Titel der Diplomarbeit

“The pragmatic world of Alice’s Adventures in Wonderland by Lewis Carroll”

(„Die pragmatische Welt in Alice’s Adventures in Wonderland von Lewis Carroll“)

Verfasserin
Valentina Gal

angestrebter akademischer Grad
Magistra der Philosophie (Mag. phil)

Wien, im Oktober 2008

Studienkennzahl lt. Studienblatt: A 190 344 362
Studienrichtung lt. Studienblatt: Lehramtsstudium, 1. Unterrichtsfach Englische Philologie
Betreuerin / Betreuer: Univ.-Prof. Dr. Barbara Kryk-Kastovsky
# Table of contents

List of tables........................................................................................................................................ v
Acknowledgements................................................................................................................................. vi

**Introduction** ....................................................................................................................................... 1

**Part I  Theoretical milestones: Essential pragmatic concepts** ........ 5

1. Deixis ............................................................................................................................................... 5
   1.1. Deixis in the framework of pragmatics .................................................................................. 5
   1.2. Uses and categories ............................................................................................................. 7
       1.2.1. Gestural vs. symbolic deixis ....................................................................................... 7
       1.2.2. Traditional deixic categories ..................................................................................... 8
       1.2.3. “Marginal” deixic categories ..................................................................................... 9
   1.3. Non-deictic use ..................................................................................................................... 13

2. Presupposition ............................................................................................................................... 14
   2.1. The semantic approach to presupposition .......................................................................... 14
       2.1.1. Historical background .............................................................................................. 15
       2.1.2. Presuppositional constancy under negation ............................................................ 17
       2.1.3. The detachability of presupposition ......................................................................... 18
       2.1.4. Types of presupposition ........................................................................................... 18
   2.2. The pragmatic approach to presupposition .......................................................................... 20

3. Implicature ...................................................................................................................................... 24
   3.1. Implicature in the framework of pragmatics ....................................................................... 24
   3.2. The properties of implicature ............................................................................................. 27

**Part II  Analysis of pragmatic concepts in Alice in Wonderland** ....... 29

4. Deixis ............................................................................................................................................. 29
   4.1. Gestural versus symbolic deixis ......................................................................................... 30
   4.2. Person deixis ....................................................................................................................... 33
       4.2.1. The ontological nature of the person deixic I ............................................................ 33
       4.2.2. Contextual identification of the Origo ....................................................................... 36
       4.2.3. Ambiguous assignment of participants’ roles ............................................................. 37
       4.2.4. Cohesiveness versus coherence ................................................................................ 38
       4.2.5. The inclusive/exclusive distinction of the pronoun we ............................................. 40
   4.3. Place deixis ......................................................................................................................... 43
       4.3.1. Default deixic centre ................................................................................................ 43
       4.3.2. Proximal vs. distal domains of deixic expressions .................................................... 44
       4.3.3. The interpretation of deixic references ...................................................................... 46
   4.4. Time deixis .......................................................................................................................... 50
       4.4.1. The nature of always and now ................................................................................... 50
       4.4.2. The nature of today and tomorrow .......................................................................... 51
       4.4.3. Instances of deixic centre collision ......................................................................... 52
   4.5. Discourse deixis .................................................................................................................... 54
       4.5.1. Anaphora vs. discourse deixis .................................................................................... 54
       4.5.2. Impure textual deixis ................................................................................................ 60
       4.5.3. Cataphora .................................................................................................................. 60
   4.6. Emotional deixis .................................................................................................................... 63
       4.6.1. This as a marker of the speaker’s emotional involvement ......................................... 63
       4.6.2. That as a marker of the speaker’s emotional detachment .......................................... 64
       4.6.3. Miscellaneous instances of emotional deixis ............................................................. 65

---

**Alice in Wonderland**

The inclusive/exclusive distinction of the pronoun 'we' as a marker of the speaker's emotional involvement.
4.7. Social deixis

4.7.1. “Royal” honorifics

4.7.2. Power vs. solidarity

4.7.3. The role of macro context

4.7.4. Animate vs. non-animate reference to the animals in Wonderland

4.8. Non-deictic use

4.9. Conclusions

5. Presupposition

5.1. Presupposition-triggers

5.2. Pragmatic presupposition

5.2.1. Defeasibility

5.2.2. Projection problem

5.2.3. Contextual appropriateness and mutual knowledge

5.2.4. Fillmore’s theory of alienable vs. inalienable possession

5.3. Conclusions

6. Implicature

6.1. The pragmatic approach to implicature

6.1.1. The importance of context

6.1.2. The role of background knowledge

6.1.3. Instances of unintentional offending implicatures

6.2. The pragmatic account of figures of speech

6.2.1. Irony

6.2.2. Hyperbole and litotes

6.2.3. Tautologies

6.2.4. Puns

6.3. Conclusions

Conclusions

Abstract

Zusammenfassung

References

Index

Curriculum vitae
List of tables

Table 1: Types of presuppositions ................................................................. 19
Table 2: Anaphoric use .................................................................................. 55
Table 3: Honorifics ......................................................................................... 69
Table 4: Presuppositional behaviour of proper names and definite descriptions .... 81
Table 5: Presuppositional behaviour of factive verbs ..................................... 83
Table 6: Presuppositional behaviour of implicative verbs ............................ 84
Table 7: Presuppositional behaviour of change of state verbs .................... 85
Table 8: Presuppositional behaviour of iterative verbs ............................... 86
Table 9: Presuppositional behaviour of temporal clauses ............................ 87
Table 10: Presuppositional behaviour of non-restrictive relative clauses .......... 88
Table 11: Presuppositional behaviour of counterfactual conditionals and structures 88
Table 12: Presuppositional behaviour of wh-questions and tag questions ......... 89
Table 13: Presuppositional behaviour of cleft constructions .......................... 90
**Acknowledgements**

Most of all, I wish to thank my children who have been the source of inexhaustible inspiration, and my husband for his support and motivation. I am especially grateful to my supervisor Univ.-Prof. Dr. Barbara Kryk-Kastovsky for helpful discussions and encouraging ideas throughout the period of writing the thesis. I also deeply appreciate the comments and advice of my friends, linguists and non-linguists alike, and want to thank them for the many insightful discussions we have had this year, both in person and via email. Without the help of all these people this work would never have been as it is.
Introduction

Lewis Carroll’s *Alice’s Adventures in Wonderland* (henceforth *Alice in Wonderland*) has won universal appeal among young and old, among mathematicians, philosophers, and linguists. It has been translated into numerous languages including Chinese, Japanese, Maori, Bengali, Gaelic and Swahili (cf. Weaver 1964 referred to in Sigler 1997: xii) and remains, along with the King James Bible and the plays of Shakespeare, one of the most quoted books in English literature (Rackin 1991: 13). It is a source for carefree leisure and meticulous research.

The idea for this classic was conceived by the shy, demure, celibate and conservative mathematics don Charles Ludwidge Dodgson, whom the world knows as Lewis Carroll. One July afternoon in 1862, he was taking a boat trip together with three daughters of Henry G. Liddell — the dean of Christ Church. At Alice Liddell’s request, he invented a story about a girl’s adventures underground which three years later was successfully published.

Carroll’s life was sedentary, void of turbulence and change.¹ His two greatest life passions were little girls and theatre plays. His interests were far-reaching. Along with his extraordinary skill at mathematics, he invented mnemonic devices, poetic acrostics, the nyctograph², the system of memorising “pi” to seventy-one decimal places and the rule for dividing a number by 9 (cf. Pudney 1976: 34-36; De la Mare 1932: 35-37). He was also one of the period’s most important amateur portrait photographers, especially of young girls. Carroll was a man of astounding precision and pedantry (Rackin 1991: xv), seeming to find pleasure in fastidiousness. He scrupulously noted the menus of his private dinners, kept a record of all letters in a register in which he marked the correspondents to whom he still had not replied³ and thanked a friend for a present that he had received five years earlier (Cohen 1979, 1: xvi). The question is, how could such an astounding precisian (ibid.: 24) write a book of absurd humour, where the rules of anarchy reign and where nonsense makes sense?

¹In 1850 he matriculated at Christ Church College, Oxford and lived there for the remaining 48 years of his life, not leaving England except for a trip to Russia in 1867 (cf. De la Mare 1932: 23).
²Nyctograph is a device for recording notes in the dark (Cohen 1979, 1: xvii).
³He started the register when he was 29; by his death it contained 98,721 letters (cf. Rackin 1991: xii).
Carroll’s writing style, as well as his language use, was my prime interest for delving deeper into the world of his words. Reading *Alice in Wonderland*, I was clueless in my attempts to answer the notorious riddle about the similarities between a raven and a writing desk. I could find no explanation for the odd sequence of the Queen’s orders: she wanted to behead the Dormouse first and then turn him out of the court. I had no idea that the common name, Mary Ann, could be an instance of social deixis hiding a dishonorific form of address. I was eager to learn more and after finishing both *Alice* books (*Alice in Wonderland* and *Through the Looking-glass and What Alice Found There*), I read Gardner’s *The Annotated Alice* and *The Universe in a Handkerchief*, where I learned about Carroll’s mathematical riddles and his passion for entertaining young girls, as well as about the stutter that disappeared only when he talked to children. I learned that he preferred Tuesdays to other weekdays and the number 42 to other numbers (Gardner 2000: 12).

What fascinated and puzzled me the most were his word plays, absurd statements and seemingly intentionally unclear references. Such language paradoxes motivated me to look for a plausible explanation of their uses in pragmatics.

Written in 1865, twenty-seven years before the German philosopher Frege first dealt with presupposition (1892), sixty-nine years before the notion of deixis was introduced by Karl Bühler (1934) and more than a hundred years before Paul Grice coined the term *implicature* (1967), *Alice in Wonderland* abounds with absurd presuppositions, deictic contextual puzzles and unexpected implicatures. Carroll played skilfully with language and meaning. His flouting of language conventions illustrates pragmatic concepts that were not explained until years later. Some language riddles based on those pragmatic concepts remained unsolved for me, even after the second studious read. Therefore, in a quest for answers I decided to engage in a thorough research-based exploration, the results of which are offered in this study.

In my thesis I approach *Alice in Wonderland* pragmatically and provide an analysis of three concepts, viz. deixis, presupposition and implicature. I believe that they help explain Carroll’s “curious, complicated kind of nonsense” (Gardner 2000: xiii).
The thesis is structured as follows:

Part I, “Theoretical milestones: essential pragmatic concepts”, is an overview of the main pragmatic concepts necessary for the analysis of *Alice in Wonderland*. It deals with deixis, presupposition and implicature and is organized across three chapters:

Chapter 1, “Deixis”, suggests how the concept of deixis has been viewed by various scholars; it discusses the importance of the deictic zero-point — the Origo; it examines the role of indexicals and summarizes the main deictic uses and categories. It also stresses the significance of context for the interpretation of deictic expressions. Finally, it focuses on non-deictic uses of deictic expressions.

In Chapter 2, “Presupposition”, my objective is to define presupposition, as well as to analyse the differences between semantic and pragmatic presupposition. In this chapter, I outline the properties of presupposition, as well as different presupposition types.

Chapter 3, “Implicature”, deals with types of implied meaning that usually differ from the logical form of the original utterance (Grundy 2000: 273). This chapter outlines the types of implicature, as well as its properties. Consequently, it introduces the Gricean Cooperative Principle and four basic maxims of conversation.

Part II, the main part of the current study, is devoted to the analysis proper of the pragmatic concepts discussed in the previous part. Examples for the analysis are taken from *Alice in Wonderland*. This part evaluates Carroll’s language paradoxes, puzzles and word plays according to pragmatic criteria and is carried out in the following chapters:

Chapter 4, “Deixis” presents an analysis of the pragmatic aspects of *Alice in Wonderland* that have or may have deictic functions. Attention is drawn to examples of gestural and symbolic uses of deixis. I discuss certain difficulties in defining gestural deixis in a piece of a written text. This chapter shows a range of examples of person, place and time deixis. Other categories of deixis, viz. discourse deixis, social deixis and emotional deixis, are considered and studied. Furthermore, I cite examples of non-deictic use and point to the differences between deictic and non-deictic
functions of the same indexicals. This chapter also considers the ascription of animate and non-animate reference to animals in Wonderland and shows which factors can influence the choice of reference.

In Chapter 5, “Presupposition”, I enumerate lexemes and syntactic structures that serve as semantic presupposition-triggers and illustrate them with examples from Alice in Wonderland. I demonstrate that the notion of presupposition cannot be restricted to the framework of semantics but has to be approached pragmatically. In this chapter I introduce the plug-hole-filter system suggested by Karttunen (1973: 171-177) and examine how the rules of presupposition-making depend on certain presupposition-carrying expressions. I introduce Fillmore’s theory of inalienable vs. alienable possession (1970: 63-67) and demonstrate how it is applicable to a presupposition-generating process. Last but not least, I address the problem of the significant dependence of pragmatic presupposition upon discourse context, speaker’s/addressee’s encyclopaedic knowledge and his/her assumptions and beliefs.

Chapter 6, “Implicature”, focuses on instantiating the concept of conversational implicature that arises as a result of breaching the maxims of communication. It stresses the importance of context and background knowledge for the inferring process. I also discuss the extent to which the theory of implicature relates to the interpretation of irony, hyperbole, litotes, tautologies and puns.

The conclusion summarises the main ideas of the present thesis and points to potential areas for further study and research.

After this brief overview of the general outline of my thesis, I will now describe the three important concepts of deixis, presupposition and implicature.
Part I
Theoretical milestones: Essential pragmatic concepts

1. Deixis

1.1. Deixis in the framework of pragmatics

Deixis is considered one of the core notions of pragmatics. Its significance is recognizable in any discourse; its correct interpretation is key to successful communication.

We are indebted to Karl Bühler and his major work *Sprachtheorie: Die Darstellungsfunktion der Sprache* (1934) for the notion of deixis. Bühler points out the essential role of deixis in a conversational situation. He singles out and draws a distinction between the deictic field of language (Zeigfeld) and the symbolic field of language (Symbolfeld) (cf. Bühler 1934 [1982]: 9). He describes the former field as the one containing context dependent or deictic words, that are linked immediately to the speech situation and the latter as a field of less context dependent words that “reflect symbolic representations” (ibid.: 9). He states that

[… ] deictic expressions refer to a deictic field of language whose zero point — the Origo — is fixed by the person who is speaking (the ‘I’), the place of utterance (the ‘here’), and the time of utterance (the ‘now’). (Bühler 1934 [1982]: 10)

Bühler emphasizes that speakers position utterances to their viewpoint, which is an unmarked zero-point of spatio-temporal coordinates. Thus, the deictic zero-point is egocentric (cf. Lyons 1977, 2: 638), that is, the vantage point of a conversational situation is the speaker. In other words, the deictic zero-point is the point specified by the speaker and the speaker’s location at the moment of utterance.

In order to avoid confusion in applying different terminology to the same notion, I will briefly outline other synonymous expressions used by scholars for the notion of
the deictic zero-point. Deictic zero-point is also called the Origo (Bühler 1934 [1982]: 10), the default deictic centre or the here-and-there centre (Lyons 1977, 2: 638), the centre of the deictic field (Fillmore 1982: 31), the point of origin (Levinson 1983: 64) or the unmarked deictic centre (Grundy 2000: 34). The main role of the speaker is to relate other objects to his/her centre of orientation. This process is tightly bound to the communicational situation and, in this way, strongly depends on the context of the utterance.

The dependency of the pragmatic meaning of the utterance on the context is also crucial in interpreting a conversational situation. Lyon’s definition of deixis clearly states this dependency:

> By deixis is meant the location and identification of persons, objects, events, processes and activities being talked about, or referred to, in relation to the spatiotemporal context created and sustained by the act of utterance and the participation in it, typically, of a single speaker and at least one addressee. (Lyons 1977, 2: 637)

The importance of context when determining deictic reference is salient. The knowledge of the identity of the speaker and the setting of the conversational situation is essential for the interpretation of deixis. Suppose the following utterances (1) and (2) are heard out of context:

1. You have a comparatively mild climate here. (Brown and Yule 1983: 52)

2. I’ll be back in an hour. (Levinson 1983: 54)

In such a narrow context, the correct interpretation of the utterances is impossible, since the addressee cannot identify the speaker’s location at the time of utterance in (1), the identity of the speaker and the moment of utterance in (2). What remains stable in the interpretation of here, I and in an hour is that the Origo is congruent with the location of the speaker. Here, I and in an hour are deictic expressions, also called indices (Peirce 1932 referred to in Rauh 1983: 10), Zeigwörter (Bühler 1934 [1982]: 10), indexicals (Bar-Hillel 1954 referred to in Rauh 1983: 10), egocentric particulars, referring expressions, or shifters (Kryk 1987: 2; 16; 35). They are anchored in the context and define participants with regard to place, time and the social roles they possess during the communication act. English has a wide array of frequently used deictics wherein semantic meaning is fully realized only with reference to the particular speech situation (cf. Mey [2001]: 54). These deictic
expressions include but are not limited to personal pronouns, demonstratives, and place and time adverbials. Deictics are pragmatically determined, since the reference of such expressions depends on a given conversational situation and their pragmatic use is inseparably linked to the context.

1.2. Uses and categories

I will now summarize the main uses and categories of deixis. Fillmore distinguishes between gestural use and symbolic use of deixis (Fillmore 1971: 220), which are compared to demonstratio ad oculos and deixis am phantasma, as originally elaborated by Bühler (1934 [1982]: 23). The discrepancy between these two uses is primarily based on ostension or pointing (cf. Levinson 1983: 65).

1.2.1. Gestural vs. symbolic deictic uses

When pointing at an object while identifying it, the speaker draws the hearer’s attention to some spatio-temporal location in which the object can be found (cf. Lyons 1977, 2: 654), that is, the speaker uses gestural deixis. According to Levinson (1983: 65), in order to be interpreted correctly, gestural deixis requires a moment of physical monitoring of the speech event. Perkin’s definition of gestural deixis also takes the above-mentioned aspect into account. Thus, deixis, cf. Perkins (1992: 100), is linguistic pointing to relevant extracts of the context of an utterance, accompanied by extra linguistic gesturing. In fact, deixis is a Greek term, which means ‘apt for pointing with the finger’ (Rauh 1983: 10). In order to prove that gestural deixis has occurred, the interpreter needs visual evidence of the speech event or at least a video recording of it, claims Levinson (1983: 65):

3. *He’s not the Duke, he is. He’s the butler.*

A video recording can prove that all three times the gestural deictic *he* is accompanied with a respective gesture towards a person.

Contrary to gestural uses, symbolic uses cannot identify the referents by means of visual gestures. Symbolic uses “make reference only to contextual co-ordinates available to participants antecedent to the utterance” (Levinson 1983: 65-66). The reference of symbolic use directly depends on the immediate context of the utterance.

---

4 Bühler also distinguishes the third mode of pointing — anaphora — which I will discuss later in this chapter (p. 9-10)
and on knowledge of particular aspects of the communication act. I will cite Levinson’s example (1983: 65) to support this theoretical statement:

4. This city is really beautiful.

The knowledge of the participants’ location will suffice to ascribe a correct reference to the utterance. In this case no ostension is necessary to determine which city is meant.

1.2.2. Traditional deictic categories

Apart from gestural and symbolic uses, deixis is traditionally categorized as person deixis, place deixis and time deixis.

Person deixis deals with encoding the identities and roles of interlocutors in the speech situation and primarily uses the personal pronoun, *I*, its corresponding plural form, *we*, and the second person pronoun, *you* (cf. Levinson 1983: 62; Grundy 2000: 26). Thus, the interpretation of the following examples hinges upon the identity of the speaker, as in (5), or the speaker and the addressee, as in (6), respectively:

5. *I* am hungry. (Kryk 1987: 14)

6. *You* can all come with *me* if *you* like. (Levinson 1983: 65)

Another traditional category of deixis is place deixis. This category expresses the position of the speaker in relation to the location of other participants involved in the speech situation, i.e. “place deixis encodes spatial locations on co-ordinates anchored to the place of utterance” (Levinson 1983: 62). In English there are two degrees of proximity to the zero-point of the deictic context, which are expressed by means of demonstratives *this/these* and *that/those*, that is to say, there is a two-way contrast, as Fillmore (1971: 222) states. The place deictics *this/these* and *that/those*, as a rule, are speaker-centred. They are also distance-oriented, i.e. they view the referent in terms of proximity or distance to the speaker and are respectively called proximal (*this/these*) or distal (*that/those*) in relation to the speaker. Among other deictics in English are the adverbs *here, there, where, left, right, up, down, above, below, in front, behind* and verbs *come, go, bring and take* (cf. Grundy 2000: 28). These are interpreted with respect to such contextual factors as the location of the participants.

---

5 The English system of two degrees of proximity to the speaker evolved from a three degree system that included the Old English *yonder*. (cf. Barnhard 1988: 1254)
in the deictic context, direction of gaze, and so forth (cf. Lyons 1977, 2: 646). An example of place deixis and the dependence of its interpretation on the location of the speaker was demonstrated in the aforementioned example (1).

The last category in the traditional deictic triad is time deixis. It relates the temporal moments of utterance to other temporal events in the discourse; it “encodes times on co-ordinates anchored to the time of utterance” (Levinson 1983: 62). Time deixis is expressed by means of deictic time adverbials that include but are not limited to now, then, today, tomorrow, yesterday, later, soon, before, and so on. In the following example, the relation to the time of the utterance is essential for establishing the correct reference:

7. I hope you’re going to do well this year. (Grundy 2000: 31)

Since this year may mean the calendrical year, the academic year, the fiscal year or a year from the birthday of a person, it is impossible to identify the meaning of (7) without relying on contextual parameters: the utterance was pronounced by a father to his daughter at the beginning of September. Thus, this year refers to the academic year.

1.2.3. “Marginal” deictic categories

With the above-mentioned threefold distinction of person, place and time deixis, Fillmore (1975: 103-107) singles out discourse deixis, as well as social deixis, and Lakoff (1974: 346) draws attention to emotional deixis. These three categories of deixis are called “marginal” categories (Kryk 1987: 23).

According to Fillmore (1975: 70-71) and Levinson (1983: 85-86), discourse deixis, also defined by Lyons (1977: 2, 667) as textual deixis, deals with the use of lexical and grammatical expressions within some utterance that is embodied in a certain discourse part, in which the preceding and following parts are essential for correct interpretation. In order to trace discourse deixis, it is worth investigating the use of indexicals in the discourse. In this thesis I will primarily focus on the demonstratives this/these and that/those which respectively refer to either immediately preceding or immediately following parts of the discourse, as in these examples taken from Levinson (1983: 85):
8. I bet you haven’t heard this story.

9. That was the funniest story I’ve ever heard.

This story in (8) refers to a story that the speaker is going to narrate and that in (9) relates to the previously narrated story.

According to Lyons (1977, 2: 668) and Levinson (1983: 86), some difficulties might arise when trying to differentiate between discourse deixis and anaphora. The first attempt to differentiate between these two notions was made by Appolonius Dyskolus in the 2nd century AD. He stressed that anaphora “points back” and deixis “points at” (Consten 2003: 224). However, the distinction is not as apparent as it may seem at first.

The term anaphora comes from Greek and means ‘renewed reference’ (Ehlich 1982: 315; Consten 2003: 224). Quoting Mey, anaphora is “the pure function of referring to earlier mentions” (Mey [2001]: 58), as in (10):

10. Harry’s a sweetheart; he’s so considerate. (Levinson 1983: 86)

where anaphoric he refers to the previously mentioned person Harry. Comparing examples (8), (9) and (10) we see that the basic difference between anaphora and deixis is in the following: an anaphoric referring expression is co-referential with the previously mentioned person or object, whereas a deictic referring expression refers to the whole portion of the discourse and not to a single entity. Thus, we can say that anaphora is a semantic phenomenon, whereas deixis is more a pragmatic phenomenon.

In some cases, the same referring expression can function both as anaphora and deixis, as in a famous example from Lyons:

11. I was born in London and have lived there all my life. (Lyons 1977, 2: 676)

There is anaphoric, since it is co-referential with a preceding entity London. On the other hand, distal there in contrast to proximal here stresses that the position of the encoder of the utterance is outside of London. This explanation supports the statement that there in the context of (11) is used place deictically. If in some contextual situations, as seen in example (11), anaphora and deixis are not mutually exclusive notions (cf. Levinson 1983: 86), some discourse extracts also have a use of the demonstratives this/that that does not fall into either of the two categories.
Consider this example:

12. X: I’ve never even seen him.
    Y: That’s a lie. (Lyons 1977, 2: 668)

The use of *that* in (12) cannot be characterised as anaphoric, since it does not have a correlated clearly definable antecedent. Nor is it discourse deictic, as *that* does not refer to the portion of the whole discourse but rather to the proposition of a single preceding utterance. Such a use of *this/that* that has features of both discourse deixis and anaphora is called impure textual deixis (Lyons: 1977, 2: 668).

Another “marginal” deictic use is emotional deixis also called empathetic deixis (Lyons 1977, 2: 677). It occurs when there is a shift between the referring expressions *this* and *that*, *here* and *there*, *now* and *then* which are organized with respect to opposition between proximal and distal orientation. If the speaker is emotionally involved in the discourse, he/she may prefer proximal indexicals over distal; whereas if the speaker dissociates himself/herself from the entity he/she is referring to, the distal indexical is selected, as in example (13) where the demonstrative *that* expresses the emotional dissociation of the speaker with the beaver referred to:

13. Get *that* beaver out of this house. (Rauh 1983: 40)

However, the degree of emotional involvement of the speaker does not always motivate the choice of the demonstrative. In some discourses, both demonstratives *this* and *that* can be used in the same situational context without a change in meaning. Consider the following examples:

14. a. *This* is it!
    b. *That* is it! (Levinson 1987: 81)

The speaker is looking through a tin of needles for a particular kind and when he/she finds it he utters (14.a.) or (14.b.), the meaning of which are identical even though two different demonstratives are used. These examples demonstrate that the proximal/distal dimension of *this* and *that* has been neutralised; it is insignificant with regard to utterance meaning.

The last “marginal” deictic use is social deixis or attitudinal deixis, as Verschueren (1999: 20) calls it. This deals with the use of language forms that indicate a social distinction between the discourse participants. Social deixis concerns the aspects of
sentences “which reflect or establish or are determined by certain realities of the social situation in which the speech act occurs” (Fillmore 1997: 112).

Many languages manifest the difference in the social relationship between the interlocutors by means of differentiating between a familiar form and a reverential form (cf. Brown & Gilman 1960: 254-257), in other words, an informal T-form (cf. Latin *tu*) and a formal V-form (cf. Latin *vos*) (cf. Kryk-Kastovsky & Kastovsky 1997: 1672). The English language, however, does not have these manifestations any longer. Moreover, there is no vastly developed system of pronouns to distinguish age, sex and social status, as in the Japanese language, for instance. Instead, other devices that express power asymmetry are used in English. Their choice depends on similar appropriateness conditions that are required from the T-/V-forms. These alternative devices include but are not limited to honorifics; plain, polite, intimate, insulting expressions; as well as names, titles and kinship terms, the usage of which depends on the relationships between the participants of the conversation (cf. Fillmore 1997: 61, 112).

One of the important manifestations of social deixis in a language is honorifics. Honorifics are language forms, such as pronouns, vocative expressions, titles of address and the like (Verschueren 1999: 21), used to encode the high status of the interlocutor. They emphasize social distance between the speaker and the addressee(s) by using a purposefully selected address form in a certain context (cf. Mey [2001]: 337). Some examples of honorifics in English include *Mr, Mrs, Miss, Dr, Your Honour, Mr President, Sir*, et cetera.

The use of honorifics, as well as other social deixtics, in context depends on the power discrepancy between the discourse participants. Brown & Gilman (1960: 257-259) single out symmetrical (reciprocal) and asymmetrical (non-reciprocal) ways of exchanging address forms, which are differentiated on the basis of power. The symmetrical way of exchanging address forms demonstrates that all participants of the discourse share similar social roles and, therefore, mutually use the terms of address with an identical degree of formality. If the relationships between

---

6 The historical *thou* and *ye*, which were the second person singular and plural pronouns, respectively, existed before the Norman Conquest in 1066 AD. Later in the thirteenth century, *ye* semantically expanded to refer to reverential singular. In the seventeenth century *thou*/*ye* forms were replaced by the *you*-form to refer to both second person singular and plural (cf. Baugh & Cable 1993).
participants are close, the degree of formality is low and they are addressed with first names, for instance. However, if the discourse participants do not know each other well, the degree of formality between them is high and they use titles as address forms. The symmetrical way of exchanging address forms is called solidarity (ibid: 258). On the other hand, the asymmetrical address forms emphasize social inequality between the participants. Depending on such bases of power as physical strength, wealth, age, sex, social context, kinship relationship and the level of emotional solidarity (cf. Brown & Gilman 1960: 255; Fillmore (1997: 116), discourse participants use nonreciprocal address forms, i.e. some of them use the implicit formal V-form and others use the informal T-forms. Thus, if the participants practice symmetrical ways of addressing each other, they unanimously use either T- or V-forms. If however, they practice an asymmetrical way of addressing each other, some participants use T-forms, whereas others use the V-form. It is the social appropriateness of the discourse situation that determines the choice of the correct form of address.

1.3. Non-deictic use

So far I have discussed the main deictic uses, as well as a non-deictic anaphoric application of deixis. Now I will focus on examples where deictic expressions are used non-deictically. Non-deictic uses make no reference to the identity of the speaker, nor to a location relative to the speaker, nor to the moment the utterance has been produced (cf. Grundy 2000: 243). “Their interpretation does not depend on the actual speech context in which they are produced” (Fillmore 1982: 36), as the following examples from Levinson (1983: 66) demonstrate:

15. You can never tell what sex they are nowadays.

16. Now, that’s not what I said.

17. Oh, I did this and that.

In these three examples of non-deixis, identifying the referent does not depend on knowing the point of origin of the utterance. In (15) you bears a general reference and does not refer to any particular individual. Indeed, Grundy (2000: 24) says “being present when the sentence was uttered would not help to identify a referent”. Now in (16) is also a non-deictic expression; it is used as a discourse particle, like
Discourse particles or discourse markers, as Schiffrin calls them are “sequentially dependent elements which bracket units of talk” (Schiffrin 1987: 31). Their purpose in the discourse is to facilitate communication and help the reader draw a correct inference (cf. Aijmer 2002: 2). *This and that* in (17) is also used non-deictically. The phrase has acquired an idiomatic status and means that a speaker “did a variety of things that he/she does not want to specify” (COBUILD Advanced Learner’s English Dictionary on CD-ROM).

Deixis has been an area of interest for many pragmatists, since it primarily deals with language representation and context. My task in Chapter 4 will be to elucidate the peculiarities of deictic examples in *Alice in Wonderland*. However, before tackling the pragmatic analysis of deixis, I will first outline the main theoretical aspects of presupposition and implicature. The subject of the following chapter is presupposition.

### 2. Presupposition

Presupposition is considered one of the most frequently researched pragmatic notions, with perhaps the exception of speech acts (Levinson 1983: 167). It has been the subject of study of both semantics and pragmatics. In order to define and determine presupposition in a discourse correctly, it is important to encompass its semantic and pragmatic characteristics and to see how pragmatic rules collaborate with semantic representations in a discourse. However, before plunging into the interrelation between semantics and pragmatics, it is worth discussing presupposition solely in terms of semantics.

#### 2.1. The semantic approach to presupposition

Semantics provides the following approach to presupposition:

Sentence A semantically presupposes another sentence B iff:
(a) in all situations where A is true, B is true
(b) in all situations where A is false, B is true. (Levinson 1983: 175)

As seen from the definition, semantic presupposition is based on rigid truth-condition and logical consequence, that is, it proceeds from the assumption that truth or falsity
are the main criteria (Mey [2001]: 184). Keenan applies the attribute ‘logical’ to semantic presupposition and gives a similar definition:

Sentence S logically presupposes sentence S’ just in case S logically implies S’, and the negation of S, […] also logically implies S’.

(Keenan 1998: 9)

That is to say, for sentence S to be either true or false, there should be a precondition that S’ is true. If, however, S’ is not true then sentence S does not bear any truth value.

As seen from both definitions, semantic presupposition is based on the truth or falsity of isolated sentences. No context is needed to trigger semantic presupposition. For the reasons adduced, semantic presupposition is called conventional or not context-determined.

2.1.1. Historical background

The phenomenon of presupposition has its roots in philosophy and logic. The first philosopher who tackled the central questions of presupposition was Gottlob Frege. In 1892, he characterised proper names and temporal clauses as linguistic expressions with presupposition-generating behaviour (cf. Levinson 1983: 167). According to Frege, if a sentence contains a proper name, it presupposes that the referent of this proper name exists:

18. Kepler died in misery.

18’. Kepler existed. (Frege 1892 [1969]: 52)

As Frege says, the assertion of (18) introduces a presupposition that the proper name refers to an existing individual. Thus, if there is a sentence (18), there is a presupposition (18’). Similarly, he explained the presupposition-triggering nature of temporal clauses: in a complex sentence the statement which is formulated in a subordinate clause after a time adverbial is the sentence’s presupposition. Thus, sentence (19) makes sense only if (19’) is its presupposition:

19. After the separation of Schleswig-Holstein from Denmark, Prussia and Austria quarrelled.

19’. Schleswig-Holstein was separated from Denmark. (Frege 1892 [1969]: 56)
Frege elaborated the theory of sense and reference and claimed that even sentences that have no reference in the real world are meaningful, i.e. they have sense. His statement is based on his theory that all proper names have sense, i.e. meaning (cf. Chapman 2000: 57). For instance, if the individual Kepler does not exist, sentence (18) still has a meaning. In such a case, however, sentence (18) fails to have a presupposition and is regarded as neither true nor false. Frege attributed the existence of sentences with no real referents to the imperfection of the language.

Frege’s concepts opened the way for further investigation of presuppositional theories. Bertrand Russell was the next scholar who contributed significantly to the theory of presupposition. In his work *On denoting* (1905), he opposed Frege’s view. As an alternative, Russell suggested a theory of descriptions where he differentiated between definite descriptions and proper names. In the framework of the former he analysed such examples as *the highest mountain in the Alps, the northern-most town in Europe, the Prime Minister of Britain*, and so on (cf. Collin & Guldmann 2005: 45; Chapman 2000: 58) and claimed that definite descriptions, contrary to proper names, describe, yet do not refer to particular individuals. Russell’s famous example below elucidates his linguistic beliefs:

20. The present king of France is bald. (Russell 1905: 483 quoted in Lyons 1977, 1: 182)

According to Russell, this sentence can be segmented into three components:

a) There exists a king of France.

b) There is at most one king of France.

c) There is nothing which has the property of being king of France and which does not also have a property of being bald.

Russell says that in order for sentence (20) to be true, the components (a) and (c) have to be fulfilled. However, component (a) cannot be fulfilled, as France was no longer a monarchy at the time of the utterance, that is, in 1905. In such a case, the definite description *the present king of France* fails to refer to a particular king and (20) does not denote anything. Russell’s conclusion is the following: sentence (20) is false, since it fails to fulfil the existential claim.

Russell’s theory of definite descriptions was well-received; it greatly influenced many philosophers of his time. Only forty-five years later, in 1950, did Strawson’s views challenge it. Strawson did not argue whether Russell’s sentence (20) held
meaning; neither did he refute the theory that for the sentences to bear truth value, the constituents of it have to be true. What he disputed was Russell’s assertion that sentence (20) was false if the existential constituent (a) was false. Strawson formulated the difference between sentences and statements claiming that only statements, as particular uses of sentences can be false or bear truth value. Thus, statement (20) in the time of the French monarchy bears truth value. Conversely, in the time of Strawson, the same statement (20) can be neither true nor false, as there is no king of France. As Strawson pointed out, there should be a precondition in order to declare a statement true or false. He singled out (20’) to be a precondition of (20):

20’. There is a present king of France.

He contended that “a statement A presupposes a statement B iff B is a precondition of the truth or falsity of A” (Strawson 1952.[1971]: 175).

His views on presuppositional phenomena were similar to those of his forerunner Frege. Both considered sentences like (20) meaningful and both shared the view that definite descriptions presuppose that their entities exist. If the presupposition (a) is false, the definite description — the king of France — fails to refer. Consequently, the question as to sentence (20) does or does not bear any truth value does not arise.

2.1.2. Presuppositional constancy under negation

Strawson also shared Frege’s view that if a sentence is negated, its presupposition does not result in inconsistency and stays intact:

21. John managed to stop in time.

21.a. John did not manage to stop in time.

21’. John tried to stop in time.

21’’. John stopped in time. (Levinson 1983: 178)

As can be seen from the examples, there is a shared element (21’) between an affirmative sentence (21) and its negated variant (21.a.). The statements (21) and (21.a.) do not agree about the validity of (21’’) but they both presuppose the validity of (21’). Hence, according to the definition of presupposition⁷, (21’) is the presupposition of (21) and (21.a.). It retains its truth value in an affirmative and a

---

⁷ see Levinson’s and Keenan’s definition of semantic presupposition mentioned earlier in this chapter on p. 14-15
negated variant of the sentence. The ability of presupposition to survive negation is characterised as *presuppositional constancy under negation* or *survival property of presupposition* (Mey [2001]: 28). The feature of constancy under negation is also embedded in the semantic definition of presupposition and serves as a distinguishing feature between presupposition and entailment. The latter is defined as:

A relation between sentences such that the truth of the second necessarily follows from the truth of the first. (Kempson 1975: 48)

Sentence A semantically entails sentence B under the condition that when sentence A is true, sentence B is also true. Thus, (21) entails (21’’) but (21.a.) does not entail (21’’). As can be seen, the manner of linguistic behaviour under negation makes a pivotal semantic distinction between presupposition and entailment: it is entailment that alters under negation, whereas presupposition, if negated, survives.

### 2.1.3. The detachability of presupposition

The examples above demonstrate that semantic presupposition is negation-surviving and conventional. Another property that is inherent to presupposition is its detachability (cf. Grice 1981: 198). Consider the following examples:

22. John didn’t manage to reach the summit.

22’. John tried to reach the summit.

22. a. John didn’t reach the summit. (Levinson 1983: 116)

The examples make apparent that (22’), which is a presupposition of (22), is attached to the semantic form *manage* and not to the content of the whole utterance; that is, if the utterance (22) is substituted by the synonymous one (22.a.), the presupposition (22’) is lost. As Levinson (1983: 223) says, the presuppositional “inferences seem to be attached directly to certain aspects of the surface form of linguistic expressions”, that is, presuppositions are form-bound.

### 2.1.4. Types of presupposition

Semantic presuppositions are often associated with certain lexemes or structures that determine their type. The table below contains different types of presuppositions, illustrated with examples that have been singled out by Yule (cf. 1996: 27-30):
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Type</th>
<th>Example</th>
<th>Presupposition</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Existential</td>
<td>23. Your car</td>
<td>23'. The car exists</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>24. The King of Sweden</td>
<td>24'. The King of Sweden exists</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Factive</td>
<td>25. Everybody knows that John is gay.</td>
<td>25'. John is gay.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>26. She didn’t realize he was ill.</td>
<td>26'. He was ill.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>27. We regret telling him.</td>
<td>27'. We told him.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>28. I wasn’t aware that she was married.</td>
<td>28'. She was married.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>29. It isn’t odd that he left early.</td>
<td>29'. He left early.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>30. I’m glad that it’s over.</td>
<td>30'. It’s over.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Non-factive</td>
<td>31. I dreamed that I was rich.</td>
<td>31'. I was not rich.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>32. We imagined we were in Hawaii.</td>
<td>32'. We were not in Hawaii.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>33. He pretends to be ill.</td>
<td>33'. He is not ill.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lexical</td>
<td>34. He managed to do something.</td>
<td>34'. He tried to do something.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>35. He stopped smoking.</td>
<td>35'. He used to smoke.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>36. They started complaining.</td>
<td>36'. They were not complaining before.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>37. You’re late again.</td>
<td>37'. You were late before.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Structural</td>
<td>38. When did he leave?</td>
<td>38'. He left.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Counterfactual</td>
<td>39. If you were my friend, you would have helped me.</td>
<td>39'. You are not my friend.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 1: Types of presuppositions

As can be seen in examples (23) and (24), possessive structures and noun phrases generate existential presuppositions. Such verbs as *know, realize, regret, be aware, be odd, be glad* trigger factive presuppositions because the complement of the sentence containing these verbs can be treated as a true fact (see examples (25) – (30)). Unlike factive presuppositions, non-factive presuppositions are not assumed to be true facts. The negated information of the complement expressed after non-factive verbs *dream, imagine, pretend* is the sentence’s presupposition. Thus, these lexemes do not presuppose the truth of what they govern (see examples (31) – (33)). Lexical presuppositions are triggered by such lexemes as *manage, stop, start, again* which
presuppose a concept not explicitly stated in the sentence containing these lexemes. Accordingly, manage presupposes the concept of trying seriously, as in (34); stop and again, presuppose the concept of having done something before, as in (35) and (37) respectively; start bears the presupposition of commencing an activity that has not been done before (see (36)). Structural presuppositions, as the name indicates, are generated by certain structures, as for instance, wh-questions. Wh-questions are those types of questions that are introduced with such interrogative pronouns or pronominal adverbs as who, what, when, where, why. They presuppose the truth of the information expressed after the wh-form, as in (38). The last type in Yule’s list of presuppositions is counterfactual presuppositions. Sentences with counterfactual presuppositions presuppose the opposite information from the information stated in the antecedent — the if-clause, for example in (39).

So far I have provided a semantic account of presupposition which is pillared on truth-condition. The examples have demonstrated that semantic presupposition works within isolated sentences and disregards the role of the speaker and the addressee, as well as the contextual surrounding of the utterance. Now I turn to analysing another kind of presupposition, namely pragmatic presupposition. Special attention is drawn to presuppositional behaviour in the contextual environment, as well as to the dependence of presupposition on speaker’s and addressee’s beliefs. In the coming sub-chapter I tackle the properties of pragmatic presupposition, including context appropriateness, shared presuppositional assumptions between interlocutors and the defeasibility of presupposition. Last but not least, I demonstrate how the presuppositions of a complex sentence depend upon the presuppositions of its parts. In doing so, I analyse the behaviour of Karttunen’s holes, plugs and filters in the framework of projection problem.

2.2. The pragmatic approach to presupposition

Semantic and pragmatic presuppositions are not mutually exclusive notions. On the contrary, they are reciprocally complementary. As Karttunen says,

> [t]here is no conflict between the semantic and the pragmatic concepts of presupposition. They are related, albeit different notions.

(Karttunen 1973: 170)
Pragmatic presupposition, contrary to its semantic counterpart, involves both the speaker and the addressee. The speaker presupposes something, that is, he/she takes the truth of the proposition for granted and expects that the addressee does the same.

The term *pragmatic presupposition* was first used by philosopher Robert Stalnaker in 1974; he pointed out its dependence on context, as well as on assumptions and beliefs shared by the speaker and the addressee:

A proposition P is a pragmatic presupposition of a speaker in a given context just in case the speaker assumes or believes that P, assumes or believes that his addressee assumes or believes that P, and assumes or believes that his addressee recognizes that he is making these assumptions, or has these beliefs. (Stalnaker 1974 [1998]: 18)

Since Stalnaker’s times many definitions of pragmatic presupposition have been proposed. Scholars used different terminology and viewed pragmatic presupposition in connection with different factors: for instance, Stalnaker (1974) accentuated the role of the speaker and the difference between sentences and statements; Thomason (1973) emphasized the role of conversational implicature in defining presupposition, et cetera (cf. Gazdar 1979: 104). Despite these discrepancies, they still seem to agree on the following statements:

I. Pragmatic presupposition is based on contextual appropriateness and a shared *linguistic context of the utterance*. It embraces background assumptions, mutual for the speaker and the addressee. Thus, if a speaker utters (40), he relies on the assumption that his/her audience shares the presupposition that he/she owns a car (40‘):

   40. I’m sorry I’m late, I’m afraid my car broke down.

   40’. The speaker has a car. (Levinson 1983: 205)

II. Pragmatic presupposition, contrary to its semantic counterpart, is sensitive to context and background beliefs. It is defeasible, which means that it is liable to disappear if the discourse context does not license it or when the addressee’s background beliefs contradict it. Alternatively, Kadmon (2001: 146) says, pragmatic

---

8 There is a detailed list of definitions in Gazdar (1979: 103-105).

9 The term *linguistic context of the utterance* was first used by Karttunen (1973: 170); it is synonymous with Levinson’s *mutual knowledge*, also called *common ground* and *joint assumption* (cf. Levinson 1983: 205).
presupposition does not disappear, but is “appropriately satisfied by the context in which the sentence is uttered”. Consider the following examples:

41. Sue cried before she finished her thesis.

41.a. Sue died before she finished her thesis. (Levinson 1983: 187)

According to the rules of presupposition-triggering temporal clauses, the information positioned after the time adverbial before is the sentence’s presupposition, i.e. (41’) should be the presupposition of both (41) and (41.a.):

41’. She finished her thesis.

However, reasonable background assumptions conflict with the statement that (41’) is the presupposition of (41.a.): Sue cannot finish the thesis after her death. Consequently, this example demonstrates that if presupposition clashes with common beliefs and assumptions, it is subject to cancellation.

III. Due to its context-sensitivity, pragmatic presupposition manifests another property, namely projection problem. This deals with presuppositional behaviour in complex sentences and demonstrates how the presuppositions of a complex sentence depend upon the presuppositions of its constituents. There are certain complement-taking predicates, known as holes, plugs and filters that are characterised by a different presupposition-triggering nature (cf. Karttunen 1973: 173).

Holes, for instance, allow presuppositions of the complement sentence to be presuppositions of the complex sentence. Therefore, Morgan’s “cumulative hypothesis” (cf. Morgan 1969 referred to in Karttunen 1973: 172) — which states that the presupposition of a complex sentence results in the sum of presuppositions of its constituent sentences — works. Holes are manifested through structures like:

| Know, regret, understand, surprise, be significant, begin, stop, continue, manage, be possible, force, prevent + that + subordinate clause |

Consider the following examples (42) – (42’’):

42. Mary forced Fred to stop beating his wife.

42’. Fred stopped beating his wife.

42’’. Fred used to beat his wife. (Karttunen 1973: 176)
(42’’) is presupposed by (42’) and is also a presupposition of all complex sentences in which (42’) is a subordinate clause, as long as the sentence’s predicates are holes. Thus, (42’’) is a presupposition of (42), since the predicate force is a hole.

Plugs, contrary to holes, are not presupposition-triggering because they do not allow presupposition of the complement sentence to become the presupposition of a complex sentence (cf. Kempson 1975: 70; Grice 1981: 195). Karttunen’s list of plugs includes:

| Verbs of saying (say tell, reply, mention, ask, promise, warn, request, etc) + that + subordinate clause. |

The function of plugs is to provide a report, not a guarantee that a report has a truth value. Consider the following example, where the presupposition of the infinitival clause in isolation is not the presupposition of the complex sentence.

43. Cecilia asked Fred to kiss her again.

43’. Fred had kissed Cecilia before. (Karttunen 1973: 173)

The infinitival clause alone, with an iterative again, presupposes (43’). However, the whole complex sentence (43), introduced with a plug verb ask, does not presuppose its complement (43’).

Filters, in their turn, may be defined as presupposition-triggering or non-presupposition-triggering depending on the context and linguistic circumstances. Consider the following example where a factive verb, regret, does not demonstrate expected presupposition-generating behaviour:

44. Either John will not in the end do linguistics, or he will regret doing it. (Levinson 1983: 196)

The constituent clause he will regret doing it triggers the presupposition (44’):

44’. John will do linguistics.

However, the first constituent of the sentence John will not in the end do linguistics does not allow (44’) to become the presupposition of the entire sentence (44). Thus, regret loses its ability to presuppose the truth of its complement. That is, regret appears to be a filter because in some contexts it lets the presupposition through, whereas in others it behaves as a presupposition-blocking predicate.
The examples above have demonstrated the essence of the projection problem: pragmatic presupposition of a complex sentence cannot be defined as a sum of presuppositions of its constituent clauses; it has to be uniquely determined by context (cf. Karttunen 1973: 174).

The subject of interest of the following chapter also depends extensively on the context of the utterance. I am talking about the pragmatic concept of implicature.

3. Implicature

3.1. Implicature in the framework of pragmatics

Implicature is a pragmatic notion that provides an explanation that semantics fails to provide: it offers reasons why some portions of a discourse mean more than they literally express, i.e. they implicitly convey the information that is not explicitly stated by the speaker. Compared to the notion of presupposition and deixis, the theory of implicature is relatively young. It was coined and elaborated by P. Grice in his lectures at Harvard in 1967, followed by a published work in 1975. After Grice (1975 [1998b]: 152-153), Gazdar defines implicature as:

A proposition that is implied by the utterance of a sentence in a context even though that proposition is not a part of nor an entailment of what was actually said. (Gazdar 1979: 38)

Grice singles out conventional and conversational implicature. The former “arise[s] solely because of conventional features of the words employed in an utterance” (Gazdar 1979: 38). It does not depend on context; neither does it depend on conversational rules. It is purely based on the semantic meaning of a word or construction. Unlike conventional implicature, conversational implicature is context-anchored and strongly dependent on communication rules; it is not bound to the literal meaning of a single lexeme.

Conversational implicatures can be divided into two types: generalized and particularized. The former are context-free, default implicatures (cf. Levinson 2000:

---

10 According to Grice (1975 [1998b]: 145-161) and Gazdar (1979: 41), Grice himself does not give a clear definition of implicature but suggests typical characteristics of it.

11 For instance, but conventionally implicates the contrast between the elements connected with it; whereas conjunction and does not bear the implicature of contrast.
11) that arise in no matter what conversational situation they occur; the latter are context-bound implicatures that vary depending on the circumstances in which the utterance is made (cf. Grice 1975 [1998b]: 159). Thus, (45’), below, is a generalized implicature of (45), since no additional contextual premises are required to infer (45’):

45. I walked into a house.

45’. The house was not my house. (Levinson 1983: 126)

Let us consider the following phrase exchange and its possible particularized implicatures in different contexts:

46. What does Julian do when he’s not at the hairdresser’s?
   He waits for boys in the restroom of the Y.M.C.A. (Gazdar 1979: 39)

A possible implicature of (46) could be that Julian is a homosexual. However, if additional information that Julian works as a school truancy officer is added, (46) will not bear the same implicature any more. Given different contexts, completely different implicatures are inferred, i.e. “there are as many implicatures as there are contexts” (Grundy 2000: 82).

Conversational implicatures arise from certain principles of cooperative communication which Grice (1975 [1998b]: 148-150) formulated within the framework of the Cooperative Principle and its attending four maxims:

**The Cooperative Principle:** make your contribution such as is required, at the stage at which it occurs, by the accepted purpose and direction of the talk exchange in which you are engaged.

**The maxim of Quality:** try to make your contribution one that is true, specifically:
   a) do not say what you believe to be false
   b) do not say that for which you lack adequate evidence

**The maxim of Quantity**
   c) make your contribution as informative as is required (for the current purposes of the exchange)
   d) do not make your contribution more informative than is required

**The maxim of Relevance:** be relevant

**The maxim of Manner:** be perspicuous:
   e) avoid obscurity of expression
   f) avoid ambiguity
Apart from the classification of conversational implicatures into generalized and particularized, there are other two kinds of conversational implicature. The first kind, as Grice (1975 [1998b]: 154) says, are implicatures that arise from observing the maxims, as in (47):

47. A: (to passer by): I’ve just run out of petrol  
   B: Oh, there’s a garage just around the corner (ibid.: 154)

B’s reply implies that speaker A can get some petrol in a nearby garage. In that way, speaker B abides by the maxim of Relevance.

However, often the speaker purposefully breaches the maxims but still manages to communicate successfully. In such cases, the second kind of implicature, which arises from flouting the maxims, comes into play, as shown in (48):

48. A: Let’s get the kids something  
   B: Okay, but I veto I-C-E C-R-E-A-M-S. (Levinson 1981: 104)

Speaker B flouts the sub-maxim of Manner “avoid obscurity”, because he/she does not say plainly *ice-cream*, but instead provides a more elaborate spelled-out variant of it. According to Grice (1975 [1998b]: 150), if a maxim is intentionally flouted, it is done with the purpose of conveying an additional unstated meaning; otherwise, the utterance may appear to be a faulty contribution to a talk. In (48) speaker B flouts the maxim with the purpose of encoding the word *ice-cream* for children because he/she does not want to buy any for them. In spite of the deliberate maxim exploitation, speaker A still understands B’s message perfectly well. The examples above show that conversational implicature arises when the speaker either observes the maxims or, in the case of the maxims being flouted, he/she observes the Cooperative Principle.

---

12 Since the Gricean formulation of these four maxims, there have been attempts to reduce them (cf. Atlas and Levinson 1981; Levinson 1997 [2000]). Sperber and Wilson (1986) minimised them to one single principle of Relevance. In my thesis, however, I will adhere to the Gricean principles of successful communication.
3.2. The properties of implicature

Conversational implicature is characterised by these properties: defeasibility, non-detachability, calculability, indeterminacy and non-conventionality (cf. Grice 1975 [1998b]: 160-161).

As far as its defeasibility or cancellability is concerned, implicature may be cancelled if additional premises inconsistent with the inference are explicitly or contextually added. This feature is well observed in example (46): the implicature *Julian is a homosexual* can be easily cancelled if we provide additional information about Julian’s job as a school truancy officer.

Grice maintains that conversational implicatures, as distinct from presuppositions, are non-detachable. They are attached to the semantic content, not to the linguistic form of the utterance, except for the implicatures arising under the maxim of Manner. By these means, the implicature remains intact if an utterance is changed for a synonymous one. Levinson (1983: 116-117) demonstrates this property of implicature by the following example of an ironic statement (49) which implies (49‘):

49. John’s a genius.

49’. John’s an idiot.

If (49) is substituted by any of the following synonymous utterances (49.a.), that is, if the surface form of the utterance is changed, the ironic interpretation (49’) still remains common for (49) and (49.a.):

49.a. John’s a mental prodigy
      John’s an exceptionally clever human being
      John’s an enormous intellect
      John’s a big brain. (Levinson 1983: 116-117)

The example demonstrates that implicatures are not form-bound; they are adherent to the semantic content of an utterance.

Implicature is characterized by calculability, i.e. it can be inferred or calculated by the hearers from the conversation on the basis of contextual knowledge. At the same time, implicature of the same expression can vary depending on the context and on the hearers that draw inferences. Many utterances acquire a different tinge of meaning when the context in which they occur changes (cf. Brown & Yule 1983:
36). Hence, implicatures are not fully determinable (cf. Verschueren 1998: 35), as (50) demonstrates:

50. It’s the taste. (Grundy 2000: 70)

The hearer starts the process of inferring by choosing the most suitable meaning of the phrase in the given context. Thus, the caption (50) in the Coca-Cola advertisement implies that the taste is good, whereas the same sentence uttered in a school biscuit barrel with a poor choice of biscuits draws an opposite implicature. Thus, understanding pragmatic meaning of implicature involves determining a context that will make sense of an utterance.

The last but not the least significant property of conversational implicature is its non-conventionality, which holds that an implied meaning is not part of a conventional literal meaning; it is a variable context-dependent meaning.

In Chapter 6, I take a closer look at conversational implicatures in *Alice in Wonderland* and demonstrate that in some contexts Alice and the Wonderland creatures communicate more than they actually say.

The second part of this thesis deals with the analysis proper of the above-discussed pragmatic concepts, viz. deixis, presupposition and implicature.
Part II
Analysis of pragmatic concepts in Alice in Wonderland

This part of the thesis deals with analysing examples of deixis, presupposition and implicature in Alice in Wonderland on the basis of the theoretical knowledge provided in Part I. In order to fully understand and correctly interpret Alice in Wonderland, the reader has to apply the main pragmatic concepts to the analysis. The reason for this, as Lakoff says (1993: 368), is the subversiveness of the book. Alice in Wonderland provokes the reader to doubt that the language people use always works as a means for successful communication. Instead, the book models the fact that language often functions as a tool for confusion and prejudice and as a differentiator between social power and solidarity:

[…] the subversive content of [Alice in Wonderland] specifically undermines […] culture’s comfortable view of language: as an orderly, value-free, cognitive and social phenomenon. (Lakoff 1993: 368)

The relation of particular examples from Alice in Wonderland to pragmatics will help the reader interpret the author’s intentions and even, to some extent, dispel the cloud of notorious nonsense that hangs over the book. This is the purpose of the present part of the study.

4. Deixis

Deixis is presented prior to other pragmatic notions. The analysis is carried out within the theoretical framework introduced in Chapter 1. After clarifying the peculiarities of gestural versus symbolic use, I focus on Bühler’s traditional triad, viz. person, place and time deixis. I show the difference between two aspects of meaning, sense and reference, in the framework of person deixis. I also provide a pragmatic interpretation of some palpably absurd abstracts, as they may at first seem,
basing my analysis on the notion of discourse deixis and its relation to anaphora and cataphora. The occurrences of emotional deixis demonstrate how the degree of emotional involvement can change the pragmatic meaning of an utterance. I also concentrate on the relationship between the language choice and the social status of the participants, thus covering the subject of interest of social deixis. At the end of the chapter, examples of deictic referring expressions in their non-deictic use are presented and discussed.

4.1. Gestural versus symbolic deixis

When referring to gestural deixis, Fillmore (1982: 46) emphasizes the importance of movements and stances, so called *indexing acts*. “The physical aspect of the communication situation” (Fillmore 1997: 62) accompanies speech acts and intensifies their pragmatic meaning, as is demonstrated in the following examples:

51. ‘And who are these?’ said the Queen, *pointing* to the three gardeners who were lying round the rose-tree. (Carroll 1865 [2000]: 82)

52. ‘In *that* direction,’ the Cat said, *waving* its right paw round, ‘lives a Hatter: and in *that* direction,’ *waving* the other paw, ‘lives a March Hare. Visit either you like: they’re both mad.’ (Carroll 1865 [2000]: 65)

53. ‘*Here!*’ cried Alice, quite forgetting in the flurry of the moment how large she had grown in the last few minutes, and she *jumped up* in such a hurry that she tipped over the jury-box with the edge of her skirt. (Carroll 1865 [2000]: 117-118)

Each of these three instances has both elements of pure gestural deixis: namely, an indexical and an accompanying gesture, i.e. pointing. The indexical *these* in (51), uttered by the Queen, is followed by the actual pointing to the three gardeners. Similarly, the indexical *that* in (52), combined with the noun *direction*, is accompanied by the Cat waving his paw. The pointing serves as a clarification aid to the deictic *these* in (51) and *that direction* in (52). In example (53), Alice’s exclamation *here* is accompanied with her physical movement upwards. In this way, the combination of the referring expression *here* and the optical assistance accorded by *she jumped up* draws the hearer’s attention more intensively than the deictic *here* alone. The accompanying gestures of (51), (52) and (53) are additionally stressed by means of complementary linguistic descriptions, such as *pointing to the three*
gardeners in (51), waving its paw in (52) and she jumped up in (53). Thus, there is written evidence of pointing in (51), (52) and (53) which largely contributes to the right of these in (51), that direction in (52) and here in (53) to be undeniably called instances of pure gestural deictis.

The referring expressions in the next examples (54), (55), (56), (57) and (58) are also potentially considered gestural deictic or ostensive. I have expressed this proposition with some doubt for the following reason: when characterising a deictic in a written text as gestural, one has to be cautious. It is almost impossible to claim confidently that it is an example of gestural deixis, unless there is an obvious complementary linguistic description, as in examples (51), (52) and (53). Thus, in a written text, it is mostly indeterminable whether deictics are accompanied with ostension or free of it. I keep this point of caution in mind when analysing (54), (55), (56), (57) and (58):

54. A large rose-tree stood near the entrance of the garden: the roses growing on it were white, but there were three gardeners at it, busily painting them red. Alice thought this a very curious thing, and she went nearer to watch them, and just as she came up to them she heard one of them say, ‘Look out now, Five! Don’t go splashing paint over me like that!’

‘I couldn’t help it,’ said Five, in a sulky tone; ‘Seven jogged my elbow.’ (Carroll 1865 [2000]: 79)

55. They are waiting on the shingle—will you come and join the dance?
Will you, won’t you, will you, won’t you, will you join the dance?
Will you, won’t you, will you, won’t you, won’t you join the dance? (Carroll 1865 [2000]: 102)

56. As they walked off together, Alice heard the King say in a low voice, to the company generally, ‘You are all pardoned.’ (Carroll 1865 [2000]: 94)

57. The first thing she heard was a general chorus of ‘There goes Bill!’ then the Rabbit’s voice along—‘Catch him, you by the hedge!’ (Carroll 1865 [2000]: 43)

58. Five and Seven said nothing, but looked at Two. Two began in a low voice, ‘Why the fact is, you see, Miss, this here ought to have been a red rose-tree, and we put a white one in by mistake; and if the Queen was to find it out, we should all have our heads cut off, you know. (Carroll 1865 [2000]: 80)

In (54) one will fail to interpret the reference of the deictic that without an ostensive aid, since that is used without any previous mention of the way Five was splashing
the paint over his fellow. In this case, the explanation of the way the paint is splashed is gestural, and is most probably intensified by raised intonation and additional stress on *that* in the conversation. In the context of the Lobster-Quadrille (55), the singers are assumed to engage bystanders by pointing at them and attempting to involve them in dancing. In this case, referring accompanied by pointing carries the function of encouraging others to dance along. In the next two examples, (56) and (57), respectively, the reader can easily envisage the King pointing at the company while making his comment and the Rabbit indicating a particular creature while giving his order. In this case, both the King and the Rabbit choose particular addressees and identify them as referents. Analogically in (58), speaker Two is most probably indicating the location of the red rose-tree with his hand. Thus, the use of *that* in (54), *you* in (55), (56) and (57) and the use of *this here* in (58) can be called gestural deictic or ostensive.

In contrast to gestural deixis, no extralinguistic features are needed to determine symbolic deixis. The basic knowledge required for disambiguating the instances of symbolic deixis is of the spatio-temporal parameters of a particular conversation and the participant role assignment. Thus, the knowledge of the identity of the addressee will suffice to interpret the deictic reference of *you* and *yourself* in (59):

59. ‘What do you mean by that?’ said the Caterpillar sternly.
    ‘Explain yourself!’  (Carroll 1865 [2000]: 47)

As the utterance is context-anchored, the reader knows that the Caterpillar is addressing Alice using the pronoun *you*. Therefore, the reference is determined without the need for pointing. In the next example (60) no ostension is required to interpret the deictic reference of *here*:

60. ‘I can’t help it,’ said Alice very meekly: ‘I’m growing.’
    ‘You’ve no right to grow here,’ said the Dormouse.

Since the interpretation of (60) is relative to the Dormouse’s location, it is sufficient to understand from the context where it is situated at the moment of utterance. That is to say, the ability to re-establish the Dormouse’s perspective is vital for the correct interpretation of the referring expression *here*. The reader knows that the action takes place in the court, thus *here* is co-referential with the court.
In the following example taken from the Lobster-Quadrille sang by the Mock Turtle to Alice, the reader needs to know the location of participants in order to correctly interpret *The further off from England the nearer is to France*:

61. “What matters it how far we go?” his scaly friend replied.
    “There is another shore, you know, upon the other side.
    *The further off from England the nearer is to France*—
    Then turn not pale, beloved snail, but come and join the dance.
    (Carroll 1865 [2000]: 103)

At first, it seems that the reader cannot relate the proximity or distance to or from France/England without the knowledge of where the song characters are currently located. However, the interpretation appears to be easier when the reader applies the background knowledge that he/she possesses. The story takes place in England, thus England is the centre of orientation, that is, the Origo, for the participants. This fact permits the reader to claim that the song characters are moving across the English Channel towards France. By these means, the deictic nature of the *further* and the *nearer* has been clarified and the reference has been determined without any additional ostensive aid.

The examples of symbolic deixis are inexhaustible, since the scope of deixis in a discourse is borderless; deictic expressions are detected in over 90% of utterances (cf. Bar-Hillel 1970: 76 referred in Kryk 1987: 14). I now continue to investigate instances of deixis in *Alice in Wonderland* and turn to the analysis of one of the main categories of deixis, viz. person deixis.

### 4.2. Person deixis

#### 4.2.1. The ontological nature of the person deictic I

Person deixis is characterised by the notion of transiency, that is, impermanence and constant change in time. On the one hand, transiency is characterised as a philosophical notion and concerns the fact that *I* am different here and now from *I* there and then. On the other hand, the reference of deictic *I* changes depending on participants’ role assignment in the discourse. The following examples manifest the ontological status of the person deictic *I*. 
Alice’s fall down the rabbit hole is a dividing line between two worlds, real and imaginary. Thus, Alice feels as if there were two Alices, each one in each world. Her personality is split, as manifested in the following extract:

62. ‘Dear, dear! How queer everything is today! and yesterday things went on just as usual. I wonder if I’ve been changed in the night? Let me think: was I the same when I got up this morning? I almost think I remember feeling a little different. But, if I’m not the same, the next question is ‘Who in the world am I?’ Ah, that’s the great puzzle!” And she began thinking of all the children she knew that were of the same age as herself, to see if she could have been changed for any of them.” (Carroll 1865 [2000]: 23)

In addition to the change of worlds, Alice constantly undergoes bodily changes. She either grows or shrinks after drinking the contents of the bottle labelled “DRINK ME”, eating cakes, and biting a piece of a mushroom. All in all, Alice’s size transmogrifies twelve times in the course of the story:

63. This was not an encouraging opening for a conversation. Alice replied, rather shyly, ‘I — I hardly know, sir, just at present — at least I know who I was when I got up this morning, but I think I must have been changed several times since then.’ ‘What do you mean by that?’ said the Caterpillar sternly. ‘Explain yourself!’ ‘I can’t explain myself, I’m afraid, sir’ said Alice, ‘because I’m not myself, you see’ ‘I don’t see,’ said the Caterpillar. (Carroll 1865 [2000]: 47)

Such rapid size changes contribute to Alice’s doubt about her own personality (cf. Rackin 1991: 42). She thinks that she has turned into a different person. Her inability to do multiplications and answer easy geographical questions only reinforces her conviction that she is not she any more:

64. ‘I’m sure I’m not Ada,’ she said, ‘for her hair goes in such long ringlets, and mine doesn’t go in ringlets at all; and I’m sure I can’t be Mabel, for I know all sorts of things, and she, oh! she knows such a very little! Besides, she’s she, and I’m I, and—oh dear, how puzzling it all is! I’ll try if I know all the things I used to know. Let me see: four times five is twelve, and four times six is thirteen, and four times seven is—oh dear! I shall never get to twenty at that rate! However, the Multiplication Table doesn’t signify: let’s try Geography. London is the capital of Paris, and Paris is the capital of Rome, and Rome—no, that’s all wrong, I’m certain! I must have been changed for Mabel! (Carroll 1865 [2000]: 23-24)
Who am I then? Tell me that first, and then, if I like being that person, I'll come up: if not, I'll stay down here till I'm somebody else”— but, oh dear!’ cried Alice, with a sudden burst of tears. (Carroll 1865 [2000]: 23-24)

As seen from the extracts (62) to (65), Carroll raises the question of identity and stresses Alice’s quest for her ontological status. It seems to Alice that she has transformed into another Alice different from the original one. Thus she thinks that Alice II is not equal to Alice I, i.e. the girl in Wonderland can not be equated with the girl from the world above the ground. Actually, there are two Alices and the second must be called Mabel! (cf. example (64)) Considering the two different aspects of meaning, sense and reference (cf. Frege 1969: 40-66), it is noticeable that the names Alice and Mabel share the same referent but they differ in the senses. The name Alice refers to a girl that some time ago was sitting on the bank, then went down into the rabbit hole and found herself in Wonderland. The name Mabel in the context of (64) refers to the same girl. Hence the two names, Alice and Mabel, have an identical referent, i.e. the one person that both names designate. However, they have different senses, that is, different linguistic modes of presentation — “Art der Gegebenseins” (ibid.: 41).

To support this argument, the theory of possible worlds and Kripke’s rigid/non-rigid designators is noteworthy. Possible worlds, Kripke claims, “are stipulated, not discovered” (Kripke 1972: 267), i.e. the observer decides where they start and determines the border between the possible worlds and the actual world. Thus, we can assume that the world of Wonderland is a possible world with rules that drastically differ from the familiar rules of the real world. The rules of the possible world of Wonderland, like the rules of a foreign country (ibid.: 1972: 266), may cause confusion and chaos when assigned to the real world. They often negate what seems to be appropriate in the real world and suppose the opposite:

The properties an object has in a counterfactual [possible] world have nothing to do with the properties used to identify it in the actual world. (Kripke 1972: 271)

In the framework of possible worlds, Kripke (1972: 269-271) touches on the problem of “identity across possible worlds” or “transworld identification”. Alice’s fall can be interpreted symbolically as a transfer into a possible world of Wonderland, which differs from the real world above the ground. From the
perspective of a real world, the fall is a “descent into chaos” (Rackin 1991: 55). According to Kripke, the name Alice, “designates the same object in any possible world” and is a rigid designator which determines a rigid reference (cf. Kripke 1972: 277), i.e. it refers to the same individual in any possible world. If we consider Lewis’s remark (1986: 52) that the actual world is also a possible world where we are located, we can conclude the following: two existing Alices in two worlds identify the same referent, or, in other words, refer to the same girl.

Alice fails to recognise the same referent — i.e. herself — hidden under two different senses or names, namely, Alice and Mabel. Thus, she loses the feeling of personal constancy. Lakoff (1993: 373) claims that Alice’s confusion is caused by the fact that she does not manage to interpret the metaphor I’m not myself correctly in (63). Instead of treating it as I’m not behaving characteristically, Alice treats it literally: I’m a different personality from the one I used to be.

The above-mentioned examples demonstrated that the person deictic I applied to the same person, particularly Alice, does not necessarily account for the feeling of personal constancy. Thus, it is indeed a transient variable with a context-anchored pragmatic meaning.

4.2.2. Contextual identification of the Origo

Having mentioned transiency, as a characteristic of person deixis, I now concentrate on another feature of person deixis, namely, the importance of contextual identification of the Origo. The reference of a deictic expression can only be determined if the centre of orientation is identified. Consider the following two examples:

66. ‘How should I know?’ said Alice, surprised at her own courage. ‘It’s no business of mine.’ (Carroll 1865 [2000]: 82)

67. ‘Get up!’ said the Queen, in a shrill, loud voice, and the three gardeners instantly jumped up, and began bowing to the King, the Queen, the royal children, and everybody else. ‘Leave off that!’ screamed the Queen. ‘You make me giddy.’ And then, turning to the rose-tree, she went on, ‘What have you been doing here?’ ‘May it please your Majesty,’ said Two, in a very humble tone, going down on one knee as he spoke, ‘we were trying—’ […] (Carroll 1865 [2000] 83)
Taken out of context, the reference *I* in the expression *How should I know* in (66) would vary in dependence with the person uttering it. In this case, however, the context determines the speaker. Since the speaker is Alice, the point of orientation is that of Alice, and the reference *I* and *mine* refers to Alice’s identity. Analysing *What have you been doing here*, in the broad context of (67), it is obvious that the centre of the deictic field — the Origo — is the Queen. The referring expression *you* designates a relation to the Queen’s egocentric point of orientation. The context specifies that *you* refers to all three gardeners, which are treated by the Queen as a group of workers fulfilling the same task of painting a white rose-tree red.

4.2.3. Ambiguous assignment of participants’ roles

When analysing person deixis the reader is often confronted with certain reference ambiguity, which can be often clarified in the context. This is often caused by ambiguous role-assignment, as in the following example:

68. ‘Don’t you mean “purpose”?’ said Alice.
   (a) ‘I mean what I say,’ the Mock Turtle replied in an offended tone. And the Gryphon said ‘Come, let’s hear some of *your* adventures.’
   ‘I could tell you my adventures — beginning from this morning,’ said Alice. (Carroll 1865 [2000]: 105)

To interpret the indexical *your* correctly, it is important to consider how the participants roles of the conversation are grammaticalized in a given situation (cf. Levinson 1983: 68-69). It is clear that the spokesman is the Gryphon but it is unclear who the recipient (target) of the utterance is and who the bystander (hearer) is. If we consider the immediate context alone — marked (a) — we will treat *your* as a reference to the recipient the Mock Turtle. However, this is an example where the distinction between the recipient and the bystander is deictically grammaticalized in a non-obvious way. Subsequent reading and context-anchoring determine the correct reference, namely *your* refers to Alice and assigns her the role of the recipient.

A similar example of ambiguous assignment of participants’ roles is in (69):

69. ‘Off with her head!’ the Queen shouted at the top of her voice.
   Nobody moved.
   ‘Who cares for *you*?’ said Alice, (she had grown to her full size by this time). ‘You’re nothing but a pack of cards!’ (Carroll 1865 [2000]: 124)
Following the text, the reader assigns the Queen to be the referent of the personal pronoun, *you*, as the previous discourse deals with a dialogue between Alice and the Queen. However, Alice’s statement *You’re nothing but a pack of cards!* determines another referent, namely all participants in the court trial. In order to assign the correct reference of this instance of deixis, details about the context in which the utterance has been made need to be taken into account.

### 4.2.4. Cohesiveness versus coherence

Another example of reference ambiguity is a well-known poem (70), brought into the court as major evidence against the Knave. To understand the set of verses properly, the reader needs to be able to identify the speaker, the addressee and the participants involved in the interaction. Apart from that, the time and place of the utterance are also significant for the correct interpretation of the poem. As a rule, an addressee awaiting successful communication presupposes that all indexicals used by the interlocutor are to be directly referential (cf. Miller 1982: 62). In the case of the poem, the reader expects to be able to trace the referents hidden behind the numerous indexicals. However, even the full context of Carroll’s work does not help determine the reference coded under numerous deictic units encountered in the anonymous poem in a form of a letter. The accused Knave claims that he neither wrote, nor signed this letter. The court fails to determine the author and the addressees of the letter. It is a piece of cohesive but not coherent text. On the one hand, the poem consists of logically combinable words that form acceptable sentences according to the rules of English grammar (cf. Brown & Yule 1983: 191). In other words, there are certain cohesive relationships or ties between words and across sentence boundaries that should facilitate the interpretation of sentences (cf. Halliday and Hasan 1976: 2-3). Furthermore, a number of formal markers such as *and, but, if, though, before* are present in the poem, thus, accounting for the text cohesion or “textness” (cf. Brown & Yule 1983: 192). However, on the other hand, cohesive ties do not provide for a coherent interpretation of the poem. The set of verses lacks the content-based linking between the words. It looks as though some essential information, without which the reader is helpless to arrive at the correct interpretation of the poem, has been intentionally withheld by the author (cf. Green 1996: 106-107). Therefore, no meaning is ensured, the poem does not make sense and, hence, is incoherent. The deictic references shift depending on the speaker and
the addressee. Since there is no author of the poem, and therefore no point of orientation, the letter does not bear any truth validity (cf. Mey [2001]: 52). The reference of the pronoun *me* changes with the person uttering it, and also changes the reference of the addressee with the person listening to it. Even the third person pronouns, such as *she* and *him*, which are not typical examples of person deixis, are used person deictically in this poem, since the discourse does not provide any contextual reference:

70. ‘They told me you had been to her,
And mentioned me to him:

She gave me a good character,
But said I could not swim.

He sent them word I had not gone
(We know it to be true):

If she should push the matter on,
What would become of you?

I gave her one, they gave him two,
You gave us three or more;

They all returned from him to you,
Though they were mine before.

If I or she should chance to be
Involved in this affair,
He trusts to you to set them free,
Exactly as we were.

My notion was that you had been
(Before she had this fit)

An obstacle that came between
Him, and ourselves, and it.

Don’t let him know she liked them best,
For this must ever be

A secret, kept from all the rest,
Between yourself and me.’ (Carroll 1865 [2000]: 122)

It is impossible to determine any reference in the poem and Carroll humorously demonstrates this, by letting the King try to establish it in vain:

71. ‘I seem to see some meaning in them, after all. “—said I could not swim—” you can’t swim, can you?’ he added, turning to the Knave.

The Knave shook his head sadly. ‘Do I look like it?’ he said.

(Which he certainly did not, being made entirely of cardboard).

‘All right, so far,’ said the King, and he went on muttering over the verses to himself: “we know it to be true—” that’s the jury,
of course—“I gave her one, they gave him two—” why, that must be what he did with the tarts, you know—’
‘But, it goes on “they all returned from him to you,”’ said Alice. ‘Why, there they are!’ said the King triumphantly, pointing to the tarts on the table. ‘Nothing can be clearer than that. Then again—“before she had this fit”—” you never had fits, my dear, I think?’ he said to the Queen. (Carroll 1865 [2000]: 122 - 123)

4.2.5. The inclusive/exclusive distinction of the pronoun we

Another important notion to be tackled within the framework of ambiguity brought out by person deixis is the inclusive/exclusive distinction of the pronoun we. The inclusive/exclusive distinction is frequently used in conjunction with the first person plural pronoun, i.e. it bears the name we-inclusive-of addressee and we-exclusive-of-addressee (cf. Levinson 1983: 69). The names are self-explanatory: we-inclusive-of addressee includes the addressee in the reference, whereas we-exclusive-of-addressee excludes the addressee from the reference. English grammar does not directly manifest the distinction between we-inclusive and we-exclusive of the addressee, as other languages do. However, the distinction is manifested by means of contextual clues, as in the following example:

72. “You can really have no notion how delightful it will be
When they take us up and throw us, with the lobsters, out to sea!” (Carroll 1865 [2000]: 103)

Us in this passage of the Lobster-Quadrille, sang by the Mock Turtle to Alice, if not analysed in context, can correspond both to we-inclusive-of addressee and we-exclusive-of-addressee. However, since we regard the phrase as context-anchored, we infer that it is we-inclusive-of addressee because the speaker’s purpose is to involve the addressee in dancing. In this example we-inclusive of addressee accounts for the emotional attachment that the speaker — the Mock Turtle — evokes in the recipient, Alice. Alice is not yet physically dancing but she is referred to as if she were performing the quadrille.

If example (72) implicitly presented the notion of we-inclusive-of addressee to the reader, the following example of brilliant Carrollian absurd humour explicitly manifests it.
73. Alice felt that this could not be denied, so she tried another question. ‘What sort of people live about here?’

‘In that direction,’ the Cat said, waving its right paw round, ‘lives a Hatter: and in that direction,’ waving the other paw, ‘lives a March Hare. Visit either you like: they’re both mad.’

But I don’t want to go among mad people,’ Alice remarked. ‘Oh, you can’t help that,’ said the Cat: ‘we’re all mad here. I’m mad. You’re mad.’

How do you know I’m mad?’ said Alice.

‘You must be,’ said the Cat, ‘or you wouldn’t have come here.’

Alice didn’t think that proved it at all; however, she went on ‘And how do you know that you’re mad?’

‘To begin with,’ said the Cat, ‘a dog’s not mad. You grant that?’

‘I suppose so,’ said Alice.

‘Well, then,’ the Cat went on, ‘you see, a dog growls when it’s angry, and wags its tail when it’s pleased. Now I growl when I’m pleased, and wag my tail when I’m angry. Therefore I’m mad.’

‘I call it purring, not growling,’ said Alice.

‘Call it what you like,’ said the Cat. (Carroll 1865 [2000]: 65-66)

The utterance I'm mad. You're mad which follows the utterance we’re all mad here, bears a reflexive function of the language (cf. Grundy 2000: 15), i.e. it assists the reader to interpret the reference we in the utterance we’re all mad here. By saying we’re all mad here. I’m mad. You’re mad, the Cat overtly states that he includes Alice in the list of the mad in Wonderland. Reflexive use of language facilitates the inferring process and thus is used when the speaker intends to ensure the correct interpretation of his/her utterance.

Let us now apply the theory of possible worlds, already mentioned before in this chapter, to interpreting the use of we-inclusive of addressee — Alice — in we’re all mad here. I’m mad. You’re mad. Possible worlds are based on possible propositions, which are true in those possible worlds. In example (73) the Cat expresses a possible proposition that Alice is mad, which is true in the possible world of Wonderland. He supports his argument by stating that if she were not mad she would not have come there. Moreover, the Cat includes himself in the mass of the mad and talks about his own madness as if it were one of the character qualities of his personality. He actually means that to be mad is a prerequisite for being in Wonderland. Such a statement is regarded as absolutely absurd and nonsensical if applied to the real world. However, in the possible world of Wonderland it makes sense and is even perceived as situation-appropriate.
The nature of we-inclusive is potentially dangerous (cf. Grundy 2000: 209). On the one hand, the speaker’s intention to include the addressee in the reference can be motivated by his/her wish to create a more intimate and friendly climate; on the other hand, the addressee could infer that the speaker means to be authoritative and to infringe the addressee’s opinion (cf. Fowler 1979: 202). Example (74) demonstrates such consequences of we-inclusive:

74. ‘And yet I wish I could show you our cat Dinah: I think you’d take a fancy to cats if you could only see her. She is such a dear quiet thing,’ Alice went on, half to herself, as she swam lazily about in the pool, ‘and she sits purring so nicely by the fire, licking her paws and washing her face—and she is such a nice soft thing to nurse—and she’s such a capital one for catching mice—oh, I beg your pardon!’ cried Alice again, for this time the Mouse was bristling all over, and she felt certain it must be really offended. ‘We won’t talk about her any more if you’d rather not.’
‘We indeed!’ cried the Mouse, who was trembling down to the end of his tail. ‘As if I would talk on such a subject! Our family always hated cats: nasty, low, vulgar things! Don’t let me hear the name again!’ (Carroll 1865 [2000]: 26-27)

Alice includes her addressee — the Mouse — in the discourse with the purpose of showing more intimacy towards and solidarity with the Mouse. The girl is so enthusiastic about her cat Dinah that she wishes her interlocutor had the same feelings. Thus, she proudly praises the cat’s abilities in catching mice and does not take into consideration the consequences her words may have on the addressee, who is a mouse! Alice’s wish to create solidarity with the Mouse cannot be fulfilled, since the Mouse obviously does not accept the reference we. His ironical reply, we indeed, implies that Alice’s use of we-inclusive of addressee is unacceptable.

The following illustrations of the pronouns we and ours mark another aspect of person deixis, namely exclusiveness of addressee:

75. ‘When we were little,’ the Mock Turtle went on at last, more calmly, though still sobbing a little now and then, ‘we went to school in the sea. The master was an old Turtle — we used to call him Tortoise —’. (Carroll 1865 [2000]: 96)

76. ‘Ah! then yours wasn’t a really good school,’ said the Mock Turtle in a tone of great relief. ‘Now at ours they had at the end

---

13 Here and further on in the thesis I will refer to the Mouse with an animate referential pronoun he (see sub-chapter 4.7.4. “Animate vs. non-animate reference to the animals in Wonderland” for details)
of the bill, “French, music, and washing — extra.” (Carroll 1865 [2000]: 97)

The Mock Turtle is telling his story to Alice, excluding her from the reference. Instead, he includes his schoolmates into the reference we and ours, who are in this situation non-present bystanders. Thus, we and ours in the context of (75) and (76) refer to the Mock Turtle himself and his peers. The use of plural we instead of singular I is justified by the Mock Turtle’s wish to be a part of the school community, which he is proud of. This is an additional contextual parameter that counts for determining the reference we.

I will now focus on another traditional deictic category, namely place deixis, whose references are also context-dependent.

4.3. Place deixis

4.3.1. Default deictic centre

Place deixis deals with “the specification of locations relative to anchorage points in the speech event” (Levinson 1983: 79), that is, it linguistically expresses the position of the speaker in three-dimensional space, as well as his/her relation to the location of others involved in the conversation. Place deixis is egocentric, in that the default deictic centre is the speaker’s location at the time of utterance (cf. Grundy 2000: 34). As Alice in Wonderland obviously abounds with examples of deictic centres by default, I will outline only a few of them:

77. Her chin was pressed so closely against her foot, that there was hardly room to open her mouth; but she did it at last, and managed to swallow a morsel of the lefthand bit. (Carroll 1865 [2000]: 54)

78. Alice watched the White Rabbit as he fumbled over the list, feeling very curious to see what the next witness would be like, ‘— for they haven’t got much evidence yet,’ she said to herself. Imagine her surprise, when the White Rabbit read out, at the top of his shrill little voice, the name ‘Alice!’ ‘Here!’ cried Alice, quite forgetting in the flurry of the moment how large she had grown in the last few minutes. (Carroll 1865 [2000]: 117 - 118)

79. Dinah my dear! I wish you were down here with me! (Carroll 1865 [2000]: 14)
80. ‘What else have you got in your pocket?’ he went on, turning to Alice.  
‘Only a thimble,’ said Alice sadly.  
‘Hand it over here,’ said the Dodo. (Carroll 1865 [2000]: 32)

These examples show that by default the deictic centre is positioned in the location of the speaker, thus, the speaker is the centre of the communicational situation. In (77), *lefthand bit* is specified in relation to Alice and from her perspective, since she is the speaker. In (78), (79) and (80) *here* refers to the position of Alice or the Dodo, respectively, as they are the speakers who adopt the egocentric view when producing an utterance.

4.3.2. Proximal vs. distal domains of deictic expressions

The speaker’s location is essential for the differentiation of proximal *this/these* and distal *that/those* that are broadly used place deictically. The location of the speaker influences the choice of the demonstrative: as a rule, *this/these* along with a place-referring expression is used when the position of the speaker is proximal to the referent and *that/those* together with a place-referring expression is used if it is distal from the referent:

81. What do you know about this business?’ the King said to Alice. 
(Carroll 1865 [2000]: 119)

82. ‘Now tell me, Pat, what’s that in the window?’ 
‘Sure, it’s an arm, yer honour!’ [Rabbit] (He pronounced it ‘arrum.’). (Carroll 1865 [2000]: 41)

83. The door led right into a large kitchen, which was full of smoke from one end to the other: the Duchess was sitting on a three-legged stool in the middle, nursing a baby; the cook was leaning over the fire, stirring a large cauldron which seemed to be full of soup. 
‘There’s certainly too much pepper in that soup!’ Alice said to herself, as well as she could for sneezing. (Carroll 1865 [2000]: 60)

In (81) the King expresses the deictic proximity, whereas in (82) the Rabbit stresses that an object in the window is distal from him. In (83) the preference for *that soup* over *this soup* is motivated by the fact that Alice is situated at a distance from the soup. Thus, the spatial closeness between the object and the speaker in (81) is grammaticalized by preferring the proximal *this* over distal *that*, whereas in (82) and (83), the spatial distance is encoded by using the distal *that* over proximal *this*:

44
After Alice fell into the Rabbit hole and, in that way, marked her departure from the real world, there was a gradual shift in her perception of proximal/distal relations (cf. Downing 2000):

84. It was much pleasanter at home,’ thought poor Alice, ‘when one wasn’t always growing larger and smaller, and being ordered about by mice and rabbits. I almost wish I hadn’t gone down that rabbit-hole — and yet — and yet — it’s rather curious, you know, this sort of life!’ (Carroll 1865 [2000]: 39)

In the extract (84), two periods of Alice’s life are contrasted, the one above the ground, it was much pleasanter at home, and the one after the fall, this sort of life. The use of proximal deictic this in this sort of life indicates that there has been a shift in Alice’s perception of the situation. In this passage she uses the proximal this to refer to the world in Wonderland, not to the world where she lived before the fall. This sort of life is linguistic proof of the fact that at the moment of utterance, Alice’s life in Wonderland has already been perceived proximal deictically. Thus, the use of proximal deictic this indicates that Alice has adapted to a new environment.

Similar to this/that, the interpretation of deictic here and there also depends on the speaker’s location. Here emphasizes the location identical to the coding place and there points to a location that is different from the coding place. Contrary to here, there stresses the extended distance between the referent and the speaker. The following examples demonstrate the deictic nature of the indexicals here and there.

85. ‘I wish you wouldn’t squeeze so.’ said the Dormouse, who was sitting next to her. ‘I can hardly breathe.’
   ‘I can’t help it,’ said Alice very meekly: ‘I’m growing.’
   ‘You’ve no right to grow here,’ said the Dormouse.
   ‘Don’t talk nonsense,’ said Alice more boldly: ‘you know you’re growing too.’ (Carroll 1865 [2000]: 114)

86. “‘What matters it how far we go?’” his scaly friend replied.
    “There is another shore, you know, upon the other side. (Carroll 1865 [2000]: 103)

Here in (85) means in the vicinity of the speaker at the coding time (Rauh 1983: 15). That is to say, the Dormouse, who feels squeezed by the rapidly growing Alice, expresses indignation by prohibiting Alice to grow here, i.e. close to the Dormouse. Contrary to here, there in (86) means not in the vicinity of the speaker. The specification upon the other side additionally indicates that the shore is situated far from the speaker.
Let us look closely at the following example where an utterance, *No room! No room!* contains a covert deictic element *here*:

87. The table was a large one, but the three were all crowded together at one corner of it: ‘*No room! No room!*’ they cried out when they saw Alice coming. ‘*There’s plenty of room!*’ said Alice indignantly, and she sat down in a large arm-chair at one end of the table. (Carroll 1865 [2000]: 69)

As the default position of the deictic centre is the location of the speaker, *no room* is relative to the place of utterance, that is, to that corner of the table where the three speakers (the Hatter, the March Hare and the Dormouse) are sitting. Considering Levinson’s statement (1983: 85) that place deixis can include a covert deictic element, the utterance *No room! No room!* is seen as an implied covert use of the indexical *here*, which from the perspective of the three speakers refers to the corner of the table where they are situated. However, Alice refers their utterance to the whole space around the table and finds that there is plenty of room. Thus, the covertly implied indexical *here* is used deictically. Due to its deictic nature it is the source of a linguistic puzzle for the participants of the current conversation.

The aforementioned examples (81) to (87) have demonstrated different ways of grammaticalising place deixis, the main principle of which is based on a twofold proximal/distal contrast of deictic expressions. The next examples (88) to (88.d.) will demonstrate what impact an inability to identify the spatio-temporal location of the speaker may have on the interpretation of an utterance.

### 4.3.3. The interpretation of deictic references

The Lobster-Quadrille (88) is full of spatial deictic indexicals whose reference can only be identified in relation to the location of participants at the coding time:

88. “Will you walk a little faster?” said a whiting to a snail.
   “There’s a porpoise close behind us, and he’s treading on my tail.
   See how eagerly the lobsters and the turtles all advance!
   They are waiting on the shingle —will you come and join the dance?

   Will you, won’t you, will you, won’t you, will you join the dance?
   Will you, won’t you, will you, won’t you, won’t you join the dance?
   “You can really have no notion how delightful it will be
   When they take us up and throw us, with the lobsters, out to sea!”

   But the snail replied “Too far, too far!” and gave a look askance —
   Said he thanked the whiting kindly, but he would not join the dance.
Would not, could not, would not, could not, would not join the dance. 
Would not, could not, would not, could not, could not join the dance.

“What matters it how far we go?” his scaly friend replied.
“There is another shore, you know, upon the other side.
The further off from England the nearer is to France — 
Then turn not pale, beloved snail, but come and join the dance.

Will you, won’t you, will you, won’t you, will you join the dance?
Will you, won’t you, will you, won’t you, won’t you join the dance?”
(Carroll 1865 [2000]: 102-103)

Since the location of the singers is not clear, or more precisely, since their location could be anywhere they decide to sing the quadrille, it is not possible to interpret many deictic notions in the quadrille. In other words, there are a number of competing potential deictic centres which remain unclear to the reader. The difficulty in determining the actual deictic centre is what makes the interpretation of references problematic. Consider this particular example from the Quadrille:

88.a. “There’s a porpoise close behind us, and he’s treading on my tail. (Carroll 1865 [2000]: 102)

The reference of the phrase behind us can only be identified if the context indicates the location of the speaker. Since it remains non-indicated there is no limit to the broad range of possible references.

88.b. But the snail replied “Too far, too far!” and gave a look askance — […]. (Carroll 1865 [2000]: 103)

This example demonstrates that the location is deictically specified and relative to the location of the participants at the coding time. As the location of the snail is not known, the snail’s utterance too far cannot be judged.

It would have been sufficient to know the location of the speakers in order to interpret (88.c.):

88.c. “There is another shore, you know, upon the other side. (Carroll 1865 [2000]: 103)

The use of upon the other side is deictic, since there is no relation between the present location of the speaker and the reference upon the other side.

The spatial location of the speaker is essential for determining the reference of the example (88.d.):
88.d. There was a large mushroom growing near her [Alice], about
the same height as herself; and when she had looked under it,
and on both sides of it, and behind it, it occurred to her that she
might as well look and see what was on the top of it. (Carroll
1865 [2000]: 46)

Without clarifying the position of the speaker, the referring expressions on both sides
of it and behind the mushroom would bear no informational value, since a mushroom
does not have an inherent front-back dimension, as — for instance — houses or cars
do (cf. Lyons 1977, 2: 697-698):

It possesses no characteristic asymmetries that we can analo
gise to those which define our own front/back and left/right axes. (Hill 1982:
15)

It is round, thus, it is impossible to determine its sides or its back without the location
and spatial dimension of the speaker at the current speech event (Fillmore 1982: 40).

Alice’s puzzling talk with the Caterpillar and his dubious references to the
mushroom continue in the following example:

89. Then it got down off the mushroom, and crawled away in the
grass, merely remarking as it went, ‘One side will make you
grow taller, and the other side will make you grow shorter.’
‘One side of what? The other side of what?’ thought Alice to
herself.
‘Of the mushroom,’ said the Caterpillar, just as if she had asked
it aloud; and in another moment it was out of sight.
Alice remained looking thoughtfully at the mushroom for a
minute, trying to make out which were the two sides of it; and as
it was perfectly round, she found this a very difficult question.
However, at last she stretched her arms round it as far as they
would go, and broke off a bit of the edge with each hand.
(Carroll 1865 [2000]: 53)

It is possible to imagine that the Caterpillar refers to this or that side of the
mushroom when sitting on it and indicating by gestures which side is meant. If this
had been so, it would have been an example of gestural deixis with a deictic centre
by default, i.e. speaker-centred. However, in the given context, this interpretation is
impossible; there is no complementary linguistic description to support the
assumption that the place-referencing expressions one side and the other side are
examples of gestural deixis. Moreover, the Caterpillar is no longer on the mushroom;
on the contrary, it crawled away from it. It would have been more helpful for Alice’s
inferring if the Caterpillar had updated the deictic centre and clarified in the context
from which perspective his further references are to be interpreted. As seen from the
discourse, the updating did not take place and the expressions one side and the other
side remained deictic.

The nature of the referring expression here in examples (90) – (91) also has remained
deictic. As all deictics, here has to be interpreted with respect to the speaker’s
location in the discourse. The problem is, however, that even the broad context of
Alice in Wonderland is unable to determine Alice’s location:

90. [...] ‘I [Alice] do wish they would put their heads down! I am so
very tired of being all alone here!’ [...] (Carroll 1865 [2000]: 24)

91. But I don’t want to go among mad people,’ Alice remarked.
‘Oh, you can’t help that,’ said the Cat: ‘we’re all mad here. I’m
mad. You’re mad.’
‘How do you know I’m mad?’ said Alice.
‘You must be,’ said the Cat, ‘or you wouldn’t have come here.
(Carroll 1865 [2000]: 66)

The referents of here in (90) – (91) are not easily accessible, since here can express
different propositions if context-anchoring is established. The deictic here has some
referents which can be picked out depending on different contexts. On the one hand,
here can refer to the place or area where Alice (example (90)) or Alice and the Cat
(example (91)) are located at the moment of speaking, but on the other hand, it can
refer to the whole of Wonderland. To conclude, the ambiguous meaning of the
indexical here demonstrates its deictic character in the given context.

As has been elucidated in the course of this sub-chapter, place deixis is involved on
every occasion when the speaker linguistically relates some objects to his egocentric
position (cf. Rauh 1983: 30). Thus, the speaker’s egocentricity — i.e. his/her self-
centeredness — is the central point in interpreting the deictic relation between
utterance parts. Person and place deixis have already demonstrated that the speaker’s
identity, as well as the speaker’s location, is an important factor for resolving the
references. The next sub-chapter deals with another deictic category, namely time
deixis. The sub-chapter illustrates the importance of the time of the utterance in
determining deictic references.
4.4. *Time deixis*

4.4.1. The nature of *always* and *now*

Time deixis deals with deictic expressions where reference can only be assigned in relation to the time of the utterance in which they occur. The interpretation of deictic expressions is then successful if it is made in the context of the utterance. Consider the nature of the referring expression *always* in example (92):

92. ‘Yes, that’s it,’ said the Hatter with a sigh: ‘it’s always tea-time, and we’ve no time to wash the things between whiles.’ (Carroll 1865 [2000]: 74)

If not analysed in context, *always tea-time* can be viewed ambiguously and in that way, prove the deictic use of the time adverbial *always*. Due to a dictionary-fixed meaning of *always*, the statement might imply that the participants are involved in constant tea-drinking regardless of the time. Provided we take the background knowledge about English traditions into account, *it’s always tea-time* might also imply *it’s always 5 pm*, which is traditional time for English Tea. However, there is a clear time reference of tea-time in the context:

93. And ever since that,’ the Hatter went on in a mournful tone, ‘he won’t do a thing I ask! It’s always six o’clock now.’

A bright idea came into Alice’s head. ‘Is that the reason so many tea-things are put out here?’ she asked.

‘Yes, that’s it,’ said the Hatter with a sigh: ‘it’s always tea-time, and we’ve no time to wash the things between whiles.’ (Carroll 1865 [2000]: 74)

The combination of utterances *it’s always six o’clock now* and *it’s always tea-time* discards the ambiguity and means that tea-time is always at six o’clock:

- *always* = 6 o’clock

Additionally, the knowledge of Liddell’s family rituals (cf. Cohen 2000: 75), namely that they used to serve tea, as the last meal before the children’s bedtime, at six o’clock, reinforces the above-mentioned statement.

*Always* and *now* in the context of *it’s always six o’clock now* is used non-deictically, as the utterance meaning remains unchanged independently of the time of the

---

14 *Always* means that something is happening continuously, repeatedly and endlessly (cf. Collins COBUILD Advanced Learner’s English Dictionary on CD-ROM).

15 In England, Tea is an afternoon meal which consists of a light meal in southern Britain or is a substantial meal in northern Britain (cf. http://www.encyclopedia.com/doc/1O39-teaafternoon.html).
utterance in the discourse and has an obvious reference, namely six o’clock. The use of now at the mad tea party in (93) contradicts the transient nature of now, which is as follows: now at the moment of speaking is not the same now some time later. In (93) the Hatter, the Dormouse, the Mad Hare and Alice are in the kingdom of a never-ending unchangeable now; they are victims of an endless tea-ceremony.

To conclude, it is clear that context-dependency is crucial for arriving at a correct interpretation of the utterance. The next example supports this statement:

94. ‘It was a curious dream, dear, certainly: but now run in to your tea; it’s getting late.’ (Carroll 1865 [2000]: 125)

The utterance it’s getting late, uttered by Alice’s sister after waking Alice up, implies it’s getting late now, since one of the unmarked anchorage points constituting the spatio-temporal zero-point is the time at which the speaker produces the utterance (cf. Levinson 1983: 62). Now in this case is a covertly used deictic expression, which refers to the coding time of the utterance. From the previous explanations in example (93), we understand that tea-time at Alice’s house takes place at 6 o’clock. The phrase run in to your tea; it’s getting late now in (94) must refer to some time in the evening when Alice’s family is having their tea. Based on this information, now contextually refers to the time close to 6 o’clock. Example (94) has been taken from the last chapter, six chapters after the time reference of the usual tea-time of the Liddells. Thus, this example demonstrates the close relationship between language, immediate context, and the context of the whole discourse, presented in the phenomenon of time deixis.

4.4.2. The nature of today and tomorrow

As a further step towards seeing how time deixis functions in context and depends on the zero point — the Origo — consider the adverbs today and tomorrow and their deictic nature in examples (95), (96) and (97):

95. That will be a queer thing, to be sure! However, everything is queer to-day.’ (Carroll 1865 [2000]: 25)

96. ‘Dear, dear! How queer everything is to-day! And yesterday things went on just as usual. I wonder if I’ve been changed in the night? Let me think: was I the same when I got up this morning? (Carroll 1865 [2000]: 22)
Downing (2000) says that deictics as indexical symbols have a basic meaning component, known as a semantic meaning, and a variable meaning, or a pragmatic meaning, which determines a referent in a particular context. The deictic element *today* is proximal, as it points to a temporal reference close to the moment of utterance. The basic meaning component of *today*, or its literal meaning, is “the day on which you are speaking or writing” (Collins COBUILD Advanced Learner’s English Dictionary on CD-ROM). Defining the pragmatic component of *today* seems problematic. As the reader is unaware of the coding time he/she cannot determine the point within the relevant time span, that is, the exact temporal location of *today*. The reader can only claim that *today* in this context refers to some unspecified moment in that portion of day that remains unexpired (cf. Grundy 2000: 31). Similar problems arise with the interpretation of the temporal deictic expression *tomorrow*, as for instance in (97):

97. ‘I shall sit here,’ the Footman remarked, ‘till tomorrow—’ […]
(Carroll 1865 [2000]: 59)

The indice *tomorrow*, unlike *today*, is distal, as it manifests remoteness from the time-reference of the speaker. Semantically, it refers to a day in the future which comes after today, that is, it refers to the diurnal span following the diurnal span that includes the coding time (cf. Levinson 1983: 74). This meaning remains constant across different occasions of the use of *tomorrow* in an utterance. However, the exact coding time of *tomorrow* in (97) is unknown for the reader; it could have happened either over twenty hours or only one minute before the mentioned *tomorrow*. This makes the pragmatic meaning of deictic *tomorrow* in the context of (97) rather difficult to determine.

**4.4.3. Instances of deictic centre collision**

To establish a correct reference of temporal deictic expressions appears to be a challenge unless the system of time organisation is understood clearly. The point of reference from which the dimension is looked at depends on the point of origin. There are such standard points of origin as day and night cycles, lunar and calendar months, seasons, academic, fiscal and calendrical years. In some cases, there may be more than one point of origin in a discourse, which leads to a deictic centre collision. Consider the example below:


The Hatter was the first to break the silence. ‘What day of the month is it?’ he said, turning to Alice; he had taken his watch out of his pocket, and was looking at it uneasily, shaking it every now and then, and holding it to his ear. Alice considered a little, and then said ‘The fourth.’ (Carroll 1865 [2000]: 71)

If analysed in the immediate context, the month itself remains unknown for the reader. However, there are some textual clues in the previous chapter (Chapter VI) of Alice in Wonderland that lead the reader to infer that the month in (98) is May:

99. ‘I’ve seen hatters before,’ she said to herself; ‘the March Hare will be much the most interesting, and perhaps as this is May it won’t be raving mad. (Carroll 1865 [2000]: 66-67)

Subsequently, the coding time of the utterance is May 4th. The proceeding remark of the Hatter, however, brings the reader into the world of bewilderment again:

100. ‘Two days wrong!’ sighed the Hatter. (Carroll 1865 [2000]: 71)

In this statement, time deixis interacts with different points of origin, viz. lunar and calendar months. As Gardner (2000: 73) states, on May 4th, 1862 there was a two-day difference between the lunar and calendar month. That explains the discrepancy when comparing the date: the Hatter’s watch ran on lunar time, i.e. his conversational point of origin was based on the lunar calendar, whereas Alice’s point of origin coordinated with the standard Gregorian solar calendar. It is the deictic centre that accounts for determining the appropriate reference in the discourse. Example (101) is similar:

101. The first witness was the Hatter. He came in with a teacup in one hand and a piece of bread-and-butter in the other. ‘I beg pardon, your Majesty,’ he began, ‘for bringing these in: but I hadn’t quite finished my tea when I was sent for.’ ‘You ought to have finished,’ said the King. ‘When did you begin?’ The Hatter looked at the March Hare, who had followed him into the court, arm-in-arm with the Dormouse. ‘Fourteenth of March, I think it was,’ he said. ‘Fifteenth,’ said the March Hare. ‘Sixteenth,’ added the Dormouse. (Carroll 1865 [2000]: 113)

The Mad Hatter claims that the day when he began his tea was March 14th. As stated in the explanation to examples (98) – (100), the Hatter’s deictic temporal default centre is the lunar month which differed from the calendar month on May 4th, 1862
by two days. I would suggest that the same reason caused the date discrepancy in March as well. Yet this suggestion lacks further and sufficient evidence and can be regarded only as an assumption. Moreover, this statement does not account for the March Hare’s comment that the date was March 15th, as a relationship between the point of origin and the reference to March 15th cannot be traced in the text. This contemplation draws the reader’s attention to the fact that in Wonderland the concept of time — one of the essential systems of order above the ground — loses its validity.

So far I have focused on three traditional deictic categories, viz. person, place and time deixis. The subject of interest in the following sub-chapters is “marginal” or “special” categories of deixis (Kryk 1987: 23) including discourse, emotional and social deixis.

4.5. Discourse deixis

4.5.1. Anaphora vs. discourse deixis

Discourse deixis is a piece of linguistic material that takes a referent within a discourse. It is juxtaposed with anaphora whose referent coincides with a previously mentioned entity. Anaphora emphasizes that the referent is already known, whereas deixis stresses the presence of the referent in the discourse (Consten 2003: 224). Anaphora is a type of indirect reference (Ehlich 1982: 316), which is linguistically seen as cross-referring, since it refers to aforementioned words that, in their turn, refer to the real world objects or individuals. The reason for frequent confusion between anaphoric and deictic use of pronouns lies in the fact that, according to the traditional formulation, a pronoun always refers to its antecedent (Lyons, 1977, 2: 668), which is understood as an expression preceding the relevant pronoun in the discourse:

102. ‘Go on with the next verse,’ the Gryphon repeated impatiently: ‘it begins “I passed by his garden.”’ (Carroll 1865 [2000]: 107)

In example (102), the use of it is anaphoric, as it refers to its antecedent the next verse.

In the table below there are six examples of anaphoric use of referring expressions randomly chosen from a wide variety of occurrences in Alice in Wonderland:
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Example</th>
<th>Pronoun</th>
<th>Antecedent</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>103. 'I haven’t opened it yet,’ said the White Rabbit, ‘but it seems to be a letter [...].’ ‘It must have been that,’ said the King. (Carroll 1865 [2000]: 121)</td>
<td>that</td>
<td>a letter</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>104. ‘Now tell me, Pat, what’s that in the window?’ ‘Sure, it’s an arm, yer honour!’ (He pronounced it ‘arrum.’) ‘An arm, you goose! Who ever saw one that size? Why, it fills the whole window!’ ‘Sure, it does, yer honour: but it’s an arm for all that.’ ‘Well, it’s got no business there, at any rate: go and take it away!’ (Carroll 1865 [2000]: 41-42)</td>
<td>there</td>
<td>in the window</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>105. I wonder?’ As she said this, she came suddenly upon an open place, with a little house in it about four feet high. ‘Whoever lives there,’ thought Alice [...]. (Carroll 1865 [2000]: 56)</td>
<td>there</td>
<td>in a house</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>106. [...] so you can have no idea what a delightful thing a Lobster Quadrille is!’ ‘No, indeed,’ said Alice. ‘What sort of a dance is it?’ ‘Why,’ said the Gryphon, ‘you first form into a line along the sea-shore—’ ‘Two lines!’ cried the Mock Turtle. ‘Seals, turtles, salmon, and so on; then, when you’ve cleared all the jelly-fish out of the way—’ ‘That generally takes some time,’ interrupted the Gryphon. (Carroll 1865 [2000]: 101)</td>
<td>that</td>
<td>clearing the jelly-fish out of the way</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>107. ‘Call it what you like,’ said the Cat. ‘Do you play croquet with the Queen to-day?’ ‘I should like it very much,’ said Alice, ‘but I haven’t been invited yet.’ ‘You’ll see me there,’ said the Cat, and vanished. (Carroll 1865 [2000]: 66)</td>
<td>there</td>
<td>at the croquet game</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>108. ‘Well, at any rate, the Dormouse said—’ the Hatter went on, looking anxiously round to see if he would deny it too: but the Dormouse denied nothing, being fast asleep. ‘After that,’ continued the Hatter, ‘I cut some more bread-and-butter—‘But what did the Dormouse say?’ one of the jury asked. ‘That I can’t remember,’ said the Hatter. (Carroll 1865 [2000]: 115)</td>
<td>that</td>
<td>what the Dormouse said</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 2: Anaphoric use

The table shows referring expressions used anaphorically and the respective antecedents. In the examples cited, (103) – (105), that and there are co-referential with the previously mentioned entities, that is they refer to the objects that the
respective antecedents refer to. The demonstrative *that* has the same referent with the object *letter* in (103). The referring expression *there* is co-referential with the phrase *in the window* in (104) and *there* in (105) is co-referential with a word-combination *in a house*. Examples (106) - (108) however, do not seem to have a direct antecedent. Instead, we assign the reference to *that* in (106) and (108) and to *there* in (107) by way of inference. These are examples of indirect anaphora because the antecedent is not clearly definable and can be determined only by inferring (cf. Consten 2003: 229). In the present study, however, I do not focus on such an approach to anaphora. The theory of indirect anaphora is rather disputable because a linguistically acceptable definition of anaphora encompasses both direct and indirect cases and is based on the fact that “anaphors are linguistic expressions that are used to relate a referent to a so-called anchor already mentioned in text or discourse” (Consten 2003: 229).

To avoid confusion when ascribing the anaphoric reference to some demonstratives, it is important to analyse them in context. Without anchorage in a context, most referring expressions are ambiguous, as in example (109):

109. ‘Well, there was Mystery,’ the Mock Turtle replied, counting off the subjects on his flappers, ‘—Mystery, ancient and modern, with Seaography: then Drawling—the Drawling-master was an old conger-eel that used to come once a week: he taught us Drawling, Stretching, and Fainting in Coils.’

‘What was *that* like?’ said Alice.

(a) ‘Well, I can’t show it you myself,’ the Mock Turtle said: I am too stiff. And the Gryphon never learnt it.’ (Carroll 1865 [2000]: 98)

In (109) *that* can anaphorically refer either to some school subjects or generally to all of them. The context (a), however, limits the referential possibilities: if the Mock Turtle is stiff, he cannot stretch and faint in coils, yet is able to drawl and do Mystery and Seagraphy. Thus, the context (a) proves that the demonstrative *that* is anaphorically co-referential only with two school subjects, Stretching and Fainting in Coils.

In contrast to anaphora, discourse deictic expressions determine their reference not by singling out the antecedent but by referring to a portion of the discourse. Discourse deixis refers to extra-linguistic entities and thereby it “crosses sentence
boundaries” (Kryk 1987: 68). In order to juxtapose anaphora with discourse deixis, consider the following example:

110. So Alice began telling them her adventures from the time when she first saw the White Rabbit. She was a little nervous about it just at first, the two creatures got so close to her, one on each side, and opened their eyes and mouths so very wide, but she gained courage as she went on. Her listeners were perfectly quiet till she got to the part about her repeating ‘You are old, Father William,’ to the Caterpillar, and the words all coming different, and then the Mock Turtle drew a long breath, and said ‘That’s very curious.’ (Carroll 1865 [2000]: 105)

The demonstrative, that in (110) is bound to the speech situation and is considered a part of the deictic field of language. The function of that in (110), contrary to the function of that in (103), is not anaphoric because it is not co-referential with any antecedent expressions. That in (110) is used to refer to a preceding portion of the discourse, namely to the fact that the words in the poem were different from the original. Since that in (110) encodes the reference to a portion of the unfolding discourse in which the utterance is located, it is an instance of discourse deixis. The examples below demonstrate the discourse deictic nature of the referring expression that:

111. ‘“Miss Alice! Come here directly, and get ready for your walk!” “Coming in a minute, nurse! But I’ve got to see that the mouse doesn’t get out.” Only I don’t think,’ Alice went on, ‘that they’d let Dinah stop in the house if it began ordering people about like that!’ (Carroll 1865 [2000]: 38)

112. Look out now, Five! Don’t go splashing paint over me like that!’ ‘I couldn’t help it,’ said Five, in a sulky tone; ‘Seven jogged my elbow.’ On which Seven looked up and said, ‘That’s right, Five! Always lay the blame on others!’ You’d better not talk!’ said Five. ‘I heard the Queen say only yesterday you deserved to be beheaded!’ ‘What for?’ said the one who had spoken first. ‘That’s none of your business, Two!’ said Seven. (Carroll 1865 [2000]: 79)

113. ‘Get up!’ said the Queen, in a shrill, loud voice, and the three gardeners instantly jumped up, and began bowing to the King, the Queen, the royal children, and everybody else. ‘Leave off that!’ screamed the Queen. ‘You make me giddy. (Carroll 1865 [2000]: 83)
114. Maybe it’s always pepper that makes people hot-tempered,’ she went on, very much pleased at having found out a new kind of rule, ‘and vinegar that makes them sour — and camomile that makes them bitter — and — and barley-sugar and such things that make children sweet-tempered. I only wish people knew that: then they wouldn’t be so stingy about it, you know —’ (Carroll 1865 [2000]: 90-91)

115. ‘You’re wrong about the crumbs,’ said the Mock Turtle: ‘crumbs would all wash off in the sea. But they [the whiting] have their tails in their mouths; and the reason is —’ here the Mock Turtle yawned and shut his eyes. — ‘Tell her about the reason and all that,’ he said to the Gryphon. (Carroll 1865 [2000]: 104)

116. ‘If you didn’t sign it [the letter],’ said the King, ‘that only makes the matter worse. You must have meant some mischief, or else you’d have signed your name like an honest man.’ There was a general clapping of hands at this: it was the first really clever thing the King had said that day.

‘That proves his guilt,’ said the Queen. (Carroll 1865 [2000]: 121)

117. ‘All right, so far,’ said the King, and he went on muttering over the verses to himself: ‘“we know it to be true —” that’s the jury, of course — “I gave her one, they gave him two —” why, that must be what he did with the tarts, you know —’

‘But, it goes on “they all returned from him to you,”’ said Alice. ‘Why, there they are!’ said the King triumphantly, pointing to the tarts on the table. ‘Nothing can be clearer than that. Then again —“before she had this fit —” you never had fits, my dear, I think?’ he said to the Queen (Carroll 1865 [2000]: 123-124)

It is contextually clear that all occurrences of that in the above mentioned examples are not co-referential with any linguistic expressions mentioned before in any passage. The extract (111) exemplifies that the discourse deictic demonstrative that refers to the way Dinah was giving orders to Alice. That in the utterance that’s none of your business in (112) is a referent of a discourse passage and can be clearly inferred only in the present context: it refers to knowing the reason for beheading the fellow Seven. That in (113) also refers to a portion of the previously mentioned discourse, namely to the long process of bowing to the King, the Queen, the royal children and everybody else. In (114), that refers to the previous immediate discourse, i.e., when assigning reference to that in (114), it is clear that Alice wishes that people possessed all knowledge about the influence of different ingredients on their mood. That in (115) does not refer to a single definite reason but to all possible
reasons why the whiting have their tails in their mouths. *That* in (116), uttered by the Queen, relates to the whole of the King’s statement about the Knave’s guilt and emphasizes the fact that the Knave purposefully did not sign the letter in order to hide his guilt. Last but not least, *that* in (117) points to the entire explanation for the anonymous letter that the King tried to provide to the audience. As seen from examples (111) – (117), the referring expressions of discourse deixis are not co-referential with any preceding linguistic forms. The reference of discourse deixis lies in a part of the discourse and its referent is “in the universe-of-discourse, which is created by the text and has a temporal structure imposed upon it by the text” (Lyons 1977, 2: 670).

In *Alice in Wonderland* there are discourse passages that contain both anaphoric and discourse deictic uses of demonstratives. This is exemplified by the following:

118. ‘Give your evidence,’ the King repeated angrily, ‘or I’ll have you executed, whether you’re nervous or not.’

‘I’m a poor man, your Majesty,’ the Hatter began, in a trembling voice, ‘— and I hadn’t begun my tea — not above a week or so — and what with the bread-and-butter getting so thin — and the twinkling of the tea —’

[...]

Here one of the guinea-pigs cheered, and was immediately *suppressed* by the officers of the court. (As *that* (a) is rather a hard word, I will just explain to you how it was done. They had a large canvas bag, which tied up at the mouth with strings: into this they slipped the guinea-pig, head first, and then sat upon it.)

‘I’m glad I’ve seen *that* (b) done,’ thought Alice. ‘I’ve so often read in the newspapers, at the end of trials, “There was some attempts at applause, which was immediately suppressed by the officers of the court,” and I never understood what it meant till now.’

‘If *that’s* (c) all you know about it, you may stand down,’ continued the King. (Carroll 1865 [2000]: 114-116)

*That* in (a) has a distinct and easily definable antecedent *suppressed*. Therefore, it is anaphoric. Further on, in the same passage, *that* in (b) does not have any anaphoric reference, its reference is of discourse deictic nature. *That* in (b) refers to the whole process of suppressing the Dormouse, previously described in the discourse. The King’s comment (c) immediately follows Alice’s contemplations on the word *suppress* and actually refers to a thematically different discourse, namely to the Hatter’s story being told before Alice expressed her thoughts on the word *suppress*.

---

16 see example (70)
That in (c) refers to the entire chain of irrelevant argumentations enumerated by the Hatter who was accused of stealing the tarts. This example shows that the demonstrative that, as in (c), can discourse deictically refer not only to an immediate but to a remote discourse as well, i.e., to a discourse interrupted by another speaking turn, in this case, by Alice’s comments.

4.5.2. Impure textual deixis

In most discourses there is no clear-cut distinction between anaphora and discourse deixis (cf. Ehlich 1982: 318). The border between anaphora and deixis is blurred, as in example (119):

119. As they walked off together, Alice heard the King say in a low voice, to the company generally, ‘You are all pardoned.’ ‘Come, that’s a good thing!’ she said to herself, for she had felt quite unhappy at the number of executions the Queen had ordered. (Carroll 1865 [2000]: 94)

The pronoun that does not refer to any single linguistic entity of Alice’s utterance, thus it does not seem to be anaphoric. On the other hand, it does not appear discourse-deictic either, as its reference lies in quite a narrow portion of the discourse, namely in the statement made by uttering an utterance you are all pardoned. Here we have a typical example of impure textual (or discourse) deixis. Below is another example of impure textual deixis from Alice in Wonderland:

120. Alice heard it [the Rabbit] say to itself ‘Then I’ll go round and get in at the window.’ ‘That you won’t’ thought Alice. (Carroll 1865 [2000]: 40)

That in (120) does not seem to refer to any aforementioned linguistic forms. It is co-referential with a “third-order entit[y]” (Kryk 1987: 89), i.e. with the proposition expressed by the utterance then I’ll go round and get in at the window. As Lyons (1977, 2: 668), says, it refers to the utterance-act, or speech-act performed by the Rabbit. In (120) that functions as both anaphora and deixis and bears characteristics of impure textual deixis.

4.5.3. Cataphora

So far I have outlined some differentiating factors between anaphora, discourse deixis and impure discourse deixis. The notion of cataphora is worth attention as well. Unlike with anaphoric use, in cataphoric use, the pronoun precedes the
expression with which it is co-referential. Both anaphora and cataphora are semantically referring phenomena but there is directional difference between them: the former deals with pointing backwards and the latter deals with pointing forwards (Ehlich 1982: 334). The notion of cataphora or Backwards Pronominalization (Kryk 1987: 73) is well exemplified in the following example:

121. At any rate I’ll never go there again!’ said Alice as she picked her way through the wood. ‘It’s the stupidest tea-party I ever was at in all my life!’ (Carroll 1865 [2000]: 78)

Example (121) is comparable with Lyon’s example I was born in London and have lived there all my life. On the one hand, the referring expression there bears cataphoric reference to the postpositioned noun tea-party. On the other hand, it simultaneously emphasizes deictic reference: according to the egocentricity of deixis, there, as a distal deictic, points to the fact that Alice is spatially located at a place different from the tea-party. The difference between Lyon’s example and example (121) is the following: there in Lyon’s example is used both anaphorically and deictically, whereas there in (121) is an instance of both cataphora and deixis.

The following examples provide more insight on the cataphoric use of demonstratives.

122. And she kept on puzzling about it while the Mouse was speaking, so that her idea of the tale was something like this: — ‘Fury said to a mouse, That he met in the house […]. (Carroll 1865 [2000]: 34)

123. The Mock Turtle sighed deeply, and began, in a voice sometimes choked with sobs, to sing this: — ‘Beautiful Soup, so rich and green, Waiting in a hot tureen! Who for such dainties would not stoop? (Carroll 1865 [2000]: 108)

124. These were the verses the White Rabbit read: — ‘They told me you had been to her, And mentioned me to him: She gave me a good character, But said I could not swim. (Carroll 1865 [2000]: 122)

---

17 see example (11)
In the following examples this/these are cataphoric, that is, they are mentioned prior to the expressions which are co-referential with them. In examples (122) to (124), it can be seen that only proximal demonstratives this/these and not distal that/those are used cataphorically (cf. Kryk 1987: 78). This observation can be explained by the fact that only proximal this/these may refer to a forthcoming discourse. The distal pronouns that/those refer only to an aforementioned discourse (cf. Lakoff 1974: 350). Proximal deictics this/these, in contrast to distal deictics, serve both a backward-pointing as well as a forward-pointing function (Fillmore 1997: 105) and, thus function anaphorically and cataphorically, whereas distal demonstratives that/those can only function anaphorically.

Cataphora cannot be applied to all pronouns preceding the expressions with which they are co-referential, as is mistakenly done by the Duck in (125). In cases like (125), the role of the broad context and the rules of English grammar are not to be discarded:

125. “Edwin and Morcar, the earls of Mercia and Northumbria, declared for him: and even Stigand, the patriotic archbishop of Canterbury, found it advisable —’’
   ‘Found what?’ said the Duck.
   ‘Found it,’ the Mouse replied rather crossly: ‘of course you know what “it” means.’
   ‘I know what “it” means well enough, when I find a thing,’ said the Duck: ‘it’s generally a frog or a worm. The question is, what did the archbishop find?’
   The Mouse did not notice this question, but hurriedly went on,
   ‘’— found it advisable to go with Edgar Atheling to meet William and offer him the crown. (Carroll 1865 [2000]: 30)

The pronoun it in the phrase found it demonstrates the inexplicitness of the referent and is an example of the so-called “empty it”. However, the Duck tries to assign a reference to it: the Duck speaks about the cataphoric use of the pronoun it with its reference of a frog or a worm. This assumption does not obey English grammar rules. The third person pronoun it in (125) is used as a syntactic index of extraposition with its reference to the following object clause (cf. Downing 2000). It is not cataphoric. This episode vividly illustrate how the Duck subverts the principles of traditional grammar

by asking language to do what is finally impossible: to be constantly unambiguous, to pull itself up independently by its own very fallible bootstraps. (Rackin 1991: 44)
In this sub-chapter I have attempted to outline the most important principles of discourse deixis and its instantiations in the discourse of Alice in Wonderland. Next, I will discuss the demonstratives this and that in the context of emotional deixis.

4.6. Emotional deixis

4.6.1. This as a marker of the speaker’s emotional involvement

Emotional or empathetic deixis deals with the high or low degree of the speaker’s involvement in the discourse situation he/she is referring to (Lyons 1977, 2: 677). In Alice in Wonderland, emotional deixis is grammaticalized through the use of the referring expressions this and that and here and there on the basis of the neutralisation of proximal and distal spatial dimension. The above mentioned indexicals in emotional deixis do not refer to the entities that are physically situated near or far from the speaker; they are distinguished by degrees of emotional closeness or distance. The shift from distal to proximal demonstratives occurs with the purpose of showing the speaker’s empathy, whereas the reverse shift, from the proximal to the distal dimension, occurs in order to show emotional distance of the speaker from an individual, object or place referred to. In the following example the preference for this over that which is motivated by the emotional involvement of the speaker in the subject matter, is dealt with:

126. Just then she heard something splashing about in the pool a little way off, and she swam nearer to make out what it was: at first she thought it must be a walrus or hippopotamus, but then she remembered how small she was now, and she soon made out that it was only a mouse that had slipped in like herself. ‘Would it be of any use, now,’ thought Alice, ‘to speak to this mouse? Everything is so out-of-the-way down here, that I should think very likely it can talk: at any rate, there’s no harm in trying.’ So she began: ‘O Mouse, do you know the way out of this pool? I am very tired of swimming about here, O Mouse!’ (Carroll 1865 [2000]: 25)

In example (126) an adverbial modifier of place a little way off, as well as the further discourse and she [Alice] swam nearer to make out what it was points to the fact that there is a certain distance between Alice and the Mouse. Thus, according to the principles of proximal/distal dimensions, Alice should use the distal demonstrative that to refer to the Mouse. However, she chooses the proximal this instead. This
preference for this over that can be explained by the fact that Alice feels emotional ties to the Mouse since it may help her get out of the pool. She uses this because she wants to achieve camaraderie with the Mouse.

The preference of a proximal over a distal demonstrative emphasizes the higher level of emotional closeness, as is also manifested in example (127):

127. Lastly, she [Alice’s sister] pictured to herself how this same little sister of hers would, in the after-time, be herself a grown woman; and how she would keep, through all her riper years, the simple and loving heart of her childhood. (Carroll 1865 [2000]: 126-127)

If that had been selected instead of this in the aforementioned example, it would not have changed the semantic meaning but it would have altered the pragmatic aspect of the utterance meaning, viz., the degree of emotional feeling towards Alice. If a speaker were emotionally neutral towards his/her addressee, he/she would say how the same little sister of hers, that is, use the definite article instead of a demonstrative. However, to emphasize emotional closeness, the proximal this is preferred. This example can be juxtaposed with the following example (128):

128. They very soon came upon a Gryphon, lying fast asleep in the sun. (If you don’t know what a Gryphon is, look at the picture.) ‘Up, lazy thing!’ said the Queen, ‘and take this young lady [Alice] to see the Mock Turtle, and to hear his his story. (Carroll 1865 [2000]: 94)

Although the proximal demonstrative this is used in a similar context in both examples (127) and (128), its nature, if compared, is significantly different. In (127) it is an instance of emotional deixis, whereas in (128) it is an occurrence of place deixis expressing spatial proximity between the Queen and Alice.

4.6.2. That as a marker of the speaker’s emotional detachment

So far, I have cited examples of the shift from distal that to proximal this caused by the speaker’s emotional involvement in the subject matter. I will now consider another side of emotional deixis, namely, the use of distal that/those instead of proximal this/these:

129. Alice opened the door and found that it led into a small passage, not much larger than a rat-hole: she knelt down and looked along the passage into the loveliest garden you ever saw. How she longed to get out of that dark hall, and wander about among
those beds of bright flowers and those cool fountains, but she
could not even get her head though the doorway. (Carroll 1865
[2000]: 16)

In example (129) the preference of that over this in the phrase that dark hall can be
explained by the fact that Alice, though physically situated in the dark hall, is
emotionally distant from where she finds herself after the fall down the Rabbit hole.
A similar explanation is applicable to the next example:

130. ‘It was much pleasanter at home,’ thought poor Alice, ‘when
one wasn’t always growing larger and smaller, and being
ordered about by mice and rabbits. I almost wish I hadn’t gone
down that rabbit-hole […]. (Carroll 1865 [2000]: 39)

In fact, Alice is in the rabbit hole. So according to proximal/distal relations, the
proximal demonstrative this should be applied. Instead, the distal deictic that is used,
which is justified by Alice’s emotional detachment from the rabbit hole.

4.6.3. Miscellaneous instances of emotional deixis
Determining the nature of the demonstratives in certain, especially written,
discourses is complicated. Consider the next example with the demonstrative that:

131. Pepper, mostly,’ said the cook.
‘Treacle,’ said a sleepy voice behind her.
‘Collar that Dormouse,’ the Queen shrieked out. ‘Behead that
Dormouse! Turn that Dormouse out of court! Suppress him!
Pinch him! Off with his whiskers!’ (Carroll 1865 [2000]: 117)

On the one hand, that can be analysed as an instance of place deixis which stresses a
spatial distance between the Queen and the Dormouse. On the other hand, the reader
knows that the Queen treats the Dormouse with disgust and repulsion, which could
be the reason for the referring to the Dormouse with the distal that, stressing the
emotional dislike. In this case, the preference for that over this can be explained by
the purely emotional negative attitude towards the object referred to, namely, the
Dormouse.

In sub-chapter 4.5. “Discourse deixis” I demonstrated that in some utterance
situations a referring expression can be used both discourse deictically and
cataphorically. Similarly, there are cases, like the following (132), where an
indexical can function both as an instance of emotional deixis and anaphora:
This example demonstrates that deixis and anaphora are not mutually exclusive. On the one hand, *there* anaphorically refers to the previously mentioned court; on the other hand, it is also an instance of emotional deixis: the distal *there* is preferred over proximal *here*. This signifies that Alice is not involved emotionally with the court which she is a part of. Her distal reference *there*, although she is present in the court, emphasizes her emotional detachment from the court procedure.

Although in most cases of emotional deixis the preference for a distal demonstrative over a proximal one, or vice versa, is motivated by a degree of personal empathetic attitude, in some discourse situations, proximal/distal demonstratives can still be used interchangeably:

133. ‘What can all *that* green stuff be?’ (Carroll 1865 [2000]: 54)

134. ‘What is the use of repeating all *this* stuff, […]’. (Carroll 1865 [2000]: 107)

These examples deal with the emotional neutralization of the proximal-distal dimension (cf. Kryk 1987: 94; Levinson 1983: 81), as both *this* and *that* can be substituted with a respective distal/proximal counterpart without any difference in meaning. The only noticeable distinction between *this* and *that* in the context of (133) and (134) is that the distal demonstrative *that* is more colloquial than *this* (cf. Lakoff 1974: 353).

Another feature that distinguishes *this* from *that* in emotional deixis is the degree of definiteness expressed by demonstratives. Depending on the context, *this* can imply indefiniteness (cf. Lakoff 1974: 347) and, as example (135) shows, can be substituted with an indefinite article:

135. She was a good deal frightened by *this* very sudden change.  
(Carroll 1865 [2000]: 53)

The preference for *this* over the indefinite article *a* provides the narrative with a greater degree of vividness; it “involve[s] the addressee in [the narrative] more fully” (Lakoff 1974: 347).
To summarise the focus of this sub-chapter, emotional deixis is based on the complicated analysis of emotional factors of the discourse participants. The nature of emotional deixis in a discourse, and especially in a written discourse, is rather subjective, since the reader, as a discourse non-participant, does not exactly know the degree of the emotional involvement of the participants and cannot objectively evaluate emotional attitude toward a particular utterance situation. For these reasons, accounting for the speaker’s preference for distal or proximal demonstratives in a particular discourse is challenging. It is unequivocally, “the speaker’s subjective involvement and his appeal to shared experience” (Lyons 1977, 2: 677) that mostly contribute to selecting the proximal this or distal that in a certain context.

4.7. Social deixis

4.7.1. “Royal” honorifics

Social deixis concerns language forms that encode the social roles and social relationships of the discourse participants (cf. Levinson 1983: 89-90). Among markers of social deixis in the discourse of Alice in Wonderland, it is worth mentioning “royal” honorifics (ibid.: 1983: 91), words or word combinations that convey high esteem and are used in addressing or referring to persons from the royal family. "Royal" honorifics are one of the important manifestations of social deixis in Alice in Wonderland, as there are many representatives of royalty including the King, the Queen and the royal children:

136. ‘My name is Alice, so please your Majesty said Alice very politely; […]. (Carroll 1865 [2000]: 81)

The address form your Majesty is usually used when addressing the Queen or the King. This form is based on the significant property, ‘majestic’, which is ascribed to anyone authorised to be called the Queen or the King. This form metonymically transfers the property of majesty, which is adjusted to the royal title, to a particular person being addressed. This transfer “acquires a metonymical value, so that the possessed attributes are made to stand for the supposed possessors of these qualities” (Mey [2001]: 275). As a result, the person addressed with the form your Majesty automatically acquires the attribute of majesty. Along with transferring a significant attribute, the address form transfers high respect and honour to the addressee. It also
carries the information about the status of the addressee in society. Therefore, the frequently used form your Majesty is an example of social deixis. Social deixis as Mey ([2001]: 275) states, indicates the extent to which the speaker and the addressee are of similar or different social status. It determines the degree of social distance and manifests the identity and relationships of interlocutors in social contexts.

4.7.2. Power vs. solidarity

As well as the “royal” honorifics used in Alice in Wonderland, there are numerous honorific and dishonorific address forms that mark social relationships between discourse participants. Although there is no explicit T-/V-distinction of address forms in English, there are other expressions of subordination which still transmit the pragmatic information on nonreciprocity of power:

137. ‘Their heads are gone, if it please your Majesty!’ the soldiers shouted in reply. (Carroll 1865 [2000]: 83)

138. ‘I beg pardon, your Majesty,’ he [the Hatter] began, ‘for bringing these in […]. (Carroll 1865 [2000]: 113)

139. ‘Sure then I’m here! Digging for apples, yer honour [the gardener Pat addressing the Rabbit]!’ (Carroll 1865 [2000]: 41)

140. ‘If you please, Sir [Alice addressing the Rabbit]—’ […]. (Carroll 1865 [2000]: 22)

141. ‘I can’t explain myself, I’m afraid, Sir’ said Alice [Alice addressing the Caterpillar]. (Carroll 1865 [2000]: 47)

142. ‘Herald, read the accusation!’ said the King [addressing the Rabbit]. (Carroll 1865 [2000]: 112)

143. You can’t think how glad I am to see you again, you dear old thing!’ said the Duchess, as she tucked her arm affectionately into Alice’s […]. (Carroll 1865 [2000]: 90)

144. ‘An arm, you goose [the Rabbit addressing the gardener Pat]! Who ever saw one that size? (Carroll 1865 [2000]: 41)

Address forms like your Majesty, yer honour, Sir which are juxtaposed with you dear old thing and you goose, demonstrate an existing gradation of social relationship between the speaker and the addressee, shown in the following table:
As can be seen in Table 3, the higher the address form is located in the table, the higher is the social status of the person addressed and the higher is the degree of formality. The line between Sir and Herald is a dividing line between the implied T-/V-address forms, i.e. the forms above the line correspond to V-form and the forms below the line correspond to T-form. Following Levinson (1983: 177), the choice of the form does not affect the semantic truth condition of the utterances. However, it marks the rank relation between the speaker and the addressee, as well as the level of power reciprocity between the discourse participants. In the above-mentioned examples, the address forms are nonreciprocal, since one of the participants has less power than the other. Those with less power, accordingly, use implicit V-forms to address their superior. The V-form, applied to a single person, connotes social prestige and indicates either social distance from, or even social superiority to the addressee. This is illustrated by the detailed analysis of examples (137) to (144).

In (137) and (138) the Queen is addressed with the royal honorific your Majesty, which is an implied V-form that demonstrates that the soldiers in (137) and the Hatter in (138) are socially inferior to the Queen. In (139) and (144) there is a power hierarchy between the Master Rabbit and his gardener Pat; hence their exchange of address forms is asymmetrical: the gardener uses a humble yer honour and the Rabbit, in turn, addresses the gardener with the dishonorific and derogative you goose. When Alice uses Sir — an implicit V-form — in addressing the Rabbit in (140) and the Caterpillar in (141), she obeys the politeness rules of talking to a stranger. In these contexts, the V-form indicates social distance from the addressee, whereas the address form you dear old thing in the context of (143) points to the social closeness between the Duchess and Alice. In (142) the combination of the address form Herald, based on a first-name basis and the use of an imperative, is a manifestation of an implied T-form.
Unlike examples (137) to (144) which manifest the asymmetrical exchange of address forms, there are also symmetric forms of address used in *Alice in Wonderland*. These are used by Alice with the Dormouse, the Hatter, the Mad Hare, the Cheshire Cat and other animals, who have equal social roles and thus reciprocally use the implicit T-form of address, which indicates solidarity (cf. Brown & Yule 1983: 254) and social closeness/equality between the speaker and the addressee (cf. Mey [2001]: 30; Levinson 1983: 129).

In different social contexts, different address forms referring to the same individual are used. In a certain context they stress the particular social role of an individual which is appropriate to that context (cf. Brown & Yule 1983: 54). The choice of form accounts for the notions of power and solidarity. To elucidate this, I consider the forms which were used to address the Rabbit:

145. ‘Sure then I’m here! Digging for apples, *yer honour* [the gardener Pat addressing the Rabbit]!’ (Carroll 1865 [2000]: 41)

146. ‘If you please, *Sir* [Alice addressing the Rabbit]—’ […] (Carroll 1865 [2000]: 22)

147. ‘*Herald*, read the accusation!’ said the King [addressing the Rabbit]. (Carroll 1865 [2000]: 112)

The examples show that it is possible to use different address forms to address the same Rabbit, who depending on the situation, plays the social role of a master in (145), a noble sir in (146) and a King’s courtier in (147). In (145) and (146) the Rabbit has more power than his interlocutor; thus, their relations are socially marked by asymmetrical forms of address. In (147) the address forms between the King and the Rabbit are also asymmetrical; the latter — since he is addressed on a first-name basis and with an imperative — occupies a lower social position and has less power than the King. When analysing (145) to (147) it is worth referring to Frege’s sense and reference, discussed in detail in the sub-chapter 4.2. “Person Deixis”. It can be seen that the three address forms applied to the Rabbit serve as three different linguistic modes of presentation, i.e. senses. However, they designate the same referent, viz. the White Rabbit. The semantic meaning in all three examples is equivalent, the difference lies in the pragmatic meaning, namely in the social deixis. *Yer honour* and *Sir*, as terms of address in (145) and (146), respectively, indicate that the addressee (the Rabbit) is socially superior to the speaker. The address form
Herald in (147), used in an imperative utterance, demonstrates that the addressee (the Rabbit) is socially inferior to the King.

4.7.3. The role of macro context
Grundy (2000: 26) claims that “we address our equals and refer to our superiors” as in examples (148) and (149) respectively:

148. An enormous puppy was looking down at her with large round eyes, and feebly stretching out one paw, trying to touch her. ‘Poor little thing!’ said Alice. (Carroll 1865 [2000]: 45)

149. ‘May it please your Majesty,’ said Two, in a very humble tone, going down on one knee as he spoke. (Carroll 1865 [2000]: 83)

In (148), as the speaker (Alice) is socially superior or at least equal to the addressee (the puppy), she uses a direct address form. In example (149), the use of the modal may along with a polite please is a standard formal way of addressing a high authority. It shows respect and indicates the inferiority of gardener Two in relation to the Queen. These examples show that there exist such factors as social class and occupation which determine the direction of talk between discourse participants. These factors, existing beyond the micro domain of the talk exchange, are defined as macro or distal context (Grundy 2000: 197). The next example demonstrates how the macro context of the age difference between participants determines the choice of the address form:

150. […] turning to Alice, she [the Queen] went on: “What’s your name, child?” (Carroll 1865 [2000]: 81)

By uttering (150), the Queen opts for stressing the distal context of the age difference between her and Alice. This is done in the opening turn of the conversation with the purpose of pointing out clearly the participants’ roles in terms of possession of power. Also interesting is example (151):

151. Very soon the Rabbit […] called out to her in an angry tone, ‘Why, Mary Ann, what are you doing out here? (Carroll 1865 [2000]: 38)

At first the name Mary Ann seems to be a usual female name, but Gardner (2000: 38) says that in Carroll’s times Mary Ann was a euphemism for ‘servant girl’. In that way, this euphemism allows the Rabbit to avoid a direct negatively-laden address form. Instead he uses an encoded dishonorific form to reflect the distal context of the
higher status of the Rabbit. The form serves as a marker of social deixis and shows the obvious superiority of the speaker over the addressee.

Another power-determining factor, singled out by Brown & Gilman, (1960: 258), is the height of interlocutors: the taller the person is, the more power he/she possesses. Carroll demonstrates this in the episode when Alice reacts to the anonymous letter sent to the court:

152. ‘If any one of them can explain it,’ said Alice, (she had grown so large in the last few minutes that she wasn’t a bit afraid of interrupting him,) ‘I’ll give him sixpence. I don’t believe there’s an atom of meaning in it.’ (Carroll 1865 [2000]: 122)

Alice’s change in size empowers her to make bold remarks without fearing the consequences. It is the power of being bigger than other participants that assigns Alice a superior position (cf. Lakoff 1993: 383).

Levinson (1983: 94) says that social deixis in English has not been so elaborate as, for instance, in Japanese, Javanese or Korean. Indeed, there are fewer social deictic markers grammaticalized in English. However, the analysis of social deixis in *Alice in Wonderland* has demonstrated that this pragmatic notion is vital for correct interpretation of the discourse and its role should not be neglected.

Another argument in support of this statement is that in some contexts social deixis can provide an explanation of the author’s preference for animate over non-animate animal reference. The following sub-chapter will focus on this issue in detail and analyse the reference applied to the White Rabbit, the Mouse, Alice’s dog Dinah, as well as the puppy that Alice met in Wonderland.

### 4.7.4. Animate vs. non-animate reference to the animals in Wonderland

First of all, the reference to the White Rabbit is traced. At the beginning of the book the Rabbit is anaphorically referred to as *it* (cf. Carroll 1865 [2000]: 11, 12), which later changes to the anaphoric *he* (ibid.: 22, 120, 121). As is clear, the reader is confronted with inconsistency. It seems that since the White Rabbit is an animal, he18 should be grammatically referred to as *it*. However, the grammatical rule of assigning non-animate reference to animals has not been fully observed by Carroll. The preference for *he* over *it* is related to the immediate context in which the White

---

18 Here and further on in the thesis I will refer to the White Rabbit with the animate referential pronoun *he*. 
Rabbit appears and depends on the social setting, the other participants involved in talk with him, as well as the social roles the participants occupy. An anaphoric *he* in reference to the Rabbit is semantically equal to an anaphoric *it*. The difference lies in pragmatic meaning, namely in the nonreciprocal social relationship between the Rabbit and his discourse partner (cf. Brown & Gilman 1960: 255).

Now I will trace how the reference to the Rabbit gradually changes from non-animate to animate. At the first encounter, Alice sees the Rabbit as a usual animal:

153. [...] a White Rabbit with pink eyes ran close by her. There was nothing so very remarkable in that; nor did Alice think it so very much out of the way to hear the Rabbit say to *itself*, ‘Oh dear! Oh dear! I shall be late!’ (Carroll 1865 [2000]: 11)

Therefore, accordingly, he is referred to as *it*. However, further in (154), the reader learns that the Rabbit possesses the ability to talk, usually applicable only to humans. These extralinguistic factors motivate the animate references to Rabbit:

154. It was the White Rabbit returning, splendidly dressed, with a pair of white kid gloves in one hand and a large fan in the other: he came trotting along in a great hurry, muttering to himself as *he* came, ‘Oh! the Duchess, the Duchess! (Carroll 1865 [2000]: 22

The example illustrates that the White Rabbit has little in common with the usual rabbit. He is immaculately dressed and wears white kid gloves. This non-linguistic information adds a peculiar tinge to the context and explains the usage of the animate referent, justifying the intentional grammatical mistake. Shared understanding of a usual domestic animal has been updated and adjusted to a new reality in Wonderland. Therefore, a new animate anaphora has been used.

It seems as if the pragmatic use of animate reference to the White Rabbit is understandable. However, the recurrent non-animate references to the Rabbit in (155) forces to search for possible explanations and, in doing so, refer to Brown & Gilman’s notion of power (cf. 1960: 255-257):

155. It was the White Rabbit, trotting slowly back again, and looking anxiously about as *it* went, as if *it* had lost something; and she heard *it* muttering to *itself* ‘The Duchess! The Duchess! Oh my dear paws! Oh my fur and whiskers! She’ll get me executed, as sure as ferrets are ferrets! (Carroll 1865 [2000]: 37)
It is the low level of power that the Rabbit has in the circumstances which assigns him to an inferior position. His social status is less significant than that of the Duchess. This hierarchy finds its representation in the non-animate anaphoric reference to the Rabbit. A similar explanation is applicable to (156):

156. […] came ten soldiers carrying clubs; these were all shaped like the three gardeners, oblong and flat, with their hands and feet at the corners: next the ten courtiers; these were ornamented all over with diamonds, and walked two and two, as the soldiers did. After these came the royal children; there were ten of them, and the little dears came jumping merrily along hand in hand, in couples: they were all ornamented with hearts. Next came the guests, mostly Kings and Queens, and among them Alice recognised the White Rabbit: it was talking in a hurried nervous manner, smiling at everything that was said, and went by without noticing her. (Carroll 1865 [2000]: 81)

It is the difference of power between the Rabbit and the royal representatives that causes a non-animate reference to the Rabbit to be used. The examples demonstrate that Carroll assigns the White Rabbit a non-animate reference in those passages where the White Rabbit has inferior power. In (156) he is presented in an immediate context with the King and the Queen, who possess superior power as members of royalty. Thus, the non-animate reference to the Rabbit in (156) is a linguistic manifestation of inferior power.

In the following examples, the reader meets the Rabbit and his discourse participant Alice. In the context of the following examples, the relationship between the Rabbit and Alice is based on the notion of solidarity, that is, on a mutual social equality:

157. ‘It’s—it’s a very fine day!’ said a timid voice at her [Alice’s] side. She was walking by the White Rabbit, who was peeping anxiously into her face.
   ‘Very,’ said Alice: ‘— where’s the Duchess?’ (Carroll 1865 [2000]: 83)

158. ‘Hush! Hush!’ said the Rabbit in a low, hurried tone. He looked anxiously over his shoulder as he spoke, and then raised himself upon tiptoe, put his mouth close to her [Alice’s] ear, and whispered ‘She’s under sentence of execution.’ (Carroll 1865 [2000]: 84)

Carroll uses animate reference he, his and who when the White Rabbit is put in the context with Alice, who is on the same social level and who has virtually equivalent power.
The referential pronouns applied to the Mouse that Alice meets in the pool of tears will now be considered. The first mention of the Mouse is as follows:

159. [...] it was only a mouse that had slipped in like herself. Would it be of any use, now,’ thought Alice, ‘to speak to this mouse? Everything is so out-of-the-way down here, that I should think very likely it can talk [...]. (Carroll 1865 [2000]: 25)

In the context of (159) the word mouse is not capitalized; the reference is non-animate. However, when Alice starts talking with the Mouse, she deliberately uses the vocative form O Mouse because she thinks that it is “the right way of speaking to a mouse” (Carroll 1865 [2000]: 25):

160. ‘O Mouse, do you know the way out of this pool? I am very tired of swimming about here, O Mouse!’ (Carroll 1865 [2000]: 25)

Since Alice has grown smaller, the size of the Mouse to Alice is comparable to the size of a walrus or hippopotamus. According to Brown & Gilman (cf. 1960: 258), the criterion of size is considered a basis of power. A big Mouse possesses more power than a tiny Alice in the enormous pool of tears. As Alice is in an inferior position to the Mouse, she uses the awe-inspired vocative, O Mouse.

With the flow of the narration, the Mouse acquires respect among the birds and animals that have fallen into the pool. Thus, he is already described as a human-like being and not as an animal:

161. At last the Mouse, who seemed to be a person of authority among them, called out, ‘Sit down, all of you, and listen to me! I’ll soon make you dry enough!’ (Carroll 1865 [2000]: 29)

162. [...] and she looked up eagerly, half hoping that the Mouse had changed his mind, and was coming back to finish his story. (Carroll 1865 [2000]: 36).

The word Mouse is capitalised for the first time in the narrative here. In addition, the animate reference, in the form of the relative pronoun who (161) and his (162), is applied here.

In the above-mentioned examples, the gradual alteration from non-animate to animate reference to the Mouse can be seen. The change in social deixis (from mouse to O Mouse; from which to who and from it to he) occurs due to the context change:

19 Here and further on in the thesis I will refer to the Mouse with an animate referential pronoun he.
the Mouse has acquired human features, including an ability to talk, a capacity to demand respect from others and thus, the ability to lead others. He also possesses more power than the other animals since he takes the leading role and initiates the drying of all animals that have fallen into the pool of tears.

Fillmore (1997: 112) says that if the social relations between the speaker and the addressee or the bystander influence the choice of personal names, titles or kinship terms, there is a place for social deixis. It may be interesting to consider whether there is any connection between the degree of social closeness and the choice of animate versus non-animate reference to two different animals, viz. Alice’s pet Dinah (163 - 165) and a neighbour’s terrier (166):

163. And yet I wish I could show you our cat Dinah: I think you’d take a fancy to cats if you could only see her. She is such a dear quiet thing.’ [...] (Carroll 1865 [2000]: 26)

164. ‘I wish I had our Dinah here, I know I do!’ said Alice aloud, addressing nobody in particular. ‘She’d soon fetch it back!’ (Carroll 1865 [2000]: 35)

165. ‘Nobody seems to like her, down here, and I’m sure she’s the best cat in the world! (Carroll 1865 [2000]: 35)

166. ‘There is such a nice little dog near our house I should like to show you! A little bright-eyed terrier, you know, with oh, such long curly brown hair! And it’ll fetch things when you throw them, and it’ll sit up and beg for its dinner, and all sorts of things—I can’t remember half of them—and it belongs to a farmer, you know, and he says it’s so useful, it’s worth a hundred pounds! He says it kills all the rats and—oh dear!’ cried Alice in a sorrowful tone. (Carroll 1865 [2000]: 27)

We notice a strict consistency in applying animate reference to Alice’s cat Dinah, which can be explained by the extralinguistic factors of affection and emotional solidarity (cf. Fillmore 1997: 114) between Alice and her pet. It is the social context that justifies the appropriateness of animate reference to the cat. As Alice has a special intimate connection with her pet, referring to Dinah as it would be totally inappropriate. Since such social and emotional closeness is absent between Alice and a neighbour’s dog, a grammatically appropriate pronoun, it, is applied in (166).

Animals in Alice in Wonderland are more than just living creatures. They are endowed with the abilities to think, talk and argue; abilities that are usually applicable only to human beings. The preference for either animate or non-animate
reference to Wonderland animals, as the examples in this sub-chapter have demonstrated, is accounted for by a number of factors. Among them are different social roles and relations between the animals and their conversation participants, as well as differences in occupation, age and height.

4.8. Non-deictic use

In the sub-chapters above I have covered the most important deictic uses encountered in *Alice in Wonderland*. Apart from deictic uses fully dependent on the Origo of the speaker, deictic expressions can be used non-deictically. I briefly touched on a non-deictic use of the indexical *always* and *now* (example (93)) in the sub-chapter 4.4. “Time Deixis”. Examples (103) to (108) in the sub-chapter 4.5. “Discourse Deixis” demonstrated the use of deictic expressions anaphorically and thus, in their non-deictic function. Now I will consider some other non-deictic uses that should be clearly distinguished from their deictic counterparts.

Unlike deictic expressions, non-deictics depend on neither the roles of the interlocutors in the communication situation, nor their location in space, nor the time at which the communication occurs. Consider the nature of *you* in the following examples:

167. For instance, suppose it were nine o’clock in the morning, just time to begin lessons: *you’d* only have to whisper a hint to Time, and round goes the clock in a twinkling! Half-past one, time for dinner!  
(‘I only wish it was,’ the March Hare said to itself in a whisper.)  
‘That would be grand, certainly,’ said Alice thoughtfully: ‘but then — I shouldn’t be hungry for it, you know.’  
‘Not at first, perhaps,’ said the Hatter: ‘but *you* could keep it to half-past one as long as you liked.’ (Carroll 1865 [2000]: 72-73)

168. […] so these three little sisters—they were learning to draw, you know —’  
‘What did they draw?’ said Alice, quite forgetting her promise.  
‘Treacle,’ said the Dormouse, without considering at all this time.  
[...]  
‘*You* can draw water out of a water-well,’ said the Hatter; ‘so I should think you could draw treacle out of a treacle-well — eh, stupid?’ (Carroll 1865 [2000]: 76)
169. […] she knelt down and looked along the passage into the loveliest garden you ever saw. (Carroll 1865 [2000]: 16)

In these examples, a deictic term, you, is used non-deictically; as Fillmore explains “it has not been anchored in the current speech event” (Fillmore 1982: 38). The you-containing utterance is uttered by the Hatter in (167) and by the Dormouse in (168) and addressed to Alice. However, you does not refer to Alice; it has a rather general reference which is inapplicable to a particular identifiable person. The interpretation of you in (169) does not have a particular referent either and does not depend on the context of the utterance. Thus, the use of you in (167) to (169) is generalized and non-deictic. A similar explanation can be given for the next example:

170. ‘Ah, my dear! Let this be a lesson to you never to lose your temper!’ (Carroll 1865 [2000]: 35)

In this example the Duchess teaches lessons of good behaviour to Alice. The possessive pronoun your does not refer to Alice. In fact, it is generalised.

In certain contexts deictic expressions like now and here acquire the role of discourse particles. In such cases their interpretation does not depend on the moment or place of utterance in which they are produced:

171. ‘Now, I give you fair warning,’ shouted the Queen, stamping on the ground as she spoke; […]. ‘(Carroll 1865 [2000]: 93)

172. Now, I’ll manage better this time,’ […]. (Carroll 1865 [2000]: 78)

173. ‘Now, what am I to do with this creature when I get it home?’ (Carroll 1865 [2000]: 63)

174. Here the Queen put on her spectacles, and began staring at the Hatter, […]. (Carroll 1865 [2000]: 113)

175. Here one of the guinea-pigs cheered, and was immediately suppressed by the officers of the court. (Carroll 1865 [2000]: 115)

The use of now in (171) to (173) and the use of here in (174) to (175) is regarded as non-deictic; the terms now and here function as signposts of discourse cohesion. They facilitate the process of connecting different parts of the discourse (cf. Aijmer 2002: 5) and serve the role of attention-getters, as they draw the addressee’s attention to the message of the utterance.
There are some deictic expressions like here and there, this and that, now and then that have acquired full idiomatic status (cf. Roug 1983: 278). Neither the identity of the speaker, nor his/her time, location or the moment of the utterance change the meaning of the idiomatic entities:

176. [...] here and there she saw maps and pictures hung upon pegs. (Carroll 1865 [2000]: 13)

177. First it marked out a race-course, in a sort of circle, (‘the exact shape doesn’t matter,’ it said,) and then all the party were placed along the course, here and there. (Carroll 1865 [2000]: 31)

The word combination here and there in the context of (176) and (177) is used non-deictically and means in assorted places.

I will now consider the spatial deictic terms behind and in front of in their non-deictic use. Their reference is identified in dependence on the spatio-locational information of non-egocentric objects rather than on the location of the speaker (cf. Lyons 1977, 2: 698). The following examples illustrate this issue:

178. She was close behind it [the Rabbit]… (Carroll 1865 [2000]: 14)

179. At this moment the door of the house opened, and a large plate came skimming out, straight at the Footman’s head: it just grazed his nose, and broke to pieces against one of the trees behind him. (Carroll 1865 [2000]: 59)

180. He [the King] got behind Alice as he spoke. (Carroll 1865 [2000]: 87)

181. Alice looked up, and there stood the Queen in front of them [Alice and the Duchess]. (Carroll 1865 [2000]: 93)

182. One of the jurors had a pencil that squeaked. This of course, Alice could not stand, and she went round the court and got behind him […]. (Carroll 1865 [2000]: 111)

The assignment of the locational information is established with reference to the canonical front-back dimension, that is, the horizontal orientation which human beings, as well as animals and some other objects that move, possess (ibid.: 698). The front of an animate being or an object is considered a part that “arrives first whenever it moves in its most characteristic manner of movement” (Fillmore 1995: 33). For instance, the Rabbit, the Footman, the Duchess, as well as the juror, have designated fronts and backs, and this canonical information is essential when
assigning locations. Thus *behind* is relative to the Rabbit’s location in (178), to the Footman’s location in (179), to Alice’s location in (180), to the juror’s location in (182), and *in front of* in (181) is relative to the location of Alice and the Duchess.

The front-back orientation is also assigned to a variety of immovable objects. Thus, a canonical front of the house is determined from the user-orientation criterion, and in this way, is the part by which it is usually approached.

183. There was a table set out under a tree *in front of* the house.
   (Carroll 1865 [2000]: 69)

The front of the house remains constant no matter where the speaker is located. Thus, in this example and similar ones, the ego-centric relation of *in front of* to the location of the speaker is annulled (cf. Rauh 1983: 51).

### 4.9. Conclusions

It has been the aim of this chapter to demonstrate the intricacies of deixis in examples from *Alice in Wonderland*. I have concentrated on the characteristic deictic categories (gestural and symbolic) and uses (person deixis, place deixis, time deixis, discourse deixis, emotional deixis and social deixis). Special attention has been paid to the egocentricity, ostension, transiency and two-fold proximal/distal dichotomy of deixis. An attempt has been made to show how skilfully Carroll plays with language forms in context and how the interpretation of those forms greatly depends on the context. I have demonstrated how the context limits the amount of possible interpretations of deictic expressions and facilitates the inferring process for the addressee. Invoking a common context for the speaker and the addressee is also a prerequisite for drawing the correct pragmatic presupposition. This notion, as well as its semantic counterpart, is the subject of discussion in the following chapter.

### 5. Presupposition

In this chapter my objective is to analyse the role of presupposition in interpreting *Alice in Wonderland* correctly. Special attention is paid to various types of semantic and syntactic presupposition-triggers encountered in the text. I concentrate on examples of direct presupposition denials and show the way these affect
communication. I also provide an explication of why the notion of presupposition cannot be restricted to the framework of semantics and has to be approached pragmatically. The basic concepts of pragmatic presupposition, viz. its appropriateness, common ground (cf. Levinson 1983: 205) and speaker’s/addressee’s encyclopaedic knowledge are also addressed.

5.1. Presupposition-triggers

It is a challenge to provide a full-fledged definition of presupposition that can encompass all its semantic and pragmatic facets. Let us consider Levinson’s account of presupposition. He states that presupposition is “a result of complex interactions between semantics and pragmatics” (Levinson 1983: 225) and is

 [...] a heterogeneous collection of quite distinct and different phenomena, some perhaps semantic, others different varieties of pragmatic implication. (ibid.: 217)

Presuppositions are often determined by particular lexemes or language structures called presupposition-triggers. In this sub-chapter, I will sketch a list of the main semantic and syntactic presupposition-triggers and elucidate their presupposition-generating behaviour on the basis of examples from *Alice in Wonderland*. The following list is based on Levinson’s (1983: 181-184), as well as Keenan’s (1998: 9-11) lists of presupposition-triggers:

I. Proper names and definite descriptions

Proper names and definite descriptions presuppose the existence of their referents; they trigger existential presuppositions:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Examples</th>
<th>Presuppositions</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>184. The Cat only grinned when it saw Alice. (Carroll 1865 [2000]: 64)</td>
<td>184’. The Cat and Alice exist.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>185. ‘[…] the King and the executor ran wildly up and down.</td>
<td>185’. The King and the executor exist.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(Carroll 1865 [2000]: 89)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>186. It’s a friend of mine — a Cheshire Cat,’ said Alice: ‘allow me</td>
<td>186’. The Cheshire Cat exists.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>to introduce it.’ (Carroll 1865 [2000]: 86)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 4: Presuppositional behaviour of proper names and definite descriptions

These examples presuppose the existence of the enumerated entities (the Cat, Alice, the King, the executor) at a certain place and time in the possible world of
Wonderland. The existential presuppositions have to be true in order for the sentences containing them to be meaningful, that is to say, only if the Cheshire Cat exists, can sentence (184) make sense. The next sequence shows what consequences an overt denial of the existential presupposition has:

187. (a) Have some *wine*,’ the March Hare said in an encouraging tone.
    Alice looked all round the table, but there was nothing on it but tea. ‘I don’t see any wine,’ she remarked.
    (b) ‘*There isn’t any*,’ said the March Hare. (Carroll 1865 [2000]: 69)

By uttering (a) the March Hare is committed to the belief that the wine exists. The existential presupposition *wine exists* has to be satisfied in order for utterance (a) to make sense. However, to Alice’s and the reader’s surprise, (b) overtly denies the presupposition embedded in (a). Thus, the existential presupposition *wine exists* fails to hold and the utterance in which it occurred (187) seems meaningless for anyone who lives by the communication rules of the real world. However, in a possible world of Wonderland, the language works differently: it does not obey the logical real-world principles of communication and appears “to operate by the opposite of our normal pragmatic rules and (therefore) to be nonsensical” (Lakoff 1993: 368). It ruins common expectations and leaves everyone, except for the inhabitants of the possible world of Wonderland, puzzled.

Analogous remarks can be made with respect to (188). The King is angry about the Cat’s impertinent behaviour because the latter refuses to kiss his hand. That is why the King orders that the Cat, or to be more precisely, its head, be beheaded:

188. The executioner’s argument was that you couldn’t cut off a *head* unless there was a *body* to cut it off from: that he had never had to do such a thing before, and he wasn’t going to begin at his time of life.
    The King’s argument was, that anything that had a *head* could be *beheaded*, and that you weren’t to talk nonsense. (Carroll 1865 [2000]: 88)

On the one hand, the executioner can behead the Cheshire Cat because it has a head and it can be cut off. On the other hand, the cat has no body to be separated from the head. Thus, the existential presuppositions contradict one another and make the problem of head-cutting-off insoluble.
II. Factive verbs

Factive verbs are a class of verbs which presuppose the truth of their complements in an utterance. Such verbs include *know, be aware, have a clear notion, realize, take into account, bear in mind, ignore, make clear, mind, criticise, forgive, regret, resent, surprise, be sorry, be proud, be indifferent, be glad, be sad, be exciting, be significant, be tragic, matters, make sense, amuse, bother* (cf. Kiparsky and Kiparsky 1971: 345; Levinson 1983: 181).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Examples</th>
<th>Presupposition-triggering lexemes</th>
<th>Presuppositions</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>189. ‘[…] all I <em>know</em> is, it would feel very queer to me […].’ (Carroll 1865 [2000]: 48)</td>
<td>know</td>
<td>189’. It would feel very queer to me.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>190. ‘[…] all I <em>know</em> is, something comes at me like a Jack-in-the-box […].’ (Carroll 1865 [2000]: 43)</td>
<td>know</td>
<td>190’. Something comes at me like a Jack-in-the-box.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>191. ‘Don’t talk nonsense,’ said Alice more boldly: <em>you know you’re growing too.</em>’ (Carroll 1865 [2000]: 114)</td>
<td>know</td>
<td>191’. You’re growing too.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>192. For, with all her knowledge of history, Alice <em>had no very clear notion</em> how long ago anything had happened. (Carroll 1865 [2000]: 26)</td>
<td>have a clear notion</td>
<td>192’. Something had happened.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>193. <em>I’m glad</em> they don’t give birthday presents like that!’ (Carroll 1865 [2000]: 93)</td>
<td>be glad</td>
<td>193’. They don’t give birthday presents like that.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>194. ‘<em>I’m glad</em> I’ve seen that done,’ thought Alice. (Carroll 1865 [2000]: 115)</td>
<td>be glad</td>
<td>194’. I’ve seen that done.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 5: Presuppositional behaviour of factive verbs

The aforementioned presuppositions, (189’) to (194’) appear because they are complements of the factive predicates *know* in (189) to (191), *have a clear notion* in (192) and *be glad* in (193) and (194). All examples demonstrate that propositions are presupposed by the clause containing the presupposition trigger: factive verbs have the semantic property of presupposing the truth of the proposition in the embedded clause.

III. Implicative verbs

Other forms of presupposition-inducing expressions are implicative verbs, examples of which include *manage, forget, happen to V, avoid V-ing,* et cetera. In a sentence
they presuppose some unexpressed concepts (e.g. manage presupposes the concept of trying):

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Examples</th>
<th>Presupposition-triggering lexemes</th>
<th>Presuppositions</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>195. […] and [Alice] managed to swallow a morsel of the lefthand bit. (Carroll 1865 [2000]: 54)</td>
<td>manage</td>
<td>195’. Alice tried to swallow a morsel of the lefthand bit; it was not easy to swallow a morsel of the lefthand bit.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>196. [Alice] managed to put it [the jar] into one of the cupboards. (Carroll 1865 [2000]: 13)</td>
<td>manage</td>
<td>196’. Alice tried to put it [the jar] into one of the cupboards; it was not easy to put it [the jar] into one of the cupboards.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>197. ‘Curiouser and curiouser!’ cried Alice (she was so much surprised, that for the moment she quite forgot how to speak good English); (Carroll 1865 [2000]: 20)</td>
<td>forget</td>
<td>197’. Alice should have spoken/intended to speak good English.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 6: Presuppositional behaviour of implicative verbs

These examples of implicative verbs in sentences demonstrate the difference between presuppositions and entailments based on their behaviour under negation. The examples with the implicative manage presuppose the unstated concept of making an effort, whether it is used in an affirmative clause, as in (195) and (196), or negated. Sentence (197) uses forget and presupposes either a reproach that Alice did not speak good English, or her intention to speak good English. This presupposition remains intact even if the verb forget is negated. Unlike presuppositional constancy under negation, entailment is susceptible to changes, if negated. The presupposition-inducing expression manage, if used in an affirmative sentence, entails the successful fulfilment of its complement. For instance, in (195), managed to swallow entails that Alice swallowed a morsel; in (196) managed to put entails that she put the jar into one of the cupboards. However, the verb forget, if not negated, entails the falsity of the proposition represented by its complement, i.e. in (197) forget entails that Alice did not speak good English. A negative variant of the same proposition, namely, she did not forget how to speak good English, would entail the opposite — she spoke good English. These examples vividly elucidate that presuppositions and entailments behave differently under negation.
IV. Change of state verbs

In sentences with the change of state verbs — also called aspe ctual predicates or inchoative verbs (Green (1996: 74) — a new state is both described and is presupposed not to have been held before the change. Examples of such verbs include the following verbs begin, stop, continue, start, finish, carry on, cease, leave, enter, come, go, arrive:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Examples</th>
<th>Presupposition-triggering lexemes</th>
<th>Presuppositions</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>198. Alice was beginning to get very tired of sitting by her sister on the bank, and of having nothing to do. (Carroll 1865 [2000]: 11)</td>
<td>begin</td>
<td>198’. Alice had not felt tired before.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>199. 'I'm very sorry you've been annoyed,' said Alice, who was beginning to see its [the Pigeon's] meaning. (Carroll 1865 [2000]: 55)</td>
<td>begin</td>
<td>199’. Alice had not seen its [the Pigeon's] meaning before.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>200. '[…] that they'd let Dinah stop in the house if it [Mouse] began ordering people about like that!' (Carroll 1865 [2000]: 38)</td>
<td>begin</td>
<td>200’. The Mouse had not ordered people about like that before.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>201. And she [Alice] went on planning to herself how she would manage it. (Carroll 1865 [2000]: 20)</td>
<td>go on</td>
<td>201’. She had been planning how she would manage it.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>202. ‘Well, I'd hardly finished [singing] the first verse,’ said the Hatter. (Carroll 1865 [2000]: 74)</td>
<td>finish</td>
<td>202’. The Hatter had been singing the first verse.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 7: Presuppositional behaviour of change of state verbs

The above-mentioned presuppositions are determined by the conventional property of the respective aspectual verb, and thus, depend on the semantic meaning of a single lexical item, such as begin, go on or finish. It is one of these lexemes that emphasizes that a new state has been introduced.

V. Iterative verbs

Sentences containing iterative lexemes are characterized by repetition. Examples include the lexemes more, again, anymore, return, another time, come back, restore, repeat, for the n\textsuperscript{th} time, and others. The utterances with iterative verbs presuppose the following in the context:
203. The March Hare took the watch and looked at it gloomily; then he dipped it [the watch] into his cup of tea, and looked at it again. (Carroll 1865 [2000]: 71)

204. ‘Take some more tea,’ the March Hare said to Alice, very earnestly. ‘I’ve had nothing yet,’ Alice replied in an offended tone, ‘so I can’t take more.’ (Carroll 1865 [2000]: 75)

205. [Alice] turned to the Dormouse, and repeated her question. (Carroll 1865 [2000]: 75)

206. They all returned from him to you [...]. (Carroll 1865 [2000]: 122)

Table 8: Presuppositional behaviour of iterative verbs

In (203) there is a complementary linguistic description the March Hare looked at the watch gloomily that precedes the statement with a presupposition-triggering iterative again. The overt manifestation of the coming presupposition reinforces the presupposition-triggering nature of the iterative again in this sentence.

Consider example (204). In the exchange of turns, Alice utters I’ve had nothing yet and thereby rejects the presupposition (204’), created by the presupposition-triggering lexeme more. On the one hand, take some more tea presumes that Alice has already had some tea, since it is only possible to take more tea if some tea has already been drunk. On the other hand, however, the assertion, ‘I’ve had nothing yet [...] ‘so I can’t take more, cancels out this presupposition. Thus, since the presupposition fails to hold, the communication between Alice and the March Hare results in failure. This is one of the countless ways that Carroll demonstrates that communicative behaviour in Wonderland does not obey the rules accepted in the real world. If approached rationally, it is provocative, challenging, illogical and uncooperative (cf. Lakoff 1993: 368).

VI. Temporal clauses

Temporal clauses introduced by when, since, before, while, after, during, whenever, and so on, function as presupposition-inducing syntactic structures. Their
presupposition is the statement that is formulated in the subordinate clause following the time adverbial:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Examples</th>
<th>Presupposition-triggering lexemes</th>
<th>Presuppositions</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>207. Hatter was out of sight before the officer could get to the door.</td>
<td>before</td>
<td>207’. The officer could get to the door.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(Carroll 1865 [2000]: 116)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>208. Alice had not a moment to think about stopping herself before she found herself falling down a very deep well.</td>
<td>before</td>
<td>208’. She found herself falling down a very deep well.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(Carroll 1865 [2000]: 12)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>209. She had not gone much farther before she came in sight of the house of the March Hare.</td>
<td>before</td>
<td>209’. She came in sight of the house of the March Hare.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(Carroll 1865 [2000]: 67)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>210. So Alice got up and ran off, thinking while she ran [...].</td>
<td>while</td>
<td>210’. Alice ran.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(Carroll 1865 [2000]: 125)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>211. ‘I [the Hatter] hadn’t quite finished my tea when I was sent for.</td>
<td>when</td>
<td>211’. The Hatter was sent for.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(Carroll 1865 [2000]: 113)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 9: Presuppositional behaviour of temporal clauses

As seen in the examples, the function of temporal clauses with the connectives before, while or when is to provide a time reference against which an event expressed in the main sentence is highlighted. That is, the event described in the main clause is tightly connected to the event described in the subordinate clause. The information in the temporal clause is taken for granted and presupposes to bear a semantic truth value. The presuppositions (207’) and (210’) initiated by before and while respectively, are unaffected by the negation of the main verb was and got up. Similarly, if, instead of the negated main verb in (208), (209) and (211), there was its affirmative counterpart, the presupposition (208’), (209’) and (211’) would remain intact.

VII. Non-restrictive relative clause

In contrast to restrictive relative clauses, non-restrictive relative clauses do not modify the noun phrase but provide further information. They can be easily extracted from the sentence without causing a change in meaning. Such non-restrictive clauses
are seen as presuppositions of the sentences which they are a part of. The negation of the main verb outside the relative clause does not affect their meaning:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Examples</th>
<th>Presuppositions</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>212. ‘We indeed!’ cried the Mouse, <em>who was trembling down to the end of his tail</em>. (Carroll 1865 [2000]: 27)</td>
<td>212’. The Mouse was trembling down to the end of his tail.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>213. ‘William the Conqueror, <em>whose cause was favoured by the pope</em>, was soon submitted to by the English […]. (Carroll 1865 [2000]: 30)</td>
<td>213’. William the Conqueror’s cause was favoured by the pope.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 10: Presuppositional behaviour of non-restrictive relative clauses

In (212) the non-restrictive relative clause *who was trembling down to the end of his tail* remains intact if the main verb *cried* is negated. Likewise, the meaning of the non-restrictive relative clause *whose cause was favoured by the pope* in (213) does not change if the main verb *was* is subjected to negation.

The difference between restrictive and non-restrictive relative clauses hinges upon the uniqueness of the matter of discussion (Kryk-Kastovsky & Kastovsky 1997: 1677). The use of non-restrictive relative clauses in (212) and (213) is appropriate only if the Mouse and William the Conqueror respectively, are unique in the universe of discourse. In other words, if the speaker and the addressee mutually agree that they know only one Mouse and only one William the Conqueror, then the use of non-restrictive relative clauses is justified.

VIII. Counterfactual conditionals and structures

Counterfactual conditionals presuppose that affirmative statements in the if-clauses did not happen and that the negative presuppositions contained in the if-clauses happened.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Examples</th>
<th>Presuppositions</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>214. […] after a few minutes it seemed quite natural to Alice to find herself talking familiarly with them [the birds and animals], <em>as if she had known them all her life</em>. (Carroll 1865 [2000]: 29)</td>
<td>214’. Alice had not known them all her life.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>215. Oh, how I wish I could shut up like a telescope! (Carroll 1865 [2000]: 16)</td>
<td>215’. Alice could not shut up like a telescope.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>216. ‘Would you like cats <em>if you [Alice] were me [the Mouse]</em>?’ (Carroll 1865 [2000]: 26)</td>
<td>216’. Alice was not the Mouse.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 11: Presuppositional behaviour of counterfactual conditionals and structures
According to the statement above, a counterfactual conditional presupposes that its antecedent — the if-clause — is false, i.e. (214) presupposes (214’) and (216) presupposes (216’). Sentences with *I wish*-construction presuppose the falsity of their postpositioned complement, thus, (215) presupposes (215’).

IX. Wh-questions and tag questions

The presuppositions of wh-questions are sentences “which are logical consequences of every one of their answers” (Keenan 1998: 11). As Lyons (1977, 2: 756-757) and Levinson (1983: 184) note, wh-questions trigger presuppositions that are identical to their assertive counterparts. In this case, an interrogative pronoun or pronominal adverb is substituted by “the appropriate existentially quantified variable” (Levinson (1983: 184), for example, *who* is replaced by *someone*, *why* by *for some reason*, *how* by *somehow*, and so on.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Examples</th>
<th>Presuppositions</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>217. The Hatter opened his eyes very wide on hearing this but all he said was: ‘Why is a raven like a writing-desk?’ (Carroll 1865 [2000]: 70)</td>
<td>217’. For some reason a raven is like a writing-desk.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>218. Who stole the tarts? (Carroll 1865 [2000]: 110)</td>
<td>218’. Someone stole the tarts</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>219. “How am I to get in?”, asked Alice again. “Are you to get in at all?” said the Footman, “that’s the first question, you know.” (Carroll 1865 [2000]: 59)</td>
<td>219’. Somehow I am to get it.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 12: Presuppositional behaviour of wh-questions and tag questions

The Hatter asking the question *Why is a raven like a writing-desk?’ in (217) presupposes that (217’) bears a truth value. Analogously, Alice asking *How am I to get in?* in (219) assumes that she can get in somehow: if she had not held this presupposition, there would have been no sense in asking for the details. The Footman’s answer, *Are you to get in at all?*, however, cancels her presupposition and makes the question *How am I to get in?* meaningless. In example (218), the *who*-question presupposes the proposition expressed by the statement (218’) where someone refers to a non-specific entity.

Another type of question that introduces presuppositions are tag questions. Example (220) with its presupposition (220’) is the only representative of tag questions in *Alice in Wonderland* that the reader can find:
220. I seem to see some meaning in them, after all. [...] you can’t swim, can you?’ he [the King] added, turning to the Knave.
(Carroll 1865 [2000]: 123)

221’. You can’t swim.

Tag questions like (220) are persuasive by their nature because they declare the speaker’s expectations, i.e. the speaker expresses a presupposition that the addressee agrees with his/her statement (cf. Verschueren 1999: 157). By these means, the presuppositional content of the tag questions is of a manipulative nature: the speaker expresses the information he/she believes is true in a way that forces the addressee to believe that it is true.

X. Cleft constructions

Before analysing presuppositions triggered by cleft constructions, I would like to define the constructions under review. A cleft construction is an identifying construction, expressing a relationship of identity between the focus and the constituent introduced by the relative clause, where the focus is a stressed lexeme that immediately follows the copula (Collins 1991: 2). For instance, in example (221), pepper is the cleft’s focus that is defined by the relative clause that had made her so savage:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Cleft constructions</th>
<th>Unclefted constructions</th>
<th>Presuppositions</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>221. It was only the pepper that had made her [the Duchess] so savage when they met in the kitchen. (Carroll 1865 [2000]: 90)</td>
<td>221. a. The pepper made her [the Duchess] so savage when they met in the kitchen.</td>
<td>221’. Something made her [the Duchess] savage</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>222. It was the White Rabbit, trotting slowly back again (Carroll 1865 [2000]: 37)</td>
<td>222. a. The White Rabbit was trotting slowly back again</td>
<td>222’. Somebody was trotting slowly back again</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>223. It was so large a house, that she did not like to go nearer till she had nibbled some more. (Carroll 1865 [2000]: 67)</td>
<td>223. a. The house was so large that she did not like to go nearer till she had nibbled some more.</td>
<td>223’. Something was so large that she did not like to go nearer till she had nibbled some more.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 13: Presuppositional behaviour of cleft constructions

Let us compare cleft constructions with their unclefted partners. It seems that both cleft and unclefted constructions share the same existential presupposition or focal
presupposition, as Kadmon (2001: 254) defines it. That is, *something made her [the Duchess] savage* is the presupposition of (221) and (221.a.), *somebody was trotting slowly back again* is the presupposition of (222) and (222.a.) and *something was so large that she did not like to go nearer till she had nibbled some more* is the presupposition of (223) and (223.a.). Cleft and unclefted constructions seem to carry identical truth conditions but differ in lexical representations. Below I suggest an explanation as to why the cleft construction (221) is preferred over the unclefted one (221.a.). I base my argument on Atlas and Levinson’s article (1981: 10-26), as well as on Levinson’s theory (1983: 217-218).

Since cleft constructions use more language resources for conveying the same meaning than unclefted partners, it could be claimed that Carroll violates the sub-maxim of Manner, “be brief”, in (221) because he does not avoid unnecessary prolixity. Therefore, according to the Cooperative Principle, he appears to be uncooperative. Let us suppose that the author obeys the principles of successful communication. He intentionally chooses (221) and is motivated to pursue a particular purpose. In this case, (221) carries an additional load of meaning, namely *pepper, and not anything else, made her savage*, triggered by the information focus element *pepper*. As a conclusion, it can be seen that the preference for cleft constructions over their unclefted partners is a syntactic way to concentrate attention on the focal element.

The view that cleft constructions, as well as implicative verbs, trigger presuppositions, is not shared by all scholars. Karttunen & Peters (1979: 11 referred to in Van der Sandt 1988: 70) argue that they are typical examples of conventional implicature. Karttunen & Peters advocate the following point of view: if a separate lexeme or a grammatical construction determines the presupposition, then the asserted presupposition is, in fact, an instance of conventional implicature. Their argument is based on the definition of conventional implicatures as being “unexplained entities conventionally attached to syntactic constructions or lexical items” (Karttunen & Peters 1979: 11 quoted in Van der Sandt 1988: 36). Conventional implicatures are based solely on the semantics of certain sentence words or forms. As Mey holds, they are “inextricably tied to a particular lexical item” (Mey [2001]: 28); yet they entirely discard the truth-conditional aspect of presupposition (Kadmon 2001: 206). It can be claimed that assimilating
presuppositions to conventional implicatures is done for terminological simplification. However, although such assimilation seems fairly practical, these two pragmatic notions have distinguishing properties that cannot be neglected.

**5.2. Pragmatic presupposition**

**5.2.1. Defeasibility**

Presupposition cannot be analysed solely in semantic terms; its pragmatic features are of prior importance. Stalnaker (1974 [1998]: 17) says that in order to give the correct linguistic analysis of a certain discourse, it is the pragmatic account of the presupposition that is of higher priority. Levinson states that pragmatic “presuppositions [unlike semantic presuppositions] are not stable, context-independent aspects of meaning” (Levinson 1983: 204). In some cases semantic representations that usually trigger potential presuppositions are to be viewed secondarily, giving way to pragmatic principles. Example (224) provides evidence for this statement:

224. They can’t have anything to put down yet, *before* the trial’s begun.’ (Carroll 1865 [2000]: 111)

As already mentioned, the proposition that is positioned after the time adverbial *before* in a temporal clause is usually the statement’s presupposition (see examples (207) to (209)). In such cases, *before* is a presupposition-inducer. However, the conjunct *the trial’s begun* is not the presupposition of (224). Contrary beliefs held in the context of (224), as well as the knowledge accumulated from previous chapters override an expected semantic presuppositional inference and trigger the opposite context-appropriate presupposition, namely (224’):

224’. The trial hasn’t begun yet.

We see that in this example *before* does not presuppose the statement that is formulated in the subordinate clause. On the contrary, it presupposes the falsity of the statement expressed in the subordinate clause.

This example shows a profound context dependency of pragmatic presupposition and outlines a peculiar property of presupposition, viz. its defeasibility or cancellability (Levinson 1983: 186): the expected presuppositions are prone to disappear in
particular discourse contexts if they are inconsistent with assumptions already in the context. The following sentence is another example which demonstrates that presupposition is susceptible to changes in context and thus cancellable:

225. ‘I know something interesting is sure to happen. (Carroll 1865 [2000]: 38)

Usually the subordinate clause of a complex sentence is presupposed when the main clause is constructed with a factive verb, in this case *know*. Thus, the presupposition (225’) is embedded in (225):

225’. Something interesting is sure to happen.

According to the property of presupposition constancy under negation, the negated variant of (225) should retain the presupposition (225’), i.e. (225.a.) should also presuppose (225’):

225. a. ‘I don’t know that something interesting is sure to happen.

However, contrary to semantic presuppositions, pragmatic presuppositions do not necessarily survive negation; they are prima facie context-sensitive. Accordingly, the expected presupposition (225’) vanishes in the negated variant of the utterance. Levinson (1983: 186) suggests the following explanation for this presuppositional phenomenon: in sentences where the subject is a noun or a pronoun in the first person and the verb is negated, the presupposition embedded in the complement, disappears. If, however, the subject in the main clause is the second or third person and its predicate is expressed with a factive verb, the presupposition in the subordinate clause is true.

### 5.2.2. Projection problem

Context-sensitivity and the defeasibility of presuppositions partly overlap with another property of presuppositional behaviour, namely projection problem. This deals with the question how the presupposition of a complex sentence depends on the presuppositions of its constituent clauses (Karttunen 1873: 172). In an attempt to solve the projection problem, Karttunen (1873: 173) singles out three types of verbs: holes, plugs and filters. Example (225) has demonstrated that the factive verb *know* does not always behave as a presupposition-creating hole. Depending on the subject’s person and the context, it demonstrates the characteristics of a filter: under
certain discourse circumstances, it does not create presupposition (Grundy 2000: 138).

Pragmatic presuppositions are triggered by dependence on contextual information. Consider example (226) where a plug, contrary to its characteristics, in a particular context demonstrates a presupposition-triggering behaviour and thus, functions, as a hole:

226. [...] it flashed across her mind that she had never before seen a rabbit with either a waistcoat-pocket or a watch [...]. (Carroll 1865 [2000]: 12)

The main clause is introduced with it flashed across her mind, which in the immediate context is synonymous to she thought quickly. According to the verb classification (Grundy 2000: 137-138), think and thus, flash across her mind, are plugs. A plug usually does not presuppose the statement of its complement. Thus, (226) should not presuppose (226’):

226’. She had never before seen a rabbit with either a waistcoat-pocket or a watch.

However, the reader’s awareness of the background information about Alice, as well as sensitivity to the context demonstrates that (226) actually presupposes (226’). Alice indeed had never before seen a rabbit with either a waistcoat-pocket or a watch. In this case, pragmatic factors override potential semantic presupposition. This example has demonstrated that a purely semantic approach to understanding presupposition cannot always be justified.

5.2.3. Contextual appropriateness and mutual knowledge

The nature of pragmatic presupposition is sensitive to contextual changes, as well as to the background assumptions and beliefs shared by the interlocutors. Levinson (1983: 204-205) emphasizes two basic concepts of pragmatic presupposition:

a) Appropriateness or felicity
b) Mutual knowledge, also called common ground or joint assumption.

He states that

[A]n utterance A pragmatically presupposes a proposition B if A is appropriate only if B is mutually known by participants. (Levinson 1983: 205)
Some utterances of Wonderland dwellers show a substantial degree of inappropriateness, as well as inconsistency with Alice’s beliefs. This can be seen in the episode where the Queen wants to execute the Dormouse:

227. (a) ‘Collar that Dormouse,’ the Queen shrieked out. ‘Behead that Dormouse!’
(b) ‘Turn that Dormouse out of court! Suppress him! Pinch him! Off with his whiskers!’ (Carroll 1865 [2000]: 117)

The utterance (a) asserts the Queen’s will to execute the Dormouse. The following sequence of orders in (b) is inappropriate, as well as inconsistent with common knowledge that the reader has acquired after the Queen’s utterance (a). The reasons for such a statement are the following: (b) presupposes that the Dormouse still exists and implicates that the Queen’s order has been ignored. Thus, the presupposition of (b) contradicts the background knowledge acquired after (a): the Dormouse cannot be at first beheaded and then turned out of court. The sequence is pragmatically inappropriate and breaches the fourth Gricean sub-maxim of Manner, “be orderly”, because it violates our expectation that events are enumerated in the order of their happening. Logically, it would have made more sense to arrange the punishments in the reverse order. First, they should have cut off the whiskers, then pinched and suppressed the Dormouse. After that, they should have turned him out of court and only then collared and beheaded him. The hierarchy of punishments would have abided not only by logical rules but stylistic ones as well. It would have gone though a progressive gradation to the climax. However, in Wonderland the logical order of events is ruined; they occur in inverted relationships with regard to their sequence in the real world. Carroll’s purpose in using such a device is to support the reigning linguistic paradox and the absurd in Wonderland (cf. Lakoff 1993: 368-369). Analogous remarks can be made regarding (228):

228. ‘No, no!’ said the Queen. ‘Sentence first — verdict afterwards.’ (Carroll 1865 [2000]: 124)

For a communication to be successful, the speaker has to express presupposition that is consistent and not contrary to the presupposition of the addressee. However, example (228) expresses a presupposition which is totally inconsistent with common beliefs of the above-ground world. In the real world, it is usually the verdict that is announced first and the sentence imposed after it, not vice versa, as it is in Wonderland.
In most cases Alice expects that Wonderland and the real world have the same rules of accepted behaviour, i.e. there is mutual knowledge, which is shared by Alice and the people or animals she meets in Wonderland. This is the basis for her background assumptions, which she believes are similar to others. As examples (227) to (228) above illustrated, Alice becomes perplexed if her assumptions (pragmatic presuppositions) are cancelled by the reigning rules of Wonderland. However, in some cases, as in example (229), Alice demonstrates that she has adapted to the rules of the possible world of Wonderland:

229. Soon her eye fell on a little glass box that was lying under the table: she opened it, and found in it a very small cake, on which the words ‘EAT ME’ were beautifully marked in currants. ‘Well, I'll eat it,’ said Alice, ‘and if it makes me grow larger, I can reach the key; and if it makes me grow smaller, I can creep under the door; so either way I’ll get into the garden, and I don’t care which happens!’ (Carroll 1865 [2000]: 18)

The episode with the cake happens after the episode with the bottle labelled “DRINK ME”. Alice has experienced that drinking something in Wonderland causes her size to change. Thus, she transfers this newly acquired experience to the cake labelled “EAT ME” and presupposes that she will grow or shrink after she eats the cake. However, what happens is this:

230. She ate a little bit, and said anxiously to herself, ‘Which way? Which way?’ holding her hand on the top of her head to feel which way it was growing, and she was quite surprised to find that she remained the same size: to be sure, this generally happens when one eats cake, but Alice had got so much into the way of expecting nothing but out-of-the-way things to happen, that it seemed quite dull and stupid for life to go on in the common way. (Carroll 1865 [2000]: 18)

Alice’s expectations have not been confirmed and, as a result, she is surprised again to witness that in Wonderland, as in the real world, nothing happens to a person after eating a cake. She needs to readjust again to the idea that sometimes, but not always, her expectations are the same as the expectations of the Wonderland inhabitants. After this episode, she learns that the laws of cause and effect in Wonderland are inconsistent with any rules.

In the next two examples, (231) and (232), Alice’s encyclopaedic knowledge, that is, her knowledge of the real world, does not accord with the possible world, or as Lakoff (1993: 368) puts it, the “alternative universe” of Wonderland. Example (231)
emphasizes that Alice’s idea of a croquet game drastically differs from the game she plays in Wonderland:

231. ‘I don’t think they play at all fairly,’ Alice began, in rather a complaining tone, ‘and they all quarrel so dreadfully one can’t hear oneself speak — and they don’t seem to have any rules in particular; at least, if there are, nobody attends to them—and you’ve no idea how confusing it is all the things being alive; for instance, there’s the arch I’ve got to go through next walking about at the other end of the ground — and I should have croqueted the Queen’s hedgehog just now, only it ran away when it saw mine coming!’ (Carroll 1865 [2000]: 86)

Alice takes for granted the factual knowledge about the game of croquet and thus, presupposes that the elementary rules will be observed by the players. However, in Wonderland the game is played differently and this seems unfair to Alice. The way it is played does not justify her presuppositional expectations, which she assumes would be shared by usual croquet players. The above-ground rules lose all validity as Alice learns the new rules of Wonderland croquet: quarrelling is allowed during the game and instead of balls the players croquet hedgehogs.

As Stalnaker (1974 [1998]: 18) says, “the notion of common background belief is the first approximation to the notion of pragmatic presupposition”. In Wonderland, the communication happens against the factual knowledge of interlocutors, as well as against their cultural background and common beliefs about the world:

232. ‘What a funny watch!’ she remarked. ‘It tells the day of the month, and doesn’t tell what o’clock it is!’
(a) ‘Why should it?’ muttered the Hatter. ‘Does your watch tell you what year it is?’ (Carroll 1865 [2000]: 72)

It is obvious for Alice that the main function of a watch is to show the time. Based on that encyclopaedic knowledge, she assumes that her addressee, the Hatter, shares the same assumption. She, as a participant willing to have a productive conversation, takes this function of a watch for granted, that is, as pragmatic presupposition. She is greatly surprised though, when the Hatter refutes her presupposition, uttering (a). His statement conversationally presupposes that a watch might show a year. Such presupposition contradicts the expected common ground and, as a result, confuses Alice. Since both interlocutors, Alice and the Hatter, understand that they cannot take each other’s beliefs and assumptions for granted, the communication between them is doomed to failure.
Example (233) triggers similar conclusions:

233. ‘Rule Forty-two. All persons more than a mile high to leave the court.’
    Everybody looked at Alice.
    ‘I’m not a mile high,’ said Alice.
    ‘You are,’ said the King.
    ‘Nearly two miles high,’ added the Queen.
    ‘Well, I shan’t go, at any rate,’ said Alice: ‘besides, that’s not a regular rule: you invented it just now.’
    ‘It’s the oldest rule in the book,’ said the King.
    ‘Then it ought to be Number One,’ said Alice. (Carroll 1865 [2000]: 120)

Alice presupposes that the oldest rule in the book should be rule number 1. She takes the truth of this assumption for granted and expects her interlocutor to share the same opinion. However, contrary to her expectations, the King denies Alice’s pragmatic presupposition by stating without reasoning that the oldest rule in the book is the rule 42. There is no shared presupposition, which is a precondition for a felicitous conversation. As a result, their communication proves inefficient and causes negative emotional responses in its participants:

234. The King turned pale, and shut his note-book hastily. (Carroll 1865 [2000]: 120)

Often “pragmatic presuppositions concern expectations […] and attitudes towards the world, fears, etc.” (Mey [2001]: 186) Alice’s encounter with a Pigeon that takes her for a serpent demonstrates how its expectations shape an unwarrantable presupposition:

235. ‘Serpent!’ screamed the Pigeon.
    ‘I’m not a serpent!’ said Alice indignantly. ‘Let me alone!’
    ‘Serpent, I say again!’ repeated the Pigeon […]. (Carroll 1865 [2000]: 54)

On their first encounter the Pigeon presupposes that Alice is a serpent. This presupposition is based on some similar features between Alice and a serpent that the Pigeon observes:

a) Both Alice and serpents have a long neck. Alice’s long neck is bending in all directions among the tree leaves:

236. I’ve seen a good many little girls in my time, but never one with such a neck as that! (Carroll 1865 [2000]: 55)

a) Both Alice and serpents eat eggs:
You’re a serpent; and there’s no use denying it. I suppose you’ll be telling me next that you never tasted an egg!"

‘I have tasted eggs, certainly,’ said Alice, who was a very truthful child; ‘but little girls eat eggs quite as much as serpents do, you know.’

‘I don’t believe it,’ said the Pigeon; ‘but if they do, why then they’re a kind of serpent, that’s all I can say.’

This was such a new idea to Alice, that she was quite silent for a minute or two, which gave the Pigeon the opportunity of adding, ‘You’re looking for eggs, I know that well enough; and what does it matter to me whether you’re a little girl or a serpent?’

(Carroll 1865 [2000]: 55-56)

The Pigeon confidently claims that if Alice has a long neck and eats eggs, then she is a kind of a serpent. By these means, the Pigeon highlights these aspects of Alice’s appearance and behaviour, yet at the same time it completely downplays other characteristics that differentiate little girls from serpents: little girls do not eat raw eggs, they do not plunder nests, they are not predators, and so on. The Pigeon’s presupposition about Alice is biased by its phobia of serpents. Thus, it is subjective and inconsistent with common beliefs in the real world about what serpents and girls are really like.

5.2.4. Fillmore’s theory of alienable vs. inalienable possession

The examples (224) and (226) discussed above have demonstrated that pragmatic presupposition of an utterance has been preferred to its semantic counterpart. Although such preference occurs often, the next example makes the opposite apparent: the literal meaning of an utterance and not the context-based one has been favoured by one of the interlocutors. Consider which consequences such a preference has had on the conversation:

238. “Take off your hat”, the King said to the hatter.
   “It isn’t mine,” said the Hatter.
   “Stolen!” the King exclaimed, turning to the jury, who instantly made a memorandum of the fact.
   “I keep them to sell”, the Hatter added as an explanation: “I’ve none of my own. I’m a Hatter.” (Carroll 1865 [2000]: 113)

Literally, your hat should be understood as the hat that belongs to the addressee. However, the communication process functions in such a way that often the contextual clues of utterances are preferred to literal meanings. Usually when an addressee hears Take off your hat, he/she successfully assigns the reference to the hat
he/she is wearing at the moment, and not to the fact that the hat belongs to him/her. Thus, according to Fillmore’s theory of inalienable vs. alienable possession (1970: 60-67), in everyday communication your hat in Take off your hat will be regarded as an alienable structure, namely, your hat with a facultative determiner expressed by the possessive pronoun your indicating optional possession. Therefore, (238’) would be a presuppositional reference of Take off your hat based on the shared assumptions and beliefs of the interlocutors:

238’. The hat that the Hatter is wearing.

However, in Wonderland the rules are different. Communication is not based on mutual assumptions of the speaker and the addressee and thus, it is predisposed to failure. By uttering It isn’t mine, the Hatter discards the contextual clues that exist in the immediate discourse and treats Take off your hat in purely literal terms. Thus, he creates a different presupposition of Take off your hat based on obligatory possession, namely:

238’’. The hat belongs to the Hatter.

Such an unsuccessful determination of presupposition based on a deliberate preference for inalienable possession over alienable possession takes the reader aback. This example demonstrates that the presupposition-triggering behaviour of Wonderland inhabitants is completely different from that in the real world.

5.3. Conclusions

Despite the fact that I have attempted to draw a dividing line between semantic and pragmatic presupposition, I have reached the conclusion that the borders between these two concepts are blurred and difficult to determine. I have pointed out that such pragmatic aspects as the discourse context, the speaker’s beliefs and background knowledge determine whether semantic presupposition, triggered by lexemes or structures, remains intact or is overruled by these pragmatic aspects. Thus, in a context, semantic presuppositions are often pragmatically approved or refuted. By

According to Fillmore (1970: 61-62), inalienable nouns are “inherently relational” and “obligatory possessed”, like for example the names of body parts (hand, face, side) or kinship terms (daughter, mother). On the other hand, alienable nouns are those that are “optionally possessed” (ibid.: 62), are the things we acquire. Most inalienable possessions are accompanied by “non-omissible determiners” (ibid.: 63) my/your/his hand, my/your/his mother, et cetera; whereas the presence of alienables’ determiners is not obligatory.
these means, semantics alone cannot account for the complex notion of presupposition, since semantics deals with stable, context-independent meanings. It is important to consider that contextual factors strongly influence presuppositional behaviour. The best approach to analysing presupposition is to take into account the semantic meaning of presupposition-triggers by means of pragmatic principles (cf. Van der Sandt 1988: 232). As Grundy says, “semantic presuppositions are pragmatically licensed by their discourse context” (Grundy 2000: 138). A theory of pragmatic presupposition goes beyond linking sentences together on the basis of what is true or false. It “inquires metapragmatically into the ways an utterance is understood in the context of the language users’ common ground” (Mey [2001]: 186-187).

6. Implicature

This chapter is dedicated to the notion of conversational implicature and its role in the correct interpretation of an utterance. Implicature\(^{21}\), as one of the principle notions of pragmatics, explains why some semantically stable utterances can have “an unstable context-specific pragmatic overlay” (Levinson 1983: 99). In this chapter, I look at implicature within the framework of Gricean pragmatics. I demonstrate how implicature can answer a wide range of questions. I begin by explaining the role of context and background knowledge for arriving at a correct interpretation and finish with numerous examples of maxim violations by the dwellers of Wonderland. This chapter will maintain that conversational implicature is empowered to provide pragmatic explanations of such figures of speech as irony, hyperbole, litotes, tautologies and puns.

\(^{21}\) Here and henceforth, the term implicate is used to refer to conversational particularized implicature.
6.1. The pragmatic approach to implicature

6.1.1. The importance of context

Understanding the pragmatic meaning of implicature involves identifying a context that accounts for the interpretation of an utterance. Context enables the hearer to infer more than what is literally expressed. Consider example (239):

239. ‘Curiouser and curiouser!’ cried Alice (she was so much surprised, that for the moment she quite forgot how to speak good English). (Carroll 1865 [2000]: 20)

The curious-looking comparative form, *curiouser*, violates the rules of standard English grammar. The pragmatic purpose of such ungrammatical usage is to emphasize the facetious point presented by a child who, out of surprise, forgets the basic grammar rules. This deviated form amuses the reader and demonstrates a natural child’s reaction to surprising events. Thus, given an appropriate context, incorrect grammar is acceptable and justified by implicature.

A hidden pragmatic meaning is also traceable in the following utterance, which is understandable only in context:

240. ‘And what are they made of?’ Alice asked in a tone of great curiosity.
     ‘Soles and eels, of course,’ the Gryphon replied rather impatiently: ‘*any shrimp could have told you that.*’ (Carroll 1865 [2000]: 104)

In the context of such sea-creatures as soles and eels, the intended message *what a stupid question!* is concealed under an exclamation *any shrimp could have told you that!* This example, as well as the following demonstrates how context determines the pragmatic meaning of an utterance and, by these means, provides the correct inference of it:

241. (a) All persons more than a mile high to leave the court.’
    Everybody looked at Alice.
(b) ‘I’m not a mile high,’ said Alice.
(c) ‘You are,’ said the King.
(d) ‘Nearly two miles high,’ added the Queen. (Carroll 1865 [2000]: 120)

If analysed semantically, the King’s order (a) emphasizes the fact that only those persons who are higher than a mile have to leave the court. However, based on the
context, as well as on knowing Alice’s enormous size, the reader is aware that the King indirectly refers to her. Alice, wanting to stay in the court, intends to confuse the King and answers (b), thus implying that she is smaller than a mile. The King’s reply, (c), contradicts his order (a): the King wants Alice out of the court so he refers to her as if she were more than a mile high, and at the same time he states that she is just a mile high. Such an illogical sequence of utterances, if analysed semantically, cannot explain the discourse meaning of the extract (241). Let us look at (c) pragmatically. Its pragmatic meaning differs drastically from its semantic meaning. Although the semantic meaning of (c) is that Alice is a mile high, context-dependently the King implies that Alice is higher than a mile. To understand this paradox better, I will cite an analogical example:

242. Großglockner is a 3000-meter-high mountain.

Although the real height of the highest mountain in Austria, Großglockner is 3798 metres, the mountain can be referred to as a 3000-meter-high mountain. One who knows the real height of the mountain and hears (242) might conclude that the maxim of Quantity is violated, since the contribution is less informative than is required. However, on the level of implied meaning, the hearer can still assume that the interlocutor wants to be cooperative in the communication, that is, he/she observes the Cooperative Principle. Thus, the simplification and imprecision of the mountain’s height (242) is used in order not to overload the discourse participant with mathematical numbers. The maxim of Quantity is flouted, whilst the maxim of Quality is strictly observed, since (242) is an absolutely true statement. According to Grice (1975 [1998b]: 150), satisfaction of the maxim of Quality is more urgent than the observance of other maxims, including the maxim of Quantity.

The possible implicature of (242) is (242’):

242’. Großglockner is a 3000-meter-high mountain or higher.

Interestingly, the height of the mountain is not rounded up to 4000, although purely mathematically this would be the correct round-up. If the statement were (242’’):

242’’. Großglockner is a 4000-meter-high mountain,

this would provide false information and thus violate the maxim of Quality.
Analogously to (242) and its implicature (242’), the particularized implicature of (241.c.) is that Alice is a mile high or higher. Although the King was aware that Alice was nearly two miles high, he still did not say *you are two miles high* instead of (c). Based on this explanation, the idea in extract (241) has been clarified. The Queen’s comment (d) supports the above-mentioned chain of thoughts and confirms Alice’s real height.

### 6.1.2. The role of background knowledge

In many cases, as in (243), the inferring of implicature involves a need for background knowledge:

> 243. ‘The Duchess! The Duchess! Oh my dear paws! Oh my fur and whiskers! She’ll get me executed, as sure as ferrets are ferrets!
> (Carroll 1865 [2000]: 37)

Taking into consideration the additional encyclopaedic knowledge that ferrets are fierce rabbit-predators, the simile *as sure as ferrets are ferrets* enriches the phrase *she’ll get me executed* with the vivid certainty of impending execution. In addition, the Rabbit’s reference to its predator in the context of being executed by the Duchess is structurally framed in a tautology *as sure as ferrets are ferrets*, which reinforces the implicature of being executed.

### 6.1.3. Instances of unintentional offending implicatures

When communicating with the inhabitants of Wonderland, Alice is often unintentionally imprudent and incautious. This happens due to her lack of experience in communicating: she is unaware of a possible offending implicature with respect to her addressees. The following examples demonstrate how Alice’s phrases with inoffensive semantic meanings in a given context acquire offensive and even threatening pragmatic meaning:

> 244. ‘Well, I should like to be a little larger, sir, if you wouldn’t mind,’ said Alice: ‘three inches is such a wretched height to be.’
> ‘It is a very good height indeed!’ said the Caterpillar angrily, rearing itself upright as it spoke (it was exactly three inches high). (Carroll 1865 [2000]: 52)

> 245. […] and *she’s [Dinah] such a capital one for catching mice*—oh, I beg your pardon!’ cried Alice again, for this time the Mouse was bristling all over, and she felt certain it must be really offended. (Carroll 1865 [2000]: 26)
246. ‘I wish I had our Dinah here, I know I do!’ said Alice aloud, addressing nobody in particular. ‘She’d soon fetch it back!’ ‘And who is Dinah, if I might venture to ask the question?’ said the Lory.

Alice replied eagerly, for she was always ready to talk about her pet: ‘Dinah’s our cat. And she’s such a capital one for catching mice you can’t think! And oh, I wish you could see her after the birds! Why, she’ll eat a little bird as soon as look at it!’

This speech caused a remarkable sensation among the party. Some of the birds hurried off at once. (Carroll 1865 [2000]: 35)

247. There is such a nice little dog, near our house. […], it belongs to a farmer, you know, and he says it’s so useful, it’s worth a hundred pounds! He says it kills all the rats and—oh dear!’ cried Alice in a sorrowful tone, ‘I’m afraid I’ve offended it again!’ For the Mouse was swimming away from her as hard as it could go […]. (Carroll 1865 [2000]: 27)

All Alice’s above-enumerated utterances contradict the Politeness Principle because they offend her addressees. In (244) Alice offends the Caterpillar by saying that three inches is a wretched height. She fails to foresee that the Caterpillar is exactly three inches long! In (245) and (246) she praises the abilities of her pet Dinah to catch mice and birds to the wrong audience in an inappropriate context. In (247) the utterance that presupposes the existence of a nice little dog is an example of irony and, thus, means the complete opposite: the dog is far from nice and little. Indeed, the dog cannot be nice and harmless to a mouse if it kills rats. Furthermore, a mouse is the wrong addressee for such a statement, as dogs are not mice-friendly! The illocutionary effect of Alice’s utterance is to be expected: it causes the Mouse, trembling from fear, to swim away.

Alice’s utterances are typical examples of communication failure resulting from language being used in a way that is inappropriate in the context (cf. Grundy 2000: 16). They carry an additional load of inexplicitly conveyed meaning that Alice, as their encoder, does not recognise. As a result, they have a completely opposite effect on the audience than the one that Alice expects.

These examples prove the cancellability of implicature: Alice, as an encoder of unintentional offensive implicature, can explicitly cancel the implicature by adding a

---

22 The Politeness Principle has been formulated by Leech as follows: “Minimize the expression of impolite beliefs or maximize the expression of polite beliefs” (Leech 1983: 81).
clause, or she can contextually suggest a different inference of the utterances and in this way, cancel it.

With the flow of time, Alice becomes more experienced and learns to respect the fears of her interlocutors. She recognizes the potentially offending implicatures in her utterances and “checks herself hastily” (Carroll 1865 [2000]: 100) before pronouncing them:

248. ‘You may not have lived much under the sea —’ (‘I haven’t,’ said Alice) — ‘and perhaps you were never even introduced to a lobster —’ (Alice began to say ‘I once tasted —’ but checked herself hastily, and said ‘No, never’). (Carroll 1865 [2000]: 100)

249. ‘Oh, as to the whiting,’ said the Mock Turtle, ‘they — you’ve seen them, of course?’ ‘Yes,’ said Alice, ‘I’ve often seen them at dinn —’ she checked herself hastily. (Carroll 1865 [2000]: 103)

She even encodes *cats* and *dogs* as *C* and *D* out of awareness of the Mouse’s fear:

250. ‘You promised to tell me your history, you know,’ said Alice, ‘and why it is you hate — *C* and *D,*’ she added in a whisper, half afraid that it would be offended again. (Carroll 1865 [2000]: 33)

The reference to *C* and *D* apparently fails to observe the maxim of Manner, since it is obscure. The preference for the initial letters of the words *cats* and *dogs* over the words themselves requires a more complicated inferring process. However, taking into account the background knowledge about what panic Alice caused among the birds when pronouncing *cats* and *dogs* in the previous settings, we understand the implicature behind this acronymic coding. Alice intentionally violates the maxim of Manner but instead observes the Politeness Principle.

6.2. The pragmatic account of figures of speech

Implicature demonstrates the discrepancy between primary dictionary meaning and contextually imposed meaning. The occurrences of such a meaning interaction in *Alice in Wonderland* are illustrated by the instances of irony, hyperbole, litotes, tautologies and puns. These figures of speech, according to Grice’s theory, originate from implicatures that arise from explicitly infringing the maxims of communication. As the present sub-chapter demonstrates, ironies and hyperboles flout the maxim of
Quality; litotes and tautologies are examples of breaching the maxim of Quantity; ultimately, puns violate the maxim of Manner and Relevance. By deliberately breaching the maxims some speakers in Wonderland still act with the purpose of getting their message across, as they want to be cooperative in the communication, whereas others ostentatiously try to be unproductive. Some further examples demonstrate in detail why some different rhetoric strategies (cf. Grundy 2000: 76) are successfully decoded by the addressee and others are not.

6.2.1. Irony

This sub-chapter deals with the analysis of irony as a meaning transfer based upon the direct contrast of the notion named and the notion stated (cf. Muecke 1980: 14-15; Ermida 2005: 236). Considerable attention is paid to the pragmatic role of irony in *Alice in Wonderland*, and the main focus is placed on examples of irony breaching the maxim of Quality (cf. Grice 1975 [1998b]: 156). I also sketch out the significance of the Irony Principle, Politeness Principle, as well as the Cooperative Principle, and subsequently demonstrate their interdependence.

The following examples (251) and (252) shed some light on what the Irony Principle is and how it functions in accordance with the Politeness Principle. These examples also prove the fact that some ironies observe the maxim of Relevance at the expense of flouting the maxim of Quality:

251. ‘Once,’ said the Mock Turtle at last, with a deep sigh, ‘I was a real Turtle.’ These words were followed by a very long silence, broken only by an occasional exclamation of ‘Hic! Hic!’ from the Gryphon, and the constant heavy sobbing of the Mock Turtle. Alice was [...] saying, *‘Thank you, sir, for your interesting story,’* [...] (Carroll 1865 [2000]: 96)

In (251) Alice implicates the opposite of what she says and, therefore, creates a gap of incongruity between the stated and the intended. The purpose of this conversational manoeuvre is to observe the Politeness Principle while still communicating the desired message, namely criticising the Mock Turtle’s silence and sobbing. In this way Alice is observing the Irony Principle, which is as follows:

If you must cause offence, at least do so in a way which doesn't overtly conflict with the PP [Politeness Principle], but allows the hearer to arrive at the offensive point of your remark indirectly, by way of implicature. (Leech 1983: 82)
The Irony Principle “enables a speaker to be impolite while seeming to be polite” (Leech 1983: 142), that is, to hide impoliteness under insincere politeness. It is reached by violating the maxim of Quality — since Alice lies — but ultimately upholding the maxim of Relevance (cf. Sperber and Wilson 1981: 299). Since the Mock Turtle did not utter a word, Alice’s comment Thank you, sir, for your interesting story, seems to be an irrelevant and blatant falsehood, which prompts the reader to look for its tacitly implicated meaning and assume that Alice is obeying the Cooperative Principle. The utterance Thank you, sir, for your interesting story carries a critical overtone and means the opposite of the stated utterance. Thus, the implicature the story was not interesting is the only relevant interpretation of Alice’s comment in this context.

Irony, as it is a kind of particularized implicature or implicative strategy (cf. Grice 1975 [1998b]: 156), is sensitive to change, and its value is totally dependent on the will of the speaker or on the will of the hearer. Thus, in (251) the implicature the story was not interesting can be denied if the Mock Turtle is offended. Due to its property of cancellability, irony always assumes the air of innocence. Its pragmatic importance lies in the juxtaposition of lexical meaning to implied meaning. This meaning opposition provides the ironist with an efficient means of achieving the desired communicative purposes.

Example (251) is not the only instance of Alice’s ironic praise, example (252) is of a similar nature. It demonstrates how irony “exploits the principle of politeness” (Leech 1983: 82):

252. ‘Thank you, it’s a very interesting dance to watch,’ said Alice, feeling very glad that it was over at last. (Carroll 1865 [2000]: 103)

Such ironical praising or mock-politeness, as defined by Leech (1983: 144), is a harmless or polite way of being offensive. It mitigates the negative effect of a direct accusation, “a hostile and derogatory judgement or a feeling such as indignation or contempt” (Grice 1978 [1998a]: 173). In such a way, the Politeness Principle is upheld. The pragmatic meaning is the complete opposite of the semantic meaning.
The maxim of Quality is flouted by implicating rather than by making a direct statement.\(^{23}\)

Often irony involves contrasting statements, as in (253):

253. […] she had read several *nice little stories* about children who had got burnt, and eaten up by wild beasts and other unpleasant things… (Carroll 1865 [2000]: 17)

In (253) Alice states that nice stories are those where children get burnt and eaten up by beasts; they are the stories “filled with episodes of horror and usually containing a pious moral” (Gardner 2000: 17). Here, irony serves the pragmatic function of stressing the confrontation and juxtaposing incompatibles. In such a way, the maxim of Quality is violated, since the statement is literally false: the stories about children getting burnt cannot be nice. The pragmatic intention of such a flouting is to create an implicature, which is contrary to the utterance’s semantics. It is the background assumptions that help the reader make a choice in favour of the ironical interpretation and not the literal meaning.

Semantics alone cannot account for the use of irony, as it fails to explain why a speaker prefers the ironic utterance to its counterpart and how a shift from literal to conversationally implicated meaning is made. A combination of semantic and pragmatic principles is a sensible way to treat irony. (Sperber & Wilson 1981: 296)

6.2.2. Hyperbole and litotes

Similarly to irony, hyperbole and litotes should also be analysed in pragmatic terms. Within the framework of Grice’s theory, hyperbole or overstatement, and litotes or understatement, are ways of violating the Gricean maxims. The purpose of this subchapter is to illustrate this process with examples from *Alice in Wonderland*.

Hyperbole refers to a case where the speaker’s description is stronger than is warranted by the state of affairs described […]. (Leech 1983: 145)

Pragmatically seen, this traditional rhetorical device flouts the maxim of Quality (Grundy 2000: 247) because it causes controversy between the linear meaning and

---

\(^{23}\) Leech’s Irony Principle has, however, received some critical remarks. Black (2006: 112) advocates that Irony Principle is indeed able to explain such instances of irony that implicate rude messages. However, it cannot explain those ironic occurrences that disapprove things that we are unable to control, for instance, our comments on never-ending rains in autumn, bureaucracy of clerks, dirty streets in town, and so forth.
the intended meaning: the former is the exaggerated form of the latter. Consider this instance of hyperbole:

254. Down, down, down. Would the fall never come to an end!  
(Carroll 1865 [2000]: 13)

Lewis Carroll, a mathematician who as a boy expressed an interest in a book of logarithms, knew the law of freefalling and was aware of the unavoidable ultimate stop for any falling object. Obviously, he could not seriously mean the truth of (254). Thus, he ostentatiously infringed the maxim of Quality. The overstatement the fall would never come to an end makes reference to the highest level of unlikeliness of the fall terminating. It is apparent that the author had no intention of deceiving his audience by using this overstatement. Thus, there is a pragmatic purpose to such an exaggeration. As Leech says, this purpose is the observation of the Interest Principle, which is as follows, “say what is unpredictable, and hence interesting” (Leech 1983: 146).

As unpredictable statements are always more interesting than predictable ones, the speaker uses exaggerations to maintain the interest of the hearer. The communicative intent of the hyperbolic utterance (254) is to intensify feeling and emotion and to make the story more impressive. The instances of hyperbole noted below in italics are all based on “the exaggerated use of universal quantifiers” (Leech 1983: 146) with the purpose of upholding he Interest Principle:

255. Now I’m opening out like the largest telescope that ever was!  
(Carroll 1865 [2000]: 20)

256. […] shedding gallons of tears […]. (Carroll 1865 [2000]: 21)

257. […] she knelt down and looked along the passage into the loveliest garden you ever saw. (Carroll 1865 [2000]: 16)

258. […] a constant howling and sneezing. (Carroll 1865 [2000]: 59)

259. […] till it had very long claws and a great many teeth. (Carroll 1865 [2000]: 64)

260. This is the driest thing I know. (Carroll 1865 [2000]: 30)

261. […] quite forgetting that she was now about a thousand times as large as the Rabbit […]. (Carroll 1865 [2000]: 40)
The frequency of overstatements in *Alice in Wonderland* can be explained by the fact that hyperbole is a device peculiar to the child, who uses it subconsciously in order to obey the Interest Principle. Children associate the world directly with themselves and are the epicentre of all events happening around them. Their power of observation is rather subjective; it is based on their opinions and feelings rather than on facts or evidence. The world in Wonderland is seen and presented through the eyes of seven-year-old Alice (cf. Lakoff 1993: 369) who elaborates events and describes them in a deliberately exaggerated way in order to make her story unpredictable and different to hearers’ expectations. The episode with the bottle labelled “DRINK ME” supports this statement:

262. [...] for she had read several nice little histories about children who had got burnt, and eaten up by wild beasts and other unpleasant things, all because they would not remember the simple rules their friends had taught them: such as, that a red-hot poker will burn you if you hold it too long; and that if you cut your finger very deeply with a knife, it usually bleeds; and she had never forgotten that, if you drink much from a bottle marked ‘poison’, it is almost certain to disagree with you, sooner or later. (Carroll 1865 [2000]: 17)

This episode is peculiar for its constellation of hyperboles. The phrases in italics are exaggerated: it is enough for a poker to be hot, not necessarily red-hot, to cause a burn; moreover, you do not need to hold it too long to get burnt, it is enough to touch it. The same concerns cutting a finger and drinking poison: your finger will bleed even if the cut is not very deep and poison will disagree with you even if you only drink a little of it. It is worth discussing the word-choice *disagree with you*. Usually the organism’s reaction to poison is more than just disagreement. Poison causes death. Therefore, *disagree with you* is an understatement of the possible effects of drinking poison, i.e., it is an instance of litotes.²⁴ Litotes, conversely to hyperbole

refers to a case where the speaker’s description is [weaker] than is warranted by the state of affairs described. (Leech 1983: 145)

It strictly obeys the maxim of Quality but it violates the maxim of Quantity, since it underplays some aspects of meaning which are pragmatically disfavoured. In the case of (262), the word *death* is fear-evoking for children; thus, it is intentionally omitted and substituted by a milder form of a reaction to poison.

²⁴ Grice (1975 [1998b]: 156) uses the term *meiosis* for understatement.
6.2.3. Tautologies

This sub-chapter continues analysing certain figures of speech in *Alice in Wonderland*. Particularly, I discuss tautologies and how they can be explained within the paradigm of Gricean theory.

In terms of semantics and rhetoric, tautologies are bare unnecessary repetitions which seem to have no communicative value, that is, “at the level of what is said […] such remarks are totally non-informative” (Grice 1975 [1998b]: 155). According to Grice’s theory, they violate the second sub-maxim of the maxim of Quantity “do not make your contribution more informative than it is required” (ibid. 149) and at first seem to disobey the Cooperative Principle. However, if the listener still expects the speaker to be cooperative, he/she can infer the pragmatic implicature of this maxim violation:

263. *Down, down, down*. Would the fall never come to an end! ‘I wonder how many miles I’ve fallen by this time?’ (Carroll 1865 [2000]: 14)

The context of (263) directs the reader to the meaning of the tautological construction, namely, the implicature of *down, down, down* is that Alice was experiencing a long and continuous fall down the hole. The pragmatic meaning of it is to stress the length of the fall.

After a long fall and a peculiar meeting with the human-like Rabbit, Alice realises that everything is queer that day (Carroll 1865 [2000]: 22). Feeling unsure of who she is, Alice assumes that she is Ada or Mabel. In a short monologue Alice soon discards this assumption by giving semantically obvious evidence:

264. *She’s she, and I’m I…* (Carroll 1865 [2000]: 23)

This tautology does not observe the maxim of Quantity but it bears the following pragmatic import, determined by the context of the utterance: both Alice and Mabel are two different personalities. The tautology works to reassure and soothe Alice’s concern about her personal identity. It does not stress the factual validity of a statement but bears a pragmatic function of an intensifying device.

---

25 It is not clearly specified who those girls are; however, in the original story, *Alice’s Adventures Under Ground*, the names of Alice’s cousins are mentioned (cf. Gardner 2000: 24).
A peculiar example of tautology is demonstrated in the episode where the Rabbit receives a letter as evidence against the Knave and asks where he should begin reading it. In reply, the King explains in an extremely detailed way:

265. “Begin at the beginning,” the King said gravely, “and go on till you come to the end: then stop.” (Carroll 1865 [2000]: 121)

The King utters information that is encoded in the conventional implicature of the word begin; therefore, he violates the maxim of Quantity by over-informing the Rabbit. As a result, instead of sharpening the Rabbit’s attention, the King’s reply has the effect of disorienting him.

The next example (266) is uttered when one of the most absurd and pun-abounding conversations between Alice and Wonderland inhabitants takes place. The Dormouse tells its amusing story about three sisters who lived at the bottom of a treacle-well, were well-in and learnt to draw everything that starts with an M, as well as they tried to draw treacle out of the treacle-well. In this nonsensical context, the tautological word combination much of a muchness is used:

266. [...] you know you say things are “much of a muchness” — did you ever see such a thing as a drawing of a muchness?” (Carroll 1865 [2000]: 77)

In this case, the meaning of the tautological construction cannot be inferred literally, as the Dormouse is trying to do. Much of a muchness is an idiomatic phrase meaning of a similar quality.

6.2.4. Puns

This sub-chapter continues to illustrate cases of maxim exploitation, in particular those caused by punning. I outline the need for a pragmatic approach to puns and suggest directions in which such a pragmatic account might contribute to the study of puns.

Punning, i.e. a humorous play on words and hence “a vehicle of humor” (Culler 1988: 5), is based on the interaction of two well known meanings of a given word or phrase. The Oxford Dictionary of English Etymology says that punning first appeared approximately after 1660; its origin is undetermined (Onions 1979: 723). Puns often result from the use of the following:
- homophones: lexemes which are identical in sound but different in visual medium (Lyons 1977, 2: 559)
- homonyms: lexemes which are identical in both sound and visual medium (Lyons 1977, 2: 559)
- polysemes: lexemes which have multiple related word meanings. (Ravin & Leacock 2000: 1)

As mentioned by Lyons (1977, 2: 552), there is no clear-cut distinction between polysemy and homonymy. Although it is not the purpose of this work to draw a dividing line between these two notions, I will briefly outline two main differentiating criteria. One criterion is the etymology of lexemes. Homonymous lexemes are those which “have developed from what were formally distinct lexemes in some earlier state of the language” (ibid.: 550). Another criterion is the unrelatedness of meaning in homonyms versus the relatedness of meaning in polysemes. Whether a lexeme is polysemous or homonymous is often disputable. Thus, Lyons (1977, 2: 552) suggests leaving the problem of the classification unresolved and turning to the analysis of their pragmatic nature.

“Punning is the most extreme example of non-communicative language use” (Sobkowiak 1991: 1); they confuse the hearers and make the language nonsensical (cf. Lakoff 1993: 371). Puns flout the maxim of Manner, as they provide obscure statements (cf. Mey [2001]: 86). Since the maxim of Manner works hand in glove with the maxim of Relevance (cf. Leech 1983: 100), many puns breach the maxim of Relevance as well, since they appear to be irrelevant, often context-isolated utterances in a particular context. The following examples with homophones (267) – (272), homonyms (275) – (278) and polysemes (279) demonstrate how a conversation can result in failure if the interlocutors intentionally or unintentionally produce obscure and/or irrelevant phrases. First of all, puns based on homophony are considered. They demonstrate that “the lack of isomorphism between the written and the spoken language” (Lyons 1977, 2: 562) is the reason for several implicatures arising:

267. ‘Mine is a long and a sad tale!’ said the Mouse, turning to Alice, and sighing.
   ‘It is a long tail, certainly,’ said Alice, looking down with wonder at the Mouse’s tail; ‘but why do you call it sad? (Carroll 1865 [2000]: 33)

26 Cf. Lyons (1977, 2: 550-552) for a detailed account on difference between homonymy and polysemy.
268. ‘You are not attending!’ said the Mouse to Alice severely. ‘What are you thinking of?’ ‘I beg your pardon,’ said Alice very humbly: ‘you had got to the fifth bend, I think?’ ‘I had not!’ cried the Mouse, sharply and very angrily. ‘A knot!’ said Alice, always ready to make herself useful, and looking anxiously about her. ‘Oh, do let me help to undo it!’ (Carroll 1865 [2000]: 34-35)

269. […] and I hadn’t begun my tea — not above a week or so — and what with the bread-and-butter getting so thin — and the twinkling of the tea — ‘The twinkling of the what?’ said the King. ‘It began with the tea,’ the Hatter replied. ‘Of course twinkling begins with a T!’ said the King sharply. ‘Do you take me for a dunce? Go on!’ (Carroll 1865 [2000]: 114-115)

270. You see the earth takes twenty-four hours to turn round on its axis — ‘Talking of axes,’ said the Duchess, ‘chop off her head!’ (Carroll 1865 [2000]: 61-62)

271. ‘And how many hours a day did you do lessons?’ said Alice, in a hurry to change the subject. ‘Ten hours the first day,’ said the Mock Turtle: ‘nine the next, and so on.’ ‘What a curious plan!’ exclaimed Alice. ‘That’s the reason they’re called lessons,’ the Gryphon remarked: ‘because they lessen from day to day.’ (Carroll 1865 [2000]: 99)

272. ‘Why did you call him Tortoise, if he wasn’t one?’ Alice asked. ‘We called him Tortoise because he taught us,’ said the Mock Turtle angrily. (Carroll 1865 [2000]: 96)

The above-mentioned examples display how identical sounding but disparity in meaning causes confusion. In (267) there is a pun based on the homophones tail (the part extending beyond the end of the body) and tale (a story). The Mouse’s tale is reinforced by the eye-catching and mind-provoking graphic imagery of the story, presented in the shape of a tail (cf. Carroll 1865 [2000]: 34). The similarity of sounds between tail and tale confuses Alice. Although tale is used in a combination with an attribute sad, which is not combinable with a tail, Alice still fails to recognize the right homophone in the context.

27 Here and henceforth, the meanings of homophones, homonyms, as well as meanings of polysemes are taken from Collins COBUILD Advanced Learner’s English Dictionary on CD-ROM.
In (268) the Mouse’s phrase *I had not*, if viewed contextually is perspicuous and relevant, since it directly contradicts Alice’s previous remark *you had got to the fifth bend, I think*. Therefore, it observes the maxim of Manner and Relevance. For this reason, Alice’s preference for the homophone *knot* over *not* is not justified. Moreover, if *knot* were the right lexeme, Alice could have presupposed that the Mouse would have used an article with it. No article has been used. Thus, the choice of the lexeme *knot* cannot be explained; it flouts the maxim of Relevance.

Example (269) is a clever exploitation of the homonyms *tea* and *T*, where

- T — is the twentieth letter of the English alphabet.
- Tea — is a drink made by adding hot water to tea leaves or tea bags.

The Hatter’s irrelevant utterances confuse the King and cause him to apply a homophone which was not meant by the Hatter (instead of *tea* the King thinks the Hatter meant the letter *T*).

The next example (270) illustrates the Duchess’s absurd and unwarranted eagerness to chop off heads. The lexeme *axis*, meaning *an imaginary line through the middle of the Earth*, creates an association with the plural form of the lexeme *axe, a tool for cutting wood*. The relevance of the Duchess’s reply is not based on the context but rather on the sound similarities of the two homophones.

In example (271), Gryphon’s quibbles about the phonetic equivalence of *lesson* and *lessen* initiate a queer definition of *lesson*: for him an important element of the meaning of *lesson* is its property *to lessen* from day to day.

A similar nonsensical explanation of the word *tortoise*, based on the phonic identity with the word-combination *taught us* pronounced without a juncture, is provided by the Mock Turtle in (272).

One of Carroll’s best puns based on sound similarity is illustrated in the following example where the Mock Turtle recalls the school subjects that he was required to take:

273. ‘*Reeling and Writhing*, of course, to begin with,’ the Mock Turtle replied; ‘and then the different branches of Arithmetic — *Ambition, Distraction, Uglification, and Derivation* […]

*Mystery, ancient and modern*, with *Seaography*: then *Drawling* — the Drawling-master was an old conger-eel, that used to come once a week: he taught us *Drawling, Stretching*, and
Painting in Coils.

[...] he taught Laughing and Grief, they used to say.’ (Carroll 1865 [2000]: 98)

The reader is able to infer the corresponding counterparts only because the “target”, namely, “the word, often only paradigmatically present in the text” (Hempelmann 2004: 383), is similar in sound to the selected pun. Thus, the newly created subjects correspond accordingly to reading, writing, addition, subtraction, multiplication, division, history ancient and modern, geography, drawing, sketching, painting in oils, Latin and Greek. This device of playing with words based on sound affinity creates an entertaining and humorous effect, but apart from that it also carries the idea of social mocking of the system of education in Victorian times.

The next instance of punning, which is also based on sound similarity, might be easily recognized by speakers or learners of British English:

274. [...] she [the Duchess] added, ‘and the moral of that is — “Take care of the sense, and the sounds will take care of themselves.”’

(Carroll 1865 [2000]: 92)

Carroll witty switched the words in the British proverb take care of the pence and the pounds will take care of themselves (cf. Gardner 2000: 92).

The next examples will deal with puns based on homonyms, i.e. lexemes which are characterised by phonic and graphic identity, as well as by a multiplicity of unrelated meanings. In the following example there is a clever exploitation of the homonymous nature of draw:

275. ‘And so these three little sisters — they were learning to draw, you know —’

‘What did they draw?’ said Alice, quite forgetting her promise.
‘Treacle,’ said the Dormouse, without considering at all this time. (Carroll 1865 [2000]: 76)

Dormouse’s answer is rather unexpected and flouts the maxim of Relevance because the logical chain of thoughts leads Alice, and the reader as well, to the answer based on the lexeme draw which means as follows:

- draw\(_1\) — use a pencil, pen or a pencil to produce a picture, pattern, or diagram.

Although the meaning of draw\(_1\) is more relevant in the given context, its homonymous partner draw\(_2\) is used, which means:
- draw: something such as water or energy from a particular source means to take it from that source.

In the following example the pun is based on the homonyms well (a hole in the ground from which a supply of water is extracted) and be well in: (to have a good relationship with a person or group which gives you an advantage):  

276. ‘But they were in the well,’ Alice said to the Dormouse, not choosing to notice this last remark. ‘Of course they were’, said the Dormouse; ‘— well in.’ (Carroll 1865 [2000]: 76)

In this example there is convergence of lexical and syntactic punning. The play upon word is based on juxtaposing a prepositional phrase in the well and an idiom be well in.

The next example (277) is one of the numerous didactic absurdities typical of the Duchess who seeks a moral in every mere trifle:

277. ‘Of course it is,’ said the Duchess, who seemed ready to agree to everything that Alice said; ‘there’s a large mustard—mine near here. And the moral of that is — “The more there is of mine, the less there is of yours.”’ (Carroll 1865 [2000]: 92)

The use of homonyms mine (a place where deep holes and tunnels are dug under the ground in order to obtain a mineral) and mine (belonging to me) in this particular context confused Alice and seemed to be beyond any sensible comprehension.

If most of the Duchess’s moralistic utterances do not bear any contextual relevance to the talk, in (278) the King puns relevantly:

278. Then again — “before she had this fit —” you never had fits, my dear, I think?’ he said to the Queen. ‘Never!’ said the Queen furiously, throwing an inkstand at the Lizard as she spoke. (The unfortunate little Bill had left off writing on his slate with one finger, as he found it made no mark; but he now hastily began again, using the ink, that was trickling down his face, as long as it lasted.) ‘Then the words don’t fit you,’ said the King, looking round the court with a smile. There was a dead silence. ‘It’s a pun!’ the King added in an offended tone, and everybody laughed. (Carroll 1865 [2000]: 124)

He skillfully and intentionally plays on the homonymic nature of the word fit:

---

• fit₁ — a state when somebody suddenly loses consciousness and their body makes uncontrollable movements
• fit₂ — to be the right size and shape to go onto a person’s body or onto a particular object.

*Alice in Wonderland* swarms with puns based on homonymous partners. Apart from previously analysed instances, there are other plays upon words that include *sole₁* (a kind of fish) and *sole₂* (the underneath surface of a foot or a shoe), *great₁* (deserving approval and admiration) and *great₂* (very large), *grow up₁* (literally: increase in size) and *grow up₂* (mature).²⁹

Apart from homophony and homonymy, puns are also rooted in lexical polysemy. Consider the next example:

279. Alice sighed wearily. ‘I think you might do something better with the time,’ she said, ‘than waste it in asking riddles that have no answers.’
‘If you knew Time as well as I do,’ said the Hatter, ‘you wouldn’t talk about wasting it. It’s him.’
‘I don’t know what you mean,’ said Alice.
‘Of course you don’t!’ the Hatter said, tossing his head contemptuously. ‘I dare say you never even spoke to Time!’
‘Perhaps not,’ Alice cautiously replied: ‘but I know I have to beat time when I learn music.’
‘Ah! that accounts for it,’ said the Hatter. ‘He won’t stand beating. (Carroll 1865 [2000]: 72)

To understand this pun, the reader needs to consider the polysemous word *time*. The Collins COBUILD Advanced Learner’s English Dictionary on CD-ROM lists eighteen meanings of the noun *time*. Carroll skillfully combines two of these meanings, specifically:

• time is what we measure in minutes, hours, and days, and years.
• the time of a piece of music is the number of beats that the piece has in each bar.

The use of *time* in this context poses the problem of inferring the correct meaning. To *beat time* is based on the latter meaning of *time*. However, the Hatter, applies the former meaning of the polysemous *time* to Alice’s utterance *I have to beat time when I learn music*. He nonsensically personifies *time* — saying *it's him* — and means that *time* will not stand beating in the literal sense of the word. The attitude to the concept of time in Wonderland is peculiar: there are never-ending tea parties, watches

²⁹ cf. Carroll 1865 [2000]: 104, 21, 39 respectively
without time, disinterest in knowing the exact date, attempts to beat time, you name it. These instances prove that time in Wonderland is an unimportant parameter.

Lewis Carroll thrillingly plays upon words, destroying their structure first and then rebuilding them with new shades of connotation. One of his favourite games is the one with decomposing metaphors, where old traditional links are destroyed and exchanged with new unexpected ones. An example of such a process, using the verb \textit{cross-examine} is given:

280. The King looked anxiously at the White Rabbit, who said in a low voice, ‘Your Majesty must cross-examine this witness.’ ‘Well, if I must, I must,’ the King said, with a melancholy air, and, after folding his arms and frowning at the cook till his eyes were nearly out of sight, he said in a deep voice, ‘What are tarts made of?’ (Carroll 1865 [2000]: 117)

Later the King complains to the Queen:

281. ‘Really, my dear, you must cross-examine the next witness. It quite makes my forehead ache!’ (Carroll 1865 [2000]: 117)

The italicised words are those that express the King’s attempts to comprehend the unknown word \textit{cross-examine}. As seen, the lexeme \textit{cross-examine} has been decomposed into two separate parts \textit{cross} and \textit{examine}. Each of them has been thought over and understood literally. Consequently, the word \textit{cross-examine} has acquired a completely new meaning based on the parts of its constituents. This example of decomposing is not unique in \textit{Alice in Wonderland}. Here is another example of a similar kind:

282. Here one of the guinea-pigs cheered, and was immediately suppressed by the officers of the court. (As that is rather a hard word, I will just explain to you how it was done. They had a large canvas bag, which tied up at the mouth with strings: into this they slipped the guinea-pig, head first, and then sat upon it.) I’m glad I’ve seen that done,’ thought Alice. ‘I’ve so often read in the newspapers, at the end of trials, “There was some attempts at applause, which was immediately suppressed by the officers of the court,” and I never understood what it meant till now.’ (Carroll 1865 [2000]: 115)

The word \textit{suppress} has been decomposed into two constituents. The meaning of the second constituent \textit{press}, which is \textit{pushing something firmly against something else}, has been applied to the context instead of the meaning of the lexeme \textit{suppress}. 

120
The aforementioned plays on words demonstrate Lewis Carroll’s skill as a punster who is sensitive to many language possibilities. He was an expert at playing with language, juggling with words in order to display both the flexibility and the perversity of familiar usages and the way in which language both reflects and distorts thought.

6.3. Conclusions

This chapter, presented within the limits of the Gricean general approach to the study of conversational implicature and its pragmatic peculiarities, has demonstrated how the Gricean Cooperative Principle contributes to the successful interpretation of implicatures in *Alice in Wonderland*. The numerous examples focused on instances of maxim flouting and its pragmatic purpose of observing the Cooperative Principle at the level of an implicated message. I have emphasized the importance of context in helping determine what is conveyed implicitly but not explicitly stated by the speaker. I have defended the opinion that irony, hyperboles, litotes, tautologies and puns are not only to be researched within the framework of semantics and rhetoric; they are the subjects of pragmatic investigation as well.
Conclusions

‘Then you should say what you mean,’ the March Hare went on.
‘I do,’ Alice hastily replied; ‘at least — at least I mean what I say — that’s the same thing, you know.’ (Carroll 1865 [2000]: 115)

This pragmatic analysis of Alice in Wonderland has demonstrated that the work abounds with examples of the relationship between literally expressed and tacitly conveyed meanings. The numerous nonsensical utterances, absurd puns and ambiguous references in Alice endorsed Carroll’s opinion that

[…] words mean more than we mean to express when we use them: so a whole book ought to mean a great deal more than the writer meant. (Cohen 1979: 548)

The analysis of deixis, presupposition and implicature in Alice in Wonderland has provided explanations for many absurdities, illogical conclusions and much disjointed talk. The work has also confirmed that a traditional semantic approach, based on truth conditioning, is not sufficient to deal with many of Carroll’s language puzzles, such as the intricacies of deictic referring, utterance presuppositions and unclear implicatures. It is pragmatics that makes good sense of much Carrollian nonsense and/or facilitates the understanding of reasons why some utterances are treated as nonsensical by the hearers.

The analysis of deictic expressions in Alice in Wonderland has established as true that deixis is pragmatically empowered to give plausible explanations to many Carrollian absurdities: for instance, why the Cheshire Cat assumes that Alice is mad; why some Wonderland characters determine the current date as May 14th, whereas others are sure that it is May 16th; why the Rabbit is sometimes referred to as he and sometimes as it; why the author preferred to capitalise the word Mouse not when he first used it, but rather in further narration; and eventually, why different pets that Alice refers to in the book respectively acquire either animate or non-animate reference. These and numerous other examples in Chapter 4 have proved that deixis is an intriguing field worth investigating.

While reading Alice in Wonderland between the lines, the notion of presupposition is no less significant. It sheds light on the absurdity of many actions, such as offering more tea to Alice without serving her any at all, or beheading a Cat if it has no body
to cut the head from. These are occurrences of how an essential convention of everyday language is subverted. They show presupposition failure, and, as a result, communication failure, which proves that the communicative behaviour in Wonderland is far from “normal and fair; it casts doubts on […] beliefs that human beings are sensible and sentient” (Lakoff 1993: 368).

Much misunderstanding between Alice and Wonderland creatures originates from different presuppositions about the world they live in. Alice bases her assumptions on the real world above the ground and completely disregards the rules of Wonderland. As a result, she is perplexed by never-ending teas, pebbles turning into cakes, the strange rules of the croquet game, her continuing changes in size, meeting talking animals, seeing a grin without the Cheshire cat and other wonders in Wonderland. Alice’s knowledge of the real world cannot accept such actions as normal. Neither can the reader find any sound meaning in Wonderland, unless he/she abandons an orderly and logical approach to it. In Wonderland, chaotic and nonsensical rules reign; “the logic is partially suspended” (Nöth 1990: 3). In the underground court, the verdict follows the sentence and the beheading precedes pinching the Dormouse. The Wonderland dwellers presuppose that a clock shows a year and not time; they start enumerating the rules in a book with the number 42 and not 1. All of Wonderland dwellers are surrounded by madness (cf. Rackin 1991: 55).

The word mad occurs fifteen times in Alice in Wonderland. It is a constituent word of Chapter 7 (“A Mad Tea-Party”), a constituent of one of the character’s proper names (the Mad Hatter) and an attribute applied to a simile as mad as a March Hare. The notion of time in Wonderland is annihilated, instead “the […] pervasive atmosphere of timelessness” (Rackin 1991: 54) prevails. As soon as the reader annihilates the rules of ordinary world and accepts Wonderland as it is, nonsense makes sense and madness transforms into sanity (cf. Lakoff 1993: 382). All these conclusions and examples have been the subject matter of Chapter 5.

Subsequently, in the concluding chapter of Part II, I have demonstrated that implicature is liable to explicate the pragmatic meanings of Alice’s grammatical mistakes and the Rabbit’s unusual similes. Moreover, the analysis of ironies, hyperboles, litoteses, tautologies and puns in the same chapter has supported the idea that “the same utterance can obtain completely different, even diametrically opposed effects, depending on convention and context!” (Mey [2001]: 44)
These conclusions point to the belief that “Carroll informed his ‘nonsense’ book — whether consciously or unconsciously — with much sense”. (Rackin 1991: 21) What at first seemed to be nonsense in Alice in Wonderland is, “for the most part, a misnomer” (ibid.: 1991: 18). Carroll has also demonstrated how subversively the language works by showing the unwillingness of Wonderland dwellers to communicate cooperatively: they ascribe inexistent references and destroy the above-ground logic of language.

Carroll undoubtedly did not have the notions of deixis, presupposition and implicature in mind while writing his Alice, as in his time these terms had not been coined. Pragmaticists, however, have found the Alice book an enriching and inexhaustible well for tracing pragmatic issues. For this, as well as for much entertainment while reading and carrying out the analysis, I would like to thank Lewis Carroll.

The pragmatic analysis of Alice in Wonderland in this thesis is detailed, but not complete, since such notions as deixis, presupposition and implicature are complex phenomena, unlikely to be fully handled in a thesis. The analysis could therefore be extended to looking into other manifestations of the concepts being studied, as well as examining speech acts, considering proper names and researching the pragmatics of metaphors. Moreover, the aspect of politeness or, more precisely, the lack of it in Wonderland could be addressed in a more detailed way. I hope that my thesis will inspire others interested in pragmatics to further research and investigation.
Abstract

Lewis Carroll’s *Alice’s Adventures in Wonderland*, since its publication in 1865, has been subjected to a number of interpretations — psychoanalytic (Goldschmidt 1933), philosophical (Holmes 1959), linguistic (Sutherland 1970), semiotic (Nöth 1990), and pragmatic (Lakoff 1993). This thesis also approaches *Alice’s Adventures in Wonderland* pragmatically and extends Lakoff’s ideas on its subversiveness in terms of language use. The thesis explores Carroll’s numerous ambiguous references, puns and preposterous statements and analyses them within the framework of three pragmatic concepts, viz. deixis, presupposition and implicature. Within the framework of these notions, the thesis concentrates on the relationship between the choice of language and the speaker’s purposes, situational appropriateness and context. The role of the latter is emphasized throughout the whole thesis. Context enables the addressee to assign a correct reference to deictic expressions, allows pragmatic presupposition to overrule its semantic counterpart, differentiates between explicitly stated and implicitly conveyed meaning, and helps infer a conversational implicature. The thesis deals with several pragmatic principles of communication, viz. Cooperative Principle and its maxims, Politeness Principle, Irony Principle and Interest Principle; it demonstrates their interrelationship in particular contexts. The *Alice* story abounds with examples of maxim flouting and instances of uncooperative communication. Such occurrences often lead to nonsensical statements and blatant absurdities, the meaning of which is impossible to find within the scope of pure semantics. The results of the thesis show that pragmatics can substantially contribute to explaining the reasons for communication failure between Alice and the dwellers of Wonderland; pragmatics facilitates the understanding of Carrollian absurd humour and nonsense.
Zusammenfassung

References


Karttunen, Lauri; Peters S. 1979. “Conventional implicature”. In Oh and Dinneen (eds.): 1-56.


Strawson, Peter Frederick. 1971. Introduction to logical theory. London: Methuen. [1952].


**Internet and electronic resources**


Index

anaphora, 7, 10, 11, 30, 54, 56, 60, 65, 66, 73, 130
appropriateness, 12, 13, 20, 21, 76, 81, 94, 127
calculability, 27
cataphora, 60, 62
cleft constructions, v, 90, 91
cohesiveness, 38-39
context, 3-10, 24, 27, 36-40, 43, 48, 51-53, 71-72, 92-99, 102-112, 118, 121, 124
cohesion, 38-39
context, 3-10, 24, 27, 36-40, 43, 48, 51-53, 71-72, 92-99, 102-112, 118, 121, 124

defeasibility, 20, 27, 92-93
deixis, 5-7, 29-30
demonstratives, 7-11, 56, 59, 61-67
detachability, 18, 27
discourse deixis, 3, 9, 10, 30, 54, 57, 59, 60, 80
distal, 8, 10, 11, 44-46, 52, 61-71, 80
emotional deixis, 9, 11, 30, 63-67, 80
entailment, 18, 24, 84
filters, 20, 22, 93
generalized implicature, 24, 26, 134
gestural deixis, 3, 7, 8, 29-32, 48, 80
holes, 20, 22, 23, 93, 118
homonyms, 114-118
homophones, 114-116
honorifics, 12, 67, 68
hyperbole, 4, 101, 106, 109-111
implicature, 2, 3, 4, 14, 21-29, 91, 101-109, 112, 113, 121, 123-127
impure textual deixis, 11, 60
indexicals, 3, 4, 6, 9, 11, 38, 45, 46, 63
Interest Principle, 110, 111, 127
irony, 4, 101, 105-109, 121, 134
Irony Principle, 107-109, 127
litotes, 4, 101, 106, 109, 111, 121
maxim of Manner, 25-27, 91, 95, 106, 107, 114, 116
maxim of Quantity, 25, 103, 107-111
maxim of Relevance, 25, 26, 107, 108, 114, 116, 117
mutual knowledge, 21, 94, 96
negation, 15, 17, 18, 84, 87, 88, 93
non-conventionality, 27, 28
non-deictic use, 3, 13, 30, 77, 79
nonsense, 1, 2, 29, 45, 82, 83, 123-127, 135
ontological status, 33, 35
Origo, 3, 5, 6, 33, 36, 37, 51, 77, 131
particularized implicature, 24-26, 101, 104, 108
person deixis, 8, 29, 33, 36, 80
place deixis, 8, 49, 64, 65, 80
plugs, 20, 22, 23, 93, 94
Politeness Principle, 105-108, 127
polysemes, 114, 115
possible world, 35, 41, 75, 81, 82, 96
power, 12, 29, 68-76, 111, 129
pragmatic presupposition, 3, 4, 20-22, 81, 94, 101, 127
presupposition, 2-4, 14-24, 80-101
projection problem, 20, 22, 24, 93
proximal, 8, 10, 11, 44-46, 52, 62-67, 80
pun, 4, 101, 106, 113-119, 121, 123, 124, 127, 130, 136
reference, 6, 7, 16, 29, 31, 32, 35-40, 72-77
role assignment, 32, 33
sense, 1, 15, 16, 28, 29, 35, 38, 41, 70, 82, 83, 89, 95, 117, 119, 123-125
social deixis, 3, 9, 11, 30, 54, 67, 72
solidarity, 13, 29, 42, 68, 70, 74, 76, 72
subversiveness, 29
symbolic, 3, 5, 7, 8, 29, 30, 32, 33, 80
tautologies, 4, 101, 106, 112, 121, 124
time deixis, 3, 8, 9, 49, 80
truth-condition, 14, 20
Curriculum vitae

Persönliche Daten:
Valentina Gal
email: vgal@gmx.at

Ausbildung
seit 10/2004 Universität Wien
Lehramt Englisch, Russisch
09/1998 – 06/2003 Nationale Universität Lemberg, Ukraine
Magister der Philologie. Unterrichtskraft für englische Sprache und Weltliteratur
Abschluss: mit Auszeichnung
08/2000 – 06/2001 Grand Valley State University, Michigan, USA
Austauschjahr; Studienrichtungen: Lehramt, Psychologie;
Abschlussnote: 3,919 (sehr gut)

Berufserfahrung
seit 13.02.2007 Theresianische Akademie
Wien, Assistentin im Russischunterricht der 7. und 8. Klassen
09/2001 – 01/2004 International House World Organisation, Lemberg, Ukraine;
Englischlehrerin (allgemeiner Englischunterricht für Erwachsene und Kinder; TOEFL-Test-Vorbereitung)
Russischlehrerin für englischsprachige Studenten

Sprachzeugnisse und Diplome
- Certificate in English Language Teaching to Adults (CELTA), University of Cambridge, April 2002; (Note: Gut)
- Deutschkurs: Fortgeschrittene 1-3 und Perfektion, Universität Wien, Wiener internationale Hochschulkurse, September 2004
- Diploma Básico de Español (DELE) como lengua extranjera, dado en Madrid, a 21.02.2003