potentials of migration for the benefit of both societies and migrants and contribute to sustainable development and poverty reduction.” (IOM 2012a). Taking a deeper look into the described approach of the IOM, the already recognized analyzed patterns of the preventive root causes approach feasible to conduct the “keeping them there” policy: “IOM’s approach addresses the root causes of migration by providing interventions in areas vulnerable to high rates of economically motivated migration” (IOM 2012a). So clearly, the patterns present in the EU discourse and activities on trying to link migration and development policies can also be found in the IOM’s approach.

Nevertheless, Georgi (2010) points out that the IOM is not following its own motive “migration for the benefit of all” because it supports the externalization of border controls with capacity building, research, assisted voluntary return programs and not to forget, the millions of migrant workers being illegalized through policies and laws based on IOM drafts. Of course, this applies only the working class, while highly qualified workers are recruited by employers in Western countries (cf. Georgi 2010:67-68). Georgi comes to the conclusion that “The world population is divided and distanced along class lines by the surveillance of movements, by border fences, detention camps and deportations - in short by a migration management. The IOM participates in building and reproducing this system. […] IOM manages migration for the benefit of only some.” (Georgi 2010:68).
### 3.3.3 Frontex

A very important aspect of the externalization approach is the external border control, arguing from the fall of internal borders, the external borders needed to be strengthened. For that, the EU established a specialized body: The European Agency for the Management of Operational Cooperation at the External Borders of the Member States of the EU, called Frontex. The establishment of Frontex fits into the general notion in external governance of migration control of institution building and outsourcing of competencies to intergovernmental organizations. Frontex was established by the Council Regulation (EC) 2007/2004 as community body having a legal personality as well as operational, administrative and budgetary autonomy. It started its work in May 2005 and its seat in Warsaw/Poland (cf. Laitinen 2007: 129; Mitsilegas 2007: 365-366; Vaughan-Williams 2008:65-66). Laitinen (2007) designates Frontex as a “key player in the implementation of the concept of EU Integrated Border Management” (Laitinen 2007:128) while Vaughan-Williams sees the agency as key player of the “integrated border security” and further points out its history of origins in the context of the “war on terror” and that its broad latitude is legitimized through the fight on terror (Vaughan-Williams 2008:66). Kasparek (2010) also states that “there is no denying that Frontex is first and foremost an instrument of European border management” (Kasparek 2010:120). Frontex mission is the complementation of national border control and the “coordination of intelligence driven operational cooperation at EU Level” (Laitinen 2007:128). Aside from implementing border checks and surveillance, Frontex is also conducting risk analysis and crime intelligence and working on the detection and investigation of cross-border crimes.

Laitinen describes the “Four-tier Access Control Model" which consists of the following core activities:

- “Measures in third countries
- Cooperation with neighboring countries
- Border control,
- Control within the area of free movement, for example return operations” (Laitinen 2007:129).

The management of external borders is at the top of the agenda, while Frontex is also training national border guards and doing research on control (cf. Laitinen 2007:130; Mitsilegas 2007:367). The complementation of national border control and management becomes manifest in the assistance to Member States requiring increased technical assistance and operational assistance, in coordinating and supporting joint return operations and the coordination of Member States joint actions, etc.. Frontex predominantly acts as a coordinator and contributor to inter-agency cooperation for border management including many stakeholders and actors like border guards,
customs, police, national security and other relevant authorities. The agency does not have its own technical and human resources. When Frontex is required to intervene or assesses the need to intervene, an initiative is drafted, including a risk analysis, which is followed by a consultation with the Member States whose territory is affected (cf. Laitinen 2007:132; Mitsilegas 2007:368-369; Vaughan-Williams 2008:65).

Joint operations are often coordinated by Frontex, but Member States’ resources and expertise are always involved because Frontex does not have its own resources. For example, coordinated the sea operations, HERA, at the Canary Islands and in Malta in summer and autumn 2006. Experts of the Member States were distributed at sight to give support in interviewing the migrants to find out their home country in order to facilitate their return. Another Frontex operation, called NAUTILUS, was in regard to coordinating the deployment of technical assets such as vessels and aircrafts to tackle migration flows to Malta and Italy and the Canary Islands. Frontex also established the European Border Patrol Network at the southern maritime borders as a cooperation model for the open sea. The Patrol Network is supposed to work as a permanent joint operation. Likewise, Frontex established joint support called the RABITs The Rapid Border Intervention Teams, which can be deployed more quickly and effectively (Laitinen 2007:133-134, Kasparek 2010:126-127). It must be questioned that the maintenance and respect of human rights are not included in the regulation, neither is data privacy protection. Frontex is increasingly networking with other agencies and actors and is closely working with Europol, for example, as well as with third states (cf. Mitsilegas 2007:372, Krause 2008:261-262). Mitsilegas argues that Frontex is increasingly profiling as executive power and working beyond its role as technical supporter and coordinator. Frontex is better comparable to other agencies under the third pillar like Europol and Eurojust (cf. Mitsilegas 2007: 374-375). Mitsilegas further questions the legal basis of the tasks and its autonomy of decision: “However, the legal basis of the powers and tasks of the agency are still unclear.” (Mitsilegas 2007: 374). The agency’s tasks are not related to the Commission, Parliament or Council, but to the respective Member State and its perception of the necessities of the external border management (cf. Guild/ Bigo 2010: 268).

As critical voices on Frontex role arose, particularly considering the obligation to international protection, the UNHCR started an exchange of letters with Frontex in June 2008, in order that the agency contribute to the fulfillment of the international protection obligations of the Member States and respect the “non-refoulement”. There are some activities planned to ensure the achievement of these aims: Regular consultation, exchange of information on migratory flows to the EU, preparation of training materials, tools and participation in border management, sharing information on joint operations.
and ad hoc activities as well as an annual review of the exchange of letters (cf. Guild, Bigo 2010: 276-277).

3.4 Frameworks of Cooperation with African countries

3.4.1 The COTONOU Agreement
In the last years, the EU strengthened the will to work on a partnership with the African Union and ECOWAS. An ongoing dialogue should take place on the basis of Article 13 of the COTONOU Agreement. The article has not changed since 2000, although there were discussions to do so, particularly to change the name of the article into “Migration and Development” (cf. Koeb/Hohmeister 2010). According to Adepoju et al. (2009), the link-up of migration control and development was established through the incorporation of the migration article in the COTONOU Agreement. The focus is still on readmission and return, which reflects the interests of the EU. Adepoju et al. note that the incorporation of the article is characterized by power imbalances and that the ACP countries struggled against the inclusion of the readmission obligations, but they had to resign and the readmission obligations were included (cf. Adepoju/ van Noorlos/ Zoomers 2010: 65). The formulation on readmission truly seems to be very harsh and does not leave the ACP countries much space for action or protest: “Each of the ACP States will accept the return of and readmission of any of its nationals who are illegally present on the territory of a Member State of the European Union at that Member State's request and without further formalities” (European Commission 2006: COTONOU Agreement 2000). Another indicator for the use of power politics in linking migration with development aid is, for example, the aforementioned proposal for punitive measures (2003) on countries that did not collaborate in irregular migration control made by UK and Spain at the Seville Council in 2003. On the other hand, countries of emigration and transit migration to Europe are also in a good position to claim more development aid for collaborating in migration control (cf. Adepoju/ van Noorlos/ Zoomers 2010:62).

Nevertheless, a broad range of issues are addressed in the migration article and not just readmission, which does not yet shed any light on the practice. There should also be a focus on institution and capacity building in the ACP countries as well as: “The Parties consider that strategies aiming at reducing poverty, improving living and working conditions, creating employment and developing training contribute in the long term to normalizing migratory flows.” (European Commission 2006: COTONOU Agreement Article 13 on Migration). So the EU expectation is that investment into poverty reduction projects leads to economic growth and in combination with support of private
development sector and regional integration, these factors will boost job creation, which will consequently halt the flow of irregular migrants (cf. Adepoju/ van Noorlos/ Zoomers 2010:65). This logic is a strong reminder of the root causes approach as well as the Neo-classical model presented and criticized in the theoretical chapter. The next paragraph also deals with combating irregular migration through prevention policies: "Issues arising from illegal immigration with a view to establishing, where appropriate, the means for a prevention policy." (European Commission 2006: COTONOU Agreement Article 13 on Migration). So fighting illegal migration is still very present and the prevention policy will be made fruitful for it. As a consequence of the incorporation of the migration article into the COTONOU Agreement, the migration issue is involved in the programming of the 10th EDF (Neisser 2007: 153). Adepoju et al (2009) argue that offering development aid and tackling the root causes of migration may seem to be positive at first sight, but that development aid and migration policy nexus might be harmful because it might lead to an imbalance. The focus might shift from poorer countries to emigration countries, as the latter are also the ones receiving more aid (cf. Adepoju/ van Noorlos/ Zoomers 2010:61).

As shown above, the DG for Development and External Relations shared those solicitudes that lead to a deferment in naming an official for migration issues and dealing with it.

3.4.2 The EU's Global Approach on Migration

In October 2005, the heads of state discussed migration and development issues and partnerships with third countries at an informal summit in Hampton Court (cf. Council of the European Union 2005b:1). According to Collett (2007), it was the British EU Presidency pushing the idea of “a balanced, global and coherent approach, covering policies to combat illegal immigration and, in cooperation with third countries, harnessing the benefits of legal migration”, but Spain was also a driving force behind the establishment of the Global Approach, particularly due to the happenings in Ceuta and Melilla (Gobierno de Espana 2006; Collett 2007:1). The outcome was that in December 2005, the European Council adopted the “Global Approach on Migration” (Collett 2007:1, Council of the European Union 2005b:1). Factors for the development of the Global Approach were the crisis and insufficiency of the security-led approach, the happenings in Ceuta and Melilla in 2006, in particular, and the recognition by the EU Member States that control-led approaches are insufficient and inadequate for addressing the migration flows from countries outside the EU: For Collett, the Global Approach is “moving the EU away from the Fortress Europe Approach” (Collett 2007:1). The Global Approach is not a new concept and many of its contents were already present in the Hague Programme as
well as in the Tampere Programme. The European Commission is pointing out ten policy priorities for the next years and among them are also to “Define a balanced approach to migration management by developing a common immigration policy which addresses legal migration at Union level, while further strengthening the fight against illegal migration, smuggling and trafficking in human beings, in particular women and children.” (Commission of the European Communities 2005; Neisser 2007: 151-152). Other activities that were planned in the Hague Programme relating to the partnership with third countries were the improvement of the capacities of third countries to improve the capacity for migration management and refugee protection. The EU seeks to prevent and combat illegal immigration by informing on legal channels for migration, resolving refugee situations by providing better access to durable solutions, building border control capacity, enhancing document security and tackling the problem of return. So within the partnerships with third countries, there are a great deal of activities planned to combat irregular migration (cf. Neisser 2007:151-152; Baldaccini 2007:282-283, Official Journal of the European Union 2005:6-7). Euractiv even argues that the focus is on the return policy: “A policy to expel and return illegal immigrants to their countries of origin” was one of the main points of the program (Euractiv 2005). Nevertheless, the emphasis is also on enhancing dialogue on migration and development and integrating migration in the country and regional strategy papers, likewise, there is reference made to the humanitarian security; the Commission wants to intensify Member States’ cooperation in preventing further loss of life resulting from attempts to enter the EU illegally, mainly in the Mediterranean” (Official Journal of the European Union 2005:7). The main policy areas of the Global Approach become much clearer in the communications of the Commission on the Global Approach in the years 2006 and 2008: “Management of legal migration, the fight against irregular immigration, and migration and development” (Commission of the European Communities 2008:2; Commission of the European Communities 2006; ECMPD 2010:3). The priority actions are focusing on Africa and the Mediterranean and the main aim is to gain more coherence in the areas external relations, development and employment (cf. Neisser 2007:154-155).

Collett claims that the approach is presented as “Migration and Development Plus” and that there is a shift in the perception of migration by also regarding the positive opportunities and impacts of migration for development. Collett states that the approach is “now the central conceptual thrust behind activities within the EU immigration policy sphere” (Collett 2007:1). Since then, international stakeholders also focus on a positive migration and development nexus. “Migration and Development” was a subject of a high-level dialogue at the UN General Assembly in 2006 that resulted in the creation of a Global Forum on Migration and Development, which unified 155 States Representatives
in 2007 to discuss pro-development migration policies (cf. Commission of the European Communities 2006:3). Aubarell et al. see the Global Approach as an introduction to “the possibility of combining border security and protection with socio-economic and development aspects” or as to say, the alleviation of the root causes or the push factors of migration (cf. Aubarell/Zapata-Carrera/Aragall 2009:10; Collett 2007:1). Aubarell et al. (2009) state that: “Strategies aimed at tackling the root causes of migration or at expanding collective responsibility, to prioritize development, co-exist with security-oriented policies.” (Aubarell/ Zapata-Barrero/ Aragall 2009: 10). Nevertheless, efforts to combat the root causes of migration can still be interpreted as a “keeping them there” policy and control measures in a different light that follow the logic of more development for less migration (cf. Haas 2007:3; Bakewell 2007:35).

Further aims are the creation of migration support teams, capacity building for combating irregular migration and building migration centers for legal migration and establishing mobility packages (cf. Commission of the European Communities 2006). Collett criticizes that the infrastructure for border control and capacity building are already existent while channels for legal migration still need to be created that can fail through the powers remaining by the nation states over the decisions of who enters or not (cf. Collett 2007:3).

The Commission also points out: “However, 2006 has also seen a further increase in migratory pressure on the EU, particularly on its southern borders. Actions must therefore be further increased and enhanced in a comprehensive way to increase the capabilities of the EU to face the challenges linked to migration.” (Commission of the European Communities 2006:11). So as can be seen, the commitments to the alleviation of root causes, the promotion of legal migration and the encouragement of the migration development nexus are still behind the priorities of control measures.

3.4.2.1 Enhancing Dialogue on Migration with African Countries
One of the most important objectives of the Global Approach on Migration is enhancing the dialogue with African countries. The Joint EU-Africa Strategy will be the mechanism in use for dialogue and cooperation on migration (cf. ECMPD 2010:3; Collett 2007:3). Also at the international level outside the EU framework, there were several developments on enhancing dialogue with African countries, as for example, the UN High-Level Dialogue on Migration and Development or the Global Forum on Migration and Development.

3.4.2.1.1 Rabat Conference
The Rabat Ministerial Conference was a joint initiative of Morocco, Spain and France and was set in July 2006. Its aim was to provide a dialogue between EU and African
countries and the two political bodies, the European Union and African Union on Migration and Development. The Conference can be seen in the general context of the Global Approach because it was already stated as an objective in the Global Approach of the Council: “Make migration a shared priority for political dialogue between the EU and the African Union” (Council of the European Union 2005b).

Some common responses to migratory flows along the West African route were discussed. The ministers settled on the partnerships focusing on the fight against poverty and the promotion of substantial development in African states (cf. Neisser 2007:152; Euro-African Ministerial Conference on Migration and Development 2006: Rabat Declaration, ECMPD 2010:3, Collyer 2008:2) The ministers came to the understanding that: “The management of migratory flows cannot be achieved through control measures only, but also require a concerted action on the root causes of migration, in particular through the implementation of development projects in Africa.” (Euro-African Ministerial Conference on Migration and Development 2006: Rabat Declaration). But in the same declaration, they came back to the same old aims like the combat against illegal migration and the ministers concluded that “effective action must be taken against illegal migration, smuggling of and trafficking in human beings, in the framework of a viable and united partnership” (Euro-African Ministerial Conference on Migration and Development 2006: Rabat Declaration). As discussed above in the theoretical chapter about migration policies from a southern perspective or in this particular case West African countries, one of the negative aspects of the migration development nexus and one of the negative consequences of “attracting skilled migrants” policies of the EU and its Member States is the high Brain Drain rate in sending countries, particularly in the health sector, which deprives the countries from many potentials for development. In the Rabat Conference, the concern about this issue was also addressed, but no concrete actions were formulated or even contemplated: “concerned by the phenomenon of brain-drain which holds back the development of countries of origin by depriving them of quality skills, leadership and experienced workers.” (Euro-African Ministerial Conference on Migration and Development 2006: Rabat Declaration). By looking further into the declaration, it becomes clear which interests are still in the forefront, although the approach to it seems to be more cooperative: “the fundamental issue of controlling migratory flows and is based on the strong conviction that the management of migration between Africa and Europe must be carried out within the context of a partnership to combat poverty and promote sustainable development and co-development.” (Euro-African Ministerial Conference on Migration and Development 2006: Rabat Declaration).

Kohnert (2007) argues that the predominant perspective is still focusing on security and prevention and that the potentials of development for both sides do not get enough
attention. He further points out that it was at the conference in Rabat that the African partner accepted the demand of European countries to foster their stronger commitment, cooperation and involvement in the surveillance and prevention of irregular migration by referring to the Rabat Action Plan. Though the ministers also admitted that control at land and sea would not be enough to condemn irregular migration. A greater emphasis on possibilities of circular migration and employment opportunities in the countries of origin will be pursued either way. But, the final actions were only about the construction of reception camps or concentration camps and even the possibility of processing asylum claims outside the EU territory were discussed (cf. Kohnert 2007:45). According to Aubarell et al. (2009), the Rabat Conference was one of the first stages for outlining EU priorities for the future: “Prioritizing development and including African countries in the external EU policy on migration.” (Aubarell/Zapata-Barrero/Aragall 2009: 9). There was a follow-up meeting in Madrid in June 2007 and another one in November 2008. In the follow-up meetings, the emphasis was much more on legal migration and migration and development, so slowly but surely, the focus of the EU-African relations started to change to more development issues. Though, of course, the traditional interests of the EU combating irregular migration, return and readmission were still present (cf. Collyer 2008:3).

3.4.2.1.2 Tripoli Conference
The EU-African Union Meeting on Migration and Development in Tripoli in November 2006 brought all the African and European Ministers together. The ministers were “Recognizing that illegal or irregular migration cannot be addressed by security considerations only, but should be based on broader development of frameworks and on mainstreaming migration in development strategies.” (European Union 2006: Tripoli Declaration). Poverty and development were finally addressed: “Finding concrete solutions to the problems posed by illegal or irregular migratory flows by regulating the influxes of migrants from Africa within the context of genuine partnership that ensures the eradication of poverty, unemployment and diseases thereby achieving comprehensive and sustainable development.” (European Union 2006: Tripoli Declaration). On any account, the EU still highlights that: “The Conference should be seen in the context of the comprehensive approach to migration that the European Union is developing.” (Communication Department of the European Union 2006). It is not deniable that there were some acknowledgements made to make the migration development nexus fruitful and consider development policies and poverty reduction strategies in a comprehensive approach on migration. Aubarell et al. (2009) even state that the comprehensive strategy on migration was adopted in Tripoli (cf. Aubarell/
Zapata-Barrero/ Aragall 2009: 9). The Tripoli Conference was the basis of the EU-Africa Partnership on Migration, Mobility and Employment adopted in 2007 at the General Summit of the EU and the AU in Lisbon, which is a further measure that can be interpreted as a step toward a comprehensive Global Approach on Migration (cf. ECMPD 2010:3, Collyer 2008:3).

### 3.4.2.2 Policy Outcomes of the Global Approach on Migration

Collyer (2008) sees the Rabat Conference and the Conferences in Tripoli as most successful elements and outcomes of the Global Approach on Migration (cf. Collyer 2008:2). Some practical implementations of the incorporation of migration in the Development Corporation, as to say, in the COTONOU Agreement, the launch of the Global Approach and the dialogue conferences in Rabat and Tripoli can already be found when looking at the focus region of West Africa. In September 2006, the EU and Mali launched a migration agreement in exchange for development aid, which can be seen in the context of the “Migration, Mobility and Employment Partnership of the Joint Africa-EU Strategy, adopted in 2007 as a follow-up of Rabat and Tripoli. The EU Pilot Project in Mali attempts to make the guest worker scheme fruitful for Africa and can be seen as a follow-up to the Conferences in Rabat and Tripoli. The project aims to boost local economies and reduce irregular migration at the same time. There will be job centers, so-called Migration Information and Management Centers, created in Mali, Senegal and Mauritania, which will give information about opportunities for legal labor migration. The aim was to meet the demand of low-skilled workers in agriculture, construction and the cleaning sectors in the European labor markets, which will also reduce the high supply of low-skilled laborers in African countries (cf. Adepoju/ van Noorlos/ Zoomers 2010: 60-61; Collett 2007:3; ECDPM 2010:3). Kohnert criticizes these concepts of circular migration because they blind out the negative social aspects in receiving and sending countries. Furthermore it is only a short-term solution for a long-term problem (cf. Kohnert 2007:46). Nevertheless, it is a beginning for trying to make the migration development nexus fruitful.

Senegal had two short-term cooperation projects with the EU in 2006. The Senegalese authorities contributed to surveillance operations, facilitated repatriation and rehabilitation of returnees. The EU provided local support for non-state actors engaged in migration. In total, Mali, Senegal, Mauritania and Morocco have signed lucrative agreements with the EU so far and Guinea-Bissau will be the next to do so (cf. Adepoju/ van Noorlos/ Zoomers 2010:61). Morocco, for example, received capacity building in national employment and migration agencies, which can be seen as a further positive development (cf. Commission of the European Communities 2011:2).
In May 2006, the proposal on “Circular migration and mobility partnerships between the European Union and third countries” was published, which can be seen as a further follow-up instrument of the Global Approach. Mobility partnerships set the legal framework for migration management with countries of origin, which is conditioned on the cooperation on irregular migration and readmission. To make a long story short: If third countries do not cooperate in combating irregular migration, their citizens will not have access to the EU. The problem is that the commitments on access to the EU are dependent on the willingness of nation states to let economic migrants enter. The only kind of visa facilitation the Commission can offer is for some categories of visitors, which is very little compared to what third countries have to commit to (cf. Collett 2007:3). Nevertheless, visa facilitation is a very important bargaining instrument for the EU when it comes to negotiations on migration Visa facilitation per se also reflects the interests of African governments (cf. Oucho 2008; Lavenex 2007). A central element of the Global Approach is a common policy on legal migrant workers, low-skilled as well as high-skilled, but Collyer assesses the efforts in that direction as very weak in the form of a proposal for a common visa application procedure, some guidelines on migrant workers’ rights and the Blue Card Directive, which aims to attract highly-skilled workers. These developments contradict the concessions for the reduction of Brain Drain, ethical recruitment and opportunities for circular migration. By now, there are some more developments in that direction: Mobility partnerships are currently piloted in Moldova and Cape Verde and there are already some ongoing negotiations with Senegal. They will give the framework for more visa facilitation, readmission and control (Collyer 2008:2; 5).

On the other side, there were also controversial developments with the emerging partnership with third countries and comprehensive character of migration policy such as the development of the European border control system, EUROSUR and the increase of the Frontex budget and the expansion of their operations. A clear burst of trust was the adoption of the return directive, which allowed Member States to put a maximum period of detention at 18 months on returnees and other very critical implications. The Commission realized and criticized that there was a lack of communication and no sign of partnership (cf. Collyer 2008:4-5; European Commission 2010a; Garcia Andrade 2010:318). Collett also mentions that there have also been proposals published on the combat of irregular immigration in the Mediterranean region, which contradicts the efforts of the comprehensive approach somehow (cf. Collett 2007:3). So though there are numerous positive developments coming along since the launch of the Global Approach, there are also still worrisome developments having the focus on border control. The ambivalent developments can also be seen in the Stockholm Programme, which is the follow-up program of the Hague Programme and the policy orientation for the years
2010-2014. The cooperation with third countries advanced into the center of migration management within the Stockholm Programme, but also a tighter cooperation among the Member States considering return decisions which will be mutually recognized. Readmission agreements in general will be designed more effectively and a common approach on readmission will be found for non-cooperative third countries. The Stockholm Programme also puts more emphasis on capacity building in third countries, but still existing control and surveillance mechanisms will be extended, while Frontex competencies will be increased in joint return operations, nationality checks and the provision of travel documents (cf. Guild/ Carrera 2010:4-5). According to Kohnert (2007), the unfair foreign trade relationships are generating more migration pressure on African people because the chances of a fair income through labor-intensive agricultural and fishery products are diminished. At the EU-AU Summit in Tripoli, the EU promised more development aid for the creation of employment opportunities in West and North African States. Nevertheless, through hampering a sustainable economic growth by the tariffs policy, high subventions that dump prices, the EU is working against its own development and pro-poor policy. The EU already recognized the need for a stronger coherence among the varying policy fields, but no actions have been pursued so far (cf. Kohnert 2007:44; Commission of the European Communities 2011:3).

Nevertheless, taking all critiques into account, it is still undeniable that there was a shift of paradigm with the launch of the Global Approach to Migration and the conferences in Rabat and Tripoli from “more development for less migration” to “better migration for more development” (Aubarell/Zapata-Carrera/Aragall 2009:18). As analyzed above, Castles also states that since the year 2000, there has been a shift once again in the perception of the migration development nexus, politicians and officials once again praise the positive potentials of international migration on economic and social development and the positive impact migration can have in the countries of origin. Previously, South-North migration was perceived as a threat to national identity, social cohesion, national security (cf. Castles 2008:3). It should be bore in mind that it was about that time that the Commission recognized that the huge decline in Europe’s working age population due to an ageing population will have negative economic effects on the stability of the internal market of the EU. The Commission therefore questioned restrictive immigration policies because the absence of a proper management may cause an increase in irregular migration. As most of the immigration issues are still national assets, the Commission asked for more harmonization and common rules on immigration such as for a common framework on the rights of third country nationals. The Commission also acknowledges the need of labor migrants at all skills levels (cf. Castles 2006:755-756).
So to sum up, the EU migration policy has made some progresses considering involving migration and development issues into the external dimension of migration policy, though it is still a long way to go to fair partnerships, which is also acknowledged by the Commission in its evaluation of the Global Approach in November 2011 by recognizing once more “the need for the EU to strengthen its external migration policy by setting up partnerships with non-EU countries”. The Commission also acknowledges the “added value of the Global Approach and the valuable results it has delivered [but] in order to reap the benefits that well-managed migration can bring and to respond to the challenges of changing migration trends, the EU will need to adapt its policy framework. This Communication puts forward a renewed Global Approach to Migration and Mobility” (Commission of the European Communities 2011:2-3). So many steps still have to be made toward a more balanced approach on migration, but there has been some progress and added value.

If this progress can also be seen in migration agreements, the most common way of working with third countries on migration, may it be control or any other migration issues, will be discussed in the following.

3.4.3 Bilateral and Multilateral Agreements on Migration with Third Countries

Since the Treaty of Amsterdam, the European Community signed several agreements with third countries on migration, in addition the readmission agreements (cf. Brouwer 2010:210). According to Adepoju et al., the agreements on migration between European Union Member States and third countries still have their policy focus on controlling migration and re-admission (cf. Adepoju/ van Noorlos/ Zoomers 2010:44). As the agreements developed in the context of rising immigration from Africa, EU countries were tightening controls and started to give financial support to African countries for border control, fighting human trafficking, strengthening their police and intelligence apparatus. Brouwer also states: “There is no doubt that there is a close relation between these readmission agreements and the measures taken by third states with regard to their external borders preventing persons to leave for the territory of the EU Member States.” Many migrants are also intercepted in transit countries, which enforced their border controls through the financial support of the EU in the framework of the readmission agreements (Brouwer 2010:210). In a Commission Communication in June 2009 ((COM) 262, p.24), the important role of third countries was emphasized once again considering the Immigration and Asylum Policy. It highlighted again that a
“comprehensive approach”, a “Global Approach” is needed based on renewed agreements with third countries. In order to prevent illegal immigration, in addition to cooperation in surveillance and border controls and facilitating return, they also aim to enhance the capacities of the central, regional and local authorities to manage migration issues. There are also several bilateral agreements between EU Member States and third countries that are not covered by the legal framework of the EU. Many of those agreements, like between Mauritania and Spain or Libya and Italy, have never been published or were never discussed in the national parliaments or the EU parliaments. That is why these agreements should be considered as exchange between economical and development aid and cooperation at the sea borders and actions to keep the citizens of the third state in the home country (cf. Brouwer 2010:210-211). The EU decided to intensify patrols in West African waters and increase police cooperation in exchange for generous development. Given that fact many West African countries started to ask for assistance, as for example, Guinea-Bissau did by asking for support from the Spanish government (cf. Adepoju/ van Noorlos/ Zoomers 2010:45). So the EU and its Member States found new incentives for cooperation and still have a privileged position when it comes to bargaining due to high financial resources, which can be made available quite easily.

The European governments are often accused of human rights violations, as Spain, for example, was accused of collaborating with Gambian National Intelligence Agency. Another accusation when it comes to refugee rights is the violation of non-refoulement principle by often executing readmission agreements without proper examination of the asylum claim. Scientists are also very critical about the lack of transparency and increased “informality” surrounding migration agreements. The arrangements for repatriation, migration control and other sensitive issues are often established outside formal agreements (cf. Adepoju/ van Noorlos/ Zoomers 2009:46). Most agreements still focus on migration control and readmission and there is only slowly a shift from repressive measures to noticeable cooperation. More cooperative elements means also taking the interest of third countries into account by boosting the economy or opening more channels for regular migration to the EU, for example (cf. Adepoju/ van Noorlos/ Zoomers 2010:42-43). An associate from the Fundamental Rights Agency (FRA) argues that there should be a stronger link between foreign policy, development policy and trade relations and return policy. She speaks out for sustainable return, for building economic and social possibilities in the home countries to make the return more sustainable. There should be changes on the macro level, not just to give the returnees small financial support for the first days. Furthermore, the associate says that in the readmission agreements, the connections to foreign and development policy are made and that there
would be the possibility to “give and take” (Employee of FRA, personal communication, 8th February, 2011). But by now, readmission agreements are connected to visa facilitation and not to reintegration policy. The expert of FRA argues that there should be a stronger focus on the reintegration policy. The European Commission is just taking a look on this issue, but up to now there are no concrete initiatives (cf. Employee of FRA, personal communication, 8th February, 2011). Migeurop and Diarra (2009) also comment that these agreements are dangerous for migrants. According to them, the agreements only facilitate the return, but they do not make sure that in the final destination, there will be a possibility for integrity and a decent life. The destination countries often lack the proper structures and facilities to receive the returnees (cf. Migeurop/Diarra, 2009). Baldaccini (2007) also argues that the focus is still on immigration control measures, burden-shifting to third countries and keeping migrants and refugees from Europe. Aid and trade concessions give incentives to cooperate in readmission, border strengthening and so on. But Baldaccini stresses that these are not the foundations on which a partnership for durable solutions and approaches on migration should be built (cf. Baldaccini 2007:297-298). Collett goes along with Baldaccini’s argumentation and also states that the focus is more on “how to prevent irregular migration than how to promote a balanced partnership” and that “support for development […] should not be linked to a country’s capacity to control emigration” (Collett 2007:4). Adepoju et al. (2009) also observed different phases in the agreements and in general, in the cooperation with third countries, which fits into the overall trends of migration policies developing between security-led interests, preventive and root cause approaches and trying to manage migration in a comprehensive manner. The first phase in cooperation with third countries was marked by deportations without consultations, inhumane conditions for migrants in host countries and violations of human rights (cf. Adepoju/ van Noorlos/ Zoomers 2010:42-43). The second phase emphasized more “dialogue and consultation” with sending countries, but with the main objective of guaranteeing the readmission to the sending countries (Adepoju/ van Noorlos/ Zoomers 2010:42-43). Zero tolerance toward irregular migrants was still the common consensus of EU policy. The second phase was also characterized by the outsourcing of responsibilities for the policing of borders to the Maghreb countries, Morocco, Libya and Algeria. Libya and Morocco were obliged to control the movements of their own nationals and others toward the Union, which led to the practice of undemocratic control policies and violations of human rights, particularly because those countries lack international human rights obligations and migrants and refugees practically do not have any rights there. These effects might lead to a further lack of success in other external policy objectives such as stability and rule of law and respect for human rights in the regions around the Union.
The third phase introduced the “carrot and stick strategy”. If countries were cooperative in border control measures and readmission, they received donations like technical and operational equipment and they were promised work quotas (Adepoju/ van Noorlos/ Zoomers 2010:42-43, Lavenex 2007). In the last few years, EU countries proposed to invest in job creation, economic growth and poverty alleviation in order to reduce irregular migration and stimulate development. Some circular migration schemes were also put in place such as the mobility partnerships. United Nations Special Rapporteur on the Human Rights of Migrants (2011) considers readmission agreements on a bilateral level (there are readmission agreements on the community level and on the bilateral level) quite positive. He gave the example of Spain and Senegal, where the readmission agreement helped in decreasing the deaths of irregular migrants coming overseas and to support economic development in Senegal. He believes that those agreements are “the right way to go to deal with undocumented migrants” (United Nations Special Rapporteur on the Human Rights of Migrants, personal communication, February 9th, 2011). Nevertheless, the EU countries are still the dominant architects and southern countries are often persuaded under pressure or financial concessions. They need to make sure their interests are included so that migration issues can no longer be used as condition for development aid. It is still a long way to go to a “development enabling” migration environment (Adepoju/ van Noorlos/ Zoomers 2010:42-43).

Considering the readmission agreements, there would still be room for improvement and the possibility to build up a more fair relationship between third countries and their nationals and the European Union and its Member States. For now, they cannot be seen as an alternative, but they have the potential to become one, as on bilateral basis, there is also proof for positive effects through the agreement.

The questions that are raised by Adepoju et al. (2009) relating to agreements on migration will also give the orientation for analyzing the national policies of: “To what extent do these agreements provide a basis for a truly global and integrated approach to migration? And are these agreements moving into the direction of a fair multilateralism, which could contribute to poverty alleviation on a global scale? Is there a common goal and do these agreements offer opportunities for optimizing the development impact of migration while minimizing the negative implications?” (Adepoju/ van Noorlos/ Zoomers 2010:43).

Adepoju et al. point out that it is still long way to go to “fair multilateralism” and “win-win” situations between the EU and sending countries (Adepoju/ van Noorlos/ Zoomers 2010: 42).
3.5 National Policies

EU Member States, particularly the southern ones like Spain, Italy, Malta and Greece, had to develop migration policies quite quickly in the last decades since each of them turned from emigration to immigration countries in a very short time. Moreover, as cooperation on migration and the harmonizing of migration policy on the EU level was pursued, the emerging immigration countries had to adapt to those policies, too. In the following chapter, a greater look will be taken on how Spain and Italy, the two countries having agreements and partnerships with the examined country The Gambia, take this role. As will be shown, both countries also have broadened their migratory agenda to the external dimensions and have taken steps toward externalizing their migration policy. Both countries are starting to take a leading role in formulating migration policy on the EU level and take leading roles in joint operations on sea surveillance, but also have their own initiatives in entering bilateral and multilateral agreements with African states on readmission and migration control as well as development and management of migratory flows (cf. Aubarrell et al. 2009: 21).

3.5.1 Spanish Migration Policy

In the 1980s, the Spanish migration policy was focused on the regularization of persons without legal status and not so much on migration control, which did not go along with the European Communities preferences in migration policy. Already, the participation in the Schengen Agreement in the early 1990s can be seen as first step toward an Europeanization of Spanish migration policies. Most of the other newer Member States ratified Schengen when they were obliged to do so by the Amsterdam Treaty in 1997 (cf. Fauser 2007:139). It is very important to note that Spain was traditionally an emigration country and that it successively became an immigration country in the 1980s and 1990s. Spain had to develop a proper migration policy quite quickly and build the institutional and judicial infrastructure for a migration policy. As the Spanish migration policy developed in the context of the already beginning harmonization processes on the European level, it was influenced by the European Community from the beginning. Important decisions on migration policy making were taken at that moment in time when harmonization between the traditional immigration countries had already started (cf. Birsl 2005:277). In the 1990s, there were already discursive approaches to the EU Migration Policy, particularly when it came to the combat of illegal migration. But it was around the turn of the century, when the Tampere Programme was formulated and the Amsterdam Treaty came into force that European Union obligations became prescriptive through directives and regulations that had to be implemented. Spain had to implement the Schengen Agreement and the Dublin
Convention, which came along with visa obligations for North African and Latin American countries. There were also significant changes in the asylum law. Pre-examination procedures for the admission to an asylum procedure were introduced, as well as the possibility for staying in Spain after a rejected asylum claim was abolished. Particularly from the year 2000 onwards, the Spanish government introduced more control measures like visa requirements and carriers sanctions (cf. Birsl 2005:213; Fauser 2007:140-141)

The Spanish migration law and policy was characterized as quite liberal before these new implications and became more restrictive at that point in time. But Spain does not align itself with all policy preferences of the EU. There is a high degree of reluctance, for example, in the area of labor migration and family reunification. Spain had the tradition of regularization measures on irregularly staying third country nationals and does not want to Europeanize that part of its migration policy, although restrictions on asylum and immigration control were integrated in Spanish law. This also depends on the ruling political party, for example, the regularization campaign was almost avoided by the conservative party in 2001 and was only pushed through with strong pressure from the Parliament and protests in the population. In 2003, the government resisted claims for regularization when, in 2005, the Socialist Party gained rule once again and implemented regularization in the same year through which 700,000 irregular migrants received official papers. The regularization in 2005 was harshly criticized from the inside by the Conservative Party “Partido Popular” and from the outside by other EU Member States, particularly by France, Austria and Germany (cf. Birsl 2005:214, 223; Gebrewold 2007:100; Fauser 2007:152-154, Pinyol 2008:1-2). Few EU Member States showed support for the initiative considering demographic and economic developments in the EU (cf. Fauser 2007:152-154). In general, there was a shift in Spanish migration policy when the Zapata government took over. A very significant step toward a more balanced approach to migration was trying to dismantle migration issues from security-led interests by moving the migration issue from the Ministry of Interior to the Ministry of Labour and Social Affairs. After the happenings in Ceuta and Melilla, the Spanish government was forced to re-orientate its external dimension of migration policy. Consequently, the Spanish government increasingly tried to link immigration policies to development policies (cf. Pinyol 2008:1-2). Within this new diplomacy, Spain developed an action plan for sub-Saharan Africa for 2006-2008, the so-called “Plan Africa”, which was followed by a second phase for 2009-2012. Countries of origin for migratory flows to Spain are now on the priority list for Spanish development cooperation (cf. Pinyol 2008:3, Gobierno de Espana 2009; Ministerio de Asuntos Exteriores y de cooperación 2006). Spain was one of the first countries, together with France, having agreements with sub-Saharan countries and showing the need for migration agreements beyond the Mediterranean
region (cf. Aubarell et al. 2009:20). As the Spanish government points out, the migration policy will be marked by a global focus which bears the causes of migration as much as the positive effects of regular migration for countries of destination and origin in mind and also the conditions in which irregular migration occurs and the negative effects for destination, transit and origin countries⁹ (cf. Ministerio de Asuntos exteriors y de cooperación 2006:35). Spain was more involved on the European level in this area and directed it to a more Spanish approach on labor migration. Spanish initiatives caused a new drive on the development of the external dimension (cf. Fauser 2007:152-154; Pinyol 2010:4). The Spanish government also sees its role and influence increasing. Particularly the EU-Africa joint conferences in Rabat, Tripoli and Lisbon came about on Spanish initiative and were characterized by the new Spanish diplomatic offensive. Spain also played a great role in developing the Global Approach on Migration (cf. Ministerio de Asuntos Exteriores y de la Cooperación 2006:35; Pinyol 2008:1-2). Nevertheless, there is a new emphasis on controlling irregular migration and regulating migration is also still observable in Spanish Migration Policy (cf. Adepoju/ van Noorlos/ Zoomers 2010:59; Birsl 2005:214). Spain also called for a greater multilateral cooperation on protecting the external borders under the coordination of Frontex. So overall, it can be said that “Spain’s dynamism gave fresh impetus to the EU’s efforts to strengthen the external dimension of immigration initiatives […] the Euro-Mediterranean partners, the African countries and those that are included within the Neighbourhood Policy have become priority regions for developing dialogue, cooperation and EU actions plans on immigration” (Pinyol 2008:3). The Spanish government captures these different activities in three dimensions: The internal dimension, the bilateral dimension and the multilateral dimension. Within the internal dimension, there are three objectives: The integration of immigrants, an orderly canalization of migrant worker flows, combating irregular employment and irregular entry to the Spanish territory and a better control of the borders and better procedures for repatriation. The internal dimension also finds its output on the European level because it was also Spain, for example, who looked at the situation of irregular emigration from the other side and handed in the proposal for the Employers Sanction Directive. Within the bilateral dimension, Spain seeks to have more cooperation agreements on migration and readmission. Conditions that increase the political will of African leaders will be created. The main objectives are the adequate regulation of migratory flows, combat on trafficking in human beings and repatriation to

⁹ El Gobierno pretende adoptar en materia migratoria con África Subsahariana un enfoque global que tenga presentes las causas de inmigración, los efectos positivos que una inmigración regular y ordenada pueden tener tanto para los países de origen como para España como país de destino, y las circunstancias en las que se produce la inmigración irregular, con efectos devastadores para países de origen, tránsito y destino de los flujos migratorios (Ministerio de Asuntos exteriors y de cooperación 2006:35).
countries of origin. On the multilateral dimension, the Spanish government seeks to support the European Union to develop and effective immigration policy. Furthermore, it tries to give support to African multilateral organizations to find “global responses to the migration question”, such as the African Union and ECOWAS (Ministerio de Asuntos Exteriores y de la Cooperación 2006: 35; Pinyol 2010: 4-5).

3.5.1.1 Cooperation with African Countries

Bilateral agreements on migration can either be police cooperation agreements, agreements on migratory labor flows or re-admission agreements. Spain is developing agreements covering all of these three categories (Aubarrell et al 2009:23). The European governments are dependent upon the cooperation with third countries concerning repatriation because there is no lawful obligation for them to take their nationals back if they are not readmitted first. And even if there are agreements between two governments, they should always maintain a good relationship and communication so that incidents like in The Gambia in September 2008 do not happen: 101 Gambian migrants were returned to Spain because The Gambian authorities did not allow them to disembark in Banjul. This occurred despite the fact that the affected migrants had been identified by a Gambian mission in Spain and that there had been an agreement on migration control between the two states since 2006 that included the readmission procedure. As soon as they were brought back to Spain, some of The Gambians had to be released because the maximum period of detention of forty days according to Spanish law was exhausted (Aubarrell et al 2009:23).

Spain has negotiated readmission agreements with Morocco (1992), Nigeria (2001), Algeria (2002), Mauritania and Guinea Bissau (2003) and agreements on migration control have been concluded within the Plan Africa with: Gambia, Guinea Bissau (2006), Cape Verde, Mali (2007), Niger and Guinea Bissau (2008). These agreements deal with several aspects of migration like the readmission process, but also, for example, they also bring up the issue of labor migration quotas that will provide opportunities for some to migrate regularly, but as Adepoju et al. point out, this is not a sufficient solution for problem of irregular migration (cf. Adepoju/ van Noorlos/ Zoomers 2010:52). In Spain, irregular workers form a vital part of the available workforce in the labor market and many employers have interest in them due to the cheap conditions. The quotas of the National Employment Agency are small in comparison to the number of irregular migrants (cf. Adepoju/ van Noorlos/ Zoomers 2010:52-53; Garcia Andrade 2010:342-343). A very interesting initiative of Spain launched in January 2007 is the issuing of labor visas for 700 Senegalese fishermen that are renewable when if they find employment in one year (cf. Adepoju/ van Noorlos/ Zoomers 2010:55). Spain started
offering development aid in exchange for fight against *illegal* migration. Spain offered The Gambia and Guinea each five million Euros of direct development aid in exchange for global migration agreements including the main components of readmission, migration control and also labor migration. In the case of Senegal, it was even ten million Euros (cf. El Pais, 9.10.2006). Nevertheless and as already mentioned several times, the UK and Spain made proposals for punitive measures (2003) that did not collaborate in irregular migration control. It must be kept in mind that these proposals were made under the administration of Aznar and the Conservative Party and that approaches to migration significantly changed under the Zapatero administration. On the other hand, this manner of linking the migration issue with development aid gives countries of emigration and transit migration to Europe a rather good bargaining position to claim more development aid (cf. Adepoju/ van Noorlos/ Zoomers 2010:62; Pinyol 2008:3). In the Spanish case, links between migration and development aid can also have positive effects. The migration pressure on Spain has put the African continent on the development agenda and tripled the amount of official development assistance. Recently, Spain has also been supporting regional and global funds on development that also benefit other development countries in the area, not just emigration countries. It is worrisome that under the cover of co-development, an increasing part of Europe’s official development aid is spent on migration control. Development money is used, for example, for strengthening the police apparatus. Spain’s agreements with The Gambia and Guinea: Capacity-building of migration-related institutions, development of a national migration policy, information campaigns on migration and recruitment schemes (cf. Adepoju/ van Noorlos/ Zoomers 2010:63). Aubarrell et al. also acknowledge that in the “new generation agreements” such as with The Gambia, Guinea-Conakry and Mali and aside from migration control, there are also elements of management of migratory flows as well as addressing the root causes and development as part of the agreements (Aubarrell et al 2009: 20). The United Nations Special Rapporteur on the Human Rights of Migrants also acknowledges the positive effects of migration agreements like the reduction of deaths on the sea mentioning the example of Spain and Senegal (cf. United Nations Special Rapporteur on the Human Rights of Migrants, personal communication, 9th February, 2011). Spain seems to be more successful in migration agreements that are cooperative and based on partnership than other European countries. It might be due to the lack of colonial ties, which enables negotiations on more egalitarian positions. Spanish diplomacy has intensified since the year 2006 and the launch of Plan Africa. Adepoju et al. assesses the Spanish efforts as quite successful in creating new relations (cf. Adepoju/ van Noorlos/ Zoomers 2010:66). Spain is trying to pursue policies in alignment with the Global Approach on Migration by trying innovative solutions within the
externalization of migration policies (cf. Aubarell et al 2009:20). Garcia Andrade argues for maintaining the border control, but also to give the same emphasis to the security approach as well as also improving living conditions in countries of origin so that the push factors for emigration can be reduced. Andrade acknowledges that the issues of employment creation and the linkages to development are already present in the political discourse of Spain, but in her opinion, they are lacking implementation (cf. Garcia Andrade 2010:345). Whether this assumption applies to The Gambian Case and will be discovered further down.

Garcia Andrade states that the main asset of these agreements is the organization of joint sea patrols between the Guardia Civil and the security forces of African countries. Spain’s major partner since 2003 has been Morocco, but in recent years, Spain has been extending its cooperational activities, agreements and memorandums of understanding to the south. Due to the enforcement of patrol and control, the irregular migrants coming from Morocco were reduced by 40%, but it caused a displacement of the routes to more distant coastal departure points in Mauritania or Senegal. From the diversification of the migration routes and the “Migration Crisis” of 2005, the Spanish government signed agreements with Senegal and Mauritania (2006), Cape Verde (2007) and with The Gambia, Guinea and Guinea-Bissau (2008) (cf. Aubarell et al. 2009: 23; Garcia Andrade 2010:319; Ministerio del Interior 2008; Wolff 2008:262-264).

3.5.1.2 Sea Surveillance
Spain is one of the main destination countries for immigrants by sea. The European Union increased the pressure on the southern Member States who are receiving states for irregular migrants by sea, due to their rising numbers. They constitute 31% of all irregular migrant compared to 50% migrants reaching by land. Still, there is the perception of a security threat and also from the humanitarian aspect of the phenomenon due to the high death toll (cf. Garcia Andrade 2010: 311). Although the country was traditionally more reluctant when considering migration countries, it developed a surveillance system for the sea and increasingly externalized control policies. In fact, this led to the development of new policy strategies beyond national border controls, which also means a shift in the territoriality principle, the main piece of sovereignty (cf. Garcia Andrade 2010:311-312). Lutterbeck points out the increasing militarization of the Spanish border surveillance at sea through the presence of security forces (cf. Lutterbeck 2006:64-65). Spanish laws were adapted in the recent years to also extend control of the seas beyond the national sea territory. Nevertheless, the laws are still in line with international laws and conventions like the United Nations Conventions on the

By extending the competencies of sea patrol, the Spanish Government established Guardia Civil Centres for the maritime surveillance of coast and borders in September 2008. As often done, the Spanish Authorities were legitimizing this step with the obligations toward the EU. The centers should help in the management and coordination of surveillance operations at sea and monitor crisis situations. There should be a coordination center in Madrid and regional centers of the Guardia Civil in Valencia for the Mediterranean surveillance, in Algeciras for the Straits, in Las Palmas for the Atlantic and in A Coruña for the Cantabrian Sea (cf. Garcia Andrade 2010:316).

New technologies can also be seen as extraterritorial control mechanisms. Spain’s step toward a technology-driven surveillance was the creation of SIVE “Integrated System of External Surveillance” under the Guardia Civil. SIVE is a system of radars with fixed and mobile sensor stations that allow the detection of suspicious vessels at a long distance even before they reach Spanish territory. This procedure enables the Guardia Civil to “wait” for the vessels until they reach the territory in order to intercept them (cf. Garcia Andrade 2010:316; Krause 2008: 287; Milborn 2006:23). According to Garcia Andrade (2010), SIVE is one of the “first instruments developed by Spain at the service of the extra-territorialization of migration-control” (Garcia Andrade 2010:317).

The Spanish government often justifies the introduction of new instruments with humanitarian purposes (to save human lives) and with the EU obligations concerning border control (cf. Garcia Andrade 2010:317). As also pointed out in the Plan Africa for 2006-2008, one of the objectives is: “el adecuado control de las fronteras para evitar la entrada ilegal y minimizar la tragedia humnaitaria que ello conlleva”, which means “the adequate control of the border in order to avoid illegal entry and minimize the humanitarian tragedy” (Ministerio de Asuntos Exteriores y de Cooperación 2006:71).

Garcia Andrade sees the argumentation with the humanitarian background of more control and surveillance quite contradictorily because the new control mechanisms create a shifting of the migration routes that often means more dangerous and longer ways and can, in consequence, even increase the death toll (cf. Garcia Andrade 2010:317).

Another technology is the utilization of SPAINSAT, a military satellite that is owned by the Ministry of Defense and has operated within the Seahorse Network since the beginning of 2009. The Seahorse Network is a project initiated by the Spanish government and funded by the EU under the AENEAS Programme. It is an intranet of encoded information that is intended to support the authorities in combating irregular migration. So far, Portugal, Senegal, Mauritania and Cape Verde are members of the
project, but the extension to Morocco, Guinea Bissau and Gambia are already in process. In the years 2009-2010, the establishment of national contact points for the Seahorse Network was funded by the EC and Europe Aid under the Thematic Programme on Migration and Asylum, while the United Kingdom of Spain had the implementing lead, which was taken by the Guardia Civil (cf. EC/Europe Aid 2010:11, Garcia Andrade 2010:318).

There are also new surveillance systems planned on the EU level such as the EUROSUR that will provide a centralized border surveillance system by giving technical assistance and information. But the EU should examine the consequences and the utility of the new technologies in use before investing on new ones (cf. Garcia Andrade 2010:318, European Commission 2010a).

According to international law, coastal states have exclusive sovereignty over their territorial waters, so if Spain wants to carry out interdiction or control activities, it has to have the permission of the sovereign state. The bilateral agreements authorize Spanish authorities to do so: “Dichos acuerdos, suscritos por tiempo indefinido, permitirán la actuación de patrulleras de la Guardia Civil, y de otros países, así como de medios aéreos, en las 200 millas de la Zona Económica Exclusiva de estos tres Estados africanos” (Ministerio del Interior 2008). National agents of the African countries must be on board because only they are entitled to enforce the legislation of the respective country in the event of an intercepted vessel. Spanish agents are neither allowed to stop them, nor are they allowed to drive them back to the mainland. Nevertheless, interdictions at sea are carried out by the Guardia Civil, which is an armed institution with a military character (cf. Garcia Andrade 2010: 315; 320). The fact is that Spanish agents are present in the African water territories most of the time, even with their own vessels under Spanish command. Their presence can also be interpreted as another instrument of extraterritorial migration control. Spain is not just sending materials and leaving it up to the African governments, it is an active part of the border control there (cf. Garcia Andrade 2010: 321, Kasparek 2010:129). The so-called “fight against irregular immigration” seems to be turning into the control of “irregular emigration” (Garcia Andrade 2010: 321). It is also very worrisome that the agreements set up with Spain also give other European countries and Frontex the right to make sea patrols in the African territories and that those agreements even serve as basis for joint operations like HERA 2008. The presence of other states’ security forces in the territorial waters is normally a breach of sovereignty under international law and a bilateral agreement between two states giving third parties the same rights is a very thin legal basis to breach that law (cf. Kasparek 2010: 128-129). During the negotiations on the agreements between Spain and Gambia and Guinea and Guinea-Bissau, the Deputy Director of Frontex was present.
because the agency bears in mind to overtake those agreements in the future (cf. Garcia Andrade 2010:332, Ministerio del Interior 2008).

Furthermore, the author points out a problematic dilemma regarding joint sea border patrols in the waters of departure countries: If there are, for example, Senegalese citizens on the intercepted vessel fleeing from political persecution and wanting to claim asylum in another country they are not entitled to do so in front of Senegalese authorities and can have even more severe problems through that. Garcia Andrade further argues that Spain is freeing itself from its international duties regarding human rights and international protection through the practice of the African states agents performing the control (cf. Garcia Andrade 2010: 322-23).

Irregular migrants retained or rescued at sea are usually brought to the Spanish mainland because sending them back would be against international human laws. Once at the mainland, they are interviewed to find out their identity and nationality so as to repatriate them in case they do not apply for asylum because they do not have proper documents that allow them to stay in Spain. The Spanish government must cooperate with the country of origin in order to be able to identify the nationality and consequently, travel documents can be issued and the respective readmission agreements come into effect (cf. Adepoju/ van Noorlos/ Zoomers 2010:52).

Spain conducted several joint sea operations against irregular migration with African countries within the bilateral agreements. For example, the ATLANTIS project in 2006 with Mauritania: Spain implemented the training of African border guards by sending Spanish liaison officers of the Guardia Civil for the establishment of a maritime service in Mauritania. Spain was also responsible for the supply of surveillance equipment (patrol boats, all-terrain vehicles and computer material). The aim of the program, which is funded by the AENEAS Community Programme and financed in a total of 60% by European Commission, was to strengthen the joint patrols. Later on after the pilot phase, there will be an extension to other African countries (cf. Garcia Andrade 2010:325-326).

The already mentioned Seahorse Project that launched in 2006 was also led by Spain and managed by Guardia Civil. Morocco, Mauritania, Cape Verde, Senegal, Italy, Germany, Portugal and France all take part in this project. Spain also set up a similar agreement with The Gambia as will be shown further down.

Spain started cooperating with Frontex quite intensively in October 2006 with the operation HERA I. As it was the “Spanish migration crisis” year, the state required more support in the identification of irregular migrants at the deportation centers. In order to prevent vessels from departing, Frontex and the Spanish government were performing joint patrols in the West African coastline, specifically at the shores of Senegal, Cape Verde and Mauritania, which was called operation HERA II. HERA III was started right
after as a follow-up program and was implementing the same operations as the previous programs including air and naval surveillance of the West African Coast. HERA has been the longest operation coordinated by Frontex so far (2006-2008). HERA was reinstated in the years 2008, 2009 and 2010 (cf. Garcia Andrade 2010: 329-330, Kasperek 2010:130).

Spain is convinced that it is the border patrol and the control measures that caused the arrivals of irregular migrants to reduce between 2006 and 2008, but Garcia Andrade argues that other factors also led to that such as the economic crisis and the diversion of migration routes to other regions. Garcia Andrade further points out that the figures in 2005 (11 781 migrants compared to 39 180 in 2006) were not very high and by then, most of the control measures in cooperation with third countries were not yet in place (cf. Garcia Andrade 2010: 327). The author further argues that the statistics on a decrease in irregular migrants are to be seen critically because they cannot include the migrants sneaking through the border controls and they cannot take account those drowning at sea. The data only includes the migrants who have been intercepted before leaving the country of departure and when trying to cross the border to Spain.

From Garcia Andrade’s point of view, “the humanitarian justification is merely incidental, as the clear objective of pre-border measures is migration control.” (Garcia Andrade 2010: 328). Others argue that it may even contribute to the increase of the death toll. The EU and its Member States do not take the effects on the third countries into account. For example, transit countries turning into immigration countries without having the capacities (cf. Garcia Andrade 2010:328). Furthermore, the controls have not prevented migrants from starting the journey but only from reaching Spanish territory and neither takes the effects on third countries in account, which makes them “short-term and self-interested measures” (Garcia Andrade 2010: 329). A deeper look at that assumption will be taken in The Gambian Case.

**3.5.2 Italian Migration Policy**

It was only in the early 1990s that Italy increasingly became an immigration country. Nowadays, Italy has some of the highest net migration rates of the Union (cf. Di Pascale 2010: 284; IDEA 2009:1). Italy had the justifiable reputation of having the highest quota of regularizations. Regularization programs were implemented in 1986, 1990, 1995, 1998 and 2002, with 2002 having the most far-reaching one in European history as well as the highest annual quota for migrants. Only Spain implemented a similar widespread regularization measure in 2005 (cf. IDEA 2009:1; Paoletti 2011).

But at the same time, Italy developed restrictive measures that led to a first law addressing immigration matters – Legislative Decree no. 286/1998 “Single Text on
Immigration and the Status of Foreigners”, which already included restrictive measures against irregular migrants, focusing on return policy and sanctions for human smugglers (Di Pascale 2010: 284).

There is increasing focus on cooperation with third countries as well as on extraterritorial control by sea that was regulated by an amendment to the Single Text in 2002. The amendment gave power to police and military ships to inspect and seize vessels that resulted in an increase of seized ships and arrests of smugglers in the period between 2004 and 2007. While there were still 121 ships seized in 2004, it was 394 in 2007. The number of persons arrested was quite small at only 24 in 2004 compared to 172 persons in 2007 (cf. Di Pascale 2010:285). IDEA (2009) also states that there was more emphasis on controlling the flow of new entries, expulsions and stricter control of the legal entry channels (cf. IDEA 2009:5). Nevertheless, “regularizations and annual quotas became a ‘chronic aspect’ of Italian migration policies” (Paoletti 2011:72). Paoletti points out that, on one hand, security mechanisms were tightened and the overall discourse on migration was characterized by the focus on surveillance and security, whereas on the other hand regularizations and annual quotas responded to labor market needs (cf. Paoletti 2011:73).

Di Pascale gives the year 2002 as a starting point for more inducement on the fight on irregular migration by the Member States at EU level, particularly during the Italian EU presidency. Special attention was given to the control of the southern maritime borders and the cooperation with third countries. The Member States argued for different policy measures on a broad range: Development assistance for the countries of origin, opening of legal channels for migration and strengthening border controls. Nevertheless, the policy focus has been on the latter, particularly from countries at the southern border like Malta, Greece, Spain and Italy (cf. di Pascale 2010:282).

Italy was working on three main points in terms of border control: The reinforcement on legislation for extraterritorial control at sea, intensification of collaboration with other EU Member States and other respective countries at the multilateral level, enhancement of bilateral agreements with countries of origin as well as transit through diplomatic efforts and legislative instruments (cf. di Pascale 2010:282).

3.5.2.1 Cooperation with African Countries

The Italian government gives a great deal of emphasis on cooperation with countries of origin and transit. Di Pascale argues that the cooperation should not only focus on control and reduction of irregular migration flows, but also on capacity building in these countries, reduction of the push factors of emigration and the creation of legal possibilities to migrate. Nonetheless, current policies have the focus on repatriation as
the main objective (cf. di Pascale 2010:285). Particularly when considering the demographic and economic needs of Italy, there should be a more comprehensive approach on migration because there is a huge gap between supply and demand of migrant labor (cf. IDEA 2009:5). However, as Paoletti has shown, regularizations and annual quotas are still the two predominant, ongoing measures as “diplomatic weapons” for negotiations with migrant-sending countries (Paoletti 2011:74).

In the 1990’s, Italy started to pressure North African countries to cooperate on migration control and to displace borders. The means were bilateral agreements on police cooperation and readmission, which were concluded with several European Union states and third countries, among them: Algeria (1999), Morocco (1998), Nigeria, Tunisia (1998), Egypt and Libya (2000). Before the readmission agreements, repatriations were carried out on the basis of police cooperation agreements, which were criticized in terms of legitimacy. Many countries received certain immigration quotas for their citizens within the readmission agreements, but under the term of cooperating effectively in migration control. Italy also used this as Nigerian political leverage as was the case with Morocco 2003: As the Italian state adjudged that Morocco was lacking proper cooperation on migration control; it lowered the quota for labor visas. Another instrument of the Italian administration on migration control is to give technical assistance to countries of transit and origin, which means the transfer of equipment and tools, training courses to improve the capacities of the respective authorities, which was the case in the cooperation with Morocco. Italian police officers are present as migration experts in diplomatic representations in several countries. In Tunisia, Algeria, Libya and Egypt, the Italian state funded processing centers for third country nationals, which point out the externalization of migration control (cf. Aubarell et al. 2009:23; Adepoju/ van Noorlos/ Zoomers 2010:49-51, 53; Di Pascale 2010:296). Second generation agreements included articles on the management of migratory flows, for example, by allowing seasonal work. And in some cases, Italy links its agreements to institutional capacity-building and financial development aid (cf. Aubarell et al. 2009: 20-21; Paoletti 2011:76). Di Pascale sees it as problematic that most of these agreements with third countries were adopted without the ratification of the parliament, although Article 80 of the Italian Constitution requires a ratification of political agreements and that migration issues form an important part of Italy’s foreign policy and of the relations with third countries is beyond doubt, so it would be recommendable to ratify them by the Parliament on a case-by-case basis (cf. Di Pascale 2010: 299).

Recently, the concerned parties often agreed on readmission matters without formalizing them or putting them in a broader framework of cooperation or other types of deals, like Memoranda of Understanding and so on. Di Pascale suggests some possible reasons
for that: “Lower visibility, better adaptability to changing circumstances, limited cost of
defection and domestic and regional security concerns.” (Di Pascale 2010: 300).

Although, Aubarell et al. (2009) acknowledges that there was a shift from pure migration control to linking migration to development under the late Romano Prodi administration, which turned back to a clearly security approach under Silvio Berlusconi (cf. Aubarell et al. 2009: 20; Paoletti 2011:77).

The cooperation with Libya can be seen as the most intense due to its strategic importance for Italy because many of the irregular migrants reaching Italy use Libya as point of departure. Due to the importance on migration control and Libya showing itself as cooperative, the EU countries even lifted the embargo against the country in order to enforce the cooperation on migration control. Since the first bilateral agreement on collaboration in combating, terrorism, organized, crime, illegal traffic of drugs and irregular migration in December 2000, more memorandums and agreements were concluded and many consultations by the Ministries of Interior followed. Libya received a great deal of technical assistance in form of vessels, equipment and a technological border control system (50% Italian funds and 50% EU funds) and they agreed upon joint patrols and joint task forces. Libya even received a compensation payment of €5 billion for the Italian colonialism (cf. di Pascale 2010:297-298).

Despite of safeguard provisions in the Italian law, Italy has been accused of having implemented several forced return operations without complying with its obligations to international protection. Many migrants were prevented from asylum applications and individual cases were not reviewed. UNHCR blamed Italy for having sent back many potential refugees to Libya where they are not guaranteed international protection and that Italy acted against the “non-refoulement” principle due to its collective expulsions (cf. Adepoju/ van Noorlos/ Zoomers 2010:47- 49; di Pascale 2010: 305-306).

3.5.2.2 Sea Surveillance

“In 2002 a General Directorate for Migration and Border Police was set up in the Department for Public Security and within the Ministry of Interior” that manages and coordinates the border control and the fight against illegal immigration It is also directly responsible for the diplomatic cooperation with third countries. The Directorate is responsible for coordinating the control operations in the international sea by the Navy, Guardia di Finanza and the Capitanerie di Porto and also for coordinating the controls in the Italian territorial waters that are performed by the police (di Pascale 2010:288). Considering the sea patrol, di Pascale points out that it is necessary to clarify the establishment of a contiguous zone because the Guardia di Fianza does not even know
where the zone under Italian jurisdiction ends exactly in order to avoid committing an
illicit act by exercising powers in another’s country territory (cf. di Pascale 2010:289).
Italy’s government has emphasized a multilateral approach in the recent years and has
used the EU presidency in the second half of 2003 to push that forward. Strengthening
coopration with third countries through direct involvement in operations and adequate
financial support was very high on the agenda. The Italian government also proposed to
establish a European Border Agency, which led to the establishment of Frontex (cf. di
Pascale 2010:291). Furthermore, there was also the common management of migration
flows, the implementation of “integrated border management” and a cost and
responsibility sharing among the Member States so that Member States with external
borders can be supported properly (cf. di Pascale 2010:289-290). Italy was involved in
almost all of the first joint operations like the “Nettuno Action” and the “Ulysses
Operation”. It also funded the “Quadro Group” consisting of Malta, Cyprus, Greece and
Italy to pay attention to the irregular migration issue at the southern borders (cf. di
Pascale 2010:291). Italy also took part in the first joint missions of Frontex, Nautilus and
migrants arriving by sea form about 10-13% of all irregular migrants in Italy, the main
part of them are “visa overstayers” and about 23% passed border controls with false
documents10 (di Pascale 2010:283).

Di Pascale also highlights that migration control patrols in the Mediterranean have not
met the aim of reducing undocumented immigration to Italy, Greece and Malta. Arrivals
on Lampedusa have increased compared to 2007, so border control alone can definitely
not be the only mean (cf. di Pascale 2010: 309). One factor was also the lacking
cooperation with Libya. While during the HERA operations, Senegal, Cape Verde and
Mauritania had signed a treaty declaring their territorial waters into part of EU external
borders, a working agreement on migration and border control including readmission
with Libya was hardly negotiated until May 2009. Libya under Gaddafi was not that easy
to pressure and convince as other states. Italy had to make a great deal of concessions
including annual 5 billion dollar payments over the following 25 years and an apology for
the crimes committed during colonial rule (cf. Kasparek 2010:131).

Di Pascale suggests, referring to the successful Albanian-Italian Cooperation,
“Increased development aid, reinforcement of institutional capacity and close police and
judicial cooperation.” (Di Pascale 2010: 309).

---

10 Italy’s contribution to the consultation process promoted by the EU Commission from September 2007
to April 2008 for the review of the EU budget for 2008-2009 is accessible at:
ec.europa.eu/budget/reform/issues/read_en.htm
3.5.3 United Kingdom

As The Gambia was a former British colony, the relationship between The Gambia and the UK was examined to see whether there are agreements on migration cooperation and at this point, none could be found. Nevertheless, the trends of the UK’s migration policy are briefly outlined. The United Kingdom did perceive itself as an immigration country for a very long time and was very reluctant in terms of immigration flows. Until the Commonwealth Relation Act in 1962, the citizens of Commonwealth Member Countries did not even need to apply for a visa to travel to the UK. The Amendment of 1971 defined the Commonwealth Member Countries as aliens for the first time. The citizens of most of the African Commonwealth Countries are visa nationals. Consequently, there was a shift within the migration flows from labor migration to family reunification and asylum claims. Immigration and asylum laws started to become even stricter in the 1990s and in the beginning of 2000. In 2002, the amended Nationality, Immigration and Asylum Act adopted the main elements of the Schengen Agreement, for example, the safe third country concept, although the UK never signed the Schengen Agreement. According to Clayton (2010), entry clearance is one of the first “interfaces” in UK’s Immigration Control and its purpose is to “prevent illegal immigration, detect and prevent crime and reduce security risk.” (Clayton 2010:403). The National Immigration and Asylum Act 2002 gave the legal power to the Home Secretary to require biometric information for the entry clearance (cf. Clayton 2010:403). The legal change goes along with the technological developments in the creation of electronic borders, e-borders. “Entry clearance is a form of prior authorization to enter the UK, granted at the diplomatic posts abroad.” (Clayton 2010:398). The entry clearance is the most common procedure today, but even nowadays, it still lacks a proper legal base. The UK laws are quite restrictive for low-skilled workers and asylum seekers and quite contrary to highly-skilled workers, particularly for citizens of Commonwealth Members (cf. Birsl 2005: 197-198; Clayton 2010:398;402).

According to Bakewell, the UK and particularly the Department for International Development has a lead in the European context in highlighting the positive potential of migration on development and trying to create a triple-win situation for countries of origin, destination countries and migrants (cf. Bakewell 2007:21). The DFID closed its branch in The Gambia in 2011 and no longer has further bilateral developmental cooperation with The Gambia. It is only through regional, multilateral initiatives such as the African Development Bank, for example. The relationship to the UK in terms of migration is simply referred to as the high Brain Drain to the UK, particularly in the medical sector. Many Gambians to the UK for study and remain there (cf. DFID 2012).
4. Case Study The Gambia

To begin, a short overview of The Gambia will be given for a better understanding of the situation at hand. The Gambia was a British colony and has been independent since 1965 and became a Republic in 1971. For several decades, the predominant ruling party was the People’s Progressive Party until the military coup in 1994. One of the leaders of the military coup was Dr. Yahya A.J.J. Jammeh, who still rules today after being elected as President in 1996. President Jammeh and the ruling party, Alliance for Patriotic Reorientation and Construction (APRC), were re-elected in 2001 and 2006 and most recently in November 2011. The Gambia is a multi-party democracy with the constitution providing for the separation of executive, legislative and judiciary powers even though the human rights situation, particularly freedom of speech and expression, a high rate of detention and arrest, corruption and interference with the judiciary is still alarming. Major problems of the small country are, for example, the high concentration of courts in the greater Banjul area, which will be tackled by institution-building in the judiciary and legal sector or the slow progress in decentralization and the lack of skilled human resources.

The predominant economic sector is the agricultural sector, employing about 70% of the entire population while just having a 30% contribution to the GDP. About 50% of the contributions to the GDP come from the sectors of tourism and re-export trade. Financial services and ITC are also emerging sectors while the manufacturing sector at 5% is well below the regional average of ECOWAS countries. The annual GDP growth rate since 2004 has stabilized on a value of 5.3% (cf. EC/The Government of The Gambia 2007:10-11).

The Gambia is divided into eight local government administrations: Two municipalities, Banjul and Kanifing that are headed by mayors and six local government areas headed by governors, namely Brikama, Masakonko, Kerewan, Kuntaur, Jangjangbureh and Basse. The six divisions of The Gambia are called Banjul City, Central River Division, Lower River Division, North Bank Division, Upper River Division and West Coast (cf. EC/The Government of The Gambia 2007: 8-10).

The Gambia is the smallest country on the African continent with 11,300 square kilometers and a population of 1.3 million with an annual population growth rate of 2.8% (cf. GBOS 2007:7; EC/ The Government of The Gambia 2007: 8-11; AHWo 2009). In 2011, the population was projected at 1.8 million people. The crude birth rate is 41 per 1000 population while the total fertility rate is 5.1 births per woman. The Gambia has a very youthful population, counting about 47% of the overall population between the ages 0-24, but as The Gambia defines youth with the age brackets 13-30, the numbers might
be even higher (cf. MOYS n.y.:3). In the National Youth Policy 2009-2018, even the percentage of 67 is indicated as being under 25 years of age (cf. MOYS 2008:VII). As far as can be seen, the numbers differ significantly, but the common feeling is that the population is very young and that is why the youth is often referred to being the backbone of the country, as will be shown in the following.

About 60% of the population lives in the rural areas while the remaining 40% live in the urban areas. It can be said that about 50% live in the urban and pre-urban area, namely the Greater Banjul Area and Western Division. The population density with 128 per square kilometers in 2003 is among the highest in Africa. The urban concentration and the high population density lead to social problems such as overcrowding, low access to social services, sanitation and housing.

About 51% of the population is female. The illiteracy rate, particularly among women, is also very high (cf. AHWO 2009; EC/ The Government of The Gambia 2007:16). The country experiences high rates of unemployment, which worsens the social problems. The Gambia is among the poorest countries in the world. In 2007, it was ranked 168 out of 177 countries in the Human Development Index (cf. UNDP 2009).

### 4.1 Migration Profile

An outline of the major trends and issues of concern on migration in The Gambia will be drawn below. The available data is very scarce. As a consequence, some of the described trends can only rely on anecdotal evidence and assessments of Gambian stakeholders.

#### 4.1.1 Internal Migrations

According to the migration analysis of the population and housing census (2003), 226,720 persons were rural-urban migrants who constitute a 16.7% of the overall population. 65% of all rural-urban migrants moved to Kanifing or Brikama, which can be categorized as urban or pre-urban areas. Banjul is not a major destination due to lack of housing facilities (cf. GBOS 2007:23). In comparison to that, just 24,298 persons migrated from the urban areas to the rural areas, so rural-urban migration is about ten times higher than urban-rural migration. Most of the people moving to rural areas are civil servants who are transferred there or they are staff members of NGOs (cf. GBOS 2007:26). Wagbou also acknowledges that the high rural-urban trend is an issue of developmental concern to African states (cf. Wagbou 2008:143). In former times, there was a great deal of seasonal migration due to farming activities. From May to November, the farmers worked on farms and from December to April, they migrated to the urban areas to work there. This trend has changed in the recent years and people tended to stay in the urban areas because the agriculture is no longer rewarding. As more and
more people stay, there are problems emerging with housing, unemployment, increase in criminality and lack of education facilities (cf. UNFPA Officer, personal communication, 4th May, 2011). As UNFPA officials point out, the problem is becoming even more severe because “Europe is also closing its doors” and it is no longer easy to settle down and get employment (UNFPA Officer, personal communication, 4th May, 2011; Youth Ambassador, personal communication, 28th March 2011). Youth Ambassador Farbakary argues the same way as the UNFPA Officer and also states that: “The rule now is leaving the country for a better search outside and mainly through illegal means or what we call here, by the back way, because a visa is not available” (Youth Ambassador, personal communication, 28th March 2011).

As pointed out by de Haas (2007), Bakewell (2007) and Castles (2008) following transitional theories, falling birth rates, moderate economic growth, urbanization and de-agrarisation are natural parts of a beginning industrialization and economic development.

4.1.2 Immigration

Though the data diverges significantly among the different sources, the overall conclusion is still that The Gambia has a high immigration rate. According to UNDP, the annual average growth rate of immigration from 1960-2005 is 4.4%. While in the year 1960, the share of immigration population was 9.9%, it increased to a share of 15.2% in the year 2005. (cf. UNDP 2009:145).

4.1.2.1 Economic Immigration

Immigrants primarily come from the ECOWAS countries, predominantly from Senegal, of course, in search of economic opportunities. About 60% of the immigrant population comes from Senegal, a further 16% originate from Guinea Conakry and the rest primarily come from Sierra Leone (5.95%), Guinea Bissau (4.79%), Mali (2.63%), Nigeria (2.04%) and Mauritania (1.98%). Just like the migrants coming from rural areas, the foreign migrants also mainly settle in Brikama and Kanifing. The Gambia does not seem to be attractive to migrants with higher levels of education since 45% of the economically active immigrants never received any formal education (cf. Wagbou 2008:144; EC/ The Government of The Gambia 2007:17; GBOS 2007:26-30). The assessment of immigration is worrisome to Gambian stakeholders and government officials in the migration field. Most of them perceive the inward migration as a problem and are concerned about the high numbers of foreigners, particularly the Senegalese, Nigerians, Ghanaians and Guineans working in the informal sector, particularly as small scale vendors and in the fishery sector, but also as mechanics and tailors and technicians. Only the Permanent Secretary of the Immigration Department recognizes the importance
of this workforce for The Gambia and the high degree of dependence on it because these economic branches lay low when immigrants travel to their countries of origin, for example, during traditional feasts. Furthermore, the PS puts the high influx of immigrants in context of the (irregular) emigration of Gambian youths and states that emigration is a further reason for the high presence of foreigners at the local market areas (cf. Permanent Secretary MOI, personal communication, 11th April 2011, Deputy Director DOYS, personal communication, 20th April 2011). Though others also acknowledge that the high presence of foreign workers at the markets and in the fishery industry cumulated out of other reasons as well and as such, a resulting lack of skills of The Gambian youth in those specific areas, some even talk about a certain kind of laziness and also highlight The Gambian tradition of the family network that tempts young people to rather stay at home (cf. UNFPA Officer, personal communication, 4th May, 2011; Deputy Director DOYS, personal communication, 20th April 2011). Njie (2008) also points out the lack of a “proper work ethic” among The Gambian youth and the need for “developing entrepreneurship culture” (Njie 2008:12). Important to note here is that The Gambia did not sign the International Convention on the protection of the rights of all migrant workers and members of their families 1990 (cf. UNDP 2009: 165).

4.1.2.2 Refugees
The share of refugees of the total immigrant population in The Gambia is estimated to be at 6.4% (cf. UNDP 2009:157). The inflow of refugees is primarily from conflict areas like Sierra Leone, Liberia and Guinea Bissau, but also from Casamance/Senegal due to the conflict between MFDC (Casamance movement for Democratic Forces) and armed forces. Although, the numbers are declining because the conflicts in the respective areas have calmed down in the last years (cf. Wagbou 2008:144-145; EC/ Government of The Gambia 2007:17; GBOS 2007:7).

4.1.2.3 Transit Migration
A direct consequence of restrictive policies in Europe is the development of new transit zones or “migration hubs” as Adepoju/Zoomers calls them. These are cities along the Sahara route or places with direct boat or flight connections and where travel documents can be easily forged. Banjul is among those migration hub cities (cf. Adepoju/Zoomers 2008a:272-273) Others also consider The Gambia as a transit country since the goal of transit migrants is to accumulate the economic means to make sure their travel continues through to Europe, which in most case, means Spain, but many also find a job in the informal trade sector in The Gambian market (cf. Wagbou 2008:144; EC/ The Government of The Gambia 2007:17; GBOS 2007:26-30).
4.1.3 Emigration

According to the estimates of Hein de Haas (2008a), regarding the destinations of emigrant populations from West and North Africa, 27.6% of Gambian emigrants stay in West Africa. The great majorities, 51.5%, leave for the main destination countries in the North, West and South of Europe (cf. Haas 2008a:29). While UNDP data states that 44.7% of the overall emigrant stock stays in Africa, 39.7% go to Europe and 12.4% to North America (cf. UNDP 2009: 149). As can be seen, data diverges widely.

The emigration rate in general is quite high. UNDP 2009 statistics state an emigration rate of 42.7% of the overall population while Rosenzweig even states the emigration rate is estimated to be 64.7% (Rosenzweig 2005:8; UNDP 2009:145). The Migration Analysis conducted by GBOS in 2003 also comes to the conclusion that there are more Gambians emigrating than immigrants coming into the country and puts the net migration rate at -0.61% (cf. GBOS 2007:7).

About 12.2% emigrate to North America and 8.7% to other destinations. Haas (2008a) further points out that data problems in West African countries lead to the assumption that the numbers in intraregional migration in West Africa are much higher than censuses might indicate. Considering the absolute numbers of West African emigrants in OECD countries, Nigeria (25.5%), Ghana (16.4 %) and Senegal (12.2 %) have the highest numbers while considering the emigrant stock of the total population, Guinea-Bissau (2.4%) and Gambia (1.8%) have the highest stock of emigrants (cf. Haas 2008a:23-24). The WB even indicates an emigrant stock of 3.7% of the overall population (cf. IBRD/WB 2011:121). Wagbou (2008) takes another statistical point of view and identifies Gambians among the largest foreign worker groups in OECD countries: 3.5% Cape Verdians, 3.1% Gambians, 2.6% Senegalese and Liberians (Wagbou 2008:144). Adepoju/Zoomers (2008a) even rank The Gambia among what they call Diasporic states, countries with a large number of expatriates dispersed in other countries (cf. Adepoju/Zoomers 2008a:270). The UK and the US were the most important destination countries for The Gambia for a long time, but migration patterns changed in the last decade and Spain and Italy have become important destination countries for Gambian emigrants. A table made by de Haas (2008a) shows that 12,663 of the 18,307 Gambians in the countries of UK, Italy, France, Portugal, Spain and the Netherlands are living in Spain. This means that about two-thirds of Gambians present in the main OECD destination countries are living in Spain (cf. Haas 2008a:29). One Permanent Secretary of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Gambians Abroad even states that there are 18,000 Gambians in Barcelona alone and that in Girona there should also be a great number of Gambians (cf. Permanent Secretary Ministry of Foreign Affairs, personal communication, 27th April 2011). The WB indicates that Spain, the
United States, Nigeria, Senegal, the United Kingdom, Germany, Sweden, Sierra Leone, Norway, France are the top destination countries for Gambians (cf. IBRC/WB 2011:121).

4.1.3.1 Reasons for Emigration
The reasons for emigration for West Africans and Gambians in particular to Europe, either irregularly or regularly, are quite the same as for other African countries: Poverty, crises and conflicts and in general, the worsening economic, political and social conditions and the widespread unemployment can be described as the pushing factors. In The Gambia particularly, those youths without prior experience entering the job markets suffer from unemployment (cf. Adepoju 2008: 24, Kohnert 2007:38, Njie 2008:7). Further reasons for emigration pressure are the lack of democracy, human rights violations, lack of transparency and popular participation (cf. Adepoju/van Naersen/Zoomers 2008:4; Kohnert 2007:38). Ocho (2009) believes that particularly for highly-skilled individuals, a breakdown in the political and economic order can be a driving force to emigration (cf. Ocho 2008: 51). The Editor of the Foroyaa newspaper confirms this for The Gambian Case and highlights that most of the educated people leave due to the political situation and due to the lack of freedom of speech (cf. Editor Foroyaa Newspaper, personal communication, 8th March 2011). Globalization and improvement in means of communication, the higher degree of interconnectivity and better conditions for networking are further reasons for increased international mobility and as well as the globalization of education and the increased possibilities to study abroad (cf. Adepoju/van Naersen/Zoomers 2008:5, Ocho 2008:51, Wagbou 2008:142-143). Not to forget are the unfair policies of trade and structural adjustment programs in the 1990s that “have forced people to consider migration as an option” because they led to greater poverty (Adepoju/van Naersen/Zoomers 2008:5). Particularly the policies of agricultural subsidies that cause price dumping in the African sphere and the high import tariffs on agricultural products, the main income source for West African countries, have caused a higher degree of poverty and unemployment. The pulling factors are the potential benefits and better employment opportunities abroad (cf. Adepoju/van Naersen/Zoomers 2008:5; Exenberger 2007: 118). Gebrewold also argues that the modern lifestyle pushes migrants to emigrate. According to Gebrewold, it is not only about profit maximization, risk minimization and city lifestyle. He argues that Africans are fascinated of the modernity and culture of Europe. They are “pushed by backwardness and tradition” (Gebrewold 2007:99). Media is playing decisive role in transmitting the picture of Europe to African societies, though it mostly transports the wrong one of an “El Dorado” of Europe or “the land of promises” (Adepoju/van Naersen/Zoomers 2008:7; Kohnert 2007:38; Njie 2008:11). Gebrewold speaks of a cultural globalization and
describes a global culture of Western system of knowledge, a culture of consumption, individual liberty and independence form binding institutions, cultural progress and civilizations and economic prosperity. Gebrewold believes that many define themselves as backward or their culture and tradition as backward and want to be part of a global (Western) culture. Out of these reasons, Gebrewold further argues that a policy of trying to stop irregular migration through economic aid and investment is predestined to fail because it is not just economic and political factors pushing people to emigrate toward the North (Gebrewold 2007:101). Njie (2008) also points out that it is not only unemployment or underemployment pushing The Gambian youth, it is also the desire to support the family and to be able to “buy nice cars, build beautiful houses and […] do big things” just like others already living in Europe (Njie 2008:11). It can be assumed that not only the media transports the picture of a Western culture The Gambian youths want to adapt to, it is also other people already living abroad and a certain degree of peer pressure as well as the surge for respect and prestige. It is primarily the low-educated youths in The Gambia embarking on irregular migration, as Gebrewold also names lack of education and entrepreneurship skills as reasons for wanting to emigrate to Europe (cf. Njie 2008:11; Group work outcomes at ONBE Workshop 7th April 2011).

As the Executive Secretary of the NYC points out: “It is only that person that is not satisfied, that is hungry and is thirsty who will risk their lives on the high seas. It is only as a result of that quest that drives them; it is only as a result of the latent desire to better their lives and the lives of their friends and their family members. And you know if they get to a point where they realize that they cannot achieve that here, then they are lit up to go elsewhere to get that. It is just natural.” (Executive Secretary NYC, personal communication, 20th April 2011).

### 4.1.3.2 Irregular Migration

Due to restrictive immigration laws and closure of legal channels to Europe, migration movements toward Europe are increasingly irregular. According to estimates by Spanish authorities in the period from January to August 2006, 2,600 Gambians reached the Canary islands irregularly, which, considering the small population, is proportionally a very high number compared to other West African states like Senegal (cf. Wikileaks 2006). In the CSP between The Gambia and the EC, the parties point out that the matter of irregular migration was concerning them “due to the inherent risk, including loss of life and the precarious conditions faced during the course of the journey” (EC/The Government of the Gambia 2007:17). According to some Gambian stakeholders, the phenomenon started to arise in the years 2004/2005 and since 2006/2007, the presence of the phenomenon in the public increased steadily, particularly regarding the irregular
migrants taking the ways through the high seas in large canoes (cf. Youth Ambassador, personal communication, 28th March 2011; Executive Secretary NYC, personal communication, 20th April 2011; Commissioner for Irregular Migration, personal communication, 30th March 2011).

4.1.3.3 Human Trafficking and Smuggling

Since the borders to Europe are strictly controlled, the young emigrants need to pay a smuggler, which means a high cost burden and a high risk for the emigrants. A trip from Senegal to the Canary Islands, for example, costs about €800-1200, which is a very high amount for the regional conditions. In West African countries, it is mostly the “extended family” paying for the journey to Europe, which means an involvement of a great deal of people and a high financial and economic risk and as well as a high pressure on the emigrants to succeed in getting to Europe in order to be able to remit the investments back and take care of the family (Kohnert 2007:38). Njie also states for The Gambian Case: “Furthermore, the business to transport youth to migrate to Europe through the illegal means is flourishing because families sell their properties and other assets to send their children.” (Njie 2008:7). Several stakeholders in migration issues state that human trafficking is increasingly a problem and the predominant reason is that the legal entries to Europe are no longer available and so human traffickers and smugglers provide ways to go to Europe: “Even the educated ones and all these do not have visa, so those unskilled or not, educated or not can’t get a visa, really, some may, but a great deal will not. So there are [sic!] some other people who capitalize on that and provide exit to Europe through North Africa and all those things. That also has negative impact because life, health is at stake. A lot of people lose their lives, a great deal of people come home unhealthy, either mentally, otherwise physically and all those things.” (Youth Ambassador, personal communication, 28th March 2011). The Commissioner for Irregular Migration agrees with the Youth Ambassador and also states that the strict visa requirements push irregular migration and human trafficking (cf. Commissioner for Irregular Migration, personal communication, 30th March 2011). The Gambia signed the Protocol within the UN Convention on Transnational Organized Crime 2000 to prevent, suppress and punish trafficking of persons, particularly women and children (cf. UNDP 2009:165). In 2007, the government adopted the Trafficking in Persons Act. Previously, there was no law to punish or sue human traffickers.

4.1.3.4 Trends and Routes

Immigration to Europe has risen in great numbers in the last two decades and the undocumented and irregular West African migrants constitute a large number of these immigrants. According to Kohnert (2007), there is a large potential of growing numbers of
sub-Saharan Africans, and about the half of them are West Africans, heading to Europe due to the geographical closeness to European southern borders (Kohnert 2007:37). Though Exenberger (2007) points out that the “ideas of millions of Africans waiting to jump over the fence to Europe is exaggerated” (Exenberger 2007: 116). Furthermore, Europe is an often chosen destination due to the socio-economic and cultural relations and connections to the African Diaspora in the former colonies in Spain, Italy, Great Britain, France, Germany and Portugal. Most of the migrants reaching Europe are still from Algeria, Morocco and Tunisia, but there is a continuously growing part of sub-Saharan Africans, mostly West Africans like Nigerians, Ghanaians and Senegalese. Citizens of Francophone countries, like Senegal, mostly try to reach France while others like Ghanaians and Nigerians are more flexible in choosing their destination (cf. IOM 2005:275). A rather new trend is that most transnational migrants, about 42%, stay in West Africa; the intra-regional migration in West Africa is very common due to the cocoa and coffee plantations in Ivory Coast and Ghana and oil industry in Nigeria, for example. About 18% of the overall number of migrants staying in West Africa are refugees as conflicts and political instability are widespread (cf. ECDPM 2010:1; Kohnert 2007:38). About a third of the global refugee population has its origins in Africa.

As in other African regions, there is still evidence of a pre-colonial migration system in West Africa due to the economic, politic, religious and social interconnections between West and North Africa during the trans-Saharan trade. Trans-Saharan mobility collapsed due to the creation of modern states through colonialism. After the independence and the oil crisis in 1973, emigration from West Africa to Libya and Algeria accelerated due to the high demand for labor (cf. Haas 2008a:15). There was a boost in migration to Libya in the 1990s due to Gaddafi’s pan-Africanist policy that he followed due to the UN embargo from 1990-2000. These developments were encouraging for many sub-Saharan Africans, mainly West Africans, to head to Europe through Libya. Libya also became a very important destination country for sub-Saharan Africans, also due to civil wars and growing economic and political instability in West African and Central African countries (cf. Haas 2008a:15; Gebrewold 2007:100). Particularly after the clash between Libyans and African workers in 2000 and the increasingly stricter immigration policies of Libya, migration patterns changed to destine to Morocco, Algeria and Tunisia. For many migrants, countries such as Tunisia and Libya are also the final destinations, but migrants are seen, similar to Europe, as a threat to the public security there and due to high police presence and control and very racist, xenophobic and inhumane living conditions, the irregular migrants face a great deal of difficulties (cf. Gebrewold 2007: 99; Kohnert 2007:43). Nevertheless, the route through the Sahara Desert to Morocco and Algeria and as a consequence, to Spain or Italy is still an actual route for Gambian
emigrants. Moreover, the land borders to Senegal are easy to cross because Gambians just need an ID to cross (cf. Njie 2008:9). As a consequence of a stricter immigration policy, Libya and Europe had to face an increasing number of irregular migrants. Around 2000 sub-Saharan Africans started to join Maghrebian migrants in their attempt to reach the Spanish enclaves of Ceuta and Melilla or the Italian Islands, Lampedusa, Pantelleria and Sicily. Since 2000, the connection between the trans-Saharan migration and Euro-Mediterranean migration systems became increasingly more vital. The high demand for migrant labor in Europe and the established smuggling networks were supportive factors in establishing these new movements in the African-European migration system. The EU is trying to address the problem by increasing economic aid and investment and is providing special grants to Italy, Spain, Malta in order to strengthen sea surveillance patrols and improvement of reception centers (cf. Haas 2008a:15-17; Gebrewold 2007:100). European official forces have had a high influence on the stricter controls by supporting the transit countries with surveillance technologies and manpower. Due to the strict controls of the shore between Morocco and Mauritania and around the Spanish enclaves of Ceuta and Melilla, the routes have transferred to routes by sea mainly from Mauritania, Senegal, The Gambia and Guinea to the Canary Islands. Gambian boat builders and carpenters have also reacted to the higher demand and have started building bigger pirogues (cf. Haas 2008a:18; Kohnert 2007:43; Njie 2008:9). As a consequence, European countries have started surveillance at the West African Coasts, which is organized in a multinational manner under operations coordinated by Frontex, like the already mentioned HERA and Nautilus. The security conditions on the pirogues are very low and dangerous and many boats do not make it to the Canary Islands. Kohnert (2007) points out that the emigrants are forced into these conditions because there are hardly other possibilities left (cf. Kohnert 2007:43). Most of the migrants try to avoid the route through the sea because they are aware of its dangers. About two-thirds of irregular migrants in Europe enter legally and overstay their visas (cf. Haas 2008a:19).

4.1.4 The Migration Development Nexus in The Gambia

Several stakeholders assessed the contribution of migration to development very positively in terms of remittances and investments in development programs and infrastructure or technology transfer of Gambians abroad, but also, for example, in terms of know-how transfer of Gambians who migrate back to The Gambia after a while and share and multiply the acquired skills. Another positive aspect mentioned is the Western culture and sense of work ethic, which can lead to a form of “civilization” and a different understanding of development (Youth Ambassador, personal communication, 28th March 2011; Permanent Secretary MOI, personal communication, 11th April 2011;
Commissioner for Irregular Migration, personal communication, 30th March 2011). The Deputy Permanent Secretary of the Ministry of Youth and Sports also highlights the importance of Gambians abroad as development agents for the families on one hand and on a small scale and on the other hand, also for the national infrastructure development, for example. Furthermore, he states that emigration, even of highly-skilled people, is very important because the small Gambian labor market could not absorb all of them and they would be unemployed if they were to stay. According to him, emigration would be better for The Gambian development (cf. Deputy Permanent Secretary MOYS, personal communication, 19th April 2011). The PS of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs explains the difficulty and tensions between the high dependence on remittances and the positive impact of the investments of Gambians abroad and the loss of highly-skilled people (cf. Permanent Secretary Ministry of Foreign Affairs, personal communication, 27th April 2011). On the other hand, the European way of life also diminishes some elements of traditional culture such as the family network due to the high degree of individualism and isolation present in Western cultures. Ambassador Kalleh Farbakary calls for the involvement of The Gambian Diaspora in development processes: “They have a voice that should be heard and should be given chance to participate in our development process.” (Youth Ambassador, personal communication, 28th March 2011).

4.1.4.1 Remittances in Numbers

The Gambia has quite high remittance inflows and in total numbers, it is 47 million dollars per year, which means 6.9% of the annual GDP (cf. UNDP 2009:161). The WB rates the remittances inflow even higher, giving a figure of 8% of the total GDP (cf. IBRD/WB 2011:14). The remittance inflow makes up 65.9% of the total ODA inflows, which shows a high ratio. 73% of the total remittance inflow come from Europe and 2.4% from North America, so there is clear sign of dependency on the emigrants in the western countries (cf. UNDP 2009:161). Most of the interview partners highlight the importance of remittances for many families: Many families are surviving due to remittances from relatives abroad. They are used for daily living for food, clothing and school fees. Whereas it is not just daily life that many families are managing, it is also housing and larger investments that Gambians abroad are funding (cf. UNFPA Officer, personal communication, 4th May, 2011; Executive Secretary NYC, personal communication, 20th April 2011; Deputy Permanent Secretary MOYS, personal communication, 19th April 2011). Adepoju/Zoomers (2008a) highlight that migrants are often seen as “money makers” and they are expected to have a great deal of skills and are of high importance to the family, but if they do not live up to these expectations, they are often socially isolated (Adepoju/Zoomers 2008a:279). The UNFPA Officer expresses
himself very worriedly about possible future shortages on remittances due to the closure of European and American borders: “So what I begin to wonder now, so now that Europe is a no-go area, what next? […] If going to Europe and America is impossible, what is going to happen now?” (UNFPA Officer, personal communication, 4th May, 2011).

4.1.4.2 Brain Drain
As already mentioned above, it is indeed easier for highly qualified people to use the advantages of migration, they face better living conditions and better employment opportunities. These conditions have led to a massive Brain Drain in the last three decades. About a third of all highly qualified work force Africans are living and working in Europe. West Africa is the most important source for Brain Drain, which is not merely due to their high qualifications, but also due to the political crises and conflicts in Ghana, Gambia, Nigeria, Liberia and Sierra Leone (cf. Kohnert 2007:40; Editor Foroyaa newspaper, personal communication, 8th March 2011).

In the year 2000, the by then Program Officer of the Strategy for Poverty Alleviation Coordinating Office, Rohey Wadda, prepared a discussion paper for a regional conference on “The Brain Drain and Capacity Building in Africa”. Already in the year 2000, she argued that Brain Drain was “emerging as a major issue of concern in the development agenda of The Gambia” (Wadda 2000). She points out that in The Gambia, highly qualified people traditionally work in the formal, public sector, but that trends were observable that people increasingly engaged in the private and non-governmental sectors. These highly qualified people working in the private sector still contribute to national development, but nevertheless, it means a loss of work force “to the public sector in terms of qualified and trained middle and senior level management to clearly articulate and implement government policy” (Wadda 2000). Kohnert (2007), also points out that Brain Drain has negative consequences for the growth of a middle class and the development of sustainable structure of the civil society, which can lead to political and economic instability. Furthermore, it is a great burden to the national budget because the education of highly qualified people is quite expensive and in the end, it is not a fruitful investment in the national development of The Gambia (cf. Deputy Director DOYS, personal communication, 20th April 2011, Kohnert 2007:40). The Deputy Permanent Secretary of the Ministry of Youth and Sports highlights that the emigration of highly-skilled people has the negative aspect of a loss of investment for the government if it is government officials going for training and not returning, but on the other hand, he also states that The Gambian labor market cannot absorb the entire workforce and that it is a natural movement due to unemployment (cf. Deputy Permanent Secretary MOYS, personal communication, 19th April 2011). Moreover, Wadda mentions that recently,
many qualified staff have emigrated to Western countries to work in the international development sector or elsewhere, many of those who have already worked in the public sector for 10 to 15 years, but even more civil servants and professionals who have worked outside the government. Additionally, many who have decided to study abroad prefer to stay in the country of study and seek employment there, even in spite of the bonding system that will be explained in the following as one of the strategies of The Gambian government to counter Brain Drain. Though reliable data on how many professionals are leaving or how many of the students stay in Western countries, even the bonded ones do not exist. Wadda suggests that “a serious problem exists, one that may worsen in years to come if current trends continue unabated” (Wadda 2000). During the interview, the UNFPA official also calls Brain Drain “a big problem for a small economy like ours” (UNFPA Officer, personal communication, 4th May, 2011). Considering the health sector, many perceive the situation alarming. Nurses even have the reputation of only conducting their education in order to get a visa: “If you want to get a visa from one of the European embassies and you have or you get a nursing certificate, it’s okay, easier for you” (Youth Ambassador, personal communication, 28th March 2011). The Gambian government has repeatedly asked the UK to stop recruiting their nurses (cf. Executive Secretary NYC, personal communication, 20th April 2011; Permanent Secretary Ministry of Foreign Affairs, personal communication, 27th April 2011; AHWO 2009:39). The Deputy Director of the DOYS also points to the high loss of nurses to UK and the United States of America (cf. personal communication, Deputy Director DOYS 20th April 2011). Rosenzweig also counts The Gambia as one of “three top African Brain Drain countries” (Rosenzweig 2005:9). UNDP 2009 estimates the emigration rate at the tertiary education level at 44.6% while the World Bank ranks The Gambia among the top emigration countries of tertiary-educated people with 63 % of all tertiary-educated as well as among the top emigration countries of physicians, a percentage of 46% of all physicians in the country and 66.2% of all nurses born in the country (cf. UNDP 2009:153; IBRD/WB 2011:9; 121).

4.2 Migration within National Policy Papers
The following will analyze how the migration issue is addressed in the development policy frameworks and in the National Youth Policy of The Gambia.

4.2.1 Stakeholders
In The Gambia, there are many stakeholders involved in the field of migration. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs, International Cooperation and Gambians Abroad are negotiating bilateral and multilateral agreements and therefore, have a strong say in
international cooperation on migration. In implementing migration policy measures and advocacy, the Ministry of Interior, along with the Immigration Department and The Gambia Police Force subordinated to it have the strongest role.

The Department of Youth and Sports is the technical arm of the Ministry of Youth and Sports and is responsible for the revision, facilitation and coordination of the implementation of the youth policy. The National Youth Council is presented as the “arm of the Ministry responsible for the coordination of all youth activities and associations” (MOYS 2008:7). It was set up by an Act of Parliament in the year 2000. As it is the premier contact for youth engagement and also functions as an umbrella organization for all youth organizations, it takes a very important role in the mobilization of youth (cf. MOYS 2008:7). Initiatives for employment creation among the youths, often work in close relationship with the Department of Youth and Sports. There are several other stakeholders in the non-governmental field working on migration or youth employment, particularly the youth association “Operation No Back Way to Europe”, which is very dedicated to the combat of irregular migration or the Young Men’s Christian Association, which tries to engage young people in self-employment.

When it comes to combating irregular migration, the Executive Secretary of the NYC names the Ministry of Interior, the NYC and ONBE as the most important stakeholders who are working closely together (cf. Executive Secretary NYC, personal communication, 20th April 2011).

4.2.2 Development Policies

The Vision 2020 was launched in 1996 and is the socio-economic development strategy for the period 1996-2020. It can be seen as the long-term strategy for Gambian national development. Every other short-term strategy paper on national development must align with the objectives outlined in Vision 2020.

Migration is hardly mentioned in the policy paper, neither irregular migration nor the potential of migration for development. Surprisingly, immigration to The Gambia is presented as a problem that needs to be controlled in order to ensure a “manageable population”:

“[…] [A] consistent set of policies to control immigration should ensure a totally manageable population that will contribute fully to the development objectives of Vision 2020” (Government of the Republic of The Gambia 1996: 13).

As outlined above, the overall opinion of immigration from neighboring countries is rather negative and quite nationalist opinions come to the forefront, for example, on the presence of Senegalese or Nigerians, particularly when considering the labor market.
Under the issue of food security, the socio-economic strategy deals again with migration, but again the problematization of rural-urban migration stands in the forefront. “The prevailing high population growth rate, environmental degradation and rural-urban migration aggravate the sustainability of the current food production strategy” (Government of the Republic of The Gambia 1996:30).

Very interesting and notifying is that the Vision 2020 indirectly addresses the Diaspora and their desired commitment to development of The Gambia: “Vision 2020 postulates that all Gambians, wherever they are [accentuation of the author], and all foreigners residing in The Gambia will contribute positively to national development and will enjoy fully the fruits of such development” (Government of the Republic of The Gambia 1996:1).

Though there are no policies yet in place to encourage the Diaspora engagement or to facilitate remittance flow, the contribution of Gambians Abroad to development was already recognized in 1996.

In the Poverty Reduction Strategy paper for the period of 2007-2011, either way, migration is hardly mentioned; only in the same context as in Vision 2020 Food Security and Rapid Urbanization and the Strategy on Decentralization. “Malnutrition continues to be a major public health problem in The Gambia, exacerbated by poverty, food deficit, rural-urban migration […] and a high population growth rate.” (Department of State for Finance and Economic Affairs 2006: 111).

One of the priority objectives of the PRSP II is “to improve living conditions in rural areas and secondary towns to attain balanced population distribution and better management of large urban areas” and in order to be able to do so, the government wants to launch more research programs for a better understanding of “different forms of migration, including rural-urban, urban-urban, rural-rural, temporary and nomadic” (Department of State for Finance and Economic Affairs 2006: 114).

Outward migration is not mentioned at all in the PRSP, neither are the positive potentials of migration for development. Oucho (2008) states that development policies should incorporate the migration issue. In The Gambia, there is still a potential to identify migration as a positive phenomenon that can be useful for the development.

**4.2.3 Youth Policy**

In the former National Youth Policy for the years 1999-2008, migration is hardly mentioned and it is not specified as any problem or potential for development (cf. Ministry of Youth and Sports 1999). In the National Youth Policy for the years 2009-2018, this picture changes: “Illegal Migration” is defined as one of the thirteen key issues of The Gambian National Youth Policy. The ministry describes the potential that the
youth has for national development and the need to get them involved in national development. Defined as the 13-30 years of age population, it makes up more than half of the overall population. While explaining the problems of unemployment, access to education, skills development, social services for the youths, the Ministry comes to the conclusion: “It does not help matters that the majority of youth suffer from the Babylon Syndrome - migration out of The Gambia by any means necessary.” (MOYS 2008:2). It seems like The Gambia is not only having problems with Brain Drain, but rather in general with outward migration. The MOYS further points out that: “Youths in The Gambia suffer from low literacy, attitudinal problems and a great affliction of going to the West”. So as we can see, the emigration or the desire for emigration of The Gambian youth is clearly perceived as a problem. To tackle that problem, the “Policy will look at how to invest in youth in a bid to foster attitudinal change, employability through appropriate training and a sense of pride and allegiance to the nation.” (MOYS 2008:10). In terms of enhancing the employability, the National Youth Service Scheme and the President’s International Award are referred to as instruments (cf. MOYS 2008:11).

Under the key issue “Education and Awareness Raising”, one of the key strategies is: “Provide information to at-risk youth about the dangers of migration.” (MOYS 2008:24-26). Moreover, the strategy focuses on educating the youths and providing the infrastructure for education and skills acquisition, particularly in the rural areas. So again, education seems to be the key.

Very notifying is the explanation of the key issue illegal migration: “One current socio-economic problem confronting Gambian youth is illegal migration. In addition to the curbing of illegal migration, the new youth policy will start making plans for returning Gambian youth as Western governments make immigration laws more stringent. It is important that the policy is proactive in this issue, otherwise we would be faced with new problems in the future.” (MOYS 2008:33). One of the strategies pursued to tackle the problem is solely addressing returnees and their reintegration into society, The Gambian government wants to “provide them with marketable skills to enable them to become economically productive in a bid to deter them from taking the risk of going to Europe again”. Very remarkable is that the IOM is running its program on voluntary return and reintegration and is having agreements with many European countries like Norway, Switzerland, Spain and so on and returnees from all these countries, but as an employee at IOM stated, the government did not show too much interest in collaborating with IOM. Though IOM has already been present in The Gambia for ten years, they hardly had a meeting with the government or were consulted. Sometimes, when it comes to child trafficking, IOM is consulted, but there are no other areas of collaboration (cf. IOM Project Officer, personal communication 8th March 2011).
overall emphasis of European countries on return migration and the conditionality of
development aid on readmission, the outlining within the National Youth Policy is to be
seen as very critical. Of course, it is very welcoming that the government wants to instate
reintegration measures because they are definitely needed considering the high
numbers of returnees arriving in The Gambia, but it is a reminder of the above analyzed
power inequalities in negotiations on migration policies considering the external
governance of EU migration policies. Moreover, the government hints at the effects of
the strict immigration laws of EU countries that can be interpreted as a sublime critique
on the EU migration policy. Looking at the formulation of the strategy, it seems like The
Gambian government only needs to put reintegration policies in place because the
European laws became that stringent and were forced to do so. It clearly is a reminder of
the logic of externalization policy, an internal policy in European countries, meaning the
expulsion of immigrants has external effects, namely on policy priorities in The Gambia.
From a Gambian point of view, it is external policies having effects on internal policies.
Here, the interrelation of internal and external policies as described by Papadopoulos
can be clearly observed (cf. Papadopoulos, 2007:98). Njie nevertheless points out the
importance of reintegration measures because the returnees face societal humiliation
and isolation from the community and family. They have to start all over again because
most of them sell all of their properties before their departure in order to be able to pay
In the strategic policy, the goal is formulated more precisely: “By 2014, reduce the rate of
illegal migration among the youth by 70%” (MOYS n.y.:36). In order to achieve this highly
set and immeasurable goal, the Ministry has planned several activities:
Together with the Department for Immigration under the Ministry of Interior, the Ministry
for Youth and Sports wants to “launch an aggressive advocacy program that will
sensitize the youth on the dangers of illegal migration and teach them how they can
legally migrate with the proper skills training” (MOYS 2008:33). The advocacy program
will primarily be implemented through activities like a Sensitization Program and
workshops on the dangers of illegal migration as indicated in the Strategic Plan for the
Implementation of the Youth Policy for the years 2010-2014 (cf. MOYS n.y.:26; 36-37).
What is surprising is the phrase “how they can legally migrate with the proper skills
training”. Of course, in the context of irregular migration, it is better to acquire skills and
then try to find a legal channel to go to Western countries, but when thinking of the Brain
Drain and the difficulties The Gambia is facing due to the lack of skilled people, it
reminds of the vicious circle of Brain Drain due to the strict immigration policies of the
European countries that welcome the highly-skilled and close their doors for the low-
skilled. This discussion will be returned to later when talking about concrete activities in
those areas. In the Annual Strategic Budget and Work Plans attached to the Strategic Plan for 2010-2014, the MOYS indicated the allocation of 75,000 Gambian Dalasi (approx. €1780) for the conduct of studies on the causes and effects of irregular migration (cf. MOYS n.y.:3; 13). For the other activities planned, like sensitization programs, advocacy programs for showing the legal ways to migrate, collaboration with relevant stakeholders and the initiation of programs to reduce irregular migration, no resources were allocated. As pointed out in the strategic plan, sponsors should be found. Under relevant stakeholders, the Ministry specifies the European embassies, particularly the Spanish embassy (cf. MOYS n.y.:3; 13). So as pointed out in the strategic plan, there will be negotiations on agreements for the sponsoring of projects addressing the causes of migration and one of the main objectives is to get the stakeholders “interested and supportive”. According to that, it is also in the interest of the government of The Gambia to obtain funding for the reduction of irregular migration.

In order to construct a National Youth Profile, The Gambian government conducted group discussions with young people to obtain information about their aspirations and needs. They questioned the young people on what should be done for progressing in the sustainable development of The Gambia. The main outcomes were youth empowerment, the youths should be involved in the political and economic sphere and should have a say in the National Assembly and local governments. The youth groups also advocated for better access to skills, entrepreneurship and finance for employment creation. According to the report of the Ministry (2010), the youth welcome employment-creating initiatives like GAMJOBS and also loan schemes like NEDI, but they should be accessible on a wider range and for a broader scope of people.

The report states that the youths are “keen and eager to answer to The Gambian President’s call of “Back to the Land”, but that they are lacking financial means that will be given to through the “Youth Agricultural Fund”. There is a strong call for participation on agricultural production and fisheries (MOYS 2010:45) as well as for more information on health issues and more sports activities (cf. MOYS 2010:45). As can be shown here, employment creation seems to be the recipe for development for The Gambian youths themselves. Likewise, concept of decentralization and the need to engage the youths again in agriculture, the strongest export sector of The Gambia is referred to. Several stakeholders also confirm that the general approach to migration is to keep the youths in The Gambia through employment creation and skills development (cf. Permanent Secretary Ministry of Foreign Affairs, personal communication, 27th April 2011; Executive Secretary NYC, personal communication, 20th April 2011). It is remarkable that migration or illegal migration is not mentioned as any problem to tackle or to deal with it in the entire report. Rapid rural-urban migration is mentioned just once as one of the causes for
unemployment: “The high rate of unemployment in the urban area can be attributed to the increase in the population in the area due primarily to migration of youths looking for employment.” (Ministry of Youth and Sports 2010: 19). In the strategic plan, the effects of rural-urban migration are pointed out as the high demand for social services and high rates of unemployment that cannot be saturated.

The high population density as a result of rural-urban migration affects the service delivery at the urban areas by increasing the demand for social services and increases unemployment (Ministry of Youth and Sports n.y.:20).

Just when it comes to the activities of the National Youth Council since its inception in 2000, the program “Advocacy on Illegal Migration” is mentioned as one of the programs having a positive impact (Ministry for Youth and Sports 2010: 44). The need for highly-skilled people dedicated to national development is also announced in the National Youth Profile: “Without well-educated, highly-skilled, healthy and dedicated youths, The Gambia will be hard pressed to achieve its sustainable development goals” (Ministry of Youth and Sports 2010: 5).

4.2.4 Interpretation

So overall, there are not many significant strategies within development policies and the youth policy dealing with irregular migration or the problems resulting of migration, neither are there many initiatives to use the positive potentials of migration. The key issues addressed in the policies are the high degree of unemployment due to the rapid rural-urban migration and the lacking access to skills training and the need to enhance the employability of the youths and to sensitize them on irregular migration and advocate them in order to reduce irregular migration. This fits in the general trend on the attitudes of African countries toward migration and its contribution for development. According to Bakewell (2007), most of African governments refer to migration as a problem, but only a few recognize the positive potentials of migration for development (cf. Bakewell 2007:11). The UNDP also states that The Gambia refers to emigration only as a problem. Though small states can make migration a strategic element for development, The Gambia is not one of them (cf. UNDP 2009:80). Adepoju/Zoomers also state the incorporation of the migration issue in PRSP has hardly been developed so far (cf. Adepoju/Zoomers 2008b: 285). In West Africa, the few having something positive to say about migration and development are Senegal, Mali and Cape Verde. If there is a reference made to Migration and Development, it is in the context of the problematization of rural urban migration as cause of “social dislocation and urban unemployment” (Bakewell 2007:19). Though, as seen above, The Gambian stakeholders assess the contribution of migration to development very positively and see a great potential in it for
the future. Furthermore, there is already a high dependency on remittances from expatriates.

The youth policy sets out the need to find reintegration measures due to the stringent laws and returns from Europe as well as decentralization for a better population distribution. The need for skilled people for the development of The Gambia and the commitment of Gambians abroad is also mentioned in Vision 2020.

The hope on embarking on irregular migration through sensitization, education and skills training and also through decentralization is also present in the oral discourse. For example, Deputy Governor Kah of the Upper River Region LGA during the ONBE campaign “used the occasion to call on the young people of the region to distance themselves from illegal migration and to embrace education or skills trainings where they can gain respect and knowledge,” he further said that “the sensitization would play a vital role in the reduction of people engaging on the risky venture.” (Kah cited after Jallow 2009). The Executive Secretary of the NYC states as well: “Sensitization, investing in employment creation, investing in technical skill organization, for me, these are the key works, these are fundamental.” (Executive Secretary NYC, personal communication, 20th April 2011).

The general African trend of the expectation that massive development and poverty reduction can reduce the pressure of rural-urban migration and outward migration to Europe is also present in The Gambian discourse on migration and development (cf. Bakewell 2007:20). Though the positive potentials of the migration development nexus are not mentioned in the development policies or in the youth policy as stated above, Gambian stakeholders still see many positive aspects in migration for development.

4.3 Cooperation with the EU and Intergovernmental Organizations

Migration has become an issue in development cooperation between the EU and The Gambia. As analyzed above, the incorporation of irregular migration in all the agreements with African countries became obligatory through the incorporation of the migration issue, particularly the obligation to readmission in the COTONOU agreement, so it is not surprising that the issue appears in the Country Strategy Paper for The Gambia, which gives the policy framework for development cooperation between the respective country and the EC. While in the Country Strategy Paper (CSP) for 2002-2007 migration is only mentioned marginally, meaning immigration to The Gambia from conflictive sub-regions, whereas irregular migration is not mentioned at all. This changes significantly in the Country Strategy Paper for 2008-2013. Regular migration and irregular migration become a “non-focal sector”. Therefore, the government should receive budget support (EC/The Government of The Gambia 2007: 5). Though the CSP
points out that regular and irregular migration will be a focus of the development cooperation, the fight against irregular migration stands in the forefront of the debate. The EC and The Gambian government describe irregular migration to Europe as a “new and evolving phenomenon”. The CSP presents irregular migration “as a matter [….] of concern to both the government and the people of The Gambia due to the inherent risk, including loss of life and the precarious conditions faced during the course of the journey, at the transit and destination points” (EC/The Government of The Gambia 2007: 17). The EC points out some action lines and planned activities for the matter:
Since statistics regarding the numbers of Gambians leaving and their characteristics are hard to find, the EC wanted to support The Gambian government to conduct an “in-depth study” to establish a migration profile for The Gambia, which was already planned under the 9th EDF. Though the EC points out in the Joint Annual Report of 2008 that migration was not addressed under the 9th EDF, but at that point in time, it was already clear that the issue would be considered under the 10th EDF. The beneficiary institutions should have been The Gambia Immigration Department, The Gambia Bureau of Statistics, the Population Secretariat and The Gambia Tourism Authority. By then, consultations with the Department of State for Interior were already ongoing and some action points on the issue were already agreed upon. The EC pointed to the National Migration survey that was conducted by that time (cf. EC/The Government of The Gambia 2007:17; The Gambia - European Community Cooperation 2009:35).
Another action line pointed out is the support in the creation of economic and employment opportunities for the young population, particularly returnees, through national and regional initiatives. In the annual report of 2008, the EC indicated that the government and non-state actors should elaborate project proposals from 2007 onwards on that issue. Furthermore, the report pointed to the employment creation project Gamjobs being implemented by DOSTIE (cf. EC/The Government of The Gambia 2007:17; The Gambia - European Community Cooperation 2009:36). Whereas NAOSU Project Officer A has stated that there is no project other than GAMJOBS in terms of employment creation and skills development (cf. NAOSU Project Officer A, personal communication, 5th April 2011). NAOSU Project Officer B rushes to point out that there are still activities that create avenues for youths to engage, but they might not halt people from leaving (cf. NAOSU Project Officer B, personal communication, 5th April 2011).
In order to find a “mutually beneficial solution to the problem”, the EC wants to enhance dialogue. It is worrisome that the EC mentions the MOU with Spain on that front, which cannot really be seen as measure to enhance the dialogue on migration (EC/The Government of The Gambia 2007: 17; 24). In the Annual Report 2008, the parties at
least declared it as an objective for The Gambian government to subscribe to the ongoing dialogue between the EU and the AU (cf. The Gambia/ European Community Cooperation 2009: 36). Though the EC wants to “support activities addressing the issue of legal and illegal migration”, there is 1 million Euros allocated for tackling illegal migration in the non-focal sector (EC/The Government of The Gambia 2007: 26; 33). The negative consequences and impacts of irregular migration will be curbed with the funds (cf. EC/The Government of The Gambia 2007: 34).

4.3.1 Policy Measures

Under the 9th EDF, there were no activities funded in The Gambia except the Information and Management Center on Migration in Mali and a project in Benin. The implementation of the ECOWAS common approach on migration was also funded under the 9th EDF within the Regional Strategy Paper for West Africa with an amount of 600,000 Euros (cf. ECMPD 2010:4). So even the implementation process of a common regional approach on migration is not independent from European influence and it should not be forgotten that the EU can still decide which activities are to be funded. ECMPD (2010) also highlights that the EU prioritization of specific areas, like illegal migration, trafficking, etc. might drive the allocation of funding (cf. ECMPD 2010:5). Under the 10th EDF, the financial means on migration increased and were also allocated on a country level, as to say in Cape Verde, The Gambia, Ghana, Mali, Nigeria and Senegal. Other foreseen interventions of the EU were, according to a project manager of the EC delegation in the Gambia, a project on criminal justice – a fight against drug trafficking and trafficking in human beings’. By then, the project formulation had just begun. A Project Officer from the National Authorizing Offers Support Unit confirmed that this project was part of a governance project within a new pipeline and the Permanent Secretary stated as well that the Ministry of Interior was working on a general framework on crime and drug trafficking. In the newsletter of the EU delegation from June 2012, again the governance program was indicated with a budget of 3 million Euros. By then, the priorities were “illegal migration, anti-trafficking, reform of the electoral process and women’s rights”, but the exact program was not yet specified. A further project on the regional level was a study on migration movements directed by the EU delegation in Nigeria (cf. Project manager EC delegation, Email communication, 4th April 2011; NAOSU Project Officer A, personal communication, 5th April 2011; Permanent Secretary MOI, personal communication, 11th April 2011; The Gambia-EU cooperation 2012). One of the interviewed NAOSU Project Officers states, there is not yet much priority given to migration when compared to other sectors:
“We have I think two or three areas that we call focal sectors and of course, the issue of migration is just like, are add-ons, not to downplay them, but you see, the most of the EU funding coming to this country is going into specific areas and migration happens to be on a very low-scale, let’s say. Compared to the other sectors, migration is only one million Euros as you see while we have, for example, for infrastructure we have about 76 million Euros, you see the wide difference?” (NAOSU Project Officer A, personal communication, 5th April 2011)

In contrast to the EDF, the Development Cooperation Instrument (DCI) provides financial support based on European policy priorities in migration and asylum (cf. ECMPD 2010:4). The AENEAS Programme was the predecessor of the Thematic Programme on Migration and Asylum; 107 projects were implemented from 2004 to 2006, many of them also in ECOWAS Member States. The issues addressed under the thematic program, the former AENEAS Programme, are: "Fostering links between migration and development, promoting well-managed labor migration, fighting illegal immigration and facilitating the re-admission of illegal immigrants, protecting migrants and supporting the fight against trafficking in human beings" (European Commission 2012, ECMPD 2010:4). ECMPD points out that labor migration and asylum issues have not experienced the same attention as, for example, illegal migration (cf. ECMPD 2010:4). One of the projects also involved The Gambia. It was a project on "Law Enforcement Capacity Building Project for West Africa in Preventing and Combating the Smuggling of Migrants". The concrete activities involved research activities regarding the routes and practices of smugglers, training for law enforcement and prosecution and support in national policy development. The project was implemented by UNODC and Europol (cf. European Commission n.y.:31). It is very likely that there is a connection between the workshop and the adoption of the Human Trafficking Act by The Gambian government in 2007.

Before the year 2007, there was no law on human trafficking and traffickers could not be sued by the law. Chief Superintendent of Police, Mr. Fatty Mandining, and Sergeant Sirra Sowe presented the illegal migration unit of the police force at the ONBE workshop in April 2011. The role is particularly defined through the enforcement of the act on human trafficking, but also on tackling irregular migration (cf. Madingding/Sowe paper prepared for ONBE-Workshop April 2011; Deputy Director of Immigration, speech at ONBE Workshop, 8th April 2011).

Under Section 28 in the Act, the prohibition of trafficking and related offences is treated. The punishments for trafficking are held very strict, from a fine between 50,000 Dalasi and 500,000 Dalasi and/or a minimum 15 years imprisonment to life imprisonment for traffickers. Intermediaries or transporters can also be sued according to the new law as
well as can be persons who know about any act of trafficking and do not inform the police forces. The act is very detailed in the range of offences, about the legal process and the treatment of victims (cf. Trafficking in Persons Act Part VII, pp. 28).

Mandingding and Sowe call for a comprehensive solution on human trafficking and illegal migration, but they acknowledge that it is still a long way to go. The police forces also call on civil society groups to engage in sensitization and dissemination of information in the area of illegal migration and human trafficking (cf. Madingding/Sowe paper prepared for ONBE-Workshop April 2011). The already mentioned Seahorse Project that launched in 2006 was also led by Spain. Also, Morocco, Mauritania, Cape Verde, Senegal, Italy, Germany, Portugal and France are taking part in this project, which is managed by Guardia Civil. The Seahorse Network is a project initiated by the Spanish government in 2006 and funded by the EU under the AENEAS Programme. It is an intranet of encoded information that is intended to support the authorities in combating irregular migration. In the years 2009-2010, the establishment of national contact points for the Seahorse Network was funded by the EC and Europe Aid under the Thematic Programme on Migration and Asylum 2007-2008 while the United Kingdom of Spain had the implementing lead, which was taken by the Guardia Civil (cf. EC/Europe Aid 2010:11, Garcia Andrade 2010:318; 329-330, Kasparek 2010:130). Njie (2011) reported in the daily observer of the inauguration of the Seahorse Network Cooperation Centre in August 2011. The Gambia Immigration Department, The Gambia Police Force and the government of the Kingdom of Spain were present at the inauguration ceremony (cf. Njie 2011).

4.3.2 The Role of ICMPD

The mobilization of international organizations of the ICMPD as subcontractor for the promotion and implementation of EU policies becomes clear in The Gambian Case (cf. Lavenex 2007; Geiger/Pecoud 2010). ICMPD implemented a seminar on integrated border management in Praia, Cape Verde in July 2009. The seminar was held under the AENEAS project “Mise en Place du Plan d’Action du Rabat”, as to say, funded by the EU, and the aim was to present the intraservice, inter-agency and international cooperation and coordination work flows for border management officials from mainly West African countries, The Gambia among them. The participants were discussing the possibility of implementing Integrated Border Management in their countries by examining existing initiatives. According to ICMPD (2009), “all participants expressed great interest in further activities related to the development of IBM in their countries” (ICMPD 2009:4).
The cooperation between ICMPD-EC and The Gambia under Project MIEUX took off in May 2011, when ICMPD experts conducted an assessment mission for a “further tailoring of the action”. According to ICMPD, the Ministry of Interior requested assistance in migration management and the development of a migration policy. It should be borne in mind that the Conference on Integrated Border Management was conducted by the ICMPD in Cape Verde in July 2009. In a meeting with the Program Manager of MIEUX in May in The Gambia, the Program manager mentioned that the intervention would focus on irregular migration and the strengthening of government institutions and likewise, an EU delegate confirmed that it would be about border management. The permanent Secretary of the Ministry of Interior explained that the intervention of MIEUX would be about anti-human trafficking, illegal migration and child trafficking. (cf. ICMPD 2011; ICMPD program manager, personal communication, 13th May 2011; Project Manager EU Delegation, Email communication, 4th April 2011; Permanent Secretary MOI, personal communication, 11th April 2011). The present Project Officer for The Gambia confirmed that: “…at that point we were, that’s what we were thinking, but also the completion of the assessment mission was under the direction of the European Union, we decided to be quite specific and focus[...] on the migration survey and the development [...] and implementation of it. So I guess broadly it will hopefully lead to some formulation of some kind of migration policy and then indirectly influence irregular migration and it will hopefully capture the numbers of people going in and out and also the identification of irregular migration activities.” (Project Officer ICMPD, personal communication, 14th November 2011). The Commissioner for Irregular Migration also pointed out that the aim of the migration survey was to formulate a comprehensive migration policy (personal communication, Commissioner for Irregular Migration, 30th March 2011). As Geiger/Pecoud (2010) highlighted, intergovernmental organizations also have their policy-making and as implicitly stated, the interest of ICMPD would have been more on the issue of irregular migration, but it seems like it was more the EU deciding on the migration data management. The migration data management should be built on the data already collected by GBOS with the funding of UNDP and UNFPA in 2009. The migration survey was trying to make a sort of migration profile of the country considering internal migration, immigration as well as emigration, the reasons for migration, the educational level of migrations, the numbers of migrations and so on. The survey was supposed to take all forms of migration into account (cf. UNFPA Officer, personal communication, 4th May, 2011; NAOSU Project Officer B, personal communication, 5th April 2011). Interesting here is that by then, the EC did not plan to join funding and did not show much interest in the research (cf. UNFPA Officer, personal communication, 4th May, 2011). As mentioned by several stakeholders, the importance of data and statistics
is high because so far, there is no reliable data: “You need statistics to develop the right policies. For example, if most people give the reason for emigration, that they do not have employment, the lack of employment, then you will know how to direct your policy.” (UNFPA Officer, personal communication, 4th May, 2011). And the project officer of ICMPD for the Gambia also points out: “[…] they need to get […] some data, once they have the data, they can identify the target areas, the policy.” (Project Officer ICMPD, personal communication, 14th November 2011). However, the funding for analyzing the data and the editing of the report ran out and likewise, specific expertise was lacking. That is where ICMPD stepped in and conducted capacity building workshops on data collection, data processing and data cleaning in October 2011 (cf. Project Officer ICMPD, personal communication, 14th November 2011; UNFPA Officer, personal communication, 4th May, 2011; NAOSU Project Officer B personal communication, 5th April 2011; ICMPD n.y.a). These were followed up by a data validation activity conducted in Italy and France and finally, there was a data analysis workshop in January 2012 for representatives of the agencies involved in the migration survey. The National Migration Survey Final Report is currently being elaborated by the MIEUX experts in collaboration with the Ministry of Interior and GBOS and is expected to be launched in December 2012 (cf. ICMPD n.y.a). As can be seen, data collection and knowledge production plays a very important role in the activities of ICMPD.

The project officer of ICMPD points out that it is hoped that the data can be used for the formulation of a migration policy. So far, ICMPD is not involved in the formulation of the policy, The Gambian government would have to make another request to ICMPD asking for support (cf. Project Officer ICMPD, personal communication, 14th November 2011). When the Programme Manager was asked whether it would be possible to have measures on migration and development, she said it might be in the future, but not for now (cf. ICMPD program manager, personal communication, 13th May 2011).

**4.3.3 The Role of Frontex**

The role of Frontex in The Gambian context can mostly be described by the organization of joint return operations, much like the one from Austria in June 2011 (cf. Frontex 2012; Permanent Secretary MOI, personal communication, 11th April 2011) So far, there was no joint sea surveillance operation coordinated under FRONTEX in the territorial waters of The Gambia. The Gambia did not take part in the HERA operations, but still, there are ongoing operations within the Spanish agreement. According to the PS of the Ministry of Interior, there is a further collaboration in terms of an information system about visa overstayers. Frontex shared data with the Immigration Department in order to be able to help in repatriations of irregular Gambians (cf. Permanent Secretary MOI, personal
communication, 11th April 2011). It can be assumed that The Gambian authorities were provided with data from the Schengen Information System or the Visa Information System. It is also very worrisome that the agreements set up with Spain also give other European countries and Frontex the right to make sea patrols in the African territories and that those agreements even serve as basis for joint operations like HERA 2008. The presence of other states’ security forces in the territorial waters is normally a breach to sovereignty under international law and a bilateral agreement between two states giving third parties the same rights is a very thin legal basis to breach that law (cf. Kasparek 2010: 128-129). During the negotiations on the agreement between Spain and The Gambia, the Deputy Director of Frontex was present because the Agency bears in mind to overtake those agreements in the future (cf. Garcia Andrade 2010:332, Ministerio del Interior 2008).

4.3.4 The Role of IOM

The IOM has been present in The Gambia since 2001 and is currently running an assistance program for the return and reintegration of trafficked children in West Africa that is also implemented in The Gambia with the support of the U.S. Department of State, Bureau of Population, Refugees and Migration (IOM n.y.). As the Project Officer of IOM in Banjul also highlighted, there was not much interest so far by the government on that matter. She explained an incident of child trafficking and the government did not even contact the IOM, because the government solved the problem with the support of UNICEF. Just in the latter the IOM found out about the incident. This tendency fits in the overall trend that African governments do not collaborate so much with the IOM (cf. Oucho 2008: 59). The PS of the Ministry of Interior puts that in a different light and showed appreciation toward the collaboration with IOM because they share data with the government and support it with returns, particularly during the crisis in Libya, the government appreciated the support of IOM (cf. Permanent Secretary MOI, personal communication, 11th April 2011; IOM Project Officer, personal communication 8th March 2011).

Moreover, the IOM is running the Assisted Voluntary Return and Reintegration Program in The Gambia. Voluntary assisted return programs or as McCabe et al. call them “Pay-to-Go Programs” have a long history and were already present in European countries practices on migration after the guest workers regime in 1970s and 1980s (McCabe / Yi-Ying Lin/ Tanaka 2009: 2). As the IOM points out: “Assisted Voluntary Return and Reintegration (AVRR) is an indispensable part of a comprehensive approach to migration management aiming at the orderly and humane return and reintegration of migrants who are unable or unwilling to remain in host countries and wish to return
voluntarily to their countries of origin […] For migrants who need to return home, but lack the means to do so, IOM’s AVRR programs are often the only solution to their immediate plight” (IOM 2010). The numbers of received returnees from 2000-2008 always varied between from 256 to a maximum of 519 returnees in 2004 annually, but there was a sharp increase in 2009 to 723 returnees and even 1001 returnees in the year 2010. Between 2000-2010, there were a total of 4894 returnees (IOM 2010: 91). According to a table provided by the IOM Field Office in The Gambia, the returnees in 2010 and the beginnings of 2011 primarily came from UK, Switzerland, Libya, Tunisia, Egypt and Norway. The IOM Officer recognizes the differences between the return programs of the Member States. While the UK only gives a certain amount once, Switzerland has a program for a business start-up including a 6 month monitoring system, but this is also sometimes difficult to implement (cf. IOM Project Officer, personal communication, 8th March 2011). As McCabe et al. point out, the Spanish administration also has a voluntary return program, known as PREVIE (*Programa de retorno voluntario de inmigrantes desde España*). In 2003, the Spanish government authorized IOM to administer the program. The program aims to encourage the return of non-EU immigrants who have lived in Spain for more than six months, but are living in precarious social situations. It provides these immigrants with a ticket home and a travel stipend. Between 2003 and 2007, IOM assisted the return of about 500 migrants a year, but the number more than tripled to 1,592 in 2008 (cf. McCabe / Yi-Ying Lin/ Tanaka 2009: 6; IOM 2011). Italy also runs the assisted return program through the IOM (cf. IOM 2011).

4.4 Cooperation with Spain
As already analyzed in Chapter 3.4.1, Spain developed an Action Plan for sub-Saharan Africa for 2006-2008, the so-called “Plan Africa”, which was followed by a second phase for 2009-2012. Countries of origin for migratory flows to Spain are now on the priority list for Spanish development cooperation (cf. Pinyol 2008:3, Gobierno de Espana 2009; Ministerio de Asuntos Exteriores y de cooperación).
In the Plan Africa for 2006-2008, the Spanish government listed The Gambia among the focused association countries (Países de interés específico), which means that these countries are of special interest for Spain due to being a country of transit or origin or irregular migration, due to their economic potential (fisheries and tourism) or due to historic, cultural or collaborative relations (MAEC 2006:45) 11. In the plan 2009-2012, The

---

11 The Spanish government identified three categories of countries for the collaboration on migration:
A. Category/Countries of priority interest: Equatorial Guinea, Senegal, Mali, Nigeria, Angola, Namibia, South Africa, Mozambique, Kenya, Ethiopia, Mauritania;
B. Category/ Focused Association Countries/ Countries of special interest: Cape Verde, Cameroon, Gabon, Gambia, Ghana, Guinea–Bissau, Niger, Guinea, Santo Tomé y Príncipe, Seychelles y Tanzania
Gambia remained in that category. When explaining the bilateral dimensions of the Plan Africa, the action lines are as follows:

- The government wants to sign cooperation agreements on migration and readmission and the fight on organized crime with the most relevant sub-Saharan countries considering those aspects. The Gambia is among those countries, so when it comes to issues of irregular migration and readmission, The Gambia is also a priority country.

- The Spanish government wants to consolidate the political will and the administrative capacities of the respective countries to be able to collaborate on the combat of irregular migration and the repatriation of their nationals.

- Moreover, the Spanish government wants to increase the diplomatic presence in those countries and wants to deploy civil servants to The Gambia to enhance the institutional stability. For the second phase of Plan Africa from 2009 to 2012, even a new embassy should be deployed in The Gambia (cf. MAEC 2006:72-73, Gobierno de Espana 2009: 64).

- Spain also wants to put emphasis on the migration development nexus, particularly on measures like remittances and explore possibilities for co-development. (cf. MAEC 2006:72-73).

- Furthermore, the police and judicial forces will be strengthened in order to be able to adequately control the borders and combat mafias (cf. MAEC 2006:72-73, Gobierno de Espana 2009: 64). In the second program phase of the Plan Africa, the Spanish government reinforced the will, particularly on enhancing the capacities for sea surveillance and joint patrols (cf. Gobierno de Espana 2009: 81).

- For the phase 2009-2012, the opening of an interior council was planned (cf. Gobierno de Espana 2009: 76).

- Spain also announced the fight against trafficking networks in training The Gambian personnel of the Immigration Department and giving technical assistance and material (cf. Gobierno de Espana 2009:99).

- While in the first program phase, the Spanish government had little to offer considering the migration development nexus. It goes further in that manner in the second program phase and wants to facilitate access to the DELE (Diploma
in Spanish as a Foreign Language), through offering courses at the University of

- The Agencia Española de Cooperación Internacional para el Desarrollo (AECID)
will create a Workshop School specialized in construction, tourism and
hospitality. The development cooperation focus will be on education, particularly
occupational training, with support for the “The Gambia National Vocational
Training Plan”.

- In the sphere of trade relations, the APPRI (Agreements for the Promotion and
Reciprocal Protection of Investments) signed in 2008 will foster investment and
facilitate the entry of Spanish companies into The Gambia in the sectors of
tourism, fishing, renewable energies and telecommunications. (cf. Gobierno de

4.4.1 The Agreements
The first of the Spanish Action Lines within the Plan Africa was implemented quite
quickly. Spain offered 5 million Euros in direct development aid in exchange for the fight
against illegal migration and agreements on readmission at the beginning of October
2006 (cf. El Pais, 9.10.2006; Lexur Editorial 2006). A few days later, Miguel Morapinos,
Minister of Foreign Affairs and International Cooperation, jointly signed the Memorandum
of understanding with his Gambian counterpart, Lamin Kaba Bajo (cf. Adepoju/ van
Noorlos/ Zoomers 2009:52; Manneh 2006). As indicated in the Plan Africa, the
agreement implied development assistance to The Gambia, as well as technical
assistance-training for The Gambian security to control, joint-cooperation and monitoring
of the borders and to support The Gambian security forces with equipment and materials
(cf. Manneh 2006). The then Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs Bala Garba Jahumpa
stated that the agreement also implied a clause for visa quotas for Gambians (cf.
Jahumba cited after Sannah/Senghore 2006; Permanent Secretary MOI, personal
communication, 14th April 2011; Deputy Director DOYS, personal communication, 20th
April 2011). According to the American Ambassador Jospeh Stafford, the Spanish
diplomat El Busto expected “reluctance by Gambian officials […] in such sensitive areas
as repatriation of illegal Gambian migrants […] [but] in fact, Gambian authorities were
providing ‘excellent cooperation’” (Wikileaks 2006). That not much reluctance was shown
might be due to the fact that a really high number of irregular migrants are leaving The
Gambia in proportional terms, as shown above, or as will be suggested in the following, it
might have other reasons like the numerous donations offered and given to the
government. According to the American ambassador, the Spanish diplomat stated that
during the negotiations, “sufficient incentives such as aid and employment opportunities”
were offered by the Spanish party, though employment possibilities and development projects were yet to be determined (Wikileaks 2006). In August 2007, the media reported that Spain promised to provide another million Euros in addition to the five million Euros already agreed upon. The million should be used for training centers in the field of agriculture, fishery and construction. The training centers should enable the youths to acquire the necessary skills and work in Spain in the following (cf. Ceesay 2007).

4.4.2 Institution Building, Technical Assistance, Trainings, Capacity Building

The media repeatedly reported about donations to the security forces of The Gambia, namely the Immigration Department, The Gambian Armed Forces and the police forces. In July 2007, two vessels and speed boats were donated to The Gambian Armed Forces. The reason for the donations was always the combat of irregular migration (cf. Ndow 2007). For the years 2008-2009, Sallah reports of two more vessels, five more cars for surveillance, five motorbikes, two lorries and communication equipment in the value of €165,000. In March 2011, the Ministry of Interior received more office equipment in the form of printers, scanners and laptops (cf. Sallah 2011).

The Spanish government also funded the establishment of a new immigration post in Tanji village, a small fishing village, a departure area for irregular migrants taking the way through the high seas. During the inauguration of the “sea control headquarters”, the Spanish government also handed over two pickups and two lorries that were supposed to be used for Border Patrol. The Migration Control Post has a value of approximately €84,200. The two representatives of the Ministries of Interior of the Spanish and The Gambian government presented the post in Tanji as a result of the successful cooperation between Spain and The Gambia. The goal is as usual: “Appalling human losses related to human trafficking by sea and to fight this hideous crime.” (Faal 2010; Sallah 2011; Commissioner for Irregular Migration, personal communication, March 30th 2011). Around the community, the government implemented sensitization campaigns. The campaigns work like a “community policy forum” implemented by a team of police officers, an Immigration Officer, an Officer from the drug squad and an official from the child welfare. They organize community events or go from house to house and sensitize people on drug abuse, irregular migration, crime and the security of the state (cf. Commissioner for Irregular Migration, personal communication, March 30th 2011). An Immigration Officer posted at Tanjir fisher village also stated that control measures alone did not have much impact on people leaving. Irregular migration reduced due to sensitization campaigns that started in 2009 (cf. Immigration Officer, personal communication, 13th April 2011).
The position of the Commissioner for Irregular Migration was also instated in late 2007. There is currently no obvious evidence that the creation of the post was in direct relation to the Spanish government’s efforts, but there was none before that cooperation with the Spanish government started shortly before that and in the Plan Africa, the establishment of administrative capacities was among the action lines. Consequently, it can be concluded that the position of the Commissioner for Irregular Migration was established due to Spanish needs and recommendations. The PS of the Ministry of Interior also explained that the Irregular Migration Unit was established due to the development of the migration issue. Consequently, we can conclude that the unit was established within the Spanish migration agreement because Spain was a driving force in the development of the migration issue (cf. Permanent Secretary MOI, personal communication, 11th April 2011).

4.4.3 Readmission and Return

Immediately after signing the agreement in October 2006, the Spanish government deported 86 Gambians by the end of October (Wikileaks 2006). The media repeatedly reported about deportations from Spain and other European countries such as Austria. One Permanent Secretary of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs also stated that the repatriation of irregular migrants is a problem The Gambia is particularly facing with Spain. The Ministry of Foreign affairs facilitates the identification missions of the Ministry of Interior in a diplomatic way. The Spanish authorities contact The Gambian authorities on a regular basis because the maximum detention period of 40 days does not allow them to keep them longer, so Gambian authorities have to go to Spain regularly to identify their citizens (cf. Permanent Secretary Ministry of Foreign Affairs, personal communication, 27th April 2011). In any case, readmission and return operations did not always work out smoothly as already mentioned above: 101 Gambian migrants, who were escorted by 107 (!) Spanish police officers were returned to Spain because The Gambian authorities did not allow them to disembark in Banjul in September 2008. This occurred despite the fact that the affected migrants had been identified by a Gambian mission in Spain. Rumors suggested that the Ministry of Foreign Affairs instructed the Immigration Department to deny entry because the Spanish government had not been giving the financial assistance as agreed. As soon as the deportees were brought back to Spain, some of The Gambians had to be released because the maximum period of detention of 40 days according to Spanish law was exhausted (cf. Freedom Newspaper 2008/Aubarrell et al. 2009:23). In January 2008, The Gambia Journal had already reported that little so far has been implemented from the agreements considering employment creation and skills training. On several occasions, it came to violent
excesses by the youths at Banjul International Airport. The young returnees often accused the government of just collaborating on readmission and “selling them out”. According to the Journal, “The authorities in Banjul have now decided to see if they can press their Spanish counterparts into hastening the implementation of the agreements and cashing in on the problem.” (The Gambia Journal 2008). So this might be also a sign that the rejection of the 101 deportees was causally determined by the restraints of the financial flows.

4.4.4 Surveillance at Sea
The bilateral agreement authorizes Spanish authorities to do so: “Dichos acuerdos, suscritos por tiempo indefinido, permitirán la actuación de patrulleras de la Guardia Civil, y de otros países, así como de medios aéreos, en las 200 millas de la Zona Económica Exclusiva de estos tres Estados africanos.” (Ministerio del Interior 2008). National agents of the African countries must be on board because only they are entitled to enforce the legislation of the respective country in the case of an intercepted vessel. Spanish agents are neither allowed to stop them, nor are they allowed to drive them back to the mainland. Nevertheless, interdictions at sea are carried out by the Guardia Civil, which is an armed institution with military character (cf. Garcia Andrade 2010: 315; 320). The fact is that Spanish agents are present in the African water territories, most of the time even with their own vessels under Spanish command. Their presence can also be interpreted as another instrument of extraterritorial migration control. Spain is not just sending materials and leaving it up to the African governments, it is an active part of the border control there. “The so-called ‘fight against Irregular Immigration’ seems to be turning into the control of ‘irregular emigration’.” (Garcia Andrade 2010: 321, Kasparek 2010:129). The Guardia Civil is training The Gambian Navy as well as The Gambian Police in order to enable them to conduct the patrols by themselves (cf. Spanish diplomat, personal communication, 25 March 2011).

4.4.5 Sensitization
As sensitization was pointed out as one of the strategies within the National Youth Policy, it has been attempted to discover whether these campaigns were realized. Sensitization campaigns were implemented in several districts, most of them by the Immigration Department, The Gambia Police Force in collaboration with Operation No Back Way to Europe, as for example, the Annual Campaign on Illegal Migration at Basse Dampa Kunda, URR in April 2009 or the sensitization campaign organized by YOMPUA in December 2007 and there are still ongoing activities, particularly on behalf of ONBE, which is doing workshops, training of trainings activities in order to deploy their people all over the country. As indicated above, the Immigration Department also organized
sensitization campaigns on their own from 2009 onward since the control measures did not show the expected impact. According to the Commissioner for Irregular Migration, there were also sensitization campaigns conducted solely by government officials, particularly in the coastal areas. As the Spanish liaison officer also points out, sensitization campaigns and information about the economic situation and living conditions in Europe are very important for the overall strategy on the combat on irregular migration and as Spanish Diplomats were also present at the inauguration of ONBE, it is likely that the ideas on sensitization also came from the Spanish part (cf. Commissioner for Irregular Migration, personal communication, 30th March 2011; Spanish Liaison Officer, personal communication, 11th April 2011, ONBE Newsletter 2010).

The organization “Operation No Back Way to Europe” (ONBE) was inaugurated in 2008 and established by a returnee. The Association was formed with the support of the government and is working closely with the National Youth Council, the Ministry of Youth and Sports, the Immigration Department and The Gambia Police Force on the main objective: The fight against illegal migration (cf. Samateh 2009; Jallow 2009, Commissioner for Irregular Migration, personal communication, 30th March 2011). The organization is claiming to be a non-governmental youth association, but it’s extremely close relations to the government and the fact that many of its members work for the government leads to the assumption that it cannot be identified as purely non-governmental. Sensitization campaigns like the aforementioned campaign on illegal migration at Basse Dampha Kunda, URR are conducted in collaboration with The Gambia Police Force and the Immigration Department. The main activities of the organization are concentrating on discouraging irregular emigration through sensitization campaigns or through radio broadcasts. By now, they have members all over the country and the train them in sensitization, through training of trainers workshops, as was personally attended in April in 2011. On the other hand, as the organization also follows the logic of engaging the youths in employment, particularly in agricultural activities, ONBE also tries to set up a farming opportunities and for that, they receive support from the Ministry of Youth and Sports and from the Ministry for Agriculture (cf. Nyockeh 2011; ONBE-PRO, personal communication, 19th April 2011). The general approach is trying to keep the youths in the country, though the PRO acknowledges the positive potential migration can have for development, he explains the approach on irregular migration: “Yes it is trying to keep the youths here, that’s why we do not want to focus on legal migration, if we taught on legal migration, we are showing them the way. So we want to talk about illegal migration, seriously, that they will be discouraged and then we talk to them about the opportunities here.” (ONBE-PRO, personal communication, 19th April 2011)
The TOT workshop was funded by the US American Embassy, but government officials from the Ministry of Youth and Sports, from the National Youth Council, from the Immigration Department and from the Initiative NEDI were also present; Spanish officials were invited, but they did not have the chance to attend (cf. Agenda of the Workshop). The participants dealt with issues like the specific roles of police forces, immigration department, the different forms of migration, but also employment creation opportunities in The Gambia, like GAMJOBS, NEDI and NYSS, among others. The focus of the workshop was definitely on the discouragement of irregular migration, by examining the reasons for irregular migration, the profile of irregular migrants, sources of funding, problems during the journey and the effects on irregular migration on the home country. As ONBE is formally a non-governmental organization, it cannot acquire funds available within the agreements with European governments directly, but due to its close relationship to government officials, it also received, for example, one of the pick-ups either donated from the Italian or the Spanish government (cf. ONBE-PRO, personal communication, 19th April 2011). Though Adepoju (2008) argues that anti-migration campaigns designed to make people aware of risks and dangers are not very high on the agenda of the sending countries, but in The Gambian Case, ONBE is not even the only organization sensitizing on irregular migration. Bakewell (2007) opposes that argumentation by saying that most of the African NGOs have a negative view on migration by naming it as a “desperate measure to avoid poverty” or as “negative impact of the crisis in agricultural productions.” (Bakewell 2007:19-20).

As reported by the press, the Youth Movement for Peace and Unity in Africa (YOMPUA) also organized a one-day workshop on “Youths and Illegal Immigration”. YOMPUA is a registered youth organization based in Farato village, Kombo North. The participants worked out strategies to curb irregular migration and how to encourage The Gambian young people to engage in the country’s socio-economic development. Similar to The Gambian discourse on migration, the measures identified were concentrating on strengthening the border patrol, particularly the sea border and the encouragement of the youth to engage in agricultural activities or self-employment. The workshop counted a high presence of government officials, including police forces, the Commissioner for the Irregular Migration Unit as well as the then Permanent Secretary for the Department of State for Agriculture (cf. Jallow 2008; Jonga 2007).

4.4.6 Initiatives on Employment Creation, Skills Development and Start-up Funding

In the joint commission from March 2011, the Spanish development cooperation intended to focus on education and integration of young people in the labor market (cf.
4.4.6.1 Hotel School
The interview partners often mentioned the Hotel School as one of the initiatives for employment creation and skills development among the youths, which seems to be highly appreciated among The Gambian stakeholders. The Spanish government aims to restructure the school into a regional tourism training institute (cf. Government of the Republic of The Gambia/ Government of the Kingdom of Spain 2011:4, Spanish Liaison Officer, personal communication, 11th April 2011).

4.4.6.2 GAMJOBS
The Gambian Priority Employment Programme, in short, GAMJOBS, is according to the Ministry of Trade, Regional Integration and Employment (MOTIE), a government project that was formulated in partnership with UNDP and ILO (cf. MOTIE Information Brochure on GAMJOBS). When explaining the genesis of the program, MOTIE names high rates of unemployment and the increase in income poverty. They consider underemployment as the key cause for poverty. Consequently, poverty and unemployment are the reasons and pushing factors for irregular migration by sea and social tensions. Under the strategic objectives, there is no reference to irregular migration, as to say, to reduce irregular migration; it is just referred to as a consequence of unemployment (cf. MOTIE Information Brochure on GAMJOBS). On the other hand, the promotion cards for the program advert with the slogan: “Employ the Youth, Stop Illegal Migration”. Concluding the program can be perceived as an instrument from the government for curbing irregular migration.
In the agreement on the project between the government of The Gambia and UNDP, a very interesting paragraph refers to irregular migration and the involvement of the European Union and Spain, it is to be mentioned that it is the only paragraph referring to migration at all:

“Acute unemployment and poverty among youth is resulting in them resorting to desperate measure such as dangerous sea-borne attempts to emigrate to Europe. [...] In recognition of this, the European Union, and the Government of Spain in particular, has embarked on employment initiatives targeting youth in West Africa, including The Gambia, to provide them with opportunities to earn a decent living and dissuade them from undertaking such perilous journeys.” (Government of The Gambia/UNDP n.y.).

Very notifying is that the project proposal indicates that the EU and the government of Spain have embarked on employment activities and the distraction from irregular migration by sea. The government of The Gambia is not mentioned in that comment as an actively enrolled advocate and actor. Moreover, the “keeping them there” approach can be identified. Employment activities will be the solution for the irregular migration phenomenon, but other migration and development concepts like the reversion of Brain Drain or the use of remittances for development or legal migration opportunities are not mentioned.
In the Annual Report 2010 of GAMJOBS, the reduction of irregular migration is not mentioned at all, which again gives the impression that it is just written in there because funders wanted it to be there (cf. MOTIE 2011).

The GAMJOBS project operates within the National Employment Policy and the National Employment Action Plan and the main strategic objectives are:

- “Mainstreaming employment in national macroeconomic, sector and social policies
- Strengthening labor market polices and institutions
- Establishment of an enterprise and skills development and training fund for self-employment (GETFUND)
- Promoting labor-intensive technologies in public works programs to create employment and sustainable livelihoods” (Government of The Gambia/UNDP n.y.; MOTIE Information Brochure on GAMJOBS)

The third objective works under another program component name “GETFUND”, which is working closely with other initiatives for the employment and engagement of youths like NYSS, NYC, NEDI, the President’s International Award the National Training Authority, Insight Training Centre and Shayk Mafous Training Institute. The interconnectivity of the programs becomes clear, which can also be seen as high degree of coherence. Many of these groups are mentioned in the context of tackling or condemning irregular migration by policy makers, but as will be seen, just few of them really have tackling irregular migration as an objective. Most of them want to create job opportunities for young people or support them financially if they want to start up a business (Government of The Gambia/UNDP n.y.; MOTIE Information Brochure on GAMJOBS).

Under the fourth goal, the YMCA, for example, was supported by the establishment of a job center. So as can be seen, the strategy for The Gambia is skills training, employment creation, may it be for the reduction of irregular migration or not. That is from a Gambian perspective, as the GAMJOBS Coordinator stated, not really the point because if they have skills and can make their way to the West through legal channels, they can still remit and contribute in that manner to national development. On the other hand, the youth should receive hope through the program and the pressure to emigrate should diminish through the program. Still, the coordinator considers it as “paramount” to provide them with skills because “no matter where”, it would improve their living conditions (GAMJOBS-Coordinator, personal communication, 1st April 2011).

Spain is one of the main donors as indicated, but according to the GAMJOBS Coordinator, it was an initiative of the government and UNDP and Spain came in later as
a donor (cf. GAMJOBS Coordinator, personal communication, 1\textsuperscript{st} April 2011). The overall budget is 9.5 Million dollars, about half a million comes from UNDP and about two million comes from Spain for a five year period (cf. GAMJOBS-coordinator, personal communication, 1\textsuperscript{st} April 2011; MOTIE Information Brochure on GAMJOBS). In April 2011, the officials of the program were still looking for funding for the year 2011 because they were experiencing some shortages. Moreover, they had positive feedback on the program and are convinced of its impact and want to implement it on a long-term as well as on a broader basis. The question of whether the EU would maybe step in and fund the project was negated, though there were some informal discussions with NAUSO and they were still hoping to get some funding from the EU, but he was not very optimistic about it (cf. GAMJOBS-coordinator, personal communication, 1\textsuperscript{st} April 2011). It appears that neither the Spanish government, nor the EU wanted to support the program any longer.

4.4.6.3 National Enterprise Development Initiative
As indicated in the National Youth Policy and in the GAMJOBS project proposal as well as in the GAMJOBS information brochure, NEDI is one of the partnering initiatives of GAMJOBS and also an initiative in reducing unemployment and can also be interpreted as one of the strategies to combat irregular migration. The National Enterprise Development Initiative, shortly called NEDI, has the primary objective to empower youth and women by training them in business entrepreneurship and offering them funding for small-scale businesses in the informal sector. The board of the program selects potential vendors in consultation with mayors and governors of the respective LGA. After selection, the vendors are trained on business management and finally, the selected business starters get funding to open and start a business venture. Normally it is an amount of 50,000 Dalasi that must be refunded within two years at an interest rate of 7\%, which is the lowest in the entire country. Since its start in early 2009, 108 shops were opened with the support of NEDI. The focal sectors of the 4\textsuperscript{th} project phase are hospitality and catering and fishing (cf. NEDI 2010; MOYS 2008:37; NEDI-Coordinator speech at ONBE Workshop, 9\textsuperscript{th} April 2011). According to the NEDI Coordinator, the program was an initiative of the President of The Gambia himself. There is also some external funding from GAMJOBS and also from the funders, Spain and UNDP (cf. NEDI Coordinator, personal communication, 14\textsuperscript{th} April 2011; MOYS 2008:37).

According to several officials, the program is one of the governmental measures to engage the youth in entrepreneurship and contravene irregular migration. This can also be shown due to the fact that the NEDI Executive was present at the ONBE Workshop on illegal migration where he clearly stated the strategy of the government and the will to
work with ONBE: “NEDI is really, really more than willing to work with ONBE, because with all the advocates, with all the talking: Do not go to Europe, if you do not have anything to do, you either go or you do something criminal, so talking is not the solution, telling you “Do not go!” is not the solution, the solution is positive engagement, that’s what the government is out to do, we want to give you something to start up, so please do not take it and sell and go again [to Europe]” (NEDI-Coordinator at ONBE workshop 8th April 2011).

One of the main objectives: “NEDI has a fundamental objective of putting ownership and control of the informal sector in the hands of Gambians by training youth and women on entrepreneurship and funding them to open business venture. This objective is informed by the fact that this sector is dominated by non-Gambians who decide the course of events to their advantage and to the detriment of Gambians” (NEDI 2011).

The NEDI coordinator also highlights “But this is just for Gambians, there are other projects for all the youths.” (NEDI-Coordinator, personal communication, 14th April 2011). The hostility toward immigration and nationalist attitudes becomes clear once again.

4.4.6.4 National Youth Service Scheme
Like NEDI, the National Youth Service Scheme (NYSS) is also one of the initiatives for youth development and self-employment and is mentioned very often in the context of the combat on irregular migration (cf. MOYS 2008:37-38). The NYSS was established and partially financed by the government. It is coordinated by the Ministry of Youth and Sports and managed through a board of directors. Moreover, it also a partner of GAMJOBS and so, indirectly funded by the Spanish government and the UNDP.

Similar to NEDI, it has the aims to provide youths with skills, but there is also a great emphasis on developing a work ethic among the youths and change the attitude, which is referred to in the National Youth policy as one of the problems of The Gambian youths. The NYSS follows a quite disciplinary approach and “seeks to train the youth to appreciate the dignity in labor, inculcate discipline, imbue the youth with the spirit of self-reliance and encourage them to create rather than seek jobs.” (MOYS 2008:38). The NYSS has two program components: the regular program, which is a 2-year program targeting youth between the ages of 18 and 25 who have completed Grade 9 and the Apprenticeship Training Program, which is a 3 to 4 year program targeting youth between the ages of 13 and 25 who could not attend school at all or not go beyond Grade 8. While the regular program deploys the selected young people among skills training centers in the formal sector, the apprenticeship program deploys the youths among mentors and workshops in the informal sector (cf. MOYS 2008:39). The program
offers training in a wide range of areas such as auto mechanics, livestock, carpentry, rice production, hair-dressing, plumbing, etc. (cf. NYSS information brochure).

### 4.4.6.5. Tertiary Education
As indicated in the Plan Africa, the Spanish government re-emphasizes the plan to deploy Spanish language teachers at the University of The Gambia for the academic year 2011-2012. Additionally, Spain wants to establish a scholarship program for postgraduate studies in Spain where individuals focusing on Spanish priority sectors will be given priority (cf. Government of the Republic of The Gambia/ Government of the Kingdom of Spain 2011:5). At the time of the research, there were not yet any steps made toward the achievements of these goals.

### 4.4.6.6. Contributions to multilateral initiatives
As already mentioned above, Spain is contributing financially to GAMJOBS. Moreover, to the “Education for All Fast Track Initiative”, the NEPAD-Spanish Fund for the Empowerment of African Women, the Democratic Governance Thematic Trust Fund and the Fund for Gender Equality (UNIFEM) (cf. Government of the Republic of The Gambia/ Government of the Kingdom of Spain 2011:3). As already mentioned above, the Spanish government also funds regional ECOWAs initiatives. In this context and particularly interesting, the Migration and Development Fund, which offers financing for civil society initiatives in the ECOWAS Member States and up to 250,000 per Member State for institutional capacity building (cf. Government of the Republic of The Gambia/ Government of the Kingdom of Spain 2011:6).

### 4.4.7 Seasonal Migration
As pointed out in media reports regarding the agreement with Spain, there were verbal promises of giving visas for seasonal migration while in the Plan Africa, no such action was indicated. The NAOSU Officer confirmed that: “Spain was trying to do that by recruiting some seasonal workers during this period when they are really required. They will be taken there to work for a few months and be paid whatever they got and then come back and start up something.” (NAOSU Project Officer B, personal communication, 5th April 2011). Whereas the PS of the Ministry of Interior points out that the possibilities of seasonal migration in some sectors were examined, but it never led to a concrete agreement due to the economic crisis and the problems with unemployment in Spain (cf. Permanent Secretary MOI, personal communication, 14th April 2011).

### 4.5 Italian Cooperation
In January 2010, Italy and The Gambia signed a bilateral agreement on irregular migration and the combat on drug trafficking. The agreement covers cooperation
between the police forces of the countries as well as the immigration departments, but cooperation between other security agencies is also possible. Three Gambian police officers went to Italy on a capacity building training in February 2010. The officers received a training of trainers package that would enable them consequently to train other officials in The Gambia. The Vice-President Njie-Saidy stated that the strengthening of the security apparatus is necessary in order to curb irregular migration. Furthermore, the Italian government donated 12 pick-ups to the Ministry of Interior that were distributed among the security forces. The Minister of Interior explained to the press that during negotiations, the Italian counterparts stated that the vehicles would simply be handed over if the parties set up an agreement on irregular migration, but surprisingly, the Italian side delivered the vehicles even before the official signing ceremony (cf. Janko 2010a, Janko 2010b, Jallow 2010, Faal 2010). The Commissioner for Irregular Migration describes Italy as a “good partner” because they give vehicles and capacity building and enable The Gambian immigration forces to patrol their borders (Commissioner for Irregular Migration, personal communication, 30th March 2011). As worked out above, technical assistance to countries of transit and origin, which means the transfer of equipment and tools, training courses to improve the capacities of the respective authorities, are instruments of political leverage for agreements on migration control (cf. Aubarell et al. 2009:23; Adepoju/ van Noorlos/ Zoomers 2009:49-51, 53; Di Pascale 2010:296). Similar to Spain, there are reports about deportations from Italy available to the press even before the agreement Gambians were deported (cf. Gibba 2009). Whereas, in The Gambian Case, the same strategies can be observed of Italian’s external dimension of migration policy pointed out in Chapter 3.4.2. Italy uses labor quotas as political leverage and if the state is lacking proper cooperation on migration control, it lowers the quota for labor visas, as was the case with Morocco in 2003 (cf. Aubarell et al. 2009:23; Adepoju/ van Noorlos/ Zoomers 2009:49-51, 53; Di Pascale 2010:296). According to the Africa News, 52,080 quotas were reserved for countries that have bilateral agreements with Italy on irregular migration and that only these workers would be allowed for work in Italy. About 1,000 visas were reserved for Gambians in the year 2011 (cf. Africa News 2011; Ministero dell’ Interno 2011). However, as Paoletti has shown, regularizations and annual quotas are still ongoing measures and the two predominantly “diplomatic weapons” for negotiations with migrant-sending countries (Paoletti 2011:74). Contrary to Spain, Italy does not boost development cooperation in The Gambia. So far, the cooperation is solely on a security basis. The only Italian development initiative in The Gambia is the program for “Food Security through Commercialization of Agriculture (FSCA)” for the years 2009-2012 implemented by the
FAO and financed through the Italian Trust Fund for Food Security (cf. FAO 2012; Ministeri del Affari Esteri 12).

4.6 Cooperation with Other Countries and Intergovernmental Organizations

According to the PS of the Immigration Department and the Commissioner of the Irregular Migration Unit, the Maghreb countries are also sponsoring The Gambia in terms of training and equipment. The PS stated herself that it is very important for the Maghreb countries because they are transit countries to Europe. This trend fits into the argumentation of Haas (2008b, 2008a, 2007) that the North African transit countries become restrictive and put the migration issue on top of the agenda of the cooperation with sub-Saharan countries. Sometimes this might worsen the relationship, but in the case of The Gambia, no negatively connotated assessment of the cooperations could be examined. (Permanent Secretary MOI, personal communication, 11th April 2011, Commissioner for Irregular Migration, personal communication, 30th March 2011).

In October/November 2008, there was a training workshop for 20 immigration officers on document security sponsored by the Dutch Transavia Airlines. The Secretary of State for Interior stated that “document security is a vital control mechanism against human trafficking and child labor” (Secretary of State Sonko cited after Faal 2008). Document security has a high priority on the agenda of European countries for the combat of irregular migration and human trafficking. While there cannot be a direct connection drawn to any European donor for the recently instated “Gambia Biometric Identity System (GAMBIS)”, it is very likely that the establishment of the system came to the force due to Western donor influence. According to the Commissioner of Irregular Migration, it might be Italy funding GAMBIS because in the personal communication, he stated that Italy is training The Gambian authorities in the inclusion of biometrics and better documentation (cf. Commissioner for Irregular Migration, personal communication, 30th March 2011). It is an integrated Biometric Identity Management System that makes the capture of biometric details of Gambian citizens and foreigners possible. The biometric data will be included in the National Identity Card, the Residential and Work Permit and the Driving Licenses. Later on, the system wants to include biometric data in passports, visas marriage certificates, birth certificates and death certificates (GAMBIS 2012). The PRO of the Immigration Department announced to the Daily Observer: "Having the biometric ID card does not only mean you have an ID, but it contributes to your personal security; it also helps in controlling the movement of people from place to place and more importantly, document security," (PRO Manneh cited after Sallah 2010). The reference to the control of migration flows supports the assumption of this paper that
a European actor is funding the high-tech system. As indicated for the case of UK, the collection of biometric data and the establishment of E-borders is a further rapidly developing control instrument in European migration policy. A further event that came into view was the seminar “Improving civil status registration systems and combating document fraud” in Warsaw in May 2011. The expert meeting was funded by ICMPD and by the Spanish “Fundación Internacional y para Iberoamérica de Administración y Políticas Públicas (FIIAPP)” and the session on “Combating Document Fraud” was held by Angele Trommelen, a document expert, Immigration and Naturalisation Services of Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Netherlands. The focus of the seminar was on civil registration in West Africa. So the Netherlands appears again and supporting training on document security in The Gambia in October 2008 and the Spanish government, which is the most active European Government in The Gambia and ICMPD, which happens to have expertise on The Gambia as well. Very worrisome is that the seminar was held within the framework of “Support for the Rabat Process on Migration and Development”. The FIIAPP also states to have a migration and development program as a focus of its actions. So the question must be asked again, how are document security and the concepts of migration and development related? Of course, data collection is a very important issue, but as the Minister for Interior pointed out clearly, the document security issue is not about strengthening the migration issue for development of having better data in general, it is about supporting the combat on irregular migration (cf. Trommelen 2011; FIIAPP n.y.).

4.7 European Influence on Gambian Migration Policy Development

Notifying is that all the measures on irregular migration and migration in general started after the cooperation with Spain took off. As Wagbou stated, there was a trend to laissez-faire on migration policy in Western Africa for a long time (cf. Wagbou 2008:141). That this also applies to The Gambia, migration is a relatively new policy field. One can even say that the policy developed under European influence. The PS of the Ministry of Interior even states it quite clearly: “The EU and its Member States were the driving forces behind the development of the migration issue because they did not want The Gambia to “export drugs and citizens” and it was mainly on irregular migration.” At the same time, she explained that due to low development and lack of resources, The Gambia is dependent on EU countries to support them in terms of migration management (Permanent Secretary MOI, personal communication, 11th April 2011). One editor of the oppositional newspaper Foroyaa also makes clear:
“It’s the initiative from the EU and it is pushed most by, more by Spain, than any country because most of these people, when they leave Spain is the first destination, so you know, this was pushed by Spain through the European Union and then this agreement came with the government” (Youth Ambassador, personal communication, 28th March 2011).

Furthermore, the PS points out that the budget support, even the 1 million for irregular migration, never comes in liquid money, it is always technical assistance that is provided and funded under the EDF. And of course, the EU has its political leverages and the options to hold the funds back in case The Gambia does not comply with some of the provisions (cf. Permanent Secretary MOI, personal communication, 11th April 2011).

The Executive Secretary of the NYC further states that there should be a stronger voice from The Gambian side considering the agreements, not all the government officials and ministries are involved in the bargaining process of the agreements and therefore, do not have the required expertise in every field, particularly the migration field, that is why sometimes The Gambian partners are “easily carried away by the Western partners” (Executive Secretary NYC, personal communication, 20th April 2011). Nevertheless, the incident of the rejected Gambian deportees and rumors about the reasons for it make it clear that The Gambian government also has its strategies to “cash in” Spanish development aid. Many African receiving countries are developing “northern responses” and are getting stricter on immigration control and surveillance (cf. Adepoju/van Naersen/Zoomers 2008:6; Adepoju/Zoomers 2008a: 268). Nessel (2009) points out that The Gambian government also became very strict on migration and is threatening irregular migrants with criminal persecution if they try to migrate to Spain. She points to the example of thirty-seven Senegalese who were imprisoned for one month after they had tried to take off to the Canary Islands. Moreover, the judge found them guilty of violating Section 222 of the Criminal Code—“not an unlikely decision considering the financial assistance The Gambia receives from Spain in exchange for its efforts to prevent unlawful migration to Spain” (Nessel 2009: 660). Nessel further highlights that the possibilities for refugee protection diminish with the practice of imprisoning irregular migrants (cf. Nessel 2009:678). Deputy Director of the Immigration Department points out very clearly how The Gambian government deals with irregular immigration:

“*In The Gambia, if you do not pass through the official recognized entry policy, the law is saying that you are a prohibited immigrant, and if you are apprehended, your expulsion from the country should be carried out, maybe most of you do not know because there are so many people that refuse entry from the entry points. […] This must be fulfilled before a visitor or an alien is admitted: One the person should be in possession of a valid passport, number two the person*
must be in possession of a visa, if this country person need a visa to come to The Gambia, number three the person must be in possession of adequate means of support in cash or kind and number four the person must be in possession of adequate cash or a return ticket or a cash equivalent to the cost of a return ticket, if you do not fulfill these requirements, definitely the law is saying you are a prohibited immigrant” (Deputy Director of Immigration Department, Speech at ONBE-Workshop, 8th April 2011).

The Deputy Director further states: “Anybody who is involved in such an act, we will make sure that you are going to face the full force of the law” (Deputy Director of Immigration Department, Speech at ONBE-Workshop, 8th April 2011). One Immigration Officer at Tanji Village also stated that the immigration forces even started criminalizing irregular emigrants, though actually, they should be treated as victims of human trafficking, The Gambian authorities started to detain them and interrogate them (cf. Immigration Officer, personal communication, 13th April 2011). Adepoju et al. (2009) also highlights that The Gambia is among the stricter ECOWAS states, which is still repatriating nationals of other Member States because they lack proper documentation. The Deputy Director of Immigration also problematizes human traffickers: “The organizers of the trips, these are the people we really want most because they are the ones who go around and brainwash the others, most of these people are in the rural areas, these are people who have no idea, who are not educated, who do not know the risk involved and they take too much money from these people.” (Deputy Director of Immigration Department, Speech at ONBE-Workshop, 8th April 2011).

The words of the Deputy Director clearly remind us of the European discourse on irregular migration and human trafficking. Particularly, the Ministry of Interior developed a strong security-led, restrictive approach on migration and recently developed many restrictive measures on irregular emigration and immigration and human trafficking. The beneficiary institutions outlined in the CSP were the Immigration Department, Gambia Bureau of Statistics, Population Secretariat, Gambia Tourism Authority and the Department of State for Interior. So it is not only security-led institutions outlined as beneficiary institutions, because most of the time, it is the Ministries of Interior or other governmental security organs dealing with immigration and asylum that are also responsible for security issues and the production of knowledge about security. So the perception of migration as a security problem is nearby (cf. Huysmans 2000: 757). Nevertheless, as shown in practice, it is mostly the immigration department, the police and the navy cooperating on migration with Spain and Italy. The Deputy Director of the DOYS also points out that the agreements deal with migration and drugs, for example. The perception of migration as a security issue increases due to the connection of
migration issues with criminal issues (Deputy Director DOYS, personal communication, 20th April 2011). The agreements, particularly the ones with Spain, are primarily not only about irregular migration, but also about human trafficking, drug trafficking and child trafficking (Permanent Secretary Ministry of Foreign Affairs, personal communication, 27th April 2011). GBOS and the Population Secretary were indicated as beneficiaries due to the migration survey, but nevertheless, if legal migration and migration and development should have been addressed, the MOYS and the MOTIE should have been involved. The Executive Secretary of the NYC reacted quite emotionally, when he was shown the indicated beneficiary institutions of the CSP with the EU: “[…] but what about the Ministry of Youth and Sports, if it is young people concerning it? How can you do that without consulting with them? How can you do this without the ministry of the young people?” (Executive Secretary NYC, personal communication, 20th April 2011).

The agreements and the first measures on irregular migration definitely developed in a security-led context. As shown above, Brouwer (2009) also states: “There is no doubt that there is a close relation between these readmission agreements and the measures taken by third states with regard to their external borders preventing persons to leave for the territory of the EU Member States” EU countries predominantly started to give financial support to African countries for border control, fighting human trafficking, strengthening their police and intelligence apparatus. Whereas it must be kept in mind that the Global Approach was actually already present in the discourse on cooperation with third countries on migration issues before 2006, so before the cooperation with The Gambia even started. When the measures implemented in The Gambia are looked at, it becomes very clear what the focus of the cooperation is: There were capacity building measures for the navy, the police forces and the immigration forces, as well as a great deal of technical assistance and donations; there was a workshop on human trafficking and law enforcement and The Gambia introduced the Human Trafficking Act one year later, a system for incorporating the biometric data in documents was instated after workshops on document security, there was a control point established at The Gambian coast, ICMPD conducted a workshop on IBM, a national contact point of the Seahorse Network was established and last but not least, there were sensitization campaigns on discouraging irregular migration. So as explained by Lavenex (2007) and Papadopoulos (2007), the European policies are transferred and exported to third countries through transgovernmental networking with the support of supranational institutions (cf. Lavenex 2007:247;249). The networking often concludes in projects like capacity building of border police on bilateral level with the technical support of Frontex. Network governance is often based on more symmetric power relations compared to others, though in practice, there is a certain kind of hierarchy and asymmetry in powers because the EU
can still give incentives and conditionality or sanctions because there is always an imbalance in resources and political power. While purely hierarchical systems pursue the objective of producing binding laws, networks produce less binding instruments like agreements or memorandums of understanding. In some external policy, field representatives of third countries are included for consultation, so network governance is characterized by co-ownership concepts and interaction that give the externalized rules more legitimacy (cf. Lavenex/Schimmelfenning 2009:797-798). So for The Gambian Case, it can be concluded that network governance is the overall present strategy of the externalization of European migration policy. Gambian governmental stakeholders are present at regional consultations on migration and development within the ECOWAS and the AU, most of these consultation and expert meetings are funded by European actors. Then, we have the Rabat Process that includes the Member States of the EU and the AU. The high presence of different multilateral organizations like the IOM, ICMPD, Frontex, Europol and UNFPA and their cooperation with EU Member States and the EC in the implementation of training workshops, capacity building and in the case of EC and ICMPD, the realization of the entire budget for migration under the 10th EDF are signs for a networking approach, particularly under the EDF, there is a co-ownership concept. Nevertheless, as pointed out by the PS of the Ministry as well as the Executive Secretary of the NYC and the Youth Ambassador, there is still a certain imbalance of power relations in terms of financial resources, dependency on the EU States and available expertise on migration, particularly in the bargaining process. Nevertheless, The Gambia has still the instrument of not accepting returned Gambians and simply not implementing control measures and using the donated articles for different purposes, may it be personal use or whatever. Network governance goes along with symmetric as well as asymmetric power relations and medium degrees of interdependence. When there is no incentive for accession, as it is the case with The Gambia, the effectiveness of EU rules for cooperation or whether the EU rules will be adopted depends on the bargaining power of the EU and on the institutionalized communication mechanisms and social learning. The overall budget of 76 million Euros within the 10th EDF gives the EU a very good position to bargain in The Gambian Case. Under the CSP, the activities of the EU have to align with the government’s policies, so it is very important to note that at the beginning the ICMPD, as the implementing organization of migration issues in The Gambia, wanted to support measures on irregular migration and strengthening the government institutions while in the end, the activities focused on the already started migration survey. So it can be assumed that The Gambia also had a strong say in that decision and as indicated in the National Youth Policy and in the PRSP II, more research on migration and data collection was among the top priorities for The Gambia. Moreover,
with the Italian and the Spanish government already supporting the small country and a
great deal in border control, there was actually no need to “triple cover” that front through
the EC again. As pointed out above, the measures funded under the thematic programs
do not necessarily have to align with the respective countries’ development policies,
which reminds us of the activities funded under the thematic program: The Seahorse
Network, which is an instrument to control irregular migration flows as well as the
seminar on integrated border management implemented by ICMPD in July 2009 and the
workshop on law enforcement. These measures obviously aim at the control of irregular
migration, which represent the security-led approach of the European Union.

As stated in Chapter 3.4.1, several researchers acknowledge that Spain is trying to
approach the migration issue in a more balanced way. Aubarell et al. (2009) and
Adepoju/ van Noorlos/ Zoomers (2009) argue that agreements with the Spanish
government also include elements of management of migratory flows in addition to
migration control and measures addressing the root causes and development. In The
Gambian Case, this applies only partially. Before the intervention in 2006, there was no
development assistance at all and as can be seen, there are some measures on
employment creation and skills development, like the Hotel Training School or the
GAMJOBS Project. These measures are perceived overall as very positive by Gambian
stakeholders. Though particularly advocates for young people and people working in the
environment of the Ministry for Youth and Sports share the opinion that the measures
are still limited in scope and there should be even more investments in employment
creation. However, the skills development and training institutions partnering with
GAMJOBS were already set up before the Spanish intervention; the Spanish
government simply provided funding. Moreover, as the Gamjobs Coordinator stated the
GAMJOBS Project was still looking for funding for the next phase in 2011. The program
was not continued in 2012, so the interest of Spain in funding employment creation
apparently diminished, perhaps because irregular migration to the Canary Islands has
reduced? Nevertheless, the link of migration and development assistance as well as the
provision of technical assistance and donations from the Spanish side give the incentives
to cooperate on migration control and readmission measures. These are “the carrots” to
follow the Spanish stick. Nevertheless, as we have seen above, The Gambia has shown
that it will follow this stick just as long as there is still financial influx and assistance from
Spain. The measures on border control and irregular migration are even more present in
the cooperation between The Gambia and Spain. The whole repertoire of capacity
building, training, technical assistance, donations, the presence of liaison officers, joint
patrols, institution building and financial support on the regional level is present in The
Gambia. As pointed out above, the donations provided are further incentives for
cooperation. Diplomatic presence and diplomatic practices as “positive conditionality linked with intergovernmental negotiations” are the backbone of the Spanish Policy on cooperation with third countries. In The Gambia, they established an embassy as well as several liaison officers deployed there (Lavenex 2007:247). In concluding, it can be said that all the strategies followed by Spain can be interpreted as the “keep them there” or “stay at home” approach with the control measures and joint patrols in combination with employment creation activities (Bakewell 2007:34-35; Haas 2008b:1). The possibilities for legal migration were not instated and neither were the possibilities for a post-graduate program for Gambians in Spain.

The Italian approach is focusing on the control of irregular migration as well. Pursuing the aim of a readmission agreement, the Italian government made several donations to the security forces of The Gambia, but also training for some immigration officers and visa quotas are among the incentives of the Italian government. So the agreement with Italy is very obviously putting the migration issue into the security context and focusing on irregular migration. Curious to note is that just one Gambian reached the Canary Islands in 2010 and cooperation with Italy started in 2010. It must also be noted that this is an assumption, but it is shown that control measures do not necessarily condemn migration movements and several Gambian stakeholders also stated that the land route through Senegal is not controllable; it might be that due to the high controls of the sea the migration patterns changed again to the land routes and Gambians were trying to reach Italy through the Maghreb countries in higher numbers once again and that was the driving reason to establish the agreement. The Commissioner for Irregular Migration also stated that the migration movements shifted from the high seas to the land routes (cf. Commissioner for Irregular Migration, personal communication, 30th March 2011).

4.8 A Comprehensive Approach on Migration?
The opinions about the European and particularly the Spanish intervention diverge among The Gambian stakeholders. First, the assessment of Gambian stakeholders on the control measures will be analyzed, while later on going on to the assessment on employment creation activities. During a visit of the then Spanish Director General for Immigration Altoro Avero in 2007 in The Gambia, The Gambian officials re-emphasized the will to cooperate on irregular migration. Nevertheless, The Gambian President Jammeh apparently stated that “nothing can stop the dangerous exodus” (President Jammeh cited after Gambianow 2007). Likewise, the Commissioner for Irregular Migration states that the irregular emigration to the Canary Islands has reduced since 2009, but he thinks that it rather shifted to the trans-Saharan route (cf. Commissioner for Irregular Migration, personal communication, 30th March 2011). The Editor of the
Foroyaa newspaper confirms that and also highlights that the main route is to Europe is through Libya because all the West African countries already have agreements on sea surveillance (cf. Editor Foroyaa newspaper, personal communication, 8th March 2011). The executive secretary of the NYC also points out that border patrol is not the right answer for the combat of irregular migration and that employment creation is the better way to deal with migration. “Yeah, it’s fine border patrol here and there but still they will go […] Even if you control the borders, they can always take the rightful route to Senegal and from Senegal they find their way. […] Definitely for me the intervention here should be investing in employment creation” (Executive Secretary NYC, personal communication, 20th April 2011). The NYC Executive Secretary further argues that border patrol alone is not the answer, but a high percentage goes into border patrol: “Most of the money that is pumped in by the Spanish government goes into border patrol. Yes, it is helping, but definitely that is not the right answer. I would prefer that money to be used to build more technical training skill centers, youth centers or perhaps be used to give out loans to young people, so much money being invested in border patrol here and they’re buying pick-ups here and there” (Executive Secretary NYC, personal communication, 20th April 2011). Most of the stakeholders do not believe in the effectiveness of border patrol. Even a Spanish Liaison Officer also states that migration is not controllable and argues for sensitization and information of the risks or irregular migration and information about the economic situation in Europe (Spanish Liaison Officer, personal communication, 11th April 2011). The Deputy Director of the Immigration Department points out that the emigration of Gambian nationals has decreased adversely due to control measures: “[…] the statistics have shown that only one Gambian who migrated from Nouadhibou [Mauritania] […] all the way […] to the Canary Islands. But in the whole of 2010, there was no illegal migration from The Gambia” (Deputy Director of Immigration Department, Speech at ONBE-Workshop, 8th April 2011). The Spanish Liaison Officer thinks that it was also due to sensitization campaigns, the high death toll on the high seas and particularly due to the economic crisis in Europe (cf. Spanish Liaison Officer, personal communication, 11th April 2011). However, when visiting the Immigration Control Post, built by the Spanish government, in Tanji Fisher village, it was found that the Immigration officers do not even have the donated pick-ups available on sight. All what they have is an old lorry, but they do not have the means to buy fuel. Furthermore, they do not have a landline telephone. That means if they would observe anybody leaving from the coast out of the observation tower, first of all, they could not be there quickly because they do not have a vehicle and second, they could not even call somebody for support or inform somebody at the Immigration Department if they do not have credit on their private cell phones (cf. Immigration Officer, personal communication,
Moreover, it was personally observed that many pick-ups with the inscription “Border Patrol” are used in the city centers of Banjul and Serrekunda, where borders are quite far. The ONBE-PRO and the Executive Secretary of the NYC confirmed that and claimed that this is a huge problem (cf. ONBE-PRO, personal communication, 19th April 2011; Executive Secretary NYC, personal communication, 20th April 2011). The Editor of Foroyaa newspaper additionally states that the agreements lack transparency and that it is often not clear, what the money is used for (cf. Editor Foroyaa Newspaper, personal communication, 8th March 2011). These facts bring us back to the argumentation of Hein de Haas, who states that African states have little interest in combating migration due to the great dependency on remittances (cf. Haas 2008b:11). The Deputy Director of Youth and Sports also states that even the irregular migrants are trying to remit and contribute to the development: “Yes, it is a very big number, they are really trying, even those there illegally hide and seek to get a job and they are trying to send remittances” (Deputy Director DOYS, personal communication, 20th April 2011). While the DPS of MOYS also states that migration is good and even helps absorb the unemployed youths and contributes a great deal to development (Deputy Permanent Secretary MOYS, personal communication, 19th April 2011). Hein de Haas also argues that many African governments are paying “lip service” to their counterparts in Europe on the combat on irregular migration and use the migration issue to bargain on development aid and states that: “Mauritania, Senegal and The Gambia have successfully capitalized on their new status as transit countries” (Haas 2008b:13).

Presenting their selves as victims of illegal immigration has increased their “geopolitical leverage”, as we can see, the Deputy Director of Immigration also presented The Gambia as “victim of illegal immigration” and that the reduction of the influx of immigration is one of the strategies of The Gambian government (Haas 2008b:13): “Illegal migration […] has reduced aversely because definitely we have put some exclusive measures in place.[…] We can minimize the influx of illegal migration in our porous points, this is what we did in 2010” (Deputy Director of Immigration Department, Speech at ONBE-Workshop, 8th April 2011).

So the increased financial aid and other forms of support were actually of benefit for The Gambia. Several stakeholders confirm that particularly when referring to the employment creation avenues supported by Spain:

“I think it’s positive, because I mean, for example, if you look at the interventions of Spain alone in GTTI and all the thing, the institution was almost dying out […] all the laboratories were almost empty at some point” (NAOSU Project Officer A, personal communication, 5th April 2011). The Youth Ambassador also assesses the initiatives like GAMJOBS very positively and is acknowledging its impact. Nevertheless, he claims that
it is limited in scope because the focus so far is on skills development, but not on employment creation. When looking at the GAMJOBS’ annual report, it is not quite true that there are no employment creation initiatives within the project. Whereas Farbakary’s objection can be aligned that there are no employment creation activities for highly-skilled people: “Those who have a higher education level, their needs are not catered for in the GAMJOBS project.” (Youth Ambassador, personal communication, 28th March 2011). The DPS of MOYS also highlights the importance of employment creation in general in order to be able to keep the youths in The Gambia, but he also mentions that GAMJOBS particularly would be a very good program, but at the time of the research he was still hoping to persuade the Spanish government to invest in the program and prolong it (cf. Deputy Permanent Secretary MOYS, personal communication, 19th April 2011). As pointed out above, there were plans for a post-graduate program for Gambians in Spain, but so far, there is no implementation. He argues that the focus of the entire intervention should be on employment creation instead of control measures: “How many people have they employed, for me, that is where the focus should be, not how many vehicles have been donated, how many security forces have been trained, how many boats are available” (Youth Ambassador, personal communication, 28th March 2011). The Executive Secretary of the National Youth Council goes along with the Youth Ambassador: “That is why, like I always say, instead of investing in buying pick-ups and all those things, on border patrol, instead you better invest in employment creation, I think that will be the best way” (Executive Secretary NYC, personal communication, 20th April 2011).

Several officials and other stakeholders see the immigration policy of the EU quite critically. Most of them state that if there would be more legal channels, it would also reduce irregular migration. So in order to have a comprehensive approach, it would be very important to facilitate visas and lower the requirements. Nevertheless, the Permanent Secretary of the Ministry of Interior, for example, thinks it is positive to have a visa system and to have control over who is going in and out. Likewise, the NAOSU Officer stated that it would be better to have a managed migration system in The Gambia. The by then PS of the MOI further states that the EU would support The Gambia in creating their own migration system and that The Gambia is willing to make that possible and maybe even be a “good example” (Permanent Secretary MOI, personal communication, 11th April 2011). It might be that the European Union will also influence the migration policy development. As indicated above, another 3 million Euros is calculated for the governance project of the next phase that should address, for example, illegal migration and human trafficking. She also argues that due to the strict immigration laws and the living conditions facing in Europe, it would be better for The
Gambian citizens to simply stay in The Gambia (cf. Permanent Secretary MOI, personal communication, 11th April 2011). As indicated above, even in the Youth Policy, a sublime critique on the European Immigration system can be found. The member of the Youth Ambassadors for peace also states that more legal channels would reduce irregular migration and the high risks the young people are facing when they embark on the journey. He further explained that in former times, it was easier for highly-skilled people to get to Europe by obtaining a visa for study reasons. Due to that fact people were also motivated to try it through legal channels and try to get good degrees to have access, but nowadays as it got very difficult for the youth to obtain a visa even with university degree, so many embark on the back way even without trying the legal way: “I may decide to go through the back way cause I know, when I try the legal way, I will not get it, so if the visas are made easy for the people, accessible […] I am convinced that legal migration and development of the economy will be assured” (Youth Ambassador, personal communication, 28th March 2011). Moreover, he pointed out that Gambians applying for a visa usually have to face a great deal of harassment and discrimination at most of the embassies of European countries or the United States, which is why many people reject that way (cf. Youth Ambassador, personal communication, 28th March 2011). Another argument of Gambian stakeholders is that European counterparts only pick the highly-skilled, which leads to Brain Drain or Brain Waste. Many Gambian stakeholders harshly criticize the selective EU policy (cf. Immigration Officer, personal communication, 13th April 2011; Permanent Secretary Ministry of Foreign Affairs, personal communication, 27th April 2011). The Commissioner of the Irregular Migration Unit as well as his colleague at Tanji Village also state that some years ago, The Gambia did not have all of these problems and that the visas were very hard to obtain, so many potential emigrants who have tried and consequently got rejected several times might just leave from the back way because they are discouraged (cf. Commissioner for Irregular Migration, personal communication, 30th March 2011; Immigration Officer, personal communication, 13th April 2011). The DPS of the MOYS also states that the EU needs to look at that issue and should “encourage people to go” because he thinks that the pressure and interest for emigration to Europe would diminish after a while. In his opinion, it is in human nature that people always want what they cannot have, because before, when there were no visa restrictions yet, the interest to go to Europe was very low and increased significantly after the visa restrictions were set in place (Deputy Permanent Secretary MOYS, personal communication, 19th April 2011). The PS of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs even calls the immigration policy of the European Union very racist, although the European governments need immigrants due to their aging populations. The Immigration Officer at Tanji village also points out the dependence of European
countries on the African work force (cf. Permanent Secretary Ministry of Foreign Affairs, personal communication, 27th April 2011; Immigration Officer, personal communication, 13th April 2011) These important issues are not yet included in The Gambian agenda and advocacy plan: The restrictive migration policies in destination countries, xenophobia in Western countries and the feminization of migration. Though the Gambian stakeholders do have their opinions on the European immigration system and see the restrictive and particularly selective policy very critically and are convinced that more legal channels to Europe would ease the pressure of irregular migration (cf. Wagbou 2008:158).

Nevertheless, the PS of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs states that the restrictive approaches on migration are sometimes just rhetorical or presented like that in public. In practice, for example, the Spanish government keeps the skilled people in detention the maximum period of 40 days and releases them afterward because they need their workforce and it is only the low-skilled who are sent back. There are media reports about more than 100 deportees while there are just 40 deportees on board. As the African governments are highly dependent on remittances, which also applies for The Gambian Case, they also do not advocate on such issues and keep quiet (cf. Permanent Secretary Ministry of Foreign Affairs, personal communication, 27th April 2011).

Concepts of circular migration or multiple entry visas and more legal recruitment in general are seen as a very potential tool for making migration fruitful for the development of The Gambia. If there would be legal possibilities, it would minimize the risks of people embarking on irregular migration and all of the demeaning conditions the migrants have to face because they would be engaged in a job immediately. Moreover, it would be better organized and there would be clear data-based knowledge about the people coming in and out. If the European countries would open up for multiple entry visas, The Gambians would also have incentives to come back because they would be secured with another opportunity to go again. They would have their experiences in Europe, work and remit some money back (cf. Permanent Secretary MOI, personal communication, 11th April 2011; NAOSU Project Officer A and B, personal communication, 5th April 2011; Deputy Director DOYS, personal communication, 20th April 2011; Immigration Officer, personal communication, 13th April 2011). So these assessments of The Gambian stakeholders allows for suggestion that possibilities for legal migration should be part of a comprehensive approach on migration from a Gambian perspective, but they are not, at least not yet. As stated above, The Gambia is also facing problems like Brain Drain or rural-urban migration, which are not part of any agreements with a European actor. There is a high dependency on remittances and a huge Diaspora distributed in Western countries, which could contribute a great deal to Gambian development. Now which policy measures dealing directly or indirectly with the migration and development nexus
in The Gambia will be considered. Not surprisingly, there is no funding from European actors in these policy areas. Some of the suggested policy approaches of Wagbou (2008), Castels (2008), Adepoju/Zoomers (2008), Adepoju (2008), Exenberger (2007), Adepoju/van Naersen/ Zoomers (2008) on making the migration and development fruitful for southern countries can be found in The Gambian policy initiatives. The suggestion of Wagbou (2008) was the creation of job opportunities and education as an alternative to international migration, though Gambian stakeholders assess the employment creation initiatives supported by the Spanish government and other stakeholders as limited in scope, the overall assessment is still positive. Wagbou’s suggestion of the introduction of a plan of action for the reintegration of returnees into agricultural activities and rural development is as yet only mentioned in the youth policy, but there were no concrete implementation activities found. Whereas as shown in the youth policy and the report on the youth assessment of the policy, the campaign “Back to the Land” and the concept of decentralization are present in The Gambian discourse on reversing migration trends. Decentralization is, according to several government officials, another instrument to regulate migration flows (cf. Immigration Officer, personal communication, 13th April 2011; Executive Secretary NYC, personal communication, 20th April 2011; Deputy Permanent Secretary MOYS, personal communication, 20th April 2011). As analyzed above, The Gambia faces great difficulties due to high rural-urban migration and an exponential population increase in the urban areas. Most of the irregular migrants are those coming from the rural areas to the urban areas who face unemployment or they depart directly from the rural area which is why many see the decentralization policy as crucial in the regulation of migratory flows. Moreover, it also fits into the overall campaign “Back to the Land” in order to enhance the agricultural activities. The ongoing decentralization process experienced a new drive through the Local Government Act 2002, which diversified and strengthened the responsibilities and competencies of the local governments and will include the local governments into the governance system of the central government (cf. AOHW 2009:15). The improvements of infrastructure, such as the development of a road network and fuel stations, electrification as well as the educational infrastructure, are improvements that aim to distribute the population to the rural areas. The Executive Secretary of the NYC also acknowledges that the university is in Brikama, which allows the people from the rural area to stay at their places of origin (cf. Executive Secretary NYC, personal communication, 20th April 2011).

The recommendation of the creation of permanent bridges between origin and destination societies is not yet fulfilled, though there are some approaches. According to Kebbeh, it was quite surprising that the government of The Gambia, through its Ministry of Foreign Affairs, International Cooperation and Gambians Abroad, convened the first
“Consultative Meeting between the Government of the Republic of The Gambia and Gambians in the Diaspora” in January 2012. The objective of the meeting was to make the talents, know-how and potentials fruitful for the achievement of Vision 2020. Whereas Kebbeh thinks it was primarily due to the high inflow of remittances. As pointed out above, the inflow in terms of percentage of the GDP is very high in The Gambia. Kebbeh further argues that this step from the government was particularly surprising when considering the traditionally quite encumbered relationship between The Gambian Diaspora and the government due to the slow democratization process and human rights abuse (cf. Kebbeh 2012). Kalleh Farbakary also states that: “For the government to ensure that illegal migration is reduced and so on to have the benefit of migration, they have to ensure just and democratic governance” (Youth Ambassador, personal communication, 28th March 2011). The Editor of the Foroyaa newspaper goes along with the argumentation of the Youth Ambassador and also states that the lack of respect of human rights and freedom of speech are main reasons for emigration and for engagement (cf. Editor Foroyaa, personal communication, 8th March 2011). Though the consultation was a first step in engaging the Diaspora, the situation and the relationship may have worsened now due to the current happenings in terms of executions of the death penalty. Several stakeholders state that it would be very meaningful if the Diaspora engagement would increase and if they would have a stronger say in development policies (cf. Youth Ambassador, personal communication, 28th March 2011; Executive Secretary NYC, personal communication, 20th April 2011; Deputy Permanent Secretary MOYS, personal communication, 19th April 2011). Furthermore, as the Deputy Director of Youth and Sports explains, there are several Diaspora organizations that are actively engaging in The Gambia. Adepoju (2008) argues that there should be a ministry for Diaspora cooperation in order to be able to have permanent linkages with their Diaspora community. To date, there is no ministry directly for Diaspora, but at least the name of the “Ministry for Foreign Affairs, International Cooperation and Gambians Abroad” suggests that this would be the ministry to deal with Diaspora cooperation. The Permanent Secretary of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, International Cooperation and Gambians Abroad also stated that the ministry is named like that because it wants to address Gambians in the Diaspora (cf. Permanent Secretary Ministry of Foreign Affairs, personal communication, 27th April 2011). As the Deputy Director from the Department of Youth and Sports pointed out, the government wanted to instate a system for Gambians residing outside the country to vote at the embassies. Though the Deputy Director said the voting system would be on the way and reinstated in the upcoming year, the Officer at UNFPA as well as the Youth Ambassador Kalleh Farbakary explained the difficulties encountered in trying to establish such a system. First of all, the government tried to
register The Gambians living in other countries, but the problem was that many countries like Nigeria, Ghana or The Gambian embassies there do not have a registration system. Another problem is the high number of unregistered Gambians. Moreover, in many countries there are no embassies, so the implementation of a voting system over the embassies would be impossible. Even further, in The Gambia, there is still a token voting system, so the system in the embassies must have been different and to unify two different voting systems comes with different problems again (cf. UNFPA Officer, personal communication, 4th May, 2011; Youth Ambassador, personal communication, 28th March 2011). Gambians do have the right to dual citizenship and all of the political and social rights coming with that (cf. Youth Ambassador, personal communication, 28th March 2011; Deputy Director DOYS; personal communication, 20th April 2011).

Wagbou (2008) recommends the establishment of a 5-year commitment to serve the country for all students who receive a national scholarship as a counter to Brain Drain. Such a program has also been realized by The Gambian government through the bonding system. Due to the high loss of human resources to Western countries and the high costs for the government spent on individuals for their training, The Gambian government instated a system called the bonding system or surety bond that will ensure that students abroad return home after their study to work for the government for a certain period of time. They receive a scholarship for their study abroad but “most are forced to sign before their departure pledging their willingness to return home and work for a specified number of years” (UNFPA Officer, personal communication, 4th May, 2011; Wadda 2000). The surety bond is concluded between the government of The Gambia, the principal debtor, as to say the student going abroad and two sureties. The government overtakes the entire cost of the training plus salaries paid to the principal debtor during the period of the training. By doing so, it conditions the “successful completion of his/her training” (Surety Bond Form). Moreover, there are some provisions: If the principal debtor fails to pass the required examination without a profound reason, the government can terminate the scholarship or if the principal debtor does not complete the courses in the required time or does not obey a lawful order or commits any criminal offence during the studying period or the during the service in The Gambia. In all of these cases, the government can terminate the scholarship and enforce the full refund of the scholarship (cf. Surety Bond Form). Families often put their entire property, like compounds, as surety into the bond that will they lose in the case that the student does not return or fulfill any of the provisions or conditions (cf. Permanent Secretary of MOYS, personal communication, 19th April 2011). Whereas several stakeholders state that even those receiving a government scholarship through the surety bond often prefer to stay abroad, seeking employment or trying to extend their program to pursue other
courses (cf. UNFPA Officer, personal communication, 4\textsuperscript{th} May, 2011; Wadda 2000). Though there are no statistics on that trend, which is why Wadda (2000) argues for better data collection on the bonding system. So far, there is no data available on the people returning, their engagement in public service, the costs for their training, the people seeking employment abroad, etc. She also claims that there should be collected data on those going abroad on self-sponsorship. The AHWO also points out that there is a definite need to carry out a survey to estimate the country's immigration and emigration (cf. AHWO 2009:10). Furthermore, Wadda (2000) recommends a “package of incentives” to stay or return to the country and work in The Gambia (Wadda 2000:17). The by then executive secretary of the NYC also goes in the same direction and states that the salaries are just too low for highly qualified staff; they cannot even cover their expenses properly with the salaries they receive. The incentives are very low for them to stay, so he suggests at least tax allowances and maybe salary top-ups for highly-skilled Gambians in some sectors that could be provided by European governments (cf. Executive Secretary NYC, personal communication, 20\textsuperscript{th} April 2011). The PS of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs also calls for higher wages, skills development and employment creation (cf. Permanent Secretary Ministry of Foreign Affairs, personal communication, 27\textsuperscript{th} April 2011). The reversion of Brain Drain is not part of any cooperation agreement with a European State or the European Union, which follows the general trend: According to Oucho (2008), there is a general lack of bilateral agreements between countries of origin and countries of destination to convert Brain Drain into Brain Gain. The power relations do not allow the countries of origin to have a strong voice in international agreements.

Many researchers also recommend that the governments should create an enabling environment for the productive use of remittances because they do not just help families, contribute to poverty reduction and development on the regional and national level. They are often higher than foreign direct investments and official development assistance. As shown for The Gambian Case, the remittances are also very high and out of anecdotal evidence, many families depend on them. Nevertheless and to date, there are no policies put in place. But as shown, at least the government started to collect the data on the remittance flows that come through the formal paths and the Central Bank of The Gambia did some research on remittances (cf. Kohnert 2007:41). Researchers also call for African-based research and data collection to generate information to be able to formulate policies in the countries of emigration. With the migration survey, data collection has started and as several stakeholders stated, the overall objective of the migration survey was to be able to formulate a migration policy. Nevertheless, data
collection should be even more enhanced, particularly on highly-skilled people leaving The Gambia and the effectiveness of the bonding system.

4.8.1 An African Position on Migration and Development

A common African position on migration and development, for example, is to develop a strategic framework for a policy on migration in the scope of the African Union is already developing. Likewise, ECOWAS is working on migration issues, which might be even a more important political body in the West African context (cf. Adepoju 2008:28). Many see a very important role in regionally organized political bodies in making the migration development nexus fruitful for West Africa. Particularly, the African Union, the NEPAD Initiative and ECOWAS can contribute in reversing Brain Drain, encouraging the Diaspora to developmental engagement and to use remittances as a source for development (cf. Adepoju/ van Noorlos/ Zoomers 2010:66; Oucho 2008: 65).

ECOWAS adopted the Protocol on the Free Movement of Persons and the Right of Residence and Establishment in 1979 and it was meant to be implemented over a period of 15 years. Article 3 in the Treaty describes the free movement of persons, goods, services and capital as a long-term objective. Only some of the provisions have been put in place up to today. The right of establishment has not been put in place, for example (cf. ECDPM 2010:2). Adepoju et al. (2009) even make clear that the ECOWAS free movement is not yet realized. Member States like Gambia and Guinea-Bissau, for example, are regularly repatriating migrants to other Member States. This might also happen due to the fact that many West African migrants do not have passports or proper documents, which makes the movement irregular and a deportation in consequence justified, but it is still a reminder of the rather strict approach on migration in The Gambia. The Editor of Foroyaa newspaper explains in more detail that The Gambia claims a 1000 Dalasi fee for an alien ID card every year. If a citizen of an ECOWAS Member State does not pay that fee, the government can arrest him/her and deport him/her. So the principle of free movement only exists on paper (cf. Editor Foroyaa, personal communication, 8th March 2011). There are many conflictive interests among the Member States that make decision-making processes very difficult. Some are also lacking the financial means to fulfill the provisions or the political will to free the financial means. The ECOWAS Commission is also lacking the resources to support Member States in implementing the agreements or to monitor the implementation (cf. Adepoju/ van Noorlos/ Zoomers 2010:66; ECDPM 2010:2-3). Nevertheless, the plans for an area of Free Movement in West Africa experienced a new drive from 2000 onwards. The Member States instated the ECOWAS passport and low requirements for residence
permits and border controls. In 2006, the ECOWAS members met in Accra to set up a commission to determine how best to limit youth emigration to the developed North (cf. ECMPD 2010:2; Oucho 2008: 66). In 2008, the Member States agreed on a Common Approach on Migration that focuses on the promotion of intra-regional mobility, labor migration to third countries and the benefits for ECOWAS free movement within the region for better regional integration, irregular migration, trafficking and migrants rights. There will be an ongoing harmonization and consultation process regarding policies on migration and development. The principle goal is the establishment of a comprehensive regional migration approach that allows for a better basis for dialogue with host and transit countries (cf. ECMPD 2010:2, Collyer 2008:4). Oucho acknowledges that ECOWAS has made some significant strides in migration discourse and is on the way to becoming a political body in migration issues (cf. Oucho 2008:66). Collyer (2008) also sees it as “the most significant development outside Europe” (Collyer 2008:3). When it comes to cooperation between the EU and ECOWAS, the 2007 instated, Joint ECOWAS-EU Working Group on Migration will be mentioned. The dialogue was strengthened since the conferences in RABAT and Tripoli and the 2007-adopted Joint Africa-EU-Strategy. Very important here is also the Global Approach on Migration in this context and its three main areas of legal migration, illegal migration and migration and development that gives the framework for a 3 year program from 2008-2011. But as the ECMPD points out, the Working Group is still looking for “concrete areas of cooperation that could be developed” and the “added value and benefit to the West African States has not yet been demonstrated” (ECMPD 2010:3). Nevertheless, the Commission of the EU acknowledges the important role of the ECOWAS, the African Union and others for a common dialogue and calls for a “stronger result-oriented dialogue and cooperation” (Commission of the European Communities 2008: 10). Notifying is the cooperation between ECOWAS and Spain. The Spanish Ministry of Foreign Affairs signed a memorandum of understanding with ECOWAS in December 2005 within the Plan Africa covering Spanish support in peacekeeping measures such as the investment in the program for the control of weapons (ECOSAP), but of course, also coordination of actions within the migratory agreements and the combat against illegal trafficking (cf. Ministerio de Asuntos Exteriores y Cooperación 2006:143-144).

The African Union held an expert meeting on migration and development in April 2006, before the Euro-African Ministerial Meeting in Rabat in July 2006, in order to be able to draw up a common African position on migration and development (cf. African Union Commission 2006b). The African leaders stated that they are very concerned that irregular migration is being dealt with primarily through security-led approaches. They argue that there should be a greater emphasis on broader development frameworks.
They also harshly criticize the selective policy of the EU on attracting highly-skilled workers because it means a “threat to African economies” and “the loss of heavy investments made by African governments in training and human resource development” (African Union Commission 2006a:4).

The African Union identified policy priority issues as migration and development, human resources and the Brain Drain, labor migration, remittances, African Diaspora, migration and peace, security and stability, migration and human rights, migration and gender, children and youth, elderly and regional initiatives (cf. African Union Commission 2006a:5-9). The regulation of irregular migration is only referred to in the context of the policy issue “Migration and Human Rights”. The AU Member States highlight that it is crucial to respect human rights when trying to manage irregular migration: “Management of illegal or irregular migration should not jeopardize the human rights of refugees and the principle of non-discrimination should be adhered to.” (African Union Commission 2006a: 8). They further point out that increased possibilities for labor migration might reduce irregular migration and that it is crucial to find bilateral and multilateral solutions for that matter (cf. African Union Commission 2006a: 9). Furthermore, the African leaders are criticizing a purely security approach and speak out for a comprehensive approach on migration issues. All forms of migration should be dealt with on the national, regional and global level, but while always protecting human rights and enhancing the linkages between migration and development:

“It would be indeed illusory to try to treat the problems of migration by recourse only to security measures; hence the need for a comprehensive, integrated, concerted and balanced solution, whose objectives, policies and measures will be long-lasting. This approach should involve the treatment of problems of the movement of persons (legal, illegal and irregular migration), the protection of the rights of communities that are legally established, as well as the linkage between migration and development. It should also be based on actions to be taken at national, continental and international levels.” (African Union Commission 2006a: 11).

Again, it is Spain that signed a memorandum of understanding with the African Union in April 2006. As with the ECOWAS, the Spanish government is supporting initiatives for peace and security as well as African initiatives like the NEPAD, for example. They sent another diplomatic functionary to Addis Ababa to better follow-up the relations between Spain and the African Union. Further agreements are that there should be consultations held periodically and of course, not to forget collaboration on the fight against terrorism, trafficking in human beings, illegal migration and the regulation of migration flows (cf. Ministerio de Asuntos Exteriores y Cooperación 2006:142-143).
5. Conclusions

a) Whereas it must be kept in mind that the Global Approach was actually already present in the discourse on cooperation with third countries on migration issues before 2006, so before the cooperation with The Gambia even started. When the measures implemented in The Gambia are looked at, it becomes very clear what the focus of the cooperation is: There were capacity building measures for the navy, the police forces and the immigration forces, as well as a great deal of technical assistance and donations; there was a workshop on human trafficking and law enforcement and The Gambia introduced the Human Trafficking Act one year later, a system for incorporating the biometric data in documents was instated after workshops on document security, there was a control point established at The Gambian coast, ICMPD conducted a workshop in IBM, a national contact point of the Seahorse Network was established and last but not least, there were sensitization campaigns on discouraging irregular migration. So the European policies are transferred and exported to third countries through transgovernmental networking with the support of supranational institutions.

In concluding, it can be said that all the strategies followed by Spain can be interpreted as the “keep them there” or “stay at home” approach with the control measures and joint patrols in combination with employment creation activities (Bakewell 2007:34-35; Hein de Haas 2008b:1). The possibilities for legal migration were not instated and neither were the possibilities for a post-graduate program for Gambians in Spain. However, the common thought of the stakeholders on the approach on migration is to keep Gambian nationals in The Gambia and to avoid outward migration. Nevertheless, so far, the new efforts on the migration and development nexus or the linkage of migration to development policies are rather to be seen as a “keeping them in their place” or a different way of “externalized control” through development cooperation (Bakewell 2007:34-35).

The Italian approach is focusing on the control of irregular migration as well. Pursuing the aim of a readmission agreement, the Italian government made several donations to the security forces of The Gambia, but also training for some immigration officers and visa quotas are among the incentives of the Italian government. So the agreement with Italy is very obviously putting the migration issue into the security context and focusing on irregular migration.

It is mostly the immigration department, the police and the navy cooperating on migration with Spain and Italy. The perception of migration as a security issue increases due to the connection of migration issues with criminal issues like drugs for example.
GBOS and the Population Secretary were indicated as beneficiaries due to the migration survey, but nevertheless, if legal migration and migration and development should have been addressed, the MOYS and the MOTIE should have been involved. Within the agreements with European actors, positive potentials on migration for development are not addressed, nor are more possibilities for legal migration. For example the reversion of Brain Drain is not part of any cooperation agreement with a European State or the European Union, which follows the general trend: According to Oucho (2008), there is a general lack of bilateral agreements between countries of origin and countries of destination to convert Brain Drain into Brain Gain. The power relations do not allow the countries of origin to have a strong voice in international agreements. There were some discussions and verbal promises on seasonal migration to Spain, but they were dropped again due to the economic crisis. Italy reserved some labor visa quotas for The Gambia due to the agreement between the two countries on readmission and return. However, the quota was quite low, so it can be interpreted rather as a political leverage for cooperation on readmission.

In conclusion the policy approaches, projects and measures influenced by European actors in The Gambia cannot be interpreted as a comprehensive approach on migration, as to say a development-friendly approach. The approaches of the EU and its Member States on migration in the cooperation with The Gambia are predominantly security-led, control approaches on migration, where the combat against irregular migration and the export of border control stands in the forefront. If the linkage of migration to development is made in the Gambian case it is for the purpose of a “keeping them in their place” policy (Bakewell 2007:34-35).

b) Considering some statements of Gambian stakeholders, it could be assumed that the combat of irregular migration is fully in the interests of The Gambia, but as shown, there are also some other opinions among the stakeholders. It is obvious that stakeholders in the environment of the Ministry of Youth and Sports as well as the NGO ONBE call for employment creation and engagement of the youth in The Gambia while stakeholders in the environment of the Ministry of Interior focus more on control and sensitization of the risks of irregular migration. Though as shown above Gambian stakeholders are highly aware of the difficulties of migration control and do sometimes not even implement the control measures. Some stakeholders stated that even the irregular migrants are trying to remit and contribute to development and that migration helps absorb the unemployed youths and contributes a great deal to development. So it can be assumed that Gambian stakeholders actually have little interest in combating migration due to the great dependency on remittances.
Though, as shown at the beginning of Chapter four, Gambian stakeholders are aware of the problems they are facing due to migration and do indeed identify them: Rural-urban migration and the lack of reliable data and knowledge about internal migration. This is the only issue that was already present in Gambian policies before the integration of the migration issue started in relations with the EU and its Member States. Though the issues on migration and development are not directly addressed in Gambian policy papers, the stakeholders still identify other important migration issues for The Gambia, particularly Brain Drain, and the high influx of remittances, Diaspora engagement and more legal channels to Europe. There are even some policy measures set in place to address these issues: The bonding system to avoid Brain Drain, as well as the right to dual citizenship, was already instated before the EU cooperation on migration took off. The collection of data on remittances started in 2008 and there recently was a consultation meeting on Diaspora engagement. As shown, political statements and consultations in the framework of the African Union and the ECOWAS on migration and development might also be driving factors for the progress on migration and development.

Several stakeholders had stated harsh critiques on the strict immigration laws of European countries that are identified as causes for the problems of irregular migration and human trafficking, but so far, there was no public political statement on that issue and the mitigation of visa restrictions is not yet part of the political dialogue between The Gambia and any European actor. The Gambian stakeholders are fully aware of the effects of internal and external European migration policy is having on The Gambia. Most of them state that if there would be more legal channels, it would also reduce irregular migration. So in order to have a comprehensive approach, it would be very important to facilitate visas and lower the requirements. Concepts of circular migration or multiple entry visas and more legal recruitment in general are seen as a very potential tool for making migration fruitful for the development of The Gambia. If there would be legal possibilities, it would minimize the risks of people embarking on irregular migration and all of the demeaning conditions the migrants have to face because they would be engaged in a job immediately. Another argument of Gambian stakeholders is that European counterparts only pick the highly-skilled, which leads to Brain Drain or Brain Waste. Many Gambian stakeholders harshly criticize the selective EU policy, in particular because of the dependence of European countries on the African work force.

The implementation of the migration survey was funded, which can be identified as a positive measure that is in line with Gambian interests. How the results of the migration survey will be used and which migration policy will be formulated are still other questions left for the future. So far, it can be assumed that the security-led approach will also be
very present in the future because it is primarily the Ministry for Interior, the Immigration Department and the security forces that are involved in migration issues. Nevertheless, the lack of integrating other stakeholders such as the Ministry for Youth and Sports was already identified during the interviews. There are some measures on employment creation and skills development, like the Hotel Training School or the GAMJOBS Project. These measures are perceived overall as very positive by Gambian stakeholders. Though particularly advocates for young people and people working in the environment of the Ministry for Youth and Sports share the opinion that the measures are still limited in scope and there should be even more investments in employment creation.

Nevertheless, The Gambia did not yet have a strong advocacy on the migration issues and possible potentials of migration for Gambian development by the time of the negotiations on migration agreements. Also, issues of interests for The Gambia like Brain Drain, remittances, legal migration or rural-urban migration are not addressed in the agreements. So it can be concluded that Gambian interests on migration are only partially represented and power imbalances in negotiations on the agreements and an imbalance of interest representation can be found in the priority action lines on migration. The measures on migration are not comprehensive in regard to the interest and challenges on migration outlined by Gambian stakeholders.

c) Due to statements of Gambian stakeholders, the influence on the development of Gambian migration policy is quite clear that the EU and Spain, in the first place, were the driving forces behind the direction the migration issue seems to be taking. The focus was primarily on repatriation, the combat on irregular migration and control measures, as shown above. As there was no migration policy set in place by that time in The Gambia, there was a trend to laissez-faire on migration. The Gambian approaches on migration policy were actually developed under the influence of the EU and its Member States. Due to low development and lack of resources and expertise, The Gambia is dependent on EU countries to support them in terms of migration management. Consequently, it is not surprising that The Gambia is following a quite security-led approach and is problematizing irregular migration and the risks and dangers coming with it and emigration in general. Particularly, the Ministry of Interior and the Immigration Department put the emphasis on security and threatened publicly with the “full force of the law” for irregular immigrants as well as irregular emigrants and human traffickers in particular (Deputy Director of Immigration, speech at ONBE Workshop, 8th April 2011). Hence, it was quite easy for European actors to bargain on their migration interests and as shown for the Spanish case, The Gambian government did not show much reluctance on issues like repatriation. Moreover it is always technical assistance that is provided
and funded under the EDF and the funds are not given as budget support, which means
that the EU has a strong say in what is provided as technical assistance. And of course,
the EU has its political leverages and the options to hold the funds back in case The
Gambia does not comply with some of the provisions.

Nevertheless, the PS of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs states that the relationship with
the EU has improved and that both parties of the European Countries and The Gambia
are more open to dialogue now and there are more consultations now (cf. personal
communication, Permanent Secretary Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 27th April 2011).

However, there were also enough incentives provided by European actors to collaborate.
As shown above, The Gambian counterpart always welcomed the numerous donations
made, particularly by Italy and Spain. The strategies of external governance applied in
The Gambia are characterized by offering incentives such as donations, capacity
building and the increase of development aid, but diplomatic practices are also
observable, particularly in the Spanish case. The link of migration and development
assistance as well as the provision of technical assistance and donations from the
Spanish side give the incentives to cooperate on migration control and readmission
measures. These are “the carrots” to follow the Spanish stick. Nevertheless, as we have
seen above, The Gambia has shown that it will follow this stick just as long as there is
still financial influx and assistance from Spain. The whole repertoire of capacity building,
training, technical assistance, donations, the presence of liaison officers, joint patrols,
institution building and financial support on the regional level is present in The Gambia.

As pointed out above, the donations provided are further incentives for cooperation.
Diplomatic presence and diplomatic practices are the backbone of the Spanish Policy on
cooperation with third countries. In The Gambia, they established an embassy, as well
as several liaison officers are deployed there. The Italian government made several
donations to the security forces of The Gambia, but also training for some immigration
officers and visa quotas are among the incentives of the Italian government. In the
European Union case, the high overall budget under the 10th EDF might be enough
incentive.

The high presence of different multilateral organizations like the IOM, ICMPD, Frontex,
Europol and UNFPA and their cooperation with EU Member States and the EC in the
implementation of training workshops, capacity building and in the case of EC and
ICMPD, the realization of the entire budget for migration under the 10th EDF are signs
for a networking approach, particularly under the EDF, there is a co-ownership concept.
The cooperation is characterized by co-ownership concepts and interaction that give the
externalized rules more legitimacy. Nevertheless there is a certain kind of hierarchy and
asymmetry in powers because the EU can still give incentives and conditionality or sanctions because there is always an imbalance in resources and political power. However, as shown above, some facts such as the laxness of the deployment of border control vehicles at border control points and the high awareness that migration is not controllable also leads to the assumption that the government is paying “lip-service” to the European actors in terms of the willingness to control migration flows out of The Gambia. Moreover, The Gambia also has its strategy on reversing imbalances in power relations and benefitting from the interests of European actors on repatriation and migration control, as the incidence with the rejected returnees from Spain has shown. Well, the EU and Member States make use of asymmetric power relations and a broad range of incentives to include their interests in the agreements with the Gambia and the Gambian stakeholders are highly influenced in migration policy development due to lack of resources and expertise, but there are also concepts of co-ownership and interaction and clear signs of a network approach and the Gambia has its own strategies to counteract imbalances in power relations.

**Outlook**

However, how the issues around migration will develop as The Gambia is still in the process of developing its position on migration and development and finding a common thought internally that could lead to a comprehensive approach on migration and a stronger voice in negotiations with European actors remains to be seen. In general, some of the policy approaches on making migration fruitful for development were rather unknown by The Gambian stakeholders, but were welcomed with great interest as they were presented them during the interviews. Even though The Gambian government takes part in international conferences and forums like the Global Forum on Migration and Development or ECOWAS and African Union processes on migration and development, there seems to be a lack of internal, national discussion and policy formulation. However, with the recent Consultation Workshop on Diaspora engagement and the beginning of data collection on remittances, for example, it can be assumed that a policy formulation, or at least a common Gambian position, on positive potentials of migration for development are on the way. The political bodies on the regional level, like the ECOWAS and the African Union, had also just started to develop a common African position on migration and development that could present a more equal counterpart to the European Union in terms of power relations. It remains to be seen how the migration and development issue will develop on the regional West African and African level and in the Gambian case. As the Gambia is in the process of formulating its own migration
policy and trying to make use of the outcomes of the migration survey it would be interesting do to further research on the contents and main elements of this policy.
6. References


160


Haas, Hein de (2007): Turning the tide? Why development will not stop migration. International Migration Institute, University of Oxford

Haas, Hein de (2008a): Irregular Migration from West Africa to the Maghreb and the European Union: An Overview of Recent Trends. IOM Migration research Series, No. 32


Ministry of Trade, Regional Integration and Employment: GAMJOBS Creating Employment Opportunities. (Information Brochure on GAMJOBS).


National Enterprise Development Initiative (NEDI) (2011): Update on NEDI activities.

National Youth Service Scheme (NYSS) (n.y.): The Gambia National Youth Service Scheme. Service and Honour. [Information Brochure]


Paoletti, E. (2011): The Migration of Power and North-South Inequalities. The Case of Italy and Libya. Palgrave Macmillan: Chippenham; Eastborne


Media articles


I. Abstract

The purpose of this study is to investigate how the Global Approach on Migration promoted by the European Union is put into practice in the case of The Gambia. As the Global Approach also aims to enhance efforts on regular migration and the migration development nexus instead of merely combating irregular migration, the objective of this thesis is to examine to what extent the policy approaches, projects and measures influenced by European actors in The Gambia can be interpreted as a comprehensive approach on migration as to say, a development-friendly approach. Another aim is to find out how European actors influence the Gambian migration policy development and the policy measures on migration and which strategies of external governance of European migration policy can be found in The Gambia. Finally, the question of whether the policy measures are also comprehensive with regard to the interests and challenges on migration outlined by Gambian stakeholders is examined in the study. In order to examine the questions, a mix of methods is applied. A theoretical framework is elaborated for the analysis of policy papers, media reports and the secondary literature as well as for the numerous, on-site interviews conducted with Gambian and international stakeholders in the migration field.

The principal conclusion is that the new efforts on the migration and development nexus or the linkage of migration to development policies are rather to be seen as a “keeping them in their place policy” and that commitments to ensure the benefits of migration for development and to minimize the negative effects, as well as the creation of regular migration channels, are rhetorical rather than followed-up with emphasis (Bakewell 2007:35). Gambian interests on migration are only partially represented and power imbalances in negotiations on the agreements and an imbalance of interest representation can be found in the priority action lines on migration. European stakeholders use a broad range of strategies to get their interests on the agenda, they create “incentives” like donations, capacity building and the increase of development assistance. But the cooperation between the EU, Member States and The Gambia is characterized by co-ownership concepts and interaction that give the externalized rules more legitimacy. The high presence of different multilateral organizations and their cooperation with EU Member States and the EC in the implementation of training workshops, capacity building are signs for a networking approach. Nevertheless there is a certain kind of hierarchy and asymmetry in powers. Several Gambian stakeholders are very critical of the European External Migration Policy, which will be a very interesting
issue to observe for the future since The Gambia is currently developing its position on migration and development and trying to find a common thought internally that could lead to a comprehensive approach on migration and a stronger voice in negotiations with European actors.

II. Kurzbeschreibung


Die wichtigsten Ergebnisse sind, dass die neuen Ansätze zur Förderung regulärer Migration und Migration für Entwicklung im gambischen Fall kaum vorhanden sind und somit die Integration von Migration in die Entwicklungspolitik eher als weitere Form von externalisierter Kontrolle und einer „keeping them in their place“-Politik zu interpretieren sind (Bakewell 2007:35). Die Schaffung von regulären Kanälen für gambische MigrantInnen in die EU, sowie die Nutzung der positiven Potenziale von Migration für Entwicklung sind nur im sprachlichen Diskurs präsent kommen aber nicht zur Anwendung. Gambische Interessen sind nur teilweise vertreten. Asymmetrische Machtverhältnisse während den Verhandlungen zu Migrationsabkommen spiegeln sich in asymmetrischen Interessensvertretungen in den primären politischen Maßnahmen wider.

Viele gambische AkteurInnen stehen der externen EU-Migrationspolitik kritisch gegenüber, was besonders im Hinblick auf die gegenwärtig entstehende gambische Position zu Migration und Entwicklung und der entstehenden gambischen Migrationspolitik ein sehr interessanter, zu beobachtender Aspekt für die Zukunft ist.
III. Interview guideline

1. Migration issues in the Gambia
   - How do you perceive emigration?
   - How do you perceive (Irregular) Migration to Europe?
   - What about Brain Drain?
   - What about rural-urban migration, in which way is it an issue for the Gambia?
   - What about Immigration from the South regions, in which way is it an issue for the Gambia?
   - Would you say that the Gambia is a transit point for irregular migration and human trafficking?
   - Is there any reliable Data on Migration?
   - What about the risks migrants face? Are there any measures to protect migrants?

2. Migration and Development
   - How do you perceive the role of migrants considering development?
   - Is the emigration to the EU to be seen as a contribution to sustainable development?
   - Can migrants be seen as development actors?
   - Can migration be a strategy for development in the Gambia?
   - What role shall the state play considering development and migration? And what role is he playing now? Is migration an issue for the government?
   - Should there be policies to encourage remittances, technology transfer, return and direct investment?
   - Should Gambians abroad be involved in development programs and policies?
   - Do emigrants of the Gambia still have rights in the Gambia? (Rights to participate in political, economic and social life)
   - Why does the Gambia cooperate on repatriating Gambians by sending delegations to identify the people? Is it to avoid identity fraud or simply to bring them back?
   - Are there any projects or measures on migration from the Gambian government?
- What about ECOWAS and the principle of free movement?
- Is there any common plan of action developing how to face migration to Europe and in general?
- How do you perceive the role of the ECOWAS?

3. Cooperation with the European Union and EU Member States

- In the CSP 2008-2013 migration is an issue on development cooperation agenda, do you know who brought it on the agenda and why? Which factors led to the incorporation of the migration issue on the agenda with the EU?

- What is the focus of the cooperation? Irregular migration?

3.1 Projects in the Gambia

Which measures and Projects on Migration (and Development) funded by external donors (IOM, EU, Spain, UNDP, UNFPA) do you know?

- Funding of surveillance and control systems
- Coastal patrol
- Training of government officials
- Capacity building
- Reintegration assistance
- Employment projects (Gamjobs)
- Reintegration projects (IOM)
- Visa facilitation?
- What about the Seahorse Project and West-Sahel project?
- What is the Gambia gaining out of this cooperation?
- How do you perceive the EU Policy on migration?

3.2 Cooperation with Spain

What is the Agreement with Spain about?

Financing of coastal patrol, training of police and navy, what else?

What do you think about Gamjobs? Are there any other projects on employment creation?

What are the benefits for the Gambia in the cooperation with Spain?

What about temporary worker programs? Are there any programs planned with any EU member state?
3.3 Cooperation with Italy

What is the Agreement with Italy about?

Readmission?

Training, capacity building, border patrol?
IV. List of Interview partners

Experts
- United Nations Special Rapporteur on the Human Rights of Migrants
- Employee of the Fundamental Rights Agency

Interview Partners from the Gambian Government
- Permanent Secretary of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs
- Permanent Secretary of the Ministry of Interior
- Deputy Director of the Immigration Department
- Commissioner for Irregular Migration/Immigration Department
- Immigration Officer of the Unit for Irregular Migration/Immigration Department
- GAMJOBS Project Coordinator/ Ministry of Trade and Employment
- Deputy Permanent Secretary of the Ministry for Youth and Sports
- Deputy Director of the Department of the Ministry for Youth and Sports
- Executive Secretary of the National Youth Council
- Project Officer A from National Authorizing Office System Support Unit
- Project Officer B from National Authorizing Office System Support Unit

Interview Partners from Gambian Non-Governmental organizations
- Member of the Youth Ambassadors for Peace
- PRO of Operation No Back Way to Europe (ONBE)
- Group discussion of members of Operation No Back Way to Europe (ONBE)

Interview Partners from International Organizations and Political Bodies
- Employee of the International Organization for Migration
- Email Communication with an Officer of the European Commission Delegation
- Project Officer of the International Center for Migration Policy Development
- Programme Manager of the International Center for Migration Policy Development
- Officer of United Nations Population Fund

Interview Partner from European governments
- Spanish Liaison Officer
- Spanish Diplomat
V. Curriculum Vitae

Curriculum Vitae – Hannah Schrems, BA

Personal Information

Name: Hannah Schrems  
Date of birth: 9th July 1987  
Place of birth: Linz  
Nationality: Austrian  
Address: Haag 9/ 4654 Bad Wimsbach Neyharting/ Austria  
Telephone: +436803238364  
E-Mail: HannahSchrems@gmx.at

Academic Education and Training

Dates: October 2006-November 2012  
Institution: University of Vienna  
Principal subject: International Development  
Diploma Thesis: „(Irregular) Migration and Development – Policy approaches in the Gambia and the role of the EU and Member States“

Dates: October 2007- March 2011  
Institution: University of Vienna  
Principal Subject: Political Science  
First Bachelor Thesis: „The EU Harmonization process on asylum issues and its influence on the Austrian State“  

Key Aspects in both studies: Migration, Migration Policy, Integration Policy, Asylum Policy, Development Policy, Development Cooperation, Racism Studies, Human Rights, Education, conflicts, conflict prevention and solution, European Union, Latin America, West Africa, Austria;

Studies abroad

Dates: February 2009 - September 2009  
Support program: Erasmus Program  
Institution: Universidad de Cantabria/Santander/Spain  
Key Subjects/Aspects: History of the actual word; History of contemporary Latin America, History of contemporary Asia and Africa; Improvement of the Spanish language to academic level

Dates: February 2011 - May 2011  
Support Program: short-term grant abroad from the University of Vienna  
Place: Banjul/Serrekunda/Bakau/Brikama - The Gambia  
Purpose: Field study for my diploma thesis; Conduction of Interviews with Gambian and European Stakeholders in the migration field
Scholarships/Awards

- “Short-term grant abroad” for the field study of my diploma thesis in the Gambia from February until May 2011
- Performance scholarship of the University of Vienna for Political Science for the years 2008/09 and 2009/10, as well as for International Development for the study years 2007/08 and 2010/2011
- Performance scholarship for Political Science for the year 2008 from the fund of foundations and scholarships of the University of Vienna

School Education

Dates: September 2001- June 2005
Institution: Bundesoberstufenrealgymnasium Honauerstraße Linz
Branch: Popular Music

Dates: September 1997-July 2001
Institution: Bundesrealgymnasium Wallererstraße Wels

Work experience

Dates: September 2012-November 2012
Occupation: Consultant for the Program for the support of the development commitment of migrant organizations
Main activities: organization of events, formulation of eligibility requirements for subsidy for the migrant organizations, elaboration of a manual on the application process for the applicants; revision of the required forms for the application process;
Employer: Center for International Migration and Development (CIM)/ Deutsche Gesellschaft für Internationale Zusammenarbeit (GIZ)

Dates: November 2009- December 2012
Occupation: Social Pedagogic/ Social worker
Main activities: Organization of daily life for twenty unaccompanied minor refugees (Educational matters, Health matters, Asylum procedure, Freetime, Sports); administrative organization and documentation for the work team;
Employer: Project Caravan/ Integrationshaus Vienna/ Austria

Internships

Dates: February 2012- August 2012
Main activities: examination of project proposals/ advisory and qualification of migrant organization/ organization of events, report activities, research activities, administrative activities, documentation

Work placement: Center for International Development and Migration (CIM)/ Deutsche Gesellschaft für Internationale Zusammenarbeit (GIZ)

Dates: January 2010- February 2010
Main activities: research activities, administrative activities, documentation
**Work placement:** Austrian Development Agency, Department for developmental communication and education  
**Dates:** August 2009- November 2009  
**Main activities:** social-pedagogic support for unaccompanied minor refugees in the accomplishment of their daily life (School, Health, Free Time, Asylum procedure, general mental state)

**Work placement:** Verein Integrationshaus – Projekt Caravan  
**Dates:** July 2008- August 2008  
**Main activities:** Supervisor for several applicants on micro credits in the local program of Caritas; assistant for the doctors and nurses in the medical ambulant center;

**Work placement:** CARITAS Requena/ Perú  
**Dates:** October 2005 – November 2005  
**Main activities:** Caretaker

**Work placement:** CENAI de Ipsi/ San José- Costa Rica  
**Dates:** December 2005- December 2005  
**Main activities:** Translation of main information brochures and project documents from English and Spanish to German

**Work placement:** Asociación Cultural de Intercambio de Costa Rica/San José  
**Dates:** July 2002; August 2003; August 2004  
**Main activities:** Caretaker of mentally and physically handicapped people

**Work placement:** Rehabilitation and Residence Center MIR –Centar Za Smjestaj i Rehabilitaciju „MIR” Kastel Nov/ Trogir/ Kroatien

**Language Skills**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Languages</th>
<th>Understanding</th>
<th>Speaking</th>
<th>Writing</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>German</td>
<td>Mother tongue</td>
<td>Mother tongue</td>
<td>Mother tongue</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Spanish</td>
<td>Proficient user (C2)</td>
<td>Proficient user (C1)</td>
<td>Proficient user (C1)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>English</td>
<td>Proficient user (C2)</td>
<td>Proficient user (C1)</td>
<td>Proficient user (C1)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Portuguese</td>
<td>Independent user (A2)</td>
<td>Independent user (A2)</td>
<td>Independent user (B1)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>French</td>
<td>Independent user (A2)</td>
<td>Basic user (A2)</td>
<td>Basic user (A2)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Computer Skills**

- Microsoft Office (Word, Excel, Power Point, Outlook, One Note, Access)
- SPSS; Atlas.ti