From niche to mainstream: Electoral politicization of immigration, migrant integration and ethnic diversity in Austria

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I. Introduction

Immigration, migrant integration and ethnic diversity\(^1\) have emerged as contentious political issues in a number of Western democracies during the last centuries. Even if countries are confronted with a different heritage of ethnic diversity and varying sources of immigration from different origins: intensive public debates about these issues as well as the political regulation of rights, duties and restraints have become a common theme across Europe. This characteristic rise of public attention is both reflected and intensified by a political debate, in which responsible political authorities, national/international courts, (caritative) non-governmental organizations, affected groups and their representatives and last but not least political parties aim to play a decisive role in a highly contentious discursive field. By tendency, this development has led to a convergence of political discourses on immigration and migrant integration in the last centuries, with dominant frames of interpretation travelling across national borders (cf. Mahnig/Wimmer 2000; Joppke 2007). It results in public debates that closely intermingle different discursive strands, like questions of cross-border immigration, asylum and refuge, ethnic diversity as well as the multiple facets of migrant and minority integration, including autochthonous/allochthonous minorities and ethnic or religious minorities alike – oftentimes lumping all of these different aspects together by roughly referring to the “others”, “aliens” or “strangers” (cf. Roggeband/Verloo 2007). Though these discursive strands quite evidently have developed at different rates in various historical periods, they have accumulated into one complex political field that increasingly structures political preferences.

Among the different spheres promoting this public debate over immigration, migrant integration and ethnic diversity, one fundamental locus has been of vital importance for the spread of issue-salience and the distribution of interpretative schemes across national contexts, that is the realm of party competition. Political parties have increasingly turned into vital voices, forwarding conflicting stances on questions of ethnic diversity, migrant integration and immigration: Most prominently, anti-immigrant perspectives and claims for cultural hegemony have been catalyzed by the rise of far right parties (cf. Betz 1993 and 1994), but also pro-immigrant and multicultural stances have been considerably

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\(^1\) In the course of the dissertation an abbreviated spelling of our subject matter will repeatedly be applied (referring to it as “immigration/integration/diversity”) in order facilitate the flow of reading.
expressed, mostly by left-libertarian and liberal parties (cf. Lahav 2004). On the other hand, mainstream parties left and right from the political center have long been characterized by their indefinite behavior, both with regard to their engagement as well as their policy stances. Hence, as a microcosm, party competition mirrors competing perspectives within a society and political parties themselves have increasingly attached immigration, integration- and/or diversity-politics to their individual agendas. But parties not only reflect on already existing preferences among electorates, in fact they vitally stimulate issues and policy perspectives themselves – turning from a mere translator into a generator of political sentiments.

Surprisingly, scholarly research on immigration has for a long time underhighlighted the role of political parties (cf. Triadafilopoulos/Zaslove 2006). Partly, due to the assumption that mainstream parties avoided its politicization, because the boundaries of a legitimate debate were narrow and detailed information on both patterns as well as consequences of immigration were scarce (Freeman 1995). In parts also due to the observation, that the actual room for policies (promoted by political parties) was limited by the role of liberal and human rights principles (Soysal 1994). Thus with mainstream politics emphasizing other policy fields more prominently, the inclusion of party politics into research on immigration, migrant integration and ethnic diversity remained a neglected endeavor way into the 1990ies. However, in recent years this negligence has been eroding with an increasing number of authors demanding a closer look on the role of political parties “as critical nodes” in the realm of immigration-/integration-/diversity-politics, most prominently the influence of far right or anti-immigrant parties (eg. Perlmutter 1996; Minkenberg 2001; Schain 2006). The crucial influence that political parties exert on both, the discussion as well as the regulation of immigration, migrant integration and ethnic diversity in Western democracies has become a vital strand of research. As Triadafilopoulos/Zaslove (2006: 189) have vividly put it, “a party-focused approach helps us to understand the importance of changing preferences, their relation to strategic interests, and the means by which they are activated in policy-making processes” on immigration and migrant integration and ethnic diversity.

As a result of this increasing scholarly interest, several authors have pointed to a transformation of traditional cleavage patterns and the growing relevance of new conflicts that structure party competition, with immigration, migrant integration and ethnic diversity becoming vital parts of this renewal (cf. Inglehart 1990; Betz 1993; Kitschelt
In terms of party families, most focus has been given to the role of anti-immigrant parties pushing immigration/integration/diversity onto the political agenda, as well as their ability to influence policies of governing parties (cf. Green-Pedersen/Odmalm 2008; van Spanje 2010) or even restructuring policies themselves by gaining office (cf. McGann/Kitschelt 2005; de Lange 2007; van Spanje/van der Brug 2008). Only in the past few years, the role of mainstream parties has been taken into account as a goal of systematic examination, mostly due to the increasing success of anti-immigrant parties and the materialization of far right government participation since the late 1990ies (Austria, Denmark, Hungary, Italy, Netherlands, Switzerland, Slovakia). Since then, the role of center-right parties has been addressed in a number of articles (cf. Eatwell 2000; Downs 2001; Bale 2003; 2005; Meguid 2005 and 2008) and recently also the hitherto neglected role of center-left parties has attracted more scholarly interest as well (cf. Art 2007; Bale et al 2010). Though there still is a deficit of systematic evaluation with regard to left-wing parties (if compared to other party families), this particular research strand has been accompanied by a number of core questions in the recent years, that will also be guiding the present dissertation: When do political parties include immigration, migrant integration and ethnic diversity on their political agenda? How can party politicization of these issues be analyzed on a systematic basis? How do parties position themselves in controversial and charged policy fields that cut across several other government portfolios? Which motives can be identified as driving forces for individual party behavior and what are the rational strategies of politicization, linked to these different motives? And finally, which of these strategies prove to be successful for the respective parties?

This dissertation addresses these highly contentious questions of contemporary political research and suggests an explanatory framework for electoral party competition on immigration, migrant integration and ethnic diversity. The dissertation’s central objective is to contribute to the evaluation of existing concepts on party politicization of these policy issues, thereby focusing on the supply-side of party competition, while demand-side factors will be considered only from an explanatory perspective. The study integrates three strands of literature on party politics, political communication and immigration research, thereby elaborating a conceptual approach in three directions: Firstly, it develops an instrument that is qualified for the study of party politicization patterns, i.e. the ways in which parties emphasize and frame different issues or subtopics
of the debate. This task is conducted both on deductive and inductive terms. We initially define politicization as the process of “publicly addressing an issue in the light of its political regulation”, that will be further conceptualized on an operational basis in Chapter 2. The operational definition of politicization, then, is based on three cornerstones, that combine different strands of literature, i.e. issue-salience, subtopics and positions (cf. Budge/Farlie 1983; Carmines/Stimson 1993; Petrocik 1996; Benoit/Laver 2006; Meguid 2008; Jäger/Maier 2009). It is argued, that parties will strategically evaluate their modes of politicization based on different competitive considerations, by altering either one or all of these aspects: thus they may increase issue-emphasis in general, highlight the importance of specific subtopics as compared to others, or even shift their policy stances on the issues in question.

These strategies of politicization are expected to vary between different party types and changing competitive conditions, which is why the dissertation – secondly – needs to elaborate an explanatory framework for party politicization of immigration, migrant integration and ethnic diversity, i.e. why parties opt for specific strategies of politicization under certain circumstances. In this regard, the thesis deduces different theoretical arguments from recent literature on party behavior (amongst others Strøm 1990, Müller/Strøm 1999; Downs 2001; Bale 2003/2008; Meguid 2008; Green-Pedersen/Odmalm 2008; Bale et al 2010) and integrates them into one explanatory model. It will be argued that only a combined framework – including party ideology and issue ownership as well as motives for vote maximization and coalition considerations – is able to explain individual party behavior from a longitudinal perspective. Additionally, since party competition does not proceed in a vacuum but is vitally embedded in external socio-structural conditions, we expected these conditions to shape the overarching politicization patterns on the party system level.

Thirdly, the thesis contends, that electoral competition constitutes a complex arena in itself, since it combines different campaign channels, each of them serving different communicative goals and needs during the campaign process. With regard to party politicization, this multi-dimensionality of the electoral arena thus poses the questions, how different campaign channels (in general) materialize in different patterns of politicization and (in detail) if some types of parties show greater campaign consistency across these channels than others (cf. Maarek 1995; Blumler/Kavanagh/Nossiter 1996; Adams et al 2006; Kriesi/Bernhard/Hänggli 2009; Williams 2009). For this reason, the dissertation compares programmatic communication as contained in election manifestos
with daily communication of parties’ press releases, aiming to shed light on their particular characteristics as well as on the question of campaign consistency in general.

These three dimensions of research questions are applied to an empirically substantial case, by conducting a time series case study of Austrian general elections from 1971 to 2008 (cf. George/Bennet 2004; Gerring 2004). The case of Austria has been selected on the basis of several theoretical considerations: Firstly, the Austrian party system as a party driven system has experienced a characteristic evolution after 1945 that is similar to that of other democracies in Europe – turning from a narrow party spectrum with high party loyalty and partisanship towards a more heterogeneous party spectrum with increasing diversity of competing issues. Secondly, Austria has a long-lasting history of cultural diversity reaching back into the Habsburg era, but – due to its geopolitical location – has witnessed characteristic patterns of immigration and asylum inflows after 1945. Thirdly, the prominent role of the far right FPÖ since the mid-1980ies has made the Austrian case a standard example of anti-immigrant party research; fourthly, the comparatively high rates of attention and scepticism among Austrian population towards the questions of immigration, migrant integration and ethnic diversity have constituted an incentive for (party) political controversy.² Taking these factors together, Austria constitutes a highly informative case for the analysis and evaluation of different party strategies in the context of electoral competition on immigration, migrant integration and ethnic diversity.

Conducting a time-series analysis, then, offers a fruitful endeavor: It enables to trace the evolution of these contentious political issues under changing socio-structural conditions while at the same time it allows to study (adaptive) party behavior under different competitive contexts and makes it possible to integrate these strands into one systematic and reciprocal model. However, we delimit our examination with regard to several aspects: As outlined above, the dissertation focuses on party competition as the crucial interface of political contestation, excluding other discursive actors from the analysis. More specifically, we also limit our examination to the electoral arena of party competition, arguing that elections condense both public perception of party politics (by voters and media) as well as strategic party considerations (see Chapter 3). It is primarily the electoral arena, that facilitates the observation of party behavior in its purest forms, hence electoral competition is predestined as the ideal locus of examination – which is

² All of these dimensions will be illustrated more precisely in Chapter 4.
why other arenas of politic competition are excluded from our analysis of politicization. Taken together, this focus on electoral politicization aims to underline the dynamics of contention in contemporary party politicization on immigration, migrant integration and ethnic diversity.

Structure of the dissertation. The argument of this dissertation is elaborated and empirically examined in six major steps:

Ensuing this introduction, Chapter 2 offers an introduction of the main theoretical arguments regarding party behavior and issue competition. As such, it initially discusses concepts on political parties and party competition (2.1.); subsequently, it isolates the specific role of issue politicization and provides a discussion of models for party behavior in spatial competition (2.2.); finally, it applies these general considerations to the specific issues of immigration, migrant integration and ethnic diversity and contrasts recent literature on this debate (2.3.). The chapter concludes with an identification of both, explanandum and explanans of the study, which consequently are joined together into a research design, that will be guiding the following chapters.

Chapter 3 extends the research design by discussing the specific political arena in question, i.e. electoral competition, emphasizing the multi-dimensional character of the process of electoral party campaigning that demands for a nuanced analysis of different campaign channels. As a consequence, it is suggested, that programmatic and daily dimensions of election campaigns need to be separated and analyzed according to their specific functions in the campaign process. The chapter thus concludes with assumptions about the different nature of politicization on these two dimensions of campaigning: On the one hand, it is assumed that campaign channels will differ in terms of consistency/divergence (with regard to subtopics and positions). On the other hand, it is expected, that campaign consistency will differ between party types (when comparing mainstream and niche parties).

Chapter 4 depicts the empirical framework for party competition on immigration/migrant integration/ethnic diversity in the Austrian case. As such, it initially outlines the socio-structural inputs with regard to these issues, like the empirical conditions of immigration in Austria since the 1960ies, the role of public opinion with regard to these questions and – at least theoretically – the framework of mediated public discourse (4.1.). However, beyond these external influences, individual party politicization of immigration/migrant integration/ethnic diversity needs to be explained primarily by internal factors of party
competition, i.e. the number and strength of relevant parties, their ideological foundations as well as coalition scenarios, which structure strategies of party competition (4.2.). Both explanatory dimensions are condensed into specific hypotheses that guide our analysis and that will be revisited in Chapter 8.

Chapter 5 is dedicated to the explanation of our methodical approach. Thus it discusses the process of data selection and outlines the operationalization of our three analytical dimensions issue-salience, subtopics and positions. Correspondingly, it refers to prior examples of content analysis and their issue categories in the policy fields of immigration/integration/diversity and discusses our deductive codes for the analysis of subtopics. Furthermore it introduces our approach with regard to salience- and proximity-measurements in party competition and leads to the ensuing chapter, which generates our policy position coding.

Chapter 6 leads over to the findings of this dissertation. Thus after introducing the concept of framing and our triangulation of inductive and deductive code development, it discusses the results of our elaboration of policy frames on immigration/integration/diversity. On a medium-level of abstraction, a set of eleven policy frames is developed which together mirror the structure of party politicization on these issues since the 1970ies. Grouped on a bipolar scale of liberal vs. restrictive policy perspectives, these frames express the conflictiveness of our subject matter and thus enable to proceed to our quantitative analysis of actual intensities and directions regarding the politicization of immigration/integration/diversity in Austrian electoral competition.

On that note, chapter 7 presents the empirical results of our time series analysis on a descriptive basis, both on an aggregated party system level as well as on an individual party level. All empirical findings will be compared between programmatic and daily campaign channels, in order to draw conclusions on the consistency of campaign communication for individual parties: The first section of the quantitative chapter collects data with regard to the question of general issue-salience of immigration/integration/diversity and demonstrates their issue-career within Austrian party competition since the mid-1980ies. As the individual party findings illustrate, immigration/integration/diversity have arrived at the mainstream of the Austrian party system and have turned into highly salient subjects of electoral competition over the course of the last two decades (7.1.); secondly, the chapter continues with the discussion of specific issue-preferences (subtopics) in Austrian party discourse. It demonstrates, that the diverse characteristics of different campaign channels considerably influence the ways
parties politicize the issues of immigration/integration/diversity. Beyond that, the findings demonstrate the central role of far right parties in influencing the subtopical choice of mainstream parties and furthermore it outlines the separated role of liberal and left-libertarian parties in terms of subtopical emphasis (7.2.); finally, the chapter identifies the core positions of Austrian parties with regard to these issues in quantitative terms. Thus by indicating those frames that have been applied most intensively by individual parties, we demonstrate the changing patterns of mainstream party behaviour as compared to niche parties. While both center-right and center-left mainstream parties show fluctuating and cautious behavior in the early period of niche party success, after the millennium and in light of changing competitive conditions they both intensify and further specify their strategies of politicization. This contributes to a dividing line that cuts right through the mainstream of the Austrian party spectrum and illustrates the conflictive character of these increasingly salient policy fields (7.3.).

Closing the circle between the preceding chapters of the dissertation, chapter 8 eventually is dedicated to the synthesis of explanandum and explanans: It integrates the assumptions generated in chapters 3 and 4 with the findings of chapter 7 and evaluates the hypothesis of our research design. In this process, the chapter discusses the explanatory potential of individual factors and highlights further factors that hitherto have been underexposed in the literature. With this synthesis, the dissertation aims to evaluate its heuristic model of explanation for the question of party politicization of immigration/migrant integration/ethnic diversity.

The conclusive chapter finally summarizes these findings and points to the main contributions of this dissertation as well as to questions left open for further research.
II. Theoretical background: Party politics & the role of politicization

Immigration and ethnic diversity are characteristic phenomena of societies in past and present. They shape the composition of people bound together in a social and political entity and thereby stimulate as well as transform conceptions of national community at the same time. However, the translation of immigration and ethnic diversity into politically relevant issues is by no means a natural, obvious process. In fact it is rather a central concern of political research, as to when and how social phenomena turn into politically relevant issues and objects of political regulation. With the evolution of modern democracies since the 19th century, this process of organizing societies into democratic polities has been linked to a specific type of actor: i.e. political parties. Parties have become one if not the central actor delivering the input necessary for political executive to implement the interest of its “demos”. Unlike other intermediary actors (such as syndicates, trade/labor unions, NGOs, grass roots, etc.), parties address a broader spectrum of issues and have come to appear as the main source for recruiting legislative and executive personal. Thus the analysis of party politicization not only highlights socially relevant issues in a society, it also indicates those issues that are most likely to become object of policy regulation in the first place. Beyond that, party politicization in Western democracies has become the main source of political orientation for both the electorate and – even more important – for journalistic gatekeepers (cf. Konstantinidis 2008; Hopmann et al 2010). Thus, party politicization constitutes an important node in the analysis of social questions and their political relevance.

Accordingly, politicization in the present study refers to a process of publicly addressing socially relevant issues under their need for political regulation – thus an issue-based definition of the term is applied. With this focus the analysis refrains from the usage of the term known from other research areas: For example, in political sociology the concept of politicization commonly refers to a process of political activity, in the sense of stimulating people, groups, classes, etc. to engage in specific forms of action (thus resembling the meaning of “mobilization”) (cf. Rothschild 1981). Conversely, in other

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3 For example, in his book „Ethnopolitics“, Joseph Rothschild sketches politicization in such a way: „To politicize ethnicity is (1) to render people cognitively aware of the relevance of politics to the health of their ethnic cultural values and vice versa, (2) to stimulate their concern about this nexus, (3) to mobilize them
research contexts, politicization can refer to definitions of *competences*, i.e. to address the responsibility of the “political system” as opposed to other systems (such as jurisprudence, economic, etc.). In this use, politicization describes a process of competence shifts, that is in contrast with tendencies of juridification, economization, etc. (cf. Schulze 2006). Although these approaches evidently are closely linked to our concept of politicization, we argue that it is still important to isolate the *issue* dimension of the concept, since the process of publicly addressing an issue in the light of its political regulation is not necessarily tied to specific actions or competences. With such an issue-based use of politicization we furthermore deviate from authors who use politicization in a broader sense, referring to all phases of the policy-cycle (e.g. Schmitter 1969; Hooghe/Marks 2008). Here we argue that it is important to maintain a crucial distinction: Putting an issue to the political agenda has to be separated from whether and how the issue finally may be translated into the actual process of “law making”. Thus, the agenda-setting and issue-framing role of politicization is isolated as an autonomous analytical realm. This is of vital importance, because it is exactly at this point where the central characteristic of political parties resides – that is to build and shape a political agenda as well as a public and media agenda (cf. McCombs 2008). Linked to this approach to politicization, the issue-dimension of party competition thus becomes the primary focus of analysis. As such, the work builds on a well-established concept of issue based party competition in electoral contexts, as brought forward by scholars from different perspectives, such as Robertson (1976), Budge/Farlie (1983), Carmines/Stimson (1993). Their common denominator is the notion that party competition is a struggle over issues, i.e. identifying and promoting winning issues, avoiding or depoliticizing disadvantageous issues and aiming to cut opponents’ issues. Hence, especially the nature of the electoral race is tied to the concept of party competition over the dominance of specific issues, which in its original thought is opposed to an understanding of positional competition (as prototypically suggested by Anthony Downs), where parties compete on the same set of issues by promoting different positions. Recent work has demonstrated that these two aspects not necessarily interfere with each other, but may very well be different aspects of one complex nature of competition (cf. Riker 1996; van der Brug 2001; Green-Pedersen 2007).
The present dissertation builds on this dual notion and thus links these two dimensions into one coherent concept of party politicization, that is defined as a process of competition over issues and positions. Accordingly this demands for a thorough discussion of the conditions that structure this process. Thus, our theoretical framework needs to work out the specific characteristics of political parties as well as the factors that determine party behavior and politicization strategies. For this reason, the following section will take three steps to narrow down this theoretical basis: In a first step it will introduce our concept of “party behavior” and “electoral competition” (chapter 2.1.). Based on these definitions it will furthermore discuss basic theories on party strategies in their competition for issues and positions (chapter 2.2). Thirdly, we will transfer these general assumptions to the specific issues of immigration, migrant integration and ethnic diversity, in order to develop assumptions on the patterns of politicization that might be expected in these sensitive policy fields (chapter 2.3).

2.1. Parties and their party system context

How do parties distinguish themselves from other actors of the political sphere? What is the motivation behind their actions and how does the “use” of issues fit into their overall goals and strategies? These questions guide the following section, which is dedicated to the development of our concept of party behavior. The section approaches on a historico-political basis, condensing early perspectives on political parties with contemporary literature on party politics, that incorporate these early works into more coherent and empirically validated concepts. This genetic derivation helps to understand the sources and constraints in which parties operate and which have persisted to a considerable amount until today.

With the spread of early types of modern political parties since the late 17th century scholars increasingly began to discuss the character, functions and organization of these growing entities in greater detail. Although primarily focusing on the (back then) dominating form of “cadre parties”, the debate quite effectively anticipated key elements of motives and limits for party behavior that have remained valid even in contemporary politics. A famous example of the durability of conceptions is the commonly quoted characterization of political parties made by Edmund Burke in the 18th century, defining a political party as “a body of men united for promoting by their joint endeavors the
national interest upon some particular principle in which they are all agreed” and who will “pursue every just method to put the men who hold their opinions into such a condition as may enable them to carry their common plans into execution” (Burke 1899: 530). Perspectives of that kind mirrored an affirmative picture of political parties as bearers of social realignment and carriers of political ideas – a concept that has influenced party conceptions way into the 20th century. Affirmative descriptions of political parties have also come from a more functionalist background, depicting the emergence of political parties as a functional response to the increasing competition of group interests in ever growing societies. From this perspective political parties perform specific functions for a polity, as is suggested by Morse (1891: 18f.): They establish a connecting link between society and government by a) informing people about public matters, b) stimulating their discussion, c) connecting like-minded people, d) suggesting policies to cope with these issues (according to party principles) and finally e) ensuring the selection of competent representatives for the parliamentary and governmental realm. It is this set of functions which parties have been performing up to the present day and from which they gather their enormous relevance for modern democracies – even if they increasingly fail to fulfill them equally well (cf. Dalton/Wattenberg 2000). Not only do political parties still operate as principal actors responsible for the appointment of government personal. Furthermore, they continue to be essential translators of social interests into political will. However, it is important to note that political parties are not simply a result of social interests being organized into political representation. They themselves are a predominant source of politicization and mobilization, for they do not simply collect interests “out there” (interest aggregation) but in fact help to produce an awareness for social interests. Thus, political parties also serve as educators for political thinking in the first place (interest expression).

Opposed to these affirmative perspectives on political parties, sceptical right up to deprecating remarks have accompanied the debate from the very beginning and have preserved their relevance until today. Subsequently, it was quite common for early “cadre”-parties to be accused of being prone to patronage, corruption and partisan purblindness (e.g. Richardson 1892; Lilly 1900). These remarks, however, have outlived the ascent of mass parties in the 20th century as described by Max Weber (1919) in his threefold distinction of party evolution (distinguishing between the stages of aristocratic cliques, small groups of notables, and plebiscitarian democracy). Although a number of processes (e.g. the growing importance of democracy, extended suffrage, the need to
organize larger parts of electorates and the increasing pressure to ensure the supply of parliamentary personal) led to a transformation of political parties throughout the 20\textsuperscript{th} century (Duverger 1954: XXIV), many of the underlying assumptions on party behavior have pertained. The fundamental contrast between different perspectives on political parties can be described as the important bottom line of this discussion: On the one hand there is a vital emphasis on the ideological dimension of political parties and their capacity to aggregate, stimulate and convert political issues in accordance with basic (ideological) party principles. On the other hand we do witness the accentuation of a strategic dimension of bargaining, maneuvering and sacrificing principles as well as staff for the sake of gaining or preserving a powerful position. For the present context the question remains, how these early perspectives have been integrated into contemporary concepts of party behavior, which is the focus of the following section. It will discuss different concepts as they are synthesized in recent literature on party motives.

2.1.1. Basic concepts of party behavior

What has been valid for the 18\textsuperscript{th} and 19\textsuperscript{th} century debate in large parts inspired also the scholarly concepts on political parties during the 20\textsuperscript{th} century. Although there are obviously a number of different approaches to party models – depending whether parties are systematized according to their origins, their electoral basis, their internal formation or their ideological origin (cf. Krouwel 2006) – many of these characteristics are linked with each other (e.g. social democrats mostly emerged as a mass-party appealing to a mass-electorate thus being amply organized). However, in terms of party behavior – which is the focus of this dissertation – a number of contemporary authors have been using this antagonism to systematize the spectrum of political parties. As such the distinction between two influential “party paradigms” has been quite typical for the debate in the twentieth century: “the rational-efficient model and the responsible parties model” (White 2006: 9). Both concepts have their origins prior to the 20\textsuperscript{th} century but have been systematically developed and advanced only after 1945. Likewise they equally articulate specific forms of party behavior that in recent years have been systematized more explicitly into coherent models (such as suggested by Strøm 1990; Müller/Strøm 1999; Wolinetz 2002). The following description tries to link these terminologies for the sake of a condensed understanding.
Rational choice concepts and the pursuit of power. The former perspective of the “rational-efficient model” of behavior is linked prominently to the seminal work of Anthony Downs’ “Economic theory of democracy” (1957), which comprehensively and systematically generated a model of political competition based on economic considerations. Based on earlier economic models of competition (Hotelling 1929; Smithies 1941), Downs fruitfully combined a spatial perspective with behavioral approaches towards party politics, thus depicting a rational choice model of party behavior. By sketching both political parties and voters as rationally motivated actors he inaugurated a perspective that offered enormous analytical potential. Briefly spoken, rational choice based approaches represent a type of theory, “that stresses strategic considerations that analyzes the likely outcome of the intermix of separately chosen rational strategies by actors with limited choice and highly imperfect information, bound by agreed rules” (Robertson 1976: 23). Within these settings, actors are expected to behave strategically based on rational assessment of options and goals. Thus, rational choice theories initially need to line out assumptions about what motivates the actors (cf. Budge/Laver 1986: 485) and for this sake ascribe formal simplifications in order to make their basic models empirically applicable. Firstly, in order to be able to talk about THE party at all, rational choice approaches have to make another basic simplification by treating the party as a homogenous, autonomous actor (“a team of men (...) whose members agree on all their goals instead of on just part of them”, Downs 1957: 25f). Secondly, with regard to voters, Downs’ rational choice model suggested a “proximity logic”, assuming that a voter will rationally choose the party which is closest to him/her on a given political dimension and thus is considered most likely to meet his expectations. This assumption entails important consequences, because – from a spatial strategic point of view – a rational party consequently has to consider the proximity of its own issue positions compared to “its” voters’ positions (a fact that leads to a number of theoretical

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4 References to an economic logic of party behavior obviously have been expressed before, although never in such a systematic way. A famous example is Schumpeter’s (1942) analogy between political parties and department stores: „A party is not, as classical doctrine (or Edmund Burke) would have us believe, a group of men who intend to promote public welfare upon some principle on which they are all agreed.’ This rationalization is so dangerous because it is so tempting. For all parties will of course, at any given time, provide themselves with a stock of principles or planks and these principles or planks may be as characteristic of the party that adopts them and as important for its success as the brands of goods a department store sells are characteristic of it and important for its success. But the department store cannot be defined in terms of its brands and a party cannot be defined in terms of its principles. A party is a group whose members propose to act in concert in the competitive struggle for political power. (...)The psychotechnics of party management and party advertising, slogans and marching tunes, are not accessories. They are of the essence of politics.” (Schumpeter 1942: 283).
conclusions discussed beyond). The main objective of parties, as proposed by Downs, is to gain office by achieving a maximum of electoral success, since “winning elections” is the major pathway of gaining government responsibility in democracies – especially in two-party systems which served as the primary reference for Downs assumptions. By defining parties in such a narrow sense, Downs has become the stepfather of a specific understanding of party goals: the *vote seeking behavior*. Although the vote-seeking model is chiefly deduced from a two-party-system-research, Downs himself expands its applicability to multiparty contexts, arguing that even in multiparty competition the maximisation of votes can be perceived as the main objective guiding political parties’ behavior (cf. Downs 1957: 159). This premise though leads to a bunch of conclusions, most importantly to the assumption that “political parties strive for the advantages, linked to the government involvement, not for a better or ideal societal system” – thus ideologies need to be interpreted merely as “weapons in the struggle for office” (Downs 1957: 96). Following this perspective, political ideologies subsequently need to be characterized as “means to power”, an understanding that bears crucial implications for Downs’ view on political parties: They could not be merely interpreted as “agents of specific social groups or classes; rather, they are autonomous teams seeking office *per se* and using group support to attain that end.” (Downs 1957: 97).

In the realm of coalition theory the notion of vote-seeking strategies of parties has been complemented by a perspective that subordinates vote-seeking to objectives of gaining executive office power – an argument that is already inherited in Downs work but not separated analytically. The concept of an *office-seeking behavior* puts its “primary emphasis on securing government office, even if it is at the expense of policy goals or maximizing votes. Office-seeking parties either seek to hold power alone, or more realistically (in the context of the systems in which they operate) to share power with others” (Wolinetz 2002: 152). To that effect the important difference from a vote-seeking strategy can be identified in the expected behavior regarding policy positions as well as confrontation with opponents. Ideally, an office-seeking party should try to remain a coalible option, thus tempering its electoral attacks against potential partners and avoiding policy commitments that make it seem like an intolerable coalition partner.: “The aim – defined in the context of a well-established party system – would be to win enough votes

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5 Interestingly Downs himself already points to the discursive dimension of ideological formations, defining them “as a verbal image of the good society and of the chief means of constructing such a society.” (Downs 1957: 96).
to ensure inclusion in coalitions.” (Wolinetz 2002: 152). It is the discrepancy between vote- and office-seeking behavior that stands out most prominently when comparing two party with multi-party systems. While maximizing votes directly implies increased chances for gaining office in the former system (thus office-seeking would merely be a function of a successful vote-seeking behavior), these strategies become autonomous options in the latter (Adams et al 2004: 589). Yet, what combines both concepts of party behavior is that they subsume parties' policy choices under their strategic considerations of power (either in terms of size or in terms of governing). From such a perspective, a scholarly focus on party politicization then has to reflect on the basic framework of party competition (such as the number of competing parties, their expected strength, their coalition potential, etc.) – sections 4.2.2. and 4.2.3. will take up these factors in detail for the Austrian case.

**Ideology, issue preferences and policy-pursuit.** In sharp contrast to both of these behavioral strategies following a rational efficient paradigm, another theoretical approach highlights how political parties evolve as actors and the way they perform in order to achieve specific political goals or ideology in a broader sense: “Policy-seeking parties are issue-oriented and, quite simply, give priority to their policies. (…) Included in this rubric are not only parties with well-defined programmes and/or well-articulated ideologies, but also single-issue and protest parties.” (Wolinetz 2002: 150). Policy-orientated concepts of party goals have been suggested by different scholarly directions. Historically speaking such understandings can be found already in early – e.g. Burkanian or Madisonian – definitions of political parties. The topical discourse, however, is shaped by the advancement of 20th-century concepts such as the discussion about the “responsible parties school” (cf. White 2006: 10). In its influential report – co-authored and influenced by E.E. Schattschneiders perspective on political parties6 – the American Political Science Association’s Committee on Political Parties in 1950 articulated the core argument that only a competition of parties responsible “to bring forth programs to which they commit themselves” and with “sufficient internal cohesion to carry out these programs” (APSA 1950: 18) would lead to an effective party system. Parties sticking to a “coherent set of ideas” not only would offer clear choices to voters but could also be held accountable for their policy-output (cf. White 2006: 10). Another stimulus has come from

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coalition studies where policy-orientated concepts have been developed to overcome the "policy-blind axioms" of earlier studies on government and coalition building which underrated the relevance of ideological proximity in this process (cf. Strøm 1990: 567). Most prominently, though, such a concept of policy oriented behavior is expressed by early cleavage theorists, arguing that social conflicts become effectively translated into democratic politics only by the formation of political parties, for they “develop a rhetoric for the translation of contrasts in the social and the cultural structure into demands and pressures for action or inaction” (Lipset/Rokkan 1967: 5). Political parties, then, are just one – although potent – social actor amongst others that associates a social divide with a particular set of values or identities and brings them into the political realm (Sartori 1990: 169f.). Consequently, politically relevant cleavages are to be highlighted as important distinctions between social groups, based on fundamental social-structural characteristics. They are used a) to appeal to a common identity that is said to be shared by the members of such a group and b) to translate such an identity into an „organizational expression, whether through a political party, a trade union, a church, or some other body“ (Mair 2006: 373).

Taken together, these ideological and preference-based perspectives on party evolution and behavior put a strong emphasis on specific issues and positions that become characteristic for political parties – which can be systematized into different “ideological” or “party families”. These preferences structure party behavior, especially within the context of competition. Hence, political parties “apply these ideologies to the issues of the day in order to generate preferred solutions, which they advocate in election campaigns as one way of attracting or consolidating their vote.” (Budge 2006: 422). Issue positions of political parties in such a concept are expected to remain relatively stable along existing social cleavages and will change only as a consequence of transformations in the cleavage structure. Although political cleavages have to be characterized by their continuity they are not unlikely to weaken or change under specific conditions, such as the „erosion of the social reality underpinning the cleavage“, the weakening common identity of relevant social groups or due to the decreasing interest of organizations to translate such a conflict (cf. Mair 2006: 374; Mair/Müller/Plasser 2004: 3). Given that

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7 Vasallo/Wilcox (2006: 413ff) distinguish at least seven major families of parties that are common among the majority of studies: Communist parties, Socialist parties, Left-libertarian parties, Green parties, Liberal parties, Christian democratic parties and New right parties.
8 Because conflicts remain stable and basic patterns of the political system – such as electoral system, parliamentary system, institutional setting – favor the cleavages of those parties that have been founding powers of this system and that continue to translate them into actual politics.
“voters are much more willing to cross the boundaries separating individual political parties than they are to cross the lines of cleavage” (Mair 2006: 373f.), established political parties may get pressurized by the emergence of new/revitalized cleavages and other parties vitally expressing them. During the recent decades many Western democracies have witnessed the growth of available electorate and a situation where „parties that traditionally lacked a sizeable number of identifiers may have experienced an enhancement of their competitive position.“ (Mair/Müller/Plasser: 5). For these former niche parties – such as Green or far right parties – it has become a winning formula to identify new, winning issues and to popularize these issues and positions accordingly (cf. Riker 1986; de Lange 2007; Meguid 2008; de Vries/Hobolt 2012). In this perspective, party behavior then is mainly based on the execution of issues and policy positions that constitute the characteristic core of a political party, thus parties’ ideological foundations and policy preferences constitute the main explanatory factor – a perspective that is discussed further on in section 4.2.1. of this dissertation.

Of course, these different principles of party behavior represent ideal types that hardly exist in their pure form. To the extent that every party at least needs a minimal core of ideology which it will not sacrifice to the thirst for power, parties will hardly be effective if they solely and permanently stick to their core positions disregarding the electoral will as well as the issue positions of the competitors.9 Hence, empirically parties will show more than just one of these behavioral patterns but still: the more established parties become the clearer their behavioral tendencies stand out (cf. Müller/Strøm 1999: 11f.; Wolinetz 2002: 153). Consequently the varying relevance of behavioral tendencies for certain (types of) parties is important for the prediction of their behavior in party competition – even more if the patterns of the competitive system are about to change (with cleavages declining or growing, with new issues appearing, with parties vanishing and emerging, with the electorate’s behavior transforming, etc.). Under such changing conditions of competition, the options of adaptive behavior for political parties are manifold. As Mair/Müller/Plasser (2004) line out, parties might simply avoid response because they may either be “unaware of these changes, or of their import” or “they may simply deny their significance.” (Mair/Müller/Plasser 2004: 10). If, on the other hand, parties do identify electoral changes and increasing competitive pressure as a call to

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9 A fact that obviously is much more pronounced in multi-party systems than it is in two-party system.
action, they may for example adapt the definition of their primary electoral target groups, abandon lost voters, define new targets in the electoral market, etc. In a multi-party system they may also respond on the inter-party level by adapting attitudes towards their opponents (e.g. by creating new alliances or increasing the controversy with other parties) in order to attract new voters. Whatever strategic response a party might choose, it will always imply a change in a party’s issue selection and/or issue positions respectively (ibd.). With party politicization being the focus of this dissertation, the following sections need to specify as to how these different motives will turn into specific strategies of electoral competition.

2.1.2. Party systems and a spatial perspective on party competition

Although a party can be analyzed as a single entity by itself, it is necessary to expand the perspective from the individual party to its location in the broader picture of the party system as a whole in order to arrive at an understanding of party competition. In this regard an extensive literature on party systems reflected the experiences of party evolution and the establishment of Western democracies in the 20th century. Especially since the 1960ies scholars have increasingly paid attention to the greater diversity of democratic countries and revising older approaches towards party system analysis (cf. Caramani/Hug 1998; Wolinetz 2006). The need for more complex typologies became apparent and was explicitly addressed by authors such as Blondel (1968) or Sartori (1976), with their common denominator being the notion that a party system had to be defined not by the parties themselves but by their continuous interactions. As Sartori (1976) stressed, the etymology of the term „party“ itself indicates its roots in the idea of a part of something bigger: „Parties make for a ‚system’ only when they are parts (in the plural); and a party system is precisely the system of interactions resulting from inter-party competition. That is, the system in question bears on the relatedness of parties to each other, on how each party is a function (in the mathematical sense) of the other parties and reacts, competitively or otherwise, to other parties.“ (Sartori 1976: 44) These interrelations and interactions thus can manifest themselves in several forms – mainly as a result of some type of competitive (electoral) framework. The most common features of party system analysis consider the number of competing parties, their strength, their ideological position, the issue-dimensions of competition as well as their coalition capacities (cf. Blondel 1968: 183; Wolinetz 2006: 53). Summarizing these premises, a
party system then has to be interpreted as a set of interacting organizations that show a certain degree of persistence (i.e. institutionalization) and are tied – in whatever way – to a specific electorate which they declare to represent (cf. Mainwaring/Torcal 2006: 205).

Although party system research per definition is concerned with the interrelations of a given set of political parties, it was only by the late 1960ies when scholars started to include the mode of competition in their descriptions of party systems. Most prominently Sartori (1976) stressed the need to broaden the “numerical picture” of party systems by reflecting the nature of party competition within a party system for it might lead to crucial differences in individual party behavior. Ascertaining the degree of polarization of a party spectrum, Sartori thus arrived at a typology that distinguished between a) One-Party Systems, Party Systems with b) Hegemonic or c) Predominant Party, d) Two Party Systems and further two forms of pluralized systems, i.e. e) moderate pluralism and f) polarized pluralism. By reflecting the modes of ideological polarization Sartori followed an approach of modeling politics that has become a dominant tool in party politics research, namely a spatial perspective on party competition. As Benoit/Laver (2006: 11) line out, spatial perspectives have become the most common way of talking about politics both for experts and ordinary followers likewise. Be it either intuitively or systematically they equally refer to the point “where key actors stand on substantive matters at issue.”

Analyzing politics in terms of parties’ positions on specific political issues allows for the comparison of such positions and consequently enables to identify similarities and differences. By quantifying differences of that kind we finally discern a spatial picture of politics that allows to put proximities and distances between actors’ positions into numerical items. Such a spatial lense on political competition has become a dominant approach, since it provides an opportunity for researchers to quantitatively measure changes in positions of political parties as well as the electorate. Therefore, a lot of scholarly effort has been put into modeling ways of describing both of these aspects and has led to a number of models of positional competition, most prominently the left-right (spatial) analogy. Although there is no natural reason of using a spatial analogy to

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10 Although the traditional Sartorian typology has become increasingly blurred because systems of polarized pluralism have rather vanished while party systems with moderate pluralism have become a dominant pattern (cf. Mair 2002), it still remains a useful tool for description, especially in historical timeseries analysis.

11 Stemming from the historical seating arrangement in the post-revolutionary French Constituent Assembly of 1789 (with conservatives placing themselves to the right of the Chair and radicals to the left), the distinction between left and right together with the notion of an undefined political center has become an established way of describing positions for both political actors as well as citizens preferences (cf. Laver/Hunt 1992: 8f.).
describe patterns of party competition, it has been the result of mainly three factors: “historical accident, ease of visualization and, by now, convention” (Laver/Hunt 1992: 11). The analogy since then has been used as a means to visualize the arrangement of competing interests in politics, subsequently facilitating the perception of gradual divergences between two extreme poles. However, corresponding to the actual complexity of political positions their leftness or rightness has become a matter of degree rather than absoluteness thus “most policy preferences can be described as having a particular position on a line, or dimension, joining the two ideological poles.” (Laver/Hunt 1992: 12ff). As a consequence the policy positions located at different points on such a scale can be put into direct comparison even on a quantitative level. In other words, spatial analysis of party competition allows for conclusions on proximity and distance between the actors’ policy positions and thus carries out at least two central purposes: a) it offers a quantitative insight on the polarization of party competition in a given party system and b) it allows for a longitudinal comparison of party positions and their shifts.

Still it is of utmost importance to remember that policy dimensions always remain scientific constructs that have no absolute meaning. Instead they merely represent an interrelation of points on a dimension defined by the scholar. It is exactly due to this “relativity” of spatial maps of political competition that their designs can vary significantly between different approaches (for a short discussion see chapter V). Of course, from its very beginning the use of a spatial analogy for describing party competition has been met with various objections, either criticizing the simplification of single-dimensional models and claiming for multidimensional concepts or even objecting that “political complexities cannot be mapped spatially at all.” (Budge 2006: 423).

First of all however, the established convention of talking about party competition in bipolar terms such as left and right is nothing more than a means to describe patterns of conflict. It is merely a framework of analysis that in itself offers no cogent information about the specific kinds of strategies, parties will adapt within such spaces. A prognostic capacity needs to link a spatial framework to the question, what parties do when acting in

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12 In a general characterization of politics in terms of left and right, the left wing has traditionally been linked to politics of resource redistribution from disadvantaged social groups and the broadening of group rights even at the expense of individual members. Conversely right wing politics has been characterized by the emphasis on individual rights, thus the reduction of resource redistribution by the state even if this risks growing social inequality (cf. Laver/Hunt 1992: 12).
spatial competition on issues and positions. For this reason the following chapter tries to introduce spatial theories of party competition as well as their application on issue-specific behavior, in order to approximate assumptions about how Austrian political parties will politicize the issues of immigration/integration/diversity under changing conditions.

2.2. Party competition & politicization: The relation of issues and positions

So far, we merely outlined the relevance of issues and positions in the strategic arsenal of political parties engaged in electoral competition. However, in order to arrive at a better understanding of what parties actually do, we need to focus in greater detail on the specific forms of behavior, parties show in electoral competition on issues. What strategies do parties apply in electoral competition over issues? How do parties utilize issues and positions to compete in the struggle over votes and office? These are the guiding question of the following chapter. It offers a short introduction into the main assumptions of party strategies from a spatial perspective on party competition, which historically has been tied to concepts in the tradition of Anthony Downs. Thus section 2.2.1. summarizes certain core assumptions as part of a Downsian rational choice logic and discusses advantages as well as critique and extension (most prominently by directional concepts and salience theory). Building on this discussion and based on recent literature, in section 2.2.2. an integrated concept of party competition on issues and positions is suggested as a basic conceptual framework for the ensuing analysis.

2.2.1. Parties in spatial competition: Foundations & extensions in tradition of Downs

Concepts of rational party behavior on a spatial basis generally refer to Anthony Downs as their common founding father. Although his seminal work in large parts debates questions from a non-spatial perspective, his famous assumptions about general patterns of party behavior in two-party as well as multiparty-systems have been guiding spatial analysis of party behavior – at least indirectly – up to the present day. Downs’ model is founded on a specific understanding of voter choices, i.e. voters choose parties that pursue issue positions closest to their own preferences (proximity argument). Applied to a spatial map of political competition (either multidimensional or – as primordarily discussed by Downs – single-dimensional) scholars are enabled to locate both a party’s issue stance as well as an individual voter’s preference, to calculate the shortest distance
and therupon to predict voting decisions. This premise resulted in an essential and probably the most quoted argument inherent in Downs work, i.e. the “median voter theorem” – assuming that the nature of two-party competition would cause parties to move towards each other in positional terms. In this terms, convergence would be the rational decision because parties can assume that in case of them moving towards the center, even extremist voters on the own fringe of the spectrum will still prefer them to the opponent (for the voter-party distance of the opponent still remains larger than the party’s own distance to these extremist voters). By moving towards the opposite position a party thus expands its appeal by enlargening its voter spectrum (Downs 1957: 116). Yet, referring to Smithies (1941), Downs narrows the argument by adding an “elastic demand at each point of the scale”, considering those voters at the extremes who might detach themselves if a party-identity becomes too centrist and who choose for abstention instead of compromise (Downs 1957: 117). These limitations hinder parties to converge beyond a point where they would be loosing more voters at the extremes than gaining voters at the center.

In a multi-party setting, however, the basic theorem of centripetal party behavior becomes problematic, mainly because the space of movement for parties becomes tighter. Downs assumes that “political parties cannot move ideologically past each other” and characterizes this as a “relative immobility, which prevents a party from making ideological leaps over the heads of its neighbors” (Downs 1957: 122). Consequently, party behavior in multi-party-settings is expected to differ from two-party-settings: Such a constellation would provide no stimuli for the parties to converge ideologically because the amount of lost voters evens the amount of voters gained. As a consequence, Downs concludes that “it is likely that in multiparty systems, parties will strive to distinguish themselves ideologically from each other and maintain the purity of their positions; whereas in two-party systems, each party will try to resemble its opponent as closely as possible.” (Downs 1957: 126). Though Downs disregards the topic of multi-party competition, in the sense of the present study he leaves the notion that even strategic behavior of a vote-seeking nature might cause parties to stick to their ideological core (as long as they cannot expect a gain of voters by shifting issue positions).
Within the range of some restrictions\textsuperscript{13} Sartori (1976) depicted his assumptions about party behavior in a comparable manner to Downs. By including ideological distance as a key variable into his model of party systems he likewise concluded that different conditions of party systems lead to different forms of competition: bipolar systems differ from moderate pluralism and even more distinctively from conditions under polarized pluralism for the latter leads to a much stronger degree of centrifugal dynamics.\textsuperscript{14} In a cross-country comparison of twenty parliamentary democracies Andrews/Money (2009) empirically documented the validity of Sartori’s assumption by demonstrating that an increasing number of parties leads to a greater ideological dispersion. Yet, this connex levels off at the number of five parties (since dispersion remains the same or even decreases in party systems with six or more parties).

However, these basic Downsian assumptions obviously have been criticized and modified henceforth. On an empirical level, conflicting findings\textsuperscript{15} regarding the traditional assumptions as articulated by Downs or Sartori have led to a number of extensions as well as alternatives, most of them carrying on a spatial perspective but trying to improve the behavioral principles articulated by Downs. In line with the underlying Downsian proximity argument, Converse (1975) has already observed that policy positions of political parties tended to be more extreme than those of their classic voters – which puts the basic motive for rational-efficient party behavior in doubt. Beyond that, findings from longitudinal empirical analysis of post-war democracies showed that parties (at election level) do not converge but stick to quite stable issue positions in multi-party as well as two-party-systems (Budge, 1994; Adams, 2001). On this account the supposed party orientation towards the median-voter did not prove to be valid, instead behavior rather fitted into a cleavage-based model of party behavior (ibd.). McDonald et al (2004b)

\textsuperscript{13} Sartori (1976: 346) argues that – even in two-party-systems – a median-voter-argument might be applied only under specific conditions, most importantly that the undecided voters are moderates not extremists and that parties compete in the same issue-space.

\textsuperscript{14} Sartori sketched similar conditions for party systems including two, three or four parties, arguing that also the “competitive configuration of three-partism remains bipolar” (Sartori 1976: 348) and that four-party systems merely are a "subdivided, or doubled, representation of the two-party scheme", i.e. they maintain a centripetal type of interaction (ibd.). According to Sartori the critical threshold for a shift towards centrifugal tendency arrives with five parties or more, for the space is enlarged and the competition within such a space allows for increasing mobility. Sartori has come to describe this leap as the turn from “moderate” to “polarized pluralism” and argues that the emergence of three or more poles in combination with a relevant center makes convergent behavior ineffective, instead the presence of relevant extreme parties at the poles stimulate for intensified polarization. However, as Sartori emphasizes, the expansion and polarization is limited because either a party spectrum finally collapses due to overstretch or at a certain point begins to shrink (Sartori 1976: 348ff.)

\textsuperscript{15} For a discussion cf. Budge 2006: 426-27.
empirically supported these findings, concluding that party responses most prominently are linked to their ideology than to any other factor, such as “empirical problem indicators” or “public opinion”. Adams et al (2004) equally highlighted the importance of parties’ ideology, although they also identified significant relevance of public opinion influencing parties’ policy positions – mostly for “disadvantaged parties” (i.e. parties adjust their ideologies according to public opinion when public opinion clearly shifts away from the party’s ideological position).

On a conceptual level objections have been made from different directions, either focusing on the spatial design itself (e.g. criticizing the insufficiency of uni-dimensional rational models concerning the interpretation of complex political behavior, cf. Green/Shapiro 1994) or on the behavioral conclusions that were drawn by Downs with regard to his rational concepts of parties. Though in terms of Downs’ competitive model, critique has most convincingly been forwarded by proponents of “directional models” and “salience theory” on party competition.

Critique and Extension: Directional and Salience theory. On a conceptual level a primary source of extension of standard spatial concepts derived from “directional models” of party competition such as discussed by Matthews (1979), Rabinowitz/MacDonald (1989) or Macdonald et al (1991). Their common objection is that parties are evaluated upon by voters not by the same but by different issue criteria and – maybe even more importantly – that voters have no specific policy interests, thus “at best, voters know which side of an issue debate they favor.” (Macdonald et al 1991: 1108). In a directional model, then, there is no room for a variety of policy positions on an issue continuum, instead every issue is conceptualized as a dichotomous choice around a neutral center position: “Just as voters are located on one side or the other of each issue, so are the parties. And just as voters differ in intensity, so do the parties.” (Macdonald et al 1991: 1107). Opposed to the median voter theorem the directional model argues that the direction of distance is of greater relevance, since voters do not evaluate parties whatsoever if they take a centrist position on an issue. That is why parties are rather expected to take strong positions on issues and consequently will avoid the center in order to attract mobilization (ibd.).

Furthermore voters are expected to choose only those parties that are considered most

16 To put it in methodical terms: “Rather than the absolute difference (or Euclidean distance) between party and voter, the directional model relies on the product of the voter position and the party position (the scalar product) to measure preference for the party. Parties will then benefit from having extreme positions on issues and will thus avoid the center.” (Karp/Banducci 2002: 125)
likely to advocate policy changes in their preferred direction (thus rather leading to greater party divergence than to converging behavior in terms of politicization) (Hinich/Henning/Shikano 2004: 37).

Consequently, the anticipated behavior would rather match a model of “conflict- or cleavage-oriented politics” (Macdonald et al 1991: 1126). Referring to this kind of approach, parties then are expected to put more emphasis on “their” electorate’s policy issues as well as directions, and thus would be inclined to prioritize “voter affect” over rational cost-benefit calculations. Yet, empirical evidence on the tenability of either proximity or directional models, however, does not offer a distinct answer. While Macdonalds et al (1991) point to a superiority of the directional model even in multi-party contexts, empirical evidence of other studies suggests that although party positions in European democracies preponderantly deviate from a median voter position, they are not as polarized as suggested by the directional model (Dalton, 1985; Iversen, 1994; Adams/Merrill, 1999; Karp/Banducci 2002). Yet the debate about the greater suitability of either proximity or directional models has remained vital up to the present day and has been pacified only by suggestions of combined or unified models (cf. Iversen 1994; Merill/Grofman 1999).

A quite similar critique comes from “saliency theory” as discussed by Budge/Farlie (1983) or Budge (1987) that puts an emphasis not only on proximity shifts but on the manipulation of favorable policy dimensions by political parties in general. The core argument of salience theory is that different parties are associated in the different policy areas with generally desirable goals. Consequently, the supply by parties can be described better in terms of different priorities they attach to specific issues, than via different positions on all possible policy aspects delivered by all competing actors – which in fact is the key assumption of uni-dimensional left-right-scales. Opposing the Downsian model, Budge/Farlie (1983: 270) state “that most of the influential rational choice theories rest on an exclusively confrontational interpretation (...) so that competition unambiguously consists of a direct confrontation of different policies on common issues”.

According to Budge/Farlie, however, parties consequently follow a strategy of „selective emphasis“ thus – based on an anticipation of voters’ attributions to party profiles – they highlight mainly those issues that correspond with their ascribed qualities whereas unfavorable issues (linked to weak points of a party), if at all, are addressed only superficially. These ascribed competences have later been labeled as “issue ownership” (Carmines/Stimson 1993; Petrocik 1996) referring to a political party’s “reputation for
policy and program interests, produced by a history of attention, initiative, and innovation toward these problems, which leads voters to believe that one of the parties (and its candidates) is more sincere and committed to doing something about them” (Petrocik 1996: 826). Admittedly Budge/Farlie (1983) have pointed to the possible links of confrontational models and salience theory, arguing that „the two models of party competition are not mutually exclusive“, but in sum they assume a dominance of “selective emphasis” (Budge/Farlie 1983: 270).

Despite ambiguous empirical evidence, what both of these critical concepts of party competition – directional as well as saliency theory – have in common is the attempt to display the relevance of salience a party grants with respect to a certain issue. More importantly either concept expects centrifugal tendency to be the dominant mode in electoral politicization because center-positions hardly account for voter mobilization. This again supports the conclusion that ideology and a cleavage-based “issue ownership” might be the major points of reference for parties when choosing their competition strategies, given their “severe constraints on information” on voters actual will (cf. Pardos-Prado 2011). These uncertainties about decisive electoral preferences consequently can be compensated only by sticking to an a priori known core party ideology, since it serves as conceptual tool of orientation for both politicians and voters and “(a)s it often defines itself by contrast to other ideologies, it provides a way of defining and partitioning policy space and of indicating the broad area within which a particular party should take its position.” (Budge 1994: 446).

To sum up, a number of factors have come to light so far that have been revealed as being influential on party behavior on any given issue-dimension of political competition: Not only do spatial models of issue competition account for the “proximity” between voters’ and parties' issue position (irrespective of the direction of distance) but informed by “directional models” they also consider the direction of distance (for movement towards a centrist position endangers to lose voter affiliation which is characterized at least by a diffuse preference for a policy direction). This in fact would be an argument against centripetal convergence of parties and lead to a centrifugal tendency of divergence. However, as noted by salience theory, these assumptions do not hold true for any issue with any party. In fact different strategies for different parties are expected, dependent whether an issue is associated with a party’s ideological profile (i.e. where it obtains issue ownership) or not. In the latter case, instead of movement and shifting positions it is more
probable that a party will avoid to address an issue at all if a) there is an option to avoid it (which might not be the case if an issue is of enormous actual relevance for a society) and b) if it is not associated with the issue but with other issues. Subsequently, further work is obliged to take into consideration at least these central extensions of spatial theory on party behavior to arrive at a coherent model of issue competition. A recent example of an integrated approach has been forwarded by Bonnie M. Meguid (2008), combining these aspects into a “Position/Salience/Ownership” (PSO) model of party competition.17

2.2.2. An integrated approach: The PSO-model of party competition

Approaches to party competition in contemporary democracies apparently can be pursued on different levels of analysis, with issue-based strategies of competition being only one instrument amongst others. However, in recent decades party-competition has become way more issue-based than in previous periods (cf. Mair/Müller/Plasser 2004: 6). Equally Meguid (2008) pointed to the important shift of electoral circumstances since the early spatial models of Anthony Downs, arguing that from the 1970ies on Western European Democracies have produced patterns “of issue-based party competition (...) where voters cast their ballots based on policies, rather than class loyalties or partisanship” (Meguid 2008: 23f), a phenomenon already discussed by Inglehart (1990: 275ff). In a number of European countries this transformation corresponded to a rising number of political parties addressing new/transformed political issues and cleavages trying to attract a rising number of “realigning” voters (cf. Dalton/Alt 1984; Mair 1990).

As a response to this increased importance of issue-orientation by voters and parties, Meguid (2008) offers an integrative approach of party competition. Under increasingly mobile conditions for both voters and political parties, issue-based voter decisions of supporting/abandoning a party – according to Meguid – are shaped by basically three factors: Whether a) a “party's issue is considered salient, or important”, b) a “party's position on a given issue is attractive” to voters and c) a “party is perceived to be the rightful 'owner' of that policy stance” (Meguid 2008: 24). By integrating the three aspects

17 It is important though to keep in mind that the nature of politicization varies according to different moments of the political process. While inter-election periods can be characterized by a more complex and issue-specific way of dealing with policy-fields (in legislatures and governments), election periods of course lead to a compression of issue-complexity on the one hand and issue-diversity on the other. As a consequence not only the debate about any single issue might be condensed to general position markers regarding the respective issue but also the competition as a whole might be compressed "into one unidimensional left-right space” (Budge 2006: 429f).
For a more detailed discussion of different electoral channels of politicization, see chapter 3 of the present study.
of “salience”, “position” and “ownership” into one model Meguid aims to overcome deficiencies of standard spatial theory. She designs her model of issue based competition as an explanation for the shifting patterns of conflict between political parties. More precisely her work can be described as an effort to shed light on a specific type of conflict in party competition, i.e. the response of mainstream parties to increasing niche party challenge – a pattern that has become typical for a number of Western democracies during the last centuries and that has been specifically relevant for the Austrian party system (making Meguids model a fruitful tool of analysis). Meguid describes party behavior on the level of issue based competition as an interaction of three strategic options, two of them (I / II) referring to the party position on a respective issue in question, according to Meguid: Thus if political parties are confronted with opponents trying to politicize specific issues to their own disadvantage, they are limited to merely two options: i.e. “(…) movement toward (policy convergence) or movement away from (policy divergence) a specific competitor”. While the former (converging) behavior is labelled an accommodative strategy (I), the latter (diverging) behavior is described as an adversarial strategy (II) (Meguid 2008: 24).

However, positional shifts themselves are insufficient as long as they are communicated only marginally. Consequently, besides the strategies of adapting an issue position it is rather more important to alter issue-salience in order to signal the relevance of the issue to voters (Meguid 2008: 24f). Thus a positional shift of a party compared to its opponents does only have an impact if at the same it is linked to increased salience of the issue – otherwise the shift might not be taken into account by voters. The relevance of issues-salience for positional-shifts then opens up a third strategic option (III) of responding to a competitor’s pressure: that is to downplay the relevance of the issue at all by simply depoliticizing it. In order to avoid increased salience of issues that might be unfavorable for the party’s own, profile depoliticization might in fact be an even more promising strategy (a dismissive strategy as Meguid calls it) than to directly deal with the issue positions of an opponent. This is especially true for issues that are not dominated by traditional mainstream parties, since they represent the fertile grounds on which niche parties can effectively compete. Although parties face limits regarding the “number of different campaign themes, to avoid giving his communication recipients the impression of being too dispersed” (Maarek 1995: 46), there are still varied options for different types of parties: While mainstream parties generally draw on a broader spectrum of issues, the opportunities of niche parties’ are usually limited to a small range of issues.
that are orthogonal to the traditional issue-dimensions. Hence salience on these dimensions is vitally important for niche party success (Meguid 2008: 26). A dismissive strategy of depoliticization thus goes beyond the mere focus on issue-positions and their salience by including the importance of a party’s issue-ownership (or credibility) regarding a specific policy issue. It points to the fact that voter decisions quite importantly are influenced by their perception of who owns an issue in question – a fact that has been overlooked by the proximity model of standard spatial theory (assuming indifference of voters about their policy-options as long as they are equally distant) (Meguid 2008: 26). Nonetheless even “issue ownership” is not a static factor but open to change (cf. Bélanger 2003), thus parties who continuously challenge an opponent’s issue ownership might achieve significant shifts in voter attribution. As a consequence Meguid weakens another argument of standard spatial theory, arguing that competition and movements of parties do not occur in a “fixed policy space”. Instead the analysis of issue competition needs to consider at least two more aspects by including salience as well as issue-ownership, for both of these aspects can transform the space of competition (Meguid 2008: 25ff). In combining these elements the static foundations of early spatial models are increasingly weakened, as is the case with the claim that parties can only compete with neighboring parties. On the contrary if “(…) strategies can also alter issue salience and ownership, then parties can target opponents anywhere on that dimension. Ideological proximity is no longer a requirement.” (Meguid 2008: 32)

Following the conclusions drawn by Meguid, we can finally use the three aspects of “position”, “salience” and “ownership” to develop assumptions about individual party behavior on a specific policy issue. Such an approach promises to be fruitful since Meguids behavioral suggestions are quite homogenous with modeling attempts raised by other scholars, also highlighting salience & position as primary instruments of strategic competition over political issues.

For example, William Downs (2001) tried to detect different modes of reactions applied by mainstream parties in the light of far-right success. Maintaining a very general level he distinguishes between strategies of disengagement (i.e. “ignoring” or “isolating”) on the one and strategies of engagement (i.e. “co-opting”, “collaborating” or “imposing legal restrictions”) on the other hand. In his qualitative interviews with elected local councilors in Antwerp and Oslo he concluded that although the influence of far-right success on
mainstream party behavior can be observed on different levels\textsuperscript{18}, the discursive convergence would be the first sign prior to any other sign of actual collaboration. Recently also Bale et al (2010) have suggested a model for mainstream party behavior in response to niche party pressure, distinguishing three types of strategies, similar to those discussed by Downs and Meguid (see Tab. 1). Thus they identify a strategy of “defusing” the issue of niche party competitor, in order to cut the competitive playground for the opponent. If, however, a mainstream party engages in issue based competition with its niche party competitor, it has to choose between two options according to the authors: either “holding” an oppositional stance in contrast to the opponent or finally “adopting” an issue position similar to those of the niche party competitor, thereby approximating to the opponent. With this model they contribute to a literature strand that sketches mainstream party behavior in rational terms and thus supposes a subordination of parties’ issue stances under strategic interests of maximizing power. Tab. 1 brings these independent models together and heuristically extracts their common denominator regarding mainstream party behavior for new issues as emphasized by niche parties.

\textbf{Tab. 1:} Issue based strategies for party behavior in the light of opponent’s success

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<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Ignoring</td>
<td>Dismissive Strategy</td>
<td>Defuse</td>
<td>Party trying to downplay the salience of an issue by depoliticizing it</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Isolating</td>
<td>Adversarial Strategy</td>
<td>Hold (opposing position)</td>
<td>Party trying to challenge a competitor by overtly politicizing opposing issue positions</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Co-opting</td>
<td>Accomodative Strategy</td>
<td>Adopt</td>
<td>Party aligning its issue positions &amp; the ascribed issue salience towards the competitors preferences</td>
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\textit{Note:} The table is of heuristic nature and aims to pin down the common denominators of the strategies outlined by the different models. Thus not every feature of each strategy is considered but a rough description of their common thrust is given.

Equipped with these general models on mainstream party behavior, we have gathered a first basis for an analytical framework: A party generally can be linked to a specific set of issues that are attached with its ideology and profile. With regard to the issues it possesses, both salience is expected to be high and position will remain clearcut.

\textsuperscript{18} Dependent on whether an analysis focuses on "bargaining impacts" (i.e. an actors capacity to influence the creation of government building) on "policy impacts" (i.e. a measurable shift of policy output that can be linked to an actors consequent ability to pressure governing parties or to participate in governmental coalition itself) or on "discourse impacts" (i.e. a measurable shift of policy formulation strategies of existing parties).
according to the party’s ideological core. If a party lacks ownership concerning a specific issue, the most probable behavior is to depoliticize it as long as the issue remains avoidable. To the extent, that other parties successfully politicize an unfamiliar issue, a party faces more or less three options when trying to use issues as a rational means for strategic competition: a) It may continue to cut the salience of the issue in its own communicative appeals, b) it may engage in confrontation with its opponent by increasing salience and taking oppositional stances or c) it may join the competitor in its active politicization of a shared issue-position.

However, after discussing issue competitive strategies it still remains unclear, as to when parties are going to opt for either one of these choices. Though we have already identified the tools of strategic politicization, we still need to clarify the particular incentives that are at the bottom of certain ways of acting. Thus, we still lack theoretically grounded assumptions in at least two regards: a) On the one hand, we need to identify the motives that will lead to either one of the depicted competitive strategies, both with regard to mainstream and niche parties as parties on the left and on the right. b) On the other hand, we need to specify the way in which these assumptions may materialize in the course of specific issues like immigration, migrant integration and ethnic diversity. What are the patterns of ownership? Which parties are pressured by particular opponents? How do these parameters determine individual party’s behavior? The following section is dedicated to complete these pending theoretical steps in order to arrive at a framework of explanation. It will discuss recent literature on party strategies in the realm of immigration/integration/diversity, which unravels a conflicting picture of contemporary assumptions (2.3.1.). As a consequence, section 2.3.2. will finally plead in favor of a more coherent approach that links the distinction of party motives as mentioned in 2.1. with the instrumental options of electoral politicization as discussed in 2.2.

2.3. Party competition on immigration, migrant integration and ethnic diversity

Having discussed basic theories on party-behavior and their links to electoral competition, it is now possible to turn more specifically to the matter of interest: party competition on the fields of immigration, migrant integration and ethnic diversity. While general literature on party behavior has accumulated to an enormous reservoir, specific work on
party behavior regarding individual issues is less advanced. Beyond that, the majority of the literature has been discussing traditional issues and/or dimensions of political conflict (such as state intervention, market economy, welfare, peace, etc.). Hence, they mostly disregarded the probable differences between traditional and emerging issues, which might very well lead to divergent patterns of behavior. Consequently it is important to focus on literature of a rather recent kind that is specifically occupied with party competition on the issues of immigration/integration/diversity, in order to connect their findings with the conclusions of general spatial literature. The following sections aim to link general concepts on party behavior and politicization with these specific issues and the respective literature concerned with this question.

2.3.1. Immigration/Integration/Diversity and party behavior: Conflicting lessons from prior analyzes

Immigration, migrant integration and ethnic diversity have become major issues across Western democracies during the recent decades and political parties have been linked to this development in considerable ways. As Triadafilopolus/Zaslove (2006: 189) put it, “(...) immigration is an issue which parties on the left and right can use to define their identities, engender coalitions, or co-opt rivals”. Thus, without thinking of political parties as “critical nodes” for immigration politics and especially politicization, we fail to understand “the contested nature of concepts such as nationhood and rights, and (...) the increasingly deep cleavages on migration-related issues in contemporary liberal democracies.” (ibd.) The question, however, remains from which angle of the political spectrum a fruitful analysis of party competition needs to depart.

The contagion thesis as a common reference. Among the authors engaged in research on party competition on immigration/integration/diversity, large parts have tied the growing politicization of these issues to the emergence of increasingly active far-right parties all over Europe (cf. Kitschelt/McGann 1997; Downs 2001; Bale 2003; Norris 2005; Schain 2006). In this regard, it has to be critically remarked that the overwhelming focus on “anti-immigrant-parties” and their impacts, has somewhat blurred the possible effects of “pro-immigrant parties” that have also entered the scenes of Western democracies since the late 1970ies (cf. Triadafilopolus/Zaslove 2006). Only recently the role of Greens and libertarian parties has gained more prominence in party related research on immigration politics. Conversely, first references to the influence of emerging anti-immigrant parties
already arose in the late 1980s with regard to the French National Front’s impact on the established parties’ rhetoric, in particular the center-right mainstream party (cf. Schain 1987). Since then, a number of authors have carried on the debate: Admittedly, even until the 1990ies there was still room for the assumption that mainstream parties would stick to a “hidden consensus” to depoliticize migration as a political issue and organize policy away from public attention as far as possible (Freeman 1995). However, faced with contrary evidence, Harmel/Svasand (1997) concluded that the success of anti-immigrant parties in fact had caused established parties to generally shift to the right during the 1990ies. The underlying argument of discursive contagion was explicitly confirmed by Pettigrew (1998: 95). Eatwell (2000) amplified this point by stating that “the extreme right can be legitimized when political discourse, especially on the center-right, becomes contaminated by its themes, notably ones related to immigration” (Eatwell 2000: 423f.). Minkenberg (2002) too emphasized that extreme right parties effectively transformed political discourse including mainstream parties’ appeals. Norris (2005) further stressed the power of the contagion effect caused by far right party success and its effect on European center-right parties. Thus, a contagion effect of anti-immigrant parties on party competition in European democracies in general as well as on center-right parties specifically has been a stimulating strand of research – also with regard to the development of assumptions on party behavior.

Amongst the more systematic typologies of party competition on immigration/integration/diversity, Bale (2003) tried to pin down issue-specific strategies of center-right parties. Being the closest ideological neighbor to increasing far right parties, he expected them to be the first respondent to far right success. Hence, he hypothesized that the growing number of post-millenium right bloc coalitions in European countries was preceded by a converging behavior on behalf of center-right parties regarding their far right counterparts (Bale 2003: 70). Although referring to simply qualitative observations, Bale concludes that at least three out of five countries (Austria among them) have witnessed a center-right priming of immigration and convergence with far-rights positions prior to establishing modes of cooperation\(^\text{19}\) (Bale 2003: 78). Further evidence for the higher involvement of center-right parties competing with far right parties on immigration is offered by Carter (2005). Van der Brug et al (2005: 260f)

\(^{19}\) While the two other countries (Netherlands, Norway) did not support the hypothesis.
equally accentuate the strong influence competition between center-right-mainstream parties and far right parties (as well as the position of the center-right party) has on the evaluation of far right parties by voters.

Looking at the issue from a different angle, Bale even sketches out the pressure for center-left parties since significant parts of their electorate overlap with far right target groups (especially amongst low-educated blue-collar workers in urban areas, being the first victims of unemployment and alarmed about immigrant competition on the labor market) (Bale 2003: 71). Nonetheless even some years later Bale (2008) still does not give empirical answers, whether such an influence could also be diagnosed with regard to center-left parties. Nevertheless he partially shares the conclusions of Garner (2005) that anti-immigration is a core value for far right, center-right and in parts center-left all over Europe and not necessarily a result of an actual far right success in a specific country. As Garner demonstrated with evidence from the United Kingdom, restrictive immigration policies partially coupled with racist tones have existed already long before the new far right emerged all over Europe (Garner 2005: 124f.). However, when it comes to electoral politics the issue of immigration has emerged as “a core issue that mobilises Far-Right, Center-Right and to a lesser extend Center-Left voters” because it is “a topic that cuts across traditional affiliations” (Garner 2005: 126). Consequently even if the ideological proximity of center-right and far-right has been plausibly argued to cause stronger reactions to immigration/integration/diversity by center-right parties, the question remains under which conditions center-left parties will respond to far-right politicization, and even more to what degree they will do it and in which direction.

Meguid’s PSO-model offers cautious suggestions by pointing out the strategic importance of emerging issues for mainstream parties in their competition with niche party opponents. In the light of a diversifying issue spectrum, mainstream parties do not simply stick to their traditional issues but also “manipulate the salience and ownership of the new party’s issue” as far as it is strategically useful. As such issue competition is not limited to the “interaction between ideological neighbors” but becomes a strategic tool for the competition with non-proximal competitors as well (Meguid 2008: 357). This happens for the mere reason that by politicizing (and thus raising the salience of) the issue of a non-proximal niche party, a mainstream party can pressurize a mainstream party opponent that is closer to the niche party. Thus, “single-issue adversarial tactics” can be a vital instrument of mainstream party strategy (ibid.). According to Meguid this can even lead to an issue outliving its introducer, since „(i)migration and the environment (being the two
dominant issues of emerging far right and green niche parties, O.G.) have become mainstream campaign topics in most Western European countries, even though many of the niche parties that introduced them have disappeared.“ (ibd.)

In his cross-country comparison of eleven countries between 1994 and 2004 Van Spanje (2010) offers some empirical evidence for this assumption: He demonstrates, that, although there is a positive effect between far right party success and a general shift of other parties towards restrictive positions, no evidence whatsoever can be found for stronger contagion effects of center-right parties as compared to other parties. Instead he concludes that even far left parties (Greens and Communists) become endangered to give up their liberal and/or multicultural positions (Van Spanje 2010: 16). Recently also Bale et al (2010) have been supporting the argument of Meguid by not only pointing to the long evident overlap in the far-rights’ and social democrats’ electorate (among blue-collar workers, uneducated and globalization losers), but to further arguments that have become apparent within the last two decades: on the one hand „they increase the salience of issues traditionally ‘owned’ by the right” thus causing troubles for center-left parties having no issue ownership regarding the issues of immigration/integration/diversity; in the light of the recent decade, on the other hand – and strategically even more important – far right parties „facilitate the formation of center-right governments” and thereby indirectly create more options for the center-right mainstream competitor (Bale et al 2010: 410f). From this perspective handling the far rights presence becomes a vast strategic factor, which center-left parties have to take into account. In the light of this kind of strategic danger it might even be of lesser importance that there is a quite noticeable ideological irritation among far right populists as well, while their center-right conservative neighbors do share an ideological intersection which is rather contrary to the solidarity-based and egalitarian values of most social democratic parties (Bale et al 2010). The result of their four-country-comparison turns out to be quite ambivalent. While their findings include diverse patterns of social democratic response to far-right pressure in all four countries – varying in „the substance, the scope or the pace of that response” – the authors nonetheless come to the conclusion that generally „the response of center-left parties is determined not just by the populist far right itself but also by the behavior of the mainstream right and of their left and/or liberal competitors, as well as by actual and potential dissent within their own ranks.” (Bale et al 2010: 423). This variety of factors thus leads to different responses when parties try to manage the balancing act of combining slight positional adaptions without giving up too many of their core values and as result: their credibility (ibd.).
Summing up, the literature on strategic party behavior in the context of immigration/integration/diversity has produced several assumptions about actual strategies of different kinds of parties. While the strategies depicted for far right parties are more or less static (in the sense that they are expected to pursue high-salience and anti-immigrant positions), different considerations have been suggested with regard to the remaining party spectrum:

Concerning center-right parties, the assumed response to anti-immigrant politicization is that of an accommodative (converging) strategy combined with increased salience of the issues. The logic behind these arguments is that center-right parties, due to voter-emigration to the far right opponent, need to articulate stronger (law&order) positions in order to signal attraction to the disappointed voters (cf. Downs 2001; Bale 2003). Conversely, with regard to center-left parties the assumptions are diverse. While Meguid (2008) assumes an adversarial (diverging) strategy opposed to the far right, in order to put the center-right competitor under pressure, Bale et al (2010) rather expect center-left parties to give up their adversarial tactics in the light of increasing far right pressure and thereby opt for depoliticizing and finally accommodative (converging) strategies as well. Finally, with regard to far left parties, only few explicit assumptions can be found in the literature. Partly because their role has received less scholarly attention until the recently, partly because similar arguments as applied to far right parties can be contended also for some far left parties (i.e. stable strategy of high-salience but pro-immigrant positions).

2.3.2. Synopsis: In need of a synthetic approach to party politicization on immigration/integration/diversity

The remarks cited above illustrate the lack of clarity that still encompasses the literature on issue based strategies of competition of political parties in the context of immigration/integration/diversity: Not only do we find assumptions that are unequally advanced and validated for certain types of parties (with center-right parties being the most debated ones whereas center-left and far left parties being still underhighlighted). We are also confronted with contradicting arguments as soon as different underlying party motives are assumed (as for example with regard to center-left party behavior). Beyond that, a number of questions do remain that so far have not been addressed sufficiently: a) Is there a potent actor from the far left, who opposes far right politicization and thus increases pressure from the other side of the party? In this case not only center-left parties will be more cautious in adapting issue positions close to the radical right, but
also center-right parties would have to weigh the danger of a majority on the left bloc against the possibility of a right bloc majority (cf. Triadafilopoulos/Zaslove 2006). b) What response do center-right parties take on the issue in question? As long as they join center-left mainstream parties in defusing the issue or even excluding far right parties, center-left will remain to do same. By the time center-right parties take over accommodative strategies, center-left parties will be forced to alter their positions (according to the other factors).

In a nutshell, this discussion demonstrates the need for a synthesis of so far only partial explanatory approaches. This synthesis, thus, has to take into account the unequal points of departure of different parties and thus needs to entertain a more systematic approach to reveal the motives that lie behind different strategies of politicization of political parties. 

The goal of the present dissertation is to contribute to the clarification of these existing lines of explanation. They altogether – at times rather implicitly, at times explicitly – have referred to different motives driving parties competitive behavior: the most important ones being *party ideology, vote maximization* as well as *coalition evaluations*. These underlying motives pushing party’s strategies of politicization closely fit into the conceptional assumptions discussed in chapter 2.1.2., distinguishing between *policy-seeking behavior* (prioritizing ideological and/or specific policy interests over strategic considerations for maximizing votes or increasing chances to take office) on the one hand and *vote-seeking behavior* (using issue-management and shifting policy-positions for the sake of winning more votes) or even merely *office-seeking behavior* (sacrificing policy interests as well as potential voter segments for the sake of improving chances to build and enter a majority coalition). On the other hand however, the distinction is of somewhat analytical nature, since – as is emphasized by Müller/Strøm (1999: 11f.) or Wolinetz (2003: 153) – hardly any party is driven by merely one of these motives. Quite on the contrary, reality is characterized by an interplay of different motives that may change their meaning for parties over time. As a consequence it becomes necessary for the present study to depict the conditions that are necessary to explain whether any of these motives may explain behavior of Austrian political parties in the context of immigration/integration/diversity. The lack of consistent results across the studies discussed above leaves a number of question marks on which intrinsic elements of party competition can be identified as a major influence on mainstream and niche party politicization likewise. Beyond that, further explanatory factors such as socio-structural
developments within the policy fields of immigration/integration/diversity or the influence of public opinion on these issues have received little attention in this debate. Still, both of these aspects might offer strong incentives to address these issues more intensively or even with a specific positional direction.

Consequently chapter 4 aims to introduce the particular context and conditions for Austrian party competition on immigration/integration/diversity. In doing so it firstly refers to aspects that could be subsumed under societal inputs, namely empirical conditions of immigration to Austria, the conditions of ethnic minorities living in the country (4.1.1.) as well as the role of public opinion and public discourse shaping the competitive space of the immigration/integration/diversity for political parties (4.1.2.) (cf. Green-Pedersen 2008). In these chapters the external dimension of party competition will be addressed, arguing that parties do find different incentives to engage in politicization on immigration/integration/diversity over time. The main focus of the dissertation, though, is directed to the intrinsic dimension of party competition. As such, section 4.2. develops the argument that the strategic assessment of policy, vote and office seeking motives largely accounts for parties’ strategies regarding politicization of immigration/integration/diversity. Accordingly, it is necessary to empirically highlight the factors that would become decisive incentives from this strategic, inter-party dimension, namely the ideological roots of competing parties (4.2.1.), the number and success of effective parties participating in Austrian party competition (together with the patterns of voter transition between them) (4.2.2.) as well as the majority conditions for different types of coalitions within the party spectrum and the history of coalition formation (4.2.3.). Thus section 4.2. aims to discuss the different explanatory variables by a) pointing out the behavioral assumptions linked to each of these conditions, b) operationalizing meaningful and accessible indicators for these conditions and c) empirically discussing the Austrian case on the basis of these indicators. As a result specific hypothesis about the expected strategies of issue-politicization by Austrian political parties will be derived in order to unravel the explanatory potential of different influences on party competition on immigration/integration/diversity (see Fig. 1).
Prior to this chapter, however, the arena of competition under consideration needs to be qualified more specifically. Party competition relates to a variety of arenas that follow a different internal logic and – in some situations – lead to contrasting strategies by political parties, counterbalancing their own strategies in other arenas. Thus, the following chapter will narrow down the concept of electoral politicization, discuss its specific relevance within the greater picture of party competition and distinguish different campaign channels and their communicative intentions within the broader election campaigns.
III. Electoral politicization: Apex of Political Communication

Chapter II has been discussing concepts of party behavior and strategies of politicization both in a broad theoretical perspective as well as with specific regard to the issues of immigration, migrant integration and ethnic diversity. However, so far no comments have been made about the arena of competition that is taken into consideration. Yet it is important to clearly distinguish different political loci, precisely because they impose different limitations as well as options on the strategies of political parties. What is important for the present study is the very specific context that is created by electoral competition as compared to other arenas of political action. Especially in the context of emotionally charged issues such as immigration and ethnic diversity, the electoral arena is the crucial sphere for an analysis of party politicization, since it condenses preferences and relevance to a prototypical core for each party. Thus, this chapter is dedicated to two goals: Firstly, it discusses the specific conditions set out by the electoral arena and their relevance for party competition and individual party campaigning. Hence, the following section addresses the distinction between the electoral and other forms of political competition and aims to locate the Austrian electoral system within the framework of this discussion (3.1.). Secondly, electoral campaigns are disjoined into diverse communicative goals that political parties need to include into their campaign efforts. The section thus suggests a closer study of the different campaign channels and strives for a discussion of the diverse roles of programmatic and daily campaign communication for parties’ politicization strategies (3.2.).

3.1. The electoral arena as party environment

Electoral competition and the role of parties. Political parties compete for power and policies in a number of different contexts with each of them constituting a particular framework for political action (cf. Wolinetz 1988: 5f). Panebianco distinguishes different “environments directly influencing parties” and depicts them as “arenas in which relations between parties and other organizational actors take place.” (Panebianco 1988: 207) These arenas are interdependent and advantages/limitations in one arena can heavily set the opportunities/restrictions in another. Thus, parties’ action in various arenas can be apprehended as a means to stimulate resources necessary for their existence and success in an overall perspective. Number and size of these arenas might vary according to time
and space, however “the two which are always ‘relevant environments’ are the electoral and the parliamentary arenas.” (Panebianco 1988: 208). E.g., the parliamentary arena differs drastically, since its main procedures are linked to the creation of both specific policies as well as to the necessity of obtaining the majorities required to pursue them (cf. Strömbäck 2007: 59). As a consequence, in parliamentary settings political actors have to be equipped with a lot more pragmatism, conflict capacities, negotiation skills, etc. than in other arenas.

In contrast to the parliamentary arena, the need for negotiation and pragmatism is much more limited in the electoral arena, because election campaigns do primarily serve the purpose of voter-allocation. Thus, although coalition scenarios will certainly be kept in mind by party strategists, they are of lesser importance as compared to the daily politics within the parliamentary arena. This, in parts, results from the different degrees of public attention devoted to particular arenas. While the parliamentary arena is a permanent and thus less newsworthy locus (which consequently is covered more selectively), the electoral arena features specific conditions that derive from its prominent role in democracies: it allows access to all legitimate political parties/candidates, disregarding their size, organization or goals; it increases public attention by voters meeting their responsibilities; it equally raises media attention due to parties’/candidates’ activities and recipients’ demands for information; finally the electoral arena intensifies the confrontation of competing ideologies and interests. This makes electoral competition the archetypical research context for party policization, especially with regard to issues such as immigration, migrant integration and ethnic diversity – being emotionally charged, of broad social concern and of more or less permanent relevance.

In representative democracies elections have become the crucial node of political decision-making, because they link the interests of “the people” to the actions of “its representatives”. Elections are the vital nerve of a democratic systems, since they represent the condensed moment of the transference of the people’s will, which is a specific aspect of democracy. Yet elections not only transfer the people’s choice into hierarchies of political representation, their outcomes also set the ground for the materialization of power of political actors. For that reason, in all democracies the dominant political actors spend huge efforts to create effective elections campaigns. The dominant actors of first order elections might vary according to the type of a country’s electoral system. In electoral systems based on proportional representation, political parties have become the major actors of competition whereas they are less dominant in
systems based on single-member-districts (SMDs) and the election of individual candidates. Equally decisive is the difference of government institutions, since presidential systems per se favor candidate-centered election campaigns (even if the legislature is elected on the basis of proportional representation, as is the case in many Latin American democracies). Conversely, parliamentary systems generally tend to promote the role of parties, even though their influence is much weaker in Westminster type democracies (relying on SMDs) than in systems using proportional representation (Wlezien 2010: 101). Another important environmental factor which is closely linked to the specific form of the electoral system is the nature of the party system. Of course, the more polarized the party spectrum the more vigourous election campaigns will become (cf. de Vreese 2009). But even multi-party systems can vary significantly in stability, which leads to a more polarized and short-term behavior by political parties the more instability and uncertainty are increasing (Panebianco 1988: 208f.).

Determining the characteristics of the Austrian case, we find an electoral system that has been based on proportional representation since 1945 and thus has been structurally open for a fragmented spectrum of political parties – as long as they surpass a 4%-threshold of national votes or obtain of a regional direct mandate (Grundmandat). Although this electoral threshold has been still lower than in other countries, it has effectively limited the number of relevant parties for most periods of the 2nd Republic (see chapter 4.2.2.). However, in light of this barrier, the role of parties in the Austrian electoral system has been fostered ever after, since individual candidates mostly lacked the capacities to effectively conduct costly and enduring campaigns. Another factor that contributed to party-centrism in Austrian federal politics is the electoral rule of open election slates, offered by political parties, with only intervening options of preference votes by the electorate. As a result of this rule, voters vote for parties rather than candidates (who themselves are suggested and listed by party conventions) – all of which leads to a homogenization of parties’ public appearance and action (cf. Müller 1997: 216f.). Thus, when we compare the Austrian electoral system with other Western democracies, we can clearly identify a predominantly party-centered nature of competition (cf.

20 To be precise, since 1945 two major reforms of the electoral rules have been conducted (1970 & 1992). While none of them changed the 4%-threshold, the reform of 1970 at least facilitated the chances for small parties by reducing the number of (thus enlargening) electoral districts and increasing the number of available seats (cf. Müller 1997: 219). However, the resulting rules did hardly materialize in an increase of parliamentary parties (most prominently, both Green lists in 1983 failed to pass the threshold and only with a combined effort in 1986 managed to enter the Austrian parliament).
Pelinka/Rosenberger 2000: 146ff). This is even substantiated by the fact that the option of preference votes has been exercised only tenuously by Austrian voters – which further illustrates the prominent role parties play for the electorate’s perceptions. In sum, this makes Austria a highly fruitful case for the analysis of party politicization of immigration, migrant integration and ethnic diversity.

With the identification of electoral competition as being a promising area of analysis, the questions remains, though, how party politicization is embedded in this context, since the electoral arena itself represents a highly complex locus of political action. Following our issue-based definition of politicization, the crucial role of party campaigning is at the center of our interest. Electoral competition places increasing pressure on parties to stage-manage their communication in order to succeed in a battle for attention (Franck 2003). Hence, it is an appropriate indicator to highlight the different relevance of policy-issues within a certain polity and the corresponding positions of parties regarding these issues. Of course, the co-evolution of political communication by parties and the media has led to the emergence of “permanent campaigns” and “policy campaigns”, i.e. continuous PR-endeavors that promote parties’ images and positions outside the usual logic of election cycles. However, their character still remains quite different from what has been called “near-term campaigns” or “three-and-a-half-week campaigns” that are focused on the preparation of critical junctures such as “election campaigns” (cf. Nimmo 1996: 37; Blumler/Kavanagh/Nossiter 1996: 50). As Kriesi/Bernhard/Hänggli (2009) emphasize, “crafting the message” has become the essential element of parties’ election campaigns. Yet while it is a common place “that parties face constraints in selecting campaign issues” (Nadeau/Petry/Belanger 2010: 369), the nature and specificity of these constraints have been characterized in a number of different ways. It has been argued that parties are restricted in their campaigns by the daily agenda as most importantly reflected by daily news and that they are allured to “ride the wave” of salient public issues (cf. Ansolabhere/Iyengar 1994; Sides 2006; Hayes 2008). These constraints may result in issue-convergence of parties and candidates (Sigleman/Buell 2004). Aldrich/Griffin (2003) even argue that parties will prioritize the public importance of certain policy-issues over their individual issue-ownership. However, we expect these patterns of issue-convergence to be drastically dependent on the type of campaign communication, that is taken into consideration. Arguing, that parties use a diverse set of channels to achieve different communicative goals, we will assume very different patterns of politicization
depending on the channel they are using. The following section thus aims to identify and characterize two contrasting goals of campaign communication and their consequences for politicization patterns.

3.2. The multi-dimensional character of election campaigns

Campaign evolution and channels of communication. The vital role of election campaigns in contemporary Western democracies is widely acknowledged, although the analysis of campaign strategies of political actors (rather than voter behavior) has received little attention among political scientists (cf. Kriesi/Bernhard/Hänggli 2009: 345). Election campaigns have been characterized by their prominent role of disseminating information between political parties/candidates and the “reasoning voter”, who usually is rather uninformed about governmental actions and parties’ actual work (Popkin 1991: 70; Arceneaux 2005). Admittedly, campaigns not only vary significantly when it comes to different layers of political organisation (federal, regional, local), they also have changed drastically in the recent decades. Though labelled differently by particular authors, a common consensus has emerged in the literature distinguishing three different core stages of the development of political campaigning.21 Despite different labels the characteristics of these periods are quite similar:

1. The first period of election campaigning can be dated to the 19th and early 20th century and is characterized by the dominance of direct and interpersonal campaign communication between candidates and voters as well as by short-term and ad-hoc planning on the part of the party leadership. Campaign organisation is very localized and based on personal-demanding campaign-tools addressed to local communities, such as “rallies, doorstep canvassing and party meetings” (Norris 2000: 137) as well as printed media-products (billboards, posters, newspaper advertisements).

2. By the midst of the 20th century, the emergence of radio and even more important television as dominant mass media channels urges parties to adapt their campaign strategies respectively. The greater need to “handle the media” supports early patterns of “mediatization” of campaign communication. Press releases and press conferences can be perceived as specific outcomes of this period, with election campaigns trying to establish permanent and differentiated information flows to journalists. In consequence, the first

21 Farell 1996 talks about a ‘premodern’ period followed by a ‘television revolution’ and ‘telecommunications revolution’; Norris 2000 as well as Plasser/Plasser 2002 call them the ‘premodern’, ‘modern’, and ‘postmodern’ periods whereas Farell/Webb 2000 simply label them “Stages 1-3”.
use of campaign advisors, autonomous party polling, political marketing instruments, and so on leads to a push in professionalization (cf. Norris 2000: 139ff.).

3. A third leap in the development of election campaigning appears at the end of the 20th century due to a bundle of new phenomena: a growing electoral dealignment; the emergence of new parties and the considerable increase of party system fragmentation; increasingly fragmented mass media supply both in traditional media as well as “new” media. These factors demand for an ever more complex campaign management on the parts of political parties. Today’s parties not only have to mobilize their electorate but need to convince (ever larger) groups of undecided voters as well. Segmented and targeted campaigns are a functional consequence of these changes and lead to the extensive use of new communication channels in order to appeal to undecided voters (Gibson/Römmele 2001: 33; Wlezien 2005: 105).

Although these phases are rather supplementing than alternating each other, the majority of campaign communication nowadays is done via the indirect use of media (de Vreese 2005: 119). As a consequence election campaigns have become ever more centralized and “within party organization more and more power is distributed to the party headquarters, resuming responsibility for the overall campaign.” (Gibson/Römmele 2001: 33). Nonetheless, costly resources in general are more available to mainstream parties, thus they can make use of a more diverse set of campaign channels (ibd.). However, unlike niche parties, mainstream parties have to bring their election campaigns into accordance with their permanent campaigns to a much stronger degree and governing parties need to synchronize their appeals with government’s and ministerial communication.

*The effective combination of campaign channels.* In a nutshell, elections campaigns have become more professionalized, mediatized and intensified during the last centuries. This development implies an increasing complexity of campaign elements especially with regard to their communicative dimension. The channels employed by political parties to submit “their messages” have drastically increased and turned to serve different interests of a campaign strategy that nowadays is strongly shaped by political marketing (Strömbäck 2007). In order to achieve their strategic electoral goals, political parties alternate the use of “direct and controlled channels of communication (e.g. political advertisments, meetings, pamphlets, direct mailing, speeches websites, manifestos, party broadcasts)” with “indirect and mediated channels of communication (e.g. media performances; any type of communication where journalists and (news) editors
Indirect forms of political campaigning address a potential and disperse audience via their appeal to organized mass media (tv-networks, newspapers, radio channels, etc.). By trying to stimulate mass media agendas as well as dominant frames of mass media discourse, they aim to influence a mediated public sphere to their own advantage. This campaign dimension includes channels primarily designed to arouse mass media attention, such as press conferences, press releases, interviews or any other form of mediatized events (Schulz 2008: 308). As opposed to this, the direct dimension of campaign communication aims to address potential voters without the mediation by professional journalism or other forms of organized media. Many of the instruments applied for this sake derive from the first period of political campaigning, such as printed materials (posters, billboards, advertisements, manifestos, brochures, etc.) as well as verbal forms (speeches, public events, seminars, canvassing, etc.) (cf. Schulz 2008: 309; Kriesi/Bernhard/Hänggli 2009: 351).

Yet, from a party competition perspective, not all campaign outlets are equally useful for the analysis of parties’ positions and their priorities. The decision to focus on specific campaign channels implies a selection among a broad range of options. As Budge (1987: 17) formulates: „So many statements, broadcasts, documents, films and reports emanate from parties in the course of an election, that under practical constraints one has to make choice. Either all the output can be studied for a few elections, or some representative portion can be analyzed over many“. At the same token it is exactly this variety of materials that offers highly fruitful approaches for political communication analysis, since they mirror the diverse conditions and settings in which political parties have to communicate their contents. For our purposes, i.e. the identification of the relevance of as well as the positions on immigration/integration/diversity in electoral campaigning on a longitudinal basis, a number of prerequisites have to be met: Firstly the material has to be recognized as an official expression of a party line at a given point time in order to detect something like “party positions” at all. This necessarily has to be an oversimplification of possible internal differences within a party, nevertheless, following standard rational choice models of party behavior it is a tolerated reduction. Secondly, the material has to show a certain degree of continuity and regularity for only then it can be regarded as a mirror of the position shifts of a party over time. Electoral communication has proved to

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22 However, in times of increasing interdependence and growing relevance of new media the distinction between indirect and direct campaign channels gets blurred because different instruments are increasingly used for both intentions (Schulz 2008: 309).
be the most fruitful approach with regard to such a long-term comparison. Thirdly it has
to be material that is used equally by all electoral contestants, disregarding variation in
the amount or intensity resulting from different campaign resources among political
parties.
Owing to the three prerequisites mentioned above, there is one particular dimension of
campaign communication that has become the most commonly used source for electoral
studies in political science, i.e. programmatic communication.

### 3.2.1. Programmatic communication of political parties

Content analytical research on party documents has a long research tradition and brings
several advantages compared to other strategies of party analysis. No other input source
(e.g. surveys of the electorate, interviews with party members, comments of experts,
interpretation by journalist observers and so on) offers a better opportunity to adequately
interpret parties’ policy stances and even more so shifts within these stances. Obviously,
other sources cannot provide the same coherence with regard to actual policy orientations,
for all of them suffer from the influence of third person interpretation. For this reason
original party programs have occupied a central status in the analysis of party profiles (cf.

*Political programs: characteristics and differences.* Among party centered campaign
channels, manifestos stand out in particular, mainly because “(…) they are unique being
the only authoritative party policy statement approved by an official convention or
congress. Possibly because of this they stand alone in being full ‘five year plans’ for the
represent one of the basic constitutive elements of political parties, ensuring a shaping of
party profile and political identity (Klingemann 1989: 99). Programs – irrespective of
their diverse forms – can be seen as one of the major carriers of party based political
communication, although they fulfil diverse internal as well as external functions of party
communication. There are various types of programs depending on factors like a) the
degree of concretion of political goals, b) the alignment with their applicability, c) the
width of their temporal horizon, d) the number of issues addressed as well as e) the
degree of obligation (Klingemann 1989: 99). This has led to the distinction of mainly
three types of programmatic party documents within the German (as well as the Austrian)
electoral context: a) Party platforms, b) (election) manifestos and c) action programs (ibid). As listed below, those three types of programmatic documents can be compared as following:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Party platform</th>
<th>(Election) manifesto</th>
<th>Action program</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>degree of concretion</td>
<td>Low</td>
<td>Medium</td>
<td>High</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>alignment with applicability</td>
<td>Low</td>
<td>Medium</td>
<td>High</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>width of temporal horizon</td>
<td>Wide</td>
<td>Medium/Tight</td>
<td>Tight</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>number of issues addressed</td>
<td>High</td>
<td>High/Medium</td>
<td>Low</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>degree of obligation</td>
<td>Low</td>
<td>Medium</td>
<td>High</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Source:* based on Klingemann 1989: 99, own endorsement

When analyzing policy positions over time, election manifestos bring some crucial advantages as compared to other programmatic documents: While the analysis of party platforms runs danger to overlook short term changes due to a too wide horizon and a low degree of policy concretion, action programmes, on the other hand, represent an unsatisfying source of research because of their irregular production (cf. Gottschlich 1989). Pelinka (1979: 8) points to a gradual increase of concretion regarding policy suggestions that distinguishes party platforms from election manifestos and thus contains a different degree of topicality. Not only do election manifestos avoid these disadvantages they also enable the researcher to make statements about various long-term aspects in question – like the salience of a specific issue in general, the continuities/shifts of position within a specific party or within the party spectrum as a whole or the relation of policy formulation and policy conversion with regard to governing parties (cf. Ickes 2008: 16f).

*Internal/external functions of party manifestos.* Manifestos do not draw their basic relevance from a direct impact on readers and supporters, in fact „manifestos and their equivalents are read by relatively few electors in most countries.“ (Budge 1987: 18). Their main importance rather comes from their indirect function, i.e. the influence on observers and commentators in public discourse, for they „can be singled out as a uniquely representative and authoritative characterization of party policy at a given point in time.“ (Budge 1987: 18). It is exactly this exterior function, that represents the primary impetus for choosing manifestos as a basis reference of party profiles. In short this aspect can be summarized with a quote by Klingemann (1987: 300): “election programs assess the importance of current political problems, specify the party’s position on them, and inform the electorate about the course of action the party will pursue when elected.”
Beyond their exterior relevance manifestos also fulfil intra-organizational – that is interior – functions for at least two reasons: Firstly, for a long time in post-war-democracies manifestos “have been legitimized by party conventions. Thus, they represent the party’s official point of view which is (...) meant to unite the party internally” (Klingemann 1987: 300). As a result of an intra-party-process of negotiation, manifestos thus quite convincingly can be perceived as a reference of THE party position treating the complex body of participants (from leadership to individual party member) as a homogenous body.23 Even if nowadays the formulation of a manifesto has become a less deliberated process, its intra-organizational significance is still very strong, since manifestos continue to serve as basic benchmarks for party members in times of increasingly diversified policy competences. Especially within the highly diversified contexts of electoral competition this guideline-function remains a much required internal aspect of manifestos.

Apart from their interior and exterior impact, manifestos also fulfil a third function, namely their inter-party coordination, that appears to be most striking from a strategic perspective on electoral competition. By highlighting specific issues as predominantly relevant, enunciating specific positions on these issues and suggesting certain measures to convert these positions into policies, political parties not only get a message across to members of their own ranks, probable opinion leaders, disseminators or their potential supporters. Even more, they signal preferences to their direct opponents, i.e. other parties competing in the same electoral arena. This is an important aspect considering that policy choices are made in the wake of a permanent anticipation of rivals, potential alliances and the opportunity structures a party is given to position itself within the spectrum of actors. Especially with regard to this aspect the analysis of policy positions in party manifestos can offer distinct indications of the specific development of politicization by Austrian parties.

23 Mohrmann (1979) quite interestingly sketched out four different ways a specific policy position can result from, distinguishing between a) a principle of majority rule (the majorities will defines the alignment/orientation of the party), b) a principle of basic area of agreement (the party positions derive from the least common denominator the competing factions can agree on), c) bargaining and horse-trading respectively (that is the agreement between the factions to accept the others position on one policy issue while obtaining the own position on another issue) or d) non-addressing (that is to leave those issues out of the manifesto that cause too much intra-party-contrast – even if such a strategy is to be expected only on issues that are of low relevance for the party in general) (Mohrmann 1979: 186ff).
3.2.2. Daily campaign communication

Programmatic communication, however, is only one of the various communicative strategies, that political parties pursue to get their messages across. In fact, electoral campaigns are continuous endeavors that urge parties to distribute their messages on a multitude of channels in order to ensure public attention. Because of the increased competition over public attention, influencing the agenda of mass media has become a major objective of election campaigning (Strombäck 2007). Thus, the concept of agenda-setting evolved as an important theoretical framework for the analysis of strategic communication – a point that is further substantiated by Maxwell McCombs who called the question of input sources the most recent (fifth) stage of agenda-setting-research (McCombs 2008: 141). Other scholars have used terms such as “agenda-building” or “media agenda setting” to refer to this phenomenon (Brandenburg 2002; Dearing and Rogers, 1996; Walters et al. 1996; Weaver et al. 2004). Its key argument is that strategic communicators are able to influence the media-agenda to their advantage by delivering continuous input for media selection processes. The tango-metaphor has become a common picture for the description of this relation between journalists and their sources, which to a vast part consist of strategic communicators. Whether political actors are to be perceived as leading the tango (cf. Gans 1980) or journalists are said to have greater dominance (cf. Strömbäck 2006), the connection remains a reciprocal one: On the one hand media coverage has turned into a main actor, linking political parties to their respective electorate (cf. Strömbäck 2010: 26) and satisfying consumers’ needs for information. As a consequence, journalists have become more and more dependent on a wider array of information material, that ranges from (direct) interpersonal ties with party staff to (indirectly) mediated services offered by party campaigns. On the other hand, strategic communication by political actors needs to be ever more diversified and sophisticated in order to have an impact on the media agenda at all (cf. Semetko/Schönbach 1999). A direct result of this adaptive approach by political parties is a growing “mediatization” of their campaign services, which have to fit into a media logic in order to increase the chances of them being noticed by journalists.

From the viewpoint of political parties, then, „(e)lection campaigns are agenda-setting games“ (Blumler/Kavanagh/Nossiter 1996: 51) and the capacity to influence media agendas has developed into an increasingly important ability in postmodern electoral
These “agenda-setting games” include a variety of channels and have become enduring processes that not only permanently screen public opinion and media coverage but continuously produce new contents to manipulate the agendas to their advantage. For the present analysis one specific aspect of mediatization needs to be highlighted the most, which is the “temporal aspect”. With political actors moving ever closer to the media logic, the schedules of the former become more and more aligned with the schedule of the latter (cf. Haynes/Flowers 2002; Carsey et al 2011). Whether it is press conferences, press releases, candidate interviews, etc. to meet the immediate needs of daily media on the one hand or background reports, pseudo events, manifestos etc. to meet the more detailed needs of weekly/monthly media on the other – political parties have to coordinate their campaign services with the varying frequency of information demands by different media actors. As Blumler/Kavanagh/Nossiter (1996: 51) have vividly put it with regard to the daily schedule of campaign managers: “Battle commences early in the day, with the party researchers looking at first editions of the daily press and analyzing overnight television coverage. The aim is to pick up the latest stories and give them a spin or relate them to the party’s chosen issue of the day. The party’s position on that issue is presented by spokespersons at an early morning press conferences and woven into susequent events and interviews of the day (...) aiming to catch the midday news with material from the morning press converences, staging leader ‘walkabouts’ in visually appealing settings in the afternoons for early evening news coverage, and inserting passages into leader speeches at party rallies in the evening for inclusion in the main nightly news” (Blumler/Kavanagh/Nossiter 1996: 51). With the establishment of “24 hour news cycles and instant access of news on the internet and social media” the need for permanent commentation and rapid response tools has even increased for strategic communicators, resulting in daily campaigning (cf. Wlezien 2005). Confronted with “real-time-coverage” of electoral competition by contemporary media, parties use immediate and flexible campaign channels to quickly influence the agenda and even more importantly “spin” current issues of public debate. Haynes/Flowers (2002) distinguish different “news cycles” (event cycle, campaign cycle, weekly cycle, annual cycle) that are monitored by campaign managers in order to time the release of campaign information (Haynes/Flowers 2002: 3): “Campaign news directors recognize this cycle

24 This influence in fact is not limited to the mere transfer of issue-saliene (first-level agenda setting), but can also be expanded to the transfer of salience on “attributes” (second level agenda setting) (cf. McCombs 2008). Thus strategic communicators even have the chance to shape the direction of public and/or media discourse by highlighting specific attributes of issues while downplaying or simply ignoring others.
and factor this into their calculations in constructing their roll-out strategy issuing more press releases in periods of high demand – the beginning of the week – and fewer during news lulls – the weekend.” (Haynes/Flowers 2002: 6)

Thus contemporary electoral competition is characterized by a highly volatile nature of election campaigns and electoral media coverage due to the increasing complexity of interests on behalf of different media actors, political parties, institutions and social movements, all of them being part of a battle of public attention. Consequently, with regard to the analysis of party agendas in the course of an election campaign, the mere reference to manifestos is hardly sufficient, because they do not reflect issue-developments during campaign periods at all. From a temporal perspective, however, it becomes a crucial task for campaign advisors to convert the programmatic communication of issues and positions into contents of daily discourse in pre-election times. Manifestos, though, give no hint whether parties are able (or willing) to promote their programmatic appeals on a daily basis. Yet it is exactly this permanence of daily campaign communication that increases the likelihood for party agendas and policy preferences to become relevant and persistent part of public discourse (a central aim of electoral communication). Thus, campaign managers have to link long-term and highly situational needs to communicate these interests.

Press releases: the party’s constant companion. In fact, official press releases have turned out to be the most useful source of analysis in order to understand whether parties transfer programmatic appeals into permanent campaign communication on the daily basis. From a scholarly perspective, press releases furthermore bring some advantages, since historically they are the only established campaign channel that has been produced on a permanent and daily basis (cf. Hopmann et al 2010). They are a vital tool for “rapid-response strategies” of parties trying to permanently set the agenda and respond to opponents’ or media stimuli. Hence, more than any of the other traditional channels used by political parties, press releases mirror the actual development of a specific election campaign and serve as an indicator of which issues and which positions are dominating the debate. As mentioned by Burton/Shea (2010: 182f), there is no other instrument that is more important and more suitable to “manage” the news and to sell the own parties candidates/issues to the media than press releases: “Releases announce candidate statements and upcoming events, attempt to spin breaking news, highlight endorsements,
and provide background facts that help reporters make sense of the race. This form of communication, inexpensive in both production and distribution, plays a central role in earned media strategy.” (Burton/Shea 2010: 183). Given the limited amount of available journalistic attention and the heaps of releases that are disseminated by all the organizations of public life, press releases are designed “to make life easy for reporters”: First of all they have to be kept short in order to aggregate the most basic information for the reader in a “bite”. Secondly their structure follows journalistic criteria for the composition of articles by including headlines, leads, pictures, by answering the important W’s and reflecting “the journalist’s inverted-pyramid format, with the most important information at the top and less important information farther down” (Burton/Shea 2010: 183). Thirdly, they are always designed to get a powerful message by using simple language, talking in third-person-style, including action verbs to strengthen their statements and by relying on as much facts as possible (ibd.) They are produced and disseminated on a permanent basis by different branches within party organizations, accumulating dozens of releases a day, some of them linked to each other in order to draw the media’s attention to a specific issue.

By applying the evaluation criteria of manifestos to press releases it becomes evident that the aims of the latter are directly opposed to the aims of programmatic communication. Press releases are a) highly concrete in their claims due to the b) small number of issues they address in a single edition – in fact they normally address only one issue at all. Owing to their actuality they c) commonly refer to short-term policy claims and measures that share a recent nature and that consequently d) are way more concrete and applicable than the general suggestions made in manifestos. This finally e) causes the highest degree of obligation for these suggested measures (see Tab. 3).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Tab. 3: Characteristics of political programs as compared to press releases</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>degree of concretion</strong></td>
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<tr>
<td>degree of concretion</td>
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<tr>
<td>alignment with applicability</td>
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<tr>
<td>width of temporal horizon</td>
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<tr>
<td>number of issues addressed</td>
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<td>degree of obligation</td>
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**Source:** based on Klingemann 1989: 99, own endorsement

In terms of the present study press releases have another major advantage compared to all other channels, especially those emerging in the third stage of campaign communication
They have been used by political parties already for a long time and thus allow for comparison throughout the whole examination period. Consequently the present dissertation distinguishes programmatic communication (covered by parties election manifestos) from daily communication (covered by press releases) of electoral campaigning and focuses on their interrelation in terms of issues and positions.

3.2.3. Consistency/Divergence of campaign communication

Campaign divergence and party types. A central question with regard to the different aspects of campaign communication thus is their degree of consistency and divergence respectively. From a normative perspective “cohesion of the communication campaign” is a crucial task for campaign management (cf. Maarek 1995: 197). In order to present a coherent profile to voters, the media and the public in general, campaign communication has to obtain a high degree of consistency between programmatic and daily campaign communication. Clear and coherent messages are a key element for campaign managers (cf. Blumler/Kavanagh/Nossiter 1996: 56). Thus, to assure a consistent party profile electoral campaigns are expected to promote the same choice of issues and positions across their different campaign channels.

However, the degree of sustaining such consistency can be assumed to vary significantly across different types of parties (cf. Adams et al 2006). Generally speaking, parties’ campaign strategies both in terms of “intensity of the mobilization and its direction are constrained by the amount of resources available”, thus asymmetric findings between different party types might be expectable (Kriesi/Bernhard/Hänggli 2009: 347). The different resources cited above are intertwined with fundamental discrepancies in terms of party scope and orientation. Mass integration parties have been the most dominant type of parties in Western democracies during the 20th century. In the wake of Kirchheimer (1966) a number of authors have characterized their transformation to catch-all-parties “(…) by their pursuit of votes at the expense of ideology, by their centrist and often inconsistent platforms designed to appeal to ever wider audiences” as well as by their comparatively large size in terms of the voteshare (Williams 2009: 539).25 Hence, catch-all-parties are generally located on the mainstream of the political spectrum, i.e. where the majorities of the electorate are situated. In order to appeal to a broader spectrum among

25 Of course it has to be qualified that the validity of the catch-all-thesis has declined during the last centuries, increasing dealignment and shrinking major parties have shown the decreasing iteration capacity of of mainstream parties. However, the catch-all phenomenon still seems to be valid for some European democracies, such as Britain, France, Germany and also … Austria (cf. Safran 2009).
the electorate and to be able to satisfy diverse interests, catch-all parties have been urged to address a much wider scheme of issues in their election campaigns (Krouwel 2006). The question of size and electoral orientation – although being separate characteristics – thus become intermingled and subsequently create difficulties when focusing on parties beyond the catch-all-type (cf. Wolinetz 2006).

Since major mainstream parties have become increasingly contested by a growing number of new parties, such as ethnoterritorial parties (Meguid 2008: 3) and most prominently a left-libertarian party family including Green parties as well as new right wing populist parties (Mudde 1999), a scholarly debate about how to precisely denominate these emerging types of parties has been recorded (amongst others cf. Mudde 1999; Gunther/Diamond 2003; Wagner 2012). For example, parties beyond the major catch-all type have been identified according to their size. Mair (1991: 43f.) separates “small parties” (1%> and <15% of the national vote) from “large parties” (>15% of the national vote) on the one and “ephemeral or micro-parties” (<1% of the national vote) on the other side. Assuming that almost all Western democracies are united by the prominence of a left-right-dimension, Smith (1991) furthermore distinguishes small parties by their type of positioning, “marginal”, “hinge” or “detached”: Marginal parties are located on the outer extremes of the left-right continuum (equipped with only limited coalition potential and eligible for merely one single major party, being its ideological neighbor) – most far right parties or communist parties can count as prototypical examples for this type. Hinge’ parties, on the other hand operate “near the center of the left-right axis, and are thus located between two or even more larger parties. Their coalitions potential is naturally greatest if they are acceptable partners on both left and right” – some liberal parties (e.g. the German FDP) are prominent examples for this group. The third group of “detached parties”, refers to small parties that are displaced from the main left-right axis and from mainstream party competition, mostly because their electoral appeals are limited to specific subgroups. This makes them a potential coalition partner for major parties as long as their appeals are not incompatible with the political mainstream. Regional and/or ethnic based parties are common examples as well

26 Among these traditional mainstream parties establishing the traditional core of most Western democracies have been most notably Labor and Social Democratic parties, Liberal parties as well as Conservative and Christian Democratic parties (Adams et al 2006: 513).
27 Arguing that “(t)here is no uniform ‘small’ party, and the wealth of descriptive terms – minor, micro, splinter fringe and ‘third’ – indicates that the concept of ‘smallness’ has a variety of connotations as well as levels.”
as – to a lesser extent – emerging Green parties until they turn to marginal parties by adapting to the left-right-axis (cf. Smith 1991: 36ff).

While other terminologies can be singled out as well (e.g. the “fringe party”-concept, cf. Arzheimer 2010 or the “single-issue”-party, cf. Mudde 1999), a recent debate has tried to make the “niche”-party concept productive for the analysis of those parties that exist beyond the major catch-all type. Meguid (2008: 3f) has tried to cover emerging parties by using the term “niche party” and defining them a) by “their rejection of the traditional class-based orientation of politics”, b) by cross-cutting “traditional patterns of partisan alignment” and c) by limiting their issue appeals to “a restricted set of issues”. Wagner (2012) criticizes that “niche parties” need not be “new” parties but in essence have to be parties that “carve out a particular ‘niche’ for themselves” (Wagner 2012: 7). As a consequence, niche parties are usually small or medium-sized and thereby share a “clear correlation between size and niche party status”, although both Meguid (2008) and Adams et al (2006) emphasize “that size (i.e., vote share) is not a defining characteristic” for niche parties. What is called into question, though, is to what degree niche parties have to refrain from the traditional „economic dimension“, to be able to match the concept. Whereas Meguid (2008) and Wagner (2012) per definition exclude those parties from the niche party concept that are competing on the economic dimension, other authors such as Adams et al (2006) and Ezrow (2010) rather refer to a party’s position on an overall left-right scale (including economic issues) in order to identify niche parties – opening the concept also for other „non-centrist parties“ such as Communists. While niche parties have repeatedly been linked to the framework of “single-issue-parties”, this label might not be taken literally. Instead they have to be defined as parties politicizing on a limited set of prominent core issues (Mudde 1999). Although niche parties can be described as opportunistically exploiting issues that appear to be fruitful at a given moment (Ignazi 2003), their choice is limited to only those issues that are a) at least broadly linked to their core values (Mudde 1999) as well as b) not dominated by traditional mainstream parties (Crotty 2006). Thus, in comparison to their mainstream party counterparts niche parties face a much lesser scope of ‘attractive’ issues.

28 What is disputed, though, is to what degree niche parties per definition refrain from the traditional „economic dimension“. Whereas Adams et al (2006) and Ezrow (2010) rather refer to a party’s position on an overall left-right scale (including economic issues) in order to identify niche parties, Meguid (2008) and Wagner (2012) per definition exclude parties competing on the economic dimension from the niche party concept.

29 A problematic aspect of the „niche“-party concept is addressed by Miller/Meyer (2010: 7): „the common denominator to most of our critique is that the niche party concept is inherently dynamic. While parties
Hypotheses and condensed framework of explanation. How do these remarks relate to the nature of electoral campaigning? Based on the previous discussion in terms of campaign consistency, we expect niche parties to show a significantly higher consistency in the politicization between campaign channels than do mainstream parties (cf. Williams 2009: 539). The greater consistency of issues chosen by niche parties thus is anticipated to translate directly into more consistent patterns of politicization among different campaign channels. The argument is substantiated by the findings of Adams et al (2006), demonstrating that niche parties rarely shift their fringe positions to more moderate ones and if they do so, tend to lose votes. Quite contrary, mainstream parties have been shown to shift their issue-position more regularly in line with public opinion and do not get punished for it at the ballot-box (ibd.). Firstly, their need to address a broader range of issues materializes in a greater diversity of issue-subtopics and positions located between programmatic and daily campaign communication. Secondly the greater room for manoeuvre concerning issue positions will also lead to stronger diversity of these positions between manifestos and press releases.³⁰ Taken together, these assumptions lead to the same working hypotheses for both issues and positions:

Mainstream parties show a more inconsistent choice of subtopics than niche parties comparing programmatic and daily campaign communication (H1).

Mainstream parties show a more inconsistent choice of positions than niche parties comparing programmatic and daily campaign communication (H2).

By including this comparative analysis in the aims of the present study, the research framework needs to become extended by distinguishing the descriptive level more clearly:

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³⁰ Niche parties, of course, are subject to change. Thus the initial role of a party as a „niche“-party can shift over time and most commonly due to success and growth. However, authors such as Mair (1991) maintain their categorization of parties even if they tend to transform into another type (of medium or major party at the mainstream). The present dissertation adopts this strategy because Austrian „niche“-parties – although crossing the conceptual borders now and then – for the most period can be qualified in terms of the niche party concept (as we well see in chapter 4).
The following chapter IV is dedicated to the description of the explanatory framework of Austrian party competition. After potential factors have been singled out in the previous sections, now their empirical expression in the Austrian case needs to be clarified.
IV. Immigration, migrant integration and ethnic diversity in Austria: Opportunities and constraints for electoral politicization

Political parties have been characterized as prototypical actors of interest aggregation, yet they face limited resources and attention for their attempts to politicize specific issues. As Ian Budge puts it with a wink, “(t)he number of potential issues which might be taken up in a given society is vast – notionally the number of individuals living in it multiplied by the number of their concerns.” (Budge 2006: 422). Consequently, the need to choose specific issues over others is vital for all parties when competing for voter and media attention. The scholarly discussion, however, has developed different explanatory approaches with regard to the evolution of issue-agendas of political parties.

On the one hand, spectators commonly assume political parties to address certain political issues on the basis of their perceived current relevance. Such a “societal perspective” states that there are factors external to party competition, which may exert potential influence on the formation parties’ issue agendas. Among these factors “societal problems are obviously important for political agendas. Political parties do not pay attention to non-existent problems, and without refugees and immigrants there would not be a political issue. Variation in the magnitude of societal problems may thus explain variation in the amount of attention paid by political parties to an issue.” (Green-Pedersen/Krogstrup 2008). Although the scope of the argument is far from conclusive, the importance of societal inputs for party competition at least needs to be controlled (cf. Green-Pedersen/Krogstrup 2008; van de Wardt 2011). Beyond the influence of certain empirical conditions in the respective policy field, societal influences also emerge from public opinion and demands of the electorate, leading to the argument that parties will heavily reflect on voters perceived salience and preferences with regard to an issue (cf. Adams et al 2004). Finally the role of mass media agendas (Walgrave/van Aalst 2006) and discursive opportunity structures (Koopmans/Statham 1999) can place a likewise constraint on parties’ decisions to emphasize specific issues and take specific stances in their regard (cf. Kriesi/Bernhard/Hänggli 2009: 346). On the whole, potentially important societal inputs are diverse and located on different levels (socio-structural, discursive, attitudinal, etc.), yet their relevance is far from being clear and generally accepted.

On the other hand, large parts of the literature on issue evolution and party competition rather focus on the dynamics of party competition (Green-Pedersen 2007) and the
incentives/constraints evolving from specific party system constellations – as has already been discussed in the previous chapter. Thus from such a party competition perspective, the focus is placed on parties’ strategic objective of finding winning formulas (albeit the concepts of success might be defined in different terms by different parties). According to this perspective, these inputs manifest in parties’ selective emphasis of potential winning issues (Budge/Farlie 1983) as well as their strategic evaluation of an individual issue ownership (Petrocik 1996), based on their assessment of party ideology. Furthermore, these strategic considerations obviously are tied to the specific competitive patterns in a given party system, creating opportunities and constraints for parties’ strategic self-placement, that predefine their strategic room for manoeuvre. Amongst these framework conditions, the number and strength of political parties together with their evaluation of previous success/failure are assumed to guide their competitive behavior. Beyond that, due to the conditions of a multi-party system and its decisive need for coalition building, the evaluation of coalition scenarios is deemed to be another decisive factor that needs to be taken into consideration.

Hence, the following sections will reflect on these explanatory traditions and discuss factors that help to generate concrete assumptions about politicization strategies of Austrian parties with regard to immigration, migrant integration and ethnic diversity. For reasons of simplification, the attempt to process a highly complex process into a reasonable model of explanation is necessarily limited to remain a heuristic tool. The following sections are dedicated to deliver exactly on that: Chapter 4.1. will sketch the societal inputs that might have triggered Austrian party competition over immigration/integration/diversity since the late 1960ies, including an empirical discussion of conditions of immigration to Austria, the role of asylum as well as the constitution of an ethnically heterogenous society (4.1.1.). Furthermore, it asks for detailed consideration of values and attitudes with respect to the Austrian population (4.1.2.) as well as their relation to patterns of mediated public discourse (4.1.3.). Following the depiction of the societal context, the subsequent sections then will focus on the most crucial internal factors of party competition that help in order to explain party behavior with regard to immigration/integration/diversity, i.e. the ideological spectrum of Austrian parties (4.2.1.), the evolution and competitive patterns of the Austrian party system (4.2.2.) as well as the probable role of coalition considerations (4.2.3.).
4.1. Societal inputs for party competition. Empirical evidences from a reluctant country of immigration

The present analysis starts with the assumption that from the perspective of political parties there are factors and conditions that constitute the environment for their actions. These environments of course differ in nature: while some are located outside of what is called the ‘political system’, quite a few are part of it and again a smaller is actually constitutive of the party system itself. In this section we will focus on certain environments that, analytically speaking, are external to the party system and competition but that nonetheless exert potential influence on parties’ behavioral strategies.

The societal environment of party competition. Politics and political debate are linked to what we might describe as social reality. Assertions of that kind are rather common among both scientific as well as mundane observers of the political life. Apparently, the political debate itself constitutes a vital part of social reality, still we tend to presume that there are certain non-discursive foundations that political debate is grounded on. Yet if we imply such an empirical foundation of political discourse, i.e. if we allege that what political parties do is discursively related to a social reality beyond, we have to take a closer look on how this reality can be characterized in the first place. This being said, literature review reveals a number of authors that (if not explicitly than at least implicitly) have been insinuating a theoretical link between empirical indicators of immigration and their interaction with public awareness, media attention, political debate or even specific policy outcomes (c.f. Lewis-Beck/Mitchell 1993; Betz 1994; Knigge 1998; Givens 2002; Lahav 2004; Givens/Luedtke 2005; Green-Pedersen/Krogstrup 2008). On an empirical basis, however, findings appear to be diverse: Among authors offering evidence for possible links, Gibson (2002) points to the interaction between empirical conditions and public opinion (with an increasing number of foreigners leading to rising levels of anti-immigrant parties). Similarly Knigge (1998) comments that “(...) real changes in the composition of the national population, as captured by the annual national immigration statistics, are related to support for extreme right-wing parties” (Knigge 1998: 270) which most likely would lead to the politicization of immigration at least by far-right parties.31

In similar manner, Pardos-Prado (2011) downplays the role of socio-structural conditions

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31 However it has to be mentioned that relying on annual national immigration statistics does not account for clandestine immigration which might lead to quite different actual numbers than perceived amounts in countries like Greece, Italy or Spain.
for the attitudes toward immigration. Golder (2003: 457) even enforces the argument by highlighting the relevance of the electoral system. He states that “the positive effect of immigration increases as the electoral system becomes more proportional” (showing that in majority-voting systems focused on mainstream parties – and their issues –, far-right parties face heavier barriers to promote “their” issues themselves. With regard to media attention, several findings can be complemented. In a study of news magazines in seven countries, Esser (2000) reveals the relative correlation between the degree of immigration and the public media debate.32 For the dutch case in the early 1990ies, Lubbers et al (1998: 420) offer similar evidence “that the media attention paid to ethnic minorities is associated with the trend in residence permits”.

Subsequent studies, though, have been doubting the validity of such generalizations by detecting that socio-economic factors fail to explain media attention, voter behavior and party responsiveness with regard to immigration. In terms of media reception, Vliegenthaart (2007: 83) concludes that from 1990 until 2002 “(r)eal world developments in immigration and asylum applications do not have a great impact on the attention for immigration and integration” – rather he stresses the relevance of certain key events that have a varying impact (Vliegenthaart 2007: 86f.). Considering the role of public attention, van der Brug/Fennema/Tillie (2005) or Arzheimer/Carter 2006 find no interaction of empirical indicators for immigration/asylum and anti-immigrant party support. Expanding the time lag, Boomgarden/Vliegenthaart (2007: 414) discover only precarious evidence for the interaction of immigration and anti-immigration party support. With regard to party behavior, Kitschelt/McGann (1997) already criticize those approaches that cut down anti-immigrant party behavior (and success) merely to the interaction with societal conditions of immigration. Conversely they urge to take the strategic dimension of issue attention considerations into account: “Strategic political entrepreneurs skillfully bring together long-term and short-term opportunities to mobilize voter coalitions.” (Kitschelt/McGann 1997: 3). McDonald et al (2004) clarify, that the issue selection of political parties is rather linked to their ideologies than to public opinion or empirical indicators of current problems. Givens/Luedtke (2005) even try to test for the interaction of growing immigration levels with more restrictive policy outcomes in Germany and France in the 1990ies, yet they find no empirical evidence for their assumption.

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In sum, the possible link between immigration as an empirically commensurable phenomenon and immigration as an issue of public and – more specifically – political debate or action is far from being definite. As a consequence the present study – in order to avoid false conclusions – will include key-data on immigration only as an initial factor of possible explanation, that needs to be controlled (cf. Green-Pedersen/Krogstrup 2008).

Accordingly, we will use the available data – as will be discussed in the following section – only as a rough indicator that creates opportunities and constraints for political parties to compete on the issues of immigration/integration/diversity at all. Thus, assumptions will be drawn merely on the party system level arguing that external environmental conditions are identical for all competing parties alike, though they nevertheless may be incorporated in varying ways by different kinds of parties.

4.1.1. Immigration and ethnic diversity: empirical evidences

Even if the immediate relevance of empirical conditions of immigration/integration/diversity for their increased relevance in public and political debate respectively is a contested assumption, it nonetheless remains a necessary background to understand their politicization in a given society. If not directly they will at least give partial hints as to which aspects are likely to become an object of political contestation and to what degree. For this reason the following subchapter will take a first look on key data on immigration, integration and asylum in Austria since the 1960ies.

Methodical digression: Data availability in Austria. Before discussing respective data on immigration, migrant integration and ethnic diversity in Austria an important remark regarding the availability of continuous aggregate data has to be made in advance. Prior to the 1990ies statistical data on non-nationals or residents with immigrant origin has been collected only marginally and unsystematically in Austria (for detailed discussion about available data sources on immigration and migrant integration in Austria, cf. Reeger 2008; Kraler/Hollomey/Wöger 2009; Kraler/Reichel 2010; Peintinger 2011).

After the Austrian census of population had been conducted only on a non-regular basis since the 18th century it has been carried out every 10 years from 1951 on. However, due to the fact that the definition of resident population was adapted between different censuses, and the variable of the country of birth was not included in 1981 and 1991, the census is a limited source for longitudinal immigration data (Kraler/Hollomey/Wöger
Furthermore, the census per definition is limited to the analysis of the resident population which results in the negligence of other migration types, like seasonal migration or transnational mobility (Reeger 2008: 114). Yet, what actually has been conducted was the constant adjustment of resident population statistics which is calculating the development after each census by quarterly extrapolating the population statistics with data gathered from regular statistics on birth, death, naturalization and net migration (cf. Kytir/Lebhart/Neustädter 2005: 203). This offers at least basic and continuous data on net migration, as shown in Fig. 3.

Another source for the qualification of immigrant population in Austria is the micro-census, a quarterly conducted survey comprising of a representative sample of Austrian households that also includes information about immigrant origin of the sampled population. At the same time, though, the microcensus is not considered a reliable source prior to the mid 1990ies because of inconsistencies in sampling and questions (Kraler/Hollomey/Wöger 2009: 6). A further basic constraint with regard to immigrant population is the comparatively late consideration of indicators for 2nd generation immigrants (such as “country of parents’ birth”) which was included only in recent years (cf. Peintinger 2011). Yet, with regard to non-nationals another source of interpretation is offered by the “Central register of residents” (since 2002 “population register” POPREG) which also quarterly submits systematic data on households to Statistic Austria and for example offers information on nationality for registered population in Austria (Fig. 4).

If the situation appears to be meager in terms of general longitudinal data on immigration, this holds all the more true for indicators reflecting the integration of non-nationals and ethnic minorities. As Reeger (2008: 128) puts it quite bluntly: “For 40 years up until the 2001 Census, Austrian migration-related statistics only used citizenship to describe the resident immigrant population. As a consequence, there was no information on naturalized immigrants, since they could not be identified in any statistical source. This is more than a subtle hint that policymakers were not really interested in these new Austrian

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33 Of course this way of calculating the developments in between the complete census of population had to be revised ex post with every new census („Bevölkerungsrückschreibung“) (Kytir/Lebhart/Neustädter 2005: 203).

34 These problems have been resolved only in the recent decade (Kraler/Hollomey/Wöger 2009: 6), thus with regard to our examination period the source is of limited value.

35 Yet, irregular migration (i.e. non national entering/staying without residence permit, such as “visa overstayers, persons losing their right to reside on grounds of illegal work, non-fulfilment of residence requirements, commitment of severe crimes, or rejection of an asylum claim”, Kraler/Hollomey/Wöger 2009: 15) has been documented only since the introduction of the Alien statistics in 1993 – leaving the situation in earlier decades puzzled.
citizens, their social situation and housing or their performance on the labor market.”
Thus, only a small number of parameters is at hand when trying to compare various
developments since the 1960ies. E.g., for immigrant labor the Austrian Labor Market
Service (AMS) administrates datasets regarding the labor market which at least since the
1970ies offer data on in/dependent employment of non-nationals. Another level of
indicators is offered by some permanent informations maintained by provincial
governments and municipalities, such as statistics on naturalizations as well as births and
deaths of non-national residents (Fig. 6). Taken together, though, these indicators only
offer a scattered picture and hence are definitely insufficient for capturing the complexity
of integration throughout the examination period.
Finally, there is a third dimension that is of somewhat autonomous relevance, that being
the question of “asylum”. Here the institutional interest for statistical data capture has
been more intense, although the actual availability of historical data still remains quite
narrow. A centralized source for information had been established only in 1983 (the
“Information System on Asylum Seekers” – Asylwerberinformationssyste, AIS),
followed by the “Information System on Federal Care of Asylum Seekers” (BIS) that has
been founded during the 1990ies (cf. Kraler/Hollomey/Wöger 2009: 14). Still, statistical
yearbooks have been covering basic informations on the number of applications for
asylum already in earlier decades which at least allows for an approximative comparison
of different time periods (Fig. 5).
In sum, the data sources mentioned above make for a rough picture of the developments
in the sectors of immigration and migrant integration and along with the common
descriptions in the basic demographic and sociological literature enable us to discuss
major periods and transformation in the Austrian immigration history since the 1960ies.
It should be underlined, however, that the present study is well aware of the range of
variation regarding these data (especially for decades prior to the 1990ies). But due to the

36 Though as Stadler (1995) has been emphasizing, the fall of the Iron Curtain has marked a crucial turning
point for the concept of “asylum” in Austria. After the political changes of 1989 a renewed concept of
“refugee” has been applied that excluded former refugees on two basic dimensions: a) Firstly it excluded a
number of “political” immigrants on a general basis who – from then on – where not treated as “asylum
seekers” according to the Geneve Convention while b) more specifically refugees from Bosnia & Croatia
were administrated under an autonomous regime of “de-facto”-refugees (not included in the annual
statistics on asylum). Thus the statistical number of “refugees” as published by the Ministry of the Interior
refers to two distinctively different populations prior to and since the 1990ies (Stadler 1995: 241). These
37 For a synoptic analysis of Austrian immigration tradition in the 19th and early 20th century, cf.
John/Lichtblau 1993; Faßmann/Münz 1995; Heiss/Rathkolb 1995; Bauböck 1996; Kraler 2007; Perchinig
2009.
synoptic objective of this chapter it is merely dedicated to sketch out basic contexts for
the political debate (thus it does not claim for perfectly precise databases on each
indicator taken into consideration).

_Immigration, Integration & Asylum since the 1960ies._ At the beginning of the 1960ies, the extensive migration movements of the immediate post-war period\(^{38}\) finally had come to a halt. A comparatively large number of non-national residents populating Austria in the immediate aftermath of World War II had decreased in the course of the 1950ies to only 1.4% of the total population in 1960 (even the flow of 180,000 Hungarian refugees in 1956 had not contributed to a significant increase since a majority returned to their home country after the crisis) (Lebhart/Marik-Lebeck 2007: 166). Due to the parallel patterns of immigration and emigration balancing the net migration in Austria this level remained quite stable during the early 1960ies (Fig. 3). While emigration of Austrian workforce\(^{39}\) remained at a continuous level during the early 1960ies, the need for human labor in Austria was compensated by early contracts for guestworker recruitment with Spain in 1962, with Turkey in 1964 and with Yugoslavia in 1966 (cf. Matuschek 1985: 160; Münz/Zuser/Kytir 2003: 21). However, as Kraler (2007: 6) points out, much of the labor migration during the 1960ies was actually not organized by recruitment offices built up in these countries. In fact it was stimulated by chain-migration from labor migrants already working in Austria on their own initiative – which again had represented an alternative way of labor immigration, so called “tourist employment” (Gächter 2000: 69).

In consequence of the growing need and increasing use of different immigration channels to overcome the labor shortage, the annual number of foreigners immigrating to Austria grew permanently until the early 1970ies, while at the same time a continuous – although lower – level of Austrian residents emigrated. Likewise the number of foreign labor increased drastically, from only 16,200 in 1961 to a record high of 226,000 in the climax of the guestworker period between 1970 and 1973 (cf. Butschek 1992 as cited in Weigl 2009: 39).

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\(^{38}\) With a characteristic emigration of Austrian citizens and a negative net migration of -129,000 people between 1951 and 1961 (cf. Münz/Zyser/Kytir 2003: 20)

\(^{39}\) Especially to Germany and Switzerland, where the lack of human labor and higher incomes attracted Austrian employees.
This development came to an abrupt halt in the year of 1974 mainly as a consequence of the recruitment stop carried out by the Austrian government that intended to reduce immigrant labor in favor of remigrating Austrian employees (Münz/Zuser/Kytir 2003: 23). Together with the introduction of a new law on immigrant labor (“Ausländerbeschäftigungsgesetz”, AbG) in 1975 the recruitment stop led to a significant decrease of immigration for almost the whole decade as well as to alternating net migration on a low level. Still, decreasing immigration did not lead to corresponding patterns of emigrating guest workers (only in 1974/75). Instead large parts of guestworkers stayed in Austria, since many of them feared to loose the possibility of coming back once they had left the country (Bauböck 1996: 13). As a consequence, remaining guestworkers and their relatives – who joined them by means of family reunification processes – compensated the number of non-nationals that had returned to their home-countries (Münz/Zuser/Kytir 2003: 23). Thus what originally was designed as a temporary phenomenon had by then turned into a structural condition (Lebhart/Marik-Lebeck 2007: 166). Accordingly, the period after 1973 has been characterized as the “heyday of family reunification with parallel cutback of labor” (Weigl 2009: 43) and resulted in the increase of non-national residents (see Fig. 4).

With regard to the origins of immigration to Austria, census of population demonstrates the different emigration countries of non-national population (see App. 1): While Germany has always been a dominant
In the aftermath of this influential stimulus for permanent migratory influx during the guestworker period (early 1960ies until mid-1970ies) the development of immigration to Austria remained at a comparatively low level and has thus been described as an “unspectacular period between return and settlement of former guestworkers” (Münz/Zuser/Kytir 2003: 23f). Alongside the slight increase of labor migration from Turkey and Yugoslavia since the Mid-1980ies and as a consequence of the facilitated exit for citizens of Eastern European countries by the end of the 1970ies, the question of asylum took on greater significance (Reeger 2008: 112; Münz/Zuser/Kytir 2003: 24). The granting of asylum had become a vital part of the Austrian post-war identity. Two refugee flows most notably set a milestone in the history of Austrian self-perception: The “Ungarnaufstand” in 1956 causing, about 180.000 to 194.000 Hungarian refugees to seek asylum in Austria, and the “Prager Frühling” in the course of which about 162.000 Czechoslovakian refugees fled to Austria. In both cases the Austrian government immediately signalled support and tried to foster the country’s image as a bridgehead between East and West. However, it could only do so because of the transitory nature of country of origin among foreign residents in Austria, the Balkan region started to become another dominant region of origin since the guestworker period in the 1960ies and it has remained the largest group if the successor states of former Yugoslavia are taken together. Turkish citizens, on the contrary, started to become a dominant part of foreign residents only during the 1970ies and for almost three decades have exceeded even the number of German citizens. Due to naturalization processes this hierarchy however has changed in the recent decade and Germany has again become the most dominant single-country of origin amongst foreign residents in Austria.
these refugee flows, that were characterized by little permanence: Only 25,000 Hungarian
refugees finally settled in Austria, while others returned or in the most cases moved on to
other Western countries. Amongst the Czechoslovakian refugees the number of
permanent asylum seekers was even lower, no more than 12,000 people applied for
permanent asylum (cf. Weigl 2009: 32f.).

Fig. 5: Applications for asylum in Austria, 1961-2009

Note: De facto-refugees from former Yugoslavian territories have not been included in the official statistics
on asylum-requests.

During the 1980ies the Austrian self-perspective was put to the test again: Loomed by a
drastic eruption of applications for asylum in 1980 that came as a result of the
Solidarnosc-crisis in Poland, the whole decade was characterized by a continuous
increase of applications compared to prior decades (see Fig. 5). Nonetheless, despite the
growing number of application for asylum most prominently from Eastern European
citizens (85% of all applications between 1982 and 1986), the number of actual
permissions did not increase. While the transitory character of refugee flows to Austria
still continued, e.g. with regard to the Polish refugees\textsuperscript{41}, a more restrictive approach by
the Austrian authorities showed its effects, since the government had demanded stricter
examination with regard to Eastern European citizens who formerly had been granted
asylum automatically (Münz/Zuser/Kytir 2003: 24). Thus, due to the decreased rate of
recognition asylum finally did not significantly affect the number of legalized foreign

\textsuperscript{41} While between 120,000 and 150,000 refugees had come to Austria in 1981, only about 33,000 applied for
residents until the end of the 1980ies. Yet the peaking number of applications at the end of the decade indicated the beginning of a new period of Austrian immigration patterns that was catalyzed both by the developments on the refugee level as well as by shifting conditions regarding labor migration and associated channels of immigration.

The crucial turn at the end of the decade materialized in a drastic increase of foreign national influx – augmenting the amount of foreign-national residents for about 80 in four years from 390,000 in 1989 to 690,000 in 1993 (Münz/Zuser/Kytir 2003: 25). This drastic increase resulted from the interplay of at least three decisive developments:

On the one hand, the fall of the iron curtain set the scene for migration flows from Eastern European citizens who in large parts were using Austria as a backdoor entrance to Western Europe, mostly without the intention to settle there. On the other hand, the emerging crisis in Yugoslavia came to be a highly influential event that culminated in a decade of wars on the Balkan and led to an increase of refugees with Austria being one of the first countries of admission due to its geographic proximity (Bauböck 1996: 20). At the beginning of the century refugees from the civil wars in Croatia (1991) and Bosnia/Hercegowina (1992/93) were treated as “de facto”-refugees and consequently granted a preliminary residence permit. While a majority of the 13,000 Croatian refugees remigrated after the war, around two thirds of the 95,000 Bosnian refugees settled permanently in Austria – thus drastically differing from the previous refugee groups in the prior decades (Münz/Zuser/Kytir 2003: 25f.). Thirdly, however, apart from the dimension of refugees the booming economic conditions at the turn of the decades also reinforced the need for immigrant labor. Though this demand in parts was met by the regularization of 30,000 illegal foreigners (Weigl 2009: 45) as well as by the immigration of refugees in the aftermath of the Yugoslavian crisis, emigration from Turkey turned out to be a dominant channel for actual labor immigration (Bauböck 1996: 20; Münz/Zuser/Kytir 2003: 26). Thus, as Fassmann/Münz (2000) have lined out, the majority of incoming foreigners in the period of 1989 to 1993 was not – as had been predicted by critics – of Eastern European origin but consisted of immigrants from Turkey (being the traditional country of labor migration in Austria) and the successor states of former Yugoslavia (due to the violent conflicts) (Münz/Zuser/Kytir 2003: 25).

As a consequence of these developments at beginning of the 1990ies, the Austrian government respondet with a number of legislative reforms: The consecutive passage of the Asylum Act (AsylG 1991), Residence Act (AufG 1992), and Aliens Act (FrG 1992)
implemented a tighter regime of migrant entrance and asylum permissions. Accordingly and together with the end of further refugee flows from the Balkan the influx of non-nationals decreased drastically from 1994 onwards, bounded further by the legislative reforms in 1997: the revision of the Aliens Act (FrG 1997) entailed a reduction of family reunification (cf. Antalovsky/Wolffhardt 2002: 164f), the amendment of the Asylum Act (AsylG 1997) included further restrictions to asylum based on Dublin agreements, secure third country rules or evident groundlessness of requests. Thus in the course of the 1990ies, legal instruments to the stricter regulation of migration and asylum had been carried through by the Grand Coalition government and only by the end of the decade a new increase both with regard to asylum requests as well as regular migration took place (Lebhart/Marik-Lebeck 2007: 167). In sum, though, until the end of the decade these developments together with the other sources of immigration had led to an immigrant population rate twice as high as it had been prior to the 1990ies (1988: 4.4%, 1999: 8.7%). This increase also reflected the novelty of EU-foreigners moving to Austria who did not to apply for residence. After the country’s EU-accession in 1994 Austria was urged to apply EU-standards regarding labor access and family reunification for EU-members as well as third country nationals (Weigl 2009: 46).

Besides the patterns of intensified family reunification, also the modes of EU-internal migration played an important role for immigration during the early years of the 2000s. In continuity with the developments of the late 1990ies and accompanied by a slight annual increase of immigrant residence the number of non-national residents grew further during the decade. What characterized this period was the growing relevance of immigration from “old European countries”, the neighboring Germany in particular (cf. Weigl 2009: 47). These shifts in migrant origins contributed to rising numbers of net-migration, even though in terms of legislature the decade rather yielded aims for further restrictions (motivated by a center-right/far-right government coalition): the amendment of the Alien Act (FrG 2002) strengthened restrictions of labor migration to „highly qualified workers“ (Schlüsselkräfte) but more importantly it stressed a cultural notion of migrant integration by introducing a mandatory “Integration Agreement”42 (cf. Mourão

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42 The Integration Agreement was introduced as mandatory set of tasks for third-country nationals (since EU-members are excluded from its scope), although asylum-seekers, „highly qualified workers“ (Schlüsselkräfte), “special executive personnel” (besondere Führungskräfte) as well as graduates of Austrian school education were excempted. The „Agreement“ obliged affected persons to the attendance of
Permoser/Rosenberger 2012: 47f); the amendment to the Asylum Act (Asyl-G-Novelle 2003) aimed for a massive acceleration of asylum procedures by introducing an admission procedure prior to the actual asylum procedure, by reducing rights of appeal and by accelerating expulsion in case of procedural rejections – accordingly the amendment was heavily criticized for its contradiction to fundamental human rights and the principle of refuge (Vogl 2007: 24f.); responding to the EU-directives43 issued by the European Council and Parliament shortly before, in 2005 the governing parties (ÖVP/BZÖ) together with the votes of the SPÖ passed a whole new Alien Legislation Package (Fremdenrechtspaket 2005), including a new Asylum Act (AsylG 2005), Settlement and Residence Act (NAG 2005), Aliens Police Act (FPG 2005) as well as several amendments of affected laws (cf. Bruckner 2006: 5). Implementing the framework of the directives, the new legislature brought improvements especially for long-term residents. However, as Perchinig (2009: 245) qualified it, the standards of the directives where implemented only reservedly: Rights of family members were granted only to a limited extent, family reunification rights were linked to the use of EU-rights of free movement and to high income requirements, protection from expulsion of native third country children were rescinded, permanent residence rights were limited to highly qualified workers and their family members and the integration agreement was tightened (by more obligatory class hours and deductibles up to 50%). Thus from a policy perspective, aims for further restrictions on the one hand and needs for aligning national law to European standards on the other hand encountered each other.

However, rather independent from these legislative activity, in terms of migration patterns the number of foreigners immigrating to Austria increased considerably during the first half of the decade. Yet the increases in immigration were partly compensated by a growing number of naturalizations and thus materialized in only slightly increasing numbers of foreign residents (cf. Lebhart/Marik-Lebeck 2007: 167). In fact, naturalizations had reached their highest level since decades, revealing their decisive role in the management of immigration.

language/country courses as well as exams (for detailed discussion of the Integration Agreement and its implementation, see Mourão Permoser 2010).

Fig. 6: Naturalization of non-national residents in Austria, 1961-2009

Fig. 6 documents the different practices of naturalization by comparing the 1960ies, 70ies and 80ies with the post-89-period: What had been a quite stable pattern from the 1960ies to the 1980ies came to a change with a distinctive increase in naturalizations by the late 1980ies. These developments went hand in hand with continuous reforms of the Nationality Act in 1965 (StbG 1965) and citizenship historically being based on a *ius sanguinis*- rather than a *ius soli*-principle) – thus all of the amendments (1973, 1983, 1985, 1993, 1999) were inspired by the logic of naturalization being the endpoint of successful integration (cf. Davy/Çinar 2001: 645f.). Over the decades the period of permanent residence required for the acquisition of citizenship has remained ten years (cf. Mourão Permoser/Rosenberger 2012: 51). However, due to the permanent residence of many guestworkers, some provinces (especially Vienna) during the late 1980ies and early 1990ies showed a more inclusive approach, since they increasingly granted citizenship invoking to “particular noteworthy reasons” after permanent residence of four years – contributing to the increase in naturalizations (Davy/Çinar 2001: 646). The sudden increase of immigration materialized in the rising number of naturalizations from the 1990ies onwards and peaked at the turn of the millennium with almost 45,000 naturalizations in 2003. Since then, however, the number has drastically declined and naturalization dropped again to dimensions similar to those of the 1960ies and 1970ies.
Apparently, naturalization practices are of considerable importance for the statistical nature of “foreign” presence in Austria. While the low level of naturalization until the late 1980ies had only marginal distorting effects on the statistical number of foreign residents in Austria, the number since the 1990ies is actually masked by the increasing naturalization-rate. These circumstances shed light on the statistical question of how to capture the presence of 2\textsuperscript{nd} and 3\textsuperscript{rd} generation immigrants who are commonly labelled with “immigrant background”. Already existing data on immigration and asylum leaves out the central aspect of what in public discourse is closely linked to the „immigration issue“, i.e. the question of integration. The integration of ethnic minorities – disregarding whether they possess Austrian citizenship or not – is not captured by any data on immigration/asylum. As has been addressed above the continuous number of naturalizations together with family reunification has led to a significant quantity of second and third generation immigrants already holding Austrian citizenship (thus enjoying certain social and political rights), but still suffering from the typical social exclusions of ethnic minorities. Unfortunately, statistical evaluation only recently has started to factor this group of people, thus hindering a historical analysis of the development of second generation and third generation immigrants as well as of first generation immigrants who have become naturalized. As is demonstrated in Fig. 6, naturalization has been constantly increasing since the 1960ies and drastically augmenting in the recent decade – which led to a further expansion of people with „immigrant background“. Yet what nowadays affects about 1.468 million (or 17,8\% of) Austrian citizens – with more than a million of them being born abroad, about 386.000 of them being descendants of foreign born parents\textsuperscript{44} – is impossible to tell for earlier decades. Few indicators are at hand, that help to understand the ethnic diversity of Austrian population in a longitudinal sense.

For example the number of Austrian citizens who speak a colloquial language other than German rose from 1,16\% (1971) to 1,56\% (1981), 2,35\% (1991) and finally to 4,52\% (2001).\textsuperscript{45} Assessing the different countries of origin of naturalized residents some remarks

\textsuperscript{44} Source: Statistic Austria. Data based on intercensus population estimates. Download: http://www.statistik.at/web_de/dynamic/statistiken/bevoelkerung/bevoelkerungsstruktur/bevoelkerung_nach_migrationshintergrund/051839.

\textsuperscript{45} Source: Statistics Austria, Data based on census of population, results include cases with combination of german and foreign colloquial language. Of course, colloquial language is an inaccurate indicator for immigrant population for it does not reflect on the divergences between allochtonous and autochtonous minorities. Download: http://www.statistik.at/web_de/statistiken/bevoelkerung/volkszaehlungen_registerzaehlungen/bevoelkerung_nach_demographischen_merkmalen/022886.html
can be made as well: While during the 1960ies and until the 1980ies German citizens were by far the largest group to become naturalized by the Austrian state, their proportion has drastically decreased ever since. A similar pattern – although from a lower starting point – can be made out with regard to Hungarian citizens. Whereas Hungarians were the second most dominant group of naturalized people during the 1960ies, their numbers have been decreasing over the decades. Other regions have shown a different development, most obviously the Balkan region with a continuously increasing number of naturalized people (and since the 1990ies the most dominant origin among people becoming naturalized), and Turkey that has emerged as the second most dominant country of origin since the 1990ies. Finally, some countries have been prime sources of naturalized residents at least for certain time periods, such as Poland (especially during 1980ies and 1990ies) or Romania (since 1990ies).

However, all of this provides no further information about the actual development of integration of ethnic minorities itself (in terms of degree, problems, opportunities, etc.). The only conclusion that can be inferred from such a knowledge is that the question of integration might have grown in importance but yet there is no clearcut assumption that can be drawn as to how and when politicization might reflect on the developments mentioned above.

**Expected influence on politicization.** Which conclusions then might be drawn from this development for the politicization of immigration/integration/diversity? Assuming a direct connection between empirical conditions and political occupation the conceptual hypothesis regarding the policy fields of immigration/integration/diversity would be *that an empirical increase of immigration/asylum will stimulate the political debate and thus increase the systemic salience of these issue-dimensions (H3)*. More precisely, this assumption needs to be specified with regard to certain issue-dimensions. The primary conclusion would be that especially in the context of drastic increases the political debate will be more intense as compared to periods of lower relevance. Reformulated in operational terms the hypothesis then would presume that

- **The greater net-immigration has been in the legislative period prior to an election the stronger the issue-dimension “immigration” will be electorally politicized (H3a)**

As already outlined above the most important peaks in Austrian net migration can be dated to certain periods since the late 1960ies (1969 to 1974), the late 1980ies (1989 to 1993) and the beginning of the 21st century (2000 to 2008). According to this assumption
elections within these periods would be expected to show the highest salience of immigration issues (1970, 1971, 1990, 2002, 2006, 2008) throughout the whole examination period. Different assumptions need to be drawn concerning the question of asylum, since its relevance does not co-emerge in terms of a parallel pattern with general labor migration or family reunification. Yet the structure of the assumption would be analogous to the previous one:

- The greater the number of applications for asylum (including applicants for de-facto contingents) has been in the legislative period prior to an election the stronger the issue-dimension “asylum” will be electorally politicized (H3b)

However, the empirical evolution of asylum would suggest other periods of issue-emphasis. Its increasing relevance at the advent and the second half of the 1980ies, its specific relevance during the early 1990ies (due to the special contingents for de facto refugees from Croatia and Bosnia) as well as the increase of applications for asylum in the first half of the recent century leads to the presumption that the question of asylum will continuously shape the debate from 1983 onwards and especially during the early 1990ies but also at the beginning of the new millennium.

With regard to the specific dimension of “integration”, we are confronted with a substantial lack of differentiated data. As a consequence we refrain from articulating specific assumptions about the link between socio-structural indicators and party politicization of integration – arguing that if there was an interaction of that kind, it would be more likely to identify them with regard to the more definable dimensions of “immigration” and “asylum”. On the whole, at least with regard to immigration and asylum the assumptions reflect the most vital socio-structural input for politicization as part of party competition. Nonetheless, as mentioned before, besides these factors there are further important external factors that constitute the environment of party competition, among them public opinion and public discourse. The following sections are dedicated to a short discussion of these framework conditions as regards the Austrian case.

### 4.1.2. Public opinion and mediated public discourse

As we have outlined previously, talking about societal indicators that influence the public and (more specifically) the political debate is a contested task. What might be evaluated as a highly relevant development by one actor might be completely disregarded by
another. As William Isaac Thomas emphasized already a century ago, “if men define situations as real, they are real in their consequences“. If parties are to be portrayed as organizations that try to satisfy their constituencies in the long run, the values and preferences of these constituencies have to be considered as fairly influential to party strategies. Thus, in terms of party competition, some scholars have argued that it is less the empirical environment of a policy field, that animates parties’ decision to politicize it, but rather the perceptions and attitudes of the electorate. There has been an extended debate about the general relevance of public opinion for the electoral strategies of political parties. In fact, a number of authors in the tradition of Downs have been underlining the assumption, that parties’ policy choices are responsive to public opinion. Only by seeking to assess the public’s policy preferences parties are able to derive certain ideal points of positions in a given policy dimension. As such, obvious shifts of public opinion are expected to be a central issue in the framework of party strategy.

Yet at that point empirical findings have been conflicting again: In their comparison of nine Western democracies, McDonald et al (2004) arrive at rather skeptical results, finding no evidence whatsoever for any significant relationships between “electoral concerns and party policy” which leads them to conclude that “parties choose policy positions independently of public sentiments at the time of the election” (McDonald et al 2004: 854). On the contrary, Adams et al (2004: 590) demonstrate that parties’ ideological orientations and their strategies of politicization do indeed shift according to changes in public opinion (though not in a general way but only if public opinion takes a different direction from a party’s policy position). Correspondingly, it seems to be a vital task for parties to determine the preferences of their constituencies and the contemporary trends of public opinion. As a consequence, we are obliged to uncover the perceptions and attitudes that Austrian voters have expressed throughout the course of the recent decades. This brings us to the central question as to how both politicians as well as researchers can accumulate knowledge about public preferences and how far they might run danger of becoming victims of their own of misperceptions (cf. Converse/Pierce 1986, as cited in Adams et al 2004: 592). While this question poses a general insecurity, its difficulty intensifies again when trying to gather ex post data about preferences in recent decades. With regard to the issues of immigration, migrant integration and ethnic diversity, few survey data is available that would give a longitudinal indication about either the relevance or the dominant position within Austrian public opinion. Comparative data has only emerged since the 1990ies, which limits the prospect of analyzing the role
of public opinion quite drastically. In order to offer at least a rough impression of available information on public opinion, some selective findings shall be discussed:

In a comparative study Lebhart/Münz (2003) contrast different surveys conducted independently between 1992 and 2001, that address various items reflecting hostile attitudes against foreigners among Austrian population (see Tab. 4). The comparison reveals conflicting tendencies for different items related to these attitudes: On the one hand, items for cultural rejection as well as political exclusion of foreigners have increased over the decade. Demographic rejections also fit that pattern, whereas exclusionist arguments based on labor displacement have declined until 2001. Taking these indicators together, there appears to be a slightly more averse pattern of attitudes in the early 1990ies while at the turn of the decade the tendency becomes slightly more open, most visibly in 2001. These findings, however, represent only a comparatively tight period of nine years and do not stem from analogous research designs.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Tab. 4: Agreement with the following items … (in %)</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>---</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>… foreigners deprive Austrians of their jobs</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>… foreigners contribute to cultural gain</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>… foreigners should obtain municipal voting rights after five years of residence</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>… immigration is necessary to stop decrease in population</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


Friesl/Polak/Hamachers-Zuba (2009) offer a more extensive comparison, combining survey results from 1994 (Solidaritätsstudie) with findings from 1999 and 2008 (both EVS-data) (Tab. 5). Based on similar questions like Lebhart/Münz (2003), they design an index that shows an increasing support of hostile items together with a decrease of refusal. Thus, their findings somewhat contradict the results from Lebhart/Münz, rather indicating an increase in antipathy against foreigners from the early to the late 1990ies and a stabilization of predominantly hostile attitudes in 2008 (with 55% of probands agreeing with restrictive items). In spite of that, the results of 1994 have to be interpreted with caution, since a) they have been conducted by different researchers and b) they refer to a temporal context in which the heated debate over the “Austria first”-petition by the FPÖ and the counterdemonstrations (“Lichtermeer”) might have contributed to a higher approval of “solidarity”-items than under regular conditions. Thus with regard to survey heterogenity and the selection of data points we need to qualify the impression of an increase between early and late 1990ies.
Tab. 5: Index “hostility to foreigners” (in %)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>1994</th>
<th>1999</th>
<th>2008</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Agreement</td>
<td>45</td>
<td>54</td>
<td>55</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Neither/nor</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>30</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rejection</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Missing</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


Note: Index based on three items: “If jobs run short, foreigners should be expelled to their home countries”; “Foreigners should be prohibited political engagement in Austria”; “Foreigners should adapt their lifestyle to Austrian habits”.

Rosenberger/Seeber (2011) try to overcome both deficits (time frame and survey heterogeneity) by using the dataset of the European Values Survey (EVS) in order to design an index of antipathy against foreigners, based on the survey-question of which groups would rather not be tolerated as neighbors by the respondents (Tab. 6). The comparison of the index over nine year intervals (1990, 1999, 2008) confirms the fluctuations of attitudes among Austrian respondents. Thus it confirms the findings gathered by Lebhart/Münz with a stronger antipathy in the contentious period of 1990 than by the end of the 1990ies, again pointing to the importance of discursive contexts. But most importantly, it highlights the drastic increase of antipathy in recent years, showing the highest index-value among all countries and time points for Austria in 2008 (0,232). Thus, while in 1990 Austria already ranked among the most antipathic countries, in 2008 it sets even new benchmarks in terms of hostile attitudes.

Tab. 6: Index of antipathy towards immigrants

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>1990</th>
<th>1999</th>
<th>2008</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Austria</td>
<td>0,142</td>
<td>0,119</td>
<td>0,232</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Italy</td>
<td>0,133</td>
<td>0,164</td>
<td>0,171</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Finland</td>
<td>0,131</td>
<td>0,145</td>
<td>0,155</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Netherlands</td>
<td>0,101</td>
<td>0,074</td>
<td>0,148</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ireland</td>
<td>0,081</td>
<td>0,130</td>
<td>0,132</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Germany</td>
<td>0,159</td>
<td>0,087</td>
<td>0,128</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Portugal</td>
<td>0,155</td>
<td>0,056</td>
<td>0,114</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>United Kingdom</td>
<td>0,118</td>
<td>0,128</td>
<td>0,110</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sweden</td>
<td>0,108</td>
<td>0,049</td>
<td>0,092</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Belgium</td>
<td>0,213</td>
<td>0,165</td>
<td>0,087</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Spain</td>
<td>0,089</td>
<td>0,102</td>
<td>0,069</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Denmark</td>
<td>0,113</td>
<td>0,114</td>
<td>0,069</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>France</td>
<td>0,132</td>
<td>0,124</td>
<td>0,051</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Rosenberger/Seeber (2010), 180ff.

Note: Antipathy is calculated upon attitudes to unwelcome neighbors. “Migrants” in this calculation denotes to people of different skin, muslims and immigrant/guestworkers. Index is calculated upon the number of unwelcome neighbors indicated by each respondent. Index ranges between 1 (in case of all groups being rejected) and 0 (if no group is rejected). Country-results are based on average value of all respondents from that country.
Taking these selective indications together, a considerable share of Austrian population can be characterized by their antipathic attitudes at least for the last two decades. As a consequence of these patterns, Austria ranks amongst the most adverse European countries versus people of immigrant origin (in terms of public opinion). Based on these findings, the tendencies even seem to have increased in recent years, although (or because) two decades of intensified public debate and political action have shaped the nature of the issue.

However, it remains difficult to convey impressions of the same kind for the periods prior to 1990. There are only few and rather intuitive indications that there might have been less public awareness and scepticism with regard to immigration/integration/diversity. For example Zuser (1996) and similarly Plasser/Ulram (1991b) suggest, that the career of what they label the “alien-question” (“Ausländerfrage”) dates back to the year of 1990. The latter even bring evidence through data from a survey that was conducted among Viennese and Lower Austrian citizens in December 1989, after the Austrian borders to the CSSR had been opened. At that time respondents expressed positive impressions of the border opening and even the long term impact of these developments was considered rather optimistic than pessimistic (cf. Plasser/Ulram 1991b: 313). The negative career of the issue, according to the authors, started only in spring 1990, due to several factors, such as the continuous overcrowding of the refugee camp in Traiskirchen, the “Causa Kaisersteinbruch”\(^{46}\), increasing black market activities, petty crimes as well as clandestine labor and last but not least leading to an aggressive Anti-Ausländer-campaign by the most dominant Austrian tabloid paper, the Neue Kronen Zeitung (ibd., 312ff., cf. also Gottschlich 1999). Thus, the importance of the issue and its negative stance increased in the course of the year and for the first time constituted a fertile ground for negative campaigning with regard to immigration/integration/diversity, a bandwagon on which pretty much all parties jumped on sooner or later in 1990 (ibd., 316f.).

Unfortunately, with regard to further elections no such survey data has been conducted that showed equal consideration of the “immigration/integration/diversity”-issue. As a consequence and despite the selective informations outlined above, it is rather impossible to elaborate specific assumptions on the interaction of public opinion and electoral politicization from a longitudinal perspective. Firstly there is no reliable indication about

\(^{46}\) In March 1990 the Austrian government aimed to shelter about 800 Romanian refugees in former military barracks located in the village of “Kaisersteinbruch”, counting not more than 250 residents. After continuous demonstration and road blockades on the part of the resident population, the government’s plan was abandoned.
the attitudes among members of the Austrian population concerning the issues of immigration/integration/diversity that dates back to the 1980ies or before. Such being the case, we are unable to determine the role of public opinion during the period of party system transformation in the mid-1980ies. Plus we cannot identify if and to what degree public attitudes have been different during the 1960ies/70ies (i.e. the guestworker-period) and the 1990ies (return of large-scale immigration). Secondly, the available data since the 1990ies reveals only gross patterns of development, for the time intervals between the surveys are considerably large. Furthermore, the evidence collected is based on different survey structures, which raises the general difficulty in comparison of their findings.

As a consequence, with regard to public opinion influence we are limited to rather general assumptions, arguing that the comparatively high illiberality among the Austrian population might favor anti-immigrant stances and parties being prone to restrictive positions. However, we do expect these conditions to be of different relevance for mainstream parties as opposed to niche parties. The latter are rather limited to preferences of their electoral niches, which seem to be fixed to either liberal or restrictive positions – since voters of the Greens and the FPÖ have been explicitly naming the policy stance on immigration as a central motive for the support of either party, see Tab. 7.

| Tab. 7: Voter preferences based on party stance on immigration/integration/diversity |
|-----------------------------------------------|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| **FPÖ** | % of voters naming party’s “immigration-stance” as voting motive | 2   | 39  | 49  | 47  | 52  | 56  | 2 |
| **Greens** | % of voters naming party’s “immigration-stance” as voting motive | -1 | -1 | 48  | 58  | 47  | 58  | 10 |


Note: Results are based on Exit-polls.

1) Survey-reports do not indicate whether “alien policies” have been excluded from the questionnaire or in fact been unimportant for Green voters.

2) Multiple items related to immigration, migrant integration and ethnic diversity obstruct the calculation of a single valid result.

What is interesting about these findings is the very low relevance the question of immigration did have for FPÖ-Voters in 1986, i.e. immediately after Jörg Haider took over the party leadership. While about 2/3 of FPÖ-voters named the person of Jörg Haider as their voting motive, the success in 1986 was only marginally a “national, right wing conservative phenomenon” (Plasser/Ulram 1987: 70). Yet, ever since, a
considerable share of either niche parties’ electorates has been explicitly supporting them for their policy stances on immigration/integration/diversity. Consequently the general tendencies of public opinion are of lesser importance for niche parties’ considerations, since their specific electorate is unambiguously promoting their either liberal or restrictive stances. On the other hand, average tendencies of public opinion might be of much greater importance for mainstream parties: Mainstream parties, both appealing to a broader spectrum of voters and being more flexible with regard to their positions on new issues orthogonal to traditional cleavages, naturally react more sensitive to public opinion than do niche parties. As a consequence, we would expect Austrian mainstream parties to respond to the restrictive and antipathic majorities among Austrian public opinion by promoting restrictive stances especially in the early 1990ies and after the millennium.

Theoretical Digression: Discursive opportunity structures. Plasser/Ulram (1991b) have been indicating that not only popular attitudes among Austrian citizens serve as a catalyst for the political debate about immigration/integration, but the behavior of public media plays a distinct role in firing the debate as well. Although there are empirical findings that completely neglect the importance of media for the party political agenda (cf. Green-Pedersen/Krogstrupp 2008), the specific role of public media for the genesis and career of political issues within the last few years has been theoretically readdressed through the ideas of the “opportunity-structures”-concept. Since the late 1970ies the concept of "political opportunity structures” (POS) has become of ever growing relevance for the behavioral analysis of politically relevant actors. By referring to “political opportunity structures”, early authors such as Peter Eisinger (1973) tried to express “the degree to which groups are likely to be able to gain access to power and to manipulate the political system” (Eisinger 1973: 25). Yet there has been an ongoing debate about the danger of vagueness in the use of “political opportunity structures”, interpreting “(a)ny environmental factor facilitating movement activity (...) as a political opportunity” (McAdam 1996: 25).

The “discursive dimension” has been separated as an autonomous dimension of opportunity by a number of authors. E.g. Ferree (2003: 309) isolates the concept as following: “Discursive opportunity structures are certainly political but are not usefully conceptualized as merely a subtype of state-centered political opportunity structure. By advantaging certain ways of speaking that are at least potentially open to anyone, discursive opportunity structures deploy power to shape ideas directly (and group access
indirectly) while other forms of political opportunity structure shape group access directly (and the expression of ideas indirectly).” As defined by Koopmans/Statham (1999: 228), the concept of “discursive opportunity structures” (DOS) originally tries to separate a set of „political-cultural or symbolic external constraints and facilitators of social movement mobilization“ from traditional variables like institutional structures or power relations, covered by the POS-concept. Ferree sketches DOS in an even broader way as “institutionally anchored ways of thinking that provide a gradient of relative political acceptability to specific packages of ideas” (Ferree 2003: 306). While these definitions cover a more general outline of what has to be understood by DOS, Koopmans/Olzak (2004) try to narrow it down to empirical dimensions of research. They argue that “media attention”, “public reactions by third actors” and “public controversies” are crucial levels to consider in terms of the analysis of discursive opportunities (Koopmans/Olzak 2004: 199). Consequently, they name “discourse opportunities” only those opportunities “that become publicly visible and that can thereby affect mobilization” (ibd. 201). Furthermore, Koopmans/Olzak put special emphasis on media coverage as a dominant level of public information exchange (a factor that still has to be expanded to other forms of online communication, especially to online social networks). Gamson (2004: 243) argues, that “general audience mass media provide a master arena” for political information, thus delivering a structure of discursive opportunities and constraints for actors trying to promote specific issues and frames. Ferree et al (2002) even consider mass media as being the primary arena to reproduce discursive opportunity structures of a society. The discursive opportunities and constraints fixed by this arena formally are the same for all actors, especially when they have to consider which issues/frames might have the best chance to a) become publicly visible and b) generate resonance of other actors.

Unfortunately, what already has been difficult to evaluate for public opinion is even more impossible with regard to patterns of media discourse. Up to that point there is no permanently conducted media analysis that could give any hint whatsoever about the historical development of the issues of immigration, migrant integration or ethnic diversity in Austrian media coverage, neither with regard to print media nor to broadcast media (cf. Gruber/Herczeg/Wallner 2009). Studies and findings are of rather selective nature and single-case oriented, whereas longitudinal or comparative data is non-existent. Exceptions to this rule only exist with regard to the role of the country’s major tabloid
paper, the *Neue Kronen Zeitung*[^47], which has been repeatedly popularizing the issues from a rather hostile perspective (cf. Herczeg 2009). Especially during the early 1990ies the newspaper heavily promoted anti-immigrant and xenophob tendencies, culminating in the paper’s support of the “Austria first”-petition launched by the FPÖ in 1993. As Joskowicz (2002: 311) assesses, in newspaper coverage a broad spectrum of resentments and stereotypes with regard to immigrants and particularly ro refugees have survived the turn of the millennium. However, in contrast to the rather negative tone of the major tabloid, there indeed is a slightly increasing number of media channels that promote perspectives of immigrants as well as the diverse ethnic and religious minorities living Austria. Most importantly, the Austrian Public Broadcast Corporation (ORF) in its broadcasting mandate is obliged to consider minority interests and to include sufficient contents in its program (cf. § 5 Austrian Broadcasting Corporation Act, ORF-G). Although this commitment historically has been dedicated to authochtonous minorities in the first place, this integrative perspective has been broadened ever since, increasingly including perspectives of “new” minorities into the ORF’s coverage. Beyond this mainstream-media segment, the recent years have also contributed to a growing market of minority-media in Austria (cf. Brantner/Herczeg 2010). Thus if evaluating the developments rather intuitively, in terms of media-attention and discursive opportunity structures a slightly growing awareness and supply might very well be stated, however, this evaluation until today has hardly been documented on a systematic and time-series basis. Given the variety of impressions with regard to specific case analysis, time periods or media channels, even taken together they do not enable us to build consistent assumptions about probable interactions with electoral politicization. For this reason, the present dissertation has refrained from including media discourse as an explanatory variable – nonetheless the importance of this factor as well as the need for longitudinal content analysis on immigration, migrant integration and ethnic diversity within Austrian media coverage shall be heavily underlined on this occasion.

What has become apparent in the previous section is the difficulty to isolate indicators for the examination of societal inputs to party politicization on immigration/integration/diversity. Although from a theoretical perspective these factors

[^47]: The *Neue Kronen Zeitung* is the most circulated newspaper in Austria and even in comparison to other major international tabloids has one of the highest coverages (cf. Seethaler/Melischek 2006). During the last ten years, according the Austrian Mediaanalyse, the tabloid has reached between 38 up to 45% of Austrian population older than 14 years.
merit considerable attention, the lack of data availability limits the actual possibilities to pursue them empirically. Nonetheless we have discussed at least a bunch of indicators and their potential interaction with politicization, in order to take this explanatory dimension into consideration. However, the main argument of the dissertation heads into a different direction: Based on the theoretical debate in chapter 2, we rather assume parties to align their strategies to opportunities/constraints that emerge from within the system of party competition. Consequently, the following chapter will focus on this internal dimension in greater detail.

4.2. Influencing party competition from within. The Austrian party system and its framework for individual party behavior

The assumed link between empirical conditions and party politicization in the present study has been limited to the party system level of politicization without reflecting party-specific strategies. This decision is based on the theoretical background, that if parties were merely troubleshooters occupied with fixing social problems, an increase/decrease in occupation could be identified across all parties likewise. This of course represents a very single-sided picture of the political world and thus is in conflict with other basic theoretical models of politics. For this reason the present dissertation puts greater focus on conceptional explanations coming from within the parties’ competitive framework itself. It is the core argument of this analysis, that party behavior regarding immigration/integration/diversity can only be understood adequately by focusing on strategic considerations of parties that strive for success in competition with their opponents.

Thus, as a first step a short discussion of major political cleavages and the emergence of associated party families in the 19th and 20th century democracies will be sent on ahead. In a second step the specific conditions of the Austrian cleavage and party spectrum will be discussed in order to arrive at ideology-based assumptions about party behavior regarding the politicization of immigration/integration/diversity (4.2.1.). Beyond the static patterns of ideology, the dynamics of the party spectrum itself have to be included as a vital factor influencing both emphasis and position of political parties with regard to these policy fields. Above all, and in order to comprehend the opportunities and constraints which parties experience from within their competitive interrelation, we need to consider
the number and strength of parties in the Austrian party system.Linked to the assumptions based on ideological foundations we may then come to the conclusion that an increasing number of divergent parties will contribute to an increasing intensity and polarization of competition over immigration/integration/diversity (4.2.2.). In addition we need to understand the coalition options based on specific conditions on the party system, since they may serve as essential explanations for individual party behavior. The transformation of a party system and the entrance of new or renewed parties on the scene will only be of permanent importance for the nature of electoral competition if they manage to build pressure on the traditional parties and their previous campaign strategies. Thus party behavior can be expected to adapt in line with changes in power and coalition patterns (4.2.3.).

4.2.1. Political cleavages and party ideology

The socio-structural inputs as discussed in the previous section might be a crucial factor for party politicization indeed, however, they need to be qualified more thoroughly. If we accept the constructivist argument, that concepts of “reality” may diverge depending on the different ideological background of the observer, we certainly need to consider party ideology as much as socio-structural inputs. Just like individuals, parties and politicians likewise do see the empirical world through different lenses. Thus, what might be defined as a problematic condition by one actor, could very well be depicted as a positive fact by another and because of that the suggested ways of dealing with the phenomenon will differ respectively. These different lenses in approaching the world and defining its patterns, problems and norms are bundled in what we term as “ideology”. As McDonald et al (2004) demonstrate, ideology is an even more important explanatory factor for politicization than current problems or public opinion.

Cleavage theory and party families. In fact such a perspective is inherent in cleavage theory of party competition, being one of the most influential instruments to explain the evolution as well as the transformation of party competition in Western Democracies. By understanding parties as genuine translators of basic conflicts in a society, both social cleavages as well as party ideology need to be looked upon more specifically. Following the basic distinction offered by Lipset/Rokkan (1967: 14f), four traditional cleavages – though with different regional intensity – have been identified for the 19th and early 20th
These four lines of conflict **dominant vs. subject culture (administrative and cultural level) / church(es) vs. government / primary vs. secondary economy / workers vs. employers & owners** have been dominating European democracies since their evolution and with respect to regional specifics led to the establishment of different types of parties. As a consequence of a cleavage based definition of parties, the notion of “ideology” moves to the center of attention which means that ideologies are to be seen as the core patterns to define a particular party as compared to others. Hence, the distinction of “ideological families” amongst political parties is a logical step of analysis, given that “(m)odern party families appeared as the ‘political translation’ of social divisions in systems in which conflict is increasingly settled through vote.” (Caramani 2007: 320). Although ideologies themselves offer a range of different issue emphases and positions, Vasallo/Wilcox (2006: 413) distinguish at least seven major families of parties that today are most common among the majority of studies on party politics: Communist parties, Socialist parties, Left-Libertarian parties, Green parties, Liberal parties, Christian Democratic parties and (new) far right parties. The evolution of these different party families has been linked to different cleavage conflicts:

Communist as well as Socialist parties derived their primary ideological structure from the support of mass labor protest and the struggle for the extension of rights against the interests of owners and employers – yet the proposed strategies differed in the course of the centuries (thus creating a dimension of conflict themselves, that was labelled as a “Communism/Socialism-Cleavage” – see Caramani 2007: 324). Although Christian Democratic or Conservative parties obviously have been addressing conflicts of capital/labor too (promoting the interests of employers and owners), their primary source of identification originally had its origins in a conflict with liberalistic perspectives (i.e. the defense of traditional privileges of church and monarchy versus liberal attempts to advance the autonomy of the nation-state promote liberal values; or the protection of agricultural interests in the peripheries versus liberal efforts to establish a free-market in the industrialized urban parts of the countries, cf. Caramani 2007: 323). This traditionalist basis materialized in conservative economic concepts and as well as law and order appeals in times of crisis (Vasallo/Wilcox 2006: 419). On the other side of these cleavages, liberal parties historically emerged as the voice of middle-class interests against the old aristocratic elites (thus pressing for autonomy of the nation-state as part of the state-church-cleavage), and thereby came to represent the interests of employers and owners on the capital/labor-cleavage as well as on the urban-rural-cleavage which led
them into a conflict with conservative, agrarian/peasant and regionalist parties (Caramani 2007: 320ff). Above all, the latter pressed for cultural/religious/linguistic autonomy against the attempts of cultural standardization by the nation state (such as in Scotland, Ireland or Spain) and hence addressed a special element of the center-periphery-conflict, that is the cultural dimension (Caramani 2007: 320f).

These 19th and early 20th century cleavages and their respective party proponents have been shaping European democracies until the present day, although many of the traditional lines of conflict have weakened during the last decades and been supplemented by different ruptures addressed by new types of parties. The most influential cross-regional transformations have been developing as a consequence of what Bell (1973) labelled the “post-industrial revolution” of the 1960ies and 1970ies. In the emerging conflict over “post-materialistic values” like peace, participation, equality or environmental issues (Caramani 2007: 325) a number of new social movements emerged on the political scene even though they rarely evolved into political parties. The major exception, of course, is the environmental movement which from the 1970ies on little by little established political parties as its institutional outlets all over Europe (thereby often including proponents of other “post-materialistic” social movements who helped to broaden their single-issue perspective) (cf. Inglehart 1990). A second influential cleavage resulting from the development in the period of post-industrial revolution was linked to the rising conflict over the negative consequences of globalization – especially concerning those who suffered the greatest disadvantages in this respect, like blue-collar workers, small and medium-sized businesses or peasant farmers. The growing controversies over the effects of globalization facilitated the emergence of new (in parts “renewed”) far right protest parties promoting protectionist policies and 'locals first'-appeals which in large parts were and still are linked to “cultural, anti-immigration and xenophobic prejudice stressing religious and national values against multi-ethnic society and cosmopolitanism.” (Caramani 2007: 325). However, right wing parties further expanded their agendas to a criticism of the welfare-state itself and a claim for greater economic liberalism as well as for strict law and order regimes (Vasallo/Wilcox 2006: 420). Therefore Mudde (1999) stressed the particular relevance of immigration issues for far right parties all over Europe while Gibson (2002: 8) points out that “immigration constitutes ‘a’ defining issue for an anti-immigrant party, although the extent to which it defines the party exclusively varies.”
Evolution of Austrian political cleavages. Historically the Austrian party spectrum for the most part can be explained by reference to the ideologies of these classic party families and the main cleavages defined by Lipset/Rokkan. The most dominant actors of Austrian party politics – although experiencing several internal shifts of different intensity – have maintained their presence since their origins back in the 1880s. In the last decades of the 19th century three traditional “camps” (“Lager”) mainly from the German-speaking regions of the Austro Hungarian Monarchy (cf. Luther 1999: 119) became the fertile ground for mass organizations that subsequently turned into political parties. Each of these early mass parties had been rooted ideologically in certain cleavage positions that appealed to their specific mass basis in the electorate.

The biggest organization among them, the anti-clerical “Social Democratic Workers Party” (Sozialdemokratische Arbeiterpartei – SDAP) first and foremost represented working class interests on a socioeconomic dimension of conflict thus carrying the emphasis on this conflict explicitly in its name (Plasser/Ulram 2006: 352). The same goes for the Christian-Conservatives who were the second large camp within Austrian society, predominantly of catholic influence and of anti-capitalist orientation. In choosing the name “Christian Social Party” (Christlich Soziale Partei – CSP) the party elites signalled their preoccupation with a religious/denominational dimension of conflict embedded in the state/church-cleavage. Its primary goal was to combat the ousting of the Catholic Church as well as traditional catholic values and customs by secular or liberal state hegemony (cf. Pelinka/Rosenberger 2000: 21). Both parties thus represented prototypically divergent electorates and shared opposed positions on both of their characteristic cleavages (capital/labor; state/church). Yet, the dominant camps also shared common lines of conflict with the third important camp in 19th-century Austria, the significantly smaller Pan-German camp, which was represented by a group of smaller parties, rather than a single victorious party (cf. Pelinka/Rosenberger 2000: 21). Though differing in their anti-clerical and anti-socialist orientation, these parties were unified the claim for a Pan-German identity in the face of the conflict of ethnicity in the then multi-

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48 Supported by mainly urban proletariat the proposition of (industrial) labour interests by the SDAP conflicted with the interests of both Christian-conservative camp (representing vast parts of rural peasantry and land-owners) as well as the German-National camp (representing especially white collar workers and members from the state-bureaucracy) (cf. Luther 1999: 119f.).

49 Many of these German-National parties – such as Deutsche Nationalpartei, Deutsche Volkspartei, Alldutsche Vereinigung, Deutschradikale Partei, Deutsche Agrarpartei – were of short persistence or were merged in more important Deutschnationale Arbeiterpartei or in the Greater German People’s Party (founded in 1918).
ethnic Austrian Empire as well as in the remaining Austrian Republic after the end of Habsburg Monarchy in 1916. This cultural conflict over the core and limits of a national identity (Pan-German vs. Austrian) (Plasser/Ulram 2006: 352) has been identified as the cultural dimension of the center/periphery-cleavage as in the model of Lipset/Rokkan (Pelinka 1998: 74). Especially with the fall of the Habsburg Monarchy and the end of the First World War the cultural cleavage in Austria had become a crunch question, in a country shrivelled to a microstate and a party system that was based on fragile grounds. Consequently during the period of the First Austrian Republic (1918-1933) not only the cultural but also other conflict lines of the 19th-century retained their relevance and despite a short period of Grand Coalition government (1918-1920) were even reflected by government coalitions – with federal governments being exclusively formed by CSP and German-nationals (cf. Luther 1999: 120). The intensity of the conflicts increased during the 1920ies and thus fostered not only the social cleavages but also the party affiliation of voters, leading to uprisings, the emergence of armed party forces, violent conflict between parties and finally a short period of civil war in 1934 that followed the suspension of the government by conservative chancellor Engelbert Dollfuß. The establishment of a one-party regime by the victorious Christian Socials brought an end to the First Republic and resulted in the exclusion of the remaining parties from the political realm – a period that until the 1938-“Anschluss” to Hitler-Germany and that was known as “Corporative State” (affirmative) or “Austro-Fascism” (critical) (ibd.: 120f.).

After World War II the Austrian party system had to be rebuilt on a difficult heritage, given the socio-cultural polarization of political camps, the failed attempt to establish a functioning multi-party system and the violent abolition of Austria’s First Republic as a sad climax (cf. Luther 1919: 121). However, the re-establishment of a functioning Austrian party system has to be read in the context of these inter-war experiences as well as in connection with the trauma of the National Socialist regime. In large parts the political elites had learned their lessons and after 1945 had developed an awareness different than that back in 1918 (cf. Plasser 1999). Beyond that, while many conditions resembled those of 1918 (a starving economic situation, a residual microstate, a continuity of political camps, political parties and even political personal) some decisive factors had changed, such as the wide-ranging discrediting of the Pan-German ideology, the explicit support of Western Allies or the experience of an Allied occupation (1945-1955) which fostered a sense of “Austrian” nationality and a desire for sovereignty (cf.
Thus, the relevance of the cultural cleavage of the inter-war-period was decreasing, since Pan-German claims largely had lost their appeal and support in society since the 1950ies (cf. Plasser/Ulram 2006: 353). In fact, this helped to limit the scope of the “party system’s ideological spectrum” (Luther 1999: 121), a process that was catalyzed by the anti-communist and anti-fascist consensus of the Western allies. As a matter of fact the developments of Austrian post-war party spectrum had two rather significant implications:

On the one hand the far right part of the spectrum had shrunk dramatically in terms of electorate size and even after the prohibition of respective parties\(^{50}\) – the “League of Independents” (VDU) was founded in 1949, adapting its name to “Freedom Party of Austria” in 1956 – the right wing parties lacked a social basis, failed to re-establish a cultural cleavage and could not gain more than a minor part of the total federal voteshare in the following three decades.\(^{51}\) On the other hand, the far left share of the spectrum that had been dominated by the Austrian Communist Party (KPÖ) did not succeed in establishing a permanent basis of mass support due to the country’s orientation to the Western model (reducing the importance of a communist/socialist-cleavage since the 1960ies), but also due to the negative experiences with Soviet occupation until 1955 and Soviet interventions in Hungary (1956) or Czechoslovakia (1968) (cf. Luther 1999).

Thus, despite being a member of the national unity government, the KPÖ only gained a minor number of parliamentary seats after 1945 and has failed to take the 4%-threshold since 1959. As such, the party has long left an open flank for center-left social democrats which had relevant consequences for the Austrian party spectrum in general.

Austrian mainstream parties witnessed characteristic transformations that were mirrored even by the adaption of their names (by which in fact they tried to facilitate their development towards catch-all-parties) (cf. Pelinka/Rosenberger 2000: 133): While the Social Democratic Workers Party renamed itself “Socialist Party” (SPÖ) in 1945 and “Social Democratic Party” from 1991 onwards, the conservative camp re-established itself under the name of “Austrian Peoples Party” (ÖVP) in 1945 (cf. Pelinka 1998). Due to a lack of niche party presence both potent Austrian mainstream parties were guided by an “essentially accommodative culture” (Luther 1999: 124) For that reason the

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\(^{50}\) During the immediate post-war years the Allies prohibited the formation of other parties than the ÖVP, SPÖ and KPÖ (Luther 1999: 121f.)

\(^{51}\) While this weak electoral support on the federal level remained to be same even after the liberal wing of the party (members of the so called “Attersee-Kreis” under N.Steeger) had taken charge of the leadership, the step towards "respectability" at least led to the FPÖ becoming a junior partner of a Social Democrat coalition from 1983 to 1986.
ideological spectrum of the Austrian party system witnessed only slight ideological shifts for almost 25 years and – reinforced by a “proportional electoral system” that supported mainstream parties at the cost of niche parties (cf. Müller 1997)\(^{52}\) – subsequently came to be one of the most stable post-war party systems amongst Western democracies. In sum three parties (SPÖ, ÖVP, FPÖ) remained as the only players in what had become a two-and-a-half party system from 1949 until 1986 (Siaroff 2000: 179).

It was only by the (late) 1970ies that an erosion of these fostered patterns of party competition began to take place:

The period of single-party governments (1966-1983) brought an end to the patterns of the historical post-war compromise and catalyzed the beginning of a transformation of the FPÖ into a potential kingmaker party.\(^{53}\) The FPÖ leaders “initiated a deliberate change in their ideological profile from that of a backward-looking party, emphasizing protest and German-nationalism, towards gradual liberalization, albeit of a distinctly conservative variety.” (Luther 1999: 129). Aside from that, the influence of “Green” parties had increased since the late 1970ies in consequence of their promotion of at first environmental issues but later post-materialistic values in general. The “post-industrial revolution” had revealed new and increasingly prominent lines of conflict in most of the Western democracies as was the case in Austria. From the 1980ies on, a decreasing – although not vanishing – relevance of traditional cleavages was met by the emergence of new conflict dimensions, such as monocultural/multicultural and cosmopolitan/national perspectives of society (cf. Dolezal 2005; Kriesi et al 2006). Although in 1983 the disunited factions of “United Greens of Austria” (VGÖ) and “Alternative Lists of Austria” (ALÖ) failed to pass the 4%-threshold, their presence indicated the increased relevance of a new post-materialistic cleavage.

The year of 1986 (with the success of both niche parties – Greens and FPÖ – in the national elections in autumn as well as the intensive Waldheim-conflict during the presidential election earlier that year) drastically demonstrated the relevance of new ruptures within Austrian population (cf. Plasser/Ulram 1987). With the emergence of a new Left-Libertarian party (Greens) as well as a renewed Far Right party (FPÖ) it had been proven that ideological changes among the population would also translate into

\(^{52}\) A condition that was slightly weakened with the 1970 reform of the electoral system (a concession made by the Social democrats to the FPÖ-support of a minority government) but again reversed by the electoral reform in 1992.

\(^{53}\) With the first obvious example being its support for a Social Democrat minority government in 1970.
relevant forms of political power (culminating in a new party spectrum). While the dominant cleavage on the parts of the “Green Alternative” obviously was the post-materialistic question of environmental respect together with claims for extended minority rights (such as gender rights, ethnic minority rights, etc.), the dominant line of conflict of the FPÖ was the attack on the “old regime” combined with a nationalist ideology that claimed to speak for globalization losers – and manifested itself as a populist anti-system, anti-immigration program. Thus the traditional Pan-German-tendency on the cultural dimension of the center-periphery cleavage became re-established as a more general struggle between nationalism/cosmopolitism and thus was compatible with a more tolerated “Austria”-Patriotism instead of a discredited German-Nationalism (Pelinka 1998: 74; Fröhlich-Steffen 2004).

The evolution ever since has clearly confirmed these transformations: Both Greens and FPÖ have established their programmatic appeals as constant forces in the Austrian party spectrum, although with different success (see section 4.2.2.). This is even more evident when looking at the performance of the fifth party joining the parliamentary arena in 1994, the “Liberal Forum” (LIF) – a splinter party of the FPÖ. Despite filling a vacant spot in the Austrian party spectrum by addressing traditional liberal issues such as market-economy, liberal values, etc. and even having a popular party leader in broadly respected Heide Schmidt, the Liberal Forum failed to establish itself as a permanent actor and missed the 4%-threshold ever since the 1999-elections. It became obvious that under the current conditions of the Austrian voter spectrum there was not enough potential for a continuous presence of a Liberal Party (a fact that was proved in the snap elections of 2002 when the Liberals even failed to attract frustrated voters of the then collapsed FPÖ).

The following years, however, will again be a litmus test for this conclusion, given the emergence of the “Alliance for the Future of Austria” (BZÖ) – another FPÖ-splinter party, founded in 2005 by Jörg Haider as a result of internal FPÖ-controversies. Since then both populist right parties have aimed to address similar sections of the Austrian electorate but with varying degrees of success. While the FPÖ has re-established large voteshares under its new leader Heinz-Christian Strache, the BZÖ has been battling for its existence both on a federal as well as on regional levels. Hence, in recent years and especially after the dead of their leading figure Jörg Haider his successors have explicitly started to re-position the BZÖ as a center-right alternative to Austrian voters – with the outcome still open.
Party types: Mainstream parties and beyond. Finally, what is important for our analysis is the classification of Austrian parties within our mainstream party vs. niche party typology. For the majority of parties it is rather unproblematic to assign them to one of the categories: To begin with, SPÖ and ÖVP both with regard to their ideology and their importance in the Austrian party system have to be qualified as prototypical mainstream parties with catch-all perspectives (cf. Safran 2009). Furthermore, the identification as Austrian “niche”-parties for the period of 1945-2008 is rather unambiguous for FPÖ (VdU), Greens and BZÖ, with all of them belonging to party families being that share the characteristics of the niche party-group (cf. Adams et al 2006, Meguid 2008). A more difficult task though is the qualification of the two remaining and also relevant post-war parties, the KPÖ and the LIF (Degen-Krause 2011 discusses the same difficulties for the Czech and Slovak party systems).

As mentioned above (see chapter 3.2.3.), it has been disputed as to whether a party’s position on an overall left-right scale (including economic issues) will be the adequate basis to identify niche parties (cf. Adams et al 2006; Ezrow 2010) or if the niche party concept per definition excludes parties that compete on a traditional economic dimension (cf. Meguid 2008; Wagner 2012). Further critique has been added by Miller/Meyer (2010) who rather calculate the „niceness“ of a party based on a combined value of all issue-dimensions taken together. Detaching the identificaton from the simple traditional left-right and/or economic dimensions, they arrive at a minimalist definition of „niche parties“ as parties that „compete by stressing other policies than their competitors“ (Miller/Meyer 2010: 4). Still such parties share some commonalities beyond this decisive kind of issue-behavior, in that „they have a distinct legislative voting behavior and they differ in their mass organizational resources, internal decision-making rules, and their dependence on public party funding.“ (ibd.) Following this argument, niche parties cannot simply be identified by their non-reference to the economic dimension but rather by their role within the overall competitive structure and their focus on specific issues. As such, both KPÖ and LIF definitely resemble the characteristics of classic niche parties – like Greens or FPÖ – much more than those of catch-all-parties covering the mainstream of the party spectrum (cf. also Deegan-Krause 2011). For this reason, we will ascribe the LIF to the niche party group in our evaluation – which stands in contrast with some of the quoted authors (in any way our findings will support this decision, as we show in Chapter VI).
Austrian cleavage structure and immigration/integration/diversity. As discussed above, these ideological roots now offer a tool to establish predictions on the way, how Austrian parties will politicize the issues of immigration, migrant integration and ethnic diversity. Rooted in the theoretical assumptions of issue-ownership it would be expected that the strongest politicization would come from parties whose predominant cleavage positions are linked to these issues in general. Despite their historical relevance, immigration/integration/diversity have been identified as comparatively young issues (at least in terms of becoming permanent divisive issues for societies) and are rather orthogonal to traditional cleavages such as socioeconomic or religious conflicts ("owned" by the Austrian mainstream parties). Instead, they not only fit into the emerging post-structural cleavage (predominantly addressed by libertarian and green parties) but correspond with a nationalistic cleavage ( politicized by new far right parties who in most parts explicitly position as “Anti-Immigrant parties”) as well (cf. Bale et al 2010: 412). Consequently, this gives rise to different suppositions regarding the assumed relevance of issues like immigration, migrant integration and ethnic diversity for Austrian political parties:

As already outlined, questions of ethnicity have been a vital part of the cultural dimension in the center-periphery cleavage ever since and thus is a basic element of nationalist identity for the “third camp”. Hence, as far as the politicization of immigration/integration/diversity is concerned, the FPÖ can obviously be expected to appear as the dominant – especially after the leadership-change from liberal Norbert Steeger to nationalist/populist Jörg Haider in 1986.\(^{54}\) Its issue-position quite naturally is assumed to be of a more restrictive nature, given the explicitly anti-immigrant party basis. On the other side, ethnicity also represents a constitutive part of a post-materialistic set of values, as is promoted by the left-libertarian “Greens”. Their guiding principle of supporting minority rights together with the comparatively high rate of party members with immigrant or minority background makes the Austrian Greens the second dominant party, that can be assumed to politicize the issues offensively. Concerning its issue-position the party will to take an opposite stance to the far right and to promote liberal

\(^{54}\) After growing intra-party popularity of Jörg Haider and his non-consideration for a government function by the party establishment in 1983, in september 1986 Haider successfully attempted a takeover of party leadership on the party convention in Innsbruck. In a crucial vote he received almost 60% of the delegates votes in an atmosphere that was characterized by a nationalist and aggressive stance against the back then leader and vice chancellor Norbert Steger. Representatives of the liberal party flank were attacked verbally and physically, furthermore “several FPÖ delegates wore Nazi regalia and shouted that Steger deserved to be ‘gassed’.” (cf. Art 2009: 341).
claims regarding immigration/integration/diversity in particular.

As a consequence of FPÖ and Greens marking the opposed ends of the ideological spectrum on the issues of immigration/integration/diversity, the remaining parties in the system are expected to be located in between those ends. Firstly the liberal LIF is assumed to equally address issues according to its basic liberalistic values (such as religious freedom and ensuring basic individual rights), on the one hand, and its close ties with the economic sector promoting entrepreneurial interests regarding labor migration on the other hand. Its position thus is expected to tend towards a liberal direction, arguing for facilitated regulations of labor migration and the maintenance of cultural/religious liberties. Conversely the BZÖ – being the outcome of an internal FPÖ-split trying to continue the heritage of its leading figure Jörg Haider – might adopt positions close to those of the far right FPÖ although in a more moderate tone. With the recent proclamation of the party’s shift to the center – this being a result only of the post-Haider period, corresponding turnarounds regarding the politicization of immigration/integration/diversity cannot be expected to appear in the present study (since the 2008-elections mark the end of the examination period).

However, it is a difficult task to make a proper prediction concerning Austrian mainstream parties. As has already been discussed, both party families – Social Democrats as well as Conservatives – are originally based on traditional cleavages and have been colonizing the Austrian electorate for centuries according to these basic divides. With the issues of immigration/integration/diversity cutting across their traditional cleavages and issue-ownership, the expected behavior of mainstream parties will be one of depoliticization, though it seems very likely that on positional basis the orientation may fit into the classic left-right-divide: On the one hand, there is a center-right ÖVP taking a slightly restrictive stance (according to its conservative values and a law-and-order background which in political terms is assumed to clearly prevail against the Christian claim of tolerance and compassion). On the other hand, we have a center-left SPÖ adopting a somewhat liberal position (in line with its socialist core values of solidarity and equality which – by tendency – are expected to dominate the equally characteristic routes of protectionism even with regard to immigrant labor).

Thus while the conceptual hypothesis regarding the intensity of politicization would assume that the stronger an issue is linked to a cleavage owned by a party the stronger this issue will be politicized by this party (H4), the operational hypothesis for the Austrian case would be as following:
• Far-right parties (FPÖ, BZÖ) will be the most dominant actors politicizing the issues of immigration/integration/diversity (H4a)

• Green party and Liberals will be the second most dominant actors politicizing the issues of immigration/integration/diversity (H4b)

• Social democrats and Conservatives will be actors politicizing it the least of immigration/integration/diversity (H4c)

These assumptions need to be supplemented by a hypothesis regarding the issue positions of political parties on immigration, migrant integration and ethnic diversity. In this regard the conceptual hypothesis would assume that issue-positions of Austrian political parties on a liberal-restrictive axis of immigration/integration/diversity correspond to their issue locations on a cultural left-right scale (H5). In operational terms this would consequently lead to the following operational hypothesis:

• Far-right parties (FPÖ, BZÖ) will take the most restrictive positions on the issues of immigration/integration/diversity (H5a)

• Left-Libertarian (Greens) and Liberal parties (LIF) will take the most liberal positions on the issues of immigration/integration/diversity (H5b)

• Center-left parties (SPÖ) will show balanced positions on the issues of immigration/integration/diversity, with a slight tendency towards the liberal side of the spectrum (H5c)

• Center-right parties (ÖVP) will show balanced positions on the issues of immigration/integration/diversity, with a slight tendency towards the restrictive side of the spectrum (H5d)

As discussed beyond, prior research on party positions in the broad picture has indicated quite a constant insistence of political parties on their ideologies and associated political issues within party competition. However, under conditions of party system transformation, increasing voter realignment and growing niche party pressure, ideological purity – at least in part – might be sacrificed for strategic considerations even by mainstream parties. In fact, the models discussed in chapter 2 rather suggest an explicit subordination of these policy constraints under the achievement of power. It is this second perspective on party behavior that pushes research towards an analysis of party competition in terms of rational choices made by the actors concerned. As such these
models offer much more effective tools for explaining *changes in party behavior* and thus add a lot of further prognostic potential in addition to sheer ideological explanations. Although parties are barely driven by a single motive alone but enforce different strategies under different circumstances, these circumstances can become object of analysis and generalized as patterns determining party behavior. The conditions of the party system are to be perceived as important structural constraints that determine party behavior in general but also specifically with regard to electoral competition over immigration/integration/diversity. Building on the ideological conditions discussed in the previous section we now need to get a better understanding of how the shape of the party spectrum itself may have become a vital factor influencing both salience and positioning of Austrian parties. Thus, we specifically consider two key elements of party competition: We argue that firstly – from a vote-seeking perspective – we have to consider the number and strength of relevant parties that have been constituting the competitive framework of the Austrian party system. When do new actors join the competition, when do party system transformations occur and how does this influence party politicization of immigration/integration/diversity? (4.2.2.) Secondly – from an office-seeking perspective – we discuss the shifting possibilities for government-participation by evaluating different coalition options for Austrian parties and their potential influence on competitive behavior. When do shifting majority relations create new options for minimal winning coalitions and how does this facilitate changing campaign strategies with regard to immigration/integration/diversity? (4.2.3.)

**4.2.2. On success and failure: The party system in numerical terms**

*Moderate pluralism there and back.* Indices for “fragmentation”, which give basic information about the proponents of a party system and its competitive conditions, have become the most basic indicator of general patterns within Western party democracies. Of course, a number of diverging calculations of party system fragmentation have been developed, either by merely calculating the number of all parties, by focusing on “relevant” parties in detail or by combining these calculations with the strength of parties or even their ideological distance (Ladner 2004: 67f.).
### Tab. 8: Voteshare in Austrian national elections (in %) / Fragmentation indices, 1945-2008

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Sartori’s typology</th>
<th>Moderate Pluralism</th>
<th>Two Party System (with predominant party)</th>
<th>Moderate Pluralism</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Election</td>
<td>'45</td>
<td>'49</td>
<td>'53</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Voteshare SPÖ</td>
<td>44.6</td>
<td>38.7</td>
<td>42.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Voteshare ÖVP</td>
<td>49.8</td>
<td>44.0</td>
<td>41.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Voteshare KPÖ</td>
<td>5.4</td>
<td>5.1</td>
<td>5.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Voteshare Vdu/FPÖ</td>
<td>11.7</td>
<td>10.9</td>
<td>6.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Voteshare Greens</td>
<td>4.8</td>
<td>4.8</td>
<td>7.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Voteshare LIF</td>
<td>6.0</td>
<td>5.5</td>
<td>3.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Voteshare BZÖ</td>
<td>4.1</td>
<td>10.7</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

| Source: Electoral documentation of Ministry of Interior (BMI) / own calculations |
| Note: Only (at least once) relevant parties have been considered. Austrian electoral system features an election threshold of 4% (of valid votes on the federal level) or obtainment of a regional direct mandate (Grundmandat). |

Comparing the different indices for Austrian party system fragmentation (thus focusing on numbers and amount of seats), either of the three main indicators listed beyond shows a distinct transformation beginning in the Mid-1980ies and alternating ever since. Sartorisis calculation of relevant parties (r.P.) simply demonstrates, that the number of relevant parties influencing party competition has stagnated until 1986.55 Beyond that, it further mirrors how the number of relevant competitors within party competition has increased ever since, whereby it should be noted, that this does not account for party strength. Conversely, the Laakso/Taagepera-index reflects the power of these competitors and – given the long-standing dominance of the two mainstream parties (SPÖ/ÖVP) – subsequently indicates a lower number of “effective parties”. As a consequence, it reveals more clearly the nature of the Austrian party system during the 1960ies and 1970ies, consisting of three parliamentary parties with only minor relevance of the third party (FPÖ) – which made Austria a prototype for a so called “limping” two-party system or two-and-a-half party system (Pelinka/Rosenberger 2000: 135). The Molinar-Index reflects these power-relations even stronger by emphasizing the relevance of the single most dominant party. Thus, the lower the distance between the strongest and the remaining party becomes – as is the case especially from 1990 onwards – the stronger the

55 With the KPÖ loosing its relevance in the Sartorian sense from 1949 on due to the cold-war developments and the anti-communist compromise of Austrian mainstream parties.

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Molinar-Index deviates from Laakso-Taagepera. In sum, all the formal indicators point to the systemic transformation of the Austrian party system since the early 1980ies culminating in the developments of 1986. Yet Sartori (1976) stresses that the numerical criterion is simply a basic indicator which does not automatically provide information about the mechanics of a party system, that is to say the patterns of inter-party competition. In distinguishing different types of two-party systems (with either a hegemonic party, a predominant party or a bipolar balance) as well as multi-party systems (moderate pluralism vs. polarized pluralism) Sartori highlights that the patterns of conflict need to be considered as an important factor themselves. As a consequence, his typology allows for an even preciser qualification of transforming party systems, which is essential when trying to characterize the Austrian developments especially since the 1980ies.

Describing the Austrian party system according to the typology of Sartori reveals three different periods of development after the reestablishment of the Austrian democracy in 1945. The first stage was initiated by the end of World War II and was characterized by the logic of rebuilding that also influenced the development of the Austrian party system. Although the immediate relevance of the Communist party in 1945 vanished in the following elections, its continuous parliamentary presence until 1959 together with a fostering VdU/FPÖ created a fourfold set of parties and thus an early form of a pluralistic party system. However a number of factors kept ideological pluralism within a tight frame: a) The civil-war experience of the First Republic, the post-war conditions of an internal anti-Nazi-heritage together with increasing Soviet pressure from the outside leading to the declaration of solidarity between the two big camps (Pelinka 1998: 76), b) the development of the Austrian model of consotionalism, including arranged proportional representation, strong integration of mainstream parties and social partners and the commitment to a Grand coalition (ibd.) as well as c) a highly concentrated party system (with the voteshare of the two mainstream parties circulating at around 90% of the valid votes\(^{56}\) that comprised a closely attached electorate and was organized by the two mainstream parties preventing any third party from achieving significant strength – despite an electoral system based on proportional representation (ibd., 77). Consequently the first post-war-decades resembled Sartoris definition of moderate pluralism because the number of relevant parties did in no way correspond to the patterns of political competition and both mainstream parties stucked to the continuance of a Grand Coalition.

\(^{56}\) With the only exceptions in 1949 and 1953 (cf. Müller 1997: 224).
The apparent crisis of the Grand Coalition in the early 1960ies gave rise to a slight change of the competitive patterns. Although the ÖVP practically would have been able to achieve an absolute majority before (which in fact was only missed by one mandate in 1956 and 1962), the party offensively expressed it as its prior goal for the first time in the 1966-elections (Müller 1998: 200). Following the ÖVP’s victory and the formation of the first single-party government of the Second Republic, the Austrian party system moved to the second stage, which in Sartoris terms corresponds to a Two-Party system, with the ÖVP and SPÖ taking turns in forming a single-party government. After the short period of an SPÖ-led minority government from 1970 to 1971, the elections in 1971 supported the absolute majority of the Social Democrats and led to the era of Chancellor Bruno Kreisky. By regaining an absolute majority in three consecutive elections (1971, 1975 and 1979) the SPÖ formed competitive patterns that lasted up until the election of 1983 and are to be described as a Party-System with predominant party. The loss of the absolute majority in the 1983-elections and the formation of an SPÖ-FPÖ-coalition under chancellor Fred Sinowatz marked the third stage after 1945, i.e. the return to a system of moderate pluralism, although under somewhat different circumstances than earlier post-war-decades: Firstly, because the SPÖ-FPÖ-coalition for the first time in the Second Republic included a third party at the cost of a mainstream party, thus the role of third parties started to improve from 1983 onwards (cf. Müller 2000: 284). Secondly because from 1983 on the number of relevant parties continuously increased to four or even five parties with the appearance of the Greens in 1986, of the Liberal Forum in 1994 and of the BZÖ in 2005. Thirdly, because of the decreasing power of the traditional mainstream parties SPÖ and ÖVP who – taken together – fell from 93% of the total votes in 1983 to only 55% in 2008, thus conceding a great number of votes to the emerging/restructuring niche parties. Fourthly, because although after 1986 the renewed Grand Coalition continued to survive for another 14 years, both mainstream parties’ willingness to enter into a coalition differed from the conviction of the post-war-period. As a consequence, the competitive patterns of the post-86-system became much more contested and subsequently, with regard to Sartori’s typology, the question remains whether the border between moderate and polarized pluralism has been crossed since the 1990ies. Though in some aspects the party system resembled polarized pluralism as
defined by Sartori\textsuperscript{57}, these changes are not sufficient to relieve the patterns of moderate pluralism (Müller 1997: 227).

However, despite Sartori’s typology that puts Austria in the “moderate pluralism”-category since 1983, a number of authors have pointed to the qualitative change of the Austrian party system that is not covered by Sartori’s indicators. As Müller (2000: 284f) summarizes, after the 1999 elections another period of the Austrian party system appears to have set in, a) with three parties competing for the majority position, b) with the logic of coalition building becoming effective also in minority constellations (lacking an absolute majority party), c) with elections and coalition preferences of voters losing their importance for the process of government formation (which is rather shaped by parties’ operational coalition evaluations) and d) with the pivotal position of a party and the size principle becoming increasingly relevant, after a minimum-winning coalition had been formed for the first time.

Linking these patterns of fragmentation within the Austrian party system to the ideological arguments made in the previous section, we could conclude that with regard to the issues of immigration/integration/diversity this interaction will start to materialize over time. Consequently, this would imply different periods of party politicization regarding immigration/integration/diversity prior to and after the election of 1986 – that correspond to the party system shift from a (limping) two-party system to moderate pluralism. Being an issue orthogonal to traditional mainstream parties’ issue ownership it is expected that the transformation on the party system level will contribute to both the relevance as well as the divisiveness of the issues of immigration, migrant integration and ethnic diversity. In the Austrian case, all relevant parties that have emerged in the period of moderate pluralism since 1986 (FPÖ, Greens, LIF, BZÖ) share a stronger ideological reference towards immigration/integration/diversity than the traditional parties. Bearing that in mind, the transformation of the party system is thus expected to increase both the relevance as well as the divisiveness of politicization of these issues in the Austrian case.\textsuperscript{58}

\textsuperscript{57} Such as a) the presence of an Anti-system party which for a long period was neglected its suitability as a coalition partner; b) niche parties winning at the cost of mainstream parties who are “forced” into Grand Coalitions; c) at least with regard to specific issues such as immigration or internal security the establishment of both a right-wing and left-wing opposition, thus increasing the ideological distance in the party spectrum (cf. Müller 1997: 227)

\textsuperscript{58} Whilst of course in countries with other historical part constellations increasing fragmentation might lead to different outcomes.
In summary it can be said that parties may strategically “use” issues to their advantage, depending on what type of motive a party is predominantly striving for. Following Budge/Laver (1986), Strøm (1990), Müller/Strøm (1999), we have analytically separated vote-seeking considerations as opposed to office-seeking considerations. As the authors have been stressing, the distinction is a rather analytical one and parties in multiparty-systems will actually aim for a trade-off between these tendencies. For a closer consideration of this interconnection we now need to clarify to what respect these two approaches would lead to different competitive behavior regarding the issues of immigration/integration/diversity. Thus, we will in a first step focus on expectations based on a purely vote-seeking perspective and will carry on later with the constraints emerging from an office-seeking perspective – which in multiparty systems corresponds with coalition options (see section 4.2.3.).

*Expectations for individual party politicization.* Starting with a strictly vote-oriented perspective, we can proceed on the assumption that, longitudinally speaking, parties may prioritize those strategies that have proven to be successful guarantors for the allocation of votes and therefore will be maintained as long as they prove to be effective. Applied to our context we thus assume that *the more a party has succeeded in the previous election, the stronger it will stick to previous strategies of politicization and vice versa (H6).*

Taking up our theoretical discussion of the recent literature on party behavior in competitive contexts (Chapter 2.2.+2.3.), we now try to break down these assumptions to individual party behavior. Based on the previous remarks we will distinguish three periods within our examination period that constitute substantially different contexts for individual party behavior and that help to identify the temporal character of politicization in the Austrian case:

1970-1986: As Tab. 8 clearly demonstrates, the election of 1986 has become a turning point for the Austrian party system. Until then the two-party system had been the dominant characteristic even though the FPÖ had twice succeeded to tip the scales (with its support of the minority government in 1970 and its role as junior partner in the SPÖ-FPÖ-coalition in 1983). According to these conditions in the period of bi-partism (1970-1986), we assume that both mainstream parties will depoliticize the issues of immigration/integration/diversity due to their lack of issue-ownership, while the FPÖ will be the only actor that politicizes the issue in a considerable manner.

1986-1999: In the context of the election of 1986 we expect a first considerable change of
politicization of immigration/integration/diversity. While the FPÖ gained its greatest success in the post-war-period after the leadership-change to Jörg Haider, the Greens entered parliament for the first time, with both parties sharing explicit non-centrist tendencies. From 1986 onwards both niche parties (FPÖ, Greens) have continuously increased their voteshare until the election of 1999.\textsuperscript{59} Following a vote seeking argument we thus assume that either niche party will try to establish its issue-ownership for the issues of immigration/integration/diversity, since it is linked to continuous increases in votes during the early period of moderate pluralism (1986-1999). As opposed to this it is reasonable to assume a different behavior by Austrian mainstream parties on the basis of vote seeking motives. In the light of increasing niche party success both SPÖ & ÖVP will be pressurized to respond to niche parties’ issue-campaigns (cf. Meguid 2008: 16).\textsuperscript{60} However, following the argument of Downs (2001), Meguid (2008) and Bale et al (2010) two constraints for mainstream parties issue-strategies need to be considered:

a) Firstly, it has been noted that mainstream parties will adapt their strategies regarding the issues of immigration/integration/diversity only if niche parties manage to successfully politicize the issue on a continuous basis. Not every single success of a competitor automatically causes immediate responses by other parties, only if the “threat” gains a permanent character. Thus, based on this argument the initial response of mainstream parties will remain a dismissive strategy as long as niche party pressure remains limited. However, with an increase of niche party pressure (in terms of voteshare and voter-migration), mainstream parties will start to abandon their dismissive approach and enter direct competition with niche party opponents (cf. Meguid 2008; Bale et al 2010).

b) Secondly, it has been stated that the first mainstream parties to alter their strategies are those who are ideological neighbors to those niche parties that most successfully politicize immigration/integration/diversity (e.g. Schain 1987; Eatwell 2000; Downs 2001; Norris 2005). In the Austrian case, strategic pressure of niche parties obviously manifested differently for the two mainstream parties: At a first glance and for several reasons, the ÖVP appeared to suffer stronger from the impacts of the transformation of the Austrian party system. The empowerment of the new niche parties did not develop in an equal way, instead the success of the far-right FPÖ surpassed the success of the left Greens by far. Hence while both mainstream parties were put under pressure much more

\textsuperscript{59} With the immediate snap election of 1995 being the only exception, due to mono thematic election campaign period and the focus on the „Kanzlerwahl“.

\textsuperscript{60} Pressure in this respect has to be defined as both “increasing niche party voteshare” as well as “increasing voter-movements from mainstream- to niche parties” (cf. Meguid 2008: 16).
intensively by the far-right-success than by the emerging Greens and Liberal Forum, the center-right ÖVP – being the ideological neighbor of the FPÖ – was the first party to lose a significant amount of voters to the far right (cf. Picker/Salfinger/Zeglovits 2004: 264). Overall, we can start from the premise that in comparison with the SPÖ the center-right ÖVP will respond to the pressure from its far right opponent at an earlier stage by applying an accommodative strategy whereas SPÖ will remain dismissive much longer (cf. Meguid 2008; Bale et al 2010).

2002-2008: Facing the second stage of moderate pluralism after the turn of the millennium, behavioral strategies are expected to change when merely considering the voteshare. Firstly, it is argued that the issues of immigration/integration/diversity have made a career and have been established as vital issues throughout the 1990ies, which in this final period should lead to an increasing awareness of ALL parties. Yet, with regard to the individual party behavior, the Greens are expected to continue their issue-emphasis further on (given their increasing success in terms of voteshare). Likewise, it could be assumed that the FPÖ will continue its strong politicization of the issue as well, even more so since the remaining ranks after the internal party-split are considered far more radical and vote-oriented than those of the Haider-FPÖ (cf. Luther 2008: 1005) and in view of the need to compete with a second right wing party (BZÖ) since 2006. With regard to mainstream parties and from a vote-seeking perspective we would rather expect the center-left SPÖ to give up its dismissive stance and to take a more accommodative position in relation to the far right stance on immigration/integration/diversity in order to regain votes previously lost to the right. The center-right ÖVP – having lost even more voters to the FPÖ until 1999 – would thus be supposed to even enforce its accommodative strategy in order to attack the far rights issue ownership (cf. Downs 2001; Bale 2003; Bale et al 2010; van Spanje 2010).61

However, pure vote seeking considerations are assumed to be an insufficient source of explanation for party behavior in multiparty constellations, which is why the following section expands the explanatory design to the role of coalition considerations.

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61 According to van Spanje (2010) even far-left parties can be expected to shift towards more restrictive stances in the light of continuous far right party success. Although he offers some evidence from communist and even particular Green parties, the argument remains to be questioned. If far-left parties would suffer from a contagion-effect, we (in line with Meguid’s POS-model) would rather expect far left parties to lower their issue-emphasis than to really give up their previous issue-positions (which from an ideology-based perspective would be a costly step).
4.2.3. The need for power sharing: Coalition perspectives in party competition

Electoral competition is intrinsically linked to further factors that lie within the relation of the competing actors. While gains/losses to/from other competitors constitute the most central criterion parties might base their decision on, the mere allocation of votes is not sufficient when competing in electoral systems based on proportional representation with the need to build government coalitions. In such a multiparty competition context, the consideration of coalition options adds up to the factors that influence parties’ campaign strategies. A long tradition of scholars have been discussing the prevalence of office-seeking motives and “minimal winning”-considerations over policy pursuits (cf. Riker 1962; De Swaan 1973; Budge/Laver 1986; Laver/Shepsle 1990; Müller/Strøm 1999 and 2000). Subsuming policy interests under the goal of government inclusion, a number of rational policy choices have already been discussed beyond. It has been noted that mainstream parties will adapt their strategies regarding the issues of immigration/integration/diversity only if niche parties successfully manage to politicize the issue. While success from a vote-seeking perspective had above been defined via increasing party voteshares and voter-movements, from an office-seeking perspective the definition would rather focus on the coalition potential of a party and its corresponding influence on other parties’ coalition considerations.

Coalition building in Austria: The crucial role of the pariah. For this reason the present section discusses the evolution of coalitions options among Austrian political parties, arguing that changing opportunities have played a leading role for the strategies applied by Austrian parties during the recent decades. Fig. 7 aims to give an overview over the majority relations in the Austrian parliament since 1945, it illustrates coalition alternatives (minimal/minimum winning coalitions) after the respective elections and it lines out the composition of the 26 government cabinets that have been formed.62

62 The provisional government of 1945 is not considered. Cabinet reformation within legislative periods have non been indicated as long as they did not alter the composition of government parties.
There has been quite a disparity between coalition practice and coalition options in Austrian post-war history. Owing to the long-standing importance of Grand Coalitions, Austria had become an exceptional case in the European standard of minimum-winning coalitions (cf. Pelinka/Rosenberger 2000: 61). Consociational democracy and the strong role of social partnership contributed to a continuous relevance of the Grand Coalition between Austrian mainstream parties. Between 1945 and 1983 only Grand Coalitions or single party governments have been in power, whereas the decision for a large-party/small-party-coalition has been realized in only three out of twenty Austrian governments since 1945 – for the first time in 1983 (SPÖ&FPÖ) and more recently with the subsequent right bloc coalitions in 1999 (ÖVP&FPÖ) and 2002 (ÖVP&FPÖ/BZÖ). Although the Grand Coalition has not lost its significance in the 1990ies and until today, the increased mobility of mainstream parties in terms of coalition building asks for a closer evaluation of coalition options and their development in the Austrian party system:
Fig. 7 clearly demonstrates the evolution of coalition options Austrian parties have been facing ever since our examination period. While in the period of bi-partism the coalition options were hardly a factor of calculation (due to the absolute majorities between 1966 and 1983), the need to consider coalition options has increased ever since the decline in party concentration. However the number of majority constellations still remained comparatively low: The Grand Coalition continued to be the strongest coalition option (even offering a comfortable 2/3-majority, which was important for the enactment of constitutional amendments until 1999 – and was only lost between 1994 and 1995). In parts, these considerations might have influenced the Austrian mainstream parties to continue their coalition until 1999, despite the increasing losses and growing niche party competitors. More importantly, though, this decision might be traced back to the circumstance that other possible minimal winning coalitions since 1986 would have meant to include the FPÖ. There has never been a left bloc majority in the whole examination period (disregarding the single party majority of the SPÖ between 1971 and 1983) because both Greens and LIF have failed to become more than “surplus parties”, thus possessing no capacity to help constituting minimal winning coalitions (Müller 2000: 290). Hence, the only alternatives to a Grand Coalition would have been a revived SPÖ-FPÖ-coalition or a center-/far right coalition between ÖVP and FPÖ.63

While in the early stage of party system transformation both mainstream parties adapted a strategy of far right exclusion on the federal level, making clear that the widely anti-systemic FPÖ was not considered a potential coalition partner by neither of them, this rampart was far from being unanimous on a regional level (Minkenberg 2001; Art 2006). On a federal level however the strategic pressure showed various effects for the two mainstream parties: At a first glance the ÖVP appeared to suffer stronger from the effects of party system transformation. As indicated above, pressure from the far-right (being the ideological neighbor of the center-right ÖVP) was much stronger than from far-left parties and in total the ÖVP lost more voters to niche parties until 1999 than its mainstream party opponent, the SPÖ. Furthermore, the ÖVP had been stuck in the role of the eternal runner-up behind the SPÖ since 1966 and thus was never really given the opportunity to open talks about government formation. Stuck with the role as the junior-partner in the Grand Coalition, the party not only lost votes with each election (-14,4 from

63 With only one exception in 2002: After the landslide victory of the conservative ÖVP for the first time since 1986 a mainstream party had the chance to build a minimal winning coalition with the Greens. However, even though coalition talks were conducted between the two parties, the ÖVP finally decided to continue its coalition with the FPÖ.
1986 to 1999), but continuously failed to promote itself as the number one choice and subsequently remained unable to challenge the SPÖ in the battle for chancellorship. Nonetheless, seemed to be a disadvantage from one angle at the same time turned out to be a prosperous perspective from another. Being the ideological neighbor of an increasingly victorious FPÖ (who was gathering votes for a possible majority on the right) in fact enhanced options for the center-right ÖVP by the time it had abandoned its exclusionary strategy towards the FPÖ. Conversely what became a strategic option for a center-right mainstream party ÖVP at the same time increased pressure on the center-left mainstream party SPÖ, which had always been refusing a cooperation with the far right FPÖ much more explicitly and has kept on doing so ever since. Lacking an alternative coalition option on the center-left and in danger of losing its traditional coalition partner, the ÖVP, a strategic response would also be expected on behalf of the SPÖ.

Especially after the watershed of 1999 the importance of coalition considerations became another vital stimulus. For the first time in Austrian post-war-history government had been formed by a right bloc coalition, the first minimum winning coalition ever to assume government duties. Yet the ÖVP-FPÖ-coalition also put an end to a number of other continuities of Austrian post-war politics. It forced the SPÖ (despite being the strongest party) into an opposition role for the first time since 1970, it deprived the consociational forces (“social partnership”) of their power and most importantly it brought an end to bilateral opposition pressure for a centrist government, all of which drastically intensified a bipolar pattern of left-right competition between the two blocs embodied by government coalition and opposition. Thus, tendencies towards an actual “bipolar multiparty system” (cf. Ray 2004: 183) with a right bloc government versus a left bloc opposition became obvious (cf. Pelinka/Plasser/Meixner 2000: 440). In keeping with Sartori (1976) this can be perceived as the return to a bipolar pattern typical for multiparty systems with less then five parties, a pattern that had been on the verge to buckle into polarized pluralism during the period of 1994-1999. According to the classic argument of Sartori’s typology this would have implied a centripetal logic of parties moving towards the center. However, such a behavior can simply not be expected in the case of the Austrian party system during the transition period since 1999. First of all, at least for a certain period after 1999 and increasingly again since 2006 the system had rather become tripolar with three parties sharing similar strength (cf. Plasser/Ulram 2000: 169). But more importantly due to the highly conflictive patterns culminating in 1999, rather “the sharpness and, to a great extent, similar contents of the attacks on government increased the impression of the
existence of an opposition bloc, eager to replace the incumbent government.” (Müller/Fallend 2004: 818). As Pelinka/Plasser/Meixner (2000: 444) point out, Austrian consociational democracy had omitted to create optimal conditions for competitive democracy, i.e. stronger consideration of majority voting elements. For that reason the authors concluded that Austrian party competition in the new millennium would neither resemble a muted kind of competition (as typical for consociational democracies) nor the typically conflictive – but due to center-orientation centripetally oriented – forms of competitive democracy as assumed by Sartori’s model. Rather the authors expected the return to a centrifugal competition similar to that of the Austrian First Republic. Already since the 1990ies ideological polarisation of party competition had increased and parties had entered a process of shifting to the poles of the spectrum (cf. Pelinka/Plasser/Meixner 2000: 449ff.). As a consequence “the distances between the parties within each of the ‘blocs’ decreased, while those between them and the parties of the ‘other’ ‘bloc’ increased.” (Müller/Fallend 2004: 818).

Considering these specific patterns of Austrian party competition since 1999 it would be rather counterintuitive to expect the polarization tendencies to suddenly end after the formation of right bloc government. From an office-seeking-perspective the continuation of the governing coalition would rather be a logical and more attractive option on behalf of the ÖVP and the FPÖ, while the SPÖ might aim for a left-bloc alliance with the Greens (Müller 2000: 305). It is not by chance that all parties have used the scenario of a right/left-bloc coalition as a mobilizing threat in their electoral appeals since 1999. Beyond that, parties’ parliamentary behavior also served as an indicator of particular preferences for intra-bloc-coalitions and subsequently led to a perception of bipolarism as being without alternative – at least for the first years of the decade.64 Thus with the government/opposition-dichotomy becoming “strictly competitive in the electoral arena” (Müller/Fallend 2004: 832) and coinciding with the left/right-bloc-dichotomy we would rather assume centrifugal tendencies by Austrian parties in the aftermath of 1999, i.e. they will stick closer to their ideology and to their ideological neighbor instead of strategically approximating opponents from the other side of the party spectrum.

64 Even though the SPÖ somewhat remained shy to fully profess a bloc-confrontation for large parts of the SPO-ranks internally preferred a return to a Grand Coalition with an alternative ÖVP-personal prior to the 2002-election (Müller/Fallend 2004). However, after the prolongation of an ÖVP-FPÖ(BZÖ) coalition from 2002-2006 the SPÖ’s preferences had clearly shifted to a coalition with the Greens (which was only made impossible by the re-election of the BZÖ) (cf. Luther 2008: 1011).
Expected influence on politicization. While from a policy perspective there would be no need for mainstream parties at the center to shift their positions, the incentives seem to be much stronger from an office-seeking perspective, considering the possible coalition options. Consequently the hypothesis based on a coalition perspective would also lead to a temporal momentum, arguing that if new niche parties on the fringes establish themselves as potential minimal-winning coalition partners, mainstream parties will turn towards centrifugal behavior (H7). With bipolarism and centrifugal tendencies becoming stronger (cf. Müller/Fallend 2004: 818) and given the lack of a mediating party at the center of the spectrum (cf. Hazan 1997) we would expect mainstream parties to use the issues of immigration/integration/diversity in favor of their coalition consideration. Hence, from the coalition perspective in can be assumed that the center-right ÖVP might join its far right coalition partner FPÖ in a more restrictive stance, thereby trying to satisfy the coalition partner with respect to one of its central issues (cf. Minkenberg 2001). However, as far as the center-left SPÖ is concerned, we rather expect the opposite behavior. As Givens (2007: 76) has pointed out, empirically “conservative parties are the only parties that have gone into coalitions with radical right parties” while center-left parties have shied away from sharing office with far right parties and from taking all too restrictive stances regarding immigration/integration/diversity. In the Austrian case we thus would expect a similar tendency: Due to the colonization of the restrictive discourse spectrum by the right bloc majority the SPÖ is rather expected to actively challenge the governing coalition by increasing the salience of liberal perspectives by tendency.

In recent literature rational choices of political parties regarding immigration/integration/diversity have most prominently been applied to explain mainstream parties and their responses to niche party-success, probably because mainstream parties have a wider range of possible ideological mobility. With regard to niche parties however, the POS-model of Meguid (2008) offers further explanatory potential, for it especially isolates “salience” as an autonomous tool of party strategy. The importance of this isolation becomes evident when trying to depict the behavior of far-

65 Meguid (2008) comes to similar conclusion on the basis of an argument she developed from a vote-seeking perspective. Although her argument contradicts classical spatial assumptions in the Downsian tradition, she supposes that mainstream parties can use adversarial tactics with regard to non-proximal fringe-parties, just to put pressure on the other mainstream party competitor. By an overt competition between a mainstream party (A) with its non-proximal fringe party (C), the mainstream party “in between” (B) gets wiped out because its voters migrate in both directions (cf. Meguid 2008: 32f.). This short digression might serve as a good example for the problematic fact, that different strategic motives under specific conditions might very well lead to similar behavioral consequences.
right as well as far-left parties. Given their location on the fringes of the ideological spectrum, it appears unlikely that these parties will shift their issue positions remarkably, since there is no particular gain that can be expected from a spatial point of view. In contrast, conceptually speaking, niche parties will most likely be striving to continually increase the salience of their positions in case of previous success or decrease their salience in the opposite case. From a coalition perspective, though, we expect niche parties to reduce their issue-emphasis over time in order to become/remain a coalible partner, if immigration is considered a conflictive issue vis a vis a potential coalition partner (H8). Applied to the Austrian case only two out of the four niche parties in the examination period have been present on a permanent basis (FPÖ and Greens) thus the operational hypotheses have to be confined to those two. However, assumptions will move in a different direction when taking into account the varying degrees of success of these parties. Both FPÖ and Greens (re)emerged on the federal scene in 1986 and have increased their parliamentary strength until 1994 whereas they faced a first set-back in 1995. Thus it is expected that until 1994 their level of politicization should remain equally intense, while from 1999 onwards an adapted behavior can be expected on both sides. While the FPÖ/BZÖ’s achievement of government participation will be accompanied by a reduction of issue-salience to prove itself a coalible partner (at least for as long as they are in power) (cf. Müller/Fallend 2004: 818), the Greens will lower their emphasis continuously from 1999 onwards (in order to become a coalible partner).

4.2.4. Synopsis

With regard to our examination period we expect an “issue-career” of immigration/integration/diversity: Both parties and issue experience a development that is clearly not monotonous but rather characterized by ups and downs. As a consequence, party behavior based on ideology will be most evidently in the beginning of transformation processes and issue-careers whereas parties will gradually adapt their previous behavior and strategically rearrange their patterns of politicization. These arrangements, of course, will still be applied within the ideological framework of a political party (thus ideology will not loose its explanatory power as such). However, with the career of an issue and its establishment as part of the competitive structure an adaptive behavior on the part of Austrian parties will be a logical reaction. The nature of these reactions will be diverse, at least depending on a) the success of previous strategies,
b) a party’s adaption of its overarching goal of rather striving for votes or for office participation or c) parties’ reevaluation of their coalition options and approximation of previously unconsidered opponents.

This dissertation will try to evaluate the importance of these factors for the Austrian case by linking them to an analysis of the supply-side offered by Austrian parties. The following chapter thus discusses the methodologic approach developed to identify parties’ politicization strategies with regard to our selected election channels.
V. Methodology

The following chapter summarizes the methodical framework for the empirical inquiry of the dissertation. In this respect it firstly specifies the sampling strategies of the present dissertation, which are varying with respect to the different types of materials included into our samples (5.1.). Secondly the chapter aims to clarify the content analytical tools, that have been applied in the course of our examination. For that reason the different dimensions of analysis are differentiated, distinguishing between a) salience as a general concept, b) issue-dimensions and subtopics as well as c) position-frames. For each of these analytical dimensions a conceptual discussion is linked with the descriptions of our coding procedures and categories (5.2. and 5.3.).

5.1. Data selection

As discussed in chapter 4, the dissertation is based on the argument that certain election campaign channels will lead to drastically different outcomes with regard to party politicization. Consequently, programmatic communication is contrasted with daily campaign communication, leading to the generation of two different samples. The former, programmatic, dimension of campaign communication is analyzed via election manifestos of political parties for every election, the sampling unit thus being the respective manifesto of each relevant party in the Austrian national assembly. Only ‘relevant’ parties, i.e. with parliamentary seats prior to or after the respective election have been considered. The latter, daily, dimension of campaign communication is analyzed via press releases that are produced on a daily basis. We focused on the hot pre-election period as a time frame for the sampling process, collecting all press releases within six weeks prior to the election day. Only press releases that had been explicitly forwarded by the federal party headquarters were considered in the sample. Press releases up to the year 1986 were taken out of the parties’ daily press portfolios, while the press releases from 1990 onwards were collected via the database of the Austrian Press Agency (APA). The respective press releases were identified by both APA-token as well as the contact details instanced in each of them. All national elections between 1971 and 2008 have been included, with the snap elections in 1995 (that were declared only shortly after the regular term in 1994 and that due to the monothematic election campaign focus on
budget and horserace-questions had drastically deviated from other elections in our examination period) being the sole the exception.  

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<th>Tab. 9: Data selected for empirical analysis</th>
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*Note: Numbers refer to sampling units, i.e. individual party manifesto as well as parties press releases. a) Due to the lack of data availability for the election of 1986 no press releases for the Greens have been included.*

The following sections will discuss the dimensions of analysis that were applied equally for both samples outlined above. On both campaign channels we focused basically on three dimensions of competitive strategies of political parties with regard to immigration/integration/diversity. These assumptions were directed towards different aspects of what parties can do when politicizing issues in their campaigns. Based on salience theory, we assumed the emphasis put on one issue in contrast to other policy fields to be a first vital indicator for the importance the issue gains within a party’s overall profile. Thus the first dimension of analysis is focused on this general salience parties grant to immigration/integration/diversity (5.2.1.). Beyond that we tried to dig deeper into strategies of politicization by measuring different subtopical nuances. Given the cross-sectional character of immigration/integration, it is of vital importance to distinguish the different facets that parties carve out in their campaigns (5.2.2.). Finally, we will discuss, how parties’ positions regarding the topic immigration/integration/diversity can be identified adequately, in order to contrast the different policy directions through which parties can be distinguished from each other (5.3.)

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*Methodical disgression: The decision to take only elections since the 1970ies into consideration results from data limitation: The availability of material drastically decreases for elections prior to the 1970ies as a) there are no press releases archived for none of the three relevant parties and b) only SPÖ and ÖVP have been publishing documents remotely similar to election manifestos (in fact they are rather “election announcements” than real elections manifestos/platforms) while the FPÖ has had no actual electoral documents expressing their goals at all. Taken together these factors led to the decision to withdraw from the inclusion of elections prior to the 1970ies, even more so as the salience among SPÖ’s and ÖVP’s manifestos is in line with the findings during the 1970ies (1962: 1% and 0%; 1966: 0.7% and 1.1%).*
5.2. Measurement procedures for party politicization

5.2.1. The concept of salience and its overall measurement

As outlined in our theoretical chapters, the assumption of salience theory lies at the heart of this dissertation. In its very narrow meaning it argues that parties will put most emphasis on those contents that are most relevant for them at a given point in time (irrespective of the reasons for their importance). Based on this core assumption the whole process of data examination had been developed and conducted around the principle of measuring the salience of specific aspects of electoral party competition.

Initially a definition of salience in general had been operationalized, a term that has various meanings within different scientific disciplines. However, in the context of political science it has most prominently been used with regard to public opinion, commonly operationalized via the “most important problem” question (for an overview see Wlezien 2005). Linked to the questions of salience in public opinion the same perspective has also been applied to contents, most prominently within the agenda setting approach since the 1970ies (cf. McCombs 2008). In this respect, issue-salience became commonly operationalized via quantitative share of a specific content in contrast to others. Yet different indicators (like the size of the coding unit, its position within the overarching text, visual emphasis of the coding unit, etc.) have been accumulated as viable criteria expressing the prominence of a content in constrast to others (cf. Behr/Iyengar 1985, Epstein/Segal 2000). Subsequently, salience measurements were not limited to salience of issues per se but rather evolved as an autonomous concept that became viable for whatever kind of content (see McCombs 2008). As such, it provides a reasonable tool for the purposes of this dissertation, by helping to operationalize the importance of different issues, subtopics and positions for political parties. Thus, we applied the concept of salience with regard to all three dimensions of electoral competition that constitute the focus of our empirical analysis. Yet, being confronted with two different campaign channels included in our framework, the question of finding a coding unit suitable for the comparison of these two channels stood at the core of the methodical design. The focus on word count finally offered the most viable solution therefore was applied as a measurement criteria for both campaign channels (cf. Laver/Benoit/Garry 2003; Klemmensen/Binzer-Hobolt/Hansen 2007).
coding dimensions (issues, subtopics, positions), salience thus had been defined as the relative proportion of words contained by a respective coding unit in relation to the total wordshare of the sampling unit (i.e. the individual manifesto or total number of press releases for each individual party). Based on this measurement procedure all three dimensions of analysis were treated equivalently, since all of them refer to the same core of coding units. The coding units for the selected cases have been defined in the same way for both channels of analysis. The basic minimal unit of analysis being the single quasi sentence for which both a specific subtopic (see section 5.2.2.) as well as the policy position (identified via policy frames) (see Chapter 6) had been coded. Quite naturally consistent references to a subtopic or a policy position normally exceed a single sentence and often cover whole passages. This is why the coding procedure in the present analysis linked sentences that continuously addressed the same subtopic AND the same position-frame to one coherent coding unit. The end of each coding unit was marked by a) the beginning of a reference to a new subtopic or to a new position-frame or b) by the beginning of a reference to a subtopic unrelated to immigration/integration/diversity. Hence, a set of coding units was generated for each party document. Specific exemptions of the coding rules were applied in case of recitals, in which every point was treated as a new unit. Coding of press releases and manifests was conducted as tight as possible, meaning that only those quasi-sentences were taken into consideration, that seemed to be directly relevant for the comprehension of a statement. This means, that surrounding sentences (especially within press releases) were excluded as far as possible. However, if a sentence contained references to immigration/integration/diversity, the whole sentence was coded, notwithstanding the possible occurrence of other references (cf. Früh 2007: 88ff).

Applying this coding and measurement procedure, all three dimensions of analysis were identified equivalently. The operationalization of the most overarching dimension – the prominence of the issues of immigration/integration/diversity in general – was simply defined by the collected sum of relevant coding units, disregarding the specific subtopic or position that might have been addressed. This accumulation led to the separation of immigration, migrant integration and ethnic diversity from other contents of electoral

\[ S_n = W_n \cdot \left( \frac{1}{W_N} \right) \]

with \( S \) denoting the salience of all relevant coding units \( n \) in relation to the total size of the sampling units \( N \) at a given data point (single manifesto or sum of press releases per party/election) and \( W \) denoting the wordshare of these units.
discourse and thus made it possible to shed light on the promincence of these policy fields at any given data point. For our purposes the conceptual definition of immigration, migrant integration and ethnic diversity is based on a broad definition in the first place, including all references to cross-national border movements as well as evaluation of access or residence rights (including asylum), to explicit remarks on inclusion/exclusion of ethnic minorities – of whatever administrative status – or to general expressions about societal concepts of coexistence in ethnically diverse societies. This rather conceptual definition, however, will be specified later on, when discussing the more specific aspect of issue-analysis – because both subtopics and frames will help to grasp the variety of meanings bundled in the discourse on immigration/integration/diversity.

5.2.2. Proximity and distance between political actors

The very notion of ‘competition’ implies the question of interrelation between particular competitors. Analyzing party politicization in an electoral competition context thus needs to document the patterns of relation between individual parties with regard to key dimensions of politicization. Simple qualifications such as “A and B are closer together on this question than are A and C” are commonly applied in scholarly as well as every day comments on politics and lie at the very heart of our understanding of political competition. Yet when turning to qualitative concepts of discourse analysis our attention is drawn to notions of “discourse coalitions”, as for example suggested by Hajer (1993). In its narrow meaning, the term “discourse coalition” refers to “a group of actors who share a social construct” or, to be more specifically, denotes to “the ensemble of a set of story lines, the actors that utter these story lines, and the practices that conform to these story lines, all organized around a discourse” (Hajer 1993: 45). Of course, these patterns of discursive convergence happen to appear in rather relative than absolute terms, nonetheless they seem to be useful indicators by which actors can be grouped together within a certain area of discursive space. However, when applying the notion of discursive convergence to quantitative terms, their formal calculation is by no means a trivial task. As Benoit/Laver (2006) put it, the question of proximity and distance between actors on a specific matter implies a number of aspects, most prominently a “space” in which proximity and distance can be aligned. Proximity and distance of party strategies are relative terms that gain their meaning only by the interrelation of two or more coordinates, i.e. by the quantification of their location in a finite space of activity. It is
because of this “relativity” of spatial maps of political competition, that their designs can vary significantly between different approaches. Stemming mostly from analysis of party stances on specific issues, Budge (2006: 431) distinguishes different designs of creating such spatial frameworks: 1. Models can assume a “pure a priori policy space” that is designed on theoretical grounds by the researcher who then locates parties, voters or whatever actors on this a priori defined scale (an approach that is closely linked to Downsian spaces). 2. Approaches can also focus on a “party-dominated pure policy space”, i.e. they theoretically derive scales from party ideology as far as familiar to the researcher – an approach that is most notably linked to the Manifesto Research Group’s study (Budge/Klingemann 2001). 3. Policy spaces can also be obtained by using factor analysis of policy texts or issue questions to generate an “inductive policy space” that is underlying the considered issues and might be constrained to a single dimension (generally coherent with a left-right-dimension) but often leads to the detection of further dimensions (e.g. Gabel/Huber 2000). 4. Fourthly, approaches can digress from the idea of an absolute scale ranging between “pure” policy points (like a “pure left” or “pure right”). Instead, they may draw up “party defined spaces” by taking “pure” party positions as the boundaries of the ideological spectrum, thus being able to define empirical party positions by their distance to these constructed boundaries (e.g. Budge/Farlie 1977).

These short remarks clearly demonstrate the need for a spatial analysis needs to specify a number of premises in advance, in order to identify and quantify the proximity/distance of actors on whatever kind of matter:

As a first step, the relational content has to be identified, since different aspects of behavior can be compared against each other. Among party politics scholars, measurements of proximity/distance have most commonly been used to describe policy stances of political actors (cf. Enelow/Hinich 1984; Laver/Hunt 1992; Hinich/Munger 1997; Laver/Garry 2000). Although this tradition of positional analysis has led to the most fruitful development of spatial concepts of competition, they are not necessarily the only content to which spatial models might be applied. In fact, within a research framework like ours that is based on spatial perspective on party competition party politicization strategies are evaluated on two accounts: issue-subtopics and issue-positions. Both aspects represent strategic instruments of party politicization and can be observed from a spatial perspective with regard to their proximity/distance. Thus, for the sake of the dissertation, the basic assumption of party defined spaces will be linked with
the consideration of a salience theoretical model. Party strategies are identified by the salience they grant to different subtopics and positions, and their proximity/distance will be evaluated by the comparison of their emphasis. However, both aspects – subtopics and positions – demand for a somewhat different kind of “space”, since their categories differ in certain aspects, which leads to the second methodical question, i.e. the number and qualities of the dimensions and categories.

Once the content of a spatial analysis of proximity/distance is identified, precise specifications have to be made with regard to the coordinate system of this spatial framework, i.e., the dimensions of evaluation and the categories that constitute the units of these dimensions need to be determined. In this regard, the present dissertation proposes different approaches for the analysis of issue-subtopics as contrasted to the question of issue-positions: With respect to issue-subtopics, a single dimensional approach is suggested that consists of individual metric categories for subtopics, unweighted and with random ordering. The construction of our subtopic-categories was conducted on a deductive basis, determining our set of subtopics a priori (see the following section 5.2.3.). In the coding process these categories were coded on the basis of relative salience a party grants to each subtopic (in relation to the total emphasis of all subtopics addressed by a party)\textsuperscript{68}. By combining these categories in one dimension, the precise topical pattern of each party could be determined for any given election.

By way of contrast and with regard to issue-positions, we chose a two-dimensional approach that compares positions on a restrictive dimension with positions on a liberal dimension of immigration, migrant integration and ethnic diversity. The combination of both dimensions can be accomplished in two ways, either in a two-dimensional policy space (preserving the values for restrictiveness and liberalism) or on a bipolar axis with negative and positive extremes (offsetting liberal and restrictive positions into one single tendency measure) – both approaches will be applied in chapter 8.3. On both dimensions, positional categories again will be of metric character and will be measured by the relative salience a party grants to each positional category. However, the construction of positional categories poses a challenge that is more complex than the mere identification of subtopics. Identifying issue-positions heavily depends on the aspired level of

\[ S_i = W_i \left( \frac{1}{W_n} \right) \]

with \( S \) denoting the salience of the individual subtopic/position \( i \) in relation to the relevant coding units \( n \) at a given data point (single manifesto or sum of press releases per party/election) and with \( W \) denoting the wordshare of these categories.
abstraction, on the amount of data that needs to be coded and on the complexity and conflictiveness of the issues in question. Thus with regard to issue-positions a simple deductive approach has proven to be insufficient when trying to adequately capture the diversity of discourse. As a consequence, chapter 6 is entirely devoted an individual chapter to the question of issue-positions on immigration, migrant integration and ethnic diversity. It will discuss the results of a qualitative analysis that was conducted prior to our quantitative coding and which by means of a parallel – inductive as well as deductive – basis, developed substantial policy frames on immigration/integration/diversity.

Within these coordinate systems the specific measuring units of proximity/distance need to be clarified. Benoit/Laver (2006) have shown that the correct choice among the variety of approaches for distance-measurement depends on the objectives of the analysis as well as on the number of dimensions constituting the spatial framework. Given that our categories of subtopics and positions are individual metric variables, the analysis is limited to the use of City-Block-Distance \(d_{\text{City-Block}}\) – or “Manhattan”-distance –, since classic Euclidian calculation of distance requires at least two or more dimensions brought together in every single measuring unit\(^{69}\) (cf. Mooi/Sarstedt 2011). As a result, City-Block-Distance\(^{70}\) calculates the sum of all categories’ absolute differences between two actors A and B. Since standard calculation of City-Block-Distance is based on two dimensions, we will bisect the measure for the ease of interpretation. Bisected City-Block-Distance between two actors then expresses the degree of distance between two actors on a range between 0 and 100 – with 100 expressing total difference and 0 expressing total congruence. In sum, calculation of City-Block-Distance draws conclusions for each relation between two parties and consequently enables to qualify those parties that are clustered around similar topical as well as positional emphases, i.e. which are most similar with regard to their strategies of politicization.

\(^{69}\) Beyond that, as Benoit/Laver (2006: 25) line out, there is also no evidence that “real people thing about political similarity and difference in Euclidian terms”. On the contrary, “Several practitioners, indeed, argued vigorously and in some detail that real people do not think about politics in Euclidian terms.”

\(^{70}\) Expressed in formal references:

\[
d_{\text{City-Block}} (A, B) = \sum_{i=1}^{n} [S_i(A) - S_i(B)]
\]

with \(S\) denoting the salience of subtopic/position \(i\) for each actor A and B at a given data point (single manifesto or sum of press releases per party/election), \(n\) referring to the number of subtopics/positions
5.2.3. Parties’ topical preferences: The role of issue-dimensions and subtopics

Identifying political issues appears to be a straightforward task. However, when taking a closer look the notion of “political issues” is not as trivial as it might seem, taking into account that what is addressed by political actors under a specific issue is not automatically linked to the same set of objects. This in fact has also to do with the level of abstraction the researcher is using to define the issues. While political issues in many content analysis are defined very broadly in terms of policy fields (such as economy, welfare or immigration), other authors build their definition on a much deeper level, describing specific aspects of a political reality (such as tax level for companies, family benefits or quota for alien labor). In parts, Donati (2001: 153) solves the puzzle by arguing that discourses aren’t constructed around macro issues (such as economy, immigration, etc.) but in fact revolve around specific objects (micro issues in the latter sense) that are linked to overall policy fields only analytically. As a consequence the task for the researcher is “to find the right object-key for the set of arguments, through which an issue is communicated and defined.” (Donati 2001: 153). These objects then may be labelled explicitly as immigration issues in the macro-sense, yet they could also be part of discourses on other macro-issues and still be related to the question of immigration (e.g. the regulation of labor market entrance for non-nationals might be treated under both, labor market policy as well as immigration policy). As a result, the present dissertation needed to identify ALL passages that address the issues of immigration, migrant integration and ethnic diversity, regardless whether the issue in question was a main issue or just a secondary aspect of another main issue. However, in order to keep the approach applicable the selection was delimited to only those passages where the link to immigration, migrant integration and ethnic diversity was articulated explicitly. As such, the analysis guarantees the inclusion of the entire range of electoral discourse on the policy fields in question.

The present dissertation developed an instrument to break down immigration/integration/diversity into more specific categories. By distinguishing various forms of issue-dimensions and subtopics the analysis draws a picture of the complexity of discursive politicization of the immigration/integration/diversity by political parties. Only by distinguishing these diverse analytical aspects it can be assured that on a longitudinal level the changing emphasis within these fields will be identified, since different
historical periods as well as competing political actors will emphasize different aspects of the issues more intensively.

Previous examples of issue-analysis. Immigration, migrant integration and ethnic diversity resemble very broad categories of policies and, unlike other policy fields, can be perceived as cross-sectional issues that are intertwined with a variety of other policy fields (cf. Borkert/Penninx 2011). Yet an in depth analysis needs to consider the different nuances of these broad issues in order to highlight the different strategies parties applied by parties. Consulting previous models of content analysis occupied with immigration/integration/diversity, a heterogeneous practice of operationalizing issue-categories comes to light. For example, media-content analysis as conducted by Signer/Puppis/Piga (2011) generally distinguishes news contexts of immigration issues and journalistic genres such as “politics”, “crime”, “court hearings/decisions”, “society”, “economy”, “sports” and the like. Distinctions like these, however, are only of limited use for strategic policy documents, which rather refer to political contexts than to news genres. Bonfadelli (2008) reflects this need in his news media analysis by distinguishing migration related subtopics such as “immigration politics”, “crime”, “integration”, “religion”, “racism”, “multiculturalism”, “statistics”, “biographies” and “isolation” (cf. Bonfadelli 2008: 41). Froehlich/Rüdiger (2006) approach the subject from a different perspective in their content analysis of political PR and news coverage on immigration issues. Looking for what they call “thematic frames”, they distinguish between a general category of “immigration” and more concrete subtopics such as “migration of labor”, “refugees/asylum seekers”, “integration of immigrants”, “family reunions”, “Ethnic German immigrants” and “illegal immigrants”. Although their set of issue categories does not seem sufficiently comprehensive to register all aspects of the immigration issue (especially when conducting a time-series analysis)\textsuperscript{71}, their distinction between general and specific aspects of the discourse is a helpful guideline for the present study. Other research projects, like the Migrant Integration Policy Index (MIPEX), though not directly employing content analysis, offer some hints but yet no satisfactory system of codes for the analysis of political discourse. The MIPEX-framework, for example, distinguishes between seven policy-dimensions, i.e. “Labor Market Mobility”, “Family-Reunification”, “Education”, “Political Participation”, “Long-term residence”, “Access to nationality”

\textsuperscript{71} In fact, their analysis was focused on a limited time range between they years 2000 and 2002 which might explain the narrow nature of the issue categories (cf. Froehlich/Rüdiger 2006).
and “Anti-Discrimination”, a set of categories that obviously is not exhaustive when applied to the complex nature of political discourse. Lynch/Simon (2003) head into a totally different direction by distinguishing more specific dimensions of immigrant policy: “Admit policy”, “Admit practice”, “Naturalization policy”, “Naturalization rate”, “Control policy”, “Administration discretion”, “Public integration efforts” and “Illegal immigration”. The present study tried to merge these approaches into one coding instrument that a) reflects the peculiarities of strategic political discourse (in contrast to public media discourse), b) considers the specific challenge of conducting a time-series analysis (creating the need for a much broader instrument than short-period-studies) and c) is sensitive to the specific nature of the questions of immigration/integration/diversity.

Subtopics: This dissertation aims for a straightforward instrument and thus developed its issue categories on the basis of traditional policy fields which can provide a policy-context for questions of immigration/integration/diversity. Based on the notion of “subtopics” as commonly applied in discourse analysis (cf. van Dijk 1989 and 1991; Wodak 2008; Jäger/Maier 2009), the analysis dissects politicization into topical components that establish links to other discourse strands. Subtopics refer to the individual topical building elements that in their sum, altogether constitute our subject matter (i.e. immigration, migrant integration and ethnic diversity). In order to reflect this topical structure of broad issues such as immigration/integration/diversity, the subtopics of electoral discourse were distinguished along two aspects: On the one hand, if connections to other policy fields such as “labor policy”, “educational policy”, “foreign relations”, “crime&border-control”, “social&family policy”, “science policy” etc. were made explicit, the coding units were subsumed under the respective policy contexts. These then were grouped under the category of policy specific subtopics. On the other hand, generalistic appeals to immigration, integration, asylum or societal models that were not explicitly linked to any other specific policy dimension were subsumed under the respective generalistic issue category. By distinguishing between policy-specific and generalistic subtopics the analysis reveals the structure of the electoral debate, its degree of abstraction/concretion as well as dominant contexts of the debate. The coding scheme observes the topical structure of politicization on a medium level of abstraction, enabling

72 All of them being autonomous departments in the Austrian polity structure, whereas immigration and integration have never been linked to an autonomous portfolio until the establishment of the “Integrationsstaatsekretariat” (as a part of the Department of the Interior) in 2011.
to grasp the different foci of political parties on a longitudinal basis.

**Issue-dimensions:** For our purposes, however, another level of abstraction was included in the issue-coding process, i.e. the role of *issue-dimensions*. On that point the dissertation coarsely distinguishes four general issue-dimensions, which together comprise the range of what is subsumed under the common labels of alien&diversity-politics, that being *immigration, integration, asylum* and *diversity* (cf. Hammar 1985; Green-Pedersen/Krogstrup 2008: 611). These four issue-dimensions denote codes on a more abstract level than the specific subtopics of the debate. Still, this distinction is of vital importance because the specific subtopics mentioned above can – theoretically – be linked to either one of these issue-dimensions (e.g. labor aspects can equally be addressed within the context of immigration, asylum or integration). Thus, in order to differentiate the particular impacts, these broader dimensions have on the overall discourse on immigration/integration/diversity, they needed to be identified separately. In our context *immigration*-issues were defined as references to cross-border movements, the control of these movements as well as the regulation of access to the country for non-nationals (Borkert/Penninx 2011). Conversely, the coding of *integration* was limited to explicit remarks on concrete policies of inclusion/exclusion of migrant population (of whatever administrative status and migrant background) (Bijl/Verweil 2012) – except for refugees. Asylum seekers and all references to the process of asylum were analytically seperated and coded under the issue-dimension of *asylum*. Finally the issue-dimension *diversity* denotes to all remarks that refer to the organisation of society as a whole, to expressions about social coexistence of majority and minorities (including both allochtonous and authochtonous ethnic minorities alike) as well as to the positive/negative evaluation of social homogeneity/heterogeneity (Zapata-Barrero/Triandafyllidou 2012).

On the basis of this distinction, the following codes were applied in the coding process. Tab. 10 collects the codes for both types of issue-categories. Each coding-unit was coded according to this scheme, identifying both the respective “issue-dimension” as well as the “subtopic” in order to unravel the interlinkage of policy fields and issue-dimensions. While some policy contexts are intrinsically connected to a respective issue-dimension (such as general references to asylum, immigration or integration as well as procedural references to asylum), others are independent and could in fact be linked to each of the four issue-dimensions considered.
The analysis of issue-dimensions and subtopics enables us to identify the dominant topical aspects of Austrian party politicization on immigration, migrant integration and ethnic diversity. Furthermore, it shows, which parties share similar types of issue-emphasis, thus approximating topical coalitions and adding to the role of proximity of issue-emphasis as a first indicator of parties’ shifting their strategies of politicization.

5.2.4. Issue-positions: Policy stances of political parties

As discussed in our theoretical chapters, the emphasis put on certain subtopics at the cost of others is only one aspect of party politicization. More commonly, research on party competition has been dealing with the role of policy positions, referring to the specific stances of political actors on the issue in question. For this reason, these two aspects of politicization were observed independently in this dissertation. However, the occupation with parties policy stances on immigration, migrant integration and ethnic diversity initially pose the basic question of a clear definition of the term “policy positions”: A policy position can broadly be defined as the suggestion of collectively binding measures for the treatment of a specific social condition. As a consequence these positions are always issue-specific and can vary in their degree of abstraction (from micro-political to macro-political positions). The common denominator of policy position analysis in political texts might be condensed to “a process of data reduction in which a large and complex text is reduced in a reliable way to a smaller and simpler set of coded
data. This can be done by either expert coders or computers and has three stages: the design of a coding scheme; the definition of a text unit to be coded; and the coding of real text units.” (Laver/Garry 2000: 622). These very general tasks of content analytical approaches however need to be specified in line with the respective research interests. Multi-topical approaches, as encouraged by the “Manifesto Research Group” (MRG) (cf. Budge/Klingemann 2001) or the “Party Change Project” (PCP) (cf. Janda et al 1995; Harmel/Tan/Janda 1995), have traditionally been applying quantitative techniques with subtly differentiated and hierarchically structured coding schemes, because they seemed to be the only feasible way of coding multiple issues over time and space. Conversely, a vast amount of single-issue analysis have been applying softer, qualitative coding methods. The great number of discourse analytic publications for example indicate the undiminished relevance of such perspectives for the identification of policy positions of political actors. Nonetheless, the MRG and PCP approaches have been of pioneering character for comparative designs (time-series as well as cross-section), since they established a research design that could well be applied for policy analysis between different democratic countries and different historical time periods. The MRG codebook, for example, codes 56 categories which were grouped into seven major policy fields (cf. Budge/Klingemann 2001), many (though not all) of them designed as valence categories (positive/negative). Using quasi-sentences as coding units the project computed a total number of quasi-sentences for every document. By relating the amount of quasi-sentences for every category to the total number the MRG generated particular levels of salience for different categories. This approach also was used in the present study, although the basis of measurement was not the quasi-sentence. Referring to the quasi-sentences as the counting device has the major disadvantage of blurring the actual size of coding units – with some quasi-sentences being much longer and more elaborated than others. For this reason, the present study also used quasi-sentences as a coding unit, but chose a different measuring device by calculating word-count for every coding unit. Most importantly, MRG and PCP have left their mark on the spatial perspective on party-oriented content analysis. As outlined in the first theoretical chapter, spatial approaches have become the dominant tool to analyze party competition in either issue-specific or general dimensions, trying to depict parties positions in policy spaces (cf. Enelow/Hinich 1984; Laver/Hunt 1992; Hinich/Munger 1997; Laver/Garry 2000). In this regard the MRG is of examplary significance for it suggests a simple and straightforward way of creating spatial positions of political parties. It predefines valence issues (i.e. issues that
by definition are either positive or negative) by opposing traditionally leftist and traditionally rightist issues and calculates “(...) the left–right score of a given party (...) by summing up the percentages of all the sentences in the left category, and subtracting their total from the sum of the percentages of the sentences in the right category of that party’s electoral programme.” (Pelizzo 2003: 69) This computing technique serves as a fundamental rolemodel – however, the categories within the present study do not construct different (valence) policy issues but pure positions on one particular policy field in question, i.e. immigration, migrant integration and ethnic diversity. This dissertation also refers to a bipolar axis in order to locate parties on that dimension, though with the difference that party positions were arranged on a liberal/restrictive-scale instead of a general left/right-dimension (cf. Lahav 2004). As a result of this approach, movements of parties were made comparable over the whole examination period, which enables us to analyze changing patterns of proximity between the competitors. Still, such a fairly closed quantitative approach would rather be impossible for the detailed analysis of contestation on a specific policy dimension. Given the broad perspective of positions on the policy-field in question that is not a priori identified, a mere focus on deductive coding has proven to be simply insufficient. For this reason the present study opted for the triangulation of a quantitative with a qualitative approach and a combination of inductive with deductive coding procedures. The following chapter aims to sketch the procedures and the findings of our analysis of issue positions, based on a specific discourse analytical tradition, i.e. frame analysis.
VI. Framing immigration, migrant integration and ethnic diversity: A qualitative exploration of discursive strategies

Identifying political positions is far from being a clearcut, unidimensional process. The vast amount of literature on policy discourses and the evolution of different approaches analyzing political contents on different semantic levels demonstrates the complexity of this subject. Political discourses evolve and circulate on very different semantic levels, all of which can be object of political content analysis. In the present dissertation, due to its practices and advantages, frame analysis turned out to be the most fruitful approach for our purposes. The analysis of discursive frames has become one of the most intensively adapted approaches in recent years. It has been a direct response to the question of how to understand and pin down the complex interrelation of different public actors in their struggle to achieve hegemony over the power of definition. Although its diverse modes of application have been somehow an obstacle to an undisputed recognition, frame analysis has established itself among the methods dedicated to the analysis, evaluation and interpretation of political discourses.

This applicability has to a growing amount also been verified with regard to the specific issues of immigration, migrant integration and ethnic diversity (cf. Lakoff/Ferguson 2006; Larsen et al 2012). However, as it is concerned with the development of narrow and elaborated frames that constitute the interpretative universe of these issues, frame analysis has not achieved its full potential in this context so far. Obviously there have been a number of scholarly attempts heading into this direction, yet they are quite often detached from one another and commonly focused on specific segments of the debate. While some authors address the question of asylum (cf. van Gorp 2005; Nickels 2007), others broaden their appeal to immigration and ethnic diversity altogether (cf. Fröhlich/Rüdiger 2006; Vliegenthaart 2007). What is fundamentally hampering the synthesis of these approaches are the quite different sets of frames they generate and/or apply – which is owed either to their different concepts of frames, to particular discourses they are tracing or, last but not least, to the different communicative channels they include. Confronted with this somewhat diffuse state of the art, the present analysis was compelled to develop an autonomous concept with regard to the framing of immigration/integration/diversity. By combining existing concepts from previous research with an inductive approach of frame identification based on our own material,
this chapter offers an important contribution to this research field. It introduces a framework of analysis for immigration/integration/diversity, that – although grounded on the Austrian case – should be a viable instrument for political discourses in other national contexts as well.

6.1. Framing and frame-analysis: A general introduction

The concept of framing and frame-analysis is a transdisciplinary property that has gathered its contemporary importance only through the reciprocal stimulation of disciplines such as psychology, sociology, communication studies, linguistics, cybernetics and last but not least, political science. Prior to the practical discussion of the frames of immigration, migrant integration and ethnic diversity, a short introduction to the concept of framing is advisable, in order to delimit our approach in this complex – and at times controversial – field or research.

6.1.1. Frames as sociopsychological concept

Scholarly activity in recent decades has yielded a range of psychological as well as sociological attempts to offer definitions about the meaning of frames. Traditionally such attempts start with a reference to Erving Goffman’s book “Frame-Analysis” (1974), introducing the concept of framing in a broader sociological context (although Goffman himself followed assumptions already made by Gregory Bateson and William James). Consequently one of the most commonly addressed explications defines frames as “schemes of interpretation” or as “organizing principles for events (…) through which we build definitions of a situation” (Goffman 1977: 31, 19). This situational dimension is one of the characteristic elements of Goffman’s approach, asking how one is able to interpret the mass of experiences he/she is confronted with every day. It implies that the understanding of a situation by a human being is depending on the type of frames he/she adapts in order to structure the elements of this situation into a meaningful whole. This concept of frames as structuring devices for the production of meaning is in line with several other concepts developed in psychology as well as research on artificial intelligence and shows remarkable parallels to the concept of scheme or script (cf. Trandafyllidou 1998; Donati 2001: 149). The concepts result from the conclusion that interpretation processes consist of more than just the re-identification of explicit contents and thus require the productive processing into a broader complex of meaning. E.g. on
behalf of artificial intelligence research, interpretation of texts is impossible if it is merely based on the available information within a text, but it requires a priori patterns of meaning that single units of information can be fitted into (cf. Donati 2001: 149).

Kahneman/Tversky (1981) delivered a psychological verification of the framing-concept by experimentally demonstrating that different preferences of probands are caused by different formulations of choice problems: “variations in the framing of acts, contingencies, and outcomes” of one and the same situation lead to a different understanding and consequently varying decisions of how to act upon these understandings (Kahneman/Tversky 1981: 457). According to the framing-concept, individuals use frames as interpretative devices to include new information into a coherent whole. In this process they stem on their previous knowledge and thus reproduce interpretative frames which they acquire in a process of socialization and acculturation (cf. Trandafyllidou 1998, Matthes 2007). At this point, the framing-perspective highlights the epistemological implications of such an understanding, for it is a clear refusal of traditional positivist theories of cognition and reality. Meaning in this respect is to be understood as the central code that human communication, social accord as well as the capacity to cope with the outside world whatsoever are founded on. It is no objective entity that would be traceable by positivist research but remains a continuously contested good (maybe the most contested good of human life at all). With the “power of definition” enabling communicators to steer public discourses into specific directions, managing public communication has become one of the most important tasks of the expanding public spheres in (post)modern societies. This holds especially true for political actors in liberal democracies, who – naturally – strive for a sort of legitimacy for their policies.

Thus, as Scheufele/Tewksbury (2007: 12) put it, the framing concept links both macrolevel and microlevel, since it refers to the individual processes of interpreting single information in a broader framework of interpretation (microlevel) as well as to the modes of presentation employed by professional communicators in order to transfer information in accordance to commonly practicable knowledge (macrolevel). However, framing

73 Inevitably it has to be pointed towards the premises of symbolic interactionism as summarized by Herbert Blumer who already in 1969 formulated the basic principles of an “interpretive paradigm” by arguing a) “that human beings act toward things on the basis of the meanings that the things have for them”, b) “that the meaning of such things is derived from, or arises out of, the social interaction that one has with one’s fellows” and c) “that these meanings are handled in, and modified through, an interpretative process used by the person in dealing with the things he encounters” (Blumer 1998: 2).
approaches have witnessed a broad differentiation within different disciplinary perspectives and consequently particular “species of frames” have been conceptualized during the last centuries. As Nelson/Willey (2003: 246) put it: “There is more than one kind of frame swimming in the political information stream. The most politically relevant species are collective action frames (Gamson 1992; Snow et al., 1986); decision frames (Kahneman & Tversky, 1984); news frames (Iyengar, 1991; Price & Tewksbury, 1997); and our favorite, issue frames (Nelson & Oxlea, 1999)”. These different types of frames are somewhat linked to different disciplines, such as the “collective action frame” to sociology, “decision frames” to behavioral management studies or “news frames” to journalism and media studies. Consequently, they do address different aspects of the framing-process, which are either located on the individual micro-level of interpretation (decision frames) (Kahneman/Tversky 1990), on the organizational meso-level of strategic communication (collective action frames) (Benford/Snow 2000) or concerned with the journalistic meta-perspective of public life (news frames) (D’Angelo 2002). Again the latter can be separated into “generic news frames” (issue-independent patterns of journalistic descriptions of reality) and “issue specific news frames” (interpretations that can only be applied to specific thematic boundaries of a news-issue) (cf. de Vreese 2005).

From a political science perspective a majority of studies has focused on the analysis of policy frames either promoted by strategic communicators or by news media. For political research the construction processes of social meaning are of vital relevance and “(t)he central question, then, for interpretive policy analysts is, How is the policy issue being framed by the various parties to the debate?” (Yanow 2006: 11). Taking this question as a basis for our concept of framing analysis, competition of political parties, then, can be described as the strategic use of policy frames in order to distribute messages and to persuade potential supporters – or as proposed by Pan/Kosicki (2003: 40): “Framing an issue is therefore a strategic means to attract more supporters, to mobilize collective actions, to expand actors’ realm of influences, and to increase their chances of winning”. Hence, political communicators are obliged to “frame” their topics in a way

74 Additionally it has to be remarked that from a methodological point of view it is also important to separate between the use of the English term “frame” either as a noun or as a verb, for this leads to consequences regarding the design of the adapted approach. The use of “frame” or “framing” as a noun refers to an understanding of temporarily fixed structures that delimit a communicative content, which can be observed and compared with structures of other communicative units (may they come from other actors at the same point in time or even from the same actor at times preceding or following). On the contrary, the use of “frame/framing” as a verb points to a process-based action of producing such a structure and can be
that proves to be beneficial to their specific interests (cf. Rein/Schön 1996; Triandafyllidou/Fotiou 1998). Apparently, these rationales are often not articulated in a clear and manifest way, but seem to be rather embedded in a semantic network of metaphors, idioms, figurations, etc. (cf. Gamson/Modigliani 1987; van Gorp 2005). Thus, the primary challenge for a frame analysis is an abstraction of these linguistic levels in order to fix the rationalities that lie behind the communication units. The question, however, remains: what do frames consist of?

6.1.2. Frame components in strategic political communication

As Yanow (2006: 11) characterizes: “Frames direct attention toward some elements while simultaneously diverting attention from other elements. They highlight and contain at the same time that they exclude”. Thus analyzing framing strategies of political actors enables to detect the interpretative differences of meaning forwarded by a particular communication unit (such as a text, a speech, etc.). As a consequence a basic definition of frame would be the one suggested by Reese (2003: 11): “Frames are organizing principles that are socially shared and persistent over time, that work symbolically to meaningfully structure the social world.” Accordingly, frames organize information into more abstract principles of interpretation which are not manifest in the text itself. Beyond that, frames refer to commonly shared knowledge that is established as a permanent cultural heritage, thereby structuring the social world into symbolic forms of expression and interpretation (ibd., 11f).

Especially since the 1980ies and within the context of social movement research a number of authors have started to apply the framing-concept also to the analysis of political communication of strategic actors (cf. Snow et al 1986; Benford/Snow 1988 and 1992; Gamson/Modigliani 1989; Tarrow 1992; Benford 1993). Their core objective was to understand how social movements successfully manage to mobilize supporters (stimulate collective action) by (re)constructing discursive interpretations of socially relevant issues. In this respect, framing was conceived as a discursive tool that constructs and promotes particular schemes of interpretation for specific problems. Consequently,
Benford/Snow (1988: 136) refer to “collective action frames” as the product of a strategic and “active, process-derived phenomenon that implies agency and contention at the level of reality construction”. They identify three “core functions of a collective action frame”: Firstly a “punctuating function” of collective action frames through which actors “punctuate or single out some existing social condition or aspect of life and define it as unjust, intolerable, and deserving of corrective action” (Benford/Snow 1988: 137). Secondly, a frame secondly needs to fulfil an “attributional function” in order to allocate actors responsibilities, that is to “attribute blame for some problematic condition by identifying culpable agents, be they individuals or collective processes or structures”, as well as to suggest “both a general line of action for ameliorating the problem and the assignment of responsibility for carrying out that action” (Benford/Snow 1988: 137). Thirdly, frames perform an “articulation function” inasmuch as they “enable activists to articulate and align a vast array of events and experiences so that they hang together in a relatively unified and meaningful fashion” (Benford/Snow 1988: 137f). Later Benford and Snow condensed their approach by distinguishing more sharply between “three core framing tasks: (1) a diagnosis of some event or aspect of social life as problematic and in need of alteration; (2) a proposed solution to the diagnosed problem that specifies what needs to be done; and (3) a call to arms or rationale for engaging in ameliorative or corrective action.” (Benford/Snow 1988b: 199). Grounded on these assumptions, Robert M. Entman (1993) gave voice to the probably most frequently quoted definition of framing, by pointing out: “To frame is to select some aspects of a perceived reality and make them more salient in a communicating context, in such a way as to promote a particular problem definition, causal interpretation, moral evaluation, and/or treatment recommendation for the item described.” (Entman 1993: 52).

Nonetheless, it can be contested, whether the principles of the framing-concept as developed in the realm of social movement literature are equally viable for the understanding of other political communicators, such as political parties, governments, ministerial departments, etc., since they all share different resources (Pan/Kosicky 2003: 44f). They rather tend to produce legitimizing communication for their own actions instead of motivation for support and collective action. All the same, in recent years framing-approaches have been very fruitfully applied to a number of other actors of political communication (eg. Trandafyllidou 1998; Benford/Snow 2000; Semetko/Valkenburg 2000; Tedesco 2001; Daviter 2007). For the specific type of actor
that is of interest in the present study, i.e. political parties, the parallels to social movements communication certainly are the strongest, especially when focusing on the specific arena of electoral competition. Parties equally pursue the primary goal of mobilizing supporters, except that the aspired objective of collective action is the vote instead of other forms of political expression. Therefore, the concept can be easily transferred to the context of political parties (with especially small parties in many respects facing the same difficulties and challenges as social movements). Policy frames then include all aspects that are necessary to analyze parties’ strategic use of issues and spins in order to mobilize supporters/voters. The discovery and popular use of framing-concepts by political campaign advisers – for example in the United States (cf. Lakoff 2004; Luntz 2007) – has demonstrated that political parties already for quite some time have added the framing-concept as a strategic element to their communicative toolbox. Policy frames are necessarily a certain kind of simplification of the actual diversities within discourses. They represent overarching patterns and thus cannot account for all the nuances of expressions that are made with regard to a political issue. However, in some way they resemble our structures of thinking and the way the average citizen approaches political issues. It is also for this reason that frames offer such a useful tool of analysis. On the one hand, they express sufficient variety to depict the cornerstones of conflict over a specific issue while, on the other hand, they abstract to such an extent that they remain longitudinally viable instruments for the analysis of political discourses.

6.2. Applying policy frame analysis to discourses on immigration, migrant integration and ethnic diversity

The analysis of political positions has been a core task of political research ever since, still the evolution of different modes of analysis has been debated up to a certain point. While some authors have argued that expert surveys would be the best instrument for identify parties’ policy positions and locate them in policy spaces (cf. Benoit/Laver 2007; Ray 2007), these perspectives have also been contested, for the reason that expert surveys themselves can show week reliability if the number of experts is too small (cf. Volkens 2007). Yet content analysis of party channels is able to avoid some of the disadvantages inherent in expert surveys. The key argument in favor of a content analysis approach thus is the originality of the source and the reduction of interpreting devices (since expert surveys in fact only reproduce experts’ interpretations) (ibd.). Originally emerging from a
qualitative and interpretative paradigm, frame analysis approaches have been designed both in qualitative and quantitative ways. While qualitative approaches at times are confronted with the accusation of blurring their method (Koenig 2004), quantitative approaches of frame analysis commonly face the opposite objection of an empirical reductionism that stem from their measuring techniques (Hertog/McLeod 2001: 152ff). This dissertation tries to overcome these obstacles by applying a triangulation of qualitative frame analysis and quantification of its outcomings as far as possible (cf. Hertog/McLeod 2001: 153). However, even if a combined content-analytical approach seems to be suitable for our present purposes it still remains ambiguous as to how parties’ policy frames can a) be identified and b) be cast into a valid and comprehensive typology.

6.2.1. A triangulated approach for frame-identification

As already mentioned, frames do not exist autonomously but are linked to specific objects, most commonly issues of debate. Once the general issue-dimensions and specific sub-topics are identified, the question of how frames relate to these sub-topics needs to be operationalized. Departing from Benford/Snow (1988b) and their three-fold concept the present analysis uses problem description (diagnosis)\(^{75}\), treatment recommendation (prognosis)\(^{76}\) and appeal to action (call to arms) as three basic indicators for the construction of a policy frame. Beyond these pillars additional indicators such as “word choice, metaphors, exemplars, descriptions, arguments, and visual images” (van Gorp 2007: 64) are considered as elements indicating the presence of a specific policy frame. However, not all of these indicators are obligatory elements in order to identify a frame. Frames – due to their synthesizing nature – tend to fill information gaps. In other words, through the use of frames we are still able to understand isolated bits of information as part of a broader meaning even if other elements of this meaning are not expressed at the same time (Entman 1993: 52; Donati 2001: 150). This is of crucial importance for the

\(^{75}\) For the purpose of the project a diagnosis is defined as the linkage of two semantic elements, that are a) the description of a historical or actual social condition (such as structures, measures, etc.) and b) the valuation of the respective condition (as either positively or negatively). The two elements do not have to appear in an equal proportion but in an explicit way. Thus valuating elements can appear either a) as autonomous sentences or b) as word- or phrase-elements within descriptive sentences

\(^{76}\) The prognostic framing of a phenomenon for the present project is defined as the the monocausal (unidirectional) linkage of a) a present action with b) a future social condition. More clearly it refers to the addressing of expected future conditions as a claimed result of specific measures (or their lacking) in the present. In contrast to the diagnostic elements, in terms of the prognosis only the description of a future condition has to be made in an explicit form, while the addressing of the action linked to it can be made a) either explicitly (by addressing it) or b) implicitly (especially in case of descriptions of the expected developments deriving from the absence of new measures). Again elements can appear either a) as autonomous sentences or b) as word- or phrase-elements within descriptive sentences.
analysis of frames in texts because it clarifies that once a frame is established in a cultural reservoir, even the use of single attributes can be sufficient for the activation of the respective interpretive frame. Thus with regard to the coding of the texts, the identification of policy frames has to be conducted along multiple indicators which cannot and will not appear altogether in every single text.\(^7\) Instead, due to the different nature of different sorts of documents they will be articulated more or less selectively. While programmatic documents will tend to deliver a more extensive description of issues (and thus contain more elements of frames), short-term communication will consist of more selective and specified descriptions of policy-issues. Subsequently, the present study focuses on two compulsory indicators for the identification of frames by looking for “problem definitions” and “treatment recommendations”, while other indicators are regarded as facultative but not compelling elements of a frame.

Donati (2001) further engages in the question of how frames have to be identified in content analytical approaches by emphasizing that a) frames need to express patterns that are more generalized than the specific singular facts of the text thus they should be “guiding principles” and b) it should be possible to replace these singular facts with the respective frame without distorting the meaning of the text (Donati 2001: 156). Another question, however, remains as to how to label frames correctly. According to Donati framing analysis is a translation of the analyzed text into common-sense-categories of the peoples’ “Lebenswelten” – such as “no gains without cost” (Donati 2001: 164).

Nelson/Willey (2001: 248) further line out that “(m)ost issue frames can be summarized by a simple tagline, such as ‘reverse discrimination’ or ‘right to life’”. Following these premises and turning to our present study, both a general indicating label (a basic noun) as well as prototypical idiomatic expressions are indicated for each frame identified in party discourse. Due to the triangulated approach some of these labels and idioms could be deduced from earlier studies in the field of immigration/integration/diversity. Yet this deductive step is supplemented by the inductive development of frames on a qualitative basis: To that extent not only new frames were generated (capturing discourse elements that are not covered by frames suggested in previous research) but also the a priori deduced frames were condensed and elaborated more clearly.

\(^7\) As Entman (1993: 52) puts it: “A single sentence may perform more than one of these four framing functions (define problems, diagnose causes, make moral judgements and suggest remedies, O.G.), although many sentences in a text may perform none of them. And a frame in any particular text may not necessarily include all four functions.”
On this basis the approach of frame-development was applied in a pre-test of about 15% of the manifesto material, alternating between deductive and inductive creation and verification of relevant policy frames. Thus, in order to generate a comprehensive and cohesive set of frames, our qualitative analysis initially was based on frame-categories deduced from literature that were applied to the material. Once previous categories had turned out to be insufficient to capture the interpretative core of the material, new frame categories were constructed, grounded on the frame-elements as discussed above. Furthermore, existing frame-categories – as far as necessary – were deepened by the analysis of our material, which in some cases has lead to a reformulation of previous frames in more precise terms (in order to ensure the discriminatory power of our frames). These frames were formulated according to the principle of creating as few frames as possible but as many as necessary to satisfyingly reflect the structure of discourse on immigration/integration/diversity. Each frame thus consisted of at least a) a diagnosis of some event or aspect of social life as problematic and in need of alteration and b) a proposed solution to the diagnosed problem that specifies what needs to be done (Benford/Snow 1988b: 199) – but can optionally be deepened by further indicators as well.

6.2.2. Frames on immigration, migrant integration and ethnic diversity

Following this approach, a total number of eleven policy frames was identified for the electoral discourse on the policy fields of immigration/integration/diversity in a period from 1971 onwards. These frames can be clustered coarsely into a group with a more “liberal” and another group with more “restrictive” tendency (cf. Lahav 2004). Restrictiveness in terms of immigration/integration/diversity, according to Givens/Luedtke (2005: 10), may be defined as “any limitation of immigrant rights, freedoms, benefits or privileges” together with pejorative and delegitimizing stances on cultural diversity, extended immigration movements or the presence of foreigners in general – whereas liberal positions were defined as the opposite stances (cf. also Ivarsflaten 2005, Statham 2003).78 With the opposition of restrictive vs. liberal stances a bipolar scale was created that enabled us to locate party positioning on a dichotomous basis. On each side of this spectrum specific policy frames can be observed, that establish

78 It is important to note that the term “liberal” in this context is used only in its narrow political sense (i.e. addressing policies that promote the freedom of individuals disregarding their sex, class, ethnicity, formal status of residence, etc.) and does not refer to a (politico)economic use of the term.
various narrations of immigration/integration/diversity. The following description depicts the core meaning of each frame and combines it with exemplary references. Additionally, all frames were grounded on previous sources that explicitly suggested interpretative categories of the same kind and used similar definitions to delimit their meaning – even though not all of these sources apply the concept of “frames”.

When looking at the liberal part of the discourse spectrum we can distinguish at least five different frames that express an inclusionist character of immigration, migrant integration and ethnic diversity:

- **(Human/Basic) rights frame:** The most fundamental of all liberal frames points to the “indivisibility of (human) rights” and thus connects questions of treatment of minorities and migrants with a basic rights perspective (cf. Fujiwara 2005). In view of this, it heavily criticizes the flouting of fundamental rights in the area of asylum and refugee policy, within the application of immigration regimes (especially with regard to family reunification) and with regard to social and political exclusion of ethnic minorities and/or foreigners. As a consequence, the rights frame promotes a humanitarian perspective and not only calls for the entire implemention of existing human rights but also for the need to widen their range – especially within the context of ethnic and religious minorities and to an increasing extent also with regard to refugees (cf. Larsen et al 2012). Correspondingly, particular emphasis is placed on the right to refuge and the right to family reunification, but also questions of religious freedom are repeatedly framed using a rights-perspective. At times, its scope may as well be extended, as in case with claims for a stronger support of disadvantaged ethnic groups that should be enabled to assert their basic rights as humans and/or citizens (e.g. by facilitating access to multilingual documents, advisors and the like) (cf. Wengeler 2003). Thus, taken together in a rights-perspective, rights are addressed only in an inclusionist manner aiming to approach both the juridical framework as well as its execution across all potential subgroups (according to their ethnicity, their religion or their residence status).

- **Participation frame:** Based on the concept of the ‘emancipation’ frame (Vliegenthart 2007: 37), the present framework suggests a slight extension of this frame towards the concept of “participation” (cf. Roggeband/Verloo 2007: 277). In this perspective, discursive strategies stress the necessity of policies that ensure equality for all groups living in a society. As a consequence, the participation frame commonly appears in the
context of migrant integration or integration of ethnic and religious minorities. Its central storyline circulated around the notion of “integration through modes of participation” – in the sense that participatory offers shall help to overcome existing inequalities and exclusion of people living in a common polity. However, this perspective needs to be specified in two regards: Firstly, the participation frame is strictly different from a rights perspective in that it only expresses the need for facilitations and modes of support which are not fundamental “rights” in a narrow sense but rather “options” for individual inclusion. Thus its basic idea goes far beyond the rigid area of positive rights, rather it opens the eye for softer instruments that promote individual and group empowerment. Secondly, the perspective of participation does not design its instruments as obligations (which would rather be the perspective of another frame, i.e. “guiding culture”) but as facilitations to participate in a wide range of individually and socially fruitful processes. Concrete examples would be measures for a more inclusive adult and school education, sponsored language programmes, facilitation of citizenship-acquisition or support with administrative procedures for people of a different native language.

- **Multiculturalism frame**: The concept of multiculturalism serves as a common interpretative framework in discourses all over Europe and thus has been identified as an important frame already by work done previously (cf. Vliegenthaart 2007; Roggeband/Verloo 2007). In essence, this frame points to the keynote of “diversity as a social boon”, primarily in a normative sense but also with respect to the historical heritage of multicultural influences in (Austrian) history and identity (most importantly with regard to the Austro-Hungarian Empire). The frame diagnoses a lack of acceptance and appreciation for modes of living or religion other than the hegemonic. It criticizes modes of active and passive discrimination of diversity and – in its most explicit form – the tendencies of compulsion to cultural assimilation. In contrast, the multicultural frame aims to overcome patterns of uniformity by supporting measures that actively promote diversity (e.g. multilingualism initiatives or specific training of educationalists on the subject of intercultural competences). With this perspective the multiculturalism frame substantially differs from weaker conceptions that merely focus on tolerance and acceptance of diversity, which leaves the source and legitimacy of power relations between majority and minorities unaffected (see “solidarity frame”). Conversely, the claim for multiculturalism is characterized by the explicit appreciation of the value of plurality and thus promotes policies that preserve and encourage all patterns of cultural/religious diversity.
• **Solidarity frame**: Unlike the multicultural perspective this frame is based on the moral value of tolerance and revolves around the principle of “*mutual coexistence instead of intergroup concurrence*”. Consequently, it primarily opposes the high degree of abuse of ethnic or religious minorities as scapegoats and the way in which they are played them off against each other, or against a supposed identity of majority culture. It overtly opposes any forms of xenophobia and exploitation of disadvantaged and vulnerable groups as a lack of solidarity (cf. Larsen et al 2012), yet it refrains from advancing towards proactive claims for diversity. Besides these rather overarching appeals, the frame is closely tied to victimization appeals – as commonly observed in the context of asylum seekers or the suppression of women from ethnic or religious minorities (cf. van Gorp 2005; Vliegenthaart/Roggeband 2007). In response to these diagnoses the solidarity frame calls upon political actors and society to show solidarity and compassion for the discriminated groups (ethnic minorities, religious minorities, asylum seekers, etc.) (cf. Lakoff/Ferguson 2006). Thus it emphasizes the key importance of working with instead of against each other and hence demands that priority should be given to social cohesion as well as forums of common discourse that promote mutual understanding. It is fundamentally different from the previous frames, since it does not explicitly promote diversity, rather it limits its tasks to giving weight to the principle of tolerance in the light of given patterns of diversity. It also makes no explicit references to the promotion of minority participation and its claims are rather pleas for recognition and charity rather than references to positive rights.

• **Opening frame**: The “opening frame” expresses an instrumental perspective with regard to immigration and access to fundamental sectors like labor, welfare system, education, and the like. It points to the necessity of migration from a social and economic angle and argues for an “*open perspective regarding immigration*”. It diagnoses tendencies of shutting/closure and exclusionary policies on a national level (vividly embodied in the famous references to the conservation of Austria as “the island of bliss”). Likewise these bulkheading behavior is identified on a European level, more specifically with regard to the European Union (“fortress of Europe”). As a direct response to these diagnoses, the frame promotes “the opening up of the national boundaries and the process of international integration” (cf. Kriesi et al 2006: 922). It appeals to a migration friendly policy on both – national and European – levels, and reflects the transformed conditions of mobility in the 21st century and the needs of Austria and Europe (such as facilitation of
immigration into Europe or Austria, incorporation into the labor market and so on). In the specific Austrian context, this frame frequently points to the historical duty of the country due to its role in the Nazi regime, its crimes, but also because of its post-war-position as a bridgehead between East and West (in consequence of the country’s declaration to neutrality, its role as a United Nations headquarter, etc.).

Moving on to the restrictive side of the ideological spectrum, we find the following frames with a more or less exclusive character with regard to immigration, migrant integration and ethnic diversity:

- **Security frame:** The frame links immigration and the presence of ethnic minorities to a setting of threat and insecurity for the Austrian population and consequently demands for “tightened security measures against criminal aspects of immigration and asylum” (cf. Huysmans/Squire 2009; Lakoff/Ferguson 2006). Its diagnostic appeals circle around the description of increased danger of crime, physical violence and more generally a violation of law by specific religious communities (mainly in the context of Islam and its practices as well as with regard to fundamentalism), by illegal entrants (commonly referring to petty crime or drug traffic) as well as so called “crime tourism” in border regions. As a consequence the security frame urges for more restrictive measures against non-nationals who commit criminal offence (such as facilitated expulsion, restrictions for re-entries, a tightening of incarceration conditions) but also a stronger use of preventive measures, like intensified border control, police surveillance or stronger sentences (cf. Huysmans 2000; Bigo 2002; Buonfino 2004; Larsen et al 2009). The core message of the security frame thus shows close ties to a traditional law&order-discourse, but exceeds it in a twofold way by ethnicizing security problems and securitizing immigration and migrant integration at the same time. Beyond that, a characteristic pattern of the securitization frame has become its combined emphasis of a national and transnational (European) perspective, with the latter catalyzing the scope of the frame significantly in recent years (under the umbrella of the EU’s “area of freedom, security justice”).

- **Genuineness frame:** The frame is built on the diagnosis of a widespread “abuse of too liberal regimes” in the fields of immigration, asylum, social system, labor market etc., that are said to be exploited by non-nationals who are not genuine target groups. The most obvious target groups of these frames are clandestine migrants who illegally live and work within the country’s borders (cf. Lakoff/Ferguson 2006). On a less obvious
approach, common examples for this kind of discursive framing are the cases of asylum seekers who are suspected to willfully delay and disguise in the process of screening (bogus refugees), but also non-nationals exploiting the welfare system or damaging the labor market through illicit work. These illicit groups are consequently contrasted with legitimate counterparts, such as the genuine asylum seeker, ambitious and hardworking labor migrants, etc., and their juxtaposition constitutes the core of this perspective. In response to this perceived abuse as opposed to genuine groups, the genuineness frame demands more measures that promote sharper distinction between those groups, better identification of illegitimate groups and a more restrictive approach with regard to the latter. Common suggestions in this respect are stronger restrictions of asylum procedures, increased penalties for abuse or non-compliance, a stronger limitation of welfare aid or rigorous expulsion of abusers (cf. Nickels 2007). Thus, a genuineness frame is entirely applied under exclusionary auspices, since the distinction of genuine and illicit groups is hardly ever addressed with a focus on the rights of the former, but rather the identification and reduction of the latter.

- Guiding culture frame: This frame is directly opposed to the multicultural frame and reflects different levels of claims for the “preservation of a guiding culture” with respect to ethnic and religious minorities. In its most extreme way it diagnoses a threat to Austrian identity by foreign ethnicities or religions – e.g. by asserting an islamization of Austria/Europe – and subsequently demands for counteractive measures against these influences. In a more moderate version, the guiding culture frame primarily calls for the subordination of foreigners and/or ethnic minorities to hegemonic values, since it diagnoses a reluctance to assimilate on behalf of those groups (who are rather accused to offend against assumed national or European basic values). Measures in this regard comprise of a broad range of different intensity: they encompass bans on specific religious practices, demands for obligatory adaptation of foreigners to Austrian language and culture as well as mandatory courses about Austrian culture, values and history (cf. Hell 2005). Beyond that, the guiding culture frame frequently refers to a gender dimension, assuming an incompatibility of “western” and “muslim” images of women. The compulsory nature of the guiding culture frame is a constitutive element, since it separates this strand of discourse from rather inclusionary perspectives as addressed by the participation frame (see above).
• **Relief frame:** The discursive core of the relief frame intrinsically centers around a notion of resources and their scarcity within a given society. As such it is characterized by a diagnosis of limited capacities of admission, of an overburdening of the labor market, welfare system and housing possibilities because of immigration, which cannot be afforded (any more) (cf. Kretsedemas 2012). Analogous problem definitions are applied with regard to asylum, which is portrayed to assume excessive conditions that overexerts the countries capacities. In contrast to the previous frames, the relief-perspective minimizes devaluing or delegitimizing references, but rather refers to a “full boat” metaphor (cf. Picard 2002). On a national level, the relief perspective is occasionally linked to critique of unequal distribution of encumbrances (such as in the case of refugee flows). As a consequence measures suggested against this burden are, amongst other things, a stop of further immigration, quicker enforcement of asylum procedures, withdrawal of residence permits for long term unemployed, an autonomous social security system for non-nationals as well as the support of the countries of origin to avoid emigration (cf. Wengeler 2003). Its detachment from the previous frames makes it a somewhat less accusative perspective that usually is not linked to any collective or individual allocation of blame with regard to immigrants or ethnic minorities (thus it often features a depersonalized nature).

• **Benefit frame:** The benefit frame is the most instrumental perspective within the discourse on immigration and migrant integration and constricted to an evaluation of costs and benefits, thus the utility of immigration to the host society (Kretsedemas 2012). The frame alleges that there is a lack of priority given to nationals as compared to foreigners in a broad range of regulated fields, such as labor market access, educational system and so on. To that effect, it expresses the need for a clear and hierarchic order of rank, assigning priority to nationals as opposed to non-nationals, while at the same time showing a tolerant attitude towards particular kinds of immigration. This hierarchic perspective is linked to the explicit claim, that in order to gain any legitimacy, immigration (in general) and foreign individuals (in particular) need to bring greater benefits to the host country – such as filling gaps in the labor-market, facilitating economic improvement, increasing professional know-how, and the like. Conversely, if these requirements are not met, the benefit frame strictly opposes access or even further residence of immigrant population. As a consequence, measures that promote beneficial immigration demand for a selective admission to these fields and for a major focus on the
expected contribution by foreigners to public interest, and thus may even result in claims for rigid inspection of criteria for residence permits or a stricter expulsion regime (cf. Wengeler 2003; Nickels 2007). As has been shown, the benefit frame is strictly different from previous frames, since it argues solely instrumental and its rigidity can assume different degrees of restrictiveness (making it a compatible perspective for different types of actors).

The eleventh and final frame goes beyond the dichotomy of liberal and restrictive tendencies because it is utilized in both contexts likewise:

- **Administration frame:** The administration perspective is a largely depersonalized frame of immigration and, more specifically, the question of asylum. It diagnoses a certain insufficiency of regulation concerning the policy fields of immigration and asylum and thus regularly serves the purpose of releasing political responsibility, since it locates the reasons for problems – may they be too much or too few immigration/integration/diversity – on a structural level. Thus, problem definitions refer to administrative difficulties, understaffed authorities, judicial complexity and the like. Accordingly, this diagnosis is linked to claims for additional resources and staff, for a simplification of laws and procedures, for clearer criteria regarding immigration and asylum as well as the formulation of rules for the coexistence of social groups, that should be fixing the “rights and duties for all members of society” (cf. Nickels 2007).

On the basis of these frames the whole discursive spectrum of Austrian electoral competition on immigration/integration/diversity can be captured and despite their natural degree of abstraction these frames offer sufficient diversity in order to portray the competing interpretations. As outlined above, this set of policy frames has been elaborated in a triangulated approach of inductive and deductive exploration. Hence, even though it is mainly grounded on Austrian party discourse, it may serve as a generalisable approach for other national contexts as well. Consequently the findings of this exploratory chapter are of intrinsic value, since they could also contribute to further case studies or even enhance country comparative research of party politicization.

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79 In the context of press releases the addition of a residual code has become necessary, due to the textual structure of press releases. Press releases regularly contain single coding units that are autonomously included into the text of the document but do not express a specific position (even though they can be identified to be related to immigration/integration). In order to capture these references, a residual code labelled „indefinite“ has been applied in cases where no explicit position could be identified.
For the present dissertation, these findings constitute the framework for a quantitative content analysis of Austrian electoral competition, as discussed in the following chapter. On these grounds, the aim of section 7.3. is to shed light on the question, how these policy frames are applied by Austrian parties and whether there are relevant strategy shifts over the course of the examination period.
VII. The politicization of immigration, migrant integration and ethnic diversity: quantitative patterns of competition

Which importance is ascribed to immigration, migrant integration and ethnic diversity in Austrian electoral competition and what kind of framing tendencies do prevail in the debate? What are the main drivers of party politicization, what kind of temporal shifts can be identified and what patterns of consistency/divergence do exist between Austrian parties? These are the guiding questions of the following chapter, that aims to reveal the structure of party politicization from an aggregate (party system) perspective as well as from an individual party perspective. As the previous chapters have shown, a number of catalysts make an active and contentious party politicization of immigration/integration/diversity highly expectable for the Austrian case: the historical legacy of a multicultural monarchy, the socio-structural developments regarding immigration and asylum in the 20th century, predominantly negative and pressing attitudes among Austrian population as well as the parallel establishment of niche parties and new cleavage structures connected to these issues – to name only the most important. Our approaches to the genesis of subtopics and frames of the debate already revealed the topical and positional complexity of the electoral debate, however, these findings now need to be evaluated in quantitative terms.

Accordingly, the following chapter presents the findings of the content-analysis, as outlined in Chapter V. Its primary goal is to deliver data on the basic patterns of Austrian electoral discourse over immigration/integration/diversity. As such it will focus on the descriptive analysis of our dependent variables, i.e. Austrian parties’ strategies in terms of issue-salience and issue-positions, whereas the conjunction with our explanatory framework will be conducted separately (see Chapter 8). Starting with the descriptive part, all sections are based on the fundamental assumption of salience theory that parties will grant most attention to those issues that are of greater relevance for them. Based on this premise the descriptive findings then are presented as follows:

1. Firstly, the question of issue-salience in general is examined by presenting an overview of the development of cross-party issue-salience in the electoral context as well as party specific salience-values. The guiding presumption here is that increased involvement of political parties in the issues of immigration/integration/diversity will materialize in an increasing salience of this issue per se, irrespective of the content or direction of politicization (7.1.).
2. Secondly, party politicization will be dissected into the analysis of “issue-dimensions” as well as specific *subtopics* of immigration/integration/diversity as they are politicized by Austrian parties. This section stems from the presumption, that political parties will accentuate particular subtopical aspects according to their advantages and ownership patterns, thereby contributing to the formation of discursive clusters. On this basis, first conclusions of issue-proximities between parties and campaign channels respectively will be drawn (7.2.).

3. Thirdly, the analysis goes beyond the topical dimension of the debate by examining the positional dimension. Driven by the assumption, that parties will employ different frames to politicize immigration/integration/diversity and thus grant more prominence to some positions than others, this section will highlight *framing-strategies* of Austrian parties as well as discursive coalitions among them (7.3). We will touch upon these findings again in our concluding remarks, by putting them together to an integrated description of party politicization of immigration, migrant integration and ethnic diversity, that aims to determine the role of these issues for Austrian party competition in general (7.4.).

### 7.1. The importance of emphasis: Issue-salience

From a contemporary perspective, the issues of immigration/integration/diversity seem to have become characteristic patterns throughout the majority of Western democracies. Yet this commonplace hides the fact that in most of these countries these issues have been subjected to historical processes of public debate – turning them from prior depoliticized or at least non-public political issues to essential contents of public and electoral debate. The initial step of our analysis thus focuses on the relevance of these issues on the party system level, i.e. the question to what extent immigration/integration/diversity have become issues of electoral politicization in the Austrian party system at all.

#### 7.1.1. Issue-salience on the party system level

In order to gain an overview of the absolute relevance of immigration, migrant integration and diversity in Austrian party competition, the shared emphasis of all relevant actors needs to be evaluated. Thus Fig. 8 plots the historic development of electoral competition on immigration/integration/diversity, reflecting the average salience across relevant parties in the respective election. These salience measures are compared between both
dimensions of campaign communication under examination: programmatic communication (manifestos) and daily communication (press releases).

Fig. 8: Average salience of immigration/integration/diversity per election, 1971-2008

Note: Graphs denote to average salience of immigration/integration/diversity among all relevant parties at a given election (based on relevant wordshare in relation to total wordshare of each party manifesto or all party’s press releases). For complete data table, see App. 3.

Comparing both campaign channels, a striking correspondence between issue salience in manifests and press releases is quite obvious, with only a slightly lower level of salience among press releases. Deviations of these patterns appear only in 1990 (with an inverse relation of higher salience during the daily basis of campaign communication than in programmatic communication) and increasingly since 2002, with the most obvious decrease of daily campaigning compared to the programmatic communication in 2008. In both cases these deviations have to be explained by the specific conditions of the elections: In 1990 the debate over visa requirements for some Eastern European countries as well as the creation of a mission for border control assistance by the Austrian military during the election campaign period led to an immense electoral debate over immigration topics even exceeding the programmatic relevance of the issue. For 2008, however, the exact opposite was true, with the global economic crisis and the debate about rising prices dominating the electoral debate in a way that other issues became disproportionately ousted.

Besides these numerical outliers, however, the co-evolution of programmatic as well as daily salience is strikingly evident. On both channels, a continuous depoliticization of

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80 Plasser/Ulram (1990) already described the elections of 1990 as the first elections to make “the immigration question an issue”.

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immigration, migrant integration and ethnic diversity is obvious throughout the 1970ies and early 1980ies. From 1971 to 1986 the issues of immigration, migrant integration and ethnic diversity are almost non-existent. They only average 1.3% of the total programmatic and just 0.4% of the total press release communication. Nonetheless, from 1990 onwards the importance of these issues magnifies drastically and the issues remain to be highly relevant ever since (they reach an average of 9.8% in manifestos and 7.5% among press releases). Thus the election of 1990 represents a kind of starting point for the career of a new campaign issue, which since then has become a characteristic cornerstone of electoral competition in Austria. In 2006, party system salience peaks on both campaign channels, whereas in 2008 the slight decline in daily campaign communication qualifies the picture. However, even in the light of punctual declines among press releases, the establishment of immigration/integration/diversity as core issues of electoral competition cannot be put in doubt. Thus the increased relevance of these issues in Austrian electoral competition since the late 1980ies quite convincingly resembles the patterns known from other European countries. Still the question remains, as to who are the main drivers of these electoral tendencies. Only with regard to the examination of the party specific results it can be identified, whether immigration/integration/diversity have been contentious issues across the whole party spectrum or “owned” by specific actors. Thus the following section focuses on party specific emphasis of these issues.

7.1.2. Engage or refrain? Individual party strategies of issue-emphasis

Heading on to the comparison of individual parties’ campaign strategies, the following section starts with a time series comparison, in order to identify the actors mostly responsible for the increase of general issue salience as well as the changing patterns of individual party emphasis. To begin with, Fig. 9 compares issue salience for relevant Austrian parties based on the wordshare in relation to the total number of word of the respective coding unit.

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81 For 1986 unfortunately there are no press releases on the part of the Greens, according to the parliamentary group of the Greens.
Fig. 9: Salience of immigration/integration/diversity per election
individual party scores, 1971-2008 (in %)

Note: No press releases available for Greens in 1986. Low salience-scores have been offset for legibility (SP: Social democrats, VP: People’s party, FP: Freedom party). For complete data table, see App. 3.

Focusing on individual party behavior, the findings reveal heterogeneous patterns of politicization featuring some prominent characteristics and changing behavior of individual parties. In order to highlight these patterns, the findings are discussed separately for each relevant party type:

Methodical digression: Comparing our salience results with the findings of the “Comparative Manifesto Project” (CMP) a striking discrepancy comes to light (for the calculations of CMP see App. 4). Not only are the relations of the parties’ salience-values characterized by a very different order of rank (except fo 2008), but more importantly, for some parties there are no salience-measures at all in the CMP-dataset in some elections like 1994, 1999 (while in our examination we do find indications of politicization). This discrepancy stems from two reasons: Firstly there is a general source of discrepancy because the CMP does not count on the basis of words but on the basis of (quasi-)sentences. Thus, it does not take into account
Lack of continuous far right dominance. Most prominently, the findings distinctively contradict the common assumption of a permanent far-right dominance. Neither among manifestos nor among the press-releases such a far-right-dominance can be identified. While with regard to programmatic communication there is a distinct dominance of Green politicization until 1994 as well as higher shares of the ÖVP in 2002, a changing dominance of Greens and FPÖ becomes evident in terms of press releases. In fact, it is only from 2006 on that the far right dominance reaches a prominent level with both FPÖ and BZÖ exceeding the other parties by far. Thus, on an electoral level and with regard to issue-salience, immigration/integration/diversity have not been primarily dominated by far right politicization but have very well been (or become) vital issues on other parties’ agendas too. Though from a temporal perspective, it has primarily been the FPÖ that has addressed the issues. Already in the pre-Haider-era the FPÖ – at least marginally – included immigration/integration/diversity into its electoral communication. Even if these shares by no means compare to the party’s numbers since the 1990ies, they indicate at least that there has existed an awareness about these issues also in the earlier decades – or to put it differently: immigration, migrant integration and ethnic diversity have rather been marginal than non-issues (a presumption that is further confirmed when taking into account the occasional politicization on behalf of the ÖVP at that time).

What is a noteworthy finding, though, is the low importance the issues gain in the immediate aftermath of the FPÖ-internal upheaval in 1986. Neither among manifestos nor among press releases there is an important reference to immigration/integration/diversity on the part of the FPÖ even though in the same election the Greens politicized the issues more intensively for the first time. A difference that persists for the following elections in the early 1990ies with the Greens exceeding the FPÖ-politicization in 1990 among manifestos and quite remarkably in 1994 on both campaign channels, manifestos and press releases. It is only in 1999 that the FPÖ becomes the most dominant actor both with regard to programmatic and daily campaign communication for the first time, yet it takes whether a quasi-sentence comprises of five or fifty words, consequently creating a huge potential for uncertainty. Our approach tries to overcome this uncertainty by referring to the number of words in relation to the total word share of a manifesto. Secondly there is a more specific problem regarding the issues of immigration, migrant integration and ethnic diversity because the CMP only offers few and very fuzzy codes that reflect upon these issues (such as their codes of “national way of life” and “multiculturalism”) leaving a number of other factors out or mingled with other issue categories that go far beyond immigration, migrant integration and ethnic diversity.

Thus while we could in some way overlook the first problem of different counting procedures, this second factor really poses a serious obstacle for migration researchers who want to apply the CMP-data for their purposes. Our approach thus offers a much more inclusive coding tool in order to capture more of the nuances within the electoral discourse on immigration, migrant integration and ethnic diversity.
a couple of years and a second internal split of the FPÖ in 2005 until this dominance reaches its peak (2006 and 2008 the FPÖ dominates by far on both campaign channels). Thus, the Austrian case heavily confirms, that the “single-issue-thesis” is hardly valid for the FPÖ and its utilization of the issues of immigration/integration/diversity. Rather it raises the question, as to which degree the internal split in 2005 has caused the drastic intensification of politicization by an again newly relaunched FPÖ ever since. Even more, when considering the pressure created by the other right-wing-opponent BZÖ and its likewise emphasis of these issues in 2006/2008, pressing the FPÖ to prove that actually they themselves would be the “rightful” owner of the anti-immigrant party label. However, as a result of this emerging conflict on the far-right wing of the party spectrum, the far-right dominance on the issues of immigration/integration/diversity has become an obvious consequence.

Prominent but declining role of liberal and left libertarian parties. With the role of far-right parties being less dominant than expected, the immediate question is how the role of parties on the left spectrum – which in the Austrian case after 1960 is limited to left libertarian and liberal parties – can be described. The presence of left-libertarian parties in the Austrian party spectrum, of course, is a temporally delayed phenomenon. However, as chapter 4.2. has shown, the Greens since 1986 have established themselves as the most prominent left-libertarian party in Austrian politics, thus it all the more important to thoroughly discuss the particular role in politicizing immigration/integration/diversity. Respective findings reveal a strong dominance of the Green party in the first years after entering the Austrian electoral stage in 1986. Putting both electoral dimensions together, the Greens are the most dominant actor attributing to questions of immigration/integration/diversity on the electoral level from 1986 until 1994. This pattern, however, begins to weaken by the end of the 1990ies with the Greens continuously cutting back some of their politicization of these issues. Taking programmatic and daily campaign communication together, the average percentage of issue-salience decreases from election to election (1999: 9,1%, 2002: 9,1%, 2006: 8,6%, 2008: 7,1%). While the constant retreat in 1999 and 2002 resembles the performance of other parties, the growing emphasis by far right and in parts also by mainstream parties since 2006 has obviously put the Greens on the second circle of the hierarchy. In the course of the 2008 elections the party has finally reached its lowest salience-values for the last two decades, which indicates a profound transformation of the party’s profile in this
regard. The decrease of Green politicization thus is accompanied by the lack of a second left-libertarian party after the exit of the LIF in 1999. During its parliamentary presence from 1994 to 1999 the LIF appeared as a dominant actor to politicize the issues of immigration/integration/diversity and thus helped to create a libertarian phalanx in opposition to the far right. With both the LIF dropping out of parliament as well as the Greens lowering their issue-appeal, the liberal/left-libertarian presence has remarkably lost its electoral dominance in the last decade.

Fluctuating mainstream party emphasis: However, these changing patterns in niche party behavior where accompanied by a likewise shift of mainstream party-emphasis on immigration/integration/diversity. As mentioned above there is an increasing participation of mainstream parties in competition over these issues, posing the question which of the mainstream parties is the more prominent driving force behind this development. To start with, the picture appears to be quite mixed for the center-right mainstream party (ÖVP). A detailed look at the different dimensions of campaign communication reveals an interesting discrepancy: Programatically the party shows some participation during the early 1970ies, no politicization until the end of 1990ies and changing patterns of issue-emphasis from election to election ever since. Focusing on the last two decades, the ÖVP in four out of six elections put considerably more emphasis on the issues of immigration/integration/diversity than its center-left counterpart (SPÖ). Especially since 2002 the party reaches its highest average appeal (including almost 15% of issue-salience in the 2008-election, the highest amount ever addressed by a mainstream party). With these increasing issue-appeals the ÖVP has become the most dominant (2002) as well as the second most dominant (2008) party politicizing immigration/integration/diversity. This demonstrates the increasing importance of the issues for the ÖVP-profile and the decision to engage in competition over these issues. However this high salience among manifestos does not translate into equal politicization among press releases. Thus when comparing programmatic appeals with the daily dimension of electoral campaigning we witness a drastic drop in importance. In terms of press releases the party is the weakest actor addressing immigration/integration/diversity throughout the whole examination period (with the only exception in 2008) which is in sharp contrast to its programmatic behavior. As a result, we can assume a twofold strategy on behalf of the ÖVP, that frequently signals the importance of these issues on a programmatic basis but avoids to engage in daily competition about the issues in the course of the election campaign.
Conversely, the center-left mainstream party (SPÖ) follows a different pattern that comprises of a much more consistent issue-salience between programmatic and daily campaign communication. The SPÖ displays a rather low level of commitment during the 1970ies and 1980ies, but since 1990 starts to address immigration/integration/diversity to a slightly greater intensity. Whereas programmatically the party remains the least active actor (except of 1990 and 2006), it continuously exceeds its center-right counterpart ÖVP on the daily campaign basis. But most importantly, the SPÖ is much more consistent with regard to the amount of politicization on the different campaign channels. Unlike the ÖVP it never displays similar discrepancies but almost continuously shows a covariant development of politicization (with slightly lower issue-salience among press releases compared to manifests). However, taking both channels together, the SPÖ (despite occasional exceptions in 1990 and 2006) is characterized by a slightly smaller degree of participation in competition over immigration/integration/diversity than its center-right counterpart and never attains the peak-values of the ÖVP.

**Mainstream parties and niche parties.** Taken together, an obvious difference in issue-salience becomes evident when comparing mainstream and niche parties (Tab. 11). From 1986 onwards the findings show a significant dominance of niche parties (with FPÖ/Greens/Liberals showing higher shares than SPÖ/ÖVP), a pattern that is even more decisive among press releases than among manifests. While the mainstream parties dedicate only 2.9% on average of their press-releases to the issues of immigration/integration/diversity, the amount on behalf of niche parties is three times as high, dedicating 10.1% of their press releases to these issues. Among manifests the difference turns out to be not that obvious, yet the tendency can be confirmed (mainstream parties 5.9%, niche parties 11.4%). Apparently, in the recent decade the dominance begins to weaken among both channels, with either SPÖ or ÖVP politicizing the issues more prominently: with respect to press-releases, niche parties even show lower issue-salience (9.6%) than in the previous decade whereas mainstream parties slightly increase their shares (3.9%); however, as far as manifests are concerned, both mainstream parties (8.8%) as well as niche parties (13.1%) exceed their issue-salience. But even in the light of these slight changes the overall patterns between mainstream and niche parties remain the same. On the whole, these findings demonstrate that immigration/integration/diversity not only have become persistent issues of electoral competition, but also have turned into essential subjects for the political mainstream.
Divergence of issue-salience between campaign channels. Finally, when taking a more systematic look on the relation of campaign channels for each party, some interesting findings come to the surface. As Tab. 12 demonstrates, since 1990 especially the SPÖ (2.3%) but also the Greens (2.8%) have a lower average divergence of salience between manifesto and press releases and thus a more covariant behavior. ÖVP (5.2%) and FPÖ (5.7%), on the other hand, are much more unbalanced in their emphasis between campaign channels. Thus, an obvious left-right-gap becomes evident, with parties right to the center being more invariant in issue-emphasis between campaign channels than parties left to the center. This pattern is even enforced when including the two impermanent niche parties into the picture (although we have only two election to account for each). While the left wing LIF is extremely consistent in its emphasis (0.5% avg. divergence), the right wing BZÖ is among the most inconsistent parties (5.4% avg. divergence).

**Tab. 11:** Avg. salience of immigration/integration/diversity – mainstream vs. niche parties (in%)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Manifestos mainstream parties</th>
<th>Manifestos niche parties</th>
<th>Press releases mainstream parties</th>
<th>Press releases niche parties</th>
</tr>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1990</td>
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<td>10.5</td>
<td>4.1</td>
<td>11.6</td>
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<td>10.1</td>
<td>2.2</td>
<td>8.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2002</td>
<td>8.5</td>
<td>8.1</td>
<td>3.6</td>
<td>8.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2006</td>
<td>7.8</td>
<td>17.1</td>
<td>5.2</td>
<td>12.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2008</td>
<td>10.2</td>
<td>13.9</td>
<td>3.1</td>
<td>8.1</td>
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<td>5.8</td>
<td>10.3</td>
<td>2.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>pre-millennium</td>
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<td>2.1</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>post-millennium</td>
<td>8.8</td>
<td>13.0</td>
<td>3.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>average</td>
<td>8.8</td>
<td>13.0</td>
<td>3.9</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: For complete data table including individual party results, see App. 3.

T-test for equality of means between mainstream and niche parties: Manifestos (T=−2.577**, df=26), Press releases (T=−3.831**, df=26), * p ≤ 0.05, ** p ≤ 0.01, two-tailed test.

**Tab. 12:** Divergence of salience between campaign channels – individual party scores (in %)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>liberal/left libertarian</th>
<th>Social democratic</th>
<th>Conservative</th>
<th>Right wing populist</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Greens</td>
<td>LIF</td>
<td>SPÖ</td>
<td>ÖVP</td>
</tr>
<tr>
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<td>-</td>
<td>1.5</td>
<td>0.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1994</td>
<td>6.7</td>
<td>0.4</td>
<td>2.9</td>
<td>6.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1999</td>
<td>2.3</td>
<td>0.7</td>
<td>0.9</td>
<td>3.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2002</td>
<td>2.4</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>2.5</td>
<td>7.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2006</td>
<td>0.8</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>3.5</td>
<td>1.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2008</td>
<td>0.6</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>2.6</td>
<td>11.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Avg. 2.8</td>
<td>0.5</td>
<td>2.3</td>
<td>5.2</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: T-test for equality of means between parties left and right to the center: T=−2.799**, df=17.8, * p ≤ 0.05, ** p ≤ 0.01, two-tailed test.
7.1.3. Synopsis

In chapter 2 the concept of “salience” has been discussed as a central strategy of political parties in their electoral campaigns. Due to a growing number of parties and the increasing importance of issue based electoral competition in Western democracies, the selective emphasis of particular issues has become a common pattern of politicization (cf. Budge/Farlie 1983). By applying the concept of salience theory to Austrian electoral competition on immigration, migrant integration and ethnic diversity, early tendencies of Austrian party competition can be revealed. From a cross-party perspective the development of salience regarding immigration, migration integration and ethnic diversity in fact remains limited during the 1970ies and 1980ies, increasing slightly in 1986 and henceforth being of permanent salience – finally arriving at its average peaks in the recent elections of 2006 and 2008. This is a first indication of the increasing prominence of these issues for Austrian electoral competition.

Grouping parties by party type, we find some expected results with niche parties dominating the scene throughout the whole examination period and mainstream parties increasing their emphasis much slower from election to election. However, with regard to individual party behavior some surprising findings come to light, as the Greens are the most active party emphasizing immigration/integration/diversity programmatically until the mid-1990ies, while on the daily campaigning basis they alternate with the FPÖ. With regard to the mainstream parties we find conflicting results between campaign channels, with the ÖVP exceeding the SPÖ in terms of programmatic salience, whereas it is the other way around on the daily basis (with the SPÖ dedicating more of its press releases to immigration/integration/diversity than the ÖVP). Yet with respect to daily campaign communication both mainstream parties remain far below the intensity of niche parties, whereas in terms of manifestos both parties (and especially the ÖVP) approximate niche party salience especially in the post-millennial period. Thus, while increasing mainstream party involvement in competition with regard to manifestos can be concluded, among press releases it remains comparatively limited. This points to the fact, that although mainstream parties increasingly identify immigration/integration/diversity as relevant issues of party competition, they are not keen to engage in daily battle with niche party opponents.
7.2. The topical structure of competition: Issue-dimensions and subtopics

So far the analysis has been limited to the general importance of immigration, migrant integration and ethnic diversity for Austrian parties in their electoral appeals. However, these overall salience-findings leave us rather puzzled about the specific contents and ideological directions of electoral discourse. While the previous section has demonstrated, that all parties sooner or later have included immigration/integration/diversity into their electoral concepts, this does by no means imply that they actually address the same subtopics. Thus in order to get a better picture of how the electoral preferences are structured, these very subtopics need to be compared in the following section. In a first step we focus on the party level and the degree of coherence of the electoral debate on immigration/integration/diversity, i.e. to what amount the different campaign channels and different elections circle around the same or different subtopics (7.2.1.). Secondly we will concentrate on the individual party level, asking which subtopics are preferred by individual political parties and how they deviate between the campaign channels in question (7.2.2.).

7.2.1. What it’s all about: Issue-dimensions and subtopics of the electoral debate

What are the most dominant subtopics within the electoral discourse on immigration, migrant integration and ethnic diversity? This is the guiding question of the following section and finding an answer is by no means a trivial task. As discussed in chapter 5.2.3., there are different approaches of how to decompose political discourse into its thematic components. For our research goals we have decided to analyze electoral politicization in two analytical steps: On the one hand we focus on what we call “issue-dimensions” (distinguishing between “asylum”, “immigration” as well as “integration” and “diversity”), arguing that they not only structure the common public debate but also political action and the responsibilities of different political authorities. For that reason, these broad categories might help to get a first indication of where the discursive focus is bundled. On the other hand, we analyze the specific subtopics of the debate precisely because of the cross-sectional character of these issue-dimensions mentioned above. Given that these questions are vitally linked to other policy-fields such as labor, crime&security, education, social&family, housing/settlement and so on (see Tab. 10 in Chapter 5), the topical structure of party politicization needs to be dissected on such a medium level of abstraction. Accordingly, this section reveals topical patterns of party
politicization, starting with the party system level, i.e. it discusses the average salience of issue-dimensions and subtopics (Tab. 13) as well as time-series patterns for each election (Fig. 10).

Comparing both campaign channels under consideration, the analysis reveals rather striking differences that relate to the following elements: Firstly with regard to the dispersion of issue-dimensions and subtopics, secondly with regard to the different nature of the most dominant aspects of the debate and thirdly with regard to the different degree of concretion of politicization. These elements shall be discussed independently:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>MF</th>
<th>PA</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Asylum</td>
<td>20.9</td>
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<td>Immigration</td>
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<td>Diversity</td>
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<td>20.5</td>
</tr>
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<td>100</td>
</tr>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Asylum procedures</td>
<td>8.5</td>
<td>13.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
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<td>3.0</td>
<td>2.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Crime&amp;Border Control</td>
<td>10.0</td>
<td>15.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Education</td>
<td>7.3</td>
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<td>Housing&amp;Settlement</td>
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<td>Labor</td>
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<td>Science</td>
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<td>4.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Social&amp;Family</td>
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<td>4.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Societal Model</td>
<td>11.6</td>
<td>5.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Xenophobia</td>
<td>4.2</td>
<td>12.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td>100</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: Results refer to time-series average of individual party salience of each subtopic in relation to each party’s relevant wordshare. MF denotes to manifestos, PR denotes to press releases.
### Fig. 10: Mean shares of issue-dimensions and subtopics per election, 1990-2008 (in %)

#### MF 1990

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Issue Dimension</th>
<th>MF 1990</th>
<th>PR 1990</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Asylum</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Asylum procedures</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Xenophobia</td>
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<td>1.0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Labor</td>
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<td>0.0%</td>
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<td>Immigration general</td>
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<td>13.1%</td>
</tr>
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<td>Crime &amp; Border Control</td>
<td>11.8%</td>
<td>21.9%</td>
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<td>Science</td>
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</tr>
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<td>Education</td>
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</tr>
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<td>27.4%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Citizenship &amp; Voting</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Housing &amp; Settlement</td>
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<td>0.0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Social &amp; Family</td>
<td>12.0%</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Diversity</td>
<td>21.6%</td>
<td>21.6%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

#### MF 1994

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<tr>
<th>Issue Dimension</th>
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</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
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<td>Asylum procedures</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Labor</td>
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<td>12.3%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>International Migration</td>
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<td>21.6%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Crime &amp; Border Control</td>
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<tr>
<td>Diversity</td>
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#### MF 1999

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<tbody>
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<tr>
<td>Crime &amp; Border Control</td>
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<td>Crime &amp; Border Control</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Diversity</td>
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<th>PR 1990</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
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<tr>
<td>Science</td>
<td>17.4%</td>
<td>0.3%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Education</td>
<td>9.5%</td>
<td>12.0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Integration general</td>
<td>24.0%</td>
<td>12.0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Citizenship &amp; Voting</td>
<td>17.8%</td>
<td>12.0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Housing &amp; Settlement</td>
<td>17.8%</td>
<td>12.0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Social &amp; Family</td>
<td>25.7%</td>
<td>23.6%</td>
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</tbody>
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#### PR 1994

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<tr>
<th>Issue Dimension</th>
<th>MF 1994</th>
<th>PR 1994</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Asylum</td>
<td>6.0%</td>
<td>8.1%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Asylum procedures</td>
<td>4.0%</td>
<td>8.1%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Labor</td>
<td>12.3%</td>
<td>8.1%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Immigration general</td>
<td>21.9%</td>
<td>67.2%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>International Migration</td>
<td>21.9%</td>
<td>67.2%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Crime &amp; Border Control</td>
<td>16.4%</td>
<td>67.2%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Science</td>
<td>17.8%</td>
<td>16.9%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Education</td>
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<td>16.9%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
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<td>16.9%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Citizenship &amp; Voting</td>
<td>17.8%</td>
<td>16.9%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Housing &amp; Settlement</td>
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<td>16.9%</td>
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<tr>
<td>Social &amp; Family</td>
<td>17.8%</td>
<td>16.9%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Crime &amp; Border Control</td>
<td>17.8%</td>
<td>16.9%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Diversity</td>
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<td>7.7%</td>
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#### PR 1999

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<th>PR 1999</th>
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<tbody>
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<tr>
<td>Asylum procedures</td>
<td>5.6%</td>
<td>22.1%</td>
</tr>
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<td>Labor</td>
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<tr>
<td>International Migration</td>
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<td>14.7%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Crime &amp; Border Control</td>
<td>42.1%</td>
<td>14.7%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Science</td>
<td>15.7%</td>
<td>14.7%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Education</td>
<td>15.7%</td>
<td>14.7%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Integration general</td>
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<td>14.7%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Citizenship &amp; Voting</td>
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<td>14.7%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Housing &amp; Settlement</td>
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<tr>
<td>Social &amp; Family</td>
<td>15.7%</td>
<td>14.7%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Crime &amp; Border Control</td>
<td>15.7%</td>
<td>14.7%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Diversity</td>
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<td>31.3%</td>
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</tbody>
</table>
Note: Results refer to average of individual party salience of each subtopic in relation to each party’s relevant wordshare within an election. MF (manifestos), PR (press releases). For absolute numbers, see Fig. 11
Balance vs. narrowness of politicization. As Fig. 10 demonstrates at first sight, issue-dimensions are much more balanced among manifestos than among press releases. In four out of six elections there is one issue-dimension within daily campaign communication that exceeds the other three dimensions by far. Conversely, the balance between issue-dimensions distributed by way of party manifestos is fairly equal, with no election showing a somewhat comparable prevalence of any issue-dimension. This impression of a more balanced discourse on the programmatic channel in contrast to a more narrowed selection of issue-dimensions in daily campaign communication also confirms when looking at the circulation of concrete subtopics. Again we can discover a far more narrowed picture among press releases that stands in contrast to the more diverse/balanced distribution of subtopics within the programmatic discourse. This remarkable divergence can not only be regarded as a first piece of evidence for the significant role of the campaign channel in structuring the nature of party politicization. It also forces us to discuss the question of subtopics separately for each campaign channel. Finally, an important finding is the increasing variety subtopics addressed on both campaign channels, the longer immigration/integration/diversity have established as issues of electoral competition – thus especially in the post-millenial period discourse has become more differentiated (a pattern that, of course, is more obvious within manifestos than within press releases).

Most dominant subtopics of electoral competition. Above all, if we accept the different nature of issue-emphasis between the two campaign channels in question, we firstly have to take a closer look at the programmatic dimension of campaign communication:

- Beginning with manifesto communication, the salience of subtopics turns out to be quite balanced in most elections: Firstly, a greater number of subtopics is addressed to a considerable amout and secondly, no single subtopic is definitely more important than others (1990 and 1994 might be slight exceptions to this rule). This is an indication that the lack of centripetal influences causes manifesto-communication to be much more heterogeneous, consequently, the distribution of subtopics addressed by political parties is roughly equal. Of course, even programmatically some subtopics actually exceed others in importance\(^\text{83}\).

Firstly, the high amount of abstract references to societal models without direct links to concrete policy suggestions is a characteristic pattern of programmatic communication. These general claims for societal configurations and majority/minority-relations (such as appeals to multiculturalism and demands for diversity or minority rights on the one as well as pleas for cultural hegemony and assimilation on the other hand) are vital patterns of the programmatic debate. General references to immigration, asylum or integration rank among the most salient subtopics in party manifestos as well, substantiating the picture of a more generalistic discourse within manifestos. Thus, programmatic communication includes more elements that do not point to any specific policy or measure but rather consist of general remarks on the questions of immigration, asylum, immigrant integration or ethnic diversity. These remarks essentially contribute to the development of ideological frames of interpretation, which is the reason for their special appeal to programmatic communication.

Furthermore, there are also some subtopics that are linked to other policy areas. Comparing these policy specific links, one field in particular shows higher salience than any other, i.e. the question of immigrant labor. Labor aspects of immigration and migrant integration rank among the three most important subtopics in five out of six elections. The labor-debate circles around the pre-eminent questions of labor-market access for non-nationals, the definition of labor contingents for immigrants and the fight against clandestine employment. Another example for a policy-dimension that is continuously linked to programmatic competition are references to education as an as aspect of integrating ethnic minorities. It is a permanent but low-salient aspect of programmatic communication already throughout the 1990ies but increases in importance with the turn of the millenium. It most prominently includes schooling policies, such as facilitations for immigrant pupils, organization of multicultural classes, early interventions regarding learning capacities of children with immigrant background etc. Increasingly, it also refers to adult education by stressing the need for language programs, cultural and administrative courses and the like.

Other issue-links only seem to develop over time, which is especially true for the policy area of crime & border control. With the sole exception of the election in 2002, the salience of crime and border control related to immigration, migrant integration and

or even education (2002, 2006) and religion (2008). But generally there are two or more subtopics that lead the salience-picture among manifestos. As the figures demonstrate, from a time-series perspective the subtopics of labor, societal model as well as crime & border control are the most continuous aspects among the high-salience-subtopics.
ethnic minorities continuously increases from only 2% in 1990 to almost 15% in 1999 and remains a vital subtopic of programmatic communication from then on. This gives evidence for an increasingly stronger police and security perspective in the debate (Gächter 2008: 16). A further aspect that grows in importance over time is the aspect of religion. Though there are actually no references to religious aspects during the early 1990ies, since 1999 religion has grown into a permanent aspect of the programmatic debate and even the most salient aspect in 2008. This development – at least within a programmatic discourse – thus indicates the growing relevance of religion for the discourse on immigration, migrant integration and ethnic diversity in the post-9/11-era, as it has been remarked already in other cases (cf. Bonifacio/Angeles 2010; Mudde 2012). In addition, the aspect of social & family increases from very low importance until the 2002-election to medium salience in 2006 and 2008, which is due to the debate about social security access for immigrants as well as the importance of family reunification. Finally, when we compare election by election, a number of subtopics appear to fluctuate in salience, e.g. the reference to international migration and mobility, but also xenophobia (appearing in 1994, 2002 and 2008 but being unimportant in other elections). Last but not least there are several continuously low levelled subtopics like housing/settlement, gender relations, science or foreign relations.

In contrast to these programmatic patterns, the distribution of suptopics on the daily basis of parties’ press releases shows a more narrow picture. In each election (except of 2008) we do have there is either one or at maximum of two subtopics that dominate daily competition at the cost of all other subtopics. What is interesting, though, is the fact that the most dominating subtopics vary from election to election:

In 1990 general references to immigration as well as the question of crime & border control dominate an electoral debate that takes place under the circumstances of the recently collapsed Iron Curtain and increasing migratory influx to Austria. Securing the country’s eastern borders, introducing visa requirements for Polish and Romanian immigrants and battling illegal immigration and illicit work become the most salient subtopics during the hot election campaign. In 1994 social & family-aspects are by far the most salient element of the debate (which, as we well see later on, is merely due to the Greens’ heavy emphasis on the question in the light of restricted residence regimes and the “Austria first” petition launched by the FPÖ – catalyzing the split off of the “Liberal Forum”). In 1999 again immigrant crime & border control and even more importantly the
subtopic of xenophobia once again clearly outdo the other subtopics, due to an increased debate between SPÖ, ÖVP and FPÖ over the status of Austrian border control and illegal immigration to Austria as well as a common appeal by all parties against a number of xenophobic statements by FPÖ-members during the election campaign. The hot election campaign period in 2002 is characterized by the most outstanding dominance of asylum aspects – more concrete of asylum procedures – throughout the whole examination period. This is primarily the result of a heated debate about the changing responsibilities in Austrian refugee assistance (installment of the private company “European Homecare” and weakening of the role played by Austrian NGOs) which was initiated after the ÖVP took over the Department of Interior. Similarly, in 2006 there again is one dominant subtopic that attracts the attention of all competing parties likewise during the hot period of the election campaign, i.e. the question of illegal immigrant labor – a debate that emerged after the revelation of a clandestine care worker in the family of then chancellor Wolfgang Schüssel. Finally, the election campaign of 2008 for the first time shows a more balanced politicization of different subtopics among press releases. While crime & border control as well as general references to asylum are slightly more important than other subtopics, they do not dominate the debate as heavily as has been the case in previous elections.

In sum, there is a fluctuating pattern across elections with regard to the most dominant subtopics on the daily basis of electoral competition, although some subtopics (crime & border control, asylum procedures, xenophobia and labor) appear more regularly than others. Thus compared to programmatic communication, the more narrow picture of issue-emphasis in daily campaign communication is striking. This pattern is supplemented by another contrast between programmatic and daily campaign communication, since there seem to be significant differences in the share of generalistic and policy specific subtopics.

*Generalistic vs. policy-orientated discourse.* The importance of generalistic issue-categories, thus shows to be a distinct factor that separates programmatic from daily campaign communication in press releases (see Tab. 14).
Tab. 14: Mean shares of generalistic / policy-specific subtopics, 1990-2008 (in %)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Generalistic MF</th>
<th>Policy-Specific MF</th>
<th>Generalistic PR</th>
<th>Policy-Specific PR</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1990</td>
<td>44.8</td>
<td>55.2</td>
<td>35.7</td>
<td>64.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1994</td>
<td>49.4</td>
<td>50.6</td>
<td>13.5</td>
<td>86.5</td>
</tr>
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<td>1999</td>
<td>28.2</td>
<td>71.8</td>
<td>17.2</td>
<td>82.8</td>
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<td>2002</td>
<td>39.5</td>
<td>60.5</td>
<td>24.4</td>
<td>75.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2006</td>
<td>34.3</td>
<td>65.7</td>
<td>21.2</td>
<td>78.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2008</td>
<td>25.1</td>
<td>74.9</td>
<td>30.1</td>
<td>69.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Avg.</td>
<td>36.9</td>
<td>61.5</td>
<td>23.7</td>
<td>75.6</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: Generalistic subtopics refer to the four codes: asylum general, immigration general, integration general, societal model. Policy-specific subtopics refer to remaining set of codes. T-tests for equality of means between manifestos (MF) and press releases (PR): T=+/−2.582**, df=10, * p ≤ 0.05, ** p ≤ 0.01, two-tailed test.

Compared to programmatic communication the salience of generalistic references to asylum, immigration, integration or societal models turns out to be significantly lower among press releases. Taken together, generalistic suptopics are more salient in every election except for 2008 (on avg. they reach 36.9% within manifestos as compared to only 23.7% within press releases).\(^{84}\) This is a result of the very nature and purpose of election manifestos. With regard to programmatic communication these generalistic references constitute a vital pillar in order to generate coherent narrations about an issue. As a consequence, general references to asylum, societal models, integration and immigration rank among the most salient subtopics. Manifestos thus contribute much stronger to the emergence of overarching storylines that constitute an interpretative framwork for the specific aspects of the daily debate. Daily campaign communication such as in press releases lacks both, time and space, necessary for the evolution of such storylines and consequently is referring to generalistic remarks less intensively. As a consequence, the higher importance of concrete subtopics (especially crime&border control, xenophobia but also education, science or social&family) demonstrates the different appeal of daily campaign communication of political parties. Unlike the programmatic appeal it visibly puts ideology and policy goals in concrete terms by articulating more specific suggestions of political action. Furthermore, it operates much stronger on the basis of statistics, exemplary individual cases, references to actual legislative conditions as well as direct responses to other statements from within the debate. Due to this forum character of press releases, a more repetitive but at the same time more practical debate evolves, while generalistic appeals are often restricted to short

\(^{84}\) In fact only in four out of twentyfour individual party cases one of these generalistic subtopics is more salient on the daily campaign basis than in programmatic campaign communication.
statements. Hence, the results for subtopics found with regard to programmatic campaign communication can only in parts be confirmed with regard to the daily dimension of press releases.

In sum, there are distinctive evidences for the need to distinguish particular dimensions of campaign communication for an analysis of electoral competition. Different communicative objectives and their specific channels lead to drastically different forms of party discourse and thus have to be carefully weighed against each other. On the daily basis, parties are much more limited in their issue-selection, yet they are also engaging into more policy-specific politicization than they do in programmatic communication. These patterns will be linked to our explanatory framework more extensively in chapter 7.4. However, they will further oblige us to discuss campaign channels separately. This is especially important when moving on to the individual party level and the questions, whether certain parties are more responsible for incongruence of politicization than others and wether some parties are more dominant than others with regard to specific subtopics? These are the driving questions of the following section.

7.2.2. Pushing their agendas: Individual party emphasis of issue-dimensions and subtopics

How do political parties differ in their electoral approach regarding immigration/integration/diversity? This fundamental question is of vital importance if we want to avoid misinterpretations by simply relying on cross-party tendencies. Thus the following section will evaluate whether there is any variance in the politicization patterns of Austrian parties. Is individual party’s politicization characterized by a focus on specific issue-dimensions and subtopics or by a heterogeneous pattern? Are there clear party-subtopic links, i.e. do individual parties politicize some issue-dimensions/subtopics more than others? Do we find clusters of parties that resemble each other?

Parties’ emphasis of issue-dimensions. In order to shed light on these questions Tab. 15 starts with a comparison of our four overarching issue-dimensions, as addressed by Austrian parties. Already with regard to these general issue-dimensions of asylum, immigration, integration and diversity, first tendencies come to light:
To begin with, there is a first obvious pattern among right wing populist parties, in that for both FPÖ and BZÖ questions of immigration represent the most prominent issue-dimension (at least in five out of six elections). Other issue-dimensions gain equal importance only selectively, like diversity in the FPÖ-manifestos of 1994 and 2008, or asylum during the post-millennial elections (among FPÖ-press releases in 2002/2008, among BZÖ-press releases in 2006). The ÖVP puts a similar focus on the immigration-dimension on both campaign channels. However, the party complements this focus with a repeated emphasis of the asylum-dimension, especially in daily campaign communication, whereas there is only sporadic consideration of the dimension of integration and diversity. A similar emphasis of the immigration-dimension can be found also with regard to the SPÖ, which emphasizes immigration especially during the 1990ies (on both campaign channels). Since 2002, however, this accentuation is intermingled with a greater emphasis on the integration-dimension, whereas with regard to asylum the SPÖ

Tab. 15: Shares of issue-dimensions per election – individual party scores, 1990-2008 (in%)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>SPO</th>
<th>OVP</th>
<th>FPÖ</th>
<th>Greens</th>
<th>LIF</th>
<th>BZÖ</th>
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<tr>
<td></td>
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<td>MF</td>
<td>PA</td>
<td>MF</td>
<td>PA</td>
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<td>0.9</td>
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<td>Avg.</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Asylum</td>
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<td>16.6</td>
<td>27.9</td>
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<td>45.0</td>
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<td>Diversity</td>
<td>7.8</td>
<td>15.1</td>
<td>16.6</td>
<td>15.5</td>
<td>19.5</td>
<td>12.8</td>
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</table>

Note: Results refer to individual party salience of each dimension in relation to a parties relevant wordshare. Most salient issue-dimension for each party is accentuated. For complete data including absolute numbers, see Fig. 1. MF denotes to manifestos, PR to press releases.
by and large remains the most restrained party of all. Finally, the Greens differ the strongest from the remaining party spectrum, since they repeatedly give prominence to the asylum-dimension (on average more than any other party). Beyond that, they also show recurrent appeals to integration (especially in programmatic communication) as well as diversity (most clearly in daily campaign communication). Together with a lower emphasis on immigration as compared to other parties, the Greens’ issue-selection is the most deviant in the whole party spectrum. The same holds true for the LIF which in his few appearances also puts most emphasis on diversity and asylum.

**Most important subtopics for each party.** The general trends of issue-dimensions, however, need to be evaluated more concretely by considering politicization-patterns of specific subtopics. Advancing to the dominant subtopics (> 10% of a party’s relevant politicization), Tab. 16 examines the average share of each suptopic in relation to the relevant wordshare for each party. In addition, Fig. 11 complements the previous table with similar findings for each general election since 1990. As such, by combining both “average patterns” and “temporal developments” the following pages aim to demonstrate the parties’ topical choices and whether these choices change over time.

**Tab. 16:** Mean shares of subtopics per election – individual party scores, 1990-2008 (in %)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Subtopic</th>
<th>SPÖ MF</th>
<th>PR</th>
<th>OVP MF</th>
<th>PR</th>
<th>FPÖ MF</th>
<th>PR</th>
<th>Greens MF</th>
<th>PR</th>
<th>LIF MF</th>
<th>PR</th>
<th>BZO MF</th>
<th>PR</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Asylum general</td>
<td>15.9</td>
<td>4.4</td>
<td>9.9</td>
<td>13.0</td>
<td>10.1</td>
<td>10.3</td>
<td>8.3</td>
<td>3.6</td>
<td>6.0</td>
<td>0.0</td>
<td>1.2</td>
<td>5.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Asylum procedures</td>
<td>3.0</td>
<td>12.0</td>
<td>5.6</td>
<td>12.4</td>
<td>3.4</td>
<td>8.5</td>
<td>17.6</td>
<td>19.9</td>
<td>30.7</td>
<td>9.8</td>
<td>3.7</td>
<td>1.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Citizenship&amp;Voting</td>
<td>2.0</td>
<td>0.8</td>
<td>2.1</td>
<td>3.1</td>
<td>2.9</td>
<td>3.0</td>
<td>7.3</td>
<td>1.1</td>
<td>0.0</td>
<td>0.0</td>
<td>0.0</td>
<td>7.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Crime&amp;Border Control</td>
<td>6.8</td>
<td>18.1</td>
<td>20.2</td>
<td>16.7</td>
<td>11.2</td>
<td>24.4</td>
<td>3.3</td>
<td>4.7</td>
<td>0.0</td>
<td>9.2</td>
<td>19.6</td>
<td>23.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Education</td>
<td>8.5</td>
<td>6.7</td>
<td>4.5</td>
<td>4.4</td>
<td>7.3</td>
<td>7.2</td>
<td>7.3</td>
<td>4.9</td>
<td>9.1</td>
<td>0.9</td>
<td>7.9</td>
<td>4.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Foreign politics</td>
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<td>0.4</td>
<td>0.4</td>
<td>0.0</td>
<td>0.9</td>
<td>0.0</td>
<td>0.0</td>
<td>0.0</td>
<td>5.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gender relations</td>
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<td>3.9</td>
<td>1.8</td>
<td>1.1</td>
<td>0.7</td>
<td>0.0</td>
<td>0.2</td>
<td>2.2</td>
<td>0.0</td>
<td>0.0</td>
<td>0.0</td>
<td>0.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Housing&amp;Settlement</td>
<td>0.3</td>
<td>0.3</td>
<td>0.7</td>
<td>0.2</td>
<td>0.0</td>
<td>0.1</td>
<td>0.4</td>
<td>0.0</td>
<td>0.0</td>
<td>0.0</td>
<td>0.0</td>
<td>0.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Immigration general</td>
<td>13.7</td>
<td>7.8</td>
<td>7.5</td>
<td>10.5</td>
<td>11.2</td>
<td>15.4</td>
<td>12.0</td>
<td>5.9</td>
<td>3.8</td>
<td>6.6</td>
<td>9.4</td>
<td>18.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Integration general</td>
<td>11.0</td>
<td>1.7</td>
<td>8.6</td>
<td>3.6</td>
<td>1.4</td>
<td>1.0</td>
<td>4.5</td>
<td>1.7</td>
<td>6.0</td>
<td>1.0</td>
<td>11.4</td>
<td>1.5</td>
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<tr>
<td>International</td>
<td>3.4</td>
<td>1.8</td>
<td>2.5</td>
<td>0.3</td>
<td>0.8</td>
<td>0.0</td>
<td>3.3</td>
<td>0.0</td>
<td>0.0</td>
<td>0.0</td>
<td>4.4</td>
<td>0.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Migration</td>
<td>18.8</td>
<td>18.6</td>
<td>13.7</td>
<td>10.1</td>
<td>24.2</td>
<td>14.3</td>
<td>7.7</td>
<td>5.8</td>
<td>0.0</td>
<td>7.5</td>
<td>14.0</td>
<td>18.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Labor</td>
<td>0.0</td>
<td>0.1</td>
<td>3.4</td>
<td>0.5</td>
<td>4.1</td>
<td>6.8</td>
<td>0.0</td>
<td>0.0</td>
<td>25.6</td>
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<td>14.3</td>
<td>6.2</td>
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<tr>
<td>Science</td>
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<td>5.2</td>
<td>3.2</td>
<td>6.5</td>
<td>0.7</td>
<td>1.1</td>
<td>0.1</td>
<td>3.8</td>
<td>0.0</td>
<td>17.4</td>
<td>0.2</td>
<td>3.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Social&amp;Family</td>
<td>2.6</td>
<td>2.0</td>
<td>2.3</td>
<td>1.4</td>
<td>5.1</td>
<td>2.2</td>
<td>1.9</td>
<td>14.4</td>
<td>0.0</td>
<td>0.0</td>
<td>0.4</td>
<td>2.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Societal Model</td>
<td>6.1</td>
<td>2.8</td>
<td>11.3</td>
<td>5.0</td>
<td>10.3</td>
<td>4.9</td>
<td>19.1</td>
<td>8.9</td>
<td>9.8</td>
<td>0.8</td>
<td>8.4</td>
<td>5.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Xenophobia</td>
<td>1.7</td>
<td>12.2</td>
<td>2.0</td>
<td>9.9</td>
<td>6.1</td>
<td>0.4</td>
<td>6.9</td>
<td>22.3</td>
<td>9.0</td>
<td>46.8</td>
<td>0.0</td>
<td>0.8</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Note:** Results are based on the means of individual party-shares between 1990 and 2008. Subtopics with mean-values > 10 are accentuated. For complete absolute numbers, see Fig. 11.
Fig. 11: Shares of subtopics per election – individual party scores, 1990-2008 (in %)
Note: For each election and party the absolute number of relevant wordshare (n) addressing immigration/integration/diversity is indicated in the legends. Correlation for each election was calculated upon each party’s word-count weighted by the average word share of all competing parties per election, * p ≤ 0.05, ** p ≤ 0.01, two-tailed test.
Mainstream parties: Starting with the SPÖ, it is hardly surprising that the focus on labor-aspects of immigration/integration/diversity is the most important subtopic both in SPÖ-manifestos (19% on avg.) as well as amongst SPÖ press releases (19% on avg.). Other subtopics vary in importance between the campaign channels: For example the references to immigration in general are much more salient among SPÖ-manifestos (14% on avg., however mostly during the 1990ies) than among the party’s press releases (8% on avg.). Likewise the references to integration in general are of greater importance in programmatic communication (averaging 11% in SPÖ-manifestos and being salient already in 1994 and 2002 but increasing in relevance since 2006) whereas they only reach an average of 2% in the daily campaign communication. Conversely, questions of crime & border control are of explicit importance for the SPÖ’s daily campaign basis (18% on avg.), whereas they are of a rather selective relevance in the party’s programmatic appeals (7% on avg.). The same holds true for the subtopic of xenophobia which is a permanent aspect of considerable salience among SPÖ press releases (12% on avg.) while it is rather irrelevant with regard to the party’s programmatic appeal. When focusing on the asylum-subtopics, the most obvious distinction of the party’s different approach between the two dimensions of campaign communication comes to light: While among manifestos the references to asylum in general are a much more vital pattern (16% on avg. vs. 4% among press releases), on the daily basis of campaigning rather the references to asylum procedures are more dominating (12% on avg. compared to only 3% in SPÖ-manifestos).

What is interesting though is the SPÖ’s deemphasis of asylum in both campaign channels after the turn of the millennium. Both the general asylum references among manifestos as well as the references to asylum procedures among press releases drop in importance after 1999 (manifesto) and 2002 (press releases) respectively. Thus, the SPÖ shows a very heterogeneous emphasis on subtopics. Besides a permanent focus on labor, none of the subtopics addressed by the SPÖ remarkably exceeds other subtopics, instead they vary in importance between campaign channels and elections.

As for the ÖVP, crime&border-control turns out to be the by far most important subtopic, on average it is the most salient aspect among manifestos (20% on avg.) as well as among press releases (17% on avg.). With this dominant emphasis the ÖVP even surpasses the SPÖ in this regard and approximates the scores of right wing populists. Another important subtopic in both campaign channels is the aspect of immigrant labor, although its relevance is slightly lower as compared to SPÖ, FPÖ or BZÖ (14% on avg. of the ÖVP’s programmatic appeals and 10% of its daily campaign appeals). Thirdly, references
to *asylum in general* also rank among the subtopics of greater importance for the ÖVP in both campaign channels (10% on avg. within manifestos and even 13% within press releases, with changing emphasis from election to election). Yet there are some subtopics that are emphasized more strongly on one campaign channel than on the other, like references to *societal models* (11% on avg.) in the programmatic appeals as well as *asylum procedures* (on avg. 12%), *immigration general* (on avg. 11%) and *xenophobia* (on avg. 10%) among relevant press releases. Thus despite some minor differences, in large parts the ÖVP-issue-emphasis resembles that of its mainstream party-counterpart SPÖ (especially regarding the subtopics of labor, crime&border-control and asylum).

*Far right populist parties:* Focusing on the right wing populist parties *FPÖ* and *BZÖ* a number of similar patterns between these parties as well as the mainstream parties come to light. Most importantly and quite similar, both FPÖ and BZÖ put very high emphasis on the subtopics of *labor* and *crime & border control*. While the FPÖ is the actor most dominantly emphasizing the labor-aspect in its campaigns (averaging 24% in its manifestos and 14% among press releases) the BZÖ puts heavy weight on crime&border control, in fact the most among all parties in the spectrum (20% on avg. in its manifestos and even 23% among press releases). Another commonality of both right-wing populist parties is their accentuation of *immigration in general* (FPÖ 11% on avg. in manifestos and 15% within press releases; BZÖ 10% on avg. in manifestos and 18% in press releases) which even exceeds the results of the mainstream parties. Finally both right wing populist parties share a considerable amount of references to *societal models* in their manifestos (FPÖ 10% on avg., BZÖ 8% on avg.). However, there are also some differences between FPÖ and BZÖ, e.g. when it comes to the relevance of asylum-aspects. While for the FPÖ references to *asylum in general* result in an average of about 10% in both campaign channels (although fluctuating from election to election), neither references to asylum in general nor to asylum procedures are of remarkable importance for the BZÖ. On the other hand, the aspect of *religion* is more heavily emphasized by the BZÖ (at least among manifestos with an avg. of 14%) than it is by the FPÖ. Even more diverse are the results with regard to *integration in general* which is of low relevance for the FPÖ but of considerable programmatic relevance for the BZÖ (on avg. 11% in
manifestos). Thus with regard to mainstream parties and right wing populist parties a striking similarity in the patterns of selected subtopics becomes evident.

Liberal and left libertarian parties: This pattern even corroborates when comparing it to the remaining party spectrum, since the strategies of both Greens and Liberals diverge remarkably from the rest of the actors. To start with the Greens, their most prominent subtopic are references to *asylum procedures*, averaging 17% among manifestos and even 20% among the party’s press releases. Together with the LIF the Greens thus are the actor granting most importance to procedural aspects of asylum politics, already in the 1990ies but also during the recent elections. However, the Greens are by far the most active party when it comes to discussing *societal models* on a general basis, with an average of 19% in its programmatic appeals and an average of 9% among its press releases. Together with the LIF they are also the most dominant party to repeatedly draw attention to *xenophobia* (with an average of 7% in its manifestos and 22% among its press releases). The only common emphasis of the Greens in relation to the previously mentioned parties is its appeal to *immigration in general* at least in programmatic communication (12% on avg.). What distinguishes the Greens from other competitors, though, is the remarkable emphasis on *social&family*-aspects in daily campaign communication (15% on avg. within among press releases, though only of considerable importance in 1994 and 1999) – which makes the Greens the only party politicizing this subtopic to a noteworthy degree.

The LIF finally in large parts resembles the patterns of the Greens when it comes to topical emphasis, although its results are based on only two electoral performances. The party’s strong emphasis on *asylum procedures* (30% on avg. in manifestos and 10% among press releases), the relevance it grants to *xenophobia* (9% on avg. in manifestos and 47% among its press releases) as well as its programmatic appeal to *societal models* (10% on avg.) closely links the LIF to the patterns of the Greens. However, what separates the two parties are the LIF’s references to *science* (17% on avg. among press releases) as well as its programmatic references to *religion* (26% on avg. in manifestos).

To complete the picture, there are a number of subtopical aspects of minor importance for all parties. Among these subtopics the *education*-aspect still gains the most importance (at

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85 A result that might in fact be traced back to BZÖ’s interest of continuing its ownership of those integration policies that had been introduced during the early ÖVP-FPÖ-coalition at instigation of the FPÖ, whose ministers after 2005 almost collectively had moved over to the BZÖ (such as front runner Peter Westenthaler, minister of Defense Herbert Scheibner, minister of Social Affairs Ursula Haubner and of course her brother and central figure, Jörg Haider).
least in either one of the campaign channels). *Science-*aspects of immigration/integration/diversity most notably are accentuated by SPÖ, ÖVP and LIF, whereas *citizenship* & *voting* instead gains some relevance in the manifestos of Greens and among BZÖ’s press releases. Despite isolated exceptions in single elections, *gender relations*, *foreign politics* as well as *housing/settlement*-aspects remain of little importance among all parties when reflecting on the whole examination period.

Examined in more detail, the question posed at the beginning of this section reveals the following picture: when asking, whether there is a similar emphasis of subtopics among parties, we can observe that right-wing populist parties (FPÖ/BZÖ) and left-libertarian or liberal niche parties (Greens/LIF) not only differ ideologically (an assumption that will be looked upon more closely in the next chapter) but also vary with regard to their particular emphasis on thematic subtopics. While the emphasis of right wing parties is more orientated towards aspects of labor and crime & border control, left wing parties rather stress subtopics such as asylum procedures, societal models or xenophobia. This distinction is apparently not an exclusive one but rather one of degree. Yet the test for correlation in the diagrams above shows a medium to strong correlation between parties and subtopics throughout the whole examination period (min. .337**; max. .640**). This result pretty much derives from these different issue alignments of parties at the fringes but is also corroborated by the behavior of Austrian mainstream parties. In terms of issue-subtopics their role is quite an intermediary one, but much less balanced as previously expected. Instead the dominant subtopics addressed by the two Austrian mainstream parties resemble the selection of right wing populists (mostly with regard to labor or crime & border control) rather than the subtopics emphasized by left-wing parties. This applies especially to programmatic campaign communication (see Tab. 17) while on the daily campaign basis the picture shifts at the end of the 1990ies (with mainstream parties becoming more equidistant to both fringes and even slightly more consistent with the issue-selection of Greens and LIF). As a result, this leaves us with the obvious tendency of an electoral discourse that is rather focused on a set of issues dominated by right wing populist parties than by left-libertarian and liberal parties.
### Tab. 17: Divergence of subtopics – mainstream vs. niche parties, 1990-2008

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>SPÖ</th>
<th>ÖVP</th>
<th>Greens</th>
<th>LIF</th>
<th>FPÖ</th>
<th>BZÖ</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1990</td>
<td>64.5</td>
<td>54.7</td>
<td>41.0</td>
<td>39.4</td>
<td>51.5</td>
<td>46.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1994</td>
<td>52.8</td>
<td>62.2</td>
<td>67.0</td>
<td>70.5</td>
<td>55.3</td>
<td>80.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1999</td>
<td>82.5</td>
<td>66.1</td>
<td>90.2</td>
<td>76.9</td>
<td>61.3</td>
<td>63.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2002</td>
<td>61.8</td>
<td>60.2</td>
<td>49.6</td>
<td>39.1</td>
<td>41.5</td>
<td>57.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2006</td>
<td>54.5</td>
<td>43.3</td>
<td>43.7</td>
<td>38.9</td>
<td>45.0</td>
<td>51.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2008</td>
<td>82.1</td>
<td>77.1</td>
<td>50.5</td>
<td>61.8</td>
<td>59.6</td>
<td>62.6</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: Calculations show bisected city-block-distance of subtopics between party in column and row (with 0=absolute congruence and 100=absolute divergence). For each mainstream party the most proximal party is accentuated. For complete measures on inter-party distance compare App. 5.

**Issue-divergence (subtopics) of political parties.** Finally, we need to clarify whether Austrian parties differ in their degree of campaign-divergence when considering their choice of subtopics. Hence, we have to find out to which degree parties are able/willing to politicize the same issue-aspects in their daily campaign communication as originally outlined in their programmatic appeals. Do some parties show a greater degree of coherence between manifestos and press releases than others? In order to shed light on this question, Tab. 18 shows the City-Block-Distance of subtopics between manifestos and press releases for every party in every election (with 100 expressing absolute difference and 0 expressing total congruence).

### Tab. 18: Divergence of subtopics between campaign channels – indiv. party scores, 1990-2008

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Party families: liberal/left libertarian</th>
<th>Social democratic</th>
<th>Conservative</th>
<th>Far right populist</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Party:</td>
<td>Greens</td>
<td>LIF</td>
<td>SPÖ</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1990</td>
<td>74.1</td>
<td>49.1</td>
<td>67.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1994</td>
<td>88.2</td>
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<td>47.1</td>
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<tr>
<td>1999</td>
<td>66.4</td>
<td>89.5</td>
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<td>2002</td>
<td>67.6</td>
<td>58.9</td>
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<tr>
<td>2006</td>
<td>55.1</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>2008</td>
<td>56.7</td>
<td>56.8</td>
<td>51.6</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

| Avg. | 68.0 | 57.9 | 53.4 | 55.0 | 53.6 |
| st.-dev. | 12.2 | 0.1  | 16.5 | 7.9  | 7.2  |

Note: One-way-Anova between different ideological families: df1=3, df2=24, F= 4.798**, * p ≤ 0.05, ** p ≤ 0.01, two-tailed test. Significant differences according to LSD-test only between liberal/left-libertarian and remaining party families.

As Tab. 18 demonstrates there is an ambiguous behavior on the party level because the degree of divergence across all parties varies from election to election – with the SPÖ
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(St.-dev. 16.5) and the Greens (St.-dev. 11) being the most fluctuating parties followed by the FPÖ (St.-dev. 9) and the ÖVP (St.-dev. 7.9). With regard to campaign divergence, however, mainstream parties and niche parties do not differ in divergence consistently. On the contrary, campaign divergence is quite common among SPÖ, ÖVP, FPÖ and BZÖ (all of them showing rather similar degrees of divergence). There is only one significant difference from this cluster that appears with regard to liberal/left libertarian parties, who show a continuously higher degree of divergence as compared to their center-right and far right opponents. With a mean divergence of 70 (Greens) and even 79 (LIF) the left-wing niche parties are substantially more divergent than the remaining party spectrum, that is generally is levelled at medium-values of divergence (SPÖ: 58, ÖVP: 53, FPÖ: 54 and BZÖ: 54). These are interesting findings for they are directly opposed to the results obtained on a general salience-level (as discussed in the previous section). Other than the higher divergence of center-right and right parties concerning general issue salience, liberal/left libertarian display a more divergent behavior with regard to subtopics. In other words: While center-right and right wing populist parties show stronger divergence in general emphasis between campaign channels, liberal/left libertarian parties – more than other parties – make a clear distinction between subtopics emphasized in their manifestos and those displayed in their press releases.

7.2.3. Synopsis

What lessons can be drawn from the analysis of different topical emphasis on the part of Austrian parties? First of all, we come to the important conclusion that the very nature of different campaign channels drastically influences the way parties politicize certain subtopics more than others. While programmatic communication in election manifestos offers parties more freedom to highlight a variety of different aspects linked to the questions of immigration/integration/diversity, the situation on the daily basis of election campaigning (here analyzed via parties’ press releases) is remarkably different. On the daily campaign basis different centripetal influences, like public agendas, media agendas or external events drastically limit parties’ possibilities to select subtopics and subsequently force them to jump on the subtopics being of actual relevance. The result is a much more narrowed pattern of competition (with fewer subtopics being more salient than in programmatic communication). This is an important contribution to the understanding of electoral politicization. As the focus on the party level demonstrates,
left-libertarian and liberal parties (Greens and LIF) show significantly higher divergence than conservative (ÖVP) or far-right parties (FPÖ, BZÖ), which in the end explains the higher overall divergence during the 1990ies (with two left-libertarian parties) as compared to the post-millenial elections (with two right wing populist parties).

Taking a closer look at the subtopics that are emphasized the most, we can make out a certain resemblance to the way in which parties are distributed across the spectrum in terms of subtopics. Again a striking similarity between Right wing populist parties (FPÖ, BZÖ), Conservatives (ÖVP) and Social democrats (SPÖ) comes to light, in contrast to an overwhelmingly different choice of subtopics on the part of the left-libertarian and liberal parties (Greens, LIF). While the former rather stress subtopics such as “labor” or “crime & border control” in their campaigns, the latter put more emphasis on “asylum procedures”, “societal models” or “xenophobia”. These findings point to the fact that right wing populist parties seem to be more successful in influencing the topical selection of mainstream parties than left-wing parties.

However, what remains uncertain up to this point is whether the intensified preoccupation with the far right’s concerns also translates into an increasing convergence of party positions or if these subtopics simply serve as further battlegrounds for opposing stances between mainstream parties and right wing populist parties? This question marks the core of the following chapter which aims to unravel issue-positions of Austrian parties concerning the issues of immigration/integration/diversity. Are there any kind of discursive coalitions that share the same type of positioning or is there just no clear pattern at all? Do parties change their issue-positions over time or do they constantly stick to the same stances?

7.3. Contested positions: Policy frames in electoral competition

The previous sections have come up with several distinct patterns of party politicization on immigration/integration/diversity: In terms of issue-salience, an increasing emphasis since the early 1990ies together with a dominance of niche parties on the left (Greens) and right (FPÖ) as well as an increasing involvement of mainstream parties since the mid-1990ies has been identified. In terms of subtopics, a common tendency of right wing populists and mainstream parties in contrast to left-libertarian and liberal parties has been indicated. However, as discussed in Chapter 2, altering the salience of an issue (or
specific subtopics) is only one amongst other options, that parties may apply as part of their electoral issue-management. Of even greater importance, though, are the positions that parties are adopting and which serve as a another crucial instrument in their strategic repertoire. In order to shed light on these patterns the following section focuses on the question of policy frames forwarded by political parties. As indicated in the methodical explanation, the electoral discourse has been coded on the basis of a framework consisting of eleven policy frames. These frames express specific perspectives on immigration/integration/diversity and collect the variety of issue-positions on a medium degree of abstraction. Ten of these frames have been arranged into a bipolar set of either liberal versus either restrictive positions. This operationalization now allows for two steps of analysis regarding parties’ issue-positions: Firstly, it allows for a gradual comparison of the general tendencies within the electoral discourse over time and thus gives an overview about whether and how the debate might have changed in the course of the examination period (6.3.1.). Secondly, it enables to dig deeper and contrast the individual frames that parties have been applying in their electoral politicization, hence offering a possibility to evaluate to what extent these particular choices resemble the patterns of other parties in terms of proximity/distance (6.3.2.).

7.3.1. Liberal or restrictive? Central tendencies of electoral politicization

Tendency of party system level. In order to approach the positional tendencies of Austrian electoral competition we initially reflect patterns on the party system level. The guiding question is to which degree electoral discourse in Austria leans towards an either liberal or restrictive tendency? In order to answer this question the following section discusses competitive patterns by leaving out any consideration of parties’ absolute issue-emphasis but rather focusing on the relevant wordshare (referring to immigration/integration/diversity) only. To delineate the logic of our positional approach, Tab. 19 documents the list of frames together with their relation to an either restrictive or liberal perspective. Furthermore, it highlights the average percent for each frame in both campaign channels.
Calculating the average salience of each frame across all parties and elections, we find a rather balanced relation of restrictive as opposed to liberal frames in both campaign channels. Differences, however, appear with regard to those frames that are emphasized the strongest (> 10% of relevant wordshare). Among restrictive frames, burden and security in both campaign channels score the highest, whereas genuineness is an equally strong frame among press releases. With regard to liberal frames, participation and rights clearly outdo the remaining frames on the programmatic basis, whereas solidarity is the most emphasized frame (together with rights) among press releases.

However, when considering the time frame of the analysis, a temporal shift in terms of policy framing becomes evident, that is clearly reflected by the contrast between a rather narrowed set of frames in the pre-millenial-period and a greater diversity of emphasized frames in the post-millennial period. This indicates an increasing diversification of framing strategies the longer the issues of immigration/integration/diversity have become established within Austrian party competition. Furthermore, these patterns are quite similar on both campaign channels, demonstrating that the nature of the channel is less important in terms of policy framing than with regard to subtopics.

Yet the increasing heterogeneity of frames is not the only shift that characterizes the development over the decades. Also with regard to the direction of policy framing a transformation becomes evident. Tab. 20 describes the average position between Austrian parties for each election (calculating the mean of the liberal/restrictive-scores of all relevant parties at the respective election). Liberal/restrictive-scores have been computed

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Tab. 19: Mean shares of policy frames, 1990-2008 (in %)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Multiculturalism</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Opening</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Participation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rights</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Solidarity</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Benefit</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Burden</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Genuineness</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Guiding culture</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Security</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Administration</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

| Note: Results refer to average wordshare of frames in relation to relevant wordshare of politicization of immigration, migrant integration and ethnic diversity. MF (Manifesto), PR (Press releases). |
by subtracting the salience of restrictive wordshare from the salience of liberal wordshare (both in relation to the relevant wordshare referring to immigration/integration/diversity) – leading to a scale between +100 (absolutely liberal) and -100 (absolutely restrictive). As such, we get a gross overview of the development of electoral politicization since its increase in the early 1990ies.

From this general bipolar perspective the findings indicate a transformation of electoral discourse when comparing the 1990ies and the post-millennial-period. The spectrum of electoral discourse experienced a shift that is in line with the changes in the spectrum of relevant parties: Except for one data point (press releases in 1990) until 2002, on average there is a slight predominance of liberal framing thanks to the presence of two left-wing niche parties that counterbalance the neutral and restrictive stances of the remaining party spectrum. Although this tendency is not very pronounced it continues until 2002, with the remaining four relevant parties holding rather balanced positions on immigration, migrant integration and ethnic diversity. Though it is in line with the transformation of the party spectrum since 2002 the politicization of these issues witnesses a likewise shift. The exit of the liberal LIF together with the presence of two right wing populist parties since 2005 has materialized in a characteristic dominance of restrictive framing. This tendency is even more pronounced than the liberal surplus until 2002, especially in programmatic communication. Comparing the different campaign channels, the patterns by and large resemble one another, with daily campaign communication being of slightly more restrictive nature than programmatic appeals.

On the other hand, polarization patterns actually are quite different between campaign channels: In manifestos polarization is the lowest in elections covering only four relevant parties (1990, 2002) whereas it is higher in elections covering five relevant parties (1994, 1998, 2002, 2006, 2008).
Thus we can observe an increase in polarization from 1990 to 1999, suspended by a drop in 2002, that is followed by another increase until 2008. Among press releases this pattern does not reproduce equally, with the degree of polarization rather fluctuating from one election to the next. Most surprisingly, though, there is an inverse development with respect to the number of parties competing in an election. While polarization is generally lower among press releases than among manifestos, the picture is reversed concerning those elections that cover only four parties (1990, 2002) (with press releases being more polarized than manifestos). Hence, while programmatically an increase of relevant parties goes along with an increase in polarization, this pattern can hardly be substantiated on the daily basis of campaigning. In sum, although the continuous fluctuation of polarization hampers any clearcut interpretation of the general modes of electoral politicization, what remains is the drastic impression of a shifting electoral discourse in terms of a central tendency – with the direction of discourse shifting remarkably from a slightly liberal tendency throughout the 1990ies to a considerably restrictive tendency in both campaign channels after 2002.

**Directions on individual party level.** These party system patterns raise the question of how individual parties contribute to this picture. As our polarization patterns have indicated, there is quite a considerable range of parties’ issue positions with regard to immigration/integration/diversity. For this reason Fig. 12 computes a two-dimensional policy space comparing liberal and restrictive tendencies for each individual party and thus identifying the spatial location of Austrian parties with regard to immigration/integration/diversity. The findings show some expectable patterns at first hand:

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86 These findings confirm also if looking at the absolute numbers of politicization as shown in App. 7.
Fig. 12: Party positions in two-dimensional policy space (liberal/restrictive), 1990-2008

Note: For each party/election the share of liberal (y-axis) and restrictive frames (x-axis) is calculated, excluding indefinite and/or neutral coding units. Shares are calculated in relation to each party’s relevant wordshare per data point (see Fig. 13). Dotted line denotes equilibrium-constant between liberal/restrictive frames. Abbreviated labels for data points indicate party/election: S (SPÖ), V (ÖVP), F (FPÖ), G (Greens), L (LIF), B (BZÖ).

Most evidently Austrian niche parties not only move along the fringes of the liberal-restrictive spectrum but obviously display stable tendencies throughout the whole examination period. Both with regard to programmatic as well as daily campaigning, liberal/left libertarian parties (Greens/LIF) maintain a predominantly liberal stance, whereas right wing populist parties (FPÖ/BZÖ) are continuously located on the restrictive end of the spectrum (only in one case – LIF press releases in 1994 – the campaign strategy at least slightly approaches a more balanced share of liberal/restrictive positions). This unambiguous behavior on the part of Austrian niche parties is hardly surprising, since they are substantially constrained to specific positional tendencies with regard to immigration/integration/diversity that maintain stable over the whole course of the examination period.

On the other hand, the contribution of mainstream parties remains diffuse and shows a more flexible relation of liberal and restrictive frames. As a consequence, mainstream parties are more clearly located at the center of the liberal/restrictive-spectrum. Nonetheless, even mainstream party politicization displays slight tendencies that become object of change: In both campaign channels, the tendency of center-right ÖVP is predominantly restrictive (except for its programmatic stance in the snap elections of
2002). The most restrictive tendencies appear in 2006 with regard to press releases and 2008 with regard to manifestos, which indicates an adaptive process to the increased far right presence since 2005. On the opposite, the center-left SPÖ is characterized by an ambivalent pattern throughout the 1990ies: While in manifestos it oscillates between neutral (1990), slightly liberal (1994) and slightly restrictive tendencies (1999), on the daily campaign basis its tendency is of a permanently restrictive nature. With the turn of the millennium, the SPÖ distinctively shifts its framing towards a pronouncedly liberal stance in both campaign channels although even more prominently in its manifestos. The party arrives at its most liberal stance in the elections of 2002 but retains a liberal tendency also in 2006 and 2008.

Thus in terms of bipolar tendencies, the analysis offers first evidence for differences in mainstream party behavior on immigration/migrant integration/ethnic diversity as well as for position changes in the context of niche party pressure. While the center-right ÖVP gives increasing preference to restrictive frames over the course of the examination period, the center-left SPÖ shows a rather ambiguous behavior throughout the 1990ies, but clearly starts to put more weight on liberal frames in the aftermath of the millennium. These first indications, however, need to be verified on a more complex level of analysis, which is why the following section focuses on the specific frames forwarded by individual parties. As such it helps to answer, whether niche- and mainstream parties only overlap in their liberalness/restrictiveness or if they actually circulate around the same lines of interpretation.

7.3.2. Promoting policies: Individual party frames and inter party frame-proximity

Although quite common for a spatial analysis of competition, the abstraction of party positions to a bipolar axis is a gross simplification and disregards the actual diversity of frames attributed to specific issues. For this reason, a closer look has to be taken at the specific frames applied by Austrian parties in order to confirm the general results. The central questions with regard to party positions are as follows: Which specific positions do parties hold in the context of immigration/integration/diversity? Is there a cleargcut link between individual parties and specific frames? Do these positions change in the course of time? Are there positional alliances using the same frames in their politicization?
Individual party framing of immigration/integration/diversity. The findings for Austrian parties’ framing strategies in the realm of immigration/integration/diversity are presented in two ways: Tab. 21 calculates the average salience of each frame for each Austrian party between 1990 and 2008 in order to give a gross summary of party strategies over the whole examination period. In addition, these averages are complemented by salience-values from election to election, for this temporal dimension gains further information about parties’ shifts or continuities (Fig. 13). The discussion of our findings tries to link the average and temporal dimension in order to give a coherent impression of electoral framing strategies.

### Tab. 21: Mean shares of policy frames – individual party scores, 1990-2008 (in %)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Frame</th>
<th>SPÖ MF</th>
<th>OVP MF</th>
<th>FPÖ MF</th>
<th>Grüne MF</th>
<th>LIF MF</th>
<th>BZÖ MF</th>
<th>SPÖ PR</th>
<th>OVP PR</th>
<th>FPÖ PR</th>
<th>Grüne PR</th>
<th>LIF PR</th>
<th>BZÖ PR</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Multiculturalism</td>
<td>2.7</td>
<td>1.6</td>
<td>2.3</td>
<td>0.7</td>
<td>1.6</td>
<td>0.0</td>
<td>9.0</td>
<td>1.5</td>
<td>15.7</td>
<td>1.8</td>
<td>0.7</td>
<td>0.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Opening</td>
<td>4.6</td>
<td>2.7</td>
<td>3.0</td>
<td>1.5</td>
<td>0.5</td>
<td>0.1</td>
<td>5.5</td>
<td>5.5</td>
<td>0.0</td>
<td>19.8</td>
<td>0.0</td>
<td>0.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Participation</td>
<td>20.6</td>
<td>7.3</td>
<td>8.2</td>
<td>3.8</td>
<td>0.6</td>
<td>0.2</td>
<td>24.1</td>
<td>5.9</td>
<td>25.0</td>
<td>0.0</td>
<td>0.8</td>
<td>0.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rights</td>
<td>15.3</td>
<td>10.1</td>
<td>9.3</td>
<td>2.9</td>
<td>3.7</td>
<td>3.0</td>
<td>37.6</td>
<td>39.2</td>
<td>39.8</td>
<td>15.2</td>
<td>0.7</td>
<td>1.1</td>
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<tr>
<td>Solidarity</td>
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<td>6.8</td>
<td>13.9</td>
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<td>0.6</td>
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<td>43.4</td>
<td>19.5</td>
<td>40.7</td>
<td>0.6</td>
<td>0.0</td>
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<tr>
<td>Burden</td>
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<td>14.0</td>
<td>33.6</td>
<td>24.5</td>
<td>0.0</td>
<td>0.9</td>
<td>0.0</td>
<td>0.0</td>
<td>16.2</td>
<td>19.4</td>
</tr>
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<td>Hierarchy</td>
<td>5.6</td>
<td>8.8</td>
<td>8.6</td>
<td>10.7</td>
<td>14.9</td>
<td>8.4</td>
<td>0.6</td>
<td>1.1</td>
<td>0.0</td>
<td>3.1</td>
<td>13.7</td>
<td>20.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Guiding culture</td>
<td>1.7</td>
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<td>9.2</td>
<td>18.1</td>
<td>11.0</td>
<td>0.0</td>
<td>0.0</td>
<td>0.0</td>
<td>0.0</td>
<td>34.3</td>
<td>13.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Genuineness</td>
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<td>6.5</td>
<td>14.5</td>
<td>15.2</td>
<td>25.3</td>
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<td>0.2</td>
<td>0.0</td>
<td>4.4</td>
<td>8.4</td>
<td>18.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Security</td>
<td>5.2</td>
<td>14.6</td>
<td>24.9</td>
<td>14.3</td>
<td>9.8</td>
<td>24.0</td>
<td>2.1</td>
<td>0.0</td>
<td>0.0</td>
<td>3.4</td>
<td>23.6</td>
<td>22.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Administration</td>
<td>8.6</td>
<td>4.2</td>
<td>8.1</td>
<td>6.5</td>
<td>1.4</td>
<td>1.7</td>
<td>3.4</td>
<td>0.6</td>
<td>0.0</td>
<td>3.2</td>
<td>1.0</td>
<td>0.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>indefinite</td>
<td>0.0</td>
<td>3.9</td>
<td>0.0</td>
<td>7.9</td>
<td>0.0</td>
<td>1.3</td>
<td>0.0</td>
<td>1.7</td>
<td>0.0</td>
<td>8.3</td>
<td>0.0</td>
<td>4.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Sum</strong></td>
<td>100</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Note:* Values are based on the means of individual party-shares between 1990 and 2008. MF stands for Manifestos, PR stands for Press releases. Frames with mean-values > 10 are accentuated.
Fig. 13: Shares of policy frames per elections – individual party scores, 1990-2008 (in %)
Note: For each election and party the absolute number of relevant wordshare (n) addressing immigration/integration/diversity is indicated in the legends. Correlation for each election was calculated upon each party’s word-count weighted by the average word share of all competing parties per election, * p ≤ 0.05, ** p ≤ 0.01, two-tailed test.
Beginning again with the behavior of Austrian niche parties, the analysis of issue-positions is all but surprising, in fact we rather find the unambiguous patterns that we would have expected in the first place.

Far right populist parties: As outlined on the previous pages, the share of restrictive frames among right wing populist parties is over 90%: The FPÖ grants 92% of relevant programmatic politicization and 93% of daily politicization to restrictive frames, whereas the BZÖ even surpasses these shares with 96% restrictive frames among manifestos and 94% among relevant press releases. With regard to their dominant frames (> 10% of relevant wordshare), however, far right parties slightly differ. As for the FPÖ the two most dominant frames are burden (averaging 34% among manifestos, 25% among press releases) and genuineness (15% on avg. in manifestos, 25% among press releases). Instead, for the BZÖ guiding culture (34% among manifestos, 14% among press releases) as well as security (MF: 24%, PR: 22%) show the highest salience scores. It goes without saying that both parties also refer to the remaining set of restrictive frames, even more prominently than most of the other parties. From a temporal perspective, though, burden, genuineness and security are the most permanent of these restrictive frames. Other frames only appear occasionally, such as guiding culture (FPÖ in 1994 among manifestos and 2006 among press releases; BZÖ 2006 & 2008 among manifestos and 2008 among press releases) or benefit (2006 both in FPÖ’s and BZÖ’s manifesto).

Liberal & left libertarian parties: The analysis of respective data for left-libertarian and liberal parties shows that patterns of issue-positions turn out to be exactly back to front: Looking at the Greens the share of liberal frames is at an average of 94% among manifestos and 96% among relevant press releases, whereas the LIF exclusively addresses liberal frames among manifestos and to 78% among press releases. The frames rights and solidarity are by far the most dominant frames for both the Greens and the LIF, with the former appealing to a rights-frame more than any other frame (MF: 38%, PR: 39%), whereas the LIF primarily does so only in its programmatic appeals (on avg. MF: 40%, PR: 15%). Furthermore, both parties repeatedly emphasize solidarity-framed appeals, although much more on the daily campaign basis (on avg. Greens: 43%; LIF: 41%) than in programmatic communication (on avg. Greens: 18%, LIF: 20%). Other frames carry only sporadic relevance in either one of the campaign channels, such as participation in manifestos (Greens on avg. 24%, LIF 25%) or multiculturalism.
(averaging 16% in the LIF- manifesto in 1999) or opening among press releases (20% on avg. among the LIF’s relevant press releases in 1994).

Heading on to Austrian mainstream parties the analysis of issue-positions reveals a divergent picture in comparison with both niche parties as well as the respective other mainstream party. Focusing on the specific frames addressed by Austrian mainstream parties we find rather distinct patterns. What mainstream parties actually do have in common is that neither of them substantially addresses a multiculturalism-frame – which subsequently can be taken as a strong indicator for the limitations of the discourse spectrum by right wing politicization. But besides this commonality, a lot of differences come to light:

Closer examination of the most important frames (> 10% of its relevant wordshare) on behalf of the SPÖ shows that they slightly vary between campaign channels. In its programmatic communication the party puts most emphasis on participation (21% on avg.), rights (15% on avg.) and solidarity (14% on avg.) as well as burden (16% on avg. but more or less limited to the 1990ies). Thus, while the liberal frames retain or even increase their importance among SPÖ-manifestos after the millennium, restrictive frames decrease significantly after 1999 with the benefit-frame being the sole sample of permanent relevance thereafter. On the daily campaign basis the SPÖ-pattern, however, turns out to be more ambiguous: the solidarity-frame is the only frame that is of continuous importance in SPÖ-manifestos throughout the whole examination period (which is in line with the party’s ideological foundations), whereas other frame’s relevance is attached to particular elections, like participation or rights in the liberal discourse spectrum as well as burden, security, genuineness and benefit in the restrictive spectrum – thus showing a high degree of fluctuation. As a result, it is almost impossible to detach any continuous tendency of individual frames with regard to the daily campaign communication, yet on the whole a slight predominance of liberal frames can still be indicated. What is interesting, though, is the SPÖ’s abandonment of cultural frames such as multiculturalism or guiding culture, a certain discourse that the party quite obviously tries to avoid. This finally marks a drastic difference to its mainstream counterpart.

There is less ambiguity as far as the ÖVP is concerned, given that its tendency towards certain restrictive frames is more obvious than is the case with the SPÖ. Restrictive frames clearly tend to prevail over liberal frames on both campaign channels (on avg. 62% vs. 30% among manifestos and even 63% vs. 23% with regard to press releases). All
restrictive frames achieve importance in excess of 10% of the relevant ÖVP-wordshare on at least one campaign channel, with security (MF: 25%, PR: 14%) and burden (MF: 12%, PR: 14%) showing particularly high ratios, yet other restrictive frames still average relevant importance (genuineness, MF: 7%, PR: 15%; guiding culture, MF: 11%, PR: 9%; benefit, MF: 9%, PR: 11%). In contrast, analysis of liberal frames shows that only solidarity reaches a relative salience higher than 10% (14% on avg. among press releases) while all the other frames rank below the 10%-threshold. Nevertheless, as we have seen above there is a temporal pattern in these findings, since the restrictive tendency of the ÖVP is less prominent during the 1990ies as compared to post-millennium-elections. The most persistent among the restrictive frames are burden and security, whereas the other restrictive frames rather fluctuate between elections. Liberal frames, after all, are only selectively relevant in ÖVP-politicization, although they mostly appear during the 1990ies.

Eventually both mainstream parties share a higher salience of administration-framing than the remaining party spectrum, due to their stronger appeal to neutral statements. This is more or less a direct consequence of them being the main responsible actors of Austrian immigration/integration/diversity-politics and thus of a greater need to express statements that do not directly conflict with their previous policy-activities.

Framing coalitions among Austrian parties. If we summarize these findings regarding parties’ issue-positions we find an even more intensified pattern of what already loomed with regard to subtopics. The dividing line of the Austrian party system in terms of issue-positions on immigration/integration/diversity cuts directly through both of the Austrian mainstream parties – separating a predominantly liberal spectrum (SPÖ, Greens and LIF) from a predominantly restrictive spectrum (ÖVP, FPÖ, BZÖ). While the patterns of the niche parties more or less remain stable with only little slight changes on the respective side of the spectrum (either restrictive or liberal), the behavior of Austrian mainstream parties turns out to be rather in a state of flux. Correspondingly, the formerly ambiguous positioning on the part of the SPÖ shifts towards a tendency of more liberal frames after the millennium, while the already restrictive tendency of the ÖVP even increases in the aftermath of 2002. These findings also translate into different correlation measures that are even higher for frames than for subtopics throughout the examination period (min. .466***; max. .658**). Thus, Greens, LIF and SPÖ mostly overlap in their use of a rights-frame and share out the rest of the liberal frames. Whereas on the other side of the
framing spectrum, we can observe a strong superposition of ÖVP, FPÖ and BZÖ in their use of burden- and security-frames, yet we do face a quite lower degree of commonality with regard to other restrictive frames.

A final option to quantify these interparty frame coalitions is the calculation of distance-measures between the competing parties. Thus, in order to answer the question of increasing proximity between center-right and far-right, Tab. 22 directly compares the divergence of particular frames addressed by individual parties. Using bisected City-Block-Distance the results display the amount of framing-proportions, that differ between two parties – with values ranging between 0 (= no differences, i.e. absolutely congruent framing) and 100 (= absolute difference, i.e. no framing-congruencies whatsoever).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>SPÖ</th>
<th>ÖVP</th>
<th>FPÖ</th>
<th>Greens</th>
<th>LIF</th>
<th>BZÖ</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1990</td>
<td>68.6</td>
<td>66.3</td>
<td>63.0</td>
<td>24.4</td>
<td>35.4</td>
<td>63.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1994</td>
<td>48.9</td>
<td>75.7</td>
<td>52.4</td>
<td>39.0</td>
<td>84.0</td>
<td>71.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1999</td>
<td>78.0</td>
<td>64.9</td>
<td>47.9</td>
<td>39.8</td>
<td>89.9</td>
<td>60.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2002</td>
<td>46.5</td>
<td>67.5</td>
<td>67.5</td>
<td>64.6</td>
<td>85.0</td>
<td>87.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2006</td>
<td>37.2</td>
<td>64.8</td>
<td>48.9</td>
<td>64.6</td>
<td>26.1</td>
<td>87.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2008</td>
<td>67.8</td>
<td>41.7</td>
<td>64.9</td>
<td>43.0</td>
<td>56.9</td>
<td>68.2</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: Results refer to City-block-distance of subtopics between party in column and row (with 0=absolute congruence and 100=absolute divergence) for each election. For each mainstream party the most proximal niche party is accentuated.
The comparison of individual frames partly confirms the general tendencies although there is a distinct deviation between different campaign channels. As Tab. 22 demonstrates, with regard to manifesto-data there is a highly consistent choice of frames displayed by parties at the fringes of the spectrum (such as Greens and LIF highly overlapping in the appeal to rights, solidarity and participation, whereas on the other end FPÖ and BZÖ equally stick to the whole set of restrictive frames). With regard to mainstream parties the manifesto-framing again documents the changing patterns throughout the 1990ies, comparing their proximity to the far-right FPÖ: Greater convergence between SPÖ and FPÖ in 1990 and 1999 (due to their common appeal to a burden-framing) is contrasted by a closer framing between ÖVP and FPÖ in 1994 (sharing a wider set of restrictive frames, such as burden, guiding culture, genuineness as well as benefit). Since the watershed in 1999, however, the distance between SPÖ and FPÖ has continuously increased (with the SPÖ giving more weight to frames like regulation, rights and participation), while the center-right ÖVP has moved its position towards the framing of the far-right parties (emphasizing security, guiding culture, burden and benefit more prominently).

These characteristic changes, however, do not correspond as distinctively on the daily campaign of press releases. Here, both mainstream parties are marked by a rather consistent framing compared to the FPÖ throughout the 1990ies. Yet the center-left SPÖ shows even more proximity to the FPÖ than the center-right ÖVP – a contrast to the findings in programmatic communication. These patterns reverse after the 1999-elections and since then conform more clearly to the manifesto-findings – with the SPÖ shifting to a more distant framing compared to the far-right parties than does the ÖVP. Still, the deviations appear to be much more vague than with regard to manifesto-framing, which can be explained with the specificity of the elections. Press releases, being instruments used for short-term communication and rapid-response strategies, are much more sensitive to short-term developments during a hot election period: Especially certain divergences in the recent elections can be traced to such short-term developments, as it is the case with the campaigns of 2006 and 2008. While the campaign of 2006 was heavily influenced by the revelation of an illegal home care worker recruited by the family of then chancellor Wolfgang Schüssel, the 2008 campaign was overshadowed by the economic crisis and an appeal to economic policies. Tying in with these situational explanations, even the analysis of daily communication via press releases tends to support the assumption of mainstream parties adopting opposed courses on
immigration/integration/diversity in the light of far-right pressure: With a) the center-left turning away from and b) the center-right if not enforcing then at least maintaining a convergent framing in relation to the far-right.

Party consistency between campaign channels. Regarding the positional aspects of party politicization, we are equally confronted with questions of party consistency between different campaign channels. In order to shed light on this aspect, bisected City Block distance measures have been applied once again, in order to identify an individual party’s consistency between programmatic and daily issue positions.

Tab. 23: Divergence of frames between campaign channels – indiv. party scores, 1990-2008

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Party families:</th>
<th>liberal/left libertarian</th>
<th>Social democratic</th>
<th>Conservative</th>
<th>Far right populist</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Party: Greens</td>
<td>30,0</td>
<td>48,9</td>
<td>41,6</td>
<td>24,5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1990</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1994</td>
<td>29,9</td>
<td>35,8</td>
<td>41,7</td>
<td>32,2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1999</td>
<td>70,7</td>
<td>59,4</td>
<td>56,3</td>
<td>50,7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2002</td>
<td>61,5</td>
<td>39,7</td>
<td>45,1</td>
<td>40,1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2006</td>
<td>39,6</td>
<td>45,7</td>
<td>42,7</td>
<td>33,7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2008</td>
<td>35,8</td>
<td>44,5</td>
<td>35,2</td>
<td>17,4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Avg.</td>
<td>44,6</td>
<td>45,7</td>
<td>43,8</td>
<td>25,6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>st.-dev.</td>
<td>15,8</td>
<td>7,5</td>
<td>6,4</td>
<td>8,2</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: Oneway-Anova between different ideological families shows no significant differences.

As Tab. 23 shows, divergence among issue positions is comparatively lower than divergence among subtopics (as shown previously in Tab.18). Thus generally speaking, parties have fewer difficulties to stick to identical frames across different campaign channels as they do with regard to identical subtopics. Comparing different party families, we find differences that in parts resemble the findings of the previous chapter: Considering the average divergence of issue positions between campaign channels, similar patterns among Greens (44,6), Social democrats (45,7) and Conservatives (43,8) become manifest, while it is comparatively lower (though not statistically significant) on behalf of far right parties (FPÖ: 36,9, BZÖ 25,6), i.e. they show a more consistent use of frames between programmatic and daily campaigning. Again, there is no evidence whatsoever for a difference between mainstream and niche parties, whereas ideology at least partially explains distinct behavior. As was already the case in the context of subtopics, we can also discern a greater divergence of frames on behalf of liberal/left libertarian parties than right wing populist parties (which more clearly stick to similar positions among manifestos and press releases). This finding corroborates the conclusion
of the previous chapter, that it might be the very centralized and populist nature of right wing parties in contrast to the heterogenous organization of liberal/left libertarian parties, which causes these differences in frame-homogeneity.

7.3.3. Synopsis

Where do Austrian parties stand on the question of immigration, migrant integration and ethnic diversity? Do they alter their positions over time? And do they join discursive coalitions by approximating framing strategies of other parties? These questions have been at the center of the previous section and the findings are quite substantial:

With regard to niche parties issue-positions follow a static pattern when looking grossly on either liberal or restrictive tendencies. All niche parties almost entirely stick to either restrictive framing (FPÖ, BZÖ) or liberal framing (Greens, LIF), thereby forming the cornerstones of the discursive spectrum. The only variation appears when looking at the individual frames, which alternate in importance from election to election (mostly depending on the type of subtopics addressed by the parties in the respective election. Mainstream parties, on the other hand, show a much more ambiguous behavior, with a) a more balanced ratio between liberal and restrictive frames and b) a greater number of frames applied. This again is in line with the greater number of subtopics addressed by mainstream parties but even more so with their inconsistent behavior over time. In what might be the biggest difference between mainstream and niche parties, both SPÖ and ÖVP alternate their framing from election to election which has two analytical consequences: Firstly it materializes in remarkable shifts on the liberal-restrictive axis (SPÖ moving from balanced to liberal, ÖVP shifting from slightly restrictive to more restrictive), secondly, it leads to different proximities in relation to the populist right wing parties (with the SPÖ moving away from and the ÖVP mostly approximating a FPÖ/BZÖ-framing after the millennium).

Thus what has partly become apparent already with regard to subtopics is even more substantial with regard to issue-positions. While the 1990ies have been characterized by a rather restrictive stance of FPÖ, ÖVP and SPÖ, as opposed to an unilaterally liberal stance on the part of Greens and LIF, the dividing line has been relocated after the millenium: Now we face an even more cohesive circle of restrictive actors (consisting of FPÖ, BZÖ and ÖVP) being set against a less cohesive couple of liberal actors (made up by Greens and SPÖ).
7.4. Conclusion: Immigration, migrant integration and ethnic diversity as a structuring conflict

The descriptive sections of this dissertation have tried to highlight different aspects of parties’ strategies with regard to electoral politicization of immigration, migrant integration and ethnic diversity. Based on the theoretical premises, three dominant strategic options have been isolated in an electoral context that is characterized by the selective competition over policy issues: “Increasing/decreasing salience of an issue in general” (7.1.), “highlighting some aspects of this issue at the cost of others” (7.2.) and “sticking to specific frames of interpretation” (7.3.). On all three dimensions of competition there had been considerable differences both between elections as well as between parties.

Section 7.1. has demonstrated, how the evolution of electoral competition on immigration/integration/diversity is a product of the mid-1980ies, with the Greens being the first party to substantially push these questions onto their programmatic agenda in the election of 1986 followed by the right wing populist FPÖ and the mainstream parties in 1990. From 1990 onwards the issues have remained to be vital aspects of the electoral competition on both programmatic as well as daily campaigning. Until the mid-1990ies Greens dominate politicization on the programmatic dimension whereas among press releases they alternate with the FPÖ in being the most dominant party. Since 2002 and the split of FPÖ/BZÖ the right wing populists, however, have become the by far most active parties, while the Greens have lowered their politicization in both campaign channels. Concerning mainstream parties, the data demonstrates a higher involvement of the ÖVP in programmatic competition as compared to the SPÖ, with salience occasionally even exceeding that niche parties. On the daily campaign basis, however, both mainstream parties shy away from stronger participation in the competition over immigration/integration/diversity (thus showing a low-level salience but under different circumstances, with SPÖ being slightly more active than ÖVP). As a consequence of these results it can be concluded that immigration, migrant integration and ethnic diversity have arrived at the center of the political spectrum during the 1990ies. While for niche parties the issue represents a fertile ground for attacking the established mainstream parties and their traditional campaign issues, the questions of immigration, migrant integration and ethnic diversity become increasingly harder to avoid for mainstream
parties themselves. Still, SPÖ and ÖVP apply different strategies in dealing with this new
dimension of conflict: The SPÖ more clearly tries to limit references to these issues as far
as possible – however, its responsibility for the Department of Interior somewhat urges
the SPÖ to deal with the issue already during the 1990ies, resulting in low level salience
with occasional increases. Conversely, the ÖVP is more actively competing with the
issues, at least programmatically. These patterns slightly change after the millennium and
the formation of a right bloc coalition. Both parties increase their previous emphasis at
least in their programmatic appeals, which – compared to the other parties – leads to
considerable salience by the SPÖ and even higher salience on the part of the ÖVP. On the
daily basis of press releases, however, these programmatic decisions do not materialize in
an equal increase of mainstream party emphasis (only if the situational conditions urge
them to do so, like in the 2006-debate on clandestine care-workers).

These changes in emphasis become even more comprehensible when linking them to the
questions of subtopics (6.2.) politicized by Austrian parties. With regard to the emphasis
of subtopics the comparison of parties reveals an interesting center of electoral debate: A
striking similarity between right wing populist parties (FPÖ, BZÖ), conservatives (ÖVP)
and also social democrats (SPÖ) comes to light in contrast to left-libertarian and liberal
parties (Greens, LIF). While the former put most emphasis on subtopics such as labor or
crime & border control, the latter rather address asylum procedures, societal models or
xenophobia. In a nutshell these findings suggest that right wing populist parties seem to
be more successful in influencing mainstream parties’ choice of subtopics than left-wing
parties. Thus, the general increase of emphasis that different parties put on immigration,
migrant integration and ethnic diversity might not be equated with a unified debate.
Instead, the decision to emphasize them more heavily is linked to the party’s choice of
subtopics and potential opponents. As the distribution of Austrian parties demonstrates,
the conservative ÖVP is most prominently competing on subtopics similar to those of
right wing populist parties while the social democrats are somewhat caught between two
stools (for they emphasize diverse subtopics very selectively and thus overlap with the
ÖVP/FPÖ/BZÖ-subtopics as well as with some of the Greens/LIF-subtopics).

Though we can discern an obvious tendency towards right wing parties on the level of
subtopics, the final – and most important – question is whether mainstream parties
directly oppose far right and far left positions respectively or rather join their framing
strategies? Parties not only alter emphasis of issues and specific subtopics, they also engage in competition over how to interpret these very issues and subtopics. By sticking to specific policy frames, parties try to impose their problem definitions and treatment recommendations on other parties and the electoral discourse as a whole. Considering these framing strategies of Austrian parties the nature of the party spectrum is even more clearcut as with regard to subtopics. As section 7.3. has demonstrated, the dividing line between restrictive and liberal cut across the ideological spectrum but does so with a temporal delay. While niche parties stick to their unilaterally restrictive (FPÖ/BZÖ) or liberal (Greens/LIF) frames and only alter the intensity of competition (with Greens reducing and FPÖ intensifying emphasis after the millennium), mainstream parties even shift their policy stances (with the ÖVP intensifying its previously slight restrictive stance whereas the SPÖ is shifting its balanced appeal of the 1990ies towards a predominantly liberal framing after the millennium). Thus, with regard to their issue-positions, the changing circumstances of party competition appear to have even more visible influence as with regard to any of the other dimensions of politicization (i.e. issue-salience & issue-subtopics). For this reason the final chapter tries to put the pieces of the puzzle together in order to get conclusive answers to our analytical research questions (see chapter 8).

*Immigration/integration/diversity as structuring conflict.* Combining our findings, we are now able to draw a conclusion on the relevance of immigration, migrant integration and ethnic diversity for Austrian party competition. We initially expected the issues to become an increasingly structuring conflict within the Austrian party spectrum. We determined four criteria in order to identify the competitive relevance of immigration, migrant integration and ethnic diversity, that being a) considerable salience of these issues in electoral competition, b) permanence of their emphasis, c) the number and comprehensiveness of relevant parties competing on these issues and d) the “conflictiveness” of the issue-positions between relevant parties.

Accounting all criteria, the discussion of the previous sections has demonstrated, that with regard to all criteria the indicators confirm the overall notion of immigration, migrant integration and ethnic diversity having become part of a dominant political conflict structure: Firstly, the issues have drastically grown in importance from the late 1980ies onwards and thus contrast a period of marginal politicization during the 1970ies and early 1980ies. Secondly, the increases since the 1990ies have not been of a singular character but the issues have rather retained their importance, in fact they witnessed another boost
in salience with the establishment of a second relevant right wing populist party in 2005. Thirdly, “all” relevant parties have been shown to sooner or later politicize the issues over the course of the examination period, i.e. immigration/integration/diversity have become unavoidable elements of electoral competition. And fourthly, the positional patterns of competition have clearly taken on a conflictive form, perfectly in line with the assumptions of Kriesi et al (2006), i.e. with liberal/left libertarian parties occupying the liberal end of the positional spectrum, with right wing populists holding the restrictive end of the spectrum and mainstream parties fluctuating in between but increasingly sticking to centrifugal tendencies (with center-left SPÖ shifting towards a liberal stance, and center-right ÖVP intensifying its restrictive positions). Although the patterns in some respects diverge between programmatic and daily campaign communication, they definitely speak the same language with regard to these four indicators: The issues of immigration, migrant integration and ethnic diversity feature all characteristics necessary to evaluate them as a dominant line of conflict that structures the nature of Austrian party competition at the beginning of the 21st century. Following Kriesi et al (2006), we thus would support the argument that immigration, migrant integration and ethnic diversity have become integrated into a broader “cultural dimension” of political conflict that “has become the primary basis on which new parties or transformed established parties seek to mobilize their electorate” (Kriesi et al 2006: 950). Thus, not only the issues separate ideological opponents but also articulate the tension between established major parties and emerging or transforming niche parties.
VIII. Closing the circle: Drivers of electoral politicization

The description of our research findings so far approached from two directions: It has revealed the contents of politicization by compiling subtopics and policy frames of electoral discourse in Austria. Further on, it has depicted the quantitative dispersion of politicization patterns among Austrian parties in terms of issue emphasis, subtopical emphasis and policy framing. On each of these three dimensions, considerable findings have come to light which demonstrate the conflicting behavior of Austrian parties in terms of electoral competition. These findings thus are substantial contributions to the understanding of party politicization of the topics of immigration, migrant integration and ethnic diversity. In order to close our circle of analysis and get a coherent picture of the dynamics of electoral politicization, we now need to connect these findings with the explanatory framework discussed in Chapters 2 to 4. For this reason the following sections will discuss the previously outlined factors and their explanatory potential for Austrian electoral competition on immigration/integration/diversity.

8.1. Societal inputs to electoral politicization

Among the most commonly alleged reasons for the amount and direction of political debate are socio-structural patterns of immigration, migrant integration and ethnic diversity, constituting the opportunistic context of electoral competition. In chapter 4.1.1. we have been discussing the limitations of this kind of argumentation as well as the problems of aggregating applicable data in order to draw assumptions from these empirical patterns. We thus have been limited to a small number of indicators that document the patterns of immigration and ethnic diversity, i.e. net-immigration record, number of foreign residents as well as applications for asylum. While we have concluded that it would be rather difficult to make a connection between these indicators and general issue-salience, we instead assumed that at least the link between specific issue-dimensions and their empirical basis should be visible in order to talk about any relation between empirical patterns and politicization at all. Hence, the following section aims to compare the salience of specific issue-dimension with the empirical indicators related to these very issue-dimensions – see Fig. 14.
**Fig. 14:** Interaction of socio-structural inputs with salience of issue-dimensions, 1971-2008

**Note:** For each diagram, bars denote the specific socio-structural input whereas graphs denote salience of the respective issue-dimension. Interaction results for 11 elections (1971 to 2008) – based on Pearson’s product-moment correlation:

- Net migration since t-1 with salience immigration
  - Manifestos: $r = .482$
  - Press releases: $r = .869^{**}$

- Asylum requests since t-1 with salience asylum
  - Manifestos: $r = .875^{**}$
  - Press releases: $r = .274$

* $p \leq 0.05$, ** $p \leq 0.01$, two-tailed test

For asylum requests two estimated values (1994: 160,000, 1999: 43,600) have been logged, aiming to take into consideration the group of de facto refugees, that have been escaping to Austria during the 1990ies and have not been covered by official statistics on asylum applications. Following Fassmann/Fenzl (2003) we calculated 13,000 Croatians in 1991 and about 85,000 Bosnians since 1992, seeking refuge from the civil wars in their home countries, as well as about 5000 refugees from Kosovo that were treated as de facto refugees during the Kosovo-wars in early 1999.

**Net migration.** Starting with the first and foremost dimension the specific aspect of immigration is at the heart of what constitutes the policy field of immigration/integration/diversity. However, it has analytically to be separated from other dimensions of this policy field, such as remarks to diversity in general, conceptions of integration of ethnically diverse societies and last but not least questions of refuge and asylum that need to be treated under different auspices. Thus, in order to isolate the part of the political debate that is actually directed to immigration (i.e. the permanent crossing
of borders and the political aim of regulating access to specific territories), chapter 6.2. extracted the different issue-dimensions of the electoral debate but left these findings unrelated to the empirical preconditions outlined in chapter 4.1. Now both of these dimensions will be combined into one integral whole (see Fig. 14), to further elaborate on the previously presumed link between net migration and salience of party politicization on the immigration-dimension (H3a).

In chapter 4.1, we already pointed to the fluctuations of net immigration that were complicating the genesis of precise expectations. We identified three core peaks of immigration, one since the late 1960ies (1969 to 1974), a second since the late 1980ies (1989 to 1993) and a third peak since the turn of the millenium (2000 to 2008). According to this assumption elections within these periods were expected to show the highest salience of the immigration dimension (1971, 1990, 2002, 2006, 2008) throughout the whole examination period.

Comparing the development of the immigration-dimension between both election campaign channels, we can identify several conflicting patterns: As for the first peak of immigration since the late 1960ies there appears to be a low correspondence in terms of politicization. There are minor references in both campaign channels in 1971, a pattern that even decreases during the remaining decade as well as the 1980ies. Despite repeatedly fluctuating patterns of net migration, politicization of immigration-aspects continues to be rather non-existent. Thus, we are faced with only little interaction between empirical indicators and politicization for the first two decades of our examination period. The situation changes drastically by the end of the 1980ies with immigration reaching at its highest level and subsequently retaining a considerably permanent character (1989-1993). These conditions obviously materialize in the first substantial increase of electoral references to immigration by Austrian parties in both campaign channels. As we have seen, especially Austrian niche parties (FPÖ, Greens) place immigration on their agenda but also mainstream parties (SPÖ, ÖVP) are compelled to deal with these issues – not only on a policy level but also within the electoral arena. The elections of 1990 mark a watershed in terms of electoral appeals to immigration, because the importance of this issue-dimension has not declined ever since. On the contrary, immigration has become a permanent pattern of both programmatic as well as daily electoral discourse even though – and this is an important finding – the empirical patterns of net migration have dropped to a minor level after 1993.
However, comparing the patterns of politicization between the two campaign channels, we find rather stronger interaction on basis of daily campaigning as compared to programmatic communication. While the newly sprouted relevance of immigration among manifestos remains stable between 1990 and 2002 and peaks only in 2006 (thus showing no interaction with neither a decrease nor increase in net migration), among press releases it pretty much covaries with net migration (with only one exception in 2002) – thus salience of immigration increases in 1990 and again in 1994, decreases in 2002, reraises in 2006 and diminishes again in 2008.

These findings are serious indicators for the issue-evolution of immigration in Austrian electoral competition and the different consequences for each campaign channel. Once a political issue has been established on the electoral scene, it holds steady, as long as it is suitable for some of the political competitors. This is especially true for parties’ programmatic appeals, which – as has been said – are in tighter control of parties themselves. Therefore it comes as no surprise that issue salience remains at the same level until 2002, even though immigration empirically decreases since the mid-1990ies and starts to increase again from 2002 on. Equally unsurprising is the finding, that programmatic salience even doubles in 2006 and 2008 (especially due to the emergence of a second right wing populist party), whereas net migration begins to decline in 2005. Yet our expectations are contradicted by respective findings that suggest a much stronger correlation between daily campaign communication and empirical patterns of net migration, since the former seems to be highly fluctuating (thus matching empirical developments). Facing this discrepancy between campaign channels, it needs to be verified whether this pattern confirms also with regard to other issue-dimensions. Hence, in order to get more evidence on the kind of interaction between empirical indicators and parties electoral emphasis, another important issue-dimension (asylum) will be taken into consideration.

Asylum. Including a second issue-dimension, reveals the difficulties of relating empirical indicators to politicization on an aggregate level. As outlined in chapter 2, the geopolitical location of Austria has historically made it a first order country for refugees between East and West during the Cold War period. For more than four decades Austria has been a primary shelter for refugees from Eastern and Southeastern Europe. As a consequence, Austrian policies towards the admission and transfer of refugees have become keystones
of Austrian self-perception and international recognition after 1955. Thus, while Austria for a long time has been ambivalent on the notion of being an “immigration country” it had less difficulties to promote itself as a “refugee country” – although this stance was principally based on the idea of keeping the country’s state as a transit for refugees moving to other destinations instead of resettling in Austria. Combining this somewhat positive notion of asylum and the empirical permanence of asylum applications, we suggested a link between the number of asylum requests and the intensity of politicization (H3b). Consequently, we expected an even stronger prominence of the asylum-dimension during the 1970ies and 1980ies as opposed to other forms of immigration. Yet again, this expectation is not met, as can be seen in Fig. 14.

The experiences of being a refugee-shelter enforced by the refugee flows of 1956 and 1968 have in no way materialized in programmatic appeals to asylum throughout the 1970ies and only to low extent among press releases. Only since 1983 the question of asylum has started to gain more relevance either among manifestos (1983) or press releases (1986). But in fact – as is true for the dimension of immigration – substantive politicization of asylum did not start off before 1990. Since then its relevance has fluctuated from election to election but has continuously stayed on a considerable level. Though what separates the issue-dimension of asylum from the immigration-dimension is an inverse role of campaign channels: Programmatic salience is significantly more in line with the number of asylum applications than salience patterns in daily campaign communication. As mentioned above, there is almost no politicization at all until the early 1980ies on both campaign channels taken into consideration (in contrast to the relevance of socio-structural indicators), but at least the increases in programmatic politicization since 1983 are quite in line with rising asylum applications. The growth of the early 1980ies materializes in the first electoral emphasis in 1983, with the successive increases of asylum applications since the late 1980ies also leading to a higher politicization in 1990, both programatically and on the daily basis. Taking into further account the great number of “de facto” refugees especially in the early 1990ies (being excluded of the regular statistics on asylum applications), the high programmatic salience in 1994 perfectly matches our expectations – whereas among press releases in 1994 salience even decreases as compared to the previous election and only slightly grows in 1999, contradicting the socio-structural inputs. After the turn of the millennium the discrepancy of both campaign channels is even further substantiated: While the programmatic patterns
continue to interact considerably with the number of asylum applications (decrease in 2002 and 2008, increase in 2006), patterns of daily campaign communication seem to be rather inverse (consequently not interacting at all). Thus, the results of our analysis of the emphasis of the asylum-dimension in Austrian electoral competition are in contrast to what we found with regard to the immigration-dimension – with manifestos being more related to socio-structural indicators than press releases.

To sum up these findings, the linkage of empirical indicators to political parties’ campaign strategies is an interesting but somewhat misleading task. None of the two campaign channels shows strong interaction with regard to both issue-dimensions taken into consideration. The contradicting findings indicate that these results should be interpreted merely as a selective evidence for the expected interaction between socio-structural inputs and their respective politicization. In addition it needs to be stated that – although being commonly used in empirical research – the very nature of our selected indicators itself limits the range of our examination. Finally, given the small ‘n’ of merely eleven elections, we want to underline the limitations to our statistical coefficients (since they merely support the intuitive interpretation of the co-evolution patterns) as well as to the generalizability of these single country data.

After considering these restrictions, the role of these socio-structural inputs should be depicted in a broader way: Under specific conditions the growth in socio-structural indicators, such as immigration or refugee-inflow, can become a vital stimulus for parties to jump on the bandwagon of politicization. However, the simple reference to socio-structural relevance is hardly sufficient to understand why and how political parties have placed different emphasis on the question of immigration during the last decades: Firstly, because they only selectively interact with the intensity of politicization on the party system level, secondly, because they fail to account for the variance between individual parties’ salience measures. Putting all this together, there is some evidence that increasing societal inputs constitute an opportune framework for parties to politicize these issues on an electoral basis, because they create some kind of urgency and justify parties’ activities. Yet there are still a number of other factors that decide whether these opportunities are taken advantage of. Beyond that, once an issue is established on the political scene it can obviously be detached from empirical preconditions, since parties may either preemptively politicize the issue or emphasize it as a result of the effects of previous experiences.
Public opinion context. Among further factors being important, we have singled out public opinion and voter preferences. However, as indicated above, due to the lack of available data and useful indicators we have not yet made an educated guess about the effects of public opinion on electoral competition. We remained with a rather general assumption that was based on a couple of obvious trends in public opinion: Following the observation of increasing antipathy in the early 1990ies as well as in recent years, that was only interrupted by a slight decline of hat the end of 1990ies, we concluded that the opinion framework would rather favor anti-immigrant stances and parties being prone to restrictive positions. However, when looking at niche parties the attitudinal opportunities are rather fixed, as we already demonstrated with regard to voter motives (with Green-voters as well as FPÖ’s voters explicitly supporting the respective party’s either liberal or restrictive stance). Thus, the general tendencies in public opinion were assumed to be of more importance for mainstream parties, whose restrictive behavior during the early 1990ies somewhat fits to the majority opinion among Austrian population. Considering the increase of restrictive attitudes, the ÖVP’s increasing involvement and emphasis of restrictive stances after the millennium fairly resembles these opinion patterns. On the contrary, the SPÖ’s shift towards more liberal stances after the turn of the century represents a deviation that occurs under conditions of reinvigorated antipathy and restrictiveness towards immigrants among the Austrian public. In sum, it can be said that, while some behavioral patterns are in line with expectations derived by public opinion framework, there are still some contradictory results, that demand for further explantory approaches – which will rather be found by focusing on internal factors of party competition.

8.2. Internal party competition factors

In fact, the core argument of the dissertation underlines the importance of party competition factors for the explanation of politicization of immigration, migrant integration and ethnic diversity by Austrian parties. Only by reflecting the internal opportunities and constraints that come from within the party system, we are able to satisfactorily explain individual party behavior. The following section aims to explicitly discuss these elucidating dimensions.
8.2.1. Cleavage structures and party ideologies

Political cleavages and party ideology are core elements structuring party behavior, whose importance as drivers of party politicization has been verified by scholars on numerous occasions (see chapter 4.1.1). In accordance with this strand of literature, the dissertation assumed that the stronger an issue is linked to a cleavage owned by a party the stronger this issue will be politicized by this party ($H_4$). Applied to the questions of immigration, migrant integration and ethnic diversity in the Austrian context we reckoned that based on the historical evolution of the traditional cleavage structure in the Austrian party system, the issues rather fit into the ideological frameworks of emerging/renewing niche parties than into those of traditional mainstream parties grounded on traditional cleavages. These ideological motives were expected to influence both issue-salience as well as the emphasis of specific subtopics and policy frames. Put into operational terms, with regard to general issue-emphasis we assumed far-right parties (FPÖ, BZÖ) to be the most dominant actors ($H_{4a}$), Greens and Liberals to be the second most dominant actors ($H_{4b}$) and mainstream parties (SPÖ and ÖVP) to be the least active actors ($H_{4c}$) politicizing the issues of immigration/integration/diversity. These assumptions are supplemented with regard to the question of issue positions. Focusing on the general tendencies of party positions on a liberal-restrictive scale, we assume that again far right parties (FPÖ, BZÖ) hold the most restrictive ($H_{5a}$) whereas left-libertarian and liberal parties (Greens, LIF) hold the most liberal positions concerning immigration/integration/diversity ($H_{5b}$). Mainstream parties finally are expected to take more centrist positions, however with tendencies towards liberal positions by center-left parties (SPÖ) ($H_{5c}$) and towards restrictive positions by center-right parties (ÖVP) ($H_{5d}$).

Our empirical findings deliver strong evidence for the importance of party ideology regarding party politicization of immigration/integration/diversity, although they cannot explain individual party behavior exhaustively.

Issue-Salience. In terms of the assumed tendencies of issue-salience our assumptions have been largely confirmed. There is an evident difference in average issue-salience when comparing traditional mainstream parties (SPÖ, ÖVP) with new/renewed niche parties such as FPÖ, BZÖ, Greens and LIF (see Tab. 11). While in daily campaign communication this difference is absolute throughout the whole examination period (with issue-salience of each niche party being more prominent than issue-salience of each
mainstream party in every election), it is not as clear cut with regard to programmatic politicization. Here in four out of six elections at least one mainstream party has more prominent issue-salience than one of the niche parties. Still taken together the expected dominance of niche parties is broadly confirmed.

When it comes to the behavior of individual parties, however, our assumptions based on the ideological perspective can only be partly asserted (see Fig. 9): Firstly, right wing populist parties are far from being the most dominating actors throughout the whole examination period. There is a distinct dominance of Green programmatic politicization until 1994, higher shares of the ÖVP-manifesto in 2002 as well as a changing dominance between Greens and FPÖ among press releases. Secondly, the issue-emphasis of Greens noticeably decreases after the turn of the millennium leading to stronger salience even by the mainstream parties (at least programmatically). Thirdly, the emphasis of mainstream parties in their programmatic appeals occasionally increases since the turn of the millennium and even exceeds or approximates the values of their niche party opponents. Thus, the influence of ideology and issue-ownership on the intensity of electoral politicization is not as single-dimensional as expected. The concept of selective emphasis (as discussed in chapter 2) offers explanatory potential, still it has to be linked to variant strategies of parties electoral campaigns. In order to maintain the relevance of the concept and its connection to issue-ownership, some authors have pointed out that issue-ownership can be object of change (cf. Walgrave/Lefevre/Nuytemans 2009), an assumption that is further underlined by our respective findings. While niche parties tend to “own” the issues of immigration/integration/diversity in the first period after their emergence (until about 1999), traditional mainstream parties adapt to these ownership-appeals over time and try to compete on these very issues themselves. These strategies, however, cannot be explained satisfyingly with reference to cleavage theory and party ideology, since both suggest relatively stable patterns. A change of mainstream parties’ strategies and their rising appeals to achieve their very own ownership over previously less considered issues point to the importance of inter-party competition rather than to the static picture of cleavage based politics – a finding which leads to our assumption in chapter 7.3.

**Issue-positions.** However, with regard to the explanation of parties’ issue-positions cleavage structure and party ideology serve as even more reliable predictors of party behavior. As we have demonstrated in section 6.2.b, niche parties maintain stable
positional tendencies throughout the whole examination period that are perfectly in line with their ideological background. Thus while far right parties are consistently the most restrictive actors, Greens and LIF are by far the most liberal actors in terms of immigration/integration/diversity. As expected, mainstream parties stick to more centrist strategies, subsequently counterbalancing restrictive and liberal positions in their campaigns, even though both SPÖ and ÖVP show at least slight tendencies: Except for one election, the tendency of center-right ÖVP appears to be restrictive on both campaign channels and increases since the watershed of 1999. The most distinct drifts appear in 2006 (press releases) and 2008 (manifesto), indicating an adaptive process to increased far right presence since 2005. On the opposite, the center-left SPÖ is characterized by an ambivalent pattern throughout the 1990ies (with changing tendencies among manifestos and a slightly restrictive dominance among press releases). Yet with the turn of the millennium and against the background of a right-bloc government it distinctively shifts its framing towards a liberal stance in both campaign channels (see Fig. 12).

Hence, ideology gains large explanatory potential for the positional strategies of Austrian parties with regard to immigration/integration/diversity. This is especially true for niche parties and still fairly evident for mainstream parties. Nonetheless, with regard to the latter, ideology itself cannot explain the shifting behavior of SPÖ and ÖVP over the course of the examination period. Thus, especially with regard to mainstream parties further explanatory factors have to be taken into consideration, to understand the variance in their strategic politicization of immigration/integration/diversity.

8.2.2. Party strength, coalition options and cabinet composition

If party behavior is object of change – as we have seen –, how can adaptive behavior of political parties be explained? In sections 4.2.2. and 4.2.3. we discussed internal party competition factors from within the party system to be crucial elements that help to explain parties’ strategic behavior, when designing parties as rational actors. Following Budge/Laver (1986), Strøm (1990) and Müller/Strøm (2000), we distinguish two analytically different motives that function as drivers for parties’ strategies, i.e. striving for votes vs. the prioritization of government participation. Although these tendencies might empirically be rather intermingled, they nonetheless may be analyzed separately, for the reason that they lead to slightly different assumptions about parties’ actual strategies.
*Parties as rational vote-seekers?* Starting with the vote-seeking argument, we assumed that parties would adapt their politicization patterns based on their previous electoral experiences. The first assumption thus argues that from a purely vote-seeking perspective Austrian niche parties are expected to continuously increase their politicization for as long as this promises to increase voteshare on the election day (*H*6). With both Austrian niche parties growing permanently since 1986 (except for the setback of the FPÖ in the 2002-snap elections and the recent losses of the Greens in 2008), we assumed them to continuously stick to the issues of immigration/integration/diversity and even elevate their accentuation over the course of the examination period.

In relation to mainstream parties we expected “dismissive strategies” (i.e. depoliticization of the issues forwarded by niche parties) to be the most rational choice in the first period of niche party success because the incentives to change their campaign strategies (loss of votes to the niche parties) are too small. Only if these dismissive strategies do not pay off, mainstream parties were expected to engage stronger competition with niche party issues (i.e. increase of issue-salience and solidification of positional stance). With the far right FPÖ being the most pressurizing niche party for both mainstream parties, we presumed the ideological neighbor (i.e. the ÖVP) to react sooner than the non-proximal mainstream party (i.e. the SPÖ). In both cases we believed an “accommodative strategy” regarding the far right (i.e. increasing salience and approximating restrictive stance) to be the most rational response. Given the transition after 1999 we finally expected both mainstream parties to even enforce their accommodative strategies in order to regain redundant votes previously lost to the far right.

Do our findings give any evidence to support these assumptions? An initial response is offered by the salience of politicization of niche parties during our examination period. Tab. 24 compares niche parties voteshares in the elections since 1986 with their issue-emphasis on both campaign channels (manifestos and press releases).
As regards niche parties, we find only partial evidence in favor of our vote-seeking argument, thus niche parties do not simply increase/decrease their issue-salience permanently in accordance with their gains and losses of votes in the previous election:

Considering the *Greens*, between 1986 and 1994 the party increases issue-salience irrespective of whether this has proven to be successful in the previous election (as in 1986=>1990) or not (as in 1990=>1994). Counterintuitively, the party even begins to cut its issue-salience in 1999 in both campaign channels, despite its success in 1994 which was accompanied by an increase of issue-salience. From 2002 on the Greens oscillate between slight increases and decreases although they gain more votes with every election until 2008. The party’s lower issue-emphasis manifests in contrast to the 1980ies and early 1990ies as well as its rather static salience among press releases corroborate the ineffectiveness of a mere vote-seeking argument for explaining Green issue-behavior.

Moreover, also with regard to the *FPÖ* the argument can hardly be supported, since the party rather maintains (manifestos) and even decreases (press releases) issue-salience between 1990 and 1994 although its previous emphasis had supported the party’s gains in the election of 1990. Again in 2002, the party cuts issue-salience despite having achieved its historical victory in 1999 on the basis of a strong emphasis on anti-immigrant claims. Only in 1999 and from 2006 onwards the party behavior can plausibly be related to previous electoral experiences (with increases in issue-salience after the party’s success with high issue-salience in 1994 and the collapse with lower issue-salience in 2002).
As for mainstream party behavior, again the data does not permit to overtly support our assumption (see Tab. 25). There is an increase in emphasis by both mainstream parties in 1990 and (with some limitation) also in 1994 but a cutback of issue-salience in 1999 when far right pressure reaches its strongest intensity. Thus, we find no evidence for an absolutely dismissive strategy, rather both parties seem to reflect socio-structural inputs and the increasing politicization employed by niche parties. Beyond that, the assumption of a stronger involvement by the center-right ÖVP only verifies with regard to programmatic politicization (where the ÖVP-salience is generally higher than the salience of the SPÖ). In contrast, both parties show equally low issue-salience in terms of daily campaign communication until the late 1990ies. These findings demonstrate the conflicting behavior of both mainstream parties during the early period of party system transformation, since both of them seem to be in search of an adequate response to the changing competitive patterns (also with regard to immigration/integration).

The election of 1999, finally, marks a disruption because both mainstream parties reduce issue-salience (the SPÖ more drastically than the ÖVP) only to reconfigure their behavior again after the turn of the millennium. Since then both mainstream parties have continued to emphasize the issues of immigration/integration/diversity more intensively (more strongly among manifestos but also slightly stronger among press releases) which seems to be more in line with our vote-seeking assumption. However, when considering the direction of mainstream party politicization, we once again need to restrict the assumptions gained from literature. While the expectation of a growing “accommodative strategy” by the center-right ÖVP can be verified, the behavior is rather inverse with

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Note: Salience denotes to relevant wordshare in relation to total amount of words in a party’s manifesto or its press releases per election (cf. Fig. 9). Framing denotes to distribution of frames among relevant wordshare and shows direction on a bipolar scale between +100 (absolutely liberal) and -100 (absolutely restrictive) (cf. Fig. 12). MF (Manifesto), PR (Press releases).

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Tab. 25: Voteshare, issue-salience, frame-direction per election, mainstream party scores, 1986-2008 (in %)

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<tr>
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<tr>
<td>Salience-MF</td>
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<td>5.2</td>
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<td>9.6</td>
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<td>Framing-MF</td>
<td>-1</td>
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<td>-21</td>
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<td>-21</td>
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<td>13</td>
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<td>34.9</td>
<td>38.10</td>
<td>33.2</td>
<td>36.5</td>
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<td>Salience-MF</td>
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<td>8.8</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>6.8</td>
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<tr>
<td>Framing-MF</td>
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<td>-29</td>
<td>-61</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>-33</td>
<td>-84</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Salience-PR</td>
<td>0.4</td>
<td>2.2</td>
<td>2.2</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>1.9</td>
<td>3.5</td>
<td>4.5</td>
<td>3.2</td>
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<td>-17</td>
<td>-55</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Voteshare</td>
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<td>32.1</td>
<td>27.7</td>
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<td>26.9</td>
<td>42.3</td>
<td>34.3</td>
<td>26</td>
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</table>

Note: Salience denotes to relevant wordshare in relation to total amount of words in a party’s manifesto or its press releases per election (cf. Fig. 9). Framing denotes to distribution of frames among relevant wordshare and shows direction on a bipolar scale between +100 (absolutely liberal) and -100 (absolutely restrictive) (cf. Fig. 12). MF (Manifesto), PR (Press releases).

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87 With one exception by the SPÖ in 1990.
regard to the center-left SPÖ. Instead of joining the “accommodative strategy” of the ÖVP, the SPÖ rather makes a shift towards an “adversarial stance” in opposition to far right positions, by visibly putting more emphasis on liberal frames after the turn of the millenium (more prominently in its manifestos but also on the daily campaign basis).

In a nutshell, with respect to Austrian parties’ strategies of electoral politicization, arguments that are merely based on a vote-seeking assumption seem to be of limited relevance. For none of the four continuously relevant parties since 1986 the assumptions gain permanent explanatory potential, instead they only help to explain certain periods of party strategy (mostly the early period of party system transformation between 1986 and 1994). In order to explain at least some of the residuals that cannot be resolved by our previous assumption, again further factors have to be considered.

*The relevance of coalition scenarios.* In multiparty contexts the consideration of coalition options adds up to the factors influencing parties’ issue-campaign strategies. A number of rational policy choices have been discussed beyond that subsume policy interests under the goal of government inclusion. Firstly, it has been noted that mainstream parties will adapt their strategies regarding the issues of immigration/integration/diversity only if niche parties successfully manage to politicize the issue. While from a vote-seeking perspective success is rather defined as the increase in party voteshares and voter-allocation, from an office-seeking perspective the definition would rather focus on the coalition potential of a party and its corresponding influence on other parties’ coalition considerations.

Based on the assumptions derived from office-seeking behavior in chapter 4.2.3., it can be pointed out that coalition options have been quite narrow for a certain period in the mid-1980ies with both mainstream parties refusing government cooperation with the far right while at the same time other minimal winning coalitions were out of reach. With the center-right ÖVP being under stronger pressure from far right success and remaining locked in its role as a junior partner in the Grand Coalition the reorientation of the party towards an accommodative stance regarding the far right had become an acceptable strategy from a rational coalition perspective. Furthermore, increasing far right success also implied an increasing majority for a potential right bloc coalition (thus a growing threat from the center-left SPÖ’s point of view). With the formation of a right bloc government and the emergence of an actual bipolarism in terms of party competition
(right government vs. left opposition), the assumed behavior is different to what we may expect from a pure vote-seeking argument. With bipolarism getting stronger (plus the lack of a mediating party at the center of the spectrum) and the SPÖ being in opposition, we rather expected a centrifugal behavior on the part of the center-left SPÖ, which would be in line with the colonization of the restrictive discourse spectrum by the right bloc majority. On the other side, we expected the center-right ÖVP to take a restrictive stance in order to please the coalition partner (FPÖ) in one of its core issues (H7).

As far as niche parties are concerned, however, we did not assume that coalition considerations will primarily influence their strategy of emphasis whereas their positional stances will remain constant. If participation in a government coalition is be superordinated to the mere allocation of votes, a shift towards a more appeasing behavior was assumed to be the rational strategy (in order to become a coalible partner). Thus, from a coalition perspective we expected niche parties to reduce their issue-emphasis over time in order to become/remain a coalible partner, if immigration is considered a conflictive issue vis a vis a potential coalition partner (H8). This pattern, however, again is expected to happen only with a certain time lag, i.e. after a period of increasing success in allocating votes without achieving office-participation. As a result, adaptive behavior by both niche parties (FPÖ and Greens) should not occur earlier than with the late 1990ies. While the FPÖ/BZÖ, as a government party, was expected to reduce issue-salience for as long as it is in government (in order to remain a coalible partner), the Greens are assumed to do so continuously from 1999 onwards (in order to become a coalible partner in the first place).

Applying coalition considerations to our dataset, we are finally able to explain a number of residual findings that were not captured by our previous explanatory factors. First of all the decision of the Greens to cut back their emphasis on immigration/integration/diversity after 1999 can actually be attributed to the party’s aim of becoming a more coalible partner for both mainstream parties (in fact, in 2002 the first coalition talks with the center-right ÖVP had demonstrated the dual approach of the Green’s coalition considerations). Secondly the temporary decision of the FPÖ to reduce issue-emphasis in 2002 might be interpreted as a similar attempt to remain a coalible option for its then
senior partner ÖVP. Thirdly, and most importantly, the clear tendency of the center-left SPÖ to shift to an “adversarial strategy” in opposition to the far right (i.e. increasing salience and moving to the liberal side of the framing-spectrum) can only be read as a rational option, if the quasi bipolar nature of Austrian party competition in the immediate aftermath of the millennium is taken into consideration. While the far right pressure until the mid-1990ies has been somewhat of a “hypothetical” menace (distracting votes but remaining a pariah for both mainstream parties on the federal level), the developments of 1999 drastically changed the conditions for party politicization of immigration, migrant integration and ethnic diversity. The formation of a ÖVP/FPÖ-government after the election of 1999 turned the conceptual pressure of the FPÖ into actual executive power and thus – as we suppose – increased the awareness of both mainstream parties to actively “use” the far right more intensively. After 1999, electoral competition generally became way more polarized in terms of left-right antagonism and thereby catalyzed the centrifugal behavior of both mainstream parties also with regard to immigration (cf. Pelinka/Plasser/Meixner 2000). Thus on both hypothesized aspects of party behavior we find patterns that fit our expectations. The increase of issue-emphasis by both mainstream parties expresses these changing conditions at the first glance whereas at the second glance they even more so materialize with regard to mainstream parties issue-positions. While ÖVP-politicization turned to be ever more restrictive and even increasingly overlapped with the frames applied by the far right parties, the SPÖ stance shifted towards a slightly more liberal notion and develops greater distance to far right parties’ issue-positions on immigration/integration/diversity. With the right bloc government colonizing the restrictive side of the positional spectrum (from 2005 on even three parties circulate around the restrictive spectrum), there was simply few to gain for the SPÖ by opting for an accomodative strategy. Though from a parliamentary and policy perspective, the SPÖ has very well remained supportive to certain further restrictions of immigration/integration/diversity-policies on behalf of the right bloc majority, in an electoral context it clearly displayed a shift towards a more liberal symbolism. This shifting behavior, although being quite explainable via the consideration of bipolarism, was eventually linked to another factor, that needs to be highlighted in our conclusion, i.e. ministerial responsibility.

88 The remaining FPÖ-team under the lead of Herbert Haupt after the resignation of the previous ministres explicitly tried to keep close ties to its coalition partner in order to maintain its strategically valuable government-inclusion (Müller/Fallend 2004: 829).
Insertion: Ministerial responsibility. With the renewed configuration of inter-party conflict after 1999, another decisive aspect of considerable impact on parties’ issue strategies comes along. It is an aspect that in previous literature has remained somewhat underestimated, i.e. the responsibility for issue-specific governmental departments. In party driven democracies executive responsibility plays a vital role for the nature of parties’ electoral strategies – a pattern that can be supported on the basis of our examination. Historically, executive responsibility on immigration/integration/diversity historically has been situated mainly in two government departments, i.e. the Ministry of Social Affairs in the earlier periods of the 2nd republic as well as predominantly by the Ministry of the Interior since the mid-1980ies (cf. Bauböck/Perchinig 2006: 732). This shifting responsibility not only affected the nature of executive discourse on immigration/integration/diversity but also influenced the “intrinsic responsibility” of government parties to forward these issues. Throughout our examination period, both government departments have been held by social democrats – most obviously throughout the 1970ies with the single-party government of the SPÖ, but also thereafter during the SPÖ/FPÖ-coalition and the grand coalition between SPÖ/ÖVP. Thus, from the perspective of ministerial responsibility the SPÖ had a much greater incentive to include immigration/integration/diversity into its electoral agenda, even though the party lacked ideological issue-ownership. In fact, these considerations might explain the occasional increase of issue emphasis among the SPÖ’s press releases in 1990 in contrast to a rather dismissive strategy applied in the other elections between 1986 and 1999. Moreover, these constraints might also account for the more restrictive traces of SPÖ politicization during the 1990ies as compared to the post-millenial period. However, with the formation of a right bloc government on behalf of ÖVP and FPÖ and the handing-over of the Ministry of the Interior from the SPÖ to the ÖVP, both mainstream parties were been urged to reconfigure their strategies on politicizing immigration/integration/diversity. Whereas the SPÖ after 1999 was relieved from the urge to justify the rather restrictive actions accompanying the work of the Ministry of the Interior, the ÖVP now faced the pressure to adopt exactly this behavior. This change in office responsibility directly materialized in shifting patterns of mainstream party politicization. While the SPÖ during the 1990ies only selectively emphasized the immigration/integration/diversity and just as long as there was strong governmental need (1990), its issue-positioning remained ambivalent and somewhat more restrictive than expected based on its ideological background. Relieved from this pressure after 1999, the
SPÖ visibly chose to include the issues of immigration/integration/diversity more actively within their framework of electoral politicization. As a consequence the SPÖ a) increased the general issue-salience on both campaign channels (in order to demonstrate a somewhat stronger relevance) and more importantly b) continuously shifted its issue-positions towards a more liberal framing. Conversely, the ÖVP after 1999 – now being in charge of the Ministry of the Interior – has isolated the issues of immigration/integration/diversity as one of its central campaign issues. In line with its ideological location it henceforth not only had a moral incentive but even more so an executive responsibility, which urged the ÖVP a) to emphasize the issues more prominently and b) to shift its positions towards a more restrictive stance (in line with a characteristic law&order-appeal of conservative parties). These patterns continued (or rather intensified) even after the return to a grand coalition in 2006, with office responsibility remaining in the hands of the ÖVP and the nomination of even more restrictive ministers (hardliners) since 2008 (Maria Fekter, Johanna Mikl-Leitner) as compared to their earlier predecessors (Liese Prokop, Günther Platter, Ernst Strasser). Thus though expectations based on rational models of inter-party competition provide strong explanatory potential, their full potential can only be achieved in combination with executive opportunities/constraints (ministerial responsibility). This is an important contribution to the contemporary literature on party politicization of immigration/integration/diversity. It points to the need of a stronger integration of party and governmental activities in the analysis of party politicization, to better understand the electoral considerations of government parties.

8.3. The role of the campaign channel: Programmatic vs. daily campaign communication

A final contribution of this dissertation was the discussion of party politicization on different campaign channels. The distinction of programmatic and daily dimension of election campaigning opened up two basic questions: Firstly, we questioned, as to how these particular dimensions of campaign communication offered different communication contexts for political parties in general and which consequences this would generate for the outcome of party politicization. Secondly, another question was focused on which parties would be more successful to translate their programmatic appeals into
communication on the daily basis – and thus would offer a coherent set of agenda building stimuli?

*Overall differences between campaign channels.* When focusing on the first question, empirical findings have demonstrated considerable divergences between programmatic and daily campaign communication considering the party system level. Concerning the question of issue-salience, the differences remain very little since a rather similar pattern has come to light (see Fig. 8). Except for a) a just slightly lower issue-salience among press releases as compared to manifestos and b) two outliers caused by exceptional elections (1990 and 2006), the salience patterns of programmatic and daily campaign communication pretty much resemble each other. However, with regard to other aspects of politicization (i.e. the choice of subtopics as well as the nature of frames) the descriptive findings have demonstrated some important differences.

Considering general *issue-dimensions* (asylum, immigration, integration and diversity) on the party system level, the distribution of these dimensions is much more balanced among manifestos than among press releases. This relation even corroborates when considering the selection of *subtopics*. Here too we find a much more narrowed picture on the daily campaign basis in contrast to a more balanced distribution of subtopics in the programmatic discourse (see Fig. 10). This evidence offers first support to our assumption that the nature of the campaign channel determines the way, parties are able to politicize campaign issues.

Beyond that, programmatic communication is characterized by a significantly stronger share of generalistic subtopics than the daily campaign. For programmatic communication these generalistic references constitute a vital pillar in order to generate coherent narrations about any issue. Manifestos thus contribute much more to the emergence of overarching storylines into which particular aspects of the daily debate can be included further on. The establishment of such storylines is a process that per definition needs time and space for elaboration. With daily campaign communication such as in press releases – obviously – lacking both of these factors (time and space), it is consequently less capable of generating coherent storylines by referring to generalistic remarks. Unlike the programmatic appeal it visibly puts ideology and policy goals in concrete terms by articulating more specific suggestions for political action. Daily campaigning operates much stronger through the use of statistics, exemplary individual cases, references to actual legislative conditions as well as through direct responses to
other statements from within the debate. Due to this forum character of press releases, a more repetitive but at the same time more practical debate may evolve, whereas generalistic appeals are often restricted to short statements. In general, the daily dimension of the election campaign is characterized by a greater heterogeneity with regard to the difference between elections. As a consequence, the findings for subtopics in programmatic communication are only partially valid for daily communication in press releases.

Finally, in terms of issue-positions the patterns on the party system level have shown a mixed picture. Firstly, the differences of framing are not as distinct as is the case with subtopics, since both campaign channels show equal patterns of heterogeneity (especially in the post-millennial period) whereas they are rather narrowed down to a few frames in the pre-millenial-period (Tab. 19). This indicates an increasing diversification of framing strategies the longer the issues of immigration and ethnic diversity have become established within Austrian party competition – a pattern that can be observed both in programmatic and daily campaign communication likewise. With regard to the direction of policy framing, the patterns show a mixed picture. While in some elections (1990, 1994, 2002) the mean tendency of the liberal/restrictive-direction considerably varies between programmatic and daily campaigning communication, in other elections (1999, 2006, 2008) both channels match each other closely (a pattern that needs to be explained by the specific conditions of these elections: with 1999 bringing a homogenous front against FPÖ-xenophobia, while 2006/2008 mirrored the presence of two dominant right wing populist parties together with an increasingly restrictive center-right ÖVP). In tendency, however, the daily campaign communication shows to be somewhat more restrictive than the programmatic appeals (Tab. 20).

Taken together these are selective evidences for the importance to distinguish between heterogeneous campaign dimensions when conducting an analysis of electoral competition. Different dimensions of election campaigning and their specific channels lead to drastically different forms of party discourse and thus need to be weighed against each other carefully. Not only are parties – due to the influence of short-term agendas – much more limited in their issue-selection on the daily basis, they are also urged to engage in a more policy-specific politicization than they do in programmatic communication.
**Campaign channels and individual party behavior.** The second core argument of the analysis was that parties would differ in their success to translate programmatic appeals into consistent short-term communication on the daily basis of election campaigns. Based on the discussion in chapter 3 we formulated the assumption that niche parties would show more consistent politicization both with regard to subtopics as well as positions, whereas mainstream parties were expected to display a more inconsistent choice of issues and positions across campaign channels (H1&H2). However, chapters 6.2. and 6.3. demonstrated that these assumptions could not be confirmed:

Firstly, the distinction between mainstream- und niche parties does not account for the explanation of a different selection of subtopics between campaign channels by an individual party – with mainstream parties and right wing parties showing equal patterns of campaign divergence (see Tab. 18). Only the liberal/left libertarian parties deviate from the remaining party spectrum as they show significantly stronger divergence between campaign channels, a finding that might rather be traced back to their pluralistic inter party organisation than to their niche party status.

Secondly, these results are notably corroborated by findings relating to issue-positions. Although party framing is slightly more consistent among different campaign channels than their choice of subtopics (Tab. 23), there still remains considerable divergence. Once more, this lack of campaign consistency again cannot be explained by the difference between mainstream and niche parties. With liberal/left libertarian, social democrat and conservative parties being equally divergent and only right wing populist parties being more consistent in their frame selection, it is rather an ideological and organisational argument that more than anything else accounts for some divergence.

Above all, there is actually no relevant difference with regard to consistency of issue-salience when comparing mainstream and niche parties, instead there rather appears to be a left-right gap – with parties right to the center fluctuating significantly stronger between programmatic and daily campaign communication than do parties left to the center (see Tab. 12).

Consequently, the distinction between mainstream- and niche parties does not explain different parties’ different capacities, to either stick to the same issue-dimensions, the same subtopics or the same frames of the debate. It also offers no explanation for different issue-emphasis (salience) that parties show between different campaign channels. Thus although we were indeed able to identify considerable differences between programmatic and daily politicization, these differences are rather linked to
ideological or organizational distinctions than to the question of mainstream or niche party type.

In a nutshell, though, the distinction of specific electoral communication channels and their very nature has proven to be a fruitful endeavor. With regard to all three dimensions of analysis (issue-salience, subtopics and positions) selective differences have been substantiated. It needs to be concluded that the different communicative contexts offered by programmatic and daily campaign channels should be taken into much stronger consideration in future research on electoral politicization. Not only the nature of selective issue emphasis is in various ways constrained by the character of the channel, but also the options of how to politicize these issues (in terms of subtopics and frames) are shaped respectively. This should at least serve as a qualification of the common research focus on programmatic communication for the identification of party competition. As the partly divergent findings on the daily campaign basis have demonstrated, electoral competition can follow remarkably different paths than outlined by programmatic appeals.
IX. Conclusion

Questions of immigration, migrant integration and ethnic diversity entered the front stage of party politics for already some time ago, yet their scholarly examination has remained somewhat single-sided. While a lot of research has been dedicated to anti-immigrant far right parties (said to have been colonizing the discourse on immigration, migration integration and ethnic diversity since their appearance), less attention has been given to other party types and their respective behavior as regards these delicate issues. However, the study of party discourses is an important research area for immigration studies: Party politicization has a vital function of indicating socially relevant problems to the public, influencing both the media’s as well as the electorate’s agendas. Furthermore, parties’ policy frames offer schemes of interpretation for political issues, that can structure common perceptions and claims within society but also help voters to identify their ideal voting options. Moreover, party politicization presents previews of which kind of regulations and issues will be object of legislative work. And finally party politicization has an important internal function for party competition itself, since it signals preferences to opponents and thus is a crucial instrument of parties’ electoral campaign strategies (cf. Adams/Merril/Grofman 2005; Benoit/Laver 2006; Triadafilopoulos/Zaslove 2006; Andrews/Money 2009).

Hence, clarifying the role of immigration, migrant integration and ethnic diversity as issues of party politicization contributes to a better knowledge of their political role and processing – which was the guiding objective of the present dissertation. This general task was broken down into separate research steps, that were dedicated to specific sub-areas integrating three strands of literature on party politics, political communication and immigration research. This conclusive chapter recapitulates these sub-areas as well as the theoretical framework of the dissertation, it repeats our main assumptions and links them to the core findings of our empirical chapters. Last but not least, it finally lines out the main contributions of the analysis and points out prospects for future research.

*Topic and theoretical background of analysis.* Immigration, migrant integration and ethnic diversity are all but new phenomena to European societies. They have been vital characteristics of a geopolitical area, that has witnessed countless border transformation processes, refugee flows and cross-country immigration. Even though national
perspectives and spaces have been structuring the European context, ties between these countries have historically contributed to ethnically diverse societies. However, recent decades have brought an immense intensification of culturalistic and ethnicized discourse across many European countries, even on a political level (Buonfino 2004; Triadafilopoulos/Zaslove 2006; Givens 2007). These discourses oftentimes are emotionally charged and polarized, since they reflect core issues of individual and collective identities. They address anthropologic un/certainties about the self and the other and consequently can be associated with feelings of fear and suspicion among the participants of the debate. A specific role in catalyzing the debate has been dedicated to party political discourse, both reflecting and intensifying public contention about immigration, migrant integration and ethnic diversity. Political parties have turned into important proponents promoting both pro- and anti-immigrant perspectives and also raising social models of multiculturalism and ethnic homogeneity to a wider public attention more generally. This intersection of immigration, migrant integration and ethnic diversity on the one and party politics on the other hand thus constitutes an important research area, if we aim to understand the dynamics of public contention about these vital questions. From a scholarly perspective, this intersection has firstly been addressed in the context of cleavage theoretical studies, pointing to a transformation of traditional cleavage patterns and new conflicts increasingly structuring party competition in Western democracies (including immigration, migrant integration and ethnic diversity) (cf. Inglehart 1990; Betz 1993; Kitschelt 2001; Kriesi et al 2006). Accordingly, based on salience theory and the concept of issue-ownership, emerging niche parties were assumed to be the profiteers of these transforming cleavage structures, promoting new winning-issues in their competition with established mainstream parties (cf. Budge/Farlie 1983; Riker 1986; Mair/Müller/Plasser 2004; Meguid 2005).

Specific scholarly occupation with immigration, migrant integration and ethnic diversity as issues of party politicization, though, emerged only belatedly and moreover remained somewhat single-sided, since most focus was been granted to the study of anti-immigrant, nationalist parties on the far right. This reductionism was owed to a number of reasons, most prominently the increasing success of European far right parties since the late 1980ies (cf. Kitschelt 1997; Schain 2002; Carter 2005; Norris 2005). But also due to assumptions that mainstream parties would avoid to politicize the issues – because of the tight limits of a legitimate debate, their lack of issue-ownership as well as the limited
room for policy activity thanks to universal basic/human rights (cf. Soysal 1994, Freeman 1995). However, recent years have yielded more extensive research activity with regard to other parties (although the initial impetus again came from the focus on far right parties). A number of authors began to study the impact of far right parties’ success on the behavior of other party types, especially mainstream parties on the center-right (cf. Eatwell 2000; Downs 2001; Bale 2003; 2005; Boswell/Hough 2008) and lately also center-left (cf. Art 2007; Bale et al 2010). The majority of these works – at least implicitly – assumed mainstream party politicization to be a result of successful far right emphasis (“contagion thesis”). The specific role of left-wing parties, however, has remained underhighlighted, therefore we are still faced with a deficit of systematic evaluation (as compared to other party families). Furthermore, many of the recent studies on the intersection of immigration and party politics have been selectively focusing on a specific party type (center-right, center-left, niche- vs. mainstream parties), aiming to develop specific explanatory potential for the respective parties. Only in some exceptions a coherent comparison of all relevant parties has been approached, integrating different conditions and motives into one coherent model of party politicization. The present dissertation aimed to take up this task, by elaborating an explanatory framework for party politicization of immigration, migrant integration and ethnic diversity, integrating different strands of party politics literature. Hence the explanation of why and when parties strategically include these issues into their agendas has been one central goal of the present study.

Explaining party behavior regarding the issues of immigration, migrant integration or ethnic diversity, though, was only one stimulus for the interlinkage of these research fields. Another strand of research was concerned with the question, of how to study politicization in the first place. In this regard a great number of scholarly work from different disciplines (linguistics, sociology, media and communication studies, political science, anthropology, etc.) has contributed to the elaboration of approaches to discourse and content analysis on issues of immigration and ethnic diversity (cf. Buonfino 2004; Fujiwara 2005; van Gorp 2005; Fröhlich/Rüdiger 2006; Nickels 2007; Green-Pedersen/Krogstrup 2008; Krzyzanowski/Wodak 2009). These heterogeneous approaches and findings of course have adjusted to different discursive spheres and were dedicated to different types of actors, still they offer an enormous repertoire, that can be applied to the specific case of party political discourse in the narrow sense as well. The crucial
questions in this particular regard are dedicated to the strategic nature of issue-management as applied by political parties, to the manipulation of issue-salience (Budge/Farlie 1983; Carmines/Stimson 1993, Petrocik 1996), to the emphasis of specific topical aspects at the cost of others (van Dijk 1989 and 1991; Lynch/Simon 2003; Fröhlich/Rüdiger 2006, Jäger/Maier 2009) or to the promotion and legitimization of certain policy-stances (Laver/Hunt 1992; Laver/Garry 2000; Budge/Klingemann 2001; Benoit/Laver 2006). While studies on party politicization have occasionally included some of these aspects, they have only rarely integrated them into a coherent approach of analyzing party politicization. In this regard, this dissertation aimed to contribute to the literature by suggesting an analytical approach for the analysis of party politicization of immigration/migrant integration/ethnic diversity, that was able to capture both the diversity of parties as well as the changes over time.

Bringing these research goals – i.e. reasons and modes of party politicization of immigration, migrant integration and ethnic diversity – together, we argued, that the electoral arena would constitute the most important locus of analysis. Elections tend to intensify political competition, they urge parties to clarify their strategies and to bring all of their instruments of competition (including politicization) in line with their fundamental goals. Elections constitute the crucial node of democracies, they create peaks of attention devoted by the electorate and accordingly are granted the strongest effort on behalf of political parties to communicate their profiles and goals (cf. Norris 2000; Franck 2003; Kriesi/Bernhard/Hänggli 2009). It is for this reason that most research on political communication has been conducted in the electoral arena, because it represents the apex of party competition. Yet even the electoral arena itself is a highly complex locus for party campaigning, since it links different short-term and long-term needs of parties who aim to craft their messages. A variety of campaign channels have evolved in order to reflect these different needs and audiences of party campaigns, all of them following a different logic and role in the campaign process (cf. Strömbäck 2007; Volkens 2007; Burton 2010; de Vreese 2010). The present dissertation reflected this campaign heterogeneity by studying party politicization on particular campaign channels (manifestos and press releases) – with the aim of analyzing parties’ abilities to craft their messages consistently in both programmatic and daily campaign communication (cf. Maarek 1995; Blumler/Kavanagh/Nossiter 1996).
Research questions and design. The present dissertation addressed this crucial epistemological interest from a longitudinal perspective, conducting a case study of Austrian electoral competition (first-order elections) since 1971. The focus on the domestic level was chosen for empirical reasons: Immigration, migrant integration and ethnic diversity are issues that – although increasingly considered on a European level – still are regulated and debated in domestic terms. Thus, domestic political arenas remain the focal point of party politicization concerning these issues which is why the study centred upon an illustrative country analysis. The case of Austria finally was selected on the basis of several theoretical considerations: Firstly, the Austrian party system is a party driven system that has experienced a characteristic evolution, similar to other European democracies after 1945 – turning from a tight party spectrum with high party loyalty and partisanship into a more heterogeneous party spectrum with more floating voters and increasing diversity of competing issues. Secondly, Austria has a long-lasting history of cultural diversity reaching back into the Habsburg era, but after 1945 – due to its geopolitical location – has witnessed characteristic patterns of immigration and asylum inflows. Thirdly, the prominent role of the far right FPÖ since the mid-1980ies has made the Austrian case a standard example for anti-immigrant party research; and fourthly, the comparatively high rates of attention and skepticism among Austrian population towards the questions of immigration/integration/diversity have constituted an incentive for (party) political controversy. Taking these factors together, Austria represents a highly informative case for the analysis and evaluation of different party strategies in the context of electoral competition on immigration, migrant integration and ethnic diversity.

Based on the main objective, the dissertation suggested three core areas of analysis:

a) It developed a methodical design to study party politicization of immigration, migrant integration and ethnic diversity on a systematic basis. This task was guided by the research questions, how political parties include these issues into their electoral campaigns and which elements of politicization could be taken as indicators of party behavior. In line with diverse strands of literature (salience theory, discourse analysis, framing theory), our approach identified “salience”, “sub-topics” and “frames” as the main indicators for the study of party politicization. Thus, we assumed that parties strategically address issues by altering either one or all of these aspects: a party may put specific emphasis on the issues of immigration/integration/diversity in general, it may focus on specific subtopics while leaving other subtopics unconsidered and it may take up
a specific policy stance on the issues in question. Although these individual aspects have been analyzed in studies before, they have rarely been linked into one coherent approach, which however is a core argument of this dissertation. Only by combining these analytical aspects we are able to comprehend each one of them to its full amount;

b) Beyond that, the reasons for politicization strategies of individual parties were assumed to differ between particular party types. In order to arrive at an explanatory model for individual party politicization, the dissertation integrated different strands of literature on party competition (such as recent literature on party motives, cleavage theory, issue-ownership, rational spatial competition), combining ideological arguments with rational choice perspectives on party behavior. While we supposed party ideology to be the driving motive for individual parties, we expected rational motives of vote maximization and coalition considerations to become increasingly important the more immigration/integration/diversity establishes themselves as permanent issues of electoral competition.

c) Additionally we distinguished between campaign channels in order to reflect the dynamics of electoral competition more adequately. Focusing on the electoral arena as a unique context of party competition, the dissertation posed the research questions, whether different campaign channels would lead to different patterns of politicization and whether some parties showed more consistent politicization across these channels than others. We started from the premise that daily campaign communication (covered by the analysis of parties’ press releases) would deviate characteristically from programmatic channels (covered by the analysis of parties’ election manifestos), although niche parties were expected to show a more consistent behavior as compared to mainstream parties.

Main empirical findings. The longitudinal analysis of party politicization in the Austrian electoral arena comes to an unambiguous conclusion: Immigration, migrant integration and ethnic diversity have emerged as key conflictive issues for Austrian party competition – being of limited relevance during the 1970ies and 1980ies, increasing slightly in 1986 and henceforth gaining permanent salience. The increasing importance of these issues since the mid-1980ies is initially owed to vital niche party politicization. Surprisingly, though, the strongest emphasis at first emanates from the pro-immigrant spectrum, with the Greens granting more programmatic salience the issues until the mid-1990ies than does the anti-immigrant-FPÖ, which only from 1990 onwards reaches salience-scores characteristic for far right parties (among daily campaign communication both parties
alternate as the most dominant actor). This has to be taken as an important evidence against previous assumptions: On the one hand, the Austrian FPÖ cannot be characterized as a single-issue anti-immigrant party in its early transformation period – rather the issues of immigration, migrant integration and ethnic diversity has only gradually gained its central role on the party’s agenda. On the other hand, the Austrian case proves that from a historical perspective pro-immigrant party politicization is not a specific reaction to anti-immigrant party success, but has already been of prominent and autonomous character before.⁸⁹ Taken together, the substantial role of Austrian niche parties perfectly meets the expectations derived from salience theory and issue-ownership concepts regarding the early period of niche party establishment.⁹⁰ While niche parties identify immigration, migrant integration and ethnic diversity as issues cross-cutting the traditional cleavage-structure (and henceforth start to politicize them more prominently), mainstream parties for the same reason rather follow the opposite path (thus depoliticizing issues where they gain no issue-ownership).

For the most part, the early dominance of niche party politicization even continues after the early 1990ies, however, over the course of the examination period the involvement of mainstream parties selectively increases – a pattern that points beyond the explanatory potential of cleavage theory and issue-ownership. The increasing – though only selective – involvement of mainstream parties rather points to the role of issue-careers. With immigration/integration/diversity turning into permanent campaign issues for increasingly successful niche parties, mainstream parties are compelled to abandon their detached behavior. At least with respect to programmatic competition, both mainstream parties show increasing emphasis since the mid-1990ies (with the center-right ÖVP exceeding the center-left SPÖ) and both parties (most notably the ÖVP) approximate niche party salience especially in the post-millenial period. On the daily campaign basis, however, both mainstream parties remain far below the activity of niche parties (even if the ranking-order of dominance is inverse, with the SPÖ dedicating more of its press releases to the issues than the ÖVP). Thus, while an increasing mainstream party involvement in programmatic competition can be concluded, with regard to the daily campaign basis (as observed in press releases) it remains comparatively limited. With the issue-career of

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⁸⁹ Of course it has to be qualified, that anti-immigrant sentiments and policy claims do have existed already long before the FPÖ’s transformation in 1986. Thus pro-immigrant politicization on the part of the Greens evidently has not emerged in a vacuum.

⁹⁰ With the only unexpected pattern being the earlier emphasis of pro-immigrant arguments (by the Greens) as compared to anti-immigrant appeals on the part of the far right FPÖ.
immigration, migrant integration and ethnic diversity mitigating the explanatory power of salience theory and issue-ownership, other explanatory factors gain importance. Confronted with niche parties that (more or less) continuously woo away voters, the basic role of vote maximization (or to put it more correctly: stopping the voter exodus) becomes a dominant motive for mainstream parties. In terms of party politicization, this leads to stronger engagement in niche parties’ campaign issues. However, the very nature of engagement is different for both mainstream parties, which is evident when focusing on the contents of politicization, i.e. subtopics and frames.

Looking at the role of subtopics that are emphasized by Austrian parties already adumbrates characteristic tendencies of mainstream party behavior. The comparison of subtopics emphasized by each party reveals a striking similarity between right wing populist parties (FPÖ, BZÖ), conservatives (ÖVP) and social democrats (SPÖ), in contrast to subtopics accentuated by left-libertarian and liberal parties (Greens, LIF). While the former most heavily stress subtopics such as “labor” or “crime & border control” in their campaigns, the latter put more emphasis on “asylum procedures”, “societal models” or “xenophobia”. These findings point to the fact that right wing populist parties seem to be more successful than left-wing parties when it comes to influencing the issue selection of mainstream parties. This conclusion is corroborated when considering the time frame of analysis, because after 1990 the data is almost entirely characterized by closer proximity between mainstream parties and far right parties as compared to left-libertarian or liberal parties regarding the choice of subtopics: Programmatically – except of two cases in the early 1990ies – this proximity can be observed almost continuously, whereas on the daily campaign basis in eight out of twelve cases mainstream parties are closer to the far right’s subtopics.91 This demonstrates that electoral discourse by tendency rather circulates around subtopics that are primarily tied to restrictive arguments (“crime&border control”, “labor migration”), hence assigning only a subordinated role to other subtopics and relinquishing them to left-libertarian or liberal parties respectively.

When examining proximity patterns of framing strategies, parties’ policy stances on immigration/integration/diversity come to light – and the quantitative findings are even more substantive than those regarding subtopics: Talking in bipolar terms, niche parties

constitute the extreme poles of either restrictive framing (FPÖ: most prominently burden and genuineness framing, BZÖ: most prominently guiding culture and security framing) or liberal framing (Greens, LIF, both emphasizing rights and solidarity frames most importantly), thereby creating the cornerstones of the discursive spectrum. Conversely, mainstream parties are characterized by a rather centrist compilation of frames, addressing a greater variety of policy frames and balancing liberal and restrictive frames more visibly. However, even mainstream parties are characterized by positional tendencies, since they alternate specific frames in the course of the last two decades. Comparing the 1990ies with the post-millenial period, the SPÖ evidently moves from a balanced to a predominantly liberal framing (rights, participation and solidarity frames), whereas the ÖVP is shifting from a slightly restrictive to a more restrictive stance in recent elections (most prominently emphasizing security and burden frames). These general tendencies can be confirmed by considering mainstream party proximity measures as compared to the right wing populist parties. On both campaign channels, the center-left SPÖ is moving away from the FPÖ- or BZÖ-framing, whereas the center-right ÖVP approximates the FPÖ/BZÖ-framing after the millenium. Thus, while the 1990ies have been characterized by a rather restrictive stance of (FPÖ, ÖVP and SPÖ) in contrast to an unilaterally liberal stance on the part of the Greens and the LIF, after the millenium the dividing line has been relocated: Now we face an even more cohesive circle of restrictive actors (consisting of FPÖ, BZÖ and ÖVP) opposed to a less cohesive couple of liberal actors (made up by Greens and SPÖ).

These shifts in mainstream party politicization show that vote seeking considerations have played a vital role for mainstream parties the longer niche parties successfully politicized the issues of immigration, migrant integration and ethnic diversity. This is especially true for the center-right mainstream party that behaves pretty much in line with vote seeking expectations as articulated in a number of recent articles (Eatwell 2000, Downs 2001, Bale 2003/2008), thus accommodating its politicization patterns to those of the restrictive far right and even intensifying this behavior after 2002. From a vote seeking perspective this behavior is expected to be the most rational choice, since it seeks to reclaim some of the voters that had been lost to the far right populists since the mid-1980ies. However, with regard to the other mainstream party, the politicization patterns are exactly the opposite during the post-millenial period, i.e. the SPÖ is acting increasingly liberal and thus is moving further apart from right wing populists. These
findings contradict the assumptions based on a mere vote seeking motive (as suggested by Bale et al 2010). Consequently the explanatory approach needed to be extended to the role of coalition considerations. The inclusion of coalition scenarios and government/opposition patterns enables to explain these residuals, since the increasingly liberal and active politicization on behalf of the center-left SPÖ is only a rational option, if the quasi bipolar nature of Austrian party competition in the immediate aftermath of the millennium is taken into consideration. The previously hypothetical menace caused by the far right, had materialized in a right bloc coalition and government-exclusion of the SPÖ for the first time since 1970. With party competition becoming more bipolar after the year 2000, the most rational behavior for the center-left was to actively attack the FPÖ on one of its core issues, i.e. immigration/integration/diversity. With the right bloc government colonizing the restrictive side of the positional spectrum (from 2005 on even three parties circulate around the restrictive spectrum), further accommodation towards the restrictive spectrum ceased to be a promising strategy – hence the opposite (adversarial) strategy was brought to bear.\textsuperscript{92} Although the SPÖ remained supportive of some restrictive legislature in the parliamentary arena, the shift towards a more liberal symbolism in the electoral arena is striking – and points to the importance of another explanatory factor, that has been underestimated in the literature so far, i.e. ministerial responsibility. In party driven democracies executive responsibility – most notably the distribution of government portfolios – plays a vital role for the nature of parties’ electoral strategies. The SPÖ for decades has been responsible for those government departments, that are primarily associated with immigration and diversity politics (i.e. the Ministry of Social Affairs until the mid-1980ies as well as the Ministry of the Interior from then on), hence its party appeals were constrained by these responsibilities – a) urging to raise politicization in times of actual crisis, such as in 1990 and b) holding a rather restrictive stance linked to the police and security logic of the Ministry of the Interior. Dispensed from these responsibilities after the developments of 1999, especially the SPÖ has found incentives and room for alternative strategies of politicization – materializing in an increased issue-emphasis and predominantly liberal framing that has continued ever since. For the center-right ÖVP, rather the opposite situation has been the case. Having assumed responsibility for the Ministry of the Interior since the year 2000, the ÖVP

\textsuperscript{92} Additionally, also the decision of the Greens to cut their emphasis of the immigration-issue after 1999 can be linked to exactly this influence of the party aiming to become a more coalible partner for both mainstream parties (in fact, in 2002 the first coalition talks with the center-right ÖVP had demonstrated the dual approach of the Green’s coalition considerations).
isolated the issues of immigration/integration/diversity as central campaign issues. Thus, vote seeking motives and ministerial constraints were merged into a strategy of greater emphasis as well as increasingly restrictive framing of immigration and ethnic diversity – that even intensified after the return to a grand coalition in 2006.

In a nutshell, these findings demonstrate that only a combination of various motivational factors is able to explain party politicization of different party types on a longitudinal basis. Even with respect to bounded policy fields like immigration, migrant integration and ethnic diversity, an extended time frame of analysis reveals considerable alternation of party strategies. Different external constraints and internal competitive structures cause parties to abandon previous strategies and apply a different rationale to their conceptions of politicization. Ideological foundations and the logic of issue-ownership, vote-seeking motives tied with coalition considerations and last but not least incentives/constraints of ministerial responsibility – all of these factors intermingle into one framework of party politicization and make for a challenge to party political research.

The present dissertation linked these findings with a specific focus on the electoral arena, arguing that different campaign channels would influence the very nature of party politicization. As the findings have shown, campaign channels considerably differ as regards the patterns of party politicization. Most importantly, programmatic politicization is characterized by a greater heterogeneity than daily campaign communication, for the reason that the latter is much more limited by centripetal tendencies of public discourse. Politicization on a daily basis mostly circulates around a few subtopics that dominate the campaign period of the respective election. Parties find themselves confronted with constraints by a public agenda, that limits their possibilities to highlight other subtopics as freely as is the case with manifestos. Accordingly, within programmatic discourse, subtopics are much more variant, which leads to a more heterogeneous picture of politicization. Furthermore, programmatic communication is characterized by a significantly stronger share of generalistic subtopics, since they are vital elements in the building process of coherent narrations. Manifestos actually aim to develop overarching storylines into which the daily debate can eventually be embedded in. Since the short-term appeal of daily press releases lacks both time and space for complexity, it is mostly shaped by policy specific subtopics. As a result, it puts ideology and policy goals in concrete terms by articulating more specific suggestions for political action (using statistics, exemplary individual cases, legislative references and replications to opponents
in a much stronger way), thereby constituting a forum for a rather practical policy discourse.

In terms of policy framing, however, no systematic differences in density could be identified between programmatic and daily campaign communication – since both show a rather narrowed pattern of frames in the pre-millenial period as compared to a more heterogeneous pattern in the post-millenial period. This rather indicates an increasing diversification of framing strategies the longer the issues of immigration, migrant integration and ethnic diversity have been politicized. With regard to the direction of policy framing, though, the patterns give a mixed picture. While in some elections (1990, 1994, 2002) the direction of the discourse considerably deviates between programmatic and daily campaign communication, in other elections (1999, 2006, 2008) both channels seem to match each other closely. In tendency, however, the daily channels show to be somewhat more restrictive than programmatic channels.

In fact, these general differences between campaign channels are valid more or less for all party types – with only singular exceptions. Although we expected niche parties to be more consistent in their politicization patterns between campaign channels, we found no evidence for this assumption. Mainstream parties and right wing populists showed equal patterns of campaign divergence and only liberal/left libertarian parties revealed by a stronger divergence of subtopics – a finding that might rather be traced back to their pluralistic inter-party organization than to any ideological explanation. Similarly, also the choice of policy frames could not confirm a systematic difference between mainstream- and niche parties. As concerns the framing of immigration, migrant integration and ethnic diversity, only far right populist parties significantly distinguished themselves from the remaining spectrum, since they showed greater framing-consistency between campaign channels, whereas liberal/left libertarian, social democrat and conservative parties were equally inconsistent. Thus; far right politicization is seemingly more able to stick to the same set of interpretations within its politicization, which in fact is tied to their populist and repetitive nature of appeals.

Taken together, these are selective evidences for the importance to differentiate between particular campaign channels in the analysis of electoral competition. The choice of campaign channels and their specific communicative functions lead to drastically different forms of party discourse and therefore need to be weighed against each other carefully. Parties are not only much more limited in their issue-selection on the daily
basis due to the influence of short-term agendas, they are also urged to engage in more policy-specific politicization than they do in programmatic appeals.

**Limitations, contributions and prospects of the dissertation.** The aim of this dissertation was to contribute to the understanding of electoral politicization of immigration, migrant integration and ethnic diversity in a threefold way: focusing on how party politicization can be described; why individual parties choose specific strategies of politicization over others; and finally, to what extent different electoral campaign channels exert influence on these patterns of politicization. However, every research endeavor is confronted with limitations that need to be mentioned for the sake of clarity. With regard to the present study, three restraints need to be underlined most importantly:

Firstly, the single country focus evidently implicates limitations as concerns the generalization of results. Although Austrian parties are prototypical examples for common party families in Western democracies, different national contexts can have varying effects on the role of party behavior and parties’ campaign strategies. Thus, a time-series analysis that compares selected countries would be a necessary step in order to corroborate the selective findings generated in this dissertation. Secondly, the focus on the supply-side was chosen due to theoretical considerations and empirical constraints likewise. Not only was the dissertation guided by the argument that strategies of party politicization are driven rather by ideological profiles and party competition conditions than demands of the electorate. Even more, our selective examination of demand-side factors (attitudes of Austrian population towards immigration, migrant integration and ethnic diversity) has given support for this assumption, showing that individual party behavior can hardly be explained by demands alone. Admittedly, these interactions might be stronger when using more nuanced data on voter demands for every segment of the electorate, yet unfortunately data of that kind is not available for the Austrian case on a historic basis. This points to a third limitation of the dissertation, i.e. the limited data-availability with regard to historical data on immigration, migrant integration and ethnic diversity – concerning socio-structural indicators, population attitudes and media discourse patterns likewise. Faced with restrictions in this regard, the dissertation was limited to a rather coarse inclusion of these factors – thus working on systematic indicators that mirror the complexity of this research topic would be another task that future research needs to pay greater attention to.
Despite these limitations, the dissertation may contribute to the contemporary work on party politicization and immigration in manifold ways. Most noticeably with regard to the explanandum the dissertation has made considerable efforts that have yielded satisfying outcomes. Hence the development of an approach to measure party politicization of immigration, migrant integration and ethnic diversity has resulted in substantial findings and has proven to be a fruitful model. The methodical focus on word-count has helped to avoid a bias that other measuring procedures (e.g. based on quasi-sentences) implicate – our findings have documented the advantage of using more precise counting units. Based on our approach, on each of our three dimensions of politicization (issue-salience, subtopics and frames), remarkable differences between parties and elections have been identified – pointing to the relevance of each dimension as an autonomous indicator for politicization. This evidence illustrates that the development of innovative coding categories for both subtopics and policy frames has been an effective methodological endeavor. By systematizing and integrating the rather dispersed approaches from the recent years, these sets of subtopics and frames may constitute a helpful foundation for future research on the politicization of immigration, migrant integration and ethnic diversity. At least for the Austrian case, they have been able to cover the diversity of subtopical emphasis and policy positions of relevant parties. On top of this, our approach has enabled to document the issue-career of immigration, migrant integration and ethnic diversity, developing from minor questions in the 1970ies and 1980ies to a fundamental pillar of party politicization since the 1990ies – thus becoming a structuring conflict for Austrian electoral competition (with broad party involvement and polarized patterns of policy positions).

A second major area of contribution is the synthesis of different factors into an integrated explanatory framework for party politicization. As the findings have shown, in the realm of immigration, migrant integration and ethnic diversity, no single factor is able to explain behavior of all parties at all periods to the same amount. Only by a combination of different factors can the full potential of analytical research on politicization be achieved. Party ideologies and cleavage structure indeed are the most fundamental factors to drive individual party politicization, especially with regard to parties’ policy positions but also with regard to parties’ issue-emphasis. However, in the long run parties adapt their strategies in the light of changing conditions of competition (such as pertaining voter-migration as well as changes in coalition scenarios, government/opposition-patterns or ministerial responsibilities). Particularly for mainstream parties these factors catalyze
significant changes in politicization (both with respect to emphasis as well as policy-positions), pointing to the relevance of vote- and office-seeking motives likewise. Niche party politicization on the other hand is rather persistent (most notably in terms of positional stances) and systematic changes only concern the amount of emphasis (i.e. issue-salience in/decreasing) – but coalition considerations do also play an increasing role, the longer these parties are established. What appears to be a striking finding, though, is the considerable prominence of left-wing politicization – as the dominant role of Austrian Greens during the mid-1980ies and early 1990ies (being the most active party) demonstrates. Based on this impression, the dissertation heavily suggests that more attention should be given to the role of left-wing parties in politicizing immigration, migrant integration and ethnic diversity, since their influence on other parties might be blurred by the long lasting focus of researchers on the role of far right politicization (“contagion thesis”).

Finally, the dissertation also contributed to an understanding of the campaign process from a political communication perspective. The distinction of specific electoral communication channels and their very nature has proven to be an important step. Comparing programmatic with daily campaign channels, selective differences have been identified on all three dimensions of analysis (issue-salience, subtopics and positions), pointing to the particular communicative contexts offered by the respective channels. Not only is the nature of selective issue emphasis constrained differently by the character of the campaign channel, but the options of how to politicize these issues (in terms of subtopics and frames) are shaped considerably as well. This should at least serve as a qualification of the common research focus on programmatic communication for the identification of party competition, given that manifestos are less sensitive to short-term agendas and centripetal effects of public and media debate. However, it should also encourage a much stronger consideration of different campaign channels in future research on electoral politicization, since electoral competition on the daily basis can follow remarkably different paths than outlined by programmatic appeals. Taking into consideration, that it is primarily the mediated coverage on the daily basis that stimulates voters perceptions in pre-election periods and not the actual contents of manifestos, these differences in politicization should be considered much more attentively.

In a nutshell, the dissertation managed to line out the importance and the complexity of party politicization as a communicative tool within electoral competition, considering the
diversity of the campaign process from the supply-side of political parties. It has documented the specific role of immigration, migrant integration and ethnic diversity as issues within these politicization processes and developed a model of analysis, that has identified the corroboration and polarization of competition in the recent decades. Furthermore it has suggested an explanatory framework that helped to understand rational party behavior in this complex endeavor of electoral politicization. Taken together, this makes for a systematic case study that helps to understand the specific development of the Austrian case but also contributes to the development of transnational approaches to studying politicization of immigration, migrant integration and ethnic diversity – a research area that noticeably will pertain its importance for decades to come.
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Ladner, M. (2007). Estimating the policy position of political actors (1. publ., transferred to digital print. ed.). London [u.a.]: Routledge [u.a.].


260


## Appendix

### App. 1: National and non-national population in Austria by citizenship, 1951-2010

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*Source:* Statistics Austria

*Note:* Population census from 1951 to 2001. The data for 2010 is derived from permanent statistics on the demographic structure administered by Statistics Austria.

1) With Asian part of former soviet union
2) Without asian part of former soviet union
3) Without Slovenia
4) Only Russian Federation
**App. 2: Number of naturalizations in Austria (most dominant countries of origin), 1960-2009**

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### App. 3: Issue-salience of immigration/integration/diversity (in % & total numbers), 1971-2008

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*Note:* MF stands for Manifestoes, PR stands for Press releases.

### App. 4: Issue-salience of immigration/integration/diversity according to CMP, 1990-2008

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*Note:* The “Comparative Manifesto Project” (CMP) is based on the coding of (quasi-)sentences. Due to the lack of more precise issue-categories, the table shows the summed salience-scores for the two codes “national way of life” and “multiculturalism.”
### App. 5: City-Block-Distance between parties’ subtopics per election, 1990-2008

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**Note:** Calculations show bisected city-block-distance of subtopics between party in column and row (with 0=absolute congruence and 100=absolute divergence)
### App. 6: City-Block-Distance between parties’ policy frames per election

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**Note:** Calculations show bisected city-block-distance of frames between party in column and row (with 0=absolute congruence and 100=absolute divergence)
### App. 7: Liberal/restrictive-tendency on party system level – absolute numbers, 1990-2008

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*Note:* Mean value denotes average tendency of frames of all relevant parties on a bipolar scale with positive values denoting to liberal tendencies and negative values denoting to restrictive tendencies. Values refer to salience of liberal and positive frames. Polarization denotes standard deviation of mean values. T-tests for equality of means between manifesto and press releases shows no significant differences: $T=-0.461$, df=10, * $p \leq 0.05$, ** $p \leq 0.01$, two-tailed test.
Abstract

English:

Immigration, migrant integration and ethnic diversity have become major issues in contemporary Western democracies. Their increased public contention is both reflected as well as stimulated by political parties, who engage in the debate for different strategic reasons. The aim of the dissertation is to examine party politicization of immigration, migrant integration and ethnic diversity on a longitudinal basis by integrating three strands of literature on party politics, political communication and immigration research. Based on a content analysis of Austrian federal elections between 1971 and 2008, the study finally offers three main contributions: It develops an approach for the analysis of politicization of these contentious campaign issues, based on issue-salience, subtopics and policy frames; it suggests an explanatory framework for party politicization, integrating socio-structural conditions with strategic party competition factors; finally it compares different electoral campaign channels, in order to evaluate campaign consistency of party politicization in the electoral arena.

As the empirical findings demonstrate, socio-structural conditions of immigration and asylum constitute a conspicuous context for party politicization, for they catalyze increasing issue-salience since the 1990ies. With regard to individual party behavior, though, only a synthesis of party competition factors is able to explain politicization over time: In the first place, party ideology and issue-ownership continuously structure parties’ strategies, especially those of Austrian niche parties, who retain their policy framing and only alter issue emphasis. Mainstream parties on the other hand remarkably shift their behavior in the light of far right success and changing coalition perspectives since the 1990ies – both in terms of emphasis and framing of immigration, migrant integration and ethnic diversity. Yet these patterns of politicization considerably differ between electoral campaign channels, since programmatic communication expresses party strategies more reliably, whereas daily campaign communication is subject to variant short-term dynamics of election campaign periods. In sum the dissertation documents, that immigration, migrant integration and ethnic diversity have established as major conflictive issues, structuring contemporary Austrian party competition and being subjected to changing party motives under shifting majority conditions.
Deutsch:


In Summe vermag die Dissertation zu verdeutlichen, dass, wie und weshalb Migration, Integration und ethische Diversität zu zentralen Bestandteilen parteipolitischer Konfliktlinien geworden sind, die den zeitgenössischen Parteienwettbewerb in Österreich strukturieren und dabei wechselnden Parteimotiven bei sich verändernden Mehrheitsverhältnissen unterworfen sind.
Curriculum vitae

Oliver Gruber

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Research interests:
Political communication and politicization, Party politics,
Immigration and Migrant Integration, Communication theory

Education

03/08 – 10/12 University of Vienna, Austria
Doctorate in Political Science
Advisor: Sieglinde Rosenberger

02/07 – 10/07 Università degli Studi di Pavia, Italy
Sabbatical term, conduction of Master-thesis in Political Science
(passed with distinction).
Advisor: Ingfrid Schütz-Müller

10/02 – 3/08 University of Vienna, Austria
Graduate student in Political Science

10/01 – 11/05 University of Vienna, Austria
Graduate student in Communication Studies and Philosophy
(Thesis: „Communicative understanding – Aporia of a misleading concept of communication science“), written in German: Kommunikatives Verstehen – Aporetik eines missverständlichen Zentralbegriffs der Kommunikationswissenschaft
(passed with distinction).
Advisor: Maximilian Gottschlich

09/92 –06/00 BRG Schwechat, Austria
High school

Memberships

- IN:EX-Research Group: The Politics of Inclusion and Exclusion (IN:EX)
- Austrian Political Science Association (AUPSA)
- European Communication Research and Education Association (ECREA)
- Young scholars network for Political Communication (NapoKo)
- Society for Terrorism Research (STR)
Professional experience (scientific)

since 09/09  University of Vienna, Austria – Department of Communication,  
University Assistant (pre-doc)

------- 09/08 – 08/09  Austrian Academy of Sciences, Commission for Comparative Media- and  
Communication Research  
Junior Researcher

10/04 – 07/08  University of Vienna, Austria – Department of Communication,  
Teaching assistant

03/04 – 08/04  University of Vienna, Austria – Department of Communication,  
Tutor

Project experience (scientific)

since 2011  University of Vienna, Austria – Research group "INEX - The Politics of Inclusion and Exclusion"  
Research project "Integrationspolitik als Regierungspolitik. Das Staatsssekretariat für Integration im Monitoring".

07/08 – 05/11  Austrian Academy of Sciences, Vienna – Commission for comparative Media- and  
Communication Research  
Research project „Continuity and Change in Campaign Communication in Austria since 1966“

10/07 – 11/08  University of Vienna, Austria – Department of Communication  
Research project „Integration and the Media: The case of "Arigona" within Austrian Media Discourse“

03/04 – 08/04  University of Vienna, Austria – Department of Communication  
Research project „80 years of Radio“

Teaching (University seminars)

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<th>Year</th>
<th>Spring semester 2012</th>
<th>Seminar: Communicating Political Protest</th>
<th>PS: Political Communication</th>
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<th>Year</th>
<th>Winter semester 2011/12</th>
<th>Seminar: Diversity and Inclusion: Perspectives from Communication Studies</th>
<th>Seminar: Human Rights &amp; the Media: Euthanasia as public issue (assistance)</th>
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<th>Year</th>
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<th>Seminar: Migration-related news coverage in transition</th>
<th>PS: Political Communication: Antisemitism &amp; the &quot;Waldheim Affair&quot; (assistance)</th>
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<th>PS: Political Communication</th>
<th>Seminar: Patterns of antisemitic attitudes (Religiousness &amp; Antisemitism) (assistance)</th>
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<th>Year</th>
<th>Winter semester 2009/10</th>
<th>Seminar: Politicization and Asylum</th>
<th>Seminar: Antisemitic prejudices within public discourse (assistance)</th>
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Publications (Book chapters & Journal Articles)


