DIPLOMARBEIT

Titel der Diplomarbeit

"Refuting the Conditioned - The Saṃskṛtārthapratiṣedha of Candrakīrti's Catuḥśatakatāṭikā: Introduction, Translation and Summary together with a Critical Edition of the Tibetan Translation"

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1 Preface

The "Commentary to the Four Hundred [Verses] on the Bodhisattva's Practice of Yoga" (Bodhisattvayogācāracatuhśatakāṭikā, CŚṬ) is the only extant Indian commentary to Āryadeva's famous Madhyamaka treatise in verse in its entirety, known as the "Treatise in Four Hundred [Verses]" (Catuhśatakaśāstra, ČŚ). Karen Lang published an edition and translation of the verse text in 1986,1 and Kōshin Suzuki published an edition of the Sanskrit fragments of the commentary, together with relevant parts of the Tibetan translation, in 1994.2 Furthermore, single chapters of the commentary have been translated into various languages since the 1970s.3

The focus of this thesis is the hitherto unaddressed chapter fifteen of Candrakīrti’s commentary. It provides a critical edition of the Tibetan text of CŚṬ XV.1-17, which is lacking in Suzuki's edition, together with the first English translation and summary. The subject of this chapter are conditioned things and their characteristics (saṃskṛtalakṣaṇa). It specifically deals with the Madhyamaka's refutation of concepts central to the Sarvāstivāda viewpoint and in doing so touches upon many central ideas prevalent at that time in Buddhist philosophy.

The thesis' introduction presents the current state of research concerning the authors, their texts and relevant modern editions and translations. It also contains a discussion of the category of the conditioned in Sarvāstivāda thought and presents the central issues that come under attack by the Madhyamaka. A critical edition of the Tibetan text of CŚṬ XV is established on the basis of the various editions of the bsTan 'gyur, including the Cone, Derge, Ganden, Peking and Narthang prints, as well as a paracanonical manuscript. The following English translation is annotated with references to relevant passages in this and other commentaries of Candrakīrti.

In questions of style and format, I have relied on Kate Turabian's A Manual for Writers of Research Papers, Theses, and Dissertations: Chicago Style for Students and Researchers4 and Matthias Karmasin's Die Gestaltung

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3. On these translations, see p. 11, n. 4 below.
wissenschaftlicher Arbeiten: Ein Leitfaden für Haus- und Seminararbeiten, Magisterarbeiten, Diplomarbeiten und Dissertationen.¹

¹ Karmasin 2007.
2 Introduction

2.1 Philological Context

2.1.1 Authors

2.1.1.1 Āryadeva

Candrakīrti gives the following account of Āryadeva's life in his commentary on the CŚ:

Āryadeva was born on the island of Siṃhala, as son of the island's king. After having become the crown prince he renounced the world and then, coming to the South, became a disciple of Nāgārjuna. He followed his doctrine and therefore the truth of this Four Hundred Treatise is not different in character from that expounded in the Middle Treatise.

Karen Lang draws a similar picture of Āryadeva's life when she surveys the commonalities of the different traditional biographical accounts. She notes that "they differ, however, on the details." The earliest of these accounts are a biography of Āryadeva, translated into Chinese by Kumārajīva at the beginning of the fifth century AD, as well as Hsuan Tsang's record of his pilgrimage to India in the seventh century AD. The details concern, most importantly, Āryadeva's

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1. 'di ltar slob dpon 'phags pa lha ni si nga la'i gling du 'khrungs pa si nga la'i gling gi rgyal po'i sras zhig ste mthar rgyal tshab bor nas de nyid du rab tu 'byung {NP byung} zhung / de nas lho phyogs kyi rgyud {CD ad. du} ltar 'ongs te slob dpon klu sgrub kyi nye gnas nyid du 'gyur zhing {NP gyur cing} / de'i langs kyi rjes su 'jug par gyur pa de nyid kyi phyir na bstan bcos bzhî brygya pa 'di'i de kho na nyid gang yin pa de ni dhu ma'i bstan bcos las bshad pa'i de kho na nyid las mtshan nyid tha dad pa can ma yin no // Tibetan text in Suzuki 1994, 434. For the Sigla see p. 34 below. Translated in Lang 2003, 112. While Lamotte translates lho phyogs kyi rgyud with "Dakṣiṇa", i.e. Dekkan (Lamotte 1970, 137), Malalasekera says that Āryadeva "came to south India" with the Sanskrit equivalent tato dakṣiṇadikparamparāyāgatyā (Malalasekera 1966, 109), but does not mention his sources. On the different interpretations of the term Siṃhaladvīpa (si nga la'i gling), see Malalasekera 1966, 109.


3. Ibid. To the available Chinese material we may also add what is known as The Record of the 23 patriarchs (Fu-fâ-tsâng-yin-yuen-kiï), in which Āryadeva is listed as the 14th patriarch under the Name Kânađeva, as well as later and thus more remote sources from Tibet, including the
nationality and place of birth, as well as his dates. In the earlier biography, Āryadeva is depicted as an Indian Brahmin, while in later accounts of Hsuan Tsang and Candrakīrti, he is considered a native of Śrī Lanka. More recently, scholars tend to follow the later version, but even in this case the question remains if it is acceptable, as some do, to identify Āryadeva with the Thera Deva referred to in the Sinhalese chronicles Mahāvaṃsa (XXXVI, 29) and Dipavaṃsa (XXII, 41 and 50). Lang holds that "there is no conclusive evidence to support the identification of the thera Deva with Āryadeva," but on the basis of Nāgārjuna's and Āryadeva's probable association with the Śatāvāhana kings dates Āryadeva's literary activity to AD 225-250, which is "compatible with the theory that he left Śrī Lanka for India." We should note that these dates also conform with Walser's recent study of Nāgārjuna's life and times, in which he dates the composition of his Ratnāvali to AD 175-204.3

Concerning Āryadeva's literary production, the Tibetan and Chinese canons hand down to us a number of other works attributed to Āryadeva, but most of them are not the works of the author of the CŚ. The three works most commonly ascribed to Āryadeva nowadays are the Catuḥśataka, the Śatasāstra, and the Aksaraśataka.4

2.1.1.2 Candrakīrti

Candrakīrti's biography is not much clearer than that of his predecessor. Apart from the later Tibet religious histories, there is very little information on his life. The colophon of his Yuktisaṣṭikāvyrti tells us he was born in a land called "Samata," which Scherrer-Schaub identifies as the Kingdom of Samataṭa situated

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1. Lang 1986, 8.
4. Lang 1976, 13 and Suzuki 1994, VII. On Āryadeva the Tantrika, see Malalasekara 1966, 115f.
5. slob dpon zla ba grags pa ... yul sa ma ta nas skyes pa / See Scherrer-Schaub 1991, 97.
in a region in Eastern India between the mouths of the Ganges. Later Tibetan sources report that he stems from a family of Brahmins and was a preceptor at the monastic university of Nālandā.¹

Candrakīrti has most recently been dated AD 570-640² and traditionally holds an eminent position in the Madhyamaka tradition as a commentator defending Buddhapālita's interpretation of Nāgārjuna's thought.³ In fact, besides the Madhyamakāvatāra, and with the exception of the Pañcaskandhaprakaraṇa and the Triśaranasaptati, his works consist in commentaries to the works of Nāgārjuna and Āryadeva.⁴ His writings seem to have been relatively neglected in India for at least the first three centuries following his death, but they were eventually revived in the eleventh century and played a central role in the birth of the Prāsaṅgika movement in Tibet in the twelfth century.⁵

2.1.2 Texts

The CŚ and CŚṬ are no longer extant in their Sanskrit originals, although fragments containing less than a third of the text were found and published by Haraprasad Shastri in the early twentieth century.⁶ The Tibetan bsTan 'gyur contains Pa tshab Nyi ma grag's and Sukṣmajana's translation of the CŚ and CŚṬ. The Chinese canon contains Hsuan Tsang's translation of the last eight chapters of the CŚ as well as his translation of a commentary on the text by Dharmapāla.⁷ A

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2. Based upon being a contemporary of Dharmapāla (AD 550-650), see Kamura 1999, 211. Slightly different dates are given in Lang 2003, 7 (AD 550-650), Tillemans 1990, 1:13 (AD 600-650), Ruegg 1982, 71 (AD 600-650) and Lindtner 1979, 91 (AD 530-600).
3. On the different interpretations of Nāgārjuna's thought, see p. 25f below.
7. In the Tibetan canon, CŚ is found under bstan bcos bzhi brgya pa zhes bya ba'i tshig le'u in bstan 'gyur, mdo 'grel, dbu ma, tsha, C 1a-18a, D 1b-18a.7, N 1a-18a.7, P 1-20b.1 and CŚṬ under byang chub sems dpa'i rnal byor spyod pa bzhi brgya pa'i rgya cher 'grel pa in bstan 'gyur, mdo 'grel, dbu ma, ya, C 29a.6-239a.7, D 30b.6-279a.1, N 34b.2-264a.4, P 33b.4-273b.6. In the Chinese canon, CŚ is found under Kuang pai lun pen in Taishō Vol. 30, No. 1574, p. 182-187
A closer and comprehensive look at all of these texts shows that there are not only two significantly different versions of the CŚ - namely as proper verse text and as the verses that are contained in the commentary - but also that the extant Tibetan and Chinese commentaries differ significantly from the text discovered by Shastri.¹

Modern and reliable editions of the text of CŚ and CŚṬ are nowadays available. Karen Lang has produced a critical edition and translation of the CŚ on the basis of the earlier work by Shastri, Vaidya and Bhattacharya, consulting also the Tibetan and Chinese translations.² The critical edition of CŚṬ by Kōshin Suzuki is based on the Sanskrit manuscript discovered by Shastri and consists of an edition of the Sanskrit text fragments and the corresponding Tibetan translation.³ Translations of single chapters of the CŚṬ are available in French, Japanese and English.⁴

2.2 Literature Context

2.2.1 Overview of Catuḥśatakā

Āryadeva's work is known simply as "The Four Hundred [Verse] Treatise" (Catuḥśatakāśāstra). Candrakīrti's commentary carries a name that illuminates their subject matter, which is the disciplined conduct of a Bodhisattva (Bodhisattvayogācāra).⁵ This disciplined conduct is said to contribute to the accumulation of merit (punyasambhāra) and the accumulation of exalted wisdom (jñānasambhāra), which are the prerequisites for the Bodhisattva's achievement of Dharmapāla's commentary under Ta ch'eng kuang pai lun shih lun in Taishō Vol. 30, No. 1571, p. 187-250. See Lang 1986, 22 and Suzuki 1994, 399ff.

2. Lang 1986. See also Shastri 1914, Vaidya 1923 and Bhattacharya 1931.
Buddhahood. The arrangement of the chapters in the CŚ follows this structure with the first eight chapters dealing with methods (upāya) and the second eight chapters dealing with knowledge (prajñā).¹ Candrakīrti describes this twofold structure of CŚ in his introduction, where he says: "After first analyzing how ordinary things really exist, gradually ultimate reality will be shown."² He then continues with a short summary of CŚ, which focuses on the content of the first eight chapters:

The first four chapters explain how ordinary things really exist. The five aggregates, form and so on, arise in dependence upon causes and conditions. Since they have an origin, they are impermanent. Whatever is impermanent is certainly suffering, because it has a nature that is injured by impermanence. Whatever is suffering is always impure, because it produces disgust. Whatever is impure is not a self, because it is wrong to generate 'I' and 'mine' toward a thing that must be rejected, and wrong to embrace egotism and selfishness. Since an ordinary thing in such a way appears different from what it is, it is only after understanding that it must certainly be given up that Buddhahood will be attained. The fifth [chapter] explains the Bodhisattva's actions, because proper explanations about the Bodhisattva's actions lead to attaining Buddhahood. The sixth [chapter] investigates the afflictions, because domination by afflictions impedes a Bodhisattva's actions. The seventh [chapter] examines sense objects because they are the reason that the afflictions arise, persist and increase. Sense objects also are the reason that the afflictions arise in human beings whose perspective is fundamentally wrong about sense objects and who misunderstand the nature of things. Since the mindstream of a student who wants to receive these instructions on the nature of things must be prepared, the eighth [chapter] is the preparation. The eight subsequent

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¹. Alternatively, the CŚ may be understood as dealing with "virtuous practice" (dharma) in the first half, and with "philosophical disputes" (vivāda) in the second. In terms of this structured presentation of the Bodhisattva path, Āryadeva's work may be seen as a predecessor to later literature on the Mahāyana path, like Śāntideva's Bodhisattvacāryāvatara. See Lang 2003, 17.

². gang las 'jig rten pa'i dngos {CDP ad. po} ji ltar gnas pa bzhin // rnam par phye nas rim gys don dam ston gyur pa // See Suzuki 1994, 433. Translated in Lang 2003, 111.
chapters explain that things do not have a nature of their own. This is the summary of the Four Hundred [Verse] Treatise.¹

The subject matter of the remaining chapters that Candrakīrti does not mention in the above comment is the refutation of permanent things (chapter 9), the self (chapter 10), time (chapter 11), speculative views (chapter 12), sense faculties and their objects (chapter 13), extreme views (chapter 14) and conditioned things (chapter 15). Chapter 16 deals with logical and epistemological problems related to the doctrine of emptiness.²

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1. de la rab tu byed pa dang po bzhis ni 'jig rten pa'i dngos po ji ltar gnas pa yongs su gsal bar bya ste / 'di ltar gcags la sogs pa phung po lnga po dag ni rgyu dang rkyen la rag las te skye ba yin la / {CD om.} de dag kyang skye ba dang ldan pa nyid kyi phyir na mi rtag pa'o / gang dag mi rtag pa de dag ni gdon mi za bar mi rtag pa nyid kyi sngon pa'i bdag nyid can yin pa'i phyir sngag bsgal ba'o / gang dag sngag bsgal ba de dag ni rtag tu skyo ba skyped par byed pa nyid kyi phyir mi gtsang ba'o // gang dag mi gtsang ba de dag ni dor bar bya ba nyid kyi bdag tu 'dzin pa dang bdag gir 'dzin pas yongs su gzung {NP bzhung} bar mi 'os pa nyid kyi nga dang nga'i hyung bar mi 'os pa nyid kyi phyir na bdag med pa'o // de'i phyir 'jig rten pa'i dngos po de lta bu 'di phyin ci log las rnam pa gzhang du snang bas gdon mi za bar 'di spang bar bya ba nyid du mngon par gsal bar byas nas svaangs rgyas nyid blang bar bya ba nyid yin no // de ni hyung chub sms dpa'i spyod pa yang dag par bstan pas 'thob pa'i phyir lnga pas ni hyang chub sms dpa'i spyod pa bstan to // nyom mongs pas zil gyis mnan pa ni hyang chub sms dpa'i spyod pa'i bar du gcod par byed pa yin pas na drug pas nyom mongs pa dpayd do // bdun pas ni yul rnamz nyom mongs pa rnamz skye ba dang gnas pa dang 'phel ba'i rgyu yin pas yul dpayd do // yul de dag kyang sms canchos kyi rang bzhin ma rtogs zhing yul rnamz la tshul bzhin ma yin pa'i yid la byed pa dang ldan pa rnamz la nyom mongs pa skye ba'i rgyu yin pas bstan bcos 'di las don dam pa bstan pa de la chos kyi rang bzhin par bshad pa nyan par 'dod pa'i slob ma'i sms kyi rgyud las su rung bar bya ba'i phyir / brgyad pa yongs su sbyong ba'i rab tu byed pa'o // de'i og tu rab tu byed pa brgyad kyi rnamz kyi rang bzhin med pa nyid bstan to // zhes ba ba ni bstan bcos bzhin brgya pa'i bs dus pa'i don to // Translation adapted from Lang 2003, 111f. Tibetan text in Suzuki 1994, 433ff.

2.2.2 Overview of Catuḥśatakāṭikā

Candrakīrti states that his intention is to explain in a single commentary the meaning of the verse in Āryadeva's CŚ. In his introduction, he criticizes the commentary of his contemporary Dharmapāla for dividing the CŚ into two parts and commenting only on the later. Candrakīrti wishes to reunify the work, restore its original arrangement, and comment on it as a whole, thereby benefiting both himself and others.²

Concerning the purpose and style of Candrakīrti's commentary, Lang mentions that "Āryadeva's Catuḥśataka requires a commentary to explain its concise and sometimes cryptic verses"³ and that his commentary is structured "around a teacher's traditional oral explanations of texts and the practice of oral debates."⁴ Suzuki identifies a general pattern to this structure, which includes steps such as presenting a problem, answering the problem, giving reasoning, explanation, examples and conclusion, as well as a conclusion in verse.⁵

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1. On Dharmapāla, see n.2 below.

2. 'dir slob dpon 'phag pa lhas nye bar shyar ba bang chub sems dpa'i rnal 'byor spyod pa bzhi brgya pa'i bstan bcos kyi rab tu byed pa beu drug gi tshig le 'ur byas pa'i don 'grel pa geig gis rnam par dbye bar 'dod ... bstan bcos bzhi brgya pa de ni da lta'i snyan dngags mkhan btsun pa chos skuong gis ji ltar bkod pa phyé nas rnam pa gnyis su byas te / ... da ni bstan bcos bzhi brgya pa de geig tu byas nas bdag gis rnam par dbye bar bya'o // de ltar byas dang bkod pa snga ma yang yongs su bskyangs par 'gyur la / des phan gtags par bya ba rnam la phan btag par yang 'gyur te / bstan bcos kyi don brjod par 'dod pa mtha' dag blangs pas rang dang gzhan gyi don yang dag par 'grub pa'i phyir ro // Tibetan text in Suzuki 1994, 433f. Translation in Lang 2003, 111f. Lang holds that "[w]hen Candrakīrti describes Dharmapāla as a poet, he may be using the term in a derogatory manner" (ibid., 18). This may well be the case considering that "[h]e [i.e. Dharmapāla] explained the essential point from the view of Vijñaptimātra, refuting that thoroughly imagined phenomena (kun brtags = parikalpita) were established by their own natures." See Tillemans 1991, 1:1, n.2. For details on Dharmapāla's life and works see ibid., 8ff. and Ruegg 1981, 51.

3. Lang, 2003, 16f.

4. Ibid.

5. See Suzuki 1994, VIII. While mundane problems are presented in part one, philosophical ones are presented in part two. These problems are followed by a brief answer, which gives Candrakīrti's view on the subject, as well as by reasoning, which includes the citation of CŚ. The following explanation details the reasoning, and often is in the form of prasaṅga arguments, followed again by examples or similes in part one. After the conclusion, a concluding
In addition to the work's sophisticated arguments and complex structure, it includes many brief references to contemporary classical Indian literature. In the first part, Candrakīrti mentions many stories from popular literature, like the Jātakas, the Pūrāṇas, the Rāmāyāṇa and Mahābhārata, or refers to secular love poetry and legal and political treatises. He also makes extensive use of stylistic devices like metaphors, similes and imagery.¹ In part two, Candrakīrti attacks opponents' views that are connected to the religious and philosophical literature of Buddhism, Brahmanism and Jainism, and includes explicit criticism of Dharmapāla, Vasubandhu and Bhāvaviveka.

From the structure and contents of the commentary we can infer that Candrakīrti's work is addressed to a broad and differentiated but generally well educated audience. His work must have appealed to monastics and scholastics of different traditions as well as to male laity and royalty.²

2.3 Historical and Philosophical Context

Having considered the authors and literary context of their work, it is necessary next to present also some of the historical and philosophical context. The following sections provide a short overview of some of the central philosophical concepts that belong to the Sarvāstivāda and how these relate to its views of the conditioned and its characteristics. This overview will not only facilitate a proper understanding of the translation, but also is important because the Madhyamaka's position may in part be understood as a reply to these ideas. It will briefly address the major influences in the formation of the Madhyamaka that come from the Mahāyāna movement and draw a picture of the social surroundings

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² Lang 2003, 17ff. Chapter four, for example, is openly addressed to an unnamed Indian king.
of the times before turning to the philosophical teachings of Nāgārjuna and Candrakīrti.

2.3.1 Sarvāstivāda

2.3.1.1 Origins

Following the primary split of the Buddhist Saṅgha into Mahāsāṅghika and Sthavira groups around the time of Aśoka, the Sarvāstivāda emerged as a distinct group from the latter in the first or second century AD during the second proliferation of monastic sects (nikāya) and doctrinal schools (vāda). The Sarvāstivāda school eventually established itself in northern India and Central Asia as one of the largest and most successful Buddhist schools of the Kuśana Empire in the first to third centuries AD.¹

The Sarvāstivāda's philosophical positions are recorded in their extensive Abhidharma literature and have to be understood against the historical backdrop of a number of doctrinal developments in early Indian Buddhism, such as the Dharma theory,² the doctrine of momentariness³ and the new systematization of

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¹ See Cox 1995, 23f. Later Abhidharma treatises mention various groups that comprise the Sarvāstivāda "such as the Westerners, the Outsiders, the Sarvāstivādins of Kaśmīra or of Gandhāra."

² The Dharma theory developed from the early attempts to preserve, arrange and systematize the Buddha's teaching. On a recent and concise overview of its origin and development, see Bronkhorst (2009), who traces the semantic development of the term "Dharma" as a property of mind in the initial arrangement of the doctrine into lists and numerical sequences to "Dharma" as a property of existence in the later principles of classification that go beyond merely arranging properties of mind. According to him, it then came to be understood that not only the human mind, but everything that exists in the world is composed of these Dharmas. See Bronkhorst 2009, 61-114.

³ The doctrine of momentariness (kṣaṇikatva) holds that these Dharmas last only for a single moment (kṣaṇa). It was not part of the original dharma theory, but it became an inseparable part of it and added the nonexistence also of temporally composite objects (Ibid, 83f). Bronkhorst remarks that "the doctrine of momentariness is explicitly attested at a relatively late date. We assume nevertheless that this doctrine is as old as the Pañcavastuka ... and that it finds expression in the characteristics of the conditioned (samskṛtalaksana)." Ibid, 83 n. 160. See also Rospatt 1995.
Dharmas known as the Pañcavastuka. The following analysis will focus on the role of the characteristics of the conditioned in Sarvāstivāda ontology.

2.3.1.2 Ontological Position

As the school's name indicates, the Sarvāstivāda holds that "everything exists" (sarvam asti). Generally, this is taken to mean that all factors (dharma) recognized in the Abhidharma taxonomy exist in the three times. This position itself is the result of earlier doctrinal debates. It suffices here to note that the existence even of past and future factors was supported by scriptural authority and also had advantages for coherent explanations of sensual perception and causality.

The Sarvāstivāda ontology differentiates an atemporal from a temporal existence of factors. Atemporal existence is the referent of the term "everything," and this may be existence as a real entity (dravyasat = paramārthasat, absolute existence) or existence as a provisional entity (prajñaptisat = svamvrtisat, conventional existence). Each factor is furthermore distinguished by an intrinsic nature (svabhāva = svalakṣhana), which determines its atemporal, existential status as a real entity (dravya) and defines it regardless of its temporal status. The

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1. The Pañcavastuka replaced the earlier scheme of categories known as the Pañcaskandhaka, which included the five aggregates (skandha), the twelve realms of the senses (āyatana) and the eighteen elements (dhātu). It introduced a new division into five categories (pañcavastu), including form (rūpa), mind (citta), mental dharmas (caitta/caitasika), conditioned factors separated from the mind (cittaviprayukta samskāra), and unconditioned dharmas (asamskṛta). The first four are considered conditioned (samskṛta), while the last category is unconditioned (asamskṛta). Among the conditioned factors separated from the mind, we find the characteristics of the conditioned (samskratalakṣaṇa), birth or arising (jāti), old age or decay (jāra), existence or abiding (shiti) and impermanence (anityatā). See Bronkhorst 2009, 86ff. On the characteristics of the conditioned, see, p. 18 below.

2. In older Abhidharma texts we find several other definitions of "everything," but all of them follow the same principle of an all-inclusive taxonomy, referring to the eighteen elements, the five aggregates together with unconditioned factors, the four noble truths, space or name and form. See Cox 1995, 151, n. 4. On other ontological models of the time, like the Samāropavādin, Vibhajyavādin, Kṣaṇikavādin, Prajñaptivādin or Nāstivādin, see ibid, 135f.

3. Ibid, 136f.

4. On the critique of svabhāva by the Madhyamaka, see p.22 below.

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temporal existence of factors is the manner in which everything exists. This distinguishes the factors in the three times and entails a certain form of transformation (anyathātva) they undergo in this process.¹ This transformation is determined by the presence or absence of the factor's manifest activity (kāritra = phalākṣepaśakti, the power of a factor to project its own effect) or capability (samārthya = phalajanana, its power to produce an effect).² Consequently, according to Cox, "a factor can thus be said to exist as a real entity at all times, because its intrinsic nature continues with no alteration. Conditioned factors can, however, be said to have transformation ... precisely because their activities arise and pass away."³

2.3.1.3 The Characteristics of the Conditioned

We have seen above that the characteristics of the conditioned (samskṛtalakṣaṇa) play a central role in the arising and passing away of conditioned factors. There is some irregularity regarding the number and proper names of these characteristics. Sometimes they come in lists of four, including birth (jāti), continuance (sthiti), senescence (jarā) and desinence (anityatā); at other times in lists of three, usually lacking continuance. They also may be referred to as arising (upāda), abiding (sthiti) and ceasing (bhaṅga).

Their general function in Sarvāstivāda ontology is to distinguish conditioned from unconditioned factors, and they apply specifically to all conditioned factors because they are said to arise together with them. Collectively they serve as causes enabling a particular conditioned factor (samskrta-dharma) to exert its own activity or to project its own effect but individually each characteristic also performs a distinctive function.⁴ Thus, the activity of a certain

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¹. The exact nature of this transformation was disputed within the Sarvāstivāda itself, but Vasumitra's view, which describes it as a difference in state (avasthā), was generally preferred. See Cox 1995, 139f.
². See Cox 1995, 137ff.
³. Ibid, 140.
⁴. Arising acts as the productive cause of a particular conditioned factor with which it is simultaneous and which enables it to enter the present time period. Abiding enables a conditioned factor that has been produced to exert its own activity. Senescence causes a conditioned factor to deteriorate and ceasing is the predominant condition for its passing away. See Cox 1995, 147f.
factor does not only depend upon a complete assemblage of causes and conditions, but it also needs to be susceptible to their influence, which is determined by these characteristics. In this sense, they are crucial in providing a clear distinction between conditioned and unconditioned factors.\textsuperscript{1} "Thus, the conditioned characteristics are considered the predominant conditions among a complete assemblage of causes and conditions that enable conditioned factors to manifest their nature as impermanent, or as conditioned, through the arising and passing away of their activities."\textsuperscript{2}

2.3.2 Madhyamaka

2.3.2.1 Origins

In this section, we will look at how the above ideas and the underlying concept of \textit{svabhāva} come under attack by the Madhyamaka. Nāgārjuna, Āryadeva and Candrakīrti all stand in a tradition that is conveniently referred to as the Madhyamaka school of Buddhist philosophy. The exact nature and philosophical project of this school is a contested issue among traditional Buddhist scholars as well as among contemporary academic scholars. The following section gives a brief account of the social circumstances of the school's origins and explains some of the central philosophical issues that are related to the discussion of the conditioned and its characteristics. It closes with a short excursus on some of the current debates in Madhyamaka scholarship.

The origins of the Madhyamaka lie in the late first or early second century AD and are contemporaneous with the beginnings of the Mahāyāna movement,\textsuperscript{3}

\begin{footnotes}
1. Ibid.
2. Ibid.
3. For a nuanced understanding of the Mahāyāna, see Williams 2009. He proposes that "Mahāyāna is not, and never was, an overall single unitary phenomenon" (Williams 2009, 3). It should therefore not be considered as a sect or school, but is perhaps best understood as a spiritual movement, which contains a large number of different doctrinal and philosophical schools, developed in a gradual way at different times and places according to an innovative and normative view of Buddhism and which went together with the development of a new canonical literary corpus known as the Mahāyānasūtras.
\end{footnotes}
early Prajñāparamitā literature\(^1\) and with Nāgārjuna's and Āryadeva's writings. These complex developments and their historical, social and institutional contexts are often overlooked or oversimplified: for example, when Nāgārjuna is retrospectively is given credit for being the "founder of the Madhyamaka school."\(^2\)

In his recent study on the social context of Nāgārjuna, Walser makes the point that Nāgārjuna's writings have to be understood in terms of securing the needs of the beginning Mahāyāna movement and that "Mahāyāna Buddhist texts should be seen not just as an aggregation of philosophical ideas but as ideas whose survival requires processes of production."\(^3\) These processes of production were in the hands of the society of monks belonging to the mainstream Buddhist sects of the time, who were in power positions to give authority to certain doctrines, texts and rules of behaviour and who had control of resources like labor and material. This then must have been Nāgārjuna's target audience, rather than his Mahāyāna supporters or philosophical opponents. Nāgārjuna's position amongst the society of monks would have been strengthened by refuting his opponents, whereas he would have achieved his primary goal by not arguing against the position of his fellow mainstream monks. With this strategy it was eventually possible for Nāgārjuna to incorporate Mahāyāna texts into the monastic

\(^1\) Williams notes that "[t]he earliest Mahāyāna sūtras are probably Prajñāparamitā sūtras" (2009, 47). Prajñāparamitā is often translated as "the perfection of wisdom". This praṇā generally is considered a mental event resulting from analysis. In the Abhidharma, this wisdom refers specifically to the discernment of Dharmas, which are considered the single and ultimate building blocks of reality. Since the Mahāyāna rejects this idea and instead proposes the emptiness of Dharmas (dharmaśūnyatā), wisdom here is understood as a mental event which understands emptiness (śūnyatā), the absence of intrinsic nature in Dharmas. Furthermore, this wisdom may also refer to a meditative nonconceptual absorption on ultimate truth, as well as, by extension, to the object of such an ultimate, nondual awareness, i.e. emptiness itself. It is this wisdom which is the principal concern of the Perfection of Wisdom texts. Ibid, 50f.

\(^2\) Huntington makes the point that it was Bhāvaviveka who coined the term "Madhyamaka" and developed a school of thought by formulating its basic positions and defending them against other Buddhist and non-Buddhist schools. See Huntington 2003, 74.

\(^3\) Walser 2005, 12.
industry of text reproduction and preservation, thereby ensuring the transmission and preservation of Mahāyāna sutras.¹

Concerning the influence of the Prajñāparamitā Sūtras on Nāgārjuna's thought, it must suffice here to say that these are commonly held as not engaging in much philosophical argument but making simple assertions from the perspective of perfect wisdom, which negates any form of independent ultimate existence. This does not suggest that thereby some true ultimate reality is uncovered. Rather it is suggested that there is no such thing as true ultimate reality.² Nāgārjuna is often credited with giving arguments to strengthen these assertions in his writings,³ and since Āryadeva is generally considered to be faithful to the thought his teacher, little needs to be said about him here.⁴

2.3.2.2 Ontological Position

Turning now to the place of Nāgārjuna and Āryadeva in Mahāyāna Buddhism as doctrinal system, the following section will address the central philosophical issues that are relevant to the discussion of the conditioned and its characteristics. It will thereby also step into a discussion of the content and

1. Ibid, 1-14. Walser summarizes his main points as follows: "In Nāgārjuna's work is visible the negotiation of Mahāyāna identity through its engagement with well-established and financially endowed Buddhist sects. The syncretic strategies of Mahāyāna that Nāgārjuna employs consist of a range of devices aimed at maximizing Mahāyāna's authority while minimizing its apparent difference from the norms of its host monastery. What Mahāyāna teaches is in many ways new, but it is packaged as merely a rearticulation or elaboration of an old and already authoritative tradition. The result is that Mahāyāna texts are neither entirely canonical nor entirely innovative."

2. See Williams 2009, 47ff. Williams also makes the point that while the Prajñāparamitā is clearly opposed to the concept of real existing factors this should not be understood as an outright opposition to the non-Mahāyāna traditions as such since there were at that time traditions not specifically Mahāyāna that taught that factors lacked a self (dharmanairātmya). Rather, perhaps the writers of the Prajñāparamitā may have seen the teachings of the mere absence of self in persons (pudgalanairātmya) alone, with real existing factors, as a dangerous innovation leading to a certain form of ontological grasping. Ibid, 53. On Nāgārjuna and the Prajñāparamitā, see also Frauwallner 2010, 93.


4. See Frauwallner 2010, 141. Lindtner (1982, 279) agrees, but adds that Āryadeva did have a distinct style of his own.
purport of their philosophy that is highly complex and much debated. The following summary has certain limitations, therefore the knowledgeable reader will have to pardon the oversimplification necessary to address these issues briefly.¹

Nāgārjuna understood the teaching of the Buddha as a middle way (madhyama pratipad), which avoids the extremes of nihilism (ucchedavāda) and eternalism (śāśvatavāda). One reading of his thought² is to see his critique addressed to everybody attached to an essentialist view of things. This can be considered the commonsense view that reality is comprised of entities such as people, mountains, houses, and so on, or a philosophical position like that of the Sārvāstivada, in which reality is comprised of fundamental building blocks like the Dharmas. Both of these views rely on the idea of self-existent entities which possess an intrinsic nature or own-being (svabhāva), a view that Nāgārjuna shows to go against the central teaching of the Buddha on dependent arising (pratītyasamutpāda).³

The term svabhāva literally means own-being, self-existence, or intrinsic existence.⁴ Whatever is characterized by intrinsic existence is "unaffected by causes, unproduced, and in all senses independent. A svabhava [sic!], or the intrinsic existence of things is, then, an essential or inherent nature that they possess which is efficiently self-contained."⁵ Because they are independent of causes and conditions, intrinsically existent things are necessarily permanent.⁶ This intrinsic existence, which is negated by the Madhyamaka, has never had an existence to start with and thus existence is not negated per se, but only in the

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¹. On the different readings and interpretations of Nāgārjuna's thought, see p. 24 below.
². The so called "svabhava-critique". See p. 26f. below.
⁴. See Fenner 1990 42f. It is also used synonymous with bhāva or vastu (tib. ngo bo), meaning entity or existence, and is functionally equivalent to the terms ātma (tib. btag nyid), self and bhāva (tib. dngos po), functional thing. The Madhyamaka understanding of the term svabhāva is defined in MMK 15.1-2. For a recent discussion of the Madhyamaka concept of svabhāva, see Westerhoff 2007.
⁵. Fenner 1990, 43. Intrinsic existence is the essence, substratum or substance of things and since these are also considered self-marked (svalakṣaṇa), they are necessarily self-defined, not relying on anything outside of themselves.
⁶. Ibid.
form of independent, self-sufficient things.\(^1\) What is not negated is dependent arising, which Nāgārjuna equates with emptiness (śunyatā) and the middle way.\(^2\)

If we recall the view of the Sarvāstivāda, we see that in this school the individual links of dependent origination are ultimately real conditioned factors. Nāgārjuna, on the other hand, holds that there are no factors that are ultimately real and that thus dependent origination likewise is empty. In MMK VII, which concerns the category of the conditioned and in this sense is the parallel chapter to CŚ XV, he goes on to argue that apart from the conditioned there is no unconditioned.\(^3\) Therefore, with the nonexistence of the conditioned and unconditioned the whole Sarvāstivāda ontology breaks down. No explicit response of the Sarvāstivāda to these charges has survived.\(^4\)

After dealing with Nāgārjuna's thought, we have to also shortly take note of the later Madhyamaka doctrinal developments and the special position the commentator Candrakīrti occupies in Indian and Tibetan Buddhist thought. Writing about five centuries after Nāgārjuna, he finds himself in a historical context that is very different from that of his predecessors. Important developments that had taken place in India of that time include the formation of the Yogācāra as philosophical counterpart to Madhyamaka; the advent of the Buddhist epistemological tradition (pramāṇavāda) through the writings of Dignāga and Dharmakīrti; and the emergence of different ways of arguing for the

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1. Ibid, 44.
2. MMK XXIV.18: "Dependent origination we call emptiness. This is metaphorical designation and is, indeed, the middle path." Translated in Harris 1991, 58. *yah pratītyasamutpādaḥ śūnyatām tām pracaksmahe | sā prajñaptir upādiyā pratipat saiva madhyamā||
3. On MMK VII, see Bronkhorst 2009, 130ff.
4. See Bronkhorst 2009, 142, who questions if such a response has ever existed and notes that modern day research has never dealt with this question. He also notes, and I find this important, that Nāgārjūna's arguments have a wider scope and are not aimed exclusively at the Sarvāstivāda, but that he simply occasionally takes their doctrinal position as his starting point. Ibid, 138. Furthermore, in Bronkhorst's opinion, the Sarvāstivāda was somehow immune to Nāgārjuna's attacks because of holding that a future object already exists before it is produced, which answers many of his arguments concerned with causality. Ibid., 151.
middle way by Buddhapālita and Bhāvaviveka. While both Buddhapālita and Bhāvaviveka accept that in ultimate reality all views must be rejected, they differ in the means with which such a nonaffirmative negation (prasyapratīṣedā) is to be effected. Bhāvaviveka held it appropriate to resort to the epistemological tradition and use "independently valid (svatantra) inferential judgements embodied in the tripartite syllogism of Indian philosophers, which consists of a proposition (pratijñā), a supportive reason (hetu), and a suitable example (dṛṣṭānta)," while the Prāsaṅgika arguments developed by Buddhapālita and Candrakīrti are more like "a species of reductio ad absurdum whereby one moves step by step to become aware of the unforeseen consequences (prasaṅgas), or better yet, the inherent contradictions invariably present within any attempt at a priori justification of the presuppositions that give meaning and structure to every dimension of conventional affairs." In the Tibetan interpretation of Madhyamaka, these differences later gave rise to the view that these two are separate subschools: the Prāsaṅgika or thal 'gyur ba and the Svātantrika or rang rgyud pa. While such a view may have been helpful for the anachronistic presentation of Indian philosophical schools by the Tibetan doxographers, it does not correspond to Indian historic reality.

1. See Casey 1964. These developments must have had an influence if not on Candrakīrti's understanding of Nāgārjuna, then at least on the style of his commentaries. On the question of a possible gap between the thought of Nāgārjuna and Candrakīrti, see p. 30 below.

2. Fenner 1989, 34

3. Ibid, 34f. Vose argues however, that "the precise rationale for the compatibility of prasaṅga reasoning with the ontology of emptiness has frequently been debated." See Vose 2009, 3. It is an open question whether these methodological differences also have ontological implications for the interpretation of the ultimate. On this issue, see p. 29f. below.

4. Speaking of Candrakīrti's foundational role in the Prāsaṅgika school, Vose (2009, 10) argues that this must be qualified in at least one of two ways: "Either we can say that Candrakīrti's major texts exhibit the doctrinal features that would form the touchstone for the doxographical category 'Prāsaṅgika', or we can say that Candrakīrti functions as the marker around whom a Prāsaṅgika school was – centuries after his death - created, refined and debated." On the Svātantrika-Prāsaṅgika distinction, see also the collection of essays in Dreyfus 2003.
2.3.2.3 Excursus: Madhyamaka Scholarship

As we have seen, classical commentators had different readings of Nāgārjuna's thought and different ways of arguing about his central claims. The same holds true for modern Madhyamaka scholarship. To this day it there is no consensus about the interpretation of his thought. The next section, therefore will briefly look at the history of Madhyamaka scholarship in the West and then discuss a few of the central and widely debated issues in recent scholarship. These not only concern the role and place of rationality in Nāgārjuna's thought and the question whether or not something like a thesis or philosophical position (*pratijñā*) may at all be ascribed to the Madhyamaka, but also the question of a complete continuity between the thought of Nāgārjuna and Candrakīrti.¹

Talking about the history of Madhyamaka scholarship in the West, Huntington depicts its progression through three phases, each more sophisticated and sensitive than its predecessor.² The first phase is characterized by a nihilistic reading of the Madhyamaka, in which its central concepts are seen as serving a "total rejection of substance ontology" and as an attack on "the concept of an ultimately real ground of phenomena," even though this interpretation is emphatically rejected by its classical authors.³ The second phase of western Madhyamaka scholarship is characterized by an absolutist interpretation, in which the negative language of the Madhyamaka is understood to uncover something like "a subjacent ground."⁴ This understanding is based on the assumption that without a transcendent ground no view could be considered false: "a view is false because it falsifies the real, makes the thing appear other than what it really is in itself."⁵ The possibility of such an absolutist interpretation is acknowledged also by the classical authors, but given their specific historical context they probably

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¹ See Shulman 2010, 380 n. 3 for comprehensive references to these scholarly debates, some of which are also reproduced below.
² Huntington 1989, 25.
³ Ibid, 26. According to Huntington, Orientalists such as A. B. Keith and Hendrick Kern fall into this camp. Huntington notes also that "the problem of relativism in connection with the linguistic interpretation is in a sense little more than a new incarnation of the same doubts and fears that plagued many nineteenth-century scholars." Ibid. On the so-called "linguistic interpretation," see below.
⁴ Ibid. 27. Stcherbatsky and Murti 1955 fall into this camp.
⁵ Murti 1955, quoted in Huntington, 1989, 27.
did not perceive it as likely that such a view would be attributed to the Madhyamaka.¹ These first two phases, according to Huntington, fail to come to terms with the classical authors' explicit statements that the Madhyamaka is a middle way between nihilism and eternalism.²

The third phase has been described as a linguistic interpretation of Madhyamaka philosophy.³ According to this interpretation, the Mādhyamika analysis is best understood as a critique of the correspondence theory of truth and the referential theory of meaning. These theories were inherited from Sanskrit grammarians and developed by Abhidharma Buddhist scholastics. They hold that a sentence that is true always corresponds to a fact and that there is a corresponding object to every simple expression that has meaning. According to Huntington, this means that the Madhyamaka criticizes "inconsistencies inherent in any kind of metaphysical language" if this language "purports to derive its meaning from a source outside of the sociolinguistic community in which it occurs."⁴ Accordingly, the Madhyamaka shows that the "truth value of a collocation of words or concepts derives from its being used in a manner that may be seen as somehow consistent with the conceptual matrix of the sociolinguistic community in which it occurs" and that "the meaning of a word or concept derives from its application in some particular sociolinguistic community." This interpretation allows for an appreciation of the central Madhyamaka insight that "metaphysical language is incapable of justifying its claim to capture truth in a complex of ontological and epistemological propositions, for the objects to which it refers are entirely without practical consequences and are thus devoid of all reality."⁵

Another scholar, David Burton, proposes that there are three different readings of Nāgārjuna's philosophy that view Nāgārjuna either as a sceptic, as a

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1. Against this absolutist interpretation, Huntington holds MMK XVIII.8: "Everything is true [or not true], also true and not true, neither true nor not true. That is the teaching of the Buddha." sarvaṃ tathyaṃ na vā tathyaṃ tathyaṃ cātathyam eva ca | naivātathyam naiva tathyam etad buddhānuśāsanaṃ || See Huntington, 1989, 28.
2. Ibid., 29.
3. According to Huntington, the scholars Robinson, Streng, Daye, Thurman, Gudmunsen, Gimello fall into this camp. Ibid., 30.
4. Ibid., 31f.
5. Ibid. In my understanding, this comes quite close Burton's "mystic reading". See below.
mystic, or as attacking the notion of svabhāva developed in other Buddhist schools. The sceptic reading sees his philosophy "as primarily an attack on knowledge" and thus will not allow for any view (drṣṭī) or any philosophical position (pratijñā). The mystic reading understands his philosophy "as primarily an attack on all conceptual and expressible knowledge-claims about how things actually are" and advocates a "trans-rational', 'non-linguistic' gnosis. The last reading consists in a critique of the notion of svabhāva and understands Nāgārjuna as refuting a particular ontological assumption. It maintains the possibility of knowledge of the nature of things and holds that "this knowledge can be correctly formulated in the proposition that 'all entities lack svabhāva.'" Nāgārjuna has no view or philosophical position in the sense that "he does not assent to any proposition which asserts that entities have svabhāva."

So we see that western scholarship has produced a number of different interpretations of Madhyamaka thought, some of which we may discard today as misrepresentations, while others are more valid ways of understanding the classical texts and their authors. Some of these may also bear resemblance to certain positions of earlier Indian or Tibetan Madhyamaka commentators.

As a conclusion to this introduction, it is necessary to take a closer look at a few issues in Madhyamaka scholarship that are currently being discussed and that certainly also pertain to our texts here but the study of which would require a much more elaborate coverage than is possible in this context. These issues concern not only the correct understanding of the Madhyamaka's use of rational

2. Ibid.
4. Burton 1999, 4. For example Inada 1970 and Bhattacharya 1990. On the side of the Tibetan commentators, according to Burton, we would find Sa skya Paṇḍita and Go rams pa bSod nams seng ge in this camp, as well as the Karmapa VIII, Mi bs kyod rdo rje.
5. Ibid.
6. Burton 1999, 4. For example Ruegg 1977. On the side of the Tibetan commentators, according to Burton, we would find in this camp the dGe lugs pa like mKhas grub dGe legs dpal bzang. Burton himself holds this position but claims that in his understanding the lack of svabhāva for all entities entails nihilism, since in the Abhidharma context "all entities have an entirely conceptually constructed existence (prajñaptisat). And ... if there is nothing unconstructed out of which and by whom/which conceptually constructed entities can be constructed, then it is impossible that these ... themselves can exist."
argument and its relationship to view (drṣṭi) or a philosophical position (pratijñā)⁴, but also touch upon questions of continuity or discontinuity between the thought of Nāgārjuna and that of Candrakīrti.²

According to Huntington, some scholars view Nāgārjuna as having "a set of definitely stated doctrines for which he was trying to produce a systematically arranged set of rational arguments."³ This view portrays Nāgārjuna as an "analytic, rational philosopher" and may "exhibit a preoccupation with logical analysis not unlike that of Bhāvaviveka."⁴ Huntington himself, on the other hand, holds that the rejection of any sort of "definitely stated doctrine," whether in the form of a philosophical view (drṣṭi), thesis (pakṣa) or proposition (pratijñā), is a defining feature of Nāgārjuna's work and believes others to "force a logical grid over the work of a writer who is so obviously and profoundly distrustful of logic."⁵ He states that rational conviction is seen by the Madhyamaka as a form of clinging that is to be rejected and that its aim is to uproot altogether the very desire or need for such rational certainty that will result in "a metaphorical place neither on nor off the map."⁶ What we are then left with is "a world that is neither as it appears nor otherwise."⁷ Huntington concludes with the statement that

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1. These two issues are connected. On the questions of pratijñā, see for one example Oetke 2003. This issue usually develops from different understandings of a corresponding statement Nāgārjuna makes in his Vīgrahavyāvartanā: yadi kācana pratijñā syān me tata eṣa me bhaved doṣah | nāsti ca mama pratijñā tasmān naivāsti me doṣah || [VV.29] "If there were some pratijñā of mine, this fault ... would ensue from this. But there is no pratijñā of mine and consequently the [alleged] fault of mine does not exist." Translated in Oetke 2003, 449. Discussed in detail in Oetke 2003 and Huntington 2007, 109ff.

2. The following passages are based on a series of articles published in the Journal of Indian Philosophy, in which Huntington and Garfield exchange their views on these issues. See Huntington 2007 and Garfield 2008. Shulman further questions the complete continuity between Nāgārjuna and Candrakīrti. See Shulman 2009.


5. Ibid, 109. Huntington cites MMK XIII.8 in his favour: śūnyatā sarvadṛṣṭināṁ proktā niḥsaraṇam jinaḥ | ye āṁ tu śūnyatā dṛṣṭis tān asādhyān babhaśire || "The emptiness of the conquerors was taught in order to do away with all views. Therefore it is said that whoever makes a philosophical view out of 'emptiness' is indeed lost."

6. Ibid., 123.

7. Ibid., 128.
Nāgārjuna as logician succeeds for Bhāvaviveka but fails in the eyes of Robinson and Hayes.¹

Garfield replies by stating that the Nāgārjuna and Candrakīrti clearly develop arguments they endorse for conclusions they endorse.² According to him, "[i]t is clear that Candrakīrti is endorsing reason, inference, and the possibility of knowledge, despite rejecting Bhāviveka's account of formal argument and the epistemology that entails. He is no irrationalist, ... but that does not make him into a svātantrika!"³ By way of a paraconsistent logic, arguments are presented for the inconsistency of reality and Nāgārjuna demonstrates that "it is rational to regard phenomena as empty, and that one cannot adopt that view consistently and remain rational. He does not therefore argue that one should abandon rationality, but consistency."⁴

According to Garfield, this makes Nāgārjuna an "anti-foundationalist, a defender of the utility of conventional practices, not an epistemic nihilist."⁵ The Prāsaṅgika is committed to take conventional reality and conventional epistemic practices seriously, and this includes the use of logic and reasoning. The appeal of this position, in Garfield's opinion, "consists in the fact that it gives us good reasons to reject foundationalism ... Its radicalism consists in its detachment of rationality from foundationalism, not in its rejection of rationality, tout court."⁶ Concerning the question of a thesis, Garfield's final word is that Nāgārjuna affirms the philosophical position that "linguistic meaning can only be conventional. This permits Nāgārjuna to prosecute a philosophical project that indeed undermines any attempt to take it as fundamental ontology, but does not undermine itself."⁷

¹ Ibid.
² Garfield 2008, 516f., where he cites MMK XXIV.18-19 together with Candrakīrtis commentary in support of his understanding.
³ Ibid., 519, n.14. Candrakīrti's arguments are held to be conventionally valid and their conclusions to be conventional truth and according to Garfield, "that is all the truth one could ever want to articulate." Ibid, 521f.
⁴ Ibid., 523.
⁵ Ibid., 524. Garfield argues that Nāgārjuna is the first philosopher to systematically defend coherentism, a theory that defines truth as coherence within a specified set of sentences, propositions or beliefs.
⁶ Ibid.
⁷ Ibid.
conclusion, Garfield agrees with Huntington that the Madhyamaka is the rejection of all views but adds that this is to be understood as "the end of objectification, not the objectification of emptiness."

Huntington and Garfield might disagree upon the Madhyamaka's use of reasoning, but like many other scholars they do not seem to question the continuity between the thought of Nāgārjuna and Candrakīrti. This is where Shulman disagrees, who notes "an identifiable gap" between the style of argument of Nāgārjuna and Candrakīrti, comparing them to a trickster and a theologian, respectively. He argues that their arguments create different cognitive spaces: Nāgārjuna engenders "a strange, tickly sense of peculiarity," and a sense of impossibility created by the necessity to accept contradiction, while Candrakīrti aims at "introducing a strong sense of logical certainty." Shulman wonders if this purported difference in the realm of method might not correspond to a difference also in ontological or metaphysical positions. While scholarship usually conceptualizes Candrakīrti's thought to "upholding the truth of conventions in a strictly non-foundation reality," Shulman mentions that other aspects of his work suggest that upon achieving liberation "nothing is left of human knowledge and experience" and "the world of conventions is completely annihilated." This reading goes together with a special feature of Buddhahood, insofar as it is here depicted as transcending logical contradiction and having a quality of complete

1. Garfield comments also that both Bhāvaviveka and Tsong kha pa fail to appreciate the full import of this idea and that Huntington goes too far in his reading of Nāgārjuna rejecting philosophical analysis entirely, thus abandoning his own corpus. Ibid.
2. Ibid., 525.
4. Ibid., 407.
5. Ibid.
6. According to Shulman, in commenting on Nāgārjuna, Candrakīrti goes beyond his predecessor in applying a clearly structured logic to his texts. Although he does not employ svātantrānumāna, nevertheless he makes his texts conform to his specific logical vision. Ibid., 409.
7. Shulman mentions the works of Arnold, Huntington, Siderits and Tillemans. Ibid.
8. Ibid, 410. This understanding of Candrakīrti's Buddhology is advanced also by Dunne 1996 and MacDonald 2009.
logical coherence, while the world of ignorance is characterized by a state of logical contradiction.¹

The purpose of this introduction has been to position Candrakīrti's text and the content of CŚṬ XV in different philological, literary, historical and philosophical traditions and to provide an overview of the various readings of the Madhyamaka proposed by different individuals. This will provide the reader with a satisfactory basis for the understanding of the following translation and summary, which is preceded by a critical edition of the Tibetan translation.

¹ Shulman 2009, 413f.
3 Critical Edition

3.1 Preface

The following critical edition consists of the commentary to the first seventeen verses of chapter fifteen. It contains readings of six different textual witnesses of the CŚṬ, which are taken from the Tibetan bsTan 'gyur, and reproduced here in Extended Wylie transliteration. Since the entire verse text of CŚ is also transmitted in the bsTan 'gyur apart from Candrakīrti's commentary, the critical apparatus also gives the variant readings to this version, which are marked with ₁. These have been taken directly from the work of Lang (1986) without reference to the original Tibetan texts.

In order to minimize the critical apparatus, a number of variants were not generally noted. These include variants of ba for pa and bo for po, and vice versa. Variants consisting in syllabic contractions (like rgyuso) were not noted for the Ganden bsTan 'gyur and the manuscript because this is a standard feature of these editions. For the other editions, the contractions were noted as variants in the critical apparatus. Readings peculiar to the manuscript were not recorded in the critical apparatus. These include scogs for sogs in la sogs pa as well as gcig char for cig car. Apart from these, the manuscript also has occasional syllabic contractions, adds shad more often than any other edition, and exhibits a frequent use of ste as continuative particle (lhag bcas kyi phrad), instead of de.

Concerning the placement of shad (/), the usage of the Derge edition has generally been retained. Single editions would add or omit shad here or there, and these variants were recorded when a shad was added where there was originally none, or if a shad was omitted. However, variants of double shad (//) for single ones, and vice versa, were not recorded. Double shad at the end of sentences were given preference over a single shad in the same place, without a note in the critical apparatus, when the majority of the witnesses have a double shad. The addition or omission of double shad however was noted. The occasional occurrence of rin chen spungs shad was not recorded. The shad after the verse text was standardized to always have a double shad.

Numbered paragraphs were not part of the original text but were added in order to give a better overview and to facilitate reference to the translation. The remarks of fictional opponents that are often indicated by gal te ... ce na are
marked in red script. The verse text of CŚ is bold and underlined and its keywords (pratīka) are bold where they appear in the commentary. Names of texts and authors are underlined. Concordances to the original text of the different editions are given in square brackets. The sigla indicate the edition, followed by the folio number, "a" for recto and "b" for verso, and occasionally a numeral indicating the exact line on that page.
3.2 Sigla

- **C**: Co ne bsTan 'gyur. Stony Brook, New York: The Institute of the Advanced Study of World Religions. Microfiches. CŚ tsha 1a-18a, CŚṬ ya 29a6-236a7.¹

- **D**: sDe dge Tibetan Tripiṭaka, bsTan 'gyur. Tokyo: Faculty of Letters of Tokyo University. dBu ma Vol. 1-17, 1977-79. CŚ tsha 1b1-18a7, CŚṬ ya 30b6-279a1.²


- **N**: sNar thang bsTan 'gyur. (Orig. publ. 1741-1742) CŚ tsha 1a-18a7, CŚṬ ya 34b2-264a4.

- **P**: The Tibetan Tripiṭaka, Peking Edition. Tokyo-Kyoto: Tibetan Tripiṭaka Research Institute, 1957. CŚ tsha 1-20b1, CŚṬ ya 33b4-273b6.³


- **S**: Paracanonical manuscript (Sakya Gonpa, Ladakh). dbu can script in black with interlinear notes in dbu med script in red. 233 folios.

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² Ibid.
³ Ibid.
3.3 Tibetan Text of Catuḥṣatakāṭikā XV.1-17

byang chub sems dpa'i rnal 'byor spyod pa bzhig brgya pa'i 'grel¹ pa las / 'dus byas kyi don dgag pa bsgom pa bstan pa zhes bya ba ste rab tu byed pa bco lnga pa'i 'grel pa'o //²

§1. [C 219a.2] [D 222a.2] [G 300b.6] [M 1455.1] [N 245a.3] [P 252a.6] [S 200b.1] // 'dir smras pa / 'dus byas rang bzhin gyis yod pa nyid de³ de'i mtshan nyid skye ba la sogs pa yod pa'i phyir ro // bong bu'i rwa la sogs pa yod pa ma yin pa la ni⁴ 'dus byas kyi mtshan [G 301a] nyid yod pa ma yin te⁵ 'dus byas la ni 'dus byas kyi⁶ mtshan nyid skye ba la sogs pa yod pa yang yin no // de'i phyir 'dus byas kyang⁷ yod do⁸ //

§2. bshad par bya⁹ ste / gal te de⁴⁰ mtshan nyid lta zhig¹¹ tu 'gyur na ni¹² 'dus byas yod par 'gyur na¹³ yod pa yang ma yin no // ji ltar byas te zhe na / [P 252b] 'di na skye ba 'di¹⁴ 'dus byas kyi dngos po bskyed¹⁵ pa na¹⁶ 'dus byas med pa' am¹⁷ yod pa zhi gbskyed grang na / de la re zhi g gang 'bras bu med par smra ba de'i ltar na sa bon gi¹⁸ gnas skabs na myu gu med pa'i phyir rgyu dang rkyen gyi tshogs pas sa bon gi mtha'i skad cig las myu gu skye'o // de'i phyir rgol ba de'i /

tha mar med par¹⁹ skye bar 'gyur // [CŚ XV.1a]

zhes bya ba phyogs yin na²⁰ / yod pa ma yin pa ni 'byung bar rigs pa yang ma yin pa¹ ste / bong bu'i rwa la sogs pa yang skye bar thal ba'i phyir ro //

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¹ CD sgrel NP 'brel
² The Sanskrit title of the chapter reads bodhisattvayogācāre catuḥṣatakāte sanskrtaḥ saṃskṛtāḥ saṃsaraphatśedu nāma pañcadaśaḥ prakaranam. In the Tibetan title, the following parts have no equivalent in the Sanskrit: 'grel pa, bsgom pa bstan pa and 'grel pa'o. See Suzuki 1994, 378f. The title of CŚ XV reads rnal 'byor spyod pa bzhig brgya pa las 'dus byas kyi don dgag pa bsgom pa bstan pa ste rab tu byed pa bco lnga pa'o. See Lang 1986, 142.
³ S ad. /
⁴ GNP om.
⁵ GNPS na
⁶ N kyi
⁷ GNPS om.
⁸ N dge GNP ad. zhe na
⁹ S byas
¹⁰ CD ad. tshe
¹¹ D nig
¹² S ad. /
¹³ S ad. /
¹⁴ S 'di'i
¹⁵ S skyled
¹⁶ S ni
¹⁷ D pa'am S ad. /
¹⁸ G gyis
¹⁹ GNP pa
²⁰ N no
§3. de nyid kyi phyir / 

des na med pa ga² la skye // [CŚ XV.1b]

zhes bya ba smos so // des na zhes bya ba ni yod pa ma yin pa nyid kyi rgyus so // 
ga³ la zhes bya ba ni mi srid pa la⁴ ste / yod pa ma yin pa'i phyir med pa la skye 
ba med [N 245b] do zhes bya ba'i don to //

§4. ci ste nyes pa 'dis 'jigs nas 'bras bu yod par smra bas⁵ yod pa kho na la 
skye bar⁶ 'dod na / de lta⁷ na⁸ /

vod pa gdod⁹ nas¹⁰ skye¹¹ 'gyur ba // [S 201a]

des na vod pa ga¹² la skye // [CŚ XV.1cd]

gal te skye ba'i ches¹³ snga rol sa bon gyi¹⁴ gnas skabs kho nar myu gu skye bar 
rtog na de'i tshe¹⁵ skye bar mi 'gyur te¹⁶ yod pa'i phyir ro //¹⁷ ci ste yod pa la skye 
bar¹⁸ yongs su rtog na de'i tshe skye ba thug pa med par 'gyur zhing / de la slar [G 
301b] skye bas byas pa'i bogs [M 1456] su¹⁹ yang 'gyur na de ni srid pa yang ma 
yin pas yod pa la yang skye ba yod pa ma yin no //

§5. [C 219b] [D 222b] gzhan yang /
'bras bu vis ni rgyu bshig pa²⁰ //

des na med pa skye mi 'gyur // [CŚ XV.2ab]

gang gi²¹ phyir myu gu skye bzhin pas rgyu sa bon zhes bya ba bshig pa²² de'i 
phyir myu gu med pa kho na sa bon las skye'o zhes bya bar²³ yang²⁴ mi rigs so // ji

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¹ S om.
² CD gang
³ CD gang
⁴ G om.
⁵ CGNP smras pa
⁶ GNP ba
⁷ GS lour
⁸ S ad. yang
⁹ N,Pa 'dod
¹⁰ GNPS mar
¹¹ N,Pa skyes
¹² CD gang
¹³ G tshas
¹⁴ G gwis
¹⁵ S ad. de
¹⁶ S ad. /
¹⁷ GNP om. ro //
¹⁸ S ba
¹⁹ N bogsu
²⁰ G ad. des na med pa
²¹ G gwis
²² S pa'i
²³ GNPS ba
²⁴ S om.
ltar nas dang gro la sogs pa dag la yod pa ma yin pa'i¹ sā² lu'i myu gu de dag rnam par 'gyur bas skye ba ma yin pa de bzhiṇ du yod pa ma yin pas sā³ lu'i sa bon rnam par 'gyur bas [P 253a] kyang skye ba ma⁴ yin pa zhig na⁵ 'bru mar 'byung⁶ na til la sogs pa dag ltar myu gu skye ba na sa bon de 'jig pa yang yin no // de'i phyir med pa mi skye'o //

grub la sgrub⁷ byed vod ma yin //
de phyir vod pa'ang⁸ mi skye'o⁹ // [CŚ XV.2cd]

grub zin pa'i myu gu ni slar 'grub pa ma yin pas yod pa yang mi skye'o //
§6. skye ba'i dus mi srid pa'i phyir yang skye ba¹⁰ yod pa¹¹ ma yin par brjod¹² pa'i phyir bshad pa/

det¹³'i tshe skye ba vod min zhing //
gzhan tshe skye ba vod ma yin //
de tshe gzhan tshe mi skye na //
nam¹⁴ zhig skye ba vod par 'gyur // [CŚ XV.3]

gang gi tshe myu gu 'di bdag gi dngos po rnyed pa yin pa de'i tshe ni grub pa'i ngo bo yin pa'i phyir¹⁵ 'di la skye ba mi srid do // gang gi¹⁶ tshe 'di ma grub pa'i ngo bo yin [S 201b] pa'i dus der yang¹⁷ 'di¹⁸ skye ba mi rigs te / ma grub pa ni¹⁹ med pa nyid kyis rten med pa'i skye ba'i bya ba mi 'byung bas gzhan gyi tshe skye ba mi srid do // cung zad cig grub cing [N 246a] cung zad cig ma grub pa [G 302a] grub bzhiṇ pa la yang phyogs gnyi²⁰ gar brjod pa'i skyon du thal ba'i phyir de'i tshe dang gzhan gyi²¹ tshe skye ba mi srid do // gang gi²² tshe de ltar dus

¹ S pa
² GNPS sa
³ GNPS sa
⁴ G ad. ma
⁵ G ad. /
⁶ GNPS byung
⁷ C₃D₄ grub pa las sgrub N₄P₄ grub pa las grub
⁸ GNP pa S pa 'ang C₃D₄ pa
⁹ GNP skye yi
¹₀ GNP la
¹¹ C med pa
¹² S rjod
¹³ S C₃D₄N₄P₄, de
¹⁴ N ni
¹⁵ G ad. la N ad. /
¹⁶ G gis
¹⁷ N yod
¹⁸ CD mi
¹⁹ N na
²⁰ GNP gnyis
²¹ G gnis
²² G gis
gsum char du yang skye ba mi srid pa¹ de'i tshe de las tha dad pa gzhan mi srid pas nam zhig skye ba yod par 'gyur te / gang du 'di skye bar 'gyur ba'i² dus de [M 1457] yod pa ma yin no snyam du dgongs so // §7. 'dir smras pa / 'o ma zho'i dngos por 'byung bar³ skye ba yin no // 'di yang mi rigs te / 'o ma la zho'i dngos po mi srid pa'i phyir ro⁴ / re zhig⁵ 'o ma'i dngos por gnas pa'i 'o ma la ni de'i bdag nyid du skye ba med de⁶ / de⁷ 'o ma'i bdag nyid der yod pa'i phyir ro // 'de'i phyir de ltar na /

de la de vi dngos po ru //
ji ltar skye ba yod min ltar //
de bzhin gzhan gvi dngos por yang //
de la skye ba yod ma vin // [ĆŚ XV.4]

[P253b] ji ltar [D 223a] 'o ma'i ngo bor gnas pa'i 'o ma la [Ć 220a] skye ba mi srid pa de bzhin du 'o ma las⁸ gzhan zho'i dngos por skye ba yang mi srid do // gang las 'o ma zho'i⁹ yin no¹⁰ zhes bya bar 'gyur ba¹¹ 'o ma la¹² zho zhes bsnyad¹³ pa yang ma yin te¹⁴ / gang gi¹⁵ tshe de¹⁶ zho¹⁷ yin pa de'i tshe de¹⁸ 'o ma ma yin la / yang gang gi¹⁹ tshe de 'o ma yin pa de'i tshe de zho ma yin pas 'o ma zhor 'gyur ro zhes bya bar mi rung ngo // §8. 'di las kyang 'dus byas la skye ba med de²⁰ / 'di²¹ ltar /
thog ma²² bar dang tha ma rnams //

skye ba'i snga rol srid ma vin // [ĆŚ XV.5ab]

¹ S pas
² S ba
³ S ba
⁴ N la
⁵ S shig
⁶ S ste
⁷ GNP de'i
⁸ S la
⁹ GNPS zho
¹⁰ G ad. / N na
¹¹ S ad. la /
¹² GNP om.
¹³ S snyad
¹⁴ S ste
¹⁵ G gis
¹⁶ GNP om.
¹⁷ G om.
¹⁸ G gis
¹⁹ S ste
²⁰ D 'dir
²¹ N thangs for thog ma
²² N thangs for thog ma
'dir thog ma dang bar [S 202a] dang tha ma¹ dag ni dngos po'i skye ba dang gnas pa dang 'jig² pa ste / re zhig de dag skye ba'i snga rol gyi³ gnas skabs na⁴ yod [G 302b] pa'i ngo bor med pas skye ba'i snga rol na 'dus byas mi srid do //

§9. ci ste skye ba'i dus na skye ba yin la gnas pa'i dus na /⁵ gnas pa yin zhing 'jig⁶ pa'i dus na 'jig pa'o snyam na / 'di yang mi rigs te / 'di ltar /

   gnyis gnyis dag ni med pa ru //
   ji ltar re re rtsom⁸ par [N 246b] 'gyur // [ČŚ XV.5cd]

'dir skye ba'i dus na gnas pa dang mi rtag pa gnyis med pas gnas pa dang / 'jig pa dang bral ba'i 'dus byas nyid med pa'i phyir skye bar yang⁹ mi 'gyur ro // de bzhin du gnas pa'i dus dang 'jig¹⁰ pa'i dus su yang gnyis gnyis dag med [M 1458] par¹¹ re re 'jug pa mi srid do¹² // de med pas 'dus byas ma yin no //

§10. 'di las kyang 'dus byas kyi¹³ skye ba mi rigs te /¹⁴ gang gi phyir /

   ghan gyi dngos po med par ni //
   bdag gi¹⁵ dngos po 'byung ba med //
   de yi¹⁶ phvir na bdag ghan ni //
   gnyis ka las 'byung¹⁷ yod ma yin // [ČŚ XV.6]

'dir bum pa¹⁸ rang las grub pa'i ngo bo med de¹⁹ gyo mo la ltos²⁰ pa'i phyir ro // gyo mo de dag la yang bdag gi dngos po med de²¹ gseg ma la ltos²² pa'i phyir ro // de'i phyir de ltar²³ na ghan gyi dngos po gyo mo med na bum [P 254a] pa la bdag gi²⁴ dngos po yod pa ma yin no // de bzhin du gyo mo dag la²⁵ gyo mo'i

¹ G om.
² G 'jigs
³ G gvis
⁴ GN ad. /
⁵ GNP om.
⁶ G 'jigs
⁷ NP om.
⁸ S brisom
⁹ S om.
¹⁰ G 'jigs
¹¹ C pa
¹² GNPS la
¹³ G kyis
¹⁴ GNP om.
¹⁵ G gis
¹⁶ S de'
¹⁷ C, D, gnyis las 'byung ba S gnyis la 'byung
¹⁸ GNS ad. la
¹⁹ S ad. /
²⁰ GNP ltos
²¹ S ad. /
²² GNP ltos
²³ S lta
²⁴ G gvis
²⁵ CD lsa
bdag gi¹ dngos po med na gyo mo dag² bum pa la ltos³ nas gzhan pa nyid du 'ang⁴ mi 'gyur ro // [G 303a] gang gi⁵ phyir⁶ de ltar bdag gi dngos po med par 'ga' yang gzhan nyid du mi 'gyur ba de'i phyir gnyis ka⁷ la skye ba mi srid de⁸ / bdag dang [D 223b] gzhan dag ni⁹ mi srid pa'i [C 220b] phyir ro // rang gi ngo bo [S 202b] med pas rang la skye ba mi srid la¹⁰ / gzhan yang rang gi¹¹ ngo bos ma grub pa'i phyir gzhan las¹² skye ba¹³ yang mi srid pas skye ba med do //

§11. gzhan yang¹⁴ skye ba med pa¹⁵ 'di skye ba po'i snga rol lam phyis sam cig car rtog grang na /¹⁶ de la gal te snga rol du¹⁷ yin na ni / mi rigs te rten med pa'i phyir ro // ci ste phyis yin na de yang mi rigs te / ma skyes pa ni yod pa ma yin pa'i phyir dang / skye ba don med pa'i phyir ro // ci ste cig car yin na ni de'i tshe gnyi ga yang phan tshun ltos¹⁸ pa med pa nyid du¹⁹ 'gyur ro // de'i phyir de ltar na /

sngon dang phyis dang cig car zhes²⁰ //
brjod pa nvid du mi nus pa //
de'i²¹ phyir skye dang bum pa la //
cig car 'byung ba vod ma yin // [CŚ XV.7]

gang gi²² phyir skye ba po dang skye ba la rim pa 'di mi srid [N 247a] pa de'i phyir skye ba dang bum pa la cig car 'byung ba yod pa ma [M 1459] yin no //²³ gang gi²⁴ tshe yod pa ma yin pa de'i tshe bum pa²⁵ skye'o zhes bya bar mi rigs so //
§12. ’dir smras pa / bum pa’i skye ba yod pa nyid de / gal te ’di skye bar mi ’gyur na ni de’i tshe ’di i rnying pa’i ngo bor mi ’gyur ba zhig na / ’di la gog pa nyid kyi mtshan nyid can rnying pa’i ngo bor yod par mthong ba yang yin no // de’i phyir rnying pa’i ngo bo yod pas skye ba yod pa nyid do //

§13. bshad par bya ste / gal te ’ga zhig la rnying pa nyid yod na ni skye ba yod par ’gyur na srid pa yang ma yin [P 254a] no // ji ltar11 zhe na / [G 303b] ’di na12 gal te rnying13 pa zhes bya ba cung14 zad cig yod na ni sngar skyes pa15 nyid dam16 phyis skyes pa zhig yin grang na gnyi ga ltar yang mi skye’o zhes bstan pa’i phyir bshad pa /

sngar skyes pa yi phyir na ni //
sngar skyes rnying par mi ’gyur zhing // [S 203a]
phyi nas kun tu skyes pa yang //
phyi nas skyes par mi ’gyur ro // [CŚ XV.8]

§14. rnying pa’i rnying pa nyid gang yin pa de ni ’jig rten gyi dngos po sngar skyes pa la rtog na / bum pa’i sngar skyes pa’i gnas skabs ni rnying pa nyid du mi rigs te / de’i tshe de la sar pa zhes bsnyad pa’i phyir ro // phyis skye pa’i gnas skabs khe tshang ma la yang phyis skyes pa’i phyir sar pa yin pas rnying pa nyid du ga la ’gyur /

§15. gal te gang sngar skyes pa de da ltar rnying pa yin no zhe na / ci ste de nyid [D 224a] yin nam / [C 221a] gzhan yin / gal te de nyid na ni5

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1 S de
2 P snying
3 S ma
4 GN gog po P gos po
5 G du kyis
6 P snying
7 GNPS bo
8 P po
9 N pa
10 S ad /
11 C lta
12 GNP ni
13 P snying
14 p rung
15 GN skye ba
16 N di S ad /
17 S ad /
18 GNPS pa’i
19 C rayings
20 S pa
21 S pas
22 P for XV.8cd phyi nas kun tu skyes par mi ’gyur ro //
23 D che
24 GN gsar
25 S snyed
26 S om.
27 GNPS om.
ni5 de'i tshe sar pa'i gnas skabs ma nyams pa'i phyir de rnying pa ma yin no // ci ste gzhan yin na ni de yang de9 ltar7 skyes pa'i phyir sar pa kho nar 'gyur bas de rnying pa ma yin no // de'i phyir de ltar na rnying8 pa nyid med pas de yod pas mtshon pa'i skye ba ma srid do //

§16. de ltar rnam par dpyad pa grub pa yin dang /9 dus ches yun ring bar ting nge 'dzin bsgoms pas rga ba dang /10 'khor ba [N 247b] rnying [M 1460] par byed cing pham par byed la11 byang chub sems dpa' rnambs kyi chos thams cad rang bzhin med pa bsgoms pas kyang /12 'chi ba'i mi dga' ba 'joms shing13 pham par byed do // ji14 skad du15
de'i tshe rga ba16 rgya chen ni // med cing sdug bsgnal 'chi ba med //
ces bya ba17 la sog18 pa dang / de [G 304a] bzhin du /
gang zhig rtag tu skye ba skye med par //
shes te19 'chi bdag pha rol 'da' bar 'gyur //20
zhes rgya cher sungs so //

§17. 'di las kyang skye ba mi srid do21 // dus gsum char22 du yang de mi rigs pa'i phyir ro // de nyid bstan pa'i phyir bshad pa /

da ltar [P 255a] ba vi23 dngos po ni //
de nyid las byung24 ma yin zhung //
ma 'ongs las byung25 yod min la //
'das pa las kyang vod ma yin // [CŚ XV.9]
da ltar ba'i don [S 203b] 'di¹ nyid las /² de nyid 'byung ba ni med de³ / rgyu dang 'bras bu dag cig car med pa'i phyir la / cig car ba nyid du yod na yang rgyu dang 'bras bu'i dngos po mi 'thad pa'i phyir ro // ma 'ongs pa las byung ba yod⁴ min la ste⁵ / ma 'ongs pa yod pa ma yin pa'i phyir⁶ bdag nyid can yin pa'i phyir ro⁷ // 'das pa las kyang 'byung ba yod pa ma yin te / 'das pa⁸ yang yod pa ma yin pa'i phyir ro // gang gi tshe dus gsum char du yang 'byung ba yod pa ma yin pa de'i tshe rang bzhin gyis skye ba med do⁹ zhes bya bar¹⁰ gnas so // gzhan yang gal te dngos po de dag la rang gi¹¹ ngo bos¹² yod na ni de'i tshe rang bzhin la ldog pa med pas dngos po skyes pa'i rang bzhin la¹³ ma byung ba las 'byung¹⁴ ba med pa'i phyir ga shed nas 'ongs par 'gyur ro // 'gags pa'i rang bzhin la yang¹⁵ byung nas med pa¹⁶ med pa'i phyir ga shed du 'gro bar 'gyur [C 221b] [D 224b] na¹⁷ 'di ni srid pa yang ma yin no // bcom ldan 'das kyis dge slong dag de ltar na mig ni skye ba na¹⁸ gang nas kyang¹⁹ 'ongs²⁰ [M 1461] pa ma yin la²¹ gag pa na gar yang 'gro ba ma yin no zhes gsungs la / de bzhin du [G 304b] 'phags pa glang po'i²² rtsal²³
gyi mdo [N 248a] las /
gal te chos rnams rang bzhin yod 'gyur na // rgyal ba nyan thos bcas pas de mkhyen 'gyur // ther zug chos ni mya ngan 'da' mi 'gyur // mkhas rnams nam yang spros dang bral mi 'gyur // zhes gsungs so // §18. de'i phyir de ltar na don gang zhig // skyes pa la ni 'ong ba dang //

¹ S de
² GNPS om.
³ S ste
⁴ S ma 'ongs la byung yod for ma 'ongs pa las byung ba yod
⁵ GN yod min te
⁶ S om.
⁷ N phyiro
⁸ S ad. la
⁹ G ad. //
¹⁰ GNP ba
¹¹ G gis
¹² S bo
¹³ GNPS om. S las
¹⁴ S byung
¹⁵ S las for la yang
¹⁶ P om. med pa
¹⁷ GNPS ad. /
¹⁸ GN om.
¹⁹ GNP om.
²⁰ S 'ong
²¹ GNPS ad. /
²² GNPS po
²³ S brtsal
de bzhin 'gags la 'gro ba med

de las des par rang bzhin med do // [CŚ XV.10]

gal te de la rang bzhin med na / ci zhig yod ce na / brjod par bya ste / gang kun [P 255b] nas nyon mongs pa dang rnam par byang ba'i rgyur byas pa'i ngo bo rten cing 'brel bar [S204a] 'byung ba de yod la / sgyu mar byas pa'i glang po che dang rta la sogs pa dang 'dra ba de yang byis pa phyin ci log pa dag gis rang bzhin dang bcas pa nyid du yongs su rtog go // 'phags pa rnam kyis ni sgyu ma dang smig rgyu la sogs pa ltar rang bzhin med par don ji lta ba bzhin yongs su gcod do // ji skad du mdo las /

sems can mi dang shed skyes kyang rung ste //

'dir skye shi ba 'ga' yang skye mi 'gyur //
chos kun rang bzhin sgyu 'dra stong pa ste //
mu stegs can gyis shes par nus ma yin //

zhes gsungs la / de bzhin du //
chos kun sgyu ma 'dra zhing de bzhin du /
rmni lam dang mtshungs sprin ltar blta byas nas //
'di 'dra'i chos kyi tshul la mam dpyad pa //
rdzogs par gnas shing chos la legs gnas sgom //

gang zhig bdag dang bdag gi snyam sems zhing //
dngos po phra mo de bzhin du zhen pa //
'dzin gnas mi mkhas de ni 'jigs 'gyur te //
chags shing sdang la de bzhin rmong par 'gyur //

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1 PN med pa G med po
2 GNP nges S pa de la nges for de las des
4 S gyu
5 D bo
6 S ad.
7 S smigs
8 D dang
9 GNP pa
10 GNP S du
11 P shes
12 S riegs
13 GNP om. //
14 GNP om. /
15 S lta
16 GNP sbyod S dpyod
17 S bogs
18 S phra mthong de nyid for phra mo de bzhin
19 P zhe na pa
20 S ste
shAkya'i¹ sras po rang bzhin med pa'i chos //
rten cing 'brel par 'byung ba rtogs 'gyur te² // [M 1462]
nam mkha³ lta bu'i sems dang ldan pa ni //
legs par mthong nas mi 'khor grol mi [N 248b] 'gyur //

zhes gsungs so // slob dpon⁴ yang 'phags pa'i ye shes la ltos⁵ nas rnam par dpyod pa'i [D 225a] 'bras bu brjod pa'i [C 222a] phyir gsungs pa ni /
de ltar yin na ji lta bur //
srid pa sgyu ma 'dra ma yin //
zhes bya ba ste / rten cing 'brel par 'byung ba ni ji lta ba bzhin mthong ba na⁶ sgyu ma⁷ byas pa lta bur 'gyur gyi mo gsham⁸ gyi bu lta bu ni ma yin no // gal te rnam par dpyod⁹ pa [S 204b] 'dis skye ba¹⁰ rnam pa thams cad du bkag pa las 'dus byas skye ba [P 256a] med par bstan par 'dod na ni¹¹ de'i tshe¹² sgyu ma lta bu nyid du mi 'gyur gyi¹³ mo gsham¹⁴ gyi¹⁵ bu la sogs pa dag gis nye bar gzhal bar 'gyur ba zhig na / rten cing 'brel par¹⁶ 'byung ba¹⁷ med par thal bar 'gyur ba/i 'jigs pas de dag dang bstun¹⁸ par¹⁹ mi byed kyi / de dang mi 'gal ba sgyu ma la sogs pa dag dang ni²⁰ byed do // de/i phyir 'phags pa ni sgyu ma²¹ byas pa lta bu'i srid²² pa snying po med pa nyid du gzigs pa na snying po med pa'i 'khor²³ ba la chags pa thams cad yongs su zad pas rnam par grol bar 'gyur bas 'di la²⁴ mi rigs pa ci yang med do //²⁵ 'di²⁶ rten cing 'brel par 'byung bar²⁷ 'gyur ba la²⁸ skur pa ma btab pas  

¹ S shag kya'i
² S ste
³ GNS namkha' P mkhas
⁴ S ad. lha
⁵ GNP bitos
⁶ N om.
⁷ S mar
⁸ S sham
⁹ GNP spyod
10 D pa
11 p ni na
12 GNPS ad. de
13 S ad. /
14 S sham
15 G gyis
16 p bar
17 CD pa
18 S stun
19 GNP pa
20 CD ad. mi S ad. bstun par
21 S mar
22 C srad pa
23 S mkhor
24 S las
25 GNP de / S ste /
26 GNPS 'dir
27 GNPS ba la
28 GNPS om. 'gyur ba la
§19. de ltar 'dus byas sgyu ma6 byas pa lta7 bur brjod nas de'i8 mtshan nyid
rnam kyod pa'i ngo bo ma yin par bstan pa'i phyir bshad pa /

re zhig phan tshun 'gal ba'i phyir skye ba dang gnas pa dang 'jig14 [M 1463] pa
rnams skad cig ma gcig la 'byung ba ni med do // rim gyis kyang 'byung15 ba
ni16 yod pa ma yin no17 // gnyis gnyis dag med par re re 'byung ba med pa'i phyir
ro // rim dang cig car ma gtogs [N 249a] par grub pa'i rgyu ghzan ma gzigs pa'i
phyir ro18 // nam zhig 'byung ba yod par 'gyur19 // zhes bya ba smos so //

§20. gzhan yang skye ba la sogs pa 'di rnams 'dus byed kyi phung [S 205a]
pol' khongs su gtogs pa'i phyir 'dus byas nyid yin te / de'i phyir nges par de rnams
la20 yang 'dus byas kyi [ID 225b] mtshan [P 256b] nyid ghzan dag cig21 'gyur bar
bya [C 222b] dgos so22 zhes bstan pa'i phyir bshad pa /

1 GNP bzhag
2 S om.
3 S om.
4 GNPS pas
5 P om. /
6 S mar
7 G ilar
8 G ad. tshe
9 G 'jigs
10 Np, P, char
11 C, D, N, P, klys
12 C, D, N, P, ba'ang
13 Lang (1986, 138) gives the Sanskrit for this verse from the Śataśāstra:
| upādānāh
tadā
dhī
tānā
dhī
tānā
dhī
| tānā
dhī
tānā
dhī
| kramātāh
sambhavaḥ
nāsti
sambhavaḥ
vidyate
cādū ||
14 G 'jigs
15 N 'gyur
16 GNS om.
17 GNP te S ste
18 GNPS om.
19 GNP om. C //
20 N pa
21 PS gcig GN gcig nyid
22 GNP ad. //
23 P ad. pa C, D, skye la sog pa Np, skye ba la sog
24 C, D, N, P, phyir
25 G 'jigs
skye ba la sogs te¹ skye ba dang gnas pa dang 'jig² pa 'dus byas nyid du khas blangs pa rnamgs la slar yang thams cad 'byung ba ste³ yang 'byung ba yin na ni skye ba la skye ba gzhan du 'gyur ro⁴ // ji ltar skye ba la skye ba gzhan yin pa'i tshul de las 'jig⁵ pa skye 'dra zhing ste / 'jig⁶ pa la⁷ yang [G 306a] 'dus byas yin pas mtshan nyid gsum dang⁸ ldan no // de'i phyir 'jig pa la yang 'jig pa gzhan yod pas 'jig⁹ pa'i 'jig par 'gyur ro // de bzhin du gnas pa la yang 'dus byas kyi mtshan nyid gsum yod pa¹⁰ dang /¹¹ gnas pa'i gnas par 'gyur bas¹² gnas pa 'jig pa dang 'dra bar snang ngo // de dag la yang¹³ 'dus byas yin pa'i phyir gzhan dag tu 'gyur bar bya dgos la / de dag la yang gzhan dag yin¹⁴ zhing / de¹⁵ la yang gzhan dag tu 'gyur bas thug pa med do // thug pa med pa yin na yang dngos po thams cad mi 'grub pas 'dus byas kyi mtshan nyid rnamgs rang bzhin gyis med do //

§21. gzhan yang mtshan nyid [M 1464] 'di rnamgs 'byung ba na mtshan gzhi las tha dad pa'i ngo bo can zhig gam¹⁶ tha mi dad pa zhig mtshan nyid kyi¹⁷ las la 'jug grang na / de la re zhig¹⁸ /

mtshan las mtshan gzhi¹⁹ gzhan zhe na // [S 205b]

mtshan gzhi mi rtag nvid ga²⁰ las // [CS XV.13ab]
§22. ci ste nyes pa 'di spang bar 'dod nas mtshan nyid dang mtshan gzhi\(^1\) gzhan ma yin pa nyid du rtog na ni de'i tshe skyon gzhan 'di yin te /\(^2\) 'di ltar /\(^3\) [G 306b]

yang na bzhig\(^4\) yang vod pa'i\(^5\) //\(^6\) [D 226a]

ngo bor gsal bar\(^7\) vod ma vin // [CŚ XV.13cd]

gal [C 223a] te mtshan nyid gsum dang mtshan gzhi\(^8\) gcig nyid du khas len na / de'i tshe mtshan nyid gsum dang mtshan gzhi\(^9\) ste bzhi char yang dngos po med par 'gyur ro // ji ltar zhe na / 'dir gcig nyid du khas blangs pa yin na ni mtshan nyid\(^10\) mtshan gzhi\(^11\) nyid du\(^12\) mi rigs pa'i phyir la mtshan gzhi\(^13\) yang mtshan nyid du mi rigs pa'i phyir bzhi char\(^14\) yang med par 'gyur ba 'am / yang na rang gi ngo bos\(^15\) ma grub pa'i phyir de nyid dang gzhan nyid du khas blang bar\(^16\) mi bya'o //

§23. 'dir smras pa / skye ba la soggs pa mams ni yod pa nyid de\(^17\) / de dag gi\(^18\) rgyu mtshan\(^19\) gyi rgyu yod pa'i phyir ro // 'dir\(^20\) myu gu la soggs pa mams rgyu'i tshogs pa de dang de la brten nas 'byung bar de la mkhas pa rnams 'chad\(^21\) do // gal te skye ba la soggs pa mams med na ni\(^22\) rgyu'i tshogs pa don med pa nyid du 'gyur na\(^23\) don med pa yang ma yin no // de'i phyir skye ba la soggs pa rnams\(^24\) [M 1465] yod pa nyid do\(^25\) //

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\(^1\) S bzhi
\(^2\) S om.
\(^3\) N om.
\(^4\) GNP gzhi C, D, P, bzhi N, gzhi S bzhi ka 'ang
\(^5\) C, D, N, P, ga'ang yod pa yi
\(^6\) G om. //
\(^7\) S ba
\(^8\) S bzhi
\(^9\) S bzhi
\(^10\) GNP om. mtshan nyid
\(^11\) S bzhi
\(^12\) GNP ad. /
\(^13\) S bzhi
\(^14\) GNP car
\(^15\) GNP bo S bor
\(^16\) GNP blangs par
\(^17\) S ste
\(^18\) G gis
\(^19\) S 'tshan
\(^20\) CD 'dir S 'di na
\(^21\) S mchad
\(^22\) S ad. /
\(^23\) S om.
\(^24\) G ad. med
\(^25\) N nyido
§24. bshad par bya ste / [S 206a] gal te 'ga' zhig las 'ga' zhig skye bar 'gyur na ni skye ba la sogs pa dag tu 'gyur na 1 srid pa yang ma yin no zhes bstan pa'i phyir bshad pa /

dngos po dngos las^2 mi skye ste //
dngos po dngos med las mi skye //
dngos po^3 dngos med mi skye ste //^4
dngos med dngos las mi skye'o // [CŚ XV.14]^5

re zhig^6 dngos po myu gu grub pa'i ngo bo ni^7 dngos po [N 250a] sa bon nam par ma gyur pa las skye ba [P 257b] mi srid de^8 nam par 'gyur bzhin pa ma yin pa'i sa bon skyed par byed pa nyid du [G 307a] mi rigs pa'i phyir la / grub pa'i dngos po^9 myu gu dngos po'i ngo bo slar yang skye bar mi rigs pa'i phyir^10 dngos po dngos las^11 mi skye'o^12 // dngos po dngos po med pa las kyang mi skye ste /^13 dngos po med pa^14 mes tshig pa'i sa bon la ni 'bras bu bskyed^15 pa'i^16 nus pa med la^17 skye ba'i ngo bo can gyi^18 dngos po la yang slar skye ba med pas^19 dngos po 'ga' yang^20 med pa las mi skye'o // dngos po med pa dang^21 dngos po med pa las kyang mi skye ste / dngos po med pa las^22 cung zad kyang skye^23 ba'i^24 nus pa med pa'i phyir la /^25 dngos po med pa la mo gsham^26 gyi bu la sogs pa ltar skye ba^27 mi srid pa'i phyir [D 226b] dngos [C 223b] po med pa las kyang dngos po med pa^28 mi skye'o // dngos po med pa ni dngos po^29 las kyang mi skye ste / bshad zin pa'i

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1 GNPS ad. /
2 C, la
3 C,D,N,P,s med
4 G om. //
5 Lang (1986, 138) gives the Sanskrit for this verse from the Śataśāstra: na bhāvāj jāyate bhāvo bhāvo 'bhāvān na jāyate | nahbhāvāj jāyate 'bhāvo 'bhāvo bhāvān na jāyate ||
6 S shig
7 G ad. //
8 S ad. /
9 GNPS om. dngos po
10 S ad. /
11 GNP dngos po med pa las kyang for dngos las
12 GNP skye ste
13 GNP om. dngos po dngos po med pa las kyang mi skye ste /
14 GNP pas
15 S skyled
16 G pas
17 S ad. /
18 G gyis
19 D pe
20 GNP om. 'ga' yang S ad. dngos po
21 GNPS om.
22 GS la
23 S skyled
24 N pa'i
25 S om.
26 S sham
27 D pa
28 S pas
29 G ad. med pa
nyes pa thog\textsuperscript{1} tu 'bab pa nyid kyi phyir ro // de ltar na dngos po las kyang dngos po med pa mi skye'o // gang gi tshe dngos po dang dngos po med pa las\textsuperscript{2} dngos po dang dngos po med pa\textsuperscript{3} skye ba yod pa ma yin pa de'i tshe skye ba mi\textsuperscript{4} srid pas rgyu dang rkyen gyi tshogs pas\textsuperscript{5} dngos po\textsuperscript{6} dgos pa\textsuperscript{7} ci zhig yod de\textsuperscript{8} / 'di ni kyi\textsuperscript{9} na'o //

§25. 'di las kyang yod pa ma yin te / skye ba dang [S 206b] 'jig\textsuperscript{10} pa dag mi rigs pa'i phyir ro // 'dir skye ba'i\textsuperscript{11} dngos po'i rang bzhin gyi don nam dngos po med pa'i rang bzhin [M 1466] la\textsuperscript{12} rtog grang na\textsuperscript{13} / de bzhin du 'jig\textsuperscript{14} pa yang rtog pa na / dngos po'am\textsuperscript{15} dngos po med pa zhig la rtog grang na / rnam pa thams cad du mi srid do zhes bstan pa'i phyir bshad pa /

\textbf{dngos po dngos por mi 'gyur te} //
\textbf{dngos med dngos por mi 'gyur ro} //
\textbf{dngos med dngos med mi 'gyur te} // [G 307b]
\textbf{dngos po\textsuperscript{16} dngos med mi 'gyur ro} // [CŚ XV.15]

de la dngos po zhes bya ba ni skyes shing bdag nyid kyi dngos po rnyed pa'i don te / de slar [P 258a] yang dngos por mi 'gyur zhing / slar yang skye bar mi 'gyur te\textsuperscript{17} / yod [N 250b] pa skye ba don med pa'i phyir ro // de ltar na yang\textsuperscript{18} dngos\textsuperscript{19} po dngos por mi 'gyur ro // dngos po med pa yang dngos por mi 'gyur ro // dngos po med pa zhes bya ba yod pa ma yin pa ji ltar dngos por\textsuperscript{20} 'gyur te\textsuperscript{21} / mo gsham\textsuperscript{22} gyi bu yang skye bar thal ba'i phyir ro // de ltar na dngos po med pa yang dngos por mi 'gyur ro\textsuperscript{23} // de ltar na re zhig dngos po'am\textsuperscript{24} dngos po med pa dang\textsuperscript{25}

\textsuperscript{1} N\_thag
\textsuperscript{2} GS om. med pa
\textsuperscript{3} S ad. las
\textsuperscript{4} G om.
\textsuperscript{5} D bas
\textsuperscript{6} S om. dngos po
\textsuperscript{7} GNP om. dgos pa
\textsuperscript{8} S ste
\textsuperscript{9} CNP gvi
\textsuperscript{10} G 'jigs
\textsuperscript{11} GNPS ba
\textsuperscript{12} GNP om.
\textsuperscript{13} S la
\textsuperscript{14} G 'jigs
\textsuperscript{15} GNPS po 'am
\textsuperscript{16} CD yod
\textsuperscript{17} S ste
\textsuperscript{18} GNPS om.
\textsuperscript{19} G ad. dngos
\textsuperscript{20} GNP po
\textsuperscript{21} S ste
\textsuperscript{22} S sham
\textsuperscript{23} N 'gyuro
\textsuperscript{24} GS po 'am P po'am N po'i
\textsuperscript{25} S om.
dngos por mi 'gyur bas skye ba mi srid do // da ni 'jig pa yang mi srid do // ji ltar zhe na / re zhig dngos po med pa ni dngos po med par mi 'gyur te / yod pa ma yin pa la ni ri bong gi rwa ltar yang dngos po med pa med pa med pa'i phyir ro // de'i phyir dngos po med de dngos po med par mi 'gyur ro // dngos po yang dngos po med par mi 'gyur te / phan tshun 'gal ba'i phyir ro / dngos po med pa med na ni 'jig pa med la / skye ba dang 'jig pa med na yang 'dus byas med do zhes bya bar grub bo // ji skad [D 227a] du / bcom ldan 'das [S 207a] kyis / [C 224a] 'dus byas 'dus ma byas kun mam par dben // drang srong de dag rnam rtog mi' mnga' ste // 'gro ba kun la 'dus ma byas thob cing // rtag tu lta bar gyur pas rnam par dben // zhes gsungs so // §26. 'dir smras pa / skyes pa mi skye la [M 1467] ma skyes pa yang mi skye ste / dngos po dang dngos po med pa dag la skye ba bkag pa'i phyir ro // 'o na ci zhe na / [G 308a] skye bzhin pa'i don skye'o // §27. 'di yang mi rigs so zhes bstan pa'i phyir bshad pa / skye bzhin pa ni phved skyes phyir // skye bzhin pa ni skye mi 'gyur // [CŚ XV.16ab] gal te gang cung zad cig skyes shing cung zad cig ma skyes pa de skye bzhin pa yin na / de ltar na ni 'o na skye bzhin pa de yod pa ma yin [P 258b] te skyes pa dang ma skyes pa dag la rjes su zhugs pas gzhan gsum pa skye bzhin pa'i dus kyi ram pa med do // de'i phyir med pa nyid kyis skye bzhin pa mi skye'o // gal te

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1. C de
2. G 'jigs
3. G de // NP de / S ste /
4. S ste
5. GNPS pa
6. N gvi
7. S ste
8. G 'jigs
10. GN po
11. GN om.
12. P song
13. P me
14. S dyen
15. GN om. //
16. C_bved S ched
17. GNP na
20. S ad. //
21. G kyis
22. S kyi
gnyi ga'i ngo bo skyes¹ bzhin pa yin na ni de'i phyir² de'i gang cung zad cig skyes pa de ni skyes pa'i khongs su gtogs pa'i [N 251a] phyir mi skye ste / dngos po ni mi skye'o zhes brjod pa'i phyir ro / de'i cung zad ma skyes pa gang yin pa de yang mi skye ste / dngos po med pa mi skye'o zhes brjod pa'i phyir ro //

§28. ci ste skyes pa dang ma skyes pa dag la skye bzhin pa nyid du³ rtog na / de lta⁴ yin na⁵ 'das pa dang ma 'ongs pa gnyis kyang skye bzhin pa nyid du 'gyur ro⁶ zhes bstan pa'i phyir bshad pa /

yang na thams cad skye bzhin pa //

nvid ni yin par thal bar 'gyur // [CŚ XV.16cd]⁷

zhes bya ba smos so // skye ba'i bya ba thob par gyur pa⁸ skyes zin pa ni mi gnas pa'i phyir 'das pa kho nar 'gyur la / ma skyes pa ni ma 'ongs par [S 207b] 'gyur ro // de'i phyir 'dir skye bzhin pa⁹ la skye bar¹⁰ rtog na / yang na dus gsum po thams cad skye bzhin pa'i khongs su gtogs pa'am / yang na skye bzhin pa zhes bya ba gang na yang¹¹ med do zhes bya bar gnas so //

§29. gzhan yang skye bzhin pa'i dngos por gnas pa¹² yongs su brtag¹³ pa gang yin pa de ci skye bzhin pa'i bdag nyid du bya ba 'am skye bzhin pa'i bdag nyid du¹⁴ bya ba ma yin pa zhig tu [M 1468] 'gyur grang na / gnyi ga ltar [D 227b] yang skyon du 'gyur ro zhes [C 224b] bstan pa'i phyir bshad pa /

skye bzhin pa vi bdag nvid du //

bya ba skye bzhin par mi 'gyur //

skye bzhin pa vi¹⁵ bdag nvid du //

mi bya'ang skye bzhin par mi 'gyur // [CŚ XV.17]

skye bzhin pa'i rang bzhin gang yin pa de ni¹⁶ de'i bdag nyid du mam par gnas pa'i phyir bya ba ma yin la / [P 259a] gang zhig skye bzhin pa'i bdag nyid du mi bya

¹ NP skyes
² C ad. de'i phyir
³ GNPS om.
⁴ S lta
⁵ GN ad. / P ad. /
⁶ Lang (1986, 140) gives the Sanskrit for this verse from the Śataśāstra: *atha vā jāyamānatvaVķ|sarvasyaiva prasajyate||
⁷ CD 'gyur ba
⁸ GNP om.
⁹ GNPS ba
¹⁰ GN ad. // P ad. //
¹¹ S gzhan for gang na yang
¹² S om. gnas pa
¹³ S rtags
¹⁴ S zhig gam / 'o na for 'am skye bzhin pa'i bdag nyid du
¹⁵ G yis S pa'i
¹⁶ S om. de ni
ba de yang skye bzhin par mi 'gyur te / skye bzhin pa'i bdag nyid du ma gyur pa'i phyir ro // gang zhig skye bzhin pa'i bdag nyid du bya ba de ni¹ yang skye bzhin pa ma yin pa ltar skye bzhin par mi 'gyur bas skye bzhin pa med do // skye bzhin pa med pas kyang skye bzhin pa mi skye'o //²

¹ GNPS om.
4 Translations

4.1 Preface

The following English translations comprise ČŚ XV.1-25, as well as ČŚṬ XV.1-15. While the translation of the verse text is based on the text established by Lang (1986), the translation of the commentary is based on the critical edition of the Tibetan text above.

The translation aims at staying as close to the original as possible, while at the same time providing a fairly readable text. Although I have tried to follow the original syntax and phrasing where possible, it was often necessary to rearrange clauses, phrases and sentences, and reproduce them in a different syntactical order, as for example in the many relative-correlative clauses.

The Tibetan translators have worked very close to the original Sanskrit text and have clearly tried as much as possible to reproduce all the details of Sanskrit grammar and syntax. I have refrained from doing the same, which may have caused me to oversee some of the terminological subtleties here or there. The text uses many different forms for the verb "to exist", or for the noun "existence" (yod pa yin, yod pa, yin pa, yod pa nyid, ...) and these have generally not been completely differentiated in the translation. The same holds for the terms ngo bo, rang bzhin, bdag nyid, which are often used as translation for the term svabhāva, as well as for other terms that are highly similar in meaning. The interested reader will be able to check these terminological details with the original Tibetan text supplied above.

Any additions to the text by the translator are set off by square brackets. The words from the verse text that are reproduced in the commentary (pratīka) are marked bold. Forms for introducing an opponent's objection or point of view, such as gal te... zhe na and others, are reproduced as "Objection", while bshad par bya ste, which often follows such a passage, is translated as "Commentary", in the sense of a reply. Numbered paragraphs were added to the text of the commentary in order to facilitate the reference to the Tibetan text and to give a better structure to the text. In order to give the reader an overview of the chapter's content, I have translated the topical outlines (sa bcad) of the Tibetan commentaries of rGyal tshab Dar ma rin chen and Red mda' ba gZhon nu blo gros, which are also helpful references to the structure of Āryadeva's arguments.
4.2 Overview

Sa bced, rGyal tshab Dar ma rin chen

Refuting that the characteristics of the conditioned, arising, abiding and ceasing are established by way of their own nature. (’dus byas kyi mtshan nyid skye ’jig gnas gsum rang bzhin gyis grub pa dgag pa)

I. Extensively establishing dependent arising, which does not arise by way of its own nature, as being in the manner of an illusion. (rten ’byung rang bzhin gyis skye ba med pa sgyu ma'i tshul du rgyas par bsgrub pa)

A. Specific refutation of arising as being established by way of its own nature. (skye ba rang bzhin gyis grub pa bye brag tu dgag pa)

1. Extensive explanation. (rgyas par bshad pa)
   a. Refutation by examining whether that which exists or does not exist is produced. (yod med skye ba brtags la dgag pa)
      (1) Reason refuting arising of that which exists or does not exist. (yod med skye ’gog gi gtan tshigs) [CŚ XV.1]
      (2) Establishing its mode [of operation.] (de’i tshul sgrub pa) [CŚ XV.2]
      (3) Refutation by examining the time of arising. (skye pa’i dus la brtags la dgag pa) [CŚ XV.3]
      (4) Refutation by examining the thing itself and a different thing. (rang dngos dang gzhan dngos su brtags nas dgag pa) [CŚ XV.4]
   b. Refutation by examining the beginning, middle and end. (thog mtha’ bar gsum la brtags la dgag pa) [CŚ XV.5]
   c. Refutation by examining both self and other. (rang gzhan gnyis la brtags la dgag pa) [CŚ XV.6]

d. Refutation by examining sequentiality and simultaneity. (*rims dang cig car brtags la dgag pa*)
   (1) Actual refutation. (*dngos*) [CŚ XV.7]
   (2) Refuting proof of arising by its own nature. (*rang bzhin gyis skye ba'i sgrub byed dgag pa*) [CŚ XV.8]

e. Refutation by examining the three times. (*dus gsum la brtags la dgag pa*) [CŚ XV.9]

2. Summarized meaning [showing the effects of refuting arising] (*don bsdu ba*) [CŚ XV.10]

B. General refutation of arising, abiding and ceasing as being established by way of their own nature. (*skye 'jig gnas gsum rang bzhin gyis grub pa spyir dgag pa*)

1. Refuting that the three characteristics are established by their own nature by examining sequentiality and simultaneity. (*mtshan nyid gsum rang bzhin gyis grub pa rims dang cig car brtags la dgag pa*) [CŚ XV.11]
2. Refutation through the consequence of infinite regress of the characteristics. (*mtshan nyid thug med du thal bas dgag pa*) [CŚ XV.12]
3. Refutation by examining whether they are one or different. (*gcig dang tha dad brtags la dgag pa*) [CŚ XV.13]
4. Refutation by examining whether they are existent or nonexistent by way of their own essence. (*ngo bo nyid kyis yod med brtags la dgag pa*)

   a. Refuting that arising and so forth are truly existent because there are truly existent causes of arising.
   (*skyed byed kyi rgyu bden grub yod pas skye sogs bden grub yod pa dgag pa*) [CŚ XV.14]
   b. Arising and so forth are neither truly established as an [existent] thing or a nonexistent thing. (*skye sogs dngos po dngos med gang du yang bden par ma grub pa*) [CŚ XV.15]
C. Refuting that the process of arising arises by way of its own nature. (*skyê bzhin pa rang bzhin gyis skyê ba dgag pa*)

1. Brief presentation. (*mdor bstan pa*) [CŚ XV.16]

2. Extensive explanation. (*rgyas par bshad pa*)

   a. Refutation by examining the thing which is in the process of arising. (*skyê bzhin pa'i don la brtags la dgag pa*) [CŚ XV.17]

   b. Refuting the claim that a thing which abides between past and future is the process of arising. (*'das ma 'ongs kyi bar na gnas pa'i dngos po skyê bzhin par 'dod pa dgag pa*) [CŚ XV.18]

   c. Refuting the claim that a thing before it has arisen is the process of arising. (*skyes pa'i sngar gyi dngos po skyê bzhin par 'dod pa dgag pa*) [CŚ XV.19-20]

   d. Refuting the claim that that which has not arisen is the process of arising. (*ma skyes pa skyê bzhin par 'dod pa dgag pa*)

      (1) Actual refutation. (*dngos*) [CŚ XV.21]

      (2) Refutation of rejecting faults (*skyon spong dgag pa*) [CŚ XV.22]

      (3) Necessity of accepting that what has not arisen arises, if that which is in the process of arising arises by way of its own essence. (*skyê bzhin pa ngo bo nyid kyis skyê na ma skyes pa skyê bar khas len dgos pa*) [CŚ XV.23]

3. Summarized meaning. (*don bsdû pa*) [CŚ XV.24]

II. Conclusion of these refutations. (*bkag pa'i 'jug bsdû ba*) [CŚ XV.25]
Sa bcad, Red mda’ ba gZhon nu blo gros

I. Refuting the nature of the characteristics [of the conditioned], arising and so forth. (mtshan nyid skye sogs kyi rang bzhin dgag pa)

A. Establishing non-arising in the way of an illusion. (skye med sgyu ma’i tshul du bsgrub)

1. Refuting arising. (skyed ba dgag)
   a. Refutation by examining the position that there is no existence or nonexistence of that which is existent. (yod pa’i yod med phyogs su brtags la dgag pa) [CŚ XV.1-4]
   b. Refutation by examining beginning, middle and end. (thog mtha’ bar mar brtags pa dgag pa) [CŚ XV.5]
   c. Refutation by examining both self and others. (rang gzhan gnyis la brtags la dgag pa) [CŚ XV.6]
   d. Refutation by examining sequentiality and simultaneity. (rim dang cig car brtags la dgag pa) [CŚ XV.7-8]
   e. Refutation by examining the three times. (dus gsum la brtags la la dgag pa) [CŚ XV.9]

2. Showing the result of these refutations. (bkag pa’i ’bras bu bstan pa) [CŚ XV.10]

B. Showing that characteristics have an empty nature (mtshan nyid rang bzhin stong par bstan pa)

1. Refutation by examining sequentiality and simultaneity. (rim dang cig car brtags la dgag pa) [CŚ XV.11]

2. Refutation by the consequence of the endlessness of characteristics. (mtshan nyid thug med du thal ba dgag pa) [CŚ XV.12]

3. Refutation by examining identity and difference. (gcig dang tha dad brtags la dgag pa) [CŚ XV.13]

4. Refutation by examining the existence and non-existence of things. (dngos po yod med brtags la dgag pa) [CŚ XV.14-15]

C. Refutation of the nature of the process of arising. (skyed bzhin pa’i rang bzhin dgag)

1. Tibetan text in Red mda’ ba gZhon nu blo gros 1974, 186-199.
1. Actual refutation. (*dgag pa dngos*)
   a. Refutation of the partly arising at the beginning of existence being the process of arising. (*yod pa'i dang po phyed skyes skye bzhin yin pa dgag pa*)
      (1) Refuting essence. (*ngo bo dgag*) [CŚ XV.16-17]
      (2) Refuting establishment. (*sgrub byed dgag pa*) [CŚ XV.18-19]
   b. Refutation of the process of arising other than that. (*de las gzhan pa'i skye bzhin pa dgag pa*) [CŚ XV.20]
   c. Refutation of that which has arisen as the process of arising. (*skyes pa skye bzhin yin pa dgag pa*) [CŚ XV.21]
   d. Refutation of that which has not arisen as the process of arising. (*ma skyes pa skye bzhin yin pa dgag pa*)
      (1) Actual refutation. (*dngos*) [CŚ XV.22]
      (2) Refutation of rejecting faults. (*skyon spong dgag pa*) [CŚ XV.23]

2. Summary (*don bsdu ba*) [CŚ XV.24]

II. Showing the conclusions of these refutations. (*bkag pa de yi 'jug bsdud bstan pa*) [CŚ XV.25]
4.3 Translation of Catuḥśataka XV.1-25

Chapter fifteen of the four hundred [verses] on engaging in [the Bodhisattva's] practice, [entitled] showing the cultivation of the refutation of conditioned things.

[Objection:] The nonexistent will arise in the end.
[Reply:] Therefore, from what will the nonexistent arise?
[Objection:] The existent arises in the beginning.
[Reply:] Therefore, from what will the existent arise? (CŚ XV.1)

The effect destroys the cause.
Therefore, the nonexistent does not arise.
There is no establishing for [something already] established.
Therefore, the existent also does not arise. (CŚ XV.2)

At that time, [when it has arisen,] there is no arising, and at another time, [when it has not,] there is no arising.
If not arising at that time or at another time, when will arising exist? (CŚ XV.3)

Just as for that [thing] there is no arising as that [very] thing, likewise, for that [same thing] there is no arising also as a different thing. (CŚ XV.4)

Beginning, middle and end are not possible prior to arising.
Without any two [of them], how will any one occur? (CŚ XV.5)

Without a different thing, an individual thing does not occur.
Therefore, there is no coming to be from both, self and other. (CŚ XV.6)
One cannot speak [of arising as]
prior, later, or simultaneous.

Therefore, arising and the pot
do not occur simultaneously. (CŚ XV.7)

Because it has previously arisen,
something that has previously arisen does not become old.
Also something that will have arisen subsequently
does not become [old either], insofar as it will have arisen earlier. (CŚ XV.8)

A present thing
does not occur from that very [present],
it does not occur from the future,
nor from the past. (CŚ XV.9)

Therefore, in such a way,
things that have arisen have no coming.
Likewise, [those that] have ceased have no going.
Certainly, thus they have no [true] nature.¹ (CŚ XV.10)

If arising, abiding, and ceasing
do not occur simultaneously
or sequentially,
when will [they] occur? (CŚ XV.11)

For every one [of these], arising and so forth,
every one again occurs.
Thus, ceasing appears like arising
and abiding like ceasing. (CŚ XV.12)

If the basis of the characteristic [i.e. the conditioned,] is different from the characteristic, how is the characteristic impermanent?

¹. This verse is different in CŚṬ. See p.80 below.
Alternatively [if not different], these four also [i.e. the conditioned and its characteristics] clearly have no [truly] existent essence. (CŚ XV.13)

An [existent] thing does not arise from an [existent] thing.
An [existent] thing does not arise from a nonexistent thing.
A nonexistent thing does not arise from a nonexistent thing.
A nonexistent thing does not arise from an [existent] thing. (CŚ XV.14)

An [existent] thing does not become an [existent] thing.
A nonexistent thing does not become an [existent] thing.
A nonexistent thing does not become a nonexistent thing.
An [existent] thing does not become a nonexistent thing. (CŚ XV.15)

Because the process of arising is [only] half-arisen,
something in the process of arising does not arise.
Alternatively, [if the past or future is maintained to be in the process of arising] it would consequently follow that everything, in fact, is the process of arising. (CŚ XV.16)

Activity is not the process of arising
in that [thing] which has the nature of the process of arising.
Non-activity also is not the process of arising
in that [thing] which has the nature of the process of arising. (CŚ XV.17)

For whom the two [past and future],
are impossible without a middle [present]
for him there is no process of arising,
because for that [present] also there is a middle. (CŚ XV.18)

[Objection:] Since what has arisen
arises from the cessation of the process of arising,
there is also something different,
which is in the process of arising. (CŚ XV.19)
[Reply:] When [something already] has arisen, the process of arising is impossible.
When what is in the process of arising has arisen, why will it arise [again]? (CŚ XV.20)

When the process of arising is said to be the unarisen having arisen, then, because there is no difference, why not conceive of a pot as something nonexistent? (CŚ XV.21)

[Objection:] Although the process of arising in incomplete, it is excluded from what has not arisen.
[Reply:] Nevertheless, what has not arisen arises, since it [the process of arising] is excluded from what has arisen. (CŚ XV.22)

[Objection:] Even though the process of arising did not priorly occur, [we] say it exists subsequently. Therefore, what has not arisen arises.
[Reply:] What does not occur surely does not arise. (CŚ XV.23)

About the completed it is said, 'It exists'.
about the uncompleted it is said, 'It does not exist'.
When the process of arising does not exist, what is said to exist? (CŚ XV.24)

When there is no effect apart from a cause, both activity and inactivity are impossible. (CŚ XV.25)
4.4 Translation of Catuḥṣatakāṭīkā XV.1-15

Chapter fifteen of the extensive commentary on the Four Hundred [Verses] on engaging in the Bodhisattva's practice, entitled showing the cultivation of the refutation of conditioned things.¹

§1. Objection: The conditioned truly exists by way of [its] own nature, because its characteristics, arising and so forth, exist. While the characteristics of the conditioned do not exist for something which is nonexistent, [like] the horns of a donkey and so forth, the[se] characteristics² do exist for the conditioned. Therefore the conditioned also exists.³

§2. Commentary: If its characteristics were like that, the conditioned would exist, but [it] does not.⁴ If you ask why, [let us consider:] here [in this

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1. The chapter title is taken from the very end of the chapter, but reproduced here in accord with contemporary publishing practice. On the differences between the Tibetan and Sanskrit title, see p.35, n. 2 above

2. Translation om. arising and so forth (skye ba la sogs pa).

3. The same objection is raised at the beginning of PsP VII, but there the opponent adds the referent of the conditioned, i.e. the aggregates, the realms of the senses and the elements. He also includes in his reasoning a quote from Buddha on the characteristics of the conditioned. The objection in PsP reads as follows: "Objection: the aggregates (skandha), the realms of the senses (āyatana) and the elements (dhātu), which have a conditioned nature, truly exist, because arising and so forth [i.e.] the characteristics of the conditioned, really exist." It follows the quote of the Buddha, before the opponent continues: "Arising and so forth [i.e.] the characteristics, do not exist for something which is nonexistent, like the horns of a donkey. Therefore, because the characteristics of the conditioned were taught [by the Buddha], the aggregates, the realms of the senses and the elements truly exist." Sanskrit text in La Vallée Poussin 1970, 145: atrāha | vidyanta eva saṅskṛtasvabhāvāḥ skandhāyatanadhātavaḥ utpādādisaṅskṛtalakṣaṇasadbhāvāt | ... na ca avidyamānasya kharaviśāntyeva jātyādilakṣaṇamāsti | tasmāt saṅskṛtalakṣaṇopadeśa-advidyanta eva skandhāyatanadhātavaḥ iti | Tibetan translation in May 1959, 344: ‘dir smras pa / phung po dang kham dang skye mched ’dus byas kyi rang bzhin can dag ni yod pa nyid de / de dag gi ’dus byas kyi mtshan nyid skye ba la sogs pa yod pa’i phyir ro / ... med pa la ni ri bong gi rwa ltar skye ba la sogs pa mtshan nyid yod pa ma yin no / de’i phyir ’dus byas kyi mtshan nyid nye bar bstan pa las na phung po dang kham dang skye mched rnam s yod pa nyid do //

4. For my understanding and translation of this sentence, see the parallel Passage in the Sanskrit text of PsP see p. 65, n.1 below.
argument], when this arising has produced a conditioned thing, is the conditioned produced [as] one which is existent or nonexistent?\textsuperscript{1}

§3. With respect to that [consideration], first of all, for a proponent of the nonexistence of the effect [in the cause] (‘bras bu med par smra ba, asatkaryavādin)\textsuperscript{2}, because [for him] the sprout is nonexistent in the condition of the seed, the sprout arises due to the combination of causes and conditions from the last moment of the seed. If, therefore, the position of that objection is that

"The nonexistent will arise in the end" [CŚ XV.1a]

[we reply that] it is not at all reasonable for the nonexistent to occur, because the arising of also the horns of a donkey and so on consequently follows.

For the same [reason Āryadeva] says:

Therefore, from what will the nonexistent arise? [CŚ XV.1b]
"Therefore" [i.e] because of being nonexistent,¹ "from what" [i.e.] with respect to the impossible, [will the nonexistent arise. This] means that there is no arising for the nonexistent, due to [its] not being existent (yod pa ma yin pa'i phyir med pa la skye ba med do).²

¹. Literally "due to the cause of [the nonexistent] being nonexistent" (yod pa ma yin pa nyid kyi rgyus so).

². A more detailed discussion of the positions of the satkaryavāda/asatkaryavāda is given by Candrakīrti in his commentary on CŚ XI.15. It starts as follows: "Now, in order to make clear that for neither of the two, proponents of existence or nonexistence of the effect [in the cause], an effect can be established by a cause, [Āryadeva] explains: 'The adornment of pillars, and so forth, for a house is useless, for someone who maintains that the effect is existent, as well as for someone who maintains that the effect is non-existent [before its production]." [CŚ XI.15] Verse text translated in Lang 1986, 107. Tibetan text: [CŚṬ D 177b.1] da ni 'bras bu yod pa dang med par smra pa gnyi ga'i ltar na yang rgyus 'bras bu sgrub par mi nus pa mngon par gsal par bya ba'i phyir bshad pa / 'bras bu yod nyid gang 'dod dang // 'bras bu med nyid gang 'dod pa {CŚ la} // khyim gyi don du ka ba la {CŚ las} // sogs pa'i rgyan ni don med 'gyur // In his commentary on this verse, Candrakīrti defines the asatkaryavādin as follows: "Vaibhāṣīka, Sautrāntika and Vijñānavādin are proponents of the nonexistent effect [in the cause]. These think that the arising of an existent effect is useless, and conceive an exclusively nonexistent effect to arise. Amongst these, the Vaibhāṣīka conceive that from minute particles arises a different thing (don gzhan), assembled of two particles, substance of a parts-possessor (yan lag can, avayavin), and that an exclusively nonexistent effect arises. Likewise, the Sautrāntika also think that a nonexistent effect arises [according to] the previous reasoning 'Monks, it is like this, …' For the Vijñānavādin also, because all aspects of things reside in the propensities (bag chags, vāsaVķ[1EDwha], i.e. the cause of arising, whatever arises for the consciousnesses that engage from conditions of the complete ripening of the propensities in consciousness which is basis of all (kun gzhi), all of that arises as exclusively nonexistent." Tibetan text: [CŚṬ D 177b] bye brag pa dang mdo sde pa dang rnams par shes par smra ba dag ni 'bras bu med par smra pa dag ste / de dag gis ni 'bras bu yod pa skye ba don med par sams shing 'bras bu med pa kho na skye'o zhes bya bar rtogs so // de la bye brag pa rnams kyi ni sa la sogs pa'i rdul phra rab rnams las don gzhan rdul gnyis 'dus pa la sogs pa yan lag can gyi rdzas skye bar rtogs shing 'bras bu med pa kha na skye'o zhes bya la sogs par rtogs so // de bzhin du mdo sde pa rnams kyang dge slong dag de ltar na mig ni ma byung ba las 'byung zhing byung nas kyang rnam par 'jig par 'gyur ro zhes [178a] bya ba'i lung las ni gan tshigs snga ma 'bras bu med pa skye'o snyam du sams so // rnam par shes par smra ba rnams kyang dngos po'i rnam pa mtha' dag skye ba'i rgyu bag chags kyi khyad par gzhag pas kun gzh'i rnam par shes pa'i bag chags yongs su smin pa'i rkyen nye ba las 'jugs pa'i rnam par shes pa la sogs pa gang dang gang skye ba de dang de ni med pa kho na skye'o zhe'o /
§4. If however, in fear of this fault, a proponent of the existence of the effect [in the cause] ("bras bu yod par smra ba, satkaryavadin) claims arising exclusively in respect to the existent, [Āryadeva's argument is] like this:

[Objection:] The existent arises in the beginning.

[Reply:] Therefore, from what will the existent arise? [CŚ XV.1cd]

If, prior to the full arising (skye ba'i ches), the arising of the sprout is conceived of exclusively in the condition of the seed, then [the sprout] does not arise, because [it already] exists. If, however, arising [still] is conceived with respect to the existent, then arising were endless and it would also arise again [and again]¹. Since this is utterly impossible, there is no arising also for that which is existent.²

1. de la slar skye bas byas pa'i bogs su yang 'gyur. The translation here is quite free and om. byas pa'i bogs, for which I could not find an appropriate equivalent.

2. In his commentary on CŚ XI.15, Candrakīrti describes the position of the satkaryavāda as follows: "The Sāṃkhya and the Vaibhāṣika are Proponents of the existence of the effect [in the cause]. For the Sāṃkhya, what exists is exclusively existent and what does not exist is exclusively nonexistent. They accept that there is no arising for the nonexistent and no ceasing for the existent. For them, an exclusively existent effect arises, because the nonexistent does not act as a cause (mi byed pa), because [they] hold to (‘dzin pa) a substantial cause (nye bar len pa), and efficacy (nus pa nus pa byed pa). In the case of a proponent of the nonexistence of the effect [in the cause], then everything would occur from everything, but it is not like that. Therefore they think that exclusively the existent will be an effect. Also the Vaibhāṣika, in fear of the consequence that [something] would occur from a nature that has not occurred, conceive existence in every (yang) part of the three times, and [accept] that also the assembly (tshogs pa) has the effect of the condition, but do not [accept it] to have the effect of the substance (rdzas). Thus [they] think that while the substance, which is the own characteristic which abides in the three times is effected (byed) by causes and conditions only in the present condition, but that earlier there is no arising of a nonexistent substance." On the details of Sarvāstivāda ontology see the introduction, p.17.

Tibetan text: [CŚṬ D 177b] grangs can dang bye brag tu smra ba dag gi ni 'bras bu yod par smra ba nyid do // grangs can pa'i ltar na ni gang zhig yod pa de yod pa kho na yin la / gang zhig yod pa ma yin pa de med pa kho na ste / med pa la skye ba med cing yod pa la 'jig pa med do zhes khas len to // de ni med pa mi byed pa'i phyir dang nye bar len pa 'dzin pa'i phyir dang / nus pas nus pa byed pa'i phyir dang zhes bya ba la sogs pas 'bras bu yod pa nyid skye ste / 'bras bu med par smra ba yin na ni thams cad thams cad las 'byung bar 'gyur na / 'di ni de ltar yang ma yin no / de'i phyir yod pa kho na 'bras bur 'gyur ro snyam du sens so // bye brag tu smra pa yang rang bzhin ma byung ba las 'byung par thal bar 'gyur bas 'jigs pas dus gsum char du yang yod pa nyid du rtog cing tshogs pa yang gnas skabs kyi 'bras bu can yin gyi / rdzas kyi 'bras bu can ma yin pas dus
§5. Furthermore [Āryadeva says]

The effect destroys the cause,
therefore, the nonexistent does not arise. [CŚ XV.2ab]

It is also not reasonable to say that, in the process of the arising of the sprout, an exclusively nonexistent sprout arises from the seed. Just as the sprout of rice, which is nonexistent for barley, wheat and so on, does not arise by way of their manifestation, in the same way, there is no arising [of rice] even by the manifestation of the seed of rice, insofar as [the seed] is nonexistent. In this case, the seed indeed disintegrates when the sprout arises, like sesame when oil occurs. Therefore, the nonexistent does not arise.

There is no establishing for [something already] established,
therefore, the existent also does not arise. [CŚ XV.2cd]

Because a sprout that has already been established is not again established, the existent also does not arise.¹

¹. Continuing his commentary on CŚ XI.15, Candrakīrti shows the consequences of the two positions of sat- and asatkaryavāda: "In this way, these opponents (rgol ba) do not go beyond the proponents of the existence or nonexistence of the effect [in the cause], because of having accepted an own characteristic of things, which is just like an identity, and because, apart from the two conceptions of existence and nonexistence, this can not be conceived in any other way. Therefore, considering amongst these two opponents first of all the proponents of the existence of the effect [in the cause] that is unreasonable, which is what has the nature of being extensively decorated by the arrangement of ornaments, figures (pa tra) and so on of the pillars and doors and so forth that were produced for the house (gyim), because their effect, the house [already] exists; and even if accepting them to be established in a different aspect [still] the consequence of a proponent of the nonexistence of the effect [in the cause] follows. For a proponent of the nonexistence of the effect [in the cause], to explain the ornaments of pillars and so on - that would be completely useless, since their effect is nonexistent. Concerning the nonexistence of the son of a barren woman no one can establish [him]. Likewise also for the proponents of the nonexistence of the effect [in the cause] the effect [i.e. the house] is not established. If, however, wanting to abandon this fault, the effect is not accepted as nonexistent in all aspects, then the proponent of the nonexistence of its effect becomes corrupt (nyams)." Candrakīrti then gives a short summary and comes back to a general discussion of existence and nonexistence: "Just as, in order to establish a
§6. In order to state that, also because the time of arising is impossible, arising does not exist [Āryadeva] explains:

**At that time, there is no arising**

and at another time, there is no arising.

**If not arising at that time or at another time,** when will arising exist? [CŚ XV.3]
As soon as this sprout acquires an individual being (bdag gi dngos po), at this time arising is no [longer] possible, because of [already] having an established essence. [On the other hand] also as long as this [sprout] has an essence that is not established, its arising is not reasonable. Thus, arising at another time is not possible, because an action (bya ba) of arising that lacks basis—insofar as the nonestablished is nonexistent—does not occur. Because the faults stated in both of the [above] positions consequently follow also in respect to being established (grub bzhin pa) [i.e. the state of being] partially established and partially not established, arising is not possible, at that time or at another time. As long as, in this way, arising is not possible in a part [of] the three times, when will arising exist, since another [time], distinct from these is impossible—intending: the time in which this arises does not exist.1

1. The impossibility of the time of arising is the topic also of PsP VII.14. Candrakīrti's commentary goes like this: "Now, [Nāgārjuna] shows that [arising] does also not produce some other thing: 'Neither what has arisen or what has not arisen, nor what is in the process of arising, arises in any way. These are [like] the explanation of what has been traversed, what has not been traversed, and what is being traversed [in MMK II].' [MMK VII.14] If something were to arise, then produced by its arising. But nothing at all arises, because arising does not exist in the three times at all ..." It follows a short summary of the argument in MMK II. Then Candrakīrti continues: ' Likewise, what has arisen does not arise, because past and present are contradictory. That, for which the action of arising has ceased, is 'what has arisen'. 'Arising' is what is now being affected (zin) by the activity [of arising]. Thus, the statement 'What has arisen arises' implies past and present at one single time. What has not arisen also does not arise, because the future and the present are contradictory. A thing in the process of arising also does not arise, because apart from what has arisen and what has not arisen there is no process of arising. Thus it is not reasonable to say that arising gives rise to something else." Sanskrit text in La Vallée Poussin 1970, 157: idānīṁ paramapi yatha notpādayati tathā pratīpādayanniḥa notpadyamānāṁḥ notpannāṁ nānupannāṁ kathānicāna | utpadyate tathākhyātaṁ gamyamānagatāgataiḥ || yadi hi kiñcindutpadyeta tadutpāda utpādayet | na tu kiñcindutpadyatedhvatraye-psyutpādā sambhavāt || evamutpadyamāno bhāvo notpadyate, utpannānutpanna vyatirekenotpadyamānābhāvāt | utpanno'pi notpadyate, atītavartamānaparuparuoḥdṛkāḥ | utpanna ityāparatoparopariṣṭikriyā ucyate, utpadyata iti vartamānākriyāvīṣṭāḥ | tataśca utpanna utpadyate ityucycāmāne atītavartamānaparuparuoḥdṛkāḥ syāt | anutpanno'pi notpadyate, anāgatavartamānaparuparuoḥdṛkāḥ | tasmādutpādaḥ paramutpādayatiṁ na yuktam || Tibetan translation in May 1959, 354.10: da ni gzhan yang ji ltar mi bskyed pa de ltar bstan pa'i phyir bshad pa / skyes dang ma skyes skye bzhin pa // ji lla bur yang ni bskyed pa // de ni song dang ma song dang // bgom pas rnam par bshad pa yin // gal te 'ga' zhig skye bar 'gyur na ni // de skye bas skyed par byed pa zhig na // 'ga' yang skye ba ni ma yin te / dus gsum kar yang skye ba med pa'i phyir ro //... zhes bshad pa de bzhin du /
§7. Objection: Arising is for milk to occur as the thing which is curd.

This also is not reasonable, because for milk, the thing which is curd is impossible. First of all, in respect to milk that abides as the thing which is milk, there is no arising as its [i.e. curds] nature, because that [curd] exists in that [very] nature of milk. Therefore, [Āryadeva's argument is] like this:

**Just as for that [thing]**

there is no arising as that [very] thing,

likewise, for that [same thing] there is no arising
also as a different thing. [CŚ XV.4]

**Just as arising is not** possible for milk, which abides as the essence (*ngo bo*) of milk, **likewise, arising is also not** possible as the thing which is curd, different from milk. So "Milk is of the curd" ('o ma zho'i yin) is certainly not saying "In milk [is] curd" ('o ma la zho). As long as that [thing] is curd, that [thing] is not milk, and also as long as that [thing] is milk, that [thing] is not curd [and] thus it is not suitable [to say] that milk changes into curd.1

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1. Candrakīrti deals with the problem of change also in PsP XIII.6: "Furthermore, 'If that becomes different, then milk itself were curd.' [MMK XIII.6ab] Objection: However, abandoning the condition of milk [it] is in the condition of curd, thus milk itself becomes curd. Commentary: If [you] do not claim that milk itself becomes curd, because they are mutually contradictory, 'Of what different from milk, will there be the thing which is curd?' [MMK XIII.6cd] Does water come to be as the thing which is curd? Therefore, it is unrelated that some different thing comes to be as the thing which is curd. Thus, because in this way there is no becoming different, where does it come to be that from this appearance things are established as endowed with [true] nature? Therefore, this is not reasonable." For a German translation of this passage, see Schayer 1931, 31ff. An English translation can be found in Nietupski 1996, 129. Sanskrit text in La Vallée Poussin 1970, 242: *api ca | tasya cedanyathābhāvaḥ kṣīrameva bhaveddadhi | atha syāt-kṣīravasthāparityāgena dadhyavasthā bhavati, ataḥ na kṣīrameva dadhi bhavatīti | ucyate | yadi kṣīraṁ dadhi bhavatīti neṣyate parasparavirodhāt | kṣīrādanyasya kasyātha dadhībhāvo bhaviṣyati || kimudakasya
§8. There is no arising for the conditioned also from the following. [Āryadeva's argument is] like this:

**Beginning, middle and end**

are not possible prior to arising. [CŚ XV.5ab]

Here, **beginning, middle and end** are the arising, abiding and ceasing of a thing. Because, first of all, these do not exist as an essence with existence in the condition prior to arising, the conditioned is **not possible prior to arising**.

§9. If however [you] think [that there] is arising at the time of arising, abiding at the time of abiding and ceasing at the time of ceasing, this is also unreasonable. [Āryadeva's argument is] like this:

**Without any two (gnyis gnyis) [of them]**

how will any one (re re) occur? 1 [CŚ XV.5cd]

Here, at the time of arising there is no arising at all, because there is no being conditioned, which is free from abiding and ceasing - insofar as there is none of the two, abiding and impermanence. Likewise, also at the time of abiding and the time of disintegration, the engagement of **any one (re re) without any two (gnyis gnyis)** is impossible. Because that does not exist, the conditioned does not exist. 2

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1. The translation and understanding of this verse is adapted from Lang 1986, 137.
2. Unwanted consequences occur for the characteristics of the conditioned if taken individually or collectively. Candrakīrti goes at length in PsP VII.2 to explain this: "Furthermore, if these, arising and so forth, are conceived as the characteristic of the conditioned, are the characteristics conceived as individual (so so), one by one (re re), or collective (‘dus pa), together (lhan cig pa)? Explaining that both cases are not suitable [Nāgārjuna says]: 'Individually, the three,
arising and so forth, cannot effect the characteristic of the conditioned. Also collectively, how are they suitable at one time and one [place]?’ [MMK VII.2] Here, individually, it is unreasonable for them to effect the characteristic. If at the time of arising, there is no abiding and ceasing, then an arising as characteristic of the condition, which is free from abiding and ceasing, like the sky, is not admissible. However, if at the time of abiding, there is no arising and ceasing, abiding would exist for [something] devoid of these [but] since a thing devoid of arising and ceasing does not exist, it is not reasonable that abiding exists for what is nonexistent, like a flower in the sky. Furthermore, what is endowed with abiding does not later also become again endowed with impermanence, because of being endowed with an attribute (chos) that contradicts it. If you think what is earlier permanent later is impermanent [I say] it is unreasonable for one thing to be endowed with permanence and impermanence. Therefore, abiding does not exist for [something] that is free from arising and ceasing. Likewise, if at the time of ceasing, there is no abiding and arising, then again, in this way, there is no arising and for that this which is free from abiding there is no ceasing at all, just like a flower of the sky. In this way, first of all, these three, arising and so forth, individually cannot effect the characteristic. That they cannot (nus pa ma yin) means that [they] do not have the power (mthu yod pa ma yin).” Sanskrit text in La Vallée Poussin 1970, 145:

api ca | ime utpādādayaḥ saṁskṛtasya laksāṇatvena parikalpyanāmā vyastā vā prthivyā laksāṇatvena parikalpyeyan, samastā vā sahaṁbhūtā vā? ubhayathā ca na yuyata ityāka | utpādādyāstrayo vyastā nālāṁ laksāṇakarmāṇi | saṁskṛtād legumikakathākddā || tatra vyastā laksāṇakarmāṇi na yuyante | yadi utpādākāle sthitiḥbhāṅgau na syātāṁ tadā sthitiḥbhāṅgārahitasya ākāśasyeva saṁskṛtalaksāṇavānumaṇapadāya evotpādaḥ | atha sthitikāle utpādābhāṅgau na stāḥ, tadā tadrāhitasya sthitiḥ syāt | utpādābhāṅgārahitāsca padārtho nāṣṭyeveti na asyāvidyāmānāsya khaṇḍasya vatsitvā beṣaṁjāpati ca | sthitiḥyuktasya paścādaitatāvayāpi yogo na syāt, tadvirodhidharmākṛantatvāt | atha syāt- pārvanā śāsivato bhūtyā paścādāśāsvata iti, na caikapadārthāḥ śāśvataścāśvataśca yakta iti notpādābhāṅgārahitasya sthitiḥ | tathā yadi bhaṅgakāle sthituyotpādau na syātāṁ, evamaprayutpannāsya sthītirahitāsya khaṇḍasya vināśo’pi nāṣṭi iti | evam tāvadutpādādayo vyastā nālaṁ laksāṇakarmāṇi nālaṁ na paryāptā ityarthāḥ || Tibetan translation in May 1959, 344f: gzhan yang / skye ba la sog pa ’di dag 'dus byas kyi mtshan nyid du rtog pa na / so so ba st re re ba zhig gam / 'dus pa stie lhan cig pa zhig mtshan nyid du rtog pa na / gnyi ga ltar yang mi rung ngo zhes bshad pa | skye la sog gsum so so yis / 'dus byas mtshan nyid bya bar ni / nus min gcig la dus gcig tu / 'dus pa yang ni ji ltar rung / de la so so ba dag gis ni mtshan nyid bya bar mi rigs te / gal te skye ba’i dus na gnas pa dang 'jig pa med na / de’i tshe nam mkha’ ltar gnas pa dang 'jig pa dang bral ba la skye ba’ dus byas kyi mtshan nyid du 'thad pa ma yin pa nyid do / ci ste gcig pa’i dus na skye ba dang ‘jig pa dag med na ni de’i tshe de dag dang bral ba la gnas pa yod par 'gyur na / skye ba dang ‘jig pa dang bral ba’i dngos po ni yod pa ma yin pa nas / nam mkha’i me tog ltar med pa’i de la gnas pa yod par mi rigs so / gzhan yang gnas pa dang ldan pa ni phyis mi rtag pa nyid dang yang ldan par yang mi ‘gyur te / de dang ’gal ba’i chos dang ldan pa’i phyir ro / ci ste ntag rtag pa ‘gyur pa las phyis mi rtag par 'gyur ro snyam na / dngos po gcig rtag pa dang mi rtag pa dang ldan par ni mi rigs so / de’i phyir skye ba dang ’jig pa dang bral ba la gnas pa med do / de bzhin du
§10. An arising of the conditioned is not reasonable, also from the following. Because:

Without a different thing,

an individual thing does not occur.

Therefore, there is no coming to be from both, self and other.¹ [CŚ XV.6]

Here, there is no essence that is established from a pot itself, because of [it] being dependent on gravel (gyo mo, kaṭhalya). For this gravel again, there is no individual thing (bdag gi dngos po), because of [being] dependent on grit (gseg ma, śarkara). Therefore, in this way, without gravel [i.e.] a different thing, there is no individual thing with respect to the pot. Likewise, if for gravel there is no individual thing of gravel, then there is no difference [between gravel and the pot] due to gravel being dependent on the pot. In this way, without an individual thing, nothing whatsoever will become different [and] therefore, arising is impossible for both [an individual thing and another thing], because self and other are impossible.

Without an individual essence, arising from self (rang la) is impossible. Because the different [thing] also is not established by [its] individual essence, arising from [this] different [thing] also is impossible. Therefore, there is no arising.

§11. Moreover, is arising conceived of as prior, later, or simultaneous to this which arises as something nonexistent (med pa 'di skye ba po)? In respect to that [consideration], if [arising] is [conceived of] as prior to [this, then that is] not reasonable, because of [being] baseless. If however [arising] is [conceived of] as later to [this], that also is not reasonable, because what has not arisen is

¹See also MMK I.1 "No things ever originate at any time from themselves, from something else, or from no cause", and MMK I.3cd "When own nature does not exist, other nature does not exist." Cited in Lang 1983, 520, n.10, which also refers to MMK XV.1-4.
nonexistent, and because of the uselessness of arising. If however [arising] is conceived of as simultaneous [to this], at that time both [i.e. arising and that which arises] are no longer mutually dependent. Therefore [Āryadeva’s argument is] like this:

One cannot speak [of arising as]

prior, later, or simultaneous.

Therefore, arising and the pot
do not occur simultaneously. [CŚ XV.7]

These stages are impossible in respect to arising and that which is characterised by arising (skyé ba po). Therefore, arising and the pot do not occur simultaneously. As long as these, i.e. arising and that which arises do not exist, it is not reasonable [to speak] of the pot arising.

§12. Objection: The arising of the pot truly exists. If it would not arise, then there were no old essence (rnying pa’i ngo bo) of it, [but] in this case [you can] actually see that [this] old essence exists, which has the characteristic of that which has just been negated here. Therefore, insofar as the old essence exists, arising truly exists [as well].

§13. Commentary: If something has oldness, for [its] arising to exist is utterly impossible. If you ask: How? Here [in this consideration], if there is a bit (cung zad cig) of what is known as old, is it one that has arisen previously or subsequently? In order to show that in fact in both cases [oldness] does not arise, [Āryadeva] explains:

Because it has previously arisen,
something that has previously arisen does not become old.

Also something that will have arisen subsequently
does not become [old either], insofar as it will have arisen earlier. [CŚ XV.8]

1. Cf. Lang 1986, 137 who supports "the mark" and "the marked thing."

2. Lang 1983, 506 notes that "the pot would not become old if it had not originated previously."

3. The translation and understanding of CŚ XV8d is adapted from Lang 1986, 137.
§14. If that which is the oldness of old (rnying pa'i rnying pa nyid) is conceived for a thing in the world which has previously arisen, then the condition of the pot's having previously arisen as oldness is not reasonable, because at that time that [condition] is said to be new. Since also all (khe tshang ma) conditions that will have arisen subsequently are new due to having arisen subsequently, where will oldness be?

§15. Objection: That which has previously arisen now is is old.

[Reply:] However, are [these two, i.e. that which has previously arisen and that which is now old] same or different. If they are same, that [which has previously arisen] is not old, because at that time the condition of the new has not degenerated. If, however, [these two] are different, that [which has previously arisen] is not old, because it were exclusively new, insofar as that [previously arisen?] also has in such a way arisen. Therefore, because oldness does not exist in such a way, arising indicated by its existence is impossible.¹

¹ In PsP XIII.4-5, Candrakīrti shows how the idea of an essence or own-nature of things goes against the perception of change: "Furthermore, 'The becoming different of what were there, if [its] essence (ngo bo, svabhāva) did not exist?' [MMK XIII.4ab]. If there is no own nature of things, who or what could the becoming different which has the characteristic of transformation (yongs su 'gyur ba) belong to? With respect to this, it is to be stated [by the Mādyamaka]: 'Even if conceiving in this way, if [its] essence did exist, how would [it] become different?' [MMK XIII.4.cd] Here, that factor (chos, dharma) which does not deviate from a being is said to be its nature, because [it] is not connected to anything else. In the world, heat, which does not deviate from fire, is stated to be [its] nature. That same heat, if observed for water is not [considered its] nature, because of being artificial due to being produced by others. Now, this nature [by definition] has to be one free from deviation [but] in this case, because of being free from deviation, there is no becoming different - the coldness of fire does not occur. Likewise, accepting a nature for things, there is no becoming different, but [in fact] becoming different is perceived (dmigs) for these. Thus, there is no [true] nature. Furthermore, this becoming different of things possessed of a nature is not possible due to the appearance of something. To show how it is impossible [Nāgārjuna] says: 'Becoming different is nonexistent, for the same [thing] and also for some different [thing]. Thus, youth does not age, [and] also what has aged does not age.' [MMK XIII.5] First of all, the becoming different of a being identical (de nyid) with that abiding in the previous condition (snar gyi gnas skabs, prāgavasthā) is not admissible. In this way the mode of youth (gzhon tshul) that abides only in the condition of puberty to adulthood (lang tsho) does not become different. However, if becoming different is conceived for something that has acquired a different condition, that also is not admissible - becoming different is a synonym for that which has aged. If
that [becoming different] is not claimed for youth, but exclusively exists for something different [i.e.] an aged person, also that is not reasonable, because aging for an aged person... [well] no commentary is needed here. Why this repeated connection of aging with the aged? Old age exists even without that [connection] and thus it is not reasonable to [say] that an old person ages. Objection: the youth becomes different. Reply: that is not reasonable, because that which has not obtained the condition of old age is designated a 'youth' and because the two conditions are mutually contradictory. German translation Schayer 1931, 31ff. English translation in Nieputski 1996, 128f. Sanskrit text in LaValle Poussin1970, 241: api ca - kasya syādanyathābhāvah svabhāvaścenna vidyate | yadi bhāvānāṁ svabhāvo na syāt , yo'yaṁ vipariṇāmalakṣaṇaṁ anyathābhāvah, sa kasya syāditī? atrocīte | evamapi parikalpyamāṁ kasya syādanyathābhāvah svabhāvo yadi vidyate || iha yo dharmo yaṁ padārthaṁ na vyabhicarati, sa tasya svabhāvo iti vyapādiṣyate, aparapratibaddhatvā | agnenaśayanāṁ hi loke tadavyabhācitvāt svabhāva itucyate | tadeva anuṣayamapsūpalabhymānaṁ parapratyayasanbhūtavātkrtrimatvānna svabhāva iti | yadā caiva mavyabhācārīnāṁ svabhāvena bhavitvānam, tadā asya avyabhācitvādananyathābhāvah syādabbhāvaḥ | na hi agraṁ sāyāṁ pratipadyate | evaiḥ bhāvānāṁ sati svabhāvabhāvyapagame'nayathābhāveva na sanbhāvet | upalabhya haitasyaścena vidyate | ato nāsti svabhāvaḥ || api ca | ayamanyathābhāvo bhāvānāṁ naiva sanbhavati, yaddaśanātvasvabhāvataḥ syāt | yathā ca na sanbhavati, tadā pratipādayannaha tasyaiva nāyathābhāvo nāpyanyasyaiva yuyyate | yuvā na jīryate yasmādyasāṁjaṁno na jīryate || tasyaiva āvat prāgavasthāyāṁ varṭamānasva bhāvasyānanyathātvāṁ nopaipadyate | tadāhi hi yūno yuvāvasthāyāṁ eva nopaipadyate | tathā hi yūno yuvāvasthāyāṁ eva nopaipadyate | ato nāsti svabhāvaḥ || api ca | ayamanyathābhāvo bhāvānāṁ naiva sanbhavati, yaddaśanātvasvabhāvataḥ syāt | yathā ca na sanbhavati, tadā pratipādayannaha tasyaiva nāyathābhāvo nāpyanyasyaiva yuyyate | yuvā na jīryate yasmādyasāṁjaṁno na jīryate || tasyaiva āvat prāgavasthāyāṁ varṭamānasva bhāvasyānanyathātvāṁ nopaipadyate | tadāhi hi yūno yuvāvasthāyāṁ eva nopaipadyate | tathā hi yūno yuvāvasthāyāṁ eva nopaipadyate | tathāhi hi yūno yuvāvasthāyāṁ eva nopaipadyate | ato nāsti svabhāvaḥ || Tibetean translation: [PsP D 92a.1] gzhan yang / gal te ngo bo nyid med na / gzhan du 'gyur ba gang gi yin || gal te dngos po nrams kyi rang bzhin med na / yongs su 'gyur ba'i mtsan nyid can gyi gzhan du 'gyur ba gang gi yin pa de gang gi yin par 'gyur zhes 'zer to / 'di la brjod par bya ste / de ltar yongs su btags kyang / gal te ngo bo nyid yod na / ji lta bur na gzhan du 'gyur / 'dir chos gang zhig dngos po gang la mi 'khrul pa de na di'i rang bzhin zhes bsnyad de/ gzhan gyis gags byar med pa'i phyir ro / de la mi 'khrul pa'i me'i tsha ba la ni 'jig rten na rang bzhin zhes brjod la / tsha ba de nyid chu dag la dmigs pa na rkyen gzhan las byang bas bcos ma yin pa'i phyir rang bzhin ma yin no // gang gi tshe / da ltar rang bzhin ni 'khrul ba med par 'gyur pa yin par bya dgos pa de'i tshe 'khrul pa med pas gzhan du 'gyur ba med de / me ni grang bar 'gyur ba'am yin no // de bzhin du dngos po nrams la yang rang bzhin khas lan na gzhan du 'gyur ba nyid med par 'gyur na / de dag ni gzhan du 'gyur ba nyid du dmigs pa yang yin te / de'i phyir rang bzhin yod po ma yin no // gzhan yang gang zhig snang ba las rang bzhin dang bcos pa nyid du 'gyur ba gzhan du gzhan pa 'di ni dngos po nrams la mi srid pa nyid do // ji ltar mi srid pa de ltar bstan pa'i phyir / de nyid la gzhan 'gyur med // gzhan nyid la yang yod ma yin // gang phyir gzhon du mi rga ste // gang
§16. Old age and cyclic existence are made to pass (rnying par byed) and defeated, by having in such a way established discrimination (rnam par dpyad pa) and by having cultivated concentration in extended periods of time; and dislike of death is destroyed and defeated also by the Bodhisattva's cultivation of all factors (chos, dharma) as lacking [any true] nature. As stated in the Lalitavistārasūtra

At that time, there is no old age and no intense (rgya chen) suffering and death.

And likewise:

[He] who always knows arising as non-arising comes to pass beyond the lord of death.

§17. Arising is impossible also from this [following]: because it is not reasonable even in a part [of the] three times. In order to show just that, [Āryadeva] explains:

A present thing
does not occur from that very [present],
it does not occur from the future,
nor from the past. [CŚ XV.9]
That very [present thing] does not occur from just this present thing, because cause and effect do not exist simultaneously, and because, even if [they] existed simultaneously, a thing which [is both] cause and effect is not admissible. [That present thing] does not occur from the future, because the future is endowed with a [specific] nature, insofar as [it is] that which is not [yet] existent. Nor does [that present thing] occur from the past, because the past also does not exist. As long as [this present thing] does not occur even in a part of the three times, [it] remains that arising by [its own] nature does not exist.

Furthermore, [even] if there were a thing which existed in these [three times] by way of [its] own essence (rang gi dngo bo), as for [the] nature of an arisen thing at that time there is no reverse in [its] nature, there is no occurrence from that which has not occurred; therefore [it] would have come from some unspecific place (ga shed nas 'ongs par 'gyur). [i.e. it could not arise]. Since also for a nature [of a thing] that has ceased ('gags pa) there is nothing that does not exist having occurred, [it] would go to some unspecific place (ga shed du 'gro bar 'gyur) [i.e. it could not cease, and] this is utterly impossible. The Bhagavan [Buddha] said: "Monks, it is as follows: when the eye arises, [it] does not come from anywhere and when it ceases, [it] does not go anywhere."¹

Likewise, the Hastikaksayasūtra² says:

If factors (chos, dharma) had [true] nature,
then the Conqueror [Buddha] and the Śrāvakas would have known that,
unchanging (ther zug) factors would never pass beyond misery
[and] the wise were never free from elaboration (spros, prapañca).³

§18. Therefore, in such a way,

things that have arisen have no coming.

¹. This citation is also found in the Tattvasamgrahapāñjika (TSP D 144b) and in the Abhidharmakośabhāṣya (AKB D 241b), where a certain don dam pa stong pa nyid kyi mdo (*Paramārthaśūnyatāsūtra) is given as reference. However, no Sūtra is known under this name, and I could not identify the passage in any other Sūtra either.

². glang po'i rtsal zhes bya ba theg pa chen po'i mdo. Derge (D) 207; mdo sde, tsha 95a7-109a5 (vol. 62).

³. The Hastikaksayasūtra does not seem to actually contain the passage in question, and it also does not seem to be cited in any other bKa' gyur or bsTan 'gyur text, but it is mentioned twice with the same reference also in Candrakīrti's Madhyamakāvatāra (MAV D 126a and 171a).
Likewise, [those that] have ceased have no going.
Certainly thus, they have no [true] nature. [CŚ XV.10]¹

Objection: If for this [thing] there is no [true] nature, what is there?
Reply: There is dependent arising [i.e. the] essence of that caused (rgyur byas pa) by the completely purified and totally afflicted², but the childish [and] perverted imagine even this [dependent arising], which is like an elephant, horse or anything else (la sogs pa) created as an illusion (sgyu mar byas pa), as possessing [true] nature. The superior [on the other hand] discriminate things, just as they are, lacking [any true] nature, like an illusion, a mirage and so on.
A Sūtra³ says:

It is fine (kyang rung) if sentient beings and force (shed) do not arise.
Here birth [and] death do not at all arise.
The nature [of] all factors (chos, dharma) is like an illusion, empty, [but those] having Tirthika [views] can not know.

And likewise⁴:
Having regarded all factors like an illusion and likewise, resembling a dream, like clouds, discriminating the manner in which such factors [exist], [he] completely abides and cultivates steadfastness (legs gnas) with respect to the factors.

¹ This verse is different in CŚ: "What has arisen has no coming; similarly, what has ceased has no going. If this is so, then isn't [the cycle of] existence like an illusion?" Translated in Lang 1984, 138f, together with the Tibetan text: skyes pa la ni 'ong ba dang / de bzhin 'gag la 'gro ba med / de lta yin na ci lta bur / srid pas sgyu ma 'dra ma yin / Note that Candrakīrti cites this version of CŚ XV.10cd below.

² The opposition of kun nas nyon mongs pa and rnam par byang ba acts as a primary dichotomy of Dharmas, and identifies factors that belong to either samsāra or nirvāṇa.

³ The following four stanzas are cited also in CŚṬ D 229a, where Candrakīrti also supplies the reference (zhes rgya cher gsungs), but apart from these two citations in CŚṬ, these stanzas are not otherwise found in bKa' 'gyur or bsTan 'gyur and again not found in the Lalitavistāra itself.

⁴ See n. 2 above
Whoever thinks in terms of 'I' and 'Mine',
and likewise clings to gross things,
not skilled in the condition of the apprehender (\textit{dzin gnas}),
this one will be afraid, become attached, averted and ignorant.

A son of the Śākya will understand [these] factors,
that lack [any true] nature [as] dependent arising,
[and] endowed with a mind that is like space,
after seeing well will not free the not circling (\textit{mi 'khor grol mi 'gyur})

In order to state the result of analysis that relies upon the superiors' exalted wisdom (\textit{ye shes}), the Master [Āryadeva] has also said: „If this is so, then isn't existence (\textit{srid pa}) like an illusion?”\textsuperscript{1} When seeing dependent arising just as it is, even though [it] is like that an illusion, [it] is not like the son of a barren woman. Suppose one wants to show that, from having negated arising in all aspects through this analysis, there is no arising of the conditioned, then there could not occur such analogies (\textit{hta bu nyid}) to illusion, [i.e.] what is compared (\textit{nye bar gzhal bar}) to the son of a barren women and so on [and furthermore] the nonexistence of dependent arising might consequently follow. Out of fear of [this] one might not conform with these [analogies to illusions], but one should conform with these illusions and so on [i.e.] which is what conforms with this [dependent arising].\textsuperscript{2} Therefore, when the superior see existence that is like an illusion as completely lacking essence (\textit{snying po}), and are completely liberated by having altogether ended all attachment towards cyclic existence that is without essence, there is nothing unreasonable here at all. This does not destroy all the principles of the world, insofar as it does not depreciate (\textit{skur pa ma btab ba}) what comes to be in dependent arising, and because it accomplishes (\textit{'grub pa}) liberation in mastering (\textit{khong du chud pa}) that which is truly so, just as it is.

\textsuperscript{1} CŚ XV.10cd. See p. 80, n.4 above.
\textsuperscript{2} The translation and understanding of this passage is adapted from Wayman 1979, 219. See Lang 1983, 522, n.16.
§19. In order to show that, after having in this way stated the conditioned to be like an illusion, also its characteristics are not an essence that [truly] exists, [Āryadeva] explains:

**If arising, abiding and ceasing,**
**do not occur simultaneously,**
**nor sequentially,**
**when will [they] occur?** [CŚ XV.11]

First of all, **arising, abiding and ceasing** do not occur in one and the same moment, because [they] mutually contradict [each other]. [They] also do not occur **sequentially,** because [they] do not occur one by one, not in pairs. Because [Āryadeva] does not see another establishing cause (**grub pa'i rgyu**) apart from sequentiality or simultaneity [he] says: "**When will [they] occur?**"

§20. Furthermore, because these [characteristics like] arising and so forth are included in the aggregate of the conditioned, [these] themselves are conditioned. In order to show that therefore surely also those [characteristics] must have the group of other characteristics of the conditioned, [Āryadeva] explains:

**For every one [of these], arising and so forth,**
**every one again occurs.**

**Thus, ceasing appears like arising,**
**and abiding like ceasing.** [CŚ XV.12]

**For arising and so forth** [i.e.] arising, abiding and ceasing, which have been accepted as being conditioned, **every one [of these] again occurs,** and if [these] occur again, then arising has another arising. **Thus,** as arising has another arising [so does ceasing, and] **ceasing appears like arising.** Also ceasing, since [it] too is conditioned, is endowed with the three characteristics. Therefore, because ceasing has another ceasing, there is ceasing of ceasing. Likewise, abiding also has the three characteristics of the conditioned, and insofar as there will be abiding of abiding, **abiding appears like ceasing.** Since these [secondary characteristics] again are conditioned, [they] will have to have [all] the others and these again have the others and these again will have to have the others, thus
being endless. If there is no end, again nothing is established (dingos po thams cad mi 'grub) and the characteristics of the conditioned do not exist by way of [their own] nature.¹

§21. Furthermore, when these characteristics occur, do [they] engage in the action of characteristics as one having an essence that is different or not different from the basis of the characteristic (mtshan gzhis)?

Here, first of all:

**If the basis of the characteristic is different from the characteristic how is the characteristic impermanent?** [CŚ XV.13ab]

Heat and cold, happiness and suffering and so on abide as difference (gzhan nyid), insofar as for one, the [other] one does not occur (gcig la gcig med par 'gyur). Likewise, if the basis of the characteristic engages as different from the characteristic and occurs without being impermanent, then its difference is

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¹. The problem of the infinite regress of the secondary characteristics (anulakṣaṇā) is discussed at some length in PsP VII.3. The passage reads as follows: "Here, concerning [you] saying 'If arising is conditioned ...' if for arising and so forth the three characteristics [again] would follow and come to be, then what fault is there? And even if these are not conditioned, what is the fault? Commentary: If for arising, abiding and ceasing, the other characteristics exist, [the fault is that these were] endless. If they do not exist, [the fault is that they were] not conditioned."

[MK VII.3] The passage in PsP goes on to discuss and present the dharma theory, focussing on how in this system the infinite regress is avoided, which then again is extensively refuted by the Mādhyamak in MMKV VII.4-7. In the CŚṬ, this lengthy discussion is of no further importance.

Sanskrit text in La Vallée Poussin 1970, 147: atha yadutaṁ 'yadi saṁskṛta utpādaḥ' ityādi, tena yadi utpādādīnāṁ trilakṣaṇī prāptā prasaktā, tataḥ ko doṣāḥ? athāsaṁskṛtaḥ, evamapadyaṇaṁ iti | ucyate - utpādāsthitiḥbhaṅgānāmanyatsaṁskṛtalakṣaṇam asti cedanavasthaivaṁ nāsti cete na saṁskṛtaḥ || ... yadi utpādāsthitiḥbhaṅgānāmanyadutpādādīkāṁ saṁskṛtalakṣaṇaṁ misyate, tadā teṣāmapiyaṇayat, teṣāmapiyaṇayat, ityaparyavasānadosāḥ syāt | Tibetan text in May 1959, 346.12: 'dir gal te skye ba 'dus byas na / zhes brjod pa de la / gal te skye ba la sogs pa rnams la mtshan nyid gsum yod par 'gyur zhung thal bar 'gyur na / de las nyes pa cir 'gyur la / de ste 'dus ma byas yin pa de lta na yang nyes pa ci yod na / brjod par bya ste skye dang gnas dang 'jig rnams la // 'dus byas mtshan nyid gzhan zhig ni // gal te yod na thug med 'gyur // med na de dag 'dus byas min // ... [346.28] gal te skye ba dang gnas pa dang 'jig pa rnams la skye ba la sogs pa 'dus byas kyi mtshan nyid gzhan 'dod na ni / de ti tshe de dag la yang gzhan yin pas mtha' thug pa med pa'i skyon du 'gyur ro //
not reasonable, because the conditioned is impermanent [and] thus there is no occurring without impermanence.

§22. If however, wanting to abandon this fault, the characteristic and the basis of the characteristic are conceived as not different, at that time, the other flaw is the following. [Āryadeva's argument is] like this:

Alternatively [if not different], these four also clearly have no [truly] existent essence. [CŚ XV.13cd]

If the three characteristics and the basis of the characteristic are accepted as one (geig nyid), then the four [i.e.] the three characteristics and the basis of the characteristic, also in part (char yang) are nonexistent things. If you ask: How? Here, if [these] have been accepted as one, the four do not exist also in part, because it is unreasonable for the characteristic to be the basis of the characteristic, and because also the basis of the characteristic as the characteristic is not reasonable. Or otherwise, insofar as [they] are not established by way of their own essence, [they] are not to be accepted as sameness (de nyid) or difference.

§23. Objection: Arising and so forth exist, because there are instrumental causes (rgyu mtshan gyi rgyu, *nimittakāraṇa). Here, the wise explain that sprouts and so on occur based on an assembly (tshogs pa) of causes. If there is no arising and so forth, the assembly of causes were uselessness (don med pa) [and] what is useless again does not exist. Therefore, arising and so forth [truly] exist.

§24. Reply: In order to show that it is impossible for arising and so forth to exist, [even] if something were to arise from something, [Āryadeva] explains:

An [existent] thing does not arise from an [existent] thing.
An [existent] thing does not arise from a nonexistent thing.
A nonexistent thing does not arise from a nonexistent thing.
A nonexistent thing does not arise from an [existing] thing.¹ [CŚ XV.14]

¹. On the definition of dngos po, or bhāva, as that thing which has arisen and acquired an individual being, and dngos po med pa or abhāva, as that which is nonexistent, see the
First of all, it is impossible for an [existent] thing [i.e.] a sprout with an
established essence, to arise from an [existent] thing [i.e.] a seed that has not
transformed (rnam par ma gyur pa), because it is not reasonable for a seed that is
nonexistent during transformation to be the agent (byed pa) of arising, and
[furthermore] because it is not reasonable for an established thing [i.e.] a sprout,
to have the essence of the thing arise again and again. Thus an [existent] thing
does not arise from an [existent] thing.

An [existent] thing also does not arise from a nonexistent thing [i.e.]
nothing arises from the nonexistent, because a nonexistent thing, [like] a seed
burnt by fire, has no potential (mus pa) to produce effects ('bras bu bskyed pa) and
also because a thing that has the essence of arising does not arise again.

A nonexistent thing does not arise from a nonexistent thing, because a
nonexistent thing does not have even the slightest potential for arising, and
because arising is impossible for a nonexistent thing, like the son of a barren
woman.

A nonexistent thing does not arise from an [existent] thing, because the
flaws that have already been explained are encountered (thog tu 'bab pa). In this
way a nonexistent thing also does not arise from an [existent] thing.

Because, as long as an [existent] thing or a nonexistent thing do not arise
from an [existent] thing or a nonexistent thing, arising is impossible, why are
things in need of the assembly of causes and conditions? This is pointless (gvi na).

§25. [Arising and so forth] do not exist also from this [following]: because
arising and ceasing are not reasonable. Here, is [arising] conceived for a thing
(don) that has a nature (rang bzhin) of being a thing that arises, or [for a thing]
that has a nature of being a nonexistent thing? Likewise, when ceasing is
conceived, is [it] conceived for an [existent] thing or a nonexistent thing? In order
to show that [arising and ceasing] are impossible in every aspect, [Āryadeva]
explains:

An [existent] thing does not become an [existent] thing.

A nonexistent thing does not become an [existent] thing.

commentary on CŚ XV.15 below. §25 reads the following: dgnos po zhes bya ba ni skyes shing
bdag nyid kyi dngos po rnyed pa'i don ... dngos po med pa zhes bya ba yod pa ma yin pa.
A nonexistent thing does not become a nonexistent thing.

An [existent] thing does not become a nonexistent thing. [CŚ XV.15]

Here, what is called "an [existent] thing" (dngos po) [is understood as] a thing (don) that has arisen and has acquired an individual being (bdag nyid kyi dngos po). This [thing] does not come to be an [existent] thing again, and does not arise again, because arising is useless for that which [already] exists. In this way then, an existent thing does not become an [existent] thing.

A nonexistent thing does not become an [existent] thing. What is called "a nonexistent thing" (dngos po med pa) is nonexistent (yod pa ma yin pa) [and] how would [this] be an [existent] thing, since the arising of even the son of a barren women would consequently follow. In this way, a nonexistent thing also does not become an [existent] thing. Thus, first of all arising is impossible, insofar as an [existent] thing or a nonexistent thing does not become an existent thing.

Then, ceasing also is impossible. If you ask: How? First of all, a nonexistent thing does not become a nonexistent thing, because for the nonexistent, like the horns of a rabbit, there is no nonexistent thing again. Therefore, this nonexistent thing does not become a nonexistent thing.

An [existent] thing also does not become a nonexistent thing, because these mutually contradict each other. If there is no nonexistent thing, there is no ceasing, and if there is no arising and ceasing, then it is established that there is also no conditioned. The Buddha said:

These sages, devoid of everything conditioned and unconditioned, are free from conceptual thought. .

[They] obtain the unconditioned for all beings and are devoid by always being in the view.
5 Summary and Conclusion

5.1 Summary of Catuḥṣatakāṭikā XV.16-25

The opponent concedes that what has arisen and what has not arisen does not arise, due to the fact that arising has been negated for an existent as well as a nonexistent thing, but he states that the thing which is in the process of arising still arises (§26. in the critical edition above). Candrākīrti replies that if the process of arising is conceived as something that has partly arisen and partly not arisen, then there could be no such thing as the process of arising because there is no third, other aspect which could be the process of arising. Even if something in the process of arising had such a double nature, what has partly arisen would not arise because an existent thing does not arise again, and what has partly not arisen would not arise because a nonexistent thing never arises (CŚ XV.16ab, §27.). If the process of arising is conceived for both, what has arisen and what has not arisen, then even past and future things would be in the process of arising, and Candrākīrti comments that what has arisen is past and what has not arisen is future. Thus if the process of arising arises, either all three times are the process of arising, or the process of arising does not exist at all (CŚ XV.16cd, §28.). Furthermore, he says, the activity of arising is neither absent nor present in the nature of something which is in the process of arising and comments that it is not present because activity as its nature could not change, but could also not be absent (CŚ XV.17, §29.).

The opponent insists that the process of arising exists, since it is what exists between present and future, and if it did not exist, how could one posit past and future? Candrākīrti replies and comments that if one supposes an intermediate state between present and future, then, because the process of arising itself is considered part present, i.e. arisen, and part future, i.e. unarisen, this would lead to an infinite regress of such intermediate states (CŚ XV.18, Suzuki 1994, 363.1-26).

The opponent responds by stating that the above fault only applies to those who hold the process of arising to be what has partly arisen, but not to someone who holds that the state which ceases prior to a thing’s arising is the process of arising. Candrākīrti’s commentary makes it clear that in this case, even apart from what has partly arisen, there is a thing which is in the process of arising (CŚ XV.19, Suzuki 1994, 365.1-11). As soon as something has arisen, the process of
arising is no longer possible for it. And since the process of arising is impossible, then what has arisen does not exist because this is inferred from the process of arising (CŚ XV.20ab, Suzuki 1994, 365.12-18). If what has arisen also is the process of arising, then arising is impossible for it because it has already arisen. Candrakīrti comments that it is unreasonable to conceive of arising for something that has already been established (CŚ XV.20cd, Suzuki 1994, 365.19-26).

The opponent objects that the thing which is in the process of arising has not arisen, but approaches arising and is in this sense called arisen. Therefore, what has arisen is the process of arising, and its arising is not useless (CŚ XV.21ab, Suzuki 1994, 367.1-9). In reply, Candrakīrti comments that only things that are in the state of having arisen are called existent, like a pot. Now, if there were no difference between what has arisen and what has not arisen, then an existent thing like a pot might as well be considered a nonexistent thing (CŚ XV.21cd, Suzuki 1994, 367.10-15).

The opponent again objects by maintaining a difference between what has arisen and what is in the process of arising. He states that the process of arising is a thing which is separate from the activity of arising (CŚ XV.22.ab, Suzuki 1994, 367.16-20). In his reply, Candrakīrti states that although a thing in the process of arising has an incomplete nature and is excluded from that which has not arisen. Nevertheless, it must also be excluded from that which has arisen because it has an incomplete nature. Therefore, since only what has arisen arises, there is no process of arising (CŚ XV.22.cd, Suzuki 1994, 367.21).

The opponent next claims that not only because of being excluded from what has arisen does what has not arisen arise, but also because the process of arising exists afterwards. What now is in the process of arising did not exist in the past but is said to exist afterwards. In this sense the process of arising is what has not arisen when free of the activity of arising (CŚ XV.23abc, Suzuki 1994, 369.1-15). However, what has not arisen does not exist, and something nonexistent does not acquire individual being and cannot engage in the activity of arising (CŚ XV.23d, Suzuki 1994, 369.16-20).

Furthermore, Candrakīrti says that the completed is said to exist and the uncompleted is said not to exist and that free from these two states the process of arising does not exist. (CŚ XV.24ab, Suzuki 1994, 369.21). He explains that if things are understood in such a way, something in the process of arising cannot be
pointed out, and what has not acquired an individual being does not exist. Thus
the process of arising as explained above is impossible (CŚ XV.24cd, Suzuki

In summary, as long as in analysis there is no effect apart from a cause,
there is no activity (‘jug pa, pravṛtti’), i.e. the arising of an effect, or cessation of
activity (ldog pa, nivṛtti), i.e. the ceasing of the cause. (CŚ XV.25, Suzuki 1994,
371.13-19)

In the Tibetan text follow two verses, purportedly from the Lalitavistāra
(Suzuki 1994, 371.20-373.5).¹ Then, there is a longer prose passage, instructing
the Bodhisattva that while he needs to shed all illusions, still he is to view all
beings with Bodhicitta and great compassion. With exalted wisdom he will be
able to bear all of their suffering and for their sake take up existence once again
(Suzuki 1994, 373.6-25). This is followed by another verse ascribed to the
Buddha, which covers the same topic in verse (Suzuki 1994, 373.26-375.5). The
chapter ends with a long passage from the Āryatathāgataśocayauhyanirdesāsūtra²
on the topic of the nonabiding Nirvāṇa (Suzuki 1994, 375.6-379.6).

5.2 Conclusion

Candrākīrti's commentary occupies a central place in Madhyamaka history
as the only Indian commentary to Āryadeva's Four Hundred Verses. This thesis
has contributed to the translation of this seminal work by providing a critical
edition of the Tibetan translation of CŚṬ XV together with a first English
translation and summary. In this chapter of the text, the Madhyamaka develops the
standpoint that it is impossible to conceptualize conditioned things
(samskṛtadharma) that are characterized by arising, abiding and ceasing without
being caught up in logical contradictions. This refutation first of all focuses on the
impossibility of the arising of conditioned things, while the later parts also treat
the impossibility of their abiding and ceasing and finally considering the

¹ The first of these is also quoted already on p. 81 above.
² 'phags pa de bzhin gshegs pa'i gsang ba'i mdo, i.e. 'phags pa de bzhin gshegs pa'i
gsang ba bsam gyis mi khyab pa bstan pa zhes bya ba theg pa chen po'i mdo (Ārya-
tathāgataśocayauhyanirdesāsūtra) Derge (D) 47; dkon brtsegs, ka 100a1-
203a7 (vol. 39).
impossibility of the process of arising. In the course of this reasoning, Āryadeva and Candrakīrti resort to the typical Madhyamaka style arguments that investigate self and other, the three times, sequentiality and simultaneity, sameness and difference, and so forth, whereby they uncover the unwanted consequences (prasaṅga) of their opponent's position.

The factors of arising, abiding and ceasing play a central role in Sarvāstivāda ontology, where it is held that all factors exist in the three times. We have seen that their transformation in the three times is understood as the presence or absence of a factor's manifest activity (kāritra), which is determined precisely by these factors of arising, abiding and ceasing. Such positions are regularly introduced in the opponent's objections in Candrakīrti commentary, and it is noteworthy that the Madhyamaka philosophical project may be understood as a critique of such an essentialist view of things, which includes factors that possess an intrinsic nature or svabhāva. Interestingly enough, there is no documented response by the Sarvāstivāda and modern scholarship has not addressed this issue.

On a more theoretical level, one can see that Madhyamaka scholarship in the West has passed through several distinct phases and that different interpretations of its philosophy still exist. One also has to take note of the fact that recently debated issues in Madhyamaka scholarship, such as the role of a philosophical position and of rationality in Madhyamaka thought, are still open.

There are several possibilities and directions in which this work could be expanded in the future. First of all, the final part of the chapter could be translated with reference to the available Sanskrit text, in which course a more thorough philosophical commentary and more substantial references to other primary and secondary sources could be given. It would then be possible to execute a full length, comparative study of CṢṬ XV and PsP VII, both which deal with the refutation of conditioned things. This could shed more light on the Madhyamaka's refutation of Sarvāstivāda ontological positions. In this manner, the origins of the positions held by the opponents could be traced back to and identified in Sarvāstivāda Abhidharma texts. Furthermore, the relationship of Nāgārjuna to Āryadeva and Candrakīrti could again be investigated in this context, probing to see whether these really do hold the same ontological and epistemological position: an assumption that has not been sufficiently clarified. CṢṬ XV could
also lend itself to comparative study in relation to the parallel chapter of the Chinese translation of the only other extant Indian commentary of Dharmapāla. In this context, one could expect more insight into the claim that Dharmapāla takes a Yogācāra viewpoint in his commentary.
6 Bibliography


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Appendix
Catuḥṣatakaṭīkā XV, Manuscript S
Abstract English


The 'Commentary to the Four Hundred [Verses] on the Bodhisattva's Practice of Yoga' (*Bodhisattvayogacāracatuḥśatakaṭikā*, ČŚṬ) is the only extant Indian commentary to Āryadeva’s famous Madhyamaka treatise in verse in its entirety, known as the 'Treatise in Four Hundred [Verses]' (*Catuḥśatakaśāstra*, ČŚ). The treatise is structured around the Bodhisattva's accumulation of the prerequisites of merit (*punyasambhāra*, chapters I-VIII) and wisdom (*jñānasambhāra*, chapters IX-XVI). Chapter XV specifically concerns the concept of conditioned things (*saṃskṛtārtha*) and presents the Madhyamaka's refutation of the existence of the conditioned and its characteristic marks (*saṃskṛtalakṣaṇa*, i.e. arising, abiding and ceasing), a position strongly advocated by the Sarvāstivāda, amongst others. In the commentary, this polemic takes the form of a dispute with a fictional opponent, in which the verse text is cited to provide arguments and counterarguments.

The original Sanskrit text of ČŚṬ is available only in form of fragments that cover about one third of the work, and there is a critical edition of these, based on a single manuscript (Suzuki 1994). A complete Tibetan translation by Sūkṣmajñāna and Nyi ma grags is contained in the bsTan 'gyur (P. vol. 96, 5266 ya 33b4-273b6; D. ya 30b6-239a7; C. ya 29a6-236a7; N. ya 34b2-246a6). Furthermore, there is an English translation of the verse text (Lang 1986), but not of the commentary, for which there are but translations of single chapters into different languages (Lang 1976 and 2003; Tillemans 1990 are the English ones).

The thesis further contributes to this work by presenting a translation and summary of the hitherto unaddressed chapter of ČŚṬ XV, on the basis of the remaining Sanskrit text (in this case ČŚṬ XV.18-25) and a critical edition of the Tibetan translation. An introduction gives an overview of relevant material and the current state of research concerning ČŚ/ČŚṬ and their authors, together with a short summary of the work, focussing especially on the content of chapter XV. It also includes an introductory presentation of the concept of the conditioned,
focussing on Sarvāstivāda and early Madhyamaka thought. The critical edition of the Tibetan text contains readings of the Derge, Peking, Cone, Narthang and Ganden bsTan 'gyur, together with a paracanonical manuscript, as well as text critical notes with reference to the available Sanskrit material, and is followed by the annotated translation and summary of CŚṬ XV, which refers to relevant parallel passages in the Saṃskṛtārthapratiṣedha of Candrakīrti's Prasannapadā (LaVallée Poussin 1992; May 1959). A concluding summary will revisit the main points of the thesis and give future perspectives.

Abstract Deutsch


Der ursprüngliche Sanskrit-Text von CŚṬ liegt lediglich in Form von Fragmenten vor, welche ungefähr ein Drittel des Gesamtwerkes ausmachen und diese sind in einer kritischen Edition zusammengefasst, welche sich auf ein einziges Manuskript stützt (Suzuki 1994). Eine vollständige Tibetische Übersetzung von Sūkṣmajñāna und Nyi ma grags ist im bsTan 'gyur enthalten (P.
vol. 96, 5266 ya 33b4-273b6; D. ya 30b6-239a7; C. ya 29a6-236a7; N. ya 34b2-246a6). Weiters gibt es eine englische Übersetzung des Vers-Textes (Lang 1986), aber nicht des Kommentars, von dem bisher nur einzelne Kapitel ins verschiedene Sprachen übersetzt worden sind (Lang 1976 und 2003; Tillemans 1990 sind englische Übersetzungen).

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