MASTERARBEIT

Titel der Masterarbeit
„An Analysis of the Re-Emergence of the “Turkish Model” in the Context of the Arab Spring“

Verfasserin
Tayyibe Zeynep Arмагan

angestrebter akademischer Grad
Master (MA)

Wien, 2012

Studienkennzahl lt. Studienblatt: A 067 805
Studienrichtung lt. Studienblatt: Individuelles Masterstudium:
Global Studies – a European Perspective
Betreuerin / Betreuer: Prof. Dr. Matthias Middell
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Verfasser /Author
Tayyibe Zeynep Armağan

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To my father Dr. Bekir Armağan
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ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

Firstly, I would like to express my deep gratitude to my supervisor, Prof. Dr. Matthias Middell, whose contribution in the formation of the research topic has been most valuable. I greatly appreciate his guidance and patience throughout the writing process.

Secondly, I would like to thank Mag. Markus Gatschnegg and Mag. Leopold Kögler for their advices, technical support, redactions and help with translation. In addition, the assistance provided by Ashley Hurst was highly appreciated.

Last but not least, I am particularly grateful to my mother and father for their unconditional support.
# LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Abbreviation</th>
<th>Description</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>AKP</td>
<td>Adelet ve Kalkınma Partisi (JDP – Justice and Development Party)</td>
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<td>CE</td>
<td>Council of Europe</td>
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<tr>
<td>CUP</td>
<td>Committee of Union and Progress</td>
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<td>DP</td>
<td>Demokrat Parti (DP – Democrat Party)</td>
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<tr>
<td>DYP</td>
<td>Doğru Yol Partisi (TPP – True Path Party)</td>
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<tr>
<td>EU</td>
<td>European Union</td>
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<tr>
<td>MENA</td>
<td>Middle East and North Africa</td>
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<td>MNP</td>
<td>Milli Nizam Partisi (NOP – National Order Party)</td>
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<td>MSP</td>
<td>Milli Selamet Partisi (NSP – National Salvation Party)</td>
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<tr>
<td>NATO</td>
<td>North Atlantic Treaty Organization</td>
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<td>NOM</td>
<td>National Outlook Movement</td>
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<td>NSC</td>
<td>National Security Council</td>
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<tr>
<td>ORSAM</td>
<td>Center for Middle Eastern Strategic Studies</td>
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<td>PKK</td>
<td>Partiya Kerkerên Kurdistan</td>
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<tr>
<td>CHP</td>
<td>Cumhuriyet Halk Partisi (RPP – Republican People’s Party)</td>
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<tr>
<td>RP</td>
<td>Refah Partisi (WP - Welfare Party)</td>
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<tr>
<td>SETAV</td>
<td>Foundation for Political, Economic and Social Research</td>
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<td>USAK</td>
<td>International Strategic Research Organisation</td>
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ABSTRACT

At the end of 2010, the world was caught off guard in the face of a wave of revolutionary movements throughout North Africa and the Middle East, which have since then, come to be referred to as the “Arab Spring”. At a time when Turkey’s regional influence has been on the increase, these movements triggered the re-emergence of the concept of a “Turkish Model”. The aim of the current thesis is to provide an analysis of the conceptual debate on Turkey’s role as a model. This analysis is based on the assumption that there is no fixed definition of the Turkish Model and that, instead, there are varying perceptions about it. The first chapter is an introduction where existentialist and epistemological concerns regarding the Turkish Model are addressed. In the second chapter, first, a historical account of the Turkish Modernization process is given with the aim to provide the background on which model debates emerge and then, the three historical moments of model debates about Turkey are explained. The third chapter narrates the transformation that Turkey experienced in the last decade, which has led to the creation of the “New Turkey”. This transformation, which can be considered as a continuation of Turkey’s modernization process, is particularly important in understanding the emergence and appeal effect of the latest set of debates of the Turkish Model. The fourth chapter focuses on these debates that and presents various perceptions and arguments. Overall, the thesis aims to demonstrate its initial assumption that though the Turkish Model exists as a discursive reality, a fixed definition is problematic, as various actors use and abuse the model in accordance with their individual interests, aims and ideologies.

Keywords: Turkish Model, Arab Spring, Turkish Modernization, New Turkey.


**Stichworte:** Türkisches Modell, Arabischer Frühling, Prozesses der türkischen Modernisierung, Neue Türkei.
CHAPTER I: INTRODUCTION

Towards the end of 2010, the international community was caught off guard in the face of a wave of revolutionary movements throughout the MENA (Middle East and North Africa) region. Since then, these movements have been referred to as the “Arab Revolutions”, “Arab Uprisings” or most commonly as the “Arab Spring”. The young Tunisian street vendor Mohamed Bouazizi’s burning himself after being harassed and humiliated by officials has become one of the most recollected symbols of these rebellions against the social injustices, financial inequalities and political oppressions that have been prevalent in many Arab countries for decades. It could also be regarded as an indicator of the degree of desperateness these peoples had reached; their lives as such were not worth living for. Indeed, the following weeks and months showed that it was not just Bouazizi, not the Tunisians but Arabs throughout the MENA region that decided to take action against these corrupted and unjust regimes. The peoples of the MENA region had had enough with the regimes that were in fact, only republics in name.

These movements appeared as unexpected not only due to the long time acceptance of the status quo of the region but also because of the Orientalist misconception that the peoples of these countries were incapable of any democratic uprising. However, contrary to these misconceptions, protests took place all over the region and resulted in the overthrowing of long time dominant dictators such as Zine El Abidine Ben Ali of Tunisia, Hosni Mubarak of Egypt and Muammar Gaddafi of Libya. Of course, this is not to say the Arab Spring has produced similar results in all of the countries it affected and it most likely will not. In each country, the accumulation of political, economic and cultural experiences has formed the soil upon which the Arab Spring blossomed. The results have varied from protests of various degrees to governmental changes, civil war and – in the case of a few – revolution. Despite this variety, the Arab Spring has been regarded by a large majority of the international community as having the potential to being an important step towards future changes for a more politically democratic system, which respects human rights and which is principled on the rule of law and separation of powers. There have been, of course,

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1 Each of these terms has been criticized for various reasons. For instance, the use of the word “revolution” has met with scepticism and the positive connotations of the word “spring” were questioned. I am aware of these however, for the purposes of identifying and distinguishing the incidents in their spatial and temporal state of being, the phrase the “Arab Spring” will be used throughout this thesis.


3 For a map of showing the various results and the state of the Arab Spring in the region see Appendix 1.
also critical reviews of the incidents in the Arab world and some of these are dealt with in later sections.

From the very beginning, the Arab Spring has been closely observed globally and the events have been the cause of heated discussions at political, media and academic circles. Within these discussions, Turkey came to be frequently mentioned by various actors. Actors as diverse as US Foreign Minister, Hillary Clinton, the former Chairman of the Egyptian armed forces, Hussein Tantawi, the leader of the Ennahda Movement of Tunisia, Rashid al-Ghannushi and Turkish Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, all refer to Turkey, though in dissimilar and sometimes even conflicting ways. The overall theme in these accounts is the role of Turkey as a model during the transition that the MENA is going through. However, there are particular reasons that these diverse actors refer to Turkey. The search for a regional power in the MENA, which has been one of the most conflict-ridden regions of the world for centuries, could be one reason for this; after all, Turkey has been quoted as a potential regional leader competing with Iran and Egypt. In this respect, emphasis has been made on Turkey’s geographical location, demographic figures, democratic and modern political structure, relative political stability and social and economic welfare. However, these discussions have gone well beyond traditional discourses on regional power structures and have ignited the idea that Turkey could be a model for these Arab countries thus resulting in the re-emergence of the concept of a “Turkish Model”.

Upon the introduction of the phrase of a Turkish Model into the text, one is obliged to answer for two sets of questions; the first is a product of existentialist concerns and the second of epistemological ones. The next two subsections deal with these concerns respectively.

1.1 Is there a Turkish Model?

Prior to any attempt at defining what is meant by the phrase of a Turkish Model, it is necessary to address scepticism regarding the existence of such a model. First and foremost, it must be said that the talk on any Turkish Model in its concrete sense; that

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6 From here onwards, the phrase is not given in quotations; however, the reader is requested to consider it as if it has been since I focus on the discourses using this term.
is, a model which is consciously formulated and systematically structured does not exist. Therefore, it is not possible to point out to any singular and existing Turkish Model. Some may argue against this by presenting the main characteristics (e.g. political, economic, social etc.) of what is referred to as the Turkish Model. These characteristics and the opponents of such arguments are explained at length in the next section. However, the fact is that this presentation shall certainly differ from other presentations of the Turkish Model; hence, the point that there exists no concrete and fixed model but rather different perceptions of what the model is or should contain. This point becomes clearer later on, when these different perceptions are dealt with in further detail.

Surprisingly, some others will use the absence of the aforementioned characteristics as the basis for their argument that no such Turkish Model exists. It is true that the presence, absence and validity of these characteristics are open to discussion. This is not within the scope of this thesis to resolve any questions on that ground. Nevertheless, it must be said that such arguments only help to strengthen the fact that there exist different perceptions of what different speakers believe the Turkish Model is and this is precisely what the current study will focus on. The mere presence of arguments regarding a Turkish Model – regardless of the different characteristics they are based upon and whether they argue for or against a model – is thought to be sufficient for the purposes of analysing the discourses referring to a Turkish Model. Indeed, though the model does not exist in form, described with definitive authority, as it has been admitted earlier, it does very much exist in the conceptual sphere as can be seen from the references made throughout this thesis. In addition, because various political and social movements as well as individual authors from very different countries refer to it, it comes in fact, into “existence”.

To sum up, considering the Turkish Model as a discursive reality, this thesis assumes the existence of a Turkish Model as something people refer to in their ways to conceptualize the present situation as well as the expected future in the whole region (and far beyond) and thus, treats it accordingly.

1.2 What is the Turkish Model?

This question is the first and perhaps the most frequently asked question regarding the Turkish Model. The answer is not as simple as the question, this is partly due to what

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7 An example may be the arguments of Ece Temelkuran in This House believes Turkey is a bad model for the Arab States, moderated by Tim Sebastian, 12 January, 2012. www.thedohadebates.com/debates/item/?d=116&s=&mode=transcript (accessed 23 June 2012).
was explained above; that is, the Turkish Model is a concept and a highly debated one. The way it is perceived differs quite a lot depending on two aspects: the context in which it is brought up (i.e. the time and place in which it is mentioned as well as the event with which it is associated) and the subject of perception (i.e. the individual or group who perceives). Regarding the first of these, it must be known that the concept of the Turkish Model is not a novel one. There have been several times in history and at different locations where Turkey was presented as a model. These are explained in detail in the second chapter where the history of the talk on the Turkish Model is given and in the fourth chapter where the contemporary discussion regarding a Turkish Model that has been re-introduced into international discourse, this time in the context of the Arab Spring, is explained.

As to the second aspect that affects the perception of the model, it must be said that the ideology of the perceiver determines not only if he or she chooses to support the model or not, but also how he or she defines it. What makes the contemporary Turkish Model very interesting is the fact that actors belonging to political groups with seemingly conflicting ideologies consider Turkey as a model for the countries of the Arab Spring or wish to see it working as a blueprint for future development in the region. This fact has also been pointed out by Burhanettin Duran and Nuh Yılmaz who ask the questions, “whose model?” and “which Turkey?” and provide categories of “political groups with competing narratives”.

Their arguments are explained in greater detail in chapter four along with other arguments surrounding the model debates. There, the ideological backgrounds of various perceptions of the Turkish Model are laid out through the arguments of intellectuals of leading think tanks in the field, academics, journalists and policy makers.

However, at this stage, the reader must be provided with at least a general idea of what the Turkish Model is, or could be imagined as. The best way to do this is by going through the main characteristics, which more than often form the basis of explanations on the Turkish Model. After surveying numerous academic and journalistic articles, the author has grouped a comprehensive set of characteristics that would best summarize the vast storage of ideas on what the Turkish Model is. Similar accounts are provided in Sinan Ülgen’s “From Inspiration to Aspiration - Turkey in the New Middle East”, Emad Y. Kaddorah’s “The Turkish Model: Acceptability and Apprehension” and Aswini K. Mohapatra’s “Democratization in the Arab World: Relevance of the Turkish Model”. These have been especially beneficial in the

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preparation of this section. Below, each of these characteristics has been described, with the aim to provide the reader with a thorough idea of what aspects are referred to when defining the Turkish Model. The reader is requested to read relevant sections of chapters two and four, for more detailed accounts.

The most commonly cited characteristic of the Turkish Model is doubtless the argument that Turkey has laid bare the falsity of the claim “Islam is incompatible with democracy”. The importance of this characteristic can be understood when one takes into consideration the significant place that Islam occupies in the social and political realms of the Arab world as well as the Arab peoples’ search for democratic regimes that conforms with the social and cultural realities of the region. In this sense, Turkey is likened to a black swan that deconstructs Orientalist, polarizing arguments that set Islam and democracy against each other. As can be implied from this metaphor, what is believed to make Turkey special is that it sets an example not so much through what it does but through what it is. This portrayal of Turkey as a modern and democratic yet Muslim country has not always been thus; it is the result of more than a century of reconciliation of Turkish Islam and forces of modernism. This point is developed, in detail, in the first part of the second chapter as well as section 3.1.

As one of these forces of modernism, secularism and its relationship with political Islam form one essential part of the aforementioned characteristic. Secularism has also become one of the most debated elements of the Turkish Model; while it is considered indispensable by certain groups, for others it has proved to be rather difficult to embrace. Nevertheless, the unique interplay between secularism and political Islam in the past four decades is of great importance for how the model has come to be thought of today and in a way, the Adelet ve Kalkınma Partisi (AKP) that has been in power since 2002 can be seen as the latest product of this interplay. Indeed, the AKP has frequently been referred to in defining the contemporary Turkish Model and some have gone so far as to refer to the AKP as a model. The party does have political Islamist roots and thus a conservative image but at the same time, it

10 Ülgen, “From Inspiration to Aspiration”, 1.
11See Şerif Mardin, Religion, Society and Modernity in Turkey, (Syracuse University, 2006).
12 Justice and Development Party (JDP)
seems to have managed to conform to the secular structure of the state.\textsuperscript{14} Furthermore, this compromise appears to agree with a majority of the Turkish population as the party has been elected for a third term.

It is not difficult to imagine why some equate the Turkish Model with the AKP. During the last 10 years in which AKP has been in power, Turkey has witnessed unprecedented transformations in various spheres and many of these – righteously or not – have been associated with the AKP. The following two characteristics of the Turkish Model – the civil-military relations and economic development – are examples of these transformations.

The military has had a determinant role during the times of the empire and its influence continued into the Republic, as the founding fathers of the modern day Turkey were military officials. Perhaps for this fact, the military has assumed the role of the guardian of the republic’s official ideology – Kemalism – and all its constituents. Until recently, this function of the military has allowed it to intervene in the politics of the state, making use of fears of Islamism, Kurdism or Communism.\textsuperscript{15} Overtime, this intervention has resulted in three conventional and two postmodern coup d’états. During the AKP government, the well-rooted role of the ‘military as guardian of state’ has been altered with recent constitutional changes, which aimed at keeping the military away from politics. In addition to this, the authority of the military was damaged by the Ergenekon trials\textsuperscript{16}. The result is a transformation in civil-military relations. It must be stated, however, that as a characteristic of the Turkish Model, civil-military relations has been interpreted differently. Scholars have pointed out that the authoritarian secular elite of the Arab world could aspire to the Turkish Model of “controlled modernization under military tutelage”\textsuperscript{17} which seems to be in stark contrast with the civilizing trend of the recent years, which is supposedly aspired by groups that are more liberal. Once again, it becomes evident that any definition of the model that disregards the different perceptions of Turkey can only go so much.

\textsuperscript{14} Ibid., 114-115.


\textsuperscript{16} ‘Ergenekon’ is the name given to a clandestine organization, thought to have connections with the ‘deep state’, which supposedly plotted a military coup against the government. The trials against this organization continue since 2008 and hundreds of people, a majority of which are high-ranking military officials and members of the traditional secular elite, have been detained and are being trialed.

\textsuperscript{17} Duran and Yılmaz, Whose Model? Which Turkey?.
The characteristic of economic development seems to be less controversial which gives even more reason for a greater critical analysis. Regional as well as global actors have appreciated the rapid and steady growth of the Turkish economy in the last decade. Opponents of the Turkish Model have especially emphasized this aspect since financial hardships rate among the first complaints of the people of the Arab Spring and the malfunctioning economies of the Arab world are in need of immediate reform.\textsuperscript{18} Turkey’s economic development has directed attention to the policies of the AKP in the last decade. Although this transformation has to do with the policies of the AKP, its foundations lie in the neoliberal policies dating back to the 1980s and these require more in depth analysis of the history of the economic transformation Turkey went through. Moreover, the evolution of the relationship between the state and business community cannot be separated from this aspect of the model.\textsuperscript{19}

The fourth, characteristic of the Turkish Model is Turkey’s close connection with the West. Indeed, Turkey is not only thought to have worked out a reconcilment between Islam and democracy but also one between Islam and the West.\textsuperscript{20} The ideological roots of this reconcilment go back to the Kemalist vision of Westernization\textsuperscript{21} the reflections of which are visible in the history of Turkish foreign policy and Turkey’s position in the international arena. Turkey has been a member of the Council of Europe (CE) since 1949 the year of its establishment, and North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) since 1952 shortly after its establishment. It has also started its negotiations for accession to the European Union (EU) in 2005. Overtime, the Kemalist vision of Westernization and the relationship between Turkey and Western powers like the United States and EU has evolved. So that in recent years, Turkey has stood out more and more as an independent actor that is able to maintain good relations with the West.

The fifth characteristic of the Turkish Model can be summed up in the reference to an imperial legacy. Turkey is considered the principal heir of the Ottoman Empire that has ruled a geography encompassing a great deal of the MENA region and

\textsuperscript{19}Ülgen, “From Inspiration to Aspiration,” 9-10.
\textsuperscript{21}Ülgen, “From Inspiration to Aspiration,” 7. Also see, Meliha Benli Altunisik, The Turkish Model and Democratization in the Middle East, \textit{Arab Studies Quarterly} 27, no. 1 and 2, Winter/Spring, 45-63. [online journal]; (EBSCOhost, accessed 9 February 2012).
including the states of the Arab Spring, most of the Balkans, parts of Eastern Europe and Central Asia and that has existed for over six centuries. Due to this position, Turkey has firstly inherited a centuries old statecraft tradition, part of which included the public respect for and acknowledgement of the importance of the state institution. Sinan Ülgen claims that these bureaucratic tradition was very important for the consolidation of democratic rule in Turkey and thus for the formation of contemporary debates on the Turkish Model. Very much related to this aspect of the imperial legacy is the inheritance in the sphere of the foreign policy. According to Mustafa Aydın, the legacy of the Ottoman Empire is one of the main structural determinants of Turkish foreign policy. Aydın provides the specific elements of the foreign policy of the Ottoman Empire that the Republic inherited. A closer analysis of these in the following sections show that they can be considered among the ferment that makes up the Turkish Model.

The final characteristic of the Turkish Model is the unique geographical location of Turkey, often expressed through the well-known metaphor of the bridge between Asia and Europe. This characteristic has not only resulted in ambivalence regarding Turkey’s categorization in either Asia or Europe but along with other characteristics, it has had consequences beyond mere categorization. Though some critiques might suspect exaggeration, it would not be incorrect to say that this rather physical reality has also influenced the dual character that so well marks the Turkish identity, at the level of the individual. But, returning to the macro level, it is easy to imagine how well Turkey’s unique geographical location fits with “the combination of modernism and traditionalism, secularism and Islamism, its [Turkey’s] dual Western and Eastern orientations.” It not only supports the other characteristics of the Turkish Model but also enables model debates to be easily appropriated to the surrounding regions (i.e. Central Asia, the Balkans, MENA, and Eastern Europe). Combining this characteristic with the common Ottoman past, many opponents of the Turkish Model indicate the comparative cultural affinities that Turkey has with its neighbours and its status as a soft power.


1.3 Why is the Arab Spring important for Turkey and vice versa?

There is a thin line between what the Turkish Model is defined as and why Turkey should or could be proposed as a model. In the previous section, the former of these was explained through the narration of the characteristics that were brought up in describing or referring to the Turkish Model, in the hope of drawing an image in the minds of the readers of what the model is thought to be. On the other hand, the latter has to do with Turkey’s potential of being a model and the dynamics that cause it to be presented as one which, although very much related to the former, is slightly different. This difference can be better understood if one asks, why the Arab Spring is important for Turkey and why Turkey, in turn, is important for the Arab Spring.

Several reasons could be listed to explain the significance of the Arab Spring for Turkish policy makers. The first of these has to do with security – as Nathalie Tocci has stated the Arab Spring has revealed “the inherent tensions between the normative and realpolitik dimensions of Turkish foreign policy”. Indeed, as the Arab Spring reminded once again that the region is far from being free of problems and that Turkey cannot avoid the security issues that have been raised in the wake of the events, some academics have even written about the death of the idealistic ‘zero problems with neighbours’ policy of current Turkish Foreign Minister Ahmet Davutoğlu. Of the four countries that experienced the Arab Spring most profoundly, Syria has an 877 km long land border with Turkey while Tunisia, Libya and Egypt are separated from Turkey only by the Mediterranean Sea. Due to this geographical proximity, it is understandable that the Turkish state would want to avoid of any large-scale instability in the region. In particular, the flows of refugees from these countries, the insecurity of Turkish citizens residing in or often commuting to and from these regions, the exploitation of these situations by terrorist groups such as the Partiya Kerkêrên Kurdistan (PKK) and the risks that the sectarian conflicts might spark similar ones in Turkey necessitate the close attention of the Turkish state.


28 Kurdistan Workers’ Party

29 Tocci, “Forward”, 5.
The second aspect that makes the Arab Spring important for Turkey is economics. Expansion of Turkish trade and investment in the Middle East is an important factor that shapes Turkish foreign policy towards the Arab world.\textsuperscript{30} In fact, Turkey’s economic interests have been the most important factor in forming the Turkish state’s country-specific reactions to the events of the Arab Spring.\textsuperscript{31} For instance, Turkey’s initial reluctance for intervention in Libya, which is one of the largest overseas markets for Turkish construction companies, could be attributed to Turkey’s economic concerns. Eventually, Turkish companies had an incurred loss of $1.4 billion and had to leave unfinished projects worth an estimated $15 billion. A similar pattern of economic loss could be drawn with other Arab Spring countries.\textsuperscript{32} Thus, in the aftermath of the Arab Spring, Turkish economy is perhaps the most affected non-Arab economy and this is another reason that obliges Turkey to be extremely attentive to the events.

A relatively weaker argument can be made about the importance of the Arab Spring for Turkey by claiming that a religious segment of the Turkish public is concerned about the well-being of their fellow Muslim brothers and sisters. This is in line with the rhetoric that has been used by some AKP officials; indeed, earlier Davutoğlu had stated about the Arab spring that the “Islamic world is going through a unique crisis”\textsuperscript{33} emphasizing the responsibility that Turkey and Iran had in this regard. A similar argument would be to claim that a conservative nationalist segment of the Turkish public have concerns for the peoples of the MENA, stemming from historical commonalities. Admittedly, these idealist arguments seem weaker compared to realist ones about security and economics. However, they weigh heavier when they are seen within the larger framework of regional power structures in the MENA region. The shifts in Turkish foreign policy is said to signal Turkey’s aspiration to be a leader in the region and such rhetoric hinting at Turkish religious or cultural affinities with the Arab peoples help strengthen this aspiration. Although the security and economic reasons mentioned above may give the impression that the Arab Spring has had negative influences for Turkey in the short-term, the last arguments could mean that in the long-term the Arab Spring presents opportunities for Turkey as the region is restructuring. This is exactly


\textsuperscript{32} Atlı, \textit{Arap Baharı, Türkiye ve İran}.

\textsuperscript{33} Ibid.
where the model debates gain a new meaning and this is explored in the fourth chapter.\textsuperscript{34}

Now it is necessary to turn the tables and consider why Turkey is important for the Arab Spring. As mentioned in the beginning of the section, answering this question has a lot to do with trying to define what the Turkish Model is. Though this question is answered throughout the thesis, a summarized reply is provided here. At the heart of the debates about the Turkish Model in the context of the Arab Spring, lies the dual character of Turkey. Indeed, if one were to specify an all-embracing theme it would be this duality, which originates from Turkey’s well-rooted affiliations with both the West and the East. Turkey’s geographical location is only one of the factors that have made this process, which started well-before the establishment of the Turkish Republic in 1923, easier. Although this process could hypothetically be taken even further back in history, for the purposes of this study, it is considered to have begun with the initial stages of modernization, evident in the reforms of the Late Ottoman Period. The process gained a keener element of Westernization with the Kemalist ideology dominant in the Republican era and has developed over the next decades. What makes it distinct is the ongoing and evolving interplay of Western concepts such as secularism and democracy and the elements arising from Turkey’s Muslim and Eastern identity. This hybrid identity is what the contemporary model debates – as well as other discourses privileging the role of Turkey in the Arab Spring – are actually based upon. Thus, Turkey is argued to be important for the Arab Spring as a state that is as much ‘one of them’ as it is Western. From another point, the lack of orientation that is often present following any revolution, also creates a need for models, and so Turkey’s role as a model is another reason that renders Turkey important in the context of the Arab Spring.

Before concluding this section, though it is not stated in the title, one may go one-step further and ask what the underlying reasons are for portraying Turkey as important for the Arab Spring and by whom this is done. This question guides the concerns of the author especially in the fourth chapter where among other issues surrounding the model debates, the Western origins of the debates are discussed.

1.4 The Findings and Objectives of the Research Project

Many articles and reports have been written on various aspects of the Turkish Model. A group of these sources focus on certain historical versions of the model, such as the

\textsuperscript{34} Tocci, “Forward”, 4.
articles written in the period after the collapse of the Soviet Union by scholars such as Andrew Mango or idris Bal. Another group of works deal with the relationship of a specific subject with the Turkish Model, for instance, articles that deal with democratization and the Turkish Model. Furthermore, recently there has been an increase in articles and reports that deal with the Turkish Model in the context of the Arab Spring. These mostly focus on issues such as the relevance or the applicability of the Turkish Model. While they provide significant observations on the characteristics and historical development of the Turkish Model, they are relatively short. Thus, a thorough and systematic academic study is yet to be done and this project tries to fill that gap by providing an analysis of the conceptual debate on the Turkish Model. In this regard, one of the most important results of the current research has been the assumption that there is no fixed definition of the Turkish Model and that there are varying perceptions about the model. This realization allows the author to take a critical distance away from discursive formations that might cloud one’s judgement. In other words, by acknowledging the multiplicity of perceptions about the model, instead of arguing for or against a model, the author situates himself or herself at a position to spot the naive use or abuse of the model. In previous studies, each of these assertive perceptions has been introduced and sometimes even a few of them have been juxtaposed or contrasted. What distinguishes this study in that respect is the fact that it attempts to bring all of these under one roof.

The main finding of the study has been that these varying perceptions are organized diachronically as well as synchronically; and the aim is to present both. In presenting the first set of perceptions, the historical development of the model debates about Turkey is provided through which the readers are shown that the concept of the Turkish Model is not a novel one. The second set presents the perceptions about the model that exists simultaneously or consequentially. This last section focuses on the most recent interpretations of the model – those that emerged in the concept of the Arab Spring. In order to make sense of the changes in the definition of the concept, processes of modernization and democratization of Turkey are dealt with. In other words, at the background of the narration of these varying sets of perceptions is a narration of Turkey’s transformation since its establishment with a specific focus on the rapid and abundant changes of the last decade.

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35 Such as Altunisik’s “The Turkish Model and Democratization”.

36 Some examples are are: Ülgen, “From Inspiration to Aspiration”; Tocci et al., “Turkey and the Arab Spring – Implications for Turkish Foreign Policy from a Transatlantic Perspective”, Mediterranean Paper Series 2011
In this context, it has become evident that the recent transformations in Turkish foreign policy especially concerning the Middle East are meaningful. Hence, another objective of the research project is to present Turkey’s changing relations with the Arab world and the implications of this for model debates and the Arab Spring. The main assumption is that a new set of debates on the Turkish Model has emerged – this time, in the context of the Arab Spring – and the main arguments surrounding these debates are brought together in this research project. The debates are strongly related to the growing global trend of regionalization as well as other processes of globalization; hence, the research project is in accordance with the research agenda of global studies.

1.5 Methodology

An extensive literature review was conducted for sources in both English and Turkish. These sources included official as well as unofficial publications such as books, journals, reports, conference proceedings, dissertations and theses and interviews. Furthermore, audio sources such as news and radio broadcasts, lectures and conferences have also been used. These have helped to determine the extent of research as well as theory in the field, define some concepts and detect areas that required more research.

Apart from the primary and secondary sources mentioned above, the research project is based on five semi-structured expert interviews. A comprehensive list of interviewees has been outlined out of staff of universities and think tanks as well as policy makers. This list has been narrowed down and potential interviewees have been contacted. The first of the interviewees was Prof. Dr. Talip Küçükcan, the Director of Foreign Policy Research at SETAV\(^\text{37}\). The second interviewee was İbrahim Kalın, the current Chief Foreign Affairs Advisor of the Prime Minister. The third interviewee was Prof. Dr. İdris Bal, current AKP member of parliament. The fourth interviewee was Dr. M. Turgut Demirtepe, head of Central Asian Studies at USAK\(^\text{38}\). The fifth and final interviewee is expert on the Middle East, Asst. Prof. Mehmet Şahin from Gazi University and advisor at ORSAM\(^\text{39}\). In consideration of the qualitative nature of the research topic, the choice has been towards conducting semi-structured interviews. Certain common themes, issues and questions have been covered during the

\(^{37}\) Siyaset, Ekonomi ve Toplum Araştırmaları Vakfı (Foundation for Political, Economic and Social Research).  

\(^{38}\) Uluslararası Stratejik Araştırmalar Kurumu (International Strategic Research Organisation).  

\(^{39}\) Ortadoğu Stratejik Araştırmalar Merkezi (Center for Middle Eastern Strategic Studies).
interviews; however, specific questions and issues have also been asked depending on the particular expertise of each interviewee. The semi-structured nature of the interviews has left room for any issue or question that arouse during the interviews. All the interviews have been recorded by means of a digital recording device and the audit versions are in the files of the author and are available upon request.

The parts of the topic that deal with historical processes have relied mainly on written documents and partly on the interviews. A great deal of the project deals with the perceptions of a wide variety of individuals ranging from state officials to intellectuals. In this respect, in addition to the interviews, the productions of think tanks have played a pivotal role. They not only reflect the views of their authors but they also provide information on public opinion by means of surveys and field research which they are able to conduct due to their broader financial and network capacities.
CHAPTER II: TURKISH MODERNIZATION AND THE HISTORY OF THE MODEL DEBATES

2.1 TURKISH MODERNIZATION

Giving an account of Turkish modernization is a very challenging task. First of all, it is possible to trace the roots of this process several centuries in the past. Moreover, its speed varies according to external and internal developments as well as the sphere in which it has taken place. Among the factors that have influenced its acceleration were the advances in communication and transportation technologies (i.e. the establishment of the printing press, newspapers, railways etc.) as part of the industrial revolution and increasing imperial interests. What is more, this process has always involved the interplay of the forces of continuity and those of change. After all, the dynamics of modernization have not always been easily accepted; there have been times when they met counter-modernization movements. These conflicting forces of the Turkish and other modernization processes characterize the modern age and are extremely significant for the global condition.

In line with this significance and multidimensionality, hundreds of books, theses, dissertations and articles have been written on Turkish modernization. Of course, providing a thorough explanation of this process is well beyond the boundaries of this thesis. Moreover, elaborating upon these would not serve to accomplish the main aims of this work. Nevertheless, when attempting to analyze the debates on the Turkish Model, one cannot completely overlook Turkey's modernization process. In fact, many of the characteristics described in the first chapter are grounded in this process. It is for this reason that in this section, a brief account of the roots of Turkish modernization process, starting from the Late Ottoman Period to the establishment of the Turkish Republic and the Kemalist ideology it has been based on, shall be given. This will also help in making sense of the second of this chapter, which deals with the history of the model debates.

2.1.1 The Roots of Modernization: The Late Ottoman Period

From the beginning of the rise of Western power in the 16th century to the time when it reached world superiority in the mid of the 19th century, the Islamic world and Asia has experienced a gradual decrease in power.40 The Ottoman Empire was not an exception to this trend. The most powerful European actor of the 15th and 16th centuries, the

Ottoman Empire is generally considered to have entered a period of standstill in the 17th century, followed by one of decline, which is traditionally claimed to begin in the 18th century. Interestingly enough, during this period one can also observe an awakening in the Ottomans reflected in the so-called ‘Ottoman Renaissance’, known more commonly as the ‘Tulip Age’. During this short-lived renaissance, the orientations of the Ottoman court and intellectuals transformed from a primary interest in territorial expansion to one in arts and entertainment. It could be characterized as the first time in the empire’s history when the West became any source of inspiration. This era provided the basis for the Westernized modernizing reforms of the late 18th and 19th century. This awakening and turn to the West is most evident in the report that Mehmet Çelebi, an ambassador sent to France in 1720 by Ahmet III, presented. Here, Çelebi questions the recent military failures of the Ottomans against Western armies and points to the fact that the empire should be awakened and pay great attention to the methods, networks, strategies and military advances of the West.41

This was the first time that the Ottomans became aware of this need; however, it took until the times of Selim III (1789-1807) and Mahmud II (1808-1839) to be put into practice. These rulers implemented state-sponsored military reforms but “did not question the cultural norms, social structures or political relationships on which the Ottoman order rested”.42 Even so, Selim III’s attempts to create an entirely new infantry corps and establish permanent embassies in European capitals were not met peacefully by the derebey-ulama-Janissary coalition and he was murdered. His successor Mahmud II proceeded more cautiously in the face of this coalition; after disempowering the derebeys using the Janissaries, he eradicated the Janissaries. He also took certain measures to limit the authority of the ulama, the class of religious scholars. He then implemented reforms in both the military and the bureaucracy; opening new schools, embassies in Europe, translation offices, introducing the more Europeanized fez and frock coat and founding the first gazette published in Ottoman-Turkish.43 The expenses of these reforms have contributed greatly to the economic fall of the empire, ending in its bankruptcy in 1876.44

The reforms mentioned above prepared the basis for the creation of a new elite group that were trained either in Europe or in Mahmud II’s Europeanized academies and that spoke European languages and were committed to policies of Westernization.

41 Ibid., 195-196, 201-203.


43 Ibid., 61-80.

44 Ibid., 86-87.
Thus, the major reformists of the 19th century were not Sultans but an elite cadre of bureaucrats and intellectuals. The most renowned of these elite were Rashid Pasha (1800-1858), Ali Pasha (1815-1871) and Fuad Pasha (1815-1869), who all attained a European education and served as high-level Ottoman officials in London or Paris and later as foreign ministers and grand viziers in the Ottoman state. During this era, which has been labeled as the Tanzimat (literally, reorganizations), the modern ideology of nationalism also found its way into this Ottoman elite’s agenda, as part of the greater wave of Westernization. In this respect, two royal decrees followed by the Nationality Law of 1869 were introduced with the aim of creating “the notion of a common Ottoman citizenship, or Ottomanism”.45

As a reaction to the oppression by this elite group had upon the public, another group of Turkish intellectuals mainly from literary circles, the Young Ottomans, gained importance during the late Tanzimat, in the years 1867-1878. These individuals were also very much influenced by European thought; however, what distinguished them was their attempt to reconcile the European institutions and thoughts of the reforms with the Ottoman and Islamic tradition. They considered the Ottomans value system as superior to that of the West but believed in the necessity to have a constitutional government. In accordance with the reforms that this group had in mind, the first Ottoman Constitution was proclaimed in 1876 and a chamber of deputies was established. Yet this constitution was dissolved by Sultan Abdul Hamid II only two years later.46 The Sultan also had the Young Ottomans exiled.47 Approximately three decades later, this exiled community, along with a group of discontent civil servants and students as well as a coalition of disaffected army officers from Ottoman Europe, combined in a movement that would become known as the ‘Young Turks’. They organized under the group that would later become their political party, the Committee of Progress and Union (CUP). Following a revolt in the summer of 1908, the constitution was declared once again, on June 24 of the same year and CUP came to power. During this era, the Westernized reforms continued. By 1913, the CUP’s increasingly oppressive policies had turned the government into a military dictatorship under the triumvirate of Enver, Talat and Jamal Pashas. The untimely and half-baked

45 Ibid., 83.
policies of CUP became one of the most important aspects that accelerated the fall leading to the dissolution of the Ottoman Empire.\textsuperscript{48}

The Ottoman awakening to the West’s relative progress that began in the Tulip Age was reflected, more than half a century later, in the military reforms of Selim III and then Mahmud II, which set the environment for the creation of a new group of elites that attained their power from their insight into the European political and intellectual system. This episode of modernizing reforms starting in the Tulip Age and continuing with varying speeds up until the end of the empire is extremely important for the more systematic and rapid transformation during and after the establishment of the Republic of Turkey. Indeed, what is depicted by this historical narrative is the beginnings of an era of transformation; one in which the value system of a centuries old empire comes to be questioned and gradually transformed. Several aspects of this transformation constitute the foundation of the modernization process of Republican times and these have been substantial in the emergence of the model debates. The first of these is the aspect of Westernization; indeed this is a characteristic that becomes even more evident in the Republican reforms where modernization is equated with Westernization.\textsuperscript{49} Another equally important aspect is secularization. This modern idea has gradually worked its way into the Ottoman order, which had been so well grounded in the Islamic tradition. The old institutions remained alongside the new ones and yet the segments of society that benefited from the old order that was based on a religious system of thought gradually found their power diminishing as the new elite’s power was increasing. Thus, both Westernization and secularization implied a direct influence in the established power structures. By the time of the Young Ottomans, the gap between the new elite and the traditional classes of power began to widen and this transformation in power structures and values set the necessary conditions for the reforms that the new Republic would implement.\textsuperscript{50} These constitute the topic of the next section.

\section*{2.1.2 The New Turkish State and Modernization}

The century old accumulation of reforms in the Ottoman times continued with great rapidity and in all spheres of life in the new Turkish state established in 1923 under the

\textsuperscript{48} Cleveland, Modern Middle East, 134-137.

\textsuperscript{49} Ülgen, “From Inspiration to Aspiration, 11.

\textsuperscript{50} Ibid., 79-102.
leadership of its founder Mustafa Kemal Pasha, later known as Atatürk. The reforms progressed in a similar direction that is to say, they continued to get inspiration from the West, mainly because the Ottomanist and Islamist movements were almost ruled out by Mustafa Kemal and the other founders of the Republic who were either former members or sympathizers of the Western-oriented CUP which was dissolved by then. The rapidity with which the reforms took place was a result of the fact that this group with the mentality of CUP held almost unlimited authority of the state. The desperate economic and psychological condition of the Turkish public and the lack of any other authority they could adhere to, were also aspects that strengthened this group’s power. Of course, it must be stated that this elite of the last decades of the Ottoman Empire gradually transformed during the early years of the Republic.

Turkish modernization of the Republican era was based on the principles of Atatürk. From the establishment of the Republic until the death of Atatürk in 1938, the reforms he implemented were in accordance with these principles. It would not be possible to comprehend this modernization process without describing these principles and reforms. Atatürk’s reforms can be best summarized in the context of the six principles that forms the foundations of the doctrine known as Kemalism: reformism (revolutionism), republicanism, secularism, nationalism, populism, and etatism (statism). The first of these, is a principle that characterizes the whole Atatürk era; the newly formed Republic was in a constant state of reform and the rulers were promoting reform in political, social, juridical, educational and economic areas. The next principle, republicanism can be linked to the demands for constitutional monarchy in the last decades of the Ottoman Empire. However, the actual declaration of the Turkish Republic was on October 29, 1923, well after the abolishment of the sultanate on November 1, 1922. According to the Kemalist ideology, the Republic was the best form of government and a lot of emphasis was made on popular sovereignty which was an important element distinguishing a republic from a monarchy.

Although secularism was officially accepted on April 10, 1928, this idea had already entered the lives of the Ottomans with the reforms of the Young Ottomans and even more so with those of the Young Turks. This principle was strengthened and

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51 This was his surname – literally father of the Turks – bestowed on him by the national assembly in 1935 after the adoption of the Surname Law requiring all citizens of Turkey to adopt the use of surnames. Cleveland, Modern Middle East, 179; Doğan Canman, “Atatürk Devrimleri” [“Atatürk’s Reforms”], 10 Kasım 1988, 3-13 [online speech] (TODAIE); available from http://yayin.todaie.gov.tr/goster.php?Dosya=MDUzMDU2MDU0, (accessed 18 July 2012), 13.

52 Cleveland, Modern Middle East, 180.

53 Ibid., 178, 180.
insinuated into the society by the abolishment of the caliphate on March 3, 1924. Two years later, the government abolished the Mecelle (the civil code of the Ottoman Empire) and the shari‘ah (the Islamic law) and adopted the Swiss civil code and Italian penal code in their place. The rulers also shut the Sufi orders, and prohibited by law worship at shrines and tombs, both of which influenced the everyday religious practices of the Turkish people. The secularist principle also interfered with the society’s mode of dressing. The fez was replaced by the hat and religious dress was prohibited in public. Furthermore, as a result of this principle, the Muslim lunar calendar was replaced by the Gregorian and Sunday instead of Friday was adopted as the weekly day of rest.

As a Kemalist principle, nationalism formed the basis for the creation of an environment that would enable the germination of the other principles. Kemalist nationalism aimed to create a society whose loyalty belongs to the nation rather than to any form religious unity; this society takes the nation and citizenship as reference points. After all, the creation of the Republic was a nation and state building process. The reflections of this principle could be seen in reforms in various spheres of life. The establishment of the Turkish Historical Society in 1931 and the Turkish Language Association in 1932 are examples of these reforms. However, the most important reflection of the nationalist principle is the language reform that involved the replacement of the Arab alphabet with the Latin one and the purification of the language of non-native linguistic elements.

With the Turkish National Independence War (1918-1922), the concepts of the ‘public’ and ‘populism’ were introduced with the aim to get rid of the classes of the Ottoman society. Moreover, this principle was also directed at various ethnic groups who may have felt as if they were ‘the other’ due to the influence of nationalism; the goal was to do away with all of the differences resulting from class or ethnicity and to unify the society under one Turkish populace. Furthermore, the principle of populism

54 The word caliphate literally means ‘to take one’s place’. As a religio-political term, it refers to the state institution following the death of the Prophet Mohammed. It has continued for 13 centuries before it was abolished. The individual who leads the state is referred to as the “caliph”. “Hilafet” [“Caliphate”], (online religious terms database of the Turkish Republic’s Presidency of Religious Affairs). http://www.diyanet.gov.tr/turkish/dy/DiniBilgilerDetay.aspx?ID=1709.


56 Cleveland, Modern Middle East, 181.


58 Kili, Atatürk Devrimi [The Atatürk Revolution], 196-203.
has affected the status of women; women of the Republic enjoyed more rights in various spheres of life.  

During the early years of the Republic when the reforms focused on political and social spheres, economic policy had been pushed to the background. Thus, etatism – the policy according to which the state takes responsibility for the areas of economy in which the private sector either does not have interest or is not able to succeed – became more prevalent in 1930s. Up to that time, the Turkish economy had been primarily based on imports and the very limited private sector of the war-torn country was not able to achieve much success. Following the Great Depression, the Turkish leaders realized the need to implement etatism and announced the first five-year plan in 1933. In accordance with this plan, large-scale textile and steel plants and other factories were opened. However, although etatism provided some foundation of industrialization in Turkey, overall it did not result in an economic success.

The main Kemalist principles and reforms that shape the modernization experience of the Republic of Turkey have been listed above. This unique process has had far-reaching consequences that continue to influence modern day Turkey. The reasons for this require some explanation. Firstly, the modernizing reforms were the envisagement of a minority who was fortunate enough to have gained relative power over the old elite as well as the masses. In fact, this was an elitist and state-led transformation. The ruling elite either completely ignored or undervalued the local social and cultural practices and knowledge. This was mainly due to this elite’s European perception of social reality. According to them, the Western civilization was superior in many ways and in order to succeed, Turkey had to completely Westernize. They viewed the Western value system and the modernization associated with this system, as universal. This is why anything local was disregarded or viewed as second-rate. Another aspect of the modernization of this era is its top-down, radical and rapid nature. Unlike grassroots movements that emerge out of the demands of a considerable majority of the society, the reforms of the early Republican era had many authoritarian features and they resulted in a rapid and radical cultural change.

59 Cleveland, Modern Middle East, 183.
60 Kili, Atatürk Devrimi [The Atatürk Revolution], 203-212.
61 Cleveland, Modern Middle East, 184.
63 Cleveland, Modern Middle East, 184-185.
64 Turan, “Atatürk’s Reforms”, 188.
Furthermore, their aim was a rupture with the Ottoman past and the reforms served to this end as well, as Fethi Keles explains:

...modernization after the collapse meant a completely different thing: It meant a cognitive rupture from the past, a restarting of the history afresh, an untying of any and every knot that had links to anything Ottoman. The founders of the Republic defined the new Turkish identity in outright opposition to Ottoman identity. They declared their desire “to be admitted as full members of Western society in order to escape from the terrible position of being its pariahs” (Tonybee 1925, cited in Robins, 1996, p. 65). The Kemalist elite adopted an irrevocable attitude toward the disavowal and denial of Ottoman past.65

The language reforms mentioned above as well as the establishment of the Turkish Historical Society were both in line with this aim to delink the Republic from its Ottoman past. However, time has shown that as the main beneficiary of the empire, it was not possible to sever all of Turkey’s ties with its past; exemplifying this is the recent discourses of ‘neo-Ottomanism’ that is dealt with in the third chapter.

Nevertheless, overall, the modernizing Turkish nationalist elite’s project has been successful in constructing a relatively modern, Western – all be it with authoritarian features – nation-state and producing a new political elite that was dedicated to all of the principles of the Kemalist ideology.66 These political elite came into existence under what is today the Cumhuriyet Halk Partisi (CHP),67 the party founded by Atatürk himself. From Atatürk’s death in 1938 until 1950 his friend İsmet İnönü was the president. Despite the fact that in 1946 the transition was made from a single-party system to a multi-party system, the CHP has ruled as the sole party of the Republic until 1950 when Demokrat Partisi (DP)68 under the leadership of Adnan Menderes won the elections. This is generally considered as the first step in the democratization process of Turkey. However, the authoritarian elements of the early Republican era continued in the form of military interventions. For a long time, this democratization process as well as the modernization process of Turkey has been shaped by the interaction between these authoritative elements and liberal elements reflected in the voice of the unrepresented segments of society. Some academics have coined the product of this interaction as “New Turkey”69 and the journey that has led to

67 Republican People’s Party (RPP)
68 Democrat Party (DP)
it as the “Turkey experience”\textsuperscript{70}. These two concepts that related to recent model debates are explained in detail in the next two chapters; however, before moving onto these, the previous versions of the model debates are reviewed in the next section.

2.2 THE HISTORY OF THE MODEL DEBATES

2.2.1 The Turkish Republic as an Example

Although a part of this chapter’s title is “the History of Model Debates”, it should be clarified that the debates had not always been as explicit as they have become in recent times; that is to say, the concept ‘model’ was not always directly stated. For the most part, Middle Eastern and North African leaders of the 20\textsuperscript{th} century either directly referred to Atatürk and Kemalism as their source of inspiration or implemented similar modernizing reforms in their countries. Thus, a logical inference can be made that the modernizing reforms of early Republican Turkey were taken as a model by these leaders.

Indeed, when the conditions of the region are taken into consideration, this could be interpreted as a natural development.

Turkey’s relatively rapid rise from the ashes of a centuries old empire in the aftermath of serious blows to its national integrity and economy was a development that the rest of the former-Ottoman territories could not overlook. During the Late Ottoman Period, part of the Arabs in these territories had rebelled against the empire as part of the popular wave of nationalism. Soon after, these people understood that the European imperial powers (i.e. British and the French empires) that had supported them had other intentions as a result of which on April 24, 1920 with the Agreement at San Remo, Syria became a mandate of France; Iraq and Palestine became a mandate of Britain.\textsuperscript{71} Former-Ottoman territories in North Africa (i.e. Algeria, Tunisia and Libya) had already been invaded by the European colonial powers over the course of the 19\textsuperscript{th} century. From this time until approximately the end of the World War II, nationalist

\textsuperscript{70} Mehmet Şahin, “Tunisian Events, The Middle East and Turkey Experience”, Ortadoğu Analiz 3, no. 26, February 2011.

movements within these colonies and mandates increased in number and influence; hence leading one by one to independence from the late 1940s to 1960s.72

During this era characterized by imperial land-grabbing, Turkey was taken as a role model by many of the nationalist and secularist/modernist groups in the region as a newly formed nation-state modernizing and westernizing impetuously.73 One of these leaders was Emir Khaled, the grandson of one of Algeria’s national heroes Emir Abdel Kader. Surely, before anything, Khaled – like many other nationalist Arabs – admired Atatürk’s nationalistic struggle against the Western Powers in World War I. Furthermore, Emir Khaled and the secular Algerians with whom he was acquainted were enthusiastic about Atatürk’s modernizing reforms. This enthusiasm continued with Khaled’s successor Ferhat Abbas,74 who was an active member of the nationalist organization, Young Algerians75. The Young Algerians looked up to Atatürk and his reforms. Their admiration of Atatürk’s reforms was especially true for the reforms that elevated the status of women in society: “...the new civil condition of Turkish women appeared to the Young Algerians as the realization of their own ideal...The triumph of secularism and the principle of equality between men and women (there) had a strong impression on Algerian Muslim youth whose admiration for the Kemalist regime was well-known...”.76 Other Algerian leaders that were reported to have admired Atatürk and his reforms were Malek Bennabi and Messali Hadj.77

Another admirer of Atatürk was Habib Bourguiba, the postcolonial leader of Tunisian Republic, which he ruled for 30 years in the manner of a dictatorship. Often Bourguiba has been compared to Atatürk because of the similarity of their reform agenda. However, according to Rashid al-Ghannushi, the leader of the Tunisia’s Ennahda Movement, Bourguiba’s model of secularism was “more radical than Kemalism itself”.78 Bourguiba’s Tunisia resembled Atatürk’s Turkey in many ways and

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72 Turan Kişlakçı, Arab Baharı [Arab Spring], 2nd ed., (İstanbul: İlimyurdu Yayıncılık, 2011), 15-21.
75 This organization was modeled after the Young Turks and Young Tunisians. Ben Hardman, Islam and the Métropole: A Case Study of Religion and Rhetoric in Algeria, American Studies University, Germany: 2009 (accessed through Google Books).
76 Knauss, The Persistence of Patriarchy, 51.
77 Ibid.,52.
even decades after the Kemalists of Turkey would praise the Tunisian regimes' achievement in turning Tunisia into a secular and modern state. Indeed, when the Tunisian regime collapsed in 2011, it was said that the Kemalism of Tunisia failed.\textsuperscript{79} According Mustafa Akyol, “[t]his, indeed, was the ‘Kemalist model’: a dictatorship by a secular cadre that took its legitimacy from a particular form of ‘modernization’ and that alienated conservative believers by both offending their values and repressing their freedoms.” \textsuperscript{80}

The nationalist leader of Egypt, Gamal Abdel Nasser, was also influenced by Atatürk though not as much as Bourguiba. Nasser was devoted to creating a modern Egypt with a Western-style state and an industrialized booming economy. Like Atatürk, he was an army officer and like him, he used the military to achieve his goal. There were of course great differences between the two, but Atatürk was certainly a source of inspiration for Nasser.\textsuperscript{81}

In all of the examples above, one can see that some nationalist leaders of the Arab world were influenced by the principles and reforms of Atatürk in one way or another. Turkey of the time was considered an example in the eyes of these Arab countries that were fighting for their independence. Similar to the Turkish case, most of these leaders and the elites surrounding them equated modernization with westernization. This meant that their modernization processes also involved top-down radical measures that would undervalue local elements and thus discriminate large segments of their societies. Here, it is important to understand that though Atatürk's Turkey may have constituted an example for these Arab leaders, there were other influences as well. After all, Atatürk's reforms themselves were influenced by several models, particularly French and Soviet ones. This may be one of the reasons that there was no explicit reference to the phrase Turkish Model at this time. The closest thing to such a reference was arguments produced in the West regarding Turkey's potential role as an example to the rest of the Islamic/Arab world. However, at this time, these arguments were mostly believed to be unrealistic and the Turkish experience was considered sui generis.\textsuperscript{82} Thus, at this stage, the accumulation of Turkish experiences with modernization that began in the Late Ottoman Period and continued well after the


\textsuperscript{80} Ibid.


\textsuperscript{82} M. Turgut Demirtepe, interviewed by the author, digital tape recording, 4 May, 2012, Ankara.
formation of the Republic was only able to create the basis for future debates on Turkey’s quality of being a model.

The first time the phrase Turkish Model was used was following the collapse of the Soviet Union and the emergence of the newly independent Turkic republics.

2.2.2 The Post-Soviet Version of the Turkish Model

In the immediate aftermath of the collapse of the Soviet Union, the territories formerly occupied by the union gave rise to the emergence of quite a few newly independent states. Among these territories were parts of Caucasia and Central Asia, which were the historical homes of various nations of Turkic origin. The majority of these territories were still occupied by these Turkic peoples and thus the states emerging in these territories came to be referred to as Turkic republics. In this respect, the collapse of the Soviet Union became even more significant for Turkey. Accordingly, Turkey acted swiftly in adapting to the situation, recognizing these newly independent states in a matter of hours and opening up embassies in the course of a few days. The peoples of these states and Turkey had strong historical and cultural ties and both sides welcomed the new developments in the region.

On the other hand, adapting to this situation was not as easy for the majority of the world who were caught unprepared in the face of the collapse and the implications this event had on the world structure. Though the downfall of the Soviet Union meant victory for the Western block, the tectonic changes in the region reflected in the emergence of these newly independent states brought new concerns for the West (i.e. US and major European powers). The Western world was concerned about the supposed power vacuum that was created with the end of Soviet control in these territories. Turkey and Iran were considered as rival powers in this regard. The concerns of the West came from the fear that these newly independent states would look up to Iran whom they viewed as an oppressive fundamentalist Islamic state. Hence, as a role model, they presented Turkey “as an ideal Muslim democracy and a model of development especially for Kazakhstan, Kirgizstan, Uzbekistan, Turkmenistan and Azerbaijan”.

83 Demirtepe, interviewed by the author.
84 Ibid.
Many politicians, academics and members of the media in the West, in Turkey and the newly independent states, pointed to what they called the Turkish Model. As mentioned before, this was the first time the phrase Turkish Model was used. Compared to the early Republican era, the references to such a model were overt and the arguments seemed stronger. Moreover, it could be said that there was a general agreement about what the model is. Firstly, Turkey’s Muslim identity was significant as the Turkic republics were also Muslim majority states. However, the religious affinity feature was only welcome so long as it did not bear radical elements that could pose a threat to the West. In this respect, the secular and modern Turkish structure that Atatürk had established when he founded the state was critical for the understanding of the model. Furthermore, another feature of the model was Turkey’s close cooperation with the West. Following World War II, Soviet demands pushed Turkey into cooperating with the West. It was around this period that Turkey became a member Western international organization such as the NATO and CE. Over the course of the Cold War, these its connection with the West strengthened. Furthermore, not long after World War II, Turkey took a step in democratizing its political structure by adapting of a multi-party system. This added to the formation of the West’s Turkish Model for the Turkic republics. Lastly, Turkey’s devotion to free market economy was a crucial feature of the model. A decade earlier, Turkey had taken measures to transform its economy though the fruits of this development would not be fully born until the 21st century, as such the Turkish economy set a good example for these Turkic republics that needed to be integrated into the global market.

Indeed, there were many reasons why this version of the Turkish Model was thought to have real potential as a modernization project for these states. These peoples did not only have a similar religious background with the people of Turkey, they also shared ethnic and linguistic roots, which meant a relatively similar socio-cultural background. For these reasons, it was assumed that the model would appeal to the Turkic republics. Thus, the West supported this pro-Western secular Muslim state model in order to eliminate the risk of these states transforming from anti-Western communist regimes into anti-Western Islamic regimes, taking Iran as an example in the

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86 The list of names is a long one and it is not possible to give them all here. For a list of examples with quotations see İdris, Bal, "Uluslararası Politika’da Türk Modelinin Yükselişi ve Düştüğü" ["The Rise and Fall of the Turkish Model in International Politics"], Bilig, no. 14, Summer 2000, 1-15 [online journal]: available from http://bilig.yesevi.net/PDFS/14.sayi.pdf (accessed 17 April, 2012).

87 Ibid., 3-4.
process. The aim was to avoid this and be able to integrate these states into the Western system – in fact, the West sought this for all the former-Soviet republics.88

For their part, the Turkish politicians saw this as an opportunity to reclaim Turkey’s significance for international political affairs in general and for the Western world in particular. The collapse of the Soviet Union had put an end to an era characterized by an ongoing ideological and military competition and a world divided into two oppositional blocks. Turkey had a strategic significance in this world structure. Now that this structure came to an end, Turkish policy makers were in search of new ways of claiming their legitimacy. Thus, Turkey reacted positively to the model debates; lending a hand to these newly formed states by providing loans, offering military assistance, opening schools, receiving exchange students, sending religious personnel and books and encouraging for a common alphabet.89 However, considering Turkey’s search for legitimacy, it is obvious that Turkish reaction to these model debates was as much a product of pragmatism as it was of idealism.

The concerns that led the Western powers to promote Turkey as a model were mainly results of a lack of knowledge concerning the region. In a few years’ time, the West’s knowledge about the actors, interests and dynamics in the region increased. As a result, they realized that its initial fears and assumptions were amiss. The first of these realizations was concerning Iran. Contrary to the first assumptions about Iran’s potential to be role model for the region, it was understood that Iran had very limited influence over the Turkic republics. This is mainly due to sectarian differences; Iran is a Shii dominated country while, all the Turkic republics with the exception of Azerbaijan, are Sunni dominated. In any case, it became obvious in time that Iran did not wish to pursue idealist politics but rather rational ones since it was searching for potential economic cooperation. Another realization was that Russia, who was no longer thought to have any interest in the region, reappeared in the picture with the launching of “near abroad” policy. There was no power vacuum to be filled after all. Having learned these, Western powers withdrew their initial support for the Turkish Model. What is more, Turkey’s had two important national problems – PKK terrorism and the dissatisfaction of the Alewites – that further decreased the popularity of the model.90

Without the support of the West, the idea of a Turkish Model was unlikely to succeed. There is no doubt that Turkey’s quality as a model was more directly referred to in the post-Soviet version of the model debates, and the arguments for a Turkish

88 Demirtepe, interviewed by the author.
89 Bal, “Türk Modelinin Yuşelisi ve Düşüşü” [“Rise and Fall of Turkish Model”], 6-9.
90 Bal, “The Turkish Model”.

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Model for the Turkic republics were stronger compared to the early Republican arguments. However, both this directness and strength were relative. Despite the liveliness of the model debates and Turkey’s efforts to strengthen relationships with the Turkic republics, it would not be incorrect to say that the strengths of the so-called Turkish Model had been inflated. On this issue, İdris Bal has stated that: “...it is difficult to interpret the West’s support as its confirmation of the Turkish Model’s maturity”.91 He adds to this point in the interview the author has conducted with him, saying that the Turkey of the time was not at a level of maturity where it could uphold the principles of this model.92 Rather, the term Turkish Model has been used as a symbol for these principles (secularity, free market economy, cooperation with the West and multi-party system).93 This is implied by Andrew Mango, the notable expert on Turkey, in his article titled “The Turkish Model”: “...relations [of Turkey] with the newly-independent Turkic republics...can yield benefits only in the context of Turkey’s wider relationship with the advanced industrialized nations. They alone can supply the capital and technology, which the Turkic republics need. With luck, Turkey may act as an intermediary or a partner in the exchange of Western money and know-how for Asian hydro-carbons and other raw materials.”.94

Hence, while the post-Soviet version of the Turkish Model was better rooted in comparison to the earlier version, it was successful to the extent that it was supported by the West and thus its popularity decreased soon after this support ended. Several years after the ‘fall’ of this version of the model, events of September 11, 2001 triggered a new set of model debates.

2.2.3 The Post-9/11 Version of the Turkish Model

On September 11, 2001, America experienced perhaps the most tragic attack within its territory throughout its history. The attacks have caused the death of more than 3000 people and have had a traumatic effect on the American public. At the global level, the attacks opened up a new era in world politics characterized by an American pledge to destroy and defeat the global terror network with all that the US had at its disposal and by the effects of this pledge on other actors and regions around the world. In this

91 Bal, “Türk Modelinin Yükselişi ve Düşüşü” [“Rise and Fall of Turkish Model”], 5.
93 Bal, “Türk Modelinin Yükselişi ve Düşüşü” [“Rise and Fall of Turkish Model”], 5.
94 Andrew Mango, “The Turkish Model”. Middle Eastern Studies 29, no. 4, October 1993, 726-757 [online journal]; (Taylor & Francis Ltd., JSTOR), 729.
respect, the Middle East has become one of the focal regions that were affected by this pledge. All of the 19 attackers were from the Middle East – 15 of them from Saudi Arabia, two from the United Arab Emirates, one from Lebanon and one from Egypt. On the other hand, though none of the attackers was from there, first Afghanistan and later Iraq would be the two states that would pay the highest bills for the attacks. The former was found guilty of hosting and supporting Al-Qaida the organization that claimed responsibility for the attacks and the latter was accused, among other things, of having mass weapons of destruction and thus posing a threat to the security in the Middle East. In this process, the American government made it clear that they rest of the world was divided into two: those who were with and those who were against America. At that time, the US’s “ideological vulgarism” and disregard for international law and for the other dominant actors of the international system, did not only scare its enemies in the Middle East but also its traditional allies like Turkey, Saudi Arabia and Egypt as well as European powers.  

In accordance with these developments, the general tendency of the post-9/11 world was one of favouring security over freedoms. However, at this stage Turkey was going through what some refer to as a ‘reformation process’ characterized by democratization and the use of soft power – priorities that were quite contrary to the American perception of the world at the time.  

One of the most obvious characteristic of this reformed Turkey is the gradual increase in its relations with the Arab Middle East throughout the post-9/11 decade. According to Erman Akıllı, there are four reasons for the emergence of this new trend in Turkish foreign policy: the transformations in global and regional structures that began with the end of the Cold War era, the acceleration in EU-Turkey relations, changes in strategic perceptions and the AKP’s accession to power.  

Though Akıllı’s observations are well-said, this transformation needs to be seen in the broader framework of developments that started in the 1980s and that gave rise to the aforementioned “New Turkey” by the end of the first decade of the 21st century. These will be explained in detail in the next chapter; however, for the purposes of understanding the emergence of debates about Turkey’s role as a model in the post-9/11 decade, it is important to know that Turkish foreign policy has changed from being

inward looking to being outward looking. In this period, Turkey’s image was more confident and independent than it ever had been in the past. The most evidential fact in this regard is Turkey’s refusal of the decision on the Iraq Bill of 2003. This bill gave the Turkish government the authority to send Turkish military troops abroad and to allow foreign military troops to remain in Turkish territory. Thus, it would have given America a head start in its war with Iraq. The fact that this bill did not pass, showed that the Turkish alliance with the US was not unconditional.

Some scholars have argued that this change in Turkish foreign policy outlook is also influenced by the power vacuum created in Turkey’s neighbourhood as the US engagement in the Middle East decreased during the post-9/11 era. These arguments may seem to contradict what has been said earlier about an assertive US foreign policy in the immediate aftermath of the attacks. This is not the case. After the collapse of the Soviet Union, international security landscape gradually became more and more heterogeneous but it took the US foreign policy two decades to adjust to this new structure. The assertive and harsh US foreign policy in the immediate aftermath of the 9/11 attacks could be seen as part of the US’s rejection of this multipolar structure where its dominance is doomed to decrease. However, further on in the decade, these assertive policies decreased and the US started scaling down its military presence, eventually withdrawing from Iraq. The argument is that this scaling down – in addition to the decrease of EU’s soft power in Eastern Europe due to ‘enlargement fatigue’ – has opened room for Turkey to pursue a more active foreign policy in its neighbourhood.

Interestingly, the increase in active Turkish foreign policy in its neighbourhood did not seem to bother the West; on the contrary, it could be said that this was promoted by Western powers. More specifically, the US promoted Turkey’s role as a model for its neighbourhood and especially for the Middle East. In a speech he gave in Istanbul following the NATO Summit in 2004, US President of the time George W. Bush, explicitly remarked on this, referring to the 150-year-old Turkish experience with democracy and social reform and declaring Turkey a model for the greater Middle East. The image of Turkey as a moderate Islamic, democratic model for the Middle

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99 Ibid.

East has continued to be of importance in the current US President Barrack Obama’s democracy promotion efforts in the Middle East. Making his first presidential visit to Turkey, Obama has defined US-Turkey relationship as a ‘model partnership’. This could be interpreted as the new administration’s efforts to start a new dialogue with the Muslim world in the hope of repairing damaged relations of the past decade.

CHAPTER III: “THE NEW TURKEY”

As stated in the introduction, one of the objectives of this thesis is to present the transformation of Turkey starting with the beginnings of the modernization process to the emergence of contemporary Turkey and situate the model debates within this transformation narrative. Accordingly, in the first part of the previous chapter, the Turkish journey of modernization has been explained in detail to provide the necessary background for the second part where some historical moments during which the debates that implicitly or explicitly refer to the Turkey’s role as a model, were explained. To a certain extent, these two parts together constitute the general reference point for the contents of this chapter. As part of the above-said objective, this chapter brings the transformation process to its final stage by explaining developments of the recent past that led to the New Turkey. This phrase, that has already been mentioned, is chosen in this thesis to represent the most recent product of this transformation process, which is the reference point of many that refer to a Turkish Model in the context of the Arab Spring.

Before one starts talking about a New Turkey, it is important to known clearly what is meant by the preceding one. The formation and contents of Old Turkey have already been partly mentioned in the previous chapter. The transformation from empire to nation has been a problematical process; though independence was gained, the new regime’s modernization project tended to disregard local social and cultural sensitivities. As a result, many segments of the society have been discriminated. While the structure of the empire had allowed for the coexistence of peoples from different ethnic, linguistic and religious backgrounds, the Kemalist nation-state could not be as


102 Duran and Yılmaz, Whose Model? Which Turkey?.

lenient. As the nation prospered and became stronger, so did the status of the Kemalist elite whose power depended on the extent to which the Kemalist principles were implemented. Thus, for decades there have been constraints on the segments of society whose ethnic, religious or ideological believes diverged from the framework envisaged by this elite. İhsan Dağı describes this Old Turkey as:

The old Turkey was a country where people were suppose to serve and remain loyal to the state and satisfy the demands of the state elite. It was a country that existed for the state and its owners, i.e., the state elite. Citizens were commanded to be stripped of their ethnic, religious and even ideological identities. In the old Turkey, the nation was imagined to be homogenous despite the diversities on the ground. The old Turkey was based on a notion of the superiority of the state over the society – an understanding that gave a privileged status and power to the bureaucracy over the citizens, which is an anomaly by any democratic standard.

In the first decade of the new century, a set of comprehensive political, juridical and economic reforms have taken place. These reforms were the first events signalling a change in this Turkey that Dağı is describing. Of course, they did not happen abruptly and all at once. Each of these was the result of transformation processes, which began at different times in different spheres. These transformation processes are key to understanding the New Turkey. Hence, in this work, these processes – that have been mentioned separately and dispersedly elsewhere – are organized under four main categories outlined in the next four sections.

3.1 The Emergence of “New Islamist Thinking”

The first of these categories is the transformation of Turkish Islamism that found expression in the AKP. Religion came first amongst the local sensitivities that the Kemalist Republic had disregarded; this was mostly evident in the strict measures taken by the regime in the name of the secularist principle. Over the decades since

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104 A good example of this is the Kurdish rebellion in 1925: “The rebellion was inspired by a mixture of Kurdish nationalism and Islamic revivalism, two sentiments that were anathema to Atatürk...When the Kurdish rebellion was crushed in late 1925, the leader and forty-six of his followers were executed by order of one of the tribunals. Neither Atatürk nor his successors were prepared to acknowledge the ethnic and cultural distinctiveness of the Kurdish minority, the government officially referred to them as ‘mountain Turks’.” Cleveland, Modern Middle East, 182.

105 Dağı, Emergence of a ‘New Turkey’.

106 The secularism of Kemalism differed quite a lot from the Anglo-Saxon interpretation. Secularism took the form of the state’s exercise of oppressive power over the Muslim public and their beliefs. As a result of this understanding, pious Muslims were abstracted from society as religion was pushed into the private sphere and the private sphere was constricted. Strict measures were taken against any public demonstration of religiosity; the prohibition of religious garments, often referred to as the “clothing reforms” were a good example of this.
the establishment of the Republic, the segments that were affected by this – by no means a minority – came to a point of potential outburst in the 1940s. Afraid of losing the consent of the masses especially after the transition into a multi-party system, in 1946 the CHP was forced to give way to Islamic elements in their discourses and policies. This was the first in a long time that religion was used for the political interests of the rulers. However, the masses did not find these late-coming gestures sincere and sufficient and elected the DP in 1950. With DP, religion was reinserted into Turkish politics. A decade later, the military in the role of the guardian of the state accused the DP of anti-secular activities and made the 1960 military coup.

By the 1970s, conditions were agreeable once again and the first religiously oriented political party emerged; this was Milli Nizam Partisi (MNP). Soon after, MNP was closed by the military and in 1972 Milli Selamet Partisi (MSP) was established under the leadership of Necmettin Erbakan by the same political Islamist movement, National Outlook Movement (NOM). During the military coup of 1980, the MSP was closed down and many politicians from the right and left wings were arrested. In the aftermath of the coup, the military “[w]ithout changing the state’s promise of secularism” adopted “a notion called ‘Turkish-Islamic-synthesis’” against the threat of communism. Much like the CHP, the Kemalist military was also flexible enough to use religion as an instrument. In this environment, Erbakan was allowed to open another party, Refah Partisi (RP) in 1983 that had electoral successes at the municipal level in the 1990s. In 1995, the RP won the elections and formed a coalition government with the Doğru Yol Partisi (DYP). For a short period, Erbakan served as prime minister until he was forced to resign by the National Security Council (NSC) that accused his government of undermining secular rule.

107 Altunisik, “Turkish Model and Democratization”, 47.
108 Ülgen, From Inspiration to Aspiration, 5.
109 National Order Party (NOP).
110 National Salvation Party (NSP).
111 Millî Görüş in Turkish, this was the major Islamist movement in Turkey from the 1970s until the late 1990s. Ahmet T. Kuru, “Reinterpretation of Secularism in Turkey” in The Emergence of a New Turkey – Democracy and the AK Parti, ed. M. Hakan Yavuz, 136-159. (Salt Lake City: The University of Utah Press, 2006), 140.
113 Welfare Party (WP).
114 True Path Party (TPP).
115 Ülgen, From Inspiration to Aspiration, 6.
This event often referred to as the “February 28 Decisions” is the first of what has been mentioned in this work as the two postmodern coup d’états. The period during and following the February 28 Decisions was characterized by an increase in the oppression towards anything associated with Islam. It also marked a turning point in Turkish political Islam as it set the ground in which the “New Islamist Thinking” embodied in AKP, has emerged. The AKP was born out of the NOM and the heads of the party were mainly politicians from the RP. However, they differed very much from their predecessors. According Gamze Çavdar, the AKP was “the result of a process of political learning, defined as 'a change of beliefs (or the degree of confidence in one’s beliefs) or development of new beliefs, skills, or procedures as a result of observation and interpretation of experience.'”.\(^{116}\) Thus learning from their experiences, the former members of the NOM in the AKP targeted a broad constituency, avoided references to religion and instead emphasized political and economic reform and EU membership.\(^{117}\) As such, the AKP must have appealed to a majority of the public as it won the 2002 elections with 34.29 percent of the votes.\(^{118}\)

A prominent Turkish social scientist, Şerif Mardin has defined this new strength of political Islam under AKP, as the successful result of Kemalist reforms.\(^{119}\) There is truth in this seemingly paradoxical statement; it is the decades-long interaction between secularism and political Islam that has produced what some refer to as a sui generis experience of Turkish Islamism. There is one important aspect distinguishing this experience from its Middle Eastern counterparts: the relative political freedom and democratic elections that allow for the inclusion of Islamist movements in politics. It is argued that this aspect is one of the reasons that explain for the absence of terrorist elements in Turkish Islamism. However, this inclusion was only possible under the constant control of the state and the military.\(^{120}\) In time, these controls, have led to the emergence of a group among the political Islamists in Turkey who have chosen to moderate their discourses at an unprecedented degree: this was the case of AKP.

\(^{116}\) Çavdar quoting Jack S. Levy, Islamist “New Thinking” in Turkey, 480.

\(^{117}\) Ibid., 479.


\(^{120}\) Çavdar, Islamist “New Thinking” in Turkey, 487.
3.2 Towards the ‘Normalization of Civil-Military Relations’ in the 21st Century Turkey

The military has occupied an important place in the lives of the Turks for centuries. It already had a well-respected status before the establishment of the Republic and this continued in the Republican era. The founders of the Republic being of military origin, the new state attributed even more power to the military. From then until the first few years of the new century, the authority of the military has remained high. In fact, until recently, public surveys indicated the military as the most trusted institution in the eyes of the public. It is important to know however, that this trust never implied the public's approval of the political role of the military. Nevertheless, the military – since the establishment of the Republic – has aimed “to influence political developments so as to eradicate all threats to the Turkish Republic, real or perceived.” This is most apparent in the five military interventions that have occurred almost every decade: the direct coups of 1960, 1971 and 1980 and memorandums of 1997 and 2007.

Truly, these interventions have greatly damaged civilian politics and the development of democracy and rule of law in Turkey. This is not an exceptional outcome for military interventions in general. However, quite different from what traditionally follows military interventions, in the case of Turkey, these interventions have not produced an officer who remained in power for decades, in other words, a dictator. Instead, the Turkish military has tried to maintain its influence through institutional channels such as constitutional amendments; hence, the post-military intervention constitutions of 1960 and 1982 in which the NSC was established and increased in authority, respectively. This could be seen as part of the self-appointed role of the military as the provider of the “checks and balances” on Turkish politics against the aforementioned “threats”. Under any circumstances, the military interventions were undemocratic and what is more, they demonstrated an increasing

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121 Ülgen, “From Inspiration to Aspiration”, 7-9.

122 Kuru, “The Rise and Fall of Military Tutelage”, 42.

123 Ülgen, “From Inspiration to Aspiration”, 7.


125 Ülgen, “From Inspiration to Aspiration”, 7.

126 Ülgen, “From Inspiration to Aspiration”, 8.
inconsistency within the Kemalist ideology: This was the fact that though Kemalism had always aspired Turkey to be a part of the West, it simultaneously rejected some of the most fundamental European values. To be more precise, these military interventions – in the name of protecting Kemalist ideals – resulted in human rights violations and damaged the democratic structure of the state.\textsuperscript{127}

One could argue that this inconsistency was lost on the West prior to the fall of the Berlin Wall. To put it in another way, the global political conditions brought forth by the Cold War kept the West silent in the face of the interventionist policies of the Turkish military. The aforementioned inconsistency only started to become evident with “the emergence of deep principles of democratic governance as preconditions for membership in the West”.\textsuperscript{128} Not long after the AKP’s rise to power in 2002, the party started a campaign at the EU Copenhagen Summit of December 2002 that aimed to accelerate the EU accession process. It became clear that “a shallow democracy under military tutelage”\textsuperscript{129} was not compatible with the membership to the EU and reforms were required to meet the Copenhagen Criteria. Accordingly, in the summer of 2003, the government introduced two constitutional amendments otherwise known as the Sixth and the Seventh Reform Packages. The latter of these was significant for the beginning of the transformation in civil-military relations in Turkey because it limited the power of the NSC.\textsuperscript{130} Turning the NSC into a genuinely advisory body could be considered as the first step for the normalization of civil-military relations in Turkey.

Reforms continued in 2004, when the State Security Courts were abolished and the military members of the Council of Higher Education and the Radio and Television High Council were removed.\textsuperscript{131}

With these reforms, the long-lasting and unquestionable authority of the military was challenged; the power structures of the civil and the military began to be transformed. The role that AKP and the EU membership prospects have had on initiating this transformation cannot be underestimated. However, other developments have helped and strengthened this long-awaited change in the civil and military relations towards normalization. According to Ahmet T. Kuru, the political power of the Turkish military was the result of the support of the military’s civilian allies in the judiciary, political parties and the media. Kuru claims that this support gradually

\begin{footnotesize}
\begin{enumerate}
\item Barkey, “Coordinating Responses”, 20-21.
\item Ülgen, “From Inspitation to Aspiration”, 8.
\item Ibid.
\item Ibid.
\item Çavdar, Islamist “New Thinking” in Turkey, 488.
\item Kuru, “The Rise and Fall of Military Tutelage”, 47.
\end{enumerate}
\end{footnotesize}
declined since 2007 when the military e-coup (i.e. the memorandum issued online) failed, the AKP won the elections by a long shot and succeeded in making Abdullah Gül, its second strongest leader, the president and the Ergenekon case was opened against some military officers and their civilian allies. In addition to these events that have weakened the military’s political influence and the power of its civilian allies, Kuru suggests that the rise of a counter-elite that is made up of a combination of pro-Islamic conservatives and liberal intellectuals have further weakened the military’s civilian allies.\(^{132}\)

This normalization in civil-military relations is one of the most distinguishing characteristics between the Old and the New Turkey. However, it must be mentioned that despite the initiation towards change by the AKP’s reforms for full EU membership and the continuation of this change by the decline of the traditional civilian allies of the military, this process is far from complete. As this thesis is being written, the Constitution that the military junta of 1980 imposed is still in effect.

3.3 Economic Transformation and the Emergence of a “New Bourgeoisie”

As mentioned before, economy was not among the initial priorities of the newly established Republic and when it became a priority in the 1930s, it was in the context of a strong nationalistic bureaucratic state that had at its disposal a great deal of political and economic resources to reconstitute the society and economy. This state created a national bourgeoisie, who was dependent on the state to which it owed its existence. This was the reality shaping the state-business interaction for decades in Turkey. The state played an important role in this structure and import-substituting industrialization was adopted as the economic model. Of course, throughout the decades, efforts to liberalize economy existed along with those for politics however; they were not effective enough in breaking through the system.\(^{133}\) For instance, when Menderes came to power in 1950, though he “was committed to the demands of private business, the policy process was still characterized by the rules of rent-seeking and distribution of favors to friendly businessmen”.\(^{134}\)

\(^{132}\) Ibid.


\(^{134}\) Ibid. 12.
The most successful attempts at transforming the economy were made during the rule of the conservative Anavatan Partisi (ANAP), which dominated politics throughout the 1980s under the leadership of Turgut Özal. Indeed, Özal’s vision was to liberalize Turkey’s foreign trade in favour of an export-oriented industrialization model. As soon as he overcame the resistance of the military and the then President Kenan Evren, and receiving 45.2 percent of the votes in the elections, he started to put his plans into action; initiated the capital liberalization program that promoted the privatization of state-owned enterprises, reduced public spending and introduced value-added tax. Knowing that the transition to an export-oriented economy was expensive, the Özal government also tried to make this process as smooth as possible by providing financial incentives to promote export. As a result of these reforms, Turkey managed to increase its exports from $2.9 billion in 1980 to $12.9 billion in 1989 and thus bringing Turkey a step closer to its present level of economic growth. During this time, Turkish entrepreneurs gradually became more and more independent of the state and entered the international markets. In 1995, this liberalization was taken another step forward with the completion of a Customs Union with the EU.

In many respects, the economic policies of the AKP government have been considered as continuations of Özal’s reforms in their neoliberal features. Despite the AKP’s big success in the elections, its political position was extremely delicate; it was being carefully observed by the military, the President Ahmet Necdet Sezer and the traditional economic elite that were made up of powerful family business conglomerates. What is more, the AKP was restricted by the international financial institutions’ economic prescriptions for the post-crisis, damaged Turkish economy. The AKP’s conduct in view of these was to emphasize liberalizing economic and political reforms with the ultimate aim of full EU membership and to strictly follow the IMF program. It avoided – as much as possible – giving any of these groups excuses for displeasure. At the end, it has become the most credited actor for the Turkish economic transformation that has turned Turkey into the world’s 16th largest economy and a member of the G20. On the other hand, it is only fair to say, “the fruits of Özal’s reforms were long in coming and the AKP today is their primary political beneficiary”.

135 Motherland Party (MP)
137 Ülgen, “From Inspitation to Aspiration”, 9.
Without a doubt, the most important result of this economic transformation in Turkey has been the emergence of a new business community, known as the Anatolian Tigers, whose economic fortunes did not depend on their good ties with the government.\textsuperscript{140} The shift from an import oriented to an export oriented economic model must have kindled the inherent economic potential of Anatolia, “[a]s a number of Anatolian trading town centres, ranged along the old silk routes, have undergone an industrial revolution which has turned them into major manufacturing centres and players in the global economy”.\textsuperscript{141} In its report, the European Stability Institute has called this development an economic miracle and referred to this new bourgeoisie as the “Islamic Calvinists”. The reason for this was that this new group, unlike the old Istanbul-centred elitist state-backed business class, was “Anatolian-based, pious, conservative and market-oriented”.\textsuperscript{142} Indeed, this group’s economic success stands out as one of the reasons for arguments about the possibility of Islam and modernity’s coexistence.\textsuperscript{143}

On the one hand, the Anatolian Tigers themselves constitute a fundamental part of the counter-elite that Kuru mentioned earlier and on the other, they are the major financier of this new elite. In fact, the AKP derives much of its electoral and financial strength from this new economic class.\textsuperscript{144} One way or another, the emergence of a new middle class who has become increasingly influential in the economy, political society, the media and the judiciary is a reality that must be appreciated in order to fully understand the New Turkey.

3.4 New Trends in Turkish Foreign Policy

Foreign policy, like many other spheres, has also been affected by the sweeping wave of change in Turkey. Some of the changes in this sphere have been touched upon as part of the post-9/11 model debates (e.g. the increase in Turkey’s relations with the Arab Middle East, parallel to a decrease in US engagement in these countries). Nevertheless, it is necessary to go over the new trends of Turkish foreign policy, this time in the context of the concept of New Turkey. Since most of this period has been

\textsuperscript{140} Ülgen, “From Inspitation to Aspiration”, 9.

\textsuperscript{141} “Islamic Calvinists – Change and Conservatism in Central Anatolia”, \textit{European Stability Initiative}, (Berlin – Istanbul: 19 September, 2005), 6.

\textsuperscript{142} Barkey, “Coordinating Responses”, 21.

\textsuperscript{143} “Islamic Calvinists”, 2.

\textsuperscript{144} Barkey, “Coordinating Responses”, 18.
dominated by the rule of the AKP government, these trends are very much related to AKP’s major foreign policy principles. The ‘zero problems with neighbours’ policy stands out as the most encompassing and popular of these policies. According its originator, Foreign Minister Ahmet Davutoğlu, this policy is based on developing as good relationships as possible with countries in Turkey’s nearby geography within the framework of principles such ‘security for all’, ‘political dialogue’, ‘economic interdependency’, ‘cultural harmony’ and ‘mutual respect’. Davutoğlu adds further that following this policy means focusing on areas of cooperation rather than differences of opinion and thus creating a trustworthy foundation enabling the solution of problems in the long term.  

As a part of this policy, Turkey’s relations with its neighbours in the MENA region experienced unprecedented changes in the last decade. Relations with Syria could be given as an obvious example of this. In stark contrast to the relations that almost came to a point of rupture in the 1990s, the two countries mended fences in the 2000s by opening borders, minesweeping in the borders and starting a process of economic cooperation reflected in the increase of reciprocal trade volume and border trade.  

Similarly, it is possible to talk about a rapprochement with Iran in the last decade. Turkey’s relations with Iran meliorated with Turkey’s purchase of Iranian natural gas and the rise in mutual investments and trade volume. Moreover, the improvement of Turkey’s relations with MENA countries could also be seen from the policy of visa-liberalization with numerous countries in the region. In 2009, Turkey mutually lifted visa requirements with Jordan, Lebanon and Syria. In the same year, visa requirements for Saudi Arabia were also unilaterally lifted. Another principle that marks the New Turkey’s foreign policy is Davutoğlu’s concept of “strategic depth”. In this respect, in addition to the opening to the MENA region, the expansion to the greater African continent plays a significant role. In 2008, the African Union declared


Turkey as the continent’s strategic partner and the same year Turkey-Africa Cooperation Summit took place in Istanbul. Since then, Turk-African foreign relations continued with speed in the framework of what has been called the African initiative.149

Here it is important to emphasize the influence of the economic transformation explained above and the new class that emerged as a result of it, in the shaping of contemporary Turkish foreign policy. According to Yasin Kaya, this new class, which he labels as the Neo-National Bourgeoisie (NNB), exhibits a developing tendency to expand to new markets. This tendency fuels the demands for the Turkish state to improve its diplomatic and institutional ties with the NNB’s desired investment locations (mainly in the MENA region). Kaya further argues that, the NNB’s “ideological-discourse synthesis of Islam, Turkish nationalism and pro-capitalism” help determine these locations. In other words, the NNB’s spatial accumulation is shaped by its ideology. This ideology in turn, appeals to the Muslim-majority countries of the MENA region.150 In view of these, it would not be wrong to assume that the religious and cultural affinities of this new conservative and pious business community have an effect in their business orientations. Though this is certainly not the sole reason, it should not be overlooked in analyzing the contemporary foreign policy trend of developing better economic relations with the MENA region.

This transformation in Turkish foreign policy in the past decade has given way to various arguments having repercussions both at national and global levels. The first of these is the discussions about Turkey’s ‘axis shift’. On the one hand, this is seen as the result of the increase in political and economic relations with the MENA region and on the other, the relative slowing down of the EU membership process in the second half of the decade. In essence, it seems to have more to do with Davutoğlu’s philosophy of foreign policy which lies on the claim that “Turkey is a great power that has neglected its historic ties, diplomatic, economic and political relations with the Middle East, North Africa, the Balkans, and Eurasia, dating back to the Ottoman era.”.151 As could be seen from the trends that have been mentioned above, the AKP has acted upon Davutoğlu’s claim by portraying an active and confident foreign policy in these areas, which are in general the former Ottoman territories. In addition to the


'axis shift' arguments, this has brought about another argument; that of 'neo-Ottomanism'. Ömer Taşpınar explains this as a concept defining both the foreign and domestic policy trends of the New Turkey and provides three factors that demonstrate Turkey’s neo-Ottoman tendencies. These are the willingness to come to terms with its Ottoman and Muslim heritage, a sense of grandeur and self-confidence in its role in the world and its goal of embracing the West as much as the Muslim world.¹⁵²

Although these tendencies have presented themselves in AKP’s foreign policy in the last decade, the AKP’s stance before arguments such as shift of axis and 'neo-Ottomanism' has been rather critical. In a personal interview, Chief Foreign Affairs Advisor of the Prime Minister İbrahim Kalın, has regarded the shift of axis arguments as reminiscent of the “either or” perspective remaining from the Cold War era. Kalın explained that the fact that Turkey has been opening to other world regions and improving its political and economic relations with the Middle East, Africa, Asia and Latin America does not – in today’s global conditions – mean that it should give up on Europe. On the contrary, he added that Turkey’s relations with the EU are continuing at full speed and that more than half of Turkey’s foreign trade is still done with the eurozone.¹⁵³ Similarly, Davutoğlu and other AKP members reject the concept ‘neo-Ottomanism’ and instead prefer less disputed concepts such as ‘zero problems with neighbours’ or ‘unlimited cooperation’.¹⁵⁴

These arguments about ‘axis shift’ and ‘neo-Ottomanism’ may be contested but overall, the new trends explained above show that Turkish foreign policy of the last decade has experienced a dramatic change and is now defined as self-confident, assertive, active and multifaceted.¹⁵⁵


In the previous chapter, the three different historical moments during which debates on Turkey's role as a model emerged, has been explained. In the current chapter, the focus is on the recent re-emergence of debates on the Turkish Model. While there are many references to the characteristics of the Turkish Model and the transformation

¹⁵² Ibid., 9-10.


¹⁵⁵ Kalın, interviewed by the author.
process both of which have been explained, this chapter puts these in the framework of the Arab Spring. Its main aim is to pin point to the most prevalent perceptions and arguments regarding the Turkish Model. Before moving on these, a brief account of the contemporary history of relations between Turkey and the Arab World is given. This is intended to be helpful in explaining the appeal effect of the Turkish Model for the Arab world.

4.1 A Brief History of Turkish-Arab Relations

The Ottoman Empire had governed a great deal of the Arab lands for over 400 years. Most of these lands became Ottoman territory without major wars and some joined the empire voluntarily. Hence, the initial relations were based on amiable foundations. From the early decades of the 19th century when Ottoman withdrawal from Arab lands started, to the establishment of the Turkish Republic, relations between the two parties were mostly characterized by "mutual cooperation against imperialism under the spiritual authority of the Caliph".156 However, during World War I, groups of Arab nationalists cooperated with the imperial powers against the Ottoman Turks, an event that came to be referred to as the “Great Arab Revolt”. The founders of the Turkish Republic used the revolt as a “propaganda tool of the official ideology during the formative period of modern Turkey for constructing negative images of Arabs”.157 The revolt was interpreted as widely-supported and anti-Arab sentiments were generated. These negative images were further reinforced by various instruments of the nation-state; for example, in the textbooks of public schools Arabs were portrayed as traitors for many years.158 This policy of the Turkish Republic should be viewed in relation to both its efforts at nation-building and its desire to strengthen its links to the Western civilizations.159

A series of events during the following decades, such as Turkey’s recognition of the state of Israel, worked to deteriorate the already strained relations. Turkey’s firm membership in the Western block during the Cold War era, moreover, produced negative attitudes towards Turkey among the Arab community. Nevertheless, relations showed small signs of recovery from the second half of the 1960s onwards, as a result


157 Ibid.

158 Ibid., 9.

of Turkey’s reaction to the 1967 Israel-Arab War. The entrance of political Islam in Turkish politics, in the 1970s under the leadership of Erbakan, contributed to the recovery and this trend continued with Turgut Özal who developed good relations with Arab countries in the 1980s and then with AKP from 2002 onwards. In the decade that has passed since then, Turkish-Arab relations have experienced revolutionary changes as mentioned above in the context of the broader transformation process.

Three events during this decade require special mention due to their significance in shaping contemporary Turkish-Arab relations and the recent model debates. The first of these is the refusal of the decision on the Iraq Bill of 2003 that has been explained in the last section of chapter two. The passing of such a bill would have meant war with a Muslim and Arab nation. Though this might not have caused conflict with some Arab regimes of the time, it would have definitely damaged the Turkish image in the eyes of the Arab peoples, who later on in the decade, constituted a large portion of the actors of the Arab Spring. The refusal of the bill on the other hand, symbolized the independence of Turkish decision-making in spite of Western interests. This added more prestige to the Turkish image. The second of these events is the heated discussion and the walkout of the Prime Minister Tayyip Erdoğan following his request for ‘one minute’ to finish his speech at the Davos Economic Forum in 2009. Here, Erdoğan’s assertive opposition to the Israeli President Simon Peres gained great admiration from the Arab peoples. The final event is the Israeli raid of the Flotilla Mavi Marmara which was carrying humanitarian aid to the besieged Gaza Strip on 31st May 2010. This event where nine Turkish citizens lost their lives severely damaged Turkish-Israeli relations. Moreover, this event had implications for the Turkish image in the eyes of the Arab peoples.

In general, these three events indicated to the Arab people, the emergence of a New Turkey that was able to make its own decisions and hence, was more independent. This independence implied a kind of dignity, which the Arab people who have spent decades as mandates and colonies, have been yearning for. This desire for dignity is stated in one of the famous slogans of the Arab Spring – “bread, freedom and dignity”.

the Arab nationalists. In addition, Turkey’s support of the Palestinian cause has worked in the same direction.

4.2 The Arab Spring and the Turkish Model

As the Arab people’s movements spread throughout the MENA region at varying levels and speeds, the protestors’ basic demands seemed to remain unchanged; these all revolved around the long overdue desire to restore the will of the people over that of the states, which functioned for decades according to the interests of a certain estranged elite. Indeed, this was not the first time that the Arab peoples rebelled in the face of such injustice; these people’s movements of 2010 were similar, in some ways, to the Arab Revolutions in the 1950s and 1960s. In fact, the Arab Spring could be interpreted as a continuation of the process – though interrupted by several decades – where the Arab peoples demand their natural rights to a free, equal and humane life; a process which gradually came to be associated with democracy. This was partly what most of the revolutionary leaders had initially promised in the 1950s and 1960s but failed to carry out once they seized power. Instead, these leaders became dictators and the masses whose political and economic demands were ignored, were excluded from the system all together.  

If one is to look at the contemporary Turkish history, similar demands for freedom and equality could be detected in the early decades of the Republic. At that time, the Turkish state had found itself forced to respond to these; hence, the shift to a multi-party system. This opened up the way for the representation of various, otherwise marginalized groups, in the political system. As demonstrated in the previous chapter, this process continued with economic transformation in the 1980s, which made it possible for these groups to be integrated into the economic system as well. Throughout, the Turkish army and the bureaucratic elite constantly intervened in these transformations; however, the power of these traditionally dominant classes was shaken more than ever before, with the recent developments that altered the balances of power in Turkish society. Admittedly, despite these changes, even today, many flaws could be pointed out regarding Turkish democracy. However, relatively speaking, Turkey stands out as the least corrupt and most democratic state in the MENA region.


According to Mehmet Şahin, in essence, what distinguished the Arab experience from that of the Turkish, is the inability of the Arab regimes to integrate the masses into the country’s political and economic systems. Şahin draws attention to the fact that all the uprisings of the Arab Spring that led to regime-change, has taken place in republics rather than monarchies and explains this as the result of the fact that these were “republics without publics”; in other words, he claims that these republics were not true republics that prioritized the public.\textsuperscript{163} On the other hand, as explained in the previous paragraph, in Turkey, these masses have gradually been incorporated into the system; “the peripheries were brought to the centre”.\textsuperscript{164} Thus, despite its shortcomings, the Turkish democratization process, along with recent transformations, distinguishes Turkey from other states in the region. It also is one of the most significant aspects with regards to Turkey’s identification as a model for the MENA region.

Knowing this, it becomes clearer to see why debates on the Turkish Model have re-emerged at the outset of the Arab Spring. In the introduction, it was stated that there is no single and definitive Turkish Model, rather the phrase is used by various actors, to conceptualize the present (and future) of the MENA region. In other words, rather than a definition, there are perceptions of what the model is or should be. At the beginning of this thesis, two aspects by which these perceptions are determined were proposed. First of these was the context in which the model is brought up; that is, the time and place in which it emerges and the event(s) it is associated with. This aspect has more to do with the diachronic dimension of model perceptions; that is to say, the different times in its history when Turkey was proposed as a model. In chapters two and three, the events that have led to the formation of such perceptions, have been explained as part of the modernization and democratization processes of Turkey. The second of these determining aspects was the “subject of perception”, the individual or group that perform the act of perceiving. To put it differently, the contents, functions and potentials of the Turkish Model change, depending on the interests, ideology or simply, the personal experiences of the perceiver. This aspect has been slightly treated in previous sections, but it is the main topic of this chapter. In what follows, based on sources from various think tanks in the field, academics, journalists and policy makers, various perceptions and arguments on the latest version of the Turkish Model are given.

\textsuperscript{163} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{164} Ibid.
4.3 On the Perceptions of the Actors in the Arab World

Often in talking about the Arab world, one tends to fall into the error of assuming that this world and the peoples inhabiting it are homogenous entities, when in fact, the word “Arab” is an overgeneralization considering the variety of dialects, cultures and histories that these peoples have. The current work is written with awareness regarding the multiplicities that constitute these peoples. However, an attempt to reflect each and every difference in the numerous states in the MENA region, while at the same time, trying to provide the reader with a general idea of the perceptions about Turkey’s role as a model, is an extremely difficult task. For this reason, the author advises the reader to keep in mind this heterogeneity and the limitations of the categorization that is presented below.

Scholars have provided different categories to organize the diversity of Turkish Model perceptions. For this section, the categorization of Burhannettin Duran and Nuh Yılmaz is considered very helpful and therefore, has been chosen to explain the perceptions of the actors in the Arab World. This narrative is particularly significant as it shows how the Turkish model appeals to seemingly contrasting groups. Here, Duran and Yılmaz, have divided the Arab perceptions under three categories.

The first of these categories is mainly made up of the ruling classes of the Arab Spring countries. According to them, their people are not mature enough to adopt democracy on their own and so the transition to a democratic regime requires state control. Thus, for this group – as for as the previous generation during the early Republican era – the Turkish Model is significant as an example of “controlled modernization under military tutelage”\(^\text{165}\). However, in the 21\(^\text{st}\) century it has become more difficult to oppress segments of the society, which is another reason the Turkish Model is appealing to this group; Turkey’s successful “integration of Islamist actors in the political system”\(^\text{166}\) may be just what these groups need, in order to continue their rule without having to surrender too much of their power.

As their second category, Duran and Yılmaz present the Islamist movements in the MENA region. The Ennahda Movement of Tunisia and the Muslim Brotherhood of Egypt are included in this group. The group mainly views the Turkish Model as “a successful reconciliation of Islam with democracy, rule of law and economic development”\(^\text{167}\). For them, the last 10 years of Turkey seem to define most of what they understand as the Turkish Model. Clearly, they equate this model with the AKP

\(^{165}\) Duran and Yılmaz, Whose Model? Which Turkey?.

\(^{166}\) Ibid.

\(^{167}\) Ibid.
and the recent transformation in political, economic, judiciary fields. This is evident in Ennahda leader Rashid al-Ghannushi's remark, "[t]he best model I can think of is the one adopted by the AKP...in Turkey".\textsuperscript{168} Shortly before the Arab Spring, another reason that increased the appeal effect of the Turkish Model for this group, presented itself in the form of tension between Turkey and Israel. The Davos incident and the Flotilla raid showed that Turkey had become a prominent and independent regional actor that could criticize Israel. This new trend in Turkish foreign policy won more admiration from the Islamist movements in the Arab world.\textsuperscript{169} In addition, it must be mentioned that the shared Ottoman past is a crucial aspect in shaping the group's perceptions. In fact, the new Foreign Minister of Tunisia, Rafik Abdessalem, stressed this during his first official visit for which he chose Turkey.\textsuperscript{170}

The final category that Duran and Yılmaz give is the people in the streets of the MENA. This group aspires to liberal aspects of Turkey, like its liberal political life and democratic transition. Moreover, economy is especially important for this group, as the key to improving their standards of living. Seeing Turkey's economic boom in the last decade gives them hope in this regard.\textsuperscript{171} Here, it is worth mentioning the role of Turkish cultural exportation, in influencing these people's perceptions regarding Turkey and its capacity to be a model for the MENA. As one result of the transformation that Turkish economy has experienced in the last decade, Turkish TV sector has branched out, reaching audiences ranging from East Europe and the Balkans to Central Asia and the Middle East. For the Arab peoples, what makes Turkey important in this regard, is its ability to incorporate Islamic and cultural values into their, otherwise Western and modern scripts.\textsuperscript{172}

Verily, for each category above the Turkish Model connotes different sets of meanings. However, it must be stated that the perceptions of these categories are not devoid of concern regarding a Turkish Model. Scholar Emad Y. Kaddorah, argues that the admiration that the Turkish Model inspires is limited, depending on the interests

\textsuperscript{168} Nuh Yılmaz, Change in Turkey has shown another way for Middle East, 8 February 2011, http://www.setav.org/public/HaberDetay.aspx?Dil=tr&hid=63716&q=change-in-turkey-has-shown-another-way-for-middle-east# (accessed 15 March 2012).

\textsuperscript{169} Duran and Yılmaz, Whose Model? Which Turkey?.


\textsuperscript{171} Duran and Yılmaz, Whose Model? Which Turkey?.

and concerns of each actor. For the first group, the integration of Islamist segments into the system may bring about risks that they do not want to take, such as the political victory of these groups at the expense of their political dominance. The second groups of actors, is particularly concerned about two aspects of the Turkish Model; the secular state structure and close relations with the Western powers. They believe that these characteristics do not conform to their Muslim-Arab identity. The final group is hesitant about the Turkish Model due to the still relatively prevalent role of the military in the system. Taking these into consideration, Kaddorah’s claim that the Turkish Model is both a source of inspiration and apprehension, seems plausible.

4.4 On the Western Perceptions

It is argued that the discussions about Turkey’s role as a model originated not in Turkey but in the West and particularly, the United States. For this reason, it is even more significant that Western perceptions are analyzed here. As it was with the previous classification, “the West” is also an overly general term of reference and naturally, within this large category, there are diversifying perceptions about the model debates. Here, these are narrowed down to the most dominant ones – those that best reflect the ‘official discourses’.

Ever since the collapse of the Soviet Union, the US remains as an unchanged actor in the making and re-making of all the theses about the Turkish Model. This could be seen from the section on post-Soviet and post-9/11 model debates in chapter two. Throughout the first decade of the 21st century, high-level US officials have frequently pointed at the role of Turkey as a model for the countries in its neighbouring regions. Indeed, sometimes, they have gone so far as to claim that Turkey presented a model beyond its immediate reach; former President of US, George W. Bush had claimed that Turkey “provided Muslims around the world with a hopeful model of a modern and secular democracy”. Following the 9/11 attacks, the Middle East has made it into the

174 Kaddorah, “Turkish Model”, 119-123.
175 Duran and Yılmaz, Whose Model? Which Turkey?.
176 Talip Küçükcana and Müge Küçükkeleş, SETA Policy Report – European Perceptions of Turkish Foreign Policy, no. 10, April 2012, 4-45 (SETA) 38.
177 Ömer Taşpınar, “An Uneven Fit? ‘The Turkish Model’ and the Arab World” The Brooking’s Project on US Policy Towards the Islamic World, Analysis Paper, no. 5, August 2003, i-47 (The Saban Center for Middle East Policy at the Brookings Institution) [online version]; available from
list of regions that could ‘benefit’ from the Turkish Model and with the occurrence of the Arab Spring, North Africa has also been added.

Up to now, a lot about how the West perceives the contemporary Turkish Model have already been indirectly stated in previous chapters. The following quotation by President Gül could be treated as good summary of these: “Turkey’s role in a changing Middle East environment is a function of what it represents in this volatile geography as a European, democratic, and secular country that is attached firmly to the principles of a free-market economy and has valuable and unique experience in implementing reforms, modernity, and regional cooperation.”¹⁷⁸ Most of the characteristics that Gül lists, refer to Turkey’s Western identity and its connection with the West. However, these only reflect one side of the Turkish Model that the West promotes. In addition to these, what the Western powers perceive as the Turkish Model, is a Muslim-majority country with strong cultural and historical roots in the East; the heiress of the Ottoman Empire. This quality bestows upon Turkey a kind of soft power that the West cannot even hope to achieve.¹⁷⁹ This indeed, is the first reason for the Western promotion of a Turkish Model.

The second reason that shapes Western perceptions about the significance of a Turkish Model is Turkey’s record of relations with a variety of actors in the MENA. At the outbreak of the Arab Spring, the West found itself in a situation where its addressees in these post-Revolution countries were groups it had formerly dubbed as “terrorists” at worst, and “fundamentalists”, at best. Neither the US nor the EU had established any diplomatic or other formal relations with these groups priorly. In this respect, Turkey stands out as an important actor as Ibrahim Kalın explains: “...Turkey’s policy of engaging various actors in the Middle East – repudiated by some as controversial, extreme and even terrorist – has played a significant role in bringing at least some of these forces into mainstream politics. Given the new political realities in Egypt, Tunisia and the Palestinian territories, as well as in Lebanon, Libya and elsewhere, the more important of these actors are no longer secret or illegal organizations.”¹⁸⁰ As Ennahda and Muslim Brotherhood now play an important role in shaping Arab politics, Turkey may act as a mediator, as an ally of both the West and


the Islamist movements in the MENA.\textsuperscript{181} So, the West perceives the Turkish Model in light of these.

In fact, Turkey’s role of a mediator between the West and the MENA has also triggered various arguments about Turkey-EU relations in the aftermath of the Arab Spring. Most of these arguments revolve around Turkey’s good relations with the countries in the MENA and the significance of this for the EU, whose relations with the region have been rather poor. According to Arthur Adamczy, the EU has not at all been interested in introducing democratic change in the MENA; on the contrary, EU politicians “turned a blind eye to the dictators” in the region.\textsuperscript{182} With the Arab Spring, most of these dictators have been overthrown and the EU has been left to interact with the Arab publics. Some scholars and policymakers, who have evaluated this interaction, found EU’s reaction to the Arab Spring unsuccessful and drew attention to the necessity of better cooperation with Turkey. While a considerable number of Turkish scholars have argued for the re-vitalization of EU-Turkey relations.\textsuperscript{183} Of course, the stance that scholars and policymakers take concerning this last point is very much dependent upon their position on Turkey’s EU membership.

Another set of arguments regarding Western perceptions of the Turkish Model has to do more with the US’s strategic partnership with Turkey. The argument goes that, Turkey’s close links with the West sends the message that the West can also be a friend to the Muslims. Thus, the adaption of Turkey as a model by the countries in the MENA is promoted on the grounds that, it would eventually improve US’s relations with these countries. Former US Defence Secretary William Cohen refers to this point when saying Turkey could send “a very important signal to the rest of the Muslim world that the United States is not-anti Muslim as so many have thought we have been, but rather here is a very strong Muslim nation that is working hand in hand with the United States”.\textsuperscript{184}

Up to now, the arguments presented above, are those implying that the Turkish Model has positive connotations for the West. However, similar to the apprehensions of the Arabs explained in the previous section, the West also has concerns regarding Turkey’s role as a model for the Middle East. According to Kaddorah, one such

\textsuperscript{181} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{182} Arthur Adamczy, “The Mediterranean Policy of the European Union and the Arab Spring”, (paper presented at the conference, Arab Spring and EU Foreign Policy: Turkish Perspective as a Candidate Country and Polish Perspective as a Member Country, On the Occasion of the 25\textsuperscript{th} Anniversary of the Foundation ATAUM), 12 April 2012, Ankara, Turkey.
\textsuperscript{184} Kaddorah, “Turkish Model”, 123.
concern is to do with AKP’s sincerity about its moderate Islamic, secular and democratic appearance. He further explains that some segments of the Western, and especially American, society fear that AKP is waiting for the right opportunity, after having gained enough power, to implement its real agenda: increasing Islamic orientation. A similar concern like exhibited among the traditional secular elite of Turkey, who go a step further and claim that the AKP would bring shari‘ah. Ironically, Turkey’s soft power in the MENA region – mentioned above as a point that makes the Turkish Model more advantages in the eyes of the West – also has the potential to put the West in an uneasy spot. However, this does not pose a threat so long as Turkey remains an ally of the West. According to Kaddorah, this is why the West is wisely managing its relations with Turkey and supporting the Turkish Model, which may be its best option for the time being.

4.5 The “Demonstrative Effect” Argument

One argument that stands out, among attempts to explain the interest of Arab and non-Arab actors in a Turkish Model, is the “demonstrative effect” thesis. Samuel P. Huntington referred to the concept this for the first time, in his work on the third wave of democratization. The term was used to explain the process by which democratic transition could occur. Huntington’s main argument was that “the example of earlier transitions provided models for subsequent efforts at democratization that in turn provided models for other efforts, and so forth.” In his article titled “Turkey’s ‘Demonstrative Effect’ and the Transformation of the Middle East”, Kemal Kirişçi applies this concept to explain the ‘demand’ (coming from both Arabs and Westerners) for the Turkish Model for the Arab world. Simply put, Kirişçi argues that what makes the Turkish Model meaningful for the peoples in the MENA is its quality as an example of democratic transition, which provides a model for the democratic transitions in their countries.

According to Huntington, the most powerful form of demonstrative effect is that of a regional actor. So, the Turkish experience with democratization is especially important for the transitions in its region. However, though its geographical proximity

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185 Ibid., 125.
186 Ibid., 125-126.
187 Ülgen, From Inspiration to Aspiration, 1.
gives it a comparative advantage, this alone, is not sufficient in explaining why Turkey's demonstrative effect is more significant than other transitions. In this regard, Kirişçi proposes that Turkey's demonstrative effect is a function of three developments: Turkey's rise as a "trading state", the emergence of Turkish democracy as a "work in progress" and the transformation of Turkish foreign policy. The first and the third of these developments are significant because they increase Turkey's visibility and significance in the region. They have already been explained in other parts of the thesis but the second development deserves more explanation. Referring to the Turkish democracy as a work in progress, means that Turkey's democratic transition is incomplete. At first sight, this may present itself as a disadvantage, a flaw in the model. However, what Kirişçi argues is that this 'deficiency' of the model is exactly what makes it attractive for the countries in the region, simply because they can relate to this model more than other Western examples, that may appear too idealistic and far-fetched.

Another reason that explains the relative advantage of the Turkish Model and its demonstrative effect is the "cultural affinity" argument. Apparently, the shared cultural elements make Turkey a more attractive model and its democratization process more relevant, for the peoples of the MENA region. The role of a shared religion needs special emphasis here; the Turkish Model is inevitably more relevant than models of non-Muslim countries. Additionally, the fact that a party with roots in political Islam is in power in Turkey, reinforces the role that cultural affinities may play in shaping the Arab people's perceptions about the Turkish Model.

4.6 The "Arab Spring as a Hegemonic Project" Thesis

With the aim to enrich the perspectives on the various perceptions of the Turkish Model, another set of arguments – from among the large crowd of debates that emerged at the outset of the Arab Spring – is presented in this section. This argumentation, which reflects a more critical line of thinking towards the uprisings, could be referred to as the "Arab Spring as a hegemonic project" thesis. In fact,

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189 Ülgen, From Inspiration to Aspiration, 14.
190 Kirişçi, “Turkey’s ‘Demonstrative Effect’”.
191 Ülgen, From Inspiration to Aspiration, 14.
several prominent journalists, regional experts and policy makers have adopted this argumentation in their explanations regarding the Arab Spring and the Turkish Model. In a nutshell, the rationale behind this line of thinking is that the US is the hegemonic power who plans – as part of its “Greater Middle East” initiative – and manages the events that have come to be labelled as the Arab Spring. The debates about a Turkish Model for the Arab Spring, are viewed in this framework and all the recent events are regarded primarily as results of external forces, rather than internal dynamics.

Mustafa Kutlay and Osman Bahadır Dinçer, have co-authored an article analyzing these arguments in detail. Here, they first present the two main assumptions that such arguments are based on, and then, deconstruct them. The first of these assumptions is ‘the sole hegemonic power in the world and the only mastermind that could control all that happens is the US’. For Kutlay and Dinçer, this assumption is actually based upon a more popular and controversial assumption about whether the US is a hegemonic power or not. Accordingly, they first go about defining what a hegemonic power is, based on the theories of Antonio Gramsci and Susan Strange. Pointing at the increasing debates about the decline of American hegemonic power in the last decade, the two conclude that it must first be answered whether or not the US possesses the qualities of a hegemonic power in the Middle East.

The second assumption that Kutlay and Dinçer claim these arguments are based on, is that ‘the masses in the region are not subjects who can exhibit any will of their own, but objects who are directed within the process’. According to the authors, this assumption resembles an Orientalist and elitist perspective, which devalues the capability and capacity of the peoples of the MENA to be the master of their own destiny. It implies that young Bouazizi who burnt himself in Tunisia, the hundreds of thousands that protested against the regimes in various Middle Eastern countries, and the thousands of Syrians who continue their struggle at the expense of their lives, are all passive individuals who merely play the role the US has chosen for them. In the opinion of the authors, this is a serious and degrading accusation.

The conclusion that Kutlay and Dinçer arrive at, is that both of these assumptions prove to be methodologically and normatively problematic. There is no doubt that the US is a global power who is greatly influenced by the events in the Middle East and who aspires to manage these events. However, arguments, that

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193 Some examples of these individuals are Sinan Oğan, Hüsnü Mahalli and Mahir Kaynak. Their relevant statements can be found in, Kutlay and Osman Bahadır Dinçer, “Arap Baharı” [‘Arab Spring’], 102-104.
194 Kutlay and Osman Bahadır Dinçer, “Arap Baharı” [‘Arab Spring’].
195 Ibid., 104-107.
196 Ibid., 107.
position the US as the sole and all-powerful architect behind the events that mobilized thousands of people in the Middle East, seem to lack thorough analyses. In fact, according to Kutlay and Dinçer, such argumentation may work to ‘re-produce the hegemony of the centre, in the periphery’ and objectify the individual who makes the analysis.\textsuperscript{197}

4.7 The ‘Turkish Official Discourse’

As debates about Turkey’s role as a model for the MENA emerged, Turkey’s reactions to the events in the Arab World gained more significance. However, Turkey had been as unprepared for the new developments in the region, as any other world power. Its first reactions, such as its silence at the start of the revolts in Tunisia and Egypt or its initial objection to a ‘no fly zone’ and any form of military intervention in Libya, were viewed quite critically by observers. Indeed, Turkey’s reactions were a result of the form that Turkish foreign policy of the last decade had taken, and these revealed two important aspects about this policy. First, the ‘zero problems with neighbours’ policy seemed, in fact, to be more like ‘zero problems with regimes’. In other words, there has certainly been a change in Turkish foreign policy towards better relations with the neighbouring countries, but this change was rather based on maintaining the status quo. Thus, the recent developments in the Arab world deeply influenced Turkish foreign policy. Secondly, it became evident that this policy was extremely dependent on the economy. Turkey’s relatively recent economic success largely depended on exportation. As a result, Turkish commercial interests and investments had considerable effect on the formation of Turkish foreign policy. This also explained Turkey’s ‘turn to the East’; increase in trade and bilateral agreements with the MENA countries as well as its liberal visa policies. However, with the Arab Spring, the instability in the region put short-term Turkish economic interests at stake.\textsuperscript{198}

In later stages of the uprisings, the reluctant stance of Turkish policy makers was replaced by one of appropriation; the discourses of the officials focused more on commonalities and expressed outright support and commiseration. During this time, the responses of the Turkish policy makers towards the newest debates on Turkish Model took a more distinct shape. The following paragraphs aim to provide an account of these responses and by doing so, present, what the author refers to – from this point

\textsuperscript{197} Ibid., 107-109.

\textsuperscript{198} Barkey, Q&A.
onwards – as, the “Turkish Official Discourse” on the Turkish Model that emerged in relation to the Arab Spring. It is considered that the formal statements of high-level government officials reflect the official policies of the state, hence, the usage of the word ‘official’. In the following narration, such statements are provided for purposes of exemplification but the main arguments are mostly based what has been deduced from the interviews conducted.

The most distinct characteristic about the Turkish Official Discourse is its reluctance to use the phrase ‘Turkish Model’. This has to do with the connotations of the word ‘model’. In an interview with the author, Talip Küçükcan, has pointed at some of the implications of the usage of this word. Firstly, Küçükcan sees a model as a “fixed” and “essentialist” term that may not be helpful in analyzing Turkey’s exemplary role, which exhibits a constant state of change since the establishment of the Republic. He stresses the significance that certain experiences of Turkey may have for the Arab countries, however, suggests that the word ‘model’ must be given a more flexible character. Secondly, Küçükcan claims that talking about a model to be adopted from one country to another, would be to “force sociology and politics”. He explains his point by referring to the difference between the socio-political conditions of the Arab world and those of Turkey. The Turkish policy makers are aware of the implications that Küçükcan mentions, and they try to avoid the use of the word ‘model’. Instead, they define Turkey’s quality of being a model using various other words. One prominent example is Prime Minister Erdoğan’s preference of the phrase ‘source of inspiration’. In fact, Erdoğan started to refer to Turkey in this way earlier in the decade: “It [Turkey] is a democratic, secular Republic, with a market economy and where the majority of the people are Muslims. In that sense, it is a source of inspiration for the peoples of the region that wish to see modernization, pluralism, democracy, the rule of law, fundamental rights and freedoms in their own countries.” In the aftermath of the Arab Spring, Erdoğan continued to define Turkey’s role as that of a source of inspiration and an example. Foreign Minister Davutoğlu has also indicated his acceptance of these phrases during an interview. Upon a question on the basic philosophy behind Turkey’s approach to the Arab Spring, Davutoğlu expressed the Turkish state’s acknowledgement that, ‘a certain model’ could not form a template for any other


200 Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, Statement by H.E. Mr. Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, Prime Minister of the Republic of Turkey, Informal Meeting of the UN General Assembly on the report of the High Level Group for the Alliance of Civilizations, 18 January 2006. http://turfuno.dt.mfa.gov.tr/ShowSpeech.aspx?ID=1310.
country since each country in the region had their unique conditions.\textsuperscript{201} In fact, this acknowledgement is another prevalent characteristic of the Turkish Official Discourse.

At a later section in the interview, Küçükcan adds one other implication that renders the usage of the word model, dangerous: this is its patronizing connotations.\textsuperscript{202} This point is also mentioned by another interviewee, Mehmet Şahin. Küçükcan and Şahin both refer to the colonial pasts of the Arab countries in the MENA and explain that other actors must be extra cautious in their approaches and that the word ‘model’ is not sensitive in this regard.\textsuperscript{203} The architects of the Turkish Official Discourse seem to understand this fact very well and formulate their discourses accordingly. Erdoğan’s insistence on the fact that Turkey “...never interfered in the internal affairs of any country, nor would it do so in the future.”\textsuperscript{204} Such statements of Turkish officials can be interpreted as part of an aim to reassure the Arab world of their good intentions. Moreover, President Gül and Erdogan, as well as officials from AKP have even stated that Turkey did not intend to be a model for any country.\textsuperscript{205} An interesting point of relevance is that, could be the argument that ‘model debates are Western in origin’ – an argument that all five interviewees have made. Indeed, the Turkish officials’ avoidance of the use of the phrase ‘Turkish Model’ clearly reinforces this argument.\textsuperscript{206}

Despite these statements however, Turkish officials still argue that Turkey may have a lot to present to the countries in the MENA. An important argument in this regard is that Turkey’s experience with modernization and democracy could be helpful in these countries’ transitions to democracy. Mehmet Şahin refers to this as the “Turkey Experience”, which he argues, deserves to be taken into consideration by the Arab world.\textsuperscript{207} Many other academics and policy makers also refer to the lessons that could be derived from Turkey’s experiences as well as mistakes. In the “25\textsuperscript{th} Annual Abant Meeting: The Future of the Middle East after the Arab Spring”, intellectuals, including

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{201} Davutoğlu, “Davutoğlu ile Mülakat” [“Interview with Davutoğlu”], 9.
\item \textsuperscript{202} Küçükcan, interviewed by the author.
\item \textsuperscript{203} Ibid.; Şahin interviewed by author.
\item \textsuperscript{205} Altunisik, “Turkish Model and Democratization”, 56; Arap Baharı, Abant Platformu’nun Gündeminde, 5 January 2011. http://www.abantplatform.org/Haberler/Detay/1949/Arap%20Bahar%C4%B1%20Abant%20Platformunun%20g%C3%BCndeminde.
\item \textsuperscript{206} See also Küçükcan and Küçükkeleş, European Perceptions, 38.
\item \textsuperscript{207} Şahin, “Tunisian Events”, 13-14.
\end{itemize}
President Gül’s Middle East Adviser Erşat Hür müzlü, stated that Arabs are welcome to learn from Turkey’s experience.\textsuperscript{208}

In short, neither Turkish officials nor intellectuals have completely disregarded Turkey’s role as a model for the region; however, they are particularly careful when it comes to vocabulary. Although Turkey had been criticized for its initial reluctance for change in the region, the caution with which it proceeded may not necessarily be disadvantageous. Turkey’s prudent attitude towards the Turkish Model may have avoided offending the Arab countries and even increased the appeal effect of a Turkish model.

CHAPTER V: CONCLUSION

This thesis emerged from the general assumption that a new set of debates regarding the Turkish Model emerged at the start of the uprisings that began in 2010, in Tunisia and spread throughout the MENA region – developments that are otherwise known as the Arab Spring. These debates were considered to be a continuation of a larger and older accumulation of model debates that extended back to the initial decades of the Turkish Republic. In other words, the discourses revolving around a Turkish Model have been present since the establishment of the Republic, but only gained momentum at certain historical moments. Interestingly enough, despite the ever-growing literature on the Turkish Model, especially following the Arab Spring, there is yet to be an extensive academic historical survey of the model debates. This thesis is a modest attempt to fill this gap by providing an analysis of the conceptual debate on Turkey’s role as a model.

As demonstrated throughout the text, each time model debates were bought up in the course of history, they were situated within a specific socio-political conjuncture, which determined their substance as well as their dominance. During the initial decades of the Republican era, Turkey’s journey to independence and the Turkish modernization process have been looked upon as a model by the Arab nationalists that aimed to decolonise and modernize their countries. However, there was no direct reference to a Turkish Model at that time. Besides, the Western world did not regard the Turkish experience as repeatable and thus any debates regarding Turkey’s quality of being a model, were found unrealistic. This view changed following the collapse of the Soviet Union, when the Western powers systematically supported a Turkish Model for the newly independent Turkic republics. This time, there was direct reference to a Turkish Model and thus, the model debates were more dominant. However, as the West’s support for the model declined, these debates lost their dominance.

In 2001, another significant moment in the history of Turkish Model debates occurred with the September 11 terrorist attacks. At various occasions throughout the period following the attacks, the Western world presented Turkey as an ideal model to be followed by other Muslim countries. This, along with transformations in Turkey’s domestic and foreign policy, had increased the dominance of debates about Turkey’s role as a model, in the academic and media circles. It was in this environment that the Arab Spring occurred and triggered the re-emergence of debates on the Turkish Model, with greater dominance than ever before.

As part of the aim of this thesis, these historical moments when debates on the Turkish Model has emerged, have been narrated chapters two and three. More
importantly, in doing this, first a historical account of the Turkish Modernization starting from the Late Ottoman Period have been given. This narrative that took the reader several decades into the Republican era, was continued in chapter three with the narration of the unprecedented rate of transformation Turkey went through in the 2000s. These transformation processes that have resulted in the formation of a New Turkey, which is mainly the Turkey that has been the point of reference in the most recent debates about a Turkish Model. In other words, just as the narrative of Turkey's modernization process had set the background for the three historical moments of model debates; the description of the transformation processes leading to the New Turkey, provided the conditional setting in which the model debates in relation to the Arab Spring emerged.

In the fourth chapter, the main aim was to demonstrate various perceptions about the Turkish Model. The main characteristics of the Turkish Model had already been given in the introduction and explained throughout the other chapters. Thus, this chapter only referred to these and exemplified what has been referred to as ‘perceptions’ up until that point. Here, the reader was presented with, what is understood by the Turkish Model by varying actors and what sorts of arguments and theses were raised in this process. In other words, in this chapter the reader was shown the perceptions about the Turkish Model that existed simultaneously and consequentially.

Overall, in accordance with its aim, the thesis both presented a diachronically organized set of perceptions that changed throughout the history of the model debates, depending on the specific context that each debate emerged in; as well as, a synchronically organized set of perceptions, that showed differing perceptions on the Turkish Model, within the same timeframe. By doing so, the initial assumption that there is no fixed Turkish Model, has been demonstrated and proven to be correct. In other words, it has become clear that though the “Turkish Model” exists as a discursive reality, it becomes problematic to define concretely, as various actors use and abuse the model in accordance with their individual interests, aims and ideologies. In a sense, this makes the Turkish Model more like an instrument than a model to be adopted for its own sake. But again, considering the novelty of the events in the MENA and the model debates that emerged in this context, this is an argument that ought to be put to the test of time and further academic research.

In fact, the research conducted for this thesis has revealed a considerable capacity for potential research topics, which, due to this thesis' limitations of time and space, could not be explored within this work. As a result, restrictions concerning perspective had to be made; as part of these restrictions, there has not been sufficient
focus on the Arab perspectives on the model debates. Even though some Arab perceptions concerning a Turkish Model were provided in chapter four, these were not sufficiently detailed and in-depth. Moreover, because of linguistic barriers, texts in Arabic could not be used and a very limited number of primary sources from the MENA region were made use of. This inevitably leaves out a great deal of potentially useful information. As Ülgen has rightly point out “the utility of the Turkish Model depends in large part to whether the recipient nations themselves find it relevant”. Although this work has aspired to determine neither the utility nor the applicability of a Turkish Model for the MENA, views on the relevancy of the model could be significant in broader analyses of model debates and these views cannot be completely comprehended without the inclusion of Arab perceptions. This is a point that ought to be taken into consideration in further research.

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209 Ülgen, “From Inspiration to Aspiration”, 15.
APPENDIX 1: Map of showing the various results and the state of the Arab Spring in the region\textsuperscript{210}

\begin{figure}[h]
\centering
\includegraphics[width=\textwidth]{Arab_Spring_map_reframed.png}
\caption{Map of Arab Spring countries that has been updated and reframed by the author named, kudzu1. \url{http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/File:Arab_Spring_map_reframed.png} (accessed 13 August 2012).}
\end{figure}

\textsuperscript{210} Wikipedia map of Arab Spring countries that has been updated and reframed by the author named, kudzu1. http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/File:Arab_Spring_map_reframed.png (accessed 13 August 2012).
TAYYIBE ZEYNEP ARMAGAN

Current Address
Zieglergasse 27/2/1
1070 Wien, ÖSTERREICH
tzarmagan@gmail.com
+43 650 869 07 63 - +43 650 653 34 51

EDUCATION

Universität Wien Vienna, AUSTRIA
MA Global Studies (Eramus Mundus) 2011-Present

Universität Leipzig Leipzig, GERMANY
MA Global Studies (Eramus Mundus) 2010-2011

Hacettepe University Ankara, TURKEY
BA-Minor Degree - International Relations 2007-2010
BA-Major Degree - English Language and Literature 2006-2010

EMPLOYMENT

Freelance Translator 2004-2010

Private English Tutor 2006-2010

In charge of English Test Materials (Gelişim Publications) 2007-2008

Private English Tutor 2011-2012

BOOKS PUBLISHED

Progress English Grade 4, Prepared for Publishing by Gelişim Publications (136 pages)
Progress English Grade 5, Prepared for Publishing by Gelişim Publications (128 pages)
Progress English Grade 6, Prepared for Publishing by Gelişim Publications (128 pages)
Progress English Grade 7, Prepared for Publishing by Gelişim Publications (128 pages)
Progress English Grade 8, Prepared for Publishing by Gelişim Publications (128 pages)

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INTERVIEWS


